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Title: The First Buckinghamshire Battalion 1914-1919
Author: P. L. Wright
Author of introduction, etc.: Robert Fanshawe
Release date: July 13, 2026 [eBook #79090]
Language: English
Original publication: London: Hazell, Watson & Viney Ltd, 1920
Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/79090
Credits: Richard Tonsing, Brian Coe, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE FIRST BUCKINGHAMSHIRE BATTALION 1914-1919 ***
THE
FIRST BUCKINGHAMSHIRE
BATTALION
1914–1919
[Illustration:
LT.-COL. L. L. C. REYNOLDS, D.S.O., T.D.
[Frontispiece
]
The First Buckinghamshire Battalion
1914–1919
BY
CAPTAIN P. L. WRIGHT, D.S.O., M.C.
With a Foreword
BY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR ROBERT FANSHAWE
K.G.B., D.S.O.
HAZELL, WATSON & VINEY, LD.
LONDON AND AYLESBURY, BUCKS
_Copyright
First published 1920_
_Printed by Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury._
FOREWORD
BY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR ROBERT FANSHAWE
K.C.B., D.S.O.
The 1st Bucks Battalion of the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light
Infantry was trained and modelled on the traditions of the Light
Division of Peninsular fame, and served through the War in the 145th
Brigade of the 48th South Midland Division. The Battalion went out to
the War with that great fighting asset—a strong _esprit de corps_. This
they maintained; and whether it was training, “holding the line,”
marching, or the attack, I, as their Divisional Commander, felt
confident that their task would be thoroughly done, and carried through
with the determination, endurance, dash, and with that proper use of
initiative for which the Light Division officers and men were noted a
hundred years ago. The officers, N.C.O.s, and men could be relied on to
act as the occasion required, in carrying out what they knew to be the
general plan.
In no case was this confidence misplaced, whether the affair was that of
a patrol or post, or for the whole Battalion.
Amongst the officers were many fine leaders of men, none more so than
Lieutenant-Colonel Reynolds, who led the Battalion through most of the
War. He was backed by many officers imbued with the same spirit and
energy.
Amongst the N.C.O.s and men were always many ready ably to second this
good leadership, and determined to make the Battalion a name of which
their whole county might be proud.
The engagements during my command of the Division which to my mind stand
prominently out were first on July 23, 1916, during the Battle of the
Somme, when the 48th Division were carrying out an attack to break the
German line of defence which linked Pozières to Thiepval, in order to
assist in the capture of the former place, and pave the way towards the
capture of the latter. The Battalion was in brigade reserve when the
battle started. The Brigade Commander had been warned that, if his
initial attack did not succeed everywhere, a fresh attack would be made
to secure our objective. I well remember my conversation on the
telephone during the attack, and being assured that the Battalion would
be ready by the time the Artillery said they would be.
The right of the Brigade attack succeeded, but that on the left was
checked, and to the Bucks Battalion was given the task, at short notice,
of capturing the point, without which the gains on the right of the
Brigade could not have been held for long. The success of the attack is
well told in these pages. The difficulty of the Battalion’s task is only
to be appreciated by those who, in the long war, have seen how seldom a
fresh attack of this sort could be organised and carried out
successfully by the immediate use of troops in reserve. The attack cost
the Battalion a heavy price—Captain E. V. Birchall, the brilliant
company commander who led his company in the attack, being mortally
wounded.
The second occasion was the capture of Tombois Farm on the night of
April 16–17, 1917. The task of the Division was to keep such continual
pressure on the enemy opposite, that he should feel that that part of
the Hindenburg Line in our front was really being worked up to. The
advanced posts of Epéhy—Lempire—Ronssoy in front of his outpost line had
been captured, and a footing gained in his outpost line, which was
covered by a belt of wire, south of Tombois Farm. The object of the
attack on this night was to gain this line of wire and the fortified
outposts along it on the rest of our Division front, which was on a very
wide one. The operation is accurately described. It was a case where
good arrangement, determination to win, and the initiative of those on
the spot led to success in spite of all obstacles.
It was said that on this occasion the Army Commander called up the Corps
Commander on the telephone, and asked whether the operation would be
carried out in such weather. The Corps Commander’s reply showed his
confidence in, and knowledge of, the troops employed, when he replied in
the affirmative without even asking the Division.
The third occasion was on August 16, 1917, at St. Julien, during the
Third Battle of Ypres, when the Battalion and certain battalions of the
145th Brigade completed the capture of St. Julien, and only
circumstances over which the Battalion had no control prevented their
success being still more complete.
The last occasion was on June 15, 1918, when the Austrians made their
great attempt to break our line along the Asiago Plateau. Although, as
the history relates, the Battalion was only holding the rear line on
that day, yet by its action it enabled the troops fighting in front of
this line to carry out their difficult task, showing what confidence
they felt in the Bucks Battalion. The initiative with which the
Battalion, finding that the right of the 1/4th Oxford & Bucks Battalion
was exposed by the line being left unoccupied beyond our own posts,
pushed out to close this gap, was of especial value to their side.
During the first few days of November, the same year, the Battalion
showed how it could play its part in that last phase of victory, when,
after the long and arduous struggle, the enemy finally broke, and the
fruits of victory had to be gathered by a vigorous pursuit. Truly has
the Battalion played a great and glorious part in this great War.
R. FANSHAWE,
_Major-General_.
_July 1, 1920._
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
PAGE
FROM MOBILISATION TO PLOEGSTEERT 1
CHAPTER II
HÉBUTERNE 13
CHAPTER III
THE SOMME 24
CHAPTER IV
THE SOMME 36
CHAPTER V
LE SARS—CAPPY 45
CHAPTER VI
THE GERMAN RETIREMENT 54
CHAPTER VII
THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES 69
CHAPTER VIII
THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES—VIMY 83
CHAPTER IX
ITALY 91
CHAPTER X
THE AUSTRIAN ATTACK OF JUNE 15 103
CHAPTER XI
RAIDS 115
CHAPTER XII
THE AUSTRIAN DÉBÂCLE 123
CHAPTER XIII
AFTER THE ARMISTICE—THE END 138
APPENDIX I
OPERATION ORDERS 144
APPENDIX II
ROLLS OF OFFICERS WHO TOOK PART IN THE MAIN ACTIONS OF
1916–1917–1918 163
APPENDIX III
HONOURS AND DECORATIONS GAINED BY OFFICERS OF THE 1ST BUCKS
BATTALION 172
APPENDIX IV
HONOURS AND DECORATIONS GAINED BY WARRANT OFFICERS, N.C.O.’S, AND
MEN OF THE FIRST BUCKS BATTALION WHILE SERVING WITH THE
BATTALION 176
APPENDIX V
ROLL OF OFFICERS WHO SERVED WITH THE 1ST BUCKS BATTALION DURING
THE PERIOD MARCH 1915–DECEMBER 1918 179
APPENDIX VI
NOMINAL ROLL OF WARRANT OFFICERS, N.C.O.’S AND MEN WHO SERVED WITH
THE BATTALION DURING THE PERIOD MARCH 1915–DECEMBER 1918 197
APPENDIX VII
TRANSLATION OF THE ITALIAN DIPLOMA 215
ILLUSTRATIONS
LT.-COL. L. L. C. REYNOLDS, D.S.O., T.D. _Frontispiece_
FACING PAGE
BATTALION OFFICERS, CHELMSFORD, MARCH 1915 4
A TYPICAL FLANDERS ROAD 8
THE 1ST BUCKS BATTALION CEMETERY, PLOEGSTEERT 8
COY. H.Q. IN THE “KEEP” AT HÉBUTERNE 16
HÉBUTERNE CHURCH, 1915 16
OUR TRENCHES IN FOREGROUND. GOMMECOURT WOOD IN
BACKGROUND, WITH Z HEDGE IN FRONT OF IT 18
REST BILLETS, COUIN 18
LT.-COL. F. O. WETHERED, C.M.G., V.D.; LT.-COL. C. P.
DOIG, D.S.O.; LT.-COL. L. C. HAWKINS, T.D. 20
THE 1ST BUCKS BATTALION CEMETERY, HÉBUTERNE 22
FRONT LINE COY. H.Q., LE SARS 48
REPRODUCTION OF A FRENCH POSTCARD OF PÉRONNE AFTER
GERMAN EVACUATION IN MARCH 1917. (WITH CRUDE
TRANSLATION) 54
PÉRONNE CHURCH 58
RONSSOY SUGAR FACTORY 58
CHEDDAR VILLA, ST. JULIEN 72
THE STEENBEEK 76
THE BATTLE-FIELD NEAR ST. JULIEN, YPRES 76
RESERVE BATTALION H.Q., KABERLABA N. 120
THE C.-IN-C. PRESENTING MEDALS TO THE BATTALION AT
GRANEZZA, AUGUST 1918 120
THE LAST QUARTER GUARD, ITALY, 1919 140
THE CADRE, 1919 142
ITALIAN MEMORIAL CERTIFICATE 216
MAPS AND PANORAMA
MAP No. 1. SOMME OPERATIONS, JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1916 28
„ No. 2. ATTACK ON TOMBOIS FARM, NIGHT 16/17, APRIL,
1917 60
„ No. 3. THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES, JULY TO OCTOBER, 1917 80
„ No. 4. ITALIAN OPERATIONS _In pocket of
cover_
„ No. 5. AREA RAIDED ON NIGHT 26/27 AUGUST, 1918 116
PANORAMA FROM MT. TORLE 128
IMPORTANT NOTE
On the eve of publication, and too late for mention in the text, the
officer commanding the 1st Bucks Battalion has received a letter from
the War Office enclosing a translation of an Italian diploma and a
facsimile in bronze of a gold medal presented to H.M. the King of Italy.
Copies of the letter and diploma will be found printed in Appendix VII
to this Record, and will be read with pride.
It will be seen that, out of all the Infantry Battalions engaged on the
Italian Front, the 1st Bucks Battalion, the 1st Battalion Royal Welsh
Fusiliers, and the H.A.C. are the three selected recipients of this high
honour.
THE
FIRST BUCKINGHAMSHIRE
BATTALION
1914–1919
CHAPTER I
FROM MOBILISATION TO PLOEGSTEERT
_August 1914 to June 1915_
It seemed almost incredible news, too good to be true, when on March 28,
1915, we received orders to proceed overseas. The 48th Division, of
which we were part, had been mobilised on August 4, 1914, immediately on
the outbreak of war. From that day our thoughts and hearts had been at
the Front—and how we longed to follow them; if war news sometimes seemed
bad it only made us the keener to be given our chance, more confident
that we should help to turn the tide. Since then eight months had all
but gone, long months of waiting, full of hopes and expectations so
often to be disappointed, but now to be realised.
The Division was commanded by Major-General H. N. C. Heath, C.B., and
consisted, as regards Infantry, of three Brigades—the Warwick, the
Gloucester and Worcester, and the South Midland, which later became
known as the 143rd, 144th, and 145th Infantry Brigades respectively. The
145th Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General W. K. McLintock,
consisted of four battalions: the 1/5th Battalion Gloucestershire
Regiment, the 1/4th Battalion Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light
Infantry, our own 1/1st Buckinghamshire Battalion, and the 1/4th
Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment.
Our Battalion was at first commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel F. O.
Wethered, T.D., but this officer was taken ill in January 1915, and
shortly afterwards the command was taken over by Lieutenant-Colonel C.
P. Doig, Seaforth Highlanders.
Before mobilisation, the Bucks Battalion had not adopted the
four-company system, but on outbreak of war this was at once organised.
The following table shows how it was effected, and from what districts
each company drew its recruits:
A Company Marlow │A Company.
│ Captain L. L. C. Reynolds.
