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Title: Eryxias
Author: An Imitator of Plato
Translator: Benjamin Jowett
Posting Date: November 6, 2008 [EBook #1681]
Release Date: March, 1999
Language: English
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Produced by Sue Asscher
ERYXIAS
By a Platonic Imitator (see Appendix II)
Translated by Benjamin Jowett
APPENDIX II.
The two dialogues which are translated in the second appendix are not
mentioned by Aristotle, or by any early authority, and have no claim
to be ascribed to Plato. They are examples of Platonic dialogues to be
assigned probably to the second or third generation after Plato, when
his writings were well known at Athens and Alexandria. They exhibit
considerable originality, and are remarkable for containing several
thoughts of the sort which we suppose to be modern rather than ancient,
and which therefore have a peculiar interest for us. The Second
Alcibiades shows that the difficulties about prayer which have perplexed
Christian theologians were not unknown among the followers of Plato.
The Eryxias was doubted by the ancients themselves: yet it may claim the
distinction of being, among all Greek or Roman writings, the one which
anticipates in the most striking manner the modern science of political
economy and gives an abstract form to some of its principal doctrines.
For the translation of these two dialogues I am indebted to my friend
and secretary, Mr. Knight.
That the Dialogue which goes by the name of the Second Alcibiades is a
genuine writing of Plato will not be maintained by any modern critic,
and was hardly believed by the ancients themselves. The dialectic is
poor and weak. There is no power over language, or beauty of style; and
there is a certain abruptness and agroikia in the conversation, which
is very un-Platonic. The best passage is probably that about the
poets:--the remark that the poet, who is of a reserved disposition, is
uncommonly difficult to understand, and the ridiculous interpretation of
Homer, are entirely in the spirit of Plato (compare Protag; Ion; Apol.).
The characters are ill-drawn. Socrates assumes the 'superior person' and
preaches too much, while Alcibiades is stupid and heavy-in-hand. There
are traces of Stoic influence in the general tone and phraseology of the
Dialogue (compare opos melesei tis...kaka: oti pas aphron mainetai):
and the writer seems to have been acquainted with the 'Laws' of Plato
(compare Laws). An incident from the Symposium is rather clumsily
introduced, and two somewhat hackneyed quotations (Symp., Gorg.) recur.
The reference to the death of Archelaus as having occurred 'quite
lately' is only a fiction, probably suggested by the Gorgias, where the
story of Archelaus is told, and a similar phrase occurs;--ta gar echthes
kai proen gegonota tauta, k.t.l. There are several passages which
are either corrupt or extremely ill-expressed. But there is a modern
interest in the subject of the dialogue; and it is a good example of
a short spurious work, which may be attributed to the second or third
century before Christ.
INTRODUCTION.
Much cannot be said in praise of the style or conception of the Eryxias.
It is frequently obscure; like the exercise of a student, it is full
of small imitations of Plato:--Phaeax returning from an expedition to
Sicily (compare Socrates in the Charmides from the army at Potidaea),
the figure of the game at draughts, borrowed from the Republic, etc. It
has also in many passages the ring of sophistry. On the other hand, the
rather unhandsome treatment which is exhibited towards Prodicus is quite
unlike the urbanity of Plato.
Yet there are some points in the argument which are deserving of
attention. (1) That wealth depends upon the need of it or demand for
it, is the first anticipation in an abstract form of one of the great
principles of modern political economy, and the nearest approach to it
to be found in an ancient writer. (2) The resolution of wealth into
its simplest implements going on to infinity is a subtle and refined
thought. (3) That wealth is relative to circumstances is a sound
conception. (4) That the arts and sciences which receive payment are
likewise to be comprehended under the notion of wealth, also touches a
question of modern political economy. (5) The distinction of post hoc
and propter hoc, often lost sight of in modern as well as in ancient
times. These metaphysical conceptions and distinctions show considerable
power of thought in the writer, whatever we may think of his merits as
an imitator of Plato.
ERYXIAS
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Eryxias, Erasistratus, Critias.
SCENE: The portico of a temple of Zeus.
