The Project Gutenberg eBook, A Short History of the 6th Division, Edited
by Thomas Owen Marden
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Title: A Short History of the 6th Division
Aug. 1914-March 1919
Editor: Thomas Owen Marden
Release Date: December 15, 2006 [eBook #20115]
Language: English
***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A SHORT HISTORY OF THE 6TH
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A SHORT HISTORY OF THE 6th DIVISION
Aug. 1914-March 1919
Edited by
MAJOR-GEN. T. O. MARDEN
C.B., C.M.G.
London
Hugh Rees, Ltd.
5 & 7 Regent Street, S.W.1
1920
PREFACE
This short history has been compiled mainly from the War Diaries.
My reason for undertaking the task is that there was no one else to do
it, the units composing the Division being scattered far and wide, and
there being no Divisional habitat with local historians as in the case
of Territorial and New Army Divisions. My object is that all who
served with the Division for any period between 1914-1919 may have a
record to show that they belonged to a Division which played no
inconspicuous part in the Great War.
I regret that it has been impossible to tabulate the honours (except
V.C.s) won by officers and men of the Division, and it is also
inevitable that the names of many individuals to whom the success of
the Division in many operations was largely due should go unrecorded.
The Infantry naturally bulk large in the picture, but they would be
the first to admit that their success could not have been obtained
without the splendid co-operation of the Artillery, who are sometimes
not even mentioned in the narrative; and this theme might be
elaborated considerably.
My particular thanks are due to Lt.-Col. T. T. Grove, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
R.E., to whom the credit belongs for the form taken by the history and
the more personal portions of the history itself. I also wish to
thank Lt.-Gen. Sir J. Keir, K.C.B., D.S.O., and Major-Gen. C. Ross, C.B.,
D.S.O., as well as several Brigadiers and C.O.s, for so kindly
reviewing the periods of which they had personal knowledge.
In conclusion, I wish to add that every copy sold helps towards the
erection of Battlefield Memorials to be placed in France and Flanders.
T. O. MARDEN,
_Major-General._
_April 1920._
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. MOBILIZATION AND MOVE TO FRANCE 1
II. BATTLE OF THE AISNE 3
III. MOVE TO THE NORTH AND FIRST BATTLE
OF YPRES 6
IV. ARMENTIÈRES 10
V. YPRES SALIENT 13
VI. THE SOMME 20
VII. LOOS SALIENT 28
VIII. CAMBRAI 35
IX. GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF MARCH 1918 44
X. YPRES SALIENT AGAIN 53
XI. THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE IN THE SOUTH 58
XII. THE MARCH TO THE RHINE AND OCCUPATION
OF GERMANY 76
APPENDIX
I. BATTLE CASUALTIES 81
II. V.C.s WON BY THE DIVISION 82
III. DIARY 85
IV. ORDERS OF BATTLE ON MOBILIZATION AND ON
11th NOVEMBER 1918 102
V. CHANGES IN COMMANDS AND STAFFS 109
A SHORT HISTORY OF THE 6th DIVISION
CHAPTER I
MOBILIZATION AND MOVE TO FRANCE
1914
The Division mobilized with its Headquarters at Cork--two brigades in
Ireland, namely, the 16th Infantry Brigade at Fermoy, and the 17th
Infantry Brigade at Cork, and one Infantry Brigade--the 18th--at
Lichfield. Divisional troops mobilized in Ireland. The order for
mobilization was received at 10 p.m. on the 4th August 1914.
On the 15th August units mobilized in Ireland commenced embarkation at
Cork and Queenstown for England, and the Division was concentrated in
camps in the neighbourhood of Cambridge and Newmarket by the 18th
August.
The period from the 18th August to the 7th September was one of hard
training. Those who were with the Division at that time will also
remember, with gratitude, the many kindnesses shown them by the people
of Cambridge; the canteens and recreation rooms instituted for the
men, and the hospitality shown by colleges and individuals to the
officers. They will remember, too, their growing impatience to get
out, and their increasing fear that the Division would arrive too
late.
On the 7th September, however, entrainment for Southampton commenced,
and on the 9th the first troops of the Division disembarked at St.
Nazaire.
From St. Nazaire a long train journey, which the novelty of the
experience robbed of its tediousness, took the Division a short
distance east of Paris, where it concentrated in billets in the area
Coulommiers--Mortcerf--Marles--Chaume by the 12th September.
CHAPTER II
BATTLE OF THE AISNE
1914
The period 13th to 19th September was spent in the march to the Aisne,
where the Division arrived at a time when a certain amount of anxiety
was felt by the Higher Command. The 5th French Army on the right, the
British Army in the centre, and the 6th French Army under General
Maunoury on the left, had pushed the Germans back across the Marne,
and on the 14th September the British troops had crossed the Aisne on
the front Soissons-Bourg--the I Corps at Bourg, the II Corps at Vailly
and Missy, and the III at Venizel. The French right attack from the
direction of Rheims and the British attack by the I Corps had
progressed much faster than the left, and had reached the heights on
the line Craonne-Troyon, astride the famous Chemin des Dames. These
were now the objective of fierce attacks by the Germans, and the 6th
Division, which had been allotted originally to the III Corps, was put
into General Reserve instead, only the artillery joining the III
Corps. The units of the I Corps were very tired and weakened after the
big retreat from Mons and the subsequent hard fighting on the Marne
and Aisne, so immediately on its arrival the 18th Infantry Brigade
(Brig.-Gen. W. N. Congreve, V.C.) was ordered to relieve the 2nd
Infantry Brigade on the right of the British line. The front taken
over ran diagonally from north-east to south-west along the high
ground just south of the Chemin des Dames to the north and north-east
of Troyon. The East Yorks on the left relieved in daylight on the 19th
September the D.L.I., and the West Yorks during the night of the
19/20th September. The West Yorks had two companies in front
trenches, one company echeloned in right rear and one company in
support. The Sherwood Foresters were in reserve.
At dawn on the 20th September, the enemy delivered a heavy attack on
the I Corps and on the French left, driving in the Tirailleurs
d'Afrique and turning the flank of the West Yorks. The echeloned
company formed front to the flank, and the supporting company followed
suit. The Germans annihilated the right front company, and, using the
white flag ruse, apparently captured some of the next company. Major
Ingles, collecting a proportion of the front companies, withdrew a
short distance and counter-attacked, but was unsuccessful and lost his
life in this gallant endeavour. At about 1 p.m. a counter-attack was
delivered by the Sherwood Foresters, who were in Brigade Reserve, the
support company of the West Yorks, under Lt.-Col. Towsey, and a
squadron of the 18th Hussars from Paissy. These, advancing over the
perfectly open ground, recaptured the trenches and gallantly held them
against further attacks. In this affair the West Yorks suffered
casualties amounting approximately to 15 officers and 600 other ranks,
the Sherwood Foresters also losing 12 officers and 180 other ranks.
The temporary loss of the trenches by the West Yorks exposed the
trenches of the D.L.I, to enfilade machine-gun fire, from which they
had considerable casualties, including Majors Mander and Robb. This
was the only serious fighting in which the Division was engaged, but a
certain amount of trouble was caused by the arrival of guns from
Antwerp which fired "Black Marias," and the enfilade gun and
machine-gun fire to which portions of the main line lent themselves.
On the 21st September the 17th Infantry Brigade (Brig.-Gen. W. R. B.
Doran) relieved the 6th Infantry Brigade and the 4th Guards Brigade on
the front Fort de Metz-La Cour de Soupir, and held the portion without
much incident till 2nd October, when they were withdrawn into
Corps Reserve.
The 16th Infantry Brigade (Brig.-Gen. E. C. Ingouville-Williams)
relieved the 7th and 9th Infantry Brigades to the north-east of Vailly
on the 21st/22nd September, and remained in trenches until 12th
October, some time after the rest of the Division had gone north. They
received the thanks of the II Corps for their soldierly conduct. The
divisional artillery (Brig.-Gen. W. H. L. Paget) was in support of the
5th Division opposite Missy, but only the 2nd Brigade was engaged. It
had already been re-organized since mobilization by the inclusion, in
each of 12th, 24th and 38th Brigades, of a battery of 4.5-in.
howitzers.
The Battle of the Aisne marked the commencement of trench warfare, and
the Royal Engineers (Lt.-Col. G. C. Kemp, C.R.E.) were employed to
some extent in wiring at night.
CHAPTER III
MOVE TO THE NORTH AND FIRST BATTLE OF YPRES
1914
The diminishing pressure of the Germans on the Aisne had made it
evident that an attempt by them to reach the Channel ports would be
made very soon. This would best be frustrated by an outflanking
movement of the Allies to the north, with the ultimate aim of joining
hands with the Belgian Army at that time holding Antwerp. Sir John
French was most anxious to place the British Army in its original
position on the left of the French, as it was based on Boulogne,
Calais and Dunkirk.
The II British Corps was the first to move from the Aisne and
prolonged the French line towards La Bassée; the I and III Corps
extending inwards to relieve it. Next followed the III Corps, relieved
by the French and destined to take its place north of the II Corps
towards Bailleul.
The Cavalry Corps advanced north of the III Corps towards Kemmel, and
at a later date the I Corps, handing over to the French, was moved
towards Ypres, while the 7th Division, just arrived in France, was
directed on Menin.
The III Corps consisted of the 4th and 6th Divisions under Lt.-Gen.
Pulteney. The period 6th to 9th October was occupied in the march to
the entraining station near Compiègne. The Division detrained at St.
Omer on 10th October, and was joined by the 19th Infantry Brigade
(Brig.-Gen. Hon. F. Gordon), which remained with it until 31st May
1915. The battalions composing this brigade were 2nd R.W.F., 1st
Cameronians, 1st Middlesex, 2nd A. and S. Highlanders. The 5th
Cameronians were added on 19th November 1914.
On the 12th October the Division marched to Hazebrouck, where it
covered the detrainment of the 4th Division and came into touch with
the enemy. The latter, consisting of two Cavalry Divisions with some
Jäger (Rifle) Battalions, and at least one Division of the XIX Corps,
were fighting a rearguard action until such time as they should be
reinforced. The character of the advance may be illustrated by an
incident on the 14th October, when a platoon of the 1st R.F. (of the
Reserve Brigade) was detailed to rescue General Keir's car, which had
run into snipers near Merris. Fortunately the G.O.C. was not in it.
The reinforcement by the enemy occurred on the 20th October, on which
date began the Battle of Ypres-Armentières, generally called the First
Battle of Ypres. As far as the Division was concerned this took place
on the western portion of the ridge between Armentières and Lille, and
resulted in the Division being forced back from the line
Préniesques-Radinghem (almost on top of the ridge) to the low ground
Rue du Bois-La Boutillerie after very fierce continuous fighting from
20th to 31st October, in which the Division suffered nearly 4,000
casualties. To revert, on 13th October the III Corps advanced with the
4th Division on the left and the 6th Division on the right. An action
took place on the line of the Méteren Brook, commencing at 1 p.m. and
continuing till dark, when the 17th and 18th Infantry Brigades had
captured Méteren and Bailleul with about 400 casualties. Pushing
forward, the 17th Infantry Brigade crossed the River Lys at Bac St.
Maur, and the 18th Infantry Brigade at Sailly on the night 15/16th
October, and approached on the 17th the ridge west of Lille, where the
enemy were reported to be entrenched. The 16th Infantry Brigade now
rejoined the Division from the Aisne, and on the 18th October a
reconnaissance in force was ordered, which was brilliantly carried
out. The Buffs and Y. and L. on the right captured Radinghem
without much opposition, and advanced across a small plateau, 300
yards in width, towards the woods in which stands the Château de
Flandres. They here came under a heavy cross-fire of machine-guns and
shrapnel, and were counter-attacked and driven back. The situation,
however, was saved by Major Bayley's company of the Y. and L., which
had worked round on the left and threatened the flank of the
counter-attack, which thereon withdrew. The Y. and L. suffered
considerable casualties in this little action--Major Robertson being
killed. Meanwhile the 18th Infantry Brigade had captured Ennetières
and the south end of Capinghem, while the 17th Infantry Brigade
reached Prémesques, but was unable to take Pérenchies. The 4th
Division had not been able to cross the Lys north of Armentières,
which necessitated the 17th Infantry Brigade throwing back its flank
to l'Epinette. On the 19th October the Division entrenched on the line
it had won. To the right were French cavalry and cyclists, covering
the gap between the right of the III Corps and the left of the I Corps
near Aubers. The advance from Hazebrouck to the ridge had occupied six
days, and cost the Division some 750 casualties.
On the morning of the 20th October the Germans attacked very heavily
on the whole front. Fighting on a very extended front (five miles) and
with very little in hand, the Division was soon in difficulties,
particularly on the exposed left flank, where the Leinsters had their
three left companies quickly driven in, and the situation at midday
was critical. One company with the machine-guns was able to hold on
until the afternoon at Mont de Prémesques, and to withdraw under cover
of darkness, having inflicted heavy loss on the enemy. Meanwhile units
of other brigades were putting up a gallant fight against great odds,
each unit generally with one or both flanks unsupported. At
Ennetières, which formed rather a salient, the Sherwood Foresters held
out all day, but were attacked at dusk by three battalions and
practically annihilated or captured, only the CO., Adjutant, Q.M. and
250 other ranks remaining the next day.
The Buffs, after a splendid fight, were driven out of Radinghem, and
by night the Division was practically back on the line which it was to
hold for the next few months, and on which the German offensive of
1918 still found the British. Continuous unsuccessful attempts to
break through occurred till 31st October, when trench warfare set in.
Notable among these was the attack on the K.S.L.I. and Y. and L. on
the 23rd October, when 300 enemy dead were left in front of our
trenches; on the 18th Infantry Brigade on the night of the 27/28th
October, when the enemy captured the line, but was driven out by a
counter-attack, in which the East Yorks specially distinguished
themselves; and on the night of the 29/30th October, when the 19th
Infantry Brigade lost some trenches, but counter-attacked
successfully, and counted 200 German dead. The incident of Cpl.
Forward, 1st The Buffs, is typical of the fierce fighting. On 30th
October, when the O.C. machine-guns of The Buffs and all the team had
been killed or wounded, this gallant N.C.O. continued to fire his gun
until eventually wounded in five places, when he crawled back to
report the situation. He was rewarded with the D.C.M. During the whole
period, 20th to 30th October, the guns were woefully short of
ammunition, and consequently a greater strain was thrown on the
infantry.
CHAPTER IV
ARMENTIÈRES
1914-15
Active fighting now died away on this front, but its place was taken
by constant shelling and the deadly sniping which claimed so many
victims at this time. The weather during November and December was
truly appalling. All trenches were knee-deep and more in mud and
water, and it is on record that the B.G.C., 19th Infantry Brigade, had
his boots sucked off by the mud and went round trenches without them.
Parapets would not stand and were so flimsy that many men were shot
through them. But the weather eventually improved, material for
revetment began to appear, and by the commencement of 1915 it was
possible to move in the trenches in comparative safety.
The next few months were uneventful ones, the only incidents worthy of
remark being a visit from the King on the 2nd December; a minor
operation by the North Staffordshire Regiment on the 12th March,
resulting in the inclusion in our line of the unsavoury Epinette
Salient; the sudden move of the 16th Infantry Brigade to Vlamertinghe
at the time of the enemy's attack at St. Eloi in the middle of March,
and a little mining and counter-mining on the Frelinghien and Le
Touquet fronts in May. The minor operation at l'Epinette was a very
well-planned night affair, whereby the 17th Infantry Brigade advanced
their line 200-300 yards on a frontage of half a mile. It was carried
out by the 1st Battalion North Staffordshire Regiment and 12th Field
Company, and Sir H. Smith-Dorrien (Army Commander), in congratulating
the regiment, mentioned particularly Lieuts. Pope and Gordon for
fine leading. But if there was no heavy fighting, the trench casualties
from sniping and enemy shell-fire were quite considerable (see
Appendix). We had practically no artillery ammunition with which to
worry the enemy, as the following extract from the Divisional War
Diary shows:--
_24th April 1915._--"In view of the fighting in progress in the north
(Second Battle of Ypres) the Corps Commander allots an extra ten
rounds of shrapnel per gun for 18-pounders with a view to making a
demonstration by fire to hold the enemy in front of us." Amusing
reading in 1919!
The Division continued to hold a quiet but very extended front till
the end of May, receiving a succession of units from new Divisions to
serve their apprenticeship to trench warfare.
Amongst our visitors, during this period, were units of the 9th
Division, and some of those who have read Ian Hay's _The First Hundred
Thousand_ will have recognized in it a description of a part of the
trenches of the 19th Infantry Brigade.
During this period the four brigades each received a fifth Territorial
Battalion--the Queen's Westminsters joining on the 11th November and
being allotted to the 18th Infantry Brigade; the 5th Scottish Rifles,
who went to the 19th Infantry Brigade, joining on the 19th November;
the 2nd Battalion London Regiment joining the 17th Infantry Brigade in
February, and the 5th Battalion Loyal North Lancashire Regiment the
16th Infantry Brigade on the 15th of that month. The 38th Field
Company left the Division on the 9th April, and on the 21st December
1914 the 1st London Field Company, later the 509th, began its long
connection with the 6th Division. The Division lost its squadron of
the 19th Hussars, receiving in its place "C" squadron of the
Northamptonshire Yeomanry.
It was during the sojourn in Armentières that the "Fancies,"
without mention of whom no history of the Division would be complete,
came into being. With the "Follies," the 4th Division troupe, formed a
few weeks before them, also in Armentières, they were the forerunners
of the Divisional theatrical troupes which subsequently became
universal.
At Armentières also took place the first 6th Divisional Horse Show, a
highly successful two-day show--the first of its kind held in the
B.E.F.
On the 27th May 1915 began the relief of the Division by the 27th
Division, and on the following days its move northwards to join the
newly formed VI Corps. Major-Gen. Sir John Keir left on the 27th to
take up command of the new corps, taking with him--as B.G.,
R.A.--Brig.-Gen. W. H. L. Paget.
Major-Gen. W. N. Congreve, V.C., from the 18th Infantry Brigade,
succeeded Sir John Keir in command of the Division; Brig.-Gen.
Humphreys taking the appointment of C.R.A.
CHAPTER V
YPRES SALIENT
1915-16
On the night of the 31st May/1st June the Division took over its new
front in the Ypres Salient, commencing its long tour in that unsavoury
region, and trench casualties almost doubled immediately. It continued
in the Salient up to the end of July 1916, with three periods of rest,
each of about a month's duration: the first spent in the neighbourhood
of Houtkerque and Poperinghe, in November and December 1915; the
second in the Houtkerque-Wormhoudt area, with one brigade at a time
back at Calais from mid-March to mid-April 1916; and the third again
in the Houtkerque-Wormhoudt area from mid-June to mid-July 1916. The
nature of these rests has been humorously but not untruthfully
portrayed in the columns of _Punch_; the author of "At the Front" in
that paper having been an officer in the K.S.L.I.
The line was just hardening after the Second Battle of Ypres when the
Division moved up to the Salient, and no active operations took place
on the actual front taken over by the Division, but its artillery was
called upon to assist its neighbours on either flank, i.e. on the 16th
June when the 3rd Division attacked Bellewarde Farm north-west of
Hooge; on the 22nd June when the 42nd Infantry Brigade of the 14th
Division attempted a small operation, and on the 6th July when the 4th
Division carried out a successful minor operation near Pilkem.
On the 30th July the 14th Division was attacked at Hooge and driven
back to Sanctuary and Zouave Woods. Their counter-attacks, gallantly
delivered, but under the circumstances giving very little prospect of
success, failed, and for a time the situation was critical. The
16th Infantry Brigade was moved up to the area about Goldfish Château
(half-mile north-west of Ypres) as a precautionary measure, and was at
one time in danger of being thrown in to make a hasty counter-attack.
Fortunately this proved unnecessary, and on the 31st July the Corps
Commander decided to relieve the whole Division, and to allot to it
the task of restoring the line at Hooge in a carefully prepared
attack.
The relief was carried out on the 2nd and 3rd August 1915, and on the
6th the Division took over its front of attack, and the preparatory
bombardment was commenced. This bombardment was very carefully
planned, carried out with great thoroughness and accuracy, and was one
of the most effective and severe that had, up to that time, been put
down by the British. The artillery co-operation in the attack was on a
similar scale and equally effective, except so far as counter-battery
work against enemy artillery to the south was concerned, and the
attack owed much of its success to the assistance it received from the
artillery. To this assistance two French batteries of "75's," lent by
the 36th French Corps, ably contributed.
The attack was launched on the 9th August at 3.15 a.m. on a front of
about 1,000 yards--the 18th Infantry Brigade (Lt.-Col. F. W. Towsey)
attacking on the right with the 2nd D.L.I. in front line and the 2nd
Sherwood Foresters in support, the 16th Infantry Brigade (Brig.-Gen.
C. Nicholson) on the left, with the 1st K.S.L.I. and the 2nd Y. and L.
Regiment in front line, and the 1st The Buffs in support.
The attack was completely successful; all objectives were quickly
gained. A very large number of German dead were counted in the
recaptured position, and a considerable number of prisoners taken. The
captured position was subjected to a very heavy bombardment,
especially on the right; principally by guns firing from the
south-east, not opposite the corps front, which took the new line in
flank and often in reverse. The troops of the 18th Infantry Brigade
held on to their positions with their usual gallantry and
determination, in spite of very heavy casualties. The 2nd D.L.I.
particularly distinguished themselves by the tenacity they displayed,
and they and the 2nd Sherwood Foresters and 1st East Yorkshire
Regiment suffered severely. In face of the heavy shelling it was found
impossible on the right to establish a line on the final objective,
where all the former trenches had been entirely obliterated. The
advanced troops had accordingly to be withdrawn on this flank, but
some time after this withdrawal was thought to have been completed a
message was received from a Lance-Corporal of the 2nd D.L.I. to the
effect that he was established in the stables of the château with a
few men, and asking that rations and ammunition might be sent up to
them. On the left not only was all the ground lost on the 30th July
regained, but an important spur north of the Menin Road, which had
hitherto been in German occupation, was included in the final position
consolidated. Three officers and 124 other ranks were taken prisoners,
and over 500 of the enemy were counted dead on the captured ground.
The gallant work of the R.E. in wiring the position was specially
mentioned in the accounts from G.H.Q. which appeared in the papers.
The attack at Hooge was particularly interesting, as it was the first
attempt made to follow the barrage really closely. The barrage did
not, however, "creep" up to the German front line, but was placed
directly on it at once at zero and lifted back from there, the 6-in.
howitzers lifting slightly before the Field Artillery. The infantry
lay out as close to the barrage as possible before zero, and moved in
_on time_ as soon as the Field Artillery barrage lifted. The attack
was looked upon for some time as a model of really close co-operation
between infantry and artillery.
For this operation, skilfully planned and most gallantly and
successfully carried out, the Division received great praise. The
casualties were 70 officers and 1,700 other ranks. (A very full
account of this operation can be found in the fourth volume of _The
Great World War_, published by the Gresham Publishing Company,
Limited.)
Other incidents of the tour in the Salient were the gallant voluntary
assistance rendered on the 6th July 1915 by Lieut. Smith, 1st North
Staffords (died of wounds), with his grenadier party to a post of the
41st Brigade which was being heavily attacked, and which brought him
the thanks of General Allenby, commanding V Corps; the enemy gas
attack of 19th December 1915, when no actual attack was launched
against the Division, and the minor operations near Turco Farm and
Morteldje Estaminet on 19th-22nd April 1916. Certain trenches, D20 and
21 and Willow Walk, were much overlooked by High Command Redoubt, some
150 yards away. The Germans throughout the 19th April heavily
bombarded these trenches, and succeeded in seizing them at night. One
company 8th Bedfords and two companies Y. and L. delivered a
counter-attack in the early hours of 20th April, but could not retake
the position. The Brigadier-General therefore decided to bombard them
steadily throughout the 21st, and recapture them on the night
21st/22nd April with three companies of the K.S.L.I., then in Brigade
Reserve. This was brilliantly accomplished in spite of the very heavy
going, and the line firmly re-established, but with the loss of
Lt.-Col. Luard, commanding K.S.L.I., who died of wounds. It was found
that the enemy had dug good new trenches in several places, and
equipped them with steel loop-hole plates, and these were occupied
thankfully by our men. The general state of the trenches, commanded as
they were by the enemy's positions, in the water-logged Ypres Salient
during the winter of 1915-1916 defies description, and all praise must
be given to the regimental officers and men for their hard work
and cheerfulness under most depressing conditions.
Mention must be made of the thirty-five-mile march to Croix Dubac to
assist in an extensive raid by the Anzac Corps, made by the 24th
Brigade, R.F.A., at the shortest notice. The brigade was away ten
days.
During this period the principal change which occurred in the Order of
Battle of the Division was the arrival of the 71st Infantry Brigade
(Brig.-Gen. M. Shewen) instead of the 17th Infantry Brigade, which
took the place of the former in the 24th Division. Consequent on this
was a redistribution of battalions to brigades--the 1st Leicestershire
Regiment, from the 16th Infantry Brigade, and the 2nd Sherwood
Foresters, from the 18th Infantry Brigade, being transferred to the
71st Infantry Brigade in exchange for the 8th Bedfordshire Regiment
and the 11th Essex Regiment respectively. These exchanges took
place--the former on the 18th November 1915, the latter on the 28th
October 1915. On 1st April the 11th Leicestershire Regiment (Pioneers)
joined from the United Kingdom.
