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Title: With the Indians in France
Author: Sir James Willcocks
Release date: October 7, 2025 [eBook #77003]
Language: English
Original publication: London: Constable & Co Ltd, 1920
Credits: Richard Tonsing, Brian Coe, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This book was produced from images made available by the HathiTrust Digital Library.)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WITH THE INDIANS IN FRANCE ***
WITH THE INDIANS IN FRANCE
By
GENERAL SIR JAMES WILLCOCKS
G.C.M.G., K.C.B., K.C.S.L., D.S.O., LL.D.
LONDON
CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LTD.
1920
TO MY BRAVE COMRADES OF ALL RANKS OF THE
INDIAN ARMY I DEDICATE THIS BOOK WHICH
IS AN EARNEST ENDEAVOUR TO RECORD THEIR
LOYALTY AND UNPERISHABLE VALOUR ON THE
BATTLEFIELDS OF FRANCE AND BELGIUM
_From BLACKWOOD’S MAGAZINE
December 1917._
HURNāM-SINGH
BY GENERAL SIR JAMES WILLCOCKS
I
Beneath an ancient pipal-tree, fast by the Jhelum’s tide,
In silent thought sat Hurnām-Singh,
A Khalsa[1] soldier of the King:
He mused on things now done and past,
For he had reached his home at last,
His empty sleeve his pride.
II
Five years before a village lout, beneath the self-same tree,
He met the Havildar, who’d come
With honeyed words and beat of drum,
Cajoling all who glory sought,
And telling how the regiment fought
The Zakha and the Mohmand clans,
With shouts of victory.
III
Wah Guru Ji! rang in his ears, the famous battle cry,
And since those days Hurnām had seen,
On Flanders plains, from fierce Messines,
To Festubert and Neuve Chapelle,
’Mid festering bogs and scenes of hell,
How Khalsa soldiers die.
IV
The village yokels round him flocked to hearken to his tales,
How he had crossed the Kala[2] sea,
From India’s strand past Araby,
Thro’ Egypt’s sands to Europe’s shores,
Where the wild stormy mistral roars,
And anchor’d in Marseilles.
V
“Is it the truth,” said one more bold than village yokels be,
“That men with wings ascend on high
And fight with Gods in yonder sky?
That iron monsters belching wrath,
Beneath their wheels of Juggernaut,
Claim victims for Kali?”
VI
“Now list all ye,” said Hurnām-Singh, “the aged and the youth,
The tales they told in bygone days,
Of Gods and Ghouls in ancient lays,
Are true, not false; mine eyes descried,
Mine ears have heard as heroes died,
The Mahabharut’s[3] truth.
VII
“The land of France is wide and fair, the people brave and free,
I fain would tell, but orders came,
‘Push on, the foe awaits the game’—
The game of death; the Khalsa cry,
The warriors’ slogan, rent the sky,
Fateh Wah Guru Ji![4]
VIII
“The Sahibs’ faces told their tale; no craven thought or sloth
In those brave hearts, as we had learned
When Gujerat the tide had turned,
And left the names of Aliwal
And Chillianwala as a pall
Of glory to us both.
IX
“And thus the sons of Hindustan, from Himalaya to Scinde,
From Hindu Kush to Deccan plains,
Rent in a day the ancient chains
Which isolated class from clan,
And joined in battle as one man,
To die for Mata Hind.[5].
X
“Hur Mahadeo! Guru Ji! and Allah’s sacred name,
Shri Gunga Jai![6] from brave Nepal,
Re-echoed loud through wild Garhwal;
From Dogra vale, Afridi clan,
To the proud homes of Rajistan,
Was lit the martial flame.
XI
“As pitiless the bullets rained, ’mid angry storm and flood,
Khudadad Khan! immortal name,
Stood by his gun, for India’s fame
Was in his hands; the Huns advance,
Recoil; Retire; the soil of France
Is richer with his blood.”
XII
And Hurnām paused as he recalled, one dark November morn,
When twice three thousand foes had rushed
Our trenches, powdered into dust,
And bayonet point and Kukry blade
Avenging retribution made,
Before the break of dawn.
XIII
“Garhwal will tell,” he said, “with pride her children oft recite,
How Durwan Negi, lion-heart!
Was first and foremost from the start;
He led the charge which won the day,—
Oh, brothers, ’twas a glorious fray,
For victory came with light.”
XIV
Shābāsh! Shābāsh! from every tongue, and mothers’ hearts stood still,
As sons stepped forth and made demand
They too should join the glorious band,
They too should hear the battle’s din,
Or purge the soul of every sin,
If such were Ishwar’s[7] will.
XV
Hurnām went on: “At Neuve Chapelle, at Festubert, we bled,
On Wipers field, at Moulin Piètre,
We heard the German hymn of hate;
Above our lines the war-ships soared,
Our trenches rocked while cannon roared
The requiem of the dead.”
XVI
The Jhelum’s banks had witnessed oft her waters stained with gore,
Had heard the tramp of countless feet,
Had known both triumph and defeat,
But never had her waters swirled
A prouder message to the world
Than Hurnām’s story bore.
XVII
For India’s sons had sealed their oath, according to their laws;
Sealed it with blood across the sea,
From Flanders to Gallipoli,
On Tigris’ banks, on Egypt’s sands,
’Mid Afric’s swamps and hinterlands,
And died in England’s cause.
XVIII
For ages long the Mullah’s cry, the temple bells shall wile,
And call to prayer for those who died,
The father, mother, son, and bride,
Descendants of the loyal brave
Who rest in warriors’ simple grave,
And need no marble pile.
CONTENTS
PAGE
CHAPTER I. 1
CHAPTER II. 18
CHAPTER III. 31
CHAPTER IV. 49
CHAPTER V. 60
CHAPTER VI. 73
CHAPTER VII. 88
CHAPTER VIII. 103
CHAPTER IX. 119
CHAPTER X. 137
CHAPTER XI. 153
CHAPTER XII. 170
CHAPTER XIII. 182
CHAPTER XIV. 193
CHAPTER XV. 200
CHAPTER XVI. 220
CHAPTER XVII. 235
CHAPTER XVIII. 245
CHAPTER XIX. 257
CHAPTER XX. 268
CHAPTER XXI. 294
CHAPTER XXII. 304
CHAPTER XXIII. 315
CHAPTER XXIV. 325
CONCLUSION 344
EPILOGUE 345
APPENDIX 347
INDEX 383
MAPS
FACING PAGE
Country adjoining Indian Corps Front 75
Dispositions of Meerut Division near Givenchy _Page_ 165
Neuve Chapelle, March 10–13, 1915 234
Movements of Lahore Division before and after Attacks of
April 26–27, 1915 267
Trenches of Indian Corps, August 27, 1915 319
Mauquissart _Page_ 343
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Facsimile of “Summary of News” in Persian and Hindi
character 317
INTRODUCTION
I have not attempted to write a Military History of the Indian Army
Corps in France. I lay no claim to describing the course of events on
the British Front, as a whole, during 1914–15, except in as far as they
concern the Corps. The excellent account written by Lieut.-Colonel
Merewether, C.I.E., Indian Army, and Sir Frederick Smith, Bart. (_The
Indian Corps in France_, published by John Murray), both of whom served
on my Staff as Recording Officers on behalf of the India and War
Offices, and who have had at their disposal all the official records,
furnishes ample details of the movements and the doings of the Corps as
forming an integral part of the British Army in Flanders.
I have not had the advantages of papers of reference, nor have I seen
all the diaries of the various Commanders and others, and have had the
handicap of writing most of my story far removed from England; but it
must be borne in mind that a great part of their information was
naturally derived from my own reports and correspondence, and of nearly
all such I kept copies, and have used them. If, therefore, in some cases
our descriptions of military events appear somewhat similar the reason
will be readily understood. Also I kept a very careful Diary from day to
day which has enabled me to write with certainty of the events recorded.
My object has been to deal with the Corps alone, only bringing in
outside movements sufficiently to describe the operations it took part
in. I have tried to bring before the public, and more especially my
numerous friends in India, the inside of the story as opposed to its
general aspect. Books on the war are already numerous, and will increase
in large numbers, and to attempt to enter into competition with many
brilliant writers would be foolish. I therefore only deal with the small
portion of the war as it appeared to me, and as few if any have a better
knowledge of the brave Indian soldiers and the deeds they performed than
I have, I hope I may succeed in bringing before my readers a true
statement of facts.
It must not be imagined that I have any illusions as to the part played
by the Indians, as will be made clear throughout this book. No one knows
better than I do how utterly impossible it would have been for them to
do what they did, without the help and example of their illustrious
comrades of the Scotch, Irish, and English battalions which formed part
of each Brigade, or of the splendid Territorial units which later joined
us, and the superb British Artillery which paved the way for all our
efforts.
But of these History will assuredly furnish a brilliant account. It is
not always so of Indian troops; their raconteurs are few and far
between; the chief actors in the play, still living, will probably be
counted by tens not thousands. The rank and file will furnish no writers
to thrill the generations to come; they will just pass with the great
masses of India, content that they have done their duty and been
faithful to their salt.
It has not been possible to record all, or even many, of the deathless
deeds performed by both British and Indian officers and men, but I have
added an Appendix extracted from the official list of Promotions and
Rewards of Officers, N.C.O.’s, and Men of all Arms of the Indian Army
who served with the Army Corps or with other Indian troops or with
British Corps in France prior to 1916; and there will be found under the
heading of Staff, Units of all Arms and Departments, etc., what I
presume is a complete roll of rewards.
It will be observed that the early fighting prior to the battle of Neuve
Chapelle is described in far greater detail than the operations which
took place subsequently. For this there are two reasons. First, I was
able to keep very full notes of all occurrences as they took place, and
for the first three months indeed all ordinary papers went no farther
than my own Army Corps. But on the formation of the First and Second
Armies the Indian Corps passed under the orders of the First Army, and
the same opportunities did not offer as previously; hence it became much
more difficult to retain copies of all correspondence. Secondly, I
consider it far more interesting to record even the smallest fights, in
which the Indians bore a share whilst they were still new to the game
and had not become versed and seasoned in the intricacies of trench
warfare.
I have considered it a sacred duty, and to the best of my ability I have
endeavoured to place on record the loyalty, courage, and devotion of the
King’s soldiers from Hindustan.
It has been impossible to write a book of this kind without entering
into personal matters, but so intimately connected is a Commander of
Indian troops with the whole being of his officers and men, that the
doings of the one cannot be separated from the other, if their combined
efforts are to be intelligently described. But putting this aside, so
erroneous are many of the opinions and so ill-natured have been some of
the criticisms of the part taken by the Indian Corps in Flanders, that
it has been impracticable to avoid writing strongly when I considered it
necessary, and hence I have not hesitated to do so. Moreover, it is due
to India to be told the facts. The day is past when that great portion
of our Empire could be kept in comparative darkness; the light is
dawning, and the Great War has opened to her an opportunity which she
never had before. Her sons have shared the glory of the Empire. From the
boggy fields and trenches of Flanders and the desert sands of Egypt;
from the immortal heights of Gallipoli; from the burning plains of
Mesopotamia and the impenetrable jungles of East Africa, comes up with
one voice, from the thousands who fought and bled for England:
India has taken a new birth; the heavens above, the sea, the earth
Have changed for aye, the darkness dies, light has illumined all men’s
eyes,
Since Armageddon’s day.
I am indebted to many officers of the Army Corps for short stories and
some details regarding their units, but I have avoided asking any of
them for information which might raise controversial matters, and for
anything contained in this book I take full responsibility. My thanks
are due to Professor John Wardell, late Professor Modern History and
Lecturer Military History, Trinity College, Dublin, for having furnished
me with some interesting diaries of deceased and other officers as well
as extracts of letters written from France.
In a few instances I have taken the liberty of copying the numbers of
casualties suffered by the Corps, as well as the names of certain
officers and men rewarded, from the semi-official history quoted
above—_The Indian Corps in France_. Unfortunately many very useful
manuscripts, notes, and returns on the way to me in Bermuda were lost in
the _Adana_ when that ship was torpedoed in the Atlantic.
BERMUDA,
_20th October 1919_.
CHAPTER I
On the 5th September 1914 I was quartered at Murree in the Punjab, and
within a few days of finishing my four years’ tenure of command of the
Northern Army in India, when the good news reached me that I was to
proceed to France in command of the Indian Army Corps, then already on
its way to take part in the Great War. My luck was once more “In.” I say
“once more,” for I had had the good fortune to serve in fourteen
campaigns or expeditions, and in all but two of these had been
associated with or in command of British and Indian troops combined.
From Sandhurst I had passed on to Afghanistan in 1879 and had served
under that grand soldier Lord Roberts. The Indian Frontiers from the
North-West to Burmah were all familiar to me. I had shared the bivouac
and the camp for thirty-six years with my brave and loyal Indian troops,
on Afghan hills and in the dense jungles of the Irriwaddy and Chindwin,
in Munipoor in the far North-East of India, in Ashanti and blood-stained
Kumassi in distant West Africa. I had sheltered with them in the living
squares of man and beast in the deserts of the Soudan, and now I was
about to participate in their trials on the plains of Flanders. It had
been my good fortune to command brigades and divisions in peace, and
twice to be in chief command of expeditions on the North-West Frontier
in 1908; and finally the Northern Army of India for four years.
Dull indeed must be the man who with all this experience did not know
the Indian soldier, did not appreciate his great worth, or recognise his
limits. I never joined the Indian Army, but did all my regimental duty
with an Irish Corps, the 1st Battalion Leinster Regiment. To Irish
soldiers I owe much; from them I first imbibed that spirit of
camaraderie which is worth more in war than all book discipline; the
spirit which recognises common sense to be one of the greatest of gifts,
and which willingly renders loyal service, so long as no attempt is made
to exact it by misplaced force.
The Irish soldier is unsurpassed in the field, but you must trust him as
an Irishman. He has a right to a distinct nationality, and is justly
proud of it. No man could serve with cheerier, better comrades than the
1st and 2nd Connaught Rangers, which belonged to my Army Corps in
France; but of them more anon.
A word more as to myself; for in writing of Indian troops it is
absolutely necessary that a man should thoroughly understand his
subject, or his story would be worthless. I need only say that their
religion, habits, castes, and language (Hindustani, the lingua franca of
India) are as familiar to me as my own religion and language, and that
from long and sometimes perhaps weary toil I had acquired a knowledge of
many of the dialects of the Native Army. Thus equipped I found myself
the fortunate commander of an Indian Army Corps, for the first time in
history to be employed in Europe.
The Army of India was little understood in Great Britain. At the
commencement of the war I read, not with any surprise but with
considerable amusement, accounts of the composition of the Army Corps. A
great part of the public appeared to think that Indian brigades and
divisions were composed of Sikhs and Gurkhas alone, and did not trouble
about any of the many other races of India; nor were they aware that in
each brigade was a British battalion. As for cavalry, of course the
“Bengal Lancers” were the only specimens known to them; a Sikh squadron
being described by one correspondent as “fierce turbaned Moslems on
fiery Arab steeds.” The artillery, which was composed of the finest
British batteries in the Army, superbly horsed, was reported by one
paper as consisting of “mountain guns borne on Abyssinian mules”; and a
foreign paper, writing of the arrival of the Corps at Marseilles,
solemnly announced that “this Corps has been raised and equipped
entirely at the expense of three great Indian Princes, who are now
occupying the finest hotels in Marseilles. Their names are Prince Sikya
(evidently a corruption of Sikh); Prince Gorok (Gurkhas); and Prince
Balukin (meant for Baluchis).”
The Germans at any rate were to be rudely awakened. The shell-torn
trenches and blood-stained fields of Neuve Chapelle were to prove to
them that, given a fair chance and a sufficient artillery support, the
men from the banks of the Ganges and Indus, from the plains lying to the
south, and the Highlanders of Nepal and North-West Frontiers, could take
as fierce a toll on the day of battle as their white comrades.
The Army of India in 1914 was trained for a Frontier war or minor
oversea expeditions, and for these purposes was to a certain extent
sufficiently well armed and equipped, but by no means fully so. The
training had been improved out of all recognition since Lord Kitchener
formed a General Staff and instituted his “Test”; at the time a much
debated innovation, but one which, in my opinion and that of many of
those best qualified to judge, was a turning point in the field training
of the Army. It had at least set up emulation and given a chance to all
classes of which that Army is composed, so that even Corps in outlying
unknown stations were brought into the competition, and the spurt thus
given to military training had far-reaching effects.
The Army had had no opportunities for the higher training which was
required for European warfare. The parsimony of the Indian Government
had put a heavy clog on the military wheel. Money could be had for
everything except preparation for war. It was far easier to get
thousands of pounds for some perfectly useless scheme which might
possibly benefit some local cause, than to extract a hundred pounds for
anything to which attached the aroma of the Army. Indeed, so
extraordinary was the antipathy to spending a farthing on anything
savouring of gunpowder that officers and men, British and Indian, had
accepted it as a cardinal principle that expenditure on the Army,
however necessary or urgent, was a matter of small concern to the
Government, and that, sink or swim, nothing but unforeseen upheaval or
disaster, would ever worm a rupee from the civilian rulers in whose
hands rested the decision.
In England there was at least our Expeditionary Force (or a great part
of it) ready for war; its transport and equipment could be completed at
the shortest notice, and its Reserves could be quickly called up. But in
India, where, if anywhere in the Empire, it was essential that several
divisions should be able to take the field at any moment, no such
organisation existed. True it is that many thousands of men stood armed
and ready to quell local disturbances or Frontier forays, but the
mobilisation of a force consisting of even two divisions could not be
completed in all its details for weeks. It is no answer to say that
India was able to despatch two divisions to Europe at short notice. Two
divisions certainly sailed from Karachi and Bombay, but their equipment
had to be completed at Marseilles, at Orleans, and actually in the
battle area itself, whilst the artillery was only made up by denuding
other divisions of their guns. The rifles were of a pattern which did
not suit the latest class of ammunition with which the Army at home was
supplied, and both rifles and ammunition had actually to be handed into
store at Marseilles and fresh arms issued. To any one acquainted with
the science of musketry, and that in the days when our infantry had to
depend on this arm alone; when hand-grenades and trench mortars were
unknown; it will readily be understood that the handicap of going into
action with brand new arms was a very real one. Even the machine-guns,
which in some cases were much worn, had to be refitted with new tripods
as best it could be managed at Orleans. Further, there were no
howitzers, no mechanical transport, a scant supply of medical equipment
and signalling apparatus, and innumerable other shortages which were
essential to a force suddenly dumped down from railhead into the
trenches. All these were supplied in abundance in France as soon as it
was possible; indeed the excellence and rapidity with which this was
done was astonishing to us who remembered the cheese-paring days in
India, but it proved what a fool’s paradise we had been bred in, and on
what sandy foundations the structure of the Indian Army rested.
I have no desire unnecessarily to string out the manifest disadvantages
the Indian Corps laboured under, but I have heard too much the
criticisms of our Indian troops by soldiers and civilians, who are
without the faintest knowledge of what they talk about, and it is only
right that the truth should be known. There is a growing body of Indians
who have every desire but no means of ascertaining the facts, and if
this book can be of any use in helping to explain to my numberless
friends and acquaintances in India the splendid deeds of their brethren
who fought and bled on the sodden plains of Flanders under handicaps
which must have been seen and felt to be understood, I shall be more
than rewarded. Moreover, as commander of those troops during a year of
the war I had opportunities of knowing many details unknown to others,
and now that the war is over I am free to write the truth which for
years has been of necessity suppressed.
Whatever may have been the shortcomings of the Indian Army it possessed
one asset which never stood it in better stead than in France; its
British officers, although far too small in number, were the salt of the
earth. As leaders of men, comrades and friends of their Indian officers,
sepoys, and sowars, as loyal and brave gentlemen, they could not be
surpassed. I always believed in them, but in France my belief was
heightened to profound admiration, and as death took its heavy toll day
by day I knew that by no means could they be replaced; for the great
essential was that they should know their men and their language, and
this became impossible as India sent more and more troops to the various
theatres of war.
Next to the British were the Indian officers, most of them men who had
earned their commissions by brave and loyal service, of fighting stock,
with martial traditions, ready to give their lives for their
King-Emperor, proud of the profession of arms; they formed the essential
link between the British officers and men. In ordinary circumstances in
the Field they were well fitted to fill temporarily the place of their
lost British leaders, and many instances of this I shall relate.
I tread perhaps on thorny ground, but after a life spent with them in
many lands, I do not consider they can replace the British officer in
the field. I have discussed this with numerous Indian officers and
soldiers of all classes, but I never met one who did not practically
agree with me. There no doubt are in India some who will lay claim to
this, but I firmly believe the British officers, who are the truest
friends of the Indian soldier, will unanimously agree with me. If
bravery and self-sacrifice were alone to be considered then by all means
the Indian can take his place in any rank, but training and temperament
at present stand in his way.
What is now being wisely done is to increase the pay of the Indian
officers and men. The pay of Indian officers especially was almost an
insult to a class so loyal and devoted, and it must be very largely
increased; they should be given rank corresponding to their British
comrades, and precedence equal to, if not above, their civilian
confrères.
This was one of the sorest points with Indian officers. To the ordinary
observer like myself, at Durbars and public gatherings it was plain that
they never received their proper share of _Izzat_ (honour). No doubt I
shall be told this was all thought out and arranged by the Government,
but I speak from practical experience, not from the edicts of Simla and
Delhi. The Indian officer was not treated with the respect which was his
due and which he has earned in arduous service on many fields of war. It
was a feeling very strongly held by them and must be set right. _Izzat_
is a thing little understood by any but Indians, but it is a great
driving force; it raises men in the estimation of their fellows, whilst
the loss of it debases them.
Public opinion as understood in this country was nonexistent in India.
It was a one-man country; if the man was a strong personality he could
do much; if he was undecided his share became a small one, and good old
Indian _dustoor_ (custom) settled the question in the prehistoric
fashion.
Under the Indian officers are the N.C.O.’s and men. I have soldiered
with Rajputs and Jats, Pathans, Sikhs, Gurkhas, Punjabi Mahomedans,
Madras Sappers and Miners, Dogras, Garhwalis and other races. Each has
its characteristics, and these must be recognised by any one entrusted
with the command of Indian troops. You cannot place them in one mould;
you will not get from them their best, unless they recognise that they
are understood.
One of my chief difficulties at the beginning of this war was to make it
understood that the Indians cannot be treated as pure machines, and that
they possess national characteristics as varied as those between
Scandinavians and Italians. I own that Sir John French and his Staff
generally made every allowance for these facts, but there were others
who made none; an Army Corps (no matter its fighting strength in
numbers) was an Army Corps and nothing else. An Army Corps was supposed
to be able to occupy so many thousand yards of trenches, and the orders
were issued by this routine rule.
It might be said the Indian Corps was sent as a Corps and times were too
pressing to go into such details; this is perhaps true, and we all
recognised it at the beginning of the Flanders fighting; but as time
went on and the German attack was beaten off, I saw plainly that you
cannot expect a ship to keep up full steam when the engineers and
stokers are lying shattered in the hold. And yet those brave men not
only filled a big gap in our battered line, but, helped and encouraged
by their comrades of the British battalions of the Indian Corps, held it
against incessant attack. Minenwerfers, hand-grenades, and high
explosives tore through them and flattened out their trenches; blood
flowed freely; but as often as they were driven back from their front
defences they managed to return to them again. India has reason to be
proud of her sons, and their children may well tell with pride of the
deeds of their fathers.
I can look back to the time when the Indian Army was commanded by Lord
Roberts, and he paid two visits to Delhi whilst I was Staff-Officer
there. Whoever may follow him as Commander-in-Chief, one thing is sure;
no individual will ever be as closely connected in the minds of Indian
soldiers with the name of Chief as he was. It was truly surprising how
he was beloved by all ranks. It is no uncommon thing to hear of Viceroys
or Commanders-in-Chief who were well known to and liked by Indians, but
no sooner do they vanish from the scene than they are practically
forgotten for all time. Perhaps it is human nature, perhaps it is common
to all countries, but one thing is sure, viz. that Lord Roberts’ name
has, and will have, an abiding place in many an Indian home for years to
come. He had the nature which earns confidence, the open mind which
breeds loyalty, the fearless character that binds men to their leaders
with hoops of steel. An Indian Army led by Lord Roberts was doubled in
its fighting capacity by his presence, which to them was the sure
presage of victory. Without that affection which he had established,
neither to-day nor in the times to come, will the soldiers of India give
of their best on the field of battle. May be it is a fault, and in the
eyes of some reduces their value as fighting units, but if the Empire
calls on all its sons to fight in one field, it must not forget that
human nature is stronger than Service Regulations, and that blood is
thicker than water.
Lord Roberts left an indelible mark on the Indian Army and one which has
proved invaluable to all who have since served in India.
Another great soldier who left his mark, but in a different way, was
Lord Kitchener. His reforms were sweeping. The training of the Army
received at his hands an impetus which will stamp his rule as remarkable
so long as we remain in India. His re-grouping of brigades and
divisions, the creation of a General Staff, the erection of new barracks
and cantonments, quite upset the slow calculations of those who looked
on and wondered. And yet if analysed his work was only a putting into
force of principles which had long been recognised as necessary but
which others had not had the power to carry out. Lord Kitchener with a
master eye saw what was needed and did it; he rode rough shod over
_dustoor_ or custom; he was a mighty organiser and the civilians were
afraid of him. He never bothered himself over minor details in India; he
left them to his subordinates. He chose them himself and trusted them.
The inside life of Indians was unknown to him, he went to India too late
in life to learn; he was too busy with big tasks to attend to what he
did not consider an essential for a Commander-in-Chief.
Among his many reforms were some which I venture to say have not been
beneficial. The terms of service which passed men to the Reserve after a
short period in the ranks proved a veritable stumbling-block, and
created a Reserve which proved not only useless but a danger in war
time. The Reservists sent to the Indian Corps in France were of this
type, largely worn out, hating the very idea of war, many physically
unfit and incapable of a single day’s work.
Even Lord Kitchener had found it hard to get sanction for sufficient
British officers for Indian regiments and battalions. The numbers
eventually sanctioned were sufficient for frontier work, but altogether
inadequate to meet the requirements of European warfare, and this very
soon made itself manifest.
The reduction of ambulance _kahars_ (trained bearers) was another very
serious drawback, but in this case it reacted worse on the Frontiers
than in Europe, for in France, of course, a totally different system
prevailed. In 1908, during the Zakka Khel and Mohmand Expeditions, in
order to equip even one division and an extra brigade, bearers had to be
collected from all the divisions in India as far as Madras; an
impossible system in an Army supposed to stand ready for Frontier wars.
During Lord Kitchener’s rule, manœuvres or large gatherings of troops
were few and far between; all the money available was spent on
reorganisation; nevertheless the battalion training reached a far higher
scale of efficiency than had ever previously been the case. In order to
increase the numbers of brigades and divisions, to meet the requirements
of his scheme for mobilisation, Lord Kitchener reduced the number of
British battalions in a brigade from two to one. This for European
warfare proved a great mistake, as I shall endeavour to show.
Lord Kitchener’s name will, in India for all time, stand as a landmark
of great changes long needed. He has been described as a hard man; this
he may in a sense have been, but underlying his hardness, to those who
were privileged to know him well, was the very kindest heart that ever
beat in a soldier. He set himself a definite task and allowed nothing to
stand in his way, and yet I never knew a man who was more ready to
listen to reasonable suggestions, more ready to acknowledge that there
were two sides to all arguments, and when you had convinced him on any
point he was always prepared to give your views a chance. As I shall
show later he had an intense wish to do justice to the Indian Army and
was the best friend of the Indian Corps from the day we landed at
Marseilles to the day the Corps left France. The first telegram I
received in Europe was from him.
I am glad to hear that the Indian troops are _razi_ (happy), give them
my salaams and tell them I feel sure they will maintain their records
of the past when they meet the Germans.
If there had been a few more in authority who knew how to deal with
Indian soldiers, and who understood that a word spoken at the right
moment is worth a volume on paper, it would have been of inestimable
advantage to the Corps in France.
The first Viceroy with whom I had any direct dealings was Lord Minto. A
soldier by instinct, a gentleman by nature, and the kindest of friends:
he was very much liked by the Indian officers. He always made a point of
having them all introduced to him after any parade at which he was
present.
During the Frontier expeditions of 1908, from the inception of the
operations to the last day when we recrossed the Frontiers, Lord Minto
never failed to bear the troops, British and Indian, in mind; and his
advice on the political questions involved and his desire to spare the
enemy once he had been well beaten and submitted, at once showed his
nature. During his Viceroyalty the Indian soldiers learned that the
representative of the King-Emperor had a heart of gold, and having been
a soldier himself was anxious, as far as his high position would allow,
to meet them as comrades.
Such men leave behind them traditions which in India far outlive those
established during their comparatively short periods of high office by
some others who place Western attainments on a higher plane than human
nature. In the East this never pays; India is very susceptible of
influence but it must be based on common sense.
On the Frontiers amid the wild hillmen, Lord Minto at once established
himself as a soldier by appearing on his first parade in uniform, with
the badges of a brigadier-general (which in military life he was), and I
well remember the surprise and pleasure of the Indian soldiers who told
me (then a Brigadier myself), that now they understood that Brigadier
was in reality a very high rank, and that in the next expedition they
hoped the Viceroy would himself command troops.
On this his first visit to the Frontiers he was accompanied by Lady
Minto, who attended the parade and later went over the Malakand Pass.
She spoke to all the Indian officers and many of the wild transborder
chiefs, and years afterwards the memory of her visit was still a theme
of conversation amongst the Maliks beyond Chakdara and _en route_ to
distant Chitral. You can do much in the East by personal example, you
can do little without it.
Lord Kitchener was followed as Commander-in-Chief by Sir O’Moore Creagh.
As a very young subaltern I had first met him after the Afghan War in
1880, when he was a Captain and had just won the V.C. at Kam Dakka in
the Khyber. His cheery character had impressed me, and I instinctively
felt I had met a soldier I might meet again in a higher sphere. His
intimate knowledge of India, its people and languages, and his early
promise marked him for distinction, and in 1910 he left the India
Office, where he was Military Secretary, and assumed command of the
Indian Army.
Sir O’Moore Creagh had to follow a difficult man. Lord Kitchener had
dragged out of the Government what in India is spoken of as a colossal
sum of money. In truth it was nothing of the kind, but it has in the
past pleased that country to call anything a waste of money which is
required for military purposes.
The military are the very root of our rule in the East, and if you
refuse sustenance to that root the tree will wither. Time has proved the
truth of this, and in 1914, when the trumpet of Death resounded all over
the world, the Government of India awoke to the fact that there are
other things than education and law on which to spend the revenues of an
Empire.
During Sir O’Moore Creagh’s tenure of command, the Northern Army, which
I commanded, was given many opportunities of holding manœuvres on a much
bigger scale than usual. Comparatively large concentrations took place
in the Peshawar Division and near Soneput in the Punjab, which offered
scope for working entire war divisions against one another and also
allowed many Corps of Imperial Service troops to share in the work. The
Chief was present at some of these operations, which he thoroughly
enjoyed.
The Indian Staff College at Quetta, which has proved so beneficial to
the Army at large, was founded during his regime, and the General Staff
was permanently established on a modern basis. He, however, like his
predecessors found himself handicapped by the difficulty of getting
sufficient funds to keep the Army efficient for war. The shortage of
ammunition; the deficiency of a reserve of rifles; the totally
inadequate numbers of Field Artillery; the absence of howitzer batteries
properly armed; the inadequate pay of all ranks of the Indian Army, and
a hundred other most important items had to remain in abeyance, and very
soon after he left the Great War came to test the machine.
The test has proved the fine fighting spirit of officers and men and the
dire need that existed for modern equipment. The aeroplanes, the
howitzers, the reserve materials were _non est_, and although I do not
know whether the Indian or Home Governments found the cash, whoever it
is has had to pay pretty heavily for the failure to provide it in time.
During my tenure of command of the Northern Army nothing struck me more
than the hopelessness of the system adopted both by the War Office and
the Government of India in fixing the age for the higher Commands, such
as divisions and brigades, and in the Indian Army of regimental and
battalion commanders. The Indian rules were hopeless; promotion was
given by length of service and selection had to take a back seat. Money
was saved by keeping on officers, long after many of them had ceased to
be fitted for command, as it kept down the pension lists, and when money
could be saved on anything connected with the Army, there was no doubt
it would be done readily. The consequence was that in a country like
India, where youth and vigour should rank first in apportioning work,
exactly the contrary was the case. Merit had to subordinate itself to
rules and customs, and far too old a race of officers were frequently
placed in positions for which they were unfitted. In themselves mostly
good and gallant soldiers in their day, it was no fault of theirs but of
the pernicious system under which they served.
But if this was the case in the Indian Army, encrusted in obsolete
traditions, what excuse can be offered for the methods adopted by the
War Office in selecting officers of the Home service for higher commands
in India? Here at least was an opportunity for sending out young
brigadiers and generals, but nothing of the kind was done. On the
contrary, although good soldiers with good records were frequently
selected, they were generally long past the age for brigade commands and
would not have been given them in England. In fact the War Office used
India as the dumping ground for senior officers whom they wished to
reward, but for whom they did not mean to find a place in this country.
No one can deny these facts; they are to be found in the Army lists of
the period. It was very hard on the many gallant officers themselves,
but still harder on the Army of India. Any one anxious to examine the
matter need only consult the comparative ages of Brigade commanders at
the beginning of the war in France. In the Indian Corps drastic changes
had to be carried out in the field in the first months, as, to quote one
instance only, it was at once discovered that in combined operations the
Indian Brigade and Divisional commanders became senior to Divisional and
Corps commanders of the other Army Corps. Such a state of affairs could
not long continue, and if for no other reasons, for this alone, the
changes became imperative. How unfair on the Army of India was such a
state of things! How unjust to those brave and loyal officers
themselves, who after long years spent in gallant service for their
country were pushed out of their places in presence of the enemy—the
great goal they had lived for. And yet it was looked on as quite the
usual thing, and no one at the War Office ever seemed to have troubled
themselves where India was concerned. Such remarks may be called
vindictive, but call them what you will the Army Council of those days
is to blame, and secure as that body may feel itself when confronted
with one whose experience has not been acquired in Whitehall, the Army
of India of 1914 will support me in what I say.
The most important event in Sir O’Moore’s Chiefship was the great Delhi
Durbar, when His Majesty the King was present. No need to write of this,
except to say that knowing India, its Army and people, as I do, whatever
may have been the impression left on the millions of the King’s
subjects, speaking of the Army I can say that his presence among them
has left an impression which no other occasion in the history of that
wondrous land could ever have equalled. Men who had never dreamed of
seeing their Emperor in person, saw him with their own eyes, knew him to
be a living entity, and went away feeling themselves sharers in an
unequalled Empire. It is not too much to say that the King’s visit did
more to bind to the Throne in loyal bonds the Indian Army than any
triumphs won by the greatest of India’s former Emperors. Only those who
know India and its people, and know them well, can understand the
magnitude of the event.
The last of the Viceroys in my day in India was Lord Hardinge. I had the
honour of knowing him sufficiently well to appreciate thoroughly the
very great interest he took in the Army. In fact I go so far as to say
that none of the high officials I ever knew in India felt a keener sense
of his duty towards the Indian soldier than he did. Grandson of a great
soldier-Viceroy who had fought the Sikhs, his sympathies were equally
with the men who had fought for and against us on many a fierce
battlefield, and from the day I first met Lord Hardinge to the last day
I commanded the Indian Army Corps in France, I never failed to enlist
his unflagging interest in the men I commanded. He attended the big
Delhi manœuvres of 1912 and camped near the troops. Up at dawn and till
evening in the saddle, the Viceroy imparted his own enthusiasm to the
men. He rode over every part of the large manœuvre area, enquired into
everything, and during the final phase on the last day was like a boy in
spirits, thoroughly enjoying the spectacle, which turned out to be as
realistic as mimic warfare can well be made.
It was Lord Hardinge who urged the employment of Indian troops in
France. He and Lord Kitchener were the two moving spirits in the scheme,
and from the day I left India he never failed at once to answer all my
long letters; never failed to give me not only his advice on all matters
connected with the semi-political aspect of affairs, as far as they
concerned my Corps, but used his great powers to meet every request
regarding the classes of troops, the terms of service, changes in the
system of enlistment and Reserves, and in short nothing was more
noticeable than the determination, throughout the first year of the war,
which he evinced, to make the employment of Indians in Europe a success.
I write plainly, as the Indian Army should know the facts. The work of
Viceroys, although frequently performed in the glare of publicity, has
two sides. Much of what Lord Hardinge did for the Indians in France is
the other, or unknown side, of the picture. What was done in India no
doubt was put down as the work of the Indian Government, but much of it
was originated by him personally, because he took the pains to enquire
and knew the facts, and more still because he sympathised with the
difficulties which attended the steering of the ship in uncharted
waters.
Of one more official I must write before I proceed with my story, for
not only were we much thrown together in peace and on active service,
but his name is so intimately connected with the North-West Frontiers of
India and the personnel of an important part of our best fighting
material, that for many years past one had naturally associated the name
of Roos-Keppel with that of the Pathans and other border clans.
Fifty-three years of age, Roos-Keppel had lived on the Frontiers for
over twenty years. In many political appointments, as Commandant of the
Khyber Rifles, and since 1909 as Chief Commissioner of the North-West
Frontier Province, he has learned all there is to learn of the
tribesmen, and has taught them, if not all, then most of what is
necessary for them to understand. His life has been a romance of the
wild border land; his success has been achieved by manly and just
conduct in the face of semi-barbarism. His fearless nature, fine
personal appearance, and intimate knowledge of the habits and language
of the clans, stamp Roos-Keppel as a Paladin of the Frontiers. You must
know the man and his task to understand what he has done for India.
Governors and generals come and go, Maliks and Khans change or
disappear, but for many long years Roos-Keppel has been the true Warden
of the Marches.
The Afridis and Afghans know the white man came decades ago and planted
himself firmly on his borders, and means to remain there; but the white
man to the present generation of these wild warriors is Colonel Sir
George Roos-Keppel and no other. His influence has won their admiration,
his stern justice tempered with mercy has won their fear, and his belief
in himself has made them believe in him also.
Often in France, in the dark days of 1914, have I quoted to the Pathans
things he had said, and it always acted with them like a trumpet call to
duty. Still more often did I wish I had had him with me, but it was not
to be. He happened to be on leave in England when war broke out and came
to Orleans to meet the Corps, and although I tried to secure his
services, he was wanted back at his post in India, and I lost the aid of
a good soldier and a remarkable man, which I deeply regretted.
CHAPTER II
The decision to send Indian troops to France was at first limited to
sending two Divisions with their artillery and other arms, and it was
not till these had actually begun to leave that orders were issued
constituting them into an Army Corps with its full Staff. I was selected
for the command, and most of my limited Northern Army Staff were
attached. The remaining officers required to complete were appointed
direct from Army Headquarters at Simla, but I was allowed to nominate
the personal Staff. Of course it was a drawback not having a Staff with
whom I had worked in peace time, but such an organisation had not been
contemplated, and in any case I had nothing to complain of, as no
General could have found a more loyal and devoted body of officers; many
with very high attainments and experience in the field, and all with a
knowledge of British and Indian troops. I very soon found that
notwithstanding the fact we were all new to the peculiar warfare and
unversed in the details of Army Corps organisation, the common-sense
training which India gives men enabled us to quickly gather up the
threads of the work.
The following was the composition of the corps which left India:
LAHORE DIVISION
Lieut.-General H. B. WATKIS, C.B. (Indian Army).
FEROZEPORE BRIGADE.—Brig.-General R. M. Egerton, C.B. (Indian Army).
1st Connaught Rangers.
57th Rifles (Frontier Force).
9th Bhopal Infantry.
120th Baluchis.
JALANDAR BRIGADE.—Major-General P. M. Carnegy, C.B. (Indian Army).
1st Manchesters.
15th Sikhs.
47th Sikhs.
59th Rifles (Frontier Force).
SIRHIND BRIGADE.—Major-General J. M. S. Brunker (late R.A.).
1st Highland Light Infantry.
1st Battalion 1st Gurkhas.
1st Battalion 4th Gurkhas.
125th Rifles.
DIVISIONAL TROOPS.
15th Lancers.
Headquarters Divisional Engineers.
20th and 21st Companies Sappers and Miners.
Signal Company.
34th Sikh Pioneers.
Headquarters Divisional Artillery.
ARTILLERY.
5th, 11th and 18th Brigades R.F.A.
Ammunition Columns.
109th Heavy Battery.
MEERUT DIVISION
Lieut.-General C. A. ANDERSON, C.B. (late R.A.)
DEHRA DUN BRIGADE.—Brig.-General C. E. Johnson (Indian Army).
1st Seaforth Highlanders.
1st Battalion 9th Gurkhas.
2nd Battalion 2nd Gurkhas.
6th Jat Light Infantry.
GARHWAL BRIGADE.—Major-General H. D’U. Keary, C.B., D.S.O. (Indian
Army).
2nd Leicesters.
2nd Battalion 3rd Gurkhas.
1st Battalion 39th Garhwal Rifles.
2nd Battalion 39th Garhwal Rifles.
BAREILLY BRIGADE.—Major-General F. Macbean, C.V.O., C.B. (late Gordon
Highlanders).
2nd Black Watch.
41st Dogras.
58th Rifles (Frontier Force).
2nd Battalion 8th Gurkhas.
DIVISIONAL TROOPS.
4th Cavalry.
3rd and 4th Companies Sappers and Miners.
107th Pioneers.
Headquarters Divisional Engineers.
Signal Company.
ARTILLERY.
Headquarters Divisional Artillery.
4th, 9th and 13th Brigades R.F.A.
Ammunition Columns.
110th Heavy Battery.
By 26th September 1914, or a little over seven weeks after the
declaration of war, two Brigades of the Lahore Division had arrived at
Marseilles. The Sirhind Brigade had been detained in Egypt to reinforce
the garrison and did not reach France till the end of November, its
place in the Corps being filled, on and off, by a British Brigade from
the Expeditionary Force.
I myself with the Corps Staff reached Marseilles by ordinary P. and O.
mail on 30th September. I was met by the General in Command and an
A.D.C. sent by General Joffre, and in a moment grasped the reality of
our alliance. I was only an Army Corps Commander, but the honour thus
conferred on us was a token of the unequalled tact and politeness of the
French people. Every day I served in France I learned more, that with
all our _esprit de corps_ we are not in the same street with their army
in _camaraderie_.
The Meerut Division was disembarking by 11th October. The Secunderabad
Cavalry Brigade also arrived in Marseilles before I finally left for
Orleans, and later was attached to the Indian Corps in Flanders, until
the arrival of the remainder of the Indian Cavalry Corps. This fine
Brigade was commanded by Brig.-General F. Wadeson, Indian Army, and
consisted of
7th Dragoon Guards,
34th Poona Horse,
20th Deccan Horse,
“N” Battery R.H.A.;
and with it came the Jodhpore Imperial Service Lancers, under command of
that fine old veteran chief, Major-General Sir Partab Singh. His name is
too familiar even in England to need any description here; suffice it to
say he has, by his glorious personal example throughout the war, earned
a prominent niche in the temple of fame, and as long as India endures
the Rathore and other Indians will treasure the name of Maharaja Sir
Partab Singh, Bahadur.
Amongst Indian princes and chiefs who came to Europe, the following were
attached on various duties to the Indian Army Corps, and by their
loyalty and devotion well maintained the fame of their ancestors.
Indeed, as I look back on those stormy days and recall many rides over
execrable roads and fields deep in mire, from one end of our line to the
other, I conjure up these scions of noble and great houses, sodden and
mud-stained, and cease to wonder why Great Britain had gained so firm a
hold over the millions of Hindustan.
It is something which our race may well be proud of. On many a bitter
field their powerful ancestors had fought against one another; some had
disputed with us our sovereignty over the peninsula now called India,
and all were of different race, creed and religion to ourselves; and yet
here on the plains of Flanders they were intent on one thing alone, and
that was to share our toils and our honours, and give if necessary their
lives for their King-Emperor.
Lieut. His Highness the Maharaja of Jodhpore was serving with Sir Partab
Singh in his own regiment of Lancers.
Colonel His Highness Sir Ganga Singh, Bahadur, Maharaja of Bikanir, was
attached to the Meerut Division. I have long known this Indian prince;
his devotion to the British and his readiness to be always doing
something were conspicuous in France. His own Camel Corps was serving in
Egypt, and later on he went and joined it for a time.
Major His Highness Sir Madan Singh, Bahadur, Maharaja Dhiraj of
Kishengarh.
Captain the Hon. Malik Sir Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana was attached to the
Ferozepore Brigade. A lithe, active man, he was the chief Mahomedan
representative with the corps.
Lieut. Raj-Kumar Hira Singh of Panna was with the Bareilly Brigade; and
Lieut. Maharaja Kumar Hitandra Narayan of Kuch Behar was attached to the
Dehra Dun Brigade.
Lieut. Maharaja Kumar Gopal Saran Narain Singh of Tikari served with the
Corps Signal Company and was a most versatile man, always ready to turn
his hand to any job. Cheery and energetic, I had many opportunities of
observing his work.
Lieut. Malik Mumtaz Mahomed Khan, Native Indian Land Forces, was with
the Staff of the Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade; and Captain Shah Mirza
Beg, Jodhpore Lancers, was an A.D.C. in the same Brigade.
Last, but by no means least, was one of the best soldiers I ever met,
Risaldar Khwaja Mahomed Khan, Sirdar Bahadur, I.D.S.M., of the Guides
Cavalry, my Indian A.D.C. He had served as A.D.C. to Lord Kitchener when
he was Commander-in-Chief, and twice with me on frontier expeditions in
1908. Brave, loyal to the core; hard as nails; always cheerful and very
hard working, it was a pleasure to serve with such a real gentleman. He
was invaluable in France, for although he knew but little English and
very little French he was liked by all, British and Allies. He was the
connecting link between me and all our Indian officers, and by his tact
arranged many matters of considerable local importance to us. The Indian
Government owes him a debt of gratitude; I hope they will not forget it.
No one who knew _The Khwaja_, as he was familiarly known, could fail to
see in him the best type of Indian officer; and in his remote village of
Hamza Kot in the Yousafzai plain beneath the shadow of the Buner hills,
he will often recall the bleak but stirring days we worked together from
Givenchy and Festubert to Neuve Chapelle.
At Marseilles the Indian troops were camped in various localities either
in or within a few miles of the town. We had our field service tents,
and except for the surroundings and the awful state of the ground from
incessant rain, one might have been back in Northern India. But in those
early days of the war everything was new to all ranks, and no matter
what the discomforts it was a sudden drop into dreamland.
Take a look at the race-course by the sea. Leaning on the rails are
twenty or thirty French, men, women, and children, watching our Indian
soldiers cooking their evening meal; these have doffed their khaki
uniform and are now clothed in the scantiest of garments. They exchange
words, French and Hindustani; a French child offers one of them a sweet,
the Indian gives a chapatty in return; cigarettes are offered by a
passer-by; a Mahomedan pulls out from his haversack a bamboo flute and
plays a ditty; all laugh heartily. The West has already conquered the
East; the East has sown a seed which gradually grew until within a few
months Indians in Flanders were entering shops, bargaining and buying as
if they were to the manner born, and the vendors were even more civil to
them than to Europeans, and that is saying much for those fine people
the French.
What may eventually be the result of all the friendliness and
_camaraderie_ between the French and Indians is hard to say. It will
have its advantages; it will assuredly have its disadvantages. “East is
East and West is West”: the Ganges and the Seine flow in different
directions; the artificial meeting of these waters may not be an unmixed
blessing. The Hindu on his return to Kashi (Benares) or the Mahomedan at
his prayers at the Jumma Musjid at Delhi may think differently of the
white races across the sea to what he thought before the transports bore
him across the _kala-pani_, the black water.
However, although everything may be changed after this war, personally I
believe the East will return to its own ways, and very rightly so, and
that the next generation of ordinary Indians will talk of France,
Gallipoli, and Mesopotamia much as we do of the conquest of Mexico or of
Peru.
Whilst the Corps was collecting and getting re-equipped with new rifles,
etc., I was summoned to General Headquarters, on the Aisne, and
travelled _via_ Paris and thence by motor-car. At General Headquarters I
saw Sir John French, and learnt from him that our Army was very shortly
to be transferred from the Aisne to Flanders, and that the Indian Corps
was to hasten its departure and join them there; he indicated the region
of La Bassée, and although heavy fighting went on before we actually
took our place in the trenches, it was immediately west of La Bassée
that we eventually did so. He asked me many questions, and whether I had
anything particular to point out. My only request was that I hoped my
Corps would not be split up before we could be more or less
concentrated, for I had a very shrewd idea we should find ourselves in
trenches in Flanders and that the days of normal past European warfare
were near their end on the Western front. I was not far wrong, but, as I
shall show later, the situation was such when the Lahore Division
arrived, that several battalions were at once taken from their brigades
and thrown in anyhow with cavalry and infantry to help stem the German
rush between Ypres and La Bassée.
The times were abnormal and the necessity was great, but it was very
unfortunate for the Indian troops that before they had time to realise
their position, or gather whether they were facing east or west, they
were separated from their own British battalions and broken up into half
battalions and even companies, and rushed into the whirlwind of Ypres
amidst those who were strangers to them.
Then came realistically home to them the shortage of British officers.
Twelve was the total war complement per battalion—twelve marked white
men; nobly these and the gallant Indians did their duty, but the tempest
was on them and the British officers were practically blotted out. The
Indian officers and men fought fiercely, but notwithstanding that the
other British troops of all classes around them were setting a deathless
example of glory, the fact remained that the Indians were fast losing
the officers who knew them and whom they trusted beyond all things; and
of the strangers there were none who could talk their language or
understand them.
Those who take up the pen to criticise should first put themselves in
the place of these men, who had crossed the seas to fight for England,
without any personal cause in the quarrel, and inspired alone by the
duty they owed their King-Emperor because they had eaten his salt. It is
a story of loyalty never surpassed in the annals of history, but the
narration of these events will follow in the next chapter.
I returned to Marseilles, and was in Orleans a few days later; here the
two Divisions and all their belongings were being concentrated and moved
on, as equipped with mechanical and horse transport. The French General
in Command of the District was greatly interested in the troops and
witnessed a march past after an inspection parade.
The Indians were much impressed by the statue of Joan of Arc, which
stands in a large square of the town; they had just heard the story of
the Maid, and I saw them assembled in groups round the statue, and some
companies which happened to be passing came to attention and turned
their faces towards it. Could the Maid have ever dreamed that the Aryans
from the far waters of the Indus and the slopes of the great Himalayas
would one day learn to honour her as her own countrymen would do? But
every day in France in 1914–15 was a lesson in psychology.
The mechanical transport handed over to us at Orleans was a revelation.
The great retreat from Mons had taken its terrible toll, England was
being called on to face difficulties of sea and land transport undreamed
of but a few months previously; our armies were fighting for dear life,
and these must needs of course be supplied first, and yet that great
organiser Lord Kitchener had found it possible to send us motor
transport sufficient for our immediate needs, and all up to time. Indeed
it was we who had to hurry to keep pace with the urgent call from the
trenches.
Had the mechanical transport been the sole difficulty, that had already
been solved, but with the horse vehicles it was a totally different
affair. No need to dilate on this; we knew they were doing their best
for us and we meant to do our best with what was given us; but in truth
the medley of carts of every description that met my eye the first
morning at Orleans was enough to turn one’s hair grey.
A vast plain, now converted into a bog, was literally strewn with
vehicles and horses; every species of conveyance found a place, and the
fair at Nijni Novgorod could not have shown greater variety; the
char-a-banc and the baker’s cart; structures on prehistoric springs;
pole and draught harness; horses in hundreds without collars, head or
heel ropes—in fact, just loose. It might have appeared grave if it had
not been so amusing. But the cart horses and harness were all as nothing
to the drivers. Good fellows, who a month later had become useful
soldiers, to-day they were indeed a sore trial. I went round to one
diminutive man and said, “Do you know anything about horses?” “I do
not,” was his reply. “How many days have you been a soldier?” “Thirteen
days.” He was doing his best to find his horses, which in company with
many others were taking a stroll along the banks of the Loire anywhere
within five miles of the camp. I liked that man.
Such were some of our first trials, but what minute ones in comparison
to the real ones we should soon be facing. The Indian soldiers could not
understand all these things! The motor lorries were new to them, and
they simply took it for granted that in a European war everything was
going to be new. But to see hundreds of magnificent horses wandering
about because there was nothing to fasten them with, and drivers who
were very much at sea, with a force going into the field, they did not
understand. They have learned a good many things since.
Of all arms of the Indian Corps there was one not surpassed in any
army—the Field Artillery. True, that to furnish the British equivalent
of a corps in guns many other divisions in India had lost their
brigades, but the artillery as it stood was near perfection. Superbly
horsed; with officers and men who had been trained on excellent and
varied manœuvre grounds; comparatively old, and in every respect highly
disciplined soldiers; the field artillery I had in France was a thing
any General might well envy. And moreover, as it was put to no such test
as the Mons retreat it went into action fully equipped, and remained
throughout the year the Corps was in France a fine fighting machine.
Officers and men disappeared as in other brigades of the Expeditionary
Force, but the nucleus remained, and improved as time went on.
The Indian Divisions had each an entire regiment of cavalry attached as
Divisional troops, and in addition a battalion of Pioneers, and in this
respect were ahead of British troops in organisation. These Pioneer
battalions proved of inestimable value, being trained in various kinds
of technical work as well as all ordinary fighting duties. In addition
each Division had two companies of Sappers and Miners; acknowledged by
all who have ever seen them in the field to be some of the finest
engineer troops in our army.
The Indian _kahars_ or stretcher-bearers attached to the field
ambulances are a peculiarity of India. In France they did most excellent
work; purely non-fighting men, they are callously brave under fire,
going about their duty with a calm air which appears to say, “I am not a
fighting but a healing man, therefore they will never shoot me”—for this
in fact is what one of them said to me. The _kahar_ of course takes his
chance, but I doubt if that man had ever heard of the Huns.
On the 18th October two Brigades of the Lahore Division left Orleans and
were on the Flanders front by the 21st, and the Meerut Division
following them reached St. Omer by the 29th of the month. These were
followed by the Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade and Jodhpore Lancers, and
thus the whole of the Corps that had so far arrived in France was at
last facing the Germans.
A great surprise to me, once we found ourselves in Flanders, was the
ease with which everything worked. The Indian troops, as is well known,
have their own peculiar customs. Their religious scruples and their
feeding have to be arranged for on lines entirely different to British
soldiers. All these details might reasonably have been expected to cause
considerable difficulties, but we had been preceded by Staff Officers
conversant with all the requirements, and General Headquarters gave such
a free hand in these matters and so readily fell in with every
suggestion which they felt was necessary, that in a very few days things
were working more smoothly than in India itself, where unfortunately red
tape, Babus, and Returns clog the wheels to such an extent as to render
the machinery frequently almost immovable.
India was now to be put to the test. Thirty, and even twenty, years
previously it had been looked upon as the best training ground for the
army. Indian campaigns had produced many distinguished soldiers. Names
like those of Nicholson, Colin Campbell, Havelock, Roberts, had
immortalised its army; and only recently Lord Kitchener had reorganised
it, but the years of desert warfare in Egypt and the war in South Africa
had shorn India of many of its attractions. It was no longer looked on
by many good soldiers as the best, or even as a good school. I had known
some who had refused high commands; others who felt European war was in
the air and had no intention of cutting themselves adrift from home,
where lay the best chance of being employed. For me personally there was
the ever-present knowledge that but few of those directing the great
military machine in France knew anything about the Indians, and yet the
very nature and composition of the corps must be thoroughly recognised
if the fullest advantage was to be taken of it. We did know,
fortunately, that His Majesty the King not only had his Indian soldiers’
welfare at heart, but also that we should always have his earnest
support, and this was a tower of strength to us. We knew also that Lord
Kitchener would watch our progress and back up our needs.
So far so good, but something more was needed. Did our immediate
commanders grasp the fact that our strength in bare numbers as compared
with a British Army Corps was 5400 bayonets short? Did they realise that
our reinforcements were precarious, and had to come thousands of miles
across the seas? They could not know what I did, viz. that a very large
proportion of our reservists, which must form a great part of such
reinforcements, were quite useless for European warfare, owing to the
pernicious reserve system then prevailing in India. Could they tell that
the drafts, before many months had gone by, would begin to consist of
recruits enlisted immediately before or during the war?
A former War Minister in England had once told me that in four months
Britishers could be turned into good soldiers, fit to fight in Europe.
Perhaps he was right; perhaps this great war has proved it; but “East is
East and West is West,” and notwithstanding my admiration for the
Indians and believing them to be first-class fighting material, I can
positively assert that it is impossible to make good soldiers of them in
four months or even in a much longer period. Education, temperament, the
difference between having and not having a cause in the quarrel, must
perforce be considered. From the day I left India I had revolved all
these matters in my mind, and now the time had come when we must put our
whole soul into the battle.
The day of my arrival at St. Omer, the British Headquarters, was indeed
one to be remembered. Asia had dropped into Europe; the descendants of
Timour, of Guru Govind, of the ancient Hindus, had come to fight the
Huns on the historic plains of Flanders. Seventy miles in a direct line
from us lay the immortal field of Waterloo; seventy-five miles away were
the cliffs of Dover. The man must have been carved out of wood who would
not have rejoiced at his good fortune; the heart atrophied that did not
beat the faster at the thought that he was given a chance, however
humble, of taking his share in the greatest conflict of all times.
As I motored to General Headquarters, methought the temple bells on
Ganges banks were ringing, and the millions of devotees offering their
prayers for their loved ones so far away, in a land which none could
conjure up even in imagination. The voices of the muezzins were
ascending from thousands of mosques, from the Afridi hills to the Deccan
plains and away beyond, calling on Allah to protect their kith and kin
and give them victory. The Golden Temple of Amritsar was sending up its
call to Ishwar, with _fatehs_ for the soldiers of the Khalsa. On the
mighty Himalayas, the home of the Highlanders of Nepal, the sturdy
little Gurkhas, I could see many thousands who knew nothing of Europe or
any land beyond their own, but who did know that their kinsfolk could
die like men, and they were calling in their simple faith on the Creator
to watch those who from loyalty to their King-Emperor had crossed the
great unknown sea. And then the car stopped, and my vision faded, for I
was at General Headquarters, and on a large table covered with small
flags was the map of the British trenches, and standing beside it was
the Field-Marshal Commander-in-Chief.
I had only met Sir John French three times in my life, but even had I
never met him before I would have been glad to serve under his command,
for he spoke so directly and with a manner that proved his sincerity and
his confidence in himself and his army. There was no bluster, but just a
man in high authority speaking to another, who, he recognised, had a
difficult task before him and meant to do his level best. I went away
happy.
I once asked one of my African soldiers, “Who is the greatest man in the
world?” He promptly answered, “You are.” I asked him why, and he
replied, “Because you are my Commander-in-Chief.” Simple fellow, but I
felt rather like him for the moment.
CHAPTER III
From General Headquarters I proceeded to my billet at Merville for the
night, and was met by the Frenchman, his wife and children, in whose
house I was quartered. The room had only been vacated by another
occupant an hour previously, and the hall and drawing-room bore the
marks of hurry and scurry everywhere. I was often in the year to come to
be the uninvited guest of other French people, but these were enough to
show me the great heart of France; a heart so true and brave that it at
first set one wondering what manner of people is this.
When I got to know them better I ceased to wonder; I ceased to doubt
what might be the end of it all; this glorious race in its dire trial
was indeed setting an example to the whole world. My hosts could not do
enough to help me; tea was served: the children ran up and down stairs
carrying something, anything, so long as they could show they were
anxious to make me welcome. I thought perhaps they imagined the Indian
General was some peculiar class of animal, but no! I soon discovered it
was because I was an ordinary Englishman and they were typical French,
that their kindness was lavished on me. And as months went on and we
mixed more and more with them, we all discovered that high as had always
been our opinion of our neighbours across the Channel, we had known but
little of them after all. The unselfishness of their race is to my
thinking unique; and from civilians, men and women alike, I never
received anything but the greatest courtesy. For two months my corps
held the trenches next to the French, and during that time I conceived a
liking for their soldiers, and an admiration for their brave and
courteous Generals and Staffs that I had never thought possible to
entertain towards any other than our own army.
There was never any kind of difficulty in working with a French General;
one was only too glad to meet his wishes, for they were always expressed
with courtesy, a natural gift with them, sometimes sadly lacking with
us.
I had the honour of knowing and working with General de Maud’huy,
Commanding the Xth Corps, and General Maistre, Commanding the XXIst
Corps d’Armée, both splendid comrades in the field. Many others, too, I
had dealings with; and amongst Staff Officers attached to the Indian
Corps none could have been a greater favourite with British and Indians
alike than Captain de la Ferronays. He joined us at Marseilles, and
remained for some months until transferred to the French General Staff.
One of my saddest days in France was when we had to part from our French
comrades for our first period of rest, and we did not serve next to them
again except for short periods.
My great hope had been that the Indian Corps would not be split up as it
arrived but be given a few days wherein to pull themselves together and
form some idea of what was before them. This later on became the policy,
and troops new to the country and form of warfare were not only kept
behind the trenches but were instructed in all that was necessary, so
that when their turn came they did not walk blindly into the hurricane.
It was, however, impossible in these days; every man as he arrived was
wanted, and wanted badly, and hence some of the first arrivals were just
pushed into the firing-line and took their chance. The Indians had one
disadvantage: their Generals and officers had no previous training in
this novel form of fighting. The British forces, even though composed of
men of all kinds, had most of them a nucleus of officers and soldiers
who had already seen the backs of the Germans. The retreat from Mons was
fresh in their memories, but the advance to the Aisne was a retort that
no retreat could dim, and with these to their credit they felt that no
matter how strong the foe, they were the same men who had turned to bay
on the Marne and driven the Prussian Eagles away from their goal.
The orders however were given, and with that spirit which they had shown
on many a field from Meanee to Delhi and Lucknow the soldiers of India
entered into battle.
The 1st Connaught Rangers, forming part of the Ferozepore Brigade, was
the first battalion of the Army Corps engaged, and the 57th Rifles and
129th Baluchis were the first Indian regiments. As the Dorsets rightly
carry on their colours the motto, “Primus in Indis,” so surely should
each of these two battalions be given “Primus in Europa,” a fitting
reward for their good fortune. On the 22nd October 1914 the Connaughts
arrived at Wulverghem by motor buses, a new form of battle transport,
and on the 23rd a portion of them took the place of the Essex regiment
in the trenches in front of Messines. The remainder of the battalion
next day relieved cavalry on the same front.
On the 26th October they were again relieved by cavalry, during which
operation they suffered some casualties. Rendezvousing near Wytschaete
they shortly afterwards received orders to attack the German trenches
near Gapaard in conjunction with the 57th Rifles, both then being under
the orders of the First Cavalry Division. The 129th Baluchis attached to
the 3rd Brigade of the Second Cavalry Division operated on their left.
The Connaughts’ attack was led by Lieut.-Colonel H. Ravenshaw, Major
Murray being in command of the firing supports. Owing to darkness it was
found impossible to keep touch with the 57th, but eventually Captain
Payne’s company, after passing through a fairly heavy fire, rushed three
German trenches, taking an officer and some men prisoners, and skilfully
withdrew. Ravenshaw specially commended Major Murray and Captain Payne
on this the first occasion of an attack by the battalion. The total
casualties were seventeen men.
On the 29th October the Connaught Rangers rejoined the Lahore Division.
This fine battalion, which did excellent work on many occasions, was the
only Irish corps then under my command; six weeks later the 2nd
battalion, which had originally formed part of the 5th Infantry Brigade
of the Second Division, was also sent to me to supplement its sister
battalion; it arrived in a very depleted state, and with only one of its
original officers, but soon recovered its condition and rendered
splendid service.
I have the greatest affection for Irishmen and have done all my
regimental soldiering with them and was proud to have so distinguished a
regiment under my command. To those who know how to treat them they are
indeed impossible to beat in any Army, and I shall hope again some day
to meet my comrades, such as may be left of them.
The 57th (Wilde’s) Rifles on arrival at the advanced scene of operations
found themselves in occupation of trenches near Oost Taverne and between
Wytschaete and Messines. Sepoy Usman Khan of the 55th (Coke’s) Rifles
(commonly known as “Cookies” on the Frontier) on this occasion won the
Indian Distinguished Service Medal. I believe he was the first Indian to
gain a decoration in France.
As stated before, the 57th took part with the Connaught Rangers in the
attack on Gapaard. Lieut.-Colonel Gray, the Commanding Officer, was
unfortunately wounded early in the day by shrapnel. He had served with
me on Frontier expeditions, and his wild fighting spirit and cheery
manner made him a typical leader of Indian troops. It was not long after
before he was back in France with his beloved regiment and later went on
to the Eastern Mediterranean as a Brigadier-General.
The 57th was composed of exceptionally good officers and a fine class of
Indian officers and men all round. In this affair they did not have a
chance of doing much and their casualties were slight. The composition
of this unit was two companies of each of the following classes, Sikhs,
Dogras, Punjabi-Musalmans, and Pathans, and their last active service
had been in China, 1900.
Meantime the 129th Baluchis who were attached to the 3rd Cavalry Brigade
and were operating on the left of the Indian battalion had to advance
over very bad ground and made but small progress. This battalion had
taken over trenches already prepared by the cavalry on the 23rd October,
and came under rifle and machine-gun fire for the first time, and as the
Commanding Officer reported, “they stood it well.”
In the attack on Gapaard a company of the Baluchis got to within 300
yards of the German trenches and were quite annoyed on receiving orders
to retire, but it was necessary as the enemy machine-guns were skilfully
posted. Captain Hampe-Vincent was killed, and besides there were
forty-six other casualties. The battalion carried out various duties
between this date and the 30th, losing another twelve men.
The movements and duties of the 57th Rifles and 129th Baluchis, during
their detachment from their own Brigade, read strangely to any one who
was not in the area at the time. Here were two Indian battalions,
suddenly dumped down in a maelstrom, depending for guidance entirely on
their few British officers, split up into half companies, attached to
various British corps in turn, cavalry, infantry, guns; hurried from one
trench to another, from one front to another, hardly realising the
meaning or object of it all; and then comes the hardest trial; their
gallant leaders are everywhere, encouraging and guiding with a spirit of
unselfish bravery that will live for all time, when the hand of death
strikes them down; others fall sorely wounded; Indian officers share
their fate; the sepoys bewildered but faithful still fight on. They may
be driven (they were driven) time after time from their trenches but
such a retreat is glory, and they shared it to the full with their newly
found British comrades in those few but stormy days of Ypres.
The difficulty of recording these events may be gathered from the
Commanding Officer’s report on the actions round Wytschaete and
Messines, which he begins with the remark: “It is not possible to submit
a detailed report or make special mention of individuals, owing to the
fact that six out of seven British officers employed with my companies
were killed or wounded.” With the help of the Indian officers later on,
all that could be discovered was noted, and as many rewards were given
by the Commander-in-Chief as there was evidence to prove had been
earned.
As a record of the kaleidoscopic movements of the 57th Rifles the
following orders are interesting: On the evening of 28th October the
Commanding Officer was directed to place one company at the disposal of
the G.O.C. 4th Cavalry Brigade, and another at that of the G.O.C. 5th
Cavalry Brigade; these two companies relieved portions of their British
comrades in the trenches. Later the same evening he was ordered to send
his two remaining companies to report to 3rd Cavalry Brigade at Messines
by 5 A.M. next morning. Headquarters of the battalion were ordered to
remain at Wytschaete; and to complete the break up, the machine-gun
section was sent to the 4th Cavalry Brigade. Of course the situation was
such as to render even such extraordinary orders necessary, but my
object in quoting them is to show the immense difficulties the
battalions had to face under most abnormal conditions, and the fact that
notwithstanding the shortage of British officers, and hence the absence
of any one who could speak their language, these gallant men of the 57th
and 129th put up and sustained so good a fight as to earn the high
encomium and thanks of leaders as distinguished as Generals Hugh Gough
and Allenby, no mean judges of human nature.
During the 29th, the 57th Rifles suffered only a few casualties, but on
the morning of 30th October the Germans plastered the trenches of the
4th and 5th Cavalry Brigades with shrapnel and high explosive and
attacked with infantry. About 2 P.M. a portion of the troops north of
the 5th Cavalry Brigade was compelled to fall back, thus exposing the
trenches to the south to enfilade fire, and the Brigade commenced a
retirement from its left flank.
Captain Forbes of the 57th, with No. 3 Company, by some mischance did
not receive the orders to retire in time and became isolated. The enemy
was soon on both his flanks, but Forbes is made of the stuff that never
acknowledges danger. He was severely wounded a day or two after and
invalided, but I was glad to have an opportunity on his rejoining, of
placing him on the Corps Staff as Camp Commandant. As the company
retired, a half of it with its leader, Lieut. I. H. Clarke, was mown
down by machine-gun fire, only a few getting away. As the Commanding
Officer put it tersely but with how much pathos—“They did not return.”
The survivors moved back to Wytschaete.
Major Willans, a sturdy soldier, with No. 1 Company farther to the right
had fared slightly better and was able to withdraw with his machine-gun
to the east of the Wytschaete-Messines Road. The bombardment of the
trenches and Wytschaete continued during the 30th and 31st October, and
on this latter night, between 3 and 4 A.M., the Germans made an infantry
attack in overwhelming numbers. The supports were commanded by Major E.
E. Barwell, and on hearing the burst of musketry he pushed forward but
was killed as he advanced. A personal friend and a brave gentleman, he
died as he once told me he hoped he might.
No. 4 Company of the 57th was bearing the weight of a strong attack at
the same time, and Captain R. S. Gordon commanding No. 2 Company at once
led them to its assistance. As the Highlander leaped from his trench he
was killed; and thus passed away an ideal soldier. “Jock” Gordon was a
very uncommon man, loved by all who knew him, of a nature that knew no
guile, literally worshipped by his men, on that cold October morn he
found his place in the Valhalla of his northern land.
Lieut. Malony, notwithstanding that he was opposed to vastly superior
advancing numbers, kept up so heavy a fire that the enemy began to cry a
halt and endeavour to dig themselves in. He held on as long as his
ammunition lasted but was then himself severely wounded and
incapacitated.
Meantime half of No. 4 Company was nearly surrounded, and the detachment
was left without a single British officer; but the occasion generally
discovers the man, and he was there in the person of Subadar Arsla Khan,
one of those legendary heroes of the days of Timour. I had known him for
years in peace and war; he had won his Order of Merit with me on the
North-West Frontiers of India, and has since added the Military Cross to
his numerous decorations. Leading a counter-attack with the bayonet he
gained sufficient time to pull his men together, and then, although
vastly outnumbered, skilfully withdrew both companies to Messines; here
the men became separated in the streets and were eventually taken in
charge by Lieut. Reardon, the British interpreter attached to the
battalion. In the counter-attack Jemadar Kapur Singh, a Dogra, was
killed after all his men had been placed _hors de combat_.
It is instructive to read in the reports that some of the men in
Messines “had the good fortune” to come across an officer who spoke
Hindustani, and was thus able to direct them to rejoin their
Headquarters; and the report concludes with, “and some of them did
arrive at Kemmel.”
Necessity may know no law, but you cannot expect a dweller of these
islands to ask his way of a Chinaman of the Yangtse, especially should
both have the misfortune of being under a heavy fire of high explosive
shell at the time. You may perhaps expect it, but one often expects too
much.
Captain Forbes, of whom I wrote above, was severely wounded whilst
conducting his men back from the north of Wytschaete, where the Germans
had gained a footing. A withdrawal also became necessary from other
portions of our trenches, and Major Willans, finding his position
untenable, had retired his Sikhs on to a battery near a windmill
south-west of Wytschaete. Lieut. Fowler, who commanded the regimental
machine-guns, was severely wounded. He had exercised his command with
great coolness.
Major Swifte, who had succeeded to the command of the 57th when
Lieut.-Colonel Gray was wounded, collected all the men he could and on
the morning of 1st November was ordered to report to G.O.C. 4th Cavalry
Brigade, who directed him to take up a position on the right of the 3rd
Hussars. Here he was joined by Major Willans with his own company and
what remained of the companies from Messines, and late that night was
ordered to report himself to O.C. 129th Baluchis.
This battalion had, like the 57th Rifles, been doing its share in
another place. After its first experience in the trenches it had a rest
in billets on 27th October, and was at work again on the 29th
entrenching a position. Whilst at this duty, at 11 A.M. on the 29th, two
companies received orders to proceed to a bridge over the Canal
north-west of Hollebeke to support the cavalry in the château there, but
at 1.10 P.M. it was moved to Klein Hollebeke to form part of the reserve
to the 1st Army Corps, and at 7 P.M. marched back to its billets. The
casualties only amounted to twelve killed and wounded.
Orders for relief had been issued for 7 A.M. on 30th October, but at
6.30 A.M. the enemy opened a heavy fire which continued throughout the
morning. Lieut.-Colonel W. M. Southey was in command of the 129th. His
was one of the few battalions of the Indian Corps that I did not then
know well, but I had seen them for a few days and made as thorough an
inspection as was possible. It had in its ranks Mahsuds and some
Mohmands, good fighters in their own Frontier hills; the Mohmands were
now being for the first time tested in our regular Army. In consequence
these were of necessity young soldiers, but under Southey all soldiers
will fight, and notwithstanding their youth the new classes gradually
acquired the discipline which is so essential for any military body.
Southey soon after this got command of a brigade and at once justified
his selection.
The 129th was originally raised in 1846 and has always been known as a
“Baluchi” battalion. It consisted in 1914 of two companies of
Punjabi-Musalmans, three of Mahsuds, and three of other Pathans, and had
seen service in Persia, Afghanistan, and Egypt, 1882. The Duke of
Connaught is their Colonel-in-Chief.
A story is told of Southey during the heavy fighting near Givenchy and
Festubert in December 1914. When commanding his battalion in the
advanced trenches he received a message from some higher authority
directing him to hold on at all costs to his somewhat precarious
position—“Never mind about holding on, I will of course do that, but
where are my rations?”
In this battalion was an Indian officer of whom also I must tell a
story. Six years previously I was in command of an expedition on the
North-West Frontier of India, when one day the tribesmen had gathered in
force and held a very strong Pass. All arrangements were completed and
our attack was just beginning when suddenly, 800 yards directly in front
of my own position, a single man carrying a large white flag appeared on
a knoll and deliberately began walking towards us. Had there been no
firing, or had the tribesmen ceased firing, the flag would of course
have been respected, but on the contrary as he advanced the Martinis of
the Mohmands began to crack louder than ever, and presently casualties
occurred here and there in our ranks. Of course such conduct could not
be tolerated, and it appeared as if one fanatic had adopted this ruse to
put us off our guard. However on came the flag, now at the double, and I
do not think I exaggerate when I say scores of shots were aimed at it.
The man kept tacking from side to side, appearing and disappearing in
the holes and hollows and behind rocks, but remaining scatheless, until
he was less than 400 yards from us, when as if from a chivalry inborn
every one ceased to fire at him, and only stared at what they thought
was a madman. The firing went on steadily elsewhere. At last he arrived
where I was standing, and saluting delivered himself of the following
speech: “General, my name is Ahmed Din, I am a native officer of the
129th Baluchis. I am on leave from my regiment. This is my home and
these people on the hills are fools and do not know the power of the
British Government. I ask you to cease firing and they will at once
surrender. I have only one request and that is that you spare the large
village just the other side of the Pass and we will pay any fine you
impose.” Whatever else he was he certainly did not fear death, for he
had faced it as coolly as man could do. I sounded the “Cease fire,” and
in five minutes all firing had ceased and white flags floated all along
the ridges and peaks. We marched over the Pass and occupied the village
but every precaution was of course taken and picquets posted. Ahmed Din
remained with me as a hostage and guest combined.
No sooner was it dark than from every side bullets came raining into our
camps, and for that form of warfare we had quite a number of men,
horses, and mules hit. I told my gallant friend that if I was killed (he
winced) the sepoys would certainly see that he followed suit. He took me
aside and said, “Remember, General, this is not my village, mine is
farther on.” “All right,” I answered, “I will burn yours to-morrow,” and
he believed I would, but of course I did not.
We left next morning but not before the rearguard had left the village
in ashes, and Ahmed Din smiled as he looked back on the smoke being
borne towards his own untouched belongings. The climax was reached when
later he came to me in Peshawar and asked to be given the medal for the
expedition; he got it, but thought it rather hard luck that he was not
given the field allowance as well. Poor fellow, I met him again in
France and we laughed over the incident. He will see his native hills no
more.
Amid the sloughs of Festubert, where India’s heroes sleep and share
With England’s sons a common grave; when Azrael’s trump shall call the
brave,
And ranks fall in and stand to arms, to answer God, not war’s alarms,
A tomb with crescent marked in green shall yield the soul of Ahmed Din.
The 129th experienced varying fortunes during the 30th October; after
reinforcing the firing-line with all available men, they were pushed
back by a strong German attack. One company held on to a farm where it
was reinforced by Colonel Southey himself but eventually had to retire.
The demoralising effect of continued retirement was beginning to tell on
the men, many of whom were very young soldiers, and it was necessary to
pull them together. Detaching a portion of them to hold a wood to the
right, the remainder were rallied in the vicinity of a château which was
held by Lieut. H. Lewis and Subadar Adam Khan. Evening saw them still
holding the wood and some trenches north of the château, and later three
companies moved to billets near the canal bank, leaving one company to
hold the trenches north of the château.
On 31st October further moves took place, resulting in three companies
taking over some cavalry trenches, with one company in support and forty
men in reserve. Firing by the enemy continued till 11 P.M., when it
increased, and news was received through some French officers that a
farm held by the Baluchis had been captured by the Germans. Colonel
Southey at once proceeded with Major Hannyngton and Lieut. Lewis to find
out what was happening. The truth was soon ascertained, viz. that Major
H. W. Potter, in local command, was still holding on round the farm
which was in possession of the enemy. It is a strange fact that
notwithstanding the difficulty of the Indians recognising the difference
between French and Germans, in this case they had been right and
insisted they were Boches, but it was the British officer who thought
them French, and would not open fire until they had arrived at twenty
paces; too late to stop them, but what a fine example of self-control;
even though it was a matter of life and death, the Englishman refused to
kill until he was sure it really was the enemy.
Fifteen or more were accounted for when the party fell back, and the
Germans entered the farm. The last bit of work that fell to the Baluchis
is best told in the brief official report of Colonel Southey himself:
“We formed up about 3 A.M. and advanced on the left of the farm, Major
Potter taking the right, and marched up to the farm. We killed about
three and wounded three, and the remainder who had not bolted
surrendered, fourteen in number.” That is all.
Thirty-five Germans had been accounted for, and many of our own brave
fellows, but the adventure on a dark night in rain-soaked fields carried
out by aliens in a strange land is dismissed in three lines.
Lieut. Lewis during this advance was twice shot at, at a distance of not
less than fifteen yards; both shots hit his field-glasses in front of
his left hip and smashed them to bits, the second one glancing off and
hitting his hand. A few days later he received a letter from a friend in
Ceylon who wound up by saying, “Take my advice and always wear your
field-glasses in front of your belt.” Lewis had another narrow escape at
Givenchy two months later. Whilst working his machine-gun in the front
trench the Germans broke in on his right, unknown to him. One of his
team suddenly saw them coming down the trench a few yards away, and
Lewis saw one man covering him with his rifle from the parapet only
three paces off. He gave the order to retire (these stories were told me
by a brother officer of his) and heard the click of the man’s rifle but
no shot followed. The rifle was not loaded.
And if any have ever doubted the splendid gallantry shown under the
severest trials let them read this example of what Indian soldiers will
do when called on by their leaders. Each battalion had in those days two
Maxim machine-guns. With the team of one gun of the Baluchis were three
men whose names deserve to be recorded: Naik Sar Mir, Lance-Naik Hobab
Gul, and Sepoy Redi Gul. These men worked their gun until it was blown
to bits by a shell and only retired under orders of their commander
Captain R. F. Dill, who, displaying splendid coolness, continued the
fight with his other gun. And what of this machine-gun? I believe the
Victoria Cross is made from the metal of guns captured at the Alma. The
second machine-gun of the 129th Baluchis might well be manufactured into
the future Victoria Crosses of the Indian Army, for it has a famous
story attached to it.
Dill had lost one gun but whilst the other remained he would remain with
it. He was disabled by a splinter of shell in the head, his glorious
team fell fast, but as each man fell another took his place. Engrave
these names in letters of gold for all time: 2524 Colour-Havildar Ghulam
Mahomed, 2813 Sepoy Lal Sher, 4182 Sepoy Said Ahmad, 103 Sepoy Kassib,
3600 Sepoy Afsar Khan; and only one remained, severely wounded. He
worked the gun till strength failed him and he lay unconscious and hence
untouched by the enemy—No. 4050 Sepoy Khudadad! and he has lived to wear
the Victoria Cross, the first Indian soldier who ever won it. His home
is in the village of Chakwal near Jhelum’s river. There I can see him in
imagination, telling the children of the deeds of his regiment, but like
all brave men saying little of his own share in it.
A tale which holdeth children from play, and old men from the chimney
corner.
The 129th on relief by French cavalry rejoined their own Brigade on the
La Bassée front.
And so the first experience of the Army Corps in the war had been gained
and the price paid. Not that any one of them grudged it, nor was the
toll as heavy as the British units had to pay, and yet comparatively it
was heavier, because it was taken from men who had had no opportunity of
realising what it was all about. They had been trained to the
understanding that when they entered into the battle it would, at any
rate at first, be alongside the British comrades with whom they had
served in Brigades in India; these at least they knew and understood;
and even if this could not be, they had every reason to believe they
would at least fight as battalions under their own Commanding Officers;
but here none of these things happened. They were split up in fragments,
and that they stood the strain as well as they did is the best possible
testimony to their discipline and efficiency. As an Indian officer said
to me on the return of the two battalions to rejoin their Headquarters,
talking about the separation from their own Brigades, “Sahib, they do
not understand anything about us.”
The short fighting round Ypres had cost the 57th Rifles the loss of two
British officers killed, three wounded, and one missing out of a total
of eleven present, three Indian officers killed or missing, and one
wounded, whilst 290 other ranks made up the casualty list for those few
days. An Indian battalion numbered only 750 all told—450 remained. In
the 129th Baluchis the losses were three British officers killed, three
wounded, and of Indian officers three were killed and two wounded, and
other ranks totalled 230.
Of Major G. G. P. Humphreys his C.O. wrote: “I most deeply deplore his
loss.” Captain W. F. Adair, though mortally wounded, refused to allow a
havildar and two of the men of the 129th to remove him as it might
entail their being killed themselves. Colonel Southey calls him “a most
gallant and cool leader.”
Subadar Zaman Khan of the 129th had the honour of being singled out as
an officer of the “greatest coolness and courage,” and Havildar Sobat
Khan of the same battalion “showed bravery and coolness above the
average,” and on the 30th October set a splendid example to his men
under a heavy shell and rifle fire by rushing out from the support to
the firing-line trenches and thus getting them to follow him.
Individual deeds of the men are difficult to record, for as the
Commanding Officer wrote at the time: “Owing to the casualties amongst
the officers of Nos. 1 and 2 Companies I find it very hard to get any
information regarding individuals.”
After the fighting near Messines the English papers got hold of a story
of how one “Ganga Singh” of the 129th had won and received the Victoria
Cross. Pictures appeared showing him being carried ashore in a stretcher
“somewhere in England, the first Indian to win the V.C.” Lord Kitchener
wired to ask for information, but I had heard nothing of it and it was
not till long after that evidence could be gathered from men who had
themselves been wounded and left the battalion. Then the true story came
out, and it was this:
On 31st October, when the trench held by his party was overwhelmed by
the enemy, Havildar Ganga (for that was his correct name), who had been
a gymnastic instructor, commanded his section and fought with his
bayonet, killing several Germans, and his weapon being bent or blunted,
and the enemy being still in the trench, he seized a sword which he had
picked up and continued to fight. In this mêlée he received five wounds
which left him disabled, and it was nearly a year before he could be
sent back to India. He was awarded the Indian Order of Merit, which
carried with it a life pension, and the Russian Cross of St. George.
Sir John French was always anxious to bestow well-earned rewards on
Indian officers and men, and it was very rarely in the early stages of
the war that any exception was taken to my recommendations. This was a
very great help to all Commanding Officers, who felt that they could
count on being supported in their selections. Later on this generosity
was considerably curtailed, although Divisional and Brigade Commanders
were very careful in sending in names.
To those who understand Indians there can be no greater mistake than to
be niggardly in the bestowal of war honours. The Indian Order of Merit
carried with it a small life pension, and this was of very great
importance to men who gave their services for a totally inadequate
remuneration. It was the highest honour a soldier could earn until the
Victoria Cross was opened to him by His Majesty the King at the great
Delhi Durbar. To show how well Lord Roberts understood the value of
immediate rewards to the Indian Army, after the defence of Thobal in
Manipore by Major Grant in 1891, a feat which made India ring with
praise of the gallant little band, Grant was especially promoted from
Lieutenant to Brevet Major and awarded the Victoria Cross, and every man
of his party (I think about seventy) received the Indian Order of Merit.
How much greater were the toils and dangers of Flanders!
Willans of the 57th Rifles received a D.S.O., and his brother-officers,
Captain W. S. Trail and Lieut. E. K. Fowler, the Military Cross. Dill of
the 129th Baluchis received the D.S.O.; and besides Sepoy Khudadad, who,
as already told, won the first V.C. given to the Indian Army, the five
men of his Maxim detachment who were all killed were rewarded
posthumously, the havildar receiving the Indian Order of Merit, and his
comrades the I.D.S.M.
It was the fate of the Indian Corps to be allotted for nearly fourteen
months almost exactly the same part of front, with only two small breaks
in the monotony. One has already been described, and the other was when
the Lahore Division was temporarily detached for a few days to take its
share in the second battle of Ypres in April 1915. With these two
exceptions the Indians were confined to the fronts from just north of
Neuve Chapelle to Givenchy, a distance in a direct line of about seven
miles.
If any one had thought how best to dishearten good soldiers, they could
not have chosen a better method. Often did I urge that we might be given
a change from the same bogs and swamps to somewhere north or south, but
it was not agreed to, and so for over thirteen months the men went up to
the same old trenches and returned to the same monotonous billets, until
many of them believed it was probably all or a greater part of the
entire British line. We often wondered what could be the reason: I knew
myself, but that is another story.
Those were the last of the days of the old Regular Army, the staunchest
and most trenchant weapon that Britain ever possessed. Signs were even
then appearing of the younger formations, which were within a year to
submerge the old and create a new Army, in which the names of historic
corps would alone form the link between them. But owing to those very
associations how strong did that link become; what a heritage did the
old regiments and battalions bequeath to their younger brothers. When
the Territorials and the New Army began to swamp the battle front they
had the good fortune to build on foundations of granite, the builders of
which had learned their trade not in months or years, but in the school
of generations of soldiers who had created and maintained the Empire of
Great Britain.
The New Armies found the bogs and the climate the same, but they also
found to hand implements to dig with, guns with countless ammunition to
help to defend or clear the way for them, howitzers, grenades, trench
mortars, searchlights, heavy guns, machine-guns galore, aeroplanes,
balloons, communication trenches, light railways, flares, etc., etc. If
they wished then to understand the conditions of those early months of
the war it was not difficult. Remove all, or nearly all, of the above
accessories, divide the numbers per mile of trench by five, reduce the
gun ammunition to an almost infinitesimal amount, double the enemy and
allow him the high _morale_ he originally undoubtedly possessed, and
they could then form some idea of the war as it had to be carried out in
the winter of 1914–15.
The part played by the Indian Corps in the first great battle of Ypres,
in as far as it relates to the fighting in the immediate vicinity of the
town itself, has been told as nearly as I can gather it from official
reports and private letters in my possession, but although the most
critical time was in the north, the country to the south as far as La
Bassée was the scene of incessant hard fighting and contests for every
inch of ground. Behind us lay the plains of Flanders, and behind them
the ports of Calais and Boulogne and the shores of the Channel. The eyes
of Germany’s War Lord were fixed on these; could he but succeed in
pushing back far enough, or breaking through, that thin khaki line, what
was the prize? Had he succeeded history might have had to tell a
different tale.
There was at one time little else between the Hun and the sea he sought
than the war-worn and battered troops of England. How they held that
line, with what fortitude and endurance they fought, with what
incredible valour they died is already a matter of history, but the
object of this book is only to tell of the part played (small in
comparison though it may be) by the Army Corps from India, the British
battalions and batteries and the soldiers of Hindustan, inhabitants of
warm climes, fighting in a country so strange and so unlike anything
they had ever heard of or imagined. The man must be totally devoid of
generosity who does not read and wonder with what fidelity and loyalty
they gave their lives, and in doing so left behind a legacy of which not
only India but Great Britain itself may be proud.
It was their good fortune to arrive just at the moment when they were
most needed; just when our troops were using their very last reserves
and fighting against terrible odds, in fact just when two extra
divisions could still help to stem the tide, and even if they had never
done another day’s fighting their advent would more than have justified
their having been sent, for they helped in some degree to save the Army
in the hour of its great trial.
CHAPTER IV
Before describing the events in which the Lahore Division, the first to
arrive on the scene of action, took part, north of La Bassée, it is well
to take a look at some of the Commanders and Staffs who left India for
France, and to study the types of Indians which constituted the Army
Corps.
The Chief Staff-Officer was Brigadier-General H. Hudson of the Indian
Cavalry, son of General Sir John Hudson, who had commanded the Bombay
Army years previously. An able soldier with much Staff experience, he
later commanded a British Division, and then became Adjutant-General in
India. He had served on my General Staff in India when I commanded the
Northern Army, and was as good a friend as he was a Staff-Officer. He
was promoted Major-General after Neuve Chapelle. Whatever his rank he
was always known as “Huddy.”
Major J. R. Charles of the Royal Engineers had served on the General
Staff and previously soldiered with me on Frontier Expeditions.
Major J. A. Longridge of the Indian Army later became a G.S.O.I. A
splendid character, brave and modest, loyal to the core, and a perfect
type of English gentleman, he was killed in the trenches in 1916.
The Chief of our Artillery was Brigadier-General F. Mercer. I seldom
call men by anything but their surnames, but with Mercer somehow it was
natural not to do so. He was always cheery and happiest on horseback,
and such men are a useful asset in war. He afterwards went as Chief of
Artillery to the First Army.
My Engineer Chief was Colonel H. C. Nanton of the Royal Engineers. As
good an officer as you could find in that line, he was a worker whom
nothing could tire, full of new ideas, never happier than when in a
trench devising methods for saving the lives of our men, or arranging
how best to destroy the Huns, and for choice in the trenches nearest to
them. Day or night Nanton’s one object in life was to be hard at work
doing his duty.
Colonel Treherne, our P.M.O., lived to save lives; he was one of the
most conscientious men I know.
And so I could go on adding names of good comrades, men of the stamp of
Colonel A. Peck, Major H. L. Tomkins, Assistant Military Secretary;
Major W. L. Twiss of the Indian Army, and Major Barclay Vincent, 6th
Inniskilling Dragoons; all since risen higher in rank and in the
estimation of their Corps Commander of those days.
Some there were in high places “over there” who, when we first arrived,
commiserated with me on the fact that we were a scratch lot on the
Headquarters of the Corps; but one advantage I did possess and that was,
that they were all men who knew the Indian soldier inside out. Camberley
may turn out Napoleons, but it cannot provide them with the knowledge
which is an absolute essential in dealing with Indian troops.
The commanders of the two Divisions belonged, one to the Indian and the
other to the British Service. Lieut.-General H. B. Watkis of the Indian
Army commanded the Lahore Division and was the first to arrive in
France. Always an earnest student of his profession, on him fell the
brunt of the German attack on Givenchy in December 1914. Watkis had a
difficult task in those days, and that Sir John French singled him out
as the only General among us all in the Indian Corps to be mentioned by
name, in the body of his early despatches, was a high tribute.
Brigadier-General Cobbe, V.C., of the Indian Army was Chief
Staff-Officer to Watkis; he had served with me in Ashanti in 1900, being
severely wounded and earning a D.S.O., which he supplemented in later
years with a Victoria Cross in Somaliland—a staunch friend, as modest as
he is brave. He served later on the Corps Staff, and left us in 1915 to
serve on the Staff of the 1st Corps, and later commanded an Army Corps
in Mesopotamia as a Lieutenant-General.
Colonel G. Hodson was A.Q.M.G. of the Division. A hard-riding polo
player and one of the cheeriest of soldiers, he died of wounds received
in Gallipoli; another name inscribed on the Roll of Honour of that
famous corps, the Guides, in which he had passed most of his life. The
name of Hodson is known throughout India, since the days when the leader
of Hodson’s Horse scoured the northern plains and leaving a landmark in
Indian history before the walls of Humayun’s Tomb near Delhi, fell in
the final triumph of Lucknow.
The Ferozepore Brigade of the Lahore Division was commanded by
Brigadier-General R. M. Egerton, another of the Guides, another scion of
a name known wherever the British flag floats in Hindustan. He served
with his Brigade until it left for Mesopotamia, and there joined in the
heavy fighting, receiving a K.C.B. and K.C.I.E.
