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Title: The autobiography of a seaman (volume 1 of 2)
Author: Thomas Cochrane
Compiler: George Butler Earp
Contributor: William B. Jackson
Release date: October 15, 2025 [eBook #77060]
Language: English
Original publication: London: Richard Bentley, 1859
Credits: MWS, KD Weeks and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) // first edit: 9/5/2025
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THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A SEAMAN.
VOL. I.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LONDON
PRINTED BY SPOTTISWOODE AND CO.
NEW-STREET SQUARE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Illustration:
_From a Photo_: _Joseph Brown_.
]
THOMAS, TENTH EARL OF DUNDONALD, G.C.B.
_Admiral of the Red, Rear Admiral of the Fleet &c._
London. Richard Bentley 1861.
THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A SEAMAN.
BY
THOMAS, TENTH EARL OF DUNDONALD, G.C.B.
ADMIRAL OF THE RED, REAR-ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET,
ETC. ETC.
[Illustration]
VOLUME THE FIRST.
=Second Edition.=
LONDON:
RICHARD BENTLEY, NEW BURLINGTON STREET,
=Publisher in Ordinary to Her Majesty.=
1861.
_The right of translation is reserved._
TO
THE ELECTORS OF WESTMINSTER,
BY WHOSE GENEROUS SUPPORT, NEARLY HALF A CENTURY AGO,
I WAS RESCUED FROM DESPAIR,
THE RESULT OF UNMERITED INJURIES INFLICTED
BY HOSTILE POLITICAL FACTION
IN RETALIATION FOR
MY ADVOCACY OF NAVAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS;
AND TO WHOSE HONOUR BE IT RECORDED
THAT IN NO INSTANCE
DURING OUR LONG POLITICAL CONNEXION
DID ANY OF THEIR BODY EVER ASK ME
TO PROCURE FOR HIM PLACE, BENEFIT, OR EMOLUMENT,
=This Volume is Inscribed=
BY THEIR FAITHFUL SERVANT,
DUNDONALD.
PREFACE.
The present Volume narrates my services in the British Navy, from my
entrance into it, and including the action in Aix Roads, on the 11th,
12th, and 13th of April, 1809. The result of that action, viz., the
court-martial on Lord Gambier—virtually a prosecution of myself; my
non-employment thenceforward in the navy; the unscrupulous plot by which
I was driven from that noble service; my restoration to rank by his late
Majesty William IV., and to the honours which had accompanied that rank
by my present most gracious Sovereign Queen Victoria; form subjects,
which, together with many others, will be concisely set forth in the
succeeding portion of this Work.
To one of these points I shall, however, here briefly allude,—my
restoration to the naval service; not for the purpose of pre-judging the
subject, but with the intention of embracing the first opportunity which
has been afforded me, of paying a tribute of thanks to those who,
convinced of the injustice of the sentence, were mainly instrumental in
procuring its reversal.
Amongst these I am proud to rank one, the soundness of whose judgment,
and the disinterestedness of whose patriotism, have throughout a long
life never failed to secure the highest respect amongst men of every
shade of political party—the Marquis of Lansdowne; who, from the
commencement of my unmerited troubles, has to this day manifested the
most generous confidence in my honour, and has as generously supported
my cause when my character has been called in question. If proof were
wanted of my entire innocence of the accusation laid to my charge
forty-five years ago, no prouder testimony of incapability to have
committed the imputed offence could be adduced than the unabated
friendship of the Marquis of Lansdowne; simply because no man with a
stain on his character could have retained any place in that illustrious
nobleman’s consideration.
To another nobleman, whose name will descend to the remotest posterity
as the promoter of everything rationally liberal in politics, and the
untiring advocate of measures calculated to promote social advancement,
my warmest thanks are no less due. First my counsel, and for half a
century my friend,—to the long-continued esteem of Lord Brougham, I owe
no small portion of that consolation which for so many years formed my
only support under a weight of persecution enough to have bowed any man,
not so supported, to the earth; into which, had it not been for the
disinterested countenance thus afforded by men above reproach I must
have prematurely sunk.
One testimony of my venerated friend I may be allowed to adduce[1]:—
“I must be distinctly understood to deny the accuracy of the opinion
which Lord Ellenborough appears to have formed in Lord Cochrane’s
case, and deeply to lament the verdict of Guilty, which the jury
returned after three hours’ consulting and hesitation.
“Our own complaint was his Lordship’s refusal to adjourn after the
prosecutor’s case closed, and his requiring us to enter upon our
defence at so late an hour—past nine o’clock—so that the adjournment
took place at midnight and before we had called our witnesses. I speak
of the trial at Guildhall only. Lord Ellenborough was _equally to
blame with his brethren in the Court of King’s Bench for that most
cruel and unjustifiable sentence_ which at once secured Lord
Cochrane’s re-election for Westminster.
“In 1833 the Government of which I was a member restored this great
warrior to his rank of admiral in our navy. The country, therefore, in
the event of hostilities, would now have the inestimable benefit of
his services, whom none perhaps ever equalled in heroic courage, and
whose fertility of resources, military as well as naval, places him
high among the very first of commanders. That his honours of
knighthood, so gloriously won, should still be withholden, is a stain,
_not upon him_, but upon the councils of his country; and after his
restoration to the service, it is as inconsistent and incomprehensible
as it is cruel and unjust.”[2]
-----
Footnote 1:
See Lord Brougham’s “Historic Sketches of Statesmen of the Reign of
George III.”
Footnote 2:
On the accession of Her present Most Gracious Majesty those honours
were restored; every attempt to obtain their restoration during the
reign of His late Majesty having failed, from causes which will be
stated in the next Volume; and notwithstanding that His Majesty
himself warmly espoused my cause.
-----
To many others, high in public estimation and in the councils of their
Sovereign, I have been equally indebted for countenance and support, but
as it has been my lot to outlive them, they are beyond the reach of
thanks. Amongst these may be mentioned the late Duke of Hamilton, the
Earl of Auckland, Sir Francis Burdett,—my late warm-hearted friend and
colleague; Mr. Whitbread, Mr. Hume, and others whose names have escaped
my memory rather than my gratitude.
Last, though foremost in estimation, is another friend, found where man
will seldom look for a friend in vain,—at home; the Countess of
Dundonald, my wife. Knowing the opinion of her Sovereign with regard to
the persecution which had entailed on me so many years of misery, and
equally well aware that in the first years of his Majesty’s reign the
non-reversal of that unjust sentence was owing to the influence of some
in his Majesty’s councils, whose political animosity sixteen years
before had no small share in its infliction,—that ardent and heroic lady
determined to penetrate to the foot of the throne, and learn from the
lips of the Sovereign himself whether it was consistent with the dignity
of his crown, that its attribute of mercy should be the sport of an
almost extinct political faction.
The step was a bold one; but the ardour which had conceived it to be
necessary lacked not the energy to carry out its resolve. In spite of
the coolness of some about the court, and the positive rudeness of
others whose names it is not worth while to resuscitate, this devoted
lady gained an interview with her Sovereign, and with the greatest
respect besought His Majesty not to permit the benevolence of his
disposition, and his own belief in the innocence of her unjustly
maligned husband, to be thwarted by those whose office it was to advise,
but not to control, his better judgment.
His Majesty graciously listened, and his reply was kingly, that “he
would no longer allow the reparation which was her husband’s due, to be
withheld.” A change of Ministry shortly afterwards followed, and, as
already quoted in an extract from the writings of Lord Brougham, my
restoration to rank rewarded the heroic efforts of my devoted wife.
Nevertheless, a leaven of former political malice remained, sufficiently
powerful to prevent my restoration to the honours with which a previous
Sovereign had invested me, but of which I had been despoiled with every
mark of degradation which political animosity could invent.[3]
-----
Footnote 3:
Viz., a forcible intrusion into my apartments in the King’s Bench
Prison in the dead of night, with a demand for the immediate surrender
of the Insignia.
-----
This gracious act of restoring my honours was reserved for Her present
Majesty, who with the delicacy which is one of Her Majesty’s noblest
characteristics, gave back the boon of which I had for so many years
been wrongfully deprived; and subsequently conferred upon me, at the age
of seventy-three, my first command of a British fleet. For both marks of
Her Majesty’s kindness and appreciation of my former services, I am
deeply grateful. But alas! reparation came too late to compensate for
the early hopes and just expectations of a life forcibly wasted as
regarded myself or my country.
The moral—to use an old-fashioned phrase—of my chequered career, is
this:—That they who, in political matters, propose to themselves a
strict and rigid adherence to the truth of their convictions,
irrespective of personal consequences, must expect obloquy rather than
reward; and that they who obstinately pursue their professional duty in
the face of routine and official prejudice, may think themselves lucky
if they escape persecution. Such a moral may be derogatory in a national
point of view, but it is the result of my own bitter experience:
notwithstanding which, were my life to begin anew, I would pursue the
same unflinching course with regard to naval abuses, of following out my
own convictions,—a course which would produce the same result to myself,
the consolation of my own rectitude, even though I might be deprived of
all other reward.
Still all is not dark. I have survived malignity, and its chief cause,
viz. the enmity arising from my zealous advocacy of departmental and
political reform. The latter has been achieved to a greater extent than
the early political reformers, amongst whose ranks I was enrolled, ever
dreamed of; and even departmental reform has become fashionable, though
it may not have advanced far beyond that point.
In one respect I will boldly assert that this narrative of my life is
worthy of example. It will show the young officer that, in spite of
obstacles, warm attachment and untiring devotion to my noble profession
enabled me to render some services to my country upon which I may be
allowed to reflect with satisfaction, even though this be accompanied
with bitter reflection as to what the all-powerful enmity of my
political opponents cruelly deprived me of further opportunity to
accomplish.
In conclusion, I must express my thanks to Mr. Earp, whose zeal has
exhumed from documents almost, in my own estimation, beyond
comprehension or arrangement[4], the mass of facts condensed within the
compass of this volume.
Footnote 4:
In the great earthquake at Valparaiso in 1822 my house shared the
common destruction, and from the torrents of rain which accompanied
the unusual atmospheric disturbance, my papers were saturated with
water, to such an extent that it became necessary to lay them to dry
in the sun. Whilst undergoing this process one of the whirlwinds
common on the Chilian coast suddenly came on, and scattered them in
all directions. Many were lost, but more torn, and rendered almost
undecipherable; whilst all that remained have been ever since in
confusion. The labour of accurate compilation from such materials may
be imagined.
In the succeeding portion of this work, should God spare me to see its
completion, I trust to render additional service, by an attempt to
deduce from past naval experience the best means of preserving
unimpaired our future maritime efficiency. Should the attempt be the
means of awakening national attention, the gratification will be mine of
having left no unworthy legacy to my country.
DUNDONALD.
December 14, 1859.
CONTENTS
OF
THE FIRST VOLUME.
INTRODUCTORY.
SOME ACCOUNT OF THE DUNDONALD FAMILY.
CHAPTER I.
MY BOYHOOD, AND ENTRANCE INTO THE NAVY.
Younger Branch succeeds to Earldom.—Alienation of Family
Estates.—My Father’s scientific Pursuits.—His ruinous
manufacturing Projects.—A neglected
Discovery.—Communicated to James Watt.—Lord Dundonald’s
Agricultural Works still held in Estimation.—Early
Reminiscences.—My first Visit to London.—My Father
destines me for the Army.—A Commission procured.—My
Aversion to the Military Profession.—Our Return to
Scotland.—I am permitted to enter the Navy Page 34
CHAP. II.
CRUISE OF THE _HIND_.
A Lieutenant of the Old School.—His Ideas on
Sea-chests.—Dockyards sixty Years ago.—Prize-money, the
leading Motive of Seamen.—Voyage to Norway.—Norwegian
Customs.—A Midshipman’s Grievances.—A Parrot turned
Boatswain.—Ineffective Armaments.—Men before
Dockyards.—Training of Officers 50
CHAP. III.
THE VOYAGE OF THE _THETIS_.
Voyage in the _Thetis_.—Icebergs.—I am made Acting
Lieutenant.—I am ordered to join the _Thetis_.—Pass
Examination for Lieutenant.—Captain Cochrane’s Capture of
French Store-ships.—My Appointment to the
_Resolution_.—Admiral winters in the Chesapeake.—An
undignified Encounter.—A Dinner ashore.—Harsh Treatment of
the Americans.—Their Complaints.—Return of the _Thetis_ to
England 62
CHAP. IV.
SERVICES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.
I join Lord Keith’s Ship.—An unpleasant Altercation, ending
in a Court-Martial.—The Blockade of Cadiz.—French Fleet in
the Offing.—Pursued by Lord Keith.—Enemy’s Vessels burnt
at Toulon.—Lord Keith recalled by Lord St. Vincent.—Lord
St. Vincent resigns the Command.—Lord Keith pursues the
French Fleet to Brest, and from thence to the
Mediterranean.—State of the French Marine.—Lord Keith
appoints me to the _Généreux_.—Burning of the _Queen
Charlotte_.—Action with Privateers off Cabritta
Point.—Recommended for Promotion 76
CHAP. V.
CRUISE OF THE _SPEEDY_.
My Appointment to the _Speedy_.—My first Prize.—Capitulation
of Genoa.—More Captures.—Join Lord Keith at
Leghorn.—Cruise on the Spanish Coast.—Nearly caught by a
Spanish Frigate.—How she was evaded.—Our Cruise
renewed.—We proceed to Malta.—Foolish Fracas in a
Ball-room.—A Duel.—Capture of a French Store-ship.—Chased
by another Spanish Frigate.—Cruise off Barcelona.—An
Attempt to entrap us.—Attack on the _El Gamo_
Frigate.—Carried by Boarding.—Trifling Loss of the
_Speedy_.—A Device practised during the Action.—We proceed
with our Prize to Mahon.—Postponement of my Post
Rank.—Official Despatch 93
CHAP. VI.
CRUISE OF THE _SPEEDY_ CONTINUED.
The _Speedy_ sent to Algiers.—Interview with the
Dey.—_Speedy_ returns to Minorca.—Attack on
Oropesa.—Enemy’s Vessels destroyed.—Letter of Thanks from
Lord Keith.—_Speedy_ sent in Convoy of a Packet.—Captured
by three French line-of-battle Ships, and taken to
Algesiras.—Attack by Sir J. Saumarez’s Squadron.—Loss of
the _Hannibal_.—Capture of Dockyard Artificers.—Gallantry
of Captain Keats 118
CHAP. VII.
ADMIRALTY RELUCTANCE TO PROMOTE ME.
Letter from Sir Alexander Cochrane.—Second Letter from Sir
Alexander.—Both written unknown to me.—Reluctance of Lord
St. Vincent to promote me.—Letter from my Father to Lord
St. Vincent, urging my right to Promotion.—Lord St.
Vincent’s Reply.—Its Fallacy.—His Lordship’s Reasoning a
Subterfuge.—Promotion of my First Lieutenant refused.—My
imprudent Remark to Lord St. Vincent, who becomes my
Enemy.—Further Effort to promote Lieutenant
Parker.—Admiralty Refusal also.—Lieutenant Parker’s
eventual Promotion, and subsequent shameful Treatment 135
CHAP. VIII.
NAVAL ADMINISTRATION SIXTY YEARS AGO.
Political Favouritism.—Refusal of further Employment.—Naval
Corruption.—Dockyard Practices.—Shameful Treatment of
Prisoners of War.—Economy the Remedy.—Results of Medical
Economy.—Empty Physic Bottles.—Seamen’s Aversion to the
Service.—A Post Captain at College 152
CHAP. IX.
EMPLOYMENT IN THE _ARAB_.
Appointment to the _Arab_.—Projected Invasion by
Napoleon.—The _Arab_ ordered to watch the French
Coast.—Then to cruise in the North Sea.—Retirement of Lord
St. Vincent 165
CHAP. X.
CRUISE OF THE _PALLAS_.
Orders of the _Pallas_ embargoed.—Capture of the
_Carolina_.—Arrival of the Prizes.—Capture of Papal
Bulls.—A Chase.—Admiral Young.—Election for Honiton.—Novel
Election Tactics.—Become a Reformer.—Painful Results 171
CHAP. XI.
SERVICES IN THE _PALLAS_ CONTINUED.
Services in the _Pallas_.—The _Pallas_ at Halifax.—Clamour
of Shipowners.—Sail from the Downs.—Capture a Vessel.—The
_Pomone_ sent to England.—Capture of the _Tapageuse_.—The
French run ashore.—Chase of the Corvettes.—Off
Chasseron.—Cold Approval of Lord St. Vincent.—Cruise of
the _Pallas_.—Sight the French Squadron.—French Signal
Houses.—The Isle of Aix.—Engage the French
Squadron.—Joined by the _Kingfisher_.—Details of the
Action.—Construction of Kites 183
CHAP. XII.
MY ENTRANCE INTO PARLIAMENT.
My Entrance into Parliament.—Enthusiastic Reception.—Seek
Promotion for Haswell.—Cutting out _Le Cæsar_.—Gross
Instance of Partiality.—Claret against Small Beer.—Story
of Mr. Croker.—Mr. Croker’s Revenge.—Command the
_Impérieuse_.—Drift towards Ushant.—Join the Squadron in
the Basque Roads.—Anchor off Cordovan.—Supply the
_Atalante_ 202
CHAP. XIII.
DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT.
Dissolution of Parliament.—Westminster Election.—Reply to
Mr. Sheridan.—I am elected.—Virulent
Recriminations.—Opening of the House.—Move for an Account
of Sinecures.—Opposition to the Motion.—Mr. Perceval’s
Proposition.—My Motion evaded.—Naval Abuses.—Details of
Abuses.—Naval Hospitals.—Speech in the Commons.—Join Lord
Collingwood’s fleet. 215
CHAP. XIV.
CRUISE OF THE _IMPÉRIEUSE_.
Cruise of the _Impérieuse_.—Engagement with the _King
George_.—Off Toulon.—Fall in with Thirteen Merchantmen.—Am
recalled by Lord Collingwood.—Russian Declaration of
War.—Capture a Vessel from Corfu.—Run into Valencia.—Clear
for Action.—Death of Lieut. Caulfield.—Chase round Cape
Negretti.—Blow up a Tower at Minorca.—Capture of Spanish
Wine.—Fall in with the _Leonidas_.—Capture a Xebec.—Chase
three Ships.—Capture a Xebec.—Cape Palos.—Gale at
Sea.—Joseph proclaimed King of Spain.—Spain declares War
against France 234
CHAP. XV.
CRUISE OF THE _IMPÉRIEUSE_ CONTINUED.
Assist the Spaniards.—Off Barcelona.—Spanish Kindness.—The
French in Mataro.—Cruise on the Spanish Coast.—Embark the
Enemies' Guns.—Give the Spaniards a Lesson.—Siege of
Gerona.—Contest at Mongat.—Irritation of the
Spaniards.—Excesses of the French.—Spirit of the
Catalans.—Anchor off San Felin.—Guerilla Troops.—Fortress
of Figueras.—Chase two Vessels.—Anchor in Gulf
Dumet.—Destroy a Signal Station.—Storming a Battery.—The
Tables turned. 255
CHAP. XVI.
CRUISE OF THE _IMPÉRIEUSE_ CONTINUED.
The French Fleet.—The Mole of Ciotat.—The Gulf of Foz.—Take
Possession of the Battery.—Silence other Batteries.—Anchor
off Cette.—Despatch the Prizes.—How we obtained Fresh
Water.—Demolish a Telegraph.—Frigates to leeward.—Ordered
to Gibraltar.—Ingratitude of Government.—Letter of Lord
Collingwood.—Letter of Lord Cochrane 275
CHAP. XVII.
CRUISE OF THE _IMPÉRIEUSE_ CONTINUED.
Capture a Settee.—Get under Sail.—Fight between the Patriots
and French.—Make sail for Rosas.—Fort Trinidad.—Gallantry
of Captain West.—Bravery of the Catalans.—Repulse of the
French.—Attack of the _Impérieuse_.—The French redouble
their Efforts.—Occupation of Catalonia.—The Castle of
Trinidad.—Nature of our Position.—Nature of our
Operations.—Manufacture of a Man-trap.—Lose my Nose.—The
French assault Rosas.—Practice of the
French.—Presentiment.—The French Attack.—The Attack
repulsed.—Bravery of a French Soldier.—Heavy Gale of
Wind.—Unfortunate Accident.—Evacuate the Fortress.—Stand
towards Scalla.—Letter from Lord Collingwood.—Despatch to
Lord Collingwood.—Letter to the Admiralty.—Testimony of
the Spaniards.—Sir Walter Scott.—Official Gratitude. 290
CHAP. XVIII.
CRUISE OF THE _IMPÉRIEUSE_ CONTINUED.
Defeat of the Spaniards.—Attack some French Vessels.—French
Operations.—Letter of Lord Cochrane.—Lord
Collingwood.—Operations of the Enemy.—Fall in with the
_Cyrene_.—Sail for Minorca.—Apply for leave.—Motives for
leaving.—Apathy of the Government.—Reproached for
Service.—Neglect of the Admiralty 323
CHAP. XIX.
APPOINTMENT TO COMMAND FIRESHIPS IN BASQUE ROADS.
Undertaking against Rochefort.—Hopes excited.—Present myself
at the Admiralty.—Am consulted by Lord Mulgrave.—Lord
Gardner’s Statement.—Anxiety of Government.—My Plan of
Action.—Decline the Command.—The Command pressed upon
me.—Return to the _Impérieuse_.—Preparations for
Attack.—Lord Gambier obtains the Laurels, but dissuades
the Attack.—The Isle d’Aix.—Lord Gambier’s Statement 338
CHAP. XX.
Sail for the Basque Roads.—My awkward Position.—Ill-humour
of the Fleet.—Admiral Harvey.—Imprudence of Admiral
Harvey.—Complains of Lord Gambier.—Inaccurate
Soundings.—Lord Gambier’s Tracts.—Cobbett’s Comments on
the Tracts.—Dissensions in the Fleet.—Letter to Lord
Mulgrave.—My Principles of Warfare.—Night-work.—My
Principles of Action.—The Isle d’Aix.—Explosion-vessels. 354
CHAP. XXI.
Press for an Attack.—Results of Delay.—The French
Preparations.—French Admiral’s Account.—Insult to the
English Fleet.—State of Preparations.—Start for the
Attack.—The Attack.—The Explosion.—Failure of the
Attack.—Terror of the French.—The French aground.—Apathy
of Lord Gambier.—The Aix Roads.—The French Fleet permitted
to escape.—Drift towards the Enemy.—Attack the French
Fleet.—The _Calcutta_ strikes.—The Attack.—Failure of
Fireships.—Singular Incident.—Signal of Recall.—Captain
Seymour.—Lord Gambier’s Evasiveness.—Am
recalled.—Remonstrate with Lord Gambier.—Am sent
Home.—Lord Gambier’s Despatch.—The French
Despatch.—Destruction of the Boom.—The _Mediator_ 370
CHAP. XXII.
ARRIVAL IN ENGLAND.
Intended Vote of Thanks to Lord Gambier.—Resolve to oppose
it.—Interview with Lord Mulgrave.—Lord Gambier demands a
Court-Martial.—He is directed to make a fresh Report of
the Action in Basque Roads.—Injustice of this second
Despatch.—Attempt to entrap me into the Position of
Prosecutor.—Composition and Proceedings of the
Court-Martial.—The Admiral’s Point of
Justification.—Disposed of by Captain Broughton’s
Evidence, and by that of Captains Malcolm, Newcombe, and
Seymour.—Sir Harry Neale’s Evidence stopped by Admiral
Young 403
CHAP. XXIII.
LORD GAMBIER’S DESPATCH.
Its Omissions and Suppressions.—Motive for Lord Gambier’s
Mis-statements.—Mr. Fairfax reports that the _Mediator_
went in fifth, not first.—Reason of the contrary
Assertion.—Napoleon attributes the Escape of his Fleet to
the Imbecility of Lord Gambier.—Mismanagement of the
Fireships.—Lord Gambier’s Delay and Misdirection.—His
Perversion of Fact.—His misplaced Praise.—The Despatch
fails to satisfy the Public.—Criticised by the
Press.—Admiral Gravière’s Account of the Termination of
the Action 416
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A SEAMAN.
————————
INTRODUCTORY.
SOME ACCOUNT OF THE DUNDONALD FAMILY.
Tradition has assigned to the Cochranes a derivation from one of the
Scandinavian sea-rovers, who, in a remote age, settled on the lands of
Renfrew and Ayr. There is reason to believe the tradition well founded;
but to trace its authenticity would be foreign to the purpose of the
present work.
In later times, incidents of historic interest connected with the
family, justify allusion, as forming contributions not only to the
national annals of Scotland, but to those of England also. The earliest
authentic record of our house is contained in the subjoined extract from
Crawfurd’s “Peerage of Scotland.”
“This family, which originally took its surname from the Barony of
Cochran, in Renfrewshire[5], is of great antiquity; and though none of
the family arrived to the dignity of peerage till the reign of King
Charles I., yet it is undeniable that they were barons of special
account for many ages before, and endowed with large possessions in
these parts and elsewhere.
“The first of whom I have found upon record is Waldenus de Coveran,
_i.e._ Cochran, who, in 1262, is witness to the grant which Dungal,
the son of Suayn, made to Walter Stewart Earl of Monteith of sundry
lands in the county of Argyle, which came in aftertimes to be
transmitted to Forrester of Carden. Another William de Coveran is
mentioned by Pryn, as a person of account in this county, who makes
his submission to King Edward I. Anno Dom. 1296, in the Ragman Roll;
also John de Coveran is witness in the regular election of James,
Abbot of Paisley, 17th of David II. Anno 1346.
“The next remarkable person of the family is Gosiline de Cochran, who
flourished under King David Bruce; he is witness to several grants
made by Robert II. when Earl of Strathern, to the religious of
Paisley, an abbacy he assumed into his particular patronage, wherein
his ancestors’ donations being made to the glory of God are
particularly narrated. He left issue, William de Cochran, of that Ilk,
his son, who obtained from King Robert II. a charter of the lands of
Cochran, to be held in as ample a manner as any of his progenitors
held the same of the Lord High Steward of Scotland, dated on the 22nd
of September 1389. As he stood in special favour with this king, so
was he in no less with Robert III. his son, to whom it seems he had
been serviceable; for when he came to the crown he had so grateful a
sense thereof, that in the second year of his reign, Anno 1392, he
made him a grant of forty shillings sterling in annuity, arising out
of the profits of the Burgh of Rutherglen. He was succeeded by Robert
his son who, in 1456, resigned his estates in favour of Allan his
son.”
This surrender of his estate appears to have been made for no other
purpose than to devote himself to the study and practice of
architecture, in which, as an art, Scotland was, at that time, behind
other nations. In the exercise of his self-imposed profession, Robert
Cochran is said to have displayed great skill in the erection of several
edifices[6], and when, by the favour of the King James III. he
afterwards rose to power, his architectural eminence procured for him,
amongst the host of enemies created by his elevation, the contemptuous
appellation of the “mason chiel.”
-----
Footnote 5:
“Opposite to Johnstoun, upon the east side of the river, lye the house
and barony of Cochran, the principal manour of the Cochrans, a family
of great antiquity in this shire, whose ancestors have possessed these
lands well nigh 500 years, and, without doubt, have taken appellation
from their hereditary lands, when fixed surnames came to be
used.”—_Crawfurd’s Description of Renfrew_, p. 82.
Footnote 6:
Pinkerton.
-----
It was not, however, his architectural skill alone which gave him a
place in his sovereign’s estimation, but his good broadsword and
powerful arm, the efficacy of which having been displayed in a combat in
the king’s presence[7] attracted his Majesty’s attention; so much so,
that the king, finding him to be of good family, and possessed of great
talent, placed him near his person; the result being that in a brief
space of time he became his chief adviser, and the great opponent of the
Scottish nobility, who sought to hold the king in their power.
In short, Robert Cochran appears to have become to James something like
what Wolsey subsequently was to Henry VIII. not in power only, but also
in ostentation. In the latter respect, Lindsay says of him, that “even
his pavilions were of silk, and the fastening chains thereof richly
gilt.” Pinkerton says he “became the fountain of royal favour, and was
elevated to a giddy and invidious height of power—this being the earldom
of Mar.”[8]
-----
Footnote 7:
“He came to be known to the king by a duel which he fought with
another; and presently from an architect came to be made a courtier,
and was put in a fair way of rising to some greater advancement; for,
having performed some lighter matters, intrusted to him, with
diligence, and also accommodating himself to the king’s humour, he was
soon admitted to advise concerning the grand affairs of the kingdom;
insomuch that Preston chose him to be his son-in-law.”—_Buchanan_,
vol. ii. p. 301. “But that which made Cochran most envied was his
earldom of March; which country the king had either given to him, or
at least committed to his trust, upon the death of the king’s younger
brother.”—_Buchanan_, vol. ii. p. 309.
Footnote 8:
The following extract from Crawfurd shows that the title and revenues
of the earldom of Mar were in the hands of James at this time:—
“ERSKINE EARL OF MAR.
“Which Thomas [Erskine Earl of Mar,] did prosecute his father’s claim
to the earldom of Mar with all the vigour imaginable, but having a
powerful party, the king, to deal with, at length a final sentence was
given against him in parliament, on the 5th November 1457, which he
was obliged to acquiesce in; but notwithstanding the hard measure he
had undergone from the king, and which might have been thought would
have made him ready to have taken all occasions of being severe of it,
yet he was a person of so much honour and virtue that in the
succeeding reign of James III., when he had a very fair opportunity to
be revenged, yet he no sooner saw the ways of duty towards the king
decline, and his power _envied by a strong party of the nobility_,
than out of pure conscience to serve his Majesty when he was in
distress he fairly engaged in his quarrel, and when the war broke out
accepted a command in the army, in which he continued till the very
end that the king was miserably killed in the field of Stirling on the
11th of June 1488.”
-----
This advancement to the earldom of Mar, says Buchanan, “was the chief
source of the hatred of the nobility, who were disgusted with James,
partly by reason of his familiarity with that rascally sort of people,
but chiefly because _he slighted the nobility_, and chose mean persons
to be his counsellors and advisers, the chief of these being Thomas
Preston, one of a good family, and Robert Cochran, a man endued with
great strength of body and equal audacity of mind.”
In classing Thomas Preston and Robert Cochran amongst “that rascally
sort of people,” Buchanan contradicts himself, for he admits that
Preston was of good family, and he must have known that Cochran’s family
was still more ancient, so that the historian only gives evidence of his
own tufthunting tendencies. What were the feelings of the nobility
towards Robert Cochran, may be gathered from the titles to the chapters
of a scurrilous book subsequently written in their interest for the
purpose of denouncing his memory.
1. “This minister’s (Robert Cochran) raising himself, first by his
impudence, and next by his alliance with a noble lord, whom he wormed
out of power.”
2. “His poor condition when he first came to court.”
5. “His buildings and passion for hunting.”
7. “_His working the disgrace of all the great men_,” &c.
This last head, “_working the disgrace of all the great men_,” appears
to form the key to their whole hatred, but it implies patriotism towards
a monarch and a country whom the “great men” had previously oppressed. I
am quite content to rest the reputation of my ancestor upon the
libellous evidence of his adversaries, or the showing of the Scottish
historians, that he attempted to abridge the power of the nobles, _and
succeeded_ to such an extent as to secure his own murder. To enter at
length into such matters would, however, be to substitute my ancestor’s
biography for my own, and therefore it will only be necessary to abridge
from Pinkerton a few interesting extracts relative to this romance of
Scottish history.
“The new Earl of Mar, unconscious that his extreme elevation was an
infallible step to the deepest ruin, continued to abuse his power, and
that of his sovereign. The nobles beheld the places, _formerly given
to their sons_, now sold (?) to Mar’s followers. The prelates and
other dignitaries of the church _sighed at the increase of simony_!
&c. &c. In short, the whole honour and welfare of the king and kingdom
were sacrificed on the domestic altar of this base and covetous
minion!
“Some of the peers assembled, and consulted upon the means of
delivering the realm from the disgrace and destruction inflicted by
Cochran and the other royal favourites. A noble deputation had even
been sent to the king, requesting that he would dismiss these
pernicious councillors, and restore the confidence placed by his
ancestors _in the loyalty of the nobility_. The answer of James was
far from satisfactory, but the peers assented to delay, and dissembled
till some decisive occasion should arise.
“The Scottish array, amounting to about fifty thousand, had crowded to
the royal banner at Burrough-muir, near Edinburgh, whence they marched
to Sontray and to Lauder, at which place they encamped between the
church and the village. Cochran, Earl of Mar, conducted the artillery,
and his presence and pomp were additional insults. On the morning
after their arrival at Lauder, the peers assembled in a secret
council, in the church, and deliberated upon their designs of revenge.
The Earls of Angus, Argyle, Huntley, Orkney or Caithness, Crawford,
the Lords Home, Fleming, Gray, Drummond, Hales, and Seton, are chiefly
mentioned upon this occasion; and the discontent must have spread far
when we find Evandale the chancellor, and some bishops united to the
above names.
“In the course of the debate Gray took occasion to introduce an
apologue: ‘The mice consulted upon the means of deliverance from their
tyrannic enemy the cat, and agreed that a bell should be suspended
about her neck, to notify her approach and their danger; but what
mouse has courage sufficient to fasten the bell?’ ‘I shall bell the
cat,’ exclaimed the impatience of Angus, in whom a current of the
blood of Douglas flowed; and the homely times conferred upon him the
appellation of Archibald Bell the Cat. It was concluded that the king
_should be put in a gentle imprisonment_ in the castle of Edinburgh,
and that all his favourites should be instantly hanged over the bridge
of Lauder.
“Cochran, ignorant of their designs, at length left the royal presence
to proceed to the council. The earl was attended by three hundred men,
armed with light battle-axes, and distinguished by his livery of white
with black fillets. He was clothed in a riding cloak of black velvet,
and wore a large chain of gold around his neck; his horn of the chase,
or of battle, was adorned with gold and precious stones; and his
helmet, overlaid with the same valuable metal, was borne before him.
Approaching the door of the church, he commanded an attendant to knock
with authority; and Sir Robert Douglas of Lochleven, who guarded the
passage, inquiring the name, was answered, ‘’Tis I, the Earl of Mar.’
Cochran and some of his friends were admitted. Angus advanced to him,
and pulling the golden chain from his neck, said, ‘A rope will become
thee better;’ while Douglas of Lochleven seized his hunting-horn,
declaring that he had been too long a hunter of mischief. Rather
astonished than alarmed, Cochran said: ‘My lords, is it jest or
earnest?’ To which it was replied, ‘It is good earnest, and so thou
shalt find it, for thou and thy accomplices have too long abused our
prince’s favour; but no longer expect such advantage, for thou and thy
followers shall now reap the deserved reward.’
“Having secured Mar, the lords dispatched some men-at-arms to the
king’s pavilion, conducted by two or three moderate leaders, who
amused James while their followers seized the favourites. Sir William
Roger, the English musician; Preston, a gentleman, Hommil, Torphichan,
Leonard, and others, were instantly hanged over the bridge at Lauder.
John Ramsay of Balmain having clasped the king’s person, was alone
spared. Cochran was now brought out, his hands bound with a rope, and
thus conducted to the bridge, and hanged above his companions.”
Even the privilege of being hanged with one of the silken cords of his
pavilion was denied him; and his making such a request Pinkerton
attributes to “weak pride,” though it certainly looked more like “cool
pride,” which would not condescend to beg life, and only asked to die
like a gentleman.
Much in the same spirit, but showing the abilities of the man, are the
following extracts from “A Detection of the Falsehood, Abuse, and
Misrepresentations in a late Libel, entitled, The Life of Sir Robert
Cochrane, Prime Minister in Scotland to James the Third.”
“This COCHRAN, [Sir Robert] according to the greatest of the Scottish
Writers, lived at a Time when a Faction in England made War on their
lawful Sovereign, and imposed it on the King by Force of Arms, that he
should bear the Name and Ensigns, or Badges of a King, but the Power
of the Government should be in the heads of their Faction, against
which Violence and Tyranny the Queen drew the Sword for her Husband’s
(Henry the 6th) Deliverance with such Vigour and Success, as rescued
him from his Enemies, slew their Chiefs in Battle, destroyed two
Armies, gaining two compleat Victories; and even when Fortune deserted
this masculine Princess, in her final Overthrow Six and thirty
thousand men were slain before she lost the Field.
“These were the Times when Cochran became the Minion of the King of
Scotland, who departing from the Counsels of his ancient Servants, and
withdrawing Himself from the Nobility, chose mean and infamous Persons
to be the Companions of his Pleasures, and the Advisers of his Reign.
“Of these one _Preston_ was Chief, though born of a better Family than
any of his Comrades, who abandoned himself to indulge the King’s
Humour in all Things. And COCHRAN came next, who, of a Builder was
instantly made Courtier! History describes Him as a Man of great
Bodily Strength, and of equal Impudence! who, making Himself known to
the King by a Duel which He fought, was admitted at Court with great
Expectations of Advancement. Having been employ’d in Matters of small
Concern, which He performed with great Application, and insinuating
Himself into the King’s Favour by constant Assiduity, He became
immediately advised with in the most important and the most intimate
Councils of the Kingdom. Preston upon this made Him his Son, by giving
him his Daughter in Marriage[9]....”
-----
Footnote 9:
Buchanan speaks of Preston’s alliance with Cochran as “one solicited
to strengthen himself, which was not the cause but the effect of
Cochran’s power at Court.... Again, the immediate Acquisition of Crown
Lands which rendered Cochran most odious, is highly spoken of,
notwithstanding that he obtained a Grant of the Lands belonging to a
Prince of the Blood, even the Revenue of an Earl! and by such Grants
_outvied the Splendour of the ancient Nobility_! who beheld Persons of
the meanest extraction eclipse them in Lustre!”
-----
To return to the descendants of the murdered minister:—
“This Allan (son of the murdered Robert), in 1452, is witness to the
mortification which Robert Lord Lyle made to the abbot and conventual
brethren of the monastery of Paisley, of the fishing on the river of
Clyde, at the place called Crokatshot, for the help of their prayers
to advance his spiritual estate, in which deed he is designated
Allanus Cochran, Armiger, his father being then alive, and to whom he
succeeded before the 1480. He married ..., daughter of ..., by whom he
had Robert, a son, who was father of John Cochran of that Ilk, who
immediately succeeded his grandfather upon his death.
“Which John, for some consideration I know not, obtained a licence
from his sovereign Lord King James IV. under the Great Seal, impouring
him to dispose of either his lands of Easter Cochran in Renfrewshire,
or his lands of Pitfour in Perthshire. Accordingly, he alienated a
part of his lands of Cochran to James Archbishop of Glasgow, Anno
1519; to which deed he appends his seal, the impression bearing _three
Boars’ Heads eraz’d_, and circumscribed _Sigillum Johannis de
Cochran_. His wife was Elizabeth, daughter of John Simple of Fullwood,
who bore him a son, John, who was served and retourned heir to his
father on the 12th of May, 1539; he, dying in the 1557, left issue by
Mary, his wife, daughter of Lindsay of Dunrod, _in Vicecomitatu de
Renfrew_, a son,
“William, who succeeded him. In 1593, he erected from the foundation
at Cochran, the ancient seat of his family, a very high tower of
free-stone, and adorned it with large plantations; he marrying
Margaret, daughter of Robert Montgomery of Skelmurly, _in Vicecomitatu
de Air_, by Mary, his wife, daughter of Robert, Lord Semple, had a
daughter Elizabeth, his sole heir.
“He wisely considering the proper way of supporting his family was to
settle his daughter in his own time, and declining to marry her into a
richer family than his son, he made a prudent and discreet match for
her with Alexander Blair, a younger son of an ancient and genteel
family in Airshire, whose ancestors had been seated in the country
aforesaid for many ages before, so that beside a noble alliance, and a
competent patrimony, he yielded to change his name to Cochran, which
was almost the only condition the old gentleman required. This
Alexander, so taking upon him the surname of Cochran, was a virtuous
and frugal man, and studied as much the good of the family as if he
himself had been born the heir thereof. In 1622, he acquired the lands
of Cowdoun with an intention to unite them to the ancient patrimonial
inheritance of Cochran; but he afterwards sold them to Sir William,
his second son, as a fund to provide his younger children; for,
besides Sir John, his eldest son, he had six other sons, and two
daughters:
“Sir William Cochran of Cowdoun.
“Alexander, a colonel in the king’s service, in the wars of Ireland,
which commenced in 1641, with the murder of upwards of fifty thousand
Scots and English by the native Irish.
“Hugh, author of the branch of Fergusly; he was a colonel, first under
the renoun’d Gustavus Adolphus King of Sweden, and afterward to King
Charles I. in the time of the Civil War in Ireland.
“Bryse, a colonel in the time of the Civil War, who lost his life in
the king’s service, Anno 1650.
“Captain Ochter Cochran.
“Gavin Cochran of Craigmure, was the seventh and youngest son.
“Elizabeth, married to John Lennox of Woodhead in Stirlingshire.
“Grisel, to Thomas Dunlop of Housle.
“Which Sir John, in the time of the unhappy Civil War in Britain,
firmly adhered to the interest of King Charles I. and had a colonel’s
commission in the army. In the year 1644, he was sent ambassador to
several princes to solicit their assistance in his Majesty’s behalf,
which he performed with such diligence and conduct, that in the treaty
of peace which was set on foot betwixt the king and the Parliament of
England and the Estates of Scotland, Anno 1646, he was, together with
the Marquis of Huntly and Montrose, the Earls of Nithsdale, Crawfurd,
Traquair, &c. proposed to be excepted from the king’s pardon, which
his Majesty generously refused. Upon the murder of the king, he
attended King Charles II. into foreign parts, and in the 1650 was sent
into Poland to crave aid of the Scots merchants there; but before his
return the king and the Scots army were defeated at Worcester; he
continuing with the king during his exile, dyed about the time of the
Restoration, without issue; so that his next brother, Sir William,
became his heir.
“Which Sir William was very carefully educated in grammar learning in
his youth, whence he was removed to the university; where having
applied himself indefatigably to his studies, and highly improved his
natural endowments with academical learning, he removed from thence
after he had taken the degree of Master of Arts, and studied our laws;
in which profession he attained to an uncommon perfection. Soon after
his entering on the stage of business, he became much famed for his
prudent management and conduct, by which he acquired a fair estate,
both in the shires of Renfrew and Air, for the last of which he had
the honour to serve as a member in the Parliament, 1647, wherein his
abilities were soon discovered by the great and leading men of the
House, and he showed himself, thro' the course of the sitting of that
Parliament, a good and even patriot, wholly intent upon the honour and
safety of the king, whose interest he did visibly advance, and the
welfare and tranquillity of the nation then in no small ferment.”
On the visit of Charles I. to his Scottish dominions in 1641, for the
purpose of allaying the hostile feelings which his arbitrary acts had
there excited, Sir William Cochrane of Cowden had sufficient influence
to be instrumental in reconciling the monarch and his angry subjects;
together with sufficient substance and loyalty to minister to the
necessities of his sovereign. For these and other services Sir William
was at this time elevated to the peerage under the title of Lord
Cochrane of Cowden; the gratitude of Charles, however, not being openly
manifested until some years afterwards a prisoner in Carisbrook
Castle.[10]
-----
Footnote 10:
That the peerage was considered to have been conferred in 1641,
appears from a subsequent order of Charles II. for the elevation of
Lord Cochrane to the Earldom of Dundonald (see p. 22); but for some
cause or other the making out of the patent had been neglected or
omitted till 1647. It would almost seem that Charles, whilst a
prisoner at Carisbrook had some presentiment of his approaching fate,
and had hastened to remedy the neglect before it was too late.
-----
As this circumstance is, to the best of my knowledge, unique, and is at
variance with the statements of some Scottish genealogists, who give the
date of the letters-patent as at Scarborough, Dec. 27, 1647, an extract
from the “Acts” of the Privy Council in Edinburgh, confirming the
original patent, may be gratifying to the historian.
“_At Edinburgh, the 1st day of April, 1648._
“The which day and year of our Lord, at his Majesty’s Privy Council,
John Earl of Crafurd and Lindsay produced a patent under his Majesty’s
Great Seal, dated at Carisbrook, the 26th day of December, 1647—by
which his Majesty, considering the faithfulness and good affection of
Sir William Cochran of Cowden towards his Majesty’s service—and his
Majesty being willing, for his further encouragement to continue
therein, to bestow some token of his royal favor on him, hath given
and granted to the said Sir William Cochrane and his heirs male
lawfully begotten, the title and dignity of a Lord of Parliament
within this kingdom, to be called in all time coming Lord Cochrane of
Dundonald, and to have exercise, and enjoy all the privileges,
liberties, and pre-eminences belonging thereto, &c. &c. In token
whereof, Archibald Marquis of Argyll, President of the Council at this
time deliberate—in the name of Lord Cochrane—received the same on his
knees,” &c. &c.—_Extractum de Libris Actorum._
It is not my intention to dilate upon the course pursued by Lord
Cochrane, in promoting the reconciliation of Charles and his hereditary
liegemen. Suffice it to say that, whilst his lordship’s predilections
and services were in favour of the constitutional power of the king, he
made a firm stand against his despotic tendencies, especially when
meditating the subversion of the Scottish Church, under the guise of
ecclesiastical reform.[11]
-----
Footnote 11:
“Charles and Laud determined to force on the Scots the English
Liturgy—or rather a liturgy which, whenever it differed from that of
England, differed, in the judgment of all rigid Protestants, for the
worse.”—_Lord Macaulay._
-----
In the national struggle which ensued after the death of Charles I. Lord
Cochrane was amongst the most active in raising troops to assert the
right of Charles II. to the throne. The subjoined letter from that
monarch, divested of its antique orthography, will show the nature of
the services rendered.
CHARLES R.
“Right trusty and well-beloved—we greet you well. We have seen your
letter to the Duke of Hamilton, whom you give no encouragement; so
hope that sometime you, with the horse raised upon the baronies of Ayr
and Renfrew, shall soon be in arms.
“Having been engaged to give to General-Major Vandrosk the first
regiment of horse raised within our kingdom of Scotland, we could not
possibly break our promise to so deserving a person. But seeing your
brother was appointed to have the command of one of the regiments of
foot before they were converted into horse, he will now be
disappointed, as likewise will Col. Cunninghame, of their
expectations. We have, therefore, thought fit to desire you to shift
your brother up to the army to us, and we do oblige ourselves to take
him into our particular favor, and to give him the command of a
regiment either of horse or foot.
“We likewise find you desire the removing of the garrison from Newark,
but having advised twice with our Committee of Estate, we find it is
not for the good of the service to remove the said garrison; but we
are content that the strength be reduced to the number of threttie
soldiers only.
“We shall desire that you would be assisted in hasting these levies,
and continue in your barony all public despatch, so as you may be in
continual receipt of our respects to you.
“So we bid you now heartily farewell, from our Camp Royal at Woodhend,
the fifth of August, 1651.
“To our right trusty and well-beloved,
the Lord Cocorane.”
The preceding letter marks the dawn of that ingratitude towards his
tried adherents of which Charles has been, not without reason, accused.
Lord Cochrane’s reward for raising “the first regiment of horse in
Scotland” was the displacement of his brother from the command, in
favour of a Dutchman; notwithstanding that the whole expenditure had
been borne by his lordship, whose fate it subsequently was that the
Stuarts should draw largely upon resources which, to the injury of his
descendants, his loyalty ungrudgingly supplied.
Passing over the defeat which followed, I select from others a letter
addressed by Charles, when in exile, to Lord Cochrane, under the assumed
name of “Lenos and Richmond;” its purport being to show that the
unfortunate royal family depended upon Lord Cochrane’s management not
only for advice, but, what was more to the purpose, for the means of
subsistence.
“February 2nd, 1657.
“MY LORD,—I find myself very much obliged to your lordship by your
great care of my dear son’s interests and mine, and have seen your
letter concerning the gentleman recommended for a commissioner, who,
though a stranger to me—yet, since it is the opinion of your lordship
that he be added to the number of the commissioners, I do in this, as
in all other things, hearken to your lordship’s advice; relying on
your lordship’s favour to me, and therefore do hereby invite him, if
he will accept the trouble, with many thanks to your lordship and to
him.
“I must further beseech of your lordship to intend the raising five
thousand pounds upon Glasgow, and to labour the sale of Methuen and
Killmorocate, both with all possible expedition.[12]
“I hope to have the happiness of seeing your lordship in these parts
ere long, that I may have a larger conveniency of making my
acknowledgments to your lordship for your eminent favour to
“Your lordship’s most humble servant,
“C. R. LENOS and RICHMOND.
-----
Footnote 12:
This letter appears to mix up the affairs of Charles and the Duke,
probably with a view to avert danger to Lord Cochrane, if
intercepted.
-----
“For my Lord Cochrane.”
Whether Lord Cochrane visited the exiled court or not, I have no
documents to decide; nor is it at all material; these letters being
adduced to show the nature of his connection with the Stuarts in their
day of humiliation, which only appeared to add to his zeal for their
welfare.
The “son” alluded to in the preceding letter was the Duke of
Monmouth[13], for espousing whose cause, in the subsequent reign of
James II., the Cochrane family suffered severely.
-----
Footnote 13:
“Charles, when a wanderer on the Continent, had fallen in at the Hague
with Lucy Walters, a Welsh girl of great beauty, but of weak
understanding. She became his mistress, and presented him with a son,
upon whom he poured forth such an overflowing fondness as seemed
hardly to belong to his cool and careless nature. Soon after the
Restoration the young favourite made his appearance at Whitehall,
where he was lodged in the palace and permitted to enjoy distinctions
till then confined to princes of the blood royal.” _Lord Macaulay._
-----
Soon after the Restoration in 1660, Lord Cochrane was sworn a privy
councillor; and by his Majesty’s special choice was constituted one of
the Commissioners of the Treasury and Exchequer, which great and weighty
employment, says Crawfurd, “he discharged with admirable prudence and
integrity, to the general satisfaction of the whole nation. Increasing
still more in wealth and honour, he acquired the lordship of Paisley,
where he fixed his seat, and lived with great splendour and hospitality
for many years. After the barbarous murder of the late king, his
lordship contributed his best and hearty endeavours towards bringing
home Charles II. to inherit the rightful possession of the throne of
these realms; which, no doubt, was the cause, when Oliver Cromwell came
to be called protector, why he fined my Lord Cochrane, among other
royalists, in 5000_l._ sterling, by special ordinance of the
Commonwealth of England, dated April 12th, 1654.”
The following letters from the Dukes of Lennox and Monmouth are still in
my possession, and from historic interest alone require no apology for
their introduction in this place.
“London, Dec. 27, 1662.
“MY LORD,—I received a discharge from your lordship, which being
ill-drawn, I have forborne to sign it; but shall readily perform it so
soon as it comes to my hands corrected by Mr. Graham.
“I must intreat of your lordship’s endeavours to raise fifteen hundred
pounds upon the two years’ rent of Jyla and my other lands for the
year 1661; with which I would desire your lordship to discharge the
six hundred pounds you borrowed for me when I was at Edinburgh, and
the seven hundred pounds I borrowed of Sir James Stuart at the same
time. The rest to be returned to me, who am
“Your lordship’s humble servant,
“LENOS and RICHMOND.
“For my Lord Cochrane.”
“P.S.—I desire your lordship to excuse my own writing, for nothing but
illness should make me make use of another.”
“London, Feb. 26th, 1663.
“MY LORD,—Give me leave to add this trouble to your lordship’s
favours, in desiring that you will be pleased to send me a full
account of all you know of the condition of my affairs in Scotland.
And wherein and how you conceive any part of my estate proper or
casual may be better improved to my advantage, with your lordship’s
advice for the management thereof for the future. If you know of any
grants made by me to any person in Scotland when I was there, which
may be prejudicial to or on my estates, you will be pleased to
acquaint me with it; for I am resolved to repose all my confidence
upon your lordship’s directions, and to take measures of all the
management of my affairs from them.
“I shall wholly trust to your lordship, and therefore entreat you will
not impart this to anybody, but conceal the request of
“Your lordship’s very humble servant,
“LENOS and RICHMOND.
“For my Lord Cochrane.”
“Whitehall, Aug. 25th, 1663.
“MY LORD,—I must desire your lordship to give yourself the trouble of
sending me word how my engagements stand to my estate mortgaged in
Scotland, that I may know whether it be convenient that the several
persons to whom it is mortgaged should receive the profits of the
lands mortgaged to them till both principal and interest is satisfied.
Or whether it be convenient if one person, in the name of the rest,
should receive the whole profits of the estate, and engage to pay all
the debts, both principal and interest, in so many years, and then to
return the estate to me again. I must beg your lordship’s faithful
advice in this, having found it so formerly. And, good my lord, let me
know in how many years my estate will pay the debt upon it, both
principal and interest. I cannot believe anybody will be so warm in my
concerns as yourself, and therefore wholly repose this trust in you,
desiring you to send me in writing a conveyance of my estate to
yourself for the payment of the debt in the aforesaid years, with the
return of the estate into my hands, who am, my lord,
“Your lordship’s most obliged servant,
“LENOS and RICHMOND.”
The following letter, written to Lord Cochrane after the removal of the
Court to Oxford on account of the plague raging in London, will show the
straits to which even the wealthiest of the Scottish nobility had been
reduced.
“Oxford, November 11th, 1665.
“MY LORD,—I had written to your lordship before this had I not an
intention of coming to Scotland myself. But being now prevented by
other affairs, I must desire your lordship to make all the possible
speed that may be to return me five hundred pounds out of the thousand
pounds that are due to me.
“My lord, _I never was in a greater strait in my life_, the plague
having prevented my tenants’ payment. If you ever did intend to oblige
me, I am sure you could never have a better opportunity than making me
a present payment.
“Good, my lord, do not fail me, who am,
“Your most humble servant,
“RICHMOND and LENOS.
“For my Lord Cochrane.”
“P.S.—My uncle Aubigny is very sick at Paris, and we expect to hear he
is dead by every post,—the last letters assuring that he was past
recovery.”
“July 1666.
“MY LORD,—I need not acquaint your lordship how great a confidence I
have of your lordship’s friendship and assistance. Having now sent
Boreman into Scotland to attend and follow your lordship’s directions,
and my Lord Newburgh’s, for the completing and settling the whole
affairs of the Admiralty. If my Lord Macdonnel goes on in his intended
bargain, I shall expect 6000_l._ to be paid and returned to me by
Michaelmas. Please to remember the 100_l._ you reserved till Boreman’s
coming. I shall trouble your lordship with nothing more at present,
but the assurance of being,
“Your lordship’s very humble servant,
“RICHMOND and LENOS.
“For my Lord Cochrane.”
“London, 18th Sept. 1666.
“MY LORD,—Though I consider that 5000_l._ is too small a sum for so
considerable and convenient an estate to my Lord Macdonald, yet I am
satisfied to be ruled by the market and the exigency of my own
affairs, but especially by your lordship’s judgment and kindness, of
which I have had so good experience.
“My lord, the sad accident of fire which hath lately happened in
London _hath almost ruined us all_. I must therefore earnestly entreat
you to return me what money you have in your hands of mine, with all
possible speed, not knowing which way to turn myself at present, there
being no such thing as money here. Pray, likewise hasten Boreman in
returning what money is due to me on the prizes, in doing all which,
you will very much oblige
“Your lordship’s humble servant,
“RICHMOND and LENOS.
“For my Lord Cochrane, at Edinburgh.”
I have purposely refrained from comment on these letters, as being
foreign to the purpose of this introductory chapter, which is not to
dilate on immaterial subjects, but simply to point out the connection of
the Cochrane family with the Stuarts, and their faithful adherents. The
subjoined, from the Duke of Monmouth, is also curious, as alluding to
the disaster of invasion, in addition to those of plague and fire.
“June 28th, 1667.
“MY LORD,—So soon as I received your lordship’s of the 26th of May I
was commanded by the king for Harwich, and have ever since been so
hurried about in this confusion upon the arrival of the Dutch, that I
have not had time to answer your lordship, to whom I do acknowledge
myself very much obliged for your care of my affairs; and if it lies
in my power to acknowledge it otherwise than in words, your lordship
shall ever find me really to be, my lord,
“Your lordship’s real friend and servant,
“MONMOUTH and BUCCLEUCH.
“These for my Lord Cochrane.”
On the 12th of May, 1669, Lord Cochrane was created Earl of Dundonald.
The annexed is his Majesty’s order for the patent:—
“Our sovereign Lord, considering that it hath been always the ancient,
constant, and worthy practice of all kings to confer titles and
degrees of honour and dignity upon such of those subjects whose good
services and worth have so deserved, and that his Majestie’s father of
blessed memory did, in the year 1641, dignify and confer upon his
right trusty and well-beloved William Lord Cochrane, the title of Lord
Cochrane. And now his Majesty—in consideration of his faithful
services, and for the better encouragement of him and his family to
continue in their constant and affectionate adhering to his interest
and service for the future—being graciously pleased to confer a
further mark of his royal favour upon him, doth therefore, of his
royal and princely power, ordain a letter patent to be made and
decreed under the great seal of his ancient kingdom of Scotland, in
due form, making, constituting, and creating the said William Lord
Cochrane, and his heirs male, which failing, the oldest heirs female,
without division, already procreate or to be procreate, of the body of
the said William Lord Cochrane, &c. &c. &c., to be called and designed
now and for ever hereafter Earl of Dundonald, Lord Cochrane of Paisley
and Ochiltree, &c. &c. (Then follow the usual technical formalities.)
“MAY IT PLEASE YOUR MAJESTY.—This contains your Majesty’s warrant for
a patent to be passed under the great seal of Scotland, for creating
William Lord Cochrane Earl of Dundonald, Lord Cochrane of Paisley and
Ochiltree, with power, &c. &c. &c. For subscription.
“LAUDERDAILL.”
“Sit supra scribitur,
“CHARLES R.”
The subjoined letters from the Duke and Duchess of Monmouth, the latter
the heiress of Buccleuch[14], are not without historical interest.
-----
Footnote 14:
“Monmouth was married, while still in tender youth, to Anna Scott,
heiress of the noble house of Buccleuch. He took her name, and
received with her hand possession of her ample domains. The estate
which he acquired by this match was popularly estimated at not less
than 10,000_l._ a-year.”—_Lord Macaulay._
-----
“Whitehall, May 2nd, 1671.
“MY LORD,—This is expressly to beg your lordship’s pardon, that I writ
not to you by the person that brought you my commission concerning my
lands, in which I was confident to put your lordship’s and Lord
Cochrane’s names; being assured that neither yourself nor any of your
family would deny me the favour of your assistance in the management
of my estate, which I have now taken into my own possession, and hope
to see the good effects of it. I beseech your lordship to give my
service and excuse to my Lord Cochrane, and tell him I hope he will be
no worse a friend to me than you have been, who, I must acknowledge,
have obliged me ever to be, my lord,
“Your very humble servant,
“MONMOUTH and BUCCLEUCH.
“For Lord Dundonald.”
“Whitehall, May 25, 1671.
“MY LORD,—I know not how to express my thanks to your lordship for the
trouble I have put upon you in your journey to Branxholme, where your
presence hath been of that advantage to my affairs, as could not,
without you, have been expected. I thank your lordship most heartily
for this and all other your kindnesses to me, and particularly your
advice concerning Orkney, &c. and to refraine the signing of anything
but what shall be most maturely advised by your lordship, and such
other my friends to whose counsel and advice, as always faithful to
me, I shall firmly adhere, and constantly remain, my lord,
“Your very affectionate friend and humble servant,
“MONMOUTH and BUCCLEUCH.
“For the Right Hon. the Earl of Dundonald.”
“Oct. 31, 1671.
“MY LORD,—Being very sensible of your constant care and industry to
promote and advance all our interests in Scotland, and receiving daily
demonstrations of your particular kindness and friendship to us, we
are the more confident on all occasions to depend wholly upon you, for
resolution in doubtful, and assistance in difficult cases, and do
entreat your lordship to take them seriously into your consideration,
and weighing all circumstances deal freely and candidly with us, and
declare truly to us your opinion what you do conceive fit for us to do
to extricate ourselves out of those dangers both we and our estate lie
under.
“We are now both of us so near the time of our majority, and are told
that it is very necessary for us to undertake a journey to Scotland
this next spring. If your lordship be of the same judgment, we must
(if possible) find out some expedient to effect it.
“My lord, we are informed that many of our late chamberlains are
resolved to stand trial with us for 3000_l._ yet remaining in their
hands upon the balance of their accounts, unless they may have such
discharge as they please.
“We do, therefore, very earnestly recommend it to your lordship’s care
to proceed vigorously against them, not only for that, but also for
the great waste and destruction they have made of the woods. A letter
is also written to the Lord President Stair and the rest of the lords
of the session’s favour for a speedy dispatch of our concerns before
them. We shall have the satisfaction that in the place where we have
received so great obligations from your lordship and the rest of our
friends—even there we shall express with much sincerity that we are,
my lord,
“Your lordship’s very affectionate and humble servants,
“BUCCLEUCH and MONMOUTH.
“ANNA BUCCLEUCH and MONMOUTH.
“For the Right Hon. the Earl of Dundonald.”
“March 14th, 1674.
“MY LORD,—The great assurance we have had of your affection and
kindness to us, which upon all occasions you have given sufficient
testimonies of in your adherence to and promoting our interest in
Scotland, encourages us to entreat and, indeed, earnestlie to desire
your continuance thereof, but especially at this time, when we find
our tenants like to be ruined and undone by the severity of continued
frost and snow. How mischievous the consequences thereof may be to us,
we are not able at this distance to conjecture, only we have just
reason to fear the worst.
“But we, depending very much if not solely upon your lordship’s wisdom
and good conduct at this juncture, and very well knowing how prevalent
your countenance and authority will be among our tenants, and what
encouragement they will receive from your presence, must needs desire
and entreat your lordship that you will not fail to be at the next
land settling, for it is your discretion and prudence that shall be
our guide and measure in the regulation of our own interests, or that
of any of our tenants who shall be held fit objects of our
consideration and favour in so general a calamity, if they be
recommended by your lordship unto my lord,
“Your lordship’s most affectionate friends and servants,
“BUCCLEUCH and MONMOUTH.
“ANNA BUCCLEUCH and MONMOUTH.
“For Lord Dundonald.”
“September 29th, 1674.
“MY LORD,—Upon all occasions my wife and I do receive new testimonies
and proofs of your continued kindness to us, and of your unwearied
care and industry to do all good offices which may any wise conduce to
our profit and advantage. And, in truth, the great pains you have
taken about our affairs, and the trouble you took upon you of an
inconvenient journey to be at our land settling, are sufficient
assurances of your zeal and affection for our welfare and prosperity,
for which we owe you a particular acknowledgment. And I do assure your
lordship, I am so extremely sensible of these and all other the
kindnesses which you have done for us, that it shall never be my fault
if I do not make it appear how much I am, my lord,
“Your lordship’s most affectionate friend and servant,
“BUCCLEUCH and MONMOUTH.
“For Lord Dundonald.”
“Whitehall, March 19th, 1676.
“MY LORD,—We are truly sorry to understand by your letter that you are
unable to ride by reason of your age and weakness, and that you cannot
go all the way in your coach to our land settling. We know very well,
and have had long and great experience, how useful you have been in
that affair for many years together; and we may have just reason to
fear that we may suffer very much by your absence from that service,
so many of our lands lying at this time waste. The tenants will be apt
to be discouraged, when they want your countenance to whom they are so
well known. But, my lord, we do not think it reasonable to press you
with arguments to undertake anything, how necessary soever it may be
for our service, if it be in the least prejudicial to your health and
safety.
“Therefore, if your infirmities cannot well dispense with your own
going that journey, we do entreat your lordship to prevail with your
son, my Lord Cochrane, to supply your place. For we are very sure that
there is not one related to you, but will have a great influence on
our tenants; and, next to yourself, we can desire none more
considerable than your son.
“We need not tell you how much the present necessity of our affairs
requires all the prudence, all the countenance and authority, and all
the diligence of ourselves, and of my lords, our commissioners, to
bring our estate out of that waste, ruinous, and scandalous condition
under which it hath lain, and we do know that your lordship will
contribute as much pains, and be as instrumental to bring this to pass
as any person whatsoever. And in this assurance we do subscribe
ourselves, as in truth we are, my lord,
“Your lordship’s most affectionate friends and servants,
“BUCCLEUCH and MONMOUTH.
“ANNA BUCCLEUCH and MONMOUTH.
“For Lord Dundonald.”
The Earl of Dundonald was subsequently appointed by James the Second one
of the Privy Council of Scotland. As the place from which the patent was
dated, viz. Hounslow Heath, is of historical significance, I shall give
the document entire:—
“JAMES R.
“Right trusty and right entirely-beloved cousin and councillor! Right
trusty and right well-beloved cousin and councillor! Right trusty and
entirely-beloved cousins and councillors! Right trusty and right
well-beloved cousins and councillors! Right trusty and well-beloved
cousins and councillors! Right trusty and well-beloved councillors,
and trusty and well-beloved councillors!
“We greet you well.
“Whereas we are fully satisfied of the loyalty, abilities, and dutiful
affection to our service, of our right trusty and well-beloved Earl of
Dundonald, we have therefore thought fit to add him to our Privy
Council of that our ancient kingdom, and do authorise and require you
to admit him accordingly.
“And we do hereby dispense with him from taking the test, oath of
allegiance, or any other oath, except that of Privy Councillor only.
For doing whereof this shall be your warrant, and to him a full and
ample security.
“Given at our camp on Hounslow Heath, the 10th day of June 1686, and
of our reign the second year.
“By His Majesty’s command,
“MELFORT.”
In the subsequent rebellions of Argyle and Monmouth the Cochranes again
suffered severely: John, the second son of the Earl of Dundonald, being
deeply implicated therein, and only escaping with his life by the earl
satisfying, first, the greed of James the Second’s popish priests, and
secondly, that of James himself.
The annexed extracts from Burnet will show all that needs be said on
this head:—
“Cochran, another of those who had been concerned in this treaty [as
to an insurrection in Scotland], was complained of, as having talked
very freely of the duke’s government of Scotland. Upon which the
Scottish secretary sent a note to him, desiring him to come to him;
for it was intended only to give him a reprimand, and to have ordered
him to go to Scotland. But he knew his own secret; so he left his
lodgings, and got beyond sea. This shewed the court had not yet got
full evidence, otherwise he would have been taken up, as well as
others were.”—Vol. i. folio, p. 548.
“The deliberations in Holland, among the English and Scotch that fled
thither, came to ripen faster than was expected. Lord Argile had been
quiet ever since the disappointment in the year eighty-three. He had
lived for most part in Frizeland, but came oft to Amsterdam, and met
with the rest of his countrymen that lay concealed there; the chief of
whom were the Lord Melvill, Sir Patrick Hume, and Sir John Cochran.
[The first of these (Melvill) was a fearful and mean-spirited man, a
zealous presbyterian, but more zealous in preserving his person and
estate. Hume was a hot and eager man, full of passion and resentment;
and instead of minding the business then in hand, he was always
forming schemes about the modelling of matters, when they should
prevail, in which he was so earnest, that he fell into perpetual
disputes and quarrels about it; Cochran was more tractable.[15]] With
these Lord Argile communicated all the advices that were sent to
him.”—On margin, “Argile designed to invade Scotland.”—Vol. iii. 27;
fol. vol. i. 632.
-----
Footnote 15:
Original note.
-----
Argile landed in the Isle of Bute with his adherents. “He had left his
arms in a castle, with such a guard as he could spare; but they were
routed by a party of the king’s forces. And with this he lost both
heart and hope. And then, apprehending that all was gone, he put
himself in a disguise, and had almost escaped; but he was taken. A
body of gentlemen that had followed him stood better to it, and forced
their way through, so that the greater part of them escaped. Some of
these were taken; the chief of them were Sir John Cochran, Ailoffe,
and Rumbold. These last two were Englishmen; but I knew not upon what
motive it was that they chose rather to run fortunes with Argile than
with the Duke of Monmouth. Thus was this rebellion brought to a speedy
end, with the effusion of very little blood.”—Vol. i. fol. p. 629.
“Cochran had a rich father, the Earl of Dundonald, and he offered the
priests 5000_l._ to save his son. They wanted a stock of money for
managing their designs, so they interposed so effectually that the
bargain was made. But to cover it, Cochran petitioned the council that
he might be sent to the king; for he had some secrets of great
importance which were not fit to be communicated to any but to the
king himself. He was upon that brought up to London; and after he had
been for some time in private with the king, the matters he had
discovered were said to be of such importance, that in consideration
of that the king pardoned him. It was said he had discovered all their
negotiations with the Elector of Brandenburg and the Prince of Orange.
But this was a pretence only, given out to conceal the bargain; for
the prince told me he had never once seen him. The secret of this came
to be known soon after.”—Vol. i. fol. 634.
Lord Macaulay’s account of the same event as regarded my ancestor, for
it is from this Sir John Cochrane that the present branch of our family
is descended, will complete all which is necessary to be alluded to in
this place.
“With Hume (Sir Patrick) was connected another Scottish exile of great
note, Sir John Cochrane, second son of the Earl of Dundonald. The
great question was, whether the Highlands or the Lowlands should be
the seat of war. The Earl (Argyle) wished to establish his authority
over his own domains, and to take possession of the ancient seat of
his family, at Inverary. But Hume and Cochrane were impracticable,
seeing that amongst his own mountains and lakes, and at the head of an
army of his own tribe, he would be able to bear down their opposition,
and to exercise the full authority of a general. They said that the
Campbells took up arms neither for liberty nor for the Church of God,
but for Mac Callum More alone. Cochrane declared he would go to
Ayrshire, if he went by himself, and with nothing but a pitch-fork in
his hand. Argyle, after long resistance, consented, and Cochrane and
Hume were at the head of a force to invade the Lowlands.
“Ayrshire was Cochrane’s object, and the coast was guarded by English
frigates. A party of militia lay at Greenock, but Cochrane, who wanted
provisions, was determined to land. Hume objected, but Cochrane was
peremptory. Cochrane entered Greenock, and procured a supply of meal,
but found no disposition to insurrection.
“Cochrane having found it impossible to raise the population on the
south of the Clyde, rejoined Argyle in Bute. The Earl again proposed
to make an attempt on Inverary, and again encountered pertinacious
opposition. The seamen sided with Hume and Cochrane. The Highlanders
were absolutely at the command of their chieftain.
* * * * * * * *
“Cochrane was taken and sent to London.... He held amongst the Scotch
rebels the same rank which had been held by Grey in the West of
England. That Cochrane should be forgiven by a prince vindictive
beyond all example seemed incredible. But Cochrane was the younger son
of a rich family; it was, therefore, only by sparing him _that money
could be made out of him_. His father, Lord Dundonald, offered a bribe
to the priests of the royal household, and a pardon was granted.”
The history of the succeeding Earls of Dundonald, down to the failure of
issue in the first branch, is thus detailed by Crawfurd.
“William, first Earl of Dundonald, married Euphemie, daughter of Sir
William Scot of Ardross, _in comitatu de Fife_, by whom he had two
sons and a daughter.
“1. William Lord Cochran, who dyed in the flower of his Age, Anno
1680, leaving Issue by the Lady Catherine his Wife, Daughter of John
Earl of Cassils, John who succeeded his Grand-father in the Honour,
William Cochran, of Kilmaronock, a Member of Parliament for the Burgh
of Wigtoun, and the other towns in that District and one of the
Commissioners for keeping her Majesty’s Signet, Sir Alexander Erskin,
Lord Lyon, and John Pringle, of Haining, being joined in Commission
with him. He married Grisel, Daughter of James, second Marquis of
Montrose, and has issue; Thomas Cochran of Polkely, third Son, dyed
without children; Alexander Cochran, of Bonshaw, the youngest; also
three Daughters; 1st. Margaret, married to Alexander Earl of
Eglintoun. 2nd. Helen, to John Earl of Sutherland. 3rd. Jean, to John
Viscount of Dundee, and afterward to William Viscount of Kilsyth.
“2nd. son, Sir John Cochran of Ochiltree, in Air-shire, Likewise a
Daughter Grisel, married to George Lord Ross.
“This Earl gave way to Nature in the spring of the Year 1686, and was
by his own Direction interr’d in the Paroch Church of Dundonald,
without any Funeral Monument, but upon his Escutcheon I find the Arms
of these noble and ancient Families.
“PATERNAL SIDE.
“Cochran of that Ilk.
“Lord Semple.
“Cunningham of Glengarnock.
“Lord Cairlyle of Torthorald.
“MATERNAL SIDE.
“Cochran of that Ilk.
“Montgomery of Skelmurly.
“Lindsay of Dunrod.
“Lord Semple.
“To William Earl of Dundonald succeeded John his Grandson and Heir, a
nobleman of great Goodness and excellent Parts; he dyed in the prime
of his Years, Anno 1691, regrated by all those who knew him, leaving
Issue by the Lady Susanna his Wife, Daughter of William Duke of
Hamilton, two Sons, William who succeeded in the Honours, but dyed
unmarried the 19th of November 1705. And
“John married Anne Daughter of Charles Earl of Dunmore, a Lady who
wanted no Vertue to make her an acceptable Wife; she dyed in 1711,
universally lamented, whose Conduct in all Conditions of Life render’d
her Loss a lasting Grief to her Relations, he had by her a Son and
three Daughters.
“William Lord Cochran,
“Lady Anne,
“Lady Catherine,
“Lady Susanne.
“ARMS.
“Argent, a chiveron; Gules, betwixt three Boars Heads, Azure,
supported by two Ratch Hounds of the first; Crest, a Horse, Argent,
Motto, Virtute et Labore.”
CHAPTER I.
MY BOYHOOD, AND ENTRANCE INTO THE NAVY.
YOUNGER BRANCH SUCCEEDS TO EARLDOM.—ALIENATION OF FAMILY ESTATES.—MY
FATHER’S SCIENTIFIC PURSUITS.—HIS RUINOUS MANUFACTURING PROJECTS.—A
NEGLECTED DISCOVERY.—COMMUNICATED TO JAMES WATT.—LORD DUNDONALD’S
AGRICULTURAL WORKS STILL HELD IN ESTIMATION.—EARLY REMINISCENCES.—MY
FIRST VISIT TO LONDON.—MY FATHER DESTINES ME FOR THE ARMY.—A
COMMISSION PROCURED.—MY AVERSION TO THE MILITARY PROFESSION.—OUR
RETURN TO SCOTLAND.—I AM PERMITTED TO ENTER THE NAVY.