On the 11th June the 5th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment left the
Division, and on 11th October the 2nd London Regiment; on the 26th
November the 1st East Yorkshire Regiment was transferred to the 1st
Division, and on the 28th November the Queen's Westminsters left to
join the 56th Division, the 14th D.L.I. arriving the same day to take
their place in the 18th Infantry Brigade. On the 13th October the
2/2nd West Riding (later the 459th) Field Company joined. Machine-gun
companies took their place--the 18th M.G.C. in January, the 16th
M.G.C. in February, and the 71st M.G.C. in March 1916. Medium T.M.s
came into being in May 1916, and L.T.M.s in August 1916. The cyclist
company and the squadron of Northamptonshire Yeomanry also left during
this period on becoming Corps troops.
The changes in the Divisional Artillery were numerous. On 12th May the
12th Brigade, R.F.A., was broken up--the 87th Battery going to the
2nd Brigade, and the 43rd Battery to the 24th Brigade; each
battery giving one section to form "D" Battery, 38th Brigade, which
latter replaced the 34th Battery transferred on 15th February to a
T.F. Division. The 86th Battery had previously been transferred from
the 12th Brigade, R.F.A., to another Division. The 38th Brigade later
became an Army Brigade, R.F.A.
On the 14th November 1915 Major-Gen. C. Ross, D.S.O., assumed command
of the Division, on the appointment of Major-Gen. W. N. Congreve,
V.C., to the command of the XIII Corps. Lt.-Col. J. M. Shea (now
Major-Gen. Sir J. M. Shea, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O.) was succeeded as
G.S.O.1 on the 5th July 1915 by Lt.-Col. G. F. Boyd, D.S.O., D.C.M.,
who finished the war as Major-General commanding the 46th Division. On
the 29th February 1916 Major W. E. Ironside, who has since reached the
position of Major-General commanding the Allied Forces at Archangel,
was succeeded as G.S.O.2 by Major L. P. Evans of the Black Watch, who
subsequently, after winning the V.C. as a Battalion Commander,
finished the War in command of an Infantry Brigade.
A history of the Division would hardly be complete without a short
reference to "The Admiral." Many of those who knew and liked him well
by that name probably never knew him by any other. Lieut. Smith was an
owner driver in charge of a convoy of 'buses with the Royal Naval
Division at Antwerp, whence he escaped to France. In October 1914 he
seized the opportunity of an officer requiring to be taken up to join
his unit, to make his way with his car to the front. Arrived there he
contrived to get himself attached to the 6th Division Headquarters,
remaining with them until he was reported missing on the 10th June
1916. Consumed with a good healthy hatred of the enemy, and keen to be
of assistance in any way that he could, he devoted the greater part of
the time he was with the Division to experimenting with bullet-proof
shields on wheels to be propelled by manpower, a sort of embryonic
tank. His ambition was himself to take the first of these into action.
At last he was offered an opportunity of co-operating with a small
3-man pattern in a minor raid near Forward Cottage. What success he
might have achieved it is impossible to say, as in his eagerness he
preceded the shield by several yards to show the crew the way and was
hit in the neck by a splinter from a bomb. The name of Admiral's Road,
given to the road past Crossroads Farm and Forward Cottage,
commemorates the incident of which it was the scene. Later "The
Admiral" turned his attention to Bangalore torpedoes, in the use of
which he trained the unauthorised party which had long existed under
the name of the 6th Division Shield Party. With them he took part in
many raids and minor enterprises, one of which earned him the D.S.O.
On the 10th June he was reported missing from a patrol of the 9th
Norfolk Regiment, and nothing has since been heard of him. For nearly
two years he contrived to serve voluntarily with the Division, nobody
quite knows in what capacity or by what authority, and during that
time he endeared himself to all by his unfailing good nature and
cheeriness, his whole-hearted enthusiasm and his lack of fear.
It may here be mentioned that during its last "rest" the Division
carried out very hard training over dummy trenches for an attack on
the Pilkem Ridge, in conjunction with the Guards. This attack was
abandoned when the Division moved to the Somme, but it formed the
basis of the very successful attack delivered by the Guards and Welsh
Divisions in July 1917.
CHAPTER VI
THE SOMME
1916
At the end of July the Division was at last relieved from the Salient,
where it had suffered nearly 11,000 casualties during its thirteen
months' sojourn, and went south by train to join the Fifth Army.
The greater part of August was spent on the Ancre, on the front
opposite Beaumont-Hamel, making preparations for an attack which was
eventually abandoned for a time.
After a short period in reserve the Division was moved, between 6th
and 8th September, to join the XIV Corps, Fourth Army (Lt.-Gen. Lord
Cavan), to which corps it had for some time belonged up north. The XIV
Corps was the right corps of the British attack, and had its right on
the north bank of the Somme. In a succession of hard-fought battles
the Fourth Army (Gen. Sir H. S. Rawlinson) had pushed the Germans back
a considerable distance; units were feeling the strain badly, and
fresh troops were needed.
On 9th September a successful attack had given us Ginchy and Leuze
Wood, but the Germans were holding very strongly the high ground which
lies in the form of a horseshoe between the above-named points, and
which dominates the country for some distance to the south. The
trenches followed the shape of the spur roughly at the back end of the
horseshoe, and covered access was given to them by a sunken road
leading back to the deep valley which runs north from Combles.
At the top of the spur, just south of the railway and communicating
with the sunken road, was a four-sided trench in the form of a
parallelogram of some 300 yards by 150 yards, called by us the
Quadrilateral.
It was this strong point and the adjoining trenches which had held up
the advance of the Fourth Army on the 9th September, and it was the
first task of the 6th Division to obliterate the horseshoe and
straighten the line preparatory to a general attack on the 15th
September.
On 12th September attacks by the 56th Division on the south and the
Guards on the north reduced the neck of the horseshoe, or pocket, to
about 500 yards, but could not close it. The situation within the
horseshoe was undefined, and the exact positions of the Quadrilateral
and other trenches were not known, owing to the bad flying weather.
Even our own positions were in doubt, as almost every vestige of
roads, railways and even villages had disappeared under the continuous
bombardments.
On night 11/12th September the 71st Infantry Brigade (Brig.-Gen. J. F.
Edwards) relieved part of the Guards Division and the 16th Infantry
Brigade (Brig.-Gen. W. L. Osborn), part of the 56th Division, with
orders on the 13th September to straighten the line by capturing the
Quadrilateral. The 71st Infantry Brigade attacked with the Foresters
north of the railway and 9th Suffolk Regiment south of the railway,
while the 8th Bedford Regiment, who were close to the Quadrilateral on
the north-east of the Leuze Wood, co-operated by bombing up the trench
towards it. The artillery co-operation was weak, observation being
difficult, and though the troops advanced with the greatest gallantry
the northern attack could only make 500 yards, and the southern attack
of the 71st Infantry Brigade still less, while casualties from the
enemy artillery and machine-gun fire were very large.
A second attack at 6 p.m. the same day succeeded in bringing our line
to about 250 yards from the Strong Point, and in getting touch on the
right with the 16th Infantry Brigade.
Preparations were now made to include the Quadrilateral in the
general attack of the 15th September instead of making it a subsidiary
operation--a situation which recurred two years later almost to a day
in the attack on Holnon Village, and which had similar results.
The British objective for the 15th September was
Gueudecourt-Flers-Lesboeufs-Morval--the XIV Corps (Guards and 6th
Division) to capture the two latter. It was the first occasion on
which tanks were employed, and as far as the Division was concerned
was a failure, for of the three allotted to the 6th Division two broke
down before starting, and the third, moving off in accordance with
orders long before the infantry, had its periscope shot off, its
peep-holes blinded, was riddled by armour-piercing bullets, and had to
come back without achieving anything. This again found a parallel in
the attack on the Quadrilateral, near St. Quentin, on 18th September
1918, when the tanks were ineffective.
To facilitate the movement of the tanks a gap of about 200 yards had
been left in the creeping barrage. This gap unfortunately coincided
with the strongest point of the Quadrilateral. The barrage, moreover,
had passed over the German trenches by the time the infantry advanced;
the latter had, consequently, to attack up the glacis-like slopes
without any artillery support except the bombardment. This, owing to
the enemy's trenches not having been accurately located, was
ineffective.
The 16th Infantry Brigade attacked on a battalion front--one company
of the Bedfords bombing up the trench from Leuze Wood, and the
remainder over the open to the north against the south-west face. The
Buffs and York and Lancasters supported the attack, but in spite of
the greatest gallantry could not take the Strong Point.
The 1st Leicesters and the Norfolks, passing through the entrenched
Foresters and Suffolks, attacked the Quadrilateral from the north-west
with equal drive, but they too failed. Some ground, however, was
made, and by 10 a.m. the 16th Infantry Brigade on the south, and the
71st Infantry Brigade on the north, were digging in close to the
enemy's wire and trenches.
During the day constant reports arrived that the Guards had gained
their objectives, and that tanks and cheering men were moving through
Lesboeufs. It was not until the following morning that this report
was proved to be incorrect, and that it was Flers which had been
captured. In the meantime it appeared to the Divisional G.O.C.
(General Ross) that the prospect of a break-through on a large scale
was prejudiced solely by the repulse of the 6th Division. He therefore
ordered a night attack on the flanks of the Quadrilateral to be
executed by two battalions of the 18th Infantry Brigade (Brig.-Gen. R.
J. Bridgford). These battalions, the 2nd Durham Light Infantry and the
11th Essex, moved round after dark and attacked; the former from the
north, the latter from the south-east to the left of the 16th Infantry
Brigade. The 11th Essex lost direction, while the 2nd D.L.I. bombed
down a trench only to find that it did not lead into the Strong Point.
Except on the 6th Divisional front and at High Wood, which was
captured during the night, the whole line had advanced, and it was a
bitter blow to the Division to think that their sacrifices had been in
vain.
On the night of the 16/17th September the 18th Infantry Brigade
relieved the sorely-tried 71st Infantry Brigade, and fresh
preparations were made for an attack, on the 18th, of the
Quadrilateral, which had been strongly reinforced by the enemy through
the sunken road.
The K.S.L.I. dug themselves in with their left on the railway, so as
to assault the south-west face of the Strong Point. The weather having
cleared, the trenches were now carefully located from the air and
heavily bombarded, and on the 18th September, under both a stationary
and creeping barrage, and with the York and Lancasters bombing up
the trench from Leuze Wood, and the 18th Infantry Brigade (West Yorks
and 14th Durham Light Infantry) attacking the north-west face and the
trench running north from the Quadrilateral, this redoubtable Strong
Point was at last captured with comparatively small loss after what
must be conceded as a magnificent defence, and which had cost the
Division upwards of 3,500 casualties. Nine machine-guns and 160
unwounded prisoners were taken in the Quadrilateral and many Germans
killed.
The Quadrilateral once captured, the advance was carried forward for
1,000 yards to within half a mile of Morval and Lesboeufs. These,
which were the original objectives on the 13th September, were now to
be attacked on the 25th September. Relieved for rest on the 16th, the
Division came in again on 21st September, and dug good assembly
trenches. The most forward portion of the line taken over by the
Division consisted of 250 yards of one of the main German trenches,
which was held by the Germans on both flanks for some distance.
Fortunately we were in possession of the communication trench leading
up to it, and during the three nights after taking over considerable
excitement and amusement were caused by the occasional arrival of
German ration parties at our part of the trench, having failed to hit
off the part occupied by their own troops. Uttering many guttural
oaths these fled for their lives, speeded up by our machine and Lewis
guns. A few prisoners were captured in this way, and some valuable
information obtained. Spurred on apparently by the loss of their
rations, the Germans attacked on the 24th September both flanks of
this trench under cover of a mist, but were driven back without
reaching it, except on the extreme right. Here they entered a bombing
post, but were ejected, leaving one officer and twelve other ranks
dead and an unwounded prisoner, while our casualties were practically
nil.
The objective allotted to the Division for the 25th September was the
ground between the north end of Morval (attacked by 5th Division)
and the road which passes through the centre of Lesboeufs. At 12.35
p.m. the attack was launched--the 16th Infantry Brigade on the right
gaining the first objective with the Buffs, and the final objective
with K.S.L.I. and the Y. and L. On the left the 2nd D.L.I. and the
Essex captured the first objective, and the West Yorks and two
companies 14th D.L.I. the final objective. This was one of the most
successful battles on the Somme--thanks to good weather and
observation, a carefully arranged creeping barrage, and a sound
preliminary bombardment.
The Division captured over 500 prisoners, 6 machine-guns, and 4 heavy
trench-mortars. Tanks were not used. We here turned the tables on the
52nd Division, 26th Reserve Corps, our old opponents at Ypres, where
the ground was all in their favour and where they had proved
troublesome antagonists.
After consolidating its ground the Division was relieved by the 20th
Division on 30th September, and the long struggle began for the
possession of the high ground overlooking the Bapaume-Le Transloy
Road.
On 7th October the XIV Corps (20th and 56th Divisions) attacked
with only partial success, and the 6th Division was brought in
again on night 8/9th October for a general attack on the 12th
October. The enemy had dug a series of trenches named by us
Rainbow--Cloudy--Misty--Zenith, etc., a portion of which had been
captured by us, making a somewhat pronounced salient. All three
brigades were in the line, with one battalion in front trenches, the
71st Infantry Brigade (Brig.-Gen. E. Feetham) being in the salient,
with the 16th Infantry Brigade on the right and the 18th Infantry
Brigade on the left. The objective of the attack of the 12th October
was the line of trenches running north from Le Transloy.
At 2.5 p.m. the flank brigades attacked, but with only partial
success. The failure to make ground, which was general all along
the British front, was attributed to want of surprise, as we had
bombarded the position for two days, and always attacked in the early
afternoon. Further, the ground was very heavy and observation
extremely bad. The Germans were fresh troops, and fought well. Perhaps
more than anything it was due to the effect of their machine-gun fire.
Taught by our creeping barrage that machine-guns in the front line
were useless, the enemy had drawn them across the valley towards the
road, and caught our advance over the brow of the rise with accurate
distant machine-gun fire.
Changing the time of zero, the attack was renewed at 5.35 a.m. on the
15th October, the 18th Infantry Brigade on the left (2nd D.L.I. and
11th Essex) attempting to seize those portions of Cloudy and Mild
trenches still held by the enemy, while the Sherwood Foresters on
their right attacked some gun pits which lay about 200 yards in front
of their line. This latter attack succeeded, but with the great loss
of Colonel Hobbs, O.C. The Foresters, who died of his wounds. The left
attack made a little ground. A final attempt to push forward the line
was made on the 18th October by the 9th Norfolks, but was only
partially successful.
On 20th October the Division (less artillery) was relieved and moved
to the First Army, going into Corps Reserve of the I Corps, with
Divisional Headquarters at Béthune and the units in the town and
surrounding area.
The artillery of the Division (Brig.-Gen. E. S. Cleeve, C.R.A.) had
first come into action on the Somme on the 3rd September, supporting
the attack of the 16th Division on Guillemont. It was grouped and
re-grouped in accordance with the requirements of the situation, but
never as a whole covered the operations of the Division.
On the 9th November it was withdrawn and marched to First Army area,
where for about a month it covered the 56th Division, XI Corps, with
6th D.A.H.Q. at La Gorgue, rejoining the Division in I Corps in
December. Brig.-Gen. E. F. Delaforce replaced Brig.-Gen. Cleeve
as C.R.A. on 25th October.
The Division had taken part as a whole in three general attacks on the
Somme (15th and 25th September and 12th October), and had also carried
out subordinate operations on 13th and 18th September and 18th
October.
It had suffered casualties amounting to 277 officers and 6,640 other
ranks, and had well earned a rest.
CHAPTER VII
LOOS SALIENT
1916-17
On 25th November the Division took over the La Bassée sector, which
included the famous Givenchy Ridge and Cuinchy Brickstacks. After
about a month it side-stepped to the Cambrin-Hohenzollern Quarries
front of about 5,500 yards, where it remained until the 28th February
1917. All this front had a most evil repute, but so exhausted was the
enemy by the Somme fighting that this four months' trench sojourn
proved the quietest the Division ever experienced, except before the
storm of March 1918, and the casualties would have been far fewer had
it not been for several raids carried out by us.
The machine-guns of the Division were strengthened on 15th December by
the arrival of the 192nd M.G. Company, and on 2nd January 1917
Lt.-Col. G. F. B. Goldney, D.S.O., succeeded Lt.-Col. H. R. S.
Christie as C.R.E., the latter having been nearly a year with the
Division.
On the 1st March the Division took over a 11,000 yards' front
extending north from the Double Crassier at Loos with sectors
Loos--14bis--Hulluch--Hohenzollern, all three brigades being in line
and a brigade of the 21st Division also which came under the command
of G.O.C., 6th Division.
March and the first portion of April were notable for raids and
counter-raids, and for considerable artillery and trench-mortar
activity, which gave place to more or less continuous fighting
consequent on the withdrawal of the enemy opposite the right of the
Division after the successful attack by the Canadians at Vimy.
Notice was received on the morning of the 13th April that a
withdrawal was contemplated by the enemy opposite part of the
Divisional front. The right section of the front was at that time held
by the 16th Infantry Brigade, with the 2nd York and Lancaster Regiment
on its right. On the 13th April the withdrawal commenced, the enemy
being so closely followed up by the York and Lancaster Regiment that
by 6.20 p.m. the brigade was able to report the Railway Triangle in
our occupation, and the whole of the battalion in the enemy's
trenches. Our troops were into the enemy's dug-outs before the candles
left by them had burnt out.
The policy laid down for the Division was that the enemy was to be
closely followed up wherever he fell back, but that our troops were
not to be committed to a serious engagement. In accordance with these
instructions the enemy's trenches were subjected to heavy bombardment,
with pauses during which patrols were sent forward and occupied as
much ground as they could. This policy was maintained for four days,
during which the 16th Infantry Brigade pressed the enemy with such
vigour, within the limits allowed to it, that he was evidently rushed
rather farther back than had been his intention, and began to become
apprehensive as to his hold on Hill 70. The opposition stiffened on
the 15th April, and on the 16th a counter-attack drove the 1st The
Buffs back slightly, but was unsuccessful against the 8th Bedfordshire
Regiment on the right. An advanced post of the latter battalion put up
a very fine defence and maintained its position. A further attack on
this battalion on the following day again failed to shake the defence.
On the 16th April a systematic bombardment of the trenches on Hill 70
was commenced, and authority was given for a slightly greater
employment of force. Attacks on the 18th and 19th April, by the 1st
K.S.L.I. and the 8th Bedfordshire Regiment, gained some ground and
gave us between forty and fifty prisoners.
By this time continuous fighting, under very trying weather
conditions, had exhausted the 16th Infantry Brigade. In order to
maintain the pressure it became necessary to withdraw battalions from
the front of the other brigades and to put them straight in on the
offensive front, replacing them by the battalions withdrawn from that
front.
An attack by the 14th D.L.I. on the 21st April in conjunction with the
left of the 46th Division, who by this time had relieved the 24th on
the right of the 6th Division, yielded thirty-five prisoners and two
machine-guns, and disposed of a strong machine-gun nest on the Double
Crassier Railway which had been holding up our right. Two
counter-attacks were repelled, and on the 22nd April the 14th D.L.I.
and the 11th Essex Regiment delivered a combined attack. The 14th
D.L.I. secured the whole of their objective, with forty-six prisoners
and three machine-guns, but the 11th Essex Regiment was unable to gain
any ground. The 46th Division had been prevented by uncut wire from
co-operating in the attack, with the result that the 14th D.L.I.,
after enduring a very heavy bombardment with exemplary determination,
were eventually sniped and machine-gunned out of the captured line
from the houses on their right. Eventually the position stabilized
itself, with the enemy in possession of Nash Alley.
During ten days the Division had been engaged in continuous fighting
on the front of one brigade, whilst holding with the other two a front
of approximately 7,000 yards. Four battalions from other brigades, in
addition to its own four, had passed through the hands of the 16th
Infantry Brigade which was conducting the fighting. Battalions
relieved from the fighting front one night were put straight into the
line elsewhere on the following night, and battalions which had
already done a long continuous tour in the trenches were relieved one
night, put into the fighting front on the following night, and
twenty-four hours later had to deliver an attack. The enemy, concerned
about the fate of Hill 70, concentrated a very formidable
artillery on the narrow front involved, and the bombardments and
barrages on the front of attack were of exceptional severity. The
extent to which the Division was stretched on the rest of its front is
exemplified by two incidents. On one occasion an enemy raid penetrated
both our front and support lines without being detected or meeting
anyone, and came upon our reserve line by chance at the only place on
the front of the brigade concerned where there was one company in that
line. At another part of the front it was found, when normal
conditions were restored, that in an abandoned part of our front line
between two posts, the enemy had actually made himself so much at home
that he had established a small dump of rations and bombs.
For the manner in which the Division had followed up and pressed the
enemy withdrawal it received the thanks of the Commander-in-Chief.
On the 26th June 1917 the 46th Division was engaged on our right in
active operations in the outskirts of Lens. The 2nd Sherwood Foresters
and the 9th Norfolk Regiment were placed at the disposal of the 46th
Division for these operations. The 9th Norfolk Regiment was not
actively engaged, but the 2nd Sherwood Foresters, used in the later
stages of the attack, fought with great gallantry and suffered fairly
heavily.
On the 25th July the Division was relieved after a continuous tour in
the Loos front of just under five months--a period of particularly
bitter and severe trench warfare. Trench-mortaring was continuous on
both sides on the greater part of the front held, and shelling heavy.
The artillery suffered no less severely than the infantry, owing to
the very restricted choice of positions and the advantages of the
observation enjoyed by the enemy. Raids and counter-raids were
numerous. An analysis of the diary shows that during the six months
from the end of January to the end of July the Division carried out
30 raids, of which 13 were successful in obtaining their objective
and securing prisoners (total for the 13 raids: 54), 11 secured their
objective but failed to yield any prisoners, and only 6 definitely
failed. During the same period the enemy attempted 21 raids, of which
only 4 succeeded in taking prisoners, 5 entered our trenches without
securing any prisoners, and 12 were entire failures. Three of the
enemy's attempted raids yielded us prisoners, and 4 yielded
identifications. The low average of prisoners taken by us in
successful raids is attributable to two causes--first the
extraordinary precautions taken by the enemy in the latter part of the
period to avoid losing prisoners by evacuating his trenches on the
slightest alarm or remaining in his dug-outs, and secondly the
fierceness engendered in our troops by the severity of the
bombardment, and particularly of the trench-mortaring to which they
were normally subjected.
A very successful battalion raid by the 1st The Buffs on the 24th
June, which yielded 15 prisoners, might have made a better showing if
it had not followed closely on the receipt of the mail containing
accounts of an enemy bombing raid on Folkestone.
It is invidious to differentiate among so many carefully prepared and
gallantly executed enterprises, but a reference to the successful
battalion raid of the 11th Essex Regiment on the 24th March, to the
raid carried out by the 14th D.L.I. on the 15th June, in the early
morning which caught the Germans at breakfast, and particularly to the
combined raid by the 2nd D.L.I. and the 11th Essex Regiment on the
28th June, will perhaps be forgiven. The latter was an exceptionally
fine performance. It was carried out in connection with the operations
of the 46th Division already referred to, by one company from each of
the two battalions. Everything possible had been done beforehand to
induce the enemy to expect attack on the front of the Division, yet
these two companies succeeded in establishing and maintaining
themselves for one hour in the enemy's line, though constantly
counter-attacked. They inflicted very heavy casualties on the enemy,
who counter-attacked both over the open and by bombing along the
trenches. It was on this occasion that 2/Lieut. F. B. Wearne, late
11th Essex Regiment, won the V.C. Mention ought also to be made of the
very gallant repulse of an enemy raid by the 1st K.S.L.I. and the 1st
The Buffs on the 7th July. In one post of the 1st K.S.L.I. one wounded
Lewis gunner, the only survivor of his post from the enemy
bombardment, kept his gun in action and beat off the raiders.
On the 25th July the Division was relieved by the Canadians, with a
view to an attack by the latter on Hill 70, and withdrew into rest in
the Monchy Breton area with Divisional Headquarters at Ourton.
A feature of this period of rest was the very successful two-day rifle
meeting, held on the Monchy-Breton Range.
During the month's rest out of the line Major-Gen. Ross left the
Division, being succeeded in command by Major-Gen. T. O. Marden,
C.M.G., on the 19th August, and Brig.-Gen. Feetham, C.B., C.M.G., left
the 71st Infantry Brigade to assume command of the 39th Division, in
command of which he was killed in March 1918.
From the 31st July to the 5th August the 1st Leicestershire Regiment
and 9th Norfolk Regiment were away from the Division, lent to the 57th
Division to assist in a relief at the time of the gas shelling of
Armentières.
On the 24th to the 27th August the Division was relieving the
Canadians on the Hill 70 front. The month spent in that sector was one
of hard work for all ranks consolidating the newly won position, but
was without important incident.
On the 24th September the Division side-stepped into the Cité St.