Major-General P. M. Carnegy of the Indian Army commanded the Jalandar
Brigade; son of another Indian General, he brought with him the
tradition of a British family which had made that historic land its
temporary home. His Brigade Major was Major Hugh Hill of the Royal Welsh
Fusiliers; I met him a week before he was killed in the trenches in
1916, and the last words he said to me were: “Your son will do all
right.” No one who knew him is likely to forget this gallant English
gentleman.
The commander of the Sirhind Brigade was Major-General J. M. Brunker,
Royal Artillery. He was detained in Egypt with his Brigade on the way to
France, but joined in time to take part in the battle of Givenchy in
December 1914.
The Divisional Artillery was commanded by Brigadier-General F. E.
Johnson, one of those who act on the principle that “whatever thine hand
findeth to do, do it with all thy might.”
I am not writing a despatch, but just jotting down the names of comrades
who come to mind; men who took part in our daily lives, whose watchword
was duty, and who will, I am sure, forgive me for recording their names
here, for they were as true as they were modest.
The Meerut Division was commanded by Lieut.-General C. A. Anderson, late
Royal Artillery. A typical Irishman and a fearless soldier, he
understood the Indian character well. No better man than “Paddy”
Anderson could have been selected for a Division. His chief amusement
was to visit the trenches, and if you wanted to find him you could not
do better than make for the front line closest to the Germans. I do not
believe there was a single General in the Expeditionary Force who so
often visited his men in the trenches. On one occasion I was looking
over a map with him at his advanced Headquarters; a few shells were
going over or dropping within an uncomfortable range, when one planted
itself close alongside us; Anderson at that moment had his pencil on a
particular spot on the map; without moving it he just looked up and said
with a strong Irish accent, “Pip-Squeak” (small German shell), and went
on with his remarks. It was his way, nothing disturbed him. At Givenchy,
Neuve Chapelle, Festubert, and on the day of Loos, “Paddy” Anderson did
splendidly; he succeeded me in command of the Indian Corps in September
1915, and shortly after orders were issued for the break up of the Corps
and it moved to Egypt, Mesopotamia and East Africa. After the Indians
left France, Anderson was given command of a British Army Corps on the
Western Front.
To prove how little was known about us at G.H.Q.; during an important
action Anderson was placed under the orders of a junior General of a
British Division, and informed that the officer concerned had been given
the temporary rank of Lieut.-General. But Anderson was already a
Lieut.-General, which Headquarters had evidently been quite unaware of,
for the order directed that “Major-General Anderson, etc., etc.” As four
of the Army Corps were at this time commanded by Generals all junior to
him, it was going a bit strong to reduce him still further. I think I am
correct in saying that Anderson was the only Corps Commander of those
days who was not given any French or foreign decoration, nor did he ever
get one.
Anderson’s Chief Staff-Officer was Colonel C. W. Jacob of the Indian
Army. A very thorough officer, who later commanded the Dehra Dun Brigade
and the Meerut Division, and on the departure of the Indians from France
was given a British Army Corps with the rank of Lieut.-General.
Brigadier-General H. D’U. Keary of the Indian Army led the Garhwal
Brigade. A bold horseman and good sportsman who had often first passed
the post, ridden down the wiry black buck, landed record fish in the
upper waters of the Irriwaddy, and shot every kind of game, Keary
impressed one by his quiet manner. He assumed command of the Lahore
Division in January 1915, and at the second battle of Ypres gained the
unstinted praise of General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, then in command of
the Second Army. Keary took his Division to Mesopotamia, earned his
K.C.B. and K.C.I.E., and characteristically refused command of a
Division in India, preferring to serve on in the field with the men he
had led in action. Later he was given the Meerut Division in India and
transferred to the Burmah command.
Brigadier-General C. E. Johnson, Indian Army, was in command of the
Dehra Dun Brigade, and later commanded a Brigade in India; and the last
of the Indian Brigades, the Bareilly, had for its Chief, Major-General
Forbes Macbean, formerly of the Gordon Highlanders, who had served in
Kabul, Tirah (where he was severely wounded), and South Africa.
The Artillery of the Division was in the competent hands of
Brigadier-General A. B. Scott. He had served in South Africa, and later
received his promotion to Major-General and command of a Division.
Lieut.-Colonels P. Twining and C. Coffin were the heads of the
engineering branches of the two Divisions, and those who knew them felt
safe in their hands.
The Field Brigades of Artillery were commanded by Colonels L. G. F.
Gordon, Ouseley, and Maxwell in the Lahore, and L. A. Gordon, Potts, and
Tyler in the Meerut Division.
Lieut.-General Sir Locke-Elliott, who had retired from the Indian Army
after holding the appointment of Inspector-General of Cavalry, was at
first attached to the Army Corps as Technical Adviser, and later on for
all Indian troops in France. Locke-Elliott’s name as a horseman was a
household word in India.
Major the Right Hon. F. E. Smith, K.C., M.P., now Lord Birkenhead,
joined us at Marseilles as Recording Officer to the Corps, and remained
with us till after the battle of Neuve Chapelle. He was a keen observer
and a brilliant writer. Had he been given a free hand, the story of our
doings would have reached India from time to time, and whilst letting
that country know something of the work of its soldiers, would at the
same time have stimulated recruiting and cheered the populace; but those
were the days of reticence; nothing could be told; the cinematograph and
the Press were kept on a leash, and “F. E.,” as he is popularly known,
was severely handicapped. All that could get past G.H.Q. was sent on,
whilst he and I were continuously being goaded by all those who cared to
send something more exciting than a bare statement of facts. However, he
kept an interesting record and one which has since been turned to good
use in compiling the history of the Corps. He had as assistant Major St.
G. Steele of the Indian Army, and with him also Captain the Hon. Neil
Primrose, a capital companion in the field. “F. E.” is a keen soldier at
heart. He had no opportunities of doing anything but his own job, but to
do that he never failed to accompany me on all kinds of missions. On one
of these occasions, when he accompanied me in the trenches, his stature
was very nearly the cause of some other than he filling the place of
Attorney-General in the Government; and rather in the spirit of a
schoolboy he was very often away in places where business did not carry
him; one day his horse was shot under him, but he turned up unhurt, and
was always in the highest spirits. He was held in high esteem by Lord
Kitchener, who frequently consulted him on important questions.
And last, but not least, were my two A.D.C.’s, Captain A. P. Y.
Langhorne, R.A., and my only son, Lieut. J. L. Willcocks, the Black
Watch. The boy has served throughout the war, winning a D.S.O. and M.C.
Langhorne had served with me for years on the Indian Frontier, earning a
D.S.O. in 1908. A sterling soldier and a loyal friend, he is now a
Lieut.-Colonel, and has added a Military Cross to his D.S.O.
On the departure of Sir Frederick Smith to become Attorney-General, I
was given Lieut.-Colonel J. W. B. Merewether of the Indian Army as
Record Officer, and he remained with the Corps till it left France. He
was an old regimental comrade and a man full of energy and wit: a clever
writer and a very entertaining companion; his presence at our
Headquarters was much appreciated. He was constantly with me when I
visited billets, trenches, etc., and he acquired a very detailed
knowledge of all that went on in the Corps. He devoted his whole time to
visiting officers and men of every unit and collecting all the
information he could gain. The results have been embodied in the book,
_The Indian Corps in France_, compiled by him and Sir Frederick Smith,
dedicated to His Majesty the King-Emperor, and published under the
authority of His Majesty’s Secretary of State for India in Council.
Particular care has been taken to bring to light the individual actions
of officers and men throughout the time the Army Corps was in France. He
deserves well of the India Office and the Indian Army in general. After
the Corps left France Merewether was given the C.I.E.
It is interesting to analyse the different types of races of which the
Indian Army Corps was composed. The Christian, the Mahomedan, and the
Hindu were ranged in the service of the King who ruled the greatest
Empire known to history; this in itself is a remarkable fact, but far
more remarkable was the reason; it was this, that they all felt in their
hearts that the cause was just, and in feeling it knew they were
fighting for the right. Had it been otherwise it could never have been
achieved.
England was represented by the 2nd Battalion of the Leicesters and 1st
Manchesters, both regiments which could not be surpassed in the field.
Ireland furnished the Connaught Rangers, like all Irish corps specially
dear to me. Scotland sent us three battalions, the 1st Seaforths, 1st
Highland Light Infantry, and 2nd Black Watch, fine specimens of that
fighting race. It is sufficient testimony to them all to say, that they
not only formed the backbone of the Army Corps, but their example in the
dreary trenches, and in the battle, served as a beacon which guided
their Indian comrades.
Of the Indians who served with me in France, the Gurkhas were the first
in the permanent trenches to bear the shock of a German attack. They
laboured under great disadvantages in taking over trenches too deep for
their stature, and that at a time when rain and slush made it impossible
to remedy the defect. They took time to accustom themselves to the
uncanny conditions, but the soldier from Nepal has a big heart in a
small body; he has the dogged characteristic of the Britisher; he will
return if he can to a trench from which he has been driven, and it will
not be so easy to turn him out a second time. After the first shocks
they pulled themselves together. Taciturn by nature, brave and loyal to
a degree, the Gurkhas ended, as I knew they would do, second to none.
The Dogras are quiet, steady, clean soldiers, of refined appearance. A
Dogra battalion always turns out smartly, and this was noticeable even
in the mud-laden swamps of Flanders. They felt the first bitter cold of
November 1914 more than any other class, but they faced it bravely and
rendered great service.
The Sikhs are a fighting race, the Khalsa or chosen people as they style
themselves. Of all Indian soldiers I know the Sikh the best and have
served with him in every imaginable condition. He does not so readily
imbibe discipline as many of the other classes in the Army. He has
grievances born of his own imagination, and can be troublesome when it
is most inconvenient for him to be so, but he is a fine manly soldier,
will share your trials with genuine good humour, and can always save
something in cash out of nothing. In France some of the first fighting
by Indians was done by Sikhs, as I shall relate. My own motto with Sikhs
is to give them all they deserve, and we owe them much, but not to spoil
and pamper them.
The Jats are strapping big men as a rule, slow in movement and decision,
with some of the characteristics of the Sikhs (with whom they are
closely connected). They always impressed me as stubborn fighters; not
brilliant, but very reliable. They did good work in France.
The Pathans have quicker wits than the other races. They can see the
light side of things. They do not always answer to a call as readily as
some of their comrades, but are possessed of an innate chivalry which,
although it makes them quickly resent whatever may be opposed to their
own ideas of honour, does not prevent them from behaving like good
soldiers when appealed to. Their _élan_ is their chief asset.
The Punjabi Mahomedan did well all round during the war. He proved
himself a reliable soldier. The mistake made in some cases in India was
to enlist men who had no claim to join the Army. There is a line of
demarcation which is well understood by those who enlist this class, but
was frequently glossed over in order to get recruits. Careful selection
is an essential if units are not to be handicapped in war.
The Garhwalis as a distinct type were being tested for the first time in
Class Corps. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 39th Garhwal Rifles did
splendidly on every occasion in which they were engaged. In fact they
surprised us all; not that we did not expect them to do well, but they
suddenly sprang into the very front rank of our best fighting men. At
Festubert in 1914, and at Neuve Chapelle, nothing could have been better
than their _élan_ and discipline, and they at once established a
reputation which will live in India.
After a long experience of the Indian Army, I do not think that what are
called Class Regiments (_i.e._ composed of men all of one race) are the
best, or in many cases even desirable. With the exception of Gurkhas,
Mazbi Sikhs, and Garhwalis, I think the other races of Northern India
are at their best in war when formed in half battalions or companies and
mixed with other classes. In the case of Gurkhas I only know one example
of their being mixed with other races, and that was a company of the
Guides. Their case, however, stands on a different footing, as it was a
Corps which was stationary in ordinary times of peace, having its
Headquarters at Mardan on the North-West Frontier, and besides the
Guides were an exceedingly very fine corps. I would advocate an
exception to the above statement, and that is, in the case of some of
the battalions, the Class system might, in recognition of their
distinguished services during the war, be given a further trial. The
reasons for what I advocate are complex, but the truth is to my thinking
undeniable. Perhaps I shall be met with the statement that this has been
disproved by the Class Regiment system in this war. I do not agree, on
the contrary in my opinion it has been proved, and I have seen much
proof of it.
The different races have their own characteristics; by mixing them you
get a combination of _élan_, stubbornness, and endurance; you make it
easier to maintain one form of discipline for all classes; and while
giving full play to each religion and its prejudices, you eliminate the
narrow-mindedness that springs of clannishness in Eastern peoples.
Moreover the mixed battalion system makes it easier to introduce
gradually the _lingua franca_ of India throughout a Corps, so that the
loss of British officers will not mean an absence of Europeans who can
talk the language of their men. This is in any case a difficult matter
under any system, but with Class Corps it is a quandary.
What then is the remedy with Gurkhas who speak a language absolutely
their own? In this case we can do our best to make Hindustani understood
as far as it can be, and for the rest, to encourage in every way a
knowledge of their language amongst British officers of the Indian Army
who can be persuaded to learn it. The Indian Army without these fine
fighters would be like a twinscrew steamer minus one screw. Means can be
found to keep the ship in trim.
I have endeavoured to give some general impressions, formed in a long
life of soldiering and also during the year I commanded the Indian Corps
in the war, of my associates of all ranks. Many names, both British and
Indian, will appear in this narrative, and some of them I hope may come
across this loyal tribute from one who bears them in happy and honoured
memory.
To the friends of those who have passed away no words of mine can
adequately express the admiration I feel for the brave comrades I am
writing of. They have left behind them imperishable memories, which are
a precious inheritance.
No need of marble pile to show
Where sleep the illustrious slain, below;
No need of graver’s art to trace
In lettered brass their resting-place;
Their own right hands in death still feared
Eternal monument have reared.
CHAPTER V
The doings of the Ferozepore Brigade only have so far been narrated, and
it is time to describe the actions of the Lahore Division farther south.
At the time I write of General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was in command
of the 2nd Corps, and was holding the Germans attacking from the general
direction of Lille towards Bethune and La Bassée.
It is no part of this story to describe the gallant fights made by this
Corps between the time of its arrival in the area and the date on which
the Lahore Division joined it. Suffice it to say that on the 24th
October 1914 the general line held by the British ran roughly from east
of Givenchy, by Neuve Chapelle bending towards the Aubers Ridge and
passing Mauquissart, which is south-east of Laventie.
The names of Givenchy, Festubert, Neuve Chapelle, and Fauquissart sum up
the story of our existence. That short line holds more Indian dead than
the whole of the rest of Europe combined. Who would ever have believed
in the last days of that cold October that we had in fact taken up our
permanent abode for a year to come?
On the 24th October the Germans made a determined attack all along our
line, but were repulsed, and it is at this stage that the Lahore
Division was called on to replace some of the weary and war-worn units
in the firing-line. Most accounts which describe the part taken by us in
this particular fighting speak of the Lahore Division as if it had been
a complete unit, but as a matter of fact at that time it consisted of
less than one complete Brigade, with the Divisional Artillery and a
regiment of Cavalry. As if determined to keep up the splitting process
to the full, in this case also the 1st Manchesters of the Jalandar
Brigade had been detached to help the French Cavalry, and then the 5th
Division, and was away for over a week (47th Sikhs also detached and two
companies Sappers and Miners), thus leaving a few Indian battalions to
start the game by themselves. The Sirhind Brigade was still detained in
Egypt and did not join till December, and the Ferozepore Brigade as
already described had been split up and was fighting with the British
Cavalry near Ypres.
On the 24th October the Sikhs, 59th Rifles, and 34th Pioneers moved up
to the support of General Conneau’s French Cavalry, and later relieved
that body in the trenches. The wedge thus formed by these Indian
battalions was between the 8th British Infantry Brigade on their right
and the 19th Infantry Brigade on their left. This relief was the first
conducted by any considerable body of the Corps, and to those who did
not know the nature of the country or the difficulties of such movements
under fire by night, perhaps the description of it given me by an Indian
officer will be the simplest explanation. “I for the first time realised
the difficulties and dangers run by Burmese dacoits approaching one of
our own strongly held stockades fully manned, armed, and ready for them.
I used to think Dacoits were a cowardly set of rascals; I changed my
mind that night.”
The enemy made frequent attacks during the night, one of which, on a
British unit to the right of the 15th Sikhs, succeeded in pushing
through, but another British battalion immediately regained the lost
trench.
The attacks continued the next day, causing us severe casualties and
thoroughly trying the temper of the men. The length of trenches held was
far greater than the numbers available warranted, but necessity knows no
law, and to those who know the British front only as it was in after
days it appears incredible that the Germans did not now, and for eight
long weeks to follow, break through our attenuated line on the Indian
front. It was nothing but the dogged pluck of the men, with occasional
bits of good luck thrown in, that prevented it. For it must always be
borne in mind that the rifle and bayonet alone were in those days the
arms of the infantry soldier, and as for guns, well! they did all that
such guns as we then possessed could do, but the numbers of them were
few and the ammunition altogether inadequate.
The Brigade Reserve on this date consisted of the ration parties alone
(all others were up in the firing-line), until a company of the 47th
Sikhs arrived to rejoice the heart of the Brigadier.
Talking of rations, it was extraordinary considering all things with
what regularity the men were fed; during this and other particular times
of course they had often enough to do without any of their accustomed
food, as the Indian soldier does not indulge in tinned supplies; but by
hook or crook the company cooks would manage to send up excellent
viands, frequently preparing them under conditions anything but
conducive to good cookery; and I do not think G.H.Q. ever had a
complaint or any cause for doubt as to the ability of the Indians to
feed themselves under all circumstances, at least none ever went through
me as Corps Commander.
A _langri_ (cook) of a Sikh regiment whom I was talking to one day not
far behind the firing-line said to me, “We like cooking close up to the
trenches, or otherwise the Government may refuse to give us a clasp to
our medals,” and being a bit of a wag, he added, “and then in India they
will call us the Marseilles _walas_ (fellows).” At that time many men
landed at Marseilles and never got beyond.
The three battalions were put to a high test during those first days and
went through the baptism of fire most creditably. On the early morning
of the 27th October the Huns made a determined attack on the 59th
Rifles, which was repulsed after a severe struggle. This battalion had
served under me on the Frontiers and was composed of splendid material,
and any commander could have put implicit trust in it. Colonel C.
Fenner, the commandant, was a most conscientious, reliable soldier; he
was killed near the trenches on 23rd November 1914.
The 59th Rifles began its career as the Scinde Camel Corps in 1843, and
received its present title in 1908. It consisted before the war of three
companies of Pathans, one of Punjabi-Musalmans, two of Sikhs, and two of
Dogras. The regimental motto is “Ready, aye ready.”
The 15th Sikhs had always been considered a crack corps in the Indian
Army, and at the beginning of the war had as fine a lot of men as the
Punjab could furnish. As time went on, like all other corps they had to
take what they could get, but later in Egypt the General in command of
the Brigade to which they were attached sent them a very satisfactory
order, showing that a good battalion utilises its material to the best
purpose. John Hill, then C.O., was a sturdy officer, whom I could always
trust to place duty above personal considerations. Later he commanded a
British Brigade. The 15th Sikhs were originally raised at “Ludhiana” in
1846, and had served in six campaigns from China to Tirah. It was a
Class Corps of eight companies of Sikhs.
The 34th Pioneers consisted of Mazbi and Ramdasia Sikhs, and was
commanded by Lieut.-Colonel E. H. Cullen. This battalion had served with
me across the Indian Frontiers, and did very good work in France on all
occasions when it was employed; and as the work of a Pioneer Corps is
never-ending, this means it well maintained its reputation. Like
everything else in the early days of the war, it started with work which
should if possible have been performed by another corps, but Pioneers
were also trained for every kind of work in the field, in case of
necessity. The battalion was raised in 1887, and had served in Chitral
and China.
Sir John French sent his congratulations to the Jalandar Brigade for the
manner in which they had done their share in the line.
For two more days the Indian battalions held on to their positions. I
say advisedly “held on,” for their numbers were very limited, and only
the reinforcement by the 15th Indian Lancers enabled them to repulse two
strong German attacks. On the 1st November the Manchesters and 47th
Sikhs rejoined their own Brigade. The former had suffered some 100
casualties during its detachment, and the 47th had lost very heavily in
its gallant fight at Neuve Chapelle (not to be confounded with the
battle, which did not take place till March 1915), as I shall relate.
Between the 24th October and 1st November 1914 the Indian battalions
engaged on this part of the line had suffered 705 casualties or
practically the strength of a whole battalion, which numbered 750 at war
strength.
The 15th Sikhs lost three British and three Indian officers wounded,
including Lieut.-Colonel J. L. Gordon, then temporarily in command.
The 34th Pioneers lost their interpreter, Captain G. H.
Vaughan-Sawyer—killed, whilst two British and three Indian officers
were wounded.
In the 59th Rifles Captain W. F. Scott was killed, and a fine specimen
of an Indian leader, Captain K. D. Murray, was severely wounded, and in
addition two Indian officers were wounded.
The 47th Sikhs (excluding their losses near Neuve Chapelle) had two more
British officers and 118 men wounded, making a total for the first few
days’ experience of trench warfare of 294 casualties out of a strength
of 750.
The names of many Indian officers were brought to notice, of which I
particularly remember that of Subadar Natha Singh, 34th Pioneers, who
took command of his portion of the defence after his British officers
had been wounded.
It was during these events, to be accurate on the 27th October, that I
reached my first Headquarters at Merville; it was also a year later to
be my last, but that was still a long time ahead and unfortunately we
cannot read the future. I took a sheet of paper to make a rough estimate
of the whereabouts of my Army Corps, and I will quote what I find noted
on it. It will give any one reading this an idea of what I felt, after
my hopes that we might get a few days, or even hours, if possible to get
into shape before actually entering the trenches.
General Watkis had had a rough experience of what breaking up a Division
means, and he had with great loyalty accepted what was naturally a blow
to a Divisional commander. It was a condition of things not only never
contemplated, but opposed to all the principles on which the Brigades of
the Army of India were constituted. If, then, here and there, things did
not meet with the approval of the Higher Command, the cause did not lie
at our doors. Orders must be obeyed.
As each battalion rejoined the Corps it brought its own story of the
fighting; a confused medley of combats fought heaven knows where, mixed
up with British troops, none of whom the Indians had ever set eyes on
before.
Sir John French’s despatch of 20th November 1914 says, “The Lahore
Division had concentrated on the 19th and 20th October,” and on the 29th
I find in my Diary:
_Extract from Diary_:
“Where is my Lahore Division?”
_Sirhind Brigade._ Detained in Egypt.
_Ferozepore Brigade._ Somewhere in the north, split up into three or
four lots.
_Jalandar Brigade._ Manchesters gone south to 5th Division (this
disposes of the only British unit).
_47th Sikhs._ Half fighting with some British Division; half somewhere
else!
_59th and 15th Sikhs._ In trenches. 34th Pioneers (Divisional troops)
also in trenches.
_15th Lancers._ In trenches. Two Companies of Sappers and Miners
fighting as Infantry with British Division.
_Divisional Headquarters._ Somewhere. ?
“Thank heaven the Meerut Division will get a better chance.” Ends.
However, what did anything matter so long as we were actually to be
allowed to collect and go into our very own trenches?
Before beginning the story of the combined Corps it is necessary to tell
the story of the first fight in the village of Neuve Chapelle, a village
later to become famous in Indian history as the first in Europe in
which, on a big scale, her soldiers attacked, dispersed, and drove from
their positions the Germans in their own chosen and defended trenches.
Neuve Chapelle had already been the scene of severe fighting, portions
of it being taken and retaken by the 7th and 9th British Brigades, until
on the 27th October the enemy bringing up considerable reinforcements
gained possession of the whole village. Pushing his advantage
vigorously, our gallant fellows were forced to retire, until a
considerable salient was created in our defensive line, and one which it
was imperative to straighten out if possible. The Wiltshires,
Lancashires, and West Kents had been fighting all they knew, and there
was a possibility of a wedge being driven between our Fifth and Third
Divisions.
I have in my possession a very full description of the part played by a
portion of the Indian troops, who were now called on to support the
situation, and later to take part in the attack on the village. I can,
however, make little use of this, as the orders received by different
units were not only very vague, but one at least did not receive them
until after the attack on the 28th had already begun. It was therefore
impossible in this case to make any arrangements, and all that could be
done was to join in as best they could.
What is clear is that half of the 47th Sikhs were on the 27th October
ordered to counter-attack, with the 9th Bhopal Infantry in support, some
trenches from which part of a British battalion had been forced to
retire. The 9th Bhopals in the intricate country temporarily lost touch
with the Sikhs and moved, as I shall tell further on. The 47th soon met
the O.C. Lincolns, and the battalion was directed to advance and assist
the companies of the Lincolns who were held up; one company under Major
H. E. Browne on the left, and another half company under Captain R. J.
M‘Cleverty on the right advanced, whilst half a company under Major S.
R. Davidson was kept in hand.
Facing a heavy fire of machine-guns and howitzers, the 47th Sikhs
receiving their baptism of fire, for the first time since raised in
1901, pushed forward, covering themselves with honour, and not halting a
moment until they were into, and in the case of one platoon beyond, the
farthest trenches occupied by the Lincolns. From this no farther advance
was possible with the limited numbers at disposal.
During this advance Major Browne and two Indian officers were wounded,
and seven men were killed and twenty-eight wounded. I have given details
more fully than is perhaps necessary, but this as I said was the first
experience the battalion had under fire, and it served to brace them up
and spur them to the deeds which they so nobly wrought throughout their
stay in France.
At 1 A.M. on the morning of the 28th October the 47th were ordered to
move and take over the trenches of the Wiltshires, but on arrival learnt
that they had already been relieved by the 20th and 21st Companies of
Indian Sappers and Miners, and the 47th took up their position in a
ditch 200 yards in rear, as daylight was appearing.
To those who know the Indian Army it will at once be evident that to
employ such highly trained technical troops as Sappers as ordinary
Infantry was to extract the very marrow from a Division engaged in this
sort of siege warfare. As well employ a battle-ship to scout for
destroyers; but in those early days of the war the Lahore Division was
turned topsy-turvy at every stage of its progress, and that it emerged
fit to fight at all is its highest testimonial.
Early on the 28th October the half battalion of the 47th Sikhs was
holding a line between the 20th and 21st Companies Sappers and Miners,
with a frontage of some 800 yards, when orders were issued for the
battalion to make a frontal attack in conjunction with their comrades of
the Sappers. The plan of attack was laid down, and was to converge on a
point in Neuve Chapelle which was indicated in the orders, and to be
carried out without a stop.
Whilst these are waiting to carry out this duty, let us return to the
9th Bhopal Infantry, whom I left under orders to counter-attack with the
47th Sikhs on the 27th October. This battalion had arrived at Vieille
Chapelle from near Ypres on that day, travelling by motor buses, then a
novel means of locomotion for Indian troops. It brought no machine-guns
(mark this) and very soon after received orders to move to Rouge Croix,
and whilst _en route_ further orders directed it to detach half a
battalion to support the 47th Sikhs in their counter-attack, already
described. This constant splitting up of battalions was one of the most
senseless proceedings.
Touch was lost in the difficult country, but eventually this half
battalion got into communication with the Royal Scots on their left, and
after further varying fortunes reached the vicinity of another British
unit, the West Kents.
The 9th then came into contact with the Germans to the south of Neuve
Chapelle, killing several of them, and assisting in checking an enemy
advance against the flank of a neighbouring unit.
Lieut.-Colonel H. L. Anderson, second in command, was mortally wounded,
and Lieutenant J. C. Mullaly, son of a gallant General and old comrade
of mine, was taken prisoner while endeavouring to stem an enemy rush,
amid fighting which, owing to many causes, was becoming a confused
medley, Germans firing from every direction. The situation now was that
a big gap existed between the 9th and the 47th Sikhs, which was filled
by No. 20 Company Sappers and Miners.
Before mid-day on the 28th we thus see that the two Indian half
battalions and the two companies of Sappers and Miners were spread over
a considerable frontage, and about to attack the village of Neuve
Chapelle. It was at this stage purely an Indian fight, no British troops
being engaged on this portion of the attack; why, I cannot say.
Major G. A. Jamieson of the 9th Bhopals has left it on record that the
orders for his battalion only reached him at 11.15 A.M., _i.e._ after
the attack had already commenced. Under such conditions all the
battalion could do was to detach as many men as possible to help the
Sappers and Miners who were on the move and advancing. Jamieson later on
died of wounds received in Mesopotamia; I had known him for many years.
Son of a soldier and descended from a long line of fighting men, he was
one of the keenest of officers, always trying to do something to improve
the efficiency of his men.
The moment had now come, and the Indians are advancing with the proud
satisfaction that this is their own fight and that the eyes of their
British comrades are on them.
The Artillery bombardment which preceded the attack had hardly ceased,
when the open country was already fast being crossed by our men; of
shelter there was little, but this only made the pace the faster, and
600 yards had soon been covered although with considerable losses.
The men, well led by their officers, were now thoroughly blooded, and
raising the war-cry of “Shri wa guru ji ka khalsa,” and the final yell
of “Fateh,” the Sikhs, and with them, every whit as keen, the two
companies of Sappers, lowered their bayonets to the charge and were
amongst the foe inside the village of Neuve Chapelle.
The Germans from houses all round kept up a heavy fire, but the Indian
soldiers were not to be denied, and using the bayonet they cleared the
streets, entering houses and killing freely, always fighting hand to
hand. It was a glorious day for the Indian Army, and the story, although
briefly told in despatches, is one of which the Sikhs as a race, and the
Sappers and Miners as a Corps, may well be proud.
An officer of a British Corps, whose fighting zeal had led him into the
fray, in describing it said: “I climbed up into a house and looked down
the street, and the way those fellows fought was a sight to remember”;
and General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien himself told me a few days later
that from every side he heard nothing but the highest praise of the
Indians.
Meantime the fight was raging in the centre of the village; Captain
M‘Cleverty, the bravest of the brave, leading his Sikhs, fell dead under
a shot from a concealed German. This man was at once accounted for by a
Punjabi Mahomedan of the Sappers. Through a hail of machine-gun fire
both Corps continued the struggle, and had soon cleared the main street.
The Germans were meantime bringing heavy counter-attacks to bear on our
scattered troops, but Davidson of the 47th was not the man to succumb to
any foe, and was trying to form up for a final charge, when the Huns
opened rapid fire from several machine-guns, literally sweeping the
streets, and no reinforcements were at hand and there were no signs of
them coming. Thus overwhelmed, the brave Sikhs were obliged to fall
back. Once again they crossed the 600 yards of open ground, in retreat
’tis true, but covered with glory. They had left a mark behind them
which must have impressed even their enemies, and as a German prisoner
said months afterwards, they had taught his people a lesson which they
remembered throughout the time they faced the Indian Corps. Davidson
received the well-merited distinction of Brevet Lieut.-Colonel.
Had reinforcements been sent up the battle of Neuve Chapelle in March
1915 might never have been necessary; but in war it is so often an “If.”
What is sure, and that is what concerns me here, is that the Indians
fought in a manner which at once established their reputation as
first-class fighting men.
The two companies of the 47th Sikhs went into action 289 of all ranks,
and the muster roll after the fight was 144, or a loss of exactly 50 per
cent of their numbers. Amongst these were two Indian officers, of whom
one was killed.
The 47th Sikhs was raised at Sialkote in 1901 as the 47th (Sikh)
Regiment of Bengal Infantry, and received its present designation in
1903. It was composed of eight companies of Sikhs.
The 21st Company Sappers and Miners were all this time sharing to the
full the brunt of the fighting. Captain J. S. Richardson was killed
while leading a charge on the enemy’s side of the village through which
the men had swept; and Almond and Rohde, his two Subalterns, shared his
fate. Lieutenant Fitzmaurice was severely wounded, and nearly 60 other
ranks out of 140 completed the casualties: A list which included every
British officer borne on its rolls, and not one remained to direct the
operations of a unit in which all skilled officers who knew their men
were needed. The I.D.S.M. was conferred on Subadars Ismail Khan and
Ganga Charn Dixit.
Their comrades of the 20th Company were likewise fighting hard; when it
was seen that reinforcements were not coming Lieutenant Nosworthy,
rather than retire, hurriedly erected a barricade in a side street, and
from this and two neighbouring houses kept the enemy at bay, until at
last, seeing no further use in delay, he and his gallant band, now under
twenty men, worked their way back over the open.
What a splendid record did this Sapper Company compile in a few brief
hours of that October day. Lieutenant E. Hayes-Sadler was killed leading
an attack on some German machine-guns which were playing havoc from a
spot outside the village, he and his men being literally mown down.
Lieutenant Rait-Kerr was severely wounded while voluntarily crossing the
open to bring up reinforcements, but endeavoured nevertheless to try and
rejoin his commanding officer. Captain Paris, who had boldly led the
company from the start, was also severely wounded.
Like its sister company the 21st Sappers and Miners, the 20th also came
out of action with the loss of all its British officers. Trained to the
technical branches of their profession, they could still fight as
Infantry with the best, even when they knew that “Some one had
blundered.”
Sapper Dalip Singh single-handed kept off numerous Germans, helped
Lieutenant Rait-Kerr into safety, and gained the Indian Order of Merit
for his bravery.
The Military Cross was the reward of Subadar Malla Singh, and the Order
of British India that of Subadar Ganpat Mahadeo, both of whom earned
their decorations by conspicuous coolness and skill.
The Indian Corps of Sappers and Miners is too well known to need
description here; as Sir John French said in his despatch of November
1914, they “have long enjoyed a high reputation for skill and resource,”
and “they have fully justified their reputation.” I would only add, that
ever after in the war they added greatly to it. I look forward with keen
pleasure to visiting them again.
The 9th Bhopal Infantry, whom we left just when they had received their
orders to join in the attack, found themselves in a dilemma, but Major
Jamieson hastily told off as many men as were at his disposal to work
along with the Sappers and Miners who were already advancing. The result
was that while some parties got into Neuve Chapelle, and one under
Jamieson passed through the village, they were compelled to retire and
suffered considerable losses. Lieut.-Colonel Anderson, second in
command, died of wounds, and one Indian officer was killed; Captain L.
J. Jones and Lieutenant H. Wade were wounded and missing; Lieutenant
Mullaly, as already stated, was unfortunately captured, and Captain G.
Irvine wounded; the total casualties including missing were just under
300.
The 9th Bhopal Infantry was raised in 1859, and reconstituted and
received its present title in 1903. It served in Afghanistan 1878–79,
and consisted of two companies of Sikhs, two of Rajputs, two of
Brahmins, and two of Musalmans. It was quartered in Fyzabad when war
broke out, and I had inspected it early that year. It was under orders
for Secunderabad in the next reliefs, but so keen were all ranks to go
to the north of India, and so eagerly did they do their field work, that
I recommended to the Commander-in-Chief they should be given a chance on
the Frontiers. The battalion was not on the mobilisation list, but the
Chief selected it to fill a gap, and hence it was sent to France. Later
it went to Mesopotamia and took part in the fighting there.
Sir John French, as he always did, acknowledged the good work done by
all ranks, both before and on this day, in a telegram in which he said:
“Please congratulate your Indian troops on their gallant conduct, and
express my gratitude to them.”
CHAPTER VI
I have told the story of the Indian Corps up to the date of the arrival
of the Meerut Division on the British Front. This Division began its
experiences in the trenches on the 29th October, from which date the
portion of the line allotted to the Corps came under my command. In
place of the Sirhind Brigade detained in Egypt, and the Ferozepore
Brigade still away in the north near Ypres, I was given two British
Brigades of the Second Army Corps; in addition, two extra battalions
were temporarily left with me. With the arrival of the Secunderabad
Cavalry Brigade and Jodhpore Lancers, I was able to count on another
1000 men as long as this Brigade might be left at my disposal.
In nearly all the accounts of our doings at this time I find it stated
that two and a half Brigades were left to strengthen the Indian Corps;
giving the impression that these were in addition to our own full
numbers. This is of course entirely erroneous. As a matter of fact, even
with the two and a half Brigades lent to us, the Corps was far under the
strength of British Army Corps; while in the matter of guns we had
nothing but the bare complement of field guns and two heavy batteries of
four guns each. In consequence the Second Corps left us, to start with,
a proportion of its Corps Artillery.
Sir John French had said to me on the night of my arrival, “Are you
prepared to take over the front of the Second Corps at once?” and I
replied, “Certainly.” If it had been twice as long, and had we been half
our strength, I should have made the same reply. We had arrived and were
going to take on anything ordered, and I felt confident we were going to
do it well; and looking back on it all, now that one can take an
unbiassed retrospect, there is only one conclusion to which honest
soldiers will come and that is that all ranks, British and Indians, did
their duty nobly and deserve well of their King and our country.
Headquarters were established at Hinges (pronounced by us phonetically),
a large château not far from Bethune. In a very few hours we had adapted
ourselves to circumstances; electric lights, telephones, and telegraphs
were all erected with surprising speed, the Indian Signalling Company
under Captain Franklin working as if it had been accustomed to such
luxuries, though here they were absolute necessities.
The Indian servants adapted themselves at once to kitchen ranges, and
meals were served up as if in an Indian bungalow. In the hall, orderlies
and messengers, French, British and Indian, fraternised and exchanged a
jargon of words; outside stood a couple of German prisoners guarded by a
mud-bespattered trooper, waiting to be interrogated. What must have been
their feelings as they watched the medley, and heard the mother tongues
of races as far apart as London and Peshawar.
As I leaned over the banisters, I felt a stern joy that it was my good
fortune to be entrusted for the first time in war with so varied a task
as the control of such divergent elements of humanity, in the heart of a
great European country.
Before General Smith-Dorrien handed over the command and left the
château, I had the advantage of a long conversation with him. For him I
have a great admiration, and I felt his advice would be valuable, and in
those two hours I learned much which stood me in good stead during the
war. I discovered that in addition to his own war-seasoned Army Corps he
had had an extra Brigade. This was news to me; and as I was taking over
his front I knew I must hold my trenches very lightly. He knew India and
its troops, and had been Adjutant-General as well as commander of a
Division in that country, so could speak from personal experience. I
received many useful hints from him, and as he drove away I felt we had
with the Expeditionary Force a General who thoroughly understood the
Corps, and when the day came, which it soon must, for the formation into
Armies, I hoped might have us in his command.
[Illustration: COUNTRY ADJOINING INDIAN CORPS FRONT.]
With the exception of Sir John French and Smith-Dorrien I was at that
time the senior officer in France, but I never for an instant suffered
under the delusion that this meant anything to me. I had come with the
Indians, and I knew that there I should remain and so long only as they
chose to keep me. Commands of Armies were altitudes too dizzy to be
reached by a soldier who had lived in khaki it is true, but had worn it
in far-away portions of the Empire, and had seldom been seen on the
Downs of Salisbury or in the purlieus of Pall Mall or Whitehall.
The front assigned to the Corps was about eight miles in length from
north of Givenchy on our right, passing east of Festubert and Richebourg
l’Avoué (only a name on the map), west of Neuve Chapelle, past
Mauquissart, and taking a bend to Rouges Bancs on our left.
The Meerut Division held the southern portion of the trenches in the
following order, commencing from Givenchy: Bareilly, Garhwal, and Dehra
Dun Brigades; with the Jalandar Brigade of the Lahore Division on the
left. This takes no account of the extra British Brigades which filled
gaps as occasion required, until our own two absent Brigades rejoined
us.
The night of the 29th October was ushered in by a storm of rain, and
through the bogs, ditches, and darkness officers and men tramped to
their first battle positions. It was difficult, but every one was keen
to try it and learn for himself what manner of game it was that was
being played in this novel war. And they soon enough learned it, for
within a few hours of their arrival our Indian troops took the first
shock. The 2nd battalion 8th Gurkhas was the unit which happened to be
holding the portion of trenches chosen by the Hun to test our men in.
Throughout the night the Gurkhas were subjected to a heavy fire—shells,
rifles, and machine-guns all taking their toll; several Infantry attacks
were also made but none were pushed home; and occupying trenches a foot
too deep for them under a deluge of rain, the men from Nepal went
through a severe ordeal. It was found impossible, under the
circumstances, to do anything to improve the trenches, which in many
places were merely the ordinary water channels or broad ditches,
affording no shelter.
At dawn the Germans made a fresh attack, which however gave them no
advantage, and about 8 o’clock concentrated a heavy shell-fire on the
8th Gurkhas and Devons, who with them formed the left of the line of the
Bareilly Brigade. For four hours this inferno continued, and, as the
Headquarters 5th Division reported, the trenches were seriously damaged.
From 11 A.M. onwards attacks followed one another in rapid succession,
but these were splendidly repulsed. Before mid-day Colonel Morris, who
was in command of the 8th, began to doubt if his ammunition would last
out, and, whilst making the best arrangements possible, observed that
the trenches held by Captain E. Hayes-Sadler and Wright were being
heavily attacked. For an hour this attack continued. Major Wake also
felt the full brunt of an attack against his trench, and on all sides
the Gurkhas were being assailed, but held on. By 1.30 P.M. the whole
battalion was in the firing-line.
Morris now sent word to General Macbean, his Brigadier, asking for
reinforcements and saying his ammunition could not last much longer. He
directed Major Wake to hold out at all hazards, which orders that
gallant soldier carried on to the death. Captains Hayes-Sadler and H.
Wright were killed whilst stemming the advancing tide. Captain E. Stack,
although severely wounded, attempted to deliver a message and in this
glorious act was again struck down, and killed. Major Barlow, already
three times wounded, by strenuous exertions succeeded in driving back a
German attack on the right, but here he found his men outflanked and the
enemy in his rear, and whilst still endeavouring to do his duty he
collapsed into a trench but fortunately after some time recovered his
senses and survived to tell the tale.
Captain B. Hartwell was killed, and Colonel Morris, who from first to
last had displayed every quality of an intrepid leader, was severely
wounded, and lay in a trench till found by his men. He lived to command
them once more, and died fighting on the day of Loos in September 1915.
Lieutenant MacLean carried on, although wounded, until unable to
continue any longer; and Captain Davidson was missing. Till half-past
three o’clock the Gurkhas held on to their line, when a heavy attack
succeeded in driving them from their fire trenches. Of Indian officers
two were killed, one wounded, and two missing, and the casualties in
other ranks totalled 207.
This serious set-back was caused chiefly by the right of the battalion
being turned, thus exposing them to a flank attack; but even this might
have been averted under conditions less trying to new troops. The
merciless shell-fire, the weather, and the trenches, useless to short
men, all combined to severely shake them and afforded little opportunity
of recovering the lost ground. They had to do what better troops have
done over and over again in this war, viz. learn their lesson. It was a
severe one and it takes time to obliterate the memory of such an ordeal,
but that the battalion was soon again able to take its share in the
heavy fighting in Flanders is the best tribute to its tenacity.
Whilst the companies which had suffered most made the best of their way
back from the trenches, Major Cassels held his portion of the line, but
was, like the remainder, eventually forced back, and Captain Buckland
with a company rejoined his Headquarters that evening.
The shortage of British officers is well exemplified by this action, as
owing to the number of casualties amongst them I was obliged to send
Major Tomkins of the 28th Punjabis, my Assistant Military Secretary, to
assume command of the battalion, no other officer in the Corps being
available. An officer who had been present throughout the retreat from
Mons told one of my Staff that he never experienced a heavier shelling
than the Gurkhas were exposed to that day.
A pleasant reminiscence is the recollection of the ungrudging help given
by the British Corps in the vicinity. As soon as it was seen that the
Gurkhas were being subjected to a very severe shelling and that the
enemy was launching one attack after another at them, their comrades of
the gallant English regiments whether in first line or in support at
once came to their help. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien directed that the
Bedfords and West Ridings, who were down for relief, were not to be
withdrawn that night, and the Norfolks and Devons also remained on
temporarily, until the situation could be cleared up and the line
re-established. An Indian officer who had been through the mill, in
telling me about it said, “I do not know a word of English but I will
remember the names _Napak_ (Norfolk) and _Diban_ (Devons), they are
_burra bahadurs_ (very brave men).”
And this gives me the opportunity of repeating with what real admiration
the Indian soldiers looked on their British comrades, not only of the
fine battalions which formed part of the Indian Corps, but Britishers of
all Corps. It has been an example and a lesson that will never be
forgotten, and under many a village tree as the sun goes down over
Indian hills and plains the old soldiers of the days to come will recite
to their listening brethren tales of the great days when the _Gora log_
(white men) dashed themselves against heavy odds or hurled back the
Kaiser’s legions.
The enemy had gained a success, but he was not going to be allowed to
retain his hold, and a counter-attack was led by the West Ridings and
Bedfords, with the 58th Rifles and 107th Pioneers in support. The attack
succeeded in clearing the enemy out of his captured trenches nearly to
the late support line of the Gurkhas; and the 58th Rifles from this
point were pushed through to the assault. The Hun had had his fling and
it was now his turn to run, with the result that the support trenches
were captured with some farm-houses near them. These were at once
subjected to a severe shelling which caused many casualties, amongst
them Colonel W. E. Venour commanding the 58th and Lieutenant J. M. Craig
(attached to the battalion from the 57th Rifles) were both killed.
The 58th lost also a good soldier, Captain and Adjutant W. Black, who
was killed whilst closely reconnoitring the German trenches prior to the
assault; but the regiment kept a firm hold of its gains at a cost of the
lives of three British officers and five other ranks killed, and four
Indian officers and eighty others wounded. The enemy still retained some
of the Gurkha trenches he had captured earlier in the day.
I had known the 2nd battalion 8th Gurkha Rifles since 1886 when they
were known as the 43rd Gurkha Light Infantry, and they had borne many
different titles since, being reorganised as the 2/8th Gurkha Rifles in
1907. I had served beside them in Burmah 1885–87. They were composed of
a fine sturdy lot of men, and had they not had the misfortune to start
their very first day in France exposed to a prolonged shelling, followed
by a series of heavy attacks, they would not have been so heavily
handicapped during the entire campaign as they were by the loss of
practically all their own officers at one sweep—the most severe trial an
Indian battalion can possibly undergo.
The 58th Vaughans Rifles was an old Punjab Frontier Force battalion; and
I soldiered alongside it in the days when it was known as the 5th Punjab
Infantry. It was given its present title in 1903. The ranks were filled
by Sikhs, Dogras, Pathans, and Punjabi-Musalmans. The battalion took
part in nearly all the fighting of the Indian Corps in France, and was
ably commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Davidson-Houston, who succeeded to it
on the death of Colonel Venour; he later was awarded the D.S.O. and was
killed in the attack on the German trenches opposite Mauquissart on the
25th September 1915, and thus the regiment lost two of its commanding
officers. One of the last letters he ever wrote was to me (mostly about
his beloved battalion) on the eve of his death.
No. 1811, Havildar Karam Singh of the 58th was awarded the Indian Order
of Merit for gallantly remaining on in command of his section after
being severely wounded.
The Army Corps being now established in its trenches, with different
members of my Staff I began a regular round of various portions of the
front and visits to the Divisional commanders and Brigadiers. During
these tours, which I kept up regularly throughout my tenure of command,
I saw over and over again every battalion, regiment and battery in the
Corps and inspected every unit forming the Transport, Supply, Medical,
etc., and of course every detail of the Hospitals, from the trenches to
the railhead. I made a regular practice of doing as much of all this as
it was possible to do on horseback, and I am convinced that no ordinary
person on the Staff should ever have had a day’s sickness who, wet or
fine, mud or dust, took his exercise, and hard exercise too, without
fail. Of course the regimental officers and men and all others connected
with them had to live a life not only of daily labour, peril and
discomfort, but had to do it on foot, and to them must always be awarded
the palm of all toil. But I am now writing of the higher Staffs;
whatever their responsibilities, they lived in comfort, they slept in
houses, and shared comparatively few of the dangers of the war, and yet
there were some who were too fond of the motor-car, and whose horses
stood idle awaiting the great advance, which did not come till four
years later.
Perpetual bodily exercise in war, as in peace, should be insisted on in
all ranks; it is the fulcrum of the health lever. In the early days of
the war and in the bog which is an ever-present feature of the Flanders
landscape I found it most difficult to get to the advanced trenches
owing to the impossibility of dragging my steel-bound leg (a legacy of
past campaigns) through the mud, and more than once in consequence I
found myself riding past sentries who had been posted on roads leading
to the vicinity of the trenches to stop all horses or vehicles
proceeding any farther. I suppose it was wrong to disobey orders, but
the gallant sentinels generally let me pass, only remarking, “All right,
pass as the orders are your own.” It was always an interesting
experience.
After we had managed to dig communication trenches and improve the
drainage, and as the wet decreased, visits to the firing-line were not
only in themselves a very good form of exercise, but in truth the most
interesting and exciting exercise one could take. I can see the reader,
who perhaps spent most of his days in that unenviable region, smile, but
I say again, for a General and his Staff the visits to the trenches form
their most pleasant recollections.
When one talks of riding across country, it has to be borne in mind that
during October and even into November there were days when this was
quite feasible, later on it became absolutely necessary to stick to the
roads, or what went by that name, as the fields were mere bogs; and
often have I been in deep sympathy with my brave chargers, who hammered
along the stony tracks or _pavés_. It had to be done, however, if riding
was to be a means of conveyance, and I had the satisfaction of feeling
that in the case of my favourite arab, “Arabi Pasha,” no one after his
own master would ever mount the faithful horse, and I believe he knew it
also. It was one of the farewells one does not wish to repeat.
What manner of country was it in which the Indian Corps now found
itself? A dismal dead plain, dotted with farm-houses and here and there
clumps of trees. The uninteresting roads metalled only in the centre;
ditches and drains in every direction; observation beyond a very limited
distance impossible, and for months the morning mists enveloped
everything in a thick haze well into mid-day; canals, crossed here and
there by bridges, added to the difficulties of communication. The fields
soon became impassable; ditto the paths except on foot; rain fell almost
daily; snow fell heavily in November; the trenches were first turned
into water channels and then frozen over. Above, the aeroplanes seemed
the only moving things besides the clouds; below was a waterlogged soil,
and on the surface lived and died men who will be handed down for all
time as heroes. This monotonous land boasted no hills and valleys, not
even a mound; it was just a flat dreary expanse in winter, and studded
with green leaves and some wild flowers in summer.
Only a few hundred yards beyond us lay the Aubers Ridge which we were
never to reach, and a small wood cast of Neuve Chapelle of which I shall
have much to say, and which went by the name of the Bois du Biez. I have
since been to Flanders to see that wood, for on it I longingly gazed for
ten months, and my last day in France was spent in the trenches exactly
opposite to it.
It was plain to see that with our weak battalions and the impossibility
of receiving Indian reinforcements, it would be necessary to have in
hand a small reserve. The only reserve I could count on was the
Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade. Much as I hated doing it, I informed
G.H.Q., and although the Commander-in-Chief was sorely pressed for
troops I eventually got three battalions, and I forthwith wrote to say
that I was now quite happy as to my position. I mention this as,
although it may have been inconvenient or even dangerous to weaken the
line elsewhere, the Indian Corps was the extreme right of the British
line and joined hands with our French allies near Givenchy, and it would
have been a blunder to allow any gap being created in that vicinity.
I also at once got into touch with the French Generals and commanders on
my right, and we mutually arranged to support one another whenever it
might become necessary. We became the best of friends, and many a time
did I lend or borrow troops or guns for various operations.
The 2nd November was a day of trial for the Indian troops, as on that
morning the 2nd Gurkhas, which held the trenches to the east of the road
junction a mile N.E. of Pont Logy and N.W. of Neuve Chapelle, which
formed an acute salient in our general outpost line, were furiously
attacked. This salient was very much in the air; the trenches were badly
sited and could hardly be called trenches at all; there was no plan;
salients were open to enfilade fire and the position as a whole was
practically untenable. In addition it was isolated from the rear by a
spinney and orchard.
The Gurkhas were dumped into it on the night of the 29th and 30th
October, and as the C.O. said at the time, there was no option but to
hold and make the best of it. The Germans, who were only some forty to
sixty yards distant, knew exactly the weakness of the position, and
determined to take advantage of it, and with this object in view were
fast sapping up to it.
The attack was opened with high explosive shell, and a trench mortar
which was some 400 yards distant threw one shell after another in rapid
succession, fired with a precision which showed they had the exact range
and correct target; the trenches were soon practically obliterated and
the occupants blown up, killed, or wounded, the position being rendered
still more difficult by the fact that we were being enfiladed.
Simultaneously with this the enemy commenced throwing hand-grenades from
the saps they had run up close to our line, and No. 3 Company’s trench
was made the target for these, rendering its right half untenable. Aided
by all these devices the Hun Infantry dashed into No. 1 and 2 Company’s
trenches, specially selecting any remaining British officers as their
victims.
It is well to once remind those who may read this that all the story of
those days must be read in the light of facts as they existed. With the
accounts of fighting at a later date before them, they are apt to forget
the dark days of 1914 when our men had to face mortars, hand-grenades,
high explosive shell, and a hundred other engines or contrivances of
war, with which they themselves were not provided. Here were these
gallant fellows just arrived and exposed to every form of terror, and
they could reply only with their valour and the rifles and two
machine-guns per battalion with which they were armed, and yet they did
it.
The left half of No. 3 Company’s trench and that of No. 4 Company still
remained; these were echeloned back to the left, towards the Connaught
Rangers, and they were held till nightfall. The Irishmen, seeing the
state of affairs and the tempest sweeping over the Gurkhas, first sent
one platoon to their assistance, and followed it with two others.
At this juncture Lieut. J. Reid, the only surviving officer, ordered the
occupants of No. 3 trench to fall back towards the left trenches; but
the communication trench was full of dying and wounded, and as they
crossed the open they suffered heavily. The survivors in the trenches
who had managed to hold on were brought out late in the evening by
Subadars Dalbahadur Rana and Fateh Singh Newar; this latter officer
received the Order of British India for his conduct, and the commanding
officer specially mentioned as fighting well and holding on to the last
Jemadars Kharak Bahadur Gurung and Tirthe Gurung, who was wounded, as
well as Bahadur Ghale and Suba Singh Gurung.
The 1st Battalion 9th Gurkhas were on the right of the 2nd, and well
thrown back. Lieut.-Colonel C. E. Norie, commander of the 2nd Gurkhas,
carries only one arm, having left the other in the mountains of Tirah;
but with one arm he also has but one heart, and it is a brave one.
He was near the battalion reserve when the German attack began, and at
once moved with it to the right of his forward trenches; having located
the mortar which was doing all the execution, he silenced it by a
concentrated fire; shortly after he again moved to his left as his
ammunition was exhausted; having replenished this and meeting a squadron
of the 34th Poona Horse coming up in support, Norie moved his reserve
forward with the squadron to assist in the defence of his left trenches.
Met by a furious machine-gun fire, this advance was held up as these
trenches had meantime been captured by the enemy.
About 2 o’clock the Gurkhas were subjected to a concentrated fire of
high explosive shell and had to move north. That evening reinforcements
of Royal Scots Fusiliers and an Indian battalion arrived, and the 9th
Gurkhas on the right were also reinforced by a portion of the 6th Jats
and 7th Dragoon Guards. Norie himself advanced with the Royal Scots
Fusiliers and his own men, and this party got within twenty yards of the
Germans, but were then held up by machine-guns. One officer of the
Fusiliers was killed and two officers of the Gurkhas were wounded; but
although the push did not succeed in getting home, it was too much for
the Huns, who forthwith left and returned to their own trenches, and
ours were reoccupied.
At this stage Brig.-General Bowes commanding the 8th British Brigade,
which was one of the two left with the Indian Corps, issued fresh orders
and a new line was begun to be consolidated. During the time General
Bowes was with me he invariably rendered good service, always being
ready to take on any job.
Such is the story of the first experience of another fine unit being
initiated in the form of fighting in Flanders, and brings to light the
discipline and tenacity of the Gurkhas of Nepal. The odds were immense,
but although hard hit they were ready to take part in a counter-attack,
and their British and Indian officers performed many deeds of gallantry.
I have described the part taken by Colonel Norie, and his own Brigadier,
C. E. Johnson, and General Anderson commanding the Meerut Division wrote
in the highest terms of him and his battalion. Sir John French too wrote
in his despatch: “The situation was prevented from becoming serious by
the excellent leadership displayed by Colonel Norie of the 2nd Gurkhas.”
A very special compliment, as he was the only officer in the Indian Army
Corps mentioned by name in this despatch. He was rewarded with a
Brevet-Colonelcy.
Of the officers killed, Major H. S. Becher met his death in covering a
portion of the retiring line. Lieutenants J. H. Walcott and I. Innes
died leading a charge against the enemy as they were nearing our
trenches.
Lieut. Reid, after hard fighting, fell whilst coolly conducting a
relieving party of the Connaught Rangers to the Gurkha trenches. Lieut.
Lucas was killed whilst collecting his men, and the same shell blew up
several of them also.
Major Ross and Subadar-Major Man Singh Bohra heroically led a charge
which ended in a hand-to-hand fight, during which they and most of their
men were killed.
Major N. Macpherson and Captain F. Barton fell at their posts.
Subadars Tekhbahadur Gurung and Gopal Singh Rawat were killed in the
counter-attack with Innes and Walcott, and Subadar Chet Singh fell with
them.
In the Connaught Rangers, Lieut. G. D. Abbott was killed while moving up
with his company in the open to the help of the Gurkhas, and with him
fell many of his brave Irish. Lieut. Hewitt of the same battalion was
wounded, but the rest held on to their trench during the night. The
Rangers suffered forty casualties.
In the 34th Poona Horse, the C.O., Lieut.-Colonel C. O. Swanston, a very
keen and earnest soldier, was killed at the head of his men whilst
crossing up to the support of the Gurkhas, and in this regiment Sowar
Madhu was given the Indian Order of Merit for saving the life of a
wounded Indian officer under a heavy fire. The Interpreter Lieut.
Sturdee was also wounded and the casualties numbered thirty-eight. Major
G. Molloy’s name was brought to notice for good work.
The 2nd Gurkhas had seven out of their full complement of twelve British
officers killed, but this did not complete the roll of casualties.
Captain G. McCleverty was wounded while “showing great gallantry, always
well to the front endeavouring to get to the trenches,” and the same
remark applied to Major F. H. Norie, attached as Interpreter, who owing
to the heavy losses amongst the officers voluntarily took his place in
the forefront of the fighting and was severely wounded, earning the
grateful thanks of all ranks and a D.S.O.
No. 1618, Naik Padamdhoj Gurung received the Indian Order of Merit for
conspicuous gallantry.
The total losses of the 2nd Gurkhas on this day were seven British and
four Indian officers killed and two British and two Indian officers
wounded; thirty-one other ranks killed and 100 wounded.
This action brings conspicuously to light the fact that even the best
Indian troops in European warfare need the leading of British officers.
The 2nd Gurkhas was a regiment second to none in the Indian Army. The
British officers were as good as those of any battalion in His Majesty’s
armies; the Indian officers, N.C.O.’s, and men were of the best stamp of
fighting men in the East, and if I had been asked I could not have
selected a better fighting battalion; and after this affair my belief in
them was confirmed. They had been tried in the fire and not found
wanting.
I had known them since the days of the Afghan War of 1878–80, and by
common consent they were acknowledged to be a first-class fighting unit.
Bhurtpore, Aliwal, Sobraon, Delhi, Kabul, Tirah are their battle
honours, and to these will now be added others well earned.
The 34th Poona Horse was originally raised in 1817, and had under
different names served from Ghazni (1839), Meeanee, and Kushab to
Afghanistan (1879–80). The Honorary Colonel was Lieut.-General H.H. the
famous Maharaja Sir Partab Singh, and the ranks were filled by Rathore
Rajputs, Kaimkhanis, and Punjab Musalmans. It was the first Indian
Cavalry regiment of the Cavalry Brigades to be engaged in the war, and
whilst it remained with the Army Corps always gave a good account of
itself.
CHAPTER VII
October had ended with some exciting episodes in the Indian Corps;
November had been ushered in with a fresh attack, and all classes of the
troops, British and Indian, were destined to find plenty of work and
fighting as the days went on.
On the 5th November a very gallant act was performed by Lieut. G.
Brunskill of the 47th Sikhs in front of his trenches. Accompanied by one
of his battalion scouts he traversed some 500 yards of “No Man’s Land,”
until he found himself not thirty yards from the entrenched Germans.
Making a detour he again crept forward, and finding the trench
unoccupied, the two got over the parapet and inspected the interior;
they then packed up various articles of equipment and papers, made a
note of the dug-outs and snipers’ posts, and began their return journey.
They were suddenly fired on, but got back safely with their valuable
information.
Brunskill made two similar journeys, on the last occasion reaching to
within thirty yards of the enemy’s second line, where he was fired on,
and this firing brought on a wild fusillade from friend and foe, through
which he and his brave companion, Sepoy Tawand Singh, also of the 47th
Sikhs, managed to return unscathed. These reconnaissances discovered the
line of advance of German supplies and gave other useful information,
which enabled us to devote particular attention to the points noted. For
his gallant work Brunskill was awarded the Military Cross. Two days
later he was severely wounded whilst performing another daring deed
during daylight.
One very important fact disclosed, and which stood us in good stead
thereafter, was that the enemy at that time used few or no patrols and
left his front line practically unoccupied. Thus the brave pay for their
daring, and the men behind reap the benefits.
The next troops to be engaged in a difficult operation were the 1st
Battalion Connaught Rangers (of the Ferozepore Brigade), commanded by
Lieut.-Colonel H. L. S. Ravenshaw. To their front was a trench which had
been held by one of their companies and was now in German hands, and it
was decided to eject the enemy and fill it in. At midnight on the
14th-15th November the Royal Scots Fusiliers, of the 8th British
Brigade, opened a heavy fire under cover of which a company of the
Rangers, commanded by Captain C. Hack, with Lieutenants F. George and D.
Tulloch, rushed and captured the trench in face of a sharp fusillade.
Captain Payne, the same officer who had behaved so well at Messines in
October, at once sent forward the digging party, and these set to work
to fill in the trench. But now the rifle-bolts of the attackers began to
jam and the men in the party had to take up the fire. Filling in soon
became impossible and the casualties were heavy, every officer having
been killed, and a retirement was ordered.
The trenches were deep in mud and very slippery, and the enemy was
superior in numbers. Payne at once reoccupied his now half filled in
trenches and advanced to the attack, but was driven back with loss. A
second attempt was also repulsed. The Germans redoubled their fire, and
as the Connaughts’ rifles were fast becoming useless, two platoons of
the Middlesex of Bowes’ British Brigade came up to relieve them. This
caused the trench to become overcrowded, and as some of the Connaughts
were leaving, in order to make room, they were caught under a heavy
machine-gun fire which caused many casualties, including Lieut. J.
Ovens, who was killed. Lieut. George, the adjutant, was severely wounded
as he rushed forward, but Lance-Corporal T. Kelly cleared the parapet,
and in face of a very heavy fire lifted his officer to carry him to
safety; as he was doing so another bullet killed Lieut. George in his
arms. This was a splendid act, and from personal descriptions at the
time a far finer one than I can describe it, and I should have liked to
see him get the Victoria Cross; but as it was he was awarded the D.C.M.
and it was never better earned. He died of wounds in January 1916.
Captain Hack was killed in the charge, and Lieut. Tulloch, although
wounded early in the attack, bravely carried on till he also was killed.
Payne received the D.S.O. for his share in the action.
The Irishmen suffered forty casualties in this affair, and had it not
been for their rifles jamming, the trenches would have been rendered
untenable for the enemy. At the same time they learned their lesson, not
the least valuable part of it being that rifles are delicate weapons and
must be looked after. There can be no doubt it was partly want of care
that caused the bolts to jam, and the troops of all Corps very soon
found that a little extra care, even if grease is not always available,
will help to save lives.
Brigadier-General Bowes in his report stated that “everything possible
was done by the Connaught Rangers to carry out the duty assigned to
them.” Within four days this battalion had lost five officers killed and
two wounded.
On the 5th November the 8th British Brigade, attached to us, recaptured
and filled in the trenches evacuated by the 2nd Gurkhas. On the same day
Major E. H. Phillips commanding the 28th Battery, 9th Brigade R.F.A.,
was killed. He had climbed a haystack to get better observation, when a
shell ended his career. He was one of my best friends and comrades in
the days when we tramped and fought through the swamps and forests of
Ashanti, and later we soldiered together in more peaceful times in
India. A splendid gunner and a charming personality, he was a real loss
to the service; but he left a perfect battery behind him. What more
could a soldier do?
As the days went on both officers and men acquired a knowledge of the
novel methods of warfare. The Indians were at last brigaded with their
own British battalions; they had behind them their own guns, transport,
supplies and hospitals, and they were finding out that the wounded or
strayed need only move in one direction to find friends who could
understand their language. The chaotic state of affairs when they were
mixed up anyhow with absolute strangers was passing away, and a sense of
cheerfulness which was bred of this knowledge soon began to manifest
itself. But even so it took time, and in some cases a very long time, to
obliterate from their minds the memory of their first rough experiences,
and in conversation with Indian officers and men I learnt many lessons
on how things might have been done. They said plainly, “We were not
given a chance; and if we get ‘bud nāāmed’ (a bad name) it is not our
fault.” Some of the tales the first arrivals in France brought back from
Messines and near Neuve Chapelle were soon spread through the ranks of
the new arrivals, and any one who knows India also knows what this
means.
One incident at once proved the innate love of fair play inherent in the
sepoy. In the German lines a document had been found, directing that
mercy was not to be shown to the Indians, and a day later the 15th Sikhs
brought back twelve prisoners from a raid. The only comment made by the
havildar of the party was, that the Germans might do as they pleased,
but he and his men were soldiers not dacoits.
The enemy early began to try the effect of using English when on the
prowl near our lines, and one man, dressed exactly like a British
officer of Gurkhas, came right up to the trenches, and in good English
said the company was to move farther along the trench to make room for
another company moving up in support. The British officer in command
being suspicious of the accent asked, “Who are you?” and the reply was
the same as before. “Answer at once by what ship you came to France,”
was our officer’s next query, and the disguised German started to run
but was shot dead. Similar ruses were not uncommon, and notwithstanding
the difficulty of our men being able to discriminate, the Hun generally
got off second best.
Fortunately for us the perfectly idiotic accounts that used to appear in
those early days of what the Indians were expected to do, or were doing,
seldom reached or interested them. They simply did their duty and cared
nothing for daily papers; but more than once Indian officers have told
me how surprised they were that our newspapers could lie as they did. In
any case such stories did much harm, for when instead of finding that
the Indian soldiers were some mythical kind of beings, the British
public discovered that they were only ordinary men trying to do their
duty under inconceivable difficulties, they grew disappointed; but we
did gain one advantage, and that was, we were left more alone, and
pictures of charging Lancers and bearded Gurkhas ceased to appear.
The Seaforth Highlanders was the first British battalion of the Meerut
Division to come up against the Germans, when on the 7th November they
found their right flank assailed; but the Seaforths, the old 72nd, did
not on service allow any man through their lines without a pass, and the
enemy could not produce that document. One or two of the attacking Huns
reached the trench and remained there for good, and the others were
driven back faster than they came, leaving many dead and wounded behind
them. The enemy on this occasion used a very large and long-range trench
mortar, which did much damage, and to which of course we had no reply.
Captain R. S. Wilson and sixteen men were killed and 2nd Lieut. I.
Macandrew and sixty-three other ranks were wounded. It was a heavy toll
for a short affair, but the battalion at once found that a Corps which
had won battle honours from Mysore and Sebastopol to South Africa had
nothing to fear from the Kaiser’s legions.
During the short time the battalion had been in the trenches it had
already, in addition to the above, suffered many casualties, losing four
officers wounded, including their splendid Chaplain Rev. McNeill, and
one missing, and other ranks suffered in proportion.
Part of the 2nd Gurkhas were again employed this day in support of the
Seaforths, and during this operation Captain Beauchamp-Duff, son of the
Commander-in-Chief in India, was killed. He was a popular officer and a
great loss to the regiment.
The description of the fighting by the Army Corps in France is of
necessity nothing but a long record, practically of siege warfare, on
the same front, relieved occasionally by an attack or defence against
the enemy, and it therefore lacks the incidents which furnish the war
correspondent with copy for stirring descriptions of battles.
Nevertheless, even in this somewhat gloomy atmosphere will be found
occasional bursts of flame helping to light up the otherwise sombre
picture; and after all what is being recorded is the long and patient
sacrifice made of course by our own men who had everything at stake on
the final decision, but still more by the loyal soldiers of India who
were equally enduring.
From the day of arrival at G.H.Q. I had resolved in my mind how we were
to meet the trench mortars and hand-grenades used by the enemy. I had
some years previously foreseen that these instruments would assuredly
take a foremost place in the next war, and when on short leave home from
India, whilst I was in command of the Peshawar Division, I had spent
several days examining and seeing the “Hale’s” hand- and rifle-grenades
used. After learning their mechanism I had myself thrown and fired these
grenades against roughly constructed wooden stockades, and been much
impressed by their destructive effects.
It appeared to me that when once troops reached within a certain
distance of a position held by an enemy who did not mean to quit it, it
became a matter of hand-to-hand fighting, and the one who possessed some
weapon other than the rifle alone would gain an immense advantage, which
would carry him forward or stop his opponent. With this in view I was
determined, to the best of my limited power, to introduce the “Hale’s”
grenades into the Indian Army; but, as I shall show, I received little
or no encouragement from our conservative administration.
At that time there were in England several officers of the Spanish Army
who were testing these grenades with a view to their use in North
Africa, and I was present when large numbers were being tried by them.
On my return to India from leave I took out a certain number which Mr.
Hale kindly placed at my disposal, and reported the fact to Army
Headquarters. I instructed squads of Sappers and Miners in my Command in
their use, and made a practical demonstration by myself firing several
rounds from one of our service rifles. Later I had them tested by squads
before the Chief of the General Staff in India, and it was obvious how
useful they would prove.
But there the matter ended, and no further notice was taken of the
experiment so far as I ever knew. Again, one of the officers who had
served with me in Africa, Major A. L. McClintock, R.E., who was then in
command of Sappers and Miners in Madras, invented and made grenades of
his own pattern, and obtained permission to bring them up to Agra to be
used before me and other officers quartered there, but there his
experiment ended also.
And now arrived in France I found the Army still practically unprovided
with them, except a few rifle-grenades, and I had no difficulty in
obtaining the small supply available; but of hand-grenades I could find
none. In those days it was a case of “God helps those who help
themselves,” and I immediately set the Sappers and Miners to work to
manufacture jam-tin hand-grenades, and gas and other pipe trench guns.
Black powder was at first used for the latter, but the smoke emitted
gave away their position, and later other devices were brought into
play.
One of my R.E. officers was sent for by the War Office for consultation,
and the Indian Corps was one of the first to capture a German trench
mortar, which was at once sent home for examination. The Corps may well
claim some credit for helping to initiate the use of these weapons; a
fact easily forgotten later on when grenades and trench mortars were
perfected and supplied in abundance to all troops as they arrived in
France.
Early in November we were able to start work with our primitive weapons,
but it gave confidence to the men and made a beginning. The devices used
by the Sapper officers were well worth seeing, and ranged from
century-old mortars to jam-tins propelled by indiarubber tubing.
On the morning of the 9th November the 2nd Black Watch of the Bareilly
Brigade, with the object of getting rid of an enemy machine-gun which
was paying them particular attention, organised a small raid, and
Captain R. E. Forrester with about twenty men made a surprise attack,
killing ten Germans and returning with only two casualties, of which he
himself was one, being wounded. This famous Corps was destined to take
part in numerous fights, always emerging with honour, and finally
strewing the sands of Mesopotamia with its gallant officers and men.
The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 39th Garhwal Rifles of the Garhwal
Brigade, a regiment which was doing its first service in the field, were
the next to try their hand, this time not in defence, but in a small
raid on the German trenches. On the night of the 9th November Major G.
H. Taylor of the 2nd Battalion organised the affair and carried it
through, and considering it was a first attempt it may be described as
very useful, and certainly encouraged officers and men to further
similar enterprises. A trench only fifty yards distant was occupied and
partly filled in, with slight casualties, and then seeing he could not
complete the work in time Taylor retired, his party bringing back with
him six prisoners. The enemy kept up a hot fire, but our men had been
into a German trench and seen them run for dear life, and this in itself
was worth much on their first attempt. They had learned that if they
kept low and used their own tactics they could outwit the Hun. Jemadar
Khushal Singh Danu of the 2nd Battalion was specially commended by
Taylor. Rifleman Ganesh Singh Sajwan had on the same morning won the
Indian Order of Merit for a very gallant act whilst acting as scout.
The two battalions of the 39th were commanded respectively by Colonels
Swiney and Drake-Brockman. Swiney, after being severely wounded at Neuve
Chapelle in March 1915, was drowned in the P. & O. _Persia_ when that
passenger vessel was torpedoed by our “gallant” enemies in the
Mediterranean.
The Garhwalis are best described as more or less related to the Gurkhas
of Nepal; there were only these two battalions in the Army, and as a
Corps they were an untried element. From first to last they did splendid
work, proving themselves to be really gallant soldiers, and their very
heavy casualties attest to the fact that they bore a lion’s share in
Flanders.
Whilst I have described in detail some of the scraps which went on
uninterruptedly, it must be borne in mind that the whole Corps was
engaged all along our front, and the daily task was one which took heavy
toll from all arms in proportion. On referring to the rolls, for
instance on the date up to which I have brought the narrative, the
Indian Corps and the battalions still attached to it to fill the gap
caused by the absence of the Sirhind Brigade in Egypt had suffered
casualties amongst all ranks amounting to 3880 or on an average of 190
daily. It does not need much imagination to discover that losses at this
rate could hardly be replaced in the Indian ranks by reinforcements of
ten per cent per month, which is what the Indian authorities had
arranged to send to France. Moreover, the time was not far distant when
the numbers would jump up, first by 1200 casualties in a single night,
and by many times more in two days’ fighting a month later on.
And later still the day arrived when, at a parade of an Indian battalion
in rest which attended to witness the promotion of a Naik to the rank of
Jemadar for gallant conduct, the total muster that could be collected
after detailing necessary billet duties was under 200 men. Not for a
long time did we receive any but small additions towards replacing
officers and men of the British battalions, which in the Corps numbered
at war strength only 850 of all ranks, though after November, in the
case of these battalions, the deficiencies were better met.
At this stage it is of interest to explain briefly the methods of supply
by which the Indian troops were fed and clothed, and the wonderful
arrangements made for the care of sick and wounded; arrangements in both
cases so good as to astonish us all by the simplicity of their working
and the celerity of execution. Indeed in these, as in all branches of
general Administrative Staff work, India was ages behind the Home Army.
Staff work in India was only beginning to emerge from the bow and arrow
days; the Indian Staff College and improved status of Departmental
officers had in recent years given a good start to the new
organisations, but economy had kept them in leash, and there had not
been time or the experience of active service or really big
concentrations to put them to the test. Where ten motor lorries or fifty
motor-cars had been available at English manœuvres, in India we had to
put up with ten prehistoric bullock carts, and perhaps a few obsolete
hired motors. It was thought extravagant to waste money on telephones,
and luxurious even to mention wireless. It was not long, therefore,
before we learned the difference between campaigns as conducted on
economical Indian principles and the more up-to-date methods of the Home
Army.
The Government of India had, however, been very wise in two things, and
these were, in always insisting on the Indian troops being rationed
strictly on Indian lines, and scrupulously observing every detail
relating to their religious customs, especially in as far as their food
was concerned. To some it may appear difficult to understand how it was
possible in the heart of Europe to observe these matters to the letter,
but we had with us officers who knew exactly what to do and how to do
it, and the names of Colonels R. H. Ewart, Hennessy, Moore, Lindsay,
Vaughan, to say nothing of many excellent junior officers, were a
guarantee all would go well with the Supply and Transport; whilst in the
Indian Medical Services we had Colonels Grayfoot, Bowle-Evans, Wall,
Hamilton, White, Moorhead, and Browse, who with their thorough knowledge
of Indian troops were prepared to look after the interests of the men,
and ably second the splendid work done by the Royal Army Medical Corps
officers, to whom (though here we are now dealing with Indians alone)
the Indian Corps owes a great debt of gratitude, and on whom fell the
main responsibilities in this European War.
There were days when the ordinary chappati could not be kneaded or the
meat cooked with the ingredients dear to the sepoy’s heart, and there
were times when perhaps men were glad to eat their flour wetted and
mixed with gur (Indian sugar), but this was seldom, and as time went on
hardly ever; and after all when the enemy is only thirty, and never more
than two or three hundred yards away, and a lively tune is singing
overhead, the beginner at the game is not too squeamish whether his
dinner is served hot or cold nor whether it is up to Savoy standard.
These are the natural accompaniments of rough war, and the Indians are
the easiest soldiers in the world to feed when they understand it is
part of the game.
The rations consisted of meat for those who ate it, several days in the
week according to the circumstances of the time; for non meat-eaters
extra gur (sugar), dall (lentils), ghee (clarified butter), potatoes,
tea, atta (flour), and five kinds of tasty ingredients; in addition
dried fruits such as raisins, etc., and various kinds of vegetables as
procurable. But this did not end their rations, for mixed sweetmeats
were frequently supplied by friends and retired British officers;
cigarettes in abundance for such classes as smoked them; European and
Indian tobacco and chillums (native clay pipes) were sent by some of the
Indian Princes. Rum was issued to those who were not prohibited from
taking alcohol, and extra tea to those who could not indulge in the
former. Goats were purchased from Southern Europe in large numbers;
slaughtered at fixed stations on the line of communications by men of
the various units; labelled with distinctive tapes and conveyed to
destination by men of the different denominations. Nothing could have
been more considerate than the details carried out to observe the
customs of the sepoy; and Indian officers and men have said to me over
and over again, “The British Government is wonderful; here in the midst
of the Mahabharat (great war) they even label our meat. Truly the
Badshah (King) is a Rustam and a Hatim (a hero and a just man).”
As for clothing and necessaries; beginning with somewhat scanty
garments, the sepoys were gradually supplied with an outfit which it
became an impossibility to move; vests, balaclava caps, warm coats,
goatskin overcoats, extra flannel shirts, socks, drawers, woollen
mufflers, and gloves poured into their wardrobes or kit-bags until a man
could neither put on nor even stagger under the burden, but the cry was,
“Still they come.” Kindly ladies in England and Regimental Committees
continued to send gifts for the Indian soldiers, and I was obliged at
last to cry a halt and find storage room for all that could not be moved
forward from rest billets.
There were occasional complaints of shortage of warm clothing from
units, chiefly Departmental ones; but though this may have been the case
during the first month or so in France, the exact contrary was the case
later on.
It is impossible in writing of the Supply and Transport to omit mention
of the personnel. The British portion of the work was done with the
thoroughness which characterises the A.S.C., but the Indian rank and
file are a hardworking, patient body of men who do much and say little
about it. In every campaign in which they have served the Transport
driver is acknowledged as a very loyal servant of the State. Most of the
Indian Transport was transferred to Gallipoli early in the war and did
good work there.
The Medical establishments from India soon fell into the routine of
trench warfare. The requirements of Frontier expeditions were of a
nature so different from anything in France that it practically meant a
fresh start as far as the transport and interior arrangements were
concerned. There is no need to go into the details of removing the
wounded from the firing-line to the Regimental Aid Posts and thence on
to the Field Ambulances, with their bearer and tent divisions, the
dressing stations and finally the clearing hospitals from which they are
conveyed by ambulance trains to the base. These things have become
familiar to all during the past war years; but the friends and relations
of the Indian soldier may rest assured that nothing was left undone by
the authorities to make the removal of the sick and wounded as easy as
it was possible to make it.
The Indians received in due course a complement of the best ambulances,
and at all times every attention that was their due. The buildings
appropriated at St. Venant, Merville, etc., for their hospitals were
fitted with every comfort that could be expected on service; the French
authorities went out of their way to do all in their power to help “les
Hindous” as they always called them, and the Medical officers of both
Services worked with a devotion which can never be forgotten by the men.
From France they were speedily removed to the special hospitals in
England, and those for India left later for that country or Egypt,
according to orders. At Marseilles also, which was the great Indian Base
in France, the hospital arrangements were excellent, and when in July
1915 I visited that seaport I found a most perfect open-air hospital,
with large tents, known as E.P. or European Privates in India,
containing several hundred beds for patients, located on cliffs
overlooking the Mediterranean. I asked an Indian officer recovering from
a serious illness how he liked it and he said, “If there be a bhist
(paradise) before death it is this.”
The Red Cross Association too, with all its million activities, was
blessed by none more than by the men who came from the far-off mountains
and plains of India. Indeed nothing made a more lasting impression on
them than the medical arrangements of the entire Army.
Their Majesties’ gifts and thoughtfulness for their Eastern subjects
were appreciated in a manner difficult for Britishers who know not the
East to understand. One sepoy had wrapped up a small metal tobacco box
given him by a British soldier and showed it to me with much pride.
“General Sahib,” he said, “this once belonged to the King, and I am
going to carry it about as a charm; I shall get back safely enough to my
home.”
Another man, very severely wounded, whom I was seeing off in the
ambulance, asked me for a “nishan” (souvenir) of the war, and I gave him
a handkerchief with blue edges, a part of one of Her Majesty’s gifts to
the Staff; he asked me to tie it round his arm as it would be a passport
at Bombay, and with a touch of humour he added, “When they see it the
Customs officers will not dare to examine my baggage.” This consisted of
a German helmet which he had tied on to his haversack.
And whilst all these and other signs were not wanting to show the
interest taken by our people at home in the Indian soldiers, there had
started in England an association which has since rendered signal
service to the Indian Army in many theatres of war. The “Indian
Soldiers’ Fund” was inaugurated in October 1914 under the Chairmanship
of Sir John Hewett, late Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces of
Agra and Oudh. Many ladies and gentlemen connected with India became
members, and Lord Curzon of Kedleston very kindly lent his London
residence as a Headquarters. Sir C. McLeod, with whom I had played many
a game of polo when quartered with my battalion in Calcutta, was the
Chairman of the City Committee. He paid me a visit in France and very
generously gave some handsome prizes for competition amongst Indian
soldiers of all corps.
Money and gifts of clothing, necessaries, and all kinds of comforts were
liberally supplied. Lady Sydenham, assisted by many others, including my
wife, helped to deal with the gifts, etc., and no one can appreciate or
understand better than myself the immense benefits the Indians derived
during the early days of the war from the gratuitous labours of all
those who so ungrudgingly gave their services. It was then a different
task from what it became afterwards when experience had perfected the
machine.
It is not too much to say, that as far as the soldiers of India were
concerned, for nothing that was done for them were they more grateful
than the work of the “Indian Soldiers’ Fund.”
Through Mrs. Morant the hospital at Brockenhurst Park was started and
named after the late Lady Hardinge of Penshurst.
The Fund also assisted with gifts towards other smaller but similar
institutions and hospital ships, in England and abroad. Prisoners of war
were not forgotten, and indeed little that could at that time be done
was left undone. In the trenches, the billets, the hospitals, the
India-bound hospital ships, and lastly the homes of the brave men who
had come to share in the toils and glory of the Great War, there could
be but one opinion, viz. that the Fund so generously contributed and so
sympathetically administered would long be remembered with gratitude.
CHAPTER VIII
On the 9th November 1914 the right of the Indian Corps was still just
north of Givenchy and in touch with the French. On this day our Allies
projected some move, and I was asked if we could take over that village
and its front, but anxious as I always was to help them in every way, I
asked the Field-Marshal not to extend my front, as my strength was quite
insufficient for such an extension. Sir John French, who had come over
to see us, quite agreed and the matter was settled. I, however, sent one
of my battalions to Givenchy as a support to them for a couple of days.
Later on I was ordered to extend my front to include Givenchy and up to
the La Bassée Road south of it. The order was of course carried out, but
it was very unfortunate for us, as when, very shortly afterwards, we
were heavily attacked on that front my numbers were altogether too small
for the extended line, and, as I shall tell, the Indian Corps was very
roughly handled and Givenchy was temporarily lost to us; it was retaken
by the heroism of the 1st Manchesters of the Jalandar Brigade, and again
lost, and finally only saved by the arrival of a Division of the First
Army Corps which was in reserve behind the British positions.
On this date I withdrew the 9th Bhopals from the trenches at the request
of their C.O. for a few days’ rest, as the battalion had been subjected
to a very severe shelling and had suffered losses which necessitated a
short change.
In diary of November 10 I find, “Our fellows tried their hand on a mine
of sorts to-day. Half a German fell into the Bareilly Brigade trenches.”
This was the beginning of mining warfare for us; though in this case the
plant was only placed in a trench and fired by electricity.
Lord Roberts had been appointed Colonel-in-Chief of the Indian Corps,
and we had the proud satisfaction of receiving the following telegram:
To Sir James Willcocks, Indian Expeditionary Force.—Allow me to
welcome you and the Indian Expeditionary Force which has come to
fight in Europe shoulder to shoulder in the cause of liberty and
truth, and in upholding our great Empire. I am proud to be your
Colonel-in-Chief.—ROBERTS.
I replied and said how rejoiced we all felt at such a message from the
Chief under whose command the Indian Army had so often been led to
victory.
In another telegram, to Sir John French, Lord Roberts also expressed his
high appreciation of the “magnificent gallantry displayed by all ranks,
British and Indian.” Our great Hero, the victor of many fights, never
forgot his Indian comrades. God rest his soul!
On November 12, Lord Roberts paid us his memorable visit. On the lawns,
now deep in slush, in front of the Château of Hinges and whilst the roar
of the guns shook the windows of the building, we drew up to receive the
great Field-Marshal. The Indian Corps was alone represented, and that
only by the Headquarters Staff and such other officers and men as were
not on duty in the trenches. Facing the entrance door was drawn up a
Guard of Honour of all available men, British and Indian. It was a mixed
body, but it was all I could muster at short notice; amongst them,
however, were two Indian officers who knew Lord Roberts personally, and
there was not a man in that small gathering who did not know the name
and the fame of India’s greatest “Jangi Lat” (War Lord).
There are times in life, fortunately rare, when one feels as if some sad
moment was approaching and you cannot assign any reason for it. This was
one; the solemnity of it was in any case visible, for it was a great
occasion in itself for the Indian Army to have with it in the heart of
France the aged soldier who had long been its Idol; but there was some
other indefinable feeling, and most of us felt it, that whatever might
come this was to be the very last meeting in the Field of War of the
Army of India and its beloved Chief. We all knew that it was the
lion-heart of this great man which had determined him to come across the
sea just once more, and by his presence encourage the troops of which he
was the Chief in name and fact, and then, having done his Duty, which
was his life’s watchword, to return to England and have us in his
keeping.
As the motor-car pulled up our Colonel-in-Chief stepped out, still with
that brisk step so well remembered by all who had ever served with him,
and we felt, as Tennyson has sung of another warrior:
This is England’s greatest son,
He that gain’d a hundred fights,
Nor ever lost an English gun.
It was a parade, but it was a duty every man present considered his
greatest privilege and honour to have attended; and who would have
missed it?
After shaking hands with every officer, Lord Roberts inspected the
Guard, saying a word, with that charm he possessed, to each British and
Indian officer and old soldier; and finally giving a military salute
entered his car, bidding me also in, and we moved off to Headquarters of
the Meerut and Lahore Divisions.
During his short visit the sky was clear but a biting cold wind chilled
us all, and no doubt this, combined with his insistence in pulling up
and alighting at each spot where representatives of every Indian
battalion and Cavalry regiment of the Corps (straight from the trenches)
were collected along the route, helped to bring on the fatal illness
which immediately followed.
During the motor journey I was able to give him an account of our doings
and to answer numerous questions he put to me. I also had the great
benefit of his advice on some important disciplinary points, on which I
would have consulted no man except him, and on which no one else could
have formed so sound and just an opinion.
At Locon he stopped about half an hour, talking to General Anderson and
his Staff and inspecting the few troops present. His pleasure was
manifest when he met his old comrade Sir Partab Singh and also the
Maharaja of Bikanir and the young Prince of Jodhpore and others from
India. Here he addressed the troops in a few words, bidding us do our
duty and saying he would keenly follow our fortunes. His last words
were, “The fame of your doings will live for ever in India.”
Passing on to the Headquarters of the Lahore Division, he saw General
Watkis and his Staff drawn up in the Square at Estaires, and spoke for
some time to an Indian officer who had served with him. He also saw
General Wadeson and officers and men of the Secunderabad Cavalry
Brigade.
Not the least touching part of his visit was the fact that he was
followed by another car, in which travelled one of his daughters, the
guardian angel of his last hours. The Indian officer to whom he had just
spoken said after he had left, “Sahib, the English are a great race.
Brave men, brave women. Peace or war they always hold fast together. The
victory is already yours.”
As I gave him my last salute and the hurrahs of the troops ceased, I
felt the Indian Corps had a friend who was the lodestar which would
guide us on our path of duty and that his visit had increased our
strength. And only two days later the great Field-Marshal passed away.
An honoured guard of Indian soldiers watched over the house where rested
his body, and England had lost one of her most precious possessions and
the Army of India its truest friend.
Most of the Indian Princes and Chiefs in France crossed to England and
attended the funeral, and, to show how heartfelt was the sorrow of our
Allies, I received letters the very next day from General de Maud’huy,
commanding the Xth Army, and General Maistre, commanding the XXIst Corps
d’Armée, who were on our right, deploring the great loss our country,
and more especially the Indian Corps, had suffered.
He will not be forgotten “while memory holds a seat in this distracted
globe.”
I was informed at this time that it was now possible to shorten the line
held by the Corps. I was naturally pleased when the change was carried
out on the night of 15th-16th November. The 8th British Division
relieved the two left brigades of the Corps, and our right then rested
on Givenchy and our left on the La Bassée-Estaires Road. On the 11th
November Captain H. Wicks, 1st Seaforth Highlanders, sent out a small
party of his battalion under command of Lieut. D. MacKenzie to destroy
three houses in his front. My chief recollection of this affair is, that
one of the party in describing it said when they got within ten yards of
the centre house the Germans shouted, “Allenmechty English,” and bolted.
It was told as if it was a huge joke, and somehow the story has always
been one I laugh over. The party split up and entered all three houses,
and were proceeding to set them on fire with the help of straw when the
Huns attacked and drove them out, and from the upper story of one a
machine-gun suddenly began to spit lead. The Germans had been surprised,
but now it was the turn of our men. Covered by our own fire from the
trenches the party got back without a scratch. Even such minor
skirmishes had their lessons. In this case it was found that the Boches
lived in cellars by day; and instead of wasting lives the houses were
demolished by shells shortly afterwards.
During the night of 11th-12th November the Germans sapped up and dug a
short parallel within thirty-five yards of the left trenches of the
Connaught Rangers, and the next night the Irishmen attacked this new
trench; but the enemy anticipated the attack, which failed, and at dawn,
elated with his success, launched a counter-attack. This was carried out
with determination and succeeded in penetrating our trenches and
temporarily capturing a machine-gun.
But this triumph was short-lived as the Connaughts immediately rushed
the lost position, recaptured the gun, bayoneting such Germans as were
found, and turned the Maxim on to the remainder. A German officer showed
great bravery on this occasion; he remained to the last at one end of a
trench and picked off three or four men with a rifle before he would
retire, and then managed to escape. Twenty of the enemy lay dead on or
near our parapet and two prisoners were taken. We suffered only eight
casualties, amongst them three men killed and one officer wounded,
Lieut. E. Morris.
The Irishmen did not mean to allow the enemy to hold on to his new
parallel, and Colonel Ravenshaw arranged an assault for midnight, 14th
November, when sixty men under Lieut. A. G. Moutray silently rushed the
trench, supported by the cross-fire of two machine-guns. A few Germans
were in occupation, of whom Moutray shot two himself. Our casualties
numbered only five men. Sergt. Brown was commended for good work, and
the parallel ceased to trouble us.
Daily small encounters were now the rule, with the more important of
which alone I shall deal. On 13th November General Keary, commanding the
Garhwal Brigade, ordered an attack on some German trenches which had
previously been assaulted but had reverted to the enemy. Lieut.-Colonel
W. R. Brakspear, 2/3rd Gurkhas, with six platoons of his own corps, and
about sixty men of the 2/39th Garhwalis under Major Taylor, who had been
in the previous attack on the same trench, carried out the assault.
The troops to fill in the trench when captured were drawn from No. 4
Company Sappers and Miners and 2/3rd Gurkhas. The assault was made at 9
P.M., but was at once shattered on its left and centre, and only a party
on the right succeeded in reaching the enemy trenches, where Lieut. H.
F. McSwiney and his Gurkhas quickly accounted for twenty-five Huns and
made four prisoners. Brakspear, who had by this time himself come up,
worked along the trench to his left until held up by a party of Germans
behind a traverse. McSwiney tried to rush the enemy by climbing the
parapet but was severely wounded in the gallant attempt.
Seeing that further help was necessary if the small party were to drive
them from their comparatively safe position, Brakspear himself went back
at considerable risk through a hot fire and, having organised a relief,
together with Major E. G. Drummond advanced towards his goal; but the
fire was very heavy and made doubly destructive by a searchlight which
played incessantly on our men. Drummond was killed as he left his own
trench; the advance, however, continued until a number of high-explosive
shells suddenly fell in succession all round the attackers, disjointing
their efforts and scattering all but a mere handful who, with Brakspear,
managed to regain their trench.
