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Title: The English Works of Thomas Hobbes Volume 3 (of 11)
Author: Thomas Hobbes
Editor: Sir William Molesworth
Release date: July 1, 2024 [eBook #73957]
Language: English
Original publication: London: John Bohn, 1839
Credits: Emmanuel Ackerman, KD Weeks and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This book was produced from images made available by the HathiTrust Digital Library.)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES VOLUME 3 (OF 11) ***
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LEVIATHAN,
OR
THE MATTER, FORM, AND POWER
OF A
COMMONWEALTH
ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVIL.
[Illustration: _Non est potestas Super Terram quæ Comparetur ei._]
THE
ENGLISH WORKS
OF
THOMAS HOBBES
OF MALMESBURY;
NOW FIRST COLLECTED AND EDITED
BY
SIR WILLIAM MOLESWORTH, BART.
---
VOL III.
---
LONDON:
JOHN BOHN,
HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN.
---
MDCCCXXXIX.
LONDON:
C. RICHARDS, PRINTER, ST. MARTIN’S LANE.
TO MY MOST HONOR’D FRIEND
MR. FRANCIS GODOLPHIN,
OF GODOLPHIN.
-------
HONOR’D SIR,
Your most worthy brother, Mr. SIDNEY GODOLPHIN, when he lived, was
pleased to think my studies something, and otherwise to oblige me, as
you know, with real testimonies of his good opinion, great in
themselves, and the greater for the worthiness of his person. For there
is not any virtue that disposeth a man, either to the service of God, or
to the service of his country, to civil society, or private friendship,
that did not manifestly appear in his conversation, not as acquired by
necessity, or affected upon occasion, but inherent, and shining in a
generous constitution of his nature. Therefore, in honour and gratitude
to him, and with devotion to yourself, I humbly dedicate unto you this
my discourse of Commonwealth. I know not how the world will receive it,
nor how it may reflect on those that shall seem to favour it. For in a
way beset with those that contend, on one side for too great liberty,
and on the other side for too much authority, ’tis hard to pass between
the points of both unwounded. But yet, methinks, the endeavour to
advance the civil power, should not be by the civil power condemned; nor
private men, by reprehending it, declare they think that power too
great. Besides, I speak not of the men, but, in the abstract, of the
seat of power, (like to those simple and unpartial creatures in the
Roman Capitol, that with their noise defended those within it, not
because they were they, but there), offending none, I think, but those
without, or such within, if there be any such, as favour them. That
which perhaps may most offend, are certain texts of Holy Scripture,
alleged by me to other purpose than ordinarily they use to be by others.
But I have done it with due submission, and also, in order to my
subject, necessarily; for they are the outworks of the enemy, from
whence they impugn the civil power. If notwithstanding this, you find my
labour generally decried, you may be pleased to excuse yourself, and
say, I am a man that love my own opinions, and think all true I say,
that I honoured your brother, and honour you, and have presumed on that,
to assume the title, without your knowledge, of being, as I am,
SIR,
Your most humble,
and most obedient Servant,
THOMAS HOBBES.
_Paris, April 15/25, 1651._
THE CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS.
-------
THE FIRST PART.--OF MAN.
CHAP. PAGE.
Introduction ix
1. Of Sense 1
2. Of Imagination 3
3. Of the Consequence or Train of Imaginations 11
4. Of Speech 18
5. Of Reason and Science 29
6. Of the Interior Beginnings of Voluntary Motions,
commonly called the Passions; and the Speeches
by which they are expressed 38
7. Of the Ends or Resolutions of Discourse 51
8. Of the Virtues, commonly called Intellectual; and
their contrary Defects 56
9. Of the Several Subjects of Knowledge 71
10. Of Power, Worth, Dignity, Honour, and Worthiness 74
11. Of the Difference of Manners 85
12. Of Religion 94
13. Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as concerning
their Felicity and Misery 110
14. Of the First and Second Natural Laws, and of
Contract 116
15. Of other Laws of Nature 130
16. Of Persons, Authors, and Things Personated 147
THE SECOND PART.--OF COMMONWEALTH.
17. Of the Causes, Generation, and Definition of a
Commonwealth 153
18. Of the Rights of Sovereigns by Institution 159
19. Of the several kinds of Commonwealth by
Institution; and of Succession to the Sovereign
Power 171
20. Of Dominion Paternal, and Despotical 185
21. Of the Liberty of Subjects 196
22. Of Systems Subject, Political, and Private 210
23. Of the Public Ministers of Sovereign Power 226
24. Of the Nutrition, and Procreation of a
Commonwealth 232
25. Of Counsel 240
26. Of Civil Laws 250
27. Of Crimes, Excuses, and Extenuations 277
28. Of Punishments, and Rewards 297
29. Of those things that weaken, or tend to the
Dissolution of a Commonwealth 308
30. Of the Office of the Sovereign Representative 322
31. Of the Kingdom of God by Nature 343
THE THIRD PART.--OF A CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH.
32. Of the Principles of Christian Politics 359
33. Of the Number, Antiquity, Scope, Authority, and
Interpreters of the Books of Holy Scripture 366
34. Of the Signification of Spirit, Angel, and
Inspiration, in the Books of Holy Scripture 380
35. Of the Signification in Scripture of the Kingdom
of God, of Holy, Sacred, and Sacrament 396
36. Of the Word of God, and of Prophets 407
37. Of Miracles, and their Use 427
38. Of the Signification in Scripture of Eternal Life,
Hell, Salvation, the World to Come, and
Redemption 437
39. Of the Signification in Scripture of the word
Church 458
40. Of the Rights of the Kingdom of God, in Abraham,
Moses, the High-Priests, and the Kings of Judah 461
41. Of the Office of Our Blessed Saviour 475
42. Of Power Ecclesiastical 485
43. Of what is Necessary for a Man’s Reception into
the Kingdom of Heaven 584
THE FOURTH PART.--OF THE KINGDOM OF DARKNESS.
44. Of Spiritual Darkness, from Misinterpretation of
Scripture 603
45. Of Demonology, and other Relics of the Religion of
the Gentiles 637
46. Of Darkness from Vain Philosophy, and Fabulous
Traditions 664
47. Of the Benefit proceeding from such Darkness; and
to whom it accrueth 688
A Review and Conclusion 701
THE
INTRODUCTION.
-------
Nature, the art whereby God hath made and governs the world, is by the
_art_ of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it
can make an artificial animal. For seeing life is but a motion of limbs,
the beginning whereof is in some principal part within; why may we not
say, that all _automata_ (engines that move themselves by springs and
wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the
_heart_, but a _spring_; and the _nerves_, but so many _strings_; and
the _joints_, but so many _wheels_, giving motion to the whole body,
such as was intended by the artificer? _Art_ goes yet further, imitating
that rational and most excellent work of nature, _man_. For by art is
created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMONWEALTH, or STATE, in Latin
CIVITAS, which is but an artificial man; though of greater stature and
strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was
intended; and in which the _sovereignty_ is an artificial _soul_, as
giving life and motion to the whole body; the _magistrates_, and other
_officers_ of judicature and execution, artificial _joints_; _reward_
and _punishment_, by which fastened to the seat of the sovereignty every
joint and member is moved to perform his duty, are the _nerves_, that do
the same in the body natural; the _wealth_ and _riches_ of all the
particular members, are the _strength_; _salus populi_, the _people’s
safety_, its _business_; _counsellors_, by whom all things needful for
it to know are suggested unto it, are the _memory_; _equity_, and
_laws_, an artificial _reason_ and _will_; _concord_, _health_;
_sedition_, _sickness_; and _civil war_, _death_. Lastly, the _pacts_
and _covenants_, by which the parts of this body politic were at first
made, set together, and united, resemble that _fiat_, or the _let us
make man_, pronounced by God in the creation.
To describe the nature of this artificial man, I will consider
First, the _matter_ thereof, and the _artificer_; both which is _man_.
Secondly, _how_, and by what _covenants_ it is made; what are the
_rights_ and just _power_ or _authority_ of a _sovereign_; and what it
is that _preserveth_ or _dissolveth_ it.
Thirdly, what is a _Christian commonwealth_.
Lastly, what is the _kingdom of darkness_.
Concerning the first, there is a saying much usurped of late, that
_wisdom_ is acquired, not by reading of _books_, but of _men_.
Consequently whereunto, those persons, that for the most part can give
no other proof of being wise, take great delight to show what they think
they have read in men, by uncharitable censures of one another behind
their backs. But there is another saying not of late understood, by
which they might learn truly to read one another, if they would take the
pains; that is, _nosce teipsum_, _read thyself_: which was not meant, as
it is now used, to countenance, either the barbarous state of men in
power, towards their inferiors; or to encourage men of low degree, to a
saucy behaviour towards their betters; but to teach us, that for the
similitude of the thoughts and passions of one man, to the thoughts and
passions of another, whosoever looketh into himself, and considereth
what he doth, when he does _think_, _opine_, _reason_, _hope_, _fear_,
&c. and upon what grounds; he shall thereby read and know, what are the
thoughts and passions of all other men upon the like occasions. I say
the similitude of _passions_, which are the same in all men, _desire_,
_fear_, _hope_, &c.; not the similitude of the _objects_ of the
passions, which are the things _desired_, _feared_, _hoped_, &c.: for
these the constitution individual, and particular education, do so vary,
and they are so easy to be kept from our knowledge, that the characters
of man’s heart, blotted and confounded as they are with dissembling,
lying, counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrines, are legible only to him
that searcheth hearts. And though by men’s actions we do discover their
design sometimes; yet to do it without comparing them with our own, and
distinguishing all circumstances, by which the case may come to be
altered, is to decypher without a key, and be for the most part
deceived, by too much trust, or by too much diffidence; as he that
reads, is himself a good or evil man.
But let one man read another by his actions never so perfectly, it
serves him only with his acquaintance, which are but few. He that is to
govern a whole nation, must read in himself, not this or that particular
man; but mankind: which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn
any language or science; yet when I shall have set down my own reading
orderly, and perspicuously, the pains left another, will be only to
consider, if he also find not the same in himself. For this kind of
doctrine admitteth no other demonstration.
PART I.
OF MAN.
-------
CHAPTER I.
OF SENSE.
[Sidenote: Sense.]
Concerning the thoughts of man, I will consider them first singly, and
afterwards in train, or dependence upon one another. Singly, they are
every one a _representation_ or _appearance_, of some quality, or other
accident of a body without us, which is commonly called an _object_.
Which object worketh on the eyes, ears, and other parts of a man’s body;
and by diversity of working, produceth diversity of appearances.
The original of them all, is that which we call SENSE, for there is no
conception in a man’s mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by
parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense. The rest are derived from
that original.
To know the natural cause of sense, is not very necessary to the
business now in hand; and I have elsewhere written of the same at large.
Nevertheless, to fill each part of my present method, I will briefly
deliver the same in this place.
The cause of sense, is the external body, or object, which presseth the
organ proper to each sense, either immediately, as in the taste and
touch; or mediately, as in seeing, hearing, and smelling; which
pressure, by the mediation of the nerves, and other strings and
membranes of the body, continued inwards to the brain and heart, causeth
there a resistance, or counter-pressure, or endeavour of the heart to
deliver itself, which endeavour, because _outward_, seemeth to be some
matter without. And this _seeming_, or _fancy_, is that which men call
_sense_; and consisteth, as to the eye, in a _light_, or _colour
figured_; to the ear, in a _sound_; to the nostril, in an _odour_; to
the tongue and palate, in a _savour_; and to the rest of the body, in
_heat_, _cold_, _hardness_, _softness_, and such other qualities as we
discern by _feeling_. All which qualities, called _sensible_, are in the
object, that causeth them, but so many several motions of the matter, by
which it presseth our organs diversely. Neither in us that are pressed,
are they any thing else, but divers motions; for motion produceth
nothing but motion. But their appearance to us is fancy, the same
waking, that dreaming. And as pressing, rubbing, or striking the eye,
makes us fancy a light; and pressing the ear, produceth a din; so do the
bodies also we see, or hear, produce the same by their strong, though
unobserved action. For if those colours and sounds were in the bodies,
or objects that cause them, they could not be severed from them, as by
glasses, and in echoes by reflection, we see they are; where we know the
thing we see is in one place, the appearance in another. And though at
some certain distance, the real and very object seem invested with the
fancy it begets in us; yet still the object is one thing, the image or
fancy is another. So that sense, in all cases, is nothing else but
original fancy, caused, as I have said, by the pressure, that is, by the
motion, of external things upon our eyes, ears, and other organs
thereunto ordained.
But the philosophy-schools, through all the universities of Christendom,
grounded upon certain texts of Aristotle, teach another doctrine, and
say, for the cause of _vision_, that the thing seen, sendeth forth on
every side a _visible species_, in English, a _visible show_,
_apparition_, or _aspect_, or _a being seen_; the receiving whereof into
the eye, is _seeing_. And for the cause of _hearing_, that the thing
heard, sendeth forth an _audible species_, that is an _audible aspect_,
or _audible being seen_; which entering at the ear, maketh _hearing_.
Nay, for the cause of _understanding_ also, they say the thing
understood, sendeth forth an _intelligible species_, that is, an
_intelligible being seen_; which, coming into the understanding, makes
us understand. I say not this, as disproving the use of universities;
but because I am to speak hereafter of their office in a commonwealth, I
must let you see on all occasions by the way, what things would be
amended in them; amongst which the frequency of insignificant speech is
one.
-------
CHAPTER II.
OF IMAGINATION.
[Sidenote: Imagination.]
That when a thing lies still, unless somewhat else stir it, it will lie
still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when a thing
is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat else stay
it, though the reason be the same, namely, that nothing can change
itself, is not so easily assented to. For men measure, not only other
men, but all other things, by themselves; and because they find
themselves subject after motion to pain, and lassitude, think every
thing else grows weary of motion, and seeks repose of its own accord;
little considering, whether it be not some other motion, wherein that
desire of rest they find in themselves, consisteth. From hence it is,
that the schools say, heavy bodies fall downwards, out of an appetite to
rest, and to conserve their nature in that place which is most proper
for them; ascribing appetite, and knowledge of what is good for their
conservation, which is more than man has, to things inanimate, absurdly.
When a body is once in motion, it moveth, unless something else hinder
it, eternally; and whatsoever hindreth it, cannot in an instant, but in
time, and by degrees, quite extinguish it; and as we see in the water,
though the wind cease, the waves give not over rolling for a long time
after: so also it happeneth in that motion, which is made in the
internal parts of a man, then, when he sees, dreams, &c. For after the
object is removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the
thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it, the
Latins call _imagination_, from the image made in seeing; and apply the
same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it
_fancy_; which signifies _appearance_, and is as proper to one sense, as
to another. IMAGINATION therefore is nothing but _decaying sense_; and
is found in men, and many other living creatures, as well sleeping, as
waking.
The decay of sense in men waking, is not the decay of the motion made in
sense; but an obscuring of it, in such manner as the light of the sun
obscureth the light of the stars; which stars do no less exercise their
virtue, by which they are visible, in the day than in the night. But
because amongst many strokes, which our eyes, ears, and other organs
receive from external bodies, the predominant only is sensible;
therefore, the light of the sun being predominant, we are not affected
with the action of the stars. And any object being removed from our
eyes, though the impression it made in us remain, yet other objects more
present succeeding, and working on us, the imagination of the past is
obscured, and made weak, as the voice of a man is in the noise of the
day. From whence it followeth, that the longer the time is, after the
sight or sense of any object, the weaker is the imagination. For the
continual change of man’s body destroys in time the parts which in sense
were moved: so that distance of time, and of place, hath one and the
same effect in us. For as at a great distance of place, that which we
look at appears dim, and without distinction of the smaller parts; and
as voices grow weak, and inarticulate; so also, after great distance of
time, our imagination of the past is weak; and we lose, for example, of
cities we have seen, many particular streets, and of actions, many
particular circumstances. This _decaying sense_, when we would express
the thing itself, I mean _fancy_ itself, we call _imagination_, as I
said before: but when we would express the decay, and signify that the
sense is fading, old, and past, it is called _memory_. So that
imagination and memory are but one thing, which for divers
considerations hath divers names.
[Sidenote: Memory.]
Much memory, or memory of many things, is called _experience_. Again,
imagination being only of those things which have been formerly
perceived by sense, either all at once, or by parts at several times;
the former, which is the imagining the whole object as it was presented
to the sense, is _simple_ imagination, as when one imagineth a man, or
horse, which he hath seen before. The other is _compounded_; as when,
from the sight of a man at one time, and of a horse at another, we
conceive in our mind a Centaur. So when a man compoundeth the image of
his own person with the image of the actions of another man, as when a
man imagines himself a Hercules or an Alexander, which happeneth often
to them that are much taken with reading of romances, it is a compound
imagination, and properly but a fiction of the mind. There be also other
imaginations that rise in men, though waking, from the great impression
made in sense: as from gazing upon the sun, the impression leaves an
image of the sun before our eyes a long time after; and from being long
and vehemently attent upon geometrical figures, a man shall in the dark,
though awake, have the images of lines and angles before his eyes; which
kind of fancy hath no particular name, as being a thing that doth not
commonly fall into men’s discourse.
[Sidenote: Dreams.]
The imaginations of them that sleep are those we call _dreams_. And
these also, as all other imaginations, have been before, either totally
or by parcels, in the sense. And because in sense, the brain and nerves,
which are the necessary organs of sense, are so benumbed in sleep, as
not easily to be moved by the action of external objects, there can
happen in sleep no imagination, and therefore no dream, but what
proceeds from the agitation of the inward parts of man’s body; which
inward parts, for the connexion they have with the brain, and other
organs, when they be distempered, do keep the same in motion; whereby
the imaginations there formerly made, appear as if a man were waking;
saving that the organs of sense being now benumbed, so as there is no
new object, which can master and obscure them with a more vigorous
impression, a dream must needs be more clear, in this silence of sense,
than our waking thoughts. And hence it cometh to pass, that it is a hard
matter, and by many thought impossible, to distinguish exactly between
sense and dreaming. For my part, when I consider that in dreams I do not
often nor constantly think of the same persons, places, objects, and
actions, that I do waking; nor remember so long a train of coherent
thoughts, dreaming, as at other times; and because waking I often
observe the absurdity of dreams, but never dream of the absurdities of
my waking thoughts; I am well satisfied, that being awake, I know I
dream not, though when I dream I think myself awake.
And seeing dreams are caused by the distemper of some of the inward
parts of the body, divers distempers must needs cause different dreams.
And hence it is that lying cold breedeth dreams of fear, and raiseth the
thought and image of some fearful object, the motion from the brain to
the inner parts and from the inner parts to the brain being reciprocal;
and that as anger causeth heat in some parts of the body when we are
awake, so when we sleep the overheating of the same parts causeth anger,
and raiseth up in the brain the imagination of an enemy. In the same
manner, as natural kindness, when we are awake, causeth desire, and
desire makes heat in certain other parts of the body; so also too much
heat in those parts, while we sleep, raiseth in the brain an imagination
of some kindness shown. In sum, our dreams are the reverse of our waking
imaginations; the motion when we are awake beginning at one end, and
when we dream at another.
[Sidenote: Apparitions or visions.]
The most difficult discerning of a man’s dream, from his waking
thoughts, is then, when by some accident we observe not that we have
slept: which is easy to happen to a man full of fearful thoughts, and
whose conscience is much troubled; and that sleepeth, without the
circumstances of going to bed or putting off his clothes, as one that
noddeth in a chair. For he that taketh pains, and industriously lays
himself to sleep, in case any uncouth and exorbitant fancy come unto
him, cannot easily think it other than a dream. We read of Marcus
Brutus, (one that had his life given him by Julius Cæsar, and was also
his favourite, and notwithstanding murdered him), how at Philippi, the
night before he gave battle to Augustus Cæsar, he saw a fearful
apparition, which is commonly related by historians as a vision; but
considering the circumstances, one may easily judge to have been but a
short dream. For sitting in his tent, pensive and troubled with the
horror of his rash act, it was not hard for him, slumbering in the cold,
to dream of that which most affrighted him; which fear, as by degrees it
made him wake, so also it must needs make the apparition by degrees to
vanish; and having no assurance that he slept, he could have no cause to
think it a dream, or any thing but a vision. And this is no very rare
accident; for even they that be perfectly awake, if they be timorous and
superstitious, possessed with fearful tales, and alone in the dark, are
subject to the like fancies, and believe they see spirits and dead men’s
ghosts walking in churchyards; whereas it is either their fancy only, or
else the knavery of such persons as make use of such superstitious fear,
to pass disguised in the night, to places they would not be known to
haunt.
From this ignorance of how to distinguish dreams, and other strong
fancies, from vision and sense, did arise the greatest part of the
religion of the Gentiles in time past, that worshipped satyrs, fawns,
nymphs, and the like; and now-a-days the opinion that rude people have
of fairies, ghosts, and goblins, and of the power of witches. For as for
witches, I think not that their witchcraft is any real power; but yet
that they are justly punished, for the false belief they have that they
can do such mischief, joined with their purpose to do it if they can;
their trade being nearer to a new religion than to a craft or science.
And for fairies, and walking ghosts, the opinion of them has, I think,
been on purpose either taught or not confuted, to keep in credit the use
of exorcism, of crosses, of holy water, and other such inventions of
ghostly men. Nevertheless, there is no doubt, but God can make unnatural
apparitions; but that he does it so often, as men need to fear such
things, more than they fear the stay or change of the course of nature,
which he also can stay, and change, is no point of Christian faith. But
evil men under pretext that God can do any thing, are so bold as to say
any thing when it serves their turn, though they think it untrue; it is
the part of a wise man, to believe them no farther, than right reason
makes that which they say, appear credible. If this superstitious fear
of spirits were taken away, and with it, prognostics from dreams, false
prophecies, and many other things depending thereon, by which crafty
ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would be much more fitted
than they are for civil obedience.
And this ought to be the work of the schools: but they rather nourish
such doctrine. For, not knowing what imagination or the senses are, what
they receive, they teach: some saying, that imaginations rise of
themselves, and have no cause; others, that they rise most commonly from
the will; and that good thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man by God,
and evil thoughts by the Devil; or that good thoughts are poured
(infused) into a man by God, and evil ones by the Devil. Some say the
senses receive the species of things, and deliver them to the common
sense; and the common sense delivers them over to the fancy, and the
fancy to the memory, and the memory to the judgment, like handing of
things from one to another, with many words making nothing understood.
[Sidenote: Understanding.]
The imagination that is raised in man, or any other creature indued with
the faculty of imagining, by words, or other voluntary signs, is that we
generally call _understanding_; and is common to man and beast. For a
dog by custom will understand the call, or the rating of his master; and
so will many other beasts. That understanding which is peculiar to man,
is the understanding not only his will, but his conceptions and
thoughts, by the sequel and contexture of the names of things into
affirmations, negations, and other forms of speech; and of this kind of
understanding I shall speak hereafter.
-------
CHAPTER III.
OF THE CONSEQUENCE OR TRAIN OF IMAGINATIONS.
By _Consequence_, or TRAIN of thoughts, I understand that succession of
one thought to another, which is called, to distinguish it from
discourse in words, _mental discourse_.
When a man thinketh on any thing whatsoever, his next thought after, is
not altogether so casual as it seems to be. Not every thought to every
thought succeeds indifferently. But as we have no imagination, whereof
we have not formerly had sense, in whole, or in parts; so we have no
transition from one imagination to another, whereof we never had the
like before in our senses. The reason whereof is this. All fancies are
motions within us, relics of those made in the sense: and those motions
that immediately succeeded one another in the sense, continue also
together after sense: insomuch as the former coming again to take place,
and be predominant, the latter followeth, by coherence of the matter
moved, in such manner, as water upon a plane table is drawn which way
any one part of it is guided by the finger. But because in sense, to one
and the same thing perceived, sometimes one thing, sometimes another
succeedeth, it comes to pass in time, that in the imagining of any
thing, there is no certainty what we shall imagine next; only this is
certain, it shall be something that succeeded the same before, at one
time or another.
[Sidenote: Train of thoughts unguided.]
This train of thoughts, or mental discourse, is of two sorts. The first
is _unguided_, _without design_, and inconstant; wherein there is no
passionate thought, to govern and direct those that follow, to itself,
as the end and scope of some desire, or other passion: in which case the
thoughts are said to wander, and seem impertinent one to another, as in
a dream. Such are commonly the thoughts of men, that are not only
without company, but also without care of any thing; though even then
their thoughts are as busy as at other times, but without harmony; as
the sound which a lute out of tune would yield to any man; or in tune,
to one that could not play. And yet in this wild ranging of the mind, a
man may oft-times perceive the way of it, and the dependance of one
thought upon another. For in a discourse of our present civil war, what
could seem more impertinent, than to ask, as one did, what was the value
of a Roman penny? Yet the coherence to me was manifest enough. For the
thought of the war, introduced the thought of the delivering up the king
to his enemies; the thought of that, brought in the thought of the
delivering up of Christ; and that again the thought of the thirty pence,
which was the price of that treason; and thence easily followed that
malicious question, and all this in a moment of time; for thought is
quick.
[Sidenote: Train of thoughts regulated.]
The second is more constant; as being _regulated_ by some desire, and
design. For the impression made by such things as we desire, or fear, is
strong, and permanent, or, if it cease for a time, of quick return: so
strong it is sometimes, as to hinder and break our sleep. From desire,
ariseth the thought of some means we have seen produce the like of that
which we aim at; and from the thought of that, the thought of means to
that mean; and so continually, till we come to some beginning within our
own power. And because the end, by the greatness of the impression,
comes often to mind, in case our thoughts begin to wander, they are
quickly again reduced into the way: which observed by one of the seven
wise men, made him give men this precept, which is now worn out,
_Respice finem_; that is to say, in all your actions, look often upon
what you would have, as the thing that directs all your thoughts in the
way to attain it.
The train of regulated thoughts is of two kinds; one, when of an effect
imagined we seek the causes, or means that produce it: and this is
common to man and beast. The other is, when imagining any thing
whatsoever, we seek all the possible effects, that can by it be
produced; that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it, when we
have it. Of which I have not at any time seen any sign, but in man only;
for this is a curiosity hardly incident to the nature of any living
creature that has no other passion but sensual, such as are hunger,
thirst, lust, and anger. In sum, the discourse of the mind, when it is
governed by design, is nothing but _seeking_, or the faculty of
invention, which the Latins called _sagacitas_, and _solertia_; a
hunting out of the causes, of some effect, present or past; or of the
effects, of some present or past cause. Sometimes a man seeks what he
hath lost; and from that place, and time, wherein he misses it, his mind
runs back, from place to place, and time to time, to find where, and
when he had it; that is to say, to find some certain, and limited time
and place, in which to begin a method of seeking. Again, from thence,
his thoughts run over the same places and times, to find what action, or
other occasion might make him lose it. [Sidenote: Remembrance.] This we
call _remembrance_, or calling to mind: the Latins call it
_reminiscentia_, as it were a _re-conning_ of our former actions.
[Sidenote: Prudence.]
Sometimes a man knows a place determinate, within the compass whereof he
is to seek; and then his thoughts run over all the parts thereof, in the
same manner as one would sweep a room, to find a jewel; or as a spaniel
ranges the field, till he find a scent; or as a man should run over the
alphabet, to start a rhyme.
Sometimes a man desires to know the event of an action; and then he
thinketh of some like action past, and the events thereof one after
another; supposing like events will follow like actions. As he that
foresees what will become of a criminal, re-cons what he has seen follow
on the like crime before; having this order of thoughts, the crime, the
officer, the prison, the judge, and the gallows. Which kind of thoughts,
is called _foresight_, and _prudence_, or _providence_; and sometimes
_wisdom_; though such conjecture, through the difficulty of observing
all circumstances, be very fallacious. But this is certain; by how much
one man has more experience of things past, than another, by so much
also he is more prudent, and his expectations the seldomer fail him. The
_present_ only has a being in nature; things _past_ have a being in the
memory only, but things _to come_ have no being at all; the _future_
being but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions past,
to the actions that are present; which with most certainty is done by
him that has most experience, but not with certainty enough. And though
it be called prudence, when the event answereth our expectation; yet in
its own nature, it is but presumption. For the foresight of things to
come, which is providence, belongs only to him by whose will they are to
come. From him only, and supernaturally, proceeds prophecy. The best
prophet naturally is the best guesser; and the best guesser, he that is
most versed and studied in the matters he guesses at: for he hath most
_signs_ to guess by.
[Sidenote: Signs.]
A _sign_ is the evident antecedent of the consequent; and contrarily,
the consequent of the antecedent, when the like consequences have been
observed, before: and the oftener they have been observed, the less
uncertain is the sign. And therefore he that has most experience in any
kind of business, has most signs, whereby to guess at the future time;
and consequently is the most prudent: and so much more prudent than he
that is new in that kind of business, as not to be equalled by any
advantage of natural and extemporary wit: though perhaps many young men
think the contrary.
Nevertheless it is not prudence that distinguisheth man from beast.
There be beasts, that at a year old observe more, and pursue that which
is for their good, more prudently, than a child can do at ten.
[Sidenote: Conjecture of the time past.]
As prudence is a _presumption_ of the _future_, contracted from the
_experience_ of time _past_: so there is a presumption of things past
taken from other things, not future, but past also. For he that hath
seen by what courses and degrees a flourishing state hath first come
into civil war, and then to ruin; upon the sight of the ruins of any
other state, will guess, the like war, and the like courses have been
there also. But this conjecture, has the same uncertainty almost with
the conjecture of the future; both being grounded only upon experience.
There is no other act of man’s mind, that I can remember, naturally
planted in him, so as to need no other thing, to the exercise of it, but
to be born a man, and live with the use of his five senses. Those other
faculties, of which I shall speak by and by, and which seem proper to
man only, are acquired and increased by study and industry; and of most
men learned by instruction, and discipline; and proceed all from the
invention of words, and speech. For besides sense, and thoughts, and the
train of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion; though by the
help of speech, and method, the same faculties may be improved to such a
height, as to distinguish men from all other living creatures.
[Sidenote: Infinite.]
Whatsoever we imagine is _finite_. Therefore there is no idea, or
conception of any thing we call _infinite_. No man can have in his mind
an image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive infinite swiftness,
infinite time, or infinite force, or infinite power. When we say any
thing is infinite, we signify only, that we are not able to conceive the
ends, and bounds of the things named; having no conception of the thing,
but of our own inability. And therefore the name of God is used, not to
make us conceive him, for he is incomprehensible; and his greatness, and
power are unconceivable; but that we may honour him. Also because,
whatsoever, as I said before, we conceive, has been perceived first by
sense, either all at once, or by parts; a man can have no thought,
representing any thing, not subject to sense. No man therefore can
conceive any thing, but he must conceive it in some place; and indued
with some determinate magnitude; and which may be divided into parts;
nor that any thing is all in this place, and all in another place at the
same time; nor that two, or more things can be in one, and the same
place at once: for none of these things ever have, nor can be incident
to sense; but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit, without any
signification at all, from deceived philosophers, and deceived, or
deceiving schoolmen.
-------
CHAPTER IV.
OF SPEECH.
[Sidenote: Original of speech.]
The invention of _printing_, though ingenious, compared with the
invention of _letters_, is no great matter. But who was the first that
found the use of letters, is not known. He that first brought them into
Greece, men say was Cadmus, the son of Agenor, king of Phœnicia. A
profitable invention for continuing the memory of time past, and the
conjunction of mankind, dispersed into so many, and distant regions of
the earth; and withal difficult, as proceeding from a watchful
observation of the divers motions of the tongue, palate, lips, and other
organs of speech; whereby to make as many differences of characters, to
remember them. But the most noble and profitable invention of all other,
was that of SPEECH, consisting of _names_ or _appellations_, and their
connexion; whereby men register their thoughts; recall them when they
are past; and also declare them one to another for mutual utility and
conversation; without which, there had been amongst men, neither
commonwealth, nor society, nor contract, nor peace, no more than amongst
lions, bears, and wolves. The first author of _speech_ was God himself,
that instructed Adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his
sight; for the Scripture goeth no further in this matter. But this was
sufficient to direct him to add more names, as the experience and use of
the creatures should give him occasion; and to join them in such manner
by degrees, as to make himself understood; and so by succession of time,
so much language might be gotten, as he had found use for; though not so
copious, as an orator or philosopher has need of: for I do not find any
thing in the Scripture, out of which, directly or by consequence, can be
gathered, that Adam was taught the names of all figures, numbers,
measures, colours, sounds, fancies, relations; much less the names of
words and speech, as _general_, _special_, _affirmative_, _negative_,
_interrogative_, _optative_, _infinitive_, all which are useful; and
least of all, of _entity_, _intentionality_, _quiddity_, and other
insignificant words of the school.
But all this language gotten, and augmented by Adam and his posterity,
was again lost at the Tower of Babel, when, by the hand of God, every
man was stricken, for his rebellion, with an oblivion of his former
language. And being hereby forced to disperse themselves into several
parts of the world, it must needs be, that the diversity of tongues that
now is, proceeded by degrees from them, in such manner, as need, the
mother of all inventions, taught them; and in tract of time grew
everywhere more copious.
[Sidenote: The use of speech.]
The general use of speech, is to transfer our mental discourse, into
verbal; or the train of our thoughts, into a train of words; and that
for two commodities, whereof one is the registering of the consequences
of our thoughts; which being apt to slip out of our memory, and put us
to a new labour, may again be recalled, by such words as they were
marked by. So that the first use of names is to serve for _marks_, or
_notes_ of remembrance. Another is, when many use the same words, to
signify, by their connexion and order, one to another, what they
conceive, or think of each matter; and also what they desire, fear, or
have any other passion for. And for this use they are called _signs_.
Special uses of speech are these; first, to register, what by
cogitation, we find to be the cause of any thing, present or past; and
what we find things present or past may produce, or effect; which in
sum, is acquiring of arts. Secondly, to show to others that knowledge
which we have attained, which is, to counsel and teach one another.
Thirdly, to make known to others our wills and purposes, that we may
have the mutual help of one another. Fourthly, to please and delight
ourselves and others, by playing with our words, for pleasure or
ornament, innocently.
[Sidenote: Abuses of speech.]
To these uses, there are also four correspondent abuses. First, when men
register their thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy of the signification
of their words; by which they register for their conception, that which
they never conceived, and so deceive themselves. Secondly, when they use
words metaphorically; that is, in other sense than that they are
ordained for; and thereby deceive others. Thirdly, by words, when they
declare that to be their will, which is not. Fourthly, when they use
them to grieve one another; for seeing nature hath armed living
creatures, some with teeth, some with horns, and some with hands, to
grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of speech, to grieve him with the
tongue, unless it be one whom we are obliged to govern; and then it is
not to grieve, but to correct and amend.
The manner how speech serveth to the remembrance of the consequence of
causes and effects, consisteth in the imposing of _names_, and the
_connexion_ of them.
[Sidenote: Names, proper and common.]
Of names, some are _proper_, and singular to one only thing, as _Peter_,
_John_, _this man_, _this tree_; and some are _common_ to many things,
_man_, _horse_, _tree_; every of which, though but one name, is
nevertheless the name of divers particular things; [Sidenote:
Universal.] in respect of all which together, it is called an
_universal_; there being nothing in the world universal but names; for
the things named are every one of them individual and singular.
One universal name is imposed on many things, for their similitude in
some quality, or other accident; and whereas a proper name bringeth to
mind one thing only, universals recall any one of those many.
And of names universal, some are of more, and some of less extent; the
larger comprehending the less large; and some again of equal extent,
comprehending each other reciprocally. As for example: the name _body_
is of larger signification than the word _man_, and comprehendeth it;
and the names _man_ and _rational_, are of equal extent, comprehending
mutually one another. But here we must take notice, that by a name is
not always understood, as in grammar, one only word; but sometimes, by
circumlocution, many words together. For all these words, _he that in
his actions observeth the laws of his country_, make but one name,
equivalent to this one word, _just_.
By this imposition of names, some of larger, some of stricter
signification, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things
imagined in the mind, into a reckoning of the consequences of
appellations. For example: a man that hath no use of speech at all, such
as is born and remains perfectly deaf and dumb, if he set before his
eyes a triangle, and by it two right angles, such as are the corners of
a square figure, he may, by meditation, compare and find, that the three
angles of that triangle, are equal to those two right angles that stand
by it. But if another triangle be shown him, different in shape from the
former, he cannot know, without a new labour, whether the three angles
of that also be equal to the same. But he that hath the use of words,
when he observes, that such equality was consequent, not to the length
of the sides, nor to any other particular thing in his triangle; but
only to this, that the sides were straight, and the angles three; and
that that was all, for which he named it a triangle; will boldly
conclude universally, that such equality of angles is in all triangles
whatsoever; and register his invention in these general terms, _every
triangle hath its three angles equal to two right angles_. And thus the
consequence found in one particular, comes to be registered and
remembered, as a universal rule, and discharges our mental reckoning, of
time and place, and delivers us from all labour of the mind, saving the
first, and makes that which was found true _here_, and _now_, to be true
in _all times_ and _places_.
But the use of words in registering our thoughts is in nothing so
evident as in numbering. A natural fool that could never learn by heart
the order of numeral words, as _one_, _two_, and _three_, may observe
every stroke of the clock, and nod to it, or say _one_, _one_, _one_,
but can never know what hour it strikes. And it seems, there was a time
when those names of number were not in use; and men were fain to apply
their fingers of one or both hands, to those things they desired to keep
account of; and that thence it proceeded, that now our numeral words are
but ten, in any nation, and in some but five; and then they begin again.
And he that can tell ten, if he recite them out of order, will lose
himself, and not know when he has done. Much less will he be able to
add, and subtract, and perform all other operations of arithmetic. So
that without words there is no possibility of reckoning of numbers; much
less of magnitudes, of swiftness, of force, and other things, the
reckonings whereof are necessary to the being, or well-being of mankind.
When two names are joined together into a consequence, or affirmation,
as thus, _a man is a living creature_; or thus, _if he be a man, he is a
living creature_; if the latter name, _living creature_, signify all
that the former name _man_ signifieth, then the affirmation, or
consequence, is _true_; otherwise _false_. For _true_ and _false_ are
attributes of speech, not of things. And where speech is not, there is
neither _truth_ nor _falsehood_; _error_ there may be, as when we expect
that which shall not be, or suspect what has not been; but in neither
case can a man be charged with untruth.
[Sidenote: Necessity of definitions.]
Seeing then that truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our
affirmations, a man that seeketh precise truth had need to remember what
every name he uses stands for, and to place it accordingly, or else he
will find himself entangled in words, as a bird in lime twigs, the more
he struggles the more belimed. And therefore in geometry, which is the
only science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind, men
begin at settling the significations of their words; which settling of
significations they call _definitions_, and place them in the beginning
of their reckoning.
By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true
knowledge, to examine the definitions of former authors; and either to
correct them, where they are negligently set down, or to make them
himself. For the errors of definitions multiply themselves according as
the reckoning proceeds, and lead men into absurdities, which at last
they see, but cannot avoid, without reckoning anew from the beginning,
in which lies the foundation of their errors. From whence it happens,
that they which trust to books do as they that cast up many little sums
into a greater, without considering whether those little sums were
rightly cast up or not; and at last finding the error visible, and not
mistrusting their first grounds, know not which way to clear themselves,
but spend time in fluttering over their books; as birds that entering by
the chimney, and finding themselves enclosed in a chamber, flutter at
the false light of a glass window, for want of wit to consider which way
they came in. So that in the right definition of names lies the first
use of speech; which is the acquisition of science: and in wrong, or no
definitions, lies the first abuse; from which proceed all false and
senseless tenets; which make those men that take their instruction from
the authority of books, and not from their own meditation, to be as much
below the condition of ignorant men, as men endued with true science are
above it. For between true science and erroneous doctrines, ignorance is
in the middle. Natural sense and imagination are not subject to
absurdity. Nature itself cannot err; and as men abound in copiousness of
language, so they become more wise, or more mad than ordinary. Nor is it
possible without letters for any man to become either excellently wise,
or, unless his memory be hurt by disease or ill constitution of organs,
excellently foolish. For words are wise men’s counters, they do but
reckon by them; but they are the money of fools, that value them by the
authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other doctor
whatsoever, if but a man.
[Sidenote: Subject to names.]
_Subject to names_, is whatsoever can enter into or be considered in an
account, and be added one to another to make a sum, or subtracted one
from another and leave a remainder. The Latins called accounts of money
_rationes_, and accounting _ratiocinatio_; and that which we in bills or
books of account call _items_, they call _nomina_, that is _names_; and
thence it seems to proceed, that they extended the word _ratio_ to the
faculty of reckoning in all other things. The Greeks have but one word,
λόγος, for both _speech_ and _reason_; not that they thought there was
no speech without reason, but no reasoning without speech: and the act
of reasoning they called _syllogism_, which signifieth summing up of the
consequences of one saying to another. And because the same thing may
enter into account for divers accidents, their names are, to show that
diversity, diversly wrested and diversified. This diversity of names may
be reduced to four general heads.
[Sidenote: Names.]
First, a thing may enter into account for _matter_ or _body_; as
_living_, _sensible_, _rational_, _hot_, _cold_, _moved_, _quiet_; with
all which names the word _matter_, or _body_, is understood; all such
being names of matter.
Secondly, it may enter into account, or be considered, for some accident
or quality which we conceive to be in it; as for _being moved_, for
_being so long_, for _being hot_, &c.; and then, of the name of the
thing itself, by a little change or wresting, we make a name for that
accident, which we consider; and for _living_ put into the account
_life_; for _moved_, _motion_; for _hot_, _heat_; for _long_, _length_,
and the like: and all such names are the names of the accidents and
properties by which one matter and body is distinguished from another.
These are called _names abstract_, because severed, not from matter, but
from the account of matter.
Thirdly, we bring into account the properties of our own bodies, whereby
we make such distinction; as when anything is seen by us, we reckon not
the thing itself, but the sight, the colour, the idea of it in the
fancy: and when anything is heard, we reckon it not, but the hearing or
sound only, which is our fancy or conception of it by the ear; and such
are names of fancies.
[Sidenote: Use of names positive.]
Fourthly, we bring into account, consider, and give names, to _names_
themselves, and to _speeches_: for _general_, _universal_, _special_,
_equivocal_, are names of names. And _affirmation_, _interrogation_,
_commandment_, _narration_, _syllogism_, _sermon_, _oration_, and many
other such, are names of speeches. And this is all the variety of names
_positive_; which are put to mark somewhat which is in nature, or may be
feigned by the mind of man, as bodies that are, or may be conceived to
be; or of bodies, the properties that are, or may be feigned to be; or
words and speech.
[Sidenote: Negative names, with their uses.]
There be also other names, called _negative_, which are notes to signify
that a word is not the name of the thing in question; as these words,
_nothing_, _no man_, _infinite_, _indocible_, _three want four_, and the
like; which are nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in correcting of
reckoning, and call to mind our past cogitations, though they be not
names of any thing, because they make us refuse to admit of names not
rightly used.
[Sidenote: Words insignificant.]
All other names are but insignificant sounds; and those of two sorts.
One when they are new, and yet their meaning not explained by
definition; whereof there have been abundance coined by schoolmen, and
puzzled philosophers.
Another, when men make a name of two names, whose significations are
contradictory and inconsistent; as this name, an _incorporeal body_, or,
which is all one, an _incorporeal substance_, and a great number more.
For whensoever any affirmation is false, the two names of which it is
composed, put together and made one, signify nothing at all. For
example, if it be a false affirmation to say _a quadrangle is round_,
the word _round quadrangle_ signifies nothing, but is a mere sound. So
likewise, if it be false to say that virtue can be poured, or blown up
and down, the words _in-poured virtue_, _inblown virtue_, are as absurd
and insignificant as a _round quadrangle_. And therefore you shall
hardly meet with a senseless and insignificant word, that is not made up
of some Latin or Greek names. A Frenchman seldom hears our Saviour
called by the name of _parole_, but by the name of _verbe_ often; yet
_verbe_ and _parole_ differ no more, but that one is Latin, the other
French.
[Sidenote: Understanding.]
When a man, upon the hearing of any speech, hath those thoughts which
the words of that speech and their connexion were ordained and
constituted to signify, then he is said to understand it;
_understanding_ being nothing else but conception caused by speech. And
therefore if speech be peculiar to man, as for aught I know it is, then
is understanding peculiar to him also. And therefore of absurd and false
affirmations, in case they be universal, there can be no understanding;
though many think they understand then, when they do but repeat the
words softly, or con them in their mind.
What kinds of speeches signify the appetites, aversions, and passions of
man’s mind; and of their use and abuse, I shall speak when I have spoken
of the passions.
[Sidenote: Inconstant names.]
The names of such things as affect us, that is, which please and
displease us, because all men be not alike affected with the same thing,
nor the same man at all times, are in the common discourses of men of
_inconstant_ signification. For seeing all names are imposed to signify
our conceptions, and all our affections are but conceptions, when we
conceive the same things differently, we can hardly avoid different
naming of them. For though the nature of that we conceive, be the same;
yet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different
constitutions of body, and prejudices of opinion, gives every thing a
tincture of our different passions. And therefore in reasoning a man
must take heed of words; which besides the signification of what we
imagine of their nature, have a signification also of the nature,
disposition, and interest of the speaker; such as are the names of
virtues and vices; for one man calleth _wisdom_, what another calleth
_fear_; and one _cruelty_, what another _justice_; one _prodigality_,
what another _magnanimity_; and one _gravity_, what another _stupidity_,
&c. And therefore such names can never be true grounds of any
ratiocination. No more can metaphors, and tropes of speech; but these
are less dangerous, because they profess their inconstancy; which the
other do not.
-------
CHAPTER V.
OF REASON AND SCIENCE.
[Sidenote: Reason, what it is.]
When a man _reasoneth_, he does nothing else but conceive a sum total,
from _addition_ of parcels; or conceive a remainder, from _subtraction_
of one sum from another; which, if it be done by words, is conceiving of
the consequence of the names of all the parts, to the name of the whole;
or from the names of the whole and one part, to the name of the other
part. And though in some things, as in numbers, besides adding and
subtracting, men name other operations, as _multiplying_ and _dividing_,
yet they are the same; for multiplication, is but adding together of
things equal; and division, but subtracting of one thing, as often as we
can. These operations are not incident to numbers only, but to all
manner of things that can be added together, and taken one out of
another. For as arithmeticians teach to add and subtract in _numbers_;
so the geometricians teach the same in _lines_, _figures_, solid and
superficial, _angles_, _proportions_, _times_, degrees of _swiftness_,
_force_, _power_, and the like; the logicians teach the same in
_consequences of words_; adding together two _names_ to make an
_affirmation_, and two _affirmations_ to make a _syllogism_; and _many
syllogisms_ to make a _demonstration_; and from the _sum_, or
_conclusion_ of a _syllogism_, they subtract one _proposition_ to find
the other. Writers of politics add together _pactions_ to find men’s
_duties_; and lawyers, _laws_ and _facts_, to find what is _right_ and
_wrong_ in the actions of private men. In sum, in what matter soever
there is place for _addition_ and _subtraction_, there also is place for
_reason_; and where these have no place, there _reason_ has nothing at
all to do.
[Sidenote: Reason defined.]
Out of all which we may define, that is to say determine, what that is,
which is meant by this word _reason_, when we reckon it amongst the
faculties of the mind. For REASON, in this sense, is nothing but
_reckoning_, that is adding and subtracting, of the consequences of
general names agreed upon for the _marking_ and _signifying_ of our
thoughts; I say _marking_ them when we reckon by ourselves, and
_signifying_, when we demonstrate or approve our reckonings to other
men.
[Sidenote: Right reason, where.]
And, as in arithmetic, unpractised men must, and professors themselves
may often, err, and cast up false; so also in any other subject of
reasoning, the ablest, most attentive, and most practised men may
deceive themselves, and infer false conclusions; not but that reason
itself is always right reason, as well as arithmetic is a certain and
infallible art: but no one man’s reason, nor the reason of any one
number of men, makes the certainty; no more than an account is therefore
well cast up, because a great many men have unanimously approved it. And
therefore, as when there is a controversy in an account, the parties
must by their own accord, set up, for right reason, the reason of some
arbitrator, or judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their
controversy must either come to blows, or be undecided, for want of a
right reason constituted by nature; so is it also in all debates of what
kind soever. And when men that think themselves wiser than all others,
clamour and demand right reason for judge, yet seek no more, but that
things should be determined, by no other men’s reason but their own, it
is as intolerable in the society of men, as it is in play after trump is
turned, to use for trump on every occasion, that suite whereof they have
most in their hand. For they do nothing else, that will have every of
their passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be taken for right
reason, and that in their own controversies bewraying their want of
right reason, by the claim they lay to it.
[Sidenote: The use of reason.]
The use and end of reason, is not the finding of the sum and truth of
one, or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions, and
settled significations of names, but to begin at these, and proceed from
one consequence to another. For there can be no certainty of the last
conclusion, without a certainty of all those affirmations and negations,
on which it was grounded and inferred. As when a master of a family, in
taking an account, casteth up the sums of all the bills of expense into
one sum, and not regarding how each bill is summed up, by those that
give them in account; nor what it is he pays for; he advantages himself
no more, than if he allowed the account in gross, trusting to every of
the accountants’ skill and honesty: so also in reasoning of all other
things, he that takes up conclusions on the trust of authors, and doth
not fetch them from the first items in every reckoning, which are the
significations of names settled by definitions, loses his labour; and
does not know anything, but only believeth.
[Sidenote: Of error and absurdity.]
When a man reckons without the use of words, which may be done in
particular things, as when upon the sight of any one thing, we
conjecture what was likely to have preceded, or is likely to follow upon
it; if that which he thought likely to follow, follows not, or that
which he thought likely to have preceded it, hath not preceded it, this
is called _error_; to which even the most prudent men are subject. But
when we reason in words of general signification, and fall upon a
general inference which is false, though it be commonly called _error_,
it is indeed an _absurdity_, or senseless speech. For error is but a
deception, in presuming that somewhat is past, or to come; of which,
though it were not past, or not to come, yet there was no impossibility
discoverable. But when we make a general assertion, unless it be a true
one, the possibility of it is inconceivable. And words whereby we
conceive nothing but the sound, are those we call _absurd_,
_insignificant_, and _nonsense_. And therefore if a man should talk to
me of a _round quadrangle_; or, _accidents of bread in cheese_; or,
_immaterial substances_; or of _a free subject_; _a free will_; or any
_free_, but free from being hindered by opposition, I should not say he
were in an error, but that his words were without meaning, that is to
say, absurd.
I have said before, in the second chapter, that a man did excel all
other animals in this faculty, that when he conceived any thing
whatsoever, he was apt to inquire the consequences of it, and what
effects he could do with it. And now I add this other degree of the same
excellence, that he can by words reduce the consequences he finds to
general rules, called _theorems_, or _aphorisms_; that is, he can
reason, or reckon, not only in number, but in all other things, whereof
one may be added unto, or subtracted from another.
But this privilege is allayed by another; and that is, by the privilege
of absurdity; to which no living creature is subject, but man only. And
of men, those are of all most subject to it, that profess philosophy.
For it is most true that Cicero saith of them somewhere; that there can
be nothing so absurd, but may be found in the books of philosophers. And
the reason is manifest. For there is not one of them that begins his
ratiocination from the definitions, or explications of the names they
are to use; which is a method that hath been used only in geometry;
whose conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.
[Sidenote: Causes of absurdity.]
I. The first cause of absurd conclusions I ascribe to the want of
method; in that they begin not their ratiocination from definitions;
that is, from settled significations of their words: as if they could
cast account, without knowing the value of the numeral words, _one_,
_two_, and _three_. And whereas all bodies enter into account upon
divers considerations, which I have mentioned in the precedent chapter;
these considerations being diversely named, divers absurdities proceed
from the confusion, and unfit connexion of their names into assertions.
And therefore,
II. The second cause of absurd assertions, I ascribe to the giving of
names of _bodies_ to _accidents_; or of _accidents_ to _bodies_; as they
do, that say, _faith is infused_, or _inspired_; when nothing can be
_poured_, or _breathed_ into anything, but body; and that, _extension_
is _body_; that _phantasms_ are _spirits_, &c.
III. The third I ascribe to the giving of the names of the _accidents_
of _bodies without us_, to the _accidents_ of our _own bodies_; as they
do that say, the _colour is in the body_; _the sound is in the air_, &c.
IV. The fourth, to the giving of the names of _bodies_ to _names_, or
_speeches_; as they do that say, that _there be things universal_; that
_a living creature is genus_, or _a general thing_, &c.
V. The fifth, to the giving of the names of _accidents_ to _names_ and
_speeches_; as they do that say, _the nature of a thing is its
definition_; _a man’s command is his will_; and the like.
VI. The sixth, to the use of metaphors, tropes, and other rhetorical
figures, instead of words proper. For though it be lawful to say, for
example, in common speech, _the way goeth, or leadeth hither, or
thither_; _the proverb says this or that_, whereas ways cannot go, nor
proverbs speak; yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such speeches
are not to be admitted.
VII. The seventh, to names that signify nothing; but are taken up, and
learned by rote from the schools, as _hypostatical_, _transubstantiate_,
_consubstantiate_, _eternal-now_, and the like canting of schoolmen.
To him that can avoid these things it is not easy to fall into any
absurdity, unless it be by the length of an account; wherein he may
perhaps forget what went before. For all men by nature reason alike, and
well, when they have good principles. For who is so stupid, as both to
mistake in geometry, and also to persist in it, when another detects his
error to him?
[Sidenote: Science.]
By this it appears that reason is not, as sense and memory, born with
us; nor gotten by experience only, as prudence is; but attained by
industry; first in apt imposing of names; and secondly by getting a good
and orderly method in proceeding from the elements, which are names, to
assertions made by connexion of one of them to another; and so to
syllogisms, which are the connexions of one assertion to another, till
we come to a knowledge of all the consequences of names appertaining to
the subject in hand; and that is it, men call SCIENCE. And whereas sense
and memory are but knowledge of fact, which is a thing past and
irrevocable. _Science_ is the knowledge of consequences, and dependance
of one fact upon another: by which, out of that we can presently do, we
know how to do something else when we will, or the like another time;
because when we see how any thing comes about, upon what causes, and by
what manner; when the like causes come into our power, we see how to
make it produce the like effects.
Children therefore are not endued with reason at all, till they have
attained the use of speech; but are called reasonable creatures, for the
possibility apparent of having the use of reason in time to come. And
the most part of men, though they have the use of reasoning a little
way, as in numbering to some degree; yet it serves them to little use in
common life; in which they govern themselves, some better, some worse,
according to their differences of experience, quickness of memory, and
inclinations to several ends; but specially according to good or evil
fortune, and the errors of one another. For as for _science_, or certain
rules of their actions, they are so far from it, that they know not what
it is. Geometry they have thought conjuring: but for other sciences,
they who have not been taught the beginnings and some progress in them,
that they may see how they be acquired and generated, are in this point
like children, that having no thought of generation, are made believe by
the women that their brothers and sisters are not born, but found in the
garden.
But yet they that have no _science_, are in better, and nobler
condition, with their natural prudence; than men, that by mis-reasoning,
or by trusting them that reason wrong, fall upon false and absurd
general rules. For ignorance of causes, and of rules, does not set men
so far out of their way, as relying on false rules, and taking for
causes of what they aspire to, those that are not so, but rather causes
of the contrary.
To conclude, the light of human minds is perspicuous words, but by exact
definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity; _reason_ is the
_pace_; increase of _science_, the _way_; and the benefit of mankind,
the _end_. And, on the contrary, metaphors, and senseless and ambiguous
words, are like _ignes fatui_; and reasoning upon them is wandering
amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention and sedition,
or contempt.
[Sidenote: Prudence and sapience, with their difference.]
As much experience, is _prudence_; so, is much science _sapience_. For
though we usually have one name of wisdom for them both, yet the Latins
did always distinguish between _prudentia_ and _sapientia_; ascribing
the former to experience, the latter to science. But to make their
difference appear more clearly, let us suppose one man endued with an
excellent natural use and dexterity in handling his arms; and another to
have added to that dexterity, an acquired science, of where he can
offend, or be offended by his adversary, in every possible posture or
guard: the ability of the former, would be to the ability of the latter,
as prudence to sapience; both useful; but the latter infallible. But
they that trusting only to the authority of books, follow the blind
blindly, are like him that, trusting to the false rules of a master of
fence, ventures presumptuously upon an adversary, that either kills or
disgraces him.
[Sidenote: Signs of science.]
The signs of science are some, certain and infallible; some, uncertain.
Certain, when he that pretendeth the science of any thing, can teach the
same; that is to say, demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously to
another; uncertain, when only some particular events answer to his
pretence, and upon many occasions prove so as he says they must. Signs
of prudence are all uncertain; because to observe by experience, and
remember all circumstances that may alter the success, is impossible.
But in any business, whereof a man has not infallible science to proceed
by; to forsake his own natural judgment, and be guided by general
sentences read in authors, and subject to many exceptions, is a sign of
folly, and generally scorned by the name of pedantry. And even of those
men themselves, that in councils of the commonwealth love to show their
reading of politics and history, very few do it in their domestic
affairs, where their particular interest is concerned; having prudence
enough for their private affairs: but in public they study more the
reputation of their own wit, than the success of another’s business.
-------
CHAPTER VI.
OF THE INTERIOR BEGINNINGS OF VOLUNTARY MOTIONS; COMMONLY CALLED THE
PASSIONS; AND THE SPEECHES BY WHICH THEY ARE EXPRESSED.
[Sidenote: Motion, vital and animal.]
There be in animals, two sorts of _motions_ peculiar to them: one called
_vital_; begun in generation, and continued without interruption through
their whole life; such as are the _course_ of the _blood_, the _pulse_,
the _breathing_, the _concoction_, _nutrition_, _excretion_, &c. to
which motions there needs no help of imagination: the other is _animal
motion_, otherwise called _voluntary motion_; as to _go_, to _speak_, to
_move_ any of our limbs, in such manner as is first fancied in our
minds. That sense is motion in the organs and interior parts of man’s
body, caused by the action of the things we see, hear, &c.; and that
fancy is but the relics of the same motion, remaining after sense, has
been already said in the first and second chapters. And because _going_,
_speaking_, and the like voluntary motions, depend always upon a
precedent thought of _whither_, _which way_, and _what_; it is evident,
that the imagination is the first internal beginning of all voluntary
motion. And although unstudied men do not conceive any motion at all to
be there, where the thing moved is invisible; or the space it is moved
in is, for the shortness of it, insensible; yet that doth not hinder,
but that such motions are. For let a space be never so little, that
which is moved over a greater space, whereof that little one is part,
must first be moved over that. [Sidenote: Endeavour.] These small
beginnings of motion, within the body of man, before they appear in
walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly
called ENDEAVOUR.
[Sidenote: Appetite. Desire.]
This endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it, is called
APPETITE, or DESIRE; the latter, being the general name; [Sidenote:
Hunger. Thirst.] and the other oftentimes restrained to signify the
desire of food, namely _hunger_ and _thirst_. [Sidenote: Aversion.] And
when the endeavour is fromward something, it is generally called
AVERSION. These words, _appetite_ and _aversion_, we have from the
Latins; and they both of them signify the motions, one of approaching,
the other of retiring. So also do the Greek words for the same, which
are ὁρμὴ and ἀφορμὴ. For nature itself does often press upon men those
truths, which afterwards, when they look for somewhat beyond nature,
they stumble at. For the Schools find in mere appetite to go, or move,
no actual motion at all: but because some motion they must acknowledge,
they call it metaphorical motion; which is but an absurd speech: for
though words may be called metaphorical; bodies and motions can not.
[Sidenote: Love. Hate.]
That which men desire, they are also said to LOVE: and to HATE those
things for which they have aversion. So that desire and love are the
same thing; save that by desire, we always signify the absence of the
object; by love, most commonly the presence of the same. So also by
aversion, we signify the absence; and by hate, the presence of the
object.
Of appetites and aversions, some are born with men; as appetite of food,
appetite of excretion, and exoneration, which may also and more properly
be called aversions, from somewhat they feel in their bodies; and some
other appetites, not many. The rest, which are appetites of particular
things, proceed from experience, and trial of their effects upon
themselves or other men. For of things we know not at all, or believe
not to be, we can have no further desire, than to taste and try. But
aversion we have for things, not only which we know have hurt us, but
also that we do not know whether they will hurt us, or not.
[Sidenote: Contempt.]
Those things which we neither desire, nor hate, we are said to
_contemn_; CONTEMPT being nothing else but an immobility, or contumacy
of the heart, in resisting the action of certain things; and proceeding
from that the heart is already moved otherwise, by other more potent
objects; or from want of experience of them.
And because the constitution of a man’s body is in continual mutation,
it is impossible that all the same things should always cause in him the
same appetites, and aversions: much less can all men consent, in the
desire of almost any one and the same object.
[Sidenote: Good.]
But whatsoever is the object of any man’s appetite or desire, that is it
which he for his part calleth _good_: [Sidenote: Evil.] and the object
of his hate and aversion, _evil_; and of his contempt, _vile_ and
_inconsiderable_. For these words of good, evil, and contemptible, are
ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being
nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil,
to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the
person of the man, where there is no commonwealth; or, in a
commonwealth, from the person that representeth it; or from an
arbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and
make his sentence the rule thereof.
[Sidenote: Pulchrum.]
[Sidenote: Turpe.]
The Latin tongue has two words, whose significations approach to those
of good and evil; but are not precisely the same; and those are
_pulchrum_ and _turpe_. Whereof the former signifies that, which by some
apparent signs promiseth good; and the latter, that which promiseth
evil. But in our tongue we have not so general names to express them by.
But for _pulchrum_ we say in some things, _fair_; in others,
_beautiful_, or _handsome_, or _gallant_, or _honourable_, or _comely_,
or _amiable_; and for _turpe_, _foul_, _deformed_, _ugly_, _base_,
_nauseous_, and the like, as the subject shall require; all which words,
in their proper places, signify nothing else but the _mien_, or
countenance, that promiseth good and evil. So that of good there be
three kinds; good in the promise, that is _pulchrum_; good in effect, as
the end desired, which is called _jucundum_, [Sidenote: Delightful.
Profitable. Unpleasant. Unprofitable.] _delightful_; and good as the
means, which is called _utile_, _profitable_; and as many of evil: for
_evil_ in promise, is that they call _turpe_; evil in effect, and end,
is _molestum_, _unpleasant_, _troublesome_; and evil in the means,
_inutile_, _unprofitable_, _hurtful_.
[Sidenote: Delight. Displeasure.]
As, in sense, that which is really within us, is, as I have said before,
only motion, caused by the action of external objects, but in apparence;
to the sight, light and colour; to the ear, sound; to the nostril,
odour, &c.: so, when the action of the same object is continued from the
eyes, ears, and other organs to the heart, the real effect there is
nothing but motion, or endeavour; which consisteth in appetite, or
aversion, to or from the object moving. But the apparence, or sense of
that motion, is that we either call _delight_, or _trouble of mind_.
[Sidenote: Pleasure.]
This motion, which is called appetite, and for the apparence of it
_delight_, and _pleasure_, seemeth to be a corroboration of vital
motion, and a help thereunto; and therefore such things as caused
delight, were not improperly called _jucunda_, _à juvando_, from helping
or fortifying; [Sidenote: Offence.] and the contrary, _molesta_,
_offensive_, from hindering, and troubling the motion vital.
_Pleasure_ therefore, or _delight_, is the apparence, or sense of good;
and _molestation_, or _displeasure_, the apparence, or sense of evil.
And consequently all appetite, desire, and love, is accompanied with
some delight more or less; and all hatred and aversion, with more or
less displeasure and offence.
[Sidenote: Pleasures of sense.]
Of pleasures or delights, some arise from the sense of an object
present; and those may be called _pleasure of sense_; the word
_sensual_, as it is used by those only that condemn them, having no
place till there be laws. Of this kind are all onerations and
exonerations of the body; as also all that is pleasant, in the _sight_,
_hearing_, _smell_, _taste_, or _touch_. Others arise from the
expectation, that proceeds from foresight of the end, or consequence of
things; whether those things in the sense please or displease.
[Sidenote: Pleasures of the mind.] And these are _pleasures of the mind_
of him that draweth those consequences, [Sidenote: Joy.] and are
generally called JOY. In the like manner, displeasures are some in the
sense, [Sidenote: Pain.] and called PAIN; others in the expectation of
consequences, [Sidenote: Grief.] and are called GRIEF.
These simple passions called _appetite_, _desire_, _love_, _aversion_,
_hate_, _joy_, and _grief_, have their names for divers considerations
diversified. As first, when they one succeed another, they are diversely
called from the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what
they desire. Secondly, from the object loved or hated. Thirdly, from the
consideration of many of them together. Fourthly, from the alteration or
succession itself.
[Sidenote: Hope.]
For _appetite_, with an opinion of attaining, is called HOPE.
[Sidenote: Despair.]
The same, without such opinion, DESPAIR.
[Sidenote: Fear.]
_Aversion_, with opinion of HURT from the object, FEAR.
[Sidenote: Courage.]
The same, with hope of avoiding that hurt by resistance, COURAGE.
[Sidenote: Anger.]
Sudden _courage_, ANGER.
[Sidenote: Confidence.]
Constant _hope_, CONFIDENCE of ourselves.
[Sidenote: Diffidence.]
Constant _despair_, DIFFIDENCE of ourselves.
[Sidenote: Indignation.]
_Anger_ for great hurt done to another, when we conceive the same to be
done by injury, INDIGNATION.
[Sidenote: Benevolence.]
_Desire_ of good to another, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL, CHARITY. [Sidenote:
Good nature.] If to man generally, GOOD NATURE.
[Sidenote: Covetousness.]
_Desire_ of riches, COVETOUSNESS; a name used always in signification of
blame; because men contending for them, are displeased with one another
attaining them; though the desire in itself, be to be blamed, or
allowed, according to the means by which these riches are sought.
[Sidenote: Ambition.]
_Desire_ of office, or precedence, AMBITION: a name used also in the
worse sense, for the reason before mentioned.
[Sidenote: Pusillanimity.]
_Desire_ of things that conduce but a little to our ends, and fear of
things that are but of little hindrance, PUSILLANIMITY.
[Sidenote: Magnanimity.]
_Contempt_ of little helps and hindrances, MAGNANIMITY.
[Sidenote: Valour.]
_Magnanimity_, in danger of death or wounds, VALOUR, FORTITUDE.
[Sidenote: Liberality.]
_Magnanimity_ in the use of riches, LIBERALITY.
[Sidenote: Miserableness.]
_Pusillanimity_ in the same, WRETCHEDNESS, MISERABLENESS, or PARSIMONY;
as it is liked or disliked.
[Sidenote: Kindness.]
_Love_ of persons for society, KINDNESS.
[Sidenote: Natural lust.]
_Love_ of persons for pleasing the sense only, NATURAL LUST.
[Sidenote: Luxury.]
_Love_ of the same, acquired from rumination, that is, imagination of
pleasure past, LUXURY.
[Sidenote: The passion of love.]
[Sidenote: Jealousy.]
_Love_ of one singularly, with desire to be singularly beloved, THE
PASSION OF LOVE. The same, with fear that the love is not mutual,
JEALOUSY.
[Sidenote: Revengefulness.]
_Desire_, by doing hurt to another, to make him condemn some fact of his
own, REVENGEFULNESS.
[Sidenote: Curiosity.]
_Desire_ to know why, and how, CURIOSITY; such as is in no living
creature but _man_: so that man is distinguished, not only by his
reason, but also by this singular passion from other _animals_; in whom
the appetite of food, and other pleasures of sense, by predominance,
take away the care of knowing causes; which is a lust of the mind, that
by a perseverance of delight in the continual and indefatigable
generation of knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnal
pleasure.
[Sidenote: Religion.]
[Sidenote: Superstition.]
[Sidenote: True religion.]
_Fear_ of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales
publicly allowed, RELIGION; not allowed, SUPERSTITION. And when the
power imagined, is truly such as we imagine, TRUE RELIGION.
[Sidenote: Panic terror.]
_Fear_, without the apprehension of why, or what, PANIC TERROR, called
so from the fables, that make Pan the author of them; whereas, in truth,
there is always in him that so feareth, first, some apprehension of the
cause, though the rest run away by example, every one supposing his
fellow to know why. And therefore this passion happens to none but in a
throng, or multitude of people.
[Sidenote: Admiration.]
_Joy_, from apprehension of novelty, ADMIRATION; proper to man, because
it excites the appetite of knowing the cause.
[Sidenote: Glory.]
_Joy_, arising from imagination of a man’s own power and ability, is
that exultation of the mind which is called GLORYING: which if grounded
upon the experience of his own former actions, is the same with
_confidence_: [Sidenote: Vain-glory.] but if grounded on the flattery of
others; or only supposed by himself, for delight in the consequences of
it, is called VAIN-GLORY: which name is properly given; because a well
grounded _confidence_ begetteth attempt; whereas the supposing of power
does not, and is therefore rightly called _vain_.
[Sidenote: Dejection.]
_Grief_, from opinion of want of power, is called DEJECTION of mind.
The _vain-glory_ which consisteth in the feigning or supposing of
abilities in ourselves, which we know are not, is most incident to young
men, and nourished by the histories, or fictions of gallant persons; and
is corrected oftentimes by age, and employment.
[Sidenote: Sudden glory.]
[Sidenote: Laughter.]
_Sudden glory_, is the passion which maketh those _grimaces_ called
LAUGHTER; and is caused either by some sudden act of their own, that
pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another,
by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves. And it is
incident most to them, that are conscious of the fewest abilities in
themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in their own favour, by
observing the imperfections of other men. And therefore much laughter at
the defects of others, is a sign of pusillanimity. For of great minds,
one of the proper works is, to help and free others from scorn; and
compare themselves only with the most able.
[Sidenote: Sudden dejection.]
[Sidenote: Weeping.]
On the contrary, _sudden dejection_, is the passion that causeth
WEEPING; and is caused by such accidents, as suddenly take away some
vehement hope, or some prop of their power: and they are most subject to
it, that rely principally on helps external, such as are women, and
children. Therefore some weep for the loss of friends; others for their
unkindness; others for the sudden stop made to their thoughts of
revenge, by reconciliation. But in all cases, both laughter, and
weeping, are sudden motions; custom taking them both away. For no man
laughs at old jests; or weeps for an old calamity.
[Sidenote: Shame.
Blushing.]
_Grief_, for the discovery of some defect of ability, is SHAME, or the
passion that discovereth itself in BLUSHING; and consisteth in the
apprehension of some thing dishonourable; and in young men, is a sign of
the love of good reputation, and commendable: in old men it is a sign of
the same; but because it comes too late, not commendable.
[Sidenote: Impudence.]
The _contempt_ of good reputation is called IMPUDENCE.
[Sidenote: Pity.]
_Grief_, for the calamity of another, is PITY; and ariseth from the
imagination that the like calamity may befall himself; and therefore is
called also COMPASSION, and in the phrase of this present time a
FELLOW-FEELING: and therefore for calamity arriving from great
wickedness, the best men have the least pity; and for the same calamity,
those hate pity, that think themselves least obnoxious to the same.
[Sidenote: Cruelty.]
_Contempt_, or little sense of the calamity of others, is that which men
call CRUELTY; proceeding from security of their own fortune. For, that
any man should take pleasure in other men’s great harms; without other
end of his own, I do not conceive it possible.
[Sidenote: Emulation.]
[Sidenote: Envy.]
_Grief_, for the success of a competitor in wealth, honour, or other
good, if it be joined with endeavour to enforce our own abilities to
equal or exceed him, is called EMULATION: but joined with endeavour to
supplant, or hinder a competitor, ENVY.
[Sidenote: Deliberation.]
When in the mind of man, appetites, and aversions, hopes, and fears,
concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately; and divers good
and evil consequences of the doing, or omitting the thing propounded,
come successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we have an
appetite to it; sometimes an aversion from it; sometimes hope to be able
to do it; sometimes despair, or fear to attempt it; the whole sum of
desires, aversions, hopes and fears continued till the thing be either
done, or thought impossible, is that we call DELIBERATION.
Therefore of things past, there is no _deliberation_; because manifestly
impossible to be changed: nor of things known to be impossible, or
thought so; because men know, or think such deliberation vain. But of
things impossible, which we think possible, we may deliberate; not
knowing it is in vain. And it is called _deliberation_; because it is a
putting an end to the _liberty_ we had of doing, or omitting, according
to our own appetite, or aversion.
This alternate succession of appetites, aversions, hopes and fears, is
no less in other living creatures than in man: and therefore beasts also
deliberate.
Every _deliberation_ is then said to _end_, when that whereof they
deliberate, is either done, or thought impossible; because till then we
retain the liberty of doing, or omitting; according to our appetite, or
aversion.
[Sidenote: The will.]
In _deliberation_, the last appetite, or aversion, immediately adhering
to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that we call the WILL; the
act, not the faculty, of _willing_. And beasts that have _deliberation_,
must necessarily also have _will_. The definition of the _will_, given
commonly by the Schools, that it is a _rational appetite_, is not good.
For if it were, then could there be no voluntary act against reason. For
a _voluntary act_ is that, which proceedeth from the _will_, and no
other. But if instead of a rational appetite, we shall say an appetite
resulting from a precedent deliberation, then the definition is the same
that I have given here. _Will_ therefore _is the last appetite in
deliberating_. And though we say in common discourse, a man had a will
once to do a thing, that nevertheless he forbore to do; yet that is
properly but an inclination, which makes no action voluntary; because
the action depends not of it, but of the last inclination, or appetite.
For if the intervenient appetites, make any action voluntary; then by
the same reason all intervenient aversions, should make the same action
involuntary; and so one and the same action, should be both voluntary
and involuntary.
By this it is manifest, that not only actions that have their beginning
from covetousness, ambition, lust, or other appetites to the thing
propounded; but also those that have their beginning from aversion, or
fear of those consequences that follow the omission, are _voluntary
actions_.
[Sidenote: Forms of speech, in passion.]
The forms of speech by which the passions are expressed, are partly the
same, and partly different from those, by which we express our thoughts.
And first, generally all passions may be expressed _indicatively_; as _I
love_, _I fear_, _I joy_, _I deliberate_, _I will_, _I command_: but
some of them have particular expressions by themselves, which
nevertheless are not affirmations, unless it be when they serve to make
other inferences, besides that of the passion they proceed from.
Deliberation is expressed _subjunctively_; which is a speech proper to
signify suppositions, with their consequences; as, _if this be done,
then this will follow_; and differs not from the language of reasoning,
save that reasoning is in general words; but deliberation for the most
part is of particulars. The language of desire, and aversion, is
_imperative_; as _do this_, _forbear that_; which when the party is
obliged to do, or forbear, is _command_; otherwise _prayer_; or else
_counsel_. The language of vain-glory, of indignation, pity and
revengefulness, _optative_: but of the desire to know, there is a
peculiar expression, called _interrogative_; as, _what is it_, _when
shall it_, _how is it done_, and _why so?_ other language of the
passions I find none: for cursing, swearing, reviling, and the like, do
not signify as speech; but as the actions of a tongue accustomed.
These forms of speech, I say, are expressions, or voluntary
significations of our passions: but certain signs they be not; because
they may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them, have such
passions or not. The best signs of passions present, are either in the
countenance, motions of the body, actions, and ends, or aims, which we
otherwise know the man to have.
[Sidenote: Good and evil apparent.]
And because in deliberation, the appetites, and aversions, are raised by
foresight of the good and evil consequences, and sequels of the action
whereof we deliberate; the good or evil effect thereof dependeth on the
foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldom any man
is able to see to the end. But for so far as a man seeth, if the good in
those consequences be greater than the evil, the whole chain is that
which writers call _apparent_, or _seeming good_. And contrarily, when
the evil exceedeth the good, the whole is _apparent_, or _seeming evil_:
so that he who hath by experience, or reason, the greatest and surest
prospect of consequences, deliberates best himself; and is able when he
will, to give the best counsel unto others.
[Sidenote: Felicity.]
_Continual success_ in obtaining those things which a man from time to
time desireth, that is to say, continual prospering, is that men call
FELICITY; I mean the felicity of this life. For there is no such thing
as perpetual tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because life
itself is but motion, and can never be without desire, nor without fear,
no more than without sense. What kind of felicity God hath ordained to
them that devoutly honour Him, a man shall no sooner know, than enjoy;
being joys, that now are as incomprehensible, as the word of school-men
_beatifical vision_ is unintelligible.
[Sidenote: Praise.]
The form of speech whereby men signify their opinion of the goodness of
any thing, is PRAISE. [Sidenote: Magnification.] That whereby they
signify the power and greatness of any thing, is MAGNIFYING. [Sidenote:
Μακαρισμός.] And that whereby they signify the opinion they have of a
man’s felicity, is by the Greeks called Μακαρισμός, for which we have no
name in our tongue. And thus much is sufficient for the present purpose,
to have been said of the PASSIONS.
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CHAPTER VII.
OF THE ENDS, OR RESOLUTIONS OF DISCOURSE.
Of all _discourse_, governed by desire of knowledge, there is at last an
_end_, either by attaining, or by giving over. And in the chain of
discourse, wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an end for that time.
If the discourse be merely mental, it consisteth of thoughts that the
thing will be, and will not be; or that it has been, and has not been,
alternately. So that wheresoever you break off the chain of a man’s
discourse, you leave him in a presumption of _it will be_, or, _it will
not be_; or, _it has been_, or, _has not been_. All which is _opinion_.
And that which is alternate appetite, in deliberating concerning good
and evil; the same is alternate opinion, in the enquiry of the truth of
_past_, and _future_. [Sidenote: Judgment, or sentence final.] And as
the last appetite in deliberation, is called the _will_; so the last
opinion in search of the truth of past, and future, is called the
JUDGMENT, or _resolute_ and _final sentence_ of him that _discourseth_.
And as the whole chain of appetites alternate, in the question of good,
or bad, is called _deliberation_; [Sidenote: Doubt.] so the whole chain
of opinions alternate, in the question of true, or false, is called
DOUBT.
No discourse whatsoever, can end in absolute knowledge of fact, past, or
to come. For, as for the knowledge of fact, it is originally, sense; and
ever after, memory. And for the knowledge of consequence, which I have
said before is called science, it is not absolute, but conditional. No
man can know by discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or will be;
which is to know absolutely: but only, that if this be, that is; if this
has been, that has been; if this shall be, that shall be: which is to
know conditionally; and that not the consequence of one thing to
another; but of one name of a thing, to another name of the same thing.
[Sidenote: Science.]
And therefore, when the discourse is put into speech, and begins with
the definitions of words, and proceeds by connexion of the same into
general affirmations, and of these again into syllogisms; the end or
last sum is called the conclusion; and the thought of the mind by it
signified, is that conditional knowledge, or knowledge of the
consequence of words, which is commonly called SCIENCE. [Sidenote:
Opinion.] But if the first ground of such discourse, be not definitions;
or if the definitions be not rightly joined together into syllogisms,
then the end or conclusion, is again OPINION, namely of the truth of
somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senseless words, without
possibility of being understood. [Sidenote: Conscious.] When two, or
more men, know of one and the same fact, they are said to be CONSCIOUS
of it one to another; which is as much as to know it together. And
because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another, or of a
third; it was, and ever will be reputed a very evil act, for any man to
speak against his _conscience_: or to corrupt or force another so to do:
insomuch that the plea of conscience, has been always hearkened unto
very diligently in all times. Afterwards, men made use of the same word
metaphorically, for the knowledge of their own secret facts, and secret
thoughts; and therefore it is rhetorically said, that the conscience is
a thousand witnesses. And last of all, men, vehemently in love with
their own new opinions, though never so absurd, and obstinately bent to
maintain them, gave those their opinions also that reverenced name of
conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful, to change or speak
against them; and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at
most, but that they think so.
When a man’s discourse beginneth not at definitions, it beginneth either
at some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still called
opinion; or it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to
know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not;
and then the discourse is not so much concerning the thing, as the
person; [Sidenote: Belief. Faith.] and the resolution is called BELIEF,
and FAITH: _faith_, _in_ the man; _belief_, both _of_ the man, and _of_
the truth of what he says. So that in belief are two opinions; one of
the saying of the man; the other of his virtue. To _have faith in_, or
_trust to_, or _believe a man_, signify the same thing; namely, an
opinion of the veracity of the man: but to _believe what is said_,
signifieth only an opinion of the truth of the saying. But we are to
observe that this phrase, _I believe in_; as also the Latin, _credo in_;
and the Greek, πιστέυω ἐις, are never used but in the writings of
divines. Instead of them, in other writings are put, _I believe him_; _I
trust him_; _I have faith in him_; _I rely on him_: and in Latin, _credo
illi_: _fido illi_: and in Greek, πιστέυω αὐτω: and that this
singularity of the ecclesiastic use of the word hath raised many
disputes about the right object of the Christian faith.
But by _believing in_, as it is in the creed, is meant, not trust in the
person; but confession and acknowledgment of the doctrine. For not only
Christians, but all manner of men do so believe in God, as to hold all
for truth they hear him say, whether they understand it, or not; which
is all the faith and trust can possibly be had in any person whatsoever:
but they do not all believe the doctrine of the creed.
From whence we may infer, that when we believe any saying whatsoever it
be, to be true, from arguments taken, not from the thing itself, or from
the principles of natural reason, but from the authority, and good
opinion we have, of him that hath said it; then is the speaker, or
person we believe in, or trust in, and whose word we take, the object of
our faith; and the honour done in believing, is done to him only. And
consequently, when we believe that the Scriptures are the word of God,
having no immediate revelation from God himself, our belief, faith, and
trust is in the church; whose word we take, and acquiesce therein. And
they that believe that which a prophet relates unto them in the name of
God, take the word of the prophet, do honour to him, and in him trust,
and believe, touching the truth of what he relateth, whether he be a
true, or a false prophet. And so it is also with all other history. For
if I should not believe all that is written by historians, of the
glorious acts of _Alexander_, or _Cæsar_; I do not think the ghost of
_Alexander_, or _Cæsar_, had any just cause to be offended; or any body
else, but the historian. If _Livy_ say the Gods made once a cow speak,
and we believe it not; we distrust not God therein, but _Livy_. So that
it is evident, that whatsoever we believe, upon no other reason, than
what is drawn from authority of men only, and their writings; whether
they be sent from God or not, is faith in men only.
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CHAPTER VIII.
OF THE VIRTUES COMMONLY CALLED INTELLECTUAL;
AND THEIR CONTRARY DEFECTS.
[Sidenote: Intellectual virtue defined.]
VIRTUE generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is valued
for eminence; and consisteth in comparison. For if all things were equal
in all men, nothing would be prized. And by _virtues intellectual_, are
always understood such abilities of the mind, as men praise, value, and
desire should be in themselves; and go commonly under the name of a
_good wit_; though the same word _wit_, be used also, to distinguish one
certain ability from the rest.
[Sidenote: Wit, natural, or acquired.]
These _virtues_ are of two sorts; _natural_, and _acquired_. By natural,
I mean not, that which a man hath from his birth: for that is nothing
else but sense; wherein men differ so little one from another, and from
brute beasts, as it is not to be reckoned amongst virtues. [Sidenote:
Natural wit.] But I mean, that _wit_, which is gotten by use only, and
experience; without method, culture, or instruction. This NATURAL WIT,
consisteth principally in two things; _celerity of imagining_, that is,
swift succession of one thought to another; and _steady direction_ to
some approved end. On the contrary a slow imagination, maketh that
defect, or fault of the mind, which is commonly called DULLNESS,
_stupidity_, and sometimes by other names that signify slowness of
motion, or difficulty to be moved.
[Sidenote: Good wit, or fancy.]
And this difference of quickness, is caused by the difference of men’s
passions; that love and dislike, some one thing, some another: and
therefore some men’s thoughts run one way, some another; and are held
to, and observe differently the things that pass through their
imagination. And whereas in this succession of men’s thoughts, there is
nothing to observe in the things they think on, but either in what they
be _like one another_, or in what they be _unlike_, or _what they serve
for_, or _how they serve to such a purpose_; those that observe their
similitudes, in case they be such as are but rarely observed by others,
are said to have a _good wit_; by which, in this occasion, is meant a
_good fancy_. But they that observe their differences, and
dissimilitudes; which is called _distinguishing_, and _discerning_,
[Sidenote: Good judgment.] and _judging_ between thing and thing; in
case, such discerning be not easy, are said to have a _good judgment_:
and particularly in matter of conversation and business; wherein, times,
places, and persons are to be discerned, [Sidenote: Discretion.] this
virtue is called DISCRETION. The former, that is, fancy, without the
help of judgment, is not commended as a virtue: but the latter which is
judgment, and discretion, is commended for itself, without the help of
fancy. Besides the discretion of times, places, and persons, necessary
to a good fancy, there is required also an often application of his
thoughts to their end; that is to say, to some use to be made of them.
This done; he that hath this virtue, will be easily fitted with
similitudes, that will please, not only by illustrations of his
discourse, and adorning it with new and apt metaphors; but also, by the
rarity of their invention. But without steadiness, and direction to some
end, a great fancy is one kind of madness; such as they have, that
entering into any discourse, are snatched from their purpose, by every
thing that comes in their thought, into so many, and so long
digressions, and parentheses, that they utterly lose themselves: which
kind of folly, I know no particular name for: but the cause of it is,
sometimes want of experience; whereby that seemeth to a man new and
rare, which doth not so to others: sometimes pusillanimity; by which
that seems great to him, which other men think a trifle: and whatsoever
is new, or great, and therefore thought fit to be told, withdraws a man
by degrees from the intended way of his discourse.
In a good poem, whether it be _epic_, or _dramatic_; as also in
_sonnets_, _epigrams_, and other pieces, both judgment and fancy are
required: but the fancy must be more eminent; because they please for
the extravagancy; but ought not to displease by indiscretion.
In a good history, the judgment must be eminent; because the goodness
consisteth, in the method, in the truth, and in the choice of the
actions that are most profitable to be known. Fancy has no place, but
only in adorning the style.
In orations of praise, and in invectives, the fancy is predominant;
because the design is not truth, but to honour or dishonour; which is
done by noble, or by vile comparisons. The judgment does but suggest
what circumstances make an action laudable, or culpable.
In hortatives, and pleadings, as truth, or disguise serveth best to the
design in hand; so is the judgment, or the fancy most required.
[Sidenote: Discretion.]
In demonstration, in counsel, and all rigorous search of truth, judgment
does all, except sometimes the understanding have need to be opened by
some apt similitude; and then there is so much use of fancy. But for
metaphors, they are in this case utterly excluded. For seeing they
openly profess deceit; to admit them into counsel, or reasoning, were
manifest folly.
And in any discourse whatsoever, if the defect of discretion be
apparent, how extravagant soever the fancy be, the whole discourse will
be taken for a sign of want of wit; and so will it never when the
discretion is manifest, though the fancy be never so ordinary.
The secret thoughts of a man run over all things, holy, profane, clean,
obscene, grave, and light, without shame, or blame; which verbal
discourse cannot do, farther than the judgment shall approve of the
time, place, and persons. An anatomist, or a physician may speak, or
write his judgment of unclean things; because it is not to please, but
profit: but for another man to write his extravagant, and pleasant
fancies of the same, is as if a man, from being tumbled into the dirt,
should come and present himself before good company. And it is the want
of discretion that makes the difference. Again, in professed remissness
of mind, and familiar company, a man may play with the sounds, and
equivocal significations of words; and that many times with encounters
of extraordinary fancy: but in a sermon, or in public, or before persons
unknown, or whom we ought to reverence; there is no gingling of words
that will not be accounted folly: and the difference is only in the want
of discretion. So that where wit is wanting, it is not fancy that is
wanting, but discretion. Judgment therefore without fancy is wit, but
fancy without judgment, not.
[Sidenote: Prudence.]
When the thoughts of a man, that has a design in hand, running over a
multitude of things, observes how they conduce to that design; or what
design they may conduce unto; if his observations be such as are not
easy, or usual, this wit of his is called PRUDENCE; and depends on much
experience, and memory of the like things, and their consequences
heretofore. In which there is not so much difference of men; as there is
in their fancies and judgment; because the experience of men equal in
age, is not much unequal, as to the quantity; but lies in different
occasions; every one having his private designs. To govern well a
family, and a kingdom, are not different degrees of prudence; but
different sorts of business; no more than to draw a picture in little,
or as great, or greater than the life, are different degrees of art. A
plain husbandman is more prudent in affairs of his own house, than a
privy-councillor in the affairs of another man.
[Sidenote: Craft.]
To prudence, if you add the use of unjust, or dishonest means, such as
usually are prompted to men by fear, or want; you have that crooked
wisdom, which is called CRAFT; which is a sign of pusillanimity. For
magnanimity is contempt of unjust, or dishonest helps. And that which
the Latins call _versutia_, translated into English, _shifting_, and is
a putting off of a present danger or incommodity, by engaging into a
greater, as when a man robs one to pay another, is but a shorter-sighted
craft, called _versutia_, from _versura_, which signifies taking money
at usury for the present payment of interest.
[Sidenote: Acquired wit.]
As for _acquired wit_, I mean acquired by method and instruction, there
is none but reason; which is grounded on the right use of speech, and
produceth the sciences. But of reason and science I have already spoken,
in the fifth and sixth chapters.
The causes of this difference of wits, are in the passions; and the
difference of passions proceedeth, partly from the different
constitution of the body, and partly from different education. For if
the difference proceeded from the temper of the brain, and the organs of
sense, either exterior or interior, there would be no less difference of
men in their sight, hearing, or other senses, than in their fancies and
discretions. It proceeds therefore from the passions; which are
different, not only from the difference of mens’ complexions; but also
from their difference of customs, and education.
The passions that most of all cause the difference of wit, are
principally, the more or less desire of power, of riches, of knowledge,
and of honour. All which may be reduced to the first, that is, desire of
power. For riches, knowledge, and honour, are but several sorts of
power.
And therefore, a man who has no great passion for any of these things;
but is, as men term it, indifferent; though he may be so far a good man,
as to be free from giving offence; yet he cannot possibly have either a
great fancy, or much judgment. For the thoughts are to the desires, as
scouts, and spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the things
desired: all steadiness of the mind’s motion, and all quickness of the
same, proceeding from thence: for as to have no desire, is to be dead:
[Sidenote: Giddiness.] so to have weak passions, is dullness; and to
have passions indifferently for everything, GIDDINESS, and
_distraction_; [Sidenote: Madness.] and to have stronger and more
vehement passions for anything, than is ordinarily seen in others, is
that which men call MADNESS.
Whereof there be almost as many kinds, as of the passions themselves.
Sometimes the extraordinary and extravagant passion, proceedeth from the
evil constitution of the organs of the body, or harm done them; and
sometimes the hurt, and indisposition of the organs, is caused by the
vehemence, or long continuance of the passion. But in both cases the
madness is of one and the same nature.
The passion, whose violence, or continuance, maketh madness, is either
great _vain-glory_; which is commonly called _pride_, and
_self-conceit_; or great _dejection_ of mind.
[Sidenote: Rage.]
Pride, subjecteth a man to anger, the excess whereof, is the madness
called RAGE and FURY. And thus it comes to pass that excessive desire of
revenge, when it becomes habitual, hurteth the organs, and becomes rage:
that excessive love, with jealousy, becomes also rage: excessive opinion
of a man’s own self, for divine inspiration, for wisdom, learning, form
and the like, becomes distraction and giddiness: the same, joined with
envy, rage: vehement opinion of the truth of anything, contradicted by
others, rage.
[Sidenote: Melancholy.]
Dejection subjects a man to causeless fears; which is a madness,
commonly called MELANCHOLY; apparent also in divers manners as in
haunting of solitudes and graves; in superstitious behaviour; and in
fearing, some one, some another particular thing. In sum, all passions
that produce strange and unusual behaviour, are called by the general
name of madness. But of the several kinds of madness, he that would take
the pains, might enrol a legion. [Sidenote: Madness.] And if the
excesses be madness, there is no doubt but the passions themselves, when
they tend to evil, are degrees of the same.
For example, though the effect of folly, in them that are possessed of
an opinion of being inspired, be not visible always in one man, by any
very extravagant action, that proceedeth from such passion; yet, when
many of them conspire together, the rage of the whole multitude is
visible enough. For what argument of madness can there be greater, than
to clamour, strike, and throw stones at our best friends? Yet this is
somewhat less than such a multitude will do. For they will clamour,
fight against, and destroy those, by whom all their lifetime before,
they have been protected, and secured from injury. And if this be
madness in the multitude, it is the same in every particular man. For as
in the midst of the sea, though a man perceive no sound of that part of
the water next him, yet he is well assured, that part contributes as
much to the roaring of the sea, as any other part of the same quantity;
so also, though we perceive no great unquietness in one or two men, yet
we may be well assured, that their singular passions, are parts of the
seditious roaring of a troubled nation. And if there were nothing else
that bewrayed their madness; yet that very arrogating such inspiration
to themselves, is argument enough. If some man in Bedlam should
entertain you with sober discourse; and you desire in taking leave, to
know what he were, that you might another time requite his civility; and
he should tell you, he were God the Father; I think you need expect no
extravagant action for argument of his madness.
This opinion of inspiration, called commonly, private spirit, begins
very often, from some lucky finding of an error generally held by
others; and not knowing, or not remembering, by what conduct of reason,
they came to so singular a truth, (as they think it, though it be many
times an untruth they light on) they presently admire themselves, as
being in the special grace of God Almighty, who hath revealed the same
to them supernaturally, by his Spirit.
Again, that madness is nothing else, but too much appearing passion, may
be gathered out of the effects of wine, which are the same with those of
the evil disposition of the organs. For the variety of behaviour in men
that have drunk too much, is the same with that of madmen: some of them
raging, others loving, others laughing, all extravagantly, but according
to their several domineering passions: for the effect of the wine, does
but remove dissimulation, and take from them the sight of the deformity
of their passions. For, I believe, the most sober men, when they walk
alone without care and employment of the mind, would be unwilling the
vanity and extravagance of their thoughts at that time should be
publicly seen; which is a confession, that passions unguided, are for
the most part mere madness.
The opinions of the world, both in ancient and later ages, concerning
the cause of madness, have been two. Some deriving them from the
passions; some, from demons, or spirits, either good or bad, which they
thought might enter into a man, possess him, and move his organs in such
strange and uncouth manner, as madmen use to do. The former sort
therefore, called such men, madmen: but the latter, called them
sometimes _demoniacs_, that is, possessed with spirits; sometimes
_enurgumeni_, that is, agitated or moved with spirits; and now in Italy
they are called, not only _pazzi_, madmen; but also _spiritati_, men
possessed.
There was once a great conflux of people in Abdera, a city of the
Greeks, at the acting of the tragedy of _Andromeda_, upon an extreme hot
day; whereupon, a great many of the spectators falling into fevers, had
this accident from the heat, and from the tragedy together, that they
did nothing but pronounce iambics, with the names of Perseus and
Andromeda; which, together with the fever, was cured by the coming on of
winter; and this madness was thought to proceed from the passion
imprinted by the tragedy. Likewise there reigned a fit of madness in
another Grecian city, which seized only the young maidens; and caused
many of them to hang themselves. This was by most then thought an act of
the Devil. But one that suspected, that contempt of life in them, might
proceed from some passion of the mind, and supposing that they did not
contemn also their honour, gave counsel to the magistrates, to strip
such as so hanged themselves, and let them hang out naked. This, the
story says, cured that madness. But on the other side, the same
Grecians, did often ascribe madness to the operation of Eumenides, or
Furies; and sometimes of Ceres, Phœbus, and other gods; so much did men
attribute to phantasms, as to think them aëreal living bodies; and
generally to call them spirits. And as the Romans in this, held the same
opinion with the Greeks, so also did the Jews; for they called madmen
prophets, or, according as they thought the spirits good or bad,
demoniacs: and some of them called both prophets and demoniacs, madmen;
and some called the same man both demoniac, and madman. But for the
Gentiles it is no wonder, because diseases and health, vices and
virtues, and many natural accidents, were with them termed, and
worshipped as demons. So that a man was to understand by demon, as well,
sometimes an ague, as a devil. But for the Jews to have such opinion, is
somewhat strange. For neither Moses nor Abraham pretended to prophecy by
possession of a spirit; but from the voice of God; or by a vision or
dream: nor is there anything in his law, moral or ceremonial, by which
they were taught, there was any such enthusiasm, or any possession. When
God is said, (_Numb._ xi. 25) to take from the spirit that was in Moses,
and give to the seventy elders, the Spirit of God (taking it for the
substance of God) is not divided. The Scriptures, by the Spirit of God
in man, mean a man’s spirit, inclined to godliness. And where it is
said, (_Exod._ xxiii. 8) “whom I have filled with the spirit of wisdom
to make garments for Aaron,” is not meant a spirit put into them, that
can make garments, but the wisdom of their own spirits in that kind of
work. In the like sense, the spirit of man, when it produceth unclean
actions, is ordinarily called an unclean spirit, and so other spirits,
though not always, yet as often as the virtue or vice so styled, is
extraordinary, and eminent. Neither did the other prophets of the old
Testament pretend enthusiasm; or, that God spake in them; but to them,
by voice, vision, or dream; and the _burthen of the Lord_ was not
possession, but command. How then could the Jews fall into this opinion
of possession? I can imagine no reason, but that which is common to all
men; namely, the want of curiosity to search natural causes: and their
placing felicity in the acquisition of the gross pleasures of the
senses, and the things that most immediately conduce thereto. For they
that see any strange, and unusual ability, or defect, in a man’s mind;
unless they see withal, from what cause it may probably proceed, can
hardly think it natural; and if not natural, they must needs think it
supernatural; and then what can it be, but that either God or the Devil
is in him? And hence it came to pass, when our Saviour (_Mark_ iii. 21)
was compassed about with the multitude, those of the house doubted he
was mad, and went out to hold him: but the Scribes said he had
Beelzebub, and that was it, by which he cast out devils; as if the
greater madman had awed the lesser: and that (_John_ x. 20) some said,
_he hath a devil, and is mad_; whereas others holding him for a prophet,
said, _these are not the words of one that hath a devil_. So in the old
Testament he that came to anoint Jehu, (_2 Kings_ ix. 11) was a prophet;
but some of the company asked Jehu, _what came that madman for?_ So that
in sum, it is manifest, that whosoever behaved himself in extraordinary
manner, was thought by the Jews to be possessed either with a good, or
evil spirit; except by the Sadducees, who erred so far on the other
hand, as not to believe there were at all any spirits, which is very
near to direct atheism; and thereby perhaps the more provoked others, to
term such men demoniacs, rather than madmen.
But why then does our Saviour proceed in the curing of them, as if they
were possessed; and not as if they were mad? To which I can give no
other kind of answer, but that which is given to those that urge the
Scripture in like manner against the opinion of the motion of the earth.
The Scripture was written to shew unto men the kingdom of God, and to
prepare their minds to become his obedient subjects; leaving the world,
and the philosophy thereof, to the disputation of men, for the
exercising of their natural reason. Whether the earth’s, or sun’s motion
make the day, and night; or whether the exorbitant actions of men,
proceed from passion, or from the devil, so we worship him not, it is
all one, as to our obedience, and subjection to God Almighty; which is
the thing for which the Scripture was written. As for that our Saviour
speaketh to the disease, as to a person; it is the usual phrase of all
that cure by words only, as Christ did, and enchanters pretend to do,
whether they speak to a devil or not. For is not Christ also said
(_Matt._ viii. 26) to have rebuked the winds? Is not he said also
(_Luke_ iv. 39) to rebuke a fever? Yet this does not argue that a fever
is a devil. And whereas many of the devils are said to confess Christ;
it is not necessary to interpret those places otherwise, than that those
madmen confessed him. And whereas our Saviour (_Matt._ xii. 43) speaketh
of an unclean spirit, that having gone out of a man, wandereth through
dry places, seeking rest, and finding none, and returning into the same
man, with seven other spirits worse than himself; it is manifestly a
parable, alluding to a man, that after a little endeavour to quit his
lusts, is vanquished by the strength of them; and becomes seven times
worse than he was. So that I see nothing at all in the Scripture, that
requireth a belief, that demoniacs were any other thing but madmen.
[Sidenote: Insignificant speech.]
There is yet another fault in the discourses of some men; which may also
be numbered amongst the sorts of madness; namely, that abuse of words,
whereof I have spoken before in the fifth chapter, by the name of
absurdity. And that is, when men speak such words, as put together, have
in them no signification at all; but are fallen upon by some, through
misunderstanding of the words they have received, and repeat by rote; by
others from intention to deceive by obscurity. And this is incident to
none but those, that converse in questions of matters incomprehensible,
as the School-men; or in questions of abstruse philosophy. The common
sort of men seldom speak insignificantly, and are therefore, by those
other egregious persons counted idiots. But to be assured their words
are without any thing correspondent to them in the mind, there would
need some examples; which if any man require, let him take a School-man
in his hands and see if he can translate any one chapter concerning any
difficult point, as the Trinity; the Deity; the nature of Christ;
transubstantiation; free-will, &c. into any of the modern tongues, so as
to make the same intelligible; or into any tolerable Latin, such as they
were acquainted withal, that lived when the Latin tongue was vulgar.
What is the meaning of these words, _The first cause does not
necessarily inflow any thing into the second, by force of the essential
subordination of the second causes, by which it may help it to work_?
They are the translation of the title of the sixth chapter of _Suarez’_
first book, _Of the concourse, motion, and help of God_. When men write
whole volumes of such stuff, are they not mad, or intend to make others
so? And particularly, in the question of transubstantiation; where after
certain words spoken; they that say, the white_ness_, round_ness_,
magni_tude_, quali_ty_, corruptibili_ty_, all which are incorporeal, &c.
go out of the wafer, into the body of our blessed Saviour, do they not
make those _nesses_, _tudes_, and _ties_, to be so many spirits
possessing his body? For by spirits, they mean always things, that being
incorporeal, are nevertheless moveable from one place to another. So
that this kind of absurdity, may rightly be numbered amongst the many
sorts of madness; and all the time that guided by clear thoughts of
their worldly lust, they forbear disputing, or writing thus, but lucid
intervals. And thus much of the virtues and defects intellectual.
-------
CHAPTER IX.
OF THE SEVERAL SUBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE.
[Sidenote: Knowledge.]
There are of KNOWLEDGE two kinds; whereof one is _knowledge of fact_:
the other _knowledge of the consequence of one affirmation to another_.
The former is nothing else, but sense and memory, and is _absolute
knowledge_; as when we see a fact doing, or remember it done: and this
is the knowledge required in a witness. The latter is called _science_;
and is _conditional_; as when we know, that, _if the figure shown be a
circle, then any straight line through the centre shall divide it into
two equal parts_. And this is the knowledge required in a philosopher;
that is to say, of him that pretends to reasoning.
The register of _knowledge of fact_ is called _history_. Whereof there
be two sorts: one called _natural history_; which is the history of such
facts, or effects of nature, as have no dependence on man’s _will_; such
as are the histories of _metals_, _plants_, _animals_, _regions_, and
the like. The other, is _civil history_; which is the history of the
voluntary actions of men in commonwealths.
The registers of science, are such _books_ as contain the
_demonstrations_ of consequences of one affirmation, to another; and are
commonly called _books of philosophy_; whereof the sorts are many,
according to the diversity of the matter; and may be divided in such
manner as I have divided them in the following table.
{ Consequences from the accidents
{ common to all bodies natural;
{ which are _quantity_, and _motion_.
{
{ Consequences { { Consequences from the
{ from the { { qualities of bodies
{ accidents { { _transient_, such as
{ of bodies { { sometimes appear,
{ natural; { { sometimes vanish,
{ which is { { _Meteorology_.
{ called { {
{ NATURAL { { { Consequences
{ PHILOSOPHY. { Physics or { { from the
{ { consequences { { qualities of
{ { from { { the _stars_.
{ { _qualities_. { {
{ { { Consequences
{ { { of the
{ { { qualities
{ { { from
{ { { _liquid_
SCIENCE, { { Consequences { bodies,
that is, { { from the { that fill
knowledge of { { qualities of { the space
consequences; { { bodies { between the
which is { { _permanent_. { stars; such
called also { { as are the
PHILOSOPHY. { { _air_, or
{ { substances
{ { ethereal.
{ {
{ { Consequences
{ { from the
{ { qualities of
{ { _bodies
{ { terrestrial_.
{ Consequences {
{ from the { 1. Of consequences from the _institution_
{ accidents of { of COMMONWEALTHS, to the _rights_, and
{ _politic_ { _duties_ of the _body politic_ or
{ bodies; { _sovereign_.
{ which is {
{ called {
{ POLITICS, { 2. Of consequences from the same, to the
{ and CIVIL { _duty_ and _right_ of the _subjects_.
{ PHILOSOPHY. {
Consequences from quantity, and motion _indeterminate_; { PHILOSOPHIA
which being the principles or first foundation of { PRIMA.
philosophy, is called _Philosophia Prima_. {
{ Consequences { By Figure. } { GEOMETRY.
{ from quanti- { } _Mathematics._ {
{ ty and motion { } {
Consequences { determined. { By Number. } { ARITHMETIC.
from motion {
and quantity { { Consequences }
_determined_. { Consequences { from the }
{ from the { motion and }
{ motion, and { quantity of } { ASTRONOMY.
{ quantity of { the greater } _Cosmography._ {
{ bodies in { parts of the } { GEOGRAPHY.
{ _special_. { world, as }
{ the _earth_ }
{ and _stars_. }
{
{ Consequences }
{ from the } { _Science_ of
{ motions of } _Mechanics._ { ENGINEERS.
{ special } Doctrine of {
{ kinds, and } _weight_. { ARCHITECTURE.
{ figures of } { NAVIGATION.
{ body. }
METEOROLOGY.
{ Consequences from the _light_ of the stars. Out of } SCIOGRAPHY.
{ this, and the motion of the sun, is made the science of }
{
{ Consequences from the _influences_ of the stars } ASTROLOGY.
{ Consequences { Consequences from the qualities of
{ from the { _minerals_, as _stones_, _metals_, &c.
{ parts of the {
{ earth, that {
{ are _without {
{ sense_. { Consequences from the qualities of
{ { _vegetables_.
{
{ { Consequences { Consequences from _vision_ OPTICS.
{ { from the { Consequences from _sounds_ MUSIC.
{ { qualities of {
{ { _animals { Consequences from the rest
{ Consequences { in general_. { of the _senses._
{ from the {
{ qualities of { { Consequences from the { ETHICS.
{ _animals_. { { _passions_ of men {
{ {
{ { { In _magnifying_, } POETRY.
{ Consequences { { _vilifying_, &c. }
{ from the { Consequences { In _persuading_, RHETORIC.
{ qualities of { from { In _reasoning_, LOGIC.
{ _men in { _speech_. { In _contracting_, The _Science_
special_. { of JUST and
{ UNJUST.
-------
CHAPTER X.
OF POWER, WORTH, DIGNITY, HONOUR, AND
WORTHINESS.
[Sidenote: Power.]
The POWER _of a man_, to take it universally, is his present means; to
obtain some future apparent good; and is either _original_ or
_instrumental_.
_Natural power_, is the eminence of the faculties of body, or mind: as
extraordinary strength, form, prudence, arts, eloquence, liberality,
nobility. _Instrumental_ are those powers, which acquired by these, or
by fortune, are means and instruments to acquire more: as riches,
reputation, friends, and the secret working of God, which men call good
luck. For the nature of power, is in this point, like to fame,
increasing as it proceeds; or like the motion of heavy bodies, which the
further they go, make still the more haste.
The greatest of human powers, is that which is compounded of the powers
of most men, united by consent, in one person, natural, or civil, that
has the use of all their powers depending on his will; such as is the
power of a common-wealth: or depending on the wills of each particular;
such as is the power of a faction or of divers factions leagued.
Therefore to have servants, is power; to have friends, is power: for
they are strengths united.
Also riches joined with liberality, is power; because it procureth
friends, and servants: without liberality, not so; because in this case
they defend not; but expose men to envy, as a prey.
Reputation of power, is power; because it draweth with it the adherence
of those that need protection.
So is reputation of love of a man’s country, called popularity, for the
same reason.
Also, what quality soever maketh a man beloved, or feared of many; or
the reputation of such quality, is power; because it is a means to have
the assistance, and service of many.
Good success is power; because it maketh reputation of wisdom, or good
fortune; which makes men either fear him, or rely on him.
Affability of men already in power, is increase of power; because it
gaineth love.
Reputation of prudence in the conduct of peace or war, is power; because
to prudent men, we commit the government of ourselves, more willingly
than to others.
Nobility is power, not in all places, but only in those commonwealths,
where it has privileges: for in such privileges, consisteth their power.
Eloquence is power, because it is seeming prudence.
Form is power; because being a promise of good, it recommendeth men to
the favour of women and strangers.
The sciences, are small power; because not eminent; and therefore, not
acknowledged in any man; nor are at all, but in a few, and in them, but
of a few things. For science is of that nature, as none can understand
it to be, but such as in a good measure have attained it.
Arts of public use, as fortification, making of engines, and other
instruments of war; because they confer to defence, and victory, are
power: and though the true mother of them, be science, namely the
mathematics; yet, because they are brought into the light, by the hand
of the artificer, they be esteemed, the midwife passing with the vulgar
for the mother, as his issue.
[Sidenote: Worth.]
The _value_, or WORTH of a man, is as of all other things, his price;
that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his power: and
therefore is not absolute; but a thing dependant on the need and
judgment of another. An able conductor of soldiers, is of great price in
time of war present, or imminent; but in peace not so. A learned and
uncorrupt judge, is much worth in time of peace; but not so much in war.
And as in other things, so in men, not the seller, but the buyer
determines the price. For let a man, as most men do, rate themselves at
the highest value they can; yet their true value is no more than it is
esteemed by others.
The manifestation of the value we set on one another, is that which is
commonly called honouring, and dishonouring. To value a man at a high
rate, is to _honour_ him; at a low rate, is to _dishonour_ him. But
high, and low, in this case, is to be understood by comparison to the
rate that each man setteth on himself.
[Sidenote: Dignity.]
The public worth of a man, which is the value set on him by the
commonwealth, is that which men commonly call DIGNITY. And this value of
him by the commonwealth, is understood, by offices of command,
judicature, public employment; or by names and titles, introduced for
distinction of such value.
To pray to another, for aid of any kind, is _to_ HONOUR; because a sign
we have an opinion he has power to help; and the more difficult the aid
is, the more is the honour.
[Sidenote: To honour and dishonour.]
To obey, is to honour, because no man obeys them, whom they think have
no power to help, or hurt them. And consequently to disobey, is to
_dishonour_.
To give great gifts to a man, is to honour him; because it is buying of
protection, and acknowledging of power. To give little gifts, is to
dishonour; because it is but alms, and signifies an opinion of the need
of small helps.
To be sedulous in promoting another’s good; also to flatter, is to
honour; as a sign we seek his protection or aid. To neglect, is to
dishonour.
To give way, or place to another, in any commodity, is to honour; being
a confession of greater power. To arrogate, is to dishonour.
To show any sign of love, or fear of another, is to honour; for both to
love, and to fear, is to value. To contemn, or less to love or fear,
than he expects, is to dishonour; for it is undervaluing.
To praise, magnify, or call happy, is to honour; because nothing but
goodness, power, and felicity is valued. To revile, mock, or pity, is to
dishonour.
To speak to another with consideration, to appear before him with
decency, and humility, is to honour him; as signs of fear to offend. To
speak to him rashly, to do any thing before him obscenely, slovenly,
impudently, is to dishonour.
To believe, to trust, to rely on another, is to honour him; sign of
opinion of his virtue and power. To distrust, or not believe, is to
dishonour.
To hearken to a man’s counsel, or discourse of what kind soever is to
honour; as a sign we think him wise, or eloquent, or witty. To sleep, or
go forth, or talk the while, is to dishonour.
To do those things to another, which he takes for signs of honour, or
which the law or custom makes so, is to honour; because in approving the
honour done by others, he acknowledgeth the power which others
acknowledge. To refuse to do them, is to dishonour.
To agree with in opinion, is to honour; as being a sign of approving his
judgment, and wisdom. To dissent, is dishonour, and an upbraiding of
error; and, if the dissent be in many things, of folly.
To imitate, is to honour; for it is vehemently to approve. To imitate
one’s enemy, is to dishonour.
To honour those another honours, is to honour him; as a sign of
approbation of his judgment. To honour his enemies, is to dishonour him.
To employ in counsel, or in actions of difficulty, is to honour; as a
sign of opinion of his wisdom, or other power. To deny employment in the
same cases, to those that seek it, is to dishonour.
All these ways of honouring, are natural; and as well within, as without
commonwealths. But in commonwealths, where he, or they that have the
supreme authority, can make whatsoever they please, to stand for signs
of honour, there be other honours.
A sovereign doth honour a subject, with whatsoever title, or office, or
employment, or action, that he himself will have taken for a sign of his
will to honour him.
The king of Persia, honoured Mordecai, when he appointed he should be
conducted through the streets in the king’s garment, upon one of the
king’s horses, with a crown on his head, and a prince before him,
proclaiming, _thus shall it be done to him that the king will honour_.
And yet another king of Persia, or the same another time, to one that
demanded for some great service, to wear one of the king’s robes, gave
him leave so to do; but with this addition, that he should wear it as
the king’s fool; and then it was dishonour. So that of civil honour, the
fountain is in the person of the commonwealth, and dependeth on the will
of the sovereign; and is therefore temporary, and called _civil honour_;
such as magistracy, offices, titles; and in some places coats and
scutcheons painted: and men honour such as have them, as having so many
signs of favour in the commonwealth; which favour is power.
[Sidenote: Honourable.]
_Honourable_ is whatsoever possession, action, or quality, is an
argument and sign of power.
[Sidenote: Dishonourable.]
And therefore to be honoured, loved, or feared of many, is honourable;
as arguments of power. To be honoured of few or none, _dishonourable_.
Dominion, and victory is honourable; because acquired by power; and
servitude, for need, or fear, is dishonourable.
Good fortune, if lasting, honourable; as a sign of the favour of God.
Ill fortune, and losses, dishonourable. Riches, are honourable; for they
are power. Poverty, dishonourable. Magnanimity, liberality, hope,
courage, confidence, are honourable; for they proceed from the
conscience of power. Pusillanimity, parsimony, fear, diffidence, are
dishonourable.
Timely resolution, or determination of what a man is to do, is
honourable; as being the contempt of small difficulties, and dangers.
And irresolution, dishonourable; as a sign of too much valuing of little
impediments, and little advantages: for when a man has weighed things as
long as the time permits, and resolves not, the difference of weight is
but little; and therefore if he resolve not, he overvalues little
things, which is pusillanimity.
[Sidenote: Honourable & Dishonourable.]
All actions, and speeches, that proceed, or seem to proceed, from much
experience, science, discretion, or wit, are honourable; for all these
are powers. Actions, or words that proceed from error, ignorance, or
folly, dishonourable.
Gravity, as far forth as it seems to proceed from a mind employed on
something else, is honourable; because employment is a sign of power.
But if it seem to proceed from a purpose to appear grave, it is
dishonourable. For the gravity of the former, is like the steadiness of
a ship laden with merchandize; but of the latter, like the steadiness of
a ship ballasted with sand, and other trash.
To be conspicuous, that is to say, to be known, for wealth, office,
great actions, or any eminent good, is honourable; as a sign of the
power for which he is conspicuous. On the contrary, obscurity, is
dishonourable.
To be descended from conspicuous parents, is honourable; because they
the more easily attain the aids, and friends of their ancestors. On the
contrary, to be descended from obscure parentage, is dishonourable.
Actions proceeding from equity, joined with loss, are honourable; as
signs of magnanimity: for magnanimity is a sign of power. On the
contrary, craft, shifting, neglect of equity, is dishonourable.
Covetousness of great riches, and ambition of great honours, are
honourable; as signs of power to obtain them. Covetousness, and
ambition, of little gains, or preferments, is dishonourable.
Nor does it alter the case of honour, whether an action, so it be great
and difficult, and consequently a sign of much power, be just or unjust:
for honour consisteth only in the opinion of power. Therefore the
ancient heathen did not think they dishonoured, but greatly honoured the
Gods, when they introduced them in their poems, committing rapes,
thefts, and other great, but unjust, or unclean acts: insomuch as
nothing is so much celebrated in Jupiter, as his adulteries; nor in
Mercury, as his frauds, and thefts: of whose praises, in a hymn of
Homer, the greatest is this, that being born in the morning, he had
invented music at noon, and before night, stolen away the cattle of
Apollo, from his herdsmen.
Also amongst men, till there were constituted great commonwealths, it
was thought no dishonour to be a pirate, or a highway thief; but rather
a lawful trade, not only amongst the Greeks, but also amongst all other
nations; as is manifest by the histories of ancient time. And at this
day, in this part of the world, private duels are, and always will be
honourable, though unlawful, till such time as there shall be honour
ordained for them that refuse, and ignominy for them that make the
challenge. For duels also are many times effects of courage; and the
ground of courage is always strength or skill, which are power; though
for the most part they be effects of rash speaking, and of the fear of
dishonour, in one, or both the combatants; who engaged by rashness, are
driven into the lists to avoid disgrace.
[Sidenote: Coats of arms.]
Scutcheons, and coats of arms hereditary, where they have any eminent
privileges, are honourable; otherwise not: for their power consisteth
either in such privileges, or in riches, or some such thing as is
equally honoured in other men. This kind of honour, commonly called
gentry, hath been derived from the ancient Germans. For there never was
any such thing known, where the German customs were unknown. Nor is it
now any where in use, where the Germans have not inhabited. The ancient
Greek commanders, when they went to war, had their shields painted with
such devices as they pleased; insomuch as an unpainted buckler was a
sign of poverty, and of a common soldier; but they transmitted not the
inheritance of them. The Romans transmitted the marks of their families:
but they were the images, not the devices of their ancestors. Amongst
the people of Asia, Africa, and America, there is not, nor was ever, any
such thing. The Germans only had that custom; from whom it has been
derived into England, France, Spain, and Italy, when in great numbers
they either aided the Romans, or made their own conquests in these
western parts of the world.
For Germany, being anciently, as all other countries, in their
beginnings, divided amongst an infinite number of little lords, or
masters of families, that continually had wars one with another; those
masters, or lords, principally to the end they might, when they were
covered with arms, be known by their followers; and partly for ornament,
both painted their armour, or their scutcheon, or coat, with the picture
of some beast, or other thing; and also put some eminent and visible
mark upon the crest of their helmets. And this ornament both of the
arms, and crest, descended by inheritance to their children; to the
eldest pure, and to the rest with some note of diversity, such as the
old master, that is to say in Dutch, the _Here-alt_ thought fit. But
when many such families, joined together, made a greater monarchy, this
duty of the Herealt, to distinguish scutcheons, was made a private
office apart. And the issue of these lords, is the great and ancient
gentry; which for the most part bear living creatures, noted for
courage, and rapine; or castles, battlements, belts, weapons, bars,
palisadoes, and other notes of war; nothing being then in honour, but
virtue military. Afterwards, not only kings, but popular commonwealths,
gave divers manners of scutcheons, to such as went forth to the war, or
returned from it, for encouragement, or recompense to their service. All
which, by an observing reader, may be found in such ancient histories,
Greek and Latin, as make mention of the German nation and manners, in
their times.
[Sidenote: Titles of honour.]
Titles of _honour_, such as are duke, count, marquis, and baron, are
honourable; as signifying the value set upon them by the sovereign power
of the commonwealth: which titles, were in old time titles of office,
and command, derived some from the Romans, some from the Germans and
French: dukes, in Latin _duces_, being generals in war: counts,
_comites_, such as bear the general company out of friendship, and were
left to govern and defend places conquered, and pacified: marquises,
_marchiones_, were counts that governed the marches, or bounds of the
empire. Which titles of duke, count, and marquis, came into the empire,
about the time of Constantine the Great, from the customs of the German
_militia_. But baron, seems to have been a title of the Gauls, and
signifies a great man; such as were the king’s, or prince’s men, whom
they employed in war about their persons; and seems to be derived from
_vir_, to _ber_, and _bar_, that signified the same in the language of
the Gauls, that _vir_ in Latin; and thence to _bero_, and _baro_: so
that such men were called _berones_, and after _barones_; and, in
Spanish, _varones_. But he that would know more particularly the
original of titles of honour, may find it, as I have done this, in Mr.
Selden’s most excellent treatise of that subject. In process of time
these offices of honour, by occasion of trouble, and for reasons of good
and peaceable government, were turned into mere titles; serving for the
most part, to distinguish the precedence, place, and order of subjects
in the commonwealth: and men were made dukes, counts, marquises, and
barons of places, wherein they had neither possession, nor command: and
other titles also, were devised to the same end.
[Sidenote: Worthiness.]
WORTHINESS, is a thing different from the worth, or value of a man; and
also from his merit, or desert, and consisteth in a particular power, or
ability for that, whereof he is said to be worthy: [Sidenote: Fitness.]
which particular ability, is usually named FITNESS, or _aptitude_.
For he is worthiest to be a commander, to be a judge, or to have any
other charge, that is best fitted, with the qualities required to the
well discharging of it; and worthiest of riches, that has the qualities
most requisite for the well using of them: any of which qualities being
absent, one may nevertheless be a worthy man, and valuable for something
else. Again, a man may be worthy of riches, office, and employment, that
nevertheless, can plead no right to have it before another; and
therefore cannot be said to merit or deserve it. For merit presupposeth
a right, and that the thing deserved is due by promise: of which I shall
say more hereafter, when I shall speak of contracts.
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CHAPTER XI.
OF THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS.
[Sidenote: What is here meant by manners.]
By MANNERS, I mean not here, decency of behaviour; as how one should
salute another, or how a man should wash his mouth, or pick his teeth
before company, and such other points of the _small morals_; but those
qualities of mankind, that concern their living together in peace, and
unity. To which end we are to consider, that the felicity of this life,
consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is no such
_finis ultimus_, utmost aim, nor _summum bonum_, greatest good, as is
spoken of in the books of the old moral philosophers. Nor can a man any
more live, whose desires are at an end, than he, whose senses and
imaginations are at a stand. Felicity is a continual progress of the
desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being
still but the way to the latter. The cause whereof is, that the object
of man’s desire, is not to enjoy once only, and for one instant of time;
but to assure for ever, the way of his future desire. And therefore the
voluntary actions, and inclinations of all men, tend, not only to the
procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life; and differ only
in the way: which ariseth partly from the diversity of passions, in
divers men; and partly from the difference of the knowledge, or opinion
each one has of the causes, which produce the effect desired.