Emile sector just north of Lens, and commenced preparations for an
attack north of Lens, to be carried out in conjunction with the
projected attack by the Canadian Corps on Sallaumines Hill. This
project was, however, abandoned, and on the 23rd October the
Division was withdrawn into rest in the St. Hilaire area, west of
Lillers.
Six days later it commenced its march south to the Riencourt area, to
join the Third Army for the Battle of Cambrai.
The 11th Leicesters (Pioneers) had gone north to the II Corps, to work
on light railway construction near Dickebusch on 2nd July 1917. Their
absence was much felt by the Division, and in view of the approaching
operations they were welcomed back on 6th November, when they brought
with them a letter from G.O.C., II Corps (Lt.-Gen. Jacob)
congratulating them on their excellent work.
Before leaving the subject of the tour of the Division in the
Loos-Lens front, some reference ought to be made to the successes won
during that period by the Division in horse shows. After practically
sweeping the board in all events at the I Corps show for which it was
eligible to enter, the Division secured seven first and eight second
prizes at the First Army show, as well as the cup for the best R.A.
turn-out presented by G.O.C., R.A., First Army, and also that for the
best R.E. turn-out, presented by the C.E., First Army.
The Divisional Ammunition Column secured prizes for the two best teams
of mules, the best single mule, and the best light draught horse.
CHAPTER VIII
CAMBRAI
1917
The general situation on the British Western Front in November 1917,
though fairly universally known to-day, may now be outlined, and the
hopes and aims which led to the Cambrai offensive be touched on
shortly. The prolonged and hard-fought attacks in Flanders by the
British, and in other portions of the front by the French, had caused
the enemy to concentrate his forces in the threatened sectors,
denuding those portions of the line which appeared reasonably safe and
quiet. The Cambrai sector was included among the latter, for not only
was the ground very open, forbidding to us the unseen concentration of
the large forces and masses of heavy artillery which at that period
were deemed essential, but also the Hindenburg Line was immensely
strong and the trenches so wide that the tanks in use by us could not
cross them.
This enemy sector was, therefore, particularly suitable for surprise
by us, as it was deemed by the enemy to be unassailable.
The Hindenburg Line ran north-west for six miles from the St. Quentin
Canal at Banteux to Havrincourt on the Canal du Nord, where it bent
sharply north for four miles to Moeuvres, thus making a pronounced
salient. The Commander-in-Chief's plan was to smash the salient, to
occupy the high ground overlooking Cambrai--notably the Bourlon Wood
Ridge--push cavalry through the gap in order to disorganise
communications and the arrival of reinforcements, and to roll up the
enemy's defences to the north-west.
The French held considerable forces in the immediate vicinity
to exploit successes. It was reckoned that the enemy could not
reinforce his front under forty-eight hours. Everything depended in
the first instance on successful surprise, and in the second on
securing within forty-eight hours the important tactical points within
the salient. The difficulties of surprise, which were many and
serious, were most successfully overcome, but the enterprise failed
eventually because the key points were not seized.
The principal factors operating against success were the limited hours
of daylight and the long distances to be traversed both by men and by
tanks, which, though vastly improved since 1916, were still very slow.
There was also, in the case of securing the high ground west of
Cambrai, the canal to be crossed by tanks. While smashing in the
enemy's salient we ourselves were making a salient, extending our
front, as far as the Third Army was concerned, from a straight 7,000
yards to a curving 15,000 yards, thus affording the enemy a chance of
a blow at the sides and hinges of the salient, of which he availed
himself to good purpose ten days after our initial attack.
To ensure success the troops which were to undertake operations
practised with tanks in back areas, and officers and men went through
the operation on a carefully made ground model without being aware
what ground it represented. Units were brought up just before the 20th
of November, the day of the attack, marching by night and hiding in
villages and woods by day. In some cases battalions were quartered in
flat canvas erections, looking like ammunition or supply dumps. The
6th Division were fortunate in being in woods and destroyed villages.
No unusual activity on ground or in the air was allowed, no guns
registered as had been usual, even the Home mails were stopped for a
short period, and a screen of the troops which had held the line for
some time was kept in front trenches to the last. Under General Byng's
initiative the difficulty of tanks crossing the wide Hindenburg
Line trenches was overcome by each tank carrying on its brow a huge
faggot which it deposited in the trench at its selected crossing-place,
and which gave its tail a purchase to enable it to climb the opposite
side of the trench. The ground was very suitable for tanks, as it was
moderately hard grass land, and the first portion of the attack on
much of the front was downhill.
The III Corps (Lt.-Gen. Sir W. Pulteney) was on the right, and
consisted of the 12th, 20th, and 6th Divisions, which attacked in the
order named. The left corps (IV) consisted of the 51st and 62nd
Divisions. These covered the six miles with an average frontage of one
and a half miles. The 6th Division attacked on the front Villers
Plouich-Beaucamps, with the 71st Infantry Brigade (Brig.-Gen. P. W.
Brown) on the left next to the 51st Division, the 16th Infantry
Brigade (Brig.-Gen. H. A. Walker) on the right next to the 20th
Division. These two brigades were to advance about 3,000 yards to the
first objective (Ribécourt and spur to south-east of it), and another
1,000 yards to the second objective (support system). The 18th
Infantry Brigade (Brig.-Gen. G. S. G. Craufurd) was ordered to advance
through the 71st Infantry Brigade and secure the third objective about
a mile farther on (Premy Chapel Ridge), throwing back a defensive
flank towards Flesquières for the further operations of the 51st
Division on its left and securing the flank of the 29th Division on
its right. The latter division passing through the right of the 6th
Division and the left of the 20th Division, was charged with securing
the crossings of the St. Quentin Canal at Marcoing and Masnières and
seizing the high ground at Rumilly, thus facilitating exploitation to
the south-east, preventing a concentration against the widely
stretched defensive flanks of the III Corps and threatening Cambrai.
The Divisional Artillery was reinforced during the first part of the
operations by the 17th Brigade of the 29th Division and the 181st
Brigade of the 40th Division, as well as by two R.H.A. Brigades.
Batteries moved into position and camouflaged their guns. No
registration could, of course, take place, but long practice enabled
the gunners to put down a very accurate barrage without this
desideratum.
Opposite the Division the Hindenburg Line commenced with an outpost
line 750 yards distant on the left and 250 yards on the right. This
was out of sight of our front trenches by reason of the curve of the
ground. Half a mile behind this came the main system, consisting of
two trenches 200 yards apart, the whole guarded by most formidable
belts of wire about 150 yards in depth. The interval between outpost
and main systems was sown with well-sighted and concealed machine gun
positions. A mile farther on, and on the opposite side of the valley
for the most part, ran the support system, similar to the main system.
One and a half miles farther back again was the reserve system, of
which only machine-gun dug-outs were completed, and a small amount of
wire had been erected.
Two battalions of tanks, each of thirty-six tanks, were allotted to
the Division. "B" Battalion (Lt.-Col. E. D. Bryce, D.S.O.) operated
with the 16th Infantry Brigade, and "H" Battalion (Lt.-Col. Hon. C.
Willoughby) with the 71st Infantry Brigade. The 18th Infantry Brigade
advanced without tanks. The only points which caused anxiety, provided
that the tanks functioned satisfactorily, were Couillet Wood on the
right of the 16th Infantry Brigade front, in which tanks could not
operate, and Ribécourt Village on the left of the 71st Infantry
Brigade front.
The former was successfully cleared by the Buffs, and the latter
gallantly captured by the 9th Norfolk Regiment; the 11th Essex
clearing and securing it for the advance of the 18th Infantry Brigade,
while the 71st Infantry Brigade attacked the second objective.
The 18th Infantry Brigade pushed through the 71st Infantry Brigade
and secured Premy Chapel Ridge in good time, and rendered great
assistance to the 51st Division on our left, who were held up at
Flesquières by guns in the valley picking off the tanks one by one as
they breasted the ridge. The West Yorks and the 2nd D.L.I. each
charged over the Premy Ridge spur and captured a battery at the point
of the bayonet.
At 3.15 p.m. the cavalry, who would have been of the greatest
assistance in capturing the enemy guns holding up the 51st Division,
reported that they could not advance owing to snipers in Ribécourt.
The village had been in our possession since 10 a.m., and the 18th
Infantry Brigade had passed through it at 11.30, and were now two
miles beyond it. However, the cavalry pushed through patrols before
nightfall to Nine Wood.
A company of the 9th Suffolk Regiment successfully carried out its
mission of advancing without artillery or tank support, and capturing
the bridge at Marcoing. The Division had a most successful day, with
very light casualties (about 650), capturing 28 officers and 1,227
other ranks prisoners, 23 guns, and between 40 and 50 machine-guns and
many trench-mortars, and receiving the congratulations of the Corps
Commander. Everything had gone like clockwork: the artillery had
pushed forward to advanced positions to cover the new front before
darkness came on; the machine-guns, under Major Muller, D.M.G.O., were
likewise established in their new forward positions, thanks to careful
arrangements and the use of pack animals; and the 11th Leicesters,
under Major Radford, were repairing and clearing the roads before the
third objective had been secured. The tanks, which had made surprise
possible, were most gallantly handled, and all arrangements most
carefully thought out by Col. A. Courage, D.S.O.
The next morning the 51st Division captured Flesquières from the
north, and three companies of the 14th D.L.I., moving forward
slightly in advance of them and operating with a squadron of the
Queen's Bays, entered Cantaing ahead of the 51st Division, handing
over subsequently to the 4th Gordons.
The Buffs, with the assistance of the tanks, completed the clearing of
Noyelles (a village some 2,500 yards north-east of Premy Chapel),
which had been entered the previous day by the 29th Division, and
relieved the latter there. On the night of the 26/27th November the
18th Infantry Brigade extended its left up to the south-east edge of
Cantaing.
About half a mile of the original front had been handed over to the
29th Division, and the 6th Division now held a rectangular strip 2,500
yards by 7,000 yards, with the head at Cantaing and Noyelles, and the
rear in the Hindenburg Main Line. The 29th Division had a precarious
hold of the ground across the canal on the right, and the Guards
Division was having hard fighting at Fontaine on the left.
Comparing the position with the back of a man's left hand, the 6th
Division occupied the third finger, the 29th Division the main finger,
the 20th Division the index finger, the 12th Division the portion
below the index finger down to the lower portion of the thumb when
fully extended, the 55th Division occupied the thumb. Such was the
situation when the enemy delivered a heavy counter-attack, on the
morning of the 30th November, on the 29th, 20th and 12th Divisions of
the III Corps and the 55th Division of the VII Corps, driving the 20th
and 12th Divisions on to the main finger except for a few posts, and
occupying the thumb.
The Germans reached Gouzeaucourt at about 9 a.m., but were stoutly
opposed by transport details of the 18th Infantry Brigade, who most
gallantly led by Lieut. and Quartermaster J. P. L. Shea, 2nd D.L.I.,
and Capt. and Adjutant W. Paul, 1st West Yorks, checked the enemy in a
portion of the village until it was retaken by the Guards about
midday. These two brave officers, whose initiative and sound military
action probably saved the situation from becoming much worse, were
both wounded, and subsequently died of their wounds, a great loss to
their battalions and to the Division.
A Staff-Officer arrived from the 29th Division about 9 a.m., and
reported their Divisional Headquarters just north-east of Gouzeaucourt
to have been captured and the Germans entering the village, which was
about two miles to the right rear of 6th Divisional Headquarters. The
16th Infantry Brigade, which was in Divisional Reserve in the
Hindenburg Main Line some two miles away, was ordered up to the ridge
between Beaucamps and Gouzeaucourt. Brig.-Gen. Walker, commanding 16th
Infantry Brigade, who was ordered to report to G.O.C., 29th Division,
at Gouzeaucourt, narrowly escaped capture, together with his
Brigade-Major, the enemy now being in possession of the village.
G.O.C., 29th Division, had in the meantime passed through 6th
Divisional Headquarters, and gone forward to his line.
The situation was now very confused, as all wires to corps had been
cut, but it was evident that there was a gap between 12th and 20th
Divisions, the latter still holding on to La Vacquerie, a strong point
on the ridge two miles east of Beaucamps. The 16th Infantry Brigade
was ordered to retake Gouzeaucourt, aided by some tanks which were at
Beaucamps, and advanced about 3 p.m., but found the Guards already in
the village. It therefore took up a position in the road between
Gouzeaucourt and Villers Plouich, to the left of the Guards, and
prepared to attack Cemetery Ridge between Gonnelieu and La Vacquerie,
so as to re-establish the line. Patrols reported no enemy activity,
and as there were no guns available (all in this sector having been
captured or out of action) the Divisional Commander (Gen. Marden)
thought a surprise attack by moonlight might succeed in capturing this
important ridge before the enemy could reinforce it. An attack
was launched at 1 a.m. hand in hand with 20th Division, but though
most gallantly pushed, failed owing to loss of direction and heavy
enemy machine gun fire. The ridge was captured by a Guards Brigade the
next morning at 6.30 a.m., by the aid of tanks and artillery.
In the meantime the Reserve Battalion of the 18th Infantry Brigade
(14th D.L.I.), and a battalion lent by the 57th Division, took up a
position on Highland Ridge facing east, thus completely securing the
flank.
On 2nd December the 16th Infantry Brigade was withdrawn and ordered to
relieve 87th Infantry Brigade (29th Division), which had been having
stiff fighting across and astride the canal east of Marcoing. The 14th
D.L.I. (18th Infantry Brigade) were lent to 16th Infantry Brigade and
on the night of 2nd/3rd December occupied the south portion of the
loop across the canal, the K.S.L.I. taking over the north half. The
88th Infantry Brigade (29th Division) held the ground south of the
canal. The whole position was a salient subject to shell, rifle and
machine-gun fire from north, south and east. The 14th D.L.I. position
had no wire, and only hastily dug trenches. At 10.30 a.m., after a
heavy bombardment, the enemy attacked the 14th D.L.I. and the
battalion of the 29th Division south of the canal, penetrating the
trenches, but was counter-attacked and driven out. At 11.30 a.m. he
attacked again with similar results. At 12.15 p.m. he attacked both
D.L.I. and K.S.L.I. and penetrated the right of the D.L.I., but was
again driven out. With a final attack at 12.45 p.m. the enemy
succeeded in forcing both battalions across the canal by sheer weight
of numbers.
Two companies of the 8th Bedfords now reinforced the 14th D.L.I., and
this force again counter-attacked and recovered the bridge-head at
dusk; the 88th Infantry Brigade, assisted by 2nd Y. and L., having
also counter-attacked successfully south of the canal. Losses were,
however, heavy, and the line was gradually withdrawn under Corps
orders during the next two days to the Hindenburg support system,
which became our front line. The 14th D.L.I. fought magnificently,
losing 15 officers and 262 other ranks, more than half being killed.
Capt. Lascelles, who led two of the counter-attacks and was twice
wounded, here gained his V.C. The 16th M.G.C., both north and south of
the canal, had very heavy losses, but put up a splendid resistance.
The only other incidents of note were the repulse by the 18th Infantry
Brigade of a half-hearted enemy attack on Cantaing on the 1st
December, and D.H.Q. being three times shelled out of its Headquarters
between 30th November and 9th December.
During the whole period--20th November to 6th December--the Divisional
Artillery were constantly changing position in order to support the
infantry, either in advance or retirement, as closely as possible. It
was a welcome change to them after the many weary months of position
warfare, and it may be said, without fear of contradiction, that both
brigades and batteries were extremely ably handled, and that the
D.A.C. never left a battery short of ammunition, in spite of very long
distances and rough going.
On 10th December the Division (less artillery) was withdrawn to rest
in the Basseux area south-west of Arras, after a strenuous three
weeks.
The Divisional Artillery remained in action, covering the 18th
Division. A little later the 2nd Brigade, R.F.A., was withdrawn to
rest, but the 24th Brigade, R.F.A., continued in the line.
CHAPTER IX
GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF MARCH 1918
1918
After a month's rest in the Basseux area, during the first few days of
which the 16th and 18th Infantry Brigades were placed at the disposal
of the 3rd Division to relieve two of their brigades on the Bullecourt
front, the Division moved up, commencing on the 17th January to
relieve the 51st Division in the front line between Hermies and
Boursies. A month later it side-stepped northwards, relieving the 25th
Division in the Lagnicourt sector. The period up to the 21st March was
one of steady work on defences, but without special incident, except a
gas-shell attack on the 71st Brigade, which caused a certain amount of
casualties.
During this period Infantry Brigades were reduced to three battalions
each--the 9th Suffolk Regiment, 8th Bedford Regiment, and 14th Durham
Light Infantry being disbanded between 1st and 16th February. Shortly
afterwards the three Machine-gun Companies and the Divisional
Machine-gun Company were organized into the 6th Machine-gun Battalion,
under the command of Lt.-Col. Rosher, D.S.O., late commanding 14th
D.L.I.
Some description of the ground and defensive organization of the
Division will not be out of place here. The front held by the Division
was generally on a forward slope opposite the villages of Quéant and
Pronville.
No Man's Land averaged three-quarters of a mile in width. The whole
area was downland, and very suitable for the action of tanks. The
position lay astride a succession of well-defined broad spurs and
narrow valleys (like the fingers of a partially opened hand), merging
into the broad transverse valley which separated the British line
from the two villages above-mentioned. All the advantages of ground
lay with the defence, and it seemed as if no attack could succeed,
unless by the aid of tanks. A large portion of the front line--notably
the valleys--was sown with 2-in. trench-mortar bombs with instantaneous
fuses, which would detonate under the pressure of a wagon but not of a
man's foot. In addition five anti-tank 18-pounder guns were placed in
positions of vantage. The wire was very broad and thick. The position
would, indeed, have been almost impregnable had there been sufficient
time to complete it, and had there been separate troops for
counter-attack.
The ground was a portion of that wrested from the enemy in the Cambrai
offensive of November-December 1917, but had only improvised trenches.
A month's hard frost in January had militated against digging, and
though there were a complete front trench and reserve trench, the
support trenches hardly existed, and dug outs were noticeable by their
absence. The front was 4,500 yards in extent, the three brigades in
line--18th on right, 71st in centre, 16th on left--on approximately
equal frontages. The depth from front or outpost zone to reserve or
battle zone was about 2,000 yards. With only three battalions in a
brigade, there was no option but to assign one battalion in each
brigade to the defence of the outpost zones, and keep two battalions
in depth in the battle zone. With battalions at just over
half-strength, and with the undulating nature of the ground, the
defence resolved itself everywhere into a succession of posts with a
very limited field of fire.
A good corps line called the Vaux-Morchies Line had been dug, the
nearest portion a mile behind the reserve line, and this was held by
the Pioneers and R.E., owing to scarcity of numbers.
The Right Group, R.F.A. (Lt.-Col. H. Weber), consisting of 2nd Brigade
(less 21st Battery), supported the 18th Infantry Brigade; the Left
Group (Lt.-Col. J. A. C. Forsyth), consisting of 24th Brigade, 21st
Battery, and 93rd (Army) Brigade, supported the 16th and 17th Infantry
Brigades.
Reports from deserters that we were to be heavily attacked were
persistent, and the Division stood to arms twice before 21st March. On
20th March aeroplane photos disclosed ammunition pits for seventy
extra batteries opposite the divisional front, and when at 5 a.m. on
21st March the bombardment commenced, there was no doubt but that a
real offensive had begun. Warning had been given overnight for all
troops to be in battle positions by 5 a.m., but it came too late to
stop working parties, and the reserve battalions of all brigades had
marched ten miles before the battle commenced.
Fog favoured the Germans in that it prevented us seeing when the
attack was launched, but every credit must be given them for the skill
they evinced and the dash with which they pushed forward and brought
up successive waves of attackers. By concentrating their efforts on
the three main valleys, i.e. Noreuil Valley on our extreme left,
Lagnicourt Valley in the centre and Morchies Valley on our extreme
right, they avoided much of the fire which they would have encountered
on the broad spurs, and thus worked round and isolated the garrisons
of the latter. For five hours the bombardment continued with
tremendous force, first with gas and H.E. on back areas to cut
communications and disorganize reinforcements, later about 7 to 8 a.m.
with smoke and H.E. on the forward system. The intensity of it may be
gauged by the fact that four out of five concealed anti-tank guns were
knocked out by direct hits.
This bombardment annihilated the garrisons of the forward system, and
few survivors came back to the reserve line.
The only authenticated accounts of a successful resistance in the
front system were from the 71st Infantry Brigade, where both 9th
Norfolks and 2nd Sherwood Foresters repulsed the first attack. By
10.30 a.m. the enemy had nearly reached Noreuil and had driven back
the 59th Division on our left, leaving the left flank of the 16th
Infantry Brigade in the air, while its right flank went shortly
afterwards, as the enemy captured Lagnicourt, driving in the Sherwood
Foresters in the valley. The 16th Infantry Brigade was gradually
squeezed out towards the corps line, where at 4 p.m. parties from the
Divisional Bombing School counter-attacked and drove the enemy out of
trenches on the immediate left. The 71st Infantry Brigade, with its
right flank secure, threw back a defensive flank south-west of
Lagnicourt, and successfully prevented issue from that village to the
high ground. The enemy broke into Skipton Reserve Strong Point, but
were thrown out again by a counter-attack of Norfolks and Leicesters.
Coming up a subsidiary valley the enemy nearly drove a wedge between
71st and 18th Infantry Brigades, but the 2nd D.L.I. counter-attacked
gallantly and kept them out till dusk. On the right of the 18th
Infantry Brigade, however, the enemy advanced up the Morchies Valley,
capturing the left trenches of the 51st Division on our right at about
10 a.m.
The 2nd West Yorks, reinforced by two companies 11th Essex, gallantly
led by Lt.-Col. Boyall, D.S.O., who was subsequently wounded and
captured, drove back three attacks issuing from our support line. The
18th Infantry Brigade held on till 7 p.m. when, in trying to withdraw,
it suffered heavy casualties. The last company was not overwhelmed
till 8.30 p.m. The 18th and 71st Infantry Brigades, therefore,
maintained their hold on the ground Lagnicourt and the Morchies Valley
all day, though the enemy had penetrated far in rear on both flanks.
When darkness fell the remnants of the Division were back in the corps
line, together with three battalions of the 75th Infantry Brigade
(25th Division), the remaining troops of the Division not being
strong enough to hold the line unaided. The 11th Cheshires were with
18th Infantry Brigade, 2nd South Lancs with 71st Infantry Brigade, and
8th Border Regiment with 16th Infantry Brigade.
The night was quiet, both sides preparing for the next day's struggle.
At 7.30 a.m. on 22nd March the 16th Infantry Brigade repulsed an
attack, but the enemy renewed his efforts with great persistence, and
with much heavy bombardment and trench-mortaring, at 9.30 a.m. and
onwards in the vicinity of Vaux and Méricourt Woods. Though frequent
counter-attacks were made, the troops were forced back little by
little from the corps line towards some improvised trenches hastily
dug under the C.R.E.'s (Col. Goldney) direction some 1,000 yards in
rear, and manned partially by men from the Corps Reinforcement Camp
under Major Jones of the 2nd D.L.I. As an example of the tenacious
fighting, a sunken road which contained the Headquarters of the 16th
and 71st Infantry Brigades changed hands three times. Throughout the
day Lt.-Col. Latham, D.S.O., commanding 1st Leicesters, and Lt.-Col.
Dumbell, D.S.O., commanding 11th Battalion Essex Regiment,
distinguished themselves greatly in the defence of their sectors of
the line. On the right of the Division the control had passed by dusk
to the G.O.C., 75th Infantry Brigade (29th Division)--the 18th
Infantry Brigade having only about 100 of all ranks left. On the left
there was a large gap between the 16th Infantry Brigade and the 40th
Division, which had been pushed up towards Vaux Vraucourt, and this
the 6th Division had no troops with which to fill it. The enemy's
pressure on the flanks of the 16th Infantry Brigade and in the centre
on the 71st Infantry Brigade caused the line to fall back on the new
Army line which was being dug and wired. This was done in good order,
and at nightfall the weary remnants of the Division were relieved by
the 41st Division and concentrated in the vicinity of Achiet, the
artillery remaining behind and fighting in the subsequent
withdrawal up to 26th March.
The Division had put up a resistance of which it had every reason to
be proud, and which won for it the following letter from the G.O.C.,
Third Army (General Sir J. Byng):--
"I cannot allow the 6th Division to leave the Third Army without
expressing my appreciation of their splendid conduct during the first
stages of the great battle now in progress.
"By their devotion and courage they have broken up overwhelming
attacks and prevented the enemy gaining his object, namely a decisive
victory.
"I wish them every possible good luck."
To this magnificent result all ranks and all arms had contributed, and
it is perhaps invidious to single out special instances for mention.
The gallant stand of the 18th and 71st Infantry Brigades in the
reserve line throughout the whole of the first day has already been
referred to. Other outstanding incidents are the counter-attack by
part of the 2nd D.L.I. against the enemy advancing from our support
line, which relieved the pressure on the reserve line and captured
four machine-guns; the holding out of a post of the West Yorks on the
east side of the Morchies Valley from 10 a.m. to 3 p.m. though
completely commanded and surrounded; the counter-attacks by companies
of the 1st Leicestershire Regiment and 9th Norfolk Regiment, which
restored the situation in the Skipton Strong Point just east of
Lagnicourt; that of a company of the 11th Leicestershire Regiment
which drove the enemy out of the corps line when he had established a
footing in it on the afternoon of the 21st; and that of the two
platoons formed from the 16th Infantry Brigade School which regained
posts on the extreme left of the corps line in the Divisional area on
the evening of the 21st.
