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Title: Corruption in American politics and life
Author: Robert Clarkson Brooks
Release date: December 5, 2023 [eBook #72328]
Language: English
Original publication: New York: Dodd, Mead and company, 1910
Credits: Bob Taylor, Turgut Dincer and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND LIFE ***
Transcriber’s Note
Italic text displayed as: _italic_
CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN
POLITICS AND LIFE
CORRUPTION _in_ AMERICAN
POLITICS AND LIFE
By
ROBERT C. BROOKS
Professor of Political Science in the University of Cincinnati
[Illustration: Decoration]
NEW YORK
DODD, MEAD AND COMPANY
1910
COPYRIGHT, 1910, BY
DODD, MEAD AND COMPANY
Published October, 1910
THE QUINN & BODEN CO. PRESS
RAHWAY, N. J.
TO
THE MEMORY OF
James Eugene Brooks
FATHER FRIEND
FIRST TEACHER OF CIVIC DUTY
PREFACE
Corruption is repulsive. It deserves the scorn and hatred which all
straightforward men feel for it and which nearly all writers on the
subject have expressed. Conviction of its vileness is the first step
toward better things. Yet there is more than a possibility that the
feeling of repugnance which corrupt practices inspire may interfere
with our clearness of vision, may cloud our conception of the work
before us, may even in some cases lead to misrepresentation—which is
misrepresentation still although designed to aid in virtue’s cause.
Fighting the devil with fire is evidence of a true militant spirit, yet
one may doubt the wisdom of meeting an adversary in that adversary’s
own element, of arming oneself for the battle with that adversary’s
favorite weapon. Whatever views are held regarding the tactics of
reform there must always be room for cool, systematic studies of social
evils. These need not be lacking in sympathy for the good cause any
more than the studies of the pathologist are devoid of sympathy for
the sufferers from the disease which he is investigating. Nor need
social studies conceived in the spirit of detachment, of objectivity,
be lacking in practical helpfulness. We recognise the immense utility
of the investigations of the pathologist although he works apart from
hospital wards with microscope and culture tubes. In an effort to
realise something of this spirit and purpose the following studies have
been conceived.
Of the several studies making up the present work the first and second
only have been published elsewhere. The writer desires to acknowledge
the courtesy of the _International Journal of Ethics_ in permitting the
reprint, without material alterations, of the “Apologies for Political
Corruption,” and of the _Political Science Quarterly_ for a similar
favour with regard to “The Nature of Political Corruption.” Objection
will perhaps be made to the precedence given the “Apologies” over “The
Nature of Political Corruption” in the present volume. Weak as it may
be in logic this arrangement would seem to be the better one in ethics;
hence the decision in its favour. Definition could wait, it was felt,
until every opportunity had been given to the apologists for corruption
to present their case.
The extent of the author’s obligations to the very rich but scattered
literature of the subject will appear partly from the references in
text and footnotes. For many criticisms and suggestions of value on
portions of the work falling within their fields of interest, cordial
acknowledgment is made to Dr. Albert C. Muhse of the Bureau of
Corporations, Washington; Mr. Burton Alva Konkle of the Historical
Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia; Professor John L. Lowes,
Washington University, St. Louis; Mr. Perry Belmont, Washington; Mr.
Frank Parker Stockbridge, of the _Times-Star_, Cincinnati; and finally
to Professor Frederick Charles Hicks, the writer’s friend and colleague
in the faculty of the University of Cincinnati. Credit must also be
given for many novel points of view developed in class room discussion
by students of Swarthmore College and the University of Cincinnati.
The members of the graduate seminar in political science at the latter
institution have been particularly helpful in this way. To one of them,
Mr. Nathan Tovio Isaacs, of Cincinnati, the author is indebted for a
most painstaking reading of the whole MS., on the basis of which many
valuable criticisms of major as well as minor importance were made.
To the members of the City Clubs of Philadelphia and Cincinnati, the
writer also returns most cordial thanks for the various pleasant
occasions which they afforded him of presenting his views in papers
read before these bodies. While there was some smoke and at times
a little heat in the resulting discussions, there were also many
flashes of inspiration emanating from the political experience
and the high unselfish ideals of the membership of the clubs. In
appropriating valuable suggestions from so many sources and with such
scant recognition, the writer trusts that his treatment of political
corruption may nevertheless escape the charge of literary corruption.
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI,
Cincinnati, Ohio,
April 1, 1910.
CONTENTS
I. APOLOGIES FOR POLITICAL CORRUPTION
PAGE
Introduction:—Corruption not defensible on the ground
of the strength and prevalence of temptation 3
Four main lines of apology 4
That corruption makes business good 4
Protection of vice 5
Corrupt concessions to legitimate business 10
That corruption may be more than compensated for
by the high efficiency otherwise of those who engage
in it 14
That corruption saves us from mob rule 17
That corruption is part of an evolutionary process the
ends of which are presumed to be so beneficent as
to more than atone for the existing evils attributable
to it 22
Conclusion: The probable future development of corruption
in politics, the failure of the apologies for
political corruption 37
II. THE NATURE OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION
Introduction, definition, etc. 41
Frequent use of the word corruption 41
Legal definitions contrasted with definitions from the
point of view of ethics, political science, etc. 42
Verbal difficulties 42
Levity in the use of the word 42
Metaphor implied by the word 43
Distinction between bribery and corruption; between
corruption and auto-corruption 45
Tentative definition of corruption 46
Analysis of the concept of corruption 46
Corruption not limited to politics. Exists in business,
church, schools, etc. 46
Intentional character of corruption. Distinguished
from inefficiency 48
Various degrees of clearness of political duties 51
Consequences of wide extension of political duties 52
Recognition of political duty 55
Legal and other standards 55
The radical view 57
Advantages sought by corrupt action 59
Various degrees and kinds of advantages 60
Rewards and threats 63
Degree of personal interest involved 65
Corruption for the benefit of party 71
Summary 74
III. CORRUPTION: A PERSISTENT PROBLEM
OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL LIFE
Extreme consequences of corruption 81
Less extreme consequences of corruption: recovery from
corrupt conditions 82
The continuing character of the problem of corruption 85
Disappearance of certain forms of corruption; changes
of form of corruption 88
Subsidies from foreign monarchs 89
Influence of royal mistresses 90
Lord Bacon’s case 90
Pepys and the acceptance of presents 93
Corruption and the administrative service appointments 95
Recent changes in the forms of municipal corruption 98
Limitation of corruption to certain branches or spheres
of government 100
In local government only, in central government only 100
Middle grade of Japanese officials 102
Limitation of corruption in amount 105
Contractual character of most corruption 106
Prudential considerations restraining corruptionists 107
Summary 109
IV. CORRUPTION IN THE PROFESSIONS,
JOURNALISM, AND THE HIGHER
EDUCATION
Forms of corruption not commonly recognised as such;
their significance 113
General classification of recognised forms of corruption 116
Defilement of the sources of public instruction 117
Difficulty of defining and regulating corruption in this
sphere 118
Professional codes of ethics 119
Corruption in journalism: an extreme view; limitations 121
Corruption in higher education 132
Growing influence of colleges and universities 133
Higher education and public opinion 134
Personal responsibility of the teacher 136
The struggle for endowments and resulting bad practices 137
The teaching of economic, political, and social doctrines
in colleges and universities 139
Summary 156
V. CORRUPTION IN BUSINESS AND
POLITICS
Corruption in business 161
Effect of consolidation in business 163
Effect of state regulation in transforming character of
business corruption 165
Necessity of further reform efforts 167
Classification of forms of political corruption 169
Political corruption resulting from state regulation of
business 171
New forms of state regulation; other means of
strengthening the position of government 174
The state as seller; difficulties and safeguards 179
Work of the Bureau of Municipal Research 184
Vice and crime in their relation to corrupt politics 186
Methods of repression 188
Tax dodging as a form of political corruption; _quasi_-justification
of the practice 192
Methods of overcoming tax dodging 195
Auto-corruption, and its effects upon party prestige 199
Corruption in relation to political control the basis of
all other forms of political corruption 201
Summary 208
VI. CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND
THE THEORY OF PARTY SUPPORT
Party functions in the United States 213
Neglect of the sources of party support 217
Campaign contributions as a part of the problem 220
Payment of campaign expenses by the state 221
Publicity of campaign contributions 229
State laws requiring publicity 229
Congressional publicity bill of 1908 230
Voluntary publicity in the presidential campaign of
1908; results 233
Publicity before or after election 236
Special information of candidates before election 239
Publicity as applied to political organisations other
than campaign committees 241
Prohibition or limitation of campaign contributions from
certain sources 244
Prohibition of corporate contributions 244
Partnerships, labour unions, clubs, etc. 247
Contributions by candidates 248
Contributions by civil service employees 256
Limiting the amount of individual contributions 258
Effect of smaller campaign funds on political affairs 259
Time limits of large contributions 262
Geographical limits upon the use of campaign funds 263
Effect of campaign fund reform on business interests
in their relation to government 264
Limitation of campaign gifts of services 267
Extension of campaign contribution reforms to state
and local elections 268
To primary and convention campaigns 270
Administration of the reform measures 271
Possibilities of campaign fund reform 273
VII. CORRUPTION AND NOTORIETY:
THE MEASURE OF OUR OFFENDING
Our damaged political reputation; how acquired 277
The garrulity of politicians, its explanation 278
Sensationalism of the press 281
Reform movements, to what extent are they evidence of
moral improvement 287
Special privilege in England and Germany 290
Significance of the American attitude toward special
privilege 291
Special privilege not always corrupt, but may come to
be considered such 292
American criticism of special privilege as corrupt not
proof of our inferiority to Europe in political
morality 294
Consequences of the wide diffusion of political power in
the United States 296
Conclusion: Corruption decreasing in the more progressive
countries of the world 299
APOLOGIES FOR POLITICAL CORRUPTION
I
APOLOGIES FOR POLITICAL CORRUPTION
Nearly all current contributions on the subject of political corruption
belong frankly to the literature of exposure and denunciation. The ends
pursued by social reformers are notoriously divergent and antagonistic,
but there is general agreement among them and, for that matter, among
Philistines as well, that corruption is wholly perverse and dangerous.
How then may one have the temerity to speak of apologies in the
premises?
Certainly not, as one writer has recently done, by presenting a
detailed and striking picture of the force with which the temptation
to corrupt action operates upon individuals exposed to its malevolent
influence. No doubt such studies are of great value in laying bare
to us the hidden springs of part of our political life, the great
resources, material and social, of those who are selfishly assailing
the honesty of government, and the difficulties in the way of those
who are sincerely struggling for better things. In the last analysis,
however, all this is nothing more than a species of explanation and
extenuation, which if slightly exaggerated may easily degenerate into
maudlin sympathy. That men’s votes or influence are cheap or dear,
that their political honour can be bought for $20 or $20,000—doubtless
these facts are significant as to the calibre of the men concerned
and the morals of the times, but they do not amount to an apology for
either.[1] If, however, it can be shown that in spite of the evil
involved political corruption nevertheless has certain resultants which
are advantageous, not simply to those who profit directly by crooked
devices, but to society in general, the use of the term would be
justified.
Four main lines of argument have been gathered from various sources
as constituting the principal, if not the entire equipment of the
_advocatus diaboli_ to this end. These are, first, that political
corruption makes business good; second, that it may be more than
compensated for by the high efficiency otherwise of those who engage in
it; third, that it saves us from mob rule; and fourth, that corruption
is part of an evolutionary process the ends of which are presumed to be
so beneficent as to more than outweigh existing evils.
I. Of these four arguments the first is most frequently presented. Few
of our reputable business men would assent to it if stated baldly,
or indeed in any form, but in certain lines of business the tacit
acceptance of this doctrine would seem to be implied by the political
attitude of those concerned. In slightly disguised form the same
consideration appeals to the whole electorate, as shown by the potency
of the “full dinner-pail” slogan, and the pause which is always given
to reforms demanded in the name of justice when commercial depression
occurs. But while we are often told that corruption makes business
good, we are seldom informed in just what ways this desirable result is
brought about. One quite astounding point occasionally brought up in
this connection is the favour with which a portion of the mercantile
community looks upon the illegal protection of vice and gambling. A
police force must sternly repress major crimes and violence. Certain
sections of the city must be kept free from offence. These things
understood, a “wide-open” town is held to have the advantage over
“slower” neighbouring places. A great city, we are told, is not a
kindergarten. Its population is composed both of the just and the
unjust, and this is equally true of the many who resort to it from the
surrounding country for purposes of pleasure or profit. The slow city
may still continue to hold and attract the better element which seeks
only legitimate business and recreation, but the wide-open town will
hold and attract both the better and the worse elements. Of course,
individuals of the latter class may be somewhat mulcted in dives and
gambling rooms, but they will still have considerable sums left to
spend in thoroughly respectable stores, and such patronage is not to be
sniffed at.[2]
Ordinarily this argument stops with the consideration of spending
alone. It may be strengthened somewhat by bringing in the reaction
of consumption upon production. A great city prides itself upon its
ceaseless rush and gaiety, its bright lights and crowded streets,
its numerous places of amusement and all the evidences of material
prosperity and pleasure. These may be held to be enhanced when both
licit and illicit pursuits and diversions are open to its people; and
further, the people themselves, under the attraction of such varied
allurements, may strive to produce more that they may enjoy more. In
the Philippines, it is said that the only labourers who can be relied
upon to stick to their work any considerable length of time are those
who have caught the gambling and cock-fighting mania. Under tropical
conditions a little intermittent labour easily supplies the few needs
of others, whereas the devotee of chance, driven by a consuming
passion, works steadily. In the present state of a fallen humanity
there are presumably many persons of similar character living under
our own higher civilisation.
Strong as is the hold which the foregoing considerations have obtained
upon certain limited sections of the business community it is not
difficult to criticise them upon purely economic grounds. Of two
neighbouring towns, one “wide-open” and the other law-abiding, the
former might, indeed, prove more successful in a business way. But
we have to consider not simply the material advantage in the case of
two rival cities. The material welfare of the state as a whole is of
greater importance, and it would be impossible to show that this was
enhanced by corruptly tolerating gambling and vice anywhere within
its territory. On the contrary, economists have abundantly shown the
harmful effects of such practices, even when no taint of illegality
attaches to them. What the “wide-open” community gains over its rival
is much more than offset by what the state as a whole loses. Moreover,
it may well be doubted whether the purely economic advantage of the
“wide-open” city is solid and permanent. Even those of its business men
who are engaged in legitimate pursuits are constant sufferers from the
general neglect of administrative duty, and sometimes even from the
extortionate practices, of its corrupt government. They may consider it
to their advantage to have gambling and vice tolerated, but only within
limits. If such abuses become too open and rampant legitimate business
is certain to suffer, both because of the losses and distractions
suffered by the worse element in the community and because of the fear
and avoidance which the prevalence of vicious conditions inspires in
the better classes. Indeed cases are by no means uncommon where the
better business element has risen in protest against lax and presumably
corrupt police methods which permitted vice to flaunt itself so boldly
on retail thoroughfares that respectable women became afraid to venture
upon them. There remain, of course, the expedients of confining illicit
practices to certain districts of the city, or of nicely restraining
them so that, while permitting indulgence to those who desire it, they
do not unduly offend the moral element in the community. But such
delicate adjustments are difficult to maintain, since vice and gambling
naturally seek to extend their field and their profits and, within
pretty generous limits, can readily afford to make it worth while for a
corrupt city administration to permit them to do so. And even if they
are kept satisfactorily within bounds, the state as a whole, if not
the particular community, must suffer from their pernicious economic
consequences.
It has been thought worth while to go at some length into the criticism
on purely economic grounds of the argument that corruption makes
business good; first, because the argument itself is primarily economic
in character, and secondly, because its tacit acceptance by certain
hard-headed business men might lead to the belief that its refutation
on material grounds was impossible. A broad view of the economic
welfare of the state as a whole and business in all its forms leads,
as we have seen, to the opposite conviction. And this conviction that
corruption does _not_ make business good in any solid and permanent way
is greatly strengthened when moral and political, as well as financial,
values are thrown into the scale. It is not necessary to recite in
detail the ethical argument against gambling and vice in order to
strengthen this point. The general duty of the state to protect the
lives and health and morals of its people, even at great financial
sacrifice if necessary, is beyond question. There is a possibility,
as Professor Goodnow maintains,[3] that in the United States we have
gone too far in attempting to suppress by police power things that are
simply vicious, as distinguished from crimes; but however this may
be, some regulation or repression of vice is always necessary. The
real point here is that, having once drawn the line, the bribery of
officials shall not be resorted to in order that vice may be permitted
to flourish in certain localities. In such cases the state suffers not
only from the effects of the vice but also from the disregard into
which the whole fabric of law falls because of the failure to enforce
it in part.
With regard to the particular plea that the life and animation and
pleasures of a wide-open town stimulate its citizens to greater
activity in producing wealth, it should be observed that this amounts
virtually to the advocacy of the purchase of a dubious economic
benefit at a high and certain moral cost. In the long run most, if
not all, the vicious practices which thus find a quasi-justification
directly cripple productive efficiency much more than they can possibly
stimulate it indirectly. “A short life and a merry one” may serve well
as a motto for a criminal career, but not as an economic maxim for a
community of sane people. It may be admitted that the world is not to
grow perfect in a day. Vice will persist, corruption will persist,
although doubtless in less noxious forms, and business will persist
with periods of greater or less prosperity under such conditions. It
would be arrant folly, however, to expect business to reach its highest
development with vice rampant under a corrupt police administration.
A policy of repression, firmly enforced, will be best in the long run
both for morals and for business. But even if honesty and prosperity
were incompatible, it would still be true that it is a higher duty of
the state to make men good than to make them rich. Ordinarily, however,
both ends may be pursued at the same time and without conflict.
Up to this point the discussion of the argument that corruption makes
business good has been confined to the forms of corruption under which
vice is illegally tolerated. A dishonest government, however, is also
frequently appealed to by businesses perfectly legitimate in their
general character for concessions of one sort or another, ranging
from the privilege to obstruct sidewalks by show windows up to the
granting of public service franchises worth millions of dollars. With
an open-handed distribution of such favours business is thought to
flourish. Of course, all these concessions must be paid for, but only
part of the money goes into the public purse, the rest falling into the
hands of boodlers, contractors, and politicians. As the latter could
not establish the most perfect title to the rights and franchises they
sell they are often inclined to fix prices much below real values.
Hence a chance for extraordinary profits to those less scrupulous
business men who know the political ropes. A still more important
feature of such a situation is that almost anything can be bought. In
the lingo of those who are willing to engage in corrupt transactions,
business men know “where they are at”; the politicians are men with
whom “they can do business.” With reformers in power “favours” are
not to be expected. Moreover reformers differ widely among themselves
with regard to the proper method of dealing with public franchises and
privileges of various sorts. Under “good government” these concessions
may not be attainable at all, or, if so, only at such excessive
prices and under such onerous conditions designed to safeguard the
public interest, that the margin of profit left is extremely small. No
wonder that contributions are made by certain kinds of business men to
political organisations which the contributors well know to be corrupt,
and refused by the same men to reform parties. The argument is, of
course, that if the rascals win it is a good stroke of policy to secure
their favour in advance, whereas if the reform party wins everybody
will be treated alike anyway.
From a business point of view that considers immediate profits and
nothing more, this reasoning is of great significance. Several
deductions must be made from it, however, before the final balance is
struck. It sometimes happens that corrupt organisations fix a regular
tariff for privileges of all sorts. So long as the rates are low
business appears to boom. But with the wide distribution of privileges
the purchasers may lose any monopoly advantage which they enjoyed when
the number of concessions was limited. Worse still, a corrupt gang that
feels firmly entrenched in power is apt to develop a pretty fair sense
of values itself, and to raise the rates for concessions to figures
that prove well-nigh prohibitive. The very willingness of business
interests to pay and keep quiet encourages the politicians to increase
their demands and to devise new methods of levying tribute. In the end
the gang may determine to assume the profits in certain lines by the
formation of inside contracting rings which make all competition from
the outside futile. Of course, while this process is going on the worst
and most unscrupulous competitors in the businesses affected by it have
a decided advantage over their fellows. Business men who complain of
railroad rebates should certainly be able to recognise the destructive
character of corrupt and unfair political conditions of the kind
described above. Even those who most profit by alliance with the gang
are apt to repent it in the end. They may have succeeded in securing
all the favours which they need, and yet stand in constant terror of
blackmail and strike legislation by their former political confederates
or of exposure by reformers. Finally, although they may be so fortunate
as to escape indictment for particular misdeeds, the general belief
that a business has been corruptly managed is likely to bring about
a demand for legislation affecting its conduct which, temporarily at
least, may reduce its profits and the value of its securities very
materially. The agitation for municipal ownership is a case in point.
Quite apart from the logical weight of the arguments advanced in
support of this policy, there can be no doubt that many people favour
it largely because of the corrupt methods believed, although in most
cases not legally proved, to have been practised by public service
corporations.
II. The second argument to be considered is that corruption may be
more than compensated for by the high efficiency otherwise of those
who engage in it. Such a plea may be offered either for an individual
or for an organisation, such as the machine. Many historical cases
could be cited of statesmanlike ability of a high order and undoubted
honesty on great issues coupled with a shrewd eye for the main chance
whenever minor opportunities presented themselves. Even for men who
are currently credited with having possessed a much larger share of
guile than of ability, admiration is sometimes expressed. There are
those who think that New York owes a statue to Tweed, and Pennsylvania
already has a statue of Quay—if not a place for the statue.[4] The same
manner of thinking prevails in other fields than politics, especially
whenever graft can be made to appear as a sort of tribute levied upon
a supposedly hostile social class. For example, a labour leader who
extorted checks from employers by threatening and even calling strikes
was defended by many of his followers on the ground that he had shown
wonderful ability in organising the union and securing higher wage
scales.[5]
The question is sometimes raised as to whether or not some purely
personal moral obliquity should be held against a candidate for
office whose qualifications otherwise are unimpeachable. A practical
answer would, of course, depend largely upon the kind of evil charged
against the man and the probability that it would interfere with
the performance of his public duties. Even an extremist upon such
an issue would have to admit that certain statesmen who have given
most distinguished service to their countries have been, for example,
intemperate in the use of liquor or unfaithful in the marriage
relation. If in such cases we excuse and forget, why not also excuse
and forget corrupt transactions that have been more than repaid by
general brilliant conduct of affairs of state? No answer to this
second question, however, can avoid the distinction that while certain
kinds of personal immorality may affect the value of a man’s public
service to an infinitesimal degree only, corruption in any part of his
political career strikes directly at whatever efficiency he may possess
as a public servant. In the former case his sins are in a different
category from his virtues, whereas in the latter case they belong to
the same category. Moreover a corrupt record even on a minor point
in a man’s official career is apt to prove a great stumblingblock
forever after. Usually designing persons can more readily employ their
knowledge of it to force him to the commission of further and worse
corrupt actions than they could hope to do had his earlier offences
been of the same degree but of a purely personal character.
There is, of course, no quantitative measure whereby we can reckon
exactly the efficiency and honesty of men, and, striking a joint
average, definitely appraise their value for a given position in the
service of the state. If there were such a measure assuredly it would
seldom, if ever, register both perfect efficiency and perfect honesty.
The work of government, like that of all social institutions, must be
performed by relatively weak and incapable human instruments. At best
we can only seek to secure the greatest attainable honesty and the
greatest attainable efficiency. There may be cases where a degree of
the latter amounting to positive genius may offset a serious defect
in the former. Distinguished ability, however, ought to be relatively
free from moral weakness. Men of more than average capacity, to say
nothing of genius, should find it less necessary than others to stoop
to equivocal practices in order to succeed. If no higher motives
swayed such men, then at least an intelligent appreciation on their
part of the risks they ran in pursuing crooked courses would serve
as sufficient deterrent. It is your stupid and incapable official
ordinarily who, because of moral insensibility or in order to keep
pace with his abler fellows, is most easily tempted to employ shifty
devices. The weakness of the second apology for corruption is thus
apparent. Normally corruption and efficiency are not found together.
On the contrary honesty and efficiency are common yokemates. A public
sentiment which weakly excuses corruption on the ground of alleged
efficiency will be deceived much more often than a public sentiment
which insists upon the highest attainable standard of both.
III. The third apology for corruption is that it saves us from
mob rule. In Professor Ford’s felicitous phrase the appearance
of corruption “instead of being the betrayal of democracy may be
the diplomatic treatment of ochlocracy, restraining its dangerous
tendencies and minimising its mischiefs.”[6] According to this view
the machine, dominated by the boss or gang, is the defender of society
itself against the attacks of our internal barbarians. Tammany Hall
had the brazen effrontery to assume this attitude during the New York
mayoralty campaign of 1886, when it nominated Mr. Hewitt in opposition
to Henry George. “Yet it would be difficult to name a time in recent
years when frauds so glaring and so tremendous in the aggregate have
been employed in behalf of any candidate as were committed in behalf of
Mr. Hewitt in 1886.”[7] Society would seem to be in desperate straits,
indeed, if it needed such defenders and such methods of defence. In
favour of their employment it is sometimes said that our propertied
and educated classes have grown away from the great democratic
mass. Of themselves they would be quite incapable of protecting the
goods, material and ideal, which are intrusted to them. The corrupt
machine, seeking its own interest, it is true, nevertheless performs
the invaluable social service of keeping the restless proletariat in
subjection. In order to obtain the votes of ignorant and venal citizens
the unscrupulous political leader is obliged to perform innumerable
petty services for them, as, for example, securing jobs, both in the
public service and outside, supplying or obtaining charitable relief in
times of need, speaking a friendly word to the police magistrate after
a neighbourhood brawl, providing recreation in the form of tickets
to chowder excursions during the summer and to “pleasure club” balls
during the winter. Bread and circuses being thus supplied, our higher
civilisation is presumably secure. If the corrupt machine did not
perform these services, it is assumed by some timorous persons that the
mob would break forth, gut our shops, rob our tills, burn, and kill in
unrestrained fury.
If catastrophes so great and terrible were actually impending the
situation would seem not only to justify our present corrupt rulers,
but might also be held sufficiently grave to induce us to establish
new bosses and gangs, giving them license to graft to their heart’s
content, provided only that they continue their beneficent mission of
saving civilisation. Dictatorship would be cheap at the price. The
whole argument, however, rests primarily upon a shockingly unjust
view of the real character of our proletariat class. Even if this
very indefinite term be interpreted to mean only the poorest and most
ignorant of our people, whether of native American or of foreign
stock, the view that they need to be constantly cajoled by the corrupt
politician in order to prevent them from resorting to the violent
seizure of the property of others is a grotesque misconception. In
the great majority of cases such persons desire nothing more than the
opportunity to earn an honest and frugal living in peace. We must
admit, of course, that lynching and labour riots occur with appalling
frequency in the United States. No one should attempt to minimise the
danger and disgrace of such outbreaks. Let us not, on the other hand,
fall into the gross error of regarding them as deliberate revolutionary
attacks upon the existing social order.
With such circumstances confronting us, what shall be said of the
alleged utility of the corrupt machine as prime defender of social
peace? If we should conclude to recognise the gang frankly in this
capacity any materials for the formation of revolutionary mobs that we
may possess would certainly be encouraged to increase the demands made
as the price of continued quiet, and even to furnish a few sample riots
from time to time as a means of enforcing their demands. In reality,
however, corrupt political machines care very little for social
welfare. The very essence of corruption is self-interest regardless of
public interest. Familiarity with the favours bestowed by politicians
is hardly the best means of encouraging quiescence among poor and
ignorant recipients. It may become the first step toward idleness and
crime. But besides the distribution of favours the corrupt politician
has many other means of procuring power. Hired thugs, and sometimes
members of the regular police force, are employed to drive honest
voters from the polls, and every manner of tricky device is resorted
to in order to deceive them in casting their ballots or to falsify the
election returns. Do such things allay social discontent? Even the rank
favouritism shown by the corrupt organisation to its servile adherents
must make enemies of those who feel themselves slighted. Few forms of
political evil are more dangerous than the fear sometimes displayed
by mayors or governors that the vigorous employment of the police to
suppress rioting may cost them votes when they come up for re-election.
And there are many other consequences of corrupt rule which indirectly
but none the less surely inflame the sufferers against the injustice of
the existing order: insufficient and inferior school accommodations,
the absence of parks and other means of rational recreation, dirty
streets, impure water supply, neglect of housing reforms, poor and
high-priced public utility services and so on. All things considered,
the corrupt machine is the sorriest saviour of society imaginable.
Assuming, finally, for the sake of argument, that there is real danger
of class war in the near future, the best defence would obviously lie
in strong police, militia, and army forces. The life of the state
itself would require the destruction of every vestige of corruption
in these branches of its service at least. If the danger of class war
were real but not imminent a thoroughgoing policy directed to the
establishment of social justice and the elimination of public abuses
would be imperative. Among other things, better education, sanitation,
poor relief, and public services, would have to be supplied, and to
get these we would have to get rid of the corrupt machine as far as
possible. Under either assumption, therefore, the state threatened
with social disturbance would find safety not in corruption but in
honesty and efficiency. However, in exposing the hollowness of the
pretence that society needs to be saved by crooked means, we should not
fall into the error of assuming that the corrupt politician alone is
responsible for all our social ills. We who not only tolerate his works
but who tolerate many other abuses with which he has no connection
whatever, should remember our own responsibility for the improvement
and continued stability of society. It is the custom to castigate
the rich in this connection, but the indifference, snobbishness, and
narrowness of large sections of our middle classes are also very
gravely at fault.[8]
IV. The fourth apology offered for corruption is that it is part of
an evolutionary process, the ends of which are presumed to be so
beneficent as to more than atone for existing evils attributable to it.
Complaint might justly be made that this is a highly general statement,
but its formulation in the broad terms used above seems necessary
in order to include the various details of the argument. A similar
sweeping defence might be set up for any conceivable abuse or evil—for
tyranny as well as for corruption, for immorality or for crime. In all
such cases, however, it would be necessary to prove—although it seems
quite impossible to do so—that the ultimate beneficent end would more
than repay the evil involved; and further, that no better way existed
of attaining the promised goal. It must be freely conceded that we know
little or nothing of the remote ends of the evolutionary process as
it exhibits itself in society. Repulsive as are many of its details,
there seem to be sufficient grounds for believing in wonderful ultimate
achievement. An apology for contemporary corruption based on such
considerations may therefore be worthy of attention, provided, however,
that it does not attempt to bind us to a purely _laissez faire_
attitude in the presence of admitted and immediate political evils.
From the latter point of view political corruption may be regarded as a
symptom, bad in itself but valuable because it indicates the need, and
in some degree the method, of cure. Like pain in the physical economy
it is one of the danger signals of the social economy. Thus, as we
have seen, the neglect of proper facilities for education, sanitation,
poor relief and so on, particularly in our large cities, is both a
resultant in part of corruption and a cause of further corruption.
By providing better facilities along these lines we may, therefore,
hope ultimately to improve the whole tone of our citizenship and the
life of the state. A still more concrete illustration is supplied by
Professor Goodnow’s masterly discussion of the boss in his “Politics
and Administration.”[9] According to his view certain defects in
our governmental organisation, notably the decentralisation and
irresponsibility of much of our administrative machinery, the futile
attempt to secure by popular vote the election of a large number of
efficient administrative officials and the lack of a close relationship
between legislation and administration, all combine to produce a
situation which only a strong party organisation dominated by a boss
can keep from degenerating into chaos. From this aspect it might be
maintained that the evil political practices commonly associated
with the boss are only incidental and in part excusable after all.
Fundamentally he exists because of defects in the organisation of
our government, and his activities go far to correct these defects.
Even accepting this argument fully, however, some choice in bosses
as Professor Goodnow points out,[10] would still be left open to
the electorate. By the progressive overthrow of the worse and the
selection of better aspirants for political power the boss may evolve
into the leader, who will retain many of the great functions of his
predecessor but will exercise them in a responsible manner and free
from corruption. The practical significance of Professor Goodnow’s
argument, however, lies far less in the explanation it gives of the
temporary ascendency of the boss and the system which he presides over
than in the conviction it enforces of the necessity of certain reforms
in the organisation of our government that will bring its functions
into harmony with each other, and ultimately, it is hoped, make corrupt
and irresponsible bosses Impossible.[11] In no proper sense of the
word, however, can this line of argument be considered an apology for
corruption such as is usually alleged to be associated with bossism. It
makes clear only that the power of the boss, under present conditions,
has its uses as well as its abuses. But these uses do not justify
the abuses. On the contrary the corruption associated with the great
powers of the boss is a menace so great as to make necessary the most
far-reaching reforms.
Whether we are soon to get rid of the boss or not we are therefore
bound to fight against any corruption that may develop as a result of
his rule. Our present system is manifestly unstable in the long run.
Individual bosses seldom retain power any great number of years. The
position of the boss may remain, but “spasms” of reform usually succeed
at least in introducing a new incumbent who brings with him new methods
and new groups of favourites. The net result is far from guaranteeing
that certainty and stability which both business and public interests
demand. Even assuming that in some way security against popular
upheaval could be conferred upon the boss, other difficulties would
still have to be met. The large financial interests, which need the
favours of government or seek release from its burdens, sometimes go
to war among themselves, and in these contests control of the powers
of the boss gives valuable strategic advantages. Hence many ambitious
aspirants among the principal heads of the gang, each awaiting a
possible palace insurrection. It is conceivable, however, that a boss
might secure himself both against factional and popular disturbances,
and at the same time be supported by consolidated business interests
powerful beyond the possibility of successful attack by other financial
groups. With further growth of corporations and the adoption of the
community of interest policy among them, the latter condition might
indeed be pretty thoroughly established. In this case we would have
a boss as impregnable as the conception allows. True he would still
operate through democratic forms, but this pseudo-democracy of his
would be nothing more than a mask for oligarchy. The system might
conceivably work out into a highly efficient and stable government.
Both the boss and the financial interests behind him might prudently
decide to content themselves with small percentages of profit, and
otherwise insist on solid merit in both the men and the materials they
employed. The disturbances due to popular uprisings on the part of an
untrammeled voting mass would be reduced to a vanishing minimum.
In this successful combination, however, the oligarchy and not the boss
would be the dominating factor. Indeed even under existing conditions
the title of boss is a singularly inappropriate one in most instances.
Unless the bearer is possessed of financial ability of a high order
himself he must remain a lieutenant rather than a leader. Usually he
does not possess this ability. Nor is the reason hard to perceive. The
boss is, and probably will continue to be, a specialist in one line
only, namely, political manipulation; and in his extremely exposed
position this work is quite sufficient in detail and variety to absorb
all the time and talents even of an extraordinarily gifted person.
Under the financial oligarchy, therefore, the boss will probably be
nothing more than an agent, a departmental head charged with the duty
of securing the necessary majority of the popular vote at all elections
and of retaining control of office holders. From this point of view the
absurdity of the conception of the boss as the saviour of democracy is
again apparent. At bottom his function is to secure power through his
knowledge and subtle bribery of the people and to sell or lease this
power to financial interests which recoup themselves out of the pockets
of the people. Instead of being the saviour of democracy the net effect
of his work, little perhaps as he realises it, is the selling out of
democracy to oligarchy.
There is, however, not the remotest possibility that the hypothetical
process sketched above will be carried to completion. If it were
it could not long survive. Oligarchies are notoriously unstable
compounds. No matter how secure they may make themselves from internal
dissension, their very power and success provoke to attack from the
outside. In the case we have assumed the weak point lies in the
unavoidable necessity of securing a majority of the popular vote from
time to time. Ultimately the oligarchy would have to become strong
enough to disregard this necessity; that is, to throw off the mask
of democracy by abolishing popular elections. Long before this point
could be reached, however, the ruling clique would probably find itself
attacked by organisations of great voting power which would demand a
share of the spoils of sovereignty for themselves. Reduce all politics
to a mere calculation of profit and even those voters who now sell
themselves for a few dollars or a few petty political favours would
come to realise that they held their ballots at too low a figure. They
would see political privileges based on their venal compliance or
connivance become the foundation stones of large fortunes. They would
further realise that the capital value of such privileges was based
largely upon the profits extracted from their own pockets a penny at
a time and many times over by the high prices charged them for public
utility services. Under conditions approaching frank oligarchy, with
a political philosophy justifying such conditions, and with class
consciousness bred of them, it would seem inevitable that powerful
organisations, particularly of labourers or other industrial classes,
would be formed for the purpose of wresting valuable privileges from
the government. Instead of the low individual forms of corruption now
prevailing we would have other forms, higher because tinged with a
group character, but still corrupt because narrow interests would be
advanced to the detriment of the interests of the state as a whole.
Confronted with such difficulties the corrupt machine would no more
prevail to save oligarchy than it is now prevailing to save democracy.
Fortunately every sign of the times points against the development
of oligarchy, and such a struggle between it and strong class
organisations as has been suggested. The great mass of our people,
fully two-thirds of the entire voting population according to Professor
Commons’ estimate,[12] stands outside the sphere of such a conflict.
This powerful neutral influence may be depended upon to establish a
rude sort of fair play and to suppress any overweening attempt to make
the machinery of the state subservient to narrow interests. Moreover
public sentiment as expressed by both the great political parties is
setting strongly against special privilege. It was once an easy matter
for politicians to approve such a sentiment outwardly, while continuing
to deal with it practically merely as a glittering generality quite
devoid of any real significance. That decidedly equivocal manner of
meeting the situation will no longer serve, however. Regulation of
railroads, trusts, and insurance companies, tariff reform, reforms
of our governmental organisations, particularly state and municipal,
primary and ballot reforms, all these have passed into the arena
of practical politics and are dealt with as living issues by both
political parties. Mistakes will be made in all these lines, the
process of reform will be slow, but that we are on the right road,
and that in the end the grosser forms of corruption that disgrace and
disgust the present era will be eliminated there can be no doubt.
A very significant evolutionary argument on the subject of corruption
has been advanced by Professor Henry J. Ford,[13] and may finally be
taken up at this point, although it might also have been considered in
connection with the third apology. In Professor Ford’s opinion:
“Just as mediæval feudalism was a powerful agency in binding together
the masses of the people into the organic union from which the modern
state was evolved, so, too, our party feudalism performs a valuable
office by the way it establishes connections of interest among the
masses of the people. To view the case as a whole, we should contrast
the marked European tendency toward disintegration of government
through strife of classes and nationalities with the strong tendency
shown in this country toward national integration of all elements of
the population. Our despised politicians are probably to be credited
with what we call the wonderful assimilating capacity of American
institutions.”
That the contrast drawn by Mr. Ford between government in Europe and
the United States is true and enormously in our favour there can be
no doubt. Of course, historical conditions would have retarded or
prevented any similar unifying development in Europe, even if that
continent had been privileged to enjoy the ministrations of all the
most talented party workers of America. And in the United States
frontier conditions, the public school, the church, the labour union,
the press, and our democratic political creed — for none of which
the ordinary politician is directly to be credited—have all worked
effectively toward the establishment of “connections of interest among
the masses of the people.” But the fact remains that the party worker
has played his part, and that it was a very important part indeed in
the process. Of course, his motives were largely selfish—personal or
party success; and his methods not of the cleanest—direct purchase of
votes, petty favours, minor offices for leading representatives of the
class or nationality whose votes were desired and so on. At any rate
the party worker met the immigrant with open arms, while too many of
our educated and propertied people sneered at or ignored him. Let us
suppose that the latter attitude had prevailed, and that the despised
foreigner had been kept from the polls either by legal means or by
other repressive measures. In defence of such procedure it could have
been argued that the purity of American institutions was at stake.
The slogan “America for Americans,” once so potent in our politics,
might have prevailed universally. At the same time our Know-nothing
rulers and people might have asserted that they were protecting and
cherishing with paternal unselfishness the best interests of the
foreign population which, manifestly, was unfit for the exercise of
political rights on its own behalf. Clearly by following this policy
some of the political evils which have been attributed so frequently to
the foreign vote could have been prevented. If immigrants were freely
permitted to come to America while all this was going on we should,
however, have had in time to reckon with a large class of unfranchised
labourers who could hardly have failed to look upon native Americans as
poor professors of democracy, or possibly even as oppressors against
whom insurrection was fully justified. Immigrants would not have become
citizens, America would not have shown the assimilative capacity which
is the wonder and despair of Europe.
Things were not so ordered. Immigrants were permitted to come in
staggering numbers, and once in the country were admitted to the
ballot with a light-hearted ease that seemed sheer insanity to
many observers. The corrupt politician improved the opportunity and
marshalled them to the polls in droves, often to the loudly expressed
disgust of the native born. Every method of coercion, deceit, and
corruption, was employed to keep the foreigner in the ranks. But this
policy was foredoomed to failure from the start. In his native country
the immigrant was either ignored or else kicked and cuffed about by
those in authority; imagine his surprise at being courted for his
political influence in the land of his adoption. The few dollars or few
petty favours at first offered him for his vote may have been a very
despicable method of acquainting him with the value of his political
rights, but the lesson had the merit at least of being adapted to every
grade of intelligence, including the lowest. Good government tracts on
the duties of citizenship would hardly have proved so effective. On
the whole it would be hard to imagine a worse school for citizenship,
and the only wonder is that in the end it has turned out so many good
citizens. A large part of the foreign vote has learned to repudiate the
leadership of designing native politicians. It has developed leaders
and aims of its own. Many of these leaders are doubtless quite as
purely selfish as the former American leaders, and many of the aims
pursued are not so high as they should be, but the political capacity
to reach higher things is there; and that, after all, is the main
consideration.[14] It would be easy to find fault on much the same
grounds with the political ideals and leaders of those parts of the
country which have been little if at all affected by immigration.