[Sidenote: A restless desire of power in all men.]
So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all
mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that
ceaseth only in death. And the cause of this, is not always that a man
hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or
that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot
assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without
the acquisition of more. And from hence it is, that kings, whose power
is greatest, turn their endeavours to the assuring it at home by laws,
or abroad by wars: and when that is done, there succeedeth a new desire;
in some, of fame from new conquest; in others, of ease and sensual
pleasure; in others, of admiration, or being flattered for excellence in
some art, or other ability of the mind.
[Sidenote: Love of contention from competition.]
Competition of riches, honour, command, or other power, inclineth to
contention, enmity, and war: because the way of one competitor, to the
attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repel the
other. Particularly, competition of praise, inclineth to a reverence of
antiquity. For men contend with the living, not with the dead; to these
ascribing more than due, that they may obscure the glory of the other.
[Sidenote: Civil obedience from love of ease.]
Desire of ease, and sensual delight, disposeth men to obey a common
power: because by such desires, a man doth abandon the protection that
might be hoped for from his own industry, and labour. [Sidenote: From
fear of death, or wounds.] Fear of death, and wounds, disposeth to the
same; and for the same reason. On the contrary, needy men, and hardy,
not contented with their present condition; as also, all men that are
ambitious of military command, are inclined to continue the causes of
war; and to stir up trouble and sedition: for there is no honour
military but by war; nor any such hope to mend an ill game, as by
causing a new shuffle.
[Sidenote: And from love of arts.]
Desire of knowledge, and arts of peace, inclineth men to obey a common
power: for such desire, containeth a desire of leisure; and consequently
protection from some other power than their own.
[Sidenote: Love of virtue from love of praise.]
Desire of praise, disposeth to laudable actions, such as please them
whose judgment they value; for of those men whom we contemn, we contemn
also the praises. Desire of fame after death does the same. And though
after death, there be no sense of the praise given us on earth, as being
joys, that are either swallowed up in the unspeakable joys of Heaven, or
extinguished in the extreme torments of hell: yet is not such fame vain;
because men have a present delight therein, from the foresight of it,
and of the benefit that may redound thereby to their posterity: which
though they now see not, yet they imagine; and anything that is pleasure
to the sense, the same also is pleasure in the imagination.
[Sidenote: Hate, from difficulty of requiting great benefits.]
To have received from one, to whom we think ourselves equal, greater
benefits than there is hope to requite, disposeth to counterfeit love;
but really secret hatred; and puts a man into the estate of a desperate
debtor, that in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitly wishes him
there, where he might never see him more. For benefits oblige, and
obligation is thraldom; and unrequitable obligation perpetual thraldom;
which is to one’s equal, hateful. But to have received benefits from
one, whom we acknowledge for superior, inclines to love; because the
obligation is no new depression: and cheerful acceptation, which men
call _gratitude_, is such an honour done to the obliger, as is taken
generally for retribution. Also to receive benefits, though from an
equal, or inferior, as long as there is hope of requital, disposeth to
love: for in the intention of the receiver, the obligation is of aid and
service mutual; from whence proceedeth an emulation of who shall exceed
in benefiting; the most noble and profitable contention possible;
wherein the victor is pleased with his victory, and the other revenged
by confessing it.
[Sidenote: And from conscience of deserving to be hated.]
To have done more hurt to a man, than he can, or is willing to expiate,
inclineth the doer to hate the sufferer. For he must expect revenge, or
forgiveness; both which are hateful.
[Sidenote: Promptness to hurt, from fear.]
Fear of oppression, disposeth a man to anticipate, or to seek aid by
society: for there is no other way by which a man can secure his life
and liberty.
[Sidenote: And from distrust of their own wit.]
Men that distrust their own subtlety, are, in tumult and sedition,
better disposed for victory, than they that suppose themselves wise, or
crafty. For these love to consult, the other, fearing to be
circumvented, to strike first. And in sedition, men being always in the
precincts of battle, to hold together, and use all advantages of force,
is a better stratagem, than any that can proceed from subtlety of wit.
[Sidenote: Vain undertaking from vain-glory.]
Vain-glorious men, such as without being conscious to themselves of
great sufficiency, delight in supposing themselves gallant men, are
inclined only to ostentation; but not to attempt: because when danger or
difficulty appears, they look for nothing but to have their
insufficiency discovered.
Vain-glorious men, such as estimate their sufficiency by the flattery of
other men, or the fortune of some precedent action, without assured
ground of hope from the true knowledge of themselves, are inclined to
rash engaging; and in the approach of danger, or difficulty, to retire
if they can: because not seeing the way of safety, they will rather
hazard their honour, which may be salved with an excuse; than their
lives, for which no salve is sufficient.
[Sidenote: Ambition, from opinion of sufficiency.]
Men that have a strong opinion of their own wisdom in matter of
government, are disposed to ambition. Because without public employment
in council or magistracy, the honour of their wisdom is lost. And
therefore eloquent speakers are inclined to ambition; for eloquence
seemeth wisdom, both to themselves and others.
[Sidenote: Irresolution, from too great valuing of small matters.]
Pusillanimity disposeth men to irresolution, and consequently to lose
the occasions, and fittest opportunities of action. For after men have
been in deliberation till the time of action approach, if it be not then
manifest what is best to be done, it is a sign, the difference of
motives, the one way and the other, are not great: therefore not to
resolve then, is to lose the occasion by weighing of trifles; which is
pusillanimity.
Frugality, though in poor men a virtue, maketh a man unapt to atchieve
such actions, as require the strength of many men at once: for it
weakeneth their endeavour, which is to be nourished and kept in vigour
by reward.
[Sidenote: Confidence in others, from ignorance of the marks of wisdom
and kindness.]
Eloquence, with flattery, disposeth men to confide in them that have it;
because the former is seeming wisdom, the latter seeming kindness. Add
to them military reputation, and it disposeth men to adhere, and subject
themselves to those men that have them. The two former having given them
caution against danger from him; the latter gives them caution against
danger from others.
[Sidenote: And from ignorance of natural causes.]
Want of science, that is, ignorance of causes, disposeth, or rather
constraineth a man to rely on the advice, and authority of others. For
all men whom the truth concerns, if they rely not on their own, must
rely on the opinion of some other, whom they think wiser than
themselves, and see not why he should deceive them.
[Sidenote: And from want of understanding.]
Ignorance of the signification of words, which is want of understanding,
disposeth men to take on trust, not only the truth they know not; but
also the errors; and which is more, the nonsense of them they trust: for
neither error nor nonsense, can without a perfect understanding of
words, be detected.
From the same it proceedeth, that men give different names, to one and
the same thing, from the difference of their own passions: as they that
approve a private opinion, call it opinion; but they that mislike it,
heresy: and yet heresy signifies no more than private opinion; but has
only a greater tincture of choler.
From the same also it proceedeth, that men cannot distinguish, without
study and great understanding, between one action of many men, and many
actions of one multitude; as for example, between one action of all the
senators of Rome in killing Cataline, and the many actions of a number
of senators in killing Cæsar; and therefore are disposed to take for the
action of the people, that which is a multitude of actions done by a
multitude of men, led perhaps by the persuasion of one.
[Sidenote: Adherence to custom, from ignorance of the nature of right
and wrong.]
Ignorance of the causes, and original constitution of right, equity,
law, and justice, disposeth a man to make custom and example the rule of
his actions; in such manner, as to think that unjust which it hath been
the custom to punish; and that just, of the impunity and approbation
whereof they can produce an example, or, as the lawyers which only use
this false measure of justice barbarously call it, a precedent; like
little children, that have no other rule of good and evil manners, but
the correction they receive from their parents and masters; save that
children are constant to their rule, whereas, men are not so; because
grown old, and stubborn, they appeal from custom to reason, and from
reason to custom, as it serves their turn; receding from custom when
their interest requires it, and setting themselves against reason, as
oft as reason is against them: which is the cause, that the doctrine of
right and wrong, is perpetually disputed, both by the pen and the sword:
whereas the doctrine of lines, and figures, is not so; because men care
not, in that subject, what be truth, as a thing that crosses no man’s
ambition, profit or lust. For I doubt not, but if it had been a thing
contrary to any man’s right of dominion, or to the interest of men that
have dominion, _that the three angles of a triangle, should be equal to
two angles of a square_; that doctrine should have been, if not
disputed, yet by the burning of all books of geometry, suppressed, as
far as he whom it concerned was able.
[Sidenote: Adherence to private men, from ignorance of the causes of
peace.]
Ignorance of remote causes, disposeth men to attribute all events, to
the causes immediate, and instrumental: for these are all the causes
they perceive. And hence it comes to pass, that in all places, men that
are grieved with payments to the public, discharge their anger upon the
publicans, that is to say, farmers, collectors, and other officers of
the public revenue; and adhere to such as find fault with the public
government; and thereby, when they have engaged themselves beyond hope
of justification, fall also upon the supreme authority, for fear of
punishment, or shame of receiving pardon.
[Sidenote: Credulity, from ignorance of nature.]
Ignorance of natural causes, disposeth a man to credulity, so as to
believe many times impossibilities: for such know nothing to the
contrary, but that they may be true; being unable to detect the
impossibility. And credulity, because men like to be hearkened unto in
company, disposeth them to lying: so that ignorance itself without
malice, is able to make a man both to believe lies, and tell them; and
sometimes also to invent them.
[Sidenote: Curiosity to know, from care of future time.]
Anxiety for the future time, disposeth men to inquire into the causes of
things: because the knowledge of them, maketh men the better able to
order the present to their best advantage.
[Sidenote: Natural religion from the same.]
Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man from the
consideration of the effect, to seek the cause; and again, the cause of
that cause; till of necessity he must come to this thought at last, that
there is some cause, whereof there is no former cause, but is eternal;
which is it men call God. So that it is impossible to make any profound
inquiry into natural causes, without being inclined thereby to believe
there is one God eternal; though they cannot have any idea of him in
their mind, answerable to his nature. For as a man that is born blind,
hearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire, and being brought to
warm himself by the same, may easily conceive, and assure himself, there
is somewhat there, which men call _fire_, and is the cause of the heat
he feels; but cannot imagine what it is like; nor have an idea of it in
his mind, such as they have that see it: so also by the visible things
in this world, and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a
cause of them, which men call God; and yet not have an idea, or image of
him in his mind.
And they that make little, or no inquiry into the natural causes of
things, yet from the fear that proceeds from the ignorance itself, of
what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm, are
inclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, several kinds of powers
invisible; and to stand in awe of their own imaginations; and in time of
distress to invoke them; as also in the time of an expected good
success, to give them thanks; making the creatures of their own fancy,
their gods. By which means it hath come to pass, that from the
innumerable variety of fancy, men have created in the world innumerable
sorts of gods. And this fear of things invisible, is the natural seed of
that, which every one in himself calleth religion; and in them that
worship, or fear that power otherwise than they do, superstition.
And this seed of religion, having been observed by many; some of those
that have observed it, have been inclined thereby to nourish, dress, and
form it into laws; and to add to it of their own invention, any opinion
of the causes of future events, by which they thought they should be
best able to govern others, and make unto themselves the greatest use of
their powers.
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CHAPTER XII.
OF RELIGION.
[Sidenote: Religion in man only.]
Seeing there are no signs, nor fruit of _religion_, but in man only;
there it no cause to doubt, but that the seed of _religion_, is also
only in man; and consisteth in some peculiar quality, or at least in
some eminent degree thereof, not to be found in any other living
creatures.
[Sidenote: First, from his desire of knowing causes.]
And first, it is peculiar to the nature of man, to be inquisitive into
the causes of the events they see, some more, some less; but all men so
much, as to be curious in the search of the causes of their own good and
evil fortune.
[Sidenote: From the consideration of the beginning of things.]
Secondly, upon the sight of anything that hath a beginning, to think
also it had a cause, which determined the same to begin, then when it
did, rather than sooner or later.
[Sidenote: From his observation of the sequel of things.]
Thirdly, whereas there is no other felicity of beasts, but the enjoying
of their quotidian food, ease, and lusts; as having little or no
foresight of the time to come, for want of observation, and memory of
the order, consequence, and dependence of the things they see; man
observeth how one event hath been produced by another; and remembereth
in them antecedence and consequence; and when he cannot assure himself
of the true causes of things, (for the causes of good and evil fortune
for the most part are invisible,) he supposes causes of them, either
such as his own fancy suggesteth; or trusteth the authority of other
men, such as he thinks to be his friends, and wiser than himself.
[Sidenote: The natural cause of religion, the anxiety of the time to
come.]
The two first, make anxiety. For being assured that there be causes of
all things that have arrived hitherto, or shall arrive hereafter; it is
impossible for a man, who continually endeavoureth to secure himself
against the evil he fears, and procure the good he desireth, not to be
in a perpetual solicitude of the time to come; so that every man,
especially those that are over provident, are in a state like to that of
Prometheus. For as Prometheus, which interpreted, is, _the prudent man_,
was bound to the hill Caucasus, a place of large prospect, where, an
eagle feeding on his liver, devoured in the day, as much as was repaired
in the night: so that man, which looks too far before him, in the care
of future time, hath his heart all the day long, gnawed on by fear of
death, poverty, or other calamity; and has no repose, nor pause of his
anxiety, but in sleep.
[Sidenote: Which makes them fear the power of invisible things.]
This perpetual fear, always accompanying mankind in the ignorance of
causes, as it were in the dark, must needs have for object something.
And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to
accuse, either of their good, or evil fortune, but some _power_, or
agent _invisible_: in which sense perhaps it was, that some of the old
poets said, that the gods were at first created by human fear: which
spoken of the gods, that is to say, of the many gods of the Gentiles, is
very true. But the acknowledging of one God, eternal, infinite, and
omnipotent, may more easily be derived, from the desire men have to know
the causes of natural bodies, and their several virtues, and operations;
than from the fear of what was to befall them in time to come. For he
that from any effect he seeth come to pass, should reason to the next
and immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause,
and plunge himself profoundly in the pursuit of causes; shall at last
come to this, that there must be, as even the heathen philosophers
confessed, one first mover; that is, a first, and an eternal cause of
all things; which is that which men mean by the name of God: and all
this without thought of their fortune; the solicitude whereof, both
inclines to fear, and hinders them from the search of the causes of
other things; and thereby gives occasion of feigning of as many gods, as
there be men that feign them.
[Sidenote: And suppose them incorporeal.]
And for the matter, or substance of the invisible agents, so fancied;
they could not by natural cogitation, fall upon any other conceit, but
that it was the same with that of the soul of man; and that the soul of
man, was of the same substance, with that which appeareth in a dream, to
one that sleepeth; or in a looking-glass, to one that is awake; which,
men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but creatures of
the fancy, think to be real, and external substances; and therefore call
them ghosts; as the Latins called them _imagines_, and _umbræ_; and
thought them spirits, that is, thin aerial bodies; and those invisible
agents, which they feared, to be like them; save that they appear, and
vanish when they please. But the opinion that such spirits were
incorporeal, or immaterial, could never enter into the mind of any man
by nature; because, though men may put together words of contradictory
signification, as _spirit_, and _incorporeal_; yet they can never have
the imagination of any thing answering to them: and therefore, men that
by their own meditation, arrive to the acknowledgment of one infinite,
omnipotent, and eternal God, chose rather to confess he is
incomprehensible, and above their understanding, than to define his
nature by _spirit incorporeal_, and then confess their definition to be
unintelligible: or if they give him such a title, it is not
_dogmatically_, with intention to make the divine nature understood; but
_piously_, to honour him with attributes, of significations, as remote
as they can from the grossness of bodies visible.
[Sidenote: But know not the way how they effect anything.]
Then, for the way by which they think these invisible agents wrought
their effects; that is to say, what immediate causes they used, in
bringing things to pass, men that know not what it is that we call
_causing_, that is, almost all men, have no other rule to guess by, but
by observing, and remembering what they have seen to precede the like
effect at some other time, or times before, without seeing between the
antecedent and subsequent event, any dependence or connexion at all: and
therefore from the like things past, they expect the like things to
come; and hope for good or evil luck, superstitiously, from things that
have no part at all in the causing of it: as the Athenians did for their
war at Lepanto, demand another Phormio; the Pompeian faction for their
war in Africa, another Scipio; and others have done in divers other
occasions since. In like manner they attribute their fortune to a
stander by, to a lucky or unlucky place, to words spoken, especially if
the name of God be amongst them; as charming and conjuring, the liturgy
of witches; insomuch as to believe, they have power to turn a stone into
bread, bread into a man, or any thing into any thing.
[Sidenote: But honour them as they honour men.]
Thirdly, for the worship which naturally men exhibit to powers
invisible, it can be no other, but such expressions of their reverence,
as they would use towards men; gifts, petitions, thanks, submission of
body, considerate addresses, sober behaviour, premeditated words,
swearing, that is, assuring one another of their promises, by invoking
them. Beyond that reason suggesteth nothing; but leaves them either to
rest there; or for further ceremonies, to rely on those they believe to
be wiser than themselves.
[Sidenote: And attribute to them all extraordinary events.]
Lastly, concerning how these invisible powers declare to men the things
which shall hereafter come to pass, especially concerning their good or
evil fortune in general, or good or ill success in any particular
undertaking, men are naturally at a stand; save that using to conjecture
of the time to come, by the time past, they are very apt, not only to
take casual things, after one or two encounters, for prognostics of the
like encounter ever after, but also to believe the like prognostics from
other men, of whom they have once conceived a good opinion.
[Sidenote: Four things, natural seeds of religion.]
And in these four things, opinion of ghosts, ignorance of second causes,
devotion towards what men fear, and taking of things casual for
prognostics, consisteth the natural seed of _religion_; which by reason
of the different fancies, judgments, and passions of several men, hath
grown up into ceremonies so different, that those which are used by one
man, are for the most part ridiculous to another.
[Sidenote: Made different by culture.]
For these seeds have received culture from two sorts of men. One sort
have been they, that have nourished, and ordered them, according to
their own invention. The other have done it, by God’s commandment, and
direction: but both sorts have done it, with a purpose to make those men
that relied on them, the more apt to obedience, laws, peace, charity,
and civil society. So that the religion of the former sort, is a part of
human politics; and teacheth part of the duty which earthly kings
require of their subjects. And the religion of the latter sort is divine
politics; and containeth precepts to those that have yielded themselves
subjects in the kingdom of God. Of the former sort, were all the
founders of common-wealths, and the lawgivers of the Gentiles: of the
latter sort, were Abraham, Moses, and our blessed Saviour; by whom have
been derived unto us the laws of the kingdom of God.
[Sidenote: The absurd opinion of Gentilism.]
And for that part of religion, which consisteth in opinions concerning
the nature of powers invisible, there is almost nothing that has a name,
that has not been esteemed amongst the Gentiles, in one place or
another, a god, or devil; or by their poets feigned to be inanimated,
inhabited, or possessed by some spirit or other.
The unformed matter of the world, was a god, by the name of Chaos.
The heaven, the ocean, the planets, the fire, the earth, the winds, were
so many gods.
[Sidenote: The absurd opinion of Gentilism.]
Men, women, a bird, a crocodile, a calf, a dog, a snake, an onion, a
leek, were deified. Besides that, they filled almost all places, with
spirits called _demons_: the plains, with Pan, and Panises, or Satyrs;
the woods, with Fawns, and Nymphs; the sea, with Tritons, and other
Nymphs; every river, and fountain, with a ghost of his name, and with
Nymphs; every house with its _Lares_, or familiars; every man with his
_Genius_; hell with ghosts, and spiritual officers, as Charon, Cerberus,
and the Furies; and in the night time, all places with _larvæ_,
_lemures_, ghosts of men deceased, and a whole kingdom of fairies and
bugbears. They have also ascribed divinity, and built temples to meer
accidents, and qualities; such as are time, night, day, peace, concord,
love, contention, virtue, honour, health, rust, fever, and the like;
which when they prayed for, or against, they prayed to, as if there were
ghosts of those names hanging over their heads, and letting fall, or
withholding that good, or evil, for, or against which they prayed. They
invoked also their own wit, by the name of Muses; their own ignorance,
by the name of Fortune; their own lusts by the name of Cupid; their own
rage, by the name of Furies; their own privy members, by the name of
Priapus; and attributed their pollutions, to Incubi, and Succubæ:
insomuch as there was nothing, which a poet could introduce as a person
in his poem, which they did not make either a _god_, or a _devil_.
The same authors of the religion of the Gentiles, observing the second
ground for religion, which is men’s ignorance of causes; and thereby
their aptness to attribute their fortune to causes, on which there was
no dependence at all apparent, took occasion to obtrude on their
ignorance, instead of second causes, a kind of second and ministerial
gods; ascribing the cause of fecundity, to Venus; the cause of arts, to
Apollo; of subtlety and craft, to Mercury; of tempests and storms, to
Æolus; and of other effects, to other gods; insomuch as there was
amongst the heathen almost as great variety of gods, as of business.
And to the worship, which naturally men conceived fit to be used towards
their gods, namely, oblations, prayers, thanks, and the rest formerly
named; the same legislators of the Gentiles have added their images,
both in picture, and sculpture; that the more ignorant sort, that is to
say, the most part or generality of the people, thinking the gods for
whose representation they were made, were really included, and as it
were housed within them, might so much the more stand in fear of them:
and endowed them with lands, and houses, and officers, and revenues, set
apart from all other human uses; that is, consecrated, and made holy to
those their idols; as caverns, groves, woods, mountains, and whole
islands; and have attributed to them, not only the shapes, some of men,
some of beasts, some of monsters; but also the faculties, and passions
of men and beasts: as sense, speech, sex, lust, generation, and this not
only by mixing one with another, to propagate the kind of gods; but also
by mixing with men, and women, to beget mongrel gods, and but inmates of
heaven, as Bacchus, Hercules, and others; besides anger, revenge, and
other passions of living creatures, and the actions proceeding from
them, as fraud, theft, adultery, sodomy, and any vice that may be taken
for an effect of power, or a cause of pleasure; and all such vices, as
amongst men are taken to be against law, rather than against honour.
Lastly, to the prognostics of time to come; which are naturally, but
conjectures upon experience of time past; and supernaturally, divine
revelation; the same authors of the religion of the Gentiles, partly
upon pretended experience, partly upon pretended revelation, have added
innumerable other superstitious ways of divination; and made men believe
they should find their fortunes, sometimes in the ambiguous or senseless
answers of the priests at Delphi, Delos, Ammon, and other famous
oracles; which answers, were made ambiguous by design, to own the event
both ways; or absurd, by the intoxicating vapour of the place, which is
very frequent in sulphurous caverns: sometimes in the leaves of the
Sybils; of whose prophecies, like those perhaps of Nostradamus (for the
fragments now extant seem to be the invention of later times), there
were some books in reputation in the time of the Roman republic:
sometimes in the insignificant speeches of madmen, supposed to be
possessed with a divine spirit, which possession they called enthusiasm;
and these kinds of foretelling events, were accounted theomancy, or
prophecy: sometimes in the aspect of the stars at their nativity; which
was called horoscopy, and esteemed a part of judiciary astrology:
sometimes in their own hopes and fears, called thumomancy, or presage:
sometimes in the prediction of witches, that pretended conference with
the dead; which is called necromancy, conjuring, and witchcraft; and is
but juggling and confederate knavery: sometimes in the casual flight, or
feeding of birds; called augury: sometimes in the entrails of a
sacrificed beast; which was _aruspicina_: sometimes in dreams: sometimes
in croaking of ravens, or chattering of birds: sometimes in the
lineaments of the face; which was called metoposcopy; or by palmistry in
the lines of the hand; in casual words, called _omina_: sometimes in
monsters, or unusual accidents; as eclipses, comets, rare meteors,
earthquakes, inundations, uncouth births, and the like, which they
called _portenta_, and _ostenta_, because they thought them to portend,
or foreshow some great calamity to come; sometimes, in mere lottery, as
cross and pile; counting holes in a sieve; dipping of verses in Homer,
and Virgil; and innumerable other such vain conceits. So easy are men to
be drawn to believe any thing, from such men as have gotten credit with
them; and can with gentleness, and dexterity, take hold of their fear,
and ignorance.
[Sidenote: The designs of the authors of the religion of the heathen.]
And therefore the first founders, and legislators of commonwealths among
the Gentiles, whose ends were only to keep the people in obedience, and
peace, have in all places taken care; first, to imprint in their minds a
belief, that those precepts which they gave concerning religion, might
not be thought to proceed from their own device, but from the dictates
of some god, or other spirit; or else that they themselves were of a
higher nature than mere mortals, that their laws might the more easily
be received: so Numa Pompilius pretended to receive the ceremonies he
instituted amongst the Romans, from the nymph Egeria: and the first king
and founder of the kingdom of Peru, pretended himself and his wife to be
the children of the Sun; and Mahomet, to set up his new religion,
pretended to have conferences with the Holy Ghost, in form of a dove.
Secondly, they have had a care, to make it believed, that the same
things were displeasing to the gods, which were forbidden by the laws.
Thirdly, to prescribe ceremonies, supplications, sacrifices, and
festivals, by which they were to believe, the anger of the gods might be
appeased; and that ill success in war, great contagions of sickness,
earthquakes, and each man’s private misery, came from the anger of the
gods, and their anger from the neglect of their worship, or the
forgetting, or mistaking some point of the ceremonies required. And
though amongst the ancient Romans, men were not forbidden to deny, that
which in the poets is written of the pains, and pleasures after this
life: which divers of great authority, and gravity in that state have in
their harangues openly derided; yet that belief was always more
cherished, than the contrary.
And by these, and such other institutions, they obtained in order to
their end, which was the peace of the commonwealth, that the common
people in their misfortunes, laying the fault on neglect, or error in
their ceremonies, or on their own disobedience to the laws, were the
less apt to mutiny against their governors; and being entertained with
the pomp, and pastime of festivals, and public games, made in honour of
the gods, needed nothing else but bread to keep them from discontent,
murmuring, and commotion against the state. And therefore the Romans,
that had conquered the greatest part of the then known world, made no
scruple of tolerating any religion whatsoever in the city of Rome
itself; unless it had something in it, that could not consist with their
civil government; nor do we read, that any religion was there forbidden,
but that of the Jews; who, being the peculiar kingdom of God, thought it
unlawful to acknowledge subjection to any mortal king or state
whatsoever. And thus you see how the religion of the Gentiles was a part
of their policy.
[Sidenote: The true religion and the laws of God’s kingdom the same.]
But where God himself, by supernatural revelation, planted religion;
there he also made to himself a peculiar kingdom: and gave laws, not
only of behaviour towards himself, but also towards one another; and
thereby in the kingdom of God, the policy, and laws civil, are a part of
religion; and therefore the distinction of temporal, and spiritual
domination, hath there no place. It is true, that God is king of all the
earth: yet may he be king of a peculiar, and chosen nation. For there is
no more incongruity therein, than that he that hath the general command
of the whole army, should have withal a peculiar regiment, or company of
his own. God is king of all the earth by his power: but of his chosen
people, he is king by covenant. But to speak more largely of the kingdom
of God, both by nature, and covenant, I have in the following discourse
assigned another place (chapter XXXV.)
From the propagation of religion, it is not hard to understand the
causes of the resolution of the same into its first seeds, or
principles; which are only an opinion of a deity, and powers invisible,
and supernatural; that can never be so abolished out of human nature,
but that new religions may again be made to spring out of them, by the
culture of such men, as for such purpose are in reputation.
[Sidenote: The causes of change in religion.]
For seeing all formed religion, is founded at first, upon the faith
which a multitude hath in some one person, whom they believe not only to
be a wise man, and to labour to procure their happiness, but also to be
a holy man, to whom God himself vouchsafeth to declare his will
supernaturally; it followeth necessarily, when they that have the
government of religion, shall come to have either the wisdom of those
men, their sincerity, or their love suspected; or when they shall be
unable to show any probable token of divine revelation; that the
religion which they desire to uphold, must be suspected likewise; and,
without the fear of the civil sword, contradicted and rejected.
[Sidenote: Enjoining belief of impossibilities.]
That which taketh away the reputation of wisdom, in him that formeth a
religion, or addeth to it when it is already formed, is the enjoining of
a belief of contradictories: for both parts of a contradiction cannot
possibly be true: and therefore to enjoin the belief of them, is an
argument of ignorance; which detects the author in that; and discredits
him in all things else he shall propound as from revelation
supernatural: which revelation a man may indeed have of many things
above, but of nothing against natural reason.
[Sidenote: Doing contrary to the religion they establish.]
That which taketh away the reputation of sincerity, is the doing or
saying of such things, as appear to be signs, that what they require
other men to believe, is not believed by themselves; all which doings,
or sayings are therefore called scandalous, because they be stumbling
blocks, that make men to fall in the way of religion; as injustice,
cruelty, profaneness, avarice, and luxury. For who can believe, that he
that doth ordinarily such actions as proceed from any of these roots,
believeth there is any such invisible power to be feared, as he
affrighteth other men withal, for lesser faults?
That which taketh away the reputation of love, is the being detected of
private ends: as when the belief they require of others, conduceth or
seemeth to conduce to the acquiring of dominion, riches, dignity, or
secure pleasure, to themselves only, or specially. For that which men
reap benefit by to themselves, they are thought to do for their own
sakes, and not for love of others.
[Sidenote: Want of the testimony of miracles.]
Lastly, the testimony that men can render of divine calling, can be no
other, than the operation of miracles; or true prophecy, which also is a
miracle; or extraordinary felicity. And therefore, to those points of
religion, which have been received from them that did such miracles;
those that are added by such, as approve not their calling by some
miracle, obtain no greater belief, than what the custom and laws of the
places, in which they be educated, have wrought into them. For as in
natural things, men of judgment require natural signs, and arguments; so
in supernatural things, they require signs supernatural, which are
miracles, before they consent inwardly, and from their hearts.
All which causes of the weakening of men’s faith, do manifestly appear
in the examples following. First, we have the example of the children of
Israel; who when Moses, that had approved his calling to them by
miracles, and by the happy conduct of them out of Egypt, was absent but
forty days, revolted from the worship of the true God, recommended to
them by him; and setting up (_Exod._ xxxiii. 1, 2) a golden calf for
their god, relapsed into the idolatry of the Egyptians; from whom they
had been so lately delivered. And again, after Moses, Aaron, Joshua, and
that generation which had seen the great works of God in Israel,
(_Judges_ ii. 11) were dead; another generation arose, and served Baal.
So that miracles failing, faith also failed.
Again, when the sons of Samuel, (_1 Sam._ viii. 3) being constituted by
their father judges in Bersabee, received bribes, and judged unjustly,
the people of Israel refused any more to have God to be their king, in
other manner than he was king of other people; and therefore cried out
to Samuel, to choose them a king after the manner of the nations. So
that justice failing, faith also failed: insomuch, as they deposed their
God, from reigning over them.
And whereas in the planting of Christian religion, the oracles ceased in
all parts of the Roman empire, and the number of Christians increased
wonderfully every day, and in every place, by the preaching of the
Apostles, and Evangelists; a great part of that success, may reasonably
be attributed, to the contempt, into which the priests of the Gentiles
of that time, had brought themselves, by their uncleanness, avarice, and
juggling between princes. Also the religion of the church of Rome, was
partly, for the same cause abolished in England, and many other parts of
Christendom; insomuch, as the failing of virtue in the pastors, maketh
faith fail in the people: and partly from bringing of the philosophy,
and doctrine of Aristotle into religion, by the Schoolmen; from whence
there arose so many contradictions, and absurdities, as brought the
clergy into a reputation both of ignorance, and of fraudulent intention;
and inclined people to revolt from them, either against the will of
their own princes, as in France and Holland; or with their will, as in
England.
Lastly, amongst the points by the church of Rome declared necessary for
salvation, there be so many, manifestly to the advantage of the Pope,
and of his spiritual subjects, residing in the territories of other
Christian princes, that were it not for the mutual emulation of those
princes, they might without war, or trouble, exclude all foreign
authority, as easily as it has been excluded in England. For who is
there that does not see, to whose benefit it conduceth, to have it
believed, that a king hath not his authority from Christ, unless a
bishop crown him? That a king, if he be a priest, cannot marry? That
whether a prince be born in lawful marriage, or not, must be judged by
authority from Rome? That subjects may be freed from their allegiance,
if by the court of Rome, the king be judged an heretic? That a king, as
Chilperic of France, may be deposed by a pope, as Pope Zachary, for no
cause; and his kingdom given to one of his subjects? That the clergy and
regulars, in what country soever, shall be exempt from the jurisdiction
of their king in cases criminal? Or who does not see, to whose profit
redound the fees of private masses, and vales of purgatory; with other
signs of private interest, enough to mortify the most lively faith, if,
as I said, the civil magistrate, and custom did not more sustain it,
than any opinion they have of the sanctity, wisdom, or probity of their
teachers? So that I may attribute all the changes of religion in the
world, to one and the same cause; and that is, unpleasing priests; and
those not only amongst Catholics, but even in that church that hath
presumed most of reformation.
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CHAPTER XIII.
OF THE NATURAL CONDITION OF MANKIND AS
CONCERNING THEIR FELICITY, AND MISERY.
[Sidenote: Men by nature equal.]
Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of the body, and mind;
as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in
body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when all is reckoned
together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable,
as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which
another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body,
the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret
machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger
with himself.
And as to the faculties of the mind, setting aside the arts grounded
upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon general, and
infallible rules, called science; which very few have, and but in few
things; as being not a native faculty, born with us; nor attained, as
prudence, while we look after somewhat else, I find yet a greater
equality amongst men, than that of strength. For prudence, is but
experience; which equal time, equally bestows on all men, in those
things they equally apply themselves unto. That which may perhaps make
such equality incredible, is but a vain conceit of one’s own wisdom,
which almost all men think they have in a greater degree, than the
vulgar; that is, than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by
fame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the
nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be
more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned; yet they will hardly
believe there be many so wise as themselves; for they see their own wit
at hand, and other men’s at a distance. But this proveth rather that men
are in that point equal, than unequal. For there is not ordinarily a
greater sign of the equal distribution of any thing, than that every man
is contented with his share.
[Sidenote: From equality proceeds diffidence.]
From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining
of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which
nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way
to their end, which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes
their delectation only, endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another. And
from hence it comes to pass, that where an invader hath no more to fear,
than another man’s single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possess a
convenient seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with
forces united, to dispossess, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of
his labour, but also of his life, or liberty. And the invader again is
in the like danger of another.
[Sidenote: From diffidence war.]
And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to
secure himself, so reasonable, as anticipation; that is, by force, or
wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no
other power great enough to endanger him: and this is no more than his
own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. Also because there
be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the
acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security
requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within
modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would
not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist.
And by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men being
necessary to a man’s conservation, it ought to be allowed him.
Again, men have no pleasure, but on the contrary a great deal of grief,
in keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe them all.
For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same
rate he sets upon himself: and upon all signs of contempt, or
undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares, (which amongst
them that have no common power to keep them in quiet, is far enough to
make them destroy each other), to extort a greater value from his
contemners, by damage; and from others, by the example.
So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel.
First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory.
The first, maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the
third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make themselves
masters of other men’s persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second,
to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different
opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their
persons, or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation,
their profession, or their name.
[Sidenote: Out of civil states, there is always war of every one against
every one.]
Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common
power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is
called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man. For
WAR, consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting; but in a
tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently
known: and therefore the notion of _time_, is to be considered in the
nature of war; as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of
foul weather, lieth not in a shower or two of rain; but in an
inclination thereto of many days together: so the nature of war,
consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto,
during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other
time is PEACE.
[Sidenote: The incommodities of such a war.]
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is
enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live
without other security, than what their own strength, and their own
invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition, there is no
place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and
consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the
commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no
instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much force;
no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no
letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and
danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish, and short.
It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things;
that nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade, and
destroy one another: and he may therefore, not trusting to this
inference, made from the passions, desire perhaps to have the same
confirmed by experience. Let him therefore consider with himself, when
taking a journey, he arms himself, and seeks to go well accompanied;
when going to sleep, he locks his doors; when even in his house he locks
his chests; and this when he knows there be laws, and public officers,
armed, to revenge all injuries shall be done him; what opinion he has of
his fellow-subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow citizens, when
he locks his doors; and of his children, and servants, when he locks his
chests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do
by my words? But neither of us accuse man’s nature in it. The desires,
and other passions of man, are in themselves no sin. No more are the
actions, that proceed from those passions, till they know a law that
forbids them: which till laws be made they cannot know: nor can any law
be made, till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it.
It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor
condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over
all the world: but there are many places, where they live so now. For
the savage people in many places of America, except the government of
small families, the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust, have no
government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I
said before. Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life there
would be, where there were no common power to fear, by the manner of
life, which men that have formerly lived under a peaceful government,
use to degenerate into, in a civil war.
But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in
a condition of war one against another; yet in all times, kings, and
persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in
continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators; having
their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is,
their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms;
and continual spies upon their neighbours; which is a posture of war.
But because they uphold thereby, the industry of their subjects; there
does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the liberty of
particular men.
[Sidenote: In such a war nothing is unjust.]
To this war of every man, against every man, this also is consequent;
that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and
injustice have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is
no law: where no law, no injustice. Force, and fraud, are in war the two
cardinal virtues. Justice, and injustice are none of the faculties
neither of the body, nor mind. If they were, they might be in a man that
were alone in the world, as well as his senses, and passions. They are
qualities, that relate to men in society, not in solitude. It is
consequent also to the same condition, that there be no propriety, no
dominion, no _mine_ and _thine_ distinct; but only that to be every
man’s, that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it. And thus
much for the ill condition, which man by mere nature is actually placed
in; though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in
the passions, partly in his reason.
[Sidenote: The passions that incline men to peace.]
The passions that incline men to peace, are fear of death; desire of
such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their
industry to obtain them. And reason suggesteth convenient articles of
peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles, are
they, which otherwise are called the Laws of Nature: whereof I shall
speak more particularly, in the two following chapters.
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CHAPTER XIV.
OF THE FIRST AND SECOND NATURAL LAWS, AND
OF CONTRACTS.
[Sidenote: Right of nature what.]
The RIGHT OF NATURE, which writers commonly call _jus naturale_, is the
liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the
preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and
consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own judgment, and reason,
he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.
[Sidenote: Liberty what.]
By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signification of the
word, the absence of external impediments: which impediments, may oft
take away part of a man’s power to do what he would; but cannot hinder
him from using the power left him, according as his judgment, and reason
shall dictate to him.
[Sidenote: A law of nature what.]
A LAW OF NATURE, _lex naturalis_, is a precept or general rule, found
out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that, which is
destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the
same; and to omit that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved.
For though they that speak of this subject, use to confound _jus_, and
_lex_, _right_ and _law_: [Sidenote: Difference of right and law.] yet
they ought to be distinguished; because RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to
do, or to forbear; whereas LAW, determineth, and bindeth to one of them:
so that law, and right, differ as much, as obligation, and liberty;
which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.
[Sidenote: Naturally every man has right to every thing.]
And because the condition of man, as hath been declared in the precedent
chapter, is a condition of war of every one against every one; in which
case every one is governed by his own reason; and there is nothing he
can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life
against his enemies; it followeth, that in such a condition, every man
has a right to every thing; even to one another’s body. And therefore,
as long as this natural right of every man to every thing endureth,
there can be no security to any man, how strong or wise soever he be, of
living out the time, which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live.
[Sidenote: The fundamental law of nature.] And consequently it is a
precept, or general rule of reason, _that every man, ought to endeavour
peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain
it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of war_. The
first branch of which rule, containeth the first, and fundamental law of
nature; which is, _to seek peace, and follow it_. The second, the sum of
the right of nature; which is, _by all means we can, to defend
ourselves_.
[Sidenote: The second law of nature.]
From this fundamental law of nature, by which men are commanded to
endeavour peace, is derived this second law; _that a man be willing,
when others are so too, as far-forth, as for peace, and defence of
himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all
things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he
would allow other men against himself_. For as long as every man holdeth
this right, of doing any thing he liketh; so long are all men in the
condition of war. But if other men will not lay down their right, as
well as he; then there is no reason for any one, to divest himself of
his: for that were to expose himself to prey, which no man is bound to,
rather than to dispose himself to peace. This is that law of the Gospel;
_whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to
them_. And that law of all men, _quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne
feceris_.
[Sidenote: What it is to lay down a right.]
To _lay down_ a man’s _right_ to any thing, is to _divest_ himself of
the _liberty_, of hindering another of the benefit of his own right to
the same. For he that renounceth, or passeth away his right, giveth not
to any other man a right which he had not before; because there is
nothing to which every man had not right by nature: but only standeth
out of his way, that he may enjoy his own original right, without
hindrance from him; not without hindrance from another. So that the
effect which redoundeth to one man, by another man’s defect of right, is
but so much diminution of impediments to the use of his own right
original.
[Sidenote: Renouncing a right, what it is.]
Right is laid aside, either by simply renouncing it; or by transferring
it to another. By _simply_ RENOUNCING; when he cares not to whom the
benefit thereof redoundeth. [Sidenote: Transferring right what.
Obligation.] By TRANSFERRING; when he intendeth the benefit thereof to
some certain person, or persons. And when a man hath in either manner
abandoned, or granted away his right; then is he said to be OBLIGED, or
BOUND, not to hinder those, to whom such right is granted, or abandoned,
from the benefit of it: and that he _ought_, [Sidenote: Duty.] and it is
his DUTY, not to make void that voluntary act of his own: [Sidenote:
Injustice.] and that such hindrance is INJUSTICE, and INJURY, as being
_sine jure_; the right being before renounced, or transferred. So that
_injury_, or _injustice_, in the controversies of the world, is somewhat
like to that, which in the disputations of scholars is called
_absurdity_. For as it is there called an absurdity, to contradict what
one maintained in the beginning: so in the world, it is called
injustice, and injury, voluntarily to undo that, which from the
beginning he had voluntarily done. The way by which a man either simply
renounceth, or transferreth his right, is a declaration, or
signification, by some voluntary and sufficient sign, or signs, that he
doth so renounce, or transfer; or hath so renounced, or transferred the
same, to him that accepteth it. And these signs are either words only,
or actions only; or, as it happeneth most often, both words, and
actions. And the same are the BONDS, by which men are bound, and
obliged: bonds, that have their strength, not from their own nature, for
nothing is more easily broken than a man’s word, but from fear of some
evil consequence upon the rupture.
[Sidenote: Not all rights are alienable.]
Whensoever a man transferreth his right, or renounceth it; it is either
in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself; or
for some other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a voluntary act:
and of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some _good to
himself_. And therefore there be some rights, which no man can be
understood by any words, or other signs, to have abandoned, or
transferred. As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them,
that assault him by force, to take away his life; because he cannot be
understood to aim thereby, at any good to himself. The same may be said
of wounds, and chains, and imprisonment; both because there is no
benefit consequent to such patience; as there is to the patience of
suffering another to be wounded, or imprisoned: as also because a man
cannot tell, when he seeth men proceed against him by violence, whether
they intend his death or not. And lastly the motive, and end for which
this renouncing, and transferring of right is introduced, is nothing
else but the security of a man’s person, in his life, and in the means
of so preserving life, as not to be weary of it. And therefore if a man
by words, or other signs, seem to despoil himself of the end, for which
those signs were intended; he is not to be understood as if he meant it,
or that it was his will; but that he was ignorant of how such words and
actions were to be interpreted.
[Sidenote: Contract what.]
The mutual transferring of right, is that which men call CONTRACT.
There is difference between transferring of right to the thing; and
transferring, or tradition, that is delivery of the thing itself. For
the thing may be delivered together with the translation of the right;
as in buying and selling with ready-money; or exchange of goods, or
lands: and it may be delivered some time after.
[Sidenote: Covenant what.]
Again, one of the contractors, may deliver the thing contracted for on
his part, and leave the other to perform his part at some determinate
time after, and in the mean time be trusted; and then the contract on
his part, is called PACT, or COVENANT: or both parts may contract now,
to perform hereafter: in which cases, he that is to perform in time to
come, being trusted, his performance is called _keeping of promise_, or
faith; and the failing of performance, if it be voluntary, _violation of
faith_.
[Sidenote: Free-gift.]
When the transferring of right, is not mutual: but one of the parties
transferreth, in hope to gain thereby friendship, or service from
another, or from his friends; or in hope to gain the reputation of
charity, or magnanimity; or to deliver his mind from the pain of
compassion; or in hope of reward in heaven; this is not contract, but
GIFT, FREE-GIFT, GRACE: which words signify one and the same thing.
[Sidenote: Signs of contract express.]
Signs of contract, are either _express_, or _by inference_. Express, are
words spoken with understanding of what they signify: and such words are
either of the time _present_, or _past_; as, _I give_, _I grant_, _I
have given_, _I have granted_, _I will that this be yours_: or of the
future; as, _I will give_, _I will grant_: [Sidenote: Promise.] which
words of the future are called PROMISE.
[Sidenote: Signs of contract by inference.]
Signs by inference, are sometimes the consequence of words; sometimes
the consequence of silence; sometimes the consequence of actions;
sometimes the consequence of forbearing an action: and generally a sign
by inference, of any contract, is whatsoever sufficiently argues the
will of the contractor.
[Sidenote: Free gift passeth by words of the present or past.]
Words alone, if they be of the time to come, and contain a bare promise,
are an insufficient sign of a free-gift, and therefore not obligatory.
For if they be of the time to come, as _to-morrow I will give_, they are
a sign I have not given yet, and consequently that my right is not
transferred, but remaineth till I transfer it by some other act. But if
the words be of the time present, or past, as, _I have given_, or, _do
give to be delivered to-morrow_, then is my to-morrow’s right given away
to day; and that by the virtue of the words, though there were no other
argument of my will. And there is a great difference in the
signification of these words, _volo hoc tuum esse cras_, and _cras
dabo_; that is, between _I will that this be thine to-morrow_, and, _I
will give it thee to-morrow_: for the word _I will_, in the former
manner of speech, signifies an act of the will present; but in the
latter, it signifies a promise of an act of the will to come: and
therefore the former words, being of the present, transfer a future
right; the latter, that be of the future, transfer nothing. But if there
be other signs of the will to transfer a right, besides words; then,
though the gift be free, yet may the right be understood to pass by
words of the future: as if a man propound a prize to him that comes
first to the end of a race, the gift is free; and though the words be of
the future, yet the right passeth: for if he would not have his words so
be understood, he should not have let them run.
[Sidenote: Signs of contract are words both of the past, present, and
future.]
In contracts, the right passeth, not only where the words are of the
time present, or past, but also where they are of the future: because
all contract is mutual translation, or change of right; and therefore he
that promiseth only, because he hath already received the benefit for
which he promiseth, is to be understood as if he intended the right
should pass: for unless he had been content to have his words so
understood, the other would not have performed his part first. And for
that cause, in buying, and selling, and other acts of contract, a
promise is equivalent to a covenant; and therefore obligatory.
[Sidenote: Merit what.]
He that performeth first in the case of a contract, is said to MERIT
that which he is to receive by the performance of the other; and he hath
it as _due_. Also when a prize is propounded to many, which is to be
given to him only that winneth; or money is thrown amongst many, to be
enjoyed by them that catch it; though this be a free gift; yet so to
win, or so to catch, is to _merit_, and to have it as DUE. For the right
is transferred in the propounding of the prize, and in throwing down the
money; though it be not determined to whom, but by the event of the
contention. But there is between these two sorts of merit, this
difference, that in contract, I merit by virtue of my own power, and the
contractor’s need; but in this case of free gift, I am enabled to merit
only by the benignity of the giver: in contract, I merit at the
contractor’s hand that he should depart with his right; in this case of
gift, I merit not that the giver should part with his right; but that
when he has parted with it, it should be mine, rather than another’s.
And this I think to be the meaning of that distinction of the Schools,
between _meritum congrui_, and _meritum condigni_. For God Almighty,
having promised Paradise to those men, hoodwinked with carnal desires,
that can walk through this world according to the precepts, and limits
prescribed by him; they say, he that shall so walk, shall merit Paradise
_ex congruo_. But because no man can demand a right to it, by his own
righteousness, or any other power in himself, but by the free grace of
God only; they say, no man can merit Paradise _ex condigno_. This I say,
I think is the meaning of that distinction; but because disputers do not
agree upon the signification of their own terms of art, longer than it
serves their turn; I will not affirm any thing of their meaning: only
this I say; when a gift is given indefinitely, as a prize to be
contended for, he that winneth meriteth, and may claim the prize as due.
[Sidenote: Covenants of mutual trust, when invalid.]
If a covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties perform presently,
but trust one another; in the condition of mere nature, which is a
condition of war of every man against every man, upon any reasonable
suspicion, it is void: but if there be a common power set over them
both, with right and force sufficient to compel performance, it is not
void. For he that performeth first, has no assurance the other will
perform after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men’s
ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions, without the fear of some
coercive power; which in the condition of mere nature, where all men are
equal, and judges of the justness of their own fears, cannot possibly be
supposed. And therefore he which performeth first, does but betray
himself to his enemy; contrary to the right, he can never abandon, of
defending his life, and means of living.
But in a civil estate, where there is a power set up to constrain those
that would otherwise violate their faith, that fear is no more
reasonable; and for that cause, he which by the covenant is to perform
first, is obliged so to do.
The cause of fear, which maketh such a covenant invalid, must be always
something arising after the covenant made; as some new fact, or other
sign of the will not to perform: else it cannot make the covenant void.
For that which could not hinder a man from promising, ought not to be
admitted as a hindrance of performing.
[Sidenote: Right to the end, containeth right to the means.]
He that transferreth any right, transferreth the means of enjoying it,
as far as lieth in his power. As he that selleth land, is understood to
transfer the herbage, and whatsoever grows upon it: nor can he that
sells a mill turn away the stream that drives it. And they that give to
a man the right of government in sovereignty, are understood to give him
the right of levying money to maintain soldiers; and of appointing
magistrates for the administration of justice.
[Sidenote: No covenant with beasts.]
To make covenants with brute beasts, is impossible; because not
understanding our speech, they understand not, nor accept of any
translation of right; nor can translate any right to another: and
without mutual acceptation, there is no covenant.
[Sidenote: Nor with God without special revelation.]
To make covenant with God, is impossible, but by mediation of such as
God speaketh to, either by revelation supernatural, or by his
lieutenants that govern under him, and in his name: for otherwise we
know not whether our covenants be accepted, or not. And therefore they
that vow anything contrary to any law of nature, vow in vain; as being a
thing unjust to pay such vow. And if it be a thing commanded by the law
of nature, it is not the vow, but the law that binds them.
[Sidenote: No covenant, but of possible and future.]
The matter, or subject of a covenant, is always something that falleth
under deliberation; for to covenant, is an act of the will; that is to
say, an act, and the last act of deliberation; and is therefore always
understood to be something to come; and which is judged possible for him
that covenanteth, to perform.
And therefore, to promise that which is known to be impossible, is no
covenant. But if that prove impossible afterwards, which before was
thought possible, the covenant is valid, and bindeth, though not to the
thing itself, yet to the value; or, if that also be impossible, to the
unfeigned endeavour of performing as much as is possible: for to more no
man can be obliged.
[Sidenote: Covenants how made void.]
Men are freed of their covenants two ways; by performing; or by being
forgiven. For performance, is the natural end of obligation; and
forgiveness, the restitution of liberty; as being a retransferring of
that right, in which the obligation consisted.
[Sidenote: Covenants extorted by fear are valid.]
Covenants entered into by fear, in the condition of mere nature, are
obligatory. For example, if I covenant to pay a ransom, or service for
my life, to an enemy; I am bound by it: for it is a contract, wherein
one receiveth the benefit of life; the other is to receive money, or
service for it; and consequently, where no other law, as in the
condition of mere nature, forbiddeth the performance, the covenant is
valid. Therefore prisoners of war, if trusted with the payment of their
ransom, are obliged to pay it: and if a weaker prince, make a
disadvantageous peace with a stronger, for fear; he is bound to keep it;
unless, as hath been said before, there ariseth some new, and just cause
of fear, to renew the war. And even in commonwealths, if I be forced to
redeem myself from a thief by promising him money, I am bound to pay it,
till the civil law discharge me. For whatsoever I may lawfully do
without obligation, the same I may lawfully covenant to do through fear:
and what I lawfully covenant, I cannot lawfully break.
[Sidenote: The former covenant to one, makes void the later to another.]
A former covenant, makes void a later. For a man that hath passed away
his right to one man to-day, hath it not to pass to-morrow to another:
and therefore the later promise passeth no right, but is null.
[Sidenote: A man’s covenant not to defend himself is void.]
A covenant not to defend myself from force, by force, is always void.
For, as I have showed before, no man can transfer, or lay down his right
to save himself from death, wounds, and imprisonment, the avoiding
whereof is the only end of laying down any right; and therefore the
promise of not resisting force, in no covenant transferreth any right;
nor is obliging. For though a man may covenant thus, _unless I do so, or
so, kill me_; he cannot covenant thus, _unless I do so, or so, I will
not resist you, when you come to kill me_. For man by nature chooseth
the lesser evil, which is danger of death in resisting; rather than the
greater, which is certain and present death in not resisting. And this
is granted to be true by all men, in that they lead criminals to
execution, and prison, with armed men, notwithstanding that such
criminals have consented to the law, by which they are condemned.
[Sidenote: No man obliged to accuse himself.]
A covenant to accuse oneself, without assurance of pardon, is likewise
invalid. For in the condition of nature, where every man is judge, there
is no place for accusation: and in the civil state, the accusation is
followed with punishment; which being force, a man is not obliged not to
resist. The same is also true, of the accusation of those, by whose
condemnation a man falls into misery; as of a father, wife, or
benefactor. For the testimony of such an accuser, if it be not willingly
given, is presumed to be corrupted by nature; and therefore not to be
received: and where a man’s testimony is not to be credited, he is not
bound to give it. Also accusations upon torture, are not to be reputed
as testimonies. For torture is to be used but as means of conjecture,
and light, in the further examination, and search of truth: and what is
in that case confessed, tendeth to the ease of him that is tortured; not
to the informing of the torturers: and therefore ought not to have the
credit of a sufficient testimony: for whether he deliver himself by
true, or false accusation, he does it by the right of preserving his own
life.
[Sidenote: The end of an oath.]
The force of words, being, as I have formerly noted, too weak to hold
men to the performance of their covenants; there are in man’s nature,
but two imaginable helps to strengthen it. And those are either a fear
of the consequence of breaking their word; or a glory, or pride in
appearing not to need to break it. This latter is a generosity too
rarely found to be presumed on, especially in the pursuers of wealth,
command, or sensual pleasure; which are the greatest part of mankind.
The passion to be reckoned upon, is fear; whereof there be two very
general objects: one, the power of spirits invisible; the other, the
power of those men they shall therein offend. Of these two, though the
former be the greater power, yet the fear of the latter is commonly the
greater fear. The fear of the former is in every man, his own religion:
which hath place in the nature of man before civil society. The latter
hath not so; at least not place enough, to keep men to their promises;
because in the condition of mere nature, the inequality of power is not
discerned, but by the event of battle. So that before the time of civil
society, or in the interruption thereof by war, there is nothing can
strengthen a covenant of peace agreed on, against the temptations of
avarice, ambition, lust, or other strong desire, but the fear of that
invisible power, which they every one worship as God; and fear as a
revenger of their perfidy. All therefore that can be done between two
men not subject to civil power, is to put one another to swear by the
God he feareth: [Sidenote: The form of an oath.] which _swearing_, or
OATH, is a _form of speech, added to a promise; by which he that
promiseth, signifieth, that unless he perform, he renounceth the mercy
of his God, or calleth to him for vengeance on himself_. Such was the
heathen form, _Let_ Jupiter _kill me else, as I kill this beast_. So is
our form, _I shall do thus, and thus, so help me God_. And this, with
the rites and ceremonies, which every one useth in his own religion,
that the fear of breaking faith might be the greater.
[Sidenote: No oath but by God.]
By this it appears, that an oath taken according to any other form, or
rite, than his, that sweareth, is in vain; and no oath: and that there
is no swearing by any thing which the swearer thinks not God. For though
men have sometimes used to swear by their kings, for fear, or flattery;
yet they would have it thereby understood, they attributed to them
divine honour. And that swearing unnecessarily by God, is but prophaning
of his name: and swearing by other things, as men do in common
discourse, is not swearing, but an impious custom, gotten by too much
vehemence of talking.
[Sidenote: An oath adds nothing to the obligation.]
It appears also, that the oath adds nothing to the obligation. For a
covenant, if lawful, binds in the sight of God, without the oath, as
much as with it: if unlawful, bindeth not at all; though it be confirmed
with an oath.
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CHAPTER XV.
OF OTHER LAWS OF NATURE.
[Sidenote: The third law of nature, justice.]
From that law of nature, by which we are obliged to transfer to another,
such rights, as being retained, hinder the peace of mankind, there
followeth a third; which is this, _that men perform their covenants
made_: without which, covenants are in vain, and but empty words; and
the right of all men to all things remaining, we are still in the
condition of war.
[Sidenote: Justice and injustice what.]
And in this law of nature, consisteth the fountain and original of
JUSTICE. For where no covenant hath preceded, there hath no right been
transferred, and every man has right to every thing; and consequently,
no action can be unjust. But when a covenant is made, then to break it
is _unjust_: and the definition of INJUSTICE, is no other than _the not
performance of covenant_. And whatsoever is not unjust, is _just_.
[Sidenote: Justice and propriety begin with the constitution of
commonwealth.]
But because covenants of mutual trust, where there is a fear of not
performance on either part, as hath been said in the former chapter, are
invalid; though the original of justice be the making of covenants; yet
injustice actually there can be none, till the cause of such fear be
taken away; which while men are in the natural condition of war, cannot
be done. Therefore before the names of just, and unjust can have place,
there must be some coercive power, to compel men equally to the
performance of their covenants, by the terror of some punishment,
greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant;
and to make good that propriety, which by mutual contract men acquire,
in recompense of the universal right they abandon: and such power there
is none before the erection of a commonwealth. And this is also to be
gathered out of the ordinary definition of justice in the Schools: for
they say, that _justice is the constant will of giving to every man his
own_. And therefore where there is no _own_, that is no propriety, there
is no injustice; and where there is no coercive power erected, that is,
where there is no commonwealth, there is no propriety; all men having
right to all things: therefore where there is no commonwealth, there
nothing is unjust. So that the nature of justice, consisteth in keeping
of valid covenants: but the validity of covenants begins not but with
the constitution of a civil power, sufficient to compel men to keep
them: and then it is also that propriety begins.
[Sidenote: Justice not contrary to reason.]
The fool hath said in his heart, there is no such thing as justice; and
sometimes also with his tongue; seriously alleging, that every man’s
conservation, and contentment, being committed to his own care, there
could be no reason, why every man might not do what he thought conduced
thereunto: and therefore also to make, or not make; keep, or not keep
covenants, was not against reason, when it conduced to one’s benefit. He
does not therein deny, that there be covenants; and that they are
sometimes broken, sometimes kept; and that such breach of them may be
called injustice, and the observance of them justice: but he
questioneth, whether injustice, taking away the fear of God, for the
same fool hath said in his heart there is no God, may not sometimes
stand with that reason, which dictateth to every man his own good; and
particularly then, when it conduceth to such a benefit, as shall put a
man in a condition, to neglect not only the dispraise, and revilings,
but also the power of other men. The kingdom of God is gotten by
violence: but what if it could be gotten by unjust violence? were it
against reason so to get it, when it is impossible to receive hurt by
it? and if it be not against reason, it is not against justice; or else
justice is not to be approved for good. From such reasoning as this,
successful wickedness hath obtained the name of virtue: and some that in
all other things have disallowed the violation of faith; yet have
allowed it, when it is for the getting of a kingdom. And the heathen
that believed, that Saturn was deposed by his son Jupiter, believed
nevertheless the same Jupiter to be the avenger of injustice: somewhat
like to a piece of law in Coke’s _Commentaries on Littleton_; where he
says, if the right heir of the crown be attainted of treason; yet the
crown shall descend to him, and _eo instante_ the attainder be void:
from which instances a man will be very prone to infer; that when the
heir apparent of a kingdom, shall kill him that is in possession, though
his father; you may call it injustice, or by what other name you will;
yet it can never be against reason, seeing all the voluntary actions of
men tend to the benefit of themselves; and those actions are most
reasonable, that conduce most to their ends. This specious reasoning is
nevertheless false.
For the question is not of promises mutual, where there is no security
of performance on either side; as when there is no civil power erected
over the parties promising; for such promises are no covenants: but
either where one of the parties has performed already; or where there is
a power to make him perform; there is the question whether it be against
reason, that is, against the benefit of the other to perform, or not.
And I say it is not against reason. For the manifestation whereof, we
are to consider; first, that when a man doth a thing, which
notwithstanding any thing can be foreseen, and reckoned on, tendeth to
his own destruction, howsoever some accident which he could not expect,
arriving may turn it to his benefit; yet such events do not make it
reasonably or wisely done. Secondly, that in a condition of war, wherein
every man to every man, for want of a common power to keep them all in
awe, is an enemy, there is no man who can hope by his own strength, or
wit, to defend himself from destruction, without the help of
confederates; where every one expects the same defence by the
confederation, that any one else does: and therefore he which declares
he thinks it reason to deceive those that help him, can in reason expect
no other means of safety, than what can be had from his own single
power. He therefore that breaketh his covenant, and consequently
declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received
into any society, that unite themselves for peace and defence, but by
the error of them that receive him; nor when he is received, be retained
in it, without seeing the danger of their error; which errors a man
cannot reasonably reckon upon as the means of his security: and
therefore if he be left, or cast out of society, he perisheth; and if he
live in society, it is by the errors of other men, which he could not
foresee, nor reckon upon; and consequently against the reason of his
preservation; and so, as all men that contribute not to his destruction,
forbear him only out of ignorance of what is good for themselves.
As for the instance of gaining the secure and perpetual felicity of
heaven, by any way; it is frivolous: there being but one way imaginable;
and that is not breaking, but keeping of covenant.
And for the other instance of attaining sovereignty by rebellion; it is
manifest, that though the event follow, yet because it cannot reasonably
be expected, but rather the contrary; and because by gaining it so,
others are taught to gain the same in like manner, the attempt thereof
is against reason. Justice therefore, that is to say, keeping of
covenant, is a rule of reason, by which we are forbidden to do any thing
destructive to our life; and consequently a law of nature.
There be some that proceed further; and will not have the law of nature,
to be those rules which conduce to the preservation of man’s life on
earth; but to the attaining of an eternal felicity after death; to which
they think the breach of covenant may conduce; and consequently be just
and reasonable; such are they that think it a work of merit to kill, or
depose, or rebel against, the sovereign power constituted over them by
their own consent. But because there is no natural knowledge of man’s
estate after death; much less of the reward that is then to be given to
breach of faith; but only a belief grounded upon other men’s saying,
that they know it supernaturally, or that they know those, that knew
them, that knew others, that knew it supernaturally; breach of faith
cannot be called a precept of reason, or nature.
[Sidenote: Covenants not discharged by the vice of the person to whom
they are made.]
Others, that allow for a law of nature, the keeping of faith, do
nevertheless make exception of certain persons; as heretics, and such as
use not to perform their covenant to others: and this also is against
reason. For if any fault of a man, be sufficient to discharge our
covenant made; the same ought in reason to have been sufficient to have
hindered the making of it.
[Sidenote: Justice of men and justice of actions what.]
The names of just, and injust, when they are attributed to men, signify
one thing; and when they are attributed to actions, another. When they
are attributed to men, they signify conformity, or inconformity of
manners, to reason. But when they are attributed to actions, they
signify the conformity, or inconformity to reason, not of manners, or
manner of life, but of particular actions. A just man therefore, is he
that taketh all the care he can, that his actions may be all just: and
an unjust man, is he that neglecteth it. And such men are more often in
our language styled by the names of righteous, and unrighteous; than
just, and unjust; though the meaning be the same. Therefore a righteous
man, does not lose that title, by one, or a few unjust actions, that
proceed from sudden passion, or mistake of things, or persons: nor does
an unrighteous man, lose his character, for such actions, as he does, or
forbears to do, for fear; because his will is not framed by the justice,
but by the apparent benefit of what he is to do. That which gives to
human actions the relish of justice, is a certain nobleness or
gallantness of courage, rarely found, by which a man scorns to be
beholden for the contentment of his life, to fraud, or breach of
promise. This justice of the manners, is that which is meant, where
justice is called a virtue; and injustice a vice.
But the justice of actions denominates men, not just, but _guiltless_:
and the injustice of the same, which is also called injury, gives them
but the name of _guilty_.
[Sidenote: Justice of manners, and justice of actions.]
Again, the injustice of manners, is the disposition, or aptitude to do
injury; and is injustice before it proceed to act; and without supposing
any individual person injured. But the injustice of an action, that is
to say injury, supposeth an individual person injured; namely him, to
whom the covenant was made: and therefore many times the injury is
received by one man, when the damage redoundeth to another. As when the
master commandeth his servant to give money to a stranger; if it be not
done, the injury is done to the master, whom he had before covenanted to
obey; but the damage redoundeth to the stranger, to whom he had no
obligation; and therefore could not injure him. And so also in
commonwealths, private men may remit to one another their debts; but not
robberies or other violences, whereby they are endamaged; because the
detaining of debt, is an injury to themselves; but robbery and violence,
are injuries to the person of the commonwealth.
[Sidenote: Nothing done to a man by his own consent can be injury.]
Whatsoever is done to a man, conformable to his own will signified to
the doer, is no injury to him. For if he that doeth it, hath not passed
away his original right to do what he please, by some antecedent
covenant, there is no breach of covenant; and therefore no injury done
him. And if he have; then his will to have it done being signified, is a
release of that covenant: and so again there is no injury done him.
[Sidenote: Justice commutative and distributive.]
Justice of actions, is by writers divided into _commutative_, and
_distributive_: and the former they say consisteth in proportion
arithmetical; the latter in proportion geometrical. Commutative
therefore, they place in the equality of value of the things contracted
for; and distributive, in the distribution of equal benefit, to men of
equal merit. As if it were injustice to sell dearer than we buy; or to
give more to a man than he merits. The value of all things contracted
for, is measured by the appetite of the contractors: and therefore the
just value, is that which they be contented to give. And merit, besides
that which is by covenant, where the performance on one part, meriteth
the performance of the other part, and falls under justice commutative,
not distributive, is not due by justice; but is rewarded of grace only.
And therefore this distinction, in the sense wherein it useth to be
expounded, is not right. To speak properly, commutative justice, is the
justice, of a contractor; that is, a performance of covenant, in buying,
and selling; hiring, and letting to hire; lending, and borrowing;
exchanging, bartering, and other acts of contract.
And distributive justice, the justice of an arbitrator; that is to say,
the act of defining what is just. Wherein, being trusted by them that
make him arbitrator, if he perform his trust, he is said to distribute
to every man his own: and this is indeed just distribution, and may be
called, though improperly, distributive justice; but more properly
equity; which also is a law of nature, as shall be shown in due place.
[Sidenote: The fourth law of nature, gratitude.]
As justice dependeth on antecedent covenant; so does GRATITUDE depend on
antecedent grace; that is to say, antecedent free gift: and is the
fourth law of nature; which may be conceived in this form, _that a man
which receiveth benefit from another of mere grace, endeavour that he
which giveth it, have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good
will_. For no man giveth, but with intention of good to himself; because
gift is voluntary; and of all voluntary acts, the object is to every man
his own good; of which if men see they shall be frustrated, there will
be no beginning of benevolence, or trust; nor consequently of mutual
help; nor of reconciliation of one man to another; and therefore they
are to remain still in the condition of _war_; which is contrary to the
first and fundamental law of nature, which commandeth men to _seek
peace_. The breach of this law, is called _ingratitude_; and hath the
same relation to grace, that injustice hath to obligation by covenant.
[Sidenote: The fifth mutual accommodation, or complaisance.]
A fifth law of nature, is COMPLAISANCE; that is to say, _that every man
strive to accommodate himself to the rest_. For the understanding
whereof, we may consider, that there is in men’s aptness to society, a
diversity of nature, rising from their diversity of affections; not
unlike to that we see in stones brought together for building of an
edifice. For as that stone which by the asperity, and irregularity of
figure, takes more room from others, than itself fills; and for the
hardness, cannot be easily made plain, and thereby hindereth the
building, is by the builders cast away as unprofitable, and troublesome:
so also, a man that by asperity of nature, will strive to retain those
things which to himself are superfluous, and to others necessary; and
for the stubbornness of his passions, cannot be corrected, is to be
left, or cast out of society, as cumbersome thereunto. For seeing every
man, not only by right, but also by necessity of nature, is supposed to
endeavour all he can, to obtain that which is necessary for his
conservation; he that shall oppose himself against it, for things
superfluous, is guilty of the war that thereupon is to follow; and
therefore doth that, which is contrary to the fundamental law of nature,
which commandeth _to seek peace_. The observers of this law, may be
called SOCIABLE, the Latins call them _commodi_; the contrary,
_stubborn_, _insociable_, _froward_, _intractable_.
[Sidenote: The sixth, facility to pardon.]
A sixth law of nature, is this, _that upon caution of the future time, a
man ought to pardon the offences past of them that repenting, desire
it_. For PARDON, is nothing but granting of peace; which though granted
to them that persevere in their hostility, be not peace, but fear; yet
not granted to them that give caution of the future time, is sign of an
aversion to peace; and therefore contrary to the law of nature.
[Sidenote: The seventh, that in revenges, men respect only the future
good.]
A seventh is, _that in revenges_, that is, retribution of evil for evil,
_men look not at the greatness of the evil past, but the greatness of
the good to follow_. Whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with
any other design, than for correction of the offender, or direction of
others. For this law is consequent to the next before it, that
commandeth pardon, upon security of the future time. Besides, revenge
without respect to the example, and profit to come, is a triumph, or
glorying in the hurt of another, tending to no end; for the end is
always somewhat to come; and glorying to no end, is vain-glory, and
contrary to reason, and to hurt without reason, tendeth to the
introduction of war; which is against the law of nature; and is commonly
styled by the name of _cruelty_.
[Sidenote: The eighth, against contumely.]
And because all signs of hatred, or contempt, provoke to fight; insomuch
as most men choose rather to hazard their life, than not to be revenged;
we may in the eighth place, for a law of nature, set down this precept,
_that no man by deed, word, countenance, or gesture, declare hatred, or
contempt of another_. The breach of which law, is commonly called
_contumely_.
[Sidenote: The ninth, against pride.]
The question who is the better man, has no place in the condition of
mere nature; where, as has been shewn before, all men are equal. The
inequality that now is, has been introduced by the laws civil. I know
that Aristotle in the first book of his _Politics_, for a foundation of
his doctrine, maketh men by nature, some more worthy to command, meaning
the wiser sort, such as he thought himself to be for his philosophy;
others to serve, meaning those that had strong bodies, but were not
philosophers as he; as if master and servant were not introduced by
consent of men, but by difference of wit: which is not only against
reason; but also against experience. For there are very few so foolish,
that had not rather govern themselves, than be governed by others: nor
when the wise in their own conceit, contend by force, with them who
distrust their own wisdom, do they always, or often, or almost at any
time, get the victory. If nature therefore have made men equal, that
equality is to be acknowledged: or if nature have made men unequal; yet
because men that think themselves equal, will not enter into conditions
of peace, but upon equal terms, such equality must be admitted. And
therefore for the ninth law of nature, I put this, _that every man
acknowledge another for his equal by nature_. The breach of this precept
is _pride_.
[Sidenote: The tenth, against arrogance.]
On this law, dependeth another, _that at the entrance into conditions of
peace_, _no man require to reserve to himself any right_, _which he is
not content should be reserved to every one of the rest_. As it is
necessary for all men that seek peace, to lay down certain rights of
nature; that is to say, not to have liberty to do all they list: so is
it necessary for man’s life, to retain some; as right to govern their
own bodies; enjoy air, water, motion, ways to go from place to place;
and all things else, without which a man cannot live, or not live well.
If in this case, at the making of peace, men require for themselves,
that which they would not have to be granted to others, they do contrary
to the precedent law, that commandeth the acknowledgment of natural
equality, and therefore also against the law of nature. The observers of
this law, are those we call _modest_, and the breakers _arrogant_ men.
The Greeks call the violation of this law πλεονεξία; that is, a desire
of more than their share.
[Sidenote: The eleventh, equity.]
Also if _a man be trusted to judge between man and man_, it is a precept
of the law of nature, _that he deal equally between them_. For without
that, the controversies of men cannot be determined but by war. He
therefore that is partial in judgment, doth what in him lies, to deter
men from the use of judges, and arbitrators; and consequently, against
the fundamental law of nature, is the cause of war.
The observance of this law, from the equal distribution to each man, of
that which in reason belongeth to him, is called EQUITY, and, as I have
said before, distributive justice: the violation, _acception of
persons_, προσωποληψία.
[Sidenote: The twelfth, equal use of things common.]
And from this followeth another law, _that such things as cannot be
divided, be enjoyed in common, if it can be; and if the quantity of the
thing permit, without stint; otherwise proportionably to the number of
them that have right_. For otherwise the distribution is unequal, and
contrary to equity.
[Sidenote: The thirteenth, of lot.]
But some things there be, that can neither be divided, nor enjoyed in
common. Then, the law of nature, which prescribeth equity, requireth,
_that the entire right; or else, making the use alternate, the first
possession, be determined by lot_. For equal distribution, is of the law
of nature; and other means of equal distribution cannot be imagined.
[Sidenote: The fourteenth, of primogeniture, and first seizing.]
Of _lots_ there be two sorts, _arbitrary_, and _natural_. Arbitrary, is
that which is agreed on by the competitors: natural, is either
_primogeniture_, which the Greek calls κληρονομία, which signifies,
_given by lot_; or _first seizure_.
And therefore those things which cannot be enjoyed in common, nor
divided, ought to be adjudged to the first possessor; and in some cases
to the first born, as acquired by lot.
[Sidenote: The fifteenth, of mediators.]
It is also a law of nature, _that all men that mediate peace, be allowed
safe conduct_. For the law that commandeth peace, as the _end_,
commandeth intercession, as the _means_; and to intercession the means
is safe conduct.
[Illustration: The sixteenth, of submission to arbitrement.]
And because, though men be never so willing to observe these laws, there
may nevertheless arise questions concerning a man’s action; first,
whether it were done, or not done; secondly, if done, whether against
the law, or not against the law; the former whereof, is called a
question _of fact_; the latter a question _of right_, therefore unless
the parties to the question, covenant mutually to stand to the sentence
of another, they are as far from peace as ever. This other to whose
sentence they submit is called an ARBITRATOR. And therefore it is of the
law of nature, _that they that are at controversy, submit their right to
the judgment of an arbitrator_.
[Sidenote: The seventeenth, no man is his own judge.]
And seeing every man is presumed to do all things in order to his own
benefit, no man is a fit arbitrator in his own cause; and if he were
never so fit; yet equity allowing to each party equal benefit, if one be
admitted to be judge, the other is to be admitted also; and so the
controversy, that is, the cause of war, remains, against the law of
nature.
[Sidenote: The eighteenth, no man to be judge, that has in him a natural
cause of partiality.]
For the same reason no man in any cause ought to be received for
arbitrator, to whom greater profit, or honour, or pleasure apparently
ariseth out of the victory of one party, than of the other: for he hath
taken, though an unavoidable bribe, yet a bribe; and no man can be
obliged to trust him. And thus also the controversy, and the condition
of war remaineth, contrary to the law of nature.
[Sidenote: The nineteenth of witnesses.]
And in a controversy of _fact_, the judge being to give no more credit
to one, than to the other, if there be no other arguments, must give
credit to a third; or to a third and fourth; or more: for else the
question is undecided, and left to force, contrary to the law of nature.
These are the laws of nature, dictating peace, for a means of the
conservation of men in multitudes; and which only concern the doctrine
of civil society. There be other things tending to the destruction of
particular men; as drunkenness, and all other parts of intemperance;
which may therefore also be reckoned amongst those things which the law
of nature hath forbidden; but are not necessary to be mentioned, nor are
pertinent enough to this place.
[Sidenote: A rule, by which the laws of nature may easily be examined.]
And though this may seem too subtle a deduction of the laws of nature,
to be taken notice of by all men; whereof the most part are too busy in
getting food, and the rest too negligent to understand; yet to leave all
men inexcusable, they have been contracted into one easy sum,
intelligible even to the meanest capacity; and that is, _Do not that to
another, which thou wouldest not have done to thyself_; which sheweth
him, that he has no more to do in learning the laws of nature, but, when
weighing the actions of other men with his own, they seem too heavy, to
put them into the other part of the balance, and his own into their
place, that his own passions, and self-love, may add nothing to the
weight; and then there is none of these laws of nature that will not
appear unto him very reasonable.
[Sidenote: The laws of nature oblige in conscience always, but in effect
then only when there is security.]
The laws of nature oblige _in foro interno_; that is to say, they bind
to a desire they should take place: but _in foro externo_; that is, to
the putting them in act, not always. For he that should be modest, and
tractable, and perform all he promises, in such time, and place, where
no man else should do so, should but make himself a prey to others, and
procure his own certain ruin, contrary to the ground of all laws of
nature, which tend to nature’s preservation. And again, he that having
sufficient security, that others shall observe the same laws towards
him, observes them not himself, seeketh not peace, but war; and
consequently the destruction of his nature by violence.
And whatsoever laws bind _in foro interno_, may be broken, not only by a
fact contrary to the law, but also by a fact according to it, in case a
man think it contrary. For though his action in this case, be according
to the law; yet his purpose was against the law; which, where the
obligation is _in foro interno_, is a breach.
[Sidenote: The laws of nature are eternal.]
The laws of nature are immutable and eternal; for injustice,
ingratitude, arrogance, pride, iniquity, acception of persons, and the
rest, can never be made lawful. For it can never be that war shall
preserve life, and peace destroy it.
[Sidenote: And yet easy.]
The same laws, because they oblige only to a desire, and endeavour, I
mean an unfeigned and constant endeavour, are easy to be observed. For
in that they require nothing but endeavour, he that endeavoureth their
performance, fulfilleth them; and he that fulfilleth the law, is just.
[Sidenote: The science of these laws, is the true moral philosophy.]
And the science of them, is the true and only moral philosophy. For
moral philosophy is nothing else but the science of what is _good_, and
_evil_, in the conversation, and society of mankind. _Good_, and _evil_,
are names that signify our appetites, and aversions; which in different
tempers, customs, and doctrines of men, are different: and divers men,
differ not only in their judgment, on the senses of what is pleasant,
and unpleasant to the taste, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also
of what is conformable, or disagreeable to reason, in the actions of
common life. Nay, the same man, in divers times, differs from himself;
and one time praiseth, that is, calleth good, what another time he
dispraiseth, and calleth evil: from whence arise disputes,
controversies, and at last war. And therefore so long as a man is in the
condition of mere nature, which is a condition of war, as private
appetite is the measure of good, and evil: and consequently all men
agree on this, that peace is good, and therefore also the way, or means
of peace, which, as I have shewed before, are _justice_, _gratitude_,
_modesty_, _equity_, _mercy_, and the rest of the laws of nature, are
good; that is to say; _moral virtues_; and their contrary _vices_, evil.
Now the science of virtue and vice, is moral philosophy; and therefore
the true doctrine of the laws of nature, is the true moral philosophy.
But the writers of moral philosophy, though they acknowledge the same
virtues and vices; yet not seeing wherein consisted their goodness; nor
that they come to be praised, as the means of peaceable, sociable, and
comfortable living, place them in a mediocrity of passions: as if not
the cause, but the degree of daring, made fortitude; or not the cause,
but the quantity of a gift, made liberality.
These dictates of reason, men used to call by the name of laws, but
improperly: for they are but conclusions, or theorems concerning what
conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves; whereas law,
properly, is the word of him, that by right hath command over others.
But yet if we consider the same theorems, as delivered in the word of
God, that by right commandeth all things; then are they properly called
laws.
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CHAPTER XVI.
OF PERSONS, AUTHORS, AND THINGS
PERSONATED.
[Sidenote: A person what.]
A PERSON, is he, _whose words or actions are considered, either as his
own, or as representing the words or actions of another man, or of any
other thing, to whom they are attributed, whether truly or by fiction_.
[Sidenote: Person natural, and artificial.]
When they are considered as his own, then is he called a _natural
person_: and when they are considered as representing the words and
actions of another, then is he a _feigned_ or _artificial person_.
[Sidenote: The word person, whence.]
The word person is Latin: instead whereof the Greeks have πρόσωπον,
which signifies the _face_, as _persona_ in Latin signifies the
disguise, or _outward appearance_ of a man, counterfeited on the stage;
and sometimes more particularly that part of it, which disguiseth the
face, as a mask or vizard: and from the stage, hath been translated to
any representer of speech and action, as well in tribunals, as theatres.
So that a _person_, is the same that an _actor_ is, both on the stage
and in common conversation; and to _personate_, is to _act_, or
_represent_ himself, or another; and he that acteth another, is said to
bear his person, or act in his name; in which sense Cicero useth it
where he says, _Unus sustineo tres personas; mei, adversarii, et
judicis_: I bear three persons; my own, my adversary’s, and the judge’s;
and is called in divers occasions, diversly; as a _representer_, or
_representative_, a _lieutenant_, a _vicar_, an _attorney_, a _deputy_,
a _procurator_, an _actor_, and the like.
Of persons artificial, some have their words and actions _owned_ by
those whom they represent. [Sidenote: Actor.] And then the person is the
_actor_; [Sidenote: Author.] and he that owneth his words and actions,
is the AUTHOR: in which case the actor acteth by authority. For that
which in speaking of goods and possessions, is called an _owner_, and in
Latin _dominus_, in Greek κύριος speaking of actions, is called author.
And as the right of possession, is called dominion; [Sidenote:
Authority.] so the right of doing any action, is called AUTHORITY. So
that by authority, is always understood a right of doing any act; and
_done by authority_, done by commission, or licence from him whose right
it is.
[Sidenote: Covenants by authority, bind the author.]
From hence it followeth, that when the actor maketh a covenant by
authority, he bindeth thereby the author, no less than if he had made it
himself; and no less subjecteth him to all the consequences of the same.
And therefore all that hath been said formerly, (chap. XIV) of the
nature of covenants between man and man in their natural capacity, is
true also when they are made by their actors, representers, or
procurators, that have authority from them, so far forth as is in their
commission, but no further.
And therefore he that maketh a covenant with the actor, or representer,
not knowing the authority he hath, doth it at his own peril. For no man
is obliged by a covenant, whereof he is not author; nor consequently by
a covenant made against, or beside the authority he gave.
[Sidenote: But not the actor.]
When the actor doth anything against the law of nature by command of the
author, if he be obliged by former covenant to obey him, not he, but the
author breaketh the law of nature; for though the action be against the
law of nature; yet it is not his: but contrarily, to refuse to do it, is
against the law of nature, that forbiddeth breach of covenant.
[Sidenote: The authority is to be shown.]
And he that maketh a covenant with the author, by mediation of the
actor, not knowing what authority he hath, but only takes his word; in
case such authority be not made manifest unto him upon demand, is no
longer obliged: for the covenant made with the author, is not valid,
without his counter-assurance. But if he that so covenanteth, knew
beforehand he was to expect no other assurance, than the actor’s word;
then is the covenant valid; because the actor in this case maketh
himself the author. And therefore, as when the authority is evident, the
covenant obligeth the author, not the actor; so when the authority is
feigned, it obligeth the actor only; there being no author but himself.
[Sidenote: Things personated, inanimate.]
There are few things, that are incapable of being represented by
fiction. Inanimate things, as a church, an hospital, a bridge, may be
personated by a rector, master, or overseer. But things inanimate,
cannot be authors, nor therefore give authority to their actors: yet the
actors may have authority to procure their maintenance, given them by
those that are owners, or governors of those things. And therefore, such
things cannot be personated, before there be some state of civil
government.
[Sidenote: Irrational.]
Likewise children, fools, and madmen that have no use of reason, may be
personated by guardians, or curators; but can be no authors, during that
time, of any action done by them, longer than, when they shall recover
the use of reason, they shall judge the same reasonable. Yet during the
folly, he that hath right of governing them, may give authority to the
guardian. But this again has no place but in a state civil, because
before such estate, there is no dominion of persons.
[Sidenote: False gods.]
An idol, or mere figment of the brain, may be personated; as were the
gods of the heathen: which by such officers as the state appointed, were
personated, and held possessions, and other goods, and rights, which men
from time to time dedicated, and consecrated unto them. But idols cannot
be authors: for an idol is nothing. The authority proceeded from the
state: and therefore before introduction of civil government, the gods
of the heathen could not be personated.
[Sidenote: The true God.]
The true God may be personated. As he was; first, by Moses; who governed
the Israelites, that were not his, but God’s people, not in his own
name, with _hoc dicit Moses_; but in God’s name, with _hoc dicit
Dominus_. Secondly, by the Son of man, his own Son, our blessed Saviour
Jesus Christ, that came to reduce the Jews, and induce all nations into
the kingdom of his father; not as of himself, but as sent from his
father. And thirdly, by the Holy Ghost, or Comforter, speaking, and
working in the Apostles: which Holy Ghost, was a Comforter that came not
of himself; but was sent, and proceeded from them both.
[Sidenote: A multitude of men, how one person.]
A multitude of men, are made one person, when they are by one man, or
one person, represented; so that it be done with the consent of every
one of that multitude in particular. For it is the _unity_ of the
representer, not the _unity_ of the represented, that maketh the person
_one_. And it is the representer that beareth the person, and but one
person: and _unity_, cannot otherwise be understood in multitude.
[Sidenote: Every one is author.]
And because the multitude naturally is not _one_, but _many_; they
cannot be understood for one; but many authors, of every thing their
representative saith, or doth in their name; every man giving their
common representer, authority from himself in particular; and owning all
the actions the representer doth, in case they give him authority
without stint: otherwise, when they limit him in what, and how far he
shall represent them, none of them owneth more than they gave him
commission to act.
[Sidenote: An actor may be many men made one by plurality of voices.]
And if the representative consist of many men, the voice of the greater
number, must be considered as the voice of them all. For if the lesser
number pronounce, for example, in the affirmative, and the greater in
the negative, there will be negatives more than enough to destroy the
affirmatives; and thereby the excess of negatives, standing
uncontradicted, are the only voice the representative hath.
[Sidenote: Representatives, when the number is even, unprofitable.]
And a representative of even number, especially when the number is not
great, whereby the contradictory voices are oftentimes equal, is
therefore oftentimes mute, and incapable of action. Yet in some cases
contradictory voices equal in number, may determine a question; as in
condemning, or absolving, equality of votes, even in that they condemn
not, do absolve; but not on the contrary condemn, in that they absolve
not. For when a cause is heard; not to condemn, is to absolve: but on
the contrary, to say that not absolving, is condemning, is not true. The
like it is in a deliberation of executing presently, or deferring till
another time: for when the voices are equal, the not decreeing
execution, is a decree of dilation.
[Sidenote: Negative voice.]
Or if the number be odd, as three, or more, men or assemblies; whereof
every one has by a negative voice, authority to take away the effect of
all the affirmative voices of the rest, this number is no
representative; because by the diversity of opinions, and interests of
men, it becomes oftentimes, and in cases of the greatest consequence, a
mute person, and unapt, as for many things else, so for the government
of a multitude, especially in time of war.
Of authors there be two sorts. The first simply so called; which I have
before defined to be him, that owneth the action of another simply. The
second is he, that owneth an action, or covenant of another
conditionally; that is to say, he undertaketh to do it, if the other
doth it not, at, or before a certain time. And these authors
conditional, are generally called SURETIES, in Latin, _fidejussores_,
and _sponsores_; and particularly for debt, _prædes_; and for appearance
before a judge, or magistrate, _vades_.
PART II.
OF COMMONWEALTH.
-------
CHAPTER XVII.
OF THE CAUSES, GENERATION, AND DEFINITION
OF A COMMONWEALTH.
[Sidenote: The end of commonwealth, particular security:]
The final cause, end, or design of men, who naturally love liberty, and
dominion over others, in the introduction of that restraint upon
themselves, in which we see them live in commonwealths, is the foresight
of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is
to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of war,
which is necessarily consequent, as hath been shown in chapter XIII, to
the natural passions of men, when there is no visible power to keep them
in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their
covenants, and observation of those laws of nature set down in the
fourteenth and fifteenth chapters.
[Sidenote: Which is not to be had from the law of nature:]
For the laws of nature, as _justice_, _equity_, _modesty_, _mercy_, and,
in sum, _doing to others, as we would be done to_, of themselves,
without the terror of some power, to cause them to be observed, are
contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride,
revenge, and the like. And covenants, without the sword, are but words,
and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore notwithstanding the
laws of nature, which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to
keep them, when he can do it safely, if there be no power erected, or
not great enough for our security; every man will, and may lawfully rely
on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men. And in
all places, where men have lived by small families, to rob and spoil one
another, has been a trade, and so far from being reputed against the law
of nature, that the greater spoils they gained, the greater was their
honour; and men observed no other laws therein, but the laws of honour;
that is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives, and
instruments of husbandry. And as small families did then; so now do
cities and kingdoms which are but greater families, for their own
security, enlarge their dominions, upon all pretences of danger, and
fear of invasion, or assistance that may be given to invaders, and
endeavour as much as they can, to subdue, or weaken their neighbours, by
open force, and secret arts, for want of other caution, justly; and are
remembered for it in after ages with honour.
[Sidenote: Nor from the conjunction of a few men or families:]
Nor is it the joining together of a small number of men, that gives them
this security; because in small numbers, small additions on the one side
or the other, make the advantage of strength so great, as is sufficient
to carry the victory; and therefore gives encouragement to an invasion.
The multitude sufficient to confide in for our security, is not
determined by any certain number, but by comparison with the enemy we
fear; and is then sufficient, when the odds of the enemy is not of so
visible and conspicuous moment, to determine the event of war, as to
move him to attempt.
[Sidenote: Nor from a great multitude, unless directed by one judgment:]
And be there never so great a multitude; yet if their actions be
directed according to their particular judgments, and particular
appetites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither
against a common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. For
being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and application of
their strength, they do not help but hinder one another; and reduce
their strength by mutual opposition to nothing: whereby they are easily,
not only subdued by a very few that agree together; but also when there
is no common enemy, they make war upon each other, for their particular
interests. For if we could suppose a great multitude of men to consent
in the observation of justice, and other laws of nature, without a
common power to keep them all in awe; we might as well suppose all
mankind to do the same; and then there neither would be, nor need to be
any civil government, or Commonwealth at all; because there would be
peace without subjection.
[Sidenote: And that continually.]
Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should last all the
time of their life, that they be governed, and directed by one judgment,
for a limited time; as in one battle, or one war. For though they obtain
a victory by their unanimous endeavour against a foreign enemy; yet
afterwards, when either they have no common enemy, or he that by one
part is held for an enemy, is by another part held for a friend, they
must needs by the difference of their interests dissolve, and fall again
into a war amongst themselves.
[Sidenote: Why certain creatures without reason, or speech, do
nevertheless live in society, without any coercive power.]
It is true, that certain living creatures, as bees, and ants, live
sociably one with another, which are therefore by Aristotle numbered
amongst political creatures; and yet have no other direction, than their
particular judgments and appetites; nor speech, whereby one of them can
signify to another, what he thinks expedient for the common benefit: and
therefore some man may perhaps desire to know, why mankind cannot do the
same. To which I answer,
First, that men are continually in competition for honour and dignity,
which these creatures are not; and consequently amongst men there
ariseth on that ground, envy and hatred, and finally war; but amongst
these not so.
Secondly, that amongst these creatures, the common good differeth not
from the private; and being by nature inclined to their private, they
procure thereby the common benefit. But man, whose joy consisteth in
comparing himself with other men, can relish nothing but what is
eminent.
Thirdly, that these creatures, having not, as man, the use of reason, do
not see, nor think they see any fault, in the administration of their
common business; whereas amongst men, there are very many, that think
themselves wiser, and abler to govern the public, better than the rest;
and these strive to reform and innovate, one this way, another that way;
and thereby bring it into distraction and civil war.
Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice, in
making known to one another their desires, and other affections; yet
they want that art of words, by which some men can represent to others,
that which is good, in the likeness of evil; and evil, in the likeness
of good; and augment, or diminish the apparent greatness of good and
evil; discontenting men, and troubling their peace at their pleasure.
Fifthly, irrational creatures cannot distinguish between _injury_ and
_damage_; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not
offended with their fellows: whereas man is then most troublesome, when
he is most at ease: for then it is that he loves to shew his wisdom, and
control the actions of them that govern the commonwealth.
Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is natural; that of men, is by
covenant only, which is artificial: and therefore it is no wonder if
there be somewhat else required, besides covenant, to make their
agreement constant and lasting; which is a common power, to keep them in
awe, and to direct their actions to the common benefit.
[Sidenote: The generation of a commonwealth.]
The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend them
from the invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one another, and
thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their own industry, and
by the fruits of the earth, they may nourish themselves and live
contentedly; is, to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or
upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality
of voices, unto one will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one
man, or assembly of men, to bear their person; and every one to own, and
acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their
person, shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern
the common peace and safety; and therein to submit their wills, every
one to his will, and their judgments, to his judgment. This is more than
consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same
person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as
if every man should say to every man, _I authorise and give up my right
of governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this
condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his
actions in like manner_. This done, the multitude so united in one
person, is called a COMMONWEALTH, in Latin CIVITAS. This is the
generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather, to speak more reverently,
of that _mortal god_, to which we owe under the _immortal God_, our
peace and defence. For by this authority, given him by every particular
man in the commonwealth, he hath the use of so much power and strength
conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is enabled to perform the
wills of them all, to peace at home, and mutual aid against their
enemies abroad. [Sidenote: The definition of a commonwealth.] And in him
consisteth the essence of the commonwealth; which, to define it, is _one
person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with
another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may
use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for
their peace and common defence_.
[Sidenote: Sovereign, and subject, what.]
And he that carrieth this person, is called SOVEREIGN, and said to have
_sovereign power_; and every one besides, his SUBJECT.
The attaining to this sovereign power, is by two ways. One, by natural
force; as when a man maketh his children, to submit themselves, and
their children to his government, as being able to destroy them if they
refuse; or by war subdueth his enemies to his will, giving them their
lives on that condition. The other, is when men agree amongst
themselves, to submit to some man, or assembly of men, voluntarily, on
confidence to be protected by him against all others. This latter, may
be called a political commonwealth, or commonwealth by _institution_;
and the former, a commonwealth by _acquisition_. And first, I shall
speak of a commonwealth by institution.
-------
CHAPTER XVIII.
OF THE RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNS BY INSTITUTION.
[Sidenote: The act of instituting a commonwealth, what.]
A _commonwealth_ is said to be _instituted_, when a _multitude_ of men
do agree; and _covenant, every one, with every one_, that to whatsoever
_man_, or _assembly of men_, shall be given by the major part, the
_right_ to _present_ the person of them all, that is to say, to be their
_representative_; every one, as well he that _voted for it_, as he that
_voted against it_, shall _authorize_ all the actions and judgments, of
that man, or assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his
own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected
against other men.
[Sidenote: The consequences to such institution, are.]
From this institution of a commonwealth are derived all the _rights_,
and _faculties_ of him, or them, on whom sovereign power is conferred by
the consent of the people assembled.
[Sidenote: 1. The subjects cannot change the form of government.]
First, because they covenant, it is to be understood, they are not
obliged by former covenant to anything repugnant hereunto. And
consequently they that have already instituted a commonwealth, being
thereby bound by covenant, to own the actions, and judgments of one,
cannot lawfully make a new covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient
to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without his permission. And
therefore, they that are subjects to a monarch, cannot without his leave
cast off monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited multitude;
nor transfer their person from him that beareth it, to another man, or
other assembly of men: for they are bound, every man to every man, to
own, and be reputed author of all, that he that already is their
sovereign, shall do, and judge fit to be done: so that any one man
dissenting, all the rest should break their covenant made to that man,
which is injustice: and they have also every man given the sovereignty
to him that beareth their person; and therefore if they depose him, they
take from him that which is his own, and so again it is injustice.
Besides, if he that attempteth to depose his sovereign, be killed, or
punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his own punishment, as
being by the institution, author of all his sovereign shall do: and
because it is injustice for a man to do anything, for which he may be
punished by his own authority, he is also upon that title, unjust. And
whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their
sovereign, a new covenant, made, not with men, but with God; this also
is unjust: for there is no covenant with God, but by mediation of
somebody that representeth God’s person; which none doth but God’s
lieutenant, who hath the sovereignty under God. But this pretence of
covenant with God, is so evident a lie, even in the pretenders’ own
consciences, that it is not only an act of an unjust, but also of a
vile, and unmanly disposition.
[Sidenote: 2. Sovereign power cannot be forfeited.]
Secondly, because the right of bearing the person of them all, is given
to him they make sovereign, by covenant only of one to another, and not
of him to any of them; there can happen no breach of covenant on the
part of the sovereign; and consequently none of his subjects, by any
pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his subjection. That he which
is made sovereign maketh no covenant with his subjects beforehand, is
manifest; because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as
one party to the covenant; or he must make a several covenant with every
man. With the whole, as one party, it is impossible; because as yet they
are not one person: and if he make so many several covenants as there be
men, those covenants after he hath the sovereignty are void; because
what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach thereof,
is the act both of himself, and of all the rest, because done in the
person, and by the right of every one of them in particular. Besides, if
any one, or more of them, pretend a breach of the covenant made by the
sovereign at his institution; and others, or one other of his subjects,
or himself alone, pretend there was no such breach, there is in this
case, no judge to decide the controversy; it returns therefore to the
sword again; and every man recovereth the right of protecting himself by
his own strength, contrary to the design they had in the institution. It
is therefore in vain to grant sovereignty by way of precedent covenant.
The opinion that any monarch receiveth his power by covenant, that is to
say, on condition, proceedeth from want of understanding this easy
truth, that covenants being but words and breath, have no force to
oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man, but what it has from the
public sword; that is, from the untied hands of that man, or assembly of
men that hath the sovereignty, and whose actions are avouched by them
all, and performed by the strength of them all, in him united. But when
an assembly of men is made sovereign; then no man imagineth any such
covenant to have passed in the institution; for no man is so dull as to
say, for example, the people of Rome made a covenant with the Romans, to
hold the sovereignty on such or such conditions; which not performed,
the Romans might lawfully depose the Roman people. That men see not the
reason to be alike in a monarchy, and in a popular government,
proceedeth from the ambition of some, that are kinder to the government
of an assembly, whereof they may hope to participate, than of monarchy,
which they despair to enjoy.
[Sidenote: 3. No man can without injustice protest against the
institution of the sovereign declared by the major part.]
Thirdly, because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a
sovereign; he that dissented must now consent with the rest; that is, be
contented to avow all the actions he shall do, or else justly be
destroyed by the rest. For if he voluntarily entered into the
congregation of them that were assembled, he sufficiently declared
thereby his will, and therefore tacitly covenanted, to stand to what the
major part should ordain: and therefore if he refuse to stand thereto,
or make protestation against any of their decrees, he does contrary to
his covenant, and therefore unjustly. And whether he be of the
congregation, or not; and whether his consent be asked, or not, he must
either submit to their decrees, or be left in the condition of war he
was in before; wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any
man whatsoever.
[Sidenote: 4. The sovereign’s actions cannot be justly accused by the
subject.]
Fourthly, because every subject is by this institution author of all the
actions, and judgments of the sovereign instituted; it follows, that
whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his subjects; nor
ought he to be by any of them accused of injustice. For he that doth
anything by authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by
whose authority he acteth: but by this institution of a commonwealth,
every particular man is author of all the sovereign doth: and
consequently he that complaineth of injury from his sovereign,
complaineth of that whereof he himself is author; and therefore ought
not to accuse any man but himself; no nor himself of injury; because to
do injury to one’s self, is impossible. It is true that they that have
sovereign power may commit iniquity; but not injustice, or injury in the
proper signification.
[Sidenote: 5. Whatsoever the sovereign doth is unpunishable by the
subject.]
Fifthly, and consequently to that which was said last, no man that hath
sovereign power can justly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner
by his subjects punished. For seeing every subject is author of the
actions of his sovereign; he punisheth another for the actions committed
by himself.
[Sidenote: 6. The sovereign is judge of what is necessary for the peace
and defence of his subjects.]
And because the end of this institution, is the peace and defence of
them all; and whosoever has right to the end, has right to the means; it
belongeth of right, to whatsoever man, or assembly that hath the
sovereignty, to be judge both of the means of peace and defence, and
also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same; and to do
whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both beforehand, for the
preserving of peace and security, by prevention of discord at home, and
hostility from abroad; and, when peace and security are lost, for the
recovery of the same. And therefore,
[Sidenote: And judge of what doctrines are fit to be taught them.]
Sixthly, it is annexed to the sovereignty, to be judge of what opinions
and doctrines are averse, and what conducing to peace; and consequently,
on what occasions, how far, and what men are to be trusted withal, in
speaking to multitudes of people; and who shall examine the doctrines of
all books before they be published. For the actions of men proceed from
their opinions; and in the well-governing of opinions, consisteth the
well-governing of men’s actions, in order to their peace, and concord.
And though in matter of doctrine, nothing ought to be regarded but the
truth; yet this is not repugnant to regulating the same by peace. For
doctrine repugnant to peace, can no more be true, than peace and concord
can be against the law of nature. It is true, that in a commonwealth,
where by the negligence, or unskilfulness of governors, and teachers,
false doctrines are by time generally received; the contrary truths may
be generally offensive. Yet the most sudden, and rough bursting in of a
new truth, that can be, does never break the peace, but only sometimes
awake the war. For those men that are so remissly governed, that they
dare take up arms to defend, or introduce an opinion, are still in war;
and their condition not peace, but only a cessation of arms for fear of
one another; and they live, as it were, in the precincts of battle
continually. It belongeth therefore to him that hath the sovereign
power, to be judge, or constitute all judges of opinions and doctrines,
as a thing necessary to peace; thereby to prevent discord and civil war.
[Sidenote: 7. The right of making rules; whereby the subjects may every
man know what is so his own, as no other subject can without
injustice take it from him.]
Seventhly, is annexed to the sovereignty, the whole power of prescribing
the rules, whereby every man may know, what goods he may enjoy, and what
actions he may do, without being molested by any of his fellow-subjects;
and this is it men call _propriety_. For before constitution of
sovereign power, as hath already been shown, all men had right to all
things; which necessarily causeth war: and therefore this propriety,
being necessary to peace, and depending on sovereign power, is the act
of that power, in order to the public peace. These rules of propriety,
or _meum_ and _tuum_, and of _good_, _evil_, _lawful_, and _unlawful_ in
the actions of subjects, are the civil laws; that is to say, the laws of
each commonwealth in particular; though the name of civil law be now
restrained to the ancient civil laws of the city of Rome; which being
the head of a great part of the world, her laws at that time were in
these parts the civil law.
[Sidenote: 8. To him also belongeth the right of judicature and decision
of controversy.]
Eighthly, is annexed to the sovereignty, the right of judicature; that
is to say, of hearing and deciding all controversies, which may arise
concerning law, either civil, or natural; or concerning fact. For
without the decision of controversies, there is no protection of one
subject, against the injuries of another; the laws concerning _meum_ and
_tuum_ are in vain; and to every man remaineth, from the natural and
necessary appetite of his own conservation, the right of protecting
himself by his private strength, which is the condition of war, and
contrary to the end for which every commonwealth is instituted.
[Sidenote: 9. And of making war, and peace, as he shall think best.]
Ninthly, is annexed to the sovereignty, the right of making war and
peace with other nations, and commonwealths; that is to say, of judging
when it is for the public good, and how great forces are to be
assembled, armed, and paid for that end; and to levy money upon the
subjects, to defray the expenses thereof. For the power by which the
people are to be defended, consisteth in their armies; and the strength
of an army, in the union of their strength under one command; which
command the sovereign instituted, therefore hath; because the command of
the _militia_, without other institution, maketh him that hath it
sovereign. And therefore whosoever is made general of an army, he that
hath the sovereign power is always generalissimo.
[Sidenote: 10. And of choosing all counsellors and ministers, both of
peace & war.]
Tenthly, is annexed to the sovereignty, the choosing of all counsellors,
ministers, magistrates, and officers, both in peace, and war. For seeing
the sovereign is charged with the end, which is the common peace and
defence, he is understood to have power to use such means, as he shall
think most fit for his discharge.
[Sidenote: 11. And of rewarding and punishing, and that (where no former
law hath determined the measure of it) arbitrarily.]
Eleventhly, to the sovereign is committed the power of rewarding with
riches, or honour, and of punishing with corporal or pecuniary
punishment, or with ignominy, every subject according to the law he hath
formerly made; or if there be no law made, according as he shall judge
most to conduce to the encouraging of men to serve the commonwealth, or
deterring of them from doing disservice to the same.
[Sidenote: 12. And of honour and order.]
Lastly, considering what value men are naturally apt to set upon
themselves; what respect they look for from others; and how little they
value other men; from whence continually arise amongst them, emulation,
quarrels, factions, and at last war, to the destroying of one another,
and diminution of their strength against a common enemy; it is necessary
that there be laws of honour, and a public rate of the worth of such men
as have deserved, or are able to deserve well of the commonwealth; and
that there be force in the hands of some or other, to put those laws in
execution. But it hath already been shown, that not only the whole
_militia_, or forces of the commonwealth; but also the judicature of all
controversies, is annexed to the sovereignty. To the sovereign therefore
it belongeth also to give titles of honour; and to appoint what order of
place, and dignity, each man shall hold; and what signs of respect, in
public or private meetings, they shall give to one another.
[Sidenote: These rights are indivisible.]
These are the rights, which make the essence of sovereignty; and which
are the marks, whereby a man may discern in what man, or assembly of
men, the sovereign power is placed, and resideth. For these are
incommunicable, and inseparable. The power to coin money; to dispose of
the estate and persons of infant heirs; to have præemption in markets;
and all other statute prerogatives, may be transferred by the sovereign;
and yet the power to protect his subjects be retained. But if he
transfer the _militia_, he retains the judicature in vain, for want of
execution of the laws: or if he grant away the power of raising money;
the _militia_ is in vain; or if he give away the government of
doctrines, men will be frighted into rebellion with the fear of spirits.
And so if we consider any one of the said rights, we shall presently
see, that the holding of all the rest will produce no effect, in the
conservation of peace and justice, the end for which all commonwealths
are instituted. And this division is it, whereof it is said, _a kingdom
divided in itself cannot stand_: for unless this division precede,
division into opposite armies can never happen. If there had not first
been an opinion received of the greatest part of England, that these
powers were divided between the King, and the Lords, and the House of
Commons, the people had never been divided and fallen into this civil
war; first between those that disagreed in politics; and after between
the dissenters about the liberty of religion; which have so instructed
men in this point of sovereign right, that there be few now in England
that do not see, that these rights are inseparable, and will be so
generally acknowledged at the next return of peace; and so continue,
till their miseries are forgotten; and no longer, except the vulgar be
better taught than they have hitherto been.
[Sidenote: And can by no grant pass away without direct renouncing of
the sovereign power.]
And because they are essential and inseparable rights, it follows
necessarily, that in whatsoever words any of them seem to be granted
away, yet if the sovereign power itself be not in direct terms
renounced, and the name of sovereign no more given by the grantees to
him that grants them, the grant is void: for when he has granted all he
can, if we grant back the sovereignty, all is restored, as inseparably
annexed thereunto.
[Sidenote: The power and honour of subjects vanisheth in the presence of
the power sovereign.]
This great authority being indivisible, and inseparably annexed to the
sovereignty, there is little ground for the opinion of them, that say of
sovereign kings, though they be _singulis majores_, of greater power
than every one of their subjects, yet they be _universis minores_, of
less power than them all together. For if by _all together_, they mean
not the collective body as one person, then _all together_, and _every
one_, signify the same; and the speech is absurd. But if by _all
together_, they understand them as one person, which person the
sovereign bears, then the power of all together, is the same with the
sovereign’s power; and so again the speech is absurd: which absurdity
they see well enough, when the sovereignty is in an assembly of the
people; but in a monarch they see it not; and yet the power of
sovereignty is the same in whomsoever it be placed.
And as the power, so also the honour of the sovereign, ought to be
greater, than that of any, or all the subjects. For in the sovereignty
is the fountain of honour. The dignities of lord, earl, duke, and prince
are his creatures. As in the presence of the master, the servants are
equal, and without any honour at all; so are the subjects, in the
presence of the sovereign. And though they shine some more, some less,
when they are out of his sight; yet in his presence, they shine no more
than the stars in the presence of the sun.
[Sidenote: Sovereign power not so hurtful as the want of it, and the
hurt proceeds for the greatest part from not submitting
readily to a less.]
But a man may here object, that the condition of subjects is very
miserable; as being obnoxious to the lusts, and other irregular passions
of him, or them that have so unlimited a power in their hands. And
commonly they that live under a monarch, think it the fault of monarchy;
and they that live under the government of democracy, or other sovereign
assembly, attribute all the inconvenience to that form of commonwealth;
whereas the power in all forms, if they be perfect enough to protect
them, is the same: not considering that the state of man can never be
without some incommodity or other; and that the greatest, that in any
form of government can possibly happen to the people in general, is
scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries, and horrible calamities,
that accompany a civil war, or that dissolute condition of masterless
men, without subjection to laws, and a coercive power to tie their hands
from rapine and revenge: nor considering that the greatest pressure of
sovereign governors, proceedeth not from any delight, or profit they can
expect in the damage or weakening of their subjects, in whose vigour,
consisteth their own strength and glory; but in the restiveness of
themselves, that unwillingly contributing to their own defence, make it
necessary for their governors to draw from them what they can in time of
peace, that they may have means on any emergent occasion, or sudden
need, to resist, or take advantage on their enemies. For all men are by
nature provided of notable multiplying glasses, that is their passions
and self-love, through which, every little payment appeareth a great
grievance; but are destitute of those prospective glasses, namely moral
and civil science, to see afar off the miseries that hang over them, and
cannot without such payments be avoided.
-------
CHAPTER XIX.
OF THE SEVERAL KINDS OF COMMONWEALTH BY
INSTITUTION, AND OF SUCCESSION TO THE
SOVEREIGN POWER.
[Sidenote: The different forms of commonwealths but three.]
The difference of commonwealths, consisteth in the difference of the
sovereign, or the person representative of all and every one of the
multitude. And because the sovereignty is either in one man, or in an
assembly of more than one; and into that assembly either every man hath
right to enter, or not every one, but certain men distinguished from the
rest; it is manifest, there can be but three kinds of commonwealth. For
the representative must needs be one man, or more: and if more, then it
is the assembly of all, or but of a part. When the representative is one
man, then is the commonwealth a MONARCHY: when an assembly of all that
will come together, then it is a DEMOCRACY, or popular commonwealth:
when an assembly of a a part only, then it is called an ARISTOCRACY.
Other kind of commonwealth there can be none: for either one, or more,
or all, must have the sovereign power, which I have shown to be
indivisible, entire.
[Sidenote: Tyranny and oligarchy, but different names of monarchy, and
aristocracy.]
There be other names of government, in the histories, and books of
policy; as _tyranny_, and _oligarchy_: but they are not the names of
other forms of government, but of the same forms misliked. For they that
are discontented under _monarchy_, call it _tyranny_; and they that are
displeased with _aristocracy_, call it _oligarchy_: so also, they which
find themselves grieved under a _democracy_, call it _anarchy_, which
signifies want of government; and yet I think no man believes, that want
of government, is any new kind of government: nor by the same reason
ought they to believe, that the government is of one kind, when they
like it, and another, when they mislike it, or are oppressed by the
governors.
[Sidenote: Subordinate representatives dangerous.]
It is manifest, that men who are in absolute liberty, may, if they
please, give authority to one man, to represent them every one; as well
as give such authority to any assembly of men whatsoever; and
consequently may subject themselves, if they think good, to a monarch,
as absolutely, as to any other representative. Therefore, where there is
already erected a sovereign power, there can be no other representative
of the same people, but only to certain particular ends, by the
sovereign limited. For that were to erect two sovereigns; and every man
to have his person represented by two actors, that by opposing one
another, must needs divide that power, which, if men will live in peace,
is indivisible; and thereby reduce the multitude into the condition of
war, contrary to the end for which all sovereignty is instituted. And
therefore as it is absurd, to think that a sovereign assembly, inviting
the people of their dominion, to send up their deputies, with power to
make known their advice, or desires, should therefore hold such
deputies, rather than themselves, for the absolute representatives of
the people: so it is absurd also, to think the same in a monarchy. And I
know not how this so manifest a truth, should of late be so little
observed; that in a monarchy, he that had the sovereignty from a descent
of six hundred years, was alone called sovereign, had the title of
Majesty from every one of his subjects, and was unquestionably taken by
them for their king, was notwithstanding never considered as their
representative; the name without contradiction passing for the title of
those men, which at his command were sent up by the people to carry
their petitions, and give him, if he permitted it, their advice. Which
may serve as an admonition, for those that are the true, and absolute
representative of a people, to instruct men in the nature of that
office, and to take heed how they admit of any other general
representation upon any occasion whatsoever, if they mean to discharge
the trust committed to them.
[Sidenote: Comparison of monarchy, with sovereign assemblies.]
The difference between these three kinds of commonwealth, consisteth not
in the difference of power; but in the difference of convenience, or
aptitude to produce the peace, and security of the people; for which end
they were instituted. And to compare monarchy with the other two, we may
observe; first, that whosoever beareth the person of the people, or is
one of that assembly that bears it, beareth also his own natural person.
And though he be careful in his politic person to procure the common
interest; yet he is more, or no less careful to procure the private good
of himself, his family, kindred and friends; and for the most part, if
the public interest chance to cross the private, he prefers the private:
for the passions of men, are commonly more potent than their reason.
From whence it follows, that where the public and private interest are
most closely united, there is the public most advanced. Now in monarchy,
the private interest is the same with the public. The riches, power, and
honour of a monarch arise only from the riches, strength and reputation
of his subjects. For no king can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure,
whose subjects are either poor, or contemptible, or too weak through
want or dissention, to maintain a war against their enemies: whereas in
a democracy, or aristocracy, the public prosperity confers not so much
to the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth
many times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action, or a civil war.
Secondly, that a monarch receiveth counsel of whom, when, and where he
pleaseth; and consequently may hear the opinion of men versed in the
matter about which he deliberates, of what rank or quality soever, and
as long before the time of action, and with as much secrecy, as he will.
But when a sovereign assembly has need of counsel, none are admitted but
such as have a right thereto from the beginning; which for the most part
are of those who have been versed more in the acquisition of wealth than
of knowledge; and are to give their advice in long discourses, which
may, and do commonly excite men to action, but not govern them in it.
For the _understanding_ is by the flame of the passions, never
enlightened, but dazzled. Nor is there any place, or time, wherein an
assembly can receive counsel with secrecy, because of their own
multitude.
Thirdly, that the resolutions of a monarch, are subject to no other
inconstancy, than that of human nature; but in assemblies, besides that
of nature, there ariseth an inconstancy from the number. For the absence
of a few, that would have the resolution once taken, continue firm,
which may happen by security, negligence, or private impediments, or the
diligent appearance of a few of the contrary opinion, undoes to-day, all
that was concluded yesterday.
Fourthly, that a monarch cannot disagree with himself, out of envy, or
interest; but an assembly may; and that to such a height, as may produce
a civil war.
Fifthly, that in monarchy there is this inconvenience; that any subject,
by the power of one man, for the enriching of a favourite or flatterer,
may be deprived of all he possesseth; which I confess is a great and
inevitable inconvenience. But the same may as well happen, where the
sovereign power is in an assembly: for their power is the same; and they
are as subject to evil counsel, and to be seduced by orators, as a
monarch by flatterers; and becoming one another’s flatterers, serve one
another’s covetousness and ambition by turns. And whereas the favourites
of monarchs, are few, and they have none else to advance but their own
kindred; the favourites of an assembly, are many; and the kindred much
more numerous, than of any monarch. Besides, there is no favourite of a
monarch, which cannot as well succour his friends, as hurt his enemies:
but orators, that is to say, favourites of sovereign assemblies, though
they have great power to hurt, have little to save. For to accuse,
requires less eloquence, such is man’s nature, than to excuse; and
condemnation, than absolution more resembles justice.
Sixthly, that it is an inconvenience in monarchy, that the sovereignty
may descend upon an infant, or one that cannot discern between good and
evil: and consisteth in this, that the use of his power, must be in the
hand of another man, or of some assembly of men, which are to govern by
his right, and in his name; as curators, and protectors of his person,
and authority. But to say there is inconvenience, in putting the use of
the sovereign power, into the hand of a man, or an assembly of men; is
to say that all government is more inconvenient, than confusion, and
civil war. And therefore all the danger that can be pretended, must
arise from the contention of those, that for an office of so great
honour, and profit, may become competitors. To make it appear, that this
inconvenience, proceedeth not from that form of government we call
monarchy, we are to consider, that the precedent monarch hath appointed
who shall have the tuition of his infant successor, either expressly by
testament, or tacitly, by not controlling the custom in that case
received: and then such inconvenience, if it happen, is to be
attributed, not to the monarchy, but to the ambition, and injustice of
the subjects; which in all kinds of government, where the people are not
well instructed in their duty, and the rights of sovereignty, is the
same. Or else the precedent monarch hath not at all taken order for such
tuition; and then the law of nature hath provided this sufficient rule,
that the tuition shall be in him, that hath by nature most interest in
the preservation of the authority of the infant, and to whom least
benefit can accrue by his death, or diminution. For seeing every man by
nature seeketh his own benefit, and promotion; to put an infant into the
power of those, that can promote themselves by his destruction, or
damage, is not tuition, but treachery. So that sufficient provision
being taken, against all just quarrel, about the government under a
child, if any contention arise to the disturbance of the public peace,
it is not to be attributed to the form of monarchy, but to the ambition
of subjects, and ignorance of their duty. On the other side, there is no
great commonwealth, the sovereignty whereof is in a great assembly,
which is not, as to consultations of peace, and war, and making of laws,
in the same condition, as if the government were in a child. For as a
child wants the judgment to dissent from counsel given him, and is
thereby necessitated to take the advice of them, or him, to whom he is
committed: so an assembly wanteth the liberty, to dissent from the
counsel of the major part, be it good, or bad. And as a child has need
of a tutor, or protector, to preserve his person and authority: so also,
in great commonwealths, the sovereign assembly, in all great dangers and
troubles, have need of _custodes libertatis_; that is of dictators, or
protectors of their authority; which are as much as temporary monarchs,
to whom for a time, they may commit the entire exercise of their power;
and have, at the end of that time, been oftener deprived thereof, than
infant kings, by their protectors, regents, or any other tutors.
[Sidenote: Definition of monarchy, and other forms.]
Though the kinds of sovereignty be, as I have now shown, but three; that
is to say, monarchy, where one man has it; or democracy, where the
general assembly of subjects hath it; or aristocracy, where it is in an
assembly of certain persons nominated, or otherwise distinguished from
the rest: yet he that shall consider the particular commonwealths that
have been, and are in the world, will not perhaps easily reduce them to
three, and may thereby be inclined to think there be other forms,
arising from these mingled together. As for example, elective kingdoms;
where kings have the sovereign power put into their hands for a time; or
kingdoms, wherein the king hath a power limited: which governments, are
nevertheless by most writers called monarchy. Likewise if a popular, or
aristocratical commonwealth, subdue an enemy’s country, and govern the
same, by a president, procurator, or other magistrate; this may seem
perhaps at first sight, to be a democratical, or aristocratical
government. But it is not so. For elective kings, are not sovereigns,
but ministers of the sovereign; nor limited kings, sovereigns, but
ministers of them that have the sovereign power: nor are those provinces
which are in subjection to a democracy, or aristocracy of another
commonwealth, democratically or aristocratically governed, but
monarchically.
And first, concerning an elective king, whose power is limited to his
life, as it is in many places of Christendom at this day; or to certain
years or months, as the dictator’s power amongst the Romans; if he have
right to appoint his successor, he is no more elective but hereditary.
But if he have no power to elect his successor, then there is some other
man, or assembly known, which after his decease may elect anew, or else
the commonwealth dieth, and dissolveth with him, and returneth to the
condition of war. If it be known who have the power to give the
sovereignty after his death, it is known also that the sovereignty was
in them before: for none have right to give that which they have not
right to possess, and keep to themselves, if they think good. But if
there be none that can give the sovereignty, after the decease of him
that was first elected; then has he power, nay he is obliged by the law
of nature, to provide, by establishing his successor, to keep those that
had trusted him with the government, from relapsing into the miserable
condition of civil war. And consequently he was, when elected, a
sovereign absolute.
Secondly, that king whose power is limited, is not superior to him, or
them that have the power to limit it; and he that is not superior, is
not supreme; that is to say not sovereign. The sovereignty therefore was
always in that assembly which had the right to limit him; and by
consequence the government not monarchy, but either democracy, or
aristocracy; as of old time in Sparta; where the kings had a privilege
to lead their armies; but the sovereignty was in the Ephori.
Thirdly, whereas heretofore the Roman people governed the land of Judea,
for example, by a president; yet was not Judea therefore a democracy;
because they were not governed by any assembly, into the which, any of
them, had right to enter; nor an aristocracy; because they were not
governed by any assembly, into which, any man could enter by their
election: but they were governed by one person, which, though as to the
people of Rome, was an assembly of the people, or democracy; yet as to
the people of Judea, which had no right at all of participating in the
government, was a monarch. For though where the people are governed by
an assembly, chosen by themselves out of their own number, the
government is called a democracy, or aristocracy; yet when they are
governed by an assembly, not of their own choosing, it is a monarchy;
not of _one_ man, over another man; but of one people, over another
people.
[Sidenote: Of the right of succession.]
Of all these forms of government, the matter being mortal, so that not
only monarchs, but also whole assemblies die, it is necessary for the
conservation of the peace of men, that as there was order taken for an
artificial man, so there be order also taken, for an artificial eternity
of life; without which, men that are governed by an assembly, should
return into the condition of war in every age; and they that are
governed by one man, as soon as their governor dieth. This artificial
eternity, is that which men call the right of _succession_.