Another gallant deed must be mentioned. Sergt. Shales, R.E., and
another signaller went from 18th Infantry Brigade Headquarters to
a distributor station 400 yards distant during the full force of the
bombardment, sorted out and tested wires in the open, and thus
established communication between the front trenches and Battalion
Headquarters. The burying and connecting up of the cable was to have
been completed the day of the attack.
The casualties in the infantry were extremely heavy, amounting in the
two days to some 3,900 out of a total for the Division of somewhat
over 5,000 engaged, and out of a total trench strength of less than
5,000 infantry. The 18th Infantry Brigade suffered particularly
heavily, being only able to muster in its three battalions 8 officers
and 110 other ranks of those who had been through the fight, including
32 at Battalion Headquarters.
The Machine-gun Battalion did excellent service and great execution,
many guns remaining in action until the enemy were within a few yards
of them. Its losses were heavy--14 officers and 280 other ranks.
The field companies suffered heavily, and rendered good service as
infantry. Special mention may be made of the action of 12th Field
Company under Capt. Langley, who rallied some 300 stragglers of
various units and filled a gap between the 18th Infantry Brigade and
troops on its left.
The 11th Leicesters, under the gallant leading of Major Radford,
fought splendidly, losing 14 officers and over 200 other ranks.
The artillery performed magnificent services, particularly on the 21st
March. All guns that were not destroyed by the enemy's bombardment
were fought until all the ammunition was expended or the enemy's
infantry reached their position. The gunners enjoyed the novel
experience of firing over open sights and seeing the effect of their
fire, and not only with their guns but with rifles and Lewis guns did
they inflict very heavy casualties on the enemy. The 42nd Battery,
having kept their three forward guns in action after our infantry had
fallen back behind them, succeeded in bringing the two that were not
destroyed away, under the very noses of the enemy and through a heavy
barrage and machine-gun fire. The forward section of the 53rd Battery
had one gun destroyed. Lieut. Reeves got the other into the open, and,
after firing 850 rounds with it over open sights and having exhausted
his ammunition, brought back his detachment and the breech-block. The
forward section of the 87th Battery continued firing until rushed by
the enemy's infantry. Sergt. Pengelly of the 112th Battery, who was in
command of a 15-pounder in an anti-tank position, having had his gun
destroyed in the preliminary bombardment, fought for two days with the
infantry, in command of a platoon, and did great execution himself
with a pickaxe. A forward gun of the 110th Battery was fought until
all its ammunition was expended, and the breech-block was then removed
with the enemy almost on the top of the gun. For over seven hours the
main battery fired on the enemy at ranges from 1,200 to 600 yards,
expending over 2,400 rounds. The forward gun of the 111th Battery,
after expending all its ammunition (500 rounds), largely over open
sights, was withdrawn and brought into action again in the main
position, a team coming up in full view of the enemy, and under very
heavy shelling and a hail of bullets, for the purpose. The 112th
Battery had two guns in action in advance of the corps line. These
remained in action until all their ammunition was expended, and the
detachments then withdrew with all their wounded and the breech-blocks
of their guns, the enemy being by this time actually on the wire of
the corps line.
The instances quoted are only typical of the conduct of the whole of
the artillery of the Division, which fully justified the very high
reputation it has always enjoyed, and the confidence which the
infantry of the Division has always felt in its own artillery.
The morning of the 23rd March found the remnants of the Division,
less artillery, assembled about Achiet-le-Grand and Bihucourt. The
survivors of the 18th Infantry Brigade numbered 8 officers and 110
other ranks; those of the 71st Infantry Brigade 11 officers and 279
other ranks. Each of these brigades had had a trench strength on the
morning of the 21st of just over 1,800 all ranks. Figures for the 16th
Infantry Brigade are not available. The Division was most fortunate in
having very few senior officers killed, though many were wounded. The
most noticeable casualties among the killed were Major Lyon, 2nd
Brigade, R.F.A., Majors Williamson and Wingate, D.S.O., M.C., R.E.,
and Capt. Harbottle, M.C., 1st Leicesters.
Even after relief the Division was not able to enjoy the rest it had
so richly deserved, and of which it stood so much in need. The further
progress of the enemy's attack and constant alarms necessitated its
preparing and taking up a position of readiness covering Achiet,
throughout the 23rd and the 24th.
On the 25th March it entrained for the north, to join the Second Army
in its old haunts in the Ypres Salient.
CHAPTER X
YPRES SALIENT AGAIN
1918
On the 30th March, whilst in rest in the neighbourhood of Steenvoorde,
the Division had the honour of a visit from His Majesty the King.
Representative survivors of all ranks from the recent fighting were
drawn up in the square and were inspected by His Majesty, who spoke
most graciously to every individual, questioning all as to their
experiences during the fighting, and thanking them for and
congratulating them on their services.
At the beginning of April the 16th and 18th Infantry Brigades took
over the front from Broodseinde southwards to Polygon Wood, coming
under the XXII Corps (Lt.-Gen. Sir A. Godley).
The general situation now was that the Flanders front was held by
tired and decimated Divisions withdrawn from the big battle in the
south. These had been brought up to a respectable strength by drafts
from all sources--wounded men belonging to other formations, R.A.S.C.,
Labour Battalions, etc., many of whom had received no training in
infantry weapons or methods of fighting. Officers and men were new to
each other, and there was no chance to train as the whole of every
Division was in trenches.
Against these forces the Germans now opened a determined offensive
from Zandvoorde southwards.
On the 13th April, as a result of the German successes on the Lys, the
71st Infantry Brigade, which was in reserve, had to be rushed off to
join the 49th Division on the Neuve Eglise front. It returned to the
Division on the 26th April after a pretty rough time, during which
it suffered considerable casualties (about 750), but earned great
praise. A counter-attack delivered by the 9th Norfolk Regiment was a
particularly creditable incident in this period.
Otherwise the first fortnight in the Salient was without special
incident. On the 16th April, in consequence of the progress made by
the enemy farther to the south, the Salient was reduced in accordance
with plan, and the line withdrawn to the battle zone, where an
advanced force was left out in a line of detached pill-boxes and
works. The enemy followed up cautiously in the afternoon, but the
garrisons of the line of posts by lying low were able in several cases
to catch parties unawares, and a fair number of casualties were
inflicted. One party of twenty-five in particular was annihilated.
On the 25th April the enemy attacked and captured Kemmel Village and
Hill from the French. This decided the Higher Command to withdraw the
advanced force, and this was successfully carried out on the night of
the 26/27th to the line West end of Zillebeke Lake-White Château.
Incessant work on the new defences, and heavy shelling, particularly
gas shelling of Ypres, were the only incidents for some time on the
actual front of the Division, though heavy attacks on the 29th April
on the Division on the right, and the enemy's unsuccessful attack on
Ridgewood on the 8th May, kept it on the alert. The Division was on
the edge of the battle, and stood to on several occasions for an
attack on its own front.
On the 11th to the 14th May the Division side-slipped to the south in
relief of the 19th Division, thus coming next door to the 14th French
Division, and passing to II Corps (Lt.-Gen. Sir C. Jacob). On the 28th
May the enemy attacked our neighbours on the right and succeeded in
driving them out of Ridgewood and almost in reaching Dickebusch Lake.
In view of the importance to us of the lost position, and of the
exhausted state of the 14th (French) Division, an offer was made
to co-operate with them in a counter-attack to regain the lost ground.
This was gladly accepted, and on the early morning of the 29th May the
11th Essex Regiment attacked in conjunction with two battalions of
Chasseurs of the 46th (French) Division, which was in process of
relieving the 14th Division, the operation taking place under the
orders of the G.O.C., 14th French Division (General Philipot, the
conqueror of Fez).
Under a barrage formed by the French and English artillery the 11th
Essex Regiment attacked with great determination, and by the end of
the day had achieved the whole of its share of the task. The two
battalions of the Chasseurs were, unfortunately, not so successful,
with the result that the right of the 11th Essex Regiment was exposed,
and it was unable to hold on to a small part of the ground recovered
on its extreme right. For this action the Division received a letter
of thanks for its "spontaneous" co-operation from General de Mitry,
commanding the French Détachement de l'Armée du Nord.
The Division remained in the line as next-door neighbours to the
French till the 7th June, when relieved by 33rd Division. Many will
retain pleasant memories of our association with our Allies during the
three to four weeks that we were alongside them, and of the admirable
liaison that existed between us.
During the period of just under three weeks' rest that it enjoyed on
this occasion the Division had one brigade always at Dirty Bucket Camp
working on rear lines of defence, one training in the St. Jan ter
Biezen area, and one at musketry at Cormette, near Tilques. During
this period, too, the 71st Trench-mortar Battery and the 18th
Trench-mortar Battery were able to be of service to the French, the
former being lent to the 46th Division to assist them in an operation
on 8th June, the latter co-operating with the 7th (French) Division in
a successful raid on the 19th June.
On the 27th June the Division passed to the XIX Corps (Lt.-Gen.
Sir H. E. Watts) and relieved the 46th French Division (Chasseurs) in
the Dickebusch sector. This was in a very unpleasant front, where the
dominating position of the enemy on Kemmel Hill made movement, even in
the rear lines, impossible by day, and practically all work, of which
there was plenty, had to be done by night.
The chief incidents of the tour of the Division in this sector were
the successful attack on Ridgewood, the 1st The Buffs daylight raid on
the Brasserie, the sixteen-prisoner night-raid of the 2nd D.L.I. on
the Zillebeke front, and the co-operation of the 18th Infantry Brigade
with the operations of the 41st Division on our right.
The situation created by the enemy's attack on Ridgewood on the 28th
May had never been satisfactorily restored, in spite of repeated
attempts on the part of the 46th (French) Division. The 6th Division
took over with the determination to put this right on the first
opportunity, profiting by the lessons learnt in the successive attacks
made by the French Chasseurs, which their Division had placed most
unreservedly at our disposal. After careful reconnaissance the 18th
Infantry Brigade, assisted by two companies of the 1st Middlesex
Regiment of the 33rd Division, attacked the enemy at 6 a.m. on the
14th July. The attack delivered by the 1st West Yorkshire Regiment and
the 2nd D.L.I. and the two above-mentioned companies was a complete
success. The enemy, taken entirely by surprise, only offered any
resistance in one or two isolated cases, and the dash and prompt
initiative of the attacking troops soon dealt with these. All
objectives were gained, Ridgewood and Elzenwalle retaken, and 7
officers, 341 other ranks, 25 machine-guns, and 3 trench-mortars
captured at small cost to the attackers. Large quantities of
trench-mortar ammunition, found dumped close up to the front line,
demonstrated the correctness of the view that the enemy had in
contemplation a resumption of his offensive on this front. For
this the Division received congratulations from the Commander-in-Chief,
the G.O.C., Second Army (General Sir Herbert Plumer), and G.O.C., XIX
Corps.
The raid of the 1st The Buffs was carried out on the 2nd August. The
objective was the Brasserie and neighbouring farms. The raid, which
was by day and on a fairly extensive scale, was very successful.
On the 8th August the 41st Division carried out a small operation, in
co-operation with which the 18th Infantry Brigade undertook two minor
operations. That by a company of the 1st West Yorkshire Regiment on
the Vierstraat Road was unsuccessful, through no fault of the
attacking infantry, who were held up by machine-guns sited so far
forward that they had escaped our barrage. On the right a company of
the 2nd D.L.I., operating in direct touch with the left of the 41st
Division, was completely successful in carrying out its task. In
connection with operations on this front the Division sustained a
severe loss in Major R. W. Barnett, K.R.R., G.S.O.2, who was killed by
a sniper while reconnoitring on 12th August.
During July and August the Divisional Artillery was exceptionally
busy. An immense amount of effort was put into the preparation of
forward positions for a large number of batteries to be employed in a
contemplated later offensive. Vast quantities of gun ammunition were
carted nightly, and dumped therein in readiness.
During the month of August the Division had the pleasure of close
association with our American Allies, part of the 27th American, a New
York Division, doing their attachment and apprenticeship to trench
warfare with us. On the 21st to the 24th August the Americans relieved
the Division in the line, and it was withdrawn for rest and training
to the Wizernes area.
On leaving the XIX Corps the Corps Commander sent the Division his
"warmest thanks for and appreciation of the excellent service
rendered" while under his command.
CHAPTER XI
THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE IN THE SOUTH
1918
Originally destined to take part in a projected attack for the
recapture of Kemmel Hill and Village, the Division suddenly received
orders at the end of August, to the delight of all, to move southwards
at very short notice. During the 1st, 2nd and 3rd September the move
southwards was carried out by rail, the Division, less artillery,
detraining at Corbie, Heilly and Méricourt. On the 4th the Divisional
Artillery followed, and the whole Division was concentrated in the
area Heilly-Ribemont-Franvillers on the River Ancre, in G.H.Q.
Reserve. The next few days were devoted to a continuation of the
training in open warfare commenced in the Wizernes area.
The Germans, forced back in July and August from the high-water mark
of their advance in March and April, had stood on the line of the
Somme and the Péronne--Arras road. In the southern sector of the
British front the Somme defences had been turned by the brilliant
capture of Mont St. Quentin (to the north of and guarding Péronne) by
the Australian Corps. The retreating enemy had been pursued across the
Somme by the 32nd Division, which had been attached temporarily to the
Australians. This Division now became part of the newly-constituted IX
Corps (Lt.-Gen. Sir W. Braithwaite), which was to bear such a glorious
part in the concluding chapter of the War, and which consisted of 1st,
6th, 32nd and 46th Divisions.
The 32nd Division had followed the enemy without much incident up to
the large Holnon Wood, three and a half miles west of St. Quentin, and
it was there that the Division relieved it on night 13/14th
September, with the 1st Division on the left and the 34th (French)
Division on the right.
It was expected that the enemy would stand on the heights which
command St. Quentin to the west and south, but it was not known
whether their resistance would be strong or not, as they were much
disorganized.
The 1st and 6th Divisions, hand in hand with the French, were ordered
to capture this tactical line on 18th September, as a starting-point
for the attack on the Hindenburg Line, which ran just outside St.
Quentin to the canal at Bellenglise.
To the 18th Infantry Brigade was entrusted the task of securing a line
well clear of Holnon Wood for the forming-up line on the 18th, and in
doing so it first had to clear the wood and establish posts at the
edge, then push forward. The selected forming-up line included to us
Holnon Village on the right and next to the French.
On the morning of the 16th September the 11th Essex, after an
unsuccessful attempt to push forward during the night, attacked under
a barrage and advanced from the line of posts taken over a little way
inside the wood to a line of trenches just clear of the wood,
capturing in this small operation forty-six prisoners. It was now
arranged for the 1st, 6th and 34th (French) Divisions to advance
simultaneously to secure the above-mentioned starting line. On the
left the 1st Division was successful, and so were the 11th Essex, who,
held up at first by heavy shelling and machine-gun fire, persevered
throughout the day and were rewarded by finishing up in possession of
the whole of their objectives, a very creditable performance.
On the right the West Yorks had to secure Holnon Village, which lay in
a hollow commanded by Round and Manchester Hills in the area allotted
to the French, and which was itself strongly held. The French failed
in their attack, and though the West Yorks obtained part of the
village they could not clear it and establish the starting line
beyond it. The situation at the end of the 17th was therefore
unsatisfactory on the right, but it was impossible to put off the
general attack, and arrangements had to be improvised. Another
unsatisfactory feature was that Holnon Wood covered practically the
whole 2,500 yards frontage of the Division, and was so drenched with
gas shells and the tracks so bad, that both 16th and 71st Infantry
Brigades had to make a detour north and south of the wood respectively
to reach their assembly positions, and this naturally fatigued the
troops and hindered communication and supply.
Standing on the east edge of the wood, a bare glacis-like slope devoid
of cover, except for two or three shell-trap copses, stretched away
for 3,000 yards to the high ground overlooking St. Quentin. There was
no sign of life and very few trenches could be seen, though it was
known that they were there as the Fifth Army had held the position in
March 1918. It was found afterwards that the Germans had camouflaged
their trenches with thistles, which here covered the ground to a
height in many places of eighteen inches.
At the highest point about the centre of the Divisional area of attack
was a network of trenches known later as the Quadrilateral--a name of
bad omen to the 6th Division--and which, like its namesake on the
Somme, could be reinforced under cover from the back slopes of the
hill. An examination of the battlefield after the 24th September also
revealed several narrow sunken roads filled with wire. The position
was one of great natural strength, and in addition the whole of the
right was dominated by heights in the area to be attacked by the
French. Lastly, adequate time could not be given to Brigades for
reconnaissance owing to the imperative necessity of pushing on to
guard the flank of Corps farther north. Troops had not seen the ground
they had to attack over, and rain and smoke obscured the few landmarks
existing on 18th September.
On that morning the Division attacked at 5.20 a.m. with the 71st
Infantry Brigade on the right, its left directed on the Quadrilateral
and its right on Holnon and Selency.
The 16th Infantry Brigade was on the left, with its right just clear
of the Quadrilateral and its left on Fresnoy le Petit. Six tanks were
allotted to the Division, but met with various mishaps or were knocked
out, and were not of much use. The attack met with most determined
opposition at once, especially on the right, where the difficulties of
the 71st Infantry Brigade were increased by the failure of the French
to take Round and Manchester Hills.
The 2nd D.L.I., attached to this brigade to complete the clearing of
Holnon Village, accomplished this, but were driven out by shelling and
by machine gun fire from Round and Manchester Hills, losing very
heavily.
The 16th Infantry Brigade was more successful, and at one time the
York and Lancasters had nearly completed the capture of Fresnoy le
Petit, but were unable to hold it. The brigade advanced, however,
3,000 yards. Fighting was continuous throughout the day, but without
further success. The Sherwood Foresters advancing very gallantly
against the Quadrilateral were reported as being just outside it and
entrenched. It was machine gun fire from this stronghold which
prevented the right of the 16th Infantry Brigade advancing, and an
attack was therefore ordered for dawn of the 19th September, but it
was evidently anticipated by the enemy, who put down a very heavy
artillery and machine-gun barrage before the attackers left their
jumping-off positions. Fighting again continued throughout the day,
but without success, and it was evident that the enemy meant standing
his ground and that this was not a rearguard action as it had at one
time been thought. The enemy's artillery was very strong, and, with
the thick Hindenburg wire in front of it, was placed close to their
front line, and was enabled thus to do considerable execution on
our back areas.
The successes of other Divisions in the south of the British zone had
been constant and fairly easy for some time, so that the partial
success which the Division had obtained was very disappointing to all
ranks. They were much cheered, therefore, to get the following wire
from the Army Commander (General Sir H. Rawlinson):--"Please convey to
the 6th Division my congratulations and warm thanks for their success
of yesterday. Though all objectives were not attained they carried
through a difficult operation with great gallantry and determination.
I offer to all ranks my warm thanks and congratulations."
All units had heavy fighting, in which some had incurred considerable
losses, and all were tired and in want of reorganization. It was
therefore decided not to renew the attack for a few days, and to
devote the interval to a proper artillery preparation (the heavy
artillery put 1,000 shells on the Quadrilateral in one day), the
reorganization of battalions, and the construction of a jumping-off
position, in the execution of which the R.E. (Lt.-Col. H. A. L. Hall)
and the Pioneers rendered invaluable assistance. The fighting up to
this date had yielded 6 officers and 264 other ranks prisoners, and 65
machine-guns.
On the morning of the 24th September a fresh attack was launched; the
18th Infantry Brigade, to which was attached the 1st Leicestershire
Regiment, attacking on the right; the 16th Infantry Brigade on the
left. The French 36th Corps attacked with a fresh division
simultaneously to our right; the 1st Division, which had taken over
the task of the capture of Fresnoy and Gricourt, on our left. The four
tanks detailed to attack the Quadrilateral again had bad luck, one
being turned absolutely turtle by a mine field. The three battalions
of the 18th Infantry Brigade met at first with little success, the
11th Essex on the left establishing a rather precarious footing
in one face of the Quadrilateral, and the 1st West Yorkshire Regiment
getting in at one point in Douai Trench, running south from the Strong
Point. The D.L.I., attacking south of them through Holnon Village,
could make no headway. The French had during the morning captured
Round Hill and part of Manchester Hill, and came up in line with us.
The 16th Infantry Brigade fared much better, and working down from the
north was able in the course of the day to secure the northern face of
the Quadrilateral. Their four tanks were of great assistance to them
this day. Throughout the day the 18th Infantry Brigade maintained the
fight with characteristic determination, but without improving its
position very much. At 11 p.m., however, it launched the 1st
Leicestershire Regiment by moonlight in a further attack on Douai
Trench. The attack, delivered with great gallantry, was successful,
and many enemy were killed in the trench which was found to be
strongly held. In spite of the very rough handling which it had
received on the 24th the 18th Infantry Brigade stuck grimly to its
task during the 25th. Douai Trench was cleared from end to end by
hand-to-hand fighting, and patrols, admirably handled, gradually made
good the whole of the objectives allotted for the previous day's
attack. On the morning of 25th September 3 officers and 104 other
ranks surrendered near Fayet to patrols of the 2nd Y. and L. Regiment.
By midnight on the night of the 25/26th September the 16th and 18th
Infantry Brigades in co-operation had completed the capture of the
Quadrilateral, a position of such unusual natural strength that
captured German officers admitted that they had fully expected to be
able to hold it indefinitely. For this very fine performance, a
remarkable instance of grit and determination and of intelligent
initiative by regimental officers of all ranks, to whom the successful
results were entirely due, the Division received the congratulations
of the Army and Corps Commanders and G.O.C., 1st Division. The
message telephoned on behalf of the Army Commander contained the
following passage:--"He fully realises the difficulties they have had
to contend with, and admires the tenacity with which they have stuck
to it and completed their task."
The enemy's resistance now broke down, and during the 26th, 27th and
28th September patrols were able gradually to gain further ground, so
that by the time the Division was relieved by the 4th French Division
on the 29/30th, posts had been established round three sides of the
village of Fayet. Manchester Hill was finally captured by the French
on 26th September.
The captures during the period were 10 officers, 372 other ranks, 4
guns, 15 trench-mortars, and 53 machine-guns.
During the relief by the French a noteworthy incident occurred. The
2nd Brigade, R.F.A., were asked to fire a barrage to cover an advance
of French infantry at a certain hour, and did so. Just after
completion a message arrived saying that the attack had been
postponed, and would the brigade repeat the operation very shortly at
another hour which was fixed. This the brigade did, clearing to
absolutely the last shell the ammunition available on the ground and
completing the barrage at the same moment.
During the fighting in September the Division had "B" and "C"
Companies, 2nd Life Guards Machine-gun Battalion, at its disposal, and
these fine troops helped much in the machine-gun barrage, and added
confidence that any counter-attack on the right would meet with a hot
reception.
While the 6th Division had been fighting on the right of the British
Army, the 46th Division, with the Americans on their left and the 1st
Division forming a defensive flank on their right, had broken the
Hindenburg Line on 29th September by a magnificent attack. Followed
across the canal by the 32nd Division, these two divisions had
very severe fighting at Ramicourt and Sequehart and were exhausted.
The 6th Division, after four days to rest and absorb reinforcements,
was ordered to relieve them and attack on the 8th October in the
direction of the small town of Bohain. The 30th American Division was
on the right and about 2,000 yards ahead, connected to the 6th
Division by a series of posts along the railway. This curious position
entailed a very complicated creeping barrage, which, however, was
successfully put into operation on the day of the attack. On the right
was the French 42nd Division slightly in rear, having followed the
Germans through St. Quentin and met with strong resistance beyond it.
The position to be attacked consisted of high rolling downs with deep
traverse valleys, giving good cover for supports and forward guns, and
on the right a broad longitudinal valley closed by a ridge on which
stood the village of Méricourt. The French had a stiff task in front
of them, and did not propose to advance as far as the British--6,000
yards--with the result that even if they were successful our frontage,
thrown back from left to right, would be 7,500 yards, and if
unsuccessful over 10,000. Added to this their zero hour was nearly an
hour after ours, and there would be a very real danger of
counter-attack from the right. The Divisional Commander, therefore,
decided to leave the valley severely alone to start with, merely
smoking by guns and bombs from aeroplanes the Méricourt Ridge and
attacking all along the high ground on the north. As our attack and
the French attack progressed the valley was to be cleared by three
whippet tanks supported by the 1st Battalion West Yorks, lent to the
16th Infantry Brigade, while finally an attack from the high ground
against the Méricourt Ridge would be delivered with a view to cutting
off posts in the valley between the two attacks. The 139th Infantry
Brigade of the 46th Division remained in position at Sequehart,
together with two companies Life Guards Machine-gun Battalion, to
secure the right flank against counter-attack. The machine-gun
nests on the Sequehart-Méricourt road enfiladed the start line of the
6th Division, and the G.O.C., 139th Infantry Brigade (Brig-Gen. J.