My birth is recorded as having taken place on the 14th of December,
1775, at Annsfield in Lanarkshire. My father was Archibald, ninth Earl
of Dundonald; my mother, Anna Gilchrist, daughter of Captain Gilchrist,
a distinguished officer of the Royal Navy.[16]
-----
Footnote 16:
One action of my maternal grandfather is worthy of record. On March
28th, 1758, upwards of a century ago, he commanded the _Southampton_,
32, and when in company with the _Melampe_, 24, Captain Hotham, fell
in with two French frigates off Yarmouth. The _Melampe_, being the
faster sailer, came up first, and was so disabled that she fell astern
before the _Southampton_ got within range. On the _Melampe_ falling
off, one of the frigates made sail, and got away. The _Southampton_
then engaged the other, and after a six hours’ contest, carried on
with equal bravery on both sides, she boarded and captured the
_Danaë_, of 40 guns and 340 men, commanded by one of the bravest
officers in the French navy.
The loss of the _Danaë_ was her first and second captains, and eighty
men killed. The _Southampton_ had only one killed and ten wounded;
amongst whom was my grandfather, whose shoulder was shattered by a
grape-shot.
-----
My father was descended from John, the younger son of the first
earl—noticed in the introductory chapter as the compatriot of Argyll. On
default of issue in the elder branch of the family the title devolved on
my grandfather, Thomas, who married the daughter of Archibald Stuart,
Esq., of Torrence, in Lanarkshire, and had issue one daughter and twelve
sons, the most distinguished amongst whom, in a public capacity, was
Admiral the Honourable Sir Alexander, father of the present Admiral Sir
Thomas Cochrane.[17]
-----
Footnote 17:
Thomas Cochrane, eighth Earl of Dundonald, was a major in the army,
and M.P. for Renfrewshire. He died in 1778, at the age of
eighty-seven, and was married, first, to Elizabeth, daughter of James
Kerr, Esq. of Moris Town, Berwickshire, by whom he had two children,
Thomas, who died young, and a daughter, Grizel, who died unmarried.
By his second countess, he had issue—1. Argyle, died in infancy; 2.
Archibald, my father, died in 1823; 3. Charles, a colonel in the army,
killed in 1781, at York Town, in Virginia, during the American war of
Independence; 4. John, died in 1802; 5. James Athol, rector of
Mansfield in Yorkshire; 6. Basil, in the civil service of the East
India Company; 7. and 8. Thomas and George, died young; 9. Alexander
Forrester, Knight of the Bath, and rear-admiral in the navy; 10. ——,
died young; 11. George Augustus Frederick, M.P. for Grampound; 12.
Andrew, also M.P. for Grampound, who, on his marriage, assumed the
surname of Johnstone, and was the father of the present dowager Lady
Napier, relict of the late Lord Napier; 13. Elizabeth, married to
Patrick Heron, Esq. of Heron.
The issue of my father, Archibald, ninth Earl of Dundonald, was as
follows: 1. myself; 2. a daughter, died young; 3. James, died young;
4. Basil, lieutenant-colonel of the 36th Regiment; 5. William Erskine,
major in the 15th Light Dragoons, my only surviving brother; 6.
Archibald, captain in the Royal Navy; 7. Charles, died young.
-----
Some of my father’s earlier years were spent in the Navy, in which he
became acting lieutenant. A cruise on the coast of Guinea gave him a
distaste for the naval profession, which, in after years, postponed my
entrance therein far beyond the usual period. On his return home he
quitted the navy for a commission in the army, which was, after a time,
also relinquished.
Of our once extensive ancestral domains I never inherited a foot. In the
course of a century, and before the title descended to our branch,
nearly the whole of the family estates had been alienated by losses
incurred in support of one generation of the Stuarts, rebellion against
another, and mortgages, or other equally destructive process,—the
consequence of both. A remnant may latterly have fallen into other hands
from my father’s negligence in not looking after it, and his unentailed
estates were absorbed by expensive scientific pursuits presently to be
noticed. So that my outset in life was that of heir to a peerage,
without other expectations than those arising from my own exertions.
My father’s day was that of Cavendish, Black, Priestley, Watt, and
others, now become historical as the forerunners of modern practical
science. Imbued with like spirit, and in intimate communication with
these distinguished men, he emulated their example with no mean success,
as the philosophical records of that period testify. But whilst they
prudently confined their attention to their laboratories, my father’s
sanguine expectations of retrieving the family estates by his
discoveries led him to embark in a multitude of manufacturing projects.
The motive was excellent; but his pecuniary means being incommensurate
with the magnitude of his transactions, its object was frustrated, and
our remaining patrimony melted like the flux in his crucibles; his
scientific knowledge, as often happens, being unaccompanied by the
self-knowledge which would have taught him that he was not, either by
habit or inclination, a “man of business.” Many who were so, knew how to
profit by his inventions without the trouble of discovery, whilst their
originator was occupied in developing new practical facts to be turned
to their advantage, and his consequent loss.
An enumeration of some of my father’s manufacturing transactions,
extensively and simultaneously carried on, will leave no doubt as to
their failure in a pecuniary sense. First, the preparation of soda from
common salt, as a substitute for _barilla_,—till then the only alkali
available for soap and glass making. Secondly, a manufactory for
improvement in the production of _alumina_, as a mordant for silk and
calico printers. Thirdly, an establishment for preparing British gum as
a substitute for _gum Senegal_, these products being in use amongst
calico-printers to the present day; the latter especially being at that
distant period of great utility, as the foreign gum was scarce and
expensive. A fourth manufactory had for its object the preparation of
_sal ammoniac_. At a fifth was carried on the manufacture of _white
lead_, by a process then new to productive science. A sixth
establishment, on a ruinous scale as compared with his resources, was
for a new process of extracting tar and other products from pit-coal;
the former as an effective agent in protecting timber from decay, whilst
the refuse coke was in request amongst ironfounders, whose previous
operations for its manufacture were wasteful and unsatisfactory.[18]
-----
Footnote 18:
Whilst serving on the west coast of Africa, my father remarked the
destructive ravages made on ships’ bottoms by worms, and, from his
chemical knowledge, it occurred to him that an extract from pit-coal,
in the form of tar, might be employed as a preventive of the evil. On
his return home, the experiment was tried, and found to answer
perfectly. Notwithstanding the subsequent refusal of the Admiralty to
make use of his preservative, it was at once adopted by the Dutch and
elsewhere in the North, and in the case of small coasting vessels is
to this day used in our own country, as less expensive than coppering.
Had not the coppering of vessels become common shortly afterwards, the
discovery must have proved of incalculable value.
-----
After this enumeration, it is unnecessary to dilate on its ruinous
results. It is simply the old adage of “too many irons in the fire.” One
by one his inventions fell into other hands, some by fair sale, but most
of them by piracy, when it became known that he had nothing left
wherewith to maintain his rights. In short, with seven children to
provide for, he found himself a ruined man.
In the present state of manufacturing science, by which the above
objects are accomplished through improved means, the mention of such
matters may, at first sight, appear unnecessary. Yet, seventy years ago
they bore the same relation to the manufacturing processes of our time
as at that period did the crude attempts at the steam engine to its
modern perfection. In this point of view—which is the true one—reference
to my father’s patents, though now superseded by improvements, will
fairly entitle him to no mean place amongst other inventors of his day,
who deservedly rank as benefactors to their country.
One of my father’s scientific achievements must not be passed over.
Cavendish had some time previously ascertained the existence of
hydrogen. Priestley had become acquainted with its inflammable
character; but the Earl of Dundonald may fairly lay claim to the
practical application of its illuminating power in a carburetted form.
In prosecution of his coal-tar patent, my father went to reside at the
family estate of Culross Abbey, the better to superintend the works on
his own collieries, as well as others on the adjoining estates of
Valleyfield and Kincardine. In addition to these works, an experimental
tar-kiln was erected near the Abbey, and here coal-gas became
accidentally employed in illumination. Having noticed the inflammable
nature of a vapour arising during the distillation of tar, the Earl, by
way of experiment, fitted a gun-barrel to the eduction pipe leading from
the condenser. On applying fire to the muzzle, a vivid light blazed
forth across the waters of the Frith, becoming, as was afterwards
ascertained, distinctly visible on the opposite shore.
Strangely enough, though quick in appreciating a new fact, Lord
Dundonald lightly passed over the only practical product which might
have realised his expectations of retrieving the dilapidated fortunes of
our house; considering tar and coke to constitute the legitimate objects
of his experiments, and regarding the illuminating property of gas
merely as a curious natural phenomenon. Like Columbus, he had the egg
before him, but, unlike Columbus, he did not hit upon the right method
of setting it on end.
The incident just narrated took place about the year 1782 and the
circumstances attending it are the more vividly impressed on my memory
from an event which occurred during a subsequent journey with my father
to London. On our way we paid a visit to James Watt, then residing at
Handsworth, near Birmingham, and amongst other scientific subjects
discussed during our stay were the various products of coal, including
the gas-light phenomenon of the Culross Abbey tar-kiln. This gave rise
to some interesting conversation, which, however, ended without further
result.
Many years afterwards, Mr. Murdoch, then one of Watt’s assistants at
Soho, applied coal-gas to the illumination of that establishment, though
even with this practical demonstration its adoption for purposes of
general public utility did not keep pace with the importance of the fact
thus successfully developed, until, by the persevering endeavours of Mr.
Winsor, its advantages overcame prejudice.[19]
-----
Footnote 19:
A paper on the “Utility and Advantages of Gas-lights,” written by Mr.
Murdoch, and transmitted by him to Sir Joseph Banks, was read before
the Royal Society on the 25th of February 1808, detailing the lighting
of Messrs. Phillips and Lee’s manufactory at Manchester, and
describing the process of gas-manufacture. In this paper Mr. Murdoch
alludes to a memorial presented by Mr. Winsor to George III., pointing
out the utility of gas for lighting the public streets, &c.
-----
It is no detraction from Mr. Murdoch’s merit of having been the first to
turn coal-gas to useful account, to infer that Watt might, at some
period during the interval, have narrated to him the incident just
mentioned, and that the fact accidentally developed by my father had
thus become the subject of long and careful experiment; for this must
have been the case before the complete achievement shone forth in
perfection. Mr. Murdoch, so far as I am aware, never laid claim to a
discovery of the illuminating property of coal-gas, but to its useful
application only, to which his right is indisputable. As it is not
generally known to whom an earlier practical appreciation of gas-light
was in reality due, I have placed these facts on record.
One notice more of my father’s investigations may be permissible. To Sir
Humphry Davy is usually ascribed the honour of first pointing out the
relation between Agriculture and Chemistry. Reference to a work
published in 1795, entitled “_A Treatise showing the intimate connection
between Agriculture and Chemistry, by the_ EARL OF DUNDONALD,” will
decide the priority. Davy’s work may in a theoretical point of view
surpass that of my father, inasmuch as the analytical chemical science
of a more modern date is more minute than that of the last century; but
in point of patient investigation from countless practical experiments,
my father’s work is more than equal to that of his distinguished
successor in the same field, and is, indeed, held in no small estimation
at the present time.[20]
-----
Footnote 20:
I may mention three points contained in this work, to the discovery of
which claim has been laid by modern writers, viz. the malting of grain
for the purpose of feeding cattle, the converting of peat moss into
good soil, and the benefit of a judicious use of salt refuse as a
manure; the latter suggestion being made by my father in a treatise
published in 1785, nearly seventy-five years ago. Other discoveries
might be enumerated, but from those adduced it will be seen that most
of my father’s experiments were far in advance of the age in which he
lived. With slight modifications only not a few rank as modern
discoveries, though little more than plagiarisms without
acknowledgment.
-----
The reader will readily pardon me for thus devoting a few pages by way
of a tribute to a parent, whose memory still exists amongst my most
cherished recollections; even though his discoveries, now of national
utility, ruined him, and deprived his posterity of their remaining
paternal inheritance.
During boyhood we had the misfortune to lose our mother[21], and as our
domestic fortunes were even then at a low ebb, great difficulty was
experienced in providing us with the means of education—four of us being
then at an age to profit by more ample opportunities. In this emergency,
temporary assistance was volunteered by Mr. Rolland, the minister of
Culross, who thus evinced his gratitude for favours received in the more
auspicious days of the family. Highly as was the offer appreciated,
family pride prevented our reaping from it the advantage contemplated by
a learned and truly excellent man.
-----
Footnote 21:
Anna, Countess of Dundonald, died at Brompton on the 13th of November
1784.
-----
Perceiving our education imperilled, the devotedness of my maternal
grandmother, Mrs. Gilchrist, prompted her to apply her small income to
the exigencies of her grandchildren. By the aid thus opportunely
afforded, a tutor was provided, of whom my most vivid recollection is a
stinging box on the ear, in reply to a query as to the difference
between an interjection and a conjunction; this solution of the
difficulty effectually repressing further philological inquiry on my
part.
We were, after a time, temporarily provided with a French tutor, a
Monsieur Durand, who, being a Papist, was regarded with no complacent
eye by our not very tolerant Presbyterian neighbours. I recollect this
gentleman getting into a scrape, which, but for my father’s countenance,
might have ended in a Kirk Session.
As a matter of course, Monsieur Durand did not attend church. On one
side of the churchyard was the Culross Abbey cherry-garden, full of fine
fruit, of which he was very fond, as were also the magpies, which
swarmed in the district. One Sunday, whilst the people were at church,
the magpies, aware no doubt of their advantage, made a vigorous
onslaught on the cherries—provoking the Frenchman, who was on the watch,
to open fire on the intruders from a fowling-piece. The effect of this
reached farther than the magpies. To fire a gun on the Sabbath was an
abomination which could only have emanated from a disciple of the
Scarlet Lady, and neither before nor after did I witness such a hubbub
in the parish. Whatever pains and penalties were to be found in Scottish
church law were eagerly demanded for Monsieur Durand’s benefit, and it
was only by my father’s influence that he was permitted to escape the
threatened martyrdom. Annoyed at the ill-feeling thus created, he
relinquished his engagement before we had acquired the rudiments of the
French language.
Even this inadequate tuition was abruptly ended by my father taking me
with him to London. His object in visiting the metropolis was to induce
the Government to make use of coal-tar for protecting the bottoms of
inferior ships of war—for in those days copper sheathing was unknown.
The best substitute—by no means a general one—was to drive large-headed
iron nails over the whole ship’s bottom, which had thus the appearance
of being “hobnailed.” Even this indifferent covering was accorded to
superior vessels only, the smaller class being entirely left to the
ravages of the worm. It was for the protection of these small vessels
that my father hoped to get his application adopted, and there is no
doubt of the benefit which would have resulted had the experiment been
permitted.
But this was an innovation, and the Board of Admiralty being then, as
too often since, opposed to everything inconsistent with ancient
routine, refused to entertain his proposal. It was only by means of
political influence that he at length induced the Navy Board to permit
him, at his own expense, to cover with his composition one side of the
buoy at the Nore. The result was satisfactory, but he was not allowed to
repeat the process. As compared with the exposure at that time of ships’
bottoms to rapid destruction, without any effort to protect them, my
father’s plan was even a greater improvement than is the modern
substitution of copper-sheathing for the “hobnail” surface which it
tardily superseded.
Failing to induce the Government to protect their ships of war, he
applied to the mercantile interest, but with no better success. I
remember going with my father to Limehouse, in the hope of inducing a
large shipbuilder there to patronise his composition; but the
shipbuilder had even a greater horror of innovation than the Admiralty
authorities. His reply was remarkable. “My Lord,” said he, “we live by
repairing ships as well as by building them, and the worm is our best
friend. Rather than use your preparation, I would cover ships’ bottoms
with honey to attract worms!”
Foiled in London, my father set on foot agencies at the outports, in the
hope of inducing provincial shipbuilders to adopt his preservative.
Prejudice, however, was not confined to the metropolis, and the
objection of the Limehouse man was everywhere encountered. Neither they,
nor any artisans in wood, would patronise a plan to render their work
durable.
Unsuccessful everywhere, my father turned his attention to myself. My
destination was originally the army, whether accordant with my taste or
not—for he was not one of those who considered it necessary to consult
the inclinations of his children in the choice of a profession; but
rather how he could best bring family influence to bear upon their
future interests. Unfortunately for his passive obedience theory, my
_penchant_ was for the sea; any hint, however, to this effect was
peremptorily silenced by parental authority, against which it was
useless to contend.
My uncle, the Hon. Captain, afterwards Admiral, Sir Alexander Cochrane,
had the sagacity to perceive, that as inclination became more rooted
with my growth, passive obedience on this point might one day come to an
end. Still further, he was kind enough to provide against such
contingency, should it arise. Unknown to my father, he had entered my
name on the books of various vessels under his command; so that,
nominally, I had formed part of the complement of the _Vesuvius_,
_Carolina_, _La Sophie_, and _Hind_; the object—common in those
days—being, to give me a few years’ standing in the service, should it
become my profession in reality.
Having, however, a relative in the army, who possessed influence at the
Horse Guards, a military commission was also procured for me; so that I
had simultaneously the honour of being an officer in his Majesty’s 104th
Regiment, and a nominal seaman on board my uncle’s ship.
By way of initiation into the mysteries of the military profession, I
was placed under the tuition of an old sergeant, whose first lessons
well accorded with his instructions, not to pay attention to my foibles.
My hair, cherished with boyish pride, was formally cut, and plastered
back with a vile composition of candle-grease and flour, to which was
added the torture incident to the cultivation of an incipient _queue_.
My neck, from childhood open to the lowland breeze, was encased in an
inflexible leathern collar or stock, selected according to my
preceptor’s notions of military propriety; these almost verging on
strangulation. A blue semi-military tunic, with red collar and cuffs, in
imitation of the Windsor uniform, was provided, and to complete the
_tout ensemble_, my father, who was a determined Whig partisan, insisted
on my wearing yellow waistcoat and breeches; yellow being the Whig
colour, of which I was admonished never to be ashamed. A more certain
mode of calling into action the dormant obstinacy of a sensitive,
high-spirited lad, could not have been devised than that of converting
him into a caricature, hateful to himself, and ridiculous to others.
As may be imagined, my costume was calculated to attract attention, the
more so from being accompanied by a stature beyond my years. Passing one
day near the Duke of Northumberland’s palace at Charing-Cross, I was
beset by a troop of ragged boys, evidently bent on amusing themselves at
the expense of my personal appearance, and, in their peculiar slang,
indulging in comments thereon far more critical than complimentary.
Stung to the quick, I made my escape from them, and rushing home, begged
my father to let me go to sea with my uncle, in order to save me from
the degradation of floured head, pigtail, and yellow breeches. This
burst of despair aroused the indignation of the parent and the Whig, and
the reply was a sound cuffing. Remonstrance was useless; but my dislike
to everything military became confirmed; and the events of that day
certainly cost His Majesty’s 104th Regiment an officer, notwithstanding
that my military training proceeded with redoubled severity.
At this juncture, my father’s circumstances became somewhat improved by
a second marriage[22], so that my brother Basil and myself were sent to
Mr. Chauvet’s academy in Kensington Square, in order to perfect our
military education—Basil, like myself, being destined for the army. At
this excellent school we only remained six months; for with slightly
increased resources my father resumed his ruinous manufacturing
pursuits, so that we were compelled by the “_res angusta domi_” to
return to Scotland.[23]
-----
Footnote 22:
My father’s second countess was Mary, daughter of Samuel Raymond,
Esq., and relict of the Rev. Mr. Mayne. This lady died, without issue,
in December 1808.
Footnote 23:
Lord Dundonald about this time entered upon a series of experiments
which, as usual, were productive of more benefit to his country than
himself, viz. an improved mode of preparing hemp and flax for the
manufacture of sailcloth. For this he subsequently took out a patent,
and submitted his process, together with samples of the manufacture,
to the Admiralty. So sensible was the Board of the advantages of the
plan, that it was subsequently stipulated in every contract that hemp
should be steeped and boiled in the way recommended in his lordship’s
patent. Since that period, the use of sailcloth so manufactured has
become general. Formerly, it was sold by weight, the worthless
material of which it was composed being saturated with a composition
of flour and whitening, so that the first shower of rain on a new sail
completely white washed the decks. Of so flimsy a nature were the
sails when this composition was washed out, that I have taken an
observation of the sun through the foretopsail, and brought it to a
horizon through the foresail.
-----
Four years and a half were now wasted without further attempt to secure
for us any regular training. We had, however, during the short advantage
enjoyed at Kensington, studied diligently, and were thus enabled to make
some progress by self-tuition, our tutor’s acquirements extending only
to teaching the rudiments to the younger branches of the family. Knowing
that my future career depended on my own efforts, and more than ever
determined not to take up my military commission, I worked assiduously
at the meagre elements of knowledge within my reach, in the hope that by
unremitting industry my father might be convinced that opposition to his
views was no idle whim, but the result of conviction that I should not
excel in an obnoxious profession.
Pleased with my progress, and finding my resolution in favour of the
naval service unalterable, he at length consented that my commission
should be cancelled, and that the renewed offer of my uncle to receive
me on board his frigate should be accepted.
The difficulty was to equip me for sea, but it was obviated by the Earl
of Hopetoun considerately advancing 100_l._ for the purpose. With this
sum the requisite outfit was procured, and a few days placed me in a
position to seek my fortune, with my father’s gold watch as a
keepsake—the only patrimony I ever inherited.
The Dowager Countess of Dundonald, then meditating a journey to London,
offered to take me with her. On our arrival in the metropolis, after
what was at that time the formidable achievement of a tour through
Wales, her ladyship went to reside with her brother, General James
Stuart, in Grosvenor Street; but, anxious to become initiated in the
mysteries of my profession, I preferred going on board the _Hind_ at
Sheerness; joining that ship on the 27th of June 1793, at the mature
age, for a midshipman, of seventeen years and a half.
CHAP. II.
CRUISE OF THE _HIND_.
A LIEUTENANT OF THE OLD SCHOOL.—HIS IDEAS ON SEA-CHESTS.—DOCKYARDS SIXTY
YEARS AGO.—PRIZE-MONEY, THE LEADING MOTIVE OF SEAMEN.—VOYAGE TO
NORWAY.—NORWEGIAN CUSTOMS.—A MIDSHIPMAN’S GRIEVANCES.—A PARROT
TURNED BOATSWAIN.—INEFFECTIVE ARMAMENTS.—MEN BEFORE
DOCKYARDS.—TRAINING OF OFFICERS.
My kind uncle, the Hon. John Cochrane, accompanied me on board the
_Hind_ for the purpose of introducing me to my future superior officer,
Lieutenant Larmour, or, as he was more familiarly known in the service,
Jack Larmour—a specimen of the old British seaman, little calculated to
inspire exalted ideas of the gentility of the naval profession, though
presenting at a glance a personification of its efficiency. Jack was, in
fact, one of a not very numerous class, whom, for their superior
seamanship, the Admiralty was glad to promote from the forecastle to the
quarter-deck, in order that they might mould into ship-shape the
questionable materials supplied by parliamentary influence—even then
paramount in the Navy to a degree which might otherwise have led to
disaster. Lucky was the commander who could secure such an officer for
his quarter-deck.
On my introduction, Jack was dressed in the garb of a seaman, with
marlinspike slung round his neck, and a lump of grease in his hand, and
was busily employed in setting up the rigging. His reception of me was
anything but gracious. Indeed, a tall fellow, over six feet high, the
nephew of his captain, and a lord to boot, were not very promising
recommendations for a midshipman. It is not impossible that he might
have learned from my uncle something about a military commission of
several years’ standing; and this, coupled with my age and stature,
might easily have impressed him with the idea that he had caught a
scapegrace with whom the family did not know what to do, and that he was
hence to be saddled with a “hard bargain.”
After a little constrained civility on the part of the first lieutenant,
who was evidently not very well pleased with the interruption to his
avocation, he ordered me to “get my traps below.” Scarcely was the order
complied with, and myself introduced to the midshipman’s berth, than I
overheard Jack grumbling at the magnitude of my equipments. “This Lord
Cochrane’s chest? Does Lord Cochrane think he is going to bring a cabin
aboard? The service is going to the devil! Get it up on the main-deck.”
The order being promptly obeyed, amidst a running fire of similar
objurgations, the key of the chest was sent for, and shortly afterwards
the sound of sawing became audible. It was now high time to follow my
property, which, to my astonishment, had been turned out on the
deck—Jack superintending the process of sawing off one end of the chest
just beyond the keyhole, and accompanying the operation by sundry
uncomplimentary observations on midshipmen in general, and on myself in
particular.
The metamorphose being completed to the lieutenant’s satisfaction,
though not at all to mine, for my neat chest had become an unshapely
piece of lumber, he pointed out the “lubberliness of shore-going people
in not making keyholes where they could be most easily got at,” viz. at
the end of a chest instead of the middle! The observation was, perhaps,
made to test my temper, but, if so, it failed in its object. I thanked
him for his kindness in imparting so useful a lesson, and left him
evidently puzzled as to whether I was a cool hand or a simple one.
Poor Jack! his limited acquaintance with the world—which, in his
estimation, was bounded by the taffrail and the bowsprit—rendered him an
indifferent judge of character, or he might have seen in me nothing but
an ardent desire diligently to apply myself to my chosen profession—with
no more pride in my heart than money in my pocket. A short time,
however, developed this. Finding me anxious to learn my duty, Jack
warmly took me by the hand, and as his only ideas of relaxation were to
throw off the lieutenant and resume the functions of the able seaman, my
improvement speedily rewarded my kind though rough teacher, by
converting into a useful adjunct one whom he had, perhaps not
unjustifiably, regarded as a nuisance. We soon became fast friends, and
throughout life few more kindly recollections are impressed on my memory
than those of my first naval instructor, honest Jack Larmour.
Another good friend in need was Lieutenant Murray, a son of Lord
Dunmore, who observing that my kit had been selected rather with a
regard to economy than fitness, kindly lent me a sum of money to remedy
the deficiency.
The period at which I joined the service was that during which events
consequent on the first French revolution reached a crisis, inaugurating
the series of wars which for twenty years afterwards devastated Europe.
Whatever might have been the faults of the British Government in those
days, that of being unprepared for the movements of revolutionary
neighbours was not amongst them, for the energy of the Government kept
pace with the patriotism of the nation. That fearful system of naval
jobbery, which unhappily characterised the subsequent progress of the
war, crowding the seas with worthless vessels, purchased into the
service in exchange for borough influence—had not as yet begun to thwart
the unity of purpose and action by which the whole realm was at first
roused into action.
With few of those costly appliances in the dockyards which at the
present day absorb vast sums voted by the nation for the support of the
navy, to the exclusion of its real strength—_trained men_—the naval
ports presented a scene of activity in every way commensurate with the
occasion by which it had been called into existence. Their streets
abounded with seamen eager to share in anticipated prize-money—for
whatever may be the ideas of modern statesmen on this subject,
prize-money formed then, as it will ever form, the principal motive of
seamen to encounter the perils of war.
On this point there is, at the present day, a tendency to dangerous
doctrine; and a word respecting it will not be out of place. I have seen
it openly proclaimed that seamen will fight for fighting’s sake, and
without expectation of reward. If the propounders of such an opinion
were to ask themselves the question, whether they engage in professional
or commercial pursuits from pure patriotism, and without hope of further
remuneration, their own reply would show them the fallacy of ascribing
to seamen a want of those motives which impel all men to adventure and
exertion. Human nature is the same in all its grades, and will remain
so, despite romantic notions of its disinterestedness and patriotism.
The result of my own experience is, that seamen fight from two leading
motives: 1st. Prize-money; 2nd. From a well-grounded belief in their own
physical and disciplinary superiority, which refuses to be beaten, and
is not satisfied with less than conquest. Take away the first motive,
and we may find difficulty, on an emergency, in getting men to
accomplish the second.
The bounty system, which has superseded the press-gang, is a direct
proof of money being admitted as the seaman’s inciting motive to engage
in war. The press-gang itself was a no less decisive proof, for it
rarely had to be resorted to, except in case of unpopular officers,
inefficient vessels, or out-of-the-way stations, where the chances of
prize-money were few. For ships commanded by well-known officers, and
with a favourable chance of making prizes, the press-gang was
unnecessary. This circumstance forms no indifferent comment on the real
motives which induce seamen voluntarily to enter the service. On this
most important subject more will be said hereafter.
To return to our cruise. The destination of the _Hind_ was the coast of
Norway, to the _fiords_ of which country the Government had reason to
suspect that French privateers might resort, as lurking-places whence to
annoy our North Sea and Baltic commerce. To ascertain this was our
primary object. The second was to look out for an enemy’s convoy,
shortly expected from the West Indies by the northern route round the
Orkneys.
We had not, however, the luck to fall in with either convoy or
privateers, though for the latter every inlet was diligently searched.
The voyage was, therefore, without incident, further than the gratifying
experience of Norse hospitality and simplicity; qualities which, it is
to be feared, may have vanished before the influence of modern rapidity
of communication, without being replaced by others equally satisfactory.
To us youngsters, this Norwegian trip was a perpetual holiday, for my
uncle, though a strict disciplinarian, omitted no opportunity of
gratifying those under his command, so that we spent nearly as much time
on shore as on board; whilst the few hours occupied in running along the
coast from one inlet to another supplied us with a moving panorama,
scarcely less to our taste than were the hospitalities on shore.
Our great amusement was sleighing at racing speed, to the musical
jingling of bells, without a sound from the catlike fall of the horse’s
feet on the snow. Other variations in the routine of pleasure, were
shooting and fishing, though these soon became secondary objects, as the
abundance of fish and game rendered their capture uninteresting.
But the principal charm was the primitive aspect of a people apparently
sprung from the same stock as ourselves, and presenting much the same
appearance as our ancestors may be supposed to have done a few centuries
before, without any symptoms of that feudal attachment which then
prevailed in Britain. I have never seen a people more contented and
happy; not because their wants were few, for even luxuries were
abundant, and in common use.
Much, however, cannot be said for Norwegian gallantry at that period. On
one occasion my uncle took me to a formal dinner at the house of a
magnate named Da Capa. The table literally groaned beneath the feast;
but a great drawback to our enjoyment of the good things set before us,
was that, during a five hours’ succession of dishes, the lady of the
house stood at the head of the table, and performed the laborious duty
of carver throughout the tedious repast. Her flushed countenance after
the intervals between the various removes, moreover, warranted the
suspicion that the very excellent cookery was the result of her
supervision. It is to be hoped that the march of civilisation has
altered this custom for the better.
It is possible that these remarks may be considered somewhat profound
for a midshipman of three months’ standing; but it must be remembered
that, from previous hard necessity, no less than maturity, they are
those of a reflective midshipman. At any rate, the remarks were duly
jotted down, and to this day their reperusal calls forth somewhat of the
freshness of boyhood to a mind worn down, not so much with age as with
unmerited injuries, which have embittered a long life, and rendered even
the failings of age premature.
From boyish impressions to a midshipman’s grievances is but a step. At
the first moment of my setting foot on board the _Hind_ it had been my
determination never to commit an act worthy of punishment; but it was
equally the determination of Jack Larmour to punish me for my resolution
the first time he caught me tripping. This was certain, for Jack was
open and above board, and declared that “he never heard of such a thing
as a faultless midshipman!” For a long time he watched in vain, but
nothing occurred more than to warrant his swearing twice as much at me
as at any other of my messmates, Jack never troubling himself to swear
at a waister. To use his own words, it “was expending wind for nothing.”
One day, when his back was turned, I had stolen off deck for a few
minutes, but only to hear on my return the ominous words, “Mast-head,
youngster!” There was no alternative but to obey. Certainly not
cheerfully—for the day was bitterly cold, with the thermometer below
zero. Once caught, I knew my punishment would be severe, as indeed it
was, for my sojourn at the mast-head was protracted almost to the limit
of human endurance, my tormentor being evidently engaged in calculating
this to a nicety. He never mast-headed me again.
By way of return for the hospitality of the Norwegian people, the
frigate was freely thrown open to their inspection. On one of their
frequent visits, an incident occurred not unworthy of record.
On board most ships there is a pet animal of some kind. Ours was a
parrot, which was Jack Larmour’s aversion, from the exactness with which
the bird had learned to imitate the calls of the boatswain’s whistle.
Sometimes the parrot would pipe an order so correctly as to throw the
ship into momentary confusion, and the first lieutenant into a volley of
imprecations, consigning Poll to a warmer latitude than his native
tropical forests. Indeed, it was only by my uncle’s countenance that the
bird was tolerated.
One day a party of ladies paid us a visit aboard, and several had been
hoisted on deck by the usual means of a “whip” on the mainyard. The
chair had descended for another “whip,” but scarcely had its fair
freight been lifted out of the boat alongside, than the unlucky parrot
piped “_Let go!_” The order being instantly obeyed, the unfortunate
lady, instead of being comfortably seated on deck, as had been those who
preceded her, was soused overhead in the sea! Luckily for Poll, Jack
Larmour was on shore at the time, or this unseasonable assumption of the
boatswain’s functions might have ended tragically.
On the return of the _Hind_ from Norway, my uncle was appointed to the
_Thetis_, a more powerful frigate; for though the _Hind_ carried 28
guns, they were only 9-pounders; an armament truly ridiculous as
compared with that of frigates of the present day. It may almost be
said, that the use of such an armament consisted in rendering it
necessary to resort to the cutlass and boarding-pike—weapons to be
relied on. Had such been the object of the Board of Admiralty as
regarded the smaller class of frigates, it could not have been better
carried out. The lighter class of vessels were even worse provided for.
Seven years later a sloop was placed under my command, armed with
4-pounders only. One day, by way of burlesque on such an equipment, I
walked the quarter-deck with a whole broadside of shot in my coat
pockets.
The _Thetis_ was ordered to equip at Sheerness, and knowing that her
first lieutenant, instead of indulging himself ashore, would pursue his
customary relaxation of working hard aboard, I begged permission to
remain and profit by his example. This was graciously conceded, on
condition that, like himself, I would put off the officer and assume the
garb of a seaman. Nothing could be more to my taste; so, with knife in
belt and marlinspike in hand, the captain of the forecastle undertook my
improvement in the arts of knotting and splicing; Larmour himself taking
charge of gammoning and rigging the bowsprit, which, as the frigate lay
in dock, overhung the common highway. So little attention was then paid
to the niceties of dockyard arrangement.
Dockyards in those days were secondary objects. At Sheerness the people
lived, like rabbits in a warren, in old hulks, hauled up high and dry;
yet everything was well done, and the supervision perfect. It would be
folly to advocate the continuance of such a state of things, yet it may
be doubted whether the naval efficiency of the present day keeps pace
with the enormous outlay on modern dockyards, almost (as it appears to
me) to ignoring the training of men. I would rather see a mistake in the
opposite extreme—men before dockyard conveniences; and am confident that
had such been our practice, we should not have recently heard
humiliating explanations, that we were without adequate naval
protection, and that our national safety depended on the forbearance of
a neighbouring state.
Precision in stone and mortar is no more naval efficiency, than are the
absurd coast fortifications (to which there is an evident leaning)
national safety. The true fortification of England is, always to be in a
position to strike the first blow at sea the moment it may become
necessary. To wait for it would, under any circumstances, be folly—to be
unprepared for it, national suicide.
The service now seems to savour too much of the dockyard, and too little
of the seaman. Formerly, both officers and men had to lend a hand in
everything, and few were the operations which, unaided by artificers,
they could not perfectly accomplish. On two occasions my own personal
skill at pump-work has saved ships and crews when other assistance was
not available.
The modern practice is to place ships in commission, with everything
perfect to the hands of the officers and crew, little being required of
them beyond keeping the ship in order whilst at sea. The practice is to
a certain extent praiseworthy; but it has the disadvantage of impressing
officers with the belief that handicraft skill on their part is
unnecessary, though in the absence of practically acquired knowledge it
is impossible even to direct any operation efficiently.
Without a certain amount of this skill, as forming an important part of
training, no man can become an efficient naval officer. It would be
gratifying to me should these remarks lead to inquiry on the subject. I
must confess my inability to peruse the accounts of inexperience in the
fleet at the outbreak of the late war with Russia, without grave
misgivings that the supervision of the navy in the present day is not
that of old time.
CHAP. III.
THE VOYAGE OF THE _THETIS_.
VOYAGE IN THE THETIS.—ICEBERGS.—I AM MADE ACTING LIEUTENANT.—I AM
ORDERED TO JOIN THE THETIS.—PASS EXAMINATION FOR LIEUTENANT.—CAPT.
COCHRANE’S CAPTURE OF FRENCH STORE-SHIPS.—MY APPOINTMENT TO THE
RESOLUTION.—ADMIRAL WINTERS IN THE CHESAPEAKE.—AN UNDIGNIFIED
ENCOUNTER.—A DINNER ASHORE.—HARSH TREATMENT OF THE AMERICANS.—THEIR
COMPLAINTS.—RETURN OF THE THETIS TO ENGLAND.
As soon as the _Thetis_ had obtained her complement, she was ordered to
join the squadron of Admiral Murray, which was being fitted out for
North America; whither, soon after the declaration of war against
England by the French Convention, the Government had despatched orders
to seize the islands of St. Pierre and Miguilon, previously captured
from the French in 1778, but restored at the termination of the American
war.
It was in order to regain these islands, and for the protection of our
commerce and fisheries generally, that a stronger force on the Nova
Scotia station was deemed essential. The conduct of the American people
was doubtful, as, from the assistance rendered by the French in the War
of Independence, and still more from the democratic institutions
recently established in France, little doubt existed that their leaning
would be upon the side of the enemy. The United States Government,
however, did all in its power to preserve neutrality by proclamations
and addresses, but as its authority was little more than nominal
throughout the various states, a disposition on the part of American
shipowners to assist the French in providing stores of every kind was
manifested very soon after the declaration of war. On our return from
Leith to Plymouth to join the admiral, we detained several American
vessels laden with corn and other provisions for French ports; one of
the objects of Admiral Murray’s squadron being to intercept traffic of
this nature.
The squadron sailed from Plymouth; and when about midway across the
Atlantic an incident occurred worth relating, as bearing upon a
conjecture made a few years ago, by the master and passengers of a
merchant vessel, regarding some vessels, supposed, though erroneously,
to form part of Sir John Franklin’s expedition.
One night, finding the temperature of the atmosphere rapidly decreasing,
the squadron was proceeding under easy sail, with a vigilant look-out
for icebergs. At dawn we were close to a block of these, extending right
across our path as far as the eye could reach. The only alternative was
to alter our course and pass to leeward of the group, to which, from the
unwonted sublimity of the sight, we approached as nearly as seemed
consistent with safety. The appearance of icebergs is now so well known
that it would be superfluous to describe them. I shall only remark that
on passing one field of great extent we were astonished at discovering
on its sides three vessels, the one nearest to us being a polacca-rigged
ship, elevated at least a hundred feet; the berg having rolled round or
been lightened by melting, so that the vessel had the appearance of
being on a hill forming the southern portion of the floe. The story of
two vessels answering the description of Sir John Franklin’s ships
having a few years ago been seen on an iceberg was scarcely credited at
the time, but may receive corroboration from the above incident.
Nothing can exceed the extraordinary aspect of these floating islands of
ice, either as regards variety of form, or the wonderful display of
reflected light which they present. But, however they may attract
curiosity, ships should always give them a wide berth, the in-draught of
water on their weather side being very dangerous. A singular effect was
experienced as we passed to leeward of the field; first, the intense
cold of the wind passing over it, and occasionally, the heat caused by
the reflection of the sun’s rays from the ice whenever the ship came
within the angle of incidence.
On our arrival at Halifax we found many American vessels which had been
detained, laden with corn and provisions. These had been seized by our
predecessors on the station, the act by no means tending to increase our
popularity on subsequent visits along the United States coast. Another
practice which was pursued has always appeared to me a questionable
stretch of authority towards a neutral nation, viz. the forcible
detention of English seamen whenever found navigating American ships. Of
this the Government of the United States justly complained, as
inflicting severe losses on their citizens, whose vessels were thus
delayed or imperilled for want of hands.
The practice was defended by the British Government, but on what grounds
I am not jurist enough to comprehend. Certain it is, that should another
Continental war arise, such a course would be impracticable; for as
American ships, whether of war or commerce, are now for the most part
manned by British seamen, driven from the service of their country by an
unwise abrogation of that portion of the navigation laws which fostered
our own nursery for the Navy—the effect of such an order would be to
unman American ships; and it is questionable whether the United States
Government would submit to such a regulation, even if we were inclined
to put it in execution.
On the 14th of January 1795, Admiral Murray appointed me acting third
lieutenant of the _Thetis_, though not eighteen months had elapsed since
my entrance into the service. Thanks to my worthy friend Jack Larmour,
and to my own industry, it may be stated, without vanity, that I was not
incompetent to fill the station to which the admiral had promoted me.
This unlooked-for reward redoubled my zeal, and on the 13th of April
following, I was made acting lieutenant of the _Africa_, Captain Rodham
Home, who applied to the admiral for my services. This additional
promotion was followed on the 6th of July by a provisional commission
confirming my rank.
The _Africa_ was sent to scour the seaboard of the States in search of
enemy’s vessels, but not falling in with any, we ran on to Florida, with
similar ill-success. An accident here occurred to me which left its mark
through life. I had contrived a ball of lead studded with barbed prongs,
for the purpose of catching porpoises. One day the doctor laid me a
wager against hurling the missile to a certain distance, and in the
attempt a hook nearly tore off the fore-finger of my right hand. A
perhaps not very judicious course of reading had at that time led me to
imbibe the notion of a current spurious philosophy, that there was no
such thing as pain, and few opportunities were lost of parading
arguments on the subject. As the doctor was dressing my hand, the pain
was so intense that my crotchet was sadly scandalised by an involuntary
exclamation of agony. “What!” said the doctor, “I thought there was no
such thing as pain!” Not liking to have a favourite theory so palpably
demolished, the ready reply was that “my exclamation was not one of
pain, but mental only, arising from the sight of my own blood!” He
laughed, whilst I writhed on, but the lesson knocked some foolish
notions out of my head.
On the 5th of January 1796, the first lieutenant of the _Thetis_ having
been promoted, an order was transmitted for me to quit the _Africa_, and
rejoin my uncle’s ship, which I did in the _Lynx_, Captain Skene. An
incident occurred during the passage worth relating.
The _Lynx_ one day overhauled an American vessel from France to New
York, professedly in ballast. At first, nothing was found to warrant her
detention, but a more minute search brought to light from amongst the
shingle ballast, a number of casks filled with costly church plate; this
being amongst the means adopted by the French Convention to raise
supplies, an intention in this case thwarted by the vigilance of Captain
Skene.
The sagacity of Captain Skene was exemplified in another instance.
Observing one day a quantity of stable litter on the surface of the sea,
it was obvious that it could only arise from the transport of animals.
Tracking the refuse to the southward, we overtook and captured a vessel
laden with mules for the use of one of the French possessions.
The period having arrived at which the Admiralty regulations permitted
young officers to offer themselves for examination—on rejoining the
_Thetis_ I was ordered up, and passed for lieutenant accordingly; my
time as a midshipman being made up from my nominal rating on board the
_Vesuvius_, &c., as narrated in a former chapter.
The mention of this practice will, perhaps, shock the purists of the
present day, who may further regard me as a stickler for corruption, for
pronouncing its effect to have been beneficial. First, because—from the
scarcity of lieutenants—encouragement was often necessary; secondly,
because it gave an admiral a power which he does not now possess, viz.
that of selecting for commissions those who exerted themselves, and on
whom he could rely, in place of having forced upon him young men
appointed by parliamentary or other influence; of whom he could know
nothing, except that they did not owe their commissions to practical
merit.
In my own subsequent career as captain of a man-of-war, there never was
the slightest difficulty as regarded men; yet no commander could, in
this respect, be more particular; but of many officers furnished to me
through parliamentary influence, it can only be said that they were
seldom trusted, as I considered it preferable, on pressing occasions, to
do their duty myself; and this, as some of them had powerful influence,
no doubt made me many enemies amongst their patrons. It is all very well
to talk of the inordinate power exercised by commanding officers in
former times, but whilst the Admiralty, even in our day, appears to
extend a system in which influence has everything and experience nothing
to do, the so-called corruption of old, which was never made use of but
to promote merit, had its advantages; no instance in which the power
then indirectly pertaining to admirals commanding having, to my
knowledge, been abused.[24]
-----
Footnote 24:
This adoption, for political purposes, of a baneful system may, in an
unforeseen emergency, tend to the overthrow of the state; and nothing,
in my opinion, can be more injurious to the Navy than the usurpation
of all distributive power by a ministry in exchange for parliamentary
votes. In civil offices this may be merely obstructive—in the Navy it
is destructive. Systems like these are such as no state can long exist
under securely, and history warns us that from perversion of patronage
great states have fallen.
-----
During my absence in the _Africa_, I lost the chance of participating in
a gallant attack made by the Hon. Captain Cochrane, in the _Thetis_, and
Captain Beresford, in the _Hussar_, on five French ships, which they had
been watching near the mouth of the Chesapeake. These ships were fallen
in with at sea off Cape Henry, and on the approach of the _Thetis_ and
_Hussar_ formed in line to receive them. The _Hussar_, being the smaller
vessel, encountered the two leading ships, whilst the _Thetis_ opened
her broadside on the centre vessel, and the two in the rear. In half an
hour, the French commodore and the second in the line gave up the
combat, and made sail, leaving the others to the mercy of the two
English frigates, which in another half hour compelled them to
surrender, one of them, however, contriving to escape. Two, the
_Prévoyant_, 36, and the _Raison_, 18, were secured and taken to
Halifax, where they were fitted out as cruisers, and afterwards returned
with the squadron to England. This action was the only one of any
importance which occurred during the dreary five years that we were
employed on the North American coast, and is here mentioned because it
has been said I was present, which was not the case.
In the year 1797, Admiral Murray was succeeded in the command by Admiral
Vandeput, who, on the 21st of June, appointed me lieutenant in his
flag-ship, the _Resolution_. On joining this ship a few days afterwards,
my reception was anything but encouraging.
Being seated near the admiral at dinner, he inquired what dish was
before me. Mentioning its nature, I asked if he would permit me to help
him. The uncourteous reply was—that whenever he wished for anything he
was in the habit of asking for it. Not knowing what to make of a rebuff
of this nature, it was met by an inquiry if he would allow me the honour
of taking wine with him. “I never take wine with any man, my lord,” was
the unexpected reply, from which it struck me that my lot was cast among
Goths, if no worse.
Never were first impressions more ill-founded. Admiral Vandeput had
merely a habit of showing his worst features first, or rather of
assuming those which were contrary to his nature. A very short time
developed his true character,—that of a perfect gentleman, and one of
the kindest commanders living. In place of the hornet’s nest figured to
my imagination, there was not a happier ship afloat, nor one in which
officers lived in more perfect harmony.
The only drawback was that of wanting something better to do than cruise
among the fogs of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia,—an inglorious pursuit,
the more severely felt, from the fact that each succeeding packet
brought accounts of brilliant naval victories achieved in European
waters. The French, after my uncle’s capture of their store-ships, gave
up all attempts to get supplies from America by means of their own
vessels; and the United States Government concluded a treaty with
England, in which both sides disclaimed all wish to pass the bounds
observed by neutral nations, so that the squadron was without beneficial
employment.
Tired of the monotony of Halifax, Admiral Vandeput determined to winter
in the Chesapeake, where he resided ashore. As it was his practice to
invite his officers by turns to remain a week with him, our time was
agreeably spent, the more so that there were several families in the
vicinity which retained their affection for England, her habits, and
customs. Even the innkeeper of the place contrived to muster a tolerable
pack of hounds which, if not brought under the perfect discipline of
their British progenitors, often led us into more danger than is
encountered in an English field, in consequence of our runs frequently
taking us amongst thick forests, the overhanging branches of which
compelled us to lay ourselves flat on the horses’ backs, in order to
avoid the fate intended for the objects of the chase.
Another of our amusements was shooting; and one day a circumstance took
place of which I did not for a long time hear the last. Being invited to
pass a week with the admiral, who was about to give a dinner to his
neighbours, it was my wish to add a delicacy to his table; and having
heard that a particular locality abounded with wild hogs, it seemed
practicable that a boar’s head might grace the feast. On reaching the
forest, nearly the first object encountered was a huge wild-looking sow
with a farrow of young pigs, and as the transition from boar’s head to
sucking pig was not great, a shot from my rifle speedily placed one in a
preliminary condition for roasting. But porcine maternal affection had
not entered into my calculations. The sow charged me with such ferocity
that prompt retreat, however undignified, became necessary, for my
weapon was now harmless. In short, so vigorous was the onslaught of the
enemy, that it became necessary to shelter myself in the fork of a tree,
my gun being of necessity left at the bottom. The enraged animal mounted
guard, and for at least a couple of hours waited for my descent; when,
finding no symptoms of unconditional surrender, she at length moved
slowly off with the remainder of her family. As the coast was now clear,
I came down and shouldered the defunct pig, hoping to be in time to add
it to the admiral’s table, for which, however, it was too late.
Having told the story with great simplicity, I found myself at dinner
roasted instead of the pig; the changes on this theme being rung till it
became rather annoying. By way of variation the admiral asked me for a
toast, and on my pleading ignorance of such customs insisted on my
giving a sentiment; whereupon I gave “the Misses Tabbs,”—the point
consisting in the fact that these ladies were each over six feet high,
and in the gossip of the place were understood to be favourites of the
admiral. For a moment Admiral Vandeput looked grave, but thinking, no
doubt, the retort a fair one, he joined in the laughter against himself;
though from that day he never asked me for a toast.
Those were days when even gentlemen did not consider it a demerit to
drink hard. It was then, as it is now, a boast with me never in my life
to have been inebriated, and the revenge was that my boast should be at
an end. Rapid circulation of the bottle accordingly set in; but this I
managed to evade by resting my head on my left hand, and pouring the
wine down the sleeve of my uniform coat. The trick was detected, and the
penalty of drinking off a whole bottle was about to be enforced when I
darted from the room, pursued by some of the company, who at length got
tired of the chase, and I passed the night at a farm-house.
Having paid so lengthened a visit to the United States at a period
almost immediately following their achievement of independence, a few
remarks relative to the temper and disposition of the American people at
that period may not be uninteresting. Thoroughly English in their habits
and customs, but exasperated by the contumely with which they had been
treated by former British governments, their civility to us was somewhat
constrained, yet so thoroughly English as to convince us that a little
more forbearance and common sense on the part of the home authorities
might have averted the final separation of these fine provinces from the
mother country. There is every reason to believe that the declaration of
the Confederation of the United Colonies in 1775 was sincere; viz. that
on the concession of their just demands, “the colonies are to return to
their former connections and friendship with Great Britain; but on
failure thereof this Confederation is to be perpetual.”[25]
-----
Footnote 25:
“Articles of Confederation between New Hampshire, Massachusetts,” &c.
&c., May 20th, 1775.
-----
In vain, however, did the more far-sighted of the English public
remonstrate with the Government, and in vain did the City of London by
their chief magistrate urge the wrongs and loyalty of the colonists,
even to memorialising the king to dismiss from his councils those who
were misleading him. A deaf ear was turned to all remonstrance, and a
determination to put down by force what could not at first be called
rebellion was the only reply vouchsafed; it was not till all
conciliatory means had failed that the first Congress of Philadelphia
asserted the cause and necessity of taking up arms in the defence of
freedom; the second Congress of the same place confederating the
provinces under the title of the “United States of America.”
The failure of those employed in conciliation to induce the colonists to
return to their allegiance—the co-operation of the King of France in aid
of the revolt—the discreditable war which followed—and the singular
recoil of his own principles on the head of Louis XVI. himself, are
matters of history and need not here be further alluded to.
When the _Thetis_ was first on the coast, the American republic was
universally recognised, and it must be admitted that our treatment of
its citizens was scarcely in accordance with the national privileges to
which the young republic had become entitled. There were, no doubt, many
individuals amongst the American people who, caring little for the
Federal government, considered it more profitable to break than to keep
the laws of nations, by aiding and supporting our enemy, and it was
against such that the efforts of the squadron had been chiefly directed;
but the way in which the object was carried out was scarcely less an
infraction of those international laws which we were professedly
enforcing.
The practice of taking English seamen out of American vessels, without
regard to the safety of navigating them when thus deprived of their
hands, has been already mentioned. To this may be added, the detention
of vessels against which nothing contrary to international neutrality
could be established, whereby their cargoes became damaged; the
compelling them, on suspicion only, to proceed to ports other than those
to which they were destined, and generally treating them as though they
were engaged in contraband trade.
Of these transactions the Americans had a right to complain; but in
other respects their complaints were indefensible; such as that of our
not permitting them to send corn and provisions to France, a violation
of neutrality into which, after declaration of blockade, none but an
inexperienced government could have fallen; though there was perhaps
something in the collateral grievance that American ships were not
permitted to quit English ports without giving security for the
discharge of their cargoes in some other British or neutral port.
It would be wearisome to enter into further details respecting the
operations of a squadron so ingloriously employed, or to notice the
subordinate part which a junior lieutenant could take in its
proceedings. Suffice it to say, that after remaining five years on the
North American station, the _Thetis_ returned to England.
CHAP. IV.
SERVICES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.
I JOIN LORD KEITH’S SHIP.—AN UNPLEASANT ALTERCATION, ENDING IN A
COURT-MARTIAL.—THE BLOCKADE OF CADIZ.—FRENCH FLEET IN THE
OFFING.—PURSUED BY LORD KEITH.—ENEMY’S VESSELS BURNT AT TOULON.—LORD
KEITH RECALLED BY LORD ST. VINCENT.—LORD ST. VINCENT RESIGNS THE
COMMAND.—LORD KEITH PURSUES THE FRENCH FLEET TO BREST, AND FROM
THENCE TO THE MEDITERRANEAN.—STATE OF THE FRENCH MARINE.—LORD KEITH
APPOINTS ME TO THE GÉNÉREUX.—BURNING OF THE QUEEN CHARLOTTE.—ACTION
WITH PRIVATEERS OFF CABRITTA POINT.—RECOMMENDED FOR PROMOTION.
Towards the close of the autumn of 1798, Lord Keith was appointed to
relieve Lord St. Vincent in the command of the Mediterranean fleet, and
kindly offered to take me with him as a supernumerary. I therefore
embarked, by his lordship’s invitation, in the flag-ship.
We arrived at Gibraltar on the 14th of December, and found Lord St.
Vincent residing on shore, his flag flying on board the _Souverain_
sheerhulk.
His lordship’s reception of me was very kind, and on the 24th of
December, at Lord Keith’s request, he gave an order for my appointment
to the _Barfleur_, to which ship Lord Keith had shifted his flag. This
appointment, from a certain dissatisfaction at my having received such a
commission after being so short a time at sea, afterwards brought me
into trouble.
Lord St. Vincent did not, as was expected, immediately transfer to Lord
Keith the command of the Mediterranean fleet, but remained at Gibraltar,
giving orders to his lordship to blockade the Spanish fleet in Cadiz.
The first part of the year was spent in this employment, Lord Keith’s
force varying from eleven to fifteen sail of the line, but without
frigates, though the commander-in-chief had a considerable number under
his orders. The omission was the more remarkable, as the blockaded
Spanish force numbered upwards of twenty ships of the line, with
frigates and smaller vessels in proportion.
The British force, for upwards of four months, was anchored some seven
or eight miles from Cadiz, but without rousing the national spirit of
the Spaniards, who manifested no disposition to quit their shelter, even
though we were compelled from time to time to leave our anchorage for
the purpose of procuring water and cattle from the neighbouring coast of
Africa. It was during one of these trips in the _Barfleur_ that an
absurd affair involved me in serious disaster.
Our first lieutenant, Beaver, was an officer who carried etiquette in
the wardroom and on deck almost to despotism. He was laudably particular
in all matters visible to the eye of the admiral, but permitted an
honest penny to be turned elsewhere by a practice as reprehensible as
revolting. On our frequent visits to Tetuan, we purchased and killed
bullocks _on board the Barfleur_, for the use of the whole squadron. The
reason was, that raw hides, being valuable, could be stowed away in her
hold in empty beef-casks, as especial perquisites to certain persons
connected with the flagship; a natural result being, that, as the fleshy
parts of the hides decomposed, putrid liquor oozed out of the casks, and
rendered the hold of the vessel so intolerable, that she acquired the
name of “The stinking Scotch ship.”
As junior lieutenant, much of the unpleasantness of this fell to my
share, and as I always had a habit of speaking my mind without much
reserve, it followed that those interested in the raw hide speculation
were not very friendly disposed towards me.
One day, when at Tetuan, having obtained leave to go ashore and amuse
myself with shooting wild-fowl, my dress became so covered with mud, as
to induce me not to come off with other officers in the pinnace which
took me on shore, preferring to wait for the launch, in which the filthy
state of my apparel would be less apparent. The launch being delayed
longer than had been anticipated, my leave of absence expired shortly
before my arrival on board—not without attracting the attention of
Lieutenant Beaver, who was looking over the gangway.
Thinking it disrespectful to report myself on the quarter deck in so
dirty a condition, I hastened to put on clean uniform, an operation
scarcely completed when Lieutenant Beaver came into the wardroom, and in
a very harsh tone demanded the reason of my not having reported myself.
My reply was, that as he saw me come up the side, he must be aware that
my dress was not in a fit condition to appear on the quarter deck, and
that it had been necessary to change my clothes before formally
reporting myself.
Lieutenant Beaver replied to this explanation in a manner so offensive
that it was clear he wanted to surprise me into some act of
insubordination. As it would have been impossible to be long cool in
opposition to marked invective, I respectfully reminded him that by
attacking me in the wardroom he was breaking a rule which he had himself
laid down; viz. that “Matters connected with the service were not there
to be spoken of.” The remark increased his violence, which, at length,
became so marked as to call forth the reply, “Lieutenant Beaver, we
will, if you please, talk of this in another place.” He then went on
deck, and reported to Captain Elphinstone that in reply to his remarks
on a violation of duty, he had received a challenge!
On being sent for to answer the charge, an explanation of what had
really taken place was given to Captain Elphinstone, who was kindly
desirous that the first lieutenant should accept an apology, and let so
disagreeable a matter drop. This was declined on my part, on the ground
that, in the conversation which had passed, I had not been in the wrong,
and had therefore no apology to make. The effect was, that Beaver
demanded a court-martial on me, and this, after manifest reluctance on
the part of Lord Keith, was ordered accordingly; the decision of which
was an admonition to be “more careful in future”—a clear proof that the
court thought great provocation had been given by my accuser, or their
opinion would have been more marked.
The Judge-Advocate on this occasion was the admiral’s secretary, one of
those who had taken offence about the raw hides before mentioned! After
the business of the court was concluded, Lord Keith, who was much vexed
with the whole affair, said to me privately: “Now, Lord Cochrane, pray
avoid for the future all flippancy towards superior officers.” His
secretary overheard and embodied the remark in the sentence of the
court-martial; so that shortly afterwards his officiousness or malice
formed an impediment to my promotion, though the court had actually
awarded no censure.
Lord Keith, who had in vain used every endeavour to induce the Spaniards
to risk an engagement, began to get tired of so fruitless an operation
as that of watching an enemy at anchor under their batteries, and
resolved to try if he could not entice or force them to quit their
moorings. With this view, the British force, though then consisting of
twelve ships only, without a single frigate to watch the enemy
meanwhile, proceeded to water, as usual, at Tetuan, so as to be in
readiness for any contingencies that might arise. As the events which
followed have been incorrectly represented by naval historians, if not
in one instance misrepresented, it is necessary, in order to do justice
to Lord Keith, to detail them at some length.
Immediately after our return from Tetuan, the _Childers_ arrived with
intelligence that five Spanish sail of the line had got out of Ferrol,
and she was followed on the same day by the _Success_ frigate, which had
been chased by a French fleet off Oporto. Lord Keith at once despatched
the _Childers_ to Gibraltar, to inform Lord St. Vincent, as was
understood in the squadron, that he intended, if the French fleet came
to Cadiz, to engage them, notwithstanding the disparity of numbers. Lord
Keith’s force, by the arrival of three additional ships of the line and
one frigate, now amounted to sixteen sail; viz. one 112-gun ship, four
98's, one 90, two 80's, seven 74's, and one frigate, and these were
immediately got under weigh and formed in order of battle, standing off
and on in front of the harbour.
About 8 A.M. on the 6th of May the French fleet was signalled in the
offing, and was made out to consist of thirty-three sail, which with the
twenty-two sail of Spaniards in Cadiz made fifty-five, besides frigates,
to be encountered by the comparatively small British force. The French
fleet was on the larboard tack, and our ships immediately formed on the
same tack to receive them. To our surprise they soon afterwards wore and
stood away to the south-west; though from our position between them and
the Spaniards they had a fair chance of victory had the combined fleets
acted in concert. According to Lord Keith’s pithily expressed opinion,
we lay between “the devil and the deep sea.”
Yet there was nothing rash. Lord Keith calculated that the Spaniards
would not move unless the French succeeded in breaking through the
British line, and this he had no doubt of preventing. Besides which, the
wind, though not dead on shore, as has been said, was unfavourable for
the Spaniards coming out with the necessary rapidity. The great point to
be gained was to prevent the junction of the enemies’ fleets, as was
doubtless intended; the attempt was however completely frustrated by the
bold interposition of Lord Keith, who, strange to say, never received
for this signal service the acknowledgment of merit which was his due.
It has been inferred by naval historians that a gale of wind, which was
blowing on the first appearance of the French fleet, was the cause of
their standing away. A better reason was their disinclination to
encounter damage, which they knew would defeat their ultimate object of
forming a junction with the Spanish fleet elsewhere.
At daylight on the 7th we were still standing off and on before Cadiz,
expecting the enemy to return; when shortly afterwards four of their
ships were seen to windward of the British force, which immediately gave
chase; but the enemy outstripping us, we returned to the coast, to guard
every point by which they might get into Cadiz. Seeing no symptoms of
the main body of the French fleet, Lord Keith concluded that the four
ships just noticed had been left as a decoy to draw his attention from
their real object of running for Toulon, now that they had been foiled
in their expectation of carrying with them the Spanish fleet. We
accordingly made all sail for Gibraltar.
From the intelligence forwarded by the _Childers_, there was reason to
suppose that Lord St. Vincent would have prepared for instant pursuit.
To our surprise, the signal was made to anchor and obtain water and
provision. Three entire days were consumed in this operation; with what
effect as regarded the other ships I do not know, but so far as the
_Barfleur_ was concerned, and as far as I know of the other ships, the
delay was unnecessary. The fleet was greatly disappointed at being thus
detained, as the enemy would thereby reach Toulon without molestation,
and for any good which could be effected we might as well remain where
we lay.
This impatience was, after a lapse of three days, ended by Lord St.
Vincent hoisting his flag on board the _Ville de Paris_; when,
reinforced by the _Edgar_, 74, the fleet shaped its course up the
Mediterranean.
After we had proceeded as far as the Bay of Rosas, Lord St. Vincent,
having communicated with Lord Keith, parted company in the _Ville de
Paris_ for Minorca, leaving Lord Keith to pursue the enemy with the
remaining ships. We now made straight for Toulon, where we learned from
some fishing boats that the enemy’s fleet had embarked spars, cordage,
anchors, and other heavy articles for the equipment of their ships of
war built or building at Spezzia—and had sailed to the eastward.
After burning some merchant vessels working into Toulon, we again
started in chase. It was now of even greater importance to overtake the
French fleet, in order to frustrate a double mischief; first, their
escape; and secondly, their getting to Spezzia with the materials for so
important an addition to their force. With this object the British ships
crowded all sail in the direction the enemy had taken, and at length
came in sight of their look-out frigates between Corsica and Genoa.
Just as we were upon the point of seeing the fleet also, a fast sailing
transport arrived from Lord St. Vincent, with orders to return to Port
Mahon; intelligence of the sailing of the French fleet having reached
that port, which, Lord St. Vincent feared, might become the object of
attack. Lord Keith, however, knowing exactly the position of the enemy,
within reach of whom we now virtually were, persevered in the pursuit.
Shortly afterwards another fast sailing transport hove in sight, firing
guns for Lord Keith to bring to, which having done, he received
peremptory orders to repair immediately to Minorca; Lord St. Vincent
still imagining that as the enemy had left Toulon they might catch him
in Port Mahon; the fact of their having gone to Spezzia, though known to
us, being unknown to him. Compliance with this unseasonable order was
therefore compulsory, and Lord Keith made the signal for all captains,
when, as reported by those officers, his lordship explained that the
bearing up was no act of his, and the captains having returned on board
their respective ships, reluctantly changed the course for Minorca,
leaving the French fleet to proceed unmolested to Spezzia.
On Lord Keith receiving this order, I never saw a man more irritated.
When annoyed, his lordship had a habit of talking aloud to himself. On
this occasion, as officer of the watch, I happened to be in close
proximity, and thereby became an involuntary listener to some very
strong expressions, imputing jealousy on the part of Lord St. Vincent as
constituting the motive for recalling him. The actual words of Lord
Keith not being meant for the ear of any one, I do not think proper to
record them. The above facts are stated as coming within my own personal
knowledge, and are here introduced in consequence of blame being cast on
Lord Keith to this day by naval historians, who could only derive their
authority from _data_ which are certainly untrue—even if official. Had
the command been surrendered to Lord Keith on his arrival in the
Mediterranean, or had his lordship been permitted promptly to pursue the
enemy, they could not have escaped.
The French fleet, after we were compelled to relinquish the chase (when
in sight of their look-out frigates), were reported to have landed 1000
men at Savona, and convoyed a supply of wheat to Genoa, as well as
having landed their naval stores at Spezzia, not one of which services
could have been effected had it not been for the unfortunate delay at
Gibraltar and the before-mentioned recall of the pursuing fleet.
Immediately after our departure from Gibraltar, the Spanish fleet
quitted Cadiz for the Mediterranean, and as no force remained to watch
the Straits, they were enabled to pass with impunity, the whole, after
suffering great damage by a gale of wind, succeeded in reaching
Carthagena.
On our arrival at Minorca, Lord St. Vincent resumed the command, and
proceeded for some distance towards Toulon. On the 2nd of June, his
lordship again quitted the fleet for Mahon, in the _Ville de Paris_. On
the 14th Lord Keith shifted his flag from the _Barfleur_ to the _Queen
Charlotte_, a much finer ship, to which I had the honour to accompany
him.
We once more proceeded in quest of the French fleet, and on the 19th the
advance ships captured three frigates and two brigs of war on their way
from Egypt to Toulon, but learned nothing of the fleet we were in search
of. On the 23rd of June, Lord St. Vincent at length resigned the
Mediterranean command and sailed for England, so that Lord Keith had no
alternative but to return to Port Mahon to make the necessary
arrangements.
Scarcely had we come to an anchor when we received intelligence that the
French fleet had passed to the westward to join the Spanish fleet at
Carthagena!
Without even losing time to fill up with water, every exertion was made
for immediate pursuit, and on the 10th we started for Carthagena, but
finding the enemy gone, again made sail, and on the 26th reached Tetuan,
where we completed our water. On the 29th Lord Keith communicated with
Gibraltar, but as nothing was heard of the combined fleets, it was
evident they had gone through the Straits in the dark; we therefore
followed and examined Cadiz, where they were not. Pursuing our course
without effect along the Spanish and Portuguese coasts—on the 8th of
August we fell in with a Danish brig off Cape Finisterre, and received
from her information that she had two days before passed through the
combined French and Spanish fleets. We then directed our course for
Brest, hoping to be in time to intercept them, but found that on the day
before our arrival they had effected their object, and were then safely
moored within the harbour. We now shaped our course for Torbay, and
there found the Channel fleet under Sir Alan Gardner—the united force
being nearly fifty ships of the line.
On our arrival at Torbay, Lord Keith sent me with despatches on board
the commander-in-chief’s ship, where, after executing my commission, it
was imperiously demanded by her captain whether I was aware that my
coming on board was an infringement of quarantine regulations? Nettled
at the over-bearing manner of an uncalled-for reprimand to an inferior
officer, my reply was that, having been directed by Lord Keith to
deliver his despatches, his lordship’s orders had been executed
accordingly; at the same time, however, assuring my interrogator that we
had no sickness in the fleet, nor had we been in any contagious
localities. From the captain’s manner, it was almost evident that, for
being thus plain spoken, he intended to put me under arrest, and I was
not sorry to get back to the _Queen Charlotte_; even a show of
resistance to an excess of authority being in those days fatal to many
an officer’s prospects.
I shall not enter into detail as to what occurred in the Channel;
suffice it to say that despite the imposing force lying at Torbay, the
combined French and Spanish fleets found no difficulty in getting out of
Brest, and that on the 6th of December Lord Keith returned in pursuit to
Gibraltar, where he resumed the Mediterranean command, administered by
Lord Nelson during his absence.
It is beyond the province of this work to notice the effectual measures
taken by Lord Nelson in the Mediterranean during our absence, as they
are matters in which I bore no part. But whilst Nelson and Lord Keith
had been doing their best there, little appeared to be done at home to
check the enemy’s operations.
From Gibraltar we proceeded to Sicily, where we found Lord Nelson
surrounded by the _élite_ of Neapolitan society, amongst whom he was
justly regarded as a deliverer. It was never my good fortune to serve
under his lordship, either at that or any subsequent period. During our
stay at Palermo, I had, however, opportunities of personal conversation
with him, and from one of his frequent injunctions, “Never mind
manœuvres, always go at them,” I subsequently had reason to consider
myself indebted for successful attacks under apparently difficult
circumstances.
The impression left on my mind during these opportunities of association
with Nelson was that of his being an embodiment of dashing courage,
which would not take much trouble to circumvent an enemy, but being
confronted with one would regard victory so much a matter of course as
hardly to deem the chance of defeat worth consideration.
This was in fact the case; for though the enemy’s ships were for the
most part superior to ours in build, the discipline and seamanship of
their crews was in that day so inferior as to leave little room for
doubt of victory on our part. It was probably with the object of
improving his crews that Admiral Bruix had risked a run from the
Mediterranean to Brest and back, as just now detailed. Had not Lord
Keith been delayed at Gibraltar, and afterwards recalled to Minorca, the
disparity of numbers on our side would not have been of any great
consequence.
Trafalgar itself is an illustration of Nelson’s peculiar clash. It has
been remarked that Trafalgar was a rash action, and that had Nelson lost
it and lived he would have been brought to a court-martial for the way
in which that action was conducted. But such cavillers forget that, from
previous experience, he had calculated both the nature and amount of
resistance to be expected; such calculation forming as essential a part
of his plan of attack as even his own means for making it. The result
justified his expectations of victory, which were not only well founded
but certain.
The fact is, that many commanders in those days committed the error of
overrating the French navy, just as, in the present day, we are
nationally falling into the still more dangerous extreme of underrating
it. Steam has, indeed, gone far towards equalising seamanship; and the
strenuous exertions of the French department of Marine have perhaps
rendered discipline in their navy as good as in ours. They moreover keep
their trained men, whilst we thoughtlessly turn ours adrift whenever
ships are paid off—to be replaced by raw hands in case of emergency!
To return from this digression. After quitting Palermo, and when passing
the Straits of Messina, Lord Keith placed me as prize-master in command
of the _Généreux_, 74—shortly before captured by Lord Nelson’s
squadron—with orders to carry her to Port Mahon. A crew was hastily made
up of sick and invalided men drafted from the ships of the fleet, and
with these we proceeded on our voyage, but only to find ourselves in
imminent danger from a gale of wind. The rigging not having been
properly set up, the masts swayed with every roll of the ship to such a
degree that it became dangerous to go aloft; the shrouds alternately
straining almost to breaking, or hanging in festoons, as the masts
jerked from side to side with the roll of the vessel. It was only by
going aloft myself together with my brother Archibald, whom Lord Keith
had permitted to accompany me, that the men could be induced to furl the
mainsail. Fortunately the weather moderated, or the safety of the ship
might have been compromised; but by dint of hard work, as far as the
ill-health of the crew would allow, we managed, before reaching Mahon,
to put the _Généreux_ into tolerable order.
It has been stated that Lord Keith permitted my brother to accompany me
in the _Généreux_. By this unexpected incident both he and myself were,
in all probability, saved from a fate which soon afterwards befel most
of our gallant shipmates. On our quitting the _Queen Charlotte_, Lord
Keith steered for Leghorn, where he landed, and ordered Captain Todd to
reconnoitre the island of Cabrera, then in possession of the French.
Whilst on his way, some hay, hastily embarked and placed under the
half-deck, became ignited, and the flame communicating with the mainsail
set the ship on fire aloft and below. All exertions to save her proved
in vain, and though some of the officers and crew escaped, more than
three-fourths miserably perished, including Captain Todd, his first
lieutenant, Bainbridge, three other lieutenants, the captain of marines,
surgeon, more than twenty master’s mates and petty officers, and upwards
of 600 marines and seamen.
On our return from England to Gibraltar I had been associated with poor
Bainbridge in an affair which—except as a tribute to his memory—would
not have been worth mentioning. On the evening of the 21st of September,
1799, we observed from the _Queen Charlotte_, lying in Gibraltar Bay,
the 10-gun cutter _Lady Nelson_, chased by some gun-vessels and
privateers, all of which simultaneously commenced an attack upon her.
Lord Keith instantly ordered out boats, Bainbridge taking command of the
barge, whilst another of the boats was put under my orders. Lord Keith’s
intention was, by this prompt aid, to induce the _Lady Nelson_ to make a
running fight of it, so as to get within range of the garrison guns; but
before the boats could come up she had been captured; Lieutenant
Bainbridge, though with sixteen men only, dashed at her, boarded, and
retook her, killing several and taking prisoners seven French officers
and twenty-seven men; but not without himself receiving a severe sabre
cut on the head and several other wounds.
The boat under my command was the cutter with thirteen men. Seeing two
privateers which had chiefly been engaged in the attack on the _Lady
Nelson_ running for Algesiras, we made at the nearest, and came up with
her at dark. On laying the cutter alongside, I jumped on board, but the
boat’s crew did not follow, this being the only time I ever saw British
seamen betray symptoms of hesitation. Regaining the cutter, I upbraided
them with the shamefulness of their conduct, for the privateer’s crew
had run below, the helmsman alone being at his post. Their excuse was
that there were indications of the privateer’s men having there
fortified themselves. No reasoning could prevail on them to board. If
this boat’s crew perished in the _Queen Charlotte_, their fate is not
nationally to be regretted.