B „ High Wycombe│ „
— ——————— ————————————│————————————————————————————
C „ Buckingham │B Company.
│ Captain L. W. Crouch.
D „ Aylesbury │ „
— ——————— ————————————│————————————————————————————
E „ Slough │C Company.
│ Captain G. E. W. Bowyer.
F „ Wolverton │ „
— ——————— ————————————│————————————————————————————
G „ Wolverton │D Company.
│ Captain E. V. Birchall.
H „ High Wycombe│ „
The order to mobilise was received at Battalion Headquarters at
Aylesbury at 6.30 p.m. on August 4, 1914. With the exception of the
Wolverton Company, whose train was put into a siding owing to some
misunderstanding, the whole Battalion was concentrated at Aylesbury
before midnight on the 4th/5th. On the evening of the 5th we entrained
for Cosham, the Battalion’s war station, where transport was drawn, and
three days were spent in digging trenches on the hills overlooking
Portsmouth harbour.
Entraining again on August 9, the Battalion journeyed to Swindon, where
a week’s hard training was carried out, and after this a succession of
moves, partly by rail, but mostly on foot, carried us via Dunstable,
Hitchin, Ware, Harlow and Great Dunmow to Chelmsford, where we arrived
on August 25. Here, with the exception of a most bitterly cold fortnight
in November spent under canvas at Great Totham, where the Battalion was
employed digging defences of the East coast, we remained for seven
months, training vigorously and praying for our early dispatch to
France.
After so long a sojourn in Chelmsford we had become part and parcel of
the town, and even rumour, who for four months had been sending us out
“in two days’ time,” had given us up as hopeless. Some had even started
wondering whether, after all, the war could not be won without the Bucks
Battalion winning it.
However, here at last was the order we had longed for, and this time
there seemed to be no mistake about it.
Officers, who had spent six months buying useless things for their kit,
now bought more feverishly and imprudently than ever. The men took it
all very quietly, on the principle, no doubt, that “an order is an
order, but it’s got to be cancelled at least twice before being carried
out.” For once they were wrong, and on the afternoon of March 30, 1915,
the Battalion paraded for the last time on the Chelmsford parade-ground
and marched to the station.
Chelmsford turned out _en masse_ and gave us a first-rate send-off. Not
a few had become fond of us and we of them, but we were too cheerful and
thankful to be off to allow our farewells to damp our spirits. At 5.30
p.m. the train steamed out of Chelmsford Station and we were on our way
to the war. The detrainment and embarkation at Folkestone were carried
out without difficulty, and at 11 p.m. we were at Boulogne.
The few _Boulonnais_ who were about did not appear to rate our arrival
nearly so highly as we did ourselves. In fact, to be honest, they were
not interested. They had seen thousands of British troops already, and
confidently counted on seeing millions more.
Eventually, we got formed up and on the move, being told that there was
a march of four or five miles ahead of us. After following a very
winding road for some two hours, we scaled a young mountain and found
ourselves at Ostrehove camp. Why the wind invariably blows icy blasts,
from all directions, on to this peculiarly unattractive spot, is not
known, but apparently it always does. However, the majority of the tents
remained standing throughout the night, though few of us got much sleep,
on account of the cold. Anxiety to see France in daylight turned us all
out of our tents early, and breakfast brought with it rumours of moving
which proved to be correct.
At 3.30 p.m. on March 31, 1915, the Battalion paraded and marched down
another tortuous road to Pont de Briques, where it entrained. We had not
thought much about the composition of a French troop-train, but our
first sight of one was, to say the least, a disappointment. It consisted
of some twenty cattle-trucks, each marked to hold between forty and
fifty men. This particular train, being a novelty, did not have such
scathing remarks passed on it as those which later had the honour of
carrying us, but even this one was not spoken of nicely. When, finally,
the guard blew his penny horn, and “puffing Billy” (as the engine was
immediately dubbed) got busy, laughter knew no bounds, and French
railways were put down as a bad show.
After some five hours of this very crowded travelling, we arrived at
Cassel, and detrained at 11 p.m. A three-hour march brought us to
Terdeghem, where our billets lay. Accommodation being very scanty, many
of us spent the warm night in the open. The wind changed during that
night, with the result that we heard the guns for the first time in the
morning. We had arrived in the neighbourhood of the war.
[Illustration:
BATTALION OFFICERS, CHELMSFORD, MARCH 1915.
]
We were expecting to move hourly closer up to the line, but for three
nights we remained at Terdeghem, the only event of importance being an
inspection on April 2 of the Brigade at Steenvoorde by General Sir H.
Smith-Dorrien, who was at that time commanding the 2nd Army. We then
moved to billets on the Oultersteene-Bailleul Road (S.E. of Méteren),
where two more nights were spent, and on April 7 the Battalion marched
via Bailleul and Armentières to Le Bizet, for trench attachment to the
4th Division. These two marches, although only some twenty-five miles,
were formidable ones. Feet, in spite of the number of route marches
carried out at home, started to blister on these cobbled roads. Heat,
dust, and the monotony of the Flanders country, increased the
discomfort. Billeting parties, sent on in advance on bicycles, had not
yet learnt that it was no kindness to meet the Battalion five miles from
billets and assure them that twenty minutes would see them in.
On April 8, all companies were attached to different units of the 4th
Division (2nd Monmouthshire Regiment, 2nd Battalion Lancashire
Fusiliers, 2nd Battalion Essex Regiment), for instruction in the method
of holding trenches. It is doubtful whether our brains ever worked again
so feverishly and incontinently as they did on that first march up to
trenches. The march was carried out in pitch darkness, along a road
which ran up to and through the British front line. Guides met us five
or six hundred yards behind the line, and escorted us as far as the
trenches. These guides, treating us like the ignorant children that we
were, kept the pace as slow as possible, knowing quite truly that we
liked that the least. Several of them, not content with this, insisted
on telling one how the Boche was in the habit of raking that road with
machine-gun fire at that hour precisely, and how two men had met their
end there the previous evening. We arrived therefore with nerves highly
strung.
The number of questions put to our hosts during that night must have
seemed to them phenomenal. How far away was Fritz? Did he do much
shooting? Was he likely to attack? Had there been many casualties? And a
thousand more such questions, all of which were asked for curiosity and
with the object of acquiring knowledge, but could well be taken to mean
we were frightened out of our lives.
Dawn enlightened us considerably and interested us no less, and by
nightfall we thought ourselves veterans at the game. There was, in fact,
a tendency to treat the Boche with much less respect than he was
entitled to, under the circumstances. Sniping was active, and the
Germans were no mean shots at the 50 to 150 yards which separated their
trenches from ours.
On the morning of the second day, April 9, the 4th Division exploded a
mine under the enemy trenches. This very naturally nettled the Boche
considerably, and he retaliated by shelling our line. One shell entered
and burst inside the remains of an old house, containing our A Company
headquarters. By a miracle everyone escaped unhurt, though many of their
possessions were never seen again.
Our attachment for instruction lasted four days, two of which were spent
in the front line, and two in support.
On April 12, the Battalion marched to billets at Steenwerck, some eight
miles distant. Here, although all companies were again very scattered in
farms, the inhabitants were most tolerant to us. Provided their manure
was left alone, and their pigs allowed to move about as they wished, no
objection would be raised to us. The importance in life of owning large
quantities of manure speedily became evident. One might almost say that
a man’s riches were gauged by the size and aroma of the heap he
possessed.
On the 14th the Commanding Officer, Adjutant and company commanders
received orders to reconnoitre the line with a view to the Battalion
relieving the 1st Battalion Somersetshire Light Infantry, who were in
support in Ploegsteert Wood.
As one tour in the line was so like another, it is proposed to give a
general outline of our life during the next two months, which were spent
at Ploegsteert or in billets at Romarin.
The weather, during the first few days we passed in reserve in the wood,
was gorgeous, and one felt grateful to those who had been responsible
for choosing this spot for us to carry on our war. Our quarters were
certainly not luxurious, consisting chiefly of what cover could be made
with a waterproof sheet. But with the whole wood at our disposal,
comfort of a kind was quite obtainable, provided one made the effort.
Some Canadians who had been there before us had indeed started building
operations, and erected a magnificent log hut, known as Plugstreet Hall.
C Company were fortunate enough to secure this as their company
headquarters at first, to the complete astonishment of D Company, who
had no notion that such a palpable error could be made.
To enhance our enjoyment of those first few days in the wood, we were
troubled with very few shells, but few of us will forget the distant
thunder, which reached our ears coming from the direction of Hill 60, on
the evening of the second or third day we were there. It was the first
real, continuous roar of bombardment we had heard, and it impressed us
mightily, suggesting to our minds that we were living in a fool’s
paradise.
The trees had been damaged very little, and the fresh green foliage and
undisturbed bird life made it most difficult to believe in the existence
of a war, and that at no great distance. Paths had been cleared in all
useful directions through the wood, and duck-board tracks laid down to
prevent the paths becoming mud channels in wet weather. The majority of
these tracks were known by London names, such as The Strand, Rotten Row,
Hyde Park Corner, but here and there names like “Dead Horse Corner”
appeared. All the houses behind our lines had names, those which
received the most attention from the German gunners being the best
known: Hull’s Burnt Farm, Three Huns, St. Yves Post Office, are names
which conjure up innumerable memories.
The trenches most frequently held by the Battalion in this area were
situated in front of the village of St. Yves, the line being held with
three companies in the firing line and one in support. The 1/5th
Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment relieved us every four days, when we
were in the habit of moving either into the wood or back to billets at
Romarin.
The trenches consisted of sand-bagged walls, a duck-board bottom, a host
of large flies and an enormous smell. The flies were kindly quiescent at
night, but the smell—never; presumably because it had so many sources to
draw upon that the wind could never really help us.
[Illustration:
A TYPICAL FLANDERS ROAD.
]
[Illustration:
THE 1ST BUCKS BATTALION CEMETERY, PLOEGSTEERT.
]
Our fire trench ran about 200 yards from the German front line, though
in places the two trenches approached to within 100 yards of each other.
To show one’s head over the top of the parapet was therefore risky, in
view of the enemy snipers, who were really first-rate shots and always
on the look-out for a target. Desultory rifle fire was kept up by both
sides throughout the twenty-four hours, always increasing in volume at
“stand to,” each morning and evening, and generally reaching the most
absurd pitch about one hour after darkness. The lunacy of expending
thousands of rounds of small arms ammunition per diem, in this way, had
yet to be fully realised.
Shells were not nearly so plentiful on either side. Certainly the Boche
fired considerably more than did our gunners, who—poor souls—had next to
none to fire. The main targets for German gunners were:
(1) Any new sandbagging in the front line;
(2) St. Yves Post Office and Hull’s Burnt Farm;
(3) Battalion Headquarters.
His dislike for the last-named was often intense. On one memorable
afternoon he put 67 six-inch high-explosive and incendiary shells within
a 70-yards radius of their domain. This shoot was watched by our front
line with enormous interest, bordering with a callous few on
satisfaction.
Rifle grenades were used extensively by the enemy, and as far as
possible by us. But the German grenades had a far greater range than our
own, which could only be employed where trenches were within 170 yards
of each other. One German grenade, fired into the rear of A Company’s
trench, wounded two company commanders, another officer, a company
sergeant-major, and five other ranks.
On occasions when anything in the nature of an attack was taking place
on some other part of the front, we received orders to make a
demonstration. Some idea of what these demonstrations consisted of
should be given here, not only to suggest their utter futility, but to
show the gradual way in which we learnt to play the game of
frightfulness. The demonstration would be carried out by all units who
happened to be holding the Divisional front.
9 a.m.—Long-range rifle fire directed on roads in rear of enemy
trenches.