Harington), was asked to capture these just before the general attack.
The 46th Divisional Pioneer Battalion (1/1st Monmouthshire Regiment)
undertook this task, and twice attacked the position but without
success, in spite of the greatest gallantry. The Commanding Officer
(Col. Jenkins) and his Adjutant were both unfortunately killed. Their
bravery, however, was well rewarded, as their action enabled the 6th
Divisional troops to work round and cut the position off, and the
enemy eventually surrendered.
The weight of artillery for the operations of the 8th October was
immense. In addition to the Divisional artillery there were the 5th
and 16th Brigades, R.H.A., 161st, 168th, 230th, 231st, 232nd Brigades,
R.F.A., and the 14th and 23rd Army Brigades, R.F.A. Only a part of
these fired the creeping barrage, the 6th Divisional Artillery, the
5th Brigade, R.H.A., and the 232nd Brigade, R.F.A., moving forward as
the infantry attack progressed to new positions, so as to support
exploitation and give protection against counter-attack. The attack
was launched at 5.30 a.m. The 16th Infantry Brigade on the right next
to the valley, and the 71st Infantry Brigade on the left next to the
Americans, both made excellent way, the former capturing the very
strong Mannikin Hill position, and the latter the formidable Doon Mill
and Doon Copse position, and making a good haul of machine-guns.
As had been anticipated the French had been held up by Bellicourt Farm
on their left, and the 16th Infantry Brigade suffered a good deal from
machine-gun fire from Cerise Wood on the farther side of the valley
and from Mannikin Wood in the valley. The three whippet tanks allotted
to the 16th Infantry Brigade were all knocked out, but the West Yorks,
to whom had been entrusted the clearing of the valley, stuck to
their work most gallantly, and in the afternoon, after three attempts,
had the satisfaction of securing Mannikin Wood, with 10 officers, 240
other ranks, and 20 machine-guns, by a final attack under an artillery
smoke barrage. To this success "B" Company, 6th Machine-gun Battalion,
contributed largely by enfilade fire.
By 3 p.m. the French announced that they had captured Bellicourt Farm,
and were advancing. The situation on the right was now completely
changed, and the 1st West Yorks, advancing up the valley, gained touch
with the French east of Fairy Wood, more than half-way to the final
objective in that area.
By nightfall Méricourt, which blocked the head of and commanded the
whole of the valley, was in our hands.
The Americans gained their final objective and continued the advance
without much opposition. In attempting to support their flank the 71st
Infantry Brigade came under the fire of field guns firing over open
sights near Joncourt Farm, and could not advance. A squadron of the
Royal Scots Greys (5th Cavalry Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Neil Haig),
attached to the Division, worked round and made a gallant attempt to
gallop the guns, but were stopped by close range gun fire. Pitch
darkness now came on, and left the Division tired but triumphant on
their final objectives. The bag of the 6th Division amounted to over
30 officers and 1,100 other ranks.
Congratulatory messages were received from the Army and Corps
Commanders as follows:--
From the Army Commander--"Will you please convey to the 6th Division
my warm thanks and hearty congratulations on their success to-day.
They have done admirable work, and I wish them all good luck for
to-morrow."
From the Corps Commander--"Well done 6th Division. So glad casualties
so light, considering what Division has accomplished."
Almost before the final objective had been captured an order was
received from the Corps for the Division to take over a portion of
the 30th American Division front on the left, hand over some ground to
46th Division on the right, and attack at dawn on the 9th behind a
barrage. Though very tired, and though it was a pitch dark night, the
71st and 16th Infantry Brigades somehow managed to carry out these
almost impossible orders, and advanced splendidly at zero hour--the
artillery putting down an accurate barrage. The attack progressed
successfully, the first objectives being gained by both brigades
without much difficulty, but the enemy was able to delay our advance
from the Railway Line, where after stiff fighting the 1st Leicesters,
by a turning movement, captured some prisoners and machine-guns. The
9th Norfolk Regiment on the left worked round by the north, and during
the night captured Bohain, where some 4,000 inhabitants were liberated,
and vast quantities of war material fell into our hands.
During this phase of the operations the 5th Cavalry Brigade was
attached to the Division, but circumstances did not allow of much
cavalry activity.
We were now in a different country to that in which the operations
since 1914 had been conducted. The country had seen no war, houses
were intact, inhabitants looking starved and downtrodden were
delighted to see the British troops. To stop our advance all roads in
Bohain had been cratered at their exits from the village, and
delay-action mines on the railways were constantly going up. As an
example, D.H.Q. was in Brancucourt Farm, in a main road which had been
cratered just outside the farm. A railway bridge just opposite had
been blown down and the line cratered. The Canadian Engineers
repairing the line had removed a great many bombs, but about three
days after the arrival of D.H.Q. a delay-action mine went off on the
railway at 7.30 p.m., and two days later again at 7 a.m. Fortunately
on both occasions no men were working on the line, and D.H.Q.
suffered no worse harm than some injuries to staff cars from falling
debris. The total captures by the Division since the 8th October now
amounted to 45 officers, 1,839 other ranks, 15 guns, 20
trench-mortars, and 266 machine-guns.
On 10th October the advance was continued--the 30th American Division
on the left, the 6th Division in the centre, and the 46th Division on
the right next to the French, who were again some distance in rear.
The 71st Infantry Brigade (1st Leicesters and 2nd Sherwood Foresters),
passing through the 9th Norfolks, gained most of its objective, which
was the high ground about 2,000 yards east of Bohain, but the 40th
Division was held up by machine-gun fire in Riqueval Wood. An
attempted advance by the 71st Infantry Brigade, assisted by two tanks,
on 11th instant was brought to a standstill by machine-gun fire, after
a small advance.
On the night of the 11/12th October the 18th Infantry Brigade, which
had been in Divisional Reserve, relieved the 71st Infantry Brigade,
and at 4.30 p.m. on the 12th October carried out a minor operation,
simultaneously with the left brigade of the 46th Division, in order to
push its left flank forward to the line of the Americans, who were
reported to be in possession of Vaux Andigny--some one and a half
miles ahead. The attack on the right failed, with about 100
casualties, owing to machine-gun fire from Regnicourt, and the 46th
Division was also held up. The left made a little ground. This attack
and a low aeroplane reconnaissance disclosed the fact that the Germans
had dug a series of new trenches on the high ground immediately in
front, and that there was a considerable amount of wire. The maps of
this area were most indifferent, and many copses existed which were
not shown. It was now evident that the enemy intended to stand on the
high ground east of Selle River and its continuation to Riqueval Wood.
Failing to make any progress by a frontal attack, the G.O.C., IX
Corps, undertook a very pretty tactical move, which produced the
attack of 17th October. The 6th and 46th Divisions were moved to
the north flank, and attacked south-east and east instead of
north-east. By this manoeuvre a great deal of enfilade fire was
brought to bear both from guns and machine-guns. The task allotted to
the 6th Division was a difficult one. It had to issue fan-wise from
the village of Vaux Andigny on a 1,500 yards front, advancing
2,500-3,000 yards to a front of 5,000 yards. The 1st Division was to
pass through it and push on towards the Sambre Canal. The attack was
to be made under a barrage of eight brigades of Field Artillery and
eighty machine-guns. The IX Corps employed on this occasion 172
60-pounders and heavy howitzers.
In the evening of 16th October Brig.-Gen. H. A. Walker, commanding
16th Infantry Brigade, which was to attack on the left the next
morning, most unfortunately lost his left arm by a shell, which blew
it off so cleanly that his wrist watch was recovered by his orderly
and was still going. Brig.-Gen. P. W. Brown, commanding 71st Infantry
Brigade, then in reserve, took command until the arrival of Brig.-Gen.
W. G. Braithwaite.
During the night 16/17th October the enemy poured gas shells into Vaux
Andigny, causing considerable casualties both to the troops forming up
just outside and to those who had to pass through a little later. Zero
was at 5.20 a.m., and the attack commenced in a dense fog, which in
the fan-shaped advance caused a good deal of loss of direction,
although the 18th Infantry Brigade on the left had laid out long
direction tapes to give the troops the initial direction.
The latter brigade was held up at the start by uncut wire, which
caused it to lose its barrage. It also encountered a good deal of
opposition on Bellevue Ridge. It was, however, carried forward by the
oncoming waves of the 1st Division, which were to pass through to a
further objective, and together the troops of the two divisions
made good the objective of the 18th Infantry Brigade. The fog was
so dense that all direction was lost, although the 11th Essex Regiment
took the unusual precaution of sending its men forward arm-in-arm.
Notwithstanding every precaution troops of the 11th Essex eventually
fetched up at Regnicourt, which was on the right of the objective
allotted to the 46th Division, who attacked on our right. Troops of
all three divisions also reached Andigny les Fermes, which was in the
objective of the 46th Division. The 16th Infantry Brigade was more
fortunate, and was assisted in maintaining its direction by the
railway, with the result that it gained its whole objective in good
time and with very little trouble. The day's captures were 26
officers, 599 other ranks, 5 trench-mortars, and 82 machine-guns.
The 1st Division having passed through, the 6th Division was now
withdrawn from the line to the neighbourhood of Bohain for a day or
two.
On the night of the 20th/21st October the Division was again put in,
relieving the 27th American Division and a part of the 25th Division
on the front from Bazuel to a short way north of Mazinghien, with a
view to the attack planned for the 23rd October. There now occurred a
sudden change in the type of country. Instead of open rolling downs,
there was a multiplicity of small fields, divided by high thick-set
hedges trained on wire which proved formidable obstacles. The enemy
had good positions for his artillery in the Bois l'Evêque, and on the
east bank of the Canal de la Sambre, protected from the danger of
being rushed by that obstacle, and it was evident that he intended to
put up a determined fight on the strong position thus afforded. The
hostile artillery fire was more than had been encountered since the
fighting about St. Quentin, and throughout the few days preceding the
attack the shelling of roads, farms and villages in our rear area and
of artillery positions was continuous. On the night of the attack the
assembly positions of the assaulting brigades were subjected to
heavy counter-preparation, including a great deal of gas-shelling,
and the assembly units suffered considerable casualties. The attack
was delivered at 1.20 a.m. on 23rd October in a dense fog; the 1st
Division being on the right and the 25th Division on the left. Three
sections of 301st American Tank Company were allotted to the Division,
and did excellent work in smashing fences and destroying machine-gun
nests, though, owing to the fog, the infantry lost touch with them
almost at once.
On the right the 18th Infantry Brigade, which attacked with the 2nd
D.L.I. on the right and the 1st West Yorkshire Regiment on the left,
had a less difficult task than the 71st Infantry Brigade, but were
delayed in crossing the gas-shelled valley in their immediate front,
and met with opposition from various farms. However, they fought their
way steadily forward during the day, and by the late afternoon their
right battalion had reached its objective and had pushed its patrols
down to the canal, and the left battalion, having reached its first
objective, was struggling forward to its second.
The 71st Infantry Brigade on the left attacked with the 9th Norfolk
Regiment and the 1st Leicestershire Regiment. Its attack soon became
disorganized in the very enclosed country, was unable to keep pace
with its barrage, lost touch with its tanks in the fog, and was soon
held up on a line not more than about 400 yards beyond that from which
it had started. Fighting continued throughout the day, and finally,
taking advantage of the progress made by the 25th Division on its
left, the 71st Infantry Brigade was able by night to reach a line
about half-way through the Bois l'Evêque.
During the night this brigade was relieved by the 16th Infantry
Brigade (Brig.-Gen. W. G. Braithwaite), which resumed the attack on
the morning of the 24th October. Opposition had by this time
decreased, and better progress was made, so that by noon the right
battalion, the 2nd York and Lancaster Regiment, held the line of
the objective laid down for the previous day's attack, and the left
battalion of the 18th Infantry Brigade had also completed the capture
of its objective. Some further progress was made during the day by the
16th Infantry Brigade.
During the period 20th to 24th October, Brig.-Gen. E. F. Delaforce,
C.R.A., 6th Division, had under his orders the Divisional Artillery of
the 3rd, 4th and 5th Australian Divisions, though the 5th Australian
Divisional Artillery was withdrawn on the eve of the attack of 24th
October. Their fire was most accurate and prompt, and gave the
attacking infantry every confidence. The 6th D.A. on this occasion was
in Corps Reserve.
During the 26th, 27th and 28th the patrols of the 16th Infantry
Brigade continued to work their way slowly forward, and the village of
Ors was evacuated of its inhabitants under the protection of patrols
of the 18th Infantry Brigade. The latter established a bridge-head
across the canal at Ors, and posts on the west side commanding the
canal on the whole brigade front.
On the 29th orders were received for the relief of the Division. In
order to be able to hand over to the relieving Division a satisfactory
position from which to launch the attack on the line of the canal, a
further small operation was planned by the 16th Infantry Brigade, and
brilliantly carried out by the 1st The Buffs on the 30th October. Two
companies attacked and captured an important farm and spur overlooking
the canal, were counter-attacked in the afternoon and turned out of
the farm, but retook it at once with the bayonet, inflicting heavy
casualties on the enemy and capturing five more machine-guns.
On the night of the 30th/31st October the relief of the Division (less
artillery) was completed, and it withdrew to billets in Fresnoy le
Grand, whence it moved some days later to Bohain.
The captures during the fighting from the 19th to the 31st October
numbered 9 officers and 431 other ranks, 13 guns (including two 5.9-in.
howitzers), 12 trench-mortars, and 61 machine-guns.
The total captures during a period of between six and seven weeks, in
which the Division had seen much stiff fighting, and had suffered over
6,000 casualties, amounted to 96 officers, 3,505 other ranks, 32 guns,
52 trench-mortars, and 527 machine-guns counted.
The infantry of the Division saw no more fighting, but its artillery
remained in till the end, finishing up in the neighbourhood of
Avesnes.
Among the many casualties which the artillery suffered must be
mentioned Major W. S. Ironside, D.S.O., M.C., commanding 112th
Battery, R.F.A., who was killed east of Le Cateau on 2nd November. He
was among the then much reduced number of those who had landed
originally with the Division in France in 1914, being then a sergeant.
Very little mention has been made of the services of the Royal
Engineers during this period. Exceptionally heavy work was thrown on
the signal sections, owing to the frequent changes of headquarters,
but they were untiring in their devotion and met each emergency with
resource. To the Field Companies fell the dangerous task of taping out
the jumping-off lines for the attacks, but they invariably achieved
this difficult task to the complete satisfaction of the
brigadier-generals and units concerned in the operations.
It is inevitable in a short History like this that the services of the
administrative branches should not receive the same notice as those of
the purely fighting portions of the Division, but the History would be
incomplete without some reference to them.
The Field Ambulances showed throughout the high devotion to duty which
has always characterized the Royal Army Medical Corps. The work of the
bearer sections during actions always elicited the admiration of the
infantry, while the tent sections were frequently under shell
fire, which, however, in no way interfered with their care of the
wounded. Both at advanced dressing stations and tent sections many of
the chaplains rendered most valuable assistance in carrying and
helping wounded men, while during trench warfare they were frequently
to be found with their men in the forward trenches.
In the action of 18th September 1918, Lt.-Col. Collins, D.S.O., and
Major German, both of the R.A.M.C., and also Father FitzGibbons, were
killed by shelling at a tent advanced dressing station.
The work of our Army Service Corps has always been the envy and
admiration of our Allies, and that of the 6th Divisional Train was up
to the highest standard of the British Army. The acknowledged
excellence of the horses and mules of the Division is a tribute to the
efficiency of the Veterinary Section and of the horsemasters attached
to the artillery, as well as to the mounted branches.
In spite of the amusing comments of "The Fancies," the life of the
Military Police was not all beer and skittles. The control of the
traffic at some of the cross-roads, favoured by the Boche heavy
gunners, was nerve-racking in ordinary times, and tenfold more so
during an action, and several awards were given to the Divisional
Military Police for gallant conduct under these conditions.
Very few officers or men served throughout with the Division. Perhaps
the two most notable were Lt.-Col. J. A. C. Forsyth, D.S.O.,
commanding 24th Brigade, R.F.A., who came out as a Captain, and
Staff-Sergt.-Major Woollard, who was Chief Clerk of the Division for
some time before mobilization.
CHAPTER XII
THE MARCH TO THE RHINE AND OCCUPATION OF GERMANY
1918-19
Armistice Day--11th November--found the Division in billets in Bohain
area, training for possible future operations. The news of the
cessation of hostilities was received with calm satisfaction that we
had beaten the Germans, and of relief that now we could sleep
peacefully at nights and that lights need not be screened.
Early in November the 1st and 32nd Divisions of the IX Corps had
forced the crossings of the Sambre Canal at Catillon and Ors after
heavy fighting, and had driven the enemy back towards Avesnes. On 11th
November a mixed force, under Major-Gen. Bethell, was pushing the
disorganized Germans over the Belgian frontier near Beaumont.
The IX Corps was now transferred to the Second Army, under Gen. Sir H.
Plumer, to whom was assigned the command of the British Army of
Occupation in Germany.
On leaving the Fourth Army the following letter, addressed personally
to the Divisional Commander, was received from Gen. Sir Henry
Rawlinson:--
"Now that the 6th Division is passing to the command of another Army,
I desire to place on record my sincere appreciation and warm thanks
for the valuable services rendered by you since you joined the Fourth
Army in September last.
"The Division has passed through strenuous times and has seen some
heavy fighting, especially in September between Holnon Wood and the
Canal, and at Bohain and Vaux Andigny in October, where the gallantry
and determination of all ranks filled me with admiration.
"I congratulate most heartily you all on the victories you have
won, and trust that at some future time I may again find the Division
under my command."
The Division spent the period 14th to 19th November in a march, via
Catillon and Avesnes, to the area round Solre le Château and Sars
Poteries, where it was to assemble for the March to the Rhine. For
this it was organized in three Infantry Brigade Groups and a
Divisional Troops Group under the C.R.A. The 16th Army R.H.A. Brigade
(Chestnut Troop, "Q" and "U" Batteries) was attached to the Division,
and formed part of the 18th Infantry Brigade Group. The 2nd Brigade,
R.F.A., marched with the Divisional Troops Column, the 24th Brigade,
R.F.A., with the 71st Infantry Brigade, and the Divisional Ammunition
Column with the 16th Infantry Brigade. Each Infantry Brigade had a
Field Company and Field Ambulance.
The march resembled the progression of a snake, the rear group moving
forward at each advance to the area occupied the previous day by the
leading group. Commencing officially on the 20th November there were
long halts up to 2nd December, owing to the difficulty of feeding the
leading Divisions (cavalry and infantry), caused by the destruction
done by the Germans to the railways, and also owing to the withdrawal
of the Germans not being carried out in accordance with programme.
Sometimes groups did not move, or only made minor adjustments to
obtain more comfortable quarters.
Both branches of the staff had long days of reconnaissance in cars
ahead of the Division, made to avoid moving troops farther off the
main roads than necessary, while the R.E. and Pioneers were often
pushed ahead to see about water supplies and mend roads. Up to the
Belgian frontier roads had been cratered and bridges blown down, and
these caused defiles and impeded the march. Once across the frontier
the roads were splendid, the inhabitants most hospitable and
enthusiastic, and the advance only held up until it could be
pushed through continuously.
However, it was no hardship to be delayed in such charming
surroundings, though the weather was for the most part vile. The march
from the neighbourhood of Dinant across the Ardennes, and along the
lovely valley of the River Ambleve, will always stand out as a most
delightful reminiscence. All ranks worked hard at their equipment, and
the transport was so smart as to be thought by the Belgians to be new.
It was a proud and splendid Division which marched, with drums beating
and colours flying, across the German frontier into the little town of
Malmedy between 13th and 16th December.
Marching generally by only one road, the length of the Division, when
billeted, varied from ten to twenty-five miles. It was particularly
interesting for Brigades to occupy the German huts at Elsenborn Camp
of Exercise, where large numbers of the enemy had assembled in the end
of July 1914 for the conquest of Belgium.
The attitude of the population in Germany was servile, and little hate
could be felt by one or two battalions which marched into Malmedy in
pouring rain and found German women lighting special fires, without
being ordered to do so, to dry their clothing. It must, however, be
added that the inhabitants of Malmedy speak French and have Belgian
sympathies.
Passing through the lovely little village of Montjoie, which reminds
one so much of Switzerland, the Division marched to its allotted area
south-west of Cologne, Divisional Headquarters arriving at Bruhl, six
miles from Cologne, on Christmas Eve; Headquarters 16th Infantry
Brigade at Zulpich, Headquarters 18th Infantry Brigade at Lechenich,
Headquarters 71st Infantry Brigade at Eichhols (a country house), and
Headquarters Divisional Troops at a château near Weilerswist. The
route followed--220 miles--is given in the Diary.
It was with a great feeling of gratitude and elation that the
Division ate their Christmas dinner on the Rhine in December 1918.
The area allotted to the Division was a strip of country almost
rectangular in shape, with a maximum length of twenty miles, and a
maximum breadth of twelve miles, and lying to the immediate south-west
of Cologne. The north-west border was on the ring of forts encircling
the city, which were later included in the divisional area.
The Civil Administration was carried out by the G.O.C. Infantry
Brigades and the C.R.A., who were much assisted by a Civil Staff
Captain and a Provost representative, and in the town of Bruhl by the
G.O.C. Division, who also generally supervised under the Corps and the
Army the work of the Group Commanders.
The Germans were very orderly, and little trouble was given, but guard
and night patrol was fairly heavy.
On 1st February 1919, General Sir H. Plumer presented a Colour to the
9th Norfolk Regiment, 11th Essex Regiment, and 11th Leicester Regiment
respectively, and made a stirring speech to each, congratulating them
on their fine appearance and steady drill, and emphasizing their duty
to their King and Country.
The Division settled down to improving their billets and to education,
and frequent lectures were given by special lecturers sent out from
England. Some of the troops were very comfortable, and notably those
in towns like Bruhl, where each man had a bed and mattress, and
Warrant Officers and N.C.O.s who were billeted in private houses, but
others in the smaller villages were not so well off.
As the Germans did not play football there was a general lack of
football grounds, which had to be made, but the troops scored
considerably by finding electric light in even the tiniest cottages,
and at least one concert-room, with a stage properly fitted up, in
even the smallest village. The Opera, too, was a great source of
pleasure to many. But it was a period of transition--men were
being demobilized freely, and it was with a sigh of relief that
something definite had been fixed, as well as with many sighs of
regret, that orders were eventually received that the 6th Division, as
such, would cease to exist in the middle of March 1919. Farewell
parades were held, farewell speeches made, farewell dinners given, and
on 15th March the Machine-gun Battalion, Pioneers, Field Companies
(except 12th Field Company), and Train were transferred to the
newly-constituted Midland Division.
The 6th Division, B.E.F., had completed its task.
APPENDIX I
BATTLE CASUALTIES
1914 Aisne (19th Sept.--12th Oct.)
1,482 Battle of the Aisne.
1914 Armentières (13th--31st Oct.)
4,696 First Battle of Ypres.
1914-15 Armentières (1st Nov.--31st May)
3,940 Trenches.
1915-16 Ypres (1st June 1915--31st July 1916)
10,938 Includes 1,780 in attack on Hooge;
660 gas attack, 15th Dec;
400 Morteldje attack.
1916 Somme (5th Aug.--20th Oct.)
7,430 Battle of the Somme.
1916-17 La Bassée (25th Nov. 1916--16th February 1917)
709 Trenches.
1917 Loos (2nd Mar.--25th July)
4,884 Raids and attacks, Hill 70.
1917 Loos-Lens (26th Aug.--23rd Oct.)
1,400 Trenches.
1917 Cambrai (20th Nov.--10th Dec.)
1,790 Battle of Cambrai.
1918 Bapaume (17th Jan.--20th March)
313 Trenches.
1918 Lagnicourt (21st--22nd March)
5,160 German offensive.
1918 Ypres (3rd April--24th Aug.)
4,715 Includes 750 at Neuve Eglise
(71st Infantry Brigade) and
250 in attack on Scottish and Ridge
Woods.
1918 St. Quentin (14th--28th Sept.)
3,163 Battle of St. Quentin.
1918 Bohain--Ors (4th--29th Oct.)
3,120 Battles of Bohain, Vaux-Andigny, and Ors.
Grand Total 53,740
N.B.--Above are approximate, and have been compiled from D.H.Q. War
Diaries (Administrative).
APPENDIX II
V.C.s WON BY THE DIVISION
No. 7504 Private HENRY MAY, 1st Battalion The Cameronians
(Scottish Rifles), 19th Infantry Brigade, at that time
attached to 6th Division.
For most conspicuous bravery near La Boutillerie, on 22nd October
1914, in voluntarily endeavouring to rescue, under very heavy fire, a
wounded man, who was killed before he could save him, and
subsequently, on the same day, in carrying a wounded officer a
distance of 300 yards into safety whilst exposed to very severe fire.
(Gazetted 21st April 1915.)
No. 9730 Private JOHN CAFFREY, 2nd Battalion The York and
Lancaster Regiment.
For most conspicuous bravery on 16th November 1915,
near La Brique.
