Modern ships of war

By Sir Edward J. Reed and Edward Simpson

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Title: Modern ships of war

Author: Sir Edward J. Reed
Edward Simpson

Contributor: J. D. Jerrold Kelley

Release date: June 22, 2024 [eBook #73887]

Language: English

Original publication: United States: Harper & Brothers, 1887

Credits: deaurider, John Campbell and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive)

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[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR, OCTOBER 21, 1805.—From a
drawing by J. O. Davidson.]

MODERN SHIPS OF WAR

SIR EDWARD J. REED, M.P.

LATE CHIEF CONSTRUCTOR OF THE BRITISH NAVY

AND

EDWARD SIMPSON

REAR-ADMIRAL U.S.N., LATE PRESIDENT U. S. NAVAL ADVISORY BOARD

WITH

SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTERS AND NOTES BY

J. D. JERROLD KELLEY

LIEUTENANT U.S.N.

AUTHOR OF “THE QUESTION OF SHIPS” “ARMORED VESSELS” ETC.

_ILLUSTRATED_

NEW YORK
HARPER & BROTHERS, FRANKLIN SQUARE
1888

_All rights reserved._

PREFACE.

After many years of neglect, the people of this country have awakened
to the necessity of creating a modern fleet. Proud as they were of
the Navy’s achievements in the past, they failed for a long time to
exhibit any interest in its present or future, and met all claims
for its re-establishment by a denial of its usefulness, or by a
lazy optimism of indifference which smilingly put the question by.
Indeed, at one time, the popular solicitude disappeared completely,
and outside of the service there was manifested neither an alarm at
its degeneracy nor an appreciation of the dangers this made possible.
With an apathy inexplicable upon any rational grounds, the notes
of warning sounded by experts were unheeded, and the law-makers
contented themselves by pinning their faith to what they called
“the creative possibilities of American genius.” They accepted this
fallacy as a fact, they made this phrase a fetich, and with a fatuous
hope believed it could, by some occult inspiration, in the event of
sudden, sharp, and short war, save them from the fighting-machines
which twenty years of tireless experiment had perfected abroad. In
the end, by a neatly balanced policy of pride and folly, the Navy
was exhausted almost to dissolution. Then Congress lazily bestirred
itself to action, and prescribed as a remedy three unarmored cruisers
and a despatch-boat.

Heroic treatment, not homœopathy, was needed; but, thanks to a
naturally vigorous constitution, the bolus sufficed to lift the
patient out of the throes, and to encourage him into a languid
convalescence. Luckily, the vessels became a party question, and
their historic tribulations did so much towards educating the
nation that a public sentiment was aroused which made a modern navy
possible. It must be confessed, however, that the demand even yet is
not so vociferous as to dominate all other issues, though there is
apparent everywhere a quickening desire for the country to take, if
not the first, at least a respectable, place among the great maritime
powers.

With these new ideas came a desire for information which could not be
satisfied, because, curiously enough, the popular literature of the
subject is meagre, or rather it is unavailable. There are treatises
in plenty which soar beyond the skies of any but experts; there are
handy manuals wherein the Navy, like the banjo, is made easy in ten
lessons; but between these extremes nothing exists which is accurate,
and at the same time free from those dismal figures and dry-as-dust
facts that are so apt to discourage a reader at the outset.

To meet this want, which was one by no means “long felt,” these
articles were originally published in _Harper’s Magazine_, and with a
success that seemed to justify their collection in a more available,
if not a more permanent, form. It may be said now that no changes of
any moment have been made in the text, that the notes attempt only to
bring down the data to the latest date, and that the appendices are
needful additions which the limited space of a monthly publication
necessarily forbade. The reader who has not followed the progress of
naval war construction will undoubtedly find many surprises, both in
achievement and promise, which may be difficult to understand, yet
it is hoped that the non-technical manner in which Sir Edward Reed
and Rear-admiral Simpson have written will do much to make plain this
important National question. Both these gentlemen are authorities
of the first rank, both are luminous writers, and each in his own
country and own sphere has had an important influence upon war-ship
design and armament. To those who read within the lines there awaits
a mortifying realization of our inferiority; for during all the
years that this country—masterful beyond compare in other material
struggles—was so successfully neglecting its navy, foreign designers
were achieving triumphs which are marvellous. With this knowledge
there is sure to come a high appreciation of the intelligence
exercised; for the evolution of the battle-ship has been so rapid,
and the resultant type has so little in common with the wooden vessel
of our war, that those who have solved the problems have practically
created a new science.

CONTENTS.

PAGE
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER 1

THE BRITISH NAVY 12
NOTES 52

THE FRENCH NAVY 67
NOTES 92

THE ITALIAN, RUSSIAN, GERMAN, AUSTRIAN, AND TURKISH NAVIES 104
NOTES 134
Italy 134
Russia 139
Spain 141
Austria 144

THE UNITED STATES NAVY 148
NOTES 183

UNITED STATES NAVAL ARTILLERY 194
NOTES 226
Guns 226
Machine and Rapid-fire Guns 234

SHIPS OF THE MINOR NAVIES 241

APPENDIX I 251
SUBMARINE WARFARE 251
TORPEDOES 259
A NAVAL RESERVE 261
FORCED DRAFT 263

APPENDIX II 267
THE QUESTION OF TYPES 267

APPENDIX III 283
RANGE OF GUNS 283

ILLUSTRATIONS.

THE BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR, OCTOBER 21, 1805.—From
a drawing by J. O. Davidson _Frontispiece._

PAGE
The “Victory” 13
The “Glatton” 15
The “Dreadnought” 17
The “Inflexible” 19
Section of the “Amiral Duperré” 23
Section of the “Inflexible” 23
Section of the “Collingwood” 23
New Admiralty Ship 23
The “Devastation” 24
The “Sultan” 27
Section and Plan of the “Alexandra” 28
Section and Plan of the “Téméraire” 28
Section and Plan of the “Nelson” 29
Section and Plan of the “Shannon” 29
The “Alexandra” 30
The “Téméraire” 31
The “Hotspur” 34
The “Warspite” 37
Transverse Section of the “Mersey” 38
The “Inconstant” 41
The “Colossus” 43
Transverse Section of one of the New “Scouts” 49
The “Jumna” 50
The “Dévastation:” French Armored Ship of the First Class 73
The “Courbet” (formerly the “Foudroyant”): French Armored Ship
of the First Class 75
The “Richelieu” 77
The “Amiral Duperré:” French Armored Ship of the First Class 81
The “Vengeur:” French Iron-clad Coast-guard Vessel 87
British Torpedo Gun-boat of the “Grasshopper” Class (side view) 90
The “Grasshopper”—Plan of Upper Deck, Poop, and Forecastle 90
The “Duilio” 105
Section of the “Italia” 110
Deck Plan of the “Italia” 110
The “Italia” 111
The “Esmeralda” 113
The “Amerigo Vespucci” 115
The “Catherine II.” 119
Half-deck Plan of the “Sachsen” 121
Side Elevation of the “Sachsen” 121
Half-deck Plan of the “Kaiser” 122
Side Elevation of the “Kaiser” 122
The “Sachsen” 123
U. S. Side-wheel Steamer “Powhatan” 150
U. S. Frigate “Franklin,” of the “Merrimac” Class 152
U. S. Sloop-of-war “Hartford” 153
U. S. Sloop-of-war “Brooklyn” 154
U. S. Sloop-of-war “Kearsarge” 155
U. S. Iron-clad “New Ironsides” 156
U. S. Monitor “Passaic” 156
U. S. Double-turreted Monitor “Terror” 157
U. S. Frigate “Tennessee” 159
U. S. Sloop-of-war “Adams” 160
U. S. Sloop-of-war “Marion” 161
U. S. Sloop-of-war “Alert” (Iron) 162
U. S. Sloop-of-war “Trenton” 163
U. S. Frigate “Chicago” (Steel) 169
Deck Plans of the U. S. Frigate “Chicago,” showing Battery 171
Deck Plan of the U. S. Sloop-of-war “Atlanta,” showing Battery 171
U. S. Sloop-of-war “Atlanta” (Steel) 173
U. S. Despatch-boat “Dolphin” 176
Light Draught Coast-defence Vessel, with Deck Plan 180
The Howell Torpedo 182
Bronze Breech-loading Cannon captured in Corea, age unknown 194
Bronze Breech-loader used by Cortez in Mexico 195
Breech-loader captured in the War with Mexico 196
Bronze 12-pounder, “El Neptuno,” 1781 197
U.S.N. Carronade, Slide, and Carriage 198
U.S.N. Medium 32-pounder 199
U.S.N. 9-inch Dahlgren (9-inch Smooth-bore) 201
Horizontal Section of Millwall Shield 204
A Krupp Gun on a Naval Carriage 206
Alfred Krupp 207
Breech-loading Rifle-tube ready for receiving Jacket 210
Breech-loading Rifle-jacket, Rough-bored and Turned 210
Putting the Jacket on a 6-inch Breech-loading Rifle-tube 211
Breech-loading Rifle after receiving Jacket 214
A Krupp Hammer 215
Transporting Cannon at Bremerhaven 217
Breech-loading Rifle after receiving Jacket and Chase Hoops 218
Breech-loading Rifle with Jacket, Chase Hoops, and Jacket
Hoops in place 218
U.S.N. 6-inch Breech-loading Rifle 218
Cartridge Case and Grains of Powder, U.S.N. 220
Common Shells, U.S.N. 220
Unburned and Partially Consumed Grains of U.S.N. Powder 222
Section of U.S.N. 6-inch Built-up Steel Breech-loading Rifle 222
Broadside Carriage for 6-inch Breech-loading Rifle 223
Rapid-firing Single-shot Hotchkiss Gun 224
New 6-inch Breech-loading Rifle 238
Longitudinal Plans of Nordenfeldt Boat 254
The Submarine Monitor “Peacemaker” 257

MODERN SHIPS OF WAR.

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.

During the last thirty years the changes in naval science have
been so much greater than in its whole previous history as to be
epoch-making. Between the wooden vessel of 1857 and the metal machine
of 1887 there exist in common only the essential principles that
each is a water-borne structure, armed with guns and propelled by
steam. Beyond this everything is changed—model, material, machinery,
rig, armament, equipment. In truth, so radical are the differences,
and so sudden have been the developments, that authorities are
widely separated in opinion, even upon such a primary question as
a universally accepted system of classification. But as this is
necessary to a proper appreciation of the subject, a generalization
may be made in which war-vessels are divided into armored and
unarmored types, the former including battle-ships, and the latter
those employed in the police of the seas, in commerce protection or
destruction, or in the attack of positions which are defenceless.

In the absence of any accepted differentiations of these classes, the
new British nomenclature may be adopted with safety, for to a certain
degree it explains the terms and includes the types now used so
variously in different navies. Under this armored vessels are grouped
into (1) battle-ships, (2) cruisers, (3) special types, such as rams
and torpedo-boats, and (4) coast-service ships; and unarmored vessels
comprise (1) cruisers, (2) sloops, (3) gun-vessels, (4) gun-boats,
(5) despatch-vessels, and (6) torpedo-vessels. “As it was impossible
to unite all the qualities which are to be desired in a ship-of-war
in a single vessel, it became necessary to divide the leading types
into subdivisions, each specially adapted to the use of a particular
arm, or to perform some special service. For the battle-ships
designed for naval operations in European waters great offensive and
defensive powers and evolutionary qualities are essential, while
the highest sea-going qualities, including habitability, are, in the
opinion of some, less essential. For sea-going battle-ships offensive
and defensive strength must be partially sacrificed in order to
secure unquestionable sea-worthiness. In ocean-going battle-ships
canvas is a valuable auxiliary. In battle-ships for European
waters, masts and yards involve a useless sacrifice of fighting
power.... Heavily armored ships intended for the line of battle
must necessarily carry powerful guns. They must be able to traverse
great distances, and must therefore have considerable storage for
coal. Great speed is required to enable them to meet the inevitable
contingencies of an engagement. In a word, the class of ships which
may be called battery-ships must be furnished with very considerable
offensive and defensive power. Their great size, however, and the
enormous weight of their armor and armament, necessitate such
displacements as render them unfit for coast defence” (BRASSEY).

While the antagonistic elements of offence, defence, speed, or
endurance have caused the main differences of design in all
types, the greatest variances with battle-ships are found in the
distribution of armor for protection. A hasty summarization of the
policies now adopted by the great maritime nations shows that the
French generally adhere to a complete armor-belt at the water-line,
that the Italians have in their latest ships totally abandoned
side-armor, and that the English favor its partial employment. The
popular idea that armor consists only of thick slabs of wrought-iron
or steel, or of steel-faced iron, bolted to a ship’s side, is
erroneous. “In the earlier broadside ships,” writes the present
director of English naval construction, Mr. W. H. White, “this view
was practically correct; they had no armor or protected decks,
the decks being covered only by thin plates fitted for structural
purposes. But in the _Devastation_ class, and all subsequent ships,
considerable and increasing weights of material are worked into the
deck armor, and with good reason. Experiments showed conclusively
that horizontal protection at the top of the armor-belt, or citadel,
was of vital necessity, and even now (1887) it is open to question
whether the provision made for horizontal protection in relation to
vertical armor is as large as it might advantageously be.”

The factors which have most influenced the problem are the torpedo,
ram, and gun. Of these the last is indubitably of the highest
importance, for the number and nature, the effective handling, the
disposition and command, and the relative protection of the guns are
the elements which control most powerfully the principles of ship
design. In the first stage of the contest between gun and armor the
defence was victorious, but so rapidly have the art and science of
ordnance developed that to-day the power of the heaviest pieces as
compared with the resistance of the heaviest armor is greater than
ever before.

The story of the contest can be briefly told. In 1858 the armament of
the newest ships was principally a broadside battery of 32-pounders;
in this were included a few 56-pound shell-guns and one or two
eight-inch 68-pounders, though of the whole number not one had
an energy, that is, a force of blow when striking, sufficient to
penetrate four and a half inches of wrought-iron at short range.
In the earliest iron-clads—the French _La Gloire_ and the English
_Warrior_—batteries mainly of nine-inch calibre were carried, the
latter mounting forty guns of all kinds. The _Minotaur_, the first
representative of the next English type, had fifty guns, but after
this class was launched there appeared that distinctively modern
tendency to decrease the number of pieces while increasing the
intensity of their fire. The succeeding vessels carried from fourteen
to twelve pieces, until, in 1874, the principle of concentration
reached its maximum in giving the _Inflexible_ only four guns.
These, like the _Warrior’s_, were muzzle-loaders, and their relative
dimensions and power may be compared as follows:

The term energy, when employed to indicate the work that a gun
can perform, is expressed in foot-tons, and signifies that the
amount developed is sufficient to raise the given weight in tons to
the height of one foot. The piercing power of the _Inflexible’s_
projectile was, under the same conditions of charge and range,
sufficient to penetrate twenty-five feet of granite and concrete
masonry, or thirty-two feet of the best Portland cement.

When the thickness of armor-plating increased, gun-makers tried
to overcome the resistance by giving greater energy to the shot.
As this required large charges of powder and very long guns,
muzzle-loaders became impracticable on shipboard, and were supplanted
by breech-loaders. From this stage guns developed greatly in power
until, in 1882, those designed for the _Benbow_ were to weigh 110
tons, to be 43 feet long and 16¾ inches in calibre, and with 900
pounds of powder and an 1800-pound projectile were to develop 54,000
foot-tons, or an energy sufficient to penetrate thirty-five inches
of unbacked wrought-iron at one thousand yards. The guns for the
latest English ships, the _Trafalgar_ and the _Nile_, weigh 67 tons,
are 36 feet 1 inch in length and 13½ inches in calibre, and with a
520-pound charge and a 1250-pound projectile are expected to develop
29,500 foot-tons, or an energy sufficient to penetrate an iron target
twenty-two and a half inches thick at a thousand yards. These results
apparently show a retrogression in power, but a comparison of the
_Inflexible’s_ and _Trafalgar’s_ batteries proves that the more
modern gun of the latter weighs 13 tons less, is 2½ inches smaller in
calibre, fires a shot 450 pounds lighter, and yet develops an energy
greater by 3000 foot-tons.

This gain is mainly due to the improvements made with powder and
projectiles. In 1883 a 403-pound Whitworth steel shell penetrated
a wrought-iron target eighteen inches thick backed by thirty-seven
inches of well-packed wet sand, one and a half inches of steel,
various balks of timber, and sixteen feet more of sand. When the
projectile was recovered after this stratified flight it was found
to be practically uninjured. On the Continent, where breech-loaders
were favored earlier than in England or with ourselves, the heaviest
rifles afloat are the 75-ton, 16.54-inch calibre, French, and the
106 tons, 17-inch Italian guns. These are, however, not the largest
pieces designed, for there is an 120-ton Krupp gun, and the French
have projected one which will weigh 124 tons, be 18.11 inches in
calibre, and fire a 2465-pound projectile—over a ton—with a powder
charge of 575 pounds. A comparison of the Krupp 120-ton gun with the
110-ton Armstrong shows that the former is more powerful; that its
projectile is much heavier, and the initial velocity and pressure are
smaller. The results at the recent test were as follows:

Armstrong. Krupp.
Charge 850 pounds 847 pounds.
Shot 1800 ” 2315 ”
Velocity 2150 feet 1900 feet.
Pressure 19.9 tons 18.8 tons.
Energy 57,679 foot-tons 67,928 foot-tons.

From the _Warrior_ to the _Inflexible_ the evolution of design
was based upon a principle that sought the best results for the
offence in small, powerful batteries, with all-around fire and armor
protection; and for the defence, in thick armor carried over the
vitals of the ship. This was satisfied by larger weights of armor and
a smaller ratio of armored part to total surface. Wrought-iron armor
was also replaced by compound, with a corresponding gain of twenty
per cent. for equal thicknesses, and at present all-steel plates, of
which great things may reasonably be expected, are now employed by
France and Italy. In 1861 the _Minotaur_ was belted throughout her
400 feet of length with 1780 tons of armor, or with a weight nearly
double that given to the _Warrior_ two years before. The _Inflexible_
has 3280 tons, and the _Trafalgar_ 4230 tons, of which 1040 are
fitted horizontally. The maximum thickness of the _Warrior’s_
wrought-iron armor is 4½ inches, of the _Devastation’s_, 12 inches,
and of the _Inflexible’s_ 24 inches; the compound (iron steel-faced)
armor of the _Trafalgar_ is 18 and 20 inches thick, and the _Baudin_
and _Formidable_ have 21.7 inches in solid plates of steel. These, of
course, are some of the dry-as-dust figures before referred to, and
they are cited only to assist a comparison, their mere enumeration
having no scientific value, because the disposition and character of
the plates are unconsidered.

To meet this development of offence and defence many changes in
design have been adopted. The _broadside system_ of the first armored
ships was followed in 1863-1867 by a _belt and battery type_,
wherein the principal guns, much reduced in number, were carried in
a box battery amidships, and given a fore-and-aft fire by means of
recessed ports or outlying batteries. In 1869 the Admiralty adopted
the _breastwork monitor_, a low free-boarded structure, which was
plated from stem to stern in the region of the water-line, and had in
its central portion an armored breastwork that carried at each end a
revolving turret. In 1870 this type was pronounced unsafe, and after
a careful investigation by a special committee on design certain
modifications were recommended. These did not affect materially
the essential features of Sir Edward Reed’s plan, for the complete
water-line belt and the central armored battery were retained; and
to-day many of the critics who then denounced it claim that, after
all, it is the true type of an ideal battle-ship.

In 1872 the Italian naval authorities accepted the conclusions of
the British committee, and laid down the first _central-citadel_
battle-ships, now known as the _Duilio_ and _Dandolo_; and about the
same time Mr. Barnaby, the new Chief Constructor of the British Navy,
brought forward a similar design in the _Inflexible_. The engines,
boilers, and the bases of two turrets in this vessel are protected
by an armored box-shaped citadel, from the extremities of which a
horizontal armored deck extends fore and aft below the water-line;
above this deck an armored superstructure completes the free-board,
and has its unprotected spaces at the water-line, subdivided into
numerous water-tight compartments. This ship met with so much hostile
criticism that a committee was appointed to investigate the charges,
but in the end the Admiralty plans were officially sustained.

The French, with characteristic ability and independence, have in
the mean time made many notable departures from their first types
of broadside ships. Believing in the association of heavy guns with
light ones—mixed armaments, as they are called—the central armored
casemate of wholly protected guns has been rejected in order to give
a maximum thickness of plating at the water-line. The largest guns
are mounted _en barbette_—that is, in towers which protect the gun
mechanism, and permit the pieces to be fired, not through port-holes,
but over the rim of armored parapets. The French constructors reason,
and with justice, that no single shot from a heavy gun should be
wasted, and that, in addition to an extended range, gun captains must
be enabled, by keeping their eyes upon the enemy, to select the best
opportunity for firing. With broadside pieces this is impossible, for
apart from the limited range, and the obscurity caused by the smoke,
the port-holes through which the sighting has necessarily to be done
are almost choked by the gun-muzzles. Turrets have their objections
also, because the poisonous gases which formerly escaped wholly from
the muzzle will, as soon as the breech is opened, rush into the
turret and make it almost uninhabitable. Often after one discharge
the air becomes stifling, and in the _Duilio_ it deteriorated
so quickly as to be unfit for respiration until a part of the
turret-roof had been lifted. Then, again, structural difficulties
not easily overcome in the turret are simplified in the barbette, as
the latter, with equal gun facilities, weighs fifty per cent. less,
and at the same time escapes all those chances of disablement which
a well-placed shot is almost sure to cause in any revolving system.
At sea the chance of hitting the gun is never great, and the main
things to protect are the gun machinery and the gunners; the armored
wall of the barbette tower does this for the former, and the latter
have a fair fighting chance afforded by the gun-shield. Of course war
is not deer-stalking, and the patriot who wants to go into battle so
fully protected as to be in no danger had better stop playing sailor
or soldier, and take to the woods before the fighting begins. In
addition to the heavy ordnance, the French mount a number of lighter
pieces, and carry powerful secondary batteries of rapid fire and
machine-guns; and sufficient armor defence is given by a belt at
the water-line, an armored deck, and a glacis and parapet for the
barbette. It is quite probable that these purely military terms may
seem odd when applied to ships, but they are the only ones which can
exactly explain what is meant, and, after all, they show how much a
battle-ship has become a floating, transferable fortress.

The Italians were not altogether satisfied with the _Duilio_, as she
lacked the high speed and coal endurance which they deem essential
in any Mediterranean naval policy; so in 1878 they adopted an idea
advanced some years before in England, and startled the world with
the _Italia_ type. In this ship protection is given, not by vertical
or side armor, but by an armored deck, between which and the deck
above there is a very minute subdivision of the water-line space.
The system is based upon the theory that the power to float must
be obtained, not by keeping our projectiles, but by so localizing
their effect as to make any penetration practically harmless. The
_Italia’s_ heavy guns are carried in a central armored redoubt, at
a height of thirty-three feet above the water-line, and with their
machinery and fittings weigh over two thousand tons. This fact
shows the magnitude of the task accepted by her designer, for it
means that a load nearly equal to the total weight of a first-class
line-of-battle ship of the last century has to be sustained at
this great elevation. Besides the main battery of four 106-ton
guns, eighteen six-inch breech-loading guns are carried—twelve in
broadside on the upper battery deck, four in the superstructure
before and abaft the redoubt, and two under cover at the extremities
of the spar-deck. The redoubt is protected by seventeen inches of
compound iron, inclined twenty-four degrees from the vertical; and
the complete armored deck, which is nearly three inches thick, dips
forward to strengthen the ram, curves aft to cover the steering gear,
and, at the ship’s sides, extends six feet below the water-line.

To cope with this formidable rival, which, whether right or wrong
in principle, must, under England’s policy, be surpassed, the ships
of the _Admiral_ class were designed. In these the main battery
is mounted in two barbettes built high out of water, near the
extremities of the vessel, while in a central broadside are carried
the armor-piercing and rapid-fire guns. The engines, boilers, and
barbette communications are protected by a water-line belt of thick
armor which covers about forty-five per cent. of the ship’s length;
at the upper edge of this there is a protective deck, and at its ends
athwartships bulkheads are erected; before and abaft the belt and
beneath the water-line there is a protective deck, together with the
usual minute subdivision into water-tight compartments. The barbettes
and the cylindrical ammunition tubes which extend from the belt-deck
to the barbette floors are strongly armored. Owing to the strong
protest made against these vessels, more efficient armor protection
has been given to the battle-ships lately laid down.

* * * * *

From this very hasty and incomplete review it may be gathered
that the first and most lasting influence in the development of
battle-ships is due to France and England, though the _Monitor_
had no little share in the result. It is difficult to say, in the
ceaseless struggle for something which, if not good, is new, what may
be the outcome of the latest efforts to revolutionize the question,
or, curiously enough, to bring it back to the point whence its
departure was taken. Whatever may be the courage of one’s opinion,
there is not sufficient data—a first-class war can only supply
these—upon which to say, Yea, yea! or Nay, nay! and prophecy is
certain to be without honor, especially as the discussions given in
the appendices demonstrate how the wisest and most experienced have
no substantial agreement in views.

An editorial in a late number of the _Broad Arrow_ declares that “the
days of armored plate protection are, in the opinion of many thinking
men, coming to a close. The gun is victorious all along the line, and
the increased speed given to the torpedo-boat, taken in conjunction
with the destructive efficiency attained by the torpedo, makes it a
questionable policy to spend such large sums of money as heretofore
upon individual ships.” There is no room here to give the various
arguments, though very clever and ingenious they are, by which this
position is fortified; it may be added, however, that to a large
degree this is the opinion of Admiral Aube, the late French Minister
of Marine, and undoubtedly this declaration re-echoes the shibboleth
of those other French officers who, in the absolute formula of their
chief, Gabriel Charmes, insist that “a squadron attacked at night by
torpedo-boats is a squadron lost.”

English authorities, with a few notable exceptions, do not go so
far as their more impulsive, or, from the Gallic stand-point, less
conservative neighbors. Chief Constructor White believes that at
no time in the war between gun and armor has the former, as the
principal fighting factor, so many chances of success. He concedes
the value of light, quick-firing guns in association with heavy
armaments, grants the importance of rams, torpedoes, submarine boats,
and torpedo-vessels generally, but denies that the days of heavily
armored battle-ships are ended. Lord Charles Beresford asserts that
the value of large guns at sea is overestimated, advocates from
motives of morals and efficiency mixed armaments, agrees to the
great, yet subordinate, importance of the usual auxiliaries, and
insists that England builds cumbersome and expensive battle-ships
only because of their possession by her dangerous rivals.

There are equally rigorous disagreements upon all the other types
of armored, unarmored, and auxiliary vessels, as needs must be, so
long as the naval policies of no two nations can be alike. England
and Russia are at opposite poles, so far as their environments are
concerned, and between France and Turkey the differences are as
radical as their national instincts and ambitions. But, among all,
England is as isolated as her geographical situation. Whatever fleets
other nations may assemble, whatever types other countries may deem
best for their interests, England, whose existence depends upon her
naval strength, must have all; not only the best in quality, but so
many of every class that she will be able to defend her integrity
against any foe that assails it. England can take no chances.

Upon one point alone, the necessity of high speed, is there
substantial agreement. Less than four years ago fifteen or sixteen
knots were accepted as a maximum beyond which profitable design could
not be urged. Greater speed, it is true, had been attained by our
first type of commerce destroyer. In February, 1868, the _Wampanoag_
ran at the rate of 16.6 knots for thirty-eight hours, and made a
maximum of 17.75 knots; but great as was the achievement, there is a
general acceptance of the fact that this vessel was a racing-machine,
and not in the modern sense a man-of-war.

Fighting-ships, with the power to steam thousands of miles at sea
without recoaling, are now being built under contracts which, for
every deficiency in speed or horse-power, pay penalties that at
our former summit of expectations would have been prohibitive to
ship construction; and, what is more startling yet, the bonus which
goes to any increase upon this speed proves the co-relation between
scientific attainment and popular appreciation of the subject, and
shows how readily the impossibilities of yesterday become the axioms
of to-morrow.

The development of speed has therefore a special interest.
Between 1859 and 1875, that tentative period which led to such
wonderful realizations, the highest speed, under the most favorable
circumstances, of large war-vessels was fourteen knots; in the
smaller classes of unarmored ships it ranged between eight and
thirteen, while that attained by fast cruisers was from fifteen
to sixteen and a half knots. In 1886 Italian armored vessels
made eighteen knots. Cruisers like the Japanese _Naniwa-Kan_ and
the Italian _Angelo Emo_ reached nearly nineteen, and the _Reina
Regente_, launched in February last, is expected to steam over
twenty. Torpedo-vessels beginning in 1873 with fourteen knots are
now running twenty-five, and at the same time the type has so much
increased in size and importance as to be an essential and not an
accessory in naval warfare.

It is impossible to explain the difficulties which have beset this
development, because the conditions that surround any attempt at
speed-increase are such as can be properly understood only by those
who have technical training; and then, too, the great ocean racers
have so much accustomed the public to wonderful sea performances that
the results are accepted without a knowledge of the credit which is
due the mechanical and marine engineers who have achieved them. But
with greater experience the higher, surely, will be the appreciation
which every one must give; for, in the words of Chief Constructor
White, “when it is realized that a vessel weighing ten thousand tons
can be propelled over a distance of nine knots in an hour by the
combustion of less than one ton of coal—the ten-thousandth part of
her own weight—it will be admitted that the result is marvellous,”
and that “‘the way of a ship in the midst of the sea’ is beyond full
comprehension.”

It is often asked which has the better fleet, France or England.
Who can tell? No one definitely. Admiral Sir R. Spencer Robinson,
late Comptroller of the British Navy, declares, in the _Contemporary
Review_ of February, 1887, that “the number of armored vessels of
the two countries may be stated approximately as fifty-five for
England and fifty-one for France. Without going into further details,
taking everything into consideration, giving due weight to all the
circumstances which affect the comparison, and assuming that the
designs of the naval constructors on each side of the Channel will
fairly fulfil the intentions of each administration (a matter of
interminable dispute, and which nothing but an experiment carried to
destruction can settle), the iron-clad force of England is, on the
whole, rather superior to that of France. A combination of the navy
of that Power with any other would completely reverse the position.
I should state as my opinion, leaving others to judge what it may
be worth, that in fighting power the unarmored ships of England
are decidedly superior to those of our rival’s; but if the _raison
d’être_ of the French navy is—as has been frequently stated in that
country, and by none more powerfully and categorically than by the
French Minister of Marine—the wide-spread, thorough destruction of
British commerce, and the pitiless and remorseless ransom of every
undefended and accessible town in the British dominions, regardless
of any sentimentalities or such rubbish as the laws of war and the
usages of civilized nations; and if at least one of the _raisons
d’être_ of the British navy is to defeat those benevolent intentions,
and to defend that commerce on which depends our national existence
and imperial greatness—then I fear that perhaps they have prepared
to realize their purpose of remorseless destruction rather better
than we have ours of successful preservation.”

A long sentence this, but it emphasizes the great axiom that war is
business, not sentiment, and teaches a lesson which this country will
do well to learn. Fortunately, we are at last out of the shallows, if
not fairly in the full flooding channel-way, though many things are
yet wanting with us. Perhaps this over-long chapter cannot be made
to end more usefully than by quoting in proof of this the concluding
paragraph of that brilliant article on naval policy which Professor
James Russell Soley, United States Navy, contributed to the February
(1887) number of _Scribner’s Magazine_:

“It is the part of wisdom,” he writes, “to study the lessons of the
past, and to learn what we may from the successes or the failures of
our fathers. The history of the last war is full of these lessons,
and at no time since its close has the navy been in a condition so
favorable for their application. At least their meaning cannot fail
to be understood. They show clearly that if we would have a navy
fitted to carry on war, we must give some recognition to officers
on the ground of merit, either by the advancement of the best, or,
what amounts to nearly the same thing, by the elimination of the
least deserving; that we must give them a real training for war in
modern ships and with modern weapons; that the direction of the
naval establishment, in so far as it has naval direction, must be
given unity of purpose, and the purpose to which it must be directed
is fighting efficiency; that a naval reserve of men and of vessels
must be organized capable of mobilization whenever a call shall be
made; and, finally, that a dozen or a score of new ships will not
make a navy, but that the process of renewal must go on until the
whole fleet is in some degree fitted to stand the trial of modern
war. Until this rehabilitation can be accomplished the navy will
only serve the purpose of a butt for the press and a foot-ball for
political parties and its officers—a body of men whose intelligence
and devotion would be equal to any trust will be condemned to fritter
away their lives in a senseless parody of their profession.”

THE BRITISH NAVY.

BY SIR EDWARD J. REED.

When timber gave place to iron and steel in the construction
of war-ships, the naval possibilities of Great Britain became
practically illimitable. Prior to that great change the British
Admiralty, after exhausting its home supplies of oak, had to seek
in the forests of Italy and of remote countries those hard, curved,
twisted, and stalwart trees which alone sufficed for the massive
framework of its line-of-battle ships. How recently it has escaped
from this necessity may be inferred from the fact that the present
writer, on taking office at the Admiralty in 1863, found her
Majesty’s dockyards largely stored with recent deliveries of Italian
and other oak timber of this description.

And here it may not be inappropriate for one whose earliest
professional studies were devoted to the construction of wooden
ships, but whose personal labors have been most largely devoted to
the iron era, to pay a passing tribute of respect to the constructive
genius of those great builders in wood who designed the stanch and
towering battle-ships of the good old times. Skilful, indeed, was the
art, sound, indeed, was the science, which enabled them to shape,
assemble, and combine thousands of timbers and planks into the _Grace
de Dieu_ of Great Harry’s day (1514), the _Sovraigne of the Seas_ of
Charles’s reign (1637), the _Royal William_ of half a century later
(1682-92), the _Victory_, immortalized by Nelson, and in our own
early day such superb ships as the _Queen_, the _Howe_, and scores
of others. Only those who have made a study of the history of sea
architecture can realize the difficulties which the designers of such
structures had to overcome.

With the introduction of iron and steel for ship-building purposes
the necessity for ransacking the forests of the world for timber
suitable for the frames and beam-knees of ships passed away, and
Great Britain, which early became, and thus far remains, first and
greatest in the production of iron and steel, was thus invited to
such a development of naval power as the world has never seen. The
mercantile marine of England at the present time furnishes a splendid
demonstration of the readiness with which the commercial classes have
appreciated this great opportunity; but the Royal Navy, by almost
universal assent, supplies a melancholy counter-demonstration, and
shows that neither the capabilities of a race nor the leadings of
Providence suffice to keep a nation in its true position when it
falls into the hands of feeble and visionary administrators. Any one
who will contrast the British navy of to-day with the British navy as
it might and would have been under the administration, say, of such
a First Lord of the Admiralty as the present Duke of Somerset proved
himself in every department of the naval service five-and-twenty
years ago, will understand the recent outcry in England for a safer
and more powerful fleet.

[Illustration: THE “VICTORY.”

From a photograph by Symonds & Co., Portsmouth.]

It is impossible, as will presently appear, to describe the existing
British navy without making reference to those administrative causes
which have so largely and so unhappily influenced it; but the primary
object of this chapter is, nevertheless, to describe and explain it,
and only such references will be made to other circumstances as are
indispensable to the fulfilment of that object.

It is fitting, and to the present writer it is agreeable, in this
place, to take early note of a matter which has, perhaps, never
before been fully acknowledged, _viz._, the indebtedness of Great
Britain and of Europe to the United States for some invaluable
lessons in naval construction and naval warfare which were derived
from the heroic efforts of their great civil war. The writer is
in a position to speak with full knowledge on this point, as his
service at the Admiralty, in charge of its naval construction,
commenced during the American conflict, and continued for some years
after its fortunate conclusion. There can be no doubt whatever
that from the _Monitor_ and her successors European constructors
and naval officers derived some extremely valuable suggestions.
The Monitor system itself, pure and simple, was never viewed with
favor, and could never be adopted by England, except under the
severest restrictions, because the work of England has mainly to
be done upon the high seas and in distant parts of the world,
and the extremely small freeboard of the _Monitor_, or, in other
words, the normal submersion of so very much of the entire ship,
is highly inconvenient and not a little dangerous on sea service,
as the fate of the _Monitor_ itself demonstrated. But for the work
the _Monitor_ was designed to do in inland waters she was admirably
conceived, and her appearance in the field of naval warfare startled
seamen and naval constructors everywhere, and gave their thoughts
a wholly novel direction. In saying this I am not unmindful that
seven years previously England had constructed steam-propelled
“floating batteries,” as they were called, sheathed with iron, and
sent them to operate against the defences of Russia. But useful as
these vessels were in many respects, their construction presented
no striking novelty of design, and their employment was unattended
by any dramatic incidents to powerfully impress the naval mind. The
_Monitor_ was both more novel and more fortunate, and opened her
career (after a severe struggle for life at sea) with so notable
a display of her offensive and defensive qualities that all eyes
turned to the scene of her exploits, and scanned her with a degree
of interest unknown to the then existing generation of sailors and
ship-builders. Her form and character were in most respects singular,
her low deck and erect revolving tower being altogether unexampled
in steamship construction. He must have been a dull and conservative
naval architect, indeed, whose thoughts Ericsson’s wonderful little
fighting ship did not stimulate into unwonted activity. But the
service rendered to Europe was not confined to the construction and
exploits of the _Monitor_ itself. The coasting passages, and, later
on, the sea-voyages, of other vessels of the Monitor type, but of
larger size, were watched with intense interest, and gave to the
naval world instructive experiences which could in no other way have
been acquired. Some of these experiences were purchased at the cost
of the lives of gallant men, and that fact enhanced their value.

[Illustration: THE “GLATTON.”]

It is not possible to dwell at length upon the means by which the
Monitor influence took effect in the navies of Europe, but it may
be doubted whether ships like the _Thunderer_, _Devastation_, and
_Dreadnought_, which naval officers declare to be to-day the most
formidable of all British war-ships, would have found their way so
readily into existence if the Monitors of America had not encouraged
such large departures from Old-world ideas. In this sense the _Times_
correctly stated some years ago that the “American Monitors were
certainly the progenitors of our _Devastation_ type.” The one ship
in the British navy which comes nearest to the American Monitor, in
respect of the nearness of her deck to the water, is the _Glatton_,
a very exceptional vessel, and designed under a very peculiar stress
of circumstances. But even in her case, as in that of every other
armored turret-ship of the present writer’s design, the base of
the turret and the hatchways over the machinery and boilers were
protected by an armored breastwork standing high above this low deck,
whereas in the American Monitors the turret rests upon the deck,
which is near to the smooth sea’s surface.

We have here, in the features just contrasted, the expression of
a fundamental difference of view between the American system, as
applied to sea-going turret-ships, and the European system of
sea-going ships introduced by the writer. It has never been possible,
in our judgment on the British side of the Atlantic, to regard even
such Monitors as the _Puritan_ and _Dictator_ were designed to be,
as sufficiently proof to sea perils. At the time when these lines
were penned the following paragraph appeared in English newspapers:
“The Cunard steamer _Servia_ arrived at New York yesterday, being
three days overdue. During a heavy sea the boats, the bridge, and the
funnel were carried away, and the saloon was flooded.” Any one who
has seen the _Servia_, and observed the great height above the smooth
sea’s surface at which her boats, bridge, and funnel are carried,
will be at no loss to infer why it is that we object to ships with
upper decks within two or three feet only of that surface. In short,
it can be demonstrated that ships of the latter type are liable, in
certain possible seas, to be completely ingulfed even to the very
tops of their funnels. In the case of the _Glatton_, which had to be
produced in conformity to ideas some of which were not those of the
designer, one or two devices were resorted to expressly in order to
secure in an indirect manner some increase of the assigned buoyancy,
and thus to raise the upper deck above its prescribed height. The
officers who served in her, however, judiciously regarded her, on
account of her low deck, as fit only for harbor service or restricted
coast defence.

A very dangerous combination, as the writer regards it, was once
proposed for his adoption by the representative of a colonial
government, but was successfully resisted. This was the association
of a “Coles” or English turret (which penetrates and passes bodily
through the weather deck) with a low American Monitor deck. This was
opposed on the ground that with such an arrangement there must of
necessity be great danger at sea of serious leakage around the base
of the turret as the waves swept over the lower deck. It would be
extremely difficult to give to the long, circular aperture around
the turret any protection which would be certain, while allowing the
turret to revolve freely, both to withstand the fire of the guns and
to resist the attack of the sea.

It will now be understood that while the Monitor system was from
the first highly appreciated in Europe, and more especially in
England, it never was adopted in its American form in the British
navy. Russia, Holland, and some other powers did adopt it, and the
Dutch government had to pay the penalty in the total disappearance
of a ship and crew during a short passage in the North Sea from
one home port to another. In a largely altered form, and with many
modifications and additions due to English ideas of sea service,
it was, however, substantially adopted in the three powerful ships
already named, of which one, the _Dreadnought_, lately bore the flag
of the British admiral who commands the Mediterranean fleet. If the
opinion of officers who have served in these ships may be accepted as
sufficiently conclusive, it was a great misfortune for the British
navy when the ruling features of this type of ship were largely
departed from in its first-class ships, and made to give place to
a whole series of so-called first-class iron-clads, of which only
about one-third of the length has been protected by armor, and which
are consequently quite unfit to take a place in any European line of
battle.

[Illustration: THE “DREADNOUGHT.”]

The characteristic differences between the American type and the
English type of sea-going Monitors (if we may apply that designation
to the _Devastation_ type) have already been stated, but may be
restated here in a single sentence, _viz._, the elevation in the
English ship of the turret breastwork deck to a height of eleven or
twelve feet above the sea’s surface, and the raising of the upper
deck generally, or of a considerable part of it, to at least that
height, by means of lightly built superstructures. Over these again,
and many feet above them, are built bridges and hurricane decks, from
which the ships may be commanded in all weathers. Lofty as these
ships are by comparison with American Monitors, it is only gradually
that they have acquired the confidence of the naval service, so
freely do the waves sweep over their weather decks when driven, even
in moderate weather, against head-seas.

The British navy, having very diversified services to perform during
both peace and war, requires ships of various kinds and sizes. Its
first and greatest requirement of all is that of line-of-battle ships
in sufficient numbers to enable England to stand up successfully
against any European naval force or forces that may threaten her
or her empire. If any one should be disposed to ask why this
requirement—which is obviously an extreme one, and an impossible one
for more than a single power—is more necessary for England than for
any other country, the answer must be, _Circumspice!_ To look round
over England’s empire is to see why her failure on the sea would be
her failure altogether. France, Germany, Italy, and even Holland,
might each get along fairly well, losing nothing that is absolutely
essential to their existence, even if every port belonging to them
were sealed by an enemy’s squadron. But were Great Britain to be cut
off from her colonies and dependencies, were her ships to be swept
from the seas, and her ports closed by hostile squadrons, she would
either be deprived of the very elements of life itself, or would have
to seek from the compassion of her foes the bare means of existence.
It is this consideration, and the strong parental care which she
feels for her colonies, that make her sons indignant at any hazardous
reduction of her naval strength. There are even in England itself
men who cannot or will not see this danger, and who impute to those
who strive to avert it ambitious, selfish, and even sordid motives.
But it is to no unworthy cause that England’s naval anxieties are
due. We have no desire for war; we do not hunger for further naval
fame; we cherish no mean rivalry of other powers who seek to colonize
or to otherwise improve their trade; we do not want the mastery of
the seas for any commercial objects that are exclusively our own.
What we desire to do is to keep the seas open thoroughfares to our
vast possessions and dependencies, and free to that commercial
communication which has become indispensable to our existence as
an empire. To accomplish that object we must, at any cost, be strong,
supremely strong, in European waters; and it is for this reason that
England’s line-of-battle ships ought to be always above suspicion
both in number and in quality.

[Illustration: THE “INFLEXIBLE.”]

It is not a pleasant assertion for an Englishman to make when he has
to say that this is very far from being the case at present. A few
months ago this statement, from whomsoever it emanated, would have
been received with distrust by the general public, for the truth was
only known to the navy itself and to comparatively few outsiders.
But the official communications made to both Houses of Parliament
early in December, 1885, prepared the world for the truth, the First
Lord of the Admiralty in the Chamber of Peers and Lord Brassey in
the House of Commons having then proposed to Parliament a programme
of additional ship-building which provided for a considerable
increase in the number of its first-class ships and cruisers, and
which also provided, on the demand of the present writer, that the
cruisers should be protected with belts of armor—an element of
safety previously denied to them. It need hardly be repeated, after
this wholesale admission of weakness by the Admiralty, that Great
Britain is at present in far from a satisfactory condition as regards
both the number and the character of its ships. Were that not so,
no public agitation could have moved the government to reverse in
several respects a policy by which it had for so long abided.

It will be interesting to broadly but briefly review the causes of
the present deplorable condition of the British navy. In the first
place, in so far as it is a financial question, it has resulted
mainly from the sustained attempt of successive governments to keep
the naval expenditure within or near to a fixed annual amount,
notwithstanding the palpable fact that every branch of the naval
service, like most other services, is unavoidably increasing in
cost, while the necessities of the empire are likewise unavoidably
increasing. The consequence is that, as officers and men of every
description must be paid, and all the charges connected therewith
must in any event be fully met, the ship-building votes of various
kinds are those upon which the main stress of financial pressure
must fall. From this follows a strong desire, to which all Boards
of Admiralty too readily yield, to keep down the size and cost
of their first-class ships, to the sacrifice of their necessary
qualities. This may be strikingly illustrated by the fact that,
although the iron _Dreadnought_, a first-class ship, designed fifteen
or sixteen years ago, had a displacement of 10,820 tons, and was
powerful in proportion, the Admiralty has launched but a single ship
(the _Inflexible_) since that period, of which the displacement
has reached 10,000 tons. In fact, every large iron-clad ship for
the British navy since launched has fallen from twelve hundred to
twenty-four hundred tons short of the _Dreadnought’s_ displacement,
and has been proportionally feeble.

If this cutting down in the size of the principal ships of Great
Britain had been attended by a corresponding reduction in the sizes
of the ships of other powers, or even by some advantages of design
which largely tended to make up for the defect of size, there might
be something to say for it. But the French ships have shown no such
falling off in size, and have benefited as fully as the English ships
by the use of steel and by the improved power and economy of the
marine steam-engine.

Simultaneously with the reduction in the size of the English ships
there has been brought about—voluntarily, and not as a consequence
of reduced size, for it was first applied in the largest of all
British men-of-war, the _Inflexible_—a system of stripping the
so-called armored ships of the English navy of a large part of their
armor, and reducing its extent to so deplorable a degree that, as
has already been said, they are quite unfit to take part, with any
reasonable hope of success, in any general engagement. Here, again,
there might have been something to say for a large reduction in
the armored surface of ships if it had been attended by some great
compensation, such as that which an immense increase in the thickness
of the armor applied might have provided, although no such increase
could ever have compensated for such a reduction of the armored part
of the ship as would have exposed the whole ship to destruction by
the mere bursting in of the unarmored ends, which is what has been
done. But although in the case of the large _Inflexible_ the citadel
armor was of excessive thickness, that is not true of the more
recent ships of England, the armor of which sometimes falls short of
that of the French ships, in two or three instances by as much as
four inches, the French ships having 22-inch armor, and the English
18-inch. But by the combined effect of injudicious economy and of
erroneous design, therefore—both furthered by a sort of frenzied
desire on the part of the British Admiralty to strip the ships of
armor, keep down their speed, delay their completion, and otherwise
paralyze the naval service, apparently without understanding what
they were about—the British navy has been brought into a condition
which none but the possible enemies of the country can regard without
more or less dismay.

[Illustration: SECTION OF THE “AMIRAL DUPERRÉ.”

SECTION OF THE “INFLEXIBLE.”

SECTION OF THE “COLLINGWOOD.”

NEW ADMIRALTY SHIP.]

In order to illustrate the extent to which side armor has been denied
to the British ships, as compared with the French, we refer the
reader to these diagrams of the _Amiral Duperré_ (French) and of the
_Inflexible_ and _Collingwood_ (both English). The black portions
represent the side armor in each case. It is scarcely possible
for any one friendly to Great Britain to look at these diagrams,
and realize what they signify, without profoundly regretting that
a sufficient force of public opinion has not yet been exerted to
compel the Admiralty to a much more liberal use of armor in the new
first-class ships, the intended construction of which was announced
to Parliament in December, 1885. In these new ships, while the length
of the partial belt has been slightly increased, no addition to its
height above water has been made (as compared with the _Collingwood_
or “Admiral” class), so that the slightest “list” towards either
side puts all the armor below water. To describe such ships as
“armored ships” is to convey a totally false impression of their
true character. A side view of one of these new ships shows that the
two principal guns are carried high up forward in an armored turret,
which sweeps from right ahead, round the bow on each side, and well
towards the stern, while several smaller guns are carried abaft with
very thin armor protection to complete the offensive powers of the
ship. The arrangement of the two principal guns in a turret forward
resembles that of the _Conqueror_, but in her the armor rises high
above the water, and a belt extends to the bow and nearly to the
stern. It is a matter of inexpressible regret that the armored
surface of these new ships is so excessively contracted as to be
wholly insufficient to preserve the ship from that terrible danger to
which so many of their predecessors have been exposed, _viz._, that
of capsizing from loss of stability when the unarmored parts alone
have been injured.

[Illustration: THE “DEVASTATION.”]

There is a sense in which all the British ships to which reference
has thus far been made may be roughly regarded as developments of,
or at least as starting from, the _Devastation_, or British Monitor
type of ship, for in all of them masts and sails have been done away
with, and steam propulsion relied upon, a single military mast alone
remaining.[1] We have now to notice another and more numerous class
of ships, which may be regarded as the lingering representatives
of those sailing-ships which have come down to us through the long
centuries, but which are now rapidly disappearing, yielding to the
all-prevalent power of steam. Some of these ships were built for
the line of battle, in their respective periods, but as they range
in size from about one thousand tons of displacement up to nearly
eleven thousand tons, it is obvious that many of them were built for
various other employments. In dealing with the full-rigged ships, we
are taking account of types of war-ships which, for all but secondary
purposes, are passing away. It fell to the lot of the present writer
(under the rule of Mr. Childers, then First Lord of the Admiralty,
and of Admiral Sir Robert Spencer Robinson, then Controller of the
Navy) to introduce the mastless war-ship, and thus to virtually
terminate what had certainly been for England a glorious period,
_viz._, that of the taunt-masted, full-rigged, and ever-beautiful
wooden line-of-battle ship. It is now, alas! but too apparent (from
what has gone before) that in virtually terminating that period, and
opening the era of the steam and steel fighting engine, we were also
introducing an era in which fantastic and feeble people might but
too easily convert what ought to have been the latest and greatest
glory of England into her direct peril, and possibly even her early
overthrow.

The first British iron-clad (neglecting the “floating batteries” of
1854) was the _Warrior_, a handsome ship 380 feet long, furnished
with steam-power, and provided with masts, spars, and a large spread
of canvas. Her ends were unprotected by armor, and her steering
gear consequently much exposed. She was succeeded by a long series
of full-rigged iron-clads, all of them supplied with steam-power
likewise, the series continuing down to the present time. The little
dependence which is now placed in the British navy upon the use of
sail-power in armored ships will be seen, however, when it is stated
that of all the ships protected by side armor which are now under
construction in the royal dockyards, but two are to be given any
sail-power at all, and these are to be rigged on two masts only,
although the ships are of large size, and intended for cruising in
distant seas.[2]

It is unnecessary in a popular subject of this description to dwell
upon, or even to state, the minor differences which exist between
the different types of rigged iron-clads. There are, however, some
points of interest in connection with their armor and armament
to be mentioned. In the design of the first group (speaking
chronologically) were commenced those changes in the disposition
of the armor which continue down to the present time, the British
Admiralty being so mixed and so virtually irresponsible a body that
it is not obliged to have a mind of its own for any great length of
time, even when many of the same men continue in office.

The _Warrior_, as we saw, and the sister ship _Black Prince_,
had a central armored battery only; the same is true of those
reduced _Warriors_, the _Defence_ and the _Resistance_. But the
next succeeding ships of the _Warrior’s_ size, the _Minotaur_ and
_Agincourt_, were fully armored from end to end; and the somewhat
smaller ship the _Achilles_ was furnished with a complete belt at
the water-line. The _Hector_ and _Valiant_ (improved _Defences_) had
complete armor above the water, but, oddly enough, had part of the
water-line at each end left unarmored. A third ship of the _Minotaur_
class, the _Northumberland_, was modified by the present writer at
the bow and stern on his entering the Admiralty, the armor above
water being there reduced, and an armored bow breastwork constructed.
Within this armored breastwork were placed two heavy guns firing
right ahead. With this exception, all these early ships, nine in
number, were without any other protected guns than those of the
broadside.

These ships were followed by a series of rigged ships of the
writer’s design, _viz._, the _Bellerophon_, _Hercules_, _Sultan_,
_Penelope_, _Invincible_, _Iron Duke_, _Vanguard_, _Swiftsure_, and
_Triumph_, all with hulls of iron, or of iron and steel combined,
together with a series of rigged ships constructed of wood, converted
from unarmored hulls or frames, _viz._, _Enterprise_, _Research_,
_Favorite_, _Pallas_, _Lord Warden_, _Lord Clyde_, and _Repulse_.
Every one of these ships was protected by armor throughout the
entire length of the vessel in the region of the water-line, and
in some cases the armor rose up to the upper deck. Most of them,
however, had the armor above the belt limited to a central battery.
The chief interest in these vessels now lies in the illustrations
they furnish of the evolution, so to speak, of bow and stern fire.
In several of them a fire approximately ahead and astern (reaching
to those directions within about twenty degrees) was obtained by
means of ports cut near to the ship’s side, through the transverse
armored bulkheads. In others these bulkheads were turned inward
towards the battery near the sides of the ship in order to facilitate
the working of the guns when firing as nearly ahead and astern as
was practicable. In the _Sultan_ an upper-deck armored battery was
adopted for the double purpose of forming a redoubt from which the
ship could be manœuvred and fought in action, and of providing a
direct stern fire from protected guns. In the five ships of the
_Invincible_ class a direct head and stern fire was obtained from
a somewhat similar upper-deck battery, which projected a few feet
beyond the side of the ship.

[Illustration: THE “SULTAN.”]

The rigged ships of later design than the writer’s present a still
greater variety in the disposition of their armor and armaments.
This variety may be in part illustrated by four examples, which for
convenience are principally taken from Lord Brassey’s book.[3] The
scales of these small drawings, as given there, are not all the same.
These examples are the _Alexandra_, the _Téméraire_, the _Nelson_,
and the _Shannon_. The _Alexandra_ (of which a separate view, in
sea-going condition, is given), which is probably the best of the
rigged iron-clads of the British navy, may be regarded as a natural,
but not the less meritorious, development of the combined broadside
and bow and stern fire of the central-battery ships which preceded
her. In her were provided a broadside battery on the main-deck, a
direct bow fire, also on that deck, and both a direct bow and a
direct stern fire on the upper deck from within armor, as in the
_Invincible_ class. The guns employed for bow and stern fire were all
available for broadside fire. The upper-deck battery did not project
beyond the main-deck as in the _Invincible_ class, the forward and
after parts of the ship above the main-deck being greatly contracted
in breadth in order to allow the guns to fire clear both forward and
aft. The _Téméraire_ is a smaller ship than the _Alexandra_, and has
a battery similar to hers on the main-deck, but with one gun less on
each side, the danger of a raking fire entering through the foremost
battery port being met by a transverse armored bulkhead, as shown in
the plan of the ship. She is provided with an additional bow gun and
a stern-chaser, carried high up in barbette towers, but worked on
Colonel Moncrieff’s disappearing principle.

[Illustration: SECTION AND PLAN OF THE “ALEXANDRA.”

SECTION AND PLAN OF THE “TÉMÉRAIRE.”]

[Illustration: SECTION AND PLAN OF THE “NELSON.”

SECTION AND PLAN OF THE “SHANNON.”]

“The _Téméraire_ fires three 25-ton guns right ahead, against two
25-ton and two 18-ton guns in the _Alexandra_; on either bow, two
25-ton against one 25-ton and one 18-ton; right aft, one 25-ton
against two 18-ton; on either quarter, one 25-ton against one 18-ton;
on either beam, if engaged on one side at a time, two 25-ton and two
18-ton, with a third 25-ton available through only half the usual
arc, against three 18-ton guns, with two of the same weight and one
of 25-tons, each available with the limitation just described.”[4]

[Illustration: THE “ALEXANDRA.”]

The _Alexandra_ is a ship of 9500 tons displacement, the _Téméraire_
is of 8500 tons; after them came the _Nelson_ (to which the
_Northampton_ is a sister ship), of 7320 tons displacement. This
vessel cannot be regarded as an armored ship at all, in the usual
sense of the word, having but a partial belt of armor, and none of
her guns being enclosed within armor protection, although two guns
for firing ahead and two for firing astern are partially sheltered by
armor. Even less protection than this is afforded to the guns of the
_Shannon_, which also has but a partial belt of armor, and protection
for two bow guns only. The comparatively small size of the _Shannon_
(5400 tons displacement) relieves her in some degree from the
reproach of being so little protected; but it is difficult (to the
present writer) to find a justification for building ships of 7320
tons, like the _Nelson_ and _Northampton_, and placing them in the
category of armor-plated ships, seeing that their entire batteries
are open to the free entrance of shell fire from all guns, small as
well as large. Where a ship has a battery of guns protected against
fire in one or more directions, but freely exposed to fire coming in
other directions, to assume that the enemy will be most likely to
attack the armor, and avoid firing into the open battery, appears to
be a reversal of the safe and well-accepted principle of warfare,
_viz._, that your enemy will at least endeavor to attack your
vulnerable part. No doubt, when the size or cost of a particular ship
is limited, the designer has to make a choice of evils, but where
people are as free as is the British Board of Admiralty to build safe
and efficient ships, the devotion of so much armor as the _Nelson_
and _Northampton_ carry to so limited a measure of protection is a
very singular proceeding, and illustrates once more with how little
wisdom the world is governed.

[Illustration: THE “TÉMÉRAIRE.”]

Before passing from the armored ships of the navy—or, rather,
as we must now say, in view of some of the ships just described
and illustrated, before passing from the ships which have some
armor—it is desirable to take note of a few exceptional vessels
which cannot be classed either with the pretentious and so-called
line-of-battle ships or with the rigged iron-clads generally. Among
these will be found two comparatively small ships, designed by the
writer many years ago to serve primarily as rams, but to carry also
some guns. These were the _Hotspur_ and _Rupert_. The water-line
of the _Hotspur_ was protected with very thick armor for her day
(11-inch), extending from stem to stern, dipping down forward to
greatly strengthen the projecting ram. She carried (besides a few
smaller guns) the largest gun of the period, one of twenty-five tons,
mounted on a turn-table, but protected by a fixed tower pierced with
four ports.[5] This fixed tower was years afterwards replaced by a
revolving turret, similar to that which the writer gave in the first
instance to the _Rupert_, designed soon after the _Hotspur_. Both the
armor and the armament of the second vessel were heavier than those
of the first, but the ram, as before, was the chief feature of the
ship.

It is needless here to describe some of the very early turret-ships,
such as the _Prince Albert_, _Scorpion_, _Wyvern_, and _Royal
Sovereign_, all of which embodied the early (though not by any means
the earliest) views of that able, energetic, and lamented officer,
the late Captain Cowper Coles, R.N., who was lost at sea by the
capsizing of his own ship, the _Captain_, her low sides failing to
furnish the necessary stability for enabling her to resist, when
under her canvas, the force of a moderate gale of wind. Had he been
able to foresee the coming abandonment of sail-power in rigged ships,
and had he been placed, as the writer advised, in charge of the
revolving turrets of the navy, leaving ship-designing to those who
understood it, he might have been alive to this day, to witness the
very general adoption in the British navy of that turret system to
which he for some years devoted and eventually sacrificed his life.

[Illustration: THE “HOTSPUR.”]

The first real sea-going and successful ship designed and built to
carry the revolving turret of Coles was, by universal consent, the
_Monarch_, whose sea-going qualities secured for her the distinction
of transporting to the shores of America—as a mark of England’s
good-will to the people of the United States, and of her admiration
of a great and good citizen—the body of the late Mr. George Peabody.
“The performances of the _Monarch_ at sea,” says Brassey’s “British
Navy,” “were in the highest degree satisfactory;” and nothing could
exceed the frank and liberal praises bestowed upon her for her
performances during the voyage to New York by the officers of the
United States man-of-war which accompanied her as a complimentary
escort.

A great deal has been written and said at different times about
four other turret-ships of the British navy, _viz._, the _Cyclops_,
_Gorgon_, _Hecate_, and _Hydra_—far less terrible vessels than
these formidable names would seem to import. Whether these four
comparatively small turret-ships possess the necessary sea-going
qualities for coast defence (as distinguished from harbor service) is
a question which has been much discussed, and is not yet settled. The
truth is that the defence of the coasts of England, Wales, Scotland,
and Ireland is a service in which the sea-going qualities of vessels
may be called into requisition as largely as in any service in the
world. There are some (this writer among them) who much prefer the
mid-Atlantic in a heavy gale of wind to many parts of these coasts,
more especially if there be any doubt about the perfect obedience
of the ship to her steam-power and her helm. The worst weather the
writer has ever experienced at sea was met with in the English
Channel, and the only merchant-ship which he ever even in part
possessed was mastered by a Channel storm, had to cast anchor outside
of Plymouth Breakwater, was blown clean over it, and sank inside of
it, with her cables stretched across that fine engineering work. It
is therefore difficult, and has always been difficult, not to say
impossible, for him to regard a “coast-defence ship,” which certainly
ought to be able to defend the coast, and to proceed from one part
of it to another, as a vessel which may be made less sea-worthy than
other vessels. Only in one respect, _viz._, that of coal supply, may
such a ship be safely made inferior to sea-going ships.

But whether the four vessels under notice be fit for coast defence or
not, it ought to be known that they were not designed for it. They
were hastily ordered in 1870, when the Franco-German war was breaking
out, under the impression that Great Britain might get involved in
that war. The British Admiralty knew then (as it knows now, and as
it has known for years past) that the navy had not been maintained
in sufficient strength, and it consequently seized the first design
for a small and cheap ship that it could lay hands on, and ordered
the construction, with all despatch, of four such vessels. The design
which it happened to take, or which seemed to it most suitable, was
that of the _Cerberus_—a breastwork Monitor designed by the writer
for special service in inland colonial waters, and made as powerful
as was then possible on 3300 tons of displacement, both offensively
and defensively, but with no necessity for, and no pretensions
whatever to, sea-going qualities. It is scarcely to be supposed that
four vessels having such an origin could be expected to take their
place as sea-going ships of the British navy; nor could they, either,
for reasons already suggested, be expected to possess any high
qualities as vessels for the defence of

“That land ’round whose resounding coasts
The rough sea circles.”

The Admiralty which ordered their construction may possibly be able
to state why it built them, but even that is not at all certain. One
of the evil results of mean economies in national enterprises in
ordinary times is extravagant and aimless expenditure in times of
necessity.

A later example of this kind of expenditure under very similar
circumstances was furnished during Lord Beaconsfield’s
administration, when war with Russia seemed likely to occur. Again
the insufficiency of the navy was strongly felt, and again public
money to the extent of two millions sterling or more was expended
upon the acquisition of such ships as could be most readily acquired,
regardless of cost. At this time the _Neptune_ (of 9170 tons
displacement), the _Superb_ (of 9100 tons), and the _Belleisle_
and _Orion_ (each of 4830 tons), were purchased into the service,
and having been built for other navies, and under very peculiar
circumstances in some cases, required large dockyard expenditure to
convert them to their new uses in the British navy.

It only remains, in so far as existing armored, or rather “partly
armored,” ships are concerned, to advert to the _Impérieuse_ and
_Warspite_, two cruisers building for distant service. These ships
are three hundred and fifteen feet long, and to them has been
allowed, by the extraordinary generosity of the Admiralty, as much
as one hundred and forty feet of length of armored belt. If this had
been extended by only twenty feet, these British cruisers, which
Lord Brassey—whether grandiloquently or satirically it is hard to
say—calls “armored cruisers,” would have actually had one-half
of their length protected by armor-plating at the water-line. In
what spirit and with what object is not known, but Lord Brassey,
in his outline sketch of these ships, writes the word “coals” in
conspicuous letters before and abaft the belt. Can it be possible
that he, undoubtedly a sensible man of business, and one who
laboriously endeavors to bring up the knowledge and sense of his
fellow-countrymen to a level with his own, and who was once Secretary
to the British Admiralty—can it be possible that he considers coal a
trustworthy substitute for armor, either before or after it has been
consumed as fuel?

It is very distressing to have to write in these terms, and put
these questions about Admiralty representatives and Admiralty ships;
but what is to be done? Here are two ships which are together to
cost nearly half a million of money, which are expressly built to
chase and capture our enemies in distant seas, which are vauntingly
described as “armored cruisers,” which cannot be expected always by
their mere appearance to frighten the enemy into submission, like
painted Chinese forts, which must be presumed sometimes to encounter
a fighting foe, or at least to be fired at a few times by the stern
guns of a vessel that is running away, and yet some eighty or ninety
feet of the bows of these ships, and as much of their sterns, are
deliberately deprived of the protection of armor, so that any shell
from any gun may pierce them, let in the sea, and reduce their
speed indefinitely; and in apparent justification of this perfectly
ridiculous arrangement—perfectly ridiculous in a ship which is
primarily bound to sustain her speed when chasing—a late Secretary
to the Admiralty tells us that she is to carry in the unprotected bow
some coals! May my hope formerly expressed in _Harper’s Magazine_
find its fruition by giving to the British Admiralty a piece of
information of which it only can be possibly ignorant, _viz._,
that even while coal is unconsumed, it differs largely from steel
armor-plates in the measure of resistance which it offers to shot
and shell; and further, that coal is put on board war-ships that it
may be consumed in the generation of steam? It is very desirable
that this information should somehow be conveyed to Whitehall in an
impressive manner, and possibly, if the combined intelligence of the
two great nations to which Harpers’ publications chiefly appeal be
invoked in its favor, it may at length be understood and attended to
even by the Admiralty, and one may hear no more of the protection of
her Majesty’s ships by means of their “coal.”

[Illustration: THE “WARSPITE.”]

[Illustration: TRANSVERSE SECTION OF THE “MERSEY.”]

Passing now from the so-called iron-clads of the British navy, we
come to a class of vessels which have their boilers, etc., protected
from above by iron decks sweeping over them from side to side. The
section of the _Mersey_, one of the most important British ships
of this type, will illustrate the system of construction. Various
attempts have been made to impose numerous ships of this kind upon a
sometimes too credulous public as armored vessels, and Lord Brassey,
while publishing descriptions and drawings which demonstrated beyond
all question that the buoyancy and stability of these ships are
not at all protected by armor, nevertheless deliberately includes
some of them in his list of “armored ships.”[6] Now, the thick
iron deck certainly protects (in some degree, according to its
thickness) all that is below it against the fire of guns, and armor
itself is sometimes employed to protect the gun machinery; but the
existence of a thickish deck under the water, or mainly under the
water, occasionally associated with patches of armor above water
here and there to protect individual parts, does not constitute the
ship itself an armored ship in any such sense of the term as is
ordinarily accepted and understood. How can that be properly called
an “armored ship” which can be utterly destroyed by guns without
any shot or shell ever touching such armor as it possesses? The
British Admiralty, in the “Navy Estimates” for 1883-84, under some
unknown influence, put forward two ships of this description as
armored vessels, and was afterwards forced to remove them from that
category, but only removed them to place them in another not less
false, not less misleading, not less deceptive and dangerous, _viz._,
that of “protected ships.” And this most improper description is
still applied to various ships of which the special characteristic
is that they themselves are _not_ protected. If the ship’s own coal
and stores may be regarded as her protection, or if the existence
of a certain number of exposed and extremely thin internal plates
can be so regarded, then may these vessels be deemed partly, but
only partly, “protected;” but if “protected ship” means, as every
honest-minded person must take it to mean, that the ship herself
is protected by armor against shot and shell, then the designation
“protected ship,” as employed by the British Admiralty, is nothing
less than an imposition. These ships are not protected. Neither their
power to float, nor their power to keep upright, nor their power to
exist at all, after a few such injuries as even the smallest guns
afloat can inflict, is “protected,” as any war whatever is likely to
demonstrate.

Those who employ such language ignore the essential characteristic
of a ship-of-war, and some of the gravest dangers which menace
her. It is conceivable that in the old days, when men wore armor,
the protection of the head with an “armet,” and of the breast by
a breastplate, might have justified the description of the man so
defended as an “armored man,” although it is difficult to see why,
since he might have been put _hors de combat_ by a single stroke.
But protect the boilers and magazines of a ship how you will, if
you do not protect the ship itself sufficiently in the region of
the water-line to prevent such an invasion of the sea as will sink
or capsize her, she remains herself essentially unprotected, liable
to speedy and complete destruction, and cannot truly be called a
“protected ship.”