11 a.m.—Artillery bombard a certain section or sections of enemy
trench with the object of breaching their parapet. (Nothing was ever
to be seen taking place at the spot indicated, but on more than one
occasion shells did reach the war zone, and went dangerously near
breaching _our_ parapet.)
11.5 a.m.—Whole of front-line garrison open five minutes’ rapid fire
on German front line.
1.45 p.m.—A few rifle grenades fired by companies within range of
enemy.
4.15 p.m.—A trench mortar fired; three rifle grenades fired at same
time from either side of it.
6.15 p.m.—Long-range rifle fire directed on roads in rear.
The enemy seldom paid the smallest attention to these demonstrations,
except possibly by spending five minutes in flooding our trench with
rifle grenades.
Soon after one of our demonstrations, however, the Boche pulled our leg
quite successfully. He had been very quiet during one afternoon, and
also during “stand to” in the evening. About an hour after “stand down”
every German in that part of the world started shouting at the top of
his voice. The immediate result (as had been anticipated by the enemy)
was to draw all our men on to their fire-steps; men who were working in
the trench, and those carrying rations, with one accord set aside their
work, took up their rifles, and manned the parapet to see what was
happening. They at once became good targets for the Hun, who opened
rapid fire on our parapet, and hurled at us every available grenade he
could lay his hands on. Twenty minutes later silence reigned again. We
had sustained several casualties, for although it was dark and no shots
could be aimed ones, a few of them succeeded in finding homes.
It is permissible perhaps to give one illustration of the fact that our
gunners were at this time not too well supplied with shells, and that
gunnery had not yet attained that high standard of proficiency which it
afterwards reached. A house which was occupied by a listening post from
our centre company by night and by a German sniper by day, was causing
us considerable annoyance, as it was placed so that from a window in the
gable end the sniper could fire at anyone entering or leaving our right
company headquarters, unless the movement was carried out on hands and
knees. Captain Reynolds, who was commanding the centre company, applied
for some sappers to come and blow the house up at night. That was
refused, but he was told that the gunners would knock it down. This idea
was not received enthusiastically, as the house was at so short a
distance from our line. However, a battery of 15-pounders was ordered to
carry out the shoot, and at 10 o’clock one morning, after we had
carefully cleared that portion of our trench which came in the line of
fire, the excitement started. Several gunner officers superintended the
shoot. Twelve rounds were fired; only one hit the house, and that one
caused no damage. One penetrated our own trench. We were then informed
that the battery had expended their ration of shells for one week (12
rounds), and that they would have another go next week.
The company, however, were quite determined that the gunners should have
no further “go’s.” The next morning, at “stand to,” Captain Reynolds
gave orders that one platoon was to open rapid fire at the gable end.
This soon brought down the entire gable end, exposing the whole attic of
the house. The sniper had lost his nest, and never fired from there
again.
We were fortunate in our sector to be rather too far away from the enemy
for mining operations, though in the sector on our right the 1/4th
Battalion Oxford & Bucks L.I., who owned a section of trench known as
the Birdcage, were blowing up or being blown up most days.
So much for our trench conditions and little excitements. Our billets
lay at Romarin, a village about two and a half miles from Ploegsteert.
Days here were spent in a variety of ways—making roads, digging rear
lines, writing and censoring letters, kit inspections, baths, etc. Here
also was enacted one of the real tragedies of the war, the surrender of
our cameras.
The last period we spent in the line in these parts was in the Douve
trenches facing Messines, after which we began on June 24 a four-day
march to other climes.
Our casualties while in the Ploegsteert area were:
_Officers_: Killed None
Wounded 5
_Other ranks_: Killed 9
Wounded 57
In the middle of June, owing to illness, Major-General H. N. C. Heath,
C.B., handed over command of the Division to Major-General R. Fanshawe,
C.B., D.S.O. (52nd L.I.).
CHAPTER II
HÉBUTERNE
_June 1915 to June 1916_
There followed a series of three night marches, via Vieux-Berquin,
Merville, Busnettes, to Allouagne, which lies five miles west of
Béthune. The night’s march of June 26/27, from Vieux-Berquin to
Busnettes, was a particularly unpleasant one, for we moved as a
Division, and those who have taken part in a divisional march, on a dark
night, will know that the constant but inevitable checking is apt to
become very tiring. In addition, we arrived at Busnettes to find that a
Brigade which should have left those billets that evening had decided
not to move, with the result that we were forced to bivouac in a very
damp orchard for the remainder of the night. We were far too weary to
grouse, however, and were quite compensated the following morning on
finding ourselves surrounded by cherry trees, the fruit on which was
quite ripe. Colossal deals were at once done with the natives, and there
were but few cherries left in the neighbourhood when we marched off.
The billets at Allouagne were the best we had yet seen, and quite a
happy fortnight was spent here. Training was strenuous and carried out
mostly in a neighbouring wood, called the Bois de Maraquet. This wood
was said to resemble closely one with which we were to have more serious
dealings, and many sinister rumours got about in regard to it.
On the morning of July 8, 1915, the Brigade rose early and lined a
portion of the Lillers-Chocques road, down which Lord Kitchener was to
pass together with Field Marshal Lord French and the Prince of Wales.
Four cars passed hurriedly by. These well-known officers were probably
inside them.
On the 12th, the Battalion was moved in to bivouacs close to
Nœux-les-Mines, every man available during the two succeeding days being
put on to digging a new rear line. It was quite thought that the
Division was to take over new trenches in these parts, but not a bit of
it: on July 16 we suddenly got orders to move, and marched the whole of
that night, in a deluge of rain, to billets in Lières, passing again
within a stone’s throw of Allouagne. Everyone was wet through after the
first twenty minutes, and, as the whole march occupied six hours and the
rain was continuous, our entry into Lières may well be pictured. Night
marches had previously been carried out more or less in silence, but at
the end of some two hours of this march, word was passed down the line
that the men could sing. Instead of having a really good grouse, and
declaring that they were of course allowed to sing when the conditions
were such as to make any lightheartedness impossible, they saw only the
humour of the situation and sang lustily for several hours.
Our probable destination entirely baffled us, and there appeared good
grounds for believing any, or all, the following rumours which were at
this time prevalent: (1) The Dardanelles, (2) Dunkirk, (3) Ypres, (4)
attachment to the French at Arras. The fourth appeared the least
probable, as we were marching so very hard in the opposite direction.
However, on the 18th this situation became a trifle less obscure, as we
were put into a train at Berguette, in which we slowly proceeded to
Doullens. A two hours’ march from here took us to some woods at Marieux,
where we arrived at 4 a.m. to bivouac.
On July 20, the Division started to relieve the French in the line in
front of the village of Hébuterne, the Battalion being in reserve, with
two companies at Sailly-au-Bois and two companies at Bayencourt. Both
these villages were then a mass of flies, owing to the general filth
everywhere, and, as the weather was extremely hot, life in these billets
was none too pleasant.
The trenches, which the Battalion took over on July 24, lay some 100 to
300 yards east of Hébuterne, and were at this time good and quiet.
Unlike the front line at Ploegsteert, where the trenches consisted of
sand-bagged barricades, these trenches were dug down about 6 feet deep
all along. The parapets were low, and consequently little visible to the
enemy. What there was of them had no pretence of being bullet-proof,
though this was apparently a matter of small importance, bullets being
so rare owing to our line being anything from 300 to 1,000 yards distant
from the Boche trenches.
Our dugouts had the outward appearance of real luxury, owing to a large
portion of the furniture of Hébuterne having been imported into them.
Four-poster beds existed in quite a number, but owing to the quantities
of small vermin and mice which had made their homes in them, they proved
to be most undesirable, and were almost all scrapped before we had been
a week in the line.
For the first fortnight the Division was supported by French guns, with
apparently no shortage of ammunition. Their gunners were most obliging,
and took endless trouble to do everything in their power for our
front-line infantry. If asked to retaliate when our front trenches were
being heavily shelled, they would throw at least three times as many
shells back—and then ring up to know if we were entirely satisfied with
their work. Satisfied indeed—we revelled, for the first time in our
lives, in the sight of the Boche receiving far more in return than what
he had hurled at us.
Brigade and Battalion headquarters were both in the village, and for
some time occupied quarters above ground, though they were compelled
eventually, when the shelling of the village became more frequent, to
take to cellars and dugouts.
Company cookers were housed in the village, and from them all food was
carried up to the front line through communication trenches.
The Battalion in Brigade reserve occupied billets above ground in
Hébuterne, and of this one company was detailed as garrison of a large
portion of the village defences, in case of attack. This company had
considerably the best of the billets, living in what was known as the
“keep,” a really charming spot amongst orchards and trees; and all those
who were then present with the Battalion and still live will cherish
happy memories of it.
As will be gathered, it was a very quiet war that was waged round
Hébuterne when we first arrived, there being a tacit agreement, between
ourselves and the Germans opposite, that provided they would leave
Hébuterne quiet, we would not entirely destroy Gommecourt, and again, if
they decided to leave Sailly alone, we in our turn would keep our hands
off Bucquoy and Puisieux. For all that, it was not pleasant to reflect
on the fact that, should the enemy choose, he could perfectly well
destroy our billets, and with them ourselves, in the short space of an
hour. What actually occurred was a gradual warming up of artillery fire
on the villages by both sides, and it became just as gradually evident
that life above ground was not only unwise, but exceedingly foolish,
with the result that, after several months’ work, dugouts had been
constructed for the entire garrison of Hébuterne.
[Illustration:
COY. H.Q. IN THE “KEEP” AT HÉBUTERNE.
]
[Illustration:
HÉBUTERNE CHURCH, 1915.
]
During the first six weeks, reliefs of this sector of the front line, by
the 5th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment and ourselves, took place
every eight days. These reliefs were really only notable on account of
one particular incident, which created not a little feeling at the time,
and has for ever since been the cause of constant good-natured banter
between the two Battalions concerned.
When the 5th Gloucesters took over the front line from the French, the
latter were generous enough to hand over to them, with the line, a good
milking cow, which was duly passed on to us on our taking over the front
line. It transpired afterwards that the Gloucesters surrendered the cow
to us not because they regarded her as belonging to the Battalion which
happened to be in Hébuterne (as we considered should be the case), but
because they thought she would not appreciate the continual move to and
from Sailly, where the rest billets lay. After some four weeks of this
periodical change of ownership, instead of our being sent back to Sailly
on relief, we were only sent as far as the western outskirts of
Hébuterne, so that the field wherein the cow grazed lay just midway
between the Gloucester headquarters and our own. Now came the
trouble—the Gloucesters discovered the cow to be dry every morning at
the usual milking hour. Accusations poured forth against our Adjutant,
and he alone is able to say whether these were justified. In any case
the cow was never again handed over to us, on taking over the line, and
it is believed that she eventually died of excessive exercise taken
between Sailly and Hébuterne, and from the overanxiety on the part of
all ranks in the Gloucesters to extract their full share of milk. This
at any rate was our explanation of her disappearance, though it is by no
means certain that it will accurately coincide with the official account
to be given by that Battalion.
Throughout the six months during which our Battalion held K sector,
patrolling was most active; this was very necessary if we were to
prevent the enemy establishing control of the extensive “No Man’s Land”
which lay between us. With the exception of a Z-shaped hedge, known as
the Z hedge, which lay out in front of the left company, “No Man’s Land”
was very featureless. This hedge, however, provided no end of
excitement, for it was most difficult at night for either side to locate
and dislodge a party which had got out first and taken up a position in
it. But the enemy were seldom, if ever, permitted to do this owing to
our constant patrolling, and after some months they gave up all except
periodical visits.
