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Title: The conquest of the Philippines by the United States, 1898-1925
Author: Moorfield Storey
Marcial Primitivo Lichauco
Release date: January 16, 2026 [eBook #77710]
Language: English
Original publication: New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1926
Credits: Robert Tonsing and The Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive).
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CONQUEST OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES, 1898-1925 ***
_The_ +Conquest+ _of the_ +Philippines+
_by the_ +United States+
1898-1925
_by_
+Moorfield Storey+
Former President American Bar Association
_and_
+Marcial P. Lichauco+
Harvard Law School
“_Personally I think it is a fine and high thing for a nation to have
done such a deed (our work in the Philippines) with such a purpose.
But we cannot taint it with bad faith. If we act so that the natives
understand us to have made a definite promise, then we should live
up to that promise. The Philippines, from a military standpoint,
are a source of weakness to us. The present administration has
promised explicitly to let them go, and by its action has rendered it
difficult to hold them against any serious foreign foe. These being
the circumstances, the islands should at an early moment be given
their independence without any guaranty whatever by us and without our
retaining any foothold in them._”
_THEODORE ROOSEVELT._
G. P. PUTNAM’S SONS
NEW YORK LONDON
The Knickerbocker Press
1926
Copyright, 1926
by
Moorfield Storey
and
Marcial P. Lichauco
[Colophon]
Made in the United States of America
PREFACE
This book has been prepared in order to lay before the people of the
United States the facts relating to the conquest of the Philippines.
The government of the United States rests upon the self-evident truths
that “all men are created equal,” that is, with equal political rights,
and that “governments derive their just powers from the consent of the
governed,” or, in the words of Abraham Lincoln,—“No man is good enough
to govern another without that other’s consent. I say this is the
leading principle—the sheet anchor of American republicanism.”
As if anticipating what would be said in justification of the policy
in the Philippines, the same great American said: “These arguments
that are made that the inferior race are to be treated with as much
allowance as they are capable of enjoying, that as much is to be done
for them as their condition will allow,—what are these arguments?
They are the arguments that kings have made for the enslaving of the
people in all ages of the world. You will find that all the arguments
of kingcraft were always of this class: they always bestrode the
necks of the people—not because they wanted to do it, but because
the people were better off for being ridden.... Turn it every way
you will,—whether it come from the mouth of a king as an excuse for
enslaving the people of his country, _or from the mouth of men of one
race as a reason for enslaving the men of another race_,—it is the same
old serpent.”
In 1898 every good American believed in the principles thus announced
and in recognition of this belief President McKinley in his message to
Congress urging the declaration of war against Spain used these words:
“I speak not of forcible annexation for that under our code of morals
is criminal aggression.”
To emphasize this principle and to remove all doubt as to the purpose
of the United States the Senate on April 20 passed the so-called Teller
Resolution declaring that “the people of Cuba are and of right ought to
be free and independent,” and that “the United States hereby disclaims
any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or
control over said island (of Cuba) except for the pacification thereof,
and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the
government and control of the Island to its people.”
How happens it that with these convictions and these high purposes the
United States proceeded to conquer the Philippine Islands and to hold
them for more than twenty-five years against the will of their people?
President McKinley assured his fellow-countrymen that “our priceless
principles undergo no change under a tropical sun.” How happened it
that they did change?
It is the purpose of this volume to answer these questions and to show
how the American people were led by false statements and systematic
suppression of truth to believe that the Islands came into their
possession “unsought by the fortune of war,” and that, in consequence,
they became responsible for the government of the Filipinos in the
effort to fit them for independence, and that they have since been
governed wholly for their own benefit and not for America’s, while as a
matter of fact their conquest and retention were due to the influence
of a comparatively few men who, caring nothing for American principles
or the interests either of the Filipinos or their own countrymen, have
sought to make money for themselves at the expense of both.
It will become apparent that this policy has not been approved by the
people of the United States nor their representatives in Congress
with full knowledge of the facts, but has been devised and carried
through by the Executive in the exercise of usurped powers. Today the
same influences are at work seeking to prevent the fulfillment of the
promise made in the Jones Bill and to make permanent the retention of
the Philippine Islands because a few Americans wish to make money. It
has even been urged that the United States should deny the Filipinos
independence because some of the Islands are well-adapted to the
cultivation of India rubber, and the question is whether America’s
“priceless principles” and solemn promise shall be abandoned in order
to make rubber cheaper.
The people of the United States must indeed be blind if with the
history of Ireland before them, they believe that the Filipino nation
will continue to submit and regard with placid indifference this
cynical repudiation of our national promises and national principles.
The weapons which labor now uses against its fellow-countrymen at home
are quite as effective abroad and will be used.
Not in the interest of the Filipinos only, therefore, but far more in
the interest of the United States, should the control of the Philippine
Islands be abandoned. Well did Lincoln say, “Those who deny freedom
to others deserve it not themselves, and under a just God cannot long
retain it,” and well did Whittier say the same thing in the lines:
That laws of changeless justice bind
Oppressor with oppressed;
And close as sin and suffering joined,
We march to fate abreast.
+Moorfield Storey+,
+Marcial P. Lichauco+.
+Lincoln, Massachusetts+
October 20, 1925
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I.—+The Cuban Insurrection+ 3
II.—+The Philippine Situation Before the American Conquest+ 20
III.—+The Beginning of the Conquest+ 33
IV.—+Filipino-American Relations Prior to August, 1898+ 44
V.—+Conquest by Treaty+ 66
VI.—+Conquest by Force of Arms+ 88
VII.—+Progress of the War+ 101
VIII.—+Conduct of the War+ 126
IX.—+The Campaign of 1900+ 156
X.—+The Taft Policy Analyzed+ 181
XI.—+The Taft Policy in Practice+ 209
XII.—+The Attitude of President Coolidge+ 229
XIII.—+An Appeal to Reason+ 255
The Conquest of the Philippines by
the United States
1898-1925
CHAPTER I
+The Cuban Insurrection+
It has been customary to attribute the outbreak of the Spanish American
war to the deplorable situation existing in the island of Cuba, for the
cruel methods by which Spain sought to suppress the local insurrection
had indeed excited the sympathy of Americans who wished to end the
horrible conditions that existed there. But the desire for intervention
in 1898 was by no means the first manifestation of interest on the
part of the United States. On the contrary, many years ago America and
Spain had been on the verge of war over this tempting possession, and
it was only the influence of conservatives in both countries that had
prevented a more frequent recurrence of such strained relations. To
understand the intervention of 1898, therefore, it is necessary to
look back and recall the attitude of American statesmen in former years
upon the Cuban problem.
We first find that fully a century before the war of 1898 Cuba had
already been an object of concern to the United States. Jefferson
had coveted it, declaring that its possession by Great Britain would
imperil the future of the Republic, and John Quincy Adams had contended
that the laws of political gravitation would inevitably draw the
island to the Union. In 1825 Henry Clay declared that America would
not permit the occupation of Cuba by any other power than Spain, while
Daniel Webster as Secretary of State subsequently went to the extent of
assuring Spain that the entire naval and military forces of the United
States would aid her in maintaining her possession of Cuba[1].
At that early period it was the fear that Cuba might fall into the
hands of France or England which caused such concern in the United
States. A change in this attitude occurred in the middle of the
nineteenth century and must be considered with more care. American
historians have aptly described this period as one during which the
young Republic began to feel more keenly her growing power, and the
relations which she maintained with foreign nations were characterized
by the spirit of expansion which a few years before had brought about
the annexation of Texas, the Oregon controversy, and the Mexican war[2].
This was also the period when American diplomacy took a vigorous
attitude in the Far East. In 1853 the Japanese government was forced
to open her doors to American commerce and the world. In the following
year, Mr. Marcy, the American Secretary of State, went so far as to
attempt the annexation of Hawaii, while troubles with Mexico and Great
Britain were pushed to a successful termination.
These difficulties, however, were trifling compared with the problems
of expansion in the South. The annexation of Cuba in particular had
been desired ardently by the southern states. “If we hold Cuba,” wrote
one enthusiastic supporter of this movement, “we would hold the destiny
of the richest commerce that has ever dazzled the cupidity of man. And
with that commerce we can control the power of the world”[3].
The Washington government did not ignore such pressure. It, therefore,
directed the American representative at Madrid to sound the Spanish
government on this matter, but the latter soon made it clear that
“sooner than see the island transferred to any power, they would prefer
seeing it sunk in the ocean”[4]. Despite such a determined opposition
on the part of Spain the desire to annex Cuba gave rise to frequent
filibustering efforts. Finally in 1852, as if to put an end to this
uncertain situation, England proposed a tri-partite agreement by which
Great Britain, France and the United States should mutually renounce
any purpose or design of annexing Cuba. To this proposition, however,
America declined to bind herself on the ground that her peculiar
interest in the island did not warrant it[5].
This attitude continued until 1854 when an extraordinary incident
temporarily put an end to it. It happened that in that year the
Secretary of State directed three of the American ministers in Europe
to prepare some statement of the policy of the United States in regard
to Cuba. The three American officials designated were the ministers to
Spain, France, and England,—Soulé, Mason and Buchanan, respectively.
They met at Ostend in the summer of 1854, and there drafted a manifesto
to the effect that:
1. Spain ought to sell Cuba to the United States.
2. That Cuba was necessary for the safety of slavery in the
southern states of the Union.
3. And that if Spain refused to sell Cuba and the internal peace of
the Union was threatened, then “by every law, human and divine,
we (U. S.) shall be justified in wresting it (Cuba) from Spain
if we possess the power.”
This clearly meant forcible annexation justified by the doctrine
that “might makes right.” In transmitting the document to Washington
the American minister Soulé further added that the time was most
appropriate in which to declare war on Spain, inasmuch as England and
France were involved in the Crimean war and hence would be unable to
interfere with the conquest[6].
When the contents of this manifesto were made known in the United
States, however, the plan was severely condemned by the northern
states and the Republican party, the avowed enemies of slavery. The
administration soon became convinced that forcible annexation in this
matter would not receive the support of the entire nation and the
proposition was, therefore, dropped.
The Republican platform of 1860 contained this statement,
That the maintenance of the principles promulgated in the
Declaration of Independence and embodied in the Federal
Constitution “that all men are created equal; that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these
are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; that, to secure
these rights, governments are instituted among men deriving their
just powers from the consent of the governed,” is essential to the
preservation of our Republican institutions.
After the Civil War, however, the United States again narrowly escaped
hostilities with Spain. It should be remembered that during the Civil
War Spain had recognized the Southern Confederacy and this did much
to augment the feeling of animosity towards the decaying empire. Many
thought that Spain should be punished for having showed friendly
interest towards the rebels. The opportunity to do so came in 1869.
In that year Cuba was seething with revolt. Although the progress of
the insurgents was slight, they found many sympathizers in the United
States, chief among whom was General Rawlins, the Secretary of War,
who persuaded General Grant to sign a proclamation recognizing the
belligerency of the insurgents. This proclamation was then handed
to Mr. Fish, the Secretary of State, with orders to seal and issue
it. Mr. Fish, however, knew better than to do this, for he realized
that conditions at the time did not warrant such drastic action.
He therefore put the paper away quietly and with the subsequent
restoration of order in Cuba it was forgotten. President Grant never
spoke of the matter again except to thank his able Secretary for
having pigeonholed the proclamation[7]. The agitation for some action
in behalf of the rebellious Cubans, which had made itself felt in the
press as well as in the halls of Congress, was later finally ended by
a definite announcement of the President that the Administration would
maintain an attitude of non-intervention[8].
The years that followed, however, again brought frequent attempts
by private Americans interested in Cuban commerce to secure a more
aggressive attitude at Washington. They resorted to filibustering in
order to draw the nation into war, and only the mature judgment of the
Secretary of State prevented ill-advised intervention[9].
It must also be remembered that during this period the grievances of
the Cubans against the home government were numerous and well-founded.
The native planters found themselves placed at a disadvantage in their
dealings with their best customers, the United States, which consumed
62 per cent of their sugar crop. This was owing to the duties placed
by the Spanish officials upon all American grains entering Cuba, a
measure which naturally provoked similar restrictions on Cuban products
entering American ports. Further grounds for complaint were found
in the fact that the creoles of the island were allowed no share in
their government, no chance to protest officially against treating
Cuba like a “milch cow which Spain seemed to wish to exhaust.” Add to
this the corrupt and complicated administration saddled upon the Cuban
producers; the disgraceful fortunes accumulated by Captains General;
and a budget augmented to cover numerous expenses of Spain entirely
disconnected with Cuba, and it is easy to understand why Cuba’s
proverbial loyalty which had withstood a heavy strain for many years
now began to fail.
It is only surprising that the final bid for freedom was so
long delayed. It came at length in 1895, but as in the earlier
insurrections, it was as clear that the Cuban “patriots” could not take
Havana as that the royal forces could not pacify the entire island.
Without aid from America it was very unlikely that the insurgents
would have realized their aim within any reasonable time. The future
could only promise a continuation of petty guerilla warfare which
naturally afforded no prospect of settlement or peace. In the meantime
the economic interests, not only of Cuba but also of the world,
and especially of the United States, were sure to suffer. Let not
the disinterested American be entirely deceived. Bitter as was the
indignation in the public mind at the Spanish atrocities, it must be
apparent that this irritation was greatly increased by the pecuniary
interests which America had and hoped to have in the struggling island
beside her. As Professor Keller of Yale put it, it was
because the interests of the United States were so extensive
that irritation in this country waxed greater, and gradually
metamorphosed itself into the form of a crusade against
misgovernment and oppression.
When General Weyler began his notorious reconcentration camps in 1896,
intervention was again averted by the narrowest of margins. Congress
on April 6 passed a resolution recognizing the belligerency of the
insurgents but President Cleveland ignored it, choosing to protest
through diplomatic correspondence. When President McKinley assumed
office these protests were renewed through the same channels but it
soon became evident that nothing tangible could be accomplished by
diplomacy.
Two later incidents also no doubt hastened the aggressive attitude of
the United States. One was the indiscretion of the Spanish minister
at Washington in writing a letter to a personal friend in which he
described the American President as a soft-handed politician, “and
a bidder for the admiration of the crowd.” Somehow, this letter was
“surreptitiously if not criminally obtained” and later published,
and it naturally created a profound feeling of indignation[10]. It
required more than the mere recall of the Spanish minister to cover
this diplomatic blunder.
The second incident was the blowing up of the battleship _Maine_ as it
lay in the harbor of Havana. No definite cause has yet been discovered
for this mysterious explosion which destroyed two hundred and fifty
American lives, but at the time an investigation made by officers of
the United States, in which the Spaniards were not allowed to take
part, reported that the destruction was caused by a mine. War spirit
could no longer be restrained. “When the _Maine_ was blown up in Havana
Harbor,” said Roosevelt, “war became inevitable”[11]. Add to this the
fact that public sentiment had been stirred up by a sensational press
which, in the words of the historian Rhodes had “manipulated the real
news, spread false reports, putting all before their readers with scare
headlines”[12], and we cannot wonder at the war fever which swept the
continent. “Every Congressman,” said Boutelle of Maine, “had two or
three newspapers in his district, most of them printed in red ink,
shouting for blood”[13].
In perfect accord with the attitude of the nation, therefore, President
McKinley, whose conduct in this matter had been flawless, sent a
message to Congress recommending intervention in behalf of Cuba and
humanity. “Our people,” he said, “have beheld a once prosperous
community reduced to comparative want, its lucrative commerce virtually
paralyzed, its exceptional productiveness diminished, its fields laid
waste, its mills in ruins and its people perishing by tens of thousands
from hunger and destitution.” Thus did the President lay bare to that
august body the situation of the Cubans, a situation which he said,
“shocked the sensibilities and offended the humane sympathies” of the
American people.
A more than ready Congress thereupon passed the Resolution introduced
by Senator Teller of Colorado declaring among other things that “the
people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and
independent,” and that “the Government of the United States does hereby
demand that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority
and government of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba
and Cuban waters.” This virtually meant war, but the Congress also took
particular care to stipulate
that the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over
said island, except for the pacification thereof, and _asserts its
determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and
control of the island to its people_[14].
It is doubtful if an actual war had ever been begun with a purpose more
lofty and humane or with a clearer declaration of that purpose.
The outcome of the war every one knows. Spain was driven from the
island and the United States was left to fulfill her promise of giving
the Cubans the government and control of their island. But now, in the
face of this sacred pledge to recognize the independence of Cuba, a
campaign for the retention of that island went on quietly and patiently.
There has been no lack of counselors [said Senator Hoar] to whisper
in the ear of the President and Senate and House the dishonorable
counsel that we should hold Cuba, without regard to our pledges
or our principles, and that the resolution of the Senator from
Colorado was a great mistake.
This movement for the retention of Cuba, however, did not prosper and
happily for the sanctity of America’s word, steps were immediately
taken for the establishment of a government which could be handed down
intact to the Cubans. This was begun early in 1899 and by July, 1900, a
constitutional convention was called to frame and adopt a constitution
for the people of Cuba, and, “as a part thereof, to provide for and
agree with the Government of the United States upon the relations to
exist between that government and the Government of Cuba.”
What these relations were to be was a question which naturally arose in
Washington, and Congress speedily decided the matter by the so-called
“Platt Amendment” defining America’s relations with Cuba. This act,
passing under a most unpretentious designation, may be said to be one
of the most important documents in the history of the nation. Let us
see why.
At the time of the intervention in Cuba the United States was only too
eager to absolutely pledge herself to establish the independence for
which the unhappy Cubans had been fighting. This unqualified promise
was given readily and sincerely. No doubt it was made to remove
the apprehension of conservative Americans as well as Cubans. But
conditions had changed in 1901. Then the possession of Porto Rico, of
Guam and the Philippines was more than certain. Certainly there was
more to be said in favor of retaining Cuba than for annexing those
far-flung possessions in the Pacific. But to annex Cuba was virtually
impossible,—a definite pledge to recognize her independence made
in the hectic days of ’98 barred the way. And so under Roosevelt’s
administration America kept her word and withdrew from Cuba. But
she kept her word with a very important qualification in the Platt
Amendment, which virtually meant no Cuban independence after all.
Already commercial advantage was overcoming conscience and principle.
The United States had promised to quit Cuba when “pacification was
accomplished.” Here was an elastic condition which could be interpreted
narrowly. She could under that phrase have stayed on the island
indefinitely troubled only by the never-ending contest between good
faith and pecuniary interest. Instead America chose to protect herself
by means of the Platt Amendment which briefly provided that (1) Cuba
should not enter into any agreement with foreign powers which might
tend to impair her independence; (2) that no debt should be contracted
which could not be paid out of the island’s current revenues; (3) that
the United States might intervene to preserve Cuban independence,
enforce the treaty obligations imposed by the treaty of Paris, and
insure a government able to protect property and life; (4) that all
acts performed by the American government during its brief occupation
were to be validated; (5) that Cuba was to sell or lease to the United
States sites for two naval stations; (6) and that by way of further
assurance that these provisions were to be followed strictly _Cuba
should embody them all in a treaty_ with the United States.
The strictness and exactness of these provisions will more clearly
appear on a careful reading of the amendment itself, paragraphs (1)
and (3) in particular being the most exact. These provisions meant
that the United States virtually retained complete control of Cuba’s
foreign relations. The right was also reserved to her whereby she might
intervene in the island government in order to correct any conditions
which _in her judgment_ were considered unsatisfactory. The two naval
bases which she reserved for herself on opposite sides of the island
were the best evidence of her power to exercise such absolute control.
Of course, Cuban statesmen were not blind to the exact purpose of the
amendment. They protested that the provisions virtually destroyed the
independence which had been promised and which America now said she was
granting. But they were informed that the acceptance of the amendment
must be unqualified and so with bad grace they were finally forced to
yield[15].
Judged superficially, however, the Cuban venture might well appear to
have been an act of altruism on the part of the United States. After
all, the Cubans got more than they could ever have got from Spain,
although their liberator did really profit from the enterprise as well.
Before leaving the story of the Cuban occupation, however, it is well
to give a parting thought to the arguments which induced nation-wide
sentiment to favor intervention. When America intervened Spain held
the island by an indisputable title. She controlled its cities, its
ports, and its coast, and maintained in them an organized government.
It is true that some of the Cubans had been for years in unsuccessful
revolt, but they had no organized government which had any claim to
be recognized as such. Yet when America declared war upon Spain she
avowedly declared that Cuba was, and of right, ought to be free and
independent. Why? Only because in the judgment of the people of the
United States, Spain’s title had been forfeited by her cruel method of
dealing with the Cubans. With this thought constantly in mind we can
approach the story of the Philippine adventure.
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER I
[1] _The American Nation—A History_, vol. xxv. Latane, _America
as a World Power_, p. 4.
[2] _The American Nation, etc._, vol. xviii. _Parties and
Slavery_, by T. C. Clarke, p. 75.
[3] Clark, _ibid._, p. 81.
[4] House Exec. Doc., 32d Cong., 1st Sess., 121, p. 58.
[5] Sen. Exec. Doc., 32d Cong., 1st Sess., No. 1, p. 74, 76; 2d
Sess., No. 63.
[6] Clarke, _Parties and Slavery_, p. 87.
[7] Dunning, _Reconstruction—Political and Economic_, p. 172.
[8] _Ibid._, p. 172.
[9] See the _Virginius_ case, for example.
[10] Day, _Foreign Relations_, p. 680 and p. 1007.
[11] Roosevelt, _Autobiography_, p. 232.
[12] Rhodes, _The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations_, p. 55.
[13] _Boston Herald_, October 23, 1898.
[14] _Foreign Relations_, 1898, liv.
[15] Powers, _America Among the Nations_, p. 116.
CHAPTER II
+The Philippine Situation before the
American Conquest+
It is difficult to understand the situation existing in the Philippines
when the first gun was fired in Manila Bay without first turning back
the pages of history for a brief period. Much can be conveyed to the
reader, however, in explaining the grievances of many decades against
the colonial government, by saying that the Spanish system in the
islands was essentially the same as that followed in her South American
possessions, including the island of Cuba. What differences there may
have existed were purely of degree,—the atrocities committed in the
Oriental colony being the worse[1]. In the clerical predominance, in
the power of the Church, in the baseness of its industrial and economic
organization and the shallowness of the governmental machinery in every
branch,—the situation in the Philippines was the exact replica of that
found in Cuba.
Prior to 1872, some thirty-four major and minor revolts against the
foreign authority had already taken place in different localities of
the archipelago. Most of them were short-lived, and practically all
had been suppressed by the better-trained Spanish regulars, though not
without much bloodshed and extreme cruelties. It was between the years
1868-72, however, that the new era in the Philippines really began.
It was then that the storm broke as a result of three important and
closely allied events occurring almost together.
The first was the opening of the Suez canal which brought the Islands
closer to Europe. This bond was supplemented later by the laying of the
commercial cables, so that the Philippines learned to think with the
rest of the world. The proverbial Oriental content with despotism now
gave way to the yearning for self-expression, for nationalism, and for
freedom.
The second was the continuation, but in a more flagrant form, of racial
discrimination between the Spanish born whites and the native Malays.
This was specially manifested by the removal of Filipino priests from
their parishes to make way for the Spanish Recollets. The indignation
that swept the Filipino laymen at this act which they considered
unjustified is difficult to measure. But it marked the day when they
began to harbor thoughts against the Spaniards which they dared not
speak aloud.
The third event which wrought considerable changes in the Islands was
the founding of the short-lived Republic in Spain, for it was between
these years that Queen Isabella was overthrown and the Spanish radicals
gained the ascendancy. The movement was short-lived, but during that
brief period many radical and progressive officials had come to Manila
and planted in the minds of the natives some new and startling ideas
about democracy, equality and practical self-government. Furthermore,
these newly arrived officials bluntly and openly pointed out the
shortcomings and autocracy of the clergy who, it must be remembered,
were the most hated and feared representatives of Spain[2].
It is not surprising, then, that all the ancient grievances of the past
now received an added airing. In the face of it, however, the friars
kept up their courage and when the downfall of the Spanish liberals
again placed them in a position where they could wreak vengeance, they
immediately did so. The wholesale arrests, the garrotings, the cruel
punishments inflicted after the most flagrant of mock trials have been
recounted too often to be repeated here. Suffice it to say that the
most unspeakable instruments of torture employed in the days of the
Inquisition were revived and used. Wholesale deportations followed
to the Carolines, to Jolo, Balabac, Ceuta, Fernando Po, the Ladrone
Islands, and even to far away Africa. Many men, members of wealthy
Filipino families, succeeded in escaping to Europe where they could air
their pleas for better government with safety.
There were also wholesale executions, and much innocent blood was
sacrificed. Among the victims of this sad episode were three beloved
Filipino priests, one of whom was so old and so feeble that he was
carried to the scaffold. The evidence of mutiny against them all was so
doubtful that the Roman Catholic Church stubbornly refused to degrade
them. The Archbishop was so thoroughly convinced of their innocence
that he allowed them to wear their priestly robes to the gallows.
This policy of wanton cruelty, instead of inspiring the natives with
fear, drew them together. A new nation was here conceived, and the time
came when the Filipinos, instead of looking towards Spain as the land
to which they owed allegiance, turned to the Philippines as the true
father-land. All this occurred in 1872.
In the years that followed the movement grew. The native exiles living
in Spain and other continental countries, drawn together by a common
grievance and a common desire to better the fate of their countrymen,
founded societies and established newspapers in which they recounted
their wrongs and asked for reforms. Many of them were joined by
their sons who came for their education, but felt that they were also
charged with a sacred mission for the good of their country as well as
of Spain. Many writings of these men were secretly circulated in the
Philippines where they had a considerable influence. The most important
was undoubtedly a novel written by Dr. Jose Rizal, a native Filipino
then studying in the University of Heidelberg. _Noli me Tangere_ it was
called and it depicted the evils of the friar system in the Islands
and the injustice that resulted from it. This novel which was smuggled
into the Islands became the _Uncle Tom’s Cabin_ of the movement, and
Rizal rose to the prominence which he richly deserved. The book was,
of course, condemned by the Spanish officials and native houses were
searched in the hope of locating copies and punishing their owners. Yet
most of the available copies circulated secretly for years: truly a
remarkable proof of Filipino unity.
In 1892, fully knowing the danger which a visit to the Islands meant,
the gentle idealist returned to the Philippines. Shortly after his
arrival he formed a “Philippine League.” The predominating idea of this
society was of the peaceful type, for it sought merely educational,
moral and economic progress. In fact, it was too mild a plan for many
Filipinos. Nevertheless, the Spaniards seized the only Filipino leader
who, more than any other malcontent, stood for peace and cooperation
with the Spanish government and exiled him to the southern island
of Mindanao. It was sheer blundering stupidity, for by doing it
they raised the already venerated leader to a pinnacle difficult to
exaggerate[3].
With Rizal as an exile in distant Mindanao, the other native leaders
now abandoned all thought of securing reform through peaceful methods.
They turned to direct action as the last resort. A small secret society
under the leadership of Andres Bonifacio was formed, and it soon became
the most powerful insurrectionary body in the Islands. It was called
the “Katipunan,” and its doors were opened to both rich and poor alike.
To the many thousands of able-bodied Filipinos who joined it, the
society was almost like a new religion. It is worth while to examine
the ideals taught to the Neophytes. Here were some of them:
All men are equal, regardless of the color of their skin.
The life which is not consecrated to the cause of justice is a tree
without shade, even though it may not have a poisonous root.
Good practices solely for personal benefit, and not from a desire
to do good, are worthless.
The true holiness is charity, love for others, and adjusting one’s
acts according to the good and the reasonable.
One may have more than another in riches, wisdom or beauty but in
manhood all are equal.
Always preserve a high sense of honor, for the word of the
honorable man is sacred.
Waste not time; riches lost may be recovered, but time, once lost,
never returns.
Defend the weak, and fight the oppressor.
In Life’s thorny road, the man is the guide of his wife and
children, and if he teaches them evil, evil will they practice.
The greatest man is not the king nor he with a high bridged nose,
nor white skin, nor the priest who represents God; but he is really
noble who, born in the forest, possesses no language save his
native tongue, and yet is moderate in speech and careful to uphold
his dignity and his honor. This man is a patriot and knows how to
defend his country.
When this country is radiant with the light of liberty and we
are all united as brothers, then will the pains of the past be
rewarded[4].
Despite the strict oaths of secrecy taken by its members, however, the
Spanish authorities got wind of the society. The report was spread
that the Katipunan meant to massacre the entire population. The friars
in their delirious anxiety could now do but one thing—ask the civil
authorities for more power and greater activity by the police with the
consequent increase of arrests. In order to gain information from the
suspected, the most horrible methods of torture were again employed.
Men were hung up by their thumbs, their bones were crushed,—too often
they were mutilated for life.
It was just about this time that Dr. Rizal, becoming dissatisfied
with the violent methods planned by the revolutionists, petitioned
the Spanish government that he be sent to the fever-stricken camps of
Cuba where he might serve in Her Majesty’s army as a physician. The
Governor-General granted Rizal’s petition. Before he reached Manila,
however, the rebellion had begun. Nevertheless he was allowed to
continue his journey to Spain where he planned to join the army for
Cuba.
But as if the enmity of the friars could not otherwise be appeased,
Rizal was detained when he reached Suez, arrested and brought back to
Manila. A new Governor-General, chosen by the friars, now sealed his
fate. Following another mock trial at which the Filipino martyr was not
even allowed to choose his counsel, he was led to his execution and in
the presence of a howling, cheering Spanish crowd killed by a volley.
There were comparatively few Filipinos present. Most of them were in
their homes, praying for the man about to be sacrificed on the altar of
freedom.
The volley of musketry which rang out that early December morning in
1896 sealed the fate of Spain forever in the Philippines. The nation
which had been conceived in 1872 was now born. The circumstances of
Rizal’s death were so dramatic, the ideals for which he labored so
noble, and his innocence of complicity in the existing revolution so
clearly manifest, that the native multitudes were inspired as if by a
second crucifixion.
One can only wonder that the final outbreak did not occur sooner. Two
months before Rizal’s execution, for example, the Spaniards caused the
arrest of numerous Filipinos in Vigan, a province which up to that
time had not revolted. These men were shipped to Manila in the holds
of vessels like pieces of merchandise, their hands and feet being tied
securely. On arrival at the capital the victims were hauled from their
dingy hole by derricks and dumped into a filthy crowded jail where many
died of suffocation. In other parts of the archipelago, this process
of extermination continued. Day after day, night after night, men and
women were dragged out of their homes and sent to prison for inspection.
This ghastly business could not continue forever, and even the home
government awoke in time to recall Governor Poltaveja and send in his
place a more peaceful administrator, General Primo de Rivera. Governor
Rivera wanted peace, and he immediately offered an amnesty to all
who would lay down their arms within a specified time. The Filipino
leaders, conscious of their inability to cope effectively with the
Crown forces, which had recently been reenforced, and being desirous of
assuring the welfare of their country, thereupon issued a proclamation
in which they stated the conditions under which they would agree to lay
down their arms. This document must be examined with care. It demanded:
1. Expulsion of the friars.
2. Parliamentary representation, freedom of the press, religious
toleration, administrative and economic autonomy.
3. Equal pay and equal treatment for Spanish and insular civil officers.
4. Restoration of all friar lands to their original owners.
5. No more banishments.
6. Legal equality for all classes.
The Spanish governor promised to fulfill all these requests and as
a further guarantee of his good faith offered to pay the leaders of
the Katipunan who were to be banished to a foreign land the sum of
$400,000.00. After negotiations which lasted several months, the
so-called “Pact of Biac-na-bato” was signed, and Aguinaldo with
thirty-four other leaders sailed for Hongkong. “No definite time was
fixed during which these men were to remain away from the Philippines;
and if the promises made by Spain were not fulfilled they had the
right to return”[5]. The old slander that Aguinaldo sold out the
revolutionary movement for a bribe has been so thoroughly exploded by
the best of authorities, that it requires uncommon audacity to repeat
it[6].
The fact was, however, that Governor Rivera was trying to steer a
middle course. He issued a scathing denunciation of the friars,
but failed to recommend their removal. It did not take long for
the Filipinos to realize that none of the expected reforms were
forthcoming. New insurrections immediately broke out in different
sections of the archipelago. In the island of Cebu, 400 miles south of
Manila, the rebels raided the city and besieged the Spanish forces in
their citadel. In northern Luzon the revolt quickly gained impetus. All
this occurred, of course, in the absence of their recognized leader,
Aguinaldo[7].
Conditions had reached such an acute state on February 22, 1898,
forty-nine days before the United States declared war on Spain, that
the American consul, Williams, stationed in Manila, sent the following
significant dispatch to the State Department in Washington:
Conditions here and in Cuba are practically alike. War exists; and
battles are of almost daily occurrence. Prisoners are brought
here and shot without trial, and Manila is under martial law. The
Crown forces have been unable to dislodge a rebel army within ten
miles of Manila, and last Saturday, February 19, a battle was
there fought. A republic is organized here as in Cuba. Insurgents
are being armed and drilled, are rapidly increasing in number and
efficiency, and all agree that a general uprising will come as
soon as the Governor-General embarks for Spain, which is fixed for
March[8].
Into this turbulent arena of war and organized revolt Admiral Dewey
sailed with his squadron, and with a few well-directed shots destroyed
the Spanish fleet without the loss of a single life. The wires of the
world vibrated with the startling news of his victory and the conquest
of the archipelago had begun.
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER II
[1] A. G. Keller, _Colonization_, p. 358.
[2] Blair and Robertson, vol. lii, p. 118.
[3] Foreman, _The Philippine Islands_, p. 533.
Austin Craig, _Life of Rizal_.
C. E. Russell, _The Hero of the Filipinos_.
[4] F. D. Laubach, _The People of the Philippine Islands_, p. 104.
[5] Findings of the Report of Schurman Commission, vol. i, p. 171.
[6] See 55th Cong., 3d Sess., S. D. 62, pt. 1, p. 421.
Aguinaldo’s bribery was exploded by Governor Rivera himself in
the Spanish Senate on June 11, 1898, when he said that
Aguinaldo undertook to submit if the Spanish government would
provide for the widows and orphans of the insurgents. Rivera
then added that the other promises he had made, he thought
later not expedient to keep. (Reference to this in Cong. Rec.,
vol. 56th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, p. 1334. Proceedings of
Senate.)