It must not for a moment be supposed that this is a mere question
of words or designations. On the contrary, it is one of the most
vital importance to all navies, and most of all to the navy of Great
Britain. What the Admiralty says, the rest of the government, and
beyond them the country, are likely to believe and to rely upon,
and when the stress of naval warfare comes, the nation which has
confidingly understood the Admiralty to mean “armored ships” and
“protected ships” when it has employed these phrases, and suddenly
finds out, by defeat following defeat, and catastrophe catastrophe,
that it meant nothing of the kind, may have to pay for its credulity,
allowable and pardonable as it may be, the penalty of betrayal, and
of something worse even than national humility.

On the other hand, it is not to be inferred from the objections thus
offered to the employment of deceptive designations that objection
is also offered to the construction of some ships with limited or
partial protection, falling short of the protection of the buoyancy
and the stability, and therefore of the life, of the ship itself.
It is quite impossible that all the ships of a navy like that of
Great Britain, or of the navies of many other powers, can be made
invulnerable, even in the region of the water-line, to all shot or
shell. Indeed, there are services upon which it is necessary to
employ armed ships, but which do not demand the use of armored or
protected vessels. Unarmored vessels, with some of their more vital
contents protected, suffice for such services. Moreover, even where
it would be very desirable indeed to have the hull protected by armor
to a sufficient extent to preserve the ship’s buoyancy and stability
from ready destruction by gun-fire, it is often impracticable to give
the ship that protection. This is true, for example, of all small
corvettes, sloops, and gun-vessels, which are too small to float
the necessary armor-plates, in addition to all the indispensable
weights of hull, steam-machinery, fuel, armament, ammunition, crew,
and stores. It would be both idle and unreasonable, therefore, to
complain of the construction of some ships with the protecting armor
limited, or even, in certain cases, with no protecting armor at all.
Such ships must be built, and in considerable number, for the British
navy. But this necessity should neither blind us to the exposure and
destructibility of all such vessels, nor induce us to endeavor to
keep that exposure and destructibility out of our own sight. Still
less should it encourage us to sanction, even for a moment, such an
abuse of terms as to hold up as “armored” and “protected” ships those
which, whether unavoidably or avoidably, have been deprived of the
necessary amount of armor to keep them afloat under the fire of small
or even of moderately powerful guns.

We are now in a position to review the British navy, and to see
of what ships it really consists. In this review it will not be
necessary to pass before the eyes of the reader that large number
of vessels of which even the boilers and magazines are without any
armor or thick-plate protection whatever. It will help, nevertheless,
to make the nature and extent of the navy understood if these are
grouped and summarized in a few sentences. Neglecting altogether
all large vessels with timber frames (which may be regarded as out
of date, seeing that all the war vessels of considerable size now
built for the navy have iron or steel frames), it may be first said
that there are but three ships of the large or frigate class in the
British navy which carry no thick protecting plate at all, _viz._,
the _Inconstant_, the _Shah_, and the _Raleigh_. Of much less size
than these, and equally devoid of protection, are the two very fast
vessels, the _Iris_ and _Mercury_, built as special despatch-vessels,
steaming at their best at about eighteen knots. Among the unarmored
corvettes are the _Active_, _Bacchante_, _Boadicea_, _Euryalus_,
_Rover_, and _Volage_, all exceeding fourteen knots in speed,
and all more than three thousand tons displacement. Then follow
thirty-six smaller and less swift corvettes, nearly one-half the
number being built wholly of wood, most of which exceed, however,
thirteen knots in speed; and below these about an equal number
of sloops of less speed and tonnage. The smaller gun-vessels and
gun-boats need not be summarized.

[Illustration: THE “INCONSTANT.”]

Passing on to vessels which, although themselves unarmored, have
thick-plate decks to give some protection to the machinery, we
observe first that there are eight ships of three thousand five
hundred to three thousand seven hundred tons built and under
construction, _viz._, the _Amphion_, _Arethusa_, _Leander_,
_Phaeton_, _Mersey_, _Severn_, _Forth_, and _Thames_.[7] Lord Brassey
very properly classes such of these vessels as he mentions in his
lists as “unarmored ships,” although, as before mentioned, when two
of them—the _Mersey_ and _Severn_—were designed, with a deck two
inches thick, the Admiralty at first ventured to put them forward as
“armored ships.”

Ascending in the scale of protection, and dealing for the present
with sea-going vessels only, we come to a long series of ships
which are undeserving of the designation of armored ships, because
they are liable to destruction by guns without the limited amount
of armor which they carry being attacked at all. These ships are
the _Impérieuse_ and _Warspite_, previously discussed, and also the
_Ajax_, _Agamemnon_, _Colossus_, _Edinburgh_, and the six large
ships of the “Admiral” class. Any one who has intelligently perused
the report of the committee on the _Inflexible_ would justify the
inclusion of that ship in this category; but she is omitted here out
of deference to the strenuous exertions which were made to invent or
devise some little stability for her, even when her bow and stern
are supposed to be badly injured, and out of compassion upon those
officers of the Admiralty who have long ago repented those trying
compromises with conscience by aid of which they expressed some
slight confidence in her ability to float upright with her unarmored
ends badly damaged. She is omitted also out of gratitude to Lord
Brassey for a sentence in which, while saving her from being placed
in so dreadful a category, he honestly places some of the other ships
in it without qualification or circumlocution. He says: “In one
important particular the _Ajax_ and _Agamemnon_ are inferior to the
_Inflexible_. The central armored citadel is not, as it is in the
case of the _Inflexible_, of sufficient displacement to secure the
stability of the ship should the unarmored ends be destroyed.”[8] In
another place the former Secretary to the Admiralty, referring to
the report of the _Inflexible_ committee (which was nominated by the
Admiralty, and under heavy obligations to support it), says: “It is
doubtless very desirable that our armored ships should possess a more
ample margin of stability than is provided in the armored citadel of
the _Inflexible_. The ideas of the committee and of Sir Edward Reed
on this point were in entire accord.”[9]

[Illustration: THE “COLOSSUS.”]

It has recently been acknowledged that, as Lord Brassey states, the
_Ajax_ and _Agamemnon_ are so constructed that they are dependent
for their ability to float, the right side uppermost, upon their
unarmored ends. To call such ships “armored ships” is, as we have
seen, to mislead the public. But some pains have been taken of late
to show that the “Admiral” class is better off in this respect,
and certainly the known opinions of the present writer have been so
far respected in these ships that their armored citadels, so called,
have been made somewhat longer and of greater proportionate area. The
following figures have been given:

Percentage of water-line area
covered by armor.
Inflexible 42.
Agamemnon 45.4
Collingwood 54.15
Camperdown 56.35

But any one who understands this question knows perfectly well
that “percentage of water-line area covered by armor” in no way
represents the relative stabilities of these ships. Indeed, that is
obvious upon the face of the matter, because we have seen the _Ajax_
and _Agamemnon_ pronounced devoid of the necessary stability when
injured, while the _Inflexible_ is said to possess it, although the
former vessel has 45½ per cent. of the water-line area covered, while
the latter has but 42 per cent. But this is not the consideration
which has led to the condemnation of the whole “Admiral” class of
so-called iron-clads as not possessing the essential characteristic
of an armored ship, _viz._, the power to float, and to float with
needful buoyancy and stability, all the time the armor is unpierced.
The ground of that condemnation is to be found in the introduction
into the “Admirals” of a dangerous combination from which the
_Inflexible_ and _Agamemnon_ and other like ships are exempt—the
combination of long unarmored ends comprising about forty-five per
cent. of the water-line area with so shallow a belt of armor that,
when the unarmored ends are injured and filled by the sea (as they
would be in action), there would remain so little armor left above
water that a very slight inclination of the ship would put it all
below water. In the _Agamemnon_ class, small as the initial stability
may be (and with the unarmored ends torn open it would be nothing),
the armor is carried up to a reasonable height above water. But
in the “Admiral” class all the advantage arising from a slightly
lengthened citadel is more than destroyed by this lowering of the
armor. So great is the consequent danger of these ships capsizing,
if ever called upon to engage in a serious battle at close quarters,
that the writer cannot conscientiously regard them as “armored
ships,” but must in common fairness to the officers and men who are
to serve in them, and to the nation which might otherwise put its
trust in them, relegate them to the category of ships with only parts
protected.

It will be observed that nothing has yet been said about thickness
of armor, although that is, of course, a very important element
of a ship’s safety or danger. But important as it is, it has to be
kept scrupulously separated from the question just discussed—the
limitation of the armor’s extent—because no misrepresentation and
no misconception can well arise concerning the relative power or
trustworthiness of ships armored variously as to thickness, while
much misrepresentation has actually taken place, and much consequent
misconception has actually arisen, on the other matter, more than one
European government having deliberately placed in the category of
“armored ships” ships which in no true sense of the word can be so
classed.

The following classifications will conform to the foregoing views,
describing as “armored ships” only those which have sufficient
side-armor to protect them from being sunk or capsized by the fire of
guns all the time the armor remains unpierced:

BRITISH SHIPS OF WAR, BUILT AND BUILDING.

ARMORED SHIPS WITH THICK ARMOR.

+---------------+----------+----------+--------+-----------+---------+
| | | | | Maximum | |
| | Tons |Indicated | Speed, | Thickness | Largest |
|NAME OF SHIP | Displace-| Horse- | in | of Armor, | Guns, |
| | ment. | power. | Knots. | in Inches.| in Tons.|
+---------------+----------+----------+--------+-----------+---------+
|Alexandra | 9,490 | 8,610 | 15 | 12 | 25 |
|Belleisle | 4,830 | 3,200 | 12¼ | 12 | 25 |
|Conqueror | 5,200 | 4,500 | 15 | 12 | 43 |
|Devastation | 9,330 | 6,650 | 13¾ | 12 | 35 |
|Dreadnought | 10,820 | 8,200 | 14½ | 14 | 38 |
|Hero | 6,200 | 4,500 | 15 | 12 | 43 |
|Inflexible[10] | 11,400 | 8,000 | 14 | 24 | 80 |
|Neptune | 9,170 | 9,000 | 14½ | 12 | 38 |
|Orion | 4,830 | 3,900 | 13 | 12 | 25 |
|Rupert | 5,440 | 4,630 | 13½ | 12 | 18 |
|Superb | 9,100 | 7,430 | 14 | 12 | 18 |
|Thunderer | 9,330 | 6,270 | 13½ | 12 | 38 |
|Glatton[11] | 4,910 | 2,870 | 12 | 12 | 25 |
+---------------+----------+----------+--------+-----------+---------+

ARMORED SHIPS WITH MEDIUM ARMOR.

ARMORED SHIPS WITH THIN ARMOR.[12]

+---------------+----------+----------+--------+-----------+---------+
| | | | | Maximum | |
| | Tons |Indicated | Speed, | Thickness | Largest |
|NAME OF SHIP | Displace-| Horse- | in | of Armor, | Guns, |
| | ment. | power. | Knots. | in Inches.| in Tons.|
+---------------+----------+----------+--------+-----------+---------+
|Achilles | 9,820 | 5,720 | 14½ | 4½ | 12 |
|Agincourt | 10,690 | 6,870 | 15 | 5½ | 12 |
|Audacious | 6,910 | 4,020 | 13 | 8 | 12 |
|Bellerophon | 7,550 | 6,520 | 14¼ | 6 | 12 |
|Black Prince | 9,210 | 5,770 | 13¾ | 4½ | 9 |
|Gorgon[13] | 3,480 | 1,650 | 11 | 9 | 18 |
|Hecate[13] | 3,480 | 1,750 | 11 | 9 | 18 |
|Hector[13] | 6,710 | 3,260 | 12½ | 4½ | 9 |
|Hydra[13] | 3,480 | 1,470 | 11¼ | 8 | 18 |
|Invincible | 6,010 | 4,830 | 14 | 8 | 12 |
|Iron Duke | 6,010 | 4,270 | 13¾ | 8 | 12 |
|Minotaur | 10,690 | 6,700 | 14½ | 5½ | 12 |
|Monarch | 8,320 | 7,840 | 15 | 7 | 25 |
|Northumberland | 10,580 | 6,560 | 14 | 5½ | 12 |
|Penelope | 4,470 | 4,700 | 12¾ | 6 | 9 |
|Prince Albert | 3,880 | 2,130 | 11¾ | 4½ | 12 |
|Swiftsure | 6,640 | 4,910 | 15¾ | 8 | 12 |
|Triumph | 6,640 | 4,890 | 14 | 8 | 12 |
|Valiant | 6,710 | 3,560 | 12¾ | 4½ | 9 |
|Warrior | 9,210 | 5,470 | 9¼ | 4½ | 9 |
+---------------+----------+----------+--------+-----------+---------+

SHIPS ARMORED IN PLACES.

The ships in this list, although having some armor upon their sides,
being liable to capsize at sea from injuries inflicted upon their
unarmored parts, cannot be classed with the armored ships.

+---------------+----------+----------+--------+-----------+---------+
| | | | | Maximum | |
| | Tons |Indicated | Speed, | Thickness | Largest |
|NAME OF SHIP | Displace-| Horse- | in | of Armor, | Guns, |
| | ment. | power. | Knots. | in Inches.| in Tons.|
+---------------+----------+----------+--------+-----------+---------+
|Ajax | 8,490 | 6,000 | 13 | 18 | 38 |
|Agamemnon | 8,490 | 6,000 | 13 | 18 | 38 |
|Anson | 10,000 | 7,500 | 14 | 18 | 63 |
|Benbow | 10,000 | 7,500 | 14 | 18 | 110 |
|Camperdown | 10,000 | 7,500 | 14 | 18 | 63 |
|Collingwood | 9,150 | 7,000 | 14 | 18 | 43 |
|Colossus | 9,150 | 6,000 | 14 | 18 | 43 |
|Edinburgh | 9,150 | 6,000 | 14 | 18 | 43 |
|Howe | 9,600 | 7,500 | 16 | 18 | 63 |
|Rodney | 9,600 | 7,500 | 14 | 18 | 63 |
|Impérieuse[14] | 7,390 | 8,000 | 16 | 10 | 18 |
|Warspite[14] | 7,390 | 8,000 | 16 | 10 | 18 |
+---------------+----------+----------+--------+-----------+---------+

To the preceding list may now be added two ships of 10,400 tons
displacement, with 18-inch armor, and five cruisers of 5000 tons
displacement, with 10-inch armor, recently ordered by the Admiralty
to be built by contract.

UNARMORED SHIPS WITH UNDER-WATER STEEL DECKS.[15]

Armored ships with 12-inch armor and upward are called ships with
thick armor; those with armor less than twelve inches but more than
eight inches thick are designated as ships with medium armor; and
those with 8-inch armor or less as ships with thin armor.

A number of vessels of the “Scout” class are now under construction
for the Admiralty. There is a disposition in certain quarters to
include these among the ships of the class recorded in the last
table. A transverse section of one of these is given here, in which
the so-called protective deck is but three-eighths of an inch in
thickness, and can therefore be pierced by any gun afloat, from the
largest down to the very smallest. It would be quite absurd to speak
of this class of vessels as being in any way “protected” against gun
fire.

The first-class ships, so called, and the armored cruisers referred
to in the former part of this chapter as having been promised to
Parliament by the Admiralty representatives, were ordered, and work
upon them is well under way in the yards of those firms to whom
their building has been intrusted. The former are two in number, and
their principal dimensions and particulars are as follows: length,
340 feet; breadth, 70 feet; draught of water, 26 feet; displacement,
10,400 tons; indicated horse-power, 10,000; estimated speed, 16
knots; thickness of armor, 18 inches; largest guns, 110 tons. The
armor-belt in these ships is a little more than 160 feet long, or
about half their length, but rises to a height of only two feet six
inches above the water. Before and abaft the belt under-water armored
decks extend to the stem and stern respectively, as in the “Admiral”
class. Besides the two 110-ton guns, which, as has been said, are
placed in a turret forward and fire over the upper deck, there are
twelve 6-inch guns ranged round the after-part of the ship on the
upper deck. A certain amount of protection has been given to these
guns by means of armor-plating, but as this is only three inches
thick, it can be said to do little more than protect the gun crews
from the fire of rifles and of the smallest machine-guns.

[Illustration: TRANSVERSE SECTION OF ONE OF THE NEW “SCOUTS”]

Of the armored cruisers,[16] five have been contracted for. Their
principal dimensions and particulars are: length, 300 feet; breadth,
56 feet; draught of water, 21 feet; displacement, 5000 tons;
indicated horse-power, 8500; estimated speed, 18 knots; thickness of
armor, 10 inches; largest guns, 18 tons. These vessels are protected
by an armor-belt nearly two hundred feet long, which extends to a
height of one foot six inches above the water, and to a depth of four
feet below it, and they also have under-water decks before and abaft
the belt. They carry two 18-ton guns, one well forward, ranging right
round the bow, and the other well aft, ranging right round the stern,
as well as five 6-inch guns on each broadside, the foremost and
aftermost of which are placed on projecting sponsons, by which they
are enabled to fire right ahead and right astern respectively. None
of these guns is protected except by the thin shields usually fitted
to keep off rifle fire from those actually working the guns.

No mention has yet been made of the troop or transport ships of
the British navy. There are in all about a dozen of these, but by
far the most conspicuous and important of them are the five Indian
transports which were built about twenty years ago, conjointly by the
Admiralty and the government of India, and ever since worked by those
departments of the State with general satisfaction. One of these, the
_Jumna_, is illustrated in the annexed figure. So satisfied was the
late Director of Transports, Sir William R. Mends, K.C.B., with the
services of these ships that, before retiring from his office, he
informed the writer that if he had to assist in the construction of a
new fleet of such transports he would desire but a single improvement
in them, as working ships, and that was the raising of the lower deck
one foot, in order to increase to that extent the stowage of the
holds.

[Illustration: THE “JUMNA.”]

In the early part of this chapter the writer made reference to the
influence exerted upon European ship-building by the incidents of the
American civil war. He will conclude by a reference to an influence
exerted upon his own mind and judgment by the most distinguished
naval hero of that war, the late Admiral Farragut. On the occasion
of that gallant officer’s visit to England the Board of Admiralty
invited him, as a wholly exceptional compliment, to accompany it on
its annual official visit of inspection to her Majesty’s dockyards.
On the way from Chatham to Sheerness in the Admiralty yacht, the
writer had a most instructive conversation with the admiral as to the
results of his practical experience of naval warfare at the brilliant
capture of New Orleans, and elsewhere, and one of those results was
this: “Never allow your men to be deceived as to the ships in which
you expect them to fight. They will fight in anything, and fight to
the death, if they know beforehand what they are going about, and
what is expected of them. But if you deceive them, and expose them to
dangers of which they know nothing, and they find this out in battle,
they are very apt to become bewildered, to lose heart all at once,
and to fail you just when you most require their utmost exertions.”
The writer has not forgotten this, and will not forget it. The
British Admiralty is, unhappily, altogether unmindful of it.

NOTES.[17]

There is no rigorous law by which a universal naval policy may be
formulated, for a nation’s environment, geographical and political,
defines the conditions that must be obeyed. Underneath all, however,
the immutable principle exists that the first and supreme duty of a
navy is to protect its own coasts. The measures required to achieve
this end are as various as a country’s necessities, resources,
opportunities, and temperament. England, for example, has always
guarded her homes, not at the hearth-stone nor the threshold, but
within gunshot of her enemy’s territory; her defence has been an
attack upon his inner line, and her vessels have been, not corsairs
preying upon merchantmen, but battle-ships, ready for duel or for
fleet engagement, whether they had the odds against them or not. This
is the true sailor instinct; this has made England’s greatness.

To-day the question is so much governed by the complexities of modern
progress that the details must be altered to suit the new demands;
for it is not the England of the British Islands nor of the sparsely
settled colonies that is now to be defended—it is a Greater Britain.
The trade and commerce of England have increased so enormously in
late years that no figures are necessary to show the interests she
has afloat; but as proof of her growth in territory and in population
outside of the mother-country, these statistics, taken from a late
number of the _Nineteenth Century_, may perhaps be quoted:

FIFTY YEARS’ GROWTH OF INDIA AND THE COLONIES.

INDIA.

1835. 1885.
Area governed in square miles 600,000 1,380,000
Population of European stock 300,000 500,000
Population, colored 96,000,000 254,000,000
State revenues £19,000,000 £74,000,000

COLONIES AND DEPENDENCIES.

1835. 1885.
Area governed in square miles 520,000 7,000,000
Population of European stock 1,800,000 9,500,000
Population, colored 2,100,000 8,000,000
State revenues £5,000,000 £51,000,000

That is to say, in fifty years England has added 7,260,000 square
miles to her territory, and nearly trebled the population she
controls in India and her colonies. Is it necessary to add that with
all this at stake the ocean highways which her ships traverse must be
held toll free; that the nations which she has peopled and owns must
be protected; that the enemy’s squadrons which will seek to cut off
her food supply, destroy her commerce, and burn her coaling stations,
must be chased and captured; or that in the line of battle her ships
must meet his and conquer? Sea-going and sea-keeping fleets and their
auxiliaries must always be ready; transferable forts for protection
abroad, and coast-defence ships for safety at home, must be kept
afloat; and, in a word, every means must be employed which, through
successful sea-war, will maintain her integrity as a nation. Her navy
must be eclectic in types, the exact instrument for any expected
operation being always at hand; her maritime administration must be
comprehensive; and her preparation ever such as will anticipate and
surpass that of all her rivals. Enormously armored battle-ships may
be economically wrong, but while other countries build them so must
she; for her immunity depends not upon treaties nor the friendly but
false protestations of rivals, but upon the fear of her unassailable
superiority. A mistaken naval policy is to any nation a grave
disaster, but to England it means ruin. “We cannot allow,” wrote
Lord Brassey, “any foreign power to possess vessels which we cannot
overhaul, or to carry guns at sea which may inflict a damaging blow
to which it is impossible for us to reply. We must have ships as fast
as the fastest, and guns at least equal to the most powerful which
are to be found in the hands of any possible enemy.”

Knowing, then, the interests imperilled, English designers are keen
to achieve the best results; and when, as they believe, this has
been accomplished, is it a wonder that they fall tooth and nail in
a white-heat of positive assertion and flat contradiction upon all
who differ from them? All are striving so honestly for the common
good of the great country which they love with such intense and
insular patriotism that even their imbittered differences of belief
command the respect of right-thinking men everywhere. But in these
variant faiths where is the truth? The question has run the gamut
of experiment without being solved, the pendulum has swung from side
to side and found no point of rest, and to-day there is a fixed
agreement only as to the dangers which threaten.

The most marked tendencies, however, in all modern design are the
diminution of side armor, the increase of deck protection, and the
development of speed. The public mind is so familiar with the great
speed of the large mail-boats that a common question, often put as an
inquiry of disparaging comparison, is why war-vessels do not steam
as fast. The simplest answer to this is that they do, and in types
which, like the big steamers, are special, the boasted achievements
have been surpassed. Of course the number of vessels that can make
nineteen knots is limited, because the man-of-war is hampered by
necessities of space, weight, and safety, which do not obtain with
the others. Mr. White, who has been so often, and, it is to be hoped,
so advantageously, quoted in this editing, says: “The necessity for
giving protection to the engines and boilers of war-ships introduces
special restrictions and difficulties in the design which are not
known in merchant-ships, wherever in war-ships the overshadowing
necessities of fighting power compel the acceptance in many cases
of limited space and other inconveniences.... Merchant-steamers
of all classes are built and engined for the purpose of steaming
continuously at certain maximum speeds, and making fairly uniform
passages; they consequently possess a considerable reserve of boiler
power to meet adverse conditions of wind and sea. War-ships, on
the contrary, ordinarily cruise at very low speeds, and yet must
be capable of reaching very high speeds when required in action or
chasing. A war-ship, for instance, that attained about sixteen knots
on the measured mile, and could steam continuously at sea, as long as
her coal lasted, at a speed of about fifteen knots, would ordinarily
have to cruise at from nine to ten knots. At this low speed she
would require, say, only _one-seventh_ of the indicated horse-power
which would be developed at her full sea speed, or say _one-tenth_
of what would be developed on the measured mile. This obviously
introduces conditions of a character entirely different from those of
the merchant-ship. The war-ship’s machinery must be so designed that
the power necessary to give her high speed at long intervals and for
short periods should be secured with the least expenditure of weight
consistent with insuring the maximum performance when required, and
with the provision of proper strength and durability.”

The very vague ideas existing as to the cost of increased speed
may be illustrated by a statement of the penalty this imposes in a
10,000 ton armored vessel. If at 10 knots this ship develops 1700
horse-power, there will be required at 15 knots, not one-third
more, but 6200 horse-power—that is, over three times as much—and
for 17 knots 12,000 horse-power, or an increase of 10,300 must
be developed. This also demonstrates how much the ratio between
speed and power falls; because if at 2000 horse-power 2.3 knots
are gained for an increase of 1000 horse-power, at 12,000 for a
similar increment of 1000 only one-quarter of a knot is obtained. In
1830 the steam pressure carried was from two to three pounds, and
the coal expenditure each hour for every horse-power reached nine
pounds; in 1886 the pressure had increased to 150 pounds, and the
fuel consumption had fallen to 1.5 pounds, and to-day pressures of
200 pounds are to be utilized. As the swifter vessel with the higher
economy is enabled to choose its range and position, and keep the sea
for longer periods, it is easily seen that this question of speed is
universally accepted as vital.

A parliamentary statement made in February shows that the following
additions to the English fleet will be passed this year into the
first-class reserve, and held ready for sea service at forty-eight
hours’ notice.

Thick armor battle-ship (_Hero_) 1
Partially armored ships of the _Admiral_ class
(_Rodney_, _Howe_, and _Benbow_) 3
Partially armored cruisers (_Warspite_, _Orlando_,
_Narcissus_, _Australia_, _Galatea_, and _Undaunted_) 6
Partially protected cruisers (_Severn_ and _Thames_) 2
Torpedo cruisers—six of the _Archer_ class, one of the
_Scout_ class (_Fearless_) 7
Torpedo gun-boats of the _Rattlesnake_ class 3
Composite gun-boats and sloops of the _Buzzard_ and
_Rattler_ class 3
--
Total 25

At the end of 1887-88 one armored ship, the _Camperdown_, and one
protected cruiser, the _Forth_, will be nearly finished, the _Anson_
will be approaching completion, and the new belted cruisers of the
_Orlando_ class will be far advanced. The armored battle-ships
_Victoria_ and _Sanspareil_, of 10,470 tons displacement, are to be
delivered according to contract in October, 1888, and the _Trafalgar_
and _Nile_, the largest war-vessels yet laid down in England,
are being pushed rapidly. Out of the thirty-seven ships building
or incomplete at the commencement of 1887-88, twenty-six will be
completed by the end of the year, thus leaving only nine of those
specified, and two others not ordered, in the programme of 1885 to be
finished subsequently. The ships projected for this year include:

20-knot steel-bottomed partially protected cruisers
(_Medea_, _Medusa_) 2
19¾-knot copper-bottomed partially protected cruisers
(_Melpomene_, _Marathon_, _Magicienne_) 3
Composite sloops of the _Buzzard_ class (_Nymphe_, _Daphné_) 2
Composite gun-boats, improved _Rattlers_, (_Pigmy_,
_Pheasant_, _Partridge_, _Plover_, _Pigeon_, _Peacock_) 6
Torpedo gun-boat of the _Grasshopper_ class (_Sharpshooter_) 1
--
Total 14

Besides the ships that have been or will be finished in 1886-87,
it is believed that thirty-five of the fifty-five first-class
torpedo-boats (125 to 150 feet in length) will be added to the twenty
which were completed in June.

In addition to the vessels mentioned above there are others not
described nor noticed in the text. The two battle-ships referred to
upon page 55 are the _Sanspareil_ and the _Victoria_, the latter
formerly known as the _Renown_, but named anew in April last. These
ships are to carry 1180 tons of coal, and under forced draught
are expected to develop 12,000 horse-power and a speed of 16.75
knots. The 9.2-inch 18-ton stern pivot gun originally intended for
these vessels has been replaced by a 10-inch 26-ton rifle, and the
secondary battery now includes twenty-one 6 and 3-pounder rapid
fire guns. The other prominent departures from the central-citadel
type are the _Nile_ and _Trafalgar_. These 11,940-ton ships are the
largest war machines ever laid down for the British service. They
are to carry revolving turrets on the fore and aft line amidships,
and will have an intermediate broadside battery mounted in a
superstructure which covers the full width of the ship between the
turrets. A water-belt line 230 feet in length rises in the waist
for a distance of 193 feet, and both belt and citadel are covered
by a three-inch steel deck, which is curved forward and aft to
strengthen the ram and protect the steering gear. The armor is
compound—eighteen inches thick on the turret and twenty inches
thick as a maximum on the water-line—and to support the backing
there is an inner skin two inches thick. The armament consists of
four 13½-inch 68-ton breech-loading rifles, two in each turret;
of eight 5-inch guns in broadside on a covered deck protected by
three inches of vertical armor, and of eight 6-pounder rapid fire,
ten 3-pounder Maxim, and four Gardner guns. The horse-power under
forced draft is to be 12,000, and the estimated speed is 16½ knots.
The main battery originally designed for these ships included only
one 68-ton breech-loading rifle for each turret; subsequently this
plan was rejected, and the armament stated above was adopted. “The
economy of mounting the heavy guns in pairs arises not only from
the increased power thus obtained from a given weight of guns, but
from the fact that it requires but little more armor to protect two
guns than to protect one. It also requires more machinery to work
two guns separately than in pairs, and the magazine and ammunition
supply arrangements of guns mounted separately are necessarily more
complicated, and require more men to operate them than those mounted
in pairs.

“The French idea in mounting their heavy guns singly in three or four
armored barbettes is evidently so to distribute the gun-power as to
leave a reserve of heavy guns in event of damage to one or more.
But the demands for economy in weight are so great that two armored
structures widely separated would seem to furnish as satisfactory a
scattering of the heavy gun-power as is justifiable. Guns mounted
on the middle line suffer less disturbance in rolling than those
mounted either in the waist or _en échelon_, and their fire should be
correspondingly more accurate.”[18]

The _Impérieuse_ and _Warspite_ have powerful ram bows, a steel
protective deck, and a belt of compound armor which is 139 feet in
length on the water-line, 8 feet in width, and 10 inches thick. The
engines were designed to develop 7500 horse-power and a speed of
16 knots, but on her trial the _Impérieuse_ attained with forced
draft a maximum speed of 18.2 knots and 10,344 horse-power, and a
mean speed, after four runs on the measured mile, of 17.21 knots.
In September, 1886, with all guns and stores in place, and with 900
tons of coal in the bunkers, the _Impérieuse_ developed a mean speed
of 16 knots. The armament is composed of four 9.2-inch guns, mounted
in four 8-inch plated circular barbettes, and situated one forward,
one aft, and two in the waist; on the gun-deck there are six 6-inch
guns, and the secondary battery is made up of twelve 6-pounder rapid
fire, ten 1-inch Nordenfeldt, and four Gardner guns, and of four
above-water and two submerged torpedo-tubes. Owing to the increased
weights of the armament, stores, machinery, and equipments put in
these vessels since they were first designed, the draught of water is
now found to be nearly three feet greater than was intended. It is
only fair to state that they were originally expected to carry but
400 tons of coal, though curiously enough, when this fuel capacity
was subsequently increased to 1200 tons, no allowance was made for
the additional armored surface required.

The armored free-board was to have been 3 feet 3 inches at a draught
of 25 feet, but the supplementary weights increased the draught 11½
inches and reduced this free-board to 2 feet 3½ inches; and later,
when the full bunker capacity of 900 tons was utilized, the draught
was again increased 14 inches, and the free-board lowered to 1 foot
1½ inches. Finally it was for a time determined to carry 1200 tons of
coal, though this would result, when the ship was fully equipped for
sea, in bringing the top of the armored belt nearly flush with the
water.

“As four of the torpedo tubes are above water, and have ports
cut through the armor-belt, this decrease of free-board rendered
them useless, it having been shown during an experimental cruise
on the _Impérieuse_ in December, 1886, with but 800 tons of coal
on board and in a calm sea, that in attempting to discharge the
broadside torpedoes they jammed in the tubes, and altered shape
to a dangerous degree. In order to make them of any use they will
have to be restored to their intended height above the water-line.
It is believed this can be accomplished by removing part of the
superstructure, by dispensing with all top-hamper and its attendant
supply of stores, equipments, etc., and by limiting the maximum coal
supply to the bunker capacity of 900 tons. The masts are accordingly
being removed from both vessels, leaving them but one signal mast
stepped between the funnels, and fitted with a military top.”[19]

In May, 1886, the _Warspite_, when very light, developed with natural
draft 7451 horse-power and a speed of 15½ knots on a consumption
of 2.69 pounds of coal each hour per horse-power; and with forced
draft 10,242 horse-power and a speed of 17¼ knots were obtained on a
similar consumption of 2.9 pounds of coal.

In the minority report of the 1871 Committee on Designs Admiral
Elliot and Rear-Admiral Ryder “strongly advocated the use of a
protective deck in conjunction with other features, instead of
side-armor, for protection to stability. The idea as regards cruisers
was first carried out in the full-rigged ships of the English _Comus_
class of 2380 tons displacement and 13 knots speed, launched in
1878, in which the engines, boilers, and magazines were covered by a
horizontal 1½-inch steel deck placed below the water-line, the space
immediately above containing cellular subdivisions.

“Then followed, in 1882, the _Leander_ and her three sister
bark-rigged vessels, which are a compromise between the speed of
the _Iris_ and the protection of the _Comus_. They are of 3750 tons
displacement and 17 knots maximum speed; they carry ten 6-inch 4-ton
B. L. R., and 725 tons of coal, and have a ‘partial protective deck,’
covering engines, boilers, and magazines, which is 1½ inches thick,
and which bends down below the load water-line at the sides. Our
new cruisers, the _Chicago_, _Boston_, and _Atlanta_, bear a closer
resemblance to this type than they do to any other in respect of
their protection. About this time the Chilian cruiser _Esmeralda_, of
3000 tons, appeared, having a protective deck complete from stem to
stern-post, carrying an exceptionally heavy battery and coal supply,
and withal attaining the unprecedented speed of 18.28 knots. Italy
was not slow to perceive the advantages of this type, and accordingly
bought an improved _Esmeralda_, the _Giovanni Bausan_, and at once
commenced to build four others, the _Vesuvio_, _Stromboli_, _Etna_,
and _Fieramosca_, each of 3530 tons. Japan ordered two improved
_Esmeraldas_, the sister ships _Naniwa-Kan_ and _Tacachiho-Kan_, from
Armstrong, in England, and a similar vessel, the _Unebi_, in France,
while England laid down a similar class, the _Mersey_ and three
others, and France a similar cruiser, the _Sfax_, of 4400 tons.”[20]
The _Unebi_ was a bark-rigged, twin-screw, protected steel cruiser of
3651 tons. Her armament consisted of four 9.45-inch breech-loaders
on sponsons, six 5.9-inch breech-loaders in broadside, one 5.9-inch
bow pivot, twelve rapid fire and two Nordenfeldt machine guns, and
a supply of Whitehead torpedoes. In September, 1886, she developed
with forced draft 7000 horse-power and an average speed of 18.5 knots
during four runs over the measured mile. She sailed for Japan in
November, 1886, with a French crew numbering seventy-eight men, left
Singapore for Yokohama on December 3, 1886, and has never been seen
nor heard of since. She is said to have been top-heavy, and to have
rolled dangerously in a sea way.

The _Naniwa-Kan_, a steel cruiser, 300 feet in length and 46 feet in
beam, has on an extreme draught of 19 feet 6 inches a displacement
of 3730 tons; the steel hull is fitted with a double bottom under
the engines and boilers, and has a strong protective deck, two to
three inches thick, which extends from the ram to the stern-post,
and carries its edges four feet below, and its crown one inch above,
the load water-line. There are ten complete transverse and several
partial water-tight bulkheads; the space between the protective
and the main deck is minutely subdivided into compartments, which
are utilized as coal-bunkers, store-rooms, chain-lockers, and
torpedo-rooms; the conning-tower is protected by two inches of steel
armor; and two ammunition hoists, three inches thick, lead from the
shell-rooms to the loading towers at the breech of the two heavy
guns. The armament consists of two 10-inch 28-ton breech-loading
rifles on central pivots, with 2-inch steel screens, and of six
6-inch guns, with a secondary battery of two 6-pounder rapid fire,
eight 1-inch Nordenfeldt, four Gardner guns, and four above-water
torpedo tubes. The engines are of the horizontal compound type,
situated in two compartments, one abaft the other, and there are
six single-ended locomotive three-furnace boilers in two separate
compartments, with athwartship fire-rooms; the indicated horse-power
under a forced draft was 7650, and the maximum speed 18.9 knots. This
has since been exceeded. The _Mersey_ and her class—the _Severn_,
_Thames_, and _Forth_—like the _Naniwa_ are unarmored steel
cruisers, with a complete protective deck, the horizontal portion
of which is one foot above, and the inclined three inches below,
the water-line. The main battery of these ships consists of two
8-inch guns, mounted on central pivots forward and abaft a covered
deck which carries ten 6-inch guns; the secondary battery has ten
1-inch Nordenfeldt and two Gardner machine guns, and there are six
above-water torpedo-tubes in broadside.

“The development of the _Mersey_ design has resulted in the new
English ‘belted cruisers,’ in which, to satisfy the demand for a
water-line belt of armor, the displacement has been increased to 5000
tons.”

The five originally projected—the _Orlando_, _Narcissus_,
_Australia_, _Galatea_, and _Undaunted_—together with the
_Immortalité_, subsequently laid down, have already been launched,
and an additional cruiser of the same type, the _Aurora_, is well
advanced. The general construction is similar to the _Naniwa_
and _Mersey_, the larger tonnage being given in order to carry a
water-line belt, which is ten inches thick, stretches for 190 feet
amidships, and was intended to extend from 1½ feet above to four
feet below the load water-line. The armored deck is from two to
three inches thick, and the conning-tower is thirteen inches. The
triple-expansion engines are planned to develop 8500 horse-power
and a speed of 18 knots. Like the _Impérieuse_ and _Warspite_,
these vessels are found to draw much more water than was originally
proposed. When designed in 1884 they were expected to have, with all
weights on board, a mean draught of twenty-one feet, and to carry
above water eighteen inches of the five feet six inch armor-belt. But
a fever for improvement set in so valorously that the changes made
in armament and machinery added one hundred and eighty-six tons to
the displacement and increased the draught seven inches—that is, an
amount which left the top of the protective belt only eleven inches
above the smooth water-line. This submersion did not, however, cool
the ardor of the Admiralty officials, for it has been decided that
the nine hundred tons of coal originally fixed as the fuel supply
must be carried; the immediate result of this is said to be an
increase in the draught of eighteen inches, and a disappearance of
the armor-belt to a point nearly six inches _below_ the water-line.
Subsequent improvements will be awaited with great interest,
especially by those American journalists of inquiring tendencies who
envyingly detect between the promise and performance of these ships
opportunities which, had they occurred at home, would have enabled
them to swamp our naval service and its administration in billows of
pitiless ink.

The most popular naval event of the year was the review in July
of the British fleet assembled at Spithead. The one hundred and
twenty-eight war-vessels participating included three squadrons
of armored vessels and cruisers, aggregating thirty-four ships,
seventy-five torpedo-boats and gun-boats, divided into five
flotillas, six training brigs, and thirteen troop-ships. Besides
these there were the troop-ships appointed to carry the distinguished
visitors, and the small vessels and dockyard craft allotted to the
corporation of Portsmouth.

The war-ships were drawn up in four lines, facing up channel, the
starboard column lying opposite the Isle of Wight, and the port
column off Portsmouth. The ships were two cables and the columns
three cables apart. The flotillas were ranged in double columns
between the port line of the armored vessels and the main-land, and
the troop-ships were placed in single column between the starboard
line and the Isle of Wight. This made four lines of vessels on one
side of the channel and three on the other, extending from South
Sea Castle to the Rye Middle Shoals, or a distance of two miles. No
such fleet was ever seen before in time of peace, for every class
of the British navy was so well represented that the review of the
Crimean fleet by the Queen and the Prince Consort, thirty-one years
ago, suffered by comparison. Some of the wooden ships which figured
at that time were present, and the wide differences in everything
bore strong testimony to the developments which have been made within
a generation. Nelson’s old ship, the _Victory_, was a conspicuous
object, and her timbers echoed again and again with cheers as boat
after boat passed her. More than that, the old ship mounted a gun or
two and joined in the universal salute to the Queen. Shortly after
two o’clock the _Euphrates_, _Crocodile_, and _Malabar_ hove to off
Osborne as an escort to the royal yachts when the Queen embarked.

The Queen left Osborne House a few minutes before three o’clock, went
aboard the royal yacht _Victoria and Albert_, and left the buoy in
the bay promptly at the hour fixed. She was preceded by the _Trinity_
yacht and followed by the royal yachts _Osborne_ and _Alberta_,
and by the war-vessels _Enchantress_, _Helicon_, _Euphrates_,
_Crocodile_, and _Malabar_. The royal procession proceeded straight
to its destination and passed between the lines, leaving the
coast-defence ships, gun-boats, and torpedo-boats on the port hand.
After steaming as far as the Horse Elbow buoy the _Victoria and
Albert_ turned to starboard, passed between the two columns of large
ships, and then between the lines of the foreign war-vessels. As the
yacht steamed slowly by the war-ships the crews cheered loudly, but
it was not until the Queen had gone through the double line that the
royal salute was fired. On board such vessels as had no masts the
turrets, breastworks, and decks were lined with the crews, and the
spectacle was as splendid as it was potent with an earnest evidence
of mighty power. Altogether the fleet extended over four miles, and
even this length was added to by the great troop-ships which steamed
into line and saluted the Queen as she made her progress.

The jubilee week was not without its accidents, for the _Ajax_ and
_Devastation_ collided at the rendezvous, and subsequently the
_Agincourt_ and _Black Prince_ had a similar experience. These
mishaps evoked much hostile criticism, and among other things gave
currency to an extract from a speech made by Lord Randolph Churchill
several weeks before. Speaking of the navy, he had declared that, “In
the last twelve or thirteen years eighteen ships have been either
completed or designed by the Admiralty to fulfil certain purposes,
and on the strength of the Admiralty statements Parliament has
faithfully voted the money. The total amount which either has been
or will be voted for these ships is about ten millions, and it is
now discovered and officially acknowledged that in respect of the
purposes for which these ships were designed, and for the purposes
for which these ten millions either have been or will be spent, the
whole of the money has been absolutely misapplied, utterly wasted and
thrown away.”

Sir Charles Dilke does not agree with this pessimism of his political
opponent, though he, too, has something to say of the British fleet,
in relation to its influence upon the present position of European
politics, which is well worth quoting.

“There is less to be said in a hostile sense with regard to the
present position of the navy,” he concedes, “than may be said, or
must be said, about the army. Clever German officers may write
their ‘Great Naval War of 1888,’ and describe the destruction of the
British fleet by the French torpedo-boats, but on the whole we are
not ill-satisfied with the naval progress that has been made in the
last three years. There is plenty of room for doubt as to whether
we get full value for our money; but at all events our navy is
undoubtedly and by universal admission the first navy in the world,
and relatively to the French we appear to show of ships built and
building a number proportionate to our expenditure. The discovery of
the comparative uselessness of automatic torpedoes is an advantage
to this country, and no great change in the opposite direction has
recently occurred. M. Gabriel Charmes has pointed out to France the
manner to destroy our sea-borne trade, but excellent steps have
been taken since his book appeared to meet the danger which he
obligingly made clear to us. It remains a puzzle to my civilian mind
how Italy can manage to do all that in a naval sense she does for
her comparatively small expenditure, and how, spending only from a
fourth to a sixth what we spend upon our navy, she can nevertheless
produce so noble a muster of great ships. But our naval dangers are,
no doubt, dangers chiefly caused rather by military than by naval
defects. Our navy is greatly weakened for the discharge of its proper
duties by the fact that duties are thrown upon it which no navy can
efficiently discharge. As Admiral Hoskins has said, it is the duty
of the commander of the British fleet to drive the hostile squadrons
from the seas, and to shut up the enemy’s ships in his different
ports; but, on the other hand, he has a right to expect that our own
ports and coaling stations shall be protected by batteries and by
land forces. This is exactly what has not yet been done, although
the defence of our coaling stations by fortresses and by adequate
garrisons is essential to the sustaining of our maritime supremacy in
time of war.

“It is only, however, by comparison with our army that I think our
navy in a sound position. In other words, our military situation
is so alarming that it is for a time desirable to concentrate our
attention upon that, rather than upon the less pressing question of
the condition of the navy. I must not be thought, however, to admit,
for one single instant, that our navy should give us no anxiety.
As long as France remains at peace, and spends upon her navy such
enormous sums as she has been spending during the last few years, she
will be sufficiently near to us in naval power to make our position
somewhat doubtful; make it depend, that is, upon how the different
new inventions may turn out in time of war. Our navy is certainly
none too large (even when the coaling stations and commercial ports
have been fortified, and made for the first time a source of strength
rather than of weakness to the navy) for the duties which it has to
perform. It would be as idle for us, with our present naval force, to
hope to thoroughly command the Mediterranean and the Red Sea against
the French without an Italian alliance, as to try to hold our own
in Turkey or in Belgium with our present army. Just as the country
seems now to have made up its mind to abandon not only the defence
of Turkey against Russia, but also the defence of the neutrality of
Belgium, so it will have to make up its mind, unless it is prepared
to increase the navy, to resort only to the Cape route in time
of war. Italy being neutral, and we at war with France, we could
not at present hope to defend the whole of our colonies and trade
against attack, and London against invasion, and yet to so guard the
Mediterranean and the Red Sea as to make passage past Toulon and
Algiers, Corsica and Biserta, safe. Our force is probably so superior
to the French as to enable us to shut up their iron-clads; but it
would probably be easier to shut in their Mediterranean iron-clads by
holding the Straits of Gibraltar than to attempt to blockade them in
Toulon. I confess that I cannot understand those Jingoes who think
that it is enough to shriek for Egypt, without seeing that Egypt
cannot be held in time of war, or the Suez route made use of with the
military and naval forces that we possess at present.

“As against a French and Russian combination of course we are weaker
still. Englishmen are hardly aware of the strength of Russia in
the Pacific, where, if we are to attack at all, we must inevitably
fight her, and where, if we are to adopt the hopeless policy of
remaining only on the defensive, we shall still have to meet her
for the protection of our own possessions. Just as the reduction
of the horse artillery, comparatively unimportant in itself, has
shown that the idea of the protection of Belgian neutrality has been
completely given up, so the abandonment of Port Hamilton, instead of
its fortification as a protection for our navy, seems to show that
we have lost all hope of being able to hold our own against Russia
in the North Pacific. On the 1st of August Russia will have upon her
North Pacific station—cruising, that is, between Vladivostock and
Yokohama—three new second-class protected ships—the _Vladimir_,
_Monomakh_, and the _Dmitri Donsköi_, of nearly six thousand tons
apiece, and the _Duke of Edinburgh_, of four thousand six hundred
tons; one older protected ship, the _Vitiaz_, of three thousand tons;
four fast-sailing cruisers—the _Naïezdnik_, the _Razboïnik_, the
_Opritchnik_, and the _Djighite_; and four gun-boats, of which two
are brand-new this year. While talking about their European fleets,
the Russians are paying no real attention to them, and are more and
more concentrating their strength in the North Pacific.”

“The British navy,” says another writer,[21] “is not in danger,
and the British navy, whatever its shortcomings, is relatively far
stronger than its thoughtless detractors would have us believe. Our
ships do steer and our ships do steam—at least as well as those
of other powers; and, what is more, our ships will ‘fight’ and our
ships will ‘win,’ in spite of the dismal forebodings of interested
panic-mongers.

“With the resources at our command, our armaments afloat admit of a
rapid development, in which no other country can compete with us. A
French writer has truly said, ‘La puissance d’une marine est moins
dans son matériel à flot, que dans l’outillage de ses arsenaux, et
dans la puissance productive de ses chantiers.’

“As a maritime power we are unequalled, and if we be true to
ourselves we shall remain so.”

In 1886 the fighting-ships of the British navy were summarized as
follows:

+--------------------------------+-----+------+---------+---------+
| SHIPS. | No. | Guns.| Displac-| Horse- |
| | No. | Guns.| ment. | power. |
+--------------------------------+-----+------+---------+---------+
| ARMORED. | | | Tons. | |
|In commission and in reserve | 50 | 508 | 339,750 | 241,390 |
|Deduct ships of doubtful value | 7 | 137 | 50,780 | 30,970 |
| +-----+------+---------+---------+
| Total reliable armored ships | 43 | 371 | 288,970 | 210,420 |
| | | | | |
| UNARMORED. | | | | |
|In commission and in reserve | 197 | 1121 | 221,957 | 245,692 |
|Deduct ships of doubtful value | 15 | 76 | 27,760 | 27,470 |
| +-----+------+---------+---------+
| Total reliable unarmored ships| 182 | 1045 | 194,197 | 218,222 |
| | | | | |
|Armored ships building | 12 | 148 | 89,660 | 114,000 |
|Unarmored ships building | 21 | 112 | 24,650 | 53,250 |
| +-----+------+---------+---------+
| Total | 33 | 260 | 114,310 | 167,250 |
| | | | | |
|Armored ships being completed | 10 | 93 | 84,880 | 84,750 |
|Unarmored ships being completed | 10 | 90 | 26,790 | 41,800 |
| +-----+------+---------+---------+
| Total | 20 | 183 | 111,670 | 126,550 |
| | | | | |
|Total armored ships | 72 | 749 | 514,290 | 440,140 |
|Total unarmored ships | 228 | 1323 | 273,397 | 340,742 |
| +-----+------+---------+---------+
| Grand total of ships | 300 | 2072 | 787,687 | 780,882 |
+--------------------------------+-----+------+---------+---------+

During the last year thirty-seven vessels of the following classes
were stricken from the list, viz., five armored ships, seven cruisers
of the third class, sixteen gun-vessels, one despatch-boat, and
eighteen special service gun-boats. The total net value, excluding
ordnance equipments, of the fleet when it is kept at a normal war
strength is $191,568,720, and the annual ship-building expenditures
required to sustain this standard of efficiency is $8,793,440. This
is a very cheap insurance upon the property, material and moral,
which is at stake.

The following table shows the armored and partially protected ships
now under construction or lately finished:

+------------+--------+--------+-------+----------+--------------------+
| NAME OF | Tons. | Horse- | Speed.| Total | Armament. |
| SHIP. | | power. | | Cost. | |
+------------+--------+--------+-------+----------+--------------------+
| TURRETS. | | | | |
|Trafalgar | 11,940 | 12,000 | 16.5 | £844,318 | 4 67-ton, 8 5-in. |
|Nile | 11,940 | 12,000 | 15.5 | 889,421 | 4 67-ton, 8 5-in. |
|Victoria | 11,470 | 12,000 | 16.75 | 829,979 | 2 110-ton. |
|Sanspareil | 11,470 | 12,000 | 16.75 | 825,468 | 1 10-in., 12 6-in. |
|Edinburgh | 9,150 | 7,500 | 15.4 | 683,609 | 4 45-ton, 5 6-in. |
|Hero | 6,200 | 6,000 | 15.5 | 421,500 | 2 45-ton, 4 6-in. |
| | | | | | |
| BARBETTES. | | | | |
|Anson | 10,000 | 12,500 | 17.5 | 752,288 | 4 67-ton, 6 6-in. |
|Camperdown | 10,000 | 11,700 | 17.5 | 743,074 | 4 67-ton, 6 6-in. |
|Benbow | 10,000 | 10,850 | 17.5 | 810,633 | 2 110-ton, 10 6-in.|
|Howe | 9,700 | 11,500 | 17.0 | 720,771 | 4 67-ton, 6 6-in. |
|Rodney | 9,700 | 11,500 | 17.0 | 726,482 | 4 69-ton, 6 6-in. |
|Collingwood | 9,150 | 9,570 | 16.5 | 670,752 | 4 44-ton, 6 6-in. |
|Impérieuse | 8,500 | 10,344 | 17.21 | 559,901 | 4 9.2-in., 6 6-in. |
|Warspite | 8,500 | 10,242 | 17.25 | 558,449 | 4 22-ton, 6 6-in. |
| | | | | | |
| BELTED CRUISERS. | | | | |
|Immortalité | 5,000 | 8,500 | 18.0 | 302,920 | 2 22-ton, 10 6-in. |
|Aurora | 5,000 | 8,500 | 18.0 | 308,585 | 2 22-ton, 10 6-in. |
|Australia | 5,000 | 8,500 | 18.0 | 290,613 | 2 9.2-in., 10 6-in.|
|Galatea | 5,000 | 8,500 | 18.0 | 290,300 | 2 9.2-in., 10 6-in.|
|Narcissus | 5,000 | 8,500 | 18.0 | 290,751 | 2 9.2-in., 10 6 in.|
|Orlando | 5,000 | 8,500 | 18.0 | 299,905 | 2 9.2-in., 10 6-in.|
|Undaunted | 5,000 | 8,500 | 18.0 | 299,525 | 2 9.2-in., 10 6-in.|
| | | | | | |
| PARTIALLY PROTECTED | | | | |
| CRUISERS. | | | | |
|Mersey | 3,500 | 6,000 | 18.0 | 236,435 | 2 8-in., 10 6 in. |
|Severn | 3,500 | 6,000 | 18.0 | 234,282 | 2 8-in., 10 6-in. |
|Thames | 3,500 | 5,700 | 18.0 | 227,980 | 2 8-in., 10 6-in. |
|Forth | 3,500 | 5,700 | 18.0 | 221,913 | 2 8-in., 10 6-in. |
+------------+--------+--------+-------+----------+--------------------+

In the notes upon the next chapter, additional data referring to
gun-boats and torpedo-boats will be found.

THE FRENCH NAVY.

BY SIR EDWARD J. REED.

We have now to pass under review that vast array of naval
constructions which the Continental navies of Europe offer to our
observation.

It is not at all surprising that the introduction of steam-engines,
of iron and steel hulls, and of armor-plating has been attended
throughout Europe by even greater diversity of thought and practice
than has characterized our naval progress—“our progress” here
signifying that of both the United States and Great Britain. And this
may, I think, truthfully be said without in any degree neglecting the
striking originality of the American Monitors, to which I endeavored
to do justice.

As regards two of the three great changes just adverted to, the only
differences of opinion that have arisen have been in the nature
of competitions rather than of conflicts. No one, so far as I am
aware, has ever proposed to revert to sail-power or to wooden hulls
in important ships-of-war. On the contrary, the powers have been in
continual competition in the effort to reduce the weights of the
hulls of war-ships (apart from armor) by the extended use, first of
iron, and afterwards of steel, and to apply the savings of weight
thus effected to the development of engine-power, speed, and steaming
endurance. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that the
development of armor has been pursued with less constancy and less
earnestness, the result being that marked contrasts are exhibited by
European navies.

It may be said, with little or no qualification, that all other
European naval powers followed, in the first place, the example set
by the late Emperor Napoleon III., in _La Gloire_, by covering the
whole of the exposed part of the war-ship’s hull with armor-plating.
All the early iron-clads of Russia, Italy, Austria, and Germany were
protected from stem to stern, and from a few feet below water to
the upper deck. England did the same in the cases of a few ships,
although she began, as we saw before, with the _Warrior_ type, in
which the armor was limited to the central part of the ship. But the
system of completely covering the exposed ship with armor has now
entirely and properly passed away from European practice, and has
been succeeded by varied arrangements of armor.

The importance of giving effectual protection to the hull “between
wind and water,” as it is called (signifying from a few feet
below the water-line to a few feet above that line), has been
steadily recognized by Continental governments, with but the rarest
exceptions. Nothing corresponding to that wholesale abandonment of
armor for about a hundred feet at each end of the ship which has been
practised in the British ships of the _Inflexible_ and _Admiral_
types is displayed in the line-of-battle ships of the Continent. In
France, indeed, two such ships were laid down under some temporary
influence, _viz._, the _Brennus_ and the _Charles Martel_, but they
appear to have soon fallen under suspicion, and there has not been,
to my knowledge, any great disposition to complete them for service.
A return made by the Admiralty to the order of the House of Commons
has been printed, and says of the _Brennus_ and _Charles Martel_:
“Though these vessels still appear in the list of the French navy,
but little money has been voted for their construction in 1886, and
all work on them is now reported to have been stopped.” I know not
what significance is to be attached to the fact, but I observe that
these two ships were omitted altogether from the iron-clad ships
of France published so recently as May, 1886, in the _Universal
Register_ of shipping, which _Lloyd’s Register_ Committee “believe
will be found the most complete list that has yet been published.”
It seems not improbable, therefore, that the dangerous system of
exposing two-thirds of the ship’s length to destruction from all
kinds and every system of naval guns, even the smallest, which
prevailed in the British navy for more than twelve years, and which
has now happily been superseded in the powerful new ships _Nile_ and
_Trafalgar_, obtained but little more than momentary approval in
France, and is likely to have led to the condemnation of the only two
ships in which it was attempted—a result which is creditable alike
to French science and to French sagacity.

In Italy the _Inflexible_ system (which has met in France with the
fate we have just seen) obtained temporary favor, and was adopted
in the _Duilio_ and the _Dandolo_, two very large ships, of 11,000
tons each, of a speed exceeding fifteen knots, and each carrying
four 100-ton guns in turrets. Although these ships are 340 feet in
length, even the armored belt amidships (if “belt” in any sense so
short a strip of armor may be called[22]) is but 107 feet long,
leaving therefore 233 feet of the ship at the ends wholly devoid
of water-line protection. As the author of the “citadel system,” I
cannot regard such an arrangement as this as a fair and reasonable
embodiment of it, the discrepancy between the armored and unarmored
portions being greater in these two ships than even in the _Ajax_
and _Agamemnon_, which are perhaps the worst examples of the abuse
of the citadel system in the British navy. It is to the credit of
the Italian government that ships of this type were not repeated in
their navy; and it is but right to point out that there were excuses
(which probably ranked in the minds of the designers as _reasons_)
for a more extreme proportionate limitation of the citadels being
adopted in the _Duilio_ and _Dandolo_ than in the _Ajax_ and
_Agamemnon_. Among these were the possession by the Italian ships of
heavier armaments, and of far greater steam-power and speed than the
British ships possessed—a matter to which further reference will be
made hereafter—and probably, also, the adoption of somewhat finer
water-lines as a means of attaining the superior speed.

In this connection it may be well to observe that the question of
leaving so-called armored line-of-battle ships without armor at
the extremities is first one of principle, and afterwards one of
degree. The principle (which should be observed in the design of
every armored vessel which is intended for the line of battle, or
for those close and severe contests of ship with ship which will
probably supersede in a great degree the system of fighting in lines
of battle) is this: the proportion which the armored citadel bears to
the unarmored ends must always be such as to enable the ship to keep
afloat all the time the armor itself holds out against the attack of
the enemy; so that injuries to the unarmored ends, however great or
multiplied, shall not alone suffice to destroy the ship. Whatever
may occur in the future to interfere with the application of this
principle—and I do not deny that such interferences may arise under
certain perfectly conceivable circumstances—nothing has yet happened
to justify its abandonment, or to even justify the remotest chance of
its being violated.

If a ship is not intended to close with an enemy, or to fight her
anyhow and anywhere on the open sea—which certainly has been
the dominant idea of the British navy, in so far as its great
line-of-battle ships are concerned—if, for example, a combination of
immense speed with one or two extremely powerful and well-protected
guns should serve a particular object better than a slower and more
fully protected ship would serve it—then even great destructibility
in the ship itself may justifiably be incurred. But for general
naval service, and in every case in which a ship is intended to
accept battle with a powerful antagonist and fight it out, or to
force an action when she encounters such an enemy, it cannot be wise
to leave her so exposed that that enemy may almost certainly sink
her or cause her to capsize by merely pouring any kind of shot or
shell into her unarmored parts. But even the observance of the above
general principle is not alone all that is desirable in armored
line-of-battle ships. It is not well to leave even so much of the
ends of such ships wholly exposed as may lead to the speedy loss in
action of her steaming or steering powers. The armor-belt should be
of sufficient length to fairly guarantee the ship against prompt
disablement in action, and to do this it must be carried very much
nearer to the bow and stern than it has been in the cases of the
Italian ships (_Duilio_ and _Dandolo_) now under notice.

On the other hand, where ships are formed with fine water-lines,
and the two opposite sides are consequently very near to each other
for many feet, it is quite unnecessary to cover them with armor.
The buoyancy comprised between the two sides aft such parts is very
small, and consequently penetration can let but little water into
the ship, and do but little harm. It is a matter for the exercise of
professional judgment where to draw the line between the armored and
the unarmored parts. In the new British ships _Nile_ and _Trafalgar_,
which have excited great admiration in England, there are about sixty
feet of length at each end left without armor, and as the ships have
fine lines, but are nevertheless of considerable breadth at sixty
feet from the ends, it seems probable that good judgment has been
shown by their designers in this matter.

I have discussed this question at some length because it is one of
primary consideration in the design of important armored ships, and
because the abandonment of a long belt of armor is also one of the
few features of construction respecting which the designers of the
Continent have steadfastly refrained from following the example set
by the Admiralty Office at Whitehall from the years 1870 to 1885.
It will complete the consideration of this branch of the subject to
say that there are numerous ships of the iron-clad type in foreign
navies in which the armor (justifiably, as has just been shown)
stops somewhat short of the ends, but very few indeed in which the
length of the unarmored parts exceeds that of the armored. Among
the last named may be mentioned a very questionable class of vessels
(_Sachsen_ type) in the German navy, and a much smaller sea-going
vessel belonging to the Argentine Republic, named the _Almirante
Brown_, which is a well-designed vessel in other respects, but which,
on account of her long defenceless bow and stern, would do better to
avoid than to fight an enemy.[23]

Having now dealt with the primary question of the defence of ships by
means of armor-belts, we come to the greater or less defence bestowed
upon them above water. The course taken by the French designers, when
the increased thickness of armor made it impossible to repeat the
complete protection adopted in _La Gloire_ and her compeers, was in
some few cases that of belting the ship with armor, and giving great
“tumble home” to the sides above water, excepting at the central
armored battery, thus allowing that battery to project, and its guns
to fire directly ahead and astern, past the inwardly inclined sides.
This system has been strikingly carried out in the two sister ships
_Courbet_ and _Dévastation_, the former of which is shown, stem on,
in the cut on page 75, which is engraved from a photograph taken
after her launch, and before she began to receive her armor-plating.
A representation of the sister vessel, _Dévastation_ (forming one
of the series of engravings given in this chapter from drawings
specially executed for the purpose by Chevalier De Martino), forms
our illustration on page 73.

But generally in the French navy, and in nearly all but its earliest
ships, direct head and stern fire has been obtained by means of
elevated and projecting towers, armor-plated to a sufficient
height to protect the gun machinery, but with the guns themselves
unprotected, and firing _en barbette_. In the case of the two ships
_Dévastation_ and _Courbet_ the main-deck projecting battery carries
four guns, each commanding a full quadrant of a circle. The barbette
batteries, standing up above the upper deck, carry a powerful gun on
each side of the ship, with great range of fire.

[Illustration: THE “DEVASTATION:” FRENCH ARMORED SHIP OF THE FIRST
CLASS.]

Having given these general indications of the system of attack and
defence adopted in the French navy—by far the most important of all
the Continental navies—it now becomes desirable to go more into
particulars. It is not necessary to dwell upon the early iron-clads
of France. The _Gloire_ and a dozen others of like character were all
built of wood, without water-tight bulkheads, without rams or spurs,
with armor-plates from four to six inches thick only, and with guns
of small calibre and power. They may be left out of consideration in
dealing with the present French navy. They were followed by six other
vessels, also built of wood, but with upper works of iron, _viz._,
the _Océan_, _Marengo_, _Suffren_, _Richelieu_, _Colbert_, _Trident_.
They were armored with plates of a maximum thickness of 8½ inches,
and carried four guns of 10¾ inches calibre, weighing 23 tons each,
with four 16-ton guns, and half a dozen light ones. They varied in
some particulars, ranging in tonnage from 7000 to 8000 tons, in
horse-power from 3600 to 4600, and in speed from 13 to 14½ knots. The
_Friedland_ is another vessel which is frequently classed with the
previous six ships, the largest of which she generally resembles,
but she is built of iron, and carries eight 23-ton guns, and none
of the 16-ton. A committee which sat in 1879, and which had for its
president and vice-presidents men no less eminent than the late M.
Gambetta and MM. Albert Grévy and Jules Ferry, pronounced these
seven ships to be the strongest armored ships of the French navy
then in service. Such great advances have since been made, however,
that it is only necessary to add respecting these vessels that they
were nearly all single-screw ships, and that they carried their
principal armament at broadside ports on the main-deck, and in raised
barbette towers placed at the four corners of the central battery.
The _Richelieu_ was the largest of these vessels.

[Illustration: THE “COURBET” (FORMERLY THE “FOUDROYANT”): FRENCH
ARMORED SHIP OF THE FIRST CLASS.]

Not one of the foregoing French ships of the early period conformed
to conditions which were laid down officially in 1872 as those
requisite for first-class French iron-clads, _viz._, that they should
be constructed of iron (or steel), with water-tight compartments,
be armored with plates 12 inches thick, with decks from 2 to 2½
inches thick, armed with guns of 24 centimetres calibre, commanding
certain prescribed ranges of fire, and furnished with spurs or ram
stems. There were, however, four ships then under construction or
trial which did conform to the prescribed conditions, _viz._, the two
already spoken of—the _Courbet_ and _Dévastation_, and two others
named the _Redoutable_ and the _Amiral Duperré_. With these powerful
ships may be said to have commenced the era of iron and steel
line-of-battle ships in France. We will now bring them, together with
still more recent French ships of the first class, into a table in
which their particulars may be conveniently grouped.

TABLE A.—MODERN FRENCH ARMORED SHIPS OF THE FIRST CLASS.[24]

Part 1 of 2
+----------------+---------+---------+--------+---------+----------+
| |Displace-|Indicated| Speed | | |
| NAME OF SHIP. | ment | Horse- | in | Length. | Breadth. |
| | in tons.| power. | Knots. | | |
| | | [25] | [25] | | |
+----------------+---------+---------+--------+---------+----------+
| | | | | Feet. | Feet. |
| Amiral Baudin | 11,200 | 8,320 | 15 | 319 | 70 |
| Amiral Duperré | 10,300 | 8,120 | 14.2 | 319 | 70 |
| Dévastation | 9,900 | 8,320 | 14.5 | 312 | 69.8 |
| | | | | | |
| Formidable | 11,260 | 8,320 | 15 | 319 | 70 |
| Foudroyant }| 9,500 | 8,200 | 15 | 311 | 69.8 |
| (now Courbet)}| | | | | |
| Hoche | 10,480 | 5,500 | 14 | 329 | 66 |
| Magenta | 10,480 | 5,500 | 14 | 329 | 66 |
| Marceau | 10,480 | 5,500 | 14 | 329 | 66 |
| Neptune | 10,480 | 5,500 | 14 | 329 | 66 |
| Redoutable | 9,030 | 6,000 | 14.2 | 312 | 64.6 |
| | | | | | |
| Caïman | 7,200 | 4,800 | 14 | 271 | 59 |
| Furieux | 5,700 | 3,400 | 12 | 248 | 59 |
| Indomptable | 7,200 | 4,800 | 14 | 271 | 59 |
| Requin | 7,200 | 6,000 | 14.5 | 271 | 59 |
| Terrible | 7,200 | 4,800 | 14 | 271 | 59 |
| Tonnant | 4,707 | 1,750 | 10 | 248 | 58.4 |
+----------------+---------+---------+--------+---------+----------+

Part 2 of 2
+----------------+---------+-----------+----------------+
| | Draught | Maximum | Heaviest Guns |
| NAME OF SHIP. | of | Thickness | carried. |
| | Water. | of Armor. | |
+----------------+---------+-----------+----------------+
| | Feet. | Inches. | |
| Amiral Baudin | 25.8 | 22 | 3 of 75 tons. |
| Amiral Duperré | 25.8 | 22 | 4 ” 48 ” |
| Dévastation | 25.5 | 15 | {4 ” 48 ” |
| | | | {4 ” 28 ” |
| Formidable | 25.8 | 22 | 3 ” 75 ” |
| Foudroyant }| 25.5 | 15 | {4 ” 48 ” |
| (now Courbet)}| | | {4 ” 28 ” |
| Hoche | 26.5 | 17.7 | 4 ” 52 ” |
| Magenta | 26.5 | 17.7 | 4 ” 52 ” |
| Marceau | 26.5 | 17.7 | 4 ” 52 ” |
| Neptune | 26.5 | 17.7 | 4 ” 52 ” |
| Redoutable | 24.4 | 14 | {4 ” 28 ” |
| | | | {4 ” 24 ” |
| Caïman | 23 | 17.5 | 2 ” 48 ” |
| Furieux | 21.4 | 17.5 | 2 ” 48 ” |
| Indomptable | 22.8 | 19.5 | 2 ” 75 ” |
| Requin | 22.8 | 19.5 | 2 ” 75 ” |
| Terrible | 22.8 | 19.5 | 2 ” 75 ” |
| Tonnant | 17.3 | 17.5 | 2 ” 48 ” |
+----------------+---------+-----------+----------------+

The ship which alphabetically falls last in this table among the
ships of 9000 tons and upwards, the _Redoutable_, came first in point
of time, _viz._, in 1872, and her design marked the commencement of
the new era in French iron-clad construction. One of the features
of the change was, as already intimated, the abandonment of wooden
hulls, which we had succeeded in accomplishing in England eight years
before. The first design proposed by myself to the British Admiralty
provided for an iron hull, and although the force of circumstances
compelled us to construct my earliest war-vessels in timber, yet so
strongly averse were we to the employment of so perishable a material
as wood within an iron casing that Admiral Sir R. Spencer Robinson
succeeded in preventing the construction of three out of five wooden
line-of-battle armored ships that had previously been proposed by the
government of the day, and sanctioned by Parliament. This was in
1863 or 1864, the _Lord Clyde_ and _Lord Warden_ being the last large
armored wooden ships laid down in her Majesty’s dockyards.