Meantime the position opposite to the traverse was being splendidly
maintained by Subadar Dalkesar Gurung, but it was now past midnight and
time to return, as that hour had been fixed for the covering Artillery
fire to help our retirement, and this was already beginning. Finding
that no further object was to be gained by remaining, McSwiney and his
party moved back, but finding that Captain R. D. Alexander, who had been
severely wounded near the traverse, had not been brought in, as he
refused to be moved before the other wounded, McSwiney and his Subadar
with a few men went back to search for him, but finding no traces had
once more sorrowfully to retire, and on reaching our trenches, drenched
in blood, McSwiney fell in a swoon.
Glorious fellows! Which was the braver, the gallant Captain who refused
to be moved lest one of his men might be left in the hands of the enemy;
or the equally gallant Subadar who, facing almost certain death,
returned, severely wounded as he was, to try and rescue his comrade?
Fine deeds, performed in company, by men of different birth, but as
Thomas Moore sings:
Shall I ask the brave soldier who fights by my side
In the cause of mankind, if our creeds agree?
The object of this attack was to destroy the trenches; it was not
achieved, as it did not come as a surprise to the enemy, and once
launched our men were heavily handicapped by the German searchlight, an
apparatus with which we were of course unprovided. Also the Huns had
considerably improved and re-aligned their trench by throwing back a
flank since our last assault on it and our scouts had not reported any
changes. Another cause was that some men in their excitement started
their rush with cheers contrary to orders. The prisoners also declared
that our shells were not exploding. But the best lesson learned from
this attack was, that it is easy enough to capture a small portion of a
trench; it is a very different matter to hold on to it, unless ample
provision has been made beforehand to ensure success. We were still
learning in those early days of the war.
Colonel Brakspear behaved with great coolness, always being in the place
of greatest danger. Drummond also of the 3rd Gurkhas only arrived that
day, and I had wished him luck as he started for the trenches. McSwiney
(son of a very old friend) received the Military Cross for his
gallantry. Captain H. Bennett was missing.
The following were brought to notice by the Division: Subadar Dalkesar
Gurung, Havildar Bahadur Thapa, Naik Rupdhan Dun, Lance-Naik Kabiram
Thapa, Rifleman Ganpati Thapa, all of the 3rd Gurkhas; and Lance-Naik
Jaman Singh Khatri, Rifleman Gajbir Bisht, and Ran Bahadur Saki, of the
1/9th Gurkhas.
The Gurkhas had fifty-seven other casualties, including two Indian
officers.
Major Taylor, who had twice attempted the attack of this same trench,
and Captain A. W. Robertson-Glasgow, both of the 2/39th Garhwalis, were
missing, and the remaining losses of this battalion amounted to
thirty-eight.
The 3rd Gurkhas were raised as far back as 1815, so the regiment was
celebrating its 100th year of existence. Its name had undergone many
changes, but in its ranks was the same breed as had originally taken
service with the British Government after the fall of Malaun and Kumaon.
In 1891 a second battalion was added, and in 1908 the present title of
the 3rd Queen Alexandra’s Own Gurkha Rifles was conferred on the
regiment. They possess seven battle honours, from Delhi (1858) to Tirah
and the Punjab Frontiers. At the outbreak of war, the 2nd battalion,
with the Indian Corps, was commanded by Lieut.-Colonel V. A. Ormsby, who
was later promoted to a Companionship of the Bath.
The Lahore Division had borne the first brunt of the fighting in France,
and now almost daily it was the turn of the sister Division to be
employed in some scrap or raid. No one who reads the records of the
Corps during its first two months in France can fail to be struck by the
energy and initiative of the Divisional Commanders, Brigadiers, and
C.O.’s of units; if it was not in attack, it was in defence of our own
trenches; but, one or other, the Corps was as incessantly employed as
any in Flanders. The numbers were being fast reduced and there were no
daily ships bringing the sorely needed reinforcements; whilst that
invaluable man, the British officer, was irreplaceable.
On the night of the 16th November the 6th Jat Light Infantry had their
first experience of carrying out an attack on German trenches.
Associated with them in this well-conceived scheme was half of No. 3
Company Sappers and Miners. The party consisted of 125 rifles of the
Jats under command of Major P. H. Dundas and sixty Sappers under Captain
E. H. Kelly, R.E., and I cannot do better than epitomise the report of
these two officers, written with a modesty that makes them very
readable.
The Jat report states that they were ordered by the C.O. to advance at 9
P.M. between two saps, made by the enemy towards the 107th Pioneers and
4th Cavalry, and to hold the portion of the German trench between these
saps till 9.45 P.M., by which time the Pioneers would have reconstructed
their trench (which had been partially destroyed by shell-fire), and the
Sappers and Miners filled in the saps. Instructions were also given re
the part to be played by our heavy and field guns. The Infantry were
extended, and advanced with orders not to fire until the objective was
reached. As they cleared the line of their own wire, the German saps on
both flanks opened a heavy fire and some casualties resulted. At sixty
yards they crossed a deep drain, and at 100 yards entered a trench
loopholed to the front and rear. (Ominous!) This trench was unoccupied,
but Germans were seen retiring. The mouth of one sap was closed and an
advance with the bayonet began, so as to protect the Sappers who had
begun work. Meantime the enemy who held the trench in prolongation of
the portion captured by the Jats opened a heavy but ineffective fire on
our men. The Jats replied vigorously, being rewarded by much groaning
and yells proceeding from the Hun trench. The same success attended our
men holding the right sap and a prisoner was captured. Lieut. Liptrott,
who was on the left, also butted against the enemy. Before 10 P.M. our
own guns and rifles in rear began to become troublesome, and the Jats,
very well handled, began their prearranged return, a party moving along
the top of the saps to finish off any enemy bottled up in them. Under a
considerable fire from both flanks the retirement was coolly carried
out, one of the Company officers being killed and another wounded,
whilst in among the dead was a frightened German prisoner; he clung to
Major Dundas rather than risk his skin in charge of what he deemed to be
the terrible sepoys. The casualties were reported as two Indian officers
and sixteen men wounded; and the only other Indian officer and ten men
were missing and certainly killed. Then followed a list of booty taken.
The Sappers and Miners under Captain Kelly and Lieut. E. O. Wheeler
advanced towards both saps. The left sap was full of Germans, who
promptly ran. A large portion of the trench was filled in and Wheeler
then retired, bringing with him some German grenades and other articles
left behind by them. Kelly with the right party found Germans retiring,
and a few of them were bayoneted. The traverses were then destroyed and
booty collected before the time for retiring. The total losses of the
Sappers consisted of only three killed and one wounded.
This ended a small enterprise which has been given in full as a sample
of how things should be done, and the manner in which our Indian troops
worked in those days, whilst the ranks still contained some of the fully
trained men with which the Corps arrived in France.
Major Dundas received the D.S.O. and Kelly the Military Cross. Liptrott
was unfortunately killed shortly afterwards. The following were brought
to notice for good work: Jemadar Abdul Aziz and Colour-Havildar
Chagatta, both of them Sappers. The latter was awarded the I.D.S.M.,
being already in possession of the Indian Order of Merit. I knew this
fine Indian soldier well. The Jemadar received the same decoration.
In the 6th Jats Havildar Jailal received the I.O.M., and the following
won honourable mention: Jemadar Incha Ram, who, although seriously
wounded, continued with the attack; Havildar Badlu, also seriously
wounded; Sepoy Risal, and lastly four gallant fellows who stayed till it
was almost too late searching for the body of their Indian officer.
The 6th Jats were originally raised in 1803, and, like other regiments
of the Bengal Army, had owned various names and numbers. In 1903 it
received its present designation, and is composed of eight companies of
Jats. Its colours bear, amongst others, such varied names as Ghazni and
Kabul 1842, Maharajpore, Sobraon, Afghanistan, and China.
Lieut.-Colonel H. J. Roche was in command when the war began. He was
later given the C.B., and his battalion have good reason to be proud of
the part they played.
During the month of November the weather was such as to test severely
the stamina of the Indians. Cold and wet accompanied frequently by
biting winds is a plain definition of the climatic conditions during the
first two weeks; then snow began and by the 20th the whole country was
clothed in a deep mantle. In the midst of the sea of mud, with scant
bedding for so bitter a climate, lying in foul and insanitary trenches,
often frozen hard, practically underground dwelt in thousands men, to
most of whom ice and snow were unknown, their only knowledge of it being
the distant views some had obtained of the mighty Himalayas, peopled
with a myriad gods, towering like Titan sentinels over their plains and
valleys. Imagine their feelings when now they found themselves in their
embrace, faced by every devilish device of murderous science, and all
from a sense of duty to an alien race. It is a subject for thought. It
is a great triumph of fellowship for the British race. A Gurkha officer
whom I asked one day what he thought of it all replied: “What can I say?
We live in a well and look up at God’s sky by day, and at German flares
by night, but we are going to win.”
The subterfuges employed by the Indians were at times quite amusing,
though not perhaps very much so for the actors. A sepoy, native of
Rustam, was out on patrol duty in “No Man’s Land” when a German
searchlight caught and exposed him in a semi-kneeling position, and the
enemy only fifty yards distant. He had probably in his day taken part in
uninvited nocturnal visits but not in quite similar circumstances;
however, his native wit came to his rescue, and immediately rising up he
stood still and saluted his foes. Surprised by the apparition, the Huns
ceased firing and the Indian, now salaaming, moved on and entered their
trench.
In the German lines facing the Indian Corps were one or two scoundrels
from India, types of traitors which are common to all countries, who,
finding Hindustan too hot for them, and preferring treachery to the
noose which awaited them if they returned, had taken service with the
Germans in pre-war days. What use was made of them it is difficult to
say, but probably such leaflets as were dropped over our lines from
aeroplanes were their production, as well as an occasional call from
their trenches shouted in Hindustani advising our men to desert and join
the generous Huns.
Be this as it may, our sepoy, seeing he must now feign hatred of us or
go under, by signs and gestures soon assured his captors that his one
object in life was to cut the throats of the English, and to give
emphasis to his bloodthirsty proclivities he passed his hand across his
throat, repeating with angry looks, “English, English.” This was enough
to at once bring him a liberal supply of rations and other trench
luxuries. His next business was to discover some means of escape, and he
managed by counting on his fingers and saying, “_Beimān_” (unfaithful)
whilst pointing to our trenches, to impress his would-be friends that
other scoundrels as black as he were willing to desert. Coffee followed
this interesting bit of news, and after much palavering the sepoy was
allowed to leave on his mission. Creeping carefully he rejoined his
battalion and the Huns saw him no more.
All ranks felt the bitter cold and there were a large number of
frost-bites and trench feet as they were called, but taken all round the
Indian troops stood it far better than I had ever believed possible. A
factor in their health was the extraordinarily good arrangements for
giving the men baths and providing them with hot water. Once out of the
trenches (such occasions were rare in those times) a man was certain to
get a hot tub of sorts. All kinds of contrivances were gradually
furnished by Government; heaters, clothes driers, fumigators, travelling
boilers were sent out by kind friends and by the “Indian Soldiers’
Fund.”
The Indian with water of any kind is like a child by the sea, he must at
once dabble in it. Now the sea is pure, but our sepoy has a bad habit of
entirely ignoring all sanitary laws where his _pani_ (water) is
concerned; so long as it is water he will drink from any pool or wash in
any gutter, and much as I admire and like him, I have in my time been
obliged to inflict very severe punishments to lead and keep him in the
path of sanitation. Hence when he found clean hot water was as easily
procured as muddy cold water, he naturally chose the former.
Riding out one day I saw a shower of paper descending earthwards
evidently dropped from an aeroplane. They were leaflets printed in Hindi
calling on our Indian soldiers to rise against the British. Comically
enough the call was headed, “True information”! thereby proving the
Germans can sometimes perpetrate a joke. Here is the text:
The Sheik Ul Islam has proclaimed a Jihad (Holy War) on the Id (a
festival day) at Mecca against the British, Russians, and French. The
Sultan of Turkey has started a war against the same oppressive people,
and he has been joined by the King of Afghanistan.
But German humour is at best singular. Here was an incitement to Hindus
and Mahomedans alike to revolt, and yet only Mahomedans are named, and
to make it more ridiculous the language was Hindi, or the language of
Hindus alone. I took a copy to the trenches of one regiment of each
class and to one or two mixed Corps of both and read them out. The
message was greeted with loud laughter, and one humorous Punjabi
Musalman shouted out, “We now understand what ‘Made in Germany’ means!”
On the 19th of November Prince Arthur of Connaught visited our
Headquarters, and I took him round the billets of the Secunderabad
Cavalry Brigade. He was much pleased with all he saw, and the Jodhpore
Lancers drawn up near a farmhouse looked weird, coated with snow, a
thing none of them had ever touched before.
On the 20th November I was the guest of General de Maud’huy commanding
the Xth French Army at St. Pol. I always repeat that I have never served
with finer soldiers than the French, nor known better Generals and
Staffs than those of our great Allies. The Headquarters Staff were
located in the most ordinary house in the main street, but the general
order that prevailed all round showed the perfection to which a Command
Headquarters can be brought. It was certainly far simpler than anything
in our own Army. The General kindly furnished me with a very large scale
map of the whole Western Front, giving all details of the German Corps
from Nieuport to the Swiss Frontier. An ordinary Corps commander was not
allowed such luxuries with us. I still hear from him, and shall
certainly make a point of again going to see him wherever he may be.
The next day H.R.H. the Prince of Wales honoured the Corps by coming
round and seeing all troops not in the trenches. The Indians were
specially delighted and cheered lustily. Just after he left I was
motoring to our Reserves to watch some newly manufactured trench mortars
fired, when I saw a new German Taube come down; it was the first in our
lines and the excitement of the sepoys was worth watching. The two
officers were taken prisoners and I saw them later at my Headquarters.
Regarding the trench mortars mentioned above, this first attempt was
most successful. The Indian Sappers and Miners soon had the matter in
hand and before long we were using them with good results. Fancy in this
great war mortars made at first of wood and cast iron being employed and
considered a great adjunct to our means of defence. The old British Army
and the Indian Corps had to learn many a lesson before the days of
15-inch guns and unlimited ammunition.
Every effort was made to alleviate the trials of the men in the
trenches. Braziers and other roughly constructed devices were
manufactured by our ubiquitous Sappers. Earthen vessels filled with
charcoal, when procurable, were distributed along the trenches; extra
socks were issued and straw was rolled under the puttees. A percentage
of gum boots were sent out by the “Indian Soldiers’ Fund,” and woollen
gloves were freely supplied. General Headquarters did all they could to
help us, and the Medical Officers and unit commanders were indefatigable
in their labours to keep the men fit during the severe ordeal of that
ghastly winter.
In this war, when of necessity the Armies lay for so long opposite to
one another in the same positions, the public naturally associated the
Infantry soldier with the greatest hardships which had to be borne. He
lived in the trenches, he held the front line when attacked, or led the
assault when in advance, but behind him was the man with the big guns.
This latter had some advantages over his Infantry comrade: he was
farther from the rifle and machine-gun, and out of the range of the
grenade and trench mortar, but without him no front line could have been
held for an hour and no attack would ever have been possible.
Moreover, he was the target most sought by the enemy; the prying
aeroplane could easily trace the trenches, but its chief prey was the
battery in rear, and once found it very soon received the concentrated
attention of the hostile guns. The men in front knew all this well. They
loved their field guns, their constant companions and always the nearest
to them. The howitzers were their closest allies when the Hun trench had
to be searched and knocked about; the biggest pieces behind them were
the loyal parents who closely supported them when necessity arose, and
watching over all farthest back were the monsters in those days still in
a state of manufacture, affectionately spoken of in later times as
Grandmothers.
And so the gunners, like those farther forward, took their full, and
often more than full, share of the daily work. They lived in great
discomfort, for you cannot be constantly moving guns in concealed
positions; the labour is vast, and so long as you are undiscovered so
much the better to remain there. Hence when the pits and dug-outs filled
with water, they just made the best of it, and the confidence inspired
by these splendid soldiers and their guns was something they could not
help realising, however modest.
The Indians, even more than their British comrades, put implicit faith
in the Artillery. So long as Jack Sepoy could hear the moan or the roar
of the missiles from his beloved guns speeding overhead towards the
enemy lines he rested assured that come what might all was well.
CHAPTER IX
The Army Corps was now on the eve of its first considerable fight. Signs
were not wanting that the Germans meant to break into, or through, a
portion of our line, and the fighting that followed was confined to the
Corps alone. It was in fact the only time during our stay in France that
we conducted a combined operation entirely on our own, so to speak. At
Givenchy in December, Neuve Chapelle in March, Ypres in April, Festubert
in May, and Mauquissart in September, our battles, though on a far
bigger scale, were fought in conjunction with and as part of combined
forces; but on this solitary occasion we had it all to ourselves, and
although it was a purely defensive action the results were highly
satisfactory. We regained all our lost trenches and the heavy losses
were more than repaid by the knowledge gained, viz. that the Indian
Corps as a fighting unit could carry out its own rôle in the war without
exterior assistance, so long as the ranks were not too far depleted to
permit of our holding the front assigned, and we could employ our own
guns as considered necessary.
It was not an unreasonable request we made, that we should not be
expected to do more than our numbers warranted. Let us examine for a
moment the fighting strength of the Indian Corps at this time. It
amounted in rifles to 3500 British and 9500 Indian, and in Reserve about
1750 were available from the Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade, which might
mean 1000 rifles. The combined strength therefore was little more than a
British Division.
There was always the argument raised that this number was far under the
“Ration strength,” _i.e._ the number of men for whom rations were drawn.
But without going into details which would not be understood by the
ordinary reader, it may at once be said that the actual troops available
for taking part in any fighting in or near the trenches was as stated
above, and no more could be found.
The preliminary operations which preceded the German attack were
directed against the Bareilly Brigade of the Meerut Division, which was
commanded by Major-General Macbean. On the 21st November the Germans
started a succession of bomb attacks from trench guns against the
section held by the 6th Jats, causing many casualties and destroying the
trenches. This was followed next day by a still heavier bombardment on
the same trenches, and against those occupied by the 58th Vaughan’s
Rifles.
On this night, 22nd-23rd November, in accordance with orders, the Meerut
Division was in process of relief by the Lahore Division, plus a portion
of the Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade. By the morning of the 23rd November
the relief had been partially completed, the result being that five
units of the Lahore Division and two battalions of the Meerut were now
in the line. The former from left to right were the 129th Baluchis and
57th Rifles composing the left section; one company Connaught Rangers,
34th Pioneers, and 9th Bhopals formed the centre section; and the 58th
Rifles and a half of the 2nd Black Watch the right section. The other
half of the Black Watch and the 41st Dogras were on their way to their
billets, whilst the 8th Gurkhas and 107th Pioneers were at Gorre, and
the 6th Jats at Festubert.
Pending the completion of the relief by Ferozepore Brigade the command
remained under Major-General Macbean. In order to give a concise account
of what followed, I will describe as a whole the action of the troops
from the time of the first attack on the 23rd November until morning of
24th, when we had completely re-established our position, and then
endeavour to explain in greater detail the part taken by the various
Corps engaged.
At 7.45 A.M. the O.C. centre section reported that the Germans had
broken his line, and a counter-attack was arranged. The 6th Jats were
moved up and the Gurkhas and Pioneers ordered to stand fast. By 9 A.M.
the enemy attack on this portion of the line appeared to be slackening,
but grenade and rifle fire was vigorously kept up. Meanwhile a great
part of the 34th Pioneers, who had been driven from their trenches, was
ordered to make a counter-attack for their recovery; but this attack
never came to anything.
Half an hour later General Macbean was informed that part of the 58th
Rifles had also been driven from their trenches, and this repeated
retirement of our troops was rendering our hold precarious. The
situation was not relieved by the fact that the right of the Connaught
company was by this time being enfiladed owing to the 34th Pioneers’
retirement.
About 10 A.M. the G.O.C.’s Meerut and Lahore Divisions mutually arranged
that the latter’s troops, who would in any case have taken over the
front that night, should move up in support at once, and this was begun.
The trench mortar of the Garhwal Brigade which was helping the
Connaughts, after firing a few rounds, burst. Such were the engines of
war in our possession in those days! General Macbean by these moves
would have ample means to resist any likely attacks, and there was no
further report of the Germans increasing their effort.
A counter-attack was being arranged, when General Egerton commanding the
Ferozepore Brigade arrived at Macbean’s Headquarters. As he was the
Brigadier to relieve him on this front, Macbean asked him to conduct the
operations of this attack, and the 8th Gurkhas and 107th Pioneers were
given him as a reinforcement.
By noon the situation appeared more serious than might be inferred from
the above, as the 34th Pioneers and 9th Bhopals had been forced from all
their trenches, and this, added to the gap caused by portions of the
58th Rifles retiring, left a long line of front trenches in possession
of the enemy. A counter-attack by the 6th Jats was unsuccessful, being
checked by machine-gun fire.
Our Artillery materially assisted in preventing any further enemy
advance, and General Anderson ordered the 1/39th Garhwalis to Gorre, and
the Leicesters and 3rd Gurkhas to be prepared to move from La Couture.
He also directed Macbean to recover the lost trenches and enemy
sap-heads, and the Garhwal Brigade Reserve to move up to the rear of
Macbean’s left.
As the enemy increased in numbers and was plentifully supplied with
bombs, General Joubert in command of the French on our immediate right
was asked to co-operate if it became necessary, and the G.O.C. 8th
British Division offered his Artillery support, but neither of these
aids proved necessary. Whilst matters were thus shaping themselves, the
company of the Rangers had been obliged by the exposure of its right
flank to move to its left into the section held by the 57th Rifles and
129th Baluchis.
The position when General Egerton arrived to take over the direction of
affairs was this. On our left the 57th Rifles and 129th Baluchis stood
firm, whilst the company of the Rangers had moved into this section also
and was defending itself with success. The section was commanded by
Lieut.-Colonel Southey of the 129th Baluchis, and he had, by occupying
some houses in rear of his exposed flank, completely held up the enemy,
and saved any chance of their further advance in this direction.
The whole of the centre of our front trenches to the right, viz. those
formerly held by the 34th Pioneers, 9th Bhopals, and the greater part of
the 58th Rifles, were in German possession. The remainder of the 58th
held on, and the Black Watch on the right had not moved. Seeing how
matters stood I ordered the Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade up to close
billets in Essars, to be available as a reinforcement.
Preceded by a heavy and most accurate Artillery fire directed by
Lieut.-Colonel E. J. Duffus and ably supported by two French batteries
which had been sent us by our ever-helpful allies, the Infantry attack
was launched at 4.30 P.M. Portions of the following formed the attacking
party, 8th Gurkhas, 6th Jats, Connaught Rangers, with 107th Pioneers in
support. Notwithstanding that the guns had inflicted heavy losses, as
evidenced by the numbers of dead Germans found in our trenches when we
recaptured them next morning, this counter-stroke was only partially
successful. The 107th Pioneers were now sent to support the right where
the 8th Gurkhas had succeeded in reoccupying a portion of the lost
trenches, whilst some of the 9th Bhopals had also recovered another
portion and the 58th, very materially helped by the Black Watch on their
right, had reoccupied part of their lost line. The Gurkhas assisted by a
detachment of the 6th Jats in this operation captured a few prisoners.
Meantime part of the 107th Pioneers who, as previously stated, had moved
to the right were temporarily held up by a furious fire of bombs, and
were directed to hold on and gain touch with the 58th Rifles.
Egerton also directed the 1/39th Garhwalis to move to the left flank of
the centre section, _i.e._ near where Colonel Southey was holding the
Germans. The plan of the Garhwal attack was formed by Colonel Swiney
after consultation with Colonel Southey and some other officers, and a
suggestion for bombing down the German trenches was first made by Lieut.
Robson, R.E.
On receiving definite news of the situation, and being quite determined
that in this our first fight as a Corps no inch of ground should be
surrendered, I had instructed General Anderson that at all costs the
lost trenches were to be recovered. There was small need perhaps, as he
was not the man to give away anything for nothing in a fight, but my
message was sent through to the troops, and I felt those fine comrades
would uphold the honour of the Corps. Knowing this, Egerton, although he
had already sent off the 39th Garhwalis on their special mission but had
no information of their progress, launched a further attack from his
right flank.
This attack consisted of two companies of the 2nd Leicesters and two of
the 107th Pioneers. The Leicesters effected a lodgment in the enemy’s
trenches but were hard pressed to retain it owing to heavy bombing, and
the 107th were repulsed, but their combined action without doubt
considerably disconcerted the Germans and assisted the 39th Garhwalis
who were advancing up the hostile trenches from the opposite direction.
This was our first attempt on a large scale in clearing the enemy out of
his trenches by bombing along them from traverse to traverse. It has
long since become familiar to every soldier, but in those days at any
rate it was new; and considering the primitive instruments at our
disposal, some lighted with matches, some with port fires, some anyhow,
a large proportion having a tendency to prematurely explode or refuse to
light, and all this done on a freezing night with snow and ice in the
trenches and half a gale of wind blowing, it was no mean performance.
The result of this long-drawn-out contest was that with the hold gained
on our right by the reoccupation of portions of our line by the 107th
Pioneers, 8th Gurkhas, 6th Jats, and a company of the Bhopals, and the
splendid advance of the 1/39th Garhwalis along the enemy’s trenches from
our left, the troops from both flanks joined hands and the entire
position was restored by 6 o’clock on the morning of the 24th November.
The trenches formerly held by the 34th Pioneers and 9th Bhopals were
taken over by the Leicesters and 1/39th Garhwalis. Our losses, however,
were very heavy.
The enemy also suffered considerably, not only in his advance, but
whilst in occupation of our trenches and their vicinity and during our
counter-attack. He had many hours in which to evacuate his wounded and
remove his dead under cover of night, nevertheless he left behind him a
great many of both, showing the hasty nature of his final departure. The
recaptured trenches had been knocked to bits by our well-directed guns,
and the 1/39th Garhwalis secured two trench mortars, three machine-guns,
and a large number of rifles and other equipment, besides four officers
and 100 men taken prisoners.
And thus was Corinth lost and won.
It was our first fight within the Corps, and hence deserves to be told
in full. We learned many useful lessons which I shall try and epitomise,
but first I must tell the story of many gallant deeds by which the
results were obtained. Over forty British officers and 1150 other ranks,
chiefly Indians, was the price we paid that November day, but the
official despatch disposed of the fighting in a few lines and no names
were singled out. Few outside the Corps ever heard of it, but it was the
Indian soldiers’ own fight, and they will often tell of it in the years
to come.
Here is the story. The 34th Pioneers had been the first to feel the
shock; and heavily attacked as they were by grenades, soon had their
left machine-gun out of action. The enemy broke into the trench but the
gun was saved by Havildar Nikka Singh, who, seeing the detachment
overwhelmed, picked up and carried the Maxim through a fierce fire into
the support trench.
Captain Mackain, who commanded the company to the right, behaved most
gallantly. His trench was rushed, but he quickly collected a party and
from behind a traverse defied the enemy advance. From this position he
shot one German after another with his revolver, keeping them at bay
whilst his men maintained a sharp duel. Mackain was at last himself
mortally wounded and carried away by Sepoy Ishar Singh, who received a
reward, but alas the gallant officer did not live to reap his. This is
surely a case for a posthumous reward! Captain G. E. Wilson of this
battalion was prominently brought to notice for his gallantry. He was
wounded and taken prisoner, but eventually returned to England.
The attack on the battalion drove the companies back from their trenches
partly to support trenches and partly towards and into the trench of the
Connaught Rangers on their left. An attempt to retake the lost positions
of the 34th’s trenches was unsuccessful, and eventually this battalion,
and along with them the 9th Bhopals, lost all their line and fell back
in some confusion.
Subadar Natha Singh of the 34th behaved with great coolness and retired
his men skilfully, gaining the Indian Order of Merit. Lance-Naik Tota
Singh and Havildar Pala Singh also received the I.O.M. for bravery, and
the same award was given to Sub-Assistant Surgeon Harnam Singh for
devotion to duty at the regimental aid-post. Lieut.-Colonel G. Kelly was
killed whilst leading a counter-attack, and Captain A. Masters, the
Adjutant, shared his fate also. Subadars Natha Singh (No. 1), Ram Singh,
and Jemadar Sundar Singh and sixty other ranks were killed. Five British
and Indian officers and 140 other ranks were wounded and twenty-three
missing.
The company of the Connaught Rangers now found themselves enfiladed from
their right, but fighting steadily moved along the trench towards the
57th Rifles and finally barricaded themselves and held on. I always
admire the short report of Captain G. F. Callaghan, their commander, who
merely says, “We resisted them traverse by traverse but suffered
considerable losses and could inflict comparatively no injury on them.”
Again, “Practically all the bombs were wet and useless.” True, it was
so. We had no provision in our army for such toys. Doubtless the result
of
The cankers of a calm world and a long peace.
This flank, as I have already told, was finally made impregnable by
Colonel Southey of the 129th Baluchis, who with the 57th and his own
battalion never gave the enemy an opportunity of further extending his
gains.
On the right of the 34th Pioneers was the 9th Bhopal Infantry. Numbers 2
and 4 double companies were heavily bombed, and with the retirement of
the 34th on the left, the Bhopals were temporarily isolated and the
battalion was unable to withstand the German rush. One company was
surrounded and the entire line of trenches lost. Later on, part of the
Bhopals under Captain E. H. Apthorpe joined in the counter-attack with
the 6th Jats and helped to recapture a portion of the trench. Their
losses were heavy, including two British officers wounded and three
missing. Indian officers: three killed, one wounded, and two missing;
other ranks, six killed and 208 wounded and missing.
The 58th Rifles on the right of the Bhopals and left of the Black Watch,
as soon as it was reported that our line had been pierced, sent up bombs
and ammunition to the firing-line. Lieut. R. A. Reilly, who carried out
this duty, was on his way back when the covered way along which he was
moving became exposed owing to the retirement of the 9th Bhopals. He and
two of his seven men were killed.
Captain H. L. Baldwin with his company held on to a ditch which
enfiladed the covered way; he was in a very trying position but
continued there throughout the day, and this good soldier then joined in
the counter-attack when he was unfortunately killed. His C.O. wrote of
him in the highest terms.
Captain A. G. Lind and his company with its left flank thrown back held
on, but a machine-gun was brought to bear on them and with very heavy
losses they were forced back. Lind was wounded during a gallant struggle
to stem the enemy advance. About mid-day Captain Bull was sent up to
replace Captain Willis who had been severely wounded, but pluckily held
on to his command and refused to leave till later, when he was ordered
to do so. Bull rallied the right company and, assisted by a party of the
Black Watch who were on his immediate right, secured this, the last part
of the 58th’s trench still in our possession, until 4.30 P.M., when the
battalion joined in General Egerton’s counter-attack. Bull’s conduct
throughout the day was exemplary, and the Section commander brought him
prominently to notice for having held up the German attack on this
flank. With him were fifty men of the Black Watch under Sergeant-Major
Kennedy and of these I will tell farther on.
This counter-attack led by Major Davidson-Houston, the C.O., was a
complete success and a great part of the 58th’s trenches were regained.
Lieut. L. Gaisford, a lad I knew well, was killed as he leaped into the
trench. Major Thomson and Captain Bull were invaluable in keeping the
men in hand during all this troubled fighting. It is worth quoting the
words of the C.O. 58th regarding their comrades of the Black Watch in
this attack, as serving to show the value of example set by the British
soldier. He says:
I was also greatly assisted in this advance on the trench, which was
done without a halt or firing, by four men of the Black Watch,
Privates Venters, Boyd, M‘Intosh, and Stewart; these men came with me
in the final rush from the road, and by their example gave a fine lead
(mark the words) to my Dogra company in front of whom we were. There
being nobody at hand when we reached the trenches, I placed them to
hold a sap which had been cut right into our line, and although bombed
they held on till I could get the men together, after which they
helped me considerably, and by their _sang froid_ and cheeriness,
impressed those round them most favourably.
No higher tribute could be paid to those four splendid Highlanders. They
all received the D.C.M.
The 58th in the day’s fighting lost three British and one Indian officer
and fifty-three others killed; two British and one Indian officer and
sixty others wounded. Lieut. S. Gordon, Indian Medical Service, and
Lieut. J. Milligan were brought to notice for gallantry in rescuing with
the stretcher-bearers many wounded men. Havildar Indar Singh was
promoted to Jemadar. Jemadar Hawinda behaved with great gallantry in
carrying in under heavy fire his British officer. Both native officers
were awarded the Military Cross.
Holding our extreme right was the Black Watch. You cannot move men of
this stamp, no matter who may be the enemy. Under ordinary circumstances
the battalion would have been more to its left, _i.e._ in between
battalions of Indian troops, but owing to the fact that our right
touched the French left, I had received orders to have a British
battalion next to them. Hence it was the case that the three battalions
on their left were all Indians and it was on these that the Germans
directed their attack.
Such details may appear unimportant to those who count Army Corps by
Divisions and Brigades, but to us who had the task of holding a given
front, they meant much. My Generals and I had many things to think of
which needed no special consideration in other Corps.
The Black Watch were not themselves directly attacked, but by their
assistance the 58th, as already described, reoccupied their lost
trenches. This right section was commanded by Major J. Harvey of the
Black Watch, a first-rate C.O., who was afterwards given a Brigade and
killed in command of it in Mesopotamia. Major A. G. Wauchope of his
battalion, always to the fore when fighting was going on, volunteered to
proceed to the trenches and find out the situation, and carried out his
mission most successfully.
Company-Sergeant-Major J. Kennedy, with fifty N.C.O.’s and men,
accompanied the counter-attack of the 58th Rifles, and this N.C.O. was
one of the first to enter the recaptured trenches, ably seconded by
Sergeant Wilson, Lance-Corporal Melrose, and Private Swan.
Wauchope proceeded with Lance-Corporal Gorrie, a gallant man who was
always volunteering for dangerous tasks, to the firing trench, and
thence to Captain Bull, who with his own men and a few of the Black
Watch was very hard pressed by Germans, who were hurling hand-grenades
amongst them from a distance of only fifteen yards, to which our men
could only oppose rifle fire; nevertheless this fire soon dominated the
enemy, who ceased their bomb-throwing.
Wauchope, accompanied by Lieut. N. McMicking, also of the Black Watch,
and twenty of his men, immediately charged over the eighty yards which
separated them from a German sap, and entering it moved on another
hundred yards, the Huns rapidly retiring and leaving rifles, etc.,
behind them. This small party then returned, and Wauchope made his way
to the O.C. 58th, who thought his whole trenches were reoccupied. It was
found, however, that there was still a gap of 300 yards on the left of
the 58th and between them and the right of the 8th Gurkhas, and this gap
was occupied by only four Highlanders, one of whom was lying wounded.
Many bombs were still falling and the party was withdrawn; this portion
of trench being soon after filled by the Indians from both flanks.
Kennedy, Drummond, and Private Swan received the D.C.M.
Whilst these events were taking place on the right some fine deeds were
being done on our left, which finally regained us all our lost trenches.
Colonel Swiney with his 1/39th Garhwalis, discarding all idea of a
frontal attack over ground white with snow and which showed up every
movement, managed after much difficulty to pick a way through ditches
and bog and assemble immediately on the right of Colonel Southey’s
section, where the 57th Rifles joined the company of the Connaught
Rangers. Swiney was dead against a frontal attack, and General Egerton
left it to him as to how he should move. Present also was a very gallant
officer, Lieut. R. G. Robson, R.E., who suggested an advance along the
lost trenches with bombs. To prove his opinion, prior to the advance he
made a demonstration by moving close to some houses and clearing the
Germans out with bombs: an unselfish and gallant act.
The occasion always finds the man, and this occasion found not only a
keen battalion but also a heroic figure in the person of Captain D. H.
Acworth of that good old Frontier regiment, the 55th Coke’s Rifles, and
then serving with the 57th Rifles. Robson and Acworth, with seven
Afridis of the 57th (one or two being 55th men attached), and one
Connaught Ranger, moved along the trench. The attack was entrusted to
two companies of the 1/39th Garhwalis, Major W. H. Wardell’s, with
Captain S. Orton; and Captain Lumb’s, a third being in support. Wardell
was to attack along the trench from left to right, Lumb moving level
with him on his right along a shallow depression some fifteen yards away
and roughly parallel with the trench. Robson and Acworth started their
bombing and continued it for some fifty yards, when owing to bombs
running out and for other causes the bombing ceased, and the attack
developed into a bayonet advance, pure and simple, by the Garhwalis. The
Germans meantime were using bombs very freely.
Wardell’s fine attack, after pushing some distance along the enemy
trenches, began to lose weight; but here Lumb, finding his own shallow
ditch was gradually ending and knowing that his business was to help
Wardell, crossed over with a rush and was into the trenches in the midst
of Wardell’s men. The Garhwalis were now thoroughly blooded and could
not be stopped. Traverses fell in rapid succession and prisoners were
being gathered up at every turn. The opposition was severe, and time
after time as the men sprang up on the parapets or ran along both sides
of the trenches they came under heavy enfilade fire.
When the advance was stayed by the reduction in numbers, Lieut. J.
Welchman joined in with more men, and the prisoners being quickly passed
to the rear, the Garhwalis under Lumb gallantly pushed on, clearing
everything in front of them with the bayonet, till they eventually
joined hands with the 107th Pioneers advancing from the right. Dawn
broke on our now victorious troops, and the Indians had the satisfaction
of knowing that although they had suffered grievously, although some of
their comrades had been forced from their trenches, and that no one
might ever hear of their work, yet it had been finally completed by the
Corps alone.
When Swiney found that the advance was leaving the trenches but sparsely
held, he had sent up Captain J. Lane with reinforcements, and as they
reached a bend in the trench they were furiously attacked by Germans who
held a sap running right into our line. Lane faced this enfilade fire
unflinchingly and managed to close the sap with a barricade, thus
ensuring the safety of the main trench. The Huns left behind them
rifles, tools, and quantities of equipment, some trench mortars and
machine-guns in the hands of the 39th, whilst their dead were strewn
along both sides of and in the recaptured trench. When I heard it I
cheered as if I myself had done the job, although I was safe in a
château miles away with my ear to a telephone, but I could not conceal
my joy at the thought that my brave Indian troops had not lost an inch
of ground.
The losses of the Garhwalis were comparatively light, but the reason was
that the work was swiftly and thoroughly done. The gallant Major Wardell
who had led the first advance was wounded and missing; Captain Orton was
severely wounded; Jemadar Daulat Rawat was killed, and two Indian
officers were wounded, whilst among other ranks eighteen were killed and
thirty-seven wounded.
Captain Lumb and Subadar Dhan Sing Negi received the Military Cross.
Captain Acworth, 55th Rifles, was also given this decoration, and
Subadar Jagat Sing Rawat the Order of British India. The I.O.M. was the
reward of four of the seven men of the 57th Rifles who accompanied
Robson, and the others were given the I.D.S.M.; whilst in the ranks of
the Garhwalis several men received the I.O.M., amongst them a gallant
N.C.O., Havildar Alam Sing Negi, and others the I.D.S.M.
The brave Robson was killed a month later, and hence did not live to
receive a well-merited honour. Colonel Swiney was promoted Brevet
Colonel for his initiative, gallantry, and skill. And last, but greatest
of all who fought that day, was Naik Darwan Sing Negi: first in the
advance and first to rush each traverse, wounded in the arm and twice in
the head, this heroic son of Garhwal continued to fight to the end, and
was the second recipient of the coveted Victoria Cross. How well earned!
In his village of Kabartir, north of the Pindar River, amid the wild
regions of the great Himalayas, often will be told the tale of how
Darwan Sing upheld the prestige of his race and gained fame for the
regiment in which he served.
Colonel Swiney’s report is a document which will be preserved in the
regiment as a memento of many brave men and the brave deeds they
performed that night. Did space permit I would like to name them, but
the battalion will treasure them all.
The 39th Garhwal Rifles was raised at Almora in 1887 as the 2nd
Battalion of the 3rd Gurkha regiment; became 39th (the Garhwali)
regiment of Bengal Infantry in 1890, and received its present name in
1901. A second battalion was added in 1901.
A part of No. 3 Company Sappers and Miners was engaged in the centre
section repairing loopholes, etc. Captain E. H. Kelly, R.E., was in
command, and finding no officers he took charge of the troops in his
vicinity. He was severely wounded by hand-grenades, being hit in the
head, shoulders, hand, and leg, but was nevertheless able to reach the
support line. The Corps of Royal Engineers never says die.
The Leicesters in their counter-attack with the 107th Pioneers lost
Captain H. Grant, killed whilst leading his company in the charge, and
2nd Lieut. M. Seton-Browne was also killed at the head of his platoon
just as he had reached the enemy trench. No. 8224 Lance-Corporal G.
Grey, Sergeant P. Forster, and three men were brought to notice for
their fine example. The latter received the D.C.M. Major H. Gordon was
in command of this attack and received the D.S.O. Throughout the time
the Leicesters served with me in France this splendid Corps shared the
brunt of every fight in which their Brigade was engaged. Its sterling
grit was recognised by none more than the Indian soldiers.
As already described, one company of the Connaught Rangers was fighting
next to the 34th Pioneers, whilst six officers and 300 rifles were in
support of the 8th Gurkhas in the counter-attack. These latter were met
by a heavy cross-fire from machine-guns. Notwithstanding this a part of
them reached the objective. Major W. Hamilton, Captain R. G. Eyre, and
Lieut. J. Hume, the only officers with one company, were wounded, whilst
fifty-five men were killed or missing and fifty-three were wounded, and
the detachment had to withdraw. The three officers named above were
brought to notice.
The 57th Rifles, who held fast to their trenches on our left, did right
good work though sharing none of the glory. The C.O. reported during the
fighting: “I am trying to improve my trenches, but have no large-sized
spades or shovels. A telephone is urgently needed. We want some
sandbags—most urgent. Also a lot of bombs. Without these and the
sandbags it is difficult sometimes.” Splendid fellow! What a commentary
on the state of affairs; little he dreamed his words would be repeated
for those to read who know nothing of how the fight was waged in the
snow-clad trenches of 1914. Ours were held, as a 57th man said to me
after the fight, “with our bare hands; we had nothing else.” Captain
Indajit Singh, the medical officer of the battalion, was killed while
coolly carrying out his duties behind the firing-line. A brother
officer, Major P. Atal, I.M.S., in medical charge of the 129th Baluchis,
was also killed with him. Both had gained the respect of their Corps by
the fearless discharge of their duty to the wounded.
The 8th Gurkhas, who had suffered so heavily on 30th October and had
hardly a British officer of their own remaining, proved their grit on
this occasion of their counter-attack by recapturing a portion of the
lost trenches. Major K. Cassels, although himself wounded, managed to
hold on to his command and the battalion suffered the further following
losses: Lieut. D. S. Macpherson, son of a gallant soldier, was killed;
Major R. W. Elliott also lost his life; both of these officers belonged
to the 7th Gurkhas. Lieut. Peploe, 6th Gurkhas, was wounded and Lieut.
C. Maxwell of the 8th was missing. It is thus made clear how the
original officers of the battalion were fast disappearing.
In this counter-attack the 6th Jats lost nearly 200 men. Captain Dudley
was killed; Lieut. Cockburn earned the Military Cross for his gallantry
in driving the Germans from traverses; Captain Moore and Major Dundas
were wounded.
The 107th Pioneers had failed at first to reach the enemy trenches in
their attack with the Leicesters, but had eventually reached them and
were slowly moving north, where they met the Garhwalis coming from the
other side. During the fighting Major Bruce and seventeen men were
killed; Captains Davis, Mangin, Turnbull, and McLaughlin and Lieut.
Wallis were wounded, besides one Indian officer and forty men. Subadars
Hashmat Dad Khan, and Labh Singh received the I.D.S.M.
There remains one splendid deed to be recorded, and that is how a very
gallant gentleman died, but left behind him an immortal name on the list
of heroes who have won the Victoria Cross.
A detachment of the 34th Poona Horse, one of the regiments of the
Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade, had been sent up as a reinforcement on the
23rd November and was in the trenches of the Ferozepore Brigade. A
German sap ran right up to our line and exposed it to fire. Guarding the
junction was Lieut. F. A. de Pass with a small party. One of this party
volunteered to move along the sap and reconnoitre it. It was found that
at twelve paces away the sap turned and there was a loopholed traverse
guarded by Huns. From this coign of vantage they continued throughout
the day to fling hand-grenades into our trench: there were no grenades
to reply with, and de Pass and his men had to stick it out, losing
several wounded.
He, however, was determined that the Germans should be turned out, and
at dawn next day, with two sowars, he crawled up the sap, inserted a
charge of gun-cotton against a loophole of the traverse, and the
explosion which followed wrecked the traverse and laid bare a wide gap,
exposing its site to fire from our trenches. A grenade hurled at his
small party was fortunately ineffective, and for twenty-four hours the
enemy was quiet.
The very next day in broad daylight this gallant soul, accompanied by
Private C. Cook of the 7th Dragoon Guards, went out and carried in a
wounded sepoy under a heavy fire for a considerable distance.
Unbounded courage and compassion joined.
On the 26th November de Pass found that the Germans had repaired their
destroyed traverse, from which heavy bombing was again proceeding, and
our parapet was being knocked to bits; moving to the evil spot, he saw a
sniper behind the loophole of the traverse and at once tried to pick him
off, but was instantly shot dead. He was honoured in death and gazetted
to the Victoria Cross as a reward from the King he had so faithfully
served. The I.D.S.M. was conferred on his companions in peril, Sowars
Abdullah Khan, Firman Shah, and Fateh Khan of the 34th Poona Horse.
Private Cook received the Distinguished Conduct Medal.
Colonel Grant, 8th Gurkhas, who commanded the centre section, had a very
difficult task as will be readily understood, but he carried it out with
resolution.
Brigadier-General Egerton readily undertook the task he was asked to
perform by General Macbean. His two Staff officers, Major Sangster, 2nd
Indian Lancers, and Captain Stewart, Cameron Highlanders, well earned
the praise he gave them.
The German attack was made by the three battalions of the 112th Regiment
of the Twenty-ninth Division, XIVth Army Corps, as evidenced by the
killed, wounded, and prisoners, with the 170th Regiment in support; and
although their numbers were inferior to the troops we eventually brought
against them before our line was re-established, they had the
superiority in guns and men on the front first attacked.
During the fighting, although of course I had not been in the trenches
myself, I had followed, as far as this could be done from a distance,
the trend of the battle. In the grounds of my Headquarters was a tower,
built for purposes other than those to which it was put this freezing
night. It was on high ground, in fact the only high ground within range
of our front, and from this vantage point I watched from dusk till dawn
the progress of the fight, only varying my vigil by constant visits to
the telephone in the house to keep in touch with Divisional
Headquarters. I can remember no occasion in my life when I felt more
acutely the desire to succeed, for where my Corps was in the grips of
death was my entire world.
Sir John French sent us his hearty congratulations on the results of the
fighting.
CHAPTER X
The fighting east of Festubert had been full of incidents which
furnished us with useful material for future operations. The German
strength directly opposite the Corps at this time may be taken at about
20,000 Infantry in addition to Pioneers, and an unknown number of guns
of all calibres. Ours should have been near that same number, but was,
owing to heavy casualties without replacements on any but a nominal
scale, very much less. What was found was that the enemy had already
achieved great skill in sapping up to our lines, and in this respect was
infinitely superior. Having completed his saps, and aided by grenades
and trench mortars, there was nothing to prevent his capturing our first
lines of trenches, nor for long after this time were we able to employ
his methods. The time came when the tables were turned; but you cannot
reach the skies while your feet are still on the earth, and ours were
deep in the Flanders mud. We also found that it makes for efficiency to
have British troops interspersed with the Indians. In this case only on
the extreme right was there half a Highland battalion, and on the
extreme left one company of an Irish regiment.
But whatever we may have learned, the Huns discovered that the Indian
Corps could give back all and more than it got, and we braced ourselves
up in the certain belief that although England had been sadly behind in
providing us with the means of paying back the enemy in his own coin,
she would assuredly make up way, and then would come our turn.
I often said all this to the Indian officers and men, and it cheered
them; they knew our real strength; they began to realise that we had
been caught tripping; and from surprise at first that this should ever
have been possible, they gradually became sarcastic at the expense of
the Huns. One Jawan (young fellow) even declared that if the Germans
would exchange weapons the war would be over in a week. “Not if we kept
them as clean as you do,” remarked a comrade, and all laughed. I
discovered our recruit had been reprimanded that morning for having a
dirty rifle on parade.
On the 24th November I attended my first conference at General
Headquarters. All the Corps Commanders were present, and although I knew
some of them and had casually met others at manœuvres which I had
attended when on leave from India (and I may here add that every time I
came home on leave I never missed attending manœuvres, British or
foreign, as opportunity offered), I felt for the first time in France
that I was a stranger. I heard as I came into the hall, “Who is that?”
“He commands the Indians.” It was as if some foreign general had
suddenly dropped into the sacred haunts of Whitehall in pre-war days.
However, I was prepared for it. I knew that most of them would hold out
the hand of welcome to our Indian soldiers, and it was satisfactory that
at our first meeting I was able to tell the Commander-in-Chief the
results of our fighting that very morning. Sir John French and Sir
Horace Smith-Dorrien congratulated me on the conduct of all ranks, and I
was rather pleased than otherwise that I was not one of those present
who might be referred to as Tom, Dick, or Harry.
On the 26th November I wrote to G.H.Q. giving a statement of the
strength of the Indian Corps which, including the Secunderabad Cavalry
Brigade, then numbered only 14,000 rifles or little over that of a
British Division, and was reducing at the rate of about eighty a day and
stating that I could receive no further reinforcements from India before
the 5th December, when the Sirhind Brigade should rejoin from Egypt. In
addition I pointed out that the British battalions averaged only 700 men
each, a pitifully low one for work in this Corps. I laid stress on the
fact that there were indications we might be again attacked, and that
one Brigade would, before the arrival of reinforcements, have done
forty-five days, and all the others thirty-five days actually in, or in
support of, the trenches, with only scraps of such rest as could be
arranged. I requested that under these conditions the Corps might be
given a complete rest of a few days when the reinforcements arrived;
gave full reasons why I considered it absolutely necessary, and
suggested remedies for our shortage in numbers and for increasing them.
One of these was the addition of Territorial battalions, and I may add
that, although G.H.Q. did not at first appear to approve of this, I did
get first two, and later a total of six, of these fine battalions, and
of them I shall have much to say as I progress. I said plainly that
unless my request was agreed to, the Corps would soon only be equivalent
to a single Division.
The reply to my letter stated that the condition of the Indian Corps was
well known, and I was to exercise caution in its employment, and that
the Commander-in-Chief would give such assistance as was possible, and
this was outlined; but I was given no hope of a rest for the Corps as a
whole, except such as I could eke out after the reinforcements arrived.
I realised the immense difficulties of the Commander-in-Chief; but I am
now writing for those who, knowing nothing of our own difficulties,
passed hasty judgement and unfairly criticised men who were in truth
doing right good work.
As a matter of fact no rest was given, but the Indian Corps held on to
its line for twenty-four days longer, reducing daily and being
eventually altogether too weak for its task. As if, however, to strain
the rope to the last strand, after the reinforcements arrived, instead
of deriving any benefit I was ordered to farther extend my front to
include Givenchy and up to the La Bassée-Bethune road. I knew how fatal
was such an order, but there was nothing to do but obey. The French
Brigadier whom we relieved was surprised at the smallness of the numbers
of the relieving troops, and told us his own outgoing strength, which
was very considerably higher. Shortly after that a heavy German attack
was launched at us, straining the tired-out troops to the limit of
endurance and entailing, after three days’ hard fighting, the assistance
of the First Army Corps from reserve to restore the position. All that
will be described in due course; but why I have gone into detail
regarding this matter is that, notwithstanding my having so strongly
urged a rest, and written as plainly as a Corps Commander could well do
in the field, yet in the despatch describing the operations of the 18th
and 19th December I am alluded to as having made an attack on the
Germans, because I deemed it to be “a favourable opportunity.” Nothing
could be farther from the facts. I considered it in truth a most
unfavourable opportunity; but my instructions as they read to me, and
which I will quote fully, were sufficiently clear to lay on me the
definite duty of using every endeavour to make one or more local pushes
to the front if I considered this reasonably feasible, and under those
conditions I chose what appeared to me to be the most favourable
opportunity that presented itself.
I had once drawn attention to the long term of unrelieved duty in the
trenches, and again when my front was extended beyond the power of the
tired Corps to hold on, and I could do no more.
On 28th November I had the honour of entertaining General de Maud’huy,
Commanding Xth French Army, at lunch. He and his Staff stayed till late
in the afternoon, and as usual I never enjoyed anything in France better
than visits to or from our Allied officers.
During the rest of the month the usual trench warfare continued, but
there was one incident worth recording. On the night of the 27th
November a party of the Manchesters, commanded by 2nd Lieut. S. D.
Connell, accompanied by Lieut. F. E. Buller, R.E., advanced and entered
two German saps sixty yards away. The saps were filled in, but in the
subsequent retirement Connell was killed and there were eleven other
casualties. Buller was awarded the Military Cross for his gallantry in
returning to bring in a wounded man, during which attempt he himself was
wounded. The O.C. Manchesters after careful inquiry estimated the German
casualties as not under forty, including an officer who was bayoneted as
he emerged from his dug-out.
On the 1st December His Majesty the King visited the Indian Corps, and
the honour was greatly appreciated by all ranks. There is nothing the
Indian soldier holds in comparison to a word from his Sovereign, and as
the King made frequent inquiries regarding individuals, these of course
were henceforth marked men. As soon as I knew that His Majesty meant to
start his tour from Corps Headquarters at Hinges, I telephoned to
General Maistre in command of the XXIst Corps d’Armée on my right and
asked him to attend. The French General had that morning an important
local duty in his trenches, but nevertheless he came. I had not been
able to tell him on the telephone the reason, as it was essential the
news of the King’s visit should be kept secret till the last moment; and
when he arrived and I explained it to him, he said, “No duty would have
kept me from paying my respects to your King. I am very pleased you let
me know.” His Majesty conversed with him for some time.
The King had all the British and Indian officers introduced to him at
each place where they were collected along the route from Hinges to
Locon: through slush and mud he tramped, adding joy and strength to his
soldiers, and after seeing all the assembled troops who were not on duty
in the trenches, and the Divisional Commanders and Indian Princes and
Chiefs, I had the honour of motoring His Majesty to a battery in action,
where he examined the guns, the men and their dug-outs, and I believe I
must have been one of the first officers to have this honour. He has
since been among many Corps and batteries, but this was his first visit
to the Army in France.
On 4th December I visited General Maistre, and with him went a long tour
of the trenches of the XXIst Corps d’Armée. What struck me most was the
extraordinarily well constructed communication trenches leading up to
the village of Fosse-Calonne. The country was chalky and rolling and as
different as a place could be from our own boggy front. I was also
struck by the perfection to which the French had brought their village
defences. The dug-outs were far more substantial and comfortable than
our own ever were at any time: electric power was available, and hence
many shelters were lighted with electricity, and every man appeared to
be hard at work improving the defences. The whole organisation was
excellent, and the nature of the soil and advantage of having a village
in the centre of the defensive line greatly assisted all their
protective measures. The men were full of humour and gave proof of this
in one room which was loopholed and only thirty yards away from another
held by the Germans. The roof had been damaged by a shell, and through
an opening one of the poilus proceeded to display a tricolour flag on
the end of a pole, his daily amusement. On this occasion, however,
Brother Boche was not to be drawn. On the table was a gramophone, and
another man at once turning it towards the loophole started the
“Marseillaise.” “If this will not fetch them,” he said, “I will try ‘God
save the King.’” But the Hun must have been in his mid-day sleep, as
nothing would move him, and all was quiet till we got outside, when they
started a lively fusillade at a chimney behind us, with what object I
could not surmise.
After spending three very interesting hours we returned by another
trench, and at an opening near a mound I emerged to find a Guard of
Honour drawn up with a band. To my surprise I learnt this was in my
honour, and after being saluted, those fine soldiers marched past me.
Needless to say I was more than gratified by this compliment paid to me
by an Allied brother Corps Commander. It is actions like this that bind
peoples together, and it is only one of a hundred proofs that our
friendship is not on the surface, but deep. Personally, I shall always
look on France as a land where I saw more human nature in its truest
form than I have ever seen elsewhere, and like Alexander and Diogenes
shall feel that if I were not an Englishman I would be a Frenchman.
On the return journey we went over the ruined village of Vermelle
recently taken by the French. I went through the German trenches and was
much surprised to find the comfortable dug-outs of the officers were
furnished with every kind of table, chair, and other luxuries. The walls
had pictures hung, and there were even good lamps and clocks in niches.
It all seemed so different from our own and gave me the impression that
the Huns looked after their comforts far too much. Shooting was going on
and numbers of shells lay unexploded, some of them being English. By
permission of the French Colonel I brought away two kinds of steel
loopholes out of German trenches, and eventually these were sent to
G.H.Q.; but I kept a periscope. These I had not till then seen in our
own Corps. The entire village was a mass of ruins, but a statuette of
the Virgin near a chapel still stood on its pedestal among the debris.
The Sirhind Brigade, under command of Major-General Brunker, arrived
from Egypt on the 7th December, and thus at last the Lahore Division was
completed. With the arrival of this Brigade and considerable drafts from
India, I prepared a scheme for giving my troops as much rest as was
possible; but it was short-lived, for on the 9th December the Chief of
the Staff called and told me the Corps was to extend its front and take
over the village of Givenchy and about a mile to the south of it from
the French. I have already told what this meant to us; but there was no
option, and on the 11th December we took over the trenches at Givenchy,
and as far as the La Bassée-Bethune road.
On the 8th December Sir John French had telegraphed thanking the Corps
for a message we had sent him, and said, “I owe them a deep debt of
gratitude for the splendid services they have rendered and which have
proved of great value in the conduct of the campaign.” Sir John never
failed to say a word at the right time.
On 12th December I attended a conference at G.H.Q., and was then
informed of the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief to commence an
offensive on the 14th December with the Second and Third Corps in
conjunction with the French on the left, with the object of reaching the
line Le Touquet-Warneton-Hollebeke. The Fourth and Indian Corps, though
taking no direct part in this action, were ordered to “carry out active
local operations with a view to containing the enemy now in their
front.” At this time the French on our right, _i.e._ next to the Indian
Corps, also undertook offensive operations.
This was the first of many orders received between this date and 20th
December, and, as I shall show, beginning with small injunctions they
increased in their scope; and the loyal endeavour on my part and that of
my Generals to comply with their spirit only ended when the enemy
launched a heavy attack against several parts of the Indian Corps.
Loyalty should claim no conditions, but it does not always meet with its
reward. As a matter of fact the offensives undertaken received the
commendation of the Commander-in-Chief at the time, as contained in his
own operation orders, and would under ordinary conditions have remained
at that, and no more would have been heard of them. It was the
long-premeditated attack delivered on the 20th December by the enemy
which alone brought us into prominence; and that it was carried out on
that date, just after our local efforts, was a mere coincidence, as the
German prisoners themselves stated the 20th was the day fixed for it.
On the 16th December it was decided to capture two German saps opposite
to the trenches of the 15th Sikhs in the neighbourhood of Givenchy, and
then to extend the operation by securing a portion of the German main
trenches. The troops selected for this operation were taken from the
Ferozepore Brigade.
The 129th Baluchis and 57th Rifles were ready to attack by 8.30 A.M.;
whilst the Connaught Rangers were detailed in support, and a Territorial
battalion (the 142nd), lent by the French General on our right, was held
in reserve. Major Potter with his company of the 129th was quickly
across the thirty yards which separated him from the left sap, and the
other company under Lieut. C. S. Browning also reached its objective;
the casualties in this first rush were not heavy, and both attacks
pushing up the sap were soon close to the enemy main trench.
But (there was always a “but” in the trench operations of those days)
the difficulty now presented itself as to how to reinforce them, as it
was impossible to cross the open space swept by a hail of bullets which
soon destroyed the wounded who had fallen in the first rush. The
attackers were gradually bombed back towards the captured sap-heads.
Browning and all his Indian officers were wounded, and the men in the
right sap got jammed in on the sap-head but held on till dusk under a
heavy fire of grenades, whilst Potter and his men in the left sap also
held their position with splendid determination.
A party of the 15th Sikhs who had accompanied each attack were meantime
working heart and soul to dig a trench back from the sap-head to our
main trench, and the 21st Company Sappers and Miners and working parties
of the 34th Pioneers were engaged in the same process to join up with
them from our own side. The right sap was the more difficult of the two,
and before connection could be established the remnants of our men in
the sap-head, fearing that relief would be late, made an attempt to
cross the open over the fifteen yards which still separated them from
their comrades: the distance was short but the devastating fire which
the enemy rained across it killed or wounded every man as he ran, and
the Hun had his revenge in the recapture of his lost ground.
Potter in the left sap was more fortunate, the new communication trench
being completed by dark, when he and his men withdrew into our own line.
His cool bearing and gallantry were never more conspicuous than on this
day, and though he was missing a few days later during an attack, his
name will live in the history of his Corps.
The casualties were heavy. In the Baluchis Captain Ussher, Subadar Adam
Khan, and fifty men were killed; Lieut. Browning, Captain Money, two
Indian officers, and seventy rank and file were wounded.
Writing of the 129th Baluchis brings to mind one or two good stories of
that battalion. Early in November, for purposes of identifying enemy
corps on our front, C.O.’s were asked to secure a few prisoners. One
afternoon Sepoy Abdulla Jan, a Mahsud, asked permission of his section
commander to cross “No Man’s Land” and enter a German sap. This was
refused, but shortly after, no N.C.O. being near, Abdulla slipped over
the parapet, ran across to the sap and jumped in. There was a Hun in it
all right but, possessing no rifle, he promptly bolted. The section
commander, having meantime returned along our trench, looked over the
parapet and saw our gallant friend; he shouted to him to return, which
the man did very quietly, and on arrival, being asked what he was at,
replied that he was trying to get hold of a German rifle and did not
think it worth while bringing in a mere man without it. His native
instinct had got the better of his discretion, as a Mahsud in his own
hills will risk his life to steal or otherwise procure a good firearm.
On being told a rifle was as nothing in value compared to a man, he at
once volunteered to go out again and capture one, and was much disgusted
when his request was refused.
These Mahsuds were on their first trial in our regular Corps, and in
some respects showed aptitude for trench warfare. As soon as our
roughly-made hand-grenades began to be issued they asked to be allowed
to use them, and the gallant Robson, R.E., of whom I told in the attack
by the 39th Garhwalis on November 23, gave them several lessons in their
use. The men were quite delighted, and parties often went out and bombed
German saps and entirely stopped the Huns working on that particular bit
of front. I have one more story of the 129th Baluchis.
The C.O., being in need of a change in his menu, one morning sent his
Afridi orderly and a signaller to find a chicken; no special method of
procuring it was prescribed, except that the men were to leave by the
communication trench. Some hours later the signaller returned with the
chicken and reported that the orderly had been arrested by the
Provost-Marshal for looting an empty shop (mark the words). This was
followed by another report from the Staff Captain. Next morning, to the
C.O.’s surprise, the orderly turned up as usual. Asked by what means he
had returned he quietly said, “I told the officer that I was taking the
things for you”; and later a large bundle arrived from Brigade
Headquarters addressed to the C.O. and on it a label, “Herewith your
property.” The contents comprised a bedspread, two blankets, a box of
china basins, knives, forks, a lady’s parasol, and a pair of stays. When
asked what the stays were for he replied, “They make very good hockey
pads.” Such were some of the lighter sides of trench warfare.
However, stern events were now ahead of us, and the Corps was about to
bear the brunt of a heavy German blow. On the 17th December, the
operation orders from Chief of Staff, G.H.Q., stated that it was the
intention of the Commander-in-Chief to “attack vigorously all along the
front” on the 18th, with the Second, Third, Fourth, and Indian Corps,
and a further paragraph directed that these Corps “will demonstrate and
seize any favourable opportunity which may offer to capture any enemy
trenches in their front.”
It is hard to reconcile the two operations contained in the self-same
order. To “attack vigorously” is clear enough; to “demonstrate” is to
make only a show of doing so. How can you do both at the same time?
This order was issued from G.H.Q. at 9 P.M. on the 17th December. My
orders based on it were timed 2.45 A.M. on the 18th, and the operations
planned were ordered to commence at 10 A.M. on the same day. At 10.15
A.M. G.H.Q. issued instructions that the efforts of the Second, Fourth,
and Indian Corps should be concentrated only on such objectives as were
reasonably feasible. At the risk of going into technical details for a
moment, I must give the orders in their sequence so that military
readers may realise the difficult conditions under which I had to carry
on operations until the German attack came on us. On this same date
(December 18) another order from G.H.Q. issued at 4.15 P.M. said the
Second, Third, Fourth, and Indian Corps would continue to demonstrate on
the 19th December along the whole front and seize every favourable
opportunity which may offer to capture any of the enemy’s trenches.
Now in order to capture enemy trenches it is necessary to make elaborate
and detailed arrangements. You cannot issue orders the same as you might
do in open warfare, and indeed it is the carefully-thought-out and
elaborate plans adopted since those early days that have turned this
trench warfare into an exact science, and why two years later even less
highly trained troops, assisted, it is true, by an overwhelming
Artillery fire, grenades, howitzers, etc., were able to carry out their
programme with something approaching mathematical exactitude. But all
this was different in 1914; we had then to do our best without these
aids and to take the consequences.
I have often thought how different might have been the results of some
of the many attacks carried out by Indian troops had we arrived “After”
instead of “Before” unlimited ammunition and all the other helps to
victory had come to be looked on as part of the absolute necessaries for
any advance.
A distinguished General said to me in 1917: “When _you_ were in France
it was a crime to say it was necessary to success to have a large gun
support; now any one volunteering to carry out an enterprise except with
an unlimited amount of shells would be looked on as a fool and take his
_congé_ at once.” What a pleasant change!
On the 18th and 19th, operations were carried out by the Indian Corps as
will shortly be narrated, and G.H.Q. was of course kept fully informed.
On this latter date the Commander-in-Chief’s orders were as follows:
Issued at 6 P.M. The operations conducted yesterday were attended in
several cases with marked success. Although the ground gained has not
in all cases been maintained the balance of advantage rests with us
and promises well for further progress. It is the intention of the
Commander-in-Chief that the Second, Third, Fourth, and Indian Corps
should continue until further orders to prosecute similar enterprises
under Corps arrangements, taking every possible measure to consolidate
and “extend” [my inverted commas] all successes achieved.
Such were the orders received by me from the 12th to 19th December
inclusive, and it was in accordance with them that the operations of the
Corps, now about to be told, were carried out. As will be seen, we
succeeded in occupying a portion of enemy trenches and sap-heads, and
captured two machine-guns and some prisoners, and, as I said before, but
for the German attack on us the following day, our job would probably
have been considered as very successful.
Details were, of course, left to Divisional Commanders, but the
responsibility was mine, for I could have altered or refused to sanction
them. In the case of the Meerut Division matters were allowed to stand
as proposed. In the case of the Lahore Division for their attack on
19th, General Watkis proposed an attack on a front of 1000 yards. I
reduced this to 300 yards, leaving the choice of the part to be attacked
to him. We had neither the men nor the guns for the larger attack, and
our orders limited us to distinctly minor operations.
The Commander-in-Chief’s despatch on this battle stated that the losses
in the Meerut Division after the first attack on the 19th December and
subsequent return to its own trenches were “considerable,” but the total
casualties amounted to eighty-two, including officers. The Lahore
Division fought for several successive days before the German attack was
launched, and during this time lost very heavily, especially in
officers; but in both Divisions not a single regimental officer in the
Indian Army was “mentioned” in the body of the despatch, and only two in
the British Service.
At this time our distribution was as under. The French on our right had
their extreme left on the Bethune-La Bassée road. From this road to the
canal was held by the Connaught Rangers of the Ferozepore Brigade, and
the remainder of this Brigade held the trenches as far as east of
Givenchy. The Sirhind Brigade was on their left and extended the line
keeping parallel to the Festubert road, up to within half a mile of the
cross-roads at La Quinque Rue. This completed the front of the Lahore
Division; and the Meerut Division, with the Seaforth Highlanders of the
Dehra Dun Brigade on their extreme right, was distributed as follows:
Remainder of this Brigade in position as far as the cross-roads on the
Rue du Bois, the line passing through what was commonly then known as
“The Orchard,” though this name later caused some confusion, owing to
the fact that several other orchards existed. The Garhwal Brigade was on
the left of the Corps, and held trenches as far as the cross-roads south
of Neuve Chapelle.
Both the Lahore and Meerut Divisional Commanders had arranged local
offensive operations to give effect to the orders of the
Commander-in-Chief, and these were put into execution on the morning of
the 19th. The portion of German trench to be attacked by the Lahore
Division was just opposite the junction of the Ferozepore and Sirhind
Brigades, and the attacking troops consisted of one battalion from each
Brigade.
The Meerut Division had selected as its objective the German trenches
near the “Orchard,” and opposite the 6th Jats on the left of the Dehra
Dun Brigade. The attacking troops consisted of one and a half battalions
of the Garhwal Brigade.
Both attacks were accompanied by a complement of Sappers and Pioneers. A
biting cold wind blew over the trenches, making it impossible to get any
warmth into the body, as the Meerut Division party, which advanced
first, left its trenches.
Half an hour after midnight the Leicesters moved to the salient whence
would start the attack, and by 3.30 A.M. deployed and began the advance.
The battalion was commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Blackader, and he had
under him a splendid body of officers and men. The remainder of his
troops consisted of half of the 2/3rd Gurkhas, a company of the 107th
Pioneers, and a party of Sappers.
Immediately the advance began machine-guns swept the area, but, although
held up by barbed wire and a hedge, Captain Romilly, who was with his
company on the left, stopped at nothing until they had entered the Hun
trench and captured two machine-guns. The enemy, not caring to face this
class of men, had bolted as we neared the objective, but the Leicesters
once started are hard to stop, and into the hail of another gun which
had opened on them went the men from the Midland County. Again the bird
had flown, but a second trench was ours and was only abandoned when it
was seen that it was too far in advance and under our own Artillery
fire. The captors took up their position in the first trench and at once
put it into a proper state of defence.
The right company of the Leicesters with equal determination had soon
made themselves masters over 100 yards of trench, but in bombing along
this found it led into the main trench, and when within only a few yards
of this, seven of the eight bombers were put out of action. A barricade
was erected and, being reinforced by their own men and some of the 3rd
Gurkhas, they held on. This, however, left a gap between the right and
left attacking companies, which Major Dundas and his Gurkhas, with
splendid élan, endeavoured to bridge. The enemy, however, held this
portion of the trench strongly, and although driven back with grenades
and bayonets, still remained in possession of a considerable part of it.
The Gurkhas suffered from a close enfilade fire, but consolidated their
gains.
In the result the trenches captured by the Leicesters on the right were
lost, as the enemy employed machine-guns to cut away the barricades and
followed up with unlimited bombing. New barricades were constructed but
shared the same fate, and, as Dundas on the left found it impossible to
advance farther, and all ranks were under heavy minenwerfer fire, a
withdrawal of the right attack was carried out deliberately and in good
order. The left company held on all day to the captured trenches but was
withdrawn by 8.30 P.M., having done its duty well.
Meantime General Anderson, commanding the Meerut Division, had with his
usual energy been doing all that was possible to enable the Leicesters
to hold on; an attack by portions of the Dehra Dun Brigade had been
arranged, but the Germans, now thoroughly roused and angry, and having
made their preparations for the attack they had planned for the next
day, the 20th, began a very heavy bombardment of our trenches, specially
selecting the “Orchard” portion of them, on which shell-fire was
concentrated, damaging everything in the vicinity, blowing men to bits,
and rendering any hold on them quite impossible. At the same time it was
reported by aviators that numbers of the enemy were concentrating on
this and other fronts, and everything pointed to a counter-attack.
During the fighting I had placed troops as necessitated from the Corps
Reserve at the disposal of the G.O.C. Meerut Division.
It has always been a wonder to me how in these winter days of 1914 the
Indian troops did their work so well. If any man trusted them to fight,
I did: but I knew their limits. What surprises me as I look back on it
all is that they stood the strain as they did. It was in truth a
prolonged feat of arms.
The result of this destructive fire was to render the “Orchard”
untenable, and a new line fifty yards farther to the west was taken up
and put into the best state of defence possible, but this was only done
late in the evening and after the Brigadier had reported the
impossibility of holding on any longer; a few Scouts still remained in
the destroyed trenches. Orders were got ready for a combined
counter-attack the next morning, but before this could be carried out
the prepared and due Hun attack was launched and a new phase in the
operations begun.
The following are amongst those who were brought to special notice
during these operations: Colonel Blackader, who led his battalion and
withdrew it skilfully; Major Knatchbull, Captain Romilly, and Lieut.
Tooley, all of the Leicesters; No. 6275 Private Buckingham, for great
gallantry (and it is pleasant to record that this brave soldier later in
the war won the V.C.); Sergeant Sutherland, Lance-Corporal Brakes, and
Private Crisp; and if all the names of other brave Leicester officers
and men were recorded here and whenever the battalion was engaged they
would fill many pages. Captain Lodwick, 3rd Gurkhas, who with his
machine-gun team rendered good service; Rifleman Thaman Gharti and Major
Dundas of the same battalion came in for high praise; and Captain C. D.
Bamberger, R.E., who was killed, would have assuredly been rewarded had
he survived.
We had on the left made our demonstration—or give it any other name. We
had certainly succeeded on this flank in holding the enemy to his ground
and prevented him sending away troops to other parts of his front. We
had captured a few prisoners and machine-guns, and now we were doing our
best to hold his attacks.
CHAPTER XI
Before beginning the story of the Lahore Division’s share in this
fighting, it is well to state that the Indian Corps had received
meantime two notable additions to its strength. The 4th Suffolks was the
first of the Territorial battalions to join us. I saw them on parade and
told them how glad I was to have them with us. I explained how it was
proposed to employ them, and particularly noticed their physique and
workmanlike appearance. I had but little acquaintance with the Force,
and had never soldiered with any but regular British troops in my life,
and hence I was able to take an impartial view.
The next to join us was the 4th Seaforths, another of that wonderful
Army which leapt from the dim shadow of neglect into the fulness of the
shining light of war, and gave England immediate proof of the truth that
though we are the least military we are the most warlike race on earth.
This battalion was intended to learn its trench work from the sister
regular battalion of Highlanders, forming part of the Indian Corps.
Immediately after their arrival I saw them at Vieille Chapelle, December
20. Even whilst I was going round and talking to the officers and
N.C.O.’s, the angry and increasing roar of guns was growing louder, and
just as I had finished explaining how they would at first be employed by
platoons in the trenches, an orderly arrived with a note to say the
German attacks were in full swing and my presence was required at my
Headquarters. These days of telephone warfare have destroyed the
glamour, such as is left of it, for Generals. It is difficult to get
away and see something of the fray oneself, but it amused me to think
after all my explanations and injunctions that this corps was in fact to
learn its lesson in the thick of the fighting without any preliminary
practice at all. Thus the 4th Seaforths, under their fine commander,
MacFarlane, marched away from the ground and their next halt was in the
second-line trenches running south from La Couture. The officers and men
all looked like fighters, and, as will be related later, they did not
belie their looks and rendered grand service throughout.
In accordance with the general plans for the local offensives,
Lieut.-General Watkis, in command of the Lahore Division, had also
directed an attack, on December 19, against a front of 300 yards of
German trenches N.E. of Givenchy, as already stated. The attacking
companies were drawn from the Highland Light Infantry and the 4th
Gurkhas, the latter being on the right, and this formed the left of the
combined Divisional attack, and was commanded by Colonel Ronaldson,
H.L.I., a good soldier. The Ferozepore Brigade was on the right of the
Sirhinds, and the 129th Baluchis were to have furnished the companies to
complete the attack which was being delivered from the point of junction
of the two Brigades, but this battalion, after its hard fighting on the
16th instant, was not fit for another thrust and was replaced by the
59th Rifles of the Jalandar Brigade.
The Sirhind attack was delivered at 5.34 A.M. after a very brief
Artillery preparation from field guns and howitzers. I have seen this
criticised in Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s most interesting book, _The
British Campaign in France and Flanders_, 1914, but it is necessary to
remember that our ammunition supply was very limited in those days and
commanders occasionally preferred a very short bombardment and a bigger
reserve to meet the counter-attacks, and to enable our men to hold on
and consolidate, or cover their retirement should such become necessary.
In any case the assault was completely successful, two lines of trenches
being taken. Though the distance was considerably over 150 yards, our
casualties in this first rush were few and over seventy prisoners fell
into our hands. The attack was made in four lines, the first being under
the command of Major B. U. Nicolay, 4th Gurkhas. He was wounded next
day, but commanded here with skill and behaved under trying
circumstances with the utmost coolness. He reported that the conduct of
the H.L.I. and 4th Gurkha detachment was admirable and described the
conditions, which, shortly explained, were these: The captured trenches
were about 200 yards long, straight and without traverses, and they were
found after some time to be under enfilade fire from the higher ground
on the right rear near Givenchy village. The trenches became overcrowded
and the saps between our own trenches and these were not finished.
Colonel Ronaldson reported that had it been possible to join these up
the gains would assuredly have been retained. Nicolay and his command
held on throughout a long and very trying day, and then, seeing the
hopelessness of the position, retired, with all the wounded, towards
dusk. The captures of the day were lost and we were once more back in
our own trenches.
Captain Cramer-Roberts, 4th Gurkhas, behaved with splendid gallantry in
carrying back a message over the open; he was thrice wounded but
nevertheless persevered, and just managed to reach the trench and give
his information to Colonel Ronaldson. He received a D.S.O. The name of
Major Gardiner, R.E., was prominently brought to notice for good work.
Our bombs had run out early in the day and the only others available
were a few found in the captured German trench, which Nicolay used with
good effect on their former owners. An incident occurred in front of the
H.L.I. advanced platoon which was already in those early days opening
our eyes to Hun methods. A German officer advanced with a white flag,
and his men, who had put on some of our Balaclava caps, under this
protection hoped to deceive us. They gained but a temporary advantage
and were soon found out, many being hit, and had thus added one more
deed to their scroll of shame.
After dark over thirty machine-guns concentrated their fire on the
H.L.I. trenches, foreshadowing the preparations which were in the making
for the attack next day.
In the H.L.I. Captain Pringle and Lieut. Anderson were missing and
Lieut. Kerr was killed. Sergeant Whitton, H.L.I., was strongly commended
by Major Nicolay, who also brought to notice the names of Subadar Durga
Gurung, Havildar Hara Sing Thapa, Naik Dharmraj Gurung, and Rifleman
Jangia Thapa, Cramer-Roberts’ orderly. Correspondence found in the
enemy’s trenches showed that we had been opposed chiefly by portions of
the 3rd, 13th, and 56th regiments, XIV. Division of Prussians.
Captain Inglis, Adjutant of the 4th Gurkhas, had guided the troops to
their rendezvous, and had then insisted as a reward on accompanying them
in the assault, and was killed. A good specimen of those splendid
British officers of which the Indian Army can boast so many.
Lieut. C. H. Anderson, H.L.I., one of those glorious spirits who are
well described in the Book of Job: “He saith unto the trumpets, Ha! Ha!
and he smelleth the battle afar off, the thunder of the Captains and the
shouting,” rushed on to the German Reserve trench, which he and his
Highlanders took in their stride, and shouting, “We are going to capture
Chapelle St. Roch,” those brave men went into the darkness, through the
pelting rain and storm, and were no more seen.
From scenes like these old Scotia’s grandeur springs.
The 59th Rifles, who attacked on the right, were only able to reach the
main German trench with a few men. Their task was a difficult one as
they had only just reached the front to relieve the 129th Baluchis, and
it was a wild stormy night with heavy rain and the ground was unknown to
them. It would have been better to have told off another corps for the
purpose, but the G.O.C. Division found it was the only way to carry out
his orders.
One company joined with the H.L.I. on their left; a platoon of another
company lost direction and went away to its right. The result was that a
number of men eventually got into the two saps on the right and left of
those attacked and held on. These two saps ran almost the whole way
between the German lines and ours. A bit which was incomplete in the
right sap was eventually, after many hours, joined up by the Sappers and
Miners, thus enabling a party of the 129th Baluchis who were holding the
main trenches to relieve the 59th. In this affair Jemadar Mangal Singh
of the 59th behaved with great gallantry and received the I.D.S.M.
After the first advance the fighting was of a very confused nature owing
to the darkness, rain, etc., and the reports that can be pieced together
are not sufficiently clear to enable me to form a connected story. This,
however, is certain, that considering the general mix up in the dark,
many deeds of bravery were performed, and although the attack did not
succeed in capturing any length of German trench, and thereby exposed
the right of the trench which had been captured to a flank attack by the
enemy, the 59th Rifles, well directed by their officers, made every
endeavour to accomplish their task.
Captain B. Anderson of this battalion, whom I had once seen lead a
charge against a band of Ghazis across the Indian border, was here again
leading his men, but on this occasion, unlike the Ghazis, who died
fighting to a man, the Germans turned and ran. Lieut. J. G. Atkinson was
killed. Lieut. W. A. McCrae-Bruce by his personal disregard of danger
set a splendid example which kept his men together in the turmoil.[8]
Havildar Dost Mahomed and Havildar Abdul Wahab were awarded the I.O.M.,
and a small party of men whose names cannot be recorded, for they all
perished, behaved splendidly, refusing to retire because the body of
their officer, Lieut. Bruce, had not been recovered.
Captain H. N. Lee and R. C. Gilchrist were killed during the attack on
and capture of the left sap, whilst Captain Scale was wounded and the
battalion had over 100 other casualties. Lieut. Scobie received the
Military Cross for his share in holding on to the left sap. Lieut.
Kisch, R.E., did excellent work under a heavy fire.
An attack on a German sap-head by two platoons of the 1st Gurkhas had
been ordered to be carried out at 5.30 A.M. this same day, and the
officers to accompany it were Captain T. Burke and Lieut. L. B. Rundall.
The latter was the younger of two sons of Colonel Rundall, an old friend
and comrade of mine who had served on my Staff. I knew both boys, and
all three of these fighting soldiers belonged to Gurkha regiments. The
elder brother was a Captain in the 4th Gurkhas and both were killed on
this and the following day, behaving as British officers do when stern
work is in hand, and leaving a name which will be cherished in the
Gurkha Brigade.
This attack could not be launched in time, owing to various causes, and
orders were issued cancelling it, but for some unknown reason the
assault was carried out at about 10 o’clock. As usual, the two brave
fellows rushed forward at the head of their men and were met by a hail
of fire and the leaden scythe mowed them down. About fifty took part in
the assault, of whom half were killed or wounded, both British officers
being among the former.
This brings the story of the Lahore Division’s attempts on December 19
to engage the enemy and help our other Army Corps and our French Allies
who were operating on our right to an end. As I said before, in
themselves, though described at length, they were only local offensives,
but they were unfortunate in as far as they had severely tried our
already tired troops on the very eve of the prepared German attack. In
war the man who can truly forecast events is of more value than many
legions of soldiers. All one can do is to endeavour by every means in
one’s power to carry out the Commander-in-Chief’s plans. Both Divisions
had done their duty.
The Meerut Division after the fighting on the 19th December was disposed
as under: Garhwal Brigade back in its own trenches; to their right the
6th Jats, the left battalion of the Dehra Dun Brigade, held their line
with the right thrown back so as to connect with, and conform to, the
retired line of the 2nd Gurkhas behind the “Orchard”; the Seaforth
Highlanders formed the right of the Brigade to near the “Picquet” house,
from which point the Sirhind Brigade of the Lahore Division continued
farther still to the right.
About 9 A.M., December 20, the attack on the Meerut Division was
started. The 2nd Gurkhas and the Seaforths—old and trusted comrades—were
singled out, and a heavy bombardment and Infantry advance told the
Division that a day which was to be an important one for the Indian
Corps had begun. Half an hour later word reached General Anderson that
the Seaforths’ right was in the air owing to the retirement of the left
of the Sirhind Brigade and that they were being heavily attacked from
this flank and at the same time bombed on their left owing to retirement
of part of the 2nd Gurkhas, which exposed them to the enemy’s bombers.
The Seaforths never lose an inch of ground without making the attackers
pay a heavy toll, but they were now fighting against great odds,
hand-grenades, machine-guns, and trench mortars, with both their flanks
in the air. One company was driven from its trench, but not until fifty
per cent of the enemy lay dead in it. Captain the Hon. St. Clair was
killed just as he had skilfully withdrawn into and was holding a
communication trench.
The 2nd Gurkhas were again put to a severe test this day; bombed and
overmatched, they were driven from their newly-occupied trenches;
followed up with hand-grenades and harried they retired, but always took
their toll in the retreat and finally drew up in a retired position
under Major Boileau, a soldier with an extraordinary personality. I
cannot better describe him than in the words of one of his own Gurkha
officers, “Asal Jangi Sahib” (a truly brave gentleman). With him was
Major Watt, another staunch fighter. During this fighting the Gurkhas
were pushed back a long way and were glad indeed to meet the 9th Gurkhas
coming up to their assistance. To do what is set you is of course the
best proof that you are competent to do it, but I have found in life
that sometimes though you may fail in the eyes of your judges, you may
nevertheless have done everything that was possible. Those gallant
Gurkhas deserved success, and I would as soon have them by me in a tight
place as any battalion I know.
It is instructive to note that at this moment N Battery, R.H.A., from
the Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade, came into action and helped materially
by its fire across the front. This was the only calibre of gun
(18-pounders) for which we were not limited to a certain number of
rounds of ammunition, and the confidence this inspired, with the
excellence of the fire itself, was equal to many heavier batteries.
Think of it, the warriors of later times! An Army Corps was rejoiced at
the advent of six guns, manned by the pick of the Army, and instead of
wondering how it was going to be done, considered themselves fortunate
and bound to win. Unlimited ammunition! although only for six guns it is
true: but the surprise caused by the advance of the first six tanks in
later days was as nothing compared to that of the General who found
himself with six real guns and plenty of rounds for each. “Tempora
mutantur, nos et mutamur in illis.”
To fill the gap between the Seaforths and the retired line of the
Gurkhas, the 58th Rifles were ordered up; half the 41st Dogras was also
placed at the disposal of the G.O.C. Dehra Dun Brigade, and half the
Black Watch to form a link between Seaforths and the retired left of
Sirhind Brigade.
It was now 1 o’clock, December 20, and in order to retain the thread of
the story and make the movements of both Divisions coincide, I will
leave the Meerut Division and relate the occurrences which had taken
place in the Lahore Command.
Simultaneously with the attacks already described on the Meerut
Division, the Germans started their operations against the Lahore
Division, and from the early morning of the 20th December the trenches
were subjected to a fierce fire from guns and mortars, and then followed
a series of mine explosions under the trenches occupied by the Sirhind
Brigade. Soaked with rain which had lasted through the night; wearied by
the previous day’s trials; standing in bog knee-deep with the mud
slipping in as fast as it could be shovelled out of the trenches, and
with numbers totally inadequate to the front held, the British and
Indian troops began the resistance which lasted for twenty-four hours
without any extraneous help, and continued it for another twenty-four
hours until in part relieved by fresh troops of the First Army Corps;
when first the Lahore and later the Meerut Divisions were withdrawn,
with difficulty lasting out the ordeal. The wonder is not that they were
literally done up but that they were able to hold out as they did.
And the men who came to their relief, what of them? They were some of
the finest troops in our Army, the famous First Corps of Mons and Ypres
fame: with double our reduced numbers, fresh from a rest in reserve,
full of fight. Guards, Highlanders, Irish and English: neither Germans
nor anybody else could have withstood such a gathering; and as they
looked at our tired-out men, amongst them a few British battalions of
their own countrymen, as fine soldiers as themselves, battle-stained and
mud-grimed, I do not believe there was one amongst the brave new
arrivals who did not own that the Indian Corps had indeed had a hard
task and done its duty well.
The fight that followed showed them that it was a determined foe they
had to deal with, and 2400 casualties in their own ranks before the line
was more or less restored was evidence of the hard fighting which had
taken toll of over 4000 British and Indian soldiers.
However, to my story. The right of the Sirhind Brigade was the first to
bear the brunt, and here a half company of the H.L.I. and a double
company[9] of the 4th Gurkhas suffered very heavy losses, being buried
or blown up by the well-engineered explosions. The day had not then
arrived when we were able to detect and counter this underground
warfare; it was new to the Indian Corps at any rate, nor had we the
appliances to put it into use.
Amongst the survivors of these first explosions was Colour-Sergeant
Brisbane, H.L.I., who had served with me in Ashanti fourteen years
previously. I had met him later in India, and on this day we were once
more separated, for after holding on to the last, he with his officer,
Lieut. D. Barry, and some others were captured by the enemy. May we meet
again!
Another double company of the 4th Gurkhas made a stout resistance
against heavy odds, but were driven from their trenches, and at about 1
P.M. these were occupied by the Germans, who were coming on in massed
formation.
During this fighting, which ended in many hand-to-hand encounters,
Captain A. M. Rundall of the 4th Gurkhas, brother of the Lieutenant
whose death I described in the previous day’s fighting, led a bombing
party in a counter-attack, himself killed two Germans, and died fighting
at the head of his few men.
A glorious tale indeed to tell,
’Neath thousand blows one hero fell.
The machine-gun detachment of the 125th (Napier’s) Rifles at this stage
rendered gallant service, and with that of the 4th Gurkhas was
practically destroyed.
Captain R. C. Yates of the 4th Gurkhas with the greater part of his
company was also overwhelmed. It was reported to me after this action
that, whereas the Germans used hundreds of bombs which almost invariably
exploded and caused great damage, our own home-made articles constantly
failed to light or dropped harmless, being wet and unprotected from the
slush and rain.
Farther to the left of the Sirhind Brigade was a double company of the
1st Gurkhas commanded by Major C. Bliss, and a company of the H.L.I.
under Major T. F. Murray, and they had between them four Maxims.
Following heavy mine explosions this section was also attacked by great
numbers of the enemy, who notwithstanding heavy losses, caused
especially by our machine-guns, rushed in and made themselves masters of
the trenches.
Murray and Captain W. Cameron with their men made a fine stand and were
reported killed. Lieut. R. Guthrie-Smith, also of the H.L.I., was killed
and Lieut. C. Pitts-Tucker, whilst crossing the open with sorely needed
reinforcements, was wounded, and most of his party shared his fate or
were killed. Tucker was being carried in by two gallant comrades,
Corporal A. Barr and Private J. Carmichael, when he was again hit and
killed. Both men received the D.C.M.
About 11 o’clock General Watkis ordered up his reserve, and two French
Territorial battalions which were at his disposal, to the neighbourhood
of Givenchy; the 47th Sikhs to move up in reserve of the Sirhind
Brigade, and General Carnegy, commanding the Jalandar Brigade, to make a
flank attack from Givenchy to retake the lost trenches of the Sirhind
Brigade. During the defence of the left section by H.L.I. and 1st
Gurkhas, just described, Lieut. W. Stewart, H.L.I., with seventy men and
two Maxims, held on in the support trench. His party was very much in
the air, but showed splendid grit, tired and overworked as they had been
for two days; but with the help of forty men who reached him at dusk he
held on for nearly twenty-four hours until relieved by troops from the
First British Division. He was awarded the D.S.O.
The assistance rendered by our Artillery at this stage, and indeed
throughout these operations, was the theme of high praise from all ranks
of the Infantry, and well was it deserved, for without it the H.L.I. and
Gurkhas would have been destroyed by the advancing mass of troops.
The 1st Gurkhas, like the H.L.I., were being severely handled and the
enemy had driven a wedge into their line. Major Bliss was mortally
wounded while leading a bayonet charge which succeeded in affording our
sorely-tried men a short respite; Captain H. Momey was killed; but
numbers prevailed, and the Germans having gained a footing on flanks and
centre, and using large numbers of grenades, forced the Gurkhas back
into their support trenches, and quickly following up established
themselves in all our advanced lines. Festubert was reached before the
retiring line could be thoroughly joined up, and some of the troops had
by this time become much disorganised.
Seeing that General Watkis had his hands more than full, and being
apprehensive of further retirement, I had placed the Secunderabad
Cavalry Brigade and Jodhpore Lancers, acting as Infantry, and the 8th
Gurkhas from the Meerut Division, at his disposal, and to these was
added the 47th Sikhs; the whole under General Macbean.
This brings the narrative up to an hour after mid-day of the 20th
December, at which time news was received that the left of the
Ferozepore Brigade had been driven back and that Givenchy was being
heavily attacked.
The Artillery was working with a precision that spoke volumes for them,
and I felt assured that, come what might, the gunners, most of whom I
had known well in India, would answer to any call, and prove as ever
that their motto is well called “Ubique.”
Of the Indian battalions of the newly-arrived Sirhind Brigade two were
Gurkhas and the third was the 125th Rifles. The 1st Gurkhas (King
George’s Own) was raised in 1815 from soldiers who took service with the
British after the fall of Malaun. It went through many changes of name
and shared in many campaigns from Bhurtpore and Aliwal to Tirah. In 1910
it received its present title. A second battalion had been added in
1886.
The 4th Gurkhas was raised in 1857 as the “Extra Gurkha Regiment.” Its
battle honours date from “Ali Musjid and Kabul, 1879,” to “China, 1900.”
A second battalion was added in 1886.