On the destruction of the _Queen Charlotte_ Lord Keith hoisted his flag
in the _Audacious_. His lordship was so well satisfied with my conduct
of the _Généreux_ as to write home to the Admiralty recommending my
promotion, at the same time appointing me to the command of the
_Speedy_, then lying at Port Mahon.
The vessel originally intended for me by Lord Keith was the _Bonne
Citoyenne_, a fine corvette of eighteen guns; but the brother of his
lordship’s secretary happening at the time to arrive from Gibraltar,
where he had been superseded in the command of the sheer hulk, that
functionary managed to place his brother in one of the finest sloops
then in the service, leaving to me the least efficient craft on the
station.
CHAP. V.
CRUISE OF THE _SPEEDY_.
MY APPOINTMENT TO THE SPEEDY.—MY FIRST PRIZE.—CAPITULATION OF
GENOA.—MORE CAPTURES.—JOIN LORD KEITH AT LEGHORN.—CRUISE ON THE
SPANISH COAST.—NEARLY CAUGHT BY A SPANISH FRIGATE.—HOW SHE WAS
EVADED.—OUR CRUISE RENEWED.—WE PROCEED TO MALTA.—FOOLISH FRACAS IN A
BALL-ROOM.—A DUEL.—CAPTURE OF A FRENCH STORE-SHIP.—CHASED BY ANOTHER
SPANISH FRIGATE.—CRUISE OFF BARCELONA.—AN ATTEMPT TO ENTRAP
US.—ATTACK ON THE EL GAMO FRIGATE.—CARRIED BY BOARDING.—TRIFLING
LOSS OF THE SPEEDY.—A DEVICE PRACTISED DURING THE ACTION.—WE PROCEED
WITH OUR PRIZE TO MAHON.—POSTPONEMENT OF MY POST RANK.—OFFICIAL
DESPATCH.
The _Speedy_ was little more than a burlesque on a vessel of war, even
sixty years ago. She was about the size of an average coasting brig, her
burden being 158 tons. She was crowded, rather than manned, with a crew
of eighty-four men and six officers, myself included. Her armament
consisted of fourteen 4-_pounders_! a species of gun little larger than
a blunderbuss, and formerly known in the service under the name of
“miñion,” an appellation which it certainly merited.
Being dissatisfied with her armament, I applied for and obtained a
couple of 12-pounders, intending them as bow and stern chasers, but was
compelled to return them to the ordnance wharf, there not being room on
deck to work them; besides which, the timbers of the little craft were
found on trial to be too weak to withstand the concussion of anything
heavier than the guns with which she was previously armed.
With her rig I was more fortunate. Having carried away her mainyard, it
became necessary to apply for another to the senior officer, who,
examining the list of spare spars, ordered the _foretopgallant-yard_ of
the _Généreux_ to be hauled out _as a mainyard for the Speedy_!
The spar was accordingly sent on board and rigged, but even this
appearing too large for the vessel, an order was issued to cut off the
yard-arms and thus reduce it to its proper dimensions. This order was
neutralised by getting down and planing the yard-arms as though they had
been cut, an evasion which, with some alteration in the rigging, passed
undetected on its being again swayed up; and thus a greater spread of
canvas was secured. The fact of the foretopgallant-yard of a second-rate
ship being considered too large for the mainyard of my “man-of-war” will
give a tolerable idea of her insignificance.
Despite her unformidable character, and the personal discomfort to which
all on board were subjected, I was very proud of my little vessel,
caring nothing for her want of accommodation, though in this respect her
cabin merits passing notice. It had not so much as room for a chair, the
floor being entirely occupied by a small table surrounded with lockers,
answering the double purpose of storechests and seats. The difficulty
was to get seated, the ceiling being only five feet high, so that the
object could only be accomplished by rolling on the locker, a movement
sometimes attended with unpleasant failure. The most singular
discomfort, however, was that my only practicable mode of shaving
consisted in removing the skylight and putting my head through to make a
toilet-table of the quarter-deck.
In the following enumeration of the various cruises in which the
_Speedy_ was engaged, the boarding and searching innumerable neutral
vessels will be passed over, and the narrative will be strictly
confined—as in most cases throughout this work—to log extracts, where
captures were made, or other occurrences took place worthy of record.
“_May_ 10.—Sailed from Cagliari, from which port we had been ordered
to convoy fourteen sail of merchantmen to Leghorn. At 9 A.M. observed
a strange sail take possession of a Danish brig under our escort. At
11:30 A.M. rescued the brig, and captured the assailant. This prize—my
first piece of luck—was the _Intrépide_, French privateer of six guns
and forty-eight men.
“_May_ 14.—Saw five armed boats pulling towards us from Monte Cristo.
Out sweeps to protect convoy. At 4 P.M. the boats boarded and took
possession of the two sternmost ships. A light breeze springing up,
made all sail towards the captured vessels, ordering the remainder of
the convoy to make the best of their way to Longona. The breeze
freshening we came up with and recaptured the vessels with the prize
crews on board, but during the operation the armed boats escaped.
“_May_ 21.—At anchor in Leghorn Roads. Convoy all safe. 25.—Off Genoa.
Joined Lord Keith’s squadron of five sail of the line, four frigates
and a brig.
“26, 27, 28.—Ordered by his lordship to cruise in the offing, to
intercept supplies destined for the French army under Massena, then in
possession of Genoa.
“29.—At Genoa some of the gun-boats bombarded the town for two hours.
“30.—All the gun-boats bombarded the town. A partial bombardment had
been going on for an hour a day, during the past fortnight, Lord Keith
humanely refraining from continued bombardment, out of consideration
for the inhabitants, who were in a state of absolute famine.”
This was one of the _crises_ of the war. The French, about a month
previous, had defeated the Austrians with great slaughter in an attempt,
on the part of the latter, to retake Genoa; but the Austrians, being in
possession of Savona, were nevertheless able to intercept provisions on
the land side, whilst the vigilance of Lord Keith rendered it impossible
to obtain supplies by sea.
It having come to Lord Keith’s knowledge that the French in Genoa had
consumed their last horses and dogs, whilst the Genoese themselves were
perishing by famine, and on the eve of revolt against the usurping
force—in order to save the carnage which would ensue, his lordship
caused it to be intimated to Massena that a defence so heroic would
command honourable terms of capitulation. Massena was said to have
replied that if the word “capitulation” were mentioned his army should
perish with the city; but, as he could no longer defend himself, he had
no objection to “treat.” Lord Keith, therefore, proposed a treaty, viz.
that the army might return to France, but that Massena himself must
remain a prisoner in his hands. To this the French general demurred; but
Lord Keith insisting—with the complimentary observation to Massena that
“he was worth 20,000 men”—the latter reluctantly gave in, and on the 4th
of June 1800 a definite treaty to the above effect was agreed upon, and
ratified on the 5th, when the Austrians took possession of the city, and
Lord Keith of the harbour, the squadron anchoring within the mole.
This affair being ended, his lordship ordered the _Speedy_ to cruise off
the Spanish coast, and on the 14th of June we parted company with the
squadron.
“_June_ 16.—Captured a tartan off Elba. Sent her to Leghorn, in the
charge of an officer and four men.
“22.—Off Bastia. Chased a French privateer with a prize in tow. The
Frenchman abandoned the prize, a Sardinian vessel laden with oil and
wool, and we took possession. Made all sail in chase of the privateer;
but on our commencing to fire, she ran under the fort of Caprea, where
we did not think proper to pursue her. Took prize in tow, and on the
following day left her at Leghorn, where we found Lord Nelson, and
several ships at anchor.
“25.—Quitted Leghorn, and on the 26th were again off Bastia, in chase
of a ship which ran for that place, and anchored under a fort three
miles to the southward. Made at and brought her away. Proved to be the
Spanish letter of marque _Assuncion_, of ten guns and thirty-three
men, bound from Tunis to Barcelona. On taking possession, five
gun-boats left Bastia in chase of us; took the prize in tow, and kept
up a running fight with the gun-boats till after midnight, when they
left us.
“29.—Cast off the prize in chase of a French privateer off Sardinia.
On commencing our fire she set all sail and ran off. Returned and took
the prize in tow; and the 4th of July anchored with her in Port Mahon.
“_July_ 9—Off Cape Sebastian. Gave chase to two Spanish ships standing
along shore. They anchored under the protection of the forts. Saw
another vessel lying just within range of the forts;—out boats and cut
her out, the forts firing on the boats without inflicting damage.
“19.—Off Caprea. Several French privateers in sight. Chased, and on
the following morning captured one, the _Constitution_, of one gun and
nineteen men. Whilst we were securing the privateer, a prize which she
had taken made sail in the direction of Gorgona and escaped.
“27.—Off Planosa, in chase of a privateer. On the following morning
saw three others lying in a small creek. On making preparations to cut
them out, a military force made its appearance, and commenced a heavy
fire of musketry, to which it would have answered no purpose to reply.
Fired several broadsides at one of the privateers, and sunk her.
“31.—Off Porto Ferraio in chase of a French privateer, with a prize in
tow. The Frenchman abandoned his prize, of which we took possession,
and whilst so doing the privateer got away.
“_August_ 3.—Anchored with our prizes in Leghorn Roads, where we found
Lord Keith in the _Minotaur_.”
Lord Keith received me very kindly, and directed the _Speedy_ to run
down the Spanish coast, pointing out the importance of harassing the
enemy there as much as possible, but cautioning me against engaging
anything beyond our capacity. During our stay at Leghorn, his lordship
frequently invited me ashore to participate in the gaieties of the
place.
Having filled up with provisions and water, we sailed on the 16th of
August, and on the 21st captured a French privateer bound from Corsica
to Toulon. Shortly afterwards we fell in with H.M.S. ships _Mutine_ and
_Salamine_, which, to suit their convenience, gave into our charge a
number of French prisoners, with whom and our prize we consequently
returned to Leghorn.
On the 14th of September we again put to sea, the interval being
occupied by a thorough overhaul of the sloop. On the 22nd, when off
Caprea, fell in with a Neapolitan vessel having a French prize crew on
board. Recaptured the vessel, and took the crew prisoners.
On the 5th of October, the _Speedy_ anchored in Port Mahon, where
information was received that the Spaniards had several armed vessels on
the look-out for us, should we again appear on their coast. I therefore
applied to the authorities to exchange our 4-pounders for 6-pounders,
but the latter being too large for the _Speedy’s_ ports, we were again
compelled to forego the change as impracticable.
“_October 12._—Sailed from Port Mahon, cruising for some time off Cape
Sebastian, Villa Nova, Oropesa, and Barcelona; occasionally visiting
the enemy’s coast for water, of which the _Speedy_ carried only ten
tons. Nothing material occurred till November 18th, when we narrowly
escaped being swamped in a gale of wind, the sea breaking over our
quarter, and clearing our deck, spars, &c., otherwise inflicting such
damage as to compel our return to Port Mahon, where we were detained
till the 12th of December.
“_December 15._—Off Majorca. Several strange vessels being in sight,
singled out the largest and made sail in chase; shortly after which a
French bombard bore up, hoisting the national colours. We now cleared
for action, altering our course to meet her, when she bore up between
Dragon Island and the Main. Commenced firing at the bombard, which
returned our fire; but shortly afterwards getting closer in shore she
drove on the rocks. Three other vessels being in the passage, we left
her, and captured one of them, the _La Liza_ of ten guns and
thirty-three men, bound from Alicant to Marseilles. Took nineteen of
our prisoners on board the _Speedy_. As it was evident that the
bombard would become a wreck, we paid no further attention to her, but
made all sail after the others.
“_December 18._—Suspecting the passage between Dragon Island and the
Main to be a lurking-place for privateers, we ran in again, but found
nothing. Seeing a number of troops lining the beach, we opened fire
and dispersed them, afterwards engaging a tower, which fired upon us.
The prisoners we had taken proving an incumbrance, we put them on
shore.
“_December 19._—Stood off and on the harbour of Palamos, where we saw
several vessels at anchor. Hoisted Danish colours, and made the signal
for a pilot. Our real character being evidently known, none came off,
and we did not think it prudent to venture in.”
It has been said that the _Speedy_ had become the marked object of the
Spanish naval authorities. Not that there was much danger of being
caught, for they confined their search to the coast only, and that in
the daytime, when we were usually away in the offing; it being our
practice to keep out of sight during the day, and run in before dawn on
the next morning.
On the 21st, however, when off Plane Island, we were very near “catching
a Tartar.” Seeing a large ship in shore, having all the appearance of a
well-laden merchantman, we forthwith gave chase. On nearing her she
raised her ports, which had been closed to deceive us, the act
discovering a heavy broadside, a clear demonstration that we had fallen
into the jaws of a formidable Spanish frigate, now crowded with men, who
had before remained concealed below.
That the frigate was in search of us there could be no doubt, from the
deception practised. To have encountered her with our insignificant
armament would have been exceedingly imprudent, whilst escape was out of
the question, for she would have outsailed us, and could have run us
down by her mere weight. There was, therefore, nothing left, but to try
the effect of a _ruse_, prepared beforehand for such an emergency. After
receiving at Mahon information that unusual measures were about to be
taken by the Spaniards for our capture, I had the _Speedy_ painted in
imitation of the Danish brig _Clomer_; the appearance of this vessel
being well known on the Spanish coast. We also shipped a Danish
quartermaster, taking the further precaution of providing him with the
uniform of an officer of that nation.
On discovering the real character of our neighbour, the _Speedy_ hoisted
Danish colours, and spoke her. At first this failed to satisfy the
Spaniard, who sent a boat to board us. It was now time to bring the
Danish quartermaster into play in his officer’s uniform; and to add
force to his explanations, we ran the quarantine flag up to the fore,
calculating on the Spanish horror of the plague, then prevalent along
the Barbary coast.
On the boat coming within hail,—for the yellow flag effectually
repressed the enemy’s desire to board us—our mock officer informed the
Spaniards that we were two days from Algiers, where at the time the
plague was violently raging. This was enough. The boat returned to the
frigate, which, wishing us a good voyage, filled, and made sail, whilst
we did the same.
I have noted this circumstance more minutely than it merits, because it
has been misrepresented. By some of my officers blame was cast on me for
not attacking the frigate after she had been put off her guard by our
false colours, as her hands—being then employed at their ordinary
avocations in the rigging and elsewhere—presented a prominent mark for
our shot. There is no doubt but that we might have poured in a murderous
fire before the crew could have recovered from their confusion, and
perhaps have taken her, but feeling averse to so cruel a destruction of
human life, I chose to refrain from an attack, which might not, even
with that advantage in our favour, have been successful.
It has been stated by some naval writers that this frigate was the
_Gamo_, which we subsequently captured. To the best of my knowledge this
is an error.
“_December_ 24.—Off Carthagena. At daylight fell in with a convoy in
charge of two Spanish privateers, which came up and fired at us; but
being to windward we ran for the convoy, and singling out two,
captured the nearest, laden with wine. The other ran in shore under
the fort of Port Genoese, where we left her.
“25.—Stood for Cape St. Martin, in hope of intercepting the
privateers. At 8 A.M. saw a privateer and one of the convoy under Cape
Lanar. Made sail in chase. They parted company; when, on our singling
out the nearest privateer, she took refuge under a battery, on which
we left off pursuit.
“30.—Off Cape Oropesa. Seeing some vessels in shore, out boats in
chase. At noon they returned pursued by two Spanish gun-boats, which
kept up a smart fire on them. Made sail to intercept the gun-boats, on
which they ran in under the batteries.
“_January_ 10, 1801.—Anchored in Port Mahon, and having refitted,
sailed again on the 12th.
“16.—Off Barcelona. Just before daylight chased two vessels standing
towards that port. Seeing themselves pursued, they made for the
battery at the entrance. Bore up and set steering sails in chase. The
wind falling calm, one of the chase drifted in shore, and took the
ground under Castel De Ferro. On commencing our fire, the crew
abandoned her, and we sent boats with anchors and hawsers to warp her
off, in which they succeeded. She proved to be the Genoese ship _Ns.
Señora de Gratia_, of ten guns.
“22.—Before daylight, stood in again for Barcelona. Saw several sail
close in with the land. Out boats and boarded one, which turned out a
Dane. Cruising off the port till 3 A.M., we saw two strange vessels
coming from the westward. Made sail to cut them off. At 6 P.M. one of
them hoisted Spanish colours and the other French. At 9 P.M. came up
with them, when after an engagement of half an hour both struck. The
Spaniard was the _Ecce Homo_ of eight guns and nineteen men, the
Frenchman _L’Amitié_ of one gun and thirty-one men. Took all the
prisoners on board the _Speedy_.
“23.—Still off Barcelona. Having sent most of our crew to man the
prizes, the number of prisoners on board the _Speedy_ became
dangerous; we therefore put twenty-five of the Frenchmen into one of
their own launches, and told them to make the best of their way to
Barcelona. As the prizes were a good deal cut up about the rigging,
repaired their damages and made sail for Port Mahon, where we arrived
on the 24th, with our convoy in company.
“28.—Quitted Port Mahon for Malta, not being able to procure at
Minorca various things of which we stood in need; and on the 1st of
February, came to an anchor at Valetta, where we obtained anchors and
sweeps.”
An absurd affair took place during our short stay at Malta, which would
not have been worthy of notice, had it not been made the subject of
comment.
The officers of a French royalist regiment, then at Malta, patronised a
fancy ball, for which I amongst others purchased a ticket. The dress
chosen was that of a sailor—in fact, my costume was a tolerable
imitation of that of my worthy friend, Jack Larmour, in one of his
relaxing moods, and personated in my estimation as honourable a
character as were Greek, Turkish, or other kinds of Oriental disguises
in vogue at such reunions. My costume was, however, too much to the life
to please French royalist taste, not even the marlinspike and the lump
of grease in the hat being omitted.
On entering the ball-room, further passage was immediately barred, with
an intimation that my presence could not be permitted in such a dress.
Good humouredly expostulating that, as the choice of costume was left to
the wearer, my own taste—which was decidedly nautical—had selected that
of a British seaman, a character which, though by no means imaginary,
was quite as picturesque as were the habiliments of an Arcadian
shepherd; further insisting that as no rule had been infringed, I must
be permitted to exercise my discretion. Expostulation being of no avail,
a brusque answer was returned that such a dress was not admissible,
whereupon I as brusquely replied that having purchased my ticket, and
chosen my own costume in accordance with the regulations, no one had any
right to prevent me from sustaining the character assumed.
Upon this a French officer, who appeared to act as master of the
ceremonies, came up, and without waiting for further explanation, rudely
seized me by the collar with the intention of putting me out; in return
for which insult he received a substantial mark of British indignation,
and at the same time an uncomplimentary remark in his own language. In
an instant all was uproar; a French picket was called, which in a short
time overpowered and carried me off to the guard-house of the regiment.
I was, however, promptly freed from detention on announcing my name, but
the officer who had collared me demanded an apology for the portion of
the _fracas_ concerning him personally. This being of course refused, a
challenge was the consequence; and on the following morning we met
behind the ramparts and exchanged shots, my ball passing through the
poor fellow’s thigh and dropping him. My escape, too, was a narrow
one—his ball perforating my coat, waistcoat, and shirt, and bruising my
side. Seeing my adversary fall, I stepped up to him—imagining his wound
to be serious—and expressed a hope that he had not been hit in a vital
part. His reply—uttered with all the politeness of his nation—was, that
“he was not materially hurt.” I, however, was not at ease, for it was
impossible not to regret this, to him, serious _dénouement_ of a
trumpery affair, though arising from his own intemperate conduct. It was
a lesson to me in future never to do anything in frolic which might give
even unintentional offence.
On the 3rd of February we sailed under orders for Tripoli, to make
arrangements for fresh provisions for the fleet. This being effected,
the _Speedy_ returned to Malta, and on the 20th again left port in
charge of a convoy for Tunis.
24th.—At the entrance of Tunis Bay we gave chase to a strange sail,
which wore and stood in towards the town, anchoring at about the
distance of three miles. Suspecting some reason for this movement, I
despatched an officer to examine her, when the suspicion was confirmed
by his ascertaining her to be _La Belle Caroline_, French brig of four
guns, bound for Alexandria with field-pieces, ammunition, and wine for
the use of the French army in Egypt.
Our position was one of delicacy, the vessel being in a neutral port,
where, if we remained to watch her, she might prolong our stay for an
indefinite period or escape in the night; whilst, from the warlike
nature of the cargo, it was an object of national importance to effect
her capture. The latter appearing the most beneficial course under all
circumstances, we neared her so as to prevent escape, and soon after
midnight boarded her, and having weighed her anchor, brought her close
to the _Speedy_, before she had an opportunity of holding any
communication with the shore.
The following day was employed in examining her stores, a portion of her
ammunition being transferred to our magazine, to replace some damaged by
leakage. Her crew, now on board the _Speedy_ as prisoners, becoming
clamorous at what they considered an illegal seizure, and being,
moreover, in our way, an expedient was adopted to get rid of them, by
purposely leaving their own launch within reach during the following
night, with a caution to the watch not to prevent their desertion should
they attempt it. The hint was taken, for before daylight on the 27th
they seized the boat, and pulled out of the bay without molestation, not
venturing to go to Tunis lest they should be retaken. We thus got rid of
the prisoners, and at the same time of what might have turned out their
reasonable complaint to the Tunisian authorities, for that we had
exceeded the bounds of neutrality there could be no doubt.
On the 28th we weighed anchor, and proceeded to sea with our prize.
After cruising for some days off Cape Bon we made sail for Cagliari,
where we arrived on the 8th of March, and put to sea on the 11th with
the prize in tow. On the 16th, anchored in Port Mahon.
On the 18th we again put to sea, and towards evening observed a large
frigate in chase of us. As she did not answer the private signal, it was
evident that the stranger was one of our Spanish friends on the
look-out. To cope with a vessel of her size and armament would have been
folly, so we made all sail away from her, but she gave instant chase,
and evidently gained upon us. To add to our embarrassment, the _Speedy_
sprung her maintopgallant-yard, and lost ground whilst fishing it.
At daylight the following morning the strange frigate was still in
chase, though by crowding all sail during the night we had gained a
little upon her; but during the day she again recovered her advantage,
the more so as the breeze freshening, we were compelled to take in our
royals, whilst she was still carrying on with everything set. After
dark, we lowered a tub overboard with a light in it, and altering our
course thus fortunately evaded her. On the 1st of April we returned to
Port Mahon, and again put to sea on the 6th.
“_April_ 11.—Observing a vessel near the shoal of Tortosa, gave chase.
On the following morning her crew deserted her, and we took
possession. In the evening anchored under the land.
“13.—Saw three vessels at anchor in a bay to the westward of Oropesa.
Made sail up to them and anchored on the flank of a ten-gun fort.
Whilst the firing was going on, the boats were sent in to board and
bring out the vessels, which immediately weighed and got under the
fort. At 5:30 P.M. the boats returned with one of them; the other two
being hauled close in shore, we did not make any further attempt to
capture them. As the prize, the _Ave Maria_, of four guns, was in
ballast, we took the sails and spars out of her, and set her on fire.
“On the following morning at daybreak, several vessels appeared to the
eastward. Made all sail to intercept them, but before we could come
up, they succeeded in anchoring under a fort. On standing towards
them, they turned out to be Spanish gun-boats, which commenced firing
at us. At 10 A.M. anchored within musket-shot, so as to keep an angle
of the tower on our beam, thus neutralising its effect. Commenced
firing broadsides alternately at the tower and the gun-boats, with
visible advantage. Shortly before noon made preparation to cut out the
gun-boats, but a fresh breeze setting in dead on shore, rendered it
impossible to get at them without placing ourselves in peril. We
thereupon worked out of the bay.
“15.—Two strange sail in sight. Gave chase, and in a couple of hours
came up with and captured them. Made sail after a convoy in the
offing, but the wind falling light at dusk, lost sight of them.
“On the 26th we anchored in Mahon, remaining a week to refit and
procure fresh hands, many having been sent away in prizes. On the 2nd
of May put to sea with a reduced crew, some of whom had to be taken
out of H.M.’s prison.”
We again ran along the Spanish coast, and on the 4th of May were off
Barcelona, where the _Speedy_ captured a vessel which reported herself
as Ragusan, though in reality a Spanish four-gun tartan. Soon after
detaining her we heard firing in the W. N.-W., and steering for that
quarter fell in with a Spanish privateer, which we also captured, the
_San Carlos_, of seven guns. On this a swarm of gun-boats came out of
Barcelona, seven of them giving chase to us and the prizes, with which
we made off shore, the gun-boats returning to Barcelona.
On the following morning the prizes were sent to Port Mahon, and keeping
out of sight for the rest of the day, the _Speedy_ returned at midnight
off Barcelona, where we found the gun-boats on the watch; but on our
approach they ran in shore, firing at us occasionally. Suspecting that
the object was to decoy us within reach of some larger vessel, we
singled out one of them and made at her, the others, however, supporting
her so well that some of our rigging being shot away, we made off shore
to repair, the gun-boats following. Having thus got them to some
distance, and repaired damages, we set all sail, and again ran in shore,
in the hope of getting between them and the land, so as to cut off some
of their number. Perceiving our intention, they all made for the port as
before, keeping up a smart fight, in which our foretopgallant-yard was
so much injured, that we had to shift it, and were thus left astern. The
remainder of the day was employed in repairing damages, and the
gun-boats not venturing out again, at 9 P.M. we again made off shore.
Convinced that something more than ordinary had actuated the gun-boats
to decoy us—just before daylight on the 6th we again ran in for
Barcelona, when the trap manifested itself in the form of a large ship,
running under the land, and bearing E. S.-E. On hauling towards her, she
changed her course in chase of us, and was shortly made out to be a
Spanish xebec frigate.
As some of my officers had expressed dissatisfaction at not having been
permitted to attack the frigate fallen in with on the 21st of December,
after her suspicions had been lulled by our device of hoisting Danish
colours, &c., I told them they should now have a fair fight,
notwithstanding that, by manning the two prizes sent to Mahon, our
numbers had been reduced to fifty-four, officers and boys included.
Orders were then given to pipe all hands, and prepare for action.
Accordingly we made towards the frigate, which was now coming down under
steering sails. At 9·30 A.M., she fired a gun and hoisted Spanish
colours, which the _Speedy_ acknowledged by hoisting American colours,
our object being, as we were now exposed to her full broadside, to
puzzle her, till we got on the other tack, when we ran up the English
ensign, and immediately afterwards encountered her broadside without
damage.
Shortly afterwards she gave us another broadside, also without effect.
My orders were not to fire a gun till we were close to her; when,
running under her lee, we locked our yards amongst her rigging, and in
this position returned our broadside, such as it was.
To have fired our popgun 4-pounders at a distance would have been to
throw away the ammunition; but the guns being doubly, and, as I
afterwards learned, trebly, shotted, and being elevated, they told
admirably upon her main deck; the first discharge, as was subsequently
ascertained, killing the Spanish captain and the boatswain.
My reason for locking our small craft in the enemy’s rigging was the one
upon which I mainly relied for victory, viz. that from the height of the
frigate out of the water, the whole of her shot must necessarily go over
our heads, whilst our guns, being elevated, would blow up her main-deck.
The Spaniards speedily found out the disadvantage under which they were
fighting, and gave the order to board the _Speedy_; but as this order
was as distinctly heard by us as by them, we avoided it at the moment of
execution by sheering off sufficiently to prevent the movement, giving
them a volley of musketry and a broadside before they could recover
themselves.
Twice was this manœuvre repeated, and twice thus averted. The Spaniards
finding that they were only punishing themselves, gave up further
attempts to board, and stood to their guns, which were cutting up our
rigging from stem to stern, but doing little farther damage; for after
the lapse of an hour the loss to the _Speedy_ was only two men killed
and four wounded.
This kind of combat, however, could not last. Our rigging being cut up
and the _Speedy’s_ sails riddled with shot, I told the men that they
must either take the frigate or be themselves taken, in which case the
Spaniards would give no quarter—whilst a few minutes energetically
employed on their part would decide the matter in their own favour.
The doctor, Mr. Guthrie, who, I am happy to say, is still living to
peruse this record of his gallantry, volunteered to take the helm;
leaving him therefore for the time both commander and crew of the
_Speedy_, the order was given to board, and in a few seconds every man
was on the enemy’s deck—a feat rendered the more easy as the doctor
placed the _Speedy_ close alongside with admirable skill.
For a moment the Spaniards seemed taken by surprise, as though unwilling
to believe that so small a crew would have the audacity to board them;
but soon recovering themselves, they made a rush to the waist of the
frigate, where the fight was for some minutes gallantly carried on.
Observing the enemy’s colours still flying, I directed one of our men
immediately to haul them down, when the Spanish crew, without pausing to
consider by whose orders the colours had been struck, and naturally
believing it the act of their own officers, gave in, and we were in
possession of the _Gamo_ frigate, of thirty-two heavy guns and 319 men,
who an hour and a half before had looked upon us as a certain if not an
easy prey.
Our loss in boarding was Lieutenant Parker, severely wounded in several
places, one seaman killed and three wounded, which with those previously
killed and wounded gave a total of three seamen killed, and one officer
and seventeen men wounded.
The _Gamo’s_ loss was Captain de Torres—the boatswain—and thirteen
seamen killed, together with forty-one wounded; her casualties thus
exceeding the whole number of officers and crew on board the _Speedy_.
Some time after the surrender of the _Gamo_, and when we were in quiet
possession, the officer who had succeeded the deceased Captain Don
Francisco de Torres, not in command, but in rank, applied to me for a
certificate that he had done his duty during the action! whereupon he
received from me a certificate that he had “conducted himself like a
true Spaniard,” with which document he appeared highly gratified, and I
had afterwards the satisfaction of learning that it procured him further
promotion in the Spanish service!
Shortly before boarding an incident occurred which, by those who have
never been placed in similar circumstances, may be thought too absurd
for notice. Knowing that the final struggle would be a desperate one,
and calculating on the superstitious wonder which forms an element in
the Spanish character, a portion of our crew were ordered to blacken
their faces, and what with this and the excitement of combat, more
ferocious looking objects could scarcely be imagined. The fellows thus
disguised were directed to board by the head, and the effect produced
was precisely that calculated on. The greater portion of the Spaniard’s
crew was prepared to repel boarders in that direction, but stood for a
few moments as it were transfixed to the deck by the apparition of so
many diabolical looking figures emerging from the white smoke of the bow
guns; whilst our other men, who boarded by the waist, rushed on them
from behind, before they could recover from their surprise at the
unexpected phenomenon.
In difficult or doubtful attacks by sea,—and the odds of 50 men to 320
comes within this description,—no device can be too minute, even if
apparently absurd, provided it have the effect of diverting the enemy’s
attention whilst you are concentrating your own. In this, and other
successes against odds, I have no hesitation in saying that success in
no slight degree depended on out-of-the-way devices, which the enemy not
suspecting, were in some measure thrown off their guard.
The subjoined tabular view of the respective force of the two vessels
will best show the nature of the contest.
_Gamo._ │ _Speedy._
│
Main-deck guns.—Twenty-two long │Fourteen 4-pounders.
12-pounders. │
Quarter-deck.—Eight long │None.
8-pounders, and two 24-pounder │
carronades. │
No. of crew, 319. │No. of crew, 54.
Broadside weight of shot, 190 lbs.│Broadside weight of shot, 28 lbs.
Tonnage, 600 and upwards. │Tonnage, 158.
It became a puzzle what to do with 263 unhurt prisoners now we had taken
them, the _Speedy_ having only forty-two men left. Promptness was
however necessary; so driving the prisoners into the hold, with guns
pointing down the hatchway, and leaving thirty of our men on board the
prize—which was placed under the command of my brother, the Hon.
Archibald Cochrane, then a midshipman—we shaped our course to Port
Mahon—not Gibraltar, as has been recorded—and arrived there in safety;
the Barcelona gun-boats, though spectators of the action, not venturing
to rescue the frigate. Had they made the attempt, we should have had
some difficulty in evading them and securing the prize, the prisoners
manifesting every disposition to rescue themselves, and only being
deterred by their own main deck guns loaded with cannister, and pointing
down the hatchways, whilst our men stood over them with lighted matches.
The subjoined is Lord Keith’s letter in reply to my official
announcement of our success.
“_Foudroyant_, off Arab’s Tower,
“9th June, 1801.
“MY LORD,—I have received your lordship’s letter of the 13th ult.,
enclosing a copy of your letter to Captain Dixon, detailing your
engagement with and capture of the Spanish xebec of 32 guns; and
cannot fail to be extremely gratified with the communication of an
event so honourable to the naval service, and so highly creditable to
your lordship’s professional reputation, and to the intrepidity and
discipline of the _Speedy’s_ officers and men, to all of whom I
request your lordship will make my perfect satisfaction and
approbation known.
“I have the honour to be, My Lord,
“Your Lordship’s most obedient servant,
(Signed) “KEITH.
“The Right Hon. Lord Cochrane,
“_Speedy_.”
As a matter of course, my report of the capture of the _Gamo_ was, in
the first instance, made to the commandant at Port Mahon, the
commander-in-chief being in Egypt. It should have been forwarded by him
to the Secretary of the Admiralty, but was delayed for upwards of a
month, thus affording a pretence for not promoting me to post rank,
according to the recognised rules of the service.
From information on the affair being thus delayed, it was generally
believed at home, that the _Gamo_ had been taken by surprise, instead of
after a close engagement, deliberately decided on, and announced to the
officers and crew of the _Speedy_ at five o’clock in the morning, the
hands being turned up for the purpose. The consequence of the delay was
a postponement of my post commission for upwards of three months, viz.
from the 6th of May to the 8th of August; and what was of more
consequence, a misunderstanding with Lord St. Vincent, which bore most
unfavourably upon all my future prospects. Upon this subject much will
have to be said in a subsequent chapter.
The subjoined is a copy of my official report to the senior officer
commanding at Port Mahon; and also of his remarkably concise comment
thereon, when tardily transmitting the same to the Secretary of the
Admiralty.
_Copy of a letter from_ Capt. M. DIXON, _of H.M.S. Genereux, to_ E.
NEPEAN, Esq., _Secretary of the Admiralty, dated Port Mahon, 9th
June, 1800_.
“SIR,—I have the pleasure to transmit a copy of Lord Cochrane’s letter
relative to the very spirited and brilliant action with a Spanish
xebec frigate.
“I have the honour, &c.
“MANLEY DIXON.
“E. Nepean, Esq.”
“H. M. Sloop _Speedy_, off Barcelona,
“6th May, 1800.
“SIR,—I have the pleasure to inform you, that the sloop I have the
honour to command, after a mutual chase and warm action, has captured
a Spanish xebec frigate of 32 guns, 22 long 12-pounders, 8 nines, and
2 heavy carronades, viz. the _Gamo_, commanded by Don Francisco de
Torres, manned by 319 officers, seamen, and marines.
“The great disparity of force rendered it necessary to adopt some
measure that might prove decisive. I resolved to board, and with
Lieut. Parker, the Hon. A. Cochrane, the boatswain and crew, did so,
when, by the impetuosity of the attack, we forced them to strike. I
have to lament, in boarding, the loss of one man only; the severe
wounds received by Lieut. Parker, both from musketry and the sword,
one wound received by the boatswain, and one seaman.
“I must be permitted to say that there could not be greater
regularity, nor more cool determined conduct shown by men, than by the
crew of the _Speedy_. Lieut. Parker, whom I beg leave to recommend to
their Lordships’ notice, as well as the Hon. Mr. Cochrane, deserve all
the approbation that can be bestowed. The exertions and good conduct
of the boatswain, carpenter, and petty officers, I acknowledge with
pleasure, as well as the skill and attention of Mr. Guthrie, the
surgeon.
“I have the honour to be, &c.
“COCHRANE.
“M. Dixon, Esq.”
_Speedy’s force at commencement of action._
Fifty-four officers, men, and boys, 14 4-pounders. Three killed and 8
wounded.
_Gamo’s force at commencement of action._
Two hundred and seventy-four officers, seamen, and supernumeraries.
Forty-five marines. Guns, 32. Don Francisco de Torres, the boatswain,
and 13 men killed, 41 wounded.
CHAP. VI.
CRUISE OF THE _SPEEDY_ CONTINUED.
THE SPEEDY SENT TO ALGIERS.—INTERVIEW WITH THE DEY.—SPEEDY RETURNS TO
MINORCA.—ATTACK ON OROPESA.—ENEMY’S VESSELS DESTROYED.—LETTER OF
THANKS FROM LORD KEITH.—SPEEDY SENT IN CONVOY OF A PACKET.—CAPTURED
BY THREE FRENCH LINE OF BATTLE SHIPS, AND TAKEN TO ALGESIRAS.—ATTACK
BY SIR J. SAUMAREZ’S SQUADRON.—LOSS OF THE HANNIBAL.—CAPTURE OF
DOCKYARD ARTIFICERS.—GALLANTRY OF CAPTAIN KEATS.
Our success hitherto had procured us some prize money, notwithstanding
the peculations of the Mediterranean Admiralty Courts, by which the
greater portion of our captures was absorbed.
Despite this drawback, which generally disinclined officers and crews
from making extraordinary exertions, my own share of the twelvemonth’s
zealous endeavours in our little sloop was considerable, and even the
crew were in receipt of larger sums than those constituting the ordinary
pay of officers; a result chiefly owing to our nocturnal mode of
warfare, together with our refraining from meddling with vessels
ascertained to be loading in the Spanish ports, and then lying in wait
for them as they proceeded on their voyage.
One effect of our success was no slight amount of ill concealed jealousy
on the part of officers senior to myself, though there were some amongst
these who, being in command of small squadrons instead of single
vessels, might, had they adopted the same means, have effected far more
than the _Speedy_, with an armament so insignificant, was calculated to
accomplish.
After remaining some days at Port Mahon to refit, we prepared to return
to our cruising ground, where, from private information, we knew that
other prizes were at hand. In place of being permitted so to do, the
_Speedy_ received an order to proceed to Algiers, for the purpose of
representing to the Dey the illegality of his cruisers having taken a
British vessel in retaliation for an Algerine captured whilst violating
the law of blockade.
The mission was a singular one to be entrusted to the captain of one of
the smallest and worst armed vessels in the British service.
Remonstrance, to be effectual with a piratical government, ought to have
been committed to an officer armed with sufficient force at least to
induce respect. There was, however, no alternative but to obey, and a
short time saw us at anchor off the mole of the predatory potentate.
The request for an interview with his highness occasioned no little
dissatisfaction amongst his ministers, if those who were quite as much
his masters as his subordinates could be so termed. After some
consultation, the interview was, however, granted, and a day was
appointed to deliver my message.
The invariable Moslem preliminary of taking coffee having been gone
through, I was ushered through a series of galleries lined with men,
each bearing on his shoulder a formidable looking axe, and eyeing me
with an insolent scowl, evidently meant to convey the satisfaction with
which they would apply its edge to my vertebræ, should the caprice of
their chief so will.
On reaching the presence of the Dey—a dignified looking and gorgeously
attired person, seated cross-legged on an elevated couch in one corner
of the gallery and surrounded by armed people of most unprepossessing
appearance—I was marched up between two janizaries, and ordered to make
three salaams to his highness.
This formality being complied with, he rudely demanded, through the
medium of an interpreter, “What brought me there?” The reply was that “I
was the commander of an English vessel of war in the roads, and had been
deputed, on behalf of my government, respectfully to remonstrate with
his highness concerning a vessel which his cruisers had taken contrary
to the laws of nations.” On this being interpreted, the ferocious scowls
of the bystanders were exchanged for expressions of injured innocence,
but the Dey got in a great passion, and told the interpreter to inform
me that “remonstrance came with an ill grace from us, the British
vessels being the greatest pirates in the world, and mine one of the
worst amongst them,” which complimentary statement was acknowledged by
me with a formal bow.
“If I did right,” continued the Dey, through his interpreter,—“I should
put you and your crew in prison, till (naming a captured Algerine
vessel) she was restored; and but for my great respect for the English
government, and my impression that her seizure was unauthorised, you
should go there. However, you may go, with a demand from me that the
vessel unjustly taken from us shall be immediately restored.”
This decision appeared to be anything but satisfactory to the oligarchy
of which his court was composed, as savouring of a clemency to which
they were little inclined. From the boisterous conversation which
ensued, they were evidently desirous of prolonging my stay to an
indefinite period, or perhaps of terminating it summarily through the
instrumentality of the axemen who lined the galleries, as a few years
afterwards they terminated the existence of the Dey himself.
To confess the truth, there was some room for self-congratulation on
quitting the presence of such barbarians, to whom I was not fairly
accredited for such a mission. However, the remonstrance confided to me
being duly delivered, we returned to Minorca, to report progress, though
not without being chased by an Algerine cruiser on our way. As the
_Speedy_ outsailed her, and as there was no beneficial object to be
gained by interfering with her, we stood on without further notice.
On arriving at our former cruising ground, we encountered a Spanish
privateer of six guns, which was captured. This vessel was fitted out at
my own private expense, and my brother appointed to command her, as a
tender to the _Speedy_; several enemy’s vessels having previously
escaped for want of such aid.
In a few days after this, we fell in with the _Kangaroo_, Captain
Pulling, who, being senior to me, was therefore my commanding officer.
Running down the coast in company, we attacked the fort of Almanara, and
after silencing it, brought off a Spanish privateer of seven guns.
On the 8th of June, the _Speedy_ ran into Oropesa, where, on the 13th
and 14th of April, we had the previous action with the fort and
gun-boats. Perceiving several vessels at anchor under the fort, it was
deemed advisable to make off shore, with the intention of running in
again at midnight, and cutting some of them out.
We had not proceeded far, before we again fell in with the _Kangaroo_,
when informing Captain Pulling of what we had seen, he declined the
night attack, preferring to postpone operations till the following day.
Accordingly, at noon on the 9th, we went in, and made out a twenty-gun
xebec and three gun-boats, with ten sail of merchantmen under their
convoy. It was determined to attack them as they lay; the _Kangaroo_
anchoring well up to and engaging the fort, whilst the _Speedy_ and her
tender under my brother’s orders, encountered the xebec and the
gun-boats—the _Speedy_ anchoring in a line between those vessels and the
_Kangaroo_.
For some hours an incessant cannonade was kept up on both sides, the
_Kangaroo’s_ fire flanking the fort, whilst the slackened fire of the
Spanish vessels showed that our shot had told. At this juncture, a
twelve-gun felucca, and two more gun-boats having arrived from Valentia
to their assistance, the Spaniards took heart, and the action became
nearly as brisk as before.
The felucca and the newly arrived gun-boats were, however, for a time
beat off, and after an hour’s additional firing, the xebec, two
gun-boats, and some of the convoy were sunk; the remaining gun-boats
shortly afterwards sharing the same fate.
The action had now continued for upwards of nine hours; during which the
_Speedy_ had expended nearly all her ammunition, viz. 1400 shot, and the
_Kangaroo_ was much in the same predicament. As the felucca and
gun-boats had again come up, it was necessary to effect something
decisive. Captain Pulling, therefore, slipping his cable, shifted close
to the fort, which was soon afterwards abandoned, and the _Speedy_
closed with the felucca and her consorts, which forthwith fled. Had they
remained, we had not half a dozen rounds left to continue the action.
Both vessels now hoisted our boats, and made for the merchantmen. Three
of these had been sunk, and four others driven on shore; we, however,
brought away the three still afloat. By this time a number of Spanish
troops lined the beach for the protection of the vessels ashore, and as
we had scarcely a shot left, it was impracticable to reply to the
musketry, within range of which the boats must necessarily have been
placed had the attempt been made. We therefore relinquished the
endeavour to get off the stranded vessels.
It may be useful here to remark that on board the _Kangaroo_ were some
guns fitted on the non-recoil principle, and that during the action
these broke from their breechings; one, if not more, endangering the
vessel by bounding down the hatchways into the hold.
The subjoined letter of thanks for this affair was forwarded to Captain
Pulling by Lord Keith, who was then at Alexandria, watching the
movements of the French in Egypt.
“_Foudroyant_, Bay of Aboukir,
“10th July, 1801.
“SIR,—I have received your letter of the 10th of June, detailing the
attack made by the _Kangaroo_ and _Speedy_ upon the fort of Oropesa
and the enemy’s armed vessels at anchor under its protection, on 9th
of that month; as well as upon the tower of Almanara on a former day:
and while I offer my congratulations upon the successful issue of your
enterprise, I cannot withhold my approbation of the persevering and
determined conduct manifested by you and by Captain Lord Cochrane, as
well as by the officers and companies of both the sloops on these
occasions, and I request that my satisfaction may be communicated by
you to his lordship, and that you and he will make the same known to
the officers and companies of the _Kangaroo_ and the _Speedy_.
“I am, &c. &c.
“KEITH.
“Capt. Pulling, _Kangaroo_.”
On our return to Port Mahon with the prizes, the _Gamo_ had not been
purchased by the Government; but, to my regret, this useful cruiser had
been sold for a trifle to the Algerines, whilst I was condemned to
continue in the pigmy and now battered craft by which she had been
taken. To have obtained command of the _Gamo_, even as a means of
deception on the enemy’s coast, I would scarcely have changed place with
an admiral.
But a more cruel thing still was in store for me. The commandant lived
in the house of a Spanish merchant who had a contract for carrying the
mails to Gibraltar. The vessel employed for this purpose was a
notoriously bad sailer, and when the _Speedy_ was ready for sea, instead
of being permitted to return to our cruising ground, she was ordered to
convoy this tub of a packet to Gibraltar, with further instructions to
take the letter-bag on board the _Speedy_, protect the packet, put the
mail on board her as soon as we arrived off the Rock, and return without
holding any communication with the shore! the evident object of the last
injunction being that the service which had been thrust upon us should
not become known!
The expectation of the packet-master, doubtless, was that we should put
to sea out of privateer reach. In place of this, we ran along the
Spanish coast, our superior sailing enabling us, without delay, to
scrutinise every creek as we passed. Nothing, however, occurred, till we
were close in with a bay, or rather indentation of the shore near
Alicant, where seeing some vessels at anchor, we made towards them, on
which they weighed and deliberately ran ashore. To have stopped to get
them off would have been in excess of our instructions. To set fire to
them was not, and as one was laden with oil, and the night following
very dark, the result was a blaze which illumined the sky for many miles
round.
Unluckily for us, three French line-of-battle ships, which afterwards
turned out to be the _Indomitable_, the _Dessaix_, and the _Formidable_,
were in the vicinity, and being attracted by the light of the burning
vessels, ran in shore to see what was the matter.
At daybreak, on the morning of July 3rd, these large ships were observed
in the distance, calling up to our imaginations visions of Spanish
galleons from South America, and accordingly the _Speedy_ prepared for
chase. It was not till day dawned that we found out our mistake, the
vessels between us and the offing being clearly line-of-battle ships,
forbidding all reasonable hope of escape.
It was about four o’clock in the morning when we made out the French
ships, which immediately on discovering us gave chase. Being to
windward, we endeavoured to escape by making all sail, and, as the wind
fell light, by using our sweeps. This proving unavailing, we threw the
guns overboard, and put the brig before the wind; but notwithstanding
every effort, the enemy gained fast upon us, and, in order to prevent
our slipping past, separated on different tacks, so as to keep us
constantly within reach of one or the other; the _Dessaix_, being
nearest, firing broadsides at us as she passed when tacking, at other
times firing from her bow chasers, and cutting up our rigging.
For upwards of three hours we were thus within gunshot of the _Dessaix_,
when finding it impossible to escape by the wind, I ordered all the
stores to be thrown overboard, in the hope of being able, when thus
further lightened, to run the gauntlet between the ships, which
continued to gain upon us.
Watching an opportunity, when the nearest line-of-battle ship was before
our beam, we bore up, set the studding sails, and attempted to run
between them, the French honouring us with a broadside for this
unexpected movement. The _Dessaix_, however, immediately tacked in
pursuit, and in less than an hour got within musket shot. At this short
distance, she let fly at us a complete broadside of round and grape, the
object evidently being to sink us at a blow, in retaliation for thus
attempting to slip past, though almost without hope of escape.
Fortunately for us, in yawing to bring her broadside to bear, the
rapidity with which she answered her helm carried her a little too far,
and her round shot plunged in the water under our bows, or the discharge
must have sunk us; the scattered grape, however, took effect in the
rigging, cutting up a great part of it, riddling the sails, and doing
material damage to the masts and yards, though not a man was hurt. To
have delayed for another broadside would have been to expose all on
board to certain destruction, and as further effort to escape was
impotent, the _Speedy’s_ colours were hauled down.
On going aboard the _Dessaix_, and presenting my sword to the captain,
Christie Pallière, he politely declined taking it, with the
complimentary remark that “he would not accept the sword of an officer
who had for so many hours struggled against impossibility,” at the same
time paying me the further compliment of requesting that “I would
continue to wear my sword, though a prisoner”—a request with which I
complied; Capt. Pallière at the same time good-naturedly expressing his
satisfaction at having terminated our exploits in the cruising line,
they having, in fact, special instructions to look out for us. After
this reception it is scarcely necessary to add that I was treated with
great kindness by my captors.
Thus ended the thirteen months’ cruise of the _Speedy_, during which we
had taken and retaken upwards of 50 vessels, 122 guns, and 534
prisoners.
After the capture of the _Speedy_, the French line-of-battle ships stood
along the coast, and proceeded with her, and the unlucky packet which
had been the primary cause of the disaster, to Algesiras. During this
passage I had ample opportunity of observing the superior manner in
which the sails of the _Dessaix_ were cut, and the consequent flat
surface exposed to the wind; this contrasting strongly with the bag
reefs, bellying sails, and breadbag canvass of English ships of war at
that period.
As there was no force at Gibraltar adequate to an attack of the French
squadron, the authorities lost no time in transmitting intelligence of
their arrival to Sir James Saumarez, then blockading the Spanish
squadron in Cadiz. The French meanwhile proceeded to water and refit,
evidently with the intention of passing the Straits with the first fair
wind.
Quitting Cadiz, Sir James Saumarez immediately sailed for Algesiras with
his squadron, consisting of the _Cæsar_, _Venerable_, _Audacious_,
_Hannibal_, _Superb_, _Pompée_, _Spencer_, _Calpe_, and _Thames_, these
reaching the bay on the 6th of July.
At the time of their first appearance I was conversing with Captain
Pallière in his cabin, when a lieutenant reported a British flag over
Cabritta point, and soon afterwards the top-gallant masts and pendants
of a British squadron became visible. We at once adjourned to the poop,
when the surprise of the French, at the sight of a more numerous
squadron, became not unreasonably apparent; Captain Pallière asked me
“if I thought an attack would be made, or whether the British force
would anchor off Gibraltar?” My reply was “that an attack would
certainly be made, and that before night both British and French ships
would be at Gibraltar,” at the same time adding that when there, it
would give me great pleasure to make him and his officers a return for
the kindness I had experienced on board the _Dessaix_!
The French admiral, however, determined that his ships should not be
carried across the bay if he could help it. Before the British squadron
had rounded the point, the French out boats, with kedges and stream
anchors, for the purpose of warping in shore, so as to prevent the
approaching squadron from cutting them out; but the order was so
hurriedly executed, that all three ships were hauled aground, with their
sterns presented to the approaching British force; a position which
could not have been taken by choice, for nothing could apparently be
more easy than to destroy the French ships, which, lying aground stern
on, could only use their stern chasers.
To employ their consequently useless hands to some purpose, the French
landed a considerable portion of their crews to man the Spanish
batteries on the island, as the ship’s guns could not be brought to
bear. Two of the British ships anchored, and opened upon the French
ships aground, but being exposed to the fire of some of the newly manned
forts higher up the bay, the heavy guns of which were admirably handled
by the French seamen, both the British vessels slipped their cables, and
together with the remainder of the squadron, which did not anchor at
all, backed their main-top-sails for the purpose of maintaining their
position. The wind, however, blowing from the westward, with a rapid
current sweeping round the bay, thwarted this intention, and the British
squadron quickly drifted past the enemy, firing as they went.
Perhaps I ought previously to have mentioned an incident demonstrative
of the _sang froid_ of my captor. After having satisfied himself that an
action with a superior force was inevitable, Capt. Pallière remarked,
“that it should not spoil our breakfast,” in which he had invited me to
join him. Before the meal was ended, a round shot crashed through the
stern of the _Dessaix_, driving before it a shower of broken glass, the
_debrís_ of a wine bin under the sofa.
We forthwith jumped up from table, and went on the quarter-deck, but a
raking shot from Sir James Saumarez’s ship sweeping a file of marines
from the poop, not far from me, I considered further exposure on my part
unnecessary, and went below to a position whence I could nevertheless,
at times, see what wasgoing on.
The _Hannibal_, having with the others forged past the enemy, gallantly
filled and tacked with a view to get between the French ships and the
shore, being evidently unaware of their having been hauled aground. The
consequence was that she ran upon a shoal, and remained fast, nearly bow
on to the broadsides of the French line-of-battle ships, which with the
shore batteries and several gunboats opened upon her a concentrated
fire. This, from her position, she was unable to return. The result was
that her guns were speedily dismounted, her rigging shot away, and a
third of her crew killed or wounded; Captain Ferris, who commanded her,
having now no alternative but to strike his colours—though not before he
had displayed an amount of endurance which excited the admiration of the
enemy.
A circumstance now occurred which is entitled to rank amongst the
curiosities of war. On the French taking possession of the _Hannibal_,
they had neglected to provide themselves with their national ensign, and
either from necessity or bravado rehoisted the English flag upside down.
This being a well-known signal of distress, was so understood by the
authorities at Gibraltar, who, manning all government and other boats
with dockyard artificers and seamen, sent them, as it was mistakenly
considered, to the assistance of the _Hannibal_.
On the approach of the launches I was summoned on deck by the captain of
the _Dessaix_, who seemed doubtful what measures to adopt as regarded
the boats now approaching to board the _Hannibal_, and asked my opinion
as to whether they would attempt to retake the ship. As there could be
no doubt in my mind about the nature of their mission or its result, it
was evident that if they were allowed to board, nothing could prevent
the seizure of the whole. My advice, therefore, to Captain Pallière was
to warn them off by a shot—hoping they would thereby be driven back and
saved from capture. Captain Pallière seemed at first inclined to take
the advice, but on reflection—either doubting its sincerity, or seeing
the real state of the case—he decided to capture the whole by permitting
them to board unmolested. Thus boat by boat was captured until all the
artificers necessary for the repair of the British squadron, and nearly
all the sailors at that time in Gibraltar, were taken prisoners!
In this action the French and Spaniards suffered severely both as
regarded ships and men, their masts and hulls being much knocked about,
whilst several Spanish gunboats were sunk. The wonder to me was that the
British squadron did not anchor, for the French ships being aground,
stern on, could have offered little resistance, and must have been
destroyed. It is true that the batteries on shore were admirably served,
and thus constituted a formidable obstacle; but had not the squadron
drifted past the French ships, the latter might have been interposed
between the batteries and the British force, when the fire of the former
would have been neutralised, and the enemy’s ships aground destroyed
with comparatively little loss. It is not, however, my purpose or
province to criticise the action, but simply to give the details, as
personally witnessed from that extraordinary place, for a British
officer, the deck of a French ship!
Neither the imprisonment of the captured crews, nor my own, was of long
duration. The day after the action, Sir J. Saumarez sent Capt. Brenton
into Algesiras Bay with a flag of truce, to endeavour to effect an
exchange of the gallant Capt. Ferris, his officers, and crew. At that
time there was no regulated system of exchange between the belligerent
powers, but Capt. Brenton succeeded in procuring the release of the crew
of the _Hannibal_ and the entrapped artificers, together with the
officers and men of the _Speedy_. Admiral Linois would not at first give
me up, but, on further consideration, allowed me to go with the other
officers to Gibraltar on _parole_. My complete release was eventually
effected for the second captain of the _St. Antonio_, taken shortly
afterwards.
The French ships having lost no time in communicating with the Spanish
admiral at Cadiz, he promptly appeared off Algesiras with a
reinforcement of six ships of the line, several frigates, and gunboats.
The enemy having by this time warped off their grounded ships, as well
as the _Hannibal_, and having by the 12th got them in sea-going order,
the whole sailed from Algesiras, followed by the British squadron,
which, by great exertions, had been got in readiness for pursuit.
Of the action which subsequently took place I have no personal
knowledge, other than that of a scene witnessed by myself from the
garden of the commissioner’s house, in which I was staying.
The enemy were overtaken at dusk, soon after leaving the bay, and when
it had become dark, Captain Keats, in the _Superb_, gallantly dashed in
between the two sternmost ships, firing right and left, and passed on.
Of course I do not assert myself to have been personally cognisant of
the way in which the attack was made, the firing only being visible from
the Rock, but that this is the correct version of the affair rests upon
indisputable authority. The movement was so rapidly executed, that the
_Superb_ shot ahead before the smoke cleared away, and the Spanish
ships, the _Real Carlos_, 112, and the _San Hermenegildo_, 112,
mistaking each other for the aggressor, began a mutual attack, resulting
in the _Real Carlos_ losing her foretop-mast, the sails of which—falling
over her own guns—caught fire. While in this condition the
_Hermenegildo_—still engaging the _Real Carlos_ as an enemy—in the
confusion fell on board her and caught fire also. Both ships burned till
they blew up, and nearly all on board perished; a few survivors only
escaping on board the _Superb_ as Captain Keats was taking possession of
a _third_ Spanish line-of-battle ship, the _San Antonio_—for whose
second captain, as has been said, I was exchanged.
The remainder of the combined squadron got safely back to Cadiz after an
encounter between the _Formidable_ and _Venerable_. I am aware that the
preceding account of the action with the French ships at Algesiras
differs in some respects from that compiled by naval historians from the
despatches; but this circumstance will not prevent me from giving my own
version of a conflict in which it was my misfortune to be a reluctant
spectator. The _Real Carlos_, one of the ships blown up, bore the flag
of the Spanish Admiral, Moreno, who with Admiral Linois was said to be
at the time on board a Spanish frigate.
CHAP. VII.
ADMIRALTY RELUCTANCE TO PROMOTE ME.
LETTER FROM SIR ALEXANDER COCHRANE.—SECOND LETTER FROM SIR
ALEXANDER.—BOTH WRITTEN UNKNOWN TO ME.—RELUCTANCE OF LORD ST.
VINCENT TO PROMOTE ME.—LETTER FROM MY FATHER TO LORD ST. VINCENT,
URGING MY RIGHT TO PROMOTION.—LORD ST. VINCENT’S REPLY.—ITS
FALLACY.—HIS LORDSHIP’S REASONING A SUBTERFUGE.—PROMOTION OF MY
FIRST LIEUTENANT REFUSED. MY IMPRUDENT REMARK TO LORD ST. VINCENT,
WHO BECOMES MY ENEMY.—FURTHER EFFORT TO PROMOTE LIEUTENANT
PARKER.—ADMIRALTY REFUSAL ALSO.—LIEUTENANT PARKER’S EVENTUAL
PROMOTION, AND SUBSEQUENT SHAMEFUL TREATMENT.
It has been already stated that not only was the action with the _Gamo_
for some time unnoticed in the customary manner, but the post rank to
which the rule of the service entitled me from the result of the action,
was withheld. My friends, being naturally surprised at the retention of
what was no favour on the part of Lord St. Vincent, but my
unquestionable right, respectfully pointed out to his lordship the
nature of the services rendered.
The subjoined letter addressed to Lord St. Vincent by my kind uncle Sir
Alexander Cochrane, in reference to the _Speedy’s_ escape from a Spanish
frigate (see page 100), was written previous to that relating to the
capture of the _Gamo_, but is worthy of record on grounds generally
connected with the naval service.
“MY LORD,—Yesterday we received accounts of your Lordship’s being
placed at the head of the Admiralty, on which occasion I beg to offer
my congratulations. I never subscribed to the opinion that a naval
officer ought not to be First Lord of the Admiralty, and from your
Lordship’s thorough knowledge of the service, we may now hope for that
support on many occasions which we could not look for from those
who—not having borne the brunt of the day, or being bred to the
Navy—could be but bad judges either of officers’ characters, or the
motives which on many occasions actuate them.
“Doubtless your Lordship has already received numerous weighty
applications for the promotion of young men in the service, nor would
I presume to add to their number but from the obliging expressions
your Lordship once made me in favour of Lord Cochrane, had you
remained longer on this station. I have the less reserve on this
occasion, as I think his Lordship has a claim to be made post, from
the presence of mind by which he lately saved H.M.’s sloop _Speedy_,
which he at present commands. This I beg leave to recount.
“He had taken several prizes off Carthagena, when, one morning, he
found himself close under the guns of a Spanish frigate.
“His only chance of escape was, either to board the frigate, in the
hope of finding her unprepared, or to pass off the _Speedy_ as a
Danish sloop of war.
“With one of these objects he stood towards her under Danish colours,
but, on a near approach, found her too formidable to be carried by the
few hands he had on board. On being hailed to know what brig it was,
he gave, through the medium of a Danish quartermaster, the name of a
Danish brig lately arrived on the station. On being ordered to come on
board the frigate with his commission, he informed the Spaniards that
his orders from the court of Denmark were not to send a boat on board
any foreign man of war, but that if they had any doubts of his not
being a Danish sloop of war, they were at liberty to board him.
“On this a boat left the frigate, but just as they were almost
alongside the _Speedy_, they were informed that she was in quarantine,
being only a few days from Algiers, where the plague at that time
existed. On this the Spanish officers in the boat refused to touch a
rope, and returned to the frigate, when her captain told Lord Cochrane
that he knew his brig, and wished him a pleasant voyage.[26]
-----
Footnote 26:
As the reader is aware, we had previously painted the _Speedy_ in
imitation of the Danish brig.
-----
“I have ever been of opinion that rewards for bold services cannot be
too great, and I must confess, that where one of his Majesty’s ships
is saved by presence of mind similar to what I have related, great
praise is due to her commander.
“Your Lordship will, I hope, excuse me for trespassing a little longer
in favour of my nephew, who is now twenty-five years old, a time of
life that promotion can only be of use. His father has expended his
whole fortune in discoveries which will be of great use to the
public—but the real sufferer is Lord Cochrane. The liberality of your
Lordship’s mind will see this in its true light, and also plead my
excuse for the liberty I have taken.
“Hoping that your Lordship’s health is reinstated, &c. &c.
“I am, your Lordship’s, &c. &c.
“ALEXANDER COCHRANE.
“The Right Hon. Lord St. Vincent.”
I was not aware till recently that Sir Alexander had kindly made this
application on my behalf. At the time the preceding letter was written
he did not know of the capture of the _Gamo_; the _Ajax_, which he
commanded, being then before Alexandria. On learning our success, he
again wrote to Lord St. Vincent as follows:—
“_Ajax_, off Alexandria, June 10th, 1801.
“MY LORD,—I some time ago wrote your Lordship in favour of my nephew
Lord Cochrane, recommending his being made post.
“I hope your Lordship received my letter, and that you viewed Lord
Cochrane’s conduct in the light I did. But if my persuasions were not
then judged of sufficient weight, I may now with much confidence come
forward and claim for my nephew the palm of victory in both ways, by
an act hardly equalled in this war of naval miracles, considering the
great inequality of force between the _Speedy_ with fifty-four men,
and a xebec frigate of thirty-two guns and 319 men.
“Well knowing that nothing gives your Lordship more pleasure than
having an opportunity of rewarding merit, let the rank of the person
be what it may, I am confident your Lordship will, on the present
occasion, do every justice to Lord Cochrane, though should his
promotion have arisen from his former exploits it would be more
grateful to my feelings, more especially as his subsequent conduct
will do honour to your Lordship’s appointment.
“I believe I told your Lordship, in my former letter, that Lord
Cochrane has the world before him. He has three younger brothers to
take care of, one of whom boarded at his side[27] when the Spaniard
was carried. Unfortunately he has not served his time; if he had I
dare say your Lordship would think him worthy of promotion for his
conduct on that occasion.
-----
Footnote 27:
Archibald.
-----
“It will give me much pleasure to hear that your Lordship’s health is
quite re-established, and that you may long live to enjoy it, is the
sincere wish of
“Your Lordship’s
“Most obedient and humble servant,
“A. COCHRANE.
“P.S. I wish I could give your Lordship any pleasing intelligence from
this quarter; but ever since the death of Sir R. Abercromby,
procrastination has been the order of the day. Never was a gallant
army so lost as the present. God grant some man of sense may come out
to command them, and save the remnant from destruction. Delay in this
climate is worse than death; five men fall a sacrifice to disease for
one in the field, and yet I don’t think it unhealthy; our troops
suffer from being encamped on burning sands.”
Even this request from a distinguished officer—preferred unknown to
me—failed to obtain what was no favour, but my right according to the
invariable rule of the service. There was even then clearly some
sinister influence at work, of the real cause for which I am to this day
ignorant, and can only surmise that it might have arisen from my, no
doubt, freely expressed opinions on being appointed to convoy the
wretched packet which led to my capture; or perhaps from the still more
indiscreet plainness with which I had spoken of the manner in which the
French fleet had been unfortunately permitted to escape Lord Keith.
Brenton, in his Life of Lord St. Vincent, thus alludes to the delay in
my promotion: “Lord St. Vincent _was so much pressed_ on the subject of
Lord Cochrane’s promotion for taking the _Gamo_, that it became almost a
point of etiquette with the earl _not to make him a captain_! An
illustrious person is reported to have said, ‘My Lord, we must make Lord
Cochrane “post;”’ to which Lord St. Vincent replied, ‘The First Lord of
the Admiralty knows _no must_.’”
There is no doubt that Captain Brenton received this account from Lord
St. Vincent himself, and as the object of his book was to shield his
lordship in questionable matters, we may receive this version as it was
given to his biographer.
The only direct application that I was at the time aware of having been
made was a letter from my father to Lord St. Vincent, _after_ the post
rank had been reluctantly conceded by placing me _at the bottom of the
list_, below others previously my juniors in the service! My father’s
letter and Lord St. Vincent’s reply are subjoined.
“No. 14, Mortimer Street, Sept. 23, 1801.
“MY LORD,—I beg leave, in behalf of my son, Lord Cochrane, who is now
in Scotland, to bring under your Lordship’s view, for your
consideration, some facts and circumstances which may not hitherto
_officially_ have come to your Lordship’s knowledge, from the perusal
of which I flatter myself it will appear to your Lordship that there
are few instances of as much being performed by one individual in the
like space of time, and with a force so inferior.
“When I first heard of Lord Cochrane’s engagement with the _Gamo_, I
reckoned it as a matter not admitting of a doubt that your Lordship
would reward him by immediately appointing him to a post ship, and I
was the more confirmed in this belief from the circumstance that the
_Gamo was not taken by surprise_, but at noonday, after an action of
an hour and ten minutes; during all of which time the _Gamo’s_ yards
were locked with the _Speedy’s_ rigging. The determination of the two
vessels to engage was mutual; Lord Cochrane turned up his ship’s
company at five in the morning, and informed them of his intention to
engage the Spanish frigate.
“The anxiety I must naturally feel for whatever concerns the honour
and rank of my son, led me, on Wednesday last, to inquire at the
Admiralty how his name stood on the post captains’ list. And I must be
allowed to state the surprise and disappointment I felt on finding
several masters and commanders on the Mediterranean station—his
juniors long before, and for several months after, the taking of the
_Gamo_—now placed before him on that list.
“I beg leave to call your Lordship’s attention to what Lord Cochrane’s
feelings must be, and what the situation he will be placed in on
service from this supersession; and whether his being thus postponed
in rank will not have a tendency to detract from the merit of one of
the most gallant actions during this or any other war? And whether it
may not induce the public at large, or the Navy in particular, to
believe that your Lordships have had cause to disapprove of some part
of Lord Cochrane’s conduct?
“If all the circumstances of the engagement had come to your
Lordship’s knowledge in due time, I am persuaded you would have shown
an additional mark of your approbation of Lord Cochrane by making him
post from the date of the capture of the _Gamo_, or, at least, that
you would not have put over him a number of masters and commanders on
the Mediterranean station, who, perhaps equally capable as he of
distinguishing themselves, have not been equally fortunate in similar
opportunities. I am likewise convinced, my Lord, that those individual
officers, who have thus been preferred to him, would not think it any
matter of injustice that Lord Cochrane should retain, as post captain,
the same seniority he held over them, both before and after his
engagement, as master and commander.
“Allow me therefore to request that your Lordship will be pleased to
give Lord Cochrane that rank in the navy which it is presumed he would
have held if the circumstantial accounts of his engagements had
reached your Lordship at an earlier date, or that he had not been so
unfortunate as to have been taken by three French line-of-battle
ships. I cannot suppose any censure is intended to attach to his
conduct on that point; for, in the narrative of his capture, your
Lordship will see that during a chase of several hours upon a wind, he
received the broadside and bow-chasers of a seventy-four gun ship, and
did not strike until, at the distance of musket shot, he received a
full broadside of round and grape from the _Dessaix_.
“I do not, however, my Lord, rest my son’s claim for seniority in
promotion solely upon the capture of the _Gamo_.[28] Although these
particulars, from their being stated in Lord Cochrane’s letters to
Captain Dixon of the _Généreux_, are known to your Lordship, yet I
cannot help here repeating them, as _from their not being published in
the Gazette_ a very erroneous opinion generally prevails that the
_Gamo was taken_ by surprise, and not after so long and close an
engagement as was really the case.
-----
Footnote 28:
“He has,” &c. &c. [Here follows a recapitulation of particulars,
with which the reader is already acquainted.]
-----
“But perhaps, my Lord, I may in the whole of this letter have been
impelled, by the ardour and anxiety of my own feelings, to urge that
which your Lordship’s good intentions may have wholly anticipated
towards Lord Cochrane. If so, my Lord, I have only to entreat your
excuse for a zeal on my part for the honour and character of my son,
for which I hope parental sensations will plead a forcible apology.
“I have the honour, &c. &c.
“DUNDONALD.
“The Right Hon. Lord St. Vincent.”
To this letter Lord St, Vincent next day replied as follows:—
“Admiralty, Sept. 24, 1801.
“MY LORD,—I can have no difficulty in acknowledging that the capture
of the _Gamo_ reflects the highest degree of credit on Lord Cochrane
and the officers and crew of the _Speedy_.
“The first account of that brilliant action reached the Admiralty
_very early in the month of August_ (it was fought on the 6th of May),
previously to which intelligence had been received of the capture of
the _Speedy_, by which Lord Cochrane was made prisoner.
“Until his exchange could be effected, and the necessary inquiry into
the cause and circumstances of the loss of that sloop had taken place,
it was impossible for the Board, consistently with its usual forms, to
mark its approbation of his Lordship’s conduct. Lord Cochrane was
promoted to the rank of post captain on the 8th of August, the day on
which the sentence of acquittal for the loss of the _Speedy was
received_—which was all that could under existing circumstances be
done.
“Having entered into this explanation with your Lordship, it remains
for me only to add that, however disposed the Board might be to pay
attention to the merits of his Lordship, it could not, consistent with
its public duty, give him rank from the time of the capture of the
_Gamo_—a measure quite unprecedented—without doing an act of injustice
to other deserving officers.
“I have the honour, &c. &c.
“ST. VINCENT.
“The Earl of Dundonald.”
I shall not shrink from canvassing this matter, the less because Lord
St. Vincent has been represented as considering himself bored on the
subject. An account of the capture of the _Gamo_ did reach the
Admiralty, though later than it ought to have done, and was
unjustifiably laid aside. Little that I effected was allowed to find its
way into the _Gazette_! Even the log extracts given in the two last
chapters, though relating to matters which occurred sixty years ago,
are, for the most part, news to the public of the present generation.
But supposing that information relative to the capture of the _Gamo_ had
not reached the Admiralty before the news of my being made prisoner,
even then it clearly entitled me to post rank from _the date of my
acquittal_. Lord St. Vincent asserted that it entitled me to promotion
only from the date on which news of my acquittal _was received_!
Reference to the Navy List at the time will show that the postponement
of my rank was rather owing to the bane of the Admiralty—family
influence, and that some of my former juniors were put over my head
because it was politically imperative on the Board to promote others
before me.
That my promotion to post rank for a previous action was impossible,
because I had some time afterwards the misfortune, whilst in a trumpery
sloop, to be captured by three French ships of the line; and therefore
could not be promoted “_until my exchange could be effected_,” was a
subterfuge unworthy of Lord St. Vincent. Had this been the rule of the
Admiralty, officers taken prisoners by the French could neither have
been tried nor promoted, for _there was no system of exchange_, so that
the reward of their services would not depend upon the discretion of the
Admiralty or the generosity of their country, but on the will of the
enemy’s Minister of Marine, who might detain them prisoners till the
close of the war.
By Lord St. Vincent’s interpretation of the Admiralty rule, I should not
have been promoted _at all_, or even tried for the loss of the _Speedy_,
if, as Lord St. Vincent asserted, no promotion could be given till “my
exchange was effected.” The fact is, that I never was exchanged, in the
Admiralty sense of the term; for at that period, as has been said, there
was no exchange of prisoners with France, nor had any previously taken
place for many years. The _Hannibal_ and _Speedy’s_ prisoners owed their
liberation to the fact that the French did not know what to do with
them; and I owed mine to the fact of Captain Keats having, a few days
after I had been liberated on parole, taken a ship of the line, the _San
Antonio_; for whose second captain, by courtesy of Admiral Linois
towards that officer, my liberation was effected.
Still it was not so much the neglect to promote me, of which proper
complaint was made, as the injustice of placing over my head especially,
a younger man and a junior officer, gazetted on the same day for a
subsequent service, to the success of which he in no degree
contributed.[29] Further discussion is unnecessary, my object being to
show the principle, or rather want of it, which prevailed at the
Admiralty where influence was concerned.
-----
Footnote 29:
The action in the Straits of Gibraltar, alluded to at page 128, when
Captain Keats destroyed two line-of-battle ships, and captured a
third, the remainder of the squadron being witnesses only.