[7] Report of American Consul General Williams, Sen. Doc., No.
62, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 221.
[8] Sen. Doc., No. 62 (1898), p. 319.
CHAPTER III
+The Beginning of the Conquest+
The people of the United States were allowed to believe that it was a
piece of good fortune that Dewey’s fleet was in Asiatic waters. As a
matter of fact the capture of Manila had been planned long before the
_Maine_ was destroyed and the Spanish war begun.
On the afternoon of December 30, 1924, a discussion was held in New
York City under the auspices of the League for Industrial Democracy.
The subject chosen was American Imperialism, and among the principal
speakers on the occasion was the well-known banker, Otto H. Kahn, who
spoke on “The Myth of American Imperialism.” Feeling, no doubt, the
tremendous significance of his words as a denial that such a force
existed, no time was lost in reproducing the address in full, to be
widely distributed later by the so-called “Committee of American
Business Men.”
Mr. Kahn’s address as printed covered twenty-six pages. Less than half
a page is devoted to the Philippine situation, however, and it is
interesting to read how he dealt with the subject. He said:
Owing to the limitation of the time available, I cannot enter
into the matter of America’s ownership of the Philippines, except
to point out that it came to us as an unforeseen incident of the
Spanish-American war, _unsought and decidedly unwanted_, but,
having come, it involves a national responsibility which, in
self-respect and in duty, we are bound to discharge, and of which
we cannot divest ourselves until it is fairly discharged.
This was a sweeping generalization, and yet it was a statement
representing the widespread belief today among the Americans unfamiliar
with the earlier years of American occupation. Let us, therefore, make
a closer examination of that period, so inadequately understood at the
time but which can now be studied soberly and with fuller knowledge.
Although when war was declared American thought and purpose were
limited to Cuban emancipation, it became apparent that it was
impossible thus to limit her action. War knows but one law. The enemy
must be attacked and destroyed wherever possible. Hence the prompt
occupation of Porto Rico followed, though Porto Rico had not revolted,
for the thought of driving a misgoverning country from one island, and
leaving her in another close by where a similar situation might later
exist was clearly indefensible.
Granting that Spain was to be driven out, what was to be done with
Porto Rico? Of course, Cuba was to have her freedom,—she had been
promised that. But Porto Rico—somehow the analogy did not fit. The
island was smaller, there had been no revolt, and there was great need
of a naval station in that locality. But why go further? Only idealists
questioned the wisdom of doing it, any other nation would have done it,
and so.... Well, that is the way that empires grow!
But there were also the Philippines. And only six hundred miles away
lay Admiral Dewey with his fleet loading coal in Hongkong. What a piece
of good fortune for the American cause. It was but a matter of hours
before Dewey received the order to sail and destroy the enemy fleet.
And yet the most remarkable thing about this naval victory which
immediately thrilled the American nation from coast to coast and
placed the Philippines definitely on the map was that it did not come
unsolicited or unpremeditated. It had been planned months before. Let
us see how and why.
When the possibility of war with Spain became generally accepted,
Admiral Dewey was in the Gulf of California in command of the
_Narragansett_. As a true naval expert the thought of taking the
Philippines came to him.
If war with Spain is declared, the _Narragansett_ will take Manila
[he said]. In command of an efficient force in the Far East,
with a free hand to act in consequence of being so far away from
Washington, I could strike promptly and successfully at the Spanish
forces in the Philippines.
This was in the fall of 1897[1]. He thereupon sought the command of the
Asiatic squadron, and with Mr. Roosevelt’s aid obtained it[2].
Thus it was that while the indignation of a sympathetic American public
was daily increasing at the atrocities in Cuba, Dewey was quietly
but efficiently fitting his squadron, firmly determined to capture
Manila[3]. He sailed on December 7, 1897, more than two months before
the destruction of the _Maine_, with the eyes of the naval authorities
watching him with interest. While lying at anchor in Hongkong there was
flashed to him on February 25, 1898, the following significant cable
from the then Assistant Secretary of the Navy:
+Dewey+, Hongkong:
Order the squadron except the _Monocacy_ to Hongkong. Keep full of
coal. In the event of declaration of war with Spain, your duty will
be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic
coast, and start offensive operations in Philippine Islands. Keep
_Olympia_ until further orders.
(Signed) +Roosevelt+[4].
And yet this was six weeks before war was declared.
The results of the battle in Manila Bay are well known. It literally
electrified the American nation. The significance of such a gallant
victory could not be over-estimated in the eyes of her citizens.
What a horizon had been opened! The stage was set for the beginning
of America’s manifest destiny,—entry into world politics,—into world
power. This was but natural. In the words of Henry Watterson, it was
the natural impulse of a people full of exultation and pride over
the completeness, without precedent in naval war, of the victory
that Dewey had achieved with a skill and intrepidity that conferred
splendor upon American arms. It was the spontaneous outburst of
simplest patriotism to ask that that flag so valiantly planted,
might float there forever in memory of the heroes who raised it[5].
There were also challenging voices, urging that the flag should remain.
Who dares halt it now [cried Senator Beveridge], now when history’s
largest events are carrying it forward, now when we are at last
one people, strong enough for any task, great enough for any glory
destiny can bestow? Blind is he who sees not the hand of God in
events so vast, so harmonious, so benign.
But glory and power were not the only incentives. If in the face of a
sacred pledge to Cuba there had not been wanting counselors who urged
the retention of the island for its commercial possibilities, their
numbers were now augmented as the movement gained momentum. There was a
glamour of romance in the entire project and the spell was difficult to
resist. As the Hon. Frank A. Vanderlip, then Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury, aptly put it in 1898,—
Together with the islands of the Japanese Empire, since the
acquirement of Formosa, the Philippines are the pickets of the
Pacific, standing guard at the entrances to trade with the millions
of China and Korea, French Indo-China, the Malay Peninsula, and the
islands of Indonesia to the south. Australia may even be regarded
as in the line of trade. _The possession of the Philippines by
a progressive, commercial power, if the Nicaragua Canal project
should be completed, would change the course of ocean navigation
as it concerns a large percentage of the water-borne traffic of
the world. The project is alluring._ In the undeveloped resources
of the Philippines the sanguine radicals see a great opportunity
for our genius. They recognize that in a decade we might make a
change greater than has been wrought since Magellan’s discovery
until the present time. They see great development companies formed
to cultivate tobacco and sugar by modern methods, others formed to
test the richness of the unknown mineral deposits, and still others
to develop transportation or to reap the treasures of the forest.
And so this gentleman, who stood high in the councils of the
administration, finally concluded:
We thus see with sudden clearness that some of the most revered of
our political maxims have outlived their force [and then adds],
a new mainspring ... has become the directing force ... the
mainspring of commercialism[6].
Thus began and thus was fostered the campaign for the retention of the
Philippines. As a distributing centre, with half the population of the
world living within a radius of 3500 miles from Manila, the possession
of the islands was indeed “alluring.”
In that proud hour of nation-wide rejoicing accompanied by the vast
commercial possibilities which victory had disclosed, the American
multitude failed to hear the voice of the Filipinos. To the former
annexation meant, and could now mean only annexation like the previous
acts of American expansion. No thought was here given to the wishes of
the eight million natives in the Islands who, under the rule of Spain,
had taken part in thirty-six distinct uprisings as a protest against
the cruelties and injustices from which they had suffered in the same
manner as had the Cubans.
There had been, of course, vague reports of a revolution then existing
in the Philippines just as one had been existing in Cuba. Could not the
Islands be turned over to the revolutionists? True, there had been no
definite promises such as those made to a nearer neighbor, but should
not Spain’s title, if any, be forfeited for the same reasons that her
claims to Cuba were being ignored? The Americans whose interests in
the occupation sprang purely from altruistic and sympathetic motives
thought that the Filipinos were entitled to the same treatment as
the Cubans. Could the Filipino rebels have organized an island
government of their own? If not, would an American protectorate for a
limited number of years have been more plausible? These were natural
inquiries, but any reports which might to some extent have answered
these questions were not forthcoming. The islands were too far
distant,—half the people of the country did not know where they were.
Of course, there were those who also believed with good reason that the
intervention in Cuba was actuated by purely altruistic motives—that of
a helping hand to a weaker nation. Thus, the venerable Senator Hoar,
writing many years afterwards about this agitating period, said,
I believed then, and I believe now, that it was our duty to deliver
them (the Philippines) from Spain, to protect them against her, or
against the cupidity of any other nation until the people could
have tried fully the experiment of self-government in which I have
little doubt they would have succeeded[7].
But there were also those who, in a spirit of evil ambition, had
already decided to retain the Philippines, if retention would benefit
the United States. On August 2, 1898, a commissioner was appointed by
the Secretary of State to “investigate and report on financial and
industrial conditions in the Philippine Islands.” This was eleven
days before the capture of Manila. The report that followed by
Commissioner Edward Harden and which was sent to the Secretary of the
Treasury, covered the field examined as well as the existing conditions
permitted. It spoke of the present situation of Philippine industry
and predicted the future possibilities that awaited the hand of a
modern expert. That regarding Manila hemp, the leading industry of the
Islands, specially deserved attention.
Manila hemp [said the report] is used in the manufacture of cordage
of a superior class. For ships’ purposes it is superior to any
other material considering its cost and wearing qualities.... _It
is found nowhere else in the world_.... There is a great future
for this product. There are vast tracts of uncultivated land ...
where it flourishes with greatest vigor, and _all that is needed is
capital and enterprise to open it up_[8].
Not apparently content with the preliminary investigations conducted by
these executive departments, the President himself decided to take a
hand. He therefore dispatched the following cable to Admiral Dewey on
August 13, the day after the signing of the protocol ending hostilities:
+Dewey+, c/o American Consul:
The President desires to receive from you any important information
you may have of the Philippines, the desirability of the several
islands, the character of their population, coal and other mineral
deposits, their harbor and commercial advantages and in a naval and
commercial sense which would be the most advantageous.
+Allen+, Secretary[9].
Of course, these proceedings were not made known to the public at that
time. This powerful minority in order to fulfill their imperialistic
aims had already embarked on a program unique in its nature and
fraught with hazardous consequences, as events later proved. Briefly,
their plan was to conceal their well-devised scheme of retention, and
should such project be forcibly exposed,—to justify it, all the while
pretending to be working solely for the good of the Filipinos. Their
real feeling was, however, bluntly expressed by Mr. Denby of McKinley’s
first Philippine Commission when he said:
The cold practical question remains: will the possession of these
islands benefit us as a nation? If they will not, set them free
tomorrow and let their peoples, if they please, cut each other’s
throats[10].
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER III
[1] Dewey, _Autobiography_, p. 168.
[2] Roosevelt, _Autobiography_, p. 231.
Dewey, _Autobiography_, p. 168.
[3] Dewey, _Autobiography_, p. 170.
[4] Dewey, _Autobiography_, p. 179.
[5] Henry Watterson, _History of the Spanish American War_, p. 277.
[6] Frank A. Vanderlip, _Century Magazine_, Aug., 1898, cited in
Sen. Doc. 62, pt. 1, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 561.
[7] Hoar, _Autobiography of Seventy Years_, vol. ii, p. 315.
[8] Sen. Doc. 169, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., 1898.
[9] See Appendix, Bureau of Navigation Reports, p. 122.
[10] _The Forum_, Feb., 1899, “Why the Treaty Should be Ratified.”
CHAPTER IV
+Filipino-American Relations Prior to
August, 1898+
Aguinaldo was in Singapore when America declared war on Spain. The
American consul at that port, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, tells in his own
words what this incident meant to him
Being aware [said Mr. Pratt] of the great prestige of General
Aguinaldo with the insurgents, and that no one, either at home or
abroad, could exert over them the same influence and control that
he could, I determined at once to see him.
An interview followed and it was arranged that if Admiral Dewey, then
at Hongkong with his squadron should so desire, the Filipino leader
would join him at that port and arrange a plan of cooperation with
the American forces[2]. Pursuant to this understanding, Mr. Pratt
immediately telegraphed to Dewey as follows:
Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hongkong arrange with
Commodore for general cooperation insurgents Manila if desired.
Telegraph.
To which Admiral Dewey (then a Commodore) immediately replied:
Tell Aguinaldo come as soon as possible.
But by the time the Filipino leader reached Hongkong the future Admiral
had been given his papers and was steaming towards Manila Bay. In
heralding the coming of the Americans, however, the insurgent leaders
at Hongkong sent to the Islands a manifesto addressed to the Filipinos
proclaiming the benevolent mission of the invaders, and urging them
not to heed the appeals of the Spaniards to oppose the Americans. The
proclamation read thus:
+Compatriots+: Divine Providence is about to place independence
within our reach. The Americans, not from mercenary motives, but
for the sake of humanity and the lamentations of so many persecuted
people have considered it opportune to extend their protecting
mantle to our beloved country.... At the present moment an American
squadron is preparing to sail to the Philippines.... The Americans
will attack by sea and prevent any reenforcements coming from
Spain.... We insurgents must attack by land.... There where you
see the American flag flying, assemble in number; they are our
redeemers!
Aguinaldo’s proclamation a few days later was of the same tenor:
Filipinos [he said], the great nation, North America, cradle of
liberty and friendly on that account to the liberty of our people
... has come to manifest a protection ... which is disinterested
towards us, considering us with sufficient civilization _to govern
by ourselves_ this our unhappy land.
It has always been a question whether or not a promise to grant the
Filipinos their freedom in the manner that Cuba had been promised
hers was made. American officials, Dewey included, vehemently deny
having made such promise, while the Filipinos and a few later American
students of history stoutly maintain the contrary. Assuming that no
promises were made by properly accredited agents of the American
government, it is certain that the revolutionists were led by the
action of the American forces in the Philippines to believe that the
United States would give them independence. Their frame of mind as a
result of the early assurances received from the American consuls at
Singapore and Hongkong may be gathered from the tone of the following
letter written by Consul Wildman of Hongkong to Aguinaldo:
Do not forget [he said] that the United States undertook this war
for the sole purpose of relieving the Cubans from the cruelties
under which they were suffering and not for the love of conquests
or the hope of gain. They are actuated by precisely the same
feelings for the Filipinos[3].
When Aguinaldo arrived in Manila on the American gunboat _McCulloch_
which Dewey had expressly sent to Hongkong to bring the Filipino
leader, he immediately went to see Dewey. The latter at once urged
him to start cooperation. “Go ashore and start your army,” he told
the Filipino[4]. Aguinaldo did the rest. “He began operations towards
Manila,” said Dewey, “and did wonderfully well. He whipped the
Spaniards battle after battle....” And so Dewey’s protégé worked, under
the constant advice and encouragement of the American commander. At
that time, of course, the American land forces had not arrived, and
were not due to arrive for several months. In the meantime the Filipino
army was daily expending its power and risking the lives of its men in
this aggressive land campaign. This accounts for Admiral Dewey’s great
concern in aiding them. Let the Admiral testify to this: “I knew what
he was doing—driving the Spaniards in—was _saving our troops_”[5].
Further testimony of this active cooperation between the two forces is
amply furnished by the Admiral.
They looked on us as their liberators [he testified before the
Senate committee[6]]. Up to the time the army came he (Aguinaldo)
did everything I requested. He was most obedient; whatever I told
him to do he did. _I saw him almost daily_[7].
The reason which prompted the American representative to act so
cordially is best described in his own words:
I was waiting for troops to arrive [testified Dewey] and I thought
that the closer they (the Filipinos) invested the city, the easier
it would be when our troops arrived to march in. The Filipinos were
our friends, assisting us; they were doing our work[8].
And when asked how strong a force Aguinaldo had under his command,
Dewey added: “They could have had any number of men; it was
just a question of arming them. _They could have had the whole
population_”[9]. These declarations took place before an investigating
committee of the Senate in 1902, but that the war department in
Washington knew of the cooperation between the two forces is clear from
the official dispatches sent by Dewey from the scene of battle.
Thus, hardly had Aguinaldo landed to organize his forces when Dewey
cabled to the Secretary of the Navy as follows:
May 20, 1898:
Aguinaldo, the rebel commander in chief, was brought down by
the _McCulloch_. Organizing forces near Cavite, and may render
assistance which will be valuable[10].
Just how valuable this assistance proved to be has been shown by
Dewey’s statements in the preceding pages. It took three and a half
months for the American Army to arrive on the scene of action and in
the meantime the telling dispatches of Dewey now survive to inform us
what the Filipino activities actually meant. Thus, a dispatch of June 6
says:
Insurgents have been engaged actively within the province of
Cavite[1] during the last week; they have had several small
victories, taking prisoners about 1800 men, 50 officers; Spanish
troops, not native[11].
Six days later, June 12, comes another telegram from Dewey:
Insurgents continue hostilities and have practically surrounded
Manila. They have taken 2500 Spanish prisoners, whom they treat
most humanely. They do not intend to attack city proper until the
arrival of the U. S. troops thither; I have advised[12].
A week later and another telling dispatch is sent to Washington:
I have given him (Aguinaldo) to understand that I consider
insurgents as friends, being opposed to a common enemy.... He has
gone to attend a meeting of insurgent leaders for the purpose of
forming a civil government. Aguinaldo has acted independently of
the squadron but has kept me advised of his progress which has been
wonderful. I have allowed to pass by water, recruits, arms and
ammunition and to take such arms and ammunition from the arsenal as
he needed. _Have advised frequently to conduct the war humanely,
which he has invariably done._
And then follows this convincing statement:
In my opinion these people are superior in intelligence and more
capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am
familiar with both races[13].
But as a forerunner of the breach which was shortly to follow comes the
testimony of Dewey that upon the arrival of the American army, instead
of seeing him daily as he had done in the past, he “had not much to do
with him after the army came”[14].
Although the Admiral had thus lost interest in Aguinaldo’s cooperation,
however, it soon appeared that the commander of the land forces,
General Anderson, who had arrived earlier on the scene of action,
thought differently. Addressing Aguinaldo on July 4, 1898, he said:
+General+:
I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America
whose land forces I have the honor to command in this vicinity ...
has entire sympathy and most friendly sentiments for the native
people of the Philippine Islands.
For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations
with you and to have you and your people cooperate with us in the
military operations against the Spanish forces.
(Signed) Gen’l +T. M. Anderson+[15].
Assuming, however, that no promises of independence were made in
writing by properly accredited agents in the name of the American
government, it is certain that the Revolutionists were led to believe
that the United States planned to do for the Philippines what she was
then actively doing for Cuba. As General Anderson aptly put it in
describing the situation at that critical period:
Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt (of Singapore), Wildman
(Hongkong) and Williams (Manila) did or did not give Aguinaldo
assurances that a Filipino government would be recognized, the
Filipinos certainly thought so, probably inferring this from their
acts rather than from their statements[16].
Laboring under such a belief the flag of the Philippines was formally
unfurled and independence proclaimed amidst elaborate ceremonies at
Cavite on June 12, 1898[17]. This was exactly two months before the
American forces of occupation finally entered Manila. Events moved
rapidly. The Revolutionary government issued its proclamation providing
for a temporary constitution, until it could be replaced by one
formally drawn by delegates from the archipelago formally assembled. In
the words of the document itself, its purpose was
to abolish with a firm hand the inveterate vices of the Spanish
administration, substituting a more simple and expeditious system
of public instruction for that superfluity of civil service and
ponderous, tardy and ostentatious official routine[18].
Accompanying this provisional constitution whose main object was “to
struggle for the independence of the Philippines until all nations
including Spain, shall expressly recognize it, and to prepare the
country for the establishment of a real Republic,” was a presidential
message from Aguinaldo. This is a noteworthy document for it clearly
mirrored the true aspirations of the Filipinos. It concluded as follows:
Thus they have constituted a revolutionary government with wise
and just laws suited to the abnormal conditions confronting
them, and which at the proper time will prepare them for a true
republic. Thus, taking for its only justification the right, for
its sole aid, justice, and for its only means honorable labor, the
government calls upon all its Filipino sons without distinction of
class, and invites them to unite solidly with the object of forming
a noble society ennobled, not by blood or pompous titles, but by
labor and the personal merit of the individual,—a free society
where there is no place for egotism and personal politics which
wither and blight, nor for envy and favoritism which debase, nor
for charlatanry and buffoonery which cause ridicule.
No other course is possible. A people that has given proof of
fortitude and valor in suffering and in danger, of industry
and learning in time of peace, is not made for slavery. These
people are called to be great, to be one of the strong arms of
Providence in directing the destinies of humanity. These people
have sufficient energy and resources to recover from the ruin and
humiliation in which it has been placed by the Spanish government
and to claim a modest but worthy place in the concert of free
nations.
Given at Cavite, June 23, 1898.
(Signed) +Emilio Aguinaldo+[19].
The march of events continued. On June 27 rules for the conduct of
executive business were announced. On July 25, the members of the
Cabinet were named, and the Congress assembled in the town of Malolos
on September 15. The Revolutionary Government was now ready to merge
into the Republic. Thus it came about that on August 6, one week
before the occupation of Manila by the American forces, Aguinaldo as
President issued an address to the foreign governments in which he
stated that his revolutionary government was then the ruling power
in fifteen provinces of the island of Luzon, where complete order
and perfect tranquillity reigned under the administration of civil
authorities duly elected for that purpose, and that the Filipino army
was then holding 9,000 Spanish prisoners of war who were being treated
according to the rules of war[20]. This proclamation was substantiated
by a secret investigation conducted at that time by Major Bell with the
purpose of ascertaining the strength of the Filipinos in the event that
General Merritt had trouble with them[21]. “There is not a particle
of doubt,” concluded Major Bell, “that Aguinaldo and his leaders
will resist any attempt of any government to reorganize a colonial
government there”[22].
And who was this man Aguinaldo, the recognized leader of the Filipino
cause? Let John Barrett, the strong supporter of the powers that be,
give a picture of the Filipino and his successes. Writing from the
scene of action, having personally known the Filipino and having seen
him put aboard the American gunboat at Hongkong for the direct purpose
of going to Cavite to organize an army and make war upon the Spaniards
in cooperation with the American forces, Mr. Barrett continues thus:
After his arrival at Cavite he organized with wonderful rapidity
a provisional government, and in a short time had an army which
was capturing Spanish outposts with the frequency of trained
regulars....
The impression went abroad among the masses of the people that
Aguinaldo had arrived to establish an independent government, and
that the Americans would assist him. The actual working of his
government under the guns of our ship was sufficient evidence to
them of our approval.... These influences had a tremendous effect.
Before Aguinaldo had been in Cavite a month he not only had more
soldiers than he could arm, but contributions of large sums of
money, with unlimited amounts of rice and other raw food supplies
brought in by the people for the support of his Army.
Of the Congress, Mr. Barrett says:
By the middle of October he had assembled at Malolos a Congress
of one hundred men.... These men whose sessions I repeatedly
attended, conducted themselves with great decorum and showed a
knowledge of debate and parliamentary law that would not compare
unfavorably with the Japanese Parliament. The executive portion of
the government was made up of a ministry of bright men who seemed
to understand their respective positions.
The army of Aguinaldo seems to have been the greatest of his
achievements in the estimation of Mr. Barrett.
He had over twenty regiments [wrote Mr. Barrett] of comparatively
well-dressed soldiers carrying modern rifles and ammunition. I saw
many of these regiments executing not only regimental but battalion
and company drill with a precision that astonished me.... The
people in all the different towns took great pride in this army.
Nearly every family had a father, son or cousin in it. Wherever
they went they aroused enthusiasm for the Filipino cause[23].
Such an estimate of Aguinaldo is largely corroborated by those
Americans who directly came in contact with him. Thus Mr. Jacob
Schurman, President of the First Philippine Commission, characterized
him as having
enjoyed the confidence of the insurgents and their sympathizers
and abettors ... in virtue of his patriotic services, his attested
honesty and his remarkable gift of surrounding himself with able
coadjutors and administrators[24].
“_He (Aguinaldo) was the incarnation of the feelings of the
Filipinos_,” adds General MacArthur[25].
It is difficult to understand the success of the insurgent forces
against the better trained Spaniards otherwise than by ascribing it
to the unusual intelligence on the part of their leaders and the firm
determination of the people. Six weeks before the American occupation
of Manila, for example, John T. McCutcheon, reporting for the Chicago
_Record_ narrated the march of events in a special dispatch dated the
24th of June, as follows:
All during the week following there was constant evidence of the
strife that was being waged between Cavite and Malate.... Imus,
Bacoor, Las Pinas and Paranaque were captured in less than a
week notwithstanding the fact that the Spaniards had splendid
guns and ammunition in unlimited quantities, supported by five
mountain batteries and rapid fire guns.... Over in Cavite the calm
passionless statements of great victories that Aguinaldo gave us
were being substantiated every day for hundreds and hundreds of
Spanish soldiers were being marched in and placed in prison!...
Closely following the remarkable insurgent successes in Cavite
Province, where the whole district had been captured in eight days,
came stories of other successful operations in Pampanga Province;
Macabebe and San Fernando were captured and the great Spanish
General Molet fled in terror to Manila. Over one thousand Spanish
soldiers had been taken prisoners and their arms given out to
natives as quickly as possible.... Our respect for the insurgent
prowess had grown a great deal, for by June 30 they had taken
almost every province in Luzon, with the exception of isolated
garrisons and were hammering away at the doors of Manila[26].
By August the insurgents had surrounded the city with fourteen miles
of trenches, the water and food supply had been cut off, internal
trade paralyzed and the inhabitants of the unfortunate city reduced
to horseflesh diet. Such was the result of a three and a half months’
blockade with Dewey guarding the harbor and the Filipinos closing in
by land[27]. So closely were the Filipinos besieging Manila that when
General Anderson arrived with his land forces to commence offensive
hostilities he was compelled to request from Aguinaldo permission to
occupy a part of the Filipino fighting line and trenches[28].
Capitulation of the city turned out to be a mere matter of form under
these circumstances. Through the Belgian consul, M. Andre, stationed in
Manila, Commodore Dewey and General Merritt arranged with the Spanish
commandants for the surrender of the city. There was to be no real
fighting, no resistance except the display of a white flag after the
firing of a few shots to save the delicate honor of the Castilians. But
one thing the Spaniards demanded, and that was that no Filipino troops
were to enter the city. To this arrangement the Americans agreed[29].
General Anderson, thereupon, notified Aguinaldo to forbid his troops
to enter the city. The unpleasant information was naturally received
with indignation, for it meant that the Filipinos must lie in their
trenches and watch all the glory of the capture fall to thousands of
American troops whose contribution to the victory had consisted in
their amiable presence on the American transports that had brought them
from San Francisco. Further than this, until the treaty of Paris was
decided upon the Filipinos had no way of knowing whether the Americans
were to turn them back to Spain or set them free. If it was to be the
former then the Revolution would continue and it was natural that the
Filipinos should wish to be in possession of the capital city.
Fearing as he had reason to fear, that the order to stay back would not
be obeyed, General Anderson sent his troops to hold the main bridge
into the city with no other purpose than to fire, if necessary, upon
their late friends. As Anderson himself put it in addressing Aguinaldo:
“Unless your troops are withdrawn beyond the lines of the city’s
defences before Thursday, the fifteenth instant, I shall be compelled
to resort to forcible action”[30].
The situation was very critical [said General Greene]. Our soldiers
believed that the Filipinos had fired upon them and the Filipinos
were almost beside themselves with rage and disappointment. The
friendly relations we had with Generals Ricarte and Noriel alone
prevented the conflict with them then and there[31].
But if the break between them had been averted in August, it failed to
end the tension between the two armies.
It is now worth while to view the situation as it stood at that time.
We held Manila and Cavite [said General Anderson] the rest of the
Island (Luzon) was held not by Spaniards but by the Filipinos.
On the other islands the Spaniards were confined to two or three
fortified towns[32].
Even these were later captured by the natives also, so that General
Otis adds:
Thus, in December, 1898, we find that in northern and southeastern
Luzon, in (the islands of) Mindoro, Samar, Leyte, Panay and even
on the coast of Mindanao and in some of the smaller islands, the
aggressive Tagalog present in person and, whether civilian or
soldier, supreme in authority[33].
Shortly after the occupation of Manila, two officers of Admiral Dewey’s
squadron, with the latter’s permission, made an intimate inspection of
the interior of the island to bring back a report of which Admiral
Dewey himself said that it contained “the most complete and reliable
information obtainable in regard to the present state of the northern
part of Luzon.” This report was forwarded to Mr. Long, the Secretary of
the Navy and, in response to a Senate resolution may be found reported
in Senate Document 196, 56th Congress, 1st Session, bearing date of
February 26, 1900. Messrs. Sargent and Wilcox, the two officers in
question, spent two months in their travels and they saw and heard even
more than that which was reported by the commanders from Manila.
As a tribute to the efficiency of Aguinaldo’s government and
the law abiding character of his subjects [wrote Mr. Sargent] I
offer the fact that Mr. Wilcox and I pursued our journey through
in perfect security and returned to Manila with only the most
pleasing recollections of the quiet and orderly life which we found
the natives to be leading under their new régime (the Filipino
Republic).
The travellers also had an opportunity to witness some of the
ceremonies inaugurating civil government under the new-born republic.
They describe those which occurred in the province of Caaygan as
follows:
The Presidentes of all the towns in the provinces were present at
the ceremony.... Colonel Tirona made a short speech.... He then
handed the staff of office to the man who had been elected governor
of the Province. This officer also made a speech in which he
thanked the military forces and assured them that the work they had
begun would be perpetuated by the people, where every man, woman
and child stood ready to take up arms to defend their newly won
liberty and to resist with the last drop of their blood the attempt
of _any nation_ whatever to bring them back to their former state
of dependence. He then knelt, placed his hand on an open Bible, and
took the oath of office.
There is a variety of feeling among the Filipinos [adds Mr.
Sargent] in regard to the debt of gratitude they owe the United
States. In every town we found men who said that our nation had
saved them from slavery and others who claimed that without our
interference their independence would have been recognized before
this time. On one point they were united, however, viz. that
whatever our government may have done for them, it has not gained
the right to annex them.
Of course, it must be remembered that all this region outside of Manila
and its environments was “_terra incognita_” to the thousands of
American soldiers stationed in Manila and to the millions of Americans
at home. That is why with the help of the censored press during the war
that followed, American public opinion utterly failed to realize what
an efficient government the Filipinos had established several months
before the treaty of Paris. The first intimate glimpse accorded the
volunteer army of occupation occurred in the fall of the following year
when that peaceful territory was finally overrun by the invading army
of the greatest republic in the world.
No one can read the evidence here presented without seeing that the
representatives of the United States in the islands and the government
in Washington knew that the Filipinos believed that the United States
would give them independence and in that belief were helping the
Americans; that while their help was needed nothing was done to disturb
that belief but, on the contrary, pains were taken not to disturb it,
if not indeed to encourage it, and the Filipinos were allowed to fight
the battles of the invaders. Among gentlemen, or in a country where
the principle of estoppel is recognized, such conduct would be held
equivalent to a binding promise.
Can the “great nation North America” afford to adopt a lower standard
of decency?
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER IV
[1] Cavite is five miles across the bay from Manila.
[2] Note: Consul Pratt’s official report regarding this early
state of the Filipino-American relations is preserved in Sen.
Doc. 62, part 1, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., 1898-99, pp. 341 _et
seq._
[3] Cong. Rec., April 17, 1900, p. 4287.
[4] From Dewey’s statement to the Senate Committee—see Sen. Doc.
331, part 3, p. 2928.
[5] Sen. Doc. 331, part 3, p. 2928.
[6] _Ibid._, p. 2934.
[7] _Ibid._, p. 2967.
[8] Sen. Doc. 331, part 3, p. 2936.
[9] _Ibid._, p. 2940.
[10] See Navy Dept. Report, 1898, App., p. 100.
[11] _Ibid._, p. 102.
[12] _Ibid._, p. 106.
[13] _Ibid._, p. 103.
[14] Sen. Doc. 331, part 3, pp. 2928 and 2956.
[15] See Sen. Doc. 56th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 208.
[16] “Our Rule in the Philippines,” _North American Review_, Feb.,
1900, p. 272.
[17] See Justice George Malcolm’s _Philippine Government_, p. 124.
[18] Sen. Doc. 62, pp. 432-437; quoted also in Foreman’s _The
Philippine Islands_, 3d, 1906, p. 448.
[19] Quoted in Millet’s _Expedition to the Philippines_, p. 49.
Foreman’s _The Philippine Islands_, 3d, 1906, pp. 454, 455.
[20] Sen. Doc. (1898), No. 208, p. 99.
[21] Sen. Doc. 62, 1898, p. 379.
[22] _Ibid._, p. 380.
[23] John Barrett in the _Review of Reviews_, July, 1899.
[24] _Philippine Affairs—a Retrospect and Outlook_, address by Mr.
Shurman before members of Cornell Univ.
[25] Statement before Senate Committee, Sen. Doc. 331, 1902, p.
1926.
[26] Note: These accounts are substantiated by Official Reports.
See War Dept. Rep. 1899, vol. 1, part 4, and Otis Report, p.
13; also Report of Shurman Commission, vol. 1, p. 172.
[27] War Dept. Rep. 1899, vol. 1, part 4, p. 13.
[28] Latane, _America as a World Power_, p. 85; also Cong. Record,
56th Cong., 1st Sess., Proceedings in the Senate, Jan. 11,
1900, p. 769.
[29] See Dewey’s _Autobiography_, pp. 273, 274, for a carefully
guarded account of these arrangements.
[30] Sec. of War Annual Rep. 1899, I, part 4, p. 9.
[31] See Charles B. Elliott’s _The Philippine Islands_, Chapter
XII, “Capture of Manila,” p. 317.
[32] _North American Review_, Feb., 1900.
[33] Report of Gen. Otis for Aug. 21, 1899; also quoted in
Harper’s _History of the War in the Philippines_, p. 99.
CHAPTER V
+Conquest by Treaty+
During the war the President had already shown a shrewd instinct for
trading, thus expressed in his own words: “While we are conducting war
and until its conclusion we must keep all we get; when the war is over
we must keep what we want”[1]. Thus it was that when, after less than
four months of fighting the Spanish government acting through the good
offices of the French government finally decided to ask for peace, she
was, to say the least, taken by surprise at the conditions imposed by
the victorious President.