The 125th (Napier’s) Rifles was raised in 1820, largely from men who had
served in the Peishwa’s Army. The battalion received several titles
connecting it with the old Bombay Army from time to time, until in 1903
its present designation was conferred upon it. It had served under
Napier at Meanee and last seen service in Burmah 1885–87.
My story of the action of the Meerut Division stopped at about this same
hour, and it is convenient to take a retrospect and see how the Army
Corps stood exactly at this time in order to better follow the battle.
Beginning with our right, the Ferozepore Brigade was next to and on the
left of the French XXIst Corps d’Armée, the Commander of which had
placed two Territorial battalions at the disposal of the Lahore
Division. The right battalion of the Ferozepore Brigade, the Connaught
Rangers, held the trenches south of the La Bassée Canal. On their left,
covering the east of Givenchy, were the greater part of the 57th Rifles
and part of the 9th Bhopals; these troops had not so far been attacked.
The 129th Baluchis was the left battalion of this Brigade and, as I
said, had just then been reported as retiring. Continuing to the left
stood the Sirhind Brigade, lately arrived from Egypt, and hence fresher
for work than others. The 4th and 1st Gurkhas and H.L.I. held the front;
companies of the Highlanders being interspersed in the Gurkha ranks. The
machine-guns of the 125th Rifles of this Brigade were also up in the
trenches. This ended the line held by the Lahore Division, and the
movements of the Divisional reserves have already been explained. As
will have been seen from the description of the fighting, this whole
Brigade had been driven back and held a now considerably retired line.
Carrying on our line to the north, _i.e._ farther to the left, the
Meerut Division had on its right the Dehra Dun Brigade, of which the
Seaforths occupied their old position, near the Picquet House, and
though being severely attacked were holding on in the most gallant
manner. On their right rear was half of the Black Watch which had been
sent up to establish connection between the Seaforths and the now
retired Sirhind Brigade. To the left of the Seaforths were the 2nd
Gurkhas, considerably drawn back by their retirement; and as a
connecting link to fill the gap the 58th Rifles had been ordered up by
General Anderson. Still farther to the left were the 6th Jats, forming
the left battalion of the Brigade, with their right skilfully thrown
back so as to keep connection with the retired Gurkha line. Finally, the
Garhwal Brigade completed the Meerut Division and was holding its
original line.
[Illustration: From a rough sketch made at the time.]
To continue the story of the Meerut Division from 1 P.M. on the 20th,
where I left them. At this hour the 2nd Gurkhas were holding a line a
quarter of a mile south of La Quinque Rue, and the Seaforths had
recaptured a lost trench on their left, and were bombing the Huns out of
their right, greatly hampered by a heavy fire from the Picquet House,
from which the left of the Sirhind Brigade had been driven. The Germans
were in occupation of the old 2nd Gurkha trenches; the 41st Dogras were
in Brigade reserve, and the 107th Pioneers, half of the Black Watch, and
4th Indian Cavalry were in Divisional reserve at Le Touret. The Garhwal
Brigade was being heavily attacked by shell-fire and trench mortars, but
was holding its own well. All available machine-guns were sent up to
assist this Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel Roche, 6th Jats, as senior officer on the spot, was in
command of his own Corps and all neighbouring reinforcements, and took
prompt measures to consolidate his position, and held it throughout this
and the next day.
The fighting Major Wauchope with half his Black Watch had succeeded by
11 P.M. in re-establishing touch with the Sirhind Brigade on his right
and the Seaforths on his left, and by this manœuvre completed the line
of the Meerut Division. The Germans had pushed in deep in front of the
2nd Gurkhas, but their triumph was only to be a temporary one.
As the attacks all along our front had assumed big proportions by the
afternoon of the 20th December, and I was only too well aware that the
Corps was, after its long tour of trench work since the end of October,
quite unfit for a prolonged struggle, I had asked G.H.Q. for two
Brigades from the Indian Cavalry Corps, which on foot might furnish the
strength of two battalions, and also for a Brigade from the First Army
Corps then in Army reserve, and these were at once given me, and two
additional Brigades from this Corps also arrived and were all employed
the next day, thus making an extra Division. I informed the G.O.C.
Meerut Division that one of these Brigades would reach him next day.
By 3 A.M. on the 21st, the Dehra Dun Brigade reported the enemy massing
on its front, and at 7.45 A.M. the G.O.C. Division learnt that a
counter-attack by the left Brigade of the Lahore Division had been
unsuccessful. At this stage General Keary, commanding the Garhwal
Brigade, suggested a counter-attack by the Dehra Dun Brigade, which he
would support from his side with his reserve battalion, the Leicesters;
this attack did not mature as the Dehra Dun Brigade was too exhausted to
carry it out. By this time the Seaforths on the right were being very
hard pressed, and half of the 107th Pioneers were sent to their
assistance, whilst the remainder of this battalion and the 4th Indian
Cavalry were called up and placed in a second line of trenches.
This remained more or less the position until the arrival that evening
of General Westmacott’s Brigade from the First Army Corps. Owing to
unavoidable delays in bringing this Brigade up, its attack was not
commenced until late in the evening. One battalion of the Royal Sussex
regiment was to relieve the Seaforths whilst the Loyal North Lancashires
and Northamptons attacked the lost “Orchard” positions.
By 10.30 P.M. on the 21st a report was received that this attack had
taken the supporting trenches west of the “Orchard” and was progressing
favourably, but the trenches about it were untenable and the attackers
eventually took position just west of it.
The Dehra Dun Brigade and the other Corps assisting in this part of the
line had now been fighting without a break for seventy-two hours in rain
and mud, and were much reduced in numbers. They had lost the “Orchard,”
but by the action of the troops in that neighbourhood, especially of the
Seaforths, the pivot at the Picquet House was still retained and acted
as a hinge the flexibility of which meant that the Meerut Division’s
line, though deeply indented, was still intact. By 7 o’clock on the
morning of the 22nd December the bulk of the Dehra Dun Brigade, as also
the 58th Rifles and Black Watch, had been withdrawn for a well-earned
rest, and the newly-arrived British Brigade had occupied their places in
the trenches.
At 10 A.M., 22nd December, after General Anderson had arranged for the
handing over of the right of his command to the First Army Corps, an
Artillery observing-officer reported that there was something wrong in
front of the “Orchard,” now held by the British troops, and that a
retirement was taking place there. If fresh Britishers found it
necessary to temporarily give way, it only shows the pressure that our
men had been faced with for two long days.
Tired out as they were, orders were at once given for the still fit
Indian Corps battalions to move up again and the others to stand fast.
The _contretemps_ was put right by the G.O.C. 2nd British Brigade before
10.30 o’clock; and at this hour on the 22nd December, the second
shortest day of the year, but, like the 21st, the longest in a fighting
sense, the worn-out troops at last found some rest, although still
retained ready in case of need. The Divisional Commander in reporting
his positions wound up with the words: “The worn-out Seaforth
Highlanders and 58th Rifles are now in reserve.”
At this point, 1 P.M., 22nd December, I will leave the Meerut Command
and describe the heavy fighting which was all this time going on in the
Lahore Division in and near that place of ill omen yclept Festubert.
Before doing so I will turn from the general story and record a few of
the names of those heroic soldiers who throughout these days had
maintained the traditions of the British and Indian Armies. I often
feel, and I say it in truth, that the rewards of Senior Generals are
seldom their own, but rather the work of subordinates of all ranks; and
if I had the power I would issue gazettes notifying them somewhat as
follows, taking as a sample an Army Corps:
In recognition of the fine fighting qualities displayed by the —— Army
Corps during the battle of ——, the G.O.C. in Command is awarded, etc.
I have received many honours from three Sovereigns. I should have
received none had it not been for the officers and men who had to carry
out orders at the risk of their lives, whilst I only issued them. It was
comparatively easy in this trench warfare to say “Promite vires,” when
you yourself were safe. He who has to make decisions under stress of
danger is the hero, and not the man FAR behind the guns.
In writing this story I have relied chiefly on orders and reports I was
able to get copied in France, and on my own diary very carefully kept
from day to day, together with letters and information from friends
since, but I have not had access to all the War diaries of Brigades and
battalions, etc. I cannot therefore pretend to describe in any detail
the doings of all those whose work I saw daily, and can only record such
matters as I have some knowledge of. If, therefore, omissions occur I
can only regret it.
Lieut.-Colonel Widdicombe, who commanded the 9th Gurkhas, did excellent
work; he arrived at a most opportune moment, reinforcing both the 2nd
Gurkhas and 6th Jats during the early fighting on 20th December. Captain
Laing of the Seaforths, leading a bombing party with great gallantry,
rushed and recaptured several traverses in a trench evacuated by the 2nd
Gurkhas, and in which the Huns left over twenty dead. Lieut. I. M.
Macandrew of the same regiment rallied some of the men of the British
Brigade as they retired from the “Orchard” on 22nd, led them in a
bombing attack, and after killing several of the enemy this gallant
young officer and ten of his men were themselves killed. Colonel
Ritchie, ever staunch and brave, Captain Wicks, a very fine soldier, and
Captain Laing, all of the Seaforths, received distinctions. In this
fighting the Seaforths suffered 175 casualties out of 700 engaged.
Major A. Young of the 1st Gurkhas, Brigade Major of the Garhwal Brigade,
had died of wounds on the 14th—a great loss to the Service. Major
Wauchope, Black Watch, was again wounded, and the regiment had to record
severe casualties.
In the 58th Rifles, Captain M. A. R. Bell, 54th Sikhs (attached), whom I
had known for many years, was killed, a very earnest soldier. Jemadar
Mardan Ali and twenty-five others were also killed and thirty-two were
wounded. The losses in killed, wounded, and missing throughout the
Divisions bore witness to the nature of the struggle in which they had
been engaged.
CHAPTER XII
The narrative of the Lahore Division brought us to after mid-day of the
20th December, at which hour the 129th Baluchis, on the left of the
Ferozepore Brigade covering Givenchy, were retiring and their trenches
were in occupation of the enemy, and the village was being attacked. In
consequence General Carnegy’s orders were cancelled, and he was directed
to secure this place; and two batteries from the Fifty-eighth Division
were placed at Watkis’s disposal by the French.
By 3.30 P.M. on the 20th the Manchesters under Colonel Strickland, with
a company of the 4th Suffolks in support, started their attack for the
recovery of the lost Givenchy trenches. By 5 P.M. this gallant
battalion, fighting often with the bayonet, had cleared the Huns out of
the village and recaptured the trenches to the north-east; but they
still retained possession of those to the north of the village; whilst
to the east and southwards the company of the 9th Bhopals, the 57th
Rifles, a portion of the 4th Suffolks, and the Connaught Rangers held
their lines intact.
On the Sirhind Brigade front the right section at 3.30 P.M. was holding
its reserve trenches; farther to the left, notwithstanding its
considerable retirement, touch had been more or less established with
the right of the Meerut Division, and the retired line of the Brigade
was intact, though somewhat disorganised. The enemy at this stage did
not appear to be making a further attack on this front.
Meantime General Macbean, with the Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade,
consisting of the 7th Dragoon Guards, 20th Deccan Horse, 34th Poona
Horse, and Jodhpore Lancers, under Brigadier-General Wadeson, and in
addition the 8th Gurkhas and 47th Sikhs, had been ordered to move to a
position near Marais and counter-attack. This movement was delayed from
various causes, and it was not till midnight that the advance was
actually carried out by the 7th Dragoon Guards and 47th Sikhs.
It was a hopeless attempt; the ground was deep in mud and a network of
ditches, and the enemy’s fire very heavy. Nevertheless these gallant
troops actually reached and entered our abandoned trenches, but were
then subjected to a heavy flanking fire and occasionally to that of our
own guns. Under such conditions it was no wonder they were driven back
to their starting-point and suffered severely. Amongst the killed was
Colonel H. Lempriere, commanding 7th Dragoon Guards, a very gallant
gentleman and hard to replace. Captain J. L. Mansel was killed leading a
rush on enemy machine-guns. Lieutenants R. L. Mann and S. Bryce were
missing. The total casualties of the 7th Dragoon Guards during the short
time they served with the Indian Corps amounted to twenty-six killed or
missing and forty wounded. Sergeant R. Snelling and Private J. Crackett
received the D.C.M.
Another counter-attack was carried out about 5 A.M. on the 21st
December, under command of Colonel Grant, 8th Gurkhas. The troops under
his command now consisted of the 8th Gurkhas, 47th Sikhs, 7th Dragoon
Guards, and Jodhpore Lancers. Stumbling under a pitiless rain, over the
ditches and through mire, this attempt, like the first, was unable to
achieve its object, and eventually a retirement had to be carried out.
To return to Givenchy, where the Manchesters had retaken a great part of
the village, General Watkis had sent the 59th Rifles to reinforce
Carnegy, who had already despatched a company of the 4th Suffolks and
one company of the 142nd French Territorials to Givenchy, as a support
to Strickland in the attack he was about to make on our advanced
abandoned trenches to the north of that village.
This attack was launched about half-past six on the morning of the 21st
December, and carried out with the _élan_ which distinguished that fine
corps, the 1st Manchesters. All that men could do was done, but the hail
of fire from machine-guns, etc., made it impossible to advance far. By
11 o’clock the enemy, after a severe bombardment with shell, pushed home
an Infantry attack which forced us back from the village. Still the
Manchesters again and again made vigorous counter-attacks, though
enfiladed and gradually becoming enveloped, until at length after severe
bayonet fighting the battalion was pushed back and Givenchy practically
lost. Their heroic conduct had, however, saved the position in this part
of our line, and held the enemy at bay just long enough to enable the
fresh troops of a Brigade from the now arriving First Army Corps to stem
and turn the tide. As the Manchesters met the Cameron Highlanders coming
up, they must indeed have been thankful that their stubborn fight had
enabled their Army Corps to still maintain its front and an almost lost
local battle to be turned into a glorious episode.
The battalion in this fighting had two officers (Captain L. Creagh and
Lieut. S. Norman) and sixty-four men killed, and forty-six missing,
whilst three officers and 124 men were wounded. I have known many
splendid Corps in the Army but not one to beat the 1st Manchesters, and
I felt that a brilliant future awaited Strickland. He has since risen to
Major-General and is a K.C.B.
At dawn on this morning I had ridden from Hinges, my Headquarters, to
see one of my Generals, and on my way back I met a brigade of the First
Army Corps now arriving to help us; it was marching towards Givenchy. I
can never forget my feelings as these splendid battalions moved
along—young, vigorous, fresh from a rest in reserve: 1000 strong each,
eager for the battle, they were the very embodiment of certain victory,
and I could not but feel proud of my own brave Corps, many of whom I had
just seen, literally caked in mud and slime, worn out after long weeks
of vigil and toil in the trenches, sadly needing some sleep and rest;
battalions worn to mere skeletons in strength, a few with no more than a
full company in the fight.
But notwithstanding all this they were still holding on, still keeping
the flag flying and doing their duty. I would fain have wished the
addition of some of the newcomers to my own Army Corps; they were my own
flesh and blood, with great traditions and a great cause which all
understood; but I would not have changed places with any living man. It
was enough for me that I was Commander of the Indian Corps, and that
that Corps was so nobly acquitting itself under extraordinary
difficulties.
As stated before, the trenches to the south and east of Givenchy had
during the battle been held by the Connaught Rangers, the 57th Rifles,
and a company of the 9th Bhopal Infantry. During the 20th December the
57th and 9th were subjected to attacks which succeeded in laying the
flank of the 57th open to enfilade fire and obliging the left to retire.
Here my old friend Subadar Arsla Khan of the 57th was again to the fore,
and by a plucky reconnaissance obtained useful information regarding the
German barricades, and surprised and shot several Huns. Later, on the
22nd December, this fine Indian officer, a Malikdin Khel Afridi, led a
charge on a party of the enemy, killing two officers and a number of
men. He has many orders and distinctions for various campaigns.
After the Manchesters were forced back from Givenchy, on the afternoon
of the 21st December, the pressure on this portion of our trenches
increased very considerably and was only relieved by the arrival of a
Brigade of the First Army Corps, and by nightfall the position was
secured. On the 22nd December the whole of the trenches east and south
of Givenchy were taken over by the First Corps, and our troops, at last
relieved from their long vigil, were able to gain some urgently-needed
rest.
My story left the Meerut Division at 2 P.M. on the same date, and just
after it had been relieved by the First Army Corps, and although the
Meerut troops remained at the disposal of that Corps for a few days
longer until a new alignment had been taken up, they were not called on
to make further efforts, and eventually, like the Lahore Division, were
able to get back to billets and enjoy a sorely needed rest and to
re-equip themselves.
By 1 P.M. on the 22nd December one Division of the First Army Corps had
arrived and taken over a great part of our trenches, and the Second
Division was in process of relieving the remainder of my Corps, and the
responsibility was gradually becoming involved, hence I asked the G.O.C.
First Army Corps to assume the command whilst I withdrew all the
relieved battalions and Artillery. This he agreed to, and the Indian
Corps was withdrawn.
During this long-drawn-out battle the losses of some battalions had been
very severe. In the Sirhind Brigade alone, on which fell the main German
onslaught, the H.L.I. had lost ten officers and fifty-four men killed,
276 men missing (mostly killed), and sixty wounded, and the total
casualties numbered 400, about fifty per cent of those in action.
Such monuments shall last when Egypt’s fall.
The 1st Gurkhas suffered well over 200 casualties, including six British
and Indian officers, and the 4th Gurkhas had seventeen British and
Indian officers and a total of 300 of all ranks. In the 4th, Jemadar
Lachman Sing Thapa, the Gurkha Adjutant, was amongst the killed, and
Captain M. Wylie was missing.
To suffer such losses and be again ready for battle within a few weeks
needs discipline of a high order, and I was lost in admiration of those
gallant corps, which I had inspected only a few days previously in their
full war strength, and saw again after their arrival in billets. The
ranks were sadly thinned, but there was no sign of despondency and only
determination on their faces. “Give us their hand-grenades and trench
mortars,” said a Gurkha havildar to me, “and you will see some fun.”
During the attack by the Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade Captain Alan Ross,
20th Deccan Horse, performed a very gallant action, which in any other
war would have been rewarded with a Victoria Cross; but I was informed
that in France it could not be given to officers for saving life alone.
Ross was one of the hardest men I ever knew: a brilliant polo player and
a strong rider all round. He had been my own A.D.C. years before in
India. Seeing an Indian officer was wounded and lying in the open, he
with two of his N.C.O.’s, Duffadars Shankar Rao and Sardar Singh, ran
under a terrific fire and carried him back. On reaching a ditch they lay
down, and seeing the Indian officer was too badly hit to be moved
further, Ross ran back, still under heavy fire, and fetched up a
stretcher, in which they placed the wounded officer and got him away.
Ross received a D.S.O. and his two companions the Indian Order of Merit.
Captain W. H. Padday, 47th Sikhs, was killed whilst bombing up a trench
with some of his men. The 20th Deccan Horse, a Corps which I had known
in years past when I commanded the Secunderabad Division, suffered over
eighty casualties, including Captain J. S. McEuan and Risaldar Mir
Hidayat Ali killed; Captain C. A. Mackenzie, Risaldar-Major Jharmal
Singh, and one other Indian officer and thirty-five other ranks killed
and missing; besides these, five officers and thirty-seven men were
wounded. The 47th Sikhs, of whom I shall often have to write, had 130;
the 34th Poona Horse fifty, including Major C. Loring, 37th Lancers,
attached. The Jodhpore Lancers in this, their first fight as a unit on
the Western Front, suffered eleven casualties. In the 8th Gurkhas one
Indian officer was killed, and there were twenty-two other losses.
Generals Watkis and Anderson, in admirably written and concise reports,
gave a very clear summary of the events which had been crowded into the
four days’ fighting, and it is interesting to note the chief points
brought out. After giving full credit to all who deserved it and not
concealing faults such as must occur in all battles, in the Lahore
Division Watkis brought specially to notice Major-General Carnegy,
commanding the Jalandar Brigade, for his thorough grasp of the
situation; General Brunker, Sirhind Brigade; and General Egerton,
Ferozepore Brigade. He gave the greatest praise to Colonel Strickland
and his fine battalion the Manchesters. Colonel Cauteau of the 142nd
French Territorial regiment was reported as rendering valuable and
noteworthy service; and Capitaine Salles, also of the 142nd, for
gallantly leading a counter-attack, although twice wounded.
Anderson specially commended the Seaforths and 58th Rifles, whose
“action, sustained over a period of three days and nights under
extremely difficult conditions, was worthy of the highest possible
commendation and reflects the greatest credit on officers, N.C.O.’s, and
men of both regiments.”
The Ambala and Sialkote Cavalry Brigades had been brought up as
reinforcements late during the battle; the former suffered thirty
casualties. I had known both these splendid Brigades when commanding the
Northern Army in India, and only regretted that this trench warfare gave
them no opportunity of riding down the Huns, who assuredly would have
had cause to remember that the Cavalry arm in India has a sword even
sharper than the boasted German weapon.
It is one of my cherished recollections that our gallant French Allies
did not fail to place on record their great regret at the departure of
the Indian Corps from their immediate vicinity. For two months we had
been able to afford each other assistance in men and guns on many
occasions, and our relations had been those of friends and comrades.
General de Maud’huy, commanding the Tenth French Army, and General
Maistre, commanding the XXIst Corps d’Armée, wrote most cordial letters,
wishing us every success as the war progressed and congratulating the
men on their having so long victoriously sustained the “particularly
difficult” conditions, especially of terrain, under which they had
fought.
It would be impossible to serve with finer soldiers and gentlemen than
composed the Army of France.
The battle was over, India had paid her dues, and this is what the
Commander-in-Chief recorded:
The Indian troops have fought with the greatest steadfastness and
gallantry whenever they have been called upon.
In these words Field-Marshal Sir John French summed up in his despatch
of the 2nd February 1915 his opinion of the conduct of the Indian
soldiers from the time they joined the Army in France until the close of
the battle of Givenchy.
In his admirable book, “1914,” the great Field-Marshal has written on
page 196:
Much has been said and written about the work of the Indian troops in
France, and various opinions have been expressed. For my part I can
only say that, from first to last, so long as they were under my
command, they maintained and probably surpassed even the magnificent
traditions of the Indian Army. In a country and climate to which they
were totally unaccustomed, the exigencies of the moment required that
they should be thrown into action successively by smaller or greater
units before they could be properly concentrated.
I shall always gratefully remember the invaluable assistance they and
their Commander, Sir James Willcocks, rendered under these difficult
conditions in the most critical hours of the First Battle of Ypres,
especially the Lahore Division, commanded by General Watkis.
This finally disposes of any criticisms of the Indians by lesser
luminaries. No one had better opportunities of realising the
difficulties connected with their employment in Europe during a
very trying winter. No one was more generous in his public
utterances and despatches to the soldiers of India. There was, it
is true, another side to this picture, but I will refrain from the
narration of such incidents, for I realise the enormous
difficulties the Commander-in-Chief had to face and the
unflinching courage and steadfastness with which he faced them;
and I am convinced that no other soldier in our Army would have
succeeded, to the same degree, in those tempestuous times.
The Indians were but a small unit in his complicated command, and that
he has for all time plainly recorded his opinion is sufficient to
disprove the criticisms of any others who are not possessed of his
soldierly instincts.
This story of the Indian Corps is only a personal narrative and the
opinions expressed in it may not be convincing to all who read it;
however, it has one merit, and that is, it is compiled from notes and
diaries kept by me from day to day, and in which I recorded the opinions
and doings of the principal actors as I observed them at the time, and
not from hearsay or memory alone.
We were now billeted in and about Lillers, and the first change in the
reconstruction of the Army came at this time. Sir Douglas Haig had just
received his well-merited promotion to General for his fine work as a
Corps Commander during the retreat from Mons and the First Battle of
Ypres. Two Armies were created, and he was appointed to command the
First Army. I had up to then been senior to him, but now found myself
junior and under his immediate command, as under the reorganisation the
Indian Corps was attached to the First Army.
To the British soldier such supersession is a natural consequence of
promotion for distinguished service in the field. To the Indian soldier
it means something very different, when suddenly thrust on him in the
field, and so it was in this case. To him his commander is everything,
and he looks to him as at any rate his local commander-in-chief, and
when he learns one morning that another, till then his junior, has been
placed over him, he concludes something is wrong. Had the Corps gone to
the Second Army, the Indians would have neither known nor cared what
promotion had taken place, for Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien in command of it
was already senior to me, but as it was I can best describe how they
took it, in the words of an Indian officer who said to me, “Now we know
the Government is displeased with our conduct in the recent battle.”
They have very strong opinions in some matters which cannot easily be
shaken.
Putting aside any personal feeling, in this case it was a pity it
happened, for it wrongly gave them to understand that it had been done
with a purpose. Of course the necessities of the Army as a whole were
far superior to any personal considerations, but I should have been glad
if it could have been otherwise arranged. However, it was now an
accomplished fact, and from that day to the day I left France no man
ever rendered more loyal or wholehearted service and support to his
superior officer.
The first duty, now we were in billets, was to overhaul thoroughly,
refit, and practically reconstitute the entire Corps. Our numbers had
fallen very considerably below war strength, but this was partly
remedied by adding Territorial battalions; these were brought on to the
strength as they became available, until eventually five of our Brigades
consisted of one Regular British, one Territorial, and three Indian
battalions, and the sixth Brigade had a battalion of the Special
Reserve; but even with these additions, owing to the limited
reinforcements from India, the shortage in the Regular British
battalions, and the weakness of the Territorial units, which
occasionally amounted to no more than half war strength, the total of
the Indian Corps, consisting of thirty-two battalions of infantry, was
under 21,000 rifles when we again took over our trenches on the 15th
January.
I have already told of the arrival of some of these Territorial
battalions, but I would again repeat that they were to us all the
surprise of the war—splendid officers and men suddenly transferred from
civilians into veteran soldiers. They will enter frequently into this
story.
Great changes took place in the commands of the Brigades, which will be
seen by reference to the lists farther on, and I was indeed sorry to bid
farewell to gallant comrades with most of whom I had served in India and
for whom I had the greatest respect as soldiers. I have already
explained the reasons for this, and so will not repeat myself.
Lieut.-General Watkis, who had commanded the Lahore Division throughout
the past trying months and had borne the chief responsibility during the
battle of Givenchy, was given the K.C.B., a well-merited honour.
The weather during January 1915 was very trying, being a succession of
rain, storm, and snow, but this did not prevent us from carrying on
systematic training of every kind—attack, defence, trench work, practice
with grenades and mortars, then still in their infancy, and night
operations. Route marching was done daily, gradually increasing until
the men’s feet had recovered somewhat from the results of immersion in
mud and snow. It was a real pleasure to watch the transformation taking
place; limbs long dormant in the trenches were restored to their natural
functions, and the knowledge that the worst was over and a warmer season
would come at its own proper time, cheered all ranks. It was a very busy
time for us all, but there is nothing like hard work to keep men fit and
happy, and the absence of it kills all joy.
Personally I have seldom been more busy in my life; rain or storm I
invariably rode from ten to fifteen miles a day, and often a lot more;
and although this may not appear much it was a great deal through those
bogs and along those cobbled and slippery roads. By the middle of
January two Brigades had returned to the trenches, and before the 24th
of the month the whole Corps was finally re-established once more about
our old haunt, Neuve Chapelle. The arms, clothing, and necessaries had
been thoroughly overhauled, boots refitted and extras issued, and when
we again entered the trenches I do not think there were many individuals
either in units, departments, or even among the followers, whom I had
not seen. It gave us a fresh start, and the many new officers who had
joined got to know something of their men.
On the last day of 1914 I gathered together nearly all the British and
Indian officers in the Army Corps; it was a damp, misty day, but they
came to my headquarters at Lillers by motor, lorry, or on horseback. It
was a pleasant gathering, full of interest to us all. Amongst those
present were a large percentage who had served with me in the field, a
few in the Soudan and West Africa, and a great many on the Indian
frontiers, and practically all had been under my command at one time or
another as Brigadier, Divisional and Army Commander. Many a time also
had I had the pleasure of entertaining them as my guests in other
climes, and now they were assembled under one roof and under such
different circumstances. It was for me a solemn occasion, for since we
had last met at Orleans many had gone for ever, and I knew before we
could meet again their ranks would be still further thinned. But no such
passing thoughts prevented us from being a cheery party, and all Corps
were enabled to exchange greetings, and fight their battles over again.
I also took the opportunity of explaining to many of the Indians, who
asked me about the recent changes, that the Indian Corps now formed part
of a larger Army, and was under the command of a very distinguished
soldier, who would assuredly lead us to victory. I am sure they felt
relieved, for the notion had got abroad that they had fallen in the
estimation of the Commander-in-Chief.
Any exotic when first transplanted must in its new soil be watched if it
is to be a success; this was our task with the Indians, and it was
succeeding by degrees, and at this gathering this was evident. They had
been plunged into Europe, but Asia was assimilating itself with its new
surroundings. It was a far more difficult task, however, than was
realised by some of our superiors, who merely issued orders and expected
them to be carried out. They did not realise that the pawns in the game
had peculiarities and characteristics which must be respected, if they
were to continue as a tangible entity. These matters were left to those
of us who understood the material we had to deal with, and it is
fortunate in some ways that it was so; for as time went on nothing was
more evident than the fact that in the First Army the Indians were
merely looked on as so many thousand men, who must just take their place
in a certain portion of the line and carry on irrespective of their
constitution or the changes which time was working in their ranks. But
it was absolutely necessary for us in the Corps not to forget these
things, and to so arrange that the machine would work smoothly and prove
efficient on the day of battle.
It was a fine test of the value of the British officer and he came well
out of it, and proved that the officers of the Indian Army are second to
none in positions of responsibility and trust.
CHAPTER XIII
When I look back on those winter days of 1914–15 I recall the names of
many of our great Indian soldiers, and it comes home vividly how much
they had done for our power in the East, and how they had gained the
confidence of the Indians. It was men like John Nicholson, Edwards,
Outram, Hodson, and Lord Roberts who had won the devotion of the men and
tempered the steel they used, and it was their example that in this
twentieth century had enabled England to call to her aid thousands of
loyal men from far across the seas, to fight her battles within a few
hours’ journey and within gun-sound of her own shores. It is an
extraordinary story, and one which we will do well to ponder. Here was a
great country with 48,000,000 of inhabitants, and yet it was found
necessary to summon a few thousands from Asia to defend our cause at our
own gates. I have heard it said that the Indian Corps was only sent to
France to give India a chance of taking her part in our Empire war;
maybe that was partly the idea of those who first originated it, but the
fact remains that the arrival of the Army Corps, just when it did come,
was the respite so sadly needed by the brave men who had wrought deeds
of almost superhuman devotion, but were then outnumbered and all but
overwhelmed by the German hordes.
Be that as it may, what has our country to say to the fact that whilst
our Indian soldiers were playing the part they did, millions in this
island were waiting on events? Lord Kitchener’s call had rung like a
trumpet through the land, but there had not yet been time for the New
Armies to be trained. Who then could be sent to stem the tide of steel
that was rolling in billows against the battered granite wall in
Flanders? There were none, save those few thousand British and those
loyal Indian soldiers just arrived from the East. There are always
critics enough to say that what was done might have been done better,
but these stay-at-home strategists and tacticians must answer the
question, why they were doing nothing themselves to help in the
trenches, and why did so many hundreds of thousands continue to do
nothing but talk, until they found themselves forced by conscription to
do their duty? And meantime who was helping (even though it was only in
small numbers) to defend their country for them? Helping with ungrudging
valour, and as recompense but a few hard-earned shillings a month.
When the tongues of controversy are lulled, and we can look back on
facts without bitterness, there will be but one verdict as to the fine
spirit and loyal devotion to duty displayed by the Indians in the hour
of England’s need.
It was my proud privilege to command these men, and it is my highest
reward that I had their confidence; I ask no other. It was palpable to
me after the formation of the New Armies that whatever might be the
outcome of our doings in France, my own days as Commander were assuredly
numbered. It would in my belief have been the case with any man in
command; that it fell to me was chiefly because I happened to be the
man.
It is of interest to note here that Lord Roberts, during his visit to
the Corps, had given me some very valuable advice, and promised that he
would bear me out in anything I did acting on that advice. I followed it
out, for it was the only way in which the best could be got from the
Indians. Alas! he did not live to help, when his help was sadly needed;
and though it eventually led to my being relieved of my command ten
months later on, I do not regret it for a moment, for it was my duty;
and in the consciousness of having done that lies a man’s greatest
reward. I will quote some of what he said from my diary of the same day.
He told me that it was absolutely necessary to remember that the Indians
must be used with discretion and not flung into battle indiscriminately.
He gave me his reasons fully, and told me it was my duty to keep those
in higher command reminded of this, and that even if it was an
unpleasant task, it still must be done. He added very positively that it
was only fair to the Army, to the Indians themselves, and, above all, to
the British battalions in the Brigades, who, he added, “will have to
bear a heavy burden in any case.”
No words of mine could possibly sum up so truthfully and exactly just
what was necessary, and to those who know the trials they endured, it
will be clear that these were the only conditions on which the Indian
soldiers could be asked to give of their best in Europe.
I write this four years after the event, and hence any spirit of
personal recrimination has, I hope, disappeared; but what can never
disappear is the sense of wrong done by the public to the men who served
under me, and served so well.
For, what were the facts? Whilst the British forces were daily improving
in man-power, we were going downhill; whilst the type of British
recruits was daily getting better and the best manhood of these islands
was gradually being drafted into their ranks, ours were deteriorating.
Whilst in England the whole country was watching and encouraging her men
to join up, India was kept in the dark regarding the doings of her
soldiers and we had to take whatever was sent us. The whole conditions
were different.
So long as we remained an Army Corps under the Commander-in-Chief, Sir
John French, he frequently saw the men and spoke to them in words of
warm praise, and even after the Armies were formed he still came more
than once and inspected the Brigades on parade; but as a part of the
First Army the rank and file never saw their Army Commander, except in
company with the Commander-in-Chief, and on more than one occasion the
Army Corps was omitted from any share in the credit it had earned in
hard-fought actions. Indians are very quick to grasp such facts, and
many of their British officers strongly resented but loyally accepted
the situation. As this story proceeds, it will be seen that what I have
stated above is the simple truth, and it will be readily understood that
under such conditions service in the field loses much of the glamour
which all soldiers associate with it, and which even the muddy trenches
of Flanders could not obliterate; and men naturally keen to do their
utmost become by degrees less zealous in the cause.
On 6th January I was informed that Lord Kitchener hoped to be able to
send us three fresh battalions from Egypt, but this he was unable to
carry out until much later. On 7th January Sir John French inspected two
of our Brigades; it was a stormy day with heavy rain, but the
Field-Marshal said a few words to each battalion, which I translated to
the men, and their pleasure was manifest. Lord French is a very eloquent
speaker to soldiers; he knows what to say and how to say it, and it is
easy to translate it into the language of the East.
It is a special pleasure to tell of the intense interest taken by Lord
Kitchener in the Indian Corps; from start to finish as Secretary of
State it is not too much to say that without his guiding hand and his
determination we could never have been kept going so long in France.
Nothing was too small for him personally to look into; nothing we wanted
and which he considered necessary was overlooked. His one great idea, as
far as the Indians were concerned, was that as he had initiated their
employment in Europe, so he would see it through. As I shall tell in
this book, at different times he brought his great personality into
play, and insisted on the Indian Corps being recognised and kept up.
Notwithstanding any opinions that may already have been or may in the
future be formed as to his keeping the reins of office in his own hands,
I maintain in our case, no other man could have conducted the business
as he did, and no other man could have more staunchly upheld the name of
India and its Army.
I had served under him as a Brigadier and a Divisional Commander during
the whole of his seven years as Commander-in-Chief in India, and twice
commanded frontier expeditions during that time, besides frequently
having been his guest; but I never realised until we came to France how
deep-rooted was his affection for our great Eastern possession, and how
wide was his sympathy with its people and Army. Many times during the
first year of the war I was sent for, and every possible aspect of our
employment was discussed by him, and it will probably surprise some as I
tell of the opinions he had formed, and his plans for employing the
Indian troops as an Army Corps. After the lamented death of our
Colonel-in-Chief, Lord Roberts, it became evident that Lord Kitchener
meant to take his place as our special friend.
During the rest we enjoyed after Givenchy I find many notes made by me,
some of which may prove of interest to those connected with the Indian
Army.
Campaigning as we were in a friendly country I was altogether against
allowing punishments to be inflicted on either British or Indians, which
might give a false impression to our Allies, or make it appear that
there was a difference in our methods of treating different classes of
our soldiers. Whatever may be thought of field punishment or of
flogging, I am convinced that to administer the former to Britishers,
and thus make them a mark of contempt to the Indians, is altogether
wrong. In the same way to flog Indians (which was permissible under the
Indian Articles of War) in France could only bring unmerited disgrace on
them as a race. There are of course crimes for which flogging is a very
suitable punishment, but this should, like a death sentence, be
inflicted only in very rare cases.
However, the law was laid down, and all a commander could do was to
mitigate sentences which he considered harsh. With this in view I very
early stopped field punishment being carried out in or near any public
place, and reserved all sentences of flogging, which could by law be
inflicted by junior commanders, for my own confirmation, and except for
most disgraceful conduct this punishment was in abeyance in the Corps in
France.
Some of the Indians, contrary to my expectations, developed a taste for
learning French. Their efforts frequently led to amusing incidents. On
one occasion I was passing an officer’s private servant, who was
ordinarily a strict Musalman, and would of course never eat meat that
had not been _hallaled_, _i.e._ killed in the orthodox style by having
its throat cut. I observed that his platter contained some beef, which
was not then part of the Indian ration, and asked him how he came by it.
“Oh, I bought it at a French butcher’s.” “But,” I said, “it has not been
_hallaled_; how can you eat it?” My friend, however, explained that he
had picked up some French, and that the “Miss Sahib” (young lady) in the
shop had told him it was, and proceeded to repeat the conversation. “I
went into the shop and said, ‘Beef, Miss,’ and she said, ‘Oui.’ I then
put my finger to my throat and ran it across to explain that it must be
_hallal_, and she at once said, ‘Oh, oui, oui,’ so you see it has been
properly killed.” That Indian was not for being too orthodox in a
foreign land, and that young lady had evidently learned something of
Oriental customs; but the story got about and less meat was purchased
from the stall after that.
At first the Indians found it very difficult to distinguish between
French and the German deserters, or prisoners captured. A story is told,
which I believe is absolutely true, of a German deserter who managed to
crawl through our front line, and finding himself among Indians, lay
hidden till dusk and then warily proceeded along a path towards our rear
in the hope of coming across a Britisher. He was afraid the Indians
would, according to what he had been taught by his own officers, soon
make mincemeat of him; however, his luck, as he explained, was all out,
and as he walked along he saw two Gurkhas coming from the opposite
direction. Bracing himself up for the tragedy he imagined was on the
point of being enacted, he approached with as much _sang froid_ as he
could muster, but to his surprise the two men, taking no notice whatever
of him, passed on. Our friend breathed once more and felt sure the next
man he met would be a Britisher; but no, his luck was still out, and he
beheld to his dismay a solitary Gurkha, by whose side hung the terrible
_kukry_, the weapon with which according to German ideas these lusty
inhabitants of Nepal were wont to carve up their victims, or decapitate
them with a single stroke.
Nothing could save the Hun now, and he advanced trembling from head to
foot, for surely the other two had only left him alive through being
engrossed in conversation and hence not having noticed him. He moved on
saying his last prayer, when the little Gurkha suddenly realising his
position pulled himself together and came to attention. The last hour of
the deserter had at last come; the hand of the man from Nepal went first
to his side; it must be the terrible _kukry_ he was about to draw, but
instead of ending the career of the German our Gurkha gave him a smart
salute. The deserter, wondering whether he was indeed face to face with
his brutal and ferocious foe or in a dream, breathed freely and went on
his way.
At last to his great relief appeared a British soldier, and he now
thought all was well. Imagine his final surprise when he was hailed
with, “What the something are you doing here?” and at the same time he
felt a bayonet point unpleasantly close to his hinder parts. He went
calmly to the guard-room; he had changed his mind about the bloodthirsty
Indians.
One more story of Indians and Germans. One night a British officer was
out scouting in front of his Corps in “No Man’s Land,” accompanied by
his Indian orderly. The pair had very stealthily approached the enemy
trench and were within a few yards of it, when a German, who had been
watching unknown of course to them, covered the officer with his rifle
and said, “You are a brave man and I do not wish to shoot you; go back.”
They went back; but this time it was the sepoy’s turn to wonder why he
had been told that the Boches were such fiends.
On the 14th January 1915 two of our Brigades, as I said before, again
took over trenches, and by the 24th the whole Corps was once more
holding a front which extended from a point west of Neuve Chapelle on
the north to the vicinity of Givenchy on the south, connecting there
with the First Army Corps.
At this time our strength was close on 21,000 rifles, 900 sabres, and
120 guns. During February I learned that it was the intention of Sir
John French at an early date to carry out a big operation in the
vicinity of Neuve Chapelle, and that it was to be the good fortune of
the Indian Corps to take a prominent part in it. The battle of Neuve
Chapelle is what resulted, and that I shall shortly describe. But before
doing so I will deal with certain matters which affected the Indian
Corps, and which may be of interest to my readers.
The enormous amount of correspondence which had to be carried on not
only gave me an insight into the complications which attended this
somewhat intricate command, but as I look back on it all I see more
plainly than I could at the time that my work as Indian Corps Commander
was doubled as compared with other Corps Generals. In this connection I
remember well the remark of one of them, who was paying me a visit, and
seeing the pile of letters already written and still to be answered, on
my table, said, “I would not change places with you for anything; you
appear to have one enemy in front and God knows how many behind you.” He
was not so far from the truth. Still I would not have changed places
with him, for although the writing work was onerous and generally kept
me up till all hours, it was very interesting; and one felt it was all
so new.
Amongst the officials with whom I had to carry on a correspondence, or
to whom I sent personal accounts of the Indians, were the Secretary of
State for War, Secretary of State for India, the Viceroy of India, and
the Military Secretary, India Office. These were high officials, but as
I recall the piles of other letters I received and answered, it
surprises me how many people took an interest in or wished to ascertain
a hundred things concerning the Indians in France. The command was a
military one, but the amount of semi-political work combined with it
could seldom before have fallen to the lot of a soldier in a
comparatively junior position in the field in Europe.
One of the points that up to this time had most disconcerted people in
India, both British and Indian, but chiefly the latter, was that they
received no news of their people. High officials in India, and some of
them in this country, constantly wrote urging me to let something be
known of the doings of the Corps, but those were the days of secrecy,
and recruiting in India was much hampered. It was not common sense to
imagine that India would rush to furnish the large number of recruits
necessary to maintain her contingents, unless the people were at least
told whether Sikh, Dogra, Gurkha or whoever it might be was in Europe or
in some other continent. You cannot describe troops from that country as
“Midland” or “Highland,” and thus give a clue; for the battalions were
largely composed of men of several nationalities and religions, formed
in companies or double companies, and without mentioning the number of
the unit no one could tell what a man belonged to. Yet it was looked on
as criminal to name a corps in any of our communications; whilst the
Germans knew exactly to a man what we had in France.
Should Indian troops again be employed in Europe, which I hope may never
be the case, the authorities concerned will have enough to go on, to
avoid the blunders made during the war in the matter of reinforcements,
drafts, and reserves. From the first weeks onwards these questions were
a puzzle.
Imagine a cold winter’s day in Flanders; a biting wind, perhaps snow
falling, and a hundred odd, unwilling and unfit reservists from the
tropics, standing shivering. The sound of the guns was more or less
incessant; overhead passed one or more aeroplanes; an occasional burst
from an anti-aircraft gun gave colour to the scene, and you have a
picture of more than one inspection of reservists I carried out. It was
unfair to the men themselves, still more to the Corps, and most unfair
to those who had to include them in their ranks and show a battle
strength of so many hundred men on paper.
Of course these remarks apply chiefly to reservists, and some other
drafts; there was the other side of the picture. Whole double companies
occasionally arrived from other battalions, splendid fighting material
and glad to be with us; and although this meant weakening the units they
came from, that was another story with which we could not concern
ourselves. As time wore on, India found it necessary to fill our gaps as
far as was possible from all classes and parts of the country. There
were at times in a single battalion men collected from nine to eleven
different units, and to those who know the Army, its composition and its
regimental system, it will be very evident how impossible it became to
keep battalions to a proper standard. Had this been the case with the
Indian ranks alone, the British and Indian officers could have worked
great changes, but these had themselves disappeared in large numbers and
been replaced by newcomers, some with a little and many without any
experience whatever of the classes they were posted to.
Towards the end of January a question was raised as to the reduction of
British officers in Indian battalions. I was surprised to receive a
letter through G.H.Q. asking if this could not be done. Considering our
losses in officers and the absolute necessity of keeping these up to at
least the number then fixed, viz. twelve combatants per unit, I found no
difficulty in proving that not only was no reduction possible, but if
efficiency was to be maintained an increase was necessary. I presume the
suggestion was only made owing to the great shortage that then existed
and the difficulty of finding replacements, but there was no question as
to the answer, more especially as I was well aware that a great number
of Indian Army officers were being employed on Staff duties in England
or with the New Armies then in course of formation.
During the winter months I received several letters from General Sir
Dighton Probyn. He of course took the greatest interest in the Indians,
and in one he said to me, “I wish I could reverse the figures of my age
and make myself twenty-eight instead of eighty-two. I would then beg of
you to take me as anything, trooper or mounted orderly,” and added that
the shirkers would have a miserable existence to the end of their days,
after the war.
During January and February 1915 hardly a day passed without my seeing
one or more units, or sometimes a whole Brigade. Often did I enter the
billets and barns, to be greeted by a chorus of cheers and shouts, and
the Indians would gather round and ask how the war was getting on. I
frequently took with me some of the presents received from friends in
England or India, and the varied class of these sometimes caused great
amusement. One kind lady had sent several coloured waistcoats for “the
dear Sikhs,” as she styled them. Amongst these ornate articles was one
made up of patches of every hue under the sun; it was an extraordinary
garment and was trimmed with gold lace. Seeing a party of Sikhs in front
of a barn, I stopped and asked them if they would like some presents
from England, and if so to come to the car and receive them. All but one
sulky-looking fellow came up and I asked why he did not come. They all
said, “Oh, he is a pessimist; he thinks the war will never end; of what
use is anything to him?” I at once took the coloured garment in my hand,
and went up to the man and in his own language asked him, as a favour,
to accept it at the hands of his General. The sepoy took it in a rather
surly manner and opened it, but even his torpor gave way when he saw the
gorgeous coat. All the others roared with laughter, in which he joined
heartily, and putting it on said, “General Sahib, you have altered my
ideas of the war, for this proves that people must still be full of
humour in England, and not as I have heard despondent. I will send it
home to my village, and attach a card to it: ‘Taken by me —— Singh in
single combat with the German Emperor and presented to me on a
full-dress parade by the Commander-in-Chief in France.’” They told me
afterwards that he had become an optimist and very keen all round.
Against 12th February I find in my diary: “General Robertson came to see
me and stayed an hour—he is a genius.” I do not think I was far wrong. I
only wish I had got to know him years before, for what I found was that
I was a stranger in my surroundings, and nothing more brought home to me
the position of the Indian soldiers. They too were strangers, and far
more of course than I could ever be, for even their language was a
different one. In those days the New Armies had not begun to arrive; the
old traditions still survived, and many of the _élite_ in the higher
ranks still looked on any innovation, such as the introduction into
their ranks of a bushman from Asia, as something which must perforce be
tolerated but not encouraged.
CHAPTER XIV
On the 27th February 1915 I arrived in England on ten days’ leave, my
first from France, and as I had not been home for over two years it was
a pleasant prospect. I did not, however, get my full leave, as I was
recalled on the fourth day, but I could well afford to give it up for it
was in order to receive the decoration of “Grand Officer of the Legion
of Honour” which the French Government had conferred on me. It was very
good of Sir John French to recommend me for this, which I prize as one
of my highest rewards. My four days were very busy ones, and I had the
honour of being summoned to see His Majesty, who made inquiries
regarding his Indian soldiers, and sent them a most encouraging message.
Lord Crewe, then Secretary of State for India, asked my views on many
matters connected with Indians, amongst others the question of granting
them commissions on the same footing as British officers. I have already
written of this. I had the pleasure of a long talk with Mr. Lloyd George
whom I met for the first time. When I left I had, like vast numbers of
his countrymen, no other opinion than that I had conversed with one of
the greatest living men. His assurance that all would be well, and his
magnetic manner, sent me away more convinced than ever that he would be
the man who would eventually guide us to a victorious peace.
Next day I dined with Neil Primrose, who had been serving on my Staff in
France, and there met Colonel Winston Churchill and many others
prominent in politics. Much of the talk turned on the Indians, and all
were most enthusiastic in their admiration of their loyalty. What,
however, struck me most was the note of something approaching pity more
than one of them manifested at their hard lot. Now there were no grounds
for such; the men were, of course, undergoing great hardships, but so
were others, and if the ordeal was harder for them to bear it was only
the luck of war. What I and many others of the seniors in the Corps felt
was that people in England believed that the Indians could not stand the
severe climate. They, like other mortals, were open to criticism, but
did not ask for pity and resented it, and I was always very careful to
keep my lips closed as to this phase of the situation when the native
officers and men asked me (as they always did) what I had heard about
them in England.
The following day I lunched with Winston Churchill, and later had him as
my guest for half a day in France. I had first made his acquaintance
after my return from Ashanti in 1901, and every time I have met him
since I like him better. There is something very taking in his
character; he always appears to be quite sure that whatever he is doing
is the best that can be done, and I think he is generally right. I have
met many others who claim to be like this, but are in reality anything
but sure. It is a treat to talk to him, and if I were a young man with
life before me I would sooner serve with him than almost any one I know.
On the 2nd March I dined with Lord Kitchener; the only other person
present was Colonel FitzGerald and he left immediately dinner was
finished. I had the benefit of a very long talk with the great
Field-Marshal, and some of this I will relate for it is of great
interest. The chief point he dealt with was the shortage of shells and
the necessity for economising ammunition in the field. He urged me to
let it be quietly known to my senior officers that it was criminal to
waste a single round; he said all would be well in due course but at
that time he could not possibly supply the wants. He particularly
pointed out that what we called “registering” and what he called
“shooting into the mist” must be limited to absolute necessity alone. I
was much impressed by this insistence on economy of gun power, and his
clear assurance that we might find ourselves without shells unless this
warning was observed. He made no mystery of it, and as I was leaving
urged me once more to do all in my power to keep down the expenditure
both of ammunition and money. “Each individual can help in his own
degree,” were his parting words. I knew, of course, we were very short
of shells, but after what he said I was more than surprised long
afterwards when I read that he had not let this be understood.
Another subject which Lord Kitchener discussed was the question of
compulsory service. He was entirely in favour of it, but said his great
difficulty lay in the fact that he knew he would never get a fair
chance. “They will exempt hundreds of thousands in what are called
indispensable positions and will only leave me the chaff.” I suggested
that if he once told the country he must have the men, would he not get
them; and he replied, “You little know all I shall have to fight
against. I do.” Judging by all the wrangling that went on before
compulsory service became a reality, his words sound prophetic now.
Regarding the Indians he spoke very fully. He did not say it in so many
words, but his meaning was quite clear, and that was that whoever might
try and get rid of them, he meant to keep an Indian Corps in France in
name at least, if not in numbers, but that he would entirely relieve
units as they dwindled, and replace them from Egypt and elsewhere. At a
subsequent interview I had with him four months later he put this very
forcibly and gave his reasons, as I shall tell.
The months of January and February had passed in what were called quiet
conditions, and during the first days of March we were full of
preparations for the coming battle before Neuve Chapelle. Previous to
this battle, in conjunction with all my Generals and my own Staff, I had
very carefully considered the question of man-power in the Indian Corps,
and I feel justified in stating at some length the conclusions we had
arrived at, and the many battles royal that they raised. I am convinced
I was right, but I was accused by the highest authorities at the time of
a lack of appreciation of the situation as it existed.
In order to explain myself I will not only state what actually occurred
early in March but will carry on the story to its final solution in
August 1915, when, to my surprise, I was summoned to England only to be
told that certain propositions were before the Government, which I found
if adopted would entirely coincide with my own made five months
previously, and would in point of time be exactly what I had
recommended. I am writing from my diary kept up daily and make no error
in details. To those who were associated with me in the task of
commanding the Corps it will be as plain as it was at that time, that it
indeed needed patience of a degree with which nature had perhaps
insufficiently endowed me, but which perforce I had to adopt; and a
spirit that refused to be subdued even when opposed to the highest
military and political authorities in the field and at home. Even if I
am considered egoistic, I must again say that I had one great advantage,
and that was I knew what I was talking about.
Armageddon has shown up the impossibility of attempting to rule the East
under purely Western methods, and has plainly manifested the need of
first acquiring some knowledge of what you are undertaking, before you
rush things to a hopeless standstill.
The many causes I have stated had by March 1915 told so severely on the
Corps that on 8th March I summoned a Conference of all my Generals and
their senior Staff officers as well as my own Army Corps Staff. On this
occasion the whole question was gone into and discussed, and it was
unanimously agreed that I should represent to the Commander-in-Chief
that it would be wise to relieve the Indian battalions then in France as
soon as this could be conveniently done, but in any case before another
winter set in. I knew that our reinforcements would dwindle, and later
on I had it on the authority of the Government of India itself that
there might be a considerable break in our receiving any at all.
Accordingly I made my recommendations, and at the same time told the
Brigadiers to inform their C.O.’s that I had done so. It was the eve of
Neuve Chapelle, and from many trusted Indian officers I learned that
they had been much impressed by the news that they were anxious to join
in the coming battle and ready to remain on, but they plainly saw they
would lose their good repute unless reinforcements were sent in large
numbers, and one officer put it, “These miserable reservists were sent
away from India so as not to frighten the young recruits.” The truth was
that every officer and man saw clearly that the Corps would soon dwindle
to a mere handful of men, and they also knew that, under the system then
prevailing, it was impossible to maintain their numbers at anything
approaching efficient fighting strength.
All kinds of remedies were already being adopted, and occasionally
complete companies from other battalions in India were sent to us and
these were generally good. Of course I knew the times were pressing, the
need great, and the arrangements for reinforcing us _nil_, but that is
just why I felt convinced the game would very soon not be worth the
candle. We had held our trenches for five months, we were on the eve of
a big battle in which I was sure the Indians would give a good account
of themselves, and our Territorial and New Armies were lining up and
would, by the time we could be relieved, have arrived in thousands, with
more ready to follow. Then, again, it was plain that the Indians would
be sadly needed in other parts of the world, where they would prove
invaluable and be nearer their own natural bases. Moreover, in France
there could be no chance of leave or relaxation for them under any
circumstances, whereas in Egypt they could quickly be re-formed,
strengthened, and again made fit for service under more congenial skies,
and at the same time others who had not then had the good fortune to see
fighting would welcome the opportunity.
It was also an important consideration they should be given to
understand that the transfer was in no way intended as a slight on them,
but was being carried out on sound principles and with the object of
making the best use of them in the many theatres of war. A hint that
this was the intention of Government would have been welcomed by all
ranks, whereas to do it suddenly for any cause would rankle in their
minds and never be understood. Everything pointed to the wisdom of
allowing them to leave France as soon as the gap they had filled was
completed by Britishers. This was my conviction and is stronger to-day
than it even then was.
However that may be, I had indeed fallen on a hornet’s nest. G.H.Q., of
course, had other expert advisers to assist them in their decisions, but
experience gained in India was somewhat discounted when the game was
being played for the first time in Europe, and only those who were
actually playing it could give practical advice.
My papers teem with suggestions for remedying the shortage of men in the
Indian battalions. Over and over again did I adjust the Brigades, mix up
units, reduce the strength of Brigades, and use every device to still
retain the name of the Corps as “The Indian Corps.” In June I received
an order by telegram to proceed to London where I again saw Lord
Kitchener. On this occasion he said to me, “I will never allow the
Indian Corps to lose its designation; it would be a disgrace to India.”
Time soothes all things, and as the months passed the battles of Second
Ypres, April 1915, and Festubert, 15th May, were fought, and in both the
Indian Divisions largely shared. I had made up my mind that the same
Army Corps was to remain in France. I had no illusion as to my own
future; after 8th June I saw it must come to an end, how or when I could
not guess, but I believed I had the confidence of Lord Kitchener and
that was my bulwark. To my surprise, in August I was summoned to London
and told to go straight to see him before seeing several other
notabilities. He informed me that the Cabinet had decided to send the
whole Indian Corps to Egypt and elsewhere and that he did not wish it.
He asked me my opinion and I reiterated my previous recommendation, but
added that if he could replace our old units by fresh ones and complete
our numbers the Indians could certainly remain. He again impressed on me
the necessity of keeping an Indian Corps in Europe; said that India
would never forgive us if we removed the Corps as a body, and asked me
to state my opinions to all whom I interviewed.
Now if there was one man for whom I would do anything in my capacity as
Corps Commander that man was Lord Kitchener. In any circumstances,
moreover, it was better to stick to a decision once made than to go on
vacillating and thus disconcerting and needlessly annoying brave men,
who cannot understand being made the shuttlecock of politicians. I will
not go into further details. I had several other interviews during my
short stay. I was once more in the Maelstrom of Scylla and Charybdis and
went back impressed by two things: one was that if the Indian Corps
remained it would be at Lord Kitchener’s wish alone; and if it left it
would be for reasons other than those I had gathered at my various
interviews. However events followed rapidly; Mesopotamia, Palestine, and
East Africa swallowed up the two Divisions, but not before my own tenure
of command had abruptly terminated.
CHAPTER XV
At the end of February 1915 Sir John French had come to a happy decision
and that was to attack the enemy at some selected point. I cannot enter
here into the reasons, or discuss the general military situation;
suffice it to say that the centre of the objective was to be the village
of Neuve Chapelle, and that it was the good fortune of the Indian Corps
to be in this line, with its left or northern flank resting opposite to
it. Amongst the reasons assigned by him was one which was particularly
apposite to the occasion, viz. “the need of fostering the offensive
spirit in the troops after the trying and possibly enervating
experiences which they had gone through of a severe winter in the
trenches.”
This, in itself, was indeed a very weighty reason for giving all ranks
an opportunity of stretching their limbs. For over five months on and
off we had lived a tedious life. Our reveille was the morning hate; our
weary day, a long-drawn-out and slow process of avoiding shells, which
we could seldom reply to for there was little ammunition to do it with;
our evenings, an interminable gloom lighted up by German Véry lights and
other fireworks, and our nights a long vigil of tired men, waiting in
muddy trenches for the dawn. No wonder then that the prospect of an
advance, preceded by what we knew must be a sharp fight, cheered all
ranks and revived their spirits. Nothing struck me more during my year
in France than their evident delight when they became aware that the
inertia of the trenches was to give place to something more active. As a
Sikh native officer said to me on the day preceding the battle, “Sahib,
we shall have a chance of proving that the Indian Army can fight and not
only do sentry-go in the _khandak_ (trenches). We shall again be able to
cry, _Fateh_ (victory).”
Our left rested on the right of Rawlinson’s Fourth Corps, on the La
Bassée-Estaires road, and our right on the Chocolat Menier Corner, from
which point the line was carried on by the First Corps past Givenchy.
Since those early days of the war so many attacks have been made on a
colossal scale, and such detailed accounts of them have been published,
illustrated, and placed on the stage, that it would be superfluous to
describe what was done by way of preparation. But it is an erroneous
idea to imagine that in those days details were neglected or only
cursorily gone into. Nothing could have been more minutely arranged to
the very smallest item; no Staffs ever more thoroughly studied, checked,
and elaborated essentials than did those of the Corps. From the big guns
down to the men’s boots nothing was neglected by the Staff, commanders,
and other regimental officers. Indeed, as I now study the orders issued
I realise that, although frequently making bricks with but scanty straw,
each blade of that straw was utilised to the greatest advantage.
Times gradually changed, until the British Army was equipped as no army
ever was before or probably will be again, but the improvements were
gradual, the Staff work enlarged with the experience gained, time was
given officers and men to go into the battle-line after a thorough
training in the requirements of trench or open warfare, and everything
improved until there was little room for improvement left. In the Neuve
Chapelle days, with all our shortage of shells, grenades, etc., there
was no shortage of endeavour, and in that respect indeed there was even
more need to husband our resources and make the best use of them. Even
so, and considering that we had been at war for seven months, it reads
strangely in the official reports of the Indian Corps that in the case
of two Territorial battalions attached to our brigades, and both of whom
fought splendidly, “Owing to the —— and —— battalions having only just
arrived, and not being in possession of any telephone equipment or
trained signallers, communication during the battle had to be carried on
by messengers alone.”
Yes, times indeed changed, but there never was any difference in the
fighting spirit of the officers and men; they remained as they were from
Mons to the Marne, from Ypres to La Bassée; the same immortal souls, if
anything, even braver, in the hour of sore trial, outnumbered and
outgunned, than in the later days of triumph when the Huns at last began
to realise that
This England never did, nor never shall,
Lie at the proud foot of a conqueror.
The object of the operations, as laid down in the First Army operation
orders, was “to force the enemy’s lines in the vicinity of Neuve
Chapelle, and drive back any hostile forces from the line
Aubers-Ligny-le-Grand, with the object of cutting off the enemy’s troops
which are now holding the front between Neuve Chapelle and La Bassée.”
The orders of the First Army were always clear and distinct, and I never
experienced any difficulty in thoroughly recognising their object. It
was sometimes the execution, with the very limited number of guns and
ammunition, that was the difficulty. At Neuve Chapelle, however, we were
locally and temporarily superior in both guns and men, and had we
succeeded in gaining more than our first objective we could have
advanced our line to the Aubers Ridge. Suppose we had done this, the
question arises, was it possible to retain the advantage? Judging from
what immediately followed the battle we certainly could not have done
so.
Events have since proved that, given sufficient gun power and good
troops, it is always possible to capture the enemy’s first and
supporting lines, but subsequently you must have unlimited munitions to
hold your gains or push on farther. We had not got the munitions, and
did not receive them till long after, and hence any advance up to or
beyond the Aubers Ridge would have resulted in a Pyrrhic victory. In
this connection it makes one think how different were our ideas in those
days, compared with those formed after two years of war, and when
experience had proved that bravery without munitions may enable an Army
to hold its own even against immense odds, but it cannot turn defence
into the offensive, except on a local and minute scale. As I write this
three years have elapsed since the battle of Neuve Chapelle, but our
trenches are still on the very same spot we gained that day, and our
gallant fellows, though but few, if any, of those who fought are still
there, look out on the very same ridge and the remnants of that same
Bois du Biez which cost us dear to attack but which we never reached.
Nevertheless it will ever remain a great day and a great memory, for if
we did not get as far as we had hoped to do, we taught the Huns a very
sharp lesson, and, as far as the Indians were concerned, they learned
that alongside the British soldier they could enter the jaws of death
and triumph.
The objective assigned to us was the Bois du Biez, a wood of
considerable size, lying just beyond and to the south-east of Neuve
Chapelle, whilst Rawlinson’s Fourth Corps was directed on Aubers and La
Cliqueterie Farm. Farther to the south the First Corps was to assault
the enemy’s lines north-east of Givenchy, and the Canadian Division was
to co-operate by a fire attack along the entire front. The map will show
how the river Des Layes formed a considerable obstacle between the
village and the Bois du Biez, being from six to ten feet wide and from
three to five feet deep, and along this stream the Germans had
constructed strong bridge-heads and trenches.
At Neuve Chapelle we were to experience for the first time the
scientific employment of 18-pounders for wire cutting, and three
Brigades were detailed for this purpose. The success achieved by the
guns in demolishing these obstacles was in those days a revelation to
us; nothing could have been better done, and wherever the Infantry took
the right line as laid down, the attack succeeded up to all expectation.
The G.O.C. First Army had frequently impressed this on me and he was
right. The pioneers and sappers and miners had done their work very
thoroughly under the direction of Brigadier-General Nanton and every
preparation had been completed before the battle opened.
Surgeon-General Treherne, who had served with me on the Indian
Frontiers, had arranged the medical side of the operations with a
thoroughness that could not have been exceeded, and which earned the
gratitude of the Indian soldiers; and last, but not least, my Chief of
Staff, General Hudson, had worked out all plans and orders with such
scrupulous care that when the battle commenced I felt it was already
half over, for each and all knew what was to be their share in it.
A readjustment of our line had been carried out during the night of 28th
February/1st March, whereby the front of the Corps extended from
Chocolat Menier Corner through Port Arthur to the La Bassée-Estaires
road. This front was occupied by the Meerut Division with one Brigade,
the two others being in reserve. The Lahore Division, less one Brigade
in Army reserve, was in Corps reserve.
About this time the heavy artillery of the Indian Corps (excepting the
2nd Siege Battery, 6-inch howitzers), and with certain additions, was
grouped under Brigadier-General Franks, R.A., as No. 1 Group G.H.Q.
Artillery. This group was ordered to support the operations of the
Indian Corps. The remainder of the Artillery of both Divisions was
gradually brought into action into positions selected by
Brigadier-General Scott, R.A., attached to Corps Headquarters. The moves
were completed by the evening of 7th March.
The system under which the artillery was disposed was as follows:
3 18-pr. Brigades to cut wire on front to be assaulted.
2 18-pr. Brigades to cover the southern section, which was not
attacking.
1 18-pr. Brigade partly building curtain of fire on roads and
approaches from the Bois du Biez, and partly in observation.
1 Brigade 4·5-inch Howitzers destroying enemy trenches.
1 Brigade 6-inch Howitzer destroying enemy trenches.
Siege Battery destroying enemy trenches.
1 Section 2·75 inch actually in fire trenches for close support of
Infantry attack.
The above were the objectives for necessarily the first phase, but the
subsequent objectives laid down did not involve a change of position for
the batteries.
Considerable engineering preparations had been made in advance, such as
provision of cover for the assaulting Brigade to form up in,
improvements to communications, and provision of light bridges, etc.,
for crossing obstacles.
The Lahore Division had moved forward on 7th March and concentrated in
the area Calonne-Lestrem-Robecq, the Meerut Division concentrating its
troops still farther forward in order to provide the necessary
accommodation.
By the morning of 9th March the Corps was disposed as follows:
CORPS HEADQUARTERS. Report Centre, La Cix Marmuse.
MEERUT DIVISION. Report Centre, Vieille Chapelle.
Dehra Dun Brigade, La Couture.
Garhwal Brigade, Richebourg St. Vaast.
Bareilly Brigade, Holding front line.
LAHORE DIVISION. Report Centre, Lestrem.
Ferozepore, Farther back.
Jalandar, Farther back.
and Sirhind Brigades. Farther back.
The Artillery of both Divisions was in action under the orders of the
Meerut Division. The Cavalry, Sappers, and Pioneers were with their
respective Divisions.
The 125th Rifles and 1 Company 34th Pioneers had been placed temporarily
at the disposal of the Fourth Corps for the road work which would be
necessitated by an advance. The recent addition of some battalions of
the Territorial Force had necessitated a reconstitution of Infantry
Brigades.
On the 10th March the composition was as under:
LAHORE DIVISION
Major-General KEARY (Indian Army).
SIRHIND BRIGADE.—Brigadier-General Walker, V.C. (Indian Army)
1st Highland Light Infantry.
4th Liverpools (Special Reserve).
15th Sikhs.
1/1st Gurkhas.
1/4th Gurkhas.
JALANDAR BRIGADE.—Brigadier-General Strickland, Manchester Regiment.
1st Manchesters.
4th Suffolks (Territorials).
47th Sikhs.
59th Rifles (Frontier Force).
FEROZEPORE BRIGADE.—Brigadier-General Egerton (Indian Army).
1st and 2nd Connaught Rangers (one unit).
4th Londons (Territorials).
9th Bhopal Infantry.
57th Rifles (Frontier Force).
129th Baluchis.
DIVISIONAL TROOPS.—
15th Lancers.
34th Sikh Pioneers.
20th and 21st Companies Sappers and Miners.
MEERUT DIVISION
Lieut.-General ANDERSON, late R.A.
GARHWAL BRIGADE.—Brigadier-General Blackader, Leicestershire Regiment.
2nd Leicesters.
3rd Londons (Territorials).
1st and 2nd Battalions 39th Garhwal Rifles (one unit).
2/3rd Gurkhas.
2/8th Gurkhas.
BAREILLY BRIGADE.—Brigadier-General Southey (Indian Army).
2nd Black Watch.
4th Black Watch (Territorials).
41st Dogras.
58th Rifles.
125th Rifles.
DEHRA DUN BRIGADE.—Brigadier-General Jacob (Indian Army).
1st Seaforths.
4th Seaforths (Territorials).
6th Jats.
2/2nd Gurkhas.
1/9th Gurkhas.
DIVISIONAL TROOPS.—
4th Cavalry.
107th Pioneers.
Nos. 3 and 4 Companies Sappers and Miners.
Aeroplanes and flying machines in general were few and far between in
those days as compared with later times; nevertheless our airmen had
even then shown what these neoteric implements could achieve in the
hands of brave men in war. The Germans were completely taken by surprise
when our attack began, and this was in a very great measure due to the
fearless daring and persistence of our aviators, who had left nothing to
chance. Although I have little to tell in this book of the Air Service
as it then was, it is a fact that the Sepoys, when they first realised
the objects and witnessed the extraordinary daring of aeroplanes, felt
that their epic of the Mahabharat (Great War) was about to be repeated.
And so the Indian soldiers were, for the first time in history, on the
eve of an offensive battle against the most highly trained and organised
army of Europe.
For those who merely looked on an attack in force as an incident of the
Great War, the coming battle may have been only a new phase in the
struggle; for me as Commander of the Corps it meant much more. I was
standing on the brink of an experiment which might have momentous
consequences. I was responsible, in my own way, for important issues; I
was, on a very small scale it is true, but nevertheless in a somewhat
similar position to the first Japanese General who met and overthrew his
Russian opponents. It was a question of the East versus the West, and
although I felt sure of my brave men, it remained to be proved how the
East would take it.
The night of 9th March 1915 will ever remain one of my most inspiriting
recollections. I can recall every moment of it; I did not sleep long,
but I thought a lot; I did not doubt, but the thing had to be made good.
Many beside myself thought much that night, but I wonder if one felt a
greater joy than I did as I realised that a life’s work was to be
tested. That life had been mostly spent in India, amongst Indian
soldiers, and when dawn proclaimed that the supreme moment was at hand,
I walked into the small garden of my dwelling and felt with Thomas
Jefferson
That all men are created equal.
Although the night of the 9th March had been cloudless up till about
midnight, the morning broke cold, damp, and misty. I stood in the
drizzle with my friend Khwaja Mahomed Khan, A.D.C., and as the watch
marked the hour for the intense bombardment, I said to him, “This is a
great hour in Indian history. Praise be to Allah.” And he replied,
“Allah is with us, the Germans’ turn for a thrashing has arrived.”
The Lahore Division during the early morning of the 10th March moved up
to Vieille Chapelle-La Couture and the area La Tombe Willot-Les
Lobes-Zelobes, the Ferozepore Brigade remaining in Army reserve at
Calonne.
After some preliminary registration the previously arranged Artillery
bombardment commenced at 7.30 A.M. For the first ten minutes three
Brigades of 18-pounders fired at the enemy’s wire entanglements, which
they succeeded in demolishing pretty completely, as we afterwards found.
For the remaining twenty-five minutes of the first phase of the
bombardment the 18-pounders (eighteen batteries) were covering the area
held by the enemy and the southern flank, so as to prevent the arrival
of reinforcements. During this same period of twenty-five minutes the
4·5-inch and 6-inch howitzers shelled the trenches which were to be
assaulted.
The frontage attacked was 600 yards, the obstacles being _chevaux de
frise_, thickly wired, generally in one but sometimes in two rows, and a
certain amount of low wire entanglement. The depth of the obstacles
varied from 6 to 15 yards, but owing to their being opposite one side of
a salient only a limited number of batteries could be brought into
action, so that the line of fire was direct. The 9th and 13th Brigades
took position at ranges averaging 1800 yards. The 4th Brigade was
disposed at an average range of 2500 yards, the line of fire being
oblique.
The method of attack was that in each battery of the 9th and 13th
Brigades fire was concentrated on numbers 2 and 5 guns, whereby two
lanes per battery, or twelve in all, were to be formed.
The 4th Brigade concentrated three guns on each alternate lane position.
The allowance of ammunition was 50 rounds per gun, and was fired in ten
minutes.
Thus twelve lanes were formed, six by having 150 rounds and six by
having 300 rounds expended on them.
The Garhwal Brigade, which had the honour of being detailed to carry out
the first assault, was commanded by a fine soldier, Brigadier-General
Blackader. I had first met him when he commanded his battalion of
Leicesters in India, and from that day onwards I had learned to respect
him and to trust in his judgement. The manner in which he handled his
Brigade at Neuve Chapelle was good to see, and his report on the three
days’ fighting is concise, and written as brave and modest men write.
In support of the Garhwal was the Dehra Dun Brigade, commanded by
Brigadier-General Jacob.
The Bareilly Brigade continued to hold the original trenches, and in
command of it was Brigadier-General Southey, Indian Army, in whom I
reposed the utmost confidence.
Whatever the qualifications of other brigade commanders in France, I
certainly was fortunate in those who directed their brigades at Neuve
Chapelle.
And all is now ready for the great attack. In such moments men think and
act according to their own peculiar natures; the Oriental’s thoughts are
generally quite different from our own. I asked a sepoy I had known for
years, and who came out of the battle scatheless, how he felt just
before the assault. This was his reply: “My right-hand comrade had been
looking at a rough map with the names of the villages and trenches
marked in Hindustani. I could read the names, but did not understand the
map; so just before we started I made up my mind to go to my British
officer after the battle and get him to teach me. I had no time to think
of anything else, for just then we advanced.” Splendid fellow! I am glad
I was not the first German who came across his path; but his simple
story impressed me much. He was not wondering what was going to happen;
he was just going to death, if Ishwar so ordained, and if he lived he
was going to improve his military value.
The half-ruined village of Neuve Chapelle, about to be turned into a
shambles for the third time, lay but a few hundred yards to the front;
boggy fields, torn hedges, and numerous ditches blocked the passages of
the attackers, and the Aubers Ridge beyond looked down on the dead level
country, so soon to mark the triumph of the Asiatic over the Teuton.
At 8.5 A.M. precisely the Garhwal Brigade rushed to the assault of the
enemy’s trenches opposite the front he had been holding along the La
Bassée road. The order of battalions from right to left was:
1/39th Garhwal Rifles (Colonel Swiney).
2nd Battalion Leicesters (Lieut.-Colonel Gordon).
2/3rd Gurkha Rifles (Lieut.-Colonel Ormsby).
2/39th Garhwal Rifles (Lieut.-Colonel Drake-Brockman).
The 3rd London Regiment was in Brigade reserve.
The assaulting infantry (except the 1/39th Garhwalis) reached their
first objective without a check, and by 8.30 had pushed through to the
east side of the road joining Port Arthur with Neuve Chapelle.
The 2/39th, the left battalion of the Brigade, and therefore the one
nearest the right of the 8th British Division, which was attacking on
our left, was met by some rifle and machine-gun fire but had soon
reached the fourth German trench. Scouts were at once sent forward, and
the consolidation of the position commenced. Simultaneously the advance
was continued to the outskirts of Neuve Chapelle, where three
machine-guns and 300 prisoners fell into their hands.
In this advance Naik Jaman Sing Bisht won the Indian Order of Merit by
fine leading, and Havildar Buta Sing Negi was awarded the same
decoration. Rifleman Gobar Sing Negi received the Victoria Cross for
conspicuous bravery and under circumstances so similar to those which
had won it for his Garhwal comrade of the 1st battalion, viz. Naik
Darwan Sing Negi, on the 23rd November 1914, near Festubert, that it
would appear the soldiers from Garhwal firmly believe that the bayonet
is the best weapon for use in the trenches. He was the leading man of
the bayonet detachment which accompanied the bombing party; was first to
rush each traverse, and besides himself bayoneting several Germans drove
back many more who finally all surrendered. Death claimed him before he
could receive the Cross which he had so bravely won, but it was awarded
posthumously, and his family get the monetary award; whilst his name
will remain a beacon to attract for years his fellow hillmen to the
2/39th Garhwal Rifles.
Jemadar Ghantu Sing Negi was killed and over 130 casualties were
suffered by the battalion.
The 2/3rd Gurkhas carried the trenches to their front and secured two
machine-guns. Having arranged for one company each from the 2/39th and
Londons to consolidate the line gained, the Gurkhas pushed on, wheeled
to the right, crossed the Rue du Bois and reached the old British trench
east of Neuve Chapelle. Quickly entrenching they gained touch with the
Rifle Brigade of the Fourth Corps on their left. Major A. Tillard on his
own initiative carried the attack still farther forward towards the
brewery and captured several prisoners. The Indian Order of Merit was
conferred on Subadar Bhim Sing Thapa, Lance-Naik Harak Sing Gharti,
Subadar Major Gambhir, Sing Gurung, Havildar Bahadur Thapa, and Rifleman
Gane Gurung. This latter gallant fellow was the hero of a melodramatic
affair. The 2nd Rifle Brigade from the Fourth Army Corps met the Gurkhas
in the village, and the first thing seen was my friend Gane Gurung, with
his bayonet very close to the stern of a German, who with seven others
were being driven off as prisoners, having surrendered _en bloc_ in a
house to the little Gurkha. Lieut.-Colonel Ormsby was made a C.B.
The 2nd Leicesters also advanced without a check and by 8.30 A.M. had
gained the road parallel to and east of the Estaires-La Bassée road,
where the battalion began to entrench itself. It was found, for reasons
which will be related, that between their right and the left of the
1/39th a considerable gap existed. Captain Romilly, using his revolver
freely and followed by a platoon of the Leicesters, bombed back the Huns
for over a hundred yards of trench and then with the assistance of
Captain Hobart, R.E., and some sappers who came up opportunely, erected
a barricade. Hobart was awarded the Military Cross, Sapper Sheikh Abdul
Rahman the I.O.M., and Colour-Havildar Chagatta, who had previously won
the I.O.M., was given the Russian Cross of St. George.
Romilly received a well-earned D.S.O., and Captain D. L. Weir, also of
the same battalion, a Military Cross. The Leicesters are all brave, but
conspicuous amongst them on this day was Private William Buckingham,
who, regardless of an inferno of fire, carried in several badly wounded
men. In doing this he received two severe wounds himself but escaped
with his life and was awarded the Victoria Cross. Poor fellow! he no
longer lives to enjoy his reward; he has added one more to the immortal
dead along the Somme. Several D.C.M.’s were also awarded to N.C.O.’s and
men of this fine fighting Corps.
In none of these assaults so far had any serious check been caused by
the enemy’s wire entanglements, these obstacles having been destroyed by
the artillery, and only in the case of the 2/39th had any considerable
fire been met before the first trench was reached.
The 1/39th Garhwalis did not fare so well; their assault unfortunately
took a wrong initial direction, and instead of keeping their left as
ordered on the Rivière des Layes, swung away to the right. Nevertheless,
in face of a heavy rifle and machine-gun fire they reached close up to
the German trenches, but the obstacles had not been destroyed by our
artillery, as they were not included in the marked zone, and
consequently the impetus of the rush was broken.
During this check the battalion suffered considerable casualties in
British officers and Indian ranks. But although the initial error cost
them dear, it was the occasion for proving the grand material of which
these fine Garhwal Rifles are made. On no occasion in the history of the
Indian Corps in France was it better proved what Indians led by British
officers will assuredly achieve, provided the men have been properly
trained. The capture of the enemy’s trenches here became a terrible
struggle, but the 39th would take no denial. Captains Owen, J. E.
Murray, R. J. Clarke, and Sparrow were killed, whilst Captain Kenny and
Lieut. Welchman actually reached and entered the trenches before they
also shared the same fate. Six out of the total of twelve British
officers gave their lives in a few short moments, and Major MacTier of
the 2nd Battalion, who had been sent to replace Colonel Swiney
(wounded), was also killed later on.
Faithful unto death.
The check created a gap between the left of the 1/39th and the right of
the Leicesters. In this gap the Germans held out, and it took much time
and was not without considerable losses that their trenches were finally
captured.
The Leicesters seeing how matters stood immediately set to work to clear
up the situation, and a party under Captain Romilly, as already related,
using bayonets and hand-grenades, gradually forced the enemy back along
his trenches. Lieut. G. A. Cammell, R.F.A., on forward observation duty,
seeing the British officers were being mown down and that some
hesitation was occurring in the advance, and his telephone communication
having been destroyed, dashed forward and headed the charge, with some
Garhwalis by his side; he and a few of the Riflemen were almost
immediately wounded, and fell, but here again another gallant soldier,
Corporal V. Thompson, 2nd Black Watch, was quickly on the scene to save
the officer, and carried him back, being himself wounded while doing so.
It is pleasant to record that the D.S.O. and D.C.M. were promptly
bestowed.
Colonel Swiney, the Commander of the 1/39th, who himself related to me
the doings of his Corps on this day, a brave and modest gentleman, was
also severely wounded during the morning; but what he did not tell me
was that he remained on for many long and weary hours, till loss of
blood forced him to leave his command. Subadar Kedar Sing Rawat and
other Garhwali officers did very fine work after the British officers
had been killed and wounded.
Further help was needed before the end could be attained, and this came
from the Dehra Dun Brigade, whose G.O.C. placed two companies of the 1st
Seaforths at the disposal of the Garhwal Brigade, and these, together
with two companies of the 3rd Londons and one company of the 1/39th from
Port Arthur, finally succeeded in carrying the trenches.
The Seaforth advance was brilliantly seconded by the 3rd Londons and a
company of the 39th, who carried out a frontal attack with the bayonet
in a most dashing style, but of course with heavy loss. The 3rd Londons,
especially in this their first fight, literally covered themselves with
honour, and I never heard their name mentioned thereafter except in
terms of the highest praise by all ranks of the Army Corps.
The 1st Seaforths carried out its advance, as it always did, with the
_élan_ and thoroughness of the pick of the “Old Contemptibles.” Captain
Wicks, once on my Staff in India, was wounded, one of the very best
all-round men I ever knew. Captain R. Murray was wounded and died the
next day. 2nd Lieut. C. H. Kirkaldy was killed, and in this short attack
the battalion suffered over seventy casualties. Three N.C.O.’s and men
received the D.C.M.
I recall a story of the Seaforths during one of my expeditions on the
North-West frontiers of India in 1908. A brigade, after carrying out
some punitive measures on a large village, was retiring over an open
plain scored by deep nullahs. The Seaforths formed the rearguard. The
Afridis, as usual, were following and firing whenever opportunity
offered, but on such ground they had no chance and were kept at a
respectful distance. After the expedition was over the chiefs all came
in to hear the terms of our Government. I asked an old warrior why they
had not followed us more closely on that day. His answer was: “We did
not like those Highlanders; they looked as if they wanted us to come on,
and we had no intention of obliging them.” He was right; the Seaforths
moved deliberately throughout as if they were spoiling for a fight. It
was on this same day that my gallant friend Major Hon. Forbes Sempill,
their C.O., was killed, and the battalion would have given a good deal
to have had its revenge.
The assault of the 3rd Londons was, as I have already said, a “most
dashing” one. Officers and men vied with one another to be first into
the German trenches. Wherever they all came from I cannot say, but
blessed indeed is the city that can pour forth such men at the call of
their country. 170 casualties marked their share in the battle. Captain
Moore received the Military Cross, and a few N.C.O.’s were awarded the
D.C.M.
The result of all these operations was that the gap in our advance was
closed, and many wounded Germans surrendered.
The 1/39th Garhwalis paid dearly on this day. By the time they had
reached the objective assigned to them in the assault the battalion had
been severely mauled, and its subsequent losses brought its total
casualties to 330 out of a strength which did not exceed 600 all told.
Every British officer was either killed or wounded before the fighting
at Neuve Chapelle ended.
Captain J. Taylor, I.M.S., in medical charge of the battalion, was
awarded the D.S.O. on Colonel Swiney’s special recommendation for
gallant conduct and devotion to duty.
During the attack of the Garhwal Brigade the Dehra Dun Brigade had moved
up in close support. At 10.45 A.M. the Jalandar Brigade also was ordered
to move to Richebourg St. Vaast, and later, at 2.30 P.M., the Sirhind
Brigade was ordered to Vieille Chapelle and La Couture.
By 11 A.M. the Dehra Dun Brigade (less 1st Seaforths, detailed to assist
the 1/39th Garhwalis’ advance) was ready to issue from the trenches
along the La Bassée road and to advance to the attack of the Bois du
Biez. Since, however, at that hour the enemy was still holding out in
the trenches between the Leicesters and the 1/39th Garhwalis (who were
isolated) this attack was postponed. The delay was most unfortunate, as
had it been carried out on the heels of the first assault, great results
might have been achieved.
As will be seen later, even as it was the Bois du Biez might have fallen
to us, but the inability of the British Brigade of the Eighth Division,
on our left, to advance prevented it, and on this and the following days
for the same cause an advance into the Bois du Biez became an
impossibility, as our left flank was entirely enfiladed.
As I stood that morning expectantly by the telephone, awaiting the first
news of the results of our assault, it seemed as if ages were rolling
by, but when the news came, it was one of the moments I often live
again. “Practically all our first objectives captured.” “Hurrah!” I
shouted, and with such energy that, as the French women at the back of
the house afterwards told me, they thought a bomb had burst inside. And
so it had! The bomb was the birth of a new life for India; the story
that the cables would bear throughout the world, viz. that the Indians,
led by British officers, could drive Germans from their own deliberately
selected entrenchments. That the men who had fought against us from
Seringapatam to Assaye, at Moodkee and Chillianwala, at Delhi, Lucknow,
and Tirah, all classes, creeds, and clans, had banded together under the
Union Jack, and trusting in the inviolable word of England’s King and
the proven valour of their white leaders, had inaugurated a new era in
the history of Hindustan.
At 3.15 P.M. orders were received from the First Army to push on to the
Bois du Biez, and instructions were issued for the Dehra Dun Brigade to
advance, supported by two battalions of the Jalandar Brigade (the 1st
Manchesters and 47th Sikhs), which had now come under the orders of the
Meerut Division. The deployment for attack along the road running
south-west from Neuve Chapelle was not completed until 4.30 P.M., and it
was nearly dark by the time the troops reached the line of the river
Layes. By 6.30 P.M. a portion of the Brigade had reached the western
edge of the wood, guided in the pitch darkness by a burning house on its
extreme north-west corner.
The leading companies of the 2nd Gurkhas under Major Watt and Captain
Dallas Smith crossed the road, occupied some houses, and commenced to
dig in at the edge of the wood. Major H. Nicolay was killed during this
operation. A portion of the 9th Gurkhas on the left of the 2nd Gurkhas
also reached the wood. In this advance both battalions moved with the
greatest steadiness under rifle and machine-gun fire from both flanks,
but although suffering casualties, had soon placed portable bridges
across the Layes river and reached the farthest limit attained during
the battle. Subadar Mehar Sing Khattri, 9th Gurkhas, was awarded the
I.O.M. for his daring leading, and Major Watt was gazetted a D.S.O. Of
the conduct of the 4th Seaforths, who were in support of the Gurkhas,
General Jacob wrote: “The 4th Seaforths (Territorials) showed itself to
be the equal of any Regular Regiment.”
The Germans, realising the position, now made a special effort to turn
our left flank, but the 9th Gurkhas were equally determined that the
attempt should fail, and Lieut. Murray, with a machine-gun, very
opportunely stopped the movement. He received the Military Cross for his
gallant conduct on this and subsequent days.
At 8.7 P.M., 10th March, Jacob, after a consultation with his Battalion
Commanders, decided to withdraw from the wood to the line of the Layes.
This operation was rendered necessary by the fact that the British
Brigade on our left was unable to make any further advance beyond the
line of the old British trench, which they had captured earlier in the
day. The left flank of the Dehra Dun Brigade was therefore entirely in
the air and exposed to machine-gun fire, and to have held on to the wood
would only have meant being cut off and adding another long list to the
“missing.”
The First Army Commander considered that Jacob should have held on, but
he was not in a position to judge, and the decision to get back to the
Layes was, in the opinion of all those cognisant of the real state of
affairs, a correct one.
The position was in fact somewhat similar to that of the 8th Gurkhas six
months later at the fight near Mauquissart during the battle of Loos. In
this case the 8th gallantly held on till it was too late to retire, and
paid a terribly heavy toll.
During the move back from the wood the following riflemen of the 2nd
Gurkhas behaved with great courage and received the I.O.M.: Hastobir
Roka, Partiman Gurung, Ujir Sing Gurung, Manjit Gurung, and Jagtia Pun.
At the time the point regarding the position in the wood was much
discussed, and it is only fair to the battalions concerned to say that
they did all they were asked to do. If any man could have remained,
without quite needlessly undue risk, that man was General Jacob. I quote
from his report: “If the Eighth Division had been able to co-operate
with me, I would have been able to maintain myself on the edge of the
wood. As it was I found myself with my left flank enfiladed. The right
flank of the Brigade was also in the air. My information showed me that
the wood was held by the enemy.” He then states that he intended to
continue the advance next morning and had issued his orders for this
advance, but that it was impracticable unless the Brigade on his left
also co-operated.
The situation at 9 P.M., 10th March, was as follows:
MEERUT DIVISION
_Dehra Dun Brigade_ (less 1st Seaforths).—On line of river Layes
south-east of the village of Neuve Chapelle. Both flanks in the air.
_Garhwal Brigade_ (plus 1st Seaforths).—Holding and strengthening a
line parallel to and about 200 yards east of the road running from
Neuve Chapelle to Port Arthur, with the right practically on the La
Bassée road.
_Bareilly Brigade._—In original trenches along the Rue du Bois.
LAHORE DIVISION
_Jalandar Brigade_ (temporarily at the disposal of Meerut
Division).—In and about the Rue des Berceaux and in Neuve Chapelle.
_Sirhind Brigade._—Vieille Chapelle and La Couture.
_Ferozepore Brigade._—Calonne.
The night of 10th March passed without any particular incident, but work
went on incessantly in strengthening all positions gained.
The Garhwal Brigade, divided into three sections, had its left in touch
with the Rifle Brigade on our left, which battalion was, however, some
200 yards farther to the rear. The left section was commanded by
Lieut.-Colonel Ormsby, 2/3rd Gurkhas, a soldier who loved his battalion
but had the great virtue of never concealing any faults of his men, and
from him I often obtained the greatest assistance in matters of
discipline.
Lieut.-Colonel Gordon, 2nd Leicesters, had charge of the centre section,
and where that Corps was stationed there was never any chance for the
enemy.
Lieut.-Colonel Ritchie, 1st Seaforths, commanded the right section,
consisting of his own battalion, the 3rd Londons, and the 1/39th Garhwal
Rifles. Ritchie was a most reliable officer, and in a short report
written on the spot, the Brigadier had added: “I am much indebted to
Colonel Ritchie for the efficient organisation and command of his
section.”
Orders had been issued from First Army at 3.45 P.M. placing one
battalion of the First Corps at our disposal. This battalion was to be
employed in working down the enemy’s trenches, parallel to the Rue du
Bois, starting from near Port Arthur, but for various reasons this order
was cancelled at 12.45 A.M. on the 11th.
CHAPTER XVI
The attack of the Dehra Dun Brigade was to have been renewed at 7 A.M.
on the 11th March and all orders had been issued. By 6.30 A.M. the
Jalandar Brigade had commenced to arrive at Neuve Chapelle in support of
Dehra Dun, but there was still no sign of any advance by the British
Brigade on our left.
At 8 A.M. General Jacob himself visited the Rifle Brigade, but was
informed by the C.O. that “he had distinct orders not to attack without
further orders.” The 2/39th Garhwalis, who had been detailed to move to
the right to protect the flank of the Brigade as it advanced, reported
themselves in position, and that the enemy was crowding into the
trenches straight to their front, whilst the houses and edge of the wood
were manned with machine-guns and men.
The 2nd Gurkhas were being enfiladed from their left, and the 9th
Gurkhas facing the Germans at 100 yards with the river between them,
were held up. The mist during the morning made observation very
difficult, and it was not possible to bring artillery fire to bear on
the points whence the attack was being retained.
During the morning of 11th March Jemadar Shibdhoj Mal of the 1/9th
Gurkhas won the Indian Order of Merit for bringing in, with the help of
some of his men, several wounded, under very heavy fire.
By 12 noon on the 11th it was found that the attack of the Dehra Dun
Brigade could not continue under the conditions, and I issued orders for
it to be renewed on the Bois du Biez at 2.15 P.M., with the Jalandar
Brigade in support. Both Brigades got into preparatory formation, but
the same causes prevented an advance. As it gradually became apparent
that nothing further could be done that afternoon, fresh orders were
issued for the relief of the Dehra Dun Brigade and for the attack to be
renewed on 12th; the Sirhind Brigade of the Lahore Division being placed
at the disposal of the Meerut Division for the purpose. This Brigade had
been ordered up at 7.45 A.M. to Richebourg St. Vaast.
The Dehra Dun Brigade eventually moved back after nightfall to the
vicinity of Lestrem, in Army reserve, and the Ferozepore Brigade was
directed on Richebourg, to arrive there on morning of 12th. The First
Army had sent a message saying that the Indian Corps should keep in
touch with Eighth Division, but this had, as already explained, been
done all along, the 9th Gurkhas being in touch with the right of the
Rifle Brigade, which corps was directly behind their left. Some
confusion existed as to the dividing line between them, the two attacks
overlapping, both Brigades having been given two common objectives.