-----
It must, however, be explained, that these remarks in no way apply to
the officer promoted, but to the act of promotion. That officer was my
former messmate Lieutenant—afterwards Admiral—Dundas, a truly honourable
man, whom, in later years, I was proud to call my friend. Strangely
enough, the Admiralty which had placed him before me on the list, killed
him in the end through grief at his inability to reform abuses; he
having been called to the Board, where he worked so assiduously in the
vain endeavour to purge the corruption around him, that his health
became undermined, and he was one day found dead in a retiring room of
the Augean establishment at Whitehall.
Before quitting the Mediterranean, a letter was addressed by me to Lord
St. Vincent, requesting him to promote my gallant First Lieutenant
Parker, who, as stated in my despatch, was severely wounded in boarding
the _Gamo_. No answer being returned to this application, up to the
period of my arrival in England, another letter was forwarded to his
lordship, which met with the same reception, and afterwards a third,
which produced from Lord St. Vincent the reply that my application could
not be entertained, for that “it was unusual to promote two officers for
such a service,—besides which the small number of men killed on board
the _Speedy_ did not warrant the application.”
It was impossible not to feel nettled at a reply so unexpected: that
because few men had been killed on board the _Speedy_, her first
lieutenant was considered unworthy of promotion, though terribly cut up.
To argue with a First Lord is no doubt an imprudent thing for a naval
officer to attempt, and my remonstrance in this instance had such an
effect as to get my name placed on the black list of the Admiralty,
never again to be erased.
In my letter to Lord St. Vincent, the following incautious observations
were made, viz. that “his reasons for not promoting Lieutenant Parker,
because there were only three men killed on board the _Speedy_, were in
opposition _to his lordship’s own promotion to an earldom_, as well as
that of his flag-captain to knighthood, and his other officers to
increased rank and honours: for that in the battle from which his
lordship derived his title there was only _one man_ killed on board his
own flagship, so that there were more casualties in my sloop than in his
line-of-battle ship.”
From the receipt of that letter Lord St. Vincent became my bitter enemy,
and not he only, but his successors thought it incumbent on them to
perpetuate his lordship’s displeasure. My reply was no doubt keenly felt
at the time, when it was a common remark in the Navy that the battle of
St. Vincent was gained by the inshore squadron, under Nelson, the
commander-in-chief being merely a spectator, at a distance which
involved only the loss of one man in his own ship.
Notwithstanding this refusal of the First Lord to promote my lieutenant,
my determination was to persevere with the Board collectively, and
accordingly I addressed an official letter to the Secretary of the
Admiralty, Mr. Nepean, embodying Lord St. Vincent’s reply, and
concluding, that “if their Lordships judge by the small number killed, I
have only to say that it was fortunate the enemy did not point their
guns better:” indeed, had I not taken care to place the _Speedy_ in a
position where the Spanish guns went over her, many would have swelled
the list whom it was my happiness to have saved.
This letter was dated May 12th, 1802, and, receiving no reply, the
annexed official letter was addressed to their Lordships on the same
subject:—
“14 Old Cavendish-street, May 17, 1802.
“MY LORDS,—The anxiety I feel for the promotion of a meritorious
officer, Lieutenant Parker, late of the _Speedy_, whose name I have
not seen in the recent list of commanders, even though a very
extensive promotion has taken place, induces me to address your
Lordships.
“Lieutenant Parker served as sole lieutenant of the _Speedy_ at the
capture of the _Gamo_, of 32 guns and 319 men, carried by boarding,
after an action of upwards of an hour; during the greatest part of
which time the yards and rigging of the vessels were locked together.
In boarding and carrying the Spanish vessel he was severely wounded by
a sword, run through his thigh, and a musket-ball lodged in his chest.
“I have always understood it to be an invariable rule with the Board
of Admiralty, to promote officers of unimpeachable character who have
distinguished themselves in action, or who have been first lieutenants
of His Majesty’s ships of war at the capture of vessels of superior
force—especially of a force so very superior as that of the _Gamo_ to
the _Speedy_; the latter, as your Lordships know, mounting 14
4-pounders, having on board only 54 men, whilst the force of the
_Gamo_ was 32 guns, with a complement of men six times greater than
that of the _Speedy_.
“When these circumstances are brought to your Lordships’ recollection,
I am fully convinced that you will see proper to reward Lieutenant
Parker by appointing him to the rank of commander in His Majesty’s
service, which will tend to cherish and promote that spirit of
exertion among the lieutenants, subordinate officers, and crew,
without whose zealous co-operation the endeavours of the captain alone
would prove of small avail.
“I have the honour to be, &c. &c.
(Signed) “COCHRANE.
“To the Right Hon. the Lords Commissioners
of the Admiralty.”
On the 26th of May the following reply was received from the
Secretary:—
“Admiralty Office, 26th May, 1802.
“MY LORD,—I have received and read to my Lords Commissioners of the
Admiralty your Lordship’s letter to me of the 17th inst., and the
representation which accompanied it, and am commanded by their
Lordships to acquaint you that your application to me is perfectly
regular, _but that it is not so for officers to correspond with the
Board_.
“I am, &c. &c.
“E. NEPEAN.
“Captain Lord Cochrane.”
Determined not to be foiled in what I conceived to be the right of
Lieutenant Parker, I replied to the Secretary as follows:—
“Old Cavendish-street, May 27th, 1802.
“SIR,—I have been favoured with your letter acknowledging that you had
received and read to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty my
letter of the 17th inst., and that you are commanded by their
Lordships to acquaint me that my application to you was perfectly
regular, but that it is not so for officers to correspond with the
Board.
“I have, therefore, to request that you will inform the Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty, that, although I have received your
letter, still I wait in expectation to be favoured with an answer to
the representation which, through you, I had the honour to transmit to
their Lordships.
“I am, &c. &c.
“COCHRANE.
“E. Nepean, Esq., Sec. to the Admiralty.”
The reply to this necessarily cut short all further correspondence.
“Admiralty Office, 29th May, 1802.
“MY LORD,—I have received and read to my Lords Commissioners of the
Admiralty your letter of the 27th inst., and have nothing in command
from their Lordships to communicate to you.
“I am, &c. &c.
“EVAN NEPEAN.
“Captain Lord Cochrane.”
In spite of this rebuff, I nevertheless continued to persevere, but
it was not till some years afterwards that the promotion of
Lieutenant Parker was obtained, with a result to that able and
gallant officer which proved his ruin, and eventually caused his
death.
The circumstances under which this took place were positively
diabolical. Despairing of promotion, Lieutenant Parker had retired
to a little farm near Kinsale, by the cultivation of which, in
addition to his half-pay, he was realising an existence for his
family. From my determined perseverance on his behalf, he was at
length made commander, and ordered to join the _Rainbow_ sloop,
represented to be stationed in the West Indies. Selling off
everything, even to his household furniture, he proceeded to
Barbadoes, and reported himself to Sir Alexander Cochrane; but, as
the vessel could not be found, Sir Alexander furnished him with a
passage to look for her at the Bermudas, where he supposed she might
be fitting for sea. Not finding her there, Lieutenant Parker
returned to Barbadoes, when _it became evident that no such vessel
was on the North American station_.
On ascertaining this, poor Parker returned to England a ruined man.
Lord Melville, who had succeeded as First Lord, expressed his
surprise and regret that such a circumstance should have occurred,
and promised the unhappy man that he should not only be amply
compensated for the loss and expense attending his outfit and
fruitless voyage to the West Indies, but that he should have another
command on the first opportunity. This generous intention was
however counteracted, for _he never received either the one or the
other_.
Lieutenant Parker’s loss, consequent to the sale of his property,
the expense attendant on settling his family, together with his
outfit and voyage, amounted to upwards of 1000_l._ His prospects
ruined, his domestic arrangements destroyed, and his pride wounded,
his spirit and constitution gradually gave way, and at length
overwhelmed with sorrow he sank into a premature grave, leaving a
wife and four daughters to deplore the loss of their only protector.
I never could find out who had thus imposed on one of the most
gallant officers in the Navy this infamous deception, concocted,
doubtless, out of pure malevolence to myself. Be he whom he may, I
am very sorry that it is not in my power to hold up his name to the
execration of posterity. It is even at the present day the duty of
the Admiralty to remedy the injury inflicted on his destitute
family—for he had left four daughters unprovided for, who had no
opportunity to escape from indigence.
CHAP. VIII.
NAVAL ADMINISTRATION SIXTY YEARS AGO.
POLITICAL FAVOURITISM.—REFUSAL OF FURTHER EMPLOYMENT.—NAVAL
CORRUPTION.—DOCKYARD PRACTICES.—SHAMEFUL TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF
WAR.—ECONOMY THE REMEDY.—RESULTS OF MEDICAL ECONOMY.—EMPTY PHYSIC
BOTTLES.—SEAMEN’S AVERSION TO THE SERVICE.—A POST CAPTAIN AT
COLLEGE.
It will be evident on a perusal of the previous chapter, that there was
no fixed principle for the promotion of officers who had distinguished
themselves, but that however desirous the Board might be to reward their
services, it was in the power of persons holding inferior offices to
thwart the intentions of the Board itself.
Were such a principle admitted, nothing could be more detrimental to the
service. Let every officer know the regulated reward for a national
service, with the certainty that he cannot be deprived of it, and rely
upon it, that whenever opportunity presents itself, the service will be
performed. There is nothing mercenary, or even selfish about this; but,
on the contrary, an ambition which should be carefully fostered.
In my own case, I can conscientiously avow my leading motive to have
been that of exerting myself to the utmost in the hope of thereby
attaining promotion in my profession, to which promotion the capture of
an enemy’s frigate, as well as of a large number of privateers and other
vessels, had entitled me, according to a judicious rule for the
encouragement of efforts useful to the nation—to a place on the list,
from which I conceived myself unjustly excluded by the promotion of a
younger man, a junior commander too, for no great apparent reason than
that of his father being a personal and political friend of the First
Lord of the Admiralty.
To those who may think my conduct towards the First Lord and the Board
disrespectful, I can only say, that were my life to begin anew, with my
present experience of consequences, I would again pursue the same
course. I cannot imagine anything more detrimental to the interests of
the Navy and the nation, than political favouritism on the part of the
Admiralty—of itself sufficient to damp that ardour which should form one
of the first requisites for future command. I would rather say to the
young officer—“If you have, in the exercise of your profession, acquired
a right which is wrongfully withheld—demand it, stick to it with
unshaken pertinacity;—none but a corrupt body can possibly think the
worse of you for it; even though you may be treated like myself—you are
doing your country good service by exposing favouritism, which is only
another term for corruption.”
Favouritism on the part of the Admiralty must ever be the bane of the
Navy, and may prove its ruin. Either let it be understood that the
institution is a parliamentary vote market, or that it is what it ought
to be—an institution for the promotion of zeal by the reward of merit.
Only let it not sustain both characters, or between the two stools the
country may one day go to the ground.
Such was the offence taken by the authorities at my persistence in my
own right, and in that of the officers under my command, that an
application to the Board for another ship met with refusal; and as it
was clear that Lord St. Vincent’s administration did not again intend to
employ me, the time on my hands was devoted to an investigation of those
abuses which were paralysing the Navy; not that this was entered upon
from any spirit of retaliation on the Admiralty, but as preparatory to
the more ambitious aim of getting into Parliament, and exposing them.
One of the most crying evils of our then naval administration had fallen
heavily upon me, though so young in command—viz. the Admiralty Courts;
but for the peculations consequent on which, the cruise of the _Speedy_
ought to have sent home myself, officers, and crew, with competence. As
it was, we got all the fighting, whilst the Admiralty Court and its
hungry parasites monopolised the greater portion of our hard-won
prize-money. In many cases they took the whole! and in one case brought
me in debt, though the prize was worth several thousand pounds!
Hitherto no naval officer had ventured to expose, in Parliament or out
of it, this or indeed any other gross abuse of the naval service; and
having nothing better to do, want of employment appeared to offer a
fitting opportunity for constituting myself the Quixote of the
profession; sparing no pains to qualify for the task, though well aware
of its arduous, if not hopeless nature—as directed against a mass of
corruption, such as—it is to be hoped—may never again strike at the
noblest arm of our national safety a blow worse than any enemy can
inflict.
After what has been stated with regard to my unpleasant relations with
Lord St. Vincent and his Board of Admiralty, it will perhaps be better
not personally to enter on the subject of then existing naval abuses,
lest I might be suspected of exaggerating their extent. Some such
explanation is necessary in justification of the course which I
subsequently thought it my duty to pursue, but it will answer every
purpose to have recourse to the experience of a contemporary
officer—Captain Brenton, the biographer of Lord St. Vincent—in
justification of my self-imposed task:—
“In the first edition of the Naval History, I have commented on the
profligate system of hired vessels and transports. In this—borough
influence reigned paramount, and the most solid information was
disregarded when the perpetrator of the greatest frauds was a
supporter of Government.”—(BRENTON’S _Life of Lord St. Vincent_, p.
167.)
“A ship purchased by a man of influence was a certain fortune to him.
He cleared his money in the first year at the rate of 400_l._ per
month, and if the ship were coppered at 7500_l._ per annum. About
twenty copper-bottomed transports were lying for three years in the
harbour of Messina, without being employed in any duty.”—(p. 169.)
The expense of these alone, no doubt all owned by “men of influence” as
Captain Brenton terms them, was for the three years 270,000_l._ As these
transports formed only a trifling illustration of the system, there is
little wonder at the enormous accumulation of the national debt, for
results so inadequate.
Captain Brenton might have gone farther, and stated with great truth,
that not only were transports hired from men of influence, but that
vessels utterly worthless were purchased by the Government from their
political supporters, and then patched up into ships of war! It was my
misfortune to be subsequently appointed to _a collier_ so converted—with
what result will appear in the sequel.
From the ships let us follow Captain Brenton into the dockyards:—
“When Mr. Colquhoun, in his celebrated police reports, stated that the
Government was plundered from the dockyards at the rate of _a million
a year_, he was supposed to have exceeded all probability. I am
satisfied he was under the mark, and if the _consequences_ of these
frauds are added to the amount of peculation, the aggregate will be
frightful. The manner in which the villany was carried on was dreadful
indeed. _Whole ships’ crews were destroyed at one fell swoop._ Every
ship was supposed to have a certain number of bolts driven to secure
her fabric. The tops and points of the bolts only were driven, and the
rest was carried away. It is probable that the loss of the _York_ of
64 guns, and the _Blenheim_ of 74 guns, was the consequence. The
_Albion_, 74, we know to have been nearly lost by this hellish
fraud.”—(BRENTON, pp. 159, 160.)
“I can remember what our slop clothing was, for which the poor seamen
were charged an extravagant price; the contract being _always given as
a matter of favour for electioneering purposes_.”—(p. 156.)
“Not only were the grossest impositions practised in the supply of the
most important stores, by sending in damaged goods, but even the raw
materials were _again sold_ before they reached their
destination.”—(p. 157.)
“At the cooperage of Deptford, 1020_l._ 10_s._ 5_d._ was charged for
work proved to be worth only 37_l._ 2_s._ 3_d._ At the cooperage at
Plymouth, the king’s casks were stolen, and sixty-four of them were
found in one brewery.”—(p. 183.)
“It was a common expression with the receiving clerks that they ‘_had
not been hampered_,—’ when they refused to receive articles into
store. The ‘hampering’ meant a bribe in the shape of wine or other
articles, as the price of their certificates.”—(p. 155.)
“It would scarcely be believed to what extent peculation was carried
on in every department.”—(p. 155.)
“Hampers of wine and ale were liberally supplied to the inspectors of
timber, and I conclude that the same treatment was applied to the
measuring clerks of the dockyard.”—(p. 179.)
“From the foregoing it may be inferred that the dockyards were the
most fruitful sources of plunder and national ruin.”—(p. 180.)
“Report No. 6 relates to the dockyards, wherein a shameful system of
plunder had long existed.”
“Reports 10 and 11 state other abuses to an enormous extent, so that
Lord St. Vincent used the elegant expression that ‘_our dockyards
stank of corruption_.’”—(p. 190.)
From this disgraceful picture let us pass on to another still more
revolting:—
“The victualling establishment at home was not less corrupt. The
charge for the supply of prisoners of war was ample, but three-fourths
of the amount was pilfered. The same nefarious system pursued in the
hospitals abroad was followed at home in a more guarded manner, and
_fortunes were made_ by cheating the sick and wounded seamen out of
the comforts and necessaries allowed them by a grateful country. Lord
Cochrane endeavoured to procure better rations and treatment for the
French prisoners, but the charge of sick and wounded prisoners of war
fell in its administration into the hands of a set of villains whose
seared consciences were proof against the silent but eloquent
pleadings of their fellow-creatures.”—(p. 165.)
“Report No. 7 relates to the hospitals, beginning with Stonehouse at
Devonport. Here was discovered waste, corruption, fraud, extravagance,
and villany to a disgusting extent. Four thousand gallons of porter
were consumed in six months, being more than four times the proportion
used in Haslar. On board the _Calne_ hulk, appropriated to sick
prisoners of war, the surgeon’s chief assistant kept a table for the
officers at the cost of 1500_l._ or 2000_l._ a year. He could afford
the purser a large salary, in lieu of his share of the profit of the
concern. The worst and most scandalous feature was, that when the
wretches in the wardroom were rioting in luxury they were consuming
the necessaries which the Government had liberally supplied for the
use of the sick prisoners of war.
“I hope there is sufficient virtue in Parliament to punish _great
delinquents_, if not the country will not stagger long under the
practice of these blood-sucking leeches.”—(_Letter of Lord St.
Vincent, quoted by Brenton._)
Abroad the condition of affairs was infinitely worse, both as regarded
the navy and army. The following extract from the “Annual Register,” at
a period when the press hardly dared to speak truth, will serve as a
sample of the practices prevailing wherever an official staff was to be
found:—
“The abuses committed in the West Indies are said to exceed everything
that was ever stated in romance. The commissioners are stated to have
discovered that forged bills and receipts, for articles never
purchased, and bills drawn on Government indorsed under forged and
fictitious names, were common and notorious. They found a most base
collusion between the officers of Government and the merchants and
contractors, by which the latter were allowed to charge stores at a
much higher rate than they might have been obtained for in the market.
In one instance it was discovered, that to conceal this iniquity, a
bribe of 18,000_l._ had been given; in another a bribe of 35,000_l._
Vessels, houses, stores, &c. were usually hired at most extravagant
rates, in consequence of fraudulent contracts, where others might have
been obtained much cheaper. But worse than either of these iniquities
was the diabolical fraud of suffering the merchants and contractors to
furnish His Majesty’s troops with inferior and bad rum, and other
articles, at an extravagant rate, by which the lives of the troops
were endangered, as well as the country defrauded. And, for the
purpose of committing these practices, all free competition for the
supply of articles was prevented; and every obstacle was put in the
way, even of the purchase of bills on the Treasury. They were dated in
one island and negotiated in another; and they were sold at a much
more advantageous exchange than that at which the officers debited
themselves in their accounts.”
There is no doubt but that Lord St. Vincent was desirous of putting a
stop to this national plunder, and the wholesale destruction of sick,
wounded, and prisoners, which was its direct consequence; but the means
he took were inadequate. His lordship’s remedy was “_economy!_” leaving
the influential delinquents in quiet possession of their places. The
most extravagant contracts and profuse expenditure of the public money
were thus to be cured by no expenditure at all on necessary objects.
One of Lord St. Vincent’s agents in this notable scheme, was a Dr.
Baird, who possessed his lordship’s highest confidence. To this person
was confided the task of regenerating the hospitals. As may be supposed,
from his profession, economy in medicine was the first step. An order
was issued that blue ointment and pills, requisite only for complaints
that might be avoided, were doled out in _minimum_ quantity. The
consequence was, that the captains and surgeons of ships of war had to
purchase these essential medicines out of their own pockets! more
especially as a subsequent order was issued that no such complaints,
should be treated in the hospitals!
A more barbarous regulation was enforced, viz, that from the expense of
_lint_ in dressing wounds, _sponge_ should be substituted, as it might
be used over again! The result was that even slight cases became
infected by the application of sponges which had been used on putrescent
sores, and this shameful practice cost the lives or limbs of many. I was
myself on a survey at the Devonport hospital, where seven persons had
lost limbs from this cause! and proposed to the other surveying captains
to draw up a representation to the Admiralty on the consequences of
applying infected sponge; but the advice was not followed for fear of
giving offence.
One of the unfortunate sufferers, amongst others, was a son of the
boatswain or gunner of the then flagship, the _Salvador del Mundo_. The
poor boy had bruised his shin, to which an infected sponge was applied,
and he lost his leg! Persons so mutilated had no claim on the service
for pension or reward. It was this very hospital to which Captain
Brenton, in the preceding extracts, applied the terms “waste,
corruption, fraud, extravagance, and villany to a disgusting extent.”
The remedy was the application of infected sponge!!
Dr. Baird had the oddest possible notions of the mission with which he
was entrusted. As to striking at the root of an evil he had not the most
remote conception, otherwise than by saving. He one day said to me; “The
extravagance of this place is incredible. I have to-day found what will
save one thousand pounds.” “Ah, Doctor,” said I, “what is that?” “Why,”
replied he, “would you believe it, in the cellars under the hospital I
have found tens of thousands of empty physic bottles! Did you ever hear
of such waste!” And the doctor set busily to work to dispose of the
empty bottles in order to pay for his medicines,—this being his idea of
correcting the most crying evil of the hospital.
A still more absurd instance of the doctor’s economy gave rise at the
time to considerable amusement. Everybody knows that a sailor requires
as much looking after as a child. It was Jack’s practice when sick in
hospital, to get out and scale a wall for the purpose of smuggling in
spirits, these of course undoing the little that medical treatment could
effect. To put an end to the practice, the authorities had ordered the
wall to be raised, but Dr. Baird stopped the work, because a coating of
broken glass-bottles on the top of the old wall would be more economical
to the nation and equally effectual! A _chevaux de frise_ of broken
glass was accordingly put on, but, to the doctor’s annoyance, Jack, with
a brickbat, pounded up the broken glass, and got to the spirit shop as
before. Whereupon the doctor declared his belief that “sailors were as
far gone in wickedness as the hospital authorities themselves.”
These were the kinds of reform adopted, the ultimate result being that
Lord St. Vincent was more blamed than had been any of his predecessors,
and was, on quitting the Admiralty, driven to the undignified
alternative of _filing a string of affidavits in the King’s Bench in
defence of his character_![30]
-----
Footnote 30:
See Brenton, vol. ii. p. 356.
-----
Much has been said about the difficulty of manning the Navy, by persons
who had not a knowledge of the arbitrary and cruel practices above
mentioned, and of many others on which it would be tedious to dilate,
but which, under pretence of zeal for the promotion of the service,
rendered the service at that time almost intolerable. No man acquainted
with the facts can wonder that interminable cruises, prohibition to land
in port, constant confinement without salutary change of food, and
consequent disease engendering total debility, should have excited
disgust, and even terror of a sailor’s life; to which may be added, the
condemnation of invalids to harbour-duty, far more severe than duty
afloat, with no chance of escape but by a return to actual service,
where, strange to say, though unfit, such men were again received!
The instances of abuses just given form but a brief outline of the state
of the Navy at that period. From these the reader may imagine the rest.
Suffice it to say, that I used all diligence to store both my memory and
note-book with facts, to be used when I might be able to expose them
with effect.
No opportunity, however, immediately occurring, I betook myself to the
College of Edinburgh, then distinguished by possessing some of the most
eminent professors in the kingdom. In the early part of this volume the
desultory and imperfect education which fell to my lot has been noticed.
It had, nevertheless, sufficed to convince me of the truth of the axiom
that “knowledge is power,” and also to decide that in my case power if
proportioned to knowledge could be of no very high order. It was
therefore my determination to increase both to the best of my ability.
It was, perhaps, an unusual spectacle for a post-captain fresh from the
quarter-deck, to enter himself as a student among boys. For my
self-imposed position I cared nothing, and was only anxious to employ
myself to the best advantage. With what success may be judged from the
fact of my never being but once absent from lectures, and that to attend
the funeral of a near relative.
Whilst at Edinburgh, I made few acquaintances, preferring secluded
lodgings and study without interruption to the gaiety of my
contemporaries. Besides which, if my object of getting into Parliament
were to be accomplished, it was necessary to be economical, since all
that the Admiralty Court had been pleased to leave me of my prize-money
would not more than suffice to satisfy the yearnings of a small borough,
for which the only hope of election was by outbribing my antagonists.
Amongst my contemporaries at the Edinburgh College was Lord Palmerston,
who resided with the most eminent of the then Scotch professors, Dugald
Stewart, and attended the classes at the same time with myself.
I might also mention others, of whose society in after life I should
have been proud, had not the shameful treatment which it was afterwards
my lot to experience from a corrupt faction, driven me from society at a
time when it ought to have afforded me a welcome relaxation from hard
and unintermitting exertions in the service of my country.
CHAP. IX.
EMPLOYMENT IN THE _ARAB_.
APPOINTMENT TO THE ARAB.—PROJECTED INVASION BY NAPOLEON.—THE ARAB
ORDERED TO WATCH THE FRENCH COAST.—THEN TO CRUISE IN THE NORTH
SEA.—RETIREMENT OF LORD ST. VINCENT.
On the renewal of war with France in 1803, application was made by me to
the Admiralty for a ship, first taking the precaution to visit the
various dockyards to see what vessels were ready, or in preparation. My
object was to obtain a suitable vessel, which should enable me to
operate inshore and harass the French coast in the Atlantic, as the
_Speedy_ had done the Spanish coast in the Mediterranean. My success
there formed sufficient warrant for such an application, as, previous to
the Peace of Amiens, the enemy’s coasting trade from Bayonne to Boulogne
had been carried on almost with impunity.
My application was made to Lord St. Vincent, who informed me that at
present there was no vessel available. Having ascertained beforehand
what vessels were in preparation for sea, I began to enumerate several,
all of which his lordship assured me were promised to others. On
mentioning the names of some in a less forward state, an objection was
raised by his lordship that they were too large. This was met by a fresh
list, but these his lordship said were not in progress. In short, it
became clear that the British Navy contained no ship of war for me.
I frankly told his lordship as much, remarking that as “the Board was
evidently of opinion that my services were not required, it would be
better for me to go back to the College of Edinburgh and pursue my
studies, with a view of occupying myself in some other employment.” His
lordship eyed me keenly, to see whether I really meant what I said, and
observing no signs of flinching,—for beyond doubt my countenance showed
signs of disgust at such unmerited treatment,—he said, “Well, you shall
have a ship. Go down to Plymouth, and there await the orders of the
Admiralty.”
Thanking his lordship, I left him, and repairing to Plymouth, found
myself appointed to the _Arab_. There was some difficulty in finding
her, for my sanguine imagination had depicted a rakish craft, ready to
run over to the French coast, and return with a goodly batch of
well-laden coasters. In place of this, a dockyard attendant showed me
the bare ribs of a collier, which had been purchased into the service in
the manner described by Captain Brenton, as quoted in the last chapter.
I would not have cared for this, but a single glance at the naked
timbers showed me that, to use a seaman’s phrase, “she would sail like a
haystack.” It was not my wish however to complain, but rather to make
the best of the wretched craft provided for me; and therefore there was
nothing to be done but to wait patiently whilst she was completed,—for
the most part with old timber from broken-up vessels.
As soon as the _Arab_ was ready for sea, instead of being permitted to
make a foray on the French coast—for which, however, she was
ill-adapted—orders were given to take a cruise round the Land’s End,
into St. George’s Channel, and return to Plymouth.
This experimental service being accomplished, without result of any
kind, although we sighted several suspicious vessels, which from our bad
sailing qualities we could not examine; on our return, the _Arab_ was
ordered to join the force then lying in the Downs, quietly watching the
movements of the enemy on the opposite coast.
Though Napoleon had not a marine capable of competing with ours, he had,
during the last war, become aware that any number of French gun-boats
could sail along their own coasts under the protection of the numerous
batteries, and hence he conceived the project of uniting these with
others at Boulogne, so as to form collectively a flotilla capable of
effecting an invasion of England, whose attention was to be divided by
an attempt on Ireland, for which purpose an army and fleet were
assembled at Brest.
The means by which this invasion of the Kentish or Sussex coast was to
be effected is worth adverting to. The various towns of France were
invited to construct flat-bottomed boats, to be distinguished by the
names of the towns and departments which furnished them. They were
divided into three classes, and transported to the nearest port-town,
thence coastwise to Boulogne, there to be filled with troops, and
convoyed to the English shores by ships of war. It has been the custom
to deride this armament, but had it not been for Nelson’s subsequent
victory at Trafalgar, I see no cause to doubt that sooner or later it
might have been successful. In our day of steam-ships the way to prevent
the success of a similar project is by the maintenance of a navy more
efficiently manned than modern governments appear to think necessary for
national safety.
I do not mean efficiency as to the _number_ of vessels of war—for in my
early day the number was very great, but their efficiency, from causes
already mentioned, very trifling. I mean, rather, that every care should
be taken to keep a sufficient number in a high state of discipline; but
above all, that the stimulus of reward for merit should be so applied,
as that parliamentary influence should not interfere with officers, nor
a paltry hankering after saving with the crews.
The _Arab_ was sent to watch the enemy in Boulogne. To those acquainted
with the collier build, even as they appear in the Thames to this day,
it is scarcely necessary to say that she would not work to windward.
With a fair wind it was not difficult to get off Boulogne, but to get
back with the same wind was—in such a craft—all but impossible. Our only
way of effecting this was, by watching the tide, to drift off as well as
we could. A gale of wind anywhere from N.E. to N.W. would infallibly
have driven us on shore on the French coast.
Under such circumstances, the idea of effectively watching the port, as
understood by me,—viz. to look out for troop-boats inshore,—was out of
the question, our whole attention being necessarily directed to the
vessel’s safety. Considering this compromised, I wrote to the admiral
commanding, that the _Arab_ was of no use for the service required, as
she would not work to windward, and that her employment in such a
service could only result in our loss by shipwreck on the French coast.
My letter was no doubt forwarded to the Admiralty, for shortly
afterwards an order arrived for the _Arab_ to convoy the Greenland ships
from Shetland, and then to cruise in the North Sea, to _protect the
fisheries_. The order was, in fact, to cruise to the N. E. of the
Orkneys, _where no vessel fished, and where consequently there were no
fisheries to protect_!!! Not so much as a single whaler was seen from
the mast-head during the whole of that lonely cruise, though it was as
light by night as by day.
The Board had fairly caught me, but a more cruel order could not have
been devised by official malevolence. It was literally naval exile in a
tub, regardless of expense to the nation. To me it was literally a
period of despair, from the useless inactivity into which I was forced,
without object or purpose, beyond that of visiting me with the weight of
official displeasure.
I will not trouble the reader with any reminiscences of this degrading
command, or rather dreary punishment, for such it was no doubt intended
to be, as depriving me of the opportunity of exerting or distinguishing
myself; and this for no better reason, than my having most truly, though
perhaps inconsiderately, urged, in justification of the promotion of the
gallant lieutenant of the _Speedy_, that all Lord St. Vincent’s chief
officers had been promoted for an action in which fewer men fell in a
three-decker than in my brig.
Of this protracted cruise it is sufficient to state that my appointment
to the _Arab_ was dated October 5th, 1803, and that she returned to
England on the 1st of December, 1804, a period which formed a blank in
my life.
On my arrival, Lord St. Vincent, fortunately for me, had quitted, or
rather had been compelled to retire from the Admiralty. The late Duke of
Hamilton, the premier peer of Scotland, and my excellent friend, was so
indignant at my ignominious expulsion from active service, where alone
it would be beneficial to the country, that, unsolicited by any one, he
strongly impressed upon Lord Melville, the successor of Lord St.
Vincent, the necessity of relieving me from that penal hulk, the _Arab_,
and repairing the injustice which had been inflicted on me, by employing
me on more important service. Lord Melville admitted the injustice, and
promptly responded to the appeal, by transferring me from the wretched
craft in which I had been for fifteen months in exile—to the _Pallas_, a
new fir-built frigate of 32 guns.
CHAP. X.
CRUISE OF THE _PALLAS_.
ORDERS OF THE PALLAS EMBARGOED.—CAPTURE OF THE CAROLINA.—ARRIVAL OF THE
PRIZES.—CAPTURE OF PAPAL BULLS.—A CHASE.—ADMIRAL YOUNG.—ELECTION FOR
HONITON.—NOVEL ELECTION TACTICS.—BECOME A REFORMER.—PAINFUL RESULTS.
On my appointment to the _Pallas_, Lord Melville considerately gave me
permission to cruise for a month off the Azores under Admiralty orders.
The favour—the object of which was to give me an opportunity of trying
my luck against the enemy, independent of superior command—was no doubt
granted in consideration of the lengthened, not to say malevolent,
punishment to which I had been condemned in the _Arab_.
My orders were to join my ship at Plymouth, with a promise that my
instructions should be forwarded. In place of this, and in disregard of
Lord Melville’s intention, the Admiralty orders were embargoed by the
Port Admiral, Sir W. Young, who had taken upon himself to recopy them,
and thus to convert them into orders _issued under his authority_. The
effect was, to enable him to lay claim to the admiral’s share of any
prize-money that we might make, even though captured out of his
jurisdiction, which extended no further than the Sound.
The mention of this circumstance requires brief comment, in order to
account for the result which followed. Perhaps the most lucid
explanation that can be given will be an extract from a letter of Lord
St. Vincent to the Admiralty when in command of the Channel fleet. “I do
not know,” says Lord St. Vincent, “what I shall do if you feel a
difficulty to give orders to despatch such ships as you may judge
necessary to place under my command. I have a notion that he (Admiral
Young) _wishes to have the power of issuing orders for their sailing, in
order to entitle him to share prize-money_!!” (BRENTON, vol. ii. p.
249.) From this extract from Lord St. Vincent, it is evident that if
Admiral Young, according to the system then prevailing, had the power—as
on his Lordship’s authority unquestionably appears—of paralysing the
operations of a whole fleet, on the question of sharing prize-money,
remonstrance on my part against the violation of Admiralty promises,
made by Lord Melville himself, would have been disregarded. Nothing was
therefore left but to submit.
The first object was to equip the _Pallas_ with all speed; and for this
we were obliged to resort to impressment, so much had my do-nothing
cruise in the _Arab_ operated against me in the minds of the seamen.
Having, however, succeeded in impressing some good men, to whom the
matter was explained, they turned to with great alacrity to impress
others; so that in a short time we had an excellent crew. This was the
only time I ever found it necessary to impress men.
As the cruise off the Western Islands—when arrived there—was restricted
to a month, it was matter of consideration how to turn such orders to
the best account, without infringing on the letter of my instructions.
We therefore crossed the Bay of Biscay, and having run to the westward
of Cape Finisterre, _worked up_ towards the Azores, so as to fall in
with any vessels which might be bound from the Spanish West Indies to
Cadiz.
Scarcely had we altered our course, when, on the 6th of February, we
fell in with and captured a large ship, the _Carolina_, bound from the
Havannah to Cadiz, and laden with a valuable cargo. After taking out the
crew, we despatched her to Plymouth.
Having learned from the prisoners that the captured ship was part of a
convoy bound from the Havannah to Spain, we proceeded on our course, and
on the 13th captured a second vessel, which was still more valuable,
containing, in addition to the usual cargo, some diamonds, and ingots of
gold and silver. This vessel was sent to Plymouth as before.
On the 15th, we fell in with another, _La Fortuna_, which proved the
richest of all, as, besides her cargo, she had on board a large quantity
of dollars, which we shifted into the _Pallas_, and sent the ship to
England.
On the 16th, we captured a fine Spanish letter-of-marque, with more
dollars on board; but as a heavy sea then running prevented us from
taking them on board the _Pallas_, these were therefore despatched with
her to Plymouth.
Whilst securing the latter vessel, we observed at sunset an English
privateer take possession of a large ship. On seeing us—evidently
knowing that we were an English man-of-war, and therefore entitled to
share in her capture—the privateer crowded all sail and made off with
her prize in company. Unluckily for this calculation, the prize was
subsequently taken by a French squadron, when it turned out that the
captured vessel—the _Preciosa_—was the richest of the whole Spanish
convoy, having, in addition to her cargo, no less than a million dollars
on board. Singularly enough, the privateer belonged to my agent Mr.
Teed, from whom I afterwards learned the value of the vessel which his
captain’s mistaken greed had sacrificed.
The sensation created on the arrival of the prizes at Plymouth was
immense, as the following curious extracts from a local paper will show.
“_February_ 24.—Came in the _Caroline_ from Havanah with sugar and
logwood. Captured off the coast of Spain by the _Pallas_, Captain Lord
Cochrane. The _Pallas_ was in pursuit of another with a very valuable
cargo when the _Caroline_ left. His Lordship sent word to Plymouth,
that if ever it was in his power, he would fulfil his public
advertisement (stuck up here) for entering seamen, of filling their
pockets with Spanish ‘pewter’ and ‘cobs,’ nicknames given by seamen to
ingots and dollars.
“_March_ 7.—Came in a rich Spanish prize, with jewels, gold, silver,
ingots, and a valuable cargo, taken by the _Pallas_, Captain Lord
Cochrane. Another Spanish ship, the _Fortuna_, from Vera Cruz, had
been taken by the _Pallas_, laden with mahogany and logwood. She had
432,000 dollars on board, but has not yet arrived.
“_March_ 23.—Came in a most beautiful Spanish letter-of-marque of
fourteen guns, said to be a very rich and valuable prize to the
_Pallas_, Captain Lord Cochrane.”
A still greater sensation was excited by the arrival of the _Pallas_
herself, with three large golden candlesticks, each about five feet
high, placed upon the mast heads. The history of these is not a little
curious. They had been presented by the good people of Mexico, together
with other valuable plate, to some celebrated church in Spain, the name
of whose patron saint I forget, and had been shipped on board one of the
most seaworthy vessels.
Their ultimate destination was, however, less propitious. It was my wish
to possess them, and with this view an arrangement had been made with
the officers and crew of the _Pallas_. On presenting the candlesticks at
the Custom-house, the authorities refused to permit them to pass without
paying the full duty, which amounted to a heavier sum than I was willing
to disburse. Consequently, although of exquisite workmanship, they were
broken in pieces, and thus suffered to pass as old gold.
The following incident relating to the capture of one of the vessels had
escaped my recollection, till pointed out in the _Naval Chronicle_ for
1805. It is substantially correct.
“Lord Cochrane, in his late cruise off the coasts of Spain and
Portugal, fell in with, and took, _La Fortuna_, a Spanish ship bound
to Corunna, and richly laden with gold and silver to the amount of
450,000 dollars (132,000_l._), and about the same sum in valuable
goods and merchandise. When the Spanish captain and his supercargo
came on board the _Pallas_, they appeared much dejected, as their
private property on board amounted to the value of 30,000 dollars
each. The captain said he had lost, in the war of 1779, a similar
fortune, having then been taken by a British cruiser, so that now, as
then, he had to begin the world again. Lord Cochrane, feeling for the
dejected condition of the Spaniards, consulted his officers as to
their willingness to give them back 5,000 dollars each in specie. This
being immediately agreed to, his lordship ordered the boatswain to
pipe all hands, and addressing the men to the like purpose, the
gallant fellows sung out, ‘Aye, aye, my lord, with all our hearts,’
and gave the unfortunate Spaniards three cheers.”
Another curious circumstance must not be passed over. In one of the
captured vessels was a number of bales, marked “_invendebles_.” Making
sure of some rich prize, we opened the bales, which to our chagrin
consisted of pope’s bulls, dispensations for eating meat on Fridays, and
indulgences for peccadilloes of all kinds, with the price affixed. They
had evidently formed a venture from Spain to the Mexican sin market, but
the supply exceeding the demand, had been reconsigned to the
manufacturers. We consigned them to the waves.
On our way home we were very near losing our suddenly acquired wealth
and the frigate too. Whilst between the Azores and Portugal, one of
those hazes common in semi-tropical climates, had for some time
prevailed on the surface of the sea, the mast-heads of the ship being
above the haze, with a clear sky. One day the look-out reported three
large ships steering for us, and on going aloft I made them out to be
line-of-battle ships in chase of the _Pallas_. As they did not show any
colours, it was impossible to ascertain their national character, but,
from the equality of the fore and maintopgallant masts, there was little
doubt they were French.
The course of the frigate was immediately altered, and the weather
changing, it began to blow hard, with a heavy sea.
The _Pallas_ was crank to such a degree, that the lee main-deck guns,
though housed, were under water, and even the lee quarter-deck
carronades were at times immerged.
As the strange ships were coming up with us hand over hand, the
necessity of carrying more sail became indispensable, notwithstanding
the immersion of the hull.
To do this with safety was the question. However, I ordered all the
hawsers in the ship to be got up to the mast-heads and hove taut. The
masts being thus secured, every possible stitch of sail was set, the
frigate plunging forecastle under, as was also the case with our
pursuers, which could not fire a gun—though as the haze cleared away we
saw them repeatedly flashing the priming. After some time the
line-of-battle ships came up with us, one keeping on our lee-beam,
another to windward, each within half a mile, whilst the third was a
little more distant.
Seeing it impossible to escape by superior sailing, it appeared
practicable to try a manœuvre, which might be successful if the masts
would stand. Having, as stated, secured these by every available rope in
the frigate, the order was given to prepare to clew up and haul down
every sail at the same instant. The manœuvre being executed with great
precision,—and the helm being put hard a-weather, so as to wear the ship
as speedily as possible,—the _Pallas_, thus suddenly brought up, shook
from stem to stern, in crossing the trough of the sea. As our pursuers
were unprepared for this manœuvre, still less to counteract it, they
shot past at full speed, and ran on several miles before they could
shorten sail, or trim on the opposite tack. Indeed, under the heavy gale
that was now blowing, even this was no easy matter, without endangering
their own masts.
There was no time for consideration on our part, so having rapidly
sheeted home, we spread all sail on the opposite tack. The hawsers being
still fast to the masts, we went away from our pursuers at the rate of
thirteen knots and upwards; so that a considerable distance was soon
interposed between us and them; and this was greatly increased ere they
were in a condition to follow. Before they had fairly renewed the chase
night was rapidly setting in, and when quite dark, we lowered a
ballasted cask overboard with a lantern, to induce them to believe that
we had altered our course, though we held on in the same direction
during the whole night. The trick was successful, for, as had been
calculated, the next morning, to our great satisfaction, we saw nothing
of them, and were all much relieved on finding our dollars and his
Majesty’s ship once more in safety. The expedient was a desperate one,
but so was the condition which induced us to resort to it.
Of the proceeds of the above-mentioned captures—all made within ten
days—Sir William Young, on the strength of having recopied my orders
from the Admiralty, _claimed and received_ half my share of the
captures. No wonder that Lord St. Vincent said of him, that he wished to
“_have the power of giving orders, and so share prize-money_.”
Being then young and ardent, my portion appeared inexhaustible. What
could I want with more? The sum claimed and received by Admiral Young
was not worth notice.
On our return to Plymouth the country was on the eve of a general
election, and the time appeared a fitting one to carry out my long
cherished scheme of getting into Parliament. The nearest borough in
which there was a chance was Honiton, and accordingly I applied to the
port admiral for leave of absence to contest that “independent”
constituency. The prize-money procured it without scruple.
My opponent was a Mr. Bradshaw, who had the advantage of a previous
canvass. From the amount of prize-money which was known to have fallen
to my share, that gentleman’s popularity was for a moment in danger, it
being anticipated that I should spend my money sailor fashion, so that
it became unmistakably manifest that the seat in Parliament would be at
my service, if my opponent were outbid! To use the words of “an
independent elector” during my canvass: “You need not ask me, my lord,
who I votes for, I always votes for Mister Most.”
To the intense disgust of the majority of the electors, I refused to
bribe at all, announcing my determination to “stand on patriotic
principles,” which, in the electioneering _parlance_ of those days,
meant “no bribery.” To my astonishment, however, a considerable number
of the respectable inhabitants voted in my favour, and my agent assured
me that a judicious application of no very considerable sum, would beat
my opponent out of the market. This, however, being resolutely refused,
the majority voted in favour of his five pound notes, and saved my
friends of the Admiralty Court and other naval departments from an
exhibition of misplaced zeal, which, as subsequently proved, could only
have ended in my parliamentary discomfiture.
To be beaten, even at an election, is one thing; to turn a beating to
account is another. Having had decisive proof as to the nature of
Honiton politics, I made up my mind that the next time there was a
vacancy in the borough, the seat should be mine without bribery.
Accordingly, immediately after my defeat, I sent the bellman round the
town, having first primed him with an appropriate speech, intimating
that “all who had voted for me, might repair to my agent, J. Townsend,
Esq., and _receive ten pounds ten_!”
The novelty of a defeated candidate paying double the current price
expended by the successful one—or, indeed, paying anything—made a great
sensation. Even my agent assured me that he could have secured my return
for less money, for that the popular voice being in my favour, a
trifling judicious expenditure would have turned the scale.
I told Mr. Townsend that such payment would have been bribery, which
would not accord with my character as a reformer of abuses—a declaration
which seemed highly to amuse him. Notwithstanding the explanation that
the ten guineas was paid as a reward for having withstood the influence
of bribery, the impression produced on the electoral mind by such
unlooked-for liberality was simply this—that if I gave ten guineas for
being beaten, my opponent had not paid half enough for being elected; a
conclusion which, by a similar process of reasoning, was magnified into
the conviction that each of his voters had been cheated out of five
pounds ten.
The result was what had been foreseen. My opponent, though successful,
was regarded with anything but a favourable eye; I, though defeated, had
suddenly become most popular. The effect at the next election, must be
reserved for its place in a future chapter.
It was this election that first induced me to become a parliamentary
Reformer, or as any one holding popular opinions was called in those
days, a “Radical,” _i. e._ a member of a political class holding views
not half so extreme as those which form the parliamentary capital of
reformers in the present day, and even less democratic than were the
measures brought in during the last session of parliament by a Tory
Government, whose predecessors consigned to gaol all who, fifty years
ago, ventured to express opinions conferring political rights on the
people.
It is strange that, after having suffered more for my political faith
than any man now living, I should have survived to see former Radical
yearnings become modern Tory doctrines. Stranger still, they should now
form stepping-stones to place and power, instead of to the bar of a
criminal court, where even the counsel defending those who were
prosecuted for holding them became marked men.
Still it is something worth living for—even with the remembrance of my
own bitter sufferings, for no greater offence than the advocacy of
popular rights, and the abolition of naval abuses.
CHAP. XI.
SERVICES IN THE _PALLAS_ CONTINUED.
SERVICES IN THE PALLAS.—THE PALLAS AT HALIFAX.—CLAMOUR OF
SHIPOWNERS.—SAIL FROM THE DOWNS.—CAPTURE A VESSEL.—THE POMONE SENT
TO ENGLAND.—CAPTURE OF THE TAPAGEUSE.—THE FRENCH RUN ASHORE.—CHASE
OF THE CORVETTES.—OFF CHASSERON.—COLD APPROVAL OF LORD ST.
VINCENT.—CRUISE OF THE PALLAS.—SIGHT THE FRENCH SQUADRON.—FRENCH
SIGNAL HOUSES.—THE ISLE OF AIX.—ENGAGE THE FRENCH SQUADRON.—JOINED
BY THE KINGFISHER.—DETAILS OF THE ACTION.—CONSTRUCTION OF KITES.
On the 28th of May 1805, the _Pallas_ again sailed from Portsmouth in
charge of a convoy for Quebec. On this voyage little occurred worthy of
note, beyond the fact that when we made the American coast we were, from
a cause presently to be mentioned, no less than thirteen degrees and a
half out in our _dead reckoning_! The reader must not imagine that we
were 800 miles out of our course, for that was corrected whenever
observations of the sun or stars could be obtained; but as these might
at any time be rendered uncertain from the fogs prevalent on the banks,
the most vigilant care was necessary to prevent the ship and convoy from
being wrecked.
In my former voyage in the _Thetis_ we had the advantage of a very
clever man on board—a Mr. Garrard—who not being able to subsist on his
salary as assistant astronomer and calculator at Greenwich, was glad to
accept the berth of schoolmaster on board my uncle’s frigate. From the
instructions of this gentleman, I had formerly profited considerably,
and was not a little pleased when he applied to me for a similar berth
on board the _Pallas_. With so skilful an observer, there could be no
mistake about the error just mentioned; which arose from this
circumstance, that for the sake of economy, the Navy Board or the
dockyard authorities had surrounded the binnacle of the _Pallas_ with
iron instead of copper bolts; so that the compass was not to be depended
upon. Fortunately the atmosphere was tolerably clear, so that no danger
was incurred.
As, however, I had no inclination to risk either the ship or my own
reputation amongst the fogs of Canada for the sake of false economy, the
course of the _Pallas_ and her convoy was directed to Halifax, there to
free the compass from the attraction of iron. On demanding copper bolts
from the dockyard officers, they were refused, on the ground that
permission must be first obtained from the authorities in London! To
this I replied, that if such were the case, the _Pallas_ should wait
with the convoy at Halifax whilst they communicated with the Admiralty
in England! for that on no account should she enter the Gulf of St.
Lawrence till our compass was right. The absurdity of detaining a convoy
for six months, on account of a hundred weight of copper bolts was too
much even for dockyard routine, and the demand was with some difficulty
conceded.
It would be wearisome to detail the uninteresting routine of attending
the convoy to Quebec, or of my taking charge of another for the homeward
voyage; further than to state, that from the defect of having no proper
lights for the guidance of the convoy by night, the whole lost sight of
us before reaching the Lizard; where we arrived with only one vessel,
and that in tow.
The carelessness of merchant captains when following a convoy can only
be estimated by those who have to deal with them. Not only was this
manifested by day, but at night their stern cabins glittered with
lights, equally intense with the convoy light, which therefore was not
distinguishable. The separation of the convoy on the following day was
thus rather a matter of course than of surprise.
This want of proper distinguishing lights, and the consequent dispersion
of convoys, were thus frequent causes of the capture of our merchantmen,
and to remedy this I constructed a lamp powerful enough to serve as a
guide in following the protecting frigate by night. The Admiralty,
however, neglected its application, or even to inspect my plan.
Some few years afterwards, the clamour of shipowners compelled the Board
to direct its attention to the subject, and, passing over my
communications, they offered a reward of fifty pounds to the inventor of
the most suitable lamp for the purpose. On this I directed my agent, Mr.
Brooks, to offer my lamp _in his own name_, feeling convinced that my
connection with it would, if known, ensure its rejection. He did so, and
after repeated trials against others at Sheerness, Spithead, and St.
Helen’s, the fifty pound prize was adjudged to Mr. Brooks _for my
lamp_!! The fact afterwards becoming known, _not a lamp was ever
ordered_, and the merchantmen were left to the mercy of privateers as
before. I do not relate this anecdote as telling against the _directing_
powers of the Admiralty, but with the _administrative_ powers, it was
then and afterwards clearly a fixed rule that no invention of mine
should be carried into effect.
On our way home, we one day made an experiment which even now I believe
might occasionally be turned to account; viz. the construction of
gigantic kites to give additional impetus to ships. With this view a
studdingsailboom was lashed across a spare flying jibboom to form the
framework, and over this a large spread of canvass was sewn in the usual
boy’s fashion. My spars were, however, of unequal dimensions throughout,
and this and our launching the kite caused it to roll greatly. Possibly
too I might not have been sufficiently experienced in the mysteries of
“wings and tail,” for though the kite pulled with a will, it made such
occasional lurches as gave reason to fear for the too sudden expenditure
of His Majesty’s stores. The power of such machines, properly
constructed, would be very great; and in the case of a constant wind,
might be useful. The experiment, however, showed that kites of smaller
dimensions would have answered better.
On our return to England in December, the _Pallas_ was ordered to join
the squadron of Admiral Thornborough, appointed to operate on the French
and Spanish coasts. Instructions were, however, given to cruise for a
few days off Boulogne before finally proceeding to Plymouth.
We sailed from the Downs on the 23rd of January 1806, and on the 31st
seeing a French merchant vessel at anchor near the mouth of the river
Somme, the boats were sent inshore to cut her out. On nearing her, a
battery opened fire on them, when we wore and engaged the battery,
whilst the boats brought off the vessel, with which we anchored in Dover
roads on the following morning.
On the 8th of February, the _Pallas_ sailed from Dover, and stood over
towards the French coast, where we captured a fast sailing lugger,
having on board a number of letters addressed to various persons in
London. Shortly after this we were ordered to join the Admiral.
On the 22nd the _Pallas_ sailed with Vice Admiral Thornborough’s
squadron from Plymouth, and remained in company till the 24th of March,
when seeing some vessels off Isle Dieu, the boats went in chase, and
returned with seven French fishing smacks; to the surprise of whose
crews we bought their fish, and let them go.
From information communicated by the fishing boats the _Pallas_ ran off
shore, and in the night following, returned and captured a vessel
freighted with wine, which was taken on board the frigate. The next
night the boats again went in, and brought off another vessel similarly
laden. On the following morning we made sail with our two prizes, but
observing a brig at anchor off Sable d’Olonne, ran in again after dark,
and sent the boats to cut her out. A fire being opened on the boats from
the town, we discharged several broadsides, on which the townspeople
desisted, and the brig was brought off. Whilst engaged in this
operation, another brig was seen to run ashore for safety. On the
morning of the 28th, the boats were again despatched to get her off,
when, the people mustering along shore to attack them, we fired several
shotted guns to warn them from interfering, and the brig was safely
brought out.
This propensity of French crews thus to run their vessels ashore—on
being chased by boats—was principally caused by a galley which had been
constructed at my own expense by the Deal boatbuilders, and shipped on
board the _Pallas_. She rowed double banked, and required eighteen hands
at the oars, and this together with her beautiful build rendered her
perhaps the fastest boat afloat. Escape from such a craft being
hopeless, she became so notorious, that the enemy’s coasters ran their
vessels ashore, and jumping into their boats, thus saved themselves from
being made prisoners.
On the 29th, we manned the largest prize, the _Pomone_, and sent her to
England in charge of the others. On the same day we fell in with the
admiral, and supplied the squadron with prize wine, of which a large
quantity had been taken, most of the vessels captured being laden with
wine of fine quality, on its way to Havre for the Parisian market.
On quitting the squadron, we proceeded to the southward in chase of a
convoy, one of which we captured, and on the 5th of April ran for the
Garonne, having received intelligence that some French corvettes were
lurking in the river and its vicinity, one of which vessels was reported
to be lying some miles up the river as a guardship. Keeping out of sight
for the remainder of the day, I determined on making an attempt to cut
her out on the following night.
After dark the _Pallas_ came to an anchor off the Cordovan lighthouse,
and the boats, manned with the whole crew of the frigate, except about
forty men, pulled for the corvette, under the command of their gallant
First Lieutenant Haswell, who found her at 3 A.M. on the morning of the
6th, anchored near two batteries. As the weather was thick when the
attack was made, the boats came upon the enemy unawares, and after a
short but gallant resistance, the corvette was carried, proving to be
the _Tapageuse_ of 14 guns.
No sooner was this effected, than two others, whose presence was
unexpected, came to her rescue. Lieutenant Haswell, however, promptly
manned the guns of the captured vessel, and beat off his assailants, the
tide rendering it imprudent for the prize or the boats to follow in
pursuit.
Whilst this was going on, the _Pallas_ remained at single anchor waiting
for the boats, and soon after daylight three strange sail appeared to
windward, making for the river. As the private signal was unanswered,
there could be no doubt but that they were enemies, to oppose whom we
had only forty hands on board, the remainder of the crew, as previously
stated, being in the prize brig.
There was no time to be lost, and as it was of the first importance to
make a show of strength, though we possessed none, I immediately set the
few hands we had to fasten the furled sails with rope yarns; the object
being to cut the yarns all at once, let fall the sails, and thus impress
the enemy with an idea that from such celerity in making sail we had a
numerous and highly disciplined crew.
The manœuvre succeeded to a marvel. No sooner was our cloud of canvass
thus suddenly let fall than the approaching vessels hauled the wind, and
ran off along shore, with the _Pallas_ in chase, our handful of men
straining every nerve to sheet home, though it is surprising that the
French officers did not observe the necessary slowness of the operation.
By superior sailing we were soon well up with one of them, and commenced
firing our bow guns—the only guns, in fact, we were able to man.
Scarcely had we fired half a dozen shots, when the French captain
deliberately ran his ship ashore as the only way of saving himself and
crew. The corvette was dismasted by the shock and immediately abandoned
by the crew, who got ashore in their boats; though had they pulled on
board the _Pallas_ instead, we were literally incapable of resistance.
After the crew had abandoned the wreck, we ran nearly close, and fired
several broadsides into her hull, to prevent her floating again with the
tide. Whilst thus engaged, the other corvettes, which had previously run
out of sight, again made their appearance to the S. S. W. under a press
of sail, evidently coming up fast to the assistance of their consort.
As it was necessary once more to take the initiative, we quitted the
wreck, ran up our colours, and gave chase, firing our bow guns at the
nearest, which soon afterwards followed the example of the first, and
ran ashore too,—with the same result of being dismasted—the crew
escaping as in the case of the other.
Of the remaining corvette we for a time took no notice, and made sail
towards the mouth of the Garonne to pick up our crew, which had
necessarily been left on board the vessel captured on the river. As the
_Pallas_ neared the Cordovan lighthouse, we observed the third corvette
making for the river. Finding herself intercepted she also ran on shore,
and was abandoned in like manner.
The chase of these corvettes forms one of my most singular
recollections, all three being deliberately abandoned and wrecked in
presence of a British frigate with only forty men on board! Had any one
of the three known our real condition, or had we not put a bold face on
the matter, we might have been taken. The mere semblance of strength
saved us, and the panic thereby inspired destroyed the enemy.
Having joined our prize—the _Tapageuse_—the prisoners were shifted on
board the _Pallas_, which made sail in quest of the squadron, rejoining
it on the 10th, when, by order of Admiral Thornborough, the prisoners
were distributed among different ships.
The subjoined despatches will afford further explanation of the events
just narrated.
“_Pallas_, off Chasseron, 8th April, 1806.
“SIR,—Having received information—which proved correct—of the
situation of the corvettes in the river of Bordeaux, a little after
dark on the evening of the 5th, the _Pallas_ was anchored close to the
shoal of Cordovan, and it gives me satisfaction to state that about 3
o’clock on the following morning the French national corvette, _La
Tapageuse_, of 14 long 12-pounders and 95 men, who had the guard, was
boarded, carried, and cut out, about twenty miles above the shoal, and
within two heavy batteries, in spite of all resistance, by the first
lieutenant of the _Pallas_, Mr. Haswell, the master, Mr. Sutherland,
Messrs. Perkyns, Crawford, and Thompson, together with the
quartermasters and such of the seamen and crew as were fortunate
enough to find places in the boats.
“The tide of flood ran strong at daylight. _La Tapageuse_ made sail. A
general alarm was given. A sloop-of-war followed, and an action
continued—often within hail—till by the same bravery by which the
_Tapageuse_ was carried, the sloop-of-war, which before had been saved
by the rapidity of the current alone, was compelled to sheer off,
having suffered as much in the hull as the _Tapageuse_ in the rigging.
“The conduct of the officers and men will be justly appreciated. With
confidence I shall now beg leave to recommend them to the notice of
the Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty.
“It is necessary to add, that the same morning, when at anchor waiting
for the boats (which, by the by, did not return till this morning),
three ships were observed bearing down towards the _Pallas_, making
many signals, and were soon perceived to be enemies. In a few minutes
the anchor of the _Pallas_ was weighed, and with the remainder of the
officers and crew we chased, drove on shore, and wrecked one national
24-gun ship, one of 22 guns, and the _Malicieuse_, a beautiful
corvette of 18 guns. Their masts went by the board, and they were
involved in a sheet of spray.
“All in this ship showed great zeal for his Majesty’s service. The
warrant officers and Mr. Tattnall, midshipman, supplied the place of
commissioned officers. The absence of Lieutenant Mapleton is much to
be regretted. He would have gloried in the expedition with the boats.
The assistance rendered by Mr. Drummond of the Royal Marines was such
as might have been expected. Subjoined is the list of wounded,
together with that of vessels captured and destroyed since the 26th
ult.
“I am, &c. &c. COCHRANE.
“To Vice-Admiral Thornborough.”
“_Prince of Wales_, off Rochefort, 9th April, 1806.
“MY LORD,—I have the honour to transmit to your lordship a copy of a
letter I have this day received from Captain Lord Cochrane of H. M. S.
_Pallas_, under my orders. It will not be necessary for me, my Lord,
to comment on the intrepidity and good conduct displayed by Lord
Cochrane, his officers and men, in the execution of a very hazardous
enterprise in the Garonne, a river, the most difficult, perhaps, in
its navigation, of any on the coast. The complete success that
attended the enterprise, as well as the destruction of the vessels of
war mentioned in the said letter on the coast of Arcasson, speaks
their merits more fully than is in my power to do. To which may be
fairly added, that nothing can show more clearly the high state of
discipline of the crew of the _Pallas_ than the humanity shown by them
in the conflict.
“I have the honour, &c. &c.
“EDWARD THORNBOROUGH.
“The Right Hon. the Earl St. Vincent.”
“_Hibernia_, off Ushant, April 14th, 1806.
“SIR,—I yesterday received from Admiral Thornborough a letter with its
enclosure from Captain Lord Cochrane, of which copies are herewith
transmitted for the information of my Lord Commissioner of the
Admiralty.
“The gallant and successful exertions of the _Pallas_ therein
detailed, reflect very high honour on her captain, officers and crew,
and call for my warmest approbation.
“I am, &c. &c. ST. VINCENT.
“W. Marsden, Esq.”
The cold, reluctant praise bestowed by this letter, was no doubt
intended by Lord St. Vincent as a wet blanket on the whole affair, and
contrasts strongly with the warm-hearted sailor-like frankness of
Admiral Thornborough. It had its full effect; not a word of approbation
did I receive from the Admiralty. The _Tapageuse_ was not bought into
the navy, though a similar vessel, subsequently captured by another
officer at the same place, was purchased. My First Lieutenant, Haswell,
was not promoted. In short, if we had done something worthy of
disapprobation, it could scarcely have been more marked. On this subject
further comment will presently become necessary.
To return to our cruise. On the 14th of April we again quitted the
squadron, and made for the corvettes run on shore on the 7th. The French
had erected a battery for the protection of one of them which was still
sound in the hull; but we silenced the battery and set fire to the
corvette. After this the _Pallas_ proceeded towards the wreck of the
northermost vessel stranded, but as strong breezes came on, and she was
evidently breaking up in the surf, we deemed it prudent to work off
shore, and in so doing captured another vessel, which turned out to be a
French packet.
On the 20th the _Pallas_ ran down abreast of the remaining corvette, and
out boats for the purpose of burning her; but these being exposed to the
fire of another battery which had been thrown up to protect the wreck,
and the _Pallas_ not being able, on account of the shoaliness of the
water, to get near enough to fire with effect, we desisted from the
attempt, and again made sail.
On the 23rd we came to an anchor off the Malmaison passage, and on the
following day reconnoitred the French squadron inside Isle Rhe. Whilst
thus engaged, the British squadron appeared to windward, and shortly
afterwards came to an anchor.
On the 24th we worked up to windward to join the admiral, and on the
following day stood into Basque Roads to reconnoitre the enemy’s
squadron. On approaching within gunshot, a frigate and three brigs got
under weigh, and we made sail to meet them, endeavouring to bring them
to action by firing several broadsides at them. On this they tacked
after returning the fire, and stood in under their batteries. Having
completed our reconnoissance, we beat out again and rejoined the
admiral, to whom I made the annexed report.
“H. M. S. _Pallas_, off Isle d’Aix, April 25th, 1806.
“SIR,—Having stood within gunshot of the French squadron this morning,
I find it to consist of the following vessels.
“One of three decks, 16 ports below; one of 80 guns, 15 ports; three
of 74, 14 ports; two heavy frigates, of 40 guns; three light frigates,
13 ports on main-deck, and three brigs of from 14 to 16 guns.
“The _Calcutta_[31] is not among them. Neither are there any
corvettes, unless a very clumsy 20-gun ship can be called one. The
ships of the line have all their topmasts struck and topgallant yards
across. They are all very deep, more so than vessels are in general
for common voyages.
“They may be easily burned, or they may be taken by sending here eight
or ten thousand men, as if intended for the Mediterranean. If people
at home would hold their tongues about it[32], possession might thus
be gained of the Isle d’Oleron, upon which all the enemy’s vessels may
be driven by sending fire vessels to the eastward of Isle d’Aix.
“A frigate and the three brigs were ordered to get under weigh. These
stood towards the _Pallas_ and exchanged a few broadsides. After
waiting from ten o’clock till past two, close to Isle d’Aix, we were
obliged to come out no better than we went in. They could not be
persuaded to stand from under their batteries.
“I have the honour, &c. &c.
“COCHRANE.
“Edw. Thornborough, Esq.,
“Vice-Admiral of the Blue.”
-----
Footnote 31:
An Indiaman, recently captured by the French off St. Helena.
Footnote 32:
It is a curious fact, that there being no such thing as confidence or
secrecy in official quarters in England, the French were as well
advised as to our movements as were our own commanders, and were
consequently prepared at all points.
-----
Having found by experience that the French had organised a system of
signal-houses, by means of which they were able to indicate the exact
position of an enemy, so as to warn their coasters from impending
danger, I resolved on destroying one of their principal stations on Isle
Rhe, at the town of St. Martin. The result will be gathered from the
subjoined despatch to Admiral Thornborough.
“_Pallas_, St. Martin’s Road, Isle Rhe, May 10th, 1806.
“SIR,—The French trade having been kept in port of late, in a great
measure by their knowledge of the exact position of his Majesty’s
cruisers, constantly announced at the signal-posts; it appeared to me
to be some object, as there was nothing better to do, to endeavour to
stop this practice.
“Accordingly, the two posts at Point Delaroche were demolished, next
that of Caliola. Then two in L’Anse de Repos, one of which Lieutenant
Haswell and Mr. Hillier the gunner took in a neat style from upwards
of 100 militia. The marines and boats’ crews behaved exceedingly well.
All the flags have been brought off, and the houses built by
government burnt to the ground.
“Yesterday too the zeal of Lieutenant Norton of the _Frisk_ cutter,
and Lieutenant Gregory of the _Contest_ gun-brig, induced them to
volunteer to flank the battery on Point d’Equillon, whilst we should
attack in the rear by land; but it was carried at once, and one of
fifty men who were stationed to three 36-pounders was made
prisoner—the rest escaped. The battery is laid in ruins—guns
spiked—carriages burnt—barrack and magazine blown up, and all the
shells thrown into the sea. The convoy got into a river beyond our
reach. Lieutenant Mapleton, Mr. Sutherland, master, and Mr. Hillier
were with me, and as they do on all occasions so they did at this time
whatever was in their power for his Majesty’s service. The petty
officers, seamen, and marines failed not to justify the opinion that
there was before reason to form; yet it would be inexcusable were not
the names of the quartermasters Barden and Casey particularly
mentioned, as men highly deserving any favour that can be shown in the
line to which they aspire.
“I have the honour, &c. &c.
“COCHRANE.
“Edw. Thornborough, Esq.,
“Vice-Admiral of the Blue.”
Early in the morning on the 14th of May, the _Pallas_ again stood in
close to the Isle of Aix, to renew her reconnoissance of the French
squadron under Admiral Allemand, then anchored at the entrance of
the Antioche passage, and also in the hope of once more getting
within range of the vessels which we had failed to bring to an
action on the 25th ultimo. In order to prevent their again taking
shelter under the batteries on Isle d’Aix, we cleared for action and
ran within range of the latter; the frigate shortly afterwards
getting under weigh to meet us.
Scarcely had she done so, than the three brigs also got under weigh
to support her, making a formidable addition to the force to be
encountered, the frigate alone showing a broadside superior to ours.
We however remained under our topsails by the wind to await them,
and when, the brigs came within point-blank shot, a broadside from
the _Pallas_ dismantled one of them. We then veered and engaged the
frigate and the other brig—the batteries on Isle d’Aix meanwhile
firing at us.
After an hour’s fighting, we observed that considerable damage had
been done by the fire of the _Pallas_ to the frigate and another of
the brigs, the maintopsail yard of the latter being cut through, and
the aftersails of the frigate shot away, though the action was not
continuous, owing to the frequent necessity on our part of tacking
to avoid shoals.
About one o’clock we managed to gain the wind of the frigate, and
running between her and the batteries, gave her two or three smart
broadsides, on which her fire slackened, and she showed signs of
meditating a retreat. Perceiving this, I directed Mr. Sutherland,
the master, to lay us aboard, which at 1.40 P.M. was gallantly but
rather too eagerly effected.
Just at this moment, unobserved by us, the French frigate grounded
on a shoal, so that on coming in contact, the spars and rigging of
both vessels were dismantled. The concussion drove our guns back
into the ports, in which position the broadside was again
discharged, and the shot tore through her sides with crushing
effect, her men taking refuge below, so that the only return to this
broadside was three pistol shots fired at random. The French captain
was the only man who gallantly remained on deck.
To clear away our own wreck was one object; to board the frigate the
next; but two more frigates were observed to quit the enemy’s
squadron, and crowd all sail to her assistance. This, in our
crippled condition, was too much; there was, therefore, nothing for
it but to quit the grounded ship and save ourselves. Accordingly we
bore up, and made what sail was possible, cutting away and repairing
the wreck as we best could; the two frigates following in chase.
Fortunately the sloop _Kingfisher_, commanded by the gallant
Captain, now Admiral, Seymour, seeing our disabled condition,
promptly ran down and took us in tow[33]; on which the enemy
desisted from the pursuit, turning their attention to their disabled
consort. The subjoined report to Admiral Thornborough details a few
other particulars of the action, though at that time we neither knew
the names nor the strength of our opponents.
“His Majesty’s Ship _Pallas_, 14th May,
“Off the Island of Oleron, May 15th, 1806.
“SIR,—This morning when close to Isle d’Aix, reconnoitring the French
squadron, it gave me great joy to find our late opponent, the black
frigate, and her companions the three brigs, getting under sail; we
formed high expectations that the long wished-for opportunity was at
last arrived.
“The _Pallas_ remained under topsails by the wind to await them; at
half-past eleven a smart point blank firing commenced on both sides,
which was severely felt by the enemy. The maintopsailyard of one of
the brigs was cut through, and the frigate lost her aftersails. The
batteries on l’Isle d’Aix opened on the _Pallas_, and a cannonade
continued, interrupted on our part only by the necessity we were under
to make various tacks to avoid the shoals, till one o’clock, when our
endeavour to gain the wind of the enemy and get between him and the
batteries proved successful; an effectual distance was now chosen, a
few broadsides were poured in, the enemy’s fire slackened. I ordered
ours to cease, and directed Mr. Sutherland, the master, to run the
frigate on board, with intention effectually to prevent her retreat.
“The enemy’s side thrust our guns back into the ports, the whole were
then discharged, the effect and crash were dreadful; their decks were
deserted; three pistol shots were the unequal return.
“With confidence I say that the frigate was lost to France had not the
unequal collision tore away our foretopmast, jibboom, fore and
maintopsailyards, spritsailyards, bumpkin, cathead, chain plates,
forerigging, foresail, and bower anchor, with which last I intended to
hook on, but all proved insufficient. She was yet lost to France had
not the French admiral, seeing his frigate’s foreyard gone, her
rigging ruined, and the danger she was in, sent two others to her
assistance.
“The _Pallas_ being a wreck, we came out with what sail could be set,
and his Majesty’s sloop the _Kingfisher_ afterwards took us in tow.
“The officers and ship’s company behaved as usual; to the names of
Lieutenants Haswell and Mapleton, whom I have mentioned on other
occasions, I have to add that of Lieutenant Robins, who had just
joined.
“I have the honour to be, &c. &c.
“COCHRANE.”
“_Killed._—David Thompson, marine.
“_Wounded._—Mr. Andrews, midshipman, very badly; John Coger, and three
other seamen, slightly.
“Edw. Thornborough, Esq., Vice-Admiral of the Blue.”
-----
Footnote 33:
“Since the publication of the first edition, Admiral Seymour has
kindly supplied me with the following interesting particulars,
which had escaped my recollection:
“I remember that on the 14th, the morning in question, the
_Kingfisher_ being off the Chaperon Lighthouse, within which I had
directions from Admiral Thornborough not to go, in consequence of
his having thought I had risked the _Kingfisher_ two days before
by too near an approach to the French squadron—that the _Pallas_
passed in towards Basque Roads (as I supposed, to reconnoitre the
enemy), and when I saw you exchanging shots with the enemy’s guard
frigate, I had no idea you would have attempted to carry her when
so near the squadron.
“The moment, however, I saw that you had run on board the
_Minerve_, and that, on separating, you had lost your foretopmast
and topsailyards, I immediately stood in to assist you, and as we
had a leading wind, and the distance from the Pertuis d’Antioche
not being, I think, above six miles, I have a clear recollection
that within the hour, we gave you the end of a hawser.
“Perhaps I may be able to recall to your recollection that when we
took you in tow, the wind had drawn more westerly, and that we
could not weather Isle Rhe on the port tack, so were obliged to go
about and stand towards the two fresh French frigates and brigs
which were standing towards us. On our approach they backed their
maintopsails, when they might have brought the _Pallas_ and
_Kingfisher_ to action. You then desired me to go round, and we
fetched out on the port tack, the French offering no molestation,
although their squadron was apparently ready for sea.
“In going into this old story, I may add that I have already seen
that there can be no disposition to undervalue the assistance I
afforded you in 1806, when you so handsomely acknowledge that
which I desired to afford you on another occasion in 1809.[34]
“Yours very faithfully, G. SEYMOUR.”
Footnote 34:
In Aix Roads. See page 392.
-----
On the 17th, being still ignorant of the name of the frigate we had
engaged, we landed some French prisoners under a flag of truce, and
thus learned that she was the 40-gun frigate _La Minerve_. The brigs
were ascertained to be the _Lynx_, _Sylphe_, and _Palinure_, each
carrying 16 guns.
On the 18th, the _Pallas_ was ordered to Plymouth in charge of a
convoy of transports, and arrived on the 27th without any other
occurrence worthy of notice.