When the desire for a parley was first brought to the attention of
McKinley he summoned his Cabinet for a protracted conference to discuss
the terms of peace. Those relating to the Philippines naturally
elicited the most attention. Secretary Bliss seeing great commercial
opportunities in the Islands favored taking the entire group. So did
Attorney General Griggs. Secretaries Gage and Long thought a naval
base would be enough. As for the Secretary of State, Mr. Day, we
quote Mr. McKinley’s own words. Commenting on the varying views of his
Cabinet which ranged from the retention of the whole archipelago to one
or two more important islands, McKinley jokingly added, “But Judge Day
only wants a hitching post.”
So much for the administration’s early attitude regarding its
benevolent and kindly intentions towards the Philippines[2].
In response, therefore, to the Spanish Minister’s request for peace, a
request in which that able representative of the Queen Regent assured
the President and his administration that the Spanish treatment of
Cuban insurrection had been adopted solely “to spare the great island
from the dangers of premature independence,” Mr. McKinley submitted the
following conditions for the suspension of hostilities:
First: the relinquishment by Spain of all claim to Cuba and
immediate evacuation of the island.
Second: the cession to the United States of the islands of Porto
Rico and the other islands then under the sovereignty of Spain in
the West Indies, and also the cession of an island in the Ladrones
to be selected by the United States.
Third: that the United States was to be entitled “to occupy and
hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of
a treaty of peace which should determine the control, disposition
and government of the Philippines”[3].
Spain was not alone in her denunciation of these hard terms. The French
ambassador, M. Cambon, through whom the interests of the Spanish
government were being represented in Washington, tried in vain to
secure a modification of these terms, particularly that regarding
Porto Rico which “he characterized as evincing a spirit of conquest
inconsistent with the declaration of disinterestedness with which
the United States had commenced the war”[4]. It should be remembered
also that these terms were made two weeks before the final capture of
Manila. At this early stage it is already evident that the President
failed to recognize in any way the existing fact that there was a
native uprising in the Islands and that a Philippine Republic had been
proclaimed under it.
Five commissioners were appointed to negotiate the final treaty
with Spain but it is significant to notice that three of them were
avowed Imperialists[5] and already known to be in favor of acquiring
territories in the Far East. These three were the Hon. Cushman Davis,
chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Hon. William
P. Frye, member of the same Committee, and the Hon. Whitelaw Reid,
who had formerly held the post of envoy extraordinary and minister
plenipotentiary of the United States to France.
Under such auspicious beginnings it was an easy matter for the
President to communicate with sufficient tact the secret instructions
which were to guide the commissioners in Paris. These secret
instructions were prepared with great detail and care and must be
examined accordingly. In them, the President first expressed in high
sounding language the altruistic purposes with which the war had been
waged.
It is my earnest wish [he said] that the United States in making
peace should follow the same high rule of conduct which guided it
in making war.... The lustre and the moral strength attaching to a
cause which can be properly rested upon the considerate judgment
of the world should not under any illusion of the hour be dimmed
by ulterior designs which might tempt us into excessive demands or
even into adventurous departure on untried paths.
These were fine words, indeed, but, they were meant only for Cuba and
not for the Philippines.
The Philippines [continued the President] stand upon a different
basis. It is none the less true, however, that without any original
thought of complete or even partial acquisition, the presence and
success of our arms at Manila impose upon us obligations which we
cannot disregard. The march of events rules and overrules human
action ... we cannot be unmindful that without any desire or design
on our part, the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities
which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation in whose
growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has
plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization.
But that these were in fact but weasel words to smooth the instructions
which were to follow now becomes evident. It bluntly appears in the
next paragraph when the President continued thus, “Incidental to our
tenure in the Philippines is the commercial opportunity to which
American statesmanship cannot be indifferent.” And thus, by elaborate
gradations finally came the President’s real demand expressed in these
words, “The United States cannot accept less than the cession in full
right and sovereignty of the island of Luzon”[6].
With these secret instructions in hand the commissioners departed for
Paris. There they were joined by other American observers fresh from
their Philippine campaigns. Among them were Admiral Dewey, General
Merritt, Major Bell and General Green who had come for the purpose
of presenting their statement to aid the commissioners in their
negotiations. The tenor of their reports was practically the same,
holding that it would not be wise to return all of the Islands or even
a part of them to Spain, that the cession of the archipelago would be a
“good business proposition” and that the Filipinos would not offer much
resistance to American rule. How totally without foundation the latter
statement was became evident during the Filipino-American war. One of
the opinions submitted which no doubt produced a marked effect on the
later negotiations came from the Belgian consul in Manila, M. Andre.
His statement was that:
The United States can assure a steady government in these islands
and in their hands the country will increase in wealth, and will,
in a short time, be able to return to the United States the money
laid out[7].
Thus it was that on October 26, before the subject of the Philippines
was actually brought to the attention of the Peace Conference,
the President cabled his commissioners to the effect that recent
information had convinced him that the cession of Luzon alone was out
of the question and therefore, influenced as he said “by the single
consideration of duty and humanity,” he directed that, “the cession
must be of the whole archipelago or none.” “The latter,” he continued,
“is wholly inadmissible, and the former must therefore be required”[8].
Now throughout these proceedings it is at once apparent that no
thought, no consideration, not even a voice was given to the Filipino
people. A representative of the Filipinos, Mr. Agoncillo, went to
Paris and later to Washington to seek a hearing before the commission,
but the doors of both council chambers were slammed in his face and
the authorities in Washington would not receive him. He could obtain
a hearing nowhere. The whole matter was a business proposition, and
the commissioners treated it accordingly. The secrecy with which
the President’s designs were guarded may be gathered from the fact
that the “Papers relating to the Treaty with Spain,” which included
also the private communications between the chief executive and his
commissioners, were carefully concealed from the American public until
January 31, 1901, that is, after the Presidential elections of 1900 had
been successfully passed. Even then the papers only came to light after
having been extracted from the jealous custody of the Executive by a
Senate resolution demanding them. They were then published as Senate
Document, 148, 56th Congress, Second Session.
It is one of the most significant features of this conquest, that
at the time when the great issue was at stake neither the Filipinos
who were most interested in the outcome nor the Americans who faced
the parting of the ways were ever taken into the confidence of the
Administration.
It is difficult to understand how the commissioners finally came to
an agreement regarding the Philippines. They could, of course, have
followed McKinley’s claim and demanded the islands by conquest. But
such a position seemed unwarrantable to the commissioners who wired
the President accordingly on November 3. Furthermore, the Spanish
commissioners feared utter repudiation at home. To lose Cuba and her
possessions in the West Indies, “the last memory of a glorious past,”
was sorrowful enough, but to lose the Philippines as well was indeed
pitiful. But the President stood firm in his demands for the entire
archipelago, and so a friendly concession was made whereby the title
to the Philippines was apparently bought, “the United States to pay
Spain the sum of twenty million dollars within three months after the
exchange of ratifications of the present treaty.” Considering that the
Islands had a total land area almost equal to that of England, Ireland,
Scotland, and Wales, and a population of more than seven million it was
not a bad bargain at all, and the President certained lived up to his
reputation for shrewdness and ability to drive a good business bargain.
And in that manner was the President’s original intention fully
accomplished. For in the words of one of his own appointed
commissioners, Mr. Davis, it was of the utmost importance that the
United States should have a “commanding commercial position” in the
waters of the East, “in view of the astounding changes which the
Chinese Empire has been subjected to and is destined to further
undergo.”
I am interested that this country shall have its share of trade
of that great empire [he said]. California, Washington and Oregon
have scarcely more than two millions of people. I want to see the
commercial development of that part of our country expand until
there shall be twenty millions of people there; and I do honestly
and sincerely believe, from all I have studied and thought on
the subject, that the retention of the Philippine Islands, and
their adjustment to our needs and destiny, is a necessary and
indispensable step in the advancement to which I have so alluded.
The well-known historian, James Ford Rhodes, contributes much light to
this chapter of American history. “It is true,” he wrote in 1922, “that
McKinley was inconsistent in his public words.” For “in his message of
December, 1897, he had said, ‘forcible annexation ... cannot be thought
of; that by our code of morality would be criminal aggression!’” And
yet “one cannot read the proceedings of the Peace Commission in
Paris,” adds Mr. Rhodes, “and see in any other light than that our
taking of the Philippines _was_ ‘forcible annexation’”[9].
The British press of that year, however, showed the incongruity even
more effectively. A cartoon was presented entitled “Doctrine and
Practice” representing Dame Europe in a garden haughtily saying to an
intruder, “To whom do I owe the pleasure of this intrusion?” To which
the person addressed replies,—“Ma’am, my name is Uncle Sam.” And this
rejoinder follows, “Any relation to the late Colonel Monroe?”[10].
It certainly would have seemed impossible after all that had passed
and the help which the United States had asked and accepted from the
Filipinos as their allies, that the future of the Islands should be
determined without even inviting a suggestion from their people as
to what should be the terms of peace. The United States had always
insisted that governments rest on the consent of the governed;
the President had taken pains to assure the world that “forcible
annexation” was not to be thought of as it would be “criminal
aggression”; it had even been insisted that “our priceless principles”
could not change under “a tropical sun” and that it was with no thought
of gain but solely for the good of the Filipinos and the sake of
humanity that the American nation was fighting at all, and yet the
Washington administration refused, not only to invite suggestion, but
even to receive and listen to the envoy whom the Filipinos sent to
express their views as to the future of the seven million people who
had proved themselves most efficient allies and whose help the American
commanders had been glad to invite and accept.
It is all a striking instance of the crimes which have been committed
in the name of liberty.
But although the President and his commissioners were highly satisfied
with the treaty, their work was far from accomplished. That document
had to be ratified and for that purpose all the forces and arguments
and all the enthusiasm which the President thought he had found in
a tour of the middle west were now employed. The struggle for its
ratification, therefore, soon got under way but this fact must be at
once noticed,—that although the people were being urged to stand behind
the treaty they did not and could not know what the treaty really meant.
And this unfortunate situation was so because to the political leaders
of that time the provisions of the treaty meant one of several
things. To the majority the cession of the Philippines if ratified
meant that America was to be definitely launched upon a policy of
colonial expansion. In the past the Federal government had acquired
territory on the continent, but in such cases it had also meant
eventual statehood by and with the consent of its inhabitants. But the
Philippine issue widely differed from this. Not only had the Filipinos
not been consulted in the matter, but the administration itself had
made it clear that it was not prepared to favor the extension of
American citizenship to the natives[11].
Now, there were certain men in the Senate who wished to ratify the
treaty and yet were opposed to a policy of colonization. Hence, they
proposed to amend it or to pass a resolution clearly stating that
the Philippines would ultimately, if not immediately, be given their
independence. A number of such resolutions were therefore offered but
they all failed to pass.
Another group of Senators, though not perhaps strictly opposed to some
other more reasonable policy of expansion, nevertheless objected to the
treaty as it then stood because it was an injustice to the Filipinos.
This element could not understand why the Cubans should be treated
differently from the Filipinos in the face of an official statement
made by Admiral Dewey to the effect that “the Filipinos were better
fitted for self-government than the Cubans were”[12]. As Senator Mason
ably put it,—
Tell me why we should adopt one plan for Cuba and another for the
Philippines? Do you say ... “We promised we would not steal Cuba,
but we did not promise not to steal the Philippines?” Do you say,
with Shylock, “Is it so nominated in the bond?” ... Will you tell
me please, how grand larceny and criminal aggression in Cuba become
high Christian civilization in the Philippines?
This powerful group of practical anti-imperialists, headed by such
men as Senator Hoar, Carl Schurz, and ex-President Harrison, stoutly
maintained that the principles underlying the structure of the American
republic were not compatible with the policy of holding colonies. They
urged the argument that the United States could have no subjects under
her suzerainty, because she herself was composed of free citizens. And,
finally, they attacked the administration’s intention of governing a
subject people without the latter’s consent.
A selfish element among the Senators also had to be contended with.
This group was made up of those who feared that annexation of the
Philippines would eventually mean the introduction of the Filipinos
in some form or another into American life. The idea was apparently
repugnant to them. Such an attitude was no doubt, however, a result of
misinformation and downright prejudice against Asiatics in general.
Senator McLaurin characterized the extent of this feeling when he said
that he was against “the incorporation of a mongrel and semibarbarous
population into our body politic,” which was “inferior to, but akin
to the Negro in moral and intellectual qualities and capacity for
self-government.”
So heavily laden was the atmosphere with these objections against
ratification, that it became doubtful whether the administration would
be vindicated. It remained for Senator Lodge with his fluent language
and adroit reasoning, and Mr. Bryan’s mistaken policy to swing the
senatorial sentiment in the other direction.
Senator Lodge’s presentation deserves first attention because of the
open and high-handed manner in which he presented his case. Briefly,
his attitude was that ratification did not necessarily mean annexation
or colonization. The time to decide the latter, in his opinion, was
after the treaty had been accepted. This was directly opposed to the
prevailing view that to accept the treaty meant to enter upon an era
of colonial expansion. But the Senator was not to be daunted. He took
as his weapon, and he followed as his method of attack, the road which
adroit diplomats and statesmen have constantly followed when arguments
have failed them—the vanity of human nature.
Let the Senator’s own words testify to this:
When that treaty is ratified [he contended] we have full power and
are absolutely free to do with those islands as we please, and
the opposition to its ratification may be summed up in a single
sentence—that the American people and the American Congress are not
to be trusted with that power and with that freedom of action in
regard to the inhabitants of those distant islands. Every one of
the resolutions thus far offered on this subject _is an expression
of distrust_ in the future and in our dealings with other people.
It is a well-meant effort to make us give bonds to Fate by means of
a Congressional resolution.
The resolutions which the Senator meant were those declaring that
the United States did not intend to make a permanent colony of the
Philippines, and that ultimately or immediately the Filipinos would be
granted self-government.
Could a more direct appeal to the vanity of the American people have
been made?
Suppose we ratify the treaty [continued the Senator] the islands
pass from the possession of Spain into our possession without
committing us to any policy. _I believe we can be trusted as a
people_ to deal honestly and justly with the islands and their
inhabitants thus given to our care[13].
It is well to recall this language of the late Senator in view of
the contention being made today that Congress cannot alienate the
Philippines. If the spokesman of the administration of 1898 insisted
that the ratification of the treaty would not commit the United States
to any policy with regard to the Philippines, and that the Congress
could later deal with the Islands in accordance with the wishes of the
people, will Congress now repudiate the theory which then prevailed and
which largely induced the Senate to ratify the treaty? Can the United
States afford to give her enemies this new ground for distrust?
But let the Senator continue once more,—“It is for us to decide the
destiny of the Philippines, not for Europe, and we can do it alone and
without assistance.” On another occasion he made this most flowery
statement,—
To the American people and their government I am ready to intrust
my life, my liberty, my honor and, what is far dearer to me than
anything personal to myself, the life and liberty of my children
and my children’s children. If I am ready thus to trust my children
to the government which the American public create and sustain,
am I to shrink from intrusting to that same people the fate and
fortune of the Philippine Islands?
Evidently it did not occur to the venerable senator that these
Filipinos were not to have a voice in the government which he praised
so eloquently and that, therefore, in the words of Daniel Webster,—
No matter how easy may be the yoke of a foreign power, no matter
how lightly it sits upon the shoulders, if it is not imposed upon
him by the voice of his own nation and of his own country, he
cannot and he means not to be happy under its burden.
But the Senator’s point had been made. He had convinced many opponents
of the treaty that refusal to ratify unless accompanied by a statement
of America’s honest intentions meant a distrust of America’s honest
abilities to give the Filipinos a square deal. These men thought that
such a resolution would mean giving bonds to Spain and to Europe for
America’s good conduct.
A further element also entered into the struggle which aided the
administration in its fight. It was Mr. Bryan’s arrival in Washington
urging the Democrats to ratify the treaty. Like Senator Lodge, Mr.
Bryan contended that the treaty as it then stood did not commit the
country to a policy of colonization. That policy was to be decided in
the coming elections when the attitude towards the Filipino could be
more plainly expressed[14]. And so confident was the great commoner
that the American public would oppose indefinite if not permanent
annexation of the Islands that he was willing to risk the issue until
1900.
The ratification of the treaty [he said] instead of committing the
United States to a colonial policy really clears the way for the
recognition of the Philippine Republic.... Could the independence
of the Filipinos be secured more easily by diplomacy from a foreign
and hostile nation than it can through laws passed by Congress and
voicing the sentiments of the American people? If independence
is more desirable to our people than a colonial policy, who is
there and what is there to prevent the recognition of Philippine
independence? It is absurd to say that the United States can be
transformed from a republic to an empire without consulting the
voters[15].
Mr. Bryan may or may not have been justified in taking this attitude,
but he certainly failed to foresee the nature of the campaign which
his opponents were to launch in order to vindicate the President’s
Philippine policy.
While the discussions on the treaty were thus rapidly coming to a close
the situation in the Philippines was constantly becoming menacing.
American transports bearing thousands of soldiers were being massed in
Manila. The insurgents who, it will be remembered, had surrounded the
city were being gradually pushed further and further back. In many
instances these advances by the Americans were also made in violation
of the protocol with Spain which had declared that America was merely
“to occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending
the conclusion of the treaty.” Generally these orders compelling
the Filipinos to make more and more humiliating withdrawals were
accompanied with gratuitous threats to use force. What friendship had
been left at the time of the occupation had given way to suspicion.
Perhaps no one more than Senator Bacon realized the danger which these
relations meant.
While there is not a declaration of war [he said] while there is no
avowal of hostile intent, with two such armies fronting each other
with such diverse intents and resolves, it will take but a spark
to ignite the magazine which may explode.... They (the Filipinos)
are opposed to the occupation of their islands by the United States
troops [warned the Senator] because of the apprehension that it is
the purpose of the United States government to maintain a permanent
dominion over those islands; and whenever, we shall by such
resolutions as these, say solemnly to the world that such is not
our purpose, there is no longer any danger or difficulty[16].
That such was also the view taken by the Filipino leaders and observed
by the American commander was also clear. “They begged,” said General
Otis, “for some tangible concession from the United States government,
one which they could present to the people and which might serve to
allay excitement” [17].
Two days before the vote was taken, however, every attempt to declare
America’s real purpose with regard to the Philippines had failed. On
that fateful day the hostilities between the Americans and Filipinos
against which Mr. Bacon had warned his countrymen finally broke
out. The Administration immediately claimed that the insurgents had
treacherously begun the hostilities, but even with this inducement to
support the treaty, that document was finally ratified with but one
vote to spare.
But it was not yet too late to hear the protest of the Filipinos
even if it had been ignored for so long a time. The opponents of
colonization immediately commenced their efforts to pass their
resolutions plainly putting the benevolent attitude which the President
and his supporters had been so vaguely hinting at. That of Mr.
McEnery’s supplemented by Mr. Bacon’s amendment was, in particular, the
most clear and reasonable of all. It read as follows:
+Resolved+, further, that the United States hereby disclaim any
disposition or intention to exercise permanent sovereignty,
jurisdiction, or control over said islands, and assert their
determination, when a stable and independent government shall have
been erected therein, entitled in the judgment of the government
of the United States to recognition as such, to transfer to said
government, upon terms which shall be reasonable and just, all
rights secured under the cession by Spain, and to thereupon leave
the government and control of the Islands to their people.
Surely, the issue could not have been more plainly put. If the United
States really intended and could be trusted to deal honestly and fairly
with the Filipinos, now was the time to announce her policy. This
resolution still gave the United States a wide latitude of discretion
as to when the Filipinos could have their cherished freedom. Even
Senator Lodge should have had no apprehension in the matter. There were
here no bonds to be given to Europe, no distrust in the good faith
and judgment of the American people. The resolution merely sought to
decide whether the Filipinos would at some distant time in the future
eventually be granted that which had been given to Cuba. But this
resolution also failed to pass and in its failure the true purpose of
the Administration was made clear. The vote was a tie and the casting
vote of the Vice-President was cast against it.
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER V
[1] Olcott’s _Life of McKinley_, vol. ii, p. 165; also James F.
Rhodes’ _The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations_, p. 100.
[2] Olcott’s _Life of McKinley_, vol. ii, p. 63.
[3] _Foreign Relations_, 1898, p. 820.
[4] Elliott, _The Philippines_, Ch. XIII, The Treaty of Peace, p.
322.
[5] Rhodes, _The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations_, p. 102.
[6] _Foreign Relations_, 1898, p. 907.
[7] Sen. Doc. 62, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 389.
[8] _Foreign Relations_, 1898, p. 935.
[9] Rhodes, _The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations_, p. 107.
[10] See _Punch_ for Aug. 6, 1898.
[11] Kalaw _The Case for the Filipinos_, p. 45.
[12] Navy Dept. Rep., 1898, App. p. 103.
[13] Speech in U. S. Senate, Jan. 24, 1899.
[14] Hoar, _Autobiography_, vol. ii, p. 332.
[15] Speech at Democratic banquet, St. Paul, Minn., Feb. 14, 1899.
[16] Con. Record, Jan. 18, 1899, p. 1899.
[17] Otis’ Report, p. 82.
CHAPTER VI
+Conquest by Force of Arms+
The last chapter took us to the day when the Senate of the United
States, with one vote to spare, finally ratified the treaty. But seven
weeks before that momentous occasion the President had already started
on his career of usurpation which finally ended in war. On December
21, 1898, he issued a proclamation which he caused to be broadcasted
in the Islands. At that time the United States had no title to a foot
of land in the Philippines, and whether it would have depended on the
ratification of the treaty which was bitterly opposed by many leaders
of the Republican party. Until this treaty was ratified the protocol of
August 13 remained in force which by its terms merely provided that the
United States forces should occupy “the city, bay and harbor of Manila,
pending the conclusion of the treaty.” None the less the President
began his proclamation by saying that,
the destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila by the
United States squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral Dewey followed by
the reduction of the city and the surrender of the Spanish forces
practically effected the conquest of the Philippine islands and
the suspension of Spanish sovereignty therein. With the signature
of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain by
their respective plenipotentiaries at Paris on the 10th instant,
and as a result of the victories of American arms, _the future
control, disposition, and government of the Philippine islands are
ceded to the United States_. In the fulfillment of the _rights of
sovereignty_ thus acquired and the responsible obligations thus
assumed, _the actual occupation and administration of the entire
group of the Philippine Islands becomes immediately necessary, and
the military government_ heretofore maintained by the United States
in the city, harbor and bay of Manila _is to be extended with all
possible dispatch to the whole ceded territory_.
He concluded by urging the military administration to win the
confidence, respect and affection of the Filipinos,
by assuring them in every possible way that full measure of
_individual rights and liberties_ which is the heritage of free
peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the United
States is one of “_benevolent assimilation_” substituting the mild
sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule.
The President’s language thus made it clear that he considered the
conquest of the Philippine Islands as practically complete, that the
United States now owned them and could deal with them as it would and
that it did not offer them any voice in their government, much less
the independence for which they had struggled so long and which they
thought the United States had fought to give them.
The President also went on to say:
All persons who, either by active aid or by honest submission,
cooperate with the Government of the United States to give effect
to these beneficent purposes will receive the reward of its support
and protection. All others will be brought within the lawful rule
we have assumed, _with firmness if need be_, but without severity
so far as possible.
Bearing in mind that this Proclamation was issued seven weeks before
the treaty was ratified, what did the President assert by it? Simply
this—in substance he told the Filipinos:
You are ours, the control of your public property and the revenues
of your state are ours, the use and management of your public means
of transportation and conveyance are controlled by our authority
and while we mean to rule you with benevolence, nevertheless you
must accept our sovereignty in order to receive our support and
protection, for if you fail to do so the armed forces of the United
States will compel you to submit.
The Filipinos realized this; it was not difficult for them to see what
the United States really intended, notwithstanding the honeyed phrases
of the proclamation. The American commander in Manila, General Otis,
also realized it, and knowing the stern resolve of the people to assert
their independence he took the liberty of censoring the proclamation
by cutting out the words “sovereignty” and “immediate extension of
authority.” Unfortunately the proclamation got out by mistake in its
original form and served to increase the tension between the two armies.
In accordance with this proclamation, the American forces in Manila
gradually extended their occupations beyond the city limits, forcing
the Filipino army to retire farther and farther from its original
lines. As long as the Filipino forces yielded gracefully to these
illegal advances they certainly had a right to feel that no organized
attack would be made upon them. But on February 4, two days before the
treaty was ratified the American lines were again extended into the
outlying territory.
That night an American sentry seeing a Filipino on the newly occupied
sector challenged him. What transpired is best stated by this same
American private.
I yelled, “Halt!” ... The man moved. I challenged him with another
“Halt.” Then he immediately shouted, “Halto” to me. Well, I thought
the best thing to do was to shoot him. He dropped. Then two
Filipinos sprang out of the gateway about fifteen feet from us. I
called “Halt” and Miller fired and dropped one. I saw that another
was left. Well, I think I got my second Filipino that time. We
retreated to where our six other fellows were and I said, “Line up,
fellows, the niggers are in here all through these yards.” We then
retreated to the pipe line and got behind the water workmain and
stayed there all night. It was some minutes after our second shots
before Filipinos began firing[1].
General Otis described the outbreak in his official report in very much
the same manner. He said:
An insurgent approaching the picket (of a Nebraska regiment)
refused to halt or answer when challenged. The result was that
our picket discharged his piece (killing the Filipino) when the
insurgent troops near Santa Mesa opened fire on our troops there
stationed.... During the night it was confined to an exchange of
fire between opposing lines for a distance of two miles.... _It is
not believed that the chief insurgents wished to open hostilities
at that time_[2].
It has never been even suggested that this exchange of fire caused any
casualties[3].
That the Filipino leaders did not desire an outbreak has also been
substantiated from numerous reliable sources since then. Thus Charles
B. Elliott, a defender of the American administration, writing as late
as 1916 says:
The Filipinos at that particular hour were unprepared for attack or
defense. The expected battle came when they were off their guard,
most of the higher officers being absent in Malolos[4]. [While] the
American authorities in Manila, having taken a more positive stand
... let loose the dogs of war they had been holding ready[5].
The next day General Aguinaldo sent a member of his staff under a flag
of truce to interview General Otis and to tell him that the firing of
the night before had been against his orders and that he wished to stop
further hostilities. To bring this about he proposed to establish a
neutral zone wide enough to keep the opposing armies apart. But to this
request Otis replied that the fighting having begun must go on “to the
grim end”[6]. This refusal was followed by an attack on the Filipino
forces which lasted all day and resulted in killing some three thousand
natives.
These incidents reviewed by a Senate Committee of which Mr. Lodge
was the chairman make other facts stand clear. General MacArthur was
questioned as follows:
+Senator Patterson+: The question is whether the Filipino troops
made any attempt to advance upon American troops that night
(Feb. 4) or that morning (Feb. 5). You have no knowledge of
anything of that kind?
+Gen. MacArthur+: I have no knowledge of that kind and I presume it
was not so because—
+Sen. Patterson+: The result of that advance was the killing and
wounding of more than 3000 Filipinos and, I suppose, their
utter disorganization?
+Gen. MacArthur+: It resulted fortunately in a great victory for
the American arms.
+Sen. Patterson+: And from that time forward the war has gone on?
+Gen. MacArthur+: It has been in progress ever since[7].
Now, why did the American commander thus receive the request for
parley, and why did he begin the war? Certainly, the incident of the
night before was one that might well have been dealt with at a friendly
conference. The discharge of the firearms was a mistake, an accident,
at the most the act of an individual. Certainly it was nothing that
would justify a war, so that when Otis not only refused Aguinaldo’s
message but also attacked and killed thousands of Filipinos in one day,
he acted either with or without orders. When General Otis made a report
of this engagement to the War Department he said it “was one strictly
defensive on the part of the _insurgents_ and one of _vigorous attack_
by our forces”[8].
The Constitution of the United States strictly provides that Congress
alone may declare war. That body certainly had not done so, and no one
familiar with the feeling in the United States at this time can believe
that Congress would have declared war on their Philippine allies. The
Filipinos had done nothing but help the Americans, and if there were
any of the latter who were hostile to the natives they were those who,
intending to rob the Filipinos of their country, feared that they
would encounter resistance. Only one conclusion is possible—the bloody
war that followed the attack of February 5 was caused by an act of
usurpation.
It may be going too far to say that the attack on the Filipino army was
ordered by McKinley, but this much is clear, that he never expressed
any disapproval, and that when in dealing with the existing hostilities
he told the American people that there would “be no useless parley,” he
made himself a party to the usurpation.
The reader will no doubt ask,—what was the significance of this
outbreak, what did it accomplish for the President and his
administration? Senator Patterson of Colorado ably described the
situation in these words:
That attack of February 4 and 5 [he said] became an absolute
necessity for the success of the imperialistic marplots at
Washington. The treaty was before the Senate. It had been agreed
that a vote upon it should be taken on February 6. It was known to
everyone that there were lacking two votes of the number required
to ratify it. The Filipinos were praying that its ratification
would be defeated, for then the treaty would be amended so that
Spain would relinquish sovereignty over the Philippines as it had
provided for Cuba. The Filipinos had all to gain by preserving the
status of the armies as it was before February 6. The imperialists
had everything to gain by precipitating a conflict[9].
This question may also well be asked—why did General Otis call the
Filipinos “insurgents,” and why was that term constantly employed by
the administration in Washington throughout the war? On the day when
the battle of February 5 was fought the Filipinos were encamped on
grounds assigned to them by the American commanders as their late
allies. Following the accidental shooting of two Filipinos by American
sentinels and an unauthorized exchange of shots between the lines the
American forces had launched a “vigorous attack,” killing thousands
of men who had resisted in a “strictly defensive” manner. When this
attack was made the treaty was before the Senate and the United States
had no title whatsoever to the Island. The Filipinos on the other hand
certainly had the right to live in their own country and to defend
themselves when attacked. Yet the skillful use of the word “insurrecto”
in 1899 and during the years that followed carried an entirely false
impression to the people of the United States. It was deception, pure
and simple.
Of course, this outbreak had to be justified by the administration in
reporting it to the American people. Three different means of deception
were therefore adopted. The first was to assert positively that the
treacherous Filipinos were to blame for the outbreak. “The first blow
was struck by the inhabitants,” said Mr. McKinley, “they assailed our
sovereignty, and _there will be no useless parley, no pause_, until
the insurrection is suppressed and American authority acknowledged
and established”[10]. On another occasion he went on to say, “We
never dreamed that the little body of insurgents whom we have just
emancipated from oppression,—we never for a moment believed that they
would turn upon the flag that had sheltered them against Spain”[11].
The second was to draw a veil of secrecy over the Philippine events and
to establish a censorship of the press. How vigorously the censorship
was enforced may be easily inferred from the fact that the staff
correspondents of the leading American papers in Manila united in a
statement to the American people.
We believe [they said] that owing to official dispatches from
Manila made public in Washington, the people of the United States
have not received a correct impression of the situation in the
Philippines.... The censorship has compelled us to participate in
these misrepresentations by excising or altering uncontroverted
statements of fact, on the plea as General Otis stated, that “they
would alarm the people at home” or “have the people of the United
States by the ears.”
Of course, the Manila censor would not permit such a dispatch to be
sent from his office. The protest was, therefore, sent by mail to
Hongkong and from there cabled to the United States. It was published
in the newspapers of this country on July 17, 1899[12].
The American correspondent of the Associated Press, Mr. Robert M.
Collins, more graphically described the situation which confronted them.
Recently [he wrote in his letter of July 30, 1899, to Mr. Melville
Stone, General Manager] I filed what I thought was the most
inoffensive statement that the business men who had appeared before
the commission had advocated a retention of the existing system of
currency. The censor said, “I ought not to let that go. That would
be a lift for Bryan. _My instructions are to shut off everything
that could hurt McKinley’s administration_”[13].
In this way, therefore, were facts being kept away, not from the enemy,
but from the people of the United States who were being called upon
to sanction the conquest of the Philippines. In this way truth was
suppressed.
The third method was to assert that only a small fraction of the
population was opposed to American sovereignty.
Well, whom are we fighting [said the Secretary of War Root]? Are
we fighting the Philippine nation? No! There is none. There are
hundreds of islands inhabited by more than sixty tribes, speaking
more than sixty languages, and all but one ready to accept American
sovereignty[14].
That this statement was also absolutely unjustified will be shown in
the next chapter.
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER VI
[1] Statement of Private W. W. Grayson quoted by C. E. Russell in
_The Outlook for the Philippines_, p. 93.
[2] Report: Maj. Gen. Commanding Army, 1899, vol. i, pt. 4, p. 92.
[3] Sen. Doc., 57th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 351, pt. 2 p. 1396.
[4] Elliott, _The Philippines_, p. 452.
[5] James LeRoy, _The Americans in the Philippines_, (1914), ii,
p. 16.
[6] See Statement of General C. McC. Reeve, at that time Provost
Marshall of Manila, Cong. Record, Jan. 11, 1900; Proceedings
of the Senate, p. 770.
[7] Sen. Doc., 57th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 331, pt. 2, p. 1356.
[8] See Otis Report, 1899, p. 99.
[9] Speech before Mass. Reform Club, June 6, 1902.
[10] Speech at Pittsburg, Aug. 28, 1899.
[11] Speech at Fargo, N. D., Oct. 13, 1899.
[12] A copy of this protest may be found in the _Review of
Reviews_ for August, 1899, pp. 137-8. It was signed by John
T. McCutcheon and Harry Armstrong representing the _Chicago
Record_; O. K. Davis and P. G. MacDonnell, representing
the _New York Sun_; Robert M. Collins, John P. Dunning and
L. Jones, representing the Associated Press; John Bass and
William Dinwiddle, representing the _New York Herald_; E. D.
Skeene, representing the _Scripps-McRae Association_; and
Richard Little, representing the _Chicago Tribune_.
[13] Cong. Record, vol. xxxiii, Proceedings in the Senate, Jan.
11, 1900, p. 768.
[14] Speech before the Marquette Club of Chicago, Oct. 7, 1899.
CHAPTER VII
+Progress of the War+
The war went on for years, but the vigor and ferocity with which
it was carried on by the able commanders of the American army have
unfortunately never been fully comprehended by the public. This was
largely due to the attempts of those in political office to minimize
the importance of the struggle and to convince the people at home that
the enemy was but a small fraction of the native population. Bearing
in mind the statement of Secretary Root, therefore, we can appreciate
the true progress of the war as shown by the war records in Washington.