Believers in the ultimate good resulting from a questionable
evolutionary process might point in support of their faith to the
foregoing interpretation of the effects of our corrupt politics upon
the immigrant. Others will doubtless find it much too roseate. What
of those immigrants, they will ask, who were already fitted for the
proper performance of the duties of American citizenship? Doubtless
the number of such was large, particularly among our earlier accessions
from western Europe. Many of this better class of immigrants must have
been debauched by contact with corrupt influences, and even those who
rose superior to such conditions must have found it an uphill fight.
Even if instances can be cited where foreign masses subject to the
worst political management have nevertheless developed independence and
organisations of their own, it is seriously to be questioned whether
this development will continue. The new flood of immigration from
southern and eastern Europe may progressively deteriorate, or remain
a stumblingblock for a long time to come. There are some communities
of native white stock in the United States where the buying of votes
has continued through two or three generations, growing worse rather
than better, until at the present time it seems to have become a
fixed institution. In the opinion of many people a large part of the
negro vote is not only corrupt but incorrigibly so. Altogether the
facts are very far from warranting a reliance upon unaided evolution
to work out the problem of electoral corruption. Even granting that
the results already secured in this way are extremely favourable, it
is probable that much better results might have been secured had the
native American stock from the start lived up to the best ideals of
republican citizenship. The immigrant might, for example, have been met
and aided by institutions working unselfishly for his welfare, such as
the church, the school, or the social settlement, rather than by the
lowest grade of party politicians working largely for their own private
advantage. Doubtless this will sound like a counsel of perfection.
So it certainly is as regards the past, but none the less it would
seem our clear duty to take every care to educate properly for future
citizenship not only such foreigners as we shall continue to admit, but
also those of our own people who are exposed to corrupt influences.
To sum up the four lines of apology offered for political corruption,
it may be noted that only two of them are so commonly entertained at
the present time as to have any large practical significance. These
are the first and second, namely, that corruption makes business good,
and that it may be more than compensated for by the high efficiency
of those who engage in it. The two remaining arguments, dealing
respectively with the danger of mob rule and the possibly beneficent
effects of further evolution, are extremely interesting; but for the
present, at least, they belong largely to the realm of political
theory. No one is so simple as to imagine that such forms of corruption
as affect our political life owe their existence to any public benefit,
near or remote, which by any stretch of the imagination may be
attributed to them. Primarily they exist because they are immediately
profitable to certain persons who are unscrupulous enough to engage
in sinister and underhanded methods of manipulation. Philosophical
excuses are not thought out until later, when the magnitude and the
profitableness of the malpractices involved suggest the possibility
of an apparently dignified and worthy defence. Not one of the four
apologies we have considered stands the test of analysis. The social
advantages alleged to flow from political corruption are either
illusory or minimal. On the other hand the resultant evils are great
and real, although, no doubt, they have often been exaggerated by
sensational writers. Whether corruption be approached from the latter
side, as is commonly done, or from the side of its apologists, the
social necessity of working for its limitation is manifest.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] “An Apology for Graft,” by Lincoln Steffens, _American Magazine_,
vol. lxvi (1908), p. 120.
[2] The argument is at least as old as Plato. In the “Laws” it is put
as follows: “Acquisitions which come from sources which are just and
unjust indifferently are more than double those which come from just
sources only.” With the true Greek contempt for business, however,
the Philosopher finds it an easy matter to dispose of this specious
contention. _Cf._ the “Laws,” bk. v, p. 125, tr. by B. Jowett, vol. v,
3d ed.
[3] “City Government in the United States,” ch. ix, p. 228.
[4] According to a newspaper report of October 16, 1909, the statue was
finally placed in its niche in the $13,000,000 Capitol at Harrisburg.
[5] This argument is presented in a very striking way in Mr. Hutchins
Hapgood’s “The Spirit of Labour,” pp. 114, 260, 345, 369.
[6] _Political Science Quarterly_, vol. xix (1904), p. 678.
[7] “The History of Tammany Hall,” by Gustavus Myers, p. 323.
[8] On this point _cf._ Mary E. Richmond’s extremely thoughtful and
sympathetic study of “The Good Neighbour in the Modern City.”
[9] Particularly chs. viii and ix.
[10] _Ibid._, p. 195.
[11] A discussion of these reforms in detail is given in ch. ix of
Professor Goodnow’s book.
[12] See his extremely able article entitled “Is Class Conflict in
America Growing and Is It Inevitable?” in the _American Journal of
Sociology_, vol. xiii (1908), p. 756.
[13] _Political Science Quarterly_, vol. xix (1904), p. 673.
[14] In his extremely interesting work on “The Anthracite Coal
Communities,” Mr. Peter Roberts takes a rather dark view of the
political morals of the coal counties of Pennsylvania (pp. 316-42,
355-58), but it is easy to recognise in his pages the emergence of
political independence and higher forms of corruption which indicate
better things for the future. “In the year 1897,” he writes, “the
courts of Lackawanna, Luzerne, and Schuylkill, drafted a new set of
rules to regulate the process of naturalising aliens, making it more
difficult and expensive.—[The cost alone was increased from $2.00 to
from $12.00 to $15.00, and applicants were compelled to engage the
services of an attorney.]—The Sclav in this matter, as in all others
which affect his material interests, moves in a practical manner that
commends his business tact and condemns his political ethics. The
applicants organise into political clubs, and prepare themselves for
the examination. When they are ready they wait for the time of election
until some aspirant for political honours comes round. A bargain is
then made; if he secures them their naturalisation papers the club
will vote for him. In this way a large number are pushed through,
previous to the elections, at little expense to themselves.—The first
lesson taught these men in the exercise of the franchise is that it is
property having market value, which they sell to the highest bidder.”
(pp. 44-45.)
“There are many brilliant young men rising among them [the Sclavs] who
cherish political ambition, and they successfully lead their fellow
countrymen to acquire the rights of citizenship in order to enhance
their prospects and power in both municipal and county politics. They
are gradually appropriating more and more of the spoils of office
in municipalities and their power in county elections is annually
increasing.”
“These people have both physical and intellectual qualities which will
enrich the blood and brain of the nation, but the political ethics
in vogue in our state are far from possessing a character likely to
strengthen and elevate the moral nature of the Sclav. His leaders teach
him cunning and give him samples of fraud and sharp practice which he
is quick to copy. Venality is the common sin of our electors and the
Sclav has been corrupted in the very inception of his political life in
his adopted country.” (pp. 47-48.)
THE NATURE OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION
II
THE NATURE OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION
In the whole vocabulary of politics it would be difficult to point
out any single term that is more frequently employed than the word
“corruption.” Party orators and writers, journalists, “muck rakers,”
and reformers all use it with the utmost freedom, and it occurs not
uncommonly in the less ephemeral pages of political philosophers and
historians. Transactions and conditions of very different kinds are
stigmatised in this way, in many cases doubtless with entire justice;
but apparently there is little disposition to inquire into the
essential nature of corruption itself and to discriminate in the use of
the word.
Detailed definitions of corrupt practices and bribery are, of course,
to be found in every highly developed legal code, but these are
scarcely broad enough to cover the whole concept as seen from the
viewpoint of political science or ethics. The sanctions of positive law
are applied only to those more flagrant practices which past experience
has shown to be so pernicious that sentiment has crystallised into
statutory prohibitions and adverse judicial decisions. Even within
this comparatively limited circle clearness and precision are but
imperfectly attained. Popular disgust is frequently expressed at the
ineptitude of the law’s definitions and the deviousness of the law’s
procedure, as a result of which prosecutions of notoriously delinquent
officials, politicians, and contractors so often and so ignominiously
fail in the courts. If once we step outside the circle of legality,
however, we find extremely confused, conflicting, and even unfair
states of moral opinion regarding corruption. Public anger at some
exposed villainy of this sort is apt to be both blind and exacting.
Reform movements directed against corrupt abuses are no more free than
are regular political organisations from partisan misrepresentation
and partisan passion. With all their faults, however, it is largely
from such forces and movements that we must expect not only higher
standards of public morality, but also a clearer and more comprehensive
legislative and judicial treatment of corrupt practices in the future.
For this reason it would seem to be desirable, if possible, to
formulate some fairly definite concept of corruption, broader than the
purely legal view of the subject and applicable in a general way to the
protean forms which evil of this sort assumes in practice.
Certain verbal difficulties must first be cleared away. Chief among
these, perhaps, is the extreme levity with which the word is bandied
about. One word, indeed, is not sufficient, and a number of slang
equivalents and other variants must needs be pressed into service:
graft, boodle, rake-off, booty, loot, spoils, and so on. With all
due recognition of recent achievements in the way of gathering and
presenting evidence, it is lamentably apparent that charges of
corruption are still very frequently brought forward, by party men and
reformers alike, on slight grounds or no grounds at all, and also that
in many of these cases no intention exists of pushing either accusation
or defence to a point where a thorough threshing-out of the matter at
issue is possible. In “practical politics” insinuations of the blackest
character are made jestingly, and they are ignored or passed off with
a shrug or a smile, provided only that they be not of too pointed
or too personal a character. Very serious evils may follow reckless
mudslinging of this sort. Even if the charges are looked upon as the
natural and harmless exuberances of our current political warfare,
their constant repetition tends to blur the whole popular conception
of corruption. Insensibly the conviction gains ground that practices
which are asserted to be so common can scarcely be wholly bad, since
public life goes on without apparent change and private prosperity
seems unaffected. If, on the other hand, the current accusations
of corruption are to be taken at anything like their face value,
it becomes difficult to avoid the pessimism that sees nothing but
rottenness in our social arrangements and despairs of all constructive
reform with present materials.
A second verbal point that demands attention is the metaphorical
character of the word corruption. Even when it is distinctly qualified
as political or business or social corruption, the suggestion is subtly
conveyed of organic corruption and of everything vile and repugnant to
the physical senses which the latter implies. It need not be charged
that such implications are purposely cultivated: indeed they are so
obvious and common that their use by this time has become a matter of
habit. Witness in current writing the frequent juxtaposition of the
word corruption, used with reference to social phenomena, with such
words as slime, filth, sewage, stench, tainted, rottenness, gangrene,
pollution, and the frequent comparison of those who are supposed to
profit by such corruption to vultures, hyenas, jackals, and so on.
Side by side with the levity already criticised we accordingly find a
usage which, however exaggerated and rhetorical it may be, appears to
indicate a strong popular feeling against what are deemed to be corrupt
practices.
Escape from such confusion can hardly come from the accepted formulas
of the dictionaries. Their descriptions or periphrases of corruption
are in general much too broad for use in exact discussion. Bribery,
indeed, is defined with sufficient sharpness by the _Century
Dictionary_ as
“a gift or gratuity bestowed for the purpose of influencing the
action or conduct of the receiver; especially money or any valuable
consideration given or promised for the betrayal of a trust or the
corrupt performance of an allotted duty, as to a fiduciary agent, a
judge, legislator or other public officer, a witness, a voter, _etc._”
Corruption, however, is by no means synonymous with bribery. The latter
is narrower, more direct, less subtle. There can be no bribe-taker
without a bribe-giver, but corruption can and frequently does exist
even when there are no personal tempters or guilty confederates. A
legislator may be approached by a person interested in a certain
corporation and may be promised a definite reward for his favourable
vote on a measure clearly harmful to the public interest but calculated
to benefit the corporation concerned. If the bargain be consummated
it is unquestionably a case of bribery, and the action involved is
also corrupt. But, if current reports are to be believed, it sometimes
happens that legislators, acting wholly on their own initiative and
regardless of their duty to the state, vote favourably or unfavourably
on pending bills, endeavouring at the same time to profit financially
by their action, or by their knowledge of the resultant action of the
body to which they belong, by speculation in the open market. In the
latter instance they have not been approached by a personal tempter,
and the brokers whom they employ to buy or sell may be ignorant of
the motives or even of the identity of their patrons. Clearly this is
not bribery, but equally clearly it is corrupt. The distinction is
perhaps sufficiently important to justify the coinage of the term
“auto-corruption” to cover cases of the latter sort.[15] Corruption
in the widest sense of the term would then include both bribery and
auto-corruption, and may be defined as _the intentional misperformance
or neglect of a recognised duty, or the unwarranted exercise of
power,_[16] _with the motive of gaining some advantage more or less
directly personal_.
It will be observed that none of the terms of the foregoing definition
necessarily confines corruption to the field of politics. This is
intentional. Corruption is quite as possible elsewhere as in the state.
That it has so frequently been discussed as peculiarly political is by
no means proof that government is subject to it in a greater degree
than other social organisations. One might rather conclude that the
earlier discovery and more vigorous denunciation of corruption as a
political evil showed greater purgative virtue in the state than in
other spheres of human activity. For surely the day is gone by when
the clamour of reformers was all for a “business administration” of
public affairs. Since that era business has had to look sharply to
its own morals—in insurance, in public utilities, in railroads, in
corporate finance, and elsewhere. Revelations in these fields have
made it plain that much of the impetus to wrong-doing in the political
sphere comes originally from business interests. This is not to be
taken as in any sense exculpating the public officials concerned; it
simply indicates the guilt of the business man as _particeps criminis_
with the politician. Moreover business can and does suffer from forms
of corruption which are peculiar to itself and which in no way involve
political turpitude. Such offences range all the way from the sale by
a clerk of business secrets to a rival concern, and the receipt of
presents or gratuitous entertainment from wholesalers by the buyers for
retail firms, up to the juggling of financial reports by directors,
the mismanagement of physical property by insiders who wish to buy out
small stockholders, and the investment of insurance or other trust
funds to the private advantage of managerial officers.
Besides business and politics, other spheres of social activity are
subject to corrupt influences. Indeed wherever and whenever there is
duty to be shirked or improperly performed for motives of more or less
immediate advantage evil of this sort may enter in. This is the case
with the church, the family, with educational associations, clubs, and
so on throughout the whole list of social organisations. To ingratiate
himself with wealthy or influential parishioners, for example, a
minister may suppress convictions which his duty to God and religion
requires him to express. A large proportion of the cases of divorce,
marital infidelity, and childless unions, reflect the operation of
corrupt influences upon our family life. In the struggle for endowments
and bequests colleges and universities have at times forgotten some of
their high ideals. If corrupt motives play a smaller part in the social
organisations just mentioned than in politics or business it is perhaps
not so much due to the finer fibre of churchmen, professors, and the
like, as to the subjection of the more grossly gainful to other motives
in clerical, educational, and similar circles.
While the possibility of corruption is thus seen to be extremely
broad, our present concern is chiefly with political corruption. To
adjust the definition hazarded above to cover the latter case alone
it is necessary only to qualify the word “duty” by the phrase “to the
state.” Further discussion of the various terms of the definition, thus
amended, would seem advisable.
* * * * *
I. To begin with, corruption is _intentional_. The political duty
involved is perceived, but it is neglected or misperformed for reasons
narrower than those which the state intends. Failure to meet a
recognised duty is not necessarily corrupt; it may be due to simple
inefficiency. The corrupt official must know the better and choose the
worse; the inefficient official does not know any better. In either
case the external circumstances may appear to be closely similar,
and the immediate results may be equally harmful. No doubt what is
often denounced in the United States as corruption is mere official
stupidity, particularly in those spheres of administration still filled
by amateurs and dominated by the “rotation of office” theory. Thus a
purchasing official unfamiliar with his duties may prove the source of
large profits to unscrupulous dealers. So far as the official himself
is concerned no private advantage may be sought or gained, but the
public interest suffers just the same. In another case the official
understands the situation thoroughly and takes advantage of it by
compelling the dealers to divide with him the amount by which the
government is being defrauded, or he may go into business with the aid
of office boys or relatives and sell to himself as purchasing agent.
The latter are clear cases of bribery and auto-corruption respectively,
but so far as immediate results are concerned the state is no worse off
than with the official who was merely ignorant or careless. To one not
in full possession of the underlying facts all three cases may appear
very similar.
Successful corruption, however, tends to become insatiable, and in the
long run the state may suffer far more from it and from the spread of
the bad moral example which it involves than it can easily suffer from
simple inefficiency. On the other hand inefficiency also may spread by
imitation, although perhaps more slowly, since it is not immediately
profitable, until the whole service of government is weakened. Moreover
inefficiency may develop by a very natural process into thoroughgoing
corruption. If not too stupid, the incapable official may come to see
the advantages which others are deriving from his incapacity and may
endeavour to participate in them. Because of his failure to obtain
promotion so rapidly as his more efficient fellow-servants, he may
be peculiarly liable to the temptation to get on by crooked courses.
Practically, therefore, inefficiency and corruption are apt to be
very closely connected—a fact which civil service reformers have long
recognised. It would also seem that the two are very closely connected
in their essential nature, and only a very qualified assent can be
given to the doctrine that inefficiency, as commonly understood, is
morally blameless. To be so considered the incapable person must be
entirely unaware of his inability to measure up to the full requirement
of duty. In any other event he is consciously and intentionally
ministering to a personal interest, be it love of ease or desire to
retain an income which he does not earn, to the neglect of the public
duties with which he is intrusted. Now, according to the definition
presented above, this attitude is unquestionably corrupt. It is,
however, so common on the part of both officeholders and citizens that
its corruptness is seldom recognised.
* * * * *
II. Political _duty_ must exist or there is no possibility of being
corruptly unfaithful to it. This statement may seem a truism, but the
logical consequences to be drawn from it are of major importance.
Among other things it follows that the more widely political duties
are diffused the more widespread are the possibilities of corruption.
A government which does not rest upon popular suffrage may be a very
bad sort of government in many ways, but it will not suffer from
vote-buying. To carry this thought out fully let us assume an absolute
despotism in which the arbitrary will of the ruler is the sole source
of power.[17] In such a case it is manifestly impossible to speak of
corruption. By hypothesis the despot owes no duty to the state or to
his subjects. Philosophers who defend absolute government naturally
lay great stress on the monarch’s duty to God, but this argument may
be read out of court on the basis of Mencius’s dictum that Heaven is
merely a silent partner in the state. The case is not materially
altered when responsibility under natural law is insisted upon instead
of to the Deity. Now since an absolute despot is bound to no tangible
duty, he cannot be corrupt in any way. If in the conduct of his
government he takes account of nothing but the grossest of his physical
lusts he is nevertheless not unfaithful to the principles on which that
government rests. Viewed from a higher conception of the state his rule
may be unspeakably bad, but the accusation of corruption does not and
cannot hold against it.
Conversely corruption necessarily finds its richest field in highly
organised political communities which have developed most fully the
idea of duty and which have intrusted its performance to the largest
number of officials and citizens. The modern movement toward democracy
and responsible government, beneficent as its results in general have
been, has unquestionably opened up greater opportunities for evil
of this sort than were ever dreamed of in the ancient and mediæval
world. Economic evolution has co-operated with political evolution
in the process. There is a direct and well-recognised relationship
between popular institutions and the growth of wealth. It is no
mere coincidence that those countries which have the most liberal
governments are also to-day the richest countries of the world. With
their growth in wealth, particularly where wealth is distributed very
unequally, materialistic views of life have gained ground rapidly. Thus
while the liberal development in politics has opened up wide new areas
to the possibility of corruption, the corresponding development in the
economic world has strengthened the forces of temptation.
Viewed in this light it must be admitted that our representative
democracy with its great international obligations, its increasing
range of governmental functions, its enormous and unequally distributed
wealth and its intense materialism, is peculiarly subject to corrupt
influence. This does not necessarily mean that the republic is destined
to be overwhelmed by selfishness. It does mean, however, that we
cannot rest secure upon the moral achievements of our ancestors and
the institutions which they have transmitted to us. We must develop a
more robust virtue, capable of resisting the greater pressure that is
brought to bear upon it.
But even if it be conceded that there is a greater measure of
successful temptation among us than in the European nations which twit
us with corruption as our national vice, it does not follow that we
are inferior in political morality to these, our self-appointed moral
censors. Reverting to the illustration of vote-buying, it is evident
that we could stop this particular form of corruption at once by
the simple and obvious, although practically impossible, measure of
abolishing popular suffrage. Assuming, for the sake of the argument,
that this could be accomplished, we might readily find ourselves
burdened with greater political evils than venal voting—for instance,
the development of an arrogant oligarchy and the growth either of
a sodden indifferentism or of a violent revolutionary spirit among
the masses. A large percentage of Prussian citizens of the poorer
classes sullenly refrain from voting, nor are they in the habit of
selling their votes. Presumably some of them would be venal if they
had the opportunity, but the plutocratic three-class election system
makes their political influence so minimal that their ballots are not
worth either the casting or the buying. Neither do Prussian municipal
officials engage in boodling, but the ascription of superior virtue to
them on this account must be tempered by a knowledge of the fact that
the local government of the country is kept closely in leading strings
by the state. Paradoxical as it may seem, it is none the less true
that political corruption implies the existence of political virtue;
it implies trust in the performance of duty, widespread obligation
to perform it, and confidence that in the great majority of cases it
will be performed in spite of the derelictions that such conditions
occasionally entail. If monarchies are less corrupt than democracies,
it is also true that monarchies do not repose so much faith in the
fundamental honesty of their citizens as do democracies. At least they
do not put it to such severe political tests.
* * * * *
III. In attempting to define corruption, emphasis was laid upon the
condition that the duty misperformed or neglected for personal reasons
must be _recognised_. The latter word needs further elucidation.
Political duties are defined at great length, of course, in
constitutions, laws, and charters. Yet with all our care in providing
laws to govern our governors it cannot be maintained that political
duty is always so clear as to be easily recognisable. It may indeed be
the case that we have at times clouded the situation by the very number
and complexity of our legislative acts. Able lawyers frequently differ,
for instance, in their views regarding the powers and limitations
affecting the action of a mayor under a city charter in a given
case. Again, the amount of work required of limited bodies of men is
sometimes so great that its full performance is physically impossible,
even if we assume perfect comprehension and perfect efficiency on their
part. Thus our municipal police forces, it is often asserted, are quite
insufficient to execute all the laws and ordinances which it is their
duty to enforce. The discretion which they must therefore exercise
is an extremely dangerous one, and the continuance of its exercise,
suggesting the possibility of suppressing this or that law for personal
reasons, is very apt to be provocative of corrupt manipulation.
Apart from the difficulty of clearly perceiving duty, owing to the
number and complexity of our legal requirements, certain degrees
of difficulty, varying with the nature of the political service
required, deserve consideration. A public official whose work is purely
administrative and ministerial would supposedly have a relatively clear
path before him. Deflection from it should be easily recognisable
and punishable. Thus the making of inspections or the granting of
permits by authorised officials would seem to be too open for corrupt
influences to tamper with. Yet even here the complexities and volume
of the business presented and the material interests involved lead to
many dishonest practices, as shown in the granting of liquor licenses
and building permits, the inspection of life-saving devices, and so
on. Judicial authorities have statutes and precedents to guide them,
but every new case presents peculiar circumstances which may furnish
opportunity or concealment for a sinister deflection. When we come to
superior executive officers who are intrusted with large discretionary
powers, and to legislators whose main function is the determination of
policy, it is evident that the path of duty is frequently indefinite.
To officials so situated personal advantages may offer themselves on
both sides of a given question. Amid so complicated a play of motives
as must assail these authorities, it becomes at times a matter of
almost infinite difficulty to distinguish and disentangle those more or
less remotely personal and venal and to give proper weight to those
only that make for the welfare of the state.
In discussing the question of the clearness with which duty presents
itself we have thus far assumed that relatively exact positive norms
are available. The question is greatly complicated, however, by the
reflection that we must deal not only with the law but also with the
prophets. What of those who, like the socialists, dream of a future
state to which they owe allegiance rather than to the present state? Or
of those whose elevation to power, as not infrequently happens under
representative government, is due to a certain class in the community,
the ideals of which they feel bound to support, be they levelling or
aristocratic? Assuming that officials or voters of this kind seek no
personal advantage whatever, the accusation of corruption would not
hold against them, although those injured by their action would most
certainly make such charges.
On the other hand advanced reformers do not hesitate to charge with
corruption many existing social institutions of apparent solidity.
Periods of confusion in constitutional arrangements, as Professor H.
J. Ford has pointed out,[18] are apt to be corrupt, or at least filled
with charges of corruption. Doubtless the same observation would hold
true for periods of class feeling or moral unsettlement, which, after
all, are only the precursors of constitutional reform. At times when
all kinds of conflicting views of duty are current, it is of course
easy for different individuals and classes to form extremely divergent
views of the morality or immorality of given acts or institutions.
Thus, among us, property of various sorts and property in general,
government in certain forms or in all forms, marriage, the church,
medicine, and law, and those who represent them, are all denounced by
small or large groups as graft and grafters. And indeed one need not
be a thoroughgoing radical to observe that in some instances narrow
and selfish interests have crept into these institutions, warped their
highest ideals and crippled their efficiency. There seems to be little
justification, however, for the employment of the word corruption in
such sweeping fashion. Those who so employ it cannot pretend that any
general consensus of moral opinion supports their usage. No doubt many
propositions for social change which are now considered extremely
radical will gradually gain converts and will ultimately be enacted
into law; but not all reforms can appeal unerringly to the future for
justification. Institutions hotly assailed in times past have not
infrequently outlived their detractors and developed new possibilities
of social utility. The formation of modern nationality itself wore
the appearance of corruption to many contemporary observers. With
all due respect for unfledged reforms, we may fitly remind their
advocates that the force of a hard and stinging word like corruption
is materially weakened by employing it in senses familiar only to the
members of a small circle. Such reckless usage is similar to that of
the party politicians criticised above, and it is similarly adapted to
produce either a callous levity or a sour distrust of social integrity
which in the end must react unfavourably upon every constructive effort
for social betterment.
* * * * *
IV. The motive of a corrupt act must be _some advantage more or less
directly personal_. The grosser the nature of the advantage sought
and the more directly selfish the purpose, the worse from the moral
point of view is the transaction. Thus in the case of venal voters or
boodling aldermen we have direct transfers of money or its equivalent,
to be employed later, it may be, solely to the advantage of the men who
sell themselves. Or still more reprehensible, high police officials or
even mayors of cities may be in receipt of sums which they know were
paid originally by criminals or prostitutes for license to disobey the
law. Perhaps we are too prone to think of all political corruption as
consisting essentially of such gross cases and sordid transactions.
In one way it is unfortunate that this is not the case, for, if it
were, the task of defining and uprooting the evil by law would be
comparatively easy. As a matter of fact we have to deal with every
possible _nuance_ of corruption, shading off from the most palpably
illegal and immoral acts to apparently harmless transactions that are
of everyday occurrence even in circles that would hotly deny the least
imputation of wrong-doing.
Let us consider first the various gradations of corrupt action with
reference to the advantages offered and sought. There are crassly
venal persons, of course, whose itching palms are held open to receive
cash bribes, but after all these are the small and stupid minority
of the army of corruptionists. Many who would scorn a direct bribe
are, however, quite willing to accept considerations more tactfully
offered but almost as purely material in character—shares of stock,
railroad passes, salaried positions, _etc_. In pointing out the
distinction between bribery and corruption, the large possibilities of
“auto-corruption” have been touched upon. The absence of a personal
tempter seems very often to veil the real nature of a corrupt act, and
contemporary usage completes the illusion of innocence. Tax-dodging is
a case in point. Here the citizen is seeking, not a bribe, of course,
but merely to cut down as far as possible an inevitable deduction from
his income. He may depend upon his political influence, his friendship
with assessors, his contributions to campaign funds, or upon the
misrepresentation of facts in obtaining the reduction, but he would
refuse indignantly to offer a cash bribe to secure action which he
knew would be disadvantageous to the government. He might refuse with
equal heat to accept a cash bribe to secure his continued allegiance to
a party or his continued support of particular politicians. It hardly
occurs to him that in a sense he is bribing himself with a part of
his own income. Of course this case leaves open the question of the
justice of the tax and of the failure of the state to provide suitable
technical safeguards to prevent evasion. Unjust or ill-constructed tax
laws do not, indeed, justify corrupt action on the part of individuals,
but they do transfer part of the moral guilt to the state. Other
instances of veiled corruption readily suggest themselves—the intrigues
of banks to secure the deposit of public funds, the devices employed
to escape tenement-house, sanitary, or life-saving inspections, the
appropriation by officials of government supplies or services as
“perquisites” of office, and so on.[19]
Besides material inducements almost every object of human desire
may tempt to corrupt action. Social position, personal reputation,
office, power, the favour of women, the gratification of revenge—all
these have been artfully adapted by corruptionists to bear with
the greatest weight upon the tempted individual. Far more often,
however, temptations of this kind originate within. They are the more
dangerous because they prevail with men of much higher type than
venal voters or boodling aldermen. But it will be objected that these
are not necessarily objects of corrupt desire; that on the contrary
they are currently recognised as part of the necessary driving power
of political and other human activities, and praised as such by
contemporaries and historians alike. The point is well taken in so far
as it is maintained that such rewards are not necessarily sought by
corrupt means. So far as that is concerned, the money which a corrupt
legislator accepts is not bad in itself, nor need it be put by him to
other than very creditable uses. The major evil lies in the deflection
from duty which the money bought, in the resultant deterioration of
character and in the contagion of bad example. Precisely the same thing
may be said of the so-called higher objects of desire to gain which men
sell their political honour. This distinction goes far toward disposing
of the objection that such motives are not corrupt because they are
currently recognised as necessary and beneficial in political life. So
far as their effect is the reinforcement of the influences which make
for the performance of public duty there is no reason why they should
not be regarded as good. To regard them in the same way when they have
a directly contrary moral effect is a pernicious perversion of a true
idea.
Nevertheless the fact must be faced that the public conscience is
often deceived on this point; and that as a consequence practices
are tolerated which will not bear the most cursory moral inspection.
Sometimes these practices become so common that all consciousness of
wrong-doing is lost. On this ground it might be maintained with reason
that they are not corrupt according to the conventional morality of the
time. It is this condition of affairs which makes the subtler aspects
of corruption so much more dangerous and so much less easy to cope with
than common bribery. Yet even here the outlook is hopeful. Corruption
in its more insidious forms is not the vice of low intellects. Hence in
many cases education of the public conscience will either suffice to
banish these forms of evil or may be depended upon to find the legal
means of destroying them. Our own recent experience with the abolition
of railroad passes is a case in point, although passes can hardly be
considered an extremely subtle means of corruption.
Corruptionists usually offer rewards of one kind or another to those
whom they wish to make their tools. What if the same end is compassed
by means of threats or injuries? Obviously the latter may be far more
potent in a given case than the most alluring promises. Sometimes
the two are employed together, enormous bribes being offered for
compliance, and political, social, or financial ruin threatened for
recalcitrance. Coercion of the latter sort may be used either to
procure corrupt action or to check honest action. It is related of
Governor Folk that shortly after he embarked upon his relentless
prosecution of the St. Louis boodlers, the latter combined and employed
detectives to delve into every act of his life from the time of his
boyhood in Tennessee up to his election as Circuit Attorney. Absolutely
nothing was developed that could be used against him. The incident is
suggestive, however, of what may have happened in the case of other
men who desired to be honest politically but were handicapped by the
fear of some forgotten scandal, perhaps of a purely personal character,
in their past lives. Thus the strength of the moral condemnation
visited by our society upon offences of a certain sort may become the
most potent weapon in the hands of an unscrupulous boss or clique.
The question remains whether the neglect or misperformance of duty
procured by threats or injuries comes properly under the definition of
corruption. The case is similar to admitted corruption in that both
involve the idea of personal advantage. Morally, however, it would
seem more reprehensible to seek or accept something desirable as the
price of disregarding public duty than to disregard it under the threat
of deprivation of some advantage already secured by honest effort.
In the latter case the individual who is coerced may deserve some
sympathy, but the individual who uses coercion adds a very ugly form
of blackmail to the general guilt of his act. Whatever answer be given
to the question of definition raised above, it is worth noting that
in speaking of corresponding virtues a distinction is made. Honesty in
politics is insisted upon, but so also is courage. “It is, of course,
not enough,” writes President Roosevelt, “that a public official should
be honest. No amount of honesty will avail if he is not also brave....
The weakling and the coward cannot be saved by honesty alone.”[20] To
this it might be added that under existing conditions courage in the
sense of power to attack or withstand, must be coupled with an almost
perfectly clean record in every way to be available as a political
asset of any value in the fight against corruption.
* * * * *
V. Just as the advantages sought by corrupt action may shade off from
the more to the less material, so also the _personal interest_ involved
is susceptible of numerous gradations from egoism to altruism. It may
be entirely selfish, as in the case of a bribe credited directly to
the bank account of the bribe-taker. It may be extended to include
the welfare of relatives—a form of corruption so common as to have
acquired a name of its own. It may be broader still, appearing as
favouritism to friends. Finally, it may be so extended that the
individual interest is merged in the interest of certain groups, such
as the party, the church, the labour union, the secret society, and so
on. The state is by no means the only sufferer by this process, any
more than it is the only social group afflicted by corrupt practices.
An official sentimentally mindful of the needs of Mother Church may
cheerfully consent to burden the public treasury with a large part of
the cost of maintaining an orphan asylum mismanaged by ecclesiastical
officials. Political influence may be brought to bear upon Rome to
secure the creation of a new American cardinal acceptable to certain
influential classes in this country. Desire to placate the labour vote
has paralysed the employment of the police power by governors or mayors
to put down violence during strikes. And labour leaders, seduced by
promises of office, have consented to misrepresent and betray their
followers. Complementary illustrations of this sort might be cited
indefinitely.
It is not maintained that the larger part of the interrelations of
social groups is tinged with corruption. Directly the contrary is more
nearly true. Thus the interests of the state and of the family are so
largely coincident that the latter is frequently spoken of as the unit
of the former. Nevertheless family interests may be cultivated very
greatly to the detriment of political life. Many flagrant examples of
nepotism and the all too prevalent neglect of the duties of citizenship
to cultivate those of the family circle are cases in point. It is no
mere coincidence that one of the most soddenly corrupt municipalities
in the United States is peculiarly distinguished as the “City of
Homes.” Again, a business man may be vastly more efficient as citizen
or public official because of his experience in business, but, on the
other hand, he may make use of this experience to plunder the state, or
he may allow himself to become so thoroughly engrossed in money-making
that others plunder it with impunity. Knowledge gained by social
intercourse with parents may enable the teacher to perform his work
with far greater discrimination as to the individual peculiarities and
needs of the children under his tuition, but it may also tempt him to
gross favouritism and toadyism.
In discussing cases of corrupt action procured by inducements not
directly material in character it was pointed out that current moral
opinion does not clearly recognise the evil involved. Similarly it
may be indicated that many of the less somber _nuances_ of corruption
resulting from the selfish interrelations of social groups hardly
deserve condemnation, because they are not commonly recognised as
deflections from duty. This may be conceded so far as the present
conditions of morals is concerned; but under any sharper analysis than
is currently employed the element of corruption contained in such
actions is manifest. The difficulty of the situation is enhanced by
the fact that it is extremely hard to separate and define duty and
self-interest in many of the relations of social and individual life.
Nevertheless the effort must be made. We must distinguish and define
economic interest, family interest, public interest. We have for our
guidance the great general principle: “Render to Cæsar the things that
are Cæsar’s, and to God the things that are God’s.” It is no valid plea
in avoidance that it is hard to distinguish the things that are Cæsar’s
and the things that are God’s. Rather would it seem to be enjoined upon
a robust morality incessantly to search the heart regarding all the
details that arise in following the commandment.
The most perplexing questions that arise in this interrogation of duty
spring from the conflict between fundamental and general moral ideas
and the customs of various social groups. It is considered entirely
allowable and laudable, for instance, that a father should encourage
his son to succeed him in business, even if the business be not his
but that of a corporation in which he is simply an official. Many of
the means employed to this end—education, travel, apprenticeship,
and so on—are beyond reproach. Others involve gross favouritism and
disregard of the merits of employees not connected with the family.
The most noteworthy point involved in this illustration is that a
procedure which passes without question in business and family circles
is recognised as reprehensible in politics. From this discrepance in
social judgments it follows, however, that the man who has made a
success in politics may find it very difficult to see anything but
the far-fetched morality of the “unco-guid” in the proposition that
he may not provide places in the public service for his relatives and
dependents, just as the man who has been successful as a merchant or
manufacturer is in the habit of doing in his store or factory.
It would be possible to point out many similar divergences between
the fatherly and motherly indulgence of family life, the charity,
long-suffering, and forgiveness of Christian faith, the easy tolerance
of social life on the one hand, and, on the other, the ideal of
justice, cold and impassive, which we associate with the state. In
her admirable discussion of “Friendship and Politics,”[21] Mrs.
Simkhovitch has given us what is, on the whole, a very sympathetic
picture of the poor man who would scorn to sell his vote outright but
who delivers it blindly to the “big hearted” ward leader, whose kindly
interest and protection he so constantly needs to secure work and avoid
oppression. It is hardly fair to characterise his attitude in slightly
ironic phrase as dominated by the principle of the “sacredness of the
job.” Hard, continuous labour and the support of a family under such
conditions are virtues of no small proportions. In large part, as Mrs.
Simkhovitch has pointed out, devotion to the ward leader may be much
less the expression of selfishness than of the traditional loyalty
of a race, class, or neighbourhood. Such loyalty, within limits, must
also be accounted a virtue. Finally, in attempting to judge the case,
we must inquire into the opportunities which voters of this sort have
had for acquiring high ideals of civic conduct. Are the best attainable
results secured by our systems of education, poor relief, correction,
and taxation? Need nothing further be done to prevent child labour, to
furnish better housing conditions and to safeguard the public health?
If we concede the necessity of social reform in these or any other
directions, we impliedly recognise either the failure of society to
live up to its own ideals or the necessity of new and higher ideals of
social conduct. And this recognition involves the assumption of part
of the moral guilt of existing corruption by society itself. Mr. G.
W. Alger has noted the current dissatisfaction with the ideal of pure
cold justice.[22] He also insists, correctly enough, that justice is
the rock upon which alone generosity can safely build. The two ideals
should not, however, be dealt with as fundamentally incompatible. Not
since the time when Thomas Aquinas first recognised the caritative
function of the state has such a view been tenable. More and more
the state has endeavoured in modern times to live up to this duty of
protecting the poor and weak. Its fuller realisation will mean the
disappearance of many of the existing causes of corruption.
One aspect of corruption for motives not entirely personal must be
dealt with separately, both because of the moral casuistry involved
and because of its practical importance. This is the acceptance and
use for party purposes of money paid to bosses or other leaders for
the corrupt use of their political power. While the personal interest
of the politician as a member of the party organisation is usually
involved to some extent in such transactions, the purely selfish
element may be extremely attenuated. Thus Floquet, accused of having
accepted money for his favourable vote as member of the French Chamber
of Deputies on the Panama canal scheme, defended himself on the ground
that every _centime_ of the sum paid him had been used for the benefit,
not of himself, but of the party to which he belonged.[23] Thurlow
Weed is alleged to have used his political control of the New York
state legislature in 1860 to secure the granting of several franchises
for street railways in New York city to a gang of lobbyists, and to
have spent the four to six hundred thousand dollars of “campaign
contributions” obtained in this manner to back the candidacy of Seward
for the presidential nomination at the Chicago convention of the
Republican party. In such cases not a cent of the corruption fund may
stick to the hand of the party chief receiving it. Indeed it is not
inconceivable that his devotion to party ends or to a party leader
might induce him to pursue a corrupt course of conduct even though he
foresaw his own ruin, politically or otherwise, as the certain result
of his action.
Cases of the foregoing sort force us to a recognition of the fact that
when political passion has reached its climax, as at the end of a hard
fought campaign involving great principles, all considerations besides
party success are apt to sink into nothingness. Properly considered,
of course, the party organisation is a social institution subordinate
to the state, but it differs materially in one way from other social
groups of the same rank, such as business associations, the church,
the family, _etc_. The latter accept their subordination more or
less passively, but the party avowedly seeks to gain control of the
government. Of course it professes its intention to conduct public
business honestly and for the benefit of the whole people, but fine
distinctions such as these are apt, in the heat of the conflict, to be
lost sight of by practical politicians. Not unnaturally they identify
the interests of the state with the interests of their party, and the
acceptance of dishonest money, with the possible danger which such an
act involves, may easily seem to them a patriotic duty rather than a
heinous offence. In all their corrupt bargaining they are conscious
of a certain devotion to ideal ends. They may sell franchises, but
they would refuse to betray a candidate. They may allow a local gang
whose support is essential to loot a city government, but they would
not abandon a fundamental party principle. On the contrary they would
defend their conduct as designed to secure the triumph of a great right
by the commission of a small wrong.
This argument is perhaps the most subtle that can be offered, and
the form of corruption for which it finds a quasi-justification is
assuredly the most dangerous with which we are confronted to-day. It
will be observed, however, that the foregoing illustrations involve a
higher range of motives than can be ascribed to our ordinary political
bosses. Doubtless there have been exceptional cases of party leaders
who, for minor but corrupt governmental favours, have accepted money
and turned every cent of it into the party treasury for honest
propaganda work. But once admit this conduct to be justifiable and
the day of such leaders will soon be over. Inevitably they must be
succeeded by less scrupulous politicians who will sell public property
and betray public interests right and left, and, after deducting large
sums to feather their own nests, still be in a position to contribute
to the support of the party more largely than any conscientious leader.