A device practised by us when, at various times, running close in to
the French shore, must not be omitted. A number of printed
proclamations, addressed to the French people, had been put on
board, with instructions to embrace every opportunity of getting
them distributed. The opportunities for this were, of course, few,
being chiefly confined to the crews of boats or small fishing craft,
who would scarcely have ventured on their distribution, had the
proclamation been entrusted to them.
The device resorted to was the construction of small kites, to which
a number of proclamations were attached. To the string which held
the kite, a match was appended in such a way, that when the kite was
flown over the land, the retaining string became burned through, and
dispersed the proclamations, which, to the great annoyance of the
French government, thus became widely distributed over the country.
CHAP. XII.
MY ENTRANCE INTO PARLIAMENT.
MY ENTRANCE INTO PARLIAMENT.—ENTHUSIASTIC RECEPTION.—SEEK PROMOTION FOR
HASWELL.—CUTTING OUT LE CÆSAR.—GROSS INSTANCE OF PARTIALITY.—CLARET
AGAINST SMALL BEER.—STORY OF MR. CROKER.—MR. CROKER’S
REVENGE.—COMMAND THE IMPÉRIEUSE.—DRIFT TOWARDS USHANT.—JOIN THE
SQUADRON IN THE BASQUE ROADS.—ANCHOR OFF CORDOVAN.—SUPPLY THE
ATALANTE.
On the termination of the cruise, the _Pallas_ was thoroughly refitted,
the interval thus occupied affording me time for relaxation, but nothing
occurred worthy of record till, in the July following, the electors of
Honiton chose me as their representative in parliament.
The story of this election is worth relating. My former discomfiture at
Honiton, and the ten guineas a head paid to those who had voted for me
on the previous occasion, will be fresh in the recollection of the
reader. A general election being at hand, no time was lost in proceeding
to Honiton, where considerable sensation was created by my entrance into
the town in a _vis-à-vis_ and six, followed by several carriages and
four filled with officers and seamen of the _Pallas_, who volunteered to
accompany me on the occasion.
Our reception by the townspeople was enthusiastic, the more so, perhaps,
from the general belief that my capture of the Spanish galleons—as they
were termed—had endowed me with untold wealth; whilst an equally
fabulous amount was believed to have resulted from our recent cruise,
during which my supporters would have been not a little surprised to
learn that neither myself, officers, nor crew, had gained anything but a
quantity of wine, which nobody would buy; whilst for the destruction of
three French corvettes we never received a shilling!
Aware of my previous objection to bribery, not a word was asked by my
partisans as to the price expected in exchange for their suffrages. It
was enough that my former friends had received ten guineas each after my
defeat, and it was judged best to leave the cost of success to my
discretion.
My return was triumphant, and this effected, it was then plainly asked,
what _ex post facto_ consideration was to be expected by those who had
supported me in so delicate a manner.
“Not one farthing!” was the reply.
“But, my Lord, you gave ten guineas a head to the minority at the last
election, and the majority have been calculating on something handsome
on the present occasion.”
“No doubt. The former gift was for their disinterested conduct in not
taking the bribe of five pounds from the agents of my opponent. For me
now to pay them would be a violation of my own previously expressed
principles.”
Finding nothing could be got from me in the way of money payment for
their support, it was put to my generosity whether I would not, at
least, give my constituents a public supper.
“By all means,” was my reply, “and it will give me great satisfaction to
know that so rational a display of patriotism has superseded a system of
bribery, which reflects even less credit on the donor than the
recipients.”
Alas! for the vanity of good intentions. The permission thus given was
converted into a public treat; not only for my partisans, but for my
opponents, their wives, children, and friends; in short, for the whole
town! The result showed itself in a bill _for some twelve hundred
pounds_! which I refused to pay, but was eventually compelled to
liquidate, in a way which will form a very curious episode hereafter.
One of my first steps, subsequent to the election, was to apply to the
Admiralty for the promotion of my first lieutenant, Haswell, who had so
gallantly cut out the _Tapageuse_ from the Bordeaux river; and also for
that of poor Parker, whose case has been notified in connection with the
_Speedy_, though it was not till after my becoming a member of the House
of Commons that he was promoted after the fashion previously narrated.
It is unnecessary to recapitulate the services of these gallant
officers, further than to state briefly, that on the 6th of April, 1806,
Lieutenant Haswell, with the boats of the _Pallas_ alone, acting under
my orders, cut out the French guardship, _La Tapageuse_, from the river
Garonne, and brought off his prize, in the face of heavy batteries, and
despite the endeavours of two vessels of war—each of equal force to the
captured corvette. For this service Lieutenant Haswell remained
unpromoted.
On the 15th of July, in the same year, the boats of Sir Samuel Hood’s
squadron, under the orders of Lieutenant Sibley, performed the somewhat
similar, though certainly not superior exploit, of cutting out _Le
Cæsar_, of 16 guns and 86 men, from the same anchorage. Within three
weeks after the performance of this service, Lieutenant Sibley was
_promoted to the rank of commander_, and so palpable an instance of
favouritism determined me to urge afresh the neglected claims of both
Parker and Haswell.
My renewed application being met with evasion in the case of both
officers, I plainly intimated to the Admiralty authorities that it would
be my duty to bring before the House of Commons a partiality so
detrimental to the interests of the navy. The threat produced what
justice refused to concede, and these deserving officers were both made
Commanders on the 15th of August, 1806; Parker, for a service performed
upwards of five years before, and Haswell for one four months
previously. Notwithstanding this lapse of time, Haswell’s promotion was
dated _eleven days after_ that of Lieutenant Sibley! though the former
officer had effected with the boats of a small frigate, and against
_three_ ships of war, as much as Lieutenant Sibley had accomplished
against _only one_, though with the boats of a whole squadron! viz. the
boats of the _Centaur_, _Conqueror_, _Revenge_, _Achilles_, _Prince of
Wales_, _Polyphemus_, _Monarch_, _Iris_, and _Indefatigable_. Lieut.
Sibley’s exploit with this overwhelming force had a medal awarded, and
appears in the Navy List to this day; Lieut. Haswell’s capture of the
_Tapageuse_ under my directions was unnoticed in any way.
The fact is, that neither of my highly meritorious officers would have
been promoted, but that, after Lieutenant Sibley’s promotion for a less
distinguished service, it was impossible to evade their claims if
brought under the notice of the legislature; and it was only by this
threatened exposure of such palpable injustice that the promotion of
either officer was obtained.
Another gross instance of partiality in the course pursued by the
Admiralty towards my officers and crews, consisted in the refusal to
purchase the _Tapageuse_ into the navy; though the _Cæsar_—prize to Sir
Samuel Hood’s squadron—was so purchased. For the four vessels of war,
viz. the _Tapageuse_, 14 guns; the _Malicieuse_, 18 guns; the _Garonne_,
22; and the _Gloire_, 24,—total, 78 guns, driven on shore by the
_Pallas_, in one day, no remuneration was awarded: the pretence for
withholding it being, that as there were no proceeds there could be no
reward; whilst, as the enemy’s crews escaped, head money was denied,
though the Act of Parliament conferring it, was expressly framed to meet
such cases, the nonpayment practically deciding, that it was not worth a
commander’s while to expose himself and ship in destroying enemy’s
vessels! Supposing it to have been necessary to adhere stringently to
the Admiralty regulation, the rule itself rendered it the more incumbent
on the Board to give remuneration for the _Tapageuse_, by purchasing
that vessel into the service, as was done to Lieutenant Sibley and his
men in the case of the _Cæsar_. Such remuneration was, however, wholly
withheld.[35]
-----
Footnote 35:
If a vessel were captured and destroyed, head money was awarded, as in
the case of the _Calcutta_, which surrendered to the _Impérieuse_ in
the subsequent affair of Basque Roads. It was sworn to by others that
she surrendered to the squadron; but that this was not the case is
proved by the French government having shot her captain for
surrendering _to me alone_; a sentence which was not likely to have
been passed had he surrendered to eight or ten ships. In this case
head money was awarded to Lord Gambier’s fleet, on which account I
declined to touch a shilling of it.
-----
Another curious circumstance connected with the _Pallas_ may be here
mentioned. As the reader is aware, that ship—on her last cruise—had
taken a number of chasse-marées, some of which were laden with the
finest vintages of the south of France. Independently of the wine
gratuitously supplied by the _Pallas_ to the squadron of Admiral
Thornborough, a large quantity of the finest had been reserved to be
sold for the benefit of the captors; so much, in fact, that in an easily
glutted market, like that of Plymouth, it was not saleable for anything
beyond the duty.
An offer was made to the Victualling Board to accept, for our claret,
the price of the villanous small beer then served out to ships’
companies, so that Jack might have a treat without additional expense to
the nation. The offer was unwisely refused, despite the benefit to the
health of the men.
As customs officers were placed on board the prize-vessels containing
the wine, considerable expense was incurred. We therefore found it
imperative that something should be done with it, and as the Victualling
Board refused to take it, there was no alternative but to knock out the
bungs of the casks, and empty the wine overboard.
My agent had, however, orders to pay duty on two pipes, and to forward
them, on my account, to my uncle the Honourable Basil Cochrane, who had
kindly offered to stow them in his cellars in Portman Square. Knowing
the quality of the wine, the agent took upon himself to forward seven
pipes instead of two, and on these duty was paid. As it was impossible
to consume such a quantity, the whole was bottled, in order to await
opportunity for its disposal.
On this wine hangs a curious story. My residence in town was in Old
Palace Yard, and one of my constant visitors was the late Mr. Croker, of
the Admiralty, then on the look-out for political employment. This
gentleman had an invitation to my table as often as he might think
proper, and of this—from a similarity of taste and habit, as I was
willing to believe—he so far availed himself as to become my daily
guest; receiving a cordial reception, from friendship towards a person
of ardent mind, who had to struggle as I had done to gain a position.
Croker was one day dining with me, when some of the _Pallas_ wine was
placed on the table. Expressing his admiration of my “superb claret,”
for such it really was, notwithstanding that the Victualling Board had
rejected wine of a similar quality for the use of seamen, though offered
at the price of small beer, he asked me to let him have some of it. The
reply was, that he should have as much as he pleased, at the cost of
duty and bottling, taking the wine as I had done from the French, for
nothing: jocosely remarking, that the claret would be all the better for
coming from a friend instead of an enemy, he stated his intention to
avail himself of my offer.
Shortly after this incident, Croker, who had previously been in
parliament, was appointed secretary to the Admiralty, and from that day
forward he never presented himself at my apartments; nor did I, by any
chance, meet him till some time afterwards, we encountered each other,
by accident, near Whitehall.
Recognising me in a way meant to convey the idea, that as he was now my
master, our relations were slightly altered, I asked him why he had not
sent for his wine? His reply was, “Why, really I have no use for it, my
friends having supplied me more liberally than I have occasion for!”
Well knowing the meaning of this, I made him a reply expressive of my
appreciation of his conduct towards me personally, as well as of the
wine sources from which he had been so liberally supplied. This, of
course, was conclusive as to any future acquaintance, and we parted
without one additional word.
This incident converted into a foe one who had been regarded by me in
the spirit of sincere and disinterested friendship. He was, moreover, in
a position to make his enmity felt, and when I was hunted down by that
infamous trial which blasted at a blow my hopes and reputation, the
weight of official vengeance was all the more keenly felt, as being the
return of former hospitality.
In my previous attempts to call the attention of the House to naval
abuses, Croker was my constant opponent; and as, in our days of
friendship, I had unreservedly unbosomed to him my views and plans of
action, he was in a condition to fight me with my own weapons, which
thus became employed in continuance of the corrupt system at which they
were aimed. If, at that period, there were any naval abuses requiring
reformation, Mr. Croker was certainly the greatest stumbling-block to
their removal, for no better reason than that plans for their remedy
emanated from me, though in the days of our friendship, he had not only
approved those plans, but even suggested others.
On the 23rd of August, 1806, I was appointed to the command of the
_Impérieuse_ frigate, which was commissioned on the 2nd of September
following, the crew of the _Pallas_ being turned over to her.
We left Plymouth on the 17th of November, but in a very unfit condition
for sea.
The alacrity of the port authorities to obtain praise for despatching
vessels to sea before they were in fit condition, was reprehensible. It
was a point in those days for port admirals to hurry off ships,
regardless of consequences, immediately after orders for their sailing
were received; this “_despatch_,” as it was incorrectly termed, securing
the commendation of the Admiralty, whom no officer dared to inform of
the danger to which both ships and crews were thereby exposed.
The case of the _Impérieuse_ was very near proving the fallacy of the
system. She was ordered to put to sea, the moment the rudder—which was
being hung—would steer the ship. The order was of necessity obeyed. We
were therefore compelled to leave port with a lighter full of provisions
on one side, a second with ordnance stores on the other, and a third
filled with gunpowder towing astern. We had not even opportunity to
secure the guns; the quarter-deck cannonades were not shipped on their
slides; and all was in the utmost confusion.
The result of this precipitation was—for it had no object—that as soon
as the land was out of sight, we were obliged to heave-to, in
mid-channel, to unstow the after hold, get down the ballast, and clear
the decks. Worse still—the rigging had not been effectually set up, so
that had a gale of wind come on, the safety of the frigate might have
been compromised; or had we been attacked by an enemy—even a gun-boat—we
could not have fired a shot in return, as, from the powder coming on
board last, we had not a cartridge filled.
The weather becoming thick on the following day, no observation could be
taken. The consequence was, that from the current and unknown drift of
the frigate whilst hove-to, to set up the new rigging, secure the masts,
and stow the hold, we drifted toward Ushant, and in the night struck
heavily three or four times on a shelf, but fortunately forged over into
a deep pool, in which, as it was blowing hard, we had to let go three
anchors to hold the ship till the following morning.
As soon as it became daylight, it was found that the _Impérieuse_ was
inside of Ushant, instead of outside, to the manifest peril of the
frigate. As it was, we sounded our way out with difficulty, and happily
without material injury.
I afterwards demanded a court-martial on my conduct in this affair, but
it was not granted; because it was known that the blame would have
fallen on others, not on me. This unwise and arbitrary conduct, in
hastily and prematurely forcing vessels to sea, was mistaken by the
public as a manifestation of official zeal in carrying on the service!
It would be easy to mention numerous instances of the like nature, but
this being my own case, I can vouch for its authenticity.
In a future chapter it will be necessary again to advert to these and
other evils to which men and ships were not only exposed, but actually
sacrificed, by hurry or neglect of equipment.
On the 29th we joined the blockading squadron in Basque Roads, and were
ordered by the admiral to cruise off shore in the vicinity, but without
effect, till the 19th of December, when we captured two vessels off
Sable d’Olonne, and on the 31st a third at the entrance of the Garonne.
On the 4th of January we gave chase to several vessels which ran in the
direction of Arcassan. On the following day the boats were sent in chase
of a galliot and another vessel in shore, but the cutter being swamped
in the surf, both escaped into the creek or basin, and ran ashore. We
then anchored about three miles from the entrance.
On the 6th we again hoisted out boats and sent them with the stream
anchors to warp off the vessels, in which operation they were
successfully obstructed by a battery on an island at the entrance of the
creek. As the water was too shoal for the frigate to approach with
safety, the boats were manned, and before daylight on the 7th we carried
the battery by assault, spiking or otherwise destroying the guns, which
consisted of four 36-pounders, two field pieces, and a 13-inch mortar;
this done, we collected their carriages, and what wood we could find,
with which we set fire to the fort. Several gunboats being at anchor in
the rear of the island, we burned them, as well as the vessels
previously chased, not thinking it prudent to remain and get them off,
as a general alarm had been excited along the coast.
Having destroyed this battery, we again sailed for the Garonne, and on
the 9th anchored off Cordovan, in the hope of intercepting any vessels
entering or quitting the river; but notwithstanding we remained here
till the 19th, none showed themselves, nor was any attempt made by the
enemy to dislodge us from our position. Our anchorage was, however,
exposed, and heavy gales coming on, we were compelled to make sail on
the 19th.
Shortly after this the _Impérieuse_ was ordered home, arriving at
Plymouth on the 11th of February, without further incident. Indeed the
cruise would not be worthy of record, except to preserve the order of
time in this narrative of my services unbroken.
On the 26th we chased some vessels off Isle Dieu, but they ran under the
protection of a battery with which we exchanged some shots, and then
made sail in the direction of Sable d’Olonne. On the 29th joined the
squadron, and were ordered to supply the _Atalante_ with provisions and
water. A further notice respecting this operation will be found in the
parliamentary debate in the next chapter.
CHAP. XIII.
DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT.
DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT.—WESTMINSTER ELECTION.— REPLY TO MR.
SHERIDAN.—I AM ELECTED.—VIRULENT RECRIMINATIONS.—OPENING OF THE
HOUSE.—MOVE FOR AN ACCOUNT OF SINECURES.—OPPOSITION TO THE
MOTION.—MR. PERCEVAL’S PROPOSITION.—MY MOTION EVADED.—NAVAL ABUSES.—
DETAILS OF ABUSES.—NAVAL HOSPITALS.—SPEECH IN THE COMMONS.—JOIN LORD
COLLINGWOOD’S FLEET.
On the 27th of April, 1807, the short but busy parliament was dissolved,
“his Majesty being anxious to recur to the sense of his people.” In
other words, it was dissolved for political reasons not within the scope
of the present work to enter.
In the following month of May writs were issued for a general election,
and as my Honiton constituents, even during the short period I had been
ashore, had heartily sickened me of further connection with them, by the
incessant cry for places with which they had assailed me, I made up my
mind to become a candidate for Westminster, with the object of adding
the weight of an important constituency to my own representations on
naval or other abuses whenever opportunity might occur. Or, as I told
the electors of Westminster at a meeting convened at the St. Alban’s
Tavern, my motive for soliciting their suffrages was, that “a man
representing a rotten borough could not feel himself of equal
consequence in the House with one representing such a city as
Westminster—that disclaiming all attachment to parties or factions, it
was not only my wish to be independent, but to be placed in a position
where I could become so with effect, and that as this was impossible
with no more efficient backers than my late constituents, my connection
with them had ceased, and I had taken the liberty of soliciting the
suffrages of the electors for Westminster.”
The candidates for Westminster were, the Right Hon. Brinsley Sheridan,
Mr. Elliot, Mr. Paul, and myself. It was not till the poll had
commenced, that Sir Francis Burdett—at that time confined to his bed by
a dangerous wound received in a duel with Mr. Paul—was put in
nomination, without his knowledge, the nature of his wound not
permitting any person to communicate with him, except his medical
attendant.
I was regarded as the opponent of Mr. Sheridan, and for want of better
argument that gentleman’s partisans in the press sought to depreciate me
in the estimation of the electors by representations of the most unjust
character, a far more reprehensible act than that of pointing out to
them the advantage of retaining an eminent and tried man in preference
to one of whose political tendencies they could practically know
nothing.
In electioneering all devices are considered fair, so in place of
resenting or retaliating, they were met by my declaration, that—
“Whatever gentlemen might say of their long political services—to the
electors belonged the privilege of judging for themselves, and that in
looking for security for the performance of pledges, they should also
consider the character of those who gave them. I was not a mere
professed reformer, but the zealous friend of reform, earnestly
desiring to see it thoroughly carried out as regarded many abuses
which had crept into our constitution. Much had been said of
profligacy and profusion of public money. But what was to be said of a
Commander-in-chief of the Navy, who would give away those commissions
which formed the stimulus, and should be the reward of honourable
merit, in exchange for borough interests? If I had the honour of being
returned for Westminster, I should feel confident in rising to arraign
such abuses. But in representing a rotten borough, I was under
restriction.”
This explanation was favourably received, and the result was, that on
the 10th of May I was at the head of the poll, whilst my detractors were
at the bottom; Sir Francis Burdett being third, and Mr. Sheridan
fourth,—a circumstance which called forth from the latter gentleman one
of those diatribes for which he had become famous.
To this I replied as follows:—
“I perfectly approved of the sentiments professed by the right
honourable gentleman, that ‘with respect to his own principles, he
would prefer the approbation of his country before the favour of any
administration, or other set of men.’ It had, however, been said, that
naval officers were unfit for representatives of the people in
parliament. But how were abuses in the Navy to be pointed out or
redressed by parliament, without the presence of men competent to
point them out, give accurate information, and suggest remedies?
“For six years past, such abuses had prevailed as were paralysing the
Navy. It was not the place to enter into details, but a few of the
more prominent points might be mentioned. Under what was called the
system of economy, adopted in the fleet, ships were kept at sea month
after month, and in such a crazy state of repair, as scarcely to be in
a condition to float. The system was, that when such vessels came into
harbour for repair, the Admiralty artificers were sent on board to
examine them. These men were afraid to tell the truth, if they
considered it unpalatable to their employers, lest they should lose
their places. They therefore reported, that such ships would do awhile
longer, with some slight repairs.
“The vessels received those repairs, without coming into dock, and
were sent to sea, where they were wrecked or foundered! This was the
case with the _Atalante_, ship of war, which was four months off
Rochefort last winter. I was ordered to victual that ship for a long
voyage, and remonstrated—declaring my opinion that she was unfit to go
to sea, and that, if she were sent, the first intelligence from her
would be, that she had foundered. The result was exactly as I had
foretold. In spite of remonstrance, she was sent to sea, and ship,
crew, and all went to the bottom (loud laughter). It was no laughing
matter. Like the fable of the frogs, it might be fun to some, though
anything but fun for brave men, whose lives were so valuable to their
families and their country. A similar fate attended the _Felix_
schooner, which was compelled to proceed to sea in a like condition,
and went down with officers and crew, of whom one man only was saved.
“Another point might be mentioned. What could be said of a man at the
head of the Navy, who would lavishly grant away, in exchange for
rotten borough interests, naval commissions which ought to be the
reward of those brave officers who had for years devoted their lives
at every hazard in the service of their country? Yet it was notorious
such things were done.
“It had been asserted, that naval and military officers were
ineligible to seats in parliament, because they might at any time be
called away by their professional duty. But such men might—and often
did—effect more for their country in a few days—sometimes in a few
hours—than half those gentlemen who continued for seven years, sitting
on their cushions in the House of Commons, without speaking a word for
the public good,—nay, very often voting against it (laughter and
applause).
“With regard to reform, it would be my wish to bring back the
constitution to its ancient purity—to exclude altogether from
parliament those placemen and pensioners who, by ancient laws, were
excluded from it, but whom modern practice had deemed it expedient to
place in the Legislature. What had the Committee of Reform done—of
whose labours and intentions so much had been said? When the
dissolution came, they were found sitting where they began their task,
without having effected anything whatever.”
At the final close of the poll, Sir Francis Burdett and myself, being at
the head, were declared elected, and I had the honour of representing a
body of constituents whose subsequent support, under the most trying
events of my life, forms one of my most gratifying recollections. I must
also record it, to the honour of my Westminster friends, that during my
long connection with them, no elector ever asked me to procure for
himself or relatives a place under Government, whilst the multitude of
applications for place from my late constituents formed, as has been
said, a source of intolerable annoyance.
This election was remarkable as being the first in which public opinion
firmly opposed itself to party faction. It had become unmistakeably
manifest that the two great factions into which politicians were divided
had no other object than to share in the general plunder, and, as a
first step to this, to embarrass the government of the “_ins_” by the
factious opposition of the “_outs_.” Indeed, so obvious had this become,
that the appellations of Whig and Tory were laid aside by common
consent, and the more descriptive names of “_outs_” and “_ins_”
substituted in their stead. My election had no doubt been secured by the
emphatic declaration, that I would belong to neither party, supporting
or opposing either as in my judgment might seem conducive to the
national good.
The animosity of these respective parties against each other was
favourable to such a course. Each accused the other of grasping at
offices for the sake of personal or dependent advantage, and averred
that the aim of their opponents was neither the administration of
government—which, as has been seen, was left to administer itself in its
own way—nor the good of the country, but the possession and distribution
of the public money. So virulent did these mutual recriminations become,
that it cannot be wondered at if people took the disputants at their
word; the more so as the moment either party was in power they threw
aside the principles which had gained momentary ascendency, and devoted
their sole attention to their former practices, knowing that, as their
possession of office might be short, a tenure so uncertain must be made
the most of. Statesmanship amongst such people was out of the question.
Neither party could even foresee that the very disgust which their
scramble for office was exciting in the public mind, must one day
overthrow both factions.
It was at this very Westminster election that the patriotism of the
electors made itself felt throughout the length and breadth of the land,
and laid the foundation of that reform which has been obtained by the
present generation. To the error which had been committed both factions
became speedily alive, and each in turn persecuted the expression of
public opinion whenever opportunity offered. The press, as far as
possible, was gagged; public writers and speakers heavily fined, and
sentenced to lengthened imprisonment; and, where the rank or position of
the offender rendered this impracticable, both parties joined in the
most uncompromising hostility to him, as afterwards I had but too much
reason to know to my cost.
On the 24th of June, the electors of Westminster insisted on carrying
Sir Francis Burdett from his house in Piccadilly to a magnificent
entertainment at the Crown and Anchor Tavern in the Strand. A triumphal
car was provided, which on its passage through immense crowds of
spectators was enthusiastically greeted, the illustrious occupant
reclining with his wounded leg on a cushion, whilst the other was placed
on a figure, inscribed with the words “VENALITY AND CORRUPTION,” which
were thus emblematically trampled under foot.
On the 26th the House was formally opened by the delivery of his
Majesty’s speech, through the instrumentality of commissioners, viz.
Lord Chancellor Eldon, and the Earls of Aylesford and Dartmouth. In the
course of the debate on the address, during which much party
recrimination took place, I excited great animosity by expressing a hope
that, “as each party charged the other with making jobs in order to
influence the elections, the conduct of both might in this respect be
inquired into, and that hence, some third party would arise, which would
stand aloof from selfish interests, and sinecure places, for that, as
parties were at present constituted, I would not support either unless
they were prepared to act on other principles than those by which them
present course appeared to be guided.”
On the 7th of July, pursuant to notice, I brought forward a motion to
the following effect:—
“That a committee be appointed to inquire into, and report upon, to
this House, an account of all offices, posts, places, sinecures,
pensions, situations, fees, perquisites, and emoluments of every
description, paid out of or arising from the public revenues, or fees
of any courts of law, equity, admiralty, ecclesiastical, or other
courts, held or enjoyed by, or in trust for, any member of this House,
his wife, or any of his descendants for him, or either of them, in
reversion of any present interest; with an account of the annual
amount of such, distinguishing whether the same arises from a certain
salary or from an average amount; that this inquiry extend to the
whole of his Majesty’s dominions, and that the said committee be
empowered to send for persons, papers, and records.”
My argument was. “that if this motion were granted, the result would
prove whether there was any possibility of making those _who had lived
on, and enriched themselves by the public money_, feel for the
extraordinary burthens under which the people laboured. The late plan of
finance proved that as much as could be exacted had been drawn from the
people, and that it was not possible to extract more—ingenuity having
exhausted itself in devising new sources of taxation; so that it was
necessary to satisfy the greed of dependents on the public purse by the
expedient of profligate advertisements, offering for sale the public
patronage, and even seats in a certain assembly. It was proper to show
the public that there was nothing in the character or habits of those
composing that House which they desired to conceal.”
There was nothing factious in this, but the fear of the Government was,
that were such a motion agreed to, the country would perceive that the
vast accumulation of the national debt did not arise so much from
warlike expenditure, defensive or aggressive, as from political
profligacy. The motion was, therefore, opposed by one of the leading
members of the House, on the ground that it was invidious and improper
_to convey to the public an insinuation that members of parliament were
influenced by considerations of private advantage for themselves or
their dependents; and that it was most essential, at this critical
period, the character of the House of Commons should not be degraded or
depreciated_.
In this view both factions joined _con amore_, for the question as to
which it was aimed at was only that of being _in or out of office_. That
there was any chance of such a motion being passed was not expected by
any one, and least of all by myself; but the predicament in which it had
placed the House was that of either assenting to the correctness of its
principle, or of asserting boldly that there were no grounds for the
inquiry. The latter course was too high to be taken with safety.
Mr. Whitbread, a most excellent man, and a great peacemaker when
practicable, came to the rescue, by stating that though he concurred in
principle with my motion, yet it might be sufficient to refer it to a
committee of finance, with instructions to inquire into and report upon
the matters therein contained. Such a course would be useful without
being invidious, and a report based upon such alteration would probably
be attended with beneficial results.
Mr. Perceval caught at the alternative thus presented, and immediately
proposed that the motion should be thus altered:—
“That there should be an instruction to the committee of public
expenditure, to procure a list of all places, pensions, &c.,
specifying by whom they were held, with the exception of those
belonging to the Army _and Navy_, and officers _below 200l. a year in
the revenue_, and that they should cause this list to be laid on the
table.”
To this compromise I demurred, stating that “my motive had not been made
in expectation of pecuniary saving, but because a general feeling
existed in the country regarding _the corruption of the House of
Commons! It was notorious that commissions in the Army and Navy had been
given for votes in that House_, and to such an extent was the system
carried, that the best way to preferment was considered to be by the
purchase of a house or two in usually contested boroughs. I could not
accept as a substitute for my motion an alphabetical list of pensions
and places, though it would be an object of great curiosity, and though
many might be ashamed of holding such offices if their names were
exposed to public view. On these grounds I would press my motion to a
division,”—which was carried against me by a majority of 29.
Mr. Perceval then moved his amendment, which elicited from Mr. Whitbread
a declaration, that “it was unquestionably Lord Cochrane’s meaning that
there should be exhibited, during the present session of parliament, a
list of _all_ the members of that House holding sinecure offices,
places, &c., under Government, and _in that way liable to have their
conduct influenced. If such a return were not made, the House would
disgrace itself._ Those who at present respected the House would suspect
that all was not right; whilst those who already suspected it would have
their suspicions confirmed.”
Mr. Sheridan also pronounced Mr. Perceval’s amendment “to be nothing but
an evasion of my motion, intended to overwhelm the inquiry, and thus to
suffocate the object Lord Cochrane had in view.” The House, however, was
not inclined to publish its own shame, and Mr Perceval’s amendment was
carried by a large majority. So far as the production of the general
pension list was concerned, my first essay in the House was thus a
success.
The ill-feeling, however, engendered towards myself amongst men of both
parties, the greater portion of whom were either implicated in, or
recipients of, the corruption denounced by a few servants of the crown,
cannot at the present day be conveyed to the imagination of the reader.
To appreciate it he must have been conversant with such matters fifty
years ago, and have witnessed the first onslaught made upon them from a
quarter so unexpected.
On the 10th of July, I brought forward a motion on naval abuses. As in
the present day any discussion of a matter so remote would be tedious,
it will suffice for the continuation of the narrative to transcribe from
the pages of Hansard all that need be said on the subject.
“LORD COCHRANE rose and said,—‘Sir,—A wish to avert part of the
impending dangers of my country has made me resolve to move for
certain papers relative to the Naval Service, not with a retrospective
view to blame individuals, but that unnecessary hardships may cease to
exist. I am willing to believe that members of this House, whose
talents are capable to do justice to the cause, are ignorant of
circumstances which for years have embittered the lives of seamen
employed in His Majesty’s Service; and that as to the gentlemen of the
naval profession who have seats here, I suppose that the diffidence
occasioned by the awe which this House at first inspires, has
prevented them from performing this important duty.
“‘I shall be as brief as possible, but as the nature of some of the
papers for which I am about to move is unknown to many members of this
House, it will be necessary that I should give some explanation. The
first motion is, “That there be laid before this House copies of all
letters or representations made by Commanders of H.M.’s sloop
_Atalante_ and schooner _Felix_, addressed to Captain Keats
(commanding off Rochefort), respecting the state and condition of
those vessels, and the sick therein.”
“‘The object of this motion is to prove that vessels, under the
present system, are kept at sea in a dangerous state, and that the
lives of many officers and men are in constant peril. Lieutenant
Cameron, who commanded the _Felix_, and since lost in that vessel, was
one of the best and ablest officers I ever knew. He found it incumbent
on him to report that the _Felix_ ought to be sent into port to
repair. I shall read part of two letters from the surgeon, dated three
months before they all perished, and previous to Lieutenant Cameron’s
being appointed to command that vessel. The other dated eight days
before that melancholy event. On the 14th of November, he says,—“Our
noble commander has been very active in his endeavours to get
confirmed to this vessel, much more than I should be: she sails worse
and worse, and I think the chances are against our ever bringing her
into an English port.” On the 14th of January, 1807, the surgeon
says,—“Every endeavour has been put in force by Cameron and myself to
get her into port, but without success. He attacked the commodore with
most miserable epistles of distress throughout, and I attacked him
with a very formidable sick list, but all, my friend, would not do.”
“‘I may be told that there is danger in agitating such subjects; but
there can be none at any time in bringing to the knowledge of the
Legislature, for redress, that which is notorious to those who have a
right to claim it. No, Sir, let grievances be redressed in time, and
complaints will cease. When the _Impérieuse_, the ship I command, was
about to leave Rochefort, I was ordered to revictual the _Atalante_
for six weeks, though she had then been out eight months—a period
sufficient to ruin the health, break the energy, and weary the spirit
of all employed in such a vessel. The _Atalante_ was hauled alongside,
the commander and several officers came on board, and informed me of
the bad condition of their sloop. They said she was wholly unfit to
keep the sea, and that a gale of wind would cause her inevitable loss.
I think they said the fore-mast, and bowsprit, and fore-yard, were all
sprung; besides, the vessel made twenty inches of water per hour. I
thought it well to mention the circumstances, thus reported, to the
commanding officer off Rochefort—for I well knew that the minds of
subordinate officers ordered to survey were impressed with terror,
lest any vessel surveyed should not be found, on arriving in port,
quite so bad as represented. Their usual plan therefore is, to say
such a vessel can keep the sea a while longer—knowing that if any
accident occurs it will be ascribed to zeal for the good of His
Majesty’s service! So much impressed was I with the bad state of this
vessel, that I said to the builder of Plymouth-yard, in the presence
of Admiral Sutton, on my arrival there, that the first news we should
have from Rochefort, if there should happen to be a gale of wind,
would be the loss of the _Atalante_. Under the harassing system of
eight or nine months’ cruises, men get tired of their lives, and even
indifferent as to the choice between a French prison and their present
misery.
“‘The next document I propose to move for is—“An abstract of the
weekly accounts of H. M.’s ships and frigates employed off Brest and
Rochefort, from the 1st of March, 1806, until the 1st of March, 1807.”
From this the number of men employed, the number of sick, the time the
ships have been kept at sea, and the time they have been allowed in
harbour to refit the vessels and recruit the crews, will appear. The
_Plantagenet_, for instance, was eight months within four hours’ sail
of England. She was then forced, by stress of weather, into Falmouth,
where she remained twelve days wind-bound; but an order existed (which
I shall presently make the subject of a motion,) by which neither
officer nor man could stretch his legs on the gravel beach within
fifty yards of the ship! In order to show how little benefit has been
derived from supplies at sea, as a substitute for refreshment and
recreation which the crews were formerly suffered to enjoy, I shall
next move—“That there be laid before this House an account of the
quantity of fresh provisions, expressed in day’s allowance, received
at sea by each of H. M.’s ships off Rochefort and Brest, from the 1st
of March, 1806, to the 1st of March, 1807.” Formerly, when the four
months’ provisions were expended, the return of a ship to port was a
matter of course; but now they are victualled and revictualled at sea;
so that an East India voyage is performed with more refreshment than a
Channel cruise. Lime-juice is the substitute for fresh provisions, a
debilitating antidote to the scurvy—unfit to re-establish the strength
of the body impaired by the constant use of salt provisions.
“‘The next motion (which I shall propose) is—“That there be laid
before this House all orders issued and acted on between the 1st of
March, 1806, and March, 1807, respecting leave to be granted or
withheld from officers or men, distinguishing who was
Commander-in-chief at the times of issuing such orders.” It is a hard
case that in harbour neither officer nor men shall be permitted to go
on shore; these orders I do not hesitate to condemn; and the injustice
appears the more striking, when it is remembered that the
Commander-in-chief resided in London, enjoying not only the salary of
his office, but claiming the emolument of prize-money gained by the
toil of those in active service. I shall not be surprised to find the
office of Commander-in-chief bestowed on some favourite as a sinecure
by some future minister.
“‘With respect to the sick, I feel it necessary to say a few words,
but I shall first read my motion on that subject—“That there be laid
before this House all orders issued and acted on between the 1st of
March, 1805, and the 1st of March, 1807, by, or by the authority of
the Commander-in-chief of H.M.’s ships and vessels in the Channel,
allowing or restraining commanding officers from sending men to the
naval hospitals, or restricting their admission to such hospitals.” In
consequence of regulations established in these institutions, men are
frequently refused admittance. No man, whatever may be his state of
health, can be sent to an hospital from any of the ships in the
Channel fleet, unless previously examined by the surgeon of the
Commander-in-chief. Deaths, amputations, and total loss of health,
were the consequences of the impossibility of this officer going from
ship to ship, in bad weather, when opportunity offered to convey the
sick to port. So pertinaciously were such regulations adhered to, that
although I sent a sick lieutenant and a man ruptured to the hospital,
they were not admitted. The disease of the one (who was under
salivation) was declared to be contrary to the order regulating
admission, and he was returned through sleet and rain: the other was
refused because everything _possible_ had not been done to reduce the
rupture, as he had not been hung up by the heels, in a rolling sea,
which might have proved his death!
“‘The system of naval hospitals is thoroughly bad. Mistaken economy
has even reduced the quantity of lint for the purpose of dressing
wounds. To the ships there is not half enough allowed. Unworthy
savings have been unworthily made, endangering the lives of officers
and seamen. Indeed the grievances of the Navy have been, and are so
severe, through rigour and mistaken economy, that I can see nothing
more meritorious than the patience with which these grievances have
been endured.’
“Sir Samuel Hood, Admiral Harvey, Admiral Markham, the Chancellor of
the Exchequer, Mr. Windham, and others, spoke against the motion.
“Lord Cochrane rose _in reply_, and said, ‘I disclaim, Sir, any motive
whatever, except a regard for the real interests of my country, though
I confess that I cannot help feeling in common with others the
treatment received. Improper motives have been imputed to me, and I
might reply to one of those gentlemen who has denied facts which I can
prove, that he was one of those who established this abominable
system. What his abilities may be, in matters not connected with the
naval service, I know not; but it is a known fact that his noble
patron, the Earl of St. Vincent, sent the master of the _Ville de
Paris_ to put his ship in some tolerable order. (Here there was a cry
of order, order, from Admiral Harvey and others.)
“‘With respect to the assertion made by the same gentleman, that the
health of the men is increased by long cruises at sea, and that of the
Commander-in-chief is improved by being on shore, he may reconcile
that if he can. I shall not follow the example of imputing improper
motives (looking at Captain Sir Samuel Hood); but another complaint
is, that under this obnoxious system of favouritism, captains have
been appointed to large commands of six and seven sail of the line, as
many frigates and as many sloops of war, the right of admirals who
have served, and can serve their country, and who have bled in its
cause. But perhaps, for such times, their ranks did not afford a
prospect of their being sufficiently subservient.
“‘This House, I believe, need not be told that from this cause there
are admirals of ability who have lingered in neglect. (A cry of order,
order, from Admiral Harvey and others.) Sir, two parts of the
statement of the Honourable Knight are especially worthy of notice, so
far as they were meant as a reply to my statement. He said he had an
hundred men killed and wounded in his ship, and no complaint, no
inconvenience arose from want of lint, or anything else. First, this
occurred when surgeons supplied their own necessaries, and next, the
wounded men were sent on the day following to Gibraltar Hospital.
“‘Now, Sir, with respect to the blame said to be attributed by me to
Lord St. Vincent for the loss of the _Felix_ and _Atalante_—I have to
say, that it is of the general system and its consequences of which I
complain—of endless cruises, rendering surveys at sea a substitute for
a proper examination of the state of ships in port. The Honourable
Knight is a little unfortunate in the comparison he has made—saying,
that Lord St. Vincent was no more to blame in the case of these
vessels, than for my getting the _Impérieuse_ on shore on the coast of
France. Now, since this subject has been touched on, I must state,
that I made application for a court-martial on my conduct; but it was
not granted, because the blame would have fallen where it ought—on the
person whose repeated positive commands sent the ship to sea in an
unfit condition. The people of the yard had not finished the work, all
was in confusion. The quarter-deck guns lay unfitted, forty tons of
ballast, besides provisions of all kinds, remained on deck. The powder
(allowed to be taken on board only when the ship is out of harbour)
was received when the ship was in that condition, and the _Impérieuse_
was hurried to sea without a cartridge filled or a gun loaded! The
order issued was, to quit the port the instant the ship would steer,
regardless of every other material circumstance. (Another cry of
order, order, from the same gentlemen. The Speaker said the Noble Lord
must confine himself to the motion before the House.)
“‘Well, Sir, it is asserted that a profusion of oranges is supplied to
the fleet at Lisbon, in reply to my statement, that none are allowed
in the hospitals at home. I have not heard from any of those who have
so zealously spoken on the other side, a defence of the obnoxious
order to keep all officers and men on board. All such grievances may
seem slight and matter of indifference to those who are here at their
ease; but I view them in another light, and if no one better qualified
will represent subjects of great complaint, I will do so, independent
of every personal consideration.
“‘In the course of the debate it has been asserted, that I said
lime-juice was a bad cure for the scurvy—no, it is a cure, and almost
a certain cure, but debilitating—it destroys the disease, but ruins
the constitution. An Hon. member (Mr. Sheridan) has said, that all
this should have been represented to the Admiralty, that this House is
an improper place for such discussions, and he has threatened to call
for all letters from me to the Board. To the first, I answer, that
Boards pay no attention to the representations of individuals whom
they consider under their command; next, that if the Right Honourable
gentleman calls for my letters, he will find some that will not suit
his purpose.
“‘Sir, besides the public abuses, the oppression and scandalous
persecution of individuals, often on anonymous information, has been,
and is matter of great complaint. Sir, if the present Admiralty shall
increase the sum allowed for the refreshment of crews in port, instead
of corrupting their bodies by salt provisions, and then drenching them
with lime-juice, they will deserve the gratitude and thanks of all
employed. In the Navy, we have had to lament the system that makes the
Admiralty an appendage of the minister of the day, and that just as a
Board begin to see, and perhaps to plan reform, they are removed from
office. I trust, Sir, that I shall not be denied the papers moved for,
and that my motion will not be got rid of by a blind vote of
confidence, or the subterfuge of the previous question.’
“The motion was negatived without a division.”[36]
-----
Footnote 36:
Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, vol. ix.
-----
From the preceding extract it will have been seen that my motion
produced no effect upon the House. It however produced a _cessation of
my legislative functions!_ for immediately afterwards I was ordered to
join Lord Collingwood’s fleet in the Mediterranean; it being perhaps
anticipated that I should vacate my seat in consequence; but this the
electors of Westminster prevented, by giving me unlimited leave of
absence from my parliamentary duties.
CHAP. XIV.
CRUISE OF THE _IMPÉRIEUSE_.
CRUISE OF THE IMPÉRIEUSE.—ENGAGEMENT WITH THE KING GEORGE.—OFF
TOULON.—FALL IN WITH THIRTEEN MERCHANTMEN.—AM RECALLED BY LORD
COLLINGWOOD.—RUSSIAN DECLARATION OF WAR.—CAPTURE A VESSEL FROM
CORFU.—RUN INTO VALENCIA.—CLEAR FOR ACTION.—DEATH OF LIEUT.
CAULFIELD.—CHASE ROUND CAPE NEGRETTI.—BLOW UP A TOWER AT
MINORCA.—CAPTURE OF SPANISH WINE.—FALL IN WITH THE LEONIDAS.—CAPTURE
A XEBEC.—CHASE THREE SHIPS.—CAPTURE A XEBEC.—CAPE PALOS.—GALE AT
SEA.—JOSEPH PROCLAIMED KING OF SPAIN.—SPAIN DECLARES WAR AGAINST
FRANCE.
On the 12th of September, 1807, the _Impérieuse_ sailed from Portsmouth
to join Lord Collingwood’s fleet in the Mediterranean, having in charge
a convoy of thirty-eight sail of merchantmen destined for Gibraltar and
Malta. We reached Malta on the 31st of October, and finding that Lord
Collingwood was cruising off Palermo, sailed on the 5th of November to
join his fleet.
On the 14th, under the land of Corsica, two strange sail were
discovered, and it being calm, the boats were manned and gave chase, the
larger of the vessels showing English colours. Finding that this _ruse_
did not check the progress of the boats, she hove to, and when they had
advanced within musket shot, hauled in her colours and commenced firing
with musketry and long guns; the boats, however, dashed alongside, and
in five minutes, after considerable slaughter, were in possession.
She proved to be a Maltese privateer of 10 guns; her crew, however,
consisting of Russians, Italians, and Sclavonians, the captain only
being a Maltese. In this affair we lost one man killed, and two officers
and thirteen men wounded. The loss of the privateer was far more
considerable, her treachery being severely punished.
I was much vexed at this affair, for the vessel, though hailing from
Malta, was in reality a pirate, and ought to have been treated as such.
After despatching her to Malta, I addressed the following letter on the
subject to Lord Collingwood:—
“H. M. S. _Impérieuse_, off Corsica,
14th Nov. 1807.
“MY LORD,—I am sorry to inform your Lordship of a circumstance which
has already been fatal to two of our best men, and I fear of thirteen
others wounded two will not survive. These wounds they received in an
engagement with a set of desperate savages collected in a privateer,
said to be the _King George_, of Malta, wherein the only subjects of
his Britannic Majesty were three Maltese boys, one Gibraltar man, and
a naturalised captain; the others being renegadoes from all countries,
and great part of them belonging to nations at war with Great Britain.
“This vessel, my Lord, was close to the Corsican shore. On the near
approach of our boats a union-jack was hung over her gunwale. One boat
of the three, which had no gun, went within hail, and told them that
we were English. The boats then approached, but when close alongside,
the colours of the stranger were taken in, and a volley of grape and
musketry discharged in the most barbarous and savage manner, their
muskets and blunderbusses being pointed from beneath the netting close
to the people’s breasts.
“The rest of the men and officers then boarded and carried the vessel
in the most gallant manner. The bravery shown and exertion used on
this occasion were worthy of a better cause.
“I have the honour, &c.
“COCHRANE.
“The Right Hon. Lord Collingwood.”
This pirate, for the capture of which, as was subsequently learned,
500_l._ had been offered, was after much trouble condemned as a _droit
of Admiralty!_ it being evidently hoped that by this course such
influence might be brought to bear as would eventually procure her
restoration: for it was currently reported at Malta that certain persons
connected with the Admiralty Court had a share in her! Be this as it
may, we never obtained the premium for her capture, but in place thereof
were _condemned by the Court of Admiralty to pay five hundred double
sequins_! After this, the Maltese court always threw every obstacle in
the way of condemning our prizes, and, when this was effected, with such
costs as to render the term “prize” almost a misnomer; a subject on
which some strange stories will have to be told in another place.
On the 19th we joined Lord Collingwood’s fleet off Toulon, consisting of
the _Ocean_, _Malta_, _Montague_, _Tiger_, _Repulse_, _Canopus_, and
_Espoir_. The _Impérieuse_ was forthwith ordered to Malta, to land the
wounded, after which we were directed by Lord Collingwood to proceed to
the Archipelago, his Lordship giving me an order to supersede the
officer in command of the blockading squadron there.
On the 26th we again fell in with the fleet off Sardinia, and on the
29th anchored in Valetta, our pirate prize having arrived on the
preceding evening. On the 6th of December, the _Impérieuse_ sailed for
the Archipelago, and on the 8th passed between Zante and Cephalonia. On
the 11th we joined the blockading squadron in the Adriatic, consisting
of the _Unité_, _Thames_, _Porcupine_, and _Weasel_, which were then
watching some French frigates in Corfu. On the 12th, the _Impérieuse_
overhauled three Russian vessels, one of which threw overboard three
bundles of letters. By prompt exertion we were lucky enough to rescue
these, and found them to contain important intelligence.
On arriving off Corfu, and pending the necessary arrangements for
transferring the command of the blockading squadron to myself, I asked
leave of the senior officer still in command to take a run to the north
end of the island. This being granted, we sailed forthwith, and to our
surprise soon afterwards fell in with thirteen merchantmen, as leisurely
proceeding along the blockaded coast as though we had belonged to their
own nation! Singling out the three nearest to us, we took possession of
them, and to our astonishment found that each had a pass from the
officer I was ordered to supersede!
Despite this unlooked-for protection, I sent them to Malta for
adjudication, and they were, I believe, condemned. The immediate result
to myself, however—as Lord Collingwood long afterwards told me—was _the
withdrawal of my appointment to the command of the blockading squadron_!
The commanding officer, whose passes I had intercepted, promptly took
the initiative, and without apprising me, despatched one of his vessels
to Lord Collingwood, with a letter stating generally that, “_from my
want of discretion I was unfit to be entrusted with a single ship, much
less with the command of a squadron_!” Lord Collingwood acted on the
representation without making inquiry into its cause, and the
consequence was my recall to receive further orders from his Lordship,
this amounting to my deposition from the only command of a squadron that
was ever offered to me.
I was, of course, ignorant of Lord Collingwood’s reasons for recalling
me, though greatly disappointed at such a result. It was not till some
time afterwards, when too late to remedy the injury, that I ventured to
ask his Lordship the reason of such a proceeding. He frankly told me,
when I as frankly informed him of the intercepted passes, and that my
senior officer had traduced me to his Lordship, by way of first blow in
a serious scrape. Lord Collingwood was very indignant, but from the
lapse of time, and probably from having neglected to investigate the
matter at the time, he thought it better not to reopen it, and thus my
traducer continued his pass trade with impunity.
I give the above incident as it occurred. Those to whom such a statement
may appear incredible, will find, on consulting the pages of Captain
Brenton, that it was not an isolated instance.
I shall add, that on my return from the Mediterranean, in 1809, an
officer, who shall be nameless, waited on me at Portsmouth, and begged
me not to make official or public mention of the preceding circumstance,
or it would be his ruin. I made him no promise, but having then the
preparation for the Basque Roads attack on my hands, there was no time
to attend to the matter, and as the circumstance had not been officially
reported by me at the time—as indeed it did not come within my province
to report it—I never afterwards troubled myself about it, though this
shameless proceeding had deprived me of the only chance I ever had to
command more than a single ship![37]
-----
Footnote 37:
The excuse offered to me was, that the purser had been making use of
the captain’s name, for his own purposes! A very improbable story, as
in such a case it would not have been difficult to convict the purser
and exonerate himself. The disgraceful letter to Lord Collingwood,
however, clearly pointed out the delinquent.
-----
On the 17th we fell in with a brig bound from Trieste to Lord
Collingwood with despatches, announcing that Russia had declared
hostilities against England. This intelligence was fortunate, as there
were several Russian ships of war in the Gulf, with one of which—a
line-of-battle ship—we had fallen in only two days previous.
The professed origin of the declaration of Russia against England was
our questionable conduct at Copenhagen. But, notwithstanding the
assumption by Russia, that she had endeavoured to serve our cause at
Tilsit, there is no doubt but that she was secretly leagued with
Napoleon against us. I never knew what was in the letters we rescued, as
they were sent to Lord Collingwood; but no doubt they contained
important intelligence for the French squadron then in the Archipelago,
and, coming from a Russian source, there was little question as to the
nature of their contents, which appeared to be conclusive in the
estimation of the British authorities.
On the 22nd the _Impérieuse_ stood into the Gulf of Valona under French
colours, and saw some vessels close in under the batteries. As soon as
it became dark, we manned the boats and brought out a Turkish vessel
under the fire of a battery. On the 30th again joined the squadron, and
learned that the Russian fleet, consisting of five sail of the line and
three frigates, had left Corfu and gone up the Adriatic.
On the 2nd of January, 1808, we joined Lord Collingwood, the fleet then
bearing up in the direction of Syracuse. On the 8th gave chase to some
vessels off the south point of Cephalonia, sending the boats after them
into the bay; but the enemy being on the alert, and the vessels being
run on shore, it became necessary to recall the boats. On the 12th, when
off Otranto, we captured a vessel from Corfu to that place, laden with
clothing and iron.
On the 23rd we again joined Lord Collingwood off Corfu, and were
dispatched to Malta with sealed orders, arriving there on the 28th.
Having filled up our water and provisions, the _Impérieuse_ was then
ordered to Gibraltar, for which port we sailed on the 31st, my
expectations of increased command, thanks to the adroit turn given to my
seizure of the intercepted passes, being thus at an end.
The instructions now given me by Lord Collingwood were to harass the
Spanish and French coast as opportunity served. These instructions,
though forming a poor equivalent for the command of a squadron, were
nevertheless considered by me complimentary, as acknowledging the good
effected by my former cruises in the _Speedy_. Consequently, I
determined to make every exertion to merit his lordship’s approbation in
the present instance.
On the 9th of February we made the high land of Spain to the eastward of
Barcelona, and at daylight on the following morning fell in with two
vessels bound from Carthagena to Marseilles, both of which were captured
and sent to Malta with the prisoners.
On the 11th looked into Barcelona, where a considerable number of
vessels lay at anchor, but knowing the fortifications to be too strong
to warrant success in an attempt to cut any of them out, the
_Impérieuse_ again made sail. On the 18th we ran in close to Valencia,
and having on the previous day perceived some vessels anchored within a
mile of the town, the boats were sent off after dark to capture them,
but as they unfortunately proved to be American, our labour was
abortive.
On the 15th we arrived off Alicant, and at daylight stood close to the
town under American colours. Two boats came out, but finding their
mistake when within gunshot, they immediately made for the shore, and
the batteries opened fire upon us. As there was no purpose to be
answered in returning this, we passed by Cape Palos, where four gunboats
showing Russian colours were observed at anchor under the protection of
one of the numerous batteries with which the Spanish coast was studded.
On the 17th entered a bay about eight miles to the westward of
Carthagena to intercept some vessels observed running along shore. After
a long chase with the boats, we succeeded in capturing two. As I had
made up my mind to get possession of the gunboats seen two days
previously, we stood off out of sight of land in order to lull
suspicion, and at sunset on the 19th again steered for the bay in which
they were at anchor. At 9 P.M. we distinctly saw them quit their
anchorage, on which we cleared for action, remaining undiscovered till
they had passed the point which forms one extremity of the bay. They now
attempted to return, but too late. Running in amongst them, we opened
both our broadsides with effect, and dashing at them with the boats,
took one, armed with a 32-pounder, a brass howitzer, and two smaller
guns. Another sank with all hands, just as the boats were alongside, and
a third sank shortly afterwards. A fourth escaped by running for
Carthagena, where we did not think it politic to follow her, lest we
might bring upon us the Spanish fleet at anchor there. A brig with a
valuable cargo also fell into our hands.
Having received information from the prisoners taken in the gunboats
that a large French ship, laden with lead and other munitions of war,
was at anchor in the Bay of Almeria, I determined on cutting her out,
and the night being dark, it became necessary to bring to. At daylight
on the 21st, we found ourselves within a few miles of the town, and
having hoisted American colours, had the satisfaction to perceive that
no alarm was excited on shore.
The boats having been previously got in readiness, were forthwith
hoisted out, and the large pinnace, under the command of Lieutenant
Caulfield, dashed at the French ship, which, as the pinnace approached,
commenced a heavy fire, in the midst of which the ship was gallantly
boarded, but with the loss of poor Caulfield, who was shot on entering
the vessel. The other pinnace coming up almost at the same moment
completed the capture, and the cable being cut, sail was made on the
prize.
Some smaller vessels were also secured, but before we could get clear
the wind died away; and the _Impérieuse_ and her prizes were
becalmed,—the batteries of the town and citadel opening upon us a heavy
fire, which lasted till 11 A.M., when a light breeze carried us out of
gun-shot.
Of these batteries our most formidable opponent was a four-gun tower,
situated on an eminence above us; but by exercising great care in laying
our guns, we contrived to keep this battery from doing mischief, except
that now and then they managed to hull the prize, which had been placed
between the battery and the frigate. By mid-day, however, we were clear
of the batteries, with the prize safe. It was fortunate for us that a
breeze sprang up, for had it continued calm, we could not have brought a
vessel out in the face of such batteries, not more than half a mile
distant.
Neither, perhaps, should we ourselves have so easily escaped, on another
account,—for about four o’clock in the afternoon a Spanish ship of the
line suddenly appeared in the offing, no doubt with the intention of
ascertaining the cause of the firing. We, however, kept close to the
wind, and got clear off with the French ship, mounting 10 guns, and two
brigs laden with cordage. The scene must have been an interesting one to
the people of Almeria, great numbers of the inhabitants lining the
shore, though at some risk, as from our position many shots from the
_Impérieuse_ must have passed over them.
On the 23rd the frigate arrived at Gibraltar, with the prizes in
company, and on the following day we attended the remains of Lieutenant
Caulfield to the grave.
On the 2nd of March, we received orders again to proceed up the
Mediterranean together with the _Hydra_, with which vessel we sailed in
company on the 4th. Heavy weather setting in, prevented our return to
Almeria, as had been intended; but on the 12th we stood close in to the
entrance of Carthagena, where only the guardship and a sloop of war were
at anchor under strong fortifications. As nothing could be done here, we
anchored about two miles to the eastward of the port, in the hope of
catching vessels running along shore. At daylight the next morning we
gave chase to a ship rounding Cape Negretti, but she escaped into a bay
in the vicinity, under the protection of a powerful battery and several
gunboats. As we knew nothing of the anchorage we did not attempt to
molest them.
On the 13th the _Impérieuse_ steered in the direction of Majorca, near
which, on the 19th, we captured a vessel bound to Port Mahon. At
daylight on the 21st went in close to the entrance of Mahon, where we
found the Spanish fleet at anchor, and captured a brig within three
miles of the shore, sending her on the following day to Gibraltar, with
some prisoners taken out of another brig on the previous evening by the
_Hydra_.
On the 23rd fell in with the _Renommé_, to which we reported that the
Spanish fleet was in Mahon harbour. After supplying us with water, she
parted company for Gibraltar. On the 26th we again made Port Mahon,
where six sail of the Spanish fleet appeared to be in readiness for sea.
Seeing a sloop to leeward, we made sail in chase, and captured her in
the evening; she was bound from Port Mahon to Sardinia.
On the 28th at daylight, having observed some vessels in Alcudia Bay, we
sent in the boats; these soon afterwards returning with a tartan laden
with wine, which we sent to Gibraltar; soon afterwards we captured
another partly laden with wine, which we took out and set her adrift. On
the 29th gave chase to two vessels rounding an island; one succeeded in
getting in safe, the other, under Moorish colours, we took,
notwithstanding the fire of the forts, and sent her to Malta; she had
several male and female passengers on board, who were highly delighted
when, two days afterwards, we put them on shore.
On the 2nd of April the _Impérieuse_ was again close to Minorca, when
reconnoitring a small bay we observed a strong tower, apparently just
built. Landed, and blew it up without molestation from the inhabitants.
Though ready for an armament, none had been placed upon it.
On the 5th at daylight, passed close to Cittadella in chase of a vessel
which escaped; made sail after a brig coming from the direction of
Majorca; at 3 P.M. she ran in shore, and anchored under a small fort,
which opened a smart fire upon us, but was soon silenced. The crew then
abandoned the brig, which was brought off and sent to Gibraltar.
On the 6th, again reconnoitred Port Mahon, and saw three sail of the
line at the entrance of the harbour, ready for sea. On the 8th captured
a French brig, laden with 163 pipes of wine for the use of the Spanish
fleet at Port Mahon; sent her to Gibraltar, and put the prisoners on
shore.
On the 11th, off Cittadella, we captured another vessel, sailing under
Moorish colours, but laden with Spanish wine; took out the wine, and as
she belonged to the unfortunate Moors who manned her, to their great
gratification we gave them back the vessel.
On the 13th it blew so hard, that we were compelled to anchor within
range of a pile of barracks placed upon a high cliff—a position
certainly not taken by choice. The troops commenced firing, which we
returned, and by 4 P.M. had pretty well demolished the barracks. I then
dispatched an officer in the gig with a barrel of powder to complete the
work, but just as they had got up, a large reinforcement of troops came
upon them and compelled them to make a retreat, leaving the powder
behind them. After this we got under weigh.
On the 18th fell in with the _Leonidas_, which on the previous day had
left Lord Collingwood with 16 sail of the fine. Parted company in quest
of the fleet, but did not fall in with it.
On the 22nd we re-entered Alcudia Bay, and sent the pinnace ashore, when
she captured some sheep. On the following day another boat’s crew
managed to procure some bullocks and pigs, which were very acceptable,
but all their efforts to obtain water failed.
A few days previous to this, when close to Majorca, we had been fired
upon from the small battery of Jacemal, and having subsequently
reconnoitred it more closely, it appeared practicable to destroy it by a
night attack. Accordingly, we again ran in, and soon reaching the tower,
blew it up, dismounting three guns. A guard-house near the battery was
set on fire, after which we returned to the frigate without loss. At
daylight on the following morning we had the gratification to perceive
that our work had been effectual, the whole being in ruins. As the place
stood on an eminence very difficult of access, and commanding two bays,
its demolition was desirable.
On the 26th fell in with the _Leonidas_, which had been in quest of, but
had not succeeded in falling in with, Lord Collingwood’s fleet. From her
we learnt that the French fleet was at anchor in Corfu. On ascertaining
this, I determined on paying another visit to the Spanish coast, and
accordingly parted company with the _Leonidas_.
At daylight on the 27th, observing a brig and a smaller vessel in shore,
made sail in chase. The brig got safe into Palamos Bay, where there were
several other vessels deeply laden, but well protected by forts and
gunboats. The smaller vessel was boarded by Mr. Harrison in the gig,
before she had time to get under the forts, but perceiving a large
galley full of men in pursuit of him, he was obliged to relinquish the
prize, and make for the frigate; the galley pressed him hard, but on
perceiving the _Impérieuse_ bringing to for her reception, she gave up
the chase, and the gig returned in safety.
We were now in great distress from want of water, and as it could only
be obtained from the enemy’s coast, we sent a boat on shore to the
westward of Blanes, but she returned without success, having been fired
upon from a fortification on an eminence in the vicinity. As a supply of
this essential fluid had become essentially necessary, even if it had to
be fought for, we made every preparation for a second attempt on a sandy
beach, between Blanes and Calella, where a large river was found, on
which the frigate was brought to an anchor about a quarter of a mile
from the place, and, thanks to our bold front, we obtained an abundant
supply without molestation; though, as we came off, a considerable body
of troops showed themselves, and a fire of musketry was opened upon us,
but the frigate promptly replying with round shot, our assailants
retreated into the woods as hastily as they had emerged from them, and
we again made sail.
On the 5th of May observing a vessel under Moorish colours to leeward,
we made all sail in chase, and by ten o’clock she was in our possession,
proving to be a xebec from Marseilles to Tripoli, laden with lead. Her
crew were Genoese, and having given us information that on the preceding
evening they were in company with a large French ship also laden with
lead, and other munitions of war, destined for the use of the French
fleet, we despatched the prize to Gibraltar, and made sail for the
mainland, in order to intercept the Frenchman.
On nearing the coast, we observed several vessels running along shore,
and singling out the one which most nearly answered the description
given us by the Genoese, she struck after a few shots; the information
thus proving correct. She was bound from Almeria to Marseilles, laden
with lead and barilla. Despatched her after the other to Gibraltar.
At daylight on the 6th, gave chase to three ships, running under the
land. On observing us they parted company, one going round a shoal near
Oliva, and another running into a small harbour. The third, a line
vessel, we chased into Valencia, but she escaped, as we did not venture
after her. Retracing our course, we saw on the following morning one of
the others anchored close in shore, and sent the boats to bring her off.
On nearing her she opened a smart fire, which being steadily returned by
our men, her crew abandoned her, and we took possession without loss. As
soon as she was boarded it was found that she had just touched the
ground, but the boats promptly taking her in tow, succeeded in getting
her afloat, and brought her safely off despite the fire of two towers
close to the town of Cullera, in the neighbourhood of Valencia. A
considerable number of people assembled to witness the attack from the
neighbouring hills.
On the 8th, perceived a vessel rounding Cape St. Antonio. On seeing us,
she made sail, as we also did in chase. At sunset lost sight of her, and
despatching our prize to Gibraltar, altered our course so as to cut her
off from Marseilles, whither we suspected she was bound. At daylight we
again caught sight of her, and by ten o’clock had gained upon her
considerably, when to our disappointment she sent a boat on board,
proving to be a Gibraltar privateer instead of a Spaniard.
At daylight the following morning we ran close to Tarragona, and
captured a large xebec under Moorish colours. At twelve o’clock observed
a fine vessel coming round the shoals of Fangalo, and knowing that she
could not have witnessed the capture of the xebec we immediately furled
all sail in order to escape observation. An alarm was, however, promptly
raised along the coast, and this causing her to alter her course, we
immediately started in pursuit. At sunset it fell calm, the ship being
then distant about twelve miles. At 3 A.M. she was discovered close in
shore, when we hoisted out boats and pulled smartly for her, but on
arriving almost within gun-shot, she caught a breeze, and went away from
us, endeavouring to get into a creek; but the boats being in a position
to cut her off, and making every effort to head her, she bore up, and at
7 A.M. anchored under a two-gun battery, which kept up a constant fire
on the boats.
The _Impérieuse_ now rapidly approaching, gave the tower a gun and
recalled the boats, in order to send other crews, those engaged in the
chase being necessarily much fatigued. About 3 P.M. we were joined by
the Gibraltar privateer, which bore up to engage the tower, keeping up a
smart fire, as did also the ship. The _Impérieuse_ now came to an
anchor, and opened her broadside on the tower, which was soon silenced.
The boats were once more manned, as were also those of the privateer,
and the prize towed out, proving to be a large Spanish ship—the same as
we had chased into Valencia—bound from Alicant to Marseilles. We learned
from her the unpleasant news of one of our lieutenants, Mr. Harrison,
having been captured by some gunboats, and taken into Denia; this
intelligence being subsequently confirmed by a fishing-boat boarded off
Denia on the 17th.
On the 20th passed close to Cape Palos, the forts on which fired several
shots at us, but without damage. At 9 o’clock on the 21st, observed
twelve vessels coming round the Cape, four of which were evidently
gunboats. We at once made all sail in chase, and as we tacked, the
gunboats opened a smart fire upon us, continuing this till we again
tacked and stood towards them, when they made off, with the exception of
one which stood towards the Cape; the other three running aground on the
beach. As we were now very close to the gunboats, the _Impérieuse_,
whilst in stays, also took the ground, but luckily got off again, and
opened a fire of musketry upon them, which, in about twenty minutes,
obliged two crews to quit the vessels, the third keeping her colours
flying till her captain was mortally wounded.
It now came on to blow hard, and as there was no probability of saving
the prizes, we set fire to the two gunboats and a large vessel laden
with barilla, the crews having all escaped on shore. The other gunboat,
which had gallantly kept her colours flying to the last, we got off,
bringing her wounded captain and two other officers on board the
frigate. About 6 P.M. both gunboats blew up with great explosion.
Our own situation was at this time critical, as we were in only four
fathom water, and it was blowing a gale of wind. By nine o’clock the
wind fortunately came off the land, which enabled us to run out a couple
of miles and anchor for the night. We learned from the officers, that
the convoy was bound from Carthagena to Barcelona, and that each gunboat
had a long gun in the bow, and two aft, with a complement of 50 men.
Two other vessels having run on shore on the morning of the 22nd, we
again despatched the boats to bring them off if possible, as well as to
recover our anchor and cable, which had been slipped when getting the
_Impérieuse_ afloat. They succeeded in bringing off one of the vessels
which was laden with barilla, but the other vessel, being immovable, was
set fire to. This done we put to sea with our prizes in tow.
In the course of the night the Spanish captain died, his wounds having
been from the first hopeless. Every attention possible was paid to the
poor fellow, from admiration of his gallantry, but anything beyond this
was out of our power. On the following morning we committed his remains
to the deep, with the honours of war.
We now made sail for Gibraltar with our prizes, one of which was with
difficulty kept afloat. On the 25th passed Malaga, and on the 31st
arrived at Gibraltar with all the prizes except one, which had been
placed in charge of the Hon. Mr. Napier (the late Lord Napier), then a
midshipman.[38]
-----
Footnote 38:
Afterwards ambassador to China, where his lordship died.
-----
On the 1st of June, the _Trident_ arrived from England with convoy, and
the intelligence of a revolution in Spain, which, being shortly
afterwards confirmed by proclamation, a friendly communication was
opened between the garrison and the Spaniards, and on the 8th Lord
Collingwood arrived at Gibraltar in the _Ocean_, to be in readiness to
act as circumstances might require.
A few words on our altered relations with Spain, though coming rather
within the province of the historian than the biographer, may here be
necessary, in order to account for so sudden a change in my own personal
operations.
On the 6th of June 1808, Napoleon issued a decree, notifying that, as it
had been represented to him by the Spanish authorities that the
well-being of Spain required a speedy stop to be put to the provisional
government, he had proclaimed his brother Joseph, King of Spain and the
Indies!
To this extraordinary proclamation the Supreme Junta, _on the same day_,
replied by another, accusing Napoleon of violating the most sacred
compacts, forcing the Spanish monarch to abdication, occupying the
country with troops, everywhere committing the most horrible excesses,
exhibiting the most enormous ingratitude for services rendered by the
Spanish nation to France, and generally treating the Spanish people with
perfidy and treachery, such as was never before committed by any nation
or monarch against the most barbarous people.
On these and other accounts the Junta declared war against France by
land and sea, at the same time proclaiming durable and lasting peace
with England, and commanding that no further molestation be offered to
English ships or property, whilst, by the same proclamation, an embargo
was laid on all French ships and property.
Another proclamation, more immediately concerning the ensuing chapters,
is an order of the Junta, forming the Spaniards generally into an
organised national militia for the defence of the country. The French,
pretending to consider this militia in the light of noncombatants,
having no right to engage in war, committed amongst them the most
barbarous atrocities, in retaliation for which many of the succeeding
operations of the _Impérieuse_ were undertaken, in pursuance of orders
from Lord Collingwood to assist the Spaniards by every means in my
power.
CHAP. XV.
CRUISE OF THE _IMPÉRIEUSE_ CONTINUED.
ASSIST THE SPANIARDS.—OFF BARCELONA.—SPANISH KINDNESS.—THE FRENCH IN
MATARO.—CRUISE ON THE SPANISH COAST.—EMBARK THE ENEMY’S GUNS.—GIVE
THE SPANIARDS A LESSON.—SIEGE OF GERONA.—CONTEST AT
MONGAT.—IRRITATION OF THE SPANIARDS.—EXCESSES OF THE FRENCH.—SPIRIT
OF THE CATALANS.—ANCHOR OFF SAN FELIN.—GUERILLA TROOPS.—FORTRESS OF
FIGUERAS.—CHASE TWO VESSELS.—ANCHOR IN GULF DUMET.—DESTROY A SIGNAL
STATION.—STORMING A BATTERY.—THE TABLES TURNED.
Shortly after Lord Collingwood’s arrival at Gibraltar, his lordship ran
down to Cadiz, to watch events, and wait instructions from the
government. On the 18th of June the _Impérieuse_ sailed from Gibraltar
to join Lord Collingwood’s fleet before Cadiz, and on the 21st was
ordered by his lordship to cruise in the Mediterranean, and render every
possible assistance to the Spaniards against the French. On the 22nd we
returned to Gibraltar for our prize tender, which had been fitted as a
gunboat, and manned with twenty men, under the command of a lieutenant.
At daylight on the 23rd we passed close to Almeria, with English and
Spanish colours flying at the main, and on the evening of the 25th came
to an anchor in the outer road of Carthagena. On the following morning a
number of Spanish officers came off to bid us welcome, and at noon we
paid a visit to the Governor, by whom, as well as by the populace, we
were received with every mark of friendship, notwithstanding our recent
hostile visits in the vicinity. Indeed, our whole passage along the
coast was one continued expression of good feeling.
On the 2nd of July the _Impérieuse_ arrived off Majorca. The inhabitants
were at first shy, apparently fearing some deception, but as we were
bearers of the good news that the English and Spaniards were now
friends, confidence was soon restored, and presents of all kinds were
sent off to the ship, payment being resolutely refused. We had also the
satisfaction of here recovering our lost midshipmen, Harrison, and the
late Lord Napier, who, whilst in charge of prizes, had been taken and
carried into Port Mahon.
On the 5th the _Impérieuse_ passed close to Barcelona, and hoisting
English and Spanish colours at the main, fired a salute of 21 guns! The
French, who were in possession of the place[39], to our great amusement
resented the affront by firing at us from all their batteries, but their
shot fell short. We could distinctly see the inhabitants crowding the
house-tops and public places of the city by thousands, and the French
cavalry and infantry meanwhile patrolling the streets. Knowing that the
French held their own with difficulty, especially in the adjacent towns,
we again hove-to and displayed English colours over French, and then
Spanish over French, firing an additional salute, which increased the
cannonade from the batteries, but to no purpose.
-----
Footnote 39:
Barcelona had been seized by General Duhesme just before Buonaparte
announced his intention of placing his brother on the throne of Spain.
Having arrived in the vicinity of the city on the 15th of February, he
requested permission to halt and refresh his troops for a few days,
before going on to Valencia. The gates were forthwith opened, and the
French treated as friends and allies. On the 16th, the _générale_ was
beat, as though they were about to proceed on their march, and the
townspeople came out to bid them farewell. To the surprise of the
latter, the French general ordered one part of his force to the
citadel, and the other to Fort Monjui, possessing himself of both.
Pampeluna was occupied on the same day by similar treachery.
-----
We then bore up along the coast, and when clear of the enemy’s lines, a
number of boats came off complaining bitterly of the French troops who
were burning their towns on the least resistance, or even pretended
resistance, and were permitted by their officers to plunder and kill the
inhabitants with impunity. Perhaps it would be more in accordance with
military justice to say, that with the ideas of equality and fraternity
then prevalent amongst the soldiers, their officers had no control over
them.
On the 6th, the _Impérieuse_ came to an anchor between the towns of
Blanes and Mataro, in nearly the same position as that taken up on the
last cruise. Great numbers of people came off, and the frigate was
speedily filled with visitors of both sexes, bringing with them all
kinds of presents; being most politely oblivious of all the mischief we
had been effecting in their vicinity for months past. On the 7th, after
paying a visit to Blanes, we got under weigh, the Spaniards having sent
us word that the French had entered the town of Mataro, at the same time
requesting our co-operation against them.