It happened by chance that Eryxias the Steirian was walking with me in
the Portico of Zeus the Deliverer, when there came up to us Critias
and Erasistratus, the latter the son of Phaeax, who was the nephew of
Erasistratus. Now Erasistratus had just arrived from Sicily and that
part of the world. As they approached, he said, Hail, Socrates!
SOCRATES: The same to you, I said; have you any good news from Sicily to
tell us?
ERASISTRATUS: Most excellent. But, if you please, let us first sit down;
for I am tired with my yesterday's journey from Megara.
SOCRATES: Gladly, if that is your desire.
ERASISTRATUS: What would you wish to hear first? he said. What the
Sicilians are doing, or how they are disposed towards our city? To my
mind, they are very like wasps: so long as you only cause them a little
annoyance they are quite unmanageable; you must destroy their nests
if you wish to get the better of them. And in a similar way, the
Syracusans, unless we set to work in earnest, and go against them with
a great expedition, will never submit to our rule. The petty injuries
which we at present inflict merely irritate them enough to make them
utterly intractable. And now they have sent ambassadors to Athens, and
intend, I suspect, to play us some trick.--While we were talking, the
Syracusan envoys chanced to go by, and Erasistratus, pointing to one of
them, said to me, That, Socrates, is the richest man in all Italy and
Sicily. For who has larger estates or more land at his disposal to
cultivate if he please? And they are of a quality, too, finer than any
other land in Hellas. Moreover, he has all the things which go to make
up wealth, slaves and horses innumerable, gold and silver without end.
I saw that he was inclined to expatiate on the riches of the man; so I
asked him, Well, Erasistratus, and what sort of character does he bear
in Sicily?
ERASISTRATUS: He is esteemed to be, and really is, the wickedest of
all the Sicilians and Italians, and even more wicked than he is rich;
indeed, if you were to ask any Sicilian whom he thought to be the worst
and the richest of mankind, you would never hear any one else named.
I reflected that we were speaking, not of trivial matters, but about
wealth and virtue, which are deemed to be of the greatest moment, and
I asked Erasistratus whom he considered the wealthier,--he who was the
possessor of a talent of silver or he who had a field worth two talents?
ERASISTRATUS: The owner of the field.
SOCRATES: And on the same principle he who had robes and bedding and
such things which are of greater value to him than to a stranger would
be richer than the stranger?
ERASISTRATUS: True.
SOCRATES: And if any one gave you a choice, which of these would you
prefer?
ERASISTRATUS: That which was most valuable.
SOCRATES: In which way do you think you would be the richer?
ERASISTRATUS: By choosing as I said.
SOCRATES: And he appears to you to be the richest who has goods of the
greatest value?
ERASISTRATUS: He does.
SOCRATES: And are not the healthy richer than the sick, since health is
a possession more valuable than riches to the sick? Surely there is no
one who would not prefer to be poor and well, rather than to have all
the King of Persia's wealth and to be ill. And this proves that men set
health above wealth, else they would never choose the one in preference
to the other.
ERASISTRATUS: True.
SOCRATES: And if anything appeared to be more valuable than health, he
would be the richest who possessed it?
ERASISTRATUS: He would.
SOCRATES: Suppose that some one came to us at this moment and were to
ask, Well, Socrates and Eryxias and Erasistratus, can you tell me what
is of the greatest value to men? Is it not that of which the possession
will best enable a man to advise how his own and his friend's affairs
should be administered?--What will be our reply?
ERASISTRATUS: I should say, Socrates, that happiness was the most
precious of human possessions.
SOCRATES: Not a bad answer. But do we not deem those men who are most
prosperous to be the happiest?
ERASISTRATUS: That is my opinion.
SOCRATES: And are they not most prosperous who commit the fewest errors
in respect either of themselves or of other men?
ERASISTRATUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And they who know what is evil and what is good; what should
be done and what should be left undone;--these behave the most wisely
and make the fewest mistakes?
Erasistratus agreed to this.
SOCRATES: Then the wisest and those who do best and the most fortunate
and the richest would appear to be all one and the same, if wisdom is
really the most valuable of our possessions?