Having gained supremacy of the hedge at night, it proved of some value
to us in pushing larger patrols along it towards the German lines. On
one night Captain N. S. Reid, who had previously carried out some daring
patrols, succeeded in reaching the enemy wire and crawling into it with
his party. Four German sentries could be distinguished along a stretch
of about 80 yards of trench. Gradually our patrol approached one of the
sentries, who was occupying a sap-head which we knew as “Y” sap. The
sentry challenged when our men were within a few yards of him. For
answer Captain Reid fired his revolver, and the sentry was seen to fall
across his parapet. An excited buzz of conversation rose from the
trench, and while this was going on our patrol was able to retire into
some dead ground before the enemy opened rapid fire. Eventually our men
returned without a casualty, having ascertained accurately the position
of at least four German sentry posts.
[Illustration:
OUR TRENCHES IN FOREGROUND. GOMMECOURT WOOD IN BACKGROUND, WITH Z
HEDGE IN FRONT OF IT.
]
[Illustration:
REST BILLETS, COUIN.
]
About September, the 5th Gloucesters took over the trenches on our
right, and from then onwards to December we were relieved by the 6th
Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment (144th Infantry Brigade) every eight
days. Each Battalion, on relief went back some four miles to the village
of Couin. There was nothing particularly attractive about this village
on the hill, but owing to the regularity of our visits to it and the
duration of our stays there, we became almost part of the place, with
the result that we became fond of it.
On the way back to these billets from the trenches during the evening of
January 27, 1916, the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel C. P. Doig,
D.S.O., sustained severe injuries through a fall from his horse, and
Major L. C. Hawkins assumed command.
Towards the middle of the month the Battalion had to bid good-bye to K
sector. We had done so much work on it in the way of defence and comfort
that the order came as a bitter blow, the more so as the trenches we
were to take over were in the last state of decay and were rapidly
falling in everywhere. They lay more to the S.E. of Hébuterne, in very
much lower ground than K sector.
We were warned that a bad state of affairs existed in this, G sector,
and were told that the Battalion had been singled out for bettering it.
The result was that every man was out to do his utmost with the spade
and show some substantial improvement, and it was not long before a very
marked change had been effected, and life was made a little more
possible. But it must be admitted that when frost gave way to heavy
rains, it became impossible to keep every trench in the sector open, and
on several occasions long lengths of even the front line became
impassable. Our efforts to keep open the communication trenches Jena,
Jean-Bart and Vercingétorix were positively heart-rending, and the
results achieved, even in good weather, were in no way proportionate to
the amount of work put on to them.
In addition, the enemy artillery became daily more active, and their
shooting, which was most exceptionally good, accounted for quite a
number of casualties, including amongst the killed Captain J. W.
Backhouse and 2/Lieutenant R. B. Furley, the last-named having only
joined us two weeks previously.
During the period that the Battalion held G sector, the enemy undertook
several raids, though on no occasion did he succeed in entering the
Battalion’s trenches. All these raids were preceded by extremely heavy
bombardments, usually of about an hour’s duration. In one of these
attacks, which the Germans delivered at 2 a.m. on March 19, they
employed a great number of gas shells, but owing to the amount of
practice the men had been given in adjusting their gas helmets quickly,
these shells did us little harm; in fact, in one way they did us good,
as the bombardment tended to increase our confidence in gas helmets for
the future.
In this same bombardment, the use and importance of yet another
protective appliance was brought out for the first time. This was the
steel helmet, which had not as yet been made a general issue, but which
had been sent to us in very small quantities to test and report on. Two
men who were wearing these helmets had them struck by large fragments of
shell. In one case the helmet was merely badly dinted, and in the other,
although the steel was ripped open, the shell fragment lost its sting
and failed to penetrate the man’s head.
In all these bombardments our trenches invariably suffered considerably,
the more so when _Minenwerfers_ were employed in large numbers, as these
shells made the most gigantic craters, which completely obliterated all
traces of dugouts and trench.
At the beginning of April the Battalion was relieved in G sector, and
took over trenches between G and K sectors. These were better but by no
means good.
[Illustration:
LT.-COL. F. O. WETHERED, C.M.G., V.D.
]
[Illustration:
LT.-COL. C. P. DOIG, D.S.O.
]
[Illustration:
LT.-COL. L. C. HAWKINS, T.D.
]
Fighting patrols, with the coming of better weather, were now sent out
more frequently, and brisk fighting in “No Man’s Land” resulted. The
most successful of these were undertaken by B Company (Captain L. W.
Crouch), and were carried out under the leadership of Captain H. V.
Combs. The main road from Hébuterne to Puisieux ran through this
company’s line across “No Man’s Land.” At some distance before it
reached the German line a sunken road branched from it. This road also
crossed the enemy trenches. In the sunken road, close to the junction
and about 100 yards from the German front line, were sixteen poplar
trees. Our reconnoitring patrols had heard the enemy digging here at
night very regularly, and it was considered a good opportunity for a
fighting patrol to take up a position before the enemy’s working party
came out, and engage them with fire, while another party endeavoured to
cut off their retreat.
Captain Combs with twenty-one N.C.O.’s and men reached the Sixteen
Poplars soon after 7 p.m. on March 6. At 10 p.m. some Germans came up,
entered the Poplars and started to work with shovels. No scouting had
been carried out by them previously, which made it appear that some
further enemy party had done this without being seen by our patrol. The
latter was now split up, one party being sent to engage the workers with
bombs, the other being sent down the road to intercept the enemy should
they retire.
Everything worked according to plan, except that a larger number of the
enemy existed in the Poplars than had been seen to enter them. Efforts
were made to get them to surrender before bombing, but they preferred to
fight. Our bombs played havoc in their midst, and caused those who
remained to fly down the road towards their line. Our second party
further diminished their numbers, L/Cpl. R. Colbrook, Ptes. J. Goldswain
and H. Hazzard standing in the middle of the road to hold up the rush.
Of the Germans who escaped the bullets and bayonets of these men the
majority made off across country in a southerly direction. Large parties
of the enemy now appeared from out of their wire, but our patrol were
able to save themselves just in time from being overwhelmed. As a result
of this encounter, at least twenty of the enemy were killed, while our
casualties consisted of three slightly wounded.
Efforts were made to repeat this performance the following month,
Captain H. V. Combs going out during the evening of April 1 with
2/Lieutenant R. Aitken and twenty-five other ranks. On this occasion the
Germans were before us, and in much larger numbers. A great fight ensued
and casualties occurred on both sides.
The following account of the action appeared in the VIII Corps summaries
of April 3 and 4:
_April 3._—“A patrol of two officers and twenty-five other ranks
advanced during the night of April 1/2 in the direction of the Sixteen
Poplars, with the intention of intercepting or capturing an enemy
patrol. The enemy, apparently becoming early aware of this patrol, sent
out a strong party of fifty men to oppose them. Our patrol after putting
up a good fight retired safely behind our wire. Our casualties were four
killed and two wounded, all of whom were brought in. Casualties to the
enemy are unknown, though several of the bombs and rifle grenades fired
were seen to burst well amongst them.”
_April 4._—“With reference to the patrol report in yesterday’s summary,
attention is drawn to the fact that the enemy were robbed of any
possible identification by the calmness and resource shown by the patrol
in getting back the killed and wounded to our trenches. The behaviour of
all ranks was excellent. The withdrawal was slow and deliberate, and the
men were well in hand.
[Illustration:
THE 1ST BUCKS BATTALION CEMETERY, HÉBUTERNE.
]
“Although it is difficult to distinguish one man’s services from
another, Sergt. W. J. Baldwin, L/Cpl. Goldswain, and L/Cpl. Jennings are
deserving of special notice. Although Sergt. Baldwin was wounded, not
only did he assist in carrying back one of the dead men, but came back
again to help the covering party, when the enemy were almost on top of
them. During the fight, several of the grenades which were thrown
amongst the enemy caused considerable havoc, loud cries and groans being
heard.”
Our killed included L/Cpl. R. Colbrook and Pte. H. Hazzard, both of whom
had distinguished themselves in the previous fight.
In May 1916, the Battalion was withdrawn from the front area, and sent
back to rest at Beauval, where a fortnight was spent before moving to
Agenvillers for a week. The most strenuous training was undertaken at
these two places, and all manner of attacks practised, with a view to
the coming British offensive.
During the march from Beauval to Agenvillers on June 2, the Commanding
Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel L. C. Hawkins, was unfortunate enough to
meet with a similar accident to that which befell Lieutenant-Colonel
Doig, being thrown from his horse and seriously damaging his shoulder.
Major L. L. C. Reynolds then assumed command, Captain A. B. Lloyd-Baker
being appointed second in command.
On June 9, we moved back to the line, and held the Hébuterne trenches
during the preparations for the coming big offensive. But for these
operations it had been decreed that the 48th Division was to be in VII.
Corps reserve, with the result that zero day (July 1, 1916) found us no
nearer to the line than Couin Woods.
CHAPTER III
THE SOMME
_July 1916_
July 1, that day full of hopes and expectations, dawned at last. The
previous week had been so noisy that away in Couin Woods one hardly
noticed the increased bombardment denoting zero hour. Our departure for
Mailly-Maillet had been fixed for 9 a.m., and by that time no rumours
had reached us, let alone accurate news. However, after marching for
about half an hour, word was passed down the column that Gommecourt Wood
and Serre were ours and the attack was going well. This, although it
proved later to be quite inaccurate, more than satisfied us at the time.
Our bivouacs, in the plantations to the south-west of Mailly-Maillet,
did not tend to allay our restlessness, and listening to rumours and the
15-inch gun just below us was our only occupation.
In the afternoon, commanding officers and adjutants were summoned to
Brigade Headquarters. They returned with plans for a proposed attack by
the 8th, 144th and 145th Infantry Brigades. For this attack, which was
to be a night operation, the Battalion was to be in Brigade reserve.
Officers and N.C.O.’s were sent forward to reconnoitre the ground, so as
to be able to support the assault, should assistance be necessary. The
attacking battalions had actually formed up when, at ten minutes before
zero, operations were cancelled.
There had been a change in the situation, and it had been decided that
the VII. Corps should withdraw to the line it had held previous to
attacking that morning. If this didn’t spell failure, nothing did, and
our hopes, which had been running sadly too high, crashed to the ground.
The Battalion remained in these bivouacs until the evening of July 3,
when a move was made back to our old huts in Couin Woods. We were
destined to carry out one further tour in the Hébuterne trenches, before
our next move, which took place in motor lorries, after handing over our
camp on July 14, at the Bus-Bayencourt-Sailly-Coigneux cross-roads, to
the 11th Battalion Middlesex Regiment.
The attack farther south, commenced on the 1st inst., had been pressed
forward satisfactorily during the days following and, when the news of
the 13th that several more villages had been taken together with
numerous prisoners was succeeded by our hasty dispatch in motor lorries
to Senlis, our spirits rose once more. At Senlis we remained two days,
during which time company commanders carried out useful reconnaissances
of the ground round La Boisselle, with a view to ascertaining the best
routes up to the line.
Orders having been received that the Battalion was to carry out a
reconnaissance in force of the enemy line, which now ran between
Ovillers and Pozières, a move was made on the evening of July 17 to some
bivouacs on the Albert-Bapaume road, and as soon as it was dark we
started up to the line, marching by platoons. Our orders were to
ascertain whether the enemy was holding four certain points. If these
points were not held by him, they were to be occupied by us and made
into strong points. Heavy fighting was not to be undertaken.
The tasks were allotted to A and D Companies, each company detailing one
platoon for each of the points in its sector. B and C Companies supplied
carrying parties.