Thus:
On February 10, six days after the firing of that fatal shot which
plunged the nation into war, General Lawton succeeded in dislodging
an army of 4,000 Filipinos from Caloocan, on the outskirts of Manila.
It was at this point, too, that General MacArthur came to realize the
stupendous task that lay before his army.
When I first started in against these rebels [he said] I believed
that Aguinaldo’s troops represented only a fraction.... I did not
like to believe that the whole population of Luzon ... was opposed
to us, but having come thus far, and having been brought much in
contact with both insurgents and amigos, I _have been reluctantly
compelled to believe that the Filipino masses are loyal to
Aguinaldo and the government which he leads_[1].
The island of Luzon alone at that time had a population of over three
and a half million.
Four hundred miles south of Manila lie the Visayan Islands, one of the
richest groups of the archipelago. Early in December, 1898, General
Miller in command of an expedition composed largely of fresh arrivals
from San Francisco had previously sailed for Iloilo, the largest city
of the Visayas. Arriving there and finding the Filipinos supreme in
command, he had courteously asked them to permit his troops to land.
This request had been refused. Another request had followed on January
1, 1899, accompanied by a copy of McKinley’s Benevolent Proclamation
claiming sovereignty over the archipelago. The Filipinos immediately
asked if the American commander carried instructions from Aguinaldo,
saying that they could do nothing without orders from their recognized
leader “in cases affecting their Federal Government.”
I have the honor to notify you [said the Filipino leader in these
islands hundreds of miles from Manila] that, in conjunction with
the people, the army, and the committee, we insist upon our
pretentions not to consent ... to any foreign interference _without
express orders from the central government of Luzon_ (that is, the
Government headed by Aguinaldo) ... with which we are one in ideas,
as we have been until now in sacrifices[2].
And with regard to the claim of sovereignty made by McKinley seven
weeks before the treaty was ratified, this is what the Filipinos in
Iloilo said in another dispatch to General Miller:
The _supposed_ authority of the United States began with the treaty
of Paris, on the 10th of December, 1898. The authority of the
Central Government of Malolos (the seat of Aguinaldo’s government)
is founded in the sacred and natural bonds of blood, language,
uses, customs, ideas (and) sacrifices[3].
Here were bits of real eloquence substantiated by acts coming from
Filipinos four hundred miles south of Manila. Compare these with
Secretary Root’s statements about the “sixty tribes” and “sixty
languages” and what conclusion are we forced to draw?
In the face of this stubborn resistance General Miller with his
several thousand troops had, therefore, decided not to land, but
instead picked up anchor and set sail for Manila. The President’s
benevolent proclamation in Iloilo, as well as in Luzon, had thus
completely failed.
Following the outbreak of February 4, however, Miller again returned
with his troops, and, with the assistance of the armed vessels
_Baltimore_ and _Petrel_ finally captured the city. Then followed the
occupation of Cebu, the third largest city of the archipelago.
During the month of March the so-called “Visayan Military District” was
organized and placed under the command of General Miller. This district
included the southern islands of Panay, Negros, and Cebu, by far the
richest sugar lands of the archipelago. On the thirty-first of the
same month, General MacArthur entered the town of Malolos where, for
several months, Aguinaldo’s seat of government had been located. One
month later he succeeded in driving the main body of Aguinaldo’s army
from that vicinity, and the march northward began in earnest. General
Lawton in command of another army moved on a parallel line thus forming
a big wing which captured and swept everything before them. A base for
military operations was established also in San Fernando, forty miles
north of Manila[4].
During the summer months that followed the army of the American
expeditionary forces was replaced largely by fresh recruits. By
October the northern advance was again launched with greater severity
towards the great plain of Luzon where Aguinaldo was still supreme.
General Lawton with his vastly superior forces again swept everything
before him. Generals Wheaton and MacArthur also followed in almost
parallel lines, and by November 12 the main body of the Filipino army
was forced to scatter. Some managed to return south where they joined
the insurgents of that region. Aguinaldo himself succeeded in evading
the net and escaped through Wheaton’s lines. After fleeing further
northward he sought refuge in the mountains along the eastern coast[5].
Having accomplished his task, General Lawton turned south in order
to break the line of communication between the northern and southern
armies of the Filipinos. He succeeded in this mission also but
sacrificed his life in a battle just twelve miles from Manila.
The new year 1900 marked the beginning of a fresh series of campaigns.
General Bates began by launching an aggressive drive in the province of
Cavite, southwest of Manila. In the following month, February, General
Bell sailed to the southern islands to capture the provinces of North
and South Camarines and West Albay where the Filipino forces had been
swelled by a number of those defeated in the north. Similar expeditions
were sent to the Visayan islands and garrisons established everywhere.
A total of four hundred different army posts was the final outcome of
this campaign[6].
In June of this same year, General MacArthur, believing that the
backbone of the Philippine army had been broken, recommended a
proclamation of amnesty. This was issued by the President on the
twenty-first, but it soon became evident that although unable to fight
in the open as an army, the Filipinos were determined to continue the
uneven struggle by guerrilla warfare.
With Aguinaldo in full retreat, the amazing thing is that he was not
overpowered sooner. The following account of the defeat of one of his
loyal forces, as reported by American eye witnesses, may give the
reason why.
It was a great fight that was fought away up on the trail of lonely
Tirad Pass on that Saturday morning of December 2. It brought glory
to Major Marsh’s battalion of the Thirty-Third volunteer infantry
who were the victors. It brought no discredit to the little band
of sixty Filipinos who fought and died there. Sixty was the number
that, at Aguinaldo’s orders had come down into the pass that
morning to arrest the onward march of the Americans. Seven were all
that went back over the pass that night to tell Aguinaldo that
they had tried and failed. Fifty-three of them were either killed
or wounded. And among them, the last to retreat, we found the body
of young General Gregorio del Pilar.
We had seen him cheering his men in the fight. One of our companies
crouched up close under the side of the cliff where he had built
his first intrenchment, heard his voice continually during the
fight urging his men to greater effort, scolding them, praising
them, cursing, appealing one moment to their love of their native
land and the next instant threatening to kill them himself if they
did not stand firm. Driven from the first intrenchment he fell
slowly back to the second in full sight of our sharpshooters and
under a heavy fire. Not until every man around him in the second
intrenchment was down did he turn his white horse and ride slowly
up the winding trail. Then we who were below saw an American squirm
his way out to the top of a high flat rock, and take deliberate aim
at the figure on the white horse. We held our breath, not knowing
whether to pray that the sharpshooter would shoot straight or
miss. Then came the spiteful crack of the Krag rifle and the man
on horseback rolled to the ground, and when the troops charging up
the mountain side reached him, the boy general of the Filipinos was
dead.
We went up on the mountain side. After H company had driven the
insurgents out of their second position and killed Pilar, the
other companies had rushed straight up the trail, and never
stopped until they were far up above the clouds and there was no
longer an insurgent in sight. As we went up the trail we passed
dead Filipino soldiers. We counted ten in all. Some had been shot
several times. We found bloody trails that led to places on the
edge of the cliffs, where wounded men had either jumped or fallen
off. We passed the second intrenchment high up on the trail. It
was built of heavy rocks well banked with earth. Just past this a
few hundred yards we saw a solitary figure lying on the road. The
body was almost stripped of clothing, and there were no marks of
rank on the blood-soaked coat. But the face of the dead man had a
look I had never noticed on the face of other dead men in insurgent
uniform on the field of battle, in the wake of an American firing
line. The features were clear cut and the forehead high and
shapely. I decided the man must have been an insurgent officer. A
soldier came running down the trail.
“That’s old Pilar,” he said, “we got the old rascal. I guess he’s
sorry he ever went up against the Thirty-Third.”
“There ain’t no doubt about its being Pilar,” rattled on the
young soldier. “We got his diary and letters and all his papers,
and Sullivan of our company’s got his pants, and Snider’s got
his shoes, but he can’t wear them because they’re too small,
and a sergeant in G. Company got one of his silver spurs, and a
lieutenant got the other, and somebody swiped the cuff buttons
before I got here or I would have swiped them, and all I got was a
stud button and his collar with blood on it.”
So this was the end of Gregorio del Pilar. Only twenty-two years
old he managed to make himself a leader of men when he was hardly
more than a boy, and at last had laid down his life for his
convictions. Major Marsh had the diary. In it he had written under
the date of December 2, the day he was killed:
“The General has given me the pick of all the men that can be
spared and ordered me to defend the pass. I realize what a terrible
task is given me. And yet I feel that this is the most glorious
moment of my life. What I do is done for my beloved country. No
sacrifice can be too great.”
A private sitting by the fire was exhibiting a handkerchief. “It’s
old Pilar’s. It’s got ‘Dolores Hoses’ on the corner. I guess that
was his girl. Well, it’s all over with Gregorio.”
“Anyhow,” said Private Sullivan, “I got his pants. He won’t need
them any more.”
The man who had the general’s shoes strode proudly past, refusing
with scorn a Mexican dollar and a pair of shoes taken from one of
the private insurgent soldiers. A private sitting on a rock was
examining a golden locket containing a curl of a woman’s hair. “Got
the locket off his neck,” said the soldier....
As the main column started on its march for the summit of the
mountain a turn in the trail brought us again in sight of the
insurgent general far down below us. There had been no time to bury
him. Not even a blanket or a poncho had been thrown over him.
A crow sat on the dead man’s feet. Another perched on his head. The
fog settled down upon us. We could see the body no longer.
“We carved not a line and we raised not a stone, But we left him
alone in his glory.”
And when Private Sullivan went by in his trousers, and Snider with
his shoes, and the other man who had the cuff buttons, and the
sergeant who had the spur, and the lieutenant who had the other
spur, and the man that had the handkerchief, and another that had
his shoulder straps, it suddenly occurred to me that his glory was
about all we had left him[7].
In fairness to the sober thought of the Americans, however, it should
be stated that the body of the Filipino general was later rescued from
those who were despoiling it and buried with full military honors. Over
his humble grave the American soldiers erected a stone bearing this
convincing testimony:
GENERAL GREGORIO DEL PILAR
KILLED
AT THE BATTLE OF TIRAD PASS
DECEMBER 2, 1899
COMMANDING AGUINALDO’S REAR GUARD
AN OFFICER AND A GENTLEMAN
It was no doubt just such instances of bravery and personal sacrifices
that finally led General Lawton to say:
“Taking into account the disadvantages they have to fight against
in arms, equipment and military discipline,—without artillery,
short of ammunition, powder inferior, shells reloaded until they
are defective, inferior in every particular of equipment and
supplies,—they are the bravest men I have ever seen.
What we want is to stop this accursed war.... These men are
indomitable. At Bacoor bridge they waited until the Americans had
brought their cannon to within thirty-five yards of their trenches.
_Such men have the right to be heard. All they want is a little
justice”_[8].
This brief but colorful record of the first stages of the conquest,
and the disastrous defeats of Aguinaldo’s army are seldom questioned.
But it has often been asked why, seeing that victory over American
arms was virtually impossible, the Filipinos should have persisted
in sacrificing their lives and their fortunes by carrying on such
an unequal struggle. The answer was properly given at that time by
Apolinario Mabini, the intellectual leader of the revolution, the
Alexander Hamilton of that epoch. He thus expressed the sentiments of
his countrymen:
The Filipinos realize that they cannot expect any victory over the
American forces; they are fighting to show the American people that
they are sufficiently intelligent to know their rights despite any
pretense to hide these rights with able sophistry....
The Filipinos maintain their fight against the American troops,
not because of an especial hatred, but in order to show to the
American people that, far from being indifferent as to their
political situation they know how to sacrifice themselves for a
government which assures them their individual liberty and which
governs them in conformity with the wishes and the needs of the
people. They have been unable to avoid that fight, owing to the
fact that they have been unable to obtain from the American
government any kind of formal and clear promise regarding the
establishment of such a kind of government[9].
In order to show that the Filipinos were not by nature of a warring
disposition and that they were anxious to have peace and understanding,
Mabini continued thus:
The present condition and state of war deprives the people of
the chance to manifest freely their aspirations; therefore the
Filipinos desire most ardently that the Congress of the United
States provide for some means to listen to them before adopting
a resolution that would mean a definite decision regarding their
future....
I confidently hope that when the Americans and Filipinos have come
to know each other better, not only will the present conflict
come to an end but also future ones will be avoided. The opinion
prevailing among the impartial part of the American nation appears
to tend toward adhering to its old traditions and the spirit of
justice and humanity, which constitute at the present time the
sole hope of all upright Filipinos[10].
In the spring of 1901 finally occurred the most important incident of
the war. This was the dramatic ruse which culminated in the capture of
Aguinaldo. It will be remembered that ever since the beginning of the
campaign the leadership of Aguinaldo was undisputed. The capture of
that great leader, therefore, meant everlasting glory to the American
soldier brave enough to perform such an exploit.
The opportunity to attempt such a deed came when an officer of
General Funston’s district in central Luzon intercepted a messenger
from Aguinaldo bearing dispatches to one of his generals in that
locality. The message directed the Filipino General Lacuna to send some
reinforcements to Aguinaldo’s camp. Here was the golden opportunity.
Why not impersonate the reinforcements called for? The plan was
submitted to General MacArthur and adopted by him.
The American commander thereupon secured a company of Macabebe Filipino
scouts for the purpose. These Macabebe scouts had been loyal to the
Spanish military régime and when the Americans came they sided with
the invader. They came from a small district in Pampanga province, the
population of which at that time was a little over 25,000. In every
respect they were pure blooded Filipinos, as later events proved, and
the American commanders took advantage of this to deceive the wily
Aguinaldo.
On March 6th the U. S. _Vicksburg_ slipped quietly out of Manila Bay
bearing the members of the enterprise. Outside the American commanders
of whom there were four, no one had been told of the nature of the
expedition. Once they were aboard, however, the Macabebes were told to
discard their American uniforms and made to dress in such fashion as to
most resemble a tired and haggard insurgent command. It was necessary
to land over a hundred miles from Aguinaldo’s camp, as the smoke from
the vessel might have attracted the attention of some peasant or
insurgent lookout who would sound the alarm. General Funston’s account
of the precautions taken in this expedition offers the most convincing
proof that outside of a few natives, such as the Macabebes who had
accepted American sovereignty, the rest of the native population as
late as 1901 were hostile to the United States and loyal to Aguinaldo.
The party landed at night with all the ship’s lights screened, and the
_Vicksburg_ sailed away immediately agreeing to meet them at a nearer
point eleven days later. Thence started the march through a hostile
territory. The friendly Macabebes had been carefully drilled in the
part they were to play, and the stories they were to tell in the
villages that they passed. The story was to the effect that on their
march cross country to join Aguinaldo they had encountered a small
party of Americans drawing maps of the outlying country. A skirmish
followed and after killing and wounding some of them they had succeeded
in capturing the five Americans whom they were now bearing to Aguinaldo
as prisoners of war.
As the party marched through the villages they were, therefore,
received with pride and honor, the natives never suspecting that
they were feeding and guiding the enemy, a convincing proof that all
Filipinos look alike and do not differ from one another in appearance
any more than a Massachusetts man does from a New Yorker. General
Funston in his account of this enterprise later took particular pains
to say that the village officials and insurrectionists whom they
encountered were very humane and courteous to himself and the other
four American “prisoners”[11].
When within eight miles of Aguinaldo’s camp, quite exhausted from
the long march, the leader of the Macabebe troop, a certain Hilario
Tal Placido, sent a note in advance to Aguinaldo saying that he had
halted his command at the beach for a short rest as they were exhausted
from their long march and very much in need of food. The message also
requested that some be sent to them. The food came, and Aguinaldo’s
capturers were elated to find that the leader did not suspect the fate
that awaited him.
Then came one of the emergencies which American wit had to encounter.
Just as the final march was about to begin word came from Aguinaldo
that the American prisoners should be left behind in charge of some of
his guards. This was no doubt a precaution to prevent the Americans
from knowing the exact location of the insurgent camp. After a hurried
whispered conversation Funston directed the Macabebes under the command
of Placido to go ahead and leave them behind, but to later send a
forged order from Aguinaldo directing that the “prisoners” be sent up
to the camp after all. This ruse was successfully accomplished also and
Placido finally reached Aguinaldo’s presence, the American “prisoners”
lagging a short distance behind and out of sight. Aguinaldo’s neatly
uniformed guard of fifty men presented arms as Placido entered the
insurgent leader’s office and while the Macabebes were nonchalantly
forming a cordon around the guard, Placido entertained the President
with his story of the march across the country. Then when he saw that
the moment had come he went to the window and by a prearranged signal
ordered the Macabebes to open fire. So unexpected was the attack that
it succeeded in overpowering the guards.
Almost immediately after giving the order Placido, who was a very stout
individual, turned and grabbed Aguinaldo, who weighed one hundred and
fifteen pounds, threw him down and sat on him until General Funston
and the rest of the Americans arrived. After a short rest the party
hurriedly covered the remaining eight miles to a certain point in the
coast where the _Vicksburg_ had agreed to meet them. The rest of the
trip by water was uneventful and in due course of time they reached
Manila.
Aguinaldo was taken to the Palace to confront General MacArthur without
a soul in Manila knowing about the successful ruse. The Filipino leader
was most graciously treated and housed by General MacArthur. He was
treated more like a guest than a prisoner of war, although, of course,
he was watched night and day by a commissioned officer. It was most
important that the leader be kept alive for his influence in quelling
the revolution was sorely needed.
During the three weeks’ confinement of the great leader, therefore,
everything was done to convince him that further resistance was
impossible. Everything that the Americans had done and the attitude
they were taking was carefully explained to him, so that he might
realize the inflexibility of America’s purpose to remain in the islands
for “the good of the Filipino,” whether they liked it or not. The
programme explained to him was wittily described by an Englishwoman
when she said that it was a plan
to have lots of American school teachers at once set to work to
teach the Filipino English and at the same time keep plenty of
American soldiers around to knock him on the head should he get a
notion that he is ready for self-government before the Americans
think he is[12].
A quaint scheme indeed and “one characteristic of the dauntlessness of
American energy”[13].
And so Aguinaldo bowed to the inevitable. On April 19 he took his oath
of allegiance and at the same time issued a proclamation recommending
the abandonment of further resistance. Among other things he said:
The time has come, however, when they (the Filipinos) find their
advance along this path (the path of their aspiration for freedom)
impeded by an irresistible force.... Enough of blood, enough
of tears and desolation.... By acknowledging and accepting the
Sovereignty of the United States, I believe I am serving thee, my
beloved country. May happiness be thine[14].
The capture of Aguinaldo, in the estimation of General MacArthur was
“the most momentous single event of the year,” inasmuch as he “was the
incarnation of the insurrection”[15]. When the news of his dramatic
capture was first received in Washington, Funston was immediately
raised to the rank of Brigadier-General, a convincing testimony that
the Washington authorities knew Aguinaldo’s importance.
Although the surrender of the Filipino leader was a severe loss to the
Filipinos, however, the war went on in full if not with increasing
ferocity. Filipino forces were active in the southern islands of
Mindoro, Samar, Cebu and Bohol. This condition was deemed sufficient
to justify the establishment of the notorious reconcentration camps,
the hideous cruelty of which had precipitated the Cuban war[16]. For
the island of Samar, the Filipinos had to contend with General “Hell
Roaring Jake Smith,” so called because of his methods of conducting
“civilized warfare”[17]. We shall make General Smith’s acquaintance
later on.
The province of Batangas, not over sixty miles south of Manila was also
seething with rebellion. The official reports from the army files tell
us graphically what measures were taken to force the native population
to submit to American arms. General Bell was in charge of this
district. His Circular Order No. 22, to be found in Senate Document
331, 1902, p. 1628, read as follows:
To combat such a population, it is necessary to make the state of
war as insupportable as possible, and there is no more efficacious
way of accomplishing this _than by keeping the minds of the people
in such a state of anxiety and apprehension that living under such
conditions will soon become unbearable. Little should be said. The
less said the better._ Let acts, not words, convey the intention.
If we compare this official order with President McKinley’s benevolent
proclamation instructing the military administration to win the
confidence, respect and affection of the Filipinos, the contrast
presented is extraordinary to say the least.
General Bell’s Christmas Day product is even more convincing. His
report of December 26, 1901, read as follows:
I am now assembling in the neighborhood of 2,500 men who will be
used in columns of about fifty men each. I take so large a command
for the purpose of thoroughly searching each ravine, valley and
mountain peak for insurgents and for food, _expecting to destroy
everything I find outside of towns. All able-bodied men will be
killed or captured.... These people need a thrashing to teach them
some good common sense; and they should have it for the good of all
concerned._
No official estimate of the number of people killed by such measures
throughout the islands since the beginning of the war has ever been
made. General J. M. Bell, however, made the estimate that in Luzon
alone one-sixth of the native population had been wiped out as a
consequence of the war[18]. Luzon then had a population of over three
and a half million, and one-sixth of that number meant 600,000 men,
women and children. How many of these were killed by powder and lead?
General Bell himself gave a suggestive answer when he said as a part of
the same statement that:
The loss of life by killing alone has been very great but I think
that not one man has been slain except where his death served the
legitimate purpose of war. It has been thought necessary to adopt
what in other countries would probably be thought harsh measures.
A Republican Congressman who visited the islands in 1902 confirmed
these estimates in an interview published in the Boston _Transcript_ of
March 4. Said he:
You never hear of any disturbances in Northern Luzon; and the
secret of its pacification is, in my opinion, the secret of
pacification of the archipelago. They never rebel in northern
Luzon because there isn’t anybody there to rebel. The country was
marched over and cleaned in a most resolute manner. The good Lord
in heaven only knows the number of Filipinos that were put under
ground. Our soldiers took no prisoners, they kept no records; they
simply swept the country, and wherever or whenever they could get
hold of a Filipino they killed him. The women and children were
spared, and may now be noticed in disproportionate numbers in that
part of the island.
The army song of that period vividly typified the feeling of the
soldier towards the Filipino. Sung to the tune of “Tramp, tramp,
tramp,” the refrain was as follows:
Damn, damn, damn, the Filipino,
Pock-marked kodiac ladrone, (copper colored thief)
Underneath the starry flag
Civilize him with a Krag (rifle)
And return us to our own beloved home[19].
Although no very careful estimate of the total casualties has been
made, it is certain from the records, official and semi-official, that
the Filipinos killed in battle far outnumbered the American losses.
Judge Blount’s examination of the available war records showed a ratio
of sixteen Filipinos to every one American killed[20]. Commenting on
this disparity in the numbers killed the famous American historian
Latane adds that it “cannot be attributed to the superior marksmanship
of the American soldiers; it was due rather to the fact that the
Filipinos were in many cases not armed with rifles, and in some cases
perhaps, _to the ruthless slaughter of the wounded_”[21].
Considering the fact that the general belief among the American
people was that their presence in the islands was merely for the
purpose of helping the Filipino, it is indeed astounding to learn
how this conquest was being carried along in their name. But did the
administration in Washington cherish a similar purpose? We would do
well to look for light on this subject.
On page 96, Volume II, of Olcott’s _Life of McKinley_, which is the
standard biography of that President, there appears a facsimile of a
memorandum written in Mr. McKinley’s own handwriting and recording a
conversation which he had with Admiral Dewey. The piece of paper used
by the President was of the White House stationery, and it bore the
date of October 3, 1899.
“What is our duty?” was one of the President’s questions. And as
Admiral Dewey answered, McKinley wrote his memorandum, as follows:
“Keep the Island _permanently_. _Valuable in every way._”
Then followed questions regarding the number of troops and ships
needed for this permanent occupation.
And as if to assure himself of his position, the President finally
asked:
“Should we give up the Islands?”
And then follows this grim reply:
“Never—never.”
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER VII
[1] Statement of MacArthur to an American war correspondent and
published in the _New York Criterion_ of June 17, 1899;
subsequently corroborated by MacArthur himself in his
testimony before the Senate in 1902. See Sen. Doc. 311, pt.
2, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1942.
[2] War Dept. Report, 1899, vol. i, pt. 4, p. 64.
[3] Sen. Doc. 208, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., 1900, pp. 54-5.
[4] Sec. War Annual Rep., 1899, I, pt. 4, pp. 115 _et seq_.
[5] See Cong. Rec, 57th Cong., No. 331, 1st Sess., p. 1986, for
an account of this flight.
[6] Sec. War Annual Rep. 1900, I, pt. 4, p. 560.
[7] Dispatch from Richard Henry Little, special correspondent of
the _Chicago Tribune_ and published in the _Chicago Tribune_
of Feb. 4, 1900. Also reprinted in the _Lincoln Republican
Booklet_, p. 14.
[8] C. E. Russell, _The Outlook for the Philippines_, p. 94.
[9] M. Kalaw, _The Case for the Filipinos_, p. 79.
[10] Note: Mabini was later captured by the Americans in Dec.,
1899, and deported to Guam for two years.
[11] Funston’s article, “Capture of Aguinaldo,” in _Scribner’s
Magazine_, Nov., 1911.
[12] Blount, _American Occupation of the Philippines_, p. 340.
[13] _Ibid._
[14] For a full copy of this proclamation see War Dept. Report,
1901, vol. i, pt. 4, p. 100.
[15] War Dept. Rep., 1901, vol. i, pt. 4, p. 99.
[16] Sen. Doc., 57th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 331, p. 1606.
[17] Latane, _United States as a World Power_, p. 98.
[18] Note: Gen. Bell’s estimate as it appeared in _New York Times_
of May 3, 1901; quoted in the U. S. Senate by Mr. Hoar and
never contradicted.
[19] Blount, _American Occupation of the Philippines_, p. 270.
[20] See Blount’s Estimate, p. 241.
[21] Latane, _United States as a World Power_, p. 97.
CHAPTER VIII
+Conduct of the War+
A war of conquest under tropical skies if carried on with scrupulous
regard for the rules of civilized warfare should not differ from any
other struggle, no matter how bitterly contested. Examination of the
casualties in the fiercest struggles of the nineteenth century, for
example, show always a striking similarity between the proportion of
men killed and the men wounded on the field of battle. Generally this
ratio is six to one, or at least five to one, that is to say, for every
one man killed in battle five or six victims are wounded.
Thus, for example, in the great Boer War this ratio is substantially
borne out. At the battle of Magersfontein there were killed, 171;
wounded 691; at Colenso, killed 50; wounded 847. In all the battles
waged in British East Africa from October, 1899, to June, 1900, killed
2518; wounded 11,405[1].
If we go back a few years and examine the greatest battles of the
Civil War, the ratio is even more accurately shown. Thus, at Antietam
where the Federal forces attacked, there were killed 2,010; wounded
9,416; at Fredericksburg where the attack was made under a withering
fire of rifle and cannon, killed 1,180; wounded 9,028; at the three
day battle of Gettysburg, killed 2,834; wounded 13,709; at Cold Harbor
where the carnage was frightful, killed 1,905 wounded 10,570[2].
Thus it is seen that in no war where the usages of civilized warfare
have been respected has the number of killed approached the number of
wounded more nearly than in these figures. The proportion as shown
remains constant—about five wounded to one killed.
Turn now to the Philippine campaign where the aim of the military
administration was to be one which would “win the confidence, respect
and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines”[3]. What do the
official war records show? Almost the reverse, that is to say that for
every Filipino wounded in battle, five were killed. Thus, in northern
Luzon whose people, said Secretary of War Root, “received us (United
States) with open arms,” the official records show that 1,014 Filipinos
were killed and only 95 wounded[4]. Losses by guerrilla warfare in
southern Luzon are almost as convincing. There were, from November 1,
1899, to September 1, 1900, 3,227 killed and only 694 wounded. About
2,800 surrendered during this period.
What do these comparative figures of killed and wounded mean? How
may they be accounted for? General MacArthur attempted to give an
explanation at the time. He said it arose “from the fact that our
soldiers are trained in what we call ‘fire discipline,’ that is, target
practice. In other words, they know how to shoot.”[5] But with the same
breath he freely admits that “the Boer is the best individual marksman
in the world.”[6]
Is it to be believed that the best marksmen in the world, opposed to
English soldiers who notoriously fought in the open, killed only one in
four of the men they hit, whereas the Americans in numerous skirmishes
killed every man they hit, and on an average nearly five out of six?
The absurdity of such an explanation is heightened by the report of the
Inspector-General of the Division, Colonel Garlington, who during the
campaign testified that:
Target practice has been, from the necessities of the case, almost
entirely neglected. This important part of the modern soldier’s
education should receive prompt attention, and be vigorously
prosecuted. At present the army is largely composed of new men
without practice or skill in shooting[7].
What then is the real explanation? It is found in the statements from
the Americans engaged in the contest, officers as well as soldiers.
These signed statements were published in the newspapers of America and
they all severely indicated the brutality with which the war was being
conducted.
Among the first descriptions to reach this country was that from L. F.
Adams of Ozark, Missouri. Referring to the first battle of the war,
that of February 5, he said:
In the path of the Washington regiment and Battery D of the Sixth
Artillery there were 1,008 dead niggers and a great many wounded.
We burned all their houses. I don’t know how many men, women and
children the Tennessee boys did kill. They would not take any
prisoners.
More reliable testimony is furnished by the American war correspondents
stationed in the islands. It will be remembered that these men had
previously joined in a protest denouncing the censorship of Manila
dispatches. The General Manager of the Associated Press ordered an
investigation and the reply from one of the correspondents, Robert M.
Collins, contained a statement of a conversation held between General
Otis and the protesting correspondents _en masse_. The following is but
a sample of it. Said Mr. Collins:
In that connection we reminded him that the stories of looting in
soldiers’ letters home had been little, if any exaggerated. Davis
and Bass told him they had personally seen our soldiers bayonetting
the wounded, and I reminded him that the cutting off of ears of two
American soldiers at Damariscotta had been merely retaliation for
similar mutilations of dead Filipinos by the Americans.
(No one could possibly tell stronger stories of the looting and
blackmailing by our soldiers than Otis has told although he charges
it all to the volunteers.)
There has been according to Otis himself, and the personal
knowledge of everyone here, a perfect orgy of looting and wanton
destruction of property and most outrageous blackmailing of the
natives and Chinamen in Manila, and various incidents like the
shooting down of several Filipinos for attempting to run from
arrest at a cock fight.
Here was then a statement by well-known correspondents. It was no
anonymous slander. The witnesses were ready. Now was the time to
investigate, to punish the offenders and to institute a reform. But
what was done? Nothing so far as the public records show.
The first investigations which finally resulted from the innumerable
letters coming from the soldiers themselves, was the case of Charles
Brenner, a private in a Kansas regiment. Speaking of the battle of
Caloocan, he wrote to his mother:
Company I had taken a few prisoners and stopped. The colonel
ordered them up into line time after time, and finally sent Captain
Bishop back to start them. Then occurred the hardest sight I ever
saw. They had four prisoners and didn’t know what to do with them.
They asked Captain Bishop what to do; and he said, “You know the
orders,” and four natives fell dead[8].
What did the military authorities do about this accusation as shown
by the official records? On June 10, 1899, or four months after
the statement was made, Brenner’s letter was referred by General
MacArthur’s order to the inspector general of the division for
investigation. What did this investigation show? It showed the
testimony of several other witnesses that Captain Bishop had admitted
giving the orders, that several others had heard the order given by
some one, while one witness (Private Putnam) testified that he with
others, had done the shooting. Captain Flanders testified that he
ordered the prisoners to the rear, and heard some one give the order to
shoot them. A lieutenant heard some one say (he thought at the time it
was Captain Bishop) “Kill them! damn it, kill them!” Another witness
testified that on the day of the battle, “word was passed along the
line that orders were to take no prisoners”[9].
Now at least, an investigation had been made and the facts found as
a result of it were then reported to the highest authority in the
Islands. This investigation conclusively showed at least three things:
1. That a crime had been committed—i.e., the killing of the
prisoners.
2. That Private Putnam admitted having done the shooting itself
but said that he had done it in obedience to the orders from
his superior officer, Captain Bishop.
3. That the remaining evidence incriminating Bishop was very
strong.
Arraigned against all this was Bishop’s denial, in the form of a
written statement, that he had given such orders.
What steps were taken to punish the guilty parties? This much was done.
General Otis believing Captain Bishop’s denial at once recommended
that young Brenner, whose letter had brought about the investigation
be court-martialled “for writing and conniving at the publication of
the article which brought about this investigation” containing a false
charge against Captain Bishop[10]. In other words, Otis proposed to
punish the soldier whose statement led to the discovery that a crime
had in fact been committed, instead of finding and punishing the
criminal.
Nor was this all. Otis further recommended that Private Putnam, the
man who had admitted that he shot the prisoners, be tried also by court
martial, thus urging the punishment of a private for obeying orders but
letting the man who gave them go free.
But if Otis had been so tactless in his acts, he was after all saved
from the folly of what he proposed to do. The Judge Advocate, Lieut.
Col. E. H. Crowder, to whom these recommendations were sent, knew
better than to follow them up. He therefore wrote to Otis on July 3,
1899, urging that the matter be dropped, saying:
I am not convinced from a careful reading of this report that
Private Brenner has made a false charge against Captain Bishop. _It
is certain that the evidence is far from conclusive that he did so._
Nor would the Judge Advocate prosecute Private Putnam for slaying the
prisoners because, he said, Putnam’s defense “would be the lawful order
of his superior officer.” “If put on trial,” added the Judge Advocate,
“it is probable that facts would develop implicating many others.”
Hence followed his advice to this effect, “I doubt the propriety of
this trial, and am of the opinion that considerations of public policy
sufficiently grave to silence every other demand require that no
further action be taken in this case”[11].
This recommendation was acted upon by Otis. The War Department in
Washington followed Otis’ advice and the record stands showing that
the highest authorities declined to punish proven acts of barbarity
not because the guilt of the accused was in doubt but because it was
probable “that facts would develop implicating many others”; not
because there was no reason, but because there was too much reason.
Nay, the Commander-in-Chief had even actually proposed to punish the
witness (Brenner) who had made the crime known, and let the criminal go
free. Is it not also probable that this latter mark of severity against
the unfortunate Brenner made itself felt throughout the army, and that
the word was passed along the ranks, “Whatever you see, it is not safe
to tell!” The strange thing is that soldiers did continue to tell with
increasing frequency.