Yes, said Eryxias, interposing, but what use would it be if a man had
the wisdom of Nestor and wanted the necessaries of life, food and drink
and clothes and the like? Where would be the advantage of wisdom then?
Or how could he be the richest of men who might even have to go begging,
because he had not wherewithal to live?
I thought that what Eryxias was saying had some weight, and I
replied, Would the wise man really suffer in this way, if he were so
ill-provided; whereas if he had the house of Polytion, and the house
were full of gold and silver, he would lack nothing?
ERYXIAS: Yes; for then he might dispose of his property and obtain in
exchange what he needed, or he might sell it for money with which he
could supply his wants and in a moment procure abundance of everything.
SOCRATES: True, if he could find some one who preferred such a house to
the wisdom of Nestor. But if there are persons who set great store by
wisdom like Nestor's and the advantages accruing from it, to sell these,
if he were so disposed, would be easier still. Or is a house a most
useful and necessary possession, and does it make a great difference in
the comfort of life to have a mansion like Polytion's instead of living
in a shabby little cottage, whereas wisdom is of small use and it is
of no importance whether a man is wise or ignorant about the highest
matters? Or is wisdom despised of men and can find no buyers, although
cypress wood and marble of Pentelicus are eagerly bought by numerous
purchasers? Surely the prudent pilot or the skilful physician, or the
artist of any kind who is proficient in his art, is more worth than the
things which are especially reckoned among riches; and he who can advise
well and prudently for himself and others is able also to sell the
product of his art, if he so desire.
Eryxias looked askance, as if he had received some unfair treatment, and
said, I believe, Socrates, that if you were forced to speak the
truth, you would declare that you were richer than Callias the son of
Hipponicus. And yet, although you claimed to be wiser about things of
real importance, you would not any the more be richer than he.
I dare say, Eryxias, I said, that you may regard these arguments of ours
as a kind of game; you think that they have no relation to facts, but
are like the pieces in the game of draughts which the player can move
in such a way that his opponents are unable to make any countermove.
(Compare Republic.) And perhaps, too, as regards riches you are of
opinion that while facts remain the same, there are arguments, no matter
whether true or false, which enable the user of them to prove that the
wisest and the richest are one and the same, although he is in the wrong
and his opponents are in the right. There would be nothing strange in
this; it would be as if two persons were to dispute about letters, one
declaring that the word Socrates began with an S, the other that it
began with an A, and the latter could gain the victory over the former.
Eryxias glanced at the audience, laughing and blushing at once, as if
he had had nothing to do with what had just been said, and replied,--No,
indeed, Socrates, I never supposed that our arguments should be of a
kind which would never convince any one of those here present or be of
advantage to them. For what man of sense could ever be persuaded that
the wisest and the richest are the same? The truth is that we are
discussing the subject of riches, and my notion is that we should
argue respecting the honest and dishonest means of acquiring them, and,
generally, whether they are a good thing or a bad.
Very good, I said, and I am obliged to you for the hint: in future we
will be more careful. But why do not you yourself, as you introduced the
argument, and do not think that the former discussion touched the point
at issue, tell us whether you consider riches to be a good or an evil?
I am of opinion, he said, that they are a good. He was about to add
something more, when Critias interrupted him:--Do you really suppose so,
Eryxias?
Certainly, replied Eryxias; I should be mad if I did not: and I do not
fancy that you would find any one else of a contrary opinion.
And I, retorted Critias, should say that there is no one whom I could
not compel to admit that riches are bad for some men. But surely, if
they were a good, they could not appear bad for any one?