A man of the West Yorkshire Regiment had been badly wounded, and was
lying in the open unable to move, in full view of, and about 300 to
400 yards from, the enemy's trenches. Corporal Stirk, Royal Army
Medical Corps, and Private Caffrey, at once started out to rescue him,
but at the first attempt they were driven back by shrapnel fire. Soon
afterwards they started again, under close sniping and machine-gun
fire, and succeeded in reaching and bandaging the wounded man, but
just as Corporal Stirk had lifted him on Private Caffrey's back he
himself was shot in the head.
Private Caffrey put down the wounded man, bandaged Corporal Stirk, and
helped him back into safety. He then returned and brought in the man
of the West Yorkshire Regiment. He had made three journeys across the
open under close and accurate fire, and had risked his own life to
save others with the utmost coolness and bravery. (Gazetted 22nd
January 1915.)
No. 3/10133 Sergeant ARTHUR FREDERIC SAUNDERS, 9th (Service)
Battalion The Suffolk Regiment.
For most conspicuous bravery. When his officer had been wounded, in
the attack he took charge of two machine-guns and a few men, and,
although severely wounded in the thigh, closely followed the last four
charges of another battalion, and rendered every possible support.
Later, when the remains of the battalion which he had been supporting
had been forced to retire, he stuck to his guns, continued to give
clear orders, and by continuous firing did his best to cover the
retirement. (Gazetted 30th March, 1916.)
2/Lieutenant FRANK BERNARD WEARNE, 11th (Service)
Battalion Essex Regiment.
For superb courage, leadership and self-sacrifice.
On 28th June 1917, 2/Lieut. Wearne was in command of two sections on
the left of a raiding party, whose objective was the German front
line, east of Loos. He led his men into the objective against
opposition, and by his magnificent example and daring, they held on to
the German trench for one hour according to orders.
Throughout the hour they were repeatedly counter-attacked, from their
left down the trench and from their front over the open. Grasping the
fact that if the left flank went, our men would have to give way,
2/Lieut. Wearne at a moment when the attack was being heavily pressed,
and when matters were most critical, leapt on to the parapet and,
followed by his left section, ran along the top of the trench, firing
and throwing bombs at the enemy. This unexpected and daring manoeuvre
threw the enemy back in disorder. Whilst on the top 2/Lieut. Wearne
was severely wounded, but refused to leave his men. He remained in the
trench directing operations, organizing the defence and encouraging
all. Just before the order to withdraw was given 2/Lieut. Wearne was
severely hit for the second time, and when being brought away was hit
for the third time and killed.
His tenacity in remaining at his post, though severely wounded, and
his magnificent fighting spirit enabled his men to hold on to the left
flank; had this gone, the whole operation would have failed. (Gazetted
5th August 1917.)
2/Lieut. (A/Captain) ARTHUR MOORE LASCELLES, 3rd Battalion,
attached 14th Battalion The Durham Light Infantry.
At Masnières on 3rd December 1917, showed the greatest courage,
initiative, and devotion to duty when in command of his company.
His company was in a very exposed position, and after a very heavy
bombardment, during which Captain Lascelles was wounded, the enemy
attacked in strong force, but was driven off, largely owing to the
fine example set by this officer, who refused to allow himself to be
dressed, but continued to encourage his men and organize the defence.
Shortly afterwards the enemy again attacked and captured the trench,
taking several of his men prisoners. Captain Lascelles at once jumped
on to the parapet and, followed by the remainder of his company,
twelve men, rushed across under very heavy machine-gun fire and drove
over sixty of the enemy back, being wounded again, thereby saving a
most critical situation. He then was untiring in re-organizing the
position, but shortly afterwards the enemy again attacked and captured
the trench and Captain Lascelles. Later he escaped, being wounded
again in doing so.
The remarkable determination and gallantry of this officer inspired
everyone. (Gazetted 11th January 1919.)
APPENDIX III
DIARY
1914.
Sept. 8. Division embarked Southampton.
9. Commenced disembarking St. Nazaire.
10. Commenced entraining.
12. Into billets Coulommiers--Mortcerf--Marles--Chaume.
13-19. Marching to the Aisne--into General Reserve, D.H.Q. at
Bazoches.
19. 18th Infantry Brigade to I Corps to relieve 2nd Infantry
Brigade.
20. Attack on I Corps--18th Infantry Brigade heavily engaged.
21. 16th Infantry Brigade to II Corps to relieve 7th and 9th
Infantry Brigades, and 17th Infantry Brigade to I Corps to
relieve 6th Infantry Brigade and 4th Guards Brigade.
Sept. 20 to Oct. 6. In trenches on the Aisne.
Oct. 2. Division (less 16th and 17th Infantry Brigades) concentrated
in area Serches--Jury, under III Corps--D.H.Q. at Serches.
6. 17th Infantry Brigade rejoined Division, which marched west.
9. Division (less 16th Infantry Brigade) entrained at St. Sauveur
near Compiègne.
10-11. Division arrived St. Omer and went into billets--19th
Infantry Brigade joined Division (one battalion to Renescure)--one
battalion 18th Infantry Brigade to Racquinghem.
12. March to Hazebrouck to cover detrainment of 4th Division. 16th
Infantry Brigade relieved by French troops.
13. 16th Infantry Brigade entrained for Cassel. Division marched
east--fighting from 1 p.m. on line La Couronne--Merris--Fontaine
Houck, which was reached at nightfall--considerable casualties.
14. Line reached R. du Leet--Blanche Maison--east of Bailleul.
Oct. 15-16. 18th Infantry Brigade crossed River Lys at Sailly,
and 17th Infantry Brigade at Bac St. Maur during the
night--Steenwerck occupied.
16. Line advanced to Rouge du Bout--Rue Dormoire. 16th Infantry
Brigade rejoined Division and went into Divisional Reserve.
17. Line Rouge du Bout--Bois Grenier--Chapelle d'Armentières
reached without opposition.
18. Reconnaissance in force on enemy's reported positions. Line at
night after considerable fighting Radinghem--Ennetières--
Prémesques--Halte to west of Pérenchies--l'Epinette (east
of Armentières).
19. Entrenching above line.
20. Massed German attack all along line--Division driven back to
Touquet--Bois Blancs--Le Quesne--La Houssoie--Rue du
Bois--l'Epinette.
21. 19th Infantry Brigade (sent to fill gap between II and III
Corps) driven back from Le Maisnil--Fromelles to La
Boutillerie--Touquet.
22. Heavy attack on 19th Infantry Brigade in evening repulsed.
23. 17th Infantry Brigade relieved by 4th Division and became
Divisional Reserve--attacks on 16th Infantry Brigade
(K.S.L.I. and Y. and L.) repulsed with much loss to enemy--
300 dead in front of trenches.
24-25. Continuous attacks on Divisional front throughout day, all
repulsed, but situation critical.
25-26. Retirement made during night to prepared line about half a mile
in rear Touquet--Flamengerie Farm--Rue du Bois, so as to
straighten front.
27-28. Attack by night on 18th Infantry Brigade trenches, which were
captured but retaken by counter-attack--East Yorks especially
distinguished themselves.
28-29. Attack by night on 19th Infantry Brigade repulsed.
29-30. Strong attack by night on 19th Infantry Brigade captured
trenches, but was driven out by counter-attack and 200 dead
counted.
Nov. and Dec. }
1915. } In trenches Armentières front.
Jan. and Feb. }
Mar. 12. L'Epinette attacked and captured by North Staffordshire
Regiment.
Mar. 15. 16th Infantry Brigade moved up to Vlamertinghe, but
returned next day.
May. A little mining and counter-mining on the Frelinghien and Le
Touquet fronts.
27. Major-Gen. Sir John Keir left to command VI Corps, being
succeeded by Brig.-Gen. Congreve. Brig.-Gen. Humphreys
succeeded Brig.-Gen. Paget in command of Divisional
Artillery.
Relief by 27th Division commenced.
31. Front handed over to 27th Division--19th Infantry Brigade left
Division.
May 31 to June 1. Took over new front Ypres Salient.
June 2. Relief completed on front from Ypres--Roulers Railway to
Wieltje.
5. 17th Infantry Brigade into line, which now extended to just
short of Turco Farm.
8. D.H.Q. from Couthove to Vlamertinghe.
15. Gallant bombing attack by Lieut. Smith's Grenadier Platoon to
assist 41st Brigade.
16. Artillery co-operation with 3rd Divisional attack on Bellewarde
Farm.
20. 16th Infantry Brigade's first experience of gas.
22. Artillery co-operation in 14th Divisional attack.
July 6. Artillery co-operation in 4th Divisional attack near Pilkem.
30. Attack on 14th Division at Hooge. Drove them back to Sanctuary
and Zouave Woods. Counter-attack unsuccessful.
31. 16th Infantry Brigade moved up. Decided to relieve 6th Division
and give it task of retaking Hooge.
Aug. 2-3. Relieved.
6. Took over new front and commenced bombardment.
9. Attack on Hooge by 16th and 18th Infantry Brigades--infantry
moved close up under barrage, which remained on support trench
five minutes longer--attack successful, but right suffered
very heavily from shelling from south and fire from east.
Oct. 14. 17th Infantry Brigade left for 24th Division, and 71st
arrived.
Nov. 19-20. Division relieved--to Houtkerque and Poperinghe, but had
to find working parties for divisions in line.
Dec. 14. Into line again--Routers Railway to Wieltje.
19. Gas attack by enemy.
1916.
Jan. 24. 11th Essex patrol raid (3 officers and 10 other ranks) on
mound on Verlorenhoek Road--killed six Germans.
Feb. 14-15. Two enemy raids near Wieltje and Trenches B9 and 10
repulsed.
Mar. 9-10. 1st The Buffs bombing raid (1 officer and 19 other ranks)
on crater at I 12.
15-16. 2nd D.L.I. (3 officers and 44 other ranks) successful raid,
capturing a prisoner--Bangalore torpedo laid by Lieut. Smith,
R.N.V.R.
15-18. Relieved from line--to Houtkerque, Wormhoudt, Calais.
April 15-18. Back into line 5,500 yards front, with left on canal next
to 58th French Division and right next Guards Division.
19-20. Enemy occupied trenches out of which he had shelled a company
of the 8th Bedfords in Morteldje Salient--counter-attack
unsuccessful.
21. Trenches retaken by two companies K.S.L.I., in spite of very
heavy going.
May 14-15. Enemy attacked four bombing posts of 1st The Buffs--beaten
off three times, but captured them at fourth attempt--all
garrison casualties.
June 3. Five officers and 200 other ranks 1st West Yorks drove enemy
out of posts on frontage 450 yards and re-occupied it.
10. "Admiral" reported missing from patrol of 9th Norfolks.
17-18. Relieved--to Bollezeele, Houtkerque, Wormhoudt.
July 15-17. Into line north-west of Hooge to north of Wieltje.
July 29 to Aug. 1. Relieved preparatory to entraining.
Aug. 2-3. Entrained Hopoutre, Proven, and Esquelbec, and detrained
Candas and Doullens.
3-4. Marched to Acheux--Raincheval area.
5-7. Into line on Ancre--preparing for attack.
21. 9th Suffolk and 2nd Sherwood Foresters' unsuccessful raid.
24. 14th D.L.I. unsuccessful raid.
Aug. 26-27. Relieved and began to move south to Vignacourt--
Flesselles area.
Sept. 6-8. Moved up to XIV Corps area.
11. Into line on front between Leuze Wood and Ginchy.
13. Attack by 71st Infantry Brigade on Quadrilateral
unsuccessful--renewed in evening but only partially successful.
15. _General attack_ by 16th and 71st Infantry Brigades--6th
Divisional objective beyond the Quadrilateral--attack
failed--renewed in evening and failed again.
16. 18th Infantry Brigade into line in relief of 71st Infantry
Brigade.
18. Fresh attack on Quadrilateral after bombardment by 16th and 18th
Infantry Brigades--successful.
19. Relieved.
21. Into line again.
25. _General attack_--6th Division on Lesboeufs, and south to
Morval--by 16th and 18th Infantry Brigades, with 71st Infantry
Brigade in reserve--successful--over 500 prisoners.
30. Relieved by 20th Division.
Oct. 8-9. Into line relieving 20th Division.
12. _General attack_--6th Division towards Le Transloy--by
18th and 71st Infantry Brigades--16th Infantry Brigade in
reserve--unsuccessful.
15. Attack renewed--partially successful.
18. Fresh attack by 71st Infantry Brigade--only partially
successful on left.
20. Relieved--to Corbie.
28. Assembled in reserve to I Corps.
Nov. 25. Into line on Canal Sector, La Bassée.
During Dec. Side-slipped slightly to south.
1917.
Jan. 26. 1st West Yorks raid (6 officers and 160 other ranks under
Capt. Trimble) in Cambrin Sector--five prisoners.
29. 8th Bedford Regiment raid (C Company--150--under Capt. Brewster)
in Hohenzollern Sector--two prisoners.
Feb. 4. Enemy raided 1st West Yorks and captured a Lewis gun and a
prisoner.
Feb. 9. 2nd Sherwood Foresters raid (6 officers and 100 other
ranks under Major Wylie) in Quarries Sector under smoke barrage
by Special Co. R.E.--20 dug-outs blown in--about 60 enemy
killed and wounded--8 prisoners.
10. 2nd D.L.I. raid (3 officers and 38 other ranks) on Mad
Point--over 30 enemy dead counted--1 prisoner brought in
--several dug-outs destroyed.
12. 71st Infantry Brigade scouting party raid partly successful
only--one machine-gun entrenchment blown in.
15. Enemy attempted raid in Hohenzollern Sector repulsed by artillery
and machine-gun fire--one enemy identification made.
16-17. Relieved by 21st Division--to Béthune--Busnes--Robecq.
Mar. 2-4. Into line Loos Sector--from Double Crassier to Railway
Alley.
18. Enemy carried out several simultaneous raids--that on 2nd York
and Lancasters dispersed by Lewis-gun fire--that on Buffs
repulsed after hand-to-hand fighting--that on 1st West
Yorks penetrated and captured one Lewis gun and six men.
19. Enemy raided 2nd York and Lancasters--unsuccessful--two
Germans killed in our trenches.
24. 11th Essex Battalion raid on area round Posen Crater (4
companies of 2 officers and 80 other ranks each)--penetrated to
enemy support line and remained one and a half hours--captured
1 officer, 8 other ranks, and 1 machine-gun.
25. Enemy raided 9th Norfolk Regiment and 2nd Sherwood Foresters
and captured nine prisoners, penetrating some distance
between the battalions, but leaving one officer and three
other ranks dead in our trenches.
30. 1st The Buffs raid (4 officers and 100 other ranks under
Capt. B. L. Strauss) in Loos Sector--remained in trenches
over half-hour--took one prisoner and one machine-gun, and
blew in eight dug-outs.
April 5. Enemy raid on 2nd Foresters at Border Redoubt--driven off
with very slight casualties.
April 8. 2nd D.L.I. patrol raid (2 officers and 47 other ranks)
in Loos Sector--held up by wire.
10. 9th Suffolks raid (D Company under Capt. England, M.C.) in
Quarries Sector--successful and obtained identification.
12. 2nd York and Lancasters raid (2 officers and 80 other ranks
under Capt. Hardy)--got into trench and killed sixteen
Germans.
13. Enemy withdrew from Railway Triangle, closely followed by 2nd
York and Lancasters, who entered enemy dug-outs before candles
had burnt out.
24th Division on our right also advancing line.
System of bombardment followed by pauses during which patrols
went out and occupied what they could.
14. Enemy small raid on 1st West Yorks--driven off by counter-attack
and identification obtained.
15. A certain amount of ground gained in the face of increasing
opposition--Buffs and York and Lancasters advanced a bit.
16. Systematic bombardment of Hill 70 trenches commenced--enemy
counter-attacked and drove Buffs back slightly, but failed
against 8th Bedfords' advanced post--D Company, West Yorks
(3 officers and 65 other ranks under Capt. Rendall), attempted
raid, but driven back by artillery fire.
17. Gas released on enemy--ideal conditions--enemy attacked
right flank of 8th Bedfords but driven back.
18. Enemy shelled Loos heavily during night (about 1,000 5.9s)
--1st Leicesters (C Company under Capt. Cox) raided and
captured one prisoner--1st K.S.L.I. and 8th Bedfords made
more ground, latter taking twenty-seven prisoners and one
machine-gun.
19. 1st K.S.L.I. got north end of Novel Alley, but three attempts
to push forward by 8th Bedfords unsuccessful--K.S.L.I. took
eighteen prisoners--14th D.L.I. relieved 8th Bedfords--11th
Essex placed under orders of G.O.C., 16th Infantry Brigade.
20. 46th Division relieved 24th Division on our right--11th Essex
into line, relieving 1st Buffs and 1st K.S.L.I.
April 20-21. Line partially withdrawn to allow of bombardment.
21. Attack by 14th D.L.I. in conjunction with 46th Division--
successful--two machine-guns and thirty-six prisoners.
21-22. 14th D.L.I. repulsed two enemy counter-attacks.
22. Attack by 14th D.L.I. and 11th Essex in conjunction with 46th
Division--latter unable to attack Narwhal trench on account
of uncut wire--11th Essex unable to get on--14th D.L.I.
took objective, but gradually shelled and sniped out and
driven back to original line--forty-six prisoners and three
machine-guns.
22. 1st Leicesters relieved 14th D.L.I.--9th Suffolks lent to 16th
Infantry Brigade--position became stationary with enemy in
Nash Alley.
23. Small enemy raid dispersed and an identification obtained.
26. G.O.C. 71st Infantry Brigade assumed command Loos Sector vice
G.O.C. 16th Infantry Brigade to northern sector of Division.
27. Enemy raided in Quarries Sector--one prisoner taken by us.
28. Raid by 9th Norfolks (No. 8 Platoon) stopped by new wire--same
by West Yorks, also unsuccessful.
29. 7,000 gas shells by enemy on Vermelles, Philosophe, and Maroc.
May 2. 46th Division took over portion of Southern Brigade area.
5. Enemy patrol entered our lines, but was shot and identification
made.
9. Enemy attempted raid on 2nd D.L.I., but driven off.
13. Heavy enemy bombardment in 14bis Sector--raid broken up as it
came out of trenches by artillery fire.
15-16. Enemy raided Boyau 46 and captured four men.
20-21. 1st West Yorks raid (2 officers and 52 other ranks) entered
trenches but enemy fled--no result.
22. 1st Leicesters raid (B Company, 4 officers and 132 other ranks,
under Capt. Wykes) in Quarries Sector--several dug-outs with
enemy in destroyed.
May 28. 2nd Sherwood Foresters (6 officers and 133 other ranks
under Major Addison-Smith) raided under cover of a smoke
barrage--captured two prisoners and destroyed some dug-outs,
machine-gun entrenchments and tunnel entrances.
June 1. 1st K.S.L.I. (3 officers and 130 other ranks under Capt. E.
Spink, M.C.) raided enemy near Hendon Alley--sixteen Germans
killed and machine-gun entrenchments blown in.
4. Two officers and forty other ranks of 1st K.S.L.I. raided same
trenches and got in, but no prisoners taken.
6. Small raid 2nd D.L.I. (2 officers and 50 other ranks)
unsuccessful--enemy's barrage too heavy.
8. Enemy small raid on 9th Suffolks at Newport Sap repulsed--four
enemy dead left on our wire.
10. 9th Suffolks (3 officers and 94 other ranks) raided as far as
enemy support trenches, but found no one.
12-13. 9th Norfolks (1 officer and 35 other ranks) attempted raid on
Merthyr Sap, but could not get in.
15. 14th D.L.I. successful daylight raid (3 officers and 80 other
ranks) in vicinity of Nash Alley--a good many enemy killed
and seven prisoners taken.
23-24. Enemy entered post of 11th Essex and did some damage, but was
driven out by counter-attack.
24. Raid by 1st Buffs (two companies under Capt. Jacob) near
Halifax Alley--remained in trenches three and a half hours
and captured fifteen prisoners and two aerial-dart machines.
Lieuts. Harrington and Buss (both killed) greatly
distinguished themselves.
27-28. Very gallant raid by 2nd D.L.I. (2 officers and 84 other ranks
under Capt. Fawcett) and 11th Essex (3 officers and 67 other
ranks under Capt. Silver) in connection with operations of
46th Division--though anticipated the raiders got into the
enemy's trenches and remained there one hour, repelling all
counter-attacks--one prisoner taken.
July 1-2. Small enemy raid on Novel Alley unsuccessful--left
one dead in our trench.
3. Small enemy raid on 1st West Yorks in Novel Alley unsuccessful
--two prisoners taken and one enemy left dead in trench.
7-8. Brilliant repulse of strong enemy raid near Boyau 70 by 1st
The Buffs and 1st K.S.L.I.--two prisoners taken by us.
9-10. 14th D.L.I. raid (1 officer and 30 other ranks)--trenches
entered but enemy fled--enemy small raid on Novel Alley
driven off.
12. Patrol raid (3 patrols of 12) by 8th Bedfords in Hulluch
Sector--one prisoner.
16. Surprise raid by 9th Norfolks (2 officers and 36 other
ranks)--stiff fighting but no identification obtained.
20. Three patrols (3 officers and 55 other ranks) of 2nd York and
Lancasters raided enemy's posts but only partly successful.
23. Raid by 1st Leicesters (8 officers and 291 other ranks under
Capt. Mosse) in Quarries Sector--enemy bolted into dug-outs
--remained one and a half hours in enemy's trenches--one
prisoner taken.
Division relieved by 46th Division--D.H.Q. to Ourton--
troops to area Ourton-Monchy Breton.
31. 9th Norfolks and 1st Leicesters went by bus to Bac St. Maur to
come under orders G.O.C., 57th Division.
Aug. 5. 9th Norfolks and 1st Leicesters returned.
24-27. Into line on Hill 70 front.
Sept. 9. 2nd Sherwood Foresters raided enemy Hill 70 Sector
unsuccessfully--enemy had bombarded trenches all day and
blown in many, and had anticipated the raid.
13. 8th Bedfords (2 officers and 85 other ranks) raided enemy and
bombed his crowded trenches, but failed to get in.
20-21. Enemy's raid on 11th Essex failed.
24. Side-stepped with a view to attack on Cité St. Auguste.
29. Enemy raided York and Lancasters, but was repulsed and left an
unwounded prisoner in our hands.
Oct. 4. Preparations for attack. Enemy raid (about half
battalion) on 18th Infantry Brigade repulsed.
Oct. 19. Raid with heavy bombardment on 14th D.L.I. unsuccessful.
20-23. Relieved by 11th Division--to St. Hilaire area.
29. Marched south to join Third Army. Training with tanks.
Nov. 15-19. Commenced march to Cambrai front.
20. _Battle of Cambrai._
16th Infantry Brigade on right, 71st Infantry Brigade on
left, 18th passed through--broke both systems of Hindenburg
Line, capturing Ribécourt and Premy Chapel Ridge--first
company into Marcoing--over 1,100 prisoners and 23 guns.
All objectives gained with few casualties by 12 noon.
Congratulatory message from Corps Commander.
21. Action of 14th D.L.I. supporting cavalry in advance to Cantaing.
26-27. 18th Infantry Brigade extended front to Cantaing. 1st The Buffs
cleared and occupied Noyelles.
30. _Enemy counter-attack in force on Third Army._
16th Infantry Brigade moved from Divisional Reserve to near
Beaucamps and ordered to counter-attack on Gouzeaucourt--
found Guards already in possession.
Arranged to attack by night on La Vacquerie-Gonnelieu--
attack unsuccessful.
Gallant action of 18th Infantry Brigade transport under Shea,
Q.M., 2nd D.L.I., and Paul, Transport officer, 1st West Yorks
--both died of wounds.
Congratulatory message on this action received from G.O.C.,
29th Division.
Night Dec. 2/3. 16th Infantry Brigade relieved part of 29th Division
north of St. Quentin Canal.
3. Enemy attacked K.S.L.I. and 14th D.L.I. north of canal. Three
counter-attacks by D.L.I., but finally driven back.
Bedfords and York and Lancasters put in to restore situation
--partially successful.
Front withdrawn to line of canal night of 3rd/4th.
4. General withdrawal of British line to Support System of
Hindenburg Line ordered.
Dec. 10. Relieved by 19th Division.
11. 16th Infantry Brigade to VI Corps.
12. 18th Infantry Brigade to VI Corps.
Above brigades placed at disposal of 3rd Division, and went
into line to relieve two of their brigades on Bullecourt
front for a few days.
Dec. 14 to } In rest--Basseux area.
Jan. 17, 1918. }
1918.
Jan. 17. Commenced move up to Frémicourt.
Feb. 4. Enemy's silent raid on three posts of Boursies area and
captured one prisoner.
13. Side-stepped into Lagnicourt Sector.
Mar. 3. 1st K.S.L.I. (2 officers and 50 other ranks, B Company) raided
Magpie's Nest and captured one machine-gun--enemy fled.
16. 1st Leicesters (2 officers and 50 other ranks) repeated raid--
post empty.
21. _Great German offensive commenced._ Fighting all day--heavy
casualties--71st and 18th Infantry Brigades holding out in
Reserve line till dark.
22. Fighting all day on Corps line.
Remnants of Division relieved at night--to Achiet and
Logeast Wood.
25. By train to Second Army.
30. King's visit to Steenvoorde.
April 3-4. Into line in Ypres Salient on high ground between Menin and
Zonnebeke Roads--came under XXII Corps.