On the 8th we were becalmed close to several villages, one of which had
been nearly destroyed by the French on pretence of some trifling
resistance. A deputation from the inhabitants of one village came off,
and informed us that their church had been plundered of everything, and
that forty-five houses had been burned to the ground. A wretched policy
truly, and one which did the French great harm by the animosity thus
created amongst the people, who were treated as rebels, rather than in
the light of honourable adversaries.
The _Impérieuse_ could effect nothing against the French in Mataro, from
its unassailable position, but having received intelligence that a
considerable force under General Duhesme was advancing towards
Barcelona, it occurred to me that their progress might be checked.
Landing accordingly with a party of seamen, we blew down the overhanging
rocks and destroyed the bridges so effectually as to prevent the passage
either of cavalry or artillery, at the same time pointing out to the
Spaniards how they might impede the enemy’s movements elsewhere along
the coast by cutting up the roads,—an operation on which they entered
with great alacrity, after being shown how to set about their work.
The nature of these operations will be readily comprehended by the
statement that a considerable portion of the main road ran along the
face of the precipitous rocks nearest the sea. By blowing up the roads
themselves in some places, and the overhanging rocks in others, so as to
bury the road beneath the _débris_, it was rendered impassable for
cavalry or artillery, whilst removal of the obstructions within
reasonable time was out of the question—indeed, so long as the frigate
remained in the vicinity, impossible, as any operation of the kind would
have been within reach of our guns.
Having effected all the damage possible, and there being no beneficial
end to be answered by longer stay in the vicinity of Mataro, we again
made sail, and on the 17th the _Impérieuse_ arrived at Port Mahon, where
we found a squadron embarking Spanish troops for Catalonia, the crews of
the six ships of the line in harbour taking their places in manning the
batteries. On the 19th the troops sailed under convoy of some English
frigates, as did others destined for Tortosa.
Having filled up with provisions and water, we quitted Port Mahon for
another cruise on the Spanish coast, and on the 22nd were close to San
Felin, when the whole of the convoy entered the harbour to the great
delight of the inhabitants, who reported that, despite the obstacles
created, the French had, in the absence of the _Impérieuse_, forced the
pass from Mataro, and marched for Gerona, to which place the Spanish
troops, just disembarked, were next day despatched, together with 1200
militia, raised from amongst the peasantry in the neighbourhood. Heavy
firing was heard shortly afterwards in the interior, and at night it was
ascertained that the French had made an attack on Hostalrich and were
beaten back. This place was about nine miles from San Felin.
On the 24th we again anchored about four miles from Mataro, and there
learned the mode in which the French had surmounted the obstacles
interposed by the Spaniards in cutting up the roads, viz. by compelling
the inhabitants to fill up the gaps with everything movable, even to
their agricultural implements, furniture, and clothes. After this, the
French, by way of deterring the Spaniards from again interfering with
the highways, sacked and burned all the dwelling-houses in the
neighbourhood.
Taking a party of marines on shore, we again blew up additional portions
of the road to the eastward, and as the gaps made on our last visit had
been chiefly filled up with wood, and other inflammable articles just
mentioned, we set fire to them, and thus not only renewed the obstacles,
but created fresh ones, in the assurance that as everything movable was
now destroyed, the obstruction must become permanent. Whilst this was
going on the seamen and marines of the _Impérieuse_ destroyed a battery
completed by the French, and threw over the cliff the four brass
24-pounders. These were next day recovered.
On the 26th we dropped down to the town of Cañette, and embarked some
more brass guns which the enemy had placed in position on the top of a
high cliff. These guns were got on board by means of hawsers carried
from the frigate to the cliff, one end being made fast to the masthead.
By the application of the capstan and tackles, the guns were thus hopped
on board. After these had been secured, I again took a party of seamen
and marines on shore, and broke down or blew up the road in six
different places. On paying a visit to the town, there was scarcely a
house which the French had not sacked, carrying off everything that was
valuable, and wantonly destroying the remainder. The inhabitants were in
a miserable condition.
The two next days were employed in blowing down rocks, and otherwise
destroying roads in every direction which the French were likely to
take, the people aiding heart and soul, anxiously listening to every
suggestion for retarding the enemy’s movements, and evincing the
greatest alacrity to put them in practice. In short, I had taken on
myself the duties of an engineer officer, though occupation of this kind
was, perhaps, out of my sphere as commander of a frigate; and there is
no doubt that I might have better consulted my personal interests by
looking after prizes at sea, for, except from Lord Collingwood, not so
much as an acknowledgment of my persevering exertions was vouchsafed. I
was, however, indignant at seeing the wanton devastation committed by a
military power, pretending to high notions of civilisation, and on that
account spared no pains to instruct the persecuted inhabitants how to
turn the tables on their spoilers; making—as throughout life I have ever
done—common cause with the oppressed.
Having effected all the mischief possible, we weighed for Mongat, ten
miles from Barcelona, and anchored off the place at sunset. I had
previously received intelligence that General Duhesme was approaching
Barcelona with a strong force to relieve the French garrison in
possession, and my object was to destroy the fort at Mongat before
Duhesme’s force came up. For this, however, we were too late, the
advanced guard having occupied the fort before our arrival. The people,
however, came off with an assurance that, if we would attack the French,
800 Spaniards were ready to assist us. As the destruction of the fort
was my principal object, I at once assented, and we commenced blowing up
the road between Barcelona and Mongat, so that the communication on that
side was effectively cut off, whilst the guns of General Duhesme’s force
were rendered immovable on the other; these he afterwards abandoned.
On the 30th it fell calm, and having weighed anchor we drifted down as
far as Mataro, but too distant from the shore to attempt anything.
Having received intelligence of the continued advance of General
Duhesme, we again returned, and anchored within five miles of Mongat,
the inhabitants coming off to beg for assistance, as the French in the
fort were keeping up a constant fire on their party in the woods, though
without venturing to dislodge them.
It is, perhaps, here necessary to explain that General Duhesme had on
the 26th of July been compelled by a well-executed movement on the part
of the Count de Caldagues, to raise the siege of Gerona, in which he had
been employed for upwards of a fortnight, his force being driven to
Sarria, where they were protected by their cavalry. During the night
they separated into two divisions, one retreating towards Figueras, and
the other in the direction of Barcelona.
It was to the latter division that my attention was directed. To reach
Barcelona with heavy guns, the enemy must of necessity proceed by way of
Mongat, the castle or fort of which place commanded a pass on their way.
By breaking up the roads, the passage of the guns was impeded, as has
been described; but, as the French had possession of the castle, it was
essential that they should be dislodged as speedily as possible. The
Spanish militia, being eager to second our efforts, I determined to make
the attack forthwith.
At 8 A.M. on the 31st the _Impérieuse_ got under weigh, and stood
towards the castle, whilst I landed in the gig, and mounted the hills
overhanging the position, for the purpose of reconnoitring; finding an
attack practicable, I returned on board, and we cleared for action.
The Spaniards, seeing the _Impérieuse_ stand in, and being eager for the
onset, gallantly dashed up a hill where the French had established an
outpost, and either killed or took the whole prisoners; upon which the
garrison in the fort opened a heavy fire to dislodge the victorious
Spaniards, but without effect. By this time I had got the _Impérieuse_
well in, and had given the castle a couple of well-directed broadsides
when the enemy hung out flags of truce.
On this I landed with a party of marines, but the exasperated Spaniards,
elated by their recent victory, paid no attention to the flags of truce,
and were advancing up the hill to storm the place, the French still
firing to keep them in check. I was immediately conducted to the castle,
where the French troops were drawn up on each side of the gate. On
entering, the commandant requested me not to allow the peasantry to
follow, as they would only surrender to me, and not to the Spaniards, of
whose vengeance they were evidently afraid.
After giving the commandant a lecture on the barbarities that had been
committed on the coast, and pointing out the folly of such a course,
inasmuch as, had his troops fallen into the hands of the Spanish
peasantry, not a man would have escaped with life, I acceded to the
request to surrender to us alone, and promised the escort of our marines
to the frigate.
The commandant then gave me his sword, and his troops forthwith laid
down their arms. We had, however, even after this surrender, some
trouble in keeping out the irritated Spaniards, who were actuated rather
by the excitement of vengeance than by the rules of war; and it was not
without a few blows, and forcing some of the assailants over the
parapet, that we succeeded in keeping them off.
The Spaniards were with some difficulty made to understand that, however
exasperated they might be at the conduct of the French, the latter were
British prisoners, and not a hair of their heads should be hurt. When we
were somewhat assured of their safety, the prisoners were marched down
to the boats; and glad enough they were to get there, for the Spaniards
accompanied them with volleys of abuse, declaring that they might thank
the English for their lives, which, had the Spanish party succeeded in
storming the fort, should have been sacrificed.
What became of the men forming the captured outpost I never knew, and
was not anxious to inquire. Having placed the troops on board, we took
off four brass field-pieces with their appendages, and threw the iron
guns over the parapet; after which the Spaniards were allowed to ransack
the fort. At 6 P.M. we laid a train to the French ammunition, and soon
after the whole blew up. Spanish colours were then hoisted on the ruins,
amidst the hearty cheers of thousands with arms in their hands, who had
by this time flocked to the spot, though when we landed not a single
inhabitant was to be seen. Soon after we gained possession, men, women,
and children came from their hiding-places in abundance, expressing
grateful satisfaction at the capture of the enemy.
It would have been well if the leaders of the French army in other parts
of Spain could have seen the exasperation produced by the barbarous
propensities of these detachments of troops, who appeared to be under no
moral discipline. Except, perhaps, in actual fight, their officers had
no control over them, so that their path was marked by excesses of every
kind. This is a fatal mistake in armies, as the French afterwards found
elsewhere—it degrades war into extermination. Our prisoners did not even
deny that the Spaniards would only have exercised a just retaliation by
immolating them, but contented themselves by saying that they would
never have given in to the Spaniards whilst a man remained alive.
After we had blown up the castle, the _Cambrian_ arrived, and to her, by
permission of her captain, we transferred half our prisoners. On the
following morning we sailed from Mongat, having first presented the
chief commanding the Spaniards with two of the field-pieces taken the
day before, together with a sufficient supply of powder and ammunition.
General Duhesme reached Barcelona by making a _détour_ into the
interior, after an absence of about a month, during which the
destruction of the roads had been going on. He was highly exasperated
with the unfortunate inhabitants, though for no better reason than that
all his plans had been thwarted, and, pointing the guns of the citadel
on the town, he threatened it with destruction, unless his force was
supplied with 12,000 rations daily, with wine and brandy in proportion;
following up this injustice by seizing the most respectable inhabitants
for the purpose of extorting ransoms for their liberation.
Great credit is due to the Catalans for the spirit thus manifested at a
time when all the more important strongholds of Catalonia were in the
hands of the enemy. I say Catalonia, as being concerned with that
province only, though there was reason to know that the like patriotism
was manifested in the western provinces, though, from the preponderance
of the enemy, with less effect.
Even when Duhesme had reached Barcelona, he had great difficulty in
maintaining himself, as the activity of the patriots in cutting off his
supplies by land was worthy of their cause, and the _Impérieuse_ and
other English vessels of war took care that he got no supplies by sea.
On the 31st of July I addressed the subjoined despatch to Lord
Collingwood:—
“H. M. S. _Impérieuse_, off Mongat, Catalonia,
“31 July, 1808.
“MY LORD,—The castle of Mongat, an important post, completely
commanding a pass on the road from Gerona to Barcelona, which the
French are now besieging, and the only post between these towns
occupied by the enemy, surrendered this morning to his Majesty’s ship
under my command.
“The Spanish militia behaved admirably in carrying an outpost on a
neighbouring hill. Lieutenant Hore of the marines took possession of
the castle, which, by means of powder, is now levelled with the
ground, and the pending rocks are blown down into the road, which in
many other places is also rendered impassable to artillery, without a
very heavy loss of men if the French resolve to repair them.
“I enclose to your Lordship a list of the prisoners, and of the
material part of the military stores, all of which that could be
useful to the Spaniards have been delivered to them.
“I have the honour, &c.
“COCHRANE.
“The Rt. Hon. Lord Collingwood.”
Having effected everything possible at Mongat, we made sail on the 4th
of August, and anchored off San Felin, where,—whilst the ship was
employed in filling up water—I rode five miles into the country to
inspect a battery which the Spaniards had erected to prevent the French
from marching on the town. It was situated on an eminence, commanding
the road to Gerona and Mataro, and was completely surrounded by high
trees, so as not to be visible from the road. If properly defended, it
would have presented a formidable obstacle, but as it was, the French
infantry would have taken it in a few minutes. I gave the Spaniards
instructions how to strengthen the position, but as they told me they
could in a short time collect 3000 armed peasantry, I bid them rather
rely on these by maintaining a guerilla warfare, which, if conducted
with their usual judgment and activity, would harass the enemy more than
the battery.
The Catalans made capital guerilla troops, possessing considerable skill
in the use of their weapons, though previously untrained. A character
for turbulence was often attributed to them; but, in a country groaning
under priestcraft and bad government, the sturdy spirit of independence,
which prompted them to set the example of heroic defence of their
country, might be, either mistakenly or purposely—the latter the more
probable—set down for discontent and sedition. At any rate, the
descendants of men who, in a former age, formed the outposts of the
Christian world against Mahomedism, in no way disgraced their ancestors,
and became in the end the terror of their enemies. One quality they
pre-eminently possess, viz. patience and endurance under privation; and
this added to their hardy habits and adventurous disposition,
contributed to form an enemy not to be despised—the less so that they
were in every way disposed to repay the barbarities of the French with
interest.
At 8 A.M. on the 6th, the _Impérieuse_ got under sail from San Felin,
and passing close to Palamos, arrived in the afternoon at Rosas, where
we found the _Montague_ and _Hind_, to the latter of which we
transferred the prisoners. The _Hind_ was bound for Port Mahon with the
Governor of Figueras and his family, who had to be escorted to the ship
by the marines of the _Montague_, in order to protect him from popular
vengeance, so exasperated were the Spaniards on account of the
governor’s cowardice or treachery in allowing the French to enter the
fortress he had commanded, though from its position and strength he
could easily have held out.
The fortress of Figueras was about twelve miles from Rosas, and was a
place of amazing strength, having been constructed for the defence of
one of the principal passes on the borders of Spain, and being well
garrisoned and provisioned, it ought certainly to have withstood a
considerable force. The Rosas people had a right to be indignant at its
pusillanimous surrender, for not only did this expose their town, but it
formed a marked contrast to one of their own exploits, when, being
attacked by a large French force, they drove them back with the loss of
300 men.
On the 7th we filled up with water at a wretched place on the opposite
side of the Bay of Rosas, and on the 8th sailed for San Felin, where we
arrived on the 9th. On the 10th we were again off Barcelona, when a flag
of truce was sent by the French to ask what had become of the troops we
had taken at Mongat. On the 11th, we bore up for San Felin and were
joined by our gunboat, after which we proceeded to see what was being
done on the French coast, and bore up for Marseilles.
My object in proceeding in this direction was, that as the French troops
kept out of our reach, there was no beneficial object to be gained by
remaining on the Spanish coast; and it occurred to me, that by giving
the French, in the neighbourhood of Marseilles, a taste of the evils
they were inflicting on their Spanish neighbours, it would be possible
to create an amount of alarm, which would have the effect of diverting
troops intended for Catalonia, by the necessity of remaining to guard
their own seaboard. It is wonderful what an amount of terrorism a small
frigate is able to inspire on an enemy’s coast. Actions between
line-of-battle ships are, no doubt, very imposing; but for real effect,
I would prefer a score or two of small vessels, well handled, to any
fleet of line-of-battle ships.
On the 15th we stood into the Bay of Marseilles, and anchored off the
mouth of the Rhone, which was distant about eight miles. Sent the
gun-boat in chase of a small vessel, but the crew ran her on shore, and
escaped. The gun-boat burned her, and joined us again on the following
morning, when we anchored abreast of a telegraph employed in signalising
our appearance on the coast. Here was a hint, the beneficial nature of
which could not be doubted, and at once I decided on destroying the
enemy’s communications along shore. As a commencement, this telegraph
was demolished without opposition.
On the 16th sent the gun-boat in chase of two vessels, close to Cette.
They escaped, but she brought back a boat with four men, who gave such
information as induced me to send her on a cruise.
On the 17th, there being nothing in sight, we made preparations for
destroying the signal-station on the island of Boni, which commands the
entrance to the Rhone. Landing ninety men in the boats, we were just in
time to see the troops in charge of the station abandon it; and having
possessed ourselves of the signals, we blew up the place and returned to
the ship.
We then got under weigh, and by 4 o’clock were close to Montpelier,
firing on a fort as we passed. Perceiving another signal-station in the
vicinity, we again out boats, and proceeded to destroy it, but found
this not so easy a matter as on the last occasion, for we had two rivers
to ford, each midleg in mud, and had moreover to encounter a fire of
musketry, but at a distance which did no harm, so that with some
difficulty we accomplished our object. This station was called
Frontignan, the one last blown up being named La Pinede. At 8 P.M. we
returned to the _Impérieuse_, with no other damage than being thoroughly
encased in mud.
In the night we ran out about ten miles, having no confidence in the
anchorage, and at daylight on the 19th again went in shore, carefully
feeling our way by the lead, which showed us that the soundings were
highly dangerous. We, nevertheless, came to an anchor off a place called
Dumet, when we again out boats and destroyed another signal tower,
together with four houses connected with it. At 2 P.M. we got under sail
and bore up, joining the gun-boat to leeward. Supplying her with a new
yard and bowsprit, her former spars being carried away, we sent her in
shore.
On the 21st it fell so calm, that the _Impérieuse_ had to be brought to
an anchor in Gulf Dumet. At 3 A.M. the boats were manned to destroy a
building which we had been informed was a custom-house. This having been
set fire to, they returned on board, and were shortly afterwards
despatched to destroy another signal-station; but as troops were now
perceived on the lookout, it was not worth while to risk the men, and
the boats were recalled. We then got under sail, passing once more close
to Montpelier and Cette, where we again joined the gun-boat, and stood
into the Bay of Perpignan—forming the west portion of Marseilles
Bay—where we destroyed another signal-station called Cañet.
At 3 A.M., on the 24th, the morning being still dark, we manned three
boats to destroy another signal-station called St. Maguire, about three
miles distant, and at about half-past four, when within ten yards of the
beach, were saluted by two heavy guns with grape, which, passing over
the boats, luckily did no damage. Fearing an ambuscade, we pulled out of
reach of musketry, but calculating that the French would not venture far
in the dark—my favourite time for attacks of any kind—instead of
returning to the ship, we made straight for the signal-station, and blew
it up amidst a dropping fire of musketry, which, as we could not be
distinguished, failed in its direction, and consequently did no harm.
Having completed our work, we next marched along the beach in line
towards a battery, observed on the previous evening, skirmishing as we
proceeded, our boats meanwhile covering us with their 9-pounders; the
French also keeping up a constant fire with their guns, but in a wrong
direction.
On storming the battery, with the usual British cheer, the enemy rushed
out in an opposite direction, firing as they went, but without effect.
We then took possession of two brass 24-pounders, but whilst making
preparations to get them off were alarmed by recall guns from the
frigate, from the masthead of which, as day was now beginning to break,
a force of cavalry had been seen making for us over the crest of a hill.
We had already had one narrow escape, for on taking possession of the
battery it was found that the magazine was prepared for blowing us up,
but fortunately, in the hurry of its late occupants to escape, the match
had not caught fire. There was, however, now no time to be lost, so
placing a barrel of powder under each gun and setting fire to the
matches, both were blown up, as was also the battery itself by lighting
the match attached to the magazine.
This somewhat staggered the cavalry in pursuit, but they soon recovered,
and some smart skirmishing took place on our retreat to the boats, which
all the time maintained a well-directed fire on the enemy, keeping them
in check, so that we got clear off with the loss of one seaman only—a
gallant fellow named Hogan—who was blown up and terribly shattered, in
consequence of a cartouch box buckled round his waist having exploded
while setting fire to the trains. We otherwise arrived safe on board
about 7 A.M., somewhat fatigued by the night’s adventure.
We now got under sail, passing close to Perpignan, and were fired upon
from Point Vendré, where a French brig of war lay at anchor under the
fortification, and therefore was too well protected to be safely
interfered with.
In this cruise against the French signal stations, the precaution of
obtaining their signal books before destroying the semaphores was
adopted; and in order to make the enemy believe that the books also were
destroyed, all the papers found were scattered about in a half-burnt
condition. The trick was successful, and the French authorities,
considering that the signal books had been destroyed also, did not deem
it necessary to alter their signals, which were forwarded by me to Lord
Collingwood, who was thus informed by the French semaphores, when
re-established, of all the movements of their own ships, as well as of
the British ships from the promontory of Italy northward!
CHAP. XVI.
CRUISE OF THE _IMPÉRIEUSE_—CONTINUED.
THE FRENCH FLEET.—THE MOLE OF CIOTAT.—THE GULF OF FOZ.—TAKE POSSESSION
OF THE BATTERY.—SILENCE THE BATTERIES.—ANCHOR OFF CETTE.—DESPATCH
THE PRIZES.—HOW WE OBTAINED FRESH WATER.—DEMOLISH A
TELEGRAPH.—FRIGATE TO LEEWARD.—ORDERED TO GIBRALTAR.—INGRATITUDE OF
GOVERNMENT.—LETTER OF LORD COLLINGWOOD.—LETTER OF LORD COCHRANE.
On the 2nd of September the _Impérieuse_ rejoined the fleet off Toulon,
and received orders from Lord Collingwood to renew operations on the
enemy’s coasts. As the French, though by our previous operations, and by
the spirit thereby inspired amongst the inhabitants, were disinclined to
advance into Catalonia, they were nevertheless in considerable force in
the neighbourhood of Figueras and Rosas, we therefore leisurely sailed
in the direction of the latter port.
Keeping well in with the French coast, some gunboats were observed at 8
A.M. on the following morning close in with the town of Ciotat, between
Toulon and Marseilles. One of these being somewhat detached, we hoisted
out all boats in chase, but on the remaining gunboats and a battery on
shore opening a heavy fire on them, they were recalled, and we cleared
for action. At 10 A.M. six sail of French line-of-battle ships were
observed to quit Toulon, but as they were far to leeward, there was
nothing to apprehend from their interference; indeed after manœuvring
for a short time, they returned to port, no doubt satisfied that the
firing which had taken place was of little importance.
At 11 A.M. we anchored under an island, within range of our main deck
guns, but in such a position as to shelter us from the fire of the
battery, which, finding that their guns could not be brought to bear,
commenced a constant discharge of shells; but as no accurate aim could
be taken, these inflicted no damage, though occasionally dropping near
us. Taking no notice of these, we out boats, and sending them to a point
out of sight of the battery, commenced throwing rockets into the town,
which was twice set on fire; but as the houses were for the most part
built of stone, the conflagration was confined to the spot where it had
broken out. Our reason for molesting the town was that the inhabitants
everywhere showed themselves in arms to oppose us.
Finding the place impervious to rockets, and the ship being too far out
for a successful cannonade, we got under weigh, and took up a position
within range of the fort, on which we continued firing till 8 P.M.,
almost every shot falling in the place. As it now came on to blow hard
from the N.W., we were obliged to anchor.
During the night the enemy had got up a large gun close to the
lighthouse, and by 10 o’clock on the following morning, a squadron
consisting of four line-of-battle ships and three frigates left Toulon
and commenced beating up towards us. We therefore did not again open
fire, being unwilling to excite the squadron to pursue us.
However, at 3 P.M., as a large settee was running into the mole of
Ciotat, we discharged two shots at her, which went over and fell in the
town. Upon this the mortar battery, seeing their squadron approaching,
again opened fire, but, as before, without effect. We took no notice of
this, but seeing the enemy manning the gun at the lighthouse, we beat to
quarters, and prepared everything in case they should fire upon us,
which was done at 4 P.M.
We again opened a heavy fire upon the town, every shot telling upon the
houses, from which the inhabitants fled, no person being anywhere
visible. At the expiration of an hour the lighthouse people left off
firing, and the gun was pointed eastward to show that they did not
intend to renew the conflict, upon which we ceased also, my object being
not to batter the town, but to get possession of some of the numerous
vessels anchored within the mole.
This purpose was, however, defeated by the perseverance of the Toulon
squadron, the headmost ship of which—a fine frigate—was now within six
miles of us, and coming up fast, supported by the others. We therefore
thought best to get under weigh, and did so under the fire of batteries
and mortars, none of which touched us. As soon as the enemy’s fleet saw
us under sail, they bore up and again ran into Toulon.
On the 6th at midday, we anchored in the Bay of Marseilles, within half
a mile from the shore, just out of range of the strongly fortified
islands in the bay. Our appearance created the greatest alarm on the
coast, from which people were hurrying with their movables beyond the
reach of shot. We had, however, no intention to molest them.
The _Impérieuse_ was now becalmed till midday on the 7th, when a breeze
springing up, we again got under sail, and exchanged signals with the
_Spartan_, which shortly afterwards joined company. Having discovered
three vessels lying in a small cove, we out boats, and brought out two
of them, setting fire to the other. As the enemy had numerous troops
ashore, they opened a brisk fire on the boats, and would probably have
defeated our intention, had not the ships kept up a fire upon them
whenever they approached. Thus aided, the boats lost only one man, with
another wounded.
On the 8th the _Spartan_ and _Impérieuse_ stood towards the Gulf of Foz,
where, seeing a number of troops placed for the defence of a signal
telegraph, both ships manned boats, and in addition to the seamen, the
marines of the _Impérieuse_ were sent with a nine-pounder field
piece—one of our prizes from Duhesme’s army. On effecting a landing, the
enemy’s troops retired to the interior, when, firing two volleys after
them, the telegraph named Tignes was taken and blown up, the signals
being secured as before.
On the 9th we passed close to Port Vendre, _Spartan_ in company, and
anchored about a mile from the shore; but an alarm having been raised,
and the troops on shore having got our range, we were at 3 A.M. on the
10th, compelled to shift our position.
Before daylight the boats of both ships were manned, and pulled on
shore, a battery firing at us, but as the shot went over, no mischief
was done. Our seamen and marines having landed to the right of the
battery, the enemy’s troops fled, and we took possession, spiking the
guns, destroying their carriages, and blowing up the barracks. These
operations were scarcely completed, when a considerable body of troops
made their appearance in the distance, and by the time we returned on
board, a number of cavalry and artillery had assembled on the site of
their demolished battery.
We now passed close to a small fishing town, where other guns were
observed in position, both on the right and on the left, these being
manned by regular troops and backed by hundreds of armed peasantry, who
showed a bolder front than had the garrison of the battery recently
destroyed. By way of feint, to draw off the attention of the cavalry,
both _Spartan_ and _Impérieuse_ manned their small boats and the rocket
boats with the ships’ boys, dressed in marines’ scarlet jackets,
despatching these at some distance towards the right, as though an
attack were there intended. The device was successful, and a body of
cavalry, as we anticipated, promptly set off to receive them.
Meanwhile the ships stood towards the town, under a smart fire from the
batteries, the shot from which several times took effect. When close in,
the _Impérieuse_ opened her broadside, and the _Spartan_ following, an
incessant fire was kept up for an hour, at the expiration of which the
marines of both ships were landed. As soon as the boats touched the
shore, the enemy fled from the battery, the guns of which were
immediately spiked.
The cavalry, which had gone off to repel the sham attack to the right,
having found out the trick which had been played upon them, were now
seen galloping back to save the battery, which had just been rendered
useless, and from which our marines were now re-embarking. So intent
were they on rescuing their guns, that they did not appear to have
noticed the altered position of the ships, which, as soon as the
horsemen approached within musket shot, opened upon them with grape so
effectually, that all who were not knocked out of their saddles rode off
as fast as they could, and the marines leisurely returned to their
respective ships.
As the French troops had now taken shelter in the town, and the people
were everywhere armed, I returned to the _Impérieuse_ for the large
boats, in each of which a gun was mounted, with the object of clearing
the beach and silencing the other battery. By 6 o’clock this was
accomplished, not only the battery, but many of the houses and vessels
being destroyed. As our boats neared the town, a numerous body of troops
again began a brisk fire with musketry; and by the time one of the
largest vessels, which yet remained undemolished, could be blown up, the
fire became so warm that it was advisable to cease from further
operations, and we returned to the frigate.
In this affair a considerable number of people must have been killed
ashore during the five hours and a half continued firing; the cavalry
and infantry engaged amounting to several hundreds, whilst the armed
inhabitants mustered in equal, if not superior numbers. Neither
_Spartan_ nor _Impérieuse_ had any killed, and only a few wounded,
though, from their proximity to the shore, the rigging of both ships was
a good deal cut up, and several shots passed through their hulls.
Besides the seamen, we had only fifty marines engaged, thirty from the
_Impérieuse_, and twenty from the _Spartan_.
On the 11th at 8 P.M. we anchored off the town of Cette, just out of
gunshot, the batteries on shore however maintaining a brisk fire, which
was consequently thrown away.
At midnight two boats were despatched from the _Impérieuse_ and one from
the _Spartan_, to throw rockets into the town, the batteries continuing
their fire in all directions till daylight, but doing no damage.
At 4 A.M. on the 12th we got under weigh, and when within a mile of the
shore, between Cette and Montpellier, sent the boats to burn two large
pontoons, close to the signal station, which the _Impérieuse_ had
attempted to destroy on the 18th _ultimo_. One of the pontoons was
burned, and the other blown up without opposition, together with the
signal station and other public buildings which we had not been able to
destroy on the former occasion. A number of troops showed themselves,
but were contented with firing at a harmless distance. As nothing more
remained to be done, we again made sail.
On the morning of the 13th a convoy was discovered in shore. As soon as
they saw us, the vessels composing it altered their course, and by 12
o’clock had taken refuge in a deep bay in the vicinity, it being, no
doubt, calculated that we should not venture to pass over an extensive
shoal, which almost closed up the entrance of the bay. By careful
sounding we, however, managed to effect a passage, and three of the
smaller vessels perceiving that we should attain our object, passed over
the opposite end of the shoal and got away.
About midday it blew a hurricane, and both ships were rapidly driving
towards shore, but by letting go another anchor they were brought up. In
about a couple of hours the wind abated, when we weighed and anchored
close to the remaining vessels, taking possession of the whole that
remained, viz. a ship, two brigs, a bombard, a xebec, and a settee, but
all aground. We, however, succeeded in getting off the ship, one brig,
the bombard, and settee. The remainder were burned. During these
operations a body of French troops lined the beach; we did not, however,
attempt to molest them, as it was still blowing so hard that the prizes
were with difficulty got off.
On the 16th we despatched some of the prizes to Gibraltar, and the
remainder to Rosas. The _Spartan_ now parted company with us to rejoin
the Toulon fleet, and the _Impérieuse_ held on her course for Rosas with
the prize brig in tow, she having been so much damaged by beating on the
shoals before she was captured, as to require the greatest exertion to
keep her afloat.
On the 18th we came to an anchor off Rosas, and on the 23rd, having
patched up our prize, she was sent to Gibraltar in charge of Lieutenant
Mapleton.
On the 24th the _Impérieuse_ again sailed for the French coast, and
passing Cette, stood into the Gulf of Foz.
In these cruises our greatest difficulty was to procure fresh water,
which was only to be obtained on the enemy’s coast, so that the men had
frequently to be placed on short allowance. As we were now destitute of
this necessary, I determined to run for the entrance of the Rhone, and
fill up with water by a novel expedient. Our foretopmast studding-sails
were sewn up and converted into huge bags nearly watertight, these—as
the water at the river’s mouth was brackish—were sent in the boats
higher up the stream where it was pure. The bags being there filled,
were towed alongside the ship, and the water pumped as quickly as
possible into the hold by means of the fire engine, the operation being
repeated till we had obtained a sufficient supply.
Having thus replenished our water, we made an attempt to obtain fresh
meat also at the enemy’s expense. Whilst engaged in watering, a number
of cattle had been observed grazing on the banks of the river, and a
party was taken on shore to secure some. But this time circumstances
were against us. The lowlands on the banks of the river having been
flooded, we found on landing a complete morass; the men nevertheless
gave chase to the cattle, but they were so wild, that after a run of
three miles, often up to the middle in water, nothing was caught but the
herdsman, a poor wretch, who no doubt believing, according to current
report in France, that the English killed all their prisoners, began to
prepare for death in the most exemplary manner, scarcely crediting the
evidence of his senses on being liberated.
In this excursion we had perceived a new telegraph station, about three
miles from Foz, the building being complete with the exception of the
machine. We set fire to the building, but the destruction not being
fully accomplished, the boats were again sent on shore to blow it up,
which was done in the presence of about a hundred troops assembled for
its protection. A shot from the ship was so well aimed that it fell
right amongst the party, killing one man and wounding several. A few
more shots completely dispersed them in such haste as to compel them to
relinquish their dead comrade.
On inspecting the abandoned body through a glass, it evidently appeared
to be that of an officer, and hence it occurred to me that he might have
papers about him which would prove useful. In order to secure them, if
there were any, the frigate’s barge was again despatched on shore, but
before the men could land, a horse was brought from the interior, and
the body being laid across him, a shot was fired from the ship over the
heads of the party in charge of the horse, which becoming restive, the
body was again abandoned. The boat’s crew having by this time landed,
found it to be that of an officer, as I had conjectured, the poor fellow
having been nearly cut in two by a round shot. As no papers of any
consequence were found, our men wrapped him in a sheet which the troops
had brought with the horse, and again returned on board.
The _Impérieuse_ continued her course along the coast, and on the 3Oth,
seeing some small vessels at anchor near Boni, the boats were sent to
destroy them. This being effected in the face of a detachment of troops
and the armed population of a small fishing town, the latter also shared
the same fate. Passing close to Boni, we saw several vessels at anchor,
and made preparations to attack them, but it coming on to blow hard from
the westward, we held on our course towards Marseilles, off which a
large polacca-rigged ship passed astern of the _Impérieuse_, out of
gunshot. The boats were lowered, but the wind increasing, they had to be
taken on board again, and the polacca got into Marseilles, which was
then distant about eight miles.
On the 1st of October we again passed close to Ciotat, but saw nothing
to attract our attention. On the 2nd some French ships were discovered
at anchor near the land to the westward of Toulon, and several guns were
fired at us from four batteries on the coast, but without damage, as we
were not within reach of shot.
Seeing a frigate to leeward, we exchanged numbers, and found her to be
our former consort the _Spartan_, which had been engaged in
reconnoitring the enemy’s port. Shortly afterwards she bore up and made
all sail, the French line-of-battle ships quitting port in pursuit. When
within about four miles of these we came to the wind, and the _Spartan_
signalled that, since the previous evening, five of the enemy’s frigates
and a storeship had sailed from Toulon.
As the _Spartan_ again signalled for us to pass within hail, I went on
board, and from the information communicated, bore up in search of the
admiral. Not finding him where we expected to fall in with him, we ran
with a fair wind for Minorca, arriving off Port Mahon on the 5th.
As there was only a Spanish ship of the line in harbour, we again
proceeded in quest of the flagship, and soon after midday fell in with
her on her way to Minorca. On communicating to Lord Collingwood
intelligence of the escape of the five frigates from Toulon, his
lordship ordered the _Impérieuse_ to Gibraltar with despatches. We
therefore wore ship and made sail for that port, where we arrived
without further incident.
For these operations on the coast of France I never received the
slightest acknowledgment from the Admiralty, though, regardless of
prize-money, I had completely disorganised the telegraphic communication
of the enemy, from the seat of war in Catalonia to one of the principal
naval arsenals of France; and had created an amount of terrorism on the
French coast, which, from inculcating the belief that it was intended to
be followed up, prevented the French Government from further attempts at
throwing a military force on the Mediterranean coast of Spain. This, as
has been said, was my object, as the Spaniards were now in alliance with
us. For the panic thus created on the French coast, and its
consequences, French writers have given me credit, but the British
Government none!
By people of narrow views it has been said that such operations formed
no business of mine, and that my zeal exceeded my discretion, which I
deny. The commander-in-chief, Lord Collingwood—confiding in my
discretion—had sent me to do what I could to assist the Spaniards and
annoy the French—and I am proud to say that both objects were effected
to his lordship’s satisfaction, as will appear from his letters. What
damage can I do to the enemy? was my guiding principle, and the
excitement of accomplishing the mischief was my only reward,—for I got
no other.
To the disgrace of the then corrupt British administration, which
withheld not only reward, but praise, because I had connected myself
with a radical constituency, and had set up as a reformer of naval
abuses, nothing was manifested in return for these services but hatred.
I am proud, however, to make known the subjoined testimony of Lord
Collingwood, who gave me the credit of paralysing the enemy’s operations
by the panic which the _Impérieuse_ created on the coast of France; thus
neutralising military expeditions intended to act against Catalonia, or,
in other words, preventing, by means of a single frigate, the march of
an army into the Mediterranean provinces of Spain, where it could at the
time have operated with complete effect. Posterity may not believe the
effect of these exertions as narrated by myself. To Lord Collingwood
they _must_ give credit.
“Admiralty Office, Jan. 7th, 1809.
“_Copy of a Letter from_ Vice-Admiral LORD COLLINGWOOD,
_Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty’s ships and vessels in the
Mediterranean, to the_ Hon. WELLESLEY POLE, _dated on board the_
Ocean, _off Toulon, the 19th of October, 1808_.
“SIR,—I enclose a letter which I have just received from the Right
Honourable Lord Cochrane, captain of the _Impérieuse_, stating the
services in which he has been employed on the coast of Languedoc.
Nothing can exceed the zeal and activity with which his lordship
pursues the enemy. The success which attends his enterprises clearly
indicates with what skill and ability they are conducted, besides
keeping the coast in constant alarm—causing a general suspension of
the trade, and harassing a body of troops employed in opposing him. He
has probably prevented _these troops which were intended for Figueras
from advancing into Spain, by giving them employment in the defence of
their own coasts_.
* * * * * * * *
“I have the honour to be, &c.
“COLLINGWOOD.”
(Enclosure.)
“_Impérieuse_, Gulf of Lyons, 28th Sept. 1808.
“MY LORD,—With varying opposition, but with unvaried success, the
newly constructed semaphoric telegraphs—which are of the utmost
consequence to the safety of the numerous convoys that pass along the
coast of France—at Bourdique, La Pinede, St. Maguire, Frontignan,
Canet, and Fay, have been blown up and completely demolished, together
with their telegraph houses, fourteen barracks of _gens d’armes_, one
battery, and the strong tower on the lake of Frontignan.
“Mr. Mapleton, first lieutenant, had command of these expeditions.
Lieutenant Johnson had charge of the field pieces, and Lieutenant Hore
of the Royal Marines. To them, and to Mr. Gilbert, assistant-surgeon,
Mr. Burney, gunner, Messrs. Houston Stewart[40] and Stoven,
midshipmen, is due whatever credit may arise from such mischief, and
for having, with so small a force, drawn about 2000 troops from the
important fortress of Figueras in Spain, for the defence of their own
coasts.
“The conduct of Lieutenants Mapleton, Johnston, and Hore, deserves my
praise, as well as that of the other officers, Royal Marines, and
seamen.
“I have the honour to be, my Lord,
“Your obedient servant, &c.
“COCHRANE.
“Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood.”
_Impérieuse._—None killed, none wounded, one singed in blowing up the
battery.
_French._—One commanding officer of troops killed. How many others
unknown.
-----
Footnote 40:
The present gallant Admiral Sir Houston Stewart, commanding Her
Britannic Majesty’s squadron on the North American station.
-----
CHAP. XVII.
CRUISE OF THE _IMPÉRIEUSE_ CONTINUED.
CAPTURE A SETTEE.—GET UNDER SAIL.—FIGHT BETWEEN THE PATRIOTS AND
FRENCH.—MAKE SAIL FOR ROSAS.—FORT TRINIDAD.—GALLANTRY OF CAPTAIN
WEST.—BRAVERY OF THE CATALAN.—REPULSE OF THE FRENCH.—ATTACK OF THE
IMPÉRIEUSE.—THE FRENCH REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS.—OCCUPATION OF
CATALONIA.—THE CASTLE OF TRINIDAD.—NATURE OF OUR POSITION.—NATURE OF
OUR OPERATIONS.—MANUFACTURE OF A MAN-TRAP.—LOSE MY NOSE.—THE FRENCH
ASSAULT ROSAS.—PRACTICE OF THE FRENCH.—PRESENTIMENT.—THE FRENCH
ATTACK.—THE ATTACK REPULSED.—BRAVERY OF A FRENCH SOLDIER.—HEAVY GALE
OF WIND.—UNFORTUNATE ACCIDENT.—EVACUATE THE FORTRESS.—STAND TOWARDS
LA ESCALA.—LETTER FROM LORD COLLINGWOOD.—DESPATCH TO LORD
COLLINGWOOD.—LETTER TO THE ADMIRALTY.—TESTIMONY OF THE
SPANIARDS.—SIR WALTER SCOTT.—OFFICIAL GRATITUDE.
On the 19th of October we again quitted Gibraltar for the eastward,
having learned that the French frigates which had succeeded in getting
out of Toulon were at anchor in St. Fiorenzo bay, in the island of
Corsica. After leaving Gibraltar, we stood over towards the Spanish
possessions on the Barbary coast, and finding everything right there,
passed on to the Zaffarine Islands, inside of which we anchored for the
purpose of painting and refitting the ship, which stood much in need of
renovation.
This being accomplished, we again sailed on the 29th, and on the 31st
arrived in the harbour of Carthagena, where we found the Russian
ambassador to Austria on his way to Trieste. No English man-of-war
having been here since our former visit, we were received with great
hospitality and attention by the authorities and inhabitants, who
unanimously expressed their delight at being at peace with England;
though, as a Spanish fleet lay dismantled in the harbour, it struck me
that they might aid England to better purpose by looking after the
enemy. Even their convoys had to be protected by English ships, for
whilst we lay at Carthagena, the _Myrtle_ arrived from Tarragona, with
twelve sail of transports which she had convoyed thither with Spanish
troops from Lisbon, and again returned for more.
The _Impérieuse_ left Carthagena on the 10th of November, and rounding
Cape Palos, passed between Majorca and the mainland, where, on the 11th,
we captured a settee. On the 12th we anchored off Barcelona, which place
was still in possession of the French. The _Cambrian_ was at anchor in
the roads.
At night we sent the boats of the _Impérieuse_ to throw rockets into the
fort, and at daylight on the following morning got under weigh, but
perceiving two boats full of men in chase of some Spanish settees, we
lowered ours, and pulled for the boats, which on seeing our intention,
abandoned their prey, and ran in under the forts for protection.
On our arrival at Barcelona the _Cambrian_ went out for a run, leaving
the _Impérieuse_ to watch the enemy. On her return we again out boats,
and proceeded to blow up a fort close to the entrance of Llogrebat
river, and succeeded in so far shattering its foundations, as to render
it useless. On the 14th the _Impérieuse_ anchored near the mouth of this
river for the purpose of watering, sending at the same time a boat to
throw rockets into the barracks, in order to divert the attention of the
Barcelona garrison.
Having completed watering on the 15th, we again got under sail, and
resumed our position before the town, shortly after which we observed
about 2000 of the French army march out and ascend the hills, where they
soon became engaged with a large body of Spanish peasantry. The ships
followed, keeping as far as practicable in shore; but still at too great
a distance to render any material assistance to the patriots, who were
at last forced from their position. As soon as this action was over, the
batteries commenced firing shells at us. In place of replying to this,
both ships opened a heavy fire on the portion of the town occupied by
French troops, amongst whom, as we afterwards learned from the
Spaniards, our shot told with great effect.
Irritated by this unexpected movement, the whole of the batteries ashore
began to ply us with shot and shell, the latter of which were thrown
with excellent precision as regarded their direction, but fell either
over or short of us, two only bursting near the _Impérieuse_, but
without doing us any harm. The _Cambrian_, lying a little farther out,
escaped with similar impunity. With round shot the batteries were in our
case more lucky, one of these passing through the barge and galley, and
another striking the muzzle of a brass 32-pounder on the forecastle, in
such a way as to render it useless, though without injury to the men who
were at the time working the guns.
The circumstances under which the destruction of this gun was effected,
are too curious to be passed over.
By an extraordinary coincidence the enemy’s shot entered the muzzle at
the moment our men were firing it, so that the two shots met in the
bore! The consequence was, that the gun was blown up nearly in the
middle, the exterior being forced into a globular form—to our great
annoyance, for this gun was one of our most useful weapons.
On the 17th another action took place between the mountaineers and a
French force on the hills, the object of the patriots being to get
possession of the heights, where the French had established a battery,
but which on every side annoyed the _cordon_ of irregular troops
employed in intercepting provisions, from which the Spaniards could not
dislodge them, though they appeared to make their attacks with so much
judgment and vigour as to compel the enemy to remain on the defensive.
In the present case the attack was unsuccessful, the patriots being
compelled to retire without accomplishing their object.
After this affair was concluded, several Spanish officers came on board
the _Impérieuse_, and spoke confidently of being able to drive in the
French advanced force as soon as General Reding’s force joined. They
informed me that the presence of the _Impérieuse_ and _Cambrian_ had
been of great use, by compelling the French to keep a considerable
portion of their troops in the town, and to employ others in manning the
coast batteries, so that few were available for operations elsewhere;
but beyond this we had no opportunity of assisting the patriots, as the
heights to which the enemy clung so tenaciously were beyond the reach of
shot or shell from the ships.
On the 19th I received information of the French having invested Rosas,
and knowing that Lord Collingwood attached considerable importance to
this place, I considered it my duty, in accordance with his lordship’s
instructions, to proceed in that direction, hoping that the _Impérieuse_
might there render substantial service; we therefore left the _Cambrian_
before Barcelona, and made sail for Rosas, where we arrived on the
following day. As it fell calm, the ship was compelled to anchor ten
miles from the fortress.
On our arrival a heavy cannonade was going on between the ships and a
French battery thrown up on the cliff above Fort Trinidad. The
_Impérieuse_, as has been said, being out of range, I took the gig and
landed in the town, to ascertain how we might best employ ourselves.
Having satisfied myself on this point, I sent back the gig with orders
for the frigate to make every effort to get within range of the French
troops surrounding the town, so as to enfilade them. As the calm
continued, she was, however, unable to approach till the following day,
I meanwhile remaining in Rosas, to encourage the Spanish troops, whose
spirit was beginning to give way.
Previous to our arrival the marines of the _Excellent_, together with
some Spanish troops, had occupied the citadel. Many of these having been
wounded, the _Excellent_ took upwards of forty on board and sailed,
leaving the _Fame_ to watch the place, and her commander withdrew some
thirty marines, who, with sixty or seventy Spaniards, occupied Fort
Trinidad. The departure of the _Excellent_ in the first place, and the
withdrawal of the marines in the second, greatly dispirited the
Spaniards, who on the evening of the 21st began to quit the town in
boats.
A brief outline of what had occurred previous to my arrival in the
_Impérieuse_, will here be requisite, in order to comprehend the events
which followed. On the 6th of November a body of 6000 French, or rather
Italians, coming from Figueras, had taken possession of the town and the
heights commanding the roads. The inhabitants forthwith fled; but the
_Excellent_ and _Meteor_, then lying in the harbour, speedily drove out
the invaders.
On the assault of the town some of the inhabitants had fled to the
citadel, which was in a wretched condition, one of its bastions having
been blown down during the last war; and such had been the negligence of
the Spanish military authorities, that it had received no better repair
than a few planks and loose stones; whilst the stores were even in a
more wretched condition than the works. It was, however, necessary to
put it, as far as possible, in a defensible condition, and to this
Captain West, of the _Excellent_, energetically applied himself.
To the eastward of the town, on an eminence commanding the harbour,
stood Fort Trinidad, of which a description will presently be given. In
this fortress Captain West placed five-and-twenty of the _Excellent’s_
marines, in addition to the Spaniards who manned the fort; and, at the
same time, sent fifty seamen into the citadel to support the garrison.
The Spanish governor, O’Daly, now sent a request to the Junta of Gerona
for reinforcements; but the French, managing to intercept his
despatches, caused it to be reported to the Junta that the English had
taken forcible possession of the fortress, and deposed the governor;
whereupon, in place of sending reinforcements, the Junta wrote to
Captain West, demanding an explanation of conduct so extraordinary, and,
till this explanation revealed the trick, it remained undiscovered.
On the 9th the citadel was attacked by General Reille, and a breach
effected; but Captain West, placing the _Meteor_ in a position to flank
the breach, and sending some boats to enfilade the shore, prevented the
assault, and despatching more seamen to the citadel, the next day it was
again in a tolerably defensive state, so much so that Captain West had
sallied out with the seamen and effected the rescue of a party of
Catalonian militia.
The French commander, thus foiled by the gallantry and judgment of
Captain West, now deemed it necessary to proceed against Rosas by
regular siege, but first made an attempt to storm Fort Trinidad, in
which he was repulsed with considerable loss; but the fort was so much
in danger that, in order to prevent surprise, Captain West reinforced it
with thirty additional marines, who entered by means of rope ladders.
The French now, despite opposition from the ships, began to erect
batteries on the heights for the demolition of Fort Trinidad, and threw
up an entrenchment 300 yards from the citadel, for the purpose of
breaching that also. A 3-gun battery opened against the town walls, and
the joint effect of these being occasionally directed against the ships
compelled them to retire out of range.
Captain West was now superseded by Captain Bennett of the _Fame_, and,
as a breach had nearly been effected in the lower bomb proof of Fort
Trinidad, Captain Bennett withdrew the marines. At this juncture I
arrived at Rosas in the _Impérieuse_, having, indeed, come there to
render what assistance I could to the Spaniards, and, knowing the
endurance, as well as indomitable bravery of the Catalan or
_Michelet_[41] character; feeling, moreover, assured that the Junta of
Gerona would supply early assistance, I determined to replace the
marines which Captain Bennett had withdrawn, with others from my own
frigate. As it was generally known amongst vessels on the Mediterranean
station that I was acting under discretionary orders from Lord
Collingwood, Captain Bennett, though he had withdrawn his own men, and
notwithstanding that he was my senior officer, did not attempt to thwart
my resolution, probably because he considered that by so doing he might
be interfering with the instructions given me by Lord Collingwood.
-----
Footnote 41:
A name given at this period to the irregular Catalonian troops, as
well as to other Spaniards embodied with them, from one of their old
leaders, Michelet de Prato, the companion of Cæsar Borgia, and the
principal agent in many of his atrocities. In the old wars of Arragon,
they were called Almogavares, and at the period of which I write had
lost little of their traditional daring, or that ready ingenuity in
difficulties, which supplied the want of a more efficient warlike
equipment.
-----
On the 22nd, after having given further instructions on board the
_Impérieuse_ for annoying the enemy during my absence, I again went on
shore to the citadel, into which the French were incessantly throwing
shells, but without much effect; for although every shell fell within
the place, the shelter was excellent, and no great damage was done.
Having ascertained the position of the enemy’s entrenchments, I returned
on board, and despatched a party from the frigate to fire upon them at
the distance of about 600 yards, as well as to harass the batteries in
course of construction. The work was so well performed by our men as to
embarrass the troops in the batteries, and thus lessen their fire on the
citadel, the preservation of which, till further assistance should
arrive, was my principal object. A battery of 24-pounders on the top of
a cliff, and therefore inaccessible to our fire, kept up, however, an
unremitting fire on Fort Trinidad, every shot striking; but the fort
being bomb-proof, without injury to the little garrison, which, like
that of the citadel, was well sheltered, but had no means of returning
the fire except occasionally by musketry.
After pounding away at the fort for several days, the French made up
their minds to storm, but on coming within range of musket-shot, they
got such a reception from the garrison as to render a hasty retreat
imperative. As their discomfiture was visible from the ship, we fired a
salute of twenty-one guns by way of sarcastic compliment, but the enemy
had not the politeness to return the courtesy.
The _Impérieuse_ now got under weigh, and cleared for action, taking up
a position to the left of the citadel, and within musket-shot of the
French lines, into which we poured such a storm of shot as to drive out
the enemy. Satisfied with the success, I went on shore at Rosas, and got
700 Spaniards to embark in the boats, afterwards putting them on board a
light vessel, with the intention of landing them at the back of Fort
Trinidad, so as to dislodge the troops from the battery on the cliff,
and throw the guns over. The movement was, however, detected by the
French commander, and a force which had just been engaged at a distance
was hastily recalled, and rushed on, driving the Spaniards and some
Germans before them. Manning the batteries, the French instantly turned
their attention to the _Impérieuse_, against which they directed such a
well-aimed shower of shells as rendered it imperative to get under sail
and anchor out of range.
The firing between the batteries and the citadel was kept up during the
night without intermission, and at daylight the Spaniards we had landed
for the attack on the cliff battery appeared in such confusion, that it
became necessary to despatch the boats to bring off a party of marines,
who had been put on shore with them. Our men reported that the Spaniards
had unaccountably refused to follow them to the attack, and, as is usual
in such cases, had suffered far more severely than they would have done
had they persevered in the attempt to capture the battery. On sending
boats to bring off the Spaniards we only got 300 out of the 700, the
remainder being either killed or made prisoners.
On the 23rd we again ran in under Fort Trinidad, but this time on the
opposite side to the battery on the cliff, where we could effect
considerable mischief, without receiving much in return. It now fell
dead calm, so that it was lucky we had not taken up our former position,
where we might have been terribly annoyed.
The French, without paying much attention to us, now appeared to
redouble their efforts against both castle and citadel, whilst their
troops mustered strongly on the hills, with the evident intention of an
attack on both, the moment a breach became practicable.
Finding this to be the case, the _Fame_ withdrew her marines from Fort
Trinidad, upon which I went ashore, and after careful inspection of the
breach in course of formation, considering it still capable of prolonged
defence, begged the commandant to hold out till next day, when he should
be reinforced with marines from the _Impérieuse_, promising at the same
time to remain myself in the fortress with the men. With some difficulty
he was induced to consent to this arrangement, after telling me that it
had been his intention to capitulate on the same evening.
Nor was the Spanish governor at all to blame for his intention to
surrender the fortress. Captain Bennett had withdrawn his men, thinking,
no doubt, that it was untenable, and that therefore nothing was to be
gained by their exposure; so that the Spanish governor might fairly
plead that further resistance had been deemed unavailing by the English
themselves.
Lord Collingwood had, however, entrusted me with discretionary orders to
assist the Spaniards, and it appeared to me that the present was an
instance where those orders might be carried into effect, for I had no
doubt, if assistance arrived promptly, that the French would be
compelled to raise the siege of Rosas, as they had done that of Gerona.
In which case they would find themselves isolated at Barcelona; and
being cut off, as they already were by land, and exposed to bombardment
by sea, must surrender. The occupation of Catalonia, in short, turned on
two points; 1st, whether the Junta of Gerona supplied an adequate
reinforcement; and, 2ndly, whether I could hold Fort Trinidad till it
arrived. Neither do I blame Captain Bennett for withdrawing his men. It
was simply matter of opinion, his being that neither fort nor citadel
would long hold out—mine, formed on actual inspection of the fort, that
it was still in a condition to maintain itself, and being so, that its
retention was essential for the preservation of the town and citadel.
And had there been a little more alacrity on the part of the Gerona
Junta in supplying reinforcements, that opinion would have been
justified. Captain Bennett perhaps knew the dilatory habits of the
Spaniards better than I did; but although my senior officer, he was
disinterested enough not in any way to interfere with my plans.
Before daylight on the 24th we landed fifty men, ordering all the
marines to follow after sunset. Our first object was to effect such
repairs as would put the fort in a better state of defence, and this was
accomplished without any great difficulty, as the French were confining
their attention to one particular spot, where, by a constant succession
of quick firing, they hoped to make a practicable breach. This we could
not prevent, having no artillery to reply to theirs.
My principal ground for a belief in the practicability of holding the
fort arose from the peculiar form and thickness of the walls, to
penetrate which was no easy matter, if resolutely defended. Even if
eventually successful, it would not be difficult to evacuate the fort by
the lower portion, before the enemy could establish themselves in the
upper, whilst a well constructed mine would involve both them and the
castle in one common ruin.
The Castle of Trinidad stood on the side of a hill, having by no means a
difficult descent to the sea, but this hill was again commanded by a
higher and more precipitous cliff, which would have enabled an enemy to
drive out the occupants with ease, but for the peculiar construction of
the fortress.
Next to the sea was a fort constructed with strong walls some 50 feet
high. Behind this and joined to it, rose another fort to the height of
30 or 40 feet more, and behind this again was a tower rising some 20 or
30 feet still higher, the whole presenting the appearance of a large
church with a tower 110 feet high, a nave 90 feet high, and a chancel 50
feet. The tower, having its back to the cliff, as a matter of course
sheltered the middle and lower portions of the fortress from a fire of
the battery above it. Nothing, in short, for a fortress commanded by
adjacent heights could have been better adapted for holding out against
offensive operations, or worse adapted for replying to them; this on our
part being out of the question, as the French battery was too much
elevated on the cliff for artillery to reach, whilst the tower which
prevented their shot from annoying us, would also have prevented our
firing at them, even had we possessed artillery.
It was to this tower therefore that the French chiefly directed their
attention, as a practicable breach therein, followed by a successful
assault, would in their estimation place the fortress at their mercy, so
that we must either be driven out or forced to surrender. In consequence
of the elevated position of the enemy’s battery on the cliff, they could
however only breach the central portion of the tower, the lowest part of
the breach being nearly sixty feet above its base, so that when
practicable, it could only be reached by long scaling ladders.
A pretty correct idea of our relative positions may be formed if the
unnautical reader will imagine our small force to be placed in the nave
of Westminster Abbey, with the enemy attacking the great western tower
from the summit of a cliff 100 feet higher than the tower, so that the
breach in course of formation nearly corresponded to the great west
window of the abbey. It will hence be clear that, in the face of a
determined opposition, it would be no easy matter to scale the external
wall of the tower up to the great west window, and more difficult still
to overcome impediments presently to be mentioned, so as to get down
into the body of the church. These were the points I had to provide
against, for we could neither prevent the French from breaching nor
storming.
It so happened, that just at the spot where the breach was in process of
formation, there was a lofty bomb proof interior arch, upwards of fifty
feet in height. This arch, reaching from the lower part of the breach to
the interior base of the tower, was without much difficulty converted
into an obstacle, of which the French little dreamed; viz. into a chasm,
down which they must have plunged headlong had they attempted to
penetrate an inch beyond the outer wall, even after they had gained it.
The only operation necessary was to break in the crown of the arch, so
that all who on an assault ventured on penetrating farther than the
outer wall of the breach, must of necessity be hurled to the bottom. But
as the fall of a portion of the enemy might not deter the rest from
holding possession of the outer wall till they were provided with the
means of overcoming the obstacle, I got together all the timber at hand,
and constructed a huge wooden case, exactly resembling the hopper of a
mill—the upper part being kept well greased with cooks’ slush from the
_Impérieuse_, so that to retain a hold upon it was impossible. Down
this, with the slightest pressure from behind, the storming party must
have fallen to a depth of fifty feet, and all they could have done, if
not killed, would have been to remain prisoners at the bottom of the
bomb proof.
The mantrap being thus completed,—and to do the Spaniards justice, they
entered with ardour into the work,—the next object was to prepare trains
for the explosion of the magazines, in case evacuation of the fort
became compulsory. This was done in two places; the first deposit of
powder being placed underneath the breach, with the portfire so
arranged, as to go off in about ten minutes; the other beneath the
remaining part of the fortress, with a portfire calculated to burn until
we ourselves were safe on board the frigate.
The French were highly exasperated on finding that the castle had been
reinforced from the _Impérieuse_, of which ship they had by this time
not a few unpleasant reminiscences; they therefore adopted additional
measures to put a stop to our co-operation.
In addition to the previously mentioned battery, another was erected on
the cliff commanding the fortress; and on the 25th, upwards of 300 shots
were directed at the tower, the result being a hole, which speedily
widened into a tolerable breach. Our men were now engaged in blocking it
up as fast as it was made, and working as they did under cover, no loss
was sustained, though every shot brought down large masses of stone
within the fortress; the French thus supplying us with materials for
repair, though rendering a sharp look-out against splinters necessary.
On this day I received a wound, which caused me intolerable agony. Being
anxious, during an ominous pause, to see what the enemy were about, I
incautiously looked round an angle of the tower towards the battery
overhead, and was struck by a stone splinter in the face; the splinter
flattening my nose and then penetrating my mouth. By the skill of our
excellent doctor, Mr. Guthrie, my nose was after a time rendered
serviceable.
Whilst the enemy were breaching the tower, the boats of the _Impérieuse_
inflicted on them such severe chastisement, that detachments of infantry
were stationed on the hills to drive off the boats with musketry; but
our people managed to keep out of harm’s way, whilst directing a
destructive fire upon the nearer portion of our opponents.
On the 26th the French renewed their fire; but as during the previous
night we had filled up the breach with loose rubble, their progress was
by no means rapid, the rubble forming almost as great an obstacle as did
the wall itself. It was, however, evident that the breach must sooner or
later become practicable, so that we turned our attention to the
erection of interior barricades, in case of a sudden attempt to storm.
In addition to these barricades festoons of top chains were brought from
the ship, and suspended over the hopper and elsewhere; the chains being
moreover armed with large fishhooks, so securely fastened, that there
was little danger of those who were caught, getting away before they
were shot.
The barricades constituted what may be termed a rampart within the
breach, constructed of palisades, barrels, bags of earth, &c., these
supplying the place of walls, whilst the descent from the crown of the
bombproof to the bottom, constituted a formidable substitute for a
ditch.
We got to-day a trifling though welcome reinforcement of sixty regular
Spanish, or rather Irish troops in the Spanish service, and sent an
equal number of peasants to Rosas; for though these men were brave, as
are all Catalans, and ready enough, yet their want of military skill
rendered them ill adapted to the work in hand. As soon as the Irish
comprehended our means of defence, and the reception prepared for the
enemy, their delight at the prospective mischief was highly
characteristic, and could not have been exceeded had they been preparing
for a “scrimmage” in their native country.
At midnight the French made a general assault on the town of Rosas, and
after several hours’ hard fighting obtained possession. The _Impérieuse_
and _Fame_ now approached, and commenced a fire which must have caused
great loss to the besiegers, but which failed to dispossess them.
Towards morning—when too late—a detachment of 2000 Spanish troops
arrived from Gerona! Six hours earlier would have saved the town, the
preservation of which was the only object in retaining the fortress.
The practice of the French when breaching the walls of Rosas, was
beautiful. So skilfully was their artillery conducted, that, to use a
schoolboy similitude, every discharge “ruled a straight line” along the
lower part of the walls; this being repeated till the upper portion was
without support, as a matter of course, the whole fell in the ditch,
forming a breach of easy ascent. This operation constituted an object of
great interest to us in the fortress, from which the whole proceedings
were clearly visible.
Having secured the town, the French redoubled their efforts against the
castle, and had they continued with the same vigour, we must have been
driven out. Two of our marines were killed by shot, as was a third by a
stone splinter, so that with all my desire to hold out, I began to doubt
the propriety of sacrificing men to the preservation of a place which
could not be long tenable.
The French being also heartily tired of the loss they were sustaining
from the fire of the ships and boats, sent us a flag of truce, with the
offer of honourable capitulation. This being declined on our part, the
firing recommenced more heavily than before.
On the 28th the fire of the enemy slackened, their troops being engaged
in throwing up intrenchments and constructing batteries in the town, a
second detachment of Spanish troops being on its way now that the place
had fallen. Soon after midday they sent a small party with another flag
of truce. As it was, however, evident that their object was this time to
spy out the state of our defences, we threw some hand grenades towards
them, to show that we would not hold any parley, on which they retired,
and the firing was again renewed.
On the 29th the French opened upon the castle from five different
batteries on the hills, but without damage to life, as our men were now
kept close. The ships and bombs, however, directed upon them a
destructive fire with shot and shell, which considerably damped their
ardour. To-day all access to the citadel was cut off, the French having
succeeded in erecting batteries on both sides the sea gates, so that all
communication with the boats was rendered impossible.
The dawn of the 30th might have been our last, but from the
interposition of what some persons may call presentiment. Long before
daylight I was awoke with an impression that the enemy were in
possession of the castle, though the stillness which prevailed showed
this to be a delusion. Still I could not recompose myself to sleep, and
after lying for some time tossing about, I left my couch, and hastily
went on the esplanade of the fortress. All was perfectly still, and I
felt half ashamed of having given way to such fancies.
A loaded mortar, however, stood before me, pointed, during the day, in
such a direction that the shell should fall on the path over the hill
which the French must necessarily take whenever they might make an
attempt to storm. Without other object than that of diverting my mind
from the unpleasant feeling which had taken possession of it, I fired
the mortar. Before the echo had died away, a volley of musketry from the
advancing column of the enemy showed that the shell had fallen amongst
them, just as they were on the point of storming.
Rushing on, their bullets pattered like hail on the walls of the fort.
To man these was the work of a moment; for, as may be supposed, our
fellows did not wait for another summons, and the first things barely
discernible amidst the darkness were the French scaling ladders ready to
be placed at the foot of the breach, with an attendant body of troops
waiting to ascend, but hesitating, as though the unexpected shell from
our mortar rendered them uncertain as to our preparations for defence.
To the purposeless discharge of that piece of ordnance we owed our
safety, for otherwise they would have been upon us before we even
suspected their presence; and so exasperated were they at our obstinate
defence, that very little attention would have been paid to any demand
for quarter. The French deserved great credit for a silence in their
movements which had not even attracted the attention of the sentries on
the tower.
Whilst the enemy were hesitating, we became better prepared, our men
being ready at every point which commanded the breach. It was not in the
nature of the French to slink off on being detected. In a few minutes on
they came up the ladders, to the certainty of getting either into the
mantrap, or of being hurled from the walls as fast as they came up,
retreat being for a short time impossible, on account of the pressure
from behind. There was now just light enough for them to see the chasm
before them, and the wall was crowded with hesitating men. About forty
had gained the summit of the breach, all of whom were swept off with our
fire; whilst a crowd was waiting below for the chance of sharing the
same fate. Giving them no time for deliberation, several shells which
had been suspended by ropes half-way down the wall, were ignited, our
hand grenades were got to work, and these, together with the musketry,
told fearfully on the mass—which wavered for a few moments, and then
retreated amidst the loud huzzas of our fellows. The French, however,
gallantly carried off their wounded, though they were compelled to leave
the dead, who, till the following morning, lay in a heap close to the
foot of the tower.
Scarcely had we got rid of our assailants, when a numerous body of
troops came down from the hills with muskets firing and drums beating,
nothing doubting that their comrades were in possession of the fortress.
Our lads, having their hands now free, returned their fire with
excellent effect, dropping some at every discharge; when at length,
finding that the assault had failed, and that we were able to offer
effectual resistance, the detachment retreated up the hills as fast as
they could, amidst the derisive cheering of our men.
The force which formed the storming party, consisted, as we afterwards
learned from our prisoners, of one company of grenadiers, two of
carabineers, and four of the voltigeurs of the 1st Light Regiment of
Italy, in all about 1200 men. They were gallantly led, two of the
officers attracting my especial attention. The first was dropped by a
shot, which precipitated him from the walls, but whether he was killed
or only wounded, I do not know, probably wounded only, as his body was
not seen by us amongst the dead. The other was the last man to quit the
walls, and before he could do so, I had covered him with my musket.
Finding escape impossible, he stood like a hero to receive the bullet,
without condescending to lower his sword in token of surrender. I never
saw a braver or a prouder man. Lowering my musket, I paid him the
compliment of remarking, that so fine a fellow was not born to be shot
down like a dog, and that, so far as I was concerned, he was at liberty
to make the best of his way down the ladder; upon which intimation he
bowed as politely as though on parade, and retired just as leisurely.
In this affair we had only three men killed—one of the marines and two
Spaniards, another Spaniard being shot through the thigh and the Spanish
governor of the fortress through the hand; there were, however, a few
minor casualties. The total loss of the enemy, judging from the dead
left behind—upwards of fifty—must have been severe. My determination not
to quit the fortress was therefore increased, as there was every reason
to be satisfied with the efficacy of my hopper trap and fish-hook
chains. In short, it was impossible for any one to get over the one or
through the other. Not a Frenchman had advanced beyond the outer wall.
After this the enemy did not molest us much, except with musketry, which
did no damage, as our men were well under cover. They, however, turned
their attention to the citadel, the Spanish garrison replying smartly to
their fire. The Spaniards with us in the castle likewise behaved with
great gallantry, as did the soldiers of the Irish brigades in the
Spanish service, by whom the peasants before mentioned had been
supplanted. Had the latter remained, the repulse of our assailants might
have been more difficult, though equally certain.
On the 1st of December we passed a tolerably quiet day, the French being
engaged in erecting a new battery, to annoy our boats when coming on
shore, with which they appeared to content themselves.
The 2nd passed over in the same quiet way.
On the 3rd the troops in the citadel made a sortie, apparently in the
hope of dislodging the French from their intrenchments, and an obstinate
engagement ensued, with considerable loss on both sides. By the time
this was over, our friends on the hill had nearly completed another new
battery, and were trying its effect on us somewhat unpleasantly, every
shot knocking down great quantities of stone. A still more unpleasant
circumstance was, that a heavy gale of wind had arisen, before which the
_Impérieuse_ was visibly dragging her anchors, and might be compelled to
go to sea, leaving us to defend ourselves till her return.
On the 4th, the French opened all their batteries on the citadel, eleven
of their guns being brought to bear upon the old breach elsewhere
mentioned as never having been properly repaired. At this point an
immense number of shot and shell were directed, and towards night a
breach was nearly practicable. This operation against the citadel
seeming decisive, the new battery on the hill began upon us in the
castle with redoubled vengeance, and every shot told with effect; the
object no doubt being to storm both fortresses simultaneously on the
following day.
An unfortunate accident occurred in the castle to-day. Five of our men
were loading a gun, intended for employment against a body of French
troops, who were throwing up an intrenchment below us, with the evident
object of cutting us off from retreat or communication with the frigate;
by some mischance the gun exploded, blowing off the arms of a marine,
who died soon after, and knocking a seaman over the castle wall, a depth
of fifty feet. The poor fellow was taken up by the boat’s crew, and
carried on board in a dreadfully shattered condition.
At daylight on the 5th, the French again opened their batteries on the
citadel, and by 8 A.M. the breach was quite practicable. A large body of
troops had assembled for the assault, but the firing suddenly ceased on
both sides, and from the number of men lounging about the breach, it was
clear that a capitulation was in progress. Under these circumstances it
became my duty not to sacrifice our marines and seamen to the mere
excitement of fighting a whole army which could now pay us undivided
attention. We therefore began to think of taking our departure, and
getting our baggage collected, we made signals to the _Impérieuse_ for
all boats to be in readiness to take us off, if the garrison in the
citadel should capitulate. The battery, however, continued firing upon
us as usual, and with decisive effect on the tower. Without taking any
notice of this, we laid trains ready for blowing up the fort.
Soon after our signals were made, the _Fame_ and _Magnificent_—the
latter of which had recently come into the anchorage—got under weigh and
beat towards the landing-place. Our signals having been also understood
by the French, the batteries overhead ceased firing, and a number of
troops approached to take possession. At 11 A.M. we made the signal for
the boats—the _Impérieuse_ attending them close in shore.
We now commenced evacuating the fortress, sending down the troops of the
Bourbon regiment first; the Irish brigade next, and our marines and
seamen last. On the boats pulling in, the ships opened fire with shot
and shell upon the French. We did not, however, receive any molestation
from the latter, whilst our men went down the rope ladders out of the
fort, and by one o’clock all were out of the castle except the gunner
and myself, we having remained to light the portfires attached to the
trains.
After this we got into the boats also unopposed, but the moment they
pulled off from the shore the French opened upon us with musketry and
round shot, fortunately without injury to any one. A stiff breeze now
blowing, enabled the _Impérieuse_ to get close in, so that we were soon
on board.
The French having become practically acquainted with some of our devices
were on their guard, and did not take possession of the castle
immediately on our quitting it, and it was lucky for them that they did
not, for shortly after we got on board the first explosion took place,
blowing up the portion of the fortress which they had been breaching;
but the second train failed, owing, no doubt, to the first shock
disarranging the portfire. Had not this been the case, scarcely one
stone of the castle would have remained on another.
In the evening I directed the _Impérieuse_ to get under weigh and stand
towards La Escala, where we landed the Spanish troops. On the following
morning the _Fame_ parted company for Lord Collingwood’s fleet; and
leaving the _Magnificent_ at anchor with the bombs, we stood towards San
Felin, having the mortification of seeing the French flag flying over
what remained of the Castle of Trinidad, which we had so pertinaciously
endeavoured to defend, and failing in this, should have wholly destroyed
but for the accident of the second portfire becoming out of order.
In the defence of this fortress, we lost only three killed and seven
wounded; the loss of the Spaniards amounting to two killed and five
wounded. Next to the thorough accomplishment of the work in hand my care
was for the lives of the men. Indeed, it is matter of congratulation to
me that no commander having gone through such service ever had fewer men
killed. Lord St. Vincent on a former occasion gave this as a reason for
not promoting my officers, but even a rebuff so unworthy failed to
induce me to depart from my system of taking care of the men, the death
of one of whom would have affected me more than the death of a hundred
enemies, because it would, in my estimation, have been attributable to
my own want of foresight.
The destruction of the French must have been very great. We who were
cooped up in the fortress had only one collision with them, but in that
they suffered fearfully, whilst we escaped scot free. But the fire of
the ships must have told upon them to a great extent.
The subjoined letters from Lord Collingwood to the Secretary of the
Admiralty constitute the only commendations I received for the services
detailed in the preceding chapters.
_Extract of a letter from_ VICE-ADMIRAL LORD COLLINGWOOD _to the_ HON.
W. W. POLE, _dated on board the_ Ocean, _Dec. 14, 1808_.
“My letter of the 1st instant would inform you of the enemy having
laid siege to the castle of Rosas, and of the measures taken by the
British ships in that bay in aid of the Spaniards for its defence. The
_Scout_ joined the squadron off Toulon on the 7th, and by her I
received further accounts from Captain Bennett, of the _Fame_, of the
progress the enemy was making against that important fortress.