Here I interposed and said to them: If you two were having an argument
about equitation and what was the best way of riding, supposing that I
knew the art myself, I should try to bring you to an agreement. For
I should be ashamed if I were present and did not do what I could
to prevent your difference. And I should do the same if you were
quarrelling about any other art and were likely, unless you agreed on
the point in dispute, to part as enemies instead of as friends. But now,
when we are contending about a thing of which the usefulness continues
during the whole of life, and it makes an enormous difference whether we
are to regard it as beneficial or not,--a thing, too, which is esteemed
of the highest importance by the Hellenes:--(for parents, as soon as
their children are, as they think, come to years of discretion, urge
them to consider how wealth may be acquired, since by riches the value
of a man is judged):--When, I say, we are thus in earnest, and you,
who agree in other respects, fall to disputing about a matter of such
moment, that is, about wealth, and not merely whether it is black or
white, light or heavy, but whether it is a good or an evil, whereby,
although you are now the dearest of friends and kinsmen, the most bitter
hatred may arise betwixt you, I must hinder your dissension to the best
of my power. If I could, I would tell you the truth, and so put an end
to the dispute; but as I cannot do this, and each of you supposes that
you can bring the other to an agreement, I am prepared, as far as my
capacity admits, to help you in solving the question. Please, therefore,
Critias, try to make us accept the doctrines which you yourself
entertain.
CRITIAS: I should like to follow up the argument, and will ask Eryxias
whether he thinks that there are just and unjust men?
ERYXIAS: Most decidedly.
CRITIAS: And does injustice seem to you an evil or a good?
ERYXIAS: An evil.
CRITIAS: Do you consider that he who bribes his neighbour's wife and
commits adultery with her, acts justly or unjustly, and this although
both the state and the laws forbid?
ERYXIAS: Unjustly.
CRITIAS: And if the wicked man has wealth and is willing to spend it,
he will carry out his evil purposes? whereas he who is short of means
cannot do what he fain would, and therefore does not sin? In such a
case, surely, it is better that a person should not be wealthy, if his
poverty prevents the accomplishment of his desires, and his desires are
evil? Or, again, should you call sickness a good or an evil?
ERYXIAS: An evil.
CRITIAS: Well, and do you think that some men are intemperate?
ERYXIAS: Yes.
CRITIAS: Then, if it is better for his health that the intemperate man
should refrain from meat and drink and other pleasant things, but he
cannot owing to his intemperance, will it not also be better that he
should be too poor to gratify his lust rather than that he should have
a superabundance of means? For thus he will not be able to sin, although
he desire never so much.
Critias appeared to be arguing so admirably that Eryxias, if he had not
been ashamed of the bystanders, would probably have got up and struck
him. For he thought that he had been robbed of a great possession when
it became obvious to him that he had been wrong in his former opinion
about wealth. I observed his vexation, and feared that they would
proceed to abuse and quarrelling: so I said,--I heard that very argument
used in the Lyceum yesterday by a wise man, Prodicus of Ceos; but the
audience thought that he was talking mere nonsense, and no one could
be persuaded that he was speaking the truth. And when at last a certain
talkative young gentleman came in, and, taking his seat, began to laugh
and jeer at Prodicus, tormenting him and demanding an explanation of his
argument, he gained the ear of the audience far more than Prodicus.
Can you repeat the discourse to us? Said Erasistratus.
SOCRATES: If I can only remember it, I will. The youth began by asking
Prodicus, In what way did he think that riches were a good and in what
an evil? Prodicus answered, as you did just now, that they were a good
to good men and to those who knew in what way they should be employed,
while to the bad and the ignorant they were an evil. The same is true,
he went on to say, of all other things; men make them to be what they
are themselves. The saying of Archilochus is true:--
'Men's thoughts correspond to the things which they meet with.'
Well, then, replied the youth, if any one makes me wise in that wisdom
whereby good men become wise, he must also make everything else good to
me. Not that he concerns himself at all with these other things, but he
has converted my ignorance into wisdom. If, for example, a person teach
me grammar or music, he will at the same time teach me all that relates
to grammar or music, and so when he makes me good, he makes things good
to me.
Prodicus did not altogether agree: still he consented to what was said.
And do you think, said the youth, that doing good things is like
building a house,--the work of human agency; or do things remain what
they were at first, good or bad, for all time?
Prodicus began to suspect, I fancy, the direction which the argument
was likely to take, and did not wish to be put down by a mere stripling
before all those present:--(if they two had been alone, he would not
have minded):--so he answered, cleverly enough: I think that doing good
things is a work of human agency.
And is virtue in your opinion, Prodicus, innate or acquired by
instruction?
The latter, said Prodicus.