There is no perfect form of government, where the disposing of the
succession is not in the present sovereign. For if it be in any other
particular man, or private assembly, it is in a person subject and may
be assumed by the sovereign at his pleasure; and consequently the right
is in himself. And if it be in no particular man, but left to a new
choice; then is the commonwealth dissolved; and the right is in him that
can get it; contrary to the intention of them that did institute the
commonwealth, for their perpetual, and not temporary security.
In a democracy, the whole assembly cannot fail, unless the multitude
that are to be governed fail. And therefore questions of the right of
succession, have in that form of government no place at all.
In an aristocracy, when any of the assembly dieth, the election of
another into his room belongeth to the assembly, as the sovereign, to
whom belongeth the choosing of all counsellors and officers. For that
which the representative doth, as actor, every one of the subjects doth,
as author. And though the sovereign assembly may give power to others,
to elect new men, for supply of their court; yet it is still by their
authority, that the election is made; and by the same it may, when the
public shall require it, be recalled.
[Sidenote: The present monarch hath right to dispose of the succession.]
The greatest difficulty about the right of succession, is in monarchy:
and the difficulty ariseth from this, that at first sight, it is not
manifest who is to appoint the successor; nor many times, who it is whom
he hath appointed. For in both these cases, there is required a more
exact ratiocination, than every man is accustomed to use. As to the
question, who shall appoint the successor, of a monarch that hath the
sovereign authority; that is to say, who shall determine of the right of
inheritance, (for elective kings and princes have not the sovereign
power in propriety, but in use only), we are to consider, that either he
that is in possession, has right to dispose of the succession, or else
that right is again in the dissolved multitude. For the death of him
that hath the sovereign power in propriety, leaves the multitude without
any sovereign at all; that is, without any representative in whom they
should be united, and be capable of doing any one action at all: and
therefore they are incapable of election of any new monarch; every man
having equal right to submit himself to such as he thinks best able to
protect him; or if he can, protect himself by his own sword; which is a
return to confusion, and to the condition of a war of every man against
every man, contrary to the end for which monarchy had its first
institution. Therefore it is manifest, that by the institution of
monarchy, the disposing of the successor, is always left to the judgment
and will of the present possessor.
And for the question, which may arise sometimes, who it is that the
monarch in possession, hath designed to the succession and inheritance
of his power; it is determined by his express words, and testament; or
by other tacit signs sufficient.
[Sidenote: Succession passeth by express words;]
By express words, or testament, when it is declared by him in his
lifetime, _viva voce_, or by writing; as the first emperors of Rome
declared who should be their heirs. For the word heir does not of itself
imply the children, or nearest kindred of a man; but whomsoever a man
shall any way declare, he would have to succeed him in his estate. If
therefore a monarch declare expressly, that such a man shall be his
heir, either by word or writing, then is that man immediately after the
decease of his predecessor, invested in the right of being monarch.
[Sidenote: Or, by not controlling a custom;]
But where testament, and express words are wanting, other natural signs
of the will are to be followed: whereof the one is custom. And therefore
where the custom is, that the next of kindred absolutely succeedeth,
there also the next of kindred hath right to the succession; for that,
if the will of him that was in possession had been otherwise, he might
easily have declared the same in his life-time. And likewise where the
custom is, that the next of the male kindred succeedeth, there also the
right of succession is in the next of the kindred male, for the same
reason. And so it is if the custom were to advance the female. For
whatsoever custom a man may by a word control, and does not, it is a
natural sign he would have that custom stand.
[Sidenote: Or, by presumption of natural affection.]
But where neither custom, nor testament hath preceded, there it is to be
understood, first, that a monarch’s will is, that the government remain
monarchical; because he hath approved that government in himself.
Secondly, that a child of his own, male, or female, be preferred before
any other; because men are presumed to be more inclined by nature, to
advance their own children, than the children of other men; and of their
own, rather a male than a female; because men, are naturally fitter than
women, for actions of labour and danger. Thirdly, where his own issue
faileth, rather a brother than a stranger; and so still the nearer in
blood, rather than the more remote; because it is always presumed that
the nearer of kin, is the nearer in affection; and it is evident that a
man receives always, by reflection, the most honour from the greatness
of his nearest kindred.
[Sidenote: To dispose of the succession, though to a king of another
nation, not unlawful.]
But if it be lawful for a monarch to dispose of the succession by words
of contract, or testament, men may perhaps object a great inconvenience:
for he may sell, or give his right of governing to a stranger; which,
because strangers, that is, men not used to live under the same
government, nor speaking the same language, do commonly undervalue one
another, may turn to the oppression of his subjects; which is indeed a
great inconvenience: but it proceedeth not necessarily from the
subjection to a stranger’s government, but from the unskilfulness of the
governors, ignorant of the true rules of politics. And therefore the
Romans when they had subdued many nations, to make their government
digestible, were wont to take away that grievance, as much as they
thought necessary, by giving sometimes to whole nations, and sometimes
to principal men of every nation they conquered, not only the
privileges, but also the name of Romans; and took many of them into the
senate, and offices of charge, even in the Roman city. And this was it
our most wise king, king James, aimed at, in endeavouring the union of
his two realms of England and Scotland. Which if he could have obtained,
had in all likelihood prevented the civil wars, which make both those
kingdoms, at this present, miserable. It is not therefore any injury to
the people, for a monarch to dispose of the succession by will; though
by the fault of many princes, it hath been sometimes found inconvenient.
Of the lawfulness of it, this also is an argument, that whatsoever
inconvenience can arrive by giving a kingdom to a stranger, may arrive
also by so marrying with strangers, as the right of succession may
descend upon them: yet this by all men is accounted lawful.
-------
CHAPTER XX.
OF DOMINION PATERNAL, AND DESPOTICAL.
[Sidenote: A commonwealth by acquisition.]
A COMMONWEALTH _by acquisition_, is that, where the sovereign power is
acquired by force; and it is acquired by force, when men singly, or many
together by plurality of voices, for fear of death, or bonds, do
authorize all the actions of that man, or assembly, that hath their
lives and liberty in his power.
[Sidenote: Wherein different from a commonwealth by institution.]
And this kind of dominion, or sovereignty, differeth from sovereignty by
institution, only in this, that men who choose their sovereign, do it
for fear of one another, and not of him whom they institute: but in this
case, they subject themselves, to him they are afraid of. In both cases
they do it for fear: which is to be noted by them, that hold all such
covenants, as proceed from fear of death or violence, void: which if it
were true, no man, in any kind of commonwealth, could be obliged to
obedience. It is true, that in a commonwealth once instituted, or
acquired, promises proceeding from fear of death or violence, are no
covenants, nor obliging, when the thing promised is contrary to the
laws; but the reason is not, because it was made upon fear, but because
he that promiseth, hath no right in the thing promised. Also, when he
may lawfully perform, and doth not, it is not the invalidity of the
covenant, that absolveth him, but the sentence of the sovereign.
Otherwise, whensoever a man lawfully promiseth, he unlawfully breaketh:
but when the sovereign, who is the actor, acquitteth him, then he is
acquitted by him that extorted the promise, as by the author of such
absolution.
[Sidenote: The rights of sovereignty the same in both.]
But the rights, and consequences of sovereignty, are the same in both.
His power cannot, without his consent, be transferred to another: he
cannot forfeit it: he cannot be accused by any of his subjects, of
injury: he cannot be punished by them: he is judge of what is necessary
for peace; and judge of doctrines: he is sole legislator; and supreme
judge of controversies; and of the times, and occasions of war, and
peace: to him it belongeth to choose magistrates, counsellors,
commanders, and all other officers, and ministers; and to determine of
rewards, and punishments, honour, and order. The reasons whereof, are
the same which are alleged in the precedent chapter, for the same
rights, and consequences of sovereignty by institution.
[Sidenote: Dominion paternal how attained.]
Dominion is acquired two ways; by generation, and by conquest. The right
of dominion by generation, is that, which the parent hath over his
children; and is called PATERNAL. [Sidenote: Not by generation, but by
contract;] And is not so derived from the generation, as if therefore
the parent had dominion over his child because he begat him; but from
the child’s consent, either express, or by other sufficient arguments
declared. For as to the generation, God hath ordained to man a helper;
and there be always two that are equally parents: the dominion therefore
over the child, should belong equally to both; and he be equally subject
to both, which is impossible; for no man can obey two masters. And
whereas some have attributed the dominion to the man only, as being of
the more excellent sex; they misreckon in it. For there is not always
that difference of strength, or prudence between the man and the woman,
as that the right can be determined without war. In commonwealths, this
controversy is decided by the civil law; and for the most part, but not
always, the sentence is in favour of the father; because for the most
part commonwealths have been erected by the fathers, not by the mothers
of families. But the question lieth now in the state of mere nature;
where there are supposed no laws of matrimony; no laws for the education
of children; but the law of nature, and the natural inclination of the
sexes, one to another, and to their children. In this condition of mere
nature, either the parents between themselves dispose of the dominion
over the child by contract; or do not dispose thereof at all. If they
dispose thereof, the right passeth according to the contract. We find in
history that the Amazons contracted with the men of the neighbouring
countries, to whom they had recourse for issue, that the issue male
should be sent back, but the female remain with themselves: so that the
dominion of the females was in the mother.
[Sidenote: Or education;]
If there be no contract, the dominion is in the mother. For in the
condition of mere nature, where there are no matrimonial laws, it cannot
be known who is the father, unless it be declared by the mother: and
therefore the right of dominion over the child dependeth on her will,
and is consequently hers. Again, seeing the infant is first in the power
of the mother, so as she may either nourish, or expose it; if she
nourish it, it oweth its life to the mother; and is therefore obliged to
obey her, rather than any other; and by consequence the dominion over it
is hers. But if she expose it, and another find and nourish it, the
dominion is in him that nourisheth it. For it ought to obey him by whom
it is preserved; because preservation of life being the end, for which
one man becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise
obedience, to him, in whose power it is to save, or destroy him.
[Sidenote: Or precedent subjection of one of the parents to the other.]
If the mother be the father’s subject, the child, is in the father’s
power: and if the father be the mother’s subject, as when a sovereign
queen marrieth one of her subjects, the child is subject to the mother;
because the father also is her subject.
If a man and woman, monarchs of two several kingdoms, have a child, and
contract concerning who shall have the dominion of him, the right of the
dominion passeth by the contract. If they contract not, the dominion
followeth the dominion of the place of his residence. For the sovereign
of each country hath dominion over all that reside therein.
He that hath the dominion over the child, hath dominion also over the
children of the child; and over their children’s children. For he that
hath dominion over the person of a man, hath dominion over all that is
his; without which, dominion were but a title, without the effect.
[Sidenote: The right of succession followeth the rules of the right of
possession.]
The right of succession to paternal dominion, proceedeth in the same
manner, as doth the right of succession of monarchy; of which I have
already sufficiently spoken in the precedent chapter.
[Sidenote: Despotical dominion attained.]
Dominion acquired by conquest, or victory in war, is that which some
writers call DESPOTICAL, from Δεσπότης, which signifieth a _lord_, or
_master_; and is the dominion of the master over his servant. And this
dominion is then acquired to the victor, when the vanquished, to avoid
the present stroke of death, covenanteth either in express words, or by
other sufficient signs of the will, that so long as his life, and the
liberty of his body is allowed him, the victor shall have the use
thereof, at his pleasure. And after such covenant made, the vanquished
is a SERVANT, and not before: for by the word _servant_, whether it be
derived from _servire_, to serve, or from _servare_, to save, which I
leave to grammarians to dispute, is not meant a captive, which is kept
in prison, or bonds, till the owner of him that took him, or bought him
of one that did, shall consider what to do with him: for such men,
commonly called slaves, have no obligation at all; but may break their
bonds, or the prison; and kill, or carry away captive their master,
justly: but one, that being taken, hath corporal liberty allowed him;
and upon promise not to run away, nor to do violence to his master, is
trusted by him.
[Sidenote: Not by the victory, but by the consent of the vanquished.]
It is not therefore the victory, that giveth the right of dominion over
the vanquished, but his own covenant. Nor is he obliged because he is
conquered; that is to say, beaten, and taken, or put to flight; but
because he cometh in, and submitteth to the victor; nor is the victor
obliged by an enemy’s rendering himself, without promise of life, to
spare him for this his yielding to discretion; which obliges not the
victor longer, than in his own discretion he shall think fit.
And that which men do, when they demand, as it is now called, _quarter_,
which the Greeks called Ζωγρία, _taking alive_, is to evade the present
fury of the victor, by submission, and to compound for their life, with
ransom, or service: and therefore he that hath quarter, hath not his
life given, but deferred till farther deliberation; for it is not a
yielding on condition of life, but to discretion. And then only is his
life in security, and his service due, when the victor hath trusted him
with his corporal liberty. For slaves that work in prisons; or fetters,
do it not of duty, but to avoid the cruelty of their task-masters.
The master of the servant, is master also of all he hath: and may exact
the use thereof; that is to say, of his goods, of his labour, of his
servants, and of his children, as often as he shall think fit. For he
holdeth his life of his master, by the covenant of obedience; that is,
of owning, and authorizing whatsoever the master shall do. And in case
the master, if he refuse, kill him, or cast him into bonds, or otherwise
punish him for his disobedience, he is himself the author of the same;
and cannot accuse him of injury.
In sum, the rights and consequences of both _paternal_ and _despotical_
dominion, are the very same with those of a sovereign by institution;
and for the same reasons: which reasons are set down in the precedent
chapter. So that for a man that is monarch of divers nations, whereof he
hath, in one the sovereignty by institution of the people assembled, and
in another by conquest, that is by the submission of each particular, to
avoid death or bonds; to demand of one nation more than of the other,
from the title of conquest, as being a conquered nation, is an act of
ignorance of the rights of sovereignty; for the sovereign is absolute
over both alike; or else there is no sovereignty at all; and so every
man may lawfully protect himself, if he can, with his own sword, which
is the condition of war.
[Sidenote: Difference between a family and a kingdom.]
By this it appears; that a great family, if it be not part of some
commonwealth, is of itself, as to the rights of sovereignty, a little
monarchy: whether that family consist of a man and his children; or of a
man and his servants; or of a man, and his children, and servants
together: wherein the father or master is the sovereign. But yet a
family is not properly a commonwealth; unless it be of that power by its
own number, or by other opportunities, as not to be subdued without the
hazard of war. For where a number of men are manifestly too weak to
defend themselves united, every one may use his own reason in time of
danger, to save his own life, either by flight, or by submission to the
enemy, as he shall think best; in the same manner as a very small
company of soldiers, surprised by an army, may cast down their arms, and
demand quarter, or run away, rather than be put to the sword. And thus
much shall suffice, concerning what I find by speculation, and
deduction, of sovereign rights, from the nature, need, and designs of
men, in erecting of commonwealths, and putting themselves under
monarchs, or assemblies, entrusted with power enough for their
protection.
[Sidenote: The rights of monarchy from Scripture.]
Let us now consider what the Scripture teacheth in the same point. To
Moses, the children of Israel say thus: _Speak thou to us, and we will
hear thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we die_. (_Exod._ xx. 19.)
This is absolute obedience to Moses. Concerning the right of kings, God
himself by the mouth of Samuel, saith, (_1 Sam._ viii. 11, 12, &c.)
_This shall be the right of the king you will have to reign over you. He
shall take your sons, and set them to drive his chariots, and to be his
horsemen, and to run before his chariots; and gather in his harvest; and
to make his engines of war, and instruments of his chariots; and shall
take your daughters to make perfumes, to be his cooks, and bakers. He
shall take your fields, your vine-yards, and your olive-yards, and give
them to his servants. He shall take the tithe of your corn and wine, and
give it to the men of his chamber, and to his other servants. He shall
take your man-servants, and your maid-servants, and the choice of your
youth, and employ them in his business. He shall take the tithe of your
flocks; and you shall be his servants._ This is absolute power, and
summed up in the last words, _you shall be his servants_. Again, when
the people heard what power their king was to have, yet they consented
thereto, and say thus, (_verse_ 10) _we will be as all other nations,
and our king shall judge our causes, and go before us, to conduct our
wars_. Here is confirmed the right that sovereigns have, both to the
_militia_, and to all _judicature_; in which is contained as absolute
power, as one man can possibly transfer to another. Again, the prayer of
king Solomon to God, was this (_1 Kings_, iii. 9): _Give to thy servant
understanding, to judge thy people, and to discern between good and
evil_. It belongeth therefore to the sovereign to be _judge_, and to
prescribe the rules of _discerning good_ and _evil_: which rules are
laws; and therefore in him is the legislative power. Saul sought the
life of David; yet when it was in his power to slay Saul, and his
servants would have done it, David forbad them, saying, (_1 Sam._ xxiv.
6) _God forbid I should do such an act against my Lord, the anointed of
God_. For obedience of servants St. Paul saith; (_Col._ iii. 22)
_Servants obey your masters in all things_; and, (_Col._ iii. 20)
_children obey your parents in all things_. There is simple obedience in
those that are subject to paternal, or despotical dominion. Again,
(_Matt._ xxiii. 2, 3) _The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses’ chair,
and therefore all that they shall bid you observe, that observe and do_.
There again is simple obedience. And St. Paul, (_Titus_ iii. 2) _Warn
them that they subject themselves to princes, and to those that are in
authority, and obey them_. This obedience is also simple. Lastly, our
Saviour himself acknowledges, that men ought to pay such taxes as are by
kings imposed, where he says, _give to Cæsar that which is Cæsar’s_; and
paid such taxes himself. And that the king’s word, is sufficient to take
anything from any subject, when there is need; and that the king is
judge of that need: for he himself, as king of the Jews, commanded his
disciples to take the ass, and ass’s colt to carry him into Jerusalem,
saying, (_Matth._ xxi. 2, 3) _Go into the village over against you, and
you shall find a she ass tied, and her colt with her, untie them, and
bring them to me. And if any man ask you, what you mean by it, say the
Lord hath need of them: and they will let them go._ They will not ask
whether his necessity be a sufficient title; nor whether he be judge of
that necessity; but acquiesce in the will of the Lord.
To these places may be added also that of _Genesis_, (iii. 5) _Ye shall
be as gods, knowing good and evil_. And (_verse_ 11) _Who told thee that
thou wast naked? hast thou eaten of the tree, of which I commanded thee
thou shouldest not eat?_ For the cognizance or judicature of _good_ and
_evil_, being forbidden by the name of the fruit of the tree of
knowledge, as a trial of Adam’s obedience; the devil to inflame the
ambition of the woman, to whom that fruit already seemed beautiful, told
her that by tasting it, they should be as gods, knowing _good_ and
_evil_. Whereupon having both eaten, they did indeed take upon them
God’s office, which is judicature of good and evil; but acquired no new
ability to distinguish between them aright. And whereas it is said, that
having eaten, they saw they were naked; no man hath so interpreted that
place, as if they had been formerly blind, and saw not their own skins:
the meaning is plain, that it was then they first judged their
nakedness, wherein it was God’s will to create them, to be uncomely; and
by being ashamed, did tacitly censure God himself. And thereupon God
saith; _Hast thou eaten, &c._ as if he should say, doest thou that owest
me obedience, take upon thee to judge of my commandments? Whereby it is
clearly, though allegorically, signified, that the commands of them that
have the right to command, are not by their subjects to be censured, nor
disputed.
[Sidenote: Sovereign power ought in all commonwealths to be absolute.]
So that it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from reason, and
Scripture, that the sovereign power, whether placed in one man, as in
monarchy, or in one assembly of men, as in popular, and aristocratical
commonwealths, is as great, as possibly men can be imagined to make it.
And though of so unlimited a power, men may fancy many evil
consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is perpetual
war of every man against his neighbour, are much worse. The condition of
man in this life shall never be without inconveniences; but there
happeneth in no commonwealth any great inconvenience, but what proceeds
from the subject’s disobedience, and breach of those covenants, from
which the commonwealth hath its being. And whosoever thinking sovereign
power too great, will seek to make it less, must subject himself, to the
power, that can limit it; that is to say, to a greater.
The greatest objection is, that of the practice; when men ask, where,
and when, such power has by subjects been acknowledged. But one may ask
them again, when, or where has there been a kingdom long free from
sedition and civil war. In those nations, whose commonwealths have been
long-lived, and not been destroyed but by foreign war, the subjects
never did dispute of the sovereign power. But howsoever, an argument
from the practice of men, that have not sifted to the bottom, and with
exact reason weighed the causes, and nature of commonwealths, and suffer
daily those miseries, that proceed from the ignorance thereof, is
invalid. For though in all places of the world, men should lay the
foundation of their houses on the sand, it could not thence be inferred,
that so it ought to be. The skill of making, and maintaining
commonwealths, consisteth in certain rules, as doth arithmetic and
geometry; not, as tennis-play, on practice only: which rules, neither
poor men have the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have
hitherto had the curiosity, or the method to find out.
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CHAPTER XXI.
OF THE LIBERTY OF SUBJECTS.
[Sidenote: Liberty what.]
LIBERTY, or FREEDOM, signifieth, properly, the absence of opposition; by
opposition, I mean external impediments of motion; and may be applied no
less to irrational, and inanimate creatures, than to rational. For
whatsoever is so tied, or environed, as it cannot move but within a
certain space, which space is determined by the opposition of some
external body, we say it hath not liberty to go further. And so of all
living creatures, whilst they are imprisoned, or restrained, with walls,
or chains; and of the water whilst it is kept in by banks, or vessels,
that otherwise would spread itself into a larger space, we use to say,
they are not at liberty, to move in such manner, as without those
external impediments they would. But when the impediment of motion, is
in the constitution of the thing itself, we use not to say; it wants the
liberty; but the power to move; as when a stone lieth still, or a man is
fastened to his bed by sickness.
[Sidenote: What it is to be free.]
And according to this proper, and generally received meaning of the
word, a FREEMAN, _is he, that in those things, which by his strength and
wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to_. But
when the words _free_, and _liberty_, are applied to any thing but
_bodies_, they are abused; for that which is not subject to motion, is
not subject to impediment: and therefore, when it is said, for example,
the way is free, no liberty of the way is signified, but of those that
walk in it without stop. And when we say a gift is free, there is not
meant any liberty of the gift, but of the giver, that was not bound by
any law or covenant to give it. So when we _speak freely_, it is not the
liberty of voice, or pronunciation, but of the man, whom no law hath
obliged to speak otherwise than he did. Lastly, from the use of the word
_free-will_, no liberty can be inferred of the will, desire, or
inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that
he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination
to do.
[Sidenote: Fear and liberty are consistent.]
Fear and liberty are consistent; as when a man throweth his goods into
the sea for _fear_ the ship should sink, he doth it nevertheless very
willingly, and may refuse to do it if he will: it is therefore the
action of one that was _free_: so a man sometimes pays his debt, only
for _fear_ of imprisonment, which because nobody hindered him from
detaining, was the action of a man at _liberty_. And generally all
actions which men do in commonwealths, for _fear_ of the law, are
actions, which the doers had _liberty_ to omit.
[Sidenote: Liberty and necessity consistent.]
_Liberty_, and _necessity_ are consistent: as in the water, that hath
not only _liberty_, but a _necessity_ of descending by the channel; so
likewise in the actions which men voluntarily do: which, because they
proceed from their will, proceed from _liberty_; and yet, because every
act of man’s will, and every desire, and inclination proceedeth from
some cause, and that from another cause, in a continual chain, whose
first link is in the hand of God the first of all causes, proceed from
_necessity_. So that to him that could see the connexion of those
causes, the _necessity_ of all men’s voluntary actions, would appear
manifest. And therefore God, that seeth, and disposeth all things, seeth
also that the _liberty_ of man in doing what he will, is accompanied
with the _necessity_ of doing that which God will, and no more, nor
less. For though men may do many things, which God does not command, nor
is therefore author of them; yet they can have no passion, nor appetite
to anything, of which appetite God’s will is not the cause. And did not
his will assure the _necessity_ of man’s will, and consequently of all
that on man’s will dependeth, the _liberty_ of men would be a
contradiction, and impediment to the omnipotence and _liberty_ of God.
And this shall suffice, as to the matter in hand, of that natural
_liberty_, which only is properly called _liberty_.
[Sidenote: Artificial bonds, or covenants.]
But as men, for the attaining of peace, and conservation of themselves
thereby, have made an artificial man, which we call a commonwealth; so
also have they made artificial chains, called _civil laws_, which they
themselves, by mutual covenants, have fastened at one end, to the lips
of that man, or assembly, to whom they have given the sovereign power;
and at the other end to their own ears. These bonds, in their own nature
but weak, may nevertheless be made to hold, by the danger, though not by
the difficulty of breaking them.
[Sidenote: Liberty of subjects consisteth in liberty from covenants.]
In relation to these bonds only it is, that I am to speak now, of the
_liberty_ of _subjects_. For seeing there is no commonwealth in the
world, wherein there be rules enough set down, for the regulating of all
the actions, and words of men; as being a thing impossible: it followeth
necessarily, that in all kinds of actions by the laws prætermitted, men
have the liberty, of doing what their own reasons shall suggest, for the
most profitable to themselves. For if we take liberty in the proper
sense, for corporal liberty; that is to say, freedom from chains and
prison; it were very absurd for men to clamour as they do, for the
liberty they so manifestly enjoy. Again, if we take liberty, for an
exemption from laws, it is it no less absurd, for men to demand as they
do, that liberty, by which all other men may be masters of their lives.
And yet, as absurd as it is, this is it they demand; not knowing that
the laws are of no power to protect them, without a sword in the hands
of a man, or men, to cause those laws to be put in execution. The
liberty of a subject, lieth therefore only in those things, which in
regulating their actions, the sovereign hath prætermitted: such as is
the liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise contract with one another;
to choose their own abode, their own diet, their own trade of life, and
institute their children as they themselves think fit; and the like.
[Sidenote: Liberty of the subject consistent with the unlimited power of
the sovereign.]
Nevertheless we are not to understand, that by such liberty, the
sovereign power of life and death, is either abolished, or limited. For
it has been already shown, that nothing the sovereign representative can
do to a subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called
injustice, or injury; because every subject is author of every act the
sovereign doth; so that he never wanteth right to anything, otherwise,
than as he himself is the subject of God, and bound thereby to observe
the laws of nature. And therefore it may, and doth often happen in
commonwealths, that a subject may be put to death, by the command of the
sovereign power; and yet neither do the other wrong: as when Jephtha
caused his daughter to be sacrificed: in which, and the like cases, he
that so dieth, had liberty to do the action, for which he is
nevertheless, without injury put to death. And the same holdeth also in
a sovereign prince, that putteth to death an innocent subject. For
though the action be against the law of nature, as being contrary to
equity, as was the killing of Uriah, by David; yet it was not an injury
to Uriah, but to God. Not to Uriah, because the right to do what he
pleased was given him by Uriah himself: and yet to God, because David
was God’s subject, and prohibited all iniquity by the law of nature:
which distinction, David himself, when he repented the fact, evidently
confirmed, saying, _To thee only have I sinned_. In the same manner, the
people of Athens, when they banished the most potent of their
commonwealth for ten years, thought they committed no injustice; and yet
they never questioned what crime he had done; but what hurt he would do:
nay they commanded the banishment of they knew not whom; and every
citizen bringing his oystershell into the market place, written with the
name of him he desired should be banished, without actually accusing
him, sometimes banished an Aristides, for his reputation of justice; and
sometimes a scurrilous jester, as Hyperbolus, to make a jest of it. And
yet a man cannot say, the sovereign people of Athens wanted right to
banish them; or an Athenian the liberty to jest, or to be just.
[Sidenote: The liberty which writers praise, is the liberty of
sovereigns; not of private men.]
The liberty, whereof there is so frequent and honourable mention, in the
histories, and philosophy of the ancient Greeks, and Romans, and in the
writings, and discourse of those that from them have received all their
learning in the politics, is not the liberty of particular men; but the
liberty of the commonwealth: which is the same with that which every man
then should have, if there were no civil laws, nor commonwealth at all.
And the effects of it also be the same. For as amongst masterless men,
there is perpetual war, of every man against his neighbour; no
inheritance, to transmit to the son, nor to expect from the father; no
propriety of goods, or lands; no security; but a full and absolute
liberty in every particular man: so in states, and commonwealths not
dependent on one another, every commonwealth, not every man, has an
absolute liberty, to do what it shall judge, that is to say, what that
man, or assembly that representeth it, shall judge most conducing to
their benefit. But withal, they live in the condition of a perpetual
war, and upon the confines of battle, with their frontiers armed, and
cannons planted against their neighbours round about. The Athenians, and
Romans were free; that is, free commonwealths: not that any particular
men had the liberty to resist their own representative; but that their
representative had the liberty to resist, or invade other people. There
is written on the turrets of the city of Lucca in great characters at
this day, the word LIBERTAS; yet no man can thence infer, that a
particular man has more liberty, or immunity from the service of the
commonwealth there, than in Constantinople. Whether a commonwealth be
monarchical, or popular, the freedom is still the same.
But it is an easy thing, for men to be deceived, by the specious name of
liberty; and for want of judgment to distinguish, mistake that for their
private inheritance, and birth-right, which is the right of the public
only. And when the same error is confirmed by the authority of men in
reputation for their writings on this subject, it is no wonder if it
produce sedition, and change of government. In these western parts of
the world, we are made to receive our opinions concerning the
institution, and rights of commonwealths, from Aristotle, Cicero, and
other men, Greeks and Romans, that living under popular states, derived
those rights, not from the principles of nature, but transcribed them
into their books, out of the practice of their own commonwealths, which
were popular; as the grammarians describe the rules of language, out of
the practice of the time; or the rules of poetry, out of the poems of
Homer and Virgil. And because the Athenians were taught, to keep them
from desire of changing their government, that they were freemen, and
all that lived under monarchy were slaves; therefore Aristotle puts it
down in his _Politics_, (_lib._ 6. _cap._ ii.) _In democracy_, LIBERTY
_is to be supposed: for it is commonly held, that no man is_ FREE _in
any other government_. And as Aristotle; so Cicero, and other writers
have grounded their civil doctrine, on the opinions of the Romans, who
were taught to hate monarchy, at first, by them that having deposed
their sovereign, shared amongst them the sovereignty of Rome; and
afterwards by their successors. And by reading of these Greek, and Latin
authors, men from their childhood have gotten a habit, under a false
show of liberty, of favouring tumults, and of licentious controlling the
actions of their sovereigns, and again of controlling those controllers;
with the effusion of so much blood, as I think I may truly say, there
was never any thing so dearly bought, as these western parts have bought
the learning of the Greek and Latin tongues.
[Sidenote: Liberty of subjects how to be measured.]
To come now to the particulars of the true liberty of a subject; that is
to say, what are the things, which though commanded by the sovereign, he
may nevertheless, without injustice, refuse to do; we are to consider,
what rights we pass away, when we make a commonwealth; or, which is all
one, what liberty we deny ourselves, by owning all the actions, without
exception, of the man, or assembly we make our sovereign. For in the act
of our _submission_, consisteth both our _obligation_, and our
_liberty_; which must therefore be inferred by arguments taken from
thence; there being no obligation on any man, which ariseth not from
some act of his own; for all men equally, are by nature free. And
because such arguments, must either be drawn from the express words, _I
authorize all his actions_, or from the intention of him that submitteth
himself to his power, which intention is to be understood by the end for
which he so submitteth; the obligation, and liberty of the subject, is
to be derived, either from those words, or others equivalent; or else
from the end of the institution of sovereignty, namely, the peace of the
subjects within themselves, and their defence against a common enemy.
[Sidenote: Subjects have liberty to defend their own bodies, even
against them that lawfully invade them.]
First therefore, seeing sovereignty by institution, is by covenant of
every one to every one; and sovereignty by acquisition, by covenants of
the vanquished to the victor, or child to the parent; it is manifest,
that every subject has liberty in all those things, the right whereof
cannot by covenant be transferred. I have shewn before in the 14th
chapter, that covenants, not to defend a man’s own body, are void.
Therefore,
[Sidenote: Are not bound to hurt themselves.]
If the sovereign command a man, though justly condemned, to kill, wound,
or maim himself; or not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain
from the use of food, air, medicine, or any other thing, without which
he cannot live; yet hath that man the liberty to disobey.
If a man be interrogated by the sovereign, or his authority, concerning
a crime done by himself, he is not bound, without assurance of pardon,
to confess it; because no man, as I have shown in the same chapter, can
be obliged by covenant to accuse himself.
Again, the consent of a subject to sovereign power, is contained in
these words, _I authorize, or take upon me, all his actions_; in which
there is no restriction at all, of his own former natural liberty: for
by allowing him to _kill me_, I am not bound to kill myself when he
commands me. It is one thing to say, _kill me, or my fellow, if you
please_; another thing to say, _I will kill myself, or my fellow_. It
followeth therefore, that
No man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill himself, or any
other man; and consequently, that the obligation a man may sometimes
have, upon the command of the sovereign to execute any dangerous, or
dishonourable office, dependeth not on the words of our submission; but
on the intention, which is to be understood by the end thereof. When
therefore our refusal to obey, frustrates the end for which the
sovereignty was ordained; then there is no liberty to refuse: otherwise
there is.
[Sidenote: Nor to warfare, unless they voluntarily undertake it.]
Upon this ground, a man that is commanded as a soldier to fight against
the enemy, though his sovereign have right enough to punish his refusal
with death, may nevertheless in many cases refuse, without injustice; as
when he substituteth a sufficient soldier in his place: for in this case
he deserteth not the service of the commonwealth. And there is allowance
to be made for natural timorousness; not only to women, of whom no such
dangerous duty is expected, but also to men of feminine courage. When
armies fight, there is on one side, or both, a running away; yet when
they do it not out of treachery, but fear, they are not esteemed to do
it unjustly, but dishonourably. For the same reason, to avoid battle, is
not injustice, but cowardice. But he that inrolleth himself a soldier,
or taketh imprest money, taketh away the excuse of a timorous nature;
and is obliged, not only to go to the battle, but also not to run from
it, without his captain’s leave. And when the defence of the
commonwealth, requireth at once the help of all that are able to bear
arms, every one is obliged; because otherwise the institution of the
commonwealth, which they have not the purpose, or courage to preserve,
was in vain.
To resist the sword of the commonwealth, in defence of another man,
guilty, or innocent, no man hath liberty; because such liberty, takes
away from the sovereign, the means of protecting us; and is therefore
destructive of the very essence of government. But in case a great many
men together, have already resisted the sovereign power unjustly, or
committed some capital crime, for which every one of them expecteth
death, whether have they not the liberty then to join together, and
assist, and defend one another? Certainly they have: for they but defend
their lives, which the guilty man may as well do, as the innocent. There
was indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty; their bearing of
arms subsequent to it, though it be to maintain what they have done, is
no new unjust act. And if it be only to defend their persons, it is not
unjust at all. But the offer of pardon taketh from them, to whom it is
offered, the plea of self-defence, and maketh their perseverance in
assisting, or defending the rest, unlawful.
[Sidenote: The greatest liberty of subjects, dependeth on the silence of
the law.]
As for other liberties, they depend on the silence of the law. In cases
where the sovereign has prescribed no rule, there the subject hath the
liberty to do, or forbear, according to his own discretion. And
therefore such liberty is in some places more, and in some less; and in
some times more, in other times less, according as they that have the
sovereignty shall think most convenient. As for example, there was a
time, when in England a man might enter into his own land, and
dispossess such as wrongfully possessed it, by force. But in aftertimes,
that liberty of forcible entry, was taken away by a statute made, by the
king, in parliament. And in some places of the world, men have the
liberty of many wives: in other places, such liberty is not allowed.
If a subject have a controversy with his sovereign, of debt, or of right
of possession of lands or goods, or concerning any service required at
his hands, or concerning any penalty, corporal, or pecuniary, grounded
on a precedent law; he hath the same liberty to sue for his right, as if
it were against a subject; and before such judges, as are appointed by
the sovereign. For seeing the sovereign demandeth by force of a former
law, and not by virtue of his power; he declareth thereby, that he
requireth no more, than shall appear to be due by that law. The suit
therefore is not contrary to the will of the sovereign; and consequently
the subject hath the liberty to demand the hearing of his cause; and
sentence, according to that law. But if he demand, or take anything by
pretence of his power; there lieth, in that case, no action of law; for
all that is done by him in virtue of his power, is done by the authority
of every subject, and consequently he that brings an action against the
sovereign, brings it against himself.
If a monarch, or sovereign assembly, grant a liberty to all, or any of
his subjects, which grant standing, he is disabled to provide for their
safety, the grant is void; unless he directly renounce, or transfer the
sovereignty to another. For in that he might openly, if it had been his
will, and in plain terms, have renounced, or transferred it, and did
not; it is to be understood it was not his will, but that the grant
proceeded from ignorance of the repugnancy between such a liberty and
the sovereign power; and therefore the sovereignty is still retained;
and consequently all those powers, which are necessary to the exercising
thereof; such as are the power of war, and peace, of judicature, of
appointing officers, and councillors, of levying money, and the rest
named in the 18th chapter.
[Sidenote: In what cases subjects are absolved of their obedience to
their sovereign.]
The obligation of subjects to the sovereign, is understood to last as
long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to
protect them. For the right men have by nature to protect themselves,
when none else can protect them, can by no covenant be relinquished. The
sovereignty is the soul of the commonwealth; which once departed from
the body, the members do no more receive their motion from it. The end
of obedience is protection; which, wheresoever a man seeth it, either in
his own, or in another’s sword, nature applieth his obedience to it, and
his endeavour to maintain it. And though sovereignty, in the intention
of them that make it, be immortal; yet is it in its own nature, not only
subject to violent death, by foreign war; but also through the
ignorance, and passions of men, it hath in it, from the very
institution, many seeds of a natural mortality, by intestine discord.
[Sidenote: In case of captivity.]
If a subject be taken prisoner in war; or his person, or his means of
life be within the guards of the enemy, and hath his life and corporal
liberty given him, on condition to be subject to the victor, he hath
liberty to accept the condition; and having accepted it, is the subject
of him that took him; because he had no other way to preserve himself.
The case is the same, if he be detained on the same terms, in a foreign
country. But if a man be held in prison, or bonds, or is not trusted
with the liberty of his body; he cannot be understood to be bound by
covenant to subjection; and therefore may, if he can, make his escape by
any means whatsoever.
[Sidenote: In case the sovereign cast off the government from himself
and his heirs.]
If a monarch shall relinquish the sovereignty, both for himself, and his
heirs; his subjects return to the absolute liberty of nature; because,
though nature may declare who are his sons, and who are the nearest of
his kin; yet it dependeth on his own will, as hath been said in the
precedent chapter, who shall be his heir. If therefore he will have no
heir, there is no sovereignty, nor subjection. The case is the same, if
he die without known kindred, and without declaration of his heir. For
then there can no heir be known, and consequently no subjection be due.
[Sidenote: In case of banishment.]
If the sovereign banish his subject; during the banishment, he is not
subject. But he that is sent on a message, or hath leave to travel, is
still subject; but it is, by contract between sovereigns, not by virtue
of the covenant of subjection. For whosoever entereth into another’s
dominion, is subject to all the laws thereof; unless he have a privilege
by the amity of the sovereigns, or by special licence.
[Sidenote: In case the sovereign render himself subject to another.]
If a monarch subdued by war, render himself subject to the victor; his
subjects are delivered from their former obligation, and become obliged
to the victor. But if he be held prisoner, or have not the liberty of
his own body; he is not understood to have given away the right of
sovereignty; and therefore his subjects are obliged to yield obedience
to the magistrates formerly placed, governing not in their own name, but
in his. For, his right remaining, the question is only of the
administration; that is to say, of the magistrates and officers; which,
if he have not means to name, he is supposed to approve those, which he
himself had formerly appointed.
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CHAPTER XXII.
OF SYSTEMS SUBJECT, POLITICAL, AND PRIVATE.
[Sidenote: The divers sorts of systems of people.]
Having spoken of the generation, form, and power of a commonwealth, I am
in order to speak next of the parts thereof. And first of systems, which
resemble the similar parts, or muscles of a body natural. By SYSTEMS, I
understand any numbers of men joined in one interest, or one business.
Of which, some are _regular_, and some _irregular_. _Regular_ are those,
where one man, or assembly of men, is constituted representative of the
whole number. All other are _irregular_.
Of regular, some are _absolute_, and _independent_, subject to none but
their own representative: such are only commonwealths; of which I have
spoken already in the five last precedent chapters. Others are
dependent; that is to say, subordinate to some sovereign power, to which
every one, as also their representative is _subject_.
Of systems subordinate, some are _political_, and some _private_.
_Political_, otherwise called _bodies politic_, and _persons in law_,
are those, which are made by authority from the sovereign power of the
commonwealth. _Private_, are those, which are constituted by subjects
amongst themselves, or by authority from a stranger. For no authority
derived from foreign power, within the dominion of another, is public
there, but private.
And of private systems, some are _lawful_; some _unlawful_. _Lawful_,
are those which are allowed by the commonwealth: all other are
_unlawful_. _Irregular_ systems, are those which having no
representative, consist only in concourse of people; which if not
forbidden by the commonwealth, nor made on evil design, such as are
conflux of people to markets, or shows, or any other harmless end, are
lawful. But when the intention is evil, or (if the number be
considerable), unknown, they are unlawful.
[Sidenote: In all bodies politic the power of the representative is
limited.]
In bodies politic, the power of the representative is always limited:
and that which prescribeth the limits thereof, is the power sovereign.
For power unlimited, is absolute sovereignty. And the sovereign in every
commonwealth, is the absolute representative of all the subjects; and
therefore no other can be representative of any part of them, but so far
forth, as he shall give leave. And to give leave to a body politic of
subjects, to have an absolute representative to all intents and
purposes, were to abandon the government of so much of the commonwealth,
and to divide the dominion, contrary to their peace and defence; which
the sovereign cannot be understood to do, by any grant, that does not
plainly, and directly discharge them of their subjection. For
consequences of words, are not the signs of his will, when other
consequences are signs of the contrary; but rather signs of error, and
misreckoning; to which all mankind is too prone.
The bounds of that power, which is given to the representative of a body
politic, are to be taken notice of, from two things. One is their writ,
or letters from the sovereign: the other is the law of the commonwealth.
[Sidenote: By letters patent:]
For though in the institution or acquisition of a commonwealth, which is
independent, there needs no writing, because the power of the
representative has there no other bounds, but such as are set out by the
unwritten law of nature; yet in subordinate bodies, there are such
diversities of limitation necessary, concerning their businesses, times,
and places, as can neither be remembered without letters, nor taken
notice of, unless such letters be patent, that they may be read to them,
and withal sealed, or testified, with the seals, or other permanent
signs of the authority sovereign.
[Sidenote: And the laws.]
And because such limitation is not always easy, or perhaps possible to
be described in writing; the ordinary laws, common to all subjects, must
determine what the representative may lawfully do, in all cases, where
the letters themselves are silent. And therefore,
[Sidenote: When the representative is one man, his unwarranted acts are
his own only.]
In a body politic, if the representative be one man, whatsoever he does
in the person of the body, which is not warranted in his letters, nor by
the laws, is his own act, and not the act of the body, nor of any other
member thereof besides himself: because further than his letters, or the
laws limit, he representeth no man’s person, but his own. But what he
does according to these, is the act of every one: for of the act of the
sovereign every one is author, because he is their representative
unlimited; and the act of him that recedes not from the letters of the
sovereign, is the act of the sovereign, and therefore every member of
the body is author of it.
[Sidenote: When it is an assembly, it is the act of them that assented
only.]
But if the representative be an assembly; whatsoever that assembly shall
decree, not warranted by their letters, or the laws, is the act of the
assembly, or body politic, and the act of every one by whose vote the
decree was made; but not the act of any man that being present voted to
the contrary; nor of any man absent, unless he voted it by procuration.
It is the act of the assembly, because voted by the major part; and if
it be a crime, the assembly may be punished, as far forth as it is
capable, as by dissolution, or forfeiture of their letters (which is to
such artificial, and fictitious bodies, capital) or, if the assembly
have a common stock, wherein none of the innocent members have
propriety, by pecuniary mulct. For from corporal penalties nature hath
exempted all bodies politic. But they that gave not their vote, are
therefore innocent, because the assembly cannot represent any man in
things unwarranted by their letters, and consequently are not involved
in their votes.
[Sidenote: When the representative is one man, if he borrow money, or
owe it, by contract, he is liable only, the members not.]
If the person of the body politic being in one man, borrow money of a
stranger, that is, of one that is not of the same body, (for no letters
need limit borrowing, seeing it is left to men’s own inclinations to
limit lending), the debt is the representative’s. For if he should have
authority from his letters, to make the members pay what he borroweth,
he should have by consequence the sovereignty of them; and therefore the
grant were either void, as proceeding from error, commonly incident to
human nature, and an insufficient sign of the will of the granter; or if
it be avowed by him, then is the representer sovereign, and falleth not
under the present question, which is only of bodies subordinate. No
member therefore is obliged to pay the debt so borrowed, but the
representative himself: because he that lendeth it, being a stranger to
the letters, and to the qualification of the body, understandeth those
only for his debtors, that are engaged: and seeing the representer can
engage himself, and none else, has him only for debtor; who must
therefore pay him, out of the common stock, if there be any, or, if
there be none, out of his own estate.
If he come into debt by contract, or mulct, the case is the same.
[Sidenote: When it is an assembly, they only are liable that have
assented.]
But when the representative is an assembly, and the debt to a stranger;
all they, and only they are responsible for the debt, that gave their
votes to the borrowing of it, or to the contract that made it due, or to
the fact for which the mulct was imposed; because every one of those in
voting did engage himself for the payment: for he that is author of the
borrowing, is obliged to the payment, even of the whole debt; though
when paid by any one, he be discharged.
[Sidenote: If the debt be to one of the assembly, the body only is
obliged.]
But if the debt be to one of the assembly, the assembly only is obliged
to the payment, out of their common stock, if they have any: for having
liberty of vote, if he vote the money shall be borrowed, he votes it
shall be paid; if he vote it shall not be borrowed, or be absent, yet
because in lending, he voteth the borrowing, he contradicteth his former
vote, and is obliged by the latter, and becomes both borrower and
lender, and consequently cannot demand payment from any particular man,
but from the common treasure only; which failing he hath no remedy, nor
complaint, but against himself, that being privy to the acts of the
assembly, and to their means to pay, and not being enforced, did
nevertheless through his own folly lend his money.
[Sidenote: Protestation against the decrees of bodies politic
sometimes lawful, but against sovereign power never.]
It is manifest by this, that in bodies politic subordinate, and subject
to a sovereign power, it is sometimes not only lawful, but expedient,
for a particular man to make open protestation against the decrees of
the representative assembly, and cause their dissent to be registered,
or to take witness of it; because otherwise they may be obliged to pay
debts contracted, and be responsible for crimes committed by other men.
But in a sovereign assembly, that liberty is taken away, both because he
that protesteth there, denies their sovereignty; and also because
whatsoever is commanded by the sovereign power, is as to the subject,
though not so always in the sight of God, justified by the command: for
of such command every subject is the author.
[Sidenote: Bodies politic for government of a province, colony, or town]
The variety of bodies politic, is almost infinite: for they are not only
distinguished by the several affairs, for which they are constituted,
wherein there is an unspeakable diversity; but also by the times,
places, and numbers, subject to many limitations. And as to their
affairs, some are ordained for government; as first, the government of a
province may be committed to an assembly of men, wherein all resolutions
shall depend on the votes of the major part; and then this assembly is a
body politic, and their power limited by commission. This word province
signifies a charge, or care of business, which he whose business it is,
committeth to another man, to be administered for, and under him; and
therefore when in one commonwealth there be divers countries, that have
their laws distinct one from another, or are far distant in place, the
administration of the government being committed to divers persons,
those countries where the sovereign is not resident, but governs by
commission, are called provinces. But of the government of a province,
by an assembly residing in the province itself, there be few examples.
The Romans who had the sovereignty of many provinces; yet governed them
always by presidents, and prætors; and not by assemblies, as they
governed the city of Rome, and territories adjacent. In like manner,
when there were colonies sent from England, to plant Virginia, and
Sommer-islands; though the governments of them here, were committed to
assemblies in London, yet did those assemblies never commit the
government under them to any assembly there, but did to each plantation
send one governor. For though every man, where he can be present by
nature, desires to participate of government; yet where they cannot be
present, they are by nature also inclined, to commit the government of
their common interest rather to a monarchical, than a popular form of
government: which is also evident in those men that have great private
estates; who when they are unwilling to take the pains of administering
the business that belongs to them, chuse rather to trust one servant,
than an assembly either of their friends or servants. But howsoever it
be in fact, yet we may suppose the government of a province, or colony
committed to an assembly: and when it is, that which in this place I
have to say, is this; that whatsoever debt is by that assembly
contracted; or whatsoever unlawful act is decreed, is the act only of
those that assented, and not of any that dissented, or were absent, for
the reasons before alleged. Also that an assembly residing out of the
bounds of that colony whereof they have the government, cannot execute
any power over the persons, or goods of any of the colony, to seize on
them for debt, or other duty, in any place without the colony itself, as
having no jurisdiction, nor authority elsewhere, but are left to the
remedy, which the law of the place alloweth them. And though the
assembly have right, to impose a mulct upon any of their members, that
shall break the laws they make; yet out of the colony itself, they have
no right to execute the same. And that which is said here, of the rights
of an assembly, for the government of a province, or a colony, is
appliable also to an assembly for the government of a town, an
university, or a college, or a church, or for any other government over
the persons of men.
And generally, in all bodies politic, if any particular member conceive
himself injured by the body itself, the cognizance of his cause
belongeth to the sovereign, and those the sovereign hath ordained for
judges in such causes, or shall ordain for that particular cause; and
not to the body itself. For the whole body is in this case his
fellow-subject, which in a sovereign assembly, is otherwise: for there,
if the sovereign be not judge, though in his own cause, there can be no
judge at all.
[Sidenote: Bodies politic for ordering of trade.]
In a body politic, for the well ordering of foreign traffic, the most
commodious representative is an assembly of all the members; that is to
say, such a one, as every one that adventureth his money, may be present
at all the deliberations, and resolutions of the body, if they will
themselves. For proof whereof, we are to consider the end, for which men
that are merchants, and may buy and sell, export, and import their
merchandize, according to their own discretions, do nevertheless bind
themselves up in one corporation. It is true, there be few merchants,
that with the merchandize they buy at home, can freight a ship, to
export it; or with that they buy abroad, to bring it home; and have
therefore need to join together in one society; where every man may
either participate of the gain, according to the proportion of his
adventure; or take his own, and sell what he transports, or imports, at
such prices as he thinks fit. But this is no body politic, there being
no common representative to oblige them to any other law, than that
which is common to all other subjects. The end of their incorporating,
is to make their gain the greater; which is done two ways; by sole
buying, and sole selling, both at home, and abroad. So that to grant to
a company of merchants to be a corporation, or body politic, is to grant
them a double monopoly, whereof one is to be sole buyers; another to be
sole sellers. For when there is a company incorporate for any particular
foreign country, they only export the commodities vendible in that
country; which is sole buying at home, and sole selling abroad. For at
home there is but one buyer, and abroad but one that selleth: both which
is gainful to the merchant, because thereby they buy at home at lower,
and sell abroad at higher rates: and abroad there is but one buyer of
foreign merchandize, and but one that sells them at home; both which
again are gainful to the adventurers.
Of this double monopoly one part is disadvantageous to the people at
home, the other to foreigners. For at home by their sole exportation
they set what price they please on the husbandry, and handy-works of the
people; and by the sole importation, what price they please on all
foreign commodities the people have need of; both which are ill for the
people. On the contrary, by the sole selling of the native commodities
abroad, and sole buying the foreign commodities upon the place, they
raise the price of those, and abate the price of these, to the
disadvantage of the foreigner: for where but one selleth, the
merchandize is the dearer; and where but one buyeth, the cheaper. Such
corporations therefore are no other than monopolies; though they would
be very profitable for a commonwealth, if being bound up into one body
in foreign markets they were at liberty at home, every man to buy, and
sell at what price he could.
The end then of these bodies of merchants, being not a common benefit to
the whole body, which have in this case no common stock, but what is
deducted out of the particular adventures, for building, buying,
victualling and manning of ships, but the particular gain of every
adventurer, it is reason that every one be acquainted with the
employment of his own; that is, that every one be of the assembly, that
shall have the power to order the same; and be acquainted with their
accounts. And therefore the representative of such a body must be an
assembly, where every member of the body may be present at the
consultations, if he will.
If a body politic of merchants, contract a debt to a stranger by the act
of their representative assembly, every member is liable by himself for
the whole. For a stranger can take no notice of their private laws, but
considereth them as so many particular men, obliged every one to the
whole payment, till payment made by one dischargeth all the rest: but if
the debt be to one of the company, the creditor is debtor for the whole
to himself, and cannot therefore demand his debt, but only from the
common stock, if there be any.
If the commonwealth impose a tax upon the body, it is understood to be
laid upon every member proportionably to his particular adventure in the
company. For there is in this case no other common stock, but what is
made of their particular adventures.
If a mulct be laid upon the body for some unlawful act, they only are
liable by whose votes the act was decreed, or by whose assistance it was
executed; for in none of the rest is there any other crime but being of
the body; which if a crime, because the body was ordained by the
authority of the commonwealth, is not his.
If one of the members be indebted to the body, he may be sued by the
body; but his goods cannot be taken, nor his person imprisoned by the
authority of the body; but only by authority of the commonwealth: for if
they can do it by their own authority, they can by their own authority
give judgment that the debt is due; which is as much as to be judge in
their own cause.
[Sidenote: A body politic for counsel to be given to the sovereign.]
Those bodies made for the government of men, or of traffic, be either
perpetual, or for a time prescribed by writing. But there be bodies also
whose times are limited, and that only by the nature of their business.
For example, if a sovereign monarch, or a sovereign assembly, shall
think fit to give command to the towns, and other several parts of their
territory, to send to him their deputies, to inform him of the
condition, and necessities of the subjects, or to advise with him for
the making of good laws, or for any other cause, as with one person
representing the whole country, such deputies, having a place and time
of meeting assigned them, are there, and at that time, a body politic,
representing every subject of that dominion; but it is only for such
matters as shall be propounded unto them by that man, or assembly, that
by the sovereign authority sent for them; and when it shall be declared
that nothing more shall be propounded, nor debated by them, the body is
dissolved. For if they were the absolute representatives of the people,
then were it the sovereign assembly; and so there would be two sovereign
assemblies, or two sovereigns, over the same people; which cannot
consist with their peace. And therefore where there is once a
sovereignty, there can be no absolute representation of the people, but
by it. And for the limits of how far such a body shall represent the
whole people, they are set forth in the writing by which they were sent
for. For the people cannot choose their deputies to other intent, than
is in the writing directed to them from their sovereign expressed.
[Sidenote: A regular private body, lawful as a family.]
Private bodies regular, and lawful, are those that are constituted
without letters, or other written authority, saving the laws common to
all other subjects. And because they be united in one person
representative, they are held for regular; such as are all families, in
which the father, or master ordereth the whole family. For he obligeth
his children, and servants, as far as the law permitteth, though not
further, because none of them are bound to obedience in those actions,
which the law hath forbidden to be done. In all other actions, during
the time they are under domestic government, they are subject to their
fathers, and masters, as to their immediate sovereigns. For the father
and master, being before the institution of commonwealth, absolute
sovereigns in their own families, they lose afterward no more of their
authority, than the law of the commonwealth taketh from them.
[Sidenote: Private bodies regular, but unlawful.]
Private bodies regular, but unlawful, are those that unite themselves
into one person representative, without any public authority at all;
such as are the corporations of beggars, thieves and gipsies, the better
to order their trade of begging and stealing; and the corporations of
men, that by authority from any foreign person, unite themselves in
another’s dominion, for the easier propagation of doctrines, and for
making a party, against the power of the commonwealth.
[Sidenote: Systems irregular, such as are private leagues.]
Irregular systems, in their nature but leagues, or sometimes mere
concourse of people, without union to any particular design, not by
obligation of one to another, but proceeding only from a similitude of
wills and inclinations, become lawful, or unlawful, according to the
lawfulness, or unlawfulness of every particular man’s design therein:
and his design is to be understood by the occasion.
The leagues of subjects, because leagues are commonly made for mutual
defence, are in a commonwealth, which is no more than a league of all
the subjects together, for the most part unnecessary, and savour of
unlawful design; and are for that cause unlawful, and go commonly by the
name of factions, or conspiracies. For a league being a connexion of men
by covenants, if there be no power given to any one man or assembly, as
in the condition of mere nature, to compel them to performance, is so
long only valid, as there ariseth no just cause of distrust: and
therefore leagues between commonwealths, over whom there is no human
power established, to keep them all in awe, are not only lawful, but
also profitable for the time they last. But leagues of the subjects of
one and the same commonwealth, where every one may obtain his right by
means of the sovereign power, are unnecessary to the maintaining of
peace and justice, and, in case the design of them be evil or unknown to
the commonwealth, unlawful. For all uniting of strength by private men,
is, if for evil intent, unjust; if for intent unknown, dangerous to the
public, and unjustly concealed.
[Sidenote: Secret cabals.]
If the sovereign power be in a great assembly, and a number of men, part
of the assembly, without authority, consult apart, to contrive the
guidance of the rest; this is a faction, or conspiracy unlawful, as
being a fraudulent seducing of the assembly for their particular
interest. But if he, whose private interest is to be debated and judged
in the assembly, make as many friends as he can; in him it is no
injustice; because in this case he is no part of the assembly. And
though he hire such friends with money, unless there be an express law
against it, yet it is not injustice. For sometimes, as men’s manners
are, justice cannot be had without money; and every man may think his
own cause just, till it be heard, and judged.
[Sidenote: Feuds of private families.]
In all commonwealths, if private men entertain more servants, than the
government of his estate, and lawful employment he has for them
requires, it is faction, and unlawful. For having the protection of the
commonwealth, he needeth not the defence of private force. And whereas
in nations not thoroughly civilized, several numerous families have
lived in continual hostility, and invaded one another with private
force; yet it is evident enough, that they have done unjustly; or else
they had no commonwealth.
[Sidenote: Factions for government.]
And as factions for kindred, so also factions for government of
religion, as of Papists, Protestants, &c. or of state, as patricians,
and plebeians of old time in Rome, and of aristocraticals and
democraticals of old time in Greece, are unjust, as being contrary to
the peace and safety of the people, and a taking of the sword out of the
hand of the sovereign.
[Sidenote: Concourse of people.]
Concourse of people is an irregular system, the lawfulness, or
unlawfulness, whereof dependeth on the occasion, and on the number of
them that are assembled. If the occasion be lawful, and manifest, the
concourse is lawful; as the usual meeting of men at church, or at a
public show, in usual numbers: for if the numbers be extraordinarily
great, the occasion is not evident; and consequently he that cannot
render a particular and good account of his being amongst them, is to be
judged conscious of an unlawful, and tumultuous design. It may be lawful
for a thousand men, to join to a petition to be delivered to a judge, or
magistrate; yet if a thousand men come to present it, it is a tumultuous
assembly; because there needs but one or two for that purpose. But in
such cases as these, it is not a set number that makes the assembly
unlawful, but such a number, as the present officers are not able to
suppress, and bring to justice.
[Sidenote: Concourse of people.]
When an unusual number of men, assemble against a man whom they accuse;
the assembly is an unlawful tumult; because they may deliver their
accusation to the magistrate by a few, or by one man. Such was the case
of St. Paul at Ephesus; where Demetrius and a great number of other men,
brought two of Paul’s companions before the magistrate, saying with one
voice, _Great is Diana of the Ephesians_; which was their way of
demanding justice against them for teaching the people such doctrine, as
was against their religion, and trade. The occasion here, considering
the laws of that people, was just; yet was their assembly judged
unlawful, and the magistrate reprehended them for it in these words
(_Acts_ xix. 38-40.) _If Demetrius and the other workmen can accuse any
man, of any thing, there be pleas, and deputies, let them accuse one
another. And if you have any other thing to demand, your case may be
judged in an assembly lawfully called. For we are in danger to be
accused for this day’s sedition; because there is no cause by which any
man can render any reason of this concourse of people._ Where he calleth
an assembly, whereof men can give no just account, a sedition, and such
as they could not answer for. And this is all I shall say concerning
_systems_, and assemblies of people, which may be compared, as I said,
to the similar parts of man’s body; such as be lawful, to the muscles;
such as are unlawful, to wens, biles, and apostems, engendered by the
unnatural conflux of evil humours.
-------
CHAPTER XXIII.
OF THE PUBLIC MINISTERS OF SOVEREIGN
POWER.
In the last chapter I have spoken of the similar parts of a
commonwealth: in this I shall speak of the parts organical, which are
public ministers.
[Sidenote: Public minister who.]
A PUBLIC MINISTER, is he, that by the sovereign, whether a monarch or an
assembly, is employed in any affairs, with authority to represent in
that employment, the person of the commonwealth. And whereas every man,
or assembly that hath sovereignty, representeth two persons, or, as the
more common phrase is, has two capacities, one natural, and another
politic: as a monarch, hath the person not only of the commonwealth, but
also of a man; and a sovereign assembly hath the person not only of the
commonwealth, but also of the assembly: they that be servants to them in
their natural capacity, are not public ministers; but those only that
serve them in the administration of the public business. And therefore
neither ushers, nor sergeants, nor other officers that wait on the
assembly, for no other purpose, but for the commodity of the men
assembled, in an aristocracy, or democracy; nor stewards, chamberlains,
cofferers, or any other officers of the household of a monarch, are
public ministers in a monarchy.
[Sidenote: Ministers for the general administration.]
Of public ministers, some have charge committed to them of a general
administration, either of the whole dominion, or of a part thereof. Of
the whole, as to a protector, or regent, may be committed by the
predecessor of an infant king, during his minority, the whole
administration of his kingdom. In which case, every subject is so far
obliged to obedience, as the ordinances he shall make, and the commands
he shall give be in the king’s name, and not inconsistent with his
sovereign power. Of a part, or province; as when either a monarch, or a
sovereign assembly, shall give the general charge thereof to a governor,
lieutenant, præfect, or viceroy: and in this case also, every one of
that province is obliged to all he shall do in the name of the
sovereign, and that not incompatible with the sovereign’s right. For
such protectors, viceroys, and governors, have no other right, but what
depends on the sovereign’s will; and no commission that can be given
them, can be interpreted for a declaration of the will to transfer the
sovereignty, without express and perspicuous words to that purpose. And
this kind of public ministers resembleth the nerves, and tendons that
move the several limbs of a body natural.
[Sidenote: For special administration, as for economy.]
Others have special administration; that is to say, charges of some
special business, either at home, or abroad: as at home, first, for the
economy of a commonwealth, they that have authority concerning the
_treasure_, as tributes, impositions, rents, fines, or whatsoever public
revenue, to collect, receive, issue, or take the accounts thereof, are
public ministers: ministers, because they serve the person
representative, and can do nothing against his command, nor without his
authority: public, because they serve him in his political capacity.
Secondly, they that have authority concerning the _militia_; to have the
custody of arms, forts, ports; to levy, pay, or conduct soldiers; or to
provide for any necessary thing for the use of war, either by land or
sea, are public ministers. But a soldier without command, though he
fight for the commonwealth, does not therefore represent the person of
it; because there is none to represent it to. For every one that hath
command, represents it to them only whom he commandeth.
[Sidenote: For instruction of the people.]
They also that have authority to teach, or to enable others to teach the
people their duty to the sovereign power, and instruct them in the
knowledge of what is just, and unjust, thereby to render them more apt
to live in godliness, and in peace amongst themselves, and resist the
public enemy, are public ministers: ministers, in that they do it not by
their own authority, but by another’s; and public, because they do it,
or should do it, by no authority but that of the sovereign. The monarch,
or the sovereign assembly only hath immediate authority from God, to
teach and instruct the people; and no man but the sovereign, receiveth
his power _Dei gratiâ_ simply; that is to say, from the favour of none
but God: all other, receive theirs from the favour and providence of
God, and their sovereigns; as in a monarchy _Dei gratiâ et regis_; or
_Dei providentiâ et voluntate regis_.
[Sidenote: For judicature.]
They also to whom jurisdiction is given, are public ministers. For in
their seats of justice they represent the person of the sovereign; and
their sentence, is his sentence: for, as hath been before declared, all
judicature is essentially annexed to the sovereignty; and therefore all
other judges are but ministers of him or them that have the sovereign
power. And as controversies are of two sorts, namely of _fact_, and of
_law_; so are judgments, some of fact, some of law: and consequently in
the same controversy, there may be two judges, one of fact, another of
law.
And in both these controversies, there may arise a controversy between
the party judged, and the judge; which because they be both subjects to
the sovereign, ought in equity to be judged by men agreed on by consent
of both; for no man can be judge in his own cause. But the sovereign is
already agreed on for judge by them both, and is therefore either to
hear the cause, and determine it himself, or appoint for judge such as
they shall both agree on. And this agreement is then understood to be
made between them divers ways; as first, if the defendant be allowed to
except against such of his judges, whose interest maketh him suspect
them, (for as to the complainant, he hath already chosen his own judge),
those which he excepteth not against, are judges he himself agrees on.
Secondly, if he appeal to any other judge, he can appeal no further; for
his appeal is his choice. Thirdly, if he appeal to the sovereign
himself, and he by himself, or by delegates which the parties shall
agree on, give sentence; that sentence is final: for the defendant is
judged by his own judges, that is to say, by himself.
These properties of just and rational judicature considered, I cannot
forbear to observe the excellent constitution of the courts of justice,
established both for Common, and also for Public Pleas in England. By
Common Pleas, I mean those, where both the complainant and defendant are
subjects: and by public, which are also called Pleas of the Crown, those
where the complainant is the sovereign. For whereas there were two
orders of men, whereof one was Lords, the other Commons; the Lords had
this privilege, to have for judges in all capital crimes, none but
Lords; and of them, as many as would be present; which being ever
acknowledged as a privilege of favour, their judges were none but such
as they had themselves desired. And in all controversies, every subject,
(as also in civil controversies the Lords), had for judges, men of the
country where the matter in controversy lay; against which he might make
his exceptions, till at last twelve men without exception being agreed
on, they were judged by those twelve. So that having his own judges,
there could be nothing alleged by the party, why the sentence should not
be final. These public persons, with authority from the sovereign power,
either to instruct, or judge the people, are such members of the
commonwealth, as may fitly be compared to the organs of voice in a body
natural.
[Sidenote: For execution.]
Public ministers are also all those, that have authority from the
sovereign, to procure the execution of judgments given; to publish the
sovereign’s commands; to suppress tumults; to apprehend, and imprison
malefactors; and other acts tending to the conservation of the peace.
For every act they do by such authority, is the act of the commonwealth;
and their service, answerable to that of the hands, in a body natural.
Public ministers abroad, are those that represent the person of their
own sovereign, to foreign states. Such are ambassadors, messengers,
agents, and heralds, sent by public authority, and on public business.
But such as are sent by authority only of some private party of a
troubled state, though they be received, are neither public, nor private
ministers of the commonwealth; because none of their actions have the
commonwealth for author. Likewise, an ambassador sent from a prince, to
congratulate, condole, or to assist at a solemnity; though the authority
be public; yet because the business is private, and belonging to him in
his natural capacity; is a private person. Also if a man be sent into
another country, secretly to explore their counsels, and strength;
though both the authority, and the business be public; yet because there
is none to take notice of any person in him, but his own; he is but a
private minister; but yet a minister of the commonwealth; and may be
compared to an eye in the body natural. And those that are appointed to
receive the petitions or other informations of the people, and are as it
were the public ear, are public ministers, and represent their sovereign
in that office.
[Sidenote: Councillors without other employment than to advise are not
public ministers.]
Neither a councillor, nor a council of state, if we consider it with no
authority of judicature or command, but only of giving advice to the
sovereign when it is required, or of offering it when it is not
required, is a public person. For the advice is addressed to the
sovereign only, whose person cannot in his own presence, be represented
to him, by another. But a body of councillors, are never without some
other authority, either of judicature, or of immediate administration:
as in a monarchy, they represent the monarch, in delivering his commands
to the public ministers: in a democracy, the council, or senate
propounds the result of their deliberations to the people, as a council;
but when they appoint judges, or hear causes, or give audience to
ambassadors, it is in the quality of a minister of the people: and in an
aristocracy, the council of state is the sovereign assembly itself; and
gives counsel to none but themselves.
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CHAPTER XXIV.
OF THE NUTRITION, AND PROCREATION OF A
COMMONWEALTH.
[Sidenote: The nourishment of a commonwealth consisteth in the
commodities of sea and land.]
The NUTRITION of a commonwealth consisteth, in the _plenty_, and
_distribution_ of _materials_ conducing to life: in _concoction_, or
_preparation_; and, when concocted, in the _conveyance_ of it, by
convenient conduits, to the public use.
As for the plenty of matter, it is a thing limited by nature, to those
commodities, which from the two breasts of our common mother, land and
sea, God usually either freely giveth, or for labour selleth to mankind.
For the matter of this nutriment, consisting in animals, vegetals, and
minerals, God hath freely laid them before us, in or near to the face of
the earth; so as there needeth no more but the labour, and industry of
receiving them. Insomuch as plenty dependeth, next to God’s favour,
merely on the labour and industry of men.
This matter, commonly called commodities, is partly _native_, and partly
_foreign_: _native_, that which is to be had within the territory of the
commonwealth: _foreign_, that which is imported from without. And
because there is no territory under the dominion of one commonwealth,
except it be of very vast extent, that produceth all things needful for
the maintenance, and motion of the whole body; and few that produce not
some thing more than necessary; the superfluous commodities to be had
within, become no more superfluous, but supply these wants at home, by
importation of that which may be had abroad, either by exchange, or by
just war, or by labour. For a man’s labour also, is a commodity
exchangeable for benefit, as well as any other thing: and there have
been commonwealths that having no more territory, than hath served them
for habitation, have nevertheless, not only maintained, but also
encreased their power, partly by the labour of trading from one place to
another, and partly by selling the manufactures whereof the materials
were brought in from other places.
[Sidenote: And the right distribution of them.]
The distribution of the materials of this nourishment, is the
constitution of _mine_, and _thine_, and _his_; that is to say, in one
word _propriety_; and belongeth in all kinds of commonwealth to the
sovereign power. For where there is no commonwealth, there is, as hath
been already shown, a perpetual war of every man against his neighbour;
and therefore every thing is his that getteth it, and keepeth it by
force; which is neither _propriety_, nor _community_; but _uncertainty_.
Which is so evident, that even Cicero, a passionate defender of liberty,
in a public pleading, attributeth all propriety to the law civil. _Let
the civil law_, saith he, _be once abandoned, or but negligently
guarded, not to say oppressed, and there is nothing, that any man can be
sure to receive from his ancestor, or leave to his children_. And again;
_Take away the civil law, and no man knows what is his own, and what
another man’s_. Seeing therefore the introduction of _propriety_ is an
effect of commonwealth, which can do nothing but by the person that
represents it, it is the act only of the sovereign; and consisteth in
the laws, which none can make that have not the sovereign power. And
this they well knew of old, who called that Νόμος, that is to say,
_distribution_, which we call law; and defined justice, by
_distributing_ to every man _his own_.
[Sidenote: All private estates of land proceed originally from the
arbitrary distribution of the sovereign.]
In this distribution, the first law, is for division of the land itself:
wherein the sovereign assigneth to every man a portion, according as he,
and not according as any subject, or any number of them, shall judge
agreeable to equity, and the common good. The children of Israel, were a
commonwealth in the wilderness; but wanted the commodities of the earth,
till they were masters of the Land of Promise; which afterward was
divided amongst them, not by their own discretion, but by the discretion
of Eleazar the Priest, and Joshua their General, who, when there were
twelve tribes, making them thirteen by subdivision of the tribe of
Joseph, made nevertheless but twelve portions of the land; and ordained
for the tribe of Levi no land; but assigned them the tenth part of the
whole fruits; which division was therefore arbitrary. And though a
people coming into possession of a land by war, do not always
exterminate the ancient inhabitants, as did the Jews, but leave to many,
or most, or all of them their estates; yet it is manifest they hold them
afterwards, as of the victors’ distribution; as the people of England
held all theirs of William the Conqueror.
[Sidenote: Propriety of subject excludes not the dominion of the
sovereign, but only of another subject.]
From whence we may collect, that the propriety which a subject hath in
his lands, consisteth in a right to exclude all other subjects from the
use of them; and not to exclude their sovereign, be it an assembly, or a
monarch. For seeing the sovereign, that is to say, the commonwealth,
whose person he representeth, is understood to do nothing but in order
to the common peace and security, this distribution of lands, is to be
understood as done in order to the same: and consequently, whatsoever
distribution he shall make in prejudice thereof, is contrary to the will
of every subject, that committed his peace, and safety to his
discretion, and conscience; and therefore by the will of every one of
them, is to be reputed void. It is true, that a sovereign monarch, or
the greater part of a sovereign assembly, may ordain the doing of many
things in pursuit of their passions, contrary to their own consciences,
which is a breach of trust, and of the law of nature; but this is not
enough to authorize any subject, either to make war upon, or so much as
to accuse of injustice, or any way to speak evil of their sovereign;
because they have authorized all his actions, and in bestowing the
sovereign power, made them their own. But in what cases the commands of
sovereigns are contrary to equity, and the law of nature, is to be
considered hereafter in another place.
[Sidenote: The public is not to be dieted.]
In the distribution of land, the commonwealth itself, may be conceived
to have a portion, and possess, and improve the same by their
representative; and that such portion may be made sufficient, to sustain
the whole expense to the common peace, and defence necessarily required.
Which were very true, if there could be any representative conceived
free from human passions, and infirmities. But the nature of men being
as it is, the setting forth of public land, or of any certain revenue
for the commonwealth, is in vain; and tendeth to the dissolution of
government, and to the condition of mere nature, and war, as soon as
ever the sovereign power falleth into the hands of a monarch, or of an
assembly, that are either too negligent of money, or too hazardous in
engaging the public stock into a long or costly war. Commonwealths can
endure no diet: for seeing their expense is not limited by their own
appetite, but by external accidents, and the appetites of their
neighbours, the public riches cannot be limited by other limits, than
those which the emergent occasions shall require. And whereas in
England, there were by the Conqueror, divers lands reserved to his own
use, besides forests and chases, either for his recreation, or
preservation of woods, and divers services reserved on the land he gave
his subjects; yet it seems they were not reserved for his maintenance in
his public, but in his natural capacity. For he, and his successors did
for all that, lay arbitrary taxes on all subjects’ land, when they
judged it necessary. Or if those public lands, and services, were
ordained as a sufficient maintenance of the commonwealth, it was
contrary to the scope of the institution; being, as it appeared by those
ensuing taxes, insufficient, and, as it appears by the late small
revenue of the crown, subject to alienation and diminution. It is
therefore in vain, to assign a portion to the commonwealth; which may
sell, or give it away; and does sell and give it away, when it is done
by their representative.
[Sidenote: The places and matter of traffic depend, as their
distribution, on the sovereign.]
As the distribution of lands at home; so also to assign in what places,
and for what commodities, the subject shall traffic abroad, belongeth to
the sovereign. For if it did belong to private persons to use their own
discretion therein, some of them would be drawn for gain, both to
furnish the enemy with means to hurt the commonwealth, and hurt it
themselves, by importing such things, as pleasing men’s appetites, be
nevertheless noxious, or at least unprofitable to them. And therefore it
belongeth to the commonwealth, that is, to the sovereign only, to
approve, or disapprove both of the places, and matter of foreign
traffic.
[Sidenote: The laws of transferring propriety belong also to the
sovereign.]
Further, seeing it is not enough to the sustentation of a commonwealth,
that every man have a propriety in a portion of land, or in some few
commodities, or a natural property in some useful art, and there is no
art in the world, but is necessary either for the being, or well being
almost of every particular man; it is necessary, that men distribute
that which they can spare, and transfer their propriety therein,
mutually one to another, by exchange, and mutual contract. And therefore
it belongeth to the commonwealth, that is to say, to the sovereign, to
appoint in what manner all kinds of contract between subjects, as
buying, selling, exchanging, borrowing, lending, letting, and taking to
hire, are to be made; and by what words and signs they shall be
understood for valid. And for the matter, and distribution of the
nourishment, to the several members of the commonwealth, thus much,
considering the model of the whole work, is sufficient.
[Sidenote: Money the blood of a commonwealth.]
By concoction, I understand the reducing of all commodities, which are
not presently consumed, but reserved for nourishment in time to come, to
something of equal value, and withal so portable, as not to hinder the
motion of men from place to place; to the end a man may have in what
place soever, such nourishment as the place affordeth. And this is
nothing else but gold, and silver, and money. For gold and silver,
being, as it happens, almost in all countries of the world highly
valued, is a commodious measure of the value of all things else between
nations; and money, of what matter soever coined by the sovereign of a
commonwealth, is a sufficient measure of the value of all things else,
between the subjects of that commonwealth. By the means of which
measures, all commodities, moveable and immoveable, are made to
accompany a man to all places of his resort, within and without the
place of his ordinary residence; and the same passeth from man to man,
within the commonwealth; and goes round about, nourishing, as it
passeth, every part thereof; in so much as this concoction, is as it
were the sanguification of the commonwealth: for natural blood is in
like manner made of the fruits of the earth; and circulating, nourisheth
by the way every member of the body of man.
And because silver and gold have their value from the matter itself;
they have first this privilege, that the value of them cannot be altered
by the power of one, nor of a few commonwealths; as being a common
measure of the commodities of all places. But base money, may easily be
enhanced, or abased. Secondly, they have the privilege to make
commonwealths move, and stretch out their arms, when need is, into
foreign countries: and supply, not only private subjects that travel,
but also whole armies with provision. But that coin, which is not
considerable for the matter, but for the stamp of the place, being
unable to endure change of air, hath its effect at home only; where also
it is subject to the change of laws, and thereby to have the value
diminished, to the prejudice many times of those that have it.
[Sidenote: The conduits and way of money to the public use.]
The conduits, and ways by which it is conveyed to the public use, are of
two sorts: one, that conveyeth it to the public coffers; the other, that
issueth the same out again for public payments. Of the first sort, are
collectors, receivers, and treasurers; of the second, are the treasurers
again, and the officers appointed for payment of several public or
private ministers. And in this also, the artificial man maintains his
resemblance with the natural; whose veins receiving the blood from the
several parts of the body, carry it to the heart; where being made
vital, the heart by the arteries sends it out again, to enliven, and
enable for motion all the members of the same.
[Sidenote: The children of a commonwealth colonies.]
The procreation or children of a commonwealth, are those we call
_plantations_, or _colonies_; which are numbers of men sent out from the
commonwealth, under a conductor, or governor, to inhabit a foreign
country, either formerly void of inhabitants, or made void then by war.
And when a colony is settled, they are either a commonwealth of
themselves, discharged of their subjection to their sovereign that sent
them, as hath been done by many commonwealths, of ancient time, in which
case the commonwealth from which they went, was called their metropolis
or mother, and requires no more of them, than fathers require of the
children, whom they emancipate and make free from their domestic
government, which is honour, and friendship; or else they remain united
to their metropolis, as were the colonies of the people of Rome; and
then they are no commonwealths themselves, but provinces, and parts of
the commonwealth that sent them. So that the right of colonies, saving
honour and league with their metropolis, dependeth wholly on their
licence or letters, by which their sovereign authorized them to plant.
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CHAPTER XXV.
OF COUNSEL.
[Sidenote: Counsel what.]
How fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things by the ordinary
and inconstant use of words, appeareth in nothing more, than in the
confusion of counsels, and commands, arising from the imperative manner
of speaking in them both, and in many other occasions besides. For the
words _do this_, are the words not only of him that commandeth; but also
of him that giveth counsel; and of him that exhorteth; and yet there are
but few, that see not that these are very different things, or that
cannot distinguish between them, when they perceive who it is that
speaketh, and to whom the speech is directed, and upon what occasion.
But finding those phrases in men’s writings, and being not able, or not
willing to enter into a consideration of the circumstances, they mistake
sometimes the precepts of counsellors, for the precepts of them that
command; and sometimes the contrary; according as it best agreeth with
the conclusions they would infer, or the actions they approve. To avoid
which mistakes, and render to those terms of commanding, counselling and
exhorting, their proper and distinct significations, I define them thus.
[Sidenote: Differences between command and counsel.]
COMMAND is, where a man saith, _do this_, or _do not this_, without
expecting other reason than the will of him that says it. From this it
followeth manifestly, that he that commandeth, pretendeth thereby his
own benefit: for the reason of his command is his own will only, and the
proper object of every man’s will, is some good to himself.
COUNSEL, is where a man saith, _do_, or _do not this_, and deduceth his
reasons from the benefit that arriveth by it to him to whom he saith it.
And from this it is evident, that he that giveth counsel, pretendeth
only, whatsoever he intendeth, the good of him, to whom he giveth it.
Therefore between counsel and command, one great difference is, that
command is directed to a man’s own benefit; and counsel to the benefit
of another man. And from this ariseth another difference, that a man may
be obliged to do what he is commanded; as when he hath covenanted to
obey: but he cannot be obliged to do as he is counselled, because the
hurt of not following it, is his own; or if he should covenant to follow
it, then is the counsel turned into the nature of a command. A third
difference between them is, that no man can pretend a right to be of
another man’s counsel; because he is not to pretend benefit by it to
himself: but to demand right to counsel another, argues a will to know
his designs, or to gain some other good to himself: which, as I said
before, is of every man’s will the proper object.
This also is incident to the nature of counsel; that whatsoever it be,
he that asketh it, cannot in equity accuse, or punish it: for to ask
counsel of another, is to permit him to give such counsel as he shall
think best; and consequently, he that giveth counsel to his sovereign,
whether a monarch, or an assembly, when he asketh it, cannot in equity
be punished for it, whether the same be conformable to the opinion of
the most, or not, so it be to the proposition in debate. For if the
sense of the assembly can be taken notice of, before the debate be
ended, they should neither ask, nor take any further counsel; for the
sense of the assembly, is the resolution of the debate, and end of all
deliberation. And generally he that demandeth counsel, is author of it;
and therefore cannot punish it; and what the sovereign cannot, no man
else can. But if one subject giveth counsel to another, to do anything
contrary to the laws, whether that counsel proceed from evil intention,
or from ignorance only, it is punishable by the commonwealth; because
ignorance of the law is no good excuse, where every man is bound to take
notice of the laws to which he is subject.
[Sidenote: Exhortation and dehortation what.]
EXHORTATION and DEHORTATION is counsel, accompanied with signs in him
that giveth it, of vehement desire to have it followed: or to say it
more briefly, _counsel vehemently pressed_. For he that exhorteth, doth
not deduce the consequences of what he adviseth to be done, and tie
himself therein to the rigour of true reasoning; but encourages him he
counselleth to action: as he that dehorteth, deterreth him from it. And,
therefore, they have in their speeches, a regard to the common passions
and opinions of men, in deducing their reasons; and make use of
similitudes, metaphors, examples, and other tools of oratory, to
persuade their hearers of the utility, honour, or justice of following
their advice.
From whence may be inferred, first, that exhortation and dehortation is
directed to the good of him that giveth the counsel, not of him that
asketh it, which is contrary to the duty of a counsellor; who, by the
definition of counsel, ought to regard not his own benefit, but his whom
he adviseth. And that he directeth his counsel to his own benefit, is
manifest enough, by the long and vehement urging, or by the artificial
giving thereof; which being not required of him, and consequently
proceeding from his own occasions, is directed principally to his own
benefit, and but accidentally to the good of him that is counselled, or
not at all.
Secondly, that the use of exhortation and dehortation lieth only where a
man is to speak to a multitude; because when the speech is addressed to
one, he may interrupt him, and examine his reasons more rigorously than
can be done in a multitude; which are too many to enter into dispute,
and dialogue with him that speaketh indifferently to them all at once.
Thirdly, that they that exhort and dehort, where they are required to
give counsel, are corrupt counsellors, and as it were bribed by their
own interest. For though the counsel they give be never so good; yet he
that gives it, is no more a good counsellor, than he that giveth a just
sentence for a reward, is a just judge. But where a man may lawfully
command, as a father in his family, or a leader in an army, his
exhortations and dehortations, are not only lawful, but also necessary,
and laudable. But then they are no more counsels, but commands; which
when they are for execution of sour labour, sometimes necessity, and
always humanity requireth to be sweetened in the delivery, by
encouragement, and in the tune and phrase of counsel, rather than in
harsher language of command.
Examples of the difference between command and counsel, we may take from
the forms of speech that express them in Holy Scripture. _Have no other
Gods but me; make to thyself no graven image; take not God’s name in
vain; sanctify the sabbath; honour thy parents; kill not; steal not,
&c._ are commands; because the reason for which we are to obey them, is
drawn from the will of God our king, whom we are obliged to obey. But
these words, _Sell all thou hast; give it to the poor; and follow me_,
are counsel; because the reason for which we are to do so, is drawn from
our own benefit; which is this, that we shall have _treasure in Heaven_.
These words, _Go into the village over against you, and you shall find
an ass tied, and her colt; loose her, and bring her to me_, are a
command: for the reason of their fact is drawn from the will of their
Master: but these words, _Repent and be baptized in the name of Jesus_,
are counsel; because the reason why we should so do, tendeth not to any
benefit of God Almighty, who shall still be king in what manner soever
we rebel; but of ourselves, who have no other means of avoiding the
punishment hanging over us for our sins.
[Sidenote: Differences of fit and unfit counsellors.]
As the difference of counsel from command, hath been now deduced from
the nature of counsel, consisting in a deducing of the benefit, or hurt
that may arise to him that is to be counselled, by the necessary or
probable consequences of the action he propoundeth; so may also the
differences between _apt_ and _inept_ counsellors be derived from the
same. For experience, being but memory of the consequences of like
actions formerly observed, and counsel but the speech whereby that
experience is made known to another; the virtues, and defects of
counsel, are the same with the virtues, and defects intellectual: and to
the person of a commonwealth, his counsellors serve him in the place of
memory, and mental discourse. But with this resemblance of the
commonwealth, to a natural man, there is one dissimilitude joined, of
great importance; which is, that a natural man receiveth his experience,
from the natural objects of sense, which work upon him without passion,
or interest of their own; whereas they that give counsel to the
representative person of a commonwealth, may have, and have often their
particular ends and passions, that render their counsels always
suspected, and many times unfaithful. And therefore we may set down for
the first condition of a good counsellor, _that his ends, and interests,
be not inconsistent with the ends and interests of him he counselleth_.
Secondly, because the office of a counsellor, when an action comes into
deliberation, is to make manifest the consequences of it, in such
manner, as he that is counselled may be truly and evidently informed; he
ought to propound his advice, in such form of speech, as may make the
truth most evidently appear; that is to say, with as firm ratiocination,
as significant and proper language, and as briefly, as the evidence will
permit. And therefore _rash and unevident inferences_, such as are
fetched only from examples, or authority of books, and are not arguments
of what is good, or evil, but witnesses of fact, or of opinion;
_obscure, confused, and ambiguous expressions, also all metaphorical
speeches, tending to the stirring up of passion_, (because such
reasoning, and such expressions, are useful only to deceive, or to lead
him we counsel towards other ends than his own) _are repugnant to the
office of a counsellor_.
Thirdly, because the ability of counselling proceedeth from experience,
and long study; and no man is presumed to have experience in all those
things that to the administration of a great commonwealth are necessary
to be known, _no man is presumed to be a good counsellor, but in such
business, as he hath not only been much versed in, but hath also much
meditated on, and considered_. For seeing the business of a commonwealth
is this, to preserve the people in peace at home, and defend them
against foreign invasion, we shall find, it requires great knowledge of
the disposition of mankind, of the rights of government, and of the
nature of equity, law, justice, and honour, not to be attained without
study; and of the strength, commodities, places, both of their own
country, and their neighbours; as also of the inclinations, and designs
of all nations that may any way annoy them. And this is not attained to,
without much experience. Of which things, not only the whole sum, but
every one of the particulars requires the age, and observation of a man
in years, and of more than ordinary study. The wit required for counsel,
as I have said before (chap. VIII.) is judgment. And the differences of
men in that point come from different education, of some to one kind of
study or business, and of others to another. When for the doing of any
thing, there be infallible rules, as in engines and edifices, the rules
of geometry, all the experience of the world cannot equal his counsel,
that has learnt, or found out the rule. And when there is no such rule,
he that hath most experience in that particular kind of business, has
therein the best judgment, and is the best counsellor.
Fourthly, to be able to give counsel to a commonwealth, in a business
that hath reference to another commonwealth, _it is necessary to be
acquainted with the intelligences, and letters_ that come from thence,
_and with all the records of treaties, and other transactions of state_
between them; which none can do, but such as the representative shall
think fit. By which we may see, that they who are not called to counsel,
can have no good counsel in such cases to obtrude.
Fifthly, supposing the number of counsellors equal, a man is better
counselled by hearing them apart, than in an assembly; and that for many
causes. First, in hearing them apart, you have the advice of every man;
but in an assembly many of them deliver their advice with _aye_, or
_no_, or with their hands, or feet, not moved by their own sense, but by
the eloquence of another, or for fear of displeasing some that have
spoken, or the whole assembly, by contradiction; or for fear of
appearing duller in apprehension, than those that have applauded the
contrary opinion. Secondly, in an assembly of many, there cannot choose
but be some whose interests are contrary to that of the public; and
these their interests make passionate, and passion eloquent, and
eloquence draws others into the same advice. For the passions of men,
which asunder are moderate, as the heat of one brand; in an assembly are
like many brands, that inflame one another, especially when they blow
one another with orations, to the setting of the commonwealth on fire,
under pretence of counselling it. Thirdly, in hearing every man apart,
one may examine, when there is need, the truth, or probability of his
reasons, and of the grounds of the advice he gives, by frequent
interruptions, and objections; which cannot be done in an assembly,
where, in every difficult question, a man is rather astonied, and
dazzled with the variety of discourse upon it, than informed of the
course he ought to take. Besides, there cannot be an assembly of many,
called together for advice, wherein there be not some, that have the
ambition to be thought eloquent, and also learned in the politics; and
give not their advice with care of the business propounded, but of the
applause of their motley orations, made of the divers coloured threds,
or shreads of authors; which is an impertinence at least, that takes
away the time of serious consultation, and in the secret way of
counselling apart, is easily avoided. Fourthly, in deliberations that
ought to be kept secret, whereof there be many occasions in public
business, the counsels of many, and especially in assemblies, are
dangerous; and therefore great assemblies are necessitated to commit
such affairs to lesser numbers, and of such persons as are most versed,
and in whose fidelity they have most confidence.
To conclude, who is there that so far approves the taking of counsel
from a great assembly of counsellors, that wisheth for, or would accept
of their pains, when there is a question of marrying his children,
disposing of his lands, governing his household, or managing his private
estate, especially if there be amongst them such as wish not his
prosperity? A man that doth his business by the help of many and prudent
counsellors, with every one consulting apart in his proper element, does
it best, as he that useth able seconds at tennis play, placed in their
proper stations. He does next best, that useth his own judgment only; as
he that has no second at all. But he that is carried up and down to his
business in a framed counsel, which cannot move but by the plurality of
consenting opinions, the execution whereof is commonly, out of envy or
interest, retarded by the part dissenting, does it worst of all, and
like one that is carried to the ball, though by good players, yet in a
wheel-barrow, or other frame, heavy of itself, and retarded also by the
inconcurrent judgments, and endeavours of them that drive it; and so
much the more, as they be more that set their hands to it; and most of
all, when there is one, or more amongst them, that desire to have him
lose. And though it be true, that many eyes see more than one; yet it is
not to be understood of many counsellors; but then only, when the final
resolution is in one man. Otherwise, because many eyes see the same
thing in divers lines, and are apt to look asquint towards their private
benefit; they that desire not to miss their mark, though they look about
with two eyes, yet they never aim but with one; and therefore no great
popular commonwealth was ever kept up, but either by a foreign enemy
that united them; or by the reputation of some eminent man amongst them;
or by the secret counsel of a few; or by the mutual fear of equal
factions; and not by the open consultations of the assembly. And as for
very little commonwealths, be they popular, or monarchical, there is no
human wisdom can uphold them, longer than the jealousy lasteth of their
potent neighbours.
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CHAPTER XXVI.
OF CIVIL LAWS.
[Sidenote: Civil law what.]
By CIVIL LAWS, I understand the laws, that men are therefore bound to
observe, because they are members, not of this, or that commonwealth in
particular, but of a commonwealth. For the knowledge of particular laws
belongeth to them, that profess the study of the laws of their several
countries; but the knowledge of civil law in general, to any man. The
ancient law of Rome was called their _civil law_, from the word
_civitas_, which signifies a commonwealth: and those countries, which
having been under the Roman empire, and governed by that law, retain
still such part thereof as they think fit, call that part the civil law,
to distinguish it from the rest of their own civil laws. But that is not
it I intend to speak of here; my design being not to show what is law
here, and there; but what is law; as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and
divers others have done, without taking upon them the profession of the
study of the law.
And first it is manifest, that law in general, is not counsel, but
command; nor a command of any man to any man; but only of him, whose
command is addressed to one formerly obliged to obey him. And as for
civil law, it addeth only the name of the person commanding, which is
_persona civitatis_, the person of the commonwealth.
Which considered, I define civil law in this manner. CIVIL LAW, _is to
every subject, those rules, which the commonwealth hath commanded him,
by word, writing, or other sufficient sign of the will, to make use of,
for the distinction of right, and wrong; that is to say, of what is
contrary, and what is not contrary to the rule_.
In which definition, there is nothing that is not at first sight
evident. For every man seeth, that some laws are addressed to all the
subjects in general; some to particular provinces; some to particular
vocations; and some to particular men; and are therefore laws, to every
of those to whom the command is directed, and to none else. As also,
that laws are the rules of just, and unjust; nothing being reputed
unjust, that is not contrary to some law. Likewise, that none can make
laws but the commonwealth; because our subjection is to the commonwealth
only: and that commands, are to be signified by sufficient signs;
because a man knows not otherwise how to obey them. And therefore,
whatsoever can from this definition by necessary consequence be deduced,
ought to be acknowledged for truth. Now I deduce from it this that
followeth.
[Sidenote: The sovereign is legislator.]
1. The legislator in all commonwealths, is only the sovereign, be he one
man, as in a monarchy, or one assembly of men, as in a democracy, or
aristocracy. For the legislator is he that maketh the law. And the
commonwealth only prescribes, and commandeth the observation of those
rules, which we call law: therefore the commonwealth is the legislator.
But the commonwealth is no person, nor has capacity to do anything, but
by the representative, that is, the sovereign; and therefore the
sovereign is the sole legislator. For the same reason, none can abrogate
a law made, but the sovereign; because a law is not abrogated, but by
another law, that forbiddeth it to be put in execution.
[Sidenote: And not subject to civil law.]
2. The sovereign of a commonwealth, be it an assembly, or one man, is
not subject to the civil laws. For having power to make, and repeal
laws, he may when he pleaseth, free himself from that subjection, by
repealing those laws that trouble him, and making of new; and
consequently he was free before. For he is free, that can be free when
he will: nor is it possible for any person to be bound to himself;
because he that can bind, can release; and therefore he that is bound to
himself only, is not bound.
[Sidenote: Use, a law not by virtue of time, but of the sovereign’s
consent.]
3. When long use obtaineth the authority of a law, it is not the length
of time that maketh the authority, but the will of the sovereign
signified by his silence, for silence is sometimes an argument of
consent; and it is no longer law, than the sovereign shall be silent
therein. And therefore if the sovereign shall have a question of right
grounded, not upon his present will, but upon the laws formerly made;
the length of time shall bring no prejudice to his right; but the
question shall be judged by equity. For many unjust actions, and unjust
sentences, go uncontrolled a longer time than any man can remember. And
our lawyers account no customs law, but such as are reasonable, and that
evil customs are to be abolished. But the judgment of what is
reasonable, and of what is to be abolished, belongeth to him that maketh
the law, which is the sovereign assembly, or monarch.
[Sidenote: The law of nature, and the civil law contain each other.]
4. The law of nature, and the civil law, contain each other, and are of
equal extent. For the laws of nature, which consist in equity, justice,
gratitude, and other moral virtues on these depending, in the condition
of mere nature, as I have said before in the end of the fifteenth
chapter, are not properly laws, but qualities that dispose men to peace
and obedience. When a commonwealth is once settled, then are they
actually laws, and not before; as being then the commands of the
commonwealth; and therefore also civil laws: for it is the sovereign
power that obliges men to obey them. For in the differences of private
men, to declare, what is equity, what is justice, and what is moral
virtue, and to make them binding, there is need of the ordinances of
sovereign power, and punishments to be ordained for such as shall break
them; which ordinances are therefore part of the civil law. The law of
nature therefore is a part of the civil law in all commonwealths of the
world. Reciprocally also, the civil law is a part of the dictates of
nature. For justice, that is to say, performance of covenant, and giving
to every man his own, is a dictate of the law of nature. But every
subject in a commonwealth, hath convenanted to obey the civil law;
either one with another, as when they assemble to make a common
representative, or with the representative itself one by one, when
subdued by the sword they promise obedience, that they may receive life;
and therefore obedience to the civil law is part also of the law of
nature. Civil, and natural law are not different kinds, but different
parts of law; whereof one part being written, is called civil, the other
unwritten, natural. But the right of nature, that is, the natural
liberty of man, may by the civil law be abridged, and restrained: nay,
the end of making laws, is no other, but such restraint; without the
which there cannot possibly be any peace. And law was brought into the
world for nothing else, but to limit the natural liberty of particular
men, in such manner, as they might not hurt, but assist one another, and
join together against a common enemy.
[Sidenote: Provincial laws are not made by custom, but by the sovereign
power.]
5. If the sovereign of one commonwealth, subdue a people that have lived
under other written laws, and afterwards govern them by the same laws,
by which they were governed before; yet those laws are the civil laws of
the victor, and not of the vanquished commonwealth. For the legislator
is he, not by whose authority the laws were first made, but by whose
authority they now continue to be laws. And therefore where there be
divers provinces, within the dominion of a commonwealth, and in those
provinces diversity of laws, which commonly are called the customs of
each several province, we are not to understand that such customs have
their force, only from length of time; but that they were anciently laws
written, or otherwise made known, for the constitutions, and statutes of
their sovereigns; and are now laws, not by virtue of the prescription of
time, but by the constitutions of their present sovereigns. But if an
unwritten law, in all the provinces of a dominion, shall be generally
observed, and no iniquity appear in the use thereof; that law can be no
other but a law of nature, equally obliging all mankind.
[Sidenote: Some foolish opinions of lawyers concerning the making of
laws.]
6. Seeing then all laws, written and unwritten, have their authority and
force, from the will of the commonwealth; that is to say, from the will
of the representative; which in a monarchy is the monarch, and in other
commonwealths the sovereign assembly; a man may wonder from whence
proceed such opinions, as are found in the books of lawyers of eminence
in several commonwealths, directly, or by consequence making the
legislative power depend on private men, or subordinate judges. As for
example, _that the common law, hath no controller but the parliament_;
which is true only where a parliament has the sovereign power, and
cannot be assembled, nor dissolved, but by their own discretion. For if
there be a right in any else to dissolve them, there is a right also to
control them, and consequently to control their controllings. And if
there be no such right, then the controller of laws is not
_parliamentum_, but _rex in parliamento_. And where a parliament is
sovereign, if it should assemble never so many, or so wise men, from the
countries subject to them, for whatsoever cause; yet there is no man
will believe, that such an assembly hath thereby acquired to themselves
a legislative power. _Item_, that the two arms of a commonwealth, are
_force and justice; the first whereof is in the king; the other
deposited in the hands of the parliament_. As if a commonwealth could
consist, where the force were in any hand, which justice had not the
authority to command and govern.
[Sidenote: Sir Edw. Coke upon Littleton, lib. 2, ch. 6, fol. 97, b.]
7. That law can never be against reason, our lawyers are agreed; and
that not the letter, that is every construction of it, but that which is
according to the intention of the legislator, is the law. And it is
true: but the doubt is of whose reason it is, that shall be received for
law. It is not meant of any private reason; for then there would be as
much contradiction in the laws, as there is in the Schools; nor yet, as
Sir Edward Coke makes it, an _artificial perfection of reason, gotten by
long study, observation, and experience_, as his was. For it is possible
long study may increase, and confirm erroneous sentences: and where men
build on false grounds, the more they build, the greater is the ruin:
and of those that study, and observe with equal time and diligence, the
reasons and resolutions are, and must remain discordant: and therefore
it is not that _juris prudentia_, or wisdom of subordinate judges; but
the reason of this our artificial man the commonwealth, and his command,
that maketh law: and the commonwealth being in their representative but
one person, there cannot easily arise any contradiction in the laws; and
when there doth, the same reason is able, by interpretation, or
alteration, to take it away. In all courts of justice, the sovereign,
which is the person of the commonwealth, is he that judgeth: the
subordinate judge, ought to have regard to the reason, which moved his
sovereign to make such law, that his sentence may be according
thereunto; which then is his sovereign’s sentence; otherwise it is his
own, and an unjust one.
[Sidenote: Law made, if not also made known, is no law.]
8. From this, that the law is a command, and a command consisteth in
declaration, or manifestation of the will of him that commandeth, by
voice, writing, or some other sufficient argument of the same, we may
understand, that the command of the commonwealth is law only to those,
that have means to take notice of it. Over natural fools, children, or
madmen, there is no law, no more than over brute beasts; nor are they
capable of the title of just, or unjust; because they had never power to
make any covenant, or to understand the consequences thereof; and
consequently never took upon them to authorize the actions of any
sovereign, as they must do that make to themselves a commonwealth. And
as those from whom nature or accident hath taken away the notice of all
laws in general; so also every man, from whom any accident, not
proceeding from his own default, hath taken away the means to take
notice of any particular law, is excused, if he observe it not: and to
speak properly, that law is no law to him. It is therefore necessary, to
consider in this place, what arguments, and signs be sufficient for the
knowledge of what is the law; that is to say, what is the will of the
sovereign, as well in monarchies, as in other forms of government.
[Sidenote: Unwritten laws are all of them laws of nature.]
And first, if it be a law that obliges all the subjects without
exception, and is not written, nor otherwise published in such places as
they may take notice thereof, it is a law of nature. For whatsoever men
are to take knowledge of for law, not upon other men’s words, but every
one from his own reason, must be such as is agreeable to the reason of
all men; which no law can be, but the law of nature. The laws of nature
therefore need not any publishing, nor proclamation; as being contained
in this one sentence, approved by all the world, _Do not that to
another, which thou thinkest unreasonable to be done by another to
thyself_.
Secondly, if it be a law that obliges only some condition of men, or one
particular man, and be not written, nor published by word, then also it
is a law of nature; and known by the same arguments, and signs, that
distinguish those in such a condition, from other subjects. For
whatsoever law is not written, or some way published by him that makes
it law, can be known no way, but by the reason of him that is to obey
it; and is therefore also a law not only civil, but natural. For
example, if the sovereign employ a public minister, without written
instructions what to do; he is obliged to take for instructions the
dictates of reason; as if he make a judge, the judge is to take notice,
that his sentence ought to be according to the reason of his sovereign,
which being always understood to be equity, he is bound to it by the law
of nature: or if an ambassador, he is, in all things not contained in
his written instructions, to take for instruction that which reason
dictates to be most conducing to his sovereign’s interest; and so of all
other ministers of the sovereignty, public and private. All which
instructions of natural reason may be comprehended under one name of
_fidelity_; which is a branch of natural justice.
The law of nature excepted, it belongeth to the essence of all other
laws, to be made known, to every man that shall be obliged to obey them,
either by word, or writing, or some other act, known to proceed from the
sovereign authority. For the will of another cannot be understood, but
by his own word, or act, or by conjecture taken from his scope and
purpose; which in the person of the commonwealth, is to be supposed
always consonant to equity and reason. And in ancient time, before
letters were in common use, the laws were many times put into verse;
that the rude people taking pleasure in singing, or reciting them, might
the more easily retain them in memory. And for the same reason Solomon
(_Prov._ vii. 3) adviseth a man, to bind the ten commandments upon his
ten fingers. And for the law which Moses gave to the people of Israel at
the renewing of the covenant (_Deut._ xi. 19), he biddeth them to teach
it their children, by discoursing of it both at home, and upon the way;
at going to bed, and at rising from bed; and to write it upon the posts,
and doors of their houses; and (_Deut._ xxxi. 12) to assemble the
people, man, woman, and child, to hear it read.
[Sidenote: Nothing is law where the legislator cannot be known.]
Nor is it enough the law be written, and published; but also that there
be manifest signs, that it proceedeth from the will of the sovereign.
For private men, when they have, or think they have force enough to
secure their unjust designs, and convoy them safely to their ambitious
ends, may publish for laws what they please, without, or against the
legislative authority. There is therefore requisite, not only a
declaration of the law, but also sufficient signs of the author and
authority. The author, or legislator is supposed in every commonwealth
to be evident, because he is the sovereign, who having been constituted
by the consent of every one, is supposed by every one to be sufficiently
known. And though the ignorance and security of men be such, for the
most part, as that when the memory of the first constitution of their
commonwealth is worn out, they do not consider, by whose power they used
to be defended against their enemies, and to have their industry
protected, and to be righted when injury is done them; yet because no
man that considers, can make question of it, no excuse can be derived
from the ignorance of where the sovereignty is placed. And it is a
dictate of natural reason, and consequently an evident law of nature,
that no man ought to weaken that power, the protection whereof he hath
himself demanded, or wittingly received against others. Therefore of who
is sovereign, no man, but by his own fault, (whatsoever evil men
suggest,) can make any doubt. [Sidenote: Difference between verifying &
authorizing.] The difficulty consisteth in the evidence of the authority
derived from him; the removing whereof, dependeth on the knowledge of
the public registers, public counsels, public ministers, and public
seals; by which all laws are sufficiently verified; verified, I say, not
authorized: for the verification, is but the testimony and record, not
the authority of the law; which consisteth in the command of the
sovereign only.
[Sidenote: The law verified by the subordinate judge.]
If therefore a man have a question of injury, depending on the law of
nature; that is to say, on common equity; the sentence of the judge,
that by commission hath authority to take cognizance of such causes, is
a sufficient verification of the law of nature in that individual case.
For though the advice of one that professeth the study of the law, be
useful for the avoiding of contention; yet it is but advice: it is the
judge must tell men what is law, upon the hearing of the controversy.
[Sidenote: By the public registers.]
But when the question is of injury, or crime, upon a written law; every
man by recourse to the registers, by himself or others, may, if he will,
be sufficiently informed, before he do such injury, or commit the crime,
whether it be an injury, or not: nay he ought to do so: for when a man
doubts whether the act he goeth about, be just, or unjust; and may
inform himself, if he will; the doing is unlawful. In like manner, he
that supposeth himself injured, in a case determined by the written law,
which he may, by himself or others, see and consider; if he complain
before he consults with the law, he does unjustly, and bewrayeth a
disposition rather to vex other men, than to demand his own right.
[Sidenote: By letters patent and public seal.]
If the question be of obedience to a public officer; to have seen his
commission, with the public seal, and heard it read; or to have had the
means to be informed of it, if a man would, is a sufficient verification
of his authority. For every man is obliged to do his best endeavour, to
inform himself of all written laws, that may concern his own future
actions.
[Sidenote: The interpretation of the law dependeth on the sovereign
power.]
The legislator known; and the laws, either by writing, or by the light
of nature, sufficiently published; there wanteth yet another very
material circumstance to make them obligatory. For it is not the letter,
but the intendment, or meaning, that is to say, the authentic
interpretation of the law (which is the sense of the legislator), in
which the nature of the law consisteth; and therefore the interpretation
of all laws dependeth on the authority sovereign; and the interpreters
can be none but those, which the sovereign, to whom only the subject
oweth obedience, shall appoint. For else, by the craft of an
interpreter, the law may be made to bear a sense, contrary to that of
the sovereign: by which means the interpreter becomes the legislator.
[Sidenote: All laws need interpretation.]
All laws, written, and unwritten, have need of interpretation. The
unwritten law of nature, though it be easy to such, as without
partiality and passion, make use of their natural reason, and therefore
leaves the violators thereof without excuse; yet considering there be
very few, perhaps none, that in some cases are not blinded by self-love,
or some other passion; it is now become of all laws the most obscure,
and has consequently the greatest need of able interpreters. The written
laws, if they be short, are easily misinterpreted, from the divers
significations of a word, or two: if long, they be more obscure by the
divers significations of many words: insomuch as no written law,
delivered in few, or many words, can be well understood, without a
perfect understanding of the final causes, for which the law was made;
the knowledge of which final causes is in the legislator. To him
therefore there cannot be any knot in the law, insoluble; either by
finding out the ends, to undo it by; or else by making what ends he
will, as Alexander did with his sword in the Gordian knot, by the
legislative power; which no other interpreter can do.
[Sidenote: The authentical interpretation of law is not that of
writers.]
The interpretation of the laws of nature, in a commonwealth, dependeth
not on the books of moral philosophy. The authority of writers, without
the authority of the commonwealth, maketh not their opinions law, be
they never so true. That which I have written in this treatise,
concerning the moral virtues, and of their necessity for the procuring,
and maintaining peace, though it be evident truth, is not therefore
presently law; but because in all commonwealths in the world, it is part
of the civil law. For though it be naturally reasonable; yet it is by
the sovereign power that it is law: otherwise, it were a great error, to
call the laws of nature unwritten law; whereof we see so many volumes
published, and in them so many contradictions of one another, and of
themselves.
[Sidenote: The interpreter of the law is the judge giving sentence viva
voce in every particular case.]
The interpretation of the law of nature, is the sentence of the judge
constituted by the sovereign authority, to hear and determine such
controversies, as depend thereon; and consisteth in the application of
the law to the present case. For in the act of judicature, the judge
doth no more but consider, whether the demand of the party, be consonant
to natural reason, and equity; and the sentence he giveth, is therefore
the interpretation of the law of nature; which interpretation is
authentic; not because it is his private sentence; but because he giveth
it by authority of the sovereign, whereby it becomes the sovereign’s
sentence; which is law for that time, to the parties pleading.
[Sidenote: The sentence of a judge does not bind him, or another judge
to give like sentence in like cases ever after.]
But because there is no judge subordinate, nor sovereign, but may err in
a judgment of equity; if afterward in another like case he find it more
consonant to equity to give a contrary sentence, he is obliged to do it.
No man’s error becomes his own law; nor obliges him to persist in it.
Neither, for the same reason, becomes it a law to other judges, though
sworn to follow it. For though a wrong sentence given by authority of
the sovereign, if he know and allow it, in such laws as are mutable, be
a constitution of a new law, in cases, in which every little
circumstance is the same; yet in laws immutable, such as are the laws of
nature, they are no laws to the same or other judges, in the like cases
for ever after. Princes succeed one another; and one judge passeth,
another cometh; nay, heaven and earth shall pass; but not one tittle of
the law of nature shall pass; for it is the eternal law of God.
Therefore all the sentences of precedent judges that have ever been,
cannot altogether make a law contrary to natural equity: nor any
examples of former judges, can warrant an unreasonable sentence, or
discharge the present judge of the trouble of studying what is equity,
in the case he is to judge, from the principles of his own natural
reason. For example sake, it is against the law of nature, _to punish
the innocent_; and innocent is he that acquitteth himself judicially,
and is acknowledged for innocent by the judge. Put the case now, that a
man is accused of a capital crime, and seeing the power and malice of
some enemy, and the frequent corruption and partiality of judges,
runneth away for fear of the event, and afterwards is taken, and brought
to a legal trial, and maketh it sufficiently appear, he was not guilty
of the crime, and being thereof acquitted, is nevertheless condemned to
lose his goods; this is a manifest condemnation of the innocent. I say
therefore, that there is no place in the world, where this can be an
interpretation of a law of nature, or be made a law by the sentences of
precedent judges, that had done the same. For he that judged it first,
judged unjustly; and no injustice can be a pattern of judgment to
succeeding judges. A written law may forbid innocent men to fly, and
they may be punished for flying: but that flying for fear of injury,
should be taken for presumption of guilt, after a man is already
absolved of the crime judicially, is contrary to the nature of a
presumption, which hath no place after judgment given. Yet this is set
down by a great lawyer for the common law of England. _If a man_, saith
he, _that is innocent, be accused of felony, and for fear flyeth for the
same; albeit he judicially acquitteth himself of the felony; yet if it
be found that he fled for the felony, he shall notwithstanding his
innocency, forfeit all his goods, chattels, debts, and duties. For as to
the forfeiture of them, the law will admit no proof against the
presumption in law, grounded upon his flight._ Here you see, _an
innocent man judicially acquitted, notwithstanding his innocency_, when
no written law forbad him to fly, after his acquittal, _upon a
presumption in law_, condemned to lose all the goods he hath. If the law
ground upon his flight a presumption of the fact, which was capital, the
sentence ought to have been capital: if the presumption were not of the
fact, for what then ought he to lose his goods? This therefore is no law
of England; nor is the condemnation grounded upon a presumption of law,
but upon the presumption of the judges. It is also against law, to say
that no proof shall be admitted against a presumption of law. For all
judges, sovereign and subordinate, if they refuse to hear proof, refuse
to do justice: for though the sentence be just, yet the judges that
condemn without hearing the proofs offered, are unjust judges; and their
presumption is but prejudice; which no man ought to bring with him to
the seat of justice, whatsoever precedent judgments, or examples he
shall pretend to follow. There be other things of this nature, wherein
men’s judgments have been perverted, by trusting to precedents: but this
is enough to show, that though the sentence of the judge, be a law to
the party pleading, yet it is no law to any judge, that shall succeed
him in that office.
In like manner, when question is of the meaning of written laws, he is
not the interpreter of them, that writeth a commentary upon them. For
commentaries are commonly more subject to cavil, than the text; and
therefore need other commentaries; and so there will be no end of such
interpretation. And therefore unless there be an interpreter authorized
by the sovereign, from which the subordinate judges are not to recede,
the interpreter can be no other than the ordinary judges, in the same
manner, as they are in cases of the unwritten law; and their sentences
are to be taken by them that plead, for laws in that particular case;
but not to bind other judges, in like cases to give like judgments. For
a judge may err in the interpretation even of written laws; but no error
of a subordinate judge, can change the law, which is the general
sentence of the sovereign.
[Sidenote: The difference between the letter and sentence of the law.]
In written laws, men use to make a difference between the letter, and
the sentence of the law: and when by the letter, is meant whatsoever can
be gathered from the bare words, it is well distinguished. For the
significations of almost all words, are either in themselves, or in the
metaphorical use of them, ambiguous; and may be drawn in argument, to
make many senses; but there is only one sense of the law. But if by the
letter, be meant the literal sense, then the letter, and the sentence or
intention of the law, is all one. For the literal sense is that, which
the legislator intended, should by the letter of the law be signified.
Now the intention of the legislator is always supposed to be equity: for
it were a great contumely for a judge to think otherwise of the
sovereign. He ought therefore, if the word of the law do not fully
authorize a reasonable sentence, to supply it with the law of nature; or
if the case be difficult, to respite judgment till he have received more
ample authority. For example, a written law ordaineth, that he which is
thrust out of his house by force, shall be restored by force: it happens
that a man by negligence leaves his house empty, and returning is kept
out by force, in which case there is no special law ordained. It is
evident that this case is contained in the same law: for else there is
no remedy for him at all; which is to be supposed against the intention
of the legislator. Again, the word of the law commandeth to judge
according to the evidence: a man is accused falsely of a fact, which the
judge himself saw done by another, and not by him that is accused. In
this case neither shall the letter of the law be followed to the
condemnation of the innocent, nor shall the judge give sentence against
the evidence of the witnesses; because the letter of the law is to the
contrary: but procure of the sovereign that another be made judge, and
himself witness. So that the incommodity that follows the bare words of
a written law, may lead him to the intention of the law, whereby to
interpret the same the better; though no incommodity can warrant a
sentence against the law. For every judge of right, and wrong, is not
judge of what is commodious, or incommodious to the commonwealth.
[Sidenote: The abilities required in a judge.]
The abilities required in a good interpreter of the law, that is to say,
in a good judge, are not the same with those of an advocate; namely the
study of the laws. For a judge, as he ought to take notice of the fact,
from none but the witnesses; so also he ought to take notice of the law
from nothing but the statutes, and constitutions of the sovereign,
alleged in the pleading, or declared to him by some that have authority
from the sovereign power to declare them; and need not take care
beforehand, what he shall judge; for it shall be given him what he shall
say concerning the fact, by witnesses; and what he shall say in point of
law, from those that shall in their pleadings show it, and by authority
interpret it upon the place. The Lords of parliament in England were
judges, and most difficult causes have been heard and determined by
them; yet few of them were much versed in the study of the laws, and
fewer had made profession of them: and though they consulted with
lawyers, that were appointed to be present there for that purpose; yet
they alone had the authority of giving sentence. In like manner, in the
ordinary trials of right, twelve men of the common people, are the
judges, and give sentence, not only of the fact, but of the right; and
pronounce simply for the complainant, or for the defendant; that is to
say, are judges, not only of the fact, but also of the right: and in a
question of crime, not only determine whether done, or not done; but
also whether it be _murder_, _homicide_, _felony_, _assault_, and the
like, which are determinations of law: but because they are not supposed
to know the law of themselves, there is one that hath authority to
inform them of it, in the particular case they are to judge of. But yet
if they judge not according to that he tells them, they are not subject
thereby to any penalty; unless it be made appear, that they did it
against their consciences, or had been corrupted by reward.
The things that make a good judge, or good interpreter of the laws, are,
first, _a right understanding_ of that principal law of nature called
_equity_; which depending not on the reading of other men’s writings,
but on the goodness of a man’s own natural reason, and meditation, is
presumed to be in those most, that have had most leisure, and had the
most inclination to meditate thereon. Secondly, _contempt of unnecessary
riches, and preferments_. Thirdly, _to be able in judgment to divest
himself of all fear, anger, hatred, love, and compassion_. Fourthly, and
lastly, _patience to hear; diligent attention in hearing; and memory to
retain, digest and apply what he hath heard_.
[Sidenote: Divisions of law.]
The difference and division of the laws, has been made in divers
manners, according to the different methods, of those men that have
written of them. For it is a thing that dependeth not on nature, but on
the scope of the writer; and is subservient to every man’s proper
method. In the Institutions of Justinian, we find seven sorts of civil
laws:
1. The _edicts_, _constitutions_, and _epistles of the prince_, that is,
of the emperor; because the whole power of the people was in him. Like
these, are the proclamations of the kings of England.
2. _The decrees of the whole people of Rome_, comprehending the senate,
when they were put to the question by the _senate_. These were laws, at
first, by the virtue of the sovereign power residing in the people; and
such of them as by the emperors were not abrogated, remained laws, by
the authority imperial. For all laws that bind, are understood to be
laws by his authority that has power to repeal them. Somewhat like to
these laws, are the acts of parliament in England.
3. _The decrees of the common people_, excluding the senate, when they
were put to the question by the _tribune_ of the people. For such of
them as were not abrogated by the emperors, remained laws by the
authority imperial. Like to these, were the orders of the House of
Commons in England.
4. _Senatus consulta_, the _orders of the senate_; because when the
people of Rome grew so numerous, as it was inconvenient to assemble
them; it was thought fit by the emperor, that men should consult the
senate, instead of the people; and these have some resemblance with the
acts of council.
5. _The edicts of prætors_, and in some cases of _ædiles_: such as are
the chief justices in the courts of England.
6. _Responsa prudentum_; which were the sentences, and opinion of those
lawyers, to whom the emperor gave authority to interpret the law, and to
give answer to such as in matter of law demanded their advice; which
answers, the judges in giving judgment were obliged by the constitutions
of the emperor to observe: and should be like the reports of cases
judged, if other judges be by the law of England bound to observe them.
For the judges of the common law of England, are not properly judges,
but _juris consulti_; of whom the judges, who are either the lords, or
twelve men of the country, are in point of law to ask advice.
7. Also, _unwritten customs_, which in their own nature are an imitation
of law, by the tacit consent of the emperor, in case they be not
contrary to the law of nature, are very laws.
[Sidenote: Another division of law.]
Another division of laws, is into _natural_ and _positive_. _Natural_
are those which have been laws from all eternity; and are called not
only _natural_, but also _moral_ laws; consisting in the moral virtues,
as justice, equity, and all habits of the mind that conduce to peace,
and charity; of which I have already spoken in the fourteenth and
fifteenth chapters.
_Positive_, are those which have not been from eternity; but have been
made laws by the will of those that have had the sovereign power over
others; and are either written, or made known to men, by some other
argument of the will of their legislator.
Again, of positive laws some are _human_, some _divine_; and of human
positive laws, some are _distributive_, some _penal_. _Distributive_ are
those that determine the rights of the subjects, declaring to every man
what it is, by which he acquireth and holdeth a propriety in lands, or
goods, and a right or liberty of action: and these speak to all the
subjects. _Penal_ are those, which declare, what penalty shall be
inflicted on those that violate the law; and speak to the ministers and
officers ordained for execution. For though every one ought to be
informed of the punishments ordained beforehand for their transgression;
nevertheless the command is not addressed to the delinquent, who cannot
be supposed will faithfully punish himself, but to public ministers
appointed to see the penalty executed. And these penal laws are for the
most part written together with the laws distributive; and are sometimes
called judgments. For all laws are general judgments, or sentences of
the legislator; as also every particular judgment, is a law to him,
whose case is judged.
[Sidenote: Divine positive law how made known to be law.]
_Divine positive laws_ (for natural laws being eternal, and universal,
are all divine), are those, which being the commandments of God, not
from all eternity, nor universally addressed to all men, but only to a
certain people, or to certain persons, are declared for such, by those
whom God hath authorized to declare them. But this authority of man to
declare what be these positive laws of God, how can it be known? God may
command a man by a supernatural way, to deliver laws to other men. But
because it is of the essence of law, that he who is to be obliged, be
assured of the authority of him that declareth it, which we cannot
naturally take notice to be from God, _how can a man without
supernatural revelation be assured of the revelation received by the
declarer?_ and _how can he be bound to obey them?_ For the first
question, how a man can be assured of the revelation of another, without
a revelation particularly to himself, it is evidently impossible. For
though a man may be induced to believe such revelation, from the
miracles they see him do, or from seeing the extraordinary sanctity of
his life, or from seeing the extraordinary wisdom, or extraordinary
felicity of his actions, all which are marks of God’s extraordinary
favour; yet they are not assured evidences of special revelation.