[Illustration: THE “RICHELIEU.”]

The French delayed the change for some years, as we see. M. De Bussy,
the designer of the _Redoutable_, and a most accomplished naval
constructor, built a very large part of the ship of steel, and by
so doing brought the French dockyards into early acquaintance with
the superiority of that material to iron for constructive purposes.
The _Redoutable_ has armor of more than 14 inches in thickness upon
her belt, and of 9½ inches upon her central battery. She carries
eight 25-ton guns[26]—four in her central battery, two in barbette
half-towers, and two on revolving platforms at the bow and stern
respectively. She also carries eight light 5½-inch guns. This ship
generally resembles her successors, the _Dévastation_ and the
_Foudroyant_ (by the same designer), in so far as that her batteries
fire past sides, with great tumble home.

Lord Brassey (in this respect somewhat erroneously following Mr.
King, of the United States navy, in his able work upon “The War-ships
and Navies of the World”), says, “The faculty of firing parallel to
the line of keel is secured in the French ship by the tumble home of
the ship’s sides, and not by the projection of the battery beyond
them, as in the English vessel (the _Audacious_).” It is difficult
to understand what this means, because it is obviously only by the
projection of the battery beyond the sides of the ship which are
before and after it that fore and aft fire can be obtained from the
battery in either case. But it is not true that the battery of the
_Audacious_, any more than the battery of the _Redoutable_, projects
beyond the breadth of the ship at the water-line, which would seem
to be what is intended, and Lord Brassey may assure himself of
the fact by looking at Plate III. of his own work on “The British
Navy,” from which the above words are quoted. The _Redoutable_ is a
full-rigged ship, and nevertheless steams 14¼ knots per hour. There
is one particular in which the _Dévastation_ and the _Foudroyant_,
like her as they are in general design, differ materially from the
_Redoutable_. I refer to the armament. The former two ships each
carry four 34-centimetre 48-ton guns in the main-deck battery, in
lieu of the four 25-ton guns of the _Redoutable_.

The _Amiral Duperré_ (designed by M. Sabattier, the able French
chief constructor) claims a few words, as she differs materially
in type from the three ships just discussed. She has a complete
belt of very thick armor from stem to stern—greatest thickness 22
inches, tapering to 10 inches at the extremities, with a thick deck
(2 inches) at the top of the belt in the usual manner. But above
this belt there is no armored main-deck battery, as in the other
ships, the chief armament, of four 48-ton guns, being carried in four
elevated barbette towers, two of which are well forward, and project
considerably to enable their guns to act efficiently as bow-chasers,
and at the same time to command all round the broadside and right
astern. To facilitate this the sides of the ship have great tumble
home. The other two towers are situated at the middle line of the
ship, one near the stern, and the other farther forward, between the
main and the mizzen masts. The main-deck, although without armor
defence, is not without armament, as it carries fourteen 5½-inch
60-pounder rifled breech-loaders. Other particulars of the _Amiral
Duperré_ are given in the table, and on page 81 is a view of her,
engraved from a photograph with which I have been favored by a French
officer.

It will be observed from her description that the most characteristic
feature of this great ship of more than 10,000 tons is the absence
of any guns protected by armor. The barbette towers, it is true,
are armored with 12-inch plates, and the main-deck guns are under
the protection of the thin plating of the ship’s side, which latter
is of little or no avail, however, against the armament of other
first-class ships. Practically the whole of the _Duperré’s_ guns are
unprotected. It may be added that during the discussions in London
upon the “ships armored in places” an attempt was made to show that
the _Duperré_, owing to her alleged small initial stability, was as
devoid of stability when injured above the belt as certain vessels of
the British _Admiral_ class when injured before and abaft the belt—a
statement which I distrust, as I regard it as a mere inference from
an experiment which I believe to be delusive. At the same time, the
_Duperré_ would have been the better for more initial stability.

[Illustration: THE “AMIRAL DUPERRÉ:” FRENCH ARMORED SHIP OF THE FIRST
CLASS.]

But it is obvious that all belted or partially belted vessels, in
which the belt is carried but a small height above the water for
the size of the ship, must run the risk of losing both buoyancy and
stability very soon if even moderately inclined in or after battle,
seeing that, with a moderate inclination only, the entire armor-belt
on the depressed side of the ship must disappear beneath the sea’s
surface. The strenuous assertion of this source of danger, although
it could not lead to much increase in the stability of the existing
armored ships, has produced as one effect the busy and earnest
efforts which both English and French constructors have been recently
making to subdivide their ships _above the armor_ into as many
water-tight compartments as possible, and to stuff these compartments
as full as possible of buoyant (or at least of water-excluding)
materials. The necessity for resorting to this device, however, in
first-class ships of nine, ten, or eleven thousand tons displacement,
and of something approaching to five million dollars each in value,
is not a thing for either French or English naval constructors to
be proud of. But the assertion of the danger in question has had in
England the further and very satisfactory result of bringing much
more trustworthy ships, like the _Nile_ and _Trafalgar_, into being,
and of insuring the determined support of these ships in Parliament
whenever those who foolishly confound mere cheapness with merit in
such constructions seek to interfere with the progress of these
magnificent vessels.

Two other powerful ships of the French navy, closely resembling the
_Amiral Duperré_, are the _Amiral Baudin_ and the _Formidable_. They
are of 3¼ feet more beam than the _Duperré_ (and therefore probably
have much larger stability), and their displacement exceeds hers by
900 tons. Their armaments chiefly differ from hers in the employment
of three guns of 75 tons each in their towers, in lieu of the four
guns of 48 tons of the _Duperré_. The _Neptune_, _Hoche_, _Magenta_,
and _Marceau_ are four other powerful ships, as will have been seen
from Table A, the principal armament of each consisting of four guns
of 52 tons, carried in towers, with the exception of the _Hoche_,
which has two of her four principal guns of 28 tons each only.

Incidental mention has already been made on page 76 of two ships,
the _Caïman_ and _Indomptable_, which, although of only 7200 tons,
carry very thick armor (19½ inches), and as a matter of fact carry
also guns of the heaviest type (75-ton). There are two other vessels
of the same description, the _Terrible_ and _Requin_. Careful note
should be taken of these four steel-built vessels, which add greatly
to the power of France. Each carries two of the very powerful guns
just mentioned, and steams at a speed of 14½ knots. In the same
category of thickly armored ships the French have yet one other ship,
the _Furieux_, of 5560 tons. Her armor is 17½ inches thick in places,
and she is armed with two 48-ton guns. Her speed is 12 knots. The
_Tonnant_ has the same armor and armament, but she is of nearly 1000
tons less displacement, drawing much less water, and steaming only at
10 knots per hour.

We may sum up the facts relating to the larger class of French
iron-clads which still rank among the efficient ships of 7000 tons
and upward by saying that, in addition to the sixteen ships of which
the particulars are given in Table A, there are on the efficient list
the _Colbert_, _Friedland, arengo_, _Océan_, _Richelieu_, _Suffren_,
_Trident_, _Savoie_, _Revanche_, _Surveillante_, and _Héroïne_, most
of which have been previously described in general terms, and the
remainder of which are of less than 6000 tons, and were built chiefly
of wood many years ago.

The French navy further comprises thirteen armor-plated cruisers, of
which four have lately been dropped out of some official lists. Of
the remaining nine, four are modern vessels, and all of about equal
size and power. These are the _Duguesclin_, _Vauban_, _Bayard_, and
_Turenne_; but of these, while the first two are built of steel,
the last two are built of wood, with iron topsides, as are all the
remaining five vessels of this class. The subjoined table will
indicate the inferior character of most of the vessels of this type:

TABLE B.—FRENCH ARMORED CRUISERS.

Part 1 of 2
+-----------------+---------+---------+--------+---------+----------+
| |Displace-|Indicated| Speed | | |
| NAME OF SHIP. | ment | Horse- | in | Length. | Breadth. |
| | in tons.| power. | Knots. | | |
+-----------------+---------+---------+--------+---------+----------+
| | Tons. | | Knots. | Feet. | Feet. |
| Bayard | 5900 | 4560 | 14.5 | 266 | 57.2 |
| Duguesclin | 5900 | 4000 | 14 | 266 | 57.2 |
| Turenne | 5900 | 4250 | 14.2 | 266 | 57.2 |
| Vauban | 5900 | 4000 | 14 | 266 | 57.2 |
| La Galissonière | 4700 | 2370 | 13 | 256 | 49 |
| Triomphante | 4700 | 2400 | 12.8 | 256 | 49 |
| Victorieuse | 4600 | 2210 | 12.7 | 256 | 49 |
| Reine Blanche | 3620 | 1860 | 11.8 | 230 | 46.2 |
| Thetis | 3620 | 1860 | 12 | 230 | 46.2 |
+-----------------+---------+---------+--------+---------+----------+

Part 2 of 2
+-----------------+---------+-----------+---------------+
| | Draught | Maximum | Heaviest Guns |
| NAME OF SHIP. | of | Thickness | carried. |
| | Water. | of Armor. | |
+-----------------+---------+-----------+---------------+
| | Feet. | Inches | |
| Bayard | 23 3 | 10 | 4 of 16 tons. |
| Duguesclin | 23.3 | 10 | 4 ” 16 ” |
| Turenne | 23.3 | 10 | 4 ” 16 ” |
| Vauban | 23.3 | 10 | 4 ” 16 ” |
| La Galissonière | 23 | 6 | 6 ” 16 ” |
| Triomphante | 23 | 6 | 6 ” 16 ” |
| Victorieuse | 23 | 6 | 6 ” 16 ” |
| Reine Blanche | 21.8 | 6 | 6 ” 8 ” |
| Thetis | 21.8 | 6 | 6 ” 8 ” |
+-----------------+---------+-----------+---------------+

Of the above ships it may be remarked that the _Thetis_ and _Reine
Blanche_ have been nearly twenty years afloat, the _Galissonière_ was
launched in 1872, the _Victorieuse_ in 1875, and the _Triomphante_
in 1877. The remainder of the nine, as previously stated, are modern
vessels, the _Duguesclin_ being not yet completed. The _Duguesclin_
and her sister ships are of the _Duperré_ type, much reduced in
dimensions.

There are nine completed coast-guard iron-clads and eight armored
gun-boats in the French navy, as follows:

TABLE C.—FRENCH IRON-CLAD COAST-GUARD VESSELS.

+---------------+-----------+--------+---------+-------------+
| NAME OF SHIP. | Displace- | Speed. | Maximum | Principal |
| | ment. | | Armor. | Guns. |
+---------------+-----------+--------+---------+-----+-------+
| | Tons. | Knots. | Inches. | No. | Tons. |
| Fulminant | 5600 | 13.22 | 13 | 2 | 28 |
| Tonnerre | 5700 | 14 | 13 | 2 | 28 |
| Tempête | 4523 | 12 | 13 | 2 | 28 |
| Vengeur | 4523 | 10.8 | 13 | 2 | 48 |
| Bélier | 3600 | 12.3 | 8.5 | 2 | 16 |
| Bouledogue | 3800 | 12.25 | 8.5 | 2 | 16 |
| Cerbère | 3800 | 11.4 | 8.5 | 2 | 16 |
| Taureau | 2700 | 13 | 6 | 1 | 23 |
| Tigre | 3500 | 13.5 | 8.5 | 2 | 16 |
+---------------+-----------+--------+---------+-----+-------+

TABLE D.—FRENCH IRON-CLAD GUN-BOATS.

+-------------------+-----------+--------+---------+-------------+
| NAME OF SHIP. | Displace- | Speed. | Maximum | Principal |
| | ment. | | Armor. | Guns. |
+-------------------+-----------+--------+---------+-----+-------+
| | Tons. | Knots. | Inches. | No. | Tons. |
| { Achéron | 1639 | 13 | 8 | 1 | 28 |
| First { Cocyte | 1639 | 13 | 8 | 1 | 28 |
| Class.{ Phlegéton | 1639 | 13 | 8 | 1 | 28 |
| { Styx | 1639 | 13 | 8 | 1 | 28 |
| | | | | | |
| { Flamme | 1045 | 13 | 8 | 1 | 16 |
| Second{ Fusée | 1045 | 13 | 8 | 1 | 16 |
| Class.{ Mitraille | 1045 | 13 | 8 | 1 | 16 |
| { Grenade | 1045 | 13 | 8 | 1 | 16 |
+-------------------+-----------+--------+---------+-----+-------+

The vessels in the tables C and D are all revolving-turret vessels,
with the exception of the _Taureau_ and of the four second-class
gun-boats, which fire their guns _en barbette_. They embrace very
different types of construction, involving different degrees of
sea-worthiness—very low degrees in some of them, I fear. With the
exception of the _Tempête_, they are all furnished with twin screws.
The _Fulminant_, _Tonnerre_, _Tempête_, and _Vengeur_, in Table C,
and the whole of the vessels in Table D (as yet incomplete), are
of iron or of steel, or of the two combined; the remainder have
hulls principally built of wood. I have chosen for illustration the
turret-vessel _Vengeur_, as seen on page 87, which has been engraved
from a photograph sent to me by a naval friend in France.

We come now to the unarmored ships of France, and as in writing of
these I purpose accepting the official classifications adopted in
France, which are not identical with those employed in England, it
may be well to repeat here a caution which the British Admiralty
has given in a memorandum prefixed to a recent “return” of theirs
“showing the fleets of England, France, Russia, Germany, Italy,
Austria, and Greece.” The caution is to the effect that France
includes under the heading of “cruisers” vessels of about similar
value to the larger class of English sloops, which are excluded from
the English “cruiser” class. But I regret the necessity of observing
that the Admiralty officers, while careful to put this explanation
well forward, appear to be equally careful to withhold an explanation
of much greater moment concerning three French cruisers of large size
and of greater importance—withheld in pursuance, apparently, and as
I have most reluctantly come to fear, of an uncandid, and indeed of
a misleading spirit, which seems to have taken possession of some
persons who have to do with the preparation of Admiralty returns to
Parliament. The exercise of this spirit has forced me ere now to draw
the attention of Parliament to the matter, and in one instance to
have an official return, which contained erroneous and too favorable
classifications of British ships, withdrawn.

Any one referring to the Parliamentary return of British and foreign
fleets just adverted to will find under the heading of “Unarmored
Vessels Building” two large and remarkably fast steel cruisers, the
_Tage_ and the _Cécile_, the former of which exceeds 7000 tons in
displacement, while the latter approaches 6000 tons, and both of
which are to steam at the immense speed of 19 knots an hour, or a
knot in excess of the fastest armed vessel (neglecting torpedo craft)
in the British navy. These two French cruisers are respectively 390
and 380 feet in length, and are to be driven by over 10,000 indicated
horse-power in the _Tage_, and by nearly 10,000 indicated horse-power
in the _Cécile_. A third vessel, the _Sfax_, launched at Brest in
1884, of 4420 tons, 7500 indicated horse-power, and 16½ knots speed,
is also given without remark in the Parliamentary return as an
“unarmored” vessel. Now even this last-named vessel has a steel deck
one and three-fourths inches thick to protect her boilers, machinery,
and magazines, while the _Tage_ and _Cécile_ have such decks three
inches thick. These, being mere decks, do not, of course, remove
the ships out of the category of unarmored ships, and the return is
correct in this respect. But now in this same return all the British
ships provided with protecting decks of this character are kept out
of the lists of unarmored or “unprotected” vessels, and are classed
separately, and are described as “protected” vessels. And not only is
this true of vessels like the _Mersey_ class, which have such decks
two and one-half inches thick in places, but it is true likewise of
some twenty vessels, ranging, many of them, as low as 1420 tons in
displacement, and with decks and partial decks of less thickness than
that of the _Sfax_, the weakest of the three French ships in this
respect. In short, while the twenty-two English ships are withheld
from the category of unarmored ships, although every one of them is
inferior in protecting decks to the three French ships, the latter
are placed in the inferior category, and not a word of explanation
is offered to prevent the uninitiated and unsuspecting reader from
regarding as weaker than our vessels those French vessels which
are in fact the strongest and best protected. I must say that, as
an Englishman, I grieve to see returns to the British Parliament
made use of for the dissemination of information so misleading as
this; and I should do so if I could believe there was nothing but
official negligence involved; but I am sorry to say I cannot doubt
that had the mere reproduction of foreign classifications put three
of the very fastest and most important cruisers of our own navy, of
Admiralty origin, at the very great disadvantage to which the French
ships are put in this return, we should have had a very full and a
very prominent explanation of the seeming discrepancy given. It is
to the credit of _Lloyd’s Register_ office that what the Admiralty
Office failed to do in a paper issued at the end of July was properly
done in their _Universal Register_, published two or three months
earlier; for in the latter the three French ships are separately
detailed under the heading of “Deck-protected Cruisers.”

[Illustration: THE “VENGEUR:” FRENCH IRON-CLAD COAST-GUARD VESSEL.]

It is absolutely necessary to bring to light the matter just
explained, for otherwise the present state and the prospects of the
French navy cannot be properly understood, the _Tage_, _Cécile_, and
_Sfax_ being, on the whole, the most important of the French ships
which are without armor-belts. Two others there are, however, which
are weaker than the _Tage_ and _Sfax_ only in the fact of their being
without special deck protection. These are the _Duquesne_ and the
_Tourville_, two ships approximately alike in size and construction,
and both having their iron bottoms sheathed with two thicknesses of
wood and then coppered, after the manner introduced by myself in
H.M.S. _Inconstant_. Both of these French ships have attained 16-9/10
knots of speed. They are armed with seven guns of eight tons and
fourteen of three tons weight.

The remaining unarmored vessels of France must be rapidly summarized.
It is impossible to neglect in this case, as was done in my article
on the British navy, all the frigates, etc., which have frames of
timber, because to do this would be to omit all unarmored frigates of
the French navy except the _Duquesne_ and the _Tourville_, already
described. But it is not necessary to do more than name the _Venus_,
_Minerve_, and _Flora_, all launched prior to 1870, and all slow,
and to say that there remain but four unarmored wood frigates of 14
knots speed, of about 3400 tons, and armed with from two to four
guns of five tons, and eighteen to twenty-two guns of three tons.
These are _Aréthuse_, _Dubourdieu_, _Iphigénie_, and _Naïade_,
which, although wooden ships, have all been launched since 1881—the
_Dubourdieu_ in 1884. Of French first-class cruisers which do not
rank as frigates (having no main-deck batteries) there are nine in
number, all built of wood except one, the _Duguay-Trouin_, which is
the fastest of them all, steaming at 15-9/10 knots. This vessel has
3300 tons displacement, and is armed with five guns of eight tons and
five of three tons. None of the remaining eight exceed 2400 tons in
displacement, none exceed 15.3 knots in speed (but none are less than
14 knots), and each of them carries fifteen guns of three tons. Next
come thirteen second-class cruisers, ranging in displacement between
1540 and 2100 tons, and in speed between 11½ and 15 knots; they are
principally armed with 3-ton guns. There is another vessel, the
_Rapide_, in this class, but I only know of her that her tonnage is
1900 tons. Of cruisers of the third class there are fifteen, ranging
from 1000 to 1400 tons, and principally armed with 3-ton guns. Their
speeds vary from 10 to 13 knots; one, however, the _Hirondelle_,
steaming at 15½ knots. The French have likewise thirty-five vessels,
“avisos,” etc., of which about one-half are from 1400 to 1600 tons,
and the remainder are from 720 to 1000 tons. About six of them
reach or approach 13 knots, but most of them range between 10 and
11 knots, some of them falling as low as 8 knots. I have further to
make mention of two very fast vessels—for they are to steam 19½
knots—now under construction, named the _Surcoup_ and the _Forbin_,
each of 1850 tons, and each armed with two 3-ton guns. There is
also a vessel of 1540 tons, named the _Milan_, which steams 18
knots, and is armed with five very light (24-cwt.) guns. The French
navy possesses also ninety-nine vessels, most of them carrying guns
(many of 3 tons, some of 5 tons, and one or two of 8 tons), and also
twenty-eight steam transports, varying in size from 1200 to nearly
6000 tons, the largest of them, the _Nive_ (of 5680 tons), steaming
14 knots.

The navies of Europe, including the British navy, have undergone of
late considerable expansion in respect of their very fast unarmored
steel vessels, the designing and successful construction of which
have been brought about by improvements in the quality of ship
steel and in steam-machinery, notably as regards the latter, by the
employment of “forced draught.”[27] These are called torpedo-vessels,
as distinct from torpedo-boats. There are in process of completion
for the British navy eight of 1630 tons (the _Archer_ class), each
carrying six 6-inch 5-ton guns, and estimated to steam with forced
draught from 16 to 17 knots; two of 1430 tons each (_Scout_ class),
carrying four 5-inch 2-ton guns, with an estimated maximum speed
of 16 knots; and two of 785 tons (_Curlew_ class), called “gun and
torpedo” vessels; speed, 15 knots; armament, one 6-inch 89-cwt.
and three 5-inch 36-cwt. guns. There is also a class of “torpedo
gun-boats” (the official designation, but not one which expresses any
very manifest distinction from the last-named class), which are of
a very notable character. This (the _Grasshopper_) class, of which
each vessel is of only 450 tons displacement, is to be supplied
with engines of 2700 indicated horse-power. The diagrams on page 90
exhibit the general form and particulars of these very remarkable
little vessels, which are expected to steam at fully 19 knots (22
miles) per hour. Against the above torpedo-vessels of the British
navy are to be set, in the French navy, four torpedo-cruisers of
1280 tons, 17 knots speed, carrying each five 4-inch guns; and eight
torpedo despatch-vessels, each of 320 tons, and designed to steam at
18 knots, carrying machine guns only; such machine guns being also
carried, of course, by all the fast torpedo-vessels and gun-boats,
both French and English, previously referred to, but in their cases
in conjunction with their other guns. These 320-ton torpedo-vessels
of France are to be driven by machinery of 1800 indicated horse-power.

[Illustration: BRITISH TORPEDO GUN-BOAT OF THE “GRASSHOPPER” CLASS
(SIDE VIEW).]

[Illustration: THE “GRASSHOPPER”—PLAN OF UPPER DECK, POOP, AND
FORECASTLE.]

It may be observed with regard to these small craft furnished with
such enormous steam-power (in proportion to their size and tonnage)
that there is much uncertainty as to the speeds which they will
attain. Not only are the builders without experience of similar
vessels by which to guide themselves, but where the proportion of
power to displacement is so great, slight differences both in hulls
and machinery, no less than in immersion and trim, may produce
unforeseen results. As designers who fail to realize promised speeds
are liable to be discredited, while those whose vessels surpass their
promised speeds may be unduly praised, it is but reasonable to expect
that the promised speeds will usually even be more than realized.
This has been the case with the _Bombe_, the first of the French
torpedo despatch-vessels which have been tried under steam, and
which, under the promise of 18 knots, realized no less than 19½ knots
on the measured mile. It should be added that all of these extremely
fast small craft in both navies are propelled by twin engines and
screws. As great public interest will be felt in the trials of these
very novel and special vessels—as mere steamers no less than as
war craft—it may be well to give their names, to facilitate their
identification hereafter.

ENGLISH TORPEDO GUN-BOATS: _Grasshopper_, _Rattlesnake_,
_Spider_, _Sandfly_—each having a displacement of 450 tons, 2700
horse-power, 200 feet length, 23 feet breadth, 8 feet draught, and
a speed estimated at 19 knots.

FRENCH TORPEDO DESPATCH-VESSELS: _Bombe_, _Couleuvrine_, _Dague_,
_Dragonne_, _Flèche_, _Lance_, _Saint-Barbe_, _Salve_—each having
a displacement of 320 tons, 1800 horse-power, 194.3 feet length,
21.4 feet breadth, 5.1 feet draught, and, with the exception of the
_Bombe_, a speed estimated at 18 knots. The actual speed of the
_Bombe_ is 19.5 knots.

Besides the above vessels, the two navies (English and French) are
provided as follows with torpedo-boats: The English have nine small
(56 feet long) and slow (14½ to 15 knots) of wood; fifty small
(60 to 66 feet long) and slow (15 to 16 knots) of steel; nineteen
others of greater length, but all less than 93 feet, and of speeds
varying from 16 to 19 knots; six of 100 to 113 feet, and 19 knots;
fifty-three of 125 feet in length, and 19 knots; and two building,
_viz._, one of 135 feet in length, and 22 knots, and one of 150
feet in length, and 20 knots; in all, one hundred and thirty-nine
torpedo-boats, of which the 135-feet boat carries four 3-pounder
quick-firing guns, and the 150-feet boat carries five 6-pounder guns
of that kind. The French have nine under 70 feet in length; forty-one
under 100 feet in length, steaming at 17 to 18 knots; eighteen of
108 feet in length, somewhat faster; nine of 113 feet in length,
steaming at 22 knots; and fifty-one of 114 feet in length, steaming
at 20 knots; in all, one hundred and twenty-eight torpedo-boats, all
armed with machine guns only. As the nine slow wooden boats of the
English navy can hardly be regarded as torpedo-boats at all, it may
be said that of torpedo-boats, built and building, the English have
one hundred and thirty, and the French one hundred and twenty-eight,
of which the English have seventy-nine completed, and fifty-one
building and completing, and the French have sixty-eight completed,
and sixty building and completing. The English navy is therefore
slightly, but only slightly, in advance of the French in the matter
of torpedo-boats proper, while in respect of extremely fast sea-going
torpedo-vessels of 320 and 450 tons respectively, the English have
three under construction and one completed, while the French have one
(the _Bombe_) completed and seven under construction.

NOTES.

Of the 150,000,000 francs appropriated in France this year for the
construction of war-ships nearly nine-tenths were set aside, not
for the building of large armored vessels, but for the following
fast cruisers and auxiliary classes: “Six cruisers, class I.,
30,000,000 francs; ten cruisers, class II., 26,000,000 francs; twenty
torpedo-catchers, 12,000,000 francs; fifty gun-boats, 15,000,000
francs; one hundred torpedo-boats, 25,000,000 francs; three
coast-defence vessels, 25,000,000 francs.”

Notwithstanding the late change in administration this seems to show
that the policy of Admiral Aube, referred to in the introductory
chapter, is still potent, and that the government believes the next
war with England will be carried on by French cruisers attacking
British commerce, and that sharp, destructive dashes will be made
against the enemy’s coast by ships with great speed, and such
sufficient power that “all of England’s littoral towns, fortified
and unfortified, whether purely peace establishments or warlike,”
will be burned or pitilessly ransomed. “In any future war,” continues
this exponent of the new ideas, “France will come down from the
heights of the cloudy sentimentality which has created that monstrous
association of words, _rights_ of war, and her attack on every source
of English riches will become not only legitimate but obligatory.”

It is certain that French naval activity is now mainly directed to
the construction of vessels just suited to these new theories. At
the same time she has a formidable fleet of heavily armored vessels,
a rough comparison with those of England being as follows, in the
classes which have over fifteen inches of armor protection and carry
guns above forty-three tons in weight:

Ships. Armor. No. Guns. Weight.
3 21½ inches 6 breech-loading rifles 75 tons.
5 20 ” 8 ” ” 75 ”
6 18 ” 8 ” ” 50 ”
2 15 ” 24 ” ” 48 ”
-- --
16 46

England has three ships with armor from twenty-four inches to
eighteen inches thick, and twelve ships with armor eighteen inches
thick; three ships carry six 110-ton guns, six carry twenty-four
67-ton guns, five carry sixteen 43-ton guns, all breech-loading
rifles, while one has four muzzle-loading 80-ton guns.

The latest additions to the armored fleet of France are the _Hoche_,
of the Marceau type of battle-ship, and the _Cocyte_ and _Mitraille_,
coast-defence gun-boats. The _Marceau_, launched May 24, 1887, is
built of steel with an under-water skin of iron; a double bottom
extends below the engines, boilers, and magazines, and the hold is
divided into thirty-one water-tight compartments by horizontal and
longitudinal bulkheads. The armor-belt encircles the ship, dips
forward to strengthen the ram, is carried twelve inches above the
load water-line, and varies in thickness from 13.7 to 17.7 inches;
the barbette towers are 15.7 inches thick, and the armored deck,
above which there are many compartments, is 2.6 inches thick. The
armament is made up of four 13-4/10-inch guns mounted in the towers,
of one 5½-inch gun at the bow, and of sixteen 5½-inch pieces in
broadside; the secondary battery includes twenty Hotchkiss guns and
four above-water torpedo tubes.

The estimated horse-power is 8548 (not 5500 as stated on page 76)
with natural draft, and 12,000 with forced draft, the estimated speed
being 16 knots, the coal capacity 800 tons, and the coal endurance
1500 miles at full power and 3500 miles at 11 knots speed. The
_Neptune_ and the _Hoche_, of the same general plans and dimensions,
were launched in the spring of this year. As originally designed
the _Hoche_ was expected to develop 16 knots and 7000 indicated
horse-power, but by the application of forced draft the speed was
increased to 17½ and the power to 12,000. The armament consists—not
of the four 52-ton guns given in the table on page 76—but, as stated
in the text, of two 13.4-inch guns (34 centimetre) mounted one in
each of the midship turrets, of two 10.6-inch guns (27 centimetre)
carried one in each of the waist turrets, and of eighteen 5.5-inch
guns (14 centimetre) so disposed in broadside within the unarmored
central superstructure which occupies the deck between the turrets
that the forward and after pairs are given bow and stern fire
respectively. The armor-belt is similar to that of the _Marceau_, but
the protective deck is from 3.15 to 3.54 inches thick, and the heavy
gun sites are protected by 15.75 inches of compound armor.

The _Amiral Courbet_ (formerly the _Foudroyant_) carries four
10.6-inch, six 5.5-inch, and twelve rapid-fire guns. She developed
6016 horse-power with natural and 8088 with forced draft, the mean
speed being 14.2 knots on a consumption of 2.35 pounds per power
each hour. The _Indomptable_, _Requin_, _Caïman_, and _Terrible_ are
sister battle-ships. They were originally laid down in 1877, and
the _Terrible_ was only completed ready for sea in 1887. They are
constructed like the _Marceau_, of iron and steel, the outer skin of
the under-water body being of the former metal; the compound armor
is from 13 to 19⅝ inches in thickness, and carries five feet of its
seven feet six inches width below the water-line. In each of two
pear-shaped barbette towers situated on the longitudinal midship
line, and protected by 17¾ inches of armor, a 16.5-inch gun, with
its axis twenty-one feet above the water is mounted; in addition
there are four 4-inch breech-loading rifles and a secondary battery
of rapid-fire guns and torpedo-tubes. The _Indomptable_, launched
in September, 1883, made in her trial trip in August, 1886, a speed
of 15 knots, and is officially rated as having a sea speed of
13.5 knots. All work upon the partially protected ships _Brennus_
and _Charles Martel_ was stopped in 1886, and their specific
appropriation has been transferred to the sum already assigned for
the construction of fast cruisers and torpedo-boats.

The _Cocyte_ and _Mitraille_ belong to a new class, or rather they
represent a type which, after disappearing for a season of doubt and
denial, has had its value so much recognized that three Continental
nations are giving it earnest study. A late French Minister of
Marine asked within a year for money to construct fifty of these
gun-boats, but was then refused the grant, a decision for which
Admiral Sir George Elliot thinks England ought to be very grateful.
This distinguished officer believes in the value of the type, and
hopes that the Admiralty “will take note of the threat thus made”
before the theory is allowed to prevail that adequate security can
be given to the British coasts by sea-going cruisers, submarine
mines, shore batteries, and torpedo-boats. The boats present a small
target, and give good armor protection to guns which, when the
vessels are inshore or reinforced by land batteries, have sufficient
power to keep battle-ships at a distance. They are very handy, have
good speed, and are economical, because for the same money they
can, as flotillas, bring into the action four times the gun-power
possible in the large battle-ships. In France this type is divided
into two classes—the _Achéron_, _Cocyte_, _Phlegéton_, and _Styx_,
of 1639 tons, belonging to the first, and the _Fusée_, _Grenade_,
_Mitraille_, and _Flamme_, of 1045 tons, to the second. The iron and
steel hulls are extensively subdivided into water-tight compartments,
and are protected by complete belts of steel armor at the water-line,
and by arched steel-armored decks. The superstructures above the
protective decks have water-line belts of cellulose. The armament
consists of one heavy gun mounted in a barbette tower, and of a
strong secondary battery of machine guns and torpedoes.

The most important contributions to the sea-going navy of France
are the cruisers. In the naval programme adopted after the war with
Germany, ships of high speed were decided to be of such great value
that thirty-four—sixteen of the first and eighteen of the second
class—were provided for. At the present day French naval policy
seems to pin its faith to fast cruisers, 5½-inch breech-loading guns,
and torpedo-vessels. In pursuance of this belief the _Tage_, the
largest unarmored cruiser yet designed by any nation, was laid down
in 1885; she is ship-rigged, has a complete under-water curved deck,
lightly armored bulkheads forward and abaft the battery, a steel
conning-tower, and heavily plated hatchways. A belt of cellulose
along the water-line, and the subdivision of the space above the
protective deck into water-tight compartments, will, it is claimed,
insure the safety of the ship in action. This employment of cellulose
to stop leaks automatically was very successfully demonstrated in
the experiments made at Toulon with a target “composed of fourteen
parts of cellulose and one part of cellulose in fibre, the whole
compressed into a felt-like mass, with a lining two feet thick. A
shot seven and one-half inches in calibre was fired against this
target at a distance to insure penetration. The result was not only
satisfactory but extraordinary. The shot, which carried away about
one-fifth of a cubic foot of the composition, had no sooner passed
through than the cellulose closed up so firmly that a strong man was
unable to insert his arm into the hole. A tank filled with water was
then hung against the place where the shot had entered, and after an
interval of fifteen minutes water began to trickle through, but not
more than a man with a bucket could easily intercept. As soon as the
composition became thoroughly soaked, it offered increased resistance
to the entrance of the water, which eventually ceased to flow, and
the breach was closed automatically. The results were the same where
shells were used instead of shot, and red-hot coals were heaped upon
the composition without causing its ignition.”[28]

The twin-screw cruiser _Cecile_, which was designed before the
_Tage_, and is somewhat smaller, illustrates the principle of
duality in construction; the two main engines are situated in
separate compartments, and the six boilers are arranged in three
different groups. The sail area is 2153 square yards, and the steel
lower masts serve as ventilators to the hold, and carry steel
crow’s-nests in which are mounted rapid fire and machine guns. The
primary batteries of the two ships are similar, each carrying six
6¼-inch guns on the spar-deck (one forward, one aft, and four on
sponsons) and ten 5½-inch pieces on the covered deck in broadside.
The secondary battery of the _Cecile_ consists of ten 37-millimetre
(1.45-inch) guns, and that of the _Tage_ of three 47-millimetre
(1.85-inch) rapid-fire guns, and twelve 37-millimetre revolving
cannon—all of the Hotchkiss pattern. Both ships are supplied with
above-water torpedo tubes, the former having four, the latter seven.
The estimated maximum speed of the _Tage_ is 19 knots, with 10,330
horse-power, and that of the _Cecile_ is 18½ knots, with 9600
horse-power. The latest cruisers laid down are the _Jean Bart_ and
the _Dupuy de Lôme_, the first bearing the name of the rugged old
sea-wolf who entered the navy as an apprentice and died a famous
admiral, and the other that of the constructor who designed both in
wood and iron the first steam line-of-battle ships. These vessels are
of 352 feet length, 43.6 feet beam, 18 feet 10 inches mean draught,
and 4162 tons displacement; their estimated maximum speed is 19
knots. The main battery is composed of four 6.3-inch guns mounted on
sponsons, and of six 5.5-inch carried in broadside, and the secondary
armament has six 37-millimetre revolving cannons, four 3-pounder
rapid-fire guns, and the usual torpedo tubes.

The _Alger_ and _Isly_ are similar in construction to the _Cecile_,
but have the dimensions and armament of the _Jean Bart_; they are
designed for 19 knots, and a coal endurance of 3600 miles at 13
knots. The _Mogador_ is a rapid cruiser of 4325 tons, and of nearly
similar design, armament, speed, and endurance as the above. The
_Chanzy_, _Davoust_, and _Suchet_ belong to the same class of
“croiseurs à barbette,” and are of 3027 tons displacement, with an
estimated speed of 20 knots.

The _Surcoup_ and _Forbin_ illustrate another favorite type of
cruiser. They are 311 feet 7 inches long, have 30 feet 6 inches
beam, and on a mean draught of 13 feet 11 inches displace 1848 tons.
The hull weighs 817 tons, and the engines (with boilers filled) 544
tons; the coal capacity is 200 tons, and the endurance 2400 miles at
10 knots. The engines are expected, with forced draft, to develop
6000 indicated horse-power and 19.5 knots. They have a four-masted
schooner rig, spread 7255.5 square feet of canvas, and carry a
complement of one hundred and fifty officers and men. The battery
consists of two 5.5-inch guns on the upper deck, three 47-millimetre
rapid-fire guns on the poop and forecastle, four 37-millimetre
Hotchkiss revolving cannon on the rail, and five torpedo launching
tubes—two firing ahead, one astern, and one on each beam. This
lightness of battery and small coal capacity indicate with great
precision how much weight-carrying power has been sacrificed to spars
and sails. The _Coetlogon_ and _Cosmao_ laid down this year are of
the same type.

Wishing to obtain a small class of steel cruisers, the French
government lately invited the leading ship-builders to send in
competitive designs for a vessel which at an extreme draught aft
of fourteen feet would on the least possible displacement sustain
with natural draft a speed of eighteen knots for twelve hours, and
with forced draft a speed of nineteen knots for two hours. The coal
endurance was to be 2400 miles at ten knots, the main battery to
include two 5.5-inch guns, and the protective steel deck to be 1.6
inch thick. Five competitors furnished plans, and finally those of
the Société de la Gironde were chosen, and the two vessels now known
as the _Troude_ and the _Lalande_ were laid down. Their principal
dimensions are, length 311 feet 7 inches, beam 31 feet, mean draught
14 feet, and displacement 1877 tons. The armament will be two
5.5-inch and three rapid-fire guns, four 37-millimetre revolving
cannon, and a supply of torpedo tubes. The vessels, as with the
_Surcoup_ type to which they are very similar, will have a fore and
aft rig and a complement of one hundred and sixty.

The _Duguesclin_, referred to on page 84, is an armored cruiser built
of steel and iron and sheathed with wood and coppered; an iron armor
belt 9⅛ to 6½ inches thick encircles her, and the four barbettes are
protected by 8 inches of compound armor. The armament consists of
four 9.45-inch guns in the barbettes, of one 7.5-inch gun in the bow,
and of six 5.5-inch pieces on broadside, in addition to two 6-pounder
rapid-fire guns, twelve revolving cannon, and two above-water torpedo
tubes. Her displacement is 5869 tons, draught 23 feet 3 inches, and
she has developed 4100 horse-power and 14 knots. The _Sfax_ is a
partially protected steel cruiser, which is sheathed with wood and
coppered, and has an under-water curved steel protective deck 1.5
inches thick. There is the usual water-tight subdivision below and
above this deck, together with the lately adopted cellulose belt. The
armament consists of six 6.3-inch guns, four mounted on sponsons,
with bow and stern fire, and two in recessed ports with bow and beam
fire; of ten 5.5-inch guns in broadside on the main deck, and of
eight Hotchkiss revolving cannon. In May, 1887,[29] “with natural
draft, the mean indicated horse-power developed for four hours was
4333, and the speed 15.9 knots. With forced draft the mean results
of a six hours’ trial were, indicated horse-power, 6034; revolutions,
78; mean speed, 16.84 knots. The trials for coal endurance showed
that with full natural draft speed the consumption was 1.96 pounds
per hour per indicated horse-power developed, and with forced draft
it was 2.10 pounds. During these trials the draught of water was 19
feet 4 inches forward and 25 feet 1 inch aft, which was in excess
of the normal designed draughts of 19 feet 8 inches and 24 feet 8
inches. Notwithstanding this fact, and the fact of the indicated
horse-power falling much below the estimated power of the engines
(5000 with natural, 7500 with forced draft), the speed realized
exceeded the maximum estimated of 16.5 knots.”

France has been very active in the construction of torpedo-vessels.
On the present plane to which the science of naval warfare has
advanced the great tactical question is whether torpedo-boats or
flotillas are, in high-sea duels or engagements, to take the place of
huge ships or large fleets. There are, even in France, very marked
differences of opinion upon this point, but so far as official policy
and programme can assert a belief, there is no other nation, Russia
alone excepted, which appears to hold the torpedo in such high
esteem. The manœuvres of 1886 were notable for the prominence given
to that type, and of the forty vessels assembled this year for drill
and instruction at Toulon, twenty-one were torpedo craft of some
kind. The French navy has over two hundred torpedo-boats, which vary
in length from seventy to one hundred and thirty-three feet, and in
speed from fifteen to twenty-three knots; England has one hundred
and eighty-one, of which eighty-eight are built and ninety-three
are under construction; these differ as much among themselves as
the French boats, their speed range being about the same, and their
lengths varying from sixty-three to one hundred and fifty feet.
Generally described torpedo-boats may be divided into two classes,
the first including such as are of a size to keep the sea and act
independently, and the second those carried by ships. The Whitehead
torpedoes, the type most generally used, are ejected from their
firing tubes by various means, slow burning powder being employed
in some cases, though more frequently compressed air or steam. The
success of the French boats in China has revived the use of the spar
torpedo in combination with the locomotive type, and with us the
promised success of the Howell design may cause another revolution in
this system of attack.

“Boats exceeding one hundred feet in length,” writes White, “have
been shown capable of making long sea-voyages unaccompanied, and
the fact has been seized upon by enthusiasts in torpedo warfare
like the late Gabriel Charmes as evidence that the days of the
armored ship, of the large and costly cruiser, were numbered. Actual
experience is not favorable to this extreme view. There is a clear
and marked distinction between the capability of making long sea
passages in safety, when specially prepared for the purpose, and the
sure sea-going qualities of large ships. Boats of the largest size
and small swift vessels cannot equal large vessels in the power of
maintaining their speed and fighting efficiency or rough war. Life
is scarcely endurable for long periods in these overturning boats
and small craft, cooking is often a difficulty, and it is not every
officer who can rival the foreign commander of a torpedo-boat I
once met, who had acquired the power of living for long periods on
sherry and eggs. M. Weyl stated a fact when he said of the grand
manœuvres with the French iron-clads and torpedo flotilla last year
(1886), ‘In my experience as a sailor I have always found that the
sea is merciful to big ships and hard upon small ones.’ A moderately
rough sea that scarcely troubles the iron-clad or the cruiser of
considerable size, suffices to render inevitable a reduction in speed
of the small vessels, and a serious loss of power in the accurate
use of their torpedoes and guns. As adjuncts to fleets, the small
swift vessels and boats are undoubtedly of immense value under many
circumstances; for the defence or attack of forts and coasts they
are well fitted, but as substitutes for all other types, and as the
successful rival of large war-ships in sea service, their claim is
not, and probably will not be, established.

“The discovery of the minimum size of swift torpedo-vessels or
torpedo-boat destroyers really capable of independent sea service
with a fleet is now engaging attention in all navies. In France the
first attempts were made in the _Bombe_ class in 1883; some vessels
of this class were tried in the recent manœuvres and favorably
mentioned. In England the _Grasshopper_ class was designated in
1885, and the first completed vessel, the _Rattlesnake_, is now
completing her speed trials.” Since this last sentence was written
the _Rattlesnake_ has made 18.799 knots with a collective indicated
horse-power of 2718.27, and though the weather was boisterous,
proved that under normal conditions she could furnish a fairly
steady platform for her battery. Chief Constructor White continues
as follows: “These vessels are of 450 tons, and estimated to steam
about 19 knots an hour. Messrs. Thomson, of Clydebank, have just
completed another example of the class, intermediate in size between
the _Bombe_ and _Grasshopper_, and said to have attained the very
high speed of 22½ knots on trial in smooth water. Experience at sea
with these vessels will be of immense value to future designs. They
combine an armament of light guns with torpedo armaments, and can
act either as torpedo-vessels or as destroyers of torpedo craft.
Similarly in the largest classes of torpedo-boats light guns as well
as torpedoes are provided for. In fact there has been a departure
from the original idea of having the torpedo as the only weapon, as
the boats have increased in size, and this change cannot but commend
itself.”

The _Milan_ mentioned in the text was designed in 1879 for a torpedo
despatch-vessel, but is now used as a scout. She is 303 feet in
length, 32 feet 10 inches in beam, draws 15 feet 1 inch aft, and
has a displacement of 1550 tons. She carries a fair battery but no
torpedoes, is propelled by twin screws, each worked by two compound
tandem engines, and has Belleville boilers. On her trial she made
18.4 knots in a rough sea, and developed with natural draft 4132
horse-power, or more than was expected with forced draft; she carries
three hundred tons of coal and has a three-masted schooner rig.

The rapid development of torpedo-vessels since her day has resulted
in the evolution of different types suited to different demands,
and of late France has adopted the following classification for her
torpedo flotilla:

Displacement.
1. Torpedo-cruisers
(_croiseurs-torpilleurs_) 1260 to 1280 tons.
2. Torpedo despatch-boats
(_avisos-torpilleurs_) 320 to 360 tons.
3. Sea-going torpedo-boats
(_torpilleurs de haute mer_) 50 tons and over.
4. Coast-guard torpedo-boats
(_torpilleurs-garde cotes_) _a_, 25 tons; _b_, 50 tons.
5. Picket torpedo-boats
(_torpilleurs-videttes_) less than 25 tons.

The _Condor_, _Epervier_, _Faucon_, and _Vautour_ are examples of
the first class, and combine the lightness of hull and the gun
armament of the torpedo-catcher with the sea-going powers of the
cruiser. They are twin-screw steel vessels, 216 feet long, 29
feet 2 inches in beam, 15 feet 5 inches in draught, and with 3200
indicated horse-power are expected to develop 17 knots. The armament
consists of five torpedo-tubes, five 4-inch and six machine guns. In
England the _Scout_, the prototype of this class, is a twin-screw
torpedo-cruiser, 220 feet in length, 34 feet 3 inches in beam, and
with 14 feet draught displaces 1450 tons. Like the _Condor_ she
is subdivided into water-tight compartments and has a steel deck;
on her trial she developed with forced draft 17.6 knots and 3350
horse-power. Her armament consists of eleven torpedo-tubes, four
5-inch rifles on central pivots, and eight Nordenfeldt guns.

The _Fearless_ is a sister ship to the _Scout_. So highly was
the class esteemed that eight others known as the _Archer_ class
were laid down, and of these the _Cossack_, _Mohawk_, _Porpoise_,
_Tartar_, _Archer_, and _Brisk_ have already undergone satisfactory
steam trials, while the _Serpent_ and _Raccoon_ are approaching
completion. All these vessels have a protective deck extending
throughout their length, and carry a battery of six 6-inch guns on
sponsons, two at each extremity, and two in the waist. On the final
trials the _Archer_ developed under forced draft 17.8 knots and 4122
horse-power, the _Brisk_ 18 knots and 3954 horse-power, the _Cossack_
18 knots and 4003 horse-power, the _Porpoise_ 17.5 knots and 3943
horse-power, and the _Tartar_ 17.28 knots and 3824 horse-power. They
have a very low coal consumption, and a coal endurance which was
estimated in the _Archer’s_ case to be sufficient for six days, or
2600 knots at full speed, or for 7000 miles at a 10-knot rate. Both
the Russians and the Austrians have vessels of this type, and there
is no doubt of the favor with which it is looked upon.

Besides the _Grasshopper_ class mentioned in the text, and which
includes the _Rattlesnake_, _Spider_, _Sandfly_, and _Sharpshooter_,
there are two steel cruising torpedo gun-vessels, the _Curlew_
and _Landrail_, of 785 tons; these are fitted with a protective
steel deck throughout their length, and have a battery of one
6-inch gun, three 5-inch pivots, a supply of machine guns, and four
torpedo-tubes. They were intended to develop 14 knots and 1200
horse-power, but on trial the _Curlew_ attained 15.081 knots and
1452 horse-power. Owing to a faulty design these ships draw with
their proposed weights two feet four inches more water than was
expected. In addition to these ships the English have the composite
gun-vessels _Buzzard_, _Swallow_, _Nymphe_, and _Daphné_ of 1040
tons; the _Icarus_ and _Acorn_, of the _Reindeer_ and _Melita_ type;
the _Rattler_, _Wasp_, _Bramble_, _Lizard_, _Pigmy_, _Pheasant_,
_Partridge_, _Plover_, _Pigeon_, and _Peacock_, all of 715 tons
displacement, with an average speed of 13.5 knots and from 1000 to
1200 horse-power; and the two despatch and scout vessels _Alacrity_
and _Surprise_. The last named displace 1400 tons, and were designed
for 3000 horse-power and 17 knots. Both exceeded these expectations,
and the _Alacrity_ was lately assigned a battery of four 5-inch
guns on sponsons, four 6-pounder rapid fire, and two five-barrelled
Nordenfeldts.

It must be stated, however, that, so far torpedo-boats are not as
successful in practice as Admiral Aube would have had the naval world
believe.

“Swayed by the concurrent testimony of different officers who
conducted or took part in the naval manœuvres of 1886, professional
opinion appears to agree that torpedo-boats are very delicate
instruments at best, and that a greater tonnage is imperative where
service at sea is anticipated. A day or two in even moderate
weather is sufficient to exhaust the stanchest crew on account of
the excessive balloting about, and a prolonged voyage has been found
to be fatally injurious to the adjustments of the Whitehead for
horizontal accuracy. Furthermore, in such small, low craft a correct
estimate of the distance, speed, or course of the enemy is most
difficult, especially if the officer be in the conning-tower, looking
through the narrow sight-slits; in anything of a sea-way, also,
accurate pointing is out of the question.... In the course of the
past year Schichau has yielded to Thornycroft the honor of producing
the fastest vessel in the world, the owner now being the Spanish
Admiralty in place of the Russian. This boat is the _Ariete_, with a
speed of 26.18 knots.

“It has become a question in the minds of some eminent designers and
observers, notably M. Normand, whether or not the extreme speeds
sought and obtained in some recent boats are not excessive. Damage
to the motive machinery is more to be apprehended than any injury to
the hull or casualty among the crew. When it is considered that under
ordinary conditions of weather and service the speed of the fastest
will be little greater than that of an ordinary twenty-knot boat,
the propriety at once suggests itself of devoting to steel plate the
extra weight of boiler, water, and engine necessary to produce that
practically superfluous horse-power.”[30]

The trials of this year have not confirmed the great promises made
for the type by its most able and influential advocates. Many of
the English boats broke down, and in few cases were the high speeds
realized in actual sea duty. The truth is, torpedo-boats have been
brought down to such a condition of refinement to meet the special
circumstances of their work that it appears probable they have become
too delicate for rough handling. Out of twenty-seven boats that were
required to steam a distance of one hundred miles, seven failed
to run the course at all, having been, from one cause or another,
practically disabled. Such a heavy percentage of failures—one
resulted in a loss of life—under a trial test to which the boats
might at any time be subjected, arouses a natural doubt as to a
policy which is sacrificing for certain impracticable results
considerations that are of vital importance.

So far as the French naval manœuvres proved this year, the
torpedo-boats were not equal to the task assigned them. During these
experiments a squadron of eight armored battle-ships, three cruisers,
and two sea torpedo-boats, under command of Vice-admiral Peyron, was
supposed to represent a convoy of troop-ships and guard-vessels which
was to be intercepted on a voyage from Toulon to Algiers by a torpedo
division of four cruisers, one store-ship, and sixteen boats, with
the _Gabriel Charmes_, gun-boat, all lying off Ajaccio, under command
of Rear-admiral Brown de Coulston.

Vice-admiral Peyron and his heavy squadron left port on the day
appointed with a strong northerly gale and a high sea, and shortly
after clearing the land the _Indomptable_, an armored battle-ship,
sustained some damage and had to anchor under the Hyères Islands.
The mistral sent the other vessels rapidly on their way to the
African coast without slackening speed, all keeping well together,
with the two torpedo-boats steaming along under the higher sides
of their consorts. On the other hand, the torpedo division of
Rear-admiral Brown, which had left Toulon two days before the
fictitious convoy, was concentrated at Ajaccio. They ran seaward
on Saturday night to find the Peyron ships, but the latter had
cleverly given them the go-by in the darkness and bad weather, and
the mosquito flotilla was forced to return to Corsica for shelter.
Ajaccio was reached by Rear-admiral Brown on Sunday afternoon, and
it was not until four-and-twenty hours afterwards that the weather
moderated sufficiently to enable him to put to sea again, but by that
time the Algiers convoy had already been at anchor in their port
of destination since the morning. The preliminary operations were
therefore a pronounced failure.

The _Gabriel Charmes_ illustrates a design which is similar to
that of a torpedo-boat, except that in place of a torpedo tube
one 5.5-inch gun is carried forward. The deck is strengthened to
bear this weight, and immediately abaft the piece is an armored
conning-tower, within which the commanding officer is enabled by
an ingenious mechanism to direct the movements of the vessel. The
dimensions are as follows: length 132.6 feet, beam 12.6 feet, draught
6.7 feet, and displacement 74 tons. The engines are two-cylindered
compound, and developed 560 indicated horse-power and 19 knots. The
boats are said to be very cranky even in smooth water, but so highly
is their fighting power rated that fifty more have been ordered.
In the Mediterranean manœuvres of May the _Gabriel Charmes_ proved
to be the swiftest vessel of the torpedo squadron, as on the run
from Toulon to Ajaccio she led the others by three hours, and was
always in the advance while scouting. One paddle-wheel armored
despatch-vessel and seven composite armored transports complete the
record of additions made to the French fleet last year.

THE ITALIAN, RUSSIAN, GERMAN, AUSTRIAN, AND TURKISH NAVIES.

The Continental navy next in present interest to that of France
is the Italian, owing to the fact that the Italian government,
although largely abstaining from the use of armor, has applied
itself urgently to developments of gun-power and speed in large
war-ships. The _Duilio_ and _Dandolo_ (illustrated on page 105) were
considered in the chapter on the French navy, and their resemblance
to the _Inflexible_ type pointed out. They are nearly as large as
the _Inflexible_, although differing greatly in proportions and form
from her. They appear to me to be more objectionable, from the want
of armored stability, if one may so speak, than even the _Ajax_ and
_Agamemnon_, which are themselves, as we know, more objectionable
than the _Inflexible_. The cause of this is to be found in the fact
that in designing the British ships, whatever else they may have lost
sight of, the Admiralty constructors saw that the more you contracted
the length of the armored citadel, the more necessity there was for
giving the ship great breadth. The reason of this can be made clear.
The fractional expression which represents the statical stability
of a ship has in its numerator the quantity _y^3x_, in which _y_
represents the half-breadth of the ship at the water-line, and _x_
the length of the ship. If we regard the stability of the armored
citadel only, and neglect the unarmored ends, _x_ represents the
length of that citadel, and _y_ its half-breadth. Now if we take two
rectangular citadels, one, say, 100 feet long and 60 feet broad, the
other the same length, but only 50 feet broad, then the value of _x_
will be the same for both, but the values of _y^3_ will be 216,000
and 125,000 respectively, the ship 60 feet broad having, _cæteris
paribus_, nearly double the citadel stability of the 50-feet broad
ship. On the other hand, if you wish to give the narrower ship the
same citadel stability as the broader one, it will be necessary to
make her citadel no less than 172-8/10 feet long. Now the citadel of
the _Duilio_ is 107 feet in length,[31] and the breadth is 64 feet
9 inches—say 65 feet. The citadel of the _Inflexible_ is 110 feet
long, and its breadth 75 feet, the figures for the _Ajax_ being 140
feet and 66 feet. Now presuming the citadels to be rectangular in
each case, we shall have,

Inflexible _y^3x_ = 618,750
Ajax _y^3x_ = 453,024
Duilio _y^3x_ = 452,075

From which it would appear that the _Duilio_ of 11,000 tons derives
from this element of stability only about as much as the _Ajax_ of
8500 tons derives from it, and only about three-fourths of that
which the _Inflexible_ of 11,400 had allowed to her. There are other
circumstances, of course, which enter into the stability of these
ships, but nothing which I know of or can imagine to enable the
_Duilio_ to compare much more favorably in this respect with the
other vessels, deficient as they themselves are. All this applies,
of course, solely to the ability of these ships to depend upon their
armored citadels for safety in war: in peace they are all safe enough
as regards stability, because they have their unarmored ends to add
largely to it, although I should doubt if the _Duilio_ is greatly
over-endowed with stability even with her long unarmored ends intact.

[Illustration: THE “DUILIO.”]

I now come to a series of ships in which the question of the amount
of their armored stability does not arise, because they have no
armored stability at all. For some reason or other Lloyds, in
their _Universal Register_, following bad examples, have arrayed
the _Italia_ and her successors under the heading of “Sea-going
Armor-clads.” These ships are nothing of the kind, in any reasonable
sense of the word, but are, as ships, wholly unarmored, although
carrying elevated armored towers, and some armor in other places. Mr.
King (in his work previously referred to) puts the facts correctly
when he says:

“The armor is only used” (in the form of a curved deck, be it
understood) “to keep out shot and shell from the engines and boilers,
the magazines, shell-room spaces, and the channels leading therefrom
to the upper deck, and to protect the guns in the casemate when not
elevated above the battery, and the gunners employed in firing them.
But all other parts of the ship above the armored deck” (which is
below water, be it said), “all the guns not in the casemate, and all
persons out of the casemate, and not below the armored deck, will be
exposed to the enemy’s projectiles.”

Mr. King takes note of this total abandonment of side armor as
a means of preserving stability when a ship is pierced at the
water-line, and regards this abandonment as a bold defiance of the
principles which I have laid down for some years past. I cannot say
that I take this view of the matter. I have always discussed this
matter from the British navy point of view, and had these ships of
the _Italia_ type been built for the British navy in substitution of
real iron-clads, while France, Russia, and other European countries
were still building such iron-clads, I should have certainly
condemned them. The primary requirement of British first-class
ships is that they shall be able to close with and fight any enemy
of the period whatever, and any defect which unfits them for this
work, or makes it extremely dangerous to perform it, is a disgrace
to England. Even if armor were given up by other powers, it would
be a matter for careful consideration in England whether enough of
it for the protection of their existence against contemporary guns
should not be retained in her principal ships. England’s ability
to live as a nation and as the head of an empire is dependent upon
her naval superiority, and no price to purchase that can be too
great for her to pay. But with Italy the case was and is wholly
different. She could not compete with England in naval power, and
would not wish to if she could, for she is without an ocean empire
to preserve. But Italy has European neighbors, and when she began
to build these _Italias_ and _Lepantos_ she had for neighbor one
power, France, which had unwisely persisted for years in building
wooden armor-clads, neither strongly protected nor swift, nor very
powerfully armed; and I am not at all sure that, to such a navy as
France then had, a few extremely fast and very powerfully armed ships
such as Italy built were not excellent answers. The _Italia_ would
have been available also against a very large proportion of the
British iron-clad fleet, and of the fleets of Austria, Turkey, and
Russia. The idea of the Italian ministers clearly was to give weaker
ships no time for long engagements with them, but to pounce upon
them by means of enormous speed, and to destroy them at a blow by
means of their all-powerful ordnance. They might well expect to have
with such ships so great a command over the conditions under which
they would give battle as to be well able to repair in time, and at
least temporarily, such dangerous wounds as they might receive. But
more than this cannot be said for such ships: they are not fit to
engage in prolonged contests, or to fight such actions as by their
assaults on superior numbers and their endurance of close conflict
have won that “old and just renown” of which England is so deservedly
proud. It seems to me as obvious as anything can possibly be that
such ships as the _Italia_, if once adopted as models for other great
powers, would admit of easy and cheap answers. Ships of equal speed,
merely belted with very thick armor, and armed with an abundance of
comparatively light shell-guns, would effectually defy them. There
would be no need of enormous and costly armaments, or of ponderous
armored towers, or of huge revolving turrets, for giving battle to
ships which any shells would be able to open up to the inroads of
the sea, and which, being opened up, would lose their stability,
and insist upon turning bottom upward. But for the purposes of the
Italian government, as I conjecture them, the _Italia_ class of
ships, large as they are, have probably been excellent investments,
and may continue to be, so long as the priceless value of impregnable
belts and interior torpedo defence is understood by so very few.

The Italian government, having completed the _Italia_, is now
pressing forward with four other equally large ships (of over 13,000
tons each) of similar type, and with three others of 11,000 tons.
Curiously enough, it keeps with these among the “war vessels of
the first class” not only the _Palestro_ and _Principe Amedeo_, of
about 6000 tons, launched in 1871-72, but also the _Roma_, a wooden
vessel of 5370 tons, launched twenty years ago, and some four or five
iron ships, of 4000 tons and of 12 knots speed, launched more than
twenty years ago. I will not occupy time and space by regarding the
particulars of these old vessels (having omitted similar ones from
my French tables), but will here give the particulars of the modern
vessels of the Italian first class, which alone deserve notice:

MODERN ITALIAN WAR-SHIPS OF THE FIRST CLASS.

Part 1 of 2
+---------------+---------+---------+--------+---------+----------+
| |Displace-|Indicated| | | |
| NAME OF SHIP. | ment. | Horse- | Speed | Length. | Breadth. |
| | | power. | | | |
+---------------+---------+---------+--------+---------+----------+
| | Tons. | | Knots. | Feet. | Feet. In.|
| Duilio | 11,140 | 7,700 | 11.1 | 340 | 64 4 |
| Dandolo | 11,200 | 7,700 | 11.2 | 340 | 64 4 |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| Italia | 13,900 | 18,000 | 18 | 400 | 74 |
| Lepanto | 13,550 | 18,000 | 18 | 400 | 73 4 |
| Re Umberto | 13,250 | 19,500 | 18 | 400 | 74 9 |
| Sicilia | 13,250 | 19,500 | 18 | 400 | 74 9 |
| Sardegna | 13,250 | 19,500 | 18 | 400 | 74 9 |
| Lauria | 11,000 | 10,000 | 16 | 328 | 67 |
| Morosini | 11,000 | 10,000 | 16 | 328 | 67 |
| Doria | 11,000 | 10,000 | 16 | 328 | 67 |
+---------------+---------+---------+--------+---------+----------+

Part 2 of 2
+---------------+---------+-----------+----------------+
| | Draught | Greatest | Heaviest Guns |
| NAME OF SHIP. | of | Thickness | carried. |
| | Water. | of Armor. | |
+---------------+---------+-----------+----------------+
| |Feet. In.| Inches on | |
| | | Sides. | |
| Duilio | 26 8 | 22 | 4 of 101 tons. |
| Dandolo | 27 | 22 | 4 ” 101 ” |
| | | Inches on | |
| | | Towers. | |
| Italia | 27 8 | 19 | 4 ” 103 ” |
| Lepanto | 27 8 | 19 | 4 ” 103 ” |
| Re Umberto | 28 7 | 19 | 4 ” 106 ” |
| Sicilia | 28 7 | 19 | 4 ” 106 ” |
| Sardegna | 28 7 | 19 | 4 ” 106 ” |
| Lauria | 27 | 14 | 4 ” 103 ” |
| Morosini | 27 | 14 | 4 ” 103 ” |
| Doria | 27 | 14 | 4 ” 103 ” |
+---------------+---------+-----------+----------------+

The manner in which the towers and guns of the _Italia_ type are
arranged is shown in section and in plan, which are taken for
convenience from the works of Mr. King and of Lord Brassey, and were
prepared, I believe, from official drawings.[32]

[Illustration: SECTION OF THE “ITALIA.”]

Among her unarmored vessels, in addition to a large number of old
and slow small craft, Italy possesses some fast modern war-ships of
the second and lower classes which are deserving of notice. In the
first place, she has eight steel vessels ranging from 2500 tons to
3600 tons, which Lloyds describe as “deck-protected cruisers,” with
a total absence of any justification, I think, excepting that other
people have doubtless done so before.[33]

There certainly are people who for business or other purposes would
call anything a “protective deck,” but why these eight vessels should
be removed from the category of unarmored ships, and constitute a
class by themselves, is more than I can imagine even the slightest
reason or justification for. I do not know any modern naval gun which
will not penetrate an inch steel plate when presented to it as it
is in the curving down decks of these vessels. It appears to me a
trifling with serious matters to try and induce naval authorities,
officers, and seamen to believe that these vessels, and similar
ones wherever they are to be found, have any pretensions to be
regarded as “protected.”

[Illustration: DECK PLAN OF THE “ITALIA.”]

[Illustration: THE “ITALIA.”]

These unarmored vessels are, however, notable for high speed, three
of them being of fifteen knots, and the other five of seventeen
knots. One of these 17-knot vessels, the _Giovanni Bausan_, built
by Sir William Armstrong & Co., at Newcastle-on-Tyne, so closely
resembles the Chilian vessel _Esmeralda_ that the engraving of the
latter vessel on this page may be taken to illustrate the general
character of both. The breadth (42 feet) is the same in each, and so
is the draught of water (18½ feet), but the _Bausan_ is a few feet
longer than the other. The armament is almost precisely the same,
being two guns of about twenty-five tons, mounted one forward and
one aft, and six of four tons. I have chosen the _Esmeralda_ for the
illustration of both vessels because (by the favor of Sir William
Armstrong & Co.) I am in possession of an instantaneous photograph
of her at full speed, from which the engraving has been made. This
is very interesting, because it exhibits what few readers are likely
to have seen, but what most will be glad to see, _viz._, the form
which is taken by the permanent waves that accompany such a ship when
steaming at the full speed of seventeen knots in comparatively still
water. The engraving also well represents the position of the bow and
stern guns.

[Illustration: THE “ESMERALDA.”]

The 15-knot vessels of Italy are named _Giojà_, _Amerigo Vespucci_,
_Savoia_, and _Colombo_, of which the _Amerigo Vespucci_ is
illustrated from a drawing by De Martino on page 115. Those of
seventeen knots, besides the _Bausan_, are the _Etna_, _Vesuvio_,
_Stromboli_, and _Fieramosca_. All the last-named vessels carry the
same armament as the _Bausan_; the others an armament of 4-ton guns
only. The Italian government also possesses (built or building) eight
other vessels exceeding or reaching fifteen knots in speed, of which
two are built of wood and the remainder of iron or steel. It has
likewise of fast torpedo craft a 2000-ton vessel of nineteen knots,
which mounts six 6-inch guns and nine 6-pounders; and four others
of twenty knots, to carry machine guns, _viz._, the _Tripoli_ and
_Goito_, of 741 tons, and the _Folgore_ and _Saetta_, of 317 tons. It
is also proposed to build six others, of 741 tons and twenty knots,
two of which, the _Monzambano_ and _Montebello_, have been laid down
at Spezzia. They have sixty-two complete first-class torpedo-boats of
over one hundred feet in length, and twenty-one second-class, already
built, of less than one hundred feet.

[Illustration: THE “AMERIGO VESPUCCI.”]

It will be seen from the foregoing statement that the Italian navy is
one of much importance, capable of working great destruction upon an
enemy’s fleet of ordinary ships, able to cope with no inconsiderable
number of modern vessels, and such as would enable the Italian
people and government to speak with a voice that would have to be
attentively heeded by any possible ally or any probable enemy in
the event of European complications arising, or of a European war
becoming imminent. This does great credit to successive Italian
political administrations.

Of late the German government has been very active in promoting
commercial ship-building and ocean enterprise, but it has been very
slack in the development of its imperial navy, and for this reason
the Russian navy next claims our notice. Russia, with the continent
of Europe interposed between its northern and its southern ports,
is compelled to divide its naval strength into two, concentrating
one part upon the Baltic and the other upon the Black Sea; and both
these divisions of its navy are under restrictions which approach
pretty nearly to the conditions of blockades. With winter comes the
natural blockade of Cronstadt and St. Petersburg on the Baltic,
and this sometimes lasts so long that I have myself seen the first
merchant-vessel of the year approach Cronstadt on the 29th of May, or
within a very few weeks of midsummer. In the South, Sebastopol and
Nikolaiev are under the permanent domination of the Bosporus forts
and fleets, and of European treaties, which are stronger still. The
disasters of the war of 1854 and the political engagements which
ensued have also borne heavily upon the naval spirit of Russia,
and it says much for the greatness of that country that again,
in spite of all these hinderances, it is raising its navy into a
position of European importance.