Throughout this day the Dehra Dun Brigade had been subjected to constant
shell-fire and suffered considerably. Whilst this delay was being
caused, some platoons of the 4th Seaforths rose up and doubled forward,
and in doing so had to pass through a heavy machine-gun fire, but
nothing ever dismayed that gallant Corps, which was reported by the
Brigadier as advancing during the battle “with a confidence and
self-reliance that left little to be desired.”
The C.O., Lieut.-Colonel MacFarlane, and the Second in Command, Major
Cuthbert, were both severely wounded. I can see them now as I first saw
them in France: two gallant gentlemen who at once gave me the impression
of being real “cool-headed Scots,” who would enjoy nothing more than a
tough scrap with a good few Boches.
I will revert to the Bareilly Brigade, which, as already narrated, was
holding our original front trenches, and had divided their line into two
sub-sections. Before the opening of the battle, advanced picquets had
been withdrawn and all houses in the Rue du Bois evacuated, in case they
should be shelled by the enemy. The main line of defences had been fully
manned, and Brigade reserves were in position by 4 A.M. on the morning
of 10th March.
Port Arthur was evacuated by the garrison for the period of our obstacle
and wire-cutting bombardment, but rifle and machine-gun fire was
maintained. A German aeroplane which had made an early trip over our
lines had spotted the gathering of troops, and shortly after a rain of
shells was poured into the redoubt, and caused many casualties. The
Leicesters and 1/39th suffered somewhat severely, and the 2nd Black
Watch also had over thirty.
Communication trenches to connect our own line with the captured German
works had been pushed forward, and three companies of the 4th Black
Watch moved up to take over the _points d’appui_ which were being
established. Shortly afterwards this battalion was withdrawn, but it
reads strangely, in the light of after events, that “it was found
difficult to keep proper communication with this unit as it had no
telephone equipment.”
I must digress a moment. “No telephone equipment!” Think of it, those
who later on fought so bravely but under what different conditions. The
Indian battalions at least had their ordinary equipment, though at first
on a very meagre scale, and if we owed nothing else to the parsimony of
the Indian Government in connection with all things militant, we
nevertheless owed them one debt of gratitude, and that was, that perhaps
of all the troops in the field in France during the winter of 1914–15,
the Indian Corps felt least the lack of necessaries, simply because it
never realised that a shortage existed; for when things were at their
very lowest ebb they still were in excess of anything we had been
accustomed to in India, even in our palmiest and most festal Durbar
days.
Before this war I never discussed with Indian officers the policy of the
Government of India in regard to the Army. They knew the position fairly
well, but with an inborn good feeling they seldom ventured to do
anything more than touch casually on what was notoriously the intense
stinginess practised towards the soldiery. If any of those high
dignitaries yclept Members of Council should read anything I write, they
may perhaps feel a passing shame in the thought that whilst they
themselves, to use a slang phrase, always “did themselves well,”
soldiers of all ranks below at any rate that of Major-General were
treated as outcasts in a financial point of view, at all and every large
political or social gathering, at which the civilians lived in luxury,
sometimes casting an eye of patronage on their military “brethren,”
whilst the latter, who had perhaps been undergoing very severe training
at manœuvres, and had only arrived in Durbar camps at the eleventh hour
(in order to make a show in scarlet and gold for the glorification of
the aforesaid civilians), were consigned to some outlying sandhills and
told to shift for themselves: no water supply prepared, no wood at hand
for fires, and no preparations for sanitation.
Yes, I have in my mind some very vivid recollections of many such
scenes, and they are recalled to me by the remembrance of incidents at
Neuve Chapelle. On this occasion the fault lay not with India, but that
it passed almost unnoticed in the Corps was, as I have said, because the
members of that Corps had been bred in an atmosphere of civilian
selfishness so abysmal that they failed to realise they were no longer
in the shiny East, but were actually considered as good as their
fellows, and would be so treated.
During the fighting, 10th to 11th March, the Dehra Dun Brigade sustained
over 570 casualties. General Jacob and Colonel Widdicombe, 1/9th
Gurkhas, were given the C.B., and Major Boileau, 2/2nd Gurkhas, was
promoted to Brevet Lieut.-Colonel.
The attack on 11th March was to have been supported by the Jalandar
Brigade, but, as already described, it could not be carried out, and the
Jalandars in consequence remained out in the preparatory positions they
had assumed for the advance, under a heavy shell and rifle fire. Brigade
Headquarters here had no luck: three different tumbledown houses
selected were shelled in turn, till at last four of the signalling
section were wounded by one projectile which plumped into the room they
were working in.
This Brigade underwent a two days’ fiery ordeal, both in support and in
moving up to Neuve Chapelle. They had been very exposed and subjected to
a ceaseless fire from big and light guns, in addition to machine-guns
and rifles, and nearly 600 casualties resulted. Some of the units became
much disorganised and broken up, but in Brigadier-General Strickland
they fortunately possessed a commander whom no losses could deter. I
remember well his quiet verbal description of the whole incidents, and
his unfaltering faith in his Brigade, happen what might. Included in
this was his own battalion of Manchesters, a model Corps.
At 8.30 P.M., 11th March, the situation was as follows:
MEERUT DIVISION.—At original Report Centre at Vieille Chapelle.
_Dehra Dun Brigade._—Marching back to La Couture.
_Garhwal Brigade._—Holding line gained on the first day.
_Bareilly Brigade._—Holding original line on the Rue du Bois.
LAHORE DIVISION.—Headquarters at La Couture.
_Ferozepore Brigade._—South of Lestrem.
_Jalandar Brigade._—Vicinity of Rue des Berceaux.
_Sirhind Brigade._—In Neuve Chapelle.
During the night Neuve Chapelle was heavily bombarded by the enemy.
The Jalandar Brigade did not long remain in their new situation, as at
midnight they were warned to be in position by 7 A.M. on 12th March, to
carry out a fresh attack in conjunction with the Sirhind Brigade.
Before relating the story of this advance I must tell of a great
counter-attack made by the enemy. About 5.30 A.M. on the morning of 12th
March, as darkness began to give place to light, the Germans launched an
attack, which covered the whole front of the Garhwal Brigade and
partially enveloped its right. Preceded by a heavy shell-fire on Roomes
trench and almost immediately after on the Crescent and Port Arthur, the
massed enemy came on. The 5th and 18th Brigades R.F.A. soon found their
targets, and masses of Germans were literally mown down by their fire
and that of every rifle and machine-gun in the vicinity. The garrison of
the “Orchard” also opened fire. The waves came on until within 100 yards
of our trenches, when they melted away, leaving many hundreds of dead
and more wounded strewing the ground in front of the Brigade. On this
day the Indian troops had a real taste of killing, and a sepoy said to
me, “It was like a hot-weather dust storm in India and looked as if it
must pass over us; but at the very moment of reaching us it was as if a
fierce rain had suddenly extinguished it.”
Captain Lodwick, 2/3rd Gurkhas, the machine-gun officer of the Garhwal
Brigade, was awarded the D.S.O. for personal bravery and the manner in
which he had used his massed guns.
On the right of the 1/39th the Germans tried to work up the trenches and
eventually came into the open; here they again met with a tempest of
fire and were literally wiped out. Lieut. Mankelow, machine-gun
commander of this battalion, was in great measure responsible for their
repulse. He was awarded the Military Cross.
The enemy consisted of various units of the 6th Bavarian Reserve
Division and troops from the XIXth Corps, who had been rushed up from
Roubaix and hastily pushed into the counter-attack. Another attempt made
by them about 9 A.M. was also repulsed.
At 7.15 A.M., 12th March, Captain J. Inglis, 2nd Black Watch, had by a
very smart local attack from the Crescent rushed and captured seventy
prisoners.
During the 11th-12th March, the 2/8th Gurkhas were employed in carrying
ammunition from the Brigade reserve to forward depots in close proximity
to the trenches. General Blackader reported that this duty was admirably
performed under heavy shell-fire. I am glad to record this here, as this
battalion had met with very ill-luck immediately it entered the war zone
in October 1914, and was again in September to go through a thrilling
experience, one which practically destroyed it but has perpetuated its
name.
Another instance of the shortage of war material in those days I can
recall. The 4th Londons, when pushed up on one occasion to replace the
41st Dogras, had to move up into the trenches without telephones or
operators, and communications had to be maintained by orderlies alone.
By 6.10 A.M., 12th March, headquarters of the Jalandar Brigade were
established in Neuve Chapelle, and units gradually arrived there. As
already told, they had suffered very heavy losses, and it speaks well
for these gallant officers and men that, with nearly 600 killed and
wounded out of 2600 actually engaged, and having had to take their
punishment whilst in a semi-passive state themselves, they were ready,
nay eager, for the attack which was now at hand.
The final orders to the Meerut Division had been issued at 3 A.M. on
12th, directing the attack on the Bois du Biez to be resumed at 11 A.M.;
the Jalandar and Sirhind Brigades of the Lahore Division being placed at
the disposal of General Anderson.
It will be readily understood by all soldiers that in a battle of this
nature the mixing up of brigades and their transfer temporarily from one
division to another, was unavoidable. The objective remained almost
always the same; the Divisional Headquarters were more or less fixed,
and the necessity of relieving tired units was imperative, and so long
as the objective had not been obtained it was essential that unity of
command should not be broken. Later in the battle, as will be seen, the
main attack was placed under General Keary’s orders, who by that time
had his whole Division (Lahore) under his own command.
The combined attack of these two Brigades was made under the orders of
Brigadier-General Walker, V.C., Indian Army, then in command of the
Sirhind Brigade. He was an old 4th Gurkha officer, had served his life
with that race of men, and wore the Victoria Cross for conspicuous
gallantry in Somaliland.
The formations ordered were as follows. The attack was to be made on a
two-brigade front, Sirhind on the right, with the 1st Highland Light
Infantry and the 1/4th Gurkhas in front line, and the 1/1st Gurkhas and
15th Sikhs in support. The Jalandar Brigade on the left of the Sirhind
had on its own left the 1st Manchesters, in touch with the 25th Brigade,
8th Division, Fourth Army Corps; next on the right was the 47th Sikhs,
fine fighters always; and on the right of all, the remnants of the
Suffolks and 59th Rifles; leaving no troops to form a Brigade reserve.
The frontage allotted to the Brigade made a total of about 900 yards.
The hour for the attack had been fixed for 11 A.M., but an order from
the First Army postponed it for two hours, on account of the
difficulties of registration due to the misty atmosphere.
Bavarian prisoners of the 16th and 21st Regiments who had surrendered,
stated that the enemy in the Bois du Biez had been strongly reinforced
that morning; however, Germans kept coming in all day and surrendering
in small parties; they stated they had had no food, and looked cold and
hungry.
I several times personally interviewed German prisoners during my year
in France, but I seldom came across the truculent specimens one reads
of; most of those I saw appeared very glad to be on the British side of
the trenches, and of one, at least, after this battle, I have an amusing
story to tell.
About 11 A.M., 12th March, the Brigadier received a report from one of
his battalions, the 4th Suffolks, that this unit then consisted of but
140 rank and file, and at the same time the 59th Rifles reported a total
strength of 125 men. The shortage had been caused largely by the
casualties both battalions had suffered, but also by the fact that many
of the men were wandering about dazed by the intense shell-fire, and
unable to follow their units. Some gradually rejoined, but meantime, as
the hour for the attack was nearing, Strickland was obliged to readjust
his formations, reducing frontage and bringing his reserve battalion,
the 59th Rifles, into the first line, thus dispensing with a Brigade
reserve altogether.
No reserve! and two battalions numbering 270 men between them: the Corps
was often expected to make bricks without straw. This reminds me of a
native of India who once explained to me, that the reason why the old
Mogul emperors used very small bricks for all the monuments round Delhi,
was that they cost less than large ones. Perhaps he was thinking of the
Government of modern India.
At 1 P.M., 12th March, it was reported that the attack of the 25th
British Brigade on our left had progressed 100 yards. Just previously
about a hundred Germans hurried across from their lines and surrendered.
By 2.10 P.M. the Jalandar Brigade was held up, as it found itself in
advance of the British Brigade on its left, and was now under a severe
enfilade and oblique fire from machine-guns and rifles.
Nevertheless, some 200 yards had been gained, but any further advance
became impossible, as the left flank was entirely exposed to a hail of
bullets. The right of the Brigade made slightly more progress, but to no
appreciable extent. In two lines the Manchesters pushed through a heavy
fire and reached our most advanced positions, losing considerably _en
route_.
The 47th Sikhs, next on the right, advanced with their usual stoicism.
Six British officers were wounded in quick succession, but the officers
of this good Khalsa regiment feared nothing; perhaps more caution was
needed (?) but praise be to God, such men are not uncommon in the Indian
Army. Subadar Harnam Singh and Captain A. M. Brown were killed. The
I.O.M. was the award of two gallant men, Sepoy Rur Singh and Havildar
Gajjan Singh. The Subadar was posthumously awarded the Order of British
India.
In the 59th Rifles the C.O., Lieut.-Colonel Eliott-Lockhart, was wounded
whilst moving up to the trenches, and died of his wounds. He had done
his service in that fine corps the Guides, and had only recently got his
new command. He was one of the most refined, gallant, and attractive men
you could meet. In him we lost a tower of strength, and his battalion
deeply felt the blow. Captains P. Hore and T. Reed shared the fate of
their colonel. The first-class Order of Merit (a very rare decoration)
was conferred on Sepoy Zarif Khan. I knew Zarif well.
The 4th Suffolks on the two days 11th and 12th March lost Captain S.
Garrett, Lieut. H. Row, and twenty-six men killed, while four officers
and 174 other ranks were wounded. When I first saw the Territorial
battalions which were sent to the Corps, I wondered how they would get
on with Indians. After their very first fights, wherever they took
place, I ceased to wonder. I then knew very well, for there is no one
the sepoy more quickly likes than a fighting Englishman, and he found
them in plenty.
The attack of the Sirhind Brigade was made with two battalions in front
line, 1/4th Gurkhas and 1st Highland Light Infantry, supported by 15th
Sikhs and 1/1st Gurkhas, the last in reserve. The 4th Liverpools were
held in hand for any special work.
The H.L.I. swept over the open ground, nor stayed their advance until
they were in the German trenches after a sharp bayonet duel, capturing
nearly 200 prisoners. The losses of this battalion at Neuve Chapelle
were very heavy. Of the officers eight were killed, five wounded, and
among other ranks there were 240 casualties. Sergeant-Major A. G. House
and a few N.C.O.’s and men were awarded Distinguished Conduct Medals,
and they were indeed well earned. I mentioned six officers in my
despatch, but was unfortunate in not being able to procure any rewards
to mark their gallantry, although I made every effort to do so. Of these
Captain W. Stewart had already been awarded the D.S.O. at Givenchy in
December 1914.
The 4th Gurkhas did not have full opportunity on this occasion of
showing their mettle, but in the performance of very gallant deeds Major
D. Young was killed, and Rifleman Wazir Sing Burathoki and Jemadar
Gangabir Gurung earned the I.O.M. Captain Collins was awarded the D.S.O.
for conspicuous bravery, when with his company he rushed a German
trench, accounting for a large number of prisoners, besides many killed.
The 1/1st Gurkhas lost their Adjutant, Captain G. S. Kennedy, and
suffered a total of seventy casualties.
In the 15th Sikhs an old comrade of mine, Subadar Gajjan Singh, was
killed.
In writing the story of any action in which one has been in command of a
part of the attacking troops, it is only natural to try and confine
criticism to one’s own restricted front; but in order to explain matters
it is also necessary to refer to those who were co-actors in the drama.
In this battle there is no sort of doubt that the advance of the Indian
Corps, after the initial success in rushing our objectives in Neuve
Chapelle, was severely handicapped by the inability of the Eighth
British Division of the Fourth Corps to make more rapid progress. All I
know is that the most gallant attempts to advance of the Brigade on our
immediate left, after the capture of the ground gained in their first
assault, proved unavailing; and in consequence, for long hours, running
even into days, we were unable to push our advantage.
This is not the opinion of one person, but the verdict of every
Brigadier of the Indian Corps engaged in this part of the battlefield;
explicit reports which I have in my possession give the exact hours in
explanation of my statement.
It was a pity it was so, for had the troops on our left been able to
push on, the First Army might have made a greater success of Neuve
Chapelle than it turned out to be, and it is well to point out that the
Indian Corps, during its year in France, did occasionally carry out its
instructions, but did not always receive the credit in its own Army.
Read the remarks of First Army attached to the Order of the Day issued
by the Commander-in-Chief after Neuve Chapelle, and compare it with
similar Orders of later times. But the Indian Corps had not come from
the Dominions! Did the words “British soldiers” include Indians? I
wonder.
It was different with the Commander-in-Chief, who did us the honour of
specifically mentioning the “Indian Corps” by name in his despatch of
5th April 1915.
The only comment made to me by the First Army Commander regarding the
battle was, that if the Brigadier in front of the Bois du Biez had been
a tactician, he would never have left the wood once he had gained a
footing in it. Perhaps his vast experience since those early days may
make him take a more lenient view of our shortcomings in 1915. In any
case that same Brigadier rose to the rank of Lieutenant-General in
France.
To resume my story. At 4.40 P.M. on the 12th March General Strickland
was informed by Walker that there would be another artillery bombardment
from 5 to 5.15 P.M., at which hour the infantry would again attack.
During this period the O.C. 47th Sikhs reported that his unit then
consisted of but five British and seven Indian officers, and about 130
men “as far as he could ascertain”; whilst the Manchesters reported the
battalion as “very much reduced.”
By 5.45 P.M. on the 12th it was rumoured that the Sirhind Brigade had
reached the Layes river, and it was enjoined on all units that the
attack should be carried out “vigorously,” as the British Brigade on our
left was to assault at the same hour. For various reasons the
bombardment did not take place, in fact, till later, and at 6.5 P.M. the
Jalandar and Sirhind Brigades made their attempt to advance. Meantime,
General Keary, commanding the Lahore Division, had taken over all the
troops of his Division, and issued orders for the capture of the Bois du
Biez “at all costs.” Still no advance was made on our left, and after
covering a very short distance the forward rush was again stayed by the
deadly oblique and machine-gun fire from the German trenches. Casualties
were accumulating, and the wearied troops were getting done up after
their trials of two whole days without rest.
However, I received fresh orders at 7.20 P.M. for an attack by the whole
of the Lahore Division. Without going into details which would interest
no one, these orders were found to be impracticable during the hours of
darkness, over unknown ground, and I most reluctantly felt obliged to
hold them in abeyance. I feel sure the G.O.C. First Army when he found
what the situation really was, agreed with my decision. At 10 P.M.
orders were received to suspend further forward operations and to
consolidate our gains. The Jalandar Brigade was withdrawn to the Rue de
Berceaux, where it had already once moved back the previous day.
The battle was fought and won. We had not done all that was hoped for;
we had not captured the Aubers Ridge (nor did we succeed in doing so
until three years later), but as far as the Corps was concerned we had
shown that Indians will face any enemy.
How changed are some of our notions regarding the enemy, and how
different became our orders as the war went on, from those which
prevailed before Neuve Chapelle. I recall how, after a conference held
before the battle, I left with the impression that Army Headquarters
would shortly, in all probability, be advanced some miles. Places were
named; the _moral_ of the Germans was placed at a low ebb; and perhaps
to encourage all ranks, perhaps because the higher authorities really
believed it, the general impression left on me was that the Hun was on
the eve of receiving a blow so severe that it would be with difficulty
he could recover. Second Ypres, Loos, the Somme, Verdun, Amiens, and
other mighty battles had not then been fought.
As an indication I will quote only one message received by me during the
battle. It was issued at 3.6 P.M., 12th March, by the First Army:
Information indicates that enemy in our front are much demoralised.
Fourth Corps and Indian Corps must push forward at once regardless of
the enemy’s fire, using reserves as may be required. Fifth Cavalry
Brigade has been ordered on Piètre. Second Cavalry Division has been
ordered up.
How often was that splendid cavalry “ordered up”; but although always
ready to do or die, the day was still far distant when the sabre and
lance could be used to destroy the “much demoralised” enemy.
Neuve Chapelle was the biggest battle up to that time in which Indians,
as a body, had ever taken a share. It marks the beginning of a new era
in the history of that wondrous land; it proved the solidarity of our
Empire in the East; it opened new fields to the peoples of Hindustan,
and it was a living proof of the genius of our race to weld into one
Imperial whole, people so diverse in colour, race, and creed. Are we on
the eve of undoing our own great work? Are we, in our desire to grant
equality to all and every race, rushing towards the goal of an ultimate
dissolution? In the words of the African proverb I would say,
Softly, softly, catchee monkey.
The total casualties of the British Army in the battle amounted to
nearly 13,000 officers and men; of which the Indian Corps sustained a
loss in killed of forty-one British and twenty-two Indian officers, 364
British and 408 Indian other ranks. Wounded, ninety-one British and
thirty-six Indian officers, 1461 British and 1495 Indian soldiers;
whilst the total reported as “Missing” numbered 315. When the actual
numbers engaged are calculated it will be seen that the Indian Corps
bore its full share of the losses.
The net result of the operations was to advance the line held by the
Indian Corps by about 1000 yards at its northern extremity, and to
straighten out the dangerous salient known as Port Arthur—a point which
had always been a considerable source of anxiety to the various Corps
who had been responsible for holding it. The losses inflicted on the
enemy by the Indian Corps amounted to five machine-guns captured, twelve
officers and 617 men prisoners. Their losses in dead amounted to 2000 on
the front captured by the Indian Corps. After the battle I viewed the
ground to our immediate front, from a ruined tower near the trenches,
and in places it was thick with bodies.
Every Brigadier engaged brought prominently to notice the excellent
spirit that had prevailed throughout all ranks, and it was a great
pleasure to me to visit every unit, combatant and non-combatant, that
had in any degree shared in winning our first Indian offensive victory.
The delight of the men was very visible, and the toils and hardships of
the long weary winter were soon effaced.
Of the units engaged, some I have not so far in this book
particularised. The 41st Dogras was serving its maiden campaign. Raised
at Jalandar in 1900, by an old brother officer of my own, as the 41st
(Dogra) Regiment of Bengal Infantry, the battalion received its present
title in 1903. It was a class regiment, and suffered very heavy losses
only eight weeks after Neuve Chapelle.
The 107th Pioneers was originally raised in 1788, as the 4th Battalion
of Bombay Sepoys. In 1900 it was turned into a Pioneer Corps and became
the 107th Pioneers in 1903. Mysore, Seringapatam, and other famous names
record its war services.
The 9th Gurkhas was raised in 1817. Till 1894 it bore the name of the
Bengal Infantry in one shape or form, but in that year became Gurkha
Rifles, and its present designation dates from 1904, in which year also
a second battalion was added. Amongst their battle honours are Bhurtpore
and Sobraon.
The 15th Lancers (Cureton’s Multanis), the Lahore Divisional Cavalry
regiment, was raised in 1858 by Captain Cureton and was then known as
the “Multani Regiment of Cavalry,” and received its present designation
in 1903. It was composed of four squadrons of Musalmans from the Derajat
and Cis-Indus. The regiment fought in Afghanistan 1878–80.
During the fighting many acts of distinguished bravery besides those I
have described could be recorded had I space, but a few must be
mentioned. Naik Khan Zaman of the Lahore Divisional Signalling Company
was brought to notice for his extraordinary coolness in repairing
telephone lines under very heavy fire. Lieutenant Steven, 4th Black
Watch, most gallantly headed a successful charge on a German redoubt. He
received the Military Cross. Corporal W. Gurdon of the Calcutta
Volunteer Rifles proved himself a very gallant soldier. He was doing
duty with the Meerut Signal Company and was awarded the D.C.M. Private
Duffy of the Highland Light Infantry brought in several wounded under a
very galling fire, and received the D.C.M.
The Fourth Army Corps, which with the Indian Corps carried out the
attack on Neuve Chapelle, was then commanded by Lieut.-General Sir Henry
Rawlinson. Of all the Corps Commanders I knew him best, and working with
him was a real pleasure. He is so straight and fearless, two unsurpassed
qualities in a great leader, and such he has indeed proved himself in
the Great War.
[Illustration: NEUVE CHAPELLE 10^{th} TO 13^{th} MARCH 1915.]
CHAPTER XVII
Neuve Chapelle will always remain a great name with Indians, for they
fought right gallantly; they fought as a Corps, with a definite
objective, and they gained a decided victory over the highly trained
army of Germany. We were superior in numbers on the actual front
attacked; we had, it is true, a superiority in guns, and the attack came
as a complete surprise to the Huns; nevertheless, theirs was at that
time the most efficient army in the world, flushed with success,
believing itself invincible, and professing to despise the Indian
soldier. The German race, no matter what its writers may say in the
years to come, will, so far from despising, respect the soldiers of
India, who have established for all time on the sodden plains of
Flanders and in many other theatres of the Great War a reputation that
cannot die.
On the 14th March Sir John French sent me the following telegram:
I have cabled following to Viceroy of India. Begins. “I am glad to be
able to inform Your Excellency that the Indian troops under Sir James
Willcocks fought with great gallantry and marked success in the
capture of Neuve Chapelle and subsequent fighting, which took place on
the 10th, 11th, 12th and 13th of this month. The fighting was very
severe and the losses heavy, but nothing daunted them; their tenacity,
courage, and endurance were admirable and worthy of the best
traditions of the soldiers of India. Message ends.” Please make this
known to the Corps under your command. Accept yourself, and repeat to
all troops, my warm and hearty appreciation of their services and my
gratitude for the help they have rendered, which has so much conduced
to the success of the operations.
Such a generous tribute to the Indian Corps coming from the great
Field-Marshal immediately after the battle was equal to a strong
reinforcement, and his appreciation of my own efforts was not only the
highest reward I could have received, but determined me to hold fast to
my command under any circumstances.
On the 15th March I received the following telegram from Lord Hardinge,
Viceroy of India:
“I have just received from Field-Marshal Sir John French a telegram
informing me of the great gallantry and marked success with which the
Indian troops under your command fought in the capture of Neuve
Chapelle and subsequent operations which took place on the 10th, 11th,
12th, and 13th of this month. Stop.” I shall be glad if you will be so
good as to convey to the Indian troops on behalf of myself, the
Commander-in-Chief, the Government, and the people of India, our warm
admiration of their gallant behaviour and our confidence that they
will ever maintain before the enemy the best traditions of the Indian
Army. Viceroy.
Naturally all ranks were very pleased, and the Indian officers
especially so.
During the battle I had ridden into the village of Richebourg St. Vaast,
and came on a company of my old friends the Guides, just arrived as a
reinforcement from India. The village was at the time being shelled, but
our meeting was all the more opportune. I spoke to the men and had a
handshake with the Indian officers. One of the sepoys, who had once
served as my orderly in the Peshawar Division, said as I rode down the
ranks, “General Sahib, if you are in need of an orderly I am with you,
but I must just see one _pukka larai_ (real fight) first, then I am
ready to come.” The Connaught Rangers were also in the village, and as I
passed them they raised a loud yell; it was splendid seeing the gallant
Irishmen just spoiling for a fight.
On 21st March I visited the trenches in Neuve Chapelle and returned
_via_ Richebourg. The high tower of the church had always been a great
landmark for the Corps, and as I passed it I remarked, “I wonder how
much longer it will stand.” I had not long to wait, as a few moments
later an 8-inch shell struck it fair, and our well-known landmark
disappeared.
On the 24th I was riding out to make some inspections, when I came on a
party of Japanese officers going round the 4th Gurkhas drawn up on the
side of a road. I watched for some time, and could not but notice the
similarity of build and stature of the two races. A few days later the
veteran General Sir Partab Singh came to see me. His visits were always
most welcome, and his advice _re_ matters connected with the Indians
most valuable. He always kept a few hog spears, much the same as cavalry
lances, and used to assure me he would never be happy until he had used
one on the Boches. His wish was probably gratified when the Jodhpore
Lancers charged the flying Turks and Germans in Palestine in 1918.
On 28th March I inspected a motor machine-gun battery which had been
sent to the Corps. It looked smart and workmanlike, and I felt as if
England was really waking up and meant business in earnest. My thoughts
wandered away to the very early days of the war, and that night I
earnestly prayed to God I might be allowed to remain in the field and
see the day when the British Army would be equipped as well as and even
better than our enemies; and then, and then, alas! my diary for this day
notes: “Was on horseback all day.” I can recall every hour of that day,
for I saw a great many units, and each one gave me signal proof of its
respect. What more could a General wish?
My horses were my great delight, and were kept fully employed. “Arabi”
and “Guide” were old Indian friends, and recently I had added a remount.
He was a fine jumper, and if by any chance I was not using one or all of
them, my son, who was one of my A.D.C.’s, was always ready to take them
on, as well as his own. The constant work kept us all fit, and I seldom
had one sick or sorry.
My brother, who was a retired Colonel in the Indian Medical Service and
had rejoined for the war, paid me a visit in April. He came on
sanitation duty, and we visited several of the field hospitals and
billets together. He had a very wide experience in his profession, and I
was glad to learn that he considered our sanitary arrangements
admirable. He made many valuable suggestions, and his short stay did a
lot to enliven me.
On 9th April I saw the 40th Pathans, just arrived from China. The
battalion looked splendid. The rain came down in buckets, but I was
never in happier mood; for here was a whole battalion ready for the fray
and up to war strength: a rarity in the Corps and enough to rejoice the
heart. A fortnight later they received their baptism of fire at the
second battle of Ypres. Colonel Rennick, their commander, fell mortally
wounded, and his last request was that his orderly might be with him
when he died. Brave man! his wish was gratified a few hours later. 320
casualties out of a total strength of 750 made up the debt paid by the
Pathans in three days’ fighting within a month of their joining the Army
Corps.
The 40th Pathans were originally raised in 1858, and underwent many
changes of name and constitution. In 1890 they were named the 40th
(Baluch) Regiment of Bengal Infantry, and later again designated as
“Pathan.” The Corps received its present title of “40th Pathans” in
1903, and was composed of Orakzais, Afridis, Yeusafzais,
Punjabi-Musalmans, and Dogras.
Six days of peace were spent in England, and on 16th April I was back at
my headquarters in Lestrem. Sir John French inspected two of our
Brigades and Divisional troops on the 17th and 19th April, and spoke to
the men in his usual chivalrous manner. I translated his speeches to all
ranks, and the men were very pleased. After he had left an Indian
officer said to me: “The _jangi_ (war) Lord is an _asal_ (real) bahadur.
We cannot understand what he says, but we can tell what he means; and
when you translate it we feel as if we had understood all his words as
he spoke.” Sir John certainly possesses the diction which appeals to
Indian soldiers, and they always appreciated his visits.
Lieut.-Colonel Merewether, who was replacing Sir Frederick Smith as
Recording Officer with the Indian Corps, joined us on the 21st April and
we had a very enjoyable evening. It was sad losing F. E., who had always
been a most cheery companion, and for whom I had established a high
regard, but we were fortunate in having had him with us so long, for he
is a man who will always bear witness to the tenacity of the Indian
soldiers, and at his hands their reputation can never suffer.
After the battle of Neuve Chapelle the Indian Corps front was assigned
to the Meerut Division. On 24th March we were moved farther north,
having Neuve Chapelle on our extreme right, and took over the frontage
of the 8th British Division; and the Meerut was relieved at the end of
the month by the Lahore Division.
Prior to this, once again, in order to make the most of our weak Indian
battalions, the Brigades of both Divisions were readjusted as under:
MEERUT DIVISION
GARHWAL BRIGADE.—
2nd Leicesters.
3rd Londons.
2/3rd Gurkhas.
2/8th Gurkhas.
The Garhwal Rifles (both battalions of the 39th having been
amalgamated owing to shortage of men).
BAREILLY BRIGADE.—
2nd Black Watch.
4th Black Watch.
41st Dogras.
58th Rifles.
125th Rifles.
DEHRA DUN BRIGADE.—
1st Seaforths.
4th Seaforths.
2/2nd Gurkhas.
1/9th Gurkhas.
6th Jats.
DIVISIONAL TROOPS.—
4th Cavalry.
107th Pioneers.
Sappers and Miners as before.
LAHORE DIVISION
SIRHIND BRIGADE.—
1st Highland Light Infantry.
4th King’s Liverpools.
1/1st Gurkhas.
1/4th Gurkhas.
15th Sikhs.
JALANDAR BRIGADE.—
1st Manchesters.
4th Suffolks.
40th Pathans.
47th Sikhs.
59th Rifles.
FEROZEPORE BRIGADE.—
Connaught Rangers (1st and 2nd battalions amalgamated).
4th Londons.
9th Bhopals.
57th Rifles.
129th Baluchis.
DIVISIONAL TROOPS.—
15th Lancers.
34th Sikh Pioneers.
Sappers and Miners as before.
On 28th April I was up in the aid posts of several units then in the
trenches. The Boche, as was his usual custom, had selected one
particular spot to shell, and was dropping them at regular intervals of
time. Naturally I avoided this particular spot, but in passing a short
distance from it I saw a sepoy carrying a load of trench props. He
appeared quite oblivious of danger, as he deliberately walked into the
ruined house that was chiefly receiving the attention of the German
gunners. As he did so, a cloud of dust and smoke rose, timbers flew into
the air, and I thought our sepoy had taken his _congé_ from this world.
I took out my glasses and watched till the atmosphere was clear, when I
saw my gallant friend, apparently not in the least disconcerted, quietly
picking up his props, which he presently shouldered again, and went on
his way. I envied that man his cool contempt of danger.
The Highland Division, commanded by Major-General Bannatine-Allason, was
posted to the Indian Corps and joined us on the 2nd May. This fine
Division afterwards became the famous “Fifty-first Highland,” commonly
referred to as the “Fighting Fifty-first.” My son in the Black Watch was
with me the day I first inspected them, and two years later was sent to
them as G.S.O., and shared in their glory at the battles near Rheims,
where the Division was sent to assist the French during the big German
push in 1918, and in the final phases of the war.
Allason had been one of my Brigade commanders in the Peshawar Division,
and it was a great joy getting so fine a unit with us. This Division was
transferred to the Fifth Army Corps on the 31st May, but once more
rejoined us in June and remained as one of my Divisions till 24th July.
Changes of Divisions were of course inevitable, but it was always a blow
when just as we were getting to know them they were taken away.
In the same way the Eighth Division, which had fought so fiercely on our
immediate left at Neuve Chapelle, joined the Corps on 1st June, and was
again transferred, this time to the Third Corps, on the 26th.
Major-General F. Davies was in command, and I was extremely sorry when
he was transferred to Gallipoli, where, however, he got his chance and
took it, as I knew he would do. Likewise the 49th West Riding Division
(New Army) joined us on 31st May and left us again on 26th June.
The last Division to join the Corps was the Nineteenth (New Army),
commanded by Major-General Fasken of the Indian Army. They arrived on
the 24th July—strength, 13,400 bayonets, with their war proportion of
officers, sabres, and guns. How Great Britain was awaking to realities!
The Infantry of the entire Indian Army Corps in November 1914 did not
number more than this one Division; and as for the equipment it was an
education to look on it. The Nineteenth stayed on with the Corps and
took part in the battle near Mauquissart in September 1915.
Amongst many notes and stories sent to me I extract a few giving some
experiences of officers of the Indian Army. On one occasion a medical
officer was extracting a tooth when a small mine exploded under the
trench. He and his patient were both blown sky-high, and on his again
alighting on mother earth he was so dazed that, holding his forceps, he
ran round in circles and finally into a brother officer’s dug-out. With
the greatest indignation he demanded: “What do you call this? War?”
“No,” replied the officer, “a joke.”—Laughter.
An officer, who had a great friend in a Gurkha regiment, could get no
news of him. One day, whilst kicking a football it went over a low wall;
he jumped over to fetch it and landed on a grave, the cross on which
showed it was that of his friend.
During my year in France I nearly always found that the French people
were not only willing, but glad, to have officers of the Indian Army
billeted on them. One Vicomte ——, who was at first quite annoyed when he
was told that British officers of an Indian unit were to be quartered in
his château, could not do enough for them after a few days’ stay. With
true French politeness he followed the fortunes of the unit after they
had left, and frequently sent his card up to the trenches with enquiries
as to their welfare. Later on he sent a formal request that all British
officers who came to that neighbourhood might be sent to him.
For cool pluck a story I was told in France of Captain Wardell, 21st
Punjabis (attached 58th Rifles), is hard to beat. He was one day in the
trenches, which were being heavily shelled, and the men were getting
somewhat jumpy under the ordeal. He was writing, when he suddenly
discovered that his seat consisted of a bunch of fifty bombs. Some of
the men knew this, but Wardell, in order to set a good example,
pretended to make light of it and went on writing. Such examples are
worth a lot in war.
I often recall the story of a sergeant in the Connaught Rangers, who was
so determined to let the Huns know that that gallant Irish Corps had no
respect for them, that he crawled up one night close to their trench and
shouted: “Ye’ll not lie there and die in peace of old age as long as I
live.” What waste of energy, but what a plucky fellow!
An officer who had been severely wounded in the head, and carried away
unconscious, woke to find himself in a large hall with Germans, all
talking. Hearing no English he concluded he was a prisoner and proceeded
to try and crawl away, when he was relieved to hear in broad Cockney,
“Where is that officer with the ’ole in ’is ’ed?” The Boches were
prisoners.
During the battle of Neuve Chapelle a batch of German prisoners, under
escort of a few Gurkhas and Garhwalis, were suddenly caught by the
German guns; the prisoners all lay down flat, but the escort, determined
to set them an example, stood strictly at attention. This is an
authentic story and a very good sample of legitimate pride and good
discipline.
An amusing incident occurred during the same battle. Lieut.-Colonel Sir
F. E. Smith (now Lord Chancellor), our Recording Officer, had pulled up
his horse by a roadside and was watching some German prisoners pass
escorted by Indians. Suddenly one of the Boches rushed out of the ranks,
and going up to F. E. said: “Mr. Smeeth, oh, Mr. Smeeth, I am so glad to
see you again.” F. E., not recognising him, asked who he was. “Oh, Mr.
Smeeth, do you not remember you saved me in (naming the law case) in
London. Well, a few days ago I was sleeping quietly in my house when I
received the order to come to the war, and before I could realise where
I was I found myself near this horrible place, and suddenly we were
fighting, and I saw Indian soldiers right over our trench, and when I
looked back more Indian soldiers behind us; and I looked along our
trench and saw all our soldiers throwing away their arms, and so, Mr.
Smeeth, not wishing to be in any way peculiar, I also threw down my
arms, and so, Mr. Smeeth, here I am. Oh! save me again.” Lucky fellow to
have been taken prisoner so early in the war. Saved him a lot of trouble
and discomfort.
The craze for souvenirs in the early days of the war was remarkable.
After Neuve Chapelle, German helmets could be had for the asking, but
shortly after ridiculous prices were being demanded for them. An officer
of an Indian unit relates how he saw a big British soldier with a
horribly smashed leg come crawling round the end of the trench on
threes, with a German helmet hanging from his mouth by its strap. As he
neared the officer the wounded man yapped at him, “Got my souvenir,
sir.”
The 39th Garhwal Rifles was a remarkably smart and clean regiment. An
officer of another Indian battalion told me that the most impressive
sight he saw at Neuve Chapelle was a dying British officer being carried
by four Garhwali soldiers through all the turmoil, confusion, and firing
with a quietness and tenderness that astonished him. He added, “and they
looked so smart and clean.”
The Indians at this battle were much impressed by the dash and bearing
of the 3rd Londons. One of them said to me: “What is this they are
saying, that untrained regiments can fight as well as trained ones. You
always told us in India that without long and hard training we should be
of no use in battle. Why is it that this London _paltan_ (regiment) can
fight so well.” I said, trying to look wise: “They come from London and
you from Lahore; there lies the difference. Think it out, my friend.”
I know no one who is more susceptible to good example than the Indian
soldier. At one time we were billeted in the same village with the
Guards Brigade. In my opinion there is no body of troops in the world to
beat the Guards at anything. One day I noticed a company of one of my
Indian battalions being inspected. It was turned out as cleanly as in
pre-war days, and I said to the Indian officers, “Your men look very
smart to-day.” They replied, “Yes, but we have been quartered near the
Guards Brigade, and although we have seen many of your best regiments we
never saw men so well dressed and drilled, and we are following their
example.”
I wrote to Lord Cavan who was in command, adding my own testimony, and
he told me he would let it be known to all ranks.
CHAPTER XVIII
On the 22nd April 1915 I visited the town of Ypres, as a guest of
General Alderson, commanding the Canadian Division. From his
Headquarters I went on to Potijze, and from a tower close by scanned the
country towards the German lines. From that same tower six days later
the G.O.C. Lahore Division was (after a forced march northwards to help
our imperilled line) directing the operations of his Division against
the first German gas attack. I had long hoped that the Indian Corps
might be moved north from the slimy dead level flats opposite Neuve
Chapelle, and as this day I surveyed the rolling country north of
Wieltje, and on my return journey about St. Eloi, I determined to make a
request to Sir John French to give us a much-needed change. Had I
succeeded I feel quite sure all ranks would have been delighted at the
prospect, more especially the Gurkhas and Pathans. For here were real
hills, valleys, and woods, and not only pestiferous bogs and almost
treeless fields; but fate ordained otherwise. We were to remain on in
our old hateful haunts to the end. At one time the Commander-in-Chief
actually asked me if I would like a change up towards Nieuport, but it
came to nothing for some reason.
And yet in a degree my wish was to be gratified, for even as I gazed on
the German lines the Boche was preparing for an immediate attack, the
first with his loathsome gas; and whilst I was motoring round this
attack had begun, over the same ground I had looked across. Next day I
received orders to hold the Lahore Division in readiness to move, and on
the following morning General Keary and his troops were _en route_ to
take part in the second bloody battle of Ypres.
As I look over my diary the names of numerous places, which had become
as familiar to me as London streets, recur again and again, and when in
1918 the Huns made their great attack on the Lys and as far as the
Nieppe forest, there was little need to refer to the map; I felt as if I
was back in my old haunts, nor could any map have helped me to take in
the situation, so clear did it all appear. But I was not there. Alack! I
was home on a month’s leave in 1919 and spent two days in going over all
the old haunts—two happy, sad days.
Next day I applied to the First Army to be allowed to run north during
the battle and see my absent Division, but permission was refused. My
Corps was now entirely split up and I could easily have been spared for
a few hours, but of course I could not go, and the remarks in my diary
are not fit for publication.
After a very fatiguing march of thirty-one miles, the Lahore Division
arrived at Ouderdom on the 25th April. It is as usual not my intention
to describe the events which led up to this battle. The Germans trusted
to the use of gas, a new feature in war, to break through our line and
to capture Ypres. So unexpected was any such method of attack that the
French Colonial Division, on which the brunt fell, was perforce obliged
to abandon its front, and in so doing exposed the left flank of the
Canadian Division on its right. The Canadians drew back their left,
retiring on St. Julien with extraordinary steadiness and gallantry. The
Huns meantime rushed over the vacated ground, killing and slaughtering
the helpless victims of their devilish devices. After heavy fighting and
attempts at counter-attack, by the evening of 24th April our advanced
lines had retired to between St. Julien and Fortuin. Notwithstanding
every effort on our part, the effect of the gas had done its work, but
there was one thing the Germans had not as usual calculated on, as far
as the Canadian Division was concerned, and that was that their foe
consisted of men of the Anglo-Saxon race, and Canadian soldiers cannot
be defeated by any enemy. The Huns had had their turn, the day was not
far distant when they would be hoist with their own petard.
By the 25th April the attack had been checked in some degree in the
vicinity of St. Julien, and the following day brings us to the date on
which the Lahore Division joined in to help stem the tide. Shortly the
orders of the Second Army (under which the Division now found itself)
were, that it was to be used in co-operation with the French, and on
their right, in an attack in a north or north-east direction from about
St. Jean. The actual time was to depend on that fixed by the French to
deliver their attack.
The following extract from a letter from the Chief of Staff, Second
Army, to Major-General Keary will explain the situation:
25th April. The Army Commander is determined not to commit your
Division to the area east of Ypres until he is sure that the French
plans have matured.... You will only be able to make an attack on a
front of two Brigades with a Brigade in support.... Sir Horace
(Smith-Dorrien) would not wish the Division to press forward unless
the French on your left had already done so.
These directions were clear and left no room for doubt and uncertainty.
The Ypres-Langemarck road was to be the dividing line between the French
right and the Lahore Division’s left; whilst the Lahore right would be
in touch with the Fifth Corps to the east.
On the 26th April the Division marched as ordered: two batteries of
Artillery and the Ferozepore and Sirhind Brigades by the road north of
Ypres, and the Jalandar Brigade by the railway south of Ypres. A certain
number of casualties occurred from shell-fire during the march,
especially in the 40th Pathans, who lost 25 men from a single shell. It
is on record that in this their first experience of shell-fire the
Battalion showed no signs of uneasiness, but closed ranks and moved on
steadily. The head of the Jalandar Brigade reached a position of
readiness just south of Wieltje at 10.30 A.M. The Ferozepore Brigade,
finding better cover at La Brique than south-east of St. Jean, went into
a position of assembly there, arriving about 9.45 A.M. The Sirhind
Brigade arrived north-west of Potijze about 11 A.M.
It had been arranged that the C.R.A., Fifth Corps, would support the
advance with all the batteries west of the canal; and as the enemy’s
defensive line could only be conjectured, two Canadian 18-pounder and
one howitzer battery, in addition to one howitzer and one 18-pounder
battery of the Lahore Division, were assigned to the two attacking
Brigades: a very useful support. The advance of the Lahore Division,
which was echeloned a little in rear, was ordered for 2 P.M., in order
to come level with the French, who were to move five minutes later.
On the march to La Brique of the Ferozepore Brigade (General Egerton),
Captain Acworth, 55th Rifles (the same officer who had assisted the
1/39th Garhwalis in their night attack on 23rd November 1914), was
wounded, as also was Lieut.-Colonel Murray, Connaught Rangers—a man who
was justly proud of his regiment. In the 4th King’s Liverpools 2nd
Lieutenant Lydden was mortally wounded.
In order to reach a point from which the assault could be delivered the
Brigades had to cross some 1500 yards of open shell-swept ground. They
were therefore deployed on an east and west line through Wieltje, the
right resting on a farm and the left on the Ypres-Langemarck road. The
Division was to cover 1000 yards of front.
From the position of deployment the Brigades were to advance under cover
of a bombardment by all the guns available. The order of advance was as
under:
Right attack.—Jalandar Brigade. Frontage, 500 yards. 1st Manchesters,
40th Pathans, with 47th Sikhs on the left. Second line—59th Rifles,
4th Suffolks, following right and left battalions.
Left attack.—Ferozepore Brigade. 129th Baluchis, 57th Rifles with
Connaught Rangers on the left and nearest the French. Behind the
Connaughts the 4th Londons were in support, and the 9th Bhopals were
in reserve.
The attack started punctually and moved forward unchecked, but losing
heavily from shell-fire. During the advance the Jalandar Brigade
inclined to its left, and pressed the left of the Ferozepore Brigade
across the Langemarck road. After crossing a crest north of the road the
troops came under a very heavy rifle and machine-gun fire, and there was
a tendency for units to bunch behind farm buildings or other cover. But
the line held on, and the Manchesters on the right, together with
portions of three battalions of the Ferozepore front line (Connaught
Rangers, 129th Baluchis, 57th Rifles), all reached the close proximity
of the German trenches about 2.15 P.M.; the 40th Pathans and the 47th
Sikhs on the left of the Manchesters getting within fifty yards of the
trenches also.
In the Manchesters Lieutenant G. B. Roberts was mortally wounded. In
this battalion the casualties were heavy, as indeed was inevitable from
the nature of the country and the fiery zeal with which they always
advanced. Before midnight they included Lieut.-Colonel Hitchins, the
gallant C.O., killed, of whom it may fairly be said, he lived for his
regiment.
The Victoria Cross was awarded to Corporal Issy Smith for his
conspicuous bravery in advancing towards the enemy in the face of heavy
rifle and machine-gun fire to help a severely wounded comrade. He
managed to carry and drag him in, a distance of 250 yards, under a hail
of bullets. Not content with this he later assisted in bringing in
several other wounded men. An Indian officer in telling the story said:
“Issy Smith has a V.C. face.” Their remarks are sometimes very apposite.
Several Distinguished Conduct Medals were also won by N.C.O.’s and men.
The Manchesters at Ypres had just under 300 casualties. The casualties
of the 59th Rifles, in support of the Manchesters, totalled 4 British
officers and 60 others.
The 40th Pathans advanced rapidly. Lieut.-Colonel Rennick, the C.O., was
mortally wounded and died the same evening. I had known him for many
years; his military life was centred in his officers and men. How fast
the old Indian “Contemptibles” were disappearing!
The story of the 40th Pathans is the story of the oft-repeated bravery
of the various units composing the Army Corps. I would that I could find
space to tell them all, it would be a joy to do so, but each battalion,
battery, and other formation would need a pamphlet to itself. Through
the leaden tornado officers and men ploughed their way, ever nearing the
goal; whilst on the right, on the left, and centre were being performed
deeds which will oft be told in far-off Hindustan. When the historian of
future Russia describes what the Russian Medal of St. George was awarded
for in the days of the now defunct Czar, he will have cause to feel that
it was never better bestowed than on a heroic sepoy, by name Muktiara,
who, scorning all danger, brought up his machine-gun over 250 yards,
after all his comrades had been mown down.
Captain Christopher was killed, as also was Major Perkins, when almost
in the German trenches. Captain Dalmahoy with six wounds fought to the
very last, and brave Lieutenant Adams, in the attempt to save him, was
himself badly wounded. Captain Waters was dangerously wounded. Twenty
British and Indian officers in all were killed and wounded. Subadar
Jahandad Khan (killed) and Jemadar Lehna Singh were awarded the I.O.M.
The Pathans recorded a casualty list of 320 of all ranks.
The 47th Sikhs on the left of the 40th once again dyed red the banner of
the Khalsa. Of 420 bayonets all told who started the fight but 92
unwounded remained when the carnage of second Ypres was over. Every
British officer save one, Lieutenant A. E. Drysdale, was killed or
wounded during the early stages of the battle. Major Talbot, Captains
Scott and Cook, and Lieutenant Allardice were killed. Drysdale received
the Military Cross.
The 4th Suffolks, who advanced in rear of the 47th Sikhs, suffered a
loss during the battle of 3 killed, whilst 6 officers and 20 other ranks
were wounded and missing.
And whilst the right Brigade was doing its part the Ferozepore Brigade
on the left was grimly endeavouring to reach the same goal. The 129th
Baluchis pushed up to within 300 yards of the Hun trenches, with a
casualty list of 230 of all ranks. Major Hannyngton, the C.O., was
awarded the D.S.O.; Sepoy Raji Khan gained the I.O.M., and Sepoy Ghulam
Hussein of the 124th Baluchis (attached) won the I.D.S.M. for bringing
Major Holbrooke, who was lying wounded, into safety through a heavy fire
and gas fumes.
The 57th Rifles, under the cheery Major Willans, the centre battalion of
the Brigade, with the dogged determination of that distinguished Corps,
reached to within ninety yards of the German defence. Willans was
wounded during the advance, together with two officers, whilst Major
Duhan, Captain Mackie, Subadar Badawa Singh, and Jemadar Kirpa Singh
were killed near the enemy trenches.
Here too fell Captain P. d’A. Banks of the Guides (attached 57th), an
officer of particular and varied attainments, and one who was marked out
for distinction. His orderly, Bhan Singh, to whom I was talking four
days previously, notwithstanding a severe wound he had received, carried
Banks through a storm of bullets until he fell from overstrain, but some
mark of his officer he must retain, and being unable to do more, he took
off his accoutrements and brought them back. Just like the Guides!
A glorious tale indeed to tell, their children sing to-day.
For each recruit the Guides e’er need, full ten are on the way,
To join the ranks, to don the drab, to bear the arms of pride,
To march behind the Surnai’s wail, or listen to the battle tale,
To stand erect at tap of drum, and breathe the air the bagpipes hum,
And say, “I am a Guide.”
Bhan Singh received the I.D.S.M. and later the Russian medal of St.
George. Willans received a D.S.O., and Lieutenant Deedes (gassed) the
M.C. Naik Atma Singh gained the I.O.M.
Lieutenant Mein of the 55th Rifles (attached) received a Military Cross
for his gallant work. This officer throughout the year of my command
rendered most valuable service. The 55th Coke’s Rifles of the old
Frontier Force added a still greater laurel to their records on this
day. A great friend of mine, Jemadar Mir Dast, who had won the I.O.M.
with me in the Mohmand expedition of 1908, and was now serving with the
57th Rifles, finding that his British officers were all killed or
wounded, refused to leave his trench when the gas forced a retirement,
and there he remained, rallying every one round him and encouraging them
to hold on. After dark, distinct orders reached him to retire, but he
only did so slowly, collecting any stray men he could find. In assisting
to bring in a number of disabled officers he was himself wounded, but
lived to wear the Victoria Cross. The I.O.M. was conferred on Havildar
Mangal Singh of the 57th Rifles.
The 57th at Ypres suffered a total of 270 casualties, including 3
British and 3 Indian officers killed.
The Connaught Rangers, who were on the extreme left, and hence next to
the French Division (as they had been on the extreme right at Givenchy
in December 1914), came under a fierce fire as they topped the ridge,
but pushed on to within 120 yards of the German lines. Corporal Flynn
gained the Médaille Militaire. Sergeant Coldwell, who had already won
the D.C.M., was awarded the Russian Cross of St. George, whilst several
N.C.O.’s and men were gazetted for the Medal of St. George. Fifteen out
of twenty officers present and 350 out of 900 other ranks were returned
on the casualty roll; three officers were killed.
I have a vivid recollection of my good friends the Connaught Rangers on
many occasions during my year of command. Not the least pleasant was one
at Orleans on the way up to the Flanders front when I had occasion to
speak to the battalion somewhat roughly regarding a certain matter.
Having exhausted my wrath, I was leaving the parade when I heard, “Three
cheers for the ‘Giniral,’” and then followed three such lusty cheers as
I shall never forget. The French liaison officer who had been waiting on
his horse a short distance away said to my A.D.C., “I suppose the
General has been telling them something they like.” Irish soldiers are
the salt of the earth, and they never resent anything so long as it is
fair and square.
The 4th Londons, who had followed the Rangers, lost two men killed and
an officer and ten men wounded.
About this time the Huns turned on asphyxiating gas in great quantities.
It was of a yellowish colour, and was distinctly seen in large jets
coming over the German parapet. The gas struck the right of the French
and the left of the Ferozepore Brigade attack, which gave way. The
greater part of our line was affected by this retirement, but the
Manchesters with about 100 Connaught Rangers and parties of other
Infantry regiments, held on to their trenches. At 2.25 P.M. the Germans
counter-attacked these detachments, which were forced back some eighty
yards, where they succeeded in again entrenching themselves. The first
news received at Divisional Headquarters was a telephone message from
the Jalandar Brigade that the attack had failed, and that troops were
falling back everywhere, together with the French. Shortly afterwards
the Ferozepore Brigade reported that the attack was held up, that the
centre of the Brigade was well up, but the French were retiring. At 2.35
P.M., in consequence of these reports, the Sirhind Brigade was ordered
to move to La Brique to be ready for any emergency in that direction.
When the gas first caught our bewildered troops, totally unprepared for
such devices, and forced them to retire rapidly, such was the confusion
amongst units, British, Indian, and French, that an Indian havildar
shouted out, “_Khabardar, Jehannam pahunche_” (“Look out, we’ve arrived
in Hell”).
But even so the gates of Hell can be held by brave men, and of such were
Major Deacon of the Connaughts and Lieutenant Henderson of the
Manchesters, with many of their own men and small parties of Indians,
who held out for many hours, unconquerable! Major Deacon as well as
Captain Ingham of the same regiment won the D.S.O., and Henderson
received a Military Cross. They were eventually relieved by Captain
Tarrant and a detachment of the Highland Light Infantry next day, and
this detachment also held on until itself relieved on the 28th. An
heroic episode! Tarrant’s name always brings home to me the fact that,
notwithstanding the earnest endeavour of the higher authorities to do
justice to all, failure must sometimes occur. He had served with
distinction at Givenchy and Neuve Chapelle, and at Ypres he paid the
supreme penalty, dying a glorious death. I had mentioned him in previous
despatches, and always feel how well he (and many others) had deserved a
reward.
About 3 P.M., 26th April, General Keary ordered the Sirhind Brigade to
send up the Highland Light Infantry and 4th Gurkhas to the Jalandar
Brigade, in order to carry that Brigade forward. Meanwhile the
Ferozepore Brigade was ordered to hold on as best they could to support
the movement and if possible to gain ground. At 3.30 P.M. the Ferozepore
Brigade reported that the French line was restored. This was confirmed
later by a message from the Second Army, which said that though the
French attack had failed at first, it was now pressing forward. The
Ferozepore Brigade was then ordered to push up reinforcements to assist
the two companies Connaught Rangers who were near the German trenches.
The G.O.C. Jalandar Brigade reported that the shell and rifle fire,
especially the former, was still so heavy that he considered it would be
a useless loss of life to push forward the Highland Light Infantry and
4th Gurkhas, and the orders were cancelled.
News was received after 6 P.M. from the Canadian Division that the
Northumberland Brigade had taken the trenches in front of St. Julien,
and that the French had taken Lizerne. The 15th Sikhs and 4th Gurkhas
were ordered up from the Sirhind Brigade to the Ferozepore Brigade to
allow of a fresh attack being organised. At 7.45 P.M. these two
battalions, supported by the 9th Bhopal Infantry, advanced under the
orders of Lieut.-Colonel Hill, 15th Sikhs, their left resting on the
Langemarck road. They reached a point about 300 yards in front of old
British trenches, discovered Major Deacon and his gallant band, and
established touch with the Manchesters on their right and the French on
their left; but as the position of the German trenches was still
uncertain, and as no other troops showed signs of advancing, they halted
and entrenched themselves.
It is pleasant to record that amongst the D.C.M.’s earned during this
battle was one given to Sergeant F. Birley of the Madras Volunteer
Rifles, attached Motor Cycle Corps, for sustained gallantry extending
over several days.
At 12.30 A.M. on 27th April General Keary ordered the relief of the
Jalandar Brigade by the Sirhind Brigade in the front line. On the
completion of this by 3 A.M. the Ferozepore and Jalandar Brigades moved
back to La Brique, whilst the Sirhind Brigade, assisted by the 34th
Pioneers and 3rd Sappers and Miners, set to work to strengthen the
position.
Major W. Maxwell, R.E., received a D.S.O. for his continued gallantry as
C.O. of the Divisional Signal Company. He was spoken of in terms of the
very highest praise by all who had observed his work. Four others,
N.C.O.’s and men (two British and two Indian), received rewards for
their gallant work with the same company.
On this day none of the exact locations of the German defences were
known. The Divisional Artillery had not had time to register, nor to
find good observation stations. In consequence, the artillery fire was
not sufficiently accurate to subdue the musketry, to the degree
necessary to enable a successful attack to be carried out over the very
open ground which was the scene of the contest. The German position ran
along a ridge at the top of a gentle slope, and the attack was fully
exposed to a frontal and enfilade fire. In addition it was subjected to
the unchecked fire of a numerous and powerful Artillery. Under the
circumstances, and notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the gunners,
the resistance could not be overcome.
Owing to the difficulty of gaining any information of the enemy
trenches, it was imperative that reconnaissances should somehow be made
by night, and whenever daring is necessary the British officer only
needs the word. The corps of Royal Engineers keeps a large reserve of
this indispensable article in hand ready for use, and in the persons of
Captain Kisch and Nosworthy, young in years but by this time experienced
campaigners, two volunteers were found to undertake this task. It was
well carried out, under conditions of imminent danger, and a very
satisfactory report and sketch of a large part of the German front
trenches was obtained. Kisch was wounded during his reconnaissance, but
got back safely, and for his services in France and later in Mesopotamia
was awarded the D.S.O. Nosworthy, who was already suffering from gas
poison, was severely wounded the following day and well earned the
Military Cross he received. The information furnished by these two
officers proved of great assistance in carrying out the operations on
the following days.
CHAPTER XIX
At 9.30 A.M., 27th April, a copy of the French Operation Orders was
received from Second Army. From these it became apparent that the French
were to continue the offensive both from the west and the south. From
this latter direction the Moroccan Brigade of Colonel Savy was to
attack, as before, along the west of the Langemarck road. Arrangements
for co-operating with this Brigade were therefore put in hand. The
Artillery bombardment was timed by the French to begin at 12.30 P.M. and
the assault at 1.15 P.M.
At 11.20 a message was received from the Second Army, giving the
intentions of the Army commander as regards the action to be taken by
the Lahore Division. In this it was made clear that the Division was to
be prepared to take advantage at once of any advance made by the French
to gain ground; but that it was not to be committed to the attack until
the advance of the French had assured the safety of its left flank. The
Artillery of the Fifth Corps and Lahore Division, which bore on the line
of advance, were to co-operate. The Headquarters of the 27th and
Canadian Divisional Artillery were in dug-outs close beside that
occupied by Lahore Division Headquarters at Potijze. The following were
the dispositions: Sirhind Brigade to attack with their right on an
oblong farm, and the left along the Langemarck road. 1/4th Gurkhas on
the right, 1/1st Gurkhas on the left. In support were a part of the
Highland Light Infantry and the 15th Sikhs and 4th King’s Liverpools.
The Ferozepore Brigade was to prolong the Sirhind Brigade’s right and to
move forward under cover of the bombardment, so as to be up in line with
Sirhind Brigade at 1.15 P.M. 9th Bhopals on the right, 4th Londons on
the left, in touch with Sirhind’s right. The Connaught Rangers in
support, with the 57th Rifles and 129th Baluchis in reserve.
As has already been stated, not only were many of these units very weak
before the battle, but had after the previous day’s losses dwindled to
shadows of battalions.
At 12.20 P.M., 27th April, the Ferozepore Brigade started and their
advance was systematically reported. The Sirhind Brigade advanced before
the time fixed and by 1.15 P.M., when the bombardment ceased, the
leading battalions of this Brigade had reached the edge of some enclosed
ground on the slope towards the valley. The heavy enfilade fire caused
the 1/1st Gurkhas to swing north-north-west to face it. The 4th Gurkhas
maintained their direction but were held up. At 1.30 P.M. it was
reported to the Divisional commander that the French were attacking to
the north-west of an adjoining farm, and though losing heavily were
continuing to form a firing-line. Our own front line was also reported
as being checked and suffering heavy loss.
In its advance the Sirhind Brigade had to pass through heavy machine-gun
and rifle fire, and casualties came fast. Before a party of the 4th
Gurkhas had reached an old farmhouse, which they tenaciously held, the
C.O., Major Brodhurst, had been killed, and his Adjutant, Captain
Hartwell, wounded. Two other officers, Captain E. C. Lentaigne and
Lieut. C. F. Moore, were also hit. The Gurkhas, however, held on to the
farm. A Gurkha officer, Jemadar Nain Singh Rana, was amongst the killed.
Meantime, the 1st Gurkhas rushed another farm 250 yards from the enemy
trench, which was held by a company till dark. The greater part of the
battalion, however, was held up at some hundred yards farther back. The
Adjutant, Lieutenant St. George, was mortally wounded, and nearly all
the other British officers present were wounded. Rifleman Ramkishan
Thapa won the I.O.M. for a particularly plucky act.
A fire fight now ensued, which continued till 4 P.M., at which time the
O.C. 4th King’s, seeing that the 4th Gurkhas could make no progress,
decided to reinforce them with part of his battalion. The King’s
advanced with great gallantry, and, although suffering severe losses,
carried the line forward for some distance. A party under Major Beall
got to within 200 yards of the German trenches.
The advance of the 4th King’s was a very fine feat of arms. Straight
from home they had joined in the tumult of Neuve Chapelle, and this day
by their valour, which would take no denial, had already established
themselves as a veteran battalion. Lieut.-Colonel Allen, the C.O., was
awarded the C.M.G., and Major Beall the D.S.O. A few N.C.O.’s and men
won the D.C.M. The casualties, as was to be expected, were very heavy,
380 of all ranks, including 2nd Lieut. Lloyd (killed), besides eight
other officers wounded.
The Ferozepore Brigade as it advanced lost heavily from Artillery, and
later from rifle fire. The attack of this Brigade was also eventually
checked.
It was at this time that Major Jamieson, 9th Bhopals, of whom I had much
to say in describing the fight before Neuve Chapelle in the autumn of
1914, was wounded. He was later killed in Mesopotamia. This battalion
suffered 120 casualties, including Captain Etlinger, the Adjutant,
killed. The 9th Bhopals had in India paid me a very special compliment
by making me a life honorary member of their mess, and I hope I may one
day again avail myself of the privilege.
The 4th Londons on the left of the Bhopals, keeping touch with the
advance on both flanks, moved on until the general line of both Brigades
was assimilated, when like the others they were brought to a halt.
Captain Saunders was mortally wounded whilst engaged in reinforcing with
his company. Lieut. Coates was also killed in the extreme front of the
advance. Two N.C.O.’s who behaved most gallantly were awarded the
D.C.M., and the M.C. was the reward of 2nd Lieut. Pyper.
The 1st Gurkhas of the Sirhind Brigade established their line beyond
four heavy French guns, which had been abandoned, and which were thus
enabled to be withdrawn at night.
An order from the Second Army directing the attack to be pressed
vigorously was received by the G.O.C. Lahore Division at 2.40 P.M., and
in order to give weight to this, the Composite Brigade, consisting of
battalions of the Cornwall Light Infantry, York and Lancasters, West
Ridings, and Royal Lancasters, but numbering less than 1300 all told,
was placed at General Keary’s disposal. This Brigade was commanded by
Colonel Tuson, and left Potijze with orders to push forward and
establish connection with the Sirhind Brigade. If the position
permitted, a heavy bombardment was then to be carried out, prior to a
fresh assault.
At 4.25 P.M., 27th April, a report was received from the Sirhind Brigade
that their front lines were far enough from the enemy to permit of a
fresh bombardment. This was accordingly arranged as soon as possible,
and all guns opened fire. It began at 5.30 P.M., and under its cover the
Highland Light Infantry (except a detachment who were facing
north-north-west, 100 yards from the German trenches) and the 15th Sikhs
pushed forward, but were temporarily checked, as there was nothing
behind them to give the necessary support.
The Highland Light Infantry, however, moved on, and eventually in order
to hold its ground, when the French Colonials on the left were once more
forced back by renewed gas attacks, the battalion entrenched itself as
best it could and held on to its position. Captain Tarrant, of whom I
have already written, and his immortal detachment were found still
occupying their isolated trench only 100 yards from the German line.
Allied, British, and Indian soldiers had been driven before the terrible
gas; shells and bullets had swept in tornadoes over them, but nothing
could discourage that noble band. The brave commander paid for his
valour with his life, but the Highlands will long re-echo his name and
treasure the memory of those true sons of Scotland. If posthumous
rewards cannot be given under present rules, the sooner such rules are
changed to meet the exigencies of this great war the better. Is it too
late?
With Tarrant was his Company Sergeant-Major, R. Bell, who, when a party
of carriers coming up with ammunition were literally swept away by fire,
went out with a few brave men and returned, to wear the Distinguished
Conduct Medal he so well merited.
The 15th Sikhs, the other battalion in the front line of the Brigade,
was met by severe shrapnel fire, whilst the incessant rain of bullets of
course never varied. Lieut.-Colonel C. A. Vivian was killed. In the
pages of _The Indian Corps in France_ will be found a story of this
officer’s gallantry during the very early days of the war, which I can
supplement by another instance of his keen courage. One night in
December 1914 he asked to see me and did not wish any one else to be
present. He then unfolded a plan to disguise himself and wander into the
German lines. His intention was to gain certain information which he
knew was badly needed. He felt sure of success and said it was well
worth risking, and it was only because of the shortage of British
officers with Indian battalions that he had come to ask permission
instead of going off on his own. He begged me not to mention the matter
to any one, which, of course, I only do now that he is no more. I had to
refuse his unselfish offer, but a few days later his restless spirit
prompted him to go through the adventure related in the book above
mentioned.
Sepoy Bakshi Singh during the advance repeatedly performed acts of
signal bravery and was awarded the I.O.M. Major Carden, the next senior
officer to Vivian, was killed while endeavouring to save a brother
officer, Captain A. H. Muir, who had been wounded. The 15th Sikhs during
the second battle of Ypres suffered a total of 100 casualties.
The commander of the Moroccan Brigade, who was in close touch with the
G.O.C. Sirhind Brigade, now informed him that he would assault again at
7 P.M., 28th April. The arrival of the Composite Brigade was expected
before that time, and arrangements for a combined assault were carried
out.
The French assault commenced punctually under cover of heavy Artillery
fire and the Sirhind Brigade moved forward once more. Shortly after, the
Moroccans were observed streaming to the rear, but observation was
difficult, owing to the clouds of smoke and asphyxiating gas. Suspecting
a counter-attack on the left of the Brigade, the 15th Sikhs wheeled
round to cover the left flank. Two battalions of the Composite Brigade
were also deployed in the same direction, and the Brigade was then
ordered to consolidate its position. The Highland Light Infantry and
15th Sikhs took over the front line, and the two Gurkha battalions and
the 4th King’s Liverpools were withdrawn to reorganise. The 34th
Pioneers and Sappers and Miners were sent up to assist and the Composite
Brigade was withdrawn into reserve. By 9 P.M. our Allies had gone
forward again and touch had been re-established with the Moroccans. The
deployment and advance of the Brigade had been carried out in full view
of the enemy, and during the whole day the troops were subjected to a
heavy enfilade and Artillery fire. They had behaved with the greatest
firmness and done all that was possible to attain their object.
The Brigadier brought to special notice the dashing advance of the 4th
King’s, and the gallantry of the company 1st Highland Light Infantry
under Captain Tarrant. At noon on 28th April the Division was placed
under the orders of Plumer’s Force, which had just been formed.
During the 28th and 29th April, various plans for an attack by the
French were arranged and the rôle of our troops was laid down and
communicated to Brigadiers, but the attacks did not take place. By this
time it was known that the German position was a continuous line of
trenches of great strength with strong points here and there at farms
and other houses. During the night of 29th April, the Ferozepore and
Jalandar Brigades were withdrawn to Ouderdom huts under orders from
Plumer’s Force. No attack took place on the 30th April, but a continuous
bombardment was carried on, in which the co-operation of the Canadian
Artillery was specially acknowledged by General Keary.
At 6 P.M. on 30th April Colonel Savy, commanding the Moroccan Brigade,
was asked to state his intention, and informed the G.O.C. Division that
his losses had been very heavy and that he could not attack without
reinforcements. During the early hours of the morning of 1st May a
message was received from Plumer’s Force giving the substance of a
communication sent to General Plutz, commanding the French Army of
Belgium, in which it was explained to him that the Sirhind Brigade, the
only one available, could be utilised to support the French right in an
attack on the German trench line on Hill 29, and orders for the
Artillery were issued to suit the particular form the attack was to
take, and instructions allotting their objectives were sent to the
Artillery of the Canadian and Twenty-seventh Divisions, which were to
co-operate.
A message from Plumer’s Force made it clear that General Plutz
understood that the Sirhind Brigade would only advance to the attack in
conjunction with the French, and that their attack would not be
converging. The Brigadier reported that he would move off twenty minutes
before the French, so as to bring him level with the latter when the
assault began. The Artillery was ordered to support this movement with a
heavy fire, and at 2.50 P.M. the Brigade advanced in the following
formation:
Right battalion—1/4th Gurkhas. In support 1st Highland Light Infantry.
Left battalion—1/1st Gurkhas; with King’s Liverpools in support. The
15th Sikhs to hold the advanced trenches.
It is on record that the Gurkhas were so overjoyed at finding themselves
for once out of a bog that they literally tore over the rolling country
until within 300 yards of the German lines. An officer who was present,
and who afterwards went to Gallipoli, wrote to say that when his men saw
the barren hills there, they shouted, “Hurrah! at last we shall be able
to shoot on a hillside—no more snipe _jheels_ for us.” Oh! if some one
who knew what many of our Indian battalions could do (outside of eternal
mire) had given us a chance in France, even for a short spell, what an
opportunity it would have been of proving once for all that the hillmen
of India with British officers cannot be beaten in hilly country no
matter who the foe. But the depression caused by existence in the same
fetid morass for fourteen long and blood-stained months, without any
change, was enough to turn sour the cheeriest mortal that ever
shouldered a rifle. I make bold to say that no other Corps, Division,
Brigade, or unit in France was ever kept as long on such a narrow,
cheerless front as was the Indian Corps, nor, had they been, would they
have stuck it out any better.
The right battalion, 1/4th Gurkhas, in its rush arrived near the farm,
the vicinity of which had been the scene of Captain Tarrant’s exploit.
Here they were joined by their supporting battalion, the Highland Light
Infantry. In this operation the rapidity of the Gurkha advance served
them well, as only some fifty casualties were recorded. The Highlanders
had eighty casualties, including 2nd Lieut. McIntosh of the Indian Army
attached to the battalion, killed.
The 1st Gurkhas only finished their rush when but 200 yards severed them
from the German trenches—that fateful “No Man’s Land,” so familiar to
every soldier, so dreaded by every mother and wife, the Lethean zone
which alone separated civilisation from modern barbarism; that 200 yards
which was more difficult to cross than the 600 leagues over which
Xenophon retreated, or the vast expanses Marco Polo explored. But in the
ranks of the army of Great Britain’s King the occasion always finds the
man.
Close by the German front was a trench: Who was in it—friend or foe?
Havildar Bhakat Sing Rana of the 2/4th Gurkhas, attached to the 1st
battalion, offered to solve the riddle. With a small chosen band he
crept out and, cheating death, discovered it was held by our Allies. The
Indian Order of Merit could not have been better won.
The 1st Gurkhas had about seventy casualties in this attack, and the
supporting battalion, the 4th King’s Liverpools, added forty-five,
including Captain Lumsden killed, and Major Beall, who had led so well a
few days previously, wounded.
I will quote from General Keary’s report, which concisely explains the
movements of the Brigade:
The leading battalions, moving rapidly forward, advanced without
serious loss, and had passed before the enemy had formed a belt of
Artillery fire on the crest of the ridge on our side of the valley,
through which it subsequently became impossible to advance. Owing to
the German line being better known by this time, and owing to the more
detailed instructions as to Artillery support, the hostile rifle fire
was more effectively kept down on this day.
The troops advanced into the front French and British trenches. The
ground between them and the German trenches was a glacis slope, and by
5 P.M. it became apparent that the wire entanglement in front, some
four yards deep, had not been cut.
At 7 P.M. the officer commanding 4th Moroccan Brigade sent a message
to say that he had decided not to attack.
Accordingly orders were issued to the Sirhind Brigade to withdraw to
the huts at Ouderdom. Ends.
During the last four days of the operations the Lahore Divisional
Artillery was chiefly employed in assisting the French. It earned the
thanks of the French Commander for the accuracy and effectiveness of its
fire. General Keary specially brought to notice the great assistance he
had received from Brigadier-General Burstall and the Staff of the
Canadian Divisional Artillery; throughout the operations they had
co-operated with the utmost zeal and cordiality. He also acknowledged
the great help Brigadier-General Stokes and the Artillery of the
Twenty-seventh Division had rendered.
Of 16,000 combatants of all arms detached from the Indian Army Corps to
take part in the second battle of Ypres, over 24 per cent were returned
as casualties. General Keary, in forwarding his report on the battle,
wrote:
In conclusion, I consider that the troops did all that it was humanly
possible to do under most trying circumstances. They had to pass along
some miles of road and narrow streets under a hail of shell-fire,
advance to a position of assembly over open ground and from thence to
a position of deployment under the same conditions.
The Germans had prepared a position which required the most accurate
and intense gun fire to reduce it. Owing to the hurried nature of the
attack it was impossible to reconnoitre sufficiently to ensure such a
fire; nor were the guns registered. During the first two days the
Infantry advanced against a position on an open glacis which was
virtually unshaken. After the first two days only one Brigade was in
action, and its action depended on that of the French, whose right was
unable to advance to the attack.
In spite of all these disabilities the carrying of the position by the
French and British was only prevented by the use of asphyxiating
gases.
I think the following regiments deserve special mention for the
gallantry shown by them:
1st Manchesters.
Connaught Rangers.
1st Highland Light Infantry.
4th King’s (Liverpool Regiment).
47th Sikhs.
57th Rifles.
40th Pathans.
The following letter was received from the Second Army:
SECOND ARMY.
G.O.C. LAHORE DIVISION—Having read the very complete and excellent
report on the work of the Lahore Division in the heavy fighting near
Ypres on the 26th and 27th April 1915, the Commander of the Second
Army is confirmed in the views he formed at the time, that the
Division had been handled with great skill and determination by
Major-General Keary.
Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien fully realises the disadvantages under which
the attack was made, insufficient Artillery preparation on our side
and an open glacis-like slope to advance over in the face of
overwhelming shell, rifle, and machine-gun fire, and the employment of
poisonous gases on the enemy’s side; and that, in spite of these
disadvantages, the troops, although only partially successful in
wrenching ground from the enemy, effectually prevented his further
advance and thus ensured the safety of the town of Ypres.
Sir Horace, whilst deploring the heavy casualties, wishes to thank the
Divisional General, Brigadiers, and Commanding Officers and all ranks
of the several Arms employed, for the great service they performed for
the Second Army on those eventful two days.
[Illustration: LAHORE DIVISION deployed for attack, April 26. ]
In this respect he would specially mention the following regiments:
[The corps named by General Keary are then enumerated.]
(Sd.) GEO. F. MILNE, Maj.-Gen., G.S., Second Army.
_7th May 1915._
General Sir Herbert Plumer also wrote us follows:
G.O.C. LAHORE DIVISION—Will you please convey to the Brigadiers,
Commanding Officers, and all Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and
Men of your Division my thanks for the assistance they have rendered
in the recent severe fighting, and my appreciation of the way in which
they have carried out the very arduous duties entrusted to them while
under my command.
I deeply regret the very heavy casualties they have suffered.
By 5th May the Lahore Division had rejoined the Corps, and immediately
proceeded to take its share in the severe fighting round Festubert.
I took the opportunity to see as many units as possible during the short
interval, and it was a great pleasure to talk with Keary, and many
others of all ranks, British and Indian. The universal note was
satisfaction that they had tried to do their duty. General Keary again
commanded his Division at the battles near Festubert and Mauquissart, in
May and September 1915, but it was not till he had been in command of a
Division in Mesopotamia, much later on, that he was given any reward for
his distinguished services.
CHAPTER XX
On every occasion the Corps had so far been called on to take part in
any definite operation, I had felt sure it would acquit itself well, and
had cause for satisfaction. But by this time the numbers and composition
of the Indian Infantry units had been so reduced that it became a
question how to allocate the duties in any offensive movement which
might be ordered. At the end of March my recommendation for reorganising
the Army Corps had been approved, and the two Divisions had been
practically reconstituted. Each of the six Infantry Brigades was now
composed of one Regular, one Territorial, and three Indian battalions.
In a later chapter I shall give some figures which will show that,
notwithstanding a battalion having been added, the strength per Brigade
was in most cases so far short of war establishment as to amount to a
nominal figure. But still the orders came for a Division to do this and
a Brigade something else.
Stern business was before us, and immediately the Lahore Division
returned from Ypres it again took its place in the old trenches before
Neuve Chapelle, whilst the Meerut Division got ready for the operations
about to be undertaken for the capture of the Aubers Ridge and
neighbouring villages and farms. The fighting for these lasted, as far
as we were concerned, from the 9th to the 22nd of May, and during this
period it was almost incessant. One attack succeeded another in
monotonous sequence; if it was not on a farm it was on a strong point,
or a distillery, or some position in a map square. Anyhow, it was the
most unsatisfactory job that fell to our lot in France, and we were not
alone in this respect, for the Fourth Corps on our left and the First on
our right, as well as the Canadians, were to expend a great many lives
and much effort with little gain to any of them.
The French were making an offensive between the right of the British
line and Arras, and Sir John French, in pursuance of a promise to
support the Allied Commander-in-Chief, directed the First Army to carry
out an attack on the German trenches in the neighbourhood of Rouges
Banes by the Fourth Corps, and between Neuve Chapelle and Givenchy by
the First and Indian Corps. A reason which we all thoroughly
appreciated.
What, however, apparently was not appreciated was that we were unlikely
to find the Germans napping again as we had at Neuve Chapelle in March,
and that the defences of those days had probably been quadrupled in
strength. This, in fact, we very soon learned to our cost, and the
cheery optimism which named Don and other places we were likely to reach
was about to receive a severe shock. But, after all, this is far better
than being pessimistic, and even the modern Attila in the very early
days of the war probably got more out of his Huns by telling them they
would be in Paris before the autumn leaves had fallen, than he would
have done by only naming, say, Verdun and Rheims.
The share of the Indian Corps in these operations was to attack between
the First Corps on our right and the Fourth Corps on our left. Our
immediate objective was the Ferme du Biez, after which we were to direct
our advance on Ligny-le-Grand-La Cliqueterie Farm. The Fourth Corps,
after carrying out its rôle on our left, was also to advance on
Cliqueterie and effect a junction with the Indian Corps. I remember
well, in imagination, picturing our Indian soldiers on the Aubers Ridge,
the huge delight of the Gurkhas and Pathans at being actually high above
a flat bog, and looking down on something instead of always looking up
from a fetid trench. When I again visit India to see my friends, many
will flatly maintain that the war was fought on a dead plain and the
only mountain near it was the poor little Aubers Ridge.
However, to my story. The Meerut Division was detailed for the attack;
the Lahore Division to hold the line, and the guns of both Divisions,
supplemented by others, were to support the attack. The assault was to
be delivered by the Dehra Dun Brigade, the Bareilly Brigade being in
support and three battalions of the Garhwal Brigade in reserve. The
first attempt was carried out on 9th May on a front of 650 yards. The
objectives were successively:
(_a_) Enemy’s front and support trenches.
(_b_) La Tourelle and houses near three named points.
(_c_) The Distillery, Ferme du Biez, S.W. edge of the Bois du Biez.
(_d_) Ligny-le-Petit.
(_e_) Ligny-le-Grand-La Cliqueterie Ferme. The Bois du Biez was to be
engaged simultaneously with the advance on Ligny-le-Petit by a special
body of troops consisting of the Garhwal Rifles and 2/8th Gurkhas with
two trench guns, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Drake-Brockman,
39th Garhwalis.
General Anderson, commanding the Meerut Division, had made every
preparation. He, his Staff, his Brigadiers, and his Commanding officers
had each and all studied every possible situation that could be
imagined, and at dawn I felt that if success did not attend their
efforts, they certainly deserved it. As I read the Corps and Divisional
Orders now, I do not believe any better could have been written at the
time.
All troops were in position as ordered with but trifling casualties and
the night of 8th-9th May passed quietly. Our own wire had been cut and
bridges laid as directed. The bombardment commenced punctually at 5 A.M.
and the enemy’s wire was cut satisfactorily, but many of our rounds were
reported as falling short.
At the appointed hour, the battalions of the Dehra Dun Brigade, the
2/2nd Gurkhas, 1/4th Seaforths, 1st Seaforths (6th Jats and 1/9th
Gurkhas in support) went over the top preparatory to the assault. Even
with the certainty of being met by an inferno of fire within a few
seconds, one young officer was heard to ask another if he knew the
Report Centre of his Brigade, and on his replying that he was not sure,
a laugh was raised by the questioner saying, “Why, you have often been
there, it is 96 Piccadilly”; and in fact it was so, but situated for the
time being in the Rue du Bois.
The morning was bright, and from all appearances the Germans appeared
quite unaware of our concentration and proposed attack. However,
immediately the Infantry crossed over the parapet to form up preparatory
to the assault, heavy machine-gun fire was opened on them from guns
sited almost on the ground level. The enemy’s Infantry also manned the
trenches.
The 2nd Gurkhas as they started their rush met a terrific fire, and all
the officers who had crossed the parapet were shot down. Lieut. Collins
and Captain C. M. Mullaly were killed at this time, and Captain Kenneth
Park, a nephew of mine, who had insisted on joining in the battle
although in very poor health, was mortally wounded. The men from Nepal,
notwithstanding every effort, were literally cut down and unable to
advance beyond a ditch in their front.
The 4th Seaforths and 1st Seaforths advanced with their usual bravery
but met with the same fate and lay for hours under a leaden sheet,
getting back as best they could after dark. In the 4th Seaforths,
Lieutenants Tennant, Railton, and Bastian were killed.
Notwithstanding the most gallant efforts to cross the fire-swept ground,
by 6 A.M. it was definitely known our attack had failed to reach its
first objective. One company 6th Jats, which had been directed between
the left of First Corps and our right was practically annihilated, and
Captain Dudley and Subadar Lekh Ram were killed. The hostile guns, which
up to now had not done much firing, opened a searching and heavy fire on
our trenches and the Rue du Bois, in consequence of which the Dehra Dun
and Bareilly Brigades suffered numerous casualties; the 41st Dogras
being particularly unfortunate in this respect.
Howitzer fire was accordingly turned on to the German trenches, and
preparatory arrangements for a fresh assault were commenced. At 6.35
A.M., the G.O.C. 1st Division on our right informed General Anderson
that the first assault of that Division had also failed. An hour later
the 1st Seaforths made a second attempt to assault, but like the first
this attempt also met with little success, and they too had to lie in
the open with the other battalions unable to advance or retire. A
special Howitzer bombardment of enemy trenches was arranged to commence
at 7.45 A.M. and to last for twenty-five minutes, under cover of which
it was hoped that the 2nd Gurkhas and 4th Seaforths would be able to
advance.
The O.C. 4th Seaforths at this time reported that the enemy was being
reinforced and was of opinion they would counter-attack. The G.O.C.
Dehra Dun Brigade accordingly sent up two companies 9th Gurkhas to
assist the 1st Seaforths, who had suffered very heavy losses, and
ordered the O.C. 9th Gurkhas to support the 4th Seaforths with the
remainder of his battalion, but owing to the congested state of the
communication trenches only 200 men were able to move forward. At 8 A.M.
the First British Division informed the G.O.C. Meerut Division that the
attack of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades had failed, and that the 1st Brigade
would hold the line while they were withdrawn.
At 8.20 A.M. I sent an order directing the further attempt at attack by
the Dehra Dun Brigade fixed for 8.45 A.M. to be stayed, and that another
assault should be organised to coincide with that of the First Division,
which could not be ready for another two hours. The assault was
consequently stopped.
As the attack by the 2nd and 3rd Brigades on our right had failed owing
to the enemy’s wire not being sufficiently cut, instructions were
received from the Army commander to recommence operations at 12 noon
after a further bombardment with H.E. 18-pr., by which it was hoped to
break down the enemy’s parapets and knock out his machine-guns.
On the urgent representation of the G.O.C. Dehra Dun Brigade, the hour
for a fresh attack had been altered to 2.40 P.M. on this same date, 9th
May. The Bareilly Brigade was also warned that it would have to relieve
the Dehra Dun Brigade, and carry out the next assault. This assault was
to be delivered by the 2nd Black Watch on the right, 58th Rifles in the
centre, and 41st Dogras on the left, the 1/4th Black Watch and
machine-guns of the 125th Rifles being in Brigade reserve. Meanwhile the
Germans were reported by G.O.C. 1st Group H.A.R. to be strongly
reinforcing their second line, which appeared to be held in strength.
At 10 A.M. the G.O.C. Seventh British Division reported that the Eighth
Division on our left was unable to make much headway beyond the front
line of German trenches owing to fortified posts in rear, which were
being bombarded afresh. The Garhwal Brigade was placed in support of the
Bareilly Brigade. The 9th Gurkhas, which so far had not been seriously
engaged, was ordered to join the Garhwal Brigade, which was short of
Lieut.-Colonel Drake-Brockman’s detachment. The relief of the Dehra Dun
by the Bareilly Brigade was commenced and carried out with considerable
difficulty as the communication trenches were full of dead and wounded,
and the movement being observed by the enemy, a heavy shell-fire was
kept up by them. Owing to the destruction of our trenches it was found
impossible to carry out the fresh attack, even at the altered hour, and
the First Army directed that both the Meerut and First Divisions should
assault at 4 P.M.
At 12 noon the G.O.C. Bareilly Brigade reported to General Anderson that
in the opinion of the G.O.C. Dehra Dun Brigade (the morning attacking
Brigade) the enemy’s position had been in no way weakened and that the
machine-gun fire which had caused the check of all efforts of the Dehra
Dun Brigade was as heavy as ever. He added that the parapets were
somewhat battered by our artillery, but that this was compensated for by
the German reinforcements which had since come up; that three of his
battalions had been exposed to heavy shell-fire, and that he wished the
above situation to be known before the assault commenced.
On receipt of this report General Anderson considered it advisable to
inform me, but instructed the G.O.C. Bareilly Brigade that meantime the
attack would take place as ordered. Whatever the circumstances, I
considered it imperative to carry out this assault, and sent
instructions that it was to be pressed at all costs, and the Divisional
Commander added to this that it was to be carried on into the night if
necessary. The orders of the First Army were distinct, and the movements
of the First Division on my right depended on ours. I therefore felt
bound to do all in my power to comply with the Army orders.
By 4 P.M. the 2nd Black Watch had relieved the 2/2nd Gurkhas on the
right, the 41st Dogras the 1st Seaforths on the left, and the 58th
Rifles had taken the place of the 1/4th Seaforths in the centre. The
1/4th Black Watch was in reserve.
The 1st Seaforths, on this 9th May 1915, had, if possible, beaten all
their records for dogged valour. Nothing in war could exceed the
determination to win through displayed by all ranks, and where they
failed no other Corps could have succeeded. When I received their
casualty roll I could have wept and felt no sense of weakness: seven
officers and 130 other ranks killed or missing; ten officers and 350
other ranks wounded, and mostly within a few short moments.
Gashed with honourable scars,
Low in glory’s lap they lie;
Though they fell, they fell like stars,
Streaming splendours through the sky.
The bombardment commenced punctually at 3.20 P.M., 9th May, and at 3.40
P.M. the assaulting troops crossed the parapet and formed up prior to
the assault. Each battalion was formed in two lines, two companies in
each line. The right battalion (2nd Black Watch) and right company of
centre battalion (58th Rifles) were met by a heavy, well-directed
machine-gun and rifle fire from their front, left front, and left flank
directly they showed over the parapets, and but few men succeeded in
crossing the ditch to their front, the majority being disabled before
reaching it. The left company of the 58th Rifles succeeded in advancing
about 100 yards; but when our guns lifted they were at once exposed to a
heavy fire and were unable to advance farther. The 41st Dogras on the
left, in particular, had been exposed to an extremely heavy shelling
from H.E. and shrapnel, both while getting forward and whilst waiting in
the front line. In consequence, one company consisted of only
twenty-eight men. The companies (what remained of them) crossed the
parapet and aligned themselves with the 58th Rifles; but rifle and
machine-gun fire brought them to a halt. Further attempts to advance by
bringing up men from the rear companies did not help them, as in
crossing the parapet most of them were shot down.
Our artillery bombardment at this stage was quite ineffective and short,
and the Germans were not appreciably shaken by it. Their infantry was
lining the parapets from the time we commenced to assemble in front of
our own trenches, and the situation was for the time being entirely in
their favour. About 4 P.M. orders were issued for battalions to
reorganise, and be prepared for a fresh assault if ordered.
A good instance of the _camaraderie_ between British and Indian soldiers
was shown on this day. A Seaforth Highlander, who was badly wounded in
the first attack in the morning, was lying out unable to be got in. A
Dogra sepoy was wounded in the second assault during the afternoon and
was lying near him. Hearing the Highlander groaning, he dragged himself
up to him, patted his arm, and said he would stay by him and take him in
later on. When darkness came on the Dogra dragged himself back and
reported to his own battalion that he wanted some men to come and bring
in the wounded Highlander. The officer commanding the company he went to
said he would see about it and ordered him to get back to the
dressing-station. He refused to go, as he said he had promised the
_ghāgra_ (kilted man) to save him, and intended to do that first and
then go to hospital. The Highlander was rescued.
Then cease all ye who, in your pride, the creed of others would deride.
The Hindu idol; crescent’s sign; the Shinto doctrine, laws divine.
Confucius made and Christ decreed, all to one common substance lead,
No matter by what faith enthralled; ’tis what men _do_ not what they’re
called.
In the ranks of the 2nd Black Watch was a Lance-Corporal, David Finlay
by name, a fine specimen of a fine Corps. As he topped the parapet a
shell exploding near him knocked him flat, but quickly recovering
himself he rushed on with his bombing party of a dozen men, defying
death. Ten out of his twelve gallant comrades were killed or
incapacitated before he cried a halt, but then only to add to his
daring, for seeing a badly wounded man he carried him for 100 yards
through a whirl of fire and brought him into our own trenches safely.
David Finlay did not live long to wear the Victoria Cross he was
awarded. Such brave souls never rest as ordinary men can. He lies ’neath
the desert sands of Mesopotamia. And of the battalion whose fame he so
much enhanced, three officers—Lieutenants W. Brownlow, the Hon. K.