13. 71st Infantry Brigade left to join 49th Division on Neuve Eglise
front.
16. Line withdrawn to battle zone--enemy followed up in the
afternoon and a good many casualties were inflicted on him--
one party of twenty-five annihilated.
18. Enemy raided post unsuccessfully and lost an officer
killed--identification obtained by us.
25. Capture of Kemmel by enemy from the French.
26. 71st Infantry Brigade returned to Division.
Night 26-27. Further withdrawal to west end of Zillebeke Lake-White
Château.
29. Heavy attacks against Division on our right.
May 8. Unsuccessful enemy attack on Ridgewood.
11-14. Side-slipped to south and came into II Corps.
19. 11th Essex raided Manor Farm successfully but no prisoners
taken.
May 22. 2nd D.L.I. (A and C Companies) raided pill-boxes
Bedford front and took sixteen prisoners.
28-29. Attack by 11th Essex in conjunction with French 46th Division.
June 5. 2nd York and Lancasters raided (3 officers and 68 other ranks)
Lankhoff Farm unsuccessfully.
7-8. Division relieved--to Dirty Bucket Camp and Jan ter Biezen area.
71st T.M.B. co-operated in 46th French Division operation.
19. 18th T.M.B. lent to 7th French Division for a raid.
27-28. Relieved 46th French Division in Dickebusch front.
July 6. Enemy's raid on Scottish Wood repulsed.
9. Patrol of 2nd Sherwood Foresters rushed a post near Ridgewood by
day--captured a machine-gun and killed the garrison.
14. _Attack by 18th Infantry Brigade on Ridgewood._ 1st West Yorks
and 2nd D.L.I. assisted by two companies 1st Middlesex of
33rd Division--enemy surprised--most successful--
captures, 7 officers, 341 other ranks, 23 machine-guns, 1
H.T.M., 2 L.T.Ms.
Aug. 2. 1st The Buffs daylight raid on the Brasserie--successful--
three prisoners.
6. H.M. The King saw some of the troops at Winnezeele.
8. Minor operation by 18th Infantry Brigade in connection with
41st Division's operation--company West Yorks unsuccessful
--company 2nd D.L.I. on right co-operating with 41st
Division entirely successful.
In August. Attachment of units of 27th American Division.
21-24. Relieved by 27th American Division--to Wizernes area.
31. Division marched to Arques.
Sept. 1. Entrained for Fourth Army.
2-4. Detrained and billeted in area Heilly-Ribemont-Franvillers.
13-14. Relieved 32nd Division at head of IX Corps by bus.
18th Infantry Brigade took over front in Holnon Wood with
11th Essex.
16th Infantry Brigade in support in Trefcon area.
71st Infantry Brigade in reserve in Monchy-Lagache
area.
Sept. 15. 11th Essex attacked and captured trenches just clear of
Holnon Wood, taking forty-six prisoners.
15-16. Divisional front re-organized with West Yorks on right and
Essex on left.
17. West Yorks attacked Holnon Village and Essex Badger Copse to
establish starting line for general attack on 18th September
--fighting all day--Essex eventually successful--West
Yorks unsuccessful.
18. _General attack_ to capture high ground overlooking St.
Quentin--71st Infantry Brigade on right, with D.L.I.
attached to capture Holnon--16th Infantry Brigade on left
--latter advanced 3,000 yards--former held up by
Quadrilateral--right made little progress as French failed
to capture Round and Manchester Hills on right flank.
19. Attack renewed on Quadrilateral but unsuccessful.
20-23. Digging new assembly trenches and bombarding Quadrilateral with
heavy artillery.
24. Attack on whole IX Corps front--18th Infantry Brigade
on right, 16th Infantry Brigade on left--fighting all day;
half Quadrilateral captured by nightfall.
1st Leicesters, attached to 18th Infantry Brigade, captured
Douai Trench east of Holnon at 10.30. p.m. by moonlight.
25. Gradual completion of capture of Quadrilateral. Selency
Village captured--Position consolidated.
26-30. On position.
Sept. 30 to Oct. 1. Relief of Division by the French.
Oct. 1-3. Resting in Tertry area.
4. Division relieved 46th Division--D.H.Q. at La Baraque, 71st
Infantry Brigade at Magny la Fosse, 16th Infantry Brigade
took over line with 139th Infantry Brigade (46th Division)
left at Sequehart under 6th Division.
7. 71st relieved part of 16th Infantry Brigade on left next
to 30th American Division.
8. _General attack_ towards Bohain--71st Infantry Brigade on
left, 16th Infantry Brigade on right, 18th Infantry
Brigade in Divisional Reserve with West Yorks (attached to
16th Infantry Brigade) attacking up valley, French on
right--all objectives gained by night.
Oct. 8-9. Took over part of line by night from 30th American Division
and handed over part to 46th Division.
9. Attack under a barrage at dawn towards Bohain and Fresnoy
--Bohain captured during night by 9th Norfolks.
10. Advance by 71st Infantry Brigade to high ground 2,000
yards east of Bohain--46th Division on right.
11. Reconnaissance in force by 71st Infantry Brigade brought
to a standstill by machine-gun fire.
11-12. 18th Infantry Brigade relieved 71st Infantry Brigade
by night.
12. 18th Infantry Brigade reconnaissance in force at 4.30 p.m.
made a little ground.
14. 71st Infantry Brigade relieved 18th Infantry Brigade.
16-17. 16th and 18th Infantry Brigades moved to north for general
attack on 18th, with 30th American Division on left and 46th
Division on right. Brig.-Gen. Walker wounded.
18. _General attack_ through Vaux Andigny--16th Infantry
Brigade on left, 18th Infantry Brigade on right, 71st
Infantry Brigade in reserve--successful--1st Division
passed through 6th Division, which came into Corps Reserve.
19-20. Resting.
20-21. Division relieved 30th American Division in St. Souplet area
--18th Infantry Brigade on right next to 1st Division, 71st
Infantry Brigade on left next to 25th Division--D.H.Q.
Becquigny.
23. _General attack_ to gain high ground overlooking Sambre
Canal--zero 1.30 a.m.--18th Infantry Brigade successful
on right--71st Infantry Brigade on left, disorganized by
gas shelling in assembly position and losing the barrage by
reason of the high fences and the mist, gained most of their
objectives by the afternoon.
23-24. 16th Infantry Brigade relieved 71st Infantry Brigade by night
and pushed on, completing capture of final objective.
Oct. 28. 71st Infantry Brigade relieved 18th Infantry Brigade.
30. Successful attack on a farm by 1st The Buffs.
30-31. Division relieved by 32nd Division, went to rest at Fresnoy le
Grand.
Nov. 6. Division moved to Bohain.
11. Hostilities ceased.
14. Division marched to area Catillon-Mazinghien-Vaux Andigny.
15. To area Prisches-Le Sart-Catillon.
16. To area Avesnes-Favril.
17. Halt.
18. To area Solre le Château-Dompierre.
19. Tail closed to Dimechaux-Sars Poteries.
20. _March to the Rhine commenced._
To area Barbençon-Thirimont. Tail at Solre le Château.
23. Tail closed to Barbençon-Beaumont.
24. To area Leneffe-Fraire-Walcourt-Boussu.
Nov. 25th to Dec. 1. Halt.
Dec. 2. To area Mettet-Flavion-Morialme. Tail at Leneffe-Fraire.
3. To area Sommières-Onhaye.
4. To area Bouvignes-Anhee. Tail at Mettet-Biesmeree.
5. H.Q. Group and 71st Infantry Brigade crossed Meuse and went to
Crupet-Braibant-Purnode.
16th and 18th Infantry Brigades closed to river at
Anhee-Bouvignes. Tail at Gerin-Maredret.
6. 16th and 18th Infantry Brigades crossed Meuse Division in area
Achet-Hamois-Ciney. Tail at Yvoir.
7. Halt.
8. To area Les Avins-Pailhe. Tail at Ciney.
9. To area Ouffet-Tinlot-Stree. Tail at Havelange.
10. Halt.
11. To area Remouchamps-Aywaille-Comblain la Tour. Tail at Tinlot.
12. To area Francorchamps-Stoumont. Tail at Ouffet-Hody.
13. 71st Infantry Brigade crossed German frontier to Malmedy.
Remainder in area Stavelot-Stoumont. Tail at Oneux-Presseux.
Dec. 14. H.Q. Group crossed frontier--71st Infantry Brigade to
Elsenborn Camp. Tail at Aywaille.
15. 18th Infantry Brigade crossed frontier--71st Infantry Brigade
to Montjoie. Tail at Stoumont.
16. 16th Infantry Brigade crossed frontier--71st Infantry Brigade
to Simmerath-Rotgen. Tail at Malmedy.
17. Tail to Elsenborn Camp.
18. Halt.
19. To area Heinbach-Gemund-Schleiden. Tail at Elsenborn Camp.
20. To area Mechernich-Kommern-Zulpich. Tail at Montjoie.
21. To area Euskirchen-Zulpich. Tail at Harpersheid-Drieborn.
22. To area Lechenich-Weilerswist. Tail at Vlatten-Satzvey.
23. To area Rondorf-Kendenich. Tail at Zulpich-Froitzhein.
D.H.Q. at Bruhl--all units now in final positions.
APPENDIX IV
ORDER OF BATTLE ON MOBILIZATION.
DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS
G.O.C. Major-Gen. J. L. Keir, C.B., late R.A.
A.D.C. Capt. P. F. Fitzgerald, King's Shropshire
Light Infantry.
G.S.O.1 Col. W. T. Furse, D.S.O., late R.A.
G.S.O.2 Lt.-Col. J. T. Burnett-Stuart, D.S.O.,
Rifle Brigade.
G.S.O.3 Capt. A. T. Paley, Rifle Brigade.
A.A. and Q.M.G. Col. W. Campbell, D.S.O., Gordon
Highlanders.
D.A.A. and Q.M.G. Major F. C. Dundas, Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders.
D.A.Q.M.G. Major A. Delavoye, A.S.C.
A.D.M.S. Col. H. O. Trevor, R.A.M.C.
D.A.D.M.S. Major N. J. C. Rutherford, R.A.M.C.
A.D.V.S. Major H. M. Lenox-Conyngham, A.V.C.
D.A.D.O.S. Major H. M. Howard, A.O.D.
A.P.M. Capt. H. S. Rogers, King's Shropshire
Light Infantry.
DIVISIONAL ENGINEERS
C.R.E. Lt.-Col. G. C. Kemp, R.E.
Adjutant Major B. W. Y. Danford, R.E.
12th Field Company Major A. F. Sargeaunt, R.E.
38th Field Company Major F. M. Browne, R.E.
6th Divisional Signal Capt. A. N. Paxton, R.E.
Company.
DIVISIONAL CAVALRY
O.C., Squadron, 19th Major H. O'S. F. Tanner, 19th Hussars.
Hussars.
DIVISIONAL CYCLISTS
O.C., Cyclist Company Capt. S. H. Dix, Leinster Regiment.
DIVISIONAL TRAIN
O.C., 6th Divisional Lt.-Col. H. Davies, A.S.C.
Train.
ROYAL ARMY MEDICAL CORPS
O.C., 16th Field Lt.-Col. A. C. Fox.
Ambulance.
O.C., 17th Field Lt.-Col. J. P. Silver.
Ambulance.
O.C., 18th Field Lt.-Col. A. A. Watson (S.R.).
Ambulance.
DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY
C.R.A. Brig.-Gen. W. L. H. Paget, C.B., M.V.O.
Brigade-Major Major J. Farquhar.
Staff-Captain Capt. J. de V. Bowles.
Orderly Officer 2/Lieut. K. F. W. Dunn.
_2nd Brigade, R.F.A._
O.C. Col. W. A. M. Thompson.
Adjutant Capt. H. R. S. Massey.
21st Battery Major L. M. Phillpotts, D.S.O.
42nd Battery Major H. J. Brock.
53rd Battery Major C. J. Rugge Price.
Brigade Ammunition Capt. C. E. S. Bower.
Column.
_24th Brigade, R.F.A._
O.C. Lt.-Col. C. E. Lawrie, D.S.O.
Adjutant Capt. H. A. Boyd.
110th Battery Major W. M. Warburton.
111th Battery Major E. C. W. D. Walthall, D.S.O.
112th Battery Major W. B. Browell.
Brigade Ammunition Capt. B. H. Shaw-Stewart.
Column.
_38th Brigade, R.F.A._
O.C. Lt.-Col. R. F. Fox, D.S.O.
Adjutant Capt. C. S. Rich.
24th Battery Major A. G. Arbuthnot.
34th Battery Major A. R. Wainwright.
72nd Battery Major F. A. Tighe.
Brigade Ammunition Capt. C. R. Hill.
Column.
_12th (Howitzer) Brigade, R.F.A._
O.C. Lt.-Col. G. Humphreys, D.S.O.
Adjutant Capt. A. T. McGrath.
43rd Battery Major E. R. Burne.
86th Battery Major R. S. Hardman.
87th Battery Major H. T. Belcher, D.S.O.
Brigade Ammunition Capt. R. J. C. Meyricke.
Column.
_24th Heavy Battery, R.G.A. (60-pounders)_
O.C. Major H. E. J. Brake, C.B., D.S.O.
_Divisional Ammunition Column_
O.C. Lt.-Col. G. A. Cardew.
Adjutant Capt. J. C. Dundas.
16th INFANTRY BRIGADE
B.G.C. Brig.-Gen. E. C. Ingouville-Williams,
C.B., D.S.O., late Worcestershire
Regiment.
Brigade-Major Capt. R. H. Mangles, D.S.O., The
Queen's Regiment.
Staff-Captain Capt. G. Lee, The Buffs.
O.C., 1st Bn., The Lt.-Col. H. C. de la M. Hill.
Buffs.
O.C., 1st Bn., Leicestershire Lt.-Col. H. L. Croker.
Regiment.
O.C., 1st Bn., K.S.L.I. Lt.-Col. C. P. Higginson, D.S.O.
O.C., 2nd Bn., York Lt.-Col. E. C. Cobbold.
and Lancaster Regt.
17th INFANTRY BRIGADE
B.G.C. Brig.-Gen. W. R. B. Doran, C.B.,
D.S.O., late Royal Irish Regiment.
Brigade-Major Major A. D. Green, D.S.O., Worcestershire
Regiment.
Staff-Captain Capt. H. V. Scott, Rifle Brigade.
O.C., 1st Bn., Royal Lt.-Col. R. Fowler-Butler.
Fusiliers.
O.C., 1st Bn., North Lt.-Col. V. W. de Falbe, D.S.O.
Staffordshire Regt.
O.C., 2nd Bn., Leinster Lt.-Col. W. T. M. Reeve.
Regiment.
O.C., 3rd Bn., Rifle Lt.-Col. R. Alexander.
Brigade
18th INFANTRY BRIGADE
B.G.C. Brig.-Gen. W. N. Congreve, V.C., C.B.,
M.V.O., late Rifle Brigade.
Brigade-Major Capt. R. F. H. Wallace, Black Watch.
Staff-Captain Capt. F. G. Maughan, Durham Light
Infantry.
O.C., 1st Bn., West Lt.-Col. F. W. Towsey.
Yorkshire Regiment.
O.C., 1st Bn., East Lt.-Col. R. E. Benson.
Yorkshire Regiment.
O.C., 2nd Bn., Sherwood Lt.-Col. C. B. Crofton-Atkins.
Foresters.
O.C., 2nd Bn., D.L.I. Lt.-Col. B. W. L. McMahon.
ORDER OF BATTLE--11TH NOVEMBER 1918
DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS
G.O.C. Major-Gen. T. O. Marden, C.B., C.M.G.,
late the Welch Regiment.
A.D.C. 2/Lieut. E. C. W. Severne, General List.
A.D.C. Capt. J. R. Tylden, East Kent Yeomanry.
G.S.O.1 Brevet-Lt.-Col. T. T. Grove, D.S.O., R.E.
G.S.O.2 Major L. M. Taylor, M.C., York and
Lancaster Regiment (T.).
G.S.O.3 Capt. J. Horlington, M.C., York and
Lancaster Regiment (S.R.).
Intelligence Officer Lieut. K. Archbold, M.C., General List.
A.A. and Q.M.G. Brevet-Lt.-Col. P. Hudson, C.M.G.,
D.S.O., The King's (Liverpool) Regt.
D.A.A.G. Major C. Macfie, D.S.O., Seaforth
Highlanders.
D.A.Q.M.G. Lt.-Col. A. J. D. Hay, East Surrey
Regiment (S.R.).
A.D.M.S. Col. H. C. R. Hime, D.S.O., R.A.M.C.
D.A.D.M.S. Major N. Cantlie, M.C., R.A.M.C.
D.A.D.V.S. Major R. F. Bett, A.V.C.
D.A.D.O.S. Major R. G. P. Hare, A.O.D.
D.A.P.M. Capt. W. A. Bignell, South Irish Horse.
S.C.F., C. of E. Rev. E. C. Hoskyns, M.C., A.C.D.
Divisional Claims Officer. Lieut. C. E. B. M. Smith, Sherwood
Foresters.
Divisional Gas Officer Capt. D. Powell, M.C., R.E.
O.C., 209th Employment Capt. G. L. Scudamore, Labour Corps.
Company.
6th M.T. Company Major O. B. Gabriel, A.S.C.
DIVISIONAL ENGINEERS
C.R.E. Lt.-Col. H. A. L. Hall, M.C., R.E.
Adjutant Capt. C. A. Langley, M.C., R.E.
12th Field Company Major F. W. Moore, M.C., R.E.(S.).
459th Field Company Major A. S. Lambert, M.C., R.E.(T.).
509th Field Company Major H. G. Bambridge, M.C., R.E.(S.).
6th Divisional Signal Major A. G. Shaw, M.C., East Yorkshire
Company Regiment (T.).
PIONEERS
O.C., 11th Bn., Leicestershire Lt.-Col. R. H. Radford, Leicestershire
Regiment Regiment (S.R.).
2nd in Command Major W. A. Rodger, Leicestershire
Regiment (S.).
Adjutant Capt. H. M. Raleigh, Leicestershire
Regiment.
MACHINE-GUN BATTALION
O.C., 6th Battalion, M.G.C. Lt.-Col. J. B. Rosher, D.S.O., M.C.,
Durham Light Infantry (S.).
2nd in Command. Major M. C. Cooper, M.C., Oxford and
Bucks Light Infantry (T.).
Adjutant Capt. J. M. Briggs, King's Shropshire
Light Infantry (S.R.).
DIVISIONAL TRAIN
O.C. Lt.-Col. F. C. S. Norrington, A.S.C.
Adjutant Capt. R. Beales, A.S.C.
Senior Supply Officer Capt. A. F. Osborne, M.C., A.S.C.
ROYAL ARMY MEDICAL CORPS
16th Field Ambulance Lt.-Col. J. W. C. Stubbs, M.C.,
R.A.M.C.
17th Field Ambulance Lt.-Col. A. J. Hickey, M.C., R.A.M.C.
18th Field Ambulance Lt.-Col. E. W. Wade, D.S.O., R.A.M.C.
MOBILE VETERINARY SECTION
O.C. Capt. H. J. Hughes, A.V.C.
DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY
C.R.A. Brig.-Gen. E. F. Delaforce, C.M.G., R.A.
Brigade-Major Major S. Carwithen, R.A.
Staff-Captain Capt. K. Lyon, R.A.
Reconnaissance Officer Lieut. L. S. Wooler, R.A.
Signal Officer Capt. F. Goodman, R.E.
_2nd Brigade, R.F.A._
O.C. Lt.-Col. W. H. F. Weber, D.S.O., R.F.A.
Adjutant Capt. T. C. Rayner, M.C.
Orderly Officer 2/Lieut. T. Brough.
Signal Officer 2/Lieut. W. F. J. Delyon.
Horsemaster Capt. W. P. Jones, Duke of Lancaster's
Yeomanry.
21st Battery Major E. F. Housden.
42nd Battery Major T. R. Ubsdell, D.S.O.
63rd Battery Major R. Scott-Aiton, M.C.
87th Battery Major J. W. Godley.
_24th Brigade, R.F.A._
O.C. Lt.-Col. J. A. C. Forsyth, D.S.O., R.F.A.
Adjutant Capt. E. J. Saltwell.
Orderly Officer Lieut. C. G. Campbell.
Horsemaster Capt. E. T. C. Murray, 6th Royal
Regiment Dragoons (Canada).
110th Battery Major P. J. C. Honner, M.C.
111th Battery Major F. M. A. Wood.
112th Battery Major G. Sandeman.
43rd Battery Major B. Todd, M.C.
_6th Divisional Ammunition Column_
O.C. Lt.-Col. B. Allan, R.F.A.
Adjutant Capt. F. Heap.
No. 1 Section Capt. A. McQueen.
No. 2 Section Capt. H. W. C. Angell.
No. 3 Section Capt. H. Brewin (S.A.A. Section).
_Divisional Trench Mortars_
D.T.M.O. Capt. R. A. Levinge, R.A.
X/6th T.M. Battery Capt. M. R. Anderson, M.C., General List.
Y/6th T.M. Battery Capt. V. E. Wait, 11th Essex Regiment.
16th INFANTRY BRIGADE
B.G.C. Brig.-Gen. W. G. Braithwaite, C.B.,
C.M.G., D.S.O., Royal Welch Fusiliers.
Brigade-Major Capt. E. Dryden, M.C., Durham L.I.
Staff-Captain Capt. S. H. D. Chamier, M.C., West
Yorkshire Regiment.
Intelligence Officer Lieut. G. H. Bond, M.C., York and
Lancaster Regiment.
Signal Officer 2/Lieut. W. D. A. Williams, R.E.
O.C., 1st The Buffs Lt.-Col. R. E. Power, D.S.O.
2nd in Command Major Lord Teynham.
Adjutant Lieut. E. F. Hall.
O.C., 1st K.S.L.I. A/Lt.-Col. L. H. Morris, M.C.
2nd in Command Major C E. Parker.
Adjutant Capt. G. S. E. Denyer, M.C.
O.C., 2nd York and Lt.-Col. J. R. Robertson, Bedfordshire
Lancaster Regt. Regiment.
2nd in Command Major P. H. C. Collins, M.C.
Adjutant Capt. E. E. Battle, M.C.
16th T.M. Battery Lieut. H. Carss, Durham Light Infantry.
18th INFANTRY BRIGADE
B.G.C. Brig.-Gen. G. S. G. Craufurd, C.M.G.,
C.I.E., D.S.O., A.D.C., Gordon Highlanders.
Brigade-Major Brevet-Major H. C. E. Hull, The
Queen's.
Staff-Captain Capt. W. V. Cavill, M.C., West Yorkshire
Regiment.
Signal Officer Lieut. G. White, Scottish Rifles.
O.C., 1st West Yorkshire Lt.-Col. D. L. Weir, D.S.O., M.C.,
Regiment. Leicestershire Regiment.
2nd in Command Major J. C. Blackburn, M.C.
Adjutant Capt. G. A. Robinson, M.C.
O.C., 11th Essex Regiment Lt.-Col. C. H. Dumbell, D.S.O., Sherwood
Foresters.
2nd in Command Major A. G. Saunders.
Adjutant Capt. G. H. Scott.
O.C., 2nd D.L.I. Lt.-Col. R. V. Turner.
2nd in Command Major P. C. Parker, M.C.
Adjutant Capt. S. R. Streatfield.
18th Trench Mortar Battery Capt. T. E. Peart, M.C., Durham Light
Infantry.
71st INFANTRY BRIGADE
B.G.C. Brig.-Gen. P. W. Brown, D.S.O., Gordon
Highlanders.
Brigade-Major Brevet-Major A. Weyman, M.C.,
Leicestershire Regiment (A/G.S.O.2,
18th Division).
Acting-Brigade-Major Capt. J. F. Tamblyn, M.C., The Queen's
Regiment (S.).
Staff-Captain Capt. F. W. Musgrave, West Yorkshire
Regiment (T.).
Intelligence Officer Lieut. H. L. Hayne, Leicestershire
Regiment (S.).
Signal Officer Lieut. K. D. Allen, R.E.
O.C., 9th Norfolk Regiment Lt.-Col. F. R. Day, Norfolk Regiment.
2nd in Command Major E. W. Cannings, M.C.
Adjutant Capt. C. P. Bassingthwaite, M.C.
O.C., 1st Leicestershire Lt.-Col. J. R. Martin, D.S.O., M.C.,
Regiment Royal Scots.
2nd in Command Major G. N. Wykes.
Adjutant Capt. R. N. Davies, M.C.
O.C., 2nd Sherwood Foresters Lt.-Col. C. E. Hudson, V.C., D.S.O., M.C.
2nd in Command Major F. D. Collen, M.C.
Adjutant Capt. A. L. Gill, M.C.
71st Trench Mortar Battery Capt. R. Gjertson, M.C., Essex Regiment (T.).
APPENDIX V
CHANGES IN COMMANDS AND STAFFS
N. B.--Ranks and Honours are given as held on date of appointment.
I. DIVISIONAL COMMANDERS
Major-Gen. J. L. Keir, C.B. Mobn.--26.5.15
Major-Gen. W. N. Congreve, V.C. M.V.O 27.5.15--13.11.15
Col. (T/Maj.-Gen.) C. Ross, D.S.O. 14.11.15--18.8.17
Col. (T/Maj.-Gen.) T. O. Marden, C.M.G. 19.8.17--Armistice.