[Illustration: THE “CATHERINE II.”]

Considering the Black Sea fleet first, the entire interest excited
by its armor-clads centres in the three new 16-knot ships, the
_Catherine II._, _Sinope_, and _Tchesme_. These three ships are
belted throughout with 18-inch armor, and are armed with six guns
of forty tons and seven of four tons, this battery being fought _en
barbette_ in towers plated with armor fourteen inches thick. The
_Universal Register_ and the French _Carnet_ agree in assigning to
the _Catherine II._ a length of 320 feet and a tonnage of 10,000,
and to the other two ships a length of 314 feet and a tonnage of
about 8600. They also agree in describing the horse-power of each of
the three ships as 9000 indicated, and the speed as 16 knots. The
Admiralty Return previously quoted gives them a speed of 15 knots,
and equal tonnages of 10,800 tons.[34] I am unable to give the
tonnage decisively, but I know that the tonnage originally intended
for these ships was 9990, and I am in possession of the details of
the corresponding weights. The discrepancies as to steam-power and
speed are matters of great moment. I believe that both the _Universal
Register_ and the French _Carnet_ are wrong in associating a power
of only 9000 horses with a speed of sixteen knots, the fifteen knots
given by the Admiralty being the speed expected with 9000 indicated
horse-power; but this power is to be obtained with natural draught,
while with forced draught the power is to be increased to 11,400, and
the speed increased to sixteen knots. The formidable character of
these ships needs no comment, although I cannot regard them as nearly
equivalent to or as well designed as the somewhat larger _Nile_ and
_Trafalgar_ of the British navy. The only other Black Sea armored
vessels are the slow and small, but somewhat powerful, circular
ships _Novgorod_ and _Vice-admiral Popoff_, of which the latter is
surrounded by 18-inch armor, and carries two guns of forty tons. A
torpedo-vessel of the 600 ton class, developing 3500 horse-power, and
20 knots speed has been built at Nikolaiev.

The Baltic fleet of Russia contains only one finished iron-clad of
much importance, the _Peter the Great_, of 9340 tons and 14 knots
speed, carrying four guns of 40 tons; but two other ships, the
_Emperor Alexander II._ and the _Nicholas I._, of 8400 tons, are now
under construction at St. Petersburg. No interest attaches to the
_Pojarsky_, the four _Admirals_, and several other old, weak, and
slow armor-clads of the Baltic navy. This fleet comprises, however,
eight belted cruisers, of which five are important. These are as
follows:

+-----------------+-------+---------+------+--------+------------------+
| |Displa-|Indicated| | | Principal |
| NAME OF SHIP. |cement.| Horse- |Speed.| Armor. | Armament. |
| | | power. | | | |
+-----------------+-------+---------+------+--------+------------------+
| | Tons.| |Knots.| | Guns |
|Vladimir Monomach| 5800 | 7000 | 15.4 | 7-inch.| 4 of 9 tons.|
|Dmitri Donsköi | 5800 | 7000 | 16.25| 7-inch.| [35]3 ” 29 ” |
|Admiral Nachimoff| 7780 | 8000 | 16 |10-inch.| 8 ” 9 ” |
|Alexander Nevsky | 7572 | 8000 | 16 |10-inch.| 8 ” 9 ” |
|Emperor Nicholas | 8000 | 8000 | 16 |10-inch.| 2 ” 40 ” |
+-----------------+-------+---------+------+--------+------------------+

The only fast armored cruisers of the Baltic fleet are the _Rynda_
and _Vitias_, of 2950 tons, 3500 horse-power, and 15 knots speed;
and another, the _Admiral Korniloff_, now being completed at Nantes,
to be much larger and faster. Among torpedo-vessels there is the
twin-screw steel _Iljin_, of 600 tons, which has steamed 20 knots,
and carries 19 machine guns; another, of only 140 tons, but to steam
20 knots, has been built at Glasgow; and a third, of like size, but
of 17 knots, at St. Petersburg. The torpedo-boats of the Russian navy
are given in the Parliamentary Return as below:

BALTIC TORPEDO-BOATS.

_Completed_: 4 over 100 feet in length; 74 over 70 feet in length;
20 under 70 feet in length. _Completed and building_: 6 over 100
feet in length, of which 4 are over 150 feet long—total, 104.

BLACK SEA TORPEDO-BOATS.

_Completed_: 5 over 100 feet in length; 8 over 70 feet in length; 6
under 70 feet in length. _Completed and building_: 7 over 100 feet
in length—total, 26.

Russia has also a volunteer fleet consisting of ten vessels of no
great fighting value; a Siberian flotilla comprising nine gun-boats
and other small craft; a Caspian flotilla of seven small vessels; and
an Aral flotilla of still less moment.

In the German armored navy four citadel vessels figure as having
the heaviest (16-inch) armor, but these are of that objectionable
_Sachsen_ type to which I previously adverted. In order to let the
reader see under what slight pretexts some people are prepared
to regard ships as powerful iron-clads, I give engravings which
represent the Sachsen in side view and in plan, these illustrations
being taken from _Captain_ J. F. von Kronenfels’s “Das Schwimmende
Flottenmaterial der Seemächte.” The shaded portion in the middle
exhibits the extent of this ship’s armor; the long white ends are
left to depend upon walls of cork, etc., which are very poor—nay,
almost imaginary—defences against the effects of explosive shells.

In observing the limitation of the armor in this and similar ships
one is tempted to ask, Why stop there? Why not shorten the armor, say
to twenty or thirty feet of length, and make it a yard thick, and
then enter her in the list of iron-clads as a vessel with armor three
feet thick? Deck-plating, according to such constructors, is ample
for the protection of engines and boilers, and everything else which
is below water.

[Illustration: HALF-DECK PLAN OF THE “SACHSEN.”

SIDE ELEVATION OF THE “SACHSEN.”]

The remaining three ships of this class are the _Baiern_, the
_Baden_, and the _Würtemberg_. The engraving of the _Sachsen_
represents their general appearance. Their dimensions and other
particulars will be given presently in table on page 125, but it
will be observed that the armament is arranged in a forward and in a
midship battery, giving right-ahead fire with four guns, a stern fire
with two, and beam fire with three.

[Illustration: THE “SACHSEN.”]

The largest iron-clad of the German navy is the _König Wilhelm_, of
9750 tons, which steams at 14¾ knots. She is also the most thickly
armor-plated (armor, twelve inches); but having been launched
eighteen years ago, her guns, although numerous, are only of fourteen
tons weight. I designed this ship for his Majesty, the late Sultan of
Turkey, Abdul-Aziz, but before she was much advanced in construction
she was purchased by the Prussian government, and passed from under
my care. A few years later I designed the _Kaiser_ and _Deutschland_
for the Prussian government; and these vessels, built on the Thames,
and launched in 1874, although 2000 tons smaller than the _Wilhelm_,
steamed but one-fourth of a knot less (14½ knots). They carry 10-inch
armor and 10-ton guns.

[Illustration: HALF-DECK PLAN OF THE “KAISER.”

SIDE ELEVATION OF THE “KAISER.”]

These ships are described on page 125. The principal ships built
in Germany are the _Preussen_ and the _Friedrich der Grosse_,
which, although designed by the German Admiralty constructors,
are but reproductions on a less scale, and with some variations,
of the British turret-ship _Monarch_, designed by myself. Lord
Brassey (in “The British Navy,” vol. i., page 22) says: “In the
mean time Germany had constructed three turret-ships of precisely
the same type as the _Monarch_, but of somewhat smaller dimensions.
These were the _Preussen_, the _Friedrich der Grosse_, and the
_Grosser Kurfürst_.”[36] His lordship goes on to say (what I do
not understand), “Their armor at the water-line is six inches
thicker, while at the turrets it is two inches less, than that of
the _Monarch_.” Now, as Lord Brassey elsewhere says (page 326), “the
_Monarch_ is protected with 8-inch armor,” and (page 333), writing
of the _Preussen_, “that the armor-plates at the water-line are 9¼
inches thick, below the water 7¼ inches, and above the water 8¼
inches,” it is obvious that there cannot be the difference of six
inches which his first-quoted statement alleges. There doubtless
was a difference of an inch, or possibly of two inches, in so far
as a few of the armor-plates were concerned, but not more, and how
far this difference extended is very doubtful, seeing that nowadays
if the constructor of a ship thickens but two or three plates on
each side of his ship he feels entitled to speak of her as being
armored with plates of the maximum thickness, and to mislead mankind
accordingly. Nor is this surprising, when we see in a late return to
the British Parliament ships like the British _Collingwood_ class,
the French _Brennus_ class, and the German _Sachsen_ class gravely
included in the lists of “armored vessels.”

The particulars of the German armored fleet, leaving out the _Hansa_,
a weak and weakly armed ship of only 3500 tons and 12 knots speed,
and all smaller armored craft, are as follows:

SEA-GOING ARMORED SHIPS OF GERMANY.

+----------------+--------+---------+-------+---------+---------------+
| | Displa-|Indicated| Speed.| Maximum | Principal |
| NAME OF SHIP. | cement.| Horse- | | Armor. | Armament. |
| | | power. | | | |
+----------------+--------+---------+-------+---------+---------------+
| | Tons. | | Knots.| Inches. | Guns. |
| König Wilhelm | 9750 | 8300 | 14¾ | 12 | 18 of 14 tons.|
| Kaiser | 7550 | 8000 | 14½ | 10 | 8 ” 18 ” |
| Deutschland | 7550 | 8000 | 14½ | 10 | 8 ” 18 ” |
| Friedrich der | | | | | |
| Grosse | 6600 | 4930 | 14 | 9½ | 4 ” 18 ” |
| Preussen | 6600 | 4380 | 14 | 9½ | 4 ” 18 ” |
| Baden | 7280 | 5600 | 14 | 16 | 6 ” 18 ” |
| Baiern | 7280 | 5600 | 14 | 16 | 6 ” 18 ” |
| Sachsen | 7280 | 5600 | 14 | 16 | 6 ” 18 ” |
| Würtemberg | 7280 | 5600 | 14 | 16 | 6 ” 18 ” |
| Oldenburg | 5200 | 3900 | 13½ | 12 | 8 ” 18 ” |
| Friedrich Karl | 6000 | 3500 | 13½ | 5 | 16 ” 9 ” |
| Kronprinz | 5480 | 4800 | 14¼ | 5 | 16 ” 9 ” |
+----------------+--------+---------+-------+---------+---------------+

All the above German ships are completed, and have been for a long
time, with the exception of the _Oldenburg_, which was not launched
until 1884. The _Baden_ was launched in 1880, the _Baiern_ and
_Würtemberg_ in 1878, and all the rest earlier—the _Friedrich Karl_
and _Kronprinz_ nearly twenty years ago. Germany appears to have
no iron-clad, large or small, under construction at present. It is
unnecessary to set forth in detail her small armored gun-vessels;
suffice it to say that she has one iron turret-ship, the _Arminius_,
of 1560 tons, with 7½-inch armor, but only carrying four 9-ton
guns, and steaming 10 to 11 knots; and eleven iron vessels of 10
feet draught of water, 1090 tons displacement, 700 horse-power, 9
knots speed, and 8-inch armor, each carrying one 12-inch gun of 37
tons. These were all built at Bremen, and launched between 1876
and 1880, inclusive. They are named after such agreeable creatures
as basilisks, crocodiles, salamanders, scorpions, etc., but owing
to their small speed would probably prove of less aggressive habits
than their names imply. They would nevertheless be very useful in
defending the coasts and harbors.

The abstention for the present of the German government from the
construction of armored ships must not be taken as implying that it
prefers the fast unarmored cruiser as a type of war-ships, for it has
no such cruiser built, and is building but three of very high speed,
and one of 16 knots.[37] The particulars of these are as follows:

+---------------+---------------+--------------+--------+------------+
| NAME OF SHIP. | Displacement. | Indicated | Speed. | Armament. |
| | | Horse-power. | | |
+---------------+---------------+--------------+--------+------------+
| | Tons. | | Knots. | Guns. |
| Elisabeth | 4500 | 8000 | 18 | 14 8-inch. |
| Ariadne | 4800 | 8000 | 18 | 14 8-inch. |
| Charlotte | 3360 | .... | 16 | .... |
| Loreley | 2000 | 5400 | 19 | 2 4-inch. |
+---------------+---------------+--------------+--------+------------+

The Admiralty Return makes no mention of the last ship, as she is but
a despatch-vessel, but she is mentioned and particularized in the
_Universal Register_. It is to be further observed that the first
two vessels on this list are each to have a 3-inch deck, for the
protection of the engines, boilers, etc., which fact has induced the
Admiralty officers to designate them “protected ships,” as they do
their own ships of this really unprotected type, and as they have not
designated the French cruisers _Tage_ and _Cécile_.

The German navy comprises a few modern and fast frigates, some of
which have been honored with illustrious names, as will be seen from
the following list:

GERMAN UNARMORED FRIGATES.

+----------------+--------+--------------+--------+-----------------+
| NAME OF SHIP. | Displa-| Indicated | Speed. | Principal |
| | cement.| Horse-power. | | Armament. |
+----------------+--------+--------------+--------+-----------------+
| | Tons. | | Knots. | Guns. |
| Bismarck | 2850 | 2500 | 13½ | 16 of 3½ tons. |
| Moltke | 2850 | 2500 | 13½ | 16 ” 3½ ” |
| Stosch | 2800 | 2500 | 13½ | 16 ” 3½ ” |
| Stein | 2800 | 2500 | 13½ | 16 ” 3½ ” |
| Prinz Adalbert | 3860 | 4800 | 15 | { 2 ” 6 ” |
| | | | | {10 ” 3½ ” |
| Leipzig | 3860 | 4800 | 15 | 10 ” 3½ ” |
| Charlotte | 3310 | 3000 | 15 | 18 ” 4 ” |
| Gueisenau | 2810 | 3000 | 15 | 16 ” 3½ ” |
+----------------+--------+--------------+--------+-----------------+

There are also some modern corvettes in this navy which may be
classed in point of speed with the above frigates; these are,

GERMAN UNARMORED CORVETTES.

+---------------+---------+--------------+---------+---------------+
| NAME OF SHIP. | Displa- | Indicated | Speed. | Principal |
| | cement. | Horse-power. | | Armament. |
+---------------+---------+--------------+---------+---------------+
| | Tons. | | Knots. | Guns. |
| Alexandrine | 2330 | 2400 |[38]15 | 10 of 4 tons. |
| Arcona | 2330 | 2400 | 15 | 10 ” 4 ” |
| Carola | 2160 | 2100 | 14 | 10 ” 4 ” |
| Marie | 2160 | 2100 | 13½ | 10 ” 4 ” |
| Olga | 2160 | 2100 | 14 | 10 ” 4 ” |
| Sophie | 2160 | 2100 | 14 | 10 ” 4 ” |
| Freya | 2000 | 2500 | 15 | 8 ” 4 ” |
+---------------+---------+--------------+---------+---------------+

There are about a dozen other smaller and slower gun-vessels and
gun-boats in the German navy, but they need not be considered here.
As to sea-going torpedo-vessels, the German government took the
lead in the production of this type of ship, and had the _Ziethen_
launched at Blackwall as a despatch-vessel ten years ago, for a
torpedo armament, and with a speed of 16 knots—an example of naval
enterprise worth remembering to the credit of Germany. The _Bletz_
and _Pfeil_, of 50 per cent. larger tonnage, have since been produced
in Germany, but only with a speed about equal to the _Ziethen’s_. Two
torpedo gun-vessels of 855 tons and nearly 2000 horse-power, and 15
knots speed (of which vessels the Admiralty Return makes no mention),
were launched at Bremen in 1884. The following is the Admiralty
statement as to German torpedo “boats:” _Completed_, 58 (43 over 100
feet in length). _Completing and building_, 2 torpedo division boats;
30 torpedo-boats over one hundred feet in length.—Total, 90.

Money was voted in 1884-85 for seventy torpedo-boats. When these have
been built, the number of German torpedo-boats will be one hundred
and five, and these are to be increased to one hundred and fifty.

Reviewing the condition of the German navy as set forth above, it
becomes obvious that for some years past the policy of the imperial
German government (contrary to that of the Prussian government,
which, before the empire, built several large and powerful sea-going
ships) has been to avoid all competition in naval matters with
the great naval powers, and to apply its moderate expenditure to
vessels of a defensive class, such as armored gun-boats and coast
torpedo-boats—a policy which, in view of the limited interests of
Germany in the Mediterranean and across the seas, has much to commend
it.[39]

The Austrian government also, which with less necessity for naval
strength now than it had when it possessed Lombardy and Venice, has
slackened greatly in the production of iron-clads of late years, and
has but two, and these of very moderate size, under completion. These
are the barbette-battery ships _Kronprinz Rudolph_, of 6900 tons, and
the _Kronprinzessin Erzherzogin Stefanie_, of 5150 tons. The former
vessel is to carry 12-inch armor, and to be armed principally with
three 48-ton guns; and the latter to carry 9-inch armor, and to be
armed with two such guns. There is much uncertainty about even the
intended speed of these vessels, neither the French _Carnet_ nor the
_Universal Register_ stating the speed, while the Admiralty assigns
a speed of 14 knots to the _Rudolph_ only. But while the _Carnet_
gives the indicated horse-power of each as 6500, the _Register_ gives
that of the _Rudolph_ as 8000, and that of the smaller vessel as much
as 11,000. If these latter figures be correct, the _Rudolph_ will
exceed 14 knots and the _Ferdinand_ 16.[40] Austria already possesses
two powerful iron-clads in the _Custoza_ and the _Tegetthoff_, but
her _Kaiser_, _Lissa_, _Ferdinand Max_, and _Hapsburg_ are old
wooden vessels, lightly armored and armed, and need not be further
considered. Besides the iron-clads already named, she has likewise
the three iron central-battery and belted ships _Don Juan d’Austria_,
_Kaiser Max_, and _Prinz Eugen_, each of 3500 tons, 2700 indicated
horse-power, and 13½ knots speed, with 8-inch armor (the thickest)
on the belt, and each carrying eight guns of 9 tons. The unarmored
vessels of Austria (other than those classed as torpedo craft) are
numerous, but most of them are small and slow. Those of thirteen
knots and upward are but three in number, the _Laudon_, _Radetzky_,
frigates of 3380 tons and 14 knots speed, and the wooden gun-vessel
_Hum_, of 890 tons and 13¼ knots speed. Austria is providing herself
with several of Sir W. Armstrong & Co.’s light steel vessels of
eighteen knots speed for torpedo service, of which she has one, the
_Panther_, completed, and two others, the _Leopard_ and _Seehund_
(all of 1550 tons), under construction. She had also four 14-knot
torpedo-vessels, built at Pola and Trieste. Of torpedo “boats” she
has the following: _Completed_, First class, 135 feet in length, 2;
second class, over 100 feet in length, 18; third class, from 85 to 90
feet in length, 8. _Incompleted_, First class, 135 feet in length, 2;
second class, over 100 feet in length, 8.—Total, 38.[41]

The navy of Turkey, which was formidable a few years ago, possessing
as it did some of the most powerful and efficient iron-clads in the
world at that period, both large and small, is rapidly declining
in importance in presence of the powerful ships constructed or
constructing in England, France, Russia (Black Sea), and Italy. The
Turkish navy would not have held its high position so long had it
not been for the foresight of the late Sultan Abdul-Aziz, having all
his armored ships built of iron. There is not a wood-built iron-clad
in the Turkish navy. The largest Turkish armored ship, and one still
very powerful, is the frigate _Mesoodiyeh_, of 9000 tons, built at
Blackwall, which in her main features resembles the German _König
Wilhelm_, being, like her, of English design, but instead of having
eighteen main-deck guns of fourteen tons, she has twelve of eighteen
tons, and her battery is consequently of less length. Her speed is
fourteen knots. Next to her comes the _Hemidiyeh_, launched in 1885
at Constantinople, of similar type to the other vessel, but of only
6700 tons, and therefore carrying but 9-inch armor, and ten guns of
fourteen tons, and steaming at a knot less speed. Turkey has no less
than thirteen other iron-clads, ranging in tonnage from 2000 to over
6000, in speed from 11 to 14 knots, and in armor from 5½ to 9 inches.
The most notable of these, if I may be allowed as its designer to say
so,[42] has been the _Feth-i-Bulend_ (“Great Causer of Conquest”),
built at the Thames Iron-works in 1869. This little vessel, although
of only 2700 tons displacement, carried a 9-inch armor-belt, and a
main-deck battery of 6-inch armor protecting four 12-ton guns, placed
at the four oblique sides of an octagonal battery, and steamed at
fourteen knots—a speed unexampled at that time for an iron-clad
of her small tonnage. It is a well-known fact that whenever of
late years Turkey has had naval work to do, the _Feth-i-Bulend_,
on account of her speed, handiness, and general efficiency, was
selected by the late lamented Hobart Pasha to perform its most active
part.

Of unarmored vessels Turkey has few worth mentioning as fighting
ships, beyond three composite corvettes now under construction at
Constantinople, one of 1960 and one of 1160 tons, both of which are
to steam at fourteen knots, their armament consisting of eight and
six light guns respectively; and one other of 670 tons which is to
steam fifteen knots[43] and to carry five light and four machine
guns. A steel torpedo-vessel which is to steam at twenty-one knots,
and three torpedo cruisers complete the list of new vessels laid
down. Turkey has six torpedo “boats” one hundred feet long, built in
France; six more of larger size, one hundred and twenty-five feet
long, building in Germany; and five of one hundred feet, building in
Turkey and France—in all, seventeen torpedo-boats.

This review of Turkish naval force bears out the remark with which
I introduced it, and shows that, either from lack of support from
the Western European powers or from some other cause, fighting
superiority in the Black Sea is being effectually abandoned by Turkey
to Russia.

Captain Lord Charles Beresford, R.N., M.P. (now a sea lord of the
Admiralty), who moved for the Admiralty Return to Parliament to which
I have made repeated reference, included Greece among the powers
whose “fleets” were to be reported on; but as Greece has but two
small and weak iron-clads, and they are nearly twenty years old,
and as she has no other at present even under construction, the
pretensions of her “fleet” are scarcely proportional to her political
ambitions. She has but one fast cruiser, the _Admiral Miaulis_,
and she is only a 15-knot vessel, and carries nothing more in the
way of guns than three of six tons and one of five tons. Greece’s
only “torpedo-vessel” steams no more than fourteen knots, and the
Admiralty Return assures Lord Charles Beresford and the world that
she has but twenty-seven torpedo-boats, of which seventeen are
over and ten under one hundred feet in length, and that she is not
building any more. Considering the island interests of Greece and her
situation in the Mediterranean, no one can pronounce her naval force
as excessive, or regard her government as being tempted to any high
heroic policy by her possession of an imposing navy.

I have not mentioned the Spanish or Portuguese “fleets,” nor is it
necessary to do much more than mention them now. Spain has only one
finished iron-clad, of over thirteen and less than fourteen knots
speed, and that is the _Vitoria_, which was launched at Blackwall, on
the Thames, more than twenty years ago. She has thin armor, and could
attempt but little in war. Spain is, however, building a large steel
turret-ship, the _Pelayo_, of 9650 tons, at La Seyne, to carry two
38-ton and two 48-ton guns, with 18-inch armor on a citadel and 19½
on her turrets. She is to steam at sixteen knots. This one ship will,
I presume, when finished, compose the armored “fleet” of Spain—that
country once so great upon the sea. Of unarmored vessels of war Spain
is building several, of which three are to have the advantage of
stout steel decks, and one is to be very fast. It will be well to
assemble these unarmored vessels of fourteen knots and upward in a
table:

TABLE G.—UNARMORED WAR-VESSELS OF SPAIN.

VESSELS OF FOURTEEN KNOTS AND UPWARD, INCLUDING TORPEDO-VESSELS.

+----------------------+--------+---------+--------+-----------------+
| | Displa-|Indicated| | Principal |
| NAME OF SHIP. | cement.| Horse- | Speed. | Armament. |
| | | power. | | Armament. |
+----------------------+--------+---------+--------+-----------------+
| | Tons. | | Knots. | Guns. |
| Reina Regente | 4300 | 11,000 | 19 | 4 of 8 inches. |
| Alfonso XII | 3000 | 4,400 | 14 | 8 ” 6 tons. |
| Aragon (wood) | 3300 | 4,400 | 14 | {4 ” 6 ” |
| | | | | {4 ” 3 ” |
| Castilla ” | 3300 | 4,400 | 14 | 8 ” 4 ” |
| Navarra ” | 3300 | 4,400 | 14 | {4 ” 6 ” |
| | | | | {4 ” 3 ” |
| Reina Cristina | 3000 | 4,400 | 14 | 8 ” 6 ” |
| Reina Mercedes | 3000 | 4,400 | 14 | 8 ” 6 ” |
| Cristabel Colón | 1100 | 1,600 | 14 | 3 ” 4 ” |
| Don Antonio Ulioa | 1100 | 1,600 | 14 | 3 ” 4 ” |
| Don Juan d’Austria | 1100 | 1,500 | 14 | 5 ” 4¾ inches.|
| Infanta Isabel | 1100 | 1,500 | 14 | 5 ” 4¾ ” |
| Isabel II | 1100 | 1,600 | 14 | 5 ” 4¾ ” |
| Velasco | 1100 | 1,600 | 14.3 | 3 ” 4 tons. |
| Isla de Cuba | 1000 | 2,200 | 15 | 6 ” 4¾ inches.|
| Islas Filipinas | 1000 | 2,200 | 15 | 6 ” 4¾ ” |
| Destructor | | | | |
| (torpedo-catcher) | 400 | 4,000 | 24 | Machine guns. |
| Alcon (sea-going | | | | |
| torpedo-boat) | 108 | 1,200 | 23 | ” ” |
| Azor ” ” | 108 | 1,200 | 23 | ” ” |
| Orion ” ” | 88 | 1,000 | 20 | ” ” |
+----------------------+--------+---------+--------+-----------------+

Spain has likewise four 125-feet torpedo “boats” of 19 knots; one,
105 feet long, of 18 knots; and three or four smaller ones.[44]

Portugal has but one iron-clad, central-battery type, of 2480 tons,
13½ knots speed, with 9-inch armor, and two 28-ton guns. Of unarmored
vessels she has but three exceeding twelve knots, in speed, _viz._:

+------------------------+---------------+--------------+--------+
| NAME OF SHIP. | Displacement. | Indicated | Speed. |
| | | Horse-power. | |
+------------------------+---------------+--------------+--------+
| | Tons. | | Knots. |
| Liberal | 500 | 500 | 16 |
| Zaire | 500 | 500 | 16 |
| Alfonso de Albuquerque | 1100 | 1360 | 13.3 |
+------------------------+---------------+--------------+--------+

All the rest are very slow, and available for little else than harbor
defence in time of war.

This concludes our review of the navies of the Continent. The
impressions which it has made upon my own mind are mainly these:
The minor naval powers are falling more or less completely out of
the lists of naval competition. Spain and Portugal have ceased to
be, and Greece has not become, of any naval importance—Spain alone
making some small effort to keep respectable, but even that effort is
chiefly expending itself—as that of the United States government is
about to expend itself, by-the-bye—in the production of very fast
vessels, which may be useful in preying upon commerce, but which
are scarcely fit to fight even pirates, and which a real war-ship
would dispose of with a single round of her battery fire. They will
be efficient in running away, no doubt, when danger arises; but
“running away” was not the method by which the United States won
naval distinction, nor that by which Spain once became great and
Greece immortal. The naval policy of Germany is defensive; she is
almost without pretensions upon the open sea. Turkey is slowly but
surely succumbing to Russia, and in the near future the Russian Black
Sea fleet will hold unquestioned mastery over Turkey. Italy has a
naval rôle of her own to play in Europe, and on the whole is playing
it well. Austria would do well to hesitate in her present naval
condition before again exposing herself to the swift and destructive
onslaughts which the tremendously armed and excessively fast Italian
ships could make upon her. France is a really great naval power, and
there are circumstances which would make a naval conflict between her
and England one of the most uncertain in the history of the world.
The French have very largely abandoned the protection of their guns
by armor; we, most unhappily, have still more largely abandoned
the protection of our ships, and it remains to be seen which has
been the most foolish. In such a conflict the French would have
this advantage over England—the overthrow of their guns, or the
destruction of their gunners at them, would not prevent their ships
themselves from withdrawing from action and repairing their injuries.
What would become of our _Ajaxes_, _Agamemnons_, our _Collingwoods_
and _Benbows_ (both these latter with guns as much exposed as the
French, by-the-bye), when their long, fragile ends had been smashed
and water-logged, and their high speed consequently gone, is a
question which I prefer not to speak of further. There was, there is,
there ever will be, but one sound policy for a nation that desires to
command the seas, and can afford to do so, and that is to reject all
doubtful fads, all dangerous fancies, and to insure without ceasing
pronounced superiority _in every known and measurable element of
naval power_. New inventions will and must be made; new sources of
power, new means of attack, will and must be discovered; but these
things take time and money and skill to develop, and that power is
the greatest and safest which from time to time and always prefers
the thing which must succeed to that which may, and which others fear
will, fail in the hour of trial. One hope I, the present writer,
have, and it is that the terrible development of the weapons of
war—for terrible it is with all its shortcomings—and the enormously
increasing cost alike of single actions and of conflicts between
squadrons and fleets, will tend to further, and to greatly further,
those influences which are happily operating in favor of peace and
good-will among men.

NOTES.

ITALY.

The characteristic development of the Italian navy has been the
abandonment of side-armor as a protection to stability, and the
attempt to obtain high speed and great coal endurance. This bold
departure in the matter of armor is due mainly to the fact that
Italy’s sea policy is governed by conditions which appeal nowhere
else with equal force. “It is the combination of a large army and a
powerful fleet,” writes Sir Charles Dilke, “which really makes Italy
formidable; for if Italy has only the fifth army it has the third
navy of all the powers. Captain à Court has admirably pointed out
how, for a young country, and a country with an overburdened budget,
it was not possible to build ship for ship against France, and not
within Italy’s power to create a fleet numerically equal to that of
France, but that it was possible to build a small number of enormous
sea-going iron-clads of the first class, ‘larger, stronger, swifter,
and more heavily armed than any afloat.’ Were Italy not protected
by a powerful fleet, such as might have some chance of holding its
own against the French in its own waters, the French fleet could be
used to destroy Italian mobilization if Italy had joined an alliance
against France. The Italian railway lines could be cut at many places
from the coast. Not only from Toulon and Ajaccio, but also from her
new port at Biserta, on the Tunisian coast, France could keep watch
and could pounce on Italy.

“The great difficulty, however, in the way of Italy is caused by
her want of coal, for Italy may be said to have no coal for her
ships, and the difficulty of getting coal to her southern ports in
time of war would be immense if she had not command of the seas. In
materially increasing the number of her large iron-clads Italy has
been aiming at nothing less than the command of the Mediterranean
as against France; but supposing that France were sufficiently free
from the risk of maritime attack elsewhere to be able to concentrate
her naval strength in the Mediterranean, it would be a delusion to
suppose that the Italian naval forces could hold their own against
the French. The Italian material is excellent, no doubt, but the
results of Lissa are not encouraging.

“To judge from naval expenditure, Italy seems to get a great deal
for her money. If we were to look at the figures we should suppose
that there were five navies in the world worth counting—the British
and French of the first class, and the Russian, German, and Italian
of the second class; but as a matter of fact the Russian and German
navies are not worth counting by the side of the Italian navy of
to-day. I doubt, however, whether the Italian, German, and Austrian
navies could possibly hope to hold the Mediterranean against those
of France and Russia, weak as is the Russian navy, in a general
Continental war, so high is the estimate which I form of the power of
France at sea. Russia, indeed, spends more upon her navy than does
Italy; but Russia probably does not get her money’s worth. Italy at
the present moment, in addition to the two splendid ships which she
has at sea, is building or equipping eight first-class sea-going
iron-clads as against seven being built by France and eleven by
ourselves, and she certainly seems to have, as regards the material
of her fleet, achieved remarkable results at a low rate of cost.

“The Italian fleet, in the event of war, would not have those
scattered duties to perform which would fall to the lot of the
French and English navies. The fleet of Italy would have to defend
the Italian coast against attack, and if possible to keep up the
communications with Sicily and Sardinia. Massowah would have to take
care of itself, and the Italian fleet would be concentrated, while
that of France, in some degree, would have to be dispersed over the
whole world; but unless France had to put forth on land such efforts
as to need the men and guns of her navy for the defence of her own
fortresses, the time of concentration in the Mediterranean would
arrive, and a great strain would be imposed upon the Italian fleet.

“Those who look upon the Italian navy as being a navy of offence
because it consists chiefly of iron-clads of the first class capable
of holding the seas, forget the necessity imposed upon Italy by her
shape and geographical position. It is impossible to defend the coast
of Italy by fortifications, and there is no country so vulnerable.
The mountains run down the centre of a long, narrow strip, and the
strategic railway lines are easily reachable from the sea. On the
south, too, Carthage once more threatens Rome. The Italian monster
iron-clads are certainly not too numerous for the defence of the
Italian coast, and in my belief the naval policy which has been
pursued by Italy is one which was necessary to her existence, and
she is to be congratulated upon the low price at which she has
succeeded in obtaining her splendid ships.”[45]

Owing to this extent and character of the Italian coast, the
government believes that absolute safety cannot be secured, and
all that may be expected is the disturbance or defeat of any great
attempt at invasion or bombardment. This the officials hope to effect
by dividing the attention of the enemy’s fleet, so that secondary
means of defence may be utilized against all attacks. The question,
therefore, resolves into one of ships. If armored vessels had to
resist the gun alone, effectual protection, they reason, could be
given by increasing the thickness of armor; but since the invention
of torpedoes, and the development of great speed in torpedo-boats,
the bottoms of ships and not the armored sides will be the points of
successful attack. The best vessels for their needs, therefore, will
be such as are capable of making the greatest impression on any given
point; that is, such as may be enabled by the partial abandonment
of armor to carry enormously heavy guns, and have great speed, the
highest coal endurance, and sufficient protection, by new structural
devices, to meet without fear any other vessel afloat.

The first fruits of this policy were seen in the central-citadel
battle-ships, _Duilio_ and _Dandolo_. Apart from their novelty, the
mere fact that the Italians could produce such machines with home
resources was a surprise to the rest of Europe. “The rise of iron
ship-building in Italy,” says the _London Engineer_, “is almost a
romance. It owes its origin to the far-seeing efforts of Italy’s
greatest statesman, Cavour.... Ten years ago it would have seemed
ludicrous to the builders on the Clyde had they been told that a
country which had no coal worth speaking of, and whose iron, though
abundant, was difficult to get at, and where, moreover, not half a
dozen men knew how to do the simplest iron ship-building job, would
in the course of those years not only beat them in quality but in
price, and would be turning out the largest, the most powerful, and
the best built vessels in the world. Such, however, is the case.”

Subsequently the Italian Admiralty realized that the ships of the
_Duilio_ design were deficient in speed and coal endurance, and that
their construction forbade the efficient use of a secondary armament
for defence against torpedo and other auxiliary boats. So, after much
earnest study, the _Italia_ type has been adopted. The account in
the text needs no amplification here, except to state that in her
steam trials she made a maximum speed of 18 and a mean speed of 17.66
knots per hour, although the 18,000 indicated horse-power required by
the contract was not developed. Eight of her 6-inch guns, it may be
added, have lately been removed.

The _Re Umberto_ and _Sicilia_ are steel barbette ships, similar to
the British _Admiral_ class without the partial armor-belt. Their
principal dimensions are, length 400 feet, beam 74 feet 9 inches,
mean draught 28 feet 7 inches, and displacement 13,251 tons. The
engines of the former are to develop 19,500 horse-power and 17 knots.
A complete steel deck three and a half inches thick protects the
under-water body. The battery is to consist of four 17-inch 106-ton
pair-mounted guns, carried on the fore-and-aft line in two barbettes,
which are protected by 18.9 inches of steel armor. There are in
addition a number of 6-inch breech-loading rifles, and a supply of
rapid-fire and machine guns, and of torpedo-tubes. The _Sardegna_, of
the same general type as the _Umberto_, is now being built at Spezzia.

The _Giovanni Bausan_, built at Elswick between 1882 and 1885, is
a ram-bowed, schooner-rigged steel cruiser, similar to, but larger
than, the _Esmeralda_, her dimensions being, length 280 feet, breadth
42 feet, draught 18½ feet, and displacement about 3100 tons. She has
an under-water protective steel deck one and a half inches thick,
and cork-filled cellular compartments about the water-line. The coal
supply is 600 tons, the coal endurance 5000 miles at 10 knots, and
with 6000 horse-power and 116 revolutions she made on trial a speed
of 17.5 knots. Her battery consists of two 10-inch, six 6-inch,
and a secondary armament of rapid-fire and machine guns, and of
torpedo-tubes.

The steel cruisers mentioned in the chapter, the _Etna_, _Stromboli_,
and _Vesuvio_, are 283 feet 6 inches in length, 43 feet in beam,
19 feet 3 inches in draught, and displace 3530 tons; with forced
draft 7700 indicated horse-power and 19 knots are to be developed.
Their armament is to consist of two 10-inch (25-ton) Armstrong
breech-loaders, mounted in an unarmored barbette on the fore
and aft line, six 6-inch guns on sponsons, eight rapid-fire and
machine guns, and four torpedo-tubes—two submerged at the bow and
two above water in broadside. The _Fieramosca_ of the same class
is slightly different in dimensions, and the _Tripoli_, _Goito_,
_Monzambano_, and _Montebello_ are rapid torpedo-cruisers, 229 feet
6 inches in length, 25 feet 10 inches in beam, 9 feet 6 inches in
mean draught, and of 741 tons displacement. They were designed to
develop 4200 indicated horse-power and a speed of 22 knots; but it
is claimed that the _Tripoli_, which was launched at Castellamare
in August, 1886, realized a speed of twenty-four knots, and
maintained a twenty-three knot rate for fifty miles. The engines
of the _Monzambano_ and _Montebello_ will be triple-expansion, and
those of the _Tripoli_ and _Goito_ of the two-cylinder compound
inclined type. These vessels have three screws, one shaft coming out
underneath the keel at an angle of eight degrees, while the others
are carried farther forward on either side. The armament consists
of four 57-millimetre and four 37-millimetre rapid-fire guns, of
three 37-millimetre revolving cannons, and of five torpedo-tubes,
two at the bow, fixed, and three training—one aft and one on each
beam. The _Confienza_, a small twin-screw cruiser of nearly the same
dimensions, carries four 4.72-inch guns, together with rapid-fire
and machine guns, and five torpedo-tubes. She is to develop 17.5
knots and 2800 horse-power, and, like the _Tripoli_ class in
general, has very light steel frames and plating, and resembles
outwardly an enlarged torpedo-boat. The _Folgore_ and _Saetta_ are
torpedo-vessels, similar in type to the _Tripoli_, but smaller; the
_Archimede_ and the _Galileo_ are armed despatch-vessels of the
_Barbarigo_ type; and the _Volturno_ and _Curtatone_ are cruising
gun-vessels. Other notable additions to the fleet are the partially
protected steel cruiser _Angelo Emo_, of 2100 tons, the _Dogali_, and
the National Line steamer _America_. The _Angelo Emo_ was designed
by Mr. White, and built at Elswick for the Greek government, but
subsequently she was bought by the Italians, and has, under her new
name, made a capital record. The _Dogali_ is a twin-screw, lightly
protected steel cruiser, built at Elswick. The displacement is 2000
tons, length 250 feet, and beam 37 feet; on the first trial the
triple-expansion engines developed 8100 horse-power and a speed of
18.5 knots, and later, with 7600 horse-power and 154 revolutions, a
speed of 19.66 knots was attained. The armament is to consist of six
5-inch guns mounted on sponsons—two on the forecastle, two on the
poop, and two in the waist.

The _America_ is 441 feet 8 inches in length over all, 51 feet
3 inches in beam, 38 feet 5 inches in depth, draws 26 feet aft,
displaces 6500 tons, has a coal capacity of 1550 tons, and develops
9000 horse-power and a maximum speed of 17 knots on a consumption
of 216 tons of coal per day. She is built of steel, was launched
in 1884, purchased in January, 1887, and when refitted is to do
duty as a torpedo-depot and transport-vessel. Two iron cruising
gun-vessels, the _Miseno_ and _Palinuro_, of 548 tons displacement,
430 horse-power, and 10 knots speed, have lately been added to the
fleet.

RUSSIA.

Russia has shown a marked independence in policy and design. Penned
in the Black Sea by treaties, and blockaded in the Baltic for nearly
half the year by ice, she has sought in coast-defence vessels, fast
commerce-destroyers and torpedo-vessels, the fleet best suited
to her necessities. In 1864 a number of monitors, built mainly
upon Ericsson’s system, were launched, and later four vessels,
sea-going, ten-knot turret-ships, were constructed. These are known
as the _Admiral_ class, and range in displacement from 3754 in the
_Lazareff_ to 3693 in the _Tchitchachoff_. About 1871 a radical
departure was made by the adoption for the Crimean defence of the
_circular_ or _Popoffka_ type. As the shallow waters of this coast
forbade the employment of anything normal in design except light,
unarmored gun-boats, recourse was had to a structure of circular
form, which with heavy weights could carry a great displacement upon
a relatively small draught. Two of these batteries, the _Novgorod_
and the _Admiral Popoff_, were laid down, the dimensions of the
latter being as follows: extreme diameter 121 feet, diameter of
bottom 96 feet, depth of hold at centre 14 feet, extreme draught 14
feet, and displacement 3550 tons. The nominal horse-power was 640,
and the number of screws six; the armament consisted of two 41-ton
breech-loading guns mounted _en barbette_ 13 feet 3 inches above
the water-load line, and of four smaller pieces in an unarmored
breastwork. The _Novgorod_ attained on her trial eight and a half
knots, and the _Popoff_ had a mean speed of eight knots.

The Russians were the first to solve the problem of an armored
cruiser in which great speed could be combined with effective
protection against the guns of a majority of the high-sea ships then
afloat. The _General Admiral_, launched in 1873, and the best known
of this class, is built of iron, wood sheathed under water, and
coppered. She is 285 feet 9 inches in length, 48 feet 2 inches in
beam, and with 21 feet mean draught has 4438 tons displacement. She
was designed to steam 13 knots, carry 1000 tons of fuel, and have a
coal endurance of 5900 miles at 10 knots; the battery and belt are
armored with six-inch plates; the belt is seven feet wide at the
water-line, and has, level with its upper edge, a highly curved deck
of iron. The type proved so successful that it has been reproduced
and improved in most of the great navies.

The _Catherine II._, _Tchesme_, and the _Sinope_ are the most
powerful battle-ships of the Russian fleet. The first and second
were launched in May, 1886, the third in June, 1887; they are built
of iron and steel (wood sheathed and coppered), have ram bows, and
are of the following dimensions: length 339 feet, beam 69 feet, mean
draught 26.5 feet, displacement 10,181 tons. They are encircled
by a belt of compound armor twelve to eighteen inches thick, and
have a complete 3-inch protective deck. Within a 14-inch armored
pear-shaped redoubt six 12-inch rifles are pair-mounted on Moncrieff
disappearing barbette carriages; seven 6-inch guns are carried on the
gun-deck—six in broadside and one on a shifting pivot mount—and
the secondary battery is composed of seven Hotchkiss revolving
cannon and seven torpedo-tubes. The engines of the _Catherine II._
and the _Tchesme_ are of the vertical compound three-cylinder type,
and are to develop 11,000 horse-power and 16 knots; the engines of
the _Sinope_ are of the triple-expansion type, and are to develop
10,000 horse-power with natural, and 13,000 with forced, draught. The
cost of each vessel will be about $4,500,000. The second ship of the
_Emperor Alexander II._ type, now building at St. Petersburg by the
Franco-Russian Company, and named the _Nicholas the First_, is to be
8440 tons in displacement, 327 feet in length, 67 feet in beam, and
have 25.5 feet draught. These ships carry a complete belt of steel
armor six to fourteen inches thick and nine feet wide, and a curved
steel deck, three inches thick, covers their under-water bodies. The
battery is to consist of two 12-inch guns, mounted in a pear-shaped
barbette tower forward; in the broadside there are to be four 9-inch,
eight 6-inch, and four 3.5-inch rifles, together with a number of
Hotchkiss guns. The barbette tower has steel armor, ten inches
thick, and the usual torpedo-tubes are to be supplied. The estimated
horse-power is 8000 and the speed 16 knots.

The _Vitias_ and _Rynda_, steel cruisers, in which the vital parts
will be covered by a curved steel deck one and a half inches thick,
are of 2965 tons displacement, develop 3000 indicated horse-power,
and have a speed of 15 knots. The _Pamjatj Azowa_, a cruiser of
the _Impérieuse_ type, with a partially armored belt and barbette
batteries, is expected to develop 8000 indicated horse-power and 17
knots.

The rapid, unarmored steel cruiser building at St. Nazaire, and named
the _Admiral Korniloff_, is of 5000 tons displacement, has triple
expansion engines, a curved steel deck to protect the machinery and
boilers, and a cellular subdivision, which it is hoped will insure
stability in case of perforation at or below the water-line. For the
Black Sea fleet six heavy gun-vessels have been projected; these
are the _Uralets_, _Tereto_, _Kubanets_, _Zaporojets_, _Donets_,
and _Chernomorets_, of 1224 tons displacement and 2000 horse-power;
their armament is to be two 8-inch guns, one 6-inch breech-loading
gun, two 6-pound rapid-fire pieces, four revolving cannons, and
two torpedo-tubes. The _Bobr_ and _Sivoutch_ are heavily armored
gun-vessels of a new type; the _Coreets_ and _Manchooria_ are small
twin-screw cruisers of 1213 tons displacement, and the _Aleuta_ is a
transport, the interior arrangements of which are designed mainly for
the storage and distribution of high explosives and torpedoes.

The remarkable development of machine-gun fire on board
torpedo-vessels is shown in the _Iljin_ and the _Saken_, a type
which occupies the middle ground between the smaller class of French
torpedo-cruisers and the British torpedo-boat catchers. The _Iljin_
carries twelve revolving cannons and seven Hotchkiss rapid-fire
guns, and has seven above-water torpedo-tubes, one on each side of
the stem, one on the port side of the stern, and four in broadside.
Russia has a most effective fleet of torpedo-boats, some of which
have attained very high speeds under the usual test conditions of
carrying 14½ tons of ballast, coal sufficient for 1200 miles, and a
crew of eighteen. The Russian officers have already shown their skill
and daring in this system of warfare, and, should they be called
upon, there is no doubt that the whole capacity of these boats will
be tested under the guidance of a courage and an intelligence which
are unsurpassed in any other navy of the world.

SPAIN.

On January 12, 1887, a new naval programme was announced by the
Spanish Government, and the following types and numbers of vessels
were designated as necessary for the modern fleet:

1. Eleven protected steel cruisers: eight to be of 3200 tons, and
three of 4500 tons displacement. The armament will be of the 9.45 or
the 11-inch calibre Hontoria breech-loading guns, mounted on central
pivots, with smaller pieces in broadside and a secondary battery of
rapid-fire guns and torpedoes. All the ships are to be constructed
on the cellular system, with double bottoms and water-tight
compartments, are to have triple-expansion engines and twin screws,
and are expected to attain a speed of 19 knots with natural, and 21
knots with forced draft.

2. Six steel torpedo-cruisers of 1500 tons displacement and a speed
of 23 knots. They are to mount central-pivot guns from 6.3 to 7
inches in calibre, in addition to a number of smaller broadside guns,
revolving cannons, and torpedoes.

3. Four torpedo-cruisers of 1100 tons displacement, to develop a
speed of from 18 to 21 knots, and to be furnished with a heavy
primary and the usual secondary battery.

4. Twelve steel torpedo gun-boats, six to be of 600 tons
displacement, and six of 350 tons, with a speed of not less than 16
knots.

5. Sixteen steel torpedo gun-boats of 200 or 250 tons displacement,
with a speed of 14 to 16 knots.

6. Ninety-six torpedo-boats, 100 to 120 tons displacement, with a
maximum speed of 24 knots, and a coal endurance of 1500 miles.

7. Forty-two torpedo-boats of 60 to 70 tons displacement.

8. One transport of 3000 tons, to be equipped as a floating arsenal
or machine-shop.

9. Twenty steel steam-launches of from 30 to 35 tons displacement,
built on the life-boat system, and fitted with triple-expansion
engines, to drive the boats from 12 to 14 knots per hour.

The cost of the new fleet will be:

For new vessels 189,900,000 Pesetas.
For completing vessels now building 22,600,000 ”
For arsenals 10,000,000 ”
For submarine defence 2,500,000 ”
-----------
Total 225,000,000[46] ”

When these vessels are finished Spain will have the following fleet:

NEW VESSELS. PRESENT VESSELS.

Armor-clad 1 Armor-clads 2
First-class cruisers 12 First-class cruisers 6
Second-class cruisers 13 Second-class cruisers 16
Torpedo gun-boats 32 Smaller vessels 37
First-class torpedo-boats 100 ---
Second-class torpedo-boats 50 Total afloat 61
Steam-launches 20 To be constructed 229
Arsenal transport 1 ---
--- Grand total of fleet 290
Total 229

In the _Reina Regente_ the Spanish government expects to have the
fastest cruiser afloat. Her keel was laid in the Thompson’s Yard
at Clydebank on June 11, 1886, and she was launched February 24,
1887. She is built of steel, is 320 feet in length, 50 feet 7 inches
in beam, has a sea-going displacement of 4800 tons, and with her
full capacity of coal and stores on board, a displacement of 5600
tons. The motive power consists of two independent, horizontal,
triple-expansion engines (each working in its own compartment),
which are capable of developing with forced draft 12,000 indicated
horse-power and a speed of 20.5 knots. The battery will consist of
four 9.45-inch Hontoria rifles, mounted on platforms raised four
feet above the deck, and situated two forward and two abaft the
superstructure; of six 4.72-inch Hontoria guns, two mounted each side
on sponsons, and one each side in a recessed port; of eight 6-pounder
rapid-fire guns, six revolving cannons, and five above-water
torpedo-tubes. The ship has a complete steel deck, curving from about
six feet below the water-line to its horizontal height; this latter
section is about one-third the width of the ship, and is three inches
thick over the engines and boilers, and one inch thick for the rest,
while the inclined and curved sides are four and three-quarter inches
thick. To assist in excluding water when pierced, a complete belt of
cellulose extends around the ship inside the inner skin, and about
the height of the water-line.

The torpedo-boat chaser _Destructor_ is not only a good sea-boat,
and capable of making a long passage at high speed, but has proved
herself to be one of the fastest vessels afloat. She has 350 tons
normal displacement, and when fully loaded and equipped 458 tons. Her
engines have developed 3829 indicated horse-power. During ten days
in November, 1886, a maximum speed of 23¾ knots was attained, and on
December 13th of that year she reached a mean speed for four hours
of 22.65 knots, and an estimated coal endurance of 5100 miles at 11½
knots, and of 700 miles at full speed. In January, 1887, she ran in
twenty four hours from Falmouth to Finisterre, thus covering the 495
miles at a mean speed of 21 knots.

The _Pelayo_, a barbette ship of the _Amiral Duperré_ class, has a
complete water-line belt of steel, 6 feet 11 inches wide, and from
11.8 to 17.72 inches thick. The steel armor on the barbette towers
is 11.8 inches, and the protective deck which extends throughout her
length is 3.5 inches thick. The dimensions are as follows: Length
344 feet 6 inches, beam 66 feet 3 inches, draught 24 feet 8 inches,
and displacement 9902 tons. The armament consists of two 12.6-inch
48-ton guns in the barbettes; of two 11-inch guns on sponsons, one
each side; of twelve 4.72-inch guns in broadside, and of one 6.3-inch
piece in the bow. The secondary battery is composed of fourteen
rapid-fire and machine guns and seven torpedo-tubes. The contract
horse-power is 7000, the speed 15 knots, and the coal endurance (the
supply being 700 tons) is sufficient for 885 miles at 15 knots, and
2340 miles at 13 knots. The five ships of the _Infanta Isabel_ class
are launched, and the small steel cruisers _Isla de Luzon_ and _Isla
de Cuba_ are rapidly approaching completion.

AUSTRIA.

Austria has under construction this year the two armor coast-defence
vessels described in the text: the _Tiger_, a 3800 ton protected
cruiser of the latest type, and the _Meteor_, a torpedo-cruiser of
the _Leopard_ and _Panther_ class. These last-mentioned important
additions to the fleet are 224 feet long, 34 feet beam, 14 feet
draught, and of 1550 tons displacement. They differ from the English
_Condor_ and the French _Archer_ in these particulars: first, the
steel protective deck is not continuous; secondly, the engines are
of the vertical, inverted, triple-expansion type; and thirdly, the
engine cylinders are protected by steel shields surrounded by coal
or sand-bags. The armament consists of four large-range Krupp guns,
mounted in sponsoned turrets, of numerous machine and rapid-fire
pieces, and of four above-water torpedo-tubes. Under natural draft
17.6 knots, and with forced 18.9 knots, were accomplished.

The 87-ton torpedo-boats _Falke_ and _Adler_, built by Messrs. Yarrow
& Co., are 135 feet long, with 14 feet beam, 5½ feet draught aft and
2¼ feet forward. The engines are of the three-cylinder, compound,
surface-condensing type, and developed 1250 horse-power and 22.4
knots in fighting trim. The coal supply of twenty-eight tons is
expected to give an endurance of two thousand miles at ten knots.
Their armament is composed of two machine guns and two torpedo-tubes,
which discharge straight ahead. The _Habicht_, a 90-ton torpedo-boat,
built by Schichau, was designed to develop with a load of 14½ tons a
speed of 20½ knots, and to have a coal endurance of 3500 miles at a
10-knot rate; but on trial she realized 21.77 knots for three hours.
It is understood that future boats will be much larger, approaching
300 to 400 tons displacement. The budget for 1887 provides 720,000
florins for torpedo-boats and vessels.

Though Austria holds a secondary place as a maritime power, she is,
of all the Continental nations, the one most liable to precipitate
the next great war, and it seems strange, therefore, that she does
not try to acquire a great number of those special classes of ships
which, after all, are the only logical answers the weaker naval
countries can make to the more powerful.

“While the Austrian military position, in spite of the desire of
the emperor for military reform, is still weak, I cannot find words
too strong to praise the political ability with which the Austrian
empire is being kept at peace and kept together. The Austrian empire
is a marvel of equilibrium. The old simile of a house of cards is
exactly applicable to its situation; and just as in the exercises of
acrobats, when seven or nine men are borne by one upon his shoulders,
it is rather skill than strength which sustains them; so, if we look
to the Austrian constitution, which we shall have to consider in the
next paper in this series, it is a miracle how the fabric stands at
all. At the same time it is impossible for Austria, although she can
maintain her stability in times of peace, to impose upon either her
Russian or her German neighbors as to her strength for war. Prince
Bismarck is obliged, with whatever words of public and private praise
for the speeches of the Austrian and Hungarian statesmen, to add the
French and Russian forces together upon his fingers, and to deduct
from them the Austrian and the German, with doubts as to the attitude
of Italy, doubts as to the attitude of England, and contemptuous
certainty as to the attitude of Turkey.

“If Austria could have presented Prince Bismarck not only with an
English alliance, but with an English, Turkish, and Italian alliance,
he might possibly have allowed her to provoke a general war; but
with the difficulties attendant upon a concession of territory to
Italy, except in the last resort, and with Turkey at the feet of
Russia, it was difficult for Prince Bismarck to go further than to
say to Austria, ‘Fight by all means, if you feel yourself strong
enough to beat Russia single-handed. France and Germany will “see all
fair,” and you can hardly expect anybody effectually to help you.’
Prince Bismarck deals with foreign affairs on the principles upon
which they were dealt with by King Henry VIII. of England, when that
king was pitted against the acutest intellects of the empire and of
France. His policy is a plain and simple policy, and not a policy of
astuteness and cunning, and almost necessarily at the present time
consists in counting heads.”[47]

There have been no additions of any importance to the fleets of the
other European powers since the publication of Sir Edward Reed’s
article, and their policy has in no way been changed from that
epitomized in the text. The apathy of Germany is inexplicable, and
as for the others, there seem, except with Turkey, perhaps, no good
reasons why they should strive to create fleets, as they are either
too poor to build and support them, or their dangers from maritime
attack are not great enough to make a large navy necessary.

Holland has lately launched the _Johan Willem Friso_, which is the
last of six large cruisers, “of which the others are the _Atjeh_,
_Tromp_, _Konigin Emma der Nederlanden_, _De Ruyter_, and _Van
Speyk_.... All these vessels are built of iron and steel, sheathed
with wood to four feet above the water-line, and coppered. They are
of 3400 tons displacement and of the following dimensions: Length
262 feet 5 inches, beam 39 feet 4 inches, and mean draught 18 feet 4
inches. Their armament is six 6.7-inch Krupp guns (one carried in the
bow, one in the stern, and the others in broadside), four 4.72-inch
Krupp pieces in broadside, six 37-millimetre revolving cannons, and
a supply of Whitehead torpedoes. The engines drive single screws,
and have an estimated horse-power of 3000, which has been slightly
exceeded by some and not attained by others. The speeds vary from
14.1 knots to 14.7 knots. The coal supply is 400 tons—sufficient for
six and three-quarter days’ steaming at full speed or for thirteen
days at ten knots.”[48]

Denmark has the _Valkyrien_, a steel cruiser of 2900 tons, fitted
with a good battery and five torpedo-tubes, and designed to develop
5000 horse-power and 17 knots. Her new double-turreted, armored,
coast-defence vessel _Iver Huitfeldt_ has developed a maximum speed
of 15.6 knots.

From data furnished by First-lieutenant Tasker H. Bliss, U. S.
Artillery, the peace strength of the principal Continental nations
may be summarized as follows:

Part 1 of 2
+----------------------------------------------------+
| PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT. |
+---------+-------------+---------+--------+---------+
| Country | Population. | Army. | Navy. | Total. |
+---------+-------------+---------+--------+---------+
| Germany | 45,234,000 | 427,274 | 11,109 | 438,383 |
| Russia | 78,000,000 | 760,000 | 29,008 | 789,000 |
| Austria | 38,000,000 | 287,000 | 8,500 | 295,500 |
| Italy | 29,000.000 | 210,373 | 15,055 | 225,428 |
| France | 37,672,000 | 518,642 | 43,235 | 561,877 |
| England | 35,000,000 | 199,000 | 58,000 | 257,000 |
+---------+-------------+---------+--------+---------+

Part 2 of 2
+----------------------------------------------------+
| COST. |
+---------+-------------+-------------+--------------+
| Country | Army. | Navy. | Total. |
+---------+-------------+-------------+--------------+
| Germany | $86,000,000 | $10,000,000 | $96,000,000 |
| Russia | 146,000,000 | 20,500,000 | 166,500,000 |
| Austria | 58,500,000 | 3,500,000 | 62,000,000 |
| Italy | 41,000,000 | 10,000,000 | 51,000,000 |
| France | 119,250,000 | 41,000,000 | 160,250,000 |
| England | 78,000,000 | 53,750,000 | 131,750,000 |
+---------+-------------+-------------+--------------+

A rough analysis of these figures shows that in strength of army
Russia is first, France second, Germany third, Austria fourth, Italy
fifth, and England sixth; and that in naval strength England is
first, France second, Russia third, Italy fourth, Germany fifth, and
Austria sixth. The cost of each nation’s navy is in direct proportion
to its strength of _personnel_; but in armies England, though last in
numbers, changes place with Italy, which supports its forces with the
least expenditure. It may be added that in total cost England, with
next to the smallest force, pays more than Germany, with the third
largest in numbers.

The percentage of expenditures is as follows:

+---------------------------------+-------------------+--------------+
| | | Taxation per |
|SERVICE PER CAPITA OF POPULATION.| COST PER MAN. | Inhabitant |
| | | to Support |
+---------+-------+-------+-------+---------+---------+ the Peace |
| Country.| Army. | Navy. | Total.| Army. | Navy. |Establishment.|
+---------+-------+-------+-------+---------+---------+--------------+
| Germany | 0.94 | 0.02 | 0.96 | $201.00 | $900.00 | $2.12 |
| Russia | 0.97 | 0.04 | 1.01 | $192.00 | $707.00 | $2.13 |
| Austria | 0.77 | 0.02 | 0.79 | $204.75 | $411.75 | $1.65 |
| Italy | 0.73 | 0.05 | 0.78 | $194.75 | $664.25 | $1.75 |
| France | 1.37 | 0.11 | 1.48 | $230.00 | $931.00 | $4.25 |
| England | 0.57 | 0.16 | 0.73 | $391.50 | $924.75 | $3.76 |
+---------+-------+-------+-------+---------+---------+--------------+

An examination of _Lloyd’s Universal Register of Shipping_ for 1887
shows that the present condition of European navies may be popularly
stated in this manner: England has 6 guns capable of penetrating 36
inches of unbacked iron, and 16 others which can penetrate 28 inches
of the same material; Italy has 20 guns which can penetrate 33 inches
of iron; France has 14 guns which can pierce 27 inches, and 14 others
able to penetrate 25 inches of unbacked iron. Russia has 20 guns and
Spain 2 which can pierce 24 inches of iron. No other power has any
guns capable of equivalent results. In other words, of guns able to
penetrate 24 inches of unbacked iron, France has 28, Italy 20, Russia
20, Spain 2, and Great Britain 22.

In war-ships of 20 knots and above, England has 1, France 1, Italy
10, Spain 2, and other European nations 4; of 19 knots speed, England
has 11 ships, France 10, Germany 3, Italy 2, and other nations 9;
of 18-knot ships, England has 5, France 7, Germany 2, Italy 6, and
other nations 6. English supremacy is, however, chiefly seen in
17-knot ships, of which she has 25, mounting 181 guns; France, 4 with
20 guns; Italy, 5 with 40 guns; and other nations 4 with 19 guns.
England has 11 ships of 90 guns that can steam 16 knots, whereas
France has 3 only of 58 guns. At 15 knots, France has 16 ships of 214
guns, and England 12 ships of 126 guns; and at 14 knots, France has
28 ships of 334 guns, and England 15 ships of 252 guns. Summarizing
these figures, it appears that with speeds above 14 knots England has
80 ships of 795 guns, France 69 of 699 guns, Germany 35 of 285 guns,
and Italy 41 of 201 guns.

Out of a total mercantile tonnage now afloat of 20,943,650, Great
Britain and her colonies own 10,539,136. The total steam mercantile
tonnage of the world is 10,531,843, and of this Great Britain and her
colonies own 6,595,871, or nearly two-thirds of the whole.

THE UNITED STATES NAVY.

IN TRANSITION.

BY REAR-ADMIRAL EDWARD SIMPSON, U.S.N.

The condition of the navy of the United States is not such as any
citizen of the country would desire. Pride in their navy was one of
the earliest sentiments that inspired the hearts of the people when
the United States took their place as a nation, and the memory of
its deeds has not faded during the subsequent years of the country’s
aggrandizement. Time was when that section of the country most remote
from the sea-coast was indifferent to it, owing to the more immediate
demand on its attention for the development of internal resources;
but the rapid settlement of our Western lands, and the annihilation
of distance produced by rapid communication, have tended to preserve
the unity of interests of the separate sections, and the happy system
that obtains through which officers are appointed to the navy keeps
it an object of personal concern to all the States of the Union.

The present condition of the navy is not such as to satisfy the
desire of the people that it should be sustained on a footing
commensurate with the position of the nation, and in keeping with
its ancient reputation. For many years circumstances have intervened
to prevent a judicious rehabilitation of the navy, notwithstanding
that its needs have been faithfully presented to Congress year after
year. The country has been wonderfully favored with peace at home and
abroad, and no urgent call to arms has roused the nation to prepare
for war. The rapidity with which a large fleet of cruising ships for
blockading purposes was extemporized during our civil war has left a
hurtful impression on the public mind that in an emergency a similar
effort might prove equally efficacious—disregarding altogether the
difference in circumstances of contending with an enemy possessed of
a naval force and with one possessed of none. The economists have
suggested that as all that relates to ships, guns, and motive forces
was being rapidly developed by others, it would be a saving of the
people’s money to await results, and to benefit by the experience of
others; and, again, party rivalry and contentions have assisted to
postpone action.

It has never been the intention that the navy should die from neglect
and be obliterated. Yearly appropriations have been faithfully
passed for the support of the _personnel_, and for such repairs
as were found to be indispensable for the old ships that have
been kept in commission; but it is now seen that this system of
temporizing has been the poorest kind of economy. This money has been
invested necessarily in perishable material, the amounts have been
insufficient to compass new constructions, whether in ships or guns,
and the only use that could be made of them was to repair wooden
ships and convert cast-iron guns, whereas the work needed was to
construct steel ships and to fabricate steel guns.

In referring to the navy of the past, it is impossible to avoid
recalling the feeling of pride with which an American seaman—officer
or man—walked the deck of his ship. This feeling was common to the
naval and commercial marine. Our wooden ships that sailed the ocean
from 1840 to 1860 were the finest in the world. The old frigate
_Congress_ in 1842 was the noblest specimen of the frigates of the
day, and the sloop-of-war _Portsmouth_ was unsurpassed as a corvette.
The clipper ships of that period need no eulogy beyond their own
record. These ships were the models for the imitation of all maritime
nations, and among the constructors of the period can be recalled,
without detriment to many others omitted, the names of Lenthall,
Steers, Pook, and Delano. The poetry of sailing reached its zenith
during this period.

But there is no sentiment in progress; its demands are practical and
imperative, and the great motive power, steam, was being crowded to
the front even during this the greatest development in the era of
sails. Advanced ideas could not be resisted, and steam was admitted
as an auxiliary; but our development in naval construction still
stood us in good stead, and enabled us to supply ships with auxiliary
steam-power, which continued to be prominent for many years as
standards to which others found it to their advantage to conform.

Before the final abandonment in the navy of sailing-ships, pure and
simple, an effort at a compromise was made by limiting steam to
side-wheel vessels, and a number of fine ships were built in the
forties which did good service, and were a credit to the country,
answering as they did the demands of the time. The _Mississippi_,
_Missouri_, _Susquehanna_, _Saranac_, and _Powhatan_ carried the flag
to all parts of the world for many years, some of them enduring to
bear their share in the late war, while the _Powhatan_ was borne on
the list of vessels of the navy until within a few months.

[Illustration: U. S. SIDE-WHEEL STEAMER “POWHATAN.”]

This vessel was built at Norfolk, Virginia, in the year 1850. Her
length was 250 feet, beam 45 feet, draught of water 19.6 feet. She
had a displacement of 3980 tons, and attained a speed of 10.6 knots
per hour with an indicated horse-power of 1172. The capacity of her
coal-bunkers was 630 tons. Her battery consisted of sixteen 9-inch
smooth-bore guns. She was built of seasoned live-oak, and though
frequently under repairs, retained so much of the strength of her
original construction that she escaped the sentence of condemnation
until recently.

The _Princeton_, of great fame, and the _San Jacinto_, were the
only ships with screw-propellers that appeared in the period under
consideration, the screw then being considered of such doubtful
propriety as to need the test of tentative experiments. These ships
have long since disappeared, but the screw remains, and side-wheels
are mainly relegated to boats for inland waters.

Confidence being established in the screw-propeller, construction
on the principle of auxiliary steam-power was decided on, and ships
of different classes were added to the navy in such numbers as the
varied duties required.

There were those at that time who, wise beyond their generation,
recognized the full meaning of the advent of steam, and saw that it
must supplant sails altogether as the motive power for ships. These
advocated that new constructions should be given full steam-power,
with sails as an auxiliary. But the old pride in the sailing-ship,
with her taunt and graceful spars, could not be made to yield at
once to the innovation; nor could the old traditions pointing to
the necessity of full sail-power be dispelled; so it was considered
a sufficient concession to admit steam on any terms, and thus the
conservative and temporizing course was adopted of retaining full
sail-power, and utilizing steam as an auxiliary.

The United States government was not alone in this policy. It was the
course pursued by all other maritime nations, and for some years the
United States retained the lead in producing the most perfect types
in this new phase of naval construction.

In 1854 Congress passed an act authorizing the construction of the
_Merrimac_ class of frigates. The famous ships immediately built
under this act were the _Merrimac_, _Wabash_, _Minnesota_, _Roanoke_,
and _Colorado_. All of these vessels got to sea during 1856 and 1857,
and were followed, at an interval of ten years, by the _Franklin_,
which was a larger ship, and an improvement on the original type.

The _Franklin_ was built at Kittery, Maine. Her length is 266 feet,
beam 54 feet, draught of water 24 feet. She has a displacement
of 5170 tons, and attains a speed of 10 knots per hour with an
indicated horse-power of 2065. The capacity of her coal-bunkers is
860 tons. Her frames are of seasoned live-oak, and she is in use as a
receiving-ship.

[Illustration: U. S. FRIGATE “FRANKLIN,” OF THE “MERRIMAC” CLASS.]

The _Merrimac_ was the first vessel of this type which got to sea.
She was sent to European waters, and on her arrival in England, early
in 1856, she became at once the object of the closest scrutiny,
resulting in the unqualified approval of foreign naval architects.
The English Admiralty proceeded to imitate the type, and many keels
were soon laid in order to reproduce it. The ships built after this
model were the crack ships of the time in the English navy, and
carried the flags of the commanders-in-chief of fleets.