“Captain Lord Cochrane has maintained himself in the possession of
Trinity castle with great ability and heroism. Although the fort is
laid open by the breach in its works, he has sustained and repelled
several assaults, having formed a sort of rampart within the breach
with his ship’s hammock cloths, awnings, &c., filled with sand and
rubbish. _The zeal and energy with which he has maintained that
fortress excites the highest admiration. His resources for every
exigency have no end._ The Spanish governor of the castle is wounded
and on board the _Meteor_.
“COLLINGWOOD.”
This expression of opinion on the part of Lord Collingwood should have
procured me some commendation from the Naval authorities at home; the
more so as it was spontaneous on his lordship’s part, no official
despatch from me on the subject having at that time reached him. I was,
however, a black sheep at the Admiralty, and, had it been my good
fortune to have been instrumental in raising the siege of Rosas, the
only care taken by the Tory Government at home would, in all
probability, have been how to conceal a knowledge of the fact from the
public. After the evacuation and destruction of the fortress I addressed
to Lord Collingwood the subjoined despatch.
“H. M. Ship _Impérieuse_, Bay of Rosas,
5th Dec. 1808.
“MY LORD,—The fortress of Rosas being attacked by an army of Italians
in the service of France (in pursuance of discretionary orders which
your lordship gave me, to assist the Spaniards whenever it could be
done with most effect), I hastened here. The citadel on the 22nd
instant was already half invested, and the enemy was making his
approaches towards the south-west bastion, which your lordship knows
was blown down last war by the explosion of a magazine and tumbled
into the ditch; a few thin planks and dry stones had been put up by
the Spanish engineers, perhaps to hide the defect; all things were in
the most deplorable state without and within; even measures for their
powder and saws for their fuses were not to be had, and mats and axes
supplied their place. The castle of Trinity, situated on an eminence,
but commanded by heights, was also invested. Three 24-pounders
battered in breach, to which a fourth was afterwards added, and a
passage through the wall to the lower bomb-proof being nearly effected
on the 23rd, the marines of the _Fame_ were withdrawn. I went to
examine the state of the castle, and, as the senior officer in the bay
had not officially altered the orders I received from your lordship, I
thought this a good opportunity, by occupying a post on which the
acknowledged safety of the citadel depended, to render them an
effectual service. The remaining garrison consisted of about eighty
Spaniards, who were on the point of surrendering; accordingly, I threw
myself into the fort with fifty seamen and thirty marines of the
_Impérieuse_. The arrangements I made need not be detailed to your
lordship; suffice it to say, that about a thousand bags (made of old
sails), besides barrels and palisades, supplied the place of walls and
ditches, and that the enemy, who assaulted the castle on the 30th with
full 1000 picked men, were repulsed with the loss of their commanding
officer, storming equipage, and all who had attempted to mount the
breach. The Spanish garrison having been changed, gave good
assistance. As to the officers, seamen, and marines of this ship, the
fatigues they underwent, and the gallant manner in which they behaved,
deserve every praise. I must, however, particularly mention Lieutenant
Johnson, of the navy, Lieutenant Hoare, of the marines, Mr. Burney,
the gunner, Mr. Lodowick, the carpenter, and Messrs. Stewart, Sloven,
and Marryat, midshipmen.
“Captain Hall, of the _Lucifer_, at all times and in every way gave
his zealous assistance. I feel also indebted to Captain Collens, of
the _Meteor_, for his aid.
“The citadel of Rosas capitulated at twelve o’clock this day. Seeing,
my lord, farther resistance in the castle of Trinity useless, and
impracticable against the whole army, the attention of which had
naturally turned to its reduction; after firing the trains for
exploding the magazines, we embarked in the boats of the
_Magnificent_, _Impérieuse_, and _Fame_.
“I have the honour to be, &c.
(Signed) “COCHRANE.
“The Right Hon. Lord Collingwood.”
LORD COLLINGWOOD’S _Letter to the Admiralty._
“H.M. Ship _Ocean_, Jan. 7. 1809.
“SIR,—The _Impérieuse_ having with other ships been employed in the
Bay of Rosas, to assist the Spaniards in defending that fortress, and
Captain Lord Cochrane having taken on himself the defence of Trinity
Castle, an outwork of that garrison, I have received from him a
letter, dated the 5th of December, a copy of which is enclosed,
stating the surrender of Rosas by the Spaniards on that day, and of
his having embarked the garrison of Trinity Castle on board his ship
from the castle destroyed.
“The heroic spirit and ability which have been evinced by Lord
Cochrane in defending this castle, although so shattered in its works,
against the repeated attacks of the enemy, is an admirable instance of
his lordship’s zeal; and the distinguished conduct of Lieutenants
Johnson and Hoare, of the Royal Marines, and the officers and men
employed in this affair under his lordship, will, doubtless, be very
gratifying to my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
(Signed, &c.) “COLLINGWOOD.
“To the Secretary of the Admiralty.”
To these despatches I may be pardoned for appending the following
extract from the _Gerona Gazette_, as it appeared in the Naval Chronicle
of 1809.
LORD COCHRANE.
The Spanish _Gerona Gazette_, when inserting a letter from Lord
Cochrane, January 1, 1809, subjoins the following liberal testimony to
his noble conduct:—
“This gallant Englishman has been entitled to the admiration and
gratitude of this country from the first moment of its political
resurrection. His generosity in co-operating with our earliest
efforts, the encouragement we received from the interest he took with
the commanders of the Balearic islands, to induce them to succour us
with troops and ammunition, can never be erased from our recollection.
The extraordinary services which we owe to his indefatigable activity,
particularly this city and the adjacent coast, in protecting us from
the attempts of the enemy, are too well known to be repeated here. It
is a sufficient eulogium upon his character to mention, that in the
defence of the castle of Trinidad, when the Spanish flag, hoisted on
the wall, fell into the ditch, under a most dreadful fire from the
enemy, his lordship was the only person who, regardless of the shower
of balls flying about him, descended into the ditch, returned with the
flag, and happily succeeded in placing it where it was.”
Without any degree of egotism, I may—considering that no praise beyond
Lord Collingwood’s was ever awarded to me for my defence of Trinidad—be
excused from adducing the following remarks, known to be from the pen of
Sir Walter Scott.
“Thus, in consequence of our cooperation, were the French detained a
whole month before a neglected and ill-provided fortress, which,
without that cooperation, could not have resisted the first attack.
The event might have been different had there been a floating army off
the coast—the whole of the besieging force might then have been cut
off. Of the errors which the English Government committed in the
conduct of the Spanish war, the neglect of this obvious and most
important means of annoying the enemy, and advantaging our allies, is
the most extraordinary. Five thousand men, at the disposal of Lord
Cochrane or Sir Sidney Smith, or any of those numerous officers in the
British Navy who have given undoubted proofs of their genius as well
as courage, would have rendered more service to the common cause _than
five times that number on shore_, because they could at all times
choose their points of attack, and the enemy, never knowing where to
expect them, would everywhere be in fear, and everywhere in reach of
the shore in danger.
“Lord Cochrane, during the month of September 1808, with his single
ship the _Impérieuse_, kept the whole coast of Languedoc in
alarm,—destroyed the numerous semaphoric telegraphs, which were of the
utmost consequence to the numerous coasting convoys of the French, and
not only prevented any troops from being sent from that province into
Spain, but even excited such dismay that 2000 men were withdrawn from
Figueras to oppose him, when they would otherwise have been marching
farther into the peninsula. The coasting trade was entirely suspended
during this alarm; yet with such consummate prudence were all Lord
Cochrane’s enterprises planned and executed, that _not one of his men
were either killed or hurt_, except one, who was singed in blowing up
a battery.”
For none of the services detailed in the last two chapters did I ever
receive praise or reward from the Admiralty authorities! though from the
nature of the services they were necessarily accompanied by the
deprivation of all chance of prize-money, either to myself, officers, or
crew. The check opposed to the advance of the French in Catalonia—as
testified by Lord Collingwood—was therefore made at _my expense_,
without costing a farthing to the nation beyond the expenditure of
ammunition; a strange contrast to some of the costly expeditions of the
period for less results, and one which ought to have secured for me
anything but the political animosity with which all my services were
regarded.
CHAP. XVIII.
CRUISE OF THE _IMPÉRIEUSE_ CONTINUED.
DEFEAT OF THE SPANIARDS.—ATTACK SOME FRENCH VESSELS.—FRENCH
OPERATIONS.—LETTER OF LORD COCHRANE.—LORD COLLINGWOOD.—OPERATIONS OF
THE ENEMY.—FALL IN WITH THE CYRENE.—SAIL FOR MINORCA.—APPLY FOR
LEAVE.—MOTIVES FOR LEAVING.—APATHY OF THE GOVERNMENT.—REPROACHED FOR
SERVICE.—NEGLECT OF THE ADMIRALTY.
When in the roads of San Felin, on the 7th of December, a boat came off
with a request from the Spanish commandant that I would reconnoitre the
enemy’s position in the direction of Gerona. I had, at first,
considerable doubts whether compliance with a request to act in a
military capacity came within the sphere of a naval officer’s duty; but
considering that Lord Collingwood’s instructions were to aid the
Spaniards by any means within my power, I resolved for once to forego my
reluctance to leave the frigate, and accordingly accompanied the
commandant and his staff in the direction of the enemy, whom we found
assembled in such numbers as to render successful opposition out of the
question.
Being unable to advise the Spaniards in this locality to adopt any
beneficial course, or indeed how to act in any effective way against the
enemy, we again sailed in the direction of Barcelona, where a Spanish
force of 40,000 men, under General Vives, was closely investing the
town, so as to cut off supplies from the French garrison. As the
consequent scarcity of provisions affected the inhabitants also, all who
could afford to hire boats were quitting the place with their families;
the garrison offering no obstacle.
On the 17th, a body of French—or rather Italian troops embodied in the
French army—made their appearance for the purpose of relieving the
garrison. As they numbered only about 10,000, and the Spaniards fully
40,000, posted on the top of a hill, with every advantage in their
favour, the defeat of the Franco-Italians appeared so much a matter of
course as to induce me to go on shore to witness the engagement.
To my surprise, Vives allowed his flank to be turned, and the French
attacking in front and rear at the same time the Spaniards became
panic-struck, and fairly ran away. The rout was complete; and it was
with difficulty that I managed to get on board the frigate.
Shortly after gaining the ship, a boat full of officers was seen to put
off from the shore and make for the _Impérieuse_. On coming alongside,
it was reported to me that General Vives was amongst their number, on
which I returned a message expressive of disbelief; adding that it could
not be the general, for that to my certain knowledge he was on shore,
driving back the French who were attempting to relieve Barcelona. After
some hesitation, General Vives personally avowed himself, and demanded a
conveyance for himself, officers, and 1000 men to Tarragona; which
demand being flatly refused, they left for the _Cambrian_, which lay at
anchor not far off.
On the 19th we got under weigh, and soon after fell in with a vessel
bound for Palamos, and crowded with families escaping from Barcelona,
all of whom bitterly complained of the shameful treatment they had
experienced at the hands of the French soldiery. On the 21st we came to
off St. Philou, which had just been plundered of everything.
Nothing material occurred till the 30th, when, beating up towards
Caldagues Bay, we received intelligence that several French vessels,
bound to Barcelona with provisions for the relief of the French army,
were at anchor there. To attack these, as we had reason to believe that
there was a considerable body of the enemy at Caldagues, and as the
harbour was not more than half a mile broad, was a dangerous affair, on
account of the necessity of anchoring within point-blank range of
musketry. It was, however, of great importance that the provisions
should not reach their destination, and, in place of waiting for them to
proceed on their voyage, I decided on attacking them as the convoy lay
at anchor.
At mid-day we were close to the entrance of the harbour, and made out
the convoy and two vessels of war in charge of them, the whole being
protected by a battery and a number of French troops on the hills.
Bringing the _Impérieuse_ to an anchor we commenced firing on the
vessels of war, one of which shortly afterwards sank; when directing our
attack on her consort, she also sank and fell on her broadside, the crew
escaping on shore.
The protecting vessels being thus disposed of, we warped closer in shore
for the purpose of silencing some guns which whilst engaged in sinking
them had repeatedly struck us. In order to divide the enemy’s attention,
a party of marines was despatched to make a feint of landing near the
town, whilst with the other marines and the blue jackets we dashed on
shore between the former and the French who were still firing on us from
the battery. The latter, seeing the double attack and afraid of being
cut off from their comrades in the town, ran off to the hills,
abandoning their guns, which, on landing, we threw over the cliff, with
the exception of four brass 18-pounders and one 24-pounder, which were
taken on board the _Impérieuse_. We then blew up the magazine.
The coast being now clear, all boats were sent in to bring out eleven
vessels laden with provisions, and by dark they were all close
alongside, with our marines safely on board. They had, indeed, met with
no opposition, the French troops in the town having run away and joined
their comrades on the hills, the whole shortly afterwards marching in
the direction of Rosas. During this affair the inhabitants remained
quiet spectators on the hills—afraid to assist us, lest the French, who
were certain to return on our departure, should retaliate after their
usual fashion.
On the 31st we made an effort to raise the vessels of war which had sunk
in shallow water near the shore, and after some time, succeeded in
stopping the leak of the one which had fallen over on her broadside, and
was full of water, which being pumped out she floated and was towed
alongside the frigate.
By this time a number of Spanish boats from the neighbouring coast came
in, and without ceremony set to work plundering our prizes! It was not
till after some rough treatment from a party of marines sent for the
protection of the captured vessels, that the Spaniards were made to
comprehend that the prizes belonged to us and not to them!
Towards midnight the Spaniards gave us information that the French, with
reinforcements from Rosas, were on the point of re-entering the town. We
therefore sent a party of marines on board the brig-of-war to protect
her from recapture.
Early in the morning of the 1st of January 1809, the enemy opened upon
the brig with a smart fire of musketry, which the marines as smartly
returned,—the frigate and a gun in the pinnace meanwhile plying the
assailants with grape so effectually that they immediately abandoned
their position, and marching round a hill, commenced firing from the
other side, where, as the movement was anticipated by the frigate, they
met with a similar reception immediately on showing themselves. Finding
us fully prepared at all points, they followed the example of their
predecessors, and retreated to the hills, offering no further
opposition, whilst we were engaged in weighing the other vessel of war,
in which we succeeded also. As soon as the French saw that they could
not save either of these vessels, they abandoned the victuallers, and
again marched off in the direction of Rosas.
The 2nd was employed in repairing our prizes, and in getting off other
brass guns found on shore. On the 3rd we blew up the barrack and another
magazine close to the town, without any further interference on the part
of the enemy. Our operations being now completed, the smallest vessel of
war was despatched to Lord Collingwood, off Toulon, with the following
account of our success.
“His Majesty’s Ship _Impérieuse_, Caldagues,
2nd January, 1809.
“MY LORD,—Having received information of two French vessels of war,
and a convoy of victuallers for Barcelona being in this port, I have
the honour to inform your lordship, that they are all—amounting to
thirteen sail—in our possession.
“The French have been driven from the tower of Caldagues with the loss
of nine cannon, which they had mounted or were mounting on the
batteries.
“I have the honour, &c.
“COCHRANE.
“The Right Hon. Lord Collingwood.”
“_La Gauloise_, cutter, 7 guns and 46 men, commanded by Mr. Avanet,
Member of the Legion of Honour.
“_La Julie_, lugger, 5 guns, 4 swivels, 44 men, commanded by Mr.
Chassereau.
“And eleven victuallers.”
In consequence of which his lordship was pleased to write to the
Admiralty as follows:—
“_Copy of a Letter from_ Vice-Admiral LORD COLLINGWOOD,
_Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty’s ships and vessels in the
Mediterranean, to the_ Hon. W. W. POLE, _dated on board the_ Ocean,
_at sea, the 6th of May 1809_.
“SIR,—I inclose—to be laid before their Lordships—a letter I have
received from Lord Cochrane, captain of his Majesty’s ship
_Impérieuse_, who has been for some time past employed on the coast of
Catalonia, and where the good services of his lordship in aid of the
Spaniards and in annoyance of the enemy could not be exceeded.
“I have, &c.
“COLLINGWOOD.”
Having put to sea with our prizes, except the smallest, which we gave to
the Spaniards,—the _Impérieuse_ stood, on the 9th of January, towards
Silva, anchoring in that port at 4 P.M. Observing a battery of ten guns
mounted ashore, we landed, rolled them into the sea, and afterwards
demolished the battery without opposition.
On the 10th, the Spaniards gave us intelligence of a large detachment of
French troops being on their march from Rosas. Anticipating much the
same kind of opposition as we had experienced at Caldagues, the marines
were directed to take possession of the hill on which the demolished
battery had been placed, and soon afterwards the enemy was seen
advancing in three divisions. Shortly before reaching the hill, they
halted and reconnoitred, after which they filed off towards the opposite
mountain, and piled their arms in sight of the ship.
About noon they were reinforced by great numbers, and the whole advanced
down the hill, their skirmishers keeping up a brisk fire upon our
marines. As it was impossible for these to hold their position against
such numbers, and as there was no particular object in so doing, it
became necessary to embark them, for which purpose the boats had been
placed in readiness. On the first appearance of the reinforcement, the
French reentered their battery, but only to find the iron guns thrown in
the sea and the brass ones in our possession. Exasperated at this, they
opened upon us so heavy a fire of musketry that we were glad to get off
as fast as we could, with the loss of three men.
Scarcely had we pushed off, when they manned a lower battery, which we
had not had time to destroy—but though they fired very smartly, we had
only two men wounded. It was fortunate we took precautions to reembark
the marines in time—five minutes later would have lost us half their
number, and we might have been compelled to leave some of the wounded.
It was no less fortunate that, from the entrance being high and narrow,
I had, before anchoring in a passage so exposed, taken the precaution of
laying out a kedge to seaward, with something like a mile of coir rope
attached, to be used in case of emergency. Hauling on this, we were
quickly out of reach of the battery, but again anchored just within our
own range of the enemy, when the frigate reopened her fire with shot and
shell, keeping up an intermitting cannonade till after nightfall.
We learned in a curious way that the principal portion of the troops who
attacked us were Swiss! About midnight a boat was reported alongside
with a letter from the commandant of the troops with which we had been
engaged. Wondering what he could want with me, I opened the letter, and
found it to contain a rigmarole account of himself and the extraordinary
achievements of his regiment, which belonged to some canton whose name I
forget; the letter concluding with a request for a few _bottles of
rum_!! I sent him the rum, together with a reply not very complimentary
to his country or present occupation.
On the 11th some of our missing men got on board, and reported that the
French had received still larger reinforcements, with heavy artillery,
of which, indeed, we had ample proof, they having this morning got their
guns to bear so accurately, that almost every shot struck us, so that it
became necessary to display the better part of valour, and be off. The
wind, unluckily for us, had died away, but a southerly air at length
springing up, we put our prisoners ashore, and stood out of the bay,
anchoring on the following day at Caldagues.
It would be tedious to narrate the remainder of our cruise, which
chiefly consisted in sailing along the Spanish coast, and firing upon
French troops wherever they came within reach, this being principally in
the vicinity of Barcelona.
On one occasion only did we make much havoc amongst them, viz. on the
22nd. On the previous day we had been reconnoitring Barcelona, and fell
in with the _Cyrene_. Whilst rounding a small promontory in company, we
observed a foraging expedition of at least 5000 troops, with immense
numbers of mules laden with provisions,—the spoil of the surrounding
country,—coming along a road close to the sea. Both ships immediately
beat to quarters, and running well within shot and shell range,
commenced a heavy fire, which told admirably on the troops and convoy,
as was evident from the disorder into which they were thrown. After
about two hours persevering—though not continuous fire,—as from the
strong breeze blowing, we were occasionally carried past the enemy, and
lost time in regaining our position; the French abandoned their line of
march, and filed off into the interior, the ships harassing their
retreat with shells till they were out of range. The loss of the enemy
on this occasion must necessarily have been very severe.
On the 30th we joined Admiral Thornborough’s squadron of thirteen sail
at Minorca. On the following day we received the unwelcome intelligence
of Lieutenant Harrison’s having been taken prisoner by the French. I had
placed this excellent officer in command of the man-of-war cutter taken
with the French convoy at Caldagues, and when off Tarragona he
imprudently went on shore with only two hands, to gain information about
us. On landing he was immediately surrounded by French troops, a body of
whom was embarked in boats to regain possession of his cutter, but by
promptly making sail she escaped.
Some time previous to this period I had applied to the Admiralty for
permission to return to England. My reasons for the application were
various, the ostensible ground being the state of my health, which had
in reality suffered severely from the incessant wear and tear of body
and mind to which for nearly two years I had been exposed. A more urgent
reason was to get back to my place in the House of Commons, in order to
expose the robberies of the Admiralty Courts in the Mediterranean, the
officials of which were reaping colossal fortunes at the expense of
naval officers and seamen, who were wasting their lives and blood for
official gain! The barefaced peculations of these courts would be almost
incredible, especially as regarded the Maltese Court, were there not
some living at the present time who can testify to their enormity. To
such an extent was this now carried, that a ship captured without cargo
never yielded a penny to the captors, the whole proceeds being swallowed
up by the Admiralty Court. With cargo, some trifling surplus might
remain, but what between pilfering and official fees, the award was
hardly worth the trouble of capture.
The effect of this upon the Navy generally was most disastrous, and not
upon the Navy only, but upon the nation also, which had upwards of 1000
ships in commission without any result at all commensurable with the
expenditure. Captains were naturally disinclined to harass themselves
and crews for nothing, and avoided making prizes certain to yield
nothing but the risk and trouble of capture, and which, in addition,
might bring them in debt, as was the result in my own case.
It will now be evident why I preferred harassing the French army in
Spain to making prizes for the enrichment of the officials of the
Maltese and other Admiralty courts. It was always my aim to serve my
country before my own interests, and in this case I judged it better to
do so where the service could be most effectual. Prizes, of which the
proceeds were monopolised by a body of corrupt officials, neither under
the eye nor control of the government, were not worth troubling
ourselves about; so I determined on a course of service where there were
no prizes to take, but abundance of highly interesting operations to be
undertaken. The frigate’s officers and crew willingly seconding my
views, I now—more on their account than my own—put on record that _none_
of the services previously narrated, though lauded by the admirals
commanding them, and by historians subsequently, were ever rewarded,
either as regarded myself, or any one under my command, even promotion
to the officers being shamefully withheld; their fault, or rather
misfortune, consisting in having served under my command.
My chief motive, however, for wishing to return to England was, that
during our operations against the French on the Spanish coast, I had
seen so much of them as to convince me, that if with a single frigate I
could paralyse the movements of their armies in the Mediterranean—with
three or four ships it would not be difficult so to spread terror on
their Atlantic shores, as to render it impossible for them to send an
army into Western Spain. My object then was—as from long and unceasing
experience I considered myself entitled to the command of more than one
ship—to propose to the Government to take possession of the French
islands in the Bay of Biscay, and to let me with a small squadron
operate against the enemy’s sea-board there, as I had previously done
with the _Speedy_ and _Impérieuse_, from Montpellier to Barcelona.
Had this permission been granted, I do not hesitate to stake my
professional reputation that _neither the Peninsular war, nor its
enormous cost to the nation, from 1809 onwards, would ever have been
heard of_. It would have been easy—_as it will always be easy in case of
future wars_—that is, provided those who have the direction of national
affairs have the sagacity to foresee disaster, and, _foreseeing it, to
take the initiative_, so to harass the French coast as to find full
employment for their troops at home, and thus to render any operations
in Western Spain, or even in foreign countries, next to impossible.
By members not aware of this power of harassing an enemy’s coast by
means of a few frigates, the ministry was greatly blamed for not having
sent a military force to Catalonia, instead of despatching the very
inadequate force under Sir John Moore to the western shores of the
Peninsula. That the latter step was a great mistake, likely only to end
in disaster, is now admitted. But what I contend for is, that no
military force was at all needed in Spain, had the government seized and
held, by a comparatively small military force, the isles on the coast of
France, viz., Isles Dieu, Rhe, Oléron, and a few others; following up or
preceding this seizure by a limited number of active frigates harassing
the whole western coast of France, which, in consequence, would not have
been able to send a single regiment into Spain, and hence, as has been
said, we should have had no Peninsular war with its hundreds of millions
of national debt. Had the French been thus employed in the defence of
their own coasts, the Spaniards on the west coast would have been a
match for their enemies, as, with the assistance of a few small British
frigates, they were rendered a match for them on the east coast. This
was the work I was prepared to recommend to the British Government;
considering, moreover, that from the part the _Impérieuse_ had taken in
harassing the enemy on the east coast of Spain, I was fairly entitled to
ask that any small squadron of frigates, appointed for the purpose of
operating on the west coast of France, should be placed under my
command.
How my plans for this end, and together with them, my own career as a
naval officer, were sacrificed by an occurrence which forms the subject
of the next chapters, will there be seen.
The reader will by this time have gathered some idea of what the
_Impérieuse_ had effected, as testified by the warmly expressed
satisfaction of Lord Collingwood; yet it will scarcely be believed that,
in place of approbation, I was reproached for the expenditure of more
sails, stores, gunpowder, and shot than had been used by any other
captain in the service!
Attention to saving ropes and sails, though without other results, was
praised. Expending them, though in energetic service, remarked with
displeasure. Nothing that I had done was deemed worthy of notice at
home, whilst officers who brought back them ships in as good condition
as they left port, were honoured with praise and substantially rewarded;
but no mark of approbation or reward was ever conferred on me till
upwards of thirty years afterwards, the late Earl of Minto generously
remedied the injustice by conferring upon me the ordinary good service
pension. A comparison of my services with the services of those who were
rewarded with pensions of 1000_l._ and 1200_l._ a year, will show the
actuating principle of the Admiralties of those days, which bestowed on
me nothing but marked neglect.
CHAP. XIX.
APPOINTMENT TO COMMAND FIRE-SHIPS IN BASQUE
ROADS.
UNDERTAKING AGAINST ROCHEFORT.—HOPES EXCITED.—PRESENT MYSELF AT THE
ADMIRALTY.—AM CONSULTED BY LORD MULGRAVE.—LORD GAMBIER’S
STATEMENT.—ANXIETY OF GOVERNMENT.—MY PLAN OF ACTION.—DECLINE THE
COMMAND.—THE COMMAND PRESSED UPON ME.—RETURN TO THE
IMPÉRIEUSE.—PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACK.—LORD GAMBIER OBTAINS THE
LAURELS,—BUT DISSUADES THE ATTACK.—THE ISLE D’AIX.—LORD GAMBIER’S
STATEMENT.
Almost immediately after arrival of the _Impérieuse_ at Plymouth, I
received the subjoined letter from the Hon. Johnstone Hope, Second Lord
of the Board of Admiralty:—
“Admiralty, March 21, 1809.
“MY DEAR LORD,—I congratulate you on your safe arrival after the
fatigues you underwent at Trinity. Be assured your exertions there
were highly applauded by the Board, and were done most ample justice
to by Lord Collingwood in all his despatches.
“There is an undertaking of great moment in agitation against
Rochefort, and the Board thinks that your local knowledge and services
on the occasion might be of the utmost consequence, and, I believe, it
is intended to send you there with all expedition; I have ventured to
say, that if you are in health, you will readily give your aid on this
business.
“Before you can answer this I shall be out of office, and on my way to
Scotland, as I found I could not continue here and keep my health. But
if you will write to Sir R. Brotherton in reply, and state your
sentiments on the getting at the enemy at Rochefort, I am sure it will
be kindly taken.
“I am, my dear Lord, your’s faithfully,
“W. JOHNSTONE HOPE.
“Captain Lord Cochrane.”
On the receipt of this letter hope appeared to dawn. The St. Vincent or
any other official _animus_ against me had evidently been satisfied with
the punishments with which I had in one shape or other been visited. I
was now to be consulted and employed on matters in which my experience
and services were to be fully recognised, and my ambition of being
ranked amongst those brave defenders of my country, to whose example I
had looked up, was about to be fulfilled! Alas, for the simplicity of my
ideas! Nothing could be further from the intention of those who wanted
to consult me!
Scarcely had the letter reached me, when a telegraphic message was
transmitted from the Admiralty, requiring my immediate presence at
Whitehall. A brief narrative of recent events will show the reason for
the summons.
Early in the year Lord Gambier had been appointed to blockade the French
fleet at Brest. Towards the end of February they, however, contrived to
elude his vigilance, and got out without leaving a trace as to the
direction taken. Despatching Admiral Duckworth in pursuit, his lordship
returned to Plymouth. Admiral Duckworth meanwhile reached Cadiz, where
he ascertained that the Brest fleet had not entered the Mediterranean.
He then ran for Madeira, in the hope of obtaining intelligence of them,
should they, as was feared in England, have made for the West Indies.
The fact was that the French squadron, consisting of eight sail of the
line and two frigates, had gone to L’Orient, and liberated the ships
there blockaded. They next made for Isle d’Aix, intending further to
reinforce themselves with the ships at that anchorage, and thence
proceed to harass our West India colonies. By the vigilance of Admiral
Stopford they were, however, discovered and thwarted as to their
ultimate purpose, though successful in forming a junction with the
Rochefort squadron. On finding Admiral Stopford in their vicinity,
though with four ships of the line only, they put into Basque Roads,
subsequently withdrawing into Aix Roads, where Admiral Stopford having
been reinforced, blockaded them with seven ships of the line. On the 7th
of March Lord Gambier arrived in Basque Roads with an additional five
sail, several frigates and small vessels, the British squadron being now
numerically superior to that of the enemy.
On presenting myself at the Admiralty, the First Lord (Mulgrave) did me
the honour to consult me confidentially as to the practicability of
destroying or disabling the French squadron as it lay at anchor under
the protection of the batteries of Isle d’Aix, where, as his lordship
told me, the commander-in-chief did not consider it prudent to attack
them. Lord Mulgrave further stated that the Board of Admiralty, fearing
that “the French fleet might again slip out, as it had done at Brest,
were extremely desirous that it should forthwith be destroyed. With that
view they had already consulted various naval officers on the
practicability of accomplishing the object by means of fire-ships; but
that their opinions were discouraging.”
“Now,” added his lordship, “you were some years ago employed on the
Rochefort station, and must, to a great extent, be practically
acquainted with the difficulties to be surmounted. Besides which, I am
told that you then pointed out to Admiral Thornborough some plan of
attack, which in your estimation would be successful. Will you be good
enough again to detail that or any other plan, which your further
experience may suggest. But first let me tell you what Lord Gambier has
written to the Admiralty on the subject.”
Lord Mulgrave then read me an extract from Lord Gambier’s letter, to the
following effect, that “an attack by means of fire-ships was hazardous,
if not desperate;” but that “if the Board of Admiralty wished to order
such an attack, it should be done secretly and quickly.”
I respectfully reminded his lordship that he was asking me to suggest
means for an attack which the admiral commanding considered “hazardous,
if not desperate;” and which other naval officers, no doubt my seniors
in the service, had pronounced impracticable. On both these accounts
there was reason to fear that if means suggested by me were adopted, the
consequence would be an amount of ill-feeling on the part of those
officers, which any naval officer in my position should feel reluctant
to provoke.
Lord Mulgrave replied that “the present was no time for professional
etiquette. The Board was, if possible, bent on striking some decisive
blow before the French squadron had an opportunity of slipping out; for
if their sailing were not prevented they might get off to the West
Indies, and do our commerce an immense amount of mischief. However,”
added his lordship, “there is Lord Gambier’s letter. Give me your
opinion on it.”
As this letter was afterwards made public, there can be no reason for
withholding it.
“_Caledonia_, off the Nertuis d’Antioche,
“11th March, 1809.
“MY DEAR LORD,—The advanced work between the Isles of Aix and Oleron,
which I mentioned in my last letter, I find was injured in its
foundation, and is in no state of progress; it is, therefore, no
obstacle to our bombarding the enemy’s fleet, if you should be
disposed to attempt to destroy it.
“A trial was made six years ago, when a Spanish squadron lay at the
same anchorage, but without effect. The report of it you will find in
the Admiralty. It was made by Sir C. Pole.
“The enemy’s ships lie much exposed to the operation of fire-ships,
_it is a horrible mode of warfare, and the attempt hazardous, if not
desperate_; but we should have plenty of volunteers for the service.
If you mean to do anything of the kind, it should be with secrecy and
quickly, and the ships used should not be less than those built for
the purpose—at least a dozen, and some smaller ones.
“Yours, my dear Lord, most faithfully,
“GAMBIER..nf-
“The Right Hon. Lord Mulgrave.”
“You see,” said Lord Mulgrave, “that Lord Gambier will not take upon
himself the responsibility of attack, and the Admiralty is not disposed
to bear the _onus_ of failure by means of an attack by fire-ships,
however desirous they may be that such attack should be made.”
It was now clear to me why I had been sent for to the Admiralty, where
not a word of approbation of my previous services was uttered. The
Channel fleet had been doing worse than nothing. The nation was
dissatisfied, and even the existence of the ministry was at stake. They
wanted a victory, and the admiral commanding plainly told them he would
not willingly risk a defeat. Other naval officers had been consulted,
who had disapproved of the use of fire-ships, and, as a last resource, I
had been sent for, in the hope that I would undertake the enterprise. If
this were successful, the fleet would get the credit, which would be
thus reflected on the ministry; and if it failed, the consequence would
be the loss of my individual reputation, as both ministry and
commander-in-chief would lay the blame on me.
I had, however, no fear of failure in the plans at that moment uppermost
in my mind, but from the way in which my co-operation was asked, I
determined to have nothing to do with the execution of the plans,
believing that I should have to deal with some who would rather rejoice
at their failure than their success.
My reply to Lord Mulgrave, therefore, was, that, “the opinion of Lord
Gambier, and the naval officers consulted by the Admiralty, as to the
use of fire-ships, coincided with my own; for if any such attempt were
made upon the enemy’s squadron, the result would in all probability be,
that the fire-ships would be boarded by the numerous row-boats on
guard,—the crews murdered,—and the vessels turned in a harmless
direction. But that if, together with the fire-ships, a plan were
combined which I would propose for his Lordship’s consideration, it
would not be difficult to sink or scatter the guard-boats, and
afterwards destroy the enemy’s squadron, despite any amount of
opposition that might be offered. I further told Lord Mulgrave that my
opinion agreed with the expression of Lord Gambier, that the
fortifications on Isle d’Aix were “no obstacle;” though this opinion on
my part was expressed for different reasons to the one assigned by his
lordship, my own previous knowledge of the anchorage satisfying me that
the channel was of sufficient breadth to enable an attacking force to
interpose the enemy’s fleet between itself and Isle d’Aix, as well as to
keep out of reach of the fortifications on Aix, even though those
fortifications might be in a state of efficiency, in place of being “no
obstacle,” from their dilapidated condition, as Lord Gambier had, no
doubt, correctly described them.
I then briefly recapitulated to his lordship the outline of my plan,
which, if seconded by the fleet, must certainly result in the total
destruction of the French squadron. His lordship appeared very much
gratified by the communication, and after praising its novelty and
completeness, frankly expressed his entire confidence in the result,
requesting me to put the substance of my suggestion in writing, so that
he might at once lay it before the Board of Admiralty, which was then
sitting.
The request was immediately complied with, and the letter placed in the
hands of Lord Mulgrave, who shortly afterwards personally communicated
to me his own satisfaction, and the entire concurrence of the Board in
my plan. His lordship at the same time asked me “if I would undertake to
put it in execution?”
I told him that “for reasons before assigned I would rather not do so,
as being a junior officer, it would excite against me a great amount of
jealousy. Besides which, Lord Gambier might consider it presumptuous on
my part to undertake what he had not hesitated to describe as
‘hazardous, if not desperate.’ It was, moreover, by no means certain
that Lord Gambier would be satisfied to put my plans in execution, as it
was not impossible that he might deem them still more ‘desperate’ and
‘horrible’ than those to which he had already objected. I, however,
assured his lordship that the plans were at the service of the
Admiralty, and Lord Gambier also, irrespective of any share in their
execution to which I might be considered entitled.”
“But,” objected his lordship, “all the officers who have been consulted
deem an attack with fire-ships impracticable, and after such an
expression of opinion, it is not likely they would be offended by the
conduct of fire-ships being given to another officer who approved of
their use.”
My answer was, “that the plan submitted to his lordship was not an
attack with fire-ships alone, and when its details became known to the
service, it would be seen that there was no risk of failure whatever, if
made with a fair wind and flowing tide. On the contrary, its success on
inspection must be evident to any experienced officer, who would see
that as the enemy’s squadron could not escape up the Charente, their
destruction would not only be certain, but, in fact, easy. The batteries
on Isle d’Aix were scarcely worth notice, not so much from their
dilapidated condition, though that was rightly estimated in Lord
Gambier’s letter, as from there being plenty of room to steer clear of
them, as well as from the ease with which the enemy’s ships might be
brought between the fortifications and the ships attacking; the channel
being sufficient for this purpose, as well as for their passage without
any exposure to shot likely to be detrimental. As all this would be
apparent to the officers of the fleet whenever the plan submitted should
be communicated to them, I must emphatically repeat my objection to
undertake its execution, not only on this ground, but for the additional
reason that my health had been so much shattered by recent exertions as
to require repose.
Lord Mulgrave did not deny the reasonableness of my objections,
admitting that “although he did not believe Lord Gambier would feel hurt
at my undertaking to put my own plan in execution, other officers might
not be well pleased that its superintendence should be committed to a
junior officer. On this ground he would reconsider the matter, and
endeavour to find some one else to put it in execution.
I then took leave of Lord Mulgrave, who, next day, again sent for me,
when he said, “My lord, you must go. The Board cannot listen to further
refusal or delay. Rejoin your frigate at once. I will make you all right
with Lord Gambier. Your own confidence in the result has, I must
confess, taken me by surprise, but it has increased my belief that all
you anticipate will be accomplished. Make yourself easy about the
jealous feeling of senior officers; I will so manage it with Lord
Gambier that the _amour propre_ of the fleet shall be satisfied.”
On this I requested a short time for final consideration, and before its
expiration sent a letter to his lordship again declining the command;
but at the same time informing him that it had ever been a maxim with me
not to shrink from duty to my country under any circumstances, however
disadvantageous to myself, and that if officers my seniors could not be
found to put the project in execution, I would then waive further
objection.
The immediate result was the following letter from Lord Mulgrave, who,
contrary to the tenour of mine, had construed it into an unqualified
acceptance of the command.
[Private.]
“Admiralty, March 25, 1809.
“MY DEAR LORD,—The letter I have just received from your lordship is
truly characteristic of the whole tenour of your professional life. If
your health will admit of your undertaking the important service
referred to, I am fully persuaded that I cannot so well commit it to
any other hands.
“I have the honour to be, with the highest esteem,
“Your lordship’s most faithful servant,
“MULGRAVE.
“The Lord Cochrane.”
“P.S. I think the sooner you go to Plymouth the better. You will there
receive an order to join Lord Gambier, to whom a secret letter will be
written, directing him to employ your Lordship on the service which we
have settled against the Rochefort fleet.”
I have been thus minute in detailing the circumstances connected with my
acceptance of a command so unusual, because it has been said, and for
anything that has appeared to the contrary, may still be considered,
that I thrust myself into the position, which, as my own foresight had
anticipated, became eventually a very serious one for me, as bringing
upon my head an amount of enmity, such as even my own misgivings had not
considered possible.
Having made the requisite suggestions to Lord Mulgrave relative to the
contents and mode of fitting up the explosion vessels, the fire-ships to
be employed being of the usual description, I returned on board the
_Impérieuse_ at Plymouth, there to await further orders from the
Admiralty.
Such was the despatch used, that by the 19th of March the Board was in a
position to apprise Lord Gambier of the steps taken, by the following
letter addressed to his lordship by the Board of Admiralty.
“Admiralty Office, March 19th, 1809.
“MY LORD,—I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to
acquaint your lordship, that they have ordered twelve transports to be
fitted as fire-ships, and to proceed and join you off Rochefort; and
that Mr. Congreve (afterwards Sir W. Congreve) is under orders to
proceed to your lordship in a coppered transport (the _Cleveland_),
containing a large assortment of rockets, and supplied with a
detachment of marine artillery, instructed in the use of them, and
placed under Mr. Congreve’s orders.
“That the vessels named in the margin (_Etna_, _Thunder_, _Vesuvius_,
_Hound_, and _Fury_), are likewise under orders to fit for sea with
all possible expedition, and to join you as soon as they may be ready.
That all preparations are making with a view to enable your lordship
to make an attack upon the French fleet at their anchorage off Isle
d’Aix, if practicable; and I am further commanded to signify their
Lordships’ directions to you, to take into your consideration the
possibility of making an attack upon the enemy, either conjointly with
your line-of-battle ships, frigates, and small craft, fire-ships,
bombs, and rockets—or separately by any of the above-named means.
“It is their Lordships’ further direction, that you state to me for
their information, whether any further augmentation of force of any
description is in your opinion necessary to enable you to perform this
service with full effect, that it may be prepared and forwarded to you
without a moment’s delay—their Lordships having come to a
determination to leave no means untried to destroy the enemy’s
squadron.
(Signed) “W. W. POLE.
“The Right Hon. Lord Gambier.”
Lord Gambier’s reply to this intimation, that on the receipt of the
above-mentioned appliances he would be expected to attack the French
squadron, was, that “_if the Board_ deemed an attack practicable, he
would obey any orders with which they might honour him, however great
might be the loss of men and ships.” A plain declaration that he _still
declined to take upon himself the responsibility of attack_.
It will be necessary to bear this fact in mind, as after the attack was
made, Lord Gambier, in his first despatch to the Admiralty, gave me
credit for everything but the success of my plan, and in his second
despatch _omitted my name altogether as having had anything to do with
either planning or executing it!!!_ and in the vote of thanks
subsequently given to his lordship in parliament, the officers under my
orders were thanked, but no mention whatever was made of me, either as
having conducted, or even taken any part in the attack, the whole merit
of which was ascribed to Lord Gambier, who was never nearer than nine
miles to the scene of action, as will subsequently appear.
Lord Gambier’s answer to the previous letter from the Board is, however,
so material to the right understanding of the events which followed,
that it will be better to subjoin the whole of it.
“_Caledonia_, in Basque Roads,
“March 26th, 1809.
“SIR,—In obedience to their Lordships’ directions to me, contained in
your letter of the 19th instant, I beg leave to state that it is
advisable that I should be furnished with six gun-brigs in addition to
those I may be able to collect of such as are under my command; at
present there are only two at this anchorage. I shall, however, order
the _Insolent_ and _Contest_ to join me from Quiberon Bay; and I
should hope that the _Martial_ and _Fervent_ will shortly return from
Plymouth.
“It is proper I should state for their Lordships’ information, the
position in which the French fleet is at present anchored under the
Isle d’Aix, that their Lordships may be able to form a judgment of the
success that may be expected to attend an attack upon the enemy’s
fleet, in either of the modes directed by their Lordships in your
letter above-mentioned.
“The enemy’s ships are anchored in two lines, very near each other, in
a direction due south from the Isle d’Aix, and the ships in each line
not further apart than their own length; by which it appears, as I
imagined, that the space for their anchorage is so confined by the
shoaliness of the water, as not to admit of ships to run in and anchor
clear of each other. The most distant ships of their two lines are
within point-blank shot of the works on the Isle d’Aix; such ships,
therefore, _as might attack the enemy would be exposed to be raked by
red-hot shot, &c. from the island, and should the ships be disabled in
their masts, they must remain within range of the enemy’s fire until
they are destroyed_—there not being sufficient depth of water to allow
them to move to the southward out of distance.
“The enemy having taken up their position apparently with the view not
only to be protected by _the strong works on the Isle d’Aix_, but also
to have the entrance of the Charente open to them, that in case of
being attacked by fire-ships and other engines of the kind, they can
run up the river beyond the reach of them. The tide and wind that are
favourable to convey this kind of annoyance to the enemy, serve
equally to carry them up the river.
“With respect to the attempt that may be made to destroy the enemy’s
ships with shells, &c., I am not competent to give an opinion until it
is ascertained whether the booms can be placed within the reach of
their mortars from the enemy’s ships, without being exposed to the
fire of the Isle d’Aix.
“I beg leave to add that, _if their Lordships_ are of opinion that an
attack on the enemy’s ships by those of the fleet under my command is
practicable, I am ready to obey any orders they may be pleased to
honour me with, _however great the risk may be of the loss of men and
ships_.
“I have the honour, &c.
“GAMBIER.
“The Hon. W. W. Pole.”
I have marked some passages of this singular letter in italics, for the
purpose of showing their important bearing on subsequent events. On the
11th Lord Gambier had informed the Board of Admiralty—as to my own
personal knowledge was the fact—that “the advanced work on the Isle
d’Aix was _no obstacle to bombardment_.” “Now,” says his lordship, “_the
ships attacking would, from the fire of this fort, be exposed to be
raked by red-hot shot, and if disabled in their masts, must be
destroyed_.” In the former letter his lordship stated that the fort was
“_injured in its foundations_, and in no state of progress.” It is now
characterised as “_the strong works_” on _the_ Isle d’Aix.
That there was really little damage to be feared from these
fortifications, either to ships or bombs, was afterwards corroborated by
the fact, that when a partial attack only was reluctantly made, neither
suffered from their fire, the result proving that these works had from
the first been rightly characterised by Lord Gambier as “_forming no
obstacle_,” though magnified into “strong works.”
In my interview with Lord Mulgrave, I had stated to his lordship, that
the works on the Isle d’Aix were no impediment, because of the facility
with which the enemy’s ships could be brought between the attacking
British force and the fortifications, so as completely to interpose
between the fire of the latter. Lord Gambier does not appear to have
taken this view, but he completely proved its soundness by stating that
the enemy’s ships lay within point-blank shot of their own works, so as
to expose them to the fire of their own forts on Aix, if these fired at
all, whilst my previous knowledge of the anchorage made it a matter of
certainty to me, that it was not difficult for the British fleet to
place the enemy in such a position. Lord Gambier’s assertion was one of
the main points relied on in the subsequent court-martial, and his
lordship’s own letter just quoted is in direct contradiction to the
evidence upon which he relied for acquittal.
A more singular declaration is made by his lordship, that if the enemy
were attacked by “fire-ships and other engines of the kind, they could
run up the river beyond their reach.” In place of this the result, as
will presently be seen, proved that the attempt to do so only ended in
all running ashore, with the exception of two, and they ultimately
escaped up the river because they were not attacked at all! But we must
not anticipate.
Had Lord Gambier been, as I was, from having previously blockaded
Rochefort in the _Pallas_, practically acquainted with the soundings, he
must have taken the same views that I had laid before Lord Mulgrave, and
in place of writing to the Admiralty all sorts of evil forebodings to
“men and ships,” he would have seen that the attack, with the means
indicated, was certain in effect, and easy of accomplishment.
CHAP. XX.
SAIL FOR THE BASQUE ROADS.—MY AWKWARD POSITION.—ILL-HUMOUR OF THE
FLEET.—ADMIRAL HARVEY.—IMPRUDENCE OF ADMIRAL HARVEY.—COMPLAINS OF
LORD GAMBIER.—INACCURATE SOUNDINGS.—LORD GAMBIER’S TRACTS.—COBBETT’S
COMMENTS ON THE TRACTS.—DISSENSIONS IN THE FLEET.—LETTER TO LORD
MULGRAVE.—MY PRINCIPLES OF WARFARE.—NIGHT-WORK.—MY PRINCIPLES OF
ACTION.—THE ISLE D’AIX.—EXPLOSION VESSELS.
Without waiting to convoy the fire-ships and explosion vessels, the
_Impérieuse_ sailed forthwith for Basque Roads in order to expedite the
necessary arrangements, so that on their arrival no time might be lost
in putting the project in execution; a point on which the Board of
Admiralty was most urgent, not more in a belligerent than a political
point of view, for as has been stated, the public was dissatisfied that
the enemy had been permitted to escape from Brest; whilst our West
Indian merchants were in a state of panic lest the French squadron,
which had escaped the vigilance of the blockading force before Brest,
might again slip out, and inflict irretrievable disaster on their
colonial interests, then the most important branch of our maritime
commerce.
The _Impérieuse_ arrived in Basque Roads on the 3rd of April, when I was
received with great urbanity by the commander-in-chief; his lordship
without reserve communicating to me the following order from the
Admiralty:—
“Admiralty Office, 25th March, 1809.
“MY LORD,—My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having thought fit
to select Captain Lord Cochrane for the purpose of conducting, under
your lordship’s direction, the fire-ships to be employed in the
projected attack on the enemy’s squadron off Isle d’Aix, I have their
Lordships’ commands to signify their direction to you to employ Lord
Cochrane in the above-mentioned service accordingly, whenever the
attack shall take place; and I am to acquaint you that the twelve
fire-ships, of which you already had notice, are now in the Downs in
readiness, and detained only by contrary winds, and that Mr. Congreve
is also at that anchorage, with an assortment of rockets, ready to
proceed with the fire-ships.
“I am also to acquaint you that the composition for the six
transports, sent to your lordship by Admiral Young, and 1000 carcases
for 18-pounders, will sail in the course of three or four days from
Woolwich, to join you off Rochefort.
“I have, &c. &c.
“W. W. POLE.
“Admiral Lord Gambier.”
Whatever might have been the good feeling manifested by Lord Gambier, it
did not, however, extend to the officers of the fleet, whose _amour
propre_ Lord Mulgrave had either not attempted, or had failed to
satisfy. Every captain was my senior, and the moment my plans were made
known, all regarded me as an interloper, sent to take the credit from
those to whom it was now considered legitimately to belong. “Why could
we not have done this as well as Lord Cochrane?” was the general cry of
the fleet, and the question was reasonable; for the means once devised,
there could be no difficulty in effectually carrying them out. Others
asked, “Why did not Lord Gambier permit us to do this before?” the
second query taking much of the sting from the first, as regarded
myself, by laying the blame on the commander-in-chief.
The ill-humour of the fleet found an exponent in the person of Admiral
Harvey, a brave Trafalgar officer, whose abuse of Lord Gambier to his
face was such as I had never before witnessed from a subordinate. I
should even now hesitate to record it as incredible, were it not
officially known by the minutes of the court-martial in which it some
time afterwards resulted.[42]
-----
Footnote 42:
Minutes of a court-martial on Admiral Harvey, on board H. M. S.
_Gladiator_, at Portsmouth, May 22nd, 1809.
-----
On ascertaining the nature of my mission, and that the conduct of the
attack had been committed to me by the Board of Admiralty, Admiral
Harvey came on board the flag-ship with a list of officers and men who
volunteered, under his direction, to perform the service which had been
thrust upon me. On Lord Gambier informing him that the Board had fixed
upon me for the purpose, he said, “he did not care; if he were passed
by, and Lord Cochrane or any other junior officer was appointed in
preference, he would immediately strike his flag, and resign his
commission!”
Lord Gambier said he “should be sorry to see him resort to such an
extremity, but that the Lords of the Admiralty having fixed on Lord
Cochrane to conduct the service, he could not deviate from their
Lordships’ orders.”
On this explanation being good-naturedly made by Lord Gambier, Admiral
Harvey broke out into invectives of a most extraordinary kind, openly
avowing that “he never saw a man so unfit for the command of the fleet
as Lord Gambier, who instead of sending boats to sound the channels,
which he (Admiral Harvey) considered the best preparation for an attack
on the enemy, he had been employing, or rather amusing himself with
mustering the ships’ companies, and had not even taken the pains to
ascertain whether the enemy had placed any mortars in front of their
lines; concluding by saying, that had Lord Nelson been there, he would
not have anchored in Basque Roads at all, but would have dashed at the
enemy at once.”
Admiral Harvey then came into Sir Harry Neale’s cabin, and shook hands
with me, assuring me that “he should have been very happy to see me on
any other occasion than the present. He begged me to consider that
nothing personal to myself was intended, for he had a high opinion of
me; but that my having been ordered to execute such a service, could
only be regarded as an insult to the fleet, and that on this account he
would strike his flag so soon as the service was executed.” Admiral
Harvey further assured me, that “he had volunteered his services, which
had been refused.”
To these remarks I replied: “Admiral Harvey, the service on which the
Admiralty has sent me was none of my seeking. I went to Whitehall in
obedience to a summons from Lord Mulgrave, and at his lordship’s request
gave the Board a plan of attack, the execution of which has been thrust
upon me, contrary to my inclination, as well knowing the invidious
position in which I should be placed.”
“Well,” said Admiral Harvey, “this is not the first time I have been
lightly treated, and that my services have not been attended to in the
way they deserved; because I am no canting methodist, no hypocrite, no
psalm-singer, and do not cheat old women out of their estates by
hypocrisy and canting! I have volunteered to perform the service you
came on, and should have been happy to see you on any other occasion,
but am very sorry to have a junior officer placed over my head.”
“You must not blame me for that,” replied I; “but permit me to remark
that you are using very strong expressions relative to the
commander-in-chief.”
“I can assure you, Lord Cochrane,” replied Admiral Harvey, “that I have
spoken to Lord Gambier with the same degree of prudence as I have now
done to you in the presence of Captain Sir H. Neale.”
“Well, admiral,” replied I, “considering that I have been an unwilling
listener to what you really did say to his lordship, I can only remark
that you have a strange notion of prudence.”
We then went on the quarter-deck, where Admiral Harvey again commenced a
running commentary on Lord Gambier’s conduct, in so loud a tone as to
attract the attention of every officer within hearing, his observations
being to the effect that “Lord Gambier had received him coldly after the
battle of Trafalgar, that he had used him ill, and that his having
forwarded the master of the _Tonnant’s_ letter for a court-martial on
him, was a proof of his methodistical, jesuitical conduct, and of his
vindictive disposition; that Lord Gambier’s conduct, since he took the
command of the fleet, was deserving of reprobation, and that his
employing officers in mustering the ships’ companies, instead of in
gaining information about the soundings, showed himself to be unequal to
the command of the fleet.” Then turning to Captain Bedford, he said,
“You know you are of the same opinion.”
Admiral Harvey then left the ship, first asking Captain Bedford “whether
he had made his offer of service _on any duty_ known to the
commander-in-chief?” To which Captain Bedford replied in the
affirmative.
My reason for detailing this extraordinary scene, the whole of which,
and much more to the same effect, will be found in the minutes of the
court-martial previously referred to—is to show into what a hornets’
nest my plans had involuntarily brought me. It may readily be imagined
that I bitterly regretted not having persisted in my refusal to have
anything to do with carrying them into execution, for now they were
known, all believed,—and, being my senior officers, had no doubt a right
to believe—that they could execute them better than myself.
So far as regarded the neglect to take soundings of even the approaches
to the channel leading to the enemy’s fleet, Admiral Harvey was quite
right in his statement. Nothing of the kind had been attempted beyond
some soundings on that part of the Boyart shoal, _farthest from the
French fleet_! Had not my previous knowledge of the anchorage, as
ascertained in the _Pallas_ a few years before, supplied all the
information necessary for my conduct of the plans proposed, this neglect
would in all probability have been fatal to their execution. Unlike
Admiral Harvey, I am not, however, prepared to blame Lord Gambier for
the neglect, as a slight acquaintance with the masters, whose duty it
was to have made the examination, showed me that they were quite capable
of misleading the commander-in-chief, by substituting their own surmises
for realities. Certain it was, that although no soundings whatever of
the approaches to the enemy’s fleet had been taken, those whose duty it
was to have made them, as far as practicable, pretended to know more of
the anchorage than I did![43] and had, no doubt, impressed the
commander-in-chief that their reports were founded on actual
observations.
-----
Footnote 43:
In the subsequent court-martial, one of these men constructed a chart
of the soundings, as from his own personal knowledge, and in his
verbal evidence said that he had never sounded at all! His chart was,
nevertheless, made the basis of the trial, to the exclusion of the
official charts!
-----
How far Admiral Harvey was justified in his intemperate allusions to the
“_musters_” and _quasi_ religious practices on board the fleet, is a
point upon which I do not care to enter, further than to state that
these “musters” were found to relate to catechetical examinations of the
men, and that I had not been many days in the fleet before the
commander-in-chief sent a number of tracts on board the _Impérieuse_,
with an injunction for their distribution amongst the crew.
Having by this time ascertained that, rightly or wrongly, the fleet was
in a state of great disorganisation on account of the orders given to
various officers for the distribution of tracts, and being naturally
desirous of learning the kind of instruction thereby imparted, I found
some of them of a most silly and injudicious character, and therefore
declined to distribute them, but imprudently selected some, and sent
them to my friend Cobbett, together with a description of the state of
the fleet, in consequence of the tract controversy. It was a false step,
though I did not at the time contemplate the virulent animosity which
might be excited at home from Cobbett’s hard-hitting comments, nor the
consequent amount of enmity to myself, which only ceased with my
eventual removal from the Navy!
The fact was, that the fleet was divided into two factions, as bitter
against each other as were the Cavaliers and Roundheads in the days of
Charles I. The above-mentioned imprudent step incurred the ill will of
both parties. The tractarian faction, consisting for the most part of
officers appointed by Tory influence or favour of the Admiral, and
knowing my connection with Burdett and Cobbett, avoided me; whilst the
opposite faction, believing that from the affair of the tracts I should
incur the irreconcilable displeasure of Lord Gambier, lost no
opportunity of denouncing me as a concocter of novel devices to advance
my own interests at the expense of my seniors in the service.
Strange as it may appear, almost the only persons who treated me with
consideration were Lord Gambier, his second in command, Admiral
Stopford, and his flag-captain, Sir H. Neale.
For this urbanity Lord Gambier had to incur the bitter sarcasm of the
fleet—that when the Admiralty wanted to attack the enemy with
fire-ships, he had denounced the operation as a “horrible and
anti-Christian mode of warfare;” but that now he saw my plan of
explosion vessels, in addition to fire-ships, was likely to be crowned
with success, he no longer regarded it in the same light.
It was evident that amidst these contending factions, so fatal in a
fleet where all ought to be zeal and unity of action—I should have to
depend on myself. Disregarding, therefore, the disunion prevalent, and,
indeed, increased four-fold by the further division of opinion with
respect to Admiral Harvey’s disrespectful expressions to the
commander-in-chief, I determined to reconnoitre for myself the position
of the French ships, especially as regarded their protection by the
batteries on Isle d’Aix, and for this purpose made as minute a
_reconnaissance_ as was practicable.
Perhaps it ought to have been previously mentioned, that on the evening
of our arrival, I had gone close in to the island, and had embodied the
result of my observations in the following letter to Lord Mulgrave, to
whom I considered myself more immediately responsible.
“_Impérieuse_, Basque Roads, 3rd April.
“MY LORD,—Having been very close to the Isle d’Aix, I find that the
western sea wall has been pulled down to build a better. At present
the fort is quite open, and may be taken as soon as the French fleet
is driven on shore or burned, which will be as soon as the fire-ships
arrive. The wind continues favourable for the attack. If your lordship
can prevail on the ministry to send a military force here, you will do
great and lasting good to our country.
“Could ministers see things with their own eyes, how differently would
they act; but they cannot be everywhere present, and on their opinion
of the judgment of others must depend the success of war—possibly the
fate of England and all Europe.
“No diversion which the whole force of Great Britain is capable of
making in Portugal or Spain, would so much shake the French government
as the capture of the islands on this coast. A few men would take
Oleron; but to render the capture effective, send twenty thousand men,
who, without risk, would find occupation for a French army of a
hundred thousand.
“The batteries on Oleron are all open, except two of no importance.
Isle Gros would also be of infinite use to our cruisers in the
destruction of the French trade.
“The commerce on this coast—and indeed on all the French coasts—is not
inferior to that of England in number of vessels and men employed,
though not in size of coasting craft.
“The coasting trade is the great nursery of English seamen, and yet we
strangely affect to despise the French coasting trade. Must not the
corn of the French northern provinces give food to the south? Are the
oil and wine of the south of no consequence to those who grow none for
themselves? I do not state these matters to your lordship but as an
answer to the opinions generally current in England, and, indeed, too
much entertained in the naval service also.
“Ships filled with stones would ruin for ever the anchorage of Aix,
and some old vessels of the line well loaded would be excellent for
the purpose.
“I hope your lordship will excuse the way in which I have jumbled
these thoughts together. My intentions are good, and if they can be of
any use, I shall feel happy.
“I have the honour to be, my Lord,
“Your most obedient servant,
“COCHRANE.
“The Right Hon. Lord Mulgrave.”
In this hurried letter the reader will readily recognise the principles
laid down by me in a former chapter, for the most advantageous mode of
warfare, viz. by harassing the enemy on his own coast, and by a
perpetual threat of a descent thereon at any moment, to prevent his
employing his forces elsewhere.
In place of the advice being even taken in good part, I had afterwards
reason to know, that the views briefly expressed in this letter were
regarded by the government as an act of impertinence. Yet nothing could
be more sound. The French islands captured, and occupied by an adequate
force, protected by a few ships, would have kept the enemy’s coasts in a
constant state of alarm, so that it would have been impossible for the
enemy to detach armies to the Spanish peninsula; had this policy been
pursued, the Peninsular war, as has been stated in a former chapter, and
its millions of National Debt, would never have been heard of. So much
does the useful or useless expenditure of war depend on the decision of
a cabinet, which can practically know little of the matter.
As it was—the French laughed at the clouds of cruisers intent on
watching their coasting trade, which was carried on almost without
interruption; our vessels going in shore in the day time, when the
French coasters kept close under their batteries, and going off shore in
the night, when they pursued their course unmolested. Provisions and
stores were thus moved as wanted from one part of the enemy’s coast to
another, with absolute safety. The great number of prizes which had
fallen to the lot of the _Speedy_, _Pallas_, and _Impérieuse_ was almost
solely owing to our working in shore at night, when the enemy’s coasters
were on the move. In the day time we are usually out of sight of land,
with the men fast asleep in their hammocks.
The constant readiness at sea for an enemy who never willingly left
port, was, in those days, a great evil, though it was the one point
inculcated by the Admiralty. It would have been far more to the purpose
to have inculcated the necessity of damaging and alarming the limited
seaboard of France, by means of small frigates capable of running
in-shore, and to have left the French fleets, whenever they ventured
out, to the supervision of squadrons composed of large ships, and
specially appointed for the purpose. From the hundreds of ships then in
commission, traversing the seas with no advantage to themselves or the
country, such an arrangement would have annihilated the commerce, and
with it the naval power of France. In place of this, attention to the
condition of ships was the most certain way to reward. As the men could
not always be employed in exercising guns and furling sails, a system of
cleaning and polishing was enforced, till it became positive cruelty to
the crews.
If the reader will refer to a previous letter of Lord Collingwood to the
Board of Admiralty, he will fully comprehend my meaning. His lordship
states that Lord Cochrane’s services on the coast of Languedoc in the
_Impérieuse_ “kept the French coast in constant alarm, causing a total
suspension of trade, and harassing a body of troops employed to oppose
him; he has probably prevented those troops, which were intended for
Figueras, from advancing into Spain, by giving them employment in the
defence of their own coasts.” For “Figueras” read “Corunna,” and it will
be evident, that had the same course been generally pursued on the
Atlantic coasts of France, by order, or even under the countenance of
the Admiralty, Sir John Moore would neither have retreated nor fallen;
because, from the occupation which the French army would have found on
its own coasts, he could not have encountered one on the Spanish soil.
One of my principal objects in returning to England, as has been said in
a former chapter, was to impress upon the government the efficiency of
this mode of proceeding on the Atlantic coasts of France, so as to
prevent reinforcements from being sent to their army in the Peninsula.
The success of the _Impérieuse_, I again repeat, warranted such an
application on my part to the Board of Admiralty, in the expectation of
being appointed to the command of an expedition to be carried into
effect on this principle.
To return from this digression to the _reconnaissance_ of the enemy’s
works on Isle d’Aix.
The opinion which I had expressed to Lord Mulgrave respecting the
trifling importance of these works, was strengthened on actual
inspection; indeed any opposition which they could have offered was too
insignificant for notice, as was afterwards proved when a partial attack
took place.
I could not say as much to Lord Gambier, after the opinion he had
expressed in his letter to the Admiralty, for this would have amounted
to a flat contradiction of his judgment, even though, as was afterwards
known, such opinion had been formed on the reports of others, who gave
his lordship their surmises as ascertained facts, an assertion which
will be hereafter fully demonstrated.
In place, therefore, of officially reporting the result of my
_reconnaissance_, I urged upon his lordship not to wait the arrival of
the fire-ships from England, but as the fleet had abundance of
materials, rather to fit up, as fire-ships and explosion vessels, some
transports which happened to be present.
With this request Lord Gambier promptly complied, manifesting his
anxious desire that my project should be put in execution without delay.
Several vessels were, therefore, chosen for the purpose; the fire-ships
being prepared by the fleet, whilst I worked hard at the explosion
vessels, two, at least, of which I determined to conduct personally; not
because I deemed myself more competent to conduct them than others, but
because, being novel engines of warfare, other officers could not have
given that attention to their effect which long deliberation on my part
had led me to anticipate, if directed according to the method on which
their efficacy depended; it being certain, even from the novelty of such
a mode of attack, that the officers and crews of the line-of-battle
ships would be impressed with the idea that every fire-ship was an
explosion vessel, and that in place of offering opposition, they would,
in all probability, be driven ashore in their attempt to escape from
such diabolical engines of warfare, and thus become an easy prey. The
creation of this terrorism amongst the enemy’s ships was indeed a main
feature of the plan, the destruction or intimidation of the guard-boats
being secondary, or rather preparatory.
The nature of the explosion vessels will be best understood from the
subjoined description of the manner in which one was prepared under my
own directions. The floor of the vessel was rendered as firm as
possible, by means of logs placed in close contact, into every crevice
of which other substances were firmly wedged, so as to afford the
greatest amount of resistance to the explosion. On this foundation were
placed a large number of spirit and water casks, into which 1500 barrels
of powder were emptied. These casks were set on end, and the whole bound
round with hempen cables, so as to resemble a gigantic mortar, thus
causing the explosion to take an upward course. In addition to the
powder casks were placed several hundred shells, and over these again
nearly three thousand hand grenades; the whole, by means of wedges and
sand, being compressed as nearly as possible into a solid mass.
This was the vessel in which I subsequently led on the attack. A more
striking comment on the “red-hot shot,” &c., of which Lord Gambier made
so much in one of his letters to the Admiralty, could scarcely be found.
Of course, had a red-hot shot from the batteries on Aix reached us—and
they were not half a mile distant[44]—nothing could have prevented our
being “hoist with our own petard.” I can, however, safely say, that such
a catastrophe never entered into my calculations, for the simple reason,
that from previous employment on the spot, on several occasions, I well
knew there was plenty of room in the channel to keep out of the way of
red-hot shot from the Aix batteries, even if, by means of blue lights or
other devices, they had discovered us.
The explosion vessels were simply naval mines, the effect of which
depended quite as much on their novelty as engines of war, as upon their
destructiveness. It was calculated that, independently of any mischief
they might do, they would cause such an amount of terror, as to induce
the enemy to run their ships ashore as the only way to avoid them and
save the crews. This expectation was fully answered, but no adequate
attack on the part of the British force following up the effect of the
explosion vessels, the stranded ships were permitted to heave off, and
thus escaped, for the most part, as will be detailed in the succeeding
chapter.
-----
Footnote 44:
Admiral Allemand had given instructions to the commandant on the Isle
d’Aix to use every precaution in case of the anticipated attack.
-----
CHAP. XXI.
PRESS FOR AN ATTACK.—RESULTS OF DELAY.—THE FRENCH PREPARATIONS.—FRENCH
ADMIRAL’S ACCOUNT. INSULT TO THE ENGLISH FLEET.—STATE OF
PREPARATIONS. START FOR THE ATTACK.—THE ATTACK.—THE
EXPLOSION.—FAILURE OF THE ATTACK.—TERROR OF THE FRENCH.—THE FRENCH
AGROUND.—APATHY OF LORD GAMBIER.—THE AIX ROADS.—THE FRENCH FLEET
PERMITTED TO ESCAPE.—DRIFT TOWARDS THE ENEMY.—ATTACK THE FRENCH
FLEET.—THE CALCUTTA STRIKES.—THE ATTACK.—FAILURE OF
FIRESHIPS.—SINGULAR INCIDENT.—SIGNAL OF RECALL.—CAPTAIN
SEYMOUR.—LORD GAMBIER’S EVASIVENESS.—AM RECALLED.—REMONSTRATE WITH
LORD GAMBIER.—AM SENT HOME.—LORD GAMBIER’S DESPATCH.—THE FRENCH
DESPATCH.—DESTRUCTION OF THE BOOM.—THE MEDIATOR.
On the 10th of April, the _Beagle_, having arrived from England with the
fireships in company, I pressed Lord Gambier to permit an attack to be
made on the same night; but, notwithstanding that the weather was
favourable, his lordship saw fit to refuse. My reason for pressing an
immediate attack was, that as the enemy could not remain in ignorance of
the character of the newly arrived vessels, they might have less time to
make additional preparations for their reception.
Notwithstanding the importance of prompt action in this respect,
argument was unavailing. His lordship urged that the fireships might be
boarded, and the crews murdered, though there was more danger of this
from delay than from attacking unawares. There was in reality no danger;
but I urged in vain that it was an essential part of my plan personally
to embark in an explosion vessel, _preceding_ the fireships, so that in
conducting and firing her all risk would fall on myself and the
volunteer crew which would accompany me; it not being probable that
after the explosion the enemy’s guard-boats would board the fireships
which might follow, as every one would certainly be taken for a mine
similarly charged. Under that impression, however gallant the enemy,
there was little chance of the fireships being boarded.
His lordship replied, that “if I chose to rush on self-destruction that
was my own affair, but that it was his duty to take care of the lives of
others, and he would not place the crews of the fireships in palpable
danger.”
To this I rejoined, that there could not be any danger, for the use of
explosion-vessels being new to naval warfare, it was unlikely that,
after witnessing the effect of the first explosion, the enemy’s officers
and men would board a single fireship. I further told his lordship that
my brother, the Hon. Basil Cochrane, and Lieut. Bissel were on board the
_Impérieuse_ as my guests, and so well satisfied were both of the little
danger to be apprehended that they had volunteered to accompany me. Lord
Gambier, however, remained firm, and further remonstrance being useless,
I had no alternative but to delay, whilst the French, who quickly became
aware of the character of the newly arrived vessels, adopted all
necessary precautions.[45]
-----
Footnote 45:
“Le 10 il arriva 16 batimens, qui me parurent des transports ou
brulôts. Je fis dégréer les mâts de perroquets, et caler ceux de
hune,” &c.—_Vice-Admiral Allemand’s Despatch, of the 12th of April._
-----
A most favourable opportunity was thus thrown away. The French admiral,
however, lost no time in turning the delay to account, by altering the
positions of his fleet, so as to expose it to the smallest possible
amount of danger.
The enemy’s ships of the line struck their topmasts, got their
topgallant yards on deck, and unbent sails, so as to expose as little
inflammable matter aloft as possible; the frigates only being left in
sailing trim, ready to act as occasion might require; whilst the boats
and launches of the fleet, to the number of seventy-three, were armed
and stationed in five divisions for the purpose of boarding and towing
off the fireships.[46]
-----
Footnote 46:
The subjoined was the French force at anchor in Aix roads:—
SHIPS OF THE LINE: _L’Océan_, 120, bearing the flag of Vice-Admiral
Allemand; _Foudroyant_, 80, bearing the flag of Rear-Admiral Gourdon;
_Cassard_, 74; _Tourville_, 74; _Regulus_, 74; _Patriote_, 74;
_Jemappes_, 74; _Tonnerre_, 74; _Aquilon_, 74; _Ville de Varsovie_,
74. Total, 10.
FRIGATES: _Indienne_, _Elbe_, _Pallas_, and _Hortense_. Total, 4.
STORESHIP: _Calcutta_, 56, armed _en flûte_. This vessel had been a
British East Indiaman, captured some time before off St. Helena.
Total, 15.
-----
The French admiral, Allemand, disposed his force in the following
manner:—The ten sail of the line, which before the arrival of the
fireships had been moored in two lines overlapping each other, were
formed afresh in a double line, nearly north and south; the outer line
comprising five, and the inner six ships, including the _Calcutta_; the
inner fine being so anchored as to face the openings between the ships
of the outer line, the extremity of which was somewhat more than a mile
from the batteries on the Isle of Aix. About half a mile in advance of
the whole lay the four frigates, and immediately in front of these was a
boom of extraordinary dimensions. As this boom will form an important
feature in the narrative, I subjoin the French admiral’s description,
first premising that, although there was reason to expect that an
obstacle of the kind would have to be encountered, its exact nature was
not known till the attack was made[47]:—
“Notre armée étoit sur deux lignes de bataille, endentées,
très-serrées, gisant au nord, un quart nord-ouest et sud, un quart
sud-est du monde, afin de présenter moins de surface à l’envoi des
brûlots.
“Elle étoit flanquée _d’une estacade à quatre cents toises au large,
qui avoit huit cents toises de long_, le bout nord étoit à une
encablure et demie des roches de l’île.
“Au coucher du soleil il ventoit encore très-gros frais. _Je laissai
chaque capitan libre de sa manœuvre pour la sûreté de son vaisseau._
“J’envoyai un officier prévenir le général Bronard, commandant à l’île
d’Aix, que l’ennemi, par sa manœuvre, annonçoit vouloir profiter du
gros vent et de la marée pour entreprendre un _coup de main_. Il me
fit dire qu’il l’attendoit de pied ferme, et qu’il répondoit de la
terre.”—_Vice-Admiral Allemand’s Despatch of the 12th of April._
-----
Footnote 47:
A better proof of the subsequent untruths uttered by the masters of
the fleet and the flagship, as to their pretended knowledge of the
soundings in the vicinity of the enemy, could not be afforded, than
their ignorance of the existence of this boom, which must from its
magnitude have occupied a considerable time in its construction, and
laying down the necessary moorings.