II. G.S.O.s, 1st GRADE
Col. W. T. Furse Mobn.--28.12.14
Lt.-Col. J. M. Shea, Indian Army 29.12.14--4.7.15
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) G. F. Boyd,
Royal Irish Regiment 5.7.15--17.6.16
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) L. F. Renny,
D.S.O., Royal Dublin Fus. 18.6.16--22.3.17
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) T. T. Grove,
D.S.O., R.E. 23.3.17--Armistice.
III. G.S.O.s, 2nd GRADE
Major J. T. Burnett-Stuart, Rifle Brigade Mobn.--17.2.15
Major W. E. Ironside, R.A. 18.2.15--29.2.16
Major L. P. Evans, Black Watch 1.3.16--5.3.17
Major M. Beevor, The Buffs 6.3.17--17.11.17
Major W. Harris-St. John, Royal
Welch Fusiliers 18.11.17--28.4.18
Major S. S. Hill-Dillon, D.S.O.,
Royal Irish Regiment 29.4.18--15.6.18
Lieut. (T/Major) R. W. Barnett,
M.C., Rifle Brigade 16.6.18--12.8.18 (K.)
Major L. M. Taylor, M.C.,
K.O.Y.L.I. (T.F.) 24.8.18--Armistice.
IV. G.S.O.s, 3rd GRADE
Capt. A. T. Paley, Rifle Brigade Mobn.--31.10.14
Major W. E. Ironside, R.A. 1.11.14--17.2.15
Capt. T. T. Grove, R.E. 18.2.15--9.8.15
Major A. B. Lawson, 11th
Hussars 10.8.15--5.12.15
Capt. H. D. Denison-Pender,
Scots Greys 6.12.15--24.6.16
Capt. M. K. Wardle, Leicestershire
Regiment 25.6.16--25.7.17
Capt. M. C. Bell, D.S.O., M.C.,
Royal Fusiliers 26.7.17--1.11.17
Major A. S. Wright, Royal Canadian
F.A. 2.11.17--21.5.18
Lieut. (T/Capt.) J. F. Horlington,
M.C., Y. and L. Regt. (S.R.) 22.5.18--Armistice.
V. A.A.s AND Q.M.G.s
Col. W. Campbell, D.S.O. Mobn.--30.9.14
Col. R. Wanless-O'Gowan 1.10.14--7.2.15
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) R.S. May,
Royal Fusiliers 15.2.15--5.2.16
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) M. R. Walsh,
Worcestershire Regiment 6.2.16--29.8.17
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) M.B. Savage,
D.S.O., South Staffs Regt. 30.8.17--15.12.17
Bt.-Lt.-Col. P. Hudson, D.S.O.,
King's (Liverpool) Regiment 16.12.17--Armistice.
VI. D.A.A.G.s (FORMERLY D.A.A.s AND Q.M.G.s.)
Major F. C. Dundas, Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders Mobn.--30.10.14
Capt. G. Ogston, Gordon Highlanders
1.11.14--4.1.16
Capt. J. L. Watson, West Riding
Regiment 5.1.16--7.3.16
Capt. S. G. L. Bradley, Queen's
Westminster Rifles 8.3.16--22.3.17
Major C. Macfie, Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders 23.3.17--Armistice.
VII. D.A.Q.M.G.'s.
Major A. Delavoye, A.S.C. Mobn.--1.1.15
Major H. L. Nevill, D.S.O., R.A. 15.1.15--26.2.15
Major B. Atkinson, R.A. 27.2.15--28.5.15
Capt. J. C. Dundas, R.A. 29.5.15--13.10.15
Major H. Street, Devon Regt. 14.10.15--16.1.17
Capt. R. B. Tower, Notts and
Derby Regiment 17.1.17--21.5.18
Bt.-Col. A. J. Hay, East Surrey
Regiment (S.R.) 22.5.18--Armistice.
VIII. C.R.A.s.
Col. (T/Brig.-Gen.) W. H. L. Paget, M.V.O. Mobn.--26.5.15
Col. (T/Brig.-Gen.) G. Humphreys, C.B., D.S.O. 27.5.15--28.6.16
Bt.-Col. (T/Brig.-Gen.) E. S. Cleeve (R. of O.) 29.6.16--23.10.16
Lt.-Col. (T/Brig.-Gen.) E. F. Delaforce, C.M.G. 24.10.16--Armistice.
IX. C.R.E.s.
Lt.-Col. G. C. Kemp Mobn.--12.8.15
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) A. G. Stevenson 13.8.15--19.12.15
Col. T. A. H. Bigge 20.12.15--24.1.16
Lt.-Col. H. R. S. Christie 25.1.16--1.1.17
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) G. F. B. Goldney, D.S.O. 2.1.17--22.9.18
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) H. A. L. Hall, M.C. 23.9.18--Armistice.
X. O.C.s Train
Major H. Davies Mobn.--6.4.17
Major F. Norrington 7.4.17--Armistice.
XI. A.D.M.S.
Col. H. O. Trevor Mobn.--March, '15
Col. B. H. Scott March, '15--March, '17
Lt.-Col. (T/Col.) H. W. Grattan March, '17--Oct., '18
Lt.-Col. (T/Col.) H. C. R. Hime, D.S.O. Oct., '18--Armistice.
XII. D.A.D.O.S.
Major H. M. Howard Oct., '14--26.1.15
Major F. H. P. O'Connor 27.1.15--18.11.15
Major S. T. Hayley, D.S.O. 19.11.15--26.12.15
Major S. B. Winch 27.12.15--28.4.17
Major R. G. P. Hare 29.4.17--Armistice.
XIII. A.D.V.S. (LATER D.A.D.V.S.)
Major H. M. Lenox-Conyngham 6.9.14--28.8.15
Major R. Tindle 29.8.15--2.2.18
Major R. F. Bett 3.2.18--Armistice.
XIV. SENIOR CHAPLAINS (C. of E.)
Rev. T. P. Moreton July, '15--Oct., '15
Rev. Nevile Talbot, M.C. Oct., '15--May, '16
Rev. Maurice Ponsonby, M.C. May, '16--Nov., '16
Rev. J. D. McCready Nov., '16--31.12.16
Rev. L. G. Reed, M.C. 1.1.17--7.7.18
Rev. E. C. Hoskyns, M.C. 8.7.18--Armistice.
XV. SENIOR CHAPLAINS (R.C.)
Rev. Father FitzGibbons, M.C. Nov., '16--Sept., '18
Rev. Father Kearey Sept., '18--Armistice.
XVI. A.P.M.s.
Capt. H. S. Rogers, K.S.L.I. Mobn.--2.3.15
Major Hon. J. R. Tufton, Royal
Sussex Regiment (S.R.). 3.3.15-- ----
Capt. A. J. Simey, R.I.C. ---- --Aug., '18
Capt. W. A. Bignell, South Irish
Horse Aug., '18--Armistice.
XVII. INFANTRY BRIGADE COMMANDERS
_16th Infantry Brigade_
Col. (T/Brig.-Gen.) E. C. Ingouville-Williams,
C.B., D.S.O. Mobn.--16.6.16
Col. (T/Brig.-Gen.) C. L. Nicholson 17.6.16--25.7.16
Major (T/Brig.-Gen.) W. L. Osborn,
D.S.O., Royal Sussex Regiment 26.7.16--26.10.17
Bt.-Lt.-Col. (T/Brig.-Gen.) H. A.
Walker, D.S.O., Royal Fus. 27.10.17--16.10.18
Bt.-Col. (T/Brig.-Gen.) W. G.
Braithwaite, C.B., D.S.O.,
Royal Welch Fusiliers 17.10.18--Armistice.
_17th Infantry Brigade (to 24th Division on 14.10.15)_
Col. (T/Brig.-Gen.) W. R. B.
Doran, C.B., D.S.O. Mobn.--10.2.15
Col. (T/Brig.-Gen.) G. M. Harper,
D.S.O. 11.2.15--23.9.15
Major (T/Brig.-Gen.) J. W. V.
Carroll, Norfolk Regiment 24.9.15--14.10.15
_18th Infantry Brigade_
Col. (T/Brig.-Gen.) W. N. Congreve,
V.C., M.V.O. Mobn.--29.5.15
Lt.-Col. (T/Brig.-Gen.) H. S.
Ainslie, C.M.G., Northumberland
Fusiliers 30.5.15--14.8.15
Lt.-Col. (T/Brig.-Gen.) R. J.
Bridgford, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
King's Shropshire L.I. 15.8.15--19.4.16
Col. (T/Brig.-Gen.) W. K. Macclintock,
C.B. 20.4.16--12.6.16
Lt.-Col. (T/Brig.-Gen.) H. S.
Tew, East Surrey Regiment 13.6.16--12.8.16
Bt.-Col. (T/Brig.-Gen.) R. J.
Bridgford, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
King's Shropshire L.I. 13.8.16--14.9.17
Lt.-Col. (T/Brig.-Gen.) G. S. G.
Craufurd, C.M.G., C.I.E.,
D.S.O., Gordon Highlanders 15.9.17--Armistice.
_19th Infantry Brigade (to 27th Division on 27.5.15)_
Col. (T/Brig.-Gen.) Hon. F. Gordon 12.10.14--27.5.15
_71st Infantry Brigade (joined Division on 14.10.15)_
Col. (T/Brig.-Gen.) M. T. Shewen 14.10.15--26.5.16
Col. (T/Brig.-Gen.) J. F. Edwards 27.5.16--4.10.16
Col. (T/Brig.-Gen.) E. Feetham, C.B. 5.10.16--19.8.17
Major (T/Brig.-Gen.) P. W.
Brown, D.S.O., Gordon Highlanders 20.8.17--Armistice.
XVIII. O.C. UNITS
[Tablenote a: Signifies date of joining or leaving Division.]
[Tablenote b: Signifies date of disbandment of unit.]
_Squadron, 19th Hussars_
Capt. H. O'S. F. Tanner Mobn.--April, '15[a]
_"B" Squadron, Northants Yeomanry_
Major Sir C. B. Lowther 14.4.15[a]--29.10.15[a]
_6th Machine-Gun Battalion_
Lt.-Col. J. B. Rosher, D.S.O.,
Durham Light Infantry March, '18--Armistice.
_2nd Brigade, R.F.A._
Col. W. A. M. Thompson Mobn.--7.7.15
Lt.-Col. L. C. L. Oldfield 8.7.15--May, '15
Lt.-Col. M. J. MacCarthy, C.M.G. May, '15--20.6.17
Lt.-Col. W. H. F. Weber, D.S.O. 21.6.17--Armistice.
_12th Brigade, R.F.A._
Lt.-Col. C. E. Lawrie, D.S.O. Mobn.--26.5.15
Lt.-Col. W. Evans, D.S.O. 27.5.15--29.2.16
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) J. A. C. Forsyth 1.3.16--Armistice.
_38th Brigade, R.F.A._
Lt.-Col. R. F. Fox, D.S.O. Mobn.--27.1.15
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) L. M. Phillpotts 30.1.15--1.11.15
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) E. F. Calthrop 2.11.15--19.12.15
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) W. E. Clark 23.12.15--25.9.16
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) A. Mellor, D.S.O. 26.9.16--2.12.16[a]
_12th Howitzer Brigade, R.F.A._
Lt.-Col. G. Humphreys, D.S.O. Mobn.--29.6.15
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) H. M. Davson 30.6.15--12.5.16
Distributed to other Brigades.
_24th Heavy Brigade, R.G.A._
Major H. E. J. Brake, C.B., D.S.O. Mobn.--Feb., '15
Capt. (T/Major) E. Miles Feb., '15--Dec., '16[a]
_6th Divisional Ammunition Column_
Lt.-Col. G. A. Cardew Mobn.--19.9.14
Lt.-Col. Baron H. E. W. de Robeck 20.9.14--Oct., '16
Lt.-Col. B. Allan (T.F.) 21.11.16--Armistice.
_1st Battalion The Buffs_ (_16th Infantry Brigade_)
Lt.-Col. H. C. de la M. Hill Mobn.--15.11.14
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) R. McDouall 16.11.14--
Bt.-Col. J. Hasler, D.S.O. --26.2.15
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) R. McDouall 27.2.15--2.6.15
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) E. H. Finch-Hatton 3.6.15--8.1.16
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) E. F. Gould 9.1.16--26.5.16
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) H. W. Green 27.5.16--1.6.16
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) E. H. Finch-Hatton 2.6.16--12.7.16
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) H. W. Green 13.7.16--26.11.17
Major B. L. Strauss 27.11.17--1.12.17 (K.)
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) R. E. Power 12.12.17--Armistice.
_1st Battalion Royal Fusiliers_ (_17th Infantry Brigade_)
Lt.-Col. R. Fowler-Butler Mobn.--31.7.15
Bt.-Lt.-Col. B. G. Price, D.S.O. 1.8.15--11.10.15[a]
_9th Battalion Norfolk Regiment_ (_71st Infantry Brigade_)
Lt.-Col. E. Stracey 11.10.15[a]--30.9.16
Lt.-Col. B. H. L. Prior 1.10.16--10.12.16
Capt. (T/Major) R. S. Dyer-Bennet,
Leicester Regiment 16.12.16--14.1.17
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) J. B. O. Trimble 27.1.17--26.2.17
Capt. (T/Major) R. S. Dyer-Bennet 27.2.17--9.3.17
Lt.-Col. E. Stracey 10.3.17--23.3.17
Lt.-Col. B. H. L. Prior 24.3.17--30.1.18
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) H. J. Spurrell, M.C. 31.1.18--13.3.18
Lt.-Col. B. H. L. Prior, D.S.O. 14.3.18--21.3.18
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) F. R. Day April, '18--28.7.18
Lt.-Col. B. H. L. Prior, D.S.O. 29.7.18--22.8.18
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) F. R. Day 23.8.18--Armistice.
_9th Battalion Suffolk Regiment_ (_71st Infantry Brigade_)
Capt. (T/Lt.-Col.) W. H. A. de la
Pryme, D.S.O., West Yorkshire
Regiment 11.10.15[a]--14.5.16
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) A. P. Mack,
Suffolk Regiment (S.) 14.5.16--15.9.16 (K.)
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) F. Latham,
D.S.O., Leicester Regiment 18.9.16--1.2.18[b]
_1st Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment_ (_18th Infantry Brigade_)
Lt.-Col. F. W. Towsey Mobn.--20.9.14
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) G. G. Lang 20.9.14--18.10.14
Lt.-Col. F. W. Towsey 14.10.14--19.10.14
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) T. P. Barrington 22.10.14--7.12.14
Lt.-Col. F. W. Towsey 8.12.14--15.9.15
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) G. G. Lang, D.S.O. 16.9.15--11.11.15
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) G. H. Soames 12.11.15--27.1.16
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) G. G. Lang, D.S.O. 29.1.16--18.9.16
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) H. M. Dillon,
D.S.O., Oxford and Bucks
Light Infantry 19.9.16--31.10.16
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) A. M. Boyall 1.11.16--21.3.18
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) D. L. Weir,
D.S.O., M.C., Leicestershire
Regiment 28.3.18--20.5.18
Lt.-Col. G. Barry-Drew, D.S.O. 21.5.18--21.7.18
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) E. W. Cannings, M.C. 22.7.18--28.7.18
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) D. L. Weir, D.S.O., M.C. 29.7.18--Armistice.
_1st Battalion East Yorkshire Regiment_ (_18th Infantry Brigade_)
Lt.-Col. R. E. Benson Mobn.--20.9.14
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) W. H. Young 20.9.14--10.11.14
Lt.-Col. W. H. Armstrong 11.11.14--19.11.14
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) J. L. S. Clarke 20.11.14--26.11.15[a]
_8th Battalion Bedfordshire Regiment_ (_71st and 16th Infantry Brigades_)
Capt. (T/Lt.-Col.) J. S. Liddell 11.10.15[a]--13.1.16
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) H. C. Jackson 14.1.16--17.4.16
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) W. R. H. Dann 17.4.16--19.5.16
Capt. (T/Lt.-Col.) D. M. Hawkins 19.5.16--1.6.16
Col. Lord Henry Scott 2.6.16--4.4.17
Lt.-Col. Lord Ampthill 5.4.17--19.5.17
Capt. (T/Lt.-Col.) H. R. MacCullagh, D.L.I. 20.5.17--14.6.17
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) R. Le Huquet 15.6.17--16.2.18[b]
_1st Battalion Leicestershire Regiment_ (_16th and 71st Infantry Brigades_)
Lt.-Col. H. L. Croker Mobn.--11.12.14
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) H. Stoney-Smith 12.12.14--15.10.15 (K.)
Lt.-Col. A. H. Buchannan-Dunlop 25.10.15--1.2.16
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) R. H. Gillespie 2.2.16--21.9.16
Capt. (T/Lt.-Col.) R. S. Dyer-Bennet 22.9.16--12.12.16
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) R. H. Gillespie 13.12.16--27.3.17
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) H. B. Brown, D.S.O. 28.3.17--2.5.17
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) R. H. Gillespie, D.S.O. 3.5.17--5.7.17
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) H. B. Brown, D.S.O. 6.7.17--16.1.18
Capt. (T/Lt.-Col.) D. L. Weir, D.S.O., M.C. 17.1.18--Feb., '18
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) F. Latham, D.S.O. Feb., '18--29.4.18
Capt. (T/Major) G. N. Wykes 30.4.18--11.5.18
Capt. (T/Major) Hartshorne 12.5.18--20.5.18
Capt. (T/Lt.-Col.) D. L. Weir, D.S.O., M.C. 21.5.18--25.7.18
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) F. Latham, D.S.O. 26.7.18--2.11.18
_11th Battalion Leicestershire Regiment_ (_Pioneers_)
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) C. Turner,
Leicestershire Regt. (S.R.) 1.4.16[a]--24.9.18
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) R. H. Radford,
Leicestershire Regt. (S.R.) 25.9.18--Armistice.
_2nd Battalion Royal Welch Fusiliers_ (_19th Infantry Brigade_)
Lt.-Col. H. Delme-Radcliffe 12.10.14[a]--26.10.14
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) O. de L. Williams 27.10.14--31.5.15[a]
_1st Battalion The Cameronians_ (_19th Infantry Brigade_)
Lt.-Col. P. R. Robertson 12.10.14[a]--31.5.15[a]
_11th Battalion Essex Regiment_ (_71st Infantry Brigade_)
Lt.-Col. C. J. Hobkirk, D.S.O. 11.10.15[a]--3.6.16.
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) H. W. Green,
D.S.O., The Buffs 3.6.16--28.6.16
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) F. G. Spring,
Lincolnshire Regiment 29.6.16--3.11.16
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) E. V. Manger,
Durham Light Infantry 4.11.16--9.12.16
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) F. G. Spring, D.S.O. 10.12.16--14.9.17
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) C. H. Dumbell,
D.S.O., Sherwood Foresters 15.9.17--Armistice.
_2nd Battalion Sherwood Foresters_ (_18th and 71st Infantry Brigades_)
Lt.-Col. C. B. Crofton-Atkins Mobn.--7.10.14
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) P. Leveson-Gower 8.10.14--5.8.15
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) C. J. W. Hobbs, D.S.O. 5.9.15--7.6.16
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) E. R. Street, D.S.O. 7.6.16--2.8.16
Lt.-Col. C. J. W. Hobbs, D.S.O. 3.8.16--15.10.16 (K.)
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) F. E. Bradshaw,
Rifle Brigade, R. of O. 19.10.16--19.10.17
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) H. Tylden-Wright,
Derby Yeomanry 19.10.17--22.11.17
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) H. M. Milward, D.S.O. 23.11.17--Sept., '18
Bt.-Major (T/Lt.-Col.) C. E. Hudson,
V.C., D.S.O., M.C. Sept., '18--Armistice.
_1st Battalion King's Shropshire Light Infantry_ (_16th Infantry Brigade_)
Lt.-Col. C. P. Higginson, D.S.O. Mobn.--23.10.14
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) E. B. Luard 24.10.14--13.11.14
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) W. J. Rowan Robinson 14.11.14--30.11.14
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) J. A. Strick 1.12.14--4.8.15
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) E. B. Luard 5.8.15--22.4.16
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) B. E. Murray 22.4.16--17.10.16
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) C. F. B. Winterscale 18.10.16--14.2.18
Lt.-Col. H. M. Smith, D.S.O. 15.2.18--21.3.18
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) H. de R.
Morgan, The Buffs 23.3.18--2.4.18
Lt.-Col. C. Meynell, D.S.O. 3.4.18--26.5.18
Capt. (T/Major) E. A. Freeman 27.5.18--8.6.18
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) H. D. Leslie 9.6.18--17.7.18
Capt. (T/Major) E. A. Freeman 18.7.18--23.7.18
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) C. H. Cautley 8.8.18--28.8.18
Lt.-Col. G. H. Meynell 29.8.18--9.10.18
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) L. H. Morris 10.10.18--Armistice.
_1st Battalion Middlesex Regiment_ (_19th Infantry Brigade_)
Lt.-Col. B. E. Ward 12.10.14[a]--21.10.14
Lt.-Col. F. G. M. Rowley 21.10.14--30.10.14
Capt. (T/Lt.-Col.) H. P. Osborne 30.10.14--28.11.14
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) W. C. C. Ash 29.11.14--31.5.15[a]
_2nd Battalion York and Lancaster Regiment_ (_16th Infantry Brigade_)
Lt.-Col. E. C. Cobbold Mobn.--9.12.14
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) W. F. Clemson 10.12.14--18.9.15
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) C. Mc.D. Pratt 19.9.15--17.10.15
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) M. F. Halford 18.10.15--30.4.16
Capt. (T/Major) H. B. Philby, D.S.O. 1.5.16--17.5.16 (K.)
Lt.-Col. H. R. Headlam, D.S.O. 17.5.16--5.6.16
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) E. L. Thomson 6.6.16--29.6.16
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) A. St. J. Blunt, D.S.O. 30.6.16--25.9.16
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) R. P. Wood, M.C. 25.9.16--9.10.16 (K.)
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) F. Lewis, D.S.O. 10.10.16--31.3.17
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) A. St. J. Blunt, D.S.O. 1.4.17--21.4.18
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) J. R. Robertson 22.4.18--Armistice.
_2nd Battalion Durham Light Infantry_ (_18th Infantry Brigade_)
Lt.-Col. B. W. L. McMahon Mobn--4.1.15
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) J. A. Crosthwaite 5.1.15--10.6.15
Lt.-Col. M. D. Goring-Jones 11.6.15--Sept., '15
Capt. (T/Lt.-Col.) A. E. Irvine Sept., '15--15.8.17
Capt. (T/Lt.-Col.) H. R. McCullagh 16.8.17--4.2.18
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) D. L. Brereton 5.2.18--12.7.18
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) R. V. Turner 13.7.18--Armistice.
_14th Battalion Durham Light Infantry_ (18th _Infantry Brigade_)
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) G. F. Menzies,
S. Lancs Regt., R. of O. 28.11.15[a]--12.11.16
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) J. B. Rosher,
Durham Light Infantry (S.) 13.11.16--1.2.18[b]
_1st Battalion North Staffordshire Regiment_
(_17th Infantry Brigade_)
Lt.-Col. V. W. de Falbe, D.S.O. Mobn.--11.10.15[a]
_2nd Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders_ (_19th Infantry Brigade_)
Lt.-Col. H. P. Moulton-Barrett 12.10.14[a]--2.11.14
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) H. B. Kirk 3.11.14--8.1.15
Lt.-Col. R. C. Gore 16.2.15--31.5.15[a]
_2nd Battalion Leinster Regiment_ (_17th Infantry Brigade_)
Lt.-Col. W. T. M. Reeve Mobn.--19.11.14
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) G. M. Bullen-Smith 20.11.14--3.6.15
Lt.-Col. W. T. M. Reeve 3.6.15--20.7.15
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) G. M. Bullen-Smith 21.7.15--11.10.15[a]
_3rd Battalion Rifle Brigade_ (_17th Infantry Brigade_)
Lt.-Col. R. Alexander Mobn.--13.10.14
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) Lord Henniker 13.10.14--21.11.14
Lt.-Col. R. Alexander 22.11.14--29.12.14 (d. of w.)
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) Lord Henniker 30.12.14--9.6.15
Capt. (T/Major) R. Pigot, M.C. 10.6.15--11.10.15[a]
_1/5th Battalion Loyal North Lancs Regiment_ (_16th Infantry Brigade_)
Lt.-Col. G. Hesketh 16.2.15[a]--11.6.15[a]
_1/2nd Battalion London Regiment_ (_17th Infantry Brigade_)
Lt.-Col. J. Attenborough 19.2.15[a]--11.10.15[a]
_Queen's Westminster Rifles_ (_18th Infantry Brigade_)
Lt.-Col. R. Shoolbred, T.D. 11.11.14[a]--28.11.15[a]
_5th Battalion Scottish Rifles_ (_19th Infantry Brigade_)
Lt.-Col. R. J. Douglas 19.11.14[a]--31.5.15[a]
Printed by Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury.
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