Stewart, and Sinclair—and seventy others gave their lives; whilst the
total casualties numbered 265, or fifty per cent of the strength which
fought that day.
The 41st Dogras, who were engaged in their first offensive battle as a
complete battalion, suffered very heavy losses. Lieut.-Colonel
Hutchinson, whilst leading a double company, received three wounds, and
his company officer, Lieutenant Vaughan, was totally disabled. At one
time the only unwounded officer was a Dogra subadar, Jai Singh (attached
from 37th Dogras). He behaved splendidly, but was himself twice wounded
before the share of the battalion in this day of carnage had ended. The
C.O., Colonel Tribe, received a shell-wound and Major Milne (82nd
Punjabis), whom I had known well in the Peshawar Division, was severely
wounded in the advance. In fact the Dogras were almost broken up as a
unit. Five of the ten British officers present and seven of the Indian
officers were rendered _hors de combat_; and the battalion suffered in
all over 400 casualties out of a muster roll of 650. I well know the
hills and vales from which most of these gallant soldiers came. I can
hear ethereal voices, wafted on the warm summer breezes as they top the
ridges of the sub-Himalayan hills, soughing, “Well done, loyal Dogras!”
The 58th Rifles had a total of 250 killed, missing, and wounded,
including Lieutenant Mackmillan, who died of wounds.
By 5 P.M., 9th May, it was clear from reports received from G.O.C.
Bareilly Brigade, Artillery observation-officers, and the First British
Division that all attacks, both of the First and Meerut Divisions had
failed. After a telephonic conversation with the G.O.C. Meerut Division
the Garhwal Brigade was ordered to take over the front line from
Bareilly, and this was finally effected by 1 A.M. midnight of the
9th-10th May. The failure of the attacks on this day were due to the
insufficient effect produced by the Artillery bombardment and to the
great volume of extremely accurate machine-gun fire from front and
flanks. As regards the insufficient effect of the Artillery bombardment,
it must be remembered that, after their experience in front of Neuve
Chapelle on 10th to 13th March, the Germans realised that breastworks of
exceptional strength were required, and had accordingly devoted their
energies to the construction of improved parapets of great thickness,
especially on both sides of the Estaires-La Bassée road, as to the
safety of which they were anxious. They had also largely increased the
number of machine-guns employed in their front line, locating them in
dug-outs heavily strutted with timber, which admitted of the
machine-guns being fired just above ground level, and ensured the safety
of the detachments during the bombardment. The light shell of our field
guns appeared to produce but small results on these improved parapets,
and even high-explosive shell had only very local effects. A very
considerable proportion of our H.E. shell also failed to detonate
satisfactorily. The fire of our 18-pounder guns was accurate enough, as
proved by the manner in which the enemy’s wire entanglements had been
cut, but owing to some defect in the construction of the shell there
were, and continued to be, a very unduly large number of prematures. As
regards the fire of our howitzers, both those of 4·5-inch and those of
6·0-inch calibre, the extreme accuracy which we had become accustomed to
obtain with them had fallen off considerably as the guns became worn by
the large number of rounds fired. In the various intensive bombardments,
too, it was reported by the Infantry that a large proportion of our
shell had fallen short of the enemy’s front line parapets. This was
largely accounted for by the error of the gun, which at the ranges fired
at hardly ensured more than twenty-five per cent of shell actually
hitting the point aimed at.
The endeavour displayed by the Infantry in the various assaults left
nothing to be desired. The successive attempts to reach the enemy
trenches were brought to a standstill by the disablement of all but a
small percentage of the assaulting columns, and by machine-gun and rifle
fire. This fire started from the moment the first of our men showed
above our breastworks, and numbers were put out of action within a few
yards of our own front line. Of those who succeeded, in spite of the
heaviest losses, in getting out half-way between our lines and the
Germans, the small number of unwounded men found themselves pinned to
the ground, unable to advance or retire in face of the enemy’s fire.
The casualties suffered on the 9th and 10th May were heavy, amounting to
sixty-eight British officers, thirty Indian officers, and a total of all
ranks, British and Indian, of over 2000, or about thirty-six per cent of
strength.
On the 10th May General Anderson came to my Headquarters, and I
communicated to him an order I had received, and which stated that it
was vitally important not a round of gun ammunition should be wasted. At
this interview I told him that no attack would take place on the 10th or
night 10th-11th, but that one might take place on the night 11th-12th.
That evening the Garhwal Brigade took over some 230 yards’ extra front
from the British Division on our right in anticipation of the attack.
The Sirhind Brigade was ordered back from Croix Barbée, and again came
under the orders of the Lahore Division, while the Dehra Dun Brigade was
replaced at the disposal of the Meerut Division.
On the morning of 12th May the situation was as follows: the Garhwal
Brigade held the line, the Bareilly Brigade was in support with
Headquarters at Lansdowne Post, and the Dehra Dun Brigade in Divisional
reserve at La Couture and Vieille Chapelle. I informed the G.O.C. Meerut
Division that his Division, less the Dehra Dun Brigade and with the
Sirhind Brigade added, would probably attack on a 300 yards’ front on
the night 13th-14th May, in co-operation with the First Corps on its
right, the front of attack being between two points designated V 5 and V
6, well known to us all.
I have since I first wrote this visited (1919) this bit of ground and
located my friends V 5 and V 6, and I touched my hat not only to the
brave men who died for us, but also to the German dead who held them so
tenaciously and died like gentlemen.
At 4 P.M. this day, 12th May, the Meerut Division was ordered to be
prepared to take over the Rue du Bois front, to Chocolat Menier Corner
inclusive, during the night. At night I proceeded to Meerut Divisional
Headquarters and discussed the arrangements for the attack with
Anderson; but next morning, 13th May, I was informed that the proposed
night operations were postponed for twenty-four hours, viz. till the
night 14th-15th May. Orders were therefore issued directing the
bombardment of the enemy’s position which was to be attacked. It was to
be deliberate and continuous till the assault was made. This bombardment
commenced at 12 noon and was maintained till the attack was delivered,
and it drew in reply a strong continuous fire on the trenches held by
the Meerut Division.
The general outlines of the operations were as follows:
The First and Indian Corps were to renew the attack and to press
forwards towards Violaines and Beau Puits, and to establish a defensive
flank along the La Bassée road on the left, maintaining the right at
Givenchy. The line to be established in the first instance was the
general line of the road Festubert-La Quinque Rue-La Tourelle
cross-roads-Port Arthur, which position was to be consolidated. The
First Corps was to assault with the Second Division on the right of the
Meerut Division, and the assault of both Divisions was to be
simultaneous. The subsequent advance was to be with the object of
securing the Ferme d’Avoué and certain named roads.
The Seventh Division on our left was to deliver an assault in the early
hours of the 15th May.
The Meerut Division, less Dehra Dun Brigade and one Brigade R.F.A., with
the Sirhind Brigade added, was ordered to make the attack of the Indian
Corps. The assault was to be made against named front-line trenches, all
details being given. Should the first two objectives be attained, as the
attack of the Second Division progressed our own was to push on and
secure the road from Port Arthur to La Tourelle cross-roads inclusive,
and consolidate itself thereon.
A deliberate Artillery bombardment was to precede the assault and was to
be maintained for thirty-six hours. Owing, however, to the further
postponement of the attack for twenty-four hours it was actually
maintained for sixty hours.
No. 4 Trench howitzer battery was placed at the disposal of the Garhwal
Brigade for the operations, and this Brigade was detailed to carry out
the assault on the enemy’s front-line trenches on a two-battalion front.
The Sirhind Brigade was in support of the Garhwal Brigade. The Bareilly
Brigade was in Divisional reserve at Croix Barbée, and the Dehra Dun
Brigade was in Corps reserve.
The 4th Indian Cavalry rendezvoused on 15th May in fields and orchards
between Vieille Chapelle and La Couture. Nos. 3 and 4 Companies Sappers
and Miners and the 107th Pioneers rendezvoused at St. Vaast on the
evening of the 14th May. All assaulting troops wore masks soaked in
solution. These were the early days of gas, and some of the devices to
ward off this poisonous innovation were grotesque. Fond parents, wives,
and relations had sent out every form of anti-gas invention. A Hindu
sepoy best explained what the Indians thought of it all when he said: “I
believe the British have been converted to our religion and are trying
to imitate our many Gods. I have already seen many ‘Hunumans,’ and
‘Ganesh’ will shortly follow.”
At 3.30 P.M. on the 14th May orders were received from First Army
directing the assault to be delayed for another twenty-four hours, as
the effect of the bombardment was not considered to have been
sufficient; the weather also was wet and the ground was soft and
holding.
The night of the 14th-15th passed without any special incident. At 3.30
P.M. on the 15th May I sent the following instructions to the G.O.C.
Meerut Division:
(_a_) If the night attack succeeds, hold on to V 6 at all costs, even
if the Second Division on your right fails.
(_b_) If the night attack fails, you will not persist in it, unless
the Second Division on the right has succeeded, when use every
endeavour to connect with its left.
(_c_) If the attack of both the Meerut and Second Divisions fail, make
a fresh attack at 3.15 A.M., to synchronise with that of the Seventh
Division; this attack is to be preceded by a fresh bombardment,
commencing at 2.45 A.M. and lasting till 3.15 A.M.
(_d_) If you fail again, re-form and prepare for another attack, which
should be preceded by a further bombardment, probably six hours later,
but further instructions will be issued as to the hour and class of
this bombardment.
At 10.50 P.M., 15th May, all troops were in position. The 2nd Leicesters
with six machine-guns were to assault with the right in the ditch
passing through V 5, and were ordered to get into touch with the Second
Division on their right. The Garhwal Rifles, with six machine-guns, were
on the left, with their right in touch with the left of the Leicesters.
The 3rd Londons and two companies 2/3rd Gurkha Rifles were in support of
the Garhwal Rifles and 2nd Leicesters respectively. The remainder of the
3rd Gurkha Rifles was in Brigade reserve. The 2/8th Gurkha Rifles were
holding the line in rear. The units of the Sirhind Brigade were disposed
as follows:
1st Highland Light Infantry, and 1/1st Gurkha Rifles in assembly
trenches east of Garhwal Brigade Reserve.
15th Sikhs in trenches east of Lansdowne Post.
1/4th King’s Liverpools in trenches about Lansdowne Post.
1/4th Gurkha Rifles in Lansdowne Post.
Immediately the bridges were in position the Leicesters and Garhwal
Rifles commenced to move out, and by 11.25 P.M. were in position.
The assault started at 11.30 P.M., and at once the German machine-gun
and rifle fire commenced, while their trenches appeared full of men. The
enemy front was lit, not only by the ordinary flares but also by bombs
thrown over the parapet, which burned on the ground. In spite of
repeated efforts to reach the German trenches, the advance of both
battalions was brought to a standstill, and each successive attempt was
similarly stopped.
At 12.30 A.M., 16th May, the G.O.C. Garhwal Brigade reported that the
Leicesters were held up and that the Garhwal Rifles had been unable to
get forward more than thirty yards owing to heavy machine-gun fire. At
this time General Anderson became aware that, though the battalion of
the British Division on his immediate right had also not succeeded in
reaching the German trenches, others of the 5th and 6th Infantry
Brigades had done so. This proved that strong-point V 6 and its vicinity
assigned to us were, as I had understood all along, one of the most
formidable obstacles on our whole front. The Leicesters and the Garhwal
Rifles were accordingly withdrawn and replaced by the 3rd Gurkhas and
1/3rd Londons, and the G.O.C. Brigade was directed to make a further
effort at 3.15 A.M.
In the meanwhile touch was maintained with the left of the Second
Division, and the G.O.C. was informed that the Garhwal Brigade would
again attack at 3.15 A.M. In reply, he stated that his left would
simultaneously make another attack. An intense bombardment commenced at
2.45 A.M., 16th May, and at 3 A.M. the battalions detailed to attack
were in position with their leading platoons in the firing-trenches. It
was impossible, owing to the light, to launch the assault from the
enemy’s side of the ditch, as the troops could not reach that position
unseen.
At 3.15 A.M. the assault was commenced, but the moment the men showed
the enemy opened a heavy rifle, machine-gun, and artillery fire. The
majority of them were shot down as they crossed our parapet, and this
assault also was entirely held up.
In both advances a certain number of officers and men arrived within a
few yards of the German wire before they were shot, but none were able
to reach the parapets. The battalions were now ordered to reorganise,
and it was decided that no further attempts to break through on this
front were to be made, but that troops should be pushed in through the
opening already made on our right.
In these assaults the German machine-guns again succeeded, in spite of
the previous heavy bombardment by Artillery and bomb-guns, in
maintaining themselves in their covered positions and in coming into
immediate action on our assault being launched. Both assaults were thus
met by heavy fire from the front and from right and left flanks, and
were brought to a standstill just as those on the 9th May had been.
The casualties, owing to the smaller front attacked, were not so
numerous as those experienced on the 9th, but they were regrettably
heavy, namely, twenty-one British officers, five Indian officers, 300
other British ranks, and 590 other ranks Indian, or about thirty per
cent of the strength of the Brigade engaged.
In these difficult operations the Garhwal Rifles suffered 150
casualties, and the Leicesters lost in killed four subalterns, viz.
Tayler, Brown, Gandy, and Crosse, besides twenty other ranks, and the
wounded and missing, including five officers, numbered over 200. It is a
sad tale to tell, this continuous long roll of dead and wounded, but it
is necessary in order to explain the difficulties we had to encounter
and the heroism of the troops, British and Indian, who, notwithstanding
the hopelessness of the task, never hesitated to go manfully forward.
The 3rd Londons suffered over 100 casualties, and the 3rd Gurkhas over
seventy, including two British officers killed. Lieutenant Nott-Bower
was shot whilst bravely trying to save a wounded man of the Leicesters
and a brother officer, Captain Grigg, was hit by a splinter of shell.
Captain F. Hodgson of the 84th Punjabis, a personal friend, was another
gallant soul who passed away in honour this day.
By 4.30 A.M., 16th May, the 6th British Brigade had taken the Orchard
and the 5th Brigade had been able to continue its advance, but the
battalion on our immediate right had again been unable to get on, as its
flank was exposed. The G.O.C. Bareilly Brigade was now directed to be
prepared to take over the front held by the Garhwal Brigade. The Army
commander had meantime decided to form a flank where the left of the
Second Division had got through, and I received orders to hold our
trenches as a defensive front.
At 8 A.M., 16th May, the situation was as follows:
Garhwal Brigade was holding the line as a defensive front. The Meerut,
Lahore, and Heavy Artillery were shelling the area V 6 and other
re-entrant objectives. The Bareilly Brigade was _en route_ to Lansdowne
Post. The Sirhind Brigade and 107th Pioneers were under orders of the
G.O.C. Second Division. Both companies Sappers and Miners and 125th
Rifles were at St. Vaast and Croix Barbée. 4th Indian Cavalry was in its
rendezvous at Vieille Chapelle; whilst the left battalion of the Second
Division, which could not advance, was still holding its old front line
in continuation of our right.
At 11.30 P.M. the Bareilly Brigade relieved the Garhwal Brigade on the
front line, with Headquarters at Lansdowne Post.
Before dawn on 17th May I received First Army Operation orders, which
directed the Indian Corps to remain in occupation of its line.
At 10 A.M. on 17th May, after a telephonic conversation with General
Anderson, it was arranged that we should seize any opportunity of
advancing into the enemy trenches. The Sirhind Brigade was again placed
at my disposal, for the purpose of ensuring touch being kept with the
left of Second Division in any advance which the latter might make.
At 11 A.M. the First Army directed that the duty of gradually
establishing a defensive flank on the left as the attack proceeded, was
assigned to the Indian Corps, and that as the attack of the Second
Division progressed we were to gradually extend to the right and relieve
troops of the Second Division as opportunity offered. The Bareilly and
Sirhind Brigades were detailed for this duty.
At 3.30 A.M. on 18th May the Germans attempted an attack on one company
of the 15th Sikhs, but were bombed and driven back. During the progress
of reliefs of certain battalions of the British Brigade on our right the
1st Highland Light Infantry had five officers and seventy other ranks
made casualties, including Lieutenant H. S. Davidson killed. It is
interesting to note here that the 1st battalion which belonged to the
Indian Corps actually relieved their own 2nd battalion which belonged to
the British Brigade fighting by our side. A chance meeting under such
conditions is rare, even under the varied circumstances in which the
British Army serves.
This 18th day of May was to witness a deed of heroism which for
sustained gallantry can surely not be surpassed. A British officer and
ten men of the 15th Sikhs were those who added a brilliant page to the
history of the Indian Army. Of the ten one Lance-Naik Mangal Singh and
three sepoys belonged to the battalion, whilst four of the others were
attached from the 19th Punjabis and two from the 45th Sikhs.
An isolated trench was held by a company of the 15th Sikhs, opposed to
an ever-increasing number of the enemy, who showed signs of an immediate
attack. Having expended all his bombs, the officer in command was in
urgent need of more, and Lieutenant J. Smyth offered to make the attempt
over the 250 yards which intervened. Ten Sikhs volunteered to accompany
him, carrying a hundred bombs in boxes between them. Moving for sixty
yards under cover, the party diverged, and at once came under heavy
fire. Crawling over dead and wounded, through such cover as battered
ditches and trenches could afford, they advanced under a galling and
aimed fire. Man after man was shot down, and by the time Smyth had got
to within thirty yards of his objective there were only three others
besides himself unwounded, but the precious boxes were still intact. The
Germans had seen and understood the object of this movement, and the
ground here was swept by a tornado of bullets, and to carry the boxes
any farther was absolutely impossible. Breaking them open, Smyth
distributed as many bombs as possible between the survivors. One of the
three gallant Sikhs was at the same time killed; and this splendid young
officer, with now but two others—a Naik and a sepoy—crawling on through
mire and water, reached their goal. Smyth, who is one of the most
modest, as he certainly is one of the bravest, of men, received the
Victoria Cross, and the Naik the Indian Order of Merit, whilst the
Indian Distinguished Service Medal was given to all who lived of that
glorious band. The Gurus of the Khalsa could have wished for no greater
proof of the right of the Sikh to style himself a Singh (lion).
On 18th May orders were received for the Indian Corps to attack the
Ferme du Bois at the same time as attacks were delivered by the Seventh
Division and the Guards Brigade more to the south.
The outlines of the operation were as follows: Meerut Division,
reinforced by Sirhind Brigade, was to attack the Ferme du Bois at 4.30
P.M., in conjunction with an attack by the Guards Brigade on Cour
d’Avoué, with the intention of obtaining possession of the Ferme du Bois
and of three trenches up to the La Tourelle-Quinque Rue road. Touch was
to be obtained with the Guards at a point marked Q 12.
The Artillery bombardment commenced at 2 P.M. The Sirhind Brigade was
directed on the Ferme du Bois and certain other points, and after
establishing itself at the Ferme, was to push forward in conjunction
with the progress of the attack by the Guards Brigade. The Bareilly
Brigade was to assist this attack by fire. The orders of the Sirhind
Brigade directed the bombing parties to be supported by half a company
1st Highland Light Infantry; and as the attack progressed the 4th King’s
had orders as to the part to be played by them.
At 4.20 P.M., 18th May, the Sirhind Brigade reported that, owing to the
heavy German Artillery fire, the bombing parties and troops intended for
the attack were being held up in their original trenches, and shortly
after communication with the front became very difficult owing to all
wires being cut.
By 5.40 P.M., 18th May, it was ascertained that the Guards Brigade were
getting forward by short rushes, and the G.O.C. Sirhind Brigade was
directed to use every possible endeavour to try and get his own attack
forward also.
At 6 P.M. he reported that the bombing parties had made three attempts
to cross, but had so far failed. As the attack appeared quite unable to
advance, I telephoned that if it could not attain its object by day it
must do so by night, and further Artillery support was promised.
As the troops of the Second Division on our right were being relieved
during the night 18th-19th May, I sent instructions that no attack
should be made till this relief was completed, but added that it must
then be made.
At 10 P.M. General Walker, V.C., in command of the Sirhind Brigade,
represented that he considered the German position round the Ferme du
Bois was such that the success of an attack was very doubtful, and that
the probable loss of life would be great until our present position
could be consolidated, and a front from which to advance was assured.
While again reminding the Division that it was most desirable the attack
should be made, I left it to the judgement of General Walker, an
experienced officer, on the spot, to decide.
At 11.10 P.M. it was definitely decided that the attack should not be
made. Throughout the night the Sirhind Brigade was in close touch with
the Germans to its front.
The 15th Sikhs had been undergoing many vicissitudes during all the
confused fighting of the past days, and as already related they had
given a fine example of the stuff of which the Khalsa is made. Attached
to the battalion was Captain F. C. Waterfield, 45th Sikhs, whom I had
known for years. This promising officer was killed. His own regiment of
Rattray’s Sikhs was the one Corps of the Indian Army which in my young
days I had most admired and had served alongside in Afghanistan. It was
always a fine battalion, and has on the plains of Mesopotamia added
still more to its reputation. As I said earlier in this book, if any
Sikh battalions are to remain as Class Corps, none is more worthy of
this honour than Rattray’s Sikhs.
On the 19th May the 15th Sikhs lost the services of two officers,
Captain Crozier and Lieutenant Thomson.
At dawn on 19th May I received orders to the effect that the Second and
Seventh Divisions were consolidating their gains and that operations
would continue on that day. The Artillery of the Indian Corps was to
assist by firing on the Ferme du Bois and certain named communication
trenches.
At 10.5 A.M. the G.O.C. Sirhind Brigade reported that owing to rain the
trenches were full of water and the parapets much damaged, and that in
consequence of reliefs of Second Division his men had been on the move
all night, and that his casualties during the past twenty-four hours had
been severe. He added that his battalions in the front line were
somewhat shaken, and he considered it essential to relieve the 15th
Sikhs by the 1st Gurkhas that night, as they were now reduced to about
250 men. He also recommended that the King’s should be relieved, and
stated that he hardly thought an attack could be got out of his men that
night.
At 6 P.M. the Germans made another attempt to bomb the left flank of
Sirhind Brigade, but this attack was stopped. On the top of all this
orders were received from the First Army that the Indian Corps was, at
all costs, to capture certain named trenches and points by the morning
of 22nd May. During the night 19th-20th the Garhwal Brigade relieved
Bareilly Brigade, and certain interbattalion reliefs desired by G.O.C.
Sirhind Brigade were also carried out. The situation remained normal
during the night.
On the morning of the 20th May I visited General Anderson’s Headquarters
and discussed the operations for the capture of the Ferme du Bois which
had been ordered by First Army. This was to co-ordinate with the general
plan, viz. that the Canadian and Highland Divisions should work
southwards and secure the group of houses south of the Ferme Cour
d’Avoué, and that the Indian Corps was to carry on active hostilities
continuously, with a view to harassing the enemy and wearing down his
resistance.
The orders issued by the Meerut Division were to the effect that the
Sirhind Brigade as a first objective was to secure named localities
about the Ferme du Bois before the morning of 22nd May, and that every
endeavour was to be made to carry out this order. The G.O.C. Sirhind
Brigade accordingly arranged that the 1st Gurkhas should establish
themselves in a named trench overnight, and that patrols were to push on
to the Ferme du Bois. Special patrols were also to be sent out to
ascertain the nature of obstacles parallel to our front; forming-up
trenches were to be dug for the assaulting battalions, and the 4th
King’s were to be relieved.
During the night a thorough reconnaissance of the position was carried
out and a picquet was established by the Sirhind Brigade 200 yards west
of the Ferme du Bois. Operation orders were telephoned to the Meerut
Division. The arrangements were as follows:
General Alderson’s force (Canadians, etc.) was to co-operate by
carrying out an intensive bombardment on Cour d’Avoué on 22nd May.
The Garhwal Brigade was to detail a bombing party, supported by one
company of infantry, and support the attack by bombing along trench V
1 to V 2 with a view to establishing themselves there. This party was
not to commence operations until ten minutes after the Sirhind Brigade
attack had started, unless the enemy opened fire on our attacking
troops, in which case it was to act at once.
A detailed artillery bombardment, which commenced at 1 P.M. on the
21st and was to continue till 5 A.M. on the 22nd, was arranged, on
trenches and area in and near the localities to be attacked, and to
form barrages to prevent arrival of reinforcements.
The Sirhind Brigade was to attack at 1 A.M. on 22nd May in the
following formation:
On the left the Highland Light Infantry had as objectives two named
trenches. In the centre were the 1st Gurkhas, and on the right the 4th
Gurkhas.
The 4th King’s were in support, and 15th Sikhs in reserve.
All columns were in position correctly, and the attacks were launched at
1 A.M. as arranged, and advanced without at first being fired on. The
right attack was checked by a ditch about twenty yards from the enemy’s
trenches, and here came under rifle and machine-gun fire from the
trenches in front, while the rear and right rear were also heavily fired
on; the south-east corner of the Ferme du Bois Orchard, in particular,
was under a severe fire, presumably from Cour d’Avoué. This ditch was
about six feet deep with three feet of water in it, and the ground
between it and the enemy’s trenches was wired. At this obstacle the
leading company of the 4th Gurkhas was checked, but Major Moule and
Captain Robinson with a detachment broke through the wire and were soon
at the German trenches. They had nobly carried out their task and never
returned to tell the tale. The battalion had 100 casualties.
Lieutenant Ballinger, 4th King’s, commanding the two machine-guns of his
battalion, had been detailed to follow the 4th Gurkhas. In his haste to
join in the fight he moved on sooner than his instructions had allowed,
and he and many of his men were killed close by the wire adjoining the
German trench—another brave set of Englishmen who died as so many others
did in the over-zealous discharge of duty.
The attack did not progress beyond this ditch, which perhaps seemed a
greater obstacle in the night than it really was. The only remaining
British officer with the attacking companies returned at 1.50 A.M. to
take up reinforcements, but at 2.20 A.M., the senior officers with the
three attacking columns having consulted, decided that as the attack was
held up all along, it was inadvisable to send up more troops, and the
attackers were ordered to withdraw.
The centre attack reached the Ferme du Bois with but little loss, owing
to the protection afforded by the farm and ridge. A ditch was reached,
and the assault at once came under heavy fire from the front and right
flank. The leading company of the 1st Gurkhas, reinforced by a second,
assaulted and captured a line of trench some thirty yards beyond the
ditch. This trench had been covered by wire which had been cut by our
artillery, whose support had been most effective. About fifteen Germans
were killed here and the rest retired to a second trench twenty yards in
rear. By this time all the British officers with the attacking companies
had been killed or wounded, and Subadar Jit Sing Gurung, 1st Gurkhas,
assumed command but was shortly afterwards ordered to retire, an order
he carried out with coolness and judgement.
Lieutenant Heyland was killed while endeavouring to alter the
configuration of a captured trench in which his men were being mown
down. Three other British officers shared the same fate, Lieutenants
Fry, Herbert, and Gamble all bravely seconding his efforts. This
battalion paid dearly for its short but fierce fight, the total
casualties amounting to 120. Subadar Jit Sing Gurung was awarded the
Indian Order of Merit, and Captain Mellis earned the Military Cross.
The advance of the Highland Light Infantry on the left of the combined
attacks was also held up by the ditch and by machine-gun fire taking the
ditch in enfilade from the right and in the rear from the Cour d’Avoué.
This battalion was faced by the impossible, but with its proven valour
did all that could be done under the conditions, and in the attempt to
carry out its task paid with a loss of over 120 of all ranks, including
Lieut. J. Agnew killed, four officers wounded, and one wounded and
missing, Lieut. B. Ivy.
Communication with the Sirhind Brigade Headquarters was interrupted till
3 A.M., when from all reports that he could receive, the G.O.C. decided
that a second attack was impracticable. He directed the original
dispositions to be resumed and the trenches to be held, up to where they
had been barricaded, and this order was carried out.
In telling the story of incessant attacks or defensive actions in those
days the infantry soldier naturally looms large, whilst the less
conspicuous units sometimes escape notice. The corps of Indian Sappers
and Miners has furnished unlimited material for tales of daring, and on
this 22nd day of May 1915 a chivalrous gentleman, Captain Francis Douie
of the Royal Engineers, and his equally gallant orderly, Jiwa Khan of
No. 3 Company, 1st Sappers and Miners, did what one is proud to record.
In broad daylight they noticed a wounded man lying only eighty yards
from a German trench from which proceeded a heavy rifle fire, whilst our
own guns were shelling the self-same trench: but for such men death has
no terrors. They were soon over the parapet, and by sheer pluck and luck
combined reached and brought in their helpless comrade. Jiwa Khan may
well be proud of the Indian Order of Merit he wears, and Captain Douie
of the D.S.O. he that day added to the Military Cross he had already
won. I may add that it was only after very searching inquiry I was
enabled to get full details of these acts of bravery, as apparently both
actors appeared to be unconscious of having done anything beyond their
ordinary duty.
The attack failed owing to excessive casualties in British officers of
the attacking companies when these companies were held up. Of those with
the assault all became casualties except two subalterns. Also the
hindrance of a deep ditch in front of the objective under close rifle
and machine-gun fire was a very serious obstacle at night, and broke the
momentum of the advance. Issue from it would have involved facing
frontal rifle fire at very close range, while men in it were taken in
enfilade and reverse by machine-guns from south-east of Ferme du Bois
and from Cour d’Avoué. The fact that no simultaneous attack was being
made on the Cour d’Avoué left the enemy in that direction at liberty to
concentrate his fire on our assault at close ranges. Reconnaissance had
been unable to ascertain with accuracy where the German trenches and
machine-guns were located. Owing to the fact that the advance to the
point of attack was carried out deliberately and in complete silence, no
fire had opened on it until thirty-five minutes after the start, and the
officer commanding the party which was to bomb along the trench in
support of the attack, hearing nothing more than general heavy firing,
was in doubt whether the attack had actually started. Inquiry from the
nearest officer of the neighbouring battalion elicited the reply that it
had not done so, and he accordingly delayed starting his operations so
as to synchronise the two attacks.
It was now broad daylight and, of course, futile to order this attack to
recommence. The officers commanding units on the spot decided that with
the situation as it was known to them any further attempt, while the
enemy was in undisturbed occupation of the vicinity of Cour d’Avoué,
offered no chance of success, and would only have led to greatly
enhanced losses, and that withdrawal before it became too late was the
best course to pursue. It would, perhaps, have been better to have
ordered the attack at an earlier hour of the night, even though the
Germans would probably have been found more on the alert than they were.
The casualties in this assault were heavy: nine companies were engaged,
in which sixteen British officers, two Indian officers, 137 British
other ranks, and 173 Indian other ranks were returned as casualties.
Although the British Division on our right had, like ourselves, been
unable to make any advance during the early days of these prolonged
attacks, there is no doubt that once they got a forward move on, they
were severely handicapped by the inability of the Indian Corps to keep
up with them, and the left battalion of that Division in consequence
could not keep in touch with those farther to the right. The situation,
in fact, closely resembled that of our left Brigade at Neuve Chapelle,
where we originally reached as far as the Bois du Biez but were obliged
to again move back owing to the British Brigade of the Eighth Division
on our immediate left finding it impossible to overcome the German
defence to its front.
In the case now under review, we did all in our power to keep up with
the advance, but the strong point V 6 baffled our efforts. It might
possibly have been better if the dividing line between the British and
Indian Corps had not run just past this redoubt, but that is a matter of
opinion only. Be that as it may, it must be owned that notwithstanding
many gallant attempts we could not get on at all, and thus hampered the
later attacks of the British Division after it had captured its first
objective.
CHAPTER XXI
If for no other reason than for the sake of being alive to read the
monumental history of Armageddon, I wish I were young again. How atomic
appears one’s own humble share in the great conflict. To Britishers who
looked on manœuvres at Aldershot or Salisbury Plain as something to
record, as Napoleonic military feats of arms which were an insurance
against all aggression, how different do matters now appear. “The
Contemptible Little Army” of those days is no more, but even so, it will
ever remain the lodestar for the armies to come, and the historian of
the five years’ clash of the world’s arms will have material to work on
such as never fell to the lot of man. What an opportunity for still
closer welding together the divers races and peoples that combine to
make the Empire of Great Britain.
I will here cease for a while recording facts, and deal with matters
which are of interest to those who look on the Indian Corps (minute as
it was in comparison) as something else besides mere congeries of
soldiers to feed the guns. There are some details which may not prove
uninteresting to the student of psychology.
By the end of May it was plain that the Indians needed a complete rest
and sorting out, if they were to continue as a Corps. The losses in
France after the May fighting had totalled up to:
Killed. Wounded. Missing.
British Officers 213 501 58
Indian Officers 88 260 53
Other Units, British 1,376 6,073 1,724
Other Units, Indian 1,943 10,650 2,504
————— —————— —————
3,620 17,484 4,321
In addition, 450 Indians had died from various causes. (Taken from _The
Indian Corps in France_.)
The above included the Territorial battalions forming part of the Corps,
but not the losses of Divisions or Brigades temporarily attached.
In my opinion it was useless to retain two Divisions in name without the
substance, and I recommended that one strong Division with Brigades
averaging 4000 rifles each should be formed, the weakest and some other
named Indian battalions being turned into a Reserve Brigade from which
casualties could be replaced. Also, should reinforcements prove larger
than I anticipated, complete battalions could replace others, and thus
give all an opportunity of sharing in the fighting. The Highland
Division had just been allotted to us also, and the two combined
Divisions would have formed a fine Army Corps.
I explained that as matters then stood the British battalions were doing
more than their share of work in the various fights. The quality of our
Indian troops had deteriorated, as we received drafts of all sorts and
kinds, and the old and tried British and Indian officers had been
reduced to a minimum; but with that spirit that animates the sons of
Britain, the British units, without complaint, continued to give of
their best (and it was of the very best). Not that I did not
occasionally receive hints from the officers of both British and Indian
regiments that this process could not be indefinitely continued, and
they had good reason too; and although I mostly kept my counsel I never
failed to impress strongly on those in higher authority, that some
drastic change was absolutely necessary.
I recommended three Indian battalions being transferred from France, and
gave my reasons in full. The two Divisional Commanders were in complete
accord with me in these suggestions, and as a proof that they were
necessary I will give a few instances of the composition of units, which
those who know the Indian Army will appreciate.
The 57th Rifles (one of the best Corps in India) was at this time made
up from six different units—total strength 446; the 129th Baluchis, of
seven different units—total strength 263 rifles. The 9th Bhopals
consisted of men from eleven different units—strength 409. I recommended
that the 57th and 59th Rifles should be combined, the total strength of
the latter then being 271 rifles with seven officers all told.
The 15th Sikhs, with a total strength of only 250, was suggested for
combination with the 47th Sikhs; the two battalions would then have
numbered 701. Think of it, after over eight months of war. The 1st
Gurkhas had only three Regular officers; the 4th Gurkhas only four. In
the 6th Jats only 160 of the original battalion remained.
The two battalions of the 39th Garhwal Rifles had already been
amalgamated. They had both done most gallant service and proved
themselves to be second to none in India. This combined corps was now
short of ten Indian officers and 64 N.C.O.’s. The C.O. reported that he
had “only four N.C.O.’s fit for promotion,” and “hardly a single
rifleman whose education would enable him to keep a company roll!” What
would some of our Solomons who came to judgement on the Indian Corps
have said to this, if it had been possible to find similar conditions in
two combined British battalions?
On 26th May the First Army informed me that my recommendations had met
with the approval both of the G.O.C. and the Commander-in-Chief. Some
alterations regarding Staff officers and others had been made, but
amongst them was one, that the appointment of Officer for Press Work
(Lieut.-Colonel Merewether) might be abolished when the Indian element
was reduced. Now if there was one person who should certainly not be got
rid of, it was this officer. India had long enough been kept in the dark
regarding the doings of her soldiers, and to have abolished him would
not only have finally severed all connection with that country, as far
as news was concerned, but would have made it impossible to compile any
detailed history of the Corps for the benefit of future generations. I
strongly protested against this on behalf of the Army and people of
India, and pointed out that after the loyalty shown, that country would
never forgive us if any such radical step was taken. India, in point of
fact, during the war sent to France alone 86,300 combatants and 48,500
non-combatants; whilst the numbers of both sent to all theatres of war
totalled one million and forty thousand men. Nothing came of it, as Lord
Kitchener was then arranging to replace several of the battalions by
others from Egypt and elsewhere, and had telegraphed to the Government
of India regarding this. Finally, before any great changes could be
made, the Indian Army Corps had left France.
There is no need to string out many other modifications I proposed, and
some I carried out, in the various Brigades. From this time till I left
the Corps it was one continuous effort to keep things going. It was
necessary to carry out tasks with the best grace we could muster, and at
the same time try and satisfy the powers that were.
I began this chapter with a remark that a student of psychology might
find something of interest in it. Put yourself in the place of a sepoy,
say of the 9th Bhopal Infantry. He had been brought up in a regiment
composed of four classes of Indians: Sikhs, Rajputs, Brahmins, and
Musalmans. He had been bred to the idea that his regiment was his
military home and that it was the best in the army. He had understood
that no man could be compulsorily transferred to another corps. He had
firmly believed that our Army was not only the best trained but best
equipped in the world, and he trusted his British officers as only
Indians can trust them, _i.e._ absolutely, implicitly. Any recruit or
trained soldier who joined his battalion he knew came there of his own
free will, and he could not for a moment imagine that all sorts and
conditions of men, out of all sorts of outlandish districts from Cape
Comorin to Peshawar and from Quetta to Assam, talking different dialects
and with entirely different ideals, might one fine morning arrive with
shoulder badges denoting anything from police to Raj troops, and claim,
not only acquaintance, but close comradeship with him as one of the 9th
Bhopals.
And yet, dumped down in the heart of Europe mid ice and snow, shot,
mangled, and torn day after day, many of these things, of which he was
so sanguine, were suddenly directly reversed. His old battalion and his
officers still stood to him in the same relation, but he awoke to the
truth that ours was by no means the best equipped Army for war; far from
it. The exigencies of the time had shattered his dream. All kinds of
strangers entered the ranks almost daily; all kinds of officers who did
not understand him took command of his company. The promotion he had
looked for in his battalion was going to outsiders; his own officers
were being wiped out week by week, and his periods of leave home were
_nil_.
He was indeed a derelict! but he still stood in his trench, his rifle
ready and his loyalty unimpaired. Only one belief had not been
shattered, and that was, that his family would regularly receive the
small dole that was his due, and that if he died this would still
continue. In this knowledge lay his contentment.
Is there not material here to ponder, for those who issued battle orders
as if the whole Army was of Anglo-Saxon blood?
Man is not cast in common mould; as iron is to unwrought gold,
So is one man, ne’er mind his faith, distinct as love is far from hate,
From all his fellow-men.
It was Lord Kitchener who wisely made the appointment of “Recording
Officer with the Indian Corps,” and it must have been he who refused to
consider his abolition under any circumstances.
On 2nd May, as on numerous other occasions, I had spent the whole day in
the trenches. There alone could one understand the real life the men
lived, and appreciate what they were doing. Besides, a big attack was
pending, and a thorough survey of the ground to our front was necessary.
The particular battalions I saw in the most advanced line this day were
the 9th Gurkhas and 6th Jats. I chatted freely with the men and was
struck by their eagerness to ask questions. One _jawan_ of the Jats
said: “We have been arguing as to whether there is a hill in this
country: why, we had one even in my own village near Hissar (it was
probably an old disused brick kiln), but although the troops who fought
near Ypres in April tell me that they saw hills and valleys, I can
scarcely believe it.” I told him there were plenty of high mountains on
some parts of the Allied front. He said: “Then send us for a motor bus
trip, and if it turns out to be so, I will give a banquet to my company
when we again get a rest.” Another young Jat quickly added: “You are too
generous. You need not trouble about the banquet, for that time will
never arrive.” This raised a general laugh, and as I passed on I said:
“You see we cannot spare the 6th Jats because the Germans are afraid to
attack as long as you are up in the front trenches.” “Well said, General
Sahib! now we understand,” came from several men.
The G.O.C. First Army was a very frequent visitor to our Corps
Headquarters. I see in my diary over and over again how often he came to
see me and discussed operations past or future. This was a great help in
carrying them out, and his intimate knowledge of the maps showing our
trenches, defensive posts, and situation generally, was quite
astonishing. It was only one of his many fronts, but you had to be
pretty quick with him, and I do not doubt that he knew as much of the
front he was eventually responsible for as he did of our own short line.
He has since made a world-wide name as a soldier. I wonder if he
sometimes recalls the days when the Corps yclept “Indian” was under his
command.
In my diary of 10th May, the day after our severe fighting at Festubert,
there is an entry, “Nice letter from Viceroy.” As I have often said
before in this book, Lord Hardinge never failed to write fully regarding
the Indian Army. I have a big file of his letters, which as I re-read
them show plainly that no man could possibly have done more to help the
Corps in France.
On the 2nd June I inspected a company of the Hazaras of the 106th
Pioneers, who had just arrived as a reinforcement for the 107th
Pioneers. It was worth a lot to see these honest-looking men, for simple
faith in the Government they served was written on their faces. A
havildar whom I asked what he thought of the country said, “Every
country to which the Government sends us is good.” A somewhat Oriental
reply, but he looked as if he meant what he said, though he was probably
wondering where he really was.
On the 7th and 8th June I saw the 69th and 89th Punjabis, just arrived
from the East to replace corps leaving France. The last time I had seen
the 69th was on the Malakand Pass on the road to Chitral; it was a
different scene now, although the ugly village they were billeted in
bore the somewhat ridiculous name of “Paradise.” They had justified
their regimental motto, “By sea and land,” and they rendered good
service in Flanders. This battalion was originally raised in 1764 at
Madura as the 10th Battalion of Coast Sepoys, and after undergoing many
changes in name and constitution, received its present designation in
1903. Ill fortune attended their arrival, for the day following, both
the Second in Command, Major Copeland, and the Adjutant, Lieut. J. R.
Dill, who had gone up to visit the trenches, were killed by a shell.
Dill was a brother of Captain R. F. Dill, 129th Baluchis, who had
behaved with such distinguished gallantry at the first battle of Ypres,
and received one of the first D.S.O.’s awarded to the Indian Army in
this war. They were sons of the Very Reverend Dr. Marcus Dill of Alloway
Manse, Ayr, who sent four sons to the war.
The 69th bears on its colours the battle honours, amongst others, of
Mysore, Ava, and Pegu.
The 89th Punjabis was raised in 1798 as the 3rd Battalion of Madras
Native Infantry, and like the 69th underwent many changes of
constitution until 1903, when it received its present title. The
battalion served in six different theatres of the Great War. One Naik
Shahmad Khan won the Victoria Cross in Mesopotamia.
Another battalion which joined the Corps later on was the 33rd Punjabis.
They were raised during the Indian Mutiny of 1857 as the “Allahabad
Levy,” and received various designations as Bengal Infantry. In 1903 it
became the 33rd Punjabis. On its colours is shown “Burma, 1885–87.”
On the 22nd June I visited the trenches and spent the night there with
the 57th Rifles. How quickly one realises in the darkness the chances of
being knocked out. Even though nothing unusual occurred, so many bullets
were flying about, ricochetting on every side, clattering on the tin
roof of the dug-out, etc., that it was made plain at any moment any man
might meet his end. And the men took it so much as a matter of fact and
appeared so unconcerned. It was only the experience hundreds of
thousands were going through every night, but it may be of some interest
to write what I, as one humble individual of that great host, myself
went through, for it just describes what occurred every day, more or
less. Towards dusk it began to rain, and seeing a young officer who had
to proceed to Divisional Headquarters on duty, starting without a
waterproof, I offered him mine. The La Bassée-Estaires road was his
shortest way, and although this was always kept under fire by the
Germans, it was still a fairly possible bicycle route if you did not
mind an occasional toss into a shell-hole, and was used by everybody who
had urgent business. The officer returned before dawn, and in handing me
back my coat said, “General, I am so sorry I have damaged it,” and on
examination I found two bullet-hole marks. Small thing, no doubt, but it
showed the kind of life those lived who spent their nights on that
Godforsaken road.
As the evening wore on a ration party assembled outside the C.O.’s
dug-out, where I was then standing. Just as they were collected, a
machine-gun, evidently fired on the signal of some watcher, pumped a
shower of lead into them; no one was hit, but in an instant that ration
party had disappeared. Evidently it was unsafe to show a head anywhere.
About midnight I lay down for an hour’s sleep as I hoped, but hardly had
I closed my eyes than a huge rat walked over my face. I jumped as if
shot, with the result that I knocked my head against the supporting
timber and remembered it for some days. I was fast appreciating the
luxuries enjoyed by those millions of brave men who spent, not one, but
hundreds of nights in this kind of inferno. But my experiences were by
no means ended; the most interesting was to come.
After a night in which I saw much of my old comrades of the 57th Rifles,
I proceeded at dawn to return to my headquarters, and remembering my
steel-bound leg, I took the La Bassée-Estaires road, instead of the
longer route by a communication trench. Not being one of those who do
not mind bullets whizzing about, I soon had cause to regret it, for the
Germans had apparently chosen the self-same hour to search this road
with a machine-gun. My orderly, Birbal, a Naik in the 69th Punjabis and
a very old friend of mine, was with me, and as we moved along for over
1000 yards we were under a most unpleasant fire which swept past us in
gusts. Birbal evidently thought “out of sight out of danger,” for he
insisted on opening his greatcoat wide and remaining on my weather side.
I ordered him to cease his folly, but, brave fellow, he replied, “They
will never see you as long as I keep this open.” None of the party of
four of us either had the time or inclination to argue, and our pace, to
say the least of it, was exceedingly rapid, and Birbal had his way.
At last we reached the waiting motor-car and were soon out of
machine-gun range; but as we spun along towards Headquarters, I could
not but realise how strange must have been the feelings of thousands of
Indians who underwent similar experiences daily and did it only because
they had sworn loyalty to England’s King. I also reflected for the
hundredth time, how safe, ordinarily speaking, was the lot of a Corps
Commander in comparison with those brave juniors who really won the war.
Sir John French, by his actions at different times during our year in
France, proved his strong sympathy, even in trivial matters, with
soldiers as a class. He could say a thing just in the right way to win
the regard of all ranks. When he found that one of our few periods of
rest behind the firing-line coincided with the Mahomedan Ramazan, he
immediately let me know that he was very pleased our men had this
opportunity of observing a religious duty. In the same way, when I was
gazetted G.C.M.G., the Commander-in-Chief did not fail to write and
congratulate me. I hope, should the great Field-Marshal ever come across
this book, he will believe that whatever I may have said in no way
reduces the very high esteem in which I bear him. The Indian Corps owes
him a debt of gratitude for his remarks in his book, “1914.”
Several French Generals also frequently sent their congratulations and
best wishes to me and the Indian Corps. The _camaraderie_ between the
French and the Indians will ever remain a precious remembrance.
CHAPTER XXII
From the finish of the battle of Festubert until the Indian Corps took
part in the subsidiary attack in front of Mauquissart on the opening day
of the battle of Loos in September 1915, was for us what was called in
France a quiet time. No big attack was undertaken and no special
features marked this period. The troops, however, had plenty of hard
work, and a few incidents are worth recording. Some of our old
battalions left us, and a few others arrived from Egypt, etc. Among the
departures were the 15th Sikhs, 6th Jats, 9th Bhopals, 41st Dogras, and
125th Rifles. I was sorry to miss the old numbers, but after being
refitted, brought up to strength, and re-equipped, they again joined one
or other of our numerous forces operating in the many theatres of war,
and shared in the toils and triumphs of Great Britain’s armies.
After the Indian Corps had left France, I wrote, as part of a story for
a magazine, a tale of one Naik Ayub Khan of the 124th, attached to the
129th Baluchis. This was not allowed to be printed by the Censor, but
all the same long before the war ended it appeared in full in _The
Indian Corps in France_. I suppose if the Germans had found out that it
was written by a former Commander of the Indian Corps it might have
altered the whole course of events in Europe, so I presume it was that
Solomonic Censor (and not Marshal Foch) who ended the war!
Here is the story, and I will give it in his own words:
“At 10 P.M. on 21st June I started with one other man to patrol the
ground in front of our own trenches. The grass for about 100 yards
this side of the German trenches has been cut. Their wire is about
fifteen yards wide, and is composed of high wire entanglements (3 feet
to 3 feet 6 inches high) outside, and _chevaux de frise_ inside. It
commences about five yards outside the German trenches.
I arrived at the ditch on the left of the road close to the barricade
on the road near Point 63 one hour before dawn. I waited until it was
light, and till the Germans stood to arms, and then stood up and held
up my hands, saying, “Germany, I am an Indian Musalman.” The Germans
immediately called an officer, who signalled to me to put down my
rifle by the barricade. I then gave up my bayonet and ammunition and
climbed over the barricade. The time was about 2 to 2.30 A.M.
There were many Germans in the trench, all wearing the number “15” on
their shoulders. They wore grey uniform and soft forage caps, with a
stiff and black shining band, apparently made of the same material as
the German helmet. They had no pack on their backs, only a belt with
several ammunition pouches and a bayonet.
The trench was very deep and strong, and is revetted entirely with
boards held up with stakes. The floor of the trench is boarded and is
kept dry by means of pumps.
Traverses are frequent, I cannot say at what intervals, but about six
to eight men between each traverse. Dug-outs are well built and
covered with sandbags. Some have doors and windows; these probably
belong to the officers.
The parapet is very strong. There are a few loopholes in it for
sentries and (perhaps) snipers, but in the case of attack the men
would, I think, all fire over the top of the parapet (probably
standing) on steps or sandbags. The German trenches appear to be
considerably stronger and better built than ours.
About five yards behind their front trench and parallel to it runs a
communication trench, connected with the firing-line in every
traverse. It is dry and in good condition and I was taken along part
of it.
Until the sun rose I stayed with the officer who called me in, and
then he took me along the trench to a senior officer about 500 yards
towards the German right.
During my walk through the trenches I saw some iron loopholes,
probably for day sentries, also some wooden loopholes which may be
used at night. There are more men in the German front-line trenches
than in ours, perhaps in the proportion of three to two.
The senior officer had a shoulder-strap covered with silver braid, and
the number “15”: I could see no other marks. I was sent off in charge
of one N.C.O. and two soldiers. I was treated well and the men in the
trenches gave me cigarettes.
The support trench was about 100 yards behind the firing-line. There
were no dug-outs, and the trench was absolutely unoccupied. I saw no
third line of trenches.
The course I followed seems to have been _via_ (here he described it
in detail). I then entered a wood, and went through it by a _kacha_
road. (He emerged at Point 72 or 73, and turned sharp to the left,
going for about 200–300 yards with the wood on his left.) I was then
taken to the second of two houses on the right, quite close to the
turning. The first of these houses is half destroyed and is used as a
telegraph and telephone office. A trolley line runs along behind the
wood and turns to the right by these two bungalows.
I was taken into the second house and saw two officers. The younger
had no coat on; the senior, who saluted me (mark the salute) and gave
me cigarettes, had silver braid on his shoulder and a brass crown and
a number which I cannot remember. I think they must have been the C.O.
and Adjutant.
I stayed there only about five minutes.
I started off along the trolley line, which continued till it reached
a main road, probably the Aubers road. (From here the description is
vague. Apparently he went past the factory west of Illies church, on
to the main La Bassée-Lille road, and thence to Wicres.)
After crossing a railway line, some five minutes afterwards we came to
a small village, well built and with only a few houses damaged. There
were French women and children in the village. I passed straight
through the village, seeing on the right an unmetalled road on which
were horse-drawn artillery wagons. I was taken to a house amidst trees
in the fork of two main roads.
An officer who spoke a little Hindustani and had been in India came
out with a senior officer (whom I took to be a General), white-haired
and with a grey moustache, whose shoulder-strap carried thick silver
braid as thick as my finger. The Interpreter brought a map and asked
me what trenches I knew. I told him that I could not read.
He asked me why the —— Regiment had left. I said they had been engaged
for a long time and had lost heavily. Other questions and answers were
as follows:
_Question._—Were you in the attack at Ypres?
_Answer._—Yes.
_Q._—How many men did your Brigade lose?
_A._—About 300 killed and 200 wounded.
_Q._—Is your Brigade very weak now?
_A._—No, a new battalion of 1100 rifles has just arrived.
_Q._—What is this battalion?
_A._—The 89th Punjabis. (The Interpreter then produced a book and
wrote this down.)
_Q._—Have the 124th (Ayub Khan’s proper battalion) come to this
country? It is not in my book. (He saw an old shoulder badge of the
124th in my pocket.)
_A._—No. When the 129th had lost 300 men, 400 more came from the 124th
to bring them up to strength. When we returned from Belgium drafts
arrived from other regiments. We are now 100 under strength but there
is a draft of 600 men waiting for us (a good lie) when we are relieved
from the trenches. I told him that the present strength of our
companies is about ninety men. (Indian battalions formerly had eight
companies.)
_Q._—Do you have plenty of rifle ammunition?
_A._—Each sentry is given a box and can fire what he likes.
_Q._—Have the guns plenty of ammunition?
_A._—Each battery has a dug-out full of ammunition, and they can fire
what they like. (Good lie!)
_Q._—What rations do you get?
_A._—In the morning, tea, milk, and biscuits. In the evening, meat,
bread, and vegetables.
_Q._—Do you get pay?
_A._—We are fed and clothed and get soap from Government. We get ten
francs monthly in the field, and the rest accumulates at the depot.
_Q._—Why did you, a non-commissioned officer, desert?
_A._—My section is tired of the war, but dare not come over in case
they get fired on. We discussed the matter and I decided to go alone
and arrange for the others to come over. There are fifteen men in my
section who want to desert, and I can find five more in the battalion.
The senior officer then said that, if I would come over to the
Germans, I should get very good pay, and that he would give me Rs. 300
if I brought over twenty men.
These questions were asked at about 12 noon on the 22nd.
I was then sent to sit in an orchard. They brought me milk and bread
on three occasions. A number of soldiers came to look at me. I saw
about eight men with the number “55” on their shoulder-strap, and
about ten men with the number “13.”
I sat in the orchard until 9 P.M. with some German soldiers. They all
had a crown on their shoulder-straps and another mark I could not
understand. They wore an ordinary black German helmet, with a black
board on the top, raised up a little. One man took the grey cover off
and showed me his helmet. It had a big white badge in front.
(N.B.—This appears to be the 16th Uhlans.)
At about 9 P.M. the Interpreter, one of the officers, and I returned
to the trenches in a motor-car. The officers in the trenches did not
want to let me go. However, it was arranged that at dawn I should
bring over the twenty men and call out my own name. The men were to
bring rifles with them but leave them in the grass. I then left the
German trench and arrived back in our own trenches about midnight the
22nd-23rd instant.
I brought back my rifle, belt, and bandolier. They took my ammunition
and bayonet.
As regards the distance of the place of interrogation from the German
trenches I cannot remember, but was walking for about two hours on the
morning of the 22nd. My motor-car ride the same evening was about five
or six miles.” Ends.
The story is a remarkable one and its general correctness was proved by
subsequent events. Ayub Khan carried his life in his hand, for had his
actions caused one doubt of any kind among his captors he would
assuredly have been shot. One spot indicated by him as an ammunition
dump was subjected to a heavy fire two days later and a very
considerable explosion occurred which we at the time attributed solely
to the information gained. The Hun was notified by unmistakable signs
that the naik’s treachery had been discovered and rewarded, as such
conduct in war should be.
Meantime I had the pleasure of presenting Ayub Khan with a larger sum of
money than he had been promised by the Germans, promoting him to a
higher grade of N.C.O., and getting him the Indian Order of Merit.
Promotion to the commissioned rank of jemadar soon followed his other
rewards.
Towards the end of June 1915 I wrote to G.H.Q. through the First Army on
the subject of the depots, convalescent camps, and drafts at Marseilles.
I have before me reports of a Committee of experienced senior officers,
also separate reports of other officers concerned. Those who only judge
Army Corps by the number of rifles and guns available might receive a
shock on reading these documents, and incidentally gather therefrom some
of the difficulties that had to be faced by the Commander of the Indian
Corps in France. The truth is that Marseilles proved to be the most
unsuitable place that could have been selected as the Indian Base. When
we first arrived it was intended to move it farther north, Havre or
elsewhere, as soon as the main body of the Corps had reached the front;
but once established, Marseilles remained our Base to the end. Its
geographical position and the shortage of shipping, of course, had much
to say to this.
The Committee did not shirk responsibility. On the contrary, its report
is a document that should be valuable to those who may ever again be
called on to select bases in Europe for Indian troops, and assist them
to avoid the stupid blunders that were made and the chaotic conditions
that prevailed. The Commandant, Colonel G. F. Tinley, did all a man
could do. He worked all and every day, but he could not refashion a
rotten system nor cleanse the Augean stable. Some of the reservists and
drafts that were sent from India were a humiliation to our name. Some of
the officers who passed them as fit should have been removed from the
Army.
For what did it all mean? Merely this, that from reasons either of
laziness or stupidity they did not hesitate to send men marked as fit
for service in the field who were absolutely unfit, and who they must
have known were unfit. They themselves were safe enough in India; if
anything went wrong, well! their comrades in France and not they would
suffer. As I look back on it all I cannot but hope that in most cases it
was only ignorance, but of what use are such officers in the Indian
Army?
It is difficult to write calmly on such a subject, for on 15th July I
myself went down to Marseilles and remained there four days. I saw all
that was being done, inspected every hospital, depot, and draft, and
returned to Flanders, only realising fully for the first time that the
authorities in India knew as much about the requirements of a European
war as I did about a Zeppelin.
Talk of the mentality of the East: I truly learned more of it in those
four days in Marseilles than I had in a lifetime. The mind of India was
laid bare. The ignorance of the West, when endeavouring to understand
the viewpoint of the East, suddenly stood naked before me. I thought I
knew something of Indians; I left Marseilles knowing a little more, but
still very far from all.
A few details may amuse the reader; they certainly afford material for
amusement, though little comfort was it at that time. I will quote from
the official reports. One lot of reservists was classed as “utterly
valueless.” Of nineteen men of one regiment “three are fit for service.”
Another small draft was classed together as “particularly poor,” of
another out of thirty-five men sent “ten are plague convalescents who
have not even yet recovered their full vigour.” One boy was referred to
as fourteen years of age, and another as a “mere child.” Of a draft of
sixty-seven reservists nine were of “indifferent physique” and
fifty-eight “unfit.” India appeared anxious to fill up sorely needed
shipping with trash of this sort. One draft of thirty Hindus was sent
for the 129th Baluchis, a Class Mahomedan regiment that had not had a
Hindu in it for thirty years, and of the thirty, twenty-two were
pronounced unfit on arrival at Marseilles.
Finally this particular Committee closed its proceedings with the
remark: “Of 212 men inspected only five or six—who (also) are
temporarily unfit—are suitable for service in France.”
G.H.Q. was shouting to us, “Promite vires,” on the battle front, but we
were fast reaching the Ultima Thule of our resources in the rear.
Attached to the Indian Corps was Captain P. J. G. Pipon of the Indian
Civil Service. He had volunteered for active service and in addition to
his military duties did much work of a political nature. His assistance
in all matters connected with religion, interior economy, etc., always
proved most valuable, and his inquiries at Marseilles unearthed many
details which make strange reading. He received the Military Cross and
C.I.E. for his services in the war. My Indian A.D.C., Risaldar Khwaja
Mahomed Khan, I.D.S.M., accompanied him on one occasion, and then, as
always, rendered invaluable service. Of course in the doing of this he
made many enemies, and those who understand the East will know what this
means. His loyalty and zeal deserve strong recognition, and I feel
certain that should the Viceroy or Commander-in-Chief ever hear of these
remarks they would not fail to inquire, and would assuredly see that
this distinguished Indian officer was honoured by those who owe him a
debt of gratitude. Captain E. B. Howell (I.C.S.), Censor with the Indian
troops, rendered valuable service and received a C.I.E.
In March 1915 I had recommended to G.H.Q. that wounded Indians should
not be sent back to the front, and the Adjutant-General had issued
orders to this effect. They still continued, however, to be sent, and in
May the G.O.C. First Army himself made similar recommendations, to which
the A.G. replied that only those who volunteered would be returned. It
was a great mistake keeping wounded men at Marseilles. They did little
good and much harm, and they should either have been kept in England or
returned to India. It was folly to mix them up with fresh drafts, who
were not cheered on first arrival by meeting a lot of bandaged men. The
Indian is not built that way.
However, it was eventually decided that all recovered wounded, as well
as sick, should as soon as pronounced fit be sent back to the front. On
this I made fresh recommendations for forming a working battalion behind
our lines, which could be utilised, at any rate for military working
parties. This project had taken shape before I left France. It was
indeed the only way out of the difficulty, and served as a means of
partially clearing that focus of discontent, Marseilles.
On 2nd July I attended the regimental sports of the 4th Cavalry. A big
French crowd had gathered, and the proceedings recalled many happy days
in India. The tent-pegging was quite good, and the jumping showed that
the horses were in good fettle and well trained.
The 4th Cavalry, the Divisional Cavalry Regiment of the Meerut Division,
was originally raised in 1838 as the “Cavalry Regiment of the Oudh
Auxiliary Force,” and received its present title in 1904. It was granted
an honorary standard for service in Scinde in 1844, and served in
Afghanistan (1879–80).
On 8th July Lord Kitchener visited us. He told me the Indians were to
have a rest and also said very decidedly that he meant to keep them in
France to the end of the war. He informed me that they would be formed
into ONE Division, and not kept as two, which was the opposite of what
he had sturdily maintained when I last saw him, so I presume the
pressure brought to bear on him had been too much even for his
determination. The G.O.C. First Army also informed me that the Indians
were to have three weeks’ rest, and that the British battalions were to
be formed into two Brigades and have a third added whilst the Indians’
rest lasted. By the 16th July this reorganisation had been completed,
but was of short duration, as only a week later we were again ordered to
change our front, and 3000 rifles of those in rest were sent to the
Lahore Division, which had been detailed to hold the line whilst all the
Indian units had been temporarily turned into the Meerut Division. Lord
Kitchener on this visit was in peculiarly happy vein and made light of
all his difficulties.
On 11th July the pipers of the 40th Pathans played in the square of the
village where our Headquarters was located and a large crowd of French
people gathered to listen. It was a very cheerful sight, and an old
Frenchman who was bent double came up to me and said, “Your Indians are
just like the British, you are a wonderful race of people.”
My own old battalion, the 1st Leinsters, was at this time quartered at
Armentières not far from us, and I went over to see them. Unfortunately
I had selected the 14th July for my visit, not remembering that it was a
great date in France, and that, in consequence, the Boches would
certainly select it as a special day of hate. Before I reached the town
this was forcibly brought home to me by the heavy shelling it was being
subjected to. However, I had fixed an hour and I knew the battalion
would be on parade waiting for me, shells or no shells. With some
difficulty I wended my way in a motor-car by back streets full of
debris, and arrived in time. I carried out a formal inspection while the
big shells were falling in the Square quite close by; but the men were
in high spirits, and I believe had a shell burst in our midst, not a
Leinster would have budged even to pick up his comrade. I could not but
compare it with the very last occasion on which I had met my old Corps
in India and had the high honour of presenting it with new colours, a
distinction that does not often fall to the lot of an ordinary officer.
We had lunch to the accompaniment of a chorus of projectiles, and I left
after the Hun had poured out the vials of his wrath. The Irishmen looked
grand. Would that we could enrol many Army Corps of such fine soldiers.
On 18th July Sir John Hewett, late Lieutenant-Governor of the United
Provinces of Agra and Oudh, paid us a visit. He came on duty in
connection with the “Indian Soldiers’ Fund,” for which he had done so
much and which I have written of elsewhere. Sir John was one of the
greatest of modern India’s Proconsuls—a man full of saving common sense,
strong in character, quick in decision, just in dealing, such an one, in
fact, as Indians respect and love, and his visit was much appreciated by
us.
Towards the end of July we received a very fine draft of 900 men from
India. I saw them on parade and was very pleased with their physique and
general appearance. They were nearly all highly trained and keen to see
fighting, and I saw that the authorities had at last begun to realise
that what we needed were soldiers and not useless reservists.
Hudson, by this time promoted Major-General, my Chief of Staff, left us
to command the Eighth British Division. I was truly sorry to lose so
excellent a Staff officer and so good a friend. His knowledge and advice
had been invaluable from the day we landed in France. Captain Langhorne,
R.A., also rejoined his own Army, and I felt his loss much. Hudson was
succeeded by Brigadier-General Charles, R.E., and Captain Forbes, 57th
Rifles, relieved Langhorne.
It is of interest to record that at the beginning of July the casualties
of the Indian Corps had reached a total of over 26,000, exclusive of
nearly 500 other deaths among the Indians.
CHAPTER XXIII
During July very few interesting events had occurred in the Corps, and
although there is nothing spectacular to record, it was just such
incidents that kept up the spirits of the men and gave opportunities for
individual distinction combined with very useful work. Of such was a
reconnaissance made by Captain Roe, 4th Gurkhas. Starting by daylight,
this gallant officer, accompanied by Lieut. C. C. Manson of the Indian
Army Reserve of Officers attached to the battalion, and his acting
Subadar-Major, Senbir Gurung, spent five hours reconnoitring the enemy
trenches from “No Man’s Land.” In the doing of this they all ran very
considerable risks, but certain information was much needed and they did
not hesitate to run every risk to gain it. I will not go into the
details: suffice it to say they not only discovered and sketched many
German traps, trenches fitted with armoured loopholes, dummy
machine-guns, barricades, and other unpleasant accessories of trench
warfare, but killed a German officer and another man, and returned with
their information and a useful sketch.
Not content with this the same trio, accompanied now by eighteen
N.C.O.’s and men, sallied out on 4th July and in three groups repeated
the performance on a larger scale. Covering parties were told off and
other necessary preparations made. Roe and his group were subjected to a
sharp bombing which temporarily knocked them out, but quickly regaining
their feet they outmatched the Huns in the bombing game, killing five of
them. Senbir was very severely wounded, but refused to be moved and
continued to exercise his command. Manson here got his chance, and with
his covering party just caught the Germans at the moment they were
gaining a decided advantage. They were utterly surprised and as they
very hurriedly retired a fortunate shell from one of our field batteries
which was assisting the operation burst over them. This ended all
opposition and the grand little Gurkhas returned full of themselves.
Roe received the D.S.O., Manson the Military Cross, and Senbir Gurung
the Indian Order of Merit. Others who were awarded the I.D.S.M. will be
found in the Appendix.
The Bishop of Nagpore visited us towards the end of July and accompanied
me to several of our advanced posts and batteries. He gave us a very
impressive service in the French schoolroom of the town, and we were
glad indeed to have had one of our Indian Bishops in our midst. In this
Corps we of course had less Christian chaplains than was naturally the
case with others, but those we had have left a splendid record of
devotion and will ever be remembered by all who served with them.
Witness one name alone, Ronald Irwin, Indian Ecclesiastical Department,
Chaplain of the Leicesters, who during the war won the D.S.O. and M.C.
with bar.
I had a very pleasant duty to perform during July when on comparing
statistics of all Brigades in the Corps I was able to report to First
Army that for the two previous months the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the
Connaught Rangers, who as I said before had been amalgamated into one
unit, had not a single court-martial, and showed the lowest average of
sick (1·37) amongst the British troops of the original Army Corps. All
of these battalions could not be beaten in the Army, but it always
rejoices me to see Irishmen setting the example, and they generally will
set it if they are taken in the right way.
Sir John French, with that soldierly instinct he possesses in so high a
degree, at once directed that an expression of his appreciation of the
efforts of the C.O. and all other ranks of the Connaughts to raise the
Corps to such a high state of discipline was to be conveyed to the
battalion.
[Illustration]
[Illustration]
Major-General Lambton, the Military Secretary at G.H.Q., had a difficult
task. Considering the numerous details he had to deal with and the
difficulty of following the ramifications of promotions and rewards in
the Indian Corps, it was wonderful how successfully he managed. His
fairness in apportioning them, and his desire to do justice to the
Indians, were very apparent. In comparing the awards with those of other
Indian Expeditionary forces, up to the time I left France, I think we
perhaps suffered in proportion to our numbers and the conditions we
lived in. There can be no question as to which force of Indians had the
hardest task and the most trying conditions to contend with during the
first months of the war, but the number of rewards for Indians were in
some cases less than their more fortunate comrades received in other
theatres. Writing of rewards I may add that Lieut.-General Sir Charles
Anderson, who commanded the Meerut Division for eleven months and
succeeded me in command of the Indian Corps, was perhaps the only Corps
Commander who never received a French decoration. He later commanded a
British Army Corps for many months, but he is still without anything to
show that he served in France.
Lieut.-Colonel S. Barry of the Northamptonshire Regiment, A.D.C. to the
Commander-in-Chief, was an officer who invariably exercised a tact that
made visits to G.H.Q. a pleasure whenever he was on duty.
General Macready, Adjutant-General, G.H.Q., was always most anxious to
help the Indian Corps, and we owe him a debt of gratitude for many
actions taken by him to keep our house in order.
It will interest those who sympathise with the complications of this
command to glance at the accompanying short extract from our “Summary of
News,” 1st to 5th June 1915. It was taken haphazard from many in my
possession. In order to convey to the Indians some idea of what was
going on in all theatres of war it was of course necessary to publish
such news in their own language. This meant, first, translation of the
ordinary summary issued to the Army into Hindustani, and then the local
presentation of it in the Persian and the Hindi character. It was all
done rapidly and regularly, with a result that the sepoy in the trenches
was enabled to learn frequently what his comrades and the Allied Armies
were doing. Without it he would have known nothing of either.
_Summary of News, 1st June to 5th June 1915._
WESTERN THEATRE
_British Front._—The British troops have captured the Château of
Hooge, about 2–1/2 miles from Ypres on the Menin road.
On the night of the 4th-5th June the British on the right of the
Indian Corps captured forty-eight German prisoners of the 56th
Regiment, Seventh Corps. These are mostly men between thirty-five and
forty years of age, who have only recently been called up for service.
From their statements it appears that in this neighbourhood the enemy
has at present no apparatus for asphyxiating gas.
_French Front._—The French continue to advance near Notre Dame de
Lorette and Souchez, fifteen to twenty miles south of the Indian
Corps. On the 31st May they captured the front German trenches of the
large work known as the “Labyrinth,” taking four officers and 146 men.
The “Labyrinth” was composed of subterranean chambers believed by the
enemy to be impregnable. The French also captured the Souchez Sugar
Factory, a large and strongly defended building. During the night the
Germans recaptured it, but were driven out again by our Allies at
daybreak on the 1st June. During this battle the French captured over
800 prisoners, including nine officers, fifty N.C.O.’s and two
machine-guns. They are now in firm possession of the building and of
the trenches all round it.
The following particulars of the results of the fighting in this
neighbourhood are issued officially by the French authorities:
“Between the 9th May and 1st June 3100 German prisoners, including
sixty-four officers, were captured, and 2600 German corpses buried,
all by one French Division.” This probably represents a loss of at
least 10,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners. “The losses of this
French Division were about 3200 in all, of which two-thirds were only
slightly wounded.” Ends.
A month before I left France Lieutenant E. Bullard, of the Indian Postal
Service, attached to the Corps, was killed by a shell whilst in his
motor-car on duty well behind the advanced posts. Poor lad, he had done
excellent service, and this will readily be understood when it is
remembered that he was responsible for the distribution of letters,
packages, post cards, and a hundred forms of correspondence and gifts
written in innumerable dialects or wrapped in the most impossible
covers, and despatched in a manner that no Westerner can conceive.
Notwithstanding this, like other exceptional matters, there was always
an officer ready and capable of carrying them out. Indian training in
this respect is difficult to beat.
[Illustration: TRENCHES. INDIAN CORPS. 27–8–1915.]
During August a company of Bhutias from the Darjeeling district of
Bengal joined us for ambulance work. Great Britain was indeed gathering
her hosts from all parts of the world. I inspected them and never
remember to have seen a more cheery detachment. They were accommodated
in tents and plainly showed that they had come to enjoy the show, for
they had no hesitation in calling the war a regular _tamasha_ (sport,
fun). They changed their mind as to the _tamasha_ part of it, but were
always in good spirits.
The 12th August was a proud day for me, for I had the honour of
receiving from His Majesty’s hands the G.C.M.G. he had been pleased to
confer on me, and at the same time my son in the Black Watch was
honoured by receiving the Military Cross. The King was kind enough to
tell the boy that he was glad to see both father and son together, and
after the Investiture I was summoned to an interview, when His Majesty
told me he had heard good reports of the Corps and directed me to convey
to the officers, N.C.O.’s, and men his good wishes. Of course this was
speedily done, and little did I then realise that only three weeks later
I was to leave my beloved Army Corps and field service for ever.
I again saw Lord Kitchener and he asked me if I had any objection to
releasing a thousand Gurkhas from the Corps for service in Gallipoli. He
wished four companies to be taken from four different battalions, but I
suggested one whole battalion being sent and made up to a thousand rank
and file. He agreed to this and I selected the 4th Gurkhas. It was a
blow losing them, but necessity demanded it, I suppose.
Only a week later Lord Kitchener again visited us in France and saw all
Corps Commanders of the First Army at St. Venant. On this occasion he
informed me that it had been suggested to him to relieve the Indians,
but he was determined they should stay on in France, and he said he was
arranging reliefs of units.
For few perhaps in the British Forces in France has the 3rd September
1915 any special significance, but for me, without any kind of immediate
warning, it was the last day of soldiering. For thirty-seven years the
thought of suddenly ending my career had never entered my head, and I
still hoped that if my Corps could be transferred to Egypt, Mesopotamia,
or anywhere from France, I should have the satisfaction of seeing the
war through. If we remained on in France, I knew it was only a matter of
time when I should be forced myself to ask for a move. However, we were
on the eve of the great attack at Loos; the Indian Corps was in as good
fettle as was then possible; every kind of preparation was in process of
completion for the attack; and as far as I was concerned there was no
immediate reason for any foreboding of evil. We had just received some
excellent drafts from India and everything seemed to be going well.
But it is the unexpected that often happens in war, and in justice to
myself and the Indians then in France, I say plainly that at a time of
comparatively profound calm on the battle front, I was for very good
reasons obliged to suggest to the G.O.C. First Army that as my services
apparently no longer met with his approval I considered it best for the
Army that I might be relieved of my command.
The war is over, I am only one humble individual, my staying or leaving
could have no bearing on events, but justice is a thing we expect in our
Army.
On the 2nd September 1915, with my old and valued friend, Colonel Sir
Frederick Lugard, Governor-General of Nigeria, who was home on leave and
paying a short visit to France, I went round almost the whole of our
front trenches. It was a murky day and nothing beyond the usual shelling
and firing was happening, but the Indians were glad to see me, as usual.
One section was held by Pathans, and some of them were singing to a
_sitar_ (guitar). My knowledge of Pashtu is limited, but I had years ago
learned their favourite song, “Zakhmi Dil” (The Wounded Heart), so I
joined in and gave them a verse. Men from other parts of the trenches
came running over, and presently to dance and music we were having an
improvised concert. I did not know it was to be my last with my brave
comrades of many campaigns.
After a long day’s tramp, and having personally inspected the various
new trench positions for guns which were to be brought up to the very
front, etc., we got home late, and for some reason I was in particularly
good spirits. Loos was about to be fought, and the Indian Corps had been
detailed to make a subsidiary attack from near Mauquissart and we had
been preparing everything for many days.
Early on the 3rd September there was a conference of the First Army at
Hinges Château; it was the first Headquarters I had been in when I took
over our front in October 1914, and I found myself back in the old
familiar room and seated at the same spot where we had begun our great
adventure. How much had passed since those early days; how few of my old
comrades of the Staff, or indeed of any kind, still remained with us!
My thoughts could interest nobody but myself, but to me as I look back
they were the last I should ever reflect, as a fighting soldier; for
within an hour I was no longer Commander of the Indian Corps. Discipline
is the marrow of an army; silence, when it is imperative that one should
uphold the authority which the King has placed over us, is sometimes
hard to endure.
An hour later, on my way back to my Headquarters, I told my Staff
officer that I had seen the Army Commander and my end had come. He was
not surprised; who that was present could be? Only twenty days
previously I had had the honour of receiving the G.C.M.G. at the hands
of His Majesty, and had been summoned afterwards to his presence, as I
have already told, when he graciously congratulated me and praised the
work of the Indian Corps, and within three weeks I was forced to leave
the Corps in which I had served with a loyalty that no man could exceed.
_Nemo repente fit turpissimus._
I had gone to the Conference in high spirits; I was leaving it, little
caring whither I went. I should have to depart before even I could shake
the hand of many brave Indians, officers and men, my lifelong friends. I
felt I must perforce go without saying a word, lest any spark of
ill-feeling should be revealed. The enemy was before us; individuals had
to go under, rightly or wrongly, but, above all, no Indian soldier
should know from me that his commander was leaving for such a reason.
They would, of course, not understand it, and so I knew the bitter pill
must be swallowed. I had long foreseen what must come; that it came with
a greater suddenness than even I had imagined possible is another story.
In my Diary under 5th September I find:
This day last year I was appointed to command the Indian Corps and the
self-same day a year later I got my orders to go. The only order in
fact I have received is, that I may proceed on leave, and that was
given me verbally by the Military Secretary. It is war time and so I
must hold my peace for the foe is at the gates, but if this is justice
then chivalry has indeed departed.
From that day to this I have never received any orders. ARGUMENTUM
BACULINUM.
Even the India Office was not informed, and my own intimation some days
later, that I had left, was the first they heard of the fact. Would this
have been possible in any other Army Corps?
Lord Kitchener saw me on 16th September, or ten days after my return,
and informed me that he had heard verbally, but had no official report
and had telegraphed for it.
I was the third senior officer in France; what must have been the fate
of many junior to me?
Had Lord Kitchener lived, I think I may safely say I should not have
been cast on the scrap-heap; with his death vanished the last hope of
re-employment in the war, and what other employment was worth having?
I have a sufficient sense of discipline to refrain from further probing
this story. I am still on the “Active List” of the Army and it is my
duty to hold my peace; but I retain the right to tell my own tale when I
am no longer employed, and I shall then do so. Even had I been totally
deficient in “initiative and tactical skill,” there are ways of doing
things. I had during my thirty-seven years’ soldiering served in
fourteen campaigns; had received the Freedom of the City of London and a
sword of honour, and the unique distinction of being mentioned by name
in King Edward’s first Speech from the Throne. Had I not the right to
expect ordinary courtesy?—but I belonged to the Indian Corps!—that
explains much.
The story of my own share in the work of the Corps in France is
finished. I have endeavoured faithfully to record, to the best of my
ability, the brave doings of brave men, British and Indian. I have tried
to repay in some small measure the heavy debt I owe to them, but
especially to the soldiers of India, my faithful friends and comrades in
many campaigns, through whose loyalty, courage, and devotion I have
risen from Subaltern to General. The memories of the long years spent in
India are, at least, a possession of which I cannot be deprived.
Ille terrarum mihi praeter omnes angulus ridet.
The following numbers of casualties, up to within a week of the date I
left France, will give some idea of the part played by the Army Corps in
the fighting and of the debt which England owes to her own sons and
brothers from overseas; but still more to those chivalrous men,
Mahomedans and Hindus, for they came from a sense of loyalty to their
King-Emperor alone, although they had no personal bias in the quarrel,
except to uphold Great Britain’s righteous cause.
British officers 850
„ other ranks 10,300
Indian officers 420
„ other ranks 17,230
——————
Total 28,800
CHAPTER XXIV
My own part in the Great War ended early in September 1915, and the
share taken by the Indian Corps as part of the Army which attacked at
and north of Loos (prior to its final departure from France) can only be
told as I have gathered it from records and letters received by me; but
my information is derived from the most authentic sources and may be
taken as absolutely correct. I should not consider this book complete
without giving in some detail an account of the last, but by no means
the least, of the fights waged by the Indians in Flanders. More
especially do I deem it an honour to do this, as the command had
devolved, on my own recommendation, on my friend, Lieut.-General Sir
Charles Anderson, K.C.B., one of the most earnest fighting soldiers.
Moreover, certain Indian battalions took part in it which had joined
just prior to, or immediately after, my departure. Like every other unit
of the Corps, I had known and served with them in India, and it is a
source of pleasure to record, as far as I can in a bald statement of
facts, the part they played in the closing scenes of the drama of the
soldiers of Hindustan. I had been partly instrumental in making the
preliminary preparations for this battle, and therefore am in a position
to understand thoroughly what occurred.
The events as they actually took place have convinced those who knew
what was being done that the task assigned to the Indian Corps was,
under the circumstances, a hopeless one, unless the wind and weather
were both favourable for the use of gas, of which we understood but
little at that time.
I had originally selected as the objective of the Corps the very same
front it finally attacked, and had laid my plans before the Army
Commander. A German deserter had, however, come in and stated that his
own side was preparing a gas attack on the self-same front, and I had
been ordered to select another portion of the German line on which to
direct our assault. Later, a heavy fire had been kept up to detect if
possible whether there was any collection of gas cylinders or apparatus
in the vicinity; the deserter’s report had been found to be untrue and I
had been ordered to hold to my original plan again; but as the operation
depended mainly on the successful use of gas, I had made certain
suggestions in case of a failure of cylinders, or an ill turn of luck in
wind and weather at the last moment.
Those who may read this story will at least see that my ideas were not
only not groundless, but that, as I had deemed possible, the supply of
gas was eventually merely a trifle of what had been planned—160
cylinders instead of the 1100 calculated—and of the 160 in the trenches
only 30 could be discharged before the wind veered. The gas, moreover,
had no effect on the enemy, as was proved after our first advance,
whilst it very seriously hampered our own troops.
The end of a year of trench warfare, and the deterioration of Indian
units as compared with our original battalions, was not the time to call
on them to carry out such an attack, unless they were to be amply
supported by guns, and of these I was very short. Given these and
favourable conditions for the use of gas, much might have been done
which the shortage of the former and handicap (as it turned out) of the
latter made an impossible task. It is true that the push was only a
subsidiary one, and designed to hold the enemy in its front and thus
prevent him from sending assistance farther south; but distinct
objectives had been assigned; and, even so, there is reason in all
things, and in my opinion, as originally designed and as we were
supposed to carry it out, there was not the slightest chance of our
gaining our objective or retaining it if gained, whilst there was the
certainty of very heavy losses amongst men who had already cheerfully
made immense sacrifices for Great Britain.
I will not enter into the operations of the British Army as a whole;
suffice it to say that the First Army assumed the offensive on September
the 25th, and the orders for the attack of the Indian Corps, amongst
others, were based on the following instructions:
The Army Corps south of the La Bassée Canal were to advance eastward
to the line Pont-à-Vendin-Bauvin. The Corps north of the Canal were to
engage the enemy vigorously and to prevent him from withdrawing troops
for a counter-attack. Wherever the enemy gave ground he was to be
followed up with the greatest energy.
The Second Division was to assault the enemy’s trenches at Givenchy
and to attack Canteleux; the Third Corps to assault the enemy’s line
near Bridoux with a view to eventually effecting a junction on the
Aubers Ridge with the Indian Corps.
The Indian Corps was to capture the enemy’s trenches in the vicinity
of the Moulin du Piètre and to take advantage of any weakening of the
enemy on its front, so as to secure the high ground about Haut
Pommereau and La Cliqueterie Ferme. The attack was to be made by the
Meerut Division, then commanded by Major-General Jacob, promoted from
Brigadier Dehra Dun Brigade. The first objective was to secure and
consolidate a line of a road which ran through Mauquissart to an enemy
salient. Every opportunity was to be seized of pushing farther forward
to gain the high ground about La Cliqueterie Ferme.
Detailed orders were also issued for the Lahore and Nineteenth
Divisions.
In the event of the enemy showing signs of weakening, the Lahore
Division was to attack and capture the Bois du Biez. Similarly, the
Nineteenth Division was to be prepared to extend any success gained by
the Second Division by advancing against the southern end of the Rue
d’Ouvert. The Artillery bombardment was ordered to commence on
September 21st, and continue day and night under instructions issued.
If the wind was favourable the attacks of the Second Division and of
the Meerut Division were to be preceded by gas and smoke. The Lahore
and Nineteenth Divisions were to assist with smoke barrages.
The Lahore Division was directed to put up a smoke barrage on the
southern flank of the Meerut Division.
The Meerut Division was to arrange a similar barrage on its northern
flank.
A mine was to be exploded under a designated enemy salient two minutes
before gas was turned on.
The attack was to be preceded by a four days’ deliberate bombardment
by the Meerut Divisional Artillery, reinforced by No. 4 Group, H.A.R.,
one Brigade R.F.A., from Lahore Division, one 3-pr. Hotchkiss gun on
trailer, and an armoured train. The assault was to be supported by the
above Artillery, and was to be carried out by the Garhwal Brigade on
the right, with the Bareilly Brigade on the left; the Dehra Dun
Brigade in Divisional reserve.
The troops were to be formed up by midnight 24th-25th September.
_Garhwal Brigade._—Three assaulting battalions (3rd Gurkha Rifles on
the right, Leicesters in the centre, and 8th Gurkha Rifles on the
left) from Sunken Street to sixty yards north of South Moated
Grange Street.
One battalion (1/3rd Londons) on the front line from Duck’s Bill
to Sunken Street.
Garhwal Rifles in the Home Counties Trench.
_Bareilly Brigade._—Three assaulting battalions (1/4th Black Watch
on the right, 69th Punjabis in the centre, and 2nd Black Watch on
the left) from sixty yards north of South Moated Grange Street to
Winchester Street.
The 33rd Punjabis were in the Home Counties Trench, etc.
The 58th Rifles were in Tilleloy trench.
_Dehra Dun Brigade._—In Divisional reserve.
One battalion (2nd Gurkha Rifles) south of Moated Grange Street.
The 1st Seaforths north of Moated Grange Street.
1/4th Seaforths in Rouge Croix East Post, etc.
The 9th Gurkhas in Min and Rugby Posts and in Bacquerot Street.
The 93rd Burma Infantry in Carter’s Post.
Owing to the uncertainty whether atmospheric conditions would admit of
gas being used, two programmes for the assault were drawn up.
_Programme “A.”_—To be followed if gas and smoke were to be employed.
_Programme “B.”_—To be followed if gas and smoke were not to be
employed.
In both programmes the first objective of all assaulting battalions
was the enemy’s front and support lines.
As soon as the assault began, troops were to move up to replace those
who had gone forward, the Divisional reserve going to Home Counties
Trench, etc. This reserve was not to move farther forward without the
orders of the Division.
Three companies 34th Pioneers and half of the 20th Company Sappers and
Miners were placed at the disposal of Meerut Division for the first
day of the operations.
Our wire entanglement was cleared by the assaulting Brigades during
the days prior to the attack, the outer fringe being left till the
night of the 24th-25th September.
Each man of the attacking Infantry carried two sandbags and two gas
helmets.
The Lahore Division on the right and the Twentieth British Division on
the left were to cover the flanks of our advance by fire, and after
the front trenches were taken these Divisions were to send troops to
hold the trenches opposite their respective fronts, and so protect our
flanks in the advance beyond the German support line.
The deliberate Artillery bombardment commenced on the 21st September,
and the results proved generally satisfactory. By the evening of the
24th the enemy’s wire entanglements in front of their front line were
reported to have been cut, with the exceptions where this could not be
done owing to trees. This bombardment was accompanied by rifle,
rifle-grenade, machine-gun, and trench-mortar fire from the front line,
and by indirect machine-gun fire from points in rear of the front line.
This fire was kept up day and night in order to prevent the enemy
effecting any repairs. There was not much retaliation on the part of the
Germans during the period of bombardment, and what there was did little
damage and caused few casualties.
Special instructions were issued to the Dehra Dun Brigade, which was in
Divisional reserve. The object aimed at was to ensure this Brigade being
concentrated and ready to move quickly in any direction required.
From 6 P.M., 23rd September, when the Brigades commenced to move to
their positions of assembly, the weather became wet and inclement. This
made the trenches difficult, and by the evening of the 25th September a
foot of water was standing in many of them.
Part of the Brigades got into position during the day of the 24th. The
smoke and gas detachments were in their places by 6 P.M., and all troops
were in their positions of assembly before midnight.
At 10.15 P.M. orders were received by the Meerut Division that Programme
“A” was to be followed, _i.e._ the employment of gas and smoke.
During the night the wind was changeable, veering round from south to
south-west.
About 4.40 A.M., 25th September, an enemy bomb burst in the Duck’s Bill,
smashing two gas cylinders, and the officer in charge of the operations
there and several of his detachment were gassed. A considerable number
of men of the 1/3rd Londons, who formed the garrison of the Duck’s Bill,
were also incapacitated.
The mine exploded to time, and it was ascertained later that the crater
formed was 92 feet across. The charge was one ton of gun-cotton.
At 5.50 A.M. the gas should have commenced, but at that hour it was
practically calm, and what wind there was made it unsafe to let it off
in certain bays. In these bays the men of the detachments, on their own
initiative, did not turn it on. Soon after the first cocks were turned
on, a gust of wind from the south-east turned the gas into our own
trenches. All gas was immediately turned off, the detachments doing this
on their own initiative, but considerable quantities entered our own
trenches and caused many casualties in the 2nd Black Watch on the
leeward of our front.
The intensive bombardment commenced at 5.50 A.M. and was satisfactory,
the field guns and the Hotchkiss gun in the front parapet participating.
The Infantry began to cross the parapet just before the assault, under
cover of the smoke and of the Artillery bombardment, the Artillery
lifting 100 yards and increasing their rate of fire, so as to conceal
the increase of range and prevent the enemy realising that the assault
was about to commence. This, combined with the smoke, had the desired
effect, as the enemy was not expecting the assault at the moment it was
delivered, and there was practically no hostile fire while the
assaulting troops crossed the ground between the two front lines.
At 6 A.M. the assault commenced. Dense clouds of smoke, the result of
the barrage on the right or south flank, travelling in a north-easterly
direction made observation difficult, and caused some confusion and
mistakes in direction. The Garhwal Brigade got up to the German wire,
which was found to be impassable opposite the 3rd Gurkha Rifles and the
right of the Leicesters. There the lanes cut by our Artillery had been
filled up during the night with rolls of French wire. This stopped the
assault sufficiently to give the enemy time to man his parapets and
prevent these troops making good the attack. The left of the Leicesters
and the 2/8th Gurkhas, however, found the wire destroyed and penetrated
into the enemy’s line.
In front of the Bareilly Brigade the wire had been destroyed by our
Artillery and all three battalions got into the enemy’s trenches with
slight opposition. On the left, the Black Watch had to go through our
own gas, which the wind had not been strong enough to disperse, and
suffered more casualties. This battalion was not free from the vapour
until it got into the enemy’s lines. The smoke clouds, which the
calmness and dampness of the day had turned into thick fog, prevented
observation and hid guiding landmarks, and considerable intermingling of
units occurred after the assault. Communication also was difficult, as
the lines laid in advance of our front parapet by the assaulting
Infantry and the R.A. officers accompanying them were continually being
cut. This was especially the case with the Infantry communications, and
the earliest information was obtained from Artillery Observation
officers, which proved generally reliable.
Writing as I am for the first time of a battle when I was not in command
of my Corps, I am tempted to describe from reports the gallantry of
units and individuals well known to me, but I will refrain, and refer
the reader to that interesting book, _The Indian Corps in France_,
wherein he will find recorded the deeds of officers and men who on this
day, although unsuccessful in completing the impossible task assigned to
them, added brilliant pages to their regimental records.
The names of such officers as Colonel Brakspear, Lieutenants
Bagot-Chester, Tyson, and Wood, of the 2/3rd Gurkhas, form a roll of
honour not to be forgotten, and greatest of all in that fine battalion
stands out Rifleman Kulbir Thapa, who on this day added the fifth and
last Victoria Cross won in France by the men from Hindustan.
Palmam qui meruit ferat.
And what of the 8th Gurkhas who had begun the war on that bleak 30th day
of October 1914 before Festubert? The old battalion had practically
disappeared, but although no longer the Corps that had suffered so
terribly in those early days, it was determined to leave its mark deep
cut on the soil of Flanders. Colonel Morris, the C.O., already severely
wounded nearly a year previously, paid with his life. Add to his the
names of Lieutenant Ryall of his own battalion and of the following
attached officers: Lieutenants Taylor (1st Brahmins), Inglis, and
Meldrum, of the Indian Army Reserve of officers, all of whom were
killed, as well as four others wounded and eight Indian officers and 460
rank and file killed, wounded, and missing, and one may well pronounce
that the 8th Gurkhas indeed did their duty and found their Valhalla.
I had left France; I knew of the “mentions in despatches,” but I
searched in vain for any rewards given to the British officers of this
and many other Indian battalions who fought round Mauquissart on that
day.
The 2nd Leicesters, as they had ever done, fought with the stubborn
pride of race they had so often displayed; no need to say more. Over
seventy were killed, including Captain Romilly, of whom I told at Neuve
Chapelle, and Lieutenant Browne. Here, too, fell a good soldier, of that
brave but merciful band the Royal Army Medical Corps, Captain Deane,
attached for duty. He had already earned the Military Cross, and died as
he had lived, “going about doing good.” I hope I shall not be accused of
aiding our next enemy when I give them my advice, viz. “Keep out of the
way of the Leicesters.”