Under these conditions the political influence of wealthy corporations
or wealthy men will be limited solely by the amount of money they are
willing to spend. No matter with what reservations and good intentions
such practices are entered upon, they will mean in the end nothing
more and nothing less than that government is on hire or on sale
to the highest bidders. There is no easier road by which democracy
may pass over into plutocracy; and it is indeed fortunate that the
American people in its recent attitude toward the question of campaign
contributions has begun to show an adequate realisation of the danger
confronting it.
* * * * *
To sum up the argument presented in the foregoing pages, it should be
noted that while it is comparatively easy to formulate a definition
of corruption, to point out the difference between the legal and
ethical conceptions of the matter, to distinguish between bribery and
auto-corruption and, in general, to mark out the logical boundaries
of the field, the application of these definitions and distinctions
is made immensely difficult by the variety of political institutions,
the divergence of political practices and the conflict between general
opinion and class opinions. A number of conclusions would nevertheless
seem to deserve at least tentative expression.
(1) The prevalence of charges of corruption and of actual corruption
in American politics is not of itself proof of our inferiority in
political morality to the other great nations of the world.
(2) Considering opportunities and temptations, our current political
morality is at least not yet proven to be inferior to our business and
social morality in general.
(3) Unsupported charges of corruption are too frequently indulged in
by practical politicians, reformers, and conservatives, the results
being a popular moral callousness and a loss of social confidence which
render all constructive work more difficult.
(4) Acts involving corrupt motives range in current social estimation
all the way from heinous felonies to minor foibles. The view that
there are only a few “corruptionists,” all of whom richly deserve
criminal sentences and might receive them without unduly crowding
our penitentiaries, is a grotesque misconception. Instead of this we
must recognise frankly that self-interest and social interests are
inextricably bound up as motive forces of our social machinery, often
working in harmony and reinforcing each other, but sometimes colliding
and presenting new questions for moral determination and social
protective action.
(5) From among such cases of collision between social and self-interest
we must endeavour to single out those most obviously harmful to society
and the state, and, not content with branding them as morally bad, we
must formulate legal prohibitions supported by penalties severe enough
to check the evil. Particularly important in this field of work is a
thorough solution of the whole problem of campaign contributions.
(6) Certain cases in which political action is determined by corrupt
considerations may be more effectively combated with moral than with
legal sanctions. These are cases which threaten no very serious
consequences, cases in which the corrupt considerations are not
directly material in character, cases in which personal advantage is
not so much sought as the advantage of some social group, and all other
cases of so subtle or undecided a character that definite legal action,
at least under existing conditions, is impossible. In the presence of
many such difficulties we can only plead for a clearer recognition by
the individual of duty to the state and to society as a whole. On the
other hand, society and the state as now constituted fall short of a
full and humane ideal of justice and hence are partly responsible for
existing corruption.
Finally it should be said that all effective work against corruption
must be two-fold. On the one hand we must endeavour to raise moral
and legal standards to a higher level. On the other hand we must
unrelentingly prosecute actual offences to the full extent of existing
law. Work of the first sort must be either impersonal or based upon
well authenticated facts. Work of the second sort must above all
things be subjected to a wise restraint; sweeping charges resting
merely upon suspicion must be scrupulously avoided; direct and
well-founded charges must be put into legal form and fought to the last
resort. Reformers should learn to bring down all direct and personal
accusations to the level of existing law, until they have succeeded in
bringing the level of the law up to their ideal standard.
FOOTNOTES:
[15] Other illustrations of auto-corruption may be found in speculation
by inside officials on the basis of crop reports not yet made public,
and in real-estate deals based on a knowledge of projected public
improvements.
[16] Misperformance and neglect of duty do not clearly include cases of
usurpation with corrupt motives; hence the addition of this clause to
the definition. Some usurpations may of course be defended as involving
high and unselfish motives, and hence free from corruption.
[17] Mr. Seeley has shown, of course, that no actual despotism,
so-called, really conforms to this conception, but for purposes of
argument, at least, the assumption may be permitted to stand.
[18] _Political Science Quarterly_, vol. xix (1904), p. 673.
[19] _Cf._ C. Howard, “The Spirit of Graft,” _Outlook_, vol. lxxxi
(1905), p. 365.
[20] _Outlook_, 65:115 (May 12, 1905).
[21] _Political Science Quarterly_, vol. xviii (1902), p. 188.
[22] _Atlantic_, vol. xcv (1905), p. 781.
[23] J. E. C. Bodley, France, bk. iii, ch. vi, p. 306.
CORRUPTION: A PERSISTENT PROBLEM OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE
III
CORRUPTION: A PERSISTENT PROBLEM OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE
In its broadest significance, corruption has been defined as “the
intentional misperformance or neglect of a recognised duty, or the
unwarranted exercise of power, with the motive of gaining some
advantage more or less directly personal.” Evil of this sort may occur
not only in the state, but also in the church, the family, in business
associations, and every other kind of social body. One may infer from
the nature of corruption itself that if developed to an extreme degree
it will cause the dissolution of any organisation affected by it.
Every social body requires as a prime condition of its existence a
certain subordination of individual interest to the general interest.
Corruption essentially means the preference of the former to the
latter. If self-interest continuously grows more potent while group
interest _pari passu_ declines, evidently the social organisation
so affected will weaken and finally die. “The king by judgment
establisheth the land: but he that receiveth gifts overthroweth it.”
Universally triumphant corruption, therefore, would destroy the body
from which it had drawn the sustenance for its own parasitic life.
Anarchy would be far preferable to the extreme logical consequences of
corruption. For anarchy seeks to destroy only the compulsory political
forms of human society, leaving men free to associate voluntarily in
all other ways, whereas ultimate corruption would loosen every social
bond and reduce humanity to the state of nature as Hobbes conceived
it:—_bellum omnium contra omnes_.
Corruption, then, is a social disease that may terminate fatally.
Social death does not always occur because of it, but from the social
point of view it is always a pathological condition. Few of the great
tragedies of history involving the fall of nations or of mighty
institutions can be explained fully without reference to the antecedent
corroding influence of corruption. It had a part in the decline of
Greece and Rome, in the Protestant Reformation, the overthrow of
the Stuart dynasty in England, the partition of Poland, and the
French Revolution. Other causes contributed to these events and were
perhaps more largely instrumental in bringing them about,—ignorance,
inefficiency, tyranny, immorality, extravagance, and obstinacy,—but in
each instance corruption was also present on a large scale. Even in
cases of historical catastrophes where the crushing force was applied
from the outside it is usually possible to discern how the victor’s
path was smoothed by the disintegrating effect of corruption upon the
social structure of the vanquished.[24] For this reason Europe fell
more easily before Napoleon from 1796 to 1812, imperial France before
Germany in 1870-’71, and Russia before Japan in 1904-’05.
While the disastrous consequences of widespread corruption as shown
by such instances are not to be lightly underestimated, it is
evident, on the other hand, that corrupt conditions may exist even on
a considerable scale without bringing about the extreme penalty of
disintegration or conquest. Recoveries little short of the miraculous
are sometimes noted in this field of social pathology. It would be
difficult to conceive a lower stage of degradation than that reached by
the English ministry and parliament during and immediately following
the time of Walpole, yet to-day England enjoys the reputation of
possessing one of the most honest and efficient governments in
the world. American municipal reformers sometimes despair of any
efficacious remedy for the corruption which prevails in our cities.
They should take heart upon observing the degraded conditions which
prevailed in Prussian municipalities prior to Stein’s _Städteordnung_
of 1808, and in England prior to the Municipal Reform Act of 1835.
In both instances formerly corrupt conditions have been succeeded by
honest and efficient municipal systems which are observed with envy and
commented upon with admiration the world over.
The conclusion which the foregoing illustrations seem to warrant is
that while corruption is a pathological condition which in an extreme
degree may lead to social death, it is also susceptible to treatment
which may bring about recovery with renewed and even enhanced vigour.
Between these two extremes every degree of partial strength or weakness
may exist in a social body as a result of the presence or after effects
of corruption. The Roman Church suffered a tremendous loss of influence
in Western and Northern Europe as a result of the Reformation. It has
never recovered this territory, but it survived as an institution
which, modified by internal reforms, has acquired a greater influence
and a greater number of communicants than the mediæval church ever
dreamed of. Spain, partly through corruption, lost her colonial empire,
but the mother country remains intact. True Lord Salisbury called it
a “decadent nation,” but at least it is not in ruins. Germany was
victor over corrupt imperial France in the last great European war.
The progress of the _Vaterland_ since that event seems phenomenal,
but already uneasy voices, troubled at contemporary conditions,
particularly in the army and the emperor’s immediate entourage, are
raising the question: “What does the future hold for us,—Jena or
Sedan?” Conquered in 1870-’71, the French, in Gambetta’s deathless
words, nevertheless remained “a great nation which does not wish to
die.” The history of the Third Republic has been besmirched at times
by scandals of the most offensively corrupt character. Yet in spite
of this and other national weaknesses the outside world is probably
altogether too much inclined to underestimate the latent strength of
modern France.
Contemplation of the general evils which may result from corruption
suggests the possibility of eliminating it from social life. While
such a condition of affairs may be looked upon as an ideal, it will
nevertheless remain an ultimate ideal which can be approximated
rather than realised, and that only by the most patient, determined,
and continued effort. Every social organisation, as we have seen,
presupposes the subordination in some measure of personal to broader
interests. But no matter how far social integration is carried, and
social duty correspondingly emphasised, there will always remain a
field for individual effort. Absolute communism in which the state
shall be everything and the individual nothing is unthinkable. Even
where the individual as such is but little regarded, he will remain
a member of small social groups, as _e.g._, the family or business
corporation, the interests of which are almost if not quite as close
to him as the interests of his naked ego. The lines bounding the two
great fields of individual interest and social interest are variously
drawn in different countries and at different times. No doubt they
will be redrawn in the future, probably greatly to the extension of
social functions if one may judge from the present drift. Always,
however, the two great fields will remain, and the best results in
each will depend partly upon the activities of the other. In the main
these activities do not conflict, indeed they strongly reinforce one
another. When the individual pursues his daily work diligently and
intelligently, although primarily with a selfish end in view, he is
nevertheless adding to national wealth and welfare. So also with
most of the activities of the family, the church, the club, and the
business corporation. In each of these cases, however, it is inevitable
that conflicts will sometimes occur between individual and narrow
group interests on the one hand, and broader social interests on the
other. These conflicts may gradually take on less selfish and less
dangerous forms, but will hardly disappear so long as the character of
the individual and the constitution of society remain fundamentally
unchanged. The problem of corruption, therefore, is a persistent
one. There will always remain the possibility of moral struggle for
improvement; there will never be absolute perfection in these extensive
and involved relationships.
A very striking implication of the persistent character of the problem
may be found in the fact that much of the current terminology of
political science implies the presence of corruption as a common factor
in the life of the state. To modern students Greek classifications
of forms of government appear rather naive, considered simply as
classifications, but many of the separate terms employed in them
nevertheless remain in general use. Plato, for example, describes the
decline of the pure Republic ruled by philosophers who are actuated by
the highest motives, first into Timarchy, next into Oligarchy, then
into Democracy in the sense of mob rule, and finally into Tyranny.
We must infer that in the real world, as the Philosopher saw it, the
number of perfect Republics, granting that such beatific political
entities or any acceptable approximation to them could exist,
would be far less than the number of degenerate states. The common
characteristic of all the latter from Timarchy to Tyranny is the
predominance of some form of personal or narrow group interest over
the highest interests of the state. In other words the great majority
of state forms as classified by Plato are to be distinguished by the
degree and kind of corruption they exhibit. Aristotle’s distinction
between pure forms of constitutions,—Royalty, Aristocracy, and
Polity,—and the corresponding perverted forms,—Tyranny, Oligarchy,
and Democracy,—is based fundamentally upon the existence of purity or
corruption in the sovereign, whether it be composed of the one, few, or
many. Dealing as he was largely with actual constitutions, Aristotle
makes it clear that in the world as he knew it, the corrupt forms of
government, particularly oligarchy and democracy, were much more common
than the pure forms, that, in fact, some degree of corruption was
frequent, and purity, on the other hand, exceptional in political life.
Other classifications of states regardless of their moral condition
are, of course, possible. Mr. Seeley has given us one that, for modern
purposes, is certainly much more useful than the Aristotelian. The
continued use of the latter in common speech and, to a somewhat less
extent in historical and scientific discussion, is evidence, however,
of a high degree of availability in describing actual political
conditions or what are believed to be such. And since this terminology
implies the existence of corruption as an ordinary accompaniment of
political life, its wide acceptance and continued use strengthens the
conviction that corruption in some form is a persistent problem of
politics.
While the general problem bids fair to remain with us always, the
particular forms and extent of corruption will be subject to change
in the future as in the past. History justifies the hope that these
changes will be for the better.[25] Many of the grosser forms of
corruption current in earlier periods are impossible now. Charles II.
was not the only king of his century who accepted corrupt subsidies
from foreign monarchs. At the present time it is impossible to doubt
that the essential loyalty of the executive heads of the principal
civilised countries of the world would be demonstrated unmistakably
in case they should be approached by corrupt solicitation from the
outside. The modern spirit of nationality and patriotism would wreak
tremendous vengeance upon any royal offender against it. The loyalty of
contemporary monarchs, however, is probably due in very slight degree,
if at all, to the fear of punishment. In addition to the responsibility
enforced upon constitutional kings, a keener sense on their part of
participation in the national spirit and higher standards both of
personal rectitude and of international dealings make corruption of
this sort well nigh unthinkable in the modern world. To a large measure
also these virtues have been extended over the whole administrative
service of civilised states and absorbed as a part of current moral
practice. Hence even in the case of inferior officials who have been
seduced by foreign bribes, as _e.g._, the sale of military plans and
secrets, a heavy penalty of popular obloquy is added to the severe
penalty of the law.
The mention of Charles II. suggests another form of corruption, the
earlier wide extension of which is familiar to every reader of history.
In times past royal mistresses appeared openly at court, secured
titles of nobility and grants of land for themselves, their children,
and their favourites, dictated appointments in the civil and military
service, and overruled decisions of internal and foreign policy. It
may be admitted that the sexual morality of some contemporary monarchs
is not above reproach. Yet the evil, so far as it exists to-day,
is largely personal, and is chiefly objectionable because of its
unfavourable influence upon the family life of the people at large. No
modern king ruling over a civilised country, it is safe to say, could
openly flaunt his mistresses and allow it to be seen that his passion
for them affected his policies as head of the state.
As another illustration of the disappearance of certain forms of
corruption once extremely common the famous case of Lord Bacon may
be cited. His offence as Lord Chancellor consisted not in the taking
of presents from suitors, for to do so after judgment was the open
practice of the time. Inadvertently, however, Bacon accepted a present
before a case was decided, and this was made the basis of the charge of
corruption which brought about his downfall. The morality of the time
had reached a stage at which it perceived clearly the corrupting effect
upon the judicial mind of presents in advance of a decision, and held
them to be bribes. It had not reached the modern point of view that
the expectation of a present after giving decision is also corrupting,
particularly since the present of one of the litigants is very likely
to be larger than that of the other. One can safely maintain that
the open receipt of presents by judicial officers of higher rank is
extremely rare in English speaking countries and in Western Europe at
the present time. Judges of our own lower courts are sometimes accused
of truckling to the party influences to which they owe their election,
but so far as it exists this is a much more subtle and surreptitious
form of corruption than present giving, or as it would frankly be
called nowadays, bribe-giving by litigants.[26] Any approach, or even
appearance of approach, to offences of the latter sort would call
forth sharp expressions of condemnation. In his “Four Aspects of Civic
Duty,” President Taft presents a very striking and acute argument on
the necessity of the exercise of extreme circumspection by judicial
officials which will serve to illustrate the progress in morals from
Lord Bacon’s time to the present:
“A most important principle in the success of a judicial system and
procedure is that the administration of justice should seem to the
public and the litigants to be impartial and righteous, as well as
that it should actually be so. Continued lack of public confidence in
the courts will sap their foundations. A careful and conscientious
judge will, therefore, strive to avoid every appearance from which the
always suspicious litigants may suspect an undue leaning toward the
other side. He will give patient hearing to counsel for each party,
and, however clear the case may be to him when stated, he will not
betray his conclusion until he has heard in full from the party whose
position cannot be supported. More than this, it not infrequently
happens, however clear his mind in the outset, that argument, if he
has not a pride of first opinion that is unjudicial, may lead him to
change his view.
“This same principle is one that should lead judges not to accept
courtesies like railroad passes from persons or companies frequently
litigants in their courts. It is not that such courtesies would really
influence them to decide a case in favour of such litigants when
justice required a different result; but the possible evil is that
if the defeated litigant learns of the extension of such courtesy to
the judge or the court by his opponent he cannot be convinced that
his cause was heard by an indifferent tribunal, and it weakens the
authority and the general standing of the court.
“I knew of one judge who indignantly declared that of course he
accepted passes, because he would not admit, by declining them, that
such a little consideration or favour would influence his decision.
But in the view I have given above a different ground for declining
them can be found than the suggestion that such a courtesy would
really influence his judgment in a case in which the railroad company
giving the courtesy was a party.”[27]
The intimate relation between present giving and bribery, suggests
another illustration somewhat similar to the preceding. Readers of
the famous diary of Samuel Pepys are familiar with the fact that in
his official capacity as Clerk of the Acts and Surveyor General of
the Victualling Office he often accepted presents. In one instance
we find him quoting with grave approval the sage observation of his
patron, Lord Sandwich, to the effect that “it was not the salary of
any place that did make a man rich, but the opportunity of getting
money while he is in the place.”[28] Venal as it may appear to the
modern reader Pepys undoubtedly lived up to this precept, and owed
to its consistent practice the very considerable property which he
afterwards amassed. Yet one would be over hasty to conclude that the
author of the “Diary” was an arch corruptionist. On the contrary he was
so distinctly superior, both in efficiency and honesty, to most of his
colleagues, that he won much well-merited recognition and succeeded
in retaining office practically throughout the whole Restoration
period in spite of the many upheavals and intrigues of that troublous
time. While Pepys frankly admits that he accepted presents he insists
that he never forgot the “King’s interest.” The manifest danger of
allowing an official to measure in this way the quality of service
due a sovereign, does not seem to occur to the diarist. On the other
hand, he refers frequently, and usually in terms of condemnation, to
many contemporaries in the administrative service who, at least in
his opinion, were much less scrupulous than they should have been in
determining the “King’s interest.” Thus he records the utterances of
a certain Cooling, the Lord Chamberlain’s secretary and a veritable
drunken roaring Falstaff of corruption, who boasted that “his horse was
a bribe, and his boots a bribe; and told us he was made up of bribes,
as an Oxford scholar is set out with other men’s goods when he goes
out of town, and that he makes every sort of tradesman to bribe him;
and invited me home to his house, to taste of his bribe wine.”[29]
Sometimes, indeed, Pepys became involved in transactions where the
“King’s interest,” as he measured it, received less than its due
share of attention. We find him fearing investigation in such cases,
and withdrawing from them with the resolution not to allow himself
to become similarly involved again. Yet on the whole there is every
evidence of a conscious feeling on his part of rectitude superior to
the administrative morals of the time. That it was largely justified in
spite of the receipt of gifts may be seen from Dr. Wheatley’s comment
to the effect that “public men in those days, without private property,
must have starved if they had not taken fees, for the King had no
idea of wasting his money by paying salaries. At the time of Pepys’s
death there was a balance of £28,007, 2 _s._ 1¼ _d._ due to him from
the Crown, and the original vouchers still remain an heirloom in the
family.”[30]
Appointments to public office have been a fruitful field for corruption
in many forms. In his “Civil Service in Great Britain,” Mr. Dorman
B. Eaton sums up the whole history of the disposal of patronage in
England in the following statement:—“From the despotic system, under
the Norman kings, through various spoils systems under arbitrary
kings—through a sort of partisan system under Cromwell—through fearful
corruption under James and Charles—through a sort of aristocratic
spoils system under William and Anne—through a partisan spoils
system under George I. and II., and a part of the reign of George
III.—through the partisan system in its best estate in later years—we
have traced the unsteady but generally ascending progress of British
administration; and, in 1870, we shall find it to have reached a
level at which office is treated as a trust and personal merit is the
recognised criterion of selection for office.”[31] It would be a most
absurd anachronism to regard all the earlier practices referred to by
Mr. Eaton with the horror of a modern civil service reformer. Richard
the Lion-Hearted could hardly have comprehended the advantage of
competitive literary examinations open to all classes of his subjects
as a means of selecting his subordinates. When under the Plantagenets
and Tudors “charters and monopolies, in a fit of good nature, were
tossed by a king to some borough, great officer, or favourite that
had pleased him; and, in a fit of anger or drunkenness—as arbitrarily
revoked,”[32] it must be remembered that neither the law nor the
morals of the time severely condemned such actions. No wonder,
therefore, that “the old system was bold, consistent, and outspoken—not
pretending to make selections for office out of regard for personal
merit or economy, or the general welfare. It plainly asserted that
those in power had a right and duty to keep themselves in power and
preserve their monopoly in any way which their judgement should
approve, and that the people were bound to submit.”[33] Further “the
right to appoint to office and to sell the appointment openly for
money became also, and long remained, hereditary; sometimes in great
families and sometimes in the holder for the time being of the offices
themselves.”[34] No doubt the exercise of such rights of purchase was
once regarded generally as no more objectionable than the sale of a
private physician’s practice or the sale of the good will of a business
at the present time. But while the various earlier methods of disposing
of the patronage as sketched by Mr. Eaton must be judged with reference
to contemporary political morality, it is true that each of them in
turn fell into disrepute, was abolished—often only after several
trials—and finally superseded by a less faulty system. Even as far back
as Magna Charta the existence of a faint conception of the modern civil
service principle is made plain by the Forty-fifth Article, according
to which the King engaged not to “make any justices, constables,
sheriffs, or bailiffs, but of such as know the law of the realm.” All
the great subsequent uprisings of English history were directed in part
against certain other abuses of the corrupt patronage system. The Tyler
and Cade Rebellions in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the
great Civil War, the expulsion of James II., the overthrow of Walpole,
the failure of George III.’s attempt at personal government,—each
marked a higher standard of public sentiment on the question. Between
1820 and 1870, the great modern civil service reform orders were
passed, resulting in the final establishment of open competition for
over 80,000 positions under the English government. Opportunities for
corrupt practices in connection with appointment to office are, of
course, not entirely excluded even by so thoroughgoing a system as that
which now exists in England, but they are few and unimportant indeed
compared to the possibilities of selfish abuses under former régimes.
It is by no means necessary to review the whole sweep of a nation’s
history in order to observe the discarding of old, and the evolution
of newer and usually less dangerous forms of corruption. Such a career
as that of Tweed would be impossible in any American city to-day. The
crude methods he employed,—raising bills, throwing contracts to members
of the Ring, keeping false books, delaying financial reports,—would
certainly and promptly send any one who attempted them at the present
time to the penitentiary. Indeed no small part of existing municipal
legislation can be traced back to the specific misdeeds of Tweed and
others of his ilk. On the other hand it must be admitted that the
ablest corruptionists sometimes show skill little short of genius in
devising new schemes to avoid the pitfalls of existing law and in
keeping always just beyond the grasp of new enactments. Mr. Steffens
tells a story of Chris Magee, former boss of Pittsburgh, to the effect
that he visited and made a most careful study of the machines of
Philadelphia and New York and particularly of their defects, finally
returning to his own city with the conviction that a “ring could
be made as safe as a bank.”[35] In this field, as in the ethics of
business management and elsewhere, there will probably always be a
running duel between anti-social action and legislation designed to
check it. Novel methods of corruption will constantly require novel
methods of correction. In the nature of the case the law will usually
be slightly behind the artifices of the most skilful corruptionists:
abuses must exist and be felt as such before the government can
successfully define and punish them. On the other hand this constant
development of the law should make corrupt practices increasingly
difficult for the less gifted rascals who must always constitute the
great majority of would-be offenders. As things are now the ignorant
heeler, and even the crooked tool who has received an ordinary
education, realise that they cannot play the game alone. Their only
hope of escaping the penitentiary is in the service of the machine
whose leaders understand the legal requirements of the situation, and
possess the skill or influence necessary to circumvent them.
While the consequences of corruption must in general be weakening and
disintegrating, their full import may be concealed or postponed owing
to the limitation of the evil condition to certain branches or spheres
of government which for the time being are not called upon to function
to their full capacity. A chain is no stronger than its weakest link,
but it may serve very well so long as no great tensile strain is
applied to it. The military arm of a government otherwise honest and
efficient might conceivably become well nigh paralysed by corruption
without any particular evil consequences so long as hostilities were
avoided. All the more terrible, on the other hand, would be the
awakening in case of the advent of war. The reverse case is suggested
by Tennyson:
“Let your reforms for a moment go!
Look to your butts and take good aims!
Better a rotten borough or so
Than a rotten fleet and a city in flames!”
Here the point is that a corrupt local government need occasion little
or no disadvantage during a state of war provided the army can be
relied upon thoroughly. Further the poet warns against agitation for
the reform of internal abuses lest it might weaken the country in the
presence of a foreign foe. Doubtless both points are well taken so
far as an immediate emergency is concerned. If war is not imminent,
however, that government would certainly be making the best preparation
against future trouble which sought to establish the highest standard
of honesty in both its civil and military services. Thus the Freiherr
vom Stein immeasurably strengthened Prussia for the final conflict with
Napoleon by reforming the rotten boroughs of his country and appealing
on the basis of this reform to the patriotism of the liberal classes of
his fellow citizens. Moreover there would seem to be little real danger
of urging internal reforms so violently during periods of warfare
as to cripple military strength. Of course if a government has been
reduced to the last extremity of unpopularity by past mismanagement,
revolutionists might take advantage of a declaration of war to tear it
to pieces, hailing foreign troops as allies rather than opponents. In
the more advanced countries of the modern world, however, the spirit
of nationality and patriotism is so highly developed that internal
reforms are instantly relegated to the background at the least threat
of foreign embroilment. To such peoples the poet’s adjuration to
“Let your reforms for a moment go”
is hardly needed.
Definite instances of corruption affecting certain spheres or
departments of government particularly may readily be suggested. There
is much that is significant in the corruption of the judicial officials
of China. Ultimately they became so rapacious that merchants feared
to come before them, preferring to leave commercial differences to be
settled by the arbitration of officers of guilds of which the business
men themselves were members. Thus corruption of one social organ may
lead to its atrophy and the corresponding strengthening of another
social organ which takes over the functions of the former. Assuming
that the function is as well performed in the second case, the internal
life of the whole structure in which the transition takes place may be
very little affected except while the change is going on. If, however,
the state is continually weakened by such transfers while at the same
time the functions remaining to it become rotten with corruption it may
finally reach the condition of abject defencelessness which China has
shown in its relations with other nations.
Another very curious case of corruption limited to certain spheres of
government is furnished by Japan. In his authoritative work on that
country,[36] Captain Brinkley expresses the opinion that the higher
and lower official classes are free from corruption while the middle
grade is more or less given over to it. The passage containing this
statement is so germane to the present discussion that it may be quoted
in full:
“There is an old and still undecided controversy among foreign
observers as to bribery in Japan. Many Japanese romancists introduce
the _douceur_ in every drama of life, and historical annals show that
from the seventeenth century downward Japanese rulers legislated
against bribery with a degree of strenuous persistence which seems
to imply conviction of its prevalence. Not only were recipients of
bribes severely punished, but informers also received twice the amount
in question. Japanese social relations, too, are maintained largely
by the giving and taking of presents. Visits to make or renew an
acquaintance are always accompanied by gifts; the four seasons of the
year are similarly marked; even deaths call for a contribution to
funeral expenses; nearly all services are ‘recognised,’ and guests
carry back from their entertainer’s house a box of confectionery
or other edibles in order that the households may not be entirely
excluded from the feast. The uses of such a system evidently verge
constantly on abuses, and prepare the observer to find that if the
normal intercourse of life sanctions these material aids, abnormal
occasions are likely to demand them in much greater profusion. All
evidence thus far obtained goes to prove that Japanese officials of
the highest and lowest classes are incorruptible, but that the middle
ranks are unsound. A Japanese police constable will never take a bribe
nor a Japanese railway _employé a pour boire_, and from Ministers of
State to chiefs of departmental bureaux there is virtual freedom from
corruption. But for the rest nothing can be claimed, and to the case
of tradespeople, inferior agents, foremen of works, contractors, and
so on, the Japanese proverb may probably be applied that ‘even hell’s
penalties are a matter of money.’”
A third illustration of the uneven distribution of corruption
throughout a political structure may be found in our own case. In the
United States, as is well known, the general opinion of the honesty
and efficiency of the federal government is extremely high; state
government enjoys considerably less repute; and municipal government
is pretty commonly and indiscriminately condemned. Even in the case
of the latter, however, it is worth while to observe that in some
cities otherwise considered almost hopelessly bad, certain departments,
notably public schools and fire protection, are recognised as being
managed on a much higher plane than other branches of the municipal
service. In such cases public recognition of the importance of the
departments concerned has led to an insistence on efficiency and
honesty that has proven effective. The conclusion would seem to be well
founded, therefore, that a proper recognition by our city population
of the vital importance of other branches of the service, such as
sanitation, refuse disposal, water supply, building and housing
inspection, letting of contracts, and so on, would go far toward
bringing about much needed improvements.
It would also appear that corruption may be omnipresent and yet not
extremely harmful because of the moderation of its demands. A practical
politician once remarked that “the people will never kick on a ten
per cent rake off.” It is quite possible that the effort to wipe out
so modest a tribute by a reform agitation opposed to the principle of
the thing might cost more in effort or even in campaign expenses than
would be represented by the saving to the municipal treasury or public.
Obviously, however, the advisability of an effort for the establishment
of honest government is not to be calculated in financial values only.
The moral effect of a corrupt exaction of ten per cent which no one
thinks it worth while to attack may be worse than the moral effect
of a fifty per cent exaction which is vigorously condemned. A purely
Machiavellian machine leader may also discern a degree of danger
lurking in a government ten per cent corrupt due to the very fact that
the electorate accepts it with quiescence. Under such conditions it
is difficult to convince the more greedy minor politicians that while
they can get ten per cent without a murmur they could not take twenty
or even fifteen per cent without serious trouble. The great expenses
of political management which the leaders are called upon to meet must
also incline them at times to exactions beyond the verge of prudence.
From the point of view of an organisation politician, therefore, the
determination of the limits within which corruption seems safe is a
serious and ever present problem. Certain features of the situation
may be noted as exerting an influence in favour of a moderate policy.
One of these is the contractual nature of many corrupt practices that
are alleged to be common. For example, franchises sought by dishonest
means usually possess a value which is pretty exactly known to the
intending purchasers. The amount which they are actually willing to
pay may be determined only after close bargaining and the allowance of
a large discount owing to the danger inseparable from this method of
acquisition. Immunity to carry on businesses under the ban of the law
is subject to the same rule.
The “Gambling Commission” which was said to exist in New York in
1900-’01, and to have been “composed of a Commissioner who is at the
head of one of the city departments, two State Senators, and the
dictator of the pool-room syndicate of this city,”[37] owed its partial
exposure to a violation of this rule. The “Commission” was alleged to
have established a regular tariff for the various forms of gambling as
follows:—Pool Rooms, $300 per month; Crap Games, and Gambling Houses
(small), $150 per month; Gambling Houses (large), $1000 per month;
Envelope Games, $50 per month. These rates would seem sufficiently
high to provoke complaint from those who had to pay them. Nevertheless
the exposure, which came from the gamblers themselves, was not so
much due to the size of the exactions as to the great increase in the
number of the gambling houses which the “Commission” licensed in order
to secure larger revenues. In the end, as one member of the sporting
fraternity phrased it, “there were not enough suckers to go ’round.”
The whole incident illustrates the principle, if the word can be used
in such an unhallowed connection, that in order to enjoy any permanent
success, corruption must by all means avoid extreme rapacity; it must
endeavour to keep alive that which it feeds on. Castro, for example,
was a highwayman rather than a grafter. He lacked the moderation, the
fine sense of proportion, necessary to qualify one for success in the
latter rôle. To paraphrase a familiar principle of taxation, a part
of income may be taken but corrupt encroachments on capital sums are
dangerous.
Prudential considerations restraining corruption are apt to be much
more keenly felt by a thoroughly organised machine than in cases where
corruption is practised by disorganised groups and individuals each
seeking its or his own advantage regardless of any common interest.
The “cohesive power of public plunder,” as President Cleveland
ponderously phrased it, may thus come to operate as a moderating
force. Notoriously corrupt city governments have not infrequently
distinguished themselves by maintaining extremely low tax rates,
or at least rates which appear to be low. Largely on this basis a
quasi-philosophic defence of corrupt municipal rule was made several
years ago by Daniel G. Thompson.[38] Arguing that some degree of
corruption was inevitable in all political organisations, he held
that they should be regarded by the voter in exactly the same light
as bidders for a contract. Government should simply be handed over
to the organisation making, all things considered, the lowest bid,
which in New York city, Mr. Thompson thought, would usually be Tammany
Hall. The argument is so thoroughly feudal in its conception of
politics that one finds it difficult to believe in the author’s entire
sincerity, although this is flatly asseverated throughout the book.
Moral objections similar to those employed against the doctrine of the
inviolability of a “ten per cent rake-off” thoroughly dispose of any
rational claim it may make to attention. Political experience is also
against it. Reform movements particularly in municipalities may be
laughed at as “spasms,” but these movements, which are usually based
largely on charges of corruption, occur so frequently as to discredit
the belief that purely prudential considerations on the part of
corruptionists will restrain effectively the excesses of their demands.
Supine acceptance by the electorate of the “lowest bidder” theory
would speedily result in the submission of none but extortionately
high bids. In the long run “millions for defence but not one cent for
tribute” is a sentiment quite as justifiable economically as ethically.
To recapitulate the preceding argument,—the structure of society, no
matter how completely evolved and generally beneficial to the highest
human interests, is nevertheless such that when brought into contact
with natural human egoism it offers access at many points to the
onslaughts of corruption. The evil consequences may be extreme, or only
severe, or in time they may be completely overcome. History furnishes
examples of all three eventualities. It also bears witness to the fact
that many gross and threatening forms of corruption that were once
prevalent have been eliminated from the life of civilised nations.
Those which remain to afflict us are the object of vigorous corrective
measures which are constantly being extended and strengthened. Corrupt
practices are found to be limited in some cases to certain branches or
spheres of government with consequences of varying degrees of danger
to the national life. Or they may be limited in amount or percentage
by various prudential considerations on the part of political leaders
who, however, are far from being sufficiently restrained in this way
as social welfare requires. While corruption thus appears to be a
persistent problem of social and political life it is far from being
a hopeless one. In the words of Professor Henry C. Adams,[39] its
solution “is a continuous task, like the cleansing of the streets of a
great city, or the renewing of a right purpose within the human heart.”
FOOTNOTES:
[24] It would, of course, be absurd to assume that every victor in
such contests is free from all taint of corruption. A very large and
powerful state may, although extremely corrupt, succeed in overcoming
a small and weak state which is relatively free from corruption.
Something akin to this occurred when Finnish autonomy was suppressed
by Russia in 1902. On the other hand it is evident that in such a
struggle the honesty of the small state would be in its favour while
the corruption of the great state would be a source of weakness.
[25] Although most of the references to historic forms of corruption
presented in the following pages are taken from the comparatively
recent annals of nations which are still living, it is worth noting
that the subject could also be illustrated abundantly from ancient
history. Even prior to the Christian era Rome suffered from various
kinds of political corruption that exist in very similar forms at the
present day. Readers of the Old Testament find, particularly in the
books of Isaiah and Micah, denunciations of social evils not unlike
those published in contemporary magazines.
[26] Herbert Spencer shows “that from propitiatory presents, voluntary
and exceptional to begin with but becoming as political power
strengthens less voluntary and more general, there eventually grow up
universal and involuntary contributions—established tribute; and that
with the rise of a currency this passes into taxation” (“Principles
of Sociology,” vol. ii, pt. iv, ch. iv, p. 371), and further that
“In our own history the case of Bacon exemplifies not a special and
late practice, but an old and usual one” (p. 372). Bribe giving may,
therefore, be regarded as a lineal descendant of an old practice once
regarded as legitimate, but now fallen under the ban. Given a social
state in which public dues are open, regular, and fixed in amount, and
in which bribery is distinctly reprobated, as contrasted with a social
state in which present giving is common and tolerated or defended by
public opinion, the higher moral standard of the former would seem
beyond question.
[27] _Op. cit._, pp. 44-45.
[28] “The Diary of Samuel Pepys,” edited by Henry B. Wheatley, vol. i,
p. 207, entry of date of August 16, 1660.
[29] _Op. cit._, vol. vii, p. 49, entry dated July 30, 1667.
[30] “Samuel Pepys and the World He Lived In,” by Henry B. Wheatley, p.
62.
[31] _Op. cit._, pp. 161-162, note.
[32] _Ibid._, p. 15.
[33] _Ibid._, p. 42.
[34] _Ibid._, p. 16.
[35] “The Shame of the Cities,” p. 152.
[36] “Japan, Its History, Arts, and Literature,” by Captain F.
Brinkley, vol. iv, p. 250 _et seq._
[37] _New York Times_, March 9, 1900.
[38] “Politics in a Democracy,” New York, 1893.
[39] “Public Debts,” p. 358
CORRUPTION IN THE PROFESSIONS, JOURNALISM, AND THE HIGHER EDUCATION
IV
CORRUPTION IN THE PROFESSIONS, JOURNALISM, AND THE HIGHER EDUCATION
The wisdom of some quasi-philosophic counsellors of ambitious youth
expresses itself in the aphorism that in this world there are as many
doors labelled “pull” as there are labelled “push.” Without admitting
the equality in ratio of the two kinds of avenues to material well
being, it is undeniable that a great many of our social relationships
are very commonly exploited by interests of a more or less directly
personal character. Church membership, for example, may be maintained
chiefly as a stepping stone to business, professional, or social
success. Business men are overrun with solicitations for aid to
church and charitable purposes under circumstances which suggest
the discrete advertisement of their delinquency in case they do not
contribute “according to their means,” and the probable loss of custom
in consequence. The charitable organisations themselves are imposed
upon by unworthy applicants for relief who display a pertinacity and
ingenuity calculated to destroy all faith in any trait of human nature
except universal parasitism. Of course one should not look a gift horse
in the mouth, but in the case of many presentations from inferiors
to superiors or from favour-seekers to men of influence the motives
of the givers, and also at times of the recipients, are certainly not
beyond suspicion. The ethics of the petty tipping system are dubious
at best. Labourers “soldier on their jobs”; clerks appropriate office
supplies as “perquisites”; there are “tricks in all trades.” To avoid
conflicts in the kitchen good housewives frequently send bad servants
away with excellent “characters.” During hard time winters newspapers
maintain free soup stations and publish the harrowing details of the
poverty which they are relieving in such a sensational fashion that
even the most guileless reader finds himself wondering whether any
motive connected with self-advertisement or circulation reinforces
the charitable sentiments of the journalist. On the other hand many a
queer and clever scheme is devised to secure newspaper notoriety for
some presumably deserving person or cause. The ways of authors with
critics, and of critics with authors for that matter, are said at times
to stand in need of criticism themselves. “Dead easy” professors and
“snap” courses (of which, be it said with grief and contrition, every
institution seems to have a few samples) are exploited by college
students whose mental efforts in other directions are hopelessly
inhibited by chronic brain fag. In short every person charged with
administrative duties in connection with any social organisation, be
it a business house, a club, a church, a school, a charity, or what
not, is familiar _ad nauseam_ with the fact that tacit or overt efforts
are constantly being made both by outsiders and insiders to procure
suspensions of the rules or other unwarranted privileges and favours.
It would, however, be an unnecessarily harsh judgment to condemn all
actions of the foregoing character as corrupt. If criticism is to be
attempted it must be based on a full knowledge of motives in given
cases, and these are not always apparent. Then, too, customs have grown
up under the influence of which men act without analyzing the real
nature of their conduct. Reflection would show, however, that, with
the exception of conscious evil intent, the elements of corruption are
present not only in the cases cited above, but in many others which are
constantly being encountered in the course of the day’s experiences. It
is certainly an error to assume that all the grafters are engaged in
“big” business or “big” politics. Let us not excuse in the slightest
degree the misdeeds of great corporations, but, on the other hand, let
us not forget that conduct of a precisely similar ethical colour is
sometimes indulged in by labourers, clerks, small retailers, farmers,
and others. The fact that corrupt or “near” corrupt practices are more
common than people are ordinarily inclined to believe is significant
in another way. There is always a direct relationship between the
characteristic petty offences of a people and its characteristic major
crimes. Thus in a country given over to brawling, crimes of violence
will be numerous. Chicane largely prevalent in every day affairs
will certainly breed an atmosphere favourable to the perpetration of
gigantic frauds. For this reason the minor forms of corruption which
occur in the daily life of a people are worthy of much more attention
than they ordinarily receive.