At 1 a.m. during the night of July 17/18 the attacking platoons advanced
in two lines of sections in file, with a point patrol immediately in
front, led by the officer in charge. All points were found to be
strongly held, and only one was occupied by us, viz. the most easterly,
which was rushed by a platoon of A Company under 2/Lieutenant B. C.
Rigden. This platoon, after driving off several bombing attacks and
starting to consolidate, was ordered to withdraw, owing to the other
points not having been taken. The reconnaissance, however, succeeded in
its object, for the positions and strength of the German dispositions in
this area were established.
The Battalion received the thanks and congratulations of the Divisional
Commander. Our casualties were:
_Officers_:
Died of wounds 2/Lieutenant C. Hall (wounded severely in the head
whilst bringing in casualties).
Missing 2/Lieutenant R. C. Norwood (afterwards presumed killed).
_Other ranks_:
Killed 2
Wounded 29
Missing 27 (all later presumed killed).
Efforts on the part of search parties, who were sent out to find the
missing, were fruitless, on account of the extreme darkness of the
night.
It was daylight when we started to move back, for the evacuation of the
wounded had taken some little while. The trench which led us back
presented one of the most gruesome sights we had yet seen, the floor
being literally paved with the bodies of dead Englishmen. Nor was this
all. Bodies lay over the parapet with rifle and fixed bayonet still held
in the hand. Others were seated or lying on fire-steps in most lifelike
positions. All had been killed at least a week previously, but burial
parties had been too much occupied farther back to reach them as yet. It
was not difficult to picture how these men had come by their end—a
German machine gun skimming the parapet of the trench with deadly
accuracy at the moment when our men were going over the top of it.
Although our orders were to move back to billets at Bouzincourt, we were
under no delusions as to our fighting in this area being finished. The
next blow to be struck was certain to be on a very much larger scale,
and would probably affect the whole Battalion. Sure enough, the
following day brought out the plans of Divisional Headquarters for an
attack, which included the 145th Infantry Brigade.
The objectives of the Bucks Battalion were points A and B (Map No. 1)
and the trenches adjoining these points. The 1/5th Battalion Gloucester
Regiment were to attack on our left, and the 1/4th Battalion Oxford &
Bucks Light Infantry on our right.
On July 19, the Battalion marched through Albert, and took over bivouacs
from 1/5th Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment by the side of the
Albert-Bapaume road. The following day was a busy one, what with the
issuing of detailed orders, explanatory lectures to the N.C.O.’s and
men, and the drawing and distribution of stores such as small arms
ammunition, grenades, Verey lights, ground flares, shovels, all of which
would have to be carried into the attack. C Company were most unlucky to
have an accident, while detonating their bombs, which caused several
casualties, and did not help them towards making a cheery start.
By 10.30 p.m. company commanders had given their final instructions to
the men, and off we started for the front line, which lay some two and a
half miles distant.
The Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel L. L. C. Reynolds) was to attack in
four lines, on a front of two companies, each in line of platoons in
column of sections,—two Sections in first line, one in second and one in
third,—C Company (Captain G. G. Jackson) on the right, A Company
(Captain N. S. Reid, M.C.) on the left. B Company (Captain L. W. Crouch)
was in immediate support to both companies in one line, and formed the
fourth wave. The enemy trench was situated about 325 yards distant from
our front assembly trench (known as Sickle Trench), but a tape was laid
by the Royal Engineers 175 yards from the German line, for the Battalion
to form up on.
[Illustration:
MAP Nº. 1.
SOMME OPERATIONS
JULY TO SEPT^R. 1916.
]
Zero was fixed for 2.45 a.m. on July 21, and at 2.15 a.m. our companies
left Sickle Trench to form up on the tape. D Company (Captain E. V.
Birchall) moved up to garrison Sickle Trench, as soon as the other three
companies went forward to their tapes. Although no unusual amount of
gunfire had as yet started, the enemy appeared to be very nervous,
starting at 2.30 a.m. to send up large quantities of flares. This was
disconcerting, as it showed too plainly that he was very much on the
_qui vive_. A few minutes later, red flares went up from his lines.
Whether these were a signal to his machine guns to open fire is not
known, but open they did—and to some tune. So long as the hands of the
watch did not point to 2.45 a.m. it was possible to lie flat, though
even so some few were hit. The moment to go forward, however, arrived,
and still the German machine guns chattered unceasingly. At 2.45 a.m.
our guns opened with a roar, and shells flew just over our heads by the
thousand, bursting their shrapnel in a line of flashes along the trench
opposite us. It was the signal to advance. Few, however, were able to do
so, for as men rose the machine guns of the enemy, upon whom our barrage
appeared to be having no effect, scythed them down. Officers especially
were dropping on all sides. A few isolated men reached the objective,
but of these hardly any returned. The attack, including that portion of
it made by the Gloucesters and Oxfords on our flanks, failed, and there
seems little doubt that the enemy were aware of our intentions, probably
owing to the bright moonlight. Casualties were heavy and included:
_Officers._—Killed. Capt. L. W. Crouch.
2/Lieut. J. P. Chapman.
2/Lieut. C. G. Abrey.
2/Lieut. C. W. Trimmer.
Wounded. 2/Lieut. H. C. E. Mason.
2/Lieut. B. C. Rigden.
2/Lieut. H. V. Shepherd.
2/Lieut. A. P. Godfrey.
Wounded and prisoner. Capt. G. G. Jackson.
_Other ranks._—Killed—8.
Wounded—96 (including 9 sergeants).
Missing—41 (all afterwards presumed killed).
Thus of the thirteen officers who were present with the three attacking
companies, only four were unhit. Captain L. W. Crouch, who was killed,
had for many years taken an active part in the training of his Aylesbury
Company, and had rendered the Battalion great service during the period
overseas. His death was felt most keenly by all ranks.
The failure of this attack was a great blow to the whole Battalion, as
it was our first serious attack, and it was as disappointed and sadder
men that we made our way back to the bivouacs: nearly everyone had lost
a real pal, temporarily or for always.
For the survivors, sleep was the first consideration, for we were worn
out; after that, reorganisation, with a view to the next attack, orders
for which might arrive at any moment. We were terribly short of officers
and short of N.C.O.’s, but fortunately, four officers had been left out
of the attack with a view to coping with this emergency in case it
should arise.
At 3 p.m. the following day (July 22), when our greatest efforts were
concentrated on refitting, cleaning up, tracing the missing and the
thousand things necessary after a battle, orders arrived to the effect
that the Battalion was to move forward at 10 p.m. to some disused
trenches, about two miles north. Here we were to stay for the night, in
support of the remainder of the Brigade, who were to attack about
midnight.
The attack was to be general along the greater part of the front held by
the Fourth Army, while the Australians were to capture Pozières, with
the 145th Infantry Brigade on their immediate left, in the order from
right to left—1/4th Battalion Oxford & Bucks Light Infantry, 1/4th
Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment, 1/5th Battalion Gloucestershire
Regiment, with the Bucks Battalion in reserve in the Mash Valley behind
Ovillers.
Thus, at 10 p.m., we once more left our bivouacs and moved to these
support positions.
At zero, half an hour after midnight (July 22/23), the host of guns all
around us broke forth in one monstrous roar. The flashes of them were on
all sides, and overhead we heard the shells, shrieking, whistling and
whining through the air, on the way to German trenches. Gunfire and
bursting shells lit up the country in fitful starts, giving sudden
pictures of ridges of ground, ruins and woods, revealing their shapes.
Rockets of every colour soared up from the German lines, in an endeavour
to give to their guns, and headquarters in rear, some indication of the
storm and trouble that assailed the garrison. A more wonderful or more
terrible picture it is impossible to imagine.
News of the attack filtered back to us slowly, but it was soon after 3
a.m. that a message reached us from Brigade Headquarters that the
Commanding Officer was required to report there immediately. He returned
about 4 a.m. The 1/4th Oxfords and 1/4th Royal Berks had gained a
footing in their objectives, but had suffered heavy casualties. They
were cut off from the Australians by a large stretch of trench, which
remained in enemy hands. On the extreme left, the 5th Gloucesters had
been unsuccessful, thus leaving the Berks in a very perilous position.
Our orders were to attack and seize at all costs that portion of the
line which had been attacked by the Gloucesters (Birchall Trench Map No.
1). Zero had been fixed for 6.30 a.m. on July 23, and as we had two
miles of strange country to cover before reaching the “jumping off”
trench, no time could be lost; orders were necessarily scanty, and much
was left to the initiative of company commanders.
The attack was one of very great difficulty, owing to the run of the
trenches. The enemy position was a stretch of trench approached by two
communication trenches, C and D, each about 400 yards long. The
right-hand one was in good condition, and met the enemy’s trench at
right angles, but the enemy had a bomb-stop about 50 yards from the
junction. The left-hand communicator was badly damaged, and ran at an
obtuse angle into the enemy’s line.
B (Captain O. V. Viney) and D (Captain E. V. Birchall) Companies were
detailed for the attack. B Company assembled in the left communicator, D
Company in the right.
Both companies, at zero, were to leave their trenches and to form
inwards on the intervening space, which was about 200 yards. A Company
(Captain N. S. Reid) were to be in support at the bottom of the
communicator. C Company (Captain P. A. Hall) were to provide the
necessary carrying parties, after the attack had been launched.
While moving up into position along the left-hand communicator, B
Company suffered a very grave misfortune. Our heavy guns, which had been
ordered to bombard the objective before zero, were shooting very short,
and many of their shells fell right in the ranks of the company. Many
casualties resulted, the trench being blocked with them in several
places. Progress under these conditions became difficult in the extreme,
and, in spite of the energy shown by the officer in command, the company
just failed to reach their forming up positions in time to take any real
part in the assault.
D Company, however, under the splendid leadership of Captain E. V.
Birchall, were able to carry out their orders to the letter, and by dint
of following our barrage so closely as to be almost in it, captured the
whole position single-handed. A Company were immediately sent up to
assist D Company in the work of consolidation and the clearing of
prisoners, who were appearing in considerable numbers, coming over the
top. These prisoners soon repented of this, however, as a battery of
German guns, either intentionally or thinking they were our men, landed
several shells in their midst and “dropped” quite a number; the
remainder took to the trenches. In all, the prisoners collected numbered
two officers and about 150 men. One of these officers stated that the
assault had taken them entirely by surprise, as they were waiting for
the barrage to lift, before manning the parapet; and declared his
opinion that the success of our assault, where two previous ones had
failed, was due entirely to the way in which we had hugged the barrage.
Consolidation proceeded apace, thanks largely to the efforts of Captain
N. S. Reid, and, at the end of a very short time, we were able to report
that a bombing section had got in touch with the 4th Royal Berks on our
right.
The enemy made frequent attempts during the day to retake the trench by
means of bombing attacks, but they were in all cases successfully driven
off. It was not till midnight of July 23/24 that he put down a heavy
barrage on the captured line, though, to our great surprise, no attack
developed, and at 12 noon the following day we were enabled, very
thankfully, to hand over the position intact to the 5th Gloucesters and
return to our bivouacs near Albert. Our casualties in this action were:
_Officers._—Wounded (died
of wounds) Capt. E. V. Birchall.
Wounded Capt. O. V. Viney.
Lieut. E. N. C. Woollerton.
2/Lieut. R. E. M. Young.
2/Lieut. F. Niall.
_Other ranks._—Killed—7.
Wounded—68.
Missing—8 (all later presumed killed).
The death of Captain Birchall was a very real loss and sorrow to the
whole Battalion. Probably no company ever had a better, fairer or more
capable commander, and no officer a truer friend. A large number of most
valuable senior N.C.O.’s were also casualties in this action, including
C.S.M. R. Read and Sergt. F. Barrett, both of whom were killed.