Then you would consider him a simpleton who supposed that he could
obtain by praying to the Gods the knowledge of grammar or music or
any other art, which he must either learn from another or find out for
himself?
Prodicus agreed to this also.
And when you pray to the Gods that you may do well and receive good, you
mean by your prayer nothing else than that you desire to become good and
wise:--if, at least, things are good to the good and wise and evil to
the evil. But in that case, if virtue is acquired by instruction, it
would appear that you only pray to be taught what you do not know.
Hereupon I said to Prodicus that it was no misfortune to him if he
had been proved to be in error in supposing that the Gods immediately
granted to us whatever we asked:--if, I added, whenever you go up to
the Acropolis you earnestly entreat the Gods to grant you good things,
although you know not whether they can yield your request, it is as
though you went to the doors of the grammarian and begged him, although
you had never made a study of the art, to give you a knowledge of
grammar which would enable you forthwith to do the business of a
grammarian.
While I was speaking, Prodicus was preparing to retaliate upon his
youthful assailant, intending to employ the argument of which you have
just made use; for he was annoyed to have it supposed that he offered a
vain prayer to the Gods. But the master of the gymnasium came to him and
begged him to leave because he was teaching the youths doctrines which
were unsuited to them, and therefore bad for them.
I have told you this because I want you to understand how men are
circumstanced in regard to philosophy. Had Prodicus been present and
said what you have said, the audience would have thought him raving, and
he would have been ejected from the gymnasium. But you have argued so
excellently well that you have not only persuaded your hearers, but have
brought your opponent to an agreement. For just as in the law courts,
if two witnesses testify to the same fact, one of whom seems to be an
honest fellow and the other a rogue, the testimony of the rogue often
has the contrary effect on the judges' minds to what he intended, while
the same evidence if given by the honest man at once strikes them as
perfectly true. And probably the audience have something of the same
feeling about yourself and Prodicus; they think him a Sophist and a
braggart, and regard you as a gentleman of courtesy and worth. For they
do not pay attention to the argument so much as to the character of the
speaker.
But truly, Socrates, said Erasistratus, though you may be joking,
Critias does seem to me to be saying something which is of weight.
SOCRATES: I am in profound earnest, I assure you. But why, as you have
begun your argument so prettily, do you not go on with the rest? There
is still something lacking, now you have agreed that (wealth) is a good
to some and an evil to others. It remains to enquire what constitutes
wealth; for unless you know this, you cannot possibly come to an
understanding as to whether it is a good or an evil. I am ready to
assist you in the enquiry to the utmost of my power: but first let him
who affirms that riches are a good, tell us what, in his opinion, is
wealth.
ERASISTRATUS: Indeed, Socrates, I have no notion about wealth beyond
that which men commonly have. I suppose that wealth is a quantity of
money (compare Arist. Pol.); and this, I imagine, would also be Critias'
definition.
SOCRATES: Then now we have to consider, What is money? Or else later
on we shall be found to differ about the question. For instance, the
Carthaginians use money of this sort. Something which is about the size
of a stater is tied up in a small piece of leather: what it is, no one
knows but the makers. A seal is next set upon the leather, which then
passes into circulation, and he who has the largest number of such
pieces is esteemed the richest and best off. And yet if any one among us
had a mass of such coins he would be no wealthier than if he had so many
pebbles from the mountain. At Lacedaemon, again, they use iron by weight
which has been rendered useless: and he who has the greatest mass of
such iron is thought to be the richest, although elsewhere it has
no value. In Ethiopia engraved stones are employed, of which a
Lacedaemonian could make no use. Once more, among the Nomad Scythians a
man who owned the house of Polytion would not be thought richer than one
who possessed Mount Lycabettus among ourselves. And clearly those things
cannot all be regarded as possessions; for in some cases the possessors
would appear none the richer thereby: but, as I was saying, some one of
them is thought in one place to be money, and the possessors of it
are the wealthy, whereas in some other place it is not money, and the
ownership of it does not confer wealth; just as the standard of morals
varies, and what is honourable to some men is dishonourable to others.