During this sad episode of the conquest, however, there were some
convictions of both enlisted men as well as officers. Rule No. 44 of
General Order 100 strictly provides that
all wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded
country; all destruction of property not commanded by the
authorized officer; all robbery, all pillage or sacking even after
taking a place by main force; all rape, wounding, maiming, or
killing of such inhabitants,—are prohibited under penalty of death
or such other severe punishment, as may seem adequate for the
gravity of the offense.
If the guilty party is an officer, his punishment should naturally
be as severe as the military law permits, for misconduct by one in
authority is more pernicious and harmful. The Secretary of War’s
own memorandum of February 17, 1901, therefore, will be taken and
examined[12]. This choice list compiled and made accessible to the
public showing the trials of forty-four men, ten of whom were officers,
opens to us only so much of the proceedings as the Secretary permits us
to see. What does it show?
Of these ten officers, one was tried and convicted for “firing into
town and looting.” Under General Order No. 100 Rule 44, such an offense
is generally punishable by death. But in this case the officer was
sentenced to—_a reprimand_.
The second officer, Lieut. Bissell Thomas, of the 35th Volunteer
Infantry, was convicted for assaulting prisoners and cruelty. The Court
furthermore said that the accused’s acts were “very severe and amounted
almost to acute torture” and that they “cannot be too much deplored nor
too emphatically denounced.” He was sentenced to a “reprimand” and a
fine of three hundred dollars.
The third officer was convicted of “looting and encouraging the same,”
and the fourth of “permitting looting.” Both were sentenced to—_a
reprimand_.
The next two officers were convicted of “torture by causing natives
to be hung by the neck for ten seconds.” The culprits here were a
Lieutenant Perkins and a Captain Brandle. In Brandle’s case[13] the
Court found as a fact that he did hang two Filipinos by the neck
for ten seconds each on May 26, 1900. Disliking the word “torture,”
however, the Court substituted the words “inflict mental anguish upon,”
as if hanging by the neck were physically delightful. Here was an
absolute case of torture found as a fact, yet when the time came for
the sentence his brother officers sentenced him to—_a reprimand_. Which
shows how little indignation was felt by the other officers of the army.
The case of Lieutenant Perkins was very similar. He too was found
guilty of hanging two natives by the neck in the same fashion. But the
military court not only changed the accusation of “torture” to “mental
anguish,” but also imposed a sentence of “a reprimand.”
The last conviction was that of First Lieutenant Brown of the 2d
Infantry who was found guilty of “killing a prisoner of war.” This was
clearly a plain case of murder, but the sentence meted was dismissal
from the service and imprisonment for five years. This punishment looks
severe in the light of the others, but the record of the case does
not stop here, for on January 27, 1902, this sentence was commuted to
a loss of thirty-five places in the army list and the forfeiture of
one-half pay for nine months. Outside of that the accused was permitted
to regain his position in the army.
The remaining three officers tried were acquitted.
Here then were seven convictions of officers standing high in the
records of the army, convictions of looting, torture and murder. Here
were crimes justly punishable by death in ordinary cases, and yet
under tropical skies they resulted in five reprimands, one fine and a
reprimand, and one loss of numbers and half pay for a few months. What
did this record say to the rest of the army,—what effect could it have
produced in checking similar offenses during the campaigning?
This comedy of errors is magnified when we consider the military orders
current at that time. On March 19, 1899, no less a personage than
General Otis himself, having found it necessary to give more explicit
orders for the conduct of his army, issued the following warning:
Commanding generals of divisions will make renewed efforts to
impress upon the troops of their commands the necessity of
exercising the greatest vigilance to insure the protection of
private property, not only in this city, but wherever they may
be quartered or acting.... The burning or looting of houses or
buildings of any description or the abuse of unarmed citizens will
be punished with the utmost severity known to military law[14].
These were indeed strong words,—on paper. For the specific cases we
have just touched show that when a few months afterwards Lieutenant
Capp fired and looted a town he received “a reprimand,”[15] while
Lieutenant Ellison “for looting and encouraging looting” also received
the same punishment[16]. “The utmost severity known to military law,”
indeed!
From the latter part of 1900 until 1902 no other officer seems to have
been convicted,—in fact only one was tried and he for having improper
relations with native women. On April 15, 1902, however, we find an
order for the court martial of General Smith. Here was a sensational
case surely. What do the records show?
General Smith had been in charge of subduing the island of Samar and
his first step had been to install a system of reconcentration. For
the benefit of those unfamiliar with this drastic term, it should be
explained that reconcentration (as practised by Weyler in Cuba and
the American commanders in the Philippines) means the establishment
of a certain prescribed zone or place where the people of a district
may be herded together. The establishment of this zone is announced by
proclamation or otherwise some days in advance and all persons must
leave their homes and come within this area, there to remain until
further orders. All persons found outside that zone are then treated as
public enemies.
Such a method of putting down a rebellion is naturally attended with
great hardships. Crops are left to ruin, homes are deserted, and the
peaceful as well as the active suffer alike. It was the establishment
of such camps in Cuba with the attendant horrors that finally led to
the Spanish American War. How the practice of reconcentration affected
McKinley when the Spaniards practised it in Cuba, may be expressed in
his own words:
It was not civilized warfare [he told Congress], but a new and
inhuman phase happily unprecedented in the modern history of
civilized Christian people.... It was extermination. The only peace
it could beget was that of the wilderness and the grave.
“The steps of the White House are slippery with the blood of the
reconcentrados,” said Roosevelt. And yet in the Philippines, however,
three years after the Filipino-American war was begun and a year
after civil government was supposed to be established under the
just administration of Governor Taft, and no person supposed to be
deprived of “life, liberty or property without due process of law,”
reconcentration camps began to flourish.
But General Smith was not tried for establishing these camps, for they
were also used in other provinces of the archipelago. In fact, as late
as June 1, 1903, the civil government in Manila, headed by Mr. Taft,
passed a law permitting the establishment of such camps[17]. Smith’s
difficulties instead came about as a result of the method by which he
enforced obedience to these orders.
It happened that on November 4, 1901, the Manila _Times_, an American
daily, gave an account of the progress of the military arm in Samar,
which then had a population of 250,000. It stated that General Smith
had been in that little island for ten days and that his strong policy
was already making itself felt. To continue,
He had already ordered all natives to present themselves in certain
of the coast towns saying that _those who were found outside
would be shot and no questions asked_. The time limit had expired
... and General Smith was _as good as his word_. The policy of
reconcentration is said to be the most effective thing of the kind
ever seen under any flag. All suspects including Spaniards and
half-breeds were rounded up in big stockades and kept under guard.
This news item was published in Manila. Surely, it must have come to
the attention of General Chaffee or the War Department at the time.
But were any steps taken to investigate or to stay the hand of General
Smith? None. Nothing was done until February 4, of the following
year, 1902, when this statement was brought to the attention of the
United States Senate as a result of a petition signed by ex-Senator
Edmunds, S. L. Clemens (Mark Twain), some thirty-six professors of the
University of Chicago and many other notables in private life. These
gentlemen asked that the matter be investigated and that such practices
be stopped. Surely the Secretary of War could not plead ignorance to
this demand from responsible citizens. But did he take any positive
action to investigate or to stop these practices? So far as the record
shows, none! The order to try General Smith by court martial was not
given till April 15.
The real gravity of the Smith offense would apparently seem to be worse
than that pictured in the newspaper item. To quote from Secretary
Root’s letter to the President on July 12, he stated that Smith had
given _the following oral instruction_:
“I want no prisoners. I wish you to kill and burn: the more you
kill and burn the better you will please me,” and further, that he
wanted all persons killed who were capable of bearing arms and in
actual hostilities against the United States, and did in reply to
a question by Major Waller asking for an age limit, designate the
limit as ten years of age.
It will be observed that in this accusation by the Secretary, which
is grave enough on its face, the Secretary interpolated the words,
“in actual hostilities against the United States,” after the phrase
“capable of bearing arms.” But the dispatches which came from Manila in
the course of the trial which were never questioned clearly refute that
mitigating phrase. For General Smith’s counsel was quoted as saying,
General Smith did give instructions to Major Waller to “kill and
burn” and “make Samar a howling wilderness,” and he admits that he
wanted everybody killed capable of bearing arms, and that he did
specify all over ten years of age, as the Samar boys of that age
were equally as dangerous as their elders.
The accused bore his trial like a man. He admitted giving the orders.
He did not seek to excuse them on the ground that his words were
reckless talk,—on the contrary, he sought to justify them. On the
solitary question, therefore, of whether or no he had given the order
the reviewing officers of high rank found him guilty and sentenced him
“_to be admonished_.”
Even the Boston _Transcript_, one of the strongest supporters of the
Washington administration, could not refrain from saying that this
sentence was “the very lightest penalty that could be awarded for such
an offence against humanity and the laws of war,” adding that had the
President done no more “the proceedings of the court martial would have
been about as effective as firing a blank cartridge against an armed
enemy.”
The representatives of the army upon the court martial were, however,
satisfied with this blank cartridge.
When these results were transmitted to the Secretary of War, surely
there was an opportunity for him to show manly indignation at General
Smith’s inhuman order. But instead of that he sought to justify the
leniency of the court on the ground that Smith did not really mean
what he said and that his subordinates so understood it. This might
conceivably sound probable having come from a man like Mr. Root were we
not confronted with official reports from Smith’s subordinates in the
course of the campaign showing how they really interpreted the command
of their superior officer. Said Major Waller on November 23, 1901[18]:
On the march to Liruan the second column, fifty men, under Captain
Bears, in accordance with my orders, destroyed all villages and
houses, burning in all one hundred and sixty-five.... I wish to
go southward a little, destroying all houses and crops, and, if
possible, get the rifles from Balangiga. _This plan has been
explained to the General (Smith), meeting his approval_[19].
This, when viewed in the light of a subsequent endorsement by General
Smith himself to the effect that the aforementioned Major Waller
“carries out my wishes loyally and gallantly,” and recommending that he
be awarded another brevet, speaks for itself.
Fire and looting, killing to exterminate, refusal to take prisoners
of war,—there are some of the outrages we have found from such
official records as are opened to us. What else do we find from other
independent and official sources? The Weir charges are the first to
attract attention among the many available.
On the tenth of April, 1901, Andrew K. Weir, a private in the Fourth
Cavalry, wrote a letter to his uncle, charging Lieutenant Frederick
Arnold and Sergeant Edwards of his regiment with outrageous cruelty to
a Filipino prisoner who was stripped naked, given the water torture in
the most revolting manner, whipped and beaten unmercifully while he
was down, kicked, strung up by the thumbs and then his ankles tied and
his feet jerked from under him. Young Weir was an eye witness of this
cruelty and complained to Lieutenant Arnold, who told him:
When I give a man to Sergeant Edwards, I want information. I do not
know how he gets it; but he gets it anyway.
Weir also charged Arnold with cutting a strip from the man’s ankle,
attaching it to a piece of wood, and then coiling the flesh up his shin
bone; with having an old man held under water until he was unconscious;
with tying several times a man to a saddled horse with a few feet
of slack, and then making the rider gallop, dragging the victim if
he could not keep up. For all these charges, Weir said that he had
witnesses.
These serious charges were eventually brought to the attention of the
War Department. The matter was thereupon referred for investigation
to the inspector general of Northern Luzon. This officer, Captain P.
W. West of the Fifth Infantry, subsequently turned in his findings on
August 27, 1901, reporting a mass of testimony proving that Weir’s
charges were true. The inspector general also added:
I believe that a thorough investigation into this matter will
substantiate the charges made by Private Weir, that prisoners were
treated in a cruel and harsh manner, and that Lieutenant Arnold
winked at this treatment.
Here certainly was an instance where the preliminary reports of an
army investigator largely substantiated the charges. But although this
report was sent to the Secretary of War on August 27, 1901, he omitted
to send it along with his other reports to the Senate on February 17,
1902. The matter would probably have been entirely ignored had not
Senator Culberson introduced a resolution asking for these papers.
Senator Lodge came to the rescue of the administration, however, by
expressing his wish to find out whether a court martial had been
ordered. A few days later Secretary Root answered by saying that a
court martial had been ordered for Edwards, the sergeant, but not for
Arnold, the Lieutenant, but neither he nor anyone else friendly to the
administration offered to say when this was done. The only inference
that can be drawn is that no court martial had been ordered until
Senator Culberson’s motion forced them to do so.
The most unfortunate result of these hideous crimes and the laxity of
the discipline with which they were combatted, was the moral effect it
had on the American soldiers, failing as it did to check the progress
of such inhuman acts under tropical skies. Take the water cure, for
example, which was widely used in order to force the native prisoner to
divulge information.
An extract in the New York _Evening Post_ of April 8, 1902, describes
this method of conducting war most vividly as in distinct violation of
the Articles of War.
Says the letter:
But the water cure! If the tortures I’ve mentioned are hellish, the
water cure is plain hell. The native is thrown upon the ground,
and, while his legs and arms are pinned, his head is raised
partially so as to make pouring in the water an easier matter. An
attempt to keep the mouth closed is of no avail; a bamboo stick or
a pinching of the nose will produce the same effect. And now the
water is poured in, and swallow the poor wretch must or strangle. A
gallon of water is much but it is followed by a second and a third.
By this time the victim is certain his body is about to burst. But
he is mistaken, for a fourth and even a fifth gallon are poured in.
By this time the body becomes an object frightful to contemplate.
While in this condition, speech is impossible, and so the water
must be squeezed out of him. This is sometimes allowed to occur
naturally, but it is sometimes hastened by pressure, and “sometimes
we jump on them to get it out quick,” said a young soldier to
me with a smile—a young soldier, a mere boy hardly ten years out
of his mother’s lap.... Does it seem possible that cruelty could
further go? And what must we think of the fortitude of the native
when we learn that many times the “cure” is twice given ere the
native yields? I heard of one who took it three times and died.
How often does it happen? is a natural question. No one knows. A
sergeant told me he had seen it taken by between two and three
hundred, by as many as twenty sometimes in a day. Another had seen
eighty. An officer saw four, but knew of its happening two hundred
times.
Another phase of the subject merits our attention,—the effect
upon the American. The unconcerned way in which the soldiers and
civilians speak of the water cure, the exulting way in most cases,
is the saddest phase of all.... These things are not lovely, but
they are true.
Indeed, what more evidence of this is needed than that even an army
judge advocate like Captain Glenn ordered such a water cure and, on
being court-martialed and found guilty, was sentenced to pay a fine
of fifty dollars, which is one half the fine that may be imposed for
spitting on a public street car in Boston!
All these charges and convictions, all these reliable accusations,
as well as the official copies of the orders given by General Bell
in Batangas and General Smith in Samar directing that the war be
conducted in the most rigorous manner possible were known to the
Secretary of War. And yet, as if to calm the public conscience which
was beginning to hear the cries of agony from the unfortunate victims
of military conquest, the Secretary of War issued an official statement
on February 17, 1902, to the effect that:
The war in the Philippines has been conducted by the American
army with scrupulous regard for the rules of civilized warfare,
with careful and genuine consideration for the prisoner and the
non-combatant, with self-restraint, and with humanity never
surpassed.
Nor was that all. Two months later in his speech at Arlington on
Decoration Day, the President himself said:
Determined and unswerving effort must be made to find out every
instance of barbarity on the part of our troops, to punish those
guilty of it, and to take, if possible, even stronger measures than
have already been taken to minimize or prevent the occurrence of
all such instances in the future.
What must we think of these words?
Here, then, were two statements carefully and deliberately planned.
Coming as they did from two of the most responsible administrators of
the nation, the statements circulated widely and served to restrain
other indignant citizens from making fruitless protests. The masses
throughout the country also took these statements at their face value
for it was easy to believe ill of one’s enemies and well of one’s kin.
But even such records only as the administration chose to open to us
and the censored dispatches from Manila tell an entirely different
story.
And now to view the product of American conquest, quietly and with
sobriety. The sudden “imperialistic impulse of 1898-1900,” as Viscount
Bryce aptly called it, had come to an end[20]. What had it achieved?
What was the future? What was to be done with the Philippines?
No one better than Senator Hoar realized the true import of the
situation. The following retrospect, perhaps, gives the most
illuminating view of the problem. Said Mr. Hoar to the imperialist
members of the Senate Chamber:
When Aguinaldo said he did not want war to go on, and that it went
on against his wish, he was told by our General that he would
not parley with him without total submission. My friend from
Wisconsin declared in the Senate that we would have no talk with
men with arms in their hands, whether we were right or wrong. The
responsibility of everything that has happened since, which he must
have foreseen if he knew something of history and human nature,
rests upon him and the men who acted with him.
_We cannot get rid of this one fact, we cannot escape it and we
cannot flinch it. You chose war instead of peace._ You chose force
instead of conciliation, with full notice that everything that has
happened since would happen as a consequence of your decision. Had
you made a declaration to Aguinaldo that you would respect their
title to independence, and that all you desired was order and to
fulfil the treaty and to protect your friends, you would have
disarmed that people in a moment....
Instead of that, gentlemen talked of the wealth of the Philippine
Islands, and about the advantage to our trade. They sought to
dazzle our eyes with nuggets of other men’s gold. Senators declared
in the Senate Chamber and on the hustings that the flag never
should be hauled down in the Philippine Islands, and those of you
who thought otherwise kept silent and entered no disclaimer....
What your fathers said when they founded the republic; the
Declaration of Independence; the great leaders of every generation;
our century of glorious history, were appealed to in vain. Their
lessons fell upon the ears of men dazzled by military glory and
delirious with the lust of conquest. I will not repeat them now. My
desire is simply to call attention to the practical working of the
two doctrines—the doctrine of buying sovereignty or conquering it
in battle, and the doctrine of the Declaration of Independence.
For the last three years you have put one of them in force in
Cuba and the other in the Philippine Islands. I ask you to think
soberly which method, on the whole, you like better. I ask you to
compare the cost of war with the cost of peace, of justice with
that of injustice, the cost of empire with the cost of republican
liberty.... You have tried both, I hope, to your hearts’ content.
Gentlemen talk about sentimentalities, about idealism. They like
practical statesmanship better. But, Mr. President, this whole
debate for the last four years has been a debate between two kinds
of sentimentality....
You, my imperialistic friends, have had your ideals and
sentimentalities. One is that the flag shall never be hauled down
where it has once floated. Another is that you will not talk or
reason with a people with arms in their hands. Another is that
sovereignty over an unwilling people may be bought with gold. And
another is that sovereignty may be got by force of arms, as the
booty of battle or spoils of victory.
What has been the practical statesmanship, which comes from your
ideals and sentimentalities? You have wasted six hundred millions
of treasure. You have sacrificed nearly ten thousand American
lives, the flower of our youth. You have devastated provinces.
You have slain uncounted thousands of the people you desire to
benefit. You have established reconcentration camps. Your generals
are coming home from their harvest, bringing their sheaves with
them, in the shape of other thousands of sick and wounded and
insane to drag out miserable lives, wrecked in body and mind. You
make the American flag in the eyes of a numerous people the emblem
of sacrilege in Christian churches, and of the burning of human
dwellings, and of the horror of the water torture....
Your practical statesmanship [added Mr. Hoar] has succeeded in
converting a people who three years ago were ready to kiss the hem
of the garment of the American and to welcome him as a liberator,
who thronged after your men after they landed on those islands with
benediction and gratitude, into sullen and irreconcilable enemies,
possessed of a hatred which centuries cannot eradicate.
And then came this prophecy of the future:
This war, if you call it war, has gone on for three years. It will
go on in some form for three hundred years, unless this policy is
abandoned. You will undoubtedly have times of peace and quiet, or
pretended submission. You will buy men with titles or officers
or salaries. You will intimidate cowards. You will get pretended
and fawning submission. The land will smile and smile and seem
at peace. But the volcano will be there. The lava will break
out again. _You can never settle this thing until you settle it
right_[21].
Men and women of today may ask on reading these pages, “Why revive
these memories that we would fain obliterate? Why add fuel to the
feeling of hostility which the Filipinos may have against us today?”
The answer is because no American today can deal with the Philippine
problem as it now stands without knowing also the history of the
conquest, for what American representatives have done in the past may
be done again. It is because with all this history behind him, the
President of the United States still asserts that the islands came to
us “unsought.”
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER VIII
Note: The facts related in this chapter have been largely collected
from the hearings held before a Senate Committee in 1902 in
response to a Senate Resolution to investigate the affairs
relating to the Philippines. Senator Lodge, friend of the
administration, was made chairman of this committee and the
record which was presented before it has been recorded in three
volumes covering over 3000 pages. (Sen. Doc., 57th Cong., 1st
Sess., No. 331, pts. 1-3.) References to this record, which the
American historian, Latane, calls “a most humiliating one,” are
cited as “Evidence.” Italicized statements are the author’s.
[1] Capt. J. P. Wisser, U. S. A.—_The Second Boer War_, see
Appendix.
[2] Campaigns of the Civil War, Statistical Record, p. 213.
[3] McKinley’s Instructions to Secretary of War, Dec. 21, 1898.
[4] Report of Lieut. Gen. Commanding army, 1900, pt. 3, p. 232,
for months of April, May, June and July, 1900.
[5] Evidence, p. 894.
[6] _Ibid._, p. 897.
[7] Report, War Dept., June 30, 1901, p. 143.
[8] Evidence, p. 1429.
[9] _Ibid._, p. 1432.
[10] _Ibid._, p. 1420.
[11] _Ibid._, p. 1447.
[12] Sen. Doc. 205, pt. 1, p. 42.
[13] Evidence, p. 2108.
[14] Sen. Doc. 205, pt. 1, p. 37.
[15] _Ibid._, p. 42.
[16] _Ibid._, p. 42.
[17] Act 781, Sect. 6, Philippine Commission.
[18] Evidence, p. 1603.
[19] _Ibid._, p. 1605.
[20] _American Commonwealth_, p. 579.
[21] From a Speech in the Senate, May 22, 1902.
CHAPTER IX
+The Campaign of 1900+
A fair estimate of the strained relations existing between Filipino
and American in 1900 is easily gathered from the account of what had
gone before. On the part of the Filipinos it may safely be said that
there was never any faltering, any concealment of what they wanted.
They knew what they were struggling for, and at all times and places,
by proclamation, by acts, and otherwise, they had made it plain that
independence was the goal to attain which they had pledged their lives,
their fortunes and their sacred honor[1].
The policy of the Washington administration, on the other hand, had
been so vague and so evasively expressed that the public itself did
not know what it was. Those officials who had been most solicitous
with regard to the welfare of the Filipinos and the benevolent aims of
the American people were the first to combat any attempt to express by
Congressional action what these purposes were to be.
In deference to the state of American public opinion, therefore,
and in preparation for the coming presidential elections of 1900,
Mr. McKinley sent two commissions to the islands. One went early in
1899 and arrived there only to find that the war of conquest was on.
The second commission headed by Mr. Taft arrived a year later, while
the American forces were still giving Aguinaldo a chase through the
mountain fastnesses of Luzon. This commission was charged with the duty
of laboring for the peace and prosperity of the Islands, “in the firm
hope that through their labors all the inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands may come to look back with gratitude to the day when God gave
victory to American arms at Manila.”
Both of these commissions were appointed by the President, without
asking Congress to authorize either, to define its duties or to fix
the commissioners’ salaries. They were, therefore, the representatives
of Mr. McKinley, responsible to him, and paid out of the public funds
as he saw fit. This has been the sad feature of this phase of the
Philippine venture. The commissions went to the Islands, not for the
purpose of reviewing the findings of the Paris Peace Commission and
thus righting any wrongs that had been committed, but to represent
President McKinley who in the approaching elections was definitely
committed to the justice of the policy which had taken the Islands for
the benevolent purposes so vaguely expressed two years before.
This policy of President McKinley was based on the assumption that
Filipinos were unfit for self-government. It was a pity, therefore,
that such an able person as Mr. Taft should have come, not to decide
on the Filipino’s capacity for independence, but rather as an advocate
of the President. “Well, we are in it, and now we must do the best we
can.” Of all stages in this long conquest of the Islands, this has
been the most deplorable, for all dealings with the Filipinos have
been based on the proposition that they are unfit to take care of
themselves. Consequently all measures of self-government granted to
them by an altruistic Congress are mere “privileges,” and so become
a standing affront to the intelligence of the native. And the more
power and latitude given to the Filipinos to assert themselves, the
more dissatisfaction is there bound to occur in their dealings with a
sovereign power which assumes to make such grants on the grounds of
benevolence alone. As an American observer has aptly put it,
government and governed thus get wider apart as the years go by,
and the _raison d’être_ of the former being the mental deficiencies
of the latter, it must, in self defense, assert those deficiencies
the more offensively, the more vehemently they are denied[2].
Now the hope of the administration in Washington was to prove that the
stubborn resistance of the Filipinos was not as great as was claimed
by the military authorities. From the beginning, therefore, the Taft
Commission tried to reconcile the subjugation of the Philippines with
the liberation of Cuba. Surely no more difficult task could have faced
them. Nevertheless, they hoped with all the ardor and benevolence of
the President himself that the Filipinos were in fact praying for
American sovereignty. And the wish became father to the thought, with
the result that friction between Mr. Taft and the military authorities
who had for two years been pouring powder and lead into the enemy’s
camps and receiving a goodly amount in return, now began to threaten.
Mr. Taft’s message of optimism and good-will regarding the Philippine
situation is still well-known. “A great majority of the people long
for peace and are entirely willing to accept the establishment of a
government under the supremacy of the United States,” he reported
to the Secretary of War in November, 1900[3]. Said report was
naturally circulated immediately throughout the length and breadth
of these United States to the glory and triumph of the President’s
administration. But it so happened that the Secretary of War during
those hectic days was also receiving official reports from the
military men in the field of battle which led him to admit four years
later, when no further harm would result from it, that in 1900 (sixteen
days after the Taft Commission arrived in Manila), “over 70,000
American soldiers from more than 500 stations held a still vigorous
enemy in check”[4].
General MacArthur was the official most apprehensive of the true
warlike conditions existing in the Islands. While Mr. Taft was crying,
“Peace! peace! the Filipinos want peace,” General MacArthur was cabling
an entirely different story to Washington.
Wherever throughout the archipelago there is a group of insurgent
army [he wrote to the Secretary of War], _it is a fact beyond
dispute_ that all contiguous towns contribute to the maintenance
thereof. In other words, towns regardless of the fact of American
occupation and town organization are the actual bases for all
insurgent military activities.... Indeed it is now the most
important maxim of Filipino tactics to disband when closely
pressed and seek safety in the nearest barrio; a manœuver quickly
accomplished by reason of the assistance of the people and the ease
with which the Filipino soldier is transformed into the appearance
of a peaceful citizen[5].
Further cold military facts concerning the stubbornness of Filipino
resistance are contributed by the General.
The success of this unique system of war depends upon almost
complete unity of action of the entire population. _That such unity
is a fact is too obvious to admit of discussion._ Intimidation
has undoubtedly accomplished much to this end, but fear as the
only motive is _hardly sufficient to account for the united and
apparently spontaneous action of several millions of people_. One
traitor in each town would effectually destroy such a complex
organization[6].
Secretary of War Root knew of this side of the picture also, but he
took care not to reveal it to the voting public, at least not until
the elections of 1900 had been safely met. Yet he did not ignore these
ominous warnings. In reply to General MacArthur’s request that nothing
be done to diminish his armed forces unless absolutely necessary, he
sent his assurances through the Adjutant General in the following
convincing dispatch:
Secretary of War directs (that) no instructions from here be
allowed (to) interfere or impede (the) progress (of) your
military operations which he expects you (to) force to successful
conclusion[7].
And as if these precautionary measures were not sufficient there
followed shortly after this grim inquiry to General Wood in Cuba:
+Wood+, Havana: Secretary of War is desirous to know if you can
give your consent to the immediate withdrawal (of the) Tenth
Infantry from Cuba. Imperative that we have (the) immediate use of
every available company we can lay our hands on for service in the
Philippines.
Signed: +Corbin+[8].
Thus it was that while the American people were being happily and
successfully pacified with Mr. Taft’s optimistic reports endorsed by
the Secretary of War, the latter was also acting in full coöperation
with the military representatives in the Islands urging MacArthur to
force the natives to really plead for peace by employing the more
customary and efficacious arguments—powder and lead.
In the light of these events, therefore, it was but natural to suppose
that the question of imperialism would be the main issue in the
presidential campaign of 1900. Everything had pointed that way. It
is therefore interesting to compare the attitude of the Republican
party at the beginning of the campaign with the attitude adopted a
year before in order to secure acquiescence in the treaty. Attention
has been called to Senator Lodge’s argument for ratification that the
treaty only gave the American people power to determine the fate of the
Philippines, but did not commit them to any policy. This position was
accepted and endorsed by the President and his Cabinet. In pursuance
of this he told the American people ten days after the ratification
that,
The whole subject is now with Congress; and Congress is the voice,
the conscience, and the judgment of the American people. Upon
their judgment and conscience can we not rely?... Our priceless
principles undergo no change under a tropical sun. They go with the
flag.
Secretary Long also sought to emphasize this compliance of the
President with the laws of the land by saying that if the treaty had
been rejected it would
have taken out of the hands of the people and put into the
hands of one man, the President, absolute authority over the
Philippines, limited only by the indefinite scope of what is
called the war power, wielded by a purely military arm holding
a naked sword. Think of that for imperialism. It is a great
credit to the President [he concluded] that, like Julius Cæsar
and George Washington, he has refused this offer of a “kingly
crown.” On the contrary, the good old democratic plan has been
adopted of putting the disposition of these Islands into the hands
of the American people who will duly express their will through
their representatives in Congress assembled. I have no doubt the
President is delighted to have the elephant off his hands and on
theirs[9].
These were indeed fine words yet the events which followed after they
were uttered showed how little was meant by them. For after the treaty
was ratified Congress was not consulted as to what should be done with
the Philippines. No extra session was called to consider this very
important question. Nay more, when the next regular session of Congress
convened on December 5, 1899, the President said in his message:
It does not seem desirable that I should recommend at this time
a specific and final form of government for these islands. When
peace shall be restored, it will be the duty of Congress to
construct a plan of government which shall establish and maintain
freedom and order and peace in the Philippines. The insurrection
is still existing; and, when it terminates, further information
will be required as to the actual condition of affairs before
inaugurating a permanent scheme of civil government.... As long as
the insurrection continues, the military arm must necessarily be
supreme.
This was a distinct invitation to Congress to leave the “elephant” on
his hands, and the invitation was accepted. But it will be observed
that the question of holding the islands—the question upon which the
Senate divided equally, the question which the treaty left open—was
treated by the President as settled. His words were: “The Islands lie
under the shelter of our flag. They are ours by every title of law and
equity. They cannot be abandoned.”
Who settled this question? Not Congress which had never considered it.
It was the President by his proclamation of December 21, 1898, six
weeks before the treaty was ratified. Thus did the President assume
the “kingly crown” which his Secretary had praised him for declining.
With this “crown” the President sanctioned a war without the authority
of Congress, he refused to parley, and he told Congress that the
question was not open for their consideration and would not be until
the conquest by arms had been completed. What wearer of a “kingly
crown” could more despotically have dealt with a question of such vital
importance to two nations? The voice, the conscience and the judgment
of the American people had thus been stifled, and now the President was
brought to judgment.
Senator Lodge had also forgotten his words employed during the debate
for ratification. Gone were the Senator’s honeyed phrases about the
good judgment and sense of the American people in giving the Filipinos
their just dues.
We make no hypocritical pretense of being interested in the
Philippines solely on account of others, [he now told the members
of the National Convention]. While we regard the welfare of these
people as a sacred trust, _we regard the welfare of the American
people first. We believe in trade expansion._
Although these dreams of military glory and commercial advantage were
still dazzling the eyes of men, however, the leaders were not sure that
the voting public would sanction such sentiments as those of Senator
Lodge. It was well-known that in the ranks of the ruling party itself,
there were strong dissenters, such as Senators Hoar and Bacon, and men
like Boutwell, Hepburn, Henderson, Harrison, Edmunds, Reed and many
others prominent in Republican circles. The list of eminent citizens
opposed to a policy of colonization, furthermore, was to say the least
full of potential power as the campaign which they led had gained a
marked number of supporters. To name only a few of the more noted
leaders there were Carl Schurz, Grover Cleveland, Andrew Carnegie, Jane
Addams, Wayne McVeagh, Champ Clarke, Thomas Mott Osborne, Jacob Gould
Schurman and a host of others.
Therefore, when the moment came to openly announce their platform, the
Republican leaders adopted this sugar-coated promise with regard to the
Philippines:
Our authority could not be less than our responsibility, and
wherever sovereign rights were extended it became the high
duty of the Government to maintain its authority; to put down
armed insurrection and to confer the blessings of liberty and
civilization upon all the rescued people. The largest measure of
self-government consistent with their welfare and our duties shall
be secured by law.
The real issue of permanent or indefinite retention was thus evaded.
However, it was really not necessary to openly assert it, for inasmuch
as the Islands were said now by the President to be unconditionally
annexed to the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Peace without
any reservation whatsoever, a mere continuation of the present status
really held no promise of ultimate freedom to the Filipinos.
Wise Republicans had realized this and they made the best use of it.
By thus stating their policy, they were placed on the defensive with
regard to the imperialist issue. Instead of openly having to assert
it they merely had to check any attempt or movement to alienate the
possession of the Islands, which they declared had been unconditionally
annexed to the nation by the terms of the treaty of Paris.
We can understand this situation better by comparing the status of
the Filipinos in the eyes of the Republican party with that of the
Cubans. In 1900 American control in Cuba was, it will be remembered,
still in effect. The control of the government was not delivered to
the Cuban people until May 20, 1902. But in the meantime the Cubans
were from the very start “free and independent” and a truly sovereign
people,—the presence of American control being merely temporary for
the purpose of “pacification.” The Filipinos were, on the other hand,
to remain subjects of the Americans for how long no one knew,—or at
least no one would tell. In the meantime they were to be given only
the “largest measure of self-government which shall be consistent with
their welfare and our duties.” The “our duties” here referred to the
duties, so-called, of an absolute, sovereign power vested in the tender
hands of an alien Congress sitting ten thousand miles away and in no
way representative of, or responsible to the people whose liberties and
rights lay in their hands.
The platform, therefore, connoted absolute ownership—ownership secured
through a treaty with Spain. Hence to them there was no such thing
as a war going on against the Filipinos. The fighting going on under
the tropical skies was but “an armed insurrection” against the “legal
authority” of the United States. As the President himself had described
it a few months before: “There is a rebellion in _one_ of the Islands
now, but it will be put down as we put down all rebellions against the
United States”[10].