-----
The French, no doubt, considered their position secure against
fireships, having no expectation of other means of attack; and so it
undoubtedly was, from the protection afforded by the boom, which, from
its peculiar construction, could neither be destroyed nor burned by
fireships—as well as further defended by the guard-boats, which were
judged sufficient to divert the course of such fireships as might drift
past the boom. Their fleet was anchored so as to expose the smallest
possible front; and what added no little to their sense of security was
the delay which had taken place on the part of the British admiral
without attack of any kind. On such grounds, therefore, they not
unreasonably felt confident that, if the fireships failed, as from the
judicious preparations made, Admiral Allemand had every reason to
anticipate, no attack on the part of the British fleet would follow. In
this belief, on altering their position, the French dressed their fleet
with flags, and, by way of contempt for their assailants, hung out the
English ensign of the _Calcutta_—which, as has been said, was a captured
English vessel—under her quarter gallery! The peculiar nature of the
insult needs not to be explained—to naval men it is the most atrocious
imaginable.
The fortifications on Isle d’Aix, alluded to by Admiral Allemand, were,
as Lord Gambier had reported to the Admiralty in his letter of the 11th
of March, insignificant, or, as his Lordship at first expressed it, “no
obstacle;” a dozen guns being the utmost number mounted on the batteries
commanding the roads, though these were afterwards characterised by his
Lordship as the “strong works on the Isle of Aix.”[48] The nearest of
the batteries on _Oleron_ was out of gunshot, and therefore of no
account.
-----
Footnote 48:
Two ships of the line would have been quite sufficient to silence “the
batteries on Aix.”—_Captain Broughton’s Evidence on the Court
Martial._
-----
As narratives of the attack on the French fleet in Basque Roads have
been often, though in some of the main points incorrectly, written from
the contradictory, and in many instances incomprehensible, evidence on
the subsequent court-martial, as compared with the no less contradictory
despatches of Lord Gambier, I shall in the following account strictly
confine myself to what took place under my own personal conduct and
observation.[49]
-----
Footnote 49:
The British force present in Basque Roads was as follows:—
SHIPS OF THE LINE: _Caledonia_, 120, bearing the flag of Lord Gambier;
_Cæsar_, 80, bearing the flag of Rear-Admiral Stopford; _Gibraltar_,
80; _Revenge_, 74; _Donegal_, 74; _Heron_, 74; _Illustrious_, 74;
_Valiant_, 74; _Bellona_, 74; _Resolution_, 74; _Theseus_, 74. Total,
11.
FRIGATES: _Indefatigable_, _Impérieuse_, _Aigle_, _Emerald_,
_Unicorn_, _Pallas_, and _Mediator_. Total, 7.
GUNBRIG SLOOPS: _Beagle_, _Dotterel_, _Foxhound_, _Lyra_, _Redpole_.
Total, 5.
GUN-BRIGS: _Insolent_, _Conflict_, _Contest_, _Encounter_, _Fervent_,
and _Growler_. Total, 6.
OTHER VESSELS: _Whiting_, _Nimrod_, _King George_, and 23 fire-ships
and explosion vessels. Total, 55.
-----
On the 11th of April, it blew hard with a high sea. As all preparations
were complete, I did not consider the state of the weather a justifiable
impediment to the attack, to which Lord Gambier had now consented; so
that after nightfall, the officers who volunteered to command the
fireships were assembled on board the _Caledonia_, and supplied with
instructions according to the plan previously laid down by myself.
The _Impérieuse_ had proceeded to the edge of the Boyart shoal, close to
which she anchored with an explosion vessel made fast to her stern, it
being my intention, after firing the one of which I was about to take
charge, to return to her for the other, to be employed as circumstances
might require. At a short distance from the _Impérieuse_ were anchored
the frigates _Aigle_, _Unicorn_, and _Pallas_, for the purpose of
receiving the crews of the fireships on their return, as well as to
support the boats of the fleet assembled alongside the _Cæsar_, to
assist the fireships. The boats of the fleet were not, however, for some
reason or other, made use of at all.
The enemy had calculated on the impending attack, and, as was afterwards
ascertained, by way of precaution against fireships, sent two divisions
of their guard-boats, with orders to lie under the boom till two in the
morning; but wind and tide being against them, they were compelled to
put back, without effecting their orders. Both wind and tide, however,
though dead against the French boats, were favourable for the boats of
the British fleet, had they been employed as arranged; and they would
have been of great use to the less efficient boats of the fireships,
some of which, in returning, were nearly swamped. For want of such
assistance, as will presently be seen, most of the fireships were
kindled too soon, no doubt to save the men the terrible pull back,
against a gale of wind and a high sea.
Having myself embarked on board the largest explosion vessel,
accompanied by Lieut. Bissel and a volunteer crew of four men only, we
led the way to the attack; the _Impérieuse_ afterwards, in accordance
with my instructions, signalising the fireships to “proceed on service.”
The night was dark, and as the wind was fair, though blowing hard, we
soon neared the estimated position of the advanced French ships, for it
was too dark to discern them. Judging our distance, therefore, as well
as we could, with regard to the time the fuse was calculated to burn,
the crew of four men entered the gig, under the direction of Lieut.
Bissel, whilst I kindled the port fires; and then, descending into the
boat, urged the men to pull for their lives, which they did with a will,
though, as wind and sea were strong against us, without making the
progress calculated.
To our consternation, the fuses, which had been constructed to burn
fifteen minutes, lasted little more than half that time, when the vessel
blew up, filling the air with shells, grenades, and rockets; whilst the
downward and lateral force of the explosion raised a solitary mountain
of water, from the breaking of which in all directions our little boat
narrowly escaped being swamped. In one respect it was, perhaps,
fortunate for us that the fuses did not burn the time calculated, as,
from the little way we had made against the strong head wind and tide,
the rockets and shells from the exploded vessel went over us. Had we
been in the line of their descent, at the moment of explosion, our
destruction, from the shower of broken shells and other missiles, would
have been inevitable.
The explosion vessel did her work well, the effect constituting one of
the grandest artificial spectacles imaginable. For a moment, the sky was
red with the lurid glare arising from the simultaneous ignition of 1500
barrels of powder. On this gigantic flash subsiding, the air seemed
alive with shells, grenades, rockets, and masses of timber, the wreck of
the shattered vessel; whilst the water was strewn with spars, shaken out
of the enormous boom, on which, according to the subsequent testimony of
Captain Proteau, whose frigate lay just within the boom, the vessel had
brought up, before she exploded. The sea was convulsed as by an
earthquake, rising, as has been said, in a huge wave, on whose crest our
boat was lifted like a cork, and as suddenly dropped into a vast trough,
out of which, as it closed upon us with a rush of a whirlpool, none
expected to emerge. The skill of the boat’s crew, however, overcame the
threatened danger, which passed away as suddenly as it had arisen, and
in a few minutes nothing but a heavy rolling sea had to be encountered,
all having again become silence and darkness.
This danger surmounted, we pulled in the direction of the _Impérieuse_,
whose lights could be distinguished at about three miles’ distance. On
our way we had the satisfaction of seeing two fireships pass over the
spot where the boom had been moored. Shortly afterwards we met the
_Mediator_ steering in the direction of the enemy, whose ships of the
line were now firing towards the spot where the explosion had taken
place, and consequently on their own advanced frigates! which, as was
afterwards learned, cut their cables, and shifted their berths to a
position in the rear of the larger ships.
On reaching the _Impérieuse_, I found, to my great mortification, that
the second explosion vessel, which, by my orders, had been made fast to
the frigate’s stern, had been cut away, and thus set adrift: a fireship
in flames having come down on her instead of the enemy! The _Impérieuse_
herself had a narrow escape of being burned, and was only saved by
veering cable; the fireship which caused the disaster drifting
harmlessly away on the Boyart Shoal. This clumsy occurrence completely
frustrated the intention with which I had reserved her, viz. for further
personal operations amongst the enemy’s fleet, now that the first
explosion vessel had cleared the way.
Of all the fireships, upwards of twenty in number, _four only reached
the enemy’s position, and not one did any damage_! The way in which they
were managed was grievous. The _Impérieuse_, as has been said, lay three
miles from the enemy, so that the one which was near setting fire to her
became useless at the outset; whilst several others were kindled a mile
and a half to windward of this, or four miles and a half from the enemy.
Of the remainder, many were at once rendered harmless, from being
brought to on the wrong tack. Six passed a mile to windward of the
French fleet, and one grounded on Oleron. I could scarcely credit my own
vision when I saw the way in which they were handled; most of them being
fired and abandoned before they were abreast of the vessels anchored as
guides.
The fear of the fireships operated strongly enough, but, notwithstanding
the actual effect attributed to them by naval historians, they did no
damage whatever. A matter of little consequence, had the British fleet,
or even a portion thereof, subsequently taken advantage of the panic
created amongst the enemy.
As the fireships began to light up the roads, we could observe the
enemy’s fleet in great confusion. Without doubt, taking every fireship
for an explosion vessel, and being deceived as to their distance, not
only did the French make no attempt to divert them from their course,
but some of their ships cut their cables and were seen drifting away
broadside on to the wind and tide—whilst others made sail, as the only
alternative to escape from what they evidently considered certain
destruction from explosive missiles!
Had the commander-in-chief witnessed this scene, he would never again
have deemed such extraordinary precaution on his part requisite to guard
against fireships being boarded when preceded by explosion vessels. In
place of becoming the aggressors, as his Lordship had anticipated, the
only care of the enemy was how to get out of the way, even at the risk
of running their ships ashore. Unfortunately the commander-in-chief was
with the fleet, fourteen miles distant.
At daylight on the morning of the 12th not a spar of the boom was
anywhere visible, and with the exception of the _Foudroyant_ and
_Cassard_, _the whole of the enemy’s vessels were helplessly aground_.
The former of these ships lying out of the sweep of the tide, and being
therefore out of danger from the fireships, appeared not to have cut her
cable, and the _Cassard_, which had at first done so, again brought up
about two cables’ length from the _Foudroyant_.
With these exceptions, every vessel of the enemy’s fleet was ashore. The
flag-ship of Admiral Allemand, _L’Océan_, three-decker, drawing the most
water, lay outermost on the north-west edge of the Palles Shoal, nearest
the deep water, where she was most exposed to attack; whilst all, by the
fall of the tide, were lying on their bilge, with their bottoms
completely exposed to shot, and therefore beyond the possibility of
resistance.
The account given by the captain of the _Indienne_, French frigate,
Captain Proteau, of the position of the grounded ships, will not be
called in question. It is as follows:—“The _Indienne_ aground on Point
Aiguille, near the fort; the _Pallas_ off Barques; the _Elbe_ and
_Hortense_ on the Fontenelles; the _Tourville_, _Patriote_, and
_Tonnerre_, as seen from the _Indienne_, in a line on the Palles Shoal;
the _Calcutta_, _Regulus_, _Jemappes_ on the extremity of that shoal;
the _Varsovie_ and _Aquilon_ aground on Charenton; and the _Océan_,
three-decker, close to the edge of the Palles.”
We did not reach the _Impérieuse_ till after midnight. At daylight
observing seven of the nearest enemy’s ships ashore, amongst which was
the admiral’s ship _L’Océan_, and a group of four others lying near her,
in a most favourable position for attack, without the possibility of
returning it, at 6 A.M. we signalised the admiral to that effect. As the
_Impérieuse_ at this time lay just within range of the batteries on Aix,
which had commenced to fire upon us, we weighed, and stood in the
direction of the fleet, letting go our anchor as soon as the ship was
out of range. At 7 A.M. we signalised again, “_All the enemy’s ships,
except two, are on shore_;” this signal, as well as the former one,
being merely acknowledged by the answering pennant; but, to our
surprise, no movement was visible in any part of the fleet indicating an
intention to take advantage of the success gained.
Reflecting that, from the distance of the British force from the
stranded enemy’s ships, viz. from twelve to fourteen miles, the
Commander-in-chief could not clearly be acquainted with their helpless
condition, I directed the signal to be run up, “_The enemy’s ships can
be destroyed_;” this also meeting with the same cool acknowledgment of
the answering pennant.
Not knowing what to make of such a reply, another signal was hoisted,
“_Half the fleet can destroy the enemy_.” This signal was again
acknowledged by the answering pennant, the whole fleet still remaining
motionless as before. On this I made several telegraph signals, one of
which was probably regarded as impertinent, viz. “_The frigates alone
can destroy the enemy_,” though it was true enough, their ships aground
being perfectly helpless. To my astonishment the answering pennant was
still the only reply vouchsafed!
Eight and nine o’clock passed without any indication of movement on the
part of the fleet, though the tide was now fast rising, so that any
ships sent to the attack of the stranded vessels would have had the
flood-tide to go in and the ebb to return, after having accomplished
their destruction; whilst it was evident that if not attacked, the same
flood-tide would enable the French ships aground to float and escape,
with which view some were heaving their guns and stores over board. On
ascertaining this, I again signalised, “_The enemy is preparing to heave
off_;” and entertaining no doubt that the Commander-in-chief would not
permit such a catastrophe, the _Impérieuse_ dropped her anchor close to
the Boyart Shoal, in readiness for any service that might be required.
As much has been said respecting the alleged narrowness of the channel
leading to Aix Roads, by way of excuse for the British fleet not having
followed up the advantage gained by the panic created on the previous
night, from terror of the explosion vessels, I may here mention, that on
our coming to an anchor, a fort on Isle d’Oleron commenced firing shells
at us. As not one of these reached us, the French gunners adopted the
expedient of loading their mortars to the muzzle, this being evident
from the fact that they now discharged them by means of portfires, the
men gaining a place of security before the mortars exploded. Not a
shell, even thus fired, reached our position, a clear proof that had the
British fleet come to the attack, it could have been in no danger from
Oleron, though even these distant batteries were afterwards brought
forward as an obstacle, in default of stronger argument.
At 11 A.M. the British fleet weighed, and stood towards Aix Roads. By
this time the _Océan_, three-decker, and nearest ships aground were
busily employed in heaving off, with a view of making sail for the
Charente!! The advance of our fleet had been too long delayed;
nevertheless, as the bulk of the enemy’s ships were still aground, good
service might have been rendered. To our amazement, the British fleet,
after approaching within seven or eight miles of the grounded ships,
_again came to anchor about three and a half miles distant from Aix_, i.
e. just out of range.
There was no mistaking; the admiral’s intention in again bringing the
fleet to an anchor. Notwithstanding that the enemy had been four hours
at our mercy, and to a considerable extent was still so, it was now
evident that _no attack was intended_[50], and that every enemy’s ship
would be permitted to float away unmolested and unassailed! I frankly
admit that this was too much to be endured. The words of Lord Mulgrave
rang in my ears, “_The Admiralty is bent on destroying that fleet before
it can get out to the West Indies._”
-----
Footnote 50:
Lord Gambier afterwards admitted, that as the object of their
destruction seemed to be attained, there was no occasion to risk any
part of the fleet!!!
-----
The motive of Lord Gambier in bringing the ships to an anchor being
beyond doubt, I made up my mind, if possible, to force him into action
by attacking the enemy with the _Impérieuse_, whatever might be the
consequence. It was, however, a step not to be taken without
consideration, and for some time I hesitated to carry out this
resolution, in the hope that a portion, at least, of the British fleet
would again weigh and stand in.
Noon passed. The _Océan_, three-decker, had now got afloat, and the
group of four others on shore near her, seeing the British fleet anchor,
proceeded with additional energy to heave off. From her position the
three-decker, lying as she did on the edge of the shoal, nearest the
deep water, ought to have been the easiest prize of the whole; for
whilst she lay on her bilge, close to the most accessible part of the
channel, even a single gunboat might have so riddled her bottom as to
have prevented her from floating off with the rising tide!
The surprise of the enemy at seeing the fleet anchor was probably
greater than my own. Before that, they had been making great exertions
to lighten and heave off, but no sooner had the fleet brought up, than,
seeing the possibility of escape, they strained every nerve to hasten
the operation.
In place of the fleet, or even the frigates, a single bomb, which, being
armed with a 13-inch mortar, could project her shells to a great
distance, without being exposed to danger from shot, was ordered in to
shell the ships aground. On my asking her commander, “_what attack was
going to be made on the enemy by the fleet?_” he replied, that “he knew
nothing further than that he was ordered to bombard the ships ashore.”
This was proof enough that no intention of attacking with the fleet, or
any part of it, existed.
In despair, lest the ships still aground should also effect their
escape, at 1 P.M. I ordered the anchor of the _Impérieuse_ to be hove
atrip, and thus we drifted stern foremost towards the enemy. I say
“_drifted_,” for I did not venture to make sail, lest the movement might
be seen from the flagship, and a signal of recall should defeat my
purpose of making an attack with the _Impérieuse_; the object of this
being to _compel_ the commander-in-chief to send vessels to our
assistance, in which case I knew their captains would at once attack the
ships which had not been allowed to heave off and escape.
Had this means not been resorted to, _not a single enemy’s ship would
have been destroyed_, for all could have hove off almost without damage,
and that, to all appearance, without the slightest attempt at
molestation on the part of the British fleet. It was better to risk the
frigate, or even my commission, than to suffer such a disgraceful
termination to the expectations of the Admiralty, after having driven
ashore the enemy’s fleet; and therefore we drifted by the wind and tide
slowly past the fortifications on Isle d’Aix, about which the
commander-in-chief had expressed so many fears in his last letter to the
Board; but though they fired at us with every gun that could be brought
to bear, the distance was too great to inflict damage.
Proceeding thus till 1.30 P.M., and then suddenly making sail after the
nearest of the enemy’s vessels escaping, at 1.40 P.M. the signal was run
up to the peak of the _Impérieuse_, “_Enemy superior to chasing ship,
but inferior to the fleet._” No attention being paid to this signal, at
1.45 P.M. I again signalled, “_In want of assistance_,” which was true
enough, being in a single frigate, close to several enemy’s ships of the
line.
As this signal, according to the code then in use, was coupled with the
one signifying “_In distress_,” the signal officer on board the flagship
thus interpreted it to the commander-in-chief; a circumstance which will
require brief explanation.
In order to divert our attention from the vessels we were pursuing,
these having thrown their guns overboard, the _Calcutta_, which was
still aground, broadside on, began firing at us. Before proceeding
further, it became, therefore, necessary to attack her, and at 1.50 we
shortened sail, and returned the fire. At 2 the _Impérieuse_ came to an
anchor in five fathoms; and veering to half a cable, kept fast the
spring, firing upon the _Calcutta_ with our broadside, and at the same
time upon the _Aquilon_ and _Ville de Varsovie_ with our forecastle and
bow guns, both these ships being aground stern on, in an opposite
direction.
This proceeding—though there could be no doubt of our being “_In want
of assistance_,” seeing that our single frigate, unaided, was engaging
three line-of-battle ships—did not look much like being “_In
distress_,” as the signal officer of the _Caledonia_ had interpreted
the signal; the nature of which could not, however, have deceived the
commander-in-chief, who must have witnessed the circumstances under
which the signal had been made by the _Impérieuse_.
After engaging the _Calcutta_ for some time, and simultaneously firing
into the sterns of the two grounded line-of-battle ships, we had at
length the satisfaction of observing several ships sent to our
assistance, viz. _Emerald_, _Unicorn_, _Indefatigable_, _Valiant_,
_Revenge_, _Pallas_, and _Aigle_. On seeing this, the captain and crew
of the _Calcutta_ abandoned their vessel, of which the boats of the
_Impérieuse_ took possession before the vessels sent to our “assistance”
came down.
On the subsequent court-martial, it was declared that the _Calcutta_ did
not strike to the _Impérieuse_, but to the ships sent to her assistance.
This was deliberately untrue; as proved beyond question by the fact that
the French government ordered a court-martial on the captain of the
_Calcutta_, Lafon, and condemned him to be shot, clearly _for having
abandoned his ship to inferior force_. The French did not shoot any of
the other captains for abandoning their ships, and would not have shot
Captain Lafon for fighting his vessel as long as he could, and then
abandoning her to two line-of-battle ships and five frigates. On the
contrary, they would have highly rewarded him, for saving his crew
against such odds. There cannot be a stronger proof, if proof in
addition to my word be wanted, that Captain Lafon abandoned the
_Calcutta_ to the _Impérieuse_, and not to the line-of-battle ships
which came up afterwards, as was subsequently asserted.
On the arrival of the two line-of-battle ships and the frigates, the
_Impérieuse_ hailed them to anchor, or they would run aground on the
Palles Shoal, on the very edge of which the _Impérieuse_ had taken up
her berth. They anchored immediately and commenced firing on the
_Calcutta_, _Aquilon_, and _Ville de Varsovie_. On this I signalled the
_Revenge_ and others to desist from firing, as the _Calcutta_ had
already struck to the _Impérieuse_, and we had at that time a boat’s
crew on board her.
On this they desisted, and turned their fire wholly on the other two
vessels. At 3.30 P.M. the _Impérieuse_ ceased firing, the crew being
thoroughly exhausted by fatigue; whilst I was so much so, as to be
almost unable to stand. My reason, however, for ordering the
_Impérieuse_ to cease firing was, that the ships sent to our assistance
were more than sufficient to destroy the enemy which remained, and had
they been sent in time—not to our “_assistance_,” but for the more
legitimate object of attacking the grounded ships—they would have been
abundantly sufficient, had they not been recalled, to have destroyed all
those that got away.[51]
-----
Footnote 51:
The _Valiant_ line-of-battle ship even signalled to this effect, as
appears from the log of the _Caledonia_, Lord Gambier’s flagship.
_Valiant_ signalled to flag, “_No doubt five more may be destroyed
to-night._” The reply was a signal of recall.
-----
At 5.30 P.M. the _Aquilon_ and _Ville de Varsovie_ struck.
Shortly afterwards, the _Calcutta_ was set on fire, and in half an hour
was burning furiously. At 6.0 P.M. the crew of the _Tonnerre_, which was
not attacked, set fire to her, escaping in their boats. At 7.0 the
_Tonnerre_ blew up, and at 9.0 the _Calcutta_ also, with an effect, from
the large quantity of ammunition on board, almost equalling that of the
explosion-vessels the night before. The _Calcutta_ was the storeship of
the French fleet.
It has been said, that my having rushed single-handed amongst the
enemy’s ships, and then hoisted the signal “_In want of assistance_,”
was unjustifiable, as forcing the commander-in-chief to attack against
his judgment. My answer to this is, that the expectations entertained by
the Admiralty of destroying the enemy’s fleet would not have been in any
way carried out, had not this means been adopted; because, as has been
said, not a ship belonging to the enemy would have sustained even the
slightest damage from the measures of the commander-in-chief.
The fire-ships entrusted to my command had failed, not from any fault of
mine, but of those who were entrusted with them. It was, then, a
question with me, whether I should disappoint the expectations of my
country; be set down as a _charlatan_ by the Admiralty, whose hopes had
been raised by my plan; have my future prospects destroyed; or force on
an action which some had induced an easy commander-in-chief to believe
impracticable.
Some proof has been given of the jealousy of a portion of the fleet
towards me. Another instance of this occurred even after the two
line-of-battle ships and the frigates came down. Perceiving that the
shot from two sloops, or rather brigs, ordered to protect the _Etna_
bomb, did not reach the enemy, from the long range at which she had
anchored, I made the signal for them to close. As no signal was at hand
to express brigs only, to the exclusion of frigates or larger vessels, I
endeavoured to explain my meaning that the signal was intended for the
brigs, by firing towards them from the main-deck of the _Impérieuse_,
the object of this being to _avoid giving offence_ to my senior officers
in command of the frigates and line-of-battle ships now present. The
signal “_to close_” in the same defective code expressing also “_to
close the Admiral_,” it was construed by my seniors into an insult to
them, as arrogating to myself the position of chief-in-command, which
was simply absurd; as, being my seniors, I had no power to order them,
nor was I so ignorant of my duty as wantonly to usurp the functions of
the commander-in-chief. Yet this at the time gave great offence, though
afterwards satisfactorily explained, to Lord Gambier.
I may here mention a singular incident which occurred some time after
the _Aquilon_ and _Ville de Varsovie_ had struck, and after their
officers and crews had been removed on board the British ships. The
captain of the _Aquilon_ having informed me that he had left his
personal effects behind, I volunteered to take him on board in my boat
and procure them. As we left the _Aquilon_ a shot from a heated gun on
board one of the vessels to which the French had set fire—the
_Tonnerre_, if I recollect rightly—struck the stern sheets of the boat
on which both he and I were sitting, and lacerated the lower part of the
gallant officer’s body so severely that he shortly afterwards expired.
Before daybreak on the following morning the officer of the watch called
me, and reported that three lights were hoisted in the squadron outside.
This proved to be a signal, afterwards reported to have been made by
Admiral Stopford, for the recall of the ships that had been sent in on
the previous evening! In obedience to this signal, they, at 4 A.M., got
under weigh, having previously kindled the French line-of-battle ships
_Aquilon_ and _Ville de Varsovie_; an act for which there was not the
slightest necessity, as they could easily have been got off. Fatigued,
and mentally harassed as I was, I had neither time nor opportunity to
protest against this wanton destruction; besides which, not knowing that
the magazines of the burning ships had been drowned, my attention was
directed to the preservation of the _Impérieuse_, which was in close
proximity.
The two ships _Foudroyant_ and _Cassard_, had cut their cables and made
sail, when on the previous evening the British fleet stood towards Aix
Roads, but afterwards so unaccountably came to an anchor. On seeing this
they shortened sail, but run aground in the middle of the channel
leading to the Charente.
It being clear to me that these ships were not in a fighting condition,
I determined, notwithstanding the recall of the British vessels, to
remain and attack them; considering the signal of recall to be addressed
only to the ships sent to our assistance, which, in obedience to that
signal, were working out of the inner anchorage without any attempt to
destroy other ships which were clearly at their mercy. As they were
passing out I hailed the _Indefatigable_, and asked the captain if he
would go on one quarter of the three-decker (_l’Océan_), whilst the
_Impérieuse_ engaged the other? The reply was that “he would not, and
that they _were going out to join the fleet_.”
To his infinite credit, Captain Seymour, of the _Pallas_ (the present
distinguished admiral, Sir George Seymour), hailed us to know “if he
should remain with the _Impérieuse_?” he being evidently as reluctant as
myself to give up advantages so manifest. I replied, that if no orders
had been given him to the contrary, I should be obliged to him so to do;
whereupon the _Pallas_ anchored, and four brigs, the _Beagle_,
_Growler_, _Conflict_, and _Encounter_, followed her example.
We now commenced clearing the decks for further action, throwing
overboard a boat which had been shot to pieces. The carpenters were then
set to stop shot holes in the sides and decks, and the seamen to repair
the rigging, and shift the fore-topmast, which had been shot through.
The brave, but unfortunate, captain of the _Calcutta_ had, in our short
action, inflicted on us an amount of damage which the forts on Aix and
Oleron had in vain attempted to effect; neither the one nor the other
having once touched us.
Whilst the refitting of the frigate was going on, I ordered our only
bomb, the _Etna_, protected by the brigs, to fire on the enemy’s Vice-
and Rear-Admiral’s ships, as well as on the _Foudroyant_ and _Cassard_,
which, having thrown all overboard, were now pressing sail to get up the
Charente, thus taking on myself to commence the action anew, _after the
auxiliary line-of-battle ships and frigates had retired_!
To my regret, a signal of recall was immediately hoisted on board the
_Caledonia_! To this I replied by another, “_The enemy can be
destroyed_;” of which no notice was taken. Shortly afterwards a boat
brought me the following letter from Lord Gambier:—
“_Caledonia_, 13th of April.
“MY DEAR LORD,—_You have done your part so admirably that I will not
suffer you to tarnish it by attempting impossibilities_[52], which I
think, as well as those captains who have come from you, any further
effort to destroy those ships would be. You must, therefore, join as
soon as you can, with the bombs, &c., as I wish for some information,
which you allude to, before I close my despatches.
“Yours, my dear Lord, most sincerely,
“GAMBIER.
“Capt. Lord Cochrane.
“_P.S._—I have ordered _three brigs and two rocket-vessels to join
you_, with which, and the bomb, you may make an attempt on the ship
that is aground on the Palles, or towards Ile Madame, but I do not
think you will succeed; and I am anxious that you should come to me,
as I wish to send you to England as soon as possible. You must,
therefore, come as soon as the tide turns.”
-----
Footnote 52:
In spite of this and other declarations arising from acts personally
witnessed, though at many miles’ distance, yet still within ken of the
telescope, Lord Gambier, on his court-martial, stated that “I had done
little beyond mischief!!”
-----
I felt deep regret at what must be considered as the evasions of this
letter. First, Lord Gambier ordered me to come out of the anchorage and
join the fleet! but evidently not choosing to take upon himself the
responsibility of ordering me out, in opposition to my own views, he
told me he would send some brigs with which I might attack vessels which
his own neglect had permitted to escape up the Charente! and thirdly, I
was ordered, to come out as soon as the tide turned!
As the commander-in-chief’s letter was thus indecisive, I chose to
construe it as giving me the option of remaining, and returned his
lordship the following answer:—
“_Impérieuse_, 13th April.
“MY LORD,—I have just had the honour to receive your Lordship’s
letter. We _can_ destroy the ships that are on shore, which I hope
your Lordship will approve of.
“I have the honour, &c.
“COCHRANE.
“The Right Hon. Lord Gambier.”
At daylight on the 14th the enemy were still in the same condition, but
with a number of chasse-marées quietly taking out their stores. Three of
them were getting out their guns, evidently in expectation of certain
destruction from the small vessels which remained after the
line-of-battle ships and heavy frigates were recalled; and, had we been
permitted to attack them _even now_, their destruction would have been
inevitable.
In place of this the recall signal was once more hoisted on board the
_Caledonia_, to which I replied by the interrogatory signal “_Shall we
unmoor?_” considering that his lordship would understand the signal as a
request to be permitted to resume the attack. I did not repeat the
signal that the enemy could be destroyed, because, having conveyed to
him by letter my opinion on that subject the day before, I thought a
repetition of that opinion unnecessary,—the more so, as, from the enemy
heaving overboard them guns, its soundness was more than ever confirmed.
In place of being ordered to attack, as from his lordship’s previous
letter I had every reason to expect, the recall signal was repeated, and
shortly afterwards came the following letter:—
“_Caledonia_, 13th (14th) April.
“MY DEAR LORD,—It is necessary I should have some communication with
you before I close my despatches to the Admiralty. _I have, therefore,
ordered Captain Wolfe to relieve you_ in the services you are engaged
in. I wish you to join me as soon as possible, that you may convey Sir
Harry Neale to England, who will be charged with my despatches, or you
may return to carry on the service where you are. I expect two bombs
to arrive every moment, they will be useful in it.
Yours, my dear Lord, most sincerely,
“GAMBIER.
“Capt. Lord Cochrane.”
Here was a repetition of the same thing. I was ordered away from the
attack, to “convey Sir H. Neale to England,” or I “might return to carry
on the service where I was,” viz. after the enemy had got clear off,
_and after being formally superseded in the service to which the Board
of Admiralty had appointed me, by a senior officer whom I could not
again supersede_!!!
There was, however, no evading Lord Gambier’s letter this time without
positive disobedience to orders, and that was not lightly to be risked,
even with the Board’s instructions to back me. I therefore returned to
the _Caledonia_, and at once told Lord Gambier that the extraordinary
hesitation which had been displayed in attacking ships helplessly on
shore, could only have arisen from my being employed in the attack, in
preference to senior officers. I begged his lordship, by way of
preventing the ill-feeling of the fleet from becoming detrimental to the
honour of the service, to set me altogether aside, and send in Admiral
Stopford, with the frigates or other vessels, as with regard to him
there could be no ill-feeling; further declaring my confidence that from
Admiral Stopford’s zeal for the service, he would, being backed by his
officers, accomplish results more creditable than anything that had yet
been done. I apologised for the freedom I used, stating that I took the
liberty as a friend, for it would be impossible, as matters stood, to
prevent a noise being made in England.
His lordship appeared much displeased; and making no remark, I repeated,
“My Lord, you have before desired me to ‘speak candidly to you,’ and I
have now used that freedom.”
Lord Gambier then replied, “_If you throw blame upon what has been done,
it will appear like arrogantly claiming all the merit to yourself._”
I assured his lordship that I had no such intention, for that no merit
was due, and told him that I had no wish to carry the despatches, or to
go to London with Sir Harry Neale on the occasion, my object being alone
that which had been entrusted to me by the Admiralty, viz. to destroy
the vessels of the enemy.
His lordship, however, cut the matter short by giving me written orders
immediately to convey Sir Harry Neale to England with despatches. In
obedience to this order we quitted Basque Roads for Plymouth on the
following morning.
These matters are officially on record, and therefore do not admit of
dispute. I will not comment further upon them, but will leave them to
the judgment of posterity. I will even go further, and acquit Lord
Gambier of all blame up to this period, except that of an easy
disposition, which yielded to the advice of officers interested in my
failure, that calm judgment which should characterise a
commander-in-chief, and which, had it been exercised, would have
rendered, as Napoleon afterwards said, the whole French fleet an easy
prey.
As much misrepresentation was made at the time relative to the damage
inflicted by the explosion-vessel under my immediate command, and as the
same misrepresentation has been adopted by all English historians, it
will be necessary particularly to advert to this. As mere assertion on
my part may be deemed egotistical, if not partial, I will adduce the
testimony of Captain Proteau, who commanded the enemy’s frigate
_Indienne_, and was _close to the boom_ at the time it was destroyed by
the explosion-vessel. The point here alluded to is the statement of the
commander of the _Mediator_, that HIS VESSEL BROKE THE BOOM BY HER
WEIGHT!! and Lord Gambier, without any personal knowledge of the fact,
was thereby led to endorse his statement.
The captain of the _Indienne_, on the other hand, states that when the
explosion-vessel blew up she was “_at the boom_,” or, nautically
speaking, “_brought up by the boom_.” His words, are “_flottant à
l’estacade_.”
It will be best, however, to extract the passage entire:—
“Nous distinguâmes, à 9 heures et demie, sous notre boussoir de
tribord, un corps _flottant à l’estacade_. L’explosion s’en fit
tout-à-coup, et vomit quantité de fusées artificielles, grenades et
obus, qui éclatèrent en l’air sans nous faire le moindre mal,
cependant nous n’en étions qu’à une demie encâblure.”—_Captain
Proteau’s Journal._
As the _Indienne_ was only half a cable’s length from the boom when the
explosion took place, the testimony of her captain on this point ought
to be decisive.
Lord Gambier stated in his despatch, and afterwards in his defence, that
the explosion-vessel blew up at half-past nine, whilst at three-quarters
past nine (_a quarter of an hour later_), the _Mediator_ and other
vessels came up, and were fired on by the French ships!
Lord Gambier, being himself more than a dozen miles from the scene of
action, made this statement on the authority of Captain Wooldridge, who
commanded the _Mediator_, and who reiterated in his evidence on the
court-martial the statement he had previously made to Lord Gambier, viz.
that _his ship_, and not the explosion-vessel, broke the boom: of the
truth of which statement the nautical reader shall judge on professional
grounds.
Admiral Allemand, who commanded in Aix Roads, thus describes, in his
despatch to the French Government, the boom which had been laid down by
his directions:—“Elle (the French fleet) étoit flanquée _d’une estacade
à quatre cents toises au large, qui avoit huits cents toises de long_.”
The boom formed two sides of a triangle, with the apex towards the
British fleet, thus,—
.
. .
400 toise. . . 400 toises.
. .
. .
. .
800 toises.
That is to say, each wing of the boom was more than half a mile long,
and the distance between the extremities of the base was nearly a mile.
This formidable obstacle was composed of large spars, bound by chains,
and moored along its whole double line with heavy anchors at appropriate
intervals, forming the most stupendous structure of the kind on record.
The statement of Captain Wooldridge to Lord Gambier, therefore, amounts
to this,—that his ship, the _Mediator_, an Indiaman of 800 tons, broke
up a double boom, each side of which was upwards of half a mile in
length; tore up, by pressure on one point only, a double line of heavy
anchors more than a mile in extent; and snapped many miles of iron
chains and lashings connecting the spars together!!!—though her contact
could not have been more than a few feet, the collision necessarily
taking place on one wing of the boom only. This was Captain Wooldridge’s
own version to Lord Gambier. To the nautical reader it is unnecessary to
write one word of comment; so much so, indeed, that I will not insult
the common sense even of the unprofessional reader by any attempt at
further explanation.
Yet this statement was made by Captain Wooldridge, not only to Lord
Gambier but to the officers composing the subsequent court-martial; more
strangely still, it was _accepted by those officers_, though every one
present must have known that the _Mediator_ would either have been
brought up on her first contact with the boom, or, if she were weighty
enough to overcome the obstacle, must have passed over it, by pressing
it beneath her bow into the water.
It was not even pretended by those on board the _Mediator_ that any
shock was felt! a pretty clear proof that, when she passed over the
place where the boom _had been_, no such obstacle existed. That a vessel
could have broken up a boom of such magnitude is too absurd for
reflection. Nor, had not this version of the matter appeared in every
naval history since 1809, should I have deemed a statement so truly
incredible worthy of notice.[53]
-----
Footnote 53:
The _Mediator’_s log, now amongst the Admiralty records, is conclusive
on the point. It is carried up to midnight on the 11th, two hours and
a half after notifying that the ship was set on fire at 9.30 P.M., but
_does not say a word about breaking or even feeling a shock from any
boom_.
-----
Even the explosion-vessel did not break the boom by actual contact. It
was the combined effect of the explosion upon the boom and upon the
surface of the sea that shook it to pieces. The huge waves caused by the
explosion lifted the boom along its entire length, and the strain so
loosened the chains which bound the spars together, that the latter
floated out of the fastenings, and were carried away with the tide, the
chains sinking as a matter of course. It is certain that at daylight the
next morning not a vestige of this formidable boom was to be seen; no
one pretended to have seen so much as a single spar of it; though, had
the _Mediator_ broken through it, as falsely alleged, the whole length
of the boom, except the part ruptured, must necessarily have remained at
anchor!!
CHAP. XXII.
ARRIVAL IN ENGLAND.
INTENDED VOTE OF THANKS TO LORD GAMBIER.—RESOLVE TO OPPOSE IT.—INTERVIEW
WITH LORD MULGRAVE.—LORD GAMBIER DEMANDS A COURT-MARTIAL.—HE IS
DIRECTED TO MAKE A FRESH REPORT OF THE ACTION IN BASQUE
ROADS.—INJUSTICE OF THIS SECOND DESPATCH.—ATTEMPT TO ENTRAP ME INTO
THE POSITION OF PROSECUTOR.—COMPOSITION AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
COURT-MARTIAL.—THE ADMIRAL’S POINTS OF JUSTIFICATION.—DISPOSED OF BY
CAPTAIN BROUGHTON’S EVIDENCE, AND BY THAT OF CAPTAINS MALCOLM,
NEWCOMBE, AND SEYMOUR.—SIR HARRY NEALE’S EVIDENCE STOPPED BY ADMIRAL
YOUNG.
On the 26th of April, His Majesty was pleased to confer on me the
Knighthood of the Order of the Bath.
Soon after Lord Gambier’s arrival in England, Lord Mulgrave informed me
that a vote of thanks to the commander-in-chief would be proposed in the
House of Commons. Whereupon I told Lord Mulgrave that it was my duty to
apprise him that in my capacity as one of the members for Westminster, I
would oppose the motion, on the ground that the commander-in-chief had
not only done nothing to merit a vote of thanks, but had neglected to
destroy the French fleet in Aix Roads, when it was clearly in his power
to do so.
Lord Mulgrave entreated me not to persist in this determination, as such
a course would not only prove injurious to the Government, but highly
detrimental to myself, by raising up against me a host of enemies. The
public, said his lordship, was satisfied with what had been done, and
gave me full credit for my share therein, so that as I should be
included in the vote of thanks, the recognition of Lord Gambier’s
services could do me no harm.
I told his lordship that, speaking as a member of the House of Commons,
I did not recognise Lord Gambier’s services at all, for that none had
been rendered; and as for any thanks to myself, I would rather be
without them, feeling conscious that I had not been enabled
satisfactorily to carry out the earnest wishes of the Admiralty by the
destruction of the enemy’s fleet, as impressed on me by his lordship
before accepting the command with which I had been entrusted. I
nevertheless begged his lordship to consider that in my professional
capacity as a naval officer, I neither did offer nor had offered, any
opinion whatever on Lord Gambier’s conduct, but that my position as
member of Parliament for Westminster forbade my acquiescence in a public
misrepresentation.
Lord Mulgrave replied, that I was even now accusing Lord Gambier in my
professional capacity; the public would not draw the distinction between
my professional and parliamentary conduct. I expressed my regret for the
public want of discrimination, but told his lordship that this would not
alter my determination.
Soon after this conversation Lord Mulgrave sent for me, and again
entreated me, for my own sake, to reconsider my resolution, saying that
he had reported our former conversation to the Government, which was
highly dissatisfied therewith. His lordship further assured me that he
was anxious about the matter on my account, as the course intimated
would certainly bring me under high displeasure. To this I replied, that
the displeasure of the Government would not for a moment influence my
Parliamentary conduct, for which I held myself answerable to my
constituents.
His lordship then said, “If you are on service, you cannot be in your
place in Parliament. Now, my lord, I will make you a proposal. I will
put under your orders three frigates, with _carte blanche_ to do
whatever you please on the enemy’s coasts in the Mediterranean. I will
further get you permission to go to Sicily, and embark on board your
squadron my own regiment, which is stationed there. You know how to make
use of such advantages.”
I thanked Lord Mulgrave for the offer, at the same time expressing my
gratitude for his anxiety to preserve me from the evils of acting
contrary to the wishes of the Government; but told his lordship that,
were I to accept this offer, the country would regard my acquiescence as
a bribe to hold my peace, whilst I could not regard it in any other
light. Self-respect must, therefore, be my excuse for declining the
proposal.
The anxiety of the then Government was, no doubt, to convert what had
been effected in Aix Roads into political capital, as a victory which
merited the thanks of parliament. My tacit aquiescence in the object of
Government would have subjected me, and rightly, to a total loss of
political confidence in the estimation of those with whom I acted. No
man with the slightest pretensions to personal honesty or political
consistency could, therefore, have decided otherwise than I did, even
with the kind warning of Lord Mulgrave, that evil consequences to myself
would follow—a prediction subsequently verified to the letter.
The upshot of the matter was, that on Lord Mulgrave communicating my
determination to Lord Gambier, the latter demanded a court-martial.
As soon as my fixed resolution of opposing the vote of thanks became
known to the Government, the Board of Admiralty directed Lord Gambier to
make a _fresh report_ of the action in Basque Roads! requiring his
lordship to call upon various officers for further reports as to the
part they took therein!
Accordingly, on the 10th of May, Lord Gambier forwarded _a new despatch_
to the Admiralty, _in which my services were altogether passed over!!!_
notwithstanding that, in Lord Gambier’s previous report, he had written
as follows:—“I cannot speak in sufficient terms of admiration and
applause of the vigorous and gallant attack made by Lord Cochrane upon
the French line-of-battle ships which were on shore; as well as of his
judicious manner of approaching them, and placing his ship in a position
most advantageous to annoy the enemy and preserve his own ship, which
could not be exceeded by any feat of valour hitherto achieved by the
British navy.”
Still more singularly, in the second despatch, which is too long for
insertion[54], Lord Gambier inadvertently confirms the fact that _no
attack on the French fleet would have been made at all_, had it not been
for my having commenced an attack with the _Impérieuse_ alone, which
movement, as has been said, was executed literally _by stealth_, under
the fear that the signal of recall would be hoisted by the
commander-in-chief!
-----
Footnote 54:
The letter in question will be found at p. 7 of “Minutes of a
Court-Martial on Lord Gambier, taken in short-hand by W. B. Gurney,”
and, as therein stated, revised by his lordship.
-----
It having, for reasons described in a former chapter, become imperative
on Lord Gambier to send us assistance, he, nevertheless, construed this
into an _intention_ on his part to attack the enemy. “_Observing the
Impérieuse to advance, and the time of flood nearly done running, the
Indefatigable_, &c. &c. were ordered to the attack!” It is not very
probable that, had Lord Gambier intended an attack, he would have let
the flood-tide go by, without taking advantage of it in a channel which
was afterwards declared unsafe from want of water!
This passage alone of Lord Gambier’s second despatch ought to have
decided the result of any court-martial. The Board of Admiralty would
not, however, see anything inculpatory of their former colleague; but,
on the 29th of May, ordered me, through their secretary, to become the
accuser of the commander-in-chief; “I am commanded by their Lordships to
signify their directions that you state fully to me, for their
information, the grounds on which your lordship objects to the vote of
thanks being moved to Lord Gambier, to the end that them Lordships’
objections may be of a nature to justify the suspension of the intended
motion in Parliament, or to call for any further information.”—(Signed)
“W. W. POLE.”
This command was manifestly intended to entrap me into the position of
Lord Gambier’s prosecutor, and was, moreover, an improper interference
with my Parliamentary capacity, in which alone I had declared my
intention to oppose an uncalled-for vote of thanks to the
commander-in-chief. I therefore wrote to the Secretary of the Admiralty
the subjoined reply.
“Portman Square, 30th May, 1809.
“SIR,—I have to request that you will submit to their Lordships that I
shall, at all times, entertain a due sense of the honour they will
confer by any directions they may be pleased to give me; that in
pursuing the object of these directions, my exertions will invariably
go hand in hand with my duty; and that, to satisfy their Lordships’
minds in the present instance, I beg leave to state that the log and
signal log-books of the fleet in Basque Roads contain all particulars,
and furnish premises whence accurate conclusions may be drawn; that,
as these books are authentic public documents, and as I cannot myself
refer to them, anything I could offer to their Lordships on the
subject would be altogether superfluous, and would appear presumptuous
interruptions to their Lordships’ judgment, which will, doubtless,
always found itself upon those grounds only that cannot be disputed.
“I have, &c. &c.
“COCHRANE.
“The Hon. W. W. Pole,
Secretary to the Admiralty.”
This reply, though plain, was respectful; but, as I had afterwards good
reason to know, was deemed very offensive; the result being that, _after
two months’ delay_ to enable Lord Gambier to get up his defence, a
court-martial was assembled on the 26th of July, on board the
_Gladiator_, at Portsmouth, the court being composed of the following
members:—
PRESIDENT—Sir Roger Curtis, Port-Admiral.
ADMIRALS—Young, Stanhope, Campbell, Douglas, Duckworth, and Sutton.
CAPTAINS—Irwin, Dickson, Hall, and Dunn.
It may perhaps be asked in what way a court-martial on Lord Gambier can
so far concern me as to occupy a prominent place in this autobiography?
The reply is, that, notwithstanding my repudiation, I was regarded at
the court-martial as his accuser, though not permitted to be present so
as to cross-examine witnesses; the whole proceeding being conducted in
my absence, rather as a prosecution against me than Lord Gambier; and
that the result was injurious to myself, as Lord Mulgrave had predicted,
involving the punishment of not being employed with my frigate at
Flushing, there to put in execution plans for the certain destruction of
the French fleet in the Scheldt; so that, in order to punish me, the
enemy’s fleet was suffered to remain in security, when it might easily
have been destroyed.
The reader must not imagine that I am about to inflict on him the
evidence of a nine days’ trial; but without some extracts therefrom, it
is impossible to comprehend the matter. Let him bear in mind that Lord
Gambier relied for justification on three points:—1st, That, had he sent
in the fleet, its safety would have been endangered by the
fortifications of Aix (which he had previously spoken of as being
dismantled); 2nd, Want of water to navigate the fleet in safety; and
3rdly, From the fire of the enemy’s vessels driven ashore (though
lightened of their guns and stores).
CAPTAIN BROUGHTON (of the _Illustrious_).—“I was in Basque Roads, in
the _Amelia_, on the 17th of March, and when within gunshot of the
Isle of Aix observed the fortifications as being under repair, from
the quantity of rubbish thrown up. I thought the fortifications on the
island were not so strong as we supposed, and so reported to Lord
Gambier. This was on the 1st of April. I did not notice any furnaces
for heating red-hot shot. We were just out of gunshot,—_they fired at
us from both sides, but none reached us_.”
In reply to the question, “whether everything was done that could be
done to effect the destruction of the enemy’s ships?” Captain Broughton
said:—
“It would have been more advantageous if the line-of-battle ships,
frigates, and small vessels had _gone in at half-flood_, about 11
o’clock. There were _nine sail ashore_, and if the British ships had
been ordered in, it would have been more advantageous. There were only
_two_ of the enemy’s ships at anchor, and the _fleet_, had it gone in,
would have been exposed to _their_ fire; but I conceived they were
panic-struck, and on the appearance of a force might have been induced
to cut their cables, and escape up the river. A ship or two might have
been placed, in my opinion, against the batteries on the southern part
of Isle d’Aix so as to take off their fire, and _silence them_. I told
Sir Henry Neale, on board the _Caledonia_, when the signal was made
for all captains in the mooring, that ‘_they were attackable from the
confused way in which the French ships were at the time_;’ viz. from
having run ashore in the night, in order to escape from the
fire-ships, which they imagined would explode.
“As the wind was north-westerly and northerly, ships might have found
safe anchorage in what is called, in my French chart, le Grand
Trousse, where there is thirty or forty feet of water _out of range of
shot or shells in any direction_. When we first came into Basque
Roads, if the charts were to be believed, _there appeared to be water
enough in that position. I do not know anything of any shoal water. I
sounded from the wreck of the Varsovie to that anchorage, and found no
shoal there_. Two ships of the line would have been sufficient to have
silenced the batteries on Aix, and five or six of the least draught of
water to attack the enemy’s ships. The discomfited French squadron
would have made very little resistance. The loss would have been very
little, as few of their ships were in a situation to fight their
guns.”
Here a distinguished officer shows that two ships could have silenced
the batteries; that, in case of damage, there was plenty of water for
them to retire to out of reach; and that the French ships, being ashore,
could not use their guns.
CAPTAIN PULTENEY MALCOLM (of the _Donegal_).—“I saw the enemy’s
three-decker on shore. Till about noon she was heeling over
considerably, and appeared to me to be _heaving her guns overboard_.
She got off about two o’clock; _all the ships got off, except those
that were destroyed_. Had it appeared to me that there was no other
chance of destroying those ships but by such an attack, I CERTAINLY
THINK IT OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN MADE. _Had they been attacked by the
British ships, in my opinion they could not have been warped off from
the shore, as it was necessary so to do, to lay out anchors to heave
them off._”
_Question._—“Would you, had you commanded the British fleet, have sent
in ships to attack the enemy’s ships on shore?”
_Answer._—“The moment the two ships quitted their defensive position,
the risk was then small, and OF COURSE I WOULD HAVE SENT THEM IN
INSTANTLY.”
This evidence is pretty decisive, but its plain tendency was attempted
to be neutralised by the question whether there would have been _risk of
damage_, had the British fleet been sent in to attack the enemy’s ships
when ashore! The great point of defence throughout was risk to the
ships, as though the chief use of ships of war was to save them from
injury.
CAPTAIN F. NEWCOMBE (of the _Beagle_).—“Can you state any instance of
neglect, misconduct, or inattention in the proceedings of the
Commander-in-chief, between the 11th and the 18th?”
_Answer._—“None; save and except, had the Commander-in-chief thought
proper, from his situation, TO HAVE SENT IN VESSELS EARLIER THAN THEY
WERE SENT, though there might be a great risk in so doing, there was a
possibility of annoying the enemy more than they were annoyed.”
CAPTAIN GEORGE FRANCIS SEYMOUR (of the _Pallas_.)—“I saw the
_Impérieuse_ inform the Commander-in-chief, by signal, that if allowed
to remain he could destroy the enemy: there was every prospect of
preventing them from getting off, as it would prevent their carrying
out hawsers to heave off by. From what I afterwards saw, I think the
ships might have floated in sooner—they might have come in with the
last half of the flood-tide.”
PRESIDENT.—“How much sooner would that have been than the time they
actually did join?”
_Answer._—“At _eleven o’clock_.”
_Question._—“What time did the line-of-battle ships join?”
_Answer._—“_Within a short time after two o’clock._”
_Question._—“Is your opinion formed from information obtained since
the 12th of April, or on that day?”
_Answer._—“It was formed from the depth of water _we found_ ON GOING
IN.”
This evidence, coming from an officer of Captain Seymour’s character and
standing, was so decisive, that it was subjected to a severe
cross-examination, of which the subjoined is the substance:—
“It is impossible for me to foretell the event of such an attack, it
so much depending on fortuitous circumstances. I cannot say that the
line-of-battle ships _should_ have gone in; I was not in possession of
the Commander-in-chief’s information. _I state the fact, and leave the
Court to judge._ I mean to say, _there would have been water enough
for the line-of-battle ships to have floated in_. As to the opposition
they would have met with, the Court has as much before them as I
have.”
If the reader will refer to Lord Gambier’s expression, in his second
despatch of the 10th of May (see page 407), it will be evident that no
attack whatever was intended; “but observing the _Impérieuse_ to
advance,” it became imperative to support her, _i.e._ when the
_flood-tide “had nearly done running.”_ This is the true explanation of
the British ships having been sent in _at all_. I repeat, that the
advance of the _Impérieuse_ thus forced on the little that was done. Had
an attack been seriously intended, the time at which the British fleet
should have gone in was that pointed out by the preceding officers, viz.
when the French ships were aground, and the whole within reach of
destruction; instead of when the few, which were unable to get off by
any exertions, were assailed. To have rested a case upon the danger to
the British fleet from the fire of the ships _ashore_, with their guns
thrown overboard to lighten them, was a course of defence which, for the
honour of the British navy, is elsewhere unparalleled.
There is no necessity to adduce further extracts on this head; and I
have purposely refrained from introducing my own evidence; but the
_animus_ by which the Court was actuated in the case must not be lightly
passed over.
One of the principal witnesses was, as a matter of course, the Captain
of the Fleet, Sir Harry Neale. This officer, though thoroughly
conversant with both the acts and intentions of the commander-in-chief,
was directed by the President openly, _not to state the opinions he had
given to Lord Gambier on public services_! By Admiral Young Sir Harry
Neale was told _to say nothing but what he was directed to detail_! This
would be incredible were it not printed in “Minutes of the
Court-Martial, revised by Lord Gambier!”
Sir H. NEALE (Captain of the Fleet).—“There were continued
conversations between the Commander-in-chief and me. I have given him
my opinion _on different services_; some of those he may have
approved, and _some he may not have approved_.”
PRESIDENT.—“I apprehend _these_ are _not_ to be stated!”
Yet Sir H. Neale carefully marked the distinction between private
conversation and the _public service_, by using the term “different
services;” he being evidently ready to tell all he knew as regarded the
public service. He was, however, stopped by Admiral Young in one of the
strangest injunctions which ever fell from the lips of a judge.
ADMIRAL YOUNG.—“If you are directed _to detail_ any circumstances, you
are _then_ to say all you know of the circumstances you _are directed
to detail_; but if you are asked a specific question, your oath, I
imagine, will _only_ oblige you to answer SPECIFICALLY and directly,
and as fully as you _can, the question which is proposed to you_!”
So that Sir Harry Neale was cautioned that, if he was _not_ directed to
detail circumstances, he was not to relate them, however important they
might be! And if asked only a specific question, he was merely to answer
_specifically_; though the Court could know nothing of the facts, unless
they permitted the witnesses to tell the truth, and the whole truth, in
the very words of the oath.
But as Sir Harry Neale was known to be a man not likely to be thus
peremptorily silenced, half a dozen insignificant questions were,
therefore, only put to him by the Court, with the exception of one or
two leading questions from Lord Gambier.
CHAP. XXIII.
LORD GAMBIER’S DESPATCH.
ITS OMISSIONS AND SUPPRESSIONS.—MOTIVE FOR LORD GAMBIER’s
MISSTATEMENTS.—MR. FAIRFAX REPORTS THAT THE MEDIATOR WENT IN FIFTH,
NOT FIRST.—REASON OF THE CONTRARY ASSERTION.—NAPOLEON ATTRIBUTES THE
ESCAPE OF HIS FLEET TO THE IMBECILITY OF LORD GAMBIER.—MISMANAGEMENT
OF THE FIRESHIPS.—LORD GAMBIER’s DELAY AND MISDIRECTION.—HIS
PERVERSION OF FACT.—HIS MISPLACED PRAISE.—THE DESPATCH FAILS TO
SATISFY THE PUBLIC.—CRITICISED BY THE PRESS.—ADMIRAL GRAVIÈRE’s
ACCOUNT OF THE TERMINATION OF THE ACTION.
The despatch brought to England by Sir Harry Neale set out with the
perversion, that the fireships, “arranged according to my plan,” were
“led on in the most undaunted and determined manner by Captain
Wooldridge in the _Mediator, preceded by some vessels filled with powder
and shells, as proposed by Lord Cochrane, with a view to explosion_!”
The omission of the fact that before Captain Wooldridge “led the
fireships” I had myself preceded them in the explosion vessel, and that,
even before the _Mediator_ proceeded on service in obedience to the
signals made by my order from the _Impérieuse_, the explosion vessel
under my personal command was half-way towards the French fleet; the
suppression of my name as having anything at all to do with the attack
by means of the explosion vessels, notwithstanding that by going first I
ran all the risk of being boarded by the French guard-boats, and myself
and crew murdered, as would have been the case had we been captured,
showed that the object of the commander-in-chief was to suppress all
mention of me, my plans, or their execution, as entitled to any credit
for the mischief done to the enemy.
The despatch leads the reader to infer that the success subsequently
obtained arose from the “undaunted and determined manner in which
Captain Wooldridge led the fireships,” from “Admiral Stopford’s zealous
co-operation with the boats,” though not one of these ever stirred from
alongside the _Cæsar_, anchored full four miles from the scene of
action, and from the plans of the commander-in-chief himself.
That this suppression of all mention of the success of my plans in
driving the whole enemy’s fleet ashore with the exception of two ships
of the line, was deliberately intended by the commander-in-chief, is
placed beyond question by the contemptuous manner in which he speaks of
the means which really effected the mischief,—“_some vessels filled with
powder and shells, with a view to explosion_.” That these means,
conducted by myself, not Captain Wooldridge, _did_ drive the French
ships ashore, has been admitted by every French and English historian
since that period; and that this was done by my personal presence and
instrumentality is a historical fact which nothing can shake or pervert.
The only person ignoring the fact was the commander-in-chief of the
British force, who not only gives me no credit for what had been done,
but does not even mention my name, as having, by the above means,
contributed to the result!
The sole conceivable motive for such a suppression of the success of my
plans must have been that, having neglected to take advantage of the
helpless condition of the French ships driven ashore, it was desirable
to conceal the whole of the facts from the British public, by ascribing
the success gained to other, and totally different causes, and thus to
convert a deep discredit into a great victory!
The despatch goes on to state that, “the _Mediator, by breaking the
boom!_” opened the way for the fireships, “but, owing to the darkness of
the night, several mistook their course and failed.”
At the conclusion of the last chapter, such reasons have, I think, been
given why the _Mediator_ could not have broken a double boom nearly a
mile in extent as ought to have set the question for ever at rest. But
as that statement, notwithstanding its impossibility, is endorsed by the
commander-in-chief as the groundwork of his despatch, it will be
necessary to refute his lordship’s statement also, and that from the
evidence of an officer upon whose testimony he must necessarily rely,
viz. Mr. Fairfax, the master of the fleet, who was deputed in the _Lyra_
to observe the effect produced by the fireships, and, as a matter of
course, reported to the commander-in-chief the result of his
observations, which were as follows:—
“When the explosion-vessel blew up, she was about two cables’ length
from the _Lyra_. The _Lyra_, as well as the other explosion-vessel, is
marked in the chart produced by me. When she blew up, the fire vessels
_all_ seemed to steer for that point. _I hailed four of them, and the
Mediator_, and desired the _Mediator_ to steer south-east, or else she
would miss the _French fleet_.”—_Minutes_, p. 177.
In another place Mr. Fairfax states that the night was so dark that it
was difficult to make out exact positions; but the testimony of Captain
Proteau, of the _Indienne_, that the explosion took place _at the boom_,
“_à l’estacade_,” is indisputable, as the _Indienne_, by Captain
Proteau’s testimony, was lying so close to the boom and the
explosion-vessel also, as only to escape the effect of the latter by her
shells going over. The spot, therefore, where the explosion took place
is historically beyond doubt.
The testimony of Mr. Fairfax, then—and it must be borne in mind that I
had no worse enemy in the fleet than that person—is this:—1st, The
explosion took place; 2ndly, _all_ the fireships steered for the point
where it had taken place; 3rdly, Mr. Fairfax hailed _four_ of them;
4thly, the _Mediator_ then came up, _steering in a wrong direction_, so
that in place of “leading the fireships in the most undaunted and
determined manner,” as vouched for by the commander-in-chief, the master
of the fleet, who was on the spot, vouches that she was the _fifth
fireship which came up_, and that had he not set her right in her course
she would have “missed the French fleet;” _i.e._ she was behind the
other fireships, and _steering outside the boom, which lay in front of
the French fleet!_
It would, I think, be superfluous to say another word about this
extraordinary story of the boom, nor should I have condescended to
notice it at all in connection with the despatch, but that the
commander-in-chief makes it the groundwork of his report to the
Government, for the unworthy purpose of altogether omitting my name as
connected with the explosion-vessels, and for leading the public to
infer that these produced _no effect whatever, either on the boom or the
French fleet!_ which is indeed the main object of the despatch.
It was, however, necessary to give some reason why the French fleet ran
ashore; and as it was not considered expedient to give me the credit of
causing it to do so by the terror created from the explosion, the
commander-in-chief, despite his own judgment as a seaman, appears to
have caught at Captain Wooldridge’s story of breaking the boom, and
other subsequent exploits just as unfounded; though the master of the
fleet must have reported that some time after the explosion-vessel had
done its work _he fell in with the Mediator, steering in a wrong
direction, and set her right in her course!!!_
I forbear to speak of having myself encountered the _Mediator_ after
passing several other fireships, as that would be assertion only. Of the
effect produced, and by what means it was produced, the subjoined
extract from the _Times_ newspaper of May 4th, 1809, will furnish some
idea, as coming from French sources:—
“Some letters have been received from the French coast, which bear
testimony to the destructive result of the late attack an the enemy’s
fleet in Basque Roads. ‘Your _infernal machines_,’ says one of the
letters, ‘have not only destroyed several of our ships, but they have
rendered almost all the remainder unfit to put to sea again. They have
proved the destruction of more than 2000 of our people, (?) and
_petrified the rest with fear_. The mouth of the Charente river is
completely blocked up with wreck.’”[55]
-----
Footnote 55:
That is, of the boom, for no ship had been wrecked at the mouth of the
Charente.
-----
Yet two days after the departure of the _Impérieuse_, the
commander-in-chief addressed another despatch to the Admiralty, from
which the subjoined is an extract:—
“_Caledonia_, April 16, 1809.
“It has blown violently from the southward and westward ever since the
departure of the _Impérieuse_, which has rendered it _impracticable to
act in any way with the small vessels or boats of the fleet_ against
the enemy. I have the satisfaction to observe this morning, that the
enemy have set fire to their frigate _L’Indienne_, and that the ship
of the line which is aground at the entrance of the river—supposed to
be the _Regulus_—there is every reason to believe will be wrecked.”
The Emperor Napoleon himself is, moreover, an authority on the subject,
not to be passed over.
“Some conversation now took place about Lord Cochrane, and the attempt
which his lordship had made to capture or destroy the ships in the
Charente.
“I said it was the opinion of a very distinguished officer, whom I
named, and who was well known to him (Napoleon), that if Cochrane had
been properly supported, he would have destroyed the whole of the
French ships.
“‘He would not only have destroyed them,’ replied Napoleon, ‘but _he
might and would have taken them out_, had your admiral supported him
as he ought to have done. For, in consequence of the signal made by
L’Allemand’ (I think he said) ‘to the ships to do the best in their
power to save themselves—_sauve qui peut_, in fact—they became
panic-struck, and cut their cables. The terror of the _brûlots_[56]
was so great, that they _actually threw their powder overboard, so
that they could have offered very little resistance_.’
-----
Footnote 56:
Napoleon, like other French writers, includes the explosion vessels
under the general term _brûlot_.
-----
“‘The French admiral,’ continued Napoleon, ‘was an _imbecile_, but
yours was just as bad. I assure you, that if Cochrane had been
supported, he would have taken every one of the ships. They ought not
to have been alarmed by your _brûlots_, but fear deprived them of
their senses, and they no longer knew how to act in their own
defence.’”—_O’Meara’s Napoleon_, vol. ii. p. 291.
Were it worth while, numerous testimonies of the like character could be
gathered from French official sources, but it is necessary to mention
some other points of the despatch.
The commander-in-chief’s assertion, that, “_owing to the darkness of the
night, several fireships mistook their course and failed_,” was true
enough, but not the _whole truth_, which was, that, from their clumsy
management—neither going in the right direction, nor being kindled at
the right time or place—_not one out of the twenty-three fireships took
effect_!
The despatch goes on to state, that at daylight Lord Cochrane signaling
that seven of the enemy’s ships were on shore, and might be destroyed,
the commander-in-chief “_immediately_”[57] ordered the fleet to unmoor
and weigh, _intending_ to proceed with it to their destruction; but the
wind blowing fresh _from the northward_[58], and _the flood-tide
running_[59], rendered it too hazardous to enter Aix Roads, wherefore
the fleet again anchored about three miles from the forts on Isle d’Aix.
-----
Footnote 57:
Four hours afterwards.
Footnote 58:
And therefore a fair wind.
Footnote 59:
Consequently favourable for the fleet to enter Aix Roads.
-----
This was, indeed, all that the fleet collectively did, or that the
commander-in-chief intended it to do. Seeing, however, the “_enemy
warping off their ships_” and that, whilst the fleet was unmooring and
anchoring again, “_they had succeeded in getting off all but five of the
line!_” the commander-in-chief “gave orders to Capt. Bligh of the
_Valiant_, with the _Revenge_, frigates, bombs, &c.,”—to attack those
that remained aground? Nothing of the kind, but—“_to anchor near the
Boyart Shoal, in readiness for an attack_!!” An odd way truly of
preventing the five remaining enemy’s ships, then throwing their guns
overboard for the purpose of lightening themselves, from warping off!!
“At twenty minutes past two, P.M.,” continues the commander-in-chief,
“Lord Cochrane advanced in the _Impérieuse_, with his accustomed
gallantry and spirit, and opened a well-directed fire on the _Calcutta_,
which _struck her colours to the Impérieuse_.” Lord Gambier afterwards
_denied this_, though almost the only part of the action which he was
near enough to see with his own eyes! Indeed, the terms of the despatch
are decisive of having been detailed from his own personal observations!
But now comes the monstrous part of the assertion; viz. “The ships and
vessels above-mentioned _soon after_ joined in the attack on the _Ville
de Varsovie_ and _Aquilon_, and obliged them to strike their colours,”
&c. Instead of “_soon after_,” the _Valiant_, _Revenge_, &c., remained
at anchor near the Boyart, till my signal “In want of assistance,” had
been wrongly interpreted as a signal of “distress.” But for this, it is
clear that not an anchor would have been weighed. Yet the
commander-in-chief made the act of sending in these ships, _when it
could no longer be avoided_, appear part of a previous plan to attack
the _Ville de Varsovie_ and _Aquilon_, and that they were sent for this
purpose _soon after_ my attack on the _Calcutta_ and them
simultaneously!
This is not only a perversion of fact, but a suppression of it; for the
commander-in-chief must have seen that the _Impérieuse_ was engaged with
the _Aquilon_ and _Ville de Varsovie_, as well as with the _Calcutta_,
before the _Valiant_, _Revenge_, &c., were ordered in to our assistance,
as requested by my signal. And here it must be distinctly understood,
that _had not a portion of the fleet been compelled by this justifiable
device of my signaling “In want of assistance,” to come to our supposed
aid, no attack would have been made_. To avert this disgrace, I
resolved, if necessary, to sacrifice my ship.
Throughout the whole despatch, there is not a word to indicate that the
terror caused by the explosion-vessels had anything to do with the
success gained. On the contrary, the success is attributed to causes
purely imaginary. Great credit is given to me “for the vigorous and
gallant attack on the French line-of-battle ships ashore,” and for “my
judicious manner of approaching them, and placing my ship in a position
most advantageous to annoy the enemy, and _preserve my own ship!_
which,” continued his Lordship, “could not be exceeded by any feat of
valour hitherto achieved by the British navy!”
The plain fact is, and it will by this time be evident to others besides
nautical men, that the just quoted piece of claptrap was considered in
the light of a sop to my supposed vanity, sufficient to insure my
holding my peace on the subject of the fleet not having even
contemplated an attack till forced into it by my signal being mistaken
for being “in distress.”
Instead of being praised for what my plans really effected, I was
praised for what was neither done nor intended to be done. Instead of
adopting “a judicious manner of approaching the enemy, so as _to
preserve my ship_,” I drifted the _Impérieuse_ in like a log with the
tide, and stern foremost, for fear of being recalled, and then went at
the enemy with a determination, not to preserve, but _to lose_ my ship,
if the commander-in-chief did not relieve her before she was riddled
with shot; this being my only hope of forcing on an attack of any kind.
My motive was, no doubt, fathomed from seeing me attack three
line-of-battle ships simultaneously. Not a moment was to be lost, and
for the first time, since the French ran their ships ashore in terror,
two British line-of-battle ships, and some frigates, approached the spot
where the enemy’s vessels had been lying aground _ever since the
previous midnight_, helpless, and, as every French authority admits,
hopeless of escape, had the slightest effort been made to prevent it.
In place, then, of attacking these with a single frigate, in such a way
as to “_preserve my ship_,” I here avow that I rushed at the enemy in
the bitterness of despair, determined that if a portion of the fleet was
not sent in, the _Impérieuse_ should never again float out; for rather
than incur the stigma which would have awaited me in England, from no
fault of mine, but because it was not expedient that plans which had
been partially successful should be fully accomplished, she should have
been destroyed.
This despatch, inexplicable as it was felt to be, naturally suggested to
the public mind in England, that, despite its assumption of a great
victory, the result of the victory was by no means commensurate with the
tone of exultation assumed. The French fleet was _not_ destroyed; and it
was equally manifest, that if but little had been effected, it was owing
to the time which had been suffered to elapse between my first signals
and the tardy aid reluctantly yielded in support of them. By that kind
of intuitive perception characteristic of the British press, it was
agreed that there had been mismanagement somewhere, but _where_ was not
to be gathered from the commander-in-chief’s despatch, in which
everything “by favour of the Almighty,”[60] as the despatch most
reprehensibly set forth, had succeeded.
-----
Footnote 60:
There is something very revolting to a truly religious mind in these
derogatory phrases, which couple the beneficent Author of our being
with the butcheries of war. Under no circumstances are they
defensible. But when the name of the great and merciful Creator is
made subservient to an attempt to palm off as a great victory that
which, in reality, was a great disgrace even to the human means
available, there is something shocking in the perversion of language
which should only be uttered with the profoundest reverence, and on
occasions in strict coincidence with the attributes of the sacred name
invoked. In this case _fireships_ had been denounced as horrible and
antichristian, yet _explosion vessels_—engines of destruction tenfold
more diabolical—had, “by favour of the Almighty,” succeeded!
-----
It is not surprising, then, that the press began to criticise the
despatch on its own merits. The following remarks are extracted from a
_Times_ leading article in the paper of April 25th, 1809, by way of
specimen:—
“None felt more joy than ourselves at the destruction of four French
vessels in Basque (Aix) Roads. We have, however, been given to
understand that there are some people conversant in these things,
whose satisfaction is not quite so complete as was our own on the
result of the action.
* * * * * * * *
“Lord Cochrane’s first signal, as we learn from the _Gazette_, to the
admiral of the fleet, was that ‘seven of the enemy’s ships were on
shore, and might be destroyed.’ The question which hereupon naturally
suggests itself to the mind is, ‘Why, then, if seven might be
destroyed, were there only four?’
“The despatch proceeds. ‘I _immediately_ made the signal for the fleet
to unmoor and weigh.’ Indeed! Had Admiral Lord Gambier to unmoor at
the time he received this intelligence? Did he not expect this might
be the case? Or with what view was Lord Cochrane sent up the Roads? We
are not much acquainted with naval matters, and therefore ask for
information. To reason by analogy, if a military commander, knowing
the enemy to be near, should send forward a detachment to reconnoitre
and to attack, if possible, he would at least keep the rest of his
troops under arms, that he might be ready to advance at a moment’s
warning, and to sustain his own party when necessary.”
* * * * * * * *
The most honest account I have ever seen of the termination of the
action, is written by the venerable and gallant Admiral Gravière, who
was present at the attack. It will be found in the _Revue des Deux
Mondes_ for 1858. From this, though incorrect in stating that I
commanded a division, I make the subjoined extract, which shall close
the subject:—
“Un esprit de vertige semblait s’être emparé, dans cette affreuse
nuit, et dans les journées qui suivirent, des plus braves capitaines.
Des vaisseaux que l’ennemi n’avait pas même attaqués furent abandonnés
par leurs équipages, et des hommes héroïques partagèrent la faiblesse
commune.
“_La mollesse de Lord Gambier_, le courage et le sang froid de
quelques-uns de nos officiers, préservèrent seuls l’escadre française
d’une ruine totale.”
END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.
LONDON
PRINTED BY SPOTTISWOODE AND CO.
NEW-STREET SQUARE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transcriber’s Note
A simple diagram of a French defensive boom, on p. 400, seems
geometrically suspect. A triangle with two ‘400 toise’ sides, cannot
have an ‘800 toise’ opposing side. (A ‘toise’ is a French measure
slightly less than two meters.) The French description the obstacle is
on p. 381, beginning with ‘Elle étoit flanquée...’.
Footnote 41 (297.28 refers to _Michelot_ de Prato, which appears in the
text as _Michelet_. These are references to Micheletto Corella, a
Catalan soldier who served as Cesar Borgia’s executioner.
Errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been corrected, and
are noted here. The references are to the page and line in the original.
ix.8 I must have p[er/re]maturely sunk. Transposed.
2.8 to the grant [w]hich Dungal Restored.
21.33 [“]Your lordship’s real friend Added.
60.8 that our national[,] safety depended on Removed.
98.11 sunk [her.] Restored.
292.1 to render it useless[,/.] Replaced.
340.1 He th[a/e]n ran for Madeira Replaced.
342.6 an immense amount of mischief[,/.] Replaced.
422.6 “‘The French admiral,[”/’] Replaced.
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