And if we wish to enquire why a house is valuable to us but not to the
Scythians, or why the Carthaginians value leather which is worthless to
us, or the Lacedaemonians find wealth in iron and we do not, can we not
get an answer in some such way as this: Would an Athenian, who had a
thousand talents weight of the stones which lie about in the Agora and
which we do not employ for any purpose, be thought to be any the richer?
ERASISTRATUS: He certainly would not appear so to me.
SOCRATES: But if he possessed a thousand talents weight of some precious
stone, we should say that he was very rich?
ERASISTRATUS: Of course.
SOCRATES: The reason is that the one is useless and the other useful?
ERASISTRATUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And in the same way among the Scythians a house has no value
because they have no use for a house, nor would a Scythian set so much
store on the finest house in the world as on a leather coat, because he
could use the one and not the other. Or again, the Carthaginian coinage
is not wealth in our eyes, for we could not employ it, as we can silver,
to procure what we need, and therefore it is of no use to us.
ERASISTRATUS: True.
SOCRATES: What is useful to us, then, is wealth, and what is useless to
us is not wealth?
But how do you mean, Socrates? said Eryxias, interrupting. Do we not
employ in our intercourse with one another speech and violence (?) and
various other things? These are useful and yet they are not wealth.
SOCRATES: Clearly we have not yet answered the question, What is
wealth? That wealth must be useful, to be wealth at all,--thus much is
acknowledged by every one. But what particular thing is wealth, if not
all things? Let us pursue the argument in another way; and then we may
perhaps find what we are seeking. What is the use of wealth, and for
what purpose has the possession of riches been invented,--in the sense,
I mean, in which drugs have been discovered for the cure of disease?
Perhaps in this way we may throw some light on the question. It appears
to be clear that whatever constitutes wealth must be useful, and that
wealth is one class of useful things; and now we have to enquire, What
is the use of those useful things which constitute wealth? For all
things probably may be said to be useful which we use in production,
just as all things which have life are animals, but there is a special
kind of animal which we call 'man.' Now if any one were to ask us, What
is that of which, if we were rid, we should not want medicine and the
instruments of medicine, we might reply that this would be the case if
disease were absent from our bodies and either never came to them at all
or went away again as soon as it appeared; and we may therefore conclude
that medicine is the science which is useful for getting rid of disease.
But if we are further asked, What is that from which, if we were free,
we should have no need of wealth? can we give an answer? If we have
none, suppose that we restate the question thus:--If a man could live
without food or drink, and yet suffer neither hunger nor thirst, would
he want either money or anything else in order to supply his needs?
ERYXIAS: He would not.
SOCRATES: And does not this apply in other cases? If we did not want for
the service of the body the things of which we now stand in need, and
heat and cold and the other bodily sensations were unperceived by us,
there would be no use in this so-called wealth, if no one, that is,
had any necessity for those things which now make us wish for wealth in
order that we may satisfy the desires and needs of the body in respect
of our various wants. And therefore if the possession of wealth is
useful in ministering to our bodily wants, and bodily wants were unknown
to us, we should not need wealth, and possibly there would be no such
thing as wealth.
ERYXIAS: Clearly not.
SOCRATES: Then our conclusion is, as would appear, that wealth is what
is useful to this end?
Eryxias once more gave his assent, but the small argument considerably
troubled him.
SOCRATES: And what is your opinion about another question:--Would you
say that the same thing can be at one time useful and at another useless
for the production of the same result?
ERYXIAS: I cannot say more than that if we require the same thing to
produce the same result, then it seems to me to be useful; if not, not.
SOCRATES: Then if without the aid of fire we could make a brazen statue,
we should not want fire for that purpose; and if we did not want it, it
would be useless to us? And the argument applies equally in other cases.
ERYXIAS: Clearly.
SOCRATES: And therefore conditions which are not required for the
existence of a thing are not useful for the production of it?
ERYXIAS: Of course not.
SOCRATES: And if without gold or silver or anything else which we do
not use directly for the body in the way that we do food and drink and
bedding and houses,--if without these we could satisfy the wants of the
body, they would be of no use to us for that purpose?
ERYXIAS: They would not.
SOCRATES: They would no longer be regarded as wealth, because they are
useless, whereas that would be wealth which enabled us to obtain what
was useful to us?