When the time came for the Democrats to summon their forces, however,
they failed to meet the situation. True it is that the Convention
proclaimed imperialism to be “the paramount issue of the campaign.”
Their platform with regard to the Philippines was also particularly
clear. Besides condemning and denouncing the Philippine policy of the
McKinley administration it further added these significant proposals:
We favor an immediate declaration of the nation’s purpose to give
to the Filipinos:
1. A stable form of government.
2. Independence.
3. Protection from outside interference such as has been given for
nearly a century to the republics of Central and South America.
The first two proposals certainly were reasonable enough if we are to
believe that America’s mission in the Philippines was purely to aid
the Filipinos, and yet such a declaration has never been made by the
Republican party to this day.
The failure to meet the issue of 1900 is found in Mr. Bryan’s
insistent demands that the silver question be also injected in the
Democratic banner. This clouded the issue and weakened their forces,
for instead of giving combat on the clean cut issue of imperialism
which they could have easily shown was of transcendant importance,
Mr. Bryan diverted an undue amount of attention to a discussion of
monetary standards. Further than this, the injection of the latter
question meant the loss of full support by the gold Democrats as well
as anti-imperialist Republicans who, though vehemently condemning
the Philippine policy of their President were unwilling to see their
country adopt a false and dangerous system of currency. Prominent
leaders of the campaign, therefore, urged Mr. Bryan to change his views
but he stood firm[11].
And thus the issue was obscured. To the conservative men of the country
at large it seemed a choice between free silver and an undecided
Philippine policy with full assurances on the part of the Republicans
that God who moved mysteriously had placed the Islands in American
hands in the interests of civilization and humanity.
We must not forget also the spectacular campaign of misrepresentation
that swept the country from the printed page and the stump. This is
what the Secretary of War, Mr. Root, told a gaping public about the
beginning of the war. Said he:
On the night of February 4, the day before the Senate approved the
treaty, an army of Tagalogs, a tribe inhabiting the central part
of Luzon, under the leadership of Aguinaldo, a Chinese half-breed,
attacked in vastly superior numbers our little army in possession
of Manila, and after a desperate and bloody fight was repulsed in
every direction[12].
And again:
The day was not then, but it came on the 4th of February when a
body of Filipino troops marched under cover of night, swiftly and
silently, through our lines, regardless of the sentry’s challenge,
and, when he fired, volleys of musketry and roar of cannon upon
every side commenced the proposed destruction of our little army.
Compare such flagrant statements with the official reports of General
Otis given in a previous chapter (Chapter VI) and preserved in the
archives of the War Department and we have an idea how far this
defender of the administration deviated from the truth.
Here again is General Otis’s report:
An insurgent approaching the picket [of a Nebraska regiment]
refused to halt or answer when challenged.
The candidate for the vice-presidency, Mr. Roosevelt, also contributed
a picture.
The reasoning which justifies our having made war against “Sitting
Bull” [said the exponent of a strenuous life] also justifies our
having checked the outbreaks of Aguinaldo and his followers,
directed, as they were against Filipino and American alike.... To
grant self-government to Luzon under Aguinaldo [he continued] would
be like granting self-government to an Apache reservation under
some local chief.
It was indeed a bold man who would say such libelous words, and yet
they were not uttered on the spur of the moment at some political
rally. They are to be found verbatim in Roosevelt’s letter of
acceptance of his nomination for the vice-presidency. Such a carefully
prepared document naturally went all over the country and helped form
the opinions of many who were only too glad to believe ill of the
people with whom their country was at war.
But we must not forget the President. What did he have to say relative
to the Philippine war?
The American people [he said] are asked by our opponents to yield
the sovereignty of the United States in the Philippines to a
small fraction of the population—a single tribe out of eighty or
more inhabiting the archipelago. We are asked to transfer our
sovereignty to a small minority in the islands without consulting
the majority, and to abandon the largest portion of the population
which has been loyal to us to the cruelties of the guerrilla
insurgent bands, and to this end repress the opposition of the
majority.
It would have struck a disinterested inquirer as singular that “a
single tribe out of eighty,” a small portion of the population, had
been able to wage war so long against a powerful American army and the
“largest portion of the population which had been loyal to us”.
These so-called Philippine tribes have been receiving such notoriety to
this day that we might as well pause now and see how much weight should
be given to these statements. The existence of tribes has been decided
by ethnologists, who claim to see among the brown-skinned natives
certain differences which stamp them into the category of tribesmen.
Now, even as early as 1901, men like Governor Taft were vehemently
maintaining that these differentiations were purely theoretical and of
little value.
The word “tribe” [he said], gives an erroneous impression. There
is no tribal relation among the Filipinos. There is a racial
solidarity among them undoubtedly. They are homogeneous. I
cannot tell the difference between an Ilocano and a Tagalog or a
Visayan.... To me all Filipinos are alike.
Mr. Schurman, President of the first Philippine commission,
representing McKinley in 1899, was just as earnest in his convictions.
Nothing could more unhappily describe ... these people than the
word “tribe” [he said]. Let us drop so misleading a term, and speak
of them as communities, and let us call the aggregate of these
communities the Philippine nation.
In 1903 a census of the Philippines was taken by the American
officials, and in comparing the tables of this census with that of the
United States, we find these American representatives saying, “Those of
the Philippine census are somewhat simpler, the differences being due
mainly to the homogeneous character of the population of the Philippine
islands”[13].
A report made by Senator Lodge himself, the staunchest supporter of
the administration, was also procurable at the time the President made
these statements. This report, “Senate Document 171, 56th Congress,
First Session,” had been prepared for the Committee on the Philippines.
What did it show?
The inhabitants of the Philippines [said the report] belong to
three sharply distinct races—the Negrito race, the Indonesian, and
the Malayan race. It is universally conceded that the Negritos are
the disappearing remnants of a people which once populated the
entire archipelago [while now] but a few scattered and numerically
insignificant groups of them remain.... It is believed that not
more than 25,000 (twenty-five thousand) of them exist in the entire
archipelago, and the race seems doomed to early extinction.
The report also gave a table of eighty-four tribes, so-called, by the
scientists to whom we must owe obedience. But these tables showed that
twenty-one of this number belonged to the Negritos, so that one quarter
of the President’s eighty tribes were described in the official report
as “a few scattered and numerically insignificant groups” of a race
“doomed to early extinction.” Both numerically and otherwise they were
and they continued to be as insignificant a part of the population as
are the Norridgewock Indians in Maine or the Mashpees in Massachusetts.
But could these facts be gathered from the President’s statements?
Taking now the next group, the Indonesian, we find that Senator Lodge’s
report confined this race to the island of Mindanao. Sixteen tribes
are classified under it, one fifth of the President’s eighty, and the
whole number was estimated also at 250,000. Thirty-seven of the eighty
tribes, therefore, contained only 275,000 out of a population of over
7,000,000 people. But to turn to the report. The rest of the tribes,
forty-seven in number, were Malays, and of these eight, including the
Moros who were given as 100,000, numbered 6,350,000 people, leaving for
the other thirty-nine tribes about 375,000. We therefore, find that out
of the eighty-four tribes in the report, seventy-six contained only
about 650,000. “Ay, in the catalogue ye go for men.”
Of the rest, the six million three hundred and fifty thousand, all were
Malays, all were Catholics softened by three centuries of intimate
contact with Spain, and they lived chiefly in Luzon and the Visayan
Islands, where the war was waging in full vigor. From these official
reports, and those of Mr. McKinley’s own witnesses, Taft, Schurman and
Lodge, what must we say of the President’s language?
In spite of these spirited pictures, however, the campaign proved to be
less exciting than that of 1896[14]. Because of the confusing issues,
party dissenters were numerous, and on both sides also many more
thousands, though faithfully following the party banner gave it only a
half hearted support. Other thousands refrained from voting[15].
With the elections of 1900 out of the way, however, and the novelty
of the possession having waned, came America’s second sober thought.
The changing mind of the American people could not long endure the
logic of the arguments which both friend and foe of the administration
now put forward with somewhat friendly moderation. Power, commerce,
and military glory ceased to be invoked as the arguments for the
indefinite retention of the Philippines. The administration now
defended its Philippine policy on other grounds—namely, philanthropy.
It was urged that the duty of educating the Filipinos, of teaching
them the rudiments of self-government and leading them out into the
bright sunlight of western civilization was the mission of the American
representatives in the Philippines.
But there were also those who though happy in feeling that the wave of
imperialism was on the wane nevertheless realized, that at bottom the
mischief was the same.
It is a significant concession to public opinion [said Senator
Carmack] that we no longer hear the argument of greed and avarice
and the hunger for other men’s possessions openly and defiantly
proclaimed. I cannot help thinking [he added] that something
has been yielded and something gained when the President of the
United States no longer talks of seizing “points of vantage” and
no longer defends our Philippine venture by glorifying England’s
despotic rule over subject races and her bloody march to empire
across the bodies and through the blood of slaughtered people. It
may not signify any change of heart or of purpose, but it shows
a realization of the fact that the public conscience is awake,
and it shows that the authors of this policy begin to understand
that they cannot justify “criminal aggression” by pointing to
the profits of the crime. It is a cheering sign that the second
sober thought has come, that the better nature of the American
people is again in the ascendant, when the party responsible
for a bucaneering war is compelled to veil the grossness of its
designs[16].
This second sober thought of America also brought a marked innovation
into the local problems of the archipelago. Prior to 1901 the seed
of greedy imperialism among the Americans in the Islands had already
blossomed into full bloom. Those then, were the days when men talked
of “the Empire.” Life was gay and irresponsible for the white man, and
many there were indeed who felt and acted like petty kings. Into this
paradise of power and prestige now came Mr. Taft as Civil Governor to
recognize the rights of the Filipino. Mr. Taft brought with him into
that new field something which Filipinos had never seen to any marked
degree among the American civilians and military officers with whom
they had come in contact. He brought sympathy, courtesy and friendly
understanding. He gathered around him those Filipino insurgents in
1901 who, having realized the futility of their efforts to combat
the American forces, had bowed to the inevitable and had resolved to
dedicate their efforts towards making the best of the situation.
This was a great concession to the Filipinos and they appreciated it.
The new governor gained popularity as the days went by, for as each
revolting province was whipped into submission Mr. Taft followed in
the wake of the army to institute civil government and promise the
natives that if they threw down their arms they would have peace and
local self-government. Thus it was that his resounding battle cry of
“The Philippines for the Filipinos” gained in power as well as in
volume as the new governor went about quietly conquering the population
with words rather than with swords. And in so doing he began a new
programme which meant, when carefully analyzed, a permanent colonial
system, maintained by the absolute power of the United States until
the Filipinos become contented subjects. It meant and it means today
Philippine independence—never. To that matter attention must now be
directed.
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER IX
[1] See Coolidge’s _America as World Power_, p. 154.
[2] Judge Blount, _American Occupation of the Philippines_, p.
294.
[3] Report of Taft Philippine Commission, 1900, p. 17.
[4] Sec. Root’s Address at the 1904 Republican Convention, p. 62.
Published by Blanchard & Co., N. Y.
[5] MacArthur’s Report, Oct. 1, 1900; also War Dept. Rep., 1900,
vol. i, pt. 5, pp. 61-62.
[6] War Dept. Rep., 1900, vol. i, pt. 5, pp. 61-62.
[7] _Correspondence Relating to War with Spain_, vol. ii, p. 1226.
[8] _Ibid._, p. 1249.
[9] Speeches at the Home Market Club, Boston, Feb. 16, 1899.
[10] Speech at Warren, Ohio, Oct. 18, 1899.
[11] Stanwood, _A History of the Presidency, 1897-1907_, vol. ii,
p. 57.
[12] Speech at Youngston, Ohio, Oct. 25, 1900.
[13] _Philippine Census_, vol. ii, p. 9.
[14] Latene, _America as a World Power_, p. 131.
[15] _World Almanac_, 1901, p. 119.
[16] Speech in the Senate, May 31, 1902.
CHAPTER X
+The Taft Policy Analyzed+
The substitution of white duck in the place of khaki and brass buttons
as the dress of the American official in the Philippines may be said
to characterize Governor Taft’s manner of quelling Filipino opposition
and at the same time reconciling the McKinley representations with
the actual state of affairs in the Islands. Therefore he proposed to
establish Civil Government in order to pacify the natives and to assure
the people at home that things were going along as they should. Of
course, this policy was vehemently opposed by the military commanders
whose real task was to combat the insurrection in some of the
remaining islands. As late as October 8, 1901, for example, while the
administration was publicly saying that the American representatives
were getting along harmoniously, we find this significant telegram from
Washington addressed to the commanding general in Manila,—
+Chaffee+, Manila.
I am deeply chagrined to use the mildest term possible over the
trouble between you and Taft. I wish you to see him personally, and
spare no effort to secure prompt and friendly agreement in regard
to the differences between you. Have cabled him also. It is most
unfortunate to have any action which produces friction and which
may have a serious effect both in the Philippines _and here at
home_. I trust implicity that you and Taft will come to agreement.
Signed: +Theodore Roosevelt+[1].
These disagreements were the natural outcome of having two officials in
the field—one who wanted civil government because he believed in it,
and the other who said there was no place for civil government while
several hundred thousand inhabitants were being herded together in
reconcentration camps.
Now, the term “civil government” is most inviting. Although it does not
necessarily imply a government by the consent of the governed, it at
least distinctly negatives the idea of a government conducted by the
military arm in a country of bleeding, prostrate and hostile people.
To be able to tell the public at home, therefore, that there was civil
government in the Philippines was to put everyone in good humour. What
if General Bell and his army were searching every ravine and mountain
side in Batangas province, a hundred miles or so from Manila, armed
to the teeth and fully determined to kill “every able-bodied man in
sight?” What care that General Smith was making Samar a “howling
wilderness,” ordering his subordinates to “kill and burn,—the more you
kill the better you will please me?” What matter that thousands were
being herded together in reconcentration camps. Civil government it
must be to please the public at home. All disorders in the Islands from
that moment could be described as acts of mere banditti. Of course this
vicious situation was not made known to the American people at that
time, but six years later, when the true facts no longer affected the
safety of the party in power, there came this blunt confession by the
American Governor, General Smith. Said he in his inaugural address:
While the smoke of battle still hung over the hills and valleys of
the Philippines, and every town and barrio in the Islands was hot
with rebellion, she (the United States) replaced military with a
civil régime and on the smouldering embers of insurrection planted
civil government[2].
We are naturally curious to learn what kind of government was thus
being offered by Mr. Taft and what was the nature of the policy back of
it. Under the new régime a civil governor in person of Governor Taft
himself, took the place of the military commander. Though not wearing
gilt braid like the other potentates in Asia he was absolute master of
the central government, as will appear from the nature of his powers.
The legislative branch was composed of the so-called Philippine
Commission. There were originally five members, all Americans,
appointed by the President of the United States but drawing salaries
in excess of that received by American cabinet officers, and like all
the other expenses of the Government paid by the Filipino tax-payers.
This constituted the central civil government. There were besides,
of course, a host of subordinate officers in executive and judicial
positions, Filipinos and Americans alike, the latter holding the best
paid offices. But for all purposes of government, the Americans in the
Commission, of which Mr. Taft, as Governor, was entitled to be one,
ruled the destinies of the nation. They made laws and administered
them; they appointed and removed; they were the “civil government.”
How absolute was the power residing in this body may be shown by an
incident related by an American in the service of that government. One
of the laws passed by the Commission in 1901 [3] had provided that
an American, in order to qualify for a position in the Philippine
judiciary should be more than thirty years of age, and should have the
experience of a five years’ practice in American law courts. In 1903
President Roosevelt wished to give the Hon. Beekman Winthrop a position
on the Philippine Bench. Winthrop, then a recent graduate of the
Harvard Law School, was under thirty years of age. Judge Taft called
his secretary, Mr. Ferguson, to acquaint him of this appointment.
“Fergy,” he said, in his good natured manner, “make me out a commission
for Beekman Winthrop as a judge of First Instance.”
“You can’t do it. Governor,” his secretary properly replied. “It’s
against the law. He’s not old enough.”
“I can’t, eh?” said the Governor humorously. “I’ll show you. Send me a
stenographer.”
The stenographer came and the Governor dictated a new law, striking
out the thirty year old requirement from the old statute and inserting
twenty-five in its place. In addition to the requirement that the
appointee must have practiced law for a period of five years, another
phrase was added, as follows: “or be a graduate of a reputable law
school”[4].
Secretary Ferguson was then summoned anew. The governor told him to get
the rest of the members of the Commission. This was done immediately,
and within a few minutes the new statute had been passed and made the
law of the land.
“Now,” said Governor Taft good naturedly to the law-abiding Ferguson,
“make out that commission”[5].
Although Mr. Winthrop with his Harvard record did make a good judge,
the incident is narrated merely to show how absolutely five Americans
could make, publish and execute Philippine laws. Even the English
despots on the mainland of Asia could not have exercised more despotic
power.
So much for the framework of Governor Taft’s civil government. Now what
did it aim to accomplish? In judging the Taft policy as announced by
its founder it is well to remember always that the statements of facts
and conditions and the nature of the people dealt with come from the
lips of persons who are speaking in their own defense and who in most
cases were possible candidates for higher offices in the future. Being
mere men, they naturally tend to present their own side of the case.
In this matter, the men from whom we expect the desired information,
become advocates of the policy to be examined rather than impartial
reporters.
Now all that these high colonial officials then said may have been
true. Certainly, a majority of their countrymen believed their
statements, because they said them. Suppose the declarations had been
false,—the American people would have believed them just the same. It
is natural that what American governors say concerning the Filipino
will be accepted as gospel truth by their countrymen however little
they may believe the assertions of their rulers at home. Past events
in the history of this nation itself have always shown that although
statements of presidents, governors and mayors in describing their own
administration are severely criticized by those directly concerned, yet
these same people will accept the statements of their officers abroad
as gospel truth. Thus, after the Civil War what the carpet-bag officers
said was considered true, while the criticism of eminent Southerners
was considered as “rebel talk.” And so this much can also be said of
the future—that no matter who the governor may be in the Philippines,
the declaration of the American will be accepted in the United States
rather than that of a Filipino. This is the insurmountable difficulty,
for the side of the Filipino will, therefore, never be understood by
Americans.
Let us, however, judge the Taft programme on its face as the founder
himself and those who have since followed him characterize the policy.
In the first place, then, it is noticed that Mr. Taft’s programme was
founded on one great assumption, namely, that the American people
were and would continue to be unselfish in their attitude towards the
Filipino, and hence that they could be trusted to keep men in office
who would carry out this policy, no matter how absolute a power they
might be able to wield from that position.
Thus, Governor Taft clearly stated his first position:
The people of the United States have under their _guidance and
control_ in the Philippines, an archipelago of 3000 islands, the
population of which is about 7,600,000 souls. Of this 7,000,000 are
Christians, 600,000 are Moros or other Pagan tribes[6].
Now, up to Mr. Taft’s régime, there had never been any talk at all in
official circles about the possibility of ever letting the Filipinos
have their independence. No such idea had ever been suggested by
President McKinley, the man most responsible for the acquisition of
the Islands. True it was that he had spoken of giving the Filipinos
“individual rights,” and perhaps some ultimate participation in their
government, but that the complete withdrawal of American sovereignty
should ever follow had not been considered by him.
But in 1901 the imperialist flame had burned itself out and America’s
second thought had succeeded. Hence Judge Taft’s purpose to improve
the people and prepare them for the hour of their liberation. Just
when this independence was to be granted, however, no one could or
would tell. Mr. Taft, however, offered the solution of this intricate
problem and we may believe his purpose has not changed since.
To put it briefly, Judge Taft insisted then and insists even today,
that upon the American people rests the duty of solving the Philippine
problem, asserting also that they are capable of accomplishing the
task when the time comes to decide upon it once and for all. In the
meantime,—well, let Judge Taft himself speak:
As a friend of the Filipinos [he said] it is my anxious desire to
enlarge that class of Americans who have a real interest in the
welfare of the Islands, and who believe that the United States
can have no higher duty or function than to assist the people
of the Islands to prosperity and a political development which
shall enable them to secure to themselves the enjoyment of civil
liberty[7].
All of this sounded well indeed, but note in the first place that
“civil liberty” does not mean political liberty, far less independence.
The method by which this new structure was to be achieved was also
carefully stated by its founder.
“The first requisite of prosperity in the Islands,” he said, “is
tranquillity, and this should be evidenced by a well-ordered
government.”
How long this upbuilding would require, Judge Taft was not sure then,
but this much he was willing to concede.
It may be that when the Filipinos have been transformed into a
people capable of safely maintaining an independent self-government
they will ask it, and then I have no doubt that it will be accorded
them.
This promising remark, however, loses its value in the light of the
language which followed it.
It may be however [added Judge Taft] _and I think quite as likely_
that by that time the Filipinos will be so well satisfied with the
good resulting from a union with the United States that they will
prefer to maintain a relation like that which now binds Canada and
Australia to Great Britain, and that _the United States will then
value its association with this pearl of the Oriental tropics_. But
whatever the ultimate decision it is certain that the time cannot
arise for a considerable period, probably several generations.
Judge Taft thus advocated a policy of waiting several generations
which means indefinitely, before the question could be decided. In
the meantime he would oppose permitting the Filipinos to talk or
ask for their freedom for, he said, “The Filipinos should learn the
disadvantages that arise to everybody in the country from political
agitation for a change in the form of government in the immediate
future.”
During this wait of several generations, however, it is apparent from
Judge Taft’s words that it was his hope that the United Sates would
really learn to value its association with “this pearl of the Oriental
tropics.”
It is estimated [he temptingly told the New York Chamber of
Commerce] that not more than five million acres of land are owned
by natives in the islands, and that remaining sixty-five million is
owned by the government.
That is, the United States government. Now it so happened that soon
after the acquisition of the Philippines, the American Congress had
passed a law limiting the number of acres which a company might buy.
This was intended to prevent a few Americans from monopolizing the
land. This limitation in Judge Taft’s opinion was “much too low for
the cultivation of sugar.” However, “there is a provision in the law,”
added the Judge, “by which irrigation companies may own stock in land
companies, _so that probably the limitations may be evaded if private
profit requires_.” Curious that such a suggestion should have come from
the highest officer of the land charged with the duty of enforcing the
law.
Here then, was Judge Taft’s policy as he presented it in 1904, and as
he would, no doubt, still present it today: The American people, a
self-sacrificing and conscientious nation, having no object in view
save the benefit of the Filipinos, should retain the absolute control
of the Philippines indefinitely, or at least for several generations,
meanwhile introducing education, sanitary improvements and other good
things, all of which were to be paid for by the Filipinos. In due time
the _American people would decide_, first—whether they had proved
themselves fit for independence, and second, whether independence was
good for them. The hope that the Filipinos themselves would in due
time lose the desire for freedom was, of course, not to be abandoned.
During this long period of several generations the Americans could and
would in fact be invited to acquire larger and larger interests in the
Islands while the Filipinos would be permitted such “civil liberties”
as Congress might choose to grant them.
Finally, as if to support the wisdom of this policy and the
reasonableness of giving the Filipinos such limited freedom, Judge Taft
finally added: “To make the Declaration of Independence apply equally
to the Filipinos as to the American colonists, is to be blind to the
plainest facts and to sacrifice truth to an impossible dogma and a
rhetorical phrase.”
Each of these proposals will now be taken up in order to show not
only the fallacy of expecting to see the plan work out, but also to
point out the viciousness underlying the policy which Judge Taft then
believed to be right.
First, then, as to this “impossible dogma and rhetorical phrase” known
as the Declaration of Independence. Did the framers of this document
really mean it to apply only to the revolting colonists? Against Mr.
Taft’s word we quote Abraham Lincoln’s estimate of that Declaration.
Its authors meant it to be [he said] as, thank God, it is now
proving itself—a stumbling block to all those who in after times
might seek to turn a free people back into the hateful paths
of despotism. _They knew the proneness of prosperity to breed
tyrants_, and they meant that when such should reappear in this
fair land and commence their vocation, they would find at least one
hard nut to crack.
But Governor Taft did try to crack this nut by confusing expansion with
imperialism. He said,
Since the foundation of our government the people of the United
States, that is the states as distinguished from the territories,
have been engaged in governing other people. We did it in the case
of Louisiana. We have done it in the case of every territory that
was subsequently admitted to the United States.
finally adding that if this governing of other people who have no voice
in the government is to violate the Declaration of Independence, then
“we have been violating the Declaration of Independence for a hundred
years.”
There is this to remember, however, in the cases with which Governor
Taft sought to justify his action. The people of the United States
beginning as a fringe of inhabitants on the edge of a continent
adopted a Constitution to which they consented. This constitution
gave to their Congress control over the unoccupied land not belonging
to any state, and in the exercise of that power Congress adopted the
policy of letting persons settle on this land and organize territorial
government, and as the settlers became sufficiently numerous in any
region, that region was admitted to statehood. To the establishment
of this policy the people as a whole had consented beforehand, and
every man who settled in that territory did so with knowledge of that
policy. In the case of Louisiana, that huge tract of land was acquired
by treaty and by purchase, whereby the United States bound itself to
incorporate its inhabitants in the Union and to give them all the
rights of American citizens.
Contrast this with the Philippine situation of 1904 when Governor
Taft made these statements or even with the situation today. In those
islands there were then some eight millions of people who had resisted
American sovereignty until overcome by force of arms. United as a
people in desiring their independence, Mr. Taft would refuse it to them
because in the estimation of those who had conquered them they were not
fit to govern themselves. Is it possible that so able a lawyer as Judge
Taft failed to detect this difference between the American government
of territories and the government of Filipinos against their will?
Still Mr. Taft seemed to be satisfied that it was enough to give the
Filipinos “civil liberties.” This, he said, had been “secured to every
man, woman and child among the Christian Filipinos,” these rights
being equivalent to those “contained in the Bill of Rights in the
Constitution of the United States except the right to bear arms and the
right to be tried by jury.”
But was it true then, and is it true now, that such rights as the
Filipinos were given were really equivalent to the Bill of Rights
in the Constitution? They were not rights—they were mere privileges
granted by an absolute foreign power resting on an Act of Congress
which could be repealed at will. Was that freedom? A free man is one
whose rights are his and cannot be taken away from him against his
will. This was instead an absolute government, in name by the American
people, and in fact by the President and his officers.
There are those, however, who might say that the course of events
has since justified Judge Taft’s policy, and that creation of the
Philippine Assembly in 1907 and the Senate in 1916, are convincing
proofs of this gradual extension of liberty to the Filipinos. How much
liberty these measures really meant will be taken up in the succeeding
chapters. For the present—attention is focussed on Judge Taft’s policy
alone.
Let us assume, therefore, that Judge Taft’s programme is faithfully
carried out. The question remains who is to decide when the Filipinos
are fit for independence? Certainly not the American residents in
the Islands who, having invested their money there and having always
regarded the Filipinos as inferiors would naturally exert their utmost
influence to perpetuate American sovereignty. Governor Taft himself
distrusted these Americans for, as he told the New York Chamber of
Commerce,
The American merchants easily caught the feeling of hostility
and contempt felt by many of the soldiers for the Filipinos, and
were most emphatic in condemning the policy of the government in
attempting to attract the Filipinos and make them so far as might
be a part of the new order.
As for the organ of these American settlers which is so frequently
heard in the United States, Judge Taft had this to say:
The American newspapers ... also took the tone of their advertisers
and their subscribers and hence it is that the American community
in the Philippines today is largely an anti-Filipino community,
prone apparently in dealing with the natives to call them names,
to make fun of them and to deride every effort toward their
advancement and development.
Let the reader of today, therefore, read the reports of these papers
and American residents with a grain of salt, for they are not
disinterested and impartial judges.
Where, then, are we to find “the good sense and virtue of the American
people,” which will in time adequately and faithfully decide the
question? Can the Americans at home be entrusted with this task of
deciding the destinies of several million Filipinos? It is submitted
that they cannot do so, because nearly all, if not actually all the
elements necessary for a real knowledge of the conditions existing
in the islands or for the creation of genuine sympathy with the
aspirations of the Filipinos, are sorely lacking in the hearts and
minds of the American people.
First, as to a knowledge of the true conditions in the Islands. Well,
we remember the censorship during the war. One cannot forget also
that Governor Taft’s own testimony before the Senate Committee, when
information was desired in 1902, gave no idea of the true extent to
which torture, destruction and reconcentration had been carried on
in the attempt to conquer the Islands. Men are human the world over
and whenever they speak of that which may reflect on their personal
positions they will put the best face possible upon the matter so as to
provoke the least hostile criticism. When these men speak, therefore,
their administration as well as the whole policy of the political party
in Washington which placed them in power is put on trial. Governor Taft
himself, may have been above temptation in these matters, but would
there be many like him?
This mental attitude on the part of the highest officials in the
Islands and those most closely connected with them is largely
substantiated by a confession made by an ex-official himself, the
Hon. W. Morgan Shuster, a former member of the Philippine Commission.
Writing in 1914 in the January issue of the _Century Magazine_, he said:
The records of our congressional committee and of the War
Department are filled with reports, speeches, letters, testimony
and statistics _going to show what the party then in power wanted
the American people to think about the Filipinos_. If any one
thought differently, he became at once, in official eyes, a
dreamer, an anti-imperialist, or a demagogue. His opinions were
taboo in high governmental circles, and he was deemed an unsafe
man to hold important office. This was only natural and I recall
it merely to show how the opinion of the American people on the
question has really been formed.
Then followed this convincing statement:
The opinion of the ordinary American citizen as to the Filipinos
is largely influenced by the statements or the pronouncements of
the very few men in public life who have had, or were thought to
have had, exceptional facilities for knowing the real facts and
situation. Thus the views of ex-Presidents Roosevelt and Taft,
of ex-Secretary of War Root, of Senator Lodge, of the different
Philippine governors and members of the Philippine Commission and
of the commanding generals who have served in the islands have been
the real source of “American Public opinion.”
As a matter of fact [confessed Mr. Morgan Shuster] it is doubtful
whether the views of any of these gentlemen were reached in a
strictly impartial and judicial manner. With the possible exception
of Mr. Taft, _they took up the subject as I did, with a previously
formed conviction that the facts were going to sustain the accepted
government belief and policy, which were that the Filipinos were
not fit to be, and should not of right be, independent, at least
for a very long time to come_. How long few ventured to predict. It
is said that Mr. Taft when invited by President McKinley to go to
Manila as head of the Civil Commission, stated that he was opposed
to our holding the islands. That, however, was before he had been
intimately connected with the administrative policies already
adopted, which were based on the opposite belief.
How about the minor American officials? How would they report the
progress of the Filipino for self-government? Does the question warrant
an answer? Pray, how else than in the same characteristic manner in
which their superior officers approached the problem? Indeed how
could they be expected to do otherwise? On that side was their bread
buttered! Time has shown that many of these men did not stop there, but
have gone to the extent of deliberately misrepresenting conditions in
the Islands. While on leave of absence at home or having permanently
retired from Philippine service, these men have launched a propaganda
from the speaking platform and the printed page wilfully slandering the
natives whom they detest.
Granting, therefore, that Americans at home might conceivably wish
to know the true facts upon which to base the exercise of their good
sense and judgment, there are no means by which they can easily learn
them. This is the unhappy result of the intolerable situation where one
nation insists on governing another without that other’s consent. For
outside of these official dispatches and perhaps a few other accounts
by prolific writers of sensationalism and trash, whose main object is
to secure a wide circulation for their volumes, nothing from the side
of the Filipino can ever be forthcoming. The political retentionist
sees to it that nothing is printed except official dispatches and
perhaps an occasional report concerning Filipino incapacity. The case
for the petitioner is “crowded out by the press of other matter,” that
the conspiracy of silence may continue.
But the question which always remains is whether the American people
will ever take an interest in the matter even if they do have reliable
information. Are they not so immersed in their own affairs, so busy in
their struggles to make money and so indifferent by reason of the great
distance separating them that even the intelligent men have not and
cannot give the necessary time to understand the Philippine situation?
If the people of the greatest American cities accept corrupt and
ignorant government which affects them directly rather than take the
time and trouble necessary to improve it, what chance is there of their
devoting time to the affairs of an alien people thousands of miles away?
The Filipinos can, therefore, only rely for justice upon the American
officials governing them. Now against a foreign oppressor men rely on
armies and navies, but against domestic tyranny they can only raise
the shield of a constitution. This restraint on arbitrary power is
the only protection of the individual against the government which
rules him. Great as is an Anglo-Saxon’s confidence in his fellowmen,
for example, he has employed in the past, and he is today employing
this device to protect himself from being ridden by men of the same
blood and color as himself. The unwritten English Constitution has
grown up from the efforts of English subjects to restrain English
kings. Americans have erected similar safeguards to prevent American
Presidents, governors, judges and even legislatures from oppressing
American citizens.
If a citizen of Massachusetts needs protection against his fellow
citizens, if the American people dare not give their President and
Congress a power unfettered by a constitution, is it not too clear for
argument that the shield of a constitution is far more needed by the
Filipinos to protect them from a government authorized by men who do
not know them and only learn of them through the reports of others who
present their side of the case most strongly and who openly regard the
natives as their inferiors?
But there is even another safeguard lacking against which laws and
even constitutions are ineffectual when the true liberties of a people
are threatened. This is public opinion, the force which, more than
anything else will restrain the rulers of every modern state. An
enlightened public opinion, however, can exist only where the public is
informed and when the public is interested. Neither of these conditions
can be relied upon in America’s dealing with the absolute government of
the Philippines. The absence of the former has already been treated in
this and preceding chapters. Of the latter it can safely be said that
popular indifference and lack of genuine interest have characterized
the occupation of the Philippines ever since the establishment of civil
government. Once the novelty of the conquest had worn away, it has been
impossible to induce the American people to take more than a passing
interest in the conduct of Philippine affairs. The complaints of the
Filipinos fall upon the ears of men, who though supposed to judge them,
know nothing of them and care little to learn about them. Say what you
will of an American’s intelligence, of his energy and high purposes and
fitness to govern himself, it is because he knows not and cares not
what is done in the Philippines that he and his fellowmen are unfit to
govern the islands.