The success of this action amply compensated for the failure of our
previous one, and the Battalion was proud indeed to receive the
following letter from its Brigade Commander, Brigadier-General H. R.
Done, D.S.O.:
_To Lieutenant-Colonel L. L. C. Reynolds_
“Please give my heartiest congratulations to all ranks of the regiment
under your command, on their gallant and entirely successful attack on
July 23. By this success, which was obtained in spite of heavy loss, you
enabled the Brigade to carry out the whole of the task allotted, and
also made secure the position of the troops who had already gained a
footing in the enemy’s position on your right.”
The following was also received:
“The Army Commander wishes to thank all ranks of the 48th Division for
their excellent work during the past ten days. By their exertions they
have greatly extended our hold on Ovillers and have directly contributed
towards the ultimate capture of Pozières.”
As may well be imagined, the last ten days had left their mark on the
Battalion. Our strength was reduced to a very low figure, and even this
included a draft of sixty-eight privates, who had arrived on the evening
of July 21, and of whose capabilities we did not know sufficient to
warrant our taking them into action. As regards officers and N.C.O.’s
the shortage was acute.
It was now decided that the Division should be withdrawn, and on July
26, at 7 a.m., the Battalion marched back to temporary billets at
Arquèves, moving via Bouzincourt, Hédauville and Varennes. Here we
remained forty-eight hours, before resuming the march to Beauval, via
Raincheval and Beauquesne. The Battalion marched exceedingly well during
these two moves, which one may safely say was distinctly creditable,
considering the strenuous days of the past fortnight, the insufficient
sleep, and the fact that full marching order was being carried.
The following day, however, saw us started off on a seventeen-mile march
to Domléger, by way of Candas, Fienvillers and Bernaville. This proved
too much for the new draft which had joined us on the 21st, and, after
the first twelve miles, considerable difficulty was experienced in
getting them along! The old hands marched into Domléger as cheerily as
they had left Albert, and great was the delight of everyone at the
prospect of a few days’ complete rest and some measure of comfort.
CHAPTER IV
THE SOMME
_August 1916_
Domléger proved to be a real haven of rest. Training was carried on
without interruption, and life was made to resemble peace time so far as
it was possible. Courses of all kinds were arranged by the higher
authorities, in particular for the training of junior officers as
company commanders and for N.C.O.’s. The maintenance and further
improvement of discipline was always the first consideration, as this
could do so much to counterbalance the unavoidable discomforts to which
all ranks were so often subjected.
Every effort was made to prevent the troops becoming tired or stale
under training. Physical rest was a necessity, and it was only by
adequate periods of relaxation in rest billets that the troops could
recover from the heavy moral strain and nerve themselves for the next
effort. We were now reinforced by a draft of ninety-seven men, mostly
drawn from the Hunts Cyclist Battalion. These were the first “strangers”
sent to us, but they proved to be an excellent lot, and many afterwards
became N.C.O.’s.
Our stay in these comfortable billets was all too short for the amount
of work to be done, for on August 9 the Battalion started marching back
to the line by the way it had come, and on the 11th we were once more in
the neighbourhood of our old friend Bouzincourt, which did not appear to
have become any more attractive in our absence. The Battalion from whom
we took over informed us that the Boche had lately taken to shelling the
camp, and had burnt out one of the huts on the previous evening by
registering a direct hit on it. No sooner had that Battalion left us
than a covey of seven or eight shells came over and landed in or around
the camp, demolishing yet another hut. This appeared to be no spot for a
so-called rest, and we were not long in finding more healthy
surroundings.
At 6 a.m. on August 13, the Battalion moved forward through Albert, and
took over a line of gunpits a little to the west of Usna Redoubt. Here
we were in reserve to the remainder of the Brigade, who were holding a
line immediately west of Pozières and on the extreme crest of the ridge.
The front trench was known as Sixth Avenue or Skyline Trench (Map No.
1). The Australians were on the right, round Pozières Windmill.
A heavy attack delivered by the enemy during the early part of the night
of August 13/14, drove the 1/4th Oxfords out of Skyline Trench. At 3
a.m. on the 14th C and D Companies were hurriedly sent up to the old
German front line at Ovillers, and were placed under the orders of O.C.
1/4th Royal Berks, to be in reserve while two companies of that regiment
were engaged in making a counter-attack on Skyline. The forming up for
this attack was observed by the enemy, and the assault proved a very
costly failure.
The Bucks Battalion was then ordered to retake this trench, and in the
afternoon of August 14 moved up and relieved the 1/4th Oxfords in the
positions they were then holding, namely Fifth Avenue.
The expression “moved up and relieved” does not give quite the picture
of what actually occurred, for in reality it was one of the most
uncomfortable proceedings ever taken part in. The ground all round was
going up like a bank of earth due to the enemy’s 5·9’s, and progress was
distinctly difficult. There certainly were casualties, but not one
quarter the number that one would have expected.
The position to be attacked consisted of a trench about 800 yards long,
approached from Fifth Avenue by two badly damaged communicators, E and
F, each about 250 yards long. It was decided to carry out a bombing
attack up these communicators, for which C Company (Captain P. A. Hall)
was detailed. Shortly after 10 p.m. bombing sections from this company
worked their way up the right-hand communicator and succeeded in gaining
Skyline Trench. They then worked outwards. A Company established a =⟙=
head at the top of the left communicator.
The operation was completely successful, and only slight opposition was
met with, the enemy running away down the north slope of the hill after
throwing a few bombs. Contact was regained with the Australians on the
right, and the whole of Skyline Trench, with the exception of about 100
yards, was in our hands by 5 a.m. the next day (August 15).
About 8 a.m. A Company (Captain N. S. Reid, D.S.O., M.C.) were sent back
for a few hours’ rest to the west entrance to Ovillers, and C and D
(Lieutenant F. D. Earle) Companies took over the line, B Company
(Captain G. R. Crouch) being in immediate support to them.
This was the situation on the morning of August 15. At 11.30 the enemy
opened heavy shell fire on the right of Fifth Avenue. At mid-day he
started on Skyline Trench with an intense enfilade bombardment carried
out mostly with heavy guns up to 12-inch, though a fair number of
trench-mortars and several _Minenwerfers_ which fired from Mouquet Farm
also took part. It seemed as if all the power of destruction in Germany
had suddenly got to work on this trench, and that the enemy were
determined that, since they were not able to hold it themselves, no
other men should either. Every size of shell was flung with unerring
accuracy, so that one great volume of smoke rose from the ridge and
covered the trench in a dense black pall. This terrific bombardment
continued for nine consecutive hours, systematically destroying
everything.
By 3 p.m. the Battalion was only holding the tops of the two
communicators and a few posts in between, and casualties from the two
companies had been very heavy. That men lived at all in such a place of
death, when shells were bursting above them, under them and round them,
was nothing less than a miracle. There were but few unwounded, and when
at 8 p.m. it became necessary to send up B Company to relieve the
remnants of C and D, the survivors were found to be dead-beat, both
physically and mentally.
But no attack ensued, and at 9 p.m. the situation became quieter. It was
then decided, in order to reduce casualties, that the remains of the
ploughed-up trench should be evacuated, and that posts should be pushed
out in shell-holes in front of it.
By night the whole Battalion was tired out, but a still further effort
was required of it in order to complete the work of the previous
morning. At midnight of August 15/16, in conjunction with the 5th
Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment, a bombing attack was delivered by A
Company against that portion of Skyline Trench on the extreme left which
was still in enemy hands. The attack was pressed with great
determination, and casualties were heavy, but success could not be
attained owing to the exhaustion of the supply of bombs, which could not
be kept up by the efforts of the worn-out remnants of C and D Companies.
The shelling in Skyline Trench and Fifth Avenue was undoubtedly the
heaviest and most prolonged that the Battalion had ever undergone, and
the endurance of all ranks throughout was of the very finest. Our
casualties were:
_Officers._—Wounded. Capt. V. C. Heathcote-Hacker.
Lieut. F. D. Earle.
2/Lieut. F. C. Dixon.
2/Lieut. D. Fallon.
_Other ranks._—Killed—8 (including 1 sergt.).
Wounded—165 (including 8 sergts.).
Missing—20.
It is certain that all the missing were killed, and so killed that no
trace could be found of them. The casualties included many of our best
N.C.O.’s, among whom may be mentioned Sergts. H. Watts, C. Fowler, A. J.
Hart and W. G. Cartwright. The greater part of the losses were borne by
C and D Companies, especially the former, who were now a mere handful of
men.
At 11 a.m. on the 16th, the exhausted Battalion was relieved by the 4th
Oxfords, and moved back to a new camp of bivouacs, trenches and smells
between Bouzincourt and Albert. On our way out of the front trenches we
passed the Divisional General, who, as usual, was one of the first on
the spot after a show, and had a cheery word for everyone.
The forty-eight hours allowed us in this camp was no great rest, as
there was so much to be done to prepare ourselves for action again. A
lot of equipment had been lost during the bombardment of Skyline, much
of it having been blown to pieces. The exact deficiencies of each
article had to be ascertained, and returns which would satisfy the
Quartermaster, the Staff Captain and D.A.D.O.S., made out. In addition
there were fresh drafts to be inspected and posted, and a thousand
inquiries to be made as to when all the missing had last been seen and
what had been their probable fate. This, if it did not make everyone
busy, supplied the Adjutant and company commanders with more than
sufficient work.
At the end of forty-eight hours, we received sudden orders to move at
once to the neighbourhood of Usna Redoubt. This we did, bivouacking for
the night in the open, without blankets. The 143rd Infantry Brigade were
attacking at dawn on August 19, and we had been sent up to be in support
and to be ready to exploit any success.
The attack was a complete success, and when the Divisional General, who
passed us on the roadside as he was going up to an O.P. at Ovillers,
instructed us to “get all the rest you can,” qualifying it by “You’ll
want your arms and your legs to-night,” we made sure we were in for more
trouble. This, however, did not mature, and by the evening of the 20th
we were back in Bouzincourt again for another forty-eight hours, before
being once more sent up to Ovillers Post to support the 144th Infantry
Brigade.
A day later we ourselves received orders for an attack to be made by the
Battalion the following afternoon on the enemy’s forward positions
between Pozières and Thiepval. The attack was to include the capture of
a trench shown as X—Y on Map No. 1, and was to be carried out in
conjunction with the 7th Infantry Brigade, 25th Division, who were to
assault other trenches on our left.
Accordingly the Battalion took over the line from the 6th Battalion
Gloucestershire Regiment. A and C Companies were detailed for the
attack, zero being fixed for 3.5 p.m., August 23. A bombardment was
carried out by the Heavy Artillery from 1 p.m. to 2.45 p.m., which not
only had no effect on the enemy trenches, but served merely to define
the precise limits of the objective. At 3 p.m. an intense bombardment
was put down for five minutes by the field guns, under cover of which
the attack was launched. The barrage was good but a trifle short, as
when it lifted the attacking troops had still some way to go, and the
enemy was manning his trench thickly, apparently very little affected by
it and firing hard on our men. In addition the enemy barrage came down
immediately after our own. The result was that casualties were heavy and
progress almost impossible. 2/Lieut. E. G. H. Bates, who was commanding
C Company, ran forward to try to rush the position, but was instantly
killed. C.S.M. F. Smith endeavoured immediately afterwards to do the
same thing, but was severely wounded. The only other officer in this
company was also wounded.
On the left, A Company’s fate was much the same, 2/Lieut. W. R. Heath
being killed and Lieut. M. Bowen wounded. A few N.C.O.’s and men of C
Company reached their objective on the extreme right, but all were at
once either killed or wounded, Sergt. S. G. Bishop alone getting back.