Let us turn now from the petty and dubious manifestations of a corrupt
spirit to those larger and more directly threatening practices
which have become subject to public criticism and in some cases to
repressive legislation. The field thus ventured upon is so extensive
and its features are so involved that no progress can be made in its
discussion without classification. Yet any scheme of classification
that may be attempted must encounter great difficulties. Individual
judgments vary widely regarding the importance or degree of danger to
the public interest of various anti-social developments. Along certain
lines corrupt practices have been exploited by journalistic enterprise
with great pertinacity, while other suspicious areas are still largely
neglected. As a consequence of the very difficulties which embarrass
it, however, there is a certain justification even for a confessedly
imperfect classification. A service of considerable importance may
be rendered merely by bringing together in the form of an outline
all or nearly all the more threatening forms of corruption in such
a way that some of their salient characteristics and interrelations
are more clearly developed. Without therefore claiming finality for
the following arrangement it would seem desirable to distinguish
roughly two great fields of corrupt practices: first, corruption in
professional life generally; and second, corruption in business and
politics. The divisions and subdivisions of these two groups will be
indicated later. Corruption in professional life will be discussed
with some detail in the present study.[40] Business and political
corruption, the interrelations of which are very numerous and close,
will form the subject of the following paper.
Corruption in professional life may be held to involve virtually all
of our social leadership outside of business and politics. Apart
from the specific services rendered by the various professions their
principal practitioners are instinctively looked up to by the community
for guidance. In a broad sense all professional men are teachers.
Corruption in the professions is thus equivalent to the defilement
of the sources of public instruction. Yet precisely on this ground
very sweeping and bitter accusations are made. Law, journalism, and
the higher education are more frequently attacked, but medicine,
philanthropy, and theology also come in for criticism. To cite
specific instances:—editors are accused of wholesale misrepresentation
and suppression of news in behalf of sinister interests; college
professors, assumed to be subtly bribed by munificent endowments, are
reproached as the crafty inventors of philosophic excuses for menacing
public evils; lawyers are denounced as servile hirelings who “justify
the wicked for reward” and who accept crooked corporation or political
work without demur; ministers, philanthropic workers, and other leaders
of thought are said to be purchased by large contributions, gifts of
parks, playgrounds, hospitals, and so on.[41] There are many modern
Micahs who go about saying of our people that “the heads thereof judge
for reward, and the priests thereof teach for hire, and the prophets
thereof divine for money.”
Corruption of the sources of public instruction is manifestly replete
with the potency of evil. If a nation’s “men of light and leading” fail
in their function the case is hopeless indeed. Moreover the regulation
of the various sources of public instruction is a task the complexity
of which far excels that of any problem presented by the other forms
of corruption. No insuperable technical difficulty is involved, for
example, in prescribing the standard of pure milk, the proper safety
devices for theatres, the best method of fencing dangerous machinery in
mills, the adequate safeguarding of the interests of policy holders in
life insurance companies. But who will tell us with authority exactly
what is news and what isn’t; who will define explicitly the standard
of orthodoxy for university instruction in economics and political
science; who will provide ministers of the gospel with a social creed
drawn up with the precision and free from the dogmatic differences of
their theological creeds? It is not strange, therefore, that although
there has been much vague talk of “tainted money,” proposals for the
legal definition and regulation of its alleged pernicious consequences
have been wanting. We already have extended and complicated legal
systems of inspection and regulation of many of the material goods of
life, while but little has been done or even concretely outlined in the
direction of state supervision of ideal goods and services.
Great as are the technical difficulties in the way of the latter
policy, the real reason for its lack of advocates would seem to lie in
the partial efficiency of the various ancient and highly socialised
codes of professional ethics. Competition in the economic world has
not been similarly safeguarded from within. With the breakdown of
the guild system and the sudden changes introduced by the industrial
revolution business found itself upon an uncharted sea. _Laisser
faire, laisser aller_ seemed perfectly obvious in this spacious time
of untouched world markets, but latterly distances have dwindled,
density has increased, and collisions with social norms have become
increasingly frequent. Too often and too easily competition has been
pushed beyond the limits of social safety. In the economic struggle the
“twentieth mean man” has been able to wield compulsory power over his
nineteen decent competitors and to force them on pain of bankruptcy
to adopt his own lower standards. The professional “mean men,” on the
other hand, knew from the start that they were derogating from the
ethics of their fellow practitioners, and in many cases were brought
quickly to book for it. Here rather than in any differences of personal
integrity must be found the reason for the higher moral reputation
enjoyed by professional as compared with business men. It is impossible
to believe that of the brothers of the family the black sheep always
went into business and the good boys into medicine or the ministry.
Finally we may expect the general immunity of the professions from
state regulation to continue just so long as they develop progressively
their own police systems. In this connection it is significant that
that one of them which has been most frequently and severely accused
of abetting corruption in economic and political fields, namely the
law, is precisely the one which has shown the most concern recently
in the reformation of its code of ethics.[42] Obviously such sanitary
processes may be materially hastened by the pressure from without of a
forceful and honest popular feeling in opposition to abuses which have
grown up in professional practice.
* * * * *
The greatest immediate influence upon public opinion is exerted,
of course, by journalism. The question of its corruption or
corruptibility is, therefore, one of prime importance. Accusations
against the press on this score are common enough, but few of them
are so sweeping as the following attributed to the late John Swinton,
formerly of the New York _Sun_ and _Tribune_.[43] At a banquet of the
New York Press Association in 1895, in response to a toast on “The
Independent Press” he is reported to have said:
“There is no such thing in America as an independent press unless it
is in the country towns. You know it, and I know it. There is not
one of you who dare express an honest opinion. If you express it,
you know beforehand that it would never appear in print. I am paid
$150 per week for keeping my honest opinions out of the paper I am
connected with. Others of you are paid similar salaries for doing
similar things. If I should permit honest opinions to be printed in
one issue of my paper, like Othello, before twenty-four hours my
occupation would be gone. The man who would be so foolish as to write
honest opinions would be out on the street hunting for another job.
The business of the New York journalist is to distort the truth, to
lie outright, to pervert, to vilify, to fawn at the feet of Mammon,
and to sell his country and race for his daily bread; or for what is
about the same thing, his salary. You know this, and I know it; and
what foolery to be toasting an ‘independent press.’ We are tools, and
the vassals of rich men behind the scenes. We are jumping jacks. They
pull the string and we dance. Our time, our talents, our lives, our
possibilities, all are the property of other men. We are intellectual
prostitutes.”
It is hardly probable that any one not himself accustomed to drafting
headlines could have so far exaggerated a situation, even under
post-prandial influences, as did the author of the above paragraph.
Whatever may be the measure of the sinning of any newspaper, certainly
no single sheet has ever been the corrupt apologist for all anti-social
interests. A paper which at any one time should attempt to stand for
unsanitary tenement houses, for child labour, for quack medicines, for
“embalmed” beef, for “tainted money” colleges, for monopoly tactics
in beating down small competitors, for life insurance frauds, for the
spoils system, the stealing of elections, and franchise grabbing,—or
for any considerable number of these,—would certainly lose its
influence with extreme suddenness. Newspapers are of all kinds, of
course. They differ even more in character than do individuals. As
the focal points of every interest in a community the interests of a
newspaper are much more diverse than those of the individual, and, as
in the case of the individual, these interests are shot through and
through with the noble and the base. Few people who are unfamiliar
with the practical making of newspapers realise what a constant and
bitter struggle is being waged in many cases to keep them free from
selfish and dishonest influences. In other instances, of course, the
partial triumph of the counting-room is palpable. Advertising columns
still carry, although with much less frequency than formerly, the
insertions of get-rich-quick schemes, of bucket-shops, of salary-loan
sharks, of quack doctors, quack medicines, and clairvoyants. Of course
these are frankly presented as paid matter, and every reader of
intelligence understands that they are inspired by the directly selfish
motives of the advertiser. When one thinks of the poor, the ignorant,
and the sick, who are exploited through such agencies, however, the
despicable character of the abuse is manifest. In some papers, also,
the reader finds abundant evidence of the activities of press and
publicity bureaus working in the interest of certain forms of business.
Morally this abuse is much worse than the foregoing, for it throws off
the form of advertising and clothes itself as news or editorial opinion.
Large advertisers, particularly since the development of daily full
page announcements by department stores, also insist at times, and not
always ineffectually, upon exerting influence over news and editorial
columns. A pitch of absurdity seldom realised in this connection was
exemplified by the silence or approval with which the press of one of
our largest cities, a single paper honourably excepted, treated the
clearly mistaken philanthropy of a certain wealthy merchant who had
established many distributing stations for sterilised, rather than
Pasteurised milk. The paralysing effect of box office influence upon
sincere and vigorous dramatic criticism is another deplorable instance
of the same sort.
Finally there are papers which, however free they may keep themselves
from outside interests, nevertheless represent the immediate political
or economic ambitions of their owners. It is easy to exaggerate this
abuse not only with regard to its present extent absolutely considered,
but also with reference to its contemporary development as compared
with the press of the past. In its earlier periods journalism was
almost universally the tool of party. During the civil war,—the epoch
of great editorial personalities,—political ambitions constantly
invaded the _sanctum_ with the result that the gross unfairness and
bitter partisanship engendered by the times were doubly and trebly
emphasised in the columns of the press. The new journalism which began
its career about 1875 not only prints more news but prints it more
fairly than the old school. Of course most of our papers are still the
recognised organs of some party, but they are far from being servile
and characterless advocates of every party policy. Moreover there is a
considerable number of politically independent papers, some of which
are avowedly so, while others are really so although they may still
wear lightly some party emblem. Fearless, continued criticism of public
abuses is more and more coming to be recognised as good policy both for
a paper and for the commonweal.
Unfortunately there is another side to this record of improvement and
achievement. Perhaps the most important single difference between the
old personal journalism and the journalism of to-day is the large
capitalistic character of the latter. When the mechanical outfit of a
city paper could be supplied with a comparatively small sum of money,
the personality of the editor was all important, although, as we have
seen, even this favouring economic condition did not by any means
produce uncorrupted journalism. At the present time large capital is
necessary not only to provide the equipment, but also to meet the heavy
losses of the few inevitable lean years at the outset. In most cases
the money is contributed by one man or by a comparatively small number
of men whose other business interests are likely to be very harmonious
if not already consolidated. In consequence there is a common, and
withal very human, tendency on the part of the paper thus established
and owned to deal favourably under all circumstances with the financial
interest or group of interests back of it. This is the typical
journalistic danger of the present period, just as the political
bee in the editor’s bonnet was the typical evil of the old personal
journalism. Legislation requiring newspapers to print the names of
their principal owners, and to deposit full lists of stockholders in
some state office of record where they could be made available to all
comers, ought to limit considerably the possibility of capitalistic
manipulation of the press. By revealing facts regarding financial
control which at best can only be suspected at the present time,
publicity of this character would enable readers to make the necessary
allowances for any undue form of counting-room control which might
manifest itself in the editorial or news columns of a given paper. In
spite of this and other shortcomings, however, most observers agree
that the American press as a whole is more independent to-day than ever
before.
In considering abuses which affect our journalism one should not forget
certain conditions which set a limit to the corrupt manipulation of the
greatest single agency of public instruction. A modern newspaper is a
large capitalistic enterprise, of course, but its business is peculiar
in that it must sell its product to tens of thousands of people every
day at the price of a cent or two per copy. However plutocratic a
paper may be at one end it always represents the extreme of democracy
at the other. Our press is occasionally prostituted by large moneyed
interests, but it is in much more constant danger of that directly
opposite form of corruption, namely demagogy. Reform of the press
depends ultimately upon the reform of its readers. Even on the latter
side, however, we have to note an increasing and very gratifying
readiness on the part of our papers to tell the American people the
truth about themselves and about foreign peoples regardless of all our
old time prejudices and antipathies.[44]
Reverting to the plutocratic influences affecting the press, however,
we have seen that in the nature of things no single newspaper can
become the tool of all the anti-social interests. It can defend
effectively only the few which for one reason or another are approved
by the managers of its policy. Usually a newspaper which is thus
silent or mildly unctuous on certain abuses endeavours to rehabilitate
itself by the condemnation, sometimes in a sensational and even
hysterical fashion, of other abuses, thus conducting, so to speak, a
vigorous department of moral foreign affairs. As a result the position
taken by the press as a whole on most points is strongly favourable
to the public interest. On this ground one may find a philosophic
justification for the sentiment so compactly phrased by Mr. George
William Curtis to the effect that “no abuse of a free press can be so
great as the evil of its suppression.”[45]
Even in dealing with those subjects concerning which a given paper is
not honest with its readers great care must be exercised. So far as
possible it must conceal the evidences of selfish interest and present
its case on grounds of public policy. Now arguments based on such
grounds are always worthy at least of consideration. A very large part
of political discussion, not only journalistic but of other kinds,
is “inspired” in this fashion, and it not infrequently happens that
what may be in accord with the self interest of individuals and groups
is also in accord with public interest. If this is not the case a
competing paper ought to be able to expose pretty effectively the false
assertions of its wily contemporary. In dealing with national questions
which are discussed by newspapers in every part of the country this
function of mutual criticism is in general well performed. Cases
occur, however, especially in connection with municipal issues, where
practically every paper of wide local circulation is either silenced
or actively engaged in the support of a crooked deal. Under such
circumstances a fight in defence of public interest is almost hopeless.
The more nearly the press of a given district approaches this condition
of corrupt paralysis, however, the brighter are the opportunities for
an opposition paper. In journalism as everywhere in the world of social
phenomena the inviolable law prevails that a function cannot be abused
without corresponding harm to the agency which allows itself to be
perverted. If it should ever happen,—although at the present time the
prospect seems remote enough,—that a thoroughgoing control embracing
the daily papers of the whole country should be established in defence
of consolidated interests, it is certain that some new agency of
publicity would spring up in the interest of the people as a whole. In
the end the daily papers themselves would be the worst sufferers from
a general perversion of their activities. As a matter of fact a new
and powerful journalistic organ has already developed an influence not
incomparable with that of the daily press. The wonderful growth of the
low priced monthly and weekly magazines during the decade just past
has been explained on various grounds:—the cheapening of paper and of
illustrations, the second-class mailing privilege, the effectiveness
of such media for advertisement, and so on. No doubt these factors go
far toward explaining the great expansion of magazine circulation, but
in spite of much journalistic prejudice to the contrary circulation
and influence are not necessarily correlative. And the influence, as
distinct from the circulation, of the magazines has been due very
largely to the boldness and effectiveness with which they assailed many
public abuses with regard to which for one reason or another the daily
press was silent or even favourable. Of course the detached situation
of the magazines made it easy and even profitable for them to pursue
policies which might have cost the newspapers dear. In any event a new
way was found for the effective journalistic presentation of the public
interest.
In discussing the alleged corruption of the learned professions as a
whole reference was made to the powerful influence of professional
codes of ethics. One must recognise the journalistic instinct and
journalistic traditions as strong factors of similar character. Even
where editorial and reportorial staffs have given way, for purely bread
and butter reasons, to what they knew were the selfish suggestions of
controlling financial interests these same interests must sometimes
have wondered at the lukewarmness of their paper’s support, and also,
perhaps, at the enthusiasm which it manifested for some good cause
indifferent to them. Moreover professional standards are rising in this
field as well as elsewhere. No one has given clearer or more forcible
expression to the highest of these newer ideals of journalism than
Mr. George Harvey of the _North American Review_, whose words, by the
way, present the extreme of contrast to those quoted earlier from Mr.
Swinton. After pointing out that the great editorial leaders of the
past generation,—Greeley, Raymond, Dana, Bennett,—were shackled by
their own political ambitions, Mr. Harvey asks:
“What, then, shall we conclude? That an editor shall bar acceptance
of public position under any circumstances? Yes, absolutely, and any
thought or hope of such preferment, else his avowed purpose is not his
true one, his policy is one of deceit in pursuance of an unannounced
end; his guidance is untrustworthy, his calling that of a teacher
false to his disciples for personal advantage, his conduct a gross
betrayal not only of public confidence, but also of the faith of every
true journalist jealous of a profession which should be of the noblest
and the farthest removed from base uses in the interests of selfish
men.” ...
“He [the journalist] is, above all, a teacher who, through daily
appeals to the reason and moral sense of his constituency, should
become a real leader.... Above capital, above labour, above wealth,
above poverty, above class, and above people, subservient to none,
quick to perceive and relentless in resisting encroachments by any,
the master journalist should stand as the guardian of all, the
vigilant watchman on the tower ever ready to sound the alarm of
danger, from whatever source, to the liberties and the laws of this
great union of free individuals.”[46]
Discussion of the “tainted money” charge so far as it affects our
universities and colleges can not, of course, be presented with
complete objectivity by the present writer. Nothing can be promised
beyond an earnest effort to attain detachment and impartiality. On the
other hand, a decade spent in the active teaching of the principal
debatable subjects in three institutions of widely different character
may furnish a basis of experience of some value.[47]
First of all there must be no blinking of the importance of the
subject. “It is manifest,” wrote the acute Hobbes, “that the
Instruction of the people, dependeth wholly, on the right teaching
of Youth in the Universities.” Quaint as is the language in which he
defends this proposition the argument which it contains is applicable
with few changes to modern conditions.
“They whom necessity, or couvetousnesse keepeth attent on their
trades, and labour; and they, on the other side, whom superfluity, or
sloth carrieth after their sensuall pleasures, (which two sorts of men
take up the greatest part of Man-kind,) being diverted from the deep
meditation, which the learning of truth, not onely in the matter of
Natural Justice, but also of all other Sciences necessarily requireth,
receive the Notions of their duty, chiefly from Divines in the Pulpit,
and partly from such of their Neighbours, or familiar acquaintance, as
having the Faculty of discoursing readily, and plausibly, seem wiser
and better learned in cases of Law, and Conscience, than themselves.
And the Divines, and such others as make shew of Learning, derive
their knowledge from the Universities, and from the Schooles of
Law, or from the Books, which by men eminent in those Schooles, and
Universities have been published.”[48]
In spite of the development of other intermediate agencies of public
instruction since the seventeenth century, and particularly of the
press and our elementary school system, the influence of universities
and colleges was never greater than it is at present, and it is an
influence which is constantly increasing in strength. The number of
universities and colleges is larger, their work is more efficient,
their curricula are broader, the number of college bred men in the
community is greater, and their leadership therein more perceptible
than ever before. Professors are enlisting in industrial, scientific,
and social activities outside academic walls in a way undreamed of so
long as the old monastic ideals held sway. By extension lectures and
still more by books and articles they are reaching larger and larger
masses of the people. Newspapers formulate current public opinion,
but to the writer, at least, it seems plainly apparent that the best
thought of the universities and colleges to-day is the thought that in
all likelihood will profoundly influence both press and public opinion
in the near future. Academic observers of the sound money struggle
of 1896, for example, must have smiled frequently to themselves at
the arguments employed during the campaign. There was not one of them
which had not been the commonplace of economic seminars for years.
The newspapers and the abler political leaders on both sides simply
filled their quivers with arrows drawn from academic arsenals. Extreme
cleverness was shown by many journalists and campaign orators in
popularising this material, in adapting it to local conditions, and in
placing it broadcast before the people, but of original argumentation
on their part there was scarcely a scintilla. It is significant also
that the battle of the ballots was decided in favour of the contention
which commanded the majority of scientific supporters. Subsequent
political issues, great and small, have developed very similar
phenomena, although of course it would be absurd to assert that in all
cases the dominant opinion of the _literati_ prevailed at the ballot.
There are also certain academic ideals of the day with which practical
politics and business are demonstrably and crassly at variance. Not
until the fate of many future battles is decided can we estimate the
full strength of the university influence on such pending questions.
Victory would seem assured in a sufficient number of cases, however,
to make it clear that just as the wholesomeness of the public opinion
of to-day is conditioned by the independence of the press, so the
wholesomeness of the public opinion of to-morrow will be determined
largely by the independence of our colleges and universities.
As compared with the press, universities possess certain great
advantages which justify the public in demanding from them higher
standards of accuracy and impartiality. The professor enjoys some
measure of leisure; the editor is always under the lash of production
on the stroke of the event. It is also a very considerable advantage
that the editorial “we” and the anonymity of the newspaper are foreign
to college practice. There is, of course, a pretty well recognised body
of opinion on methods and ideals common to the faculties of our learned
institutions, but in the separate fields of departmental work any
opinion that may be expressed is primarily the opinion of the professor
expressing it. His connection with a given institution is, indeed,
a guaranty of greater or less weight as to his general scholarly
ability, and he will, of course, be mindful of this in all that he
says or writes. But beyond this his personal reputation is directly
involved. Those who make a newspaper suffer collectively and more or
less anonymously for any truckling to corrupt interests. The college
president or teacher guilty of an offence of the same sort must suffer
in his own person the contempt of his colleagues, his students, and the
public generally.
Newspapers, moreover, are usually managed by private corporations
frankly seeking profit as one of their ends. Universities and
colleges, on the other hand, are much more free from the directly
economic motive. There are, however, certain large qualifications
to the advantages which institutions of learning thus enjoy. Every
university and college is constantly perceiving new means of increasing
its usefulness and persistently seeking to secure them. The demands
made in behalf of such purposes may seem excessive at times, but it
is clear that an educational institution which does not appreciate
the vital importance of the work it is doing, and consequently the
importance of expanding that work, is simply not worth its salt. In a
great many cases the readiest means of securing the necessary funds is
by appeal to rich men for large gifts and endowments. As the number
of munificent Mæcenases is always limited and the number of needy
institutions always very considerable, a competitive struggle ensues,
different in most of its incidents from the directly profit seeking
struggles of the business world, but essentially competitive none
the less. In the campaign of a university or college for expansion
a large body of students makes a good showing; hence too often low
entrance requirements weakly enforced and low standards of promotion.
At times even the springs of discipline are relaxed lest numbers should
be reduced by a salutary expulsion or two. Courses are divided and
subdivided beyond the real needs of an institution and salaries are
reduced in order to secure a sufficient number of teachers to give the
large number of courses advertised with great fulness in the catalogue.
A large part of crooked collegiate athletics is due to an indurated
belief in the advertising efficacy of gridiron victories as a means
of attracting first, students, and then endowments. So far as charges
of corruption against our higher educational institutions are at all
justified they are justified chiefly by the practices just described.
Fairness requires the statement, however, that a marked change of heart
is now taking place. Public criticism has placed athletic graft in
the pillory to such an extent that enlightened self-interest, if no
better motive, should bring about its speedy abolition by responsible
college managements. Many sincere efforts have been made by members of
faculties singly and through organisations covering certain fields of
study to raise and properly enforce entrance and promotion standards.
Finally in the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching
there has been developed an agency of unparalleled efficiency for
detecting and exposing low standards. A college may continue to publish
fake requirements, to crowd its class rooms with students who belong
to high schools, to pad its courses, to underpay and overwork its
instructing staff, but if it does these things it cannot, even if
otherwise qualified, secure pensions for its professors, and in any
event its derelictions will be advertised broadcast in the reports of
the Foundation with a precision and a conviction beyond all hope of
rebuttal. Let cynics smile at a process which they may describe as
bribing the colleges to be good by pensioning their superannuates,
but unquestionably the work of the Foundation has resulted in a new
uprightness, a new firmness of standards, a higher efficiency that
bodes well for the future of American education. Parents may give
material encouragement to this movement by reading the publications
of the Carnegie Foundation, as well as college catalogues and
advertisements, before they determine upon an institution for the
education of their children.
Although the conditions just described are the principal evil results
of the competitive struggle for college and university expansion, the
accusations of corruption against institutions of learning have usually
dealt with their teaching of the doctrines of economics, sociology,
and political science. Endowments must be secured; as a rule they can
be had only from the very rich; among the very rich are numbered most
of the “malefactors of great wealth”;—_ergo_ university and college
teaching on such subjects must be made pleasing or at least void of
all offence to plutocratic interests.
There is a certain disproportion between the means and the ends
considered by the foregoing argument which is worth notice. To
found or endow a college or university requires a great deal of
money. Any institution worthy of either name is made up of numerous
departments,—languages, literature, the natural sciences, history,
and the social sciences,—of which only the last named are concerned
with the moot questions of the day. If one cherished the Machiavellian
notion of corrupting academic opinion to his economic interest he
would be obliged, therefore, to support an excessively large number of
departments the work of which would be absolutely indifferent to him.
Endowment of the social sciences alone would be rather too patent.
That they are not over-endowed at the present time in comparison with
their importance relative to other departments is a condition the
large mournfulness of which seems beyond all possibility of doubt to
the writer. Nor should it be forgotten that the teachers of the social
sciences form but a small minority of the whole body of university and
collegiate instructors in all subjects. Nevertheless they are subject
to the rigid general standards of accuracy, fairness, and impartiality
prescribed by the profession as a whole, and enforced severely whether
the offender be a biologist, a philologist, or an economist. Criticism
is far more relentless and constant in this sphere than laymen are
wont to suspect, except on the rare occasions when some more than
ordinarily virulent controversy is taken up by the daily papers. Under
such conditions any academic tendency either toward servility or toward
demagogy is not likely to go long unchallenged.
Considering the high cost and small profits of university manipulation
in this light it is very doubtful whether so indirect a method of
social defence would appeal to our financial pirates. Whatever
their defects or vices, men of this type have at least received the
rigorous training of the business career. They are not philosophers of
farsighted vision, nor are they easily perturbed by fears of distant
dangers. Troubles near at hand they see very clearly; indeed, one of
the chief grounds of clamour against such men is the crass directness
of the bribery to which on occasion they resort. Interests under fire
appeal rather to political hirelings, to venal lawyers, to the courts,
to legislatures, or to the press for effective protection and defence.
College doctrines are too remote, too uncertain of manipulation to be
of assistance. Although they did not learn it from the poet, business
men are certainly not unmindful that:
“was ein Professor spricht
Nicht gleich zu allen dringet.”
Given both the motive and the means, however, the task of corrupting
the college teaching of economic, political, and social doctrines would
seem almost hopelessly difficult. A given institution, may, indeed,
be endowed almost exclusively by a certain man of great wealth. With
very few exceptions knowledge of such munificence is made public
property. If then the president or professors of such a university
should endeavour to justify or palliate the business conduct of the
founder their motives will be suspected from the start and their
arguments, however artfully they might plead the case, discounted
accordingly. If discretion were thrown to the winds (there is perhaps
one case of this sort) the net effect of the work of such apologists,
instead of aiding their financial friends, might profoundly injure
and embarrass them. Those who are familiar with the character of
the American student know that he would be the first to detect any
insincerity in the discussion of public questions by an instructor or
college official. If the prosperity of the college were due almost
entirely to a single bounteous donor its venal professors would, of
course, have no direct motive to defend the economic misconduct of any
other than their particular friend among the captains of industry.
Possibly they might develop a policy similar to that of newspapers in
the same predicament,—silence or soft speaking regarding the sins of
their great and rich friend combined with louder trumpetings against
the social misconduct of other and indifferent financial interests. In
the case of all our important institutions of learning, however, funds
of very considerable size in the aggregate have been received from
many sources in the past, and new gifts, even when they are of large
amount, represent merely fractional additions thereto. Those who know
our colleges and universities will find it hard to believe that the old
academic ideals and traditions of well supported institutions, their
scientific honesty and earnest devotion to broad public service, are to
be cheaply bought by gifts of half a million or more from the _nouveau
riche_. There is such a thing as loyalty to the small gifts often made
with the highest motives and the greatest sacrifices by generations
long since dead. Few institutions desire to disregard this sentiment,
and no institution can disregard it with impunity.
Finally there are the great state institutions of the country,
maintained almost wholly by taxation and hence free from any
corrupting influence that large endowments might exercise. There can
be no doubt that the possession of these two fundamentally different
kinds of economic support is a great safeguard to the independence
of university instruction in the United States. No country is more
blatant in asserting its _Lehrfreiheit_ than Germany, but there the
exclusive reliance of universities upon state support, coupled with the
tremendous strength of government, makes necessary very considerable
modification of the Teutonic boast of absolute academic freedom. To
be sure state institutions in the United States have been charged at
times with similar subservience to legislatures and political leaders.
Whatever perversion of this sort may have occurred it was at least
not turned to the advantage of corporate misdoing. Indeed it probably
had a directly opposite and strongly demagogic trend. Fortunately our
state universities are becoming so powerful, so well fortified by
high and honest traditions, so beloved by great and rapidly growing
bodies of influential alumni that the days of their dependence upon
political favour are well nigh over. It is now beyond all doubt that
they are destined to a career of immense usefulness to our democracy,
and it seems highly probable that they will overtake, if they do not
ultimately excel, the great endowed institutions of the country. If
the latter should ever show themselves subject to the influence of
predatory wealth the development of well supported public universities
should supply the necessary corrective. At the present time, however,
a strong presumption of the general devotion of both classes of
institutions to the public welfare is afforded by the fact that no
recognisable distinction exists between the general doctrines of
economics, political, and social science as taught in endowed schools
on the one hand and in state schools on the other.
It was unfortunately essential to the foregoing argument that the worst
motives should be assumed on the part of college benefactors. Justice
requires ample correction of this point. A conspiracy to influence
the social doctrines of our colleges, as we have seen, is neither so
inexpensive, so direct, nor so likely to succeed as to commend itself
to business men looking for immediate results. No doubt there have
been men of wealth who by large and well advertised benefactions to
colleges and universities have sought not to influence college teaching
but to rehabilitate themselves and their business methods in popular
esteem. Conspicuous giving with this penitential purpose in view is
not likely to prove very effective, however. The sharp insight as to
motives and the half humourous cynicism peculiar to American character
are sufficient safeguards against the purchase of undeserved sympathy
by rich offenders. In spite of the enormous sums given in the United
States not only to the higher educational institutions but also for
many other educational and philanthropic purposes, it seems extremely
doubtful that public opinion has been affected thereby favourably to
plutocratic interests. Few of the great mass are directly touched and
consciously benefited by such gifts, but all are able to see (and
if not they are helped by radicals to see), the superfluity out of
which the donations were made. Benefactors, prospective and actual,
must face the certainty of much criticism and misinterpretation. So
far as this criticism is unjust it is to be regretted; so far as it
is just it contributes materially to social welfare. Investments in
business are judged as to their wisdom by the ready tests of profits
and permanence; investments in social work are not subject to tests so
accurate and so easily applied. To some extent their place is taken
by the advice and criticism of workers in the field. Still there is
large possibility that gifts for social work may be applied in useless
or even in harmful ways. A wise conception of the function of the
philanthropist must therefore include a realisation of the value of
criticism by specialists, and also a determination either to ignore
misinterpretation and unjust criticism, or to await its reversal by a
better informed, if somewhat belated public opinion.
Besides the possible but not always probable motives for making large
gifts referred to above every other conceivable influence has affected
educational benefactions. George Ade’s breezy Chicago magnate who slaps
the college president on the back and says: “Have a laboratory on
me, old fellow,” is slangy, to be sure, but not altogether fabulous.
It is a very common misconception that financial assistance is the
only thing needful in higher educational work. President Schurman of
Cornell University expressed the views of many of his colleagues among
the great university executives of the country when he lamented that
“rich men who give their money to educational institutions cannot
be induced to give also their time and energy to the management of
them.”[49] So neglectful an attitude on their part, by the way, is
hardly consistent with the theory that they are engaged in a conspiracy
to pollute the wells of knowledge. When we consider the immense number
of contributors, large and small, to the cause of higher education
it is impossible to escape the conviction that behind many of their
generous acts lay real sacrifice, an adequate conception of the great
function of university teaching, and the purest and most humanitarian
motives. Often, too, there has been full realisation that “the gift
without the giver is bare,” and patient, unstinted, intelligent service
has accompanied money benefactions. In the same fine spirit nearly all
our colleges and universities have accepted and employed the resources
so generously placed at their disposal.
While due weight should be given to the honourable influences
ordinarily accompanying benefactions, candour also compels the frank
discussion of those cases where constraint of professorial opinion
has been attempted. There have been a few flagrant instances of the
dismissal of teachers on account of utterances displeasing to men who
have been drawn upon heavily for financial support. One can readily
understand the feeling of the latter that, considering their large
gifts, they have been most ungratefully and unjustly abused, and
also the action which they accordingly instigate, although it is as
silly in most cases as the Queen of Hearts’ peremptory command:—“Off
with his head!” Men in other walks of life frequently behave in
the same way. There is, for example, the very commonplace case of
the church member who, disgruntled because of pulpit references—no
matter how impersonal—to his pet sin, cuts down his contribution and
seeks to drive the minister from his charge. The consequences of the
dismissal of a professor because of conflict between his teachings and
the outside interests of college benefactors are so widespread and
dangerous, however, that they cannot be passed over lightly simply
because occurrences of this sort are relatively infrequent in the
academic world.
In the first instance, of course, the teacher himself may seem the
chief sufferer from such controversies. Few of the clear cases of this
sort, uncomplicated by any personal defect on the part of the man who
is dismissed, have resulted, however, in the destruction of a promising
career. On the contrary, positions have been opened up in other more
liberal and often more important institutions to the teachers who have
been persecuted for truth’s sake. Indeed there is some danger that
the halo of false martyrdom, with its possible accompanying rewards,
may mislead the younger and less judicious holders of professorships
to indulge in forms of blatherskiting quite inconsistent with their
office. In the great majority of cases, however, the effect of such
individual assaults upon the tenure of academic position is to threaten
the independence of every department in the same or related subjects
the country over. Here we have the most serious evil resulting from
such unfortunate occurrences. It is certainly great enough to justify
the intervention of the national scientific association to which the
professor belongs at least to the extent of the most searching and
impartial investigation of all the circumstances involved in his
dismissal, and their subsequent publication as widely as possible
whether or not they justify the professor concerned. A powerful
and most welcome auxiliary to the restraining influence which such
investigations are bound to exercise is likely to be supplied by the
Carnegie Foundation if one may judge from tendencies exhibited by its
most recent report.[50] Thus in the last analysis the evil consequences
of attempts to interfere with liberty of teaching are likely to fall
most severely upon the institution which is so weak as to permit such
manipulation. It risks exposure and loss of prestige, it loses men
of worth and suffers in its capacity to attract others to take their
places. All things considered there is every indication that the few
institutions which have offended in this way have learned well their
lesson, and are quite in the penitent frame of mind of the pious Helen:—
“... dies will ich nun
Auch ganz gewiss nicht wieder thun.”
Amid the manifold influences that environ university teaching it is
impossible for any one writer to set down all the guiding professional
ideals. That they are easily corruptible and frequently corrupted is,
as we have seen, absurd. Of both the press and higher education it may
be said that they are in the grip of forces greater than themselves,
of forces mighty to restrain any tendency to be unfaithful to their
own better ideals. The rapidly growing attendance and influence
of universities and colleges would appear to constitute a vote of
confidence on the part of the public which may be interpreted as
a general denial of the charges made against them. In the great
majority of institutions the writer believes that the teaching of the
social sciences is dominated by the ideals of scientific honesty,
thoroughness, and impartiality. No instructor is worthy of university
or college position who deliberately seeks to make converts to any
party or cause, however free his motives may be from the taint of
personal advantage. Rather is it his duty to present systematically
all moot questions in all their aspects. Like the judge summing up
a case he should attempt further to supply a basis for the critical
weighing of testimony by the class,—his jury. He is by no means to be
inhibited from expressing an opinion, indeed he should be strongly
encouraged to express it, stating it however as opinion together with
the reasons that have led him to form it. But active proselyting should
be rigorously barred. It is certainly no part of the duties of a
professor of political science, for example, to attempt to make voters
for either the Democratic or Republican ticket in a given campaign.
If he attempts to do so he will certainly and deservedly fail, and in
addition cripple his own influence and that of the institution which he
represents. The higher duty is his of presenting all the evidence and
the opinions on the points at issue and of exhibiting in his procedure
the methods which will enable his students to investigate and decide
for themselves not merely the political questions of the day but also
the political questions they will have to meet unaided throughout their
later active lives. Not voters for one campaign or recruits for one
cause, but intelligent citizenship for all time and every issue,—such
as is the ideal which the teacher should pursue.
Naturally this attitude does not please everybody. All sorts of
interests, not only corrupting but reforming in character, are
constantly endeavouring to secure academic approval in order to
exploit it in their own propaganda. When this is denied, recourse to
the charge of corruption by an adverse interest lies very close to
a hand already habituated to mudslinging. Although the prevailing
opinions of college teachers on labour legislation, to cite a specific
example, are certainly not those of the manufacturer’s office, just
as certainly they are broader and more progressive than the opinions
of the man in the street. Of course radical labour leaders will take
up still more advanced positions. In the partisanship natural to men
in their situation they may even regard academic suggestions for the
solution of the question as mere palliatives. It is difficult for
them to appreciate the motives or the value to the cause of labour of
the tempered advocacy of disinterested persons who are able to appeal
to the great neutral public which in the end must pass on all labour
reforms and all labour legislation. And the socialists are accustomed
to go much farther than labour leaders, insinuating that capitalistic
influence lurks behind every university chair in economics. Mr. W. J.
Ghent puts their view of the situation as follows:
“Teachers, economists, in their search for truth, too often find it
only within the narrow limits which are prescribed by endowments.”
“The economic, and, consequently, the moral, pressure exerted upon
this class [_i.e._, “social servants,” including college teachers]
by the dominant class is constant and severe; and the tendency of
all moral weaklings within it is to conform to what is expected from
above.”
“Educators and writers have a normal function of social service. Many
of these, however, are retainers of a degraded type, whose greatest
activity lies in serving as reflexes of trading-class sentiment and
disseminators of trading-class views of life.”
“Rightly, it may be said that it is to his [the minister, writer, or
teacher’s] economic interest to preach and teach the special ethics
of the traders; that the good jobs go to those who are most eloquent,
insistent, and thoroughgoing in expounding such ethics, while the
poor jobs or no jobs at all go to those who are most backward or
slow-witted in such exposition.”
“It may even be said that the net result of many of their [_i.e._,
trading-class] benefactions is nothing less than the prostitution of
the recipients—in particular of writers, preachers, and educators.”[51]
By way of contrast with this thoroughgoing arraignment, the opinion of
Mr. Paul Elmer More may be quoted:
“Of all the substitutes for the classical discipline there is none
more popular and, when applied to immature minds, more pernicious
than economics. To a very considerable degree the present peril of
socialism and other eccentricities of political creed is due to
the fact that so many young men are crammed with economical theory
(whether orthodox or not) when their minds have not been weighted with
the study of human nature in its larger aspects. From this lack of
balance they fall an easy prey to the fallacy that history is wholly
determined by economical conditions, or to the sophism of Rousseau
that the evil in society is essentially the result of property. The
very thoroughness of this training in economics is thus a danger.”[52]
The positions both of Mr. Ghent and of Mr. More are extreme. As for
the special ethics of the trading class, of which the former makes
so much, it is doubtful if anything exists more foreign to current
academic ideals. So marked is this aversion that it is distinctly
difficult for the ordinary professor to estimate correctly the real
value to the community of the service of the business man. That equal
difficulty exists on the other side is apparent from the openly
expressed conviction of many business men that the college teacher is
a thoroughly unpractical sort of person. The latter attitude, by the
way, is a most remarkable one for a client to assume toward his social
apologist,—taking Mr. Ghent’s view of the situation. A prisoner at the
bar who should rail at the abilities of his counsel is certainly not
putting himself in the way of acquittal. As for “moral weaklings,” no
profession can honestly deny the existence of some examples of this
pestiferous species in its ranks. If academic promotion depended upon
moral weakness, however, the bankruptcy of the profession would have
been announced long ago. As a matter of fact, the system of selection
and advancement employed by colleges is admirably adapted to their
requirements. In spite of the machinations of occasional cliques,
chiefly of a personal or churchly character, it usually succeeds
in placing the best prepared and most capable men in desirable and
influential positions. Certainly college administration as a whole
deserves the reputation of success which it enjoys, a reputation, by
the way, much superior to that of most of our governmental machinery.
If, for example, an equally effective system could be employed in the
selection of the administrative heads of American city governments it
is safe to say that many of our municipal problems would find a speedy
solution.
As between Mr. Ghent and Mr. More, the latter is much nearer the
truth in his main contention. It is hardly the case, however, as Mr.
More would seem to imply, that thorough training in economics is more
likely to produce half-baked agitators than is a mere smattering of the
subject. Here as elsewhere “a little knowledge is a dangerous thing,”
and the students who afterwards run amuck in radicalism are drawn to
a very slight extent from the ranks of those who acquire a really
thorough knowledge of economics or the other social sciences. Without
recourse to the old classical discipline, as proposed by Mr. More,
the study of history and of the theory of evolution should furnish an
excellent corrective to the excessively _a priori_ processes employed
in some fields of economics. Apart from these exceptions Mr. More is
clearly right in maintaining that the net result of college instruction
in this subject is radical rather than reactionary. However, the
impress finally given to the overwhelming majority of college students
is not that of radicalism but rather that of willingness to work
patiently, constructively, and progressively for social betterment.
In either event the sweeping assertion that college teachers are the
hirelings of capitalistic conspirators finds little ground for support.
* * * * *
One who attempts a survey of the whole field of corruption is apt to
be impressed at first with its hopeless complexity and heterogeneity.
There are many petty forms of evil, the shady moral character of which
is as yet hardly perceived. The spirit thus revealed is, however,
identical with that which expresses itself in the major forms of
corruption which are so obvious and threatening that they have become
subject to public criticism. It cannot be denied that some abuses of
a grave character make their appearance in the learned professions,
journalism, and higher education. In all such cases, however, vigorous
reform work is in progress. A very gratifying feature of the situation
is that the most effective and sincere efforts for improvement are
being made from the inside. Our “men of light and leading” are sound
at heart. It is not necessary to prove to them, as unfortunately it
sometimes is to those in other walks of life, that corruption does
not pay. Rehabilitated by some of its more recent forms journalism
exercises an alert and resourceful influence upon the opinion of the
day. More hopeful still is the fact that our institutions of higher
learning are moulding both the men and the measures of to-morrow into
nobler forms.