Miracles are marvellous works: but that which is marvellous to one, may
not be so to another. Sanctity may be feigned; and the visible
felicities of this world, are most often the work of God by natural, and
ordinary causes. And therefore no man can infallibly know by natural
reason, that another has had a supernatural revelation of God’s will;
but only a belief; every one, as the signs thereof shall appear greater
or lesser, a firmer or a weaker belief.
But for the second, how can he be bound to obey them; it is not so hard.
For if the law declared, be not against the law of nature, which is
undoubtedly God’s law, and he undertake to obey it, he is bound by his
own act; bound I say to obey it, but not bound to believe it: for men’s
belief, and interior cogitations, are not subject to the commands, but
only to the operation of God, ordinary, or extraordinary. Faith of
supernatural law, is not a fulfilling, but only an assenting to the
same; and not a duty that we exhibit to God, but a gift which God freely
giveth to whom he pleaseth; as also unbelief is not a breach of any of
his laws; but a rejection of them all, except the laws natural. But this
that I say, will be made yet clearer, by the examples and testimonies
concerning this point in holy Scripture. The covenant God made with
Abraham, in a supernatural manner, was thus, (_Gen._ xvii. 10) _This is
the covenant which thou shalt observe between me and thee and thy seed
after thee_. Abraham’s seed had not this revelation, nor were yet in
being; yet they are a party to the covenant, and bound to obey what
Abraham should declare to them for God’s law; which they could not be,
but in virtue of the obedience they owed to their parents; who, if they
be subject to no other earthly power, as here in the case of Abraham,
have sovereign power over their children and servants. Again, where God
saith to Abraham, _In thee shall all nations of the earth be blessed;
for I know thou wilt command thy children, and thy house after thee to
keep the way of the Lord, and to observe righteousness and judgment_, it
is manifest, the obedience of his family, who had no revelation,
depended on their former obligation to obey their sovereign. At Mount
Sinai Moses only went up to God; the people were forbidden to approach
on pain of death; yet they were bound to obey all that Moses declared to
them for God’s law. Upon what ground, but on this submission of their
own, _Speak thou to us, and we will hear thee; but let not God speak to
us, lest we die_? By which two places it sufficiently appeareth, that in
a commonwealth, a subject that has no certain and assured revelation
particularly to himself concerning the will of God, is to obey for such,
the command of the commonwealth: for if men were at liberty, to take for
God’s commandments, their own dreams and fancies, or the dreams and
fancies of private men; scarce two men would agree upon what is God’s
commandment; and yet in respect of them, every man would despise the
commandments of the commonwealth. I conclude therefore, that in all
things not contrary to the moral law, that is to say, to the law of
nature, all subjects are bound to obey that for divine law, which is
declared to be so, by the laws of the commonwealth. Which also is
evident to any man’s reason; for whatsoever is not against the law of
nature, may be made law in the name of them that have the sovereign
power; and there is no reason men should be the less obliged by it, when
it is propounded in the name of God. Besides, there is no place in the
world where men are permitted to pretend other commandments of God, than
are declared for such by the commonwealth. Christian states punish those
that revolt from the Christian religion, and all other states, those
that set up any religion by them forbidden. For in whatsoever is not
regulated by the commonwealth, it is equity, which is the law of nature,
and therefore an eternal law of God, that every man equally enjoy his
liberty.
[Sidenote: Another division of laws.]
There is also another distinction of laws, into _fundamental_ and _not
fundamental_; but I could never see in any author, what a fundamental
law signifieth. Nevertheless one may very reasonably distinguish laws in
that manner.
[Sidenote: A fundamental law, what.]
For a fundamental law in every commonwealth is that, which being taken
away, the commonwealth faileth, and is utterly dissolved; as a building
whose foundation is destroyed. And therefore a fundamental law is that,
by which subjects are bound to uphold whatsoever power is given to the
sovereign, whether a monarch, or a sovereign assembly, without which the
commonwealth cannot stand; such as is the power of war and peace, of
judicature, of election of officers, and of doing whatsoever he shall
think necessary for the public good. Not fundamental is that, the
abrogating whereof, draweth not with it the dissolution of the
commonwealth; such as are the laws concerning controversies between
subject and subject. Thus much of the division of laws.
[Sidenote: Difference between law and right.]
I find the words _lex civilis_, and _jus civile_, that is to say _law_
and _right civil_, promiscuously used for the same thing, even in the
most learned authors; which nevertheless ought not to be so. For _right_
is _liberty_, namely that liberty which the civil law leaves us: but
_civil law_ is an _obligation_, and takes from us the liberty which the
law of nature gave us. Nature gave a right to every man to secure
himself by his own strength, and to invade a suspected neighbour, by way
of prevention: but the civil law takes away that liberty, in all cases
where the protection of the law may be safely stayed for. Insomuch as
_lex_ and _jus_, are as different as _obligation_ and _liberty_.
[Sidenote: And between a law and a charter.]
Likewise _laws_ and _charters_ are taken promiscuously for the same
thing. Yet charters are donations of the sovereign; and not laws, but
exemptions from law. The phrase of a law is, _jubeo_, _injungo_, _I
command_ and _enjoin_: the phrase of a charter is, _dedi_, _concessi_,
_I have given_, _I have granted_: but what is given or granted, to a
man, is not forced upon him, by a law. A law may be made to bind all the
subjects of a commonwealth: a liberty, or charter is only to one man, or
some one part of the people. For to say all the people of a
commonwealth, have liberty in any case whatsoever, is to say, that in
such case, there hath been no law made; or else having been made, is now
abrogated.
-------
CHAPTER XXVII.
OF CRIMES, EXCUSES, AND EXTENUATIONS.
[Sidenote: Sin, what.]
A SIN, is not only a transgression of a law, but also any contempt of
the legislator. For such contempt, is a breach of all his laws at once.
And therefore may consist, not only in the _commission_ of a fact, or in
speaking of words by the laws forbidden, or in the _omission_ of what
the law commandeth, but also in the _intention_, or purpose to
transgress. For the purpose to break the law, is some degree of contempt
of him, to whom it belongeth to see it executed. To be delighted in the
imagination only, of being possessed of another man’s goods, servants,
or wife, without any intention to take them from him by force or fraud,
is no breach of the law, that saith, _Thou shalt not covet_: nor is the
pleasure a man may have in imagining or dreaming of the death of him,
from whose life he expecteth nothing but damage, and displeasure, a sin;
but the resolving to put some act in execution, that tendeth thereto.
For to be pleased in the fiction of that, which would please a man if it
were real, is a passion so adherent to the nature both of man, and every
other living creature, as to make it a sin, were to make sin of being a
man. The consideration of this, has made me think them too severe, both
to themselves, and others, that maintain, that the first motions of the
mind, though checked with the fear of God, be sins. But I confess it is
safer to err on that hand, than on the other.
[Sidenote: A crime, what.]
A CRIME, is a sin, consisting in the committing, by deed or word, of
that which the law forbiddeth, or the omission of what it hath
commanded. So that every crime is a sin; but not every sin a crime. To
intend to steal, or kill, is a sin, though it never appear in word, or
fact: for God that seeth the thoughts of man, can lay it to his charge:
but till it appear by something done, or said, by which the intention
may be argued by a human judge, it hath not the name of crime: which
distinction the Greeks observed, in the word ἁμάρτημα, and ἔγκλημα, or
ἀιτία; whereof the former, which is translated _sin_, signifieth any
swerving from the law whatsoever; but the two latter, which are
translated _crime_, signify that sin only, whereof one man may accuse
another. But of intentions, which never appear by any outward act, there
is no place for human accusation. In like manner the Latins by
_peccatum_, which is _sin_, signify all manner of deviation from the
law; but by _crimen_, which word they derive from _cerno_, which
signifies _to perceive_, they mean only such sins, as may be made appear
before a judge; and therefore are not mere intentions.
[Sidenote: Where no civil law is, there is no crime.]
From this relation of sin to the law, and of crime to the civil law, may
be inferred, first, that where law ceaseth, sin ceaseth. But because the
law of nature is eternal, violation of covenants, ingratitude,
arrogance, and all facts contrary to any moral virtue, can never cease
to be sin. Secondly, that the civil law ceasing, crimes cease: for there
being no other law remaining, but that of nature, there is no place for
accusation; every man being his own judge, and accused only by his own
conscience, and cleared by the uprightness of his own intention. When
therefore his intention is right, his fact is no sin: if otherwise, his
fact is sin; but not crime. Thirdly, that when the sovereign power
ceaseth, crime also ceaseth; for where there is no such power, there is
no protection to be had from the law; and therefore every one may
protect himself by his own power: for no man in the institution of
sovereign power can be supposed to give away the right of preserving his
own body; for the safety whereof all sovereignty was ordained. But this
is to be understood only of those, that have not themselves contributed
to the taking away of the power that protected them; for that was a
crime from the beginning.
[Sidenote: Ignorance of the law of nature excuseth no man.]
The source of every crime, is some defect of the understanding; or some
error in reasoning; or some sudden force of the passions. Defect in the
understanding, is _ignorance_; in reasoning, _erroneous opinion_. Again,
ignorance is of three sorts; of the _law_, and of the _sovereign_, and
of the _penalty_. Ignorance of the law of nature excuseth no man;
because every man that hath attained to the use of reason, is supposed
to know, he ought not to do to another, what he would not have done to
himself. Therefore into what place soever a man shall come, if he do
anything contrary to that law, it is a crime. If a man come from the
Indies hither, and persuade men here to receive a new religion, or teach
them anything that tendeth to disobedience of the laws of this country,
though he be never so well persuaded of the truth of what he teacheth,
he commits a crime, and may be justly punished for the same, not only
because his doctrine is false, but also because he does that which he
would not approve in another, namely, that coming from hence, he should
endeavour to alter the religion there. But ignorance of the civil law,
shall excuse a man in a strange country, till it be declared to him;
because, till then no civil law is binding.
[Sidenote: Ignorance of the civil law excuseth sometimes.]
In the like manner, if the civil law of a man’s own country, be not so
sufficiently declared, as he may know it if he will; nor the action
against the law of nature; the ignorance is a good excuse: in other
cases ignorance of the civil law, excuseth not.
[Sidenote: Ignorance of the sovereign excuseth not.]
Ignorance of the sovereign power, in the place of a man’s ordinary
residence, excuseth him not; because he ought to take notice of the
power, by which he hath been protected there.
[Sidenote: Ignorance of the penalty excuseth not.]
Ignorance of the penalty, where the law is declared, excuseth no man:
for in breaking the law, which without a fear of penalty to follow, were
not a law, but vain words, he undergoeth the penalty, though he know not
what it is; because, whosoever voluntarily doth any action, accepteth
all the known consequences of it; but punishment is a known consequence
of the violation of the laws, in every commonwealth; which punishment,
if it be determined already by the law, he is subject to that; if not,
then he is subject to arbitrary punishment. For it is reason, that he
which does injury, without other limitation than that of his own will,
should suffer punishment without other limitation, than that of his will
whose law is thereby violated.
[Sidenote: Punishments declared before the fact, excuse from greater
punishments after it.]
But when a penalty, is either annexed to the crime in the law itself, or
hath been usually inflicted in the like cases; there the delinquent is
excused from a greater penalty. For the punishment foreknown, if not
great enough to deter men from the action, is an invitement to it:
because when men compare the benefit of their injustice, with the harm
of their punishment, by necessity of nature they chuse that which
appeareth best for themselves: and therefore when they are punished more
than the law had formerly determined, or more than others were punished
for the same crime; it is the law that tempted, and deceiveth them.
[Sidenote: Nothing can be made a crime by a law made after the fact.]
No law, made after a fact done, can make it a crime: because if the fact
be against the law of nature, the law was before the fact; and a
positive law cannot be taken notice of, before it be made; and therefore
cannot be obligatory. But when the law that forbiddeth a fact, is made
before the fact be done; yet he that doth the fact, is liable to the
penalty ordained after, in case no lesser penalty were made known
before, neither by writing, nor by example, for the reason immediately
before alleged.
[Sidenote: False principles of right & wrong causes of crime.]
From defect in reasoning, that is to say, from error, men are prone to
violate the laws, three ways. First, by presumption of false principles:
as when men, from having observed how in all places, and in all ages,
unjust actions have been authorized, by the force, and victories of
those who have committed them; and that potent men, breaking through the
cobweb laws of their country, the weaker sort, and those that have
failed in their enterprises, have been esteemed the only criminals; have
thereupon taken for principles, and grounds of their reasoning, _that
justice is but a vain word_: _that whatsoever a man can get by his own
industry, and hazard, is his own_: _that the practice of all nations
cannot be unjust_: _that examples of former times are good arguments of
doing the like again_; and many more of that kind: which being granted,
no act in itself can be a crime, but must be made so, not by the law,
but by the success of them that commit it; and the same fact be
virtuous, or vicious, as fortune pleaseth; so that what Marius makes a
crime, Sylla shall make meritorious, and Cæsar, the same laws standing,
turn again into a crime, to the perpetual disturbance of the peace of
the commonwealth.
[Sidenote: False teachers mis-interpreting the law of nature.]
Secondly, by false teachers, that either misinterpret the law of nature,
making it thereby repugnant to the law civil; or by teaching for laws,
such doctrines of their own, or traditions of former times, as are
inconsistent with the duty of a subject.
[Sidenote: And false inferences from true principles, by teachers.]
Thirdly, by erroneous inferences from true principles; which happens
commonly to men that are hasty, and precipitate in concluding, and
resolving what to do; such as are they, that have both a great opinion
of their own understanding, and believe that things of this nature
require not time and study, but only common experience, and a good
natural wit; whereof no man thinks himself unprovided: whereas the
knowledge, of right and wrong, which is no less difficult, there is no
man will pretend to, without great and long study. And of those defects
in reasoning, there is none that can excuse, though some of them may
extenuate, a crime in any man, that pretendeth to the administration of
his own private business; much less in them that undertake a public
charge; because they pretend to the reason, upon the want whereof they
would ground their excuse.
[Sidenote: By their passions.]
Of the passions that most frequently are the causes of crime, one, is
vain glory, or a foolish overrating of their own worth; as if difference
of worth, were an effect of their wit, or riches, or blood, or some
other natural quality, not depending on the will of those that have the
sovereign authority. From whence proceedeth a presumption that the
punishments ordained by the laws, and extended generally to all
subjects, ought not to be inflicted on them, with the same rigour they
are inflicted on poor, obscure, and simple men, comprehended under the
name of the _vulgar_.
[Sidenote: Presumption of riches,]
Therefore it happeneth commonly, that such as value themselves by the
greatness of their wealth, adventure on crimes, upon hope of escaping
punishment, by corrupting public justice, or obtaining pardon by money,
or other rewards.
[Sidenote: And friends.]
And that such as have multitude of potent kindred; and popular men, that
have gained reputation amongst the multitude, take courage to violate
the laws, from a hope of oppressing the power, to whom it belongeth to
put them in execution.
[Sidenote: Wisdom.]
And that such as have a great, and false opinion of their own wisdom,
take upon them to reprehend the actions, and call in question the
authority of them that govern, and so to unsettle the laws with their
public discourse, as that nothing shall be a crime, but what their own
designs require should be so. It happeneth also to the same men, to be
prone to all such crimes, as consist in craft, and in deceiving of their
neighbours; because they think their designs are too subtle to be
perceived. These I say are effects of a false presumption of their own
wisdom. For of them that are the first movers in the disturbance of
commonwealth, which can never happen without a civil war, very few are
left alive long enough, to see their new designs established: so that
the benefit of their crimes redoundeth to posterity, and such as would
least have wished it: which argues they were not so wise, as they
thought they were. And those that deceive upon hope of not being
observed, do commonly deceive themselves, the darkness in which they
believe they lie hidden, being nothing else but their own blindness; and
are no wiser than children, that think all hid, by hiding their own
eyes.
And generally all vain-glorious men, unless they be withal timorous, are
subject to anger; as being more prone than others to interpret for
contempt, the ordinary liberty of conversation: and there are few crimes
that may not be produced by anger.
[Sidenote: Hatred, lust, ambition, covetousness, causes of crime]
As for the passions, of hate, lust, ambition, and covetousness, what
crimes they are apt to produce, is so obvious to every man’s experience
and understanding, as there needeth nothing to be said of them, saving
that they are infirmities, so annexed to the nature, both of man, and
all other living creatures, as that their effects cannot be hindered,
but by extraordinary use of reason, or a constant severity in punishing
them. For in those things men hate, they find a continual, and
unavoidable molestation; whereby either a man’s patience must be
everlasting, or he must be eased by removing the power of that which
molesteth him. The former is difficult; the latter is many times
impossible, without some violation of the law. Ambition, and
covetousness are passions also that are perpetually incumbent, and
pressing; whereas reason is not perpetually present, to resist them: and
therefore whensoever the hope of impunity appears, their effects
proceed. And for lust, what it wants in the lasting, it hath in the
vehemence, which sufficeth to weigh down the apprehension of all easy,
or uncertain punishments.
[Sidenote: Fear sometimes cause of crime, as when the danger is neither
present nor corporeal.]
Of all passions, that which inclineth men least to break the laws, is
fear. Nay, excepting some generous natures, it is the only thing, when
there is apparence of profit or pleasure by breaking the laws, that
makes men keep them. And yet in many cases a crime may be committed
through fear.
For not every fear justifies the action it produceth, but the fear only
of corporeal hurt, which we call _bodily fear_, and from which a man
cannot see how to be delivered, but by the action. A man is assaulted,
fears present death, from which he sees not how to escape, but by
wounding him that assaulteth him: if he wound him to death, this is no
crime; because no man is supposed at the making of a commonwealth, to
have abandoned the defence of his life, or limbs, where the law cannot
arrive time enough to his assistance. But to kill a man, because from
his actions, or his threatenings, I may argue he will kill me when he
can, seeing I have time, and means to demand protection, from the
sovereign power, is a crime. Again, a man receives words of disgrace or
some little injuries, for which they that made the laws, had assigned no
punishment, nor thought it worthy of a man that hath the use of reason,
to take notice of, and is afraid, unless he revenge it, he shall fall
into contempt, and consequently be obnoxious to the like injuries from
others; and to avoid this, breaks the law, and protects himself for the
future, by the terror of his private revenge. This is a crime: for the
hurt is not corporeal, but phantastical, and, though in this corner of
the world, made sensible by a custom not many years since begun, amongst
young and vain men, so light, as a gallant man, and one that is assured
of his own courage, cannot take notice of. Also a man may stand in fear
of spirits, either through his own superstition, or through too much
credit given to other men, that tell him of strange dreams and visions;
and thereby be made believe they will hurt him, for doing, or omitting
divers things, which nevertheless, to do, or omit, is contrary to the
laws; and that which is so done, or omitted, is not to be excused by
this fear; but is a crime. For, as I have shown before in the second
chapter, dreams be naturally but the fancies remaining in sleep, after
the impressions our senses had formerly received waking; and when men
are by any accident unassured they have slept, seem to be real visions;
and therefore he that presumes to break the law upon his own, or
another’s dream, or pretended vision, or upon other fancy of the power
of invisible spirits, than is permitted by the commonwealth, leaveth the
law of nature, which is a certain offence, and followeth the imagery of
his own, or another private man’s brain, which he can never know whether
it signifieth any thing or nothing, nor whether he that tells his dream,
say true, or lie; which if every private man should have leave to do, as
they must by the law of nature, if any one have it, there could no law
be made to hold, and so all commonwealth would be dissolved.
[Sidenote: Crimes not equal.]
From these different sources of crimes, it appears already, that all
crimes are not, as the Stoics of old time maintained, of the same allay.
There is place, not only for EXCUSE, by which that which seemed a crime,
is proved to be none at all; but also for EXTENUATION, by which the
crime, that seemed great, is made less. For though all crimes do equally
deserve the name of injustice, as all deviation from a straight line is
equally crookedness, which the Stoics rightly observed: yet it does not
follow that all crimes are equally unjust, no more than that all crooked
lines are equally crooked; which the Stoics not observing, held it as
great a crime, to kill a hen, against the law, as to kill one’s father.
[Sidenote: Total excuses.]
That which totally excuseth a fact, and takes away from it the nature of
a crime, can be none but that, which at the same time, taketh away the
obligation of the law. For the fact committed once against the law, if
he that committed it be obliged to the law, can be no other than a
crime.
The want of means to know the law, totally excuseth. For the law whereof
a man has no means to inform himself, is not obligatory. But the want of
diligence to inquire, shall not be considered as a want of means; nor
shall any man, that pretendeth to reason enough for the government of
his own affairs, be supposed to want means to know the laws of nature;
because they are known by the reason he pretends to: only children, and
madmen are excused from offences against the law natural.
Where a man is captive, or in the power of the enemy (and he is then in
the power of the enemy, when his person, or his means of living, is so),
if it be without his own fault, the obligation of the law ceaseth;
because he must obey the enemy, or die; and consequently such obedience
is no crime: for no man is obliged, when the protection of the law
faileth, not to protect himself, by the best means he can.
If a man, by the terror of present death, be compelled to do a fact
against the law, he is totally excused; because no law can oblige a man
to abandon his own preservation. And supposing such a law were
obligatory; yet a man would reason thus, _If I do it not, I die
presently; if I do it, I die afterwards; therefore by doing it, there is
time of life gained_; nature therefore compels him to the fact.
When a man is destitute of food, or other thing necessary for his life,
and cannot preserve himself any other way, but by some fact against the
law; as if in a great famine he take the food by force, or stealth,
which he cannot obtain for money nor charity; or in defence of his life,
snatch away another man’s sword; he is totally excused, for the reason
next before alleged.
[Sidenote: Excuses against the author.]
Again, facts done against the law by the authority of another, are by
that authority excused against the author; because no man ought to
accuse his own fact in another, that is but his instrument: but it is
not excused against a third person thereby injured; because in the
violation of the law, both the author and actor are criminals. From
hence it followeth that when that man, or assembly, that hath the
sovereign power, commandeth a man to do that which is contrary to a
former law, the doing of it is totally excused: for he ought not to
condemn it himself, because he is the author; and what cannot justly be
condemned by the sovereign, cannot justly be punished by any other.
Besides, when the sovereign commandeth anything to be done against his
own former law, the command, as to that particular fact, is an
abrogation of the law.
If that man, or assembly, that hath the sovereign power, disclaim any
right essential to the sovereignty, whereby there accrueth to the
subject, any liberty inconsistent with the sovereign power, that is to
say, with the very being of a commonwealth, if the subject shall refuse
to obey the command in anything contrary to the liberty granted, this is
nevertheless a sin, and contrary to the duty of the subject: for he
ought to take notice of what is inconsistent with the sovereignty,
because it was erected by his own consent and for his own defence; and
that such liberty as is inconsistent with it, was granted through
ignorance of the evil consequence thereof. But if he not only disobey,
but also resist a public minister in the execution of it, then it is a
crime; because he might have been righted, without any breach of the
peace, upon complaint.
The degrees of crime are taken on divers scales, and measured, first, by
the malignity of the source, or cause; secondly, by the contagion of the
example; thirdly, by the mischief of the effect; and fourthly, by the
concurrence of times, places, and persons.
[Sidenote: Presumption of power aggravateth.]
The same fact done against the law, if it proceed from presumption of
strength, riches, or friends to resist those that are to execute the
law, is a greater crime than if it proceed from hope of not being
discovered, or of escape by flight: for presumption of impunity by
force, is a root, from whence springeth, at all times, and upon all
temptations, a contempt of all laws; whereas in the latter case, the
apprehension of danger, that makes a man fly, renders him more obedient
for the future. A crime which we know to be so, is greater than the same
crime proceeding from a false persuasion that it is lawful; for he that
committeth it against his own conscience, presumeth on his force, or
other power, which encourages him to commit the same again: but he that
doth it by error, after the error is shewn him, is conformable to the
law.
[Sidenote: Evil teachers extenuate.]
He, whose error proceeds from the authority of a teacher, or an
interpreter of the law publicly authorized, is not so faulty as he whose
error proceedeth from a peremptory pursuit of his own principles and
reasoning: for what is taught by one that teacheth by public authority,
the commonwealth teacheth, and hath a resemblance of law, till the same
authority controlleth it; and in all crimes that contain not in them a
denial of the sovereign power, nor are against an evident law, excuseth
totally: whereas he that groundeth his actions on his private judgment,
ought, according to the rectitude, or error thereof, to stand or fall.
[Sidenote: Examples of impunity extenuate.]
The same fact, if it have been constantly punished in other men, is a
greater crime, than if there have been many precedent examples of
impunity. For those examples are so many hopes of impunity, given by the
sovereign himself: and because he which furnishes a man with such a hope
and presumption of mercy, as encourageth him to offend, hath his part in
the offence; he cannot reasonably charge the offender with the whole.
[Sidenote: Premeditation aggravateth.]
A crime arising from a sudden passion, is not so great, as when the same
ariseth from long meditation: for in the former case there is a place
for extenuation, in the common infirmity of human nature: but he that
doth it with premeditation, has used circumspection, and cast his eye on
the law, on the punishment, and on the consequence thereof to human
society; all which, in committing the crime, he hath contemned and
postposed to his own appetite. But there is no suddenness of passion
sufficient for a total excuse: for all the time between the first
knowing of the law, and the commission of the fact, shall be taken for a
time of deliberation; because he ought by meditation of the law, to
rectify the irregularity of his passions.
Where the law is publicly, and with assiduity, before all the people
read and interpreted, a fact done against it, is a greater crime, than
where men are left without such instruction, to enquire of it with
difficulty, uncertainty, and interruption of their callings, and be
informed by private men: for in this case, part of the fault is
discharged upon common infirmity; but, in the former, there is apparent
negligence, which is not without some contempt of the sovereign power.
[Sidenote: Tacit approbation of the sovereign extenuates.]
Those facts which the law expressly condemneth, but the law-maker by
other manifest signs of his will tacitly approveth, are less crimes,
than the same facts, condemned both by the law and law-maker. For seeing
the will of the law-maker is a law, there appear in this case two
contradictory laws; which would totally excuse, if men were bound to
take notice of the sovereign’s approbation, by other arguments than are
expressed by his command. But because there are punishments consequent,
not only to the transgression of his law, but also to the observing of
it, he is in part a cause of the transgression, and therefore cannot
reasonably impute the whole crime to the delinquent. For example, the
law condemneth duels; the punishment is made capital: on the contrary
part, he that refuseth duel, is subject to contempt and scorn, without
remedy; and sometimes by the sovereign himself thought unworthy to have
any charge, or preferment in war. If thereupon he accept duel,
considering all men lawfully endeavour to obtain the good opinion of
them that have the sovereign power, he ought not in reason to be
rigorously punished; seeing part of the fault may be discharged on the
punisher: which I say, not as wishing liberty of private revenges, or
any other kind of disobedience; but a care in governors, not to
countenance anything obliquely, which directly they forbid. The examples
of princes, to those that see them, are, and ever have been, more potent
to govern their actions, than the laws themselves. And though it be our
duty to do, not what they do, but what they say; yet will that duty
never be performed, till it please God to give men an extraordinary, and
supernatural grace to follow that precept.
[Sidenote: Comparison of crimes from their effects.]
Again, if we compare crimes by the mischief of their effects; first, the
same fact, when it redounds to the damage of many, is greater, than when
it redounds to the hurt of few. And therefore, when a fact hurteth, not
only in the present, but also, by example, in the future, it is a
greater crime, than if it hurt only in the present: for the former, is a
fertile crime, and multiplies to the hurt of many; the latter is barren.
To maintain doctrines contrary to the religion established in the
commonwealth, is a greater fault, in an authorized preacher, than in a
private person: so also is it, to live profanely, incontinently, or do
any irreligious act whatsoever. Likewise in a professor of the law, to
maintain any point, or do any act, that tendeth to the weakening of the
sovereign power, is a greater crime, than in another man: also in a man
that hath such reputation for wisdom, as that his counsels are followed,
or his actions imitated by many, his fact against the law, is a greater
crime, than the same fact in another: for such men not only commit
crime, but teach it for law to all other men. And generally all crimes
are the greater, by the scandal they give; that is to say, by becoming
stumbling-blocks to the weak, that look not so much upon the way they go
in, as upon the light that other man carry before them.
[Sidenote: Læsa Majestas.]
Also facts of hostility against the present state of the commonwealth,
are greater crimes, than the same acts done to private men: for the
damage extends itself to all: such are the betraying of the strengths,
or revealing of the secrets of the commonwealth to an enemy; also all
attempts upon the representative of the commonwealth, be it a monarch,
or an assembly; and all endeavours by word, or deed, to diminish the
authority of the same, either in the present time, or in succession:
which crimes the Latins understand by _crimina læsæ majestatis_, and
consist in design, or act, contrary to a fundamental law.
[Sidenote: Bribery and false testimony.]
Likewise those crimes, which render judgments of no effect, are greater
crimes, than injuries done to one, or a few persons; as to receive money
to give false judgment, or testimony, is a greater crime, than otherwise
to deceive a man of the like, or a greater sum; because not only he has
wrong, that falls by such judgments; but all judgments are rendered
useless, and occasion ministered to force, and private revenges.
[Sidenote: Depeculation.]
Also robbery, and depeculation of the public treasure, or revenues, is a
greater crime, than the robbing, or defrauding of a private man; because
to rob the public, is to rob many at once.
[Sidenote: Counterfeiting authority.]
Also the counterfeit usurpation of public ministry, the counterfeiting
of public seals or public coin, than counterfeiting of a private man’s
person, or his seal; because the fraud thereof, extendeth to the damage
of many.
[Sidenote: Crimes against private men compared.]
Of facts against the law, done to private men, the greater crime, is
that, where the damage in the common opinion of men, is most sensible.
And therefore
To kill against the law, is a greater crime, than any other injury, life
preserved.
And to kill with torment, greater, than simply to kill.
And mutilation of a limb, greater, than the spoiling a man of his goods.
And the spoiling a man of his goods, by terror of death, or wounds, than
by clandestine surreption.
And by clandestine surreption, than by consent fraudulently obtained.
And the violation of chastity by force, greater, than by flattery.
And of a woman married, than of a woman not married.
For all these things are commonly so valued: though some men are more,
and some less sensible of the same offence. But the law regardeth not
the particular, but the general inclination of mankind.
And therefore the offence men take, from contumely, in words, or
gesture, when they produce no other harm, than the present grief of him
that is reproached, hath been neglected in the laws of the Greeks,
Romans, and other both ancient and modern commonwealths; supposing the
true cause of such grief to consist, not in the contumely, which takes
no hold upon men conscious of their own virtue, but in the pusillanimity
of him that is offended by it.
Also a crime against a private man, is much aggravated by the person,
time, and place. For to kill one’s parent, is a greater crime, than to
kill another: for the parent ought to have the honour of a sovereign,
though he surrendered his power to the civil law; because he had it
originally by nature. And to rob a poor man, is a greater crime, than to
rob a rich man; because it is to the poor a more sensible damage.
And a crime committed in the time or place appointed for devotion, is
greater, than if committed at another time or place: for it proceeds
from a greater contempt of the law.
Many other cases of aggravation, and extenuation might be added: but by
these I have set down, it is obvious to every man, to take the altitude
of any other crime proposed.
[Sidenote: Public crimes what.]
Lastly, because in almost all crimes there is an injury done, not only
to some private men, but also to the commonwealth; the same crime, when
the accusation is in the name of the commonwealth, is called public
crime: and when in the name of a private man, a private crime; and the
pleas according thereunto called public, _judicia publica_, Pleas of the
Crown; or Private Pleas. As in an accusation of murder, if the accuser
be a private man, the plea is a Private Plea; if the accuser be the
sovereign, the plea is a Public Plea.
-------
CHAPTER XXVIII.
OF PUNISHMENTS AND REWARDS.
[Sidenote: The definition of punishment.]
A PUNISHMENT, _is an evil inflicted by public authority, on him that
hath done, or omitted that which is judged by the same authority to be a
transgression of the law; to the end that the will of men may thereby
the better be disposed to obedience_.
[Sidenote: Right to punish whence derived:]
Before I infer any thing from this definition, there is a question to be
answered, of much importance; which is, by what door the right or
authority of punishing in any case, came in. For by that which has been
said before, no man is supposed bound by covenant, not to resist
violence; and consequently it cannot be intended, that he gave any right
to another to lay violent hands upon his person. In the making of a
commonwealth, every man giveth away the right of defending another; but
not of defending himself. Also he obligeth himself, to assist him that
hath the sovereignty, in the punishing of another; but of himself not.
But to covenant to assist the sovereign, in doing hurt to another,
unless he that so covenanteth have a right to do it himself, is not to
give him a right to punish. It is manifest therefore that the right
which the commonwealth, that is, he, or they that represent it, hath to
punish, is not grounded on any concession, or gift of the subjects. But
I have also showed formerly, that before the institution of
commonwealth, every man had a right to every thing, and to do whatsoever
he thought necessary to his own preservation; subduing, hurting, or
killing any man in order thereunto. And this is the foundation of that
right of punishing, which is exercised in every commonwealth. For the
subjects did not give the sovereign that right; but only in laying down
theirs, strengthened him to use his own, as he should think fit, for the
preservation of them all: so that it was not given, but left to him, and
to him only; and (excepting the limits set him by natural law) as
entire, as in the condition of mere nature, and of war of every one
against his neighbour.
[Sidenote: Private injuries & revenges no punishments:]
From the definition of punishment, I infer, first, that neither private
revenges, nor injuries of private men, can properly be styled
punishment; because they proceed not from public authority.
[Sidenote: Nor denial of preferment:]
Secondly, that to be neglected, and unpreferred by the public favour, is
not a punishment; because no new evil is thereby on any man inflicted;
he is only left in the estate he was in before.
[Sidenote: Nor pain inflicted without public hearing;]
Thirdly, that the evil inflicted by public authority, without precedent
public condemnation, is not to be styled by the name of punishment; but
of an hostile act; because the fact for which a man is punished, ought
first to be judged by public authority, to be a transgression of the
law.
[Sidenote: Nor pain inflicted by usurped power;]
Fourthly, that the evil inflicted by usurped power, and judges without
authority from the sovereign, is not punishment; but an act of
hostility; because the acts of power usurped, have not for author, the
person condemned; and therefore are not acts of public authority.
[Sidenote: Nor pain inflicted without respect to the future good.]
Fifthly, that all evil which is inflicted without intention, or
possibility of disposing the delinquent, or, by his example, other men,
to obey the laws, is not punishment; but an act of hostility: because
without such an end, no hurt done is contained under that name.
[Sidenote: Natural evil consequences no punishments.]
Sixthly, whereas to certain actions, there be annexed by nature, divers
hurtful consequences; as when a man in assaulting another, is himself
slain, or wounded; or when he falleth into sickness by the doing of some
unlawful act; such hurt, though in respect of God, who is the author of
nature, it may be said to be inflicted, and therefore a punishment
divine; yet it is not contained in the name of punishment in respect of
men, because it is not inflicted by the authority of man.
[Sidenote: Hurt inflicted, if less than the benefit of transgressing, is
not punishment.]
Seventhly, if the harm inflicted be less than the benefit, or
contentment that naturally followeth the crime committed, that harm is
not within the definition; and is rather the price, or redemption, than
the punishment of a crime: because it is of the nature of punishment, to
have for end, the disposing of men to obey the law; which end, if it be
less than the benefit of the transgression, it attaineth not, but
worketh a contrary effect.
[Sidenote: Where the punishment is annexed to the law, a greater hurt is
not punishment, but hostility.]
Eighthly, if a punishment be determined and prescribed in the law
itself, and after the crime committed, there be a greater punishment
inflicted, the excess is not punishment, but an act of hostility. For
seeing the aim of punishment is not a revenge, but terror; and the
terror of a great punishment unknown, is taken away by the declaration
of a less, the unexpected addition is no part of the punishment. But
where there is no punishment at all determined by the law, there
whatsoever is inflicted, hath the nature of punishment. For he that goes
about the violation of a law, wherein no penalty is determined,
expecteth an indeterminate, that is to say, an arbitrary punishment.
[Sidenote: Hurt inflicted for a fact done before the law, no
punishment.]
Ninthly, harm inflicted for a fact done before there was a law that
forbade it, is not punishment, but an act of hostility: for before the
law, there is no transgression of the law: but punishment supposeth a
fact judged, to have been a transgression of the law; therefore harm
inflicted before the law made, is not punishment, but an act of
hostility.
[Sidenote: The representative of the commonwealth unpunishable.]
Tenthly, hurt inflicted on the representative of the commonwealth, is
not punishment, but an act of hostility: because it is of the nature of
punishment, to be inflicted by public authority, which is the authority
only of the representative itself.
[Sidenote: Hurt to revolted subjects is done by right of war, not by way
of punishment.]
Lastly, harm inflicted upon one that is a declared enemy, falls not
under the name of punishment: because seeing they were either never
subject to the law, and therefore cannot transgress it; or having been
subject to it, and professing to be no longer so, by consequence deny
they can transgress it, all the harms that can be done them, must be
taken as acts of hostility. But in declared hostility, all infliction of
evil is lawful. From whence it followeth, that if a subject shall by
fact, or word, wittingly, and deliberately deny the authority of the
representative of the commonwealth (whatsoever penalty hath been
formerly ordained for treason) he may lawfully be made to suffer
whatsoever the representative will. For in denying subjection, he denies
such punishment as by the law hath been ordained; and therefore suffers
as an enemy of the commonwealth; that is, according to the will of the
representative. For the punishments set down in the law, are to
subjects, not to enemies; such as are they, that having been by their
own acts subjects, deliberately revolting, deny the sovereign power.
The first, and most general distribution of punishments, is into
_divine_, and _human_. Of the former I shall have occasion to speak, in
a more convenient place hereafter.
_Human_, are those punishments that be inflicted by the commandment of
man; and are either _corporal_, or _pecuniary_, or _ignominy_, or
_imprisonment_, or _exile_, or mixed of these.
[Sidenote: Punishments corporal.]
_Corporal punishment_ is that, which is inflicted on the body directly,
and according to the intention of him that inflicteth it: such as are
stripes, or wounds, or deprivation of such pleasures of the body, as
were before lawfully enjoyed.
[Sidenote: Capital.]
And of these, some be _capital_, some _less_ than _capital_. Capital, is
the infliction of death; and that either simply, or with torment. Less
than capital, are stripes, wounds, chains, and any other corporal pain,
not in its own nature mortal. For if upon the infliction of a punishment
death follow not in the intention of the inflictor, the punishment is
not to be esteemed capital, though the harm prove mortal by an accident
not to be foreseen; in which case death is not inflicted, but hastened.
_Pecuniary punishment_, is that which consisteth not only in the
deprivation of a sum of money, but also of lands, or any other goods
which are usually bought and sold for money. And in case the law, that
ordaineth such a punishment, be made with design to gather money, from
such as shall transgress the same, it is not properly a punishment, but
the price of privilege and exemption from the law, which doth not
absolutely forbid the fact, but only to those that are not able to pay
the money: except where the law is natural, or part of religion; for in
that case it is not an exemption from the law, but a transgression of
it. As where a law exacteth a pecuniary mulct, of them that take the
name of God in vain, the payment of the mulct, is not the price of a
dispensation to swear, but the punishment of the transgression of a law
indispensable. In like manner if the law impose a sum of money to be
paid, to him that has been injured; this is but a satisfaction for the
hurt done him; and extinguisheth the accusation of the party injured,
not the crime of the offender.
[Sidenote: Ignominy.]
_Ignominy_, is the infliction of such evil, as is made dishonourable; or
the deprivation of such good, as is made honourable by the commonwealth.
For there be some things honourable by nature; as the effects of
courage, magnanimity, strength, wisdom, and other abilities of body and
mind: others made honourable by the commonwealth; as badges, titles,
offices, or any other singular mark of the sovereign’s favour. The
former, though they may fail by nature, or accident, cannot be taken
away by a law; and therefore the loss of them is not punishment. But the
latter, may be taken away by the public authority that made them
honourable, and are properly punishments: such are degrading men
condemned, of their badges, titles, and offices; or declaring them
incapable of the like in time to come.
[Sidenote: Imprisonment.]
_Imprisonment_, is when a man is by public authority deprived of
liberty; and may happen from two divers ends; whereof one is the safe
custody of a man accused; the other is the inflicting of pain on a man
condemned. The former is not punishment; because no man is supposed to
be punished, before he be judicially heard, and declared guilty. And
therefore whatsoever hurt a man is made to suffer by bonds, or
restraint, before his cause be heard, over and above that which is
necessary to assure his custody, is against the law of nature. But the
latter is punishment, because evil, and inflicted by public authority,
for somewhat that has by the same authority been judged a transgression
of the law. Under this word imprisonment, I comprehend all restraint of
motion, caused by an external obstacle, be it a house, which is called
by the general name of a prison; or an island, as when men are said to
be confined to it; or a place where men are set to work, as in old time
men have been condemned to quarries, and in these times to galleys; or
be it a chain, or any other such impediment.
[Sidenote: Exile.]
_Exile_ (banishment) is when a man is for a crime, condemned to depart
out of the dominion of the commonwealth, or out of a certain part
thereof: and during a prefixed time, or for ever, not to return into it:
and seemeth not in its own nature, without other circumstances, to be a
punishment; but rather an escape, or a public commandment to avoid
punishment by flight. And Cicero says, there was never any such
punishment ordained in the city of Rome; but calls it a refuge of men in
danger. For if a man banished, be nevertheless permitted to enjoy his
goods, and the revenue of his lands, the mere change of air is no
punishment, nor does it tend to that benefit of the commonwealth, for
which all punishments are ordained, that is to say, to the forming of
men’s wills to the observation of the law; but many times to the damage
of the commonwealth. For a banished man, is a lawful enemy of the
commonwealth that banished him; as being no more a member of the same.
But if he be withal deprived of his lands, or goods, then the punishment
lieth not in the exile, but is to be reckoned amongst punishments
pecuniary.
[Sidenote: The punishment of innocent subjects is contrary to the law of
nature.]
All punishments of innocent subjects, be they great or little, are
against the law of nature; for punishment is only for transgression of
the law, and therefore there can be no punishment of the innocent. It is
therefore a violation, first, of that law of nature, which forbiddeth
all men, in their revenges, to look at anything but some future good:
for there can arrive no good to the commonwealth, by punishing the
innocent. Secondly, of that, which forbiddeth ingratitude: for seeing
all sovereign power, is originally given by the consent of every one of
the subjects, to the end they should as long as they are obedient, be
protected thereby; the punishment of the innocent, is a rendering of
evil for good. And thirdly, of the law that commandeth equity; that is
to say, an equal distribution of justice; which in punishing the
innocent is not observed.
[Sidenote: But the harm done to innocents in war not so.]
But the infliction of what evil soever, on an innocent man, that is not
a subject, if it be for the benefit of the commonwealth, and without
violation of any former covenant, is no breach of the law of nature. For
all men that are not subjects, are either enemies, or else they have
ceased from being so by some precedent covenants. But against enemies,
whom the commonwealth judgeth capable to do them hurt, it is lawful by
the original right of nature to make war; wherein the sword judgeth not,
nor doth the victor make distinction of nocent, and innocent, as to the
time past nor has other respect of mercy, than as it conduceth to the
good of his own people. [Sidenote: Nor that which is done to declared
rebels.] And upon this ground it is, that also in subjects, who
deliberately deny the authority of the commonwealth established, the
vengeance is lawfully extended, not only to the fathers, but also to the
third and fourth generation not yet in being, and consequently innocent
of the fact, for which they are afflicted: because the nature of this
offence, consisteth in the renouncing of subjection; which is a relapse
into the condition of war, commonly called rebellion; and they that so
offend, suffer not as subjects, but as enemies. For _rebellion_, is but
war renewed.
[Sidenote: Reward is either salary or grace.]
REWARD, is either of _gift_, or by _contract_. When by contract, it is
called _salary_, and _wages_; which is benefit due for service
performed, or promised. When of gift, it is benefit proceeding from the
_grace_ of them that bestow it, to encourage, or enable men to do them
service. And therefore when the sovereign of a commonwealth appointeth a
salary to any public office, he that receiveth it, is bound in justice
to perform his office; otherwise, he is bound only in honour, to
acknowledgment, and an endeavour of requital. For though men have no
lawful remedy, when they be commanded to quit their private business, to
serve the public, without reward or salary; yet they are not bound
thereto, by the law of nature, nor by the institution of the
commonwealth, unless the service cannot otherwise be done; because it is
supposed the sovereign may make use of all their means, insomuch as the
most common soldier, may demand the wages of his warfare, as a debt.
[Sidenote: Benefits bestowed for fear are not rewards.]
The benefit which a sovereign bestoweth on a subject, for fear of some
power and ability he hath to do hurt to the commonwealth, are not
properly rewards; for they are not salaries; because there is in this
case no contract supposed, every man being obliged already not to do the
commonwealth disservice: nor are they graces; because they be extorted
by fear, which ought not to be incident to the sovereign power: but are
rather sacrifices, which the sovereign, considered in his natural
person, and not in the person of the commonwealth, makes, for the
appeasing the discontent of him he thinks more potent than himself; and
encourage not to obedience, but on the contrary, to the continuance, and
increasing of further extortion.
[Sidenote: Salaries certain and casual.]
And whereas some salaries are certain, and proceed from the public
treasure; and others uncertain, and casual, proceeding from the
execution of the office for which the salary is ordained; the latter is
in some cases hurtful to the commonwealth; as in the case of judicature.
For where the benefit of the judges, and ministers of a court of justice
ariseth from the multitude of causes that are brought to their
cognizance, there must needs follow two inconveniences: one, is the
nourishing of suits; for the more suits, the greater benefit: and
another that depends on that, which is contention about jurisdiction;
each court drawing to itself, as many causes as it can. But in offices
of execution there are not those inconveniences; because their
employment cannot be increased by any endeavour of their own. And thus
much shall suffice for the nature of punishment and reward; which are,
as it were, the nerves and tendons, that move the limbs and joints of a
commonwealth.
Hitherto I have set forth the nature of man, whose pride and other
passions have compelled him to submit himself to government: together
with the great power of his governor, whom I compared to _Leviathan_,
taking that comparison out of the two last verses of the
one-and-fortieth of _Job_; where God having set forth the great power of
_Leviathan_, calleth him king of the proud. _There is nothing_, saith
he, _on earth, to be compared with him. He is made so as not to be
afraid. He seeth every high thing below him; and is king of all the
children of pride._ But because he is mortal, and subject to decay, as
all other earthly creatures are; and because there is that in heaven,
though not on earth, that he should stand in fear of, and whose laws he
ought to obey; I shall in the next following chapters speak of his
diseases, and the causes of his mortality; and of what laws of nature he
is bound to obey.
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CHAPTER XXIX.
OF THOSE THINGS THAT WEAKEN, OR TEND TO
THE DISSOLUTION OF A COMMONWEALTH.
[Sidenote: Dissolution of commonwealths proceedeth from their imperfect
institution.]
Though nothing can be immortal, which mortals make; yet, if men had the
use of reason they pretend to, their commonwealths might be secured, at
least from perishing by internal diseases. For by the nature of their
institution, they are designed to live, as long as mankind, or as the
laws of nature, or as justice itself, which gives them life. Therefore
when they come to be dissolved, not by external violence, but intestine
disorder, the fault is not in men, as they are the _matter_; but as they
are the _makers_, and orderers of them. For men, as they become at last
weary of irregular jostling, and hewing one another, and desire with all
their hearts, to conform themselves into one firm and lasting edifice:
so for want, both of the art of making fit laws, to square their actions
by, and also of humility, and patience, to suffer the rude and
cumbersome points of their present greatness to be taken off, they
cannot without the help of a very able architect, be compiled into any
other than a crazy building, such as hardly lasting out their own time,
must assuredly fall upon the heads of their posterity.
Amongst the _infirmities_ therefore of a commonwealth, I will reckon in
the first place, those that arise from an imperfect institution, and
resemble the diseases of a natural body, which proceed from a defectuous
procreation.
[Sidenote: Want of absolute power.]
Of which, this is one, _that a man to obtain a kingdom, is sometimes
content with less power, than to the peace, and defence of the
commonwealth is necessarily required_. From whence it cometh to pass,
that when the exercise of the power laid by, is for the public safety to
be resumed, it hath the resemblance of an unjust act; which disposeth
great numbers of men, when occasion is presented, to rebel; in the same
manner as the bodies of children, gotten by diseased parents, are
subject either to untimely death, or to purge the ill quality, derived
from their vicious conception, by breaking out into biles and scabs. And
when kings deny themselves some such necessary power, it is not always,
though sometimes, out of ignorance of what is necessary to the office
they undertake; but many times out of a hope to recover the same again
at their pleasure. Wherein they reason not well; because such as will
hold them to their promises, shall be maintained against them by foreign
commonwealths; who in order to the good of their own subjects let slip
few occasions to _weaken_ the estate of their neighbours. So was Thomas
Becket, archbishop of Canterbury, supported against Henry the Second, by
the Pope; the subjection of ecclesiastics to the commonwealth, having
been dispensed with by William the Conqueror at his reception, when he
took an oath, not to infringe the liberty of the church. And so were the
barons, whose power was by William Rufus, to have their help in
transferring the succession from his elder brother to himself, increased
to a degree inconsistent with the sovereign power, maintained in their
rebellion against king John, by the French.
Nor does this happen in monarchy only. For whereas the style of the
ancient Roman commonwealth, was, _the senate and people of Rome_;
neither senate, nor people pretended to the whole power; which first
caused the seditions, of Tiberius Gracchus, Caius Gracchus, Lucius
Saturninus, and others; and afterwards the wars between the senate and
the people, under Marius and Sylla; and again under Pompey and Cæsar, to
the extinction of their democracy, and the setting up of monarchy.
The people of Athens bound themselves but from one only action; which
was, that no man on pain of death should propound the renewing of the
war for the island of Salamis; and yet thereby, if Solon had not caused
to be given out he was mad, and afterwards in gesture and habit of a
madman, and in verse, propounded it to the people that flocked about
him, they had had an enemy perpetually in readiness, even at the gates
of their city; such damage, or shifts, are all commonwealths forced to,
that have their power never so little limited.
[Sidenote: Private judgment of good and evil.]
In the second place, I observe the _diseases_ of a commonwealth, that
proceed from the poison of seditious doctrines, whereof one is, _That
every private man is judge of good and evil actions_. This is true in
the condition of mere nature, where there are no civil laws; and also
under civil government, in such cases as are not determined by the law.
But otherwise, it is manifest, that the measure of good and evil
actions, is the civil law; and the judge the legislator, who is always
representative of the commonwealth. From this false doctrine, men are
disposed to debate with themselves, and dispute the commands of the
commonwealth; and afterwards to obey, or disobey them, as in their
private judgments they shall think fit; whereby the commonwealth is
distracted and _weakened_.
[Sidenote: Erroneous conscience.]
Another doctrine repugnant to civil society, is, that _whatsoever a man
does against his conscience, is sin_; and it dependeth on the
presumption of making himself judge of good and evil. For a man’s
conscience, and his judgment is the same thing, and as the judgment, so
also the conscience may be erroneous. Therefore, though he that is
subject to no civil law, sinneth in all he does against his conscience,
because he has no other rule to follow but his own reason; yet it is not
so with him that lives in a commonwealth; because the law is the public
conscience, by which he hath already undertaken to be guided. Otherwise
in such diversity, as there is of private consciences, which are but
private opinions, the commonwealth must needs be distracted, and no man
dare to obey the sovereign power, further than it shall seem good in his
own eyes.
[Sidenote: Pretence of inspiration.]
It hath been also commonly taught, _that faith and sanctity, are not to
be attained by study and reason, but by supernatural inspiration, or
infusion_. Which granted, I see not why any man should render a reason
of his faith; or why every Christian should not be also a prophet; or
why any man should take the law of his country, rather than his own
inspiration, for the rule of his action. And thus we fall again in the
fault of taking upon us to judge of good and evil; or to make judges of
it, such private men as pretend to be supernaturally inspired, to the
dissolution of all civil government. Faith comes by hearing, and hearing
by those accidents, which guide us into the presence of them that speak
to us; which accidents are all contrived by God Almighty; and yet are
not supernatural, but only, for the great number of them that concur to
every effect, unobservable. Faith and sanctity, are indeed not very
frequent; but yet they are not miracles, but brought to pass by
education, discipline, correction, and other natural ways, by which God
worketh them in his elect, at such times as he thinketh fit. And these
three opinions, pernicious to peace and government, have in this part of
the world, proceeded chiefly from the tongues, and pens of unlearned
divines, who joining the words of Holy Scripture together, otherwise
than is agreeable to reason, do what they can, to make men think, that
sanctity and natural reason, cannot stand together.
[Sidenote: Subjecting the sovereign power to civil laws.]
A fourth opinion, repugnant to the nature of a commonwealth, is this,
_that he that hath the sovereign power is subject to the civil laws_. It
is true, that sovereigns are all subject to the laws of nature; because
such laws be divine, and cannot by any man, or commonwealth be
abrogated. But to those laws which the sovereign himself, that is, which
the commonwealth maketh, he is not subject. For to be subject to laws,
is to be subject to the commonwealth, that is to the sovereign
representative, that is to himself; which is not subjection, but freedom
from the laws. Which error, because it setteth the laws above the
sovereign, setteth also a judge above him, and a power to punish him;
which is to make a new sovereign; and again for the same reason a third,
to punish the second; and so continually without end, to the confusion,
and dissolution of the commonwealth.
[Sidenote: Attributing of absolute propriety to subjects.]
A fifth doctrine, that tendeth to the dissolution of a commonwealth, is,
_that every private man has an absolute propriety in his goods; such, as
excludeth the right of the sovereign_. Every man has indeed a propriety
that excludes the right of every other subject: and he has it only from
the sovereign power; without the protection whereof, every other man
should have equal right to the same. But if the right of the sovereign
also be excluded, he cannot perform the office they have put him into;
which is, to defend them both from foreign enemies, and from the
injuries of one another; and consequently there is no longer a
commonwealth.
And if the propriety of subjects, exclude not the right of the sovereign
representative to their goods; much less to their offices of judicature,
or execution, in which they represent the sovereign himself.
[Sidenote: Dividing of the sovereign power.]
There is a sixth doctrine, plainly, and directly against the essence of
a commonwealth; and it is this, _that the sovereign power may be
divided_. For what is it to divide the power of a commonwealth, but to
dissolve it; for powers divided mutually destroy each other. And for
these doctrines, men are chiefly beholding to some of those, that making
profession of the laws, endeavour to make them depend upon their own
learning, and not upon the legislative power.
[Sidenote: Imitation of neighbour nations.]
And as false doctrine, so also oftentimes the example of different
government in a neighbouring nation, disposeth men to alteration of the
form already settled. So the people of the Jews were stirred up to
reject God, and to call upon the prophet Samuel, for a king after the
manner of the nations: so also the lesser cities of Greece, were
continually disturbed, with seditions of the aristocratical, and
democratical factions; one part of almost every commonwealth, desiring
to imitate the Lacedemonians; the other, the Athenians. And I doubt not,
but many men have been contented to see the late troubles in England,
out of an imitation of the Low Countries; supposing there needed no more
to grow rich, than to change, as they had done, the form of their
government. For the constitution of man’s nature, is of itself subject
to desire novelty. When therefore they are provoked to the same, by the
neighbourhood also of those that have been enriched by it, it is almost
impossible for them, not to be content with those that solicit them to
change; and love the first beginnings, though they be grieved with the
continuance of disorder; like hot bloods, that having gotten the itch,
tear themselves with their own nails, till they can endure the smart no
longer.
[Sidenote: Imitation of the Greeks and Romans.]
And as to rebellion in particular against monarchy; one of the most
frequent causes of it, is the reading of the books of policy, and
histories of the ancient Greeks, and Romans; from which, young men, and
all others that are unprovided of the antidote of solid reason,
receiving a strong, and delightful impression, of the great exploits of
war, achieved by the conductors of their armies, receive withal a
pleasing idea, of all they have done besides; and imagine their great
prosperity, not to have proceeded from the emulation of particular men,
but from the virtue of their popular form of government: not considering
the frequent seditions, and civil wars, produced by the imperfection of
their policy. From the reading, I say, of such books, men have
undertaken to kill their kings, because the Greek and Latin writers, in
their books, and discourses of policy, make it lawful, and laudable, for
any man so to do; provided, before he do it, he call him tyrant. For
they say not _regicide_, that is, killing a king, but _tyrannicide_,
that is, killing of a tyrant is lawful. From the same books, they that
live under a monarch conceive an opinion, that the subjects in a popular
commonwealth enjoy liberty; but that in a monarchy they are all slaves.
I say, they that live under a monarchy conceive such an opinion; not
they that live under a popular government: for they find no such matter.
In sum, I cannot imagine, how anything can be more prejudicial to a
monarchy, than the allowing of such books to be publicly read, without
present applying such correctives of discreet masters, as are fit to
take away their venom: which venom I will not doubt to compare to the
biting of a mad dog, which is a disease the physicians call
_hydrophobia_, or _fear of water_. For as he that is so bitten, has a
continual torment of thirst, and yet abhorreth water; and is in such an
estate, as if the poison endeavoured to convert him into a dog: so when
a monarchy is once bitten to the quick, by those democratical writers,
that continually snarl at that estate; it wanteth nothing more than a
strong monarch, which nevertheless out of a certain _tyrannophobia_, or
fear of being strongly governed, when they have him, they abhor.
[Sidenote: The opinion that there be more sovereigns than one in the
commonwealth.]
As there have been doctors, that hold there be three souls in a man; so
there be also that think there may be more souls, that is, more
sovereigns, than one, in a commonwealth; and set up a _supremacy_
against the _sovereignty_; _canons_ against _laws_; and a _ghostly
authority_ against the _civil_; working on men’s minds, with words and
distinctions, that of themselves signify nothing, but bewray by their
obscurity; that there walketh, as some think, invisibly another kingdom,
as it were a kingdom of fairies, in the dark. Now seeing it is manifest,
that the civil power, and the power of the commonwealth is the same
thing; and that supremacy, and the power of making canons, and granting
faculties, implieth a commonwealth; it followeth, that where one is
sovereign, another supreme; where one can make laws, and another make
canons; there must needs be two commonwealths, of one and the same
subjects; which is a kingdom divided in itself, and cannot stand. For
notwithstanding the insignificant distinction of _temporal_, and
_ghostly_, they are still two kingdoms, and every subject is subject to
two masters. For seeing the _ghostly_ power challengeth the right to
declare what is sin, it challengeth by consequence to declare what is
law, sin being nothing but the transgression of the law; and again, the
civil power challenging to declare what is law, every subject must obey
two masters, who both will have their commands be observed as law; which
is impossible. Or, if it be but one kingdom, either the _civil_, which
is the power of the commonwealth, must be subordinate to the _ghostly_,
and then there is no sovereignty but the _ghostly_; or the _ghostly_
must be subordinate to the _temporal_, and then there is no _supremacy_
but the _temporal_. When therefore these two powers oppose one another,
the commonwealth cannot but be in great danger of civil war and
dissolution. For the _civil_ authority being more visible, and standing
in the clearer light of natural reason, cannot choose but draw to it in
all times a very considerable part of the people: and the _spiritual_,
though it stand in the darkness of School distinctions, and hard words,
yet because the fear of darkness and ghosts, is greater than other
fears, cannot want a party sufficient to trouble, and sometimes to
destroy a commonwealth. And this is a disease which not unfitly may be
compared to the epilepsy, or falling sickness, which the Jews took to be
one kind of possession by spirits, in the body natural. For as in this
disease, there is an unnatural spirit, or wind in the head that
obstructeth the roots of the nerves, and moving them violently, taketh
away the motion which naturally they should have from the power of the
soul in the brain, and thereby causeth violent, and irregular motions,
which men call convulsions, in the parts; insomuch as he that is seized
therewith, falleth down sometimes into the water, and sometimes into the
fire, as a man deprived of his senses; so also in the body politic, when
the spiritual power, moveth the members of a commonwealth, by the terror
of punishments, and hope of rewards, which are the nerves of it,
otherwise than by the civil power, which is the soul of the
commonwealth, they ought to be moved; and by strange, and hard words
suffocates their understanding, it must needs thereby distract the
people, and either overwhelm the commonwealth with oppression, or cast
it into the fire of a civil war.
[Sidenote: Mixed government.]
Sometimes also in the merely civil government, there be more than one
soul; as when the power of levying money, which is the nutritive
faculty, has depended on a general assembly; the power of conduct and
command, which is the motive faculty, on one man; and the power of
making laws, which is the rational faculty, on the accidental consent,
not only of those two, but also of a third; this endangereth the
commonwealth, sometimes for want of consent to good laws; but most often
for want of such nourishment, as is necessary to life, and motion. For
although few perceive, that such government, is not government, but
division of the commonwealth into three factions, and call it mixed
monarchy; yet the truth is, that it is not one independent commonwealth,
but three independent factions; nor one representative person, but
three. In the kingdom of God, there may be three persons independent,
without breach of unity in God that reigneth; but where men reign, that
be subject to diversity of opinions, it cannot be so. And therefore if
the king bear the person of the people, and the general assembly bear
also the person of the people, and another assembly bear the person of a
part of the people, they are not one person, nor one sovereign, but
three persons, and three sovereigns.
To what disease in the natural body of man, I may exactly compare this
irregularity of a commonwealth, I know not. But I have seen a man, that
had another man growing out of his side, with a head, arms, breast, and
stomach, of his own: if he had had another man growing out of his other
side, the comparison might then have been exact.
[Sidenote: Want of money.]
Hitherto I have named such diseases of a commonwealth, as are of the
greatest, and most present danger. There be other not so great; which
nevertheless are not unfit to be observed. As first, the difficulty of
raising money, for the necessary uses of the commonwealth; especially in
the approach of war. This difficulty ariseth from the opinion, that
every subject hath a propriety in his lands and goods, exclusive of the
sovereign’s right to the use of the same. From whence it cometh to pass,
that the sovereign power, which foreseeth the necessities and dangers of
the commonwealth, finding the passage of money to the public treasury
obstructed, by the tenacity of the people, whereas it ought to extend
itself, to encounter, and prevent such dangers in their beginnings,
contracteth itself as long as it can, and when it cannot longer,
struggles with the people by stratagems of law, to obtain little sums,
which not sufficing, he is fain at last violently to open the way for
present supply, or perish; and being put often to these extremities, at
last reduceth the people to their due temper; or else the commonwealth
must perish. Insomuch as we may compare this distemper very aptly to an
ague; wherein, the fleshy parts being congealed, or by venomous matter
obstructed, the veins which by their natural course empty themselves
into the heart, are not, as they ought to be, supplied from the
arteries, whereby there succeedeth at first a cold contraction, and
trembling of the limbs; and afterward a hot, and strong endeavour of the
heart, to force a passage for the blood; and before it can do that,
contenteth itself with the small refreshments of such things as cool for
a time, till, if nature be strong enough, it break at last the contumacy
of the parts obstructed, and dissipateth the venom into sweat; or, if
nature be too weak, the patient dieth.
[Sidenote: Monopolies, and abuses of publicans.]
Again, there is sometimes in a commonwealth, a disease, which resembleth
the pleurisy; and that is, when the treasure of the commonwealth,
flowing out of its due course, is gathered together in too much
abundance, in one, or a few private men, by monopolies, or by farms of
the public revenues; in the same manner as the blood in a pleurisy,
getting into the membrane of the breast, breedeth there an inflammation,
accompanied with a fever, and painful stitches.
[Sidenote: Popular men.]
Also the popularity of a potent subject, unless the commonwealth have
very good caution of his fidelity, is a dangerous disease; because the
people, which should receive their motion from the authority of the
sovereign, by the flattery and by the reputation of an ambitious man are
drawn away from their obedience to the laws, to follow a man, of whose
virtues, and designs they have no knowledge. And this is commonly of
more danger in a popular government, than in a monarchy; because an army
is of so great force, and multitude, as it may easily be made believe,
they are the people. By this means it was, that Julius Cæsar, who was
set up by the people against the senate, having won to himself the
affections of his army, made himself master both of senate and people.
And this proceeding of popular, and ambitious men, is plain rebellion;
and may be resembled to the effects of witchcraft.
[Sidenote: Excessive greatness of a town, multitude of corporations.]
Another infirmity of a commonwealth, is the immoderate greatness of a
town, when it is able to furnish out of its own circuit, the number, and
expense of a great army: as also the great number of corporations; which
are as it were many lesser commonwealths in the bowels of a greater,
like worms in the entrails of a natural man. [Sidenote: Liberty of
disputing against sovereign power.] To which may be added, the liberty
of disputing against absolute power, by pretenders to political
prudence; which though bred for the most part in the lees of the people,
yet animated by false doctrines, are perpetually meddling with the
fundamental laws, to the molestation of the commonwealth; like the
little worms, which physicians call _ascarides_.
We may further add, the insatiable appetite, or βουλιμια, of enlarging
dominion; with the incurable _wounds_ thereby many times received from
the enemy; and the _wens_, of ununited conquests, which are many times a
burthen, and with less danger lost, than kept; as also the _lethargy_ of
ease, and _consumption_ of riot and vain expense.
[Sidenote: Dissolution of the commonwealth.]
Lastly, when in a war, foreign or intestine, the enemies get a final
victory; so as, the forces of the commonwealth keeping the field no
longer, there is no further protection of subjects in their loyalty;
then is the commonwealth DISSOLVED, and every man at liberty to protect
himself by such courses as his own discretion shall suggest unto him.
For the sovereign is the public soul, giving life and motion to the
commonwealth; which expiring, the members are governed by it no more,
than the carcase of a man, by his departed, though immortal, soul. For
though the right of a sovereign monarch cannot be extinguished by the
act of another; yet the obligation of the members may. For he that wants
protection, may seek it any where; and when he hath it, is obliged,
without fraudulent pretence of having submitted himself out of fear, to
protect his protection as long as he is able. But when the power of an
assembly is once suppressed, the right of the same perisheth utterly;
because the assembly itself is extinct; and consequently, there is no
possibility for the sovereignty to re-enter.
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CHAPTER XXX.
OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOVEREIGN
REPRESENTATIVE.
[Sidenote: The procuration of the good of the people.]
The office of the sovereign, be it a monarch or an assembly, consisteth
in the end, for which he was trusted with the sovereign power, namely
the procuration of _the safety of the people_; to which he is obliged by
the law of nature, and to render an account thereof to God, the author
of that law, and to none but him. But by safety here, is not meant a
bare preservation, but also all other contentments of life, which every
man by lawful industry, without danger, or hurt to the commonwealth,
shall acquire to himself.
[Sidenote: By instruction and laws.]
And this is intended should be done, not by care applied to individuals,
further than their protection from injuries, when they shall complain;
but by a general providence, contained in public instruction, both of
doctrine, and example; and in the making and executing of good laws, to
which individual persons may apply their own cases.
[Sidenote: Against the duty of a sovereign to relinquish any essential
right of sovereignty.]
And because, if the essential rights of sovereignty, specified before in
the eighteenth chapter, be taken away, the commonwealth is thereby
dissolved, and every man returneth into the condition, and calamity of a
war with every other man, which is the greatest evil that can happen in
this life; it is the office of the sovereign, to maintain those rights
entire; and consequently against his duty, first, to transfer to
another, or to lay from himself any of them. For he that deserteth the
means, deserteth the ends; and he deserteth the means, that being the
sovereign, acknowledgeth himself subject to the civil laws; and
renounceth the power of supreme judicature; or of making war, or peace
by his own authority; or of judging of the necessities of the
commonwealth; or of levying money and soldiers, when, and as much as in
his own conscience he shall judge necessary; or of making officers, and
ministers both of war and peace; or of appointing teachers, and
examining what doctrines are conformable, or contrary to the defence,
peace, and good of the people. [Sidenote: Or not to see the people
taught the grounds of them.] Secondly, it is against his duty, to let
the people be ignorant, or misinformed of the grounds, and reasons of
those his essential rights; because thereby men are easy to be seduced,
and drawn to resist him, when the commonwealth shall require their use
and exercise.
And the grounds of these rights, have the rather need to be diligently,
and truly taught; because they cannot be maintained by any civil law, or
terror of legal punishment. For a civil law, that shall forbid
rebellion, (and such is all resistance to the essential rights of the
sovereignty), is not, as a civil law, any obligation, but by virtue only
of the law of nature, that forbiddeth the violation of faith; which
natural obligation, if men know not, they cannot know the right of any
law the sovereign maketh. And for the punishment, they take it but for
an act of hostility; which when they think they have strength enough,
they will endeavour by acts of hostility, to avoid.
[Sidenote: Objection of those that say there are no principles of reason
for absolute sovereignty.]
As I have heard some say, that justice is but a word, without substance;
and that whatsoever a man can by force, or art, acquire to himself, not
only in the condition of war, but also in a commonwealth, is his own,
which I have already showed to be false: so there be also that maintain,
that there are no grounds, nor principles of reason, to sustain those
essential rights, which make sovereignty absolute. For if there were,
they would have been found out in some place, or other; whereas we see,
there has not hitherto been any commonwealth, where those rights have
been acknowledged, or challenged. Wherein they argue as ill, as if the
savage people of America, should deny there were any grounds, or
principles of reason, so to build a house, as to last as long as the
materials, because they never yet saw any so well built. Time, and
industry, produce every day new knowledge. And as the art of well
building is derived from principles of reason, observed by industrious
men, that had long studied the nature of materials, and the divers
effects of figure, and proportion, long after mankind began, though
poorly, to build: so, long time after men have begun to constitute
commonwealths, imperfect, and apt to relapse into disorder, there may
principles of reason be found out, by industrious meditation, to make
their constitution, excepting by external violence, everlasting. And
such are those which I have in this discourse set forth: which whether
they come not into the sight of those that have power to make use of
them, or be neglected by them, or not, concerneth my particular
interests, at this day, very little. But supposing that these of mine
are not such principles of reason; yet I am sure they are principles
from authority of Scripture; as I shall make it appear, when I shall
come to speak of the kingdom of God, administered by Moses, over the
Jews, his peculiar people by covenant.
[Sidenote: Objection from the incapacity of the vulgar.]
But they say again, that though the principles be right, yet common
people are not of capacity enough to be made to understand them. I
should be glad, that the rich and potent subjects of a kingdom, or those
that are accounted the most learned, were no less incapable than they.
But all men know, that the obstructions to this kind of doctrine,
proceed not so much from the difficulty of the matter, as from the
interest of them that are to learn. Potent men, digest hardly any thing
that setteth up a power to bridle their affections; and learned men, any
thing that discovereth their errors, and thereby lesseneth their
authority: whereas the common people’s minds, unless they be tainted
with dependance on the potent, or scribbled over with the opinions of
their doctors, are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever by public
authority shall be imprinted in them. Shall whole nations be brought to
_acquiesce_ in the great mysteries of the Christian religion, which are
above reason, and millions of men be made believe, that the same body
may be in innumerable places at one and the same time, which is against
reason; and shall not men be able, by their teaching, and preaching,
protected by the law, to make that received, which is so consonant to
reason, that any unprejudicated man, needs no more to learn it, than to
hear it? I conclude therefore, that in the instruction of the people in
the essential rights which are the natural and fundamental laws of
sovereignty, there is no difficulty, whilst a sovereign has his power
entire, but what proceeds from his own fault, or the fault of those whom
he trusteth in the administration of the commonwealth; and consequently,
it is his duty, to cause them so to be instructed; and not only his
duty, but his benefit also, and security against the danger that may
arrive to himself in his natural person from rebellion.
[Sidenote: Subjects are to be taught not to affect change of
government.]
And, to descend to particulars, the people are to be taught, first, that
they ought not to be in love with any form of government they see in
their neighbour nations, more than with their own, nor, whatsoever
present prosperity they behold in nations that are otherwise governed
than they, to desire change. For the prosperity of a people ruled by an
aristocratical, or democratical assembly, cometh not from aristocracy,
nor from democracy, but from the obedience, and concord of the subjects:
nor do the people flourish in a monarchy, because one man has the right
to rule them, but because they obey him. Take away in any kind of state,
the obedience, and consequently the concord of the people, and they
shall not only not flourish, but in short time be dissolved. And they
that go about by disobedience, to do no more than reform the
commonwealth, shall find they do thereby destroy it; like the foolish
daughters of Peleus, in the fable; which desiring to renew the youth of
their decrepid father, did by the counsel of Medea, cut him in pieces,
and boil him, together with strange herbs, but made not of him a new
man. This desire of change, is like the breach of the first of God’s
commandments: for there God says, _Non habebis Deos alienos_; Thou shalt
not have the Gods of other nations; and in another place concerning
_kings_, that they are _Gods_.
[Sidenote: Nor adhere, against the sovereign, to popular men.]
Secondly, they are to be taught, that they ought not to be led with
admiration of the virtue of any of their fellow-subjects, how high
soever he stand, or how conspicuously soever he shine in the
commonwealth; nor of any assembly, except the sovereign assembly, so as
to defer to them any obedience, or honour, appropriate to the sovereign
only, whom, in their particular stations, they represent; nor to receive
any influence from them, but such as is conveyed by them from the
sovereign authority. For that sovereign cannot be imagined to love his
people as he ought, that is not jealous of them, but suffers them by the
flattery of popular men, to be seduced from their loyalty, as they have
often been, not only secretly, but openly, so as to proclaim marriage
with them _in facie ecclesiæ_ by preachers, and by publishing the same
in the open streets: which may fitly be compared to the violation of the
second of the ten commandments.
[Sidenote: Nor to dispute the sovereign power.]
Thirdly, in consequence to this, they ought to be informed, how great a
fault it is, to speak evil of the sovereign representative, whether one
man, or an assembly of men; or to argue and dispute his power; or any
way to use his name irreverently, whereby he may be brought into
contempt with his people, and their obedience, in which the safety of
the commonwealth consisteth, slackened. Which doctrine the third
commandment by resemblance pointeth to.
[Sidenote: And to have days set apart to learn their duty.]
Fourthly, seeing people cannot be taught this, nor when it is taught,
remember it, nor after one generation past, so much as know in whom the
sovereign power is placed, without setting apart from their ordinary
labour, some certain times, in which they may attend those that are
appointed to instruct them; it is necessary that some such times be
determined, wherein they may assemble together, and, after prayers and
praises given to God, the sovereign of sovereigns, hear those their
duties told them, and the positive laws, such as generally concern them
all, read and expounded, and be put in mind of the authority that maketh
them laws. To this end had the Jews every seventh day, a sabbath, in
which the law was read and expounded; and in the solemnity whereof they
were put in mind, that their king was God; that having created the world
in six days, he rested the seventh day; and by their resting on it from
their labour, that that God was their king, which redeemed them from
their servile, and painful labour in Egypt, and gave them a time, after
they had rejoiced in God, to take joy also in themselves, by lawful
recreation. So that the first table of the commandments, is spent all in
setting down the sum of God’s absolute power; not only as God, but as
king by pact, in peculiar, of the Jews; and may therefore give light, to
those that have sovereign power conferred on them by the consent of men,
to see what doctrine they ought to teach their subjects.
[Sidenote: And to honour their parents.]
And because the first instruction of children, dependeth on the care of
their parents, it is necessary that they should be obedient to them,
whilst they are under their tuition; and not only so, but that also
afterwards, as gratitude requireth, they acknowledge the benefit of
their education, by external signs of honour. To which end they are to
be taught, that originally the father of every man was also his
sovereign lord, with power over him of life and death; and that the
fathers of families, when by instituting a commonwealth, they resigned
that absolute power, yet it was never intended, they should lose the
honour due unto them for their education. For to relinquish such right,
was not necessary to the institution of sovereign power; nor would there
be any reason, why any man should desire to have children, or take the
care to nourish and instruct them, if they were afterwards to have no
other benefit from them, than from other men. And this accordeth with
the fifth commandment.
[Sidenote: And to avoid doing of injury.]
Again, every sovereign ought to cause justice to be taught, which,
consisting in taking from no man what is his, is as much as to say, to
cause men to be taught not to deprive their neighbours, by violence or
fraud, of any thing which by the sovereign authority is theirs. Of
things held in propriety, those that are dearest to a man are his own
life, and limbs; and in the next degree, in most men, those that concern
conjugal affection; and after them, riches and means of living.
Therefore the people are to be taught, to abstain from violence to one
another’s person, by private revenges; from violation of conjugal
honour; and from forcible rapine, and fraudulent surreption of one
another’s goods. For which purpose also it is necessary they be showed
the evil consequences of false judgment, by corruption either of judges
or witnesses, whereby the distinction of propriety is taken away, and
justice becomes of no effect: all which things are intimated in the
sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth commandments.
[Sidenote: And to do all this sincerely from the heart.]
Lastly, they are to be taught, that not only the unjust facts, but the
designs and intentions to do them, though by accident hindered, are
injustice; which consisteth in the pravity of the will, as well as in
the irregularity of the act. And this is the intention of the tenth
commandment, and the sum of the second table; which is reduced all to
this one commandment of mutual charity, _thou shalt love thy neighbour
as thyself_: as the sum of the first table is reduced to _the love of
God_; whom they had then newly received as their king.
[Sidenote: The use of universities.]
As for the means, and conduits, by which the people may receive this
instruction, we are to search, by what means so many opinions, contrary
to the peace of mankind, upon weak and false principles, have
nevertheless been so deeply rooted in them. I mean those, which I have
in the precedent chapter specified: as that men shall judge of what is
lawful and unlawful, not by the law itself, but by their own
consciences; that is to say, by their own private judgments: that
subjects sin in obeying the commands of the commonwealth, unless they
themselves have first judged them to be lawful: that their propriety in
their riches is such, as to exclude the dominion, which the commonwealth
hath over the same: that it is lawful for subjects to kill such, as they
call tyrants: that the sovereign power may be divided, and the like;
which come to be instilled into the people by this means. They whom
necessity, or covetousness keepeth attent on their trades, and labour;
and they, on the other side, whom superfluity, or sloth carrieth after
their sensual pleasures; which two sorts of men take up the greatest
part of mankind; being diverted from the deep meditation, which the
learning of truth, not only in the matter of natural justice, but also
of all other sciences necessarily requireth, receive the notions of
their duty, chiefly from divines in the pulpit, and partly from such of
their neighbours or familiar acquaintance, as having the faculty of
discoursing readily, and plausibly, seem wiser and better learned in
cases of law and conscience, than themselves. And the divines, and such
others as make show of learning, derive their knowledge from the
universities, and from the schools of law, or from the books, which by
men, eminent in those schools and universities, have been published. It
is therefore manifest, that the instruction of the people, dependeth
wholly, on the right teaching of youth in the universities. But are not,
may some man say, the universities of England learned enough already to
do that? or is it you, will undertake to teach the universities? Hard
questions. Yet to the first, I doubt not to answer; that till towards
the latter end of Henry the Eighth, the power of the Pope, was always
upheld against the power of the commonwealth, principally by the
universities; and that the doctrines maintained by so many preachers,
against the sovereign power of the king, and by so many lawyers, and
others, that had their education there, is a sufficient argument, that
though the universities were not authors of those false doctrines, yet
they knew not how to plant the true. For in such a contradiction of
opinions, it is most certain, that they have not been sufficiently
instructed; and it is no wonder, if they yet retain a relish of that
subtle liquor, wherewith they were first seasoned, against the civil
authority. But to the latter question, it is not fit, nor needful for me
to say either aye, or no: for any man that sees what I am doing, may
easily perceive what I think.
The safety of the people, requireth further, from him, or them that have
the sovereign power, that justice be equally administered to all degrees
of people; that is, that as well the rich and mighty, as poor and
obscure persons, may be righted of the injuries done them; so as the
great, may have no greater hope of impunity, when they do violence,
dishonour, or any injury to the meaner sort, than when one of these,
does the like to one of them: for in this consisteth equity; to which,
as being a precept of the law of nature, a sovereign is as much subject,
as any of the meanest of his people. All breaches of the law, are
offences against the commonwealth: but there be some, that are also
against private persons. Those that concern the commonwealth only, may
without breach of equity be pardoned; for every man may pardon what is
done against himself, according to his own discretion. But an offence
against a private man, cannot in equity be pardoned, without the consent
of him that is injured; or reasonable satisfaction.
The inequality of subjects, proceedeth from the acts of sovereign power;
and therefore has no more place in the presence of the sovereign, that
is to say, in a court of justice, than the inequality between kings and
their subjects, in the presence of the King of kings. The honour of
great persons, is to be valued for their beneficence and the aids they
give to men of inferior rank, or not at all. And the violences,
oppressions, and injuries they do, are not extenuated, but aggravated by
the greatness of their persons; because they have least need to commit
them. The consequences of this partiality towards the great, proceed in
this manner. Impunity maketh insolence; insolence, hatred; and hatred,
an endeavour to pull down all oppressing and contumelious greatness,
though with the ruin of the commonwealth.
[Sidenote: Equal taxes.]
To equal justice, appertaineth also the equal imposition of taxes; the
equality whereof dependeth not on the equality of riches, but on the
equality of the debt that every man oweth to the commonwealth for his
defence. It is not enough, for a man to labour for the maintenance of
his life; but also to fight, if need be, for the securing of his labour.
They must either do as the Jews did after their return from captivity,
in re-edifying the temple, build with one hand, and hold the sword in
the other; or else they must hire others to fight for them. For the
impositions, that are laid on the people by the sovereign power, are
nothing else but the wages, due to them that hold the public sword, to
defend private men in the exercise of their several trades, and
callings. Seeing then the benefit that every one receiveth thereby, is
the enjoyment of life, which is equally dear to poor and rich; the debt
which a poor man oweth them that defend his life, is the same which a
rich man oweth for the defence of his; saving that the rich, who have
the service of the poor, may be debtors not only for their own persons
but for many more. Which considered, the equality of imposition,
consisteth rather in the equality of that which is consumed, than of the
riches of the persons that consume the same. For what reason is there,
that he which laboureth much, and sparing the fruits of his labour,
consumeth little, should be more charged, than he that living idly,
getteth little, and spendeth all he gets; seeing the one hath no more
protection from the commonwealth, than the other? But when the
impositions, are laid upon those things which men consume, every man
payeth equally for what he useth: nor is the commonwealth defrauded by
the luxurious waste of private men.
[Sidenote: Public charity.]
And whereas many men, by accident inevitable, become unable to maintain
themselves by their labour; they ought not to be left to the charity of
private persons; but to be provided for, as far forth as the necessities
of nature require, by the laws of the commonwealth. For as it is
uncharitableness in any man, to neglect the impotent; so it is in the
sovereign of a commonwealth, to expose them to the hazard of such
uncertain charity.
[Sidenote: Prevention of idleness.]
But for such as have strong bodies, the case is otherwise: they are to
be forced to work; and to avoid the excuse of not finding employment,
there ought to be such laws, as may encourage all manner of arts; as
navigation, agriculture, fishing, and all manner of manufacture that
requires labour. The multitude of poor, and yet strong people still
increasing, they are to be transplanted into countries not sufficiently
inhabited: where nevertheless, they are not to exterminate those they
find there; but constrain them to inhabit closer together, and not to
range a great deal of ground, to snatch what they find; but to court
each little plot with art and labour, to give them their sustenance in
due season. And when all the world is overcharged with inhabitants, then
the last remedy of all is war; which provideth for every man, by
victory, or death.
[Sidenote: Good laws, what.]
To the care of the sovereign, belongeth the making of good laws. But
what is a good law? By a good law, I mean not a just law: for no law can
be unjust. The law is made by the sovereign power, and all that is done
by such power, is warranted, and owned by every one of the people; and
that which every man will have so, no man can say is unjust. It is in
the laws of a commonwealth, as in the laws of gaming: whatsoever the
gamesters all agree on, is injustice to none of them. A good law is
that, which is _needful_, for the _good of the people_, and withal
_perspicuous_.
[Sidenote: Such as are necessary.]
For the use of laws, which are but rules authorized, is not to bind the
people from all voluntary actions; but to direct and keep them in such a
motion, as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires,
rashness or indiscretion; as hedges are set, not to stop travellers, but
to keep them in their way. And therefore a law that is not needful,
having not the true end of a law, is not good. A law may be conceived to
be good, when it is for the benefit of the sovereign; though it be not
necessary for the people; but it is not so. For the good of the
sovereign and people, cannot be separated. It is a weak sovereign, that
has weak subjects; and a weak people, whose sovereign wanteth power to
rule them at his will. Unnecessary laws are not good laws; but traps for
money: which where the right of sovereign power is acknowledged, are
superfluous; and where it is not acknowledged, insufficient to defend
the people.
[Sidenote: Such as are perspicuous.]
The perspicuity, consisteth not so much in the words of the law itself,
as in a declaration of the causes, and motives for which it was made.
That is it, that shows us the meaning of the legislator; and the meaning
of the legislator known, the law is more easily understood by few, than
many words. For all words, are subject to ambiguity; and therefore
multiplication of words in the body of the law, is multiplication of
ambiguity: besides it seems to imply, by too much diligence, that
whosoever can evade the words, is without the compass of the law. And
this is a cause of many unnecessary processes. For when I consider how
short were the laws of ancient times; and how they grew by degrees still
longer; methinks I see a contention between the penners, and pleaders of
the law; the former seeking to circumscribe the latter; and the latter
to evade their circumscriptions; and that the pleaders have got the
victory. It belongeth therefore to the office of a legislator, (such as
is in all commonwealths the supreme representative, be it one man, or an
assembly), to make the reason perspicuous, why the law was made; and the
body of the law itself, as short, but in as proper, and significant
terms, as may be.
[Sidenote: Punishments.]
It belongeth also to the office of the sovereign, to make a right
application of punishments, and rewards. And seeing the end of punishing
is not revenge, and discharge of choler; but correction, either of the
offender, or of others by his example; the severest punishments are to
be inflicted for those crimes, that are of most danger to the public;
such as are those which proceed from malice to the government
established; those that spring from contempt of justice; those that
provoke indignation in the multitude; and those, which unpunished, seem
authorized, as when they are committed by sons, servants, or favourites
of men in authority. For indignation carrieth men, not only against the
actors, and authors of injustice; but against all power that is likely
to protect them; as in the case of Tarquin; when for the insolent act of
one of his sons, he was driven out of Rome, and the monarchy itself
dissolved. But crimes of infirmity; such as are those which proceed from
great provocation, from great fear, great need, or from ignorance
whether the fact be a great crime, or not, there is place many times for
lenity, without prejudice to the commonwealth; and lenity, when there is
such place for it, is required by the law of nature. The punishment of
the leaders and teachers in a commotion, not the poor seduced people,
when they are punished, can profit the commonwealth by their example. To
be severe to the people, is to punish that ignorance, which may in great
part be imputed to the sovereign, whose fault it was, that they were no
better instructed.
[Sidenote: Rewards.]
In like manner it belongeth to the office, and duty of the sovereign, to
apply his rewards always so, as there may arise from them benefit to the
commonwealth; wherein consisteth their use, and end; and is then done,
when they that have well served the commonwealth, are with as little
expense of the common treasure, as is possible, so well recompensed, as
others thereby may be encouraged, both to serve the same as faithfully
as they can, and to study the arts by which they may be enabled to do it
better. To buy with money, or preferment, from a popular ambitious
subject, to be quiet, and desist from making ill impressions in the
minds of the people, has nothing of the nature of reward; (which is
ordained not for disservice, but for service past;) nor a sign of
gratitude, but of fear; nor does it tend to the benefit, but to the
damage of the public. It is a contention with ambition, like that of
Hercules with the monster Hydra, which having many heads, for every one
that was vanquished, there grew up three. For in like manner, when the
stubbornness of one popular man, is overcome with reward, there arise
many more, by the example, that do the same mischief, in hope of like
benefit: and as all sorts of manufacture, so also malice encreaseth by
being vendible. And though sometimes a civil war, may be deferred by
such ways as that, yet the danger grows still the greater, and the
public ruin more assured. It is therefore against the duty of the
sovereign, to whom the public safety is committed, to reward those that
aspire to greatness by disturbing the peace of their country, and not
rather to oppose the beginnings of such men, with a little danger, than
after a longer time with greater.
[Sidenote: Counsellors.]
Another business of the sovereign, is to choose good counsellors; I mean
such, whose advice he is to take in the government of the commonwealth.
For this word counsel, _consilium_, corrupted from _considium_, is of a
large signification, and comprehendeth all assemblies of men that sit
together, not only to deliberate what is to be done hereafter, but also
to judge of facts past, and of law for the present. I take it here in
the first sense only: and in this sense, there is no choice of counsel,
neither in a democracy, nor aristocracy; because the persons counselling
are members of the person counselled. The choice of counsellors
therefore is proper to monarchy; in which, the sovereign that
endeavoureth not to make choice of those, that in every kind are the
most able, dischargeth not his office as he ought to do. The most able
counsellors, are they that have least hope of benefit by giving evil
counsel, and most knowledge of those things that conduce to the peace,
and defence of the commonwealth. It is a hard matter to know who
expecteth benefit from public troubles; but the signs that guide to a
just suspicion, is the soothing of the people in their unreasonable, or
irremediable grievances, by men whose estates are not sufficient to
discharge their accustomed expenses, and may easily be observed by any
one whom it concerns to know it. But to know, who has most knowledge of
the public affairs, is yet harder; and they that know them, need them a
great deal the less. For to know, who knows the rules almost of any art,
is a great degree of the knowledge of the same art; because no man can
be assured of the truth of another’s rules, but he that is first taught
to understand them. But the best signs of knowledge of any art, are,
much conversing in it, and constant good effects of it. Good counsel
comes not by lot, nor by inheritance; and therefore there is no more
reason to expect good advice from the rich or noble, in matter of state,
than in delineating the dimensions of a fortress; unless we shall think
there needs no method in the study of the politics, as there does in the
study of geometry, but only to be lookers on; which is not so. For the
politics is the harder study of the two. Whereas in these parts of
Europe, it hath been taken for a right of certain persons, to have place
in the highest council of state by inheritance; it is derived from the
conquests of the ancient Germans; wherein many absolute lords joining
together to conquer other nations, would not enter into the confederacy,
without such privileges, as might be marks of difference in time
following, between their posterity, and the posterity of their subjects;
which privileges being inconsistent with the sovereign power, by the
favour of the sovereign, they may seem to keep; but contending for them
as their right, they must needs by degrees let them go, and have at last
no further honour, than adhereth naturally to their abilities.
And how able soever be the counsellors in any affair, the benefit of
their counsel is greater, when they give every one his advice, and the
reasons of it apart, than when they do it in an assembly, by way of
orations; and when they have premeditated, than when they speak on the
sudden; both because they have more time, to survey the consequences of
action; and are less subject to be carried away to contradiction,
through envy, emulation, or other passions arising from the difference
of opinion.
The best counsel, in those things that concern not other nations, but
only the ease and benefit the subjects may enjoy, by laws that look only
inward, is to be taken from the general informations, and complaints of
the people of each province, who are best acquainted with their own
wants, and ought therefore, when they demand nothing in derogation of
the essential rights of sovereignty, to be diligently taken notice of.
For without those essential rights, as I have often before said, the
commonwealth cannot at all subsist.
[Sidenote: Commanders.]
A commander of an army in chief, if he be not popular, shall not be
beloved nor feared as he ought to be by his army; and consequently,
cannot perform that office with good success. He must therefore be
industrious, valiant, affable, liberal and fortunate, that he may gain
an opinion both of sufficiency, and of loving his soldiers. This is
popularity, and breeds in the soldiers both desire, and courage, to
recommend themselves to his favour; and protects the severity of the
general in punishing, when need is, the mutinous, or negligent soldiers.
But this love of soldiers, if caution be not given of the commander’s
fidelity, is a dangerous thing to sovereign power; especially when it is
in the hands of an assembly not popular. It belongeth therefore to the
safety of the people, both that they be good conductors, and faithful
subjects, to whom the sovereign commits his armies.
But when the sovereign himself is popular; that is, reverenced and
beloved of his people, there is no danger at all from the popularity of
a subject. For soldiers are never so generally unjust, as to side with
their captain though they love him, against their sovereign, when they
love not only his person, but also his cause. And therefore those, who
by violence have at any time suppressed the power of their lawful
sovereign, before they could settle themselves in his place, have been
always put to the trouble of contriving their titles, to save the people
from the shame of receiving them. To have a known right to sovereign
power, is so popular a quality, as he that has it needs no more, for his
own part, to turn the hearts of his subjects to him, but that they see
him able absolutely to govern his own family: nor, on the part of his
enemies, but a disbanding of their armies. For the greatest and most
active part of mankind, has never hitherto been well contented with the
present.
Concerning the offices of one sovereign to another, which are
comprehended in that law, which is commonly called the _law of nations_,
I need not say anything in this place; because the law of nations, and
the law of nature, is the same thing. And every sovereign hath the same
right, in procuring the safety of his people, that any particular man
can have, in procuring the safety of his own body. And the same law,
that dictateth to men that have no civil government, what they ought to
do, and what to avoid in regard of one another, dictateth the same to
commonwealths, that is, to the consciences of sovereign princes and
sovereign assemblies; there being no court of natural justice, but in
the conscience only; where not man, but God reigneth; whose laws, such
of them as oblige all mankind, in respect of God, as he is the author of
nature, are _natural_; and in respect of the same God, as he is King of
kings, are _laws_. But of the kingdom of God, as King of kings, and as
King also of a peculiar people, I shall speak in the rest of this
discourse.
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CHAPTER XXXI.
OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD BY NATURE.
[Sidenote: The scope of the following chapters.]
That the condition of mere nature, that is to say, of absolute liberty,
such as is theirs, that neither are sovereigns, nor subjects, is
anarchy, and the condition of war: that the precepts, by which men are
guided to avoid that condition, are the laws of nature: that a
commonwealth, without sovereign power, is but a word without substance,
and cannot stand: that subjects owe to sovereigns, simple obedience, in
all things wherein their obedience is not repugnant to the laws of God,
I have sufficiently proved, in that which I have already written. There
wants only, for the entire knowledge of civil duty, to know what are
those laws of God. For without that, a man knows not, when he is
commanded any thing by the civil power, whether it be contrary to the
law of God, or not: and so, either by too much civil obedience, offends
the Divine Majesty; or through fear of offending God, transgresses the
commandments of the commonwealth. To avoid both these rocks, it is
necessary to know what are the laws divine. And seeing the knowledge of
all law, dependeth on the knowledge of the sovereign power, I shall say
something in that which followeth, of the KINGDOM OF GOD.
[Sidenote: Who are subjects in the kingdom of God.]
_God is king, let the earth rejoice_, saith the psalmist, (xcvii. 1).
And again, (_Psalm_ xcix. 1) _God is king, though the nations be angry;
and he that sitteth on the cherubims, though the earth be moved_.
Whether men will or not, they must be subject always to the divine
power. By denying the existence, or providence of God, men may shake off
their ease, but not their yoke. But to call this power of God, which
extendeth itself not only to man, but also to beasts, and plants, and
bodies inanimate, by the name of kingdom, is but a metaphorical use of
the word. For he only is properly said to reign, that governs his
subjects by his word, and by promise of rewards to those that obey it,
and by threatening them with punishment that obey it not. Subjects
therefore in the kingdom of God, are not bodies inanimate, nor creatures
irrational; because they understand no precepts as his: nor atheists,
nor they that believe not that God has any care of the actions of
mankind; because they acknowledge no word for his, nor have hope of his
rewards or fear of his threatenings. They therefore that believe there
is a God that governeth the world, and hath given precepts, and
propounded rewards, and punishments to mankind, are God’s subjects; all
the rest, are to be understood as enemies.
[Sidenote: A threefold word of God, reason, revelation, prophecy.]
To rule by words, requires that such words be manifestly made known; for
else they are no laws: for to the nature of laws belongeth a sufficient,
and clear promulgation, such as may take away the excuse of ignorance;
which in the laws of men is but of one only kind, and that is,
proclamation, or promulgation by the voice of man. But God declareth his
laws three ways; by the dictates of _natural reason_, by _revelation_,
and by the _voice_ of some _man_, to whom by the operation of miracles,
he procureth credit with the rest. From hence there ariseth a triple
word of God, _rational_, _sensible_, and _prophetic_: to which
correspondeth a triple hearing; _right reason_, _sense supernatural_,
and _faith_. As for sense supernatural, which consisteth in revelation
or inspiration, there have not been any universal laws so given, because
God speaketh not in that manner but to particular persons, and to divers
men divers things.
[Sidenote: A twofold kingdom of God, natural and prophetic.]
From the difference between the other two kinds of God’s word,
_rational_, and _prophetic_, there may be attributed to God, a twofold
kingdom, _natural_, and _prophetic_: natural, wherein he governeth as
many of mankind as acknowledge his providence, by the natural dictates
of right reason; and prophetic, wherein having chosen out one peculiar
nation, the Jews, for his subjects, he governed them, and none but them,
not only by natural reason, but by positive laws, which he gave them by
the mouths of his holy prophets. Of the natural kingdom of God I intend
to speak in this chapter.
[Sidenote: The right of God’s sovereignty is derived from his
omnipotence.]
The right of nature, whereby God reigneth over men, and punisheth those
that break his laws, is to be derived, not from his creating them, as if
he required obedience as of gratitude for his benefits; but from his
_irresistible power_. I have formerly shown, how the sovereign right
ariseth from pact: to show how the same right may arise from nature,
requires no more, but to show in what case it is never taken away.
Seeing all men by nature had right to all things, they had right every
one to reign over all the rest. But because this right could not be
obtained by force, it concerned the safety of every one, laying by that
right, to set up men, with sovereign authority, by common consent, to
rule and defend them: whereas if there had been any man of power
irresistible, there had been no reason, why he should not by that power
have ruled and defended both himself, and them, according to his own
discretion. To those therefore whose power is irresistible, the dominion
of all men adhereth naturally by their excellence of power; and
consequently it is from that power, that the kingdom over men, and the
right of afflicting men at his pleasure, belongeth naturally to God
Almighty; not as Creator, and gracious; but as omnipotent. And though
punishment be due for sin only, because by that word is understood
affliction for sin; yet the right of afflicting, is not always derived
from men’s sin, but from God’s power.
[Sidenote: Sin not the cause of all affliction.]
This question, _why evil men often prosper, and good men suffer
adversity_, has been much disputed by the ancient, and is the same with
this of ours, _by what right God dispenseth the prosperities and
adversities of this life_; and is of that difficulty, as it hath shaken
the faith, not only of the vulgar, but of philosophers, and which is
more, of the Saints, concerning the Divine Providence. _How good_, saith
David, (_Psalm_ lxxiii. 1, 2, 3) _is the God of Israel to those that are
upright in heart; and yet my feet were almost gone, my treadings had
well-nigh slipt; for I was grieved at the wicked, when I saw the ungodly
in such prosperity_. And Job, how earnestly does he expostulate with
God, for the many afflictions he suffered, notwithstanding his
righteousness? This question in the case of Job, is decided by God
himself, not by arguments derived from Job’s sin, but his own power. For
whereas the friends of Job drew their arguments from his affliction to
his sin, and he defended himself by the conscience of his innocence, God
himself taketh up the matter, and having justified the affliction by
arguments drawn from his power, such as this, (_Job_ xxxviii. 4) _Where
wast thou, when I laid the foundations of the earth?_ and the like, both
approved Job’s innocence, and reproved the erroneous doctrine of his
friends. Conformable to this doctrine is the sentence of our Saviour,
concerning the man that was born blind, in these words, _Neither hath
this man sinned, nor his fathers; but that the works of God might be
made manifest in him_. And though it be said, _that death entered into
the world by sin_, (by which is meant, that if Adam had never sinned, he
had never died, that is, never suffered any separation of his soul from
his body,) it follows not thence, that God could not justly have
afflicted him, though he had not sinned, as well as he afflicteth other
living creatures, that cannot sin.
[Sidenote: Divine laws.]
Having spoken of the right of God’s sovereignty, as grounded only on
nature; we are to consider next, what are the Divine laws, or dictates
of natural reason; which laws concern either the natural duties of one
man to another, or the honour naturally due to our Divine Sovereign. The
first are the same laws of nature, of which I have spoken already in the
fourteenth and fifteenth chapters of this treatise; namely, equity,
justice, mercy, humility, and the rest of the moral virtues. It
remaineth therefore that we consider, what precepts are dictated to men,
by their natural reason only, without other word of God, touching the
honour and worship of the Divine Majesty.
[Sidenote: Honour and worship, what.]
Honour consisteth in the inward thought, and opinion of the power, and
goodness of another; and therefore to honour God, is to think as highly
of his power and goodness, as is possible. And of that opinion, the
external signs appearing in the words and actions of men, are called
_worship_; which is one part of that which the Latins understand by the
word _cultus_. For _cultus_ signifieth properly, and constantly, that
labour which a man bestows on anything, with a purpose to make benefit
by it. Now those things whereof we make benefit, are either subject to
us, and the profit they yield, followeth the labour we bestow upon them,
as a natural effect; or they are not subject to us, but answer our
labour, according to their own wills. In the first sense the labour
bestowed on the earth, is called _culture_; and the education of
children, a _culture_ of their minds. In the second sense, where men’s
wills are to be wrought to our purpose, not by force, but by
complaisance, it signifieth as much as courting, that is, a winning of
favour by good offices; as by praises, by acknowledging their power, and
by whatsoever is pleasing to them from whom we look for any benefit. And
this is properly _worship_: in which sense _Publicola_, is understood
for a worshipper of the people; and _cultus Dei_, for the worship of
God.
[Sidenote: Several signs of honour.]
From internal honour, consisting in the opinion of power and goodness,
arise three passions; _love_, which hath reference to goodness; and
_hope_, and _fear_, that relate to power: and three parts of external
worship; _praise_, _magnifying_, and _blessing_: the subject of praise,
being goodness; the subject of magnifying and blessing, being power, and
the effect thereof felicity. Praise, and magnifying are signified both
by words, and actions: by words, when we say a man is good, or great: by
actions, when we thank him for his bounty, and obey his power. The
opinion of the happiness of another, can only be expressed by words.
[Sidenote: Worship natural and arbitrary.]
There be some signs of honour, both in attributes and actions, that be
naturally so; as amongst attributes, _good_, _just_, _liberal_, and the
like; and amongst actions, _prayers_, _thanks_, and _obedience_. Others
are so by institution, or custom of men; and in some times and places
are honourable; in others, dishonourable; in others, indifferent: such
as are the gestures in salutation, prayer, and thanksgiving, in
different times and places, differently used. The former is _natural_;
the latter _arbitrary_ worship.
[Sidenote: Worship commanded and free.]
And of arbitrary worship, there be two differences: for sometimes it is
a _commanded_, sometimes _voluntary_ worship: commanded, when it is such
as he requireth, who is worshipped: free, when it is such as the
worshipper thinks fit. When it is commanded, not the words, or gesture,
but the obedience is the worship. But when free, the worship consists in
the opinion of the beholders: for if to them the words, or actions by
which we intend honour, seem ridiculous, and tending to contumely, they
are no worship, because no signs of honour; and no signs of honour,
because a sign is not a sign to him that giveth it, but to him to whom
it is made, that is, to the spectator.
[Sidenote: Worship public and private.]
Again, there is a _public_, and a _private_ worship. Public, is the
worship that a commonwealth performeth, as one person. Private, is that
which a private person exhibiteth. Public, in respect of the whole
commonwealth, is free; but in respect of particular men, it is not so.
Private, is in secret free; but in the sight of the multitude, it is
never without some restraint, either from the laws, or from the opinion
of men; which is contrary to the nature of liberty.
[Sidenote: The end of worship.]
The end of worship amongst men, is power. For where a man seeth another
worshipped, he supposeth him powerful, and is the readier to obey him;
which makes his power greater. But God has no ends: the worship we do
him, proceeds from our duty, and is directed according to our capacity,
by those rules of honour, that reason dictateth to be done by the weak
to the more potent men, in hope of benefit, for fear of damage, or in
thankfulness for good already received from them.
[Sidenote: Attributes of divine honour.]
That we may know what worship of God is taught us by the light of
nature, I will begin with his attributes. Where, first, it is manifest,
we ought to attribute to him _existence_. For no man can have the will
to honour that, which he thinks not to have any being.
Secondly, that those philosophers, who said the world, or the soul of
the world was God, spake unworthily of him; and denied his existence.
For by God, is understood the cause of the world; and to say the world
is God, is to say there is no cause of it, that is, no God.
Thirdly, to say the world was not created, but eternal, seeing that
which is eternal has no cause, is to deny there is a God.
Fourthly, that they who attributing, as they think, ease to God, take
from him the care of mankind; take from him his honour: for it takes
away men’s love, and fear of him; which is the root of honour.
Fifthly, in those things that signify greatness, and power; to say he is
_finite_, is not to honour him: for it is not a sign of the will to
honour God, to attribute to him less than we can; and finite, is less
than we can; because to finite, it is easy to add more.
Therefore to attribute _figure_ to him, is not honour; for all figure is
finite:
Nor to say we conceive, and imagine, or have an _idea_ of him, in our
mind: for whatsoever we conceive is finite:
Nor to attribute to him _parts_, or _totality_; which are the attributes
only of things finite:
Nor to say he is in this, or that _place_: for whatsoever is in place,
is bounded, and finite: Nor that he is _moved_, or _resteth_: for both
these attributes ascribe to him place:
Nor that there be more Gods than one; because it implies them all
finite: for there cannot be more than one infinite:
Nor to ascribe to him, (unless metaphorically, meaning not the passion
but the effect,) passions that partake of grief; as _repentance_,
_anger_, _mercy_: or of want; as _appetite_, _hope_, _desire_; or of any
passive faculty: for passion, is power limited by somewhat else.
And therefore when we ascribe to God a _will_, it is not to be
understood, as that of man, for a _rational appetite_; but as the power,
by which he effecteth every thing.
Likewise when we attribute to him _sight_, and other acts of sense; as
also _knowledge_, and _understanding_; which in us is nothing else, but
a tumult of the mind, raised by external things that press the organical
parts of man’s body: for there is no such thing in God; and being things
that depend on natural causes, cannot be attributed to him.
He that will attribute to God, nothing but what is warranted by natural
reason, must either use such negative attributes, as _infinite_,
_eternal_, _incomprehensible_; or superlatives, as _most high_, _most
great_, and the like; or indefinite, as _good_, _just_, _holy_,
_creator_; and in such sense, as if he meant not to declare what he is,
(for that were to circumscribe him within the limits of our fancy,) but
how much we admire him, and how ready we would be to obey him; which is
a sign of humility, and of a will to honour him as much as we can. For
there is but one name to signify our conception of his nature, and that
is, I AM: and but one name of his relation to us, and that is, _God_; in
which is contained Father, King, and Lord.
[Sidenote: Actions that are signs of divine honour.]
Concerning the actions of divine worship, it is a most general precept
of reason, that they be signs of the intention to honour God; such as
are, first, _prayers_. For not the carvers, when they made images, were
thought to make them gods; but the people that _prayed_ to them.
Secondly, _thanksgiving_; which differeth from prayer in divine worship,
no otherwise, than that prayers precede, and thanks succeed the benefit;
the end, both of the one and the other, being to acknowledge God, for
author of all benefits, as well past, as future.
Thirdly, _gifts_, that is to say, _sacrifices_ and _oblations_, if they
be of the best, are signs of honour: for they are thanksgivings.
Fourthly, _not to swear by any but God_, is naturally a sign of honour:
for it is a confession that God only knoweth the heart; and that no
man’s wit or strength can protect a man against God’s vengeance on the
perjured.
Fifthly, it is a part of rational worship, to speak considerately of
God; for it argues a fear of him, and fear is a confession of his power.
Hence followeth, that the name of God is not to be used rashly, and to
no purpose; for that is as much, as in vain: and it is to no purpose,
unless it be by way of oath, and by order of the commonwealth, to make
judgments certain; or between commonwealths, to avoid war. And that
disputing of God’s nature is contrary to his honour: for it is supposed,
that in this natural kingdom of God, there is no other way to know
anything, but by natural reason, that is, from the principles of natural
science; which are so far from teaching us any thing of God’s nature, as
they cannot teach us our own nature, nor the nature of the smallest
creature living. And therefore, when men out of the principles of
natural reason, dispute of the attributes of God, they but dishonour
him: for in the attributes which we give to God, we are not to consider
the signification of philosophical truth; but the signification of pious
intention, to do him the greatest honour we are able. From the want of
which consideration, have proceeded the volumes of disputation about the
nature of God, that tend not to his honour, but to the honour of our own
wits and learning; and are nothing else but inconsiderate and vain
abuses of his sacred name.
Sixthly, in _prayers_, _thanksgivings_, _offerings_, and _sacrifices_,
it is a dictate of natural reason, that they be every one in his kind
the best, and most significant of honour. As for example, that prayers
and thanksgiving, be made in words and phrases, not sudden, nor light,
nor plebeian; but beautiful, and well composed. For else we do not God
as much honour as we can. And therefore the heathens did absurdly, to
worship images for gods: but their doing it in verse, and with music,
both of voice and instruments, was reasonable. Also that the beasts they
offered in sacrifice, and the gifts they offered, and their actions in
worshipping, were full of submission, and commemorative of benefits
received, was according to reason, as proceeding from an intention to
honour him.
Seventhly, reason directeth not only to worship God in secret; but also,
and especially, in public, and in the sight of men. For without that,
that which in honour is most acceptable, the procuring others to honour
him, is lost.
Lastly, obedience to his laws, that is, in this case to the laws of
nature, is the greatest worship of all. For as obedience is more
acceptable to God than sacrifice; so also to set light by his
commandments, is the greatest of all contumelies. And these are the laws
of that divine worship, which natural reason dictateth to private men.
[Sidenote: Public worship consisteth in uniformity.]
But seeing a commonwealth is but one person, it ought also to exhibit to
God but one worship; which then it doth, when it commandeth it to be
exhibited by private men, publicly. And this is public worship; the
property whereof, is to be _uniform_: for those actions that are done
differently, by different men, cannot be said to be a public worship.
And therefore, where many sorts of worship be allowed, proceeding from
the different religions of private men, it cannot be said there is any
public worship, nor that the commonwealth is of any religion at all.
[Sidenote: All attributes depend on the laws civil.]
And because words, and consequently the attributes of God, have their
signification by agreement and constitution of men, those attributes are
to be held significative of honour, that men intend shall so be; and
whatsoever may be done by the wills of particular men, where there is no
law but reason, may be done by the will of the commonwealth, by laws
civil. And because a commonwealth hath no will, nor makes no laws, but
those that are made by the will of him, or them that have the sovereign
power; it followeth that those attributes which the sovereign ordaineth,
in the worship of God, for signs of honour, ought to be taken and used
for such, by private men in their public worship.
[Sidenote: Not all actions.]
But because not all actions are signs by constitution, but some are
naturally signs of honour, others of contumely; these latter, which are
those that men are ashamed to do in the sight of them they reverence,
cannot be made by human power a part of Divine worship; nor the former,
such as are decent, modest, humble behaviour, ever be separated from it.
But whereas there be an infinite number of actions and gestures of an
indifferent nature; such of them as the commonwealth shall ordain to be
publicly and universally in use, as signs of honour, and part of God’s
worship, are to be taken and used for such by the subjects. And that
which is said in the Scripture, _It is better to obey God than man_,
hath place in the kingdom of God by pact, and not by nature.
[Sidenote: Natural punishments.]
Having thus briefly spoken of the natural kingdom of God, and his
natural laws, I will add only to this chapter a short declaration of his
natural punishments. There is no action of man in this life, that is not
the beginning of so long a chain of consequences, as no human providence
is high enough, to give a man a prospect to the end. And in this chain,
there are linked together both pleasing and unpleasing events; in such
manner, as he that will do anything for his pleasure, must engage
himself to suffer all the pains annexed to it; and these pains, are the
natural punishments of those actions, which are the beginning of more
harm than good. And hereby it comes to pass, that intemperance is
naturally punished with diseases; rashness, with mischances; injustice,
with the violence of enemies; pride, with ruin; cowardice, with
oppression; negligent government of princes, with rebellion; and
rebellion, with slaughter. For seeing punishments are consequent to the
breach of laws; natural punishments must be naturally consequent to the
breach of the laws of nature; and therefore follow them as their
natural, not arbitrary effects.
[Sidenote: The conclusion of the second part.]
And thus far concerning the constitution, nature, and right of
sovereigns, and concerning the duty of subjects, derived from the
principles of natural reason. And now, considering how different this
doctrine is, from the practice of the greatest part of the world,
especially of these western parts, that have received their moral
learning from Rome and Athens; and how much depth of moral philosophy is
required, in them that have the administration of the sovereign power; I
am at the point of believing this my labour, as useless, as the
commonwealth of Plato. For he also is of opinion that it is impossible
for the disorders of state, and change of governments by civil war, ever
to be taken away, till sovereigns be philosophers. But when I consider
again, that the science of natural justice, is the only science
necessary for sovereigns and their principal ministers; and that they
need not be charged with the sciences mathematical, as by Plato they
are, farther than by good laws to encourage men to the study of them;
and that neither Plato, nor any other philosopher hitherto, hath put
into order, and sufficiently or probably proved all the theorems of
moral doctrine, that men may learn thereby, both how to govern, and how
to obey; I recover some hope, that one time or other, this writing of
mine may fall into the hands of a sovereign, who will consider it
himself, (for it is short, and I think clear,) without the help of any
interested, or envious interpreter; and by the exercise of entire
sovereignty, in protecting the public teaching of it, convert this truth
of speculation, into the utility of practice.
PART III.
OF A
CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH.
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CHAPTER XXXII.
OF THE PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN POLITICS.
[Sidenote: The word of God delivered by prophets is the main principle
of Christian politics.]
I have derived the rights of sovereign power, and the duty of subjects,
hitherto from the principles of nature only; such as experience has
found true, or consent concerning the use of words has made so; that is
to say, from the nature of men, known to us by experience, and from
definitions of such words as are essential to all political reasoning,
universally agreed on. But in that I am next to handle, which is the
nature and rights of a CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH, whereof there dependeth
much upon supernatural revelations of the will of God; the ground of my
discourse must be, not only the natural word of God, but also the
prophetical.
[Sidenote: Yet is not natural reason to be renounced.]
Nevertheless, we are not to renounce our senses, and experience; nor,
that which is the undoubted word of God, our natural reason. For they
are the talents which he hath put into our hands to negotiate, till the
coming again of our blessed Saviour; and therefore not to be folded up
in the napkin of an implicit faith, but employed in the purchase of
justice, peace, and true religion. For though there be many things in
God’s word above reason; that it is to say, which cannot by natural
reason be either demonstrated, or confuted; yet there is nothing
contrary to it; but when it seemeth so, the fault is either in our
unskilful interpretation, or erroneous ratiocination.
Therefore, when anything therein written is too hard for our
examination, we are bidden to captivate our understanding to the words;
and not to labour in sifting out a philosophical truth by logic, of such
mysteries as are not comprehensible, nor fall under any rule of natural
science. For it is with the mysteries of our religion, as with wholesome
pills for the sick; which swallowed whole, have the virtue to cure; but
chewed, are for the most part cast up again without effect.
[Sidenote: What it is to captivate the understanding.]
But by the captivity of our understanding, is not meant a submission of
the intellectual faculty to the opinion of any other man; but of the
will to obedience, where obedience is due. For sense, memory,
understanding, reason, and opinion are not in our power to change; but
always, and necessarily such, as the things we see, hear, and consider
suggest unto us; and therefore are not effects of our will, but our will
of them. We then captivate our understanding and reason, when we forbear
contradiction; when we so speak, as by lawful authority we are
commanded; and when we live accordingly; which, in sum, is trust and
faith reposed in him that speaketh, though the mind be incapable of any
notion at all from the words spoken.
[Sidenote: How God speaketh to men.]
When God speaketh to man, it must be either immediately; or by mediation
of another man, to whom he had formerly spoken by himself immediately.
How God speaketh to a man immediately, may be understood by those well
enough, to whom he hath so spoken; but how the same should be understood
by another, is hard, if not impossible to know. For if a man pretend to
me, that God hath spoken to him supernaturally and immediately, and I
make doubt of it, I cannot easily perceive what argument he can produce,
to oblige me to believe it. It is true, that if he be my sovereign, he
may oblige me to obedience, so, as not by act or word to declare I
believe him not; but not to think any otherwise than my reason persuades
me. But if one that hath not such authority over me, should pretend the
same, there is nothing that exacteth either belief, or obedience.
For to say that God hath spoken to him in the Holy Scripture, is not to
say God hath spoken to him immediately, but by mediation of the
prophets, or of the apostles, or of the church, in such manner as he
speaks to all other Christian men. To say he hath spoken to him in a
dream, is no more than to say he dreamed that God spake to him; which is
not of force to win belief from any man, that knows dreams are for the
most part natural, and may proceed from former thoughts; and such dreams
as that, from self-conceit, and foolish arrogance, and false opinion of
a man’s own godliness, or other virtue, by which he thinks he hath
merited the favour of extraordinary revelation. To say he hath seen a
vision, or heard a voice, is to say, that he hath dreamed between
sleeping and waking: for in such manner a man doth many times naturally
take his dream for a vision, as not having well observed his own
slumbering. To say he speaks by supernatural inspiration, is to say he
finds an ardent desire to speak, or some strong opinion of himself, for
which he can allege no natural and sufficient reason. So that though God
Almighty can speak to a man by dreams, visions, voice, and inspiration;
yet he obliges no man to believe he hath so done to him that pretends
it; who, being a man, may err, and, which is more, may lie.
[Sidenote: By what marks prophets are known.]
How then can he, to whom God hath never revealed his will immediately,
saving by the way of natural reason, know when he is to obey, or not to
obey his word, delivered by him that says he is a prophet? Of four
hundred prophets, of whom the king of Israel asked counsel, concerning
the war he made against Ramoth Gilead, (_1 Kings_, xxii.) only Micaiah
was a true one. The prophet that was sent to prophecy against the altar
set up by Jeroboam, (_1 Kings_, xiii.) though a true prophet, and that
by two miracles done in his presence, appears to be a prophet sent from
God, was yet deceived by another old prophet, that persuaded him as from
the mouth of God, to eat and drink with him. If one prophet deceive
another, what certainty is there of knowing the will of God, by other
way than that of reason? To which I answer out of the Holy Scripture,
that there be two marks, by which together, not asunder, a true prophet
is to be known. One is the doing of miracles; the other is the not
teaching any other religion than that which is already established.
Asunder, I say, neither of these is sufficient. _If a prophet rise
amongst you, or a dreamer of dreams, and shall pretend the doing of a
miracle and the miracle come to pass; if he say, Let us follow strange
Gods, which thou hast not known, thou shalt not hearken to him, &c. But
that prophet and dreamer of dreams shall be put to death, because he
hath spoken to you to revolt from the Lord your God._ (_Deut._ xiii.
1-5.) In which words two things are to be observed; first, that God will
not have miracles alone serve for arguments, to approve the prophet’s
calling; but, as it is in the third verse, for an experiment of the
constancy of our adherence to himself. For the works of the Egyptian
sorcerers, though not so great as those of Moses, yet were great
miracles. Secondly, that how great soever the miracle be, yet if it tend
to stir up revolt against the king, or him that governeth by the king’s
authority, he that doth such miracle, is not to be considered otherwise
than as sent to make trial of their allegiance. For these words, _revolt
from the Lord your God_, are in this place equivalent to _revolt from
your king_. For they had made God their king by pact at the foot of
Mount Sinai; who ruled them by Moses only; for he only spake with God,
and from time to time declared God’s commandments to the people. In like
manner, after our Saviour Christ had made his disciples acknowledge him
for the Messiah, (that is to say, for God’s anointed, whom the nation of
the Jews daily expected for their king, but refused when he came,) he
omitted not to advertise them of the danger of miracles. _There shall
arise_, saith he, _false Christs, and false prophets, and shall do great
wonders and miracles, even to the seducing, if it were possible, of the
very elect_. (_Matt._ xxiv. 24.) By which it appears, that false
prophets may have the power of miracles; yet are we not to take their
doctrine for God’s word. St. Paul says farther to the Galatians, (_Gal._
i. 8.) that _if himself, or an angel from heaven preach another gospel
to them, than he had preached, let him be accursed_. That gospel was,
that Christ was King; so that all preaching against the power of the
king received, in consequence to these words, is by St. Paul accursed.
For his speech is addressed to those, who by his preaching had already
received Jesus for the Christ, that is to say, for King of the Jews.
[Sidenote: The marks of a prophet in the old law, miracles, and doctrine
comformable to the law.]
And as miracles, without preaching that doctrine which God hath
established; so preaching the true doctrine, without the doing of
miracles, is an insufficient argument of immediate revelation. For if a
man that teacheth not false doctrine, should pretend to be a prophet
without showing any miracle, he is never the more to be regarded for his
pretence, as is evident by _Deut._ xviii. v. 21, 22, _If thou say in thy
heart, How shall we know that the word_ (of the prophet) _is not that
which the Lord hath spoken? when the prophet shall have spoken in the
name of the Lord, that which shall not come to pass, that is the word
which the Lord hath not spoken, but the prophet has spoken it out of the
pride of his own heart, fear him not._ But a man may here again ask,
when the prophet hath foretold a thing, how shall we know whether it
will come to pass or not? For he may foretell it as a thing to arrive
after a certain long time, longer than the time of man’s life; or
indefinitely, that it will come to pass one time or other: in which case
this mark of a prophet is unuseful; and therefore the miracles that
oblige us to believe a prophet, ought to be confirmed by an immediate,
or a not long deferred event. So that it is manifest, that the teaching
of the religion which God hath established, and the showing of a present
miracle, joined together, were the only marks whereby the Scripture
would have a true prophet, that is to say, immediate revelation, to be
acknowledged; neither of them being singly sufficient to oblige any
other man to regard what he saith.
[Sidenote: Miracles ceasing, prophets cease, and the Scripture supplies
their place.]
Seeing therefore miracles now cease, we have no sign left, whereby to
acknowledge the pretended revelations or inspirations of any private
man; nor obligation to give ear to any doctrine, farther than it is
conformable to the Holy Scriptures, which since the time of our Saviour,
supply the place, and sufficiently recompense the want of all other
prophecy; and from which, by wise and learned interpretation, and
careful ratiocination, all rules and precepts necessary to the knowledge
of our duty both to God and man, without enthusiasm or supernatural
inspiration, may easily be deduced. And this Scripture is it, out of
which I am to take the principles of my discourse, concerning the rights
of those that are the supreme governors on earth of Christian
commonwealths; and of the duty of Christian subjects towards their
sovereigns. And to that end, I shall speak in the next chapter, of the
books, writers, scope and authority of the Bible.
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CHAPTER XXXIII.
OF THE NUMBER, ANTIQUITY, SCOPE, AUTHORITY
AND INTERPRETERS OF THE BOOKS OF
HOLY SCRIPTURE.