ERYXIAS: O Socrates, you will never be able to persuade me that gold
and silver and similar things are not wealth. But I am very strongly of
opinion that things which are useless to us are not wealth, and that the
money which is useful for this purpose is of the greatest use; not that
these things are not useful towards life, if by them we can procure
wealth.
SOCRATES: And how would you answer another question? There are persons,
are there not, who teach music and grammar and other arts for pay, and
thus procure those things of which they stand in need?
ERYXIAS: There are.
SOCRATES: And these men by the arts which they profess, and in exchange
for them, obtain the necessities of life just as we do by means of gold
and silver?
ERYXIAS: True.
SOCRATES: Then if they procure by this means what they want for the
purposes of life, that art will be useful towards life? For do we not
say that silver is useful because it enables us to supply our bodily
needs?
ERYXIAS: We do.
SOCRATES: Then if these arts are reckoned among things useful, the arts
are wealth for the same reason as gold and silver are, for, clearly,
the possession of them gives wealth. Yet a little while ago we found it
difficult to accept the argument which proved that the wisest are the
wealthiest. But now there seems no escape from this conclusion. Suppose
that we are asked, 'Is a horse useful to everybody?' will not our reply
be, 'No, but only to those who know how to use a horse?'
ERYXIAS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And so, too, physic is not useful to every one, but only to
him who knows how to use it?
ERYXIAS: True.
SOCRATES: And the same is the case with everything else?
ERYXIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then gold and silver and all the other elements which are
supposed to make up wealth are only useful to the person who knows how
to use them?
ERYXIAS: Exactly.
SOCRATES: And were we not saying before that it was the business of a
good man and a gentleman to know where and how anything should be used?
ERYXIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: The good and gentle, therefore will alone have profit from
these things, supposing at least that they know how to use them. But if
so, to them only will they seem to be wealth. It appears, however, that
where a person is ignorant of riding, and has horses which are useless
to him, if some one teaches him that art, he makes him also richer, for
what was before useless has now become useful to him, and in giving him
knowledge he has also conferred riches upon him.
ERYXIAS: That is the case.
SOCRATES: Yet I dare be sworn that Critias will not be moved a whit by
the argument.
CRITIAS: No, by heaven, I should be a madman if I were. But why do you
not finish the argument which proves that gold and silver and other
things which seem to be wealth are not real wealth? For I have been
exceedingly delighted to hear the discourses which you have just been
holding.
SOCRATES: My argument, Critias (I said), appears to have given you the
same kind of pleasure which you might have derived from some rhapsode's
recitation of Homer; for you do not believe a word of what has been
said. But come now, give me an answer to this question. Are not certain
things useful to the builder when he is building a house?
CRITIAS: They are.
SOCRATES: And would you say that those things are useful which are
employed in house building,--stones and bricks and beams and the like,
and also the instruments with which the builder built the house, the
beams and stones which they provided, and again the instruments by which
these were obtained?
CRITIAS: It seems to me that they are all useful for building.
SOCRATES: And is it not true of every art, that not only the materials
but the instruments by which we procure them and without which the work
could not go on, are useful for that art?
CRITIAS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And further, the instruments by which the instruments are
procured, and so on, going back from stage to stage ad infinitum,--are
not all these, in your opinion, necessary in order to carry out the
work?
CRITIAS: We may fairly suppose such to be the case.
SOCRATES: And if a man has food and drink and clothes and the other
things which are useful to the body, would he need gold or silver or any
other means by which he could procure that which he now has?
CRITIAS: I do not think so.
SOCRATES: Then you consider that a man never wants any of these things
for the use of the body?
CRITIAS: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: And if they appear useless to this end, ought they not always
to appear useless? For we have already laid down the principle that
things cannot be at one time useful and at another time not, in the same
process.
CRITIAS: But in that respect your argument and mine are the same. For
you maintain if they are useful to a certain end, they can never become
useless; whereas I say that in order to accomplish some results bad
things are needed, and good for others.
SOCRATES: But can a bad thing be used to carry out a good purpose?
CRITIAS: I should say not.