FOOTNOTES:
[40] Corruption in the professions might also be dealt with as a
subdivision of economic corruption. All professional services, it
could be argued, must be remunerated, and the abuses which have grown
up in connection with them are the outgrowth of a commercial spirit
antagonistic to professional ideals. While this is doubtless true,
the persistence of the older ideals and the efforts to rehabilitate
and extend them are facts of sufficient importance, in the opinion of
the writer, to justify the separate treatment of corruption in the
professions. Even if this distinction did not exist convenience would
make a division of the fields for the purpose of discussion highly
desirable.
[41] _Cf._ G. W. Alger’s “Generosity and Corruption,” _Atlantic_, vol.
xcv (1905), p. 781.
[42] Even if it be sneered at in certain quarters as a mere counsel
of perfection, the following statement of the principles underlying
“the lawyer’s duty in its last analysis” is of great significance:—“No
client, corporate or individual, however powerful, nor any cause, civil
or political, however important, is entitled to receive, nor should
any lawyer render, any service or advice involving disloyalty to the
law whose ministers we are, or disrespect of the judicial office,
which we are bound to uphold, or corruption of any person or persons
exercising a public office or private trust, or deception or betrayal
of the public. When rendering any such improper service or advice, the
lawyer invites and merits stern and just condemnation. Correspondingly,
he advances the honour of his profession and the best interests of his
client when he renders service or gives advice tending to impress upon
the client and his undertaking exact compliance with the strictest
principles of moral law.” The “Canons of Professional Ethics,” adopted
by the American Bar Association at its thirty-first annual meeting at
Seattle, August 27, 1908, are conceived in the spirit of the foregoing,
taken from Canon 32. Canons 2, 3, 6, 26, 29, and 31 also declare
specifically and unqualifiedly against various forms of corruption.
[43] Quoted in Lester F. Ward’s “Pure Sociology,” p. 487. Professor
Ward himself says: “The newspaper is simply an organ of deception.
Every prominent newspaper is the defender of some interest and
everything it says is directly or indirectly (and most effective when
indirect) in support of that interest. There is no such thing at the
present time as a newspaper that defends a principle.”
[44] _Cf._ “Is an Honest Newspaper Possible,” by “A New York Editor,”
in the _Atlantic_, vol. cii (1908), p. 441.
[45] “Orations and Addresses,” vol. i, p. 303.
[46] “Journalism, Politics, and the University,” _North American
Review_, vol. clxxxvii (1908), p. 598.
[47] It is perhaps worth noting that the debatable subjects of to-day
are not those of a generation or so ago. Geology and biology were
then the dangerous chairs, the occupants of which frequently found
themselves in conflict with straight-laced followers of various
religious sects. Occasionally professors of philosophy and ethics
became involved in similar controversies. At the present time conflicts
of this character are much less frequent and are confined for the most
part to theological seminaries and those smaller colleges which are
still dominated by narrow denominational influences. Nearly all our
leading universities have so far emancipated themselves from sectarian
control that controversies with their professors on this basis are
virtually impossible. In such institutions the chairs which present
difficulties nowadays are those in economics, political science, and
sociology, although, as we shall see, these difficulties are greatly
exaggerated in popular estimation. It is hardly necessary to add that
(with the exception in some small measure of sociology) the area
of friction in these subjects is not at all in their contact with
religious, but almost exclusively in their contact with business and
political activities outside university walls.
[48] “Leviathan,” pt. ii, ch. xxx.
[49] _Cf._ his annual report for 1904-05, pp. 19-20, for a brief but
very interesting reference to the “tainted money” charge.
[50] “The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, Third
Annual Report,” 1908, pp. 82-91.
[51] “Mass and Class,” pp. 14, 82, 83, 105, 243.
[52] _Bookman_, p. 652, August, 1906.
CORRUPTION IN BUSINESS AND POLITICS
V
CORRUPTION IN BUSINESS AND POLITICS
No form of corruption can exist without reacting upon the life of
the state. Pollution of the sources of public instruction defiles
individuals and all the manifold non-sovereign social organisations,
but it culminates in an infection of public opinion which directly
contaminates the body politic. Even more immediately corrupt business
practices lead to corrupt political practices. This is so conspicuously
the case that separate discussion of the two subjects is virtually
impossible. It is feasible, however, and should prove profitable,
to distinguish the various subdivisions of economic and political
corruption and to point out certain lines of the development which have
bound the two so closely together in our modern life.
Pre-eminent among the forms of business corruption are the vicious
practices which have grown up in the general relation of buyer and
seller. Purveyors of adulterated, infected, or diseased consumption
goods, such as food stuffs, and particularly meat and milk; dealers in
sweatshop clothing; vendors of patent medicines; owners and builders of
unsanitary tenement houses, of unsafe theatres, and excursion steamers;
managers of railroad and trolley companies who neglect to install
devices to protect their passengers may serve as illustrations. A
further branch of this form of corruption, the importance of which
would perhaps justify separate classification, occurs in connection
with the dealers in vice,—the dive keepers, policy kings, gamblers,
and procurers. The relation of master and servant furnishes a
second subdivision of the primarily economic forms of corruption.
Transportation companies, mine owners, manufacturers, and others who
neglect the installation of safety devices to protect labourers; the
employers of child labour; the labour leaders who extort blackmail by
threatening strikes are cases in point. Still another subdivision of
economic corruption centres about the fiduciary business relations
such as occur particularly in connection with savings banks, trust
companies, corporate directorships in general, and with the work of the
promoter. Underlying nearly all these kinds of economic corruption,
and emerging in the corruption of public instruction and political
corruption as well, is competition,—itself a force or method rather
than a form. Some species of corruption belonging logically under one
or another of the preceding heads exhibit the effects of competition
more plainly than others. Thus many practices common to those periods
of forced competition which so frequently precede the formation of
trusts have come to be looked upon as essentially corrupt and deserving
of legal restraint. Corruption does not disappear when competition is
practically eliminated, however. Some of the most difficult problems
involved in dealing with it notoriously result from the existence of
monopolies which have outstripped if they have not exterminated their
rivals.
To attempt the adequate discussion of all the forms of economic
corruption would require extended treatises on the labour problem,
the trust problem, banking, transportation, insurance, and many other
special subjects. The limitations of the present study exclude anything
beyond a few general observations. It may first be noted that many of
the abuses which are now undergoing the process of sanitation were
the result not so much of corrupt intention as of ignorance and the
relatively unlimited character of the competitive struggle to which
reference has already been made. They emerged long before the era of
consolidation, and are therefore not to be attributed solely to big
business. For many years prior to the Chicago slaughter house exposures
of 1906, for example, unclean meat was sold both by large packers and
by country butchers. Small producers were and are largely responsible
for impure milk and sweatshop clothing. Petty landlords as well as
extensive holders of real estate have built unsanitary tenement houses
and overcrowded them with renters. The neglect of transportation
companies to install safety devices for the protection of passengers
and employees has in the very nature of the case been a corporation
offence. On the other hand small as well as large mining operators
have sinned in this way, and small as well as large manufacturers
have exploited child labour. Betrayal of fiduciary relationships has
naturally occurred most frequently and most disastrously in enterprises
of large capital, although by no means confined exclusively to them.
Indeed there would seem to be reason for believing that in certain
ways consolidation has aided in bringing about the correction of some
of these evils. It centres them in a few large establishments, often
in a single district of no great size, where by their very magnitude
abuses force themselves upon a sluggish public attention. Consolidation
also makes it appear that the interests of a few selfish owners are
being pursued at the cost of the general welfare. This at once enlists
popular support for attacks upon abuses, and is a factor well worth
comparison with the defensive strength of massed capital. For these
reasons the cleaning up of the meat industry probably proceeded far
more rapidly after the Chicago exposures than would have been the case
if the effort had been made some years earlier during the period of
many scattered local abattoirs.
So many factors co-operated in bringing about the business evils under
consideration that the quality of corruption cannot always be ascribed
to them directly. Under a policy of _laisser faire_, of unlimited
competition, of public indifference and apathy, it is not easy to fix
moral responsibility. Even the twentieth mean man at any given time
may be only a little meaner than several of his nineteen competitors.
His offences are dictated by self-interest, of course, but they are
offences against a vague set of business customs or moral principles.
Public interest suffers, it is true, but the public is apathetic; it
has not laid down definite norms of business conduct. On the part of
the offender there is often lacking that conscious and purposeful
subordination of public to private interest which constitutes full
fledged corruption. Whatever degree of extenuation is afforded by
these considerations vanishes, however, when definite regulation is
undertaken by the state. Now that we are fairly launched upon an
era of legislative and administrative control, business offences of
the kind under consideration are frankly corrupt. Public apathy has
vanished, the interest of the public has been sharply defined, and he
who in contravention of these norms places his private gain above the
general welfare does so with full intent, and cannot evade or shift the
accusation of corruption.
A further consequence of the effort to regulate business practice by
law is not only intrinsically important but also serves as the great
connecting link between primarily economic and political corruption
proper. As soon as regulation is undertaken by the state a motive is
supplied to the still unterrified twentieth mean man to break the law
or to bribe its executors. In either case, by the way, the profits are
directly conditioned by the thoroughness with which his competitors
are restrained from following his own malpractices. The scales
employed by tariff officials may be tampered with in the interests of
large importers whose profits are thereby enormously increased. Or
inspectors may be bribed to pass infected carcasses, to approve impure
milk, to permit get-rich-quick concerns to use the mails, to wink at
lead weighted life preservers, to ignore the fact that the exits of
a theatre are entirely inadequate. With cases where state regulation
supplied the motive for the direct commission of fraud we are not
directly concerned here, but in all the cases where the collusion of
inspectors is involved we have to note that government regulation of
business has made easy the transmutation of what before was merely
corrupt and morally offensive into direct bribery. And from the point
of view of a venal official or political machine the extension of state
control means the widening of the opportunities for levying tribute.
Thus a form of corruption which began among, and for a time was limited
to, business relations becomes under regulation a menace to political
integrity. In other words, it takes on the form of political corruption
as well, and must, therefore, become the subject of discussion in that
connection.
However disheartening in other ways, a consideration of the forms of
business corruption yields the comforting reflection that all the
major forms of evil in this field are clearly recognised and severely
criticised. One must guard oneself against too cheerful optimism in
the premises, however. Reform forces armed _cap-a-pie_ do not spring
like unheralded knight errants of old into every breach at which social
integrity is being assailed. Instead they can be developed only by
persistent individual and associated effort and sacrifice. Moreover
the problem of corruption, as we have seen, is a persistent one, the
forms of which are ever changing and ever requiring new ingenuity and
resourcefulness in the methods of social sanitation. Back of reform
effort, also, there remains much that the individual can affect
simply by clearer habits of moral reflection and action even in the
small affairs of life. Public sentiment is built of such individual
fragments. Low opinion, low action in everyday affairs become a part
of the psychological atmosphere befogged by which the outlines even of
the larger evils of the present régime grow indistinct. Professor Ross
has performed a valuable service by exposing the fallacy that “sinners
should be chastised only by their betters.”[53] Social life, indeed,
would be inconceivable if the judgment of disinterested parties were
not superior to that of parties in interest. This is true even if the
former are themselves far from moral perfection. But it is further
true that the judgment of the disinterested will be more worthy and
helpful if in the conduct of their own affairs the disinterested have
habituated themselves to scrupulous honesty of thought and action. Till
this is more generally the case social ostracism, public contempt, and
loathing of the corruptionist, regardless of his looted wealth, will
not prove such effective measures of restraint as one might hope. “The
simplest reform,” said Mr. James B. Dill, “the hardest, but it must
be the first, is to make up our minds not to do those things which
the other man may be doing, but which we know to be wrong.”[54] Of
course the universal acceptance of such higher individual standards
would solve not only the problems of corruption but all our other
social and moral difficulties. We may not hope for the early arrival
of the millennium in this way, but neither may we hope for any large
movement toward better conditions without improvement of personal
character. Under our present circumstances much may be accomplished
by institutional reform, by legislation and the application of the
power of the state, although none of these is possible without the
application of the good will, the clearer intelligence and honesty of
individuals. If not the first or only reform, then, still it is clear
that no movement against corruption is complete which does not demand
frank recognition by the individual that he must deliberately choose
to get along less rapidly at times when the cost of advancement is
personal dishonour.
* * * * *
Corrupt practices may begin in, and at first be limited to, the
business world, but, as we have just seen, they are likely to overstep
economic boundaries and become a menace to the integrity of the state.
As such they must also be recognised and discussed as derivative forms
of political corruption. But in addition to evils of this kind which
originate, as it were, in other fields, various subdivisions of the
forms of corruption which immediately involve government may be marked
out tentatively for subsequent illustration and discussion.
To gain means for its support the state is obliged to impose taxes and
other burdens upon its citizens. The self-interest of the latter leads
them into many evasive practices of a more or less corrupt character.
The state is also a great buyer of materials and services of all sorts,
and hence subject to fraud in innumerable forms. It is further a great
seller and provider of various services, and is equally exposed to
danger in this capacity. Efforts by the state to regulate or suppress
vice and crime necessarily lead to attempts on the part of the vicious
and criminal to protect themselves by corrupt means. Without outside
collusion public officials may endeavour to exploit in their private
interest the powers which were conferred upon them solely for the
public benefit, and the result is auto-corruption, as defined in an
earlier study.[55] Preyed upon by corruption the state also at times
instigates corruption in the pursuit of its own ends, particularly
where international rivalries are concerned.[56] Finally the control of
government by political parties may lead to the purchase or stealing
of elections and the perversion of the functions of all the organs of
government in the interests of the machine. The fundamental importance
of the practices which fall under the last head is apparent. Upon them
ultimately depends the ability to maintain and profit by all the other
forms of political corruption.
* * * * *
Regulation of business by the state is an established fact, the causes
and origin of which need no further discussion in this place. Once
established it is subject to attack and evasion along various lines.
Downright fraud is possible, as in the concealment or false weighing
of dutiable articles, the publication of false statements regarding
the financial condition of fiduciary institutions, the covering up
of defects in tenement house building, and so on. Practices of this
character are extremely dangerous, however, as they are subject to
detection and consequent punishment by the first more than ordinarily
inquisitive inspector. Criminal chances are materially improved by
the bribery of officials who are thus bound to concealment both by
money interest and their own fear of exposure. Vigilant and honest
administration of the laws and the infliction of sufficient penalties,
particularly if they involve the imprisonment of principals, may be
trusted to reduce such practices to a minimum. There are, however,
other and more open methods of attack upon the regulation of business
by the state. Appeal may be made to the courts in the hope that laws of
this character may be declared unconstitutional. Business interests may
also seek their repeal or amendment at the hands of the legislature.
No one who accepts the fundamental principles of our government can
quarrel with either of these two modes of procedure. While doubtless
intended to secure the public interest, attempts to regulate industry
by the state may in given cases really defeat this end. And the latter
likelihood would be increased almost to the point of certainty if
legitimate protests from the businesses affected were stifled. On the
other hand attempts may be made by business interests to influence
courts or legislatures corruptly. Assuming that the honesty of all the
departments of government would be proof against such attempts there is
still another possibility. A business affected by some form of state
regulation may endeavour to call to its aid the influence of party.
This final method of procedure may also be conducted in a perfectly
legitimate fashion. Public sentiment may be honestly converted to
the view that the amendment or repeal of the law, as demanded by the
business interest, is also in the interest of the state as a whole. On
the other hand the effort may be made, either by large contributions
to campaign funds, or by other still more objectionable means, to
enlist the support of party regardless of the public welfare. Carrying
out these various methods of procedure to their logical conclusion
brings us, therefore, face to face with the question which underlies
the whole fabric of political corruption, namely how shall our party
organisations be supported and financed?
Reserving this issue for subsequent discussion, certain general
features of the reaction of industry against state regulation must be
noted as of immense importance. Black as it is corruption after all
is a mere incident in this struggle. The broad lines of development
which the Republic will follow in the near future would seem to depend
largely upon the outcome of this great process. Certain social prophets
tell us insistently that there are but two possibilities: if the state
wins the upper hand the inevitable result will be socialism; if on the
other hand business triumphs we must resign ourselves to a more or less
benevolent financial oligarchy. Imagination is not lacking to embellish
or render repulsive this pair of alternatives. From Plato to Herbert
George Wells all social prophets have been thus gifted with the power
of depicting finely if not correctly the minutiæ of the world as it is
to be. Time, the remorseless confuter of all earlier forecasters of
this sort, has shown them to be singularly lacking in the ability to
anticipate the great divergent highways of development,—sympodes in
Ward’s phrase,—which have opened up before the march of human progress
and determined the subsequent lines of movement. So it may well be
in the present case. The social futures, one or the other of which we
are bidden by present day prophets to choose, are like two radii of
a circle. They point in very different directions, it is true, but
between them are many possible yet uncharted goals. And if social
development may be likened to movement in three instead of only two
dimensions the lines open to the future are enormously more divergent
than our seers are wont to conceive. Employing a less mathematical
figure, prophecy usually proceeds from the assumption that cataclysmic
changes are immediately impending. Otherwise, by the way, the prophets
would utterly fail to attract attention. But this presupposes an
extremely plastic condition of society. If social structures, however,
really are so plastic, they may then be remoulded not into one or two
forms merely, but into many other forms conceivable or inconceivable
at the present time. Current and widely accepted forecasts to the
contrary, therefore, one may still venture to doubt that our through
ticket to 1950 or 2000 A.D. is inscribed either “socialism” or
“financial oligarchy,” and stamped “non-transferable.”
Whatever the future may bring forth faith has not yet been lost in the
efficacy of state regulation. It is certainly within the bounds of
possibility that some working balance between government and industry
may be established through this means which will continue indefinitely.
As late as 1870, according to Mr. Dicey, individualistic opinions
dominated English law-making thought.[57] Reaction from the doctrine of
_laisser faire_ was, if anything, even later in the United States. For
a considerable period after the turning point had been passed measures
of state regulation were weakened by survivals of old habits of
thought. Even to-day the period of construction and extension along the
line of state regulation seems far from finished. Certain inevitable
errors have required correction, but no major portion of the system has
been abandoned. Further progress should be made easier by accumulating
experience and precedents.
It is significant of the temper of the American people on this question
that an increasing number of the great successes of our political life
are being made by the men who have shown themselves strongest and
most resourceful in correcting the abuses of business. Under present
conditions no public man suspected of weakness on this issue has the
remotest chance of election to the presidency or to the governorship
of any of our larger states. On the purely administrative side of
the system of state regulation new and more powerful agencies,—such
as the Bureau of Corporations and the various state Public Service
Commissions,—have been devised recently to grapple with the situation.
Considering the extreme importance of the work which such agencies
have to perform it is improbable that either their position, or the
position of government in general, is as yet sufficiently strong with
reference to corporate interests. Under modern conditions success in
business means very large material rewards. Important as are industry
and commerce, however, certain parts of the work which the state is now
performing are, from the social point of view, immensely more valuable.
The commonweal requires that our best intellect be applied to these
tasks. Any condition which favours the drafting of our ablest men from
the service of the state into the service of business is a point in
favour of the latter wherever the conflict between them is joined. Yet
not infrequently we witness the promotion of judges to attorneyships
for great corporations, the translation of men who have won their
spurs in administrative supervision of certain kinds of business to
high managerial positions in these same businesses. As long as our
morals remain as mercenary as those of a Captain Dugald Dalgetty there
may seem to be little to criticise in such transactions. Doubtless
loyalty is shown by the men concerned to the government, their original
employer, and to the corporation, their ultimate employer. If, however,
there is to be an exchange of labourers between these fields it would
be vastly better for the state if the man who had succeeded brilliantly
in business should normally expect promotion to high governmental
position. As things are at present the glittering prizes known to be
obtained by ex-government officials who have gone into corporation
service cannot have the most favourable effect upon the minds and
activities of officials remaining in public positions requiring them to
exercise supervision over business activities.
It is high time that there should be a reversal of policy in this
connection. We need urgently greater security of tenure, greater social
esteem, much higher salaries, and ample retiring pensions for those
public officials who are on the fighting line of modern government.
Incomes as large as those of our insurance presidents or trust magnates
are not needed, although in many cases they would be much more richly
deserved. There is recompense which finer natures will always recognise
in the knowledge that they are performing a vitally important public
work. In spite of the loss which political corruption causes the
state it is probably more than made up by the devoted, and in part
unrequited, work of its good servants. Still the labourer is worthy of
his hire. It is both deplorable and disastrous that the current rewards
of good service should be so meagre while the rewards of betrayal are
so large.[58]
But it may be objected that public sentiment in a democracy will not
support high salaries even for the most important public services,
that democracies notoriously remunerate their higher officials very
much less adequately than monarchies. The time is ripe, however, for
challenging this attitude. As long as government work is looked upon as
a dull, soulless, and not extremely useful routine, popular opposition
to high salaries is not only comprehensible but praiseworthy. Once
convinced of the value of certain services, however (and there is
plentiful opportunity to do this), it is doubtful if self-governing
peoples will show themselves less intelligent than kings. Even
now engineers directing great and unusual public undertakings are
frequently paid larger salaries than high officers of government
charged with the execution of ordinary functions. Recognition of the
importance of the work of the specialist is much more common now than
formerly. The development of science and large scale industry is daily
enforcing this lesson. As regards the unwillingness of democracy to
pay well, a change that has recently come over the policy of certain
labour unions is worth noting. Instead of ordering strikes they have
on occasion taken a lesson from the procedure of their employers, and
resorted to the courts for the redress of grievances. And in doing so
they have called in the very ablest lawyers they could find, paying
the latter out of the funds of the union fees as large as they could
have earned on the opposing side. A similar illustration is afforded
by the policy of the Social-democratic party in Germany which
for a considerable period has recognised and met the necessity of
remunerating its leaders in editorial, parliamentary, and propagandist
work at professional rates far higher than the average wages received
by the party rank and file.[59] Demos may despise aristocracy of birth
but he is perhaps not so incapable of comprehending the aristocracy of
service as many of his critics suppose.
* * * * *
By the system of regulation, as we have seen, government is brought
into close contact with business along many lines. But the state is
also one of the largest sellers and buyers in the markets of the
world, and as such has many other intimate points of contact with
economic affairs. Like any individual or corporation under the same
circumstances it is liable to be victimised by practices designed
fundamentally to make it sell cheaply or buy dearly,—both to the
advantage of corrupt outside interests. Franchise grabbing is perhaps
the most magnificent single example of the difficulties the state
encounters when it appears as a vendor. Popular ignorance of the real
nature of such valuable rights has been responsible for enormous
losses on this score. A city which for any reason had to dispose of a
parcel of land would find itself safeguarded in some measure by the
fact that a large number of its citizens were familiar with real estate
values and methods. Knowledge of intangible property is very much less
common. There has been a great deal of effective educational work along
this line, however, and that community is indeed backward which at the
present time does not understand perfectly that perpetual franchises
without proper safeguards of public interests are fraudulent on their
face. Administrative agencies such as were referred to in connection
with business regulation, and particularly public service commissions,
are doing extremely valuable work in cutting down the possibilities
of franchise corruption. The grabbing of alleys, the seizure of
water fronts, and the occupation of sidewalks are minor forms of the
same sort of evil which can no longer be practised with the impunity
characteristic of the good old free and easy days of popular ignorance
and carelessness.
In disposing of its public domain, although here, of course, the price
obtained was not the major consideration on the part of the government,
notorious cases of corruption were of common occurrence. Recent
developments, particularly in connection with timber, mineral, and oil
lands, reveal the stiffer attitude which the public and the government
are taking on this question. Time was also when deposits of public
funds yielded little or no interest to cities and counties. At bottom
such loan transactions were sales, _i.e._, the sale of the temporary
use of public monies. Quite commonly treasurers were in the habit of
considering themselves responsible for the return of capital sums only,
and any interest received was regarded as a perquisite of office. The
system had all the support of tradition and general usage; it was
frequently practised with no effort at concealment and without protest
on moral or business grounds. Nowadays its existence would be regarded
as a sign of political barbarism, and would furnish opportunity for
charges of corruption about which effective reform effort would
speedily gather.
The element of selling is not of major importance in many services
performed by the state which nevertheless require constant watching in
order to prevent corrupt misuse. Efforts to use the mails improperly
are continually being made by get-rich-quick schemes, swindlers,
gamblers, and touts of all descriptions. Crop reports are furnished
without charge, but extraordinary precautions are necessary to prevent
them from leaking out.
Instances such as the foregoing also serve to illustrate the point
that any extension of the functions of government results in an
enlargement of the opportunities for political corruption. Government
railways, for example, would afford venal public officials many
crooked opportunities (as _e.g._, for false billing, charges, and
discrimination) which do not now exist as direct menaces to public
administrative integrity. Private management of railways, however, has
not been so free from such evils as to be able to use this argument
effectively against nationalisation. Municipalities selling water, gas,
or electricity, are notoriously victimised on a large scale by citizens
whose self-interest as consumers overcomes all thought of civic duty
or common honesty.[60] There is one other closely related phenomenon
connected with the extension of the economic functions of government
which will perhaps not so readily be thought of as corrupt, and which
yet deserves consideration from that point of view. Public service
enterprises under government ownership and management are always
exposed to what some writers stigmatise as “democratic finance,”—that
is strong popular pressure to reduce rates. Cost of production and the
general financial condition of a given city may make the reduction of
the prices charged for water, electricity, or gas, frankly contrary
to public policy. Yet the self-interest of the consumer suggests the
use of his vote and political influence to compel such reductions. Of
course his action is not consciously corrupt, but it has every other
characteristic feature of this evil.
* * * * *
The state is a much larger buyer than seller, and manifold are
the possibilities of malpractice in connection with its enormous
purchases of land, materials, supplies, and labour. Yet nothing in our
contemporary political life is more marvellous than the light-hearted
indifference with which the public regards the voting and expenditure
of sums running into the millions. We recall vaguely that the great
constitutional issues of English history were fought out on fiscal
grounds, but we find the budget of our own city a deadly bore. We rise
in heated protest whenever the tax rate is advanced by a fraction of a
mill, but we regard with indifference the new forms either of necessary
expenditure or needless extravagance which make such increases
inevitable. There is one general advantage which state buying has over
state selling, however. A great many of the purchases of government are
made in competitive markets where fair price rates are ascertainable
with comparative ease. Even large public contracts such as for erecting
public buildings or for road construction are usually resolvable into
a number of comparatively simple processes and purchases. Of course
there are exceptions, as for example government contracts with railroad
companies for carrying mail. But as a rule the ordinary purchasing
operations of the state are simpler and more easily comprehensible
than such acts of sale as franchise grants,—to mention the one of most
importance from the view point of possible corruption. It is precisely
at this vulnerable point on the buying side of governmental operations
that the New York Bureau of Municipal Research has struck home. With a
skill that amounts to positive genius this voluntary agency has placed
before the people the ruling market prices and the enormously higher
prices actually paid by officials for public supplies. Taking the
purchasing departments of our best organised private corporations as
a model it has drawn practical plans for the installation of similar
methods as part of our municipal machinery. Equipped with field glasses
and mechanical registering devices its agents have kept tab upon
the flaccid activities of labourers in the public service and have
contrasted the long distance results thus obtained with the suddenly
energised performances of the same men when they knew themselves to be
under observation. It has co-operated quietly and effectively with all
willing officials in improving the methods of work in their offices,
in installing more logical accounting systems and better methods of
recording work done; and it has fought effectively, with the penalty
of discharge by the Governor in two cases, those officials who were
not amenable to proper corrective influences. And finally the Bureau
has attacked the city budget and has even succeeded in making that
dry and formidable document the object of active and intelligent
public interest. Yet the cost of the Bureau’s work has been out of
all proportion small in comparison with the benefits obtained. “Less
than $30,000 was spent in 1908 in securing for four million people the
beginnings of a method of recording work done when done, and money
spent when spent, which will henceforth make inefficiency harder than
efficiency, and corruption more difficult than honesty.”[61]
It is extremely gratifying to note the widespread interest which this
work is arousing. Philadelphia and Cincinnati have established bureaus
under the supervision of the parent organisation, and other cities are
earnestly considering similar action. There would seem to be ample
opportunity for the employment of the same sort of agency in connection
with our state governments, and possibly in certain fields of national
administration. Altogether it is by far the most noteworthy recent
effort to stamp out governmental inefficiency and corruption. Other
efforts are being made to the same end, particularly where extravagance
is concerned. In many cities business men’s clubs, improvement
associations, and taxpayers’ leagues, are watching expenditure as
it has never been watched before. Public officials have co-operated
loyally in a number of cases. Occasional discoveries have been made
of safeguards and powers in the law which had been long forgotten
or unused. The progress of uniform bookkeeping is rapid and highly
significant in this connection. Aided largely by the latter development
census reports, particularly the special issues dealing with statistics
of cities of over 30,000 inhabitants, are making it possible to compare
municipalities on strictly quantitative lines as to the cost and
efficiency of various services. Altogether we are developing a new
financial alertness and intelligence that should materially cut down
various forms of political inefficiency and corruption, particularly
on the purchasing side of governmental operations. It is not too much
to say that the methods by which these results are to be effected are
either at hand or capable of being worked out on demand. The question
now is simply one of funds and the training of specialists to do the
work.
* * * * *
Efforts by the state to regulate or suppress vice and crime bring
about reactions on the part of the interests affected not unlike those
which follow from the attempt to regulate legitimate business.[62]
The corrupt practices thus occasioned are among the commonest and
most objectionable that society has to contend with. Very large money
returns in the aggregate are obtainable by political organisations
which protect vice. It is doubtful, however, whether such sources of
income are ordinarily so productive financially as the various corrupt
relationships between business and politics described above. On the
other hand the alliance between politics and the underworld has the
advantage, from an unmoral point of view, that it yields not only money
but also strong support at the polls. And as some of the voters whose
support is thus secured may be depended upon for work as repeaters,
ballot-box staffers, and thugs, the net political power which they
wield is much greater than their number alone would indicate. There
is one other important difference between the corruption arising from
the attempt to regulate legitimate business and that which arises from
the regulation of vice. In the former case a “deal” can frequently
be consummated between two principals, the leader of a centralised
business interest on the one hand and the leader of a centralised
political organisation on the other. Something of the secrecy and the
binding personal obligation of a “gentleman’s agreement” are thus
obtained. Of course to carry out the compact the political leader must
control the action of his dependents in public office, but the latter,
whatever they may suspect, know nothing definite about the agreement
into which the boss has entered. The protection of vice cannot be
managed by so small a number of conspirators. Compliance by the whole
police force with orders from the “front” is necessary. Every patrolman
knows what is going on when he is told that he must not molest dives,
gambling hells, or brothels. Members of the force may or may not be
used to collect protection money and pass it “higher up,” but since
there are many establishments which must pay tribute the employment
of a considerable corps of collectors is necessary. In any event the
number of those who have knowledge amounting to legal evidence is
likely to be much larger in the case of the protection of vice than in
the case, for example, of a corrupt franchise grant. Exposure either by
some disgruntled police officer or by some overtaxed purveyor of vice
is likely to come at any moment.
When revelations of this kind are made the moral uprising which follows
seldom lacks force. Cynics may sneer at such popular manifestations as
paroxysms of virtue, but practical political leaders are not likely to
underestimate the damage which they are capable of inflicting. Even
if the machine emerges comparatively unharmed from such a period of
attack the heads of some of the leaders are likely to fall before the
popular fury. Remembering Fernando Wood’s caution about the necessity
of “pandering a little to the moral element in the community,”
farsighted bosses are therefore more and more inclined to limit their
operations in the field of vice protection and to seek support from
their relations with legitimate business interests. If this process
is carried on further, as now seems likely, the general problem we
are considering will be simplified by the reduction to a minimum of
corruption by the vicious element, although, of course, we would still
have on our hands the large question of corruption in the interests of
otherwise legitimate business.
With all their mistakes and wasted energy moral uprisings will help
this development materially. After a “spasm” things seldom fall back
into the lowest depths of their former state. We need more frequent
spasms, at least until we shall have learned to live continuously
and steadily on a higher plane. The gravest evil of the present
intermittent situation would seem to be that in our occasional fits of
indignation we write requirements into the law which, considering the
prevalence of minor vicious habits among large masses of the people,
are impossible of execution. One of the lessons which we have learned
in attempting to regulate business is that legislation of this sort
must be supplemented by special administrative agencies if it is to
have any effect whatever. Admirable child labour laws, for example,
remain absolutely futile without labour commissioners and a force
of inspectors created particularly to see them enforced. Yet in the
regulation of vice we rush on heedlessly piling one new duty after
another upon an already overburdened and underpaid police force. As
a consequence its chiefs become habituated to the idea that they can
exercise discretion as to what laws are to be enforced and what laws
may with impunity be neglected. Usually the police decision of such
questions is that crime must be dealt with vigilantly and severely,
vice, on the other hand, with large tolerance. No better situation
could be devised for the schemes of corruptionists. Moreover the latter
are materially aided in their nefarious work by the high standards and
the severe penalties which the moral element has written into the law.
Using these as clubs the corrupt politician can extort much larger
contributions than would otherwise be possible. There are only two
ways in which this situation may be met. Either we must reduce our too
ambitious programmes for the regulation of vice, or we must strengthen
our police forces until they are adequate to meet the demands placed
upon them.
In whatever way this question may be decided there is ample ground
for demanding the application of the most thoroughgoing civil service
reform rules to our police establishments. It is well known that the
rank and file of our police forces despise the dirty work forced upon
them by the political wretches “higher up.” No man capable of the
heroic deeds which are commonplace in the annals of the police service
rings the doors of bawdy houses and collects a tithe from the sorrowful
wages of shame except under the compulsion of the sternest bread and
butter necessity. Usually it is necessary to select the yellow dogs
of the force for this particular devil’s work, and the promotion of
such creatures for their pliancy is a stench in the nostrils of their
honest comrades. If one doubts that this is the real spirit of the
police force let him consider the character of the fire departments
of nearly all of our cities. The men in the latter service are chosen
from the same class, face dangers of the same magnitude, and receive
wages of about the same amount as policemen. In the main they deserve
and receive high praise for their efficiency and honesty. It is true
that they are not exposed to the corrupt temptations which surround
policemen, and also that their work is held up to exacting standards
by business men and insurance companies. The fact remains that our
police forces are constructed of the same human material as our fire
fighting forces. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that if we
adapt our requirements in the regulation of vice to the capacities of
our forces, (or _vice versa_); if we criticise and appreciate their
work in the same way as we do the work of their sister department; if
we place their appointment, tenure, and promotion, upon grounds of
merit and utterly exclude the influence of the corrupt “higher-ups,”
we will have gone a long ways toward drying up the most despicable of
the sources of political corruption.
* * * * *
Certain of the moral aspects of tax dodging have been dealt with in an
earlier connection.[63] Contrary as it may seem to the principle of
economic interest there is a good deal of carelessness and stupidity
in this field, and cases are occasionally found of property that has
been over-assessed. On the other hand more or less deliberate dodging
is indulged in very largely. So far as this practice deserves the
stigma of corruption it is a stigma which rests to a very considerable
extent upon the so-called class of “good citizens.” Certain residents
of “swell suburbs” who daily thank God that their government is not
so corrupt as that of the neighbouring city are among the worst
offenders of this kind. As directors of corporations men of the same
standing are sometimes responsible for monumental evasions. Of course
what was said with regard to the reaction of business against state
regulation holds good here also. There are plenty of legitimate methods
of protesting against unjust or oppressive taxes,—before the courts,
before legislatures, and by open propaganda designed to influence party
organisations. But the furtive concealment or misrepresentation of
taxable values is a matter of entirely different moral colour, and it
is the latter practice that we now have to consider.
Tax dodging is so common and so well established that it has built up
an exculpatory system of its own. Instead of bringing his conscience up
to the standards set by the law the ordinary property owner inquires
into the practice of his neighbours, and governs himself accordingly.
Wherever business competition is involved the threat of possible
bankruptcy practically forces him into this course. Yet withal our
citizen is likely to be somewhat troubled in his mind about his
conduct, at least until he learns how shamelessly John Smith who lives
just a little way down the street has behaved. This information quite
restores his equanimity, and at the next assessment he may outdo Smith
himself. Thus the extra legal, if not frankly illegal, neighbourhood
standard tends constantly to become lower. And not only taxpayers
but tax officials themselves are affected by local feeling and fall
into the habit of closing their eyes to certain kinds of property and
expecting only a certain percentage of the valuation fixed by law to be
returned.
Back of such neighbourhood ideas on taxation there are at least
two lines of defence. One is that our present tax system is highly
illogical, bothersome, and burdensome. To a considerable extent,
unfortunately, this is the case, but it does not justify illegal
methods of seeking redress. Not much argument is required to
convince the ordinary property owner that all the inequities of the
existing system fall with cumulative weight upon his devoted head.
His pocketbook affirms this view more strongly perhaps than he would
care to admit, but anyhow the net result is that he feels himself
more or less pardonable for evading the burden as far as he can. The
other common excuse for tax dodging is supplied by the conviction that
much of the money raised by government is wasted or stolen. The logic
based upon this premise is most curiously inverted, but none the less
it sways the action of great multitudes. Politicians are a set of
grafters, says our taxpayer. The more money they get the more they will
waste and steal. I will punish the rascals as they deserve by dodging
my taxes, that is _by becoming a grafter myself_. Seldom, however, is
the latter clause clearly expressed. Yet the existence of corruption
on one side of the state’s activities is thus made the excuse for
corruption on another side whereby the state is mulcted of much revenue
which it might receive. Of course evasion results in higher tax rates,
which, by the way, fall crushingly upon the citizen who makes full and
honest returns, and thus part of the loss in income to the government
is made up. It seems clear, however, that in the long run government
income is materially reduced by the feeling prevalent among taxpayers
which has just been described and the procedure based upon it. On
the whole this is by far the most serious single economic consequence
of political corruption. It is bad enough that public money should be
stolen, that public work should be badly done, and that politicians
and contractors should grow rich in consequence, but it is far worse
that the state should be starved of the funds necessary to perform
its existing functions properly and to extend its activities into new
fields. In the regulation of industry, in education, philanthropy,
sanitation, and art, American government is very far from achieving
what it should do in the public interest and what it could do more
efficiently and cheaply than any other agency. Yet our progress toward
this goal is perpetually hindered by the existence of waste and
corruption on the one hand, and the consequent peremptory shutting of
the taxpayers’ pocketbooks on the other hand.
Consideration of the theory underlying tax dodging reveals certain
broad lines of correction. In proportion as our tax system approximates
greater justice, the evasion which defends itself on the ground of the
inequities of the present system will tend to disappear. To show how
this may be done is beyond the limits of the present study. Suffice it
to say that the work which reformers and students of public finance
are now doing on inheritance, income, and corporation taxes, on the
taxation of unearned increment, on various applications of the
progressive principle, and so on, should eventuate in the tapping of
much needed new sources of income, and thus facilitate the correction
of present unjust burdens. The introduction of economical methods and
the elimination of the grosser forms of corruption in the field of
government expenditure will weaken the excuses offered for evasion on
the ground of public waste and graft. There is an overwhelming mass
of evidence to show that the American taxpayer, once convinced of the
necessity of a given public work and further assured that it will be
honestly executed, is generous to the point of munificence. The annals
of our cities are full of the creation of appointive state boards
composed of men of the highest local standing and intrusted with the
carrying out of some great single project,—the erection of a city hall
building, the construction of a water works and filtration plant, or of
a park system. Very few such commissions are grudged the large sums of
money necessary for their undertakings. If every ordinary branch of our
government enjoyed public confidence to a similar degree such special
boards would no longer be needed, and ample funds would be forthcoming
from taxpayers for all our present functions and for other new and
worthy functions which might be undertaken greatly to the public
advantage. Finally our system of tax administration, like our system
of government regulation of business, needs strengthening. Larger
districts and centralised power in the hands of the assessors will help
to lift them above the neighbourhood feeling which is responsible for
so much evasion. Higher salaries will bring expert talent and backbone
sufficient to resist the pressure brought to bear by large interests.
As a matter of fact the first threat of a virile execution of the laws
wipes out a considerable part of the tax dodging in a community.
There would also seem to be much virtue in the plan for the reduction
of the tax rate advocated by the Ohio State Board of Commerce.[64]
Given a community with a high general tax rate it may be the case,
for example, that only about fifty per cent of true value is being
returned. Everybody knows it; everybody is sneakingly ashamed of it.
Still fundamental honesty is supposed to exist in the man who does not
cut the percentage below say, forty; the really mean taxpayer is he
who risks twenty-five per cent on what he feels obliged to return and
conceals whatever he can into the bargain. Under such circumstances
it is proposed to take the heroic step of reducing the tax rate to
one-half its existing figure or even less.[65] If this can be done it
is hoped that taxpayers can be induced to return their property at full
value, and that much personal property will come out of the concealment
into which it has fled under the menace of a high general property tax
rate. In support of this argument cases are cited where a reduction
of the personal property tax rate alone has brought in much larger
returns and converted into a source of revenue a form of taxation which
everywhere under high rates shows a tendency to dwindle to practically
nothing.