[Sidenote: Of the books of Holy Scripture.]
By the Books of Holy SCRIPTURE, are understood those, which ought to be
the _canon_, that is to say, the rules of Christian life.
And because all rules of life, which men are in conscience bound to
observe, are laws; the question of the Scripture, is the question of
what is law throughout all Christendom, both natural and civil. For
though it be not determined in Scripture, what laws every Christian king
shall constitute in his own dominions; yet it is determined what laws he
shall not constitute. Seeing therefore I have already proved, that
sovereigns in their own dominions are the sole legislators; those books
only are canonical, that is, law, in every nation, which are established
for such by the sovereign authority. It is true, that God is the
sovereign of all sovereigns; and therefore, when he speaks to any
subject, he ought to be obeyed, whatsoever any earthly potentate command
to the contrary. But the question is not of obedience to God, but of
_when_ and _what_ God hath said; which to subjects that have no
supernatural revelation, cannot be known, but by that natural reason,
which guideth them, for the obtaining of peace and justice, to obey the
authority of their several commonwealths, that is to say, of their
lawful sovereigns. According to this obligation, I can acknowledge no
other books of the Old Testament, to be Holy Scripture, but those which
have been commanded to be acknowledged for such, by the authority of the
Church of England. What books these are, is sufficiently known, without
a catalogue of them here; and they are the same that are acknowledged by
St. Jerome, who holdeth the rest, namely, the _Wisdom of Solomon_,
_Ecclesiasticus_, _Judith_, _Tobias_, the first and the second of
_Maccabees_, (though he had seen the first in Hebrew,) and the third and
fourth of _Esdras_, for _Apocrypha_. Of the canonical, Josephus, a
learned Jew, that wrote in the time of the emperor Domitian, reckoneth
_twenty-two_, making the number agree with the Hebrew alphabet. St.
Jerome does the same, though they reckon them in different manner. For
Josephus numbers _five_ Books of _Moses_, _thirteen_ of _Prophets_ that
writ the history of their own times, (which how it agrees with the
prophets’ writings contained in the Bible we shall see hereafter,) and
_four_ of _hymns_ and moral precepts. But St. Jerome reckons _five_
books of _Moses_, _eight_ of _Prophets_, and _nine_ of other Holy Writ,
which he calls of ἁγιόγραφα. The Septuagint, who were seventy learned
men of the Jews, sent for by Ptolemy, king of Egypt, to translate the
Jewish law out of the Hebrew into the Greek, have left us no other for
Holy Scripture in the Greek tongue, but the same that are received in
the Church of England.
[Sidenote: Their antiquity.]
As for the Books of the New Testament, they are equally acknowledged for
canon by all Christian churches, and by all sects of Christians, that
admit any books at all for canonical.
Who were the original writers of the several Books of Holy Scripture,
has not been made evident by any sufficient testimony of other history,
which is the only proof of matter of fact; nor can be, by any arguments
of natural reason: for reason serves only to convince the truth, not of
fact, but, of consequence. The light therefore that must guide us in
this question, must be that which is held out unto us from the books
themselves: and this light, though it show us not the writer of every
book, yet it is not unuseful to give us knowledge of the time, wherein
they were written.
[Sidenote: The Pentateuch not written by Moses.]
And first, for the _Pentateuch_, it is not argument enough that they
were written by Moses, because they are called the five Books of
_Moses_; no more than these titles, the Book of _Joshua_, the Book of
_Judges_, the Book of _Ruth_, and the Books of the _Kings_, are
arguments sufficient to prove, that they were written by _Joshua_, by
the _Judges_, by _Ruth_, and by the _Kings_. For in titles of books, the
subject is marked, as often as the writer. The history of Livy, denotes
the writer; but the history of Scanderberg, is denominated from the
subject. We read in the last chapter of _Deuteronomy_, verse 6th,
concerning the sepulchre of Moses, _that no man knoweth of his sepulchre
to this day_, that is, to to the day wherein those words were written.
It is therefore manifest, that those words were written after his
interment. For it were a strange interpretation, to say Moses spake of
his own sepulchre, though by prophecy, that it was not found to that
day, wherein he was yet living. But it may perhaps be alleged, that the
last chapter only, not the whole Pentateuch, was written by some other
man, but the rest not. Let us therefore consider that which we find in
the book of Genesis, (xii. 6.) _And Abraham passed through the land to
the place of Sichem, unto the plain of Moreh, and the_ Canaanite _was
then in the land_; which must needs be the words of one that wrote when
the Canaanite was not in the land; and consequently, not of Moses, who
died before he came into it. Likewise _Numbers_, xxi. 14, the writer
citeth another more ancient book, entitled, _The Book of the Wars of the
Lord_, wherein were registered the acts of Moses, at the Red Sea, and at
the brook of Arnon. It is therefore sufficiently evident, that the five
Books of Moses were written after his time, though how long after it be
not so manifest.
But though Moses did not compile those books entirely, and in the form
we have them; yet he wrote all that which he is there said to have
written: as for example, the Volume of the Law, which is contained, as
it seemeth, in the xith. of _Deuteronomy_, and the following chapters to
the xxviith. which was also commanded to be written on stones, in their
entry into the land of Canaan. And this also did Moses himself write,
(_Deut._ xxxi. 9, 10) and delivered to the priests and elders of Israel,
to be read every seventh year to all Israel, at their assembling in the
Feast of Tabernacles. And this is that law which God commanded, that
their kings, when they should have established that form of government,
should take a copy of from the priests and Levites: and which Moses
commanded the priests and Levites to lay in the side of the ark,
(_Deut._ xxxi. 26); and the same which having been lost, was long time
after found again by Hilkiah, and sent to king Josias (_2 Kings_ xxii.
8) who causing it to be read to the people, (_2 Kings_ xxiii. 1, 2, 3)
renewed the covenant between God and them.
[Sidenote: The book of Joshua written after his time.]
That the book of _Joshua_ was also written long after the time of
Joshua, may be gathered out of many places of the book itself. Joshua
had set up twelve stones in the midst of Jordan, for a monument of their
passage; of which the writer saith thus, _They are there unto this day_
(_Josh._ iv. 9); for _unto this day_, is a phrase that signifieth a time
past, beyond the memory of man. In like manner, upon the saying of the
Lord, that he had rolled off from the people the reproach of Egypt, the
writer saith, _The place is called Gilgal unto this day_ (_Josh._ v. 9);
which to have said in the time of Joshua had been improper. So also the
name of the valley of Achor, from the trouble that Achan raised in the
camp, the writer saith, _remaineth unto this day_ (_Josh._ vii. 26);
which must needs be therefore long after the time of Joshua. Arguments
of this kind there be many other; as _Josh._ viii. 29, xiii. 13, xiv.
14, xv. 63.
[Sidenote: The books of Judges and Ruth written long after the
captivity.]
The same is manifest by like arguments of the book of _Judges_, chap. i.
21, 26, vi. 24, x. 4, xv. 19, xvii. 6, and _Ruth_ i. 1; but especially
_Judg._ xviii. 30, where it is said, that _Jonathan and his sons were
priests to the tribe of Dan, until the day of the captivity of the
land_.
[Sidenote: The like of the books of Samuel.]
That the books of _Samuel_ were also written after his own time, there
are the like arguments, _1 Sam._ v. 5, vii. 13, 15; xxvii, 6, and xxx.
25, where, after David had adjudged equal part of the spoils, to them
that guarded the ammunition, with them that fought, the writer saith,
_He made it a statute and an ordinance to Israel to this day_. Again,
when David, displeased, that the Lord had slain Uzzah, for putting out
his hand to sustain the ark, called the place Perez-Uzzah, the writer
saith, (_2 Sam._ vi. 8) it is called so _to this day_: the time
therefore of the writing of that book, must be long after the time of
the fact; that is, long after the time of David.
[Sidenote: The books of the Kings, and the Chronicles.]
As for the two books of the _Kings_, and the two books of the
_Chronicles_, besides the places which mention such monuments, as the
writer saith, remained till his own days; such as are _1 Kings_ ix. 13,
ix. 21, x. 12, xii. 19. _2 Kings_ ii. 22, viii. 22, x. 27, xiv. 7, xvi.
6, xvii. 23, xvii. 34, xvii. 41, and _1 Chron._ iv. 41, v. 26: it is
argument sufficient they were written after the captivity in Babylon,
that the history of them is continued till that time. For the facts
registered are always more ancient than the register; and much more
ancient than such books as make mention of, and quote the register; as
these books do in divers places, referring the reader to the Chronicles
of the Kings of Judah, to the Chronicles of the Kings of Israel, to the
Books of the prophet Samuel, of the prophet Nathan, of the prophet
Ahijah; to the Vision of Jehdo, to the books of the prophet Serveiah,
and of the prophet Addo.
[Sidenote: Ezra and Nehemiah.]
The books of _Ezra_ and _Nehemiah_ were written certainly after their
return from captivity; because their return, the re-edification of the
walls and houses of Jerusalem, the renovation of the covenant, and
ordination of their policy, are therein contained.
[Sidenote: Esther.]
The history of _Queen Esther_ is of the time of the captivity; and
therefore the writer must have been of the same time, or after it.
[Sidenote: Job.]
The book of _Job_ hath no mark in it of the time wherein it was written;
and though it appear sufficiently (_Ezekiel_ xiv. 14, and _James_ v. 11)
that he was no feigned person; yet the book itself seemeth not to be a
history, but a treatise concerning a question in ancient time much
disputed, _why wicked men have often prospered in this world, and good
men have been afflicted_; and this is the more probable, because from
the beginning, to the third verse of the third chapter, where the
complaint of Job beginneth, the Hebrew is, as St. Jerome testifies, in
prose; and from thence to the sixth verse of the last chapter, in
hexameter verses; and the rest of that chapter again in prose. So that
the dispute is all in verse; and the prose is added, but as a preface in
the beginning, and an epilogue in the end. But verse is no usual style
of such, as either are themselves in great pain, as Job; or of such as
come to comfort them, as his friends; but in philosophy, especially
moral philosophy, in ancient time frequent.
[Sidenote: The Psalter.]
The _Psalms_ were written the most part by David, for the use of the
quire. To these are added some songs of Moses, and other holy men; and
some of them after the return from the captivity, as the 137th and the
126th, whereby it is manifest that the Psalter was compiled, and put
into the form it now hath, after the return of the Jews from Babylon.
[Sidenote: The Proverbs.]
The _Proverbs_, being a collection of wise and godly sayings, partly of
Solomon, partly of Agur, the son of Jakeh, and partly of the mother of
king Lemuel, cannot probably be thought to have been collected by
Solomon, rather than by Agur, or the mother of Lemuel; and that, though
the sentences be theirs, yet the collection or compiling them into this
one book, was the work of some other godly man, that lived after them
all.
[Sidenote: Ecclesiastes and the Canticles.]
The books of _Ecclesiastes_ and the _Canticles_ have nothing that was
not Solomon’s, except it be the titles, or inscriptions. For _The Words
of the Preacher, the son of David, king in Jerusalem_; and, _The Song of
Songs_, which is Solomon’s, seem to have been made for distinction’s
sake, then, when the Books of Scripture were gathered into one body of
the law; to the end, that not the doctrine only, but the authors also
might be extant.
[Sidenote: Prophets.]
Of the prophets, the most ancient, are Zephaniah, Jonah, Amos, Hosea,
Isaiah, and Michah, who lived in the time of Amaziah and Azariah,
otherwise Ozias, kings of Judah. But the book of Jonah is not properly a
register of his prophecy; for that is contained in these few words,
_Forty days and Niniveh shall be destroyed_; but a history or narration
of his frowardness and disputing God’s commandments; so that there is
small probability he should be the author, seeing he is the subject of
it. But the book of _Amos_ is his prophecy.
Jeremiah, Obadiah, Nahum, and Habakkuk prophecied in the time of Josiah.
Ezekiel, Daniel, Haggai, and Zechariah, in the captivity.
When Joel and Malachi prophecied, is not evident by their writings. But
considering the inscriptions, or titles of their books, it is manifest
enough, that the whole Scripture of the Old Testament, was set forth in
the form we have it, after the return of the Jews from their captivity
in Babylon, and before the time of Ptolomæus Philadelphus, that caused
it to be translated into Greek by seventy men, which were sent him out
of Judea for that purpose. And if the books of Apocrypha, which are
recommended to us by the church, though not for canonical, yet for
profitable books for our instruction, may in this point be credited, the
Scripture was set forth in the form we have it in, by Esdras: as may
appear by that which he himself saith, in the second book, (chapter xiv.
verse 21, 22, &c.) where speaking to God, he saith thus, _Thy law is
burnt; therefore no man knoweth the things which thou hast done, or the
works that are to begin. But if I have found grace before thee, send
down the holy spirit into me, and I shall write all that hath been done
in the world, since the beginning, which were written in thy law, that
men may find thy path, and that they which will live in the latter day,
may live._ And verse 45: _And it came to pass when the forty days were
fulfilled, that the highest spake, saying, The first that thou hast
written, publish openly, that the worthy and unworthy may read it; but
keep the seventy last, that thou mayest deliver them only to such as be
wise among the people_. And thus much concerning the time of the writing
of the books of the Old Testament.
[Sidenote: The New Testament.]
The writers of the New Testament lived all in less than an age after
Christ’s ascension, and had all of them seen our Saviour, or been his
disciples, except St. Paul, and St. Luke; and consequently whatsoever
was written by them, is as ancient as the time of the apostles. But the
time wherein the books of the New Testament were received, and
acknowledged by the church to be of their writing, is not altogether so
ancient. For, as the books of the Old Testament are derived to us, from
no other time than that of Esdras, who by the direction of God’s spirit
retrieved them, when they were lost: those of the New Testament, of
which the copies were not many, nor could easily be all in any one
private man’s hand, cannot be derived from a higher time, than that
wherein the governors of the church collected, approved, and recommended
them to us, as the writings of those apostles and disciples, under whose
names they go. The first enumeration of all the books, both of the Old
and New Testament, is in the canons of the apostles, supposed to be
collected by Clement, the first (after St. Peter) bishop of Rome. But
because that is but supposed, and by many questioned, the Council of
Laodicea is the first we know, that recommended the Bible to the then
Christian churches, for the writings of the prophets and apostles: and
this Council was held in the 364th year after Christ. At which time,
though ambition had so far prevailed on the great doctors of the church,
as no more to esteem emperors, though Christian, for the shepherds of
the people, but for sheep; and emperors not Christian, for wolves; and
endeavoured to pass their doctrine, not for counsel and information, as
preachers; but for laws, as absolute governors; and thought such frauds
as tended to make the people the more obedient to Christian doctrine, to
be pious; yet I am persuaded they did not therefore falsify the
Scriptures, though the copies of the books of the New Testament, were in
the hands only of the ecclesiastics; because if they had had an
intention so to do, they would surely have made them more favourable to
their power over Christian princes, and civil sovereignty, than they
are. I see not therefore any reason to doubt but that the Old and New
Testament, as we have them now, are the true registers of those things,
which were done and said by the prophets and apostles. And so perhaps
are some of those books which are called apocrypha, and left out of the
canon, not for inconformity of doctrine with the rest, but only because
they are not found in the Hebrew. For after the conquest of Asia by
Alexander the Great, there were few learned Jews, that were not perfect
in the Greek tongue. For the seventy interpreters that converted the
Bible into Greek, were all of them Hebrews; and we have extant the works
of Philo and Josephus, both Jews, written by them eloquently in Greek.
[Sidenote: Their scope.] But it is not the writer, but the authority of
the church, that maketh the book canonical. And although these books
were written by divers men, yet it is manifest the writers were all
indued with one and the same spirit, in that they conspire to one and
the same end, which is setting forth of the rights of the kingdom of
God, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. For the book of _Genesis_,
deriveth the genealogy of God’s people, from the creation of the world,
to the going into Egypt: the other four books of Moses contain the
election of God for their king, and the laws which he prescribed for
their government: the books of _Joshua_, _Judges_, _Ruth_, and _Samuel_,
to the time of Saul, describe the acts of God’s people, till the time
they cast off God’s yoke, and called for a king, after the manner of
their neighbour nations. The rest of the history of the Old Testament
derives the succession of the line of David, to the captivity, out of
which line was to spring the restorer of the kingdom of God, even our
blessed Saviour God the Son, whose coming was foretold in the books of
the prophets, after whom the Evangelists write his life, and actions,
and his claim to the kingdom, whilst he lived on earth: and lastly, the
_Acts_, and _Epistles_ of the Apostles, declare the coming of God the
Holy Ghost, and the authority he left with them and their successors,
for the direction of the Jews, and for the invitation of the Gentiles.
In sum, the histories and the prophecies of the Old Testament, and the
gospels and epistles of the New Testament, have had one and the same
scope, to convert men to the obedience of God; I., in Moses, and the
Priests; II., in the man Christ; and III., in the Apostles and the
successors to apostolical power. For these three at several times did
represent the person of God: Moses, and his successors the High Priests,
and Kings of Judah, in the Old Testament: Christ himself, in the time he
lived on earth: and the Apostles, and their successors, from the day of
Pentecost, when the Holy Ghost descended on them, to this day.
[Sidenote: The question of the authority of the Scriptures stated.]
It is a question much disputed between the divers sects of Christian
religion, _from whence the Scriptures derive their authority_; which
question is also propounded sometimes in other terms, as, _how we know
them to be the word of God_, or, _why we believe them to be so_: and the
difficulty of resolving it, ariseth chiefly from the improperness of the
words wherein the question itself is couched. For it is believed on all
hands, that the first and original _author_ of them is God; and
consequently the question disputed, is not that. Again, it is manifest,
that none can know they are God’s word, (though all true Christians
believe it,) but those to whom God himself hath revealed it
supernaturally; and therefore the question is not rightly moved, of our
_knowledge_ of it. Lastly, when the question is propounded of our
_belief_; because some are moved to believe for one, and others for
other reasons; there can be rendered no one general answer for them all.
The question truly stated is, _by what authority they are made law_.
[Sidenote: Their authority and interpretation.]
As far as they differ not from the laws of nature, there is no doubt,
but they are the law of God, and carry their authority with them,
legible to all men that have the use of natural reason: but this is no
other authority, than that of all other moral doctrine consonant to
reason; the dictates whereof are laws, not _made_, but _eternal_.
If they be made law by God himself, they are of the nature of written
law, which are laws to them only to whom God hath so sufficiently
published them, as no man can excuse himself, by saying, he knew not
they were his.
He therefore to whom God hath not supernaturally revealed that they are
his, nor that those that published them, were sent by him, is not
obliged to obey them, by any authority, but his, whose commands have
already the force of laws; that is to say, by any other authority, than
that of the commonwealth, residing in the sovereign, who only has the
legislative power. Again, if it be not the legislative authority of the
commonwealth, that giveth them the force of laws, it must be some other
authority derived from God, either private, or public: if private, it
obliges only him, to whom in particular God hath been pleased to reveal
it. For if every man should be obliged, to take for God’s law, what
particular men, on pretence of private inspiration, or revelation,
should obtrude upon him, in such a number of men, that out of pride and
ignorance, take their own dreams, and extravagant fancies, and madness,
for testimonies of God’s spirit; or out of ambition, pretend to such
divine testimonies, falsely, and contrary to their own consciences, it
were impossible that any divine law should be acknowledged. If public,
it is the authority of the _commonwealth_, or of the _church_. But the
church, if it be one person, is the same thing with a commonwealth of
Christians; called a _commonwealth_, because it consisteth of men united
in one person, their sovereign; and a _church_, because it consisteth in
Christian men, united in one Christian sovereign. But if the church be
not one person, then it hath no authority at all: it can neither
command, nor do any action at all; nor is capable of having any power,
or right to anything: nor has any will, reason nor voice; for all these
qualities are personal. Now if the whole number of Christians be not
contained in one commonwealth, they are not one person; nor is there an
universal church that hath any authority over them; and therefore the
Scriptures are not made laws, by the universal church: or if it be one
commonwealth, then all Christian monarchs and states are private
persons, and subject to be judged, deposed, and punished by an universal
sovereign of all Christendom. So that the question of the authority of
the Scriptures, is reduced to this, _whether Christian kings, and the
sovereign assemblies in Christian commonwealths, be absolute in their
own territories, immediately under God; or subject to one vicar of
Christ, constituted of the universal church; to be judged, condemned,
deposed, and put to death, as he shall think expedient, or necessary for
the common good_.
Which question cannot be resolved, without a more particular
consideration of the Kingdom of God; from whence also, we are to judge
of the authority of interpreting the Scripture. For, whosoever hath a
lawful power over any writing, to make it law, hath the power also to
approve, or disapprove the interpretation of the same.
-------
CHAPTER XXXIV.
OF THE SIGNIFICATION OF SPIRIT, ANGEL,
AND INSPIRATION IN THE BOOKS OF
HOLY SCRIPTURE.
[Sidenote: Body and spirit how taken in the Scripture.]
Seeing the foundation of all true ratiocination, is the constant
signification of words; which in the doctrine following, dependeth not,
as in natural science, on the will of the writer, nor, as in common
conversation, on vulgar use, but on the sense they carry in the
Scripture; it is necessary, before I proceed any further, to determine,
out of the Bible, the meaning of such words, as by their ambiguity, may
render what I am to infer upon them, obscure, or disputable. I will
begin with the words BODY and SPIRIT, which in the language of the
Schools are termed, _substances_, _corporeal_, and _incorporeal_.
[Sidenote: Body and spirit how taken in the Scripture.]
The word _body_, in the most general acceptation, signifieth that which
filleth, or occupieth some certain room, or imagined place; and
dependeth not on the imagination, but is a real part of that we call the
_universe_. For the _universe_, being the aggregate of all bodies, there
is no real part thereof that is not also _body_; nor any thing properly
a _body_, that is not also part of that aggregate of all _bodies_, the
_universe_. The same also, because bodies are subject to change, that is
to say, to variety of apparence to the sense of living creatures, is
called _substance_, that is to say, _subject_ to various accidents: as
sometimes to be moved; sometimes to stand still; and to seem to our
senses sometimes hot, sometimes cold, sometimes of one colour, smell,
taste, or sound, sometimes of another. And this diversity of seeming,
produced by the diversity of the operation of bodies on the organs of
our sense, we attribute to alterations of the bodies that operate, and
call them _accidents_ of those bodies. And according to this acceptation
of the word, _substance_ and _body_ signify the same thing; and
therefore _substance incorporeal_ are words, which when they are joined
together, destroy one another, as if a man should say, an _incorporeal
body_.
But in the sense of common people, not all the universe is called body,
but only such parts thereof as they can discern by the sense of feeling,
to resist their force, or by the sense of their eyes, to hinder them
from a farther prospect. Therefore in the common language of men, _air_,
and _aerial substances_, use not to be taken for _bodies_, but (as often
as men are sensible of their effects) are called _wind_, or _breath_, or
(because the same are called in the Latin _spiritus_) _spirits_; as when
they call that aerial substance, which in the body of any living
creature gives it life and motion, _vital_ and _animal spirits_. But for
those idols of the brain, which represent bodies to us, where they are
not, as in a looking-glass, in a dream, or to a distempered brain
waking, they are, as the apostle saith generally of all idols, nothing;
nothing at all, I say, there where they seem to be; and in the brain
itself, nothing but tumult, proceeding either from the action of the
objects, or from the disorderly agitation of the organs of our sense.
And men, that are otherwise employed, than to search into their causes,
know not of themselves, what to call them; and may therefore easily be
persuaded, by those whose knowledge they much reverence, some to call
them _bodies_, and think them made of air compacted by a power
supernatural, because the sight judges them corporeal; and some to call
them _spirits_, because the sense of touch discerneth nothing in the
place where they appear, to resist their fingers: so that the proper
signification of _spirit_ in common speech, is either a subtle, fluid,
and invisible body, or a ghost, or other idol or phantasm of the
imagination. But for metaphorical significations, there be many: for
sometimes it is taken for disposition or inclination of the mind; as
when for the disposition to controul the sayings of other men, we say,
_a spirit of contradiction_; for _a disposition to uncleanness_, _an
unclean spirit_; for _perverseness_, _a froward spirit_; for
_sullenness_, _a dumb spirit_; and for _inclination to godliness and
God’s service_, _the Spirit of God_: sometimes for any eminent ability
or extraordinary passion, or disease of the mind, as when _great wisdom_
is called _the spirit of wisdom_; and _madmen_ are said to be _possessed
with a spirit_.
Other signification of _spirit_ I find nowhere any; and where none of
these can satisfy the sense of that word in Scripture, the place falleth
not under human understanding; and our faith therein consisteth not in
our opinion, but in our submission; as in all places where God is said
to be a _Spirit_; or where by the _Spirit of God_, is meant God himself.
For the nature of God is incomprehensible; that is to say, we understand
nothing of _what he is_, but only _that he is_; and therefore the
attributes we give him, are not to tell one another, _what he is_, nor
to signify our opinion of his nature, but our desire to honour him with
such names as we conceive most honourable amongst ourselves.
[Sidenote: The spirit of God taken in the Scripture sometimes for a
wind, or breath.]
_Gen._ i. 2. _The Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters._ Here
if by the _Spirit of God_ be meant God himself, then is _motion_
attributed to God, and consequently _place_, which are intelligible only
of bodies, and not of substances incorporeal; and so the place is above
our understanding, that can conceive nothing moved that changes not
place, or that has not dimension; and whatsoever has dimension, is body.
But the meaning of those words is best understood by the like place,
(_Gen._ viii. 1.) where when the earth was covered with waters, as in
the beginning, God intending to abate them, and again to discover the
dry land, useth the like words, _I will bring my Spirit upon the earth,
and the waters shall be diminished_: in which place, by _Spirit_ is
understood a wind, that is an air or _spirit moved_, which might be
called, as in the former place, the _Spirit of God_, because it was
God’s work.
[Sidenote: Secondly, for extraordinary gifts of the understanding.]
Gen. xli. 38, Pharoah calleth the Wisdom of Joseph, the _Spirit of God_.
For Joseph having advised him to look out a wise and discreet man, and
to set him over the land of Egypt, he saith thus, _Can we find such a
man as this is, in whom is the Spirit of God?_ And _Exod._ xxviii. 3,
_Thou shalt speak_, saith God, _to all the wise hearted, whom I have
filled with the spirit of wisdom, to make Aaron garments, to consecrate
him_: where extraordinary understanding, though but in making garments,
as being the _gift_ of God, is called the _Spirit of God_. The same is
found again, _Exod._ xxxi. 3, 4, 5, 6, _and_ xxxv. 31. And _Isaiah_ xi.
2, 3, where the prophet speaking of the Messiah, saith, _the Spirit of
the Lord shall abide upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding,
the spirit of counsel and fortitude, and the spirit of the fear of the
Lord_. Where manifestly is meant, not so many ghosts, but so many
eminent graces that God would give him.
[Sidenote: Thirdly, for extraordinary affections.]
In the book of _Judges_, an extraordinary zeal and courage in the
defence of God’s people, is called the _Spirit_ of God; as when it
excited Othniel, Gideon, Jephtha, and Sampson to deliver them from
servitude, _Judges_, iii. 10, vi. 34, xi. 29, xiii. 25, xiv. 6, 19. And
of Saul, upon the news of the insolence of the Ammonites towards the men
of Jabesh Gilead, it is said, (_1 Sam._ xi. 6) that _the Spirit of God
came upon Saul, and his anger_, (or, as it is in the Latin, _his fury_),
_was kindled greatly_. Where it is not probable was meant a ghost, but
an extraordinary _zeal_ to punish the cruelty of the Ammonites. In like
manner by the _Spirit_ of God, that came upon Saul, when he was amongst
the prophets that praised God in songs and music, (_1 Sam._ xix. 23), is
to be understood, not a ghost, but an unexpected and sudden _zeal_ to
join with them in their devotion.
[Sidenote: Fourthly, for the gift of prediction by dreams and visions.]
The false prophet Zedekiah saith to Micaiah (_1 Kings_ xxii. 24), _which
way went the Spirit of the Lord from me to speak to thee?_ Which can not
be understood of a ghost; for Micaiah declared before the kings of
Israel and Judah, the event of the battle, as from a _vision_, and not
as from a _spirit_ speaking in him.
In the same manner it appeareth in the books of the Prophets, that
though they spake by the _spirit_ of God, that is to say, by a special
grace of prediction; yet their knowledge of the future, was not by a
ghost within them, but by some supernatural _dream_ or _vision_.
[Sidenote: Fifthly, for life.]
_Gen._ ii. 7, it is said, _God made man of the dust of the earth, and
breathed into his nostrils_ (spiraculum vitæ) _the breath of life, and
man was made a living soul_. There the _breath of life_ inspired by God,
signifies no more, but that God gave him life; and (_Job_ xxvii. 3) _as
long as the Spirit of God is in my nostrils_, is no more than to say,
_as long as I live_. So in _Ezek._ i. 20, _the spirit of life was in the
wheels_, is equivalent to, _the wheels were alive_. And, (_Ezek._ ii. 2)
_the Spirit entered into me, and set me on my feet_, that is, _I
recovered my vital strength_; not that any ghost or incorporeal
substance entered into, and possessed his body.
[Sidenote: Sixthly, for a subordination to authority.]
In the xith chap. of _Numbers_, v. 17, _I will take_, saith God, _of the
Spirit, which is upon thee, and will put it upon them, and they shall
bear the burthen of the people with thee_; that is, upon the seventy
elders: whereupon two of the seventy are said to prophecy in the camp;
of whom some complained, and Joshua desired Moses to forbid them; which
Moses would not do. Whereby it appears, that Joshua knew not that they
had received authority so to do, and prophecied according to the mind of
Moses, that is to say, by a _spirit_, or _authority_ subordinate to his
own.
In the like sense we read, (_Deut._ xxxiv. 9) that _Joshua was full of
the spirit of wisdom, because Moses had laid his hands upon him_: that
is because he was _ordained_ by Moses, to prosecute the work he had
himself begun, namely the bringing of God’s people into the promised
land, but prevented by death, could not finish.
In the like sense it is said, (_Rom._ viii. 9) _If any man have not the
Spirit of Christ, he is none of his_: not meaning thereby the _ghost_ of
Christ, but a _submission_ to his doctrine. As also, (_1 John_ iv. 2)
_Hereby you shall know the Spirit of God; every spirit that confesseth
that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God_; by which is meant
the spirit of unfeigned Christianity, or _submission_ to that main
article of Christian faith, that Jesus is the Christ; which cannot be
interpreted of a ghost.
Likewise these words, (_Luke_ iv. 1) _And Jesus full of the Holy Ghost_,
(that is, as it is expressed, _Matt._ iv. 1, and _Mark_ i. 12, _of the
Holy Spirit_,) may be understood, for _zeal_ to do the work for which he
was sent by God the Father: but to interpret it of a ghost, is to say,
that God himself, for so our Saviour was, was filled with God; which is
very improper and insignificant. How we came to translate _spirits_, by
the word _ghosts_, which signifieth nothing, neither in heaven, nor
earth, but the imaginary inhabitants of man’s brain, I examine not: but
this I say, the word _spirit_ in the text signifieth no such thing; but
either properly a real _substance_, or metaphorically, some
extraordinary _ability_ or _affection_ of the mind, or of the body.
[Sidenote: Seventhly, for aerial bodies.]
The disciples of Christ, seeing him walking upon the sea, (_Matt._ xiv.
26, and _Mark_ vi. 49) supposed him to be a _Spirit_, meaning thereby an
aerial _body_, and not a phantasm; for it is said, they all saw him;
which cannot be understood of the delusions of the brain, (which are not
common to many at once, as visible bodies are; but singular, because of
the differences of fancies,) but of bodies only. In like manner, where
he was taken for a _spirit_, by the same apostles, (_Luke_ xxiv. 37): so
also (_Acts_ xii. 15) when St. Peter was delivered out of prison, it
would not be believed; but when the maid said he was at the door, they
said it was his _angel_; by which must be meant a corporeal substance,
or we must say, the disciples themselves did follow the common opinion
of both Jews and Gentiles, that some such apparitions were not
imaginary, but real, and such as needed not the fancy of man for their
existence. These the Jews called _spirits_, and _angels_, good or bad;
as the Greeks called the same by the name of _demons_. And some such
apparitions may be real, and substantial; that is to say, subtle bodies,
which God can form by the same power, by which he formed all things, and
make use of, as of ministers, and messengers, that is to say, angels, to
declare his will, and execute the same when he pleaseth, in
extraordinary and supernatural manner. But when he hath so formed them,
they are substances, endued with dimensions, and take up room, and can
be moved from place to place, which is peculiar to bodies; and therefore
are not ghosts _incorporeal_, that is to say, ghosts that are in _no
place_; that is to say, that are _no where_; that is to say, that
seeming to be _somewhat_, are _nothing_. But if corporeal be taken in
the most vulgar manner, for such substances as are perceptible by our
external senses; then is substance incorporeal, a thing not imaginary,
but real; namely, a thin substance invisible, but that hath the same
dimensions that are in grosser bodies.
[Sidenote: Angel, what.]
By the name of ANGEL, is signified generally, a _messenger_; and most
often, a _messenger of God_; and by a messenger of God, is signified,
any thing that makes known his extraordinary presence; that is to say,
the extraordinary manifestation of his power, especially by a dream or
vision.
Concerning the creation of _angels_, there is nothing delivered in the
Scriptures. That they are spirits, is often repeated: but by the name of
spirit, is signified both in Scripture, and vulgarly, both amongst Jews
and Gentiles, sometimes thin bodies: as the air, the wind, the spirits
vital and animal of living creatures; and sometimes the images that rise
in the fancy in dreams and visions; which are not real substances, nor
last any longer than the dream, or vision they appear in; which
apparitions, though no real substances, but accidents of the brain; yet
when God raiseth them supernaturally, to signify his will, they are not
improperly termed God’s messengers, that is to say, his _angels_.
And as the Gentiles did vulgarly conceive the imagery of the brain, for
things really subsistent without them, and not dependent on the fancy;
and out of them framed their opinions of _demons_, good and evil; which
because they seemed to subsist really, they called _substances_; and,
because they could not feel them with their hands, _incorporeal_: so
also the Jews, upon the same ground, without any thing in the Old
Testament that constrained them thereunto, had generally an opinion,
except the sect of the Sadducees, that those apparitions, which it
pleased God sometimes to produce in the fancy of men, for his own
service, and therefore called them his _angels_, were substances, not
dependent on the fancy, but permanent creatures of God; whereof those
which they thought were good to them, they esteemed the _angels of God_,
and those they thought would hurt them, they called _evil angels_, or
evil spirits; such as was the spirit of Python, and the spirits of
madmen, of lunatics and epileptics: for they esteemed such as were
troubled with such diseases, _demoniacs_.
But if we consider the places of the Old Testament where angels are
mentioned, we shall find, that in most of them, there can nothing else
be understood by the word _angel_, but some image raised,
supernaturally, in the fancy, to signify the presence of God in the
execution of some supernatural work; and therefore in the rest, where
their nature is not expressed, it may be understood in the same manner.
For we read, (_Gen._ xvi.) that the same apparition is called, not only
an _angel_, but _God_; where that which (verse 7) is called the _angel_
of the Lord, in the tenth verse, saith to Agar, _I will multiply thy
seed exceedingly_; that is, speaketh in the person of God. Neither was
this apparition a fancy figured, but a voice. By which it is manifest,
that _angel_ signifieth there, nothing but _God_ himself, that caused
Agar supernaturally to apprehend a voice from heaven; or rather, nothing
else but a voice supernatural, testifying God’s special presence there.
Why therefore may not the angels that appeared to Lot, and are called
(_Gen._ xix. 12) _men_; and to whom, though they were two, Lot speaketh
(verse 18) as but to one, and that one, as God, (for the words are, _Lot
said unto them, Oh not so my Lord_), be understood of images of men,
supernaturally formed in the fancy; as well as before by angel was
understood a fancied voice? When the angel called to Abraham out of
heaven, to stay his hand (_Gen._ xxii. 11) from slaying Isaac, there was
no apparition, but a voice; which nevertheless was called properly
enough a messenger or _angel_ of God, because it declared God’s will
supernaturally, and saves the labour of supposing any permanent ghosts.
The angels which Jacob saw on the ladder of Heaven, (_Gen._ xxviii. 12)
were a vision of his sleep; therefore only fancy, and a dream; yet being
supernatural, and signs of God’s special presence, those apparitions are
not improperly called _angels_. The same is to be understood, (_Gen._
xxxi. 11) where Jacob saith thus, _The Angel of the Lord appeared to me
in my sleep_. For an apparition made to a man in his sleep, is that
which all men call a dream, whether such dream be natural, or
supernatural: and that which there Jacob calleth an _angel_, was God
himself; for the same angel saith, verse 13, _I am the God of Bethel_.
Also (_Exod._ xiv. 19) the angel that went before the army of Israel to
the Red Sea, and then came behind it, is, (verse 24) the Lord himself;
and he appeared, not in the form of a beautiful man, but in form,
(_Exod._ xiii. 21) by day, of a _pillar of cloud_, and, by night, in
form of a _pillar of fire_; and yet this pillar was all the apparition
and _angel_ promised to Moses, (_Exod._ xxxiii. 2) for the army’s guide:
for this cloudy pillar (_Exod._ xxxiii. 9) is said to have descended,
and stood at the door of the Tabernacle, and to have talked with Moses.
There you see motion and speech, which are commonly attributed to
angels, attributed to a cloud, because the cloud served as a sign of
God’s presence; and was no less an angel, than if it had had the form of
a man, or child of never so great beauty; or wings, as usually they are
painted, for the false instruction of common people. For it is not the
shape; but their use that makes them angels. But their use is to be
significations of God’s presence in supernatural operations; as when
Moses (_Exod._ xxxiii. 14) had desired God to go along with the camp, as
he had done always before the making of the golden calf, God did not
answer, _I will go_, nor, _I will send an angel in my stead_; but thus,
_My presence shall go with thee_.
To mention all the places of the Old Testament where the name of angel
is found, would be too long. Therefore to comprehend them all at once, I
say, there is no text in that part of the Old Testament, which the
Church of England holdeth for canonical, from which we can conclude,
there is, or hath been created, any permanent thing, understood by the
name of _spirit_ or _angel_, that hath not quantity; and that may not be
by the understanding divided; that is to say, considered by parts; so as
one part may be in one place, and the next part in the next place to it;
and, in sum, which is not (taking body for that, which is somewhat or
some where,) corporeal; but in every place, the sense will bear the
interpretation of angel, for messenger; as John Baptist is called an
angel, and Christ the Angel of the Covenant; and as, according to the
same analogy, the dove and the fiery tongues, in that they were signs of
God’s special presence, might also be called angels. Though we find in
_Daniel_ two names of angels, Gabriel and Michael; yet it is clear out
of the text itself, (_Dan._ xii. 1) that by Michael is meant Christ, not
as an angel, but as a prince: and that Gabriel, as the like apparitions
made to other holy men in their sleep, was nothing but a supernatural
phantasm, by which it seemed to Daniel, in his dream, that two saints
being in talk, one of them said to the other, _Gabriel, Let us make this
man understand his vision_: for God needeth not to distinguish his
celestial servants by names, which are useful only to the short memories
of mortals. Nor in the New Testament is there any place, out of which it
can be proved, that angels, except when they are put for such men as God
hath made the messengers and ministers of his word or works, are things
permanent, and withal incorporeal. That they are permanent, may be
gathered from the words of our Saviour himself, (_Matt._ xxv. 41) where
he saith, it shall be said to the wicked in the last day, _Go ye cursed
into everlasting fire prepared for the Devil and his angels_: which
place is manifest for the permanence of evil angels, (unless we might
think the name of Devil and his angels may be understood of the Church’s
adversaries and their ministers); but then it is repugnant to their
immateriality; because everlasting fire is no punishment to impatible
substances, such as are all things incorporeal. Angels therefore are not
thence proved to be incorporeal. In like manner where St. Paul says, (_1
Cor._ vi. 3) _Know ye not that we shall judge the angels?_ and _2 Pet._
ii. 4, _For if God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down
into hell_: and (_Jude_ i. 6) _And the angels that kept not their first
estate, but left their own habitation, he hath reserved in everlasting
chains under darkness unto the judgment of the last day_: though it
prove the permanence of angelical nature, it confirmeth also their
materiality. And (_Matt._ xxii. 30) _In the resurrection men do neither
marry nor give in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven_: but
in the resurrection men shall be permanent, and not incorporeal; so
therefore also are the angels.
There be divers other places out of which may be drawn the like
conclusion. To men that understand the signification of these words,
_substance_, and _incorporeal_; as _incorporeal_ is taken, not for
subtle body, but for _not body_; they imply a contradiction: insomuch as
to say, an angel or spirit is in that sense an incorporeal substance, is
to say in effect, there is no angel nor spirit at all. Considering
therefore the signification of the word _angel_ in the Old Testament,
and the nature of dreams and visions that happen to men by the ordinary
way of nature; I was inclined to this opinion, that angels were nothing
but supernatural apparitions of the fancy, raised by the special and
extraordinary operation of God, thereby to make his presence and
commandments known to mankind, and chiefly to his own people. But the
many places of the New Testament, and our Saviour’s own words, and in
such texts, wherein is no suspicion of corruption of the Scripture, have
extorted from my feeble reason, an acknowledgment and belief, that there
be also angels substantial, and permanent. But to believe they be in no
place, that is to say, no where, that is to say, nothing, as they,
though indirectly, say, that will have them incorporeal, cannot by
Scripture be evinced.
[Sidenote: Inspiration, what.]
On the signification of the word _spirit_, dependeth that of the word
INSPIRATION; which must either be taken properly; and then it is nothing
but the blowing into a man some thin and subtle air or wind, in such
manner as a man filleth a bladder with his breath; or if spirits be not
corporeal, but have their existence only in the fancy, it is nothing but
the blowing in of a phantasm; which is improper to say, and impossible;
for phantasms are not, but only seem to be, somewhat. That word
therefore is used in the Scripture metaphorically only: as (_Gen._ ii.
7) where it is said that God _inspired_ into man the breath of life, no
more is meant, than that God gave unto him vital motion. For we are not
to think that God made first a living breath and then blew it into Adam
after he was made, whether that breath were real, or seeming; but only
as it is, (_Acts_ xvii. 25) _that he gave him life, and breath_; that
is, made him a living creature. And where it is said, (_2 Tim._ iii. 16)
_all Scripture is given by inspiration from God_, speaking there of the
Scripture of the Old Testament, it is an easy metaphor, to signify, that
God inclined the spirit or mind of those writers, to write that which
should be useful, in teaching, reproving, correcting, and instructing
men in the way of righteous living. But where St. Peter, (_2 Pet._ i.
21) saith, that _Prophecy came not in old time by the will of man, but
the holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Spirit_, by the
Holy Spirit is meant the voice of God in a dream or vision supernatural,
which is not _inspiration_. Nor, when our Saviour breathing on his
disciples, said, _Receive the Holy Spirit_, was that breath the Spirit,
but a sign of the spiritual graces he gave unto them. And though it be
said of many, and of our Saviour himself, that he was full of the Holy
Spirit; yet that fulness is not to be understood for _infusion_ of the
substance of God, but for accumulation of his gifts, such as are the
gift of sanctity of life, of tongues, and the like, whether attained
supernaturally, or by study and industry; for in all cases they are the
gifts of God. So likewise where God says (_Joel_ ii. 28) _I will pour
out my Spirit upon all flesh, and your sons and your daughters shall
prophecy, your old men shall dream dreams, and your young men shall see
visions_, we are not to understand it in the proper sense, as if his
_Spirit_ were like water, subject to effusion or infusion; but as if God
had promised to give them prophetical dreams, and visions. For the
proper use of the word _infused_, in speaking of the graces of God, is
an abuse of it; for those graces are virtues, not bodies to be carried
hither and thither, and to be poured into men as into barrels.
In the same manner, to take _inspiration_ in the proper sense, or to say
that good _spirits_ entered into men to make them prophecy, or evil
_spirits_ into those that became phrenetic, lunatic, or epileptic, is
not to take the word in the sense of the Scripture; for the Spirit there
is taken for the power of God, working by causes to us unknown. As also
(_Acts_ ii. 2) the wind, that is there said to fill the house wherein
the apostles were assembled on the day of Pentecost, is not to be
understood for the _Holy Spirit_, which is the Deity itself; but for an
external sign of God’s special working on their hearts, to effect in
them the internal graces, and holy virtues he thought requisite for the
performance of their apostleship.
-------
CHAPTER XXXV.
OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF
KINGDOM OF GOD, OF HOLY, SACRED,
AND SACRAMENT.
[Sidenote: The kingdom of God taken by divines metaphorically, but in
the Scriptures properly.]
The _Kingdom of God_ in the writings of divines, and specially in
sermons and treatises of devotion, is taken most commonly for eternal
felicity, after this life, in the highest heaven, which they also call
the kingdom of glory; and sometimes for the earnest of that felicity,
sanctification, which they term the kingdom of grace; but never for the
monarchy, that is to say, the sovereign power of God over any subjects
acquired by their own consent, which is the proper signification of
kingdom.
To the contrary, I find the KINGDOM OF GOD to signify, in most places of
Scripture, a _kingdom properly so named_, constituted by the votes of
the people of Israel in peculiar manner; wherein they chose God for
their king by covenant made with him, upon God’s promising them the
possession of the land of Canaan; and but seldom metaphorically; and
then it is taken for _dominion over sin_; (and only in the New
Testament;) because such a dominion as that, every subject shall have in
the kingdom of God, and without prejudice to the sovereign.
From the very creation, God not only reigned over all men _naturally_ by
his might; but also had _peculiar_ subjects, whom he commanded by a
voice, as one man speaketh to another. In which manner he _reigned_ over
Adam, and gave him commandment to abstain from the tree of cognizance of
good and evil; which when he obeyed not, but tasting thereof, took upon
him to be as God, judging between good and evil, not by his creator’s
commandment, but by his own sense, his punishment was a privation of the
estate of eternal life, wherein God had at first created him: and
afterwards God punished his posterity for their vices, all but eight
persons, with an universal deluge; and in these eight did consist the
then _kingdom of God_.
[Sidenote: The original of the kingdom of God.]
After this it pleased God to speak to Abraham, and (_Gen._ xvii. 7, 8)
to make a covenant with him in these words, _I will establish my
covenant between me, and thee, and thy seed after thee in their
generations, for an everlasting covenant, to be a God to thee, and to
thy seed after thee; and I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after
thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan for
an everlasting possession_. In this covenant _Abraham promiseth for
himself and his posterity, to obey as God, the Lord that spake to him;
and God on his part promiseth to Abraham the land of Canaan for an
everlasting possession_. And for a memorial, and a token of this
covenant, he ordaineth (_Gen._ xvii. 11) the _sacrament of
circumcision_. This is it which is called the _old covenant_ or
_testament_; and containeth a contract between God and Abraham; by which
Abraham obligeth himself, and his posterity, in a peculiar manner to be
subject to God’s positive law; for to the law moral he was obliged
before, as by an oath of allegiance. And though the name of _King_ be
not yet given to God, nor of _kingdom_ to Abraham and his seed: yet the
thing is the same; namely, an institution by pact, of God’s peculiar
sovereignty over the seed of Abraham; which in the renewing of the same
covenant by Moses, at Mount Sinai, is expressly called a peculiar
_kingdom of God_ over the Jews: and it is of Abraham, not of Moses, St.
Paul saith (_Rom._ iv. 11) that he is the _father of the faithful_; that
is, of those that are loyal, and do not violate their allegiance sworn
to God, then by circumcision, and afterwards in the _new covenant_ by
baptism.
[Sidenote: That the kingdom of God is properly his civil sovereignty
over a peculiar people by pact.]
This covenant, at the foot of Mount Sinai, was renewed by Moses,
(_Exod._ xix. 5) where the Lord commandeth Moses to speak to the people
in this manner, _If you will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant,
then ye shall be a peculiar people to me, for all the earth is mine; and
ye shall be unto me a sacerdotal kingdom, and an holy nation_. For a
_peculiar people_, the vulgar Latin hath _peculium de cunctis populis_:
the English translation, made in the beginning of the reign of King
James, hath a _peculiar treasure unto me above all nations_; and the
Geneva French, _the most precious jewel of all nations_. But the truest
translation is the first, because it is confirmed by St. Paul himself
(_Tit._ ii. 14) where he saith, alluding to that place, that our blessed
Saviour _gave himself for us, that he might purify us to himself, a
peculiar_, that is, an extraordinary, _people_: for the word is in the
Greek περιούσιος, which is opposed commonly to the word ἐπιούσιος: and
as this signifieth _ordinary_, _quotidian_, or, as in the Lord’s Prayer,
_of daily use_; so the other signifieth that which is _overplus_, and
_stored up_, and _enjoyed in a special manner_; which the Latins call
_peculium_: and this meaning of the place is confirmed by the reason God
rendereth of it, which followeth immediately, in that he addeth, _For
all the earth is mine_, as if he should say, _All the nations of the
world are mine_; but it is not so that you are mine, but in a _special
manner_: for they are all mine, by reason of my power; but you shall be
mine, by your own consent, and covenant; which is an addition to his
ordinary title, to all nations.
The same is again confirmed in express words in the same text, _Ye shall
be to me a sacerdotal kingdom, and an holy nation_. The vulgar Latin
hath it, _regnum sacerdotale_, to which agreeth the translation of that
place (_1 Pet._ ii. 9) _Sacerdotium regale_, _a regal priesthood_; as
also the institution itself, by which no man might enter into the
_Sanctum Sanctorum_, that is to say, no man might enquire God’s will
immediately of God himself, but only the high-priest. The English
translation before mentioned, following that of Geneva, has, _a kingdom
of priests_; which is either meant of the succession of one high-priest
after another, or else it accordeth not with St. Peter, nor with the
exercise of the high-priesthood: for there was never any but the
high-priest only, that was to inform the people of God’s will; nor any
convocation of priests ever allowed to enter into the _Sanctum
Sanctorum_.
Again, the title of a _holy nation_ confirms the same: for _holy_
signifies, that which is God’s by special, not by general right. All the
earth, as is said in the text, is God’s; but all the earth is not called
_holy_, but that only which is set apart for his especial service, as
was the nation of the Jews. It is therefore manifest enough by this one
place, that by the _kingdom of God_, is properly meant a commonwealth,
instituted, by the consent of those which were to be subject thereto,
for their civil government, and the regulating of their behaviour, not
only towards God their king, but also towards one another in point of
justice, and towards other nations both in peace and war; which properly
was a kingdom wherein God was king, and the high-priest was to be, after
the death of Moses, his sole viceroy or lieutenant.
But there be many other places that clearly prove the same. As first (_1
Samuel_, viii. 7) when the Elders of Israel, grieved with the corruption
of the sons of Samuel, demanded a king, Samuel displeased therewith,
prayed unto the Lord, and the Lord answering said unto him, _Hearken
unto the voice of the people, for they have not rejected thee, but they
have rejected me, that I should not reign over them_. Out of which it is
evident, that God himself was then their king; and Samuel did not
command the people, but only delivered to them that which God from time
to time appointed him.
Again, (_1 Sam._ xii. 12) where Samuel saith to the people, _When ye saw
that Nahash, king of the children of Ammon, came against you, ye said
unto me, Nay, but a king shall reign over us; when the Lord your God was
your king_. It is manifest that God was their king, and governed the
civil state of their commonwealth.
And after the Israelites had rejected God, the prophets did foretell his
restitution; as (_Isaiah_, xxiv. 23) _Then the moon shall be confounded,
and the sun ashamed, when the Lord of hosts shall reign in Mount Zion,
and in Jerusalem_; where he speaketh expressly of his reign in Zion and
Jerusalem; that is, on earth. And (_Micah_, iv. 7) _And the Lord shall
reign over them in Mount Zion_: this Mount Zion is in Jerusalem, upon
the earth. And (_Ezek._ xx. 33) _As I live, saith the Lord God, surely
with a mighty hand, and a stretched out arm, and with fury poured out, I
will rule over you_; and (verse 37) _I will cause you to pass under the
rod, and I will bring you into the bond of the covenant_; that is, I
will reign over you, and make you to stand to that covenant which you
made with me by Moses, and brake in your rebellion against me in the
days of Samuel, and in your election of another king.
And in the New Testament, the angel Gabriel saith of our Saviour (_Luke_
i. 32, 33) _He shall be great, and be called the Son of the most High,
and the Lord shall give unto him the throne of his father David; and he
shall reign over the house of Jacob for ever; and of his kingdom there
shall be no end_. This is also a kingdom upon earth; for the claim
whereof, as an enemy to Cæsar, he was put to death; the title of his
cross, was, _Jesus of Nazareth, King of the Jews_; he was crowned in
scorn with a crown of thorns; and for the proclaiming of him, it is said
of the disciples (_Acts_ xvii. 7) _That they did all of them contrary to
the decrees of Cæsar, saying there was another king, one Jesus_. The
kingdom therefore of God is a real, not a metaphorical kingdom; and so
taken, not only in the Old Testament, but in the New; when we say, _For
thine is the kingdom, the power, and glory_, it is to be understood of
God’s kingdom, by force of our covenant, not by the right of God’s
power; for such a kingdom God always hath; so that it were superfluous
to say in our prayer, _Thy kingdom come_, unless it be meant of the
restoration of that kingdom of God by Christ, which by revolt of the
Israelites had been interrupted in the election of Saul. Nor had it been
proper to say, _The kingdom of heaven is at hand_; or to pray, _Thy
kingdom come_, if it had still continued.
There be so many other places that confirm this interpretation, that it
were a wonder there is no greater notice taken of it, but that it gives
too much light to Christian kings to see their right of ecclesiastical
government. This they have observed, that instead of a _sacerdotal
kingdom_, translate, _a kingdom of priests_; for they may as well
translate a _royal priesthood_, as it is in St. Peter, into a
_priesthood of kings_. And whereas, for a _peculiar people_, they put a
_precious jewel_, or _treasure_, a man might as well call the special
regiment, or company of a general, the general’s precious jewel, or his
treasure.
In short, the kingdom of God is a civil kingdom; which consisted, first,
in the obligation of the people of Israel to those laws, which Moses
should bring unto them from Mount Sinai; and which afterwards the
high-priest for the time being, should deliver to them from before the
cherubims in the _sanctum sanctorum_; and which kingdom having been cast
off in the election of Saul, the prophets foretold, should be restored
by Christ; and the restoration whereof we daily pray for, when we say in
the Lord’s Prayer, _Thy kingdom come_; and the right whereof we
acknowledge, when we add, _For thine is the kingdom, the power, and
glory, for ever and ever, Amen_; and the proclaiming whereof, was the
preaching of the apostles; and to which men are prepared, by the
teachers of the Gospel; to embrace which Gospel, that is to say, to
promise obedience to God’s government, is to be in the _kingdom of
grace_, because God hath _gratis_ given to such the power to be the
subjects, that is children, of God hereafter, when Christ shall come in
majesty to judge the world, and actually to govern his own people, which
is called _the kingdom of glory_. If the kingdom of God, called also the
kingdom of heaven, from the gloriousness and admirable height of that
throne, were not a kingdom which God by his lieutenants, or vicars, who
deliver his commandments to the people, did exercise on earth; there
would not have been so much contention, and war, about who it is, by
whom God speaketh to us; neither would many priests have troubled
themselves with spiritual jurisdiction, nor any king have denied it
them.
[Sidenote: Holy, what.]
Out of this literal interpretation of the _kingdom of God_, ariseth also
the true interpretation of the word HOLY. For it is a word, which in
God’s kingdom answereth to that, which men in their kingdoms use to call
_public_, or the _king’s_.
The king of any country is the _public_ person, or representative of all
his own subjects. And God the king of Israel was the _Holy One_ of
Israel. The nation which is subject to one earthly sovereign, is the
nation of that sovereign, that is, of the public person. So the Jews,
who were God’s nation, were called (_Exod._ xix. 6) _a holy nation_. For
by _holy_, is always understood either God himself, or that which is
God’s in propriety; as by public is always meant, either the person of
the commonwealth itself, or something that is so the commonwealth’s, as
no private person can claim any propriety therein.
Therefore the Sabbath, God’s day, is a _holy day_; the temple, God’s
house, _a holy house_; sacrifices, tithes, and offerings, God’s tribute,
_holy duties_; priests, prophets, and anointed kings, under Christ,
God’s ministers, _holy men_; the celestial ministering spirits, God’s
messengers, _holy angels_; and the like: and wheresoever the word _holy_
is taken properly, there is still something signified of propriety,
gotten by consent. In saying, _Hallowed be thy name_, we do but pray to
God for grace to keep the first commandment, of _having no other Gods
but him_. Mankind is God’s nation in propriety: but the Jews only were a
_holy nation_. Why, but because they became his propriety by covenant?
[Sidenote: Sacred, what.]
And the word _profane_, is usually taken in the Scripture for the same
with _common_; and consequently their contraries, _holy_ and _proper_,
in the kingdom of God, must be the same also. But figuratively, those
men also are called _holy_, that led such godly lives, as if they had
forsaken all worldly designs, and wholly devoted and given themselves to
God. In the proper sense, that which is made _holy_ by God’s
appropriating or separating it to his own use, is said to be
_sanctified_ by God, as the seventh day in the fourth commandment; and
as the elect in the New Testament were said to be _sanctified_, when
they were endued with the spirit of godliness. And that which is made
_holy_ by the dedication of men, and given to God, so as to be used only
in his public service, is called also SACRED, and said to be
consecrated, as temples, and other houses of public prayer, and their
utensils, priests, and ministers, victims, offerings, and the external
matter of sacraments.
[Sidenote: Degrees of sanctity.]
Of _holiness_ there be degrees: for of those things that are set apart
for the service of God, there may be some set apart again, for a nearer
and more especial service. The whole nation of the Israelites were a
people holy to God; yet the tribe of Levi was amongst the Israelites a
holy tribe; and amongst the Levites, the priests were yet more holy; and
amongst the priests, the high-priest was the most holy. So the land of
Judea was the Holy Land; but the holy city wherein God was to be
worshipped, was more holy; and again the Temple more holy than the city,
and the _sanctum sanctorum_ more holy than the rest of the Temple.
[Sidenote: Sacrament.]
A SACRAMENT, is a separation of some visible thing from common use; and
a consecration of it to God’s service, for a sign either of our
admission into the kingdom of God, to be of the number of his peculiar
people, or for a commemoration of the same. In the Old Testament, the
sign of admission was _circumcision_; in the New Testament, _baptism_.
The commemoration of it in the Old Testament, was the _eating_, at a
certain time which was anniversary, of the _Paschal Lamb_; by which they
were put in mind of the night wherein they were delivered out of their
bondage in Egypt; and in the New Testament, the celebrating of the
_Lord’s Supper_; by which, we are put in mind of our deliverance from
the bondage of sin, by our blessed Saviour’s death upon the cross. The
sacraments of _admission_, are but once to be used, because there needs
but one _admission_; but because we have need of being often put in mind
of our deliverance, and of our allegiance, the sacraments of
_commemoration_ have need to be reiterated. And these are the principal
sacraments, and as it were the solemn oaths we make of our allegiance.
There be also other consecrations, that may be called sacraments, as the
word implieth only consecration to God’s service; but as it implies an
oath, or promise of allegiance to God, there were no other in the Old
Testament, but _circumcision_, and the _passover_; nor are there any
other in the New Testament, but _baptism_ and the _Lord’s Supper_.
-------
CHAPTER XXXVI.
OF THE WORD OF GOD, AND OF PROPHETS.
[Sidenote: Word, what.]
When there is mention of the _word of God_, or of _man_, it doth not
signify a part of speech, such as grammarians call a noun, or a verb, or
any simple voice, without a contexture with other words to make it
significative; but a perfect speech or discourse, whereby the speaker
_affirmeth_, _denieth_, _commandeth_, _promiseth_, _threateneth_,
_wisheth_, or _interrogateth_. In which sense it is not _vocabulum_,
that signifies a _word_; but _sermo_, (in Greek λόγος) that is, some
_speech_, _discourse_, or _saying_.
[Sidenote: The words spoken by God, and concerning God, both are called
God’s word in Scripture.]
Again, if we say the _word of God_, or of _man_, it may be understood
sometimes of the speaker: as the words that God hath spoken, or that a
man hath spoken; in which sense, when we say, the Gospel of St. Matthew,
we understand St. Matthew to be the writer of it: and sometimes of the
subject; in which sense, when we read in the Bible, _the words of the
days of the kings of Israel, or Judah_, it is meant, that the acts that
were done in those days, were the subject of those words; and in the
Greek, which, in the Scripture, retaineth many Hebraisms, by the word of
God is oftentimes meant, not that which is spoken by God, but concerning
God, and his government; that is to say, the doctrine of religion:
insomuch, as it is all one, to say λόγος Θεοῦ, and _theologia_; which
is, that doctrine which we usually call _divinity_, as is manifest by
the places following, (_Acts_ xiii. 46) _Then Paul and Barnabas waxed
bold, and said, it was necessary that the word of God should first have
been spoken to you, but seeing you put it from you, and judge yourselves
unworthy of everlasting life, lo, we turn to the Gentiles_. That which
is here called the word of God, was the doctrine of Christian religion;
as it appears evidently by that which goes before. And (_Acts_ v. 20)
where it is said to the apostles by an angel, _Go stand and speak in the
Temple, all the words of this life_; by the words of this life, is
meant, the doctrine of the Gospel; as is evident by what they did in the
Temple, and is expressed in the last verse of the same chapter, _Daily
in the Temple, and in every house they ceased not to teach and preach
Christ Jesus_: in which place it is manifest, that Jesus Christ was the
subject of this _word of life_; or, which is all one, the subject of the
_words of this life eternal_, that our Saviour offered them. So (_Acts_
xv. 7) the word of God, is called _the word of the Gospel_, because it
containeth the doctrine of the kingdom of Christ; and the same word
(_Rom._ x. 8, 9) is called _the word of faith_; that is, as is there
expressed, the doctrine of Christ come, and raised from the dead. Also
(_Matth._ xiii. 19) _When any one heareth the word of the kingdom_; that
is, the doctrine of the kingdom taught by Christ. Again, the same word,
is said (_Acts_ xii. 24) _to grow and to be multiplied_; which to
understand of the evangelical doctrine is easy, but of the voice or
speech of God, hard and strange. In the same sense (_1 Tim._ iv. 1) the
_doctrine of devils_ signifieth not the words of any devil, but the
doctrine of heathen men concerning _demons_, and those phantasms which
they worshipped as gods.
[Sidenote: The word of God metaphorically used, first, for the decrees
and power of God.]
Considering these two significations of the WORD OF GOD, as it is taken
in Scripture, it is manifest in this latter sense, where it is taken for
the doctrine of Christian religion, that the whole Scripture is the word
of God: but in the former sense, not so. For example, though these
words, _I am the Lord thy God, &c._ to the end of the Ten Commandments,
were spoken by God to Moses; yet the preface, _God spake these words and
said_, is to be understood for the words of him that wrote the holy
history. The _word of God_, as it is taken for that which he hath
spoken, is understood sometimes _properly_, sometimes _metaphorically_.
_Properly_, as the words he hath spoken to his prophets:
_metaphorically_, for his wisdom, power, and eternal decree, in making
the world; in which sense, those fiats, _Let there be light_, _Let there
be a firmament_, _Let us make man, &c._ (_Gen._ i.) are the word of God.
And in the same sense it is said (_John_ i. 3) _All things were made by
it, and without it was nothing made that was made_: and (_Heb._ i. 3)
_He upholdeth all things by the word of his power_; that is, by the
power of his word; that is, by his power: and (_Heb._ xi. 3) _The worlds
were framed by the word of God_; and many other places to the same
sense: as also amongst the Latins, the name of _fate_, which signified
properly _the word spoken_, is taken in the same sense.
[Sidenote: Secondly, for the effect of his word.]
Secondly, for the effect of his word; that is to say, for the thing
itself, which by his word is affirmed, commanded, threatened, or
promised; as (_Psalm_ cv. 19) where Joseph is said to have been kept in
prison, _till his word was come_; that is, till that was come to pass
which he had foretold to Pharaoh’s butler (_Gen._ xl. 13) concerning his
being restored to his office: for there, by _his word was come_, is
meant, the thing itself was come to pass. So also (_1 Kings_ xviii. 36)
Elijah saith to God, _I have done all these thy words_, instead of _I
have done all these things at thy word_, or commandment; and (_Jer._
xvii. 15) _Where is the word of the Lord_, is put for, _Where is the
evil he threatened_. And (_Ezek._ xii. 28) _There shall none of my words
be prolonged any more_: by _words_ are understood those _things_, which
God promised to his people. And in the New Testament (_Matth._ xxiv. 35)
_heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away_;
that is, there is nothing that I have promised or foretold, that shall
not come to pass. And in this sense it is, that St. John the Evangelist,
and, I think, St. John only, calleth our Saviour himself as in the flesh
_the word of God_, as (_John_ i. 14) _the word was made flesh_; that is
to say, the word, or promise that Christ should come into the world;
_who in the beginning was with God_; that is to say, it was in the
purpose of God the Father, to send God the Son into the world, to
enlighten men in the way of eternal life; but it was not till then put
in execution, and actually incarnate. So that our Saviour is there
called the _word_, not because he was the promise, but the thing
promised. They that taking occasion from this place, do commonly call
him the verb of God, do but render the text more obscure. They might as
well term him the noun of God: for as by _noun_, so also by _verb_, men
understand nothing but a part of speech, a voice, a sound, that neither
affirms, nor denies, nor commands, nor promiseth, nor is any substance
corporeal, or spiritual; and therefore it cannot be said to be either
God, or man; whereas our Saviour is both. And this _word_, which St.
John in his gospel saith was with God, is (in his _first Epistle_, verse
1) called the _word of life_; and (verse 2) _the eternal life, which was
with the Father_. So that he can be in no other sense called the _word_,
than in that, wherein he is called eternal life; that is, _he that hath
procured us eternal life_, by his coming in the flesh. So also
(_Apocalypse_ xix. 13) the apostle speaking of Christ, clothed in a
garment dipped in blood, saith, his name is _the word of God_; which is
to be understood, as if he had said his name had been, _He that was come
according to the purpose of God from the beginning, and according to his
word and promises delivered by the prophets_. So that there is nothing
here of the incarnation of a word, but of the incarnation of God the
Son, therefore called _the word_, because his incarnation was the
performance of the promise; in like manner as the Holy Ghost is called
(_Acts_ i. 4; _Luke_ xxiv. 49) _the promise_.
[Sidenote: Thirdly, for the words of reason and equity.]
There are also places of the Scripture, where, by the _word of God_, is
signified such words as are consonant to reason and equity, though
spoken sometimes neither by prophet, nor by a holy man. For
Pharaoh-Necho was an idolater; yet his words to the good king Josiah, in
which he advised him by messengers, not to oppose him in his march
against Charchemish, are said to have proceeded from the mouth of God;
and that Josiah, not hearkening to them, was slain in the battle; as is
to be read (_2 Chron._ xxxv. 21, 22, 23.) It is true, that as the same
history is related in the first book of Esdras, not Pharaoh, but
Jeremiah, spake these words to Josiah, from the mouth of the Lord. But
we are to give credit to the canonical Scripture, whatsoever be written
in the Apocrypha.
The _word of God_, is then also to be taken for the dictates of reason
and equity, when the same is said in the Scriptures to be written in
man’s heart; as _Psalm_ xxxvii. 31; _Jer._ xxxi. 33; _Deut._ xxx. 11,
14, and many other like places.
[Sidenote: Divers acceptions of the word prophet.]
The name of PROPHET signifieth in Scripture, sometimes _prolocutor_;
that is, he that speaketh from God to man, or from man to God: and
sometimes _predictor_, or a foreteller of things to come: and sometimes
one that speaketh incoherently, as men that are distracted. It is most
frequently used in the sense of speaking from God to the people. So
Moses, Samuel, Elijah, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and others were _prophets_. And
in this sense the high-priest was a _prophet_, for he only went into the
_sanctum sanctorum_, to enquire of God; and was to declare his answer to
the people. And therefore when Caiphas said, it was expedient that one
man should die for the people, St. John saith (chapter xi. 51) that _He
spake not this of himself, but being high-priest that year, he
prophesied that one man should die for the nation_. Also they that in
Christian congregations taught the people, (_1 Cor._ xiv. 3) are said to
prophecy. In the like sense it is, that God saith to Moses (_Exod._ iv.
16) concerning Aaron, _He shall be thy spokesman to the people; and he
shall be to thee a mouth, and thou shalt be to him instead of God_: that
which here is _spokesman_, is (_Exod._ vii. 1) interpreted prophet;
_See_, saith God, _I have made thee a God to Pharaoh, and Aaron thy
brother shall be thy prophet_. In the sense of speaking from man to God,
Abraham is called a prophet (_Gen._ xx. 7) where God in a dream speaketh
to Abimelech in this manner, _Now therefore restore the man his wife,
for he is a prophet, and shall pray for thee_; whereby may be also
gathered, that the name of prophet may be given, not unproperly, to them
that in Christian churches, have a calling to say public prayers for the
congregation. In the same sense, the prophets that came down from the
high place, or hill of God, with a psaltery, and a tabret, and a pipe,
and a harp (_1 Sam._ x. 5, 6, and 10), Saul amongst them, are said to
prophecy, in that they praised God in that manner publicly. In the like
sense, is Miriam (_Exod._ xv. 20) called a prophetess. So is it also to
be taken (_1 Cor._ xi. 4, 5), where St. Paul saith, _Every man that
prayeth or prophecieth with his head covered, &c., and every woman that
prayeth or prophecieth with her head uncovered_: for prophecy, in that
place, signifieth no more, but praising God in psalms and holy songs;
which women might do in the church, though it were not lawful for them
to speak to the congregation. And in this signification it is, that the
poets of the heathen, that composed hymns and other sorts of poems in
the honour of their gods, were called _vates_, prophets; as is well
enough known by all that are versed in the books of the Gentiles, and as
is evident (_Tit._ i. 12), where St. Paul saith of the Cretians, that a
prophet of their own said, they were liars; not that St. Paul held their
poets for prophets, but acknowledgeth that the word prophet was commonly
used to signify them that celebrated the honour of God in verse.
[Sidenote: Prediction of future contingents, not always prophecy.]
When by prophecy is meant prediction, or foretelling of future
contingents; not only they were prophets, who were God’s spokesmen, and
foretold those things to others, which God had foretold to them; but
also all those impostors, that pretend, by help of familiar spirits, or
by superstitious divination of events past, from false causes, to
foretel the like events in time to come: of which, as I have declared
already in the twelfth chapter of this discourse, there be many kinds,
who gain in the opinion of the common sort of men, a greater reputation
of prophecy, by one casual event that may be but wrested to their
purpose, than can be lost again by never so many failings. Prophecy is
not an art, nor, when it is taken for prediction, a constant vocation;
but an extraordinary, and temporary employment from God, most often of
good men, but sometimes also of the wicked. The woman of Endor, who is
said to have had a familiar spirit, and thereby to have raised a
phantasm of Samuel, and foretold Saul his death, was not therefore a
prophetess; for neither had she any science, whereby she could raise
such a phantasm; nor does it appear that God commanded the raising of
it; but only guided that imposture to be a means of Saul’s terror and
discouragement, and by consequent, of the discomfiture by which he fell.
And for incoherent speech, it was amongst the Gentiles taken for one
sort of prophecy, because the prophets of their oracles, intoxicated
with a spirit or vapour from the cave of the Pythian oracle at Delphi,
were for the time really mad, and spake like madmen; of whose loose
words a sense might be made to fit any event, in such sort, as all
bodies are said to be made of _materia prima_. In Scripture I find it
also so taken (_1 Sam._ xviii. 10) in these words, _And the evil spirit
came upon Saul, and he prophecied in the midst of the house_.
[Sidenote: The manner how God hath spoken to the prophets.]
And although there be so many significations in Scripture of the word
_prophet_; yet is that the most frequent, in which it is taken for him,
to whom God speaketh immediately that which the prophet is to say from
him, to some other man, or to the people. And hereupon a question may be
asked, in what manner God speaketh to such a prophet. Can it, may some
say, be properly said, that God hath voice and language, when it cannot
be properly said, he hath a tongue, or other organs, as a man? The
prophet David argueth thus, (_Psalm_ xciv. 9) _Shall he that made the
eye, not see? or he that made the ear, not hear?_ But this may be
spoken, not as usually, to signify God’s nature, but to signify our
intention to honour him. For to _see_, and _hear_, are honourable
attributes, and may be given to God, to declare, as far as our capacity
can conceive, his almighty power. But if it were to be taken in the
strict and proper sense, one might argue from his making of all other
parts of man’s body, that he had also the same use of them which we
have; which would be many of them so uncomely, as it would be the
greatest contumely in the world to ascribe them to him. Therefore we are
to interpret God’s speaking to men immediately, for that way, whatsoever
it be, by which God makes them understand his will. And the ways whereby
he doth this, are many, and to be sought only in the Holy Scripture:
where though many times it be said, that God spake to this, and that
person, without declaring in what manner; yet there be again many
places, that deliver also the signs by which they were to acknowledge
his presence, and commandment; and by these may be understood, how he
spake to many of the rest.
[Sidenote: To the extraordinary prophets of the Old Testament he spake
by dreams, or visions.]
In what manner God spake to Adam, and Eve, and Cain, and Noah, is not
expressed; nor how he spake to Abraham, till such time as he came out of
his own country to Sichem in the land of Canaan; and then (_Gen._ xii.
7) God is said to have _appeared_ to him. So there is one way, whereby
God made his presence manifest; that is, by an _apparition_, or
_vision_. And again, (_Gen._ xv. 1) _the word of the Lord came to
Abraham in a vision_; that is to say, somewhat, as a sign of God’s
presence, appeared as God’s messenger, to speak to him. Again, the Lord
appeared to Abraham (_Gen._ xviii. 1) by an apparition of three angels;
and to Abimelech (Gen. xx. 3) in a dream: to Lot (_Gen._ xix. 1) by an
apparition of two angels: and to Agar (_Gen._ xxi. 17) by the apparition
of one angel: and to Abraham again (_Gen._ xxii. 11) by the apparition
of a voice from heaven: and (_Gen._ xxvi. 24) to Isaac in the night,
that is, in his sleep, or by dream: and to Jacob (_Gen._ xxviii. 12) in
a dream; that is to say, as are the words of the text, _Jacob dreamed
that he saw a ladder, &c._: and (_Gen._ xxxii. 1) in a vision of angels:
and to Moses (_Exod._ iii. 2) in the apparition of a flame of fire out
of the midst of a bush. And after the time of Moses, where the manner
how God spake immediately to man in the Old Testament is expressed, he
spake always by a vision, or by a dream; as to Gideon, Samuel, Eliah,
Elisha, Isaiah, Ezekiel, and the rest of the prophets; and often in the
New Testament, as to Joseph, to St. Peter, to St. Paul, and to St. John
the Evangelist in the Apocalypse.
Only to Moses he spake in a more extraordinary manner in Mount Sinai,
and in the Tabernacle; and to the high-priest in the Tabernacle, and in
the _sanctum sanctorum_ of the Temple. But Moses, and after him the
high-priests, were prophets of a more eminent place and degree in God’s
favour; and God himself in express words declareth, that to other
prophets he spake in dreams and visions, but to his servant Moses, in
such manner as a man speaketh to his friend. The words are these
(_Numb._ xii. 6, 7, 8) _If there be a prophet among you, I the Lord will
make myself known to him in a vision, and will speak unto him in a
dream. My servant Moses is not so, who is faithful in all my house; with
him I will speak mouth to mouth, even apparently, not in dark speeches;
and the similitude of the Lord shall he behold._ And (_Exod._ xxxiii.
11) _The Lord spake to Moses face to face, as a man speaketh to his
friend_. And yet this speaking of God to Moses, was by mediation of an
angel, or angels, as appears expressly, _Acts_ vii. 35 and 53, and
_Gal._ iii. 19; and was therefore a vision, though a more clear vision
than was given to other prophets. And conformable hereunto, where God
saith (_Deut._ xiii. 1) _If there arise amongst you a prophet, or
dreamer of dreams_, the latter word is but the interpretation of the
former. And (_Joel_, ii. 28) _Your sons and your daughters shall
prophecy; your old men shall dream dreams, and your young men shall see
visions_; where again, the word _prophecy_ is expounded by _dream_, and
_vision_. And in the same manner it was, that God spake to Solomon,
promising him wisdom, riches, and honour; for the text saith, (_1 Kings_
iii. 15) _And Solomon awoke, and behold it was a dream_; so that
generally the prophets extraordinary in the Old Testament took notice of
the word of God no otherwise than from their dreams, or visions; that is
to say, from the imaginations which they had in their sleep, or in an
extasy: which imaginations in every true prophet were supernatural; but
in false prophets were either natural or feigned.
The same prophets were nevertheless said to speak by the spirit; as
(_Zech._ vii. 12); where the prophet speaking of the Jews, saith, _They
made their hearts hard as adamant, lest they should hear the law, and
the words which the Lord of Hosts hath sent in his Spirit by the former
prophets_. By which it is manifest, that speaking by the _spirit_, or
_inspiration_, was not a particular manner of God’s speaking, different
from vision, when they, that were said to speak by the Spirit, were
extraordinary prophets, such as for every new message, were to have a
peculiar commission, or, which is all one, a new dream, or vision.
[Sidenote: To prophets of perpetual calling, and supreme, God spake in
the Old Testament from the mercy seat, in a manner not
expressed in the Scripture.]
Of prophets, that were so by a perpetual calling in the Old Testament,
some were _supreme_, and some _subordinate_: supreme were first Moses;
and after him the high-priests, every one for his time, as long as the
priesthood was royal; and after the people of the Jews had rejected God,
that he should no more reign over them, those kings which submitted
themselves to God’s government, were also his chief prophets; and the
high-priest’s office became ministerial. And when God was to be
consulted, they put on the holy vestments, and enquired of the Lord, as
the king commanded them, and were deprived of their office, when the
king thought fit. For king Saul (_1 Sam._ xiii. 9) commanded the burnt
offering to be brought, and (_1 Sam._ xiv. 18) he commands the priests
to bring the ark near him; and (v. 19) again to let it alone, because he
saw an advantage upon his enemies. And in the same chapter (v. 37) Saul
asketh counsel of God. In like manner king David, after his being
anointed, though before he had possession of the kingdom, is said to
_enquire of the Lord_ (_1 Sam._ xxiii. 2) whether he should fight
against the Philistines at Keilah; and (verse 9) David commandeth the
priest to bring him the ephod, to enquire whether he should stay in
Keilah, or not. And king Solomon (_1 Kings_ ii. 27) took the priesthood
from Abiathar, and gave it (verse 35) to Zadok. Therefore Moses, and the
high-priests, and the pious kings, who enquired of God on all
extraordinary occasions, how they were to carry themselves, or what
event they were to have, were all sovereign prophets. But in what manner
God spake unto them is not manifest. To say that when Moses went up to
God in Mount Sinai, it was a dream or vision, such as other prophets
had, is contrary to that distinction which God made between Moses and
other prophets (_Numb._ xii. 6, 7, 8). To say God spake or appeared as
he is in his own nature, is to deny his infiniteness, invisibility,
incomprehensibility. To say he spake by inspiration, or infusion of the
Holy Spirit, as the Holy Spirit signifieth the Deity, is to make Moses
equal with Christ, in whom only the Godhead (as St. Paul speaketh,
_Col._ ii. 9) dwelleth bodily. And lastly, to say he spake by the Holy
Spirit, as it signifieth the graces or gifts of the Holy Spirit, is to
attribute nothing to him supernatural. For God disposeth men to piety,
justice, mercy, truth, faith, and all manner of virtue, both moral and
intellectual, by doctrine, example, and by several occasions, natural
and ordinary.
And as these ways cannot be applied to God in his speaking to Moses, at
Mount Sinai; so also, they cannot be applied to him, in his speaking to
the high-priests, from the mercy-seat. Therefore in what manner God
spake to those sovereign prophets of the Old Testament, whose office it
was to enquire of him, is not intelligible. In the time of the New
Testament, there was no sovereign prophet, but our Saviour; who was both
God that spake, and the prophet to whom he spake.
[Sidenote: To prophets of perpetual calling, but subordinate, God spake
by the spirit.]
To subordinate prophets of perpetual calling, I find not any place that
proveth God spake to them supernaturally; but only in such manner, as
naturally he inclineth men to piety, to belief, to righteousness, and to
other virtues all other Christian men. Which way, though it consist in
constitution, instruction, education, and the occasions and invitements
men have to Christian virtues; yet it is truly attributed to the
operation of the Spirit of God, or Holy Spirit, which we in our language
call the Holy Ghost: for there is no good inclination, that is not of
the operation of God. But these operations are not always supernatural.
When therefore a prophet is said to speak in the spirit, or by the
spirit of God, we are to understand no more, but that he speaks
according to God’s will, declared by the supreme prophet. For the most
common acceptation of the word spirit, is in the signification of a
man’s intention, mind, or disposition.
In the time of Moses, there were seventy men besides himself, that
_prophecied_ in the camp of the Israelites. In what manner God spake to
them, is declared in _Numbers_, chap. xi. verse 25. _The Lord came down
in a cloud, and spake unto Moses, and took of the spirit that was upon
him, and gave it to the seventy elders. And it came to pass, when the
spirit rested upon them, they prophecied and did not cease._ By which it
is manifest, first, that their prophecying to the people was subservient
and subordinate to the prophecying of Moses; for that God took of the
spirit of Moses, to put upon them; so that they prophecied as Moses
would have them: otherwise they had not been suffered to prophecy at
all. For there was (verse 27) a complaint made against them to Moses;
and Joshua would have Moses to have forbidden them; which he did not,
but said to Joshua, _be not jealous in my behalf_. Secondly, that the
spirit of God in that place signifieth nothing but the mind and
disposition to obey and assist Moses in the administration of the
government. For if it were meant they had the substantial spirit of God;
that is, the divine nature, inspired into them, then they had it in no
less manner than Christ himself, in whom only the spirit of God dwelt
bodily. It is meant therefore of the gift and grace of God, that guided
them to cooperate with Moses; from whom their spirit was derived. And it
appeareth (_Numb._ xi. 16) that they were such as Moses himself should
appoint for elders and officers of the people: for the words are,
_Gather unto me seventy men, whom thou knowest to be elders and officers
of the people_: where, _thou knowest_, is the same with _thou
appointest_, or _hast appointed to be such_. For we are told before
(_Exod._ xviii. 24) that Moses following the counsel of Jethro, his
father-in-law, did appoint judges and officers over the people, such as
feared God; and of these were those seventy, whom God, by putting upon
them Moses’ spirit, inclined to aid Moses in the administration of the
kingdom: and in this sense the spirit of God is said (_1 Sam._ xvi. 13,
14) presently upon the anointing of David, to have come upon David, and
left Saul; God giving his graces to him he chose to govern his people,
and taking them away from him he rejected. So that by the spirit is
meant inclination to God’s service; and not any supernatural revelation.
[Sidenote: God sometimes also spake by lots.]
God spake also many times by the event of lots; which were ordered by
such as he had put in authority over his people. So we read that God
manifested by the lots which Saul caused to be drawn (_1 Sam._ xiv. 43)
the fault that Jonathan had committed, in eating a honey-comb, contrary
to the oath taken by the people. And (_Josh._ xviii. 10) God divided the
land of Canaan amongst the Israelites, by the _lots that Joshua did cast
before the Lord in Shiloh_. In the same manner it seemeth to be, that
God discovered (_Joshua_ vii. 16, &c.) the crime of Achan. And these are
the ways whereby God declared his will in the Old Testament.
All which ways he used also in the New Testament. To the Virgin Mary, by
a vision of an angel: to Joseph in a dream: again, to Paul, in the way
to Damascus, in a vision of our Saviour: and to Peter in the vision of a
sheet let down from heaven, with divers sorts of flesh; of clean, and
unclean beasts; and in prison, by vision of an angel: and to all the
apostles, and writers of the New Testament, by the graces of his spirit;
and to the apostles again, at the choosing of Matthias in the place of
Judas Iscariot, by lot.
[Sidenote: Every man ought to examine the probability of a pretended
prophet’s calling.]
Seeing then, all prophecy supposeth vision, or dream, (which two, when
they be natural, are the same), or some especial gift of God so rarely
observed in mankind as to be admired where observed; and seeing as well
such gifts, as the most extraordinary dreams and visions, may proceed
from God, not only by his supernatural, and immediate, but also by his
natural operation, and by mediation of second causes; there is need of
reason and judgment to discern between natural, and supernatural gifts,
and between natural, and supernatural visions or dreams. And
consequently men had need to be very circumspect and wary, in obeying
the voice of man, that pretending himself to be a prophet, requires us
to obey God in that way, which he in God’s name telleth us to be the way
to happiness. For he that pretends to teach men the way of so great
felicity, pretends to govern them; that is to say, to rule and reign
over them; which is a thing, that all men naturally desire, and is
therefore worthy to be suspected of ambition and imposture; and
consequently, ought to be examined and tried by every man, before he
yield them obedience; unless he have yielded it them already, in the
institution of a commonwealth; as when the prophet is the civil
sovereign, or by the civil sovereign authorized. And if this examination
of prophets and spirits, were not allowed to every one of the people, it
had been to no purpose to set out the marks, by which every man might be
able to distinguish between those, whom they ought, and those whom they
ought not to follow. Seeing therefore such marks are set out (_Deut._
xiii. 1, &c.) to know a prophet by; and (_1 John_ iv. 1, &c.) to know a
spirit by: and seeing there is so much prophecying in the Old Testament,
and so much preaching in the New Testament, against prophets; and so
much greater a number ordinarily of false prophets, than of true; every
one is to beware of obeying their directions, at their own peril. And
first, that there were many more false than true prophets, appears by
this, that when Ahab (_1 Kings_ xxii.) consulted four hundred prophets,
they were all false impostors, but only one Micaiah. And a little before
the time of the captivity, the prophets were generally liars. _The
prophets_, (saith the Lord, by _Jeremiah_, chapter xiv. 14) _prophecy
lies in my name. I sent them not, neither have I commanded them, nor
spake unto them; they prophecy to you a false vision, a thing of nought,
and the deceit of their heart._ Insomuch as God commanded the people by
the mouth of the prophet Jeremiah (chapter xxiii. 16) not to obey them:
_Thus saith the Lord of hosts, hearken not unto the words of the
prophets, that prophecy to you. They make you vain, they speak a vision
of their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the Lord._
[Sidenote: All prophecy but of the sovereign prophet, is to be examined
by every subject.]
Seeing then there was in the time of the Old Testament, such quarrels
amongst the visionary prophets, one contesting with another, and asking,
_when departed the Spirit from me, to go to thee?_ as between Micaiah
and the rest of the four hundred; and such giving of the lie to one
another, (as in _Jerem._ xiv. 14) and such controversies in the New
Testament at this day, amongst the spiritual prophets; every man then
was, and now is bound to make use of his natural reason, to apply to all
prophecy those rules which God hath given us, to discern the true from
false. Of which rules, in the Old Testament, one was, conformable
doctrine to that which Moses the sovereign prophet had taught them; and
the other, the miraculous power of foretelling what God would bring to
pass, as I have already showed out of _Deut._ xiii. 1, &c. And in the
New Testament there was but one only mark; and that was the preaching of
this doctrine, _that Jesus is the Christ_, that is, king of the Jews,
promised in the Old Testament. Whosoever denied that article, he was a
false prophet, whatsoever miracles he might seem to work; and he that
taught it was a true prophet. For St. John (_1 Epist._ iv. 2, &c.)
speaking expressly of the means to examine spirits, whether they be of
God, or not; after he had told them that there would arise false
prophets, saith thus, _Hereby know ye the Spirit of God. Every spirit
that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God_; that
is, is approved and allowed as a prophet of God: not that he is a godly
man, or one of the elect, for this, that he confesseth, professeth, or
preacheth Jesus to be the Christ; but for that he is a prophet avowed.
For God sometimes speaketh by prophets, whose persons he hath not
accepted; as he did by Balaam; and as he foretold Saul of his death, by
the Witch of Endor. Again in the next verse, _Every spirit that
confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of Christ;
and this is the spirit of Anti-Christ_. So that the rule is perfect on
both sides; that he is a true prophet, which preacheth the Messiah
already come, in the person of Jesus; and he a false one that denieth
him come, and looketh for him in some future impostor, that shall take
upon him that honour falsely, whom the apostle there properly calleth
Anti-Christ. Every man therefore ought to consider who is the sovereign
prophet; that is to say, who it is, that is God’s vicegerent on earth;
and hath next under God, the authority of governing Christian men; and
to observe for a rule, that doctrine, which in the name of God, he hath
commanded to be taught; and thereby to examine and try out the truth of
those doctrines, which pretended prophets with miracle, or without,
shall at any time advance: and if they find it contrary to that rule, to
do as they did, that came to Moses, and complained that there were some
that prophecied in the camp, whose authority so to do they doubted of;
and leave to the sovereign, as they did to Moses, to uphold, or to
forbid them, as he should see cause; and if he disavow them, then no
more to obey their voice; or if he approve them, then to obey them, as
men to whom God hath given a part of the spirit of their sovereign. For
when Christian men, take not their Christian sovereign, for God’s
prophet; they must either take their own dreams, for the prophecy they
mean to be governed by, and the tumor of their own hearts for the Spirit
of God; or they must suffer themselves to be led by some strange prince;
or by some of their fellow-subjects, that can bewitch them, by slander
of the government, into rebellion, without other miracle to confirm
their calling, than sometimes an extraordinary success and impunity; and
by this means destroying all laws, both divine and human, reduce all
order, government, and society, to the first chaos of violence and civil
war.
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CHAPTER XXXVII.
OF MIRACLES, AND THEIR USE.
[Sidenote: A miracle is a work that causeth admiration.]
By _miracles_ are signified the admirable works of God: and therefore
they are also called _wonders_. And because they are for the most part,
done, for a signification of his commandment, in such occasions, as
without them, men are apt to doubt, (following their private natural
reasoning,) what he hath commanded, and what not, they are commonly, in
holy Scripture, called _signs_, in the same sense, as they are called by
the Latins, _ostenta_, and _portenta_, from showing and fore-signifying
that, which the Almighty is about to bring to pass.
[Sidenote: And must therefore be rare, and whereof there is no natural
cause known.]
To understand therefore what is a miracle, we must first understand what
works they are, which men wonder at, and call admirable. And there be
but two things which make men wonder at any event: the one is, if it be
strange, that is to say, such as the like of it hath never, or very
rarely been produced: the other is, if when it is produced, we cannot
imagine it to have been done by natural means, but only by the immediate
hand of God. But when we see some possible, natural cause of it, how
rarely soever the like has been done, or if the like have been often
done, how impossible soever it be to imagine a natural means thereof, we
no more wonder, nor esteem it for a miracle.
Therefore, if a horse or cow should speak, it were a miracle; because
both the thing is strange, and the natural cause difficult to imagine.
So also were it to see a strange deviation of nature, in the production
of some new shape of a living creature. But when a man, or other animal,
engenders his like, though we know no more how this is done, than the
other; yet because it is usual, it is no miracle. In like manner, if a
man be metamorphosed into a stone, or into a pillar, it is a miracle;
because strange: but if a piece of wood be so changed; because we see it
often, it is no miracle: and yet we know no more by what operation of
God, the one is brought to pass, than the other.
The first rainbow that was seen in the world, was a miracle, because the
first; and consequently strange; and served for a sign from God, placed
in heaven, to assure his people, there should be no more any universal
destruction of the world by water. But at this day, because they are
frequent, they are not miracles, neither to them that know their natural
causes, nor to them who know them not. Again, there be many rare works
produced by the art of man: yet when we know they are done; because
thereby we know also the means how they are done, we count them not for
miracles, because not wrought by the immediate hand of God, but of human
industry.
[Sidenote: That which seemeth a miracle to one man, may seem otherwise
to another.]
Furthermore, seeing admiration and wonder are consequent to the
knowledge and experience, wherewith men are endued, some more, some
less; it followeth, that the same thing may be a miracle to one, and not
to another. And thence it is, that ignorant and superstitious men make
great wonders of those works, which other men, knowing to proceed from
nature, (which is not the immediate, but the ordinary work of God),
admire not at all: as when eclipses of the sun and moon have been taken
for supernatural works, by the common people; when nevertheless, there
were others, who could from their natural causes have foretold the very
hour they should arrive: or, as when a man, by confederacy and secret
intelligence, getting knowledge of the private actions of an ignorant,
unwary man, thereby tells him what he has done in former time; it seems
to him a miraculous thing; but amongst wise, and cautelous men, such
miracles as those, cannot easily be done.
[Sidenote: The end of miracles.]
Again, it belongeth to the nature of a miracle, that it be wrought for
the procuring of credit to God’s messengers, ministers, and prophets,
that thereby men may know, they are called, sent, and employed by God,
and thereby be the better inclined to obey them. And therefore, though
the creation of the world, and after that the destruction of all living
creatures in the universal deluge, were admirable works; yet because
they were not done to procure credit to any prophet, or other minister
of God, they use not to be called miracles. For how admirable soever any
work be, the admiration consisteth not in that it could be done; because
men naturally believe the Almighty can do all things; but because he
does it at the prayer or word of a man. But the works of God in Egypt,
by the hand of Moses, were properly miracles; because they were done
with intention to make the people of Israel believe, that Moses came
unto them, not out of any design of his own interest, but as sent from
God. Therefore, after God had commanded him to deliver the Israelites
from the Egyptian bondage, when he said (_Exod._ iv. 1) _They will not
believe me, but will say, the Lord hath not appeared unto me_, God gave
him power, to turn the rod he had in his hand into a serpent, and again
to return it into a rod; and by putting his hand into his bosom, to make
it leprous; and again by putting it out, to make it whole; to make the
children of Israel believe (as it is in verse 5) that the God of their
fathers had appeared unto him: and if that were not enough, he gave him
power to turn their waters into blood. And when he had done these
miracles before the people, it is said (verse 31) that _they believed
him_. Nevertheless, for fear of Pharaoh, they durst not yet obey him.
Therefore the other works which were done to plague Pharaoh and the
Egyptians, tended all to make the Israelites believe in Moses, and were
properly miracles. In like manner if we consider all the miracles done
by the hand of Moses, and all the rest of the prophets, till the
captivity; and those of our Saviour, and his apostles afterwards; we
shall find, their end was always to beget or confirm belief, that they
came not of their own motion, but were sent by God. We may farther
observe in Scripture, that the end of miracles, was to beget belief, not
universally in all men, elect and reprobate; but in the elect only; that
is to say, in such as God had determined should become his subjects. For
those miraculous plagues of Egypt, had not for their end, the conversion
of Pharaoh; for God had told Moses before, that he would harden the
heart of Pharoah, that he should not let the people go: and when he let
them go at last, not the miracles persuaded him, but the plagues forced
him to it. So also of our Saviour, it is written (_Matth._ xiii. 58),
that he wrought not many miracles in his own country, because of their
unbelief; and (in _Mark_ vi. 5) instead of, _He wrought not many_, it
is, _He could work none_. It was not because he wanted power; which to
say, were blasphemy against God; nor that the end of miracles was not to
convert incredulous men to Christ; for the end of all the miracles of
Moses, of the prophets, of our Saviour, and of his apostles was to add
men to the church: but it was, because the end of their miracles, was to
add to the church, not all men, but such as should be saved; that is to
say, such as God had elected. Seeing therefore our Saviour was sent from
his Father, he could not use his power in the conversion of those, whom
his Father had rejected. They that expounding this place of _St. Mark_,
say, that this word, _He could not_, is put for, _He would not_, do it
without example in the Greek tongue: where _would not_, is put sometimes
for _could not_, in things inanimate, that have no will; but _could
not_, for _would not_ never: and thereby lay a stumbling block before
weak Christians; as if Christ could do no miracles, but amongst the
credulous.
[Sidenote: The definition of a miracle.]
From that which I have here set down, of the nature and use of a
miracle, we may define it thus: A MIRACLE _is a work of God, (besides
his operation by the way of nature, ordained in the creation) done, for
the making manifest to his elect, the mission of an extraordinary
minister for their salvation_.
And from this definition, we may infer; first, that in all miracles, the
work done, is not the effect of any virtue in the prophet; because it is
the effect of the immediate hand of God; that is to say God hath done
it, without using the prophet therein, as a subordinate cause.
Secondly, that no devil, angel, or other created spirit, can do a
miracle. For it must either be by virtue of some natural science, or by
incantation, that is, by virtue of words. For if the enchanters do it by
their own power independent, there is some power that proceedeth not
from God; which all men deny: and if they do it by power given them,
then is the work not from the immediate hand of God, but natural, and
consequently no miracle.
There be some texts of Scripture, that seem to attribute the power of
working wonders, equal to some of those immediate miracles wrought by
God himself, to certain arts of magic and incantation. As for example,
when we read that after the rod of Moses being cast on the ground became
a serpent, (_Exod._ vii. 11) _the magicians of Egypt did the like by
their enchantments_; and that after Moses had turned the waters of the
Egyptian streams, rivers, ponds, and pools of water into blood, (_Exod._
vii. 22) _the magicians did so likewise with their enchantments_; and
that after Moses had by the power of God brought frogs upon the land,
(_Exod._ viii. 7) _the magicians also did so with their enchantments,
and brought up frogs upon the land of Egypt_; will not a man be apt to
attribute miracles to enchantments; that is to say, to the efficacy of
the sound of words; and think the same very well proved out of this, and
other such places? And yet there is no place of Scripture, that telleth
us what an enchantment is. If therefore enchantment be not, as many
think it, a working of strange effects by spells and words; but
imposture and delusion, wrought by ordinary means; and so far from
supernatural, as the impostors need not the study so much as of natural
causes, but the ordinary ignorance, stupidity, and superstition of
mankind, to do them; those texts that seem to countenance the power of
magic, witchcraft, and enchantment, must needs have another sense, than
at first sight they seem to bear.
For it is evident enough, that words have no effect, but on those that
understand them; and then they have no other, but to signify the
intentions or passions of them that speak; and thereby produce hope,
fear, or other passions or conceptions in the hearer. Therefore when a
rod seemeth a serpent, or the waters blood, or any other miracle seemeth
done by enchantment; if it be not to the edification of God’s people,
not the rod, nor the water, nor any other thing is enchanted; that is to
say, wrought upon by the words, but the spectator. So that all the
miracle consisteth in this, that the enchanter has deceived a man; which
is no miracle, but a very easy matter to do.
[Sidenote: That men are apt to be deceived by false miracles.]
For such is the ignorance and aptitude to error generally of all men,
but especially of them that have not much knowledge of natural causes,
and of the nature and interests of men; as by innumerable and easy
tricks to be abused. What opinion of miraculous power, before it was
known there was a science of the course of the stars, might a man have
gained, that should have told the people, this hour or day the sun
should be darkened? A juggler by the handling of his goblets and other
trinkets, if it were not now ordinarily practised, would be thought to
do his wonders by the power at least of the devil. A man that hath
practised to speak by drawing in of his breath, (which kind of men in
ancient time were called _ventriloqui_), and so make the weakness of his
voice seem to proceed, not from the weak impulsion of the organs of
speech, but from distance of place, is able to make very many men
believe it is a voice from Heaven, whatsoever he please to tell them.
And for a crafty man, that hath enquired into the secrets, and familiar
confessions that one man ordinarily maketh to another of his actions and
adventures past, to tell them him again is no hard matter; and yet there
be many, that by such means as that obtain the reputation of being
conjurers. But it is too long a business, to reckon up the several sorts
of those men, which the Greeks called θαυματουργοι, that is to say,
workers of things wonderful: and yet these do all they do, by their own
single dexterity. But if we look upon the impostures wrought by
confederacy, there is nothing how impossible soever to be done, that is
impossible to be believed. For two men conspiring, one to seem lame, the
other to cure him with a charm, will deceive many: but many conspiring,
one to seem lame, another so to cure him, and all the rest to bear
witness, will deceive many more.
[Sidenote: Cautions against the imposture of miracles.]
In this aptitude of mankind, to give too hasty belief to pretended
miracles, there can be no better, nor I think any other caution, than
that which God hath prescribed, first by Moses, as I have said before in
the precedent chapter, in the beginning of the xiiith and end of the
xviiith of _Deuteronomy_; that we take not any for prophets, that teach
any other religion, than that which God’s lieutenant, which at that time
was Moses, hath established; nor any, though he teach the same religion,
whose prediction we do not see come to pass. Moses therefore in his
time, and Aaron and his successors in their times, and the sovereign
governor of God’s people, next under God himself, that is to say, the
head of the Church, in all times, are to be consulted, what doctrine he
hath established, before we give credit to a pretended miracle or
prophet. And when that is done, the thing they pretend to be a miracle,
we must both see it done, and use all means possible to consider,
whether it be really done; and not only so, but whether it be such, as
no man can do the like by his natural power, but that it requires the
immediate hand of God. And in this also we must have recourse to God’s
lieutenant, to whom in all doubtful cases, we have submitted our private
judgments. For example; if a man pretend, after certain words spoken
over a piece of bread, that presently God hath made it not bread, but a
god, or a man, or both, and nevertheless it looketh still as like bread
as ever it did; there is no reason for any man to think it really done,
nor consequently to fear him, till he enquire of God, by his vicar or
lieutenant, whether it be done, or not. If he say, not, then followeth
that which Moses saith (_Deut._ xviii. 22) _he hath spoken it
presumptuously, thou shalt not fear him_. If he say, it is done, then he
is not to contradict it. So also if we see not, but only hear tell of a
miracle, we are to consult the lawful Church; that is to say, the lawful
head thereof, how far we are to give credit to the relators of it. And
this is chiefly the case of men, that in these days live under Christian
sovereigns. For in these times, I do not know one man, that ever saw any
such wonderous work, done by the charm, or at the word, or prayer of a
man, that a man endued but with a mediocrity of reason would think
supernatural: and the question is no more, whether what we see done, be
a miracle; whether the miracle we hear, or read of, were a real work,
and not the act of a tongue, or pen; but in plain terms, whether the
report be true, or a lie. In which question we are not every one, to
make our own private reason, or conscience, but the public reason, that
is, the reason of God’s supreme lieutenant, judge; and indeed we have
made him judge already, if we have given him a sovereign power, to do
all that is necessary for our peace and defence. A private man has
always the liberty, because thought is free, to believe or not believe
in his heart those acts that have been given out for miracles, according
as he shall see what benefit can accrue by men’s belief, to those that
pretend or countenance them, and thereby conjecture whether they be
miracles or lies. But when it comes to confession of that faith, the
private reason must submit to the public; that is to say, to God’s
lieutenant. But who is this lieutenant of God, and head of the Church,
shall be considered in its proper place hereafter.
-------
CHAPTER XXXVIII.
OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF ETERNAL
LIFE, HELL, SALVATION, THE WORLD
TO COME, AND REDEMPTION.
The maintenance of civil society depending on justice, and justice on
the power of life and death, and other less rewards and punishments,
residing in them that have the sovereignty of the commonwealth; it is
impossible a commonwealth should stand, where any other than the
sovereign hath a power of giving greater rewards than life, and of
inflicting greater punishments than death. Now seeing _eternal life_ is
a greater reward than the _life present_; and _eternal torment_ a
greater punishment than the _death of nature_; it is a thing worthy to
be well considered of all men that desire, by obeying authority, to
avoid the calamities of confusion and civil war, what is meant in Holy
Scripture, by _life eternal_, and _torment eternal_; and for what
offences, and against whom committed, men are to be _eternally
tormented_; and for what actions they are to obtain _eternal life_.
[Sidenote: The place of Adam’s eternity, if he had not sinned, had been
the terrestrial Paradise.]
And first we find that Adam was created in such a condition of life, as
had he not broken the commandment of God, he had enjoyed it in the
paradise of Eden everlastingly. For there was the _tree of life_,
whereof he was so long allowed to eat, as he should forbear to eat of
the tree of knowledge of good and evil; which was not allowed him. And
therefore as soon as he had eaten of it, God thrust him out of Paradise,
(_Gen._ iii. 22) _lest he should put forth his hand, and take also of
the tree of life and live for ever_. By which it seemeth to me, (with
submission nevertheless both in this, and in all questions whereof the
determination dependeth on the Scriptures, to the interpretation of the
Bible authorized by the commonwealth, whose subject I am), that Adam, if
he had not sinned, had had an eternal life on earth, and that mortality
entered upon himself and his posterity by his first sin. Not that actual
death then entered; for Adam then could never have had children; whereas
he lived long after, and saw a numerous posterity ere he died. But where
it is said, (_Gen._ ii. 17) _In the day that thou eatest thereof, thou
shalt surely die_, it must needs be meant of his mortality, and
certitude of death. Seeing then eternal life was lost by Adam’s
forfeiture in committing sin, he that should cancel that forfeiture, was
to recover thereby that life again. Now Jesus Christ hath satisfied for
the sins of all that believe in him; and therefore recovered to all
believers, that eternal life which was lost by the sin of Adam. And in
this sense it is that the comparison of St. Paul holdeth, (_Rom._ v. 18,
19) _As by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to
condemnation, even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came
upon all men to justification of life_; which is again (_1 Cor._ xv. 21,
22) more perspicuously delivered in these words, _For since by man came
death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all
die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive._
[Sidenote: Texts concerning the place of life eternal, for believers.]
Concerning the place wherein men shall enjoy that eternal life which
Christ hath obtained for them, the texts next before alleged seem to
make it on earth. For if as in Adam all die, that is, have forfeited
paradise and eternal life on earth, even so in Christ all shall be made
alive; then all men shall be made to live on earth; for else the
comparison were not proper. Hereunto seemeth to agree that of the
psalmist (_Psalm_. cxxxiii. 3) _upon Zion God commanded the blessing,
even life for evermore_: for Zion is in Jerusalem upon earth: as also
that of St. John (_Rev._ ii. 7) _To him that overcometh I will give to
eat of the tree of life, which is in the midst of the paradise of God_.
This was the tree of Adam’s eternal life; but his life was to have been
on earth. The same seemeth to be confirmed again by St. John (_Rev._
xxi. 2), where he saith, _I John saw the holy city, new Jerusalem,
coming down from God out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her
husband_: and again (verse 10) to the same effect: as if he should say,
the new _Jerusalem_, the paradise of God, at the coming again of Christ,
should come down to God’s people from heaven, and not they go up to it
from earth. And this differs nothing from that, which the two men in
white clothing, that is the two angels, said to the apostles that were
looking upon Christ ascending (_Acts_ i. 11) _This same Jesus, who is
taken up from you into heaven, shall so come, as you have seen him go up
into heaven_. Which soundeth as if they had said he should come down to
govern them under his Father eternally here, and not take them up to
govern them in heaven; and is conformable to the restoration of the
kingdom of God instituted under Moses, which was a political government
of the Jews on earth. Again, that saying of our Saviour (_Matth._ xxii.
30), _that in the resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in
marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven_, is a description of
an eternal life, resembling that which we lost in Adam in the point of
marriage. For seeing Adam and Eve, if they had not sinned, had lived on
earth eternally in their individual persons; it is manifest, they should
not continually have procreated their kind; for if immortals should have
generated as mankind doth now, the earth in a small time would not have
been able to afford them place to stand on. The Jews that asked our
Saviour the question, whose wife the woman that had married many
brothers should be in the resurrection, knew not what were the
consequences of life eternal: and therefore our Saviour puts them in
mind of this consequence of immortality; that there shall be no
generation, and consequently no marriage, no more than there is marriage
or generation among the angels. The comparison between that eternal life
which Adam lost, and our Saviour by his victory over death hath
recovered, holdeth also in this; that as Adam lost eternal life by his
sin, and yet lived after it for a time, so the faithful Christian hath
recovered eternal life by Christ’s passion, though he die a natural
death, and remain dead for a time, namely, till the resurrection. For as
death is reckoned from the condemnation of Adam, not from the execution;
so life is reckoned from the absolution, not from the resurrection of
them that are elected in Christ.
[Sidenote: Ascension into heaven.]
That the place wherein men are to live eternally, after the
resurrection, is the heavens, (meaning by heaven, those parts of the
world, which are the most remote from earth, as where the stars are, or
above the stars, in another higher heaven, called _cœlum empyreum_,
whereof there is no mention in Scripture, nor ground in reason), is not
easily to be drawn from any text that I can find. By the Kingdom of
Heaven, is meant the kingdom of the King that dwelleth in heaven; and
his kingdom was the people of Israel, whom he ruled by the prophets, his
lieutenants; first Moses, and after him Eleazar, and the sovereign
priests, till in the days of Samuel they rebelled, and would have a
mortal man for their king, after the manner of other nations. And when
our Saviour Christ, by the preaching of his ministers, shall have
persuaded the Jews to return, and called the Gentiles to his obedience,
then shall there be a new kingdom of heaven; because our king shall then
be God, whose _throne_ is heaven: without any necessity evident in the
Scripture, that man shall ascend to his happiness any higher than God’s
_footstool_ the earth. On the contrary, we find written (_John_ iii. 13)
that _no man hath ascended into heaven, but he that came down from
heaven, even the son of man, that is in heaven_. Where I observe by the
way, that these words are not, as those which go immediately before, the
words of our Saviour, but of St. John himself; for Christ was then not
in heaven, but upon the earth. The like is said of David (_Acts_ ii. 34)
where St. Peter, to prove the ascension of Christ, using the words of
the Psalmist (_Psalm_ xvi. 10), _Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell,
nor suffer thine holy one to see corruption_, saith, they were spoken,
not of David, but of Christ; and to prove it, addeth this reason, _For
David is not ascended into heaven_. But to this a man may easily answer,
and say, that though their bodies were not to ascend till the general
day of judgment, yet their souls were in heaven as soon as they were
departed from their bodies; which also seemeth to be confirmed by the
words of our Saviour (_Luke_ xx. 37, 38), who proving the resurrection
out of the words of Moses, saith thus, _That the dead are raised, even
Moses shewed at the bush, when he calleth the Lord, the God of Abraham,
and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. For he is not a God of the
dead, but of the living; for they all live to him._ But if these words
be to be understood only of the immortality of the soul, they prove not
at all that which our Saviour intended to prove, which was the
resurrection of the body, that is to say, the immortality of the man.
Therefore our Saviour meaneth, that those patriarchs were immortal; not
by a property consequent to the essence and nature of mankind; but by
the will of God, that was pleased of his mere grace, to bestow _eternal
life_ upon the faithful. And though at that time the patriarchs and many
other faithful men were _dead_, yet as it is in the text, they _lived to
God_; that is, they were written in the Book of Life with them that were
absolved of their sins, and ordained to life eternal at the
resurrection. That the soul of man is in its own nature eternal, and a
living creature independent on the body, or that any mere man is
immortal, otherwise than by the resurrection in the last day, except
Enoch and Elias, is a doctrine not apparent in Scripture. The whole of
the xivth chapter of _Job_, which is the speech not of his friends, but
of himself, is a complaint of this mortality of nature; and yet no
contradiction of the immortality at the resurrection. _There is hope of
a tree_, saith he, (verse 7) _if it be cast down. Though the root
thereof wax old, and the stock thereof die in the ground, yet when it
scenteth the water it will bud, and bring forth boughs like a plant. But
man dieth and wasteth away, yea, man giveth up the ghost, and where is
he?_ And (verse 12) _Man lieth down, and riseth not, till the heavens be
no more_. But when is it, that the heavens shall be no more? St. Peter
tells us, that it is at the general resurrection. For in his 2nd
_Epistle_, chap. iii. verse 7, he saith, _that the heavens and the earth
that are now, are reserved unto fire against the day of judgment, and
perdition of ungodly men_, and (v. 12) _looking for, and hasting to the
coming of God, wherein the heavens shall be on fire and shall be
dissolved, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat. Nevertheless,
we according to the promise look for new heavens, and a new earth,
wherein dwelleth righteousness._ Therefore where Job saith, _man riseth
not till the heavens be no more_; it is all one, as if he had said, the
immortal life, (and soul and life in the Scripture do usually signify
the same thing,) beginneth not in man, till the resurrection and day of
judgment; and hath for cause, not his specifical nature and generation,
but the promise. For St. Peter says, not _We look for new heavens and a
new earth, from nature_, but _from promise_.
Lastly, seeing it hath been already proved out of divers evident places
of Scripture, in chap. xxxv. of this book, that the kingdom of God is a
civil commonwealth, where God himself is sovereign, by virtue first of
the _old_, and since of the _new_ covenant, wherein he reigneth by his
vicar or lieutenant; the same places do therefore also prove, that after
the coming again of our Saviour in his majesty and glory, to reign
actually and eternally, the kingdom of God is to be on earth. But
because this doctrine, though proved out of places of Scripture not few
nor obscure, will appear to most men a novelty, I do but propound it;
maintaining nothing in this, or any other paradox of religion; but
attending the end of that dispute of the sword, concerning the
authority, not yet amongst my countrymen decided, by which all sorts of
doctrine are to be approved or rejected; and whose commands, both in
speech and writing, whatsoever be the opinions of private men, must by
all men, that mean to be protected by their laws, be obeyed. For the
points of doctrine concerning the kingdom of God, have so great
influence on the kingdom of man, as not to be determined, but by them,
that under God have the sovereign power.
[Sidenote: The place after judgment of those who were never in the
kingdom of God, or having been in, are cast out.]
As the kingdom of God, and eternal life, so also God’s enemies, and
their torments after judgment, appear by the Scripture to have their
place on earth. The name of the place, where all men remain till the
resurrection, that were either buried, or swallowed up of the earth, is
usually called in Scripture, by words that signify _under ground_; which
the Latins read generally _infernus_, and _inferi_, and the Greek ἃδης,
that is to say, a place where men cannot see; and containeth as well the
grave, as any any other deeper place. But for the place of the damned
after the resurrection, it is not determined, neither in the Old nor New
Testament, by any note of situation; but only by the company: as that it
shall be, where such wicked men were, as God in former times, in
extraordinary and miraculous manner, had destroyed from off the face of
the earth: [Sidenote: Tartarus.] as for example, that they are _in
Inferno_, in _Tartarus_, or in the bottomless pit; because Corah,
Dathan, and Abiron, were swallowed up alive into the earth. Not that the
writers of the Scripture would have us believe, there could be in the
globe of the earth, which is not only finite, but also, compared to the
height of the stars, of no considerable magnitude, a pit without a
bottom, that is, a hole of infinite depth, such as the Greeks in their
_demonology_, (that is to say, in their doctrine concerning _demons_),
and after them the Romans, called _Tartarus_; of which Virgil (_Æn._ vi.
578, 579) says,
Bis patet in præceps tantum, tenditque sub umbras,
Quantus ad ætherium cœli suspectus Olympum:
for that is a thing the proportion of earth to heaven cannot bear: but
that we should believe them there, indefinitely, where those men are, on
whom God inflicted that exemplary punishment.
[Sidenote: The congregation of giants.]
Again, because those mighty men of the earth, that lived in the time of
Noah, before the flood, (which the Greeks call _heroes_, and the
Scripture _giants_, and both say were begotten by copulation of the
children of God with the children of men,) were for their wicked life
destroyed by the general deluge; the place of the damned, is therefore
also sometimes marked out, by the company of those deceased giants; as
_Proverbs_ xxi. 16, _The man that wandereth out of the way of
understanding, shall remain in the congregation of the giants_; and
_Job_ xxvi. 5, _Behold the giants groan under water, and they that dwell
with them_. Here the place of the damned is under the water. And
_Isaiah_ xiv. 9, _Hell is troubled how to meet thee_ (that is, the King
of Babylon) _and will displace the giants for thee_: and here again the
place of the damned, if the sense be literal, is to be under water.
[Sidenote: Lake of fire.] Thirdly, because the cities of Sodom and
Gomorrah, by the extraordinary wrath of God, were consumed for their
wickedness with fire and brimstone, and together with them the country
about made a stinking bituminous lake: the place of the damned is
sometimes expressed by fire, and a fiery lake, as in the _Apocalypse_,
xxi. 8, _But the timorous, incredulous, and abominable, and murderers,
and whoremongers, and sorcerers, and idolaters, and all liars, shall
have their part in the lake that burneth with fire and brimstone; which
is the second death_. So that it is manifest, that hell fire, which is
here expressed by metaphor from the real fire of Sodom, signifieth not
any certain kind or place of torment; but is to be taken indefinitely,
for destruction, as it is in _Rev._ xx. 14, where it is said, that
_death and hell were cast into the lake of fire_; that is to say, were
abolished and destroyed; as if after the day of judgment, there shall be
no more dying, nor no more going into hell; that is, no more going to
_Hades_, (from which word perhaps our word Hell is derived,) which is
the same with no more dying.
[Sidenote: Utter darkness.]
Fourthly, from the plague of darkness inflicted on the Egyptians, of
which it is written (_Exod._ x. 23) _They saw not one another, neither
rose any man from his place for three days; but all the children of
Israel had light in their dwellings_; the place of the wicked after
judgment, is called _utter darkness_, or, as it is in the original,
_darkness without_. And so it is expressed (_Matth._ xxii. 13) where the
king commanded his servants, _to bind hand and foot the man that had not
on his wedding garment, and to cast him out_, εἰς τὸ σκοτος τὸ ἐξώτερον,
_into external darkness_, or _darkness without_: which though translated
_utter darkness_, does not signify _how great_, but _where_ that
darkness is to be; namely, _without the habitation_ of God’s elect.
[Sidenote: Gehenna, and Tophet.]
Lastly, whereas there was a place near Jerusalem, called the _Valley of
the Children of Hinnon_; in a part whereof, called _Tophet_, the Jews
had committed most grievous idolatry, sacrificing their children to the
idol Moloch; and wherein also God had afflicted his enemies with most
grievous punishments; and wherein Josiah had burned the priests of
Moloch upon their own altars, as appeareth at large in the 2nd of
_Kings_, chap. xxiii.: the place served afterwards to receive the filth
and garbage which was carried thither out of the city; and there used to
be fires made from time to time, to purify the air, and take away the
stench of carrion. From this abominable place, the Jews used ever after
to call the place of the damned, by the name of _Gehenna_, or _Valley of
Hinnon_. And this _Gehenna_, is that word which is usually now
translated HELL; and from the fires from time to time there burning, we
have the notion of _everlasting_ and _unquenchable fire_.
[Sidenote: Of the literal sense of the Scripture concerning hell.]
Seeing now there is none, that so interprets the Scripture, as that
after the day of judgment, the wicked are all eternally to be punished
in the Valley of Hinnon; or that they shall so rise again, as to be ever
after under ground or under water; or that after the resurrection, they
shall no more see one another, nor stir from one place to another: it
followeth, methinks, very necessarily, that that which is thus said
concerning hell fire, is spoken metaphorically; and that therefore there
is a proper sense to be enquired after, (for of all metaphors there is
some real ground, that may be expressed in proper words,) both of the
_place_ of _hell_, and the nature of _hellish torments_, and
_tormenters_.
[Sidenote: Satan, Devil, not proper names, but appellatives.]
And first for the tormenters, we have their nature and properties,
exactly and properly delivered by the names of, _the Enemy_, or _Satan_;
_the Accuser_, or _Diabolus_; _the Destroyer_, or _Abaddon_. Which
significant names, _Satan_, _Devil_, _Abaddon_, set not forth to us any
individual person, as proper names use to do; but only an office, or
quality; and are therefore appellatives; which ought not to have been
left untranslated, as they are in the Latin and modern Bibles; because
thereby they seem to be proper names of _demons_; and men are the more
easily seduced to believe the doctrine of devils; which at that time was
the religion of the Gentiles, and contrary to that of Moses and of
Christ.
And because by the _Enemy_, the _Accuser_, and _Destroyer_, is meant the
enemy of them that shall be in the kingdom of God; therefore if the
kingdom of God after the resurrection, be upon the earth, as in the
former chapter I have shown by Scripture it seems to be, the Enemy and
his kingdom must be on earth also. For so also was it, in the time
before the Jews had deposed God. For God’s kingdom was in Palestine; and
the nations round about, were the kingdoms of the Enemy; and
consequently by _Satan_, is meant any earthly enemy of the Church.
[Sidenote: Torments of hell.]
The torments of hell, are expressed sometimes, by _weeping_, and
_gnashing of teeth_, as _Matth._ viii. 12. Sometimes by _the worm of
conscience_; as _Isaiah_ lxvi. 24, and _Mark_ ix. 44, 46, 48: sometimes,
by fire, as in the place now quoted, _where the worm dieth not, and the
fire is not quenched_, and many places beside: sometimes by _shame and
contempt_, as _Dan._ xii. 2, _And many of them that sleep in the dust of
the earth, shall awake; some to everlasting life; and some to shame, and
everlasting contempt_. All which places design metaphorically a grief
and discontent of mind, from the sight of that eternal felicity in
others, which they themselves through their own incredulity and
disobedience have lost. And because such felicity in others, is not
sensible but by comparison with their own actual miseries; it followeth
that they are to suffer such bodily pains, and calamities, as are
incident to those, who not only live under evil and cruel governors, but
have also for enemy the eternal king of the saints, God Almighty. And
amongst these bodily pains, is to be reckoned also to every one of the
wicked a second death. For though the Scripture be clear for an
universal resurrection; yet we do not read, that to any of the reprobate
is promised an eternal life. For whereas St. Paul (_1 Cor._ xv. 42, 43)
to the question concerning what bodies men shall rise with again, saith,
that _The body is sown in corruption, and is raised in incorruption; it
is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weakness, it
is raised in power_. Glory and power cannot be applied to the bodies of
the wicked: nor can the name of _second death_ be applied to those that
can never die but once: and although in metaphorical speech, a
calamitous life everlasting, may be called an everlasting death, yet it
cannot well be understood of a _second death_.
The fire prepared for the wicked, is an everlasting fire: that is to
say, the estate wherein no man can be without torture, both of body and
mind, after the resurrection, shall endure for ever; and in that sense
the fire shall be unquenchable, and the torments everlasting: but it
cannot thence be inferred, that he who shall be cast into that fire, or
be tormented with those torments, shall endure and resist them so as to
be eternally burnt, and tortured, and yet never be destroyed, nor die.
And though there be many places that affirm everlasting fire and
torments, into which men may be cast successively one after another as
long as the world lasts, yet I find none that affirm there shall be an
eternal life therein of any individual person; but to the contrary, an
everlasting death, which is the second death: (_Rev._ xx. 13, 14) _For
after death and the grave shall have delivered up the dead which were in
them, and every man be judged according to his works; death and the
grave shall also be cast into the lake of fire. This is the second
death._ Whereby it is evident that there is to be a second death of
every one that shall be condemned at the day of judgment, after which he
shall die no more.