In 1858, 1859, and 1860, the _Hartford_ class of large corvettes
appeared. These are full-rigged ships. The class comprises the
_Hartford_, _Brooklyn_, _Pensacola_, _Richmond_, and _Lancaster_.

[Illustration: U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAR “HARTFORD.”]

The _Hartford_ was built at Boston in 1858. Her length is 225 feet,
beam 44 feet, draught of water 18.3. She has a displacement of 2900
tons, and attains a speed of 10 knots per hour with an indicated
horse-power of 940. The capacity of her coal-bunkers is 241 tons.
Her battery consists of one 8-inch muzzle-loading rifle (converted)
and 12 9-inch smooth-bores. These ships were built of live-oak, and
endure to the present day. They were reproduced by England and France
when they made their appearance, and are now, except the _Trenton_,
the only ships in service which can accommodate a commander-in-chief
of a squadron. They are kept constantly employed showing the flag
abroad, but it is with difficulty that they are retained in suitable
repair for service.

[Illustration: U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAR “BROOKLYN.”]

This class of ships has good speed under sail, with the wind free,
but their light draught prevents them from being weatherly on a wind.
Much of their cruising is done under sail, which tends to lengthen
their existence. Under the late act of Congress prohibiting repairs
on wooden ships when the expense shall exceed twenty per cent. of
the cost of a new vessel, these ships must soon disappear from the
navy list. When that time shall arrive, and steel cruisers shall
be substituted, the name of the _Hartford_ should be preserved as
closely associated with the glory that Farragut shed upon the navy.

In 1859 a new type of sloop-of-war was introduced, of which the
_Kearsarge_ will serve as an example. This ship was built at
Kittery, Maine; her length is 199 feet, beam 33 feet, draught of
water 15.9 feet. She has a displacement of 1550 tons, and attains a
speed of 11 knots per hour with an indicated horse-power of 842. The
capacity of her coal-bunkers is 165 tons. Her battery consists of two
8-inch muzzle-loading rifles (converted), four 9-inch smooth-bores,
and one 60-pounder. This has proved a very handy class of vessel,
and for the year in which they were built were considered as having
very fair speed under steam, the proportion of space occupied by
boilers and engines being more than had been assigned in previous
constructions. Several ships of this class were launched and put in
commission before the war, and gave a new impetus to construction.

[Illustration: U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAR “KEARSARGE.”]

The types of vessels that were built during the war were selected for
special purposes. The effort was made to multiply ships as rapidly
as possible to blockade the coast and to enter shoal harbors; the
“ninety-day gun-boats” and the “double-enders” were added to the navy
list, and merchant-steamers were purchased, and were armed with such
batteries as their scantling would bear. All of these vessels have
disappeared, with the exception of the _Tallapoosa_. The _Juniata_
and _Ossipee_, of the _Kearsarge_ type, but of greater displacement,
were launched in 1862, and are still in service; and at about the
close of the war several vessels of large displacement and great
speed were launched which were never taken into service, have been
disposed of since, and form no part of our present navy.

The _New Ironsides_ and the _Monitor_ represented the two features
of construction which, produced in that period of emergency, have
continued to impress naval architecture.

[Illustration: U. S. IRON-CLAD “NEW IRONSIDES.”]

As a sea-going iron-clad the _New Ironsides_ was, for the time and
service required, a success. She was built at the yard of Mr. Cramp,
in Philadelphia, in 1862. Her length was 230 feet, beam 56 feet,
draught of water 15 feet. She had a displacement of 4015 tons, and
attained a speed of six knots per hour with an indicated horse-power
of 700. The capacity of the coal-bunkers was 350 tons. Her battery
consisted of twenty 11-inch smooth-bore guns. She was built of wood,
and was covered with armor four inches in thickness, which, with the
inclination given to her sides, made her impervious to the artillery
that was used against her during the war. In one engagement with the
batteries on Sullivan’s Island, Charleston Harbor, lasting three
hours, she was struck seventy times, but at the end of the action,
except some damage to a port shutter or two, she withdrew in as
perfect fighting condition as when the fight commenced. This ship
does not appear on the navy list, as she was destroyed by fire off
the navy-yard at League Island, Pennsylvania.

The _Monitor_ was, without doubt, the most remarkable production
of the constructive art that appeared during the war. The original
_Monitor_ was lost at sea, but our illustration presents the
_Passaic_ class of Monitors, which quickly followed the original of
this type.

[Illustration: U. S. MONITOR “PASSAIC.”]

The _Passaic_ was built of iron, and was launched in 1862. Her
length is 200 feet, beam 46 feet, draught of water 11.6 feet. She
has a displacement of 1875 tons, and attains a speed of seven knots
per hour with an indicated horse-power of 377. The capacity of
her coal-bunkers is 140 tons. Her battery consists of one 15-inch
smooth-bore and one 11-inch smooth-bore. Her sides are protected
by five inches of laminated iron, and her turret by eleven inches
of the same. This vessel and eleven others of her class constitute
the entire armored fleet of the United States. Too much credit
cannot be awarded to Captain Ericsson for his brilliant conception
of this floating battery, and the navy must be ever grateful to him
for preserving it from the dire disaster which was averted by the
appearance of the original _Monitor_ at the moment of a great crisis.
These vessels bore themselves well through the storms of elements
and battle during the war, proving capable of making sea-voyages,
and of resisting the effects of the artillery that was in use during
the period of their usefulness; but an interval of more than
twenty years has produced such a change in artillery as to make the
protection afforded by a few laminated plates of one-inch iron but a
poor defence against weapons which have robbed this fleet of its once
formidable character. Although many of the features of the original
design may be retained in new constructions, most of the details will
be changed, notably in the turret, in consequence of the greater
weight resulting from the increased thickness of armor. The central
spindle around which the Ericsson turret revolves must disappear, and
the turret must turn on rollers under the base.

The effect produced abroad by the success of Ericsson’s _Monitor_ is
so familiar to all that it hardly needs more than a passing allusion
here. There is no doubt that the _Monitor_ was the progenitor
of all the turreted vessels in the fleets of the world, though
the essential principle of the vessel, however, was never viewed
with favor. This principle consists in the low freeboard, which,
besides reducing the size of the target, is intended to contribute
to the steadiness of the hull as a gun-platform by offering no
resistance to the waves that are expected to wash freely over the
vessel’s deck: the horizontal overhang of the _Passaic_ class is
intended to contribute to resisting a rolling motion. The vessel
was designed to be as a raft on the water, constantly submerged by
the passing waves, hermetically sealed to prevent the admission
of water, and artificially ventilated by means of blowers drawing
air down through the turret. This was the most startling feature
about the construction. The protection afforded to the battery by a
circular turret having the form best suited to deflect projectiles,
the employment of machinery to point the guns by the rotation of the
turret, the protection to motive power, to anchoring apparatus, etc.,
all presented admirable points of advantage, but the almost perfect
immersion of the hull, and the absence of motion due to the _great
stability_, are the essential features in the construction.

[Illustration: U. S. DOUBLE-TURRETED MONITOR “TERROR.”]

The double-turreted Monitors, of which the _Terror_ indicates the
class, were built with a sponson, and it would have been better for
the navy if this had been the only deviation made from the original
design of Captain Ericsson. But it was not; the great mistake
was made of building this class of Monitors of wood—a style of
construction which had been already condemned abroad, in consequence
of the impossibility of repairing an armored vessel so constructed,
it being necessary to remove the armor for that purpose.

The _Miantonomoh_, _Monadnock_, and _Terror_ were completed and put
in commission. The _Miantonomoh_ made a cruise to European waters,
spreading the fame of Ericsson, and proving the ability of a vessel
of this type to navigate the high seas; the _Monadnock_ made the
voyage to the Pacific, passing through the Strait of Magellan; and
the _Terror_ was for a time on service on our eastern coast; but
their lifetime was of short duration, and they are now being rebuilt,
or rather new vessels, three of which bear their names, are now under
construction of iron, which will serve to make them efficient and
durable.

It will hardly be a digression at this point to call attention
more particularly to these double-turreted Monitors now under
construction. They bear the following names, _viz._, _Puritan_,
_Terror_, _Amphitrite_, _Miantonomoh_, and _Monadnock_. There was
much contention about the completion of these vessels, and imaginary
defects were ventilated in the newspapers. It may be that these
attacks and erroneous statements prejudiced the public mind, and
that the idea was entertained by some whose opinion is valued that
there were grounds for the doubts that had been expressed of their
sea-worthiness. The practical effect of these statements was to
prevent Congress from appropriating money for the completion of the
vessels, and this course on the part of Congress might have confirmed
some in their doubts. Several boards of officers, most competent
experts, however, reported upon them, recommending their completion;
of these that made by the Advisory Board may be regarded as a final
decision, for it was accepted without question. The Advisory Board
reported as follows:

“It is our opinion that it would be wise and expedient to finish
these vessels at once, and for the following reasons, _viz._:

“1. The hulls, as they are at present, are of excellent
workmanship, fully up to the present standard condition of iron
ship construction, whilst the flotation of the _Puritan_ and the
behavior of the _Miantonomoh_ at sea confirm the correctness of the
calculations of the designs.

“2. It is easily possible to complete the vessels by taking
advantage of the recent developments in armor, guns, and machinery,
without making any radical changes in the designs, so that their
speed, endurance, battery power, protection, and sea-going
qualities shall be fully equal to those of any foreign iron-clad of
similar dimensions designed previous to 1879.

“3. The vessels may be finished so as to develop all the
above-mentioned advantages without making their total cost, when
completed, in any way exorbitant, compared with the results
obtained; again, the interests of our sea-coast defence require a
force at least equal to that which would be represented by these
vessels.

“We take the liberty of calling your attention to a certain
erroneous impression which now exists with regard to these vessels.
In one of the reports of these hulls a doubt was thrown on the
correctness of the calculations of the _Puritan_. This doubt has
spread in the public mind until it includes all the ships. The
actual flotation of the _Puritan_ and the _Miantonomoh_ proves
beyond question not only the reliability of the calculations, but
also that the hulls of these vessels are lighter in proportion to
the total displacement than those of any iron-clad low freeboard
hulls afloat, with two exceptions.

“It has been the unfortunate custom, in arguments as to the value
of the results to be obtained, to compare these vessels with such
foreign ships as the _Inflexible_ and the _Duilio_, to the evident
disadvantage of the Monitors, no account whatever being taken of
the fact that these vessels are double the size of the Monitors. If
these hulls be compared with foreign ones of similar dimensions, no
such disparity will appear.”

These vessels, with the exception of the _Monadnock_, have their
machinery in place; the _Miantonomoh_ has her side armor on; the
others are finished as to their hulls, except the interior fittings,
side armor, and turrets. The estimated cost to complete them is about
four millions of dollars. When we consider the very slight defence
that the country now possesses in the single-turreted Monitors before
alluded to, it would seem imperative to complete with all despatch
these vessels, which would represent a force of real power.

These vessels are of iron as to the hulls, but they will be armored
with steel or compound armor, and will be armed with the most
powerful modern artillery that can be accommodated in their turrets.
Their names appear in the navy list as “building.” They were launched
in 1883.

[Illustration: U. S. FRIGATE “TENNESSEE.”]

The double-decked ship _Tennessee_ was the only frigate, or
“first-rate,” borne, up to within a few months, on the list of
vessels of the navy as available for sea service. She was for many
years in commission as the flag-ship of the North Atlantic Station,
but this year she reached that condition when the twenty per cent.
law consigned her to “ordinary,” from which she has lately been
removed under the operation of the hammer of the auctioneer. She was
launched in 1865. Her length was 335 feet, beam 45 feet, draught of
water 21.8 feet. She had a displacement of 4840 tons, and attained
a speed of 11 knots with an indicated horse-power of 1900. The
capacity of her coal-bunkers was 381 tons. Her battery consisted
of two 8-inch muzzle-loading rifles (converted), sixteen 9-inch
smooth-bores, and four 80-pounders.

The vessels next in order of construction are those of the _Adams_
class, small sloops-of-war, which were launched in 1874.

[Illustration: U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAR “ADAMS.”]

These vessels were built of wood. They are convenient and handy,
and perform the duty required of a cruiser in time of peace.
Engine-power is developed in them to a higher degree than in those
preceding them, but in all else they are merely a repetition of
earlier constructions. The _Adams_ was launched in 1874. Her length
is 185 feet, beam 35 feet, draught of water 14.3 feet. She has a
displacement of 1375 tons, and attains a speed of 11.3 knots with
an indicated horse-power of 715. The capacity of her coal-bunkers
is 140 tons. Her battery consists of one 11-inch and four 9-inch
smooth-bores, and one 60-pounder.

[Illustration: U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAR “MARION.”]

The _Marion_ class of sloops, launched about the same period, are of
an increased displacement and speed, and built of wood. The length of
the _Marion_ is 216 feet, beam 37 feet, draught of water 16.6 feet.
She has a displacement of 1900 tons, and attains a speed of 12.9
knots per hour with an indicated horse-power of 966. The capacity
of her coal-bunkers is 135 tons. Her battery consists of one 8-inch
muzzle-loading rifle (converted), six 9-inch smooth-bores, and one
60-pounder.

[Illustration: U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAR “ALERT” (IRON).]

The _Alert_ is one of three vessels that were built of iron in 1874,
the exceptional and spasmodic indication of an effort to change the
material for construction, much induced by pressure from the iron
interests of the country. This effort was made in a very mild and
tentative manner, and was limited to this small class of diminutive
vessels. The length of the _Alert_ is 175 feet, beam 32 feet, draught
of water 12.9 feet. She has a displacement of 1020 tons, and attains
a speed of ten knots per hour with an indicated horse-power of 655.
The capacity of her coal-bunkers is 133 tons. Her battery consists of
one 11-inch and four 9-inch smooth-bores, and one 60-pounder.

[Illustration: U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAR “TRENTON.”]

The shock attending the first step towards a change in the material
for construction was so great as to cause a suspension of the
effort, and in 1876 was launched the _Trenton_, built of wood,
which represents the latest of that type on the list of the navy.
The length of this ship is 253 feet, beam 48 feet, draught of water
20.6 feet. She has a displacement of 3900 tons, and attains a speed
of 12.8 knots per hour with an indicated horse-power of 2813. The
capacity of her coal-bunkers is 350 tons. Her battery consists of ten
8-inch muzzle-loading rifles (converted).

The above is a fair presentation of our old navy. Of such vessels
we have, larger and smaller, twenty-five which are fit for service
as cruisers, exclusive of the old single-turreted Monitors. These
cruisers are built of wood, have low speed, and are armed with
smooth-bore guns, with a sprinkling of rifled cannon, converted on
the Palliser system from smooth-bore cast-iron guns. Of what service
is this force, this relic of a past age?

The duties of a navy, apart from the consideration of war, are
manifold. As stated by the first Advisory Board, it is required for
“surveying, deep-sea sounding, the advancement and protection of
American commerce, exploration, the protection of American life and
property endangered by wars between foreign countries, and service in
support of American policy in matters where foreign governments are
concerned.”

With such a poor force it must be evident that it was impossible
to discharge in an efficient manner all the duties of a navy. Our
work in foreign surveys is limited to that of one small vessel
on the west coast of North America; our deep-sea soundings are
few and far between, dotted along the tracks pursued by our ships
while going to and returning from distant stations; our commerce is
protected; but we are unable to support any positive policy that the
government might decide to declare in reference to, for example,
the Monroe doctrine. To say nothing of European naval armaments, it
is only necessary to point to some of the smaller powers in our own
hemisphere that possess ships-of-war with which we have nothing fit
to cope.

Our people cannot desire to assume a position in the society of naval
powers without supporting the position with dignity; they cannot wish
their navy to be cited as a standard of inefficiency; they cannot
wish to force their representatives (the officers of the navy) into a
position of humiliation and mortification such as is imposed by being
called on to deprecate criticism by labored explanations. Better
abolish the navy and lower our pretensions.

But the fact seems to be that the rapidity of naval development has
not been properly appreciated, and it is after a long interval of
indifference that, attention being at last centred on the subject,
it is seen how rapid its strides have been, and how utterly we
are distanced in the race. There is evidently now in the country
a growing desire to repair the effects of the past oversight, and
we see Congress has moved in the matter. As all political parties
now unite in the necessity of effort in this direction, the hope is
inspired that the subject is to be separated from those of a partisan
character, and that the rehabilitation of the navy will be put on
its proper level, and accepted as a national question in which all
are alike interested.

Possessed as we are now of a navy such as has been indicated, the
change that was instituted involved a most violent transition. In
reviewing our work of construction for over thirty years we saw
no new type of cruiser. The only types of ships that we produced
were those that date before the war; since which we but reproduced
the same in classes of differing dimensions. From the sailing-ship
with auxiliary steam-power we passed to the steamer with auxiliary
sail-power; but we had no full-powered steamers, with or without
sails. As long as it was considered necessary to spread as much
canvas as was used, the space assigned to boilers and engines was
limited, and we failed to achieve full power; and a reduction to the
minimum of sail-power had to be accepted before we could present a
type of a full-powered steamer.

With the exception of two vessels of the _Alert_ class built of
iron, we had nothing but wooden hulls. We had continued to build in
perishable material, requiring large sums to be spent in repairs, and
ignoring the manufactures of the country which could have been aided
in their development by the contrary course. We permitted the age of
steel to reach its zenith without indicating that we were aware of
its presence.

In these ships, with the exception of a few converted rifles of
8-inch calibre, our armaments consist of smooth-bore cast-iron guns
which have composed our batteries for thirty years. These are now to
be discarded, and their places to be filled with modern steel cannons.

Torpedoes, movable torpedoes, of which we know nothing practically,
are to be brought to the front, and are to form part of our
equipment. Torpedo-boats are to be brought into use, and details
innumerable are now to be studied and worked out.

Conceive, then, a high-powered steamer with a minimum of canvas,
built of steel, armed with modern steel artillery, and a secondary
battery of Hotchkiss guns, fitted for launching movable torpedoes,
with protective deck over boilers and engines, divided into many
water-tight compartments giving protection to buoyancy, and compare
such a ship with the old type of the United States cruiser, and
an idea may be formed of the violence of the transition through
which we had to pass. And there was nothing intermediate to break
the suddenness of this change; there was no connecting link. The
structure of to-day was placed in direct contrast with that of
twenty-five years ago. This is the position in which we stood, and we
could only accept a situation from which there was no escape.

From all appearances the navy is now to be given an opportunity of
asserting itself, and the steps already taken to remedy the existing
state of things can be stated in a few words.

The origin of the effort dates from June, 1881, when the first
Advisory Board was appointed to consider and to report on the need
of appropriate vessels for the navy. This Board, in its report of
November 7, 1881, decided that the United States navy should consist
of seventy unarmored cruisers of steel; it reported that there were
thirty-two vessels in the navy fit for service as cruisers, and it
indicated the character of the new vessels to be built. This Board
confined itself to the consideration of unarmored vessels, as it did
not consider that the orders under which it acted required that it
should discuss the subject of armored ships, though it expressed the
opinion that such vessels were indispensable in time of war.

Some time elapsed before any practical results followed from the
action of this Board, but in an act of Congress approved March 3,
1883, the construction of three steam-cruisers and a despatch-boat
was authorized. These vessels, the _Chicago_, _Boston_, _Atlanta_,
and _Dolphin_, are, with the exception of the _Chicago_, now in
commission.

In an act of Congress approved March, 1885, five additional vessels
were authorized, and these, the _Charleston_, _Baltimore_, _Newark_,
and gun-boats No. 1 and 2, are under construction.[49]

Up to the time of the inception of these cruisers no steel for
ship-plates had been rolled in the United States. Construction in
American iron plates had been extensively carried on, but if steel
plating was required it had to be imported at great cost to the
builder. Those who contemplated bidding on the proposals issued
by the government for the first four vessels had to consider this
matter. Mr. John Roach, of New York and of Chester, Pennsylvania,
undertook the manufacture of this material, and finding that success
attended his experiment, he was able to direct extensively the
steel-works at Thurlow, Pennsylvania, to this line of business,
and when the bids were opened it was found that this new industry,
introduced through his enterprise, enabled him to underbid all
competitors. After receiving the contracts for the ships, Mr. Roach
contracted with the Phœnix Iron Company, of Phœnixville, with Messrs.
Park Brothers, of Pittsburgh, and the Norway Iron and Steel Works, of
South Boston, for supplies of similar material: thus the first step
in this effort to rehabilitate the navy resulted in introducing a
new industry into the country. The still more extensive development
of industries that will attend the work of rehabilitation as it
advances will be treated further on.

Before presenting the types of cruisers which are now to be
introduced into the navy, it may be well to refer to an error that
exists, or has existed, in the popular mind as to the signification
of a steel cruiser. To many who are uninformed in technical language
the word steel, in connection with a vessel of war, implies
protecting armor, and such misapprehension would convey the idea that
a cruiser of steel is able to contend with an armored vessel. This
is a mistake; there is protection obtained by constructing a vessel
of steel, but not such as is provided by armor. The destructive
effect of shell-firing and the development in modern artillery have
made armor necessary for all vessels which can carry it, and has
also made it necessary to provide all other protection possible to
vessels that cannot carry armor. Although this protection cannot be
given absolutely to the hull of such ships and to the _personnel_,
it is provided to the _buoyancy_ by the introduction of water-tight
compartments and protective decks, which limit the destructive effect
of the fire of the enemy and localize the water that may enter
through shot-holes. With a wooden hull it would not be possible to
combine this precaution because of the difficulty in making joints
water-tight between wood and metal, and in consequence of the weight
that would be added to a wooden hull, which is already from sixteen
per cent. to twenty per cent. heavier than if constructed of steel.
The only defensive advantage possessed by a steel unarmored cruiser
over a wooden one is derived from this system of construction.

[Illustration: U. S. FRIGATE “CHICAGO” (STEEL).]

The _Chicago_ is a steam-frigate, built throughout of steel of
domestic manufacture, the outside plating being 9/16 inch thick. Her
length is 325 feet, beam 48.2 feet, draught of water 19 feet. She has
a displacement of 4500 tons, and will attain a minimum speed of 14
knots per hour with an indicated horse-power of 5000. The capacity
of her coal-bunkers is 940 tons, and she carries a battery of four
8-inch steel breech-loading guns in half-turrets, and eight 6-inch
and two 5-inch steel breech-loaders on the gun-deck. This ship
has nine athwartships bulkheads, dividing the hull into ten main
water-tight compartments, and the machinery and boilers are covered
by a protective deck one and a half inches in thickness. When the
bunkers are full of coal she has a coal protection nine feet thick
from the water-line to eight feet above it.

[Illustration: DECK PLANS OF THE U. S. FRIGATE “CHICAGO,” SHOWING
BATTERY.]

The deck plans show the arrangement of the main battery, in
addition to which she carries a powerful secondary battery of
Hotchkiss rapid-firing single-shot, and revolving cannons and Gatling
guns.

The bow of the vessel is strengthened for using the ram with which
she is fitted. The rudder and steering-gear are under water. She has
two screws—a subdivision of power which is given to all ships-of-war
of over 3000 tons displacement—from which a great advantage is
derived if one engine is broken down, as three-fourths of the speed
can be maintained with the other. The advantage of this in a naval
action is obvious.

[Illustration: U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAR “ATLANTA” (STEEL).]

The _Atlanta_, of which the _Boston_ is a counterpart, presents
another type of a steel unarmored cruiser. She is a steam-corvette,
or sloop-of-war, a single-decked ship. Her length is 276 feet, beam
42 feet, draught of water 16 feet 10 inches. She has a displacement
of 3000 tons, and has attained a speed of 15.5 knots per hour with a
maximum horse-power of 3482. The capacity of her coal-bunkers is 580
tons, and her battery consists of two 8-inch steel breech-loading
guns and six 6-inch, besides a secondary battery of Hotchkiss and
Gatling guns.

[Illustration: DECK PLAN OF THE U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAR “ATLANTA,” SHOWING
BATTERY.]

In vessels of this class it is usual to have an open-deck battery,
with a poop-deck and top-gallant forecastle at the extremities, but
the effort has been made in this type to increase the effectiveness
of the battery by giving the guns a more extended lateral train than
is possible when a ship is arranged with a forecastle and poop-deck.
These, with the accommodations which they provide, have been removed
from the ends of the ship, and a superstructure has been erected
amidships. This arrangement gives a clear sweep forward and aft
for the powerful 8-inch guns, enabling the forward gun to cover an
all-around fire of from 40° abaft the beam on the port side to 30°
abaft the beam on the starboard side, the after 8-inch gun having
a corresponding lateral sweep aft. Within the superstructure are
mounted the six 6-inch guns, two on each side on the broadside, with
a train of 60° before and abaft the beam, the other two being mounted
at diagonally opposite corners in such a way as to admit of their use
either on the broadside or for fire ahead or astern. This object is
achieved by mounting the two 8-inch guns _en échelon_, the forward
gun being on the port side of the centre line of the ship, and the
after 8-inch gun on the starboard side of the same line. This is
shown on the deck plan.[50]

It does not require the discrimination of a professional eye to see
the increased power given to the battery by this arrangement. It is
an innovation that was very startling to the conservative mind; but
the more familiar the idea becomes, the more favorable opinion grows
to the change, and the more apparent becomes the increased offensive
power of the ship. The extremities of this type of ship will not,
of course, be so dry in heavy weather as if it had a forecastle and
poop, but it must be remembered that every part of the spar-deck is
from nine to ten feet above the water. The rig of the _Atlanta_ is
that of a brig, but without head-booms; the fire ahead of the forward
guns is thus unobstructed, and the ram with which she is fitted is
always clear for use. The division of the hull into water-tight
compartments by athwartship bulkheads, and a protective deck over
engines and boilers, form a part of the construction.

[Illustration: U. S. DESPATCH-BOAT “DOLPHIN.”]

The _Dolphin_, though not regarded as a vessel for fighting
purposes, is the type of a class that is needed in all navies for
duty as a despatch-boat, or for the temporary accommodation of a
commander-in-chief of a squadron who may desire to communicate
rapidly with his ships at distant points. She is well fitted for
the service, and is now in commission, demonstrating her ability to
perform the work required of her. She could also be of service as a
commerce destroyer, for which service she is equipped with one gun of
long range. Her length is 240 feet, beam 32 feet, draught of water
14.25 feet. She has a displacement of 1485 tons, and attains a speed
of 15 knots per hour.

Her advent into the navy marks an epoch—the inauguration of the
successful manufacture in the United States of American rolled steel
ship-plating, equal to the best in the world, as shown by the most
rigid government tests. The _Dolphin_, is the first vessel, whether
for naval or commercial purposes, that is built entirely of steel
of domestic manufacture, and is the pioneer representative of other
similar industries which will be developed as the rehabilitation of
the navy proceeds. She has proved herself eminently successful, and
is the fastest sea-steamer of her displacement built in the United
States, with perhaps the exception of the steam-yacht _Atalanta_. She
is a stanch vessel of great structural strength, and does credit to
the ship-building profession of the country.

Of the additional cruisers authorized by the late acts of Congress,
particulars will be found in the Notes.

In one of the larger vessels the type of the _Atlanta_ will be
reproduced on a larger scale, while the other vessel of the same
class will be provided with a poop and top-gallant forecastle, and
will carry her forward and after guns on sponsons, by which means
fire ahead and astern will be secured. This will make it necessary to
limit the power of the battery of the second vessel to 6-inch guns,
as the 8-inch gun cannot conveniently be carried on sponsons in a
vessel of 4000 tons displacement.

The heavy gun-boat will carry six 6-inch guns, the forward and after
ones on sponsons; and the light gun-boat will carry four of the same
guns.

In the construction of these additional vessels advantage has been
taken of all our experience in our initial effort, and of whatever
developments may have been made by others since the earlier vessels
were designed.

The absolute departure from the old standards is apparent in
material, in armament, in speed, and in rig.

The causes that have led to this change in material may be found,
first, in the change that has taken place in ordnance. The
introduction of the rifled cannon, and its subsequent development,
have increased very much the weight of this part of the equipment of
a vessel-of-war, and the necessity of accommodating the stowage of
charges of powder much increased in size, and of ammunition for the
secondary batteries, which must be most liberally supplied, makes
an absolute demand on an increased portion of space. Again, the
increased speed now considered indispensable makes a similar demand
for space, and carries with it as well an increased proportion of
the total displacement. In a wooden hull it would be impossible to
reconcile these demands, in consequence of the weight of the hull
itself.

The hull and hull fittings of an unarmored cruiser built of wood will
weigh from 49 per cent. to 52 per cent. of the total displacement.
With high-powered engines it is doubtful if sufficient strength can
be obtained with even 52 per cent. of the displacement for the hull,
and this must suppose the absence of all protection to buoyancy, as
water-tight compartments.

The hull and fittings of a steel cruiser, exclusive of protective
decks, will weigh from 39 per cent. to 44 per cent. of the total
displacement.

Suppose a 4500-ton ship built of wood weighing 50 per cent. of the
total displacement, and the same ship built of steel weighing 40 per
cent. of the total displacement, the respective weights of the hulls
will be 2250 tons and 1800 tons, a difference of 450 tons, the steel
hull being one-fifth, or 20 per cent., lighter than the wooden one.
This will allow for increased weight of ordnance, protective deck,
or increased coal endurance, as may be decided when considering the
service on which the ship is to be employed.

But notwithstanding the saving thus obtained, the question of weights
is still full of difficulties and embarrassments, and it is found
impossible in the same structure to accommodate all demands from the
different departments concerned in the equipment of a vessel-of-war.
The sail-power has been reduced, so as to save weight of spars and
sails, which have become of secondary importance, but this will not
satisfy all the requirements of the problem. As articles appertaining
to the old method of equipment are removed, those belonging to what
are considered necessary under the new order of things are brought
forward. Space is still to be found for movable torpedoes, for
torpedo-boats, and for engines and appurtenances for electrical
apparatus for lighting the ship, for search-light, and other ordnance
purposes. It is evident that much study is needed to reduce weights
in all the essential parts, so as to be able to accommodate all the
devices which the progress of ideas continues to present. Much is yet
to be done by the substitution of steel for iron in many parts of our
engines, and experiments abroad lead to the hope that the weights of
boilers may be much reduced, but as the question stands to-day it is
impossible to provide any single ship with all the appliances that
are considered necessary for a perfectly equipped vessel-of-war.
Every ship, therefore, must present a compromise.

Another reason for the transition from wood to steel hulls is
the durability of steel as compared with wood. Referring to the
large sums of money that have been appropriated under the head of
construction and repairs, for which there is now so little to show
(and disregarding the question of administration, which of course
is vital, but which has no place in this chapter), the main reason
for the deficiency in the results is that all this money has been
expended in perishable material. Every ship that has been built
of wood since the war has been a mistake. The most serious error
was committed when the wooden double-turreted Monitors of the
_Miantonomoh_ class were built, which, it is believed, was done
against the protest of Captain Ericsson. The result was the early
decay of these vessels, and the present defenceless condition of
our sea-coast. The lifetime of a wooden ship is of short duration.
It requires constant repairs, which amount in the long-run to
rebuilding, and it is in this manner that so many of our old ships
are still retained in service; but in the case of a wooden armored
vessel these repairs are impossible without removing the armor. This
was the condition of affairs with regard to these Monitors, and the
consequence is that the country has to incur the expense of entirely
new constructions. These are in durable material, and will give good
account of themselves when called on.

The steel hulls that it is now the intention shall compose the fleet,
will, if well cared for, endure in perfect condition for thirty
years. In fact, the lifetime of an iron or steel hull is not defined
to any limit, and if a perfect anti-corrosive and anti-fouling
composition can be produced, the limit may be regarded as indefinite.

The foregoing remarks on our new navy apply to unarmored cruisers,
a class of ships which supply a want in time of peace, but cannot
fulfil the purposes of war. At such a time the armored ship is
recognized as indispensable, and there is every reason why the
construction of armored vessels should proceed simultaneously with
that of the unarmored cruisers. These are a more intricate problem
for study, need much more time to build, and are required, while at
peace, as a school of instruction in which to prepare for war. Our
selection of armor has been much assisted by the investigations of
others, and we are in a favorable condition to make a decision on
this point; and the type of vessel best suited for a cruiser seems to
be settled, by the uniform practice of foreign nations, in favor of
the barbette.[51]

It must be remembered, however, that six months since we were not
in a condition to proceed with the construction of armored vessels,
depending on our own resources. We had to go abroad to purchase
armor, or set ourselves to the task of establishing works where it
could be manufactured. The establishment of these plants was the
first thing needful, and until this was done it was impossible to
make ourselves independent in this matter. The construction of our
first unarmored cruisers introduced into the country the industry of
rolling steel ship-plates; the construction of our new ordnance and
armored ships has, in turn, introduced the new industries of casting
and forging large masses of war material.

This subject, so far as it relates to ordnance, was referred to a
mixed board of army and navy officers, known as the Gun Foundery
Board; this, with the aid and counsel of some of the ablest and
leading steel manufacturers in the United States, submitted to
Congress a report which presented a solution of the problem, and
demonstrated on what terms the steel manufacturers of the country
could be induced to work in accord with the government. The Board had
under consideration only the subject of founderies and factories for
gun construction, but the casting and forging facilities required
for guns could be applicable to armor; thus in providing means for
the manufacture of one, the other purpose was equally subserved.

With material of domestic manufacture at hand, it will be the duty
of the government to provide the navy with a fleet of ten armored
cruisers of the most approved type. These vessels would form the
outer line of defence of the coast during war, and should be of such
force as to be able to contend with any second-class armored vessel
of other nations. Some of them should be always in commission during
times of peace, if only for instruction and practice purposes, and
one should be assigned to each squadron abroad to carry the flag of
the rear-admiral in command, to assert our position in the society of
naval powers, able to give substantial “support to American policy in
matters where foreign governments are concerned.”

The ability to contend with armored vessels of the first class
must be reserved for another type of ships, which are styled
“coast-defence vessels,” and without which our new navy will not be
thoroughly equipped for contributing its full share to defence at
home. In considering armored vessels, what was said before as to the
character of compromise that obtains in vessels-of-war must be borne
in mind. All desirable features cannot be concentrated in any one
ship; the special duty for which the vessel is to be used controls
the selection. The sea-going armored cruiser is expected to keep the
sea for a lengthened period: she must have large coal endurance. She
may be called on to sustain more than one engagement: her supply of
ammunition must be large. Her speed must equal that of the fastest
sea-going vessels of similar type to enable her to pursue an equal or
to avoid a superior force: hence much space and displacement must be
assigned to engines and boilers. Thus the amount of her armor and the
weight of her battery are affected by these other demands, which are
the more imperative.

In the case of coast-defence vessels the conditions are changed,
enabling in them the full development of both offensive and defensive
properties. These vessels are assigned to duty on the coast: they
must be as fit to keep the sea as are the armored cruisers, and they
must be able to fight their guns in all weathers that the armored
cruiser can fight; but as they do not require the coal endurance nor
the speed of the ship that is to keep the sea for lengthened periods,
the weight saved in coal and machinery can be utilized in battery and
armor. Such vessels constitute the main line of naval defence, as
they can be made almost absolutely invulnerable and irresistible.

Under an act of a late Congress a board on “fortifications and other
defences” was occupied in considering the defences of the coast,
and there were recommended by this Board two classes of “floating
batteries” (so called), coast-defence vessels, and one class of low
freeboard vessels for harbor defence. An examination of the designs
of these vessels shows that they are replete with merit, and present
some novel and valuable features. A justifiable limitation is put
on the coal endurance and speed, though fair speed is secured;
and altogether the plans prove there can be designed vessels of
comparatively small dimensions, light draught, great handiness and
manœuvring power, which can carry the heaviest guns, and be capable
of contending on equal terms with the heaviest European battle-ships.
The cut below represents the smaller of the type of coast-defence
vessels.

[Illustration: LIGHT DRAUGHT COAST-DEFENCE VESSEL, WITH DECK PLAN.]

The largest class will be armed with two 107-ton guns in a turret,
and two 26-ton guns in a barbette. The thickness of armor will vary
from 16 to 18 inches.

The second class will be armed with two 75-ton guns in a turret, and
two 26-ton guns in a barbette. The thickness of armor will be from 11
to 16 inches.

The smallest vessels, for harbor defence, modified Monitors, will
be armed with two 44-ton guns in a turret, and two 26-ton guns in a
barbette. The thickness of armor will be from 10 to 13 inches.

A fleet composed of such vessels as are represented in the largest
type would be able to engage an enemy at some distance from the
coast—an important object in these days when the range of heavy
rifled cannons makes it possible to shell towns from a great
distance, and at points remote from shore batteries.

Nominally we have now a fleet of vessels for coast defence, the old
war Monitors of the _Passaic_ class; but the contrast between them
and the vessels recommended by the Fortifications Board is about
equal in degree with that between our wooden fleet and the new steel
cruisers.

It is intended that a movable automatic torpedo shall be utilized by
all armored vessels, either by means of a torpedo-boat to be carried
by armored cruisers, or by the vessel itself in the case of coast and
harbor defence ships.

The torpedo that has mainly succeeded thus far in recommending itself
to the naval powers is that invented by Mr. Whitehead. Numerous
efforts have been made by others in this field, but the difficulties
that surround it are made very apparent by the paucity of the
results. It will be understood that the torpedo, when launched, is
left entirely to automatic control; hence, apart from the motive
power, it is necessary that it shall possess directive power,
vertically to control immersion and horizontally to control direction
in the horizontal plane. In the Whitehead torpedo the immersion is
well regulated, and if no deflecting influences are encountered, the
direction is also preserved; but it fails where deflecting influences
intervene. During the Turko-Russian war valuable experience was
gained, and instances are known where the torpedo failed to operate
from want of directive power. An instance is cited where a torpedo
was deflected by striking the chain of a vessel at anchor, causing it
to pass harmlessly to one side. Another instance is cited where the
torpedo was deflected from the side of a ship owing to the angle at
which it struck. It is evident that perfection cannot be associated
with a weapon of this class that has not a strong directive force
inherent in it.

The torpedo invented by Captain J. A. Howell, of the United States
navy, possesses this property to an eminent degree, and it is
regarded by most competent experts as the successful rival of the
Whitehead. In the Howell torpedo the power is stored in a fly-wheel
revolving with great rapidity in a longitudinal vertical plane,
and its gyroscopic tendency makes it impossible for the torpedo to
deviate from its original course in a horizontal plane; the principle
is the same as insures the accuracy of the rifle-bullet, enabling
it to resist deflecting influences. The latest experiments of
Captain Howell in controlling the immersion of his torpedo were very
successful, and it is probable that the auto-mobile torpedo for our
new navy will be an American invention. Liberality in experiments is
indispensable in perfecting a device of this kind; it is to be hoped
that such may be extended to the Howell torpedo.[52]

[Illustration: THE HOWELL TORPEDO.

_B_, fly-wheel. _C_, _C_, screw propellers. _D_, diving rudder.
_E_, _E_, steering rudders. _F_, water-chamber containing automatic
apparatus. _G_, firing pin. _H_, position of gun-cotton magazine.]

The general reader is probably not aware of the effect on naval
warfare produced by the introduction of the auto-mobile torpedo,
affecting the constituents of the fleet itself. Formerly a fleet
consisted of battle-ships alone, or with store-ships to provide
consumable articles; to these were later added despatch-boats for
the service indicated by their title; but since the introduction
of the torpedo an additional fleet of torpedo-boats is considered
necessary for the protection of the battle-ships. All armored ships
are expected to carry at least one torpedo-boat, which is designed
for operating against the enemy during an action at sea, and the
universal adoption of this practice has led to the introduction
into fleets of a new type of vessel called torpedo-boat catchers,
whose primary duty it is to destroy the torpedo-boats of the enemy.
For this purpose these vessels have phenomenal speed, and besides
their equipment of auto-mobile torpedoes, are provided with powerful
batteries of single-shot and revolving Hotchkiss guns, capable of
penetrating all parts of a torpedo-boat. This type of vessel is now
being tested by the English and the Continental governments, and
forms one of the constituents of their fleets.

The torpedo-boat is undoubtedly one of the features that should be
introduced into our new navy, not only for their possible use on the
high seas, but for the purpose of supplementing the harbor-defence
vessels, while the type of vessel known as the torpedo-boat catcher
would be a powerful auxiliary to the armored cruisers on the first
line, or the more powerful vessels forming the second line of the
coast defence.

NOTES.

For the new navy of the United States Congress has authorized the
construction of twenty-five vessels, of which seven will be armored,
sixteen unarmored, and two “such floating batteries, rams, or other
naval structures for coast defence” as may be determined by the
Navy Department. This list embraces five double-turreted Monitors,
one armored battle-ship, one armored cruiser, eight partially
protected cruisers, one dynamite-gun cruiser, four gun-boats, one
despatch-vessel, and two torpedo-boats. Of the twenty vessels already
built or ordered but three are in commission. They vary so much in
type that the following conventional data may perhaps be of some use
(see table on the following page), though it must be remembered that
the performances stated are theoretical, except in the cases of the
_Atlanta_, _Boston_, and _Dolphin_.

The defects found in the _Atlanta_ when first tested were so easily
remedied that the machinery finally developed a maximum horse-power
which was only a little less than that required by the contract;
while the _Boston_ reached a maximum of 4248.5 horse-power. In his
last report to the President the Secretary of the Navy said:

“The _Dolphin_ and the _Atlanta_ having both been completed, and
having had trial trips, it is possible to compare them in their
results with similar vessels built contemporaneously elsewhere.
The _Dolphin_, of 1500 tons displacement, can be compared with
the _Alacrity_ and _Surprise_, English despatch-vessels of 1400
tons each, and the _Milan_, a French despatch-vessel of 1550 tons,
all built contemporaneously. The _Dolphin_ was designed for 2300
indicated horse-power, the _Alacrity_ and _Surprise_ each 3000,
and the _Milan_ 3900. The highest mean horse-power developed upon
trial was, in the case of the _Dolphin_, less than 2200; of the
_Alacrity_, 3173; of the _Surprise_, 3079; of the _Milan_, 4132. The
highest speed of the _Dolphin_, resulting from several trials, was
15.11 knots, running light; of the _Alacrity_, 17.95 knots; of the
_Surprise_, 17.8 knots; of the _Milan_, 18.4 knots.

“The _Atlanta_, the sister ship to the _Boston_, can be compared
with the _Esmeralda_, the _Giovanni Bausan_, and the _Mersey_. All
three were built in England: the _Esmeralda_ for Chili, the _Giovanni
Bausan_ for Italy, and the _Mersey_ for the English government. The
_Atlanta_ is of 3000 tons displacement; the _Esmeralda_, 2920; the
_Giovanni Bausan_, 3086; and the _Mersey_, 3550. The _Atlanta_ was
designed to attain an indicated horse-power of 3500, the _Esmeralda_
and the _Giovanni Bausan_ each 5500, and the _Mersey_ 6000. The
trials had of the _Atlanta_ indicate that her engines will develop
less than 3500 horse-power, while the _Esmeralda_ developed 6000,
the _Giovanni Bausan_ 6680, and the _Mersey_ 6626. The maximum speed
of the _Atlanta_ will be less than 15 knots, while that of the
_Esmeralda_ was 18.28 knots, the _Giovanni Bausan_ 17.5 knots, the
_Mersey_ 17.5 knots.”

Part 1 of 3
+------------------+------+-------+--------------+---------+--------+
| NAME OF SHIP. | Keel |Launch.| Condition. |Material.| Displa-|
| | laid.| | | | cement.|
+------------------+------+-------+--------------+---------+--------+
| _Armored._ | Date.| Date. | | | Tons. |
|Puritan | 1875 | 1883 | Completing. | Iron. | 6000 |
|Miantonomoh | 1874 | ” | ” | ” | 3887 |
|Amphitrite | 1874 | ” | ” | ” | 3887 |
|Monadnock | 1874 | ” | ” | ” | 3887 |
|Terror | 1874 | ” | ” | ” | 3887 |
| | | | | | |
|Battle-ship | .. | .. |}Plans under | Steel. | 6000 |
| | | |}consideration| | |
|Cruiser | .. | .. |} | ” | 6000 |
| | | | | | |
| _Unarmored._ | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
|Chicago | 1883 | 1886 | Completing. | ” | 4500 |
| | | | | | |
|Boston | 1882 | 1885 | In commis’n. | ” | 3000 |
| | | | | | |
|Atlanta | 1882 | 1885 | ” | ” | 3000 |
| | | | | | |
|Dolphin | 1882 | 1885 | ” | ” | 1485 |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
|Charleston | 1887 | .. | Building. | ” | 3730 |
| | | | | | |
|Baltimore | 1887 | .. | ” | ” | 4413 |
| | | | | | |
|Newark | 1887 | .. | ” | ” | 4083 |
|Gun-boat No. 1 | 1887 | | ” | ” | 1700 |
|Gun-boat No. 2 | 1887 | | ” | ” | 870 |
| | | | | | |
|Dynamite cruiser | 1887 | | ” | ” | .. |
| | | | | | |
|Cruiser No. 4 | 1887 | | ” | ” | 4083 |
|Cruiser No. 5 | 1887 | | ” | ” | 4083 |
|Gun-boat No. 3 | 1887 | | ” | ” | 1700 |
|Gun-boat No. 4 | 1887 | | ” | ” | 1700 |
|Torpedo-boat | .. | |Not designed. | ” | 108 |
| | | | | | |
|Stiletto | 1884 | 1885 | Completed. | Wood. | 356 |
|Floating batteries| .. | .. |Not designed. | Steel. | |
+------------------+------+-------+--------------+---------+--------+

Part 2 of 3
+------------------+-------+--------+--------+------+------------+
| NAME OF SHIP. |Length.| Beam. |Draught.|Speed.|Horse-power.|
| | | | | | |
+------------------+-------+--------+--------+------+----------- +
| _Armored._ | Feet. |Ft. In. |Ft. In. |Knots.| Tons. |
|Puritan | 280 | 60 | 18 | 13¼ | 3,500 |
|Miantonomoh | 250 | 55.6 | 14.2 | 10 | 1,600 |
|Amphitrite | 250 | 55.6 | 14.2 | 10 | 1,600 |
|Monadnock | 250 | 55.6 | 14.2 | 10 | 1,600 |
|Terror | 250 | 55.6 | 14.2 | 10 | 1,600 |
| | | | | | |
|Battle-ship | .. | .. | .. | 17 | .. |
| | | | | | |
|Cruiser | .. | .. | .. | 17 | .. |
| | | | | | |
| _Unarmored._ | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
|Chicago | 315 | 48.2 | 20.6 | 15 | 5,000 |
| | | | | | |
|Boston | 270 | 42 | 18.6 | 15.5 | 4,248 |
| | | | | | |
|Atlanta | 270 | 42 | 18.6 | 15.5 | 3,482 |
| | | | | | |
|Dolphin | 240 | 32 | 14.3 | 15 | 2,300 |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
|Charleston | 300 | 45 | 19.6 | 18 | 7,500 |
| | | | | | |
|Baltimore | 315 | 48.6 | 21 | 19 | 10,750 |
| | | | | | |
|Newark | 310 | 49.2 | 20.6 | 18 | 8,500 |
|Gun-boat No. 1 | 230 | 36 | 15 | 16 | 3,500 |
|Gun-boat No. 2 | 175 | 31 | 12.6 | 13 | 1,300 |
| | | | | | |
|Dynamite cruiser | 239 | 26.6 | 7.6 | 20 | 3,200 |
| | | | | | |
|Cruiser No. 4 | 310 | 49.1¾ | 18.9 | 19 | 10,500 |
|Cruiser No. 5 | 310 | 49.1¾ | 18.9 | 19 | 10,500 |
|Gun-boat No. 3 | 230 | 36 | 14 | 16 | 3,500 |
|Gun-boat No. 4 | 230 | 36 | 14 | 16 | 3,500 |
|Torpedo-boat | | | .. | 23 | .. |
| | | | | | |
|Stiletto | 90 | 11 | 3 | 22.9 | 560 |
|Floating batteries| | | .. | .. | .. |
+------------------+-------+--------+--------+------+------------+

Part 3 of 3
+------------------+----------------------------------------+---------+
| NAME OF SHIP. | Armament. | Cost. |
| | | |
+------------------+----------------------------------------+---------+
| _Armored._ | Main. Secondary. | Dollars.|
|Puritan | 4 of 10 inch} |2,300,970|
|Miantonomoh | 4 ” 10 ” } |1,637,110|
|Amphitrite | 4 ” 10 ” } |1,590,930|
|Monadnock | 4 ” 10 ” } |1,592,849|
|Terror | 4 ” 10 ” } |1,891,077|
| |{2 ” 6 ” } Not determined. | |
|Battle-ship |{2 ” 10 ” } |2,500,000|
| |{2 ” 12 ” } | |
| | } | |
|Cruiser |{4 ” 10 ” } |2,500,000|
| |{6 ” 6 ” } | |
| _Unarmored._ | | |
| |{4 ” 8 ” } 2 6-pdrs., 4 47 mm., | |
|Chicago |{8 ” 6 ” } 2 37 mm. |1,576,854|
| |{2 ” 5 ” } 2 1-pdrs., 2 short Gat. | |
| | | |
|Boston |{2 ” 8 ” } 2 6-pdrs., 2 3-pdrs., 2 |1,031,225|
| |{6 ” 6 ” } 1-pdrs. | |
| | | |
|Atlanta |{2 ” 8 ” } 2 47 mm., 2 37 mm., 2 |1,031,225|
| |{6 ” 6 ” } short Gatlings. | |
| | | |
|Dolphin | 1 ” 6 ” } 2 6-pdrs., 4 47 mm., 2 | 460,000|
| | } Gatlings. | |
| | | |
| | Auto-mobile torpedoes. | |
|Charleston |{2 ” 10 ” } 4 6-pdrs., 2 3-pdrs., |1,017,500|
| |{6 ” 6 ” } 1 1-pdr., *Amt | |
| | | |
|Baltimore |{4 ” 8 ” } 4 37 mm., 2 short |1,325,000|
| |{8 ” 6 ” } Gatlings, *Amt | |
| | | |
|Newark |12 ” 6 ” } *Amt |1,300,000|
| | | |
|Gun-boat No. 1 | 6 ” 6 ” } 2 6-pdrs., 2 3-pdrs., | 455,000|
| | } 1 1-pdr., *Amt | |
| | | |
|Gun-boat No. 2 | 4 ” 6 ” } 2 37 mm., 2 short | 247,000|
| | } Gatlings, *Amt | |
| | | |
|Dynamite cruiser |{3 ” 10½ ” } 2 3-pdrs., 1 1-pdr., | 350,000|
| |{ (Dynamite.) } 2 37 mm., 2 short Gat. | |
| | | |
|Cruiser No. 4 |12 ” 6 ” } Not yet determined. |1,500,000|
|Cruiser No. 5 |12 ” 6 ” } |1,500,000|
| | | |
|Gun-boat No. 3 | 6 ” 6 ” } Same as Gun-boat | 550,000|
|Gun-boat No. 4 | 6 ” 6 ” } No. 1. | 550,000|
| | | |
|Torpedo-boat | .... } 2 rapid-fire guns. | 100,000|
| | } 5 torpedoes. | |
| | | |
|Stiletto | .... } Not yet determined. | 25,000|
|Floating batteries| .... } |2,000,000|
+------------------+----------------------------------------+---------+
*Amt = Auto-mobile torpedoes.

Thanks to the force of public opinion, liberal appropriations
have been made for the navy. Leaving out of consideration the
double-turreted Monitors, the additions to the fleet have been the
cruisers _Charleston_ and _Baltimore_, the No. 1 and 2 gun-boats,
the cruiser _Newark_, the two armored vessels, the torpedo-boat,
the dynamite cruiser, the No. 4 and 5 cruisers, the No. 3 and 4
gun-boats of No. 1 type, and the floating batteries. The _Stiletto_,
if accepted, will be bought from the Herreshoff Company; all the
rest, except the battle-ship, are to be or have been constructed by
contract in private yards. Of the new ones the _Charleston_ and No. 5
cruiser will be built at San Francisco; gun-boat No. 2 at Baltimore;
the dynamite cruiser, gun-boat No. 1, the _Baltimore_, _Newark_, and
cruiser No. 4, at Philadelphia, and gun-boats Nos. 3 and 4 at New
York.

The steel partially protected cruiser _Charleston_ is, except in
details of internal accommodations, a duplicate of the _Naniwa-Kan_,
which was in turn a progressive development of the type-making
_Esmeralda_, inasmuch as she has greater speed, more powerful
armament, and superior protection to stability. The plans of the
_Charleston_ were bought abroad simply because they could not be
made here; and notwithstanding the twopenny-ha’penny criticisms this
action evoked, its wisdom has been justified. The _Charleston_ has
neither poop nor forecastle, and the unhampered ends give in action
perfect freedom of fire for two 10-inch guns, which are mounted in
low, thin-plated barbettes, situated on the ship’s middle line, at
a distance of sixty feet from the bow and stern respectively. These
pieces are without armor protection, except that offered against
machine-gun fire by a two-inch segmental shield. Between these
heavy guns a high waist stretches amidships, in which six 6-inch
breech-loaders are mounted on sponsons or in projecting turrets.
The secondary battery includes two 6-pounder rapid-fire guns, eight
machine guns, and four above-water torpedo-tubes. The 10-inch guns
must always be brought back to the fore-and-aft line for reloading,
and their ammunition is passed through steel tubes which extend below
the protective deck. The engines are double-compound, situated in
separate compartments, and in the _Naniwa-Kan_ the type developed
7650 horse-power and 18.9 knots.

In the twin-screw cruiser _Baltimore_ a longitudinal water-tight
bulkhead joins the double bottom, which runs under the engine and
boilers to a protective deck that extends the whole length of the
ship, and is three inches thick on the flat top and four inches
thick on the sloping sides. The machinery consists of a pair of
triple-expansion compound engines which are to develop 18 knots and
7500 horse-power with natural, and 19½ knots and 10,750 horse-power
with forced, draft. There are two separate engine-rooms and two
boiler-rooms, and the normal coal capacity of 600 tons will be
sufficient for 1800 knots. Additional space is provided for 300 tons
more, and with this total there ought to be an endurance of 8000
miles at 11 knots, and of 14,000 miles, or 75 days’ steaming, at 8
knots. No sails except storm-sails will be provided. The _Baltimore_
is to have a poop and forecastle, on which four 8-inch guns with
direct fore-and-aft fire will be mounted. On the main deck six 6-inch
guns will be carried in broadside, and the secondary battery and
torpedo-tubes are effective and well disposed.

The maximum price fixed at first by Congress for the _Newark_ was
less than any of the bids received, but at the last session the
appropriation was increased to $1,300,000, and the contract was
awarded in August of this year. The _Newark_ is a bark-rigged,
twin-screw cruiser of 4083 tons displacement. A double bottom extends
through 129 feet of her length, and a protective deck, which rises
fifteen inches above the water-line amidships, runs uninterruptedly
fore and aft. Four feet above this the berth-deck is built, the
intermediate space being greatly subdivided and utilized for stores.
Numerous water-tight frames are worked in the double bottom, and
wherever practicable the cellular construction is employed. The
engines are to develop 6000 horse-power with natural draft, and
8500 horse-power and a maximum speed of eighteen knots with forced
draft. This vessel has a poop and forecastle, and the guns are
carried on the upper deck. The main battery consists of twelve
6-inch centre-pivot guns, furnished with segmental shields, and
mounted on sponsons so as to obtain the greatest arc of fire; the
two guns nearest the bow and stern converge their fire at a point
400 feet distant from the ends of the ship, and those in broadside
can be concentrated within 100 feet of the ship. In addition to
the secondary battery given in the table, there are six above-water
torpedo-tubes.

The development of naval construction cannot be proved more
conclusively than by comparing the new cruisers with those which
were first laid down. In the _Atlanta_, for example, the builder
guaranteed that 664 tons of machinery would produce 3500 indicated
horse-power; but the _Charleston_ must, before acceptance, develop
7000 horse-power for 710 tons of machinery; that is to say, the
energy for weight has been doubled within four years.

The twin-screw gun-boat No. 1 is the prototype of a class that now
include three vessels, and a very promising nucleus it is for a
fleet to which the defence of the country’s coast must mainly be
intrusted. The ship is to be built of steel, with a three and a half
inch complete water-tight deck, so arched as to have a spring of
about three feet in its greatest width, and a crown that will nearly
reach the water-line level. There is no double bottom, but the number
of water-tight compartments is very great, and coffer-dams surround
the engine and fire-room hatches, and are carried to a height of
eighteen inches above the main deck. The complement numbers 150, and
the rig is that of a three-masted schooner, with a sail area of 4400
square feet. The machinery is estimated to indicate 2200 horse-power
with natural draft, and 3300 with forced draft, and consists of two
independent compound engines placed in separate compartments. The
speed is given as sixteen knots, but it is probable this rate will be
considerably exceeded. The main battery consists of six 6-inch guns,
the secondary of two 57-millimetre rapid-fire guns, two 37-millimetre
revolving cannons, and one short Gatling. Four of the 6-inch guns are
mounted on the poop and forecastle—two forward, two aft—and the
other pieces of this calibre are carried on sponsons amidships, so
as to have a large arc of fire about the beam. The elevated guns are
eighteen feet above the low-water line, the centre ones ten feet, and
all are mounted on central pivots and fitted with protective shields.
The torpedo armament is of great relative importance; of the eight
tubes supplied, the stem and stern ones are fixed and fitted with
under-water discharge, while the other six can be trained, and are
distributed four forward and two aft. In gun-boat No. 2 the machinery
is to develop 900 horse-power with natural, and 1350 with forced,
draft; the engines, boilers, and magazines are placed beneath a steel
deck three-eighths of an inch thick, which amidships is twenty-seven
inches below the water-line at the edge and eight inches above at the
crown. The armament consists of four 6-inch sponson-mounted guns, two
47-millimetre guns, two 37-millimetre revolving cannons, and one
short Gatling. She is barkentine rigged, with a plain sail area of
4480 square feet, and has a slightly ram-shaped, cast-steel stem. The
complement is 100.

The pneumatic-gun cruiser is to be armed with three of Zalinski’s
pneumatic dynamite guns of 10½-inch calibre, each of which is to
throw a shell containing 200 pounds of high explosives for a distance
of one mile, and to be capable of being discharged at least once in
two minutes. The guaranteed speed is twenty knots.

Under the law of August 3, 1881, authorizing the construction of
two new ships, it was provided that these should be “sea-going,
double-bottomed, armored vessels of about 6000 tons displacement,
designed for a speed of at least sixteen knots an hour, with engines
having all necessary appliances for working under forced draft, to
have a complete torpedo outfit, and be armed in the most effective
manner.” According to the circular issued by the Navy Department,
one of these was to be an armored cruiser, with a maximum draught
of twenty-two feet, and the other a battle-ship, with a draught
of twenty-three feet; both were to be built of steel, with double
bottoms, to have numerous water-tight compartments fitted with
powerful pumping apparatus, and to be supplied throughout with
perfect drainage and ventilation. A ram bow, twin screws, electric
search-lights, torpedo outfit, and a protected steel-armored deck
running the whole length of the ship and covering the boilers,
engines, and magazines, were essentials; while high power and economy
were so equally demanded that, to a maximum maintained speed of
seventeen knots when fully equipped, great coal endurance and small
fuel consumption were to be added. In each vessel a space sufficient
for two hundred and seventy people, for provisions for three months,
and for water for one month, was required. The cruiser was to have
two-thirds sail-power on two or three masts, each supplied with a
military top fitted to mount one or more machine guns. The armament
of this ship was to include ten steel breech-loading rifles—four of
10-inch and six of 6-inch calibre—and a secondary battery of four
6-pounders, four 3-pounders, and two 1-pounders, rapid-fire, and four
47-millimetre and four 37-millimetre revolving cannons, all of the
Hotchkiss pattern, together with four Gatling guns. There were to be
fitted six torpedo-tubes—one bow, one stern, and two on each side,
of which at least one on each side forward was to be under water.
The heavy guns were to load in not less than two positions, and were
to be protected by at least ten and a half inches of steel armor,
properly backed; the 6-inch guns were to be fitted with shields,
and all the guns were to be arranged so as to obtain the greatest
horizontal and vertical fire consistent with other conditions. Any
vertical armored protection at the water-line was to be at least
eleven inches thick in the heaviest part, and thicker, if practicable.

The armament of the line-of-battle ship was to consist of two 12-inch
and six 6-inch guns, and of a secondary battery which included four
6-inch, six 3-pounder, and two 1-pounder rapid-fire guns; of four
47-millimetre and four 37-millimetre revolving cannons, and of four
Gatlings. The torpedo outfit was similar to that of the cruiser.

The plans submitted were opened on April 1st of this year, and
notwithstanding the difficulties which the displacement imposed
upon the other requirements, no less than thirteen designs were
received from ten different competitors. The most important of
these were offered by the Thames Iron Ship Building Company and the
Barrow Ship Building Company, of Great Britain; by A. H. Grandjean,
Esq., of France; and by Chief Constructor Wilson, Naval Constructor
Pook, and Lieutenant Chambers, all of the United States navy. The
designs were submitted to a board, and this finally recommended the
Barrow plan as best suited for the armored battle-ship. So far as
the armored cruiser was concerned, the Board reported as follows:
“The marked differences in the essential features of the designs of
armored cruisers of the Barrow Ship Building Company, Lieutenant W.
I. Chambers, A. H. Grandjean, and the Thames Iron-Works and Ship
Building Company, prevent their classification in the order of merit.
Each exhibits features which strongly commend themselves, but the
Board does not consider it advisable for the government to build a
vessel upon any one of these plans.”

The battle-ship, though designed by one of the most distinguished
marine architects in England, has not in its present form received
the general approval of experts, for between it and the plan
submitted by the Bureau of Construction there seem to be differences
of merits which are strongly in favor of the latter. The dimensions
of the new ships are as follows:

BARROW SHIP.

Length between perpendiculars, 290 feet; on load water-line, 300
feet; extreme breadth, 64 feet 1 inch; mean draught, 22 feet 6
inches; displacement, 6300 tons.

NAVY DEPARTMENT SHIP.

Length between perpendiculars, 300 feet; on load water-line,
310 feet; extreme breadth, 58 feet; mean draught, 22 feet;
displacement, 6600 tons.

The striking differences between these two ships are found in their
relative stability and sea-going qualities. Mr. John, the designer
of the Barrow ship, in a paper on “Atlantic Steamers,” read before
the Institution of Naval Architects July 29, 1886, made the following
statements:

“This question of stability will have to be carefully watched and
studied within the next few years, because there is a tendency at
present towards a rapid increase in the proportion of beam to length;
and as the draught of water in these large ships is limited, we must
be careful that in seeking higher speeds with increased beam we do
not get too much stability, and so render the vessels heavy rollers
and very uncomfortable as passenger-ships. It is possible the future
may see vessels of greater beam than any yet afloat in the merchant
service; but if so, it is almost inevitable that they will have to be
made higher out of water in order to render them easy and comfortable
at sea, but even that has its limits. Perhaps it is well to give
an extreme case, and here I will make use of our old friend _The
Great Eastern_.... Now, for the purpose of trading it is quite clear
that _The Great Eastern_ cannot be loaded much deeper than other
ships, while her beam is half as great again; and the consequence
is, her stability, as compared with our modern passenger-ships, is
so excessive that she is bound to be a tremendous roller among the
heavy seas in the Atlantic. Her metacentric height, when loaded, was,
I believe, stated by the late Mr. Froude to be as much as 8.7 feet,
which is from three to four times as much as is thought sufficient
for ships in the present day, or consistent with their easy behavior
at sea.”

Thus Mr. John himself regards 2.9 feet to 2.2 feet as the proper
metacentric height for those steamers, and it is generally considered
by modern designers that from 2.5 to 3.2 feet is most suitable for
this class of armored ships, and is conducive to easiness of motion
in a sea-way. The value of this quality to a ship intended for
sea-fighting cannot be overestimated, for upon her steadiness as a
gun-platform the aim and efficiency of her guns greatly depend.

It will be noticed that this ship has exceptionally great beam,
that of most ships of her class and displacement, varying from 54
to 59 feet, and judging from the sketches which have appeared, her
water-line coefficient is about 0.72. From an approximate calculation
based on this assumption it is found that her metacentric height
will be about six feet. The water-line coefficient may possibly be
a little finer than 0.72, and thus reduce the metacentric height,
but if this ship is assumed to have a metacentric height of three
feet, her water-line coefficient would be 0.6288, which is an
_impossibility_, if her coefficient of fineness of displacement
be that given in the published dimensions. Such a water-line and
coefficient of fineness for 6300 tons displacement would produce
a perfect rectangle for a midship section. So that, unless her
dimensions are changed, she will surely be a heavy roller, and after
much sea duty she will suffer such severe strains as to require
frequent and costly repairs.

The battle-ship designed at the Navy Department has very different
qualities, if the dimensions already published be correct. To possess
a metacentric height of three feet she would require a water-line
coefficient of 0.753, and a midship-section coefficient of 0.89 to
0.90, which is a good proportion for such a vessel. Not only in
sea-going qualities does the American design seem to be superior,
but her battery is far more powerful and better disposed in every
way, while her speed and endurance are equally as great as the plan
recommended. Mr. John has adopted the _échelon_ arrangement of heavy
guns, a disposition which both the English and Italian governments
have, after long trial, discarded in their latest ships. When the
first sketches of a design are made, this arrangement of guns is
theoretically perfect, as it is supposed to give quite as much power
of fire ahead and astern as on each broadside; but when the design is
developed and practically tested, it is found that too much of the
ship’s efficiency in other respects is sacrificed, that the powerful
end fire is not attained, and that the broadside is greatly weakened,
owing to the obstructed arcs of fire.

Besides this, the guns, being placed at some distance from the
midship line, have less accurate fire in rolling, and the ship’s
propensities to roll are encouraged and are greater than would be the
case if the guns were placed on the midship line. It is also found
that the blast from the heavy guns is destructive to superstructures
and other fittings on the upper deck. The Italians, indeed, have
placed stout ventilating shafts on their _Italia_ and _Lepanto_ to
prevent the rearmost pair of heavy guns from being trained within
twenty degrees of the fore and aft line. This is done so that the
blast from these guns will not prostrate the gunners attending the
other pair, notwithstanding the fact that those men are under the
armor cover. The _Duilio’s_ forward smoke-pipe is placed entirely
on the port side of the fore and aft line, in order to permit of
one pair of turret guns firing ahead. The upper-deck, 6-inch,
central-pivot guns of the _Andrea Doria_ class are now to be placed
wholly within the superstructure, in order to be out of danger from
the blast of the heavy guns when the latter are fired near the
line of keel, and the same change would have to be made with the
upper-deck, 6-inch guns in the Barrow design.

Similar objections exist to the Bureau of Construction design for an
armored cruiser. This vessel, although possessing the bad features
inherent in the _échelon_ arrangement of heavy guns, does not have
the best ideas of the Barrow design, _i.e._, high freeboard, heavy
guns mounted high above the water-line, and commodious quarters for
officers and men. Both designs besides have the very objectionable
and old-fashioned features of requiring the turrets to be revolved
to fixed loading positions after being fired. The Bureau cruiser, it
may be said, is not saddled with too much metacentric height. She has
ten feet less beam, her centre of gravity is about one foot lower,
and unless her water-line coefficient is very full, she will have a
metacentric height rather less than what is regarded to be the best.

It is not surprising, however, that the Bureau plans are so different
in efficiency, for while the better plan, the battle-ship, is
original with the Navy Department, the armored cruiser is a copy
of, and no substantial improvement over, that of the Brazilian ship
_Riachuelo_ designed several years ago. This ship is considered one
of the best of her date, but great improvements in ship design have
been made within the past few years, and it is against the tendencies
of American inventive genius to take a step backward.

The general plans of cruisers No. 4 and 5 were published in the _New
York Herald_ of June 1st, together with the following data:

“They are to be twin-screw cruisers, 310 feet long on the water-line,
49 feet 1¾ inches extreme breadth, 18 feet 9 inches mean draught,
displacing 4083 tons. They are to have machinery of 10,500 indicated
horse-power under forced draft. The maximum speed is 19 knots, rig
that of a three-masted schooner, spreading 5400 square feet of sail.
They will have a double bottom extending through 129 feet of the
length. The framing in this portion is on the bracket system. Before
and abaft the double bottom, above the protective deck, Z-bars form
the transverse frames. The protective deck, which is nineteen inches
above the water-line amidships, is flat across the top, with sides
which slope down to a depth of four feet three inches below the
water-line. The horizontal portion is two inches thick, the slope
being three inches, reduced at both ends to one and a half inches. It
extends uninterruptedly forward and aft, and protects the machinery,
magazines, and steering-gear, the machinery being further defended by
the disposition of the coal-bunkers. The main hatches in this deck
are protected by armor-bars, and have coffer-dams extending to the
upper deck. The guns are carried on the gun, forecastle, and poop
decks.