As against the plan it may be said that taxpayers are habitually
suspicious and extremely likely to regard any change whatever as
certain to increase their burdens. Many of them would see nothing in
the proposition beyond a tricky device to screw up their valuations
under the pretext of low rates with the intention of falling upon them
later with rates as high or higher than before. Unless the reform were
fully understood and then backed up by the most vigorous administration
there would be grave danger that revenues would materially suffer.
Given these conditions essential to success, however, the plan
would seem decidedly worth trying. A community willing to take the
plunge, it is pointed out, would enjoy large advantages over its
less enterprising competitors in the advertising value of a low tax
rate, particularly as a means of inducing new industries to locate in
its midst. The reform would probably not increase revenue, indeed it
does not aim to do so, but it would yield a moral return of immense
value. Self respect would be restored to many otherwise thoroughly
good citizens, and public opinion, to the tone of which the taxpaying
class contributes largely, would be lifted to higher planes. Under the
present vicious system there must be a considerable number who realise
secretly and more or less vaguely the inherent kinship between their
conduct and that of the corrupt political organisation under which they
live, and who in consequence remain inactive and ashamed when movements
for better things in city, state, or nation, are on foot.
* * * * *
In our earlier study of the nature of political corruption an effort
was made to distinguish between bribery and auto-corruption. As
examples of the latter, legislators may employ knowledge gathered on
the floor of the chamber or in committee rooms for the purpose of
speculating to their own advantage on stock or produce exchanges;
administrative officials who by virtue of their position learn in
advance any information which may affect the market (_i.e._, crop
reports) can do likewise; knowledge of important judicial decisions
before they are handed down may be exploited in a similar fashion;
insiders who have access to plans for projected public improvements
are in a position to acquire quietly the needed real estate for
sale at much advanced prices to the city or state when condemnation
proceedings are actually begun. In addition to large and striking
transactions of this sort there are innumerable smaller possibilities
for auto-corruption which present themselves to public functionaries
ranging in rank from the highest places in the official hierarchy
to that of the policeman on his beat. Logically the practices under
consideration are not separable from the general forms of political
corruption as the term is applied in the present discussion. Instead
they would seem to be a special method of carrying on corrupt
transactions of many different kinds. All cases of auto-corruption,
however, have the common feature that bribery by an outside interest
is excluded, and this absence of bribery has sometimes led to the
assertion that the practices included under this heading are “honest
grafts.” An illusory appearance of innocence is also conferred by
the difficulty of tracing the incidence of the burdens resulting
from such transactions. There is no moral ground for such favourable
distinctions, however. On the contrary, auto-corruption is clearly
worse than bribery in that an entire transaction of this character must
be guiltily designed and executed wholly by one person, and that person
an official charged with knowledge which should be used only in the
public interest. Moreover the profits of his secret treachery may be
turned entirely into his private bank account. If so he cannot even
plead in justification that he has been acting in behalf of a party
organisation by gathering and contributing the funds necessary to its
management. The latter feature of auto-corruption stands in need of
special consideration.
It may be laid down as a principle of fairly general applicability
that political corruption as such is disadvantageous to the party
organisation permitting it. From a purely tactical point of view
it would be the extreme of bad party management to tolerate loose
conditions under which a large number of officials could graft
freely on their own account and place the entire proceeds in their
own pockets. Whether they confined themselves to auto-corruption
or accepted bribes singly or in combinations the case would not be
materially altered. A day of reckoning at the polls would surely come,
and it would find the party treasury unprovided with the means of
defence. Yet conditions of this character prevailed pretty generally
prior to the advent of strongly centralised political machines.
Corruption was extremely diffuse, personal responsibility for it widely
scattered, party responsibility not so clear. Manipulation required
whole corps of lobbyists, “third houses,” “black horse cavalry,”
and the like. Under present conditions the party organisation with
strongly centralised management has a direct interest in limiting
corruption and also in seeing that contributions which arise from such
practices as it tolerates actually flow into the party war chest.
Corruption in purely selfish interest becomes treachery to the party as
well as treachery to the state. Of course even under strong centralised
and permanent party control cases of auto-corruption still occur, and
at times officials receive bribes without turning in their quotas. If
so, however, it may fairly be presumed that they make their peace with
the organisation in other ways. They may be exempt from paying tribute,
but they are nevertheless obliged to deliver votes or influence. Many
sins are laid at the door of the machine. It has at least the advantage
of enabling us to centralise responsibility for all corrupt practices
which occur under its management.
From this point of view one may undertake an outline of the form of
corruption connected with political control. All the preceding forms of
political corruption may be considered the obverse, this is the reverse
of the die. None of the practices earlier considered can be carried
on without danger; the corruption of political control is the crooked
means of avoiding the cumulative effects of these practices. It is
not popular, it is not good politics even in the narrowest practical
acceptance of that term, for a political organisation to grant corrupt
favours to business, to wink at the violation of the law by vice, to
allow its partisans in office to sell government property cheap and
buy government supplies dear. If any of these things are permitted the
organisation, like the common criminal, must take care to lay aside
“fall money” against a day of trial.
One might feel greater confidence in the restraining influence of
party centralisation were it not for the fact that the more dangerous
to party success are the forms of corruption which an organisation
tolerates the more lucrative they are apt to be. Though its sins be as
scarlet still they produce funds sufficient to buy indulgences and to
leave a handsome profit over. In connection with business regulation,
for example, bribery in any considerable amount is not possible until
legislation is enacted or close at hand. And legislation of this
kind is not likely to be passed or threatened unless a strong public
sentiment demands action. Political manipulation which attempts to
frustrate regulation at such a juncture must sooner or later prepare
itself to reckon with the public sentiment which it has flouted. Vice
cannot be tolerated except in contravention of laws against it, and to
do so means to offend the moral sentiment in the community which placed
such laws on the statute books. Franchise grabbing is not profitable
on a large scale until the experience of earlier public service
corporations has impressed upon the public mind the great value of
such grants. If, nevertheless, grabs are permitted by the machine,
the boodle must be sufficient to pay both for the personal services
involved and to repair any resulting damage to party prestige at the
next election. Of course many citizens are apathetic with regard to
such abuses or even ignorant of their existence, and there are others
who are so involved in corrupt practices, particularly in connection
with tax dodging, meter fixing, and the protection of vice, that they
feel themselves allied in interest with the party organisation and
accordingly vote its ticket. Always, however, there is a contingent,
and frequently it is large enough to hold the balance of power, which
is neither ignorant nor apathetic, and which, although perhaps too
quiescent ordinarily, will rise in revolt against any organisation
which grafts too boldly and too widely.
The situation of the venal machine is, therefore, substantially this:
more money can be obtained at any time if certain practices dangerous
from the point of view of party expediency are tolerated. If they are
tolerated greater expenditures of money and of other party resources
must be made when the final accounting with public sentiment takes
place. To put the matter in another way: the forms of political
corruption earlier described, _i.e_., corruption in connection with the
regulation of business and of vice and corruption in connection with
the buying and selling operations of the state, are for the most part
sources of income, whereas corruption in the form of political control
is mainly expenditure. Under George III., according to Mr. Dorman B.
Eaton, a “Patronage Secretary of the Treasury” was appointed
“whose duty it was to stand between members and partisan managers
appealing for places for their favourites, on the one side, and the
heads of offices who needed to have these places filled with competent
persons, on the other side. This Secretary measured the force of
threats and took the weight of influence; he computed the political
value of a member’s support and deducted from it the official
appraisement of patronage before awarded to him. It is said that
actual accounts, Dr. and Cr., were kept with members by this Patronage
Secretary.”[66]
Whether or not “accounts Dr. and Cr.” are kept by our political
organisations, a calculus of essentially the same character must
underlie the determination of their policy.
On the spending, or political control, side of their ledgers the
various heads are comparatively simple. Office holders must be kept
in line, and to this end patronage, promotion, and the control of
primaries are important. The direct use of money for bribes may play
only a small part in this process; opportunities for auto-corruption
may be left open in special cases, but personal and party loyalty
and ambition can be relied on to a large extent. Back of the office
holders of the hour, however, there are the constantly recurring
necessities of election day. Party organisation must be kept up
continuously, involving the reward in some way of swarms of assistants
and hangers-on who cannot all be remunerated directly at public
expense. At times votes must be bought, and repeaters, thugs, and
ballot-box stuffers must be paid for their services. A heavy toll
is apt to be taken out of the funds used for such purposes by every
hand through which they pass on their way down. In addition to the
expenditures already noted there are many other occasions, some of
them quite legitimate in character, and others unobjectionable or even
laudable, for the lavish use of money to secure party success and party
control.
The situation which has just been described is so common that the only
justification for repeating its description here is the necessity of
completing an outline the other parts and interrelations of which
are somewhat more obscure. In the gradual awakening of the American
people to corrupt conditions existing in their government the first
evils clearly seen were the abuses of the patronage and the defilement
of the ballot-box. Civil service reform and corrupt practices acts
(the latter term seems lamentably narrow in its original usage to
the present somewhat more sophisticated generation) were the result.
Later the presence of purveyors of vice immediately behind much of
the prevailing electoral corruption was clearly discerned, and the
battle on that score is still being waged. It is beyond question that
our present local option movement is directed against the saloon not
so much because it is a place where intoxicating liquor is sold, as
because it is a political centre which did not know how to be moderate
in its exercise of power during the days of its ascendancy. Still later
the more secret relationship between grafting business and political
corruption was laid bare. Renewed determination to impose the necessary
measures of state regulation and, more specifically, the campaign
contribution issue were the results. The problems presented by corrupt
practices in connection with political control are still far from
adequate solution. Reforms already achieved in the right direction, and
still more the determination to press for further reforms, are the most
hopeful features of the present situation. In our national government,
for example, the civil service movement has reached a gratifyingly
high development, but it still needs much extension and strengthening
in our states and cities. We have some stringent legislation against
ballot-box crimes, but, an election once settled, our tolerance on
this subject is amazing and deplorable. Every act which simplifies our
governmental machinery, which places responsibility squarely upon a
few shoulders and provides means for enforcing it, which shortens our
cumbersome ballots, which makes the primary accessible to independent
voters, will help in the solution of the problem of honest party
control.
Without undertaking a summary of the argument on the various forms
of business and political corruption the same point may be made with
regard to them that was made with reference to the corruption in the
professions, journalism, and the higher education,—namely that the
major forms of evil are recognised and savagely criticised. To an
even greater extent legislative action has been secured against the
primarily political forms of corruption. The fight for the regulation
of business is the great unsolved problem of our time, but so far as
it is successful we may expect not only more honest business practices
but also a favourable reaction upon political life. A great many means
may be brought to bear to secure honesty in the buying and selling
operations of the state and to prevent the corrupt toleration of vice.
Their success will mean that the corrupt political manager will find
himself deprived of some of his most lucrative sources of income. A
strong impression prevails at the present time that corruption funds in
general are much smaller in amount than a few years ago. In part this
is perhaps due to a change of heart, in part to the fear, intensified
by recent events, of exposure. Perhaps, however, it is still more
largely the result of a conviction that the “goods” could not, or
would not, in the present state of public opinion, be delivered by
the politicians. It is evident that the more successful we are in
thus drying up the income sources of venal political organisations
the smaller will be the resources available in their hands for the
extension and perpetuation of their power of control.
FOOTNOTES:
[53] “Sin and Society,” p. 78.
[54] “Back to Beginnings,” Commencement Address, Oberlin College, June
28, 1905.
[55] “The Nature of Political Corruption,” p. 46, _supra._
[56] Limitation of the scope of this study to the internal forms
of corruption makes it impossible to discuss this very interesting
topic. It may be noted, however, that in international cases certain
peculiarities occur regarding the personal element of corruption. When
the military secrets of one government are purchased by another, the
faithless official of the former who makes the sale is, of course,
corrupt in the highest degree. What shall be said of the nation making
the purchase? Personal interest on its side is merged in the collective
interest of a commonwealth numbering millions of inhabitants it may
be. The case is not entirely unlike those in which group interest
rather than self interest impels to corrupt action (see p. 65), except
that in the latter the groups are subordinate and not sovereign. If,
however, the state which buys the secrets of another government runs
counter to international law or morality in so doing, it may be held
to be pursuing a relatively narrow interest regardless of the broader
interest of humanity as a whole. From this point of view the state
which uses money for such ends is guilty of corruption although, of
course, it is a highly socialised form of corruption.
[57] “Law and Opinion in England,” p. 216.
[58] _Cf._ H. C. Adams, “Public Debts,” pt. iii, ch. iv, for a very
able discussion of the influence of the commercial spirit on public
officials.
[59] _Cf._ sec. vii, “Die Organisation als Klassenerhöhungsmaschine,”
in Robert Michel’s very thorough and illuminating study of
the organisation of the German social-democracy. _Archiv. f.
Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik_, Bd. xxiii, Heft 2 (September,
1906).
[60] For an overwhelmingly convincing presentation of materials on this
point _cf._ the “Digest of Report by the Bureau of Municipal Research
on the Administration of the Water Revenues, Manhattan,”—_Efficient
Citizenship Leaflet_, no. 145. Corruption of this sneaking sort
resembles tax dodging in that it is so largely indulged in by otherwise
respectable people. _Cf._ p. 192.
[61] “Enough Money to Uplift the World,” p. 6, by William H. Allen,
Director, Bureau of Municipal Research, reprinted as a pamphlet by the
Bureau from the _World’s Work_ of May, 1909.
[62] _Cf._ p. 5, _supra_, for a discussion of the consequences of the
corrupt protection of vice and crime.
[63] _Cf_ p. 61, _supra_.
[64] _Cf._ especially No. 3 of the Taxation Series published by the
Board, entitled, “Cincinnati an Independent Assessment District,” by
Allen Ripley Foote.
[65] The assumption is not extreme. In the pamphlet referred to it is
held that by the various means proposed, Cincinnati’s (then) rate of
2.96 per cent. might be reduced to 0.75 per cent. “When the real estate
of the state of Kansas was revalued by the Tax Commission,” according
to Mr. Foote, “the valuation was increased 484 per cent.” Of course
real increase of property values through considerable periods of time
accounts in part for such totals whenever assessment periods are a
number of years apart.
[66] “Civil Service in Great Britain,” p. 154.
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND THE THEORY OF PARTY SUPPORT
VI
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND THE THEORY OF PARTY SUPPORT
A party, according to Burke, “is a body of men united, for promoting
by their joint endeavours the national interest, upon some particular
principle in which they are all agreed.”[67] One must admit that
the definition is admirable in that it lays emphasis upon the ideal
end of party action,—the promotion of the national interest. It is
adroit in that it evades the question so constantly thrust upon one in
practical politics as to how far the real motive powers of party are
class interest and personal greed and ambition. Applied to the simpler
conditions of England where the single great object of political strife
is the capture of a parliamentary majority, Burke’s definition may be
accepted as sufficient even to-day. But it would need considerable
amplification before it could be regarded as an adequate description of
the vital activities of an American political party.
While the threshing out of reforms proposed in the public interest
and their translation into law is with us, as in England, the most
important single function of party, still it is but one among a
number of functions actually performed. Our adherence to the “check
and balance” system involves the possibility of clashes between the
legislative, executive, and judicial powers, and these clashes would
certainly be both more frequent and more violent were it not for the
party control which seeks to maintain harmony among the three great
departments of government. The relation between our state and city
governments is also such that conflict is chronic except where a
party organisation secures concerted action. In the state and city
governments themselves administration is so poorly organised that
authorities would constantly be falling afoul of each other were it
not for the intervention of party managers who realise the necessity
of maintaining harmony. Our elections involve a tremendous volume
of labour most of which is performed by party workers. Not only
legislative, but also frequently executive and judicial candidates
must be voted for; national, state, and local offices must be filled.
Back of the elections is a complex convention or primary system which
must be kept in running order. Referendum and latterly initiative and
recall elections require servants and machinery. The ordinary good
citizen who experiences a deep feeling of personal satisfaction if
he casts his vote, and who until recently considered himself little
less than a civic hero if he also attended his primary, seldom has an
adequate conception of the enormous volume of detailed work which a
popular government such as ours involves. By those persons who are not
so fortunately situated the political worker is called upon for all
manner of services,—for aid in securing naturalisation papers, for
assistance in obtaining employment, for advice in every emergency of
life, for charitable relief. No doubt a _quid pro quo_ is exacted in
all these cases, but so long as philanthropy fails to provide other and
better agencies the social value of such work must be admitted.[68]
Considering these various and exacting party activities it is
altogether probable, as Professor Henry Jones Ford maintains, that “the
machinery of control in American government requires more people to
tend and work it than all other political machinery in the rest of the
civilised world.”[69]
Under our present system the performance of this tremendous volume
of work is essential. In connection with it many grave abuses have
developed, but in the final balance there must be some surplus of
good over evil. Moreover the division of labour which places the
major portion of our political work in the hands of the much maligned
politician is at bottom economic. By so doing we enable our “good”
citizen to devote a larger share of attention to his business, his
family, and the other more immediate affairs of life. No doubt he
has taken too great an advantage of this opportunity, and thereby
enabled the political class to run things with a high hand. The future
of democracy in America will depend largely upon the extent of the
activity and intelligence manifested by our citizens. But at the very
best the great mass can give only a limited portion of its time to
public affairs. Too much politics and too little business, as in South
America, is also bad.
So far as can be foreseen at present, therefore, the political worker
and party machinery bid fair to remain functional and efficient in
America for an indefinite period. Reforms harmonising and simplifying
the departments and spheres of government may reduce to some extent
the volume of our necessary political work. On the other hand our
growth in population and the increase of governmental functions tend
constantly to increase it. Whatever the future may bring forth present
conditions clearly require the co-operation of strong parties with a
complex governmental organisation. “In America,” wrote Mr. Bryce, “the
government goes for less than in Europe, the parties count for more.
The great moving forces are the parties.” Students of political science
generally have recognised that parties constitute an integral and very
vital part of our political system. It would perhaps not be putting it
too strongly to maintain that our government is divided into what may
be called an “official” part, consisting of the legally constituted
political structure and actual office holders, and an “unofficial”
part, consisting of the party organisations and their workers. As
things are now the co-operation of the two is absolutely essential to
efficiency. Nothing is so helpless or so certain to disappear promptly
from the political arena as an “official” group which has lost the
support of its complementary “unofficial” organisation.
Now while the utility and necessity of co-operation between official
and unofficial political forces is generally recognised by careful
students we have, singularly enough, provided regular and legitimate
means of subsistence only for the former, leaving the latter to shift
for itself as best it may. Our unofficial political forces, _i.e._, the
party organisations and their workers, are, as we have seen, burdened
with tasks of enormous magnitude. Under simpler conditions Burke’s
“body of men joined together for the purpose of promoting the national
interest upon some particular principle” might indeed “by their joint
endeavour” alone succeed in performing this work in a patriotic and
disinterested spirit. With the growth of American population and the
development of our very complex government, however, this became
impossible. Steady professional work by a large body of men is demanded
under present conditions. Much of this work the politician knows to be
necessary and useful even if the full measure of its social utility
seldom dawns upon him. Naturally he thinks the labourer worthy of
his hire, or, at any rate, he is keenly conscious of his own bread
and butter necessities. No regular income being provided for the
politician as such, he proceeds to collect it in various ways, some of
them perfectly open and even praiseworthy, as in the case of campaign
contributions made by disinterested persons, and others distinctly
furtive or even corrupt and criminal. Under the old régime if his party
was successful at the polls there was, of course, the possibility of
a job,—that is of a translation from the unofficial to the official
governmental sphere. Even in the hey-day of the spoils system, however,
there were never jobs enough to supply the faithful and those who
received appointments were consequently “assessed” large sums to pay
for the labours of their less fortunate companions in arms. And the
politicians of the beaten party went bare although their social service
in arousing the people on the issues of the campaign was probably as
valuable in proportion to their numbers as that rendered by the workers
of the victorious party. Under the circumstances it was inevitable that
the party worker in office would pay more attention to the requirements
of the machine than to his public duties, and the evils thus occasioned
naturally gave rise to civil service reform. Wherever it has been
applied the merit system has done much to discourage the collection of
party revenues from office holders. As sources of income there remain,
however, the manifold possibilities of the sale of political influence
ranging all the way from permission to violate a municipal ordinance up
to the sale of a franchise or the grant of legislative favours to large
private interests. Many of the forms of corruption dealt with in the
preceding studies are cases in point.
Whatever means may be employed to collect funds the total cost of
party maintenance in the United States is extremely heavy. Referring
to this frequently unreckoned burden, Professor Ford remarks: “It is
a fond delusion of the people that our republican form of government
is less expensive than the monarchical forms which obtain in Europe.
The truth is that ours is the costliest government in the world.”[70]
Turn the matter about as one will it is inevitable that these costs of
parties must be paid. Our present method of paying them is indirect,
furtive, fraught with grave moral consequences, and it is tremendously
extravagant. We do not perceive the latter point clearly because we
seldom get an insight into the total amount demanded or into the many
and devious ways by which it is collected. What is exacted of us in
the final analysis is not to be reckoned in money alone but also in
bad and inefficient government with all the harm that it entails upon
business, health, security, and morality. And we must continue to pay
in our present wasteful and foolish manner until we devise a better
method or make some arrangement to dispense largely with the services
of party organizations.
What the ultimate lines of the solution may be it is too early to
inquire. It is only very recently that we have become aware of the
existence and magnitude of the problem. Indeed in its present form the
problem is itself of recent origin. Not until the presidential campaign
in 1876 was money used on a scale which could be described as lavish.
The interest which has been shown recently in campaign contributions
is gratifying evidence that our former neglect of the sources of party
support is giving way to lively interest. Such contributions, however,
represent a part only of the total expenses of political management.
Party organisations must be kept up permanently and politicians, in or
out of office, have a large amount of party work to perform between
elections. As a matter of fact campaign funds may be regarded as a form
of provision for the surplus demand occasioned by the election time
necessity of running the machine at full blast with a large number
of supernumerary workers under employment. The size of the total
sums contributed at such periods, the influences behind some of the
contributions, and the new interest of the public in these influences
make it desirable, however, to consider the matter as a single but very
important section of the broader subject of party support in general.
Admitting the necessity and utility under present conditions of party
organisation and party work it is certainly not unreasonable to suggest
that part of the burden of campaign management should be borne by the
state. In his message at the beginning of the first session of the
Sixtieth Congress, December, 1907, President Roosevelt said on this
subject:
“The need for collecting large campaign funds would vanish if Congress
provided an appropriation for the proper and legitimate expenses of
each of the great national parties, an appropriation ample enough to
meet the necessity for thorough organisation and machinery, which
requires a large expenditure of money. Then the stipulation should be
made that no party receiving campaign funds from the Treasury should
accept more than a fixed amount from any individual subscriber or
donor; and the necessary publicity for receipts and expenditures could
without difficulty be provided.”
It was frankly admitted that this proposal was “very radical” and
that until the people had time to familiarise themselves with it
they would not be willing to consider its adoption. Indeed popular
feeling nowadays, whether rightly or wrongly, is strongly averse to
the granting of aid to party organisations and is manifestly bent on
cutting off some of their sources of supply rather than on providing
others. Many objections may be made to President Roosevelt’s proposal,
some of them technical in character, others on the basis of principle.
“Legitimate expenses” might be hard to define, but the attempt has been
made already by several state legislatures.[71] Congress would either
have to vote the same sum to each of the two principal parties, or else
devise some scheme of _pro rata_ distribution. How minor political
parties would fare under the former arrangement is not discussed.
Colorado met this question in 1909, by providing that the state should
pay twenty-five cents for each vote cast at the preceding contest
for governor. The money is distributed to the state party chairmen
in proportion to the votes cast by each party. One-half of it must
be handed over to the county chairmen in proportion to the number of
votes cast in each county. Other contributions to campaign funds are
prohibited, except from candidates, who, however, may not give sums
in excess of twenty-five per cent of their first year’s salary. What
the practical outcome of the plan may be it is, of course, impossible
to predict. Just how a new minor party is to get itself started, apart
from the limited contributions of its candidates, does not appear.
Objection might also be raised to this _pro rata_ arrangement on the
ground that it bases the financial support of parties almost entirely
upon their showing at the preceding election. So far as the strength of
parties is determined by their money income the effect of the law will
manifestly be to maintain the _status quo ante_. Theoretically party
support ought to depend on the present actual standing of a party,
that is, the comparative value to the state of its policies at the
election for which its expenses are to be paid. Of course no agreement
is possible as to just what this standing is in given cases. None the
less it would seem clear that there might be a wide divergence between
the relative showing made by a party at the polls two or more years ago
and its present deserts. Possibly also a system of voluntary giving
with restrictions of corporate contributions and other abuses might
more correctly measure the current merit of parties than the _pro rata_
state appropriation system.
The Colorado plan, with the exception of the limited contributions
it permits from candidates, places the burden of election expenses
entirely upon the state, and therefore prohibits contributions both
from corporations and individuals. President Roosevelt’s suggestion is
not so radical, involving as it clearly did the raising of funds by
contributions in addition to the proposed congressional appropriations.
If, however, the latter were made sufficient to provide for the “proper
and legitimate expenses of each of the great national parties,” one
might inquire for what other purposes the campaign managers would
need money. Waiving this question, a mixed system of state subsidies
and private contributions has certain distinct advantages. There is
considerable force in President Roosevelt’s argument that publicity and
the restriction of large contributions could be more easily obtained
under a plan combining the two kinds of support. Public appropriations
for campaign purposes would place the state in a stronger position
logically to exercise supervision over the whole process of gathering
and spending money for political purposes. However, it remains to
be demonstrated that publicity and the restriction of objectionable
contributions cannot be secured without the payment of party subsidies.
Evidently, also, there would be difficulties in connection with the
supervision of party activities necessary to determine whether or not
the proposed congressional appropriations should be granted. Democratic
campaign managers would certainly feel that no Republican congress
could deal fairly with them in such matters, although a bi-partisan
supervisory board appointed by Congress might escape this suspicion.
Any appropriation of state funds for campaign purposes would also be
objected to on grounds of principle. It is not considered a misfortune,
for example, that a philanthropic, educational, or religious
association must appeal to the public for contributions. On the
contrary this very necessity forces the managers of such organisations
to keep the service of the public constantly in view. Fully endowed
charities, schools, and churches, on the other hand, have a notorious
tendency to develop the dry rot or to degenerate into positive
nuisances. It is possible that even if our two great parties were
guaranteed support from state funds the keen rivalry between them might
preserve them from deterioration. Still the logic of events may at any
time demand the disbandment of a given political party. If at such a
juncture it were assured a large subsidy, equal to or approximating
that of the majority party, it might outlive its usefulness
indefinitely, maintaining its organisation and a numerous body of
adherents simply in order to devour the congressional appropriation
provided for its useless campaign work.
There is one form of campaign expenditure, however, which the state may
well assume and seek to extend, namely that incurred for performing
any service offered equally to all parties. Already public provision
is made for the rent of polling places, the salaries of election
officials, the printing of ballots, and some other expenditures of
a similar character. Legal regulation of the primary and convention
system, such as has been undertaken on a large scale within the last
decade, offers opportunities for the payment of certain preliminary
expenses in the same way. In connection with its referendum elections
Oregon has begun to print and distribute at public expense documents
containing the substance of the laws to be voted on, supplemented by
brief arguments drawn up by adherents of both sides.[72] So far as this
principle can be extended the real need for campaign contributions
from private citizens or corporations will be reduced. Thus without
going the length of placing the whole burden of campaign expenditures
upon the state, experimentation may well be undertaken with various
combinations of the mixed system. If found advisable the relative
amount of the state’s contribution may then be increased from time to
time.
While the work of parties at the present time must be conceded to
be essential and on the whole useful, the argument for their entire
support by the state is still far from being made out. There is, as
we have seen, a certain virtue in the very necessity under which
parties labour of applying to the people for contributions. Normally
it should have the effect of keeping the parties closer in interest
to the people. It is highly improbable that the question of campaign
funds would ever have been raised in American politics if party
contributions were habitually made by a large number of persons each
giving a relatively small amount. If in addition the donors were
inspired by patriotic motives only and never sought to procure corrupt
favours through their contributions such a system would be well nigh
ideal. With all the abuses that have sprung up in this connection it
is probably true that by far the larger number of the contributors
to our campaign funds have been of the better type just described,
although, of course, the same judgment would hardly be expressed
with regard to the greater portion of the total amounts contributed.
Under a system of small contributions from a large number of people
it would matter little even if some of the contributors were not
wholly disinterested. The relatively small proportion of the total sum
represented by any individual subscription would make it absurd for the
donor to claim corrupt favours of importance. It is not so much the
campaign contribution itself that has fallen into disrepute among us
as the secrecy involving the whole subject and the belief that large
corporate contributions have been repaid by corrupt favours. Short of
public subsidies, therefore, most of the advocates of reform in this
field content themselves with the demand for publicity and certain
restrictions as to the collection and expenditure of campaign funds.
The movement for publicity was preceded by much vigorous legislation
against the bribery of voters and other abuses at the ballot-box,
but as these subjects have been abundantly discussed elsewhere they
need only incidental mention here. New York led in the movement
for publicity proper with a law passed in 1890 (ch. 94), requiring
candidates to file statements of their expenditures. This act was very
ineffective, no publicity being required for the expenses of election
committees. Most of the laws subsequently passed have brought campaign
committees as well as candidates specifically under regulation.[73]
By the end of 1908, more than twenty states altogether had taken some
action looking toward the publicity of expenditures. The earlier laws
of this character were very loosely drawn. In many cases they simply
required “statements,” and the results obtained were distinguished
chiefly by gross inadequacy and heterogeneity. Later statutes and
amendments, however, have fixed the form of reports precisely,
itemising them in considerable detail. Wisconsin, for example,
furnishes blanks especially prepared for this purpose. Vouchers for all
sums exceeding five or ten dollars are required in a number of states.
Publicity of receipts is not so commonly prescribed as publicity of
expenditures. Reports of contributions were first required by Colorado
and Michigan in 1891, followed by Massachusetts in 1892, California
in 1894, Arizona in 1895, Ohio in 1896. Repeals of the laws first
passed in Ohio and Michigan indicate that they were somewhat ahead
of public sentiment at the time, although they would hardly be so
regarded now. In this connection the New York law of 1906 (ch. 502),
was an event of first class importance. It compels political committees
to file detailed statements of receipts as well as expenditures, and
provides for judicial investigation to enforce correct statements. The
great weight of the name of the Empire State is thus placed squarely
behind the demand for real publicity of receipts.[74] Under this act,
voluntarily accepted by the national chairmen in 1908, publicity was
given to the finances of a presidential campaign for the first time in
the history of the country.
In the national field the nearest approach to legislation prescribing
publicity for campaign contributions was made by a bill (H. R. 20112)
introduced into the House of Representatives in 1908. Briefly this
bill covered both expenditures and contributions of the national and
the congressional campaign committees of all parties, and of “all
committees, associations, or organisations which shall in two or more
states influence the result or attempt to influence the result of an
election at which Representatives in Congress are to be elected.”
Treasurers of such committees were required to file itemised detailed
statements with the Clerk of the House of Representatives “not more
than fifteen days and not less than ten days before an election,” and
also final reports within thirty days after such elections. These
statements were to include the names and addresses of contributors of
$100 or more, the total of contributions under $100, disbursements
exceeding $10 in detail, and the total of disbursements of less amount.
The bill also contained provisions, which will be referred to later,
designed to cover the use of money by persons or associations other
than those mentioned above. Unfortunately a provision was tacked on
to the foregoing raising the question of the restriction of colored
voting in the South and hinting at a reapportionment of congressional
representation under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. As
a consequence an embittered opposition was made by the Democrats who
charged that the latter provision was deliberately introduced in bad
faith with the intention of making the passage of the bill impossible.
In the House it was carried by a solid Republican vote of 161 in its
favour to 126 Democratic votes in opposition, but was allowed to expire
in the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections for fear that it
would become the object of a Democratic filibuster.
Whatever may be the merits of the proposal to readjust congressional
representation it is clearly a question which is logically separable
from that of campaign contributions. If this separation is effected
there would seem to be reason to hope that a publicity bill similar in
its main outlines to that of 1908 can pass Congress. While a platform
plank of this sort was voted down in the Republican National Convention
of that year, Mr. Taft in his speech of acceptance said:—
“If I am elected President I shall urge upon Congress, with every
hope of success, that a law be passed requiring a filing in a Federal
office of a statement of the contributions received by committees and
candidates in elections for members of Congress, and in such other
elections as are constitutionally within the control of Congress.”[75]
The manœuvring for position between the parties in 1908 which resulted
in the voluntary acceptance by each of high standards of publicity is
too fresh in the public mind to require rehearsal here. For the first
time in the history of presidential elections some definite information
was made available regarding campaign finances. The Republican National
Committee reported contributions of $1,035,368.27. This sum, however,
does not include $620,150 collected in the several states by the
finance committees of the Republican National Committee and turned
over by them to their respective state committees. The Democratic
National Committee reported contributions amounting to $620,644.77. The
list of contributors to the Republican National Fund contained 12,330
names.[76] The Democratic National Committee filed a “list of over
25,000 names representing over 100,000 contributors who contributed
through newspapers, clubs, solicitors, and other organisations, whose
names are on file in the office of the chairman of the Democratic
National Committee at Buffalo.”[77]
On many points, unfortunately, the two reports, while definite to a
degree hitherto unknown, are not strictly comparable. Some species of
“uniform accounting” applicable to this subject is manifestly necessary
before any detailed investigation can be undertaken. One big fact
stands out with sufficient clearness, however, namely that the national
campaign of 1908 was waged at a money cost far below that of the three
preceding campaigns.
Basing his estimate upon what is said to have been spent in 1896,
1900, and 1904, Mr. F. A. Ogg placed the total cost of a presidential
election to both parties, including the state and local contests
occurring at the same time, at $15,000,000.[78] One-third to one-half
of this enormous sum, in his opinion, must be attributed to the
presidential campaign proper. Compared with this estimate of from five
to seven and a half millions the relatively modest total of something
more than two and a quarter millions shown by the figures of 1908 must
be counted a strong argument in favour of publicity.
The most important single issue raised by the policies of the two
parties during the last presidential campaign was that of publicity
before or after election. Early in the campaign the Democratic National
Committee decided to publish on or before October 15th all individual
contributions in excess of $100; contributions received subsequent
to that date to be published on the day of their receipt. Following
the principle of the New York law both parties made post-election
statements. It is manifest that complete statements of expenditures,
or for that matter of contributions as well, can be made only after
election. Every thorough provision for publicity must, therefore,
require post-election reports. Shall preliminary statements also be
required? As against the latter it is urged that contributors whose
motives are of the highest character will be deterred by the fear of
savage partisan criticism. If publicity is delayed until after the
election campaign bitterness will have subsided and a juster view of
the whole situation will be possible. In favour of publicity before the
election it is said that two main ends are aimed at by all legislation
of this sort;—first to prevent the collection and expenditure of
enormous sums for the bribery of voters and other corrupt purposes,
and, second, by revealing the source of campaign funds to make it
difficult or impossible for the victorious party to carry out corrupt
bargains into which it may have entered in order to obtain large
contributions. Publicity after the election will, indeed, serve the
second of these ends, but publicity before would be much more effective
in preventing corrupt collection and expenditure of funds. Moreover
it might prevent the victory of the party pursuing such a policy and
thus, by keeping it out of power, render it incapable of paying by
governmental favour for its contributions.
In attempting to arrive at a conclusion on this issue it is difficult
to assign it such practical importance as it received during the
campaign of 1908. Publicity after election simply delays the time of
exposure. The knowledge that it is bound to come must exert a very
powerful influence over intending contributors. That this was the
case in 1908 is pretty convincingly demonstrated by a comparison of
the figures of that year with the figures for earlier presidential
campaigns. It is certain that publicity pure and simple, whether before
or after election, will seldom show on the face of the returns any
facts seriously reflecting upon party integrity. If there is to be
difficulty in administering laws of this character it will come in the
way of getting at real, complete statements, going back of the names
and figures on the return if necessary. On the other hand it is not
altogether to be deplored that before election publicity may result in
rather bitter criticism of some contributors. Gifts in general, as we
have already noted,[79] stand in especial need of criticism, and this
principle applies with maximum force to campaign gifts. Designed as
they are to affect public policy a plea for privacy cannot be set up on
their behalf. If the criticism of contributors should go to extremes
it will hurt the party making it more than the individuals assailed.
Contributors who know their own motives to be honourable ought not to
allow themselves to be deterred by baseless clamour. If, however, such
criticism is just, both the individual making, and the party receiving
the suspicious contribution deserve to suffer. By deterring other
contributions of a similar questionable character a distinct public
service will be rendered by such ante-election criticism. Knowledge of
the sources of the financial support of a party is certainly not the
only nor the best basis to be employed by an elector in determining
the way he shall cast his vote, but under present conditions it is
certainly a matter which he is entitled to take into consideration.
While admitting, therefore, that there is room for honest difference
of opinion on the question of publicity before or after election,
the weight of the argument would seem to fall distinctly in favour
of the former. It is sincerely to be regretted that the question
became in a sense a matter of party record in 1908. Going back to the
congressional bill of the same year, however, it is worth noting that
the Republican majority in the House once placed itself solidly and
squarely on record in favour of publicity before the election. Looking
at the matter solely from the lower standpoint of expediency that party
is now in a most enviable position to revert to its earlier attitude
and, by enacting the principle of ante-election publicity into law,
to secure for itself the credit of a popular reform. This would place
the two parties on a uniform legal basis for the future, and make it
impossible for the Democrats to assume voluntarily a higher standard
regarding publicity which they could then use as a campaign argument
against the Republicans.[80]
There is one form of publicity before election, if it may be considered
such, which while not a matter of public discussion would seem
advisable in any event. Laws should require that all candidates must
be furnished with daily accounts of the financial operations both as
to receipts and expenditures of campaign committees and others acting
in their interest. Even under the old régime of secrecy scandalous
exposures sometimes occurred. Confronted by such untoward circumstances
partisans always urged in defence that the candidate himself was the
soul of honesty and that he was as ignorant as a new-born babe of
the dirty work carried on by a handful of irresponsible and corrupt
friends. No doubt there have been many cases where the moral insulation
thus alleged really existed. On the other hand some of these pleas in
defence and extenuation were abject farces. They should be prevented
once for all by providing that every candidate must be fully and
promptly informed regarding the financial conditions of his campaign.
Indeed he is entitled to this information in advance of the public,
for his personal honour is at stake. If, then, he should disapprove
of the measures employed in his behalf he can take such action as may
seem desirable to clear his reputation. If, on the other hand, he is
willing that dubious methods should be resorted to, let him not attempt
to play upon the credulity of the public in case of exposure.[81] It
is notorious that the last refuge of a discredited machine is the
nomination of a man whose personal honesty is above suspicion, and
his election by every possible crooked device. While the campaign is
going on the “irreproachable candidate” is kept carefully in ignorance
of the methods of his more “practical” managers. After the election
he may be told of them if it is necessary to force his compliance to
corrupt bargains made in his behalf. Pre-election campaign publicity
for the particular information of candidates ought to make it more
difficult for a machine _in extremis_ to save itself by the nomination
of “irreproachables.” Or if they are nominated they will at least be
able to insist on the “irreproachable” conduct of their campaign. In
any event such publicity would provide the voters with candidates of
whom it might be assumed in every case that they knew exactly what sort
of methods were being used to secure their election.
The question of campaign publicity involves, of course, the further
question as to what organisations and officials shall make reports
of contributions and expenditures. In a general way this duty,
which originally was laid only upon candidates has been extended
sweepingly to party committees and similar bodies. The language of the
congressional bill referred to above is extremely broad, but it does
not settle all the questions that may arise on this point. Associations
may be formed which without nominating candidates of their own or
undertaking other definitely partisan activities may nevertheless
profoundly affect the outcome of an election. A curious illustration
of this point may be found in the Missouri law of 1907,[82] which
provided that civic leagues making reports on the fitness of candidates
for public office must also publish the basis of their information
and file statements of their expenses. It is manifest that leagues
of this character, which seldom if ever nominate candidates of their
own, may nevertheless come under the control of contributing interests
and use their considerable influence to affect elections corruptly.
Other illustrations are supplied by large organisations devoted to the
propaganda of a given cause. In a tariff campaign, for example, both
free trade and protectionist leagues might raise and expend enormous
sums in a way that would materially affect the result at the polls.
There is at least the possibility of evasion and trouble in this
direction, mitigated, however, by the fact that in general the work
of propagandist leagues will be educational and free from grosser
offences such as bribery of voters. Finally there is the possibility of
large direct individual expenditures by warm friends or near relatives
in favour of a given candidacy. This was met in the congressional bill
by requiring reports of expenditures by persons other than members
of campaign committees in excess of $50, not, however, including
travelling expenses or postage, telegraph, and telephone charges.[83]
Legislation compelling all contributors to make their contributions
through campaign committees,[84] or forbidding the direct use of money
by individuals may suffice to overcome this difficulty if it should
ever become threatening.