Second Lieutenant Gedge of the 3rd Londons, one of the battalions in
Brigade reserve, was killed. Another of these units, the Garhwal Rifles,
had seventy casualties. The Garhwalis had established a grand
reputation, but were by this time unrecognisable in their old form, and
in finally passing out of this record I can say without fear of
contradiction that they left a name which will be held in high esteem by
all who ever knew them in France, and not least by the Germans. The last
name mentioned to me after the Indians had left France was that of
Lieutenant Rama Jodha Jang, who behaved right well on this day and was
awarded the Military Cross.
By 6.30 A.M. our Infantry were reported to have penetrated into the
enemy’s position as far as the support line all along the front
attacked; the Germans were reported to be surrendering freely, and there
was little hostile Infantry or Artillery fire.
Shortly after, the Twentieth British Division informed Meerut Division
that the Sixtieth Brigade had been ordered to advance at once to protect
the left flank of the Indian attack.
From all indications it appeared now as if we had captured the German
front and support trenches along the whole of the front attacked, and
that the left of the Bareilly Brigade was pushing forward towards the
German second line, but subsequently it was found that the situation was
actually as follows:
On the right the Garhwal Brigade was held up by wire, but the 8th
Gurkhas and one company Leicesters on the left had penetrated the German
position.
Of the Bareilly Brigade, the 1/4th Black Watch had gone through the
enemy’s front system and had moved forward considerably beyond the line
assigned to them as their first objective, and were digging themselves
in opposite the enemy second line. The 69th Punjabis were pressing
forward mixed up with the 58th Rifles and the 2nd Black Watch. One
company, together with one from each of the 58th Rifles and 33rd
Punjabis, were consolidating the position gained. The Black Watch, less
two companies, which were blocking the trenches to the north, were
advancing against the German second line of trenches, about the Moulin
du Piètre. The 58th Rifles were pressing forward with the Black Watch
and 69th Punjabis. The 33rd Punjabis were in our proper front line. The
Garhwal Rifles had been delayed in their advance to our front line owing
to congestion in the trenches, caused principally by the number of men
suffering from the effects of our gas, and were still in their original
position. Lastly, the Dehra Dun Brigade had commenced to concentrate
forward.
The enemy’s guns were active at this hour, and there was much
intermixture of units, loss of direction, and confusion.
The consolidation of the captured trenches was not sufficiently
considered, in the anxiety of all ranks to take advantage of the
weakness of the opposition where we had penetrated the position. The
Bareilly Brigade had passed over its first objective, and the flanks
were dangerously exposed, especially as the attack of the Garhwal
Brigade on its right had been held up. The natural anxiety to press our
advantage led the 58th Rifles to advance on its own initiative, but I
will later on more fully refer to this incident.
By 8 A.M. the Divisional Commander had learned that the Garhwal Brigade
had been unable to enter the enemy’s front trenches, and the following
was the situation:
In this Brigade there was no correct information of the 3rd Gurkhas. The
Leicesters were held up by wire, but one company had penetrated the
German line and half of the 8th Gurkhas were in the German trenches. The
other half had lost direction and were intermingled with the right of
the Bareilly Brigade.
The Bareilly Brigade was making rapid progress. The 69th Punjabis and
4th Black Watch had taken the German first-line and support trenches. On
the left of the attack the 2nd Black Watch had passed all the advanced
trenches and were moving on the Moulin du Piètre. In support of this
battalion the 58th Rifles were also moving forward. In fact, the entire
Brigade had advanced so rapidly that their position was not fully
realised. Unfortunately, the captured support line was not consolidated,
owing to the companies detailed for this work having joined in the
general advance and left the work uncompleted. Except in officers,
however, the casualties so far had not been heavy.
Shortly after this hour it was reported that the enemy was massing in
front of the Black Watch, and our guns were immediately turned on to the
Moulin du Piètre. At the same time two companies of the 33rd Punjabis
were moved forward to support the 69th Punjabis, and six machine-guns
were sent to support the Black Watch and 58th Rifles in the mine
salient.
At 8.15 A.M. this same day, 25th September, the Dehra Dun Brigade was
ordered to move up one battalion in close support of the Garhwal
Brigade. This battalion was to remain under the orders of the Dehra Dun
Brigade.
About 9 A.M. the Corps Commander directed the Dehra Dun Brigade to be
pushed through the gap made in the German line and attack towards the
high ground between Haut Pommereau and La Cliqueterie Ferme. Half an
hour later five field batteries from rearward positions commenced to
move forward to the east of the Rue du Bacquerot, and at the same time
the Bareilly Brigade confirmed the report that the Black Watch and the
58th Rifles had captured portions of the German second line but that the
enemy still held the Moulin du Piètre. Casualties were reported as
slight, and the O.C. 58th Rifles was of opinion that the Haut Pommereau
Ridge could be won if fresh units were pushed through.
By 9 A.M. the Pioneers had commenced work on communication trenches
under considerable machine-gun and rifle fire. Before this work had to
be discontinued about 100 yards of fire trench had been completed. The
party at work on No. 2 trench also suffered considerably from hostile
fire and hand-grenades, but it had completed about 130 yards of
traversed trench before it had to retire. No work was possible on two
other communication trenches; whilst the party on No. 4 trench continued
work till 1.15 P.M. under constant fire.
The Garhwal Rifles could not carry out the fresh attack as planned for
them, as they were unable to get forward out of the communication
trenches, which had become very congested in their neighbourhood.
The general situation of the Bareilly Brigade remained as before. The
few officers left were endeavouring to reorganise the units and to guard
their flanks. On the right flank the 4th Black Watch were being
echeloned back towards the left of the Garhwal Brigade in order to
protect the right flank of the Bareilly Brigade.
Major Wauchope, commanding the 2nd Black Watch, made over to the 12th
Rifle Brigade of the 60th British Brigade on our left the trenches which
the two companies of the Black Watch had been consolidating, and
arranged for the party to extend along a ditch to join up with the 58th
Rifles. The remainder of the Bareilly Brigade gradually collected in the
German second line, where there seem to have been great congestion and
heavy losses, owing to the dense target offered to the enemy. It is
impossible to establish the hour at which these various actions took
place, as most of the officers responsible for them were killed or
wounded.
Captain Hewett of the 41st Dogras, on the Staff of the Bareilly Brigade,
was killed during the fighting. Like nearly every officer of the Indian
Army who served on the Staff in France, he had won his own way by sheer
merit.
But now a change came over the hitherto successful operations. After
mid-day, Artillery Observation officers reported that a good many men
were to be seen coming back, and being rallied in an old German trench;
and by 1 P.M. all our troops had fallen back to their original line.
The enemy’s counter-attacks had developed at about 11.30 A.M. and were
pressed home strongly and methodically against the front and both
flanks. The front was able to hold its ground without difficulty, but on
the flanks the enemy established a decided ascendancy in bombing. On our
right flank the Germans outlasted our various parties with their
grenade-throwing, and successively obtained the mastery of one point
after another. The blocking of the trenches was ineffective after our
supply of bombs was finished, and, although the men made a series of
stands during the retirement, they were unable to maintain any position
for long, as the Germans came bombing up from trenches on either flank.
On our left the Rifle Brigade (British Division) was unable to hold the
“blocks” made by the 2nd Black Watch, as their supply of bombs also ran
short very quickly.
With both flanks turned, the whole of the Bareilly Brigade had to fall
back.
In the rapidity of their advance our troops had not systematically
searched the enemy front-line dug-outs, and a considerable number of
Germans remained in them and fired into the backs of our men, evidently
singling out officers in particular, as the loss in officers was very
heavy.
When it was established that the Bareilly Brigade had fallen back, the
attack by the Dehra Dun Brigade, which was to have been directed against
Haut Pommereau, was cancelled, and that Brigade was ordered to gain
touch with the troops who were believed to be still holding out in the
German trenches. Accordingly, the G.O.C. Bareilly and Dehra Dun Brigades
proceeded to Winchester Road to discover whether the report was true,
and to determine the best line on which the Dehra Dun Brigade should
carry out its advance. One company of the 2nd Gurkhas and two companies
of the Garhwal Rifles which attempted to cross to the German line were
driven back by heavy fire from all parts of that line, and this showed
that the German front line was held in strength, and that none of our
troops were now holding any part of it.
At 4.45 P.M. the G.O.C. Indian Corps issued definite orders cancelling
the attack being organised by the Dehra Dun Brigade. The fighting along
our front practically ceased, and for the last time the Indian Corps had
borne its share in one of the many fierce battles on the Western Front.
As I said before, I am writing this chapter from reports and letters in
my possession, and hence it is not the same thing as describing events
in which one has borne a part, but in many instances the records of
battalions and even individuals have become almost public property, and
of such I feel I may justly give some account.
The 2nd Battalion of the Black Watch was well known to me and had served
under my orders as a Brigadier, Divisional and Army Commander in India
and for a year during the war. I was well acquainted with the Commanding
Officer, Colonel Harvey, who was now in command of the Dehra Dun
Brigade. The actual Commander on this day was Major Wauchope, D.S.O.,
who had served with them for years, and who afterwards commanded a
Brigade in Mesopotamia. Where Wauchope rules all is well, and on the
25th September he and his Highlanders well sustained the name of that
famous corps before Mauquissart.
Many had been disabled at the very commencement of the attack by our own
gas, but the spirit which never acknowledges difficulties permeated all
ranks, and the Royal Highlanders, as they had done from Seringapatam to
Waterloo, and from the Alma to Lucknow and Tel-el-Kebir, sweeping away
all opposition, were almost into the Moulin du Piètre before they
realised that they had not only gained their objective but were far (too
far) beyond it. Not finding the necessary support to enable them to
advance, the Battalion held on to its gains, but eventually had to
retire. Bombed, mangled, and attacked on both flanks they moved back,
but only over the bodies of their comrades did the Huns advance; only
after paying a heavy toll could the enemy regain his ground, and only
after desperate fighting would the Scots quit each yard of trench. It
had to be done, but the name Moulin du Piètre is worthy to be added to
the other twenty-eight borne on the colours which commemorate gallant
deeds performed from Guadeloupe, 1759, to Paardeberg 140 years later.
The losses suffered amounted to 360 killed, wounded, and missing,
including sixteen officers out of the twenty with which the Battalion
went into battle, and of these five were killed, viz. Captain Denison, a
young officer of quite exceptional promise; Lieutenants Sotheby,
Henderson, Balfour-Melville, and MacLeod.
The halo of the 2nd Battalion had also encircled its sister Battalion of
the Brigade, viz. the 4th Black Watch—Territorials to start with, but
veterans in September 1915. I can see the C.O., Lieut.-Colonel Walker,
leading on his men, for this he literally did. Major Tosh was near him
and fell; a sergeant quickly tried to save him, but in vain. The bayonet
avenged his and many other losses, and the 4th Black Watch, like the 2nd
Battalion, looking only forward, pushed on regardless of all but the
Mill before them. Dearly they paid, but the glory they won will
assuredly live when the Moulin du Piètre will remain only a spot marked
on old maps of the Great War. The Commander, Lieut.-Colonel Walker, his
Second in Command, and a young officer, 2nd Lieut. Anderson, were
killed, seventeen other officers were reported as wounded or missing, or
a total of twenty out of twenty-one officers present that day; and 420
other ranks completed the casualty roll.
Like the Highlanders, the 69th Punjabis never stayed their rush till the
prize, the Moulin, was almost within their grasp, but they too were to
earn renown alone. When the fate of war overtook the others, the 69th
also retired fighting. The Commander, Major Stansfeld (attached from the
74th Punjabis), was killed, and Captain Nelson, Lieutenants Moberly and
Fraser also gave their lives; whilst three Indian officers and seventy
others were killed or missing. Amongst the wounded were four British and
six Indian officers and 260 others, or a total of over 50 per cent of
strength present.
Captain Nelson was attached from the 3rd Brahmins. We had spent three
very good days together shooting and fishing on the Ganges Canal
eighteen months previously, and I had been much struck by his keenness
and zeal in whatever he put his hand to. Major Bingham behaved with
great coolness throughout this day, but I could find no record of
rewards for the officers.
Of my good friend, Colonel Davidson-Houston, 58th Rifles (Frontier
Force), I have written elsewhere. His battalion, in support of the Black
Watch, cared for naught, like its comrades, save the fatal Moulin. On
that all eyes were bent, and it must be won at any cost. The
oft-repeated injunctions of the First Army to push on regardless of side
issues had burnt into the souls of men who had for a whole year tasted
the fruits of success and failure in varying degrees.
The 58th pushed on, and a part found themselves close up to the Mill;
the remainder met with the same counter-attacks as the rest of the
advance; they held on to their gains and consolidated as much as
possible, but eventually were forced to retire to our own original line.
Amongst the killed or missing were Colonel Davidson-Houston, Captains
Flagg, Harcourt, McKenzie, and Lieutenants Nicolls, Deane-Spread (Indian
Army Reserve of Officers, attached), and Milligan. Captain C. G. Wardell
(21st Punjabis, attached) was severely wounded. Five Indian officers and
240 other ranks completed the roll of casualties.
As an example of the inferno through which the troops went on this day,
I will instance the doings of Captain Wardell above mentioned. At the
very start he was knocked over by the explosion of a shell close by;
almost immediately a bullet smashed his water-bottle and a second one
cut away the straps. In moving up to form a defensive flank in the
second German line captured trenches he lost a good many men getting
through uncut wire. Units in the front line were by this time
indescribably mixed up; there were too many men, and very few officers
left. An hour later a bullet cut the strap of his field-glasses and
another smashed the glasses in his hand. A third passed through his
lung, injuring several ribs and emerging through his coat pocket, but
such was the situation that each and every British officer must perforce
fight on, so a fresh pair of glasses was got, and whilst he was
observing as best he could another bullet passed through his shoulder.
Bleeding and sorely hurt as he was, I have been told on good authority
that this brave officer remained with his command until sent back on a
stretcher by his Colonel.
I looked for any rewards to British officers of this battalion, but I
could find none.
The last of the Indian battalions to join the Corps in France, and the
last of which I shall write here, was the 33rd Punjabis. They had
arrived the very day after I left, and were not long before, in their
reconstituted form, they too had received their baptism of fire. The
same goal was theirs, the same vicinity of the Moulin was to be the last
resting-place of many of the men from the land of the Five Rivers, and
as their comrades had fought, so now did they share in the glory and
carnage of the strife.
As a Captain and Staff-Officer at Delhi I had been present when the old
33rd Regiment of “Bengal Infantry” was mustered out, and the “33rd
Punjabi Mahomedans” took their place. I had again seen them at Delhi,
when commanding the Northern Army, and I only missed them by a day in
Flanders. They may rest content in the knowledge that although the last
to join the Corps they were not the least in the share they took on 25th
September 1915, before Mauquissart, and to this fact their long list of
casualties attests. Killed and missing—Major Kelly, Captains Price and
MacCall, Lieutenant Grasett (attached from 28th Punjabis). The
Commanding Officer, Colonel Ridgway, and Captain Vincent were wounded.
Five Indian officers were also killed or missing and three were wounded,
a total of fourteen officers all told. Of other ranks eighty-seven were
killed or missing and 160 wounded. The senior Indian officer,
Subadar-Major Bahadur Khan, and the senior Jemadar, Akbar Ali, were
among the killed.
General Jacob in his report on these operations made the following
remarks, which explain some of the reasons for the failure of the Indian
Corps to retain the ground it had won. He says:
It was unfortunate that the wind, changing at the last moment, blew
the gas back on to our own trenches, ... men under the influence of
gas seemed to lose all sense of direction, and some are said to have
charged down between the German and our own front lines until stopped
by the Duck’s Bill.
After highly praising the keenness, spirit, _élan_, and dash shown by
all units, he adds:
The charge made by the 2/8th Gurkhas and the 2nd Leicesters of the
Garhwal Brigade and by the 2nd Black Watch, 69th Punjabis, and 1/4th
Black Watch of the Bareilly Brigade could not have been finer.
He explains how some of the attacking battalions in their eagerness to
move on exceeded the limits of ordinary prudence and went too far, with
the result that they were cut off and many valuable lives lost, and
attributes the immediate success of the German counter-attack largely to
their superiority in bombs and to our own supply entirely running out.
Regarding the action of the 58th Rifles; from the information now
available, it would appear that the opinions formed by both the
Divisional and Brigade Commanders at the time are quite open to
explanation. These officers considered that the advance of the 58th was
premature, but in _The Indian Corps in France_, on page 451 (second
edition), is given Brigadier-General Wauchope’s (then a Major in the 2nd
Black Watch) opinion, and I have no doubt that both Generals Jacob and
Norie agree with it.
In any case, it is to all of us who knew Colonel Davidson-Houston, the
Commander of the 58th Vaughan’s Rifles, a certainty, that in giving his
orders for the battalion to advance, he acted either on some information
which we shall never know, or because he considered it imperative he
should do so, even if contrary to his instructions. Such faults, if
faults they be, are a credit to those who will take the responsibility,
and I can well imagine my friend as he took it on this day. He was a
C.O. so devoted to the men he commanded and so absorbed in his regiment
that more than once his actions were misunderstood whilst in France. On
one occasion it was my good fortune to stand by him, when some very high
personages differed from us both on a question of vital interest to the
Indians. We went to, and left the stormy meeting together, and somehow I
felt we had “learned them” something they did not know before.
Davidson-Houston was indeed “a veray parfit gentil Knight.” His
character partook of manly physical bravery, tempered with a fine
discretion when he had to consider others. He never asked any man to do
what he was not ready to do himself if necessary.
Both the Corps and Divisional Commanders mentioned in terms of high
praise the work and devotion to duty of the Technical troops, the
Pioneers, and Sappers and Miners. The medical branch of the Corps
received the credit which all ranks had well earned, as did the Staff,
each and every one of whom was known to me.
It was pleasant to read in the report on this battle mention made for
the first time in France, by the Army Commander, of the “Indian Corps”
by name.
Shortly after this battle, rumours were rife, that the Corps would not
remain another winter in France, and before the end of November the
entire Indian personnel had left this theatre of war.
[Illustration: Mauquissart.]
CONCLUSION
Thus ended for the sepoy the “Great Adventure” on the plains of
Flanders. What memories it brings back! what future possibilities it has
in store! Some of them may arise sooner than the most imaginative can
foreshadow.
I have throughout this book endeavoured to do full justice to the Indian
Army, both to its British officers and all Indian ranks, but I venture
to offer one final word of advice to those in whose hands may lie the
future destinies of that Army. This advice has at least one merit, it is
based on a very wide and lifelong experience of India, its people, its
Provinces, its Frontiers in every direction, and, above all, of its
Army.
It is this. Whatever you do as regards the inhabitants of India,
whatever form of Government they may eventually possess, so long as the
Union Jack floats over Hindustan do not reduce the present status of the
British officer. You will find Indians as brave, loyal gentlemen and
splendid comrades, and hence you may find it difficult to refuse
equality of command; but you must make this a cardinal principle, for no
argument decked in rhetoric will alter the fact, that you can NEVER
replace the British officer in the Indian Army.
EPILOGUE
In 1919 I was home on short leave, and it happened that the Indian
Contingent was in London for the Peace celebrations. I was a spectator
when they marched to Buckingham Palace to be reviewed by their beloved
King-Emperor, and as they passed on their return from the Palace,
although I was in plain clothes, some of the Indian officers and men
recognised me amongst the crowd. One of them shouted the Sikh war-cry of
“FATEH,” and a number ran out of the marching ranks, saying, “Here is
our General.” It was a very short greeting, but it was none the less
both moving and splendid.
A few days later I visited their Camp at Hampton Court. I will not
attempt to describe what took place, but when I left in my motor-car,
this at least I clearly knew, that those faithful comrades would never
forget their old Commander. It is my final and highest reward.
APPENDIX
PROMOTIONS AND REWARDS OF OFFICERS, NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, AND MEN
OF THE INDIAN ARMY AND DEPARTMENTS WHO SERVED WITH THE ARMY CORPS OR
OTHER INDIAN TROOPS OR BRITISH UNITS IN FRANCE PRIOR TO 1916, AND
WERE GAZETTED BEFORE 20TH FEBRUARY 1916.
_Extracted from Official Lists, “London” and “Indian” Gazettes,
etc._
=Victoria Cross=
Sepoy KHUDADAD KHAN, 129th Baluchis (severely wounded).
Naik DARWAN SING NEGI, 1/39th Garhwal Rifles (severely wounded).
Lieutenant F. A. DE PASS, 34th Poona Horse (killed).
Lance-Corporal DAVID FINLAY, 2nd Black Watch (killed).
Rifleman GOBAR SING NEGI, 2/39th Garhwal Rifles (killed).
Private WILLIAM BUCKINGHAM, 2nd Leicestershire Regiment (killed).
Rifleman KULBIR THAPA, 2/3rd Gurkha Rifles.
Lieutenant J. G. SMYTH, 15th Sikhs.
Subadar MIR DAST, I.O.M., 55th Coke’s Rifles (F.F.), attached 57th
Rifles (F.F.) (wounded).
Corporal ISSY SMITH, 1st Manchester Regiment.
Lieutenant W. A. M‘CRAE BRUCE, 59th Scinde Rifles (F.F.) (killed).
STAFF
_Knight Commander of the Bath_
Lieut.-General H. B. B. Watkis, C.B., Indian Army.
_Companion of the Bath_
Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) F. W. G. Wadeson, Indian Army.
Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) C. W. Jacob, Indian Army.
Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) A. S. C. Cobbe, V.C., D.S.O.,
A.D.C., 32nd Pioneers.
Lieut.-Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) G. de S. Barrow, 35th
Horse.
Colonel R. H. Ewart, C.I.E., D.S.O., A.D.C., Supply and Transport
Corps.
Lieut.-Colonel J. S. M. Shea, D.S.O., 35th Horse.
Major-General C. P. W. Pirie, I.A.
Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) C. A. Fowler, D.S.O., I.A.
Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) W. H. Fasken, I.A.
_Companion of St. Michael and St. George_
Lieut.-Colonel J. P. C. Hennessy, Supply and Transport Corps.
Lieut.-Colonel H. A. P. Lindsay, Supply and Transport Corps.
Lieut.-Colonel C. H. G. Moore, D.S.O., Supply and Transport Corps.
Major (temporary Lieut.-Colonel) H. E. Rhys Pryce, 18th Infantry.
Lieut.-Colonel (temporary Colonel) G. S. Sheppard, Military Accounts
Department.
Major and Brevet Lieut.-Colonel H. C. Holman, D.S.O., 16th Cavalry.
Colonel F. C. Muspratt, I.A.
_Distinguished Service Order_
Major H. B. D. Baird, 12th Cavalry.
Major R. C. W. Lukin, 9th Horse.
Major J. H. K. Stewart, 39th Garhwalis.
Major A. Strong, 10th Lancers.
Major (temporary Lieut.-Colonel) L. R. Vaughan, 7th Gurkha Rifles.
Captain J. P. Villiers-Stuart, 55th Rifles.
Major G. D. Bruce, 61st K.G.O. Pioneers.
Major W. F. S. Casson, 27th Light Cavalry.
Major C. J. B. Hay, Q.V.O. Corps of Guides (F.F.).
Major F. S. Keen, 45th Rattray’s Sikhs.
Captain D. G. Robinson, 40th Punjabis.
_Military Cross_
Captain B. de L. Brock, 126th Baluchistan Infantry.
Captain M. A. Hamer, 129th Baluchis.
Captain H. L. Watkis, 31st Punjabis.
Captain R. G. Alexander, 11th K.E.O. Lancers.
Captain H. L. Dyce, 9th Hudson’s Horse.
Captain E. St. C. Gray, 34th Poona Horse.
Captain E. D. Raymond, 30th Lancers.
Captain H. R. B. Reed, 39th Garhwal Rifles.
Captain H. L. Scott, 1/1st Gurkha Rifles.
Captain S. R. Shirley, 54th Sikhs (F.F.).
Captain W. L. O. Twiss, 9th Gurkha Rifles.
Lieutenant O. Gough, 12th Cavalry.
_Order of British India, 1st Class, with title of “Sardar Bahadur”_
Risaldar Khwaja Muhammad Khan, I.D.S.M., A.D.C., Queen’s Own Corps of
Guides.
_French Order of the Legion of Honour, Croix de Commandeur_
Lieut.-General Sir E. Locke Elliot, K.C.B., D.S.O. (retired), I.A.
_Russian Order of St. Vladimir, 4th Class, with Swords_
Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) C. W. Jacob, C.B., Indian Army.
_Major-General_
Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) H. Hudson, C.B., C.I.E., Indian
Army.
Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) C. W. Jacob, C.B., I.A.
Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) W. G. Walker, V.C., C.B., I.A.
_Brevet Colonel_
Lieut.-Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) W. B. James, C.I.E.,
M.V.O., 21st Cavalry.
Lieut.-Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) H. J. M. Macandrew,
D.S.O., 5th Cavalry.
Lieut.-Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) W. M. Southey, C.M.G.,
129th Baluchis.
Lieut.-Colonel R. E. Vaughan, D.S.O., Supply and Transport Corps.
Major and Brevet Lieut.-Colonel A. Skeen, 24th Punjabis.
Major and Brevet Lieut.-Colonel H. C. Holman, C.M.G., D.S.O., 16th
Cavalry.
Lieut.-Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) J. S. M. Shea, C.B.,
D.S.O., 35th Scinde Horse.
_Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel_
Major A. G. Stuart, 40th Pathans.
Major H. L. Tomkins, D.S.O., 28th Punjabis.
Major A. W. Peck, 25th Cavalry.
Major J. A. Longridge, 43rd Erinpura Regiment.
Major (temporary Lieut.-Colonel) C. A. C. Godwin, 23rd Cavalry (F.F.).
Major (temporary Lieut.-Colonel) C. C. Newnham, 6th K.E.O. Cavalry.
_Brevet Major_
Captain H. R. A. Hunt, 25th Punjabis.
CAVALRY
4TH CAVALRY
_Companion of St. Michael and St. George_
Lieut.-Colonel H. G. Stainforth.
_Military Cross_
Captain G. Howson.
_Order of British India, 2nd Class, with title of “Bahadur”_
Risaldar-Major Awal Khan.
Risaldar Saddha Singh.
_Indian Distinguished Service Medal_
Ressaidar Udmi Ram.
No. 333 Dafadar Karam Singh.
_Russian Medal of St. George, 1st Class_
No. 2210 Dafadar Amanatullah Khan.
_Honorary Rank of Jemadar_
No. 322 Dafadar and Head Salutri Lachman Singh.
9TH HODSON’S HORSE
_Military Cross_
Captain F. H. M. Moody (13th Lancers, attached).
_Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class_
No. 2889 Lance-Dafadar Jit Singh (11th King Edward’s Own Lancers,
attached).
2614 Acting Lance-Dafadar Ganga Singh (11th K.E.O. Lancers attached).
11TH KING EDWARD’S OWN LANCERS
_Military Cross_
Lieutenant R. V. Sherston (attached 4th Queen’s Own Hussars).
Lieutenant (temporary Captain) H. G. A. Fellowes (attached 1st
Battalion Prince Albert’s Somerset Light Infantry).
13TH DUKE OF CONNAUGHT’S LANCERS
_Military Cross_
Lieutenant D. Pott.
15TH LANCERS (CURETON’S MULTANIS)
_Military Cross_
Captain A. C. K. S. Clarke.
_Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class_
Jemadar Malik Mihr Khan.
_Indian Distinguished Service Medal_
No. 346 Dafadar Ibrahim Khan.
No. 2176 Lance-Dafadar Alladad Khan.
20TH DECCAN HORSE
_Distinguished Service Order_
Captain A. C. Ross.
_Military Cross_
Lieutenant G. F. Tinley.
_Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class_
No. 295 Dafadar Sardar Singh.
No. 255 Dafadar Shankar Rao.
_Indian Distinguished Service Medal_
No. 830 Sowar Gokul Singh.
25TH CAVALRY (FRONTIER FORCE)
_Military Cross_
Lieutenant J. Nethersole (attached 2nd Life Guards).
28TH LIGHT CAVALRY
_Distinguished Service Order_
Captain A. Marshall (attached Royal Flying Corps).
29TH LANCERS (DECCAN HORSE)
_Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class_
Jemadar Hayat Ali Beg.
31ST DUKE OF CONNAUGHT’S OWN LANCERS
_Russian Order of St. Stanislas, 3rd Class, with Swords_
Major A. F. C. Williams, D.S.O.
34TH PRINCE ALBERT VICTOR’S OWN POONA HORSE
=Victoria Cross=
Lieutenant F. A. de Pass (killed in action).
_Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class_
No. 2743 Sowar Madhu.
_Indian Distinguished Service Medal_
Ressaidar Badan Singh.
No. 3027 Sowar Abdulla Khan.
No. 3250 Sowar Fateh Khan.
No. 3154 Sowar Firman Shah.
_Russian Cross of the Order of St. George, 4th Class_
No. 2085 Kot-Dafadar (now Jemadar) Abdul Ghafur Khan.
39TH CENTRAL INDIA HORSE
_Military Cross_
Captain W. A. K. F. Fraser (attached 16th Lancers).
ROYAL FIELD ARTILLERY
_Indian Distinguished Conduct Medal_
No. 4079 Naik Ilm Din, 5th Brigade, Ammunition Column.
No. 9483 Driver Fateh Khan, 18th Brigade, Ammunition Column.
SAPPERS AND MINERS
_Distinguished Service Order_
Captain A. J. G. Bird, R.E., No. 4 Company, 1st Sappers and Miners.
Captain F. M‘C. Douie, R.E., No. 3 Company, 1st (K.G.O.) Sappers and
Miners.
Captain F. H. Kisch, R.E., 3rd Sappers and Miners.
Captain J. C. Wickham, R.E., 2nd Sappers and Miners.
_Distinguished Service Order and Military Cross_
Lieutenant F. M‘C. Douie, R.E., 3rd Company Sappers and Miners.
_Military Cross_
Captain E. H. Kelly, R.E., 1st Sappers and Miners.
Captain E. F. J. Hill, R.E., 1st Sappers and Miners.
Captain P. C. S. Hobart, R.E., 1st Sappers and Miners.
Captain F. P. Nosworthy, R.E., 3rd Sappers and Miners.
Captain E. K. Squires, R.E., No. 21 Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners.
Lieutenant F. E. Buller, R.E., 3rd Sappers and Miners.
Subadar Malla Singh, R.E., 3rd Sappers and Miners.
Subadar Gaurishankar Dube, 1st Sappers and Miners.
Lieutenant H. W. R. Hamilton, R.E., 3rd Sappers and Miners.
Lieutenant A. Mason, R.E., 3rd Sappers and Miners.
Second Lieutenant H. M. Hance (I.A.R.O.), 176th Mining Company, R.E.
_Order of British India, 2nd Class, with title of “Bahadur”_
Subadar Sundar Singh, 1st Sappers and Miners.
Subadar Gaurishankar Dube, 1st Sappers and Miners.
Subadar Ganpat Mahadeo, 3rd Sappers and Miners.
Subadar Ismail Khan, 3rd Sappers and Miners.
Jemadar Sada Singh, 1st Sappers and Miners.
_Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class_
Subadar Malla Singh, 3rd Sappers and Miners.
Jemadar Ram Rup Singh, No. 3 Company, 1st Sappers and Miners.
No. 2479 Havildar Muhammad Khan, No. 20 Company, 3rd Sappers and
Miners.
No. 3795 Sapper Dalip Singh, No. 20 Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners.
No. 2192 Sapper Shaikh Abdul Rahman, 1st Sappers and Miners.
No. 1694 Sapper Jiwa Khan, 1st Sappers and Miners.
Jemadar Uttam Singh, 20th Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners.
Jemadar Liyakat Ali, 21st Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners.
No. 3144 Driver Havildar Muhammad Baksh, 21st Company, 3rd Sappers and
Miners.
No. 3108 Naik Gurmukh Singh, 21st Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners.
_Indian Distinguished Service Medal_
Subadar Sundar Singh, No. 4 Company, 1st Sappers and Miners.
Jemadar Abdul Aziz, 1st Sappers and Miners.
Jemadar Mehar Baksh, 1st Sappers and Miners.
Jemadar Niamutullah, No. 4 Company, 1st Sappers and Miners.
Jemadar Gangacharan Dikshit, 3rd Sappers and Miners (deceased).
Jemadar Ismail Khan, 3rd Sappers and Miners.
Jemadar Nur Alam, 20th Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners.
Colour-Havildar Chagatta, I.O.M., 1st Sappers and Miners.
No. 322 Havildar Sucha Singh, 1st Sappers and Miners.
No. 3144 Driver Havildar Mahamed Baksh, 21st Company, 3rd Sappers and
Miners.
Sapper Suba Singh, 1st Sappers and Miners.
Jemadar Ali Bahadur, No. 20 Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners.
Jemadar Data Din Badhai, No. 21 Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners.
No. 4052 Sapper Indar Singh, 20th Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners.
No. 708 Sapper Basant Singh, No. 2 Field Squadron.
No. 312 Havildar Basant Singh, No. 4 Company, 1st (K.G.O.) Sappers and
Miners.
No. 1910 Lance-Naik Hari Singh, No. 4 Company, 1st (K.G.O.) Sappers
and Miners.
Subadar Fazl Shah, No. 3 Company, 1st Sappers and Miners.
No. 859 Naik Magh Singh, No. 4 Company, 1st Sappers and Miners.
No. 1029 Lance-Naik Bhawani Dutt, No. 3 Company, 1st Sappers and
Miners.
No. 3348 Havildar Maraoti Jadhao, 21st Company, 3rd Sappers and
Miners.
No. 2720 Naik Harnam Singh, 20th Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners.
No. 2869 Lance-Naik Shaikh Ramzan, 21st Company, 3rd Sappers and
Miners.
No. 3450 Sapper Saleh Muhammad, 21st Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners.
_Russian Cross of the Order of St. George, 4th Class_
Jemadar Chagatta, I.O.M., 1st Sappers and Miners.
Subadar Ismail Khan, 3rd Sappers and Miners.
No. 3795 Naik Dalip Singh, 3rd Sappers and Miners.
_Russian Medal of St. George, 2nd Class_
No. 1007 Havildar Nowsher Khan, 1st Sappers and Miners.
_Russian Medal of St. George, 3rd Class_
No. 1773 Sapper Channan Singh, 1st Sappers and Miners.
SPECIAL PROMOTIONS IN THE FIELD
_To be Havildar_
No. 2779 Naik Liyakat Ali, 3rd Sappers and Miners.
_To be Naik_
No. 3056 Lance-Naik Fazl Din, 3rd Sappers and Miners.
No. 3132 Lance-Naik Narayan Ranowde, 3rd Sappers and Miners.
No. 3134 Lance-Naik Bhan Ranowde, 3rd Sappers and Miners.
SIGNAL COMPANIES
_Distinguished Service Order_
Major W. F. Maxwell, R.E., Lahore Divisional Signal Company.
Captain C. J. Torrie, 30th Punjabis, 35th Signal Company.
Major H. S. E. Franklin, 15th Sikhs, 31st Divisional Signal Company.
_Military Cross_
Lieutenant F. C. de Butts, 55th Rifles, 31st Divisional Signal
Company.
_Order of British India, 2nd Class, with title of “Bahadur”_
Subadar Qasim Ali, 31st Divisional Signal Company.
_Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class_
Jemadar Alah Rakkha Khan, Lahore Divisional Signal Company.
_Indian Distinguished Service Medal_
No. 91 Sapper Bawani Singh, Lahore Signal Company.
No. 13 Naik Bari Sher, 62nd Punjabis, Meerut Signal Company.
No. 44 Naik Khan Zaman, Lahore Signal Company.
No. 23 Lance-Naik Mushtak Husain, Lahore Signal Company.
No. 45 Sapper Ghulam Ayud Din, Lahore Signal Company.
No. 1209 Naik Imam Shah, 62nd Punjabis, Meerut Signal Company.
No. 2616 Sepoy Mihan Singh, 93rd Burma Infantry, Meerut Signal
Company.
No. 42 Sapper Jai Singh, “A” Section, Indian Signal Company.
No. 4204 Sapper Changa, “C” Section, Lahore Divisional Signal Company.
No. 7 Sapper Gujar Singh, “C” Section, Lahore Divisional Signal
Company.
Dafadar Mangal Singh, 33rd Light Cavalry (attached Meerut Signal
Company).
No. 1776 Sepoy Bhagat Singh, 90th Punjabis (attached Meerut Signal
Company).
No. 2636 Sepoy Sucha Singh, 92nd Punjabis (attached Meerut Signal
Company).
No. 3475 Sepoy Jetta Singh, 107th Pioneers (attached Meerut Signal
Company).
INFANTRY
6TH JAT LIGHT INFANTRY
_Companion of the Bath_
Lieut.-Colonel H. J. Roche.
_Distinguished Service Order_
Major P. H. Dundas.
Captain R. C. Ross.
_Military Cross_
Lieutenant C. J. Cockburn.
Captain J. de la H. Gordon.
Captain A. B. Macpherson.
Jemadar Incha Ram.
Jemadar Lakhi Ram.
_Order of British India, 2nd Class, with title of “Bahadur”_
Subadar Shib Lal.
Subadar Inchha Ram.
_Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class_
No. 1821 Havildar Jai Lal.
_Indian Distinguished Service Medal_
Subadar Parshadi Singh (118th Infantry, attached).
Jemadar Lakhi Ram.
No. 1548 Havildar Badlu.
No. 3426 Sepoy Risal.
No. 1696 Havildar Harpul.
No. 2685 Lance-Naik Maru.
No. 1004 Sepoy Bagmal.
No. 1574 Havildar Mula.
No. 2960 Sepoy Rambhagat.
Subadar Ratna.
No. 1757 Havildar Har Lal.
No. 2822 Naik Hardwari.
No. 3106 Bugler Bhup Singh.
No. 3415 Sepoy Lehri.
_Russian Cross of the Order of St. George, 4th Class_
No. 2693 Havildar Debi Sahai.
9TH BHOPAL INFANTRY
_Military Cross_
Captain G. D. Martin.
_Indian Distinguished Service Medal_
Subadar-Major Bhure Singh.
No. 2206 Havildar Amur Singh.
No. 2069 Sepoy Abdul Latif.
No. 2867 Naik Angad Pande.
_Russian Medal of St. George, 2nd Class_
Subadar Nazir Khan.
_Brevet Major_
Captain C. H. Jardine (96th Berar Infantry, attached).
15TH LUDHIANA SIKHS
=Victoria Cross=
Lieutenant J. G. Smyth.
_Distinguished Service Order_
Captain J. A. S. Daniell (14th Sikhs, attached).
Major H. S. E. Franklin.
_Military Cross_
Lieutenant A. E. Barstow.
Captain R. J. MacBrayne.
Jemadar Bir Singh.
_Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class_
No. 4011 Havildar Bishan Singh.
No. 698 Sepoy Bakshi Singh.
No. 529 Sepoy Tilok Singh.
No. 131 Lance-Naik Mangal Singh.
No. 4727 Havildar Mahan Singh.
_Indian Distinguished Service Medal_
Jemadar Wazir Singh (died of wounds).
Jemadar Bir Singh.
No. 4576 Naik Bishn Singh.
No. 702 Sepoy Lal Singh.
No. 638 Sepoy Sucha Singh.
No. 962 Sepoy Sapuran Singh.
No. 1255 Sepoy Sarain Singh (19th Punjabis, attached).
No. 1036 Sepoy Fateh Singh (45th Sikhs, attached).
No. 1001 Sepoy Ujagar Singh (45th Sikhs, attached).
No. 1249 Sepoy Sundar Singh (19th Punjabis, attached).
No. 1339 Sepoy Ganda Singh (19th Punjabis, attached).
No. 1360 Sepoy Harnam Singh (19th Punjabis, attached).
No. 4474 Lance-Naik Kesar Singh.
No. 53 Lance-Naik Bhagwan Singh.
No. 219 Sepoy Diwan Singh.
No. 435 Sepoy Dan Singh.
No. 4095 Sepoy Lal Singh.
_Russian Order of St. George, 4th Class_
Lieutenant J. G. Smyth, V.C.
_Russian Medal of St. George, 1st Class_
No. 4727 Havildar Mahan Singh.
_Brevet Colonel_
Lieut.-Colonel J. Hill, D.S.O.
_Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel_
Major C. A. Vivian (killed in action).
26TH PUNJABIS
_Distinguished Service Order_
Captain (temporary Major) G. O. Turnbull (attached 6th Service
Battalion Royal Scots Fusiliers).
29TH PUNJABIS
_Brevet Major_
Captain (temporary Major) S. D. Massy (attached Royal Flying Corps).
30TH PUNJABIS
_Order of British India, 2nd Class, with title of “Bahadur”_
Subadar Diwan Singh.
34TH SIKH PIONEERS
_Companion of St. Michael and St. George_
Lieut.-Colonel E. H. S. Cullen, M.V.O., D.S.O.
_Military Cross_
Captain C. E. Hunt.
Captain G. F. J. Paterson.
Subadar Sant Singh.
_Order of British India, 2nd Class, with title of “Bahadur”_
Subadar Natha Singh (II.), I.O.M.
_Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class_
Subadar Natha Singh (II.).
No. 1871 Havildar Nikka Singh.
No. 1148 Havildar Pala Singh.
No. 4563 Sepoy Mastan Singh.
No. 2775 Lance-Naik Tota Singh.
No. 2071 Naik Bir Singh.
Subadar-Major Jwala Singh, “Sardar Bahadur.”
No. 1907 Naik Guja Singh.
Jemadar Kharak Singh (32nd Sikh Pioneers, attached).
No. 3623 Havildar Mangal Singh (32nd Sikh Pioneers, attached).
Jemadar Maingha Singh (12th Pioneers, attached).
_Indian Distinguished Service Medal_
Subadar Sher Singh.
Subadar Wasawa Singh (32nd Pioneers, attached).
No. 1452 Havildar Narayan Singh.
No. 2578 Sepoy Ishar Singh.
No. 3063 Sepoy Sant Singh.
No. 3013 Sepoy Gopal Singh.
No. 2398 Sepoy Katha Singh.
No. 1576 Havildar Prem Singh.
_Russian Medal of St. George, 3rd Class_
No. 4563 Sepoy Mastan Singh (32nd Pioneers, attached).
_Russian Medal of St. George, 4th Class_
No. 1804 Lance-Naik Teja Singh (12th Pioneers, attached).
_Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel_
Major E. N. Heale (121st Pioneers, attached).
1ST BATTALION 39TH GARHWAL RIFLES
=Victoria Cross=
No. 1909 Naik Darwan Sing Negi.
_Military Cross_
Captain F. G. E. Lumb.
Captain J. T. H. Lane.
Lieutenant A. H. Mankelow (killed in action).
Second Lieutenant Rama Jodha Jang Bahadur (Indian Native Land Forces,
attached).
Subadar Dhan Sing Negi.
Subadar Bishan Sing Rawat.
_Order of British India, 2nd Class, with title of “Bahadur”_
Subadar Jagat Sing Rawat, I.O.M.
Subadar Baij Sing Rawat.
Subadar Bije Sing Kandari.
_Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class_
Jemadar Prem Sing Negi (killed in action).
No. 1810 Havildar Alam Sing Negi.
No. 2408 Lance-Naik Sankaru Gusain.
No. 2605 Lance-Naik Kiyali Gusain.
No. 1674 Rifleman Kalamu Bisht.
No. 2172 Rifleman Ghantu Rawat.
No. 1715 Rifleman Dhan Sing Negi.
No. 2417 Rifleman Partab Rana.
No. 2480 Rifleman Banchu Negi.
No. 2285 Rifleman Jawarihu Negi.
No. 4423 Sepoy Beli Ram (30th Punjabis, attached).
_Indian Distinguished Service Medal_
Subadar Kedar Sing Rawat.
Subadar Dan Sing Negi.
Jemadar Goman Sing Negi.
No. 1321 Lance-Naik Dangwa Ramola.
No. 1085 Rifleman Raichand Negi.
No. 1760 Rifleman Kutalu Bisht.
No. 2854 Rifleman Keshi Bisht.
No. 2697 Bugler Bhola Bisht.
_Russian Cross of the Order of St. George, 4th Class_
No. 1729 Havildar Padam Sing Rawat.
_Russian Medal of St. George, 4th Class_
No. 2103 Lance-Naik Jit Sing Negi.
_Brevet Colonel_
Lieut.-Colonel E. R. Swiney.
2ND BATTALION 39TH GARHWAL RIFLES
=Victoria Cross=
No. 1685 Rifleman Gobar Sing Negi (deceased).
_Companion of St. Michael and St. George_
Lieut.-Colonel D. H. Drake-Brockman.
_Distinguished Service Order_
Captain G. W. Burton (killed in action).
_Military Cross_
Subadar Nain Sing Chinwarh.
Jemadar Pancham Sing Mahar.
Jemadar Sangram Sing Negi.
_Order of British India, 2nd Class, with title of “Bahadur”_
Subadar Nain Sing Chinwar.
Subadar Makhar Sing Kawar.
_Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class_
No. 762 Havildar Butha Sing Negi.
No. 463 Naik Baktwar Sing Bisht.
No. 1283 Naik Jaman Sing Bisht.
No. 541 Rifleman Madan Sing Rawat.
No. 1342 Rifleman Ganesh Sing Sajwan.
_Indian Distinguished Service Medal_
Jemadar Lachman Sing Rawat.
No. 617 Havildar Bir Sing Danu.
No. —— Havildar Ranjir Sing Pandir.
No. —— Havildar Diwan Sing Padhujar.
No. 1480 Naik Kedar Sing Mahar.
No. 289 Rifleman Kesar Sing Rana.
No. 870 Rifleman Nain Sing Rawat.
No. 1598 Rifleman Chandar Sing Negi.
No. 1465 Rifleman Gopal Sing Pharswan.
_Russian Medal of St. George, 3rd Class_
No. 1211 Rifleman Man Sing Bisht.
_Russian Medal of St. George, 4th Class_
No. 1448 Rifleman Karam Sing Rithal.
40TH PATHANS
_Military Cross_
Lieutenant F. C. G. Campbell.
Lieutenant F. L. R. Munn (46th Punjabis, attached).
_Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class_
Jemadar Lehna Singh.
Subadar Jahandad Khan, “Bahadur.”
No. 4551 Havildar Abas Khan.
_Indian Distinguished Service Medal_
No. 3435 Sepoy Haidar Ali.
No. 3362 Colour-Havildar Shiraz.
_Russian Medal of St. George, 4th Class_
No. 3893 Sepoy Muktiara.
41ST DOGRAS
_Companion of St. Michael and St. George_
Lieut.-Colonel C. W. Tribe.
_Distinguished Service Order_
Lieut.-Colonel H. W. Cruddas.
Major and Brevet Lieut.-Colonel C. A. R. Hutchinson.
_Military Cross_
Captain W. E. Fleming.
Lieutenant E. L. E. Lindop.
Captain R. M. F. Patrick (42nd Deoli Regiment, attached).
Captain R. M. Brind (37th Dogras, attached).
_Order of British India, 2nd Class, with title of “Bahadur”_
Subadar Mehar Singh.
Subadar Sundar Singh.
_Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class_
No. 1011 Havildar Gujar Singh (38th Dogras, attached).
_Indian Distinguished Service Medal_
No. 409 Havildar Saudagar Singh.
No. 1090 Lance-Naik Jamit Singh.
No. 306 Sepoy Sidhu.
Subadar Mehar Singh, “Bahadur.”
Jemadar Gujar Singh, I.O.M.
No. 547 Naik Surjan Singh.
No. 1389 Lance-Naik Dhiyan Singh.
No. 4902 Sepoy Albel Singh (29th Punjabis, attached).
No. 2061 Sepoy Thakur Diyal.
_Russian Cross of the Order of St. George, 3rd Class_
Subadar Jai Singh.
_Russian Medal of St. George, 4th Class_
No. 1033 Lance-Naik Devi Singh.
47TH SIKHS
_Companion of St. Michael and St. George_
Lieut.-Colonel O. G. Gunning (35th Sikhs, attached).
_Military Cross_
Captain A. M. Brown (killed in action).
Lieutenant G. S. Brunskill.
Lieutenant A. E. Drysdale.
Captain S. B. Combe.
Captain R. F. Francis.
Captain W. H. Ralston.
Subadar Thakur Singh.
_Order of British India, 2nd Class, with title of “Bahadur”_
Subadar Saudagar Singh.
_Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class_
Subadar Bakshi Singh.
Subadar Harnam Singh (killed in action).
Jemadar Sucha Singh.
No. 231 Havildar (now Jemadar) Narain Singh.
No. 337 Havildar Lachman Singh.
No. 514 Havildar Gajjan Singh.
No. 2270 Sepoy Rur Singh.
No. 2277 Sepoy Bhagwan Singh (36th Sikhs, attached).
No. 2103 Havildar Bir Singh (35th Sikhs, attached).
No. 2479 Lance-Havildar Lal Singh (35th Sikhs, attached).
Subadar Mota Singh (killed in action).
_Indian Distinguished Service Medal_
No. 355 Naik Jagat Singh.
No. 1336 Naik Mota Singh.
No. 1189 Naik Mit Singh.
No. 1791 Sepoy Waryam Singh.
No. 3201 Sepoy Asa Singh (35th Sikhs, attached).
No. 228 Havildar Bhola Singh.
No. 1410 Sepoy Kesar Singh.
No. 2266 Sepoy Buta Singh.
No. 482 Havildar Bhagat Singh.
No. 1308 Sepoy Kehr Singh.
No. 337 Havildar Lachman Singh.
No. 2116 Naik Kishen Singh.
No. 2882 Havildar Mula Singh (35th Sikhs, attached).
_Russian Cross of the Order of St. George, 3rd Class_
No. 337 Havildar Lachman Singh.
_Russian Cross of the Order of St. George, 4th Class_
Jemadar Mota Singh.
_Brevet Colonel_
Lieut.-Colonel H. L. Richardson.
_Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel_
Major S. R. Davidson.
SPECIAL PROMOTION IN THE FIELD
_To be Havildar_
Naik Bhagat Singh.
57TH (WILDE’S) RIFLES (FRONTIER FORCE)
=Victoria Cross=
Jemadar Mir Dast, I.O.M. (55th Coke’s Rifles, F.F., attached).
_Companion of St. Michael and St. George_
Lieut.-Colonel F. W. B. Gray, D.S.O.
_Distinguished Service Order_
Major T. J. Willans.
_Military Cross_
Captain D. H. Acworth (55th Rifles, attached).
Lieutenant E. K. Fowler.
Lieutenant D. B. Mein (55th Rifles, attached).
Lieutenant D. Bainbridge.
Lieutenant R. B. Deedes (31st Punjabis, attached).
Subadar Arsla Khan, I.O.M.
_Order of British India, 2nd Class, with title of “Bahadur”_
Subadar Arsla Khan, I.O.M.
Subadar Imam Ali.
_Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class_
Jemadar Mangal Singh.
No. 2584 Havildar Yakub Khan.
No. 2630 Havildar Ganga.
No. 2718 Lance-Naik Said Akbar.
No. 2554 Lance-Naik Lalak.
No. 3576 Sepoy Daulat Khan.
No. 1695 Sepoy Usman Khan (55th Rifles, attached).
No. 2609 Naik Atma Singh.
No. 2632 Sepoy Palla Ram.
_Indian Distinguished Service Medal_
Subadar Fateh Jang (died of wounds).
No. 1991 Havildar (now Jemadar) Bur Singh.
No. 2595 Havildar Karim Khan.
No. 2583 Naik Narayan.
No. 2760 Naik Sahib Sher.
No. 2063 Naik Sohan Singh.
No. 2589 Sepoy Bahadur Khan.
No. 2702 Sepoy Ram Saran.
No. 3484 Sepoy Alvas Khan.
No. 2108 Sepoy Mir Badshah.
No. 3119 Sepoy Mir Badshah.
No. 3223 Sepoy Mir Baz.
No. 2625 Sepoy Mehr Khan (55th Rifles, attached).
No. 2540 Havildar Sar Mast.
No. 5510 Sepoy Bhan Singh (Q.O. Corps of Guides, attached).
_Russian Cross of the Order of St. George, 3rd Class_
Subadar Mir Dast, V.C., I.O.M. (55th Rifles, attached).
_Russian Cross of the Order of St. George, 4th Class_
No. 2630 Havildar Ganga.
_Russian Medal of St. George, 3rd Class_
No. 5510 Sepoy Bhan Singh (Q.O. Corps of Guides, attached).
_Russian Medal of St. George, 4th Class_
No. 3361 Sepoy Sahib Jan.
SPECIAL PROMOTION
_To be Naik_
No. 3028 Lance-Naik Gul Hasham.
58TH (VAUGHAN’S) RIFLES (FRONTIER FORCE)
_Distinguished Service Order_
Major C. E. D. Davidson-Houston (killed in action).
Major A. G. Thomson.
_Military Cross_
Captain G. S. Bull.
Jemadar Indar Singh.
Jemadar Hawinda.
_Order of British India, 2nd Class, with title of “Bahadur”_
Subadar Abdul Ali.
Subadar Raj Talab.
_Indian Order of Merit, 1st Class_
Subadar Suhel Singh.
_Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class_
Jemadar Harchand Singh.
Jemadar Suhel Singh.
Jemadar Muhammad Arabi.
No. 1811 Havildar Karam Singh.
No. 1848 Havildar Roshan Khan.
No. 3572 Havildar Saidak.
No. 3032 Lance-Naik Lal Badshah.
No. 2834 Lance-Naik Sher Khan.
No. 2742 Sepoy Isar Singh.
No. 1925 Havildar Santa Singh.
No. 2830 Naik Kashmir Singh.
No. 3131 Lance-Naik Phangan Singh.
_Indian Distinguished Service Medal_
Subadar Raj Talab.
Subadar Phuman Singh (died of wounds).
Jemadar Indar Singh.
No. 2008 Havildar (now Jemadar) Hawinda.
No. 2763 Havildar Arjun.
No. 3136 Havildar Sarfaraz.
No. 2164 Havildar Sundar Singh.
No. 3212 Havildar Lashkar.
No. 2198 Havildar Fazl Dad.
No. 2758 Naik Dewa Singh.
No. 2634 Naik Zargun Shah.
No. 3404 Naik Baidullah.
No. 3066 Naik Sardar.
No. 3080 Naik Zar Baz.
No. 3567 Lance-Naik Said Asghar.
No. 3374 Sepoy Dewa Singh.
No. 3133 Sepoy Maluk Singh.
_Russian Cross of the Order of St. George, 4th Class_
No. 3080 Naik Zar Baz.
_Russian Medal of St. George, 3rd Class_
No. 3457 Naik Safirullah.
_Russian Medal of St. George, 4th Class_
No. 3156 Sepoy Banta Singh.
59TH SCINDE RIFLES (FRONTIER FORCE)
_Military Cross_
Lieutenant J. A. M. Scobie.
Captain R. D. Inskip.
Subadar Parbat Chand.
_Order of British India, 1st Class, with title of “Sardar Bahadur”_
Subadar-Major Nasir Khan.
_Indian Order of Merit, 1st Class_
No. 27 Sepoy Zarif Khan.
_Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class_
No. 3063 Havildar Abdul Wahab.
No. 3191 Havildar Dost Muhammad.
No. 3638 Havildar Muhammad Jan.
No. 3663 Havildar Muzaffar Khan.
No. 3705 Lance-Naik Buta Singh.
No. 3902 Lance-Naik Biaz Gul.
No. 27 Sepoy Zarif Khan.
Subadar-Major Nasir Khan, “Sardar Bahadur.”
_Indian Distinguished Service Medal_
Subadar-Major Muhammad Khan.
Jemadar Zaman Ali.
No. 4264 Havildar Niaz Gul.
No. 3529 Naik Amir Ali.
No. 3581 Naik Ghammai Khan.
No. 2520–1/2 Lance-Naik Chur Khan (52nd Sikhs, F.F., attached).
No. 4845 Sepoy Akbar Khan.
No. 4731 Sepoy Lal Khan.
Subadar Bishan Singh.
Jemadar Mangal Singh (52nd Sikhs, F.F., attached).
_Russian Medal of St. George, 1st Class_
Subadar-Major Nasir Khan.
_Russian Medal of St. George, 2nd Class_
No. 3063 Havildar Abdul Wahab, I.O.M.
_Russian Medal of St. George, 4th Class_
No. 3890 Sepoy (Ward Orderly) Sadardin (attached 112th Indian Field
Ambulance).
_Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel_
Major (temporary Lieut.-Colonel) T. L. Leeds.
_Brevet Major_
Captain B. E. Anderson.
89TH PUNJABIS
_Military Cross_
Captain R. F. D. Burnett (42nd Deoli Regiment, attached).
_Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class_
No. 2316 Sepoy Indar Singh.
No. 3275 Sepoy Suleiman.
No. 1088 Colour-Havildar Hira Tiwari.
_Indian Distinguished Service Medal_
No. 1528 Havildar Harnam Singh.
No. 2352 Naik Muhammad Sadik.
No. 2029 Naik Ramji Misr.
No. 1485 Naik Karam Dad.
No. 2102 Sepoy Muhammad Khan.
107TH PIONEERS
_Companion of St. Michael and St. George_
Lieut.-Colonel N. M. C. Stevens.
_Distinguished Service Order_
Captain A. T. Sheringham (121st Pioneers, attached).
_Military Cross_
Captain E. B. Mangin.
Lieutenant F. H. F. Hornor.
Lieutenant B. H. Wallis.
_Order of British India, 2nd Class, with title of “Bahadur”_
Subadar-Major Labh Singh.
Subadar Hashmat Dad Khan.
_Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class_
Subadar Khan Zaman.
No. 4050 Bugler Nathu Singh.
_Indian Distinguished Service Medal_
Subadar Labh Singh.
Subadar Hashmat Dad Khan.
No. 3417 Havildar Bhagat Singh.
No. 2980 Naik Achar Singh.
No. 3991 Sepoy Phaga Singh.
Subadar Fateh Muhammad Khan.
No. 1027 Havildar Dal Khan (121st Pioneers, attached).
_Russian Cross of the Order of St. George, 4th Class_
No. 2762 Sepoy Sundar Singh.
125TH (NAPIER’S) RIFLES
_Military Cross_
Captain W. F. Odell (123rd Rifles, attached).
_Order of British India, 2nd Class, with title of “Bahadur”_
Subadar-Major Umar Din.
_Indian Distinguished Service Medal_
No. 2602 Sepoy Gul Sher.
129TH (DUKE OF CONNAUGHT’S OWN) BALUCHIS
=Victoria Cross=
No. 4050 Sepoy Khudadad.
_Companion of St. Michael and St. George_
Lieut.-Colonel W. M. Southey.
_Distinguished Service Order_
Major J. A. Hannyngton, C.M.G.
Captain R. F. Dill (killed in action).
Major H. Hulseberg (127th Baluch Light Infantry, attached).
_Military Cross_
Lieutenant F. M. Griffith-Griffin.
Lieutenant H. V. Lewis.
Captain C. M. Thornhill (24th Punjabis, attached).
Subadar Zaman Khan.
_Order of British India, 2nd Class, with title of “Bahadur”_
Subadar Zaman Khan.
Subadar Makmad Azam, I.O.M.
_Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class_
Subadar Makmad Azam.
Jemadar Mir Badshah.
Jemadar Ayub Khan (124th Baluchis, attached).
No. 4280 Naik Sar Nir.
No. 118 Lance-Naik Nek Amal.
No. 3814 Lance-Naik Hobab Gul.
No. 453 Sepoy Sahib Jan.
No. 250 Sepoy Saiday Khan.
No. 4333 Sepoy Redi Gul.
No. 2524 Colour-Havildar Ghulam Muhammad.
No. 471 Sepoy Raji Khan.
No. 3836 Havildar Fateh Haidar.
_Indian Distinguished Service Medal_
No. 2268 Havildar Nur Khan.
No. 105 Sepoy Kassib.
No. 2813 Sepoy Lal Sher.
No. 3600 Sepoy Lafar Khan.
No. 4182 Sepoy Said Ahmad.
No. 2102 Sepoy Aulia Khan.
No. 4267 Sepoy Mehrab Gul.
No. 4231 Sepoy Ghulam Hussein (124th Baluchistan Infantry, attached).
No. 4305 Sepoy Mistakin.
No. 246 Sepoy Dad Khan (127th Baluchis, attached).
_Russian Cross of the Order of St. George, 4th Class_
No. 118 Sepoy Nek Amal, I.O.M.
_Russian Medal of St. George, 1st Class_
No. 4355 Havildar Wasim Khan.
_Russian Medal of St. George, 4th Class_
No. 3836 Sepoy Fateh Haidar.
SPECIAL PROMOTION IN THE FIELD
_To be Naik_
No. 3640 Lance-Naik Ayub Khan (124th Baluchis, attached).
1ST BATTALION 1ST KING GEORGE’S OWN GURKHA RIFLES
_Companion of St. Michael and St. George_
Lieut.-Colonel W. C. Anderson.
_Military Cross_
Captain A. R. Mellis (Indian Army Reserve of Officers, attached).
_Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class_
Jemadar Sasidhar Thapa.
No. 1843 Naik Ramkishan Thapa.
No. 2205 Rifleman Balbir Thapa.
No. 2719 Rifleman Jitman Thapa.
Subadar Jit Sing Gurung (2nd Battalion 3rd Gurkha Rifles, attached).
Subadar Autbir Thapa (2nd Battalion 4th Gurkha Rifles, attached).
Jemadar Kharakbir Thapa (2nd Battalion 4th Gurkha Rifles, attached).
_Indian Distinguished Service Medal_
No. 2814 Rifleman Baliram Thapa.
No. 2515 Rifleman Kansi Gurung.
No. 2734 Rifleman Khamba Sing Gurung.
No. 2397 Rifleman Phalman Gurung.
No. 1946 Rifleman Lalbir Thapa.
No. 2650 Rifleman Chitabir Thapa.
_Russian Cross of the Order of St. George, 4th Class_
Subadar Puran Sing Gurung.
No. 2719 Rifleman Jitman Thapa, I.O.M.
_Russian Medal of St. George, 3rd Class_
No. 2205 Rifleman Balbir Thapa.
2ND BATTALION 2ND KING EDWARD’S OWN GURKHA RIFLES
_Distinguished Service Order_
Major D. M. Watt.
Major F. H. Norie (Indian Army retired, attached).
_Military Cross_
Captain A. D. Smith (1st Battalion 2nd Gurkha Rifles, attached).
Lieutenant E. J. Corse-Scott.
Lieutenant G. A. P. Scoones.
Subadar Kharak Sing Rana.
_Order of British India, 2nd Class, with title of “Bahadur”_
Subadar-Major Fateh Sing Newar.
Subadar Sarabjit Gurung, I.O.M. (1st Battalion, attached).
_Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class_
Subadar Dan Sing Lama.
Jemadar Arjun Rana.
No. 1618 Naik Padamdhoj Gurung.
No. 1959 Rifleman Bhagat Bahadur Gurung.
No. 2265 Rifleman Tula Gurung.
No. 2515 Rifleman Hastobir Roka.
No. 3266 Rifleman Jagtea Pun.
No. 4024 Rifleman Manjit Gurung.
No. 2447 Rifleman Partiman Gurung.
No. 1599 Rifleman Ujir Sing Gurung.
No. 1597 Naik Bum Bahadur Gurung.
No. 2693 Rifleman Anarupe Rana.
_Indian Distinguished Service Medal_
No. 1222 Havildar Ran Patti Gurung.
No. 1280 Havildar Judhia Sarki.
No. 1432 Havildar Janglai Gurung.
No. 1628 Havildar Bag Sing Thapa.
No. 1473 Naik Ramparshad Thapa.
No. 1517 Naik Bhimbahadur Thapa.
No. 1679 Naik Gamer Sing Bura.
No. 1593 Naik Patiram Thapa.
No. 2153 Lance-Naik Sher Sing Ghale.
No. 2392 Lance-Naik Amar Sing Pun.
No. 2618 Rifleman Kalu Gurung.
_Russian Cross of the Order of St. George, 4th Class_
No. 3184 Havildar Sarabjit Gurung.
_Brevet Colonel_
Lieut.-Colonel C. E. de M. Norie, D.S.O.
_Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel_
Major S. B. Boileau (1st Battalion 2nd Gurkha Rifles, attached).
2ND BATTALION 3RD QUEEN ALEXANDRA’S OWN GURKHA RIFLES
=Victoria Cross=
No. 2129 Rifleman Kulbir Thapa.
_Companion of the Bath_
Lieut.-Colonel V. A. Ormsby.
_Distinguished Service Order_
Captain J. T. Lodwick.
_Military Cross_
Lieutenant H. C. F. McSwiney.
_Order of British India, 2nd Class, with title of “Bahadur”_
Subadar-Major Gambhir Sing Gurung.
Subadar Kharak Bahadur Thapa.
_Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class_
Subadar-Major Gambhir Sing Gurung.
Subadar Bhim Sing Thapa.
Jemadar Harak Bahadur Thapa (deceased).
No. 1569 Havildar Bahadur Thapa.
No. 1805 Lance-Naik Hark Sing Gharti.
No. 1757 Lance-Naik Jhaman Sing Thapa.
No. 1749 Rifleman Gane Gurung.
No. 2252 Bugler Kharak Bahadur Alc.
_Indian Distinguished Service Medal_
Subadar Baru Sing Thapa.
Jemadar Puran Sing Thapa.
No. 1313 Havildar Motilal Gurung.
No. 2118 Rifleman Ganpati Thapa.
_Russian Cross of the Order of St. George, 4th Class_
Subadar Dalkesar Gurung.
_Russian Medal of St. George, 2nd Class_
No. 1760 Naik Rupdan Pun.
_Russian Medal of St. George, 3rd Class_
No. 3530 Rifleman Kharkbir Pun.
1ST BATTALION 4TH GURKHA RIFLES
_Distinguished Service Order_
Captain L. P. Collins.
Captain A. T. Cramer-Roberts.
Captain C. D. Roe.
_Military Cross_
Lieutenant C. F. F. Moore (123rd Outram’s Rifles, attached).
Second Lieutenant C. C. E. Manson (I.A.R.O., attached).
_Order of British India, 2nd Class, with title of “Bahadur”_
Subadar Senbir Gurung (2nd Battalion, attached).
_Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class_
Subadar Senbir Gurung.
Jemadar Gangabir Gurung.
No. 4252 Naik Diwan Sing Gurung.
No. 4015 Rifleman Khamba Sing Gurung.
No. 4509 Rifleman Parbir Gurung.
No. 4578 Rifleman Wazir Singh Burathoki.
No. 1840 Havildar Bhakat Sing Rana (2nd Battalion 4th Gurkha Rifles,
attached).
No. 2417 Rifleman Bhandoj Rai.
_Indian Distinguished Service Medal_
No. 4203 Rifleman Deotinarain Newar.
No. 3994 Rifleman Patiram Kunwar.
No. 798 Lance-Naik Asbir Rana.
No. 4945 Lance-Naik Lachman Gurung.
No. 1074 Rifleman Garbha Sing Gurung.
_Russian Medal of St. George, 3rd Class_
No. 4578 Rifleman Wazir Sing Burathoki.
2ND BATTALION 8TH GURKHA RIFLES
_Distinguished Service Order_
Captain G. C. Buckland.
_Order of British India, 2nd Class, with title of “Bahadur”_
Subadar Shamsher Gurung.
_Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class_
No. 3110 Havildar Hari Parshad Thapa.
Subadar Sarabjit Gurung.
No. 1632 Rifleman Narbahadur Gurung (Naga Hills Military Police
Battalion, attached).
No. 1348 Rifleman Budhiman Thapa (Chin Hills Military Police
Battalion, attached).
_Russian Medal of St. George, 4th Class_
No. 4078 Rifleman Dhamraj Thapa.
1ST BATTALION 9TH GURKHA RIFLES
_Companion of the Bath_
Lieut.-Colonel G. T. Widdicombe.
_Military Cross_
Captain J. R. L. Heyland (killed in action).
Captain G. D. Pike.
Lieutenant L. C. C. Rogers (1st Battalion 7th Gurkha Rifles, attached;
died of wounds).
Lieutenant R. G. H. Murray.
Subadar Haridhoj Khattri.
Subadar Bakht Bahadur Adhikari.
_Order of British India, 2nd Class, with title of “Bahadur”_
Subadar Balbahadar Khattri.
Subadar Chandrabir Thapa.
_Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class_
Subadar Mehar Sing Khattri.
Jemadar Shibdhoj Mal.
No. 2016 Lance-Naik Jhaman Sing Khattri (2nd Battalion, attached).
No. 2721 Rifleman Panchbir Mal (2nd Battalion, attached).
No. 2589 Rifleman Tika Ram Kunwar.
_Indian Distinguished Service Medal_
Subadar Chandrabir Thapa.
Subadar Haridhoj Khattri.
Jemadar Damodhar Khattri.
No. 1922 Havildar Gambhir Sing Bohra.
No. 1515 Havildar Lalit Bahadur Mal.
No. 2017 Naik Kharak Bahadur Basnet.
No. 2027 Naik Kulman Khattri.
No. 2096 Lance-Naik Jowar Sing Khattri.
No. 2118 Lance-Naik Samar Bahadur Mal.
No. 2814 Lance-Naik Sirikisan Khattri.
No. 2772 Rifleman Manbahadur Sahi.
No. 2799 Rifleman Kharak Bahadur Bhandari.
No. 2588 Rifleman Dhan Bahadur.
No. 2492 Rifleman Gajbir Bisht.
No. 2885 Rifleman Balbahadur Khattri.
No. 3055 Rifleman Ranbahadur Sahi.
No. 3075 Rifleman Dinbahadur Kunwar.
_Russian Cross of the Order of St. George, 4th Class_
Subadar Bakht Bahadur Adhikari.
_Russian Medal of St. George, 3rd Class_
No. 2589 Rifleman Tika Ram Kunwar.
SPECIAL PROMOTION IN THE FIELD
_To be Havildar_
No. 2721 Rifleman Panchbir Mal, 2nd Battalion 9th Gurkha Rifles
(attached to 1st Battalion).
UNATTACHED LIST, INDIAN ARMY
_Military Cross_
Second Lieutenant A. C. Curtis (attached 1st Bedfordshire Regiment).
Second Lieutenant C. S. Searle (attached 1st Royal Berkshire
Regiment).
Second Lieutenant (temporary Lieutenant) A. F. Logan (attached 2nd
Battalion Bedfordshire Regiment).
Lieutenant (temporary Captain) T. Layng (attached Durham Light
Infantry).
Second Lieutenant (temporary Lieutenant) C. H. H. Eales (attached 2nd
Battalion Royal Irish Rifles).
Second Lieutenant (temporary Lieutenant) F. Powell (attached
Bedfordshire Regiment).
MEDICAL SERVICES
_Companion of the Bath_
Colonel B. B. Grayfoot, M.D., I.M.S.
_Companion of St. Michael and St. George_
Lieut.-Colonel C. H. Bowle-Evans, M.B., I.M.S. (attached 8th Gurkha
Rifles).
Lieut.-Colonel F. Wall, I.M.S. (attached 3rd Gurkha Rifles).
Major H. M. Cruddas, I.M.S.
Lieut.-Colonel J. A. Hamilton, M.B., F.R.C.S.
Major W. W. Jeudwine, M.D.
_Distinguished Service Order_
Captain J. Taylor (attached 1st Battalion 89th Garhwal Rifles).
Major G. C. L. Kerans, I.M.S.
Major R. A. Needham, M.B.
_Military Cross_
Captain Kunwar Indarjit Singh (attached 57th Rifles; killed in
action).
Captain J. S. O’Neill, M.B., I.M.S.
Third Class Assistant Surgeon F. B. A. Braganza, Indian Subordinate
Medical Department.
Assistant Surgeon E. B. Messinier, Indian Subordinate Medical
Department.
No. 298 Second Class Sub-Assistant Surgeon Ram Krishna Ganpat Shinde
(attached 1st Battalion 39th Garhwal Rifles).
Captain H. S. C. Cormack, M.B., F.R.C.S., I.M.S.
Captain C. A. Wood, M.B., I.M.S.
First Class Assistant Surgeon W. J. S. Maine, I.S.M.D.
Third Class Assistant Surgeon E. H. Boilard, I.S.M.D.
_Distinguished Conduct Medal_
Third Class Assistant Surgeon K. P. Elloy, Indian Subordinate Medical
Department, No. 7 British Field Ambulance.
_Royal Red Cross Decoration, 1st Class_
Miss H. A. M. Rait, Queen Alexandra’s Military Nursing Service for
India.
Miss P. F. Watt, Queen Alexandra’s Military Nursing Service for India.
_Royal Red Cross Decoration, 2nd Class_
Miss M. D. Knapp, Queen Alexandra’s Military Nursing Service for
India.
_Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class_
No. 1116 First Class Sub-Assistant Surgeon Nagindar Singh, Indian
Subordinate Medical Department.
No. 128 Field Ambulance, No. 1124 First Class Sub-Assistant Surgeon
Maula Baksh.
No. 111 Field Ambulance, No. 988 First Class Sub-Assistant Surgeon Tek
Chand.
Third Class Sub-Assistant Surgeon G. K. R. Rane (attached 21st Company
3rd Sappers and Miners).
Sub-Assistant Surgeon Harnam Singh (attached 34th Sikh Pioneers).
Senior Sub-Assistant Surgeon Pandit Shankar Das (attached 47th Sikhs).
No. 111 Field Ambulance, No. 2421 Stretcher-bearer Jaganaut.
No. 8 Company Army Bearer Corps, No. 8001 Havildar Bihari.
No. 862 First Class Sub-Assistant Surgeon Ram Singh, I.S.M.D.
(attached 1/4th Gurkha Rifles).
No. 1230 Second Class Sub-Assistant Surgeon Pargan Singh, I.S.M.D.
(attached 6th Jat Light Infantry).
_Indian Distinguished Service Medal_
No. 7 Company Army Bearer Corps, No. 7032 Lance-Naik Surjoo.
No. 8 Company Army Bearer Corps, No. 8316 Bearer Ram Sabatu.
No. 8 Company Army Bearer Corps, No. 937 First Class Sub-Assistant
Surgeon Muhammad Umar.
No. 8 Company Army Bearer Corps, No. 3039 Naik Achroo.
112th Indian Field Ambulance, First Class Senior Sub-Assistant Surgeon
Gaure Shankar.
129th Indian Field Ambulance, No. 1171 2nd Class Sub-Assistant Surgeon
Zafar Husain.
112th Indian Field Ambulance, No. 4009 Naik Wadhawa.
19th British Field Ambulance Army Bearer Corps, No. 7017 Naik
Khushali.
20th British Field Ambulance Army Bearer Corps, No. 11018 Lance-Naik
Surjoo.
1st Class Sub-Assistant Surgeon Narayan Parshad Sukal, 112th Field
Ambulance.
2nd Class Senior Sub-Assistant Surgeon Mahadeo Parshad, attached 1st
Battalion 1st Gurkha Rifles.
No. 8037 Lance-Naik Mangli, No. 8 Company, 113th Field Ambulance.
No. 772, 1st Class Sub-Assistant Surgeon Pohlo Ram, I.S.M.D. (attached
1/9th Gurkha Rifles).
No. 1246, 2nd Class Sub-Assistant Surgeon Kishan Singh, I.S.M.D.
(attached 113th Indian Field Ambulance).
No. 1360, 3rd Class Sub-Assistant Surgeon Mathura Parshad Sarswit,
I.S.M.D. (attached 57th Wilde’s Rifles (F.F.)).
No. 3000 Havildar Nikka, No. 7 British Field Ambulance (Army Bearer
Corps).
No. 7034 Lance-Naik Kundan, No. 19 British Field Ambulance (Army
Bearer Corps).
No. 7052 Bearer Bhujjoo, No. 19 British Field Ambulance (Army Bearer
Corps).
No. 7455 Bearer Mulloo, No. 19 British Field Ambulance (Army Bearer
Corps).
No. 7339 Bearer Narian, No. 19 British Field Ambulance (Army Bearer
Corps).
No. 4349 Bearer Madan Singh, No. 112 Indian Field Ambulance (Army
Bearer Corps).
No. 4397 Bearer Mastan Singh, No. 112 Indian Field Ambulance (Army
Bearer Corps).
No. 7074 Lance-Naik Ram Charan, No. 128 Indian Field Ambulance (Army
Bearer Corps).
No. 7204 Bearer Beni, No. 128 Indian Field Ambulance (Army Bearer
Corps).
No. 7259 Bearer Chabi, No. 128 Indian Field Ambulance (Army Bearer
Corps).
_Russian Cross of the Order of St. George, 4th Class_
3rd Class Assistant Surgeon K. P. Elloy, I.S.M.D., No. 7 British Field
Ambulance.
_Russian Medal of St. George, 2nd Class_
3rd Class Sub-Assistant Surgeon Gopinath Agarwal, 128th Indian Field
Ambulance.
_Brevet Colonel_
Lieut.-Colonel W. W. White, M.D., I.M.S.
Lieut.-Colonel A. H. Moorhead, M.B., I.M.S.
_Brevet Lieut.-Colonel_
Major H. Boulton, M.B., I.M.S.
Major G. Browse, M.B., I.M.S.
_Senior Assistant Surgeon with Honorary Rank of Lieutenant_
1st Class Assistant Surgeon W. J. S. Maine, I.S.M.D.
_3rd Class Assistant Surgeon_
4th Class Assistant Surgeon E. R. Hill, I.S.M.D.
_French Croix de Guerre_
7204 Bearer Beni, 128th Field Ambulance.
SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT CORPS
_Distinguished Service Order_
Major A. K. Heyland.
_Order of British India, 2nd Class, with title of “Bahadur”_
Ressaidar Amir Khan, 2nd Mule Corps.
_Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class_
31st Mule Corps, No. 1357 Driver Sayad Abdulla.
_Indian Distinguished Service Medal_
11th Mule Corps, No. 904 Naik Miram Baksh.
11th Mule Corps, No. 831 Naik Painda Khan.
11th Mule Corps, No. 1526 Lance-Naik Rafiuddin.
11th Mule Corps, No. 605 Driver Chedu Beg.
11th Mule Corps, No. 1315 Driver Fakir Muhammad.
11th Mule Corps, No. 986 Driver Shubrati.
No. 1406 Driver Abdullah Shah, 2nd Mule Corps.
No. 182 Kot-Dafadar Fetch Khan, 9th Mule Corps.
No. 82 Kot-Dafadar Bahawal Din, 9th Mule Corps.
No. 694 Naik Khan Gul, 9th Mule Corps.
No. 843 Naik Mahomed Khan, 9th Mule Corps.
No. 862 Driver Rup Singh, 27th Mule Corps.
No. 319 Lance-Naik Sundar Singh, 38th Mule Corps.
_Brevet Lieut.-Colonel_
Major W. F. Smith, Meerut Divisional Train.
Major W. N. Lushington.
_Honorary Major_
Commissary and Honorary Captain E. J. Goodhall.
INDIAN ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT
_Military Cross_
Sub-Conductor J. L. N. M‘Dougall.
_Distinguished Conduct Medal_
Sub-Conductor E. V. Johnson.
REMOUNT DEPARTMENT
_Companion of St. Michael and St. George_
Lieut.-Colonel C. F. Templer, I.A.
INDIAN MISCELLANEOUS LIST
_Assistant Commissary with Honorary Rank of Lieutenant_
Sub-Conductor W. Forsyth.
Sub-Conductor F. C. Marks.
Sub-Conductor C. G. Jackson.
INDIAN VOLUNTEER CORPS
_Distinguished Conduct Medal_
Corporal W. Gurdon, Calcutta Volunteer Rifles.
Sergeant F. Birley, Madras Volunteer Rifles.
MILITARY WORKS SERVICES
_Distinguished Conduct Medal_
Sub-Conductor P. J. Fitzpatrick.
ROYAL INDIAN MARINE
_Companion of St. Michael and St. George_
Commander (retired) G. E. Holland, C.I.E., D.S.O. (temporary Colonel
R.E.).
SPECIAL LIST
_Companion of the Indian Empire_
Temporary Captain P. J. G. Pipon, I.C.S.
Temporary Captain E. B. Howell (Indian Civil Service), Censor of
Indian Mails with the Indian Expeditionary Force in France.
_Military Cross_
Rev. R. J. B. Irwin, M.A., Indian Ecclesiastical Department.
Temporary Captain P. J. G. Pipon, I.C.S.
Temporary Lieutenant A. H. Parker (Indian Civil Service), Punjab
Volunteer Rifles (attached Royal Flying Corps).
INDEX[10]
Abdulla, No. 1357 Driver Sayad, I.O.M., 381
Adair, Capt. W. F., 44
Adams, Lieut., 250
Adhikari, Subadar Bakht Bahadur, M.C., Russian Cross of the Order of
St. George, 4th Class, 376, 377
Afghan War (1880), 11, 87
Afghanistan, 1, 3, 9, 72, 87, 113, 312
Afghans, 16
Africa, East, 52, 109
North, 98
South, 28, 53, 92, 94
West, 1, 180
Afridi Hills, 20
Afridis, 16, 214, 238
Agarwal, 3rd Class Sub-Assist. Surgeon Gopinath, Russian Medal of St.
George, 2nd Class, 380
Agnew, Lieut. J., 291
Agra, 94, 101
Ahmad, No. 4182 Sepoy Said, I.D.S.M., 43, 371
Aisne River, 28, 24, 32
Akbar, No. 2718 Lance-Naik Said, I.O.M., 365
Alam, Jemadar Nur, I.D.S.M., 354
Aldershot, 294
Alderson, General, 245, 280
Ale, No. 2252 Bugler Kharak Bahadur, I.O.M., 374
Alexander, Capt. R. D., 100
Alexander, Capt. R. G., M.C., 349
Alexandra’s (Queen) Own Gurkha Rifles, 3rd, 110
Ali, Subadar Abdul, Bahadur, 367
Ali, Jemadar Akbar, 341
Ali, No. 3529 Naik Amir, I.D.S.M., 368
Ali, Jemadar Bahadur, I.D.S.M., 354
Ali, No. 3435 Sepoy Haidar, I.D.S.M., 362
Ali, No. 2770 Naik Liyakat, afterwards Havildar, 355
Ali, Jemadar Liyakat, I.O.M., 353
Ali, Jemadar Mardan, 169
Ali, Risaldar Mir Hidayat, 175
Ali Musjid, 164
Ali, Subadar Qasim, Bahadur, 355
Ali, Jemadar Zaman, I.D.S.M., 368
Aliwal, 87, 164
“Allahabad Levy,” 300
Allardice, Lieut., 250
Allen, Lieut.-Col., 259
Almond, Lieut., 70
Amal, No. 118 Lance-Naik Nek, I.O.M., Russian Cross of the Order of St.
George, 4th Class, 371
Ambala Cavalry Brigade, 176
Amiens, 232
Ammunition Columns, 19, 20
Anderson, Lieut.-Col., 72
Anderson, Lieut., 155–6, 339
Anderson, Capt. B. E., afterwards Brevet Major, 157, 369
Anderson, Lieut.-General Sir C. A., C.B., 19, 52, 68, 85, 105, 121,
123, 151, 159, 165, 167, 175, 176, 206, 226, 270, 271, 273, 278,
279, 282, 284, 288, 317, 325
Anderson, Lieut.-Col. W. C., C.M.G., 372
Apthorpe, Capt. E. H., 126
Arabi, Jemadar Muhammad, I.O.M., 367
Arjun, No. 2763 Havildar, I.D.S.M., 367
Armentières, 313
Army Corps, British, 1st, 39, 166–7, 172–4, 209, 279
3rd, 241
4th, 232, 234, 268, 269
5th, 241
Army Service Corps, 99
Arras, 269
Asghar, No. 3567 Lance-Naik Said, I.D.S.M., 367
Ashanti, 1, 90, 161, 194
Asia, 29
Assam, 297
Assaye, 216
Atal, Major P., 133
Atkinson, Lieut. J. G., 157
Aubers Ridge, 60, 81, 202, 203, 210, 231, 267, 269, 306, 327
Ava, 300
Avoué, Ferme d’, 279
Azam, Subadar Makmad Bahadur, I.O.M., 371
Aziz, Jemadar Abdul, I.D.S.M., 112, 354
Bacquerot, Rue du, 335
Badhai, Jemadar Data Din, I.D.S.M., 354
Badlu, No. 1548 Havildar, I.D.S.M., 113, 357
Badshah, No. 3032 Lance-Naik Lal, I.O.M., 367
Badshah, Jemadar Mir, I.O.M., 371
Badshah, No. 3119 Sepoy Mir, I.D.S.M., 366
Badshah, No. 2108 Sepoy Mir, I.D.S.M., 366
Bagmal, No. 1004 Sepoy, I.D.S.M., 357
Bagot-Chester, Lieut., 332
Baidullah, No. 3404 Naik, I.D.S.M., 367
Bainbridge, Lieut. D., M.C., 365
Baird, Major, H. B. D., D.S.O., 348
Baksh, No. 1124 1st Class Sub-Assist. Surgeon Maula, I.O.M., 379
Baksh, Jemadar Mehar, I.D.S.M., 354
Baksh, No. 904 Naik Miram, I.D.S.M., 331
Baksh, No. 3144 Driver Havildar Muhammad, I.O.M., I.D.S.M., 354
Baldwin, Capt. H. L., 127
Balfour-Melville, Lieut., 338
Ballinger, Lieut., 290
Baluchis, 129th, 18, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45,
46, 120, 122, 123, 126, 133, 144, 145, 146, 154, 156, 157, 164, 170,
206, 240, 248, 249, 250, 258, 295, 300, 304, 310
124th, 251, 304
Bamberger, Capt. C. D., R.E., 152
Banks, Capt. P. d’A., 251
Bannatine-Allason, Major-General, 241
Bareilly Brigade, 19, 22, 53, 75, 76, 95, 103, 120, 205, 206, 209, 218,
221, 224, 239, 270, 276, 277, 280, 283, 284, 286, 288, 328, 331,
333, 341
Barlow, Major, 76
Barr, Corporal A., 162
Barrow, Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-General) G. de S., C.B., 343
Barry, Lieut. D., 161
Barry, Lieut.-Col. S., 317
Barstow, Lieut. A. E., M.C., 358
Barton, Capt. F., 85
Barwell, Major, E. E., 87
Basnet, No. 2017 Naik Kharak Bahadur, I.D.S.M., 376
Bassée, La, 24, 44, 48, 49, 60, 103, 107, 139, 143, 149, 164, 201, 202,
204, 210, 211, 215, 218, 277, 279, 301, 302, 306, 327
Bastian, Lieut., 271
Bauvin, 327
Bavarian Reserve Division, 6th, 225
Regiments, 16th and 21st, 227
Baz, No. 3223 Sepoy Mir, I.D.S.M., 366
Baz, No. 3030 Naik Zar, I.D.S.M., Russian Cross of the Order of St.
George, 4th Class, 367
Beall, Major, 259, 264
Beau Puits, 279
Beauchamp-Duff, Capt., 92
Becher, Major, H. S., 85
Bedford Regiment, 78
Beg, No. 605 Driver Chedu, I.D.S.M., 381
Beg, Jemadar Hayat Ali, I.O.M., 352
Beg, Capt. Shah Mirza, 22
Belgium, 307
Bell, Capt. M. A. R., 169
Bell, Serjeant-Major R., 260–61
Bengal, 319
Bengal Infantry, 233, 234, 239, 300, 341
Beni, No. 7204 Bearer, I.D.S.M., French Croix de Guerre, 380, 381
Bennett, Capt. H., 110
Berceaux, Rue des, 218, 224, 231
Bethune, 60, 74, 139, 143, 149
Bhandari, No. 2799 Rifleman Kharak Bahadur, I.D.S.M., 377
Bhopal Infantry, 9th, 18, 66–8, 71, 72, 103, 120–23, 125, 126, 164,
170, 173, 200, 240, 248, 254, 258, 259, 296, 297, 304
Bhujjoo, No. 7052 Bearer, I.D.S.M., 380
Bhurtpore, 87, 164, 284
Bhutias, 319
Biez, Ferme du, 269, 270
Bihari, No. 8001 Havildar, I.O.M., 379
Bingham, Major, 330
Birbal, Naik, 302
Bird, Capt. A. J. G., D.S.O., 352
Birley, Sergeant F., D.C.M., 255, 382
Bisht, No. 463 Naik Baktwar Sing, I.O.M., 362
Bisht, No. 2697 Bugler Bhola, I.D.S.M., 361
Bisht, No. 2492 Rifleman Gajbir, I.D.S.M., 110, 377
Bisht, No. 1283, Naik Jaman Sing, I.O.M., 210, 362
Bisht, No. 1674 Rifleman Kalamu, I.O.M., 360
Bisht, No. 2854 Rifleman Keshi, I.D.S.M., 361
Bisht, No. 1760 Rifleman Kutalu, I.D.S.M., 361
Bisht, No. 1211 Rifleman Man Sing, Russian Medal of St. George, 3rd
Class, 362
Black, Capt. W., 78–9
Black Watch Regiment, 2nd, 19, 55, 94, 120, 122–3, 126–9, 160, 165–167,
169, 206, 213, 222, 225, 239, 241, 272, 274–5, 330–31, 334–9, 341–2
4th, 222, 234, 239, 272, 274, 328, 333–4, 336, 339, 341
Blackader, Brig.-General, 150, 152, 206, 209, 225
Bliss, Major C., 162, 163
Bohra, No. 1922 Havildar Gambhir Sing, I.D.S.M., 376
Bohra, Subadar-Major Man Singh, 85
Boilard, 3rd Class Assist. Surgeon E. H., M.C., 378
Boileau, Major S. B., afterwards Brevet Lieut.-Col., 159, 223, 374
Bois du Biez, 80, 203, 204, 215, 216, 220, 226, 227, 230, 231, 270,
298, 327
Bois, Ferme du, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 292
Bois, Rue du, 149, 211, 219, 221, 224, 271, 279
Bombay, 4, 100
Bombay Sepoys, 233
Boulogne, 48
Boulton, Major H. M. B., afterwards Brevet Lieut.-Col., 380
Boyd, Private, 127
Bowes, Brig.-General, 85, 89, 90
Bowle-Evans, Lieut.-Col. C. H., C.M.G., 97, 377
Braganza, 3rd Class Assist. Surgeon F. B. A., M.C., 378
Brahmin Regiment, 1st, 332 3rd, 330
Brahmins, 72, 297
Brakes, Lance-Corporal, 152
Brakspear, Lieut.-Col. W. K., 108, 109, 110, 332
Bridoux, 327
Brigade (British), 2nd, 168
5th, 283
6th, 283
7th, 65
8th, 85, 89, 90
9th, 65
60th, 333, 336
Brind, Capt. R. M., M.C., 368
Brique, La, 247, 248, 253, 255
Brisbane, Colour-Sergeant, 161
Brock, Capt. B. de L., M.C., 349
Brodhurst, Major, 258
Brown, Lieut., 283
Brown, Capt. A. M., M.C., 228, 368
Browne, Lieut., 332
Browne, Major H. E., 66
Browning, Lieut. C. S., 144, 145
Brownlow, Lieut. W., 276
Browse, Major G., M.B., afterwards Brevet Lieut.-Col., 97, 380
Bruce, Major, 184
Bruce, Major G. D., D.S.O., 348
Bruce, Lieut. W. A. M‘Crae, V.C., 347
Brunker, Major-General J. M. S., 19, 51, 148, 175
Brunskill, Lieut. G. S., M.C., 88, 364
Bryce, Lieut. S., 171
Buckingham, Private William, V.C., 152, 212, 347
Buckland, Capt. G. C., D.S.O., 77, 375
Bull, Capt. G. S., M.C., 127, 129, 366
Bullard, Lieut. E., 318–19
Buller, Lieut. F. E., R.E., M.C., 140, 353
Buner Hills, 22
Bura, No. 1679 Naik Gamer Sing, I.D.S.M., 373
Burathoki, No. 4578 Rifleman Bhakat Sing, I.O.M., Russian Medal of St.