The remnants of the two companies had to lie out in No Man’s Land until
dark, during which time more became casualties through shell fire and
sniping.
Very great gallantry was displayed by the officers and N.C.O.’s, but the
losses in both companies were irreparable, coming on the heels of
previous fighting, and in 2/Lieutenants Bates and Heath the Battalion
lost two very able and gallant officers. No real gain resulted except
that we captured almost the whole of a diagonal trench running from our
centre to the enemy’s right, and on the left advanced our bomb-stop some
50 yards.
Out of a total of four officers and 150 other ranks who actually went
over the top, our casualties were:
_Officers._—Killed. 2/Lieut. E. G. H. Bates.
2/Lieut. W. R. Heath.
Wounded. Lieut. M. Bowen.
2/Lieut. H. M. Breton.
_Other ranks._—Killed—24.
Wounded—71.
Missing—13 (all subsequently presumed killed).
The Battalion spent three more nights in these trenches before being
relieved by the 5th Gloucesters on August 25. During this time every
effort was made to improve our position, and to gain certain points by
means of bombing attacks.
Some sort of revenge for the failure of the attack on the 23rd fell to
the Battalion early one morning, when an enemy relief was spotted coming
over the open and heavy casualties were inflicted on them with Lewis-gun
fire.
Constant patrols, too, were sent out at night and gathered much useful
information concerning the enemy’s dispositions, and a German prisoner,
belonging to the 28th I.R., confirmed much of this, and added more. This
information was handed over to the 5th Gloucesters, and assisted them in
making a most successful attack on the position on the 27th.
On the 28th the whole Division was relieved, and started moving back to
Bus-les-Artois via Hédauville, Forceville and Bertrancourt.
Throughout this month’s fighting on the Somme, the Battalion had been
greatly handicapped by a shortage of thoroughly trained men, more
especially in bombing and Lewis-gun work. Bombing had proved itself to
be all important in this kind of fighting, and it was really necessary
that every man, as far as possible, should be a trained bomber: merely
to have been taught to throw a Mills bomb was not sufficient. In
clearing Skyline Trench, eight bombing sections were absorbed in a few
hours through casualties and the manning of bomb-stops.
It was found essential to collect a very plentiful supply of bombs and
rifle grenades at several advanced dumps before bombing operations were
undertaken, for they were used up at an incredible rate. The
replenishing of these forward dumps was often a great difficulty, unless
a permanent party had been detailed for the purpose, as troops in
support, if they had been relieved recently from the front line, were
often far too exhausted to be detailed for carrying, which is one of the
most fatiguing duties a soldier has to perform.
It must be said, however, that although great importance was rightly
attached to bombing, it was found later that the men had come to rely
overmuch on this form of weapon, and were apt to forget that the rifle
is, and always will be, their main weapon of defence.
It would not be right to fail to add here some word of praise for our
gunners. Their shooting had by this time won the entire trust and
confidence of the Infantry. As for our own divisional gunners, they were
the best, and there was not a man in the ranks of the Battalion whose
_moral_ was not the better, when going forward to an attack, for the
knowledge that it was the 48th Divisional gunners who were supporting
him.
CHAPTER V
LE SARS—CAPPY
_September 1916 to March 1917_
We spent a week at Bus, before taking over trenches in front of
Beaumont-Hamel, The Battalion held these trenches for four days, without
any incident worthy of mention. The line here had not moved forward
during the Somme fighting, as the attack on July 1 had failed in that
sector, and no subsequent one had been delivered.
We had considered ourselves a little ill used in not being taken back
and given a proper rest, with the chance to refit after our recent
exertions, so our delight was great when, after spending a night or two
in Mailly-Maillet and a day in the Bois de Warnimont, we were moved back
to Beauval on September 11.
It was not the first time we had been in Beauval, and the Battalion was
becoming increasingly popular in that part of the town in which our
billets lay. As a billeting area, it was an ideally proportioned place,
holding without much difficulty an entire Brigade of Infantry. There
were good billets, good mess-rooms and a few shops, and the town lay
within easy reach of Doullens, where the shops were good. But the
training facilities were bad, as the land was a mass of crops, which we
had strict orders not to damage.
During the week we spent here, in addition to considerable drafts of
men, we received a reinforcement of no less than thirteen officers of
the Essex Regiment, who nearly all reported on the same day. The arrival
of all these officers, belonging to another regiment, was, it must be
admitted, something of a shock to us. The more credit to them then, when
within a very few days we realised we had struck oil and been sent a
most excellent batch of officers, many of whom afterwards greatly
distinguished themselves, both in and out of action.
After a week at Beauval, on September 19 the Battalion moved to
Berneuil, some nine miles distant, where the training area was decidedly
better, though the billets were not so good. Intensive training was the
order of the day, to such an extent indeed that many were only too glad
to be inoculated and get forty-eight hours off duty.
On September 30 a twenty-mile march took us to Coullemont, and, after
another move two days later to St. Amand, we found ourselves once again
in the Hébuterne trenches on October 5. They had changed but little,
though our disappointment was very great on finding that all the old
familiar names of trenches in the K sector had been scrapped and new
ones, all starting with the letter Y, substituted.
Rumour was rife that an attack was to be made on Gommecourt, and indeed
with excellent reason, for everything pointed to something of the kind
taking place at no very distant date. Orders for the attack soon made
their appearance, and on October 7 we were taken out of the line and
sent back to Souastre, about three miles behind, for a final “fatten
up.” Those who took part in that short march will not easily forget the
scene that the road presented. It was one endless stream of horse and
motor transport, moving up with every imaginable article on board. But,
after all this material had been brought up, and everything appeared to
be in readiness, the attack was postponed, and we were sent still
farther back to the village of Warlencourt. Here practice attacks of all
kinds were exercised until about the middle of the month, when the
Gommecourt attack was definitely given up and all orders cancelled.
This wandering about from place to place, spending a few days and
sometimes only a few hours in each, was becoming a little tiresome, and
we were not altogether sorry to find ourselves back in the line at the
beginning of November, having spent the remainder of October in
Warluzel, Talmas and La Houssoye. The part of the line to which we were
sent, namely Martinpuich and Le Sars, proved, however, anything but
pleasant; in fact, for a sector which was not taking part in active
operations, it was the most miserable one the Battalion ever occupied.
From all sides, our line was under the most complete observation by the
enemy—from Loupart Wood, Irles, the Butte de Warlencourt and other
places, and this observation extended several miles behind the line. The
trenches themselves were full of water and falling in; the ground all
round them was pitted with shell-holes, which also had filled with
water, whilst every track was deep in glutinous mud. Movement in the
dark was a nightmare, for it was impossible to struggle twenty yards
without falling into a shell-hole, getting soaked through and plastered
with mud. Ration-carrying parties, which had to manhandle the rations
for almost a mile over this kind of ground, had the most bitter
experiences; there were no landmarks, and men frequently lost themselves
for a whole night. To add to our difficulties, the enemy shelling,
particularly at night, was extremely heavy. His opportunities for
observation by day enabled him to mark down all the tracks which our
reliefs and carrying parties were in the habit of using by night, and to
shell them accordingly. He succeeded in making Le Sars quite
uninhabitable, by shelling it for the greater part of the day and night,
so that, as the place was of no tactical importance (the line running
some half-mile in front), it was left severely alone. Destremont Farm,
or rather the remains of it, which lay behind Le Sars, received the same
attention; but it contained two large cellars which no shells could
touch, and in these we quartered two platoons by day. This was the only
semblance of accommodation in the sector, and even Battalion
Headquarters had to be content with eight steps of a shaft of an
incomplete mined dugout, started by the Germans and consequently facing
the wrong way. These steps our Headquarters continued to occupy, for
lack of a “better ’ole,” even after a shell had landed in the entrance,
blocking it up, and imprisoning the Commanding Officer, the Adjutant and
Intelligence officers. Fortunately for them a meal happened to be long
overdue, and the batman who brought it discovered them in this plight.
The strain and exhaustion of the Battalion, especially when holding the
front line, were extreme, and the greatest difficulties were experienced
by company commanders, struggling to make out written reports at night
and endeavouring to prevent the appearance of “trench-foot” in their
companies.
[Illustration:
FRONT LINE COY. H.Q., LE SARS.
]
Reliefs varied, but on the average the Battalion were in the habit of
doing three days in the front trenches, three days in support trenches
and three days “at rest.” Rest, so called, but which one never found.
The camps lay round Contalmaison, and most unpleasant they were. The
enemy knew their location exactly, and shot at them with unerring
precision, usually having his greatest “hate” between midnight and 2
a.m., when a little sleep was helping us to forget, temporarily, the
vileness of it all. A camp of huts known as Acid Drop Camp used to catch
the worst of the shelling, and two huts received direct hits at night
whilst we were in occupation. In the other camps we were under canvas,
chilled to the marrow in cold November nights.
During the periods spent “at rest,” working parties were practically
continuous; as many as 200 men had often to be found by day and the same
number (if our strength allowed it) by night. Casualties were abnormally
heavy, considering the fact that no active operations were undertaken,
but the Battalion dealt most successfully with the trench-foot problem,
having only one case up to the end of December.
Our transport in this area was quartered close to Bécourt, which lay
some three miles behind Contalmaison, amongst a mass of old disused
trenches, surrounded by a sea of mud. The conditions under which the
transport lived, consequently, were miserable in the extreme, and it was
due largely to the never-failing energy of the transport officer,
Captain J. B. Hill, who organised the erection of standings for the
horses and shelters for the men, that living was made possible.
At this time there had been no leave open for some four months, so that
the survivors of the Somme fighting were getting pretty well worn out,
but after six weeks in the sector, the Division was relieved, and moved
back to Bécourt, where a fortnight, including Christmas Day, was spent.
Officers and men alike were determined to enjoy themselves thoroughly on
this day, despite the very unfavourable conditions, and it speaks highly
of the Quartermaster’s branch that every man had a good whack of turkey
with chestnut stuffing and vegetables.
On December 28 the Battalion moved about six miles west to the village
of Bresle, where the Brigade was inspected on January 6, 1917, by
Lieutenant-General Pulteney, commanding the IIIrd Corps.
A further move to Heilly took place on January 9, where we entrained at
3.30 a.m. for Oisemont, arriving there at 12 noon. Here we were billeted
in two small country villages, half a mile apart, A and B Companies
being in Forceville, and Battalion Headquarters, C and D Companies, and
the transport in Neuville. For three weeks most valuable training was
carried out, and sports and games greatly encouraged. In the latter the
Battalion distinguished itself by winning the Brigade football
competition, the Brigade cross-country steeplechase, and the majority of
events in the boxing competition. The weather was good during the whole
of this time, though a certain amount of snow fell.
On January 29 the Battalion entrained at Oisemont, preparatory to taking
over a new area from the French south of the Somme. The detrainment was
carried out at Cerisy, after nearly twelve hours’ travelling in icy cold
trucks. After spending three days at Hamel, we marched on February 2 to
Cappy, taking over what was known as Camp 56, on the Cappy-Eclusier
road, from a reserve battalion of the French. The few days we had here
were occupied in reconnoitring the new forward area, and vainly
endeavouring to extract a little heat from the French stoves which had
been left in the huts.
So long as the frost lasted the trenches in this area were excellent,
probably the best we had yet seen, but with the thaw, which made its
appearance towards the end of February, their condition became very bad.
The greatest possible precautions had once more to be taken to prevent
“trench-foot.” Arrangements were made for washing every man’s feet in a
special solution before the Battalion went into the line, and when in
the line, for rubbing the feet and supplying every man with a dry pair
of socks every twenty-four hours. Annoying as these precautions were to
carry out at the time, it must be said that the result fully justified
them, for we had only one further case of trench-foot during the
remainder of the winter, whereas many battalions suffered severely from
this disease.