“_Armament._—The main battery, which consists of twelve 6-inch
breech-loading rifles, all on centre-pivot mounts, with two-inch
segmental steel shields, is arranged on sponsons so as to obtain
the greatest possible arc of fire. The forecastle, the poop, and
the bridges have been as much as possible availed of to shelter
the guns. The two guns forward and the two guns aft converge their
fire a short distance from the ends of the ship, and the broadside
can be concentrated within 100 feet of the side. Four above-water
torpedo-tubes are provided on the berth-deck, and two direct ahead
under-water torpedoes in the bow. The secondary battery is composed
of four 47-millimetre revolvers, four 57-millimetre single-shots, two
37-millimetre revolvers, and one short Gatling. The coal capacity is
850 tons. The complement of men 300....

“To appreciate what is required to make nineteen knots an hour at
sea, we have only to remember that the _Umbria_ and _Etruria_ are
500 feet long, with more than 12,000 tons displacement and 14,500
indicated horse-power, ordinarily making 18½ and on special occasions
19 knots an hour. Now, to increase her speed to 20 knots an hour,
the _Umbria_ would require about 19,500 horse-power, which means
5000 extra horse-power for the extra knot. For a second extra knot
would be required about 6000 horse-power more, making about 25,000
horse-power necessary to develop a speed of 21 knots.”

Gun-boats Nos. 3 and 4 are to be copies of gun-boat No. 1. No designs
for the floating batteries and the torpedo-boat have been published.
The _Stiletto_ is one of the famous Herreshoff boats, and is now
being tested in consequence of a favorable report made by a board of
officers. On July 23, 1886, with a total displacement of twenty-eight
tons, she made an average of 22.12 knots as the mean of four runs
over the measured mile in a rough sea and fresh wind, and on July
30th she attained an average of 22.89 knots. These were excellent
results for a boat ninety feet in length, and promised that the
type, with certain modifications, was equal to greater demands. The
trial data of this year have not yet been published, though it is
unofficially reported that her performance was equally as creditable.

UNITED STATES NAVAL ARTILLERY.

From the time of the introduction of cast-iron cannons in 1558 until
a comparatively late period, development in naval artillery proceeded
at a very slow rate. The security that was attained by the adoption
of cast-iron was so great, as compared with the danger attending the
use of the more ancient artillery, that the new guns were regarded as
fully supplying all the demands of a suitable battery. The guns were
muzzle-loaders, making the manipulation simple, the previous rude
attempts at breech-loading being abandoned. The number of calibres
that were introduced was very numerous, partly to suit the weight of
the batteries to the ships, and partly to accommodate the fancy of
the time for placing in different parts of the ships guns varying
much in size and destructive effect. The general character of the
batteries and the multiplication of calibres can best be illustrated
by noting the armament of two typical ships of the seventeenth
century.

[Illustration: BRONZE BREECH-LOADING CANNON CAPTURED IN COREA, AGE
UNKNOWN.]

The _Royal Prince_, a British ship built in 1610, carried
fifty-five guns. Of these, two were _cannon-petronel_, or
24-pounders; six were _demi-cannon_, medium 32-pounders; twelve were
_culverins_, 18-pounders, which were nine feet long; eighteen were
_demi-culverins_, nine-pounders; thirteen were _rakers_, 5-pounders,
six feet long; and four were _port-pieces_, probably swivels.
These guns were disposed as follows: on the lower gun-deck, two
24-pounders, six medium 32-pounders, and twelve 18-pounders; on
the upper gun-deck the battery was entirely of 9-pounders; and the
forecastle and quarter-deck were armed with 5-pounders, and the brood
of smaller pieces which swelled the nominal armament.

The _Sovereign of the Seas_, built in 1637, in the reign of Charles
I., was unequalled by any ship afloat in her time. She mounted on
three gun-decks eighty-six guns. On the lower deck were thirty long
24-pounders and medium 32-pounders; on her middle deck, thirty
12-pounders and 9-pounders; on the upper gun-deck, “other lighter
ordnance;” and on her quarter-deck and forecastle, “numbers of
murdering pieces.”

In the obstinately contested actions between Blake and Van Tromp in
the Cromwellian time, the ships and batteries did not differ in any
great degree from those contemporaneous in construction with the
_Sovereign of the Seas_; and when we remember the inferior character
of the powder used in those days we can account for the duration of
some of the engagements between the English and Dutch ships which
were sometimes protracted through three days.

[Illustration: BRONZE BREECH-LOADER USED BY CORTEZ IN MEXICO.]

The brood of “murdering pieces” of small calibre and little energy
was, after many years, dispersed by the introduction of carronades—a
short cannon of large calibre, which was found to be a convenient
substitute for the 8-pounders and 9-pounders on upper decks, and for
the “lighter ordnance,” which was ineffective; but this change was
brought about slowly, as is seen by referring to the batteries of
some ships which fought at Trafalgar.

The Spanish seventy-fours in that action had fifty-eight long
24-pounders on the gun-decks; on the spar-deck, ten iron 36-pounder
carronades and four long 8-pounders; and on the poop, six iron
24-pounder carronades—total, seventy-eight guns.

[Illustration: BREECH-LOADER CAPTURED IN THE WAR WITH MEXICO.]

The _Victory_, the English flag-ship, mounted on her three gun-decks
ninety long 32, 24, and 12 pounders, and on the quarter-deck and
forecastle, ten long 12-pounders and two 68-pounder carronades.

The _Santissima Trinidada_ mounted on the lower gun-deck thirty long
36-pounders; on the second deck, thirty-two long 18-pounders; on
the third deck thirty-two long 12-pounders; and on the spar-deck,
thirty-two 8-pounders. In the British accounts she is said to have
had one hundred and forty guns, which number must have included
swivels mounted for the occasion.

At the end of the eighteenth century the 18-pounder was the preferred
gun for the main-deck batteries of frigates, guns of larger calibre
being found only on the lower decks of line-of-battle ships. The
18-pounder was the maximum calibre that was employed on board the
ships of the United Colonies of North America in the war of the
Revolution. The resources of the colonies did not admit of building
ships to contend with vessels fit to take their place in line of
battle, but such as were constructed were well adapted to resist the
small British cruisers, and to capture transports and store-ships.
The so-called frigates of that day were vessels varying from six
hundred to a thousand tons, and, according to their capacity, carried
12-pounders or 18-pounders in the main-deck batteries. There was
usually no spar-deck, but the forecastle and quarter-deck, which were
connected by gangways with gratings over the intermediate space,
were provided with an armament of light 6, 9, or 12 pounders. A few
carronades came into use during this war.

At the conclusion of this war the Colonial fleet disappeared, and it
was not until the time of the depredations on the growing commerce
of the United States by the Algerine corsairs that Congress felt
justified in incurring the expense of establishing a national marine.
The ships which were built under the law of 1794 were fully up to
the most advanced ideas of the time, and some of these ships carried
on their gun-decks a full battery of 24-pounders, thirty in number,
while the others were armed with 18-pounders on the gun-deck, with
spar-deck batteries of 9 and 12 pounders, the carronade not having
been yet definitely adopted for spar-deck batteries.

It is not until the war of 1812 that we find the carronade fully
established as the spar-deck armament of frigates. The _Constitution_
and the _Guerrière_ carried 32-pounder carronades of very similar
weight and power in the place of the long guns of smaller calibre on
the spar-deck. The original name of this piece of ordnance was the
“Smasher,” the leading purpose of the inventor, General Melville,
of the British artillery, being to fire 68-pounder shot with a low
charge, thus effecting a greater destruction in a ship’s timbers
by the increased splintering which this practice was known to
produce. Carronades of small calibre were subsequently cast, which
were adopted for spar-deck batteries of frigates and line-of-battle
ships, and, as they grew in favor, formed the entire battery of
sloops-of-war and smaller vessels until about 1840, when the
attention that had been given for some years to the subject of naval
ordnance began to assume tangible shape, and the effort was made to
proceed in this matter in accordance with an intelligent system.

[Illustration: BRONZE 12-POUNDER, “EL NEPTUNO,” 1781.]

The advantage of large calibre was firmly impressed upon those who
occupied themselves with the ordnance matters of the navy. As the
fleet was developed, the 24-pounder gave way to the 32-pounder, and
for the lower-deck battery of line-of-battle ships the 42-pounder
was introduced. Some 42-pounder carronades were also introduced as
spar-deck batteries for these larger ships. With the disappearance of
this class of ship the 42-pounder was abandoned, and the 32-pounder
was retained as the maximum calibre, different classes being assigned
to different sizes of ships. These classes were divided into the gun
proper, with 150 pounds of metal to one of shot; the double-fortified
gun, with 200 pounds of metal to one of shot; and the medium gun,
with 100 pounds of metal to one of shot. The carronade of the same
calibre, mounted on a slide, had a proportional weight of 65 pounds
of metal to one of shot.

[Illustration: U.S.N. CARRONADE, SLIDE, AND CARRIAGE.]

In the interval between 1840 and 1845 the double-fortified 32-pounder
was replaced by a gun of the same calibre of 57 hundred-weight,
called the long 32-pounder; and to suit the capacity of the different
classes of ships then in the service, there were introduced
the 32-pounders of 46 hundred-weight, 42 hundred-weight, and
27 hundred-weight, in addition to the regular medium gun of 32
hundred-weight. This period also marks the introduction of shell-guns
as part of the battery.

To this time no explosive projectiles had been used with cannons
properly so called; their use had been limited to mortars and
howitzers. The mortar was originally used for projecting huge balls
of stone at high angles. The first practical use made of them
for projecting bombs was in 1624, but the unwieldy weight of the
mortar and its bomb, the latter sometimes exceeding 300 pounds,
prevented their use in field operations. To provide for this, light
mortars were cast, which, being mounted on wheels, were denominated
howitzers. Frederick the Great of Prussia brought this form of
artillery to its highest development for field and siege use, and
the Continental powers of Europe adopted it to a large extent for
projecting bombs at high angles of fire. The mortar has never had
a place in regular naval armaments; it has been used afloat for
bombardment of cities and fortified positions, but never with a view
to contending with ships.

[Illustration: U.S.N. MEDIUM 32-POUNDER.]

The success attending the use of explosive projectiles at high
elevations did not lead at once to their application to horizontal
firing from cannons. An important link in the progress of the idea
resulted from the effort to avail of the advantage of ricochet firing
with bombs. In order to effect this, the angle of elevation had to
be reduced to enable the bomb to roll along the ground. The reduced
angle of elevation was still greater than that used for cannon, but
the success of the experiment led to the casting by the French of an
8-inch siege howitzer, which, in connection with the development in
the manufacture of fuses, made it practicable to apply the idea of
firing shells, like shot, horizontally, and the chief object in view
seems to have been to operate against ships.

The combining of the elements necessary for the achievement of this
important step in naval artillery is by common consent credited to
General Paixhan, of the French artillery, who, though not claiming
the invention of any of the numerous details involved in the system,
succeeded in so judiciously arranging the parts as to make the system
practicable by which the whole character of naval armaments was
revolutionized.

Following the progressive ideas of the age, shell-guns were
introduced in the United States navy. These were of 8-inch calibre,
and of weights of 63 hundred-weight and 55 hundred-weight. The
guns were shaped in accordance with the form adopted by General
Paixhan, and were easily distinguishable in the battery from the
ordinary shot-gun. From this circumstance they obtained the title of
Paixhan-guns, though there was nothing special in the gun itself to
merit an appellation. The whole system was Paixhan’s; the gun was
only a part of the system.

It required many years to bring the shell-gun into such general
application as to displace the solid-shot gun. They were assigned
tentatively to ships in commission, and in 1853, by a navy
regulation, the battery of a frigate was provided with only ten of
these guns, which were collected in one division on the gun-deck. The
first vessel in the United States navy whose battery was composed
exclusively of shell-guns was the sloop-of-war _Portsmouth_, in 1856.
This vessel carried a battery of sixteen 8-inch shell-guns of 63
hundred-weight. These were among the first of a new pattern of gun
for which the navy is indebted to the skill and study of the late
Rear-admiral Dahlgren.

The determination of the best form for cannons was a question which
had occupied the minds of artillerists for some years. In the older
guns the thickness of metal was badly distributed; it was too
uniformly extended along the entire length, not arranged in such
proportions as to accord with the differing strains along the bore.
Colonel Bumford, of the United States Ordnance, had been among the
first to consider this subject, and for many years the results of
his experiments had guided construction to a great degree. General
Paixhan made a further step in advance by reducing very much the
thickness of metal along the chase of his guns, but it remained for
Rear-admiral Dahlgren to produce the perfection of form in the gun
so widely known bearing his name. In this gun the thickness of metal
is proportioned to the effort of the gases in the bore, and all
projections and angular changes of form are suppressed, giving to
all parts a curved and rounded surface. The suppression of angular
formations on the exterior of a casting has a remarkable effect
on the arrangement of the crystals while cooling. These arrange
themselves normal to the cooling waves, which, if entering from
directions not radial with the cylindrical casting, produce confusion
in their arrangement, establishing planes of weakness where the waves
meet, which, in case of overstrain on the piece, assist rupture and
determine the course of the fracture.

With the introduction of the Dahlgren shell-gun the transition of
the artillery of the United States navy may be said to have been
completed. The shell-gun of 9-inch and 11-inch calibres followed the
8-inch, and ships were armed with such as were appropriate to their
capacity as rapidly as the new guns could be manufactured. When fully
equipped, the armament of the United States navy was superior to that
of any other navy in the world.

The substitution of shells for solid shot marks an important epoch in
naval artillery. The probable effect of a shot could be predetermined
and provided for; that of a shell was unknown. In order to produce
serious injury with a shot, it was necessary to perforate the side
of an enemy. This was not indispensable with a shell; with the
latter, perforation might be dispensed with, as penetration to such
a depth as would give efficacy to the explosion might prove more
destructive to the hull than would absolute perforation. With the
shot, damage was done to life and material in detail; with the shell,
if successfully applied, destruction was threatened to the entire
fabric, with all it contained. Naval artillery entered a new phase;
the rough appliances of the past would no longer answer all demands.
The founder could not alone equip the battery; the laboratory was
called into use, and pressed to provide from its devices. The “new
arm” depended upon the successful working of the fuse of the shell,
without which it was but a hollow substitute for a solid shot, and
this detail demanded the utmost care in preparation. It was the
perfecting of this device which, more than aught else, delayed the
general adoption of the new artillery for so long a time after its
advantages had been recognized.

[Illustration: U.S.N. 9-INCH DAHLGREN (9-INCH SMOOTH-BORE).]

The fuses that were used to explode the ancient bombs were long
wooden plugs, bored cylindrically, and filled with powder condensed
by tamping it to a hard consistency. The fuse case projected from the
bomb, and to avoid being bent by the shock of discharge, was placed
carefully in the axis of fire. Before the discharge of the mortar
the fuse was lighted by a match. In applying the fuse to shell-guns
fired horizontally, the problem was so to arrange it as to ignite
it by the flame of discharge, and so to support it in the wall of
the shell as to prevent any dislocation of the fuse composition, the
cracking of which would permit the penetration of the flame into
the mass. This was successfully accomplished, and the United States
navy fuse was justly famous, one feature of it being a simple but
most effective device called a “water-cap,” which guarded against
the injurious introduction of sand or water when the shell was fired
_en ricochet_. The introduction of a safety-plug in the bottom of
the fuse case, which required the shock of discharge to displace it
in order to open a way of communication between the fuse and the
bursting charge in the shell, and the absence of all accidents in
manipulation, inspired such confidence that the new arm advanced to
favor, and both officers and men were proud to be identified with it.

Previous to the introduction of shells there had been in use
incendiary projectiles, not explosive, but intended to set fire to an
enemy’s vessel. Hot shot were applied to this purpose, but the use
of these was chiefly confined to shore batteries, where a suitable
heating furnace could be conveniently provided. The projectile for
this purpose chiefly used from ships was the carcass, which was a
shot in which several radial cylindrical holes were formed which
were filled with powder tamped to a hard consistency; these columns
of composition were ignited by the flame of discharge, and continued
to burn until consumed. The flame issuing from these holes served to
ignite consumable material in their vicinity. The chief danger from
a carcass was from lodgment in the side of a ship; if it landed on
deck it could be removed and thrown overboard, as there was no danger
from explosion; the addition of the bursting charge in the cavity
of a shell produced a projectile which was far in advance both for
generating a flame and for preventing interference with its mission.

The probable destructive effect of shells exploding in the sides
or on the open decks of ships was thoroughly recognized, and
experiments at targets sufficiently proved it; but circumstances on
a proving-ground and in action are so dissimilar that the experience
of a naval engagement was looked forward to with much interest, in
order to satisfy as to the effect of the new projectile in all the
varying conditions of a sea-fight. Referring to the history of the
past thirty years, which marks the period of the general introduction
of shell-guns, it is remarkable how few engagements between ships
have taken place; but on every occasion of the use of shells, when
unarmored vessels were engaged, the effect has been most decided
and complete. Three instances only can be referred to of purely
sea-fights, _viz._, the engagement between the Russian and Turkish
fleets at Sinope in 1853, during the Crimean war, the engagement
between the United States steamer _Hatteras_ and the Confederate
cruiser _Alabama_ during the war of the rebellion, and the fight
between the _Kearsarge_ and the _Alabama_ during the same war. In
the affair at Sinope the Russian ships used shells; the Turkish had
only solid shot. The result was the total destruction of the Turkish
force. Not one ship escaped; all were burned or sunk. The fight
between the _Alabama_ and the _Hatteras_ resulted in the sinking
of the _Hatteras_; and the contest between the _Alabama_ and the
_Kearsarge_ ended the career of the _Alabama_. And it may be noticed
that but for the failure to explode of a shell that was embedded in
the stern-post of the _Kearsarge_, that vessel might have accompanied
her antagonist to the bottom of the sea.

The gallant attempt of Rear-admiral Lyons with the British wooden
fleet before the forts of Sebastopol is an instance which proved the
uselessness of subjecting unarmored vessels to the steady fire of
fortified positions using shells from their batteries.

One other instance of a sea-fight can be cited in the engagement in
1879 between two Chilian armored vessels and the lightly armored
Peruvian turreted vessel _Huascar_. The _Huascar_ was terribly
over-matched during this fight, but at its conclusion her boilers and
engines were intact, and indentations on her sides showed that her
light armor had deflected a number of projectiles; but the effect of
the shells that had burst on board of her was apparent in the great
destruction of life.

The very decisive engagement which took place at Lissa in 1866,
between the Austrian and Italian fleets, should not be omitted in
alluding to sea-fights of a late period; but this action can hardly
be quoted as one in which the element of shell-fire can be recognized
as the exclusive cause of destruction, for the remarkable impetuosity
and dash of the attack and the desperate use of the ram produced a
crisis which obviated the necessity for continuous bombardment with
cannon.

The necessity of providing a defence against shells was recognized
both by England and France during the Crimean war, and a protection
of armor was supplied to some floating batteries built at that time
which were intended to operate before fortified positions; and at the
conclusion of the war the English built the _Warrior_ and the French
built _La Gloire_. These were the first specimens of iron-clad ships
of war. They were capable of resisting successfully the entrance
of shells from guns of the period. It is thus seen that almost
coincident with the general adoption of horizontal shell-firing,
naval construction entered a new phase, and a new problem was
submitted to the naval artillerist.

Against an iron-faced target the solid shot might be partially
effective, but the impact of the spherical shell was harmless, and
the explosive effect of the bursting charge enclosed in it would be
superficial. This was amply demonstrated in actual practice during
our war experience, notably at Mobile Bar, in the engagement with the
Confederate iron-clad _Tennessee_, the roughly constructed armor of
which vessel resisted a storm of our heaviest shells.

[Illustration: HORIZONTAL SECTION OF MILLWALL SHIELD.]

The impotency of the spherical shell against armor being recognized
by foreign governments, they proceeded to develop the rifled
cannon, which with its elongated projectile offered the means
of effecting the object of the time—to perforate armor with an
explosive projectile. Our authorities, however, persevered in their
faith in the smooth-bore, and held that the _racking_ effect of a
spherical projectile of sufficiently large calibre was superior to
that produced by the perforation of a rifle projectile of inferior
diameter. The 15-inch and 20-inch smooth-bore cannons were cast in
accordance with this idea, and the racking side of the question was
so obstinately held that the British government imported in 1867 from
the United States a 15-inch gun for the purpose of determining by
their own experiments what foundation there was for the advantages
that were claimed for it. The gun was bought of Charles Alger & Co.,
of Boston; it weighed nineteen tons, and threw a cast-iron spherical
solid shot of about four hundred and fifty pounds. It was mounted
at Shoeburyness, and was fired in competition with English rifled
cannons of 9-inch and 10-inch calibres. The result of the experiments
went to show that against a target with a power of resistance
inferior to the energy of the projectile the effect of the large
sphere at short range is more disastrous than that of the elongated
rifle projectile of the same weight; but that against a target able
to resist the total energy of both the injury done by the rifle
projectile is by far the greater. The comparative effect is well
shown on a target called the “Millwall Shield,” consisting of a plate
nine inches in thickness, backed by Hughes’s hollow stringers—an
arrangement of target which to the time of the experiment had proved
invincible. The 15-inch smooth-bore spherical shot rebounded from the
target six feet, leaving a 3-inch indentation on the plate, while the
9-inch rifle projectile, weighing two hundred and fifty pounds, made
complete penetration of the plate, passing two or three inches into
the backing, and the 10-inch rifle projectile, weighing four hundred
pounds, penetrated to the rear of the backing itself.

It should be mentioned in this connection that the United States
government adopted during the war of the rebellion a rifled cannon
proposed by Captain Parrott of the West Point Foundery, New York, of
which many were introduced into both the navy and army, and did good
service as long as the charges of powder were limited in weight; but
when these guns were called upon for work requiring great endurance,
they proved untrustworthy and dangerous to those who served them.
At the naval bombardment of Fort Fisher several of them burst,
causing loss of life on board the vessels of which they formed the
armament. They were constructed of cast-iron, having a coiled hoop
of wrought-iron shrunk around the breech. They have ceased to form a
part of our naval armament.

During the years of inaction in the United States that have
intervened since these experiments, the smooth-bore partisans have
had time to reflect and to learn lessons of practical usefulness from
observing what has been transpiring abroad. Opportunities have been
afforded to note the progress made in armor and artillery, and though
the smooth-bore shell is still operative against unarmored vessels,
the advantages of the rifled gun under all the circumstances of navy
experiences have been admitted, and in the transition through which
our naval artillery is now passing we are not embarrassed by the
presentation of views antagonistic to the principles on which it has
been determined our new artillery is to be constructed. The system
at the basis of our present acts is founded on a comprehensive view
of the whole subject, and is intended to provide our ships with a
surplus of offensive power over what their capacity for defence might
seem to call for.

Our navy will possess a certain number of armored vessels for coast
defence, and armored sea-cruisers are certain to be included in
the list, but the more numerous class will be unarmored, and the
first problem to be solved is that of providing for these a suitable
armament.

[Illustration: A KRUPP GUN ON A NAVAL CARRIAGE.]

The work to be done by an unarmored cruiser must be done from a
distance when risking an engagement with an armored enemy. The
superiority of armament must compensate for deficiency in defensive
power which precludes close quarters. To make these ships effective
they must be armed with guns capable of doing an extraordinary amount
of work, and yet the size of the vessels will not admit of their
carrying guns of immense weight. In order to get this amount of
work out of a comparatively light gun, we must secure great initial
velocity for the projectile. This can only be done by burning a large
charge of powder, which involves a long bore in which to burn it,
while care is necessary to secure a large margin of strength in the
material of which the gun is constructed. These essential demands
required a radical change in the form and material of our present
armament; they also forced a change in the method of construction.

[Illustration: ALFRED KRUPP.]

The superior fitness for cannons of steel over cast-iron was
recognized many years ago, but the difficulty of casting steel
in large masses prevented the introduction of steel guns, and
the generally acceptable treatment of cast-iron made it answer
satisfactorily the demands for gun-metal not subjected to unusual
strains. Mr. Frederick Krupp, of Essen, in Germany, was the first
steel manufacturer who succeeded in casting steel in large masses,
and he produced a number of steel guns cast from crucibles in solid
ingots, which were bored, turned, and fashioned as in the case of
cast-iron smooth-bore guns. These guns held a position in advance
of other manufactures on the score of strength of material. But the
introduction of the rifle system, the call for higher velocities, the
increased charges of powder, with the consequent increase of strain,
enhanced by the friction attending the passage of the projectile
forced along the bore, had the effect of calling attention to the
weakness that was inherent in the method of construction of cannons.
It is well known that an explosive force operating in the interior
of a hollow cylinder of any thickness is not felt equally throughout
the wall of metal; the parts near the seat of explosion are called
upon to do much more work in restraining the force generated than are
the parts more remote. It has been determined that the strain brought
upon the portions of the wall is in inverse proportion to the squares
of their distances from the seat of effort. Thus, in a gun cast
solid, if we take a point two inches from the bore, and another four
inches from the bore, the strain felt at those points respectively
will be inversely in the proportion of four to sixteen, or, in other
words, the metal at two inches from the bore will be strained four
times as much as that at the distance of four inches. From this it
can be seen that the metal near the seat of effort may be strained
beyond its tensile strength, while that more distant is only in
partial sympathy with it. Rupture thus originates at the interior
portion, and the rest of the wall yields in detail. No additional
strength of material can change this relationship between the parts;
they result from a law, and show that this method of construction
for a cannon is untrustworthy where the strains approach the tensile
strength of the material.

The means of providing against this successive rupture of
over-strained parts is found in the “built-up gun,” in which an
interior tube is surrounded by encircling hoops of metal, which are
shrunk on at sufficient tension to compress the portions which they
enclose. This is the principle of “initial tension,” which is the
basis of the modern construction of cannons. By adopting this method,
an ingot to form a tube to burn the required amount of powder can be
cast of a light weight in comparison with what would be needed for
a complete gun, and the strength and number of reinforcing rings to
be shrunk around it can be readily determined, proportioned to the
known strain that will be brought upon the bore of the piece. The
late developments in the manufacture of steel by the open-hearth
process remove all difficulty to procuring the necessary metal in
masses suitable for all parts of the heaviest guns.

[Illustration: BREECH-LOADING RIFLE-TUBE READY FOR RECEIVING JACKET.]

The built-up steel gun is the one now adopted in Europe by the
leading powers, and it is the gun with which the United States navy
will be armed; but, before its final adoption, efforts were made to
convert old smooth-bore cast-iron guns into rifles, and to construct
new guns partially of steel and partly of wrought-iron. As some of
these methods of conversion offered an economical means of acquiring
rifled cannons, our naval authorities were led into the error of
countenancing the effort to a moderate degree.

[Illustration: BREECH-LOADING RIFLE-JACKET, ROUGH-BORED AND TURNED.]

The system that was adopted was that originally suggested by Mr.
P. M. Parsons in England, which was afterwards patented by Major
Palliser, R.A., and bears his name. It consisted in enlarging the
bore of a cast-iron gun, and inserting a tube of wrought-iron formed
of a bar arranged in the form of a coil when heated. The tube was
expanded by firing charges of powder, and afterwards rifled. The guns
are muzzle-loaders, and are not increased in length beyond that of
the cast-iron gun which forms the casing for the tube. The length is
thus limited in order to preserve the preponderance of the piece,
and because of the want of longitudinal strength in the coil, which
cannot be depended on beyond a few tons’ strain; the arrangement of
metal in a coil provides very well for circumferential or tangential
strains, but in the Palliser conversion the longitudinal strength
depends on the cast-iron casing. The idea of the coiled wrought-iron
tube originated with Professor Treadwell, of Harvard University, in
1841. He utilized it by enclosing a tube of cast-iron or steel in
the same manner as it is applied in the wrought-iron Armstrong and
Woolwich guns.

[Illustration: PUTTING THE JACKET ON A 6-INCH BREECH-LOADING
RIFLE-TUBE.]

The administration of our naval ordnance has abandoned conversions,
and has concentrated its efforts on the production of an armament
of built-up steel guns. The system of construction that has been
adopted originated in England, but was for many years ignored by
the government authorities. It involved the use of steel in all its
parts, and this was charged as an objection, as confidence in this
metal was not established in the minds of the English artillerists.
That government committed itself entirely to the wrought-iron gun
proposed by Mr. (now Lord) Armstrong, whose system was a reproduction
of that successfully experimented on by Professor Treadwell, and the
entire force of the government works at Woolwich and of the Armstrong
works at Elswick-on-the-Tyne was occupied with the production of this
style of ordnance. The English steel gun invented by Captain Blakely
and Mr. J. Vavasseur was ignored in England, but its merit could not
be suppressed, and its superiority has forced a tardy recognition by
that government.

This gun came prominently into notice for a short time at the
breaking out of the war of the rebellion: some guns were imported
for the service of the Southern States. At the exhibition in London
in 1862 a Blakely 8.5-inch gun was one of the features of attraction
in the department of ordnance. The principle of the construction
was shown in this gun, consisting in shrinking a long jacket of
steel around an enclosed steel tube, the jacket extending to the
trunnions. Mr. Vavasseur was the manager of the London Ordnance
Works, and was associated with Captain Blakely in the manufacture of
his earlier guns, but the entire business soon fell into the hands
of Mr. Vavasseur, whose name alone is associated with the succeeding
developments of the gun.

In 1862 the guns manufactured by Mr. Krupp were solid forgings. He
advanced but slowly towards the construction of built-up cannons, and
it was not until the failure of some of his solid-cast guns that he
entered on the built-up system. His first steps were to strengthen
the rear portion of new guns by shrinking on hoops, and to increase
the strength of old guns he turned down the breech and shrunk on
hoops. He confined this system of strengthening to the rear of the
trunnions until he was reminded of the necessity of strength along
the chase of the gun by the blowing off of the chase of some 11-inch
guns of his manufacture. His system was then modified so as to
involve reinforcing the tube of the larger calibred guns along its
whole length with hoops, and his later and largest productions are
provided with a long jacket reinforcing the entire breech portion of
the tube—a virtual adoption of the great element of strength which
has always formed the essential feature in the Vavasseur gun which is
now adopted in the United States navy.

In the building up of the steel gun for the navy advantage is so
taken of the elastic characteristic of the metal that all parts tend
to mutual support. The gun proper consists of a steel tube and a
steel jacket shrunk around it, reaching from the breech to and beyond
the location of the trunnion-band. Outside the jacket and along the
chase of the gun there are shrunk on such hoops as the known strain
on the tube may make necessary for its support. The tube is formed
from a casting which is forged, rough-bored, and turned, and then
tempered in oil, by which its elasticity and tensile strength are
much increased. It is then turned on the exterior, and adjusted to
the jacket, the proper difference being allowed for shrinkage. The
jacket, previously turned and tempered, is then heated, and rapidly
lowered to its place. The front hoops over the chase are then put
on, and the gun is put into a lathe and turned to receive the
trunnion-band and rear and front hoops. The gun is then fine-bored
and rifled.

[Illustration: BREECH-LOADING RIFLE AFTER RECEIVING JACKET.]

Each part, as successively placed in position, is expected to
compress the parts enclosed through the initial tension due to
contraction in cooling. This tension is the greater the farther the
part is removed from the tube; thus the jacket is shrunk on at a less
tension than are the encircling hoops. By this means full use is
made of the elastic capacity of the tube which contributes the first
resistance to the expanding influence of the charge. The tension of
the jacket prevents the tube being forced up to its elastic limit,
and it in turn experiences the effect of the tension of the other
encircling parts which contribute to the general support; thus no
part is strained beyond its elastic limit, and on the cessation
of the pressure all resume their normal form and dimensions. A
comparison of this method of common and mutual support of parts with
that given by the wall of a gun cast solid will serve to demonstrate
the superior strength of the construction. In order to achieve this
intimate working of all the parts it is necessary that the metal
of which they are respectively composed must be possessed of the same
essential characteristics; in a word, the gun must be homogeneous.
It was the absence of this feature in the Armstrong gun which has
caused its abolition. This gun was built up, and the parts were
expected to contribute mutual support, but the want of homogeneity
between the steel tube and the encircling hoops of wrought-iron made
it impossible for them to work in accord, in consequence of the
different elastic properties of the two metals, which, after frequent
discharges, resulted in a separation of surfaces between the tube and
hoops, when the tube cracked from want of support.

[Illustration: A KRUPP HAMMER.]

[Illustration: TRANSPORTING CANNON AT BREMERHAVEN.]

In the construction of the guns for the United States navy, as in
the new steel guns now being manufactured in England, the theory
of the built-up system is practically conformed to; more so than by
Krupp or the French artillerists, who use a thicker tube than is
considered judicious at Woolwich or at the Washington navy-yard. Any
increase of thickness of the tube beyond what is necessary to receive
the initial pressure of the charge is open to the objections made to
the gun with a solid wall, the proportion of the strain communicated
to the hoops is reduced, and rupture may ensue from overstraining
the tube. The thicker the tube, the less appreciable must be the
compression induced by the tension of the encircling hoops.

[Illustration: BREECH-LOADING RIFLE AFTER RECEIVING JACKET AND CHASE
HOOPS.]

[Illustration: BREECH-LOADING RIFLE WITH JACKET, CHASE HOOPS, AND
JACKET HOOPS IN PLACE.]

The gun is a breech-loader. The system adopted for closing the
breech is an American invention (see note, p. 257), but having
been employed in France from the earliest experimental period, it
is known as the French _fermeture_. A screw is cut in the rear end
of the jacket to the rear of the tube, and a corresponding screw
is cut upon a breech-plug. The screw threads are stripped at three
equidistant places, the screw and plane surfaces alternating, thus
forming what is called an “interrupted” or “slotted” screw. The screw
portions of the breech-plug enter freely along the plane longitudinal
surfaces cut in the tube, and being then turned one-sixth of its
circumference, the screw of the plug locks in that of the tube, and
the breech is closed.

[Illustration: U.S.N. 6-INCH BREECH-LOADING RIFLE.]

The success of this system of breech mechanism was not so pronounced
on its introduction as it is to-day. The plug forms the base of the
breech of the gun, and all the effort of the gases to blow out the
breech is exerted at this point. The impact upon the end of the plug
is very severe, and has a tendency to _upset_ the metal, thereby
increasing the diameter of the plug, which would prevent its removal
after the discharge of the piece. With quick-burning powder, as was
generally in use for cannons at the inception of the breech-loading
experiments, this result ensued if the charges of powder were carried
above a certain limit, and the consequent restriction that was
put upon velocities was a serious obstacle to the adoption of the
system; but the progress that has been made of late years in the
science of gunpowder manufacture has relieved the subject from this
embarrassment, powder being now provided which communicates very high
velocities while developing pressures so moderate and regular as to
be entirely under the control of the artillerist.

The original guns, four in number, constructed with breech mechanism
on the French _fermeture_ principle for the British government during
the Crimean war are now in the “Graveyard” at Woolwich Arsenal.

The projectiles for the new armament are of two kinds; both, however,
are shells. That for ordinary use against unarmored vessels is
styled the common shell, and is of cast-iron. The length bears a
uniform proportion to the gun, being in all cases three and a half
calibres. The armor-piercing shell is made of forged steel, and is
three calibres in length. The following table gives the particulars,
approximately, of the common shell:

+------------------------------+------------------+--------+---------+
| GUN. | Length. | Weight.| Bursting|
| | | | Charge. |
+------------------------------+--------+---------+--------+---------+
| | Inches.| Calibre.| Pounds.| Pounds. |
| 5 inch breech-loading rifle | 17.97 | 3.59 | 60 | 2 |
| 6-inch breech-loading rifle | 20.90 | 3.48 | 100 | 4 |
| 8-inch breech-loading rifle | 28.10 | 3.51 | 250 | 12 |
| 10 inch breech-loading rifle | 35.00 | 3.50 | 500 | 22 |
| 12 inch breech-loading rifle | 42.00 | 3.50 | 850 | 38 |
| 16-inch breech-loading rifle | 56.00 | 3.50 | 2000 | 90 |
+------------------------------+--------+---------+--------+---------+

The armor-piercing shell of the same weight is reduced in length,
and its walls are thicker; the bursting charge is consequently much
reduced. The following are the particulars, approximately determined:

+------------------------------+------------------+--------+---------+
| GUN. | Length. | Weight.| Bursting|
| | | | Charge. |
+------------------------------+--------+---------+--------+---------+
| | Inches.| Calibre.| Pounds.| Pounds. |
| 5-inch breech-loading rifle | 15.07 | 3.01 | 60 | 1 |
| 6-inch breech-loading rifle | 17.91 | 2.98 | 100 | 1.50 |
| 8-inch breech-loading rifle | 24.25 | 3.03 | 250 | 3.50 |
| 10-inch breech-loading rifle | 30.00 | 3.00 | 500 | 7 |
| 12-inch breech-loading rifle | 36.00 | 3.00 | 850 | 14 |
| 16-inch breech-loading rifle | 48.00 | 3.00 | 2000 | 30 |
+------------------------------+--------+---------+--------+---------+

The rifle motion is communicated by one rotating ring of copper,
which is placed at the distance of 1.5 inch from the base of the
projectile.

[Illustration: CARTRIDGE CASE AND GRAINS OF POWDER, U.S.N.]

The uniform windage for all calibres is .04 inch; thus, taking the
6-inch gun as an example, the diameter of the bore across the lands
is 6 inches, the diameter of the shell is 5.96 inches, the depth of
the grooves is .05 inch; thus the diameter of the bore across the
grooves is 6.10 inches. In order to permit the rotating ring to fill
the grooves, it must have a diameter of 6.14 inches; this causes a
_squeeze_ of .05 inch between the lands and the rotating ring.

There is no subject in the development of the new naval artillery
more important than the powder. That used with the old artillery is
entirely unsuited to the new conditions that obtain in the modern
high-power guns. A brown powder, introduced first in Germany, has
exhibited decided advantages over all others, and the efforts to
reproduce it have been thoroughly successful at the Du Pont Mills.
It is generally known as “cocoa” powder. Its peculiarity exists in
the method of preparing the charcoal; this affects the color, and
results in a brown instead of a black powder. With this powder,
experiments with the 6-inch gun give a muzzle velocity of over 2000
feet per second with a projectile of 100 pounds, using charges of 50
pounds, and this result is obtained with less than 15 tons pressure
per square inch in the powder chamber. The grain is prismatic, with
a central perforation, and as regards its rate of burning, is under
complete control in the manufacture; the form provides an increasing
surface for the flame during the period of combustion, thus
relieving the gun from abnormal pressures at the moment of ignition,
but continuing the extreme pressure farther along the bore. The
progressive nature of the combustion is very apparent when comparing
an unburned grain with others partially consumed, blown out from the
gun.

[Illustration: COMMON SHELLS, U.S.N.]

The gun-carriage, which is a separate study in itself, is carried to
a high pitch of perfection, and presents many features being adopted
abroad. The importance of a suitable carriage can be appreciated by
inspecting the following table, which exhibits the _energy_ that must
be controlled by it:

Part 1 of 2
+------------------------------------+---------+-----------+---------+
| | | | |
| | Weight | Weight | Muzzle |
| GUN. | of | of |Velocity.|
| | Charge. |Projectile.| |
+------------------------------------+---------+-----------+---------+
| | Pounds. | Pounds. | Feet. |
| 5-inch steel breech-loading rifle | 30 | 60 | 1915 |
| 6-inch steel breech-loading rifle | 50 | 100 | 1915 |
| 8-inch steel breech-loading-rifle | 125 | 250 | 2050 |
| 10-inch steel breech-loading rifle | 250 | 500 | 2100 |
| 12-inch steel breech-loading rifle | 425 | 850 | 2100 |
| 14-inch steel breech-loading rifle | 675 | 1350 | 2100 |
| 16-inch steel breech-loading rifle | 1000 | 2000 | 2100 |
+------------------------------------+---------+-----------+---------+

Part 2 of 2
+---------+----------+-------------+----------+----------+-----------+
| | | Penetration | Muzzle | | |
| | Muzzle | in | Energy | Weight | Weight of |
| GUN. | Energy. |Wrought-iron.| per Ton | of Gun. | Carriage. |
| | | | of Gun. | | |
+---------+----------+-------------+----------+----------+-----------+
| | Ft.-Tons.| Inches. | Ft.-Tons.| Pounds. | Pounds. |
| 5-inch | 1,525 | 10.7 | 552 | 6,187 | 4,200 |
| 6-inch | 2,542 | 13.2 | 521 | 11,000 | 6,400 |
| 8-inch | 7,285 | 18.2 | 560 | 28,000 | 14,000 |
| 10-inch | 15,285 | 23.7 | 588 | 58,240 | 32,482 |
| 12-inch | 25,985 | 27.6 | 591 | 44 tons | .... |
| 14-inch | 41,270 | 32.2 | 550 | 75 tons | .... |
| 16-inch | 61,114 | 36.8 | 571 | 107 tons | .... |
+---------+----------+-------------+----------+----------+-----------+

This _energy_, total energy, expresses the work that the gun can
perform. It is expressed in foot-tons, and signifies that the energy
developed is sufficient to raise the weight in tons to a height of
one foot. Thus the projectile from the small 5-inch gun, weighing
sixty pounds, fired with a charge of thirty pounds of powder, leaves
the gun with an energy capable of lifting 1525 tons to the height of
one foot! Comparing this with the energy developed by the 100-ton
hammer at the forge of Le Creuzot in France, the energy of which is
1640 foot-tons, we have a most striking illustration of the power of
gunpowder, and the testimony in the table as to the energy developed
per ton of gun more forcibly exhibits the perfection of a manufacture
which, with so little weight of gun, can develop such gigantic power.

[Illustration: UNBURNED AND PARTIALLY CONSUMED GRAINS OF U.S.N.
POWDER]

It is this power, united with a moderate weight of gun, which
will enable our unarmored cruisers to hold their own with vessels
moderately armored. The power of the battery is greater than is
required to contend with unarmored ships, there is a great surplus
of power of offence, and the effort is very properly made to sustain
this at the highest practicable point. The table shows that the
5-inch gun can perforate 10.7 inches of wrought-iron at the muzzle;
but the results given in tables are based on deliberate firing made
on a practice-ground, with the position of the target normal to the
line of fire. Such conditions cannot obtain during an action at
sea, for, besides the modified effect caused by increased distance
of target, it must be borne in mind that the side of an enemy’s
ship will be presented at varying angles, which introduces the
element of deflection, than which no cause is more detrimental to
penetration. Though the table states a fact, the practical effect of
the projectile will be far less than is stated, hence the wisdom of
providing a large surplus of power to compensate for the resistance
to its operation.

[Illustration: SECTION OF U.S.N. 6-INCH BUILT-UP STEEL BREECH-LOADING
RIFLE.]

It will readily be conceded that the artillerist has a very
responsible duty to perform in so designing his gun that the parts
shall lock and interlock to guard against chance of dislocation in
the structure. A study of the illustration of the 6-inch built-up gun
as constructed at the Washington navy-yard will show the system there
adopted.

[Illustration: BROADSIDE CARRIAGE FOR 6-INCH BREECH-LOADING RIFLE.]

In the list of guns each calibre is represented by one gun. We have
not, as of old, several guns of the same calibre differing in weight;
multiplicity of classes will be avoided; but this will apply only
to the main battery, for history is singularly repeating itself at
this time in the restoration of the “murdering pieces” which have
been cited as forming part of naval armaments in the seventeenth
century. The needfulness of machine guns for operating against men on
open decks, for effecting entrance through port-holes, for repelling
attacks in boats, and for resisting the approach of torpedo-boats,
is so widely recognized that no vessel of war is considered properly
equipped without a secondary battery of these “murdering pieces.”
They are mounted on the rail, on platforms projecting from the sides
and in the tops. The types adopted in the United States navy are the
Hotchkiss revolving cannon and rapid-firing single-shot guns, and the
smaller calibre machine guns of Gatling. The heavier pieces, throwing
shells of six pounds weight, are very effective against vessels of
ordinary scantling.

In contemplating the present condition of our new naval armament
we have the consolation of knowing that, so far as concerns the
study of the subject generally and in detail, the designs, and the
initial manufacture, all has been done that could have been done
with the resources available. What has been achieved has been
without the facilities that are provided in modern gun-factories;
but notwithstanding all the drawbacks, it is probably safe to assert
that no guns in the world to-day are superior to those that have
been fabricated at the Washington navy-yard of steel on the new
adopted pattern. The work at this ordnance yard is carried on without
ostentation; there is no flourish of trumpets accompanying its
operations; it is not advertised, and the people do not yet know how
much they owe to the ordnance officers of the navy for the initiation
of this new industry, which enables us to assert our ability to
advance in this manufacture through the incontrovertible proof of
work accomplished. The results are meagre in quantity, and at the
present rate of manufacture it will require many years to equip our
fleet with modern artillery; this should be remedied, as there is now
no doubt as to the success of the productions of this establishment.
The plant should be enlarged on a liberal and well-matured plan, and
the work should be encouraged by generous appropriations.

[Illustration: RAPID-FIRING SINGLE-SHOT HOTCHKISS GUN.]

It may not be generally known that the steel forgings required for
the few 8-inch and the two 10-inch guns now in hand were imported
from abroad, for the reason that they could not be furnished
of domestic manufacture, from the want of casting and forging
facilities in the United States for work of such magnitude. This
was a deficiency in our resources that required prompt attention to
secure us a position of independence in this important matter. The
method of achieving the object was carefully studied out by a mixed
board of army and navy officers, and presented in a document known
as the “Gun Foundery Board Report,” and the subject received the
attention of committees from both Houses of Congress. All of these
reports virtually agreed as to the method, but there was a useless
delay in action; large expenditures of money were required, and
there was hesitancy in assuming the responsibility of recommending
it. The object was of national importance, however, and public
opinion demanded its accomplishment. The officers of the navy have
proved their ability to carry on the work successfully; and if the
opportunity be given they will establish the artillery of the United
States navy in a position of which the country may again be proud.

NOTES.

GUNS.

The United States no longer depend upon foreigners for guns or
armor, inasmuch as the circular issued in August, 1886, by the Navy
Department inviting all domestic steel manufacturers to state the
terms upon which they were willing to produce the steel plates and
forgings required for ships and ordnance, has met with a prompt
response. About 4500 tons were needed for armor, in plates varying
from 20 feet by 8 feet by 12 inches thick, to 11.6 feet by 4.3 feet
by 6 inches thick; and of the 1310 tons of steel forgings, 328 tons
were intended for the 6-inch guns, 70 tons for the 8-inch, and 912
tons for the calibres between 10 and 12 inches, both inclusive. The
rough-bored and turned forgings required by the contract were to
weigh 3¼ tons for the 6-inch calibres, 5 tons for the 8-inch, 9½
tons for the 10-inch, 9¾ tons for the 10½-inch, and 12½ tons for
the 12-inch. From the time of closing the contract twenty-eight
6-inch forgings were to be delivered in one year, and the remainder
within eighteen months. All the 8-inch were to be ready within two
years, and the 10-inch and larger calibres within two years and a
half. The proposals opened on the 22d of last March showed that for
the gun-forgings the Cambria Iron Company had bid $851,513, the
Midvale Steel Company $1,397,240, and the Bethlehem Iron Company
$902,230; and that for the armor-plates the Bethlehem Company had
bid $3,610,707, and the Cleveland Rolling-mill Company $4,021,561.
Subsequently the Navy Department awarded the contract to the
Bethlehem Company, which agreed to furnish all the required steel at
a total cost of $4,512,938.29.

The tests are so rigorous that a high quality of steel is sure
to be produced. The specifications require the forgings to be of
open-hearth steel of domestic manufacture, from the best quality of
raw material, uniform in quality throughout the mass of each forging
and throughout the whole order for forgings of the same calibre,
and free from slag, seams, cracks, cavities, flaws, blow-holes,
unsoundness, foreign substances, and all other defects affecting
their resistance and value. While it is prescribed that the ingots
shall be cast solid, latitude is given to the method of production;
but no matter what method may be employed, the part to be delivered
for test and acceptance must be equal in quality and in all other
respects to a gun ingot cast solid in the usual way, from which at
least 30 per cent. of the weight of the ingot has been discarded from
the upper end and 5 per cent. from the lower end.

For breech-pieces each ingot must be reduced in diameter by forging
at least 40 per cent.; in case tubes are forged upon a mandrel from
bored ingots, the walls must be reduced in thickness by forging at
least 50 per cent. Forgings are to be annealed, oil tempered under
such conditions as will assure their resistance and again annealed,
and no piece will be accepted unless the last process has been an
annealing one. The forging must be left with a uniformly fine grain.

All these excellent results are the direct outcomes of the report
made in 1884 by the Ordnance Board. 1st. That the army and navy
should each have its own gun-factory; 2d. That the parts should be
shipped by the steel-makers ready for finishing and assembling in
guns; 3d. That the government should not undertake the production of
steel of its own accord; 4th. That the Watervliet Arsenal, West Troy,
N. Y., should be the site of the army gun-factory; and 5th. That the
Washington navy-yard should be the site of the navy gun-factory. No
action was taken upon the recommendation to establish gun-factories;
but at the first session of the Forty-ninth Congress an appropriation
of $1,000,000 was made for the armament of the navy, of which sum so
much as the Secretary determined might be employed for the creation
of a plant. Under this permission the gun-factory at the Washington
navy-yard is now being established.

The construction of the breech-loading steel guns for the new
cruisers has been energetically pushed. Slight modifications in
the original designs were made necessary by the adoption of slower
burning powder, which carried the pressure still farther forward
in the bore, and, in the case of some foreign guns, caused their
destruction. Though our guns have not suffered from any such
accident, it has been deemed a wise precaution to give the 8-inch
guns of the _Atlanta_ two additional chase hoops, and to hoop all
other pieces of this calibre to the muzzle.

From a memorandum kindly furnished by Lieutenant Bradbury, United
States navy, it is learned that the number and calibre of the new
guns now finished, under construction, or projected, are as follows:

+------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| NAME OF SHIP. | Calibre. |
+------------------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| | 5-inch.| 6-inch.| 8-inch.|10-inch.|12-inch.|
| Dolphin | None. | 1 | None. | None. | None. |
| Atlanta[53] | ” | 6 | 2 | ” | ” |
| Boston[53] | ” | 6 | 2 | ” | ” |
| Chicago[54] | 2 | 8 | 4 | ” | ” |
| Gun-boat No. 1[54] | None. | 6 | None. | ” | ” |
| Gun-boat No. 2 | ” | 4 | ” | ” | ” |
| Newark | ” | 12 | ” | ” | ” |
| Baltimore | ” | 6 | 2 | ” | ” |
| Charleston | ” | 6 | None. | 2 | ” |
| Miantonomoh | ” | None. | ” | 4 | ” |
| Terror | ” | ” | ” | 4 | ” |
| Amphitrite | ” | ” | ” | 4 | ” |
| Monadnock | ” | ” | ” | 4 | ” |
| Puritan | ” | ” | ” | 4 | ” |
| Armored cruiser | ” | 6 | ” | 4 | ” |
| Armored battle-ship[55]| ” | 6 | ” | None. | 2 |
| 2 Gun-boats | ” | 12 | ” | ” | None. |
| 2 Cruisers | ” | 24[56]| ” | ” | ” |
| Floating batteries | ” | None. | ” | ” | 8[56]|
+------------------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+

This gives a total of two 5-inch, one hundred and three 6-inch, ten
8-inch, twenty-six 10-inch, and ten 12-inch. In his last report,
Captain Sicard, Chief of Ordnance, states that “for the new ships
approaching completion we have eighteen 6-inch, three 8-inch, and two
5-inch guns finished, and three 6-inch and five 8-inch well advanced,
together with all the carriages for the _Atlanta_ and _Boston_, and
all for the _Chicago_, except the 8-inch.... With brown powder the
following are the best results obtained in the 6-inch and 8-inch guns.

+-----------+--------------------+---------------+-----------+
| GUN. | Powder. | Muzzle | Pressure. |
| | | Velocity. | |
+-----------+--------------------+---------------+-----------+
| | | Foot seconds. | Tons. |
| 6-inch | American Brown. | 2,105 | 15.6 |
| 8-inch | Westphalian Brown. | 2,013 | 15.5 |
+-----------+--------------------+---------------+-----------+

“It will be observed,” he adds, “that the muzzle velocities are as
high, while the chamber pressures are considerably below those which
the guns were calculated to support in service.”

During the preliminary trials afloat of the _Atlanta’s_ battery in
July, a few minor faults were unfairly given an importance by the
newspapers which led the country to believe that the ship and her
armament were useless. Unfriendly critics vented their spite and
aired their ignorance in condemnations which included all who had
had anything to do, even in the remotest degree, with the design
and construction of vessel and gun. Indeed, so bitter and persistent
were they that for a time it seemed almost hopeless to expect any
further good could come out of the Nazareth of public opinion. It was
not a question of politics, for the journalists of every political
faith ran amuck riotously upon the subject; nor was it a matter
of morals, where, through intelligent discussion, better things
could be attained, for with brilliant misinformation and dogmatic
dulness each scribe stuck his pin-feathered goose-quill into the
navy’s midriff—it being such an easy, such a safe thing to do—and
then thanked Heaven he was a virtuous citizen. Finally, a board was
appointed to inspect the ship and battery, and after a thorough
examination it made the following report:

“In obedience to the Department’s order of the 22d instant, the Board
convened on board the _Atlanta_, Newport, Rhode Island, on the 25th
instant (July, 1887), and made a careful examination of the ship,
guns, carriages, and fittings, and of the damage sustained during the
recent target practice, as reported by the board of officers ordered
by the commanding officer of the _Atlanta_. The Board proceeded to
sea on the morning of the 25th instant, but were prevented from
firing the guns by a heavy fog which prevailed throughout the day.
The ship was again taken to sea on the morning of the 27th instant,
and the guns were fired. No deficiencies were noted in the guns
themselves other than a slight sticking of the breech-plug in 6-inch
breech-loading rifle No. 5 (this disappeared during the firing), some
difficulty in the management of the lock of 6-inch breech-loading
rifle No. 4, caused by slight upsetting of the firing-pin, and the
bending of the extractor in 6-pounder rapid-fire No. 5.

“The recoil and counter-recoil of the 8 and 6 inch guns were easy and
satisfactory, except at the second fire of the 8-inch breech-loading
rifle No. 1, when the gun remained in. (This was readily run out with
a tackle.) The action of the carriage of 8-inch breech-loading rifle
No. 1 at the first fire was due to want of strength in the clips and
clip circles, and at the second fire to want of sufficient bearing
and securing of the deck socket. It is believed that had the deck
socket held, the carriage would not have been disabled by the giving
way of the clips. The training gear, steam and hand, was uninjured;
the gun was readily trained when run out to place. The action of the
after 6-inch shifting gun No. 4 was satisfactory, notwithstanding
that the front clips had a play of half an inch. The action of the
broadside carriages of 6-inch guns Nos. 5 and 18 was satisfactory,
except the breaking of clips, the starting of the copper rivets in
the clip circles, and the wood screws in the training circles.

“It is believed from the action of the carriage of 6-inch
breech-loading rifle No. 5, when the clips were removed, that the
carriages can be safety used without clips. The clips, however, give
additional security and steadiness to the carriage, and assist the
pivot and socket in bearing the shock of the discharge. The firing of
the 6-pounder rapid-fire guns developed a weakness in one leg of the
cage mount of No. 4, due to imperfect workmanship, and showed also
the necessity of locking nuts on the bolts that secure the mounts
to the ports. The tower mounts of the 3-pounder rapid-fire guns are
unsatisfactory. They cannot be moved with facility; the line of
sight of the gun is obstructed at ranges beyond 1600 yards, and the
guns cannot be safely used as now fitted. For this reason 3-pounder
rapid-fire No. 3 was not fired. The tripod mounts of the 1-pounder
rapid-fire guns need stronger holding-down arrangements. The tower
mounts of the 47-millimetre revolving cannon are like those of the
3-pounder rapid-fire guns, and have the same defects. The mounts of
the 37-millimetre in the tops are satisfactory.

“Careful observation of the effect of the firing upon the hull of the
vessel failed to develop any damage other than the breaking of the
cast-steel port-sills and the starting of some light wood-work. The
shock of discharge was slight on the berth-deck, and observers there
were unable to observe which 6-inch gun had been fired. The deck,
hull, and fittings, with the exception of the port-sills, hinges to
superstructure doors and vegetable lockers, and some of the light
wood-work, have every appearance of strength and ability to endure
the strain of continuous firing of the guns. The blast of the forward
8-inch gun, when fired abaft the starboard beam, will not permit the
crews of the starboard 3-pounder rapid fire and 1-pounder rapid fire
to remain at their guns. When the after 8-inch gun is fired forward
of the port beam, the crews of the after 47-millimetre revolving
cannon and of the port after 1-pounder rapid fire cannot remain at
their guns. When the forward 6-inch shifting gun is fired on the port
bow or directly ahead, the crew of forward 8-inch gun cannot remain
at their places. When the after 6-inch shifting gun is fired on the
starboard quarter or directly aft, the crew of the after 8-inch
gun cannot remain at their gun. The inability to fire parts of the
secondary battery under certain conditions is due to the great arc of
fire given to the 8-inch guns. This can hardly be called a defect. It
is thought that a screen can be placed between the 8 and 6 inch guns
which will enable them to be worked together forward or aft.

“The pivot socket of the 8-inch carriage should have a broader
bearing surface, and should be rigidly bolted to the steel deck and
to the framework of the ship in such manner as to distribute the
strain over a larger area. The clips and clip circles of the 8-inch
and 6-inch carriage should be made of steel. The clips should have
larger bearing surfaces, and should be shaped to fit the circle. The
circle should have double flanges, and be bolted (not riveted) on
each flange to the steel deck. There should be no appreciable play
between the clips and the circles. All bolts used in the battery
fittings should have the nuts locked.

“The clip rail of the tower mount should be altered to fit the mount.
This change will make the compressors effective, and allow the guns
to be used with safety. The port-sills should be replaced by heavier
sills, made of the best quality of malleable cast-steel. The plan of
testing the hull, guns, and fittings of the _Atlanta_ arranged by the
Board contemplated a more extended use of the main battery, but the
weakness developed in the port-sills and in the sockets of the 8-inch
carriages rendered further firing inadvisable.”

Whatever conclusion may be drawn from this report, there is one fact
which may serve as an important corollary. In the latest drills
of the ships on the North Atlantic station, the _Atlanta_ won the
champion pennant for the best gunnery practice, and this with guns
and carriages which were said to be completely disabled.

The safe employment of high explosives for war purposes is looked
upon by many as a solution of certain vexed problems, and much time
and money have been given to the subject. From the nitro-glycerine
products there has been a loudly heralded advance to melinite and
roborite, of which the great things expected have not yet been
realized. Among the most promising attempts to use dynamite in
a projectile is that made with the pneumatic gun, perfected by
Lieutenant Zalinski, of the U. S. Artillery, who has courteously
furnished the following description of the system:

“The pneumatic dynamite torpedo gun is a weapon which has been
evolved for the purpose of projecting with safety and accuracy very
large charges of the high explosives. While a gun in name and form,
it is practically a torpedo-projecting machine, the propelling force
used being compressed air. The use of the compressed air gives
uniformity and complete control of pressures and total absence of
heat. This insures entire absence of violent initial shocks from
the propelling force; it also eliminates danger of increasing the
normal sensitiveness of the high explosives by heating while resting
in the bore of the gun. The ability to reproduce, time after time,
absolutely the same pressure necessarily carries with it great
accuracy of fire. The torpedo shell thrown by the gun is essentially
arrow-like, and is very light and compact compared to the weight of
charge thrown. This is a matter of no little importance on shipboard,
as a very much larger number can therefore be carried for a given
weight and storage room. The torpedoes projected by this machine
have a twofold field of action when acting against ships: first, the
over-water hull, second, the under-water hull.

“The shell is exploded by an electrical fuse. This is brought into
action if striking the over-water hull an instant _before_ full
impact. If the shell misses the over-water hull and enters the
water, explosion is produced _after_ the shell is thoroughly buried,
thus obtaining the fullest tamping effect of the water. The delayed
action of the fuse can be controlled so as to cause the shell to go
to the bottom before explosion ensues. This is needed at times when
the torpedo shell is used for counter-mining a system of submerged
stationary torpedo defences.

“Experiments against iron plates have shown that it is essential to
have the initial point of explosion at the rear of the shell. When
explosion takes place by simple impact from the front end, the injury
to the plates is actually less than when a blank shell is used.

“For these reasons the fuse has been arranged so that the initial
point of explosion is at the _rear_ of the shell. No attempt has been
made to make a shell which can perforate armor before explosion. To
do so would involve thickening the walls to such an extent as to
materially reduce the weight of the charge carried. Besides that, it
is very doubtful whether a shell fully charged with gunpowder can
perforate any considerable thickness of armor without previously
exploding its bursting charge. Much more will this be the case where
the bursting charge is one of the more sensitive high explosives.

“The pneumatic torpedo-gun system has various fields of usefulness as
an auxiliary war appliance. Among these are the following:

“1st. On swift-moving torpedo-boats; 2d. On larger war-vessels,
for general use and for defence against surface and submarine
torpedo-boats; 3d. In land defences; 4th. For use in the approaches
during land sieges.

“Torpedo-boats carrying the pneumatic guns can commence effective
operations at the range of at least one mile, as compared to not
more than three hundred yards of the boats carrying the Whitehead
torpedoes. Their torpedo shell cannot be stopped by netting, as is
the case with the latter. The charges which can be thrown are also
much greater. The guns to be carried on the pneumatic dynamite-gun
cruiser now building for the United States government will throw
shell charged with 200 and 400 pounds of explosive gelatine. These
guns can be fired at the rate of one in two minutes, and indeed even
more rapidly if required.

“In the defence of a man-of-war no other means can as effectually
stop the advance either of submarine boats or submerged movable
torpedoes. This is due to the ability to explode the large charges
when the shells are well submerged. Their radius of action will be so
great as to avoid the necessity of making absolute hits. The chances
of stopping the attack are thereby very much increased.

“A tube of large calibre can be fixed in the bow, so as to be of
use when advancing to the attack with the ram. An 18-inch shell,
containing 1000 pounds of explosive gelatine, can be thrown 500
yards in advance of the ship, and that, too, without danger of
running into the explosion of its own petard, as would be the case in
ejecting directly ahead ordinary torpedoes. This will be made more
clear by the statement of the relative speed of the two classes. The
pneumatic-gun torpedo has a mean velocity of 400 knots for a range
of one mile, as compared to 25 knots for a range of 200 yards of
the Whitehead torpedo. Furthermore, there is no danger of the shell
turning back, as is sometimes the case with the latter.

“The opportunities of making an effective hit will be much greater
with the torpedo shell than with the ram; it will be easier to point
the vessel fairly at the enemy’s broadside when at the range of
five hundred yards than to bring the ram in absolute contact with
the enemy’s side. The gun-tubes used are very thin (not exceeding
three-quarters of an inch in thickness), and may be of sections of
any convenient length. The other portions of the supporting truss,
reservoirs, etc., are also of comparatively light weight. They could
be of large calibres, and the destructive effects producible by large
charges of high explosives will doubtless have a demoralizing effect
upon the defence.”

Upon September 20th of this year a public trial was successfully made
with the gun, the target being the condemned coast survey schooner
_Silliman_. After firing two shots to verify the range, the gun was
loaded with a projectile which was five and a half feet in length,
contained fifty-five pounds of explosive gelatine, and was fired
under an air pressure of 607 pounds. The torpedo rushed from the
muzzle of the tube with a loud report; in thirteen seconds it plunged
into the water close under the starboard quarter of the _Silliman_,
and exploding almost instantly, threw a great volume of water one
hundred and fifty feet into the air.

For a moment the schooner was hidden from view, but when the mist
cleared away it was found that her main-mast had toppled over the
side. At a distance this seemed to be all the damage inflicted, but
a closer inspection showed that all the wood-ends on deck had been
loosened, that the cabin fittings had been thoroughly shaken up, and
that water was running into the hold.

Soon afterwards a fourth shot was fired. This landed very close to
the starboard side of the vessel, and on explosion seemed to lift the
_Silliman_ out of the water.

The hull was very badly shattered; the water-tank, which had been
firmly fastened to the schooner’s bottom, was blown up through the
deck and floated on the wreckage, and the stump of the main-mast
was capsized. The bow was held above water by barrel buoys, and the
fore-mast, which had heeled over to an angle of forty-five degrees,
was sustained by the steel rigging that had become entangled in the
pieces of wood floating to windward.

MACHINE AND RAPID-FIRE GUNS.

Of the machine guns, the Gatling, Gardner, Nordenfeldt, and Maxim
systems are the best known. The adoption of the Accles feed in the
Gatling eliminates largely the liability of cartridge jams, and
increases the rapidity of fire at all angles to twelve hundred shots
per minute; when this rapid delivery of fire is not needed, Bruce’s
slower feed may be substituted. The Gardner gun is an effective
weapon, but it has less rapidity of fire and smaller range of
vertical train than the Gatling. The Nordenfeldt rifle-calibre gun
has not obtained the prominence of the others, and the Maxim, in
which the energy of recoil is ingeniously applied to the work of
loading and firing, is growing in favor. The Hotchkiss revolving
cannon was a wonderful step—the 37, 47, and 53 millimetre calibres
firing 1 pound, 2½ pound, and 3½ pound explosive projectiles, with
muzzle velocities of about 1400 feet per second. “The heavier nature
of revolving cannon,” declares Commander Folger, United States Navy,
“proved somewhat unwieldy, and the change to the single barrel of
increased length, and using a heavier powder charge, was a natural
one, and in keeping with the growing ballistic power of large guns.
Though no longer denominated machine guns, the term now being
generally applied to a cluster of barrels, the rapid-fire guns are
a direct outgrowth of the larger calibres of machine guns, and are
classed with them as secondary battery arms. There are now in the
service of all the great military powers rapid-firing guns of 47
and 57 millimetre calibre, firing respectively explosive shells of
3 pounds and 6 pounds weight, at muzzle velocity of about 1900 feet
per second. This will give with the 6-pound gun a range of about
2½ miles at 10 degrees elevation. These guns will deliver, under
favorable circumstances, perhaps ten aimed rounds per minute, and the
shells perforating the sides of an unarmored vessel, and bursting,
after passing through into, say, twenty-five fragments, each with
energy sufficient to kill a man, we have here a weapon of unequalled
destructive capacity. It is beyond question that the conditions of
combat between ships and forts are definitely changed by the advent
of these guns. Even armored vessels with covered batteries are at
a disadvantage, as a hail of missiles will seek the gun-ports and
conning-towers wherever an enemy, from the nature of circumstances,
takes close quarters. Experiment abroad has also demonstrated that
the projecting chase (forward body) of a large gun is extremely
vulnerable, and liable to injury from the fire of the larger
rapid-firing pieces.

“This system, which is just now so important an adjunct to the main
battery of ships of war, is of but recent development. The first
order received for a weapon of this kind by the Hotchkiss firm came
from the United States, and the guns now mounted in the new ships
_Boston_, _Atlanta_, and _Dolphin_ were delivered under it. Three
calibres were obtained, _viz._, the 6, 3, and 1 pounder, as they
are known in the United States navy, their usual names in other
countries being the 57, 47, and 37 millimetre guns. Since their
introduction the demand for larger calibres by most of the prominent
naval powers has been so pressing that the Hotchkiss Company has
produced a 9-pounder and has a 33-pounder in course of manufacture.
It is believed that this last calibre represents about the limit of
utility of the Hotchkiss system, though the gain in time by the use
of ammunition carrying the charge projectile and fulminate in one
case will recommend it for use with much larger calibres, even where
two men may be required to handle the cartridge.”

The most important trials of rapid-fire guns during the past two
years are thus described by Lieutenant Driggs, United States navy:

“The various systems now in use, or being developed, are the
Albini, Armstrong, Driggs-Schroeder, Gruson, Hotchkiss, Krupp,
Maxim, Nordenfeldt. Of these the Armstrong has not been favorably
received on account of the cumbersome breech-closing arrangement.
This consists in two side levers attached to and turning about the
trunnions; a cross-head connects the two levers, and by an eccentric
motion one of them is pressed against or removed from the breech of
the gun, thus closing or opening it. The _Bausan_ has two of those
guns, but with that known exception few, if any, have been put in
service.

“The Gruson gun is said to be very similar to the Hotchkiss in its
mechanism, though not as good. The Maxim and Hotchkiss are both well
known. The Nordenfeldt, which in Europe is the greatest rival of the
Hotchkiss, is entirely different from the guns heretofore made under
this name. In the single-shot rapid-fire gun the breech is closed
with a double breech-plug, which is revolved in the breech recess
by a cam motion. The plug is divided transversely; the front half
carries the firing-pin, and has only a circular motion in closing
and opening; the rear half acts as a wedge, the first motion being
downward and the second circular, the front half then moving with it.

“One of the most complete tests to which guns of this class have been
subjected was that conducted by the Italian government in February
of last year (1885). The trials were made at Spezia, the following
being offered for test: Hotchkiss rapid-fire; improved Nordenfeldt
rapid-fire on recoil-carriage; Armstrong rapid-fire; and a rapid-fire
gun made at the Government Works at Venice. The Armstrong gun was not
fired; the others were fired in the following order: Nordenfeldt,
Hotchkiss, and Italian.