But the Taft policy, however, proposed and it has in fact succeeded
in its proposal, that these inferior natives with whom the great body
of Americans would not care to associate, should be given only such
measure of free government as unenlightened and unsympathetic Americans
think them qualified to use, exercising in doing so a power unfettered
by any constitution and unrestrained by any informed and interested
public opinion.
Now it may be that in the future as in the past, a group of really
disinterested Americans of high calibre will take a serious view of
their duty and responsibility in the Islands—that is, the kind of
duty and responsibility that the Taft programme calls for. Such an
instance occurred shortly after the establishment of the Taft régime
when several thousands of Americans signed a petition for Philippine
independence. Governor Taft described these men as “a number of
excellent and prominent gentlemen.”—and well he might. Could not these
“excellent and prominent gentlemen” be trusted with the problem?
Apparently not in Mr. Taft’s opinion, for he told the New York Chamber
of Commerce at the time when the petition was presented that “the good
people who signed the petition” should not “intermeddle with something
the effect of which they are very little able to understand[8].”
Who were these men whose ability to understand the Philippine situation
Judge Taft so seriously questioned? The list included Cardinal Gibbons,
Archbishop Farley, more than fifty bishops, more than sixty judges, a
long list of college presidents and leading educators, such as Eliot
of Harvard, Schurman of Cornell, himself not without experience in
the Philippines, and ex-President Cleveland. There were also Andrew
Carnegie, Charles Francis Adams, Wayne McVeagh and thousands of other
respected and prominent men in private life. Here were the spiritual
and the intellectual leaders of America. If they were “little able to
understand,” to whom in the United States could the Filipinos look
for leadership in their behalf? If these American leaders must not
“intermeddle,” how can Judge Taft justify his “abiding confidence in
the power of the American people to reach a right conclusion?”
If, therefore, the Americans in the Islands as well as the good and
intelligent Americans at home cannot be trusted, no one is left, unless
by “the good sense and judgment of the American people,” Mr. Taft
really meant the President, the Secretary of War, and their appointees,
who in the past have been indifferent to human rights and only too
ready to seek commercial advantage.
It has been constantly urged, however, that this “benevolent
despotism,” for that is what the Taft programme really meant then and
now, was merely a step towards preparing the Filipinos for eventual
independence. This argument is being used to this day, and will
continue to be so used by all those who seek to hide the vicious
character of their scheme. For this method of dealing with the problem
unfits rather than prepares the Filipinos for independence.
The policy of Governor Taft, in the first place, creates a new race
problem because his position rests entirely upon the assumption that
the Filipinos, being unfit to govern themselves, should be governed by
a race of superior people. Everything, therefore, that the American
officials in the Philippines say about the fitness of the Filipino will
be accepted as gospel truth by the great majority. They will never take
the word of the Filipino against the word of the American. The side
of the Filipino will, therefore, not only never be understood in this
country but will suffer greatly as the years go by because the more
stubbornly the Filipino asserts his fitness for self-government, the
more vehemently will his caretakers in the Islands deny it.
The Taft policy moreover creates a far more serious obstacle to
independence, for during this period of education paid for by the
Filipino it calls for the investment of large amounts of American
capital in the Islands hoping that in that manner the Americans will,
as the years go by, learn to value truly “this pearl of the Oriental
tropics.” Stripped of its sugar coating the Taft policy is to keep the
Islands for generations and to plant there in the meantime American
citizens and American capital. Now there is nothing clearer in the
history of all nations than the inevitable alliance between financial
and political power. Wherever capital goes it seeks to control the
government in its own interest. If invested in a weak foreign state its
owners seek to own the government of that state or, failing in this,
exert their efforts to make the home government interfere and control
it. This was the origin of the Boer War. This laid the basis for the
Indian Empire, and like influences have inspired English, French, and
German aggression in Asia and Africa.
Such also are the vicious results which the Taft programme insures.
Every dollar of American capital implanted in those Islands becomes
a rivet which binds them to the United States, and every American
residing there learns to argue soon enough against Philippine
independence. State it as you will, the Taft policy means indefinite
retention maintained by the absolute power of the United States until
the Filipinos become contented subjects. The “Philippines for the
Filipinos,” degenerates into the “Philippines for the Americans,” with
as much liberty to the Filipinos thrown in as is not inconsistent with
American interests. Well did Senator Lodge say several years before,
“We believe in trade expansion.”
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER X
[1] _Correspondence Relating to War with Spain_, vol. ii, p. 1297.
[2] Report of the U. S. Phil. Comm., 1907, pt. 1, p. 229.
[3] Act No. 136, U. S. Phil. Comm.
[4] Act No. 1024, U. S. Phil. Comm., Oct. 10, 1903.
[5] Incident related by Ferguson himself and narrated by Judge
Blount in _The American Occupation of the Philippines_, p.
444.
[6] Speech before the New York Chamber of Commerce, April 21,
1904.
[7] _Ibid._
[8] _The Outlook_, April 30, 1904.
CHAPTER XI
+The Taft Policy in Practice+
Mr. Taft’s Civil Government was adopted on July 4, 1901. What have been
its most beneficent results since then, as proclaimed by the American
officials themselves? The first results were quite evident—more
schools, better roads, and an improved system of sanitation. What did
these mean?
“We have given them education and public improvement,” said the
administration. Let us state this more accurately. “We,” the benevolent
American people have selected American teachers to teach Filipinos
what “we” choose, making the Filipino treasury pay for such expenses.
“We” have decided what improvements were needed, have effected such
improvements under the supervision of American office-holders, and
have later presented the bill to the native taxpayer. These American
officers, technical as well as administrative, have been paid large
salaries and the system has naturally been most expensive to the
impoverished islanders.
From the way these material benefits have been related to the Americans
at home, however, one is led to assume that the improvements effected
have cost the American taxpayer a considerable amount. That the
contrary is true was baldly stated by Secretary of War Stimson who in
his report of 1912 said, “And the cost of all this and of the much more
that has been similarly done has been borne by the Filipino people
themselves.”
Is not this method of improving a nation like the rich man who tells
his poor neighbor that he ought to have a larger house, better
furniture, newer clothes, horses and carriages and forthwith orders
them, but has them charged to his neighbor without consulting him as
to how these bills are to be met? It is a form of charity easy to the
soi-distant benefactor but ruinous to the unhappy neighbor. Surely
if “we” insisted upon teaching the Filipinos the American language,
instead of propagating the already implanted Castilian tongue, “we”
should at least have defrayed that portion of the bill. Evidently this
was a benevolence tinctured with New England thrift. Was not this
policy aptly expressed at that time by Mr. Dooley when he said:
In ivry city in this unfair land we will erect school houses an’
packin’ houses an’ houses iv correction; an’ we’ll larn ye our
language because ’tis aisier to larn ye ours than to larn oursilves
yours. An’ we’ll give ye clothes, if ye pay f’r thim; an’ if ye
don’t, ye can go without. And whin ye’re hungry ye can to th’
morgue—we mane th’ resth’rant—an’ ate a good square meal if ar-rmy
beef. An’ we’ll sind th’ gr-reat Gin’ral Eagan over f’r to larn
ye etiquette, an’ Andhrew Carnegie to larn ye pathriteism with
blowholes into it, an’ Gin’ral Alger to larn ye to hould onto a
job; an’ whin ye’ve become edycated an’ have all th’ blessings if
civilization that we don’t want, that’ll count ye one. We can’t
give ye anny votes, because we haven’t more thin enough to go round
now; but we’ll treat ye th’ way a father shud treat his childher if
we have to break ivry bone in ye’er bodies.
The teaching of the English language, however, did accomplish something
at the expense of the Taft policy. It opened to the Filipinos the
history of the American revolution, the Declaration of Independence.
It opened to them the words of Lincoln that “no man is good enough to
govern another without that other’s consent.” And yet the Taft policy
expected to have these pupils as contented subjects for generations,
enjoying the contempt that was daily being heaped upon them, loving to
be treated as an inferior people. How strange an expectation!
Nor was this prophecy far fetched. Six years after the establishment
of the Taft Government, one of his successors, Governor Smith, was
forced to point out with regret “the growing gulf between the two
peoples” and to say that an era of ill feeling had started between
Americans and Filipinos and, I hesitate to say it, “race hatred”[1].
And no wonder. Let Mr. Leupp, a staunch supporter of the late President
Roosevelt give an idea of the conditions then existing in the Islands.
Speaking of the American residents in the Philippines who, say what one
will, are the only Americans known to the majority of Filipinos, he
said:
These men are the loudest and most bitter in their criticisms
of the conduct of affairs. They disapprove most vigorously the
friendly attitude of our government towards the natives, and
denounce the policy of benevolent assimilation as preposterous and
visionary.... They object to the appointment of so many Filipinos
to office and instead of cultivating the good will of the native
people and creating a demand for American goods, they spend their
time and energy finding fault and making gloomy predictions.
The people here described have sent emissaries to Washington
to convince the authorities that things are all wrong in the
Philippines, that the iron hand of white supremacy should replace
the Taft policy of “The Philippines for the Filipinos.” What they
call a Chamber of Commerce in Manila is really an organization
for bringing about conditions more favorable to the exploitation
of the islands, without reference to the welfare of the natives.
The admission of Chinese labor is the first thing the chamber of
commerce wants in this program.
The relations between the “American element” there and the
Filipinos are most seriously strained; the newspapers which cater
to it never say a word for the Filipinos, nor, for that matter,
the civil government. The despicable “little brown brother” poem
has been widely circulated. It is about as true a picture of the
Filipinos as “the Leopard’s Spots” is of the negro in America.
No one can read its fierce arraignment of the natives and learn
that it is almost a national hymn with our soldiers here, and then
imagine that relations between the two races are very cordial[2].
But for even better testimony, let these American residents speak
their own mind. At a mass meeting held by them in Manila one speaker
expressing his belief that the American government had been weak and
vacillating, added:
Now I believe in “benevolent assimilation” (which quotation was
greeted with laughter). I believe it so strongly that I would, if
necessary, pin it to these islands with the bayonet.
Then, referring to a celebration that the Filipinos had had in which
American and Filipino flags had been displayed, came this ambitious
claim:
They (the Filipinos) did not realize that we, who are here tonight,
are the Government, and that that government could not have been
here without us, and cannot stay here without us.... I believe in
peace and harmony. I always did, and when I had a battalion of
volunteers behind me I felt awful peaceful.... I believe that if we
could put about one hundred thousand American troops here it would
be very peaceful (laughter), exceedingly so, and you would not see
any more Katipunan (Filipino) banners eight or ten feet long, with
their designs emblazoned in silk, going along the streets with a
little six cent American flag carried underneath it. It would be
too peaceful for that.
So much for the bonds of friendship between the two peoples. No wonder
they have led to further bickerings on the part of the American
residents whenever concessions have been granted to the Filipinos. No
wonder too that when, in 1907, the Filipinos were finally granted a
Philippine assembly, they made that the occasion to renew their demand
for independence. Before the establishment of this Philippine Assembly
it was virtually an act of disloyalty to talk of independence. Mr. Taft
himself had refused to permit the Filipinos to organize an independence
party. But with the veil of suppression removed in 1907, the agitation
for a complete separation was formally launched, and has been kept up
since with increasing vigor.
What about the economic blessings given to the country? As the fires
of insurrection were finally suppressed, the Filipinos turned to their
chosen occupation—agriculture. The fields were then in a ravaged
condition as a result of the prolonged period of war. The struggle
had reduced most of the provinces to a state of misery. In his report
of 1902, the Secretary of War, Mr. Root, had acknowledged these
catastrophes. He said,
The ills which have recently befallen the people of the islands
call for active and immediate measures of relief. The people of a
country just emerging from nearly six years of devastating warfare,
during which productive industry was interrupted, vast amounts of
property were destroyed, the bonds of social order were broken,
habits of peaceful industry were lost ... had a sufficiently
difficult task before them to restore order and prosperity. In
addition to this, however, the people of the Philippine islands
have within the past year been visited by great misfortunes.
The rinderpest has destroyed about ninety per cent of all their
carabaos, leaving them without draft animals to till their land
and aid in the ordinary work.... The rice crop has been reduced to
twenty-five per cent of the ordinary crop ... cholera has raged
and is still raging throughout the islands....
And yet on November 19 of that same year, the President was telling
the people of the United States that “the islands have never been as
orderly, as peaceful or as prosperous as now” [3], which statement
properly induced Mr. Burrit Smith to say, “The President’s prosperity
seems to be composed in nearly equal parts of pestilence and famine.”
For indeed, the bare comparison of the statement with the facts made
arguments superfluous.
As late as August 2, 1905, the Representatives of Batangas province
addressed a letter to Governor Taft to show the miserable condition of
the municipality of Balayan. The statistics they offered showed that,
whereas in 1896 the number of inhabitants in that district was 41,308,
in 1905 the number had been reduced to 13,924. There had been 19,500
hectares of cultivated land in 1896—there were only 1,700 in 1905.
Other items had suffered even more, rice having fallen from 39,020 to
12,500 cavanes, sugar from 520,000 to 12,300; maize from 110,000 to
10,000, cows 3,680 in 1896, only 80 left seven years later; oxen from
4,110 to 433; hens from 96,000 before the war to only 5,000 four years
after the establishment of civil government. Consider what a story
those figures tell.
In addition to these calamities there had been placed upon the
shoulders of the entire population an internal revenue tax, of which
Professor Paul S. Reinsch said:
Outside of Italy it would be hard to find a system of taxation that
so efficiently scours the whole field of business. The merchants
and professional men of a country like the United States would look
upon it as a most unbearable burden.
In the light of these hardships, it would be reasonable to expect that
the economic policy of the United States towards the Islands would be
guided by the desire to make them as prosperous as possible. And yet
the first few years of American legislation in this matter showed a
series of blunders which resulted in heaping further hardships upon the
already prostrated people.
When the Islands were under the dominion of Spain the native
planters had had the benefit of a limited Spanish market, but when
the United States sovereignty was extended to the archipelago this
market was taken away, and in its place nothing was given. The first
tariff act passed by the American Congress to regulate the trade of
the Philippines was that of March 8, 1902. It allowed Philippine
products coming into the United States a reduction of 25%, from the
regular Dingley rates. Governor Taft realized how ineffective this
reduction was, and he pleaded very earnestly with Congress to give
his “Filipinos” something in lieu of the privileges they had under
Spain. But the sugar and tobacco interests in the United States checked
his efforts because they were afraid that Philippine products would
endanger their domestic crops.
There were one or two “jokers” in this tariff legislation of 1902 also
that are already well-known. One was the clause which abolished the
export tax on Philippine produce coming to the United States. Among
these native products was the world-famous Philippine hemp. This native
product was at the time sorely needed in the home markets, and the
object of the law was clearly to favor the exportation of this article
to the United States exclusively and thus defeat the British and other
foreign exporters in Manila from getting their share of the article in
question.
The method by which this was accomplished was even more vicious, and
really constituted the big “joker” of the tariff act. It will be
remembered that export taxes were collected on Philippine produce
as they left the custom house in Manila. Now the levying of taxes
on exports is strictly prohibited by the Constitution of the United
States, but the Supreme Court at Washington had said that the
Constitution did not extend to the Philippines. Among the articles thus
taxed was hemp, but the tariff law of 1902 now said that if the hemp
shipped from Manila was proved to have been consumed in the United
States, then the export duties already paid would be refunded to the
shipper in order to give him the true benefit of a reduction. This odd
method of administering the law was thus double-edged. It not only gave
the American exporter a tremendous advantage over his British rival,
but it also favored the American shipper over the Filipino planter.
This was so because when the native planter sold his crop he was forced
to sell it at the current price which assumed that an export tax would
be levied upon it. To an American shipper the recovery of this export
duty later was a matter of routine, as he could easily prove through
his American offices that the hemp was in fact received and consumed
in the United States. But the Filipino planter or broker dealing on a
much smaller scale could not, without difficulty and expense, follow
his few bales into the markets of the United States and then prove to
the custom officials that the hemp was in fact consumed there. The
result of this American legislation was apparent—only the big fish,
like the American Hemp trust, got the benefit of this so-called favored
reduction.
Governor Taft and his commission saw the injustice thus placed on the
native planters, and they earnestly besought Congress to remove such
legislation from the statute books of the United States.
“These refundable duties,” they said in their report of 1904, “are in
effect a gift of that amount to the manufacturers of the United States
who use hemp in their operations”[4].
Their report of the following year was just as earnest in its complaint.
“It is a direct burden upon the people of the Philippine Islands,”
they said, “because it takes from the Insular treasury export duties
collected from the people and gives them to manufacturers of hemp
products in the United States.”
Surely this was a poor way to make the Filipinos learn to value their
association with the United States, and Mr. Taft’s commission tried to
impress the American Congress with this consideration.
“It seems hardly consistent,” they said, that “with our expressions of
purpose to build and develop the Philippine Islands ... we are thus
enriching a few of our own people at their (Filipino) expense”[5].
By 1906 the situation had not abated. When the American Governor
General Ide returned to the United States he frankly said, “By
annexation we killed the Spanish market for Philippine sugar and
tobacco, and our tariff shuts these products from the United States,
and today both these industries are prostrated”[6].
It would be fruitless to examine in detail all the steps taken by
the powerful American elements at home and abroad to aid their own
interests at the expense of others. Dr. Parker Willis, Professor
of Economics in the Washington and Lee University, after making an
exacting study of the tariff laws, finally added this convincing
summary:
Wines were taxed in such a way as to discriminate against the light
Spanish beverages and in favour of the Californian. Canned goods
were taxed according to weights of the cans, a plan which favoured
Chicago and St. Louis producers as against English. Beer was so
rated that the American product shipped in barrels was favoured
against the beer of other countries. Every effort was made to help
the American and hamper the foreign shipper[7].
An even more scholarly discussion of these discriminations was
published in the Journal of Political Economy for March, 1903.
And yet in the midst of these calamities and discriminations, President
Roosevelt was telling the American Congress, that,
No great civilized power has ever managed with such wisdom and
disinterestedness the affairs of people committed by the accident
of war to its hands[8].
Mr. Taft realized the burdens which American interests, afraid of the
so-called Asiatic competition, were thus placing on the industries of
the Philippines. He, therefore, labored hard, quietly and with infinite
patience, and finally after a campaign of nine years succeeded in
convincing the sugar and tobacco industries in the United States that a
little Philippine produce would do them little harm and would put the
Islanders in good humor. The Payne tariff law was therefore enacted in
1909, permitting the free entrance of Philippine produce up to certain
limits prescribed by the Act.
This relief was by no means satisfactory, however, for the new tariff
proposed to continue the tax on exports shipped to foreign countries
from Manila. Well did the Hon. Oscar W. Underwood tell Congress:
When you put a tax on your people for engaging in export trade,
to that extent you lessen their ability to successfully meet
their foreign competitor, and reduce the territory in which they
can successfully dispose of their surplus products abroad. _Our
forefathers in writing the Constitution of the United States,
recognizing the false principle on which the export tax was based,
put it in the fundamental law of the land that the United States
Government should not lay export_ _taxes. If we enact this law, we
write into the statute book for the Philippine Islands, legislation
which is little short of barbarous, legislation that no government
in the civilized world except Turkey and Persia, and other second
class nations countenance today[9]._
The protest was vain, for the American hemp interests won and the
provision for an export tax was adopted. The Hon. Manuel Quezon arguing
for the repeal of this export tax two years later, ably put forth this
unanswerable argument:
Although it has been decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States that the provisions of the Constitution are not in force in
the Philippines, I have serious doubts as to whether said decision
also meant that this government has the power to enact laws for the
islands which are expressly prohibited by the Constitution of the
United States[10].
In 1909, a distinguished son of Boston, the Hon. W. Cameron Forbes,
assumed the position of Governor General in the Philippines. He was
able, conscientious, and unselfish, and thoroughly convinced that the
Taft program was justified, and, as an untiring worker, was determined
to make this policy a true blessing to the Filipinos. During the
four years that he occupied that exalted position, he sacrificed his
health and his comfort in exchange for the consciousness that comes
from a job well done. His extreme courtesy, his marked sympathy for
the aspirations of the Filipinos and his deep-rooted interest in all
affairs appurtenant to the Islands made him a most gracious person to
deal with, and during his administration he made friends readily and
kept them for all time. Certainly, then, if the policy founded by Judge
Taft was the right one, no more admirable person could have been found
to administer it. If we must oppose him and criticize him, therefore,
we do so not on personal grounds but because he pursued a policy which
we believe was wrong—because the undertaking in which he engaged was
hopeless.
Governor Forbes’s inaugural address aptly characterized his policy.
Improvement in the material conditions of the Islands and the people
was the keynote of his speech, and he declared that capital was the
greatest need of the country.
Capital [he said] demands a stable government. Capital is not
particularly interested in the color or design of the flag, it
wants just and equitable laws, sound and uniform currency on the
part of the government, just and fair treatment in the courts. The
faith of the United States is pledged that all of these benefits
shall be permanently assured to the Filipinos ... There is not on
the horizon discernible any cloud which indicates the possibility
of any kind of disturbance in the present status of these Islands,
either from within or without, by war or insurrection. The United
States is strong, determined, fixed in her policy and not to be
dissuaded or coerced. The development of the Philippines will
proceed along the lines originally set forth, strictly adhered
to by each successive administration and by the gradual process
in line of declared policy.... The government should offer every
reasonable inducement to capital and should make more liberal the
land and mining laws and lessen the restrictions which are at
present discouraging investors.
In a word, then, Governor Forbes’s policy was to introduce more
capital from sources foreign to the Philippines, and thus create
material prosperity. To induce American and other foreign investors
to settle in the Islands it was also his aim to assure these men
that their investments would be protected by American control. His
ideal was not, however, novel for it was the deal also of many in his
generation and of those who had preceded him in office. This policy is
opposed, therefore, simply because it creates an interest hostile to
Philippine independence, because it makes separation more difficult
and more costly. It was capital which brought on the Boer War, it
was capital which led to the conquest of India, it is capital which
promotes the aggression of the strong upon the weak, and so to the
policy of introducing material improvements by foreign capital while
the Philippines are yet in a state of dependence, their people are
absolutely opposed.
If the Filipinos must be taught something about Yankee ingenuity,
let them be taught to help themselves with their own resources, and
not with the money of others. Set before them, as was set before the
founders of the American republic, “the glorious prospect of entire
independence,” that it may “breathe into them anew the breath of life,”
as it did into the breasts of those who have gone before them. And if
foreign capital must come into the Philippines, as it will inevitably
come, let it come when the Islands are independent, so that it may
settle as it has settled in Mexico and Cuba with the full understanding
that it is the native government upon which it must depend for
security. This policy, though investments may be slow at first, will
encourage foreign capital more and more as the peoples of the world
learn to look upon the Filipinos as human beings anxious to contribute
their modest share to the welfare of mankind. Is this not infinitely
better than the policy which to this day tells the sensitive Filipinos,—
no matter what you think, we shall act without regard to your
wishes as we alone are fit to judge of your ability; we alone will
decide when independence is
good for you; meanwhile you shall have no voice in your government save
that which we choose to give you.
How absolute the American control of the Philippine treasury has
been to this day was stated in the leading editorial of the Boston
_Transcript_ for September 24, 1925, from which the following is a
quotation:
The American people are brought to a crisis in their and the
government’s relations with the Philippine Islands by the decision
of the Philippine Supreme Court that rulings of the insular auditor
are not definitive, but may be appealed to the local courts. _The
power of the Philippine auditor (an American official) subject
to that of the Governor-General and the United States Secretary
of War, is absolutely necessary to the maintenance of American
authority in the islands...._ The present decision has been
promptly appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and no doubt
a prompt ruling will be handed down from that tribunal. If it
should sustain the Philippine decision, the decisive authority of
the American government in the islands would be at an end, and the
islands themselves might as well be turned over to the Filipinos.
In other words one subordinate official with a salary of six thousand
dollars must have absolute control over the use which is made of taxes
raised from eleven millions of people. What nation would submit to
such tyranny? How would such an officer appointed by the Governor of
New York be received in Massachusetts?
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER XI
[1] Speech before Manila Quill Club, Jan. 25, 1909.
[2] _New York Evening Post_, June 11, 1904.
[3] Speech at Memphis, Nov. 19, 1902.
[4] Report of U. S. Phil. Comm., 1904, pt. 1, p. 26.
[5] Report of U. S. Phil. Comm., 1905, pt. 1, p. 72.
[6] _New York Independent_, Nov. 22, 1906.
[7] _Our Philippine Problem_, pp. 274-5.
[8] Message to Congress, Jan. 27, 1908.
[9] Speech in House of Rep., May 18, 1909, See Cong. Rec., p.
2009.
[10] Speech in House of Rep., Aug. 19, 1911.
CHAPTER XII
+The Attitude of President Coolidge+
To lessen the absolute power of the American representatives in the
Philippines, and in order to fulfill the promise of the Philippine
plank in the Democratic platform of 1912 which had declared for an
immediate declaration of the nation’s purpose “to recognize the
independence of the Philippine Islands as soon as a stable government”
could be established, Mr. Jones of Virginia introduced a bill in the
House of Representatives in August, 1914. The bill which passed the
House besides providing for a more popular and autonomous form of
government, contained a preamble to the effect that it was and always
had been “the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw
their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their
independence as soon as a stable government could be established
therein.”
When the bill was presented to the Senate, however, the preamble was
slightly changed. Independence, according to the Senate bill was to
be granted when, in the judgment of the United States it would be “to
the permanent interests of the Philippine Islands.” The question thus
naturally arose when the bill was under discussion whether the new
proposal really paved the way for independence.
Suppose [asked Senator Cummings of Iowa] that I believe it would
be better for the people of the Philippine Islands to remain
permanently attached to the United States as a state, with all the
privileges of a state or otherwise, would I not fulfill the promise
or assurance of the preamble in voting to retain the Philippine
Islands as a part of the territory of the United States?
To this question. Senator Hitchcock who was supporting the new preamble
candidly replied, “I presume the Senator would.”
Interest was thus aroused by this sudden revelation that the preamble
as now worded did not explicitly pledge independence after all. To put
an end to this uncertainty, and in order to show the seriousness of the
pledge which the Administration wished to give the Filipinos, Senator
Clarke of Arkansas introduced an amendment authorizing the President of
the United States to definitely “withdraw and surrender all right of
possession, supervision, jurisdiction, control, and sovereignty” over
the Philippine Islands and requiring that the transfer of possession
and sovereignty be made absolute in not less than two nor more than
four years. The proposed measure also authorized the President to
acquire land sites desired by the United States for naval and coaling
stations in the Philippines.
So strong was the feeling in the Senate in favor of Philippine autonomy
that this unexpected proposal, grave and far-reaching as it was meant
to be, was successfully carried. When the final vote was taken the
measure was accepted, the vote being fifty-two against twenty-four, the
Democrats solidly voting for it and carrying six Republican ballots
as well. Never had the Filipinos been as near their goal as on this
occasion. It was certainly the most decisive step ever taken by a
branch of the American Congress.
When the news was cabled to the Philippines, the Filipinos greeted
their triumph with enthusiasm and hopes that the House would likewise
vote favorably on the bill. It will be remembered that ever since
the American occupation of 1898 neither House of Congress had made a
definite statement of America’s policy. When the bill, as amended, was
brought before the House, however, it suffered another change.
It was found necessary to hold a conference between the committees of
the two Houses in order to reconcile the varying views regarding the
liberty to be granted the Filipinos. As finally passed and enacted
into law by both Houses, the Jones Bill made the statement that “it
is and always has been the purpose of the people of the United States
to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to
recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be
established therein.” In order to speedily accomplish this purpose the
new law also granted immediately a larger share of self-government in
matters of domestic concern. The importance of this measure, however,
which had the approbation of both Houses, lay in the pledge which for
eighteen years a Republican administration had been able to avoid.
Now, however, not only was America’s word given, but a test had also
been provided—that of a stable government. The problem of the future
must therefore be limited to the question whether the Filipinos had
succeeded in establishing a stable government.
In accordance with the spirit of the new law, Governor Francis Burton
Harrison who had succeeded Cameron Forbes in 1913 immediately began to
place Filipinos in charge of the administration as rapidly as possible,
until the American Governor General, the Vice-Governor, the Secretary
of Public Instruction, the Insular auditor and a few minor officials
were the only Americans left in office. But the theoretical sovereignty
of the American people still remained, a sovereignty based on force
and certainly not sanctioned or even acquiesced in by the Filipino
people.
It would entail an endless array of facts and figures to recount the
progress and missteps of the new régime. But a brief survey of the most
undisputed facts would show beyond a doubt that the Filipinos were
not forgetting what had been taught them by the “self-sacrificing”
Americans. Take the matter of schooling and education. Under the Forbes
administration the attendance in public schools had reached 440,000,
but in 1921, when Governor Wood came to assume his duties he found that
the Filipinos had provided accommodations for over 1,100,000. Only
7,512,000 pesos had been spent annually for education in 1913 when
Governor Forbes left; in 1921 over 22,000,000 pesos were employed to
provide for the increased attendance in schools. Of course the number
of schools rose in proportion as well, from 2,934 in 1913, to 5,944 in
the course of Filipino administration, while the number of Filipino
teachers kept pace accordingly—from 7,671 to 17,575.
In the field of transportation the material progress effected was
just as convincing. First class roads increased from a total mileage
of 2,035 kilometers in 1913 to 4,698, or an increase of over 100 per
cent in eight years. So with inter-island coastwise traffic,—from 680
vessels with a net tonnage of 54,396, the number rose to 3,044 with a
net tonnage of 99,376.
In 1913 there were no public dispensaries giving free medical treatment
but within eight years the Filipinos established over 800 such
institutions. There were then also only two insular and six provincial
hospitals, but that was increased under Filipino “misgovernment”
to eleven insular and eleven provincial hospitals. There was only
one organization for infant welfare when the Filipinos took charge
unhampered by an American Governor General. Here was clearly a large
field for improvement as infant mortality in the Islands had in the
past been unusually heavy. They proved themselves equal to the task,
however, for by 1921 there were 615 institutions functioning for this
purpose. Death rates thus fell from 32.28 per thousand for the periods
of 1908-13, to 28.62 from 1914-19, despite the fact that an epidemic of
influenza had ravaged the Islands in 1918.
During this significant period of Philippine autonomy, of course
mistakes were made as mistakes always are made by even the best of all
governments. We do not seek to excuse them or to place responsibility
for them upon the shoulders of the American Governor General who was
on the ground and who was responsible in numerous instances for unwise
appointments. Suffice it to say that marked progress was made during
this period of trial, how marked will be shown by the report of the
investigation made by leading Republicans—of which more anon.
It was no doubt in view of these marked advances and the evident
capacity of the Filipinos to manage their own interests that President
Wilson finally informed Congress that the Filipinos had fulfilled the
required condition set before them.
Allow me to call your attention to the fact [he told the Houses of
Congress on December 7, 1920] that the people of the Philippine
Islands have succeeded in maintaining a stable government since
the last action of the Congress in their behalf, and have thus
fulfilled the condition set by the Congress as the precedent
to a consideration of granting independence to the Islands. I
respectfully submit that this condition precedent having been
fulfilled, it is now our liberty and our duty to keep our promise
to the people of those Islands, by granting them the independence
which they so honorably covet.
If the future of the Philippine Islands had been without regard to
party fortunes in the United States such a recommendation would
undoubtedly have resulted in definite action. But another political
party assumed power on March of the following year and the New
Republican President, Mr. Harding, almost immediately sent a commission
of his own to the Philippines there to make a study of the situation
in order to inform the new administration. In this action is clear
proof of the difficulties that attend the efforts of impartial
Americans to learn the exact state of affairs in the Islands, because
each administration in Washington views the problem from a different
angle and refuses to trust the findings of the party which preceded it.
Two eminent Republicans, both of whom were well-known to be against
Philippine independence, were the chosen investigators. It might
properly have occurred to the President that impartial men should have
been sent, or that at least one member of the commission should have
been in favor of independence. As it was both General Wood and Governor
Forbes who had never changed their views in regard to Philippine
independence were made final arbitrators. No one need question the
honest purposes of both men, as they stood high in the estimation of
their own fellow-citizens, but men are human and when they have for
years maintained a certain point of view they cannot approach the
subject anew with an open or judicial mind. The Filipinos, however,
hoped that they might after a more careful investigation change their
outlook.
The Wood-Forbes mission spent some six months in the Islands. They
brought back a report recommending the continuance of American
control. The commission stated that they had found marked progress
in the Islands, but recommended nevertheless that the hour for
independence had not yet come as the people needed more time “to absorb
and master the powers already in their hands.”
The field of government service was in particular the one in which the
greatest progress had been made.
We find [said the commission] that many Filipinos have shown marked
capacity for government service and that the young generation is
full of promise; that the civil service laws have been in the main
honestly administered[1]. In many positions they have shown marked
capacity and have done better than could reasonably be expected of
an inexperienced and untried people. There are many holding high
positions in the judicial, executive and educational departments
who would be a credit to any government. They are proud as they
may well be, of the advance they have made since the beginning of
American control of the Islands, for _it can be safely stated that
no people under the friendly tutelage of another have made so great
a progress in so short a time_[2].
We find [said the commission] that the legislative chambers
are conducted with dignity and decorum and are composed of
representative men[3].
These statements having been made by men known to have been opposed to
Philippine independence should be interpreted in the strongest light
possible. Can they be applied also to most of the state legislatures in
America?
Nevertheless, the commission finally concluded by submitting the
following recommendations:
1. We recommend that the present general status of the Philippine
Islands continue until the people have had time to absorb and
thoroughly master the powers already in their hands.
2. We recommend that the responsible representative of the United
States, the Governor General, have authority commensurate
with the responsibilities of his position. In case of failure
to secure the necessary corrective action by the Philippine
Legislature, we recommend that Congress declare null and void
legislation which has been enacted diminishing, limiting, or
dividing the authority granted by the Governor General under act
of Congress No. 240 known as the Jones Bill.
3. We recommend that in case of a deadlock between the Governor
General and the Philippine Senate in the confirmation of
appointments the President of the United States be authorized to
make and render the final decision.
The first general recommendation naturally meant retention for another
indefinite period of years,—a continuation of the Taft policy. The
other two meant the diminishing of powers already in the hands of
the Filipinos. The American Congress has not acted on either of the
latter, but when General Wood was appointed governor shortly after
the submission of this report it was evident to all that he would to
a large extent be influenced in the exercise of his powers by the
recommendations which he himself had made. Many there were, therefore,
who feared that a clash between him and the native legislators was
inevitable.