[Sidenote: The joys of life eternal, and salvation, the same thing.]
[Sidenote: Salvation from sin, and from misery, all one.]
The joys of life eternal, are in Scripture comprehended all under the
name of SALVATION, or _being saved_. To be saved, is to be secured,
either respectively, against special evils, or absolutely, against all
evils, comprehending want, sickness, and death itself. And because man
was created in a condition immortal, not subject to corruption, and
consequently to nothing that tendeth to the dissolution of his nature;
and fell from that happiness by the sin of Adam; it followeth, that to
be _saved_ from sin, is to be saved from all the evil and calamities
that sin hath brought upon us. And therefore in the holy Scripture,
remission of sin, and salvation from death and misery, is the same
thing, as it appears by the words of our Saviour, who having cured a man
sick of the palsy, by saying, (_Matth._ ix. 2) _Son be of good cheer,
thy sins be forgiven thee_; and knowing that the Scribes took for
blasphemy, that a man should pretend to forgive sins, asked them (verse
5) _whether it were easier to say, Thy sins be forgiven thee, or, Arise
and walk_; signifying thereby, that it was all one, as to the saving of
the sick, to say, _Thy sins are forgiven_, and _Arise and walk_; and
that he used that form of speech, only to shew he had power to forgive
sins. And it is besides evident in reason, that since death and misery
were the punishments of sin, the discharge of sin must also be a
discharge of death and misery; that is to say, salvation absolute, such
as the faithful are to enjoy after the day of judgment, by the power and
favour of Jesus Christ, who for that cause is called our SAVIOUR.
Concerning particular salvations, such as are understood, (_1 Sam._ xiv.
39) as the _Lord liveth that saveth Israel_, that is, from their
temporary enemies, and (_2 Sam._ xxii. 3) _Thou art my Saviour, thou
savest me from violence_; and, (_2 Kings_ xiii. 5) _God gave the
Israelites a Saviour, and so they were delivered from the hand of the
Assyrians_, and the like, I need say nothing; there being neither
difficulty, nor interest to corrupt the interpretation of texts of that
kind.
[Sidenote: The place of eternal salvation.]
But concerning the general salvation, because it must be in the kingdom
of heaven, there is great difficulty concerning the place. On one side,
by _kingdom_, which is an estate ordained by men for their perpetual
security against enemies and want, it seemeth that this salvation should
be on earth. For by salvation is set forth unto us, a glorious reign of
our king, by conquest; not a safety by escape: and therefore there where
we look for salvation, we must look also for triumph; and before
triumph, for victory; and before victory, for battle; which cannot well
be supposed, shall be in heaven. But how good soever this reason may be,
I will not trust to it, without very evident places of Scripture. The
state of salvation is described at large, _Isaiah_ xxxiii. 20, 21, 22,
23, 24:
_Look upon Zion, the city of our solemnities; thine eyes shall see
Jerusalem a quiet habitation, a tabernacle that shall not be taken down;
not one of the stakes thereof shall ever be removed, neither shall any
of the cords thereof be broken._
_But there the glorious Lord will be unto us a place of broad rivers and
streams; wherein shall go no galley with oars, neither shall gallant
ship pass thereby._
_For the Lord is our Judge, the Lord is our law-giver, the Lord is our
king, he will save us._
_Thy tacklings are loosed; they could not well strengthen their mast;
they could not spread the sail: then is the prey of a great spoil
divided; the lame take the prey:_
_And the inhabitant shall not say, I am sick; the people that shall
dwell therein shall be forgiven their iniquity._
In which words we have the place from whence salvation is to proceed,
_Jerusalem, a quiet habitation_; the eternity of it, _a tabernacle that
shall not be taken down, &c_; the Saviour of it, _the Lord, their judge,
their law-giver, their king, he will save us; the salvation, the Lord
shall be to them as a broad moat of swift waters, &c_; the condition of
their enemies, _their tacklings are loose, their masts weak, the lame
shall take the spoil of them_; the condition of the saved, _the
inhabitant shall not say, I am sick_: and lastly, all this is
comprehended in forgiveness of sin, _the people that dwell therein shall
be forgiven their iniquity_. By which it is evident, that salvation
shall be on earth, then, when God shall reign, at the coming again of
Christ, in Jerusalem; and from Jerusalem shall proceed the salvation of
the Gentiles that shall be received into God’s kingdom: as is also more
expressly declared by the same prophet, (_Isaiah_ lxvi. 20, 21), _And
they_ (that is the Gentiles who had any Jew in bondage) _shall bring all
your brethren, for an offering to the Lord, out of all nations, upon
horses, and in chariots, and in litters, and upon mules, and upon swift
beasts, to my holy mountain, Jerusalem, saith the Lord, as the children
of Israel bring an offering in a clean vessel into the house of the
Lord. And I will also take of them for priests and for Levites, saith
the Lord._ Whereby it is manifest, that the chief seat of God’s kingdom,
which is the place from whence the salvation of us that were Gentiles
shall proceed, shall be Jerusalem: and the same is also confirmed by our
Saviour in his discourse with the woman of Samaria, concerning the place
of God’s worship; to whom he saith (_John_ iv. 22) that the Samaritans
worshipped they knew not what, but the Jews worshipped what they knew,
_for salvation is of the Jews_ (_ex Judæis_, that is, begins at the
Jews): as if he should say, you worship God, but know not by whom he
will save you, as we do, that know it shall be by one of the tribe of
Judah; a Jew, not a Samaritan. And therefore also the woman not
impertinently answered him again, _We know the Messias shall come_. So
that which our Saviour saith, _Salvation is from the Jews_, is the same
that Paul says (_Rom._ i. 16, 17) _The Gospel is the power of God to
salvation to every one that believeth: to the Jew first, and also to the
Greek. For therein is the righteousness of God revealed from faith to
faith_; from the faith of the Jew to the faith of the Gentile. In the
like sense the prophet Joel describing the day of Judgment, (chap. ii.
30, 31) that God would _shew wonders in heaven, and in earth, blood, and
fire, and pillars of smoke; the sun shall be turned to darkness, and the
moon into blood, before the great and terrible day of the Lord come_: he
addeth, (verse 32) _and it shall come to pass, that whosoever shall call
upon the name of the Lord shall be saved. For in Mount Zion and in
Jerusalem shall be salvation._ And _Obadiah_, (verse 17) saith the same,
_Upon Mount Zion shall be deliverance; and there shall be holiness, and
the house of Jacob shall possess their possessions_, that is the
possessions of the _heathen_, which _possessions_, he expresseth more
particularly in the following verses, by the _mount of Esau_, the _Land
of the Philistines_, the _fields of Ephraim_, of _Samaria_, _Gilead_,
and the _cities of the south_, and concludes with these words, _the
kingdom shall be the Lord’s_. All these places are for salvation, and
the kingdom of God, after the day of judgment, upon earth. On the other
side, I have not found any text that can probably be drawn, to prove any
ascension of the saints into heaven; that is to say, into any _cœlum
empyreum_, or other ætherial region; saving that it is called the
kingdom of Heaven: which name it may have, because God, that was king of
the Jews, governed them by his commands, sent to Moses by angels from
heaven; and after the revolt, sent his Son from heaven to reduce them to
their obedience; and shall send him thence again to rule both them, and
all other faithful men, from the day of judgment, everlastingly: or from
that, that the throne of this our great king is in heaven; whereas the
earth is but his footstool. But that the subjects of God should have any
place as high as his throne, or higher than his footstool, it seemeth
not suitable to the dignity of a king, nor can I find any evident text
for it in Holy Scripture.
[Sidenote: The world to come.]
From this that hath been said of the kingdom of God, and of salvation,
it is not hard to interpret what is meant by the WORLD TO COME. There
are three worlds mentioned in Scripture, the _old world_, the _present
world_, and the _world to come_. Of the first, St. Peter speaks, (_2
Pet._ ii. 5) _If God spared not the old world, but saved Noah the eighth
person, a preacher of righteousness, bringing the flood upon the world
of the ungodly, &c._ So the _first world_, was from Adam to the general
flood. Of the present world, our Saviour speaks (_John_ xviii. 36) _My
kingdom is not of this world_. For he came only to teach men the way of
salvation, and to renew the kingdom of his Father, by his doctrine. Of
the world to come, St. Peter speaks (_2 Pet._ iii. 13) _Nevertheless we
according to his promise look for new heavens, and a new earth_. This is
that WORLD, wherein Christ coming down from heaven in the clouds, with
great power, and glory, shall send his angels, and shall gather together
his elect, from the four winds, and from the uttermost parts of the
earth, and thenceforth reign over them, under his Father, everlastingly.
[Sidenote: Redemption.]
_Salvation_ of a sinner, supposeth a precedent REDEMPTION; for he that
is once guilty of sin, is obnoxious to the penalty of the same; and must
pay, or some other for him, such ransom as he that is offended, and has
him in his power, shall require. And seeing the person offended, is
Almighty God, in whose power are all things; such ransom is to be paid
before salvation can be acquired, as God hath been pleased to require.
By this ransom, is not intended a satisfaction for sin, equivalent to
the offence; which no sinner for himself, nor righteous man can ever be
able to make for another: the damage a man does to another, he may make
amends for by restitution or recompense; but sin cannot be taken away by
recompense; for that were to make the liberty to sin, a thing vendible.
But sins may be pardoned to the repentant, either _gratis_, or upon such
penalty as God is pleased to accept. That which God usually accepted in
the Old Testament, was some sacrifice or oblation. To forgive sin is not
an act of injustice, though the punishment have been threatened. Even
amongst men, though the promise of good, bind the promiser; yet threats,
that is to say, promises of evil, bind them not; much less shall they
bind God, who is infinitely more merciful than men. Our Saviour Christ
therefore to _redeem_ us, did not in that sense satisfy for the sins of
men, as that his death, of its own virtue, could make it unjust in God
to punish sinners with eternal death; but did make that sacrifice and
oblation of himself, at his first coming, which God was pleased to
require for the salvation, at his second coming, of such as in the
meantime should repent, and believe in him. And though this act of our
_redemption_, be not always in Scripture called a _sacrifice_, and
_oblation_, but sometimes a _price_; yet by _price_ we are not to
understand anything, by the value whereof, he could claim right to a
pardon for us, from his offended Father; but that price which God the
Father was pleased in mercy to demand.
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CHAPTER XXXIX.
OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF
THE WORD CHURCH.
[Sidenote: Church the Lord’s house.]
The word Church, (_Ecclesia_) signifieth in the books of Holy Scripture
divers things. Sometimes, though not often, it is taken for _God’s
house_, that is to say, for a temple, wherein Christians assembled to
perform holy duties, publicly, as (_1 Cor._ xiv. 34) _Let your women
keep silence in the Churches_: but this is metaphorically put for the
congregation there assembled; and hath been since used for the edifice
itself, to distinguish between the temples of Christians and idolaters.
The Temple of Jerusalem was _God’s house_, and the house of prayer; and
so is any edifice dedicated by Christians to the worship of Christ,
_Christ’s house_: and therefore the Greek fathers call it Κυριακὴ, _the
Lord’s house_: and thence in our language it came to be called _kyrke_,
and _church_.
[Sidenote: _Ecclesia_, properly what.]
Church, when not taken for a house, signifieth the same that _ecclesia_
signified in the Grecian commonwealth, that is to say, a congregation,
or an assembly of citizens, called forth to hear the magistrate speak
unto them; and which in the commonwealth of Rome was called _concio_: as
he that spake was called _ecclesiastes_, and _concionator_. And when
they were called forth by lawful authority, (_Acts_ xix. 39) it was
_Ecclesia legitima_, a _lawful Church_, ἔννομος ἐκκλησία. But when they
were excited by tumultuous and seditious clamour, then it was a Confused
Church, ἐκκλησία συγκεχυμένη.
It is taken also sometimes for the men that have right to be of the
congregation, though not actually assembled, that is to say, for the
whole multitude of Christian men, how far soever they be dispersed: as
(_Acts_ viii. 3) where it is said, that _Saul made havoc of the Church_:
and in this sense is Christ said to be the head of the Church. And
sometimes for a certain part of Christians, as (_Col._ iv. 15) _Salute
the Church that is in his house_. Sometimes also for the elect only; as
(_Eph._ v. 27) _A glorious Church, without spot, or wrinkle, holy, and
without blemish_; which is meant of the _Church triumphant_, or _Church
to come_. Sometimes, for a congregation assembled of professors of
Christianity, whether their profession be true or counterfeit; as it is
understood, (_Matth._ xviii. 17) where it is said, _Tell it to the
Church; and if he neglect to hear the Church, let him be to thee as a
Gentile, or publican_.
[Sidenote: In what sense the church is one person.]
[Sidenote: Church defined.]
And in this last sense only it is that the _Church_ can be taken for one
person; that is to say, that it can be said to have power to will, to
pronounce, to command, to be obeyed, to make laws, or to do any other
action whatsoever. For without authority from a lawful congregation,
whatsoever act be done in a concourse of people, it is the particular
act of every one of those that were present, and gave their aid to the
performance of it; and not the act of them all in gross, as of one body;
much less the act of them that were absent, or that being present, were
not willing it should be done. According to this sense, I define a
CHURCH to be, _a company of men professing Christian religion, united in
the person of one sovereign, at whose command they ought to assemble,
and without whose authority they ought not to assemble_. And because in
all commonwealths, that assembly, which is without warrant from the
civil sovereign, is unlawful; that Church also, which is assembled in
any commonwealth that hath forbidden them to assemble, is an unlawful
assembly.
[Sidenote: A Christian commonwealth and a church all one.]
It followeth also, that there is on earth, no such universal Church, as
all Christians are bound to obey; because there is no power on earth, to
which all other commonwealths are subject. There are Christians, in the
dominions of several princes and states; but every one of them is
subject to that commonwealth, whereof he is himself a member; and
consequently, cannot be subject to the commands of any other person. And
therefore a Church, such a one as is capable to command, to judge,
absolve, condemn, or do any other act, is the same thing with a civil
commonwealth, consisting of Christian men; and is called a _civil
state_, for that the subjects of it are _men_; and a _Church_, for that
the subjects thereof are _Christians_. _Temporal_ and _spiritual_
government, are but two words brought into the world, to make men see
double, and mistake their _lawful sovereign_. It is true, that the
bodies of the faithful, after the resurrection, shall be not only
spiritual, but eternal; but in this life they are gross, and
corruptible. There is therefore no other government in this life,
neither of state, nor religion, but temporal; nor teaching of any
doctrine, lawful to any subject, which the governor both of the state,
and of the religion forbiddeth to be taught. And that governor must be
one; or else there must needs follow faction and civil war in the
commonwealth, between the _Church_ and _State_; between _spiritualists_
and _temporalists_; between the _sword of justice_, and the _shield of
faith_: and, which is more, in every Christian man’s own breast, between
the _Christian_, and the _man_. The doctors of the Church, are called
pastors; so also are civil sovereigns. But if pastors be not subordinate
one to another, so as that there may be one chief pastor, men will be
taught contrary doctrines; whereof both may be, and one must be false.
Who that one chief pastor is, according to the law of nature, hath been
already shown; namely, that it is the civil sovereign: and to whom the
Scripture hath assigned that office, we shall see in the chapters
following.
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CHAPTER XL.
OF THE RIGHTS OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD, IN
ABRAHAM, MOSES, THE HIGH-PRIESTS, AND
THE KINGS OF JUDAH.
[Sidenote: The sovereign right of Abraham.]
The father of the faithful, and first in the kingdom of God by covenant,
was Abraham. For with him was the covenant first made; wherein he
obliged himself, and his seed after him, to acknowledge and obey the
commands of God; not only such, as he could take notice of, (as moral
laws,) by the light of nature; but also such, as God should in special
manner deliver to him by dreams and visions. For as to the moral law,
they were already obliged, and needed not have been contracted withal,
by promise of the land of Canaan. Nor was there any contract, that could
add to, or strengthen the obligation, by which both they, and all men
else were bound naturally to obey God Almighty: and therefore the
covenant which Abraham made with God, was to take for the commandment of
God, that which in the name of God was commanded him in a dream, or
vision; and to deliver it to his family, and cause them to observe the
same.
[Sidenote: Abraham had the sole power of ordering the religion of his
own people.]
In this contract of God with Abraham, we may observe three points of
important consequence in the government of God’s people. First, that at
the making of this covenant, God spake only to Abraham; and therefore
contracted not with any of his family, or seed, otherwise than as their
wills, which make the essence of all covenants, were before the contract
involved in the will of Abraham; who was therefore supposed to have had
a lawful power, to make them perform all that he covenanted for them.
According whereunto (_Gen._ xviii. 18, 19) God saith, _All the nations
of the earth shall be blessed in him; for I know him that he will
command his children and his household after him, and they shall keep
the way of the Lord_. From whence may be concluded this first point,
that they to whom God hath not spoken immediately, are to receive the
positive commandments of God, from their sovereign; as the family and
seed of Abraham did from Abraham their father, and Lord, and civil
sovereign. And consequently in every commonwealth, they who have no
supernatural revelation to the contrary, ought to obey the laws of their
own sovereign, in the external acts and profession of religion. As for
the inward _thought_, and _belief_ of men, which human governors can
take no notice of, (for God only knoweth the heart), they are not
voluntary, nor the effect of the laws, but of the unrevealed will and of
the power of God; and consequently fall not under obligation.
[Sidenote: No pretence of private spirit against the religion of
Abraham.]
From whence proceedeth another point, that it was not unlawful for
Abraham, when any of his subjects should pretend private vision or
spirit, or other revelation from God, for the countenancing of any
doctrine which Abraham should forbid, or when they followed or adhered
to any such pretender, to punish them; and consequently that it is
lawful now for the sovereign to punish any man that shall oppose his
private spirit against the laws: for he hath the same place in the
commonwealth, that Abraham had in his own family.
[Sidenote: Abraham sole judge and interpreter of what God spake.]
There ariseth also from the same, a third point; that as none but
Abraham in his family, so none but the sovereign in a Christian
commonwealth, can take notice what is, or what is not the word of God.
For God spake only to Abraham; and it was he only, that was able to know
what God said, and to interpret the same to his family: and therefore
also, they that have the place of Abraham in a commonwealth, are the
only interpreters of what God hath spoken.
[Sidenote: The authority of Moses whereon grounded.]
The same covenant was renewed with Isaac; and afterwards with Jacob; but
afterwards no more, till the Israelites were freed from the Egyptians,
and arrived at the foot of Mount Sinai: and then it was renewed by
Moses, (as I have said before, chap. xxxv.) in such manner, as they
became from that time forward the peculiar kingdom of God; whose
lieutenant was Moses, for his own time: and the succession to that
office was settled upon Aaron, and his heirs after him, to be to God a a
sacerdotal kingdom for ever.
By this constitution, a kingdom is acquired to God. But seeing Moses had
no authority to govern the Israelites, as a successor to the right of
Abraham, because he could not claim it by inheritance; it appeareth not
as yet, that the people were obliged to take him for God’s lieutenant,
longer than they believed that God spake unto him. And therefore his
authority, notwithstanding the covenant they made with God, depended yet
merely upon the opinion they had of his sanctity, and of the reality of
his conferences with God, and the verity of his miracles; which opinion
coming to change, they were no more obliged to take anything for the law
of God, which he propounded to them in God’s name. We are therefore to
consider, what other ground there was, of their obligation to obey him.
For it could not be the commandment of God that could oblige them;
because God spake not to them immediately, but by the mediation of Moses
himself: and our Saviour saith of himself, (_John_ v. 31) _If I bear
witness of myself, my witness is not true_; much less if Moses bear
witness of himself, especially in a claim of kingly power over God’s
people, ought his testimony to be received. His authority therefore, as
the authority of all other princes, must be grounded on the consent of
the people, and their promise to obey him. And so it was: for _the
people_ (_Exod._ xx. 18, 19) _when they saw the thunderings, and the
lightenings, and the noise of the trumpets, and the mountain smoking,
removed, and stood afar off. And they said unto Moses, speak thou with
us, and we will hear, but let not God speak with us lest we die._ Here
was their promise of obedience; and by this it was they obliged
themselves to obey whatsoever he should deliver unto them for the
commandment of God.
[Sidenote: Moses was, under God, sovereign of the Jews all his own time,
though Aaron had the priesthood.]
And notwithstanding the covenant constituted a sacerdotal kingdom, that
is to say, a kingdom hereditary to Aaron; yet that is to be understood
of the succession after Moses should be dead. For whosoever ordereth and
establisheth the policy, as first founder of a commonwealth, be it
monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy, must needs have sovereign power
over the people all the while he is doing of it. And that Moses had that
power all his own time, is evidently affirmed in the Scripture. First,
in the text last before cited, because the people promised obedience,
not to Aaron, but to him. Secondly, (_Exod._ xxiv. 1, 2) _And God said
unto Moses, Come up unto the Lord, thou and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and
seventy of the Elders of Israel. And Moses alone shall come near the
Lord, but they shall not come nigh, neither shall the people go up with
him._ By which it is plain, that Moses, who was alone called up to God,
(and not Aaron, nor the other priests, nor the seventy elders, nor the
people who were forbidden to come up,) was alone he, that represented to
the Israelites the person of God, that is to say, was their sole
sovereign under God. And though afterwards it be said (verses 9, 10)
_Then went up Moses and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and seventy of the
elders of Israel, and they saw the God of Israel, and there was under
his feet, as it were a paved work of a sapphire stone &c_; yet this was
not till after Moses had been with God before, and had brought to the
people the words which God had said to him. He only went for the
business of the people; the others, as the nobles of his retinue, were
admitted for honour to that special grace, which was not allowed to the
people; which was, as in the verse after appeareth, to see God and live,
_God laid not his hand upon them, they saw God and did eat and drink_,
that is, did live: but did not carry any commandment from him to the
people. Again, it is everywhere said, _the Lord spake unto Moses_, as in
all other occasions of government, so also in the ordering of the
ceremonies of religion, contained in chapters xxv. xxvi. xxvii. xxviii.
xxix. xxx. and xxxi. of _Exodus_, and throughout _Leviticus_: to Aaron
seldom. The calf that Aaron made, Moses threw into the fire. Lastly, the
question of the authority of Aaron, by occasion of his and Miriam’s
mutiny against Moses, was (_Numb._ xii.) judged by God himself for
Moses. So also in the question between Moses and the people, who had the
right of governing the people, when Corah, Dathan, and Abiram, and two
hundred and fifty princes of the assembly, _gathered themselves
together_ (_Numb._ xvi. 3) _against Moses, and against Aaron, and said
unto them, ye take too much upon you, seeing all the congregation are
holy, every one of them, and the Lord is amongst them, why lift you up
yourselves above the congregation of the Lord?_ God caused the earth to
swallow Corah, Dathan, and Abiram, with their wives and children, alive,
and consumed those two hundred and fifty princes with fire. Therefore
neither Aaron, nor the people, nor any aristocracy of the chief princes
of the people, but Moses alone had next under God the sovereignty over
the Israelites: and that not only in causes of civil policy, but also of
religion: for Moses only spake with God, and therefore only could tell
the people what it was that God required at their hands. No man upon
pain of death might be so presumptuous as to approach the mountain where
God talked with Moses. _Thou shalt set bounds_ (saith the Lord, _Exod._
xix. 12) _to the people round about, and say, Take heed to yourselves
that you go not up into the Mount, or touch the border of it; whosoever
toucheth the Mount shall surely be put to death_. And again (verse 21)
_Go down, charge the people, lest they break through unto the Lord to
gaze_. Out of which we may conclude, that whosoever in a Christian
commonwealth holdeth the place of Moses, is the sole messenger of God,
and interpreter of his commandments. And according hereunto, no man
ought in the interpretation of the Scripture to proceed further than the
bounds which are set by their several sovereigns. For the Scriptures,
since God now speaketh in them, are the Mount Sinai; the bounds whereof
are the laws of them that represent God’s person on earth. To look upon
them, and therein to behold the wondrous works of God, and learn to fear
him, is allowed; but to interpret them, that is, to pry into what God
saith to him whom he appointeth to govern under him, and make themselves
judges whether he govern as God commandeth him, or not, is to transgress
the bounds God hath set us, and to gaze upon God irreverently.
[Sidenote: All spirits were subordinate to the spirit of Moses.]
There was no prophet in the time of Moses, nor pretender to the spirit
of God, but such as Moses had approved and authorized. For there were in
his time but seventy men, that are said to prophecy by the spirit of
God, and these were all of Moses his election; concerning whom God said
to Moses, (_Numb._ xi. 16) _Gather to me seventy of the elders of
Israel, whom thou knowest to be the elders of the people_. To these God
imparted his spirit; but it was not a different spirit from that of
Moses; for it is said (verse 25) _God came down in a cloud, and took of
the spirit that was upon Moses, and gave it to the seventy elders_. But
as I have shown before (chap. XXXVI.) by _spirit_, is understood the
_mind_; so that the sense of the place is no other than this, that God
endued them with a mind conformable and subordinate to that of Moses,
that they might prophecy, that is to say, speak to the people in God’s
name, in such manner, as to set forward, as ministers of Moses and by
his authority, such doctrine as was agreeable to Moses his doctrine. For
they were but ministers; and when two of them prophecied in the camp, it
was thought a new and unlawful thing; and as it is in verses 27 and 28
of the same chapter, they were accused of it, and Joshua advised Moses
to forbid them, as not knowing that it was by Moses his spirit that they
prophecied. By which it is manifest, that no subject ought to pretend to
prophecy, or to the spirit, in opposition to the doctrine established by
him whom God hath set in the place of Moses.
[Sidenote: After Moses the sovereignty was in the high priest.]
Aaron being dead, and after him also Moses, the kingdom, as being a
sacerdotal kingdom, descended by virtue of the covenant, to Aaron’s son
Eleazar the high-priest: and God declared him, next under himself, for
sovereign, at the same time that he appointed Joshua for the General of
their army. For thus God saith expressly (_Numb._ xxvii. 21) concerning
Joshua: _He shall stand before Eleazar the priest, who shall ask counsel
for him before the Lord; at his word shall they go out, and at his word
they shall come in, both he, and all the children of Israel with him_.
Therefore the supreme power of making war and peace, was in the priest.
The supreme power of judicature belonged also to the high-priest: for
the book of the law was in their keeping; and the priests and Levites
only were the subordinate judges in causes civil, as appears in _Deut._
xvii. 8, 9, 10. And for the manner of God’s worship, there was never
doubt made, but that the high-priest till the time of Saul, had the
supreme authority. Therefore the civil and ecclesiastical power were
both joined together in one and the same person, the high-priest; and
ought to be so, in whosoever governeth by divine right, that is, by
authority immediate from God.
[Sidenote: Of the sovereign power between the time of Joshua and of
Saul.]
After the death of Joshua, till the time of Saul, the time between is
noted frequently in the Book of _Judges_, _That there was in those days
no king in Israel_; and sometimes with this addition, that _every man
did that which was right in his own eyes_. By which is to be understood,
that where it is said, _there was no king_, is meant, _there was no
sovereign power_ in Israel. And so it was, if we consider the act and
exercise of such power. For after the death of Joshua and Eleazar,
_there arose another generation_ (_Judges_ ii. 10, 11) _that knew not
the Lord, nor the works which he had done for Israel, but did evil in
the sight of the Lord, and served Baalim_. And the Jews had that quality
which St. Paul noteth, _to look for a sign_, not only before they would
submit themselves to the government of Moses, but also after they had
obliged themselves by their submission. Whereas signs and miracles had
for end to procure faith, not to keep men from violating it, when they
have once given it; for to that men are obliged by the law of nature.
But if we consider not the exercise, but the right of governing, the
sovereign power was still in the high-priest. Therefore whatsoever
obedience was yielded to any of the judges, who were men chosen by God
extraordinarily to save his rebellious subjects out of the hands of the
enemy, it cannot be drawn into argument against the right the
high-priest had to the sovereign power, in all matters both of policy
and religion. And neither the judges nor Samuel himself had an ordinary,
but an extraordinary calling to the government; and were obeyed by the
Israelites, not out of duty, but out of reverence to their favour with
God, appearing in their wisdom, courage, or felicity. Hitherto therefore
the right of regulating both the policy, and the religion, were
inseparable.
[Sidenote: Of the rights of the kings of Israel.]
To the judges succeeded kings: and whereas before, all authority, both
in religion and policy, was in the high-priest; so now it was all in the
king. For the sovereignty over the people, which was before, not only by
virtue of the divine power, but also by a particular pact of the
Israelites, in God, and next under him, in the high-priest, as his
vicegerent on earth, was cast off by the people, with the consent of God
himself. For when they said to Samuel (_1 Sam._ viii. 5) _Make us a king
to judge us like all the nations_, they signified that they would no
more be governed by the commands that should be laid upon them by the
priest, in the name of God; but by one that should command them in the
same manner that all other nations were commanded; and consequently in
deposing the high-priest of royal authority, they deposed that peculiar
government of God. And yet God consented to it, saying to Samuel (_1
Sam._ viii. 7) _Hearken unto the voice of the people, in all that they
shall say unto thee; for they have not rejected thee, but they have
rejected me, that I should not reign over them_. Having therefore
rejected God, in whose right the priests governed, there was no
authority left to the priests, but such as the king was pleased to allow
them; which was more or less, according as the kings were good or evil.
And for the government of civil affairs, it is manifest, it was all in
the hands of the king. For in the same chapter, (verse 20), they say
_they will be like all the nations; that their king shall be their
judge, and go before them, and fight their battles_; that is, he shall
have the whole authority, both in peace and war. In which is contained
also the ordering of religion: for there was no other word of God in
that time, by which to regulate religion, but the law of Moses, which
was their civil law. Besides, we read (_1 Kings_ ii. 27) that _Solomon
thrust out Abiathar from being priest before the Lord_: he had therefore
authority over the high-priest, as over any other subject; which is a
great mark of supremacy in religion. And we read also, (_1 Kings_ viii.)
that he dedicated the Temple; that he blessed the people; and that he
himself in person made that excellent prayer, used in the consecration
of all churches and houses of prayer; which is another great mark of
supremacy in religion. Again, we read (_2 Kings_ xxii.) that when there
was question concerning the Book of the Law found in the Temple, the
same was not decided by the high-priest, but Josiah sent both him and
others to enquire concerning it, of Huldah, the prophetess; which is
another mark of supremacy in religion. Lastly, we read (_1 Chron._ xxvi.
30) that David made Hashabiah and his brethren, Hebronites, officers of
Israel among them westward, _in all their business of the Lord, and in
the service of the king_. Likewise (verse 32) that he made other
Hebronites, _rulers over the Reubenites, the Gadites, and the half tribe
of Manasseh_ (these were the rest of Israel that dwelt beyond Jordan)
_for every matter pertaining to God, and affairs of the king_. Is not
this full power, both _temporal_ and _spiritual_, as they call it that
would divide it? To conclude; from the first institution of God’s
kingdom, to the captivity, the supremacy of religion was in the same
hand with that of the civil sovereignty; and the priest’s office after
the election of Saul, was not magisterial, but ministerial.
[Sidenote: The practice of supremacy in religion was not, in the time of
the kings, according to the right thereof.]
Notwithstanding the government both in policy and religion, were joined,
first in the high-priests, and afterwards in the kings, so far forth as
concerned the right; yet it appeareth by the same holy history, that the
people understood it not: but there being amongst them a great part, and
probably the greatest part, that no longer than they saw great miracles,
or, what is equivalent to a miracle, great abilities, or great felicity
in the enterprises of their governors, gave sufficient credit either to
the fame of Moses or to the colloquies between God and the priests; they
took occasion, as oft as their governors displeased them, by blaming
sometimes the policy, sometimes the religion, to change the government
or revolt from their obedience at their pleasure: and from thence
proceeded from time to time the civil troubles, divisions, and
calamities of the nation. As for example, after the death of Eleazar and
Joshua, the next generation which had not seen the wonders of God, but
were left to their own weak reason, not knowing themselves obliged by
the covenant of a sacerdotal kingdom, regarded no more the commandment
of the priest nor any law of Moses, but did every man that which was
right in his own eyes, and obeyed in civil affairs such men, as from
time to time they thought able to deliver them from the neighbour
nations that oppressed them; and consulted not with God, as they ought
to do, but with such men or women, as they guessed to be prophets by
their predictions of things to come; and though they had an idol in
their chapel, yet if they had a Levite for their chaplain, they made
account they worshipped the God of Israel.
And afterwards when they demanded a king after the manner of the
nations; yet it was not with a design to depart from the worship of God
their king; but despairing of the justice of the sons of Samuel, they
would have a king to judge them in civil actions; but not that they
would allow their king to change the religion which they thought was
recommended to them by Moses. So that they always kept in store a
pretext, either of justice or religion, to discharge themselves of their
obedience, whensoever they had hope to prevail. Samuel was displeased
with the people, for that they desired a king; for God was their king
already, and Samuel had but an authority under him; yet did Samuel, when
Saul observed not his counsel, in destroying Agag as God had commanded,
anoint another king, namely David, to take the succession from his
heirs. Rehoboam was no idolater; but when the people thought him an
oppressor, that civil pretence carried from him ten tribes to Jeroboam
an idolater. And generally through the whole history of the kings, as
well of Judah as of Israel, there were prophets that always controlled
the kings, for transgressing the religion; and sometimes also for errors
of state; as Jehosaphat was reproved (_2 Chron._ xix. 2) by the prophet
Jehu, for aiding the king of Israel against the Syrians; and Hezekiah,
by Isaiah, (xxxix. 3-7) for shewing his treasures to the ambassadors of
Babylon. By all which it appeareth, that though the power both of state
and religion were in the kings; yet none of them were uncontrolled in
the use of it, but such as were gracious for their own natural abilities
or felicities. So that from the practise of those times, there can no
argument be drawn, that the right of supremacy in religion was not in
the kings, unless we place it in the prophets, and conclude, that
because Hezekiah praying to the Lord before the cherubims, was not
answered from thence, nor then, but afterwards by the prophet Isaiah,
therefore Isaiah was supreme head of the church; or because Josiah
consulted Huldah the prophetess, concerning the Book of the Law, that
therefore neither he nor the high-priest, but Huldah the prophetess, had
the supreme authority in matter of religion; which I think is not the
opinion of any doctor.
[Sidenote: After the captivity, the Jews had no settled commonwealth.]
During the captivity, the Jews had no commonwealth at all: and after
their return, though they renewed their covenant with God, yet there was
no promise made of obedience, neither to Esdras, nor to any other: and
presently after, they became subjects to the Greeks, from whose customs
and demonology, and from the doctrine of the Cabalists, their religion
became much corrupted: in such sort as nothing can be gathered from
their confusion, both in state and religion, concerning the supremacy in
either. And therefore so far forth as concerneth the Old Testament, we
may conclude, that whosoever had the sovereignty of the commonwealth
amongst the Jews, the same had also the supreme authority in matter of
God’s external worship, and represented God’s person; that is, the
person of God the Father; though he were not called by the name of
Father, till such time as he sent into the world his son Jesus Christ,
to redeem mankind from their sins, and bring them into his everlasting
kingdom, to be saved for evermore. Of which we are to speak in the
chapter following.
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CHAPTER XLI.
OF THE OFFICE OF OUR BLESSED SAVIOUR.
[Sidenote: Three parts of the office of Christ.]
We find in Holy Scripture three parts of the office of the Messiah: the
first of a _Redeemer_ or _Saviour_; the second of a _pastor_,
_counsellor_, or _teacher_, that is, of a prophet sent from God to
convert such as God hath elected to salvation: the third of a _king_, an
_eternal king_, but under his Father, as Moses and the high-priests were
in their several times. And to these three parts are correspondent three
times. For our redemption he wrought at his first coming, by the
sacrifice wherein he offered up himself for our sins upon the cross: our
conversion he wrought partly then in his own person, and partly worketh
now by his ministers, and will continue to work till his coming again.
And after his coming again, shall begin that his glorious reign over his
elect, which is to last eternally.
[Sidenote: His office as a Redeemer.]
To the office of a Redeemer, that is, of one that payeth the ransom of
sin, which ransom is death, it appertaineth, that he was sacrificed, and
thereby bare upon his own head and carried away from us our iniquities,
in such sort as God had required. Not that the death of one man, though
without sin, can satisfy for the offences of all men, in the rigour of
justice, but in the mercy of God, that ordained such sacrifices for sin,
as he was pleased in his mercy to accept. In the old law (as we may
read, _Levit._ xvi.) the Lord required that there should, every year
once, be made an atonement for the sins of all Israel, both priests and
others; for the doing whereof, Aaron alone was to sacrifice for himself
and the priests a young bullock; and for the rest of the people, he was
to receive from them two young goats, of which he was to _sacrifice_
one; but as for the other, which was the _scape-goat_, he was to lay his
hands on the head thereof, and by a confession of the iniquities of the
people, to lay them all on that head, and then by some opportune man, to
cause the goat to be led into the wilderness, and there to _escape_, and
carry away with him the iniquities of the people. As the sacrifice of
the one goat was a sufficient, because an acceptable, price for the
ransom of all Israel; so the death of the Messiah, is a sufficient price
for the sins of all mankind, because there was no more required. Our
Saviour Christ’s sufferings seem to be here figured, as clearly as in
the oblation of Isaac, or in any other type of him in the Old Testament.
He was both the sacrificed goat, and the scapegoat; _he was oppressed,
and he was afflicted_ (_Isaiah_ liii. 7); _he opened not his mouth; he
is brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep is dumb before the
shearer, so he opened not his mouth_: here he is the _sacrificed goat_.
_He hath borne our griefs_ (verse 4), _and carried our sorrows_: and
again, (verse 6), _the Lord hath laid upon him the iniquities of us
all_: and so he is the _scape-goat_. _He was cut off from the land of
the living_ (ver. 8) _for the transgression of my people_: there again
he is the _sacrificed goat_. And again, (verse 11) _he shall bear their
sins_: he is the _scape goat_. Thus is the lamb of God equivalent to
both those goats; sacrificed, in that he died; and escaping, in his
resurrection; being raised opportunely by his Father, and removed from
the habitation of men in his ascension.
[Sidenote: Christ’s kingdom not of this world.]
For as much therefore, as he that _redeemeth_ hath no title to the
_thing redeemed_, before _the redemption_, and ransom paid; and this
ransom was the death of the Redeemer; it is manifest, that our Saviour,
as man, was not king of those that he redeemed, before he suffered
death; that is, during that time he conversed bodily on the earth. I
say, he was not then king in present, by virtue of the pact, which the
faithful make with him in baptism. Nevertheless, by the renewing of
their pact with God in baptism, they were obliged to obey him for king,
under his Father, whensoever he should be pleased to take the kingdom
upon him. According whereunto, our Saviour himself expressly saith,
(_John_ xviii. 36) _My kingdom is not of this world_. Now seeing the
Scripture maketh mention but of two worlds; this that is now, and shall
remain unto the day of judgment, which is therefore also called the
_last day_; and that which shall be after the day of judgment, when
there shall be a new heaven, and a new earth: the kingdom of Christ is
not to begin till the general resurrection. And that is it which our
Saviour saith, (_Matth._ xvi. 27) _The Son of man shall come in the
glory of his Father, with his angels; and then he shall reward every man
according to his works_. To reward every man according to his works, is
to execute the office of a king; and this is not to be till he come in
the glory of his Father, with his angels. When our Saviour saith,
(_Matth._ xxiii. 2, 3) _The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses’ seat;
all therefore whatsoever they bid you do, that observe and do_; he
declared plainly, that he ascribed kingly power, for that time, not to
himself, but to them. And so he doth also, where he saith (_Luke_ xii.
14) _Who made me a judge or divider over you?_ And (_John_ xii. 47) _I
came not to judge the world, but to save the world_. And yet our Saviour
came into this world that he might be a king and a judge in the world to
come: for he was the Messiah, that is, the Christ, that is, the anointed
priest, and the sovereign prophet of God; that is to say, he was to have
all the power that was in Moses the prophet, in the high-priests that
succeeded Moses, and in the kings that succeeded the priests. And St.
John says expressly (chap. v. verse 22) _the Father judgeth no man, but
hath committed all judgment to the Son_. And this is not repugnant to
that other place, _I came not to judge the world_: for this is spoken of
the world present, the other of the world to come; as also where it is
said, that at the second coming of Christ, (_Matth._ xix. 28) _Ye that
have followed me in the regeneration, when the Son of Man shall sit in
the throne of his glory, ye shall also sit on twelve thrones, judging
the twelve tribes of Israel_.
[Sidenote: The end of Christ’s coming was to renew the covenant of the
kingdom of God, and to persuade the elect to embrace it,
which was the second part of his office.]
If then Christ, whilst he was on earth, had no kingdom in this world, to
what end was his first coming? It was to restore unto God, by a new
covenant, the kingdom, which being his by the old covenant, had been cut
off by the rebellion of the Israelites in the election of Saul. Which to
do, he was to preach unto them, that he was the _Messiah_, that is, the
king promised to them by the prophets; and to offer himself in sacrifice
for the sins of them that should by faith submit themselves thereto; and
in case the nation generally should refuse him, to call to his obedience
such as should believe in him amongst the Gentiles. So that there are
two parts of our Saviour’s office during his abode upon the earth: one
to proclaim himself the Christ; and another by teaching, and by working
of miracles, to persuade and prepare men to live so, as to be worthy of
the immortality believers were to enjoy, at such time as he should come
in majesty to take possession of his Father’s kingdom. And therefore it
is, that the time of his preaching is often by himself called the
_regeneration_; which is not properly a kingdom, and thereby a warrant
to deny obedience to the magistrates that then were; for he commanded to
obey those that sat then in Moses’ chair, and to pay tribute to Cæsar;
but only an earnest of the kingdom of God that was to come, to those to
whom God had given the grace to be his disciples, and to believe in him;
for which cause the godly are said to be already in the _kingdom of
grace_, as naturalized in that heavenly kingdom.
[Sidenote: The preaching of Christ not contrary to the then law of the
Jews, nor of Cæsar.]
Hitherto, therefore, there is nothing done or taught by Christ, that
tendeth to the diminution of the civil right of the Jews or of Cæsar.
For as touching the commonwealth which then was amongst the Jews, both
they that bare rule amongst them, and they that were governed, did all
expect the Messiah and kingdom of God; which they could not have done,
if their laws had forbidden him, when he came, to manifest and declare
himself. Seeing therefore he did nothing, but by preaching and miracles
go about to prove himself to be that Messiah, he did therein nothing
against their laws. The kingdom he claimed was to be in another world:
he taught all men to obey in the mean time them that sat in Moses’ seat:
he allowed them to give Cæsar his tribute, and refused to take upon
himself to be a judge. How then could his words or actions be seditious,
or tend to the overthrow of their then civil government? But God having
determined his sacrifice for the reduction of his elect to their former
covenanted obedience, for the means, whereby he would bring the same to
effect, made use of their malice and ingratitude. Nor was it contrary to
the laws of Cæsar. For though Pilate himself, to gratify the Jews,
delivered him to be crucified; yet before he did so, he pronounced
openly, that he found no fault in him: and put for title of his
condemnation, not as the Jews required, _that he pretended to be king_;
but simply, _that he was king of the Jews_; and notwithstanding their
clamour, refused to alter it; saying, _What I have written, I have
written_.
[Sidenote: The third part of his office was to be king, under his
Father, of the elect.]
As for the third part of his office, which was to be _king_, I have
already shewn that his kingdom was not to begin till the resurrection.
But then he shall be king, not only as God, in which sense he is king
already, and ever shall be, of all the earth, in virtue of his
omnipotence; but also peculiarly of his own elect, by virtue of the pact
they make with him in their baptism. And therefore it is, that our
Saviour saith (_Matth._ xix. 28) that his apostles should sit upon
twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel, _When the Son of
Man shall sit in the throne of his glory_: whereby he signified that he
should reign then in his human nature; and (_Matth._ xvi. 27) _The Son
of Man shall come in the glory of his Father, with his angels, and then
he shall reward every man according to his works_. The same we may read,
_Mark_ xiii. 26, and xiv. 62; and more expressly for the time, _Luke_
xxii. 29, 30, _I appoint unto you a kingdom, as my Father hath appointed
to me, that you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom, and sit on
thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel_. By which it is manifest,
that the kingdom of Christ appointed to him by his Father, is not to be
before the Son of Man shall come in glory, and make his apostles judges
of the twelve tribes of Israel. But a man may here ask, seeing there is
no marriage in the kingdom of heaven, whether men shall then eat and
drink? What eating therefore is meant in this place? This is expounded
by our Saviour (_John_ vi. 27), where he saith, _Labour not for the meat
which perisheth, but for that meat which endureth unto everlasting life,
which the Son of Man shall give you_. So that by eating at Christ’s
table, is meant the eating of the tree of life; that is to say, the
enjoying of immortality, in the kingdom of the Son of Man. By which
places and many more, it is evident that our Saviour’s kingdom is to be
exercised by him in his human nature.
[Sidenote: Christ’s authority in the kingdom of God, subordinate to that
of his Father.]
Again, he is to be king then, no otherwise than as subordinate or
vicegerent of God the Father, as Moses was in the wilderness; and as the
high-priests were before the reign of Saul; and as the kings were after
it. For it is one of the prophecies concerning Christ, that he should be
like, in office, to Moses: _I will raise them up a prophet_, saith the
Lord (_Deut._ xviii. 18) _from amongst their brethren, like unto thee,
and will put my words into his mouth_; and this similitude with Moses,
is also apparent in the actions of our Saviour himself, whilst he was
conversant on earth. For as Moses chose twelve princes of the tribes, to
govern under him; so did our Saviour choose twelve apostles, who shall
sit on twelve thrones, and judge the twelve tribes of Israel. And as
Moses authorized seventy elders, to receive the Spirit of God, and to
prophecy to the people, that is, as I have said before, to speak unto
them in the name of God; so our Saviour also ordained seventy disciples,
to preach his kingdom and salvation to all nations. And as when a
complaint was made to Moses, against those of the seventy that
prophecied in the camp of Israel, he justified them in it, as being
subservient therein to his government; so also our Saviour, when St.
John complained to him of a certain man that cast out devils in his
name, justified him therein, saying, (_Luke_ ix. 50) _Forbid him not,
for he that is not against us, is on our part_.
[Sidenote: Christ’s authority in the kingdom of God, subordinate to that
of his Father.]
Again, our Saviour resembled Moses in the institution of _sacraments_,
both of _admission_ into the kingdom of God, and of _commemoration_ of
his deliverance of his elect from their miserable condition. As the
children of Israel had for sacrament of their reception into the kingdom
of God, before the time of Moses, the rite of _circumcision_, which rite
having been omitted in the wilderness, was again restored as soon as
they came into the Land of Promise; so also the Jews, before the coming
of our Saviour, had a rite of _baptizing_, that is, of washing with
water, all those that being Gentiles embraced the God of Israel. This
rite St. John the Baptist used in the reception of all them that gave
their names to the Christ, whom he preached to be already come into the
world; and our Saviour instituted the same for a sacrament to be taken
by all that believed in him. From what cause the rite of baptism first
proceeded, is not expressed formally in the Scripture; but it may be
probably thought to be an imitation of the law of Moses, concerning
leprosy; wherein the leprous man was commanded to be kept out of the
camp of Israel for a certain time; after which time being judged by the
priest to be clean, he was admitted into the camp after a solemn
washing. And this may therefore be a type of the washing in baptism;
wherein such men as are cleansed of the leprosy of sin by faith, are
received into the Church with the solemnity of baptism. There is another
conjecture, drawn from the ceremonies of the Gentiles, in a certain case
that rarely happens: and that is, when a man that was thought dead
chanced to recover, other men made scruple to converse with him, as they
would do to converse with a ghost, unless he were received again into
the number of men by washing, as children new-born were washed from the
uncleanness of their nativity; which was a kind of new birth. This
ceremony of the Greeks, in the time that Judea was under the dominion of
Alexander and the Greeks his successors, may probably enough have crept
into the religion of the Jews. But seeing it is not likely our Saviour
would countenance a heathen rite, it is most likely it proceeded from
the legal ceremony of washing after leprosy. And for the other sacrament
of eating the _Paschal lamb_, it is manifestly imitated in the sacrament
of the _Lord’s Supper_; in which the breaking of the bread, and the
pouring out of the wine, do keep in memory our deliverance from the
misery of sin, by Christ’s passion, as the eating of the Paschal lamb
kept in memory the deliverance of the Jews out of the bondage of Egypt.
Seeing therefore the authority of Moses was but subordinate, and he but
a lieutenant of God; it followeth that Christ, whose authority, as man,
was to be like that of Moses, was no more but subordinate to the
authority of his Father. The same is more expressly signified, by that
that he teacheth us to pray, _Our Father, let thy kingdom come_; and,
_For thine is the kingdom, the power and the glory_; and by that it is
said, that _He shall come in the glory of his Father_; and by that which
St. Paul saith, (_1 Cor._ xv. 24) _then cometh the end, when he shall
have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father_; and by many
other most express places.
[Sidenote: One and the same God is the person represented by Moses and
Christ.]
Our Saviour, therefore, both in teaching and reigning, representeth, as
Moses did, the person of God; which God from that time forward, but not
before, is called the Father; and being still one and the same
substance, is one person as represented by Moses, and another person as
represented by his son the Christ. For _person_ being a relative to a
_representer_, it is consequent to plurality of representers, that there
be a plurality of persons, though of one and the same substance.
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CHAPTER XLII.
OF POWER ECCLESIASTICAL.
For the understanding of POWER ECCLESIASTICAL, what, and in whom it is,
we are to distinguish the time from the ascension of our Saviour, into
two parts; one before the conversion of kings, and men endued with
sovereign civil power; the other after their conversion. For it was long
after the ascension, before any king or civil sovereign embraced and
publicly allowed the teaching of Christian religion.
[Sidenote: Of the holy spirit that fell on the apostles.]
And for the time between, it is manifest, that the _power
ecclesiastical_ was in the apostles; and after them in such as were by
them ordained to preach the gospel, and to convert men to Christianity,
and to direct them that were converted in the way of salvation; and
after these, the power was delivered again to others by these ordained,
and this was done by imposition of hands upon such as were ordained; by
which was signified the giving of the Holy Spirit, or Spirit of God, to
those whom they ordained ministers of God, to advance his kingdom. So
that imposition of hands was nothing else but the seal of their
commission to preach Christ, and teach his doctrine; and the giving of
the Holy Ghost by that ceremony of imposition of hands, was an imitation
of that which Moses did. For Moses used the same ceremony to his
minister Joshua, as we read (_Deut._ xxxiv. 9) _And Joshua the son of
Nun was full of the spirit of wisdom; for Moses had laid his hands upon
him_. Our Saviour therefore, between his resurrection and ascension,
gave his spirit to the apostles; first, by _breathing on them, and
saying_, (_John_ xx. 22) _Receive ye the Holy Spirit_; and after his
ascension (_Acts_ ii. 2, 3) by sending down upon them _a mighty wind,
and cloven tongues of fire_; and not by imposition of hands; as neither
did God lay his hands on Moses: and his apostles afterward transmitted
the same spirit by imposition of hands, as Moses did to Joshua. So that
it is manifest hereby, in whom the power ecclesiastical continually
remained, in those first times where there was not any Christian
commonwealth; namely, in them that received the same from the apostles,
by successive laying on of hands.
[Sidenote: Of the Trinity.]
Here we have the person of God born now the third time. For as Moses,
and the high-priests, were God’s representative in the Old Testament;
and our Saviour himself, as man, during his abode on earth: so the Holy
Ghost, that is to say the apostles and their successors, in the office
of preaching and teaching, that had received the holy Spirit, have
represented him ever since. But a person, as I have shown before, (chap.
XIII.) is he that is represented, as often as he is represented; and
therefore God, who has been represented, that is personated, thrice, may
properly enough be said to be three persons; though neither the word
_Person_, nor _Trinity_, be ascribed to him in the Bible. _St. John_,
indeed (_1 Epist._ v. 7) saith, _There be three that bear witness in
heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit; and these three are
One_. But this disagreeth not, but accordeth fitly with three persons in
the proper signification of persons; which is, that which is represented
by another. For so God the Father, as represented by Moses, is one
person; and as represented by his Son, another person; and as
represented by the apostles, and by the doctors that taught by authority
from them derived, is a third person; and yet every person here, is the
person of one and the same God. But a man may here ask, what it was
whereof these three bear witness. _St. John_ therefore tells us (verse
11) that they bear witness, that _God hath given us eternal life in his
Son_. Again, if it should be asked, wherein that testimony appeareth,
the answer is easy; for he hath testified the same by the miracles he
wrought, first by Moses; secondly, by his Son himself; and lastly by his
apostles, that had received the Holy Spirit; all which in their times
represented the person of God, and either prophecied or preached Jesus
Christ. And as for the apostles, it was the character of the
apostleship, in the twelve first and great apostles, to bear witness of
his resurrection; as appeareth expressly (_Acts_ i. 21, 22), where St.
Peter, when a new apostle was to be chosen in the place of Judas
Iscariot, useth these words, _Of these men which have companied with us
all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out amongst us, beginning
at the baptism of John, unto that same day that he was taken up from us,
must one be ordained to be a witness with us of his resurrection_: which
words interpret the _bearing of witness_, mentioned by St. John. There
is in the same place mentioned another Trinity of witnesses in earth.
For (_1 John_ v. 8) he saith, _there are three that bear witness in
earth, the Spirit, and the water, and the blood, and these three agree
in one_: that is to say, the graces of God’s spirit, and the two
sacraments, baptism, and the Lord’s supper, which all agree in one
testimony to assure the consciences of believers, of eternal life; of
which testimony he saith (verse 10) _He that believeth on the Son of man
hath the witness in himself_. In this Trinity on earth, the unity is not
of the thing; for the spirit, the water, and the blood, are not the same
substance, though they give the same testimony: but in the Trinity of
heaven, the persons are the persons of one and the same God, though
represented in three different times and occasions. To conclude, the
doctrine of the Trinity, as far as can be gathered directly from the
Scripture, is in substance this, that the God who is always one and the
same, was the person represented by Moses; the person represented by his
Son incarnate; and the person represented by the apostles. As
represented by the apostles, the Holy Spirit, by which they spake, is
God; as represented by his Son, that was God and man, the Son is that
God; as represented by Moses and the high-priests, the Father, that is
to say, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, is that God. From whence we
may gather the reason why those names _Father_, _Son_, and _Holy
Spirit_, in the signification of the Godhead, are never used in the Old
Testament: for they are persons, that is, they have their names from
representing; which could not be, till divers men had represented God’s
person in ruling or in directing under him.
Thus we see how the power ecclesiastical was left by our Saviour to the
apostles; and how they were, to the end they might the better exercise
that power, endued with the Holy Spirit, which is therefore called
sometimes in the New Testament _paracletus_, which signifieth an
_assister_, or one called to for help, though it be commonly translated
a _comforter_. Let us now consider the power itself, what it was, and
over whom.
[Sidenote: The power ecclesiastical is but the power to teach.]
Cardinal Bellarmine, in his third general controversy, hath handled a
great many questions concerning the ecclesiastical power of the pope of
Rome; and begins with this, whether it ought to be monarchical,
aristocratical, or democratical: all which sorts of power are sovereign
and coercive. If now it should appear, that there is no coercive power
left them by our Saviour, but only a power to proclaim the kingdom of
Christ, and to persuade men to submit themselves thereunto; and by
precepts and good counsel, to teach them that have submitted, what they
are to do, that they may be received into the kingdom of God when it
comes; and that the apostles, and other ministers of the Gospel, are our
schoolmasters, and not our commanders, and their precepts not laws, but
wholesome counsels: then were all that dispute in vain.
[Sidenote: An argument thereof, the power of Christ himself.]
I have shown already, in the last chapter, that the kingdom of Christ is
not of this world: therefore neither can his ministers, unless they be
kings, require obedience in his name. For if the supreme king have not
his regal power in this world; by what authority can obedience be
required to his officers? _As my Father sent me_, so saith our Saviour,
(_John_ xx. 21) _I send you_. But our Saviour was sent to persuade the
Jews to return to, and to invite the Gentiles to receive, the kingdom of
his Father, and not to reign in majesty, no not as his Father’s
lieutenant, till the day of judgment.
[Sidenote: From the name of regeneration.]
The time between the ascension and the general resurrection, is called,
not a reigning, but a regeneration; that is, a preparation of men for
the second and glorious coming of Christ, at the day of judgment; as
appeareth by the words of our Saviour, (_Matth._ xix. 28,) _You that
have followed me in the regeneration, when the Son of man shall sit in
the throne of his glory, you shall also sit upon twelve thrones_; and of
St. Paul (_Ephes._ vi. 15) _Having your feet shod with the preparation
of the gospel of peace_.
[Sidenote: From the comparison of it, with fishing, leaven, seed.]
And is compared by our Saviour, to fishing, that is, to winning men to
obedience, not by coercion and punishing, but by persuasion: and
therefore he said not to his apostles, he would make them so many
Nimrods, _hunters of men; but fishers of men_. It is compared also to
leaven, to sowing of seed, and to the multiplication of a grain of
mustard-seed; by all which compulsion is excluded; and consequently
there can in that time be no actual reigning. The work of Christ’s
ministers, is evangelization; that is, a proclamation of Christ, and a
preparation for his second coming, as the evangelization of John the
Baptist was a preparation to his first coming.
[Sidenote: From the nature of faith.]
Again, the office of Christ’s ministers in this world, is to make men
believe and have faith in Christ; but faith hath no relation to, nor
dependance at all upon compulsion or commandment; but only upon
certainty or probability of arguments drawn from reason, or from
something men believe already. Therefore the ministers of Christ in this
world, have no power, by that title, to punish any man for not believing
or for contradicting what they say; they have I say no power by that
title of Christ’s ministers, to punish such; but if they have sovereign
civil power, by politic institution, then they may indeed lawfully
punish any contradiction to their laws whatsoever: and St. Paul, of
himself and other the then preachers of the gospel, saith in express
words (_2 Cor._ i. 24), _We have no dominion over your faith, but are
helpers of your joy_.
[Sidenote: From the authority Christ hath left to civil princes.]
Another argument, that the ministers of Christ in this present world
have no right of commanding, may be drawn from the lawful authority
which Christ hath left to all princes, as well Christians as infidels.
St. Paul saith (_Col._ iii. 20) _Children obey your parents in all
things; for this is well pleasing to the Lord_: and (verse 22)
_Servants, obey in all things your masters according to the flesh; not
with eye-service, as men-pleasers, but in singleness of heart, as
fearing the Lord_; this is spoken to them whose masters were infidels;
and yet they are bidden to obey them _in all things_. And again,
concerning obedience to princes (_Rom._ xiii. the first six verses),
exhorting _to be subject to the higher powers_, he saith, _that all
power is ordained of God_; and _that we ought to be subject to them, not
only for fear of incurring their wrath, but also for conscience sake_.
And _St. Peter_ (1 Epistle ii. 13, 14, 15), _Submit yourselves to every
ordinance of man, for the Lord’s sake, whether it be to the king, as
supreme; or unto governors, as to them that be sent by him for the
punishment of evil doers, and for the praise of them that do well; for
so is the will of God_. And again St. Paul (_Titus_ iii. 1), _Put men in
mind to be subject to principalities and powers, and to obey
magistrates_. These princes and powers, whereof St. Peter and St. Paul
here speak, were all infidels: much more therefore we are to observe
those Christians, whom God hath ordained to have sovereign power over
us. How then can we be obliged to obey any minister of Christ, if he
should command us to do anything contrary to the command of the king, or
other sovereign representant of the commonwealth whereof we are members,
and by whom we look to be protected? It is therefore manifest, that
Christ hath not left to his ministers in this world, unless they be also
endued with civil authority, any authority to command other men.
[Sidenote: What Christians may do to avoid persecution.]
But what, may some object, if a king, or a senate, or other sovereign
person forbid us to believe in Christ? To this I answer, that such
forbidding is of no effect; because belief and unbelief never follow
men’s commands. Faith is a gift of God, which man can neither give, nor
take away by promise of rewards, or menaces of torture. And if it be
further asked, what if we be commanded by our lawful prince to say with
our tongue, we believe not; must we obey such command? Profession with
the tongue is but an external thing, and no more than any other gesture
whereby we signify our obedience; and wherein a Christian, holding
firmly in his heart the faith of Christ, hath the same liberty which the
prophet Elisha allowed to Naaman the Syrian. Naaman was converted in his
heart to the God of Israel; for he saith (_2 Kings_ v. 17, 18) _Thy
servant will henceforth offer neither burnt offering nor sacrifice unto
other gods, but unto the Lord. In this thing the Lord pardon thy
servant, that when my master goeth into the house of Rimmon to worship
there, and he leaneth on my hand, and I bow myself in the house of
Rimmon: when I bow down myself in the house of Rimmon, the Lord pardon
thy servant in this thing._ This the prophet approved, and bid him _Go
in peace_. Here Naaman believed in his heart; but by bowing before the
idol Rimmon, he denied the true God in effect, as much as if he had done
it with his lips. But then what shall we answer to our Saviour’s saying,
(_Matth._ x. 33) _Whosoever denieth me before men, I will deny him
before my Father which is in heaven_. This we may say, that whatsoever a
subject, as Naaman was, is compelled to do in obedience to his
sovereign, and doth it not in order to his own mind, but in order to the
laws of his country, that action is not his, but his sovereign’s; nor is
it he that in this case denieth Christ before men, but his governor, and
the law of his country. If any man shall accuse this doctrine, as
repugnant to true and unfeigned Christianity; I ask him, in case there
should be a subject in any Christian commonwealth, that should be
inwardly in his heart of the Mahomedan religion, whether if his
sovereign command him to be present at the divine service of the
Christian church, and that on pain of death, he think that Mahomedan
obliged in conscience to suffer death for that cause, rather than obey
that command of his lawful prince. If he say, he ought rather to suffer
death, then he authorizeth all private men to disobey their princes in
maintenance of their religion, true or false: if he say, he ought to be
obedient, then he alloweth to himself that which he denieth to another,
contrary to the words of our Saviour, (_Luke_ vi. 31) _Whatsoever you
would that men should do unto you, that do ye unto them_; and contrary
to the law of nature, which is the indubitable everlasting law of God,
_Do not to another, that which thou wouldest not he should do unto
thee_.
[Sidenote: Of martyrs.]
But what then shall we say of all those martyrs we read of in the
history of the Church, that they have needlessly cast away their lives?
For answer hereunto, we are to distinguish the persons that have been
for that cause put to death: whereof some have received a calling to
preach, and profess the kingdom of Christ openly; others have had no
such calling, nor more has been required of them than their own faith.
The former sort, if they have been put to death, for bearing witness to
this point, that Jesus Christ is risen from the dead, were true martyrs;
for a _martyr_ is, (to give the true definition of the word) a witness
of the resurrection of Jesus the Messiah; which none can be but those
that conversed with him on earth, and saw him after he was risen: for a
witness must have seen what he testifieth, or else his testimony is not
good. And that none but such can properly be called martyrs of Christ,
is manifest out of the words of St. Peter, (_Acts_ i. 21, 22) _Wherefore
of these men which have companied with us all the time that the Lord
Jesus went in and out amongst us, beginning from the baptism of John
unto that same day he was taken up from us, must one be ordained to be a
martyr_ (that is a witness) _with us of his resurrection_: where we may
observe, that he which is to be a witness of the truth of the
resurrection of Christ, that is to say, of the truth of this fundamental
article of Christian religion, that Jesus was the Christ, must be some
disciple that conversed with him, and saw him before and after his
resurrection; and consequently must be one of his original disciples:
whereas they which were not so, can witness no more but that their
antecessors said it, and are therefore but witnesses of other men’s
testimony; and are but second martyrs, or martyrs of Christ’s witnesses.
He, that to maintain every doctrine which he himself draweth out of the
history of our Saviour’s life, and of the Acts or Epistles of the
apostles, or which he believeth upon the authority of a private man,
will oppose the laws and authority of the civil state, is very far from
being a martyr of Christ, or a martyr of his martyrs. It is one article
only, which to die for, meriteth so honourable a name; and that article
is this, that _Jesus is the Christ_; that is to say, He that hath
redeemed us, and shall come again to give us salvation, and eternal life
in his glorious kingdom. To die for every tenet that serveth the
ambition or profit of the clergy, is not required; nor is it the death
of the witness, but the testimony itself that makes the martyr: for the
word signifieth nothing else, but the man that beareth witness, whether
he be put to death for his testimony, or not.
Also he that is not sent to preach this fundamental article, but taketh
it upon him of his private authority, though he be a witness, and
consequently a martyr, either primary of Christ, or secondary of his
apostles, disciples, or their successors; yet is he not obliged to
suffer death for that cause; because being not called thereto, it is not
required at his hands; nor ought he to complain, if he loseth the reward
he expecteth from those that never set him on work. None therefore can
be a martyr, neither of the first nor second degree, that have not a
warrant to preach Christ come in the flesh; that is to say, none, but
such as are sent to the conversion of infidels. For no man is a witness
to him that already believeth, and therefore needs no witness; but to
them that deny, or doubt, or have not heard it. Christ sent his
apostles, and his seventy disciples, with authority to preach; he sent
not all that believed. And he sent them to unbelievers; _I send you_,
saith he, (_Matth._ x. 16) _as sheep amongst wolves_; not as sheep to
other sheep.
[Sidenote: Argument from the points of their commission.]
Lastly, the points of their commission, as they are expressly set down
in the gospel, contain, none of them, any authority over the
congregation.
[Sidenote: To preach;]
We have first (_Matth._ x. 6, 7), that the twelve apostles were sent _to
the lost sheep of the house of Israel_, and commanded to preach _that
the kingdom of God was at hand_. Now preaching, in the original, is that
act, which a crier, herald, or other officer useth to do publicly in
proclaiming of a king. But a crier hath not right to command any man.
And (_Luke_ x. 2) the seventy disciples are sent out as _Labourers, not
as Lords of the harvest_; and are bidden (verse 9) to say, _The kingdom
of God is come nigh unto you_; and by kingdom here is meant, not the
kingdom of grace, but the kingdom of glory; for they are bidden (verse
11, 12) to denounce it to those cities which shall not receive them, as
a threatening _that it shall be more tolerable in that day for Sodom,
than for such a city_. And (_Matth._ xx. 28) our Saviour telleth his
disciples, that sought priority of place, their office was to minister,
_even as the son of man came, not to be ministered unto, but to
minister_. Preachers therefore have not magisterial, but ministerial
power: _Be not called masters_, saith our Saviour, (_Matth._ xxiii. 10)
_for one is your master, even Christ_.
[Sidenote: And teach;]
Another point of their commission, is, to _Teach all nations_; as it is
in _St. Matth._ xxviii. 19, or as in _St. Mark_, xvi. 15; _Go into all
the world, and preach the gospel to every creature_. Teaching therefore,
and preaching, is the same thing. For they that proclaim the coming of a
king, must withal make known by what right he cometh, if they mean men
shall submit themselves unto him: as St. Paul did to the Jews of
Thessalonica, when (_Acts_ xvii. 2, 3) _three Sabbath days he reasoned
with them out of the Scriptures, opening, and alleging that Christ must
needs have suffered, and risen again from the dead, and that this Jesus
is Christ_. But to teach out of the Old Testament that Jesus was Christ,
that is to say, king, and risen from the dead, is not to say that men
are bound, after they believe it, to obey those that tell them so,
against the laws and commands of their sovereigns; but that they shall
do wisely, to expect the coming of Christ hereafter, in patience and
faith, with obedience to their present magistrates.
[Sidenote: To baptize;]
Another point of their commission, is to _baptize, in the name of the
Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost_. What is baptism? Dipping
into water. But what is it to dip a man into the water in the name of
anything? The meaning of these words of baptism is this. He that is
baptized, is dipped or washed, as a sign of becoming a new man, and a
loyal subject to that God, whose person was represented in old time by
Moses, and the high-priests, when he reigned over the Jews; and to Jesus
Christ his Son, God and Man, that hath redeemed us, and shall in his
human nature represent his Father’s person in his eternal kingdom after
the resurrection; and to acknowledge the doctrine of the apostles, who,
assisted by the spirit of the Father and of the Son, were left for
guides to bring us into that kingdom, to be the only and assured way
thereunto. This being our promise in baptism; and the authority of
earthly sovereigns being not to be put down till the day of judgment;
for that is expressly affirmed by St. Paul (_1 Cor._ xv. 22, 23, 24)
where he saith, _As in Adam all die, so in Christ all shall be made
alive. But every man in his own order, Christ the first fruits,
afterward they that are Christ’s at his coming; then cometh the end,
when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father,
when he shall have put down all rule, and all authority and power_: it
is manifest, that we do not in baptism constitute over us another
authority, by which our external actions are to be governed in this
life; but promise to take the doctrine of the apostles for our direction
in the way to life eternal.
[Sidenote: And to forgive, and retain sins.]
The power of _remission and retention of sins_, called also the power of
_loosing_ and _binding_, and sometimes the _keys of the kingdom of
heaven_, is a consequence of the authority to baptize, or refuse to
baptize. For baptism is the sacrament of allegiance of them that are to
be received into the kingdom of God; that is to say, into eternal life;
that is to say, to remission of sin: for as eternal life was lost by the
committing, so it is recovered by the remitting of men’s sins. The end
of baptism is remission of sins: and therefore St. Peter, when they that
were converted by his sermon on the day of Pentecost, asked what they
were to do, advised them (_Acts_ ii. 38) to _repent, and be baptized in
the name of Jesus, for the remission of sins_. And therefore, seeing to
baptize is to declare the reception of men into God’s kingdom; and to
refuse to baptize is to declare their exclusion; it followeth, that the
power to declare them cast out, or retained in it, was given to the same
apostles, and their substitutes and successors. And therefore after our
Saviour had breathed upon them, saying (_John_ xx. 22) _Receive the Holy
Ghost_, he addeth in the next verse, _Whosesoever sins ye remit, they
are remitted unto them; and whosesoever sins ye retain, they are
retained_. By which words, is not granted an authority to forgive or
retain sins, simply and absolutely, as God forgiveth or retaineth them,
who knoweth the heart of man, and truth of his penitence and conversion;
but conditionally, to the penitent: and this forgiveness, or absolution,
in case the absolved have but a feigned repentance, is thereby, without
other act, or sentence of the absolved, made void, and hath no effect at
all to salvation, but on the contrary to the aggravation of his sin.
Therefore the apostles, and their successors, are to follow but the
outward marks of repentance; which appearing, they have no authority to
deny absolution; and if they appear not, they have no authority to
absolve. The same also is to be observed in baptism: for to a converted
Jew, or Gentile, the apostles had not the power to deny baptism; nor to
grant it to the unpenitent. But seeing no man is able to discern the
truth of another man’s repentance, further than by external marks, taken
from his words and actions, which are subject to hypocrisy; another
question will arise, who it is that is constituted judge of those marks?
And this question is decided by our Saviour himself; _If thy brother_,
saith he, (_Matth._ xviii. 15, 16, 17) _shall trespass against thee, go
and tell him his fault, between thee and him alone; if he shall hear
thee, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, then
take with thee one or two more. And if he shall neglect to hear them,
tell it unto the Church; but if he neglect to hear the Church, let him
be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican._ By which it is manifest,
that the judgment concerning the truth of repentance, belonged not to
any one man, but to the Church, that is, to the assembly of the
faithful, or to them that have authority to be their representant. But
besides the judgment, there is necessary also the pronouncing of
sentence. And this belonged always to the apostle, or some pastor of the
Church, as prolocutor; and of this our Saviour speaketh in the 18th
verse, _Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven; and
whatsoever ye shall loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven_. And
conformable hereunto was the practise of St. Paul, (_1 Cor._ v. 3, 4, 5)
where he saith, _For I verily, as absent in body, but present in spirit,
have determined already, as though I were present, concerning him that
hath so done this deed; in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, when ye
are gathered together, and my spirit, with the power of our Lord Jesus
Christ, to deliver such a one to Satan_; that is to say, to cast him out
of the Church, as a man whose sins are not forgiven. Paul here
pronounceth the sentence; but the assembly was first to hear the cause,
for St. Paul was absent, and by consequence to condemn him. But in the
same chapter (verses 11, 12), the judgment in such a case is more
expressly attributed to the assembly: _But now I have written unto you,
not to keep company, if any man that is called a brother be a
fornicator, &c. with such a one, no not to eat. For what have I to do to
judge them that are without? Do not ye judge them that are within?_ The
sentence therefore by which a man was put out of the Church, was
pronounced by the apostle, or pastor; but the judgment concerning the
merit of the cause, was in the Church; that is to say, as the times were
before the conversion of kings, and men that had sovereign authority in
the commonwealth, the assembly of the Christians dwelling in the same
city: as in Corinth, in the assembly of the Christians of Corinth.
[Sidenote: Of excommunication.]
This part of the power of the keys, by which men were thrust out from
the kingdom of God, is that which is called _excommunication_; and to
_excommunicate_, is in the original, ἀποσυνάγωγον ποιεῖν, _to cast out
of the synagogue_; that is, out of the place of divine service; a word
drawn from the custom of the Jews, to cast out of their synagogues such
as they thought, in manners or doctrine, contagious, as lepers were by
the law of Moses separated from the congregation of Israel, till such
time as they should be by the priest pronounced clean.
[Sidenote: The use of excommunication without civil power.]
The use and effect of excommunication, whilst it was not yet
strengthened with the civil power, was no more than that they, who were
not excommunicate, were to avoid the company of them that were. It was
not enough to repute them as heathen, that never had been Christians;
for with such they might eat and drink; which with excommunicate persons
they might not do; as appeareth by the words of St. Paul, (_1 Cor._ v.
9, 10, &c.) where he telleth them, he had formerly forbidden them to
_company with fornicators_; but, because that could not be without going
out of the world, he restraineth it to such fornicators, and otherwise
vicious persons, as were of the brethren; _with such a one_, he saith,
they ought not to keep company, _no not to eat_. And this is no more
than our Saviour saith (_Matth._ xviii. 17), _Let him be to thee as a
heathen, and as a publican_. For publicans, which signifieth farmers and
receivers of the revenue of the commonwealth, were so hated and detested
by the Jews that were to pay it, as that _publican_ and _sinner_ were
taken amongst them for the same thing: insomuch, as when our Saviour
accepted the invitation of Zacchæus a publican; though it were to
convert him, yet it was objected to him as a crime. And therefore, when
our Saviour to _heathen_ added _publican_, he did forbid them to eat
with a man excommunicate.
As for keeping them out of their synagogues, or places of assembly, they
had no power to do it, but that of the owner of the place, whether he
were Christian, or heathen. And because all places are by right in the
dominion of the commonwealth; as well he that was excommunicated, as he
that never was baptized, might enter into them by commission from the
civil magistrate; as Paul before his conversion entered into their
synagogues at Damascus, (_Acts_ ix. 2) to apprehend Christians, men and
women, and to carry them bound to Jerusalem, by commission from the
high-priest.
[Sidenote: Of no effect upon an apostate;]
By which it appears, that upon a Christian, that should become an
apostate, in a place where the civil power did persecute, or not assist
the Church, the effect of excommunication had nothing in it, neither of
damage in this world, nor of terror: not of terror, because of their
unbelief; nor of damage, because they are returned thereby into the
favour of the world; and in the world to come were to be in no worse
estate, than they which never had believed. The damage redounded rather
to the Church, by provocation of them they cast out, to a freer
execution of their malice.
[Sidenote: But upon the faithful only.]
Excommunication therefore had its effect only upon those, that believed
that Jesus Christ was to come again in glory, to reign over and to judge
both the quick and the dead, and should therefore refuse entrance into
his kingdom to those whose sins were retained, that is, to those that
were excommunicated by the Church. And thence it is, that St. Paul
calleth excommunication, a delivery of the excommunicate person to
Satan. For without the kingdom of Christ, all other kingdoms, after
judgment, are comprehended in the kingdom of Satan. This is it that the
faithful stood in fear of, as long as they stood excommunicate, that is
to say, in an estate wherein their sins were not forgiven. Whereby we
may understand, that excommunication, in the time that Christian
religion was not authorized by the civil power, was used only for a
correction of manners, not of errors in opinion: for it is a punishment,
whereof none could be sensible but such as believed, and expected the
coming again of our Saviour to judge the world; and they who so
believed, needed no other opinion, but only uprightness of life, to be
saved.
[Sidenote: For what fault lieth excommunication.]
There lieth excommunication for injustice; as (_Matth._ xviii.), If thy
brother offend thee, tell it him privately; then with witnesses; lastly,
tell the Church; and then if he obey not, _Let him be to thee as an
heathen man and a publican_. And there lieth excommunication for a
scandalous life, as (_1 Cor._ v. 11) _If any man that is called a
brother, be a fornicator, or covetous, or an idolater, or a drunkard, or
an extortioner, with such a one ye are not to eat_. But to excommunicate
a man that held this foundation, that _Jesus was the Christ_, for
difference of opinion in other points, by which that foundation was not
destroyed, there appeareth no authority in the Scripture, nor example in
the apostles. There is indeed in St. Paul (_Titus_ iii. 10) a text that
seemeth to be to the contrary; _A man that is an heretic, after the
first and second admonition, reject_. For an _heretic_, is he, that
being a member of the Church, teacheth nevertheless some private
opinion, which the Church has forbidden: and such a one, St. Paul
adviseth Titus, after the first and second admonition, to _reject_. But
to _reject_, in this place, is not to _excommunicate_ the man; but to
_give over admonishing him, to let him alone, to set by disputing with
him_, as one that is to be convinced only by himself. The same apostle
saith (_2 Tim._ ii. 23) _Foolish and unlearned questions avoid_: the
word _avoid_ in this place, and _reject_ in the former, is the same in
the original, παραιτοῦ: but foolish questions may be set by without
excommunication. And again, (_Titus_ iii. 9) _Avoid foolish questions_,
where the original περιΐστασο (_set them by_) is equivalent to the
former word _reject_. There is no other place that can so much as
colourably be drawn, to countenance the casting out of the Church
faithful men, such as believed the foundation, only for a singular
superstructure of their own, proceeding perhaps from a good and pious
conscience. But on the contrary, all such places as command avoiding
such disputes, are written for a lesson to pastors, such as Timothy and
Titus were, not to make new articles of faith, by determining every
small controversy, which oblige men to a needless burthen of conscience,
or provoke them to break the union of the Church. Which lesson the
apostles themselves observed well. St. Peter and St. Paul, though their
controversy were great, as we may read in _Gal._ ii. 11, yet they did
not cast one another out of the Church. Nevertheless, during the
apostles’ times, there were other pastors that observed it not; as
Diotrephes (_3 John_, 9, &c.) who cast out of the Church such as St.
John himself thought fit to be received into it, out of a pride he took
in preeminence. So early it was, that vain glory and ambition had found
entrance into the Church of Christ.
[Sidenote: Of persons liable to excommunication.]
That a man be liable to excommunication, there be many conditions
requisite; as first, that he be a member of some commonalty, that is to
say, of some lawful assembly, that is to say, of some Christian Church,
that hath power to judge of the cause for which he is to be
excommunicated. For where there is no community, there can be no
excommunication; nor where there is no power to judge, can there be any
power to give sentence.
From hence it followeth, that one Church cannot be excommunicated by
another: for either they have equal power to excommunicate each other,
in which case excommunication is not discipline, nor an act of
authority, but schism, and dissolution of charity; or one is so
subordinate to the other, as that they both have but one voice; and then
they be but one Church; and the part excommunicated is no more a Church,
but a dissolute number of individual persons.
And because the sentence of excommunication, importeth an advice, not to
keep company nor so much as to eat with him that is excommunicate, if a
sovereign prince or assembly be excommunicate, the sentence is of no
effect. For all subjects are bound to be in the company and presence of
their own sovereign, when he requireth it, by the law of nature; nor can
they lawfully either expel him from any place of his own dominion,
whether profane or holy; nor go out of his dominion without his leave;
much less, if he call them to that honour, refuse to eat with him. And
as to other princes and states, because they are not parts of one and
the same congregation, they need not any other sentence to keep them
from keeping company with the state excommunicate: for the very
institution, as it uniteth many men into one community, so it
dissociateth one community from another: so that excommunication is not
needful for keeping kings and states asunder; nor has any further effect
than is in the nature of policy itself, unless it be to instigate
princes to war upon one another.
Nor is the excommunication of a Christian subject, that obeyeth the laws
of his own sovereign, whether Christian or heathen, of any effect. For
if he believe that _Jesus is the Christ, he hath the Spirit of God_ (_1
John_ v. 1): _and God dwelleth in him, and he in God_ (_1 John_ iv. 15.)
But he that hath the spirit of God; he that dwelleth in God; he in whom
God dwelleth, can receive no harm by the excommunication of men.
Therefore, he that believeth Jesus to be the Christ, is free from all
the dangers threatened to persons excommunicate. He that believeth it
not, is no Christian. Therefore a true and unfeigned Christian is not
liable to excommunication: nor he also that is a professed Christian,
till his hypocrisy appear in his manners, that is, till his behaviour be
contrary to the law of his sovereign, which is the rule of manners, and
which Christ and his apostles have commanded us to be subject to. For
the Church cannot judge of manners but by external actions, which
actions can never be unlawful, but when they are against the law of the
commonwealth.
If a man’s father, or mother, or master, be excommunicate, yet are not
the children forbidden to keep them company, nor to eat with them: for
that were, for the most part, to oblige them not to eat at all, for want
of means to get food; and to authorize them to disobey their parents and
masters, contrary to the precept of the apostles.
In sum, the power of excommunication cannot be extended further than to
the end for which the apostles and pastors of the Church have their
commission from our Saviour; which is not to rule by command and
co-action, but by teaching and direction of men in the way of salvation
in the world to come. And as a master in any science may abandon his
scholar, when he obstinately neglecteth the practise of his rules; but
not accuse him of injustice, because he was never bound to obey him: so
a teacher of Christian doctrine may abandon his disciples that
obstinately continue in an unchristian life; but he cannot say, they do
him wrong, because they are not obliged to obey him. For to a teacher
that shall so complain, may be applied the answer of God to Samuel in
the like place, (_1 Sam._ viii. 7) _They have not rejected thee, but
me_. Excommunication therefore, when it wanteth the assistance of the
civil power, as it doth, when a Christian state or prince is
excommunicate by a foreign authority, is without effect; and
consequently ought to be without terror. The name of _Fulmen
excommunicationis_, that is, the _thunderbolt of excommunication_,
proceeded from an imagination of the Bishop of Rome, which first used
it, that he was king of kings; as the heathen made Jupiter king of the
gods, and assigned him, in their poems, and pictures, a thunderbolt,
wherewith to subdue and punish the giants, that should dare to deny his
power. Which imagination was grounded on two errors; one, that the
kingdom of Christ is of this world, contrary to our Saviour’s own words,
(_John_ xviii. 36) _My kingdom is not of this world_; the other, that he
is Christ’s vicar, not only over his own subjects, but over all the
Christians of the world; whereof there is no ground in Scripture, and
the contrary shall be proved in its due place.
[Sidenote: Of the interpreter of the Scriptures, before civil sovereigns
became Christians.]
St. Paul coming to Thessalonica, where was a Synagogue of the Jews,
(_Acts_, xvii. 2, 3) _as his manner was, went in unto them, and three
Sabbath days reasoned with them out of the Scriptures, opening and
alleging, that Christ must needs have suffered and risen again from the
dead; and that this Jesus whom he preached was the Christ_. The
Scriptures here mentioned were the Scriptures of the Jews, that is, the
Old Testament. The men, to whom he was to prove that Jesus was the
Christ and risen again from the dead, were also Jews, and did believe
already, that they were the word of God. Hereupon (as it is in verse 4)
some of them believed, and (as it is in verse 5) some believed not. What
was the reason, when they all believed the Scripture, that they did not
all believe alike; but that some approved, others disapproved the
interpretation of St. Paul that cited them; and every one interpreted
them to himself? It was this; St. Paul came to them without any legal
commission, and in the manner of one that would not command, but
persuade; which he must needs do, either by miracles, as Moses did to
the Israelites in Egypt, that they might see his authority in God’s
works; or by reasoning from the already received Scripture, that they
might see the truth of his doctrine in God’s word. But whosoever
persuadeth by reasoning from principles written, maketh him to whom he
speaketh judge, both of the meaning of those principles, and also of the
force of his inferences upon them. If these Jews of Thessalonica were
not, who else was the judge of what St. Paul alleged out of Scripture?
If St. Paul, what needed he to quote any places to prove his doctrine?
It had been enough to have said, I find it so in Scripture, that is to
say, in your laws, of which I am interpreter, as sent by Christ. The
interpreter therefore of the Scripture, to whose interpretation the Jews
of Thessalonica were bound to stand, could be none: every one might
believe, or not believe, according as the allegation seemed to himself
to be agreeable, or not agreeable to the meaning of the places alleged.
And generally in all cases of the world, he that pretendeth any proof,
maketh judge of his proof him to whom he addresseth his speech. And as
to the case of the Jews in particular, they were bound by express words
(_Deut._ xvii.) to receive the determination of all hard questions, from
the priests and judges of Israel for the time being. But this is to be
understood of the Jews that were yet unconverted.
For the conversion of the Gentiles, there was no use of alleging the
Scriptures, which they believed not. The apostles therefore laboured by
reason to confute their idolatry; and that done, to persuade them to the
faith of Christ, by their testimony of his life and resurrection. So
that there could not yet be any controversy concerning the authority to
interpret Scripture; seeing no man was obliged, during his infidelity,
to follow any man’s interpretation of any Scripture, except his
sovereign’s interpretation of the laws of his country.
Let us now consider the conversion itself, and see what there was
therein that could be cause of such an obligation. Men were converted to
no other thing than to the belief of that which the apostles preached:
and the apostles preached nothing, but that Jesus was the Christ, that
is to say, the king that was to save them, and reign over them eternally
in the world to come; and consequently that he was not dead, but risen
again from the dead, and gone up into heaven, and should come again one
day to judge the world, (which also should rise again to be judged,) and
reward every man according to his works. None of them preached that
himself, or any other apostle, was such an interpreter of the Scripture,
as all that became Christians, ought to take their interpretation for
law. For to interpret the laws, is part of the administration of a
present kingdom; which the apostles had not. They prayed then, and all
other pastors ever since, _let thy kingdom come_; and exhorted their
converts to obey their then ethnic princes. The New Testament was not
yet published in one body. Every of the evangelists was interpreter of
his own gospel; and every apostle of his own epistle; and of the Old
Testament our Saviour himself saith to the Jews (_John_ v. 39) _Search
the Scriptures; for in them ye think to have eternal life, and they are
they that testify of me_. If he had not meant they should interpret
them, he would not have bidden them take thence the proof of his being
the Christ: he would either have interpreted them himself, or referred
them to the interpretation of the priests.
When a difficulty arose, the apostles and elders of the Church assembled
themselves together, and determined what should be preached and taught,
and how they should interpret the Scriptures to the people; but took not
from the people the liberty to read and interpret them to themselves.
The apostles sent divers letters to the Churches, and other writings for
their instruction; which had been in vain, if they had not allowed them
to interpret, that is, to consider the meaning of them. And as it was in
the apostles’ time, it must be till such time as there should be
pastors, that could authorize an interpreter, whose interpretation
should generally be stood to: but that could not be till kings were
pastors, or pastors kings.
[Sidenote: Of the power to make Scripture, law.]
There be two senses, wherein a writing may be said to be _canonical_;
for _canon_, signifieth a _rule_; and a rule is a precept, by which a
man is guided and directed in any action whatsoever. Such precepts,
though given by a teacher to his disciple, or a counsellor to his
friend, without power to compel him to observe them, are nevertheless
canons; because they are rules. But when they are given by one, whom he
that receiveth them is bound to obey, then are those canons, not only
rules, but laws. The question therefore here, is of the power to make
the Scriptures, which are the rules of Christian faith, laws.
[Sidenote: Of the ten commandments.]
That part of the Scripture, which was first law, was the Ten
Commandments, written in two tables of stone, and delivered by God
himself to Moses; and by Moses made known to the people. Before that
time there was no written law of God, who as yet having not chosen any
people to be his peculiar kingdom, had given no law to men, but the law
of nature, that is to say, the precepts of natural reason, written in
every man’s own heart. Of these two tables, the first containeth the law
of sovereignty; 1. That they should not obey, nor honour the gods of
other nations, in these words, _Non habebis deos alienos coram me_, that
is, _thou shalt not have for gods, the gods that other nations worship,
but only me_: whereby they were forbidden to obey, or honour, as their
king and governor, any other God, than him that spake unto them then by
Moses, and afterwards by the high-priest. 2. That they _should not make
any image to represent him_; that is to say, they were not to choose to
themselves, neither in heaven, nor in earth, any representative of their
own fancying, but obey Moses and Aaron, whom he had appointed to that
office. 3. That _they should not take the name of God in vain_; that is,
they should not speak rashly of their king, nor dispute his right, nor
the commissions of Moses and Aaron, his lieutenants. 4. That _they
should every seventh day abstain from their ordinary labour_, and employ
that time in doing him public honour. The second table containeth the
duty of one man towards another, as _to honour parents_; _not to kill_;
_not to commit adultery_; _not to steal_; _not to corrupt judgment by
false witness_; and finally, _not so much as to design in their heart
the doing of any injury one to another_. The question now is, who it was
that gave to these written tables the obligatory force of laws. There is
no doubt but they were made laws by God himself: but because a law
obliges not, nor is law to any, but to them that acknowledge it to be
the act of the sovereign; how could the people of Israel, that were
forbidden to approach the mountain to hear what God said to Moses, be
obliged to obedience to all those laws which Moses propounded to them?
Some of them were indeed the laws of nature, as all the second table;
and therefore to be acknowledged for God’s laws; not to the Israelites
alone, but to all people: but of those that were peculiar to the
Israelites, as those of the first table, the question remains; saving
that they had obliged themselves, presently after the propounding of
them, to obey Moses, in these words (_Exod._ xx. 19), _Speak thou to us,
and we will hear thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we die_. It was
therefore only Moses then, and after him the high-priest, whom, by
Moses, God declared should administer this his peculiar kingdom, that
had on earth the power to make this short Scripture of the Decalogue to
be law in the commonwealth of Israel. But Moses, and Aaron, and the
succeeding high-priests, were the civil sovereigns. Therefore hitherto,
the canonizing or making the Scripture law, belonged to the civil
sovereign.
[Sidenote: Of the judicial and Levitical law.]
The judicial law, that is to say, the laws that God prescribed to the
magistrates of Israel for the rule of their administration of justice,
and of the sentences or judgments they should pronounce in pleas between
man and man; and the Levitical law, that is to say, the rule that God
prescribed touching the rites and ceremonies of the priests and Levites,
were all delivered to them by Moses only; and therefore also became
laws, by virtue of the same promise of obedience to Moses. Whether these
laws were then written, or not written, but dictated to the people by
Moses, after his being forty days with God in the Mount, by word of
mouth, is not expressed in the text; but they were all positive laws,
and equivalent to holy Scripture, and made canonical by Moses the civil
sovereign.
[Sidenote: The second law.]
After the Israelites were come into the plains of Moab over against
Jericho, and ready to enter into the land of promise, Moses to the
former laws added divers others; which therefore are called
_Deuteronomy_; that is, _second laws_. And are, (as it is written
_Deut._ xxix. 1) _the words of a covenant which the Lord commanded Moses
to make with the children of Israel, besides the covenant which he made
with them in Horeb_. For having explained those former laws, in the
beginning of the book of _Deuteronomy_, he addeth others, that begin at
the xiith chapter, and continue to the end of the xxvith of the same
book. This law (_Deut._ xxvii. 3) they were commanded to write upon
great stones plastered over, at their passing over Jordan: this law also
was written by Moses himself in a book, and delivered into the hands of
the _priests, and to the elders of Israel_ (_Deut._ xxxi. 9), and
commanded (verse 26) _to be put in the side of the ark_; for in the ark
itself was nothing but the _ten commandments_. This was the law, which
Moses (_Deut._ xvii. 18) commanded the kings of Israel should keep a
copy of: and this is the law, which having been long time lost, was
found again in the temple in the time of Josiah, and by his authority
received for the law of God. But both Moses at the writing, and Josiah
at the recovery thereof, had both of them the civil sovereignty.
Hitherto therefore the power of making Scripture canonical, was in the
civil sovereign.
Besides this book of the law, there was no other book, from the time of
Moses till after the Captivity, received amongst the Jews for the law of
God. For the prophets, except a few, lived in the time of the Captivity
itself; and the rest lived but a little before it; and were so far from
having their prophecies generally received for laws, as that their
persons were persecuted, partly by false prophets, and partly by the
kings which were seduced by them. And this book itself, which was
confirmed by Josiah for the law of God, and with it all the history of
the works of God, was lost in the captivity and sack of the city of
Jerusalem, as appears by that of _2 Esdras_, xiv. 21, _thy law is burnt;
therefore no man knoweth the things that are done of thee, or the works
that shall begin_. And before the captivity, between the time when the
law was lost, (which is not mentioned in the Scripture, but may probably
be thought to be the time of Rehoboam, when (_1 Kings_ xiv. 26) Shishak,
king of Egypt, took the spoil of the temple), and the time of Josiah
when it was found again, they had no written word of God, but ruled
according to their own discretion, or by the direction of such as each
of them esteemed prophets.
[Sidenote: The Old Testament when made canonical.]
From hence we may infer, that the Scriptures of the Old Testament, which
we have at this day, were not canonical nor a law unto the Jews, till
the renovation of their covenant with God at their return from the
captivity, and restoration of their commonwealth under Esdras. But from
that time forward they were accounted the law of the Jews, and for such
translated into Greek by seventy elders of Judea, and put into the
library of Ptolemy at Alexandria, and approved for the word of God. Now
seeing Esdras was the high-priest, and the high-priest was their civil
sovereign, it is manifest that the Scriptures were never made laws, but
by the sovereign civil power.
[Sidenote: The New Testament began to be canonical under Christian
sovereigns.]
By the writings of the fathers that lived in the time before that the
Christian religion was received, and authorized by Constantine the
emperor, we may find, that the books we now have of the New Testament
were held by the Christians of that time, except a few, (in respect of
whose paucity the rest were called the Catholic Church, and others
heretics), for the dictates of the Holy Ghost, and consequently for the
canon or rule of faith: such was the reverence and opinion they had of
their teachers; as generally the reverence, that the disciples bear to
their first masters in all manner of doctrine they receive from them, is
not small. Therefore there is no doubt, but when St. Paul wrote to the
Churches he had converted; or any other apostle or disciple of Christ,
to those which had then embraced Christ; they received those their
writings for the true Christian doctrine. But in that time, when not the
power and authority of the teacher, but the faith of the hearer, caused
them to receive it, it was not the apostles that made their own writings
canonical, but every convert made them so to himself.
But the question here, is not what any Christian made a law or canon to
himself, which he might again reject by the same right he received it;
but what was so made a canon to them, as without injustice they could
not do any thing contrary thereunto. That the New Testament should in
this sense be canonical, that is to say a law, in any place where the
law of the commonwealth had not made it so, is contrary to the nature of
a law. For a law, as has been already shown, is the commandment of that
man or assembly, to whom we have given sovereign authority to make such
rules for the direction of our actions as he shall think fit, and to
punish us when we do any thing contrary to the same. When therefore any
other man shall offer unto us any other rules, which the sovereign ruler
hath not prescribed, they are but counsel and advice; which, whether
good or bad, he that is counselled, may without injustice refuse to
observe; and when contrary to the laws already established, without
injustice cannot observe, how good soever he conceiveth it to be. I say,
he cannot in this case observe the same in his actions, nor in his
discourse with other men; though he may without blame believe his
private teachers, and wish he had the liberty to practise their advice,
and that it were publicly received for law. For internal faith is in its
own nature invisible, and consequently exempted from all human
jurisdiction; whereas the words and actions that proceed from it, as
breaches of our civil obedience, are injustice both before God and man.
Seeing then our Saviour hath denied his kingdom to be in this world,
seeing he had said, he came not to judge, but to save the world, he hath
not subjected us to other laws than those of the commonwealth; that is,
the Jews to the law of Moses, which he saith (_Matth._ v. 17) he came
not to destroy, but to fulfil; and other nations to the laws of their
several sovereigns, and all men to the laws of nature; the observing
whereof, both he himself, and his apostles, have in their teaching
recommended to us, as a necessary condition of being admitted by him in
the last day into his eternal kingdom, wherein shall be protection, and
life everlasting. Seeing then our Saviour, and his apostles, left not
new laws to oblige us in this world, but new doctrine to prepare us for
the next; the books of the New Testament, which contain that doctrine,
until obedience to them was commanded by them that God had given power
to on earth to be legislators, were not obligatory canons, that is,
laws, but only good and safe advice, for the direction of sinners in the
way to salvation, which every man might take and refuse at his own
peril, without injustice.
Again, our Saviour Christ’s commission to his apostles and disciples,
was to proclaim his kingdom, not present, but to come; and to teach all
nations, and to baptize them that should believe; and to enter into the
houses of them that should receive them, and where they were not
received, to shake off the dust of their feet against them; but not to
call for fire from heaven to destroy them, nor to compel them to
obedience by the sword. In all which there is nothing of power, but of
persuasion. He sent them out as sheep unto wolves, not as kings to their
subjects. They had not in commission to make laws; but to obey, and
teach obedience to laws made; and consequently they could not make their
writings obligatory canons, without the help of the sovereign civil
power. And therefore the Scripture of the New Testament is there only
law, where the lawful civil power hath made it so. And there also the
king, or sovereign, maketh it a law to himself; by which he subjecteth
himself, not to the doctor or apostle that converted him, but to God
himself and his Son Jesus Christ, as immediately as did the apostles
themselves.
[Sidenote: Of the power of councils to make the Scriptures law.]
That which may seem to give the New Testament, in respect of those that
have embraced Christian doctrine, the force of laws, in the times and
places of persecution, is the decrees they made amongst themselves in
their synod. For we read (_Acts_ xv. 28) the style of the council of the
apostles, the elders, and the whole Church, in this manner; _It seemed
good to the Holy Ghost, and to us, to lay upon you no greater burthen
than these necessary things, &c_; which is a style that signifieth a
power to lay a burthen on them that had received their doctrine. Now _to
lay a burthen on another_, seemeth the same as _to oblige_; and
therefore the acts of that council were laws to the then Christians.
Nevertheless, they were no more laws than are these other precepts,
_Repent; be baptized; keep the commandments; believe the gospel; come
unto me; sell all that thou hast; give it to the poor_; and, _follow
me_; which are not commands, but invitations, and callings of men to
Christianity, like that of _Isaiah_ lv. 1; _Ho, every man that
thirsteth, come ye to the waters, come, and buy wine and milk without
money_. For first, the apostles’ power was no other than that of our
Saviour, to invite men to embrace the kingdom of God; which they
themselves acknowledged for a kingdom, not present, but to come; and
they that have no kingdom, can make no laws. And secondly, if their acts
of council were laws, they could not without sin be disobeyed. But we
read not any where, that they who received not the doctrine of Christ,
did therein sin; but that they died in their sins; that is, that their
sins against the laws to which they owed obedience, were not pardoned.
And those laws were the laws of nature, and the civil laws of the state,
whereto every Christian man had by pact submitted himself. And therefore
by the burthen, which the apostles might lay on such as they had
converted, are not to be understood laws, but conditions proposed to
those that sought salvation; which they might accept or refuse at their
own peril, without a new sin, though not without the hazard of being
condemned and excluded out of the kingdom of God for their sins past.
And therefore of infidels, St. John saith not, the wrath of God shall
_come_ upon them, but (_John_ iii. 36) _the wrath of God remaineth upon
them_; and not that they shall be condemned, but that (_John_ iii. 18)
_they are condemned already_. Nor can it be conceived, that the benefit
of faith _is remission of sins_, unless we conceive withal, that the
damage of infidelity _is the retention of the same sins_.
But to what end is it, may some man ask, that the apostles, and other
pastors of the Church after their time, should meet together to agree
upon what doctrine should be taught, both for faith and manners, if no
man were obliged to observe their decrees? To this may be answered, that
the apostles and elders of that council were obliged even by their
entrance into it, to teach the doctrine therein concluded and decreed to
be taught, so far forth, as no precedent law, to which they were obliged
to yield obedience, was to the contrary; but not that all other
Christians should be obliged to observe what they taught. For though
they might deliberate what each of them should teach; yet they could not
deliberate what others should do, unless their assembly had had a
legislative power; which none could have but civil sovereigns. For
though God be the sovereign of all the world, we are not bound to take
for his law whatsoever is propounded by every man in his name; nor
anything contrary to the civil law, which God hath expressly commanded
us to obey.
Seeing then the acts of council of the apostles, were then no laws, but
counsels; much less are laws the acts of any other doctors or council
since, if assembled without the authority of the civil sovereign. And
consequently, the Books of the New Testament, though most perfect rules
of Christian doctrine, could not be made laws by any other authority
than that of kings or sovereign assemblies.
The first council, that made the Scriptures we now have canon, is not
extant: for that collection of the canons of the apostles, attributed to
Clemens, the first bishop of Rome after St. Peter, is subject to
question. For though the canonical books be there reckoned up; yet these
words, _sint vobis omnibus clericis et laicis libri venerandi, etc._
contain a distinction of clergy and laity, that was not in use so near
St. Peter’s time. The first council for settling the canonical
Scripture, that is extant, is that of Laodicea, (_Can._ lix.) which
forbids the reading of other books than those in the churches; which is
a mandate that is not addressed to every Christian, but to those only
that had authority to read any thing publicly in the church; that is, to
ecclesiastics only.
[Sidenote: Of the right of constituting ecclesiastical officers in the
time of the apostles.]
Of ecclesiastical officers in the time of the apostles, some were
magisterial, some ministerial. Magisterial were the offices of the
preaching of the gospel of the kingdom of God to infidels; of
administering the sacraments, and divine service; and of teaching the
rules of faith and manners to those that were converted. Ministerial was
the office of deacons, that is, of them that were appointed to the
administration of the secular necessities of the church, at such time as
they lived upon a common stock of money, raised out of the voluntary
contributions of the faithful.
Amongst the officers magisterial, the first and principal were the
apostles; whereof there were at first but twelve; and these were chosen
and constituted by our Saviour himself; and their office was not only to
preach, teach, and baptize, but also to be martyrs, witnesses of our
Saviour’s resurrection. This testimony was the specifical and essential
mark, whereby the apostleship was distinguished from other magistracy
ecclesiastical; as being necessary for an apostle, either to have seen
our Saviour after his resurrection, or to have conversed with him
before, and seen his works, and other arguments of his divinity; whereby
they might be taken for sufficient witnesses. And therefore at the
election of a new apostle in the place of Judas Iscariot, St. Peter
saith (_Acts_ i. 21, 22) _Of these men that have companied with us, all
the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out amongst us, beginning from
the baptism of John unto that same day that he was taken up from us_,
must _one be ordained to be a witness with us of his resurrection_:
where by this word _must_, is implied a necessary property of an
apostle, to have companied with the first and prime apostles, in the
time that our Saviour manifested himself in the flesh.
[Sidenote: Matthias made apostle by the congregation.]
The first apostle, of those which were not constituted by Christ in the
time he was upon the earth, was Matthias, chosen in this manner. There
were assembled together in Jerusalem about one hundred and twenty
Christians (_Acts_ i. 15). These (verse 23) appointed two, Joseph the
Just and Matthias, and caused lots to be drawn; _and_ (verse 26) _the
lot fell on Matthias, and he was numbered with the apostles_. So that
here we see the ordination of this apostle was the act of the
congregation, and not of St. Peter nor of the eleven, otherwise than as
members of the assembly.
[Sidenote: Paul and Barnabas made apostles by the Church of Antioch.]
After him there was never any other apostle ordained, but Paul and
Barnabas; which was done as we read (_Acts_ xiii. 1, 2, 3) in this
manner. _There were in the Church that was at Antioch, certain prophets
and teachers; as Barnabas, and Simeon that was called Niger, and Lucius
of Cyrene, and Manaen; which had been brought up with Herod the
Tetrarch, and Saul. As they ministered unto the Lord, and fasted, the
Holy Ghost said, Separate me Barnabas and Saul for the work whereunto I
have called them. And when they had fasted and prayed, and laid their
hands on them, they sent them away._
By which it is manifest, that though they were called by the Holy Ghost,
their calling was declared unto them and their mission authorized by the
particular Church of Antioch. And that this their calling was to the
apostleship, is apparent by that, that they are both called (_Acts_ xiv.
14) apostles: and that it was by virtue of this act of the Church of
Antioch, that they were apostles, St. Paul declareth plainly (_Rom._ i.
1), in that he useth the word, which the Holy Ghost used at his calling:
for he styleth himself, _An apostle separated unto the gospel of God_;
alluding to the words of the Holy Ghost, _Separate me Barnabas and Saul,
&c._ But seeing the work of an apostle, was to be a witness of the
resurrection of Christ, a man may here ask, how St. Paul, that conversed
not with our Saviour before his passion, could know he was risen? To
which is easily answered, that our Saviour himself appeared to him in
the way to Damascus, from heaven, after his ascension; _and chose him
for a vessel to bear his name before the Gentiles, and kings, and
children of Israel_: and consequently, having seen the Lord after his
passion, he was a competent witness of his resurrection. And as for
Barnabas, he was a disciple before the passion. It is therefore evident
that Paul and Barnabas were apostles; and yet chosen and authorized, not
by the first apostles alone, but by the Church of Antioch; as Matthias
was chosen and authorized by the Church of Jerusalem.
[Sidenote: What offices in the church are magisterial.]
_Bishop_, a word formed in our language out of the Greek Επισκοπος,
signifieth an overseer or superintendent of any business, and
particularly a pastor or shepherd; and thence by metaphor was taken, not
only amongst the Jews that were originally shepherds, but also amongst
the heathen, to signify the office of a king, or any other ruler or
guide of people, whether he ruled by laws or doctrine. And so the
apostles were the first Christian bishops, instituted by Christ himself:
in which sense the apostleship of Judas is called (_Acts_ i. 20) _his
bishopric_. And afterwards, when there were constituted elders in the
Christian Churches, with charge to guide Christ’s flock by their
doctrine and advice; these elders were also called bishops. Timothy was
an elder, (which word _elder_, in the New Testament, is a name of
office, as well as of age); yet he was also a bishop. And bishops were
then content with the title of elders. Nay St. John himself, the apostle
beloved of our Lord, beginneth his second Epistle with these words, _The
elder to the elect lady_. By which it is evident, that _bishop_,
_pastor_, _elder_, _doctor_, that is to say, _teacher_, were but so many
divers names of the same office in the time of the apostles; for there
was then no government by coercion, but only by doctrine and persuading.
The kingdom of God was yet to come, in a new world: so that there could
be no authority to compel in any Church, till the commonwealth had
embraced the Christian faith: and consequently no diversity of
authority, though there were diversity of employments.
Besides these magisterial employments in the Church, namely, apostles,
bishops, elders, pastors, and doctors, whose calling was to proclaim
Christ to the Jews and infidels, and to direct and to teach those that
believed, we read in the New Testament of no other. For by the names of
_evangelists_ and _prophets_, is not signified any office, but several
gifts, by which several men were profitable to the Church: as
evangelists, by writing the life and acts of our Saviour, such as were
St. Matthew and St. John apostles, and St. Mark and St. Luke disciples,
and whosoever else wrote of that subject, (as St. Thomas, and St.
Barnabas are said to have done, though the Church have not received the
books that have gone under their names): and as prophets, by the gift of
interpreting the Old Testament, and sometimes by declaring their special
revelations to the Church. For neither these gifts, nor the gifts of
languages, nor the gift of casting out devils, nor of curing other
diseases, nor any thing else, did make an officer in the Church, save
only the due calling and election to the charge of teaching.
[Sidenote: Ordination of teachers.]
As the apostles, Matthias, Paul, and Barnabas, were not made by our
Saviour himself, but were elected by the Church, that is, by the
assembly of Christians; namely, Matthias by the Church of Jerusalem, and
Paul and Barnabas by the Church of Antioch; so were also the
_presbyters_ and _pastors_ in other cities, elected by the Churches of
those cities. For proof whereof let us consider, first, how St. Paul
proceeded in the ordination of presbyters, in the cities where he had
converted men to the Christian faith, immediately after he and Barnabas
had received their apostleship. We read (_Acts_ xiv. 23) that _they
ordained elders in every Church_; which at first sight may be taken for
an argument, that they themselves chose, and gave them their authority:
but if we consider the original text, it will be manifest that they were
authorized and chosen by the assembly of the Christians of each city.
For the words there are, χειροτονήσαντες ἀυτοῖς πρεσβυτέρους κατ’
ἐκκλησίαν, that is, _when they had ordained them elders by the holding
up of hands in every congregation_. Now it is well enough known, that in
all those cities the manner of choosing magistrates and officers, was by
plurality of suffrages; and, because the ordinary way of distinguishing
the affirmative votes from the negatives, was by holding up of hands, to
ordain an officer in any of the cities, was no more but to bring the
people together, to elect them by plurality of votes, whether it were by
plurality of elevated hands, or by plurality of voices, or plurality of
balls, or beans, or small stones, of which every man cast in one, into a
vessel marked for the affirmative or negative; for divers cities had
divers customs in that point. It was therefore the assembly that elected
their own elders: the apostles were only presidents of the assembly, to
call them together for such election, and to pronounce them elected, and
to give them the benediction which now is called consecration. And for
this cause, they that were presidents of the assemblies, as in the
absence of the apostles the elders were, were called προεστῶτες, and in
Latin _antistites_; which words signify the principal person of the
assembly, whose office was to number the votes, and to declare thereby
who was chosen; and where the votes were equal, to decide the matter in
question, by adding his own; which is the office of a president in
council. And, because all the Churches had their presbyters ordained in
the same manner, where the word is _constitute_, (as _Titus_ i. 5) ἵνα
καταστησης κατα πόλιν πρεσβυτέρους, _For this cause left I thee in
Crete, that thou shouldest constitute elders in every city_, we are to
understand the same thing, namely, that he should call the faithful
together, and ordain them presbyters by plurality of suffrages. It had
been a strange thing, if in a town, where men perhaps had never seen any
magistrate otherwise chosen than by an assembly, those of the town
becoming Christians should so much as have thought on any other way of
election of their teachers and guides, that is to say, of their
presbyters, (otherwise called bishops) than this of plurality of
suffrages, intimated by St. Paul (_Acts_ xiv. 23) in the word
χειροτονήσαντες. Nor was there ever any choosing of bishops, before the
emperors found it necessary to regulate them, in order to the keeping of
the peace amongst them, but by the assemblies of the Christians in every
several town.
The same is also confirmed by the continual practice, even to this day,
in the election of the bishops of Rome. For if the bishop of any place
had the right of choosing another, to the succession of the pastoral
office, in any city, at such times as he went from thence to plant the
same in another place; much more had he had the right to appoint his
successors in that place, in which he last resided and died: and we find
not that ever any bishop of Rome appointed his successor. For they were
a long time chosen by the people, as we may see by the sedition raised
about the election between _Damasus_ and _Ursicinus_; which Ammianus
Marcellinus saith was so great, that _Juventius_ the præfect, unable to
keep the peace between them, was forced to go out of the city; and that
there were above an hundred men found dead upon that occasion in the
church itself. And though they afterwards were chosen, first, by the
whole clergy of Rome, and afterwards by the cardinals; yet never any was
appointed to the succession by his predecessor. If therefore they
pretended no right to appoint their own successors, I think I may
reasonably conclude they had no right to appoint the successors of other
bishops, without receiving some new power; which none could take from
the Church to bestow on them, but such as had a lawful authority, not
only to teach, but to command the Church; which none could do, but the
civil sovereign.
[Sidenote: Ministers of the Church, what.]
The word _minister_, in the original Διάκονος, signifieth one that
voluntarily doth the business of another man; and differeth from a
servant only in this, that servants are obliged by their condition, to
do what is commanded them; whereas ministers are obliged only by their
undertaking, and bound therefore to no more than that they have
undertaken: so that both they that teach the word of God, and they that
administer the secular affairs of the Church, are both ministers, but
they are ministers of different persons. For the pastors of the Church,
called (_Acts_ vi. 4) _the ministers of the word_, are ministers of
Christ, whose word it is: but the ministry of a deacon, which is called
(verse 2 of the same chapter) _serving of tables_, is a service done to
the Church or congregation: so that neither any one man, nor the whole
church, could ever of their pastor say, he was their minister: but of a
deacon, whether the charge he undertook were to serve tables, or
distribute maintenance to the Christians, when they lived in each city
on a common stock or upon collections, as in the first times, or to take
a care of the house of prayer, or of the revenue, or other worldly
business of the Church, the whole congregation might properly call him
their minister.
For their employment, as deacons, was to serve the congregation; though
upon occasion they omitted not to preach the gospel, and maintain the
doctrine of Christ, every one according to his gifts, as St. Stephen
did; and both to preach and baptize, as Philip did. For that Philip,
which (_Acts_ viii. 5) preached the gospel at Samaria, and (verse 38)
baptized the Eunuch, was Philip the deacon, not Philip the apostle. For
it is manifest (verse 1) that when Philip preached in Samaria, the
apostles were at Jerusalem, and (verse 14) _when they heard that Samaria
had received the word of God, sent Peter and John to them_; by
imposition of whose hands, they that were baptized (verse 15), received,
which before by the baptism of Philip they had not received, the Holy
Ghost. For it was necessary for the conferring of the Holy Ghost, that
their baptism should be administered or confirmed by a minister of the
word, not by a minister of the Church. And therefore to confirm the
baptism of those that Philip the deacon had baptized, the apostles sent
out of their own number from Jerusalem to Samaria, Peter and John; who
conferred on them that before were but baptized, those graces that were
signs of the Holy Spirit, which at that time did accompany all true
believers; which what they were may be understood by that which St. Mark
saith (chap. xvi. 17), _these signs follow them that believe in my name;
they shall cast out devils; they shall speak with new tongues; they
shall take up serpents; and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not
hurt them; they shall lay hands on the sick, and they shall recover_.
This to do, was it that Philip could not give; but the apostles could,
and, as appears by this place, effectually did to every man that truly
believed and was by a minister of Christ himself baptized: which power
either Christ’s ministers in this age cannot confer, or else there are
very few true believers, or Christ hath very few ministers.
[Sidenote: And how chosen.]
That the first deacons were chosen, not by the apostles, but by a
congregation of the disciples, that is, of Christian men of all sorts,
is manifest out of _Acts_ vi, where we read that the _Twelve_, after the
number of disciples was multiplied, called them together, and having
told them, that it was not fit that the apostles should leave the word
of God and serve tables, said unto them, (verse 3) _Brethren, look you
out among you seven men of honest report, full of the Holy Ghost and of
wisdom, whom we may appoint over this business_. Here it is manifest,
that though the apostles declared them elected; yet the congregation
chose them; which also (verse 5) is more expressly said, where it is
written, that _the saying pleased the whole multitude, and they chose
seven, &c._
[Sidenote: Of ecclesiastical revenue, under the law of Moses.]
Under the Old Testament, the tribe of Levi were only capable of the
priesthood, and other inferior offices of the Church. The land was
divided amongst the other tribes, Levi excepted, which, by the
subdivision of the tribe of Joseph into Ephraim and Manasseh, were still
twelve. To the tribe of Levi were assigned certain cities for their
habitation, with the suburbs for their cattle: but for their portion,
they were to have the tenth of the fruits of the land of their brethren.
Again, the priests for their maintenance had the tenth of that tenth,
together with part of the oblations and sacrifices. For God had said to
Aaron (_Numb._ xviii. 20) _Thou shalt have no inheritance in their land;
neither shalt thou have any part amongst them; I am thy part and thine
inheritance amongst the children of Israel_. For God being then king,
and having constituted the tribe of Levi to be his public ministers, he
allowed them for their maintenance the public revenue, that is to say,
the part that God had reserved to himself; which were tithes and
offerings: and that is it which is meant, where God saith, _I am thine
inheritance_. And therefore to the Levites might not unfitly be
attributed the name of _clergy_, from κλῆρος, which signifieth lot or
inheritance; not that they were heirs of the kingdom of God, more than
other; but that God’s inheritance was their maintenance. Now, seeing in
this time God himself was their king, and Moses, Aaron, and the
succeeding high-priests, were his lieutenants; it is manifest, that the
right of tithes and offerings was constituted by the civil power.
After their rejection of God in the demanding of a king, they enjoyed
still the same revenue; but the right thereof was derived from that,
that the kings did never take it from them: for the public revenue was
at the disposing of him that was the public person; and that, till the
Captivity, was the king. And again, after the return from the Captivity,
they paid their tithes as before to the priest. Hitherto therefore
Church livings were determined by the civil sovereign.
[Sidenote: In our Saviour’s time, and after.]
Of the maintenance of our Saviour and his apostles, we read only they
had a purse, which was carried by Judas Iscariot; and that of the
apostles, such as were fishermen did sometimes use their trade; and that
when our Saviour sent the twelve apostles to preach, he forbad them
(_Matth._ x. 9, 10): _to carry gold, and silver, and brass in their
purses, for that the workman is worthy of his hire_. By which it is
probable, their ordinary maintenance was not unsuitable to their
employment; for their employment was (verse 8) _freely to give, because
they had freely received_; and their maintenance was the _free gift_ of
those that believed the good tiding they carried about of the coming of
the Messiah their Saviour. To which we may add, that which was
contributed out of gratitude by such as our Saviour had healed of
diseases; of which are mentioned (_Luke_ viii. 2, 3) _Certain women
which had been healed of evil spirits and infirmities; Mary Magdalen,
out of whom went seven devils; and Joanna the wife of Chuza, Herod’s
steward, and Susanna, and many others, which ministered unto him of
their substance_.
After our Saviour’s ascension, the Christians of every city lived in
common (_Acts_ iv. 34,35) upon the money which was made of the sale of
their lands and possessions, and laid down at the feet of the apostles,
of good will, not of duty; for, _whilst the land remained_, saith St.
Peter to Ananias (_Acts_ v. 4), _was it not thine? and after it was
sold, was it not in thy power?_ which sheweth he needed not have saved
his land nor his money by lying, as not being bound to contribute any
thing at all, unless he had pleased. And as in the time of the apostles,
so also all the time downward, till after Constantine the Great, we
shall find that the maintenance of the bishops and pastors of the
Christian Church was nothing but the voluntary contribution of them that
had embraced their doctrine. There was yet no mention of tithes: but
such was in the time of Constantine and his sons the affection of
Christians to their pastors, as Ammianus Marcellinus saith, describing
the sedition of Damasus and Ursicinus about the bishopric, that it was
worth their contention, in that the bishops of those times, by the
liberality of their flock, and especially of matrons, lived splendidly,
were carried in coaches, and were sumptuous in their fare and apparel.
[Sidenote: The ministers of the Gospel lived on the benevolence of their
flocks.]
But here may some ask, whether the pastors were then bound to live upon
voluntary contribution, as upon alms; _For who_, saith St. Paul (_1
Cor._ ix. 7) _goeth to war at his own charges? or who feedeth a flock,
and eateth not of the milk of the flock?_ And again, (verse 13) _Do ye
not know that they which minister about holy things, live of the things
of the temple; and they which wait at the altar, partake with the
altar_; that is to say, have part of that which is offered at the altar
for their maintenance? And then he concludeth, (verse 14) _Even so hath
the Lord appointed, that they which preach the gospel should live of the
gospel_. From which place may be inferred indeed, that the pastors of
the Church ought to be maintained by their flocks; but not that the
pastors were to determine, either the quantity, or the kind of their own
allowance, and be, as it were, their own carvers. Their allowance must
needs therefore be determined, either by the gratitude and liberality of
every particular man of their flock, or by the whole congregation. By
the whole congregation it could not be, because their acts were then no
laws; therefore the maintenance of pastors before emperors and civil
sovereigns had made laws to settle it, was nothing but benevolence. They
that served at the altar lived on what was offered. So may the pastors
also take what is offered them by their flock; but not exact what is not
offered. In what court should they sue for it, who had no tribunals? Or,
if they had arbitrators amongst themselves, who should execute their
judgments, when they had no power to arm their officers? It remaineth,
therefore, that there could be no certain maintenance assigned to any
pastors of the Church, but by the whole congregation; and then only,
when their decrees should have the force, not only of _canons_, but also
of _laws_; which laws could not be made, but by emperors, kings, or
other civil sovereigns. The right of tithes in Moses’ law, could not be
applied to the then ministers of the gospel; because Moses and the
high-priests were the civil sovereigns of the people under God, whose
kingdom amongst the Jews was present; whereas the kingdom of God by
Christ is yet to come.
Hitherto hath been shewn what the pastors of the Church are; what are
the points of their commission, as that they were to preach, to teach,
to baptize, to be presidents in their several congregations; what is
ecclesiastical censure, viz. excommunication, that is to say, in those
places where Christianity was forbidden by the civil laws, a putting of
themselves out of the company of the excommunicate, and where
Christianity was by the civil law commanded, a putting the excommunicate
out of the congregations of Christians; who elected the pastors and
ministers of the Church, that it was the congregation; who consecrated
and blessed them, that it was the pastor; what was their due revenue,
that it was none but their own possessions, and their own labour, and
the voluntary contributions of devout and grateful Christians. We are to
consider now, what office in the Church those persons have, who being
civil sovereigns, have embraced also the Christian faith.
[Sidenote: That the civil sovereign, being a Christian, hath the right
of appointing pastors.]
And first, we are to remember, that the right of judging what doctrines
are fit for peace, and to be taught the subjects, is in all
commonwealths inseparably annexed, as hath been already proved (chapter
XVIII.), to the sovereign power civil, whether it be in one man, or in
one assembly of men. For it is evident to the meanest capacity, that
men’s actions are derived from the opinions they have of the good or
evil, which from those actions redound unto themselves; and
consequently, men that are once possessed of an opinion, that their
obedience to the sovereign power will be more hurtful to them than their
disobedience, will disobey the laws, and thereby overthrow the
commonwealth, and introduce confusion and civil war; for the avoiding
whereof, all civil government was ordained. And therefore in all
commonwealths of the heathen, the sovereigns have had the name of
pastors of the people, because there was no subject that could lawfully
teach the people, but by their permission and authority.