SOCRATES: And we call those actions good which a man does for the sake
of virtue?
CRITIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: But can a man learn any kind of knowledge which is imparted by
word of mouth if he is wholly deprived of the sense of hearing?
CRITIAS: Certainly not, I think.
SOCRATES: And will not hearing be useful for virtue, if virtue is taught
by hearing and we use the sense of hearing in giving instruction?
CRITIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And since medicine frees the sick man from his disease, that
art too may sometimes appear useful in the acquisition of virtue, e.g.
when hearing is procured by the aid of medicine.
CRITIAS: Very likely.
SOCRATES: But if, again, we obtain by wealth the aid of medicine, shall
we not regard wealth as useful for virtue?
CRITIAS: True.
SOCRATES: And also the instruments by which wealth is procured?
CRITIAS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then you think that a man may gain wealth by bad and
disgraceful means, and, having obtained the aid of medicine which
enables him to acquire the power of hearing, may use that very faculty
for the acquisition of virtue?
CRITIAS: Yes, I do.
SOCRATES: But can that which is evil be useful for virtue?
CRITIAS: No.
SOCRATES: It is not therefore necessary that the means by which we
obtain what is useful for a certain object should always be useful for
the same object: for it seems that bad actions may sometimes serve good
purposes? The matter will be still plainer if we look at it in this
way:--If things are useful towards the several ends for which they
exist, which ends would not come into existence without them, how would
you regard them? Can ignorance, for instance, be useful for knowledge,
or disease for health, or vice for virtue?
CRITIAS: Never.
SOCRATES: And yet we have already agreed--have we not?--that there
can be no knowledge where there has not previously been ignorance, nor
health where there has not been disease, nor virtue where there has not
been vice?
CRITIAS: I think that we have.
SOCRATES: But then it would seem that the antecedents without which a
thing cannot exist are not necessarily useful to it. Otherwise ignorance
would appear useful for knowledge, disease for health, and vice for
virtue.
Critias still showed great reluctance to accept any argument which
went to prove that all these things were useless. I saw that it was as
difficult to persuade him as (according to the proverb) it is to boil
a stone, so I said: Let us bid 'good-bye' to the discussion, since we
cannot agree whether these things are useful and a part of wealth or
not. But what shall we say to another question: Which is the happier and
better man,--he who requires the greatest quantity of necessaries for
body and diet, or he who requires only the fewest and least? The answer
will perhaps become more obvious if we suppose some one, comparing the
man himself at different times, to consider whether his condition is
better when he is sick or when he is well?
CRITIAS: That is not a question which needs much consideration.
SOCRATES: Probably, I said, every one can understand that health is a
better condition than disease. But when have we the greatest and the
most various needs, when we are sick or when we are well?
CRITIAS: When we are sick.
SOCRATES: And when we are in the worst state we have the greatest and
most especial need and desire of bodily pleasures?
CRITIAS: True.
SOCRATES: And seeing that a man is best off when he is least in need of
such things, does not the same reasoning apply to the case of any two
persons, of whom one has many and great wants and desires, and the other
few and moderate? For instance, some men are gamblers, some drunkards,
and some gluttons: and gambling and the love of drink and greediness are
all desires?
CRITIAS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: But desires are only the lack of something: and those who have
the greatest desires are in a worse condition than those who have none
or very slight ones?
CRITIAS: Certainly I consider that those who have such wants are bad,
and that the greater their wants the worse they are.
SOCRATES: And do we think it possible that a thing should be useful for
a purpose unless we have need of it for that purpose?
CRITIAS: No.
SOCRATES: Then if these things are useful for supplying the needs of the
body, we must want them for that purpose?
CRITIAS: That is my opinion.
SOCRATES: And he to whom the greatest number of things are useful
for his purpose, will also want the greatest number of means of
accomplishing it, supposing that we necessarily feel the want of all
useful things?
CRITIAS: It seems so.
SOCRATES: The argument proves then that he who has great riches has
likewise need of many things for the supply of the wants of the body;
for wealth appears useful towards that end. And the richest must be in
the worst condition, since they seem to be most in want of such things.
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