“The guns were mounted on board a small ship (the _Vulcano_) for
firing at sea. A large target was fixed on the breakwater in the
middle of the harbor of Spezia, and two smaller targets of triangular
shape had been anchored, one 550 yards inside, and the other 550
yards outside, the breakwater. The _Vulcano_ was then placed 1300
to 1400 yards inside the breakwater, and fire begun against the
large target with the Nordenfeldt 6-pounder gun, which was worked
by Italian sailors. A first series of eighteen shots were fired
in forty-seven seconds, for rapidity of fire with rough aiming. A
second series of sixteen shots were fired in thirty-four seconds.
The rapidity of fire with rough aiming and untried men was thus
respectively at the rate of twenty-three and twenty-eight shots per
minute. Afterwards, ten case-shots were fired with the gun almost
level, in order to see how the lead bullets were spread over the
range. Some of them were seen to touch the water 700 or 800 yards
from the muzzle, and the whole range was well covered by the 150 lead
bullets contained in each of the Nordenfeldt case-shots.

“The second part of the programme consisted of the firing at three
targets, respectively at 600, 1200, and 1800 yards, the ranges being
only approximately known, changing the aim at every third shot,
and firing under difficulty, owing to the movement of the ship.
Twenty-one common shells were fired, seven at each target, with good
accuracy, and the shells on striking the water burst better at the
shorter than at the longer ranges.

“The firing at sea was closed with one more series of ten rounds,
fired rapidly in twenty-six seconds, in order to see if the gun
would act well after being heated by the eighty-five rounds which
had already been fired. Four of the last series were ring-shells,
and burst on striking the water at the first impact, breaking into a
larger number of pieces than the common shells. The Nordenfeldt gun
was then mounted on shore for tests of penetration. The plates used
were: (1) a 5¼-inch solid wrought-iron; (2) a 4-inch solid (Cammell)
steel plate; (3) one ⅞-inch steel plate, at an angle of fifteen
degrees to line of fire. The two thick plates were backed by ten
inches of oak, and at right angles to line of fire and one hundred
yards from the gun. The perforation was in every case complete, both
with solid steel shot and chilled-point shells, these latter bursting
in the wood behind. The thin plate was then put at more acute angle
to the line of fire, and only when this angle was seven degrees or
eight degrees did the projectile fail to penetrate. The indicated
muzzle velocity of this gun is 2130 feet, with a 6-pound projectile
and charge of two pounds fifteen ounces.

“A few days afterwards the Hotchkiss gun went through the same trials
and programme. For rapidity forty rounds were fired with rough aiming
in three minutes, the rate being 13.3 per minute. The shooting was
good, but the men serving the gun complained of being fatigued by
the shocks from the shoulder-piece. The muzzle velocity was about
1085 feet, or about 300 feet below that of the Nordenfeldt. Last of
all, the Italian gun was fired, but as it was designed for 1480 feet
velocity, it was not brought in direct competition with the other
two guns in power. The rapidity of fire obtained, however, was about
twenty rounds per minute, and both the mechanism and recoil-carriage
worked well.[57]

“The Hotchkiss and Nordenfeldt guns were tried in competition at
Ochta, near St. Petersburg, in September last (1886). The reports
that have reached this country are very meagre, but are unanimous
in favor of the Nordenfeldt gun. From what can be learned, the fire
was first for rapidity, in which the Nordenfeldt discharged thirty
rounds in one minute, and the Hotchkiss twenty rounds in the same
time, the initial velocity of the former being 624 metres (2047 feet)
per second, while that of the latter was 548 metres (1797 feet) per
second.

“The fire of both guns was directed upon a target at 1800 metres
(1969 yards) range. The Nordenfeldt scored nine hits, while the
Hotchkiss made none. It is more than likely that this failure was due
more to defective pointing than to any defect of construction.

“The trial closed with a very interesting and instructive experiment.

“Four targets were placed at 600, 800, 1000, and 1200 metres; each
gun was to fire as rapidly as possible for thirty seconds, changing
the range each fire, from the 600 up to the 1200 metre target and
back. During this test the Nordenfeldt is said to have discharged
fifteen shots in the thirty seconds, and to have made nine hits,
while the Hotchkiss scored but two hits and only discharged eleven
rounds in thirty-two seconds. Here again the element of inaccurate
sighting may be largely responsible for the difference in the number
of hits, but the great disparity in the number of rounds fired must
be due to the mechanical defects in the Hotchkiss system by which the
action of its breech-block is too slow. Notwithstanding the reported
success of the Nordenfeldt gun in the trials, the Russian government
ordered a number of Hotchkiss guns and no Nordenfeldts.”

[Illustration: NEW 6-INCH BREECH-LOADING RIFLE.]

The latest experiments with large calibred rapid-fire guns were
those of the Armstrong 36 and 70 pounder. The first piece differs
materially from the new 33-pounder Hotchkiss; it is 4.724 inches in
calibre, 14 feet 2½ inches length, and weighs 34 hundred-weight.
It was fired with seven and a half pounds of powder ten times
in forty-seven seconds, or at a rate six times faster than that
obtained with the service guns of like calibre. The 70-pounder was
fired with both twenty-five-pound and thirty-pound charges, at a
speed of from eight to ten rounds per minute. In the latest mount
for the 36-pounder the gun is supported on a rocking slide which
pivots on transverse bearings, so that the piece moves only forward
and backward on the slide; elevation and depression are given by a
shoulder-piece attached to the slide, and the gun is secured at any
desired angle with a clamp attached to the side of the slide.

This development of rapid-fire pieces opens anew the discussion
as to the comparative values of large and small calibre guns. At
the present stage of the question it is safe to say that, however
necessary the large calibre may be in armored battle-ships and
coast-defence vessels, its usefulness in thin-skinned, high-powered
cruisers is questionable. Abroad, the long-range guns which
constitute the primary batteries are being reduced in calibre, while
the secondary batteries of rapid-fire guns are increasing so much in
size that before the next sea-war a nearly uniform calibre of four or
five inches will probably be established.

The reasons for these changes are not difficult to understand. In
all sea engagements hereafter type will fight with type; that is
to say, apart from the rôle which auxiliary rams and torpedo-boats
may play, armored ships will oppose armored ships, and unarmored
cruisers and gun-boats will, when intelligently handled, seek action
only with vessels of similar character. To-day every unarmored
ship afloat or under construction can be penetrated at the average
fighting distance by a musket-bullet impelled with a little more than
the ordinary velocity; and as there is absolutely no protection, it
seems a mistake to arm such vessels with the unnecessarily large
calibres now in use. Especially is this true when their employment
is based mainly upon the remote assumption that such ships may have
to attack fortifications. Smaller guns will do the work equally as
well, if not better; for the greater intensity of fire secured by the
certain action of a large number of easily handled small-calibred
guns is surely more valuable than any probable advantage which might
be derived from heavier projectiles fired under conditions that make
their effectiveness doubtful.

Whatever may be said to the contrary by mere theorists, the
difficulty of handling ordnance increases enormously as the calibres
grow; and sea-officers, who alone are the proper judges, insist that
the monster pieces of the present day are so unmanageable as to
be nearly useless. Of course, where armor penetration is vital to
success, heavy armaments must and will be employed; but when this
factor need not be considered, a great many light guns, easily worked
by hand, are the demands of the hour. The problem, fortunately, is
nearer solution owing to the development now in progress; and when
this is coupled with the rapidly increasing popularity of the 5-inch
breech-loading all-steel rifle, our country notably may congratulate
itself that ordnance is reverting to a plane which other nations
mistakenly and at great cost abandoned, and which the United States
can readily attain.

SHIPS OF THE MINOR NAVIES.

Early in September of this year there sailed from England for the
East five Chinese war-vessels of the latest types: the _Chih Yüan_
and _Ching Yüan_, fast cruisers; the _King Yüan_ and _Lai Yüan_,
coast-defence ships; and a torpedo-boat as yet unnamed. Though the
squadron was commanded by Admiral Lang, a captain in the Royal
Navy temporarily serving under the Chinese government, the other
officers were mainly, and the crews were wholly, natives who had
passed through English cruising and training ships. The _Chih Yüan_
was commanded by Captain Tang, who had under him nine English and
fifteen Chinese officers and one hundred and fifty men; the _Ching
Yüan_ was in charge of Captain Yih, and eleven English and fourteen
Chinese officers, with the same complement; while the other ships
were officered and manned much the same way. There was, it is true,
an English fleet surgeon, but each ship had its native medical
officer and two chief engineers, one of whom was a Chinese. “On
leaving Spithead,” stated the _Herald_ cable despatch, “the fleet
will proceed direct to Gibraltar, thence to Port Said, where it will
take in coal; it will stop at Suez, Aden, Colombo (where it will coal
again), Singapore, Hong-Kong, Chefoo, and Taku, joining at this place
the fleet already assembled under Admiral Ting, and replacing there
many of the foreigners by native officers. The voyage is expected to
occupy seventy-two days—fifty-two at sea and twenty in harbor—and
during this time the crews will be thoroughly practised in torpedo,
gun, and other drills. This, of course, will involve a deal of hard
work, such as would try the endurance of English sailors, but the
Chinamen will be allowed a plentiful supply of beef and beer.”

Modern cruisers and armed battle-ships requiring the highest
intelligence to fight, torpedo-drills, beef and beer—and all for
that outer barbarian whom our mobs murder just for a lark! Here is
a lesson for Congressmen; here an example and a possible menace for
this defenceless land.

The Chinese navy, though of recent growth, consists to-day of seven
armored and ten unarmored ships of modern types, in addition to
torpedo-boats, and to at least thirty other vessels which are not so
obsolete as nine-tenths of the ships this country has in commission.

Nearly ten years ago the Chinese government realized that its
wooden corvettes, gun-boats, and armed junks were no longer adapted
to warfare, and ordered from the Vulcan Works at Stettin the two
steel cruisers _Nan Shu_ and _Nan Shen_. These are of 2200 tons
displacement, and with 2400 horse-power have developed 15 knots
speed; their armament is composed of two 8-inch and eight 4½-inch
Armstrongs, and of lighter secondary pieces. In 1881 these ships
were followed by the armored battle-ships _Chen Yüan_ and _Ting
Yüan_, and by the steel cruiser _Tchi Yüan_. The battle-ships are
built of steel, and have the following dimensions: length 296.5
feet, beam 59 feet, mean draught 20 feet, displacement 7430 tons.
Their compound armor extends throughout a central citadel 138 feet
long, and around a nearly elliptical redoubt situated at its forward
end; the side armor is five feet wide, and has a thickness of 14
inches at the water-line, of 8 inches at the lower and of 10 inches
at the upper edge; the protection to the redoubt is 12, and to the
conning-tower 8, inches thick. The armament consists of four 12-inch
Krupps, echeloned in pairs within the redoubt; of two 5.9-inch
Krupps mounted forward and aft inside of machine-gun proof turrets;
of eleven Hotchkiss revolving cannons, and a supply of Whitehead
torpedo-tubes. The engines are of the three-cylinder compound type,
and develop 7300 horse-power and 15.5 knots. The ships have double
bottoms, minutely subdivided, and in addition to a cork belt forward
and abaft the citadel a steel protective deck two inches thick curves
to the extremities. The twin-screw steel cruiser _Tchi Yüan_ is of
3200 tons displacement, and has two sets of two-cylinder horizontal
compound engines, which develop 2800 horse-power and a speed of 15
knots; her dimensions are: length 236 feet 3 inches, beam 34 feet 5
inches, and draught 15 feet 9 inches. The entire under-water body is
covered by a curved steel deck, which is 4 inches thick, and extends
4 feet 9 inches below the water-line; the space between this deck and
the one above is used for coal-bunkers. “There are two machine-gun
proof turrets on the fore and aft line, the base of the forward one
being surmounted by a fixed tower armored with 15-inch steel, which
extends to a height sufficient to protect the base of the turret,
its machinery, and gun-carriages. The armament is composed of two
8.27-inch (21 centimetre) Krupps in the forward turret, of one
5.9-inch (15 centimetre) Krupp in the after turret, of two similar
guns on the main deck aft, of five Hotchkiss revolving cannons,
and of a supply of Whitehead torpedoes, discharged through four
above-water tubes.”[58]

The swift protected cruisers _Chih Yüan_ and _Ching Yüan_ were built
at Elswick; the unnamed torpedo-boat is of the _Yarrow_ type; and the
coast-defence vessels _King Yüan_ and _Lai Yüan_ were constructed at
Stettin. The displacement of the cruisers is 2300 tons, length 268
feet, beam 38 feet, depth 21 feet, and draught 14 feet forward and 16
feet aft. Each vessel has two pairs of triple-expansion engines. Both
the engine and boiler rooms are divided into water-tight compartments
by transverse and longitudinal bulkheads, and the machinery is so
arranged that either boiler can work on one engine or on both, and
the change necessary to effect this can be made while the vessel is
in motion. The result of this intercommunication between each engine
and each boiler is that the vessel can proceed so long as any single
boiler and engine are uninjured.

In the four trial trips, two with and two against the tide, with all
their weights, armament, and Chinese crews on board, they attained an
average speed of 18.536 knots.

The vessels are built of steel, and have two decks, the lower one
consisting of four-inch steel plates, rising in the middle above
the water-line and inclined at the sides so as to dip below it.
The engines, magazines, rudder-head, and steering gear lie below,
and are protected by this deck. The openings in the deck are
encircled by coffer-dams, armored with steel plates, inclined so as
to deflect projectiles. The bows are formed and strengthened for
ramming purposes. Additional protection is given to the vessel by
a partition which is built on the protective deck parallel to the
side of the ship; this encloses a space that is eight feet wide, and
is subdivided into a great number of water-tight compartments for
the stowage of four hundred and fifty tons of fuel. Both ships have
double bottoms, minutely subdivided into water-tight compartments.

The armament consists of three 21-centimetre Krupp guns—two mounted
forward and one aft—all on centre-pivot, shield-protected Vavasseur
carriages; of two 6-inch Armstrongs on sponsons, also Vavasseur
mounted; of eight 6-pounder rapid-fire Hotchkiss; and of six Gatling
guns. There are four above-water torpedo-tubes—two fixed (one in the
bow, firing ahead, and one aft, pointed astern) and two training, one
in each broadside.

There are two electric search-lights for each vessel, with a nominal
power of 25,000 candles, while the cabins and rest of the ship are
lighted with incandescent lamps.

“It is humiliating,” writes the _Army and Navy Gazette_, “but
nevertheless an actual fact, that two of the cruisers of the
Chinese squadron under command of Admiral Lang are superior in
certain novelties of construction to any of our own vessels of this
class. In point of speed the two unarmored ships which have been
turned out by the Elswick firm cannot be touched by our swiftest
cruisers. They steam nearly nineteen knots an hour. The traversing
and manipulation of their guns can be effected with such rapidity
that when saluting the garrison at Portsmouth recently it appeared
almost impossible that the guns could have been properly sponged
between each discharge, the two bow guns especially keeping up
a continuous roar. Only the two sponson 6-inch guns are from
Armstrong’s; they are mounted on Vavasseur carriages, and fitted
with singularly simple breech apparatus. The other three heavy guns
are Krupp’s 21-centimetres (about 8¼-inch). These last are protected
with a shield of entirely unique construction. It is of steel, and
commencing from the trunnion ring spreads out into a wide shelter
sufficient to accommodate the entire gun detachment. The sights are
also under cover. The stern-chaser has a single shield; the two
bow-chasers are included within one. The torpedo apparatus is most
complete. In addition to the two tubes opening ahead and astern,
which are well above the surface of the water, there are six others
in connection with the torpedo-room.

“But the latest improvement which is observable on board is the
steel armored conning-tower, fitted with Lord Armstrong’s patent
telegraph and communications, for which a special royalty of four
hundred pounds has to be paid. It is the most perfect scheme for
conducting fighting operations that has ever come under our notice. A
model for laying all the guns is prominently placed in front of the
steering-wheel, which is under personal command of the officer in
charge. On the left are tubes and telegraphs by which he can converse
with the officer in command of the gun detachment, and correct any
mistakes observable in the laying of the guns. Then he can fire
simultaneously, if desirable, or singly, if preferred. All stations
on board are also in communication with this conning-tower. Hence the
entire fighting power of the vessel, torpedoes and all included, is
at the disposal of the officer in command within the conning-tower.
Another useful modification has been effected in these vessels. The
conning-tower, which is at the foot of the foremost fighting mast,
has close to it the signal station, also protected with steel armor,
so that the signaller therein is absolutely secure, and close to the
commanding officer, from whom he receives and to whom he communicates
outside signals.”

The torpedo-boat built by Yarrow is said to be the fastest of its
size that has ever been launched, as it has reached a speed of about
twenty-eight knots an hour. It is armed with two fixed 14-inch
torpedo-tubes in the bows, and one 14-inch training-tube on deck
abaft the funnel. It is also supplied with a powerful armament of
Hotchkiss and Gatling guns, and a strong electric search-light so
arranged as to be worked either from the conning-tower or from the
deck.

The _King Yüan_ and _Lai Yüan_, built by the Vulcan Company at
Stettin, are powerful vessels, effective for either coast defence or
distant sea service. Their principal dimensions are: length 269 feet,
beam 39 feet 4 inches, depth 25 feet 6 inches, mean draught 16 feet 8
inches, and displacement 2900 tons. They are built entirely of steel,
with double bottoms extending two-thirds of the length, and the
under-water body is divided by bulkheads into sixty-six water-tight
compartments. The armor protection is compound, and consists of a
belt six feet wide extending the length of the machinery and boiler
space, having a maximum thickness of 9.5 inches at and above the
water-line, and a minimum thickness of 5.1 inches. This belt is
terminated at either end by thwartship armored bulkheads, 5.1 inches
thick. At the forward end of the belt is a circular revolving turret
eight inches thick, on top of which is the conning-tower, with an
armor protection of six inches. The under-water body is protected
by a complete steel protective deck, 1.5 inches thick over the top
of, and three inches thick forward and abaft, the belt. A partial
cork belt above the protective deck gives additional stability. The
engines consist of two sets of three-cylinder compound type, situated
in two separate compartments, driving twin screws, and developing
3400 horse-power with forced draft. The boilers, four in number, are
placed in two separate compartments. A speed of about sixteen knots
was attained. The armament consists of two 21-centimetre (8.27-inch)
Krupps mounted in the turret; of two 15-centimetre (5.91-inch)
similar guns carried in recessed ports; of two 47-millimetre
Hotchkiss rapid-fire guns; of five 37-millimetre revolving cannons;
and of four torpedo-discharging tubes—three above-water and one in
the bow below the water-line.[59]

As additions to the lightly armored gun-boat _Tiong Sing_, built
in 1875, China ordered this year from the Vulcan Company two heavy
coast-defence vessels of 7000 tons displacement and 6000 horse-power,
and laid down at Foochow an armored gun-vessel. The _Tshao Yong_
and _Yang Wai_ are steel cruisers built at Elswick, of 1350 tons
displacement and 2400 horse-power; they have developed sixteen knots,
and are armed with two 10-inch and four 4½-inch Armstrongs, with a
secondary battery of two lighter pieces and six machine guns. The
_Fee-chen_, a small steel cruiser built at Sunderland, England, has
triple-expansion engines, and is expected to develop thirteen knots.
Her armament consists of two 6-inch Armstrongs and four lighter guns;
she is also fitted to do cable work. Three cruisers of the _Nan Shu_
type are being constructed in Chinese dockyards, besides several of
the _Kuang Chen_ class of gun-boats.

The Japanese navy consists of forty vessels, of which eight only are
modern. The classified armored fleet includes five ships, among them
the _Adsama Kan_, formerly known as the _Stonewall Jackson_; none
of these is of any importance except the central battery ship _Fu
Soo_, which was launched in 1877. In January of this year, however,
the Japanese government ordered from the Société des Forges et
Chantiers de la Méditerranée two coast-defence vessels, to be built
on the plans of M. Bertin, constructing engineer of the Japanese
navy. They are to be built entirely of steel, on the cellular
plan, with two longitudinal and twelve transverse bulkheads. Their
principal dimensions are: length 295 feet 2 inches, beam 50 feet
6 inches, depth 34 feet 9 inches, draught aft 21 feet 2 inches,
displacement 4140 tons. The armament proposed is one 12.6-inch
(32-centimetre) breech-loader, eleven 4.72-inch (12-centimetre)
breech-loaders, six rapid-fire guns, twelve revolving cannons, and
four torpedo-tubes—one in the bow, one in the stern, and one each
broadside. Two independent triple-expansion engines, driving twin
screws, and required to develop 5400 indicated horse-power with
forced draft, and 3400 with natural draft, supplied with steam by six
three-furnace boilers in two groups, furnish the motive power. The
estimated maximum speed is sixteen knots. A heavy protective steel
deck and a complete surrounding arrangement of coal-bunkers protect
the engine and boiler space and magazines. The complement of officers
and men will number four hundred. In March, 1887, a small armored
gun-vessel, designed by the same official, was laid down at the
Ishikawa-Shima dockyard, Japan. The displacement is 750 tons, length
150 feet, and beam 25 feet.[60]

Of the unarmored vessels, the sister ships _Naniwa-Kan_ (already
described) and _Takatschio_ are at present the most important, though
six modern cruisers now under construction in Japanese dockyards
will soon be added to the fleet. The navy is manned and officered
exclusively by natives, and the service is well administered and
popular. Owing to possible complications with China, coast defence
has become a live national question, and the wealthy Japanese are
subscribing large sums for ships and forts. In addition to these
voluntary contributions, the new tax which has been imposed will
enable Japan to put herself in an excellent condition for attack or
defence.

The other navies not described in these pages have afloat or under
construction but few modern ships-of-war. Still, there are vessels
in the minor services which ought to be briefly described. One of
these, the _Almirante Brown_, of the Argentine navy, is a twin-screw,
central-battery steel ship which was launched in 1880. Her dimensions
are: length 240 feet, beam 50 feet, draught 20 feet 6 inches, and
displacement 4200 tons. With 4500 horse-power she attained 13.75
knots, and her coal endurance is given as 4300 knots at 10 knots
speed. Her armament is made up of eight 8-inch and six 4½-inch
Armstrongs, and of four machine guns; the armor is compound, nine
inches thick on the belt and eight inches on the battery. There is
also building in England for this government a central casemate steel
cruiser of 4400 tons displacement. The armor on the casemate is to
be compound, ten inches thick, and the armament is to be composed of
eight 8-inch breech-loading Armstrongs, with a secondary battery of
rapid-fire guns and torpedo-tubes. The estimated speed is fourteen
knots. In addition to these two vessels the Argentine navy has two
small coast-defence turret-ships, one 14-knot steel cruiser (the
_Patagonia_, which is similar in appearance to the United States
steamer _Atlanta_), six gun-boats, eleven torpedo-boats, and a few
other vessels of an unimportant character.

The Brazilian navy has, exclusive of her capital torpedo-boat
flotilla, over fifty vessels, of which a dozen are classed as
armored. These last are mainly medium draught, coast-service
turret-ships and river monitors, though among them are the
_Riachuelo_ and _Aquidaban_, twin-screw armored cruisers, and the
_Solimoes_, an armored battle-ship. The _Riachuelo_ made a sensation
when she first appeared, and is still one of the most formidable
vessels in the world. She is built of steel, and has the following
dimensions: length 305 feet, beam 52 feet, draught 19 feet 6 inches,
displacement 5700 tons. Her armor is compound, eleven inches thick on
the belt and ten inches on the turret, conning-tower, and redoubt.
She has also a steel deck, which curves forward to strengthen the
ram, and aft to protect the steering gear. Her armament consists
of four 9-inch 20-ton Whitworths (Armstrong altered) mounted in
two echeloned turrets, and of six 5½-inch guns carried under cover
in the superstructure. Her secondary battery includes fifteen
machine Nordenfeldts and five above-water torpedo-tubes. With 7300
horse-power she attained a speed of 16.71 knots, and is credited with
a coal endurance of 4500 miles at 15 knots speed.

The _Aquidaban_ is of the same type and general appearance as the
_Riachuelo_, but of smaller dimensions. Her length is 280 feet, beam
52 feet, draught 18 feet, displacement 4950 tons. The compound armor
is from seven to eleven inches in thickness, and seven feet in width
on the water-line belt, and is ten inches thick on the conning-tower
and on the oval redoubts which protect the bases of the two echeloned
turrets. The armored deck and redoubt roofs are built of steel, from
two to three inches thick. The armament consists of four 9-inch
20-ton guns mounted in the turrets, and of four 70-pounders carried
under the superstructure. The secondary battery is made up of fifteen
1-inch Nordenfeldts and five above-water torpedo-tubes. She developed
on trial 6251 horse-power and a speed of 15.81 knots, and made on
the voyage from Lisbon to Bahia 3600 knots in 13 days and 17 hours,
and from Bahia to Rio Janeiro 750 knots in 2 days and 20 hours. The
average speed for the passage from England to Rio was nearly eleven
knots on a daily coal consumption of forty-three tons.

The Chilian navy has the two iron-armored, twin-screw,
central-battery ships _Almirante Cochrane_ and _Blanco Encalada_, and
the lightly armored turret-ship _Huascar_. The _Almirante Cochrane_
and _Blanco Encalada_ are 210 feet in length, 45 feet 9 inches in
beam, 19 feet 8 inches in draught, and 3500 tons in displacement. The
former carries four 9-inch and two 7-inch breech-loading Armstrong
rifles, four lighter pieces, and seven machine guns. Before the
alterations and repairs lately made, the _Blanco Encalada_ had
six 12-ton muzzle-loading Armstrong rifles, four lighter pieces,
and seven machine guns. The _Huascar_ was built in 1865, and is
a slightly protected iron ship of 2032 tons displacement, 1050
horse-power, and 12 knots speed. Her battery consists of two 10-inch
muzzle-loading Armstrongs and two 40-pounders. Her wonderful record
on the west coast of South America has made her name as familiar in
the mouth as a household word, and whatever may have been the justice
of the war, there never can or will be a question of the superb
courage with which she was fought by her gallant officers and crew.
Chili has three wooden corvettes, the _Chacabuco_, _O’Higgins_, and
_Pilcomayo_, one composite corvette, the _Magellanes_, one steel
cruiser, the _Esmeralda_, five gun-boats, two paddle steamers, one
despatch-boat, one transport, and eleven torpedo-boats. In April,
1885, the _Esmeralda_ ran from Valparaiso to Callao, 1292 miles,
in one hundred and eight hours, the engines during the last eight
hours barely turning over. In the exhaustive trials made before her
departure from England the highest speed attained was 18¼ knots per
hour. The _Esmeralda_ is said to be at present in an inefficient
condition, both as regards her speed and battery power. In November,
1886, the Chilian government gave the Armstrong firm an order for
a powerful, partially-protected steel cruiser, which is to be of
4500 tons displacement, and to develop 19 knots speed. Her armament
is to consist of two 10-inch, one 8-inch, and two 6-inch Armstrong
breech-loaders, with a secondary battery of four 6-pounder rapid-fire
guns, eight Hotchkiss revolving cannons, and eight torpedo-tubes. The
cost of this vessel is to be about $1,500,000.

APPENDIX I.

SUBMARINE WARFARE.

The practicability of submarine navigation was established by the
Dutch over two hundred and fifty years ago. Then, as now, its
underlying idea, its claim for recognition, was the advantages the
system gave in marine warfare. Nor is its battle value overestimated;
for such a boat, if successful, exercises an influence that is
great in material uses, that is enormous in moral effects. Its
development has been slow; for though the problem was solved long
ago, no practical results were attained until within the last thirty
years. During the late war submarine boats were for the first time
employed with such sufficient success that the great maritime powers
have considered the type to have an importance which justified
investigation. They reached this conclusion because no plan of
defence exists which could defy the operations of a weapon that
attacks not only matter but mind.

There is no danger which sailors will not face; because their
environments are always perilous, and their traditions are rich
with glorious records of seeming impossibilities overcome by pluck
and dash. They are willing always, even against the heaviest odds,
to accept any fighting chance. They know that the unexpected is
sure to happen. The spirit that made Farragut take the lead of his
disorganized line in Mobile Bay still lives; his clarion call of
“Damn the torpedoes! Follow me!” is a sea instinct, born of brine and
gale, which never dies.

Whatever coast fighting or port blockading may demand, sea battles
are unchanged. History teaches that ships always closed for action,
and that vessels fighting each other from beyond the circling
horizons, or hull down, with long-range guns, are the dreams of shore
inventors. Guns and ships have changed, but men and the sea are
changeless. The fighting distance of to-day is not much greater than
it was in Nelson’s or in Perry’s time; and the next naval war will
surely prove that battle will be nearly as close as in Benbow’s age,
when the gallant tars combed innocuous four-pound shots out of their
pigtails, and battered each other within biscuit-throwing distance
with deftly shied chocking quoins.

It is fortunate, in the interest of good, square fighting, that
the operative sphere of submarine boats is limited to coast work.
Fortunate, because while the bravery and the grit are the same, the
threatening of a danger which cannot be squarely met is apt to benumb
the heart of the stoutest. A sailor hates to run; he does not care to
fight another day when the chance of the present is open before him;
but of what avail are the highest courage and skill against a dull,
venomous dog of an enemy who crawls in the darkness out of the deeps,
and, silently attaching a mine or torpedo, leaves his impotent foe to
sure destruction?

Submarine mines may be countermined; when necessary, defied; guns
may be silenced and torpedo-boats so riddled by rapid-fire guns that
they will be disabled beyond the radius of their effective action;
automatic torpedoes may be checked by netting, or by the prompt
manœuvrings of the attacked vessel; ship may always fight ship. But
what is the chance for brain or brawn against a successful submarine
boat, when the mere suspicion of its presence is enough in itself to
break down the blithest, bravest heart of oak. It is here that their
moral effects are enormous.

The history of their development may be briefly told. In 1624
Cornelius Van Drebble, a Hollander, made some curious experiments
under the Thames. His diving-boat was propelled by twelve pairs
of oars and carried a dozen persons, among them King James I. In
1771 Bushnell, of Connecticut, constructed a boat which Washington
described in a letter to Jefferson as being a “machine so contrived
as to carry the inventor under water at any depth he chose, and
for a considerable time and distance with an appendage charged
with powder, which he could fasten to a ship, and give fire to it
in time sufficient for his returning, and by means thereof destroy
it.” Fulton borrowed Bushnell’s idea, and in 1801 experimented
successfully with it in the Seine. He descended under water, remained
for twenty minutes, and after having gone a considerable distance,
emerged. In 1851 a shoemaker named Phillips launched in Lake Michigan
a cigar-shaped boat forty feet long and four feet in its greatest
diameter. This was his first attempt, but in the course of a few
years he so far perfected his arrangements for purifying the air that
on one occasion he took his wife and children, and spent a whole
day in exploring the bottom of the lake. In the history of these
boats, as told in the report of the Board on Fortifications, Phillips
afterwards descended in Lake Erie, near Buffalo, and never reappeared.

Many other attempts were made, the most successful being that of a
Russian mechanic, who in 1855 built a diving-boat which was under
such perfect control that he could remain submerged for eight hours.
The boat which sank the _Housatonic_ was a remarkable submarine
vessel; it was about thirty-five feet long, built of boiler iron, and
had a crew of nine men, of whom eight worked the propeller by hand,
while the ninth steered and governed the boat. She could be submerged
to any desired depth or could be propelled on the surface. After
various mishaps she went out of Charleston harbor, attacked and sank
the United States steamer _Housatonic_, then on blockade duty; as she
never returned, it is supposed that the reflex action of the torpedo
destroyed her.

In the report quoted above the results already attained in submarine
navigation are thus summarized by Captain Maguire, U.S.A.:

1. Submarine boats have been built in which several persons have
descended (with safety) for a great distance below the surface of the
water.

2. Submarine boats have been propelled on and under the surface in
all directions.

3. The problem of supplying the necessary amount of respirable air
for a crew of several persons for a number of hours has been solved.

4. Steam, compressed air, and electricity have been used as the
motive power.

5. The incandescent electric light has been used for illuminating the
interior of submarine boats.

6. Seeing apparatus have been made by which the pilot, while under
water, may scan the horizon in all directions.

7. A vessel has been in time of war destroyed by a submarine boat.
The latter, it is true, was also sunk, but it was for reasons that
are no longer in force.

As yet no perfectly successful boat of this type has been tried in
any naval war, but there is no question that they will be used at the
very first opportunity. Compared with a surface boat, the submarine
has the following advantages:

1. It does not need so much speed. The surface boat demands this
quality so as to get quickly within striking range of its torpedo,
and then to escape speedily out of range of machine guns, etc.

2. Its submersion in the presence of the enemy prevents the engines
being heard.

3. There is no smoke nor glare from the fires to cause its detection.

4. The boat and crew, being under water, are protected from the fire
of machine guns and rifles.

5. It is enabled to approach the enemy near enough to make effective
even an uncontrollable fish torpedo.

6. It can be used with safety as a reconnoitring or despatch-boat.

7. It can examine the faults in the lines of submarine mines, and
replace mines exploded in action. Abroad, the Nordenfeldt boat has
awakened the most interest, and here the American submarine monitor
holds the first place.

The form of the Nordenfeldt boat is that of a cigar or of an
elongated cylinder tapering away to a fine point at each end. The
outer case, built of stout steel, is calculated in its construction
to resist such a pressure as would enable the boat to descend even
beyond a depth of fifty feet, although that is set as the maximum
for its diving operations. The cigar shape does not at first sight
commend itself, even in the eyes of nautical men, on account of its
supposed tendency towards a rolling motion. The experience, however,
gained with the boat exhibited for the benefit of naval experts at
Carlscrona, in September, 1885, has shown that very good sea-going
qualities can be developed in a craft built upon such lines; for
this small vessel has weathered more than one gale in the Baltic, to
say nothing of the severe storm it encountered at the entrance to
the Kattegat when proceeding from Gottenburg to Copenhagen for the
experimental trials.

This quality results from the fact that each end of the boat forms a
tank, which is filled with water, and as there is no extra buoyancy
in those directions, and consequently no tendency to lift at those
parts as with an ordinary vessel in a sea-way, the vessel rises and
falls bodily instead of pitching. It has been found that by going at
a moderate speed and taking the seas a point or so on the bows the
boat makes very good weather, as the waves, breaking on the snout,
sweep over the fore part and expend their force before any portion of
them can reach the central section.

Steam, which is employed as motive power, is perfectly trustworthy
as an agent. There is nothing about its action, or the appliances
connected with it, that is beyond the grasp of an ordinary engineer,
whereas such can hardly be said as yet in respect either to
electricity or the other agencies by which inventors have sought
to obtain motion. The difficulty, however, has always been how
to retain steam pressure for any great length of time without
carrying on combustion. This in the Nordenfeldt boat is secured
in the following ingenious manner: A large reservoir or hot-water
cistern (marked Q in the plate) is placed in the fore part of the
boat, in communication with the boiler. The steam from the latter
passes through a number of tubes in the reservoir N, thus raising
the temperature of its contents until the pressure stands at the
same degree in both. While the boat is at the surface, the maximum
pressure once attained, as long as combustion is carried on, supplies
quite enough steam both for driving the engines at full speed and for
maintaining the contents of the cistern in the proper superheated
condition. When the boat is submerged and the furnace doors are
closed combustion ceases, and the steam given off by the hot-water in
the boiler and cistern is sufficient to keep the engines going for
several hours.

[Illustration: LONGITUDINAL PLANS OF NORDENFELDT BOAT.]

Submersion to the various depths required is secured by the motion
of the vertically acting screws, S S, driven by small three-cylinder
engines. The boat is so ballasted as always to have spare buoyancy,
and while a few revolutions of the screws will send her under water,
the arrest of their motion is all that is required to bring her to
the surface again. In this arrangement, as even the non-technical
reader will readily understand, there is a great element of safety,
the rising motion being entirely independent of any machinery which
might refuse to act at the required moment. Another advantage is
also gained in the ease with which the horizontal position is
maintained by regulating the speed of the screws. To assist in
keeping this position there is a horizontal rudder or fin, R, at the
bows, which, by a very ingenious arrangement of a plumb weight with
other mechanism in connection with the steering tower, works both
automatically and by hand. The torpedoes are carried on the outside
of the boat, as shown at F. They are Swartzkoph or Whitehead, as the
case may be, and are released by electrical action under the control
of the captain, standing on the platform at P. C is a cupola of stout
glass by which a view is obtained occasionally when the boat is
running submerged.

_Construction Details._—The following are the dimensions of the
Turkish boat: length 100 feet, beam 12 feet, displacement 150
tons, speed 12 knots, and coal endurance sufficient for travelling
900 miles. The engines (E) are of the ordinary inverted compound
surface-condensing type, with two cylinders, and with 100 pound
pressure indicate 250 horse-power. The circulating and air pumps
being actuated by a separate cylinder, the main engine is left free
to work or not, while a vacuum is always maintained to assist the
various other engines with which the boat is fitted. In this respect
it should be mentioned that all the engines are specially designed
with such valve arrangements as will make the utmost use of the
vacuum, it having been found that while the boat is running beneath
the surface as much power can be developed below the atmospheric line
as above it.

The boiler, B, is of the ordinary marine return-tube type, with two
furnaces, and the heating surface is about seven hundred and fifty
square feet. The tanks at each end of the boat contain about fifteen
tons each, and there is a third of seven tons capacity at the bottom
of the central compartment for regulating buoyancy. The coal is
stored around the hot-water cistern as well as at the sides of the
boiler and over the central ballast tank.

Three men and the captain can efficiently work this boat, although
she may carry a crew of seven, who could remain in her for over
seven hours beneath the water without experiencing any difficulty
in respiration. No attempt is made as in some systems to purify the
atmosphere by chemical means, as it is said to be quite unnecessary.

_The Practical Management._—The boat is operated in the following
manner: Steam having been raised to the required pressure, the
funnel is lowered, and water is let into the ballast tanks to bring
the craft down to the proper trim for action. In this condition the
screws, S S, are sufficiently under water to obtain the requisite
thrust. The boat may still proceed at the surface for some time if
the enemy be distant, but the conning-tower should be closed, and the
cupola hatch and the furnace doors shut, before there is any chance
of discovery. The vertically acting screws being started, the boat
is then submerged to the cupola, and continues approaching until,
according to circumstances, it becomes prudent to disappear entirely.
The direction is taken at the last moment, and maintained by compass
until within striking distance, when a torpedo is released, and the
boat immediately turns in another direction.

In May of this year there was launched at Barrow a Nordenfeldt boat
110 feet in length and 13 feet in diameter. The engines are capable
of developing good power, and a speed of 12 knots on the surface
was realized. The boat was tried on the Bosporus during July under
government supervision, and as these were satisfactory, it seems
likely that a number of similar vessels will be built next year for
the Ottoman navy.

The original submarine monitor _Peacemaker_ is well known through
its trials on the Hudson River in 1886, but since then so many
improvements have been made in the direction of increased efficiency
that it is confidently expected the boat just designed will surpass
its former successes. It must be understood in the beginning that its
essential principle remains the same, all the important improvements
being the outgrowth of the experience gained in previous experiments.

Broadly defined, the new craft has a midship section, which through
its high centre of buoyancy and low centre of gravity gives great
stability of form, or, to make it plain to the non-technical reader,
it differs from the ordinary cigar and tortoise shaped boat in being
more nearly like the section of a pear, the apex of which forms the
keel. Its longitudinal section is not unlike the form generally used,
though the lines are such as have been found to give the form of
least resistance and the highest speed.

It is built of steel, with frames and spacings sufficient to stand
the pressure of the lowest depth to which the boat is or can be
expected to go. The old dimensions were: length 30 feet, depth 7
feet, and beam 8 feet. In order to obtain increased speed the present
vessel will be 50 feet in length, 8 feet in beam, and 8 feet in
depth, with a displacement of from thirty-five to forty tons, or an
amount sufficient to carry the weights of the interchangeable boiler,
of the sixty horse-power engine, and of the provisions and fuel
necessary for a surface cruise of one week, and, when necessary, for
a constantly submerged cruise of twelve hours.

The advantages claimed for the new boat are that she is so
self-sustaining as not to need the assistance of any other vessel;
that she is not an accessary, but has in herself all essentials
of defence; and that she answers all possible necessities for
submarine work of any kind whatever, whether in peace or war. The
increased speed will, it is hoped, give her power to attack modern
vessels under way. When submerged, as was proved last summer, she
sent no bubbles of air to the surface, and had neither a wake nor a
wash to militate against the possibilities of an absolutely secret
attack. Besides these advantages, the boat is said to be a safe
surface-cruising vessel, forming no target for the destructive action
of an enemy’s attack, and at the same time having a capacity for
disappearing so readily under water and avoiding the possibility of
discovery that the enemy will be unable to tell when, where, or how
the assault upon him may be made.

As in a former trial an accident proved the danger of an exposed
conning-tower, the Submarine Monitor Company have provided a
fin or guard for protecting the new helmsman’s lookout and
companion-hatches. The waterlock appliance employed in the original
boat has now an additional use in supplying a mode of egress and
ingress, the opening being made telescopic, so as to permit surface
runs in comparatively rough water. When submerged, the smoke-stack
acts telescopically, and is closed with a water-tight valve. To avoid
the necessity of divers going out of the boat when under water,
there are various openings at places in the exterior skin to which
rubber sleeves or arms, with a radius sufficient to cover almost
all practical necessities, will be fitted. These apertures do not
constitute planes of weakness or danger, because they are normally
closed by stout water-tight dead-lights.

[Illustration: THE SUBMARINE MONITOR “PEACEMAKER.”]

The Westinghouse engine is employed, as its construction prevents,
by the packing used, any radiation of heat and the consequent
elevation of temperation below. The air-tight doors and bulkheads
work laterally, and the conning-dome is made of steel, with such
apertures as will enable the helmsman to have, when on the surface,
an all-round view, and when submerged, a sufficient light to let him
in the daytime read, at a depth of thirty feet, the time by his watch.

Should the necessity arise, when submerged, the purity of the
atmosphere below is preserved by passing the air through caustic
soda, thus eliminating carbonic acid gas, and by reinforcing the loss
of oxygen from tanks of compressed air. In the original experiments
the boat was frequently submerged six hours at a time, and the crew
of two men had no other air supplied than that which the boat carried
down with her.

Besides these chemical means there are rubber tubes floated by buoys,
with nozzles which protrude above the wash of the surface water.
There is in each tube an automatic valve, which prevents water
coming through the pipe at the time the air is being pumped in, and
the depth below the surface to which outside air can be supplied is
limited only by the length of the pipe.

In the plate, A represents a patented interchangeable boiler, in
which either hydro-carbonate fuel or caustic soda can be used, in
both cases steam being the motive power. The interior boiler for
the use of the caustic soda is surrounded by a jacket, into which
the steam exhausted from the engine can be used before it becomes
so saturated as to create a back pressure on the engine, that is,
for a period of twelve hours. When this limit is attained, and
the surface is reached, the soda can be blown off into an outer
receptacle provided for the purpose, and then reheated and recharged.
The hydro-carbon fuel is ordinary mineral oil, carried in tanks of
sufficient capacity for a surface run of a week. It may be emphasized
as an important fact that this method of exhausting into the jacket
of the boiler avoids the possibility of any bubbles appearing on the
surface, as was notably the case with the earlier Lay boats.

Before diving, the caustic soda, which has been already heated by
the combustion of the oil to the proper degree, acts in place of the
ordinary fuel, thus constituting a sort of perpetual motion, until
the point of saturation is reached, and back pressure in the engine
results.

The boat, when on the surface, is run with the oil fuel, but as
soon as it becomes necessary to dive this fire is extinguished,
the after-hatch is opened by unlocking the door of the bulkhead
separating the after from the bulkheaded end of the vessel, and by
a system of fans the hot air from the fire-room is driven outboard.
Then the after telescopic hatch is reefed and secured, the soda is
thrown from the receptacle where it has been heated into the jacket
of the caustic-soda boiler, the fires are put out, the smoke-stack
is taken in and securely fastened, and the machinist, leaving
the engine-room, goes through the bulkhead door into the forward
compartment, where he has complete control of the machinery and
boiler by means of a duplicate set of gauges and levers. In case of
an attack, the man detailed for operating the main torpedo is left in
the after compartment, where he has access to that weapon and to the
buoy, reel, and other mechanical appliances employed in its operation.

The helmsman, who controls the steering apparatus that governs
the horizontal and perpendicular rudders, also operates with his
feet the levers which are connected by links to the throttle that
supplies steam to cylinders K K. These last function like the
Westinghouse brake, and are connected with pistons to the cylinders
J J. Through their agency water is at will admitted into or forced
out of the larger receptacles, either from one end or from both ends
simultaneously. The effect of discharging water is of course to
increase the buoyancy of the vessel; and of admitting it, to decrease
this quality so that without changing structural weights the boat
is enabled to rise or sink perpendicularly, or, by admitting more
water in one end than in the other, to take a downward or an upward
course. Though this does away with the necessity of the horizontal
rudder, it is kept as an additional resource for steering. In case of
accident to the connecting pipes or machinery the vessel is supplied
with water receptacles and hand-pumps, which are able to govern its
submergence so that should all other mechanism break down the boat is
so completely under the control of the operator that it can at all
times be brought to the surface. As an additional safeguard, there
is on the outside of the boat a quantity of ballast which can be
readily detached by the arms or sleeves previously described, and so
effectively that the reserve buoyancy thus gained will alone carry
the boat to the surface.

In addition to the main torpedo and buoy resting in the cylindrical
apertures aft, other torpedoes, connected by spans, are carried
on deck. The method of their employment in attack is to go under
the body of the vessel athwartship, and to liberate them. As they
are fitted with magnets, they will, it is claimed, when freed,
attach themselves to the bilges of the enemy’s vessel, while the
_Peacemaker_ can continue her cruise and let them act automatically,
or, backing off to a distance greater than the depth of water in
which she then is, safely explode them by conventional electrical
appliances. With the increased speed of the present boat there are
various methods of attacking vessels of war when under way, among
them one which is somewhat similar to that described above.

The _Peacemaker_, when under the body of the vessel athwartship,
would liberate a buoy, B, that is connected with a torpedo, T, by a
chain, the length of which depends upon the depth beneath the buoy
the torpedo is desired to float. The steel tow-line to the torpedo is
payed out from reel G to a sufficient length, and then by going ahead
with the boat the torpedo is drawn close under the opposite side of
vessel from buoy B. In this position the torpedo can be exploded by
electricity.

If necessary, by liberating buoy B, while crossing the bow on the
starboard side of the fore-foot of a vessel, the forward motion will
draw the torpedo, T, close in to the opposite side; then, by a system
of push-pins on the torpedo, the operator learns that it is in close
contact and ready for explosion by electricity. Should the enemy’s
vessel be at anchor the tide can be employed for the purpose of
bringing the buoy on one side of the vessel while the torpedo is on
the other.

The boat is supplied with the ordinary incandescent lights, or
apparatus for lighting the interior for night attacks.

TORPEDOES.

America has contributed to modern warfare many of its most valuable
inventions. In the decade of 1850-60 the steam frigates of the
_Merrimac_ class revolutionized the naval constructions of the
world, and became the models for the war-ships of the great maritime
powers. In the same period our coast defences reached the high-water
mark of modern development, and, soon to be crystallized, there
were seething in the brains of American inventors ideas of guns,
ships, and projectiles which made history. Though to-day our created
contributions to quick peace through arrested or irresistible war
are meagre, still many of the theories which make possible modern
ordnance and ships are the fruits of American genius and industry.

Is the future to be as fertile in thought and deed? Are the
destroyers of Ericsson, the dynamite safety shells of Hayes, the guns
of Zalinski, the torpedoes of Howell, Sims, or Berdan, the turrets of
Timby, the submarine monitors of Tuck, the gun-carriages of King or
Buffington, the ordnance of Sicard, Benét—are these to prove that
Yankee brain and brawn are potent yet for the mastery of the problem?

The country has no plainer duty than to foster by every care American
ideas working in national ways of thought. It is rich, public
sentiment is ripe and responsive, and Congress should encourage in
peace the experiments which may make war impossible. In the question
of ship armament and sea-coast fortifications notably, the value of
torpedoes is now so generally recognized that the definite selection
of some type has attained an importance which demands most careful
consideration. All experts agree that they are vital, but there is
not that consensus of opinion which within limits affirms exactly
what should be done.

The Fortification Board in their report say: “It is not generally
considered possible to bar the progress of an armored fleet by the
mere fire of a battery; some obstructions sufficient to arrest the
ships within effective range of the guns is necessary. The kind
of obstruction now relied upon is the torpedo, in the form of a
submarine mine, and, except in special cases, exploded by electric
currents which are so managed that the operator on shore can either
ignite the mine under the ship’s bottom, or allow the ship to explode
it by contact. In deep channels the submarine mines are buoyant; in
comparatively shallow waters they are placed upon the bottom—the
object in both cases being to touch or nearly approach the hull of
the vessel. Submarine mines are not accessaries to defence, but are
essential features wherever they can be applied.”

The Senate Committee on Ordnance and War-ships reported: “Concerning
another class of torpedoes, ‘fixed’ or ‘anchored’ or ‘planted,’
technically known as submarine mines, there is a great popular
misapprehension. Their value is greatly overestimated. They require
picked and trained men for their management, electrical apparatus
for their discharge and for lighting up the approaches, stations on
shore secure against sudden assault, a flanking fire of canister and
case shot and of machine guns (themselves protected), light draught
picket-boats, and the overshadowing protection of armored forts and
heavy guns. None of these things can be extemporized. The submarine
mine alone is of little use, and it must accompany, not precede, more
costly and less easily prepared means of defence.”

There is, however, a more definite agreement as to the value of
torpedo-boats. The Fortification Board declare: “Among the most
important means of conducting an active defence of the coast is the
torpedo-boat, which, although recently developed, has received the
sanction of the nations of Europe, each one of which now possesses
a large number of these vessels. Their use will be quite general.
First, in disturbing blockades, and preventing these from being
made close, as no fleet would like to lie overnight within striking
distance of a station of these boats; secondly, in attacking an
enemy’s ship enveloped in fog or smoke; thirdly, in relieving a
vessel pursued by the enemy; and fourthly, in defending the mines
by night and by day against attempts at counter-mining, and in many
other ways not necessary to recapitulate.” Impressed with the utility
of this mode of defence, the Board recommended the construction of
one hundred and fifty of these boats, and the organization of a
special corps of officers and men from the navy trained to their use.

In England, Commander Gallwey does not hesitate to say that the
torpedo-boat is for harbor defence so superior to the submarine
mine that he would not be surprised if before long it superseded
the latter altogether. In France, Charmes insists that an armored
vessel will run the most serious risk if a torpedo-boat is allowed to
approach unobserved to within one thousand to fifteen hundred feet;
that the torpedo will surely triumph over the iron-clad, and that
armor has been vanquished, not by the gun, but by the torpedo.

A NAVAL RESERVE.

Among the problems to be solved by an efficient naval administration
there is none more difficult or of greater importance than the
formation of reserves of seamen. Our late war exposed the nation’s
weakness in sailors. At the beginning of hostilities the fleet,
on paper, consisted of forty-two ships of all classes, mainly
sailing-vessels, with a few paddle-wheel steamers, and less than
ten screw-vessels with auxiliary power. Its _personnel_ comprised
seven thousand of all grades. And yet, to blockade a coast of over
three thousand miles in length, the Secretary of the Navy had at
his disposal but three effective vessels, and a reserve of only
two hundred seamen on all the receiving-ships and at all the naval
stations.

As late as the first of July, 1863, there were not men enough to
carry out efficiently the work imposed upon the navy, and of the
thirty-four thousand blue-jackets twenty-five thousand were landsmen.
Secretary Welles, at the end of the same year, complained that there
were no reserve seamen, that the supply for immediate and imperative
duties was so inadequate that one of the largest and fastest steamers
destined for important foreign service had been detained for months
in consequence of the need of a crew, and that many other vessels
were very much short of their complements. The cause of this was want
of foresight, of prudence, of national common-sense even. We did not
lack the material from which crews could have been drawn, for in
1860 over seventy-five thousand men sailed in the American merchant
marine, fifty thousand of whom, under any system of enrolment suited
to our national instincts and prejudices, would, before the end of
1861, have been available for duty on shipboard.

In peace there had been no organization, so when war came we were
almost helpless, and as late as the end of 1863 not twenty per cent.
of the men who should have been ready for service were in government
ships. Let _doctrinaires_ theorize as they may, this was not the
fault of our maritime class, for thousands of sailors and fishermen
who had already entered the army were by force of law denied the
opportunity either of enlisting in, or of being transferred to, the
navy. In addition, the operation of the draft was made detrimental to
the naval interests of the country, for it violated the Act of May,
1792, which exempts from military duty all mariners actually employed
in the sea service of any citizen or merchant within the United
States. Furthermore, the government unjustly discriminated against
the seaboard towns, for not only was the seafaring class, which is
fostered and cherished by all maritime governments, withdrawn from
the element to which it has been accustomed, but in addition sailors
actually afloat were taken from their ships and compelled, under the
penalty of law, to enter the land service. It was not until 1864 that
Congress finally enacted the law which enabled seamen serving as
soldiers to be drafted into the navy.

How different would have been the state of affairs had there existed
in 1861 some system of government administration as to the creation
of naval reserves, or, more far-reaching still, had we been free from
that illogical distrust which possessed the whole country! The fear
of too much centralization was the stock in trade of professional
patriots, and the people, hampered by traditions which had come
down to us from our English ancestors, saw in any attempt towards
efficient war preparation in times of peace all the dangers they had
been taught to believe existed in standing armies.

England acted more wisely, for she had been taught a grim lesson
by her adversities, and without fear we might have profited by her
example. In the history of the Peninsula war, Napier, after picturing
the horrors of the fearful April night when Badajoz was stormed,
asked, bitterly,

“And why was all this striving in blood against insurmountable
difficulties? Why were men sent thus to slaughter when the
application of a just science would have rendered the operations
comparatively easy?

“Because the English ministers, so ready to plunge into war,
were quite ignorant of its exercises; because the English people
are warlike without being military, and, under the pretence of
maintaining liberty which they do not possess, oppose in peace all
useful martial establishments. In the beginning of each war England
had to seek in blood for the knowledge necessary to insure success.”

Equally has this always been the attitude of the American people
towards every attempt made in peace to prepare for war. Besides this
national distrust, prejudices had to be overcome which have existed
both in the navy and the merchant marine. Our naval officers have
never made any determined effort to create a reserve, either because
they have not fully grasped the correlation and interdependence of
the navy and the merchant marine, or because they have doubted the
wisdom of spending upon an outside issue appropriations which, given
to the navy, would produce a more immediate and tangible result. But
from both points of view they are wrong, “for a navy unsupported by a
merchant marine is a hot-house plant which may produce great results
for a while, but cannot endure the strain of a long protracted
campaign.” From the merchant marine the _personnel_ of the navy
in war must come, and it is a fallacy to believe that by a small
addition to our ordinary naval resources we would be able to cope
with the navies of other maritime powers, or that in a long war an
efficient and numerous reserve is not of greater importance than a
few more seamen permanently maintained in the navy during peace.

To the merchants and ship-owners the question is one of vital
importance. The earliest and most disastrous consequence of war
will fall upon the shipping interest. Under any system of defence
the necessities of the navy must withdraw seamen from the merchant
service and raise the rate of wages. If, then, by timely precautions
during peace, we can diminish the probability that war can occur
at all; if we are ready upon the outbreak of war to show that our
homeward-bound ships are safe; if we can abolish or modify the risk
that the employment of seamen would be abruptly suspended by embargo
or interfered with by impressment or draft; if we can attach the
sailor to his country, and prevent him from seeking employment under
other flags, surely the owners of our ships and merchants will reap
the greatest advantage. Abroad the importance of the subject has been
fully recognized. France, under a system which has existed for over
two hundred and fifty years, maintains a reserve of 172,000 men,
who are between the ages of eighteen and fifty; 65,000 of these are
between the ages of twenty and twenty-six, 15,000 are usually kept
afloat, and 6000 more are quartered on shore. Germany has 15,000, and
England nearly the same number.

Notwithstanding the decadence of our shipping interest we have a
large force from which to draw. The maritime population of this
country numbers over 350,000, of whom 180,000 are available for the
fleet. This number of course includes all those in any way connected
with sea industries, and embraces coasters, fishermen, whalers,
yachtsmen, boatmen, and all workmen in ship-building yards and
equipment shops and stores.

To man our ships in time of war three means are open: voluntary
enlistment, draft or impressment, or employment of men enrolled in a
naval reserve. It would be unreasonable to depend altogether upon the
loyal and unselfish patriotism of necessitous men serving before the
mast, and there is a chance that mere enthusiasm would not induce a
seaman to join the navy if employment was being offered elsewhere at
increasing rates of pay. Impressment under any name is unpopular. In
its common form it is illegal, and the draft is ever a last resort
and always a dangerous measure. Nothing, then, remains as a certainty
but to turn towards the naval reserve as the best means of manning
our fleet. In time of war not only would the men enrolled come
forward willingly and be immediately available, but deserters would
have the machinery of the law put in motion for their apprehension,
and popular feeling would be as earnest in support of their arrest
as it would be opposed to all attempts which enforced the arbitrary
powers of draft or impressment.

No system exists abroad entirely suited to our necessities and our
national instincts; but, generally speaking, that adopted in England
comes nearest to what we should employ. Naturally our lake sailors,
coasters, fishermen, and yachtsmen would form the main body of the
reserve. These should be enrolled, divided into classes, be given
each year a certain fixed sum of pay, with an increase for each day’s
drill, and at stated times they should be embarked for great gun
practice at sea, so they might learn something of man-of-war routine
and discipline. The officers could be drawn from the merchant marine,
from the graduates of the school-ships, and from former officers of
the regular and volunteer services who are now in civil life.

FORCED DRAFT.

The subject of forced draft is of great importance, and, as a
corollary of high-speed development, is being studied with keen
interest. There are wide differences of opinion not only as to the
proper systems, but even as to the value of the principle. The
literature as yet is rather meagre, but an excellent compilation of
existing material will be found in the latest publication of the
Naval Intelligence Office.

“A forced draft in the furnaces,” explains the _Marine Engineer_ of
September, 1887, “can be generated in two ways: first, by exhausting
the uptakes and funnels of the products of combustion, when a greater
flow of air will necessarily take place through the fire-bars; and
secondly, by increasing the pressure of the air in the furnaces
beyond that of the atmosphere. The steam-blast in marine boilers is
well known to engineers as a means of quickly getting up the steam
after its pressure has dropped; but the locomotives on our railways
afford a very good illustration of how boilers may be continuously
worked under forced combustion through a jet of steam exhausting
the smoke-box and funnel of the products of combustion. This system
of creating a draft involves a very large expenditure of steam and
water, and as it is a _sine qua non_ in these days of high pressure
that only fresh water should be used in boilers, and also as only a
limited supply of this element can be carried in a ship, it follows
that the plan of inducing a forced draft by means of a steam jet in
the funnel cannot be well adopted in marine boilers.

“Mr. Martin, the inventor of the well-known furnace doors,
substitutes a fan in the uptake for the steam jet, and so arranges
his funnel that in the event of the forced draft not being required
the gases of combustion arising from natural draft will not be
impeded in their exit to the atmosphere. He claims for his invention
that it does away with all necessity for closing in the stoke-holds
or furnaces, and that in war-ships funnels could be dispensed with,
as the gases and smoke could be discharged anywhere from the fans. He
also claims that by his plan of producing a draft the boiler-tubes
become much more efficient as heating surfaces, and that the ends
of the tubes in the fire-box are not so liable to be burned away,
and that therefore there will be less chance of the boiler leaking
round the tubes. There appears to be some grounds for these latter
assumptions, for it is a well-known fact that the tubes of locomotive
boilers, which are worked, as we have seen, on the exhaust principle,
do very much more work than those of marine boilers before they are
ferruled or rolled. It can also be shown by a very simple experiment
that when the gases are sucked or drawn through the tubes the flame
extends a much greater distance along the tube than when the gases
are driven through the tubes. In this latter case the flame impinges
on the tube-plates before separating into tongues and entering the
tubes; but when sucked through the tongues of flame commence at some
little distance from the plate before penetrating the tubes, and the
ends are not therefore burned as when the flame impinges directly on
them. It may be urged, however, against Martin’s system that owing
to the greatly increased volume of the products of combustion due to
their temperature, fans of from three to four times the size of those
used in other systems are required; also, that the uptakes have to
be made larger and heavier to take in the fans; and lastly, that the
fans themselves are likely to be quickly rendered inefficient through
working in a temperature of at least a thousand degrees. These
objections prove so formidable that up till the present time Martin’s
plan of creating a forced draft has made little or no headway.

“The other plan for creating an artificial draft in marine furnaces
is to force air into them by means of fans. This is done either by
closing in the whole of the stoke-hold and filling it with air of
a pressure greater than that of the atmosphere, or by pumping the
air direct into the furnace. This latter is the usual practice in
the mercantile marine, where economy of fuel is sought after. Mr.
Howden seeks, by first heating the air, and then forcing it by means
of fans into the furnaces and ash-pits, to insure a very rapid and
complete combustion of the coal. His plan has been carried out in the
Atlantic liner _Ohio_ quite recently, and the results as published
lead one to expect that with a little more progress in the direction
in which he is working our ships will be driven across the Atlantic
without the expenditure of any fuel whatever. The fact of heating
the air to a temperature of two hundred degrees before it enters the
furnace cannot go very far in affecting either the rapidity or the
completeness of the combustion of the fuel, and it certainly cannot
affect the economy. Where the fire-grate area is small compared with
the total heating surface, good evaporative results are likely to
be obtained; and in the _Ohio_ the fire-grate area was certainly
smaller than is usual for the same sized boilers fitted with forced
draft. The trip of the _Ohio_ to America has given somewhat different
results to those of the official trials, and it is a question whether
any saving in weight, either in the apparatus required to produce
forced draft under this system, or in the economy of fuel to be
derived from it, has been obtained more than exists in the system of
closed stoke-holds.

“The only plan that seems to hold its own is the closed stoke-hold
system, and the results that have been obtained with it in the
navy are so satisfactory that Messrs. J. & G. Thomson are about to
adopt it in the two large Inman liners they are now building; and
also several other firms are about to introduce it in preference to
all other plans for increasing the efficiency of their boilers and
promoting greater economy. In the Royal Navy space and weight are
of such vital importance that the boilers have to be constructed on
principles the very reverse of those which exist in boilers specially
designed for high evaporative work per pound of fuel; and it is
not, therefore, to be wondered at that the consumption of fuel per
indicated horse-power has not been reduced since the introduction of
forced draft; but, on the other hand, the capabilities of the boilers
have been expanded far beyond the expectations of a few years ago.
In the mercantile marine there is no reason whatever why the system
of closed stoke-holds for creating a forced draft should not combine
economy with greater efficiency in the boilers.”

These conclusions are not universally accepted, as will be seen in
the following extract from the article contributed by Assistant
Engineer R. S. Griffin, United States Navy, to the Naval Intelligence
Office publication mentioned at the beginning of this subject.

“The forced-draft trials of the _Archer_ class,” he writes, “go far
towards sustaining the objections raised by Mr. Howden against the
closed stoke-hold system. The trials of the _Archer_, _Brisk_, and
_Cossack_ had to be discontinued on several occasions, owing to
leakage of the boiler-tubes; and when it is remembered that these
trials are for only four hours, and that no provision is made for
hoisting ashes, it becomes a question of serious consideration
whether the maintenance of this high power for such a short period
brings with it advantages at all comparable with the continued
development of a reasonably high power with an economical expenditure
of coal, such as is possible with the closed ash-pit system.

“A number of steamers have been fitted with Howden’s system during
the past year, among others the _Celtic_, of the White Star Line,
and the _Ohio_, of the International Navigation Company. One of the
latest steamers fitted with this system is the _City of Venice_,
whose engines were converted from compound to quadruple expansion.
Her boilers were designed to develop 1800 indicated horse-power with
eighty square feet of grate, but on trial she could only work off
1300 indicated horse-power, owing to some derangement of the valves.
She was afterwards tried with half the grate surface in use, when it
was demonstrated that there would be no difficulty in developing the
power so far as the boilers were concerned. Unfortunately, no data as
to weight of boilers, space, or heating surface are obtainable.

“In 1886 the _Alliance_ was supplied with new boilers, fitted
with a system of forced draft designed by the Bureau of Steam
Engineering. It was originally the intention of the Department to
put six boilers in this vessel, as in the _Enterprise_ and _Nipsic_,
but with the introduction of the forced-draft system, which was
purely experimental, this number was reduced to four, having a total
grate surface of 128 square feet. The boilers were designed to burn
anthracite coal with natural draft, and were of course unsuited to
the requirements of forced draft, the ratio of heating to grate
surface being only 25.6 to 1, and the water surface and steam space
being small. The maximum indicated horse-power developed on trial
was 1022, but any attempt to run at this or at increased power for
any length of time was attended with so much priming of the boilers
that the trial had to be discontinued. Alterations were made in the
boilers to prevent the priming, but no continuous trial was had
previously to the sailing of the _Alliance_. The results obtained
on a measured base were, however, sufficient to demonstrate the
practicability of the system, and to show that a higher power could
be maintained with the four boilers at forced draft than with the
original eight boilers at natural draft.

“The practical working of the system at sea presents no difficulty,
as a recent run of the _Alliance_ has demonstrated. On a continuous
run of ten hours, using only two boilers with sixty square feet
of grate (the grate surface of each boiler having been reduced to
thirty), the mean indicated horse-power was 668 and the maximum
744, being respectively 11.1 and 12.4 indicated horse-power per
square foot of grate. There was an entire absence of priming, and no
difficulty was experienced in operating the forced-draft apparatus,
the length of the trial having been determined by the arrival of
the vessel in port. The coal burned was Welsh, of fair quality, the
consumption being 29.9 pounds per square foot of grate.

“The efficiency of the system may be judged by the results obtained
from an experimental boiler at the Washington Navy-yard. The boiler
was of the marine locomotive type, and had a ratio of heating to
grate surface of 32.73 to 1, with a water space of 245 and a steam
space of 163 cubic feet. The coal burned was ordinary Cumberland
Valley bituminous, and the evaporation, when burning as much as forty
pounds per square foot of grate, was 6.61, while with 37.5 it was
7.24, and this with a moderate air pressure—1.5 inches in ash-pit
and one inch on furnace door.”

It is unfair to attempt the explanation of this system without
accompanying drawings, but it may be stated that the air, drawn by
fan-blowers from the heated portion of the fire-room, is forced
through a passage into the ash-pit and furnace, a portion of the
current being directed by an interposed plate through the holes in
the furnace frame. By the agency of a double row of holes the greater
portion of the air which enters the furnace passes around the frame,
thence through other apertures to the space between the furnace door
and lining, and finally to the furnace through the space between the
lining and furnace frame. The supply of air when firing or hauling
ashes is shut off by a damper.

APPENDIX II.[61]

THE QUESTION OF TYPES.

The following letter appeared in the _Times_ (London) of April 4,
1885:

“SIR,—May I request the favor of space in the _Times_ in which to
comment upon the opinions recently expressed by Sir Edward Reed
and other writers respecting the designs of the _Admiral_ class of
ships in the Royal Navy, and the four central-citadel ships which
were laid down subsequently to the _Inflexible_?

“Having been closely associated with Mr. Barnaby in the designing
of all these ships, with the exception of the _Ajax_ and
_Agamemnon_, I can speak with full knowledge of both the history
and intentions of the designs.

“Moreover, my share of the responsibility for the professional work
involved in those designs remains, although my official connection
with the constructive department of the Admiralty was severed years
ago. It need hardly be added that the remarks which follow simply
embody my own opinions, and that I write neither as an apologist
for Mr. Barnaby nor as a champion of the ship-building policy of
the Admiralty.

“The sweeping condemnation which has been pronounced against the
most recent English battle-ships is based upon the consideration
of one feature only in their fighting efficiency, _viz._, the
extent of the armor protection of their sides in the region of the
water-line. There has been no discussion in the letters to which
I have referred of the comparative speeds, armaments, or other
qualities of the French and English ships. But the fact that the
French ships are armor-belted from end to end, while the English
ships have no vertical armor on considerable portions of the length
at the region of the water-line, is considered by Sir Edward Reed
so serious a matter that he says, ‘The French armored ships must in
all reason be expected to dispose of these English ships in a very
few minutes by simply destroying their unarmored parts.’

“From this opinion I most strongly dissent, for reasons which are
stated below; and I venture to assert that if attention is directed
simply to the possible effects of gun-fire, while the possibly
greater risks incidental to attacks with the ram and torpedo are
altogether neglected, then there is ample justification for the
belief that the English ships of recent design can do battle on at
least equal terms with their contemporaries in the French or any
other navy.

“In all recent armored ships, if the wholesale and extremely rapid
destruction of the unarmored portions of the ships which Sir
Edward Reed contemplates actually took place, very considerable
risks would undoubtedly result; but in my judgment these risks
are not sensibly affected by the different distribution of the
armor on the ships of the two great navies. And, further, there
is every reason for doubting whether such wholesale destruction
of the unarmored parts could be effected with the appliances
which are now available, not merely in ‘a few minutes,’ but in a
very considerable time, and under the most favorable conditions
for the attack. Nor must it be forgotten that armor, even of
the greatest thickness, applied to the sides or decks of ships
is not impenetrable to the attack of guns already afloat, while
the _mitraille_, which is driven back into a ship when armor is
penetrated, is probably as destructive as any kind of projectile
can be, and attacks directly the vital parts which the armor is
intended to protect.