This right of the heathen kings cannot be thought taken from them by
their conversion to the faith of Christ; who never ordained that kings,
for believing in him, should be deposed, that is, subjected to any but
himself, or, which is all one, be deprived of the power necessary for
the conservation of peace amongst their subjects, and for their defence
against foreign enemies. And therefore Christian kings are still the
supreme pastors of their people, and have power to ordain what pastors
they please, to teach the Church, that is, to teach the people committed
to their charge.
Again, let the right of choosing them be, as before the conversion of
kings, in the Church; for so it was in the time of the apostles
themselves, as hath been shown already in this chapter; even so also the
right will be in the civil sovereign, Christian. For in that he is a
Christian, he allows the teaching; and in that he is the sovereign,
which is as much as to say, the Church by representation, the teachers
he elects are elected by the Church. And when an assembly of Christians
choose their pastor in a Christian commonwealth, it is the sovereign
that electeth him, because it is done by his authority; in the same
manner, as when a town choose their mayor, it is the act of him that
hath the sovereign power: for every act done, is the act of him, without
whose consent it is invalid. And therefore whatsoever examples may be
drawn out of history, concerning the election of pastors by the people,
or by the clergy, they are no arguments against the right of any civil
sovereign, because they that elected them did it by his authority.
Seeing then in every Christian commonwealth, the civil sovereign is the
supreme pastor, to whose charge the whole flock of his subjects is
committed, and consequently that it is by his authority that all other
pastors are made, and have power to teach, and perform all other
pastoral offices; it followeth also, that it is from the civil sovereign
that all other pastors derive their right of teaching, preaching, and
other functions pertaining to that office, and that they are but his
ministers; in the same manner as the magistrates of towns, judges in
courts of justice, and commanders of armies, are all but ministers of
him that is the magistrate of the whole commonwealth, judge of all
causes, and commander of the whole militia, which is always the civil
sovereign. And the reason hereof, is not because they that teach, but
because they that are to learn, are his subjects. For let it be
supposed, that a Christian king commit the authority of ordaining
pastors in his dominions to another king, as divers Christian kings
allow that power to the Pope; he doth not thereby constitute a pastor
over himself, nor a sovereign pastor over his people; for that were to
deprive himself of the civil power; which, depending on the opinion men
have of their duty to him and the fear they have of punishment in
another world, would depend also on the skill and loyalty of doctors,
who are no less subject, not only to ambition, but also to ignorance,
than any other sort of men. So that where a stranger hath authority to
appoint teachers, it is given him by the sovereign in whose dominions he
teacheth. Christian doctors are our schoolmasters to Christianity; but
kings are fathers of families, and may receive schoolmasters for their
subjects from the recommendation of a stranger, but not from the
command; especially when the ill teaching them shall redound to the
great and manifest profit of him that recommends them: nor can they be
obliged to retain them, longer than it is for the public good; the care
of which they stand so long charged withal, as they retain any other
essential right of the sovereignty.
[Sidenote: The pastoral authority of sovereigns only is _jure divino_;
that of other pastors is _jure civili_.]
If a man therefore should ask a pastor, in the execution of his office,
as the chief-priests and elders of the people (_Matth._ xxi. 23) asked
our Saviour, _By what authority doest thou these things, and who gave
thee this authority?_ he can make no other just answer, but that he doth
it by the authority of the commonwealth, given him by the king, or
assembly that representeth it. All pastors, except the supreme, execute
their charges in the right, that is by the authority of the civil
sovereign, that is, _jure civili_. But the king, and every other
sovereign, executeth his office of supreme pastor by immediate authority
from God, that is to say, in _God’s right_ or _jure divino_. And
therefore none but kings can put into their titles a mark of their
submission to God only, _Dei gratiâ rex_, &c. Bishops ought to say in
the beginning of their mandates, _By the favour of the King’s Majesty,
bishop of such a diocese_; or as civil ministers, _in His Majesty’s
name_. For in saying, _Divinâ providentiâ_, which is the same with _Dei
gratiâ_, though disguised, they deny to have received their authority
from the civil state; and slily slip off the collar of their civil
subjection, contrary to the unity and defence of the commonwealth.
[Sidenote: Christian kings have power to execute all manner of pastoral
function.]
But if every Christian sovereign be the supreme pastor of his own
subjects, it seemeth that he hath also the authority, not only to
preach, which perhaps no man will deny, but also to baptize and to
administer the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper: and to consecrate both
temples and pastors to God’s service; which most men deny; partly
because they use not to do it, and partly because the administration of
sacraments, and consecration of persons and places to holy uses,
requireth the imposition of such men’s hands, as by the like imposition
successively from the time of the apostles have been ordained to the
like ministry. For proof therefore that Christian kings have power to
baptize, and to consecrate, I am to render a reason, both why they use
not to do it, and how, without the ordinary ceremony of imposition of
hands, they are made capable of doing it when they will.
There is no doubt but any king, in case he were skilful in the sciences,
might by the same right of his office read lectures of them himself, by
which he authorizeth others to read them in the universities.
Nevertheless, because the care of the sum of the business of the
commonwealth taketh up his whole time, it were not convenient for him to
apply himself in person to that particular. A king may also, if he
please, sit in judgment to hear and determine all manner of causes, as
well as give others authority to do it in his name; but that the charge,
that lieth upon him of command and government, constrain him to be
continually at the helm, and to commit the ministerial offices to others
under him. In the like manner our Saviour, who surely had power to
baptize, baptized none (_John_ iv. 2) himself, but sent his apostles and
disciples to baptize. So also St. Paul, by the necessity of preaching in
divers and far distant places, baptized few: amongst all the Corinthians
he baptized only (_1 Cor._ i. 14, 16,) Crispus, Gaius, and Stephanas;
and the reason was, (_1 Cor._ i. 17) because his principal charge was to
preach. Whereby it is manifest, that the greater charge, such as is the
government of the Church, is a dispensation for the less. The reason
therefore why Christian kings use not to baptize, is evident, and the
same for which at this day there are few baptized by bishops, and by the
Pope fewer.
And as concerning imposition of hands, whether it be needful for the
authorising of a king to baptize and consecrate, we may consider thus:
Imposition of hands, was a most ancient public ceremony amongst the
Jews, by which was designed, and made certain, the person, or other
thing intended in a man’s prayer, blessing, sacrifice, consecration,
condemnation, or other speech. So Jacob, in blessing the children of
Joseph (_Gen._ xlviii. 14), _Laid his right hand on Ephraim the younger,
and his left hand on Manasseh the first born_; and this he did
_wittingly_ (though they were so presented to him by Joseph, as he was
forced in doing it to stretch out his arms across) to design to whom he
intended the greater blessing. So also in the sacrificing of the burnt
offering, Aaron is commanded (_Exod._ xxix. 10) _to lay his hands on the
head of the bullock_: and (verse 15) _to lay his hand on the head of the
ram_. The same is also said again _Levit._ i. 4, and viii. 14. Likewise
Moses, when he ordained Joshua to be captain of the Israelites, that is,
consecrated him to God’s service, (_Numb._ xxvii. 23) _Laid his hands
upon him, and gave him his charge_, designing and rendering certain, who
it was they were to obey in war. And in the consecration of the Levites
(_Numb._ viii. 10), God commanded that _the children of Israel should
put their hands upon the Levites_. And in the condemnation of him that
had blasphemed the Lord (_Levit._ xxiv. 14), God commanded that _all
that heard him should lay their hands on his head, and that all the
congregation should stone him_. And why should they only that heard him,
lay their hands upon him, and not rather a priest, Levite, or other
minister of justice, but that none else were able to design and to
demonstrate to the eyes of the congregation, who it was that had
blasphemed and ought to die? And to design a man or any other thing, by
the hand to the eye, is less subject to mistake, than when it is done to
the ear by a name.
And so much was this ceremony observed, that in blessing the whole
congregation at once, which cannot be done by laying on of hands, yet
Aaron (_Levit._ ix. 22) _did lift up his hands toward the people when he
blessed them_. And we read also of the like ceremony of consecration of
temples amongst the heathen, as that the priest laid his hands on some
post of the temple, all the while he was uttering the words of
consecration. So natural it is to design any individual thing, rather by
the hand, to assure the eyes, than by words to inform the ear, in
matters of God’s public service.
This ceremony was not therefore new in our Saviour’s time. For Jairus
(_Mark_ v. 23), whose daughter was sick, besought our Saviour, not to
heal her, but _to lay his hands upon her that she might be healed_. And
(_Matthew_ xix. 13) _they brought unto him little children, that he
should put his hands on them, and pray_.
According to this ancient rite, the apostles, and presbyters, and the
presbytery itself, laid hands on them whom they ordained pastors, and
withal prayed for them that they might receive the Holy Ghost; and that
not only once, but sometimes oftener, when a new occasion was presented:
but the end was still the same, namely a punctual and religious
designation of the person, ordained either to the pastoral charge in
general, or to a particular mission. So (_Acts_ vi. 6) _The apostles
prayed, and laid their hands_ on the seven deacons; which was done, not
to give them the Holy Ghost, (for they were full of the Holy Ghost
before they were chosen, as appeareth immediately before, verse 3) but
to design them to that office. And after Philip the deacon had converted
certain persons in Samaria, Peter and John went down (_Acts_ viii. 17),
_and laid their hands on them, and they received the Holy Ghost_. And
not only an apostle, but a presbyter had this power: for St. Paul
adviseth Timothy (_1 Tim._ v. 22) _Lay hands suddenly on no man_; that
is, design no man rashly to the office of a pastor. The whole presbytery
laid their hands on Timothy, as we read _1 Tim._ iv. 14: but this is to
be understood, as that some did it by the appointment of the presbytery,
and most likely their προεστὼς, or prolocutor, which it may be was St.
Paul himself. For in his second Epistle to _Timothy_, (chap. i. 6) he
saith to him, _Stir up the gift of God, which is in thee by the laying
on of my hands_: where note by the way, that by the Holy Ghost, is not
meant the third person in the Trinity, but the gifts necessary to the
pastoral office. We read also, that St. Paul had imposition of hands
twice; once from Ananias at Damascus, (_Acts_ ix. 17, 18) at the time of
his baptism; and again (_Acts_ xiii. 3) at Antioch, when he was first
sent out to preach. The use then of this ceremony, considered in the
ordination of pastors, was to design the person to whom they gave such
power. But if there had been then any Christian, that had had the power
of teaching before; the baptizing of him, that is, the making him a
Christian, had given him no new power, but had only caused him to preach
true doctrine, that is, to use his power aright; and therefore the
imposition of hands had been unnecessary; baptism itself had been
sufficient. But every sovereign, before Christianity, had the power of
teaching, and ordaining teachers; and therefore Christianity gave them
no new right, but only directed them in the way of teaching truth; and
consequently they needed no imposition of hands, besides that which is
done in baptism, to authorize them to exercise any part of the pastoral
function, as namely, to baptize and consecrate. And in the Old
Testament, though the priest only had right to consecrate, during the
time that the sovereignty was in the high-priest; yet it was not so when
the sovereignty was in the king. For we read (_1 Kings_ viii.) that
Solomon blessed the people, consecrated the Temple, and pronounced that
public prayer which is the pattern now for consecration of all Christian
churches and chapels: whereby it appears, he had not only the right of
ecclesiastical government, but also of exercising ecclesiastical
functions.
[Sidenote: The civil sovereign, if a Christian, is head of the Church in
his own dominions.]
From this consolidation of the right politic and ecclesiastic in
Christian sovereigns, it is evident, they have all manner of power over
their subjects, that can be given to man, for the government of men’s
external actions, both in policy and religion; and may make such laws as
themselves shall judge fittest, for the government of their own
subjects, both as they are the commonwealth, and as they are the Church;
for both State and Church are the same men.
If they please, therefore, they may, as many Christian kings now do,
commit the government of their subjects in matters of religion to the
Pope; but then the Pope is in that point subordinate to them, and
exerciseth that charge in another’s dominion _jure civili_, in the right
of the civil sovereign; not _jure divino_, in God’s right; and may
therefore be discharged of that office, when the sovereign, for the good
of his subjects, shall think it necessary. They may also, if they
please, commit the care of religion to one supreme pastor, or to an
assembly of pastors; and give them what power over the Church, or one
over another, they think most convenient; and what titles of honour, as
of archbishops, bishops, priests, or presbyters, they will; and make
such laws for their maintenance, either by tithes or otherwise, as they
please, so they do it out of a sincere conscience, of which God only is
the judge. It is the civil sovereign that is to appoint judges and
interpreters of the canonical Scriptures; for it is he that maketh them
laws. It is he also that giveth strength to excommunications; which but
for such laws and punishments, as may humble obstinate libertines, and
reduce them to union with the rest of the Church, would be contemned. In
sum, he hath the supreme power in all causes, as well ecclesiastical as
civil, as far as concerneth actions and words, for those only are known
and may be accused; and of that which cannot be accused, there is no
judge at all but God, that knoweth the heart. And these rights are
incident to all sovereigns, whether monarchs or assemblies: for they
that are the representants of a Christian people, are representants of
the Church: for a Church, and a commonwealth of Christian people, are
the same thing.
[Sidenote: Cardinal Bellarmine’s books, _De Summo Pontifice_
considered.]
Though this that I have here said, and in other places of this book,
seem clear enough for the asserting of the supreme ecclesiastical power
to Christian sovereigns; yet because the Pope of Rome’s challenge to
that power universally, hath been maintained chiefly, and I think, as
strongly as is possible, by Cardinal Bellarmine, in his controversy _De
Summo Pontifice_; I have thought it necessary, as briefly as I can, to
examine the grounds and strength of his discourse.
[Sidenote: The first book.]
Of five books he hath written of this subject, the first containeth
three questions: one, which is simply the best government, _Monarchy_,
_Aristocracy_, or _Democracy_; and concludeth for neither, but for a
government mixed of all three: another, which of these is the best
government of the Church; and concludeth for the mixed, but which should
most participate of monarchy: the third, whether in this mixed monarchy,
St. Peter had the place of monarch. Concerning his first conclusion, I
have already sufficiently proved (chapter XVIII.) that all governments
which men are bound to obey, are simple and absolute. In monarchy there
is but one man supreme; and all other men that have any kind of power in
the state, have it by his commission, during his pleasure, and execute
it in his name: and in aristocracy and democracy, but one supreme
assembly, with the same power that in monarchy belongeth to the monarch,
which is not a mixed, but an absolute sovereignty. And of the three
sorts, which is the best, is not to be disputed, where any one of them
is already established; but the present ought always to be preferred,
maintained, and accounted best; because it is against both the law of
nature, and the divine positive law, to do anything tending to the
subversion thereof. Besides, it maketh nothing to the power of any
pastor, unless he have the civil sovereignty, what kind of government is
the best; because their calling is not to govern men by commandment, but
to teach them, and persuade them by arguments, and leave it to them to
consider whether they shall embrace, or reject the doctrine taught. For
monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, do mark out unto us three sorts of
sovereigns, not of pastors; or, as we may say, three sorts of masters of
families, not three sorts of schoolmasters for their children.
And therefore the second conclusion, concerning the best form of
government of the Church, is nothing to the question of the Pope’s power
without his own dominions. For in all other commonwealths his power, if
he have any at all, is that of the schoolmaster only, and not of the
master of the family.
For the third conclusion, which is, that St. Peter was monarch of the
Church, he bringeth for his chief argument the place of St. Matthew
(chap. xvi. 18, 19) _Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my
Church, &c. And I will give thee the keys of heaven; whatsoever thou
shalt bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt
loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven._ Which place, well
considered, proveth no more, but that the Church of Christ hath for
foundation one only article; namely, that which Peter in the name of all
the apostles professing, gave occasion to our Saviour to speak the words
here cited. Which that we may clearly understand, we are to consider,
that our Saviour preached by himself, by John the Baptist, and by his
apostles, nothing but this article of faith, _that he was the Christ_;
all other articles requiring faith no otherwise, than as founded on
that. John began first, (_Matth._ iii. 2) preaching only this, _the
kingdom of God is at hand_. Then our Saviour himself (_Matth._ iv. 17)
preached the same: and to his twelve apostles, when he gave them their
commission, (_Matth._ x. 7), there is no mention of preaching any other
article but that. This was the fundamental article, that is the
foundation of the Church’s faith. Afterwards the apostles being returned
to him, he (_Matth._ xvi. 13) asketh them all, not Peter only, _who men
said he was_; and they answered, that _some said he was John the
Baptist, some Elias, and others Jeremiah, or one of the Prophets_. Then
(verse 15) he asked them all again, not Peter only, _whom say ye that I
am?_ Therefore St. Peter answered for them all, _Thou art Christ, the
Son of the living God_; which I said is the foundation of the faith of
the whole Church; from which our Saviour takes the occasion of saying,
_upon this stone I will build my Church_: by which it is manifest, that
by the foundation-stone of the Church, was meant the fundamental article
of the Church’s faith. But why then, will some object, doth our Saviour
interpose these words, _thou art Peter_? If the original of this text
had been rigidly translated, the reason would easily have appeared. We
are therefore to consider, that the apostle Simon was surnamed _Stone_,
which is the signification of the Syriac word _Cephas_, and of the Greek
word Πετρος. Our Saviour therefore, after the confession of that
fundamental article, alluding to his name, said (as if it were in
English) thus, Thou art _Stone_, and upon this Stone I will build my
Church: which is as much as to say, this article, that _I am the
Christ_, is the foundation of all the faith I require in those that are
to be members of my Church. Neither is this allusion to a name, an
unusual thing in common speech. But it had been a strange and obscure
speech, if our Saviour, intending to build his Church on the person of
St. Peter, had said, _thou art a stone, and upon this stone I will build
my Church_; when it was so obvious, without ambiguity, to have said, _I
will build my Church on thee_; and yet there had been still the same
allusion to his name.
And for the following words, _I will give thee the keys of heaven, &c._
it is no more than what our Saviour gave also to all the rest of his
disciples, (_Matth._ xviii. 18), _Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth,
shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth, shall
be loosed in heaven_. But howsoever this be interpreted, there is no
doubt but the power here granted belongs to all supreme pastors; such as
are all Christian civil sovereigns in their own dominions. In so much,
as if St. Peter, or our Saviour himself, had converted any of them to
believe him, and to acknowledge his kingdom; yet, because his kingdom is
not of this world, he had left the supreme care of converting his
subjects to none but him; or else he must have deprived him of the
sovereignty, to which the right of teaching is inseparably annexed. And
thus much in refutation of his first book, wherein he would prove St.
Peter to have been the monarch universal of the Church, that is to say,
of all the Christians in the world.
[Sidenote: The second book.]
The second book hath two conclusions: one, that St. Peter was bishop of
Rome, and there died: the other, that the Popes of Rome are his
successors. Both which have been disputed by others. But supposing them
true; yet if by Bishop of Rome, be understood either the monarch of the
Church, or the supreme pastor of it; not Silvester, but Constantine, who
was the first Christian emperor, was that bishop; and as Constantine, so
all other Christian emperors, were of right supreme bishops of the Roman
empire: I say, of the Roman empire, not of all Christendom; for other
Christian sovereigns had the same right in their several territories, as
to an office essentially adherent to their sovereignty. Which shall
serve for answer to his second book.
[Sidenote: The third book.]
In the third book he handleth the question, whether the Pope be
Antichrist? For my part, I see no argument that proves he is so, in that
sense the Scripture useth the name: nor will I take any argument from
the quality of Antichrist, to contradict the authority he exerciseth, or
hath heretofore exercised, in the dominions of any other prince or
state.
It is evident that the prophets of the Old Testament foretold, and the
Jews expected a Messiah, that is, a Christ, that should re-establish
amongst them the kingdom of God, which had been rejected by them in the
time of Samuel, when they required a king after the manner of other
nations. This expectation of theirs made them obnoxious to the imposture
of all such, as had both the ambition to attempt the attaining of the
kingdom, and the art to deceive the people by counterfeit miracles, by
hypocritical life, or by orations and doctrine plausible. Our Saviour
therefore, and his apostles, forewarned men of false prophets and of
false Christs. False Christs are such as pretend to be the _Christ_, but
are not, and are called properly _Antichrists_; in such sense, as when
there happeneth a schism in the Church, by the election of two Popes,
the one calleth the other _Antipapa_, or the false Pope. And therefore
Antichrist in the proper signification hath two essential marks; one,
that he denieth Jesus to be Christ; and another that he professeth
himself to be Christ. The first mark is set down by St. John in his
first Epistle, iv. 3, _Every Spirit that confesseth not that Jesus
Christ is come in the flesh, is not of God; and this is the spirit of
Antichrist_. The other mark is expressed in the words of our Saviour,
(_Matth._ xxiv. 5) _many shall come in my name, saying, I am Christ_;
and again, (verse 23) _If any man shall say unto you, lo! here is
Christ, there is Christ, believe it not_. And therefore Antichrist must
be a false Christ; that is, some one of them that shall pretend
themselves to be Christ. And out of these two marks, _to deny Jesus to
be the Christ_, and _to affirm himself to be the Christ_, it followeth,
that he must also be an _adversary of Jesus the true Christ_, which is
another usual signification of the word Antichrist. But of these many
Antichrists, there is one special one, ὁ Αντίχριστος, _the Antichrist_,
or _Antichrist_ definitely, as one certain person; not indefinitely _an
Antichrist_. Now, seeing the Pope of Rome neither pretendeth himself,
nor denieth Jesus to be the Christ, I perceive not how he can be called
Antichrist; by which word is not meant, one that falsely pretendeth to
be _his lieutenant_ or _vicar-general_, but to be _He_. There is also
some mark of the time of this special Antichrist, as (_Matth._ xxiv.
15), when that abominable destroyer, spoken of by Daniel (_Dan._ ix. 27)
shall stand in the Holy place, and such tribulation as was not since the
beginning of the world, nor ever shall be again, insomuch as if it were
to last long, (_Matth._ xxiv. 22) _no flesh could be saved; but for the
elect’s sake those days shall be shortened_, made fewer. But that
tribulation is not yet come; for it is to be followed immediately (verse
29) by a darkening of the sun and moon, a falling of the stars, a
concussion of the heavens, and the glorious coming again of our Saviour
in the clouds. And therefore _the Antichrist_ is not yet come; whereas,
many Popes are both come and gone. It is true, the Pope, in taking upon
him to give laws to all Christian kings and nations, usurpeth a kingdom
in this world, which Christ took not on him: but he doth it not _as
Christ_, but as _for Christ_, wherein there is nothing of _the
Antichrist_.
[Sidenote: Fourth book.]
In the fourth book, to prove the Pope to be the supreme judge in all
questions of faith and manners, _which is as much as to be the absolute
monarch of all Christians in the world_, he bringeth three propositions:
the first, that his judgments are infallible: the second, that he can
make very laws, and punish those that observe them not: the third, that
our Saviour conferred all jurisdiction ecclesiastical on the Pope of
Rome.
[Sidenote: Texts for the infallibility of the Pope’s judgment in points
of faith.]
For the infallibility of his judgments, he allegeth the Scriptures: and
first, that of Luke, xxii. 31, 32: _Simon, Simon, Satan hath desired
you, that he may sift you as wheat; but I have prayed for thee, that thy
faith fail not; and when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren_.
This, according to Bellarmine’s exposition, is, that Christ gave here to
Simon Peter two privileges: one, that neither his faith should fail, nor
the faith of any of his successors: the other, that neither he, nor any
of his successors, should ever define any point concerning faith or
manners erroneously, or contrary to the definition of a former Pope:
which is a strange, and very much strained interpretation. But he that
with attention readeth that chapter, shall find there is no place in the
whole Scripture that maketh more against the Pope’s authority, than this
very place. The Priests and Scribes seeking to kill our Saviour at the
Passover, and Judas possessed with a resolution to betray him, and the
day of killing the Passover being come, our Saviour celebrated the same
with his apostles, which he said, till the kingdom of God was come he
would do no more; and withal told them, that one of them was to betray
him. Hereupon they questioned which of them it should be; and withal,
seeing the next Passover their master would celebrate should be when he
was king, entered into a contention, who should then be the greatest
man. Our Saviour therefore told them, that the kings of the nations had
dominion over their subjects, and are called by a name in Hebrew, that
signifies bountiful; but I cannot be so to you, you must endeavour to
serve one another; I ordain you a kingdom, but it is such as my Father
hath ordained me; a kingdom that I am now to purchase with my blood, and
not to possess till my second coming; then ye shall eat and drink at my
table, and sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel. And then
addressing himself to St. Peter, he saith; Simon, Simon, Satan seeks, by
suggesting a present domination, to weaken your faith of the future; but
I have prayed for thee, that thy faith shall not fail; thou therefore
note this, being converted, and understanding my kingdom as of another
world, confirm the same faith in thy brethren. To which St. Peter
answered, as one that no more expected any authority in this world,
_Lord, I am ready to go with thee, not only to prison, but to death_.
Whereby it is manifest, St. Peter had not only no jurisdiction given him
in this world, but a charge to teach all the other apostles, that they
also should have none. And for the infallibility of St. Peter’s sentence
definitive in matter of faith, there is no more to be attributed to it
out of this text, than that Peter should continue in the belief of this
point, namely, that Christ should come again and possess the kingdom at
the day of judgment; which was not given by this text to all his
successors; for we see they claim it in the world that now is.
The second place is that of Matth. xvi. 18, _Thou art Peter, and upon
this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not
prevail against it_. By which, as I have already shown in this chapter,
is proved no more, than that the gates of hell shall not prevail against
the confession of Peter, which gave occasion to that speech; namely
this, that _Jesus is Christ the Son of God_.
The third text is John xxi. 16, 17: _Feed my sheep_; which contains no
more but a commission of teaching. And if we grant the rest of the
apostles to be contained in that name of _sheep_; then it is the supreme
power of teaching: but it was only for the time that there were no
Christian sovereigns already possessed of that supremacy. But I have
already proved, that Christian sovereigns are in their own dominions the
supreme pastors, and instituted thereto, by virtue of their being
baptized, though without other imposition of hands. For such imposition,
being a ceremony of designing the person, is needless, when he is
already designed to the power of teaching what doctrine he will, by his
institution to an absolute power over his subjects. For as I have proved
before, sovereigns are supreme teachers, in general, by their office;
and therefore oblige themselves, by their baptism, to teach the doctrine
of Christ: and when they suffer others to teach their people, they do it
at the peril of their own souls; for it is at the hands of the heads of
families that God will require the account of the instruction of his
children and servants. It is of Abraham himself, not of a hireling, that
God saith (_Gen._ xviii. 19) _I know him that he will command his
children, and his household after him, that they keep the way of the
Lord, and do justice and judgment_.
The fourth place is that of _Exod._ xxviii. 30: _Thou shalt put in the
breast-plate of judgment, the Urim and the Thummim_: which he saith is
interpreted by the Septuagint δήλωσιν κὰι ἀλήθειαν; that is, _evidence_
and _truth_: and thence concludeth, God hath given evidence and truth,
which is almost infallibility, to the high-priest. But be it evidence
and truth itself that was given; or be it but admonition to the priest
to endeavour to inform himself clearly, and give judgment uprightly; yet
in that it was given to the high-priest, it was given to the civil
sovereign; (for such next under God was the high-priest in the
commonwealth of Israel); and is an argument for evidence and truth, that
is, for the ecclesiastical supremacy of civil sovereigns over their own
subjects, against the pretended power of the Pope. These are all the
texts he bringeth for the infallibility of the judgment of the Pope in
point of faith.
[Sidenote: Texts for the same, in point of manners.]
For the infallibility of his judgment concerning manners, he bringeth
one text, which is that of John xvi. 13: _When the Spirit of truth is
come, he will lead you into all truth_: where, saith he, by _all truth_,
is meant, at least _all truth necessary to salvation_. But with this
mitigation, he attributeth no more infallibility to the Pope, than to
any man that professeth Christianity and is not to be damned. For if any
man err in any point, wherein not to err is necessary to salvation, it
is impossible he should be saved; for that only is necessary to
salvation, without which to be saved is impossible. What points these
are, I shall declare out of the Scripture in the chapter following. In
this place I say no more, but that though it were granted, the Pope
could not possibly teach any error at all, yet doth not this entitle him
to any jurisdiction in the dominions of another prince; unless we shall
also say, a man is obliged in conscience to set on work upon all
occasions the best workman, even then also when he hath formerly
promised his work to another.
Besides the text, he argueth from reason, thus. If the Pope could err in
necessaries, then Christ hath not sufficiently provided for the Church’s
salvation; because he hath commanded her to follow the Pope’s
directions. But this reason is invalid, unless he shew when and where
Christ commanded that, or took at all any notice of a Pope. Nay,
granting whatsoever was given to St. Peter, was given to the Pope; yet
seeing there is in the Scripture no command to any man to obey St.
Peter, no man can be just, that obeyeth him, when his commands are
contrary to those of his lawful sovereign.
Lastly, it hath not been declared by the Church, nor by the Pope
himself, that he is the civil sovereign of all the Christians in the
world; and therefore all Christians are not bound to acknowledge his
jurisdiction in point of manners. For the civil sovereignty, and supreme
judicature in controversies of manners, are the same thing: and the
makers of civil laws, are not only declarers, but also makers of the
justice and injustice of actions; there being nothing in men’s manners
that makes them righteous or unrighteous, but their conformity with the
law of the sovereign. And therefore, when the Pope challengeth supremacy
in controversies of manners, he teacheth men to disobey the civil
sovereign; which is an erroneous doctrine, contrary to the many precepts
of our Saviour and his apostles, delivered to us in the Scripture.
To prove the Pope has power to make laws, he allegeth many places; as
first, (_Deut._ xvii. 12), _The man that will do presumptuously, and
will not hearken unto the priest, that standeth to minister there before
the Lord thy God, or unto the judge, even that man shall die; and thou
shalt put away the evil from Israel_. For answer whereunto, we are to
remember that the high-priest, next and immediately under God, was the
civil sovereign; and all judges were to be constituted by him. The words
alleged sound therefore thus: _The man that will presume to disobey the
civil sovereign for the time being, or any of his officers in the
execution of their places, that man shall die, &c._; which is clearly
for the civil sovereignty, against the universal power of the Pope.
Secondly, he allegeth that of Matth. xvi. 19, _Whatsoever ye shall bind,
&c._ and interpreteth it for such _binding_ as is attributed (_Matth._
xxiii. 4) to the Scribes and Pharisees, _They bind heavy burthens, and
grievous to be borne, and lay them on men’s shoulders_; by which is
meant, he says, making of laws; and concludes thence, that the Pope can
make laws. But this also maketh only for the legislative power of civil
sovereigns. For the Scribes and Pharisees sat in Moses’ chair; but Moses
next under God was sovereign of the people of Israel: and therefore our
Saviour commanded them to do all that they should say, but not all that
they should do: that is, to obey their laws, but not follow their
example.
The third place is John xxi. 16, _Feed my sheep_; which is not a power
to make laws, but a command to teach. Making laws belongs to the lord of
the family; who by his own discretion chooseth his chaplain, as also a
schoolmaster to teach his children.
The fourth place (_John_ xx. 21) is against him. The words are, _As my
father sent me, so send I you_. But our Saviour was sent to redeem by
his death such as should believe, and by his own and his apostles’
preaching to prepare them for their entrance into his kingdom; which he
himself saith, is not of this world, and hath taught us to pray for the
coming of it hereafter, though he refused (_Acts_ i. 6, 7) to tell his
apostles when it should come; and in which, when it comes, the twelve
apostles shall sit on twelve thrones, every one perhaps as high as that
of St. Peter, to judge the twelve tribes of Israel. Seeing then God the
Father sent not our Saviour to make laws in this present world, we may
conclude from the text, that neither did our Saviour send St. Peter to
make laws here, but to persuade men to expect his second coming with a
steadfast faith; and in the mean time, if subjects, to obey their
princes; and if princes, both to believe it themselves, and to do their
best to make their subjects do the same; which is the office of a
bishop. Therefore this place maketh most strongly for the joining of the
ecclesiastical supremacy to the civil sovereignty, contrary to that
which Cardinal Bellarmine allegeth it for.
The fifth place is _Acts_ xv. 28, 29, _It hath seemed good to the Holy
Spirit and to us, to lay upon you no greater burthen, than these
necessary things, that ye abstain from meats offered to idols, and from
blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication_. Here he notes
the word _laying of burthens_ for the legislative power. But who is
there, that reading this text, can say, this style of the apostles may
not as properly be used in giving counsel, as in making laws? The style
of a law is, _we command_: but, _we think good_, is the ordinary style
of them, that but give advice; and they lay a burthen that give advice,
though it be conditional, that is, if they to whom they give it, will
attain their ends: and such is the burthen of abstaining from things
strangled, and from blood; not absolute, but in case they will not err.
I have shown before, (chapter XXV.) that law is distinguished from
counsel in this, that the reason of a law is taken from the design and
benefit of him that prescribeth it; but the reason of a counsel, from
the design and benefit of him to whom the counsel is given. But here,
the apostles aim only at the benefit of the converted Gentiles, namely
their salvation; not at their own benefit; for having done their
endeavour, they shall have their reward, whether they be obeyed or not.
And therefore the acts of this council, were not laws, but counsels.
The sixth place is that of _Rom._ xiii, _Let every soul be subject to
the higher powers, for there is no power but of God_; which is meant, he
saith, not only of secular, but also of ecclesiastical princes. To which
I answer, first, that there are no ecclesiastical princes but those that
are also civil sovereigns; and their principalities exceed not the
compass of their civil sovereignty; without those bounds, though they
may be received for doctors, they cannot be acknowledged for princes.
For if the apostle had meant, we should be subject both to our own
princes, and also to the Pope, he had taught us a doctrine, which Christ
himself hath told us is impossible, namely, _to serve two masters_. And
though the apostle say in another place, (_2 Cor._ xiii. 10) _I write
these things being absent, lest being present I should use sharpness,
according to the power which the Lord hath given me_; it is not, that he
challenged a power either to put to death, imprison, banish, whip, or
fine any of them, which are punishments; but only to excommunicate,
which, without the civil power, is no more but a leaving of their
company, and having no more to do with them than with a heathen man or a
publican; which in many occasions might be a greater pain to the
excommunicant, than to the excommunicate.
The seventh place is _1 Cor._ iv. 21, _Shall I come unto you with a rod,
or in love, and the spirit of lenity?_ But here again, it is not the
power of a magistrate to punish offenders, that is meant by a rod; but
only the power of excommunication, which is not in its own nature a
punishment, but only a denouncing of punishment, that Christ shall
inflict when he shall be in possession of his kingdom, at the day of
judgment. Nor then also shall it be properly a punishment, as upon a
subject that hath broken the law; but a revenge, as upon an enemy or
revolter, that denieth the right of our Saviour to the kingdom. And
therefore this proveth not the legislative power of any bishop, that has
not also the civil power.
The eighth place is _1 Timothy_, iii. 2; _A bishop must be the husband
of but one wife, vigilant, sober, &c._: which he saith was a law. I
thought that none could make a law in the Church, but the monarch of the
Church, St. Peter. But suppose this precept made by the authority of St.
Peter; yet I see no reason why to call it a law, rather than an advice,
seeing Timothy was not a subject, but a disciple of St. Paul; nor the
flock under the charge of Timothy, his subjects in the kingdom, but his
scholars in the school of Christ. If all the precepts he giveth Timothy
be laws, why is not this also a law, (_1 Tim._ v. 23) _Drink no longer
water, but use a little wine for thy health’s sake_. And why are not
also the precepts of good physicians so many laws, but that it is not
the imperative manner of speaking, but an absolute subjection to a
person, that maketh his precepts laws?
In like manner, the ninth place, _1 Tim._ v. 19, _Against an elder
receive not an accusation, but before two or three witnesses_, is a wise
precept, but not a law.
The tenth place is _Luke_ x. 16, _He that heareth you, heareth me; and
he that despiseth you, despiseth me_. And there is no doubt, but he that
despiseth the counsel of those that are sent by Christ, despiseth the
counsel of Christ himself. But who are those now that are sent by
Christ, but such as are ordained pastors by lawful authority? And who
are lawfully ordained, that are not ordained by the sovereign pastor?
And who is ordained by the sovereign pastor in a Christian commonwealth,
that is not ordained by the authority of the sovereign thereof? Out of
this place therefore it followeth, that he which heareth his sovereign,
being a Christian, heareth Christ; and he that despiseth the doctrine
which his king, being a Christian, authorizeth, despiseth the doctrine
of Christ: which is not that which Bellarmine intendeth here to prove,
but the contrary. But all this is nothing to a law. Nay more, a
Christian king, as a pastor and teacher of his subjects, makes not
thereby his doctrines laws. He cannot oblige men to believe; though as a
civil sovereign he may make laws suitable to his doctrine, which may
oblige men to certain actions, and sometimes to such as they would not
otherwise do, and which he ought not to command; and yet when they are
commanded, they are laws; and the external actions done in obedience to
them, without the inward approbation, are the actions of the sovereign,
and not of the subject, which is in that case but as an instrument,
without any motion of his own at all; because God hath commanded to obey
them.
The eleventh is every place where the apostle for counsel putteth some
word, by which men use to signify command; or calleth the following of
his counsel by the name of obedience. And therefore they are alleged out
of _1 Cor._ xi. 2, _I commend you for keeping my precepts as I delivered
them to you_. The Greek is, _I commend you for keeping those things I
delivered to you, as I delivered them_. Which is far from signifying
that they were laws, or anything else, but good counsel. And that of _1
Thess._ iv. 2, _You know what commandments we gave you_: where the Greek
word is παραγγελίας ἐδώκαμεν, equivalent to παρεδώκαμεν, _what we
delivered to you_, as in the place next before alleged, which does not
prove the traditions of the apostles to be any more than counsels;
though as is said in the 8th verse, _he that despiseth them, despiseth
not man, but God_. For our Saviour himself came not to judge, that is,
to be king in this world; but to sacrifice himself for sinners, and
leave doctors in his Church to lead, not to drive men to Christ, who
never accepteth forced actions, (which is all the law produceth,) but
the inward conversion of the heart; which is not the work of laws, but
of counsel and doctrine.
And that of _2 Thess._ iii. 14, _If any man obey not our word by this
Epistle, note that man, and have no company with him, that he may be
ashamed_: where from the word _obey_, he would infer, that this epistle
was a law to the Thessalonians. The epistles of the emperors were indeed
laws. If therefore the epistle of St. Paul were also a law, they were to
obey two masters. But the word _obey_, as it is in the Greek ὑπακούει,
signifieth _hearkening to_ or _putting in practice_, not only that which
is commanded by him that has right to punish, but also that which is
delivered in a way of counsel for our good; and therefore St. Paul does
not bid kill him that disobeys; nor beat, nor imprison, nor amerce him,
which legislators may all do; but avoid his company, that he may be
ashamed: whereby it is evident, it was not the empire of an apostle, but
his reputation amongst the faithful, which the Christians stood in awe
of.
The last place is that of _Heb._ xiii. 17, _Obey your leaders, and
submit yourselves to them; for they watch for your souls, as they that
must give account_: and here also is intended by obedience, a following
of their counsel. For the reason of our obedience is not drawn from the
will and command of our pastors, but from our own benefit, as being the
salvation of our souls they watch for, and not for the exaltation of
their own power and authority. If it were meant here, that all they
teach were laws, then not only the Pope, but every pastor in his parish
should have legislative power. Again, they that are bound to obey their
pastors, have no power to examine their commands. What then shall we say
to St. John, who bids us (_1 Epistle_ iv. 1) _Not to believe every
spirit, but to try the spirits whether they are of God; because many
false prophets are gone out into the world_? It is therefore manifest,
that we may dispute the doctrine of our pastors; but no man can dispute
a law. The commands of civil sovereigns are on all sides granted to be
laws: if any else can make a law besides himself, all commonwealth, and
consequently all peace and justice must cease; which is contrary to all
laws both divine and human. Nothing therefore can be drawn from these,
or any other places of Scripture, to prove the decrees of the Pope,
where he has not also the civil sovereignty, to be laws.
[Sidenote: The question of superiority between the Pope and other
bishops.]
The last point he would prove, is this, _That our Saviour Christ has
committed ecclesiastical jurisdiction immediately to none but the Pope_.
Wherein he handleth not the question of supremacy between the Pope and
Christian kings, but between the Pope and other bishops. And first, he
says, it is agreed that the jurisdiction of bishops is at least in the
general _de jure divino_, that is, in the right of God; for which he
alleges St. Paul, _Eph._ iv. 11, where he says, that Christ after his
ascension into heaven, _gave gifts to men, some apostles, some prophets,
and some evangelists, and some pastors, and some teachers_; and thence
infers, they have indeed their jurisdiction in God’s right; but will not
grant they have it immediately from God, but derived through the Pope.
But if a man may be said to have his jurisdiction _de jure divino_, and
yet not immediately; what lawful jurisdiction, though but civil, is
there in a Christian commonwealth, that is not also _de juro divino_?
For Christian kings have their civil power from God immediately; and the
magistrates under him exercise their several charges in virtue of his
commission; wherein that which they do, is no less _de jure divino
mediato_, than that which the bishops do in virtue of the Pope’s
ordination. All lawful power is of God, immediately in the Supreme
Governor, and mediately in those that have authority under him: so that
either he must grant every constable in the state, to hold his office in
the right of God; or he must not hold that any bishop holds his so,
besides the Pope himself.
But this whole dispute, whether Christ left the jurisdiction to the Pope
only, or to other bishops also, if considered out of those places where
the Pope has the civil sovereignty, is a contention _de lana caprina_:
for none of them, where they are not sovereigns, has any jurisdiction at
all. For jurisdiction is the power of hearing and determining causes
between man and man; and can belong to none but him that hath the power
to prescribe the rules of right and wrong; that is, to make laws; and
with the sword of justice to compel men to obey his decisions,
pronounced either by himself, or by the judges he ordaineth thereunto;
which none can lawfully do but the civil sovereign.
Therefore when he allegeth out of chapter vi. of _Luke_, that our
Saviour called his disciples together, and chose twelve of them, which
he named apostles, he proveth that he elected them (all, except
Matthias, Paul and Barnabas,) and gave them power and command to preach,
but not to judge of causes between man and man: for that is a power
which he refused to take upon himself, saying, _Who made me a judge, or
a divider, amongst you?_ and in another place, _My kingdom is not of
this world_. But he that hath not the power to hear and determine causes
between man and man, cannot be said to have any jurisdiction at all. And
yet this hinders not, but that our Saviour gave them power to preach and
baptize in all parts of the world, supposing they were not by their own
lawful sovereign forbidden: for to our own sovereigns Christ himself,
and his apostles, have in sundry places expressly commanded us in all
things to be obedient.
The arguments by which he would prove, that bishops receive their
jurisdiction from the Pope (seeing the Pope in the dominions of other
princes hath no jurisdiction himself,) are all in vain. Yet because they
prove, on the contrary, that all bishops receive jurisdiction, when they
have it, from their civil sovereigns, I will not omit the recital of
them.
The first is from chapter xi. of _Numbers_, where Moses not being able
alone to undergo the whole burthen of administering the affairs of the
people of Israel, God commanded him to choose seventy elders, and took
part of the spirit of Moses, to put it upon those seventy elders: by
which is understood, not that God weakened the spirit of Moses; for that
had not eased him at all; but that they had all of them their authority
from him; wherein he doth truly and ingenuously interpret that place.
But seeing Moses had the entire sovereignty in the commonwealth of the
Jews, it is manifest, that it is thereby signified, that they had their
authority from the civil sovereign: and therefore that place proveth
that bishops in every Christian commonwealth have their authority from
the civil sovereign; and from the Pope in his own territories only, and
not in the territories of any other state.
The second argument, is from the nature of monarchy; wherein all
authority is in one man, and in others by derivation from him. But the
government of the Church, he says, is monarchical. This also makes for
Christian monarchs. For they are really monarchs of their own people;
that is, of their own Church; for the Church is the same thing with a
Christian people; whereas the power of the Pope, though he were St.
Peter, is neither monarchy, nor hath anything of _archical_, nor
_cratical_, but only of _didactical_; for God accepteth not a forced,
but a willing obedience.
The third, is from that the _see_ of St. Peter is called by St. Cyprian,
the _head_, the _source_, the _root_, the _sun_, from whence the
authority of bishops is derived. But by the law of nature, which is a
better principle of right and wrong than the word of any doctor that is
but a man, the civil sovereign in every commonwealth, is the _head_, the
_source_, the _root_, and the _sun_, from which all jurisdiction is
derived. And therefore the jurisdiction of bishops, is derived from the
civil sovereign.
The fourth, is taken from the inequality of their jurisdictions. For if
God, saith he, had given it them immediately, he had given as well
equality of jurisdiction, as of order: but we see, some are bishops but
of one town, some of a hundred towns, and some of many whole provinces;
which differences were not determined by the command of God; their
jurisdiction therefore is not of God, but of man; and one has a greater,
another a less, as it pleaseth the Prince of the Church. Which argument,
if he had proved before, that the Pope had an universal jurisdiction
over all Christians, had been for his purpose. But seeing that hath not
been proved, and that it is notoriously known, the large jurisdiction of
the Pope was given him by those that had it, that is, by the emperors of
Rome, (for the patriarch of Constantinople, upon the same title, namely
of being bishop of the capital city of the empire, and seat of the
emperor, claimed to be equal to him), it followeth, that all other
bishops have their jurisdiction from the sovereigns of the place wherein
they exercise the same. And as for that cause they have not their
authority _de jure divino_; so neither hath the Pope his _de jure
divino_, except only where he is also the civil sovereign.
His fifth argument is this: _if bishops have their jurisdiction
immediately from God, the Pope could not take it from them, for he can
do nothing contrary to God’s ordination_; and this consequence is good,
and well proved. _But_, saith he, _the Pope can do this, and has done
it_. This also is granted, so he do it in his own dominions, or in the
dominions of any other prince that hath given him that power; but not
universally, in right of the popedom: for that power belongeth to every
Christian sovereign, within the bounds of his own empire, and is
inseparable from the sovereignty. Before the people of Israel had, by
the commandment of God to Samuel, set over themselves a king, after the
manner of other nations, the high-priest had the civil government; and
none but he could make or depose an inferior priest. But that power was
afterwards in the king, as may be proved by this same argument of
Bellarmine; for if the priest, be he the high-priest or any other, had
his jurisdiction immediately from God, then the king could not take it
from him; _for he could do nothing contrary to God’s ordinance_. But it
is certain that king Solomon (_1 Kings_ ii. 26, 27) deprived Abiathar
the high-priest of his office, and placed Zadok (verse 35) in his room.
Kings therefore may in like manner ordain and deprive bishops, as they
shall think fit for the well-governing of their subjects.
His sixth argument is this, if bishops have their jurisdiction _de jure
divino_, that is, _immediately from God_, they that maintain it, should
bring some word of God to prove it: but they can bring none. The
argument is good; I have therefore nothing to say against it. But it is
an argument no less good, to prove the Pope himself to have no
jurisdiction in the dominion of any other prince.
Lastly, he bringeth for argument the testimony of two popes, Innocent
and Leo; and I doubt not he might have alleged, with as good reason, the
testimonies of all the popes almost since St. Peter. For considering the
love of power naturally implanted in mankind, whosoever were made Pope,
he would be tempted to uphold the same opinion. Nevertheless, they
should therein but do, as Innocent and Leo did, bear witness of
themselves, and therefore their witness should not be good.
[Sidenote: Of the Pope’s temporal power.]
In the fifth book he hath four conclusions. The first is, _that the Pope
is not lord of all the world_: the second, _that the Pope is not the
lord of all the Christian world_: the third, _that the Pope, without his
own territory, has not any temporal jurisdiction_ DIRECTLY. These three
conclusions are easily granted. The fourth is, _that the Pope has, in
the dominions of other princes, the supreme temporal power_ INDIRECTLY:
which is denied; unless he mean by _indirectly_, that he has gotten it
by indirect means, then is that also granted. But I understand, that
when he saith he hath it _indirectly_, he means, that such temporal
jurisdiction belongeth to him of right, but that this right is but a
consequence of his pastoral authority, the which he could not exercise
unless he have the other with it: and therefore to the pastoral power,
which he calls spiritual, the supreme power civil is necessarily
annexed; and that thereby he hath a right to change kingdoms, giving
them to one and taking them from another, when he shall think it
conduces to the salvation of souls.
Before I come to consider the arguments by which he would prove this
doctrine, it will not be amiss to lay open the consequences of it; that
princes and states, that have the civil sovereignty in their several
commonwealths, may bethink themselves, whether it be convenient for
them, and conducing to the good of their subjects, of whom they are to
give an account at the day of judgment, to admit the same.
When it is said, the Pope hath not, in the territories of other states,
the supreme civil power _directly_; we are to understand, he doth not
challenge it, as other civil sovereigns do, from the original submission
thereto of those that are to be governed. For it is evident, and has
already been sufficiently in this treatise demonstrated, that the right
of all sovereigns is derived originally from the consent of every one of
those that are to be governed; whether they that choose him, do it for
their common defence against an enemy, as when they agree amongst
themselves to appoint a man or an assembly of men to protect them; or
whether they do it, to save their lives, by submission to a conquering
enemy. The Pope therefore, when he disclaimeth the supreme civil power
over other states _directly_, denieth no more, but that his right cometh
to him by that way; he ceaseth not for all that, to claim it another
way; and that is, without the consent of them that are to be governed,
by a right given him by God, which he calleth _indirectly_, in his
assumption to the papacy. But by what way soever he pretend, the power
is the same; and he may, if it be granted to be his right, depose
princes and states, as often as it is for the salvation of souls, that
is, as often as he will; for he claimeth also the sole power to judge
whether it be to the salvation of men’s souls or not. And this is the
doctrine, not only that Bellarmine here, and many other doctors, teach
in their sermons and books, but also that some councils have decreed,
and the Popes have accordingly, when the occasion hath served them, put
in practice. For the fourth council of Lateran, held under Pope Innocent
the Third, in the third chapter _De Hæreticis_, hath this canon: _If a
king, at the Pope’s admonition, do not purge his kingdom of heretics,
and being excommunicate for the same, make not satisfaction within a
year, his subjects are absolved of their obedience_. And the practice
hereof hath been seen on divers occasions; as in the deposing of
Chilperic, king of France; in the translation of the Roman empire to
Charlemagne; in the oppression of John, king of England; in transferring
the kingdom of Navarre; and of late years, in the league against Henry
the Third of France, and in many more occurrences. I think there be few
princes that consider not this as unjust, and inconvenient; but I wish
they would all resolve to be kings or subjects. Men cannot serve two
masters. They ought therefore to ease them, either by holding the reins
of government wholly in their own hands; or by wholly delivering them
into the hands of the Pope; that such men as are willing to be obedient,
may be protected in their obedience. For this distinction of temporal
and spiritual power is but words. Power is as really divided, and as
dangerously to all purposes, by sharing with another _indirect_ power,
as with a _direct_ one. But to come now to his arguments.
The first is this, _The civil power is subject to the spiritual:
therefore he that hath the supreme power spiritual, hath right to
command temporal princes, and dispose of their temporals in order to the
spiritual_. As for the distinction of temporal and spiritual, let us
consider in what sense it may be said intelligibly, that the temporal or
civil power is subject to the spiritual. There be but two ways that
those words can be made sense. For when we say, one power is subject to
another power, the meaning either is, that he which hath the one, is
subject to him that hath the other; or that the one power is to the
other, as the means to the end. For we cannot understand, that one power
hath power over another power; or that one power can have right or
command over another. For subjection, command, right, and power, are
accidents, not of powers, but of persons. One power may be subordinate
to another, as the art of a saddler to the art of a rider. If then it be
granted, that the civil government be ordained as a means to bring us to
a spiritual felicity; yet it does not follow, that if a king have the
civil power, and the Pope the spiritual, that therefore the king is
bound to obey the Pope, more than every saddler is bound to obey every
rider. Therefore as from subordination of an art, cannot be inferred the
subjection of the professor; so from the subordination of a government,
cannot be inferred the subjection of the governor. When therefore he
saith, the civil power is subject to the spiritual, his meaning is, that
the civil sovereign is subject to the spiritual sovereign. And the
argument stands thus, _The civil sovereign is subject to the spiritual;
therefore the spiritual prince may command temporal princes_. Where the
conclusion is the same with the antecedent he should have proved. But to
prove it, he allegeth first, this reason: _Kings and popes, clergy and
laity, make but one commonwealth; that is to say, but one Church: and in
all bodies the members depend one upon another: but things spiritual
depend not of things temporal: therefore temporal depend on spiritual,
and therefore are subject to them_. In which argumentation there be two
gross errors: one is, that all Christian kings, popes, clergy, and all
other Christian men, make but one commonwealth. For it is evident that
France is one commonwealth, Spain another, and Venice a third, &c. And
these consist of Christians; and therefore also are several bodies of
Christians; that is to say, several Churches: and their several
sovereigns represent them, whereby they are capable of commanding and
obeying, of doing and suffering, as a natural man; which no general or
universal Church is, till it have a representant; which it hath not on
earth: for if it had, there is no doubt but that all Christendom were
one commonwealth, whose sovereign were that representant, both in things
spiritual and temporal. And the Pope, to make himself this representant,
wanteth three things that our Saviour hath not given him, to _command_,
and to _judge_, and to _punish_, otherwise than, by excommunication, to
run from those that will not learn of him. For though the Pope were
Christ’s only vicar, yet he cannot exercise his government, till our
Saviour’s second coming: and then also it is not the Pope, but St. Peter
himself with the other apostles, that are to be judges of the world.
The other error in this his first argument is, that he says, the members
of every commonwealth, as of a natural body, depend one of another. It
is true, they cohere together; but they depend only on the sovereign,
which is the soul of the commonwealth; which failing, the commonwealth
is dissolved into a civil war, no one man so much as cohering to
another, for want of a common dependance on a known sovereign; just as
the members of the natural body dissolve into earth, for want of a soul
to hold them together. Therefore there is nothing in this similitude,
from whence to infer a dependance of the laity on the clergy, or of the
temporal officers on the spiritual; but of both on the civil sovereign;
which ought indeed to direct his civil commands to the salvation of
souls; but is not therefore subject to any but God himself. And thus you
see the laboured fallacy of the first argument, to deceive such men as
distinguish not between the subordination of actions in the way to the
end; and the subjection of persons one to another in the administration
of the means. For to every end, the means are determined by nature, or
by God himself supernaturally: but the power to make men use the means,
is in every nation resigned, by the law of nature, which forbiddeth men
to violate their faith given, to the civil sovereign.
His second argument is this; _Every commonwealth, because it is supposed
to be perfect and sufficient in itself, may command any other
commonwealth not subject to it, and force it to change the
administration of the government; nay, depose the prince, and set
another in his room, if it cannot otherwise defend itself against the
injuries he goes about to do them: much more may a spiritual
commonwealth command a temporal one to change the administration of
their government, and may depose princes, and institute others, when
they cannot otherwise defend the spiritual good_.
That a commonwealth, to defend itself against injuries, may lawfully do
all that he hath here said, is very true; and hath already in that which
hath gone before been sufficiently demonstrated. And if it were also
true, that there is now in this world a spiritual commonwealth, distinct
from a civil commonwealth, then might the prince thereof, upon injury
done him, or upon want of caution that injury be not done him in time to
come, repair and secure himself by war; which is, in sum, deposing,
killing, or subduing, or doing any act of hostility. But by the same
reason, it would be no less lawful for a civil sovereign, upon the like
injuries done, or feared, to make war upon the spiritual sovereign;
which I believe is more than Cardinal Bellarmine would have inferred
from his own proposition.
But spiritual commonwealth there is none in this world: for it is the
same thing with the kingdom of Christ, which he himself saith, is not of
this world; but shall be in the next world at the resurrection, when
they that have lived justly, and believed that he was the Christ, shall,
though they died _natural_ bodies, rise _spiritual_ bodies; and then it
is, that our Saviour shall judge the world, and conquer his adversaries,
and make a spiritual commonwealth. In the meantime, seeing there are no
men on earth whose bodies are spiritual, there can be no spiritual
commonwealth amongst men that are yet in the flesh; unless we call
preachers, that have commission to teach, and prepare men for their
reception into the kingdom of Christ at the resurrection, a
commonwealth; which I have proved already to be none.
The third argument is this; _It is not lawful for Christians to tolerate
an infidel, or heretical king, in case he endeavour to draw them to his
heresy or infidelity. But to judge whether a king draw his subjects to
heresy or not, belongeth to the Pope. Therefore hath the Pope right to
determine whether the prince be to be deposed, or not deposed._
To this I answer, that both these assertions are false. For Christians,
or men of what religion soever, if they tolerate not their king,
whatsoever law he maketh, though it be concerning religion, do violate
their faith, contrary to the divine law, both _natural_ and _positive_:
nor is there any judge of heresy amongst subjects, but their own civil
sovereign. For _heresy is nothing else but a private opinion obstinately
maintained, contrary to the opinion which the public person, that is to
say, the representant of the commonwealth, hath commanded to be taught_.
By which it is manifest, that an opinion publicly appointed to be
taught, cannot be heresy; nor the sovereign princes that authorize them,
heretics. For heretics are none but private men, that stubbornly defend
some doctrine, prohibited by their lawful sovereigns.
But to prove that Christians are not to tolerate infidel or heretical
kings, he allegeth a place in _Deut._ xvii. 15, where God forbiddeth the
Jews, when they shall set a king over themselves, to choose a stranger:
and from thence inferreth, that it is unlawful for a Christian to choose
a king that is not a Christian. And it is true, that he that is a
Christian, that is, he that hath already obliged himself to receive our
Saviour, when he shall come, for his king, shall tempt God too much in
choosing for king in this world, one that he knoweth will endeavour,
both by terror and persuasion, to make him violate his faith. But it is,
saith he, the same danger, to choose one that is not a Christian, for
king, and not to depose him when he is chosen. To this I say, the
question is not of the danger of not deposing; but of the justice of
deposing him. To choose him, may in some cases be unjust; but to depose
him when he is chosen, is in no case just. For it is always violation of
faith, and consequently against the law of nature, which is the eternal
law of God. Nor do we read that any such doctrine was accounted
Christian in the time of the apostles; nor in the time of the Roman
emperors, till the Popes had the civil sovereignty of Rome. But to this
he hath replied, that the Christians of old deposed not Nero, nor
Dioclesian, nor Julian, nor Valens an Arian, for this cause only, that
they wanted temporal forces. Perhaps so. But did our Saviour, who for
calling for, might have had twelve legions of immortal, invulnerable
angels to assist him, want forces to depose Cæsar, or at least Pilate,
that unjustly, without finding fault in him, delivered him to the Jews
to be crucified? Or if the apostles wanted temporal forces to depose
Nero, was it therefore necessary for them, in their epistles to the new
made Christians, to teach them, as they did, to obey the powers
constituted over them, whereof Nero in that time was one, and that they
ought to obey them, not for fear of their wrath, but for conscience
sake? Shall we say they did not only obey, but also teach what they
meant not, for want of strength? It is not therefore for want of
strength, but for conscience sake, that Christians are to tolerate their
heathen princes, or princes (for I cannot call any one whose doctrine is
the public doctrine, an heretic) that authorize the teaching of an
error. And whereas for the temporal power of the Pope, he allegeth
further, that St. Paul (_1 Cor._ vi.) appointed judges under the heathen
princes of those times, such as were not ordained by those princes; it
is not true. For St. Paul does but advise them, to take some of their
brethren to compound their differences as arbitrators, rather than to go
to law one with another before the heathen judges; which is a wholesome
precept, and full of charity, fit to be practised also in the best
Christian commonwealths. And for the danger that may arise to religion,
by the subjects tolerating of a heathen, or an erring prince, it is a
point of which a subject is no competent judge; or if he be, the Pope’s
temporal subjects may judge also of the Pope’s doctrine. For every
Christian prince, as I have formerly proved, is no less supreme pastor
of his own subjects, than the Pope of his.
The fourth argument, is taken from the baptism of kings; wherein, that
they may be made Christians, they submit their sceptres to Christ; and
promise to keep and defend the Christian faith. This is true; for
Christian kings are no more but Christ’s subjects: but they may, for all
that, be the Pope’s fellows; for they are supreme pastors of their own
subjects; and the Pope is no more but king and pastor, even in Rome
itself.
The fifth argument, is drawn from the words spoken by our Saviour, _Feed
my sheep_; by which was given all power necessary for a pastor; as the
power to chase away wolves, such as are heretics; the power to shut up
rams, if they be mad, or push at the other sheep with their horns, such
as are evil, though Christian, kings; and power to give the flock
convenient food. From whence he inferreth, that St. Peter had these
three powers given him by Christ. To which I answer, that the last of
these powers is no more than the power, or rather command, to teach. For
the first, which is to chase away wolves, that is, heretics, the place
he quoteth is (_Matth._ vii. 15) _Beware of false prophets, which come
to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly are ravening wolves_. But
neither are heretics false prophets, or at all prophets: nor, admitting
heretics for the wolves there meant, were the apostles commanded to kill
them, or if they were kings, to depose them; but to beware of, fly, and
avoid them: nor was it to St. Peter, nor to any of the apostles, but to
the multitude of the Jews that followed him into the mountain, men for
the most part not yet converted, that he gave this counsel, to beware of
false prophets: which therefore, if it confer a power of chasing away
kings, was given, not only to private men, but to men that were not at
all Christians. And as to the power of separating, and shutting up of
furious rams, by which he meaneth Christian kings that refuse to submit
themselves to the Roman pastor, our Saviour refused to take upon him
that power in this world himself, but advised to let the corn and tares
grow up together till the day of judgment: much less did he give it to
St. Peter, or can St. Peter give it to the Popes. St. Peter, and all
other pastors, are bidden to esteem those Christians that disobey the
Church, that is, that disobey the Christian sovereign, as heathen men,
and as publicans. Seeing then, men challenge to the Pope no authority
over heathen princes, they ought to challenge none over those that are
to be esteemed as heathen.
But from the power to teach only, he inferreth also a coercive power in
the Pope over kings. The pastor, saith he, must give his flock
convenient food: therefore the Pope may, and ought to compel kings to do
their duty. Out of which it followeth, that the Pope, as pastor of
Christian men, is king of kings: which all Christian kings ought indeed
either to confess, or else they ought to take upon themselves the
supreme pastoral charge, every one in his own dominion.
His sixth and last argument, is from examples. To which I answer, first,
that examples prove nothing: secondly, that the examples he allegeth
make not so much as a probability of right. The fact of Jehoiada, in
killing Athaliah, (_2 Kings_ xi.) was either by the authority of king
Joash, or it was a horrible crime in the high-priest, which ever after
the election of king Saul was a mere subject. The fact of St. Ambrose,
in excommunicating Theodosius the emperor, if it were true he did so,
was a capital crime. And for the Popes, Gregory I, Gregory II, Zachary,
and Leo III, their judgments are void, as given in their own cause; and
the acts done by them conformably to this doctrine, are the greatest
crimes, especially that of Zachary, that are incident to human nature.
And thus much of Power Ecclesiastical; wherein I had been more brief,
forbearing to examine these arguments of Bellarmine, if they had been
his as a private man, and not as the champion of the Papacy against all
other Christian Princes and States.
-------
CHAPTER XLIII.
OF WHAT IS NECESSARY FOR A MAN’S RECEPTION
INTO THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN.
[Sidenote: The difficulty of obeying God and man both at once;]
The most frequent pretext of sedition, and civil war, in Christian
commonwealths, hath a long time proceeded from a difficulty, not yet
sufficiently resolved, of obeying at once both God and man, then when
their commandments are one contrary to the other. It is manifest enough,
that when a man receiveth two contrary commands, and knows that one of
them is God’s, he ought to obey that, and not the other, though it be
the command even of his lawful sovereign (whether a monarch, or a
sovereign assembly), or the command of his father. The difficulty
therefore consisteth in this, that men, when they are commanded in the
name of God, know not in divers cases, whether the command be from God,
or whether he that commandeth do but abuse God’s name for some private
ends of his own. For as there were in the Church of the Jews, many false
prophets, that sought reputation with the people, by feigned dreams and
visions; so there have been in all times in the Church of Christ, false
teachers, that seek reputation with the people, by fantastical and false
doctrines; and by such reputation, (as is the nature of ambition), to
govern them for their private benefit.
[Sidenote: Is none to them that distinguish between what is, and what is
not necessary to salvation.]
But this difficulty of obeying both God and the civil sovereign on
earth, to those that can distinguish between what is _necessary_, and
what is not _necessary for their reception into the kingdom of God_, is
of no moment. For if the command of the civil sovereign be such, as that
it may be obeyed without the forfeiture of life eternal; not to obey it
is unjust; and the precept of the apostle takes place: _Servants obey
your masters in all things_; and _Children obey your parents in all
things_; and the precept of our Saviour, _The Scribes and Pharisees sit
in Moses’ chair; all therefore they shall say, that observe and do_. But
if the command be such as cannot be obeyed, without being damned to
eternal death; then it were madness to obey it, and the council of our
Saviour takes place, (_Matth._ x. 28), _Fear not those that kill the
body, but cannot kill the soul_. All men therefore that would avoid,
both the punishments that are to be in this world inflicted, for
disobedience to their earthly sovereign, and those that shall be
inflicted in the world to come, for disobedience to God, have need be
taught to distinguish well between what is, and what is not necessary to
eternal salvation.
[Sidenote: All that is necessary to salvation is contained in faith and
obedience.]
All that is NECESSARY _to salvation_, is contained in two virtues,
_faith in Christ_, and _obedience to laws_. The latter of these, if it
were perfect, were enough to us. But because we are all guilty of
disobedience to God’s law, not only originally in Adam, but also
actually by our own transgressions, there is required at our hands now,
not only _obedience_ for the rest of our time, but also a _remission of
sins_ for the time past; which remission is the reward of our faith in
Christ. That nothing else is necessarily required to salvation, is
manifest from this, that the kingdom of heaven is shut to none but to
sinners; that is to say, to the disobedient, or transgressors of the
law; nor to them, in case they repent, and believe all the articles of
Christian faith necessary to salvation.
[Sidenote: What obedience is necessary;]
The obedience required at our hands by God, that accepteth in all our
actions the will for the deed, is a serious endeavour to obey him; and
is called also by all such names as signify that endeavour. And
therefore obedience is sometimes called by the names of _charity_ and
_love_, because they imply a will to obey; and our Saviour himself
maketh our love to God, and to one another, a fulfilling of the whole
law: and sometimes by the name of _righteousness_; for righteousness is
but the will to give to every one his own; that is to say, the will to
obey the laws: and sometimes by the name of _repentance_; because to
repent, implieth a turning away from sin, which is the same with the
return of the will to obedience. Whosoever therefore unfeignedly
desireth to fulfil the commandments of God, or repenteth him truly of
his transgressions, or that loveth God with all his heart, and his
neighbour as himself, hath all the obedience necessary to his reception
into the kingdom of God. For if God should require perfect innocence,
there could no flesh be saved.
[Sidenote: And to what laws.]
But what commandments are those that God hath given us? Are all those
laws which were given to the Jews by the hand of Moses, the commandments
of God? If they be, why are not Christians taught to obey them? If they
be not, what others are so, besides the law of nature? For our Saviour
Christ hath not given us new laws, but counsel to observe those we are
subject to; that is to say, the laws of nature, and the laws of our
several sovereigns: nor did he make any new law to the Jews in his
sermon on the Mount, but only expounded the law of Moses, to which they
were subject before. The laws of God therefore are none but the laws of
nature, whereof the principal is, that we should not violate our faith,
that is, a commandment to obey our civil sovereigns, which we
constituted over us by mutual pact one with another. And this law of
God, that commandeth obedience to the law civil, commandeth by
consequence obedience to all the precepts of the Bible; which, as I have
proved in the precedent chapter, is there only law, where the civil
sovereign hath made it so; and in other places, but counsel; which a man
at his own peril may without injustice refuse to obey.
[Sidenote: In the faith of a Christian, who is the person believed.]
Knowing now what is the obedience necessary to salvation, and to whom it
is due; we are to consider next concerning faith, whom, and why we
believe; and what are the articles, or points necessary to be believed
by them that shall be saved. And first, for the person whom we believe,
because it is impossible to believe any person, before we know what he
saith, it is necessary he be one that we have heard speak. The person,
therefore, whom Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, and the prophets,
believed, was God himself, that spake unto them supernaturally: and the
person, whom the apostles and disciples that conversed with Christ
believed, was our Saviour himself. But of them, to whom neither God the
father, nor our Saviour, ever spake, it cannot be said that the person
whom they believed, was God. They believed the apostles, and after them
the pastors and doctors of the Church, that recommended to their faith
the history of the Old and New Testament: so that the faith of
Christians ever since our Saviour’s time, hath had for foundation,
first, the reputation of their pastors, and afterward, the authority of
those that made the Old and New Testament to be received for the rule of
faith; which none could do but Christian sovereigns; who are therefore
the supreme pastors, and the only persons whom Christians now hear speak
from God; except such as God speaketh to in these days supernaturally.
But because there be many false prophets _gone out into the world_,
other men are to examine such spirits, as St. John adviseth us, (1st
Epistle iv. 1) _whether they be of God, or not_. And therefore, seeing
the examination of doctrines belongeth to the supreme pastor, the
person, which all they that have no special revelation are to believe,
is, in every commonwealth, the supreme pastor, that is to say, the civil
sovereign.
[Sidenote: The causes of Christian faith.]
The causes why men believe any Christian doctrine, are various. For
faith is the gift of God; and he worketh it in each several man, by such
ways as it seemeth good unto himself. The most ordinary immediate cause
of our belief, concerning any point of Christian faith, is, that we
believe the Bible to be the word of God. But why we believe the Bible to
be the word of God, is much disputed, as all questions must needs be,
that are not well stated. For they make not the question to be, _why we
believe it_, but, _how we know it_; as if _believing_ and _knowing_ were
all one. And thence while one side ground their knowledge upon the
infallibility of the Church, and the other side, on the testimony of the
private spirit, neither side concludeth what it pretends. For how shall
a man know the infallibility of the Church, but by knowing first the
infallibility of the Scripture? Or how shall a man know his own private
spirit to be other than a belief, grounded upon the authority and
arguments of his teachers, or upon a presumption of his own gifts?
Besides, there is nothing in the Scripture, from which can be inferred
the infallibility of the Church; much less, of any particular Church;
and least of all, the infallibility of any particular man.
[Sidenote: Faith comes by hearing.]
It is manifest therefore, that Christian men do not know, but only
believe the Scripture to be the word of God; and that the means of
making them believe, which God is pleased to afford men ordinarily, is
according to the way of nature, that is to say, from their teachers. It
is the doctrine of St. Paul concerning Christian faith in general
(_Rom._ x. 17), _Faith cometh by hearing_, that is, by hearing our
lawful pastors. He saith also, (verses 14, 15, of the same chapter),
_How shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? and how
shall they hear without a preacher? and how shall they preach, except
they be sent?_ Whereby it is evident, that the ordinary cause of
believing that the Scriptures are the word of God, is the same with the
cause of the believing of all other articles of our faith, namely, the
hearing of those that are by the law allowed and appointed to teach us,
as our parents in their houses, and our pastors in the churches. Which
also is made more manifest by experience. For what other cause can there
be assigned, why in Christian commonwealths all men either believe, or
at least profess the Scripture to be the word of God, and in other
commonwealths scarce any; but that in Christian commonwealths they are
taught it from their infancy; and in other places they are taught
otherwise?
But if teaching be the cause of faith, why do not all believe? It is
certain therefore that faith is the gift of God, and he giveth it to
whom he will. Nevertheless, because to them to whom he giveth it, he
giveth it by the means of teachers, the immediate cause of faith is
hearing. In a school, where many are taught, and some profit, others
profit not, the cause of learning in them that profit, is the master;
yet it cannot be thence inferred, that learning is not the gift of God.
All good things proceed from God; yet cannot all that have them, say
they are inspired; for that implies a gift supernatural, and the
immediate hand of God; which he that pretends to, pretends to be a
prophet, and is subject to the examination of the Church.
But whether men _know_, or _believe_, or _grant_ the Scriptures to be
the word of God; if out of such places of them, as are without
obscurity, I shall show what articles of faith are necessary, and only
necessary for salvation, those men must needs _know_, _believe_, or
_grant_ the same.
[Sidenote: The only necessary article of Christian faith;]
The _unum necessarium_, only article of faith, which the Scripture
maketh simply necessary to salvation, is this, that JESUS IS THE CHRIST.
By the name of _Christ_ is understood the king, which God had before
promised by the prophets of the Old Testament, to send into the world,
to reign (over the Jews, and over such of other nations as should
believe in him), under himself eternally; and to give them that eternal
life, which was lost by the sin of Adam. Which when I have proved out of
Scripture, I will further show when, and in what sense, some other
articles may be also called _necessary_.
[Sidenote: Proved from the scope of the Evangelists:]
For proof that the belief of this article, _Jesus is the Christ_, is all
the faith required to salvation, my first argument shall be from the
scope of the Evangelists; which was by the description of the life of
our Saviour, to establish that one article, _Jesus is the Christ_. The
sum of St. Matthew’s Gospel is this, that Jesus was of the stock of
David, born of a Virgin; which are the marks of the true Christ: that
the Magi came to worship him as King of the Jews: that Herod for the
same cause sought to kill him: that John the Baptist proclaimed him:
that he preached by himself and his apostles that he was that king: that
he taught the law, not as a scribe, but as a man of authority: that he
cured diseases by his word only, and did many other miracles, which were
foretold the Christ should do: that he was saluted king when he entered
into Jerusalem: that he forewarned them to beware of all others that
should pretend to be Christ: that he was taken, accused, and put to
death, for saying he was king: that the cause of his condemnation
written on the cross was, JESUS OF NAZARETH, THE KING OF THE JEWS. All
which tend to no other end than this, that men should believe that
_Jesus is the Christ_. Such therefore was the scope of St. Matthew’s
Gospel. But the scope of all the evangelists, as may appear by reading
them, was the same. Therefore the scope of the whole Gospel was the
establishing of that only article. And St. John expressly makes it his
conclusion, (_John_ xx. 31), _These things are written, that you may
know that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the living God_.
[Sidenote: From the sermons of the apostles:]
My second argument is taken from the subjects of the sermons of the
apostles, both whilst our Saviour lived on earth, and after his
ascension. The apostles, in our Saviour’s time, were sent, (_Luke_ ix.
2) _to preach the kingdom of God_. For neither there, nor, _Matth._ x.
7, giveth he any commission to them other than this, _As ye go, preach,
saying, the kingdom of heaven is at hand_; that is, that Jesus is the
_Messiah_, the _Christ_, the _King_ which was to come. That their
preaching also after his ascension was the same, is manifest out of
_Acts_ xvii. 6, 7, _They drew_, saith St. Luke, _Jason and certain
brethren unto the rulers of the city, crying, these that have turned the
world upside down are come hither also, whom Jason hath received: and
these all do contrary to the decrees of Cæsar, saying, that there is
another king, one Jesus_. And out of the 2nd and 3rd verses of the same
chapter, where it is said, that St. Paul, _as his manner was, went in
unto them; and three sabbath days reasoned with them out of the
Scriptures; opening and alleging, that Christ must needs have suffered,
and risen again from the dead, and that this Jesus, whom he preached, is
Christ_.
[Sidenote: From the easiness of the doctrine:]
The third argument is from those places of Scripture, by which all the
faith required to salvation is declared to be easy. For if an inward
assent of the mind to all the doctrines concerning Christian faith now
taught, whereof the greatest part are disputed, were necessary to
salvation, there would be nothing in the world so hard as to be a
Christian. The thief upon the cross, though repenting, could not have
been saved for saying, _Lord remember me when thou comest into thy
kingdom_; by which he testified no belief of any other article, but
this, that _Jesus was the king_. Nor could it be said (as it is,
_Matth._ xi. 30), that _Christ’s yoke is easy, and his burthen light_:
nor that _little children believe in him_, as it is _Matth._ xviii. 6.
Nor could St. Paul have said, (_1 Cor._ i. 21), _It pleased God by the
foolishness of preaching, to save them that believe_. Nor could St. Paul
himself have been saved, much less have been so great a doctor of the
Church so suddenly, that never perhaps thought of transubstantiation nor
purgatory, nor many other articles now obtruded.
[Sidenote: From formal and clear texts.]
The fourth argument is taken from places express, and such as receive no
controversy of interpretation; as first, _John_ v. 39; _Search the
Scriptures; for in them ye think ye have eternal life; and they are they
that testify of me_. Our Saviour here speaketh of the Scriptures only of
the Old Testament; for the Jews at that time could not search the
Scriptures of the New Testament, which were not written. But the Old
Testament hath nothing of Christ, but the marks by which men might know
him when he came; as that he should descend from David; be born at
Bethlehem, and of a Virgin; do great miracles, and the like. Therefore
to believe that this Jesus was He, was sufficient to eternal life: but
more than sufficient is not necessary; and consequently no other article
is required. Again, (_John_ xi. 26) _Whosoever liveth and believeth in
me, shall not die eternally_. Therefore to believe in Christ, is faith
sufficient to eternal life; and consequently no more faith than that is
necessary. But to believe in Jesus, and to believe that Jesus is the
Christ, is all one, as appeareth in the verses immediately following.
For when our Saviour (verse 26) had said to Martha, _Believest thou
this?_ she answereth (verse 27), _Yea, Lord, I believe that thou art the
Christ, the Son of God, which should come into the world_. Therefore
this article alone is faith sufficient to life eternal; and more than
sufficient is not necessary. Thirdly, _John_ xx. 31: _These things are
written that ye might believe, that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God,
and that believing ye might have life through his name_. There, to
believe that _Jesus is the Christ_, is faith sufficient to the obtaining
of life; and therefore no other article is necessary. Fourthly, _1 John_
iv. 2: _Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the
flesh, is of God_. And _1 John_ v. 1: _Whosoever believeth that Jesus is
the Christ, is born of God_. And verse 5, _Who is he that overcometh the
world, but he that believeth that Jesus is the Son of God?_ Fifthly,
_Acts_ viii. 36, 37: _See_, saith the Eunuch, _here is water, what doth
hinder me to be baptized? And Philip said, if thou believest with all
thy heart, thou mayst. And he answered and said, I believe that Jesus
Christ is the Son of God._ Therefore this article believed, _Jesus is
the Christ_, is sufficient to baptism, that is to say, to our reception
into the kingdom of God, and by consequence, only necessary. And
generally in all places where our Saviour saith to any man, _Thy faith
hath saved thee_, the cause he saith it, is some confession, which
directly, or by consequence, implieth a belief, that _Jesus is the
Christ_.
[Sidenote: From that it is the foundation of all other articles.]
The last argument is from the places, where this article is made the
foundation of faith: for he that holdeth the foundation, shall be saved.
Which places are first, _Matth._ xxiv. 23, 24: _If any man shall say
unto you, Lo here is Christ, or there, believe it not; for there shall
arise false Christs, and false prophets, and shall shew great signs and
wonders, &c._ Here we see this article, _Jesus is the Christ_, must be
held, though he that shall teach the contrary should do great miracles.
The second place is, _Gal._ i. 8: _Though we, or an angel from heaven,
preach any other gospel unto you, than that we have preached unto you,
let him be accursed_. But the gospel which Paul, and the other apostles,
preached, was only this article, that _Jesus is the Christ_: therefore
for the belief of this article, we are to reject the authority of an
angel from heaven; much more of any mortal man, if he teach the
contrary. This is therefore the fundamental article of Christian faith.
A third place is, _1 John_, iv. 1, 2: _Beloved, believe not every
spirit: hereby ye shall know the Spirit of God; every spirit that
confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God_. By which
it is evident, that this article, is the measure and rule, by which to
estimate and examine all other articles; and is therefore only
fundamental. A fourth is _Matth._ xvi. 16, 18, where after St. Peter had
professed this article, saying to our Saviour, _Thou art Christ the Son
of the living God_, our Saviour answered, _Thou art Peter, and upon this
rock I will build my Church_; from whence I infer, that this article is
that, on which all other doctrines of the Church are built, as on their
foundation. A fifth is _1 Cor._ iii. 11, 12, &c. _Other foundation can
no man lay, than that which is laid, Jesus is the Christ. Now if any man
build upon this foundation, gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay,
stubble; every man’s work shall be made manifest; for the day shall
declare it, because it shall be revealed by fire, and the fire shall try
every man’s work of what sort it is. If any man’s work abide, which he
hath built thereupon, he shall receive a reward. If any man’s work shall
be burnt, he shall suffer loss; but he himself shall be saved, yet so as
by fire._ Which words, being partly plain and easy to understand, and
partly allegorical and difficult; out of that which is plain, maybe
inferred, that pastors that teach this foundation, that _Jesus is the
Christ_, though they draw from it false consequences, which all men are
sometimes subject to, they may nevertheless be saved; much more that
they may be saved, who being no pastors, but hearers, believe that which
is by their lawful pastors taught them. Therefore the belief of this
article is sufficient; and by consequence, there is no other article of
faith necessarily required to salvation.
Now for the part which is allegorical, as _that the fire shall try every
man’s work_, and that _they shall be saved, but so as by fire_, or
_through fire_, (for the original is διὰ πυρὸς,) it maketh nothing
against this conclusion which I have drawn from the other words, that
are plain. Nevertheless, because upon this place there hath been an
argument taken, to prove the fire of purgatory, I will also here offer
you my conjecture concerning the meaning of this trial of doctrines, and
saving of men as by fire. The apostle here seemeth to allude to the
words of the prophet _Zechariah_, (xiii. 8, 9), who speaking of the
restoration of the kingdom of God, saith thus; _Two parts therein shall
be cut off, and die, but the third shall be left therein; and I will
bring the third part through the fire, and will refine them as silver is
refined, and will try them as gold is tried; they shall call on the name
of the Lord, and I will hear them_. The day of judgment is the day of
the restoration of the kingdom of God; and at that day it is, that St.
Peter tells us (_2 Pet._ iii. 7, 10, 12) shall be the conflagration of
the world, wherein the wicked shall perish; but the remnant which God
will save, shall pass through that fire unhurt, and be therein, (as
silver and gold are refined by the fire from their dross,) tried, and
refined from their idolatry, and be made to call upon the name of the
true God. Alluding whereto, St. Paul here saith, that _the day_, that
is, the day of judgment, the great day of our Saviour’s coming to
restore the kingdom of God in Israel, shall try every man’s doctrine, by
judging which are gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble; and
then they that have built false consequences on the true foundation,
shall see their doctrines condemned; nevertheless they themselves shall
be saved, and pass unhurt through this universal fire, and live
eternally, to call upon the name of the true and only God. In which
sense there is nothing that accordeth not with the rest of Holy
Scripture, or any glimpse of the fire of purgatory.
[Sidenote: In what sense other articles may be called necessary.]
But a man may here ask, whether it be not as necessary to salvation, to
believe, that God is omnipotent; Creator of the world; that Jesus Christ
is risen; and that all men else shall rise again from the dead at the
last day; as to believe that _Jesus is the Christ_. To which I answer,
they are; and so are many more articles: but they are such, as are
contained in this one, and may be deduced from it, with more or less
difficulty. For who is there that does not see, that they who believe
Jesus to be the Son of the God of Israel, and that the Israelites had
for God the Omnipotent Creator of all things, do therein also believe,
that God is the Omnipotent Creator of all things? Or how can a man
believe, that Jesus is the king that shall reign eternally, unless he
believe him also risen again from the dead? For a dead man cannot
exercise the office of a king. In sum, he that holdeth this foundation,
_Jesus is the Christ_, holdeth expressly all that he seeth rightly
deduced from it, and implicitly all that is consequent thereunto, though
he have not skill enough to discern the consequence. And therefore it
holdeth still good, that the belief of this one article is sufficient
faith to obtain remission of sins to the _penitent_, and consequently to
bring them into the kingdom of heaven.
[Sidenote: That faith and obedience are both of them necessary to
salvation.]
Now that I have shown, that all the obedience required to salvation,
consisteth in the will to obey the law of God, that is to say, in
repentance; and all the faith required to the same, is comprehended in
the belief of this article, _Jesus is the Christ_; I will further allege
those places of the Gospel, that prove, that all that is necessary to
salvation is contained in both these joined together. The men to whom
St. Peter preached on the day of Pentecost, next after the ascension of
our Saviour, asked him, and the rest of the apostles, saying, (_Acts_
ii. 37), _Men and brethren, what shall we do?_ To whom St. Peter
answered (in the next verse) _Repent, and be baptized every one of you,
for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy
Ghost_. Therefore repentance, and baptism, that is, believing that
_Jesus is the Christ_, is all that is necessary to salvation. Again, our
Saviour being asked by a certain ruler (_Luke_ xviii. 18), _What shall I
do to inherit eternal life?_ answered, (verse 20) _Thou knowest the
commandments, do not commit adultery, do not kill, do not steal, do not
bear false witness, honour thy father and thy mother_. Which when he
said he had observed, our Saviour added, (verse 22) _Sell all thou hast,
give it to the poor, and come and follow me_: which was as much as to
say, rely on me that am the king. Therefore to fulfil the law, and to
believe that Jesus is the king, is all that is required to bring a man
to eternal life. Thirdly, St. Paul saith (_Rom._ i. 17), _The just shall
live by faith_; not every one, but the _just_; therefore _faith_ and
_justice_ (that is, the _will to be just_, or _repentance_) are all that
is necessary to life eternal. And (_Mark_ i. 15) our Saviour preached,
saying, _The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand,
repent and believe the evangile_, that is, the good news that the Christ
was come. Therefore, to repent, and to believe that Jesus is the Christ,
is all that is required to salvation.
[Sidenote: What each of them contributes thereunto]
Seeing then it is necessary that faith and obedience, implied in the
word repentance, do both concur to our salvation; the question by which
of the two we are justified, is impertinently disputed. Nevertheless, it
will not be impertinent, to make manifest in what manner each of them
contributes thereunto; and in what sense it is said, that we are to be
justified by the one, and by the other. And first, if by righteousness
be understood the justice of the works themselves, there is no man that
can be saved; for there is none that hath not transgressed the law of
God. And therefore when we are said to be justified by works, it is to
be understood of the will, which God doth always accept for the work
itself, as well in good, as in evil men. And in this sense only it is,
that a man is called _just_, or _unjust_; and that his justice justifies
him, that is, gives him the title, in God’s acceptation, of _just_; and
renders him capable of _living by his faith_, which before he was not.
So that justice justifies in that sense, in which to _justify_, is the
same as that to _denominate a man just_; and not in the signification of
discharging the law; whereby the punishment of his sins should be
unjust.
But a man is then also said to be justified, when his plea, though in
itself insufficient, is accepted; as when we plead our will, our
endeavour to fulfil the law, and repent us of our failings, and God
accepteth it for the performance itself. And because God accepteth not
the will for the deed, but only in the faithful; it is therefore faith
that makes good our plea; and in this sense it is, that faith only
justifies. So that _faith_ and _obedience_ are both necessary to
salvation; yet in several senses each of them is said to justify.
[Sidenote: Obedience to God and to the civil sovereign not inconsistent,
whether Christian, or infidel.]
Having thus shown what is necessary to salvation; it is not hard to
reconcile our obedience to God, with our obedience to the civil
sovereign; who is either Christian, or infidel. If he be a Christian, he
alloweth the belief of this article, that _Jesus is the Christ_; and of
all the articles that are contained in, or are by evident consequence
deduced from it: which is all the faith necessary to salvation. And
because he is a sovereign, he requireth obedience to all his own, that
is, to all the civil laws; in which also are contained all the laws of
nature, that is all the laws of God: for besides the laws of nature, and
the laws of the Church, which are part of the civil law, (for the Church
that can make laws is the commonwealth), there be no other laws divine.
Whosoever therefore obeyeth his Christian sovereign, is not thereby
hindered, neither from believing, nor from obeying God. But suppose that
a Christian king should from this foundation _Jesus is the Christ_, draw
some false consequences, that is to say, make some superstructions of
hay or stubble, and command the teaching of the same; yet seeing St.
Paul says he shall be saved; much more shall he be saved, that teacheth
them by his command; and much more yet, he that teaches not, but only
believes his lawful teacher. And in case a subject be forbidden by the
civil sovereign to profess some of those his opinions, upon what just
ground can he disobey? Christian kings may err in deducing a
consequence, but who shall judge? Shall a private man judge, when the
question is of his own obedience? Or shall any man judge but he that is
appointed thereto by the Church, that is, by the civil sovereign that
representeth it? Or if the pope, or an apostle judge, may he not err in
deducing of a consequence? Did not one of the two, St. Peter or St.
Paul, err in a superstructure, when St. Paul withstood St. Peter to his
face? There can therefore be no contradiction between the laws of God,
and the laws of a Christian commonwealth.
[Sidenote: Or infidel.]
And when the civil sovereign is an infidel, every one of his own
subjects that resisteth him, sinneth against the laws of God, (for such
are the laws of nature), and rejecteth the counsel of the apostles, that
admonisheth all Christians to obey their princes, and all children and
servants to obey their parents and masters in all things. And for their
_faith_, it is internal, and invisible; they have the license that
Naaman had, and need not put themselves into danger for it. But if they
do, they ought to expect their reward in heaven, and not complain of
their lawful sovereign; much less make war upon him. For he that is not
glad of any just occasion of martyrdom, has not the faith he professeth,
but pretends it only, to set some colour upon his own contumacy. But
what infidel king is so unreasonable, as knowing he has a subject, that
waiteth for the second coming of Christ, after the present world shall
be burnt, and intendeth then to obey him, (which is the intent of
believing that Jesus is the Christ,) and in the mean time thinketh
himself bound to obey the laws of that infidel king, (which all
Christians are obliged in conscience to do), to put to death or to
persecute such a subject?
[Sidenote: Conclusion.]
And thus much shall suffice, concerning the kingdom of God, and policy
ecclesiastical. Wherein I pretend not to advance any position of my own,
but only to show what are the consequences that seem to me deducible
from the principles of Christian politics, (which are the holy
Scriptures,) in confirmation of the power of civil sovereigns, and the
duty of their subjects. And in the allegation of Scripture, I have
endeavoured to avoid such texts as are of obscure or controverted
interpretation; and to allege none, but in such sense as is most plain,
and agreeable to the harmony and scope of the whole Bible; which was
written for the re-establishment of the kingdom of God in Christ. For it
is not the bare words, but the scope of the writer, that giveth the true
light, by which any writing is to be interpreted; and they that insist
upon single texts, without considering the main design, can derive
nothing from them clearly; but rather by casting atoms of Scripture, as
dust before men’s eyes, make every thing more obscure than it is; an
ordinary artifice of those that seek not the truth, but their own
advantage.
PART IV.
OF
THE KINGDOM OF DARKNESS.
-------
CHAPTER XLIV.
OF SPIRITUAL DARKNESS, FROM MISINTERPRETATION
OF SCRIPTURE.
[Sidenote: The kingdom of Darkness, what.]
Besides these sovereign powers, _divine_, and _human_, of which I have
hitherto discoursed, there is mention in Scripture of another power,
namely, (_Eph._ vi. 12) that of _the rulers of the darkness of this
world_; (_Matth._ xii. 26) _the kingdom of Satan_; and (_Matth._ ix. 34)
_the principality of Beelzebub over demons_, that is to say, over
phantasms that appear in the air: for which cause Satan is also called,
(_Eph._ ii. 2) _the prince of the power of the air_; and, because he
ruleth in the darkness of this world, (_John_ xvi. 11) _the prince of
this world_: and in consequence hereunto, they who are under his
dominion, in opposition to the faithful, (who are the _children of the
light_,) are called the _children of darkness_. For seeing Beelzebub is
prince of phantasms, inhabitants of his dominion of air and darkness,
the children of darkness, and these demons, phantasms, or spirits of
illusion, signify allegorically the same thing. This considered, the
kingdom of darkness, as it is set forth in these and other places of the
Scripture, is nothing else but a _confederacy of deceivers, that to
obtain dominion over men in this present world, endeavour by dark and
erroneous doctrines, to extinguish in them the light, both of nature,
and of the gospel; and so to disprepare them for the kingdom of God to
come_.
[Sidenote: The Church not yet fully freed of darkness.]
As men that are utterly deprived from their nativity, of the light of
the bodily eye, have no idea at all of any such light; and no man
conceives in his imagination any greater light, than he hath at some
time or other perceived by his outward senses: so also is it of the
light of the gospel, and of the light of the understanding, that no man
can conceive there is any greater degree of it, than that which he hath
already attained unto. And from hence it comes to pass, that men have no
other means to acknowledge their own darkness, but only by reasoning
from the unforeseen mischances, that befall them in their ways. The
darkest part of the kingdom of Satan, is that which is without the
Church of God; that is to say, amongst them that believe not in Jesus
Christ. But we cannot say, that therefore the Church enjoyeth, as the
land of Goshen, all the light, which to the performance of the work
enjoined us by God, is necessary. Whence comes it, that in Christendom
there has been, almost from the time of the Apostles, such justling of
one another out of their places, both by foreign and civil war; such
stumbling at every little asperity of their own fortune, and every
little eminence of that of other men; and such diversity of ways in
running to the same mark, _felicity_, if it be not night amongst us, or
at least a mist? We are therefore yet in the dark.
[Sidenote: Four causes of spiritual darkness.]
The enemy has been here in the night of our natural ignorance, and sown
the tares of spiritual errors; and that, first, by abusing, and putting
out the light of the Scriptures: for we err, not knowing the Scriptures.
Secondly, by introducing the demonology of the heathen poets, that is to
say, their fabulous doctrine concerning demons, which are but idols, or
phantasms of the brain, without any real nature of their own, distinct
from human fancy; such as are dead men’s ghosts, and fairies, and other
matter of old wives’ tales. Thirdly, by mixing with the Scripture divers
relics of the religion, and much of the vain and erroneous philosophy,
of the Greeks, especially of Aristotle. Fourthly, by mingling with both
these, false, or uncertain traditions, and feigned, or uncertain
history. And so we come to err, _by giving heed to seducing spirits_,
and the demonology of such _as speak lies in hypocrisy_; or as it is in
the original, (_1 Tim._ iv. 1, 2) _of those that play the part of liars,
with a seared conscience_, that is, contrary to their own knowledge.
Concerning the first of these, which is the seducing of men by abuse of
Scripture, I intend to speak briefly in this chapter.
[Sidenote: Errors from misinterpreting the Scriptures, concerning the
kingdom of God:]
The greatest and main abuse of Scripture, and to which almost all the
rest are either consequent or subservient, is the wresting of it, to
prove that the kingdom of God, mentioned so often in the Scripture, is
the present Church, or multitude of Christian men now living, or that
being dead, are to rise again at the last day: whereas the kingdom of
God was first instituted by the ministry of Moses, over the Jews only;
who were therefore called his peculiar people; and ceased afterward, in
the election of Saul, when they refused to be governed by God any more,
and demanded a king after the manner of the nations; which God himself
consented unto, as I have more at large proved before in chapter XXXV.
After that time, there was no other kingdom of God in the world, by any
pact, or otherwise, than he ever was, is, and shall be king of all men,
and of all creatures, as governing according to his will, by his
infinite power. Nevertheless, he promised by his prophets to restore
this his government to them again, when the time he hath in his secret
counsel appointed for it shall be fully come, and when they shall turn
unto him by repentance and amendment of life. And not only so, but he
invited the Gentiles to come in, and enjoy the happiness of his reign,
on the same conditions of conversion and repentance; and he promised
also to send his Son into the world, to expiate the sins of them all by
his death, and to prepare them by his doctrine, to receive him at his
second coming. Which second coming not yet being, the kingdom of God is
not yet come, and we are not now under any other kings by pact, but our
civil sovereigns; saving only, that Christian men are already in the
kingdom of grace, in as much as they have already the promise of being
received at his coming again.
[Sidenote: As that the kingdom of God is the present Church]
Consequent to this error, that the present Church is Christ’s kingdom,
there ought to be some one man, or assembly, by whose mouth our Saviour,
now in heaven, speaketh, giveth law, and which representeth his person
to all Christians; or divers men, or divers assemblies that do the same
to divers parts of Christendom. This power regal under Christ, being
challenged, universally by the Pope, and in particular commonwealths by
assemblies of the pastors of the place, (when the Scripture gives it to
none but to civil sovereigns,) comes to be so passionately disputed,
that it putteth out the light of nature, and causeth so great a darkness
in men’s understanding, that they see not who it is to whom they have
engaged their obedience.
[Sidenote: And that the Pope is his vicar general:]
Consequent to this claim of the Pope to be vicar-general of Christ in
the present Church, (supposed to be that kingdom of his to which we are
addressed in the gospel,) is the doctrine, that it is necessary for a
Christian king to receive his crown by a bishop; as if it were from that
ceremony, that he derives the clause of _Dei gratia_ in his title; and
that then only he is made king by the favour of God, when he is crowned
by the authority of God’s universal vicegerent on earth; and that every
bishop, whosoever be his sovereign, taketh at his consecration an oath
of absolute obedience to the Pope. Consequent to the same, is the
doctrine of the fourth Council of Lateran, held under Pope Innocent the
Third, (chap. III. _De Hereticis_), _that if a king at the Pope’s
admonition, do not purge his kingdom of heresies, and being
excommunicate for the same, do not give satisfaction within a year, his
subjects are absolved of the bond of their obedience_. Where, by
heresies are understood all opinions which the Church of Rome hath
forbidden to be maintained. And by this means, as often as there is any
repugnancy between the political designs of the Pope, and other
Christian princes, as there is very often, there ariseth such a mist
amongst their subjects, that they know not a stranger that thrusteth
himself into the throne of their lawful prince, from him whom they had
themselves placed there; and in this darkness of mind, are made to fight
one against another, without discerning their enemies from their
friends, under the conduct of another man’s ambition.
[Sidenote: And that the pastors are the clergy.]
From the same opinion, that the present Church is the kingdom of God, it
proceeds that pastors, deacons, and all other ministers of the Church,
take the name to themselves of the _clergy_; giving to other Christians
the name of _laity_, that is, simply _people_. For clergy signifies
those, whose maintenance is that revenue, which God having reserved to
himself during his reign over the Israelites, assigned to the tribe of
Levi, (who were to be his public ministers, and had no portion of land
set them out to live on, as their brethren,) to be their inheritance.
The Pope therefore, pretending the present Church to be, as the realm of
Israel, the kingdom of God, challenging to himself and his subordinate
ministers, the like revenue, as the inheritance of God, the name of
clergy was suitable to that claim. And thence it is, that tithes, and
other tributes paid to the Levites, as God’s right, amongst the
Israelites, have a long time been demanded, and taken of Christians, by
ecclesiastics, _jure divino_, that is, in God’s right. By which means,
the people every where were obliged to a double tribute; one to the
state, another to the clergy; whereof, that to the clergy, being the
tenth of their revenue, is double to that which a king of Athens, and
esteemed a tyrant, exacted of his subjects for the defraying of all
public charges: for he demanded no more but the twentieth part, and yet
abundantly maintained therewith the commonwealth. And in the kingdom of
the Jews, during the sacerdotal reign of God, the tithes and offerings
were the whole public revenue.
[Sidenote: And that the pastors are the clergy.]
From the same mistaking of the present Church for the kingdom of God,
came in the distinction between the _civil_ and the _canon_ laws: the
civil law being the acts of _sovereigns_ in their own dominions, and the
canon law being the acts of the _Pope_ in the same dominion. Which
canons, though they were but canons, that is, _rules propounded_, and
but voluntarily received by Christian princes, till the translation of
the empire to Charlemagne; yet afterwards, as the power of the Pope
increased, became _rules commanded_, and the emperors themselves, to
avoid greater mischiefs, which the people blinded might be led into,
were forced to let them pass for laws.
From hence it is, that in all dominions where the Pope’s ecclesiastical
power is entirely received, Jews, Turks, and Gentiles, are in the Roman
Church tolerated in their religion, as far forth, as in the exercise and
profession thereof they offend not against the civil power: whereas in a
Christian, though a stranger, not to be of the Roman religion, is
capital; because the Pope pretendeth, that all Christians, are his
subjects. For otherwise it were as much against the law of nations, to
persecute a Christian stranger, for professing the religion of his own
country, as an infidel; or rather more, in as much as they that are not
against Christ, are with him.
From the same it is, that in every Christian state there are certain
men, that are exempt, by ecclesiastical liberty, from the tributes, and
from the tribunals of the civil state; for so are the secular clergy,
besides monks and friars, which in many places bear so great a
proportion to the common people, as if need were, there might be raised
out of them alone, an army, sufficient for any war the Church militant
should employ them in, against their own, or other princes.
[Sidenote: Error from mistaking consecration for conjuration.]
A second general abuse of Scripture, is the turning of consecration into
conjuration, or enchantment. To _consecrate_, is, in Scripture, to
offer, give, or dedicate, in pious and decent language and gesture, a
man, or any other thing to God, by separating of it from common use;
that is to say, to sanctify, or make it God’s, and to be used only by
those, whom God hath appointed to be his public ministers, (as I have
already proved at large in the XXXVth chapter,) and thereby to change,
not the thing consecrated, but only the use of it, from being profane
and common, to be holy, and peculiar to God’s service. But when by such
words, the nature or quality of the thing itself, is pretended to be
changed, it is not consecration, but either an extraordinary work of
God, or a vain and impious conjuration. But seeing, for the frequency of
pretending the change of nature in their consecrations, it cannot be
esteemed a work extraordinary, it is no other than a _conjuration_ or
_incantation_, whereby they would have men to believe an alteration of
nature that is not, contrary to the testimony of man’s sight, and of all
the rest of his senses. As for example, when the priest, instead of
consecrating bread and wine to God’s peculiar service in the sacrament
of the Lord’s Supper, (which is but a separation of it from the common
use, to signify, that is, to put men in mind of their redemption, by the
passion of Christ, whose body was broken, and blood shed upon the cross
for our transgressions,) pretends, that by saying of the words of our
Saviour, _This is my body_, and _this is my blood_, the nature of bread
is no more there, but his very body; notwithstanding there appeareth not
to the sight, or other sense of the receiver, any thing that appeared
not before the consecration. The Egyptian conjurers, that are said to
have turned their rods to serpents, and the water into blood, are
thought but to have deluded the senses of the spectators, by a false
show of things, yet are esteemed enchanters. But what should we have
thought of them, if there had appeared in their rods nothing like a
serpent, and in the water enchanted, nothing like blood, nor like any
thing else but water, but that they had faced down the king, that they
were serpents that looked like rods, and that it was blood that seemed
water? That had been both enchantment, and lying. And yet in this daily
act of the priest, they do the very same, by turning the holy words into
the manner of a charm, which produceth nothing new to the sense; but
they face us down, that it hath turned the bread into a man; nay more,
into a God; and require men to worship it, as if it were our Saviour
himself present God and man, and thereby to commit most gross idolatry.
For if it be enough to excuse it of idolatry, to say it is no more
bread, but God; why should not the same excuse serve the Egyptians, in
case they had the faces to say, the leeks and onions they worshipped,
were not very leeks and onions, but a divinity under their _species_, or
likeness. The words, _This is my body_, are equivalent to these, _this
signifies_, or _represents my body_; and it is an ordinary figure of
speech: but to take it literally, is an abuse; nor though so taken, can
it extend any further, than to the bread which Christ himself with his
own hands consecrated. For he never said, that of what bread soever, any
priest whatsoever, should say, _This is my body_, or, _this is Christ’s
body_, the same should presently be transubstantiated. Nor did the
Church of Rome ever establish this transubstantiation, till the time of
Innocent the Third; which was not above 500 years ago, when the power of
popes was at the highest, and the darkness of the time grown so great,
as men discerned not the bread that was given them to eat, especially
when it was stamped with the figure of Christ upon the cross, as if they
would have men believe it were transubstantiated, not only into the body
of Christ, but also into the wood of his cross, and that they did eat
both together in the sacrament.
[Sidenote: Incantation in the ceremonies of baptism:]
The like incantation, instead of consecration, is used also in the
sacrament of baptism: where the abuse of God’s name in each several
person, and in the whole Trinity, with the sign of the cross at each
name, maketh up the charm. As first, when they make the holy water, the
priest saith, _I conjure thee, thou creature of water, in the name of
God the Father Almighty, and in the name of Jesus Christ his only Son
our Lord, and in virtue of the Holy Ghost, that thou become conjured
water, to drive away all the powers of the enemy, and to eradicate, and
supplant the enemy, &c._ And the same in the benediction of the salt to
be mingled with it: _That thou become conjured salt, that all phantasms,
and knavery of the devil’s fraud may fly and depart from the place
wherein thou art sprinkled; and every unclean spirit be conjured by Him
that shall come to judge the quick and the dead_. The same in the
benediction of the oil; _That all the power of the enemy, all the host
of the devil, all assaults and phantasms of Satan, may be driven away by
this creature of oil_. And for the infant that is to be baptized, he is
subject to many charms: first, at the church door the priest blows
thrice in the child’s face, and says: _Go out of him unclean spirit, and
give place to the Holy Ghost the comforter_. As if all children, till
blown on by the priest, were demoniacs. Again, before his entrance into
the church, he saith as before, _I conjure thee, &c. to go out, and
depart from this servant of God_. And again the same exorcism is
repeated once more before he be baptized. These, and some other
incantations, are those that are used instead of benedictions, and
consecrations, in administration of the sacraments of baptism, and the
Lord’s supper; wherein every thing that serveth to those holy uses,
except the unhallowed spittle of the priest, hath some set form of
exorcism.
[Sidenote: And in marriage, in visitation of the sick, and in
consecration of places.]
Nor are the other rites, as of marriage, of extreme unction, of
visitation of the sick, of consecrating churches and churchyards, and
the like, exempt from charms; inasmuch as there is in them the use of
enchanted oil and water, with the abuse of the cross, and of the holy
word of David, _asperges me Domine hyssopo_, as things of efficacy to
drive away phantasms, and imaginary spirits.
[Sidenote: Errors from mistaking eternal life, and everlasting death:]
Another general error, is from the misinterpretation of the words
_eternal life_, _everlasting death_, and the _second death_. For though
we read plainly in Holy Scripture, that God created Adam in an estate of
living for ever, which was conditional, that is to say, if he disobeyed
not his commandment; which was not essential to human nature, but
consequent to the virtue of the tree of life; whereof he had liberty to
eat, as long as he had not sinned; and that he was thrust out of
Paradise after he had sinned, lest he should eat thereof, and live for
ever; and that Christ’s Passion is a discharge of sin to all that
believe on him; and by consequence, a restitution of eternal life to all
the faithful, and to them only: yet the doctrine is now, and hath been a
long time far otherwise; namely, that every man hath eternity of life by
nature, inasmuch as his soul is immortal. So that the flaming sword at
the entrance of Paradise, though it hinder a man from coming to the tree
of life, hinders him not from the immortality which God took from him
for his sin; nor makes him to need the sacrificing of Christ, for the
recovering of the same; and consequently, not only the faithful and
righteous, but also the wicked and the heathen, shall enjoy eternal
life, without any death at all; much less a second, and everlasting
death. To salve this, it is said, that by second, and everlasting death,
is meant a second, and everlasting life, but in torments; a figure never
used but in this very case.
All which doctrine is founded only on some of the obscurer places of the
New Testament; which nevertheless, the whole scope of the Scripture
considered, are clear enough in a different sense, and unnecessary to
the Christian faith. For supposing that when a man dies, there remaineth
nothing of him but his carcass; cannot God, that raised inanimated dust
and clay into a living creature by his word, as easily raise a dead
carcass to life again, and continue him alive for ever, or make him die
again, by another word? The _soul_ in Scripture, signifieth always,
either the life, or the living creature; and the body and soul jointly,
the _body alive_. In the fifth day of the creation, God said: Let the
waters produce _reptile animæ viventis_, the creeping thing that hath in
it a living soul; the English translate it, _that hath life_. And again,
God created whales, _et omnem animam viventem_; which in the English is,
_every living creature_. And likewise of man, God made him of the dust
of the earth, and breathed in his face the breath of life, _et factus
est homo in animam viventem_, that is, _and man was made a living
creature_. And after Noah came out of the ark, God saith, he will no
more smite _omnem animam viventem_, that is, _every living creature_.
And (_Deut._ xii. 23), _Eat not the blood, for the blood is the soul_;
that is, _the life_. From which places, if by _soul_ were meant a
_substance incorporeal_, with an existence separated from the body, it
might as well be inferred of any other living creature as of man. But
that the souls of the faithful, are not of their own nature, but by
God’s special grace, to remain in their bodies, from the resurrection to
all eternity, I have already, I think, sufficiently proved out of the
Scriptures, in chapter XXXVIII. And for the places of the New Testament,
where it is said that any man shall be cast body and soul into hell
fire, it is no more than body and life; that is to say, they shall be
cast alive into the perpetual fire of Gehenna.
[Sidenote: As the doctrine of purgatory, and exorcisms, and invocation
of saints.]
This window it is, that gives entrance to the dark doctrine, first, of
eternal torments; and afterwards of purgatory, and consequently of the
walking abroad, especially in places consecrated, solitary, or dark, of
the ghosts of men deceased; and thereby to the pretences of exorcism and
conjuration of phantasms; as also of invocation of men dead; and to the
doctrine of indulgences, that is to say, of exemption for a time, or for
ever, from the fire of purgatory, wherein these incorporeal substances
are pretended by burning to be cleansed, and made fit for heaven. For
men being generally possessed before the time of our Saviour, by
contagion of the demonology of the Greeks, of an opinion, that the souls
of men were substances distinct from their bodies, and therefore that
when the body was dead, the soul of every man, whether godly or wicked,
must subsist somewhere by virtue of its own nature, without
acknowledging therein any supernatural gift of God; the doctors of the
Church doubted a long time, what was the place, which they were to abide
in, till they should be reunited to their bodies in the resurrection;
supposing for a while, they lay under the altars; but afterward the
Church of Rome found it more profitable to build for them this place of
purgatory; which by some other Churches in this latter age has been
demolished.
[Sidenote: The texts alleged for the doctrines aforementioned have been
answered before.]
Let us now consider what texts of Scripture seem most to confirm these
three general errors, I have here touched. As for those which Cardinal
Bellarmine hath alleged, for the present kingdom of God administered by
the Pope, than which there are none that make a better show of proof; I
have already answered them; and made it evident, that the kingdom of
God, instituted by Moses, ended in the election of Saul; after which
time the priest of his own authority never deposed any king. That which
the high-priest did to Athaliah, was not done in his own right, but in
the right of the young king Joash her son: but Solomon in his own right
deposed the high-priest Abiathar, and set up another in his place. The
most difficult place to answer, of all those that can be brought to
prove the kingdom of God by Christ is already in this world, is alleged,
not by Bellarmine, nor any other of the Church of Rome; but by Beza,
that will have it to begin from the resurrection of Christ. But whether
he intend thereby, to entitle the Presbytery to the supreme power
ecclesiastical in the commonwealth of Geneva, and consequently to every
presbytery in every other commonwealth, or to princes, and other civil
sovereigns, I do not know. For the presbytery hath challenged the power
to excommunicate their own kings, and to be the supreme moderators in
religion, in the places where they have that form of Church-government,
no less than the Pope challengeth it universally.
[Sidenote: Answer to the text on which Beza inferreth that the kingdom
of Christ began at the resurrection.]
The words are (_Mark_ ix. 1), _Verily I say unto you, that there be some
of them that stand here, which shall not taste of death, till they have
seen the kingdom of God come with power_. Which words if taken
grammatically, make it certain, that either some of those men that stood
by Christ at that time, are yet alive; or else, that the kingdom of God
must be now in this present world. And then there is another place more
difficult. For when the apostles, after our Saviour’s resurrection, and
immediately before his ascension, asked our Saviour, saying, (_Acts_ i.
6), _Wilt thou at this time restore again the kingdom to Israel?_ he
answered them, _It is not for you to know the times and the seasons,
which the Father hath put in his own power; but ye shall receive power
by the coming of the Holy Ghost upon you, and ye shall be my (martyrs)
witnesses both in Jerusalem, and in all Judea, and in Samaria, and unto
the uttermost part of the earth_. Which is as much as to say, My kingdom
is not yet come, nor shall you foreknow when it shall come; for it shall
come as a thief in the night; but I will send you the Holy Ghost, and by
him you shall have power to bear witness to all the world, by your
preaching, of my resurrection, and the works I have done, and the
doctrine I have taught, that they may believe in me, and expect eternal
life, at my coming again. How does this agree with the coming of
Christ’s kingdom at the resurrection? And that which St. Paul says (_1
Thess._ i. 9, 10), _That they turned from idols, to serve the living and
true God, and to wait for his Son from heaven_; where to wait for his
Son from heaven, is to wait for his coming to be king in power; which
were not necessary, if his kingdom had been then present. Again, if the
kingdom of God began, as Beza on that place (_Mark_ ix. 1) would have
it, at the resurrection; what reason is there for Christians ever since
the resurrection to say in their prayers, _Let thy kingdom come_? It is
therefore manifest, that the words of St. Mark are not so to be
interpreted. There be some of them that stand here, saith our Saviour,
that shall not taste of death till they have seen the kingdom of God
come in power. If then this kingdom were to come at the resurrection of
Christ, why is it said, _some of them_, rather than _all_? For they all
lived till after Christ was risen.
[Sidenote: Explication of the place in Mark ix. 1.]
But they that require an exact interpretation of this text, let them
interpret first the like words of our Saviour to St. Peter, concerning
St. John, (chap. xxi. 22), _If I will that he tarry till I come, what is
that to thee?_ upon which was grounded a report that he should not die.
Nevertheless the truth of that report was neither confirmed, as well
grounded; nor refuted, as ill grounded on those words; but left as a
saying not understood. The same difficulty is also in the place of _St.
Mark_. And if it be lawful to conjecture at their meaning, by that which
immediately follows, both here, and in _St. Luke_, where the same is
again repeated, it is not improbable, to say they have relation to the
Transfiguration, which is described in the verses immediately following:
where it is said, that _after six days Jesus taketh with him Peter, and
James, and John_ (not all, but some of his disciples), _and leadeth them
up into a high mountain apart by themselves, and was transfigured before
them: and his raiment became shining, exceeding white as snow; so as no
fuller on earth can white them: and there appeared unto them, Elias with
Moses, and they were talking with Jesus, &c._ So that they saw Christ in
glory and majesty, as he is to come; insomuch as _they were sore
afraid_. And thus the promise of our Saviour was accomplished by way of
_vision_. For it was a vision, as may probably be inferred out of _St.
Luke_, that reciteth the same story (chap. ix. 28, &c.), and saith, that
Peter and they that were with him, were heavy with sleep: but most
certainly out of _Matth._ xvii. 9, where the same is again related; for
our Saviour charged them, saying, _Tell no man the vision until the Son
of Man be risen from the dead_. Howsoever it be, yet there can from
thence be taken no argument, to prove that the kingdom of God taketh
beginning till the day of judgment.
[Sidenote: Abuse of some other texts in defence of the power of the
Pope.]
As for some other texts, to prove the Pope’s power over civil
sovereigns, (besides those of Bellarmine,) as that the two swords that
Christ and his apostles had amongst them, were the spiritual and the
temporal sword, which they say St. Peter had given him by Christ: and,
that of the two luminaries, the greater signifies the Pope, and the
lesser the King; one might as well infer out of the first verse of the
Bible, that by heaven is meant the Pope, and by earth the King. Which is
not arguing from Scripture, but a wanton insulting over princes, that
came in fashion after the time the Popes were grown so secure of their
greatness, as to contemn all Christian kings; and treading on the necks
of emperors, to mock both them and the Scripture, in the words of Psalm
XCI. 13, _Thou shalt tread upon the lion and the adder; the young lion
and the dragon thou shalt trample under thy feet_.
[Sidenote: The manner of consecrations in the Scripture, was without
exorcisms.]
As for the rights of consecration, though they depend for the most part
upon the discretion and judgment of the governors of the Church, and not
upon the Scriptures; yet those governors are obliged to such direction,
as the nature of the action itself requireth; as that the ceremonies,
words, and gestures, be both decent and significant, or at least
conformable to the action. When Moses consecrated the tabernacle, the
altar, and the vessels belonging to them, (_Exod._ xl. 9), he anointed
them with the oil which God had commanded to be made for that purpose:
and they were holy: there was nothing exorcised, to drive away
phantasms. The same Moses, the civil sovereign of Israel, when he
consecrated Aaron, the high-priest, and his sons, did wash them with
water, not exorcised water, put their garments upon them, and anointed
them with oil; and they were sanctified, to minister unto the Lord in
the priest’s office; which was a simple and decent cleansing, and
adorning them, before he presented them to God, to be his servants. When
king Solomon, the civil sovereign of Israel, consecrated the temple he
had built, (_1 Kings_ viii.), he stood before all the congregation of
Israel; and having blessed them, he gave thanks to God, for putting into
the heart of his father to build it; and for giving to himself the grace
to accomplish the same; and then prayed unto him, first, to accept that
house, though it were not suitable to his infinite greatness; and to
hear the prayers of his servants that should pray therein, or, if they
were absent, towards it; and lastly, he offered a sacrifice of
peace-offering, and the house was dedicated. Here was no procession; the
king stood still in his first place; no exorcised water; no _Asperges
me_, nor other impertinent application of words spoken upon another
occasion; but a decent and rational speech, and such as in making to God
a present of his new-built house, was most conformable to the occasion.
We read not that St. John did exorcise the water of Jordan; nor Philip
the water of the river wherein he baptized the Eunuch; nor that any
pastor in the time of the apostles, did take his spittle, and put it to
the nose of the person to be baptized, and say, _in odorem suavitatis_,
that is, _for a sweet savour unto the Lord_; wherein neither the
ceremony of spittle, for the uncleanness; nor the application of that
Scripture for the levity, can by any authority of man be justified.
[Sidenote: The immortality of man’s soul, not proved by Scripture to be
of nature, but of grace.]
To prove that the soul separated from the body, liveth eternally, not
only the souls of the elect, by especial grace, and restoration of the
eternal life which Adam lost by sin, and our Saviour restored by the
sacrifice of himself, to the faithful; but also the souls of reprobates,
as a property naturally consequent to the essence of mankind, without
other grace of God, but that which is universally given to all mankind;
there are divers places, which at the first sight seem sufficiently to
serve the turn: but such, as when I compare them with that which I have
before (chapter XXXVIII.) alleged out of the 14th of _Job_, seem to me
much more subject to a diverse interpretation, than the words of Job.
And first there are the words of Solomon (_Eccles._ xii. 7), _Then shall
the dust return to dust, as it was, and the spirit shall return to God
that gave it_. Which may bear well enough, if there be no other text
directly against it, this interpretation, that God only knows, but man
not, what becomes of a man’s spirit, when he expireth; and the same
Solomon, in the same book, (chapter iii. 20, 21) delivereth the same
sentence in the same sense I have given it. His words are: _All go_,
(man and beast), _to the same place; all are of the dust, and all turn
to dust again; who knoweth that the spirit of man goeth upward, and that
the spirit of the beast goeth downward to the earth?_ That is, none
knows but God; nor is it an unusual phrase to say of things we
understand not, _God knows what_, and, _God knows where_. That of
(_Gen._ v. 24) _Enoch walked with God, and he was not; for God took
him_; which is expounded, (_Heb._ xi. 5), _He was translated, that he
should not die; and was not found, because God had translated him. For
before his translation, he had this testimony, that he pleased God_;
making as much for the immortality of the body, as of the soul, proveth,
that this his translation was peculiar to them that please God; not
common to them with the wicked, and depending on grace, not on nature.
But on the contrary, what interpretation shall we give besides the
literal sense, of the words of Solomon (_Eccles._ iii. 19), _That which
befalleth the sons of men, befalleth beasts; even one thing befalleth
them; as the one dieth, so doth the other; yea, they have all one
breath_, (one spirit); _so that a man hath no pre-eminence above a
beast, for all is vanity_. By the literal sense, here is no natural
immortality of the soul; nor yet any repugnancy with the life eternal,
which the elect shall enjoy by grace. And (_Eccles._ chap. iv. 3)
_Better is he that hath not yet been, than both they_; that is, than
they that live, or have lived; which, if the soul of all them that have
lived, were immortal, were a hard saying; for then to have an immortal
soul, were worse than to have no soul at all. And again, (chapter ix.
5), _The living know they shall die, but the dead know not any thing_;
that is, naturally, and before the resurrection of the body.
Another place which seems to make for a natural immortality of the soul,
is that, where our Saviour saith, that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, are
living: but this is spoken of the promise of God, and of their certitude
to rise again, not of a life then actual; and in the same sense that God
said to Adam, that on the day he should eat of the forbidden fruit, he
should certainly die; from that time forward he was a dead man by
sentence; but not by execution, till almost a thousand years after. So
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were alive by promise, then, when Christ
spake; but are not actually till the resurrection. And the history of
Dives and Lazarus, makes nothing against this, if we take it, as it is,
for a parable.
But there be other places of the New Testament, where an immortality
seemeth to be directly attributed to the wicked. For it is evident that
they shall all rise to judgment. And it is said besides in many places,
that they shall go into _everlasting fire, everlasting torments,
everlasting punishments; and that the worm of conscience never dieth_;
and all this is comprehended in the word _everlasting death_, which is
ordinarily interpreted _everlasting life in torments_. And yet I can
find no where that any man shall live in torments everlastingly. Also,
it seemeth hard, to say, that God who is the father of mercies; that
doth in heaven and earth all that he will; that hath the hearts of all
men in his disposing; that worketh in men both to do, and to will; and
without whose free gift a man hath neither inclination to good, nor
repentance of evil, should punish men’s transgressions without any end
of time, and with all the extremity of torture, that men can imagine,
and more. We are therefore to consider, what the meaning is, of
_everlasting fire_, and other the like phrases of Scripture.
I have showed already, that the kingdom of God by Christ beginneth at
the day of judgment: that in that day the faithful shall rise again,
with glorious and spiritual bodies, and be his subjects in that his
kingdom, which shall be eternal: that they shall neither marry nor be
given in marriage, nor eat and drink, as they did in their natural
bodies; but live for ever in their individual persons, without the
specifical eternity of generation: and that the reprobates also shall
rise again, to receive punishments for their sins: as also, that those
of the elect, which shall be alive in their earthly bodies at that day,
shall have their bodies suddenly changed, and made spiritual and
immortal. But that the bodies of the reprobate, who make the kingdom of
Satan, shall also be glorious, or spiritual bodies, or that they shall
be as the angels of God, neither eating, nor drinking, nor engendering;
or that their life shall be eternal in their individual persons, as the
life of every faithful man is, or as the life of Adam had been if he had
not sinned, there is no place of Scripture to prove it; save only these
places concerning eternal torments; which may otherwise be interpreted.