To put it mildly the attitude of the new Governor was that the Chief
Executive being the representative of American sovereignty was entitled
to exercise an authority over the Philippines equal to or even more
than that of the President of the United States over his own people,
inasmuch as the Governor’s veto is practically final, whereas that of
an American president may be and is in fact frequently overridden by
a legislature. Nay, more, as we have seen that the American auditor
appointed by the Governor was to have final authority over the
Philippine expenditures.
The claim of the Filipinos on the other hand may be gathered from the
words of one of its greatest leaders. Senator Osmenà. Speaking before
the Philippine barristers, he expressed Filipino sentiment in these
words:
The Filipinos know that theirs is now an autonomous régime; that
they and not the Governor General, are being subjected to a test;
that they and not the Governor General are in duty bound to
establish a stable government here, and that they and only they
are committed to the task of hastening the day for the granting
of their independence. They, therefore, have the right to follow
and be guided by their own leaders and to expect that their
control in the government of their own country be real, ample and
effective.... To surrender our present lease of governmental power
or our control over internal affairs for one reason or another, is
not only sheer cowardice; it is downright desertion of duty—treason
against the Nation[4].
Here then were two conflicting positions—the Governor claiming for
himself greater power as an executive than that wielded by an American
president, and the Philippine legislature asserting that in matters of
domestic concern they, as representatives of the people and responsible
to them, should be the ones to decide the local problems of the day.
The legislative session of 1922-23 left little doubt in the minds
of men that the conflict would not be long delayed. Following the
resignation of the Philippine Cabinet and the Council of State because,
as the Filipino leaders alleged, the Governor General was overriding
the clear law, the Filipinos decided to appeal their case to the
American people. Knowing how impossible it is for the Filipinos
to arouse the interest of Americans in these matters, they hoped,
nevertheless, that they might succeed in laying their case before
Congress. For that purpose they sent a commission to Washington headed
by Speaker Roxas of the Philippine House of Representatives.
The Commission came to state that Governor General Wood had been guilty
of illegal and arbitrary acts and that the irritation caused by his
course had led various Philippine leaders to resign their official
positions.
This event, [added the Filipino spokesman] grave and serious as
it is, once more demonstrates that the immediate and absolute
independence of the Philippines which the whole country demands,
is the only complete and satisfactory settlement of the Philippine
problem.
About the time when this delegation took its headquarters in Washington
there was a bill pending before the Committee on Insular Affairs
favoring Philippine independence. The Boston _Globe_ of March 9, 1924,
reported the progress of this bill in these terms:
The United States House of Representatives Committee on Insular
Affairs has this week voted to report out a bill favoring
Philippine independence by a vote of eleven to five. The Filipino
representatives in this country were jubilant. They felt that there
is a strong sentiment in the present Congress.... Just as the
rejoicing was highest ... President Coolidge dropped a bombshell
upon their festival of hope.
Now, what was this bombshell with which the President could defeat
Filipino aspirations without consulting Congress? It was an open letter
from the President addressed to the Filipino delegates in reply to
their list of grievances growing out of the intolerable situation in
the Islands. The President’s letter was written along familiar lines,
but it must be considered carefully, bearing in mind that it was
published just as the Insular Committee was proposing to report a bill
to grant the Islands their independence and, in the language of the New
York _Times_ of March 14, “blocked any such bill in Congress,” and was
intended to do so.
Said the President to the head of the Philippine Commission:
The extent to which the grievances which you suggest are shared
by the Filipino people has been a subject of some disagreement.
The American Government has information which justifies it in the
confidence that a very large proportion, at any rate, and possibly
a majority of the substantial citizenry of the Islands, does not
support the claim that there are grounds for serious grievances.
But does a general statement of this sort carry conviction? From whom
did the information come? What is meant by “substantial citizenry?”
What did the President mean by “the American Government”? Lincoln said
it was a “government by the people,” but the people had not received
such information nor had Congress, their chosen representatives. If
there was any reliable information why did not the President make it
known to the people or to Congress? Surely, if the President would
not rely upon the unanimous voice of the Philippine legislature,
a legislature which, in the opinion of the Wood-Forbes Report is
“composed of representative men,” it was imperative that the President
give the people the information which he had received, in order
that they might judge its value. The question is a question for the
people—not for Mr. Coolidge alone.
The President went on to say also that, “a considerable section of the
Filipino people is further of the opinion that at this time any change
which would weaken the tie between the Filipinos and the American
nation would be a misfortune to the Islands.” What is this considerable
section? What is the evidence of such a feeling? The President has no
right to act upon information which he will not disclose.
It has been years since the desire for independence by Filipinos
was firmly established. Every year since the organization of the
Philippine Legislature in 1916, and before that the Philippine Assembly
in 1907, a resolution has been adopted unanimously asking the Congress
of the United States to grant independence. There is not a single
dissenting vote in the Houses when this matter is brought up. All
political parties in the Islands are for immediate independence and
they vie with each other in their efforts to secure their country’s
freedom. There is not a single man in the Philippines who can be
elected to office if he does not advocate independence. Even the
Wood-Forbes Report substantiated this attitude, for they “found
everywhere, among the Christian Filipinos (which compose ninety per
cent of the population) the general desire for independence.” If the
President, therefore, had evidence to the contrary upon which he
could safely rely, it should have been published. It is a familiar
rule of law that “fraud lurks in general statements”—“_Dolus latet in
generalibus._”
But the President went on instead to speak of the altruism of the
United States in helping the Filipinos.
A great responsibility came _unsought_ to the American people [he
said] referring to the period of 1898. It was not imposed upon
them because they had yielded to any designs of imperialism or of
colonial expansion. The fortunes of war brought American power
to your Islands, playing the part of an unexpected and welcome
deliverer.
This claim that the Islands came to the United States unsought by the
fortunes of war has been dealt with in earlier chapters of this volume.
It was not to be wondered, however, that the President should have
again alluded to this period of the conquest in such a high-handed
manner. This method was adopted by McKinley twenty-seven years before
and it has since been handed down intact and accepted by the American
people, because they have always been too busy to look at the sources
of information or to even examine with a grain of salt these statements
though made by men presenting their side of the case and defending the
policies for which they are responsible.
But the most naïve suggestion in the President’s letter was his
statement to the commission and, through them to the Filipino people,
that they would “do well to consider most carefully the value of their
intimate association with the American nation.” These were Governor
Taft’s words nineteen years before when he expressed the hope that the
Filipinos would learn to value their connection with the United States,
while the United States would then also appreciate this “pearl of the
Oriental tropics.” Do not both these suggestions look toward permanent
retention?
Is it not also safe and reasonable to assume that ever since 1898 the
Filipinos have carefully considered the possible value of a permanent
or even an indefinite connection with the United States? Is it not
clear that having so considered it they have unequivocally expressed
for the last twenty-five years their ardent desire to terminate these
relations? What, therefore, did the President expect to gain by urging
them to reconsider a question which they have already studied and on
which their attitude has never varied?
Even with the presence of the American flag in the Islands today the
archipelago is one of the most poorly protected lands in the world.
Any considerable force can easily overthrow the scanty representation
of American arms in the Islands, and it is absurd to believe that the
American people would permit a President or a Secretary of War to
send the forces necessary to protect eleven millions of “inferior”
people. Nor have the Filipinos forgotten that when their peace was last
endangered during the World War, orders were given to the American
military and naval forces to leave the Islands in the event of a
threatened attack.
What respect does the President pay to the solemn promise made by
the government of the United States in the Jones Law that as soon
as the Filipinos had established a stable government they should be
granted their independence? Here is a promise and a test to decide
when independence should be granted. The Filipinos have contended that
this test has been satisfied by them. President Wilson upheld this
contention and President Coolidge added some support to this when he
said in his letter that:
In education, in cultural advancement, in political conceptions and
institutional development, the Filipino people have demonstrated a
capacity which cannot but justify high hopes for their future.
But the President stated his conclusion, nevertheless, that
there had not been thus far a full realization of the fundamental
ideals of Democratic government. There have been evidences of a
certain inability or unwillingness to recognize that this type
of governmental organization rests upon the theory of complete
separation of the legislative, executive and judicial functions.
There have been many evidences of a disposition to extend the
functions of the legislature and thereby curtail the proper
authority of the executive,
which under the veil of generality means that the Governor General and
the Philippine legislature have disagreed. Such disagreements are not
rare in the realm of American national and state government, but it
has never been suggested that they were proof of political incapacity
on the part of the legislatures or of infallibility on the part of the
President. Is the President entitled to make this opinion of his, with
no statements of the facts on which he relies, binding on two nations?
Are not his fellow-citizens entitled to weigh the “evidences” to which
he refers?
In a word, therefore, we find the President brushing aside the test of
a stable government made by Congress in 1916 and substituting in its
place several tests of his own, such as a legislature acting in entire
harmony with a Governor appointed by him but paid out of the taxes
raised from the Filipino people. Wherein does the President get the
authority to make this test? How many independent nations in the world
today can establish the clear recognition of the separation of powers
which the President wants the Filipinos to achieve before independence
is granted them? Even in the United States the relative weight of each
department in the Federal government varies from time to time and in no
other country in the world does the American experiment prevail—and yet
they are all independent.
Suppose the President’s test is applied to himself. Where does our
constitution give him the power to determine the future of eleven
millions of men and their relations with the United States? Who gives
him the right to decide whether their government corresponds with
the American ideals or not? Did not the Supreme Court of the United
States unequivocally declare that the “Constitution of the United
States did not follow the flag” into the Philippines, as it does in the
American territories? Did not even McKinley himself announce from the
beginning of the occupation that America had no intention of applying
her own theories of government in the Islands, but intended rather to
insure the welfare of the Filipinos with due respect for even their
“prejudices if necessary”?[5] The powers which the President now
exercises are not executive. They are legislative and the President
usurped them to prevent Congress from exercising its legitimate right
to decide the Philippine issue.
The relations of the United States with the Philippines are peculiarly
a subject to be dealt with by Congress. This was asserted at the outset
of the occupation and has never been questioned. What right has the
President to interfere with their deliberations and seek to impose
his opinion upon them? History repeats itself, and as the Islands
were acquired and held and a war declared by the President, without
consulting Congress, so now the Executive usurps the function of
Congress and would continue the occupation of the Islands because he
approves it.
This new and impossible test set by the President really meant and will
continue to mean unless changed, that the promise made by an American
Congress in 1916 can be treated as “a scrap of paper” in order to give
place to a policy which gives the Filipinos no hope of independence as
long as an excuse may be found by the President for holding that the
government of the Islands is not what it should be, or that it does not
correspond with his ideals. Apply such tests to the American cities and
which would be left to govern itself?
For the sake of clarity let us again state the problem in the
Philippines as it arose in 1923 and as it exists today. General Wood
and the Filipinos have been and continue to be at issue, the latter
asserting that the Governor’s course has been arbitrary and lawless.
History has invariably shown that when a military officer is placed
in civil authority he is apt to irritate the people over whom he is
placed. Here was an issue—is it not reasonable to suppose that an
impartial tribunal should have settled the problem? The least partial
tribunal to which the Filipinos could state their case was Congress,
but the President took it into his own hands, and has assumed to decide
it without action by Congress.
It is a fundamental fact in the government of one people by another
that the governing power stands by its own representatives, believes in
them and is determined to sustain them. And so the President sustained
his representative on this occasion. He told the complaining Filipinos
that he had “full confidence in the ability, good intentions, fairness
and sincerity” of General Wood, and pronounced him, “a hard working,
painstaking and conscientious administrator,” finding no evidence that
he had “acted with any other than the purposes of best serving the real
interests of the Filipino people.”
What do these words mean? Only that the President approves his
appointee. But General Wood may have had one idea as to the “real
interest” of the Filipinos, and the Filipinos a very different one. He
may have sincerely adopted what he considered the proper means, and
yet in the judgment of others they may have been improper. A man may
be “hard working, painstaking and conscientious” in the pursuit of
what he thinks is good for a population, and yet be an unsuccessful
administrator lacking sympathy, wisdom and tact.
Are there not in the United States differences and deadlocks
between “conscientious, painstaking and hard working” Presidents
and Congresses; between Governors of “ability, good intentions and
fairness” and state legislatures, and between mayors and councils
in the most progressive cities of America? When a President is tried
on articles of impeachment as was Andrew Johnson, when members of
a Cabinet are forced to resign because of blundering stupidity or
dishonesty, when elected governors are sent to the state penitentiaries
for dishonest practices, do such catastrophes prove that the country is
not fit for self-government?
No one need question the honest purposes of the President or of General
Wood, but the principles on which the American government was founded
are eternal, and consistently with them the fate of a nation cannot be
decided by a few men. The New York _Times_ of March 14, 1924, gives
a glaring example of the practice which in 1898 permitted a few men
to conquer the Islands. The dispatch in question came from Washington
and described a “conference in the office of the Secretary of War”
which, the paper said, “may have an important hearing on Philippine
independence _as several American business men who have interests in
the Philippines attended_.” A list of these business men was given.
One had “extensive interests in the Islands,” another was “a member of
the Chamber of Commerce,” a third had “large sugar plantations” and a
fourth was a “hemp importer.” With these were joined Secretary Weeks,
General McIntyre and Ex-Vice-Governor Gilbert, the latter being one
of the strongest advocates of indefinite control. Here were a few
Americans with private interests at stake met to advise the Secretary
of War as to what should be done in the Philippines, and although there
were several Filipino officials in Washington at that time, not one was
present.
Is it not wiser and safer to leave the question in the hands of the
representatives of the American people, and let the issue be settled
after open debate in Congress, rather than permit the President to
dispose of the Islands according to the counsel of men whom he believes
“able to give the best advice” but whom he does not name, or by secret
meetings between the Secretary of War and interested American business
men?
Just as President McKinley deliberately settled the fate of the
Islands without consulting Congress in accordance with the desires of
a few selfish Americans who believed in trade expansion, President
Coolidge in March, 1924, blocked favorable action by Congress in behalf
of the Filipinos and, at the behest apparently of a few American
capitalists, undertook to settle the future of the Philippines for many
years to come. The letter of the President was but one step in this
well-conceived scheme to hold the Islands permanently, or at least
until the interest of these trade expansionists no longer warrants
the maintenance of “a door to the commercial markets of the Far East.”
The plan will succeed, unless the American people realize in time what
“benevolent assimilation” really means.
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER XII
[1] Wood-Forbes Report, p. 45.
[2] _Ibid._, p. 18.
[3] _Ibid._, p. 45.
[4] Speech on Dec. 7, 1923, Manila.
[5] Instructions to first Philippine Commission.
CHAPTER XIII
AN APPEAL TO REASON
The arguments of those, who would retain the Islands purely for
so-called benevolent motives, today consist mostly in prophecies of
disaster. These men claim to see the downfall of all that is good in
the Philippines in the event of American withdrawal. Suppose we view
the record which the Filipinos have made within the last quarter of
a century. We need not do this in detail, as that would demand too
much time and space, but we can view the work as the American critics
themselves have seen it.
An examination, therefore, would show that the record of the Filipinos
has been like that of every other nation in the world for a similar
period of time. There has been unwise legislation and excellent
legislation. There have been ill-advised appointments as there are in
every country on earth, but there have also been admirable choices for
administrative and judicial positions. The people have regularly held
their elections with earnestness but with fairness, and with orderly
conduct. Said Governor General Wood to the Philippine Legislature in
1922:
I congratulate you and through you the Filipino people, on
the orderly and lawful conduct of the recent elections which,
notwithstanding the keenness of the struggle and the appearance of
a strong new party in the field, were conducted with due regard
to the rights of the candidates and with the absence of fraud and
irregularity which would be a credit to any people.
Of course, the Filipinos have made mistakes. There have been errors
in the conduct of their affairs, and these, sad to relate, have been
meticulously picked out, enlarged, colored and blazoned before the
American public by the retentionists who would fain base their campaign
for indefinite control on the ground that the natives are incapable of
governing themselves. But on the whole, what does the record show? The
Wood-Forbes mission after spending six months in the Islands making the
most exhaustive investigation for a report to a Republican President
said, “no people under the friendly tutelage of another, have made so
great a progress in so short a time”[1]. The Filipino progress in the
estimation of the late President Harding “is without parallel anywhere
in the world”[2]. Are these testimonials not convincing enough? Must
there be absolute perfection? Must there be a Utopia in the Islands?
But there are those who would say that this progress has been due
entirely to the “constant support and supervision at every step by
Americans.” This is a great assumption. That is what every teacher is
apt to think of a pupil’s achievement, but the pupils seldom agree and
they generally have a right to think differently. The good schools,
the good roads, the good water, the improved sanitary conditions—how
were they achieved? At the outset the Americans contributed advice
and direction—the Filipinos contributed the money and the labor.
Now practically all four elements are contributed by the Filipinos
themselves. If more American advice is needed in the future along these
lines, this advice can be secured by paying for it as has been done
in the past, but it will then be cheaper because there will be none
of the heavy expenses attending American administration. This is what
Asiatic nations like Siam have done, and they have achieved success and
prosperity and have also maintained their honor as well.
It was Mr. Taft who at one time said that to confer independence
upon the Filipinos would be “to subject the great mass of their
people to the dominance of an oligarchical and probably exploiting
minority.” Where have the Filipinos been all these years? For a long
time they were under the domination of five oligarchs, the American
Commissioners, and with the passing of years that number was reduced to
one—the American Governor General under no responsibility to the people
over whom he rules. This kind of oligarchy has been a stubborn fact—the
Filipino “oligarchical minority” is a pure fancy.
That there will be leaders among the Filipinos is undoubtedly true,
just as there are leaders and “bosses” in the political circles of the
United States, and these leaders, like all leaders, will be a minority
of the people, but they will at least be men of the same blood, the
same aspirations, and the same traditions as their followers. These
leaders will at least understand their constituents and have respect
for them and sympathize with them, which is a very different thing
from the government of millions of people by a few foreigners who
look down upon the governed as members of an inferior race, and upon
that assumption rest their right to govern. Well did Mr. Curry of New
Mexico, who served eight years in the Philippines as governor of three
provinces, finally say:
The government which the Filipinos will establish may not be
approved by the ordinary American citizen, but it will suit the
Filipinos themselves.
And that is the final test. The best government for any people is the
government which they like.
Let us examine even more closely, however, the prophecy that if given
entire independence the Filipinos would “fall a prey to the strongest
of the sectional aggregations.” What does that statement mean? It
means only that the strongest party will carry the elections, and the
defeated party like all defeated parties here and elsewhere will bewail
the fact that the country has become a “prey” to the officers in power.
These prophecies are the familiar weapons of political contests. They
do not frighten the Filipinos and they should not frighten Americans.
There is also the prophecy among retentionists that the Filipinos, if
independent, will give up all that is good and take to mutual slaughter
as the best way to settle their domestic difficulties. This argument
is absurd. Filipinos have learned that good water is healthy and that
good roads are useful, and they have no more desire to die of disease
or to be killed in battle than peaceful Americans have. The instinct
of self-preservation is as strong among them as it is among the
Anglo-Saxons.
The Philippine schools which received such great impetus under early
American guidance, why did they become so pronouncedly successful? Why
are there more than a million children attending schools today? It is
because the Filipinos have sent their children there to be taught.
What made them do this? No law has compelled it. The children went
and studied because they wanted to learn—Americans did not implant
the desire in their breasts. It was already there in 1900 and it will
remain there when America has gone.
How is the rest of the world today faring in this matter of
self-government? Are there not nations all over the world governing
themselves, not as the United States would have them, but as they
themselves prefer? Nor are the eyes of the American people free from
beams. We have only to read the morning paper to see things proposed
and too often carried out by American governors, legislators, and
statesmen, municipal, state and national, that more intelligent
Americans deplore. And yet the remedy for these evils is not to invite
some more successful nation to come and govern the United States, but
to let the parties in error correct the abuses themselves. Well did
President Eliot say:
“Political freedom means freedom to be feeble, foolish and sinful in
public affairs as well as freedom to be strong, wise and good.”
And this is true of all freedom—individual or political. If the
Filipinos should quarrel, therefore, which they have not yet done
where the national independence of their country has been concerned,
let the nation now free, whose way to freedom has not been made through
dissension and folly, through bloodshed and civil war, cast the first
stone.
But does bloodshed and civil war necessarily threaten the future of
a Philippine republic? Too often it has been said that anarchy would
inevitably ensue if the United States left the Islands. Let us look at
this closely. When the American troops reached the Islands in 1898,
there was no anarchy and the Filipinos were governing themselves. But
more blood was shed in the Filipino-American war that ensued than in
the three hundred years of Spanish oppression. There is no reason to
think that Asiatics are more prone to civil war than Europeans. Turn
the pages of history! The War of the Roses, the English Revolution and
the wars with Scotland and Ireland occurred while the British nation
was in the making. Gettysburg and Antietam, Fredericksburg and Cold
Harbor—do not these names mean something to Americans? Are there not
gray-haired men even today who remember the days when Americans killed
their brother Americans on the field of battle? Remember that, and then
bear in mind that Asiatic nations have endured as long as the memory of
men extends, undestroyed by civil war. Why then should it be assumed
that the Filipinos would develop a passion for slaughtering each other
which would exceed the measure allowed to civilized nations?
Nor is this all. The history of the Philippines has shown that its
people are natural republicans possessed of the democratic spirit, and
the more recent pages of their history are illumined with the most
eloquent proofs of their unity. Whenever or wherever the opportunity
has been presented to them they have availed themselves of it by an
attempt to establish a republic. When the American people first became
acquainted with the Filipinos the latter were engaged in a fight for
national independence. When success seemed within reach they set up not
a Tagalo Republic, or a Republic of Luzon, but a Philippine Republic
established by representatives from the Islands. They did not then
draw a separate constitution for each province but instead prepared a
constitution for the whole group of islands, and when the national hymn
was composed by the revolutionists it was addressed not to any portion
of the archipelago but to the whole adored fatherland. There is not a
region in the whole archipelago which has not been sprinkled with the
blood of its inhabitants in their struggle for the liberty of their
country. “They could have had any number of men,” said Admiral Dewey in
1898, “it was just a question of arming them. They could have had the
whole population.”
A great deal of harm has been done by Americans who misrepresent the
true condition of the Philippines, that of calling the Filipinos
tribesmen in particular being the most current infamy. The Filipinos
know that to this day they are being thus discredited by innuendo
if not by direct misrepresentation. They know that the majority of
Americans in the Islands look upon them with undue authority and hardly
concealed contempt. This attitude is not new to an Anglo-Saxon and
where there is political mastery as well, the feeling of superiority
is augmented. All this is, of course, offensive to the Filipino and it
is an offense which seriously threatens the respect and the admiration
which they have for all liberty-loving and democratic Americans.
Assuming, however, for the purposes of argument, that the American
administration has governed well, what is there to assure the
continuance of good government under their supervision? The whole
policy of today which was really begun by Mr. Taft is founded on
the assumption that the American people are and will continue to be
unselfish toward the Filipino, and that they can be trusted as well to
keep men in office anxious to carry out this unselfish and altruistic
policy. Is this view compatible with human nature as justified by the
experience of the American people at home? Have they forgotten the
Tweed Ring and the Teapot Dome, to give only two illustrations?
There will always be in the future, as there has been in the past, a
body of Americans anxious to make money and hoping to find it in the
Philippines. There will always be governors naturally solicitous for
the success of their administration and unwilling to disclose the
facts which might lead to criticism or condemnation. They will always
tell some of the Americans at home, as Mr. Taft told some thousands
of “excellent and prominent gentlemen,” not to intermeddle because
they are “very little able to understand” the situation. And then, of
course, there will always be the great body of the good-natured but
over-busy American people knowing little and caring less about their
distant subjects and believing what Americans say about them because
the latter are of their own flesh and blood. How many, how many indeed,
are the Americans today who, on finding a small headline in some
obscure corner of the daily newspaper to the effect that the “Filipinos
want independence,” casually dismiss the subject by remarking, “Oh
well, they shall have it when they are ready.”
It is in that manner that the good-natured American prides himself
on the fair dealing which Filipinos are to receive from people of
an alien race. Why do not these Americans pause a moment to consider
whether their own house is in such good order, and whether they are
willing to trust their own countrymen in matters concerning the life
and the destiny of their own country. Do they not see their own
officials, judges, mayors, governors and legislators directly opposed
to public opinion and severely criticized in the newspapers and on the
stump? So little is their trust in their own elected officers that they
do not in many jurisdictions permit these men to occupy their positions
for even a brief period of time without the additional safeguard of
the recall, the initiative and the referendum, or a provision against
re-election.
When we find representatives of a defeated political party in America
prophesying all sorts of evil because their opponents, men of the
same blood, color and ability as themselves, are placed in power by a
majority vote,—when Americans will not trust Americans at home, how can
the good-natured citizen, with nothing at stake in the Philippines,
confidently hope that men can be trusted with absolute power over
millions of aliens whom they consider their inferiors, and where
there is no public opinion which they may fear, no American press to
criticize them, no initiative, no referendum, no recall? Does the graft
which disgraces every city in the United States disappear in the
Philippines? Men are essentially selfish, and power is always used to
benefit him who wields it.
There is another argument, however, which has been constantly urged by
retentionists as well as by well-meaning Americans to the effect that
an independent Philippines would become a prey to Japanese aggression
and commercial exploitation. What are these arguments worth? It is well
for these kindly Americans to first consider certain significant facts
concerning Filipino-Japanese relations.
In the first place, then, it must be remembered that the Japanese and
Filipinos always have maintained the best of relations. Both peoples
respect each other, both nations sympathize with one another. Japan
has also every desire to gain the abiding confidence of the Filipinos
for, as the leader of the Far East, she wants all the other smaller
nations to look upon her as their champion and their defender. She can,
therefore, ill afford to make any move which may create the enmity of
eleven million people.
Nor has Japan shown any desire to make the Philippines a “hitching
post” as Secretary Day of McKinley’s cabinet had openly advocated
twenty-seven years ago. Although Filipino doors have been open to
Japanese immigration in the past, less than seven thousand have availed
themselves of it, the tropical climate of the archipelago being
extremely distasteful to them.
Assume, however, that Japan does cherish secret intentions against
Filipino autonomy, there is this to be considered,—that a Japanese base
on Philippine waters would be a direct threat to British supremacy in
that corner of the world. Hongkong is thirty-six hours by passenger
steamer from Manila, Borneo almost touches the island of Palawan,
Singapore is but a step away, and even Australia may well be considered
to be on the direct line of trade. Is it conceivable then that Great
Britain will permit Japanese occupancy without raising a hand of
protest? And it is currently known that English statesmen wield a
mighty influence in the foreign affairs of the Japanese Empire.
Japan has, furthermore, made it clear through the utterances of her
acknowledged statesmen that if a proposal to neutralize the Philippines
were made she would be among the first to affix her seal to such
a binding covenant. Now these covenants of neutralization are, of
course, not final, and they cannot guarantee for all time the security
of the archipelago. But this much is certain,—that promises of that
nature become sacred in the eyes of the world and if openly repudiated
turn friends into foes. Where the interests of other nations become
endangered, who having relied upon such promises, as well they might,
have acted upon them, repudiation makes war justifiable. Well did Japan
herself herald her participation in the World War in these words:
We of Japan took up arms against Germany because a solemn treaty
was not to us “a scrap of paper”.... We are in the war, we insist
on being in it, and we shall stay in it because earnestly, as a
nation and as individuals, we believe in the righteousness of
the cause for which we stand; because we believe that only by a
complete victory for that cause can there be made a righteous,
honorable and permanent peace, so that this world may be made safe
for all men to live in, so that all nations may work out their
destinies untramelled by fear[3].
And the Filipinos believe in the Japanese word even if the Congress of
the United States apparently does not. Both peoples also realize that
they have everything to gain by maintaining an attitude of friendship
and coöperation because their economic interests demand it, Japan being
essentially a manufacturing nation and the Philippines thriving purely
on agriculture. And as peoples of the Far East they have additional
reason to stand on good terms, that they may present a direct front to
Anglo-Saxon aggressions.
What now of American exploitation in the Philippines? Early in 1924,
the American Chamber of Commerce in Manila issued for the third
time a little pamphlet which was widely distributed in the United
States. It was entitled, the _Philippine Problem Presented from a New
Angle_. After elaborately building an argument to the effect that the
Philippines can never be given their independence by Congress because
they are as much a part of American domain as California and Louisiana,
and hence can only be alienated by a constitutional amendment,
these boosters of Philippine trade presented the following tempting
considerations to the American public at home.
They said:
1. No unconditional promise of independence has ever been made [to
the Filipinos] even in the preamble to the Jones Bill[4].
2. We are here by right, we are here by conquest and we have a
title by conquest and a title by purchase[5].
3. We are here as possessors, and we are here as sovereigns; we are
here as owners and controllers of absolute sovereignty[6].
4. The Philippines are larger than New England and Pennsylvania
combined.... They are United States territory ... [and are]
inalienable by Congress[7].
5. The American people own 63,000,000 acres of public domain in
this territory[8].
6. Your Philippine territory is the base for your trade with
China[9].
7. This portion of the world is the great arena of future
commerce[10].
8. Hard fibre! Magic phrase of commerce! The product that beckoned
the first Yankee clippers to Manila! In its Philippine territory
the United States holds exclusively the premier hard fibre region
of the world, sole source of Manila hemp that binds the homeland
harvests and outfits homeland ships. The homeland requires
two-thirds of all Manila hemp grown in this territory and none of
merchantable quality grows elsewhere[11].
9. In this territory homeland farm products find a growing annual
market. And so with homeland manufactures[12].
10. Think about this territory; learn about this territory; tell
your Congressmen to lay off of this territory as to base attempts
to withdraw or curtail your sovereignty![13]
11. Take a national view of this territory; endorse the organized
territory movement. We need such an act[14].
12. “Vizualize!”[15]
And so on _ad infinitum_,
(Signed) +The American Chamber of
Commerce of the Philippine Islands.+
These statements need no comment. They are self-incriminating and
constitute in the face of all fair opposition the strongest arguments
why the Philippines should be free. This movement on the part of the
American business men in the Islands was, of course, not new. In the
past as in the present, they have been one of the most fruitful
sources for the propagation of misinformation regarding Filipino
incapacity. Can the statements of Americans in the Philippines be worth
a whit, in the face of this evidence?
Let the American public, therefore, be warned for the drive has not
abated. Today we find business interests and even public men openly
advocating the retention of the Islands, not indefinitely but for all
time, in order that the American nation may ride on inflated wheels.
America will never let the Philippines go [said Congressman James
Begg to the Filipinos during his visit to the Islands a few months
ago]. She cannot.... Much of America’s future prosperity is
intertwined with the future of the Far East. The Philippines are
America’s outposts in the doorway to the Orient.... America is now
on the ground. Our troops are here, our flag is here[16].
Do the American people sanction these views? If they do, then they
should say so openly and frankly,—it would be more humane and less
cowardly. If they do not, and we believe that the latter is the truth,
then it is time that an overwhelming public sentiment should make
itself felt against these imperialists and thus destroy the greatest
menace which lies in the path of Filipino autonomy, of Filipino
freedom, of Filipino life itself.
But there is an even deeper reason why delay may prove fatal. Today,
the United States is the greatest nation in the world of men. But that
distinction has also been enjoyed by other nations as well, who then
felt so secure and so confident in their positions that no one dared
prophesy the ruin which the future held in store for them. Persia,
Greece, Rome, Spain—where are they today?
When the French historian Guizot asked Lowell how long the American
republic would last, he replied, “As long as the ideas of the men who
founded it continue dominant.” These ideas are indeed the foundation of
the American government, and whatever weakens them endangers the life
of the Republic.
There are today certain domestic problems which threaten the security
of the nation and which Americans must definitely settle among
themselves. There is the question of restraining the power of capital
and suppressing the excesses of labor; there is the task of hindering
the immoderate usurpation of governmental powers by a minority, and
there is the nation-wide effort to inculcate in the minds of the masses
the necessity of obedience to law. To meet these problems the American
people must have a deeply-rooted faith in their institutions and a
passionate love of justice.
They cannot, therefore, afford to insist that the American Declaration
of Independence was not meant to apply to the Filipinos; they cannot
repudiate the words of the men who framed that document when they said,
“Let it be remembered that it has ever been the pride and boast of
America that the rights for which we contended were the rights of human
nature”; they cannot govern millions of men in a foreign land where the
constitution does not protect them,—and still hope to preserve in full
strength that faith in the equal rights of men which is the soul of the
American nation.
Truly did Froude say,
If there be one lesson which history clearly teaches, it is this,
that free nations cannot govern subject provinces. If they are
unable or unwilling to admit their dependencies to share their own
constitution, the constitution itself will fall to pieces, through
mere incompetence for its duties.
This, then, is an appeal to reason,—if a Federal Union cannot live half
slave and half free, can it live with millions of men denied a voice in
the government which controls them?
How long will the people of the United States assert a right to a
foreign country conquered confessedly by “criminal aggression” and held
by acts carefully kept from their knowledge through misrepresentation,
concealment and what Mr. Lodge called “hypocritical pretences” of
altruism? The people of the United States consider themselves
sensible, keen and benevolent. Can they read the record presented in
these pages and not resent the things which have been done in their
name and insist upon a new assertion of the great principles upon which
their government rests?
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER XIII
[1] Wood-Forbes Report, p. 11.
[2] Reply to Second Independence Mission.
[3] Speech of Viscount Ishii, Ambassador Extraordinary of the
Imperial Japanese Mission before the United States Senate,
August 29, 1917.
[4] _Philippine Problem Presented from a New Angle_, published by
American Chamber of Commerce, Manila, 1924, p. 8.
[5] _Ibid._, p. 10.
[6] _Ibid._, p. 10.
[7] _Ibid._, p. 75.
[8] _Ibid._
[9] _Ibid._
[10] _Ibid._
[11] _Ibid._
[12] _Ibid._
[13] _Ibid._
[14] _Ibid._
[15] _Ibid._
[16] _Philippine Free Press_ (an American weekly), July 18, 1925.
Transcriber’s Notes:
• Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_).
• Text enclosed by pluses is in small caps (+small caps+).
• Obvious typographical errors have been silently corrected.
• Redundant half-title pages and blank pages were removed.
• New original cover art included with this eBook is granted to the
public domain.
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