George, 3rd Class, 375
Burathoki, Rifleman Wazir Sing, 229
Burke, Capt. T., 157
Burmah, 1, 53, 79, 164, 300
Burma Infantry, 93rd, 328
Burnett, Capt. R. F. D., M.C., 369
Burstall, Brig.-General, 265
Burton, Capt. G. W., D.S.O., 361
Butts, Lieut. F. C. de, M.C., 355
Calais, 48
Calcutta, 101
Calcutta Volunteer Rifles, 234
Callaghan, Capt. G. F., 126
Calonne, 205, 208, 218
Camberley, 50
Cameron, Capt. W., 162
Cameron Highlanders, 135, 172
Cammell, Lieut. G. A. (R.F.A.), 213
Campbell, Colin, 28
Campbell, Lieut. F. C. G., M.C., 362
Canadian Division, 203, 245, 246, 254, 257, 269, 288, 289
Royal Artillery, 248, 262, 263, 265
Canteloux, 327
Carden, Major, 201
Carmichael, Corporal J., 162
Carnegy, Major-General P. M., C.B., 10, 51, 163, 170, 171, 175
Carter’s Post, 328
Cassels, Major K., 77, 133, 134
Casson, Major W. F. S., D.S.O., 348
Cauteau, Colonel, 175
Cavalry Division, 1st, 33
Division, 2nd, 33, 34, 232
Division, 4th, 20, 240
Brigade, 3rd, 36
Brigade, 4th, 36, 38, 111
Brigade, 5th, 36
Brigade, 6th, 232
Ceylon, 42
Chabi, No. 7259 Bearer, I.D.S.M., 380
Chagatta, Colour-Havildar, I.O.M., I.D.S.M., Russian Cross of the Order
of St. George, 4th Class, 112, 212, 354, 355
Chakdara, 11
Chakwal, 43
Chand, Subadar Parbat, M.C., 368
Chand, No. 988 1st Class Sub-Assist. Surgeon Tek, I.O.M., 379
Changa, No. 4204 Sapper, I.D.S.M., 356
Chapelle St. Roch, 150
Charan, No. 7074 Lance-Naik Ram, I.D.S.M., 380
Charles, Brig.-General (R.E.), 314
Charles, Major J. R., 49
Chenwar, Subadar Nain Sing Bahadur, 361
_Chevaux de frise_, 208
Chillianwala, 216
China, 34, 63, 113, 164, 238
Chindwin, 1
Chinwarh, Subadar Nain Sing, M.C., 361
Chitral, 11, 63, 300
Chocolat Menier Corner, 201, 204, 279
Christopher, Capt., 250
Churchill, the Rt. Hon. Winston, 103, 194
Cis-Indus, 234
Cix Marmuse, La, 205
Clarke, Capt. A. C. K. S., M.C., 351
Clarke, Lieut. I. H., 37
Clarke, Capt. R. J., 213
Cliqueterie, La, Farm, 203, 209, 270, 327, 335
Coast Sepoys, 10th Battalion of, 300
Coates, Lieut., 259
Cobbe, Col. (temp. Brig.-General), A.S.C., V.C., D.S.O., C.B., 50, 348
Cockburn, Lieut. C. J., M.C., 134, 356
Coffin, Lieut.-Col. C., 53
Coldwell, Sergeant, 254
Collins, Capt. L. P., D.S.O., 229, 375
Collins, Lieut., 271
Combe, Capt. S. B., M.C., 364
Comorin, Cape, 297
Connaught, Duke of, 39 Prince Arthur of, 116
Connaught Rangers, 1st and 2nd, 2, 33, 34, 55, 83, 85, 86, 90, 107,
120, 121, 122, 125, 126, 130, 133, 144, 149, 164, 170, 178, 200,
236, 240, 242, 248, 249, 252, 253, 254, 258, 266, 316
1st, 18, 89
Conneau, General, 61
Connell, Lieut. S. D., 140
Cook, Capt., 250
Cook, Private C., 135
Copeland, Major, 300
Cormack, Capt. H. S. C., M.B., F.R.C.S., M.C., 378
Cornwall Light Infantry, 260
Corps d’Armée, XXIst, 106, 141, 164, 170
Corse-Scott, Lieut. E. J., M.C., 373
Cour d’Avoué, 280, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293
Couture, La, 122, 154, 205, 208, 215, 218, 224, 278, 280
Crackett, Private J., 171
Craig, Lieut. J. M., 78
Cramer-Roberts, Capt. A. T., D.S.O., 155–6, 375
Creagh, Sir O’Moore, 11, 12, 14
Creagh, Capt. L., 172
Crescent, the, 224
Crewe, Lord, 193
Crisp, Private, 152
Croix Barbée, 278, 280, 284
Crosse, Lieut., 283
Crozier, Capt., 287
Cruddas, Major H. M., C.M.G., 378
Cruddas, Lieut.-Col. H. W., D.S.O., 363
Cullen, Lieut.-Col. E. H. S., M.V.O., D.S.O., C.M.G., 63, 359
Cureton, Capt., 234
Curtis, 2nd Lieut. A. C., M.C., 377
Curzon, Lord, of Kedleston, 101
Cuthbert, Major, 221
Dad, No. 2198 Havildar Fazl, I.D.S.M., 367
Dad, No. 1485 Naik Karam, I.D.S.M., 369
Dalmahoy, Capt., 250
Daniell, Capt. J. A. S., D.S.O., 357
Danu, No. 617 Havildar Bir Sing, I.D.S.M., 362
Danu, Jemadar Khushal Singh, 95
Darjeeling, 319
Das, Senior Sub-Assist. Surgeon Pandit Shankar, I.O.M., 379
Dast, Jemadar Mir, I.O.M., V.C., 251, 365
Dast, Subadar Mir, V.C., I.O.M., Russian Cross of the Order of St.
George, 3rd Class, 347, 366
Davidson, Capt., 77
Davidson, Lieut. H. S., 285
Davidson, Major S. R., afterwards Brevet Lieut.-Col., 66, 69, 70, 365
Davidson-Houston, Major C. E. D., D.S.O., 79, 127, 339, 340, 342, 366
Davies, Major-General F., 241
Davis, Capt., 134
Deacon, Major, 253, 254
Deane, Capt., 332–3
Deane-Spread, Lieut., 340
Deccan Horse, 20th, 20, 171, 174, 175
Plains, 29
Deedes, Lieut. R. B., M.C., 251, 365
Dehra Dun Brigade, 19, 22, 53, 75, 149, 150, 151, 158, 160, 165, 166,
167, 205, 209, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 220, 221, 223, 224, 239,
270, 271, 272, 273, 278, 279, 280, 327, 328, 329, 334, 335, 337, 338
Delhi, 6, 8, 14, 15, 23, 33, 46, 51, 87, 110, 216, 227, 341
Denison, Capt., 338
Derajat, 284
Devon Regiment, 76
Dhan, No. 2588 Rifleman, Bahadur, I.D.S.M., 377
Diejal, No. 2061 Sepoy Thakur, I.D.S.M., 363
Dikshit, Jemadar Gangacharan, I.D.S.M., 354
Dill, Lieut. J. R., 300
Dill, Very Rev. Dr. Marcus, 300
Dill, Capt. R. F., D.S.O., 43, 46, 300, 370
Din, Ahmed, 40, 41
Din, No. 82 Kot-Dafadar Bahawal, I.D.S.M., 381
Din, No. 3056 Lance-Naik, afterwards Naik, Fazl, 355
Din, No. 45 Sapper Ghulam Ayud, I.D.S.M., 356
Din, No. 4079 Naik Ilm, I.D.S.M., 352
Din, Subadar-Major Umar Din, Bahadur, 370
Distillery, the, 270
Divisions (British), 1st, 163, 274, 276
2nd, 279–81, 284, 287–8
7th, 273, 279, 281, 286–7
8th, 107, 122, 210, 216, 218, 226, 227, 228, 230, 239, 241, 273, 293,
314
19th, 241, 327
20th, 329, 333
27th (Artillery of), 263, 265 (and _see_ Cavalry)
(French) 58th, 170
Dixit, Ganga Charn, 70
Dogras, 7, 34, 56, 63, 79, 239
37th Regiment, 276
41st Regiment, 19, 120, 160, 166, 206, 225, 233, 239, 271, 272, 274,
276, 304, 336
Don, 269
Dorset Regiment, 33
Douie, Lieut. F. M‘C., D.S.O., M.C., 291–2, 353
Dover, 29
Doyle, Sir Arthur Conan, _The British Campaign in France and Flanders,
1914_, 154
Dragoon Guards, 7th, 20, 84, 135, 170, 171
Drake-Brockman, Lieut.-Col. D. H., C.M.G., 95, 210, 270, 273, 361
Drummond, Major E. G., 108, 109, 110
Drysdale, Lieut. A. E., M.C., 250, 364
Dube, Subadar Gaurishankar, Bahadur, M.C., 353
Duck’s Bill, 328, 330, 341
Dudley, Capt., 134, 271
Duffus, Lieut.-Col. E. J., 122
Duffy, Private, 234
Duhan, Major, 251
Dun, Naik Rupdhan, 110
Dundas, Major, 151, 152
Dundas, Major P. H., D.S.O., 111, 112, 134, 356
Dutt, No. 1029 Lance-Naik Bhawani, I.D.S.M., 354
Dyce, Capt. H. L., M.C., 349
Eales, 2nd Lieut. (temp. Lieut.), C. H. H., M.C., 377
Edward VII., King of England, 323
Edward, H.R.H. Prince of Wales, 116
Edwards, 182
Egerton, Brig.-General R. M., C.B., 18, 51, 121, 122, 123, 127, 130,
135, 175, 206, 248
Egypt, 20, 28, 39, 51, 52, 63, 65, 73, 96, 100, 138, 143, 164, 185,
195, 197, 198, 297, 304, 320
Elliot, Lieut.-General Sir E. Locke, K.C.B., D.S.O., French Legion of
Honour, Croix de Commandeur, 349
Eliott-Lockhart, Lieut.-Col., 228
Elliott, Major R. W., 134
Elloy, 3rd Class Assistant Surgeon K. P., D.C.M., Russian Cross of the
Order of St. George, 4th Class, 378, 380
England, 4, 17, 25, 45, 48, 100, 101, 106, 137, 153, 182, 183, 184,
192, 193, 194, 196, 237, 238, 311, 323
Essars, 122
Essex Regiment, 33
Estaires, 106, 107, 201, 204, 211, 277, 301, 302
Etlinger, Capt., 259
Ewart, Colonel R. H., D.S.O., C.B., 97, 348
Eyre, Capt. K. G., 133
Fasken, Colonel (temp. Brig.-General) W. H., C.B., 241, 348
Fellowes, Lieut. (temp. Capt.) H. G. A., M.C., 351
Fenner, Colonel C., 62
Ferozepore Brigade, 18, 21, 33, 51, 60, 61, 65, 73, 89, 120, 121, 134,
144, 149, 150, 154, 163, 164, 170, 175, 205, 206, 208, 218, 221,
224, 240, 247, 248, 249, 250, 253, 254, 255, 257, 258, 259, 262
Ferronays, Capt. de la, 32
Festubert, 22, 39, 52, 57, 75, 119, 120, 137, 149, 163, 168, 211, 267,
279, 299, 304, 332
Finlay, Lance-Corporal David, V.C., 275–6, 347
Fitzgerald, Colonel, 194
Fitzmaurice, Lieut., 70
Fitzpatrick, Sub-Conductor P. J., D.C.M., 382
Flagg, Capt., 340
Flanders, 1, 5, 7, 20, 21, 23, 24, 27, 29, 46, 48, 56, 77, 80, 82, 85,
96, 137, 183, 185, 190, 235, 252, 300, 310, 325, 332, 341, 344
Fleming, Capt. W. E., M.C., 363
Flynn, Corporal, 252
Foch, Marshal, 304
Forbes, Capt., 36, 38, 314
Forrester, Capt. R. E., 95
Forster, Sergeant P., 132
Forsyth, Sub-Conductor W. (afterwards Assist. Commissary and Hon.
Lieut.), 382
Fortuin, 246
Fosse-Calonne, 141
Fowler, Colonel (temp. Brig.-General), D.S.O., C.B., 348
Fowler, Lieut. E. K., M.C., 38, 46, 365
France, 2, 4, 5, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31,
32, 34, 41, 49, 52, 53, 55, 56, 63, 67, 72, 75, 79, 82, 91, 93, 94,
96, 99, 100, 104, 106, 110, 111, 119, 138, 140, 142, 148, 169, 174,
177, 178, 182, 183, 185, 186, 189, 190, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196,
197, 198, 200, 209, 218, 221, 222, 227, 230, 255, 263, 264, 268,
294, 295, 297, 299, 300, 302, 304, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314,
317, 318, 320, 321, 323, 325, 332, 333, 336, 340, 342, 343
Francis, Capt. R. F., M.C., 364
Franklin, Capt., 74
Franklin, Major H. S. E., D.S.O., 355, 357
Franks, Brig.-General (R.A.), 204
Fraser, Lieut., 339
Fraser, Capt. W. A. K. F., M.C., 352
French, Sir John, 7, 24, 30, 45, 50, 63, 65, 71, 72, 73, 75, 85, 103,
104, 136, 138, 143, 176, 184, 185, 188, 193, 200, 235, 236, 238,
245, 269, 302, 316
“1914” quoted, 177;
ref., 303
French Colonial Division, 246, 260
Territorials, 142nd, 171, 175, 176
Frontier Expeditions (1908), 10
Fry, Lieut., 291
Fyzabad, 72
Ganga, No. 2630 Havildar, I.O.M., Russian Cross of the Order of St.
George, 4th Class, 45, 365, 366
Gaisford, Lieut. L., 127
Gallipoli, 23, 51, 99, 241, 263, 319
Gambhir, Subadar-Major, 211
Gamble, Lieut., 291
Gandy, Lieut., 283
Ganges River, 3, 23, 29
Canal, 339
Gapaard, 33, 34, 35
Gardiner, Major (R.E.), 155
Garhwal Brigade, 19, 53, 95, 108, 121, 122, 149, 150, 158, 165, 166,
169, 205, 206, 209, 210, 214, 218, 219, 224, 225, 239, 270, 273,
277, 278, 280–84, 288, 289, 328, 331, 333–6, 341
Rifles, 39th, 1st and 2nd Batt., 19, 57, 75, 95, 108, 121, 123, 124,
129–32, 134, 136, 206, 210–215, 219, 220, 222, 225, 239, 244, 248,
270, 281–3, 296, 328, 333, 334, 336, 337
Garhwalis, 7, 57
Garrett, Capt. S., 228
Gedge, 2nd Lieut., 333
George V., King of England, 14, 46, 141, 193, 319
George, the Rt. Hon. David Lloyd, 193
George, Lieut. F., 89, 90
Germany, 235
Ghale, Jemadar Bahadur, 84
Ghale, No. 2153 Lance-Naik Sher Sing, I.D.S.M., 373
Gharti, Lance-Naik Harak Sing, I.O.M., 211, 374
Gharti, Rifleman Thaman, 152
Ghazis, the, 157
Ghazni (1839), 87, 113
Gilchrist, Capt. R. C., 157
Givenchy, 22, 39, 43, 47, 50, 51, 52, 60, 75, 82, 103, 119, 139, 143,
144, 149, 155, 162, 163, 164, 170, 171, 172, 173, 177, 179, 186,
188, 201, 203, 229, 253, 254, 269, 279, 327
Godwin, Major (temp. Lieut.-Col.), afterwards Brevet Lieut.-Col., C. A.
C., 350
Goodhall, Commissary and Hon. Capt., afterwards Hon. Major, 381
Gordon, Major H., 133
Gordon, Capt. J. de la H., M.C., 356
Gordon, Lieut.-Col. J. L., 64
Gordon, Lieut.-Col. L. A., 53, 210, 219
Gordon, Colonel L. F. G., 53
Gordon, Capt. R. S., 37
Gordon, Lieut. S., 128
Gordon Highlanders, 53
Gorre, 120, 121
Gorrie, Lance-Corporal, 129
Gough, Lieut. O., M.C., 349
Govind, Guru, 20
Grant, Colonel, 135, 171
Grant, Major, 46
Grant, Capt. H., 132
Grasett, Lieut., 341
Gray, Capt. E. St. C., M.C., 349
Gray, Lieut.-Colonel F. W. B., C.M.G., 34, 38, 365
Grayfoot, Colonel B. B., M.D., C.B., 97, 377
Grey, Lance-Corporal G., 132
Griffith-Griffin, Lieut. F. M., M.C., 371
Grigg, Capt., 283
Guadeloupe, 338
Guards Brigade, 286
Guides, 57–8, 228, 236, 251
Guides Cavalry, 22
Gul, No. 3902 Lance-Naik Biaz, I.O.M., 368
Gul, No. 3814 Lance-Naik Hobab, I.O.M., 43, 371
Gul, No. 694 Naik Khan, I.D.S.M., 381
Gul, No. 4267 Sepoy Mehrab, I.D.S.M., 371
Gul, No. 4264 Havildar Niaz, I.D.S.M., 368
Gul, No. 4333 Sepoy Redi, I.O.M., 43, 371
Gunning, Lieut.-Col. O. G., C.M.G., 363
Gurdon, Corporal W., D.C.M., 234, 382
Gurkha Light Infantry, 43rd, 79
Gurkhas, 2, 7, 30, 56–8, 85, 86, 92, 96, 245, 269, 319
1st (1st Batt.), 19, 79, 157, 162–4, 169, 174, 205, 226, 229, 240,
257–9, 263, 264, 281, 288–90, 296
2nd (2nd Batt.), 19, 82–6, 90–92, 108, 150, 158–60, 165–6, 169, 206,
216, 218, 220, 223, 238, 270–72, 274, 328, 337
3rd (2nd Batt.), 19, 108, 110, 121–122, 150–52, 206, 210, 211, 219,
225, 238, 281–3, 328, 331–2, 334
4th (1st Batt.), 19, 154–7, 161, 162, 164, 174, 205, 226, 229, 237,
240, 254, 257, 258, 263, 264, 281, 289, 290, 296, 315, 320
6th, 134
7th, 134
8th (2nd Batt.), 19, 75–9, 120–24, 129, 133–5, 163, 171, 175, 206,
217, 218, 225, 238, 270, 281, 328, 331–3, 341
9th (1st Batt.), 19, 84, 159, 169, 206, 217, 220, 221, 223, 234, 238,
270, 272, 273, 298
Gurung, No. 1959 Rifleman Bhagat Bahadur, I.O.M., 373
Gurung, No. 1597 Naik Bum Bahadur, I.O.M., 373
Gurung, Subadar Dalkesar, Russian Cross of the Order of St. George, 4th
Class, 109, 110, 374
Gurung, Naik Dharmraj, 156
Gurung, No. 4252 Naik Diwan Sing, I.O.M., 375
Gurung, Subadar Durga, 156
Gurung, Subadar-Major Gambhir Sing, Bahadur, I.O.M., 374
Gurung, No. 1749 Rifleman Gane, I.O.M., 374
Gurung, Jemadar Gangabir, I.O.M., 229, 375
Gurung, No. 1074 Rifleman Garbha Sing, I.D.S.M., 375
Gurung, No. 1432 Havildar Janglai, I.D.S.M., 373
Gurung, Subadar Jit Sing, I.O.M., 290–91, 372
Gurung, No. 2618 Rifleman Kalu, I.D.S.M., 373
Gurung, No. 2515 Rifleman Kansi, I.D.S.M., 372
Gurung, No. 2734 Rifleman Khamba Sing, I.D.S.M., 372
Gurung, No. 4015 Rifleman Khamba Sing, I.O.M., 375
Gurung, Jemadar Kharak Bahadur, 84
Gurung, No. 4945 Lance-Naik Lachman, I.D.S.M., 375
Gurung, No. 4024 Rifleman Manjit, I.O.M., 218, 373
Gurung, No. 1313 Havildar Motilal, I.D.S.M., 374
Gurung, No. 1632 Rifleman Narbahadur, I.O.M., 376
Gurung, No. 1618 Naik Padamdhoj, I.O.M., 86, 373
Gurung, No. 4509 Rifleman Parbir, I.O.M., 375
Gurung, No. 2447 Rifleman Partiman, I.O.M., 218, 373
Gurung, No. 2397 Rifleman Phalman, I.D.S.M., 372
Gurung, Subadar Puran Sing, Russian Cross of the Order of St. George,
4th Class, 372
Gurung, No. 1222 Havildar Ran Patti, I.D.S.M., 373
Gurung, No. 3184 Havildar Sarabjit, Russian Cross of the Order of St.
George, 4th Class, 373
Gurung, Subadar Sarabjit, I.O.M., Bahadur, 373
Gurung, Subadar Sarabjit, I.O.M., 375
Gurung, Subadar Senbir, Bahadur, I.O.M., 316, 375
Gurung, Subadar Shamsher, Bahadur, 375
Gurung, Sing, 211
Gurung, Jemadar Suba Singh, 84
Gurung, Subadar Tekhbahadur, 85
Gurung, Jemadar Tirthe, 84
Gurung, No. 2265 Rifleman Tula, I.O.M., 373
Gurung, No. 1599 Rifleman Ujir Sing, I.O.M., 218, 373
Gusain, No. 2605 Lance-Naik Kiyali, I.O.M., 360
Gusain, No. 2408 Lance-Naik Sankaru, I.O.M., 360
Guthrie-Smith, Lieut. R., 162
Hack, Capt. C., 89, 90
Haidar, No. 3836 Havildar Fateh, I.O.M., Russian Medal of St. George,
1st Class, 371, 372
Haig, Sir Douglas, 178
Hale, Mr., 94
“Hale’s” hand-grenades, 93
Hamer, Capt. M. A., M.C., 349
Hamid, Jemadar, I.D.S.M., 367
Hamilton, Lieut. H. W. R., M.C., 353
Hamilton, Lieut.-Col. J. A., M.B., F.R.C.S., C.M.G., 97, 378
Hamilton, Major W., 133
Hampe-Vincent, Capt., 35
Hamza Kot, 22
Hance, 2nd Lieut. H. M., M.C., 353
Hannyngton, Major J. A., C.M.G., D.S.O., 42, 251, 370
Harcourt, Capt., 340
Hardinge, Lord, and the Indian Army, 15, 16, 235, 236, 299
Hardinge, Lady, of Penshurst, 101
Hardwari, No. 2822 Naik, I.D.S.M., 357
Harpul, No. 1696 Havildar, I.D.S.M., 357
Hartwell, Capt., 258
Hartwell, Capt. B., 76
Harvey, Colonel, 338
Harvey, Major J., 128
Hasham, No. 3028 Lance-Naik Gul, afterwards Naik, 366
Haut Pommereau, 327, 335, 337
Havelock, 28
Havre, 309
Hawinda, Jemadar, M.C., 128, 366
Hawinda, No. 2008 Havildar, afterwards Jemadar, I.D.S.M., 367
Hay, Major C. J. B., D.S.O., 348
Hayes-Sadler, Lieut. E., 71, 76
Heall, Major E. N., afterwards Brevet Lieut.-Col., 360
Heavy Battery, 109th, 19
110th, 20
Henderson, Lieut., 253
Henderson, Lieut., 338
Hennessy, Lieut.-Col. J. P. C., C.M.G., 97, 348
Herbert, Lieut., 291
Hewett, Sir John, 101, 313
Hewett, Capt., 336
Hewitt, Lieut., 86
Heyland, Lieut., 291
Heyland, Major A. K., D.S.O., 381
Heyland, Capt. J. R. L., M.C., 376
Highland Division, “Fighting Fifty-first,” 241
Highland Light Infantry, 1st, 19, 56, 205, 226, 229, 262, 263, 265,
281, 284, 286
2nd, 154–6, 161–4, 174, 234, 240, 253–4, 257, 260, 262, 264, 285, 291
Hill, Capt. E. F. J., M.C., 353
Hill, 4th Class Assist. Surgeon E. R., afterwards 3rd Class, 381
Hill, Major Hugh, 51
Hill, John, 63
Hill, Lieut.-Col. J., D.S.O., afterwards Brevet Colonel, 254, 358
Hill 29, 263
Himalayas, 25, 30, 113, 132
Hinges, 74, 104, 141, 172
Château, 321
Hissar, 298
Hitchins, Lieut.-Col., 249
Hobart, Capt. P. C. S., M.C., 212, 353
Hodgson, Capt. F., 283
Hodson, 182
Hodson, Colonel G., 51
Holbrooke, Major, 251
Holland, Commander (retired) G. E., C.I.E., D.S.O. (temp. Colonel,
R.E.), C.M.G., 382
Hollebeke, 39, 143
Holman, Major and Brevet Colonel (afterwards Brevet Col.) H. C.,
D.S.O., C.M.G., 348, 350
Home Counties Trench, 328, 329
Hore, Capt. P., 228
Hornor, Lieut. F. H. F., M.C., 369
House, Sergeant-Major A. G., 229
Howell (temp. Capt.), E. B., C.I.E., 311, 382
Howson, Capt. G., M.C., 350
Hudson, General Sir John, 49
Hudson, Col. (temp. Brig.-General), afterwards Major-General H., C.B.,
49, 313–14, 349
Hulseberg, Major H., D.S.O., 370
Humayun’s tomb, 51
Hume, Lieut. J., 133
Humphreys, Major G. G. P., 44
Hunt, Capt. C. E., M.C., 359
Hunt, Capt., afterwards Brevet Major, H. R. A., 350
Husain, No. 23 Lance-Naik Mushtak, I.D.S.M., 356
Husain, No. 1171 2nd Class Sub-Assist. Surgeon Zafar, I.D.S.M., 379
Hussars, 3rd, 38
Hussein, No. 4231 Sepoy Ghulam, I.D.S.M., 251, 371
Hutchinson, Major and Brevet Lieut.-Col. C. A. R., D.S.O., 276, 363
Illies, 306
India, Army of, 2–17, 55;
Field Artillery of, 26–7;
class system in, 57–8;
Corps in France, methods of supply, 96–102, 115, 117;
strength of units, 138–9;
casualties, 294–5, 314, 324;
proposed changes in, 295–7;
the Indian soldier’s viewpoint, 297 _seq._;
reservists, 309–10;
work of, 326 _seq._
Indian Cavalry Corps, 20
4th, 166, 167, 206, 280, 284, 312
_Indian Corps in France_, 304, 332, 342
Indian Lancers, 2nd, 185
15th, 63
Indian Signalling Company, 74
Indus River, 3, 25
Infantry Brigade (British), 5th, 32, 282
6th, 282
8th, 61
19th, 61
Ingham, Capt., 253
Inglis, Lieut., 332
Inglis, Capt. J., 156, 225
Innes, Lieut. I., 85
Inniskilling Dragoons, 6th, 50
Inskip, Capt. R. D., M.C., 368
Irriwaddy, 1, 53
Irvine, Capt. G., 72
Irwin, Rev. R. J. B., M.C., 316, 382
Ivy, Lieut. B., 291
Jackson, Sub-Conductor C. G., afterwards Assist. Commissary and Hon.
Lieut., 382
Jacob, Col. (temp. Brig.-General), afterwards Major-General C. W.,
C.B., Russian Order of St. Vladimir, 4th Class with swords, 53, 209,
217, 218, 220, 223, 327, 341, 342, 348, 349
Jadhao, No. 3348 Havildar Maraoti, I.D.S.M., 354
Jaganaut, No. 2421 Stretcher-Bearer, I.O.M., 379
Jailal, Havildar, 113
Jalandar, 233
Jalandar Brigade, 19, 51, 61, 63, 65, 75, 103, 154, 163, 175, 205, 206,
215, 216, 218, 220, 223, 224, 226, 228, 231, 240, 247, 248, 249,
253, 254, 255, 262
James, Lieut.-Col. (temporary Brig.-General), afterwards Brevet Col. W.
B., C.I.E., M.V.O., 349
Jamieson, Major G. A., 68, 71, 259
Jan, Sepoy Abdullah, 145–6
Jan, No. 5510 Sepoy Bhan, Russian Medal of St. George, 4th Class, 366
Jan, No. 3638 Havildar Muhammad, I.O.M., 368
Jan, No. 453 Sepoy Sahib, I.O.M., 371
Jang, Subadar Fateh, I.D.S.M., 366
Jang, 2nd Lieut., Rama Jodha, Bahadur, M.C., 333, 360
Jardine, Capt. C. H., afterwards Brevet Major, 357
Jat Light Infantry, 6th, 19, 84, 111, 112, 113, 120, 122, 123, 124,
134, 150, 158, 165, 166, 169, 206, 239, 270, 271, 296, 298, 299, 304
Jats, 7, 57
Jefferson, Thomas, quoted, 208
Jeudwine, Major W. W., M.D., C.M.G., 378
Jhelum River, 43
Joan of Arc, 25
Jodhpore, Maharaja of, 21
Prince of, 106
Jodhpore Imperial Service Lancers, 20, 22, 27, 73, 116, 163, 171, 237
Joffre, Marshal, 20
Johnson, Brigadier C. E., 53, 85
Johnson, Sub-Conductor E. V., D.C.M., 381
Johnson, Brig.-General F. E., 51
Jones, Capt. L. J., 72
Joubert, General, 122
Kabartir, 132
Kabul, 53, 87, 113, 164
Kaimkhanis, 87
Kam Dakka, 11
Kandari, Subadar Bije Sing, Bahadur, 360
Karachi, 4
Kashi, 23
Kassib, No. 105 Sepoy, I.D.S.M., 43, 371
Kawar, Subadar Makhar Sing, Bahadur, 361
Keary, Major-General H. D’U., C.B., D.S.O., 19, 53, 108, 166, 205, 226,
231, 246, 247, 254, 255, 260, 262, 264, 265, 266, 267
Keen, Major F. S., D.S.O., 348
Kelly, Major, 341
Kelly, Capt. E. H., M.C., 111, 112, 132, 353
Kelly, Lieut.-Col. G., 125
Kelly, Lance-Corporal T., 89
Kemmel, 38
Kennedy, Sergeant-Major, 127, 129
Kennedy, Capt. G. S., 229
Kenny, Capt., 213
Kerans, Major G. C. L., D.S.O., 378
Kerr, Lieut., 157
Khalsa, 250, 286, 287
Khan, No. 4551 Havildar Abas, I.O.M., 362
Khan, No. 2085 Kot-Dafadar, afterwards Jemadar, Abdul Ghafur, Russian
Cross of the Order of St. George, 4th Class, 352
Khan, No. 3027 Sowar Abdullah, I.D.S.M., 135, 352
Khan, Subadar Adam, 41, 145
Khan, Sepoy Afsar, 43
Khan, No. 4845 Sepoy Akbar, I.D.S.M., 368
Khan, Jemadar Alah Rakkha, I.O.M., 355
Khan, No. 2176 Lance-Dafadar Alladad, I.D.S.M., 351
Khan, No. 3480 Sepoy Alvas, I.D.S.M., 366
Khan, No. 2210 Dafadar Amanatullah, Russian Medal of St. George, 1st
Class, 350
Khan, Ressaidar Amir, Bahadur, 381
Khan, Subadar Arsla, Bahadur, I.O.M., M.C., 37, 38, 173, 365
Khan, No. 2102 Sepoy Aulia, I.D.S.M., 371
Khan, Risaldar-Major Awal, Bahadur, 350
Khan, Jemadar Ayub, I.O.M., 371
Khan, No. 3640 Lance-Naik Ayub, afterwards Naik, 304–9, 372
Khan, Subadar-Major Bahadur, 341
Khan, No. 2589 Sepoy Bahadur, I.D.S.M., 366
Khan, No. 246 Sepoy Dad, I.D.S.M., 371
Khan, No. 1027 Havildar Dal, I.D.S.M., 370
Khan, No. 3576 Sepoy Daulat, I.O.M., 365
Khan, No. 9483 Driver Fateh, I.D.S.M., 352
Khan, No. 182 Kot-Dafadar Fateh, I.D.S.M., 381
Khan, No. 3250 Sowar Fateh, I.D.S.M., 135, 352
Khan, Subadar Fateh Muhammad, I.D.S.M., 370
Khan, No. 3581 Naik Ghammai, I.D.S.M., 368
Khan, Subadar Hashmat Dad, Bahadur, I.D.S.M., 134, 370
Khan, No. 346 Dafadar Ibrahim, I.D.S.M., 351
Khan, Subadar Ismail, Bahadur, I.D.S.M., Russian Cross of the Order of
St. George, 3rd Class, 70, 353, 354
Khan, Subadar Jahandad, Bahadur, I.O.M., 250, 362
Khan, No. 1694 Sapper Jiwa, I.O.M., 291–2, 353
Khan, No. 2595 Havildar Karim, I.D.S.M., 366
Khan, Sepoy Khudadad, V.C., 347
Khan, Risaldar Khwaja Mahomed, Sirdar Bahadur, I.D.S.M., 22, 208, 311,
349
Khan, No. 3600 Sepoy Lafar, I.D.S.M., 371
Khan, No. 4731 Sepoy Lal, I.D.S.M., 368
Khan, No. 843 Naik Mahomed, I.D.S.M., 381
Khan, Jemadar Malik Mihi, I.O.M., 351
Khan, Lieut. Malik Mumtaz Mahomet, 22
Khan, No. 3663 Havildar Muzaffar, I.O.M., 368
Khan, No. 2625 Sepoy Mehr, I.D.S.M., 366
Khan, Subadar-Major Muhammad, I.D.S.M., 368
Khan, No. 2479 Havildar Muhammad, I.O.M., 353
Khan, No. 2102 Sepoy Muhammad, I.D.S.M., 369
Khan, Subadar-Major Nasir, Sardar Bahadur, I.O.M., Russian Medal of St.
George, 1st Class, 368, 369
Khan, Subadar Nazir, Russian Medal of St. George, 2nd Class, 357
Khan, No. 1007 Havildar Nowsher, Russian Medal of St. George, 2nd
Class, 355
Khan, No. 2268 Havildar Nur, I.D.S.M., 371
Khan, No. 831 Naik Painda, I.D.S.M., 381
Khan, No. 471 Sepoy Raji, I.O.M., 251, 371
Khan, No. 1848 Havildar Roshan, I.O.M., 367
Khan, Havildar Sobat, 45
Khan, No. 250 Sepoy Saiday, I.O.M., 371
Khan, Naik Shahmad, 300
Khan, No. 2834 Lance-Naik Sher, I.O.M., 367
Khan, No. 1695 Sepoy Usman, I.O.M., 34, 365
Khan, No. 4355 Havildar Wasim, Russian Medal of St. George, 1st Class,
371
Khan, No. 2584 Havildar Yakub, I.O.M., 365
Khan, Subadar Zaman, Bahadur, M.C., 45, 371
Khan, No. 27 Sepoy Zarif, I.O.M., 229, 368
Khans, 16
Khattri, No. 2885 Rifleman Balbahadur, I.D.S.M., 377
Khattri, Subadar Balbahadar, Bahadur, 376
Khattri, Jemadar Damodhar, I.D.S.M., 376
Khattri, Subadar Haridhoj, M.C., I.D.S.M., 376
Khattri, No. 2016 Lance-Naik Jhaman Sing, I.O.M., 110, 376
Khattri, No. 2096 Lance-Naik Jowar Sing, I.D.S.M., 376
Khattri, No. 2027 Naik Kulman, I.D.S.M., 376
Khattri, Subadar Mehar Sing, I.O.M., 217, 376
Khattri, No. 2314 Lance-Naik Sirikisan, I.D.S.M., 377
Khudadad, No. 4050 Sepoy, V.C., 43, 46, 370
Khushali, No. 7017 Naik, I.D.S.M., 379
Khyber, 11
Khyber Rifles, 16
Kirkaldy, 2nd Lieut. C. H., 214
Kisch, Lieut. (R.E.), 157
Kisch, Capt. F. H., D.S.O., 255, 256, 353
Kitchener, Lord, and the Indian Army, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 22, 25,
28, 45, 54, 182, 185, 186, 194, 195, 198, 199, 297, 298, 312, 319,
320, 322, 323
Klein Hollebeke, 39
Knapp, Miss M. D., Royal Red Cross Decoration, 2nd Class, 376
Knatchbull, Major, 152
Kumaon, 110
Kumassi, 1
Kundan, No. 7034 Lance-Naik, I.D.S.M., 380
Kunwar, No. 3075 Rifleman Dinbahadur, I.D.S.M., 377
Kunwar, No. 3994 Rifleman Partiram, I.D.S.M., 375
Kunwar, No. 2589 Rifleman Tika Ram, I.O.M., Russian Medal of St.
George, 3rd Class, 376
Kushab, 87
Lahore, 244
Lahore Division, 18–20, 24, 27, 33, 46, 49, 53, 60, 65, 67, 75, 105,
106, 110, 120, 121, 143, 149, 150, 153, 154, 157, 160, 164, 165,
166, 168, 170, 173, 174, 175, 177, 179, 204, 205, 208, 218, 221,
224, 226, 231, 239, 245, 246, 247, 248, 257, 260, 266, 267, 268,
269, 278, 284, 312, 327, 328, 329
Division Artillery, 265
Division, Signalling Company, 234
Laing, Capt., 169
Lal, No. 1757 Havildar Har, I.D.S.M., 357
Lal, No. 1821 Havildar Jai, I.O.M., 356
Lal, Subadar Shib, Bahadur, 356
Lalak, No. 2554 Lance-Naik, I.O.M., 365
Lama, Subadar Dan Sing, I.O.M., 373
Lambton, Major-General, 316–17
Lancashire (Royal) Regiment, 66, 260
(Loyal North) Regiment, 167
Lancers, 15th (Cureton’s Multani), 19, 65, 206, 234, 240
Lane, Capt. J. H. T., M.C., 181, 360
Langemarck, 247, 248, 249, 254, 257
Langhorne, Capt. A. P. Y., 54, 55, 314
Lansdowne Post, 278, 281, 284
Lashkar, No. 3212 Havildar, I.D.S.M., 367
Latif, No. 2069 Sepoy Abdul, I.D.S.M., 357
Laventie, 60
Layes, Des, river, 203, 212, 216–18, 230
Layng, Lieut. (temp. Capt.) T., M.C., 377
Lee, Capt. H. N., 157
Leeds, Major (temp. Lieut.-Col.), afterwards Brevet Lieut.-Col., 369
Lehri, No. 3415 Sepoy, I.D.S.M., 357
Leicester Regiment, 2nd, 19, 55, 121, 123, 124, 132, 133, 134, 150,
151, 152, 206, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 215, 219, 222, 239, 281,
282, 283, 328, 331, 332, 333, 334, 341
Leinster Regiment, 1st Battalion, 2, 313, 316
Lentaigne, Capt. E. C., 258
Lempriere, Colonel H., 171
Lestrem, 205, 221, 224, 238
Lewis, Lieut. H. V., M.C., 41–3, 371
Ligny-le-Grand, 202, 269, 270
Ligny-le-Petit, 270
Lille, 60, 306
Lillers, 178, 180
Lincoln Regiment, 66
Lind, Capt. A. G., 127
Lindop, Lieut. E. L. E., M.C., 363
Lindsay, Lieut.-Col. H. A. P., C.M.G., 97, 348
Liptrott, Lieut., 112
Liverpool Regiment (King’s), 4th, 205, 229, 240, 248, 257, 258, 259,
262, 263, 264, 266, 281, 286, 288, 289, 290
Lizerne, 254
Lloyd, Lieut., 259
Lobes, Les, 208
Locke-Elliott, Lieut.-General Sir, 53, 54
Locon, 105, 141
Lodwick, Capt. J. T., D.S.O., 152, 225, 374
Logan, 2nd Lieut. (temp. Lieut.) A. F., M.C., 377
Loire River, 26
London, 74, 198, 244, 246
_London Gazette_ (Sept. 14, 1919), 157 _n._
London Regiment, 4th (Territorials), 206, 225, 240, 248, 252, 259
3rd (Territorials), 206, 210, 211, 214, 215, 239, 244, 281, 282, 283,
328, 330, 333
Longridge, Major J. A., afterwards Brevet Lieut.-Col., 49, 350
Loos, 52, 77, 218, 232, 304, 320, 321, 325
Loring, Major C., 175
Lucas, Lieut., 85
Lucknow, 33, 51, 216, 338
“Ludhiana,” 63
Lugard, Colonel Sir Frederick, 320
Lukin, Major R. C. W., D.S.O., 348
Lumb, Capt. F. G. E., M.C., 130, 131, 360
Lushington, Major W. N., afterwards Brevet Lieut.-Col., 381
Lydden, 2nd Lieut., 248
Lys, 246
Macandrew, Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-General), afterwards Brevet Col.,
H. J. M., D.S.O., 349
Macandrew, 2nd Lieut. I., 92
Macandrew, Lieut. I. M., 169
Macbean, Major-General F., C.V.O., C.B., 19, 53, 76, 120, 121, 122,
135, 163, 170
MacBrayne, Capt. R. J., M.C., 358
MacCall, Capt., 341
McCleverty, Capt. G., 86
M‘Cleverty, Capt. R. J., 66, 69
McClintock, Major A. L., 94
McCrae-Bruce, Lieut. W. A., 157
M‘Dougall, Sub-Conductor J. L. N., M.C., 381
McEwan, Capt. J. S., 175
MacFarlane, Lieut.-Col., 154, 221
McIntosh, 2nd Lieut., 264
M‘Intosh, Private, 127
Mackain, Capt., 125
McKenzie, Capt., 340
Mackenzie, Capt. C. A., 175
MacKenzie, Lieut. D., 107
Mackie, Capt., 251
Mackmillan, Lieut., 276
McLaughlin, Capt., 134
MacLean, Lieut., 77
McLeod, Sir C., 101
MacLeod, Lieut., 338
McMicking, Lieut. N., 129
McNeill, Chaplain Rev., 92
Macpherson, Capt. A. B., M.C., 356
Macpherson, Lieut. D. S., 134
Macpherson, Major N., 85
Macready, General, 317
McSwiney, Lieut. H. C. F., M.C., 108–10, 374
MacTier, Major, 213
Madhu, No. 2743 Sowar, I.O.M., 86, 352
Madras, 94
Madras Native Infantry, 3rd Batt., 300
Sappers and Miners, 7, 9
Volunteer Rifles, 255
Madura, 300
Mahadeo, Subadar Ganpat, Bahadur, 71, 353
Mahar, No. 1480 Naik Kedar Sing, I.D.S.M., 362
Mahar, Jemadar Pancham Sing, M.C., 361
Maharajpore, 113
Mahomed, Havildar Dost, 157
Mahomed, Colour-Havildar Ghulam, 43
Mahsuds, 39, 146
Maine, 1st Class Assist. Surgeon W. J. S., afterwards Assistant Surgeon
Lieut., M.C., 378, 380
Maistre, General, 32, 106, 141, 176
Mal, No. 1515 Havildar Lalit, Bahadur, I.D.S.M., 376
Mal, No. 2721 Rifleman Panchbir, afterwards Havildar, I.O.M., 376, 377
Mal, No. 2118 Lance-Naik Samar Bahadur, I.D.S.M., 376
Mal, Jemadar Shibdhoj, I.O.M., 220, 376
Malakand Pass, 11, 300
Malaun, 110, 164
Maliks, 11, 16
Malony, Lieut., 37
Manchesters, 1st, 19, 55, 61, 63, 65, 108, 140, 170, 171, 172, 173,
175, 206, 216, 224, 226, 228, 231, 240, 248, 249, 253, 254, 266
Mangin, Capt. E. B., M.C., 184, 369
Mangli, No. 8037 Lance-Naik, I.D.S.M., 379
Manipore, 46
Mankelow, Lieut. A. H., M.C., 225, 360
Mann, Lieut. R. L., 171
Mansel, Capt. J. L., 171
Manson, 2nd Lieut. C. C. E., M.C., 315–16, 375
Marais, 171
Mardan, 58
Marks, Sub-Conductor F. C., afterwards Assist. Commissary and Hon.
Lieut., 382
Marne River, 33, 202
Marseilles, 3, 4, 10, 20, 22, 23, 25, 32, 54, 62, 100, 309–12
Marshall, Capt. A., D.S.O., 352
Martin, Capt. G. D., M.C., 357
Maru, No. 2685 Lance-Naik, I.D.S.M., 357
Mason, Lieut. A., M.C., 353
Massy, Capt. (temp. Major), afterwards Brevet Major, S. D., 359
Masters, Capt. A., 125
Maud’huy, General de, 92, 106, 116, 140, 176
Mauquissart, 60, 75, 79, 119, 218, 241, 267, 304, 321, 327, 332, 338,
341
Maxwell, Colonel, 53
Maxwell, Lieut. C., 134
Maxwell, Major W. F., D.S.O., 255, 355
Mazbi Sikhs, 57, 68
Meanee, 33
Mediterranean, 95, 100
Eastern, 34
Meeanee, 87, 164
Meerut Division, 19–20, 52, 53, 65, 73, 75, 85, 92, 105, 120, 121, 149,
150, 151, 152, 158, 160, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 170, 173,
204, 205, 206, 216, 218, 221, 224, 226, 239, 268, 269, 270, 272,
273, 277, 278, 279, 281, 284, 288, 289, 312, 317, 327, 328, 329,
330, 333
Signal Company, 234
Mein, Lieut. D. B., M.C., 251, 365
Meldrum, Lieut., 332
Mellis, Capt. A. R., M.C., 291, 372
Melrose, Lance-Corporal, 129
Mercer, Brig.-General, 49
Merewether, Lieut.-Col. J. W. B., _The Indian Corps in France_, 55,
239, 296
Merville, 31, 64, 100
Mesopotamia, 28, 51, 52, 58, 68, 72, 128, 199, 255, 259, 267, 276, 300,
320, 338
Messines, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 89, 91
Messinier, Assist. Surgeon E. B., M.C., 378
Mexico, 23
Middlesex Regiment, 89
Milligan, Lieut., 340
Milligan, Lieut. J., 128
Milne, Major, 276
Milne, Major-General Geo. F., 267
Min Post, 328
Minto, Lord, 10, 11
Minto, Lady, 11
Mir, Naik Sar, 48
Misr, No. 2029 Naik Ramji, I.D.S.M., 369
Mistakin, No. 4305 Sepoy, I.D.S.M., 371
Moated Grange Street, 328
Moberly, Lieut., 339
Mohmand Expedition, 9, 252
Mohmands, 39, 40
Molloy, Major G., 86
Morney, Capt. H., 163
Money, Capt., 145
Mons, 25, 27, 32, 77, 161, 178, 202
Moodkee, 216
Moody, Capt. F. H. M., M.C., 350
Moore, Thomas, quotation from, 109
Moore, Capt., 184
Moore, Capt., 215
Moore, Lieut. C. F. F., M.C., 258, 375
Moore, Lieut.-Col. C. H. G., D.S.O., C.M.G., 97, 348
Moorhead, Lieut.-Col. A. H., M.B., afterwards Brevet Col., 97, 380
Morant, Mrs., 101
Moroccan Brigade, 257, 261, 262
4th, 265
Morris, Colonel, 76, 332
Morris, Lieut. E., 108
Motor Cycle Corps, 255
Moule, Major, 290
Moulin du Piètre, 327, 334, 335, 338, 339, 340, 341
Moutray, Lieut. A. G., 108
Muhammad, No. 3191 Havildar Dost, I.O.M., 368
Muhammad, No. 1815 Driver Fakir, I.D.S.M., 381
Muhammad, No. 2524 Colour-Havildar Ghulam, I.O.M., 371
Muhammad, No. 3450 Sapper Saleh, I.D.S.M., 354
Muir, Capt. A. H., 261
Muktiara, No. 3893 Sepoy, Russian Medal of St. George, 4th Class, 362
Mula, No. 1574 Havildar, I.D.S.M., 357
Mullaly, Capt. C. M., 271
Mullaly, Lieut. J. C., 68, 72
Mulloo, No. 7455 Bearer, I.D.S.M., 380
Munipoor, 1
Munn, Lieut. F. L. R., M.C., 302
Murray, Lieut.-Col., 248
Murray, Major, 33
Murray, Capt. K. D., 64
Murray, Capt. Owen J. E., 213
Murray, Capt. R., 214
Murray, Lieut. R. G. H., M.C., 217, 376
Murray, Major T. F., 162
Murree, 1
Musalmans, 72, 234, 297
Muspratt, Colonel F. C., C.M.G., 348
Mysore, 92, 233, 300
Nagpore, Bishop of, 316
Nanton, Colonel H. C., afterwards Brig.-General, 204
Napier, 164
Narayan, Lieut. Maharaja Kumar Hitandra, of Kuch Behar, 22
Narayan, No. 2583 Naik, I.D.S.M., 366
Narian, No. 7330 Bearer, I.D.S.M., 380
Neale, Major E. B. afterwards Brevet Lieut.-Col., 360
Needham, Major R. A., D.S.O., 378
Negi, No. 1810 Havildar Alam Sing, I.O.M., 182, 360
Negi, No. 2480 Rifleman Banchu, I.O.M., 361
Negi, Havildar Buta Sing, 210
Negi, No. 762 Havildar Butha Sing, I.O.M., 362
Negi, No. 1598 Rifleman Chandar Sing, I.D.S.M., 362
Negi, Subadar Dan Sing, I.D.S.M., 361
Negi, No. 1909 Naik Darwan Sing, V.C., 132, 211, 347, 360
Negi, Subadar Dhan Sing, M.C., 131, 360
Negi, No. 1715 Rifleman Dhan Sing, I.O.M., 360
Negi, Jemadar Ghantu Sing, 211
Negi, No. 1085 Rifleman Gobar Sing, V.C., 210, 347, 361
Negi, Jemadar Goman Sing, I.D.S.M., 361
Negi, No. 2285 Rifleman Jawarihu, I.O.M., 361
Negi, No. 2103 Lance-Naik Jit Sing, Russian Medal of St. George, 4th
Class, 361
Negi, Jemadar Prem Sing, I.O.M., 300
Negi, No. 1085 Rifleman Raichand, I.D.S.M., 361
Negi, Jemadar Sangram Sing, M.C., 361
Nelson, Capt., 339
Nepal, 3, 30, 56, 76, 85, 96, 187, 271
Nethersole, Lieut. J., M.C., 351
Neuve Chapelle, 3, 22, 46, 49, 52, 54, 57, 60, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69,
70, 71, 75, 82, 91, 95, 119, 150, 180, 188, 189, 195, 196, 200, 201,
202, 203, 209, 210, 211, 215, 216, 218, 220, 222, 223, 224, 226,
229, 230, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 239, 241, 243, 244, 245, 254,
259, 268, 269, 277, 293, 332
Newar, No. 4203 Rifleman Deotinarain, I.D.S.M., 375
Newar, Subadar-Major Fateh Sing, Bahadur, 84, 378
Newnham, Major (temp. Lieut.-Col.), afterwards Brevet Lieut.-Col., C.
C., 350
Niamutullah, Jemadar, I.D.S.M., 354
Nicholson, John, 28, 182
Nicolay, Major B. A., 155, 156
Nicolay, Major H., 217
Nicolls, Lieut., 340
Nieppe Forest, 246
Nieuport, 116, 245
Nijni Novgorod Fair, 26
Nikka, No. 3000 Havildar, I.D.S.M., 380
Nir, No. 4280 Naik Sar, I.O.M., 371
Norfolk Regiment, 78
Norie, Lieut.-Col. C. E. de M., D.S.O., afterwards Brevet Col., 84–6,
342, 378
Norie, Major F. H., D.S.O., 372
Norman, Lieut. S., 172
Northamptonshire Regiment, 167, 317
Northumberland Brigade, 254
Nosworthy, Lieut., 76
Nosworthy, Capt. J. P., M.C., 255, 353
Nott-Bower, Lieut., 283
Odell, Capt. W. F., M.C., 370
O’Neill, Capt. J. S., M.C., 378
Oost Taverne, 34
Orakzais, 238
Orchard, the, 149, 150, 151, 152, 158, 167, 169, 224, 283
Orleans, 4, 17, 20, 25, 26, 27, 180, 252
Ormsby, Lieut.-Col. V. A., C.B., 110, 210, 211, 219, 374
Orton, Capt. S., 130, 131
Ouderdom, 246, 262, 265
Oudh, 101
Oudh Auxiliary Force, Cavalry Regiment of the, 312
Ouseley, Colonel, 53
Outram, General, 182
Ouvert, Rue d’, 327
Ovens, Lieut. J., 89
Paardeberg, 338
Padday, Capt. W. H., 175
Padhujar, Havildar Diwan Sing, I.D.S.M., 362
Palestine, 199, 237
Pande, No. 2867 Naik Angad, I.D.S.M., 357
Pandir, Havildar Ranjir Sing, I.D.S.M., 362
Paris, 23, 269
Paris, Capt., 71
Park, Capt. Kenneth, 271
Parker, temp. Lieut. A. H., M.C., 382
Parshad, 2nd Class Sen. Sub-Assist. Surgeon Mahadeo, I.D.S.M., 379
Pass, Lieut. F. A. de, V.C., 134–5, 347, 352
Paterson, Capt. G. F. J., M.C., 359
Pathans, 7, 10, 34, 39, 57, 62, 79, 245, 269, 321
40th, 238, 240, 247–50, 266, 312
Patrick, Capt. R. M. F., M.C., 363
Payne, Capt., 33, 89, 90
Peck, Major, afterwards Brevet Lieut.-Col., A. W., 50, 350
Pegu, 300
Peishwa, 164
Peploe, Lieut., 134
Perkins, Major, 250
_Persia_, 39
Persia, s.s., 95
Peru, 23
Peshawar, 41, 74, 230, 297
Peshawar Division, 12, 93, 241, 270
Pharswan, No. 1465 Rifleman Gopal Sing, I.D.S.M., 362
Phillips, Major E. H., 90
Picquet House, 165, 166, 167
Piètre, 232
Pike, Capt. G. D., M.C., 376
Pindar River, 132
Pioneers, 106th, 299
107th, 20, 27, 78, 111, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 131, 132, 134, 150,
166, 167, 206, 233, 240, 284, 299, 342
Pipon, temp. Capt. P. J. G., C.I.E., M.C., 311, 382
Pirie, Major-General C. P. W., C.B., 348
Pitts-Tucker, Lieut. C., 162
Plumer, General Sir Herbert, 267
Plumer’s Force, 202, 263
Plutz, General, 263
Polo, Marco, 264
Pont-à-Vendin, 327
Pont Logy, 82
Poona Horse, 84th, 20, 84, 86, 87, 134, 135, 171, 175
Port Arthur, 204, 210, 214, 218, 219, 222, 224, 233, 279, 280
Potijze, 245, 257, 260
Pott, Lieut. D., M.C., 351
Potter, Major H. W., 42, 144, 145
Potts, Colonel, 53
Powell, 2nd Lieut, (temp. Lieut.) F., M.C., 377
Price, Capt., 341
Primrose, Capt. the Hon. Neil, 54, 193
Pringle, Capt., 155
Probyn, Sir Dighton, 191
Pryce, Major (temp. Lieut.-Col.) H. E. Rhys, C.M.G., 348
Pun, No. 2392 Lance-Naik Amar Sing, I.D.S.M., 373
Pun, No. 3266 Rifleman Jagtea, I.O.M., 218, 373
Pun, No. 3530 Rifleman Kharkbir, Russian Medal of St. George, 3rd
Class, 374
Pun, No. 1760 Naik Rupdan, Russian Medal of St. George, 2nd Class, 374
Punjab, 1, 12, 63, 110
Punjabi Infantry, 5th, 79
Mahomedans, 7, 57
Musalmans, 34, 39, 63, 79, 87, 238
Regiment, 19th, 285
Regiment, 21st, 242
Regiment, 28th, 77
Regiment, 33rd, 300, 328, 334, 335, 340, 341
Regiment, 69th, 300, 302, 333, 334, 335, 339, 341
Regiment, 74th, 339
Regiment, 82nd, 276
Regiment, 84th, 283
Regiment, 89th, 300, 307
Pyper, 2nd Lieut., 259
Quetta, 297
Indian Staff College at, 12
Quinque, La, Rue, 149, 165, 279, 286
Rafiuddin, No. 1526 Lance-Naik, I.D.S.M., 381
Rahman, No. 2192 Sapper Shaikh Abdul, I.O.M., 212, 353
Rai, No. 2417 Rifleman Bhandoj, I.O.M., 375
Railton, Lieut., 271
Rait, Miss H. A. M., Royal Red Cross Decoration, 1st Class, 378
Rait-Kerr, Lieut., 71
Rajputs, 7, 72, 297
Ralston, Capt. W. H., M.C., 364
Ram, No. 4423 Sepoy Beli, I.O.M., 361
Ram, Jemadar Incha, M.C., 118, 356
Ram, Subadar Inchha, Bahadur, 356
Ram, Jemadar Lakhi, M.C., I.D.S.M., 356, 357
Ram, Subadar Lekh, 271
Ram, No. 2632 Sepoy Palla, I.O.M., 365
Ram, No. 772 1st Class Sub-Assist. Surgeon Pohlo, I.D.S.M., 379
Ram, Ressaidar Udmi, I.D.S.M., 350
Rambhagat, No. 2960 Sepoy, I.D.S.M., 357
Ramdasia, 63
Ramzan, No. 2869 Lance-Naik Shaikh, I.D.S.M., 354
Rana, No. 2698 Rifleman Anarupe, I.O.M., 378
Rana, Jemadar Arjun, I.O.M., 378
Rana, No. 798 Lance-Naik Asbir, I.D.S.M., 375
Rana, No. 1840 Havildar Bhakat Sing, I.O.M., 264, 375
Rana, Subadar Dalbahadur, 84
Rana, No. 289 Rifleman Kesar Sing, I.D.S.M., 362
Rana, Subadar Kharak Sing, M.C., 378
Rana, Jemadar Nain Sing, 258
Rana, No. 2417 Rifleman Partab, I.O.M., 361
Rane, 3rd Class Sub-Assist. Surgeon, G. R. R., I.O.M., 379
Ranowde, No. 3134 Lance-Naik Bhan, afterwards Naik, 355
Ranowde, No. 3132 Lance-Naik Narayan, afterwards Naik, 355
Rao, No. 255 Dafadar Shankar, I.O.M., 175, 351
Rathore Rajputs, 87
Ratna, Subadar, I.D.S.M., 357
Ravenshaw, Lieut.-Col. H., 33, 89, 108
Rawat, Subadar Baij Sing, Bahadur, 360
Rawat, Subadar Bishan Sing, M.C., 360
Rawat, Jemadar Daulat, 181
Rawat, No. 2172 Rifleman Ghantu, I.O.M., 360
Rawat, Gopal Singh, 85
Rawat, Subadar Jagat Sing, Bahadur, 181, 360
Rawat, Subadar Kedar Sing, I.D.S.M., 214, 361
Rawat, Jemadar Lachman Sing, I.D.S.M., 362
Rawat, No. 541 Rifleman Madan Sing, I.O.M., 362
Rawat, No. 870 Rifleman Nain Sing, I.D.S.M., 362
Rawat, No. 1729 Havildar Padam Sing, Russian Order of St. George, 4th
Class, 361
Rawlinson, Lieut.-Gen. Sir Henry, 284
Rawlinson’s 14th Corps, 201, 203
Raymond, Capt. E. D., M.C., 349
Reardon, Lieut., 38
Red Cross Association, 100
Reed, Capt. H. R. B., M.C., 349
Reed, Capt. T., 228
Reid, Lieut. J., 83, 85
Reilly, Lieut. R. A., 128
Rennick, Lieut.-Col., 238, 249
Rheims, 241, 289
Richardson, Lieut.-Col. H. L., afterwards Brevet Col., 365
Richardson, Captain J. S., 70
Richebourg l’Avoué, 75
Richebourg St. Vaast, 205, 215, 221, 238
Ridgway, Colonel, 341
Rifle Brigade (British), 12th, 336
Rifles, 55th (Coke’s), 34, 130, 131, 248, 251
57th (Wilde’s, Frontier Force), 19, 33–6, 39, 44, 48, 78, 120, 122,
126, 129–31, 133, 144, 164, 170, 173, 206, 240, 248–9, 251–2, 258,
288, 295–6, 300–302, 314
58th (Vaughan’s, Frontier Force), 79, 120–23, 128–9, 160, 165,
167–169, 176, 208, 239, 242
59th (Frontier Force), 19, 61–2, 64, 154, 156–7, 171, 206, 226–8,
240, 248–9, 298
125th (Napier’s), 19, 162, 164, 165, 205–6, 239, 272, 284, 304
Risal, No. 3426 Sepoy, I.D.S.M., 118, 357
Ritchie, Lieut.-Col., 169, 219
Rithal, No. 1448 Rifleman Karam Sing, Russian Medal of St. George, 4th
Class, 362
Robecq, 205
Roberts, Field-Marshal Lord, 1, 28, 48, 103–6
and the Indian Army, 8, 182, 183, 188
Roberts, Lieut. G. B., 249
Robertson, General, 192
Robertson-Glasgow, Capt. A. W., 110
Robinson, Capt., 290
Robinson, Capt. D. G., D.S.O., 348
Robson, Lieut. R. E., 123–30, 131, 132, 148
Roche, Lieut.-Col. H. J., C.B., 113, 166, 356
Roe, Capt. C. D., D.S.O., 315–16, 375
Rogers, Lieut. L. C. C., M.C., 376
Rohde, Lieut., 70
Roka, No. 2515 Rifleman Hastobir, I.O.M., 218, 373
Romilly, Captain, 150, 152, 212, 213, 332
Romola, No. 1321 Lance-Naik Dangwa, I.D.S.M., 361
Ronaldson, Colonel, 154–5
Roomes trench, 224
Roos-Keppel, Colonel Sir George, 16, 17
Ross, Major, 85
Ross, Capt. Alan, 174, 175
Ross, Capt. A. C., D.S.O., 351
Ross, Capt. R. C., D.S.O., 356
Roubaix, 225
Rouge Croix, 67
Rouge Croix East Post, 328
Rouges Bancs, 75, 260
Row, Lieut. H., 228
Royal Field Artillery, 5th, 11th, and 18th Brigades, 19, 224
4th, 9th, and 13th Brigades, 20
9th, 28th Battery, 90
Royal Horse Artillery, N Battery, 20
Royal Scots Fusiliers, 84, 89
Royal Scots Regiment, the, 68
Rugby Post, 328
Rundall, Colonel, 158
Rundall, Capt. A. M., 162
Rundall, Lieut. L. B., 157–8
Rustam, 114
Ryall, Lieut., 332
Sabatu, No. 8910 Bearer Ram, I.D.S.M., 379
Sadardin, No. 3890 Sepoy, Russian Medal of St. George, 4th Class, 369
Sadik, No. 2352 Naik Muhammad, I.D.S.M., 369
Safirullah, No. 3457 Naik, Russian Medal of St. George, 3rd Class, 308
Sahai, No. 2093 Havildar Debi, Russian Cross of the Order of St.
George, 4th Class, 357
Sahi, No. 2772 Rifleman Manbahadur, I.D.S.M., 377
Sahi, No. 3055 Rifleman Ranbahadur, I.D.S.M., 377
Saidak, No. 3572 Havildar, I.O.M., 367
St. Clair, Capt. the Hon., 150
St. Eloi, 245
St. George, Lieut., 258
St. Jean, 247, 248
St. Julien, 246, 247, 254
St. Omer, 20
St. Pol, 116
St. Vaast, 280, 284
St. Venant, 100, 320
Sajwan, No. 1342 Rifleman Ganesh Sing, I.O.M., 95, 362
Saki, Ran Bahadur, 110
Salisbury, 75, 204
Salles, Capitaine, 176
Sandhurst, 1
Sangster, Major, 185
Sappers and Miners, 20th and 21st Companies, 19, 27, 61, 65, 67, 68,
69, 70, 71, 94, 108, 116, 206, 240, 284, 291–2, 329, 342
3rd and 4th Companies, 20, 27, 65, 111, 112, 116, 132, 206, 240, 255,
262, 280, 284, 291–2, 342
Saran, No. 2702 Sepoy Ram, I.D.S.M., 366
Sardar, No. 3866 Naik, I.D.S.M., 367
Sarfaraz, No. 3136 Havildar, I.D.S.M., 367
Sarki, No. 1280 Havildar Judhia, I.D.S.M., 378
Sarewit, No. 1360 3rd Class Sub-Assist. Surgeon Mathura Parshad,
I.D.S.M., 380
Saunders, Capt., 259
Savy, Colonel, 257, 261, 262
Scale, Capt., 157
Scinde, 312
Scinde Camel Corps, 62, 63
Scobie, Lieut. J. A. M., M.C., 157, 368
Scoones, Lieut. G. A. P., M.C., 373
Scott, Capt., 250
Scott, Brig.-General A. B., 53, 204
Scott, Capt. H. L., M.C., 349
Scott, Capt. W. F., 64
Seaforth Highlanders, 1st, 19, 55, 92, 107, 140, 206, 214, 215, 218,
219, 230, 270, 271, 272, 274, 328
4th, 153, 154, 158, 159, 160, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 176, 206, 217,
221, 230, 270, 271, 272, 274, 328
Searle, 2nd Lieut. C. S., M.C., 377
Sebastopol, 92
Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade, 20, 22, 27, 72, 73, 82, 106, 116, 119,
120, 122, 134, 138, 159, 163, 170, 174, 175
Seine River, 23
Sempill, Major the Hon. Forbes, 215
Seringapatam, 216, 233, 338
Seton-Browne, 2nd Lieut. M., 132
Shah, No. 1406 Driver Abdullah, I.D.S.M., 381
Shah, Subadar Fazl, I.D.S.M., 354
Shah, No. 3154 Sowar Firman, I.D.S.M., 135, 352
Shah, No. 1209 Naik Imam, I.D.S.M., 356
Shah, No. 2634 Naik Zargun, I.D.S.M., 367
Shankar, 1st Class Sub-Assist. Surgeon Game, I.D.S.M., 379
Shea, Lieut.-Col., afterwards Brevet Col., J. S. M., D.S.O., C.B., 348,
350
Sheppard, Lieut.-Col. (temp. Col.), G. S., C.M.G., 246
Sher, No. 13 Naik Bari, I.D.S.M., 355
Sher, No. 2602 Sepoy Gul, I.D.S.M., 318
Sher, No. 2813 Sepoy Lal, I.D.S.M., 49, 371
Sher, No. 2760 Naik Sahab, I.D.S.M., 366
Sheringham, Capt. A. T., D.S.O., 369
Sherston, Lieut. R. V., M.C., 351
Shinde, No. 298 2nd Class Sub-Assist. Surgeon Ram Krishna Ganpat, M.C.,
378
Shiraz, No. 3362 Colour-Havildar, I.D.S.M., 362
Shubrati, No. 986 Driver, I.D.S.M., 381
Sialkote, 70
Sialkote Cavalry Brigade, 176
Sidhu, No. 306 Sepoy, I.D.S.M., 363
Signal Company, 19, 20
Sikhs, 2, 7, 15, 34, 38, 56–7, 63, 65, 72, 79, 297
9th, 68
15th, 19, 61, 63–5, 91, 144–5, 205, 226, 229, 240, 254, 257, 260–63,
281, 284–5, 287–9, 296, 304
34th (Pioneers), 19, 61, 63–5, 120–122, 124–6, 133, 145, 205–6, 240,
255, 262, 329
45th, 285, 287
47th, 19, 61–70, 88, 162–3, 171, 175, 206, 216, 226, 228, 231, 240,
248–50, 266, 296
54th, 169
Rattray’s, 287
Simla, 6, 18
Sinclair, Lieut., 276
Singh, Colonel Sir Ganga, Bahadur, Maharajah of Bikanir, 21, 106
Singh, Major Sir Madan, Bahadur, Maharaja Dhiraj of Kishengarh, 21
Singh, Lieut.-General Sir Partab, Bahadur, 21, 87, 106, 237
Singh, Lieut. Maharaja Kumar Gopal Saran Narain, of Tikari, 22
Singh, Lieut. Raj-Kumar Hira of Panna, 22
Singh, No. 2980 Naik Achar, I.D.S.M., 370
Singh, No. 4902 Sepoy Albel, I.D.S.M., 363
Singh, No. 2206 Havildar Amar, I.D.S.M., 357
Singh, No. 8201 Sepoy Asa, I.D.S.M., 364
Singh, No. 2609 Naik Atma, I.O.M., 251, 365
Singh, Ressaidar Badan, I.D.S.M., 352
Singh, Subadar Badawa, 251
Singh, Subadar Bakshi, I.O.M., 364
Singh, No. 698 Sepoy Bakshi, I.O.M., 261, 358
Singh, No. 3156 Sepoy Banta, Russian Medal of St. George, 4th Class,
368
Singh, No. 312 Havildar Basant, I.D.S.M., 354
Singh, No. 708 Sapper Basant, I.D.S.M., 354
Singh, No. 91 Sapper Bawani, I.D.S.M., 355
Singh, No. 3417 Havildar Bhagat, I.D.S.M., 370
Singh, No. 482 Havildar Bhagat, I.D.S.M., 364
Singh, No. 1776 Sepoy Bhagat, I.D.S.M., 356
Singh, Naik Bhagat, afterwards Havildar, 365
Singh, No. 53, Lance-Naik Bhagwan, I.D.S.M., 358
Singh, No. 2277 Sepoy Bhagwan, I.O.M., 364
Singh, No. 5510 Sepoy Bhan, I.D.S.M., Russian Medal of St. George, 3rd
Class, 25, 366
Singh, No. 228 Havildar Bhola, I.D.S.M., 364
Singh, No. 3106 Bugler Bhup, I.D.S.M., 357
Singh, Subadar-Major Bhure, I.D.S.M., 357
Singh, No. 2103 Havildar Bir, I.O.M., 364
Singh, Jemadar Bir, M.C., I.D.S.M., 358
Singh, No. 2071 Naik Bir, I.O.M., 359
Singh, Subadar Bishan, I.D.S.M., 368
Singh, No. 4011 Havildar Bishan, I.O.M., 358
Singh, No. 4576 Naik Bishn, I.D.S.M., 358
Singh, No. 1991 Havildar, afterwards Jemadar, Bur, I.D.S.M., 366
Singh, No. 3705 Lance-Naik Buta, I.O.M., 368
Singh, No. 2266 Sepoy Buta, I.D.S.M., 364
Singh, No. 1773 Sapper Channan, Russian Medal of St. George, 3rd Class,
355
Singh, Subadar Chet, 85
Singh, No. 3795 Sapper Dalip, I.O.M., Russian Cross of the Order of St.
George, 4th Class, 353, 355
Singh, No. 435 Sepoy Dan, I.D.S.M., 358
Singh, No. 1033 Lance-Naik Devi, Russian Medal of St. George, 4th
Class, 363
Singh, No. 2758 Naik Dewa, I.D.S.M., 367
Singh, No. 3374 Sepoy Dewa, I.D.S.M., 367
Singh, No. 1389 Lance-Naik Dhiyan, I.D.S.M., 363
Singh, Subadar Diwan, Bahadur, 359
Singh, No. 219 Sepoy Diwan, I.D.S.M., 358
Singh, No. 1036 Sepoy Fateh, I.D.S.M., 358
Singh, No. 514 Havildar Gajjan, I.O.M., 228–9, 364
Singh, No. 1339 Sepoy Ganda, I.D.S.M., 358
Singh, No. 2614 Acting Lance-Dafadar Ganga, I.O.M., 351
Singh, No. 830 Sowar Gokul, I.D.S.M., 351
Singh, No. 3013 Sepoy Gopal, I.D.S.M., 360
Singh, No. 1907 Naik Guja, I.O.M., 359
Singh, Jemadar Gujar, I.O.M., I.D.S.M., 363
Singh, No. 1011 Havildar Gujar, I.O.M., 363
Singh, No. 7 Sapper Gujar, I.D.S.M., 356
Singh, No. 3108 Naik Gurmukh, I.O.M., 354
Singh, Jemadar Harchand, I.O.M., 367
Singh, No. 1910 Lance-Naik Hari, 354
Singh, Subadar Harnam, I.O.M., 228, 364
Singh, Sub-Assist. Surgeon Harnam, I.O.M., 125, 379
Singh, No. 2720 Naik Harnam, I.D.S.M., 354
Singh, No. 1528 Havildar Harnam, I.D.S.M., 369
Singh, No. 1360 Sepoy Harnam, I.D.S.M., 358
Singh, Capt. Indajit, 133
Singh, Havildar Indar, 128
Singh, Jemadar Indar, M.C., I.D.S.M., 365, 366
Singh, No. 4052 Sapper Indar, I.D.S.M., 354
Singh, No. 2316 Sepoy Indar, I.O.M., 369
Singh, Capt. Kunwar Indarjit, M.C., 378
Singh, No. 2742 Sepoy Isar, I.O.M., 125, 367
Singh, No. 2578 Sepoy Ishar, I.D.S.M., 360
Singh, No. 355 Naik Jagat, I.D.S.M., 364
Singh, Subadar Jai, I.D.S.M., Russian Cross of the Order of St. George,
3rd Class, 276, 363
Singh, No. 42 Sapper Jai, I.D.S.M., 356
Singh, No. 1090 Lance-Naik Jamit, I.D.S.M., 363
Singh, No. 3475 Sepoy Jetta, I.D.S.M., 356
Singh, Risaldar-Major Jharmal, 175
Singh, No. 2889 Lance-Dafadar Jit, I.O.M., 351
Singh, Subadar-Major Jwala, Sardar Bahadur, I.O.M., 359
Singh, Jemadar Kapur, 38
Singh, No. 1811 Havildar Karam, I.O.M., 79, 367
Singh, No. 333 Dafadar Karam, I.D.S.M., 350
Singh, No. 2830 Naik Kashmir, I.O.M., 367
Singh, No. 2398 Sepoy Katha, I.D.S.M., 360
Singh, No. 1308 Sepoy Kehr, I.D.S.M., 364
Singh, No. 4474 Lance-Naik Kesar, I.D.S.M., 358
Singh, No. 1410 Sepoy Kesar, I.D.S.M., 364
Singh, Jemadar Kharak, I.O.M., 359
Singh, Jemadar Kirpa, 251
Singh, No. 1246, 2nd Class Sub-Assist. Surgeon Kishan, I.D.S.M., 380
Singh, No. 2116 Naik Kishen, I.D.S.M., 364
Singh, Subadar-Major Labh, Bahadur, 370
Singh, Subadar Labh, I.D.S.M., 134, 370
Singh, No. 337 Havildar Lachman, I.D.S.M., I.O.M., Russian Cross of the
Order of St. George, 3rd Class, 364
Singh, No. 322 Dafadar and Head Salutri Lachman, afterwards Jemadar,
350
Singh, No. 2479 Lance-Havildar Lal, I.O.M., 364
Singh, No. 702 Sepoy Lal, I.D.S.M., 358
Singh, No. 4095 Sepoy Lal, I.D.S.M., 358
Singh, Jemadar Lehna, I.O.M., 250, 362
Singh, No. 4349 Bearer Madan, I.D.S.M., 380
Singh, No. 859 Naik Magh, I.D.S.M., 354
Singh, No. 4727 Havildar Mahan, I.O.M., Russian Medal of St. George,
1st Class, 358
Singh, Subadar Malla, M.C., I.O.M., 71, 353
Singh, No. 3133 Sepoy Maluk, I.D.S.M., 367
Singh, Dafadar Mangal, I.D.S.M., 356
Singh, Jemadar Mangal, I.D.S.M., 368
Singh, Jemadar Mangal, I.O.M., 157, 365
Singh, No. 3623 Havildar Mangal, I.O.M., 252, 359
Singh, No. 131 Lance-Naik Mangal, I.O.M., 285, 358
Singh, Jemadar Maingha, I.O.M., 359
Singh, No. 4397 Bearer Mastan, I.D.S.M., 380
Singh, No. 4563 Sepoy Mastan, I.O.M., Russian Medal of St. George, 3rd
Class, 359, 360
Singh, Subadar Mehar, Bahadur, I.D.S.M., 363
Singh, No. 2616 Sepoy Mihan, I.D.S.M., 356
Singh, No. 1189 Naik Mit, I.D.S.M., 364
Singh, Subadar Mota, I.O.M., 364
Singh, Jemadar Mota, Russian Cross of the Order of St. George, 4th
Class, 364
Singh, No. 1336 Naik Mota, I.D.S.M., 364
Singh, No. 2882 Havildar Mula, I.D.S.M., 364
Singh, No. 1116 1st Class Sub-Assist. Surgeon Nagindar, I.O.M., 378
Singh, No. 231 Havildar, afterwards Jemadar, Narain, I.O.M., 364
Singh, No. 1452 Havildar Narayan, I.D.S.M., 360
Singh, Subadar Natha, I.O.M., Bahadur, 64, 125, 359
Singh, No. 1871 Havildar Nikka, I.O.M., 125, 359
Singh, No. 1148 Havildar Pala, I.O.M., 125, 359
Singh, No. 1230 2nd Class Sub-Assist. Surgeon Pargan, I.O.M., 379
Singh, Subadar Parshada, I.D.S.M., 357
Singh, No. 3991 Sepoy Phaga, I.D.S.M., 370
Singh, No. 3131 Lance-Naik Phangan, I.O.M., 367
Singh, Subadar Phuman, I.D.S.M., 367
Singh, No. 1576 Havildar Prem, I.D.S.M., 360
Singh, Subadar Ram, 125
Singh, No. 862 1st Class Sub-Assist. Surgeon Ram, I.O.M., 379
Singh, Jemadar Ram Rup, I.O.M., 353
Singh, No. 862 Driver Rup, I.D.S.M., 381
Singh, No. 2270 Sepoy Rur, I.O.M., 228, 364
Singh, Jemadar Sada Bahadur, 353
Singh, Risaldar Saddha Bahadur, 350
Singh, Subadar Sant, M.C., 359
Singh, No. 3063 Sepoy Sant, I.D.S.M., 360
Singh, No. 1025 Havildar Santa, I.O.M., 367
Singh, No. 962 Sepoy Sapuran, I.D.S.M., 358
Singh, No. 1255 Sepoy Sarain, I.D.S.M., 358
Singh, No. 295 Dafadar Sardar, I.O.M., 175, 351
Singh, No. 409 Havildar Saudagar, I.D.S.M., 363
Singh, Subadar Saudagar, Bahadur, 364
Singh, Subadar Sher, I.D.S.M., 359
Singh, No. 2063 Naik Sohan, I.D.S.M., 366
Singh, Sapper Suba, I.D.S.M., 354
Singh, Jemadar Sucha, I.O.M., 364
Singh, No. 322 Havildar Sucha, I.D.S.M., 354
Singh, No. 638 Sepoy Sucha, I.D.S.M., 358
Singh, No. 2636 Sepoy Sucha, I.D.S.M., 356
Singh, Subadar Suhel, I.O.M., 367
Singh, Jemadar Suhel, I.O.M., 367
Singh, Subadar Sundar, I.D.S.M., 354
Singh, Subadar Sundar, Bahadur, 353
Singh, Subadar Sundar, Bahadur, 368
Singh, Jemadar Sundar, 125
Singh, No. 2164 Havildar Sundar, I.D.S.M., 367
Singh, No. 319 Lance-Naik Sundar, I.D.S.M., 381
Singh, No. 1249 Sepoy Sundar, I.D.S.M., 358
Singh, No. 2762 Sepoy Sundar, Russian Cross of the Order of St. George,
4th Class, 370
Singh, No. 547 Naik Surjan, I.D.S.M., 363
Singh, Sepoy Tawand, 88
Singh, No. 1804 Lance-Naik Teja Singh, Russian Medal of St. George, 4th
Class, 360
Singh, Subadar Thakur, M.C., 364
Singh, No. 529 Sepoy Tilok, I.O.M., 358
Singh, No. 2775 Lance-Naik Tota, I.O.M., 125, 359
Singh, No. 1001 Sepoy Ujagar, I.D.S.M., 358
Singh, Jemadar Uttam, I.O.M., 353
Singh, No. 1791 Sepoy Waryam, I.D.S.M., 364
Singh, Subadar Wasawa, I.D.S.M., 389
Singh, Jemadar Wazir, I.D.S.M., 358
Sirhind Brigade, 19, 20, 51, 61, 65, 78, 96, 138, 143, 149, 150, 154,
158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 164, 165, 166, 170, 174, 175, 205, 215,
218, 221, 224, 226, 229, 231, 240, 247, 248, 253, 254, 255, 257,
258, 259, 260, 261, 263, 265, 278, 279, 280, 281, 284, 286, 287,
288, 289, 291
Skeen, Major and Brevet Lieut.-Col., afterwards Brevet Col., A., 349
Smith, Capt. A. D., M.C., 373
Smith, Capt. Dallas, 217
Smith, Major the Hon. F. E., K.C., M.P., afterwards Lieut.-Col.,
afterwards Lord Birkenhead, 54, 55, 239, 243
Smith, Corporal Issy, V.C., 249, 347
Smith, Major W. F., afterwards Brevet Lieut.-Col., 381
Smith-Dorrien, General Sir Horace, 53, 60, 69, 74, 75, 78, 138, 178,
247, 266
Smyth, Lieut. J. G., V.C., Russian Order of St. George, 4th Class,
285–6, 347, 357, 358
Snelling, Sergeant R., 171
Sobraon, 87, 118, 234
Somaliland, 50, 226
Somme River, 212, 232
Soneput, 12
Sotheby, Lieut., 338
Soudan, 1, 180
Southey, Lieut.-Col, (temp. Brig.-General), afterwards Brevet Col., W.
M., C.M.G., 39, 41, 42, 45, 122, 123, 126, 129, 206, 209, 349, 370
Sparrow, Capt., 213
Squires, Capt. E. K., M.C., 353
Stack, Capt. E., 76
Stainforth, Lieut.-Col. H. G., C.M.G., 350
Stansfield, Major, 339
Steele, Major St. G., 54
Steven, Lieut., 234
Stevens, Lieut.-Col. N. M. C., C.M.G., 369
Stewart, Private, 127
Stewart, Major J. H. K., D.S.O., 348
Stewart, Lieut, the Hon. K., 276
Stewart, Capt. W., D.S.O., 185, 220
Stewart, Lieut. W., 163
Stokes, Brig.-General, 265
Strickland, Colonel, afterwards Brigadier· General, 170, 171, 175, 206,
224, 227, 230
Strong, Major A., D.S.O., 348
Stuart, Major, afterwards Brevet Lieut.-Col., A. G., 350
Sturdee, Lieut., 86
Suffolk Regiment, 4th, 153, 170, 171, 206, 220, 228, 240, 248, 250
Sukal, 1st Class Sub-Assist. Surgeon Narayan Parshad, I.D.S.M., 379
Suleiman, No. 3275 Sepoy, I.O.M., 369
_Summary of News Extract_, 1st-5th June 1915, 318
Sunken Street, 328
Surjoo, No. 7032 Lance-Naik, I.D.S.M., 379
Surjoo, No. 11018 Lance-Naik, I.D.S.M., 379
Sussex, (Royal) Regiment, 167
Sutherland, Sergeant, 152
Swan, Private, 129
Swanston, Lieut.-Col. C. O., 86
Swifte, Major, 38
Swiney, Lieut.-Col. E. R., afterwards Brevet Col., 95, 123, 129–32,
210, 213, 215, 361
Sydenham, Lady, 101
Talab, Subadar Raj, D.S.O., I.D.S.M., 367
Talbot, Major, 250
Tarrant, Capt., 253, 260, 262, 264
Tayler, Lieut., 283
Taylor, Lieut., 332
Taylor, Major G. H., 95, 108, 110
Taylor, Capt. J., D.S.O., 215, 378
Tel-el-Kebir, 338
Templer, Lieut.-Col. C. F., C.M.G., 382
Tennant, Lieut., 271
Tennyson, Alfred Lord, quoted, 105
Territorial Battalion, 142nd, 144
Thapa, Subadar Autbir, I.O.M., 372
Thapa, No. 1628 Havildar Bag Sing, I.D.S.M., 373
Thapa, Havildar Bahadur, I.O.M., 110, 211, 374
Thapa, No. 2205 Rifleman Balbir, I.O.M., Russian Medal of St. George,
3rd Class, 372
Thapa, No. 2814 Rifleman Baliram, I.D.S.M., 372
Thapa, Subadar Bara Sing, I.D.S.M., 374
Thapa, Subadar Bhim Sing, I.O.M., 211, 374
Thapa, No. 1517 Naik Bhimbahadur, I.D.S.M., 373
Thapa, No. 1348 Rifleman Budhiman, I.O.M., 376
Thapa, Subadar Chandrabir, Bahadur, I.D.S.M., 376
Thapa, No. 2650 Rifleman Chitabir, I.D.S.M., 372
Thapa, No. 4078 Rifleman Dhamraj, Russian Medal of St. George, 4th
Class, 376
Thapa, No. 2118 Rifleman Ganpati, I.D.S.M., 110, 374
Thapa, Havildar Hara Sing, 156
Thapa, Jemadar Harak Bahadur, I.O.M., 374
Thapa, No. 3110 Havildar Hari Parshad, I.O.M., 375
Thapa, Rifleman Jangia, 156
Thapa, No. 1757 Lance-Naik Jhaman Sing, I.O.M., 374
Thapa, No. 2719 Rifleman Jilman, I.O.M., Russian Cross of the Order of
St. George, 4th Class, 372
Thapa, Lance-Naik Kabiram, 110
Thapa, Subadar Kharak Bahadur, Bahadur, 374
Thapa, Jemadar Kharakbir, I.O.M., 372
Thapa, No. 2129 Rifleman Kulbir, V.C., 332, 347
Thapa, Jemadar Lachman Sing, 174
Thapa, No. 1946 Rifleman Lalbir, I.D.S.M., 372
Thapa, No. 1593 Naik Patiram, I.D.S.M., 373
Thapa, Jemadar Puran Sing, I.D.S.M., 374
Thapa, No. 1843 Naik Ramkishan, I.O.M., 258, 374
Thapa, No. 1473 Naik Ramparshad, I.D.S.M., 373
Thapa, Jemadar Sasidhar, I.O.M., 374
Thobal, 46
Thompson, Corporal N., 213
Thomson, Lieut., 287
Thomson, Major A. G., D.S.O., 127, 366
Thornhill, Capt. C. M., M.C., 371
Tillard, Major A., 211
Tilleloy, Trench, 328
Timour, 29, 37
Tinley, Colonel G. F., 309
Tinley, Lieut. G. F., M.C., 351
Tirah, 53, 63, 85, 87, 110, 164, 216
Tiwana, Capt. the Hon. Malik Sir Umar Hayat Khan, 21
Tiwari, No. 1088 Colour-Havildar Hira, I.O.M., 369
Tombe Willot, La, 208
Tomkins, Major, afterwards Brevet Col., H. L., 50, 77, 350
Tooley, Lieut., 152
Torrie, Capt. C. J., D.S.O., 355
Tosh, Major, 339
Touquet, le, 143
Tourelle, La, 270, 279, 280, 286
Touret, Le, 166
Trail, Capt. W. S., 46
Treherne, Surgeon-General, 50, 204
Tribe, Lieut.-Col. C. W., C.M.G., 276, 363
Tulloch, Lieut. D., 80, 90
Turnbull, Capt., 134
Turnbull, Capt. (temp. Major) G. O., D.S.O., 359
Tuson, Colonel, 260
Twining, Lieut.-Col. P., 53
Twiss, Major W. L., 50
Twiss, Capt. W. L. O., M.C., 349
Tyler, Colonel, 53
Tyson, Lieut., 332
Uhlans, 16th, 308
Umar, No. 937 1st Class Sub-Assist. Surgeon Muhammad, I.D.S.M., 379
Ussher, Capt., 145
Vaughan, Lieut., 276
Vaughan, Major (temp. Lieut.-Col.) L. R., D.S.O., 348
Vaughan, Lieut.-Col., afterwards Brevet Col., R. E., D.S.O., 97, 349
Vaughan-Sawyer, Capt. G. H., 64
Venour, Colonel W. E., 78, 79
Venters, Private, 127
Verdun, 232, 269
Vermelle, 142–3
Vieille Chapelle, 67, 153, 205, 208, 215, 218, 224, 278, 280, 284
Villiers-Stuart, Capt. J. P., D.S.O., 348
Vincent, Capt., 341
Vincent, Major Barclay, 50
Violaines, 279
Vivian, Major C. A., afterwards Brevet Lieut.-Col., 261, 358
Wade, Lieut. H., 72
Wadeson, Col. (temp. Brig.-General) F. W. G., C.B., 20, 106, 171
Wadhawa, No. 4009 Naik, I.D.S.M., 379
Wahab, No. 3063 Havildar Abdul, I.O.M., Russian Medal of St. George,
2nd Class, 157, 368, 369
Wake, Major, 76
Walcott, Lieut. J. H., 85
Walker, Col. (temp. Brig.-General), afterwards Major-General, W. G.,
V.C., C.B., 205, 226, 230, 287, 349
Walker, Lieut.-Col., 339
Wall, Lieut.-Col. F., C.M.G., 97, 378
Wallis, Lieut. B. H., M.C., 134, 369
War Office, the, and the Indian Army, 13, 14
Wardell, Capt. C. G., 242, 340
Wardell, Major W. H., 130, 131
Warneton, 143
Waterfield, Capt. F. C., 287
Waterloo, 29, 338
Waters, Capt., 250
Watkis, Lieut.-General H. B. B., K.C.B., 18, 50, 64, 106, 149, 154,
162, 163, 170, 171, 175, 177, 179, 347
Watkis, Capt. H. L., M.C., 349
Watt, Major D., D.S.O., 159, 217, 372
Watt, Miss P. F., Royal Red Cross Decoration, 1st Class, 378
Wauchope, Major A. G., afterwards Brig.-General, 128–9, 166, 169, 336,
338, 342
Weir, Capt. D. L., 212
Welchman, Lieut. J., 131, 213
Welsh (Royal) Fusiliers, 51
West Kent Regiment, 66, 68
West Riding Regiment, 78, 260
West Riding Regiment, 49th, 241
Westmacott, General, 167
Wheeler, Lieut. E. O., 112
White, Lieut.-Col. W. W., afterwards Brevet Col., 97, 380
Whitton, Sergeant, 156
Wickham, Capt. J. C., D.S.O., 353
Wicks, Capt. H., 107, 169, 214
Wicres, 306
Widdicombe, Lieut.-Col. G. T., C.B., 169, 223, 376
Wieltje, 245, 247, 248
Willans, Major T. J., D.S.O., 37, 38, 46, 251, 365
Willcocks, Lieut. J. L., 54, 55, 177, 235
Williams, Major A. F. C., D.S.O., Russian Order of St. Stanislas, 3rd
Class, with Swords, 352
Wilson, Sergeant, 129
Wilson, Capt. G. E., 125, 127
Wilson, Capt. R. S., 92
Wiltshire Regiment, 66, 67
Winchester Road, 337
Street, 328
Wood, Lieut., 332
Wood, Capt. C. A., M.B., M.C., 378
Wright, Capt. H., 76
Wulverghem, 33
Wylie, Captain M., 174
Wytschaete, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38
Xenophon, 264
Yates, Capt. R. C., 162
Yeusafzais, 238
York and Lancaster Regiment, 260
Young, Major A., 169
Young, Major D., 229
Yousafzai, 22
Ypres, 24, 35, 44, 46, 48, 53, 61, 67, 73, 119, 161, 177, 178, 202,
232, 244, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 252, 254, 261, 265, 266, 268,
298, 300, 307
Zakka Khel Expedition, 9
Zaman, Subadar Khan, I.O.M., 370
Zaman, No. 44 Naik Khan, I.D.S.M., 234, 355
Zelobes, 208
_Printed in Great Britain by_ R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, _Edinburgh_.
-----
Footnote 1:
General name for Sikhs = chosen people.
Footnote 2:
Black; a term applied to the sea.
Footnote 3:
Mahabharut or “Great War”; the great epic poem of India.
Footnote 4:
The Sikh war-cry.
Footnote 5:
Mother India.
Footnote 6:
War-cries of Hindus, Sikhs, Mahomedans, and Gurkhas.
Footnote 7:
God.
Footnote 8:
I was rejoiced to see in the _London Gazette_ of 4th September 1919
that this very gallant officer had been given the Victoria Cross.
Footnote 9:
Indian battalions were in these days formed in eight companies.
Footnote 10:
In indexing the many Indian names the indexer has followed the method
used in the India Office _English_ catalogues.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE WAR IN MESOPOTAMIA AND PALESTINE
THE LIFE OF LIEUT.-GENERAL
SIR STANLEY MAUDE
K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
By Major-General Sir C. E. CALLWELL, K.C.B., Author of “The
Dardanelles,” etc. Illustrations and Maps. Demy 8vo.
This important book is the authorised memorial biography of the famous
soldier who in Mesopotamia was in command of the gallant effort to
relieve Kut, who conquered Baghdad, and died of cholera in November
1917. Major-General Callwell has had access to every family and official
record, and his book contains, in their own words, the estimates of
Maude as a man and a soldier formed by the officers and others most
closely associated with him during his career.
_Contents_:—Ancestry and Early Years—From 1884 to 1899—The South African
War—The Time in Canada—From 1905 to 1914—1914: On the Staff of the Third
Corps in France—In Command of the 14th Infantry Brigade—The
Dardanelles—The Move from Egypt to Mesopotamia—The Effort to relieve
Kut—From Divisional to Army Commander—Preparations for an Offensive
Campaign—The Campaign of Baghdad—Consolidating the Conquest—The Death of
Maude—An Appreciation—Index.
HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON
By W. T. MASSEY, C.B.E. Illustrated.
ALLENBY’S FINAL TRIUMPH
By W. T. MASSEY, C.B.E. Illustrated.
These two volumes by the Official Correspondent of the London newspapers
with the E.E.F. from a comprehensive record of Allenby’s victorious
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Two volumes of brilliant description of naval operations in the more
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CONSTABLE & CO. LTD. 10–12 ORANGE STREET LONDON W.C.2.
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1914
By Field-Marshal Lord FRENCH of Ypres, K.P., O.M., etc. With a Preface
by Marshal FOCH. Second Edition, with a Preface by the Author.
Maps. Demy 8vo.
YPRES 1914
An official account published by order of the German General Staff.
With Introduction and Note by the Historical Section (Military
Section) of the Committee of Imperial Defence.
R.A.M.C. AND THE GREAT WAR
MONS: THE MARNE: THE AISNE
By Lt.-Col. F. E. BRERETON, R.A.M.C. Maps. Demy 8vo.
NOTES OF A CAMP-FOLLOWER ON THE WESTERN FRONT
A picture of the work of the Y.M.C.A. Huts by E. W. HORNUNG.
THE ROMANCE OF THE BATTLE LINE IN FRANCE
An Historical Guide to the Invaded Regions.
By J. E. C. BODLEY, Author of “France.” Maps.
ENGLAND IN FRANCE
Mainly with the 59th Division.
Illustrations by SYDNEY A. JONES. Text by CHARLES VINCE.
CONSTABLE & CO. LTD. 10–12 ORANGE STREET LONDON W.C.2.
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