Publicity laws have done something to fix responsibility for
collections by specifying the nature of organisations which are
compelled to report and further by requiring the appointment of certain
financial officials in such organisations. It would seem difficult to
go further in a legal way. There is, however, a manifest impropriety
in the appointment of persons to do this work who through the exercise
of their own official power or because of knowledge gained while in
office could use threats express or implied in approaching prospective
contributors. At its worst this amounts to a subtle sort of corrupt
blackmail which is only slightly veiled; at its best it may be condoned
as a political device formerly considered clever but now so generally
reprobated as to be dangerous. The general recognition of the purpose
of such appointments should be sufficient to prevent the naming as
party collectors of officials who come, have come, or are to come into
contact with the business world through the exercise of the taxing or
supervisory powers of government.
Closely associated with the subject of publicity is the question of
the prohibition or limitation of contributions from various sources.
Absolute prohibition, of course, could come only as a corollary to a
system of government appropriations for campaign expenses. Under a
mixed system of support or with wholly voluntary support, prohibition
or limitation of certain kinds of contributions may be attempted
by law. Of course there is a possibility that with publicity fully
secured obnoxious contributions may become, through fear of criticism,
extremely rare. Quite a number of states, however, have deemed it
necessary to supplement their publicity acts with acts prohibiting or
restricting certain kinds of contributions.
The most common objects of such prohibitions are, of course, the
corporations. As early as 1894, Mr. Elihu Root, speaking in the New
York Constitutional Convention in favour of an amendment prohibiting
contributions from such sources, said:—“It strikes at a constantly
growing evil which has done more to shake the confidence of the plain
people of small means of this country in our political institutions
than any other practice which has ever obtained since the foundation
of our government.” Even now that the turning point has been passed
and we are clearly on the way to better things there are few students
of our public life who would dissent from Mr. Root’s judgment of
the seriousness of the question raised by corporate contributions
to campaign funds. Missouri, Nebraska, Tennessee, and Florida, were
pioneers in acting on this conviction, all four having passed laws in
1897 absolutely forbidding such gifts.[85] Several states followed in a
desultory fashion until in 1907 a sudden burst of legislative activity
occurred as a result of the New York insurance revelations. In that one
year no fewer than eleven states passed laws forbidding life insurance
companies to contribute, and five other states forbade all corporations
of whatever sort to make contributions to campaign funds.
It is frequently objected to laws of this character that they are
worthless because they can readily be evaded. A corporation may
secretly direct one of its officials to make a large contribution
with the understanding that the money is to be returned to him later,
concealed, it may be, in the price paid for some property which he
sells the corporation. No doubt evasion of this sort is possible, but
it will hardly become common because it involves the collusion of so
many men not only in the management of the corporation but also in the
party management, all of whom will fully understand the criminal nature
of the transaction. On the corporation side, moreover, the act remains
a gift, and withal a gift of a much more hazardous nature and one much
less certain to bring returns than such gifts are reputed to have been
in the past. Now even under the most favourable circumstances giving,
whether by corporations or by individuals, is a somewhat painful
process. The absence of souls in the case of the former does not seem
to make their feeling of sacrifice any the less keen. It is highly
improbable, therefore, that in addition to this natural obstacle and
other disadvantages corporations are likely to run the risks of penal
law frequently in order that they may bestow their surplus wealth upon
party organisations.
Of course there are corporations so largely owned by individuals and
so thoroughly identified with the latter that a contribution from
them may seem to amount to the same thing as a contribution from the
corporation. Technically, however, the money must be offered as a
personal gift, and party managers might defend themselves on this score
in case the contributor afterwards demanded a corrupt favour in the
interest of his corporation. If the public remains suspicious of such
large personal contributions by corporate managers the further step may
be taken of fixing by law the maximum amount to be contributed by any
individual.
Considering the special disabilities which have been laid upon
corporations in the matter of campaign contributions it is indeed
remarkable that similar restrictions have not been suggested for other
associations. Either by gradually extending this policy or by a single
sweeping measure the right of contribution may finally be brought to
as purely individual a basis as the right of suffrage itself. Some
partnerships, particularly in manufacturing and the express business,
have been notorious seekers after special privileges, but not being
corporations there is nothing to prevent them from contributing
largely to campaign funds. Labour unions might be developed into very
heavy contributors to campaign funds. Although in the latter case the
contributions would come from a great number of individuals giving
relatively small amounts each, yet the machinery of organisation and
the emulation it could excite among the members might prove potent in
producing very large sums in the aggregate. The same considerations
apply to clubs, whether purely social or propagandist in character,
which can contribute great sums without revealing the identity of large
donors among their members,—except perhaps privately to the financial
officers of a campaign committee. If publicity reveals any such abuses
legislation to correct them along the same lines as our present
corporate prohibitions may prove desirable.
Next to contributions by corporations political contributions from
candidates would seem to stand most in need of restriction. The
English Corrupt and Illegal Practice Prevention Act is very explicit
and drastic on this subject. It even goes to the length of forbidding
contributions for charitable purposes subsequent to the public
announcement of the candidate’s intention to stand for a borough. Our
own legislation, however, has been very fragmentary except in so far
as candidates were affected by the general publicity requirements. By
an act which went into effect, August, 1892, Massachusetts prohibited
political committees from soliciting contributions from candidates who,
however, might “make a voluntary payment of money—for the promotion of
the principles of the party which the committee represents, and for
the general purposes of the committee.” While doubtless excellent as a
statement of ideal relations it is questionable whether this enactment
materially increased the obstacles intervening between campaign
committees and candidates’ pocketbooks. At least the legislature of
the same state found it necessary in 1908 to provide that political
committees should not solicit money from a candidate as a prerequisite
to giving him his nomination papers.[86] A new departure was made by
the Ohio law of 1896, known as the Garfield Act,[87] which endeavoured
to grade candidates’ expenses according to the number of votes cast,
limiting them to $100 for five thousand voters or less, and providing
that they should not exceed $650 in any case.[88] In case of violation
the office of a successful candidate could be declared vacant at any
time during his term. California, Missouri, Montana, Minnesota,
and New York, have also attempted the limitation of candidates’
contributions or expenditures.[89] In 1895, Connecticut and New York
forbade contributions by candidates except to authorised committees
or party agents.[90] California, in 1907, adopted the rather doubtful
expedient of limiting contributions from candidates according to
the length of term and salary of the office for which they are
contesting.[91] Perhaps the most significant step that has been taken
in this direction was the action of New York which in 1906 prohibited
contributions from candidates for judicial offices.[92]
With these exceptions contributions by candidates are in general
free from legal regulation. There have been comparatively few great
exposures to awaken the public conscience to the abuses that have
grown up in this connection, but as to the widespread and extremely
scandalous nature of these abuses no one who is in the least familiar
with practical politics can have the slightest doubt. Broadly
considered any large contribution by a candidate toward his own
election is manifestly indelicate, not to say frankly improper. Custom
has rendered us so familiar with this practice, however, that we are
inclined to accept it as a matter of course. There is a certain
gambling spirit inherent in politics which is profoundly potent for
evil. Primarily this is due, of course, to the inevitable uncertainties
of campaigning. No single factor contributes to it more largely than
the habit of “assessing” candidates for office. Honest and able men
are frequently repelled from politics when they encounter this system.
Some of them may hesitate to make the material sacrifices involved and
are consequently deemed miserly by the politicians, although it is
not the amount of money demanded but rather the uses to which these
men know the money will be put that leads them to withdraw. It is not
too much to maintain that the conditions now existing in many places
are worse than the property qualifications once required by law to
make one eligible to hold office. Our present “voluntary” contribution
system, rendered practically obligatory by party authorities, is more
burdensome on the candidate than a property qualification because
it requires him not only to have property but also to sacrifice a
considerable part of it to obtain office or the chance of office. The
old property qualifications were really lighter and more democratic
since they merely required prospective office holders to own so
much, and all who possessed more than this fixed sum were eligible
equally. The existing system which allows voluntary contributions
by candidates unlimited as to amount is equivalent to a property
qualification interpreted in the light of the prospective generosity
of the candidate. Party managers are continually under temptation to
name the man who has the more money and can be expected to make the
larger contribution. Of course this does not mean that the man with
the biggest “bar’l” is always nominated. Other qualifications such as
the man’s education, character, and equipment for campaigning, must be
taken into account as well as his ability and inclination to pay. Or if
one candidate is placed on the ticket solely because of his liberality
the general average must be raised by a larger admixture of brains and
character on the part of his running mates. So long as candidates’
contributions are unlimited as to amount we are, nevertheless, openly
tolerating conditions which give the maximum effect to wealth as a
qualification for public office. True we wish to encourage our men of
wealth to go into politics, but we desire them to do so on the basis
of their brains and character, not on the basis of their dollars. Even
without the use of money in their own interest they enjoy a tremendous
advantage for candidacy in their leisure and freedom from material
cares. On the other hand the multi-millionaire backed almost solely
by his own wealth and unlimited as to the amount he can spend on his
campaigning has already caused considerable annoyance in our political
life and is likely to become an unmitigated nuisance if checks are not
applied betimes. Although cases of this sort are relatively infrequent
as yet they are likely to occur more commonly in the future. Business
prizes have been so large until recently that they have absorbed the
attention of most of our men of wealth. To our captains of industry the
money rewards of an office were as nothing, and the honour it conferred
added little to their importance. Washington’s recently acquired
prominence as a winter residence for wealthy families may appear to
be nothing more than a whim of gilded society, but the relationships
thus established are certain to stimulate political ambitions in
new quarters. With increasing power and social prestige attached to
office,[93] more owners of great fortunes are likely to enter politics
in the future. In general we have every reason to rejoice that this
is the case, but we should also endeavour to adjust the terms of
competition so that no undue political weight shall be given to the
brute force of millions.
Underlying the system of contributions by candidates is the uncritical
view that the latter should pay largely because they are to enjoy
personally the honours and emoluments of office. Nominees, at least
successful nominees, are deemed to be the special favourites of the
party, and hence morally obligated to contribute generously to its
support. Little consideration is given by those holding such views
to the tremendous tax laid upon the vitality of candidates by the
strenuous modern methods of campaigning, certainly a burden large
enough in most cases to justify their exemption from heavy financial
contributions in addition. But there are other and more serious logical
defects in the theory justifying such impositions upon candidates.
Normally, of course, assessments of this character must be recouped
out of the earnings of the office, although it is said sometimes to
happen that the sum demanded for campaign expenses is larger than the
salary for the entire term of occupancy. One of our states, as we have
seen, attempts to limit candidates’ contributions to a certain ratio of
official earnings.[94] The clear implication of all this is that the
salary of office is considered to represent first, a payment for the
public services rendered by the office holder, and second, a surplus
over the preceding which should be devoted to campaign expenses. If we
accept this view we virtually accept the principle of the payment of
campaign expenses in part at least by the state. One who repudiated
this principle might therefore consistently demand the reduction of
all official salaries by the amount of the campaign surplus which
they contain over and above the value of services actually rendered
by incumbents. As a matter of fact such a reduction would be most
unfortunate, the truth being, as we have already had occasion to note,
that most official salaries in the United States are too low. And,
finally, a consistent believer in the principle of the payment of
campaign contributions by the state might object to its realisation
through the underhanded and coercive method of assessments levied upon
candidates. Some perfectly frank and legal method of administering the
subsidy would be far preferable.
Both in practice and theory, therefore, grave objections may be urged
against a _laisser faire_ policy in regard to campaign contributions
by candidates. Effective publicity may possibly suffice to bring the
abuses which have developed in this connection within bounds. The
existing system, however, is old, widespread, and deeply entrenched.
Public sentiment against it is far from being so strong as the
facts warrant. Particularly significant in this connection is the
recent action of New York in prohibiting contributions from judicial
candidates. Doubtless the reason for this special limitation was
the peculiar sanctity and impartiality which we associate with the
functions of the judiciary. Yet in ideal at least these high qualities
should attach to other public offices. So far, therefore, as the
sanctity and impartiality of public office in general can be cultivated
by prohibiting or limiting campaign contributions we should apply the
reform to the legislative and administrative branches of government as
well as to the judiciary.
It is worth noting that complete prohibition of such contributions,
as in the New York instance, will probably involve the limitation of
contributions by others than candidates. A judicial or other nominee
prohibited by law from using money on his own behalf might, for
example, knowingly or unknowingly, owe his election largely to a few
rich supporters who perhaps would not hesitate at some later time to
try to use the influence which they had thus obtained. Indeed it is
one of the redeeming features of the present system that men of ample
means have sometimes bought independence in office by financing their
own campaigns. If, therefore, it should prove desirable to restrict
candidates’ contributions in the future, care should also be taken to
limit the contributions of third parties. Otherwise the latter, by
assuming the financial burden taken from the shoulders of nominees
might attempt to purchase political influence on which they could
realise after those whom they assisted had obtained office.
While the foregoing argument has been directed chiefly to the case
of candidates for elective office it is also applicable in some
particulars to the campaign contributions of officials under civil
service rules. Usually efforts are made with a considerable degree
of success to protect the latter from the assessment system. The old
abuse of extortion by officials of higher rank is in a fair way to be
obliterated, although sporadic cases of this sort still occur even in
the federal service. Unfortunately it is easy to appoint collectors
who themselves hold no office under civil service rules, but whose
intimate personal relations with high officials are widely known to
subordinates. Civil service employees of higher grades are probably
too well informed of their rights to submit to extortion veiled in
this or any other guise, but there are doubtless considerable numbers
of the less intelligent and poorly paid civil servants, at least in
some of our state and local governments, who are really being assessed
frequently and heavily under the pretence, of course, of “voluntary”
contributions. Probably it is true everywhere that those who suffer
worst from this despicable malpractice are precisely those who are
least able to bear it. Even this, however, is not the chief evil of the
system. Absolute non-partisanship in their official work can hardly
be expected of a body of men who are constantly being approached for
campaign contributions, and in effect being reminded thereby that,
civil service or no civil service, they are deemed to be subject in a
peculiar degree to party taxation. Moreover one of the great weaknesses
of the civil service establishment is the conviction on the part of
the opposition party, inevitable whether or not it be justifiable,
that civil service employees are being exploited for contributions by
the party in power. Publicity may dispel both this abuse, so far as
it exists, and also the misconceptions based upon it. If not it may
prove desirable in the future to prohibit absolutely all campaign
contributions from employees under civil service rules. Administration
will certainly be much easier and suspicion more difficult when no
contribution whatever is legally permissible than under any system
which permits “voluntary” offerings.
In addition to the prohibition or limitation of campaign contributions
from certain specified sources the suggestion has been touched
upon that it may prove desirable in the end to limit the campaign
contributions of individuals. Just what theoretical basis might be
found for fixing the exact amount of such limitation is not clear.
Possibly the number of voters, the number of candidates, and the
estimated legitimate costs of a given campaign could be combined in
some way to give a definite result. In practice, however, the question
of fixing a satisfactory limit to individual contributions will hardly
present any great difficulty. Evasion of such limitations by means
of dummy contributors is, as we have seen,[95] not very probable.
There ought, however, to be a very stringent penalty against the
custom of handing considerable sums to campaign treasurers personally
with the understanding that the amount shall be turned in as the
individual contribution of the treasurer himself. Limitation of the
amount of individual contributions, together with the other safeguards
that have been discussed, may prove a very effective substitute
for ante-election publicity. If we are assured that corporation
contributions are barred, that the contributions of candidates and
civil service employees are either prohibited or strictly limited, and
finally that the contributions of others are limited to relatively
small amounts, it becomes a matter of distinctly minor importance to
know who are the financial supporters on either side. Given these
conditions the publication of such information would scarcely attract
any notice even during the heat of a campaign.
As a first effect the restriction of contributions according to all
or a part of the various propositions discussed above would probably
reduce the aggregate of campaign funds considerably. It remains to
be seen whether this will have an unfavourable influence upon our
political life. Shocked by the magnitude of the sums recently employed
many of our social doctors would advise rigorous starvation and
copious bloodletting as essential to the radical cure of our campaign
diseases. In spite of the necessity of parties under the conditions
of American government public prejudice is strongly inclined to
underestimate the value of party work. Yet considering the size of the
country and the magnitude of the interests involved it is doubtful
if the amount expended in the last presidential election, to cite a
specific instance, was uneconomical. Certainly an even larger sum
could be spent profitably along educational lines in our greater
campaigns. One trouble now is that quite apart from the illegal or
immoral practices charged against American campaign managers the latter
have in too many cases carried on their activities in a conventional
fashion which is rather ineffective and wasteful. Thousands of dollars
are spent in circulating documents and speeches. Yet printed matter of
this character is so cheap and nasty in appearance, so unattractive in
form, so devoid of illustration, and often so dry and prolix that it
is promptly and deservedly thrust into the waste-basket by practically
all recipients. Progressive business men have learned the value of
modern forms of advertising in newspapers, magazines, street cars,
etc., but the political manager seldom employs it with any effect. In
many districts illustrated lectures would be an enormous improvement
over the cheap mouthings of the ordinary cart-tail spell-binder.
Campaign text-books, as the term is at present understood, are at
best dry and formal arsenals of fact fit only for the higher grade of
speakers and leaders, or, at worst, mere hodge-podge collections of
sensational clippings useful only to equip already convinced partisans
with a few accusations and arguments which they can then monotonously
parrot forth from the beginning to the end of the campaign. Constructed
with some regard to pedagogical principles and popular requirements
such books might be made extremely influential. By these and
other improved methods our campaigns may finally come to be worth
what they cost. Certainly few services are of more importance in a
democracy than rousing the people to political issues, instructing
them as to men and policies, leading them out from narrow personal
concerns to participation in the broad life of the state. Even with
all the restrictions on the collection of campaign funds which have
been mentioned above it is improbable that sufficient funds for all
legitimate purposes will in the long run be denied. If any shortage
threatens, campaign managers may better their situation by the same
policy which any institution dependent upon public support must follow
under similar circumstances,—that is, they must so impress the value
of the work they are doing upon the people that ample material support
will be freely offered. If this cannot be done they will simply have to
get along with less, the probability being, of course, that the smaller
amount is quite as much as is necessary and certainly as much as they
deserve.
One certain consequence of the prohibition of large contributions
will be greater activity on the part of campaign collectors to secure
contributions in smaller amounts. This would seem desirable in every
way. Until we commit ourselves to the principle of state subsidies it
ought to be part of common school instruction everywhere to insist on
the duty of the voter to contribute something toward party support.
Possibly large contributions might be found unobjectionable in the
future if given for some specific purpose, the circulation of a certain
speech, for example, or some other educational form of political
activity. Considering the abuses which have been charged against
campaign managers the almost universal habit of making gifts to them
on a _carte blanche_ basis is remarkable to say the least. Taking a
suggestion from educational practice, large campaign contributions
might be further legitimatised in case it were stipulated, that equal
amounts should be raised in small sums by campaign managers. If the
time be short in which to comply with a condition of this sort, the
interest in such collections, on the other hand, would be very great.
Certainly it could scarcely be argued that a sum thus collected
represented nothing more than the selfish desire of a rich man to
promote one of his personal interests.
Besides prohibiting or limiting contributions from certain sources it
may also prove desirable to fix time limits within which large gifts
may not be received. Among other conditions voluntarily accepted in
1908 the Democratic National Committee pledged itself to receive no
contribution above $100 within three days of the election. The time
limit in this case was scarcely long enough to be very impressive, but
the principle involved is of some importance. Such facts as we possess
with regard to the history of campaign funds indicate “fat-frying”
of a most strenuous and compromising character during the last few
days preceding an election. Alarmist and hysterical reports about
doubtful states were prepared on both sides and presented tearfully and
confidentially to men of wealth, to candidates, and to other persons
from whom money might perchance be obtainable. The probability is very
strong that the great sums thus raised and of necessity spent at the
eleventh hour were more largely subject to waste, theft, and corrupt
use, than any other money which was placed in the hands of campaign
managers. Prohibition of contributions within a short period prior to
election or their limitation in amount during such period ought to
reduce this evil considerably, at least on the collecting side. If
subjected to such a restriction campaign managers will, of course, seek
to secure as large a sum as possible before the time limit expires, and
they will also take care to keep a sufficient reserve on hand for the
culminating needs of the campaign. Nevertheless they will be pretty
effectually estopped from calamity howling at the last minute as a
means of obtaining large additional “slush” funds.
A very important question is raised by one section of the Wisconsin
law of 1897,[96] which provides that contributions to aid certain
candidates may be made only by residents of their districts. So far as
ascertainable this is the only case of a geographical limitation upon
the gathering of campaign funds. It is a matter of common knowledge
that in national contests very great sums collected on the outside are
poured into doubtful states, sometimes with material influence upon the
results. Large amounts of money are occasionally massed in a single
district to elect a particularly strong, or to defeat a particularly
obnoxious member of Congress. In state and local contests the same sort
of financial manipulation is not unusual. Our laws, unlike those of
England, do not permit plural voting. An American citizen votes where
he resides. No matter how great may be his property holdings he cannot
vote elsewhere. But he may spend his dollars anywhere in support of
candidates and policies, or his contributions may be similarly employed
by the party managers to whom they are handed. It is too early to
discuss the equities of a situation the moral obliquity of which is as
yet so dimly perceived. A principle of some importance, however, would
seem to underlie the Wisconsin prohibition against invasion by foreign
campaign contributions.
Assuming publicity and other necessary restrictions of campaign
funds to have been put into effect, the question may be raised
as to whether business interests could secure proper hearing for
themselves in political affairs. It must be conceded at once that
government should act always with due regard to economic factors. Many
campaign contributions of times past, including even some of the most
objectionable, were made by business men who felt that while by so
doing they were pledging public officials in their favour they were
at the same time pledging these officials to that course of conduct
which was best for the prosperity and welfare of the country as a
whole. Quite apart from all moral considerations such contributions
were looked upon as a sort of business tax, made necessary by our
democratic political conditions, and as such fundamentally justifiable.
There is no excuse for not knowing better now; in a short time there
will be absolutely no justification for tolerating contributions made
on this basis. Business men who pursued the old policy were following
what looked like a short and easy cut to their immediate ends. In
reality they were piling up class hatred, restrictive legislation,
obnoxious taxes, and various instalments of socialism. Fortunately this
destructive process, so far as objectionable campaign contributions
minister to it, is likely to be checked. But legitimate businesses,
including big monopolistic concerns properly conducted, will not be
debarred by publicity and the regulation of campaign contributions
from the use of a great many open and effective means of bringing
their interests to the attention of government. Of course grafting
business will receive a set-back, but this is exactly what is desired.
Our great economic interests would probably be in a far healthier
condition to-day if they had employed legitimate agencies only in the
past, and neglected altogether the short and dangerous cut to political
influence offered by large campaign contributions. Business is now
learning the value of frank and honest methods of dealing with the
people, of publicity on its own account as contrasted with the old
public-be-damned attitude. Internal reforms of business practices, the
correction of abuses from within and by insiders, are seen to be much
less costly than the application of legislative sledge-hammers. The
American people is far from radical at heart. Given full and honest
expositions of the case for business it is highly improbable that rash
and destructive policies will triumph in the future, any more than they
were wont to triumph in time past when business interests fought them
in a manner scarcely less objectionable than the subversive policies
themselves. And always back of the public opinion and temper of the
people there are constitutional guaranties and the courts to maintain
them,—safeguards stronger in all probability than those possessed
by property in any other civilised nation in the world to-day.[97]
Manifestly it will require much more than a reform of our present
system of collecting campaign funds to prevent the proper and adequate
hearing by governmental authorities of the legitimate business
interests of the country.
By way of objection to such limitations of campaign contributions as
have been proposed it might be urged that since gifts of services as
well as gifts of money are made to campaign committees the former
as well as the latter must logically be subjected to regulation.
In certain cases it may be admitted that regulation of services is
necessary. Particularly is this true of civil service employees. It
is by no means improbable that it may be found advisable to enforce
by law their complete abstention from all kinds of political work,
leaving them nothing beyond the right to cast their vote. Certainly a
very considerable amount of trouble is experienced at the present time
in keeping them clearly within the legal, but not always self-evident,
lines drawn by civil service acts and rulings. With this exception,
perhaps, there would seem to be every reason to leave campaign
contributions of services free from every restriction but publicity.
No means should be neglected of encouraging the widest possible
participation by amateurs in party activities and party management, and
this is one such means. It is true, of course, that the services of
some exceptionally able men may be equivalent to money gifts of tens
or hundreds of thousands of dollars, and also that such gifts may not
be equally or even proportionally divided among the parties. Normally,
however, the differences between individuals as to their political
abilities are not to be compared in magnitude to the existing enormous
differences in wealth which have made regulation of money contributions
a necessity. And if one party is pre-eminently the gainer through
gifts of services by brilliant men certainly it would seem to deserve
any advantage thus obtained. Its rivals may thereby learn the value
of the enthusiastic support of men of talent, and bestir themselves
to revise their own programmes so that such men may be induced to
enlist in their fighting columns. It is possible that minor parties
and reform movements are relatively more successful in this way than
the great parties. If so no dislocation of the political balance of
power is likely to be occasioned by a policy of regulation of monetary
contributions coupled with _laisser faire_ as to contributions of
services. Usually the strength of minor parties in enthusiastic
personal support will still find itself more than outmatched by the
strength of the old line parties in traditional fealty, in practical
experience, and in greater monetary resources.
Whatever additional reform measures may be suggested by further
experience with regard to the publicity and restriction of campaign
contributions, two broad general principles would seem to apply in the
application of all legislation of this character.
First, the subject is clearly one of state and local as well as of
national politics. The two former are subject to the same abuses as the
latter. State and local politics are immensely important in themselves.
They touch the daily affairs of the great mass of the people much more
closely than do national politics. Moreover there is danger that with
campaign fund reform in national affairs only, no matter how thorough
it might be, the neglect of similar reforms in state and local politics
would facilitate the evasion of national law. At least it would seem to
make it possible to use large funds in local and state contests in such
a way as to help indirectly but very materially the national interests
of one or the other party. Fortunately some of our most important
states have already provided for a measure of publicity sufficient to
reduce this possibility so far as they are concerned. The danger will
not be much lessened, however, until their example has been followed
generally. Still it is hardly to be regretted that at the present time
the major public interest is centred in the great presidential contest.
There is no danger that the object lesson voluntarily given by the
two national parties in 1908 will be forgotten by the American people
either in succeeding presidential campaigns or in our minor state and
city elections. But while we are securing the great political front
door let us remember that the horse may also be stolen if we neglect to
lock the numerous side and back doors.
Secondly, our primary and convention system is subject to the same
abuses in the use of money as the election system proper. Indeed
in states solid one way or the other it is probable that corrupt
practices are more common in connection with nominations, where there
may be sharp fighting, than in the subsequent cut and dried election.
Organic reforms of a most sweeping character are in process in this
field,[98] and when the time is ripe it would seem to be an easy
matter to graft upon them the requirement of publicity of nominating
expenses and other restrictions upon primary contributions similar
in a general way to the restrictions now being imposed upon campaign
contributions. A start has already been made in this direction. By a
law which went into effect in 1892, Massachusetts established publicity
in respect to nominating as well as election expenses. The Garfield
Corrupt Practices Act passed by the Ohio legislature of 1896,[99] and
unfortunately repealed in 1902, required publicity and limited the
expenditure of candidates before conventions and primaries as well as
before elections. In 1906, Pennsylvania passed a law[100] containing
a list of the legitimate forms of campaign expenditure and requiring
statements from candidates for nomination in the primary as well as
from candidates for election. Nebraska, Virginia, and Georgia, have
also passed laws of this character.[101] In sharp contrast with these
movements for better things within our states are the deplorable
conditions currently alleged to exist in the greatest of all our
nominating institutions,—the National Conventions. It would seem hardly
possible to delay much longer reform measures designed to bring about
improved conditions in this field.
Considering the many unsettled points with regard to the proper
measures for regulating campaign contributions and the necessity for
the extension of such reforms to many areas as yet untouched it is
evident that we are dealing with a movement which has scarcely made
more than a beginning. Even with satisfactory legislation on our
statute books the fight will not be completely won. Fortunately it is
believed that the argument of unconstitutionality cannot be employed
against this movement.[102] Difficulties of administration will have
to be met, however, although it is highly improbable that these will
be so great as the difficulties occasioned by the execution of other
parts of our corrupt practices acts, such for example as the manifold
conditions which prevent the complete enforcement of laws against
the bribery of voters. Bi-partisan state election boards may take
over all ordinary official duties in connection with laws requiring
the publicity of, or otherwise limiting, campaign contributions. In
this work they may be somewhat aided by the mutual criticism of the
parties themselves, although, unfortunately, this is a party function
which is very imperfectly performed in the United States. Much good
may be accomplished by such voluntary organisations as the New York
_Association to Prevent Corrupt Practices at Elections_. With men
of prominence in both of the leading parties in its directorate and
membership the Association proposes:
“First, To ascertain whether any judicial proceedings should be
brought by the Association’s initiative; that is to say, whether there
is apparent evidence of bribery, or of deliberate falsification,
concealment, and evasion in the statements [of campaign contributions
and expenditures] such as would warrant a judicial inquiry to compel a
proper accounting.”
“Second, To secure a permanent record for the Association of the
important facts in connection with the statements filed, upon which
an opinion may be based as to whether additional corrupt practices
legislation ought to be recommended by the Association to the
Legislature.”
The Association further intends to exercise the closest scrutiny
over such items as “canvassers,” “watchers,” “expenditures for
workers,” and so on. Particularly praiseworthy in its platform is the
determination to prosecute violations before the courts. Unless some
determined agency undertakes this function all campaign fund enactments
will promptly sink to the level of those already too numerous American
laws which adorn our statute books with ideal maxims but in practice
are ignored by our administrators.[103]
Assuming both legislative and administrative activity in campaign
fund reform still we must not overestimate the value of the probable
results. Only a part of the problem of the support of party machinery
and party workers will be solved thereby, but at least it may be said
that an important contribution toward the ultimate complete solution of
the problem will be made. Bribery and corruption will not be done away
with by the reform. They are, as we have seen, much too persistent and
extended to yield to any single reform effort. Indeed some forms of
bribery may be encouraged by the new practice with regard to campaign
contributions. Although it may be made impossible to place men under
obligations while they are candidates it will still be possible to buy
them, if they are purchasable, after they have been elected. One should
remember, however, that if primaries and elections can be purged
of corrupt financial influences it is probable that our successful
candidates for office will be less open to venal influence than those
who win out under the present vicious system. Thoroughgoing campaign
fund reform will enable candidates to attain office without assuming
financial burdens of such a character as to make it difficult for
them to act in a perfectly honest and independent manner. By far the
worst evil of the present system is the ease with which it enables men
otherwise incorruptible to be placed tactfully, subtly, and—as time
goes on—always more completely under obligations incompatible with
public duty. Finally campaign fund reform will enable parties to become
what democratic theory requires them to be, namely honest interpreters
of the popular will instead of crooked agents of sinister influence
into which they will otherwise degenerate. Taking the most moderate
view of the benefits to arise from such reforms, therefore, it would
seem a clear duty of all patriotic citizens and statesmen to work first
for the publicity of campaign contributions and afterwards for such
other restrictions upon their collection and use as experience may
suggest.
FOOTNOTES:
[67] “Present Discontents,” Bohn ed. vol. i, p. 375.
[68] _Cf._ Jane Addams, “Democracy and Social Ethics,” ch. vii.
[69] _Cf._ “The Rise and Growth of American Politics,” p. 312.
[70] _Cf._ “The Rise and Growth of American Politics,” p. 323. He adds
that: “No other nation in the world is rich enough for the political
experimentation which the United States is carrying on; but when the
end crowns the work, its cost may be found to have been small in
comparison with the value of the recompense.”
[71] Nevada was the first state to enact legislation of this character.
(L. 1895, ch. 103; repealed, 1899, ch. 108.) In the same year a
Minnesota law (ch. 277) presented a very detailed definition of
legitimate expenses. The laws of Pennsylvania (1906, ch. 17), and of
New York (1906, ch. 503), are very significant. Professor Merriam sums
them up as follows: “Both provide that no expenses shall be incurred
except of the classes authorised in the act. The New York list, which
is rather more liberal in this respect than that of Pennsylvania,
includes rent of halls and compensation of speakers, music, and
fireworks, advertisement and incidental expenses of meetings, posters,
lithographs, banners, and literary material, payments to agents to
supervise the preparation of campaign articles and advertisements, and
furnish information to newspapers; for advertising, pictures, reading
material, etc.; for rent of offices and club rooms, compensation of
clerks and agents; for attorneys at law; for preparation of lists of
voters; for necessary personal and travelling expenses of candidates
and committeemen; for postage, express, telegraph, and telephone; for
preparing nominating petitions; for workers and watchers at the polls,
and food for the same; for transportation of the sick and infirm to the
polls.” (“N. Y. State Library Review of Legislation, 1906,” p. 160.)
_Cf._ also Virginia, L. 1903, ch. 98; South Dakota, L. 1907, ch. 146;
and California, L. 1907, ch. 350.
In 1907, New York took the further step of limiting the amount of
expenditure for a given purpose, ch. 398 of that year providing that
not more than three carriages in a city district, nor more than six
in other districts, should be used for the transportation of voters.
Acting on the same principle Massachusetts in 1908 (ch. 85), prohibited
the employment by political committees of more than six persons in a
voting precinct or city ward. As the lavish expenditure of campaign
funds for service, rents, and commodities may become nothing more than
a veiled form of vote buying, the significance of the action of New
York and Massachusetts is apparent. The English Act of 1883 contains
similar provisions.
The New Jersey law of 1906 (ch. 208) contains a long list of
_prohibited_ expenditures, including payments for entertainment, for
fitting up club rooms for social or recreative purposes, or providing
uniforms for any organised club, and the payment for insertion of
articles in newspapers and magazines unless labelled as paid articles.
[72] _Cf._ also the Oregon law proposed by initiative petition and
adopted June 1, 1908.
[73] New York now requires full reports from committees also (ch. 502,
L. 1906).
[74] Iowa, L. 1907, ch. 50, followed New York’s example.
[75] “Republican Campaign Text Book,” 1908, p. 25. In his message at
the beginning of the second (_i. e._, the first regular) session of the
Sixty-first Congress on December 7, 1909, President Taft returns to the
subject as follows:
“I urgently recommend to Congress that a law be passed requiring that
candidates in elections of Members of the House of Representatives, and
committees in charge of their candidacy and campaign, file in a proper
office of the United States Government a statement of the contributions
received _and of the expenditures incurred_ in the campaign for such
elections, and that similar legislation be enacted in respect to all
other elections which are constitutionally within the control of
Congress.”
The passage in the foregoing, italicised by the writer, is noteworthy
in that it indicates a step in advance by the president. His speech
of acceptance referred to contributions only, whereas the message of
December 7, 1909, demands publicity of expenditures as well as of party
income.
[76] New York _Tribune_, November 24, 1908, p. 3. The Cincinnati
_Enquirer_ of November 22, 1908, said that approximately 20,000 persons
contributed to the Republican fund. Possibly the discrepancy is due
to the inclusion in the latter figure of contributors to the finance
committees of the Republican National Committee in the several states,
which as noted above collected $620,150.
[77] Cincinnati _Commercial-Tribune_, November 23, 1908. According to
the New York _Tribune_ of November 24, 1908, p. 3, in which is given a
list of contributors to the Republican fund in sums of $500 and upward
the larger contributors to the Republican fund were as follows: C. P.
Taft, $110,000; Union League Club, New York, $34,377, Larz Anderson
and G. A. Garrotson, each $25,000; Union League Club, Philadelphia,
$22,500; Andrew Carnegie and J. P. Morgan each $20,000. In addition
to these there were fifteen contributors of sums of between $6000 and
$15,000 inclusive; twenty-four contributors of $5000 each; thirty-four
of sums between $2500 and $4000 inclusive; twenty of $2000 each;
twenty-eight of sums between $1250 and $1500 inclusive; one hundred
and nineteen contributors of $1000 each; ten of between $750 and $900
inclusive; and two hundred and fifty contributors of $500 each.
The Democrats made a preliminary report of contributions on October 15,
and daily reports thereafter until the election. As the newspapers did
not state clearly whether the later figures regarding contributions
were inclusive or additional it is difficult to summarise the larger
contributions accurately. According to the New York _Times_ of October
14, Tammany Hall sent a check for $10,000 to the Democratic National
Committee. The general report issued October 15, showed the following
contributors in excess of $2000: C. J. Hughes, $5000; W. J. Bryan,
Profits of the _Commoner_, $4046; Nathan Straus, $2500; National
Democratic Club, $2500; Norman E. Mack, $2000; Sen. W. A. Clark, $2000;
George W. Harris, $2000. Some of the foregoing were reported as making
contributions after October 15, and if other contributions reported
at various times were not repetitions the list of contributors of
$2000 and over would be somewhat increased. On October 29, the New
York _Times_ reported a gift of $10,000 from Herman Ridder, Treasurer
of the Democratic Committee, and gifts of $9000 each from his three
sons, Victor, Bernard, and Joseph. A contribution of $3000 from E. F.
Goltra was also reported on this date. In addition to the foregoing,
five contributions of between $1000 and $1500, and thirty-three of
a thousand dollars each were reported. According to the Cincinnati
_Commercial-Tribune_ of October 16, Democratic newspapers collected
almost $100,000 out of the $248,000 obtained up to that date. The New
York _Times_ of October 31, noted that one paper, _The New Orleans
States_, had collected a total of $22,000, said to be the record
contribution for any one newspaper.
[78] “The Dollars Behind the Ballots,” _World To-day_, vol. xv (1908),
p. 946.
[79] _Cf._ p. 145, _supra_.
[80] As final corrections were being made upon these pages the
continental press announces the passage of a publicity measure by
Congress. Unfortunately the writer is unable to secure details upon
which to base a judgment of the new law. That publicity before
election was not provided for is, in his opinion, to be regretted.
On the other hand the enactment as federal law of a measure of this
character represents a decided victory for a principle capable of great
expansion. In this connection the able and persistent propagandist work
of the National Publicity Law Association under the presidency of Mr.
Perry Belmont deserves the warmest commendation. Noteworthy also is the
fact that the Association includes in its membership many of the most
distinguished leaders of both political parties.—Paris, July 1, 1910.
[81] According to the English Corrupt and Illegal Practice Prevention
Act of 1883, bribery as the unauthorised act of an agent renders the
election invalid and disqualifies the candidate from representing the
constituency in which the offence was committed for seven years. While
the penalty may seem drastic it has the good effect of compelling
candidates to scrutinise expenditures in their behalf with a degree of
anxious care seldom duplicated on this side of the Atlantic.
[82] Missouri, L. 1907, p. 261. This law was declared unconstitutional
in 1908, however, on the ground that it impaired liberty of press and
speech. _Ex parte Harrison_, 110 S. W. 709.
[83] A similar provision was included in the Massachusetts law of 1892.
[84] A Michigan law which went into effect in 1892 (Repealed, ch. 61,
1901) provided that all expenditures on behalf of candidates, with few
exceptions, should be made through the party committees.
[85] Following the four states which took action in 1897, Kentucky
forbade corporate contributions in 1900. In 1905, Minnesota (ch. 291)
made it a felony for an officer of a business corporation to vote
money to a campaign fund. Wisconsin in the same year (ch. 492) made
it a felony for a corporation to contribute to political parties for
the purpose of influencing legislation or promoting or defeating the
candidacy of persons for public office. New York in 1906, (ch. 239)
prohibited political contributions by corporations and made violation
of the act a misdemeanor. Alabama, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota,
and Texas were the five states which forbade corporate contributions
in 1907, and the following eleven were reported as specifically
prohibiting contributions from life insurance companies in that year:
Delaware, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia.
In 1908, Ohio, Georgia, Massachusetts, and Mississippi also forbade
corporate contributions. Altogether to the end of 1908, seventeen
states had forbidden corporate contributions in general, and eleven had
specifically forbidden contributions from life insurance companies.
[86] Massachusetts, L. 1908, ch. 85.
[87] Ohio, L. 1896, p. 123; repealed, L. 1902, p. 77.
[88] Nebraska in L. 1899, ch. 29, fixed the same maxima and minima
as the Garfield Act. The sliding scale principle was employed in the
English Act of 1883.
[89] California, L., 1893, ch. 2; Missouri, L. 1893, p. 157; Montana,
Penal Code, 1895, sec. 80 ff.; Minnesota, L. 1895, ch. 277; and New
York, L. 1907, ch. 584.
[90] New York, L. 1895, 155; Connecticut, L. 1895, 338.
[91] California, L. 1907, ch. 350.
[92] New York, L. 1906, ch. 503.
[93] _Cf._ p. 177, _supra_.
[94] See p. 250, _supra_.
[95] _Cf._ p. 246, _supra_.
[96] Wisconsin, L. 1897, 358.
[97] _Cf._ President Arthur T. Hadley’s discussion of “The
Constitutional Position of Property in America” in the _Independent_ of
April 16, 1908.
[98] _Cf._ Professor C. Edward Merriam’s “Primary Elections.”
[99] Laws of 1896, p. 123. The repeal was due to minor defects in the
law which could easily have been corrected by amendment.
[100] Laws of 1906, ch. 17.
[101] Nebraska, L. 1901, 30; Virginia L. 1903, ch. 98; Georgia, L.
1908, 63.
[102] An able argument on this point is presented by Mr. Perry Belmont
in his “Publicity of Election Expenditures,” _North American Review_,
vol. clxxx (1905), p. 166. For many of the most important facts cited
in the preceding pages of this study the writer is indebted to Mr.
Belmont’s valuable article.
[103] _Cf._ the Association’s searching “Report of Examination of
Election Expense Statements, 1908;” also its leaflet on “Future Plans
to Prevent Corrupt Practices.”