“In support of these assertions I must ask permission to introduce
certain detailed statements which appear to be absolutely necessary
to a discussion of the subject, but which shall be made as brief
and untechnical as possible.

“It appears that the points raised by the discussion may be grouped
under two heads. First, does the shortening of the belt in the
English ships introduce such serious dangers if they have to do
battle with the French ships? Secondly, what should be considered
the principal uses of armor-plating in modern war-ships? The second
question may be considered to include the first; but it will be
convenient to take the questions in the order in which they have
been placed, as, after all, the greatest immediate interest centres
in the comparison between existing ships.

“At the outset it is important to remark that in the most recent
designs of armored ships for all navies, increase in speed,
armament, and thickness of armor has been associated with a
decrease in the area of the broadside protected by armor. Further,
it has been considered important in most cases to distribute the
armored positions of the heavy guns in the ships in order to reduce
the risks of complete disablement of the principal armament by
one or two lucky shots which may happen when the heavy guns are
concentrated in a single citadel or battery. This distribution
of the heavy guns also gives greater efficiency to the auxiliary
armament of lighter guns, and enables these heavy guns to be placed
at a considerably greater height above water than was usual in
former days, so that the chances of the guns being prevented from
being fought in heavy weather are diminished, and their power
as compared with the lower guns in earlier ships is increased,
especially when firing with depression.

“The days of the ‘completely protected iron-clad,’ with the
broadside armored throughout the length from the upper deck down
to five or six feet below the water-line, have long gone by.
The ‘central battery and belt’ system has also been practically
dropped, whether the battery contained broadside guns or formed a
citadel protecting the bases of the turrets. In short, on modern
battle-ships there now remains only a narrow belt of armor, rising
from five or six feet below the load-line to two or three feet
above it. This narrow strip of armor in the French ships extends
from end to end, and is associated with a protective deck worked
at the height of the top of the belt, and forming a strong roof
to the hold spaces beneath. In the English ships of the _Admiral_
class the belt of armor extends somewhat less than half the total
length, protecting one hundred and forty to one hundred and fifty
feet of the central portion of the ship (in which are situate
the engines and boilers), and protecting also the communications
from the barbette towers to the magazines. At the extremities of
the belt strong armored bulkheads are built across the ships. The
protected deck is fitted at the upper edge of the belt over the
central portion. Before and abaft the bulkheads, where there is
no side armor, the protection consists of a strong steel deck,
situated from four to five feet below water, and extending to the
bow and stern respectively. Upon this under-water deck are placed
coal-bunkers, chain-lockers, fresh-water tanks, store-rooms, etc.,
the spaces between it and the deck next above being subdivided into
a large number of water-tight compartments or cells by means of
longitudinal and transverse bulkheads. A water-tight top or roof to
these compartments is formed by plating over the main deck-beams
with thin steel at the same height above water as the top of the
armor-belt. In this manner the unarmored ends above the protective
deck are not merely packed to a large extent with water-excluding
substances when the vessel is fully laden, but they are minutely
subdivided into separate compartments, which can only be thrown
into communication with one another by means of very extensive
injuries to the partitions.

“In all the modern French ships, as well as in the _Admiral_ class,
a light steel superstructure of considerable height is built above
the level of the belt-deck; the living quarters of the crew and the
stations of the auxiliary armament are contained within this light
erection, which also surrounds the armored communications from the
barbette towers to the magazines. In this manner a ship with a
small height of armored freeboard is converted into a high-sided
ship for all purposes of ordinary navigation, sea-worthiness, and
habitability; while spaces are provided in which a more or less
considerable number of light guns can be fought concurrently
with the heavy guns placed in the armor-protected stations. The
radical difference, therefore, between the French ships and the
_Admiral_ class, independently of other considerations than the
armor protection of the water-line, consists in the omission of
the side armor at the extremities, and the use instead of the side
armor of the strong under-water deck with cellular subdivision
and other arrangements for adding to the protection and securing
the buoyancy of the spaces at the ends, into which water may
find access through the thin sides if they are shot through and
seriously damaged in action. If the completely belted French ship
has to fight a vessel of the _Admiral_ class, the latter has
obviously the greater chance of damage to the narrow strips of the
sides lying above the under-water deck before and abaft the ends
of the belt. If the action takes place in smooth water, when the
ships are neither rolling nor pitching, but are simply in motion,
the chances of hitting these narrow strips in the water-line region
might not be very great; but it must be admitted that even the
lightest guns would penetrate the thin sides of the English ships
and admit more or less considerable quantities of water into the
ends. If, on the other hand, the fight takes place in a sea-way,
with the ships lolling and pitching, then the relative importance
of penetration of these narrow’ strips of the ends of the English
ships becomes much less, because the belt armor of the French ships
will be brought out of water for a considerable length of the bow
and the stern by a very moderate angle of pitching, or by the
passage of a comparatively low wave, and because rolling motion
of the ships will alternately immerse or emerge the belt armor,
even at the midships part, where it has its greatest thickness.
In fact, as I have more than once said publicly, it is clearly an
error to limit criticism to the longitudinal extent of the belt
armor in modern ships, and to exclude consideration of the vertical
extent of the armor above and below the load-line. Apart from any
discussion of the question from the artillerist’s point of view,
or any attempt to determine the probability or otherwise of the
wholesale destruction of the unarmored portions of modern battle
ships by shell-fire from large guns, or by the projectiles from
rapid-firing and machine guns, it is perfectly obvious to any one
who will examine into the matter that the risk of damage to the
light superstructures situated above the belt must be greater than
the corresponding risk of damage to the narrow strips of side area
exposed at the unarmored ends of the _Admiral_ class, between the
level of the belt-deck and the water-line.

“Sir Spencer Robinson, after his inspection of the models shown
him at the Admiralty, recognizes the fact that in the French
belted ships (of which the _Amiral Duperré_ is an example), if the
light sides above the belt-deck are destroyed or very seriously
riddled in action, the ship would be capsized in a very moderate
sea-way. He further emphasizes the statement that the ships of
the _Admiral_ class in the English navy, if similarly treated,
would also capsize under the same conditions, and he appears to
be surprised at the admission having been made. The fact is that
there has never been any assertion that the _Admiral_ class would
be safe against capsizing independently of assistance given to the
armor-belted portions by the unarmored structure situated above.
On the contrary, from the first, in the design of these ships, it
was recognized that their stability, in the sense of their power
to resist being capsized, if inclined to even moderate angles of
inclination, was not guaranteed by the armor-belts. In this respect
they were in identically the same position as all other armored
ships with shallow water-line belts and isolated armored batteries
placed high above water.

“What has been said respecting the _Admiral_ class is this: If the
unarmored ends above the protective deck were completely thrown
open to the sea, then the initial stability (that is to say, the
stiffness of the ships or their power to resist small inclinations
from the upright) would still be guaranteed by the central armored
portions. So fully did we appreciate the fact that the life of
the ship in action (as determined by her power to resist large
inclinations) depends greatly upon the assistance given by the
unarmored superstructures to the armor-belted parts, that we were
careful to make the structural arrangements of the superstructures
above the belts such that they could bear a very considerable
amount of riddling and damage from shot and shell without ceasing
to contribute in the most important degree to the buoyancy and
stability.

“There are double cellular sides between the belt and upper decks;
the main bulkheads are carried up high above water; hatches and
openings are trunked up and protected by coffer-dams. In short,
every possible precaution is taken to subdivide into compartments,
and thus limit the spaces to which water can find access when the
outer sides are penetrated or shattered, as well as to facilitate
the work of stopping temporarily shot-holes in the sides.

“Now, without in the least intending to discredit the work of the
French designers, I have to state that no corresponding or equal
precautions have been taken in the portions of their ships lying
above the belt-decks. And the absence of these features in the
French ships is a great relative advantage to the English ships.
Of course there is nothing to hinder the French from imitating
our practice, but they are content to take the risks involved in
a simpler construction, and in so doing they show their practical
disbelief in the doctrine of armor-protected stability. I am aware
that some eminent authorities do not concur with this view, and
maintain that stability and buoyancy should be guaranteed by armor.
To this point I will revert hereafter, but for the present I am
content to say that, as between the French ships and the _Admiral_
class, the most serious risks of damage by gun-fire in action
are of the same kind, and, practically, are not affected by the
shortening of the armor-belts in the English ships.

“Next I would refer to the differences which are undoubtedly
involved in shortening the belts of the English ships. In the
first place, by dispensing with the side armor towards the
extremities a very considerable saving is effected in the weight
and the cost of the armor fitted to the ships. Mr. Barnaby has
recently given an illustration of this, where a ship, in other
respects unchanged, has to be increased from 10,000 to 11,000 tons
in displacement in order to carry the shallow armor-belt to the
ends. In the _Collingwood_ herself quite as large a proportionate
increase of size would be involved in having a thick armor-belt
from stem to stern. This saving in weight and cost of armor might,
of course, be purchased too dearly, if dispensing with the armor
involved possibly fatal risks to the ship. However the result
may be attained, there is universal agreement that a ship-of-war
should have her buoyancy, stability, and trim guaranteed as far
as possible against the effects of damage in action. Now, in the
_Admiral_ class this matter was very carefully investigated before
the design was approved. In order to prevent derangement of the
trim of the vessels by penetration of the light sides above the
protective deck at one end, arrangements were made in the design by
means of which water can be introduced into the spaces occupied by
coal-bunkers, etc., before the ships go into action.

“The extent to which water may be introduced is a matter over which
the captain would necessarily have control. But even if the whole
of the unoccupied spaces were filled with water, the increase in
draught would not exceed fourteen to eighteen inches, and the loss
in speed would not exceed half a knot. If only the coal-bunkers
were flooded as a preliminary to action, the chance of any serious
disturbance of trim, and consequent loss of manœuvring power or
speed by damage to the light sides above the protective deck and
near the water, would be very small, and the ‘sinkage’ of the
vessel would be decreased considerably. But taking the extreme
case, with the ends completely filled and a sinkage of fourteen to
eighteen inches, a ship of the _Admiral_ class would go into action
with practically her full speed available, and with her ends so
protected by under-water deck and the water admitted above that
deck that damage to the thin sides by shot or shell penetrating
at or near the water-line would not produce changes of trim or
alterations of draught to any greater extent than would be produced
if the armor-belt had been carried to the stem and stern. Nor would
the admission of water into the ends render the vessel unstable.

“It has been urged that the sinkage due to filling the tank ends
with water is a disadvantage, because it brings the upper edge of
the belt armor in the _Admiral_ class about fourteen to eighteen
inches nearer the water than the upper edge of the belts of the
French ships. If the greatest danger of the ships was to be
measured by the smallness of their ‘reserve’ of ‘armor-protected
buoyancy’ (that is to say, by the buoyancy of the part of the ship
lying above her fighting water-line and below the belt-deck), then
the _Admiral_ class would not compare favorably with the fully
belted French ships. But I have already explained that this is not
the true measure of the greatest danger arising from the effects of
gun-fire, and that it would be a mistake to assume that in either
the French or the English ships the armor-belted portions of the
vessels guarantee their safety when damaged in action.

“As between the _Admiral_ class and the central-citadel ships
of the _Inflexible_ type there is a difference in this respect
which has been much commented upon. When the ends of the citadel
ships are filled with water, the armored wall of the citadel
still remains several feet above water; whereas, in the _Admiral_
class, the top of the belt under similar conditions is very near
the water-level. All that need be said on this point is that,
notwithstanding the greater height of the armored wall above water,
the citadel ships have practically no greater guarantee of safety
against capsizing by means of armor-protected stability than the
_Admiral_ class. In both classes the armored portions require the
assistance of the unarmored to secure such a range and amount
of stability as shall effectually guarantee their security when
damaged in action. And, as has been stated above, this condition is
true of all armor-clads with narrow armor-belts.

“One other objection to the shortened belts yet remains to be
considered.

“It is urged that when the thin ends are broken through or damaged
by shot or shell, jagged or protruding holes will be formed in
the plating near the water-line, and then if the ships are driven
at speed, the water will flow into the holes in large quantities,
and produce serious changes of trim and loss of speed. In support
of this contention, reference is made to the published reports of
experiments made with the _Inflexible’s_ model about eight years
ago. It is impossible to discuss the matter fully, and I must
therefore content myself with a statement of my opinion, formed
after a careful personal observation of these model experiments.
First, it cannot be shown from the experiments that the presence
of a shallow belt of armor reaching two to three feet above the
still-water line would make any sensible difference in the dangers
arising from the circumstances described. Holes in the thin sides
above this belt would admit water in large quantities on the
belt-deck when the vessel was under way, and if it could flow along
that deck changes of trim and other disagreeable consequences would
result. Secondly, it is certain that the numerous bulkheads and
partitions, coffer-dams, etc., built above the belt-deck level in
the _Admiral_ class for the very purpose of limiting the flow of
entering water would greatly decrease any tendency to check the
speed or change the trim. Whether the belt be short or long, it is
evident that gaping holes low down in the light sides will make it
prudent for a captain to slow down somewhat if he wishes to keep
the water out as much as possible. But between such prudence and
the danger of disaster there is a wide gulf.

“Summing up the foregoing statements, I desire to record my
opinion, based upon complete personal knowledge of every detail
in the calculations and designs for the _Admiral_ class, that the
disposition of the belt armor (in association with the protective
decks and cellular sides, water-tight subdivision, etc., existing
in the unarmored portions of the vessels situated above the
protective decks) is such that the buoyancy, stability, trim,
speed, and manœuvring capabilities are well guaranteed against
extensive damage from shot and shell fire in action. And, further,
that in these particulars the _Admiral_ class are capable of
meeting, at least on equal terms, their contemporary ships in the
French navy.

“I must add that I am not here instituting any comparison between
the ‘fighting efficiencies’ of the ships of the two fleets; nor
have I space in this letter to do so. Opinions have differed, and
will probably always differ, as to the relative importance of the
different qualities which go to make up fighting efficiency. There
is no simple formula admitting of general application which enables
the comparative fighting values of war-ships to be appraised.
As the conditions of naval warfare change and war material is
developed, so the balance of qualities in ship-designing has to be
readjusted, and estimates of the fighting powers of existing ships
have to be revised. And, further, different designers, working
simultaneously, distribute the displacement, which is their sum
total of capital to work upon, according to their own judgments of
what is wisest and best for the particular conditions which the
ships built from those designs have to fulfil. The designer who has
the larger displacement to work upon has the better opportunity of
producing a more powerful ship; but it by no means follows that he
will secure so good a combination of qualities as a rival obtains
on a smaller displacement. And hence I cannot but dissent from the
doctrine that displacement tonnage is to be accepted as a fair
measure of relative fighting efficiency, or that recent English
ships are necessarily unable to fight recent French ships because
they are of smaller displacement.

“In the preceding remarks I have been careful to confine myself
chiefly to the naval architect’s side of the subject, as it
would clearly be out of place for me to say much respecting the
artillerist’s side. But, having had the great advantage of knowing
the views of some of the most experienced gun-makers and gunnery
officers, and having studied carefully what has been written on the
subject, I would venture to say a few words.

“First, there seems, as was previously remarked, every reason
for doubting, in the actual conditions of naval gunnery, whether
it would be possible, not merely in a few minutes, but in a
considerable time, to produce the wholesale destruction of the
unarmored parts of modern war-ships which has been assumed in
the condemnation of the _Admiral_ class. If the _Collingwood_,
or one of her successors, were simply treated as a moving target
in a sea-way for the _Amiral Duperré_ or one of her consorts,
this would be a most improbable result. But, remembering that the
_Collingwood_ would herself be delivering heavy blows in return for
those received, the chances of her disablement would necessarily
be decreased. Secondly, it does not seem at all evident that the
introduction of rapid-fire guns has such an important influence on
the question of shortened belts as some writers have supposed. So
far as machine guns are concerned, I well remember at the board
meeting which decided to approve the building of the _Collingwood_
the possible effects of machine-gun fire were discussed at some
length, both in reference to the adoption of the barbette system
and to the system of hull protection. The rapid-firing gun which
has since been introduced is now a formidable weapon; but it may
be questioned whether its effects upon the unarmored portions of
modern war-ships would be so serious as those resulting from the
shell-fire of heavier guns, and therefore it cannot with certainty
be concluded that it would be advantageous to make arrangements
for keeping out the projectiles from the rapid-firing guns now in
use at the ends of the _Admiral_ class. More especially is this
true when it is considered that already rapid-fire guns of much
larger calibre and greater power than the 6-pounder and 9-pounder
are being made. To these guns three inches of steel would be
practically no better defence than the existing thin sides, and
the real defence lies in the strong protective deck. Shell-fire
from heavier guns will probably be found the best form of attack
against the unarmored or lightly armored portions of battle-ships,
especially now that the use of steel shells with thin walls and
large bursting charges is being so rapidly developed.

“I would again say that on this side of the subject I do not
profess to speak with authority, and it is undoubted that great
differences of opinion prevail; but it must not be forgotten
that the Board of Admiralty, by its recent decision announced
in the House of Commons, has reaffirmed the opinion that from
the artillerist’s point of view the existing disposition of the
armor in the _Admiral_ class is satisfactory. This has been done
after the attention of the Board and the public has been most
strongly directed to the supposed dangers incidental to the
rapid destruction of the light superstructures lying above the
under-water decks of the _Admiral_ class. It would be folly to
suppose that in such a matter any merely personal considerations
would prevent the Board from authorizing a change which was proved
to be necessary or advantageous. With respect to the possibility
of making experiments which should determine the points at issue,
I would only say that considerable difficulties must necessarily
arise in endeavoring to represent the conditions of an actual
fight; but in view of the diametrically opposite views which
have been expressed as to the effect of gun-fire upon cellular
structures, it would certainly be advantageous if some scheme of
the kind could be arranged.

“There still remains to be considered the question of the uses of
armor in future war-ships. This letter has already extended to too
great a length to permit of any attempt at a full discussion. It
will be admitted by all who are interested in the questions of
naval design that an inquiry into the matter is urgently needed,
even if it leads only to a temporary solution of the problem, in
view of the present means of offence and defence.

“Armor, by which term I understand not merely vertical armor,
but oblique or horizontal armor, is regarded in different ways
by different authorities. For example, I understand Sir Edward
Reed to maintain that side-armor should be fitted in the form of
a water-line belt, extending over a very considerable portion of
the length, and that such armor, in association with a strong
protective deck, and armored erections for gun-stations, etc.,
should secure the buoyancy, trim, and stability of the vessel.
At the other extreme we have the view expressed in the design
of the grand Italian vessels of the _Italia_ class. In them the
hull-armor is only used for the purpose of assisting the cellular
hull subdivisions in protecting buoyancy, stability, and trim,
taking the form of a thick protective deck, which is wholly under
water, and above which comes a minutely subdivided region, which
Signor Brin and his colleagues consider sufficient defence against
gun-fire.

“In these Italian vessels the only thick armor is used to protect
the gun-stations, the pilot-tower, and the communications from
those important parts to the magazines and spaces below the
protective deck. The strong deck, besides forming a base of the
cellular subdivision, is of course a defence to the vital parts of
the ship lying below it.

“Between these two types of ships come the _Admiral_ class of the
English navy and the belted vessels of the French navy, whose
resemblances and differences have been described above.

“In addition, there are not a few authorities who maintain that the
development of the swift torpedo-cruiser, or the swift protected
cruiser, makes the continued use of armor at least questionable,
seeing that to attempt to protect ships by thick armor either on
decks or sides, and to secure high speeds and heavy armaments,
involves the construction of large and expensive vessels, which
are necessarily exposed to enormous risks in action from forms
of under-water attack, against which their armor is no defence.
In view of such differences of opinion, and of the heated
controversies which have arisen therefrom, the time seems certainly
to have arrived when some competent body should be assembled
by the Admiralty for the purpose of considering the designs of
our war-ships, and enabling our constructors to proceed with
greater assurance than they can at present. Questions affecting
the efficiency of the Royal Navy clearly ought not to be decided
except in the most calm and dispassionate manner. The work done
by the Committee on Designs for Ships of War fourteen years ago
was valuable, and has had important results. What is now wanted,
I venture to think, is a still wider inquiry into the condition
of the navy, and one of the branches of that inquiry which will
require the most careful treatment is embraced in the question,
‘What are the uses of armor in modern war-ships?’

“My own opinion, reached after very careful study of the subject,
is that very serious limitations have to be accepted in the
disposition and general efficiency of the armaments, if the
principle of protecting the stability at considerable angles of
inclination by means of thick armor is accepted, the size and
cost of the ships being kept within reasonable limits. There is
no difficulty, of course, apart from considerations of size and
cost, in fulfilling the condition of armor-protected stability; but
it may be doubted whether the results could prove satisfactory,
especially when the risks from under-water attacks, as well as
from gun-fire, are borne in mind, and the fact is recognized that
even the thickest armor carried or contemplated is not proof
against existing guns. No vessel can fight without running risks.
It is by no means certain, however, that the greater risks to be
faced are those arising from damage to the sides in the region
of the water-line and consequent loss of stability. So far as I
have been able to judge, it appears possible to produce a better
fighting-machine for a given cost by abandoning the idea of
protecting stability, buoyancy, and trim entirely by thick armor,
and by the acceptance of the principle that unarmored but specially
constructed superstructures shall be trusted as contributories to
the flotation and stability. Thick vertical side armor, even over
a portion of the length, appears to be by no means a necessary
condition to an effective guarantee of the life and manageability
of a ship when damaged in action; and it seems extremely probable
that in future the great distinction between battle-ships and
protected ships will not be found in the nature of their hull
protection in the region of the water-line, but in the use of thick
armor over the stations of the heavy guns in battle-ships.

“The decisions as to future designs of our battle-ships is a
momentous one. It can only be reached by the consideration of the
relative advantages and disadvantages of alternative proposals. It
cannot be dissociated from considerations of cost for a single ship.

“On all grounds, therefore, it is to be hoped that a full and
impartial inquiry will be authorized without delay; for it may be
assumed that, however opinions differ, there is the common desire
to secure for the British navy the best types of ships and a
sufficient number to insure our maritime supremacy.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,
“W. H. WHITE.

“ELSWICK WORKS, _March 26th_.”

The following reply by Sir Edward Reed appeared in the _Times_ of
April 8, 1885, the omitted portions being personal allusions which
have very little bearing upon the discussion, and which are of no
interest to a professional reader outside of England:

“It is not Mr. White’s fault but his misfortune that he is
compelled to admit the perfect correctness of the main charge which
I have brought against these six ships, _viz._, that they have been
so constructed, and have been so stripped of armor protection, that
their armor, even when intact and untouched, is wholly insufficient
to prevent them from capsizing in battle. Mr. White expends a
good deal of labor in attempting to show that their unarmored
parts would have a better chance of keeping the ships upright and
afloat than I credit them with, which is a secondary, although an
important, question; but he frankly admits that these six ships of
the _Admiral_ type are, and are admitted to be, so built that their
‘stability in the sense of the power to resist being capsized if
inclined to even moderate angles of inclination is not guaranteed
by their armor-belts.’

* * * * *

“I have no doubt it would suit the purposes of all those who are
or who have been responsible for those ships if I were to allow
myself to be drawn, in connection with this question, away from
the essential points just adverted to into a controversy upon the
efforts made by the Admiralty to give to these ships, which have
been denied a reasonable amount of armor protection, such relief
from the grave dangers thus incurred as thin sheet compartments,
coffer-dams, coals, patent fuel, stores, etc., can afford. (Cork
is what was at first relied upon in this connection, but we hear
no more of it now.) But I do not intend to be drawn aside from
my demand for properly armored ships of the first class by any
references to these devices, and for a very simple reason, _viz._,
all such devices, whether their value be great or small, are in no
sense special to armored ships; on the contrary they are common
to all ships, and are more especially applied to ships which are
unable to carry armor. The application of these devices to ships
stripped of armor does not make them armored ships, any more than
it makes a simple cruiser or other ordinary unarmored vessel an
armored ship; and what I desire, and what I confidently rely upon
the country demanding before long, is the construction of a few
line-of-battle ships made reasonably safe by armor, in lieu of the
present ships, which, while called armored ships, in reality depend
upon their thin unarmored parts for their ability to keep upright
and afloat. Besides, I do not believe in these devices for ships
intended for close fighting. I even believe them likely, in not a
few cases, to add to their danger rather than to their safety. If,
for example, a raking shot or shell should let the sea into the
compartments on one side of the ship, while those on the other side
remain intact and buoyant, this very buoyancy upon the uninjured
side of the ship would help to capsize her.

“Mr. White says that no vessel can fight without running risks,
and thinks that thick, vertical side-armor, even over a portion
of the ship’s length, is not a necessary guarantee of the life of
a ship. Well, sir, we are all at liberty to think, or not think,
what we please, so far as our sense and judgment will allow us;
but Mr. White, like all other depreciators of side-armor, fails
utterly to show us what else there is which can be relied upon to
keep shell out of a ship, or what can be done to prevent shell
that burst inside a ship from spreading destruction all around. He
refers us to no experiments to show that the thin plate divisions
and coffer-dams, and like devices, will prove of any avail for
the purpose proposed. In the absence of any such experiments, he
tells us, as others have told us, that Signor Brin and colleagues
in the Italian Admiralty consider ‘a minutely subdivided region’
at and below the water-line ‘sufficient defence against gun-fire.’
But I do not think Signor Brin believes anything of the kind; what
he believes is that the Italian government cannot afford to build
a fleet of properly armored line-of-battle ships for hard and
close fighting, and that, looking at their limited resources, a
few excessively fast ships, with armor here and there to protect
particular parts, and with ample capabilities of retreat to a safe
distance, will best serve their purpose. I do not say that he is
wrong, and I certainly admire the skill which he has displayed in
carrying out his well-defined object. But that object is totally
different from ours, and our naval habits, our traditions, our
national spirit, the very blood that flows in our veins, prevent
such an object from ever becoming ours.

“Mr. White all through his letter, in common with some of his late
colleagues at the Admiralty, thinks and speaks as if naval warfare
were henceforth to be chiefly a matter of dodging, getting chance
shots, and keeping out of the enemy’s way; and this may be more or
less true of contests between unarmored vessels. But why is not the
line-of-battle ship _Collingwood_ to be supposed to steam straight
up to the enemy, I should like to know? and if she does, what is
to prevent the enemy from pouring a raking fire through her bow,
and ripping up at once, even with a single shell, every compartment
between the stem and the transverse armored bulkhead?

“It distresses me beyond measure to see our ships constructed so
as to impose upon them the most terrible penalties whenever their
commanders dare, as dare they ever have, and dare they ever will,
to close with their foe and try conclusions with him. Why, sir,
it has been my painful duty over and over again to hear foreign
officers entreat me to use all my influence against the adoption in
their navy of ships with so little armored surface as ours. On one
occasion the _Collingwood_ herself was imposed upon them as a model
to be imitated, and I was besought to give them a safer and better
ship. ‘How could I ever steam up to my enemy with any confidence,’
said one of the officers concerned, ‘with such a ship as that under
my feet?’

* * * * *

“Mr. White coolly tells us that the _Collingwood_, with five
hundred tons of water logging her ends to a depth of seven or eight
feet, will not be much worse off than a ship whose armored deck
stands two and a half or three feet above the water’s surface,
and his reason is that even above this latter deck the water
would flow in when the ship was driving ahead with an injured
bow. Well, sir, I will only say that sailors of experience see a
very great difference between the two cases, and I can but regard
such theorizings as very unfortunate basis for the designs of her
Majesty’s ships.

“I have said that Mr. White’s assumptions as to the immunity of the
above-water compartments and coffer-dams from wide-spread injury
by shell-fire rest upon no experimental data; I go on to say that
such data as we have to my mind point very much the other way. The
_Huascar_ was not an unarmored vessel, and such shell as penetrated
her had first to pass through some thin armor and wood backing; yet
after the _Cochrane_ and _Blanco Encaloda_ had defeated her she
presented internally abundant evidence of the general destruction
which shell-fire produces. An officer of the _Cochrane_, who was
the first person sent on board by the captors, in a letter to me
written soon afterwards, said: ‘It requires seeing to believe the
destruction done.... We had to climb over heaps, table-high, of
_débris_ and dead and wounded.... We fired forty-five Palliser
shell, and the engineers who were on board say that every shell, or
nearly so, must have struck, and that every one that struck burst
on board, doing awful destruction.’

“Speaking of the injury which the _Cochrane_ received from a single
shell of the _Huascar_, he said: ‘It passed through the upper works
at commander’s cabin, breaking fore and aft bulkhead of cabins,
breaking skylight above ward-room, thwartship bulkhead of wood,
passed on, cut in two a 5-inch iron pillar, through a store-room,
struck armor-plate, glanced off, passing through plating of
embrasure closet at corner, finishing at after gun-port, and went
overboard. This shell passed in at starboard part of stern and
terminated at after battery port on port side, which is finished
with the wide angle-iron, carrying out a part of the angle-iron in
its flight.’

“This was a shell of moderate size, from a moderate gun, but it is
obvious that it would have made short work of penetrating those
very thin sheets of steel which constitute the compartments,
coffer-dams, etc., upon the resistance of which, to my extreme
surprise, those responsible for the power and safety of our fleets
seem so ready to place their main dependence.

* * * * *

“For resistance to rams and torpedoes, and for the limitation of
the injuries to be effected by them, as much cellular subdivision
as possible should be supplied; but, as against shot and shell,
subdivision by their sheet-steel is no guarantee whatever of safety
in any ship, least of all in line-of-battle ships, which must be
prepared for fighting at close quarters.

“I must now ask for space to remark upon a few minor points in
Mr. White’s letter. He seems to consider that the scant armor
of the _Admiral_ class is somehow associated with the placing
of the large, partly protected guns of these ships in separate
positions, ‘in order to reduce the risks of complete disablement
of the principal armament by one or two lucky shots, which may
happen when the heavy guns are concentrated on a single citadel
or battery.’ Suffice it to reply that in the proposed new designs
of the Admiralty ships now before Parliament, which have almost
equally scant partial belts of armor, the guns are nevertheless
concentrated in a single battery.

“Again, Mr. White says the Admiralty have declined to adopt
my advice to protect the _Admiral_ class in certain unarmored
parts with 3-inch plating, and declares that such plating would
practically be no better defence against rapid-fire guns than
existing thin sides; but has he forgotten the fact that my
suggestion has been adopted in the new designs for the protection
of the battery of 6-inch guns, although it is perversely withheld
from those parts of the ship in which it might assist in some
degree in prolonging the ship’s ability to float and to resist
capsizing forces?

“Mr. White makes one very singular statement. He takes exception
to my claiming for the _Inflexible_ type of ship, on account of
their armored citadel, a much better chance of retaining stability
in battle than the _Admiral_ type possesses, because, he says, ‘in
both classes the armored portions require the assistance of the
unarmored to secure such a range and amount of stability as shall
effectually guarantee their security when damaged in action.’
The fair inference to be drawn from this would be that where the
principle long ago laid down by me, and supported by Mr. Barnaby in
the words previously quoted, is once departed from, the danger must
in all cases be so great as to exclude all distinctions of more or
less risk. Mr. White can hardly mean this; but if he does not, then
on what grounds are we told that a ship which has no armor at all
left above water at an inclination say of six or eight degrees is
no worse off than a ship which at those angles and at still greater
ones has a water-tight citadel over one hundred feet long to help
hold her up?

* * * * *

“I am not at all disposed to enter into a discussion as to the
relative stabilities of the English and French ships under various
conditions. The French ships have armored belts two and a half to
three feet above water from end to end. That fact, other things
being presumed equal, gives them an immense advantage over our
ships, which in battle trim have belts scarcely more than a foot
wide above water, and for less than half their length. It is quite
possible that the French constructors may have given their ships
less initial stability than ours; from such information as I
possess I believe they have; but in so far as the ship below the
armor-deck, and the action of shot and shell upon that part of her,
are concerned, whatever stability they start with in battle they
will retain until their armor is pierced; whereas our ships may
have a large proportion of theirs taken from them without their
armor being pierced, and their armored decks are then less than
half the height of those of the French ships above water.

* * * * *

“I will add that I doubt if the French ships are dealt fairly by at
Whitehall. I lately heard a good deal of the extreme taper of their
armor-belts at the bow, and the _Amiral Duperré_ was always quoted
in instance of this. It is true that this ship’s armor does taper
from fifty-five centimetres amidships to twenty-five centimetres at
the stem, but she stands almost alone among recent important ships
in this respect, as the following figures will show:

+------------------+--------------+--------------+
| | Thickness | Thickness |
| NAME OF SHIP. | of Armor | of Armor |
| | Amidship. | at Bows. |
+------------------+--------------+--------------+
| | Centimetres. | Centimetres. |
| Amiral Baudin | 55 | 40 |
| Formidable | 55 | 40 |
| Hoche | 45 | 40 |
| Magenta | 45 | 40 |
| Marceau | 45 | 40 |
| Caiman | 50 | 35 |
| Fulminant | 33 | 25 |
| Furieuse | 50 | 32 |
| Indomptable | 50 | 37 |
| Requin | 50 | 40 |
| Terrible | 50 | 37 |
+------------------+--------------+--------------+

“A friend writes me: ‘Comparing the _Amiral Duperré_ with the
_Amiral Baudin_, _Dévastation_, _Formidable_, and _Foudroyant_,
which are ships of about her size, the following peculiarities
are observable: The _Duperré_ is about three feet narrower than
the other ships mentioned, and has fully fifteen inches less
metacentric height. She is also slightly deeper in proportion to
her breadth than the other ships.’

“As narrowness, small metacentric height, and excessive depth
all tend to reduce stability, it would appear that the Admiralty
office has, as I supposed, been careful to select a vessel not
unfavorable to their purpose. But however this may be, it is no
business of mine to defend the French ships in the details of their
stability, nor even to defend them at all; and, as a matter of
fact, the French Admiralty, although stopping far short of ours,
has in my opinion gone much too far in the direction of reducing
the armored stability at considerable angles of inclination. But
their falling into one error is no justification for our falling
into a much greater one, and deliberately repeating it in every
ship we lay down. In this connection I will only add that the
experiments performed at our Admiralty on models must be viewed
with great distrust for a reason not yet named. They deal only, so
far as I am acquainted with them, with models set oscillating or
rolling by waves or otherwise. But the danger thus dealt with is a
secondary one; the primary one is that due to ‘list’ or prolonged
inclination to one side. What sort of protection against the danger
of capsizing from this cause can be possessed by a ship the entire
armor on each side of which becomes immersed even in smooth water
when the ship is inclined a couple of degrees only, and which then
has no side left to immerse, save such as single shells can blow
into holes ten by four feet?

“It is to be observed that although Mr. White does not venture
to join the only other apologist for these deficiently armored
ships in stating that India-rubber umbrella shot-stoppers are to
be employed for their preservation in battle, he does go so far
as to tell us that the spaces into which water would enter when
the unarmored parts have been penetrated have been subdivided ‘to
facilitate the work of stopping temporarily shot-holes in the
sides,’ and I know independently that a good deal of reliance is
placed at the Admiralty upon the presumed ability to stop such
holes as they are made. But the whole thing is a delusion. The
officer of the _Cochrane_, before quoted, said, ‘I wish to state
that shot-plugs are out of the question after or at such a fight.
They are entirely useless. Not a hole was either round, square, or
oval, but different shapes—ragged, jagged, and torn, the inside
parts and half-inch plating being torn in ribbons; some of the
holes inside are as large as four by three feet, and of all shapes.
There are many shot-plugs on board here, all sizes, conical shapes
and long, but they are of no use whatever.’

“Mr. White’s letter invites many other comments, but I have said
enough to show that it in no way changes my view of the question
of armor-plated line-of-battle ships. In so far as it advocates
a further abandonment of armor and a further resort to doubtful
devices in lieu thereof, it is already answered by anticipation
by the Admiralty itself. Until I wrote my recent letters to you,
our Admiralty thought as Mr. White still thinks, and tended as
he still tends. In the case of all our recent cruisers but two
they had abolished side-armor altogether. To my public appeal
for armor-belted cruisers they have, however, responded, and are
about to order six of such ships. So far, so good. We ought to be
grateful for this concession to a most reasonable demand. I wish
these cruisers were to be faster, much faster, but in Admiralty
matters the country must be thankful for small mercies.

“It only remains for me to note with satisfaction one or two of
the points upon which Mr. White is in agreement with myself. He
admits that it ‘would certainly be advantageous’ to carry out those
experiments which I regard the Admiralty as afraid to make, _viz._,
experiments to test the effect of gun-fire upon the subdivided but
unarmored parts of ships.

* * * * *

“It may be taken for what it is worth, but I declare that the
abandonment of armor has not at all been forced upon us by
unavoidable circumstances, nor is it from any intrinsic necessity
that we go on refusing to provide our ships with torpedo defence.
On not immoderate dimensions, at not immoderate cost, ships might
be built, still practically invulnerable to gun, ram, and torpedo
alike, ships which could dispose of the _Admiral_ class of ships
more quickly and certainly than she could dispose of the feeblest
antagonist that she is likely to encounter. But in order to
produce such ships we must revive the now abandoned principle that
armor, and armor alone can save from destruction those ships whose
business it is to drive our future enemies from the European seas
and lock them up in their own ports.”

The Committee on Designs of 1872, previously alluded to, contained
sixteen members, of whom six were naval officers. Two of those
members, Admiral George Elliot, R.N., and Rear-admiral A. P. Ryder,
R.N., dissented so far from their colleagues that they could not
sign the report, and accordingly they submitted a very able minority
report embodying their views.

The first of the “general principles” laid down in their report is as
follows:

“That it is of the last importance that the modifications in
existing types of men-of-war which the committee have been invited
to suggest should be calculated not merely to effectually meet the
necessities of naval warfare now and in the immediate future, but
in full view of the probable necessities of naval warfare in the
more remote future.”

It must be a source of satisfaction to these gallant officers to
observe in some designs of the present day a confirmation of their
forecast in many particulars.

The following extracts from a letter bearing upon the present
controversy, by Admiral Elliot, appeared in the _Times_ (London) of
April 24, 1885, and contain the pith of his oft-quoted arguments:

“My first impression on reading these letters in the _Times_ is one
of disappointment that the point at issue between these two experts
has not been more closely confined to the comparative merits of
side-armor _versus_ cellular-deck armor, but that their attention
has been directed to this feature of design only as connected with
a particular type of ship, namely, the _Collingwood_, which vessel
is a hybrid, or cross between the two systems of protection to
buoyancy, and therefore not truly representative of either. Mr.
White’s defence of the unarmored ends of the _Collingwood_ is so
far unsatisfactory that it treats of a very imperfect development
of the cellular-deck mode of protection, and therefore he is not an
exponent of the real merits of this system.

* * * * *

“I am quite aware that the main point at issue between these two
distinguished naval architects has been more closely confined to
the question of stability than to that of flotation as displayed in
the design of the _Collingwood_, and in this scientific view of the
case I do not feel competent to offer any opinion, except to point
out that the cellular-deck principle _per se_ does not involve any
such danger as regards stability as is produced by the top weight
of a central citadel. Mr. White acknowledges that this top weight
will capsize his ship if deprived of the buoyancy afforded by the
unarmored ends, and on this danger point Sir Edward Reed fixes his
sharpest weapon of attack.

* * * * *

“The great issue at stake is how the weights available for the
protection of buoyancy and for gun defence are to be distributed to
the best advantage for defensive purposes, and in order to discuss
Sir Edward Reed’s opinions in a concise form I will deal with the
question solely as concerning the use of side-armor of less than
twelve inches, beyond which limit of thickness I will, for the
sake of argument, admit its practical advantages; and looking to
the demand for increased speed and coal-carrying capacity, it does
not appear probable that if combined with adequate gun protection,
and if of sufficient depth, an all-round belt of thicker than
ten inches can be carried by any vessels of war except those of
much greater displacement than the _Collingwood_ class. I feel
justified, however, in discussing the question on this basis,
because Sir Edward Reed includes in his category of approved
armored ships our recent belted cruisers, having a narrow belt of
ten inches maximum thickness, and takes credit for having induced
the Admiralty to abandon their original intention of cellular-deck
water-line protection in this class of war-ship in favor of this
thin armor-belt.

“The relative value of these two systems of water-line protection,
namely, an all-round belt _versus_ a raft body, must not only be
ruled by the displacement decided upon for each class of vessel,
and by the power of the gun which has to be encountered, but by
such tactical expedients as can be resorted to in battle, as being
those best suited to the known offensive and defensive properties
of the combatants.

“Looking at this disputed question entirely from the point of view
of an artillerist and a practical seaman, I can perceive very great
tactical advantages to be obtained by the adoption of the mode of
protection proposed as a substitute for obsolete armor, and I view
with much regret the one-sidedness of the conclusions arrived at by
the opponents of this system, and the disparaging terms in which
it is sought to turn it into ridicule, such as ‘doubtful devices’
and ‘useless contrivances,’ etc., because they indicate prejudice
and a want of mature consideration of the incidents of naval
battles. I cannot, also, help observing that while, on the one
side, prophesying the most fatal consequences to ensue from what is
called ‘stripping ships of armor,’ on the other side no admission
is made of the disastrous results which must follow from placing
reliance on such a delusive defensive agency as an armor-plate
known to be penetrable by guns certain to be encountered; and
in order to support this theory we are called upon to believe
that gunners will be so excited in action or so unskilful that
in no case will they hit the large object aimed at, namely, the
water-line of an adversary passing even at close quarters on
their beam, but I shall refer to this feature of assumed impunity
hereafter.

“Sir Edward Reed’s comparative remarks on the effect of shot-holes
as between the two systems of defence are of the same one-sided
character, notwithstanding the evidence of the fractured condition
of armor-plates subjected to experimental firing; and it is
almost apparent that in decrying the one mode of protection he
has lost sight of the fact that a ten-inch armor-plate is all
that will stand between the life and death of a ship—that is
to say, between one well-directed shell and the magazines and
boilers—which plate can be easily penetrated and smashed up by
the guns which similar vessels will assuredly carry if so invited.
Also, in referring to the baneful effects of raking fire and shell
explosion inboard, the assumed inferiority is misplaced because
one prominent advantage of the cellular-deck system is that by
economizing weight at the water-line it enables the bow and stern
to be armor-plated—a matter of the highest tactical importance
as a defence against raking fire, which is unobtainable in a
belted ship of the same displacement, at least without entailing
a considerable reduction of the thickness of armor on the belt.
This feature of end-on defence is not only an essential element of
safety, but must prove most effective as enabling a combatant to
close his adversary at an advantage, and enforce the bow-to-bow ram
encounter, or compel him to resort to a stern fight, or otherwise
to pass him at such close quarters as will insure direct hits
and depressed fire at the water-line belt, and by these tactics
the opportunities for riddling the raft body will be few and far
between.

“I may also express the opinion that for repairing damages in a
raft-bodied ship at the water-line far more efficacious means can
be resorted to than the ordinary shot-plugs, and that the use of
cork bags for closing shot-holes in the coffer-dam sides, if they
are open at the top, is far from being an unreasonable or ‘stupid
contrivance,’ as it is called, considering that, as a general
rule, the perforations through thin plating would not be ragged or
extensive. Sir Edward Reed’s wise suggestion to make the outer skin
of the coffer-dam of two-inch steel plates would render machine-gun
fire of little avail. The injurious effects of shell fire would,
I reckon, be far more fatal if the projectile exploded in passing
through the ten-inch belt than if it burst at some distance inboard
after penetrating thin plating. I think it will be admitted without
dispute that this feature of design must be governed to a great
extent by tactical considerations, the object sought for being
to secure out of a given weight of steel the greatest amount of
fighting vitality consistent with the power of manœuvring available
between skilful antagonists. This view of the case is especially
applicable to single actions at sea, when a clever tactician
will select his mode of fighting according to the offensive and
defensive properties known to be possessed by his opponent, and in
this respect an armor-plated bow and stern will afford enormous
advantages, both for attack and defence, if the plating is extended
as high as the upper deck.

“In fleet actions the ram and torpedo will require more attention
than the gun attack, and that feature of battle introduces another
disputed point, namely, the limit of size of ship; but that
question is outside the scope of the present discussion, and I
shall conclude my arguments by a strong expression of opinion that,
as gunpowder has so completely mastered the pretensions of outside
armor protection, the direction in which prudence leans towards
defensive properties in future designs for ships-of-war is that
of deflection rather than of direct resistance, and that in this
respect science has not reached its utmost limit of invention.

“The prevailing disposition to regulate the power of the gun by the
size of the vessel is, I consider, a great mistake, seeing that
the additional weight of a powerful gun is not inadmissible, even
in such vessels as our belted cruisers, and looking to the strong
inducement held out by the continued use of armor-plating, even of
such moderate thickness as ten inches. In the splendid steamers
purchased from the mercantile marine, which are being armed with
light guns only, one 25-ton gun would greatly add to their fighting
power, but the cause of this omission may probably be found in the
answer to the question, Where are the guns?”

The following reply appeared in the _Times_ (London) of May 1, 1885:

“SIR.—The letter of Admiral Sir George Elliot ... deals ably and
candidly with a subject of such fundamental importance to our navy
that I venture to offer a few observations upon it.

“I am glad to see that the gallant admiral separates his case and
the cellular or raft-deck system from any connection with the
_Collingwood_ or _Admiral_ type of ship, but I regret that he has
treated my criticisms of that kind of ship just as if I had applied
them in the abstract to the system which he advocates. This is
not fair either to the gallant officer himself or to me, as will
presently appear.

“If Sir George Elliot will remove the cellular or raft-deck
question completely away from the very unsatisfactory and
unpleasant region of Admiralty practice, and let it be treated
upon its merits, while I shall still have to respectfully submit
to him some cautionary considerations, I shall also be prepared to
make to him some very considerable concessions. One thing I should
find it desirable to press upon him is the absolute necessity of
giving closer attention to the provision of stability. He treats
the subject mainly as a question of ‘buoyancy,’ and wisely so from
his point of view; but ‘stability,’ or the power of resisting
capsizing, comes first, and on this he declines to offer an
opinion. Again, when the gallant officer speaks of a ‘raft’ deck,
I would point out that this may be a very different thing from a
cellular-deck. The characteristic of a raft is that it is usually
formed of solid buoyant materials; you may make it of cellular
steel if you please, but in that case wherever injury lets in water
the steel so far ceases to be a raft, which helps to float its
load, and becomes a weight to help sink it. Now, cells formed of
thin steel do not upon the face of the matter appear to be safe
materials for a raft which is to be subject to the multitudinous
fire of small guns and the explosions of shells of all sizes. It
needs a very skilful artificer to build a safe floating raft of
thin steel for such a purpose, especially when regard is had to the
dangers of raking fire, against which bow and stern armor would not
sufficiently provide.

“Having expressed these cautions, I will go on to say that in my
opinion the main idea of your gallant correspondent, which he
has so long and so steadily developed, is nevertheless a sound
one, and one which has a great future. I do not, of course, for a
moment admit with him that the gun has yet mastered the armor. I
believe the _Dreadnought_, though of old design, would still fight
a good action against all ships now ready for sea, and have to fear
only a very exceptional, and therefore either a very skilful or
very fortunate, shot. The recent Admiralty ships, where they are
armored, are practically proof against almost every gun afloat.
Further, I have satisfied myself that if the existing restrictions
imposed upon us by the absence of floating docks adapted to receive
ships of great breadth were removed (these restrictions crippling
us to a most unfortunate degree), and if certain professional
conventionalities as to the forms of ships were set aside, it would
be perfectly practicable to build war-ships no larger and no more
costly than the _Inflexible_, with enough side-armor more than a
yard (three feet) thick to preserve their stability, and at the
same time made ram-proof and torpedo-proof. Meanwhile, of all the
vulnerable objects afloat, the recent guns themselves, by reason of
their absurdly long and slender barrels, left fully exposed to all
fire, are among the most vulnerable.

“Still, the raft-deck system has a wide field before it, and I am
quite prepared to admit that I believe in its practicability and in
its sufficient security for certain classes of vessels if properly
carried out. This it has not yet been in any single instance. Even
in the case of the great Italian ships, as in our own, there are
elements of weakness which would be fatal to the system in action,
but which are _not_ unavoidable. Allow me to assure Sir George
Elliot that I have largely and closely studied this subject, and
that my main objections to it are not objections of principle.

“If the raft-deck system is to be adopted, it must in my opinion
be carried out in a much fuller and more satisfactory manner than
hitherto, and with the aid of arrangements which I have for a long
time past seen the necessity of, and been engaged upon.

* * * * *

“To my mind the Admiralty, while protecting certain parts and
contents of their largest ships from injury from shell fire, have
made the fatal error of failing to protect the ship itself, which
contains them all, from being too readily deprived of stability
and made to capsize. The advocates of the alternative system must
not repeat this error, or, if they do, they must not expect me
to become their ally. On the other hand, if they will join me
in despising what are merely specious elements of safety, and
in demanding those which are real, if they will insist that our
principal and most costly ships at least shall be so constructed
as to keep afloat and upright for a reasonable length of time in
battle, in spite of any form of attack, so as to give their gallant
crews a fair chance of achieving their objects, they will not find
me averse to any improvement whatever. When a suitable opportunity
offers I shall be happy to show to Admiral Sir George Elliot
that he has not been alone in seeking to develop the cellular or
raft-deck system, and that it has, in fact, capabilities which
possibly he himself may not yet have fully realized.”

The same number of the _Times_ contains a reply to Mr. Reed’s letter
of April 8, 1885, by Mr. White, mainly devoted to a refutation of
certain charges of no interest to us, but containing the following
paragraphs:

“I must refer to the passage in which Sir Edward Reed quotes a
description of the damage done to the _Huascar_ in her action with
the two Chilian iron-clads.

“This description seems to me one of the best possible
illustrations of a remark in my previous letter, that ‘the
_mitraille_ which is driven back into a ship when armor is
penetrated is probably as destructive as any kind of projectile can
be.’ Had the _Huascar_ not had weak armor, but light sides only,
the local injuries might have been less. The other case cited of
a shell which entered the unarmored stern of the _Cochrane_ shows
how little damage may be done when a projectile passes through
thin plating. At the bombardment of Alexandria there were many
such examples on board our ships, although it must be frankly
admitted that the engagement is no sufficient indication of what
shell fire may do. A good deal of use has been made of the single
case where a shell in bursting blew a hole ten by four feet in the
thin side-plating of the _Superb_. The case was quite exceptional,
whether it be compared with the other hits on the same ship or with
the injuries done to the unarmored sides of other ships. Moreover,
in that case exceptional injury is traceable to special structural
arrangements at the embrasure near the battery port, where the
shell struck. These cases do not prove that the light unarmored
structures in the _Admiral_ class are likely to be destroyed in
such a rapid and wholesale manner as has been asserted. Nor,
on the other hand, do they indicate conclusively what damage
shell-fire may do in future actions. On these points, as I have
before remarked, experiment might be made with advantage. But, on
the other hand, there is good evidence that armor so thin as to be
readily penetrable to many guns may be a serious danger, and that
armor over the vital parts of ships should be strong if it is to be
a real defence.

* * * * *

“In matters of ship design the constructors of the navy are
only the servants of the Board, and while they must take sole
responsibility for professional work, the governing features in
the designs are determined by higher authorities, among whom are
officers of large experience, both as seamen and gunners. And it
is certainly not the practice of the constructive department to
intrude themselves or their advice into matters for which neither
their training nor their experience fits them to give an opinion.

* * * * *

“I make no attempt to be either a sailor or a gunner, but am
content to seek information from the best authorities in both
branches. As the result of this study of tactics and gunnery, I
have been led to the belief that the sea-fights of the future are
not likely to be settled altogether or chiefly by the effects of
gun-fire. This is not quite the same thing as Sir Edward Reed
attributes to me when he says that ‘Mr. White thinks and speaks as
if naval warfare henceforth were to be merely a matter of dodging,
getting chance shots, and keeping out of an enemy’s way.’

“Nor do I think that the designers of the Italian war-ships will
indorse the description of their views and intentions, with which
Sir Edward Reed has favored us in his letter and elsewhere. I have
the honor of knowing his excellency Signor Brin (now Minister
of Marine) and other members of the constructive corps of the
Italian navy, and from their statements, including the powerful
publications of Signor Brin, ‘La Nostra Marina Militaire,’ I have
no hesitation in saying that in spending larger sums on single
ships than have ever before been spent, the Italian authorities
think, and are not alone in thinking, that they are producing the
most powerful fighting-ships afloat.”

APPENDIX III.

RANGE OF GUNS.

_From Report of U. S. Fortification Board._

GUNS AFLOAT RANGING POSSIBLY NINE TO TEN MILES.

+---------+----------------+---------+-----------+---------+---------+
| NATION. | Ship. | Maximum | Draught. | Guns. | Calibre.|
| | | Armor. | | | |
+---------+----------------+---------+-----------+---------+---------+
| | | Inches. | Feet. In. | Number. | Inches. |
| England | Inflexible | 24 | 25 4 | 4 | 16 |
| France | Friedland | 7⅞ | 29 4 | 2 | 10.6 |
| ” | Redoubtable | 14 | 24 10 | 4 | 10.6 |
| ” | Duguesclin } | | | | |
| ” | Bayard } | 9⅞ | 24 10 | 4 | 9.5 |
| ” | Turenne } | | | | |
| ” | Vauban } | | | | |
| ” | Fulminant } | 13 | 21 4 | 2 | 10.6 |
| ” | Tonnerre } | | | | |
| Italy | Duilio | 21.7 | 28 | 4 | 17 |
| ” | Dandolo | 21.7 | 28 9 | 4 | 17 |
| Germany | Sachsen } | | | | |
| ” | Baiern } | 17.25 | 19 8 | 4 | 10.2 |
| ” | Würtemberg } | | | | |
| ” | Baden } | | | | |
| ” | Wespe } | | | | |
| ” | Viper } | | | | |
| ” | Biene } | | | | |
| ” | Mücke } | 8 | 10 2 | 1 | 12 |
| ” | Scorpion } | | | | |
| ” | Basilisk } | | | | |
| ” | Cameleon } | | | | |
| ” | Crocodil } | | | | |
| Brazil | Riachuelo | 11 | 20 | 4 | 9 |
+---------+----------------+---------+-----------+---------+---------+

Besides a large number on unarmored vessels and on armored vessels
not yet completed.

GUNS AFLOAT RANGING POSSIBLY TEN MILES OR UPWARD.

+---------+---------------------+-------+---------+-------+--------+
| NATION. | Ship. |Maximum|Draught. | Guns. |Calibre.|
| | |Armor. | | | |
+---------+---------------------+-------+---------+-------+--------+
| | |Inches.|Feet. In.|Number.|Inches. |
| England | Conqueror | 12 | 24 0 | 2 | 12 |
| ” | Colossus | 18 | 26 3 | 4 | 12 |
| ” | Edinburgh | 18 | 26 3 | 4 | 12 |
| France | Amiral Duperré | 21.6 | 26 9 | 4 | 13.4 |
| ” | Dévastation | 15 | 24 11 | { 2 | 10.6 |
| | and Foudroyant | | | { 4 | 13.4 |
| ” | Terrible | 19 | 24 7 | 2 | 16.5 |
| ” | Tonnant | 17¾ | 16 9 | 2 | 13.4 |
| ” | Vengeur | 13¾ | 16 9 | 2 | 13.4 |
| Italy | Italia | 18.9 | 30 3 | 4 | 17 |
| Germany | Salamander } | | | | |
| ” | Natter } | 8 | 10 2 | 1 | 12 |
| ” | Hummel } | | | | |
| China | Ting Yuen } | 14 | 20 | 4 | 12 |
| ” | Chen Yuen } | | | | |
+---------+---------------------+-------+---------+-------+--------+

GUNS RANGING POSSIBLY TEN MILES OR UPWARD SHORTLY TO BE AFLOAT.

+---------+--------------------+--------+----------+---------+---------+
| NATION. | Ship. | Maximum| Draught.| Guns. | Calibre.|
| | | Armor. | | | |
+---------+--------------------+--------+----------+---------+---------+
| | | Inches.| Feet. In.| Number. | Inches. |
| England | Collingwood | 18 | 26 3 | 4 | 12 |
| ” | Rodney | 18 | 25 3 | 4 | 13.5 |
| ” | Benbow | 18 | 27 | 2 | 17 |
| ” | Camperdown | 18 | 27 3 | 4 | 13.5 |
| ” | Howe | 18 | 27 3 | 4 | 13.5 |
| ” | Anson | 18 | 27 3 | 4 | 13.5 |
| ” | Hero | 12 | 24 | 2 | 12 |
| ” | Renown | 18 | 27 3 | 2 | 16.25 |
| ” | Sanspareil | 18 | 27 3 | 2 | 16.25 |
| France | Amiral Baudin | 21⅝ | 26 | 3 | 16.5 |
| ” | Formidable | 21⅝ | 26 | 3 | 16.5 |
| ” | Furieux | 19⅝ | 21 7 | 2 | 13.4 |
| ” | Indomptable } | | | | |
| ” | Caïman } | 19⅝ | 24 7 | 2 | 16.5 |
| ” | Requin } | | | | |
| ” | Marceau } | | | | |
| ” | Hoche } | 17¾ | 27 3 | { 2 | 13.4 |
| ” | Magenta } | | | { 2 | 10.6 |
| ” | Neptune | 17¾ | 27 3 | 3 | 13.5 |
| Italy | Lepanto | 18.9 | 29 6 | 4 | 17 |
| ” | Ruggiero di Lauria | 17.7 | 25 11 | 4 | 17 |
| ” | Andrea Doria | 17.7 | 29 6 | 4 | 17 |
| ” | F. Morosini | 17.7 | 25 11 | 4 | 17 |
| Russia | Catherine II. | 24 | 27 | 4 | 12 |
| ” | Tchesme | 24 | 25 | 4 | 12 |
| ” | Sinope | 24 | 25 | 4 | 12 |
| Denmark | Tordenskiold | 8 | 15 | 1 | 13.8 |
+---------+--------------------+--------+----------+---------+---------+

THE END.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] This is not strictly true of quite all the ships named, but it
probably will be true erelong, as none of them has more than a light
auxiliary rig, and that will probably be abandoned.

[2] See Note, page 27.

[3] “The British Navy.”

[4] From “Engineering.”

[5] Some persons regarded the existence of these four small
port-holes as converting the tower into a nest for projectiles,
although a single enemy could not possibly have attacked more than
two of these ports at once, situated as they were. What would such
persons think of the batteries of the _Nelson_, _Northampton_, and
_Shannon_, each open for more than one hundred feet in length, on
each side of the ship, in so far as armor is concerned?

[6] The _Italia_ and _Lepanto_, for example.

[7] See Notes, page 58.

[8] “The British Navy,” vol. i., p. 438.

[9] _Ibid._, p. 427. The writer trusts he may be excused from again
quoting these very important sentences from the work of the former
Secretary to the Admiralty, notwithstanding that he recently had
occasion to quote them elsewhere.

[10] The reasons for placing this ship in the list of armored ships,
against the writer’s own judgment, have been stated previously. (See
Notes for new ships.)

[11] Harbor-defence vessel.

[12] Three turret-vessels, nearly resembling the _Gorgon_, which
belong to the Indian and colonial governments, are not included
in this list, nor are several unimportant small vessels, _viz._,
_Scorpion_, _Wyvern_, _Viper_, _Waterwitch_, and _Vixen_. The very
few remaining thinly armored wood-built ships are also excluded.

[13] Ships for local defence of ports.

[14] Cruisers for distant service.

[15] The thicknesses of decks given are those of the horizontal, or
nearly horizontal, parts of the deck. Where the decks slope down at
the sides the thickness is sometimes increased a little, as will have
been seen in the section of the _Mersey_. (See Notes for new ships.)

[16] See Notes, page 60.

[17] The editor of these Notes wishes to acknowledge his very great
indebtedness to the Office of United States Naval Intelligence
for the data relating to foreign navies, notably to Lieutenant R.
P. Rodgers, Chief Intelligence Officer, and to Lieutenants W. H.
Beehler, J. C. Colwell, and W. I. Chambers, Assistants. The notes
upon the United States Navy are to a great degree reprints of his
own contributions to the editorial and news columns of the New York
_Herald_.

[18] “Recent Naval Progress,” June, 1887.

[19] Lieutenant Colwell, U.S.N., in “Recent Naval Progress,” 1887.

[20] Lieutenant Chambers, U.S.N.

[21] “Our War Ships,” Cusack-Smith.

[22] It is called a belt in _Lloyd’s Universal Register_, but the
term is very likely to mislead.—E. J. R.

[23] It will be instructive to repeat here, before leaving this
question of partially armored ships, a comparison resembling that
which I employed in a paper read at the Royal United Service
Institution, in which are set down in one column the displacements of
certain British and French ships, eleven of each, built and building,
possessing maximum armor on the water-line of at least fifteen
inches. As all the French ships given have complete or all but
complete armor-belts, it is proper to reckon their whole displacement
tonnages as armored tonnage. But in the case of all the British ships
which carry such thick armor they are deprived of armor altogether
except amidships, and it is therefore misleading, and even absurd,
to reckon their whole displacement tonnages as armored tonnage. For
this reason I am obliged to give two tonnages for them, _viz._, the
armored and the unarmored, as I do below:

+-------------------------++----------------------------------------+
| FRENCH SHIPS. || BRITISH SHIPS. |
+----------------+--------++-------------+--------+--------+--------+
| |Armored.|| Unarmored.|Armored.| Total. |
+----------------+--------++-------------+--------+--------+--------+
| | Tons. || | Tons. | Tons. | Tons. |
| Amiral Baudin | 11,141 || Inflexible | 5,210 | 6,670 | 11,880 |
| Amiral Duperré | 10,486 || Ajax | 4,160 | 4,350 | 8,510 |
| Dévastation | 9,639 || Agamemnon | 4,160 | 4,350 | 8,510 |
| Formidable | 11,441 || Colossus | 4,580 | 4,570 | 9,150 |
| Courbet | 9,639 || Edinburgh | 4,580 | 4,570 | 9,150 |
| Hoche | 9,864 || Collingwood | 4,580 | 4,570 | 9,150 |
| Magenta | 9,864 || Rodney | 4,800 | 4,900 | 9,700 |
| Marceau | 9,864 || Home | 4,800 | 4,900 | 9,700 |
| Neptune | 9,864 || Camperdown | 4,900 | 5,100 | 10,000 |
| Caïman | 7,239 || Benbow | 4,900 | 5,100 | 10,000 |
| Indomptable | 7,184 || Anson | 4,900 | 5,100 | 10,000 |
+----------------+--------++-------------+--------+--------+--------+
| Total |106,225 || Total | 51,570 | 54,180 |105,750 |
+----------------+--------++-------------+--------+--------+--------+

I have not thought it necessary to alter these figures in repeating
this comparison, as they are sufficiently near the truth for the only
purpose for which I employ them, which is that of exhibiting the fact
that whereas the above eleven British iron-clads (so called) figure
in the official tables of the British government as constituting an
armored tonnage of 105,750 tons, nearly equal to that of the eleven
French ships, they really represent but little more than half that
amount of armored tonnage.—E. J. R.

[24] For the reason before stated, the _Brennus_ and _Charles Martel_
are omitted from this table.

[25] These powers and speeds are taken from _Lloyd’s Universal
Register_.

[26] Some returns say four of 28 tons, and four of 24 tons, all being
of 27 centimetres calibre. I have adopted these in Table A.

[27] See Notes, page 263.

[28] Lieutenant Chambers, U. S. Navy.

[29] Lieutenant Colwell, U. S. Navy.

[30] Lieutenant Shroeder, U. S. Navy.

[31] I adopt this figure from Lord Brassey, who adopts it from Mr.
King, but I am inclined to regard it as too small by about five feet,
for I observe that in giving the length as 107 feet they give the
breadth as 58 feet, whereas they give the breadth of the ship as 64¾
feet. I also observe that they both speak of an “armored citadel or
compartment 107 feet in length,” and the word “compartment” seems to
point to _inside_ dimensions, and although it seems odd to use these
in such a case, it is probable that that has been done. But as there
is considerable curvature in the transverse bulkheads, and as the
greatest inside length has presumably been given, it may still be
practically correct to regard the mean length of the battery as 107
feet. I regret that I have not the means at hand of making certain of
the precise length.—E. J. R.

[32] See Notes, page 136.

[33] _Lloyd’s Universal Register_ falls into a still more notable
error in respect to the speed of these vessels, for it assigns to the
best of them a speed of only seven and one-half knots, and to some
only five knots, whereas they are very much faster, as will presently
be shown in the text. But the mistake, grave as it is, seems to me
to have resulted only from a printer’s error, for the removal of a
vertical “lead” one column to the left would add ten knots to the
speeds of all these vessels, and make them correct.—E. J. R.

[34] See Notes, page 139.

[35] According to the _Universal Register_; but only two of nine
tons (besides smaller ones) according to Admiralty Return to
Parliament.—E. J. R.

[36] The _Grosser Kurfürst_ was run into off Folkestone by the _König
Wilhelm_, and foundered.—E. J. R.

[37] See Notes, page 145.

[38] _Lloyd’s Universal Register_ appears to me to be in error
concerning the speed of this and the next vessel. The _Carnet_ gives
their speed as fourteen knots, and the Admiralty Return puts it at
fifteen knots, which I believe to be the expected speed.—E. J. R.

[39] See Notes, page 145.

[40] See Notes, page 144.

[41] See Notes, page 144.

[42] Curiously enough, neither Lord Brassey, nor Mr. King (United
States Navy), nor Captain Von Kronenfels seems to have been aware
of the origin of this little ship’s design, for it is mentioned
by none of them, although all of them have been most ready to
do me, in common with others, full justice in such matters. Mr.
King, for example, speaking of a ship previously mentioned, says,
“The most powerful ship belonging to the Turkish navy is the
_Mesoodiyeh_, designed by Sir E. J. Reed, C.B., M.P., built by the
Thames Shipbuilding Company, delivered to the Sultan in 1876, and
now the flag-ship of the fleet.” He would doubtless have as readily
acknowledged the authorship of the _Feth-i-Bulend’s_ design, had he
been aware of it. As I was the Chief Constructor of the British Navy
when I designed for the Sultan of Turkey this ship and the _Fatikh_
(now the German _König Wilhelm_), I think it right to state that I
did so not only with the sanction but by the orders of the Admiralty,
and in pursuance of what was then the declared policy of England,
viz., that of giving Turkey the benefit of our good offices in
efforts to produce a powerful fleet. Beyond a complimentary present
of a jewelled snuffbox or two, I received no remuneration for my
services to Turkey, and sought none, and desired none.—E. J. R.

[43] See Notes, page 141.

[44] See Notes, page 142.

[45] “The Present Position of European Politics.”

[46] $43,425,000.

[47] Dilke.

[48] Lieut. Colwell, U.S.N., in “Recent Naval Progress.”

[49] See Notes for later ships.

[50] See Notes, page 227.

[51] See Notes, page 185.

[52] See Notes, p. 257.

[53] Complete.

[54] Building at South Boston and West Point.

[55] It is probable that the battery of the battle-ship will be two
6-inch, two 10-inch, and two 12-inch guns.

[56] Probably.

[57] From _Army and Navy Gazette_, February 27, 1886.

[58] Lieutenant Colwell, United States Navy.

[59] Naval Intelligence, General Information Series No. 5.

[60] “Recent Naval Progress.”

[61] From the General Information Series No. V., U. S. Naval
Intelligence Office.

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

Footnotes [13] and [14] have multiple anchors on page 47.
Footnote [25] has multiple anchors on page 76.
Footnotes [53], [54] and [56] have multiple anchors on page 228.

The illustrations on pages 90, 254 and 257 were vertical and have
been rotated to the horizontal.

Some illustrations have been moved several pages to be closer to
the related text.

The table on page 184 of the original book was very wide, and has
been split into 3 parts. The tables on pages 76, 84, 109, 146 and
221 have been split into 2 parts.

Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been
corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within
the text and consultation of external sources.

Some hyphens in words have been silently removed, some added,
when a predominant preference was found in the original book.

Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text,
and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.

Pg 49: ‘projecting sponsoons’ replaced by ‘projecting sponsons’.
Pg 57: ‘1-inch Nordenfelt’ replaced by ‘1-inch Nordenfeldt’.
Pg 76: ‘Furiex’ (in table) replaced by ‘Furieux’.
Pg 89: ‘nearly 600 tons’ replaced by ‘nearly 6000 tons’.
Pg 98: ‘slow burning power’ replaced by ‘slow burning powder’.
Pg 118: ‘Dmitry Donskoi’ (in table) replaced by ‘Dmitri Donsköi’.
Pg 118: ‘Admiral Kornilof’ replaced by ‘Admiral Korniloff’.
Pg 140: ‘_Rinda_’ replaced by ‘_Rynda_’.
Pg 180: ‘floating ing batteries’ replaced by ‘floating batteries’.
Pg 243: ‘Whitehead torpedes’ replaced by ‘Whitehead torpedoes’.

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