From whence may be inferred, that as the elect after the resurrection
shall be restored to the estate, wherein Adam was before he had sinned;
so the reprobate shall be in the estate, that Adam and his posterity
were in after the sin committed; saving that God promised a Redeemer to
Adam, and such of his seed as should trust in him, and repent; but not
to them that should die in their sins, as do the reprobate.
[Sidenote: Eternal torments, what.]
These things considered, the texts that mention _eternal fire, eternal
torments, or the worm that never dieth_, contradict not the doctrine of
a second, and everlasting death, in the proper and natural sense of the
word _death_. The fire, or torments prepared for the wicked in Gehenna,
Tophet, or in what place soever, may continue for ever; and there may
never want wicked men to be tormented in them; though not every, nor any
one eternally. For the wicked being left in the estate they were in
after Adam’s sin, may at the resurrection live as they did, marry, and
give in marriage, and have gross and corruptible bodies, as all mankind
now have; and consequently may engender perpetually, after the
resurrection, as they did before: for there is no place in Scripture to
the contrary. For St. Paul, speaking of the resurrection (_1 Cor._ xv.)
understandeth it only of the resurrection to life eternal; and not the
resurrection to punishment. And of the first, he saith, that the body is
_sown in corruption, raised in incorruption; sown in dishonour, raised
in honour; sown in weakness, raised in power; sown a natural body,
raised a spiritual body_. There is no such thing can be said of the
bodies of them that rise to punishment. So also our Saviour, when he
speaketh of the nature of man after the resurrection, meaneth the
resurrection to life eternal, not to punishment. The text is, _Luke_ xx.
verses 34, 35, 36, a fertile text: _The children of this world marry,
and are given in marriage; but they that shall be counted worthy to
obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry,
nor are given in marriage: neither can they die any more; for they are
equal to the angels, and are the children of God, being the children of
the resurrection_. The children of this world, that are in the estate
which Adam left them in, shall marry, and be given in marriage; that is,
corrupt, and generate successively; which is an immortality of the kind,
but not of the persons of men: they are not worthy to be counted amongst
them that shall obtain the next world, and an absolute resurrection from
the dead; but only a short time, as inmates of that world; and to the
end only to receive condign punishment for their contumacy. The elect
are the only children of the resurrection; that is to say, the sole
heirs of eternal life: they only can die no more, it is they that are
equal to the angels, and that are the children of God; and not the
reprobate. To the reprobate there remaineth after the resurrection, a
_second_ and _eternal_ death: between which resurrection, and their
second and eternal death, is but a time of punishment and torment; and
to last by succession of sinners thereunto, as long as the kind of man
by propagation shall endure; which is eternally.
[Sidenote: Answer of the texts alleged for purgatory.]
Upon this doctrine of the natural eternity of separated souls, is
founded, as I said, the doctrine of purgatory. For supposing eternal
life by grace only, there is no life but the life of the body; and no
immortality till the resurrection. The texts for purgatory alleged by
Bellarmine out of the canonical Scripture of the Old Testament, are,
first, the fasting of David for Saul and Jonathan, mentioned _2 Sam._ i.
12, and again, _2 Sam._ iii. 35, for the death of Abner. This fasting of
David, he saith, was for the obtaining of something for them at God’s
hands, after their death: because after he had fasted to procure the
recovery of his own child, as soon as he knew it was dead, he called for
meat. Seeing then the soul hath an existence separate from the body, and
nothing can be obtained by men’s fasting for the souls that are already
either in heaven, or hell, it followeth that there be some souls of dead
men, that are neither in heaven, nor in hell; and therefore they must be
in some third place, which must be purgatory. And thus with hard
straining, he has wrested those places to the proof of a purgatory:
whereas it is manifest, that the ceremonies of mourning, and fasting,
when they are used for the death of men, whose life was not profitable
to the mourners, they are used for honour’s sake to their persons; and
when it is done for the death of them by whose life the mourners had
benefit, it proceeds from their particular damage. And so David honoured
Saul and Abner, with his fasting; and in the death of his own child,
recomforted himself, by receiving his ordinary food.
In the other places, which he allegeth out of the Old Testament, there
is not so much as any show, or colour of proof. He brings in every text
wherein there is the word _anger_, or _fire_, or _burning_, or
_purging_, or _cleansing_, in case any of the fathers have but in a
sermon rhetorically applied it to the doctrine of purgatory, already
believed. The first verse of _Psalm_ xxxvii; _O Lord, rebuke me not in
thy wrath, nor chasten me in thy hot displeasure_: what were this to
purgatory, if Augustine had not applied the _wrath_ to the fire of hell,
and the _displeasure_ to that of purgatory? And what is it to purgatory,
that of _Psalm_ lxvi. 12, _We went through fire and water, and thou
broughtest us to a moist place_; and other the like texts, with which
the doctors of those times intended to adorn, or extend their sermons,
or commentaries, haled to their purposes by force of wit?
[Sidenote: Places of the New Testament for purgatory answered.]
But he allegeth other places of the New Testament, that are not so easy
to be answered. And first that of _Matth._ xii. 32: _Whosoever speaketh
a word against the Son of man, it shall be forgiven him; but whosoever
speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him neither in
this world, nor in the world to come_: where he will have purgatory to
be the world to come, wherein some sins may be forgiven, which in this
world were not forgiven: notwithstanding that it is manifest, there are
but three worlds; one from the creation to the flood, which was
destroyed by water, and is called in Scripture _the old world_; another
from the flood, to the day of judgment, which is _the present world_,
and shall be destroyed by fire; and the third, which shall be from the
day of judgment forward, everlasting, which is called _the world to
come_; and in which it is agreed by all, there shall be no purgatory:
and therefore the world to come, and purgatory, are inconsistent. But
what then can be the meaning of those our Saviour’s words? I confess
they are very hardly to be reconciled with all the doctrines now
unanimously received: nor is it any shame, to confess the profoundness
of the Scripture to be too great to be sounded by the shortness of human
understanding. Nevertheless, I may propound such things to the
consideration of more learned divines, as the text itself suggesteth.
And first, seeing to speak against the Holy Ghost, as being the third
person of the Trinity, is to speak against the Church, in which the Holy
Ghost resideth; it seemeth the comparison is made, between the easiness
of our Saviour, in bearing with offences done to him while he himself
taught the world, that is, when he was on earth, and the severity of the
pastors after him, against those which should deny their authority,
which was from the Holy Ghost. As if he should say, you that deny my
power; nay you that shall crucify me, shall be pardoned by me, as often
as you turn unto me by repentance: but if you deny the power of them
that teach you hereafter, by virtue of the Holy Ghost, they shall be
inexorable, and shall not forgive you, but persecute you in this world,
and leave you without absolution, (though you turn to me, unless you
turn also to them), to the punishments, as much as lies in them, of the
world to come. And so the words may be taken as a prophecy, or
prediction concerning the times, as they have along been in the
Christian Church. Or if this be not the meaning, (for I am not
peremptory in such difficult places), perhaps there may be places left
after the resurrection, for the repentance of some sinners. And there is
also another place, that seemeth to agree therewith. For considering the
words of St. Paul (_1 Cor._ xv. 29), _What shall they do which are
baptized for the dead, if the dead rise not at all?_ why also are they
baptized for the dead? a man may probably infer, as some have done, that
in St. Paul’s time, there was a custom, by receiving baptism for the
dead, (as men that now believe, are sureties and undertakers for the
faith of infants, that are not capable of believing), to undertake for
the persons of their deceased friends, that they should be ready to
obey, and receive our Saviour for their king, at his coming again; and
then the forgiveness of sins in the world to come, has no need of a
purgatory. But in both these interpretations, there is so much of
paradox, that I trust not to them; but propound them to those that are
thoroughly versed in the Scripture, to inquire if there be no clearer
place that contradicts them. Only of thus much, I see evident Scripture,
to persuade me, that there is neither the word, nor the thing of
purgatory, neither in this, nor any other text; nor any thing that can
prove a necessity of a place for the soul without the body; neither for
the soul of Lazarus during the four days he was dead; nor for the souls
of them which the Roman Church pretend to be tormented now in purgatory.
For God, that could give a life to a piece of clay, hath the same power
to give life again to a dead man, and renew his inanimate, and rotten
carcase, into a glorious, spiritual, and immortal body.
Another place is that of _1 Cor._ iii., where it is said, that they
which build stubble, hay, &c. on the true foundation, their work shall
perish; but _they themselves shall be saved, but as through fire_: this
fire, he will have to be the fire of purgatory. The words, as I have
said before, are an allusion to those of _Zech._ xiii. 9, where he
saith, _I will bring the third part through the fire, and refine them as
silver is refined, and will try them as gold is tried_: which is spoken
of the coming of the Messiah in power and glory; that is, at the day of
judgment, and conflagration of the present world; wherein the elect
shall not be consumed, but be refined; that is, depose their erroneous
doctrines and traditions, and have them as it were singed off; and shall
afterwards call upon the name of the true God. In like manner, the
apostle saith of them, that holding this foundation, _Jesus is the
Christ_, shall build thereon some other doctrines that be erroneous,
that they shall not be consumed in that fire which reneweth the world,
but shall pass through it to salvation; but so as to see, and relinquish
their former errors. The builders, are the _pastors_; the foundation,
that _Jesus is the Christ_; the stubble and hay, _false consequences
drawn from it through ignorance, or frailty_; the gold, silver, and
precious stones, are their _true doctrines_; and their refining or
purging, the _relinquishing of their errors_. In all which there is no
colour at all for the burning of incorporeal, that is to say, impatible
souls.
[Sidenote: Baptism for the dead, how understood.]
A third place is that of _1 Cor._ xv. 29, before mentioned, concerning
baptism for the dead: out of which he concludeth, first, that prayers
for the dead are not unprofitable; and out of that, that there is a fire
of purgatory: but neither of them rightly. For of many interpretations
of the word baptism, he approveth this in the first place, that by
baptism is meant, metaphorically, a baptism of penance; and that men are
in this sense baptized, when they fast, and pray, and give alms: and so,
baptism for the dead, and prayer for the dead, is the same thing. But
this is a metaphor, of which there is no example, neither in the
Scripture, nor in any other use of language; and which is also
discordant to the harmony, and scope of the Scripture. The word baptism
is used (_Mark_ x. 38, and _Luke_ xii. 50), for being dipped in one’s
own blood, as Christ was upon the cross, and as most of the apostles
were, for giving testimony of him. But it is hard to say, that prayer,
fasting, and alms, have any similitude with dipping. The same is used
also _Matth._ iii. 11 (which seemeth to make somewhat for purgatory) for
a purging with fire. But it is evident the fire and purging here
mentioned, is the same whereof the prophet Zechariah speaketh (chapter
xiii. 9) _I will bring the third part through the fire, and will refine
them, &c._ And St. Peter after him (1 Epistle i. 7), _That the trial of
your faith, which is much more precious than of gold that perisheth,
though it be tried with fire, might be found unto praise, and honour,
and glory at the appearing of Jesus Christ_; and St. Paul (_1 Cor._ iii.
13), _The fire shall try every man’s work of what sort it is_. But St.
Peter and St. Paul speak of the fire that shall be at the second
appearing of Christ; and the prophet Zechariah of the day of judgment.
And therefore this place of St. Matthew may be interpreted of the same;
and then there will be no necessity of the fire of purgatory.
Another interpretation of baptism for the dead, is that which I have
before mentioned, which he preferreth to the second place of
probability: and thence also he inferreth the utility of prayer for the
dead. For if after the resurrection, such as have not heard of Christ,
or not believed in him, may be received into Christ’s kingdom; it is not
in vain, after their death, that their friends should pray for them,
till they should be risen. But granting that God, at the prayers of the
faithful, may convert unto him some of those that have not heard Christ
preached, and consequently cannot have rejected Christ, and that the
charity of men in that point cannot be blamed; yet this concludeth
nothing for purgatory; because to rise from death to life, is one thing;
to rise from purgatory to life is another; as being a rising from life
to life, from a life in torments to a life in joy.
A fourth place is that of _Matth._ v. 25, 26: _Agree with thine
adversary quickly, whilst thou art in the way with him, lest at any time
the adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to
the officer, and thou be cast into prison: verily I say unto thee, thou
shalt by no means come out thence, till thou hast paid the uttermost
farthing_. In which allegory, the offender is the _sinner_; both the
adversary and the judge is _God_; the way is this _life_; the prison is
the _grave_; the officer, _death_; from which, the sinner shall not rise
again to life eternal, but to a second death, till he have paid the
utmost farthing, or Christ pay it for him by his passion, which is a
full ransom for all manner of sins, as well lesser sins, as greater
crimes; both being made by the passion of Christ equally venial.
The fifth place, is that of _Matth._ v. 22: _Whosoever is angry with his
brother without a cause, shall be guilty in judgment: and whosoever
shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be guilty in the council: but
whosoever shall say, thou fool, shall be guilty to hell fire_. From
which words he inferreth three sorts of sins, and three sorts of
punishments; and that none of those sins, but the last, shall be
punished with hell fire; and consequently, that after this life, there
is punishment of lesser sins in purgatory. Of which inference, there is
no colour in any interpretation that hath yet been given of them. Shall
there be a distinction after this life of courts of justice, as there
was amongst the Jews in our Saviour’s time, to hear, and determine
divers sorts of crimes, as the judges, and the council? Shall not all
judicature appertain to Christ and his apostles? To understand therefore
this text, we are not to consider it solitarily, but jointly with the
words precedent, and subsequent. Our Saviour in this chapter
interpreteth the law of Moses; which the Jews thought was then
fulfilled, when they had not transgressed the grammatical sense thereof,
howsoever they had transgressed against the sentence, or meaning of the
legislator. Therefore whereas they thought the sixth commandment was not
broken, but by killing a man: nor the seventh, but when a man lay with a
woman, not his wife; our Saviour tells them the inward anger of a man
against his brother, if it be without just cause, is homicide. You have
heard, saith he, the Law of Moses, _Thou shalt not kill_, and that
_Whosoever shall kill, shall be condemned before the judges_, or before
the session of the Seventy: but I say unto you, to be angry with one’s
brother without cause, or to say unto him _Raca_, or _Fool_, is
homicide, and shall be punished at the day of judgment, and session of
Christ, and his apostles, with hell fire. So that those words were not
used to distinguish between divers crimes, and divers courts of justice,
and divers punishments; but to tax the distinction between sin and sin,
which the Jews drew not from the difference of the will in obeying God,
but from the difference of their temporal courts of justice; and to show
them that he that had the will to hurt his brother, though the effect
appear but in reviling, or not at all, shall be cast into hell fire, by
the judges, and by the session, which shall be the same, not different,
courts at the day of judgment. This considered, what can be drawn from
this text, to maintain purgatory, I cannot imagine.
The sixth place is _Luke_ xvi. 9: _Make ye friends of the unrighteous
Mammon; that when ye fail, they may receive you into everlasting
tabernacles_. This he alleges to prove invocation of saints departed.
But the sense is plain, that we should make friends with our riches, of
the poor; and thereby obtain their prayers whilst they live. _He that
giveth to the poor, lendeth to the Lord._
The seventh is _Luke_ xxiii. 42: _Lord, remember me, when thou comest
into thy kingdom_. Therefore, saith he, there is remission of sins after
this life. But the consequence is not good. Our Saviour then forgave
him; and at his coming again in glory, will remember to raise him again
to life eternal.
The eighth is _Acts_ ii. 24, where St. Peter saith of Christ, _that God
had raised him up, and loosed the pains of death, because it was not
possible he should be holden of it_: which he interprets to be a descent
of Christ into purgatory, to loose some souls there from their torments:
whereas it is manifest, that it was Christ that was loosed; it was he
that could not be holden of death, or the grave; and not the souls in
purgatory. But if that which Beza says, in his notes on this place, be
well observed, there is none that will not see, that instead of _pains_,
it should be _bands_; and then there is no further cause to seek for
purgatory in this text.
-------
CHAPTER XLV.
OF DEMONOLOGY, AND OTHER RELICS OF THE
RELIGION OF THE GENTILES.
[Sidenote: The original of demonology.]
The impression made on the organs of sight by lucid bodies, either in
one direct line, or in many lines, reflected from opaque, or refracted
in the passage through diaphanous bodies, produceth in living creatures,
in whom God hath placed such organs, an imagination of the object, from
whence the impression proceedeth; which imagination is called _sight_;
and seemeth not to be a mere imagination, but the body itself without
us; in the same manner, as when a man violently presseth his eye, there
appears to him a light without, and before him, which no man perceiveth
but himself; because there is indeed no such thing without him, but only
a motion in the interior organs, pressing by resistance outward, that
makes him think so. And the motion made by this pressure, continuing
after the object which caused it is removed, is that we call
_imagination_ and _memory_; and, in sleep, and sometimes in great
distemper of the organs by sickness or violence, a _dream_; of which
things I have already spoken briefly, in the second and third chapters.
This nature of sight having never been discovered by the ancient
pretenders to natural knowledge; much less by those that consider not
things so remote, as that knowledge is, from their present use; it was
hard for men to conceive of those images in the fancy and in the sense,
otherwise, than of things really without us: which some, because they
vanish away, they know not whither nor how, will have to be absolutely
incorporeal, that is to say immaterial, or forms without matter; colour
and figure, without any coloured or figured body; and that they can put
on airy bodies, as a garment, to make them visible when they will to our
bodily eyes; and others say, are bodies and living creatures, but made
of air, or other more subtle and ethereal matter, which is, then, when
they will be seen, condensed. But both of them agree on one general
appellation of them, DEMONS. As if the dead of whom they dreamed, were
not inhabitants of their own brain, but of the air, or of heaven, or
hell; not phantasms, but ghosts; with just as much reason as if one
should say, he saw his own ghost in a looking-glass, or the ghosts of
the stars in a river; or call the ordinary apparition of the sun, of the
quantity of about a foot, the _demon_, or ghost of that great sun that
enlighteneth the whole visible world: and by that means have feared
them, as things of an unknown, that is, of an unlimited power to do them
good or harm; and consequently, given occasion to the governors of the
heathen commonwealths to regulate this their fear, by establishing that
DEMONOLOGY, (in which the poets, as principal priests of the heathen
religion, were specially employed or reverenced,) to the public peace,
and to the obedience of subjects necessary thereunto; and to make some
of them good _demons_, and others evil; the one as a spur to the
observance, the other as reins to withhold them from violation of the
laws.
[Sidenote: What were the demons of the ancients.]
What kind of things they were, to whom they attributed the name of
_demons_, appeareth partly in the genealogy of their gods, written by
Hesiod, one of the most ancient poets of the Grecians; and partly in
other histories; of which I have observed some few before, in the
twelfth chapter of this discourse.
[Sidenote: How that doctrine was spread.]
The Grecians, by their colonies and conquests, communicated their
language and writings into Asia, Egypt, and Italy; and therein, by
necessary consequence their _demonology_, or, as St. Paul calls it, (_1
Tim._ iv. 1) _their doctrines of devils_. And by that means the
contagion was derived also to the Jews, both of Judea and Alexandria,
and other parts, whereinto they were dispersed. But the name of _demon_
they did not, as the Grecians, attribute to spirits both good and evil;
but to the evil only: and to the good _demons_ they gave the name of the
spirit of God; and esteemed those into whose bodies they entered to be
prophets. [Sidenote: How far received by the Jews.] In sum, all
singularity, if good, they attributed to the spirit of God; and if evil,
to some _demon_, but a κακοδάιμων, an evil _demon_, that is a _devil_.
And therefore, they called _demoniacs_, that is _possessed by the
devil_, such as we call madmen or lunatics; or such as had the falling
sickness, or that spoke any thing which they, for want of understanding,
thought absurd. As also of an unclean person in a notorious degree, they
used to say he had an unclean spirit; of a dumb man, that he had a dumb
devil; and of John the Baptist (_Matt._ xi. 18), for the singularity of
his fasting, that he had a devil; and of our Saviour, because he said,
he that keepeth his sayings should not see death _in æternum_, (_John_
viii. 52), _Now we know thou hast a devil; Abraham is dead, and the
prophets are dead_: and again, because he said (_John_ vii. 20), _They
went about to kill him_, the people answered, _Thou hast a devil; who
goeth about to kill thee?_ Whereby it is manifest, that the Jews had the
same opinions concerning phantasms, namely, that they were not
phantasms, that is, idols of the brain, but things real, and independant
on the fancy.
[Sidenote: Why our Saviour controlled it not.]
Which doctrine, if it be not true, why, may some say, did not our
Saviour contradict it, and teach the contrary? Nay, why does he use on
divers occasions such forms of speech as seem to confirm it? To this I
answer, that first, where Christ saith, (_Luke_ xxiv. 39) _A spirit hath
not flesh and bone_, though he show that there be spirits, yet he denies
not that they are bodies. And where St. Paul says, (_1 Cor._ xv. 44) _we
shall rise spiritual bodies_, he acknowledgeth the nature of spirits,
but that they are bodily spirits; which is not difficult to understand.
For air and many other things are bodies, though not flesh and bone, or
any other gross body to be discerned by the eye. But when our Saviour
speaketh to the devil, and commandeth him to go out of a man, if by the
devil, he meant a disease, as phrensy, or lunacy, or a corporeal spirit,
is not the speech improper? Can diseases hear? Or can there be a
corporeal spirit in a body of flesh and bone, full already of vital and
animal spirits? Are there not, therefore spirits, that neither have
bodies, nor are mere imaginations? To the first I answer, that the
addressing of our Saviour’s command to the madness, or lunacy he cureth,
is no more improper than was his rebuking of the fever, or of the wind
and sea; for neither do these hear; or than was the command of God, to
the light, to the firmament, to the sun, and stars, when he commanded
them to be; for they could not hear before they had a being. But those
speeches are not improper, because they signify the power of God’s word;
no more therefore is it improper, to command madness, or lunacy, under
the appellation of devils by which they were then commonly understood,
to depart out of a man’s body. To the second, concerning their being
incorporeal, I have not yet observed any place of Scripture, from whence
it can be gathered, that any man was ever possessed with any other
corporeal spirit, but that of his own, by which his body is naturally
moved.
[Sidenote: The Scriptures do not teach that spirits are incorporeal.]
Our Saviour, immediately after the Holy Ghost descended upon him in the
form of a dove, is said by St. Matthew (chapter iv. 1), to have been
_led up by the Spirit into the wilderness_; and the same is recited
(_Luke_ iv. 1) in these words, _Jesus being full of the Holy Ghost, was
led in the Spirit into the wilderness_; whereby it is evident that by
_spirit_ there, is meant the Holy Ghost. This cannot be interpreted for
a possession; for Christ, and the Holy Ghost, are but one and the same
substance; which is no possession of one substance, or body, by another.
And whereas in the verses following he is said _to have been taken up by
the devil into the holy city, and set upon a pinnacle of the temple_,
shall we conclude thence that he was possessed of the devil, or carried
thither by violence? And again, _carried thence by the devil into an
exceeding high mountain, who showed him thence all the kingdoms of the
world_: wherein we are not to believe he was either possessed, or forced
by the devil; nor that any mountain is high enough, according to the
literal sense, to show him one whole hemisphere. What then can be the
meaning of this place, other than that he went of himself into the
wilderness; and that this carrying of him up and down from the
wilderness to the city, and from thence into a mountain, was a vision?
Conformable whereunto, is also the phrase of St. Luke, that he was led
into the wilderness, not _by_, but _in_, the Spirit; whereas, concerning
his being taken up into the mountain, and unto the pinnacle of the
temple, he speaketh as St. Matthew doth: which suiteth with the nature
of a vision.
Again, where St. Luke (chap. xxii. 3, 4) says of Judas Iscariot, that
_Satan entered into him, and thereupon that he went and communed with
the chief priests, and captains, how he might betray Christ unto them_;
it may be answered, that by the entering of Satan, that is the _enemy_,
into him, is meant, the hostile and traitorous intention of selling his
Lord and Master. For as by the Holy Ghost, is frequently in Scripture
understood, the graces and good inclinations given by the Holy Ghost; so
by the entering of Satan may be understood the wicked cogitations, and
designs of the adversaries of Christ, and his disciples. For as it is
hard to say, that the devil was entered into Judas, before he had any
such hostile design; so it is impertinent to say, he was first Christ’s
enemy in his heart, and that the devil entered into him afterwards.
Therefore the entering of Satan, and his wicked purpose, was one and the
same thing.
[Sidenote: The Scriptures do not teach that spirits are incorporeal.]
But if there be no immaterial spirit, or any possession of men’s bodies
by any spirit corporeal, it may again be asked, why our Saviour and his
apostles did not teach the people so; and in such clear words, as they
might no more doubt thereof. But such questions as these, are more
curious, than necessary for a Christian man’s salvation. Men may as well
ask why Christ, that could have given to all men faith, piety, and all
manner of moral virtues, gave it to some only, and not to all: and why
he left the search of natural causes, and sciences, to the natural
reason and industry of men, and did not reveal it to all, or any man
supernaturally; and many other such questions. Of which nevertheless
there may be alleged probable and pious reasons. For as God, when he
brought the Israelites into the land of Promise, did not secure them
therein, by subduing all the nations round about them; but left many of
them, as thorns in their sides, to awaken from time to time their piety
and industry: so our Saviour, in conducting us toward his heavenly
kingdom, did not destroy all the difficulties of natural questions; but
left them to exercise our industry, and reason; the scope of his
preaching, being only to show us this plain and direct way to salvation,
namely, the belief of this article, _that he was the Christ, the Son of
the living God, sent into the world to sacrifice himself for our sins,
and at his coming again, gloriously to reign over his elect, and to save
them from their enemies eternally_. To which, the opinion of possession
by spirits, or phantasms, is no impediment in the way; though it be to
some an occasion of going out of the way, and to follow their own
inventions. If we require of the Scripture an account of all questions,
which may be raised to trouble us in the performance of God’s commands,
we may as well complain of Moses for not having set down the time of the
creation of such spirits, as well as of the creation of the earth and
sea, and of men and beasts. To conclude; I find in Scripture that there
be angels, and spirits, good and evil; but not that they are
incorporeal, as are the apparitions men see in the dark, or in a dream,
or vision; which the Latins call _spectra_, and took for _demons_. And I
find that there are spirits corporeal, though subtle and invisible; but
not that any man’s body was possessed or inhabited by them; and that the
bodies of the saints shall be such, namely, spiritual bodies, as St.
Paul calls them.
[Sidenote: The power of casting out devils, not the same it was in the
primitive church.]
Nevertheless, the contrary doctrine, namely, that there be incorporeal
spirits, hath hitherto so prevailed in the Church, that the use of
exorcism, that is to say, of ejection of devils by conjuration, is
thereupon built; and, though rarely and faintly practised, is not yet
totally given over. That there were many demoniacs in the primitive
Church, and few madmen, and other such singular diseases; whereas in
these times we hear of, and see many madmen, and few demoniacs, proceeds
not from the change of nature, but of names. But how it comes to pass
that whereas heretofore the apostles, and after them for a time, the
pastors of the Church, did cure those singular diseases, which now they
are not seen to do; as likewise, why it is not in the power of every
true believer now, to do all that the faithful did then, that is to say,
as we read (_Mark_ xvi. 17, 18), _in Christ’s name to cast out devils,
to speak with new tongues, to take up serpents, to drink deadly poison
without harm-taking, and to cure the sick by the laying on of their
hands_, and all this without other words, but _in the name of Jesus_, is
another question. And it is probable that those extraordinary gifts were
given to the Church, for no longer a time, than men trusted wholly to
Christ, and looked for their felicity only in his kingdom to come; and
consequently, that when they sought authority, and riches, and trusted
to their own subtlety for a kingdom of this world, these supernatural
gifts of God were again taken from them.
[Sidenote: Another relic of Gentilism, worshipping of images, left in
the Church, not brought into it.]
Another relic of Gentilism is, the _worship of images_, neither
instituted by Moses in the Old, nor by Christ in the New Testament; nor
yet brought in from the Gentiles; but left amongst them after they had
given their names to Christ. Before our Saviour preached, it was the
general religion of the Gentiles to worship for gods those apparences
that remain in the brain from the impression of external bodies upon the
organs of their senses, which are commonly called _ideas_, _idols_,
_phantasms_, _conceits_, as being representations of those external
bodies which cause them, and have nothing in them of reality, no more
than there is in the things that seem to stand before us in a dream. And
this is the reason why St. Paul says, (1 Cor. viii. 4) _we know that an
idol is nothing_; not that he thought that an image of metal, stone, or
wood, was nothing; but that the thing which they honoured, or feared in
the image, and held for a god, was a mere figment, without place,
habitation, motion, or existence, but in the motions of the brain. And
the worship of these with divine honour, is that which is in the
Scripture called idolatry, and rebellion against God. For God being King
of the Jews, and his lieutenant being first Moses, and afterward the
high-priest; if the people had been permitted to worship, and pray to
images, which are representations of their own fancies, they had had no
further dependance on the true God, of whom there can be no similitude;
nor on his prime-ministers, Moses and the high-priests; but every man
had governed himself according to his own appetite, to the utter
eversion of the commonwealth, and their own destruction for want of
union. And therefore the first law of God was, _they should not take for
gods_, ALIENOS DEOS, that is, _the gods of other nations, but that only
true God, who vouchsafed to commune with Moses, and by him to give them
laws and directions, for their peace, and for their salvation from their
enemies_. And the second was, that _they should not make to themselves
any image to worship, of their own invention_. For it is the same
deposing of a king, to submit to another king, whether he be set up by a
neighbour nation, or by ourselves.
[Sidenote: Answer to certain seeming texts for images.]
The places of Scripture pretended to countenance the setting up of
images, to worship them; or to set them up at all in the places where
God is worshipped, are first, two examples; one of the cherubims over
the ark of God; the other of the brazen serpent. Secondly, some texts
whereby we are commanded to worship certain creatures for their relation
to God; as to worship his footstool. And lastly, some other texts, by
which is authorized a religious honouring of holy things. But before I
examine the force of those places, to prove that which is pretended, I
must first explain what is to be understood by _worshipping_, and what
by _images_ and _idols_.
[Sidenote: What is worship.]
I have already shown in the XXTH chapter of this discourse, that to
honour, is to value highly the power of any person: and that such value
is measured, by our comparing him with others. But because there is
nothing to be compared with God in power; we honour him not, but
dishonour him by any value less than infinite. And thus honour is
properly of its own nature, secret, and internal in the heart. But the
inward thoughts of men, which appear outwardly in their words and
actions, are the signs of our honouring, and these go by the name of
_worship_; in Latin, _cultus_. Therefore, to pray to, to swear by, to
obey, to be diligent and officious in serving: in sum, all words and
actions that betoken fear to offend, or desire to please, is _worship_,
whether those words and actions be sincere, or feigned: and because they
appear as signs of honouring, are ordinarily also called _honour_.
[Sidenote: Distinction between divine and civil worship.]
The worship we exhibit to those we esteem to be but men, as to kings,
and men in authority, is _civil worship_: but the worship we exhibit to
that which we think to be God, whatsoever the words, ceremonies,
gestures or other actions be, is _divine worship_. To fall prostrate
before a king, in him that thinks him but a man, is but civil worship:
and he that putteth off his hat in the church, for this cause, that he
thinketh it the house of God, worshippeth with divine worship. They that
seek the distinction of divine and civil worship, not in the intention
of the worshipper, but in the words δουλεία and λατρεία, deceive
themselves. For whereas there be two sorts of servants: that sort, which
is of those that are absolutely in the power of their masters, as slaves
taken in war, and their issue, whose bodies are not in their own power,
(their lives depending on the will of their masters, in such manner as
to forfeit them upon the least disobedience), and that are bought and
sold as beasts, were called δουλοι, that is, properly slaves, and their
service δουλεία: the other, which is of those that serve (for hire, or
in hope of benefit from their masters) voluntarily, are called θῆτες;
that is, domestic servants, to whose service the masters have no further
right, than is contained in the covenants made betwixt them. These two
kinds of servants have thus much common to them both, that their labour
is appointed them by another: and the word λάτρις, is the general name
of both, signifying him that worketh for another, whether as a slave, or
a voluntary servant. So that λατρεία signifieth generally all service;
but δουλεία the service of bondmen only, and the condition of slavery:
and both are used in Scripture, (to signify our service of God)
promiscuously; δουλεία, because we are God’s slaves; λατρεία, because we
serve him. And in all kinds of service is contained, not only obedience,
but also worship; that is, such actions, gestures, and words, as signify
_honour_.
[Sidenote: An image, what.]
An _image_, in the most strict signification of the word, is the
resemblance of something visible: [Sidenote: Phantasms.] in which sense
the phantastical forms, apparitions, or seemings of visible bodies to
the sight, are only _images_; such as are the show of a man, or other
thing in the water, by reflection, or refraction; or of the sun, or
stars by direct vision in the air; which are nothing real in the things
seen, nor in the place where they seem to be; nor are their magnitudes
and figures the same with that of the object; but changeable, by the
variation of the organs of sight, or by glasses, and are present
oftentimes in our imagination, and in our dreams, when the object is
absent; or changed into other colours and shapes, as things that depend
only upon the fancy. And these are the _images_, which are originally
and most properly called _ideas_, and _idols_, and derived from the
language of the _Grecians_, with whom the word εἴδω signifieth _to see_.
They also are called _phantasms_, which is in the same language,
_apparitions_. And from these images it is, that one of the faculties of
man’s nature, is called the _imagination_. And from hence it is
manifest, that there neither is, nor can be, any image made of a thing
invisible.
It is also evident, that there can be, no image of a thing infinite: for
all the images, and phantasms that are made by the impression of things
visible, are figured; but figure is a quantity every way determined. And
therefore there can be no image of God; nor of the soul of man; nor of
spirits; but only of bodies visible; that is, bodies that have light in
themselves, or are by such enlightened.
[Sidenote: Fictions.]
And whereas a man can fancy shapes he never saw; making up a figure out
of the parts of divers creatures; as the poets make their centaurs,
chimeras, and other monsters never seen: so can he also give matter to
those shapes, and make them in wood, clay, or metal. [Sidenote: Material
images.] And these are also called images, not for the resemblance of
any corporeal thing, but for the resemblance of some phantastical
inhabitants of the brain of the maker. But in these idols, as they are
originally in the brain, and as they are painted, carved, moulded, or
moulten in matter, there is a similitude of the one to the other, for
which the material body made by art, may be said to be the image of the
fantastical idol made by nature.
But in a larger use of the word image, is contained also, any
representation of one thing by another. So an earthly sovereign may be
called the image of God: and an inferior magistrate, the image of an
earthly sovereign. And many times in the idolatry of the Gentiles there
was little regard to the similitude of their material idol to the idol
in their fancy, and yet it was called the image of it. For a stone
unhewn has been set up for Neptune, and divers other shapes far
different from the shapes they conceived of their gods. And at this day
we see many images of the Virgin Mary, and other saints, unlike one
another, and without correspondence to any one man’s fancy; and yet
serve well enough for the purpose they were erected for; which was no
more but by the names only, to represent the persons mentioned in the
history; to which every man applieth a mental image of his own making,
or none at all. And thus an image in the largest sense, is either the
resemblance, or the representation of some thing visible; or both
together, as it happeneth for the most part.
But the name of idol is extended yet further in Scripture, to signify
also the sun, or a star, or any other creature, visible or invisible,
when they are worshipped for gods.
[Sidenote: Idolatry, what.]
Having shown what is _worship_, and what an _image_; I will now put them
together, and examine what that IDOLATRY is, which is forbidden in the
second commandment, and other places of the Scripture.
To worship an image, is voluntarily to do those external acts, which are
signs of honouring either the matter of the image, which is wood, stone,
metal, or some other visible creature; or the phantasm of the brain, for
the resemblance, or representation whereof, the matter was formed and
figured; or both together, as one animate body, composed of the matter
and the phantasm, as of a body and soul.
To be uncovered, before a man of power and authority, or before the
throne of a prince, or in such other places as he ordaineth to that
purpose in his absence, is to worship that man, or prince with civil
worship; as being a sign, not of honouring the stool or place, but the
person; and is not idolatry. But if he that doth it, should suppose the
soul of the prince to be in the stool, or should present a petition to
the stool, it were divine worship, and idolatry.
To pray to a king for such things, as he is able to do for us, though we
prostrate ourselves before him, is but civil worship; because we
acknowledge no other power in him, but human: but voluntarily to pray
unto him for fair weather, or for any thing which God only can do for
us, is divine worship, and idolatry. On the other side, if a king compel
a man to it by the terror of death, or other great corporal punishment,
it is not idolatry: for the worship which the sovereign commandeth to be
done unto himself by the terror of his laws, is not a sign that he that
obeyeth him, does inwardly honour him as a God, but that he is desirous
to save himself from death, or from a miserable life; and that which is
not a sign of internal honour, is no worship; and therefore no idolatry.
Neither can it be said, that he that does it, scandalizeth, or layeth
any stumbling block before his brother; because how wise, or learned
soever he be that worshippeth in that manner, another man cannot from
thence argue, that he approveth it; but that he doth it for fear; and
that it is not his act, but the act of his sovereign.
To worship God, in some peculiar place, or turning a man’s face towards
an image, or determinate place, is not to worship, or honour the place,
or image; but to acknowledge it holy, that is to say, to acknowledge the
image, or the place to be set apart from common use. For that is the
meaning of the word _holy_; which implies no new quality in the place or
image, but only a new relation by appropriation to God; and therefore is
not idolatry; no more than it was idolatry to worship God before the
brazen serpent; or for the Jews, when they were out of their own
country, to turn their faces, when they prayed, towards the temple of
Jerusalem; or for Moses to put off his shoes when he was before the
flaming bush, the ground appertaining to Mount Sinai, which place God
had chosen to appear in, and to give his laws to the people of Israel,
and was therefore holy ground, not by inherent sanctity, but by
separation to God’s use; or for Christians to worship in the churches,
which are once solemnly dedicated to God for that purpose, by the
authority of the king, or other true representant of the Church. But to
worship God, as inanimating, or inhabiting such image, or place; that is
to say, in infinite substance in a finite place, is idolatry: for such
finite gods, are but idols of the brain, nothing real; and are commonly
called in the Scripture by the names of _vanity_, and _lies_, and
_nothing_. Also to worship God, not as inanimating, or present in the
place, or image; but to the end to be put in mind of him, or of some
works of his, in case the place, or image be dedicated, or set up by
private authority, and not by the authority of them that are our
sovereign pastors, is idolatry. For the commandment is, _thou shalt not
make to thyself any graven image_. God commanded Moses to set up the
brazen serpent; he did not make it to himself; it was not therefore
against the commandment. But the making of the golden calf by Aaron, and
the people, as being done without authority from God, was idolatry; not
only because they held it for God, but also because they made it for a
religious use, without warrant either from God their sovereign, or from
Moses, that was his lieutenant.
The Gentiles worshipped for gods, Jupiter and others; that living, were
men perhaps that had done great and glorious acts: and for the children
of God, divers men and women, supposing them gotten between an immortal
deity, and a mortal man. This was idolatry, because they made them so to
themselves, having no authority from God, neither in his eternal law of
reason, nor in his positive and revealed will. But though our Saviour
was a man, whom we also believe to be God immortal, and the Son of God,
yet this is no idolatry; because we build not that belief upon our own
fancy, or judgment, but upon the Word of God revealed in the Scriptures.
And for the adoration of the Eucharist, if the words of Christ, _this is
my body_, signify, _that he himself, and the seeming bread in his hand,
and not only so, but that all the seeming morsels of bread that have
ever since been, and any time hereafter shall be consecrated by priests,
be so many Christ’s bodies, and yet all of them but one body_; then is
that no idolatry, because it is authorized by our Saviour: but if that
text do not signify that, (for there is no other that can be alleged for
it) then, because it is a worship of human institution, it is idolatry.
For it is not enough to say, God can transubstantiate the bread into
Christ’s body: for the Gentiles also held God to be omnipotent, and
might upon that ground no less excuse their idolatry, by pretending, as
well as others, a transubstantiation of their wood, and stone into God
Almighty.
Whereas there be, that pretend divine inspiration to be the supernatural
entering of the Holy Ghost into a man, and not an acquisition of God’s
graces, by doctrine, and study; I think they are in a very dangerous
dilemma. For if they worship not the man whom they believe to be so
inspired, they fall into impiety; as not adoring God’s supernatural
presence. And again, if they worship him, they commit idolatry; for the
apostles would never permit themselves to be so worshipped. Therefore
the safest way is to believe, that by the descending of the dove upon
the apostles; and by Christ’s breathing on them, when he gave them the
Holy Ghost; and by the giving of it by imposition of hands, are
understood the signs which God has been pleased to use, or ordain to be
used, of his promise to assist those persons in their study to preach
his kingdom, and in their conversation, that it might not be scandalous,
but edifying to others.
[Sidenote: Scandalous worship of images.]
Besides the idolatrous worship of images, there is also a scandalous
worship of them; which is also a sin, but not idolatry. For _idolatry_
is to worship by signs of an internal, and real honour: but _scandalous
worship_, is but seeming worship, and may sometimes be joined with an
inward, and hearty detestation, both of the image, and of the
phantastical _demon_, or idol, to which it is dedicated; and proceed
only from the fear of death, or other grievous punishment; and is
nevertheless a sin in them that so worship, in case they be men whose
actions are looked at by others, as lights to guide them by; because
following their ways, they cannot but stumble, and fall in the way of
religion: whereas the example of those we regard not, works not on us at
all, but leaves us to our own diligence and caution; and consequently
are no causes of our falling.
If therefore a pastor lawfully called to teach and direct others, or any
other, of whose knowledge there is a great opinion, do external honour
to an idol for fear; unless he make his fear and unwillingness to it, as
evident as the worship; he scandalizeth his brother, by seeming to
approve idolatry. For his brother arguing from the action of his
teacher, or of him whose knowledge he esteemeth great, concludes it to
be lawful in itself. And this scandal is sin, and a _scandal given_. But
if one being no pastor, nor of eminent reputation for knowledge in
Christian doctrine, do the same, and another follow him; this is no
scandal given; for he had no cause to follow such example: but is a
pretence of scandal, which he taketh of himself for an excuse before
men. For an unlearned man, that is in the power of an idolatrous king,
or state, if commanded on pain of death to worship before an idol, he
detesteth the idol in his heart, he doth well; though if he had the
fortitude to suffer death, rather than worship it, he should do better.
But if a pastor, who as Christ’s messenger, has undertaken to teach
Christ’s doctrine to all nations, should do the same, it were not only a
sinful scandal, in respect of other Christian men’s consciences, but a
perfidious forsaking of his charge.
The sum of that which I have said hitherto, concerning the worship of
images, is this, that he that worshippeth in an image, or any creature,
either the matter thereof, or any fancy of his own, which he thinketh to
dwell in it; or both together; or believeth that such things hear his
prayers, or see his devotions, without ears or eyes, committeth
idolatry: and he that counterfeiteth such worship for fear of
punishment, if he be a man whose example hath power amongst his
brethren, committeth a sin. But he that worshippeth the Creator of the
world before such an image, or in such a place as he hath not made, or
chosen of himself, but taken from the commandment of God’s word, as the
Jews did in worshipping God before the cherubims, and before the brazen
serpent for a time, and in, or towards the Temple of Jerusalem, which
was also but for a time, committeth not idolatry.
Now for the worship of saints, and images, and relics, and other things
at this day practised in the Church of Rome, I say they are not allowed
by the Word of God, nor brought into the Church of Rome, from the
doctrine there taught; but partly left in it at the first conversion of
the Gentiles; and afterwards countenanced, and confirmed, and augmented
by the bishops of Rome.
[Sidenote: Answer to the argument from the cherubims, and brazen
serpent.]
As for the proofs alleged out of Scripture, namely, those examples of
images appointed by God to be set up; they were not set up for the
people, or any man to worship, but that they should worship God himself
before them; as before the cherubims over the ark, and the brazen
serpent. For we read not, that the priest, or any other did worship the
cherubims; but contrarily we read (_2 Kings_ xviii. 4) that Hezekiah
brake in pieces the brazen serpent which Moses had set up, because the
people burnt incense to it. Besides, those examples are not put for our
imitation, that we also should set up images, under pretence of
worshipping God before them; because the words of the second
commandment, _thou shalt not make to thyself any graven image, &c._
distinguish between the images that God commanded to be set up, and
those which we set up to ourselves. And therefore from the cherubims or
brazen serpent, to the images of man’s devising; and from the worship
commanded by God, to the will-worship of men, the argument is not good.
This also is to be considered, that as Hezekiah brake in pieces the
brazen serpent, because the Jews did worship it, to the end they should
do so no more; so also Christian sovereigns ought to break down the
images which their subjects have been accustomed to worship, that there
be no more occasion of such idolatry. For at this day, the ignorant
people, where images are worshipped, do really believe there is a divine
power in the images; and are told by their pastors, that some of them
have spoken; and have bled; and that miracles have been done by them;
which they apprehend as done by the saint, which they think either is
the image itself, or in it. The Israelites, when they worshipped the
calf, did think they worshipped the God that brought them out of Egypt;
and yet it was idolatry, because they thought the calf either was that
God, or had him in his belly. And though some man may think it
impossible for people to be so stupid, as to think the image to be God,
or a saint; or to worship it in that notion; yet it is manifest in
Scripture to the contrary; where when the golden calf was made, the
people said, (_Exod._ xxxii. 4) _These are thy gods, O Israel_; and
where the images of Laban (_Gen._ xxxi. 30) are called his gods. And we
see daily by experience in all sorts of people, that such men as study
nothing but their food and ease, are content to believe any absurdity,
rather than to trouble themselves to examine it; holding their faith as
it were by entail unalienable, except by an express and new law.
[Sidenote: Painting of fancies no idolatry; but abusing them to
religious worship is.]
But they infer from some other places, that it is lawful to paint
angels, and also God himself: as from God’s walking in the garden; from
Jacob’s seeing God at the top of the ladder; and from other visions, and
dreams. But visions, and dreams, whether natural, or supernatural, are
but phantasms: and he that painteth an image of any of them, maketh not
an image of God, but of his own phantasm, which is making of an idol. I
say not, that to draw a picture after a fancy, is a sin; but when it is
drawn, to hold it for a representation of God, is against the second
commandment; and can be of no use, but to worship. And the same may be
said of the images of angels, and of men dead; unless as monuments of
friends, or of men worthy remembrance. For such use of an image, is not
worship of the image; but a civil honouring of the person, not that is,
but that was. But when it is done to the image which we make of a saint,
for no other reason, but that we think he heareth our prayers, and is
pleased with the honour we do him, when dead, and without sense, we
attribute to him more than human power; and therefore it is idolatry.
Seeing therefore there is no authority, neither in the law of Moses, nor
in the Gospel, for the religious worship of images, or other
representations of God, which men set up to themselves; or for the
worship of the image of any creature in heaven or earth, or under the
earth: and whereas Christian kings, who are living representants of God,
are not to be worshipped by their subjects, by any act that signifieth a
greater esteem of his power, than the nature of mortal man is capable
of; it cannot be imagined, that the religious worship now in use, was
brought into the Church by misunderstanding of the Scripture. It resteth
therefore, that it was left in it, by not destroying the images
themselves, in the conversion of the Gentiles that worshipped them.
[Sidenote: How idolatry was left in the Church.]
The cause whereof, was the immoderate esteem, and prices set upon the
workmanship of them, which made the owners, though converted from
worshipping them as they had done religiously for demons, to retain them
still in their houses, upon pretence of doing it in the honour of
Christ, of the Virgin Mary, and of the Apostles, and other the pastors
of the primitive Church; as being easy, by giving them new names, to
make that an image of the Virgin Mary, and of her son our Saviour, which
before perhaps was called the image of Venus, and Cupid; and so of a
Jupiter to make a Barnabas, and of Mercury a Paul, and the like. And as
worldly ambition creeping by degrees into the pastors, drew them to an
endeavour of pleasing the new-made Christians; and also to a liking of
this kind of honour, which they also might hope for after their decease,
as well as those that had already gained it: so the worshipping of the
images of Christ and his apostles, grew more and more idolatrous; save
that somewhat after the time of Constantine, divers emperors, and
bishops, and general councils, observed and opposed the unlawfulness
thereof; but too late, or too weakly.
[Sidenote: Canonizing of saints.]
The canonizing of saints, is another relic of Gentilism: it is neither a
misunderstanding of Scripture, nor a new invention of the Roman Church,
but a custom as ancient as the commonwealth of Rome itself. The first
that ever was canonized at Rome, was Romulus, and that upon the
narration of Julius Proculus, that swore before the senate, he spake
with him after his death, and was assured by him, he dwelt in heaven,
and was there called _Quirinus_, and would be propitious to the state of
their new city: and thereupon the senate gave _public testimony_ of his
sanctity. Julius Cæsar, and other emperors after him, had the like
_testimony_; that is, were canonized for saints; for by such testimony
is CANONIZATION now defined; and is the same with the ἀποθέωσις of the
heathen.
[Sidenote: The name of Pontifex.]
It is also from the Roman Heathen, that the Popes have received the
name, and power of PONTIFEX MAXIMUS. This was the name of him that in
the ancient commonwealth of Rome, had the supreme authority under the
senate and people, of regulating all ceremonies and doctrines concerning
their religion: and when Augustus Cæsar changed the state into a
monarchy, he took to himself no more but this office, and that of
tribune of the people, that is to say, the supreme power both in state,
and religion; and the succeeding emperors enjoyed the same. But when the
emperor Constantine lived, who was the first that professed and
authorized Christian religion, it was consonant to his profession, to
cause religion to be regulated, under his authority, by the Bishop of
Rome: though it do not appear they had so soon the name of Pontifex; but
rather, that the succeeding bishops took it of themselves, to
countenance the power they exercised over the bishops of the Roman
provinces. For it is not any privilege of St. Peter, but the privilege
of the city of Rome, which the emperors were always willing to uphold,
that gave them such authority over other bishops; as may be evidently
seen by that, that the bishop of Constantinople, when the emperor made
that city the seat of the empire, pretended to be equal to the bishop of
Rome; though at last, not without contention, the Pope carried it, and
became the _Pontifex Maximus_; but in right only of the emperor; and not
without the bounds of the empire; nor any where, after the emperor had
lost his power in Rome; though it were the Pope himself that took his
power from him. From whence we may by the way observe, that there is no
place for the superiority of the Pope over other bishops, except in the
territories whereof he is himself the civil sovereign, and where the
emperor having sovereign power civil, hath expressly chosen the Pope for
the chief pastor under himself, of his Christian subjects.
[Sidenote: Procession of images.]
The carrying about of images in _procession_, is another relic of the
religion of the Greeks, and Romans. For they also carried their idols
from place to place, in a kind of chariot, which was peculiarly
dedicated to that use, which the Latins called _thensa_, and _vehiculum
Deorum_; and the image was placed in a frame, or shrine, which they
called _ferculum_: and that which they called _pompa_, is the same that
now is named _procession_. According whereunto, amongst the divine
honours which were given to Julius Cæsar by the senate, this was one,
that in the pomp, or procession, at the Circæan games, he should have
_thensam et ferculum_, a sacred chariot and a shrine; which was as much,
as to be carried up and down as a god: just as at this day the Popes are
carried by Switzers under a canopy.
[Sidenote: Wax candles, and torches lighted.]
To these processions also belonged the bearing of burning torches, and
candles, before the images of the gods, both amongst the Greeks, and
Romans. For afterwards the emperors of Rome received the same honour; as
we read of Caligula, that at his reception to the empire, he was carried
from Misenum to Rome, in the midst of a throng of people, the ways beset
with altars, and beasts for sacrifice, and burning _torches_: and of
Caracalla, that was received into Alexandria with incense, and with
casting of flowers, and δαδοῦχίαις, that is, with torches; for δαδοῦχοι
were they that amongst the Greeks carried torches lighted in the
processions of their gods. And in process of time, the devout, but
ignorant people, did many times honour their bishops with the like pomp
of wax candles, and the images of our Saviour, and the saints,
constantly, in the church itself. And thus came in the use of wax
candles; and was also established by some of the ancient Councils.
The heathens had also their _aqua lustralis_, that is to say, _holy
water_. The Church of Rome imitates them also in their _holy days_. They
had their _bacchanalia_; and we have our _wakes_, answering to them:
they their _saturnalia_, and we our _carnivals_, and Shrove-Tuesday’s
liberty of servants: they their procession of _Priapus_; we our fetching
in, erection, and dancing about _May-poles_; and dancing is one kind of
worship: they had their procession called _Ambarvalia_; and we our
procession about the fields in the _Rogation-week_. Nor do I think that
these are all the ceremonies that have been left in the Church, from the
first conversion of the Gentiles; but they are all that I can for the
present call to mind; and if a man would well observe that which is
delivered in the histories, concerning the religious rites of the Greeks
and Romans, I doubt not but he might find many more of these old empty
bottles of Gentilism, which the doctors of the Roman Church, either by
negligence or ambition, have filled up again with the new wine of
Christianity, that will not fail in time to break them.
-------
CHAP. XLVI.
OF DARKNESS FROM VAIN PHILOSOPHY, AND
FABULOUS TRADITIONS.
[Sidenote: What philosophy is.]
By PHILOSOPHY is understood _the knowledge acquired by reasoning, from
the manner of the generation of any thing, to the properties: or from
the properties, to some possible way of generation of the same; to the
end to be able to produce, as far as matter, and human force permit,
such effects, as human life requireth_. So the geometrician, from the
construction of figures, findeth out many properties thereof; and from
the properties, new ways of their construction, by reasoning; to the end
to be able to measure land, and water; and for infinite other uses. So
the astronomer, from the rising, setting, and moving of the sun, and
stars, in divers parts of the heavens, findeth out the causes of day,
and night, and of the different seasons of the year; whereby he keepeth
an account of time; and the like of other sciences.
[Sidenote: Prudence no part of philosophy.]
By which definition it is evident, that we are not to account as any
part thereof, that original knowledge called experience, in which
consisteth prudence; because it is not attained by reasoning, but found
as well in brute beasts, as in man; and is but a memory of successions
of events in times past, wherein the omission of every little
circumstance altering the effect, frustrateth the expectation of the
most prudent: whereas nothing is produced by reasoning aright, but
general, eternal, and immutable truth.
[Sidenote: No false doctrine is part of philosophy.]
Nor are we therefore to give that name to any false conclusions: for he
that reasoneth aright in words he understandeth, can never conclude an
error:
[Sidenote: No more is revelation supernatural.]
Nor to that which any man knows by supernatural revelation; because it
is not acquired by reasoning:
[Sidenote: Nor learning taken upon credit of authors.]
Nor that which is gotten by reasoning from the authority of books;
because it is not by reasoning from the cause to the effect, nor from
the effect to the cause; and is not knowledge but faith.
[Sidenote: Of the beginnings and progress of philosophy.]
The faculty of reasoning being consequent to the use of speech, it was
not possible, but that there should have been some general truths found
out by reasoning, as ancient almost as language itself. The savages of
America, are not without some good moral sentences; also they have a
little arithmetic, to add, and divide in numbers not too great: but they
are not, therefore, philosophers. For as there were plants of corn and
wine in small quantity dispersed in the fields and woods, before men
knew their virtue, or made use of them for their nourishment, or planted
them apart in fields and vineyards; in which time they fed on acorns,
and drank water: so also there have been divers true, general, and
profitable speculations from the beginning; as being the natural plants
of human reason. But they were at first but few in number; men lived
upon gross experience; there was no method; that is to say, no sowing,
nor planting of knowledge by itself, apart from the weeds, and common
plants of error and conjecture. And the cause of it being the want of
leisure from procuring the necessities of life, and defending themselves
against their neighbours, it was impossible, till the erecting of great
commonwealths, it should be otherwise. _Leisure_ is the mother of
_philosophy_; and _Commonwealth_, the mother of _peace_ and _leisure_.
Where first were great and flourishing _cities_, there was first the
study of _philosophy_. The _Gymnosophists_ of India, the _Magi_ of
Persia, and the _Priests_ of Chaldea and Egypt, are counted the most
ancient philosophers; and those countries were the most ancient of
kingdoms. _Philosophy_ was not risen to the Grecians, and other people
of the west, whose _commonwealths_, no greater perhaps than Lucca or
Geneva, had never _peace_, but when their fears of one another were
equal; nor the _leisure_ to observe anything but one another. At length,
when war had united many of these Grecian lesser cities, into fewer, and
greater; then began _seven men_, of several parts of Greece, to get the
reputation of being _wise_; some of them for _moral_ and _politic_
sentences; and others for the learning of the Chaldeans and Egyptians,
which was _astronomy_, and _geometry_. But we hear not yet of any
_schools_ of _philosophy_.
[Sidenote: Of the schools of philosophy amongst the Athenians.]
After the Athenians, by the overthrow of the Persian armies, had gotten
the dominion of the sea; and thereby, of all the islands, and maritime
cities of the Archipelago, as well of Asia as Europe; and were grown
wealthy; they that had no employment, neither at home nor abroad, had
little else to employ themselves in, but either (as St. Luke says,
_Acts_ xvii. 21), _in telling and hearing news_, or in discoursing of
_philosophy_ publicly to the youth of the city. Every master took some
place for that purpose. Plato, in certain public walks called
_Academia_, from one _Academus_: Aristotle in the walk of the temple of
Pan, called _Lyceum_: others in the _Stoa_, or covered walk, wherein the
merchants’ goods were brought to land: others in other places; where
they spent the time of their leisure, in teaching or in disputing of
their opinions: and some in any place, where they could get the youth of
the city together to hear them talk. And this was it which Carneades
also did at Rome, when he was ambassador: which caused Cato to advise
the senate to dispatch him quickly, for fear of corrupting the manners
of the young men, that delighted to hear him speak, as they thought,
fine things.
From this it was, that the place where any of them taught, and disputed,
was called _schola_, which in their tongue signifieth _leisure_; and
their disputations, _diatribæ_, that is to say, _passing of the time_.
Also the philosophers themselves had the name of their sects, some of
them from these their Schools: for they that followed Plato’s doctrine,
were called _Academics_; the followers of Aristotle _Peripatetics_, from
the walk he taught in; and those that Zeno taught _Stoics_, from the
_Stoa_; as if we should denominate men from _Moor-fields_, from _Paul’s
Church_, and from the _Exchange_, because they meet there often, to
prate and loiter.
Nevertheless, men were so much taken with this custom, that in time it
spread itself over all Europe, and the best part of Afric; so as there
were schools publicly erected and maintained, for lectures and
disputations, almost in every commonwealth.
[Sidenote: Of the schools of the Jews.]
There were also schools, anciently, both before and after the time of
our Saviour, amongst the Jews; but they were schools of their law. For
though they were called _synagogues_, that is to say, congregations of
the people; yet, inasmuch as the law was every sabbath-day read,
expounded, and disputed in them, they differed not in nature, but in
name only, from public schools; and were not only in Jerusalem, but in
every city of the Gentiles, where the Jews inhabited. There was such a
school at Damascus, whereinto Paul entered, to persecute. There were
others at Antioch, Iconium, and Thessalonica, whereinto he entered to
dispute: and such was the synagogue of the _Libertines_, _Cyrenians_,
_Alexandrians_, _Cilicians_, and those of Asia; that is to say, the
school of _Libertines_, and of _Jews_ that were strangers in Jerusalem;
and of this school they were that disputed (_Acts_ vi. 9) with St.
Stephen.
[Sidenote: The schools of the Grecians unprofitable.]
But what has been the utility of those schools? What science is there at
this day acquired by their readings and disputings? That we have of
geometry, which is the mother of all natural science, we are not
indebted for it to the schools. Plato, that was the best philosopher of
the Greeks, forbad entrance into his school to all that were not already
in some measure geometricians. There were many that studied that science
to the great advantage of mankind: but there is no mention of their
schools; nor was there any sect of geometricians; nor did they then pass
under the name of philosophers. The natural philosophy of those schools
was rather a dream than science, and set forth in senseless and
insignificant language; which cannot be avoided by those that will teach
philosophy, without having first attained great knowledge in geometry.
For nature worketh by motion; the ways and degrees whereof cannot be
known, without the knowledge of the proportions and properties of lines
and figures. Their moral philosophy is but a description of their own
passions. For the rule of manners, without civil government, is the law
of nature; and in it, the law civil, that determineth what is _honest_
and _dishonest_, what is _just_ and _unjust_, and generally what is
_good_ and _evil_. Whereas they make the rules of _good_ and _bad_, by
their own _liking_ and _disliking_: by which means, in so great
diversity of taste, there is nothing generally agreed on; but every one
doth, as far as he dares, whatsoever seemeth good in his own eyes, to
the subversion of commonwealth. Their _logic_, which should be the
method of reasoning, is nothing else but captions of words, and
inventions how to puzzle such as should go about to pose them. To
conclude, there is nothing so absurd, that the old philosophers, as
Cicero saith, (who was one of them,) have not some of them maintained.
And I believe that scarce anything can be more absurdly said in natural
philosophy, than that which now is called _Aristotle’s Metaphysics_; nor
more repugnant to government, than much of that he hath said in his
_Politics_; nor more ignorantly, than a great part of his _Ethics_.
[Sidenote: The schools of the Jews unprofitable.]
The school of the Jews was originally a school of the law of Moses; who
commanded (_Deut._ xxxi. 10) that at the end of every seventh year, at
the Feast of the Tabernacles, it should be read to all the people, that
they might hear and learn it. Therefore the reading of the law, which
was in use after the captivity, every Sabbath day, ought to have had no
other end, but the acquainting of the people with the Commandments which
they were to obey, and to expound unto them the writings of the
prophets. But it is manifest, by the many reprehensions of them by our
Saviour, that they corrupted the text of the law with their false
commentaries, and vain traditions; and so little understood the
prophets, that they did neither acknowledge Christ, nor the works he
did, of which the prophets prophesied. So that by their lectures and
disputations in their synagogues, they turned the doctrine of their law
into a fantastical kind of philosophy, concerning the incomprehensible
nature of God, and of spirits; which they compounded of the vain
philosophy and theology of the Grecians, mingled with their own fancies,
drawn from the obscurer places of the Scripture, and which might most
easily be wrested to their purpose; and from the fabulous traditions of
their ancestors.
[Sidenote: University, what it is.]
That which is now called an _University_, is a joining together, and an
incorporation under one government, of many public schools, in one and
the same town or city. In which, the principal schools were ordained for
the three professions, that is to say, of the Roman religion, of the
Roman law, and of the art of medicine. And for the study of philosophy,
it hath no otherwise place, than as a hand-maid to the Roman religion:
and since the authority of Aristotle is only current there, that study
is not properly philosophy, (the nature whereof dependeth not on
authors,) but _Aristotelity_. And for geometry, till of very late times
it had no place at all; as being subservient to nothing but rigid truth.
And if any man by the ingenuity of his own nature, had attained to any
degree of perfection therein, he was commonly thought a magician, and
his art diabolical.
[Sidenote: Errors brought into religion from Aristotle’s metaphysics.]
Now to descend to the particular tenets of vain philosophy, derived to
the Universities, and thence into the Church, partly from Aristotle,
partly from blindness of understanding; I shall first consider their
principles. There is a certain _philosophia prima_, on which all other
philosophy ought to depend; and consisteth principally, in right
limiting of the significations of such appellations, or names, as are of
all others the most universal; which limitations serve to avoid
ambiguity and equivocation in reasoning; and are commonly called
definitions; such as are the definitions of body, time, place, matter,
form, essence, subject, substance, accident, power, act, finite,
infinite, quantity, quality, motion, action, passion, and divers others,
necessary to the explaining of a man’s conceptions concerning the nature
and generation of bodies. The explication, that is, the settling of the
meaning, of which, and the like terms, is commonly in the Schools called
_metaphysics_; as being a part of the philosophy of Aristotle, which
hath that for title. But it is in another sense; for there it signifieth
as much as _books written or placed after his natural philosophy_: but
the schools take them for _books of supernatural philosophy_: for the
word _metaphysics_ will bear both these senses. And indeed that which is
there written, is for the most part so far from the possibility of being
understood, and so repugnant to natural reason, that whosoever thinketh
there is any thing to be understood by it, must needs think it
supernatural.
[Sidenote: Errors concerning abstract essences.]
From these metaphysics, which are mingled with the Scripture to make
school divinity, we are told, there be in the world certain essences
separated from bodies, which they call _abstract essences, and
substantial forms_. For the interpreting of which jargon, there is need
of somewhat more than ordinary attention in this place. Also I ask
pardon of those that are not used to this kind of discourse, for
applying myself to those that are. The world, (I mean not the earth
only, that denominates the lovers of it _worldly men_, but the
_universe_, that is, the whole mass of all things that are), is
corporeal, that is to say, body; and hath the dimensions of magnitude,
namely, length, breadth, and depth: also every part of body, is likewise
body, and hath the like dimensions; and consequently every part of the
universe, is body, and that which is not body, is no part of the
universe: and because the universe is all, that which is no part of it,
is _nothing_; and consequently _no where_. Nor does it follow from
hence, that spirits are _nothing_: for they have dimensions, and are
therefore really _bodies_; though that name in common speech be given to
such bodies only, as are visible, or palpable; that is, that have some
degree of opacity. But for spirits, they call them incorporeal; which is
a name of more honour, and may therefore with more piety be attributed
to God himself; in whom we consider not what attribute expresseth best
his nature, which is incomprehensible; but what best expresseth our
desire to honour Him.
To know now upon what grounds they say there be _essences abstract_, or
_substantial forms_, we are to consider what those words do properly
signify. The use of words, is to register to ourselves, and make
manifest to others the thoughts and conceptions of our minds. Of which
words, some are the names of the things conceived; as the names of all
sorts of bodies, that work upon the senses, and leave an impression in
the imagination. Others are the names of the imaginations themselves;
that is to say, of those ideas, or mental images we have of all things
we see, or remember. And others again are names of names; or of
different sorts of speech: as _universal_, _plural_, _singular_, are the
names of names; and _definition_, _affirmation_, _negation_, _true_,
_false_, _syllogism_, _interrogation_, _promise_, _covenant_, are the
names of certain forms of speech. Others serve to show the consequence,
or repugnance of one name to another; as when one saith, _a man is a
body_, he intendeth that the name of _body_ is necessarily consequent to
the name of _man_; as being but several names of the same thing, _man_;
which consequence is signified by coupling them together with the word
_is_. And as we use the verb _is_, so the Latins use their verb _est_,
and the Greeks their Ἔστι through all its declinations. Whether all
other nations of the world have in their several languages a word that
answereth to it, or not, I cannot tell; but I am sure they have not need
of it. For the placing of two names in order may serve to signify their
consequence, if it were the custom, (for custom is it, that gives words
their force,) as well as the words _is_, or _be_, or _are_, and the
like.
And if it were so, that there were a language without any verb
answerable to _est_, or _is_, or _be_; yet the men that used it would be
not a jot the less capable of inferring, concluding, and of all kind of
reasoning, than were the Greeks, and Latins. But what then would become
of these terms, of _entity_, _essence_, _essential_, _essentiality_,
that are derived from it, and of many more than depend on these, applied
as most commonly they are? They are therefore no names of things; but
signs, by which we make known, that we conceive the consequence of one
name or attribute to another: as when we say, _a man is a living body_,
we mean not that the _man_ is one thing, the _living body_ another, and
the _is_, or _being_ a third; but that the _man_, and the _living body_,
is the same thing; because the consequence, _if he be a man, he is a
living body_, is a true consequence, signified by that word _is_.
Therefore, _to be a body_, _to walk_, _to be speaking_, _to live_, _to
see_, and the like infinitives; also _corporeity_, _walking_,
_speaking_, _life_, _sight_, and the like, that signify just the same,
are the names of _nothing_; as I have elsewhere more amply expressed.
But to what purpose, may some man say, is such subtlety in a work of
this nature, where I pretend to nothing but what is necessary to the
doctrine of government and obedience? It is to this purpose, that men
may no longer suffer themselves to be abused, by them, that by this
doctrine of _separated essences_, built on the vain philosophy of
Aristotle, would fright them from obeying the laws of their country,
with empty names; as men fright birds from the corn with an empty
doublet, a hat, and a crooked stick. For it is upon this ground, that
when a man is dead and buried, they say his soul, that is his life, can
walk separated from his body, and is seen by night amongst the graves.
Upon the same ground they say, that the figure, and colour, and taste of
a piece of bread, has a being, there, where they say there is no bread.
And upon the same ground they say, that faith, and wisdom, and other
virtues, are sometimes _poured_ into a man, sometimes _blown_ into him
from Heaven, as if the virtuous and their virtues could be asunder; and
a great many other things that serve to lessen the dependance of
subjects on the sovereign power of their country. For who will endeavour
to obey the laws, if he expect obedience to be poured or blown into him?
Or who will not obey a priest, that can make God, rather than his
sovereign, nay than God himself? Or who, that is in fear of ghosts, will
not bear great respect to those that can make the holy water, that
drives them from him? And this shall suffice for an example of the
errors, which are brought into the Church, from the _entities_ and
_essences_ of Aristotle: which it may be he knew to be false philosophy;
but writ it as a thing consonant to, and corroborative of their
religion; and fearing the fate of Socrates.
Being once fallen into this error of _separated essences_, they are
thereby necessarily involved in many other absurdities that follow it.
For seeing they will have these forms to be real, they are obliged to
assign them _some place_. But because they hold them incorporeal,
without all dimension of quantity, and all men know that place is
dimension, and not to be filled, but by that which is corporeal; they
are driven to uphold their credit with a distinction, that they are not
indeed anywhere _circumscriptivè_, but _definitivè_; which terms being
mere words, and in this occasion insignificant, pass only in Latin, that
the vanity of them may be concealed. For the circumscription of a thing,
is nothing else but the determination, or defining of its place; and so
both the terms of the distinction are the same. And in particular, of
the essence of a man, which, they say, is his soul, they affirm it, to
be all of it in his little finger, and all of it in every other part,
how small soever, of his body; and yet no more soul in the whole body,
than in any one of those parts. Can any man think that God is served
with such absurdities? And yet all this is necessary to believe, to
those that will believe the existence of an incorporeal soul, separated
from the body.
And when they come to give account how an incorporeal substance can be
capable of pain, and be tormented in the fire of hell or purgatory, they
have nothing at all to answer, but that it cannot be known how fire can
burn souls.
Again, whereas motion is change of place, and incorporeal substances are
not capable of place, they are troubled to make it seem possible, how a
soul can go hence, without the body, to heaven, hell, or purgatory; and
how the ghosts of men, and I may add of their clothes which they appear
in, can walk by night in churches, churchyards, and other places of
sepulture. To which I know not what they can answer, unless they will
say, they walk _definitivè_, not _circumscriptivè_, or _spiritually_,
not _temporally_: for such egregious distinctions are equally applicable
to any difficulty whatsoever.
[Sidenote: Nunc-stans.]
For the meaning of _eternity_, they will not have it to be an endless
succession of time; for then they should not be able to render a reason
how God’s will, and preordaining of things to come, should not be before
his prescience of the same, as the efficient cause before the effect, or
agent before the action; nor of many other their bold opinions
concerning the incomprehensible nature of God. But they will teach us,
that eternity is the standing still of the present time, a _nunc-stans_,
as the Schools call it; which neither they, nor any else understand, no
more than they would a _hic-stans_ for an infinite greatness of place.
[Sidenote: One body in many places, and many bodies in one place at
once.]
And whereas men divide a body in their thought, by numbering parts of
it, and, in numbering those parts, number also the parts of the place it
filled; it cannot be, but in making many parts, we make also many places
of those parts; whereby there cannot be conceived in the mind of any
man, more, or fewer parts, than there are places for: yet they will have
us believe, that by the Almighty power of God, one body may be at one
and the same time in many places; and many bodies at one and the same
time in one place: as if it were an acknowledgment of the Divine Power
to say, that which is, is not; or that which has been, has not been. And
these are but a small part of the incongruities they are forced to, from
their disputing philosophically, instead of admiring, and adoring of the
divine and incomprehensible nature; whose attributes cannot signify what
he is, but ought to signify our desire to honour him, with the best
appellations we can think on. But they that venture to reason of his
nature, from these attributes of honour, losing their understanding in
the very first attempt, fall from one inconvenience into another,
without end, and without number; in the same manner, as when a man
ignorant of the ceremonies of court, coming into the presence of a
greater person than he is used to speak to, and stumbling at his
entrance, to save himself from falling, lets slip his cloak; to recover
his cloak, lets fall his hat; and with one disorder after another,
discovers his astonishment and rusticity.
[Sidenote: Absurdities in natural philosophy, as gravity the cause of
heaviness.]
Then for _physics_, that is, the knowledge of the subordinate and
secondary causes of natural events; they render none at all, but empty
words. If you desire to know why some kind of bodies sink naturally
downwards toward the earth, and others go naturally from it; the Schools
will tell you out of Aristotle, that the bodies that sink downwards, are
_heavy_; and that this heaviness is it that causes them to descend. But
if you ask what they mean by _heaviness_, they will define it to be an
endeavour to go to the centre of the earth. So that the cause why things
sink downward, is an endeavour to be below: which is as much as to say,
that bodies descend, or ascend, because they do. Or they will tell you
the centre of the earth is the place of rest, and conservation for heavy
things; and therefore they endeavour to be there: as if stones and
metals had a desire, or could discern the place they would be at, as man
does; or loved rest, as man does not; or that a piece of glass were less
safe in the window, than falling into the street.
[Sidenote: Quantity put into body already made.]
If we would know why the same body seems greater, without adding to it,
one time, than another; they say, when it seems less, it is _condensed_;
when greater, _rarified_. What is that _condensed_, and _rarified_?
Condensed, is when there is in the very same matter, less quantity than
before; and rarified, when more. As if there could be matter, that had
not some determined quantity; when quantity is nothing else but the
determination of matter; that is to say, of body, by which we say, one
body is greater or lesser than another, by thus, or thus much. Or as if
a body were made without any quantity at all, and that afterwards more
or less were put into it, according as it is intended the body should be
more or less dense.
[Sidenote: Pouring in of souls.]
For the cause of the soul of man, they say, _creatur infundendo_, and
_creando infunditur_: that is, _it is created by pouring it in_, and
_poured in by creation_.
[Sidenote: Ubiquity of apparition.]
For the cause of sense, an ubiquity of _species_; that is, of the
_shows_ or _apparitions_ of objects; which when they be apparitions to
the eye, is _sight_; when to the ear, _hearing_; to the palate, _taste_;
to the nostril, _smelling_; and to the rest of the body, _feeling_.
[Sidenote: Will, the cause of willing.]
For cause of the will, to do any particular action, which is called
_volitio_, they assign the faculty, that is to say, the capacity in
general, that men have, to will sometimes one thing, sometimes another,
which is called _voluntas_; making the _power_ the cause of the _act_.
As if one should assign for cause of the good or evil acts of men, their
ability to do them.
[Sidenote: Ignorance an occult cause.]
And in many occasions they put for cause of natural events, their own
ignorance; but disguised in other words: as when they say, fortune is
the cause of things contingent; that is, of things whereof they know no
cause: and as when they attribute many effects to _occult qualities_;
that is, qualities not known to them; and therefore also, as they think,
to no man else. And to _sympathy_, _antipathy_, _antiperistasis_,
_specifical qualities_, and other like terms, which signify neither the
agent that produceth them, nor the operation by which they are produced.
If such _metaphysics_, and _physics_ as this, be not _vain philosophy_,
there was never any; nor needed St. Paul to give us warning to avoid it.
[Sidenote: One makes the things incongruent, another the incongruity.]
And for their moral, and civil philosophy, it hath the same, or greater
absurdities. If a man do an action of injustice, that is to say, an
action contrary to the law, God they say is the prime cause of the law,
and also the prime cause of that, and all other actions; but no cause at
all of the injustice; which is the inconformity of the action to the
law. This is vain philosophy. A man might as well say, that one man
maketh both a straight line, and a crooked, and another maketh their
incongruity. And such is the philosophy of all men that resolve of their
conclusions, before they know their premises; pretending to comprehend,
that which is incomprehensible; and of attributes of honour to make
attributes of nature; as this dictinction was made to maintain the
doctrine of free-will, that is, of a will of man, not subject to the
will of God.
[Sidenote: Private appetite the rule of public good.]
Aristotle, and other heathen philosophers, define good and evil, by the
appetite of men; and well enough, as long as we consider them governed
every one by his own law; for in the condition of men that have no other
law but their own appetites, there can be no general rule of good, and
evil actions. But in a commonwealth this measure is false: not the
appetite of private men, but the law, which is the will and appetite of
the state, is the measure. And yet is this doctrine still practised; and
men judge the goodness or wickedness of their own, and of other men’s
actions, and of the actions of the commonwealth itself, by their own
passions; and no man calleth good or evil, but that which is so in his
own eyes, without any regard at all to the public laws; except only
monks, and friars, that are bound by vow to that simple obedience to
their superior, to which every subject ought to think himself bound by
the law of nature to the civil sovereign. And this private measure of
good, is a doctrine, not only vain, but also pernicious to the public
state.
[Sidenote: And that lawful marriage is unchastity.]
It is also vain and false philosophy, to say the work of marriage is
repugnant to chastity, or continence, and by consequence to make them
moral vices; as they do, that pretend chastity, and continence, for the
ground of denying marriage to the clergy. For they confess it is no
more, but a constitution of the Church, that requireth in those holy
orders that continually attend the altar and administration of the
eucharist, a continual abstinence from women, under the name of
continual chastity, continence, and purity. Therefore they call the
lawful use of wives, want of chastity and continence; and so make
marriage a sin, or at least a thing so impure, and unclean, as to render
a man unfit for the altar. If the law were made because the use of wives
is incontinence, and contrary to chastity, then all marriage is vice: if
because it is a thing too impure, and unclean, for a man consecrated to
God; much more should other natural, necessary, and daily works which
all men do, render men unworthy to be priests, because they are more
unclean.
But the secret foundation of this prohibition of marriage of priests, is
not likely to have been laid so slightly, as upon such errors in moral
philosophy; nor yet upon the preference of single life, to the estate of
matrimony; which proceeded from the wisdom of St. Paul, who perceived
how inconvenient a thing it was, for those that in those times of
persecution were preachers of the gospel, and forced to fly from one
country to another, to be clogged with the care of wife and children;
but upon the design of the Popes, and priests of after times, to make
themselves the clergy, that is to say, sole heirs of the kingdom of God
in this world; to which it was necessary to take from them the use of
marriage; because our Saviour saith, that at the coming of his kingdom
the children of God _shall neither marry, nor be given in marriage, but
shall be as the angels in heaven_; that is to say, spiritual. Seeing
then they had taken on them the name of spiritual, to have allowed
themselves, when there was no need, the propriety of wives, had been an
incongruity.
[Sidenote: And that all government but popular is tyranny.]
From Aristotle’s civil philosophy, they have learned, to call all manner
of commonwealths but the popular, (such as was at that time the state of
Athens), _tyranny_. All kings they called tyrants; and the aristocracy
of the thirty governors set up there by the Lacedemonians that subdued
them, the thirty tyrants. As also to call the condition of the people
under the democracy, _liberty_. _A tyrant_ originally signified no more
simply, but a _monarch_. But when afterwards in most part of Greece that
kind of government was abolished, the name began to signify, not only
the thing it did before, but with it, the hatred which the popular
states bare towards it. As also the name of king became odious after the
deposing of the kings in Rome, as being a thing natural to all men, to
conceive some great fault to be signified in any attribute, that is
given in despite, and to a great enemy. And when the same men shall be
displeased with those that have the administration of the democracy, or
aristocracy, they are not to seek for disgraceful names to express their
anger in; but call readily the one _anarchy_, and the other _oligarchy_,
or the _tyranny of a few_. And that which offendeth the people, is no
other thing, but that they are governed, not as every one of them would
himself, but as the public representant, be it one man, or an assembly
of men, thinks fit; that is, by an arbitrary government: for which they
give evil names to their superiors; never knowing, till perhaps a little
after a civil war, that without such arbitrary government, such war must
be perpetual; and that it is men, and arms, not words and promises, that
make the force and power of the laws.
[Sidenote: That not men, but law governs.]
And therefore this is another error of Aristotle’s politics, that in a
well-ordered commonwealth, not men should govern, but the laws. What
man, that has his natural senses, though he can neither write nor read,
does not find himself governed by them he fears, and believes can kill
or hurt him when he obeyeth not? Or that believes the law can hurt him;
that is, words and paper, without the hands and swords of men? And this
is of the number of pernicious errors: for they induce men, as oft as
they like not their governors, to adhere to those that call them
tyrants, and to think it lawful to raise war against them: and yet they
are many times cherished from the pulpit, by the clergy.
[Sidenote: Laws over the conscience.]
There is another error in their civil philosophy, which they never
learned of Aristotle, nor Cicero, nor any other of the heathen, to
extend the power of the law, which is the rule of actions only, to the
very thoughts and consciences of men, by examination, and _inquisition_
of what they hold, notwithstanding the conformity of their speech and
actions. By which, men are either punished for answering the truth of
their thoughts, or constrained to answer an untruth for fear of
punishment. It is true, that the civil magistrate, intending to employ a
minister in the charge of teaching, may enquire of him, if he be content
to preach such and such doctrines; and in case of refusal, may deny him
the employment. But to force him to accuse himself of opinions, when his
actions are not by law forbidden, is against the law of nature; and
especially in them, who teach, that a man shall be damned to eternal and
extreme torments, if he die in a false opinion concerning an article of
the Christian faith. For who is there, that knowing there is so great
danger in an error, whom the natural care of himself, compelleth not to
hazard his soul upon his own judgment, rather than that of any other man
that is unconcerned in his damnation?
[Sidenote: Private interpretation of law.]
For a private man, without the authority of the commonwealth, that is to
say, without permission from the representant thereof, to interpret the
law by his own spirit, is another error in the politics: but not drawn
from Aristotle, nor from any other of the heathen philosophers. For none
of them deny, but that in the power of making laws, is comprehended also
the power of explaining them when there is need. And are not the
Scriptures, in all places where they are law, made law by the authority
of the commonwealth, and consequently, a part of the civil law?
Of the same kind it is also, when any but the sovereign restraineth in
any man that power which the commonwealth hath not restrained; as they
do, that impropriate the preaching of the gospel to one certain order of
men, where the laws have left it free. If the state give me leave to
preach, or teach; that is, if it forbid me not, no man can forbid me. If
I find myself amongst the idolaters of America, shall I that am a
Christian, though not in orders, think it a sin to preach Jesus Christ,
till I have received orders from Rome? Or when I have preached, shall
not I answer their doubts, and expound the Scriptures to them; that is,
shall I not teach? But for this may some say, as also for administering
to them the sacraments, the necessity shall be esteemed for a sufficient
mission; which is true: but this is true also, that for whatsoever, a
dispensation is due for the necessity, for the same there needs no
dispensation, when there is no law that forbids it. Therefore to deny
these functions to those, to whom the civil sovereign hath not denied
them, is a taking away of a lawful liberty, which is contrary to the
doctrine of civil government.
[Sidenote: Language of School divines.]
More examples of vain philosophy, brought into religion by the doctors
of School-divinity, might be produced; but other men may if they please
observe them of themselves. I shall only add this, that the writings of
School-divines, are nothing else for the most part, but insignificant
trains of strange and barbarous words, or words otherwise used, than in
the common use of the Latin tongue; such as would pose Cicero, and
Varro, and all the grammarians of ancient Rome. Which if any man would
see proved, let him, as I have said once before, see whether he can
translate any School-divine into any of the modern tongues, as French,
English, or any other copious language: for that which cannot in most of
these be made intelligible, is not intelligible in the Latin. Which
insignificancy of language, though I cannot note it for false
philosophy; yet it hath a quality, not only to hide the truth, but also
to make men think they have it, and desist from further search.
[Sidenote: Errors from tradition.]
Lastly, for the errors brought in from false, or uncertain history, what
is all the legend of fictitious miracles, in the lives of the saints;
and all the histories of apparitions, and ghosts, alleged by the doctors
of the Roman Church, to make good their doctrines of hell, and
purgatory, the power of exorcism, and other doctrines which have no
warrant, neither in reason, nor Scripture; as also all those traditions
which they call the unwritten word of God: but old wives’ fables?
Whereof, though they find dispersed somewhat in the writings of the
ancient fathers; yet those fathers were men, that might too easily
believe false reports; and the producing of their opinions for testimony
of the truth of what they believed, hath no other force with them that,
according to the counsel of St. John (_1 Epist._ iv. 1), examine
spirits, than in all things that concern the power of the Roman Church,
(the abuse whereof either they suspected not, or had benefit by it), to
discredit their testimony, in respect of too rash belief of reports;
which the most sincere men, without great knowledge of natural causes,
such as the fathers were, are commonly the most subject to. For
naturally, the best men are the least suspicious of fraudulent purposes.
Gregory the Pope, and St. Bernard have somewhat of apparitions of
ghosts, that said they were in purgatory; and so has our Bede: but no
where, I believe, but by report from others. But if they, or any other,
relate any such stories of their own knowledge, they shall not thereby
confirm the more such vain reports; but discover their own infirmity, or
fraud.
[Sidenote: Suppression of reason.]
With the introduction of false, we may join also the suppression of true
philosophy, by such men, as neither by lawful authority, nor sufficient
study, are competent judges of the truth. Our own navigations make
manifest, and all men learned in human sciences, now acknowledge there
are antipodes: and every day it appeareth more and more, that years and
days are determined by motions of the earth. Nevertheless, men that have
in their writings but supposed such doctrine, as an occasion to lay open
the reasons for, and against it, have been punished for it by authority
ecclesiastical. But what reason is there for it? Is it because such
opinions are contrary to true religion? That cannot be, if they be true.
Let therefore the truth be first examined by competent judges, or
confuted by them that pretend to know the contrary. Is it because they
be contrary to the religion established? Let them be silenced by the
laws of those, to whom the teachers of them are subject; that is, by the
laws civil. For disobedience may lawfully be punished in them, that
against the laws teach even true philosophy. Is it because they tend to
disorder in government, as countenancing rebellion, or sedition? Then
let them be silenced, and the teachers punished by virtue of his power
to whom the care of the public quiet is committed; which is the
authority civil. For whatsoever power ecclesiastics take upon
themselves, (in any place where they are subject to the state), in their
own right, though they call it God’s right, is but usurpation.
-------
CHAPTER XLVII.
OF THE BENEFIT THAT PROCEEDETH FROM SUCH
DARKNESS, AND TO WHOM IT ACCRUETH.
[Sidenote: He that receiveth benefit by a fact, is presumed to be the
author.]
Cicero maketh honourable mention of one of the Cassii, a severe judge
amongst the Romans, for a custom he had, in criminal causes, when the
testimony of the witnesses was not sufficient, to ask the accusers, _cui
bono_; that is to say, what profit, honour, or other contentment, the
accused obtained, or expected by the fact. For amongst presumptions,
there is none that so evidently declareth the author, as doth the
benefit of the action. By the same rule I intend in this place to
examine, who they may be that have possessed the people so long in this
part of Christendom, with these doctrines, contrary to the peaceable
societies of mankind.
[Sidenote: That the Church militant is the kingdom of God, was first
taught by the Church of Rome:]
And first, to this error, _that the present Church now militant on
earth, is the kingdom of God_, (that is, the kingdom of glory, or the
land of promise; not the kingdom of grace, which is but a promise of the
land), are annexed these worldly benefits; first, that the pastors and
teachers of the Church, are entitled thereby, as God’s public ministers,
to a right of governing the Church; and consequently, because the Church
and commonwealth are the same persons, to be rectors, and governors of
the commonwealth. By this title it is, that the Pope prevailed with the
subjects of all Christian princes, to believe, that to disobey him, was
to disobey Christ himself; and in all differences between him and other
princes, (charmed with the word _power spiritual_), to abandon their
lawful sovereigns; which is in effect an universal monarchy over all
Christendom. For though they were first invested in the right of being
supreme teachers of Christian doctrine, by and under Christian emperors,
within the limits of the Roman empire, as is acknowledged by themselves,
by the title of _Pontifex Maximus_, who was an officer subject to the
civil state; yet after the empire was divided, and dissolved, it was not
hard to obtrude upon the people already subjected to them, another
title, namely, the right of St. Peter; not only to save entire their
pretended power; but also to extend the same over the same Christian
provinces, though no more united in the empire of Rome. This benefit of
an universal monarchy, (considering the desire of men to bear rule), is
a sufficient presumption, that the Popes that pretended to it, and for a
long time enjoyed it, were the authors of the doctrine, by which it was
obtained; namely, that the Church now on earth, is the kingdom of
Christ. For that granted, it must be understood, that Christ hath some
lieutenant amongst us, by whom we are to be told what are his
commandments.
After that certain Churches had renounced this universal power of the
Pope, one would expect in reason, that the civil sovereigns in all those
Churches, should have recovered so much of it, as before they had
unadvisedly let it go, was their own right, and in their own hands. And
in England it was so in effect; saving that they, by whom the kings
administered the government of religion, by maintaining their employment
to be in God’s right, seemed to usurp, if not a supremacy, yet an
independency on the civil power: and they but seemed to usurp it,
inasmuch as they acknowledged a right in the king, to deprive them of
the exercise of their functions at his pleasure.
[Sidenote: And maintained also by the Presbytery.]
But in those places where the presbytery took that office, though many
other doctrines of the Church of Rome were forbidden to be taught; yet
this doctrine, that the kingdom of Christ is already come, and that it
began at the resurrection of our Saviour, was still retained. But _cui
bono_? What profit did they expect from it? The same which the Popes
expected: to have a sovereign power over the people. For what is it for
men to excommunicate their lawful king, but to keep him from all places
of God’s public service in his own kingdom; and with force to resist
him, when he with force endeavoureth to correct them? Or what is it,
without authority from the civil sovereign, to excommunicate any person,
but to take from him his lawful liberty, that is, to usurp an unlawful
power over their brethren? The authors therefore of this darkness in
religion, are the Roman, and the presbyterian clergy.
[Sidenote: Infallibility.]
To this head, I refer also all those doctrines, that serve them to keep
the possession of this spiritual sovereignty after it is gotten, As
first, that the _Pope in his public capacity cannot err_. For who is
there, that believing this to be true, will not readily obey him in
whatsoever he commands?
[Sidenote: Subjection of bishops.]
Secondly, that all other bishops, in what commonwealth soever, have not
their right, neither immediately from God, nor mediately from their
civil sovereigns, but from the Pope, is a doctrine, by which there comes
to be in every Christian commonwealth many potent men, (for so are
bishops), that have their dependance on the Pope, and owe obedience to
him, though he be a foreign prince; by which means he is able, as he
hath done many times, to raise a civil war against the state that
submits not itself to be governed accordingly to his pleasure and
interest.
[Sidenote: Exemptions of the clergy.]
Thirdly, the exemption of these, and of all other priests, and of all
monks, and friars, from the power of the civil laws. For by this means,
there is a great part of every commonwealth, that enjoy the benefit of
the laws, and are protected by the power of the civil state, which
nevertheless pay no part of the public expense; nor are liable to the
penalties, as other subjects, due to their crimes; and consequently,
stand not in fear of any man, but the Pope; and adhere to him only, to
uphold his universal monarchy.
[Sidenote: The names of sacerdotes, and sacrificers.]
Fourthly, the giving to their priests, which is no more in the New
Testament but presbyters, that is, elders, the name of _sacerdotes_,
that is, sacrificers, which was the title of the civil sovereign, and
his public ministers, amongst the Jews, whilst God was their king. Also,
the making the Lord’s Supper a sacrifice, serveth to make the people
believe the Pope hath the same power over all Christians, that Moses and
Aaron had over the Jews; that is to say, all power, both civil and
ecclesiastical, as the high-priest then had.
[Sidenote: The sacramentation of marriage.]
Fifthly, the teaching that matrimony is a sacrament, giveth to the
clergy the judging of the lawfulness of marriages; and thereby, of what
children are legitimate; and consequently, of the right of succession to
hereditary kingdoms.
[Sidenote: The single life of priests.]
Sixthly, the denial of marriage to priests, serveth to assure this power
of the Pope over kings. For if a king be a priest, he cannot marry, and
transmit his kingdom to his posterity; if he be not a priest, then the
Pope pretendeth this authority ecclesiastical over him, and over his
people.
[Sidenote: Auricular confession.]
Seventhly, from auricular confession, they obtain, for the assurance of
their power, better intelligence of the designs of princes, and great
persons in the civil state, than these can have of the designs of the
state ecclesiastical.
[Sidenote: Canonization of saints, and declaring of martyrs.]
Eighthly, by the canonization of saints, and declaring who are martyrs,
they assure their power, in that they induce simple men into an
obstinacy against the laws and commands of their civil sovereigns even
to death, if by the Pope’s excommunication, they be declared heretics or
enemies to the Church; that is, as they interpret it, to the Pope.
[Sidenote: Transubstantiation, penance, absolution.]
Ninthly, they assure the same, by the power they ascribe to every
priest, of making Christ; and by the power of ordaining penance; and of
remitting, and retaining of sins.
[Sidenote: Purgatory, indulgences, external works.]
Tenthly, by the doctrine of purgatory, of justification by external
works, and of indulgences, the clergy is enriched.
[Sidenote: Demonology and exorcism.]
Eleventhly, by their demonology, and the use of exorcism, and other
things appertaining thereto, they keep, or think they keep, the people
more in awe of their power.
[Sidenote: School divinity.]
Lastly, the metaphysics, ethics, and politics of Aristotle, the
frivolous distinctions, barbarous terms, and obscure language of the
Schoolmen, taught in the universities, which have been all erected and
regulated by the Pope’s authority, serve them to keep these errors from
being detected, and to make men mistake the _ignis fatuus_ of vain
philosophy, for the light of the Gospel.
[Sidenote: The authors of spiritual darkness, who they be.]
To these, if they sufficed not, might be added other of their dark
doctrines, the profit whereof redoundeth manifestly, to the setting up
of an unlawful power over the lawful sovereigns of Christian people; or
for the sustaining of the same, when it is set up; or to the worldly
riches, honour, and authority of those that sustain it. And therefore by
the aforesaid rule, of _cui bono_, we may justly pronounce for the
authors of all this spiritual darkness, the Pope, and Roman clergy, and
all those besides that endeavour to settle in the minds of men this
erroneous doctrine, that the Church now on earth, is that kingdom of God
mentioned in the Old and New Testament.
But the emperors, and other Christian sovereigns, under whose government
these errors, and the like encroachments of ecclesiastics upon their
office, at first crept in, to the disturbance of their possessions, and
of the tranquillity of their subjects, though they suffered the same for
want of foresight of the sequel, and of insight into the designs of
their teachers, may nevertheless be esteemed accessories to their own,
and the public damage. For without their authority there could at first
no seditious doctrine have been publicly preached. I say they might have
hindered the same in the beginning: but when the people were once
possessed by those spiritual men, there was no human remedy to be
applied, that any man could invent. And for the remedies that God should
provide, who never faileth in his good time to destroy all the
machinations of men against the truth, we are to attend his good
pleasure, that suffereth many times the prosperity of his enemies,
together with their ambition, to grow to such a height, as the violence
thereof openeth the eyes, which the wariness of their predecessors had
before sealed up, and makes men by too much grasping let go all, as
Peter’s net was broken, by the struggling of too great a multitude of
fishes; whereas the impatience of those, that strive to resist such
encroachment, before their subjects’ eyes were opened, did but increase
the power they resisted. I do not therefore blame the emperor Frederick
for holding the stirrup to our countryman Pope Adrian; for such was the
disposition of his subjects then, as if he had not done it, he was not
likely to have succeeded in the empire. But I blame those, that in the
beginning, when their power was entire, by suffering such doctrines to
be forged in the universities of their own dominions, have holden the
stirrup to all the succeeding Popes, whilst they mounted into the
thrones of all Christian sovereigns, to ride, and tire, both them, and
their people at their pleasure.
But as the inventions of men are woven, so also are they ravelled out;
the way is the same, but the order is inverted. The web begins at the
first elements of power, which are wisdom, humility, sincerity, and
other virtues of the Apostles, whom the people, converted, obeyed out of
reverence, not by obligation. Their consciences were free, and their
words and actions subject to none but the civil power. Afterwards the
presbyters, as the flocks of Christ increased, assembling to consider
what they should teach, and thereby obliging themselves to teach nothing
against the decrees of their assemblies, made it to be thought the
people were thereby obliged to follow their doctrine, and when they
refused, refused to keep them company, (that was then called
excommunication), not as being infidels, but as being disobedient: and
this was the first knot upon their liberty. And the number of presbyters
increasing, the presbyters of the chief city or province, got themselves
an authority over the parochial presbyters, and appropriated to
themselves the names of bishops: and this was a second knot on Christian
liberty. Lastly, the bishop of Rome, in regard of the imperial city,
took upon him an authority, (partly by the wills of the emperors
themselves, and by the title of _Pontifex Maximus_, and at last when the
emperors were grown weak, by the privileges of St. Peter), over all
other bishops of the empire: which was the third and last knot, and the
whole _synthesis_ and _construction_, of the pontificial power.
And therefore the _analysis_, or _resolution_, is by the same way; but
beginneth with the knot that was last tied; as we may see in the
dissolution of the præterpolitical Church government in England. First,
the power of the Popes was dissolved totally by Queen Elizabeth; and the
bishops, who before exercised their functions in right of the Pope, did
afterwards exercise the same in right of the Queen and her successors;
though by retaining the phrase of _jure divino_, they were thought to
demand it by immediate right from God: and so was untied the third knot.
After this, the presbyterians lately in England obtained the putting
down of episcopacy: and so was the second knot dissolved. And almost at
the same time, the power was taken also from the presbyterians: and so
we are reduced to the independancy of the primitive Christians, to
follow Paul, or Cephas, or Apollos, every man as he liketh best: which,
if it be without contention, and without measuring the doctrine of
Christ, by our affection to the person of his minister, (the fault which
the apostle reprehended in the Corinthians), is perhaps the best. First,
because there ought to be no power over the consciences of men, but of
the Word itself, working faith in every one, not always according to the
purpose of them that plant and water, but of God himself, that giveth
the increase. And secondly, because it is unreasonable in them, who
teach there is such danger in every little error, to require of a man
endued with reason of his own, to follow the reason of any other man, or
of the most voices of any other men, which is little better than to
venture his salvation at cross and pile. Nor ought those teachers to be
displeased with this loss of their ancient authority. For there is none
should know better than they, that power is preserved by the same
virtues by which it is acquired; that is to say, by wisdom, humility,
clearness of doctrine, and sincerity of conversation; and not by
suppression of the natural sciences, and of the morality of natural
reason; nor by obscure language; nor by arrogating to themselves more
knowledge than they make appear; nor by pious frauds; nor by such other
faults, as in the pastors of God’s Church are not only faults, but also
scandals, apt to make men stumble one time or other upon the suppression
of their authority.
[Sidenote: Comparison of the papacy with the kingdom of fairies.]
But after this doctrine, _that the Church now militant, is the kingdom
of God spoken of in the Old and New Testament_, was received in the
world; the ambition, and canvassing for the offices that belong
thereunto, and especially for that great office of being Christ’s
lieutenant, and the pomp of them that obtained therein the principal
public charges, became by degrees so evident, that they lost the inward
reverence due to the pastoral function: insomuch as the wisest men, of
them that had any power in the civil state, needed nothing but the
authority of their princes, to deny them any further obedience. For,
from the time that the Bishop of Rome had gotten to be acknowledged for
bishop universal, by pretence of succession to St. Peter, their whole
hierarchy, or kingdom of darkness, may be compared not unfitly to the
_kingdom of fairies_; that is, to the old wives’ _fables_ in England,
concerning _ghosts_ and _spirits_, and the feats they play in the night.
And if a man consider the original of this great ecclesiastical
dominion, he will easily perceive, that the Papacy is no other than the
_ghost_ of the deceased _Roman empire_, sitting crowned upon the grave
thereof. For so did the Papacy start up on a sudden out of the ruins of
that heathen power.
The _language_ also, which they use, both in the churches, and in their
public acts, being _Latin_, which is not commonly used by any nation now
in the world, what is it but the _ghost_ of the old _Roman language_?
The _fairies_ in what nation soever they converse, have but one
universal king, which some poets of ours call King Oberon; but the
Scripture calls Beelzebub, prince of _demons_. The _ecclesiastics_
likewise, in whose dominions soever they be found, acknowledge but one
universal king, the _Pope_.
The _ecclesiastics_ are _spiritual_ men, and _ghostly_ fathers. The
fairies are _spirits_, and _ghosts_. _Fairies_ and _ghosts_ inhabit
darkness, solitudes, and graves. The _ecclesiastics_ walk in obscurity
of doctrine, in monasteries, churches, and church-yards.
The _ecclesiastics_ have their cathedral churches, which, in what town
soever they be erected, by virtue of holy water, and certain charms
called exorcisms, have the power to make those towns, cities, that is to
say, seats of empire. The _fairies_ also have their enchanted castles,
and certain gigantic ghosts, that domineer over the regions round about
them.
The _fairies_ are not to be seized on; and brought to answer for the
hurt they do. So also the _ecclesiastics_ vanish away from the tribunals
of civil justice.
The _ecclesiastics_ take from young men the use of reason, by certain
charms compounded of metaphysics, and miracles, and traditions, and
abused Scripture, whereby they are good for nothing else, but to execute
what they command them. The _fairies_ likewise are said to take young
children out of their cradles, and to change them into natural fools,
which common people do therefore call _elves_, and are apt to mischief.
In what shop, or operatory the fairies make their enchantment, the old
wives have not determined. But the operatories of the _clergy_ are well
enough known to be the universities, that received their discipline from
authority pontificial.
When the _fairies_ are displeased with any body, they are said to send
their elves, to pinch them. The _ecclesiastics_, when they are
displeased with any civil state, make also their elves, that is,
superstitious, enchanted subjects, to pinch their princes, by preaching
sedition; or one prince enchanted with promises, to pinch another.
The _fairies_ marry not; but there be amongst them _incubi_, that have
copulation with flesh and blood. The _priests_ also marry not.
The _ecclesiastics_ take the cream of the land, by donations of ignorant
men, that stand in awe of them, and by tithes. So also it is in the
fable of _fairies_, that they enter into the dairies, and feast upon the
cream, which they skim from the milk.
What kind of money is current in the kingdom of _fairies_, is not
recorded in the story. But the _ecclesiastics_ in their receipts accept
of the same money that we do; though when they are to make any payment,
it is in canonizations, indulgencies, and masses.
To this, and such like resemblances between the _papacy_, and the
kingdom of _fairies_, may be added this, that as the _fairies_ have no
existence, but in the fancies of ignorant people, rising from the
traditions of old wives, or old poets: so the spiritual power of the
_Pope_, without the bounds of his own civil dominion, consisteth only in
the fear that seduced people stand in, of their excommunications; upon
hearing of false miracles, false traditions, and false interpretations
of the Scripture.
It was not therefore a very difficult matter, for Henry VIII by his
exorcism; nor for queen Elizabeth by hers, to cast them out. But who
knows that this spirit of Rome, now gone out, and walking by missions
through the dry places of China, Japan, and the Indies, that yield him
little fruit, may not return, or rather an assembly of spirits worse
than he, enter, and inhabit this clean swept house, and make the end
thereof worse than the beginning? For it is not the Roman clergy only,
that pretends the kingdom of God to be of this world, and thereby to
have a power therein, distinct from that of the civil state. And this is
all I had a design to say, concerning the doctrine of the POLITICS.
Which when I have reviewed, I shall willingly expose it to the censure
of my country.
A REVIEW, AND CONCLUSION.
[Sidenote: Review, and conclusion.]
From the contrariety of some of the natural faculties of the mind, one
to another, as also of one passion to another, and from their reference
to conversation, there has been an argument taken, to infer an
impossibility that any one man should be sufficiently disposed to all
sorts of civil duty. The severity of judgment, they say, makes men
censorious, and unapt to pardon the errors and infirmities of other men:
and on the other side, celerity of fancy, makes the thoughts less steady
than is necessary, to discern exactly between right and wrong. Again, in
all deliberations, and in all pleadings, the faculty of solid reasoning
is necessary: for without it, the resolutions of men are rash, and their
sentences unjust: and yet if there be not powerful eloquence, which
procureth attention and consent, the effect of reason will be little.
But these are contrary faculties; the former being grounded upon
principles of truth; the other upon opinions already received, true or
false; and upon the passions and interests of men, which are different,
and mutable.
And amongst the passions, _courage_, (by which I mean the contempt of
wounds, and violent death) inclineth men to private revenges, and
sometimes to endeavour the unsettling of the public peace: and
_timorousness_, many times disposeth to the desertion of the public
defence. Both these, they say, cannot stand together in the same person.
And to consider the contrariety of men’s opinions, and manners, in
general, it is, they say, impossible to entertain a constant civil amity
with all those, with whom the business of the world constrains us to
converse: which business consisteth almost in nothing else but a
perpetual contention for honour, riches, and authority.
To which I answer, that these are indeed great difficulties, but not
impossibilities: for by education, and discipline, they may be, and are
sometimes reconciled. Judgment and fancy may have place in the same man;
but by turns; as the end which he aimeth at requireth. As the Israelites
in Egypt, were sometimes fastened to their labour of making bricks, and
other times were ranging abroad to gather straw: so also may the
judgment sometimes be fixed upon one certain consideration, and the
fancy at another time wandering about the world. So also reason, and
eloquence, though not perhaps in the natural sciences, yet, in the
moral, may stand very well together. For wheresoever there is place for
adorning and preferring of error, there is much more place for adorning
and preferring of truth, if they have it to adorn. Nor is there any
repugnancy between fearing the laws, and not fearing a public enemy; nor
between abstaining from injury, and pardoning it in others. There is
therefore no such inconsistence of human nature, with civil duties, as
some think. I have known clearness of judgment, and largeness of fancy;
strength of reason, and graceful elocution; a courage for the war, and a
fear for the laws, and all eminently in one man; and that was my most
noble and honoured friend, Mr. Sidney Godolphin; who hating no man, nor
hated of any, was unfortunately slain in the beginning of the late civil
war, in the public quarrel, by an undiscerned and an undiscerning hand.
To the Laws of Nature, declared in Chapter XV., I would have this added,
_that every man is bound by nature, as much as in him lieth, to protect
in war the authority, by which he is himself protected in time of
peace_. For he that pretendeth a right of nature to preserve his own
body, cannot pretend a right of nature to destroy him, by whose strength
he is preserved: it is a manifest contradiction of himself. And though
this law may be drawn by consequence, from some of those that are there
already mentioned; yet the times require to have it inculcated, and
remembered.
And because I find by divers English books lately printed, that the
civil wars have not yet sufficiently taught men in what point of time it
is, that a subject becomes obliged to the conqueror; nor what is
conquest; nor how it comes about, that it obliges men to obey his laws:
therefore for further satisfaction of men therein, I say, the point of
time, wherein a man becomes subject to a conqueror, is that point,
wherein having liberty to submit to him, he consenteth, either by
express words, or by other sufficient sign, to be his subject. When it
is that a man hath the liberty to submit, I have showed before in the
end of Chapter XXI.; namely, that for him that hath no obligation to his
former sovereign but that of an ordinary subject, it is then, when the
means of his life are within the guards and garrisons of the enemy; for
it is then, that he hath no longer protection from him, but is protected
by the adverse party for his contribution. Seeing therefore such
contribution is every where, as a thing inevitable, notwithstanding it
be an assistance to the enemy, esteemed lawful; a total submission,
which is but an assistance to the enemy, cannot be esteemed unlawful.
Besides, if a man consider that they who submit, assist the enemy but
with part of their estates, whereas they that refuse, assist him with
the whole, there is no reason to call their submission, or composition,
an assistance; but rather a detriment to the enemy. But if a man,
besides the obligation of a subject, hath taken upon him a new
obligation of a soldier, then he hath not the liberty to submit to a new
power, as long as the old one keeps the field, and giveth him means of
subsistence, either in his armies, or garrisons: for in this case, he
cannot complain of want of protection, and means to live as a soldier.
But when that also fails, a soldier also may seek his protection
wheresoever he has most hope to have it; and may lawfully submit himself
to his new master. And so much for the time when he may do it lawfully,
if he will. If therefore he do it, he is undoubtedly bound to be a true
subject: for a contract lawfully made, cannot lawfully be broken.
By this also a man may understand, when it is, that men may be said to
be conquered; and in what the nature of conquest, and the right of a
conqueror consisteth: for this submission in itself implieth them all.
Conquest, is not the victory itself; but the acquisition, by victory, of
a right over the persons of men. He therefore that is slain, is
overcome, but not conquered: he that is taken, and put into prison, or
chains, is not conquered, though overcome; for he is still an enemy, and
may save himself if he can: but he that upon promise of obedience, hath
his life and liberty allowed him, is then conquered, and a subject; and
not before. The Romans used to say, that their general had _pacified_
such a _province_, that is to say, in English, _conquered_ it; and that
the country was _pacified_ by victory, when the people of it had
promised _imperata facere_, that is, _to do what the Roman people
commanded them_: this was to be conquered. But this promise may be
either express, or tacit: express, by promise: tacit, by other signs. As
for example, a man that hath not been called to make such an express
promise, because he is one whose power perhaps is not considerable; yet
if he live under their protection openly, he is understood to submit
himself to the government: but if he live there secretly, he is liable
to anything that may be done to a spy, and enemy of the state. I say
not, he does any injustice; for acts of open hostility bear not that
name; but that he may be justly put to death. Likewise, if a man, when
his country is conquered, be out of it, he is not conquered, nor
subject: but if at his return, he submit to the government, he is bound
to obey it. So that _conquest_, to define it, is the acquiring of the
right of sovereignty by victory. Which right, is acquired in the
people’s submission, by which they contract with the victor, promising
obedience, for life and liberty.
In Chapter XXIX., I have set down for one of the causes of the
dissolutions of commonwealths, their imperfect generation, consisting in
the want of an absolute and arbitrary legislative power; for want
whereof, the civil sovereign is fain to handle the sword of justice
unconstantly, and as if it were too hot for him to hold. One reason
whereof, which I have not there mentioned, is this, that they will all
of them justify the war, by which their power was at first gotten, and
whereon, as they think, their right dependeth, and not on the
possession. As if, for example, the right of the kings of England did
depend on the goodness of the cause of William the Conqueror, and upon
their lineal, and directest descent from him; by which means, there
would perhaps be no tie of the subjects’ obedience to their sovereign at
this day in all the world: wherein whilst they needlessly think to
justify themselves, they justify all the successful rebellions that
ambition shall at any time raise against them, and their successors.
Therefore I put down for one of the most effectual seeds of the death of
any state, that the conquerors require not only a submission of men’s
actions to them for the future, but also an approbation of all their
actions past; when there is scarce a commonwealth in the world, whose
beginnings can in conscience be justified.
And because the name of tyranny, signifieth nothing more, nor less, than
the name of sovereignty, be it in one, or many men, saving that they
that use the former word, are understood to be angry with them they call
tyrants; I think the toleration of a professed hatred of tyranny, is a
toleration of hatred to commonwealth in general, and another evil seed,
not differing much from the former. For to the justification of the
cause of a conqueror, the reproach of the cause of the conquered, is for
the most part necessary: but neither of them necessary for the
obligation of the conquered. And thus much I have thought fit to say
upon the review of the first and second part of this discourse.
In Chapter XXXV., I have sufficiently declared out of the Scripture,
that in the commonwealth of the Jews, God himself was made the
sovereign, by pact with the people; who were therefore called his
_peculiar people_, to distinguish them from the rest of the world, over
whom God reigned not by their consent, but by his own power: and that in
this kingdom Moses was God’s lieutenant on earth; and that it was he
that told them what laws God appointed them to be ruled by. But I have
omitted to set down who were the officers appointed to do execution;
especially in capital punishments; not then thinking it a matter of so
necessary consideration, as I find it since. We know that generally in
all commonwealths, the execution of corporal punishments, was either put
upon the guards, or other soldiers of the sovereign power; or given to
those, in whom want of means, contempt of honour, and hardness of heart,
concurred, to make them sue for such an office. But amongst the
Israelites it was a positive law of God their sovereign, that he that
was convicted of a capital crime, should be stoned to death by the
people; and that the witnesses should cast the first stone, and after
the witnesses, then the rest of the people. This was a law that designed
who were to be the executioners; but not that any one should throw a
stone at him before conviction and sentence, where the congregation was
judge. The witnesses were nevertheless to be heard before they proceeded
to execution, unless the fact were committed in the presence of the
congregation itself, or in sight of the lawful judges; for then there
needed no other witnesses but the judges themselves. Nevertheless, this
manner of proceeding being not thoroughly understood, hath given
occasion to a dangerous opinion, that any man may kill another, in some
cases, by a right of zeal; as if the executions done upon offenders in
the kingdom of God in old time, proceeded not from the sovereign
command, but from the authority of private zeal: which, if we consider
the texts that seem to favour it, is quite contrary.
First, where the Levites fell upon the people, that had made and
worshipped the Golden Calf, and slew three thousand of them; it was by
the commandment of Moses, from the mouth of God; as is manifest, _Exod._
xxxii. 27. And when the son of a woman of Israel had blasphemed God,
they that heard it, did not kill him, but brought him before Moses, who
put him under custody, till God should give sentence against him; as
appears, _Levit._ xxiv. 11, 12. Again, (_Numb._ xxv. 6, 7), when
Phinehas killed Zimri and Cosbi, it was not by right of private zeal:
their crime was committed in the sight of the assembly; there needed no
witness; the law was known, and he the heir-apparent to the sovereignty;
and, which is the principal point, the lawfulness of his act depended
wholly upon a subsequent ratification by Moses, whereof he had no cause
to doubt. And this presumption of a future ratification, is sometimes
necessary to the safety of a commonwealth; as in a sudden rebellion, any
man that can suppress it by his own power in the country where it
begins, without express law or commission, may lawfully do it, and
provide to have it ratified, or pardoned, whilst it is in doing, or
after it is done. Also _Numb._ xxxv. 30, it is expressly said,
_Whosoever shall kill the murderer, shall kill him upon the word of
witnesses_: but witnesses suppose a formal judicature, and consequently
condemn that pretence of _jus zelotarum_. The law of Moses concerning
him that enticeth to idolatry, that is to say, in the kingdom of God to
a renouncing of his allegiance, (_Deut._ xiii. 8, 9), forbids to conceal
him, and commands the accuser to cause him to be put to death, and to
cast the first stone at him; but not to kill him before he be condemned.
And (_Deut._ xvii. 4, 5, 6, 7), the process against idolatry is exactly
set down: for God there speaketh to the people, as judge, and commandeth
them, when a man is accused of idolatry, to enquire diligently of the
fact, and finding it true, then to stone him; but still the hand of the
witness throweth the first stone. This is not private zeal, but public
condemnation. In like manner when a father hath a rebellious son, the
law is, (_Deut._ xxi. 18-21), that he shall bring him before the judges
of the town, and all the people of the town shall stone him. Lastly, by
pretence of these laws it was, that St. Stephen was stoned, and not by
pretence of private zeal: for before he was carried away to execution,
he had pleaded his cause before the high-priest. There is nothing in all
this, nor in any other part of the Bible, to countenance executions by
private zeal; which being oftentimes but a conjunction of ignorance and
passion, is against both the justice and peace of a commonwealth.
[Sidenote: Review, and conclusion.]
In chapter XXXVI., I have said, that it is not declared in what manner
God spake supernaturally to Moses: nor that he spake not to him
sometimes by dreams and visions, and by a supernatural voice, as to
other prophets: for the manner how he spake unto him from the
mercy-seat, is expressly set down, _Numbers_ vii. 89, in these words,
_From that time forward, when Moses entered into the Tabernacle of the
congregation to speak with God, he heard a voice which spake unto him
from over the mercy-seat, which is over the Ark of the testimony; from
between the cherubims he spake unto him_. But it is not declared in what
consisteth the preeminence of the manner of God’s speaking to Moses,
above that of his speaking to other prophets, as to Samuel, and to
Abraham, to whom he also spake by a voice, (that is, by vision), unless
the difference consist in the clearness of the vision. For _face to
face_, and _mouth to mouth_, cannot be literally understood of the
infiniteness, and incomprehensibility of the Divine nature.
And as to the whole doctrine, I see not yet, but the principles of it
are true and proper; and the ratiocination solid. For I ground the civil
right of sovereigns, and both the duty and liberty of subjects, upon the
known natural inclinations of mankind, and upon the articles of the law
of nature; of which no man, that pretends but reason enough to govern
his private family, ought to be ignorant. And for the power
ecclesiastical of the same sovereigns, I ground it on such texts, as are
both evident in themselves, and consonant to the scope of the whole
Scripture. And therefore am persuaded, that he that shall read it with a
purpose only to be informed, shall be informed by it. But for those that
by writing, or public discourse, or by their eminent actions, have
already engaged themselves to the maintaining of contrary opinions, they
will not be so easily satisfied. For in such cases, it is natural for
men, at one and the same time, both to proceed in reading, and to lose
their attention, in the search of objections to that they had read
before. Of which in a time wherein the interests of men are changed,
(seeing much of that doctrine, which serveth to the establishing of a
new government, must needs be contrary to that which conduced to the
dissolution of the old), there cannot choose but be very many.
In that part which treateth of a Christian commonwealth, there are some
new doctrines, which, it may be, in a state where the contrary were
already fully determined, were a fault for a subject without leave to
divulge, as being an usurpation of the place of a teacher. But in this
time, that men call not only for peace, but also for truth, to offer
such doctrines as I think true, and that manifestly tend to peace and
loyalty, to the consideration of those that are yet in deliberation, is
no more, but to offer new wine, to be put into new casks, that both may
be preserved together. And I suppose, that then, when novelty can breed
no trouble nor disorder in a state, men are not generally so much
inclined to the reverence of antiquity, as to prefer ancient errors,
before new and well-proved truth.
There is nothing I distrust more than my elocution, which nevertheless I
am confident, excepting the mischances of the press, is not obscure.
That I have neglected the ornament of quoting ancient poets, orators,
and philosophers, contrary to the custom of late time, whether I have
done well or ill in it, proceedeth from my judgment, grounded on many
reasons. For first, all truth of doctrine dependeth either upon
_reason_, or upon _Scripture_; both which give credit to many, but never
receive it from any writer. Secondly, the matters in question are not of
_fact_, but of _right_, wherein there is no place for _witnesses_. There
is scarce any of those old writers, that contradicteth not sometimes
both himself and others; which makes their testimonies insufficient.
Fourthly, such opinions as are taken only upon credit of antiquity, are
not intrinsically the judgment of those that cite them, but words that
pass, like gaping, from mouth to mouth. Fifthly, it is many times with a
fraudulent design that men stick their corrupt doctrine with the cloves
of other men’s wit. Sixthly, I find not that the ancients they cite,
took it for an ornament, to do the like with those that wrote before
them. Seventhly, it is an argument of indigestion, when Greek and Latin
sentences unchewed come up again, as they use to do, unchanged. Lastly,
though I reverence those men of ancient time, that either have written
truth perspicuously, or set us in a better way to find it out ourselves;
yet to the antiquity itself I think nothing due. For if we will
reverence the age, the present is the oldest. If the antiquity of the
writer, I am not sure, that generally they to whom such honour is given,
were more ancient when they wrote, than I am that am writing. But if it
be well considered, the praise of ancient authors, proceeds not from the
reverence of the dead, but from the competition, and mutual envy of the
living.
[Sidenote: Review, and conclusion.]
To conclude, there is nothing in this whole discourse, nor in that I
writ before of the same subject in Latin, as far as I can perceive,
contrary either to the Word of God, or to good manners; or to the
disturbance of the public tranquillity. Therefore I think it may be
profitably printed, and more profitably taught in the Universities, in
case they also think so, to whom the judgment of the same belongeth. For
seeing the Universities are the fountains of civil and moral doctrine,
from whence the preachers, and the gentry, drawing such water as they
find, use to sprinkle the same (both from the pulpit and in their
conversation), upon the people, there ought certainly to be great care
taken, to have it pure, both from the venom of heathen politicians, and
from the incantation of deceiving spirits. And by that means the most
men, knowing their duties, will be the less subject to serve the
ambition of a few discontented persons, in their purposes against the
state; and be the less grieved with the contributions necessary for
their peace, and defence; and the governors themselves have the less
cause, to maintain at the common charge any greater army, than is
necessary to make good the public liberty, against the invasions and
encroachments of foreign enemies.
And thus I have brought to an end my Discourse of Civil and
Ecclesiastical Government, occasioned by the disorders of the present
time, without partiality, without application, and without other design
than to set before men’s eyes the mutual relation between protection and
obedience; of which the condition of human nature, and the laws divine,
both natural and positive, require an inviolable observation. And though
in the revolution of states, there can be no very good constellation for
truths of this nature to be born under, (as having an angry aspect from
the dissolvers of an old government, and seeing but the backs of them
that erect a new), yet I cannot think it will be condemned at this time,
either by the public judge of doctrine, or by any that desires the
continuance of public peace. And in this hope I return to my interrupted
speculation of bodies natural; wherein, if God give me health to finish
it, I hope the novelty will as much please, as in the doctrine of this
artificial body it useth to offend. For such truth, as opposeth no man’s
profit, nor pleasure, is to all men welcome.
FINIS.
C. RICHARDS, PRINTER, ST. MARTIN’S LANE.
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Transcriber’s Note
Other errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been
corrected, and are noted here. The references are to the page and
line in the original.
34.7 I as[s]cribe to the giving of names Removed.
37.27 he that p[er/re]tendeth the science Transposed.
66.20 to[ to] take from the spirit Removed.
108.6 to cho[o]se them a king Inserted.
178.22 or arist[r]ocracy of another commonwealth Removed.
217.34 For [roo f/proof] whereof Replaced.
240.11 with[t h/ th]eir metropolis Move space.
323.3 rights of sov[e]reignty Inserted.
323.4 Against the[ the] duty of a sovereign Removed.
385.23 the _breath of life_ in[s]pired by God Inserted.
408.1 (_Acts_[,] xiii. 46) Removed.
430.22 (as it is[ in] verse 5) is ‘said’
in?
447.15 ε[ἰ/ὶ]ς τὸ σκοτος Replaced.
493.13 hold[i n/ing] firmly in his heart Replaced.
497.1 We have first (_Matth._ x. 6, 7[,)/)], that Transposed?
526.8 any other rule[r] Added.
527.11 St. Matthew and St. John apos[ /t]les Restored.
601.25 (verses 11, 12[,)/),] the judgment Tranposed.
704.34 He therefore that [i]s slain Added.
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