CORRUPTION AND NOTORIETY: THE MEASURE OF OUR OFFENDING
VII
CORRUPTION AND NOTORIETY: THE MEASURE OF OUR OFFENDING
Charges of corruption make up a large and important part of the stock
in trade of the ordinary American journalist, politician, and reformer.
One unfortunate result of this condition of affairs is that, taking us
at our word, Europe is forming a very low estimate of the honesty of
governmental and business practices on this side of the Atlantic. Even
among ourselves corruption is coming to be thought of as an indefinite
percentage of evil corroding the general service of the state, and
this percentage is assumed to be much larger in the United States than
abroad. Similar comparisons are drawn between the principal local and
state governments of the country. One popular writer owes no small part
of his vogue to the crisp and supposedly accurate tags which he has
affixed to several of our municipalities and states, _e.g._, “corrupt
and contented,” “half free and fighting on,” “a city ashamed,” “bad
and glad of it,” “a traitor state,” “a state for sale,” and so on.
Between actual corruption, however, and the notoriety attached to it
no definite and known ratio can be said to exist. Much as it is to be
regretted quantitative measures of this political and social evil are
at present quite impossible. Many difficulties stand in the way even
of approximations sufficiently exact for comparisons of any value. It
may perhaps be as well worth while to consider the nature of these
difficulties as to indulge in denunciation regardless of them.
In the first place a thoroughgoing policy of concealment and silence
would seem absolutely essential on the part of those who engage in
corrupt practices. Our most astute leaders and manipulators realise
this fact. All observers agree, however, that among the initiated,
which usually means a pretty large circle, corrupt transactions
are discussed with comparative freedom. It is a matter of no great
difficulty for an ordinarily capable reporter to learn in a general way
what has been done by the boss or gang in certain instances, although
this, of course, is sufficiently far from being legal evidence. And it
is notorious that our politicians of the baser sort often indulge their
cronies with boasting accounts of their own achievements in grafting.
No one has commented upon this fact with greater vigour than Professor
H. J. Ford of Princeton in his admirable review of Mr. Steffens’ _Shame
of the Cities_.
“The facts with which Mr. Steffens deals,” writes Professor Ford,
“are superficial symptoms. Hardly any disguise of them is attempted
in the ordinary talk of local politicians. One of the first things
which practical experience teaches is that the political ideals which
receive literary expression have a closely limited range. One soon
reaches strata of population in which they disappear, and the relation
of boss and client appears to be proper and natural. The connection
between grafting politicians and their adherents is such that ability
to levy blackmail inspires the same sort of respect and admiration
which Rob Roy’s followers felt for him in the times that provided a
career for his particular talents. And as in Rob Roy’s day, intimate
knowledge finds in the type some hardy virtues. For one thing,
politicians of this type do not indulge in cant. They are no more
shamefaced in talking about their grafting exploits to an appreciative
audience than a mediæval baron would have been in discussing the
produce of his feudal fees and imposts. Mr. Steffens has really done
no more than to put together material lying about loose upon the
surface of municipal politics and give it effective presentation. The
general truth of his statement of the case is indisputable.”[104]
Possibly, however, Professor Ford underestimates the penetrating force
of “political ideals which receive literary expression.” If by this
phrase he means only the highest conclusions of philosophy clothed in
the noblest language, it is apparent that a very small circle will be
reached at first, although in time these ideals also are certain to
be widely diffused by the schools, by journalism and by the learned
professions. If, on the other hand, “literary expression” is understood
to include the news and editorial columns and the cartoons of the
daily newspaper, a great and constantly increasing body of readers are
becoming amenable to ideals higher than those bred by the personal
relation of “boss and client.” Tweed’s sensitiveness to the terribly
cutting cartoons of Thomas Nast shows this process in the course of
development. In spite of the fact, of which the Tammany chieftain
had boasted, that most of his constituents could not read, he was
nevertheless forced to exclaim:—“If those picture papers would only
leave me alone I wouldn’t care for all the rest. The people get used
to seeing me in stripes, and by and by grow to think I ought to be in
prison.”[105] Even that portion of our foreign population which differs
most widely in language and customs from the native American stock is
being brought with amazing swiftness under the influence of the daily
papers published in English.[106] That influence may not be all that
we would like it, but at any rate it is much more broadening than the
ethics of the clan.
In addition to the perverted class ideas current in the lower political
ranks there are other causes of the astounding garrulity which prevails
regarding corrupt practices. One of these is the exaggerated vanity
which all penologists note as a common trait of criminal character. The
most adequate explanation, however, is to be found in the fact that so
many of the offenders of this sort are allowed to escape the penalties
of the law. If corruption even in its grosser forms were as certain
of punishment as burglary or forgery, its still unterrified votaries
would speedily learn to keep their mouths shut. One almost amusing
consequence of the large degree of immunity they enjoy at present is
the maudlin sympathy expressed by confrères when an occasional unlucky
rascal is fairly caught in the net of the law. Well they know, these
friends of his, that he is no more guilty than a score of others
who go scot free. Often the untoward event is made the subject of
denunciations on the flagrant injustice involved, and if the gang is
particularly impudent its next accession to power is pretty apt to be
marked by the complete rehabilitation of the “martyrs” who suffered
during the reform uprising.
As a result of the reckless and often exaggerated gabble of the
grafters, sensational newspapers and magazines find it an easy matter
to keep their columns filled continually with highly spiced political
exposures. In all probability comparatively few out of the total of
corrupt transactions that actually take place are thus made public,
but the prominence given these few may easily lead to overestimates
of the extent of this evil in our political life. Undoubtedly, also,
our practical political leaders are sometimes accused of offences in
which they had no part. Inefficiency, as we have seen, is very common
and very similar in appearance to corruption. No great reportorial or
editorial skill is required to dress it in the garb of the latter. The
constant reiteration of stories of this kind creates as well as meets
a popular demand. Ordinarily a saving sense of the exaggeration and
partisanship indulged in by a section of the press leads readers to
make the necessary discount in forming their opinions of the published
accounts of corruption. At times, however, the popular craving for
pungent stories of corruption amounts to a positive mania. Such was
the case in 1905, 1906, and 1907, as any comparison of the tables
of contents of certain magazines and papers of that period with
previous years will abundantly show. On the other hand there can be
no doubt that a considerable part of this literature of exposure and
denunciation was substantially accurate, and that its publication was
a service of high merit. That it was also profitable is no reproach:
society is the gainer when instead of ostracism and punishment it
provides rewards and honours for those who attack real public abuses.
In not a few cases where corruption was thus charged by journalists
subsequent investigations before commissions and courts left no doubt
of the existence of vicious practices, and led to reforms of a most
beneficent character.
Extremely deplorable as must be the effect of false accusations
inspired by selfish motives, a policy of the widest publicity offers
great advantages over one of suppression and silence. Better fifty
exposures, ten or even twenty of which are misleading, than blind
concealment of official misdoing. Disproof of false charges is
comparatively easy and when effectively made redounds to the prestige
of the official or individual who has been unjustly assailed. As
for those newspapers and periodicals which flagrantly abuse their
privilege, it is seldom that they altogether escape penalties in the
form of loss of influence if not of circulation. If penalties of these
kinds can be made effective press censorship and _lese majeste_ laws,
such as exist in autocratic governments, need never be resorted to in
America. From this point of view the horror frequently expressed by
continental publicists at the corruption existing in the United States
appears rather equivocal. Bad as some of our political conditions
may be, we at least deserve credit for our willingness, nay, our
determination, to hear the worst about ourselves. Certainly there
would seem to be greater hope of improvement under our policy than
in a country whose chief national hero used the enormous income from
the sequestered estates of the House of Hanover to fill the news and
editorial columns of the “reptile” press with lying articles favourable
to his policies, and in which only recently the facts concerning the
Camarilla surrounding the Emperor were so cautiously and partially
brought to light. And it is well known that in Russia the censorship
was deliberately used by provincial bureaucrats to conceal their
misdeeds from the knowledge of the Czar.
As between countries which muzzle the press and those which allow
liberty it is inevitable, then, that the governments of the latter
will be charged far more openly and frequently with corruption.
Citizens who are shocked by the accusations thus trumpeted forth may be
pardoned some apprehensions for the continued stability and success of
their institutions. The sentiment does them more credit than callous
disregard or brazen Chauvinism, and is altogether more likely to be
productive of good works in the future. But it may easily be carried
to an extreme. National shamefacedness is not a virtue. In forming a
judgment of the extent of contemporary corruption the garrulity of
politicians, the sensationalism of the press, the popular demand for
highly spiced accounts of official sinning should all be taken into
account. A cynical representative of yellow journalism, replying to
the criticism that his paper indulged too much in lengthy and lurid
accounts of crime and immorality, remarked rather sententiously that
“sin is news.” The statement is only partially true. Most sins are too
common and too petty to have any news value. Only those offences that
to current estimation seem large and dangerous are given prominence
and headlines. If Turkey and China enjoyed the blessings of a free
press it is hardly probable that the papers of those countries would
give much space to what, according to Western standards, would be
frankly considered corrupt and extortionate practices on the part of
their pashas and mandarins. Such practices would be so common, so
universally known, and so little in conflict with contemporary Turkish
and Chinese political morals that they would excite little interest
and comment. If then, as in our own papers, accounts of atrocious
crimes and accusations of corrupt practices are given the same large
measure of prominence it means simply that both kinds of offences are
considered to possess a high degree of news value. Puritans may deplore
the popular taste which finds interest in such reports, but we cannot
deny the existence of that interest. Primarily it exists not because
sin as such is news but because offences which are considered large and
dangerous appeal powerfully to the popular mind.
To the normal reader, of course, the fascination of such accounts is
the fascination of repulsion, not of attraction. In attempting to
explain the pornographic note in modern French literature, Professor
Barrett Wendell makes a most ingenious suggestion that is not without
its application to the present argument.[107] With the exception of
a class forming a small part of the whole population, French family
life is conspicuously pure. Why, then, asks Professor Wendell, should
fathers and mothers who themselves practise every conjugal virtue
delight in novels and dramas that dissect all the prurient phases of
divorce, adultery, and sexual laxity? Simply because such topics take
them out of themselves by presenting situations quite foreign to their
experience and hence strikingly interesting. In some degree the same
answer applies to American public interest in corrupt practices. The
great mass of business and professional men, and of politicians as
well, who sincerely attempt to live up to the best standards of their
vocations nevertheless read and hear with avidity spicy accounts of the
malpractices of their disreputable colleagues. Nor can this interest on
their part be denounced as morbid so long as it leads not to palliation
and imitation but to reprobation and efforts for the wiping out of
abuses. Would the situation be really improved if instead of the daily
grists presented to us by the newspapers we should read nothing but
accounts of the straightforward methods which are employed in the great
bulk of political, business, and professional transactions? The habit
might be exemplary but it would certainly be supremely dull. While
it is not true that all sin is news there would seem to be nothing
to regret in the fact that neither are all virtues. Of the two the
former undoubtedly has the greater news value. But the reason for
this is that relative to the sum total of everyday transactions the
more heinous offences against morals and law are to a high degree
unusual. Virtue and ability, on the other hand, are so commonplace
that it requires a most exceptional display of either to secure public
notice. Considerable vogue has been enjoyed recently by the term
“smokeless sin,” as applied to certain forms of social evil-doing
which although large and dangerous are also so subtle and complicated
that responsibility for them can easily be avoided.[108] Students of
sin would do well to remember, however, that now as always virtue as
a whole possesses the quality of smokelessness to a much more eminent
degree than vice.
Admitting that political corruption exists among us to a disquieting
extent the point is frequently made that the vigour with which it has
recently been exposed and attacked is in itself evidence of moral
health and harbinger of ultimate victory over the evil. Such exposure
and attacks, it is said, signify the development of higher ideals
measured by which practices formerly tolerated are now condemned by
public opinion and will later be condemned by law. As to the emergence
of higher ideals there can be no doubt, and so far we have just
ground for encouragement. Reform sentiment as a whole, however, can
scarcely be accepted at its full face value. A considerable part of
the denunciation which accompanies it is as much exaggerated as the
corresponding campaign “literature” and “oratory” of the practical
politician. Thus the volume of clamour is augmented and the difficulty
of correctly estimating honesty in public life increased. There are
always those who deliberately attach themselves to reform movements
solely because they foresee victory at the polls with office and
emoluments and other less legitimate opportunities for themselves.
In other words while ostensibly fighting corruption the motives of
such persons are at bottom corrupt from the start. Bandit Mendoza
of the Sierras, that eminent socialist of Shaw’s creation, was not
entirely wrong in maintaining that “a movement which is confined to
philosophers and honest men can never exercise any real political
influence: there are too few of them. Until a movement shows itself
capable of spreading among brigands, it can never hope for a political
majority.” In some American cities charges have even been made that
corporate interests which did not enjoy the favour of the gang or
boss have contributed largely to “anti-graft” campaigns, their real
purpose being to place themselves in a position to claim the favour
of the “honest” administration elected by their efforts. Knowledge of
corrupt transactions, discretely hinted at in the press, has been used
in other instances as a sort of political blackmail to club the gang
or boss into the granting of privileges to applicants who had hitherto
been denied. The mere volume of clamour developed by reform movements
against corrupt practices is, therefore, no certain index of higher
moral standards. There is even danger that we may too complacently
accept mere denunciation for real achievement. Nor can the work be
deemed finished when popular uproar has secured new legislation, for
laws, notoriously, do not execute themselves. Discouragement then too
easily overtakes the rank and file of the anti-corrupt element; hence,
in part, the spasmodic character of many reform movements. When every
necessary deduction has been made, however, the fundamental strength
and continued progress of the cause of honesty in politics is beyond
question. Even the selfish interests that attach themselves to it
prove this contention. It is true they bring no enthusiasm for higher
standards as such, and also that the results of alliances of this
character are often disheartening. Nevertheless the mere fact that such
alliances are entered into by practical politicians is pretty strong
testimony, coming as it does from men who are very little affected by
considerations of sentiment, to the power of the sincere reform element
which is pursuing no ulterior ends. In all cases of this sort the
selfish politician is seeking to strike with the strength of others,
and this strength must be reckoned with as a real factor, no matter
what uses designing men endeavour to make of it. Here as elsewhere the
counterfeit bears witness to the value of the genuine.
Whatever may be the extent of corruption in the United States it is
under fire all along the line. Moreover we regard and attack as abuses
practices which in other countries are considered free from reproach or
even as pillars of the state. Comparisons to our disadvantage on the
score of corruption are most frequently made with England and Germany.
In England, however, the privileges of peerage, gentry, clergy, and
the landholding class generally are enormous.[109] Land is assessed at
a fraction of its real value, local rates are thrown upon the tenant,
railroads seeking charters and cities seeking legislation to wipe
out disease-breeding slums or to take over badly managed docks find
themselves mulcted by special acts exacting excessive prices for the
property taken, and the interests responsible for all these conditions
sit enthroned in an omnipotent parliament. Landlordism has progressed
to a considerable degree in the United States, to be sure, and we
possess a more than plentiful supply of slum landlords. Property rights
in realty are abundantly protected among us, but our landowners are
very far from enjoying the class privileges or the social standing
accorded them in England. Moreover when abuses arise in connection
with their management, public opinion does not hesitate to express
itself unmistakably, nor is corrective legislation difficult to
procure. In Germany, which like England is frequently extolled for its
high political morality, autocracy, aristocracy, _Junkertum_, and the
swaggering military class are sacrosanct. Landtag and city councils in
Prussia are elected under a three-class voting system which fills these
bodies with agents of the landed and plutocratic interests and deprives
the great mass of the people of adequate representation. Against these
and kindred abuses has risen the menace of social-democracy. The
prospects for peaceful reform in the near future are not altogether
bright. Autocratic, aristocratic, and plutocratic rule is seated firmly
in the saddle, and is not inclined to listen to proposals that it shall
reduce its own powers. Special privileges exist in the United States,
it is true, but they are always regarded as questionable, they must
continually justify themselves to a majority of the whole people, they
can never feel themselves secure in public opinion even if for the time
being they have the support of law. “Grafting,” said Governor Folk of
Missouri, “may or may not be unlawful. It is either a special privilege
exercised contrary to law or one that the law itself may give. Special
privileges are grafts and should be hateful to all good citizens.”[110]
The statement is an unguarded one, but it is thoroughly typical of a
deep-seated American tendency to suspect corruption in every special
privilege, whether it be legal or illegal, whether it be condemned by
a sweeping consensus of moral opinion or only by some reforming voice
crying in the wilderness.
It is no part of this argument to assert that the rights and immunities
enjoyed by the English aristocracy, for example, are corrupt. Under
the definition earlier proposed this is clearly not the case. On the
contrary these privileges have as yet the support of law, tradition,
custom, public opinion, and public deference. A radical democrat might
say that all this simply proves the blind ignorance of the great mass
of Englishmen and the fatal ease with which they can be exploited by a
horde of social parasites. From an unprejudiced point of view, however,
we must concede the right of a people to govern itself according to
its own lights. The English may be committing a monstrous political
blunder in tolerating their aristocracy, but if they decide to do so
that is their own concern, and the privilege so established is, both
in morals and in law, beyond the accusation of corruption. Exactly the
same defence may be made for the Prussian _Junkertum_ and the German
military class, or, for that matter, for the caste system of India. The
development of new standards of public opinion, morals, and politics,
in these countries may at some time bring their privileged classes
under effective criticism; the conviction that they are socially
harmful may gain ground; and out of this conviction may come reform
movements designed to secure their abolition. Until that time, however,
while we may perceive clearly enough the political ills entailed upon
our neighbours by special privilege, we cannot denounce them as corrupt
because they tolerate it.
It may even be conceded that in some cases the glorification of a class
is in the best interests of the state as a whole. Feudal aristocracy
was certainly functional and efficient, whatever one may think of its
modern descendants. Considering Germany’s powerful neighbours and her
extended frontier there is much to be said even for the privileges at
present granted to her military class, however odious they may appear
to the citizen of a non-militant country. One need not go far afield
in search of illustrations of this sort. Under our tariff system
advantages accrue particularly to manufacturers that are not entirely
dissimilar to the special privileges referred to above. Protection was
established, however, on the ground that while manufacturers might
benefit primarily by duties on imports, the resulting advantages
would be widely diffused, and the interests of the country as a whole
advanced by this policy. It is possible that the majority was mistaken
in so thinking, just as the English may be mistaken in thinking that
the maintenance of an aristocracy is to their national advantage.
Deeply as our protective system is entrenched, however, it has no such
support as aristocracy in England, as militancy in Germany. It has
continuously been criticised by very large minorities, and the only
real basis of defence it possesses is the conviction of the majority
that it is conducive to the welfare of the country as a whole. If it
once loses this support its ultimate fall is assured. Other forms of
privilege existing among us,—railroad interests, franchise interests,
interests seeking land, timber, and mineral grants, or subsidies, and
corporations generally,—are on the defensive to an even greater degree
than the protective system.
The argument so far as it relates to special privileges may now be
summed up as follows: Special privileges are not necessarily corrupt;
they may be in the public interest and recognised as such. They exist
in the United States, but are much more common in England and Germany.
We, however, have chosen to regard all of them with suspicion and to
attack many of them vigorously, charging them not only with corruption
but with every other political crime in the calendar. Abroad they
enjoy greater security and respectability. Even when they are assailed
by English and continental publicists more deferential methods of
attack are employed than we are used to in America. Rude words such
as “graft” are avoided.[111] Hence in part the greater appearance of
corruption which we present to Europe, and which we seem to confirm by
the criminations and recriminations which issue from our own mouths.
Mr. Frederic C. Howe is therefore right in maintaining the probability
that “it is not so much in the badness, as in our knowledge of the
badness, that America differs from the rest of the world.” Without
underestimating the enormous power of the forms of special privilege
which exist among us, and the difficulty of restraining and regulating
them,[112] European nations may nevertheless find it a far more trying
task to adjust the claims of their own widespread and deeply rooted
forms of privilege when they come into conflict with the rising tide
of democratic and socialistic sentiment. So far as privilege in
autocratic, aristocratic, and clerical forms, is concerned we have
every reason to be grateful that the fathers of the Republic long
ago made away with it. They left the awful heritage of slavery, but
privilege resting upon that basis has also been wiped out. We ourselves
must face the power of the political machine and massed wealth, and
we are facing it. Momentous as is the issue, we have, at least, the
satisfaction of being able to rejoice, in the trenchant and essentially
true words of Mr. William Allen White, that the United States is “a
country where you can buy men only with money.”[113]
In comparing the political morality of Europe and America reference
must finally be made, even at the risk of repetition, to the greater
political trust imposed in the mass of our people. As regards the
number participating suffrage is not materially different in the United
States from the systems of the leading European nations. The tendency
abroad, however, is to limit the direct popular vote to legislative
offices only and to the smallest possible number of these. It is
undeniable that we have gone too far in the opposite direction. We
crowd not only legislative but also many judicial and administrative
offices on our “blanket” ballots, and as a result the total number of
places submitted to the popular vote passes all bounds. Instead of
realising greater democracy by this method we enable the machine to
take advantage of the confusion which the elector feels when confronted
by so many places and candidates, and his consequent inclination to
vote “straight.”[114] Apart from this point, however, it is extremely
important to note that the power of the vote to confer place is much
greater in the United States than abroad, and consequently, if it is
to be corruptly purchased or misused, its value is higher. To put
the matter in another way, the trust imposed by the Republic in the
voter is greater. The number of offices to which the ordinary citizen
is eligible by ballot without regard to class standing or desirable
preparation, the greater importance of state and local government,
and the placing of the latter under popular control,—all contribute
to increase the burden of responsibility which is imposed upon
the great mass. We must admit that the trust thus created is often
violated, but on the other hand we deserve such credit as may arise
from the fact that we have deliberately chosen to believe in the
virtue of the whole people and have established a system which puts
that virtue to a supreme test. European nations which take the “holier
than thou” attitude with reference to our corruption might be forced
to abandon their pretensions if they were to lodge as much power in
their electorates as we do in ours. Given two communities, one “dry”
and the other “wet,” the mere fact that there was more drunkenness in
the latter would not prove a less degree of moral control of appetite
on the part of its inhabitants. One would have to take into account
that the citizens of the “wet” community could satisfy their thirst
openly and frequently, whereas some of the “drys” must be sober at
times simply because they cannot get liquor. On the other hand, those
citizens of the “wet” community who abstain must do so of their own
volition and in the face of constant temptation. Similarly it may be
said of the political vice existing in the United States that its
magnitude is in part due to the fact that, loving democracy “not
wisely but too well,” we have distributed powers and responsibilities
broadcast with the consequence that they have fallen partly into
unworthy hands. And of such political virtue as we possess at least we
may assert that it is not the anemic innocence which has never known
the approach of temptation.
It would appear from the foregoing that the various factors which must
be taken into account in attempting to determine the extent of existing
corruption are extremely conflicting and uncertain. As between country
and country, city and city, comparisons are certain to be odious and
likely to be misleading. Each has problems sufficiently pressing and
extended to occupy its reform energies to better advantage. We in the
United States may not be so wicked as our neighbours believe, but our
work is cut out for us, and it is work that will require the greatest
intelligence and the greatest virtue that the republic possesses.
Hasty conclusions regarding the outcome, and particularly such as
lean towards pessimism, should be avoided. Although as a general
proposition it is unquestionably true that universal corruption would
mean social disintegration, extreme caution should be employed before
venturing such a prediction in a given case. Prophecies of this
character have been made in almost countless numbers and in almost
every age and country. In the overwhelming majority of cases they have
been falsified by subsequent events. It is easy to underestimate the
essential strength of the more fundamental social institutions and
to forget the long course of evolution during which they have become
delicately adapted to human needs. So far as the more progressive
countries of the modern world are concerned,—England, France, Germany,
Austria, Italy, no less than the United States,—there would seem to
be ground for the conclusion that political and social corruption is
decreasing in extent and virulence. At bottom government rests as much
upon confidence as does a savings bank. Now in spite of the current
and very pointed query:—“Where did he get it?”—the greatest harm done
by corruption is not that it enables some men to acquire fortune and
power rapidly at the expense of others. Resentment at the constant
repetition of this spectacle is natural, and the influence which it
exerts as a bad example is most deplorable. But far in excess of this
is the evil which corruption inflicts by destroying the confidence of
men in their social institutions. In the field of politics this evil
is particularly great because of the wide extension of governmental
functions in recent times and the great possibilities which might be
realised by further extensions. To cite tangible examples, it is both
exasperating and dangerous that much needed plans for the building
of a school, hospital, asylum, sewerage system, or a State Capitol,
or for the establishment of departments of inspection to supervise
industrial plants, theatres, or tenement houses, should be halted
by the fear that corrupt interests will take an initial toll out of
the expenses of installation and thereafter seek to pervert these
services to their private advantage. Just so far as this retarding
condition exists the state is prevented from realising its present
possibilities and from undertaking other beneficent work which it might
perform particularly in the fields of education, art, sanitation, and
philanthropy. Yet in spite of this heavy drag the more progressive
modern states are extending their functions and, on the whole, giving
better satisfaction to the needs of larger populations than ever
before. Petty principalities and the city states of former times have
passed away forever. The dominant modern national type of state stands
for populations that must be reckoned by tens of millions.
Even more significant than growth in population and territory, however,
is the growth that has taken place in the number and complexity of
political and other social relationships. It is true that far back
in antiquity there were great and powerful despotisms, but they were
held together largely by the strong hand, and, as compared with modern
governments, performed very few services for their peoples. Within
recent times inventions annihilating time and space have brought men
closer together but they would not _cohere_ as they do in government,
in business, and in other social activities, were the requisite moral
factors not present. Civilisation has developed these factors, but at
the same time, unfortunately, a new breed of parasites has come into
existence to destroy in part the fruits of our more intelligent, more
honest, and better equipped labour. Vigorous fighting is necessary
to limit the damage inflicted by the type of social marauder which
Professor Ross so trenchantly describes,—“the respectable, exemplary,
trusted personage who, strategically placed at the focus of a spider
web of fiduciary relations, is able from his office chair to pick a
thousand pockets, poison a thousand sick, pollute a thousand minds, or
imperil a thousand lives.”[115] With full recognition of the danger
threatening our highly specialised society from resourceful enemies of
this character there is still another aspect of the case which should
not be forgotten. One must learn “to look at the doughnut as well as
the hole.” While insisting upon the enormity of the offences committed
by our modern social pirates let us not ignore the significance of the
multiplication of foci strategically placed within the spider webs
of fiduciary relations. If social trusts were habitually betrayed
they could not increase in number and importance. Such enormous and
complex aggregations as are brought together under modern governments,
for example, mean that men numbered on the scale of millions are
convinced of the substantial fidelity to their deepest interests of
the governmental structures to which they acknowledge allegiance.
If this were not the case, if corruption and other abuses infected
governments to such an extent as to render them unfaithful to their
peoples, disloyalty would take the place of loyalty, disintegration
would succeed integration. No doubt many causes besides those mentioned
conspired to bring about the appearance of the large, potent, and
complex units which now prevail in government. While this process was
being accomplished various hostile conditions had to be attacked, of
which corruption was only one, although one of the most threatening. As
these unfavourable conditions were and are being overcome it is safe to
conclude, in spite of all superficial appearances to the contrary, that
the relative extent and harmfulness of corruption are decreasing in the
more progressive modern countries. A similar line of argument supports
the same conclusion with regard to business institutions, which also
have been increasing both in size, complexity, and the importance of
the functions which they perform. The household industry of a few
generations ago has given way to corporations employing their tens of
thousands of men, trusting them with property worth millions, and,
particularly in transportation, with the safety of myriads of lives.
Such developments would be impossible either in politics or in business
without greater intelligence, a greater degree of fair dealing, and
greater confidence and loyalty from man to man. Corruption which
exalts the selfish interest above the general interest has doubtless
hindered, but it has not stopped, this process. Never before have men
co-operated on so large a scale and so honest a basis as here and now.
If corruption had really penetrated to the vitals of our economic and
governmental organisations this development could not have taken place.
FINIS
FOOTNOTES:
[104] _Political Science Quarterly_, vol. xix (1904), p. 676.
[105] G. Myers, “History of Tammany Hall,” p. 285.
[106] Mr. Ernest Poole under the title of “New Readers of the News”
in the _American Magazine_ for November 1907, (65:41), presents an
extremely interesting study of the broadening power of the press along
this line.
[107] “The France of To-day,” pp. 223 _et seq._
[108] As, _e.g._, fraudulent promotion, adulteration, the building
of unsanitary tenements, failure to provide proper safety devices in
theatres and factories or on railroads and steamships.
[109] _Cf._ Mr. Frederic C. Howe’s admirable article on “Graft in
England,” _American Magazine_, vol. lxiii (1907), p. 398.
[110] _Nation_, lxxxi (November 23, 1905), p. 422.
[111] Note, for example, the very different treatment of the campaign
contribution question in the two countries. It may be conceded that
America has much to learn from England with regard to the control
of election expenditures. On the side of collections, however, it
is notorious that in England both political parties unblushingly
barter titles for financial support. There is something particularly
despicable in this pollution of the “fountain of honour” to procure
campaign funds, yet on the rare occasions when the matter is brought
up in Parliament its discussion is characterised by hilarity rather
than by moral earnestness. In American politics the corresponding evil
is felt to be a scandal and as such provokes not only the curative
legislation discussed in an earlier study but also much bitter and
noisy denunciation.
[112] Any illusion as to the ease of restraining privilege in the
United States is likely to be speedily dispelled by the reading of
President Arthur T. Hadley’s masterly discussion in the _Independent_
of April 16, 1908, of “The Constitutional Position of Property in
America.”
[113] In “The Old Order Changeth,” _American Magazine_, lxvii (1909),
p. 219.
[114] No political reform now before the American people promises more
beneficent results than the short ballot movement. It advocates the
principle “that democracy can reach more efficient working through a
drastic reduction in the present number of officials selected by the
individual voter, thus securing a ballot which is very short and which
includes only offices that are of sufficient public interest to attract
from the voters a scrutiny and comparison of candidates that will be
adequate to make their relative individual merits a matter of common
knowledge.” _Cf._ the vigorous little pamphlet by Richard S. Childs on
“The Short Ballot: A New Plan of Reform,” reprinted from the _Outlook_
of July 17, 1909, New York, 127 Duane St., 1909.
[115] “Sin and Society,” pp. 29-30.
INDEX
Adams, Professor Henry C., 110, 177.
Addams, Jane, 215.
Ade, George, 146.
Advantage, personal, the end of a corrupt act, 59, 60.
Alger, G. W., 70.
Allen, William H., 185.
American Bar Association, 121.
Anarchy, 17, 21, 29, 66, 82.
Anthracite coal committees, 34.
Apologies for political corruption, 3, 37.
Aquinas, Thomas, 70.
Aristotle, 87.
Association to Prevent Corrupt Practices at Elections, New York, 272.
“Auto-corruption,” 46, 60, 170, 199.
Bacon, Lord, 90.
Belmont, Perry, 239, 271.
“Big Business,” 115, 163.
Blackmail, 63.
Bodley, J. E. C., 71.
Bonaparte, Napoleon, 83.
Boss, The (see also Machine), 23, 26, 71, 73, 105, 240, 278, 279.
Bribery, 44, 49, 59.
Brinkley, Captain F., 102.
Bryce, James, 216.
Bureau of Corporations, 175.
Bureau of Municipal Research, 184.
Burke, Edmund, 213.
Business, alleged to be made good by corruption, 4-13;
and social morals, 67, 68, 75;
and politics, corruption in, 161;
state regulation of, 165, 171;
and campaign contributions, 264;
consolidation of, 163.
“Business administration” of public affairs, 46.
Campaign contributions, danger of plutocracy involved in, 71-74;
problem of, 76;
and theory of party support, 213;
congressional appropriations, 221;
publicity, 229;
prohibition and restriction of, 244;
from corporations, 244;
from candidates, 248;
from civil servants, 256;
from individuals, 258;
and campaign literature, 260;
in small amounts, 261;
time limits, 262;
geographical limits, 263;
and business interests, 264;
of services, 267;
in state and local contests, 268;
in primaries and conventions, 270;
results of reform, 273.
Candidates, corruption and personal immorality as disqualifications,
15;
and publicity, 240;
contributions of, 248.
Caritative function of the state, 70.
Carnegie Foundation, 138, 149.
Census statistics of cities, 186.
Charles II., 89.
Chicago, slaughter-house exposures, 163.
Childs, Richard S., 297.
China, 102.
Church, the, 31, 36, 47, 66, 69.
Citizenship, education for, 36.
Civil service, Great Britain, 95-98;
in police departments, 190;
spoils system, 218;
and campaign contributions, 256.
Class war, 21, 29;
social interest _vs._ class interest, 293.
Cleveland, Grover, 107.
Colleges and universities, 48, 132, 139, 143.
Commissions, Public Service, 175.
Commons, Professor John R., 29.
Competition, 162.
Congressional appropriations for campaign expenses, 221.
Consensus of moral opinion on corruption, 58.
Contractual nature of corrupt practices, 106.
Corporation campaign contributions, 244.
Corporations, Bureau of, 175.
Corruption, defined, 41-48;
distinguished from inefficiency, 48-51;
a persistent problem, 81;
limited to certain branches or spheres of government, 100-104;
contractual nature of, 106;
minor forms of, 113;
classification of forms of, 116;
in professional life, 177;
in politics and business, 161, 169;
international, 170;
and the party organisation, 201;
decreasing in progressive countries, 299.
Crime and vice, 186.
Curtis, George William, 128.
Democracy, the corrupt machine as the saviour of, 17;
oligarchy _vs._, 26;
as means of establishing community of interest among the people,
30;
liability of, to corruption, 52, 54, 296.
“Democratic finance,” 182.
Democratic National Committee, Report 1908, 233;
time limit for contributions, 262.
Despotism, 51.
Dicey, Albert Venn, 175.
Dill, James B., 168.
Duty, political, 46, 51.
Eaton, Dorman B., 95-98, 205.
Economic evolution in relation to corruption, 52.
Economics, university instruction in, 139.
Education for citizenship, 36.
Efficiency, 14, 16.
England, 83, 95-98, 290, 295.
English Corrupt Practices Act, 248.
Europe, 30, 53, 74, 296.
Evolution, 22, 29, 33, 52.
Executive authorities, 56.
Family, the, 48, 66.
Finland, 83.
Fire departments, personnel of, 191.
Floquet, Charles, 71.
Folk, Joseph W., 64, 291.
Foote, Allen, Ripley, 197.
Ford, Professor Henry J., 17, 30, 57, 215, 219, 278.
Foreign vote in the United States, 31.
Franchises, Public Service, 11, 71, 73, 179.
Future, the social, 173.
Gambetta, Leon, 85.
“Gambling Commission,” New York, 106.
Gambling and vice, 6, 7, 8, 186.
Garfield Corrupt Practices Act, 249, 270.
George, Henry, 17.
Germany, 84, 85, 143, 290.
Ghent, W. J., 152.
Goodnow, Professor F. J., 9, 23, 25.
Graft, and other slang equivalents for corruption, 42.
Greece, 82.
Hadley, Arthur T., 266, 295.
Hapgood, Hutchins, 14.
Harvey, George, 131.
Hewitt, Abram S., 17.
Hobbes, Thomas, 82, 133.
Howard, C., 61.
Howe, Frederick C., 290, 295.
Immigrants, 31.
Inefficiency, 16, 48-51.
Intentional character of corruption, 48.
International corruption, 170.
Japan, 83, 102.
Journalism, 31, 121, 128, 279, 281, 284.
Judicial corruption, 56, 90, 92.
Justice, ideal of, 70.
Labour unions, 31;
leaders of, 14, 66.
Law, profession of, 121.
Legislation against corrupt practices (see also campaign
contributions), 75, 76.
Legislative corruption, 45, 56.
Machine, political (see also Boss, Party Organisation), 17, 20, 72.
Magee, Chris., 99.
Materialism, 53.
Mencius, 51.
Merriam, Professor C. E., 270.
Michels, Professor Robert, 179.
Mistresses, royal, 90.
Mob rule, 17, 66.
Monarchies, corruption in, as compared with democracies, 54.
Monopolies, contracting rings, 13;
era of consolidation, 163.
Moral uprisings, 188.
More, Paul Elmer, 153.
Muckraking, 281.
Municipal corruption, 83, 84, 98, 101, 184.
Municipal ownership, 13.
Municipal Research, Bureau of, 184.
Myers, Gustavus, 280.
Nast, Thomas, 280.
Nationality, development of, 58;
spirit of, 89.
Nature of political corruption, 41.
Negro vote, 36.
Nepotism, 65, 66.
New York city, 14, 17, 71, 98, 106, 108, 280.
Notoriety, corruption and, 277.
Ochlocracy, 17, 66.
Ogg, Frederick A., 235.
Ohio State Board of Commerce, 197.
Oligarchy, financial, 26, 54.
Party organisation, 30, 43, 72, 201, 213, 214.
Passes, railroad, 60, 230.
Pepys, Samuel, 93-95.
Persistent problem, corruption as a, 81, 85, 86.
Personal interest involved in corruption, 65.
Plato, 6, 87.
Plutocracy, 26, 74.
Poland, 82.
Police forces, 9, 21, 55, 190.
Political science, university instruction in, 139.
Politics, corruption not limited to, 46, 48;
corruption in business and, 161, 169.
Poole, Ernest, 280.
Presidential Campaign Costs, 1908, 233.
Press, the—see journalism.
Primaries and conventions, political contributions for, 270.
Privilege, special, 28, 290.
Professions, corruption in the, 117.
Professors, dismissal of, 147.
Proletariat, 18.
Prosperity and corruption, 5, 53.
Protectionism, 293.
Prussia, 54, 84, 101, 291.
Publicity, campaign fund, 229;
before or after election, 236;
and candidates, 239;
organisations reporting, 241.
Public Service Commissions, 175.
Public utility service, 28.
Quay, Matthew S., 14.
Railroads, nationalisation of, 181;
passes, 60, 230.
Reform and reformers, 5, 11, 57, 75, 84, 100, 105, 287.
Reformation, the, 82, 84.
Republican National Committee, Report 1908, 233.
Richmond, Mary E., 22.
Riots, 19, 20, 66.
Roberts, Peter, 34.
Rome, 82, 89.
Roosevelt, Theodore, 65, 221, 225.
Root, Elihu, 244.
Ross, Professor Edward A., 167, 302.
Russia, 83.
Salaries of public officials, 177.
Salisbury, Lord, 84.
Sandwich, Lord, 93.
Schools, public, 23, 31, 36.
Schurman, Jacob G., 146.
Seeley, Professor J. R., 51, 88.
Settlements, social, 36.
Seward, William H., 71.
Shaw, Bernard, 288.
Short Ballot, 297.
Simkhovitch, Mary K., 69.
Sin and news, 284;
“smokeless” sin, 286.
Slang equivalents of corruption, 42.
Social groups, interrelations, 66;
individual interests and, 86.
Socialism, 57, 152, 179.
Society, the corrupt machine as the saviour of, 17;
corruption as evidence of maladjustment in, 23;
sweeping charges of corruption against, 57;
responsible in part for existing corruption, 70;
disintegrating effect of corruption upon, 81, 299;
forms of corruption in, 116, 161;
future of, 173;
fundamental strength of institutions of, 301.
Sociology, university instruction in, 139.
Spain, 84.
Special privileges, 28, 290.
Spencer, Herbert, 91.
State, welfare of the, contrasted with local welfare, 7;
corruption not confined to the state, 46;
caritative function of, 70;
Greek classifications of, 87;
primarily political forms of corruption, 169;
international corruption, 170.
State universities, 143.
Steffens, Lincoln, 4, 99, 278.
Stein, Freiherr vom, 101.
Swinton, John, 122.
Taft, William H., 236.
Tammany Hall, 17, 108.
Tax dodging, 60, 192.
“Ten per cent. rake-off,” 105.
Tennyson, Lord, 100.
Thompson, David G., 108.
Tweed, William M., 14, 98, 280.
United States, suppression of vice in, 9;
riots in, 19;
integration of population in, 31;
vote buying in, 36;
political morality of, compared with Europe, 53, 296;
uneven distribution of corruption in, 104;
academic freedom in, 143;
_laisser faire_ doctrine in, 175;
party functions in, 213;
costliness of government in, 215;
privilege in, 290.
Universities and colleges, 48, 132, 139, 143.
Vice, gambling and, 6, 7-8, 186.
Virtue, political, 53, 54, 296.
Walpole, Horace, 83.
Ward, Professor Lester F., 122.
Washington, D. C., 253.
Wealth, growth of, 53.
Weed, Thurlow, 71.
Wendell, Professor Barrett, 285.
Wheatley, Henry B., 94, 95.
White, William Allen, 296.
“Wide-open” communities, 7, 298.
Wood, Fernando, 188.
Transcriber’s Notes
pg 7 Changed: whole is of greater imporance
to: whole is of greater importance
pg 87 Changed: as the Philospher saw it
to: as the Philosopher saw it
pg 94 Changed: contemporaries in the adminstrative
to: contemporaries in the administrative
pg 124 Changed: Advertising colums still carry
to: Advertising columns still carry
pg 148 Changed: consequences of the dismisal
to: consequences of the dismissal
pg 219 Changed: the sale of politicial influence
to: the sale of political influence
pg 266 Changed: offered by large compaign contributions
to: offered by large campaign contributions
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