The trenches held by the Division crossed the river Somme and faced
Péronne, half of the little village of Biaches being just included in
our line. The sector was a quiet one, and the only missile used by the
enemy which caused us any great inconvenience when we first took over,
was one known as a “blue pigeon.” It was a particularly effective form
of mortar, which made a sort of shrill whistle as it proceeded through
the air and caused us a considerable number of casualties.
Duration of tours in the trenches here was irregular, and the varying
portions of the line held by the Battalion are well illustrated by the
different elements of the whole of the 143rd Brigade to whom we handed
over when we were relieved on February 9.
Two left platoons on the Somme handed over to 1/8th Battalion Royal
Warwickshire Regiment;
Two right platoons on the Somme to 1/7th Battalion Royal Warwickshire
Regiment;
Garrison of Tr. Iglau and Battalion Headquarters to 1/5th Battalion
Royal Warwickshire Regiment;
Two platoons in Tr. Désirée to 1/6th Battalion Royal Warwickshire
Regiment.
This relief occupied the whole night and did not proceed too smoothly,
with the result that it was an irritated Commanding Officer who ordered
Battalion Headquarters to move off just as daylight was appearing.
Towards the middle of February the Brigade took over the right of the
Divisional line, north-east of the village of Barleux, which lay just
inside the German lines. During the month that the Battalion took turns
with the 7th Battalion Worcestershire Regiment in holding these
trenches, patrolling was very active, especially when it became known
that the enemy was evacuating his trenches farther north and effecting
an organised retreat to some line in rear. Shelling was heavy on both
sides, and on March 10 occurred one of the most unlucky events that had
yet befallen us. About 4 a.m. on this date, a gas shell, fired from a
German _Minenwerfer_, landed and exploded inside the entrance of the A
Company Headquarters’ dugout. There were at the time inside the dugout
three officers (Captain J. D. B. Warwick, 2/Lieutenant S. Wiseman,
2/Lieutenant R. B. Cooper-Smith), C.S.M. Watts, two corporals, five
orderlies, three signallers and four batmen. The first impression of
those inside (presumably caused by the flash of the shell) appears to
have been that the dugout was on fire, and a large dose of poison was
inhaled before they adjusted their box respirators, while those who were
asleep were killed without waking. Captain Warwick and 2/Lieutenant
Wiseman, believing that a gas attack was taking place, together with
their orderlies attempted to reach the front line, but the latter died
just as he reached his platoon and the former not long after. The fate
of the remaining occupants of the dugout was no less tragic, for, in
spite of the utmost efforts to save them, the majority died within an
hour of the bursting of the shell, and all were dead within six hours.
This sad event cannot be passed by without an allusion to No. 2535
Private Harry Topple, who was the company signaller on duty in the
dugout at the time when the shell burst. Being under the impression that
a gas attack was taking place, he refused to leave his post, and
continued to endeavour to obtain communication with Battalion
Headquarters, until forcibly dragged away by a rescue party half an hour
later. He died in the trenches near the dugout about 7 a.m. the same
day. By remaining at his post, this very gallant man undoubtedly
sacrificed his own life in the hope of saving others.
Two days after this D Company were severely shelled in Flaucourt, which
was the position of the reserve company, and suffered a number of
casualties.
Our rest billets were usually Camp 56 at Cappy; this occasioned a long
and weary march, usually taking place in the middle of the night, after
a six days’ tour in the line with a very inadequate ration of sleep. It
was in this camp that we received news—about March 17—that patrols sent
out by the Brigades holding the line had reported the enemy trenches
opposite to be unoccupied. The retirement on our front had begun.
CHAPTER VI
THE GERMAN RETIREMENT
_March to July 1917_
The excitement caused by the news of the enemy’s retirement may well be
imagined. The very idea of marching into his trenches without being
fired at seemed almost too good to be true, and the possibilities opened
up by the thought of marching for miles behind them appeared
incalculable. One was very apt to forget during those first few days
that the retirement was being carried out “according to plan,” which
meant that we could not pursue bald-headed the moment that we received
news.
[Illustration:
REPRODUCTION OF A FRENCH POSTCARD OF PÉRONNE AFTER GERMAN EVACUATION
IN MARCH 1917. (WITH CRUDE TRANSLATION!)
]
It was not, in fact, until March 20 that we received orders to move to
billets at Péronne, which town had been entered by the 143rd Infantry
Brigade on the previous day. The march through “No Man’s Land,” Biaches,
and over the pontoon bridge, just finished by the Royal Engineers at
Bazincourt, was one of exceptional interest. The area had been
completely cleared of all stores by the enemy before his departure, and
the most that one saw, in the way of material left behind, was a few
coils of barbed wire. Péronne presented the most awful of pictures,
being completely wrecked and a large portion of it still burning. An
earthquake could not have produced a more appalling effect or a scene of
greater chaos. House fronts in many cases had been blown completely out
and had fallen right across the street, so that one looked from the
street straight into the rooms of the houses. These rooms were bare of
all furniture, every stick of which had been either carried away by the
enemy or sent to Berlin as souvenirs. Everywhere lay huge masses of
rubble and paper, and the work of tidying up appeared to be well-nigh
hopeless. The only two buildings which remained more or less intact were
the Town Hall and the Castle, and these we guessed must be mined.
Battalion Headquarters were, however, billeted in the Castle for that
night, and the remainder of the Battalion in cellars on the north-west
side of the square. These cellars were selected, not from any idea of
possible bombardment, but because they provided the only shelter left,
and there was less fear of a wall falling on one there than above
ground.
At 6.30 a.m. on March 21, B, C and D Companies moved off to relieve the
1/8th Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment in the outpost line, which
then lay some three miles east of the town and embraced Doingt, Doingt
Woods and Courcelles Wood, from a point about 500 yards south of Bussu
to the Cologne River. In the afternoon, Battalion Headquarters and A
Company moved up from Péronne, the former taking up quarters in Doingt.
In the evening, a flying column, known as “Ward’s Column,” and composed,
roughly speaking, of one Infantry Brigade, drawn from elements of all
Brigades in the Division, moved forward through the outpost line to
Cartigny.
The line, which we took over on the 21st, remained the Divisional line
of resistance until the 26th, though places well forward were occupied
and held by us during this period. With the exception of a few Uhlans
who were at times visible in the distance, no enemy was seen, and we
were given a great opportunity of practising, in real earnest and yet
without molestation, open warfare, which was a complete novelty to us.
Mounted officers were enabled to visit their outposts on horseback, and
the free and open life, after trench warfare, was thoroughly
appreciated. On the evening of March 26 we moved forward to Tincourt,
taking over billets there from the 1/4th Battalion Oxford and Bucks
Light Infantry. This village had not been completely demolished like the
others, chiefly because it had been used by the enemy as a dumping
ground for civilians, who had been collected there from all farms and
villages in the neighbourhood. Our excitement at finding them was great,
as they were the first we had seen.
The following day, March 27, the Battalion took over the outpost line,
which now ran from Roisel (captured by 1/4th Battalion Oxford and Bucks
Light Infantry) to Villers-Faucon (exclusive), Battalion Headquarters
being at Hamel. At 5.30 in the afternoon, the 5th Cavalry Division
attacked and captured Villers-Faucon. At 7 p.m. that part of the line
covering Roisel was handed over to the 2/4th Battalion Lincolnshire
Regiment (59th Division), and B Company were dispatched to
Villers-Faucon to assist the cavalry, who, in taking this village, had
met with considerable opposition from the enemy rearguards, and suffered
a number of casualties from their machine guns.
The following day the enemy shelled the village pretty heavily with 77
mm’s, and 5·9’s, and after dark the cavalry were withdrawn, being
relieved by C Company. There can have been few darker or wetter nights
than this one. Telephone lines were cut, and communication forward
entirely broke down, owing to the difficulty of finding Company
Headquarters in the dense darkness. Strong patrols were sent forward at
dawn to ascertain whether the enemy were still holding St. Emilie, and
they were found to be there in considerable numbers.
In pouring rain on the 29th March, the Battalion marched back to
Cartigny at dusk, on relief by the 4th Battalion Gloucestershire
Regiment. Here we became part of what had been called “Ward’s Column,”
but was now known as “Dobbin’s Column.” After four happy days with this
column the Battalion was moved to Longavesnes, relieving the 1/4th
Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment in Brigade reserve. This village,
which had been attacked and captured by the 143rd Infantry Brigade on
the 26th, was absolutely devoid of any accommodation or shelter, so
completely had it been wrecked by the enemy and our shells.
On April 5, at 2 a.m., we marched to the railway cutting between
Villers-Faucon and St. Emilie, acting as reserve to the remainder of the
Brigade, who were to capture the villages of Lempire, Ronssoy and
Basse-Boulogne (Map No. 2), attacking as follows:
1/4th Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment, south and south-east of
Ronssoy and Basse-Boulogne;
1/4th Battalion Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, south-west end of
Ronssoy;
1/5th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment, the work-house, Lempire and
Basse-Boulogne.
Each of these battalions carried out the attack with three companies,
keeping one in battalion reserve. Zero was at 4.45 a.m. The operation
was completely successful, all objectives being taken, together with
over thirty prisoners and six machine guns. The German dead numbered
over 200. The prisoners, who belonged to the 237th Infantry Regiment,
stated that one platoon from each of their companies had been holding
the villages, but owing to our active patrolling the alarm had been
given at 11 o’clock that night and the support platoons had been brought
into the picquet line. They had received no orders to withdraw in case
of a heavy attack, and had been told to hold the position to the last.
All had the greatest confidence in the impregnability of the Hindenburg
Line, and, though they were obviously tired of the war, their _moral_
was not bad. They said that the Hindenburg Line near Bony had been
occupied since the 28th of last month, and that their next outpost line
ran in front of Tombois Farm and Malakoff Farm.
The Battalion moved back into Villers-Faucon for the remainder of the
day, officers being sent up to reconnoitre the new line, with a view to
relieving the 5th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment that evening. The
outpost line was held by A and B Companies, the 1/4th Battalion Royal
Berkshire Regiment being on the right, and 1/6th Battalion Royal
Warwickshire Regiment on the left. C Company were in support in cellars
in Basse-Boulogne, and D Company in reserve with Battalion Headquarters
in the railway cutting, just south of the Lempire-Epehy Road. The
transport and quartermaster’s stores had at this time been moved to the
neighbourhood of Villers-Faucon.
No counter-attack developed on that night or the two succeeding ones,
during which the Battalion held that line, and companies were occupied
in consolidating the whole position, which it was decided should be the
future Divisional line of resistance.
On the evening of April 7 we were relieved by the 1/7th Battalion
Worcestershire Regiment, and marched back to cellar accommodation in
Marquaix. Work was here concentrated on roads which the enemy had done
everything in his power to make impassable. Additional parties were sent
up to the outpost line on most nights, to help the forward battalions in
the work of wiring and digging of new trenches.
[Illustration:
PÉRONNE CHURCH.
]
[Illustration:
RONSSOY SUGAR FACTORY.
]
On April 15 the Battalion took over the line again, receiving orders at
the same time that we were to attack Tombois Farm on the following
night. (See Appendix I A.)
This farm lay on the southern side of the Lempire-Vendhuille Road (Map
No. 2), midway between the two villages, and about 1,000 yards from our
nearest sentry post. At dusk on April 16, A Company (Captain N. S. Reid,
D.S.O., M.C.) took over the whole of the Battalion outpost line,
relieving B and C Companies for the attack. On our right, the 1/4th
Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment were to capture Gillemont Farm, and
on our left, the 1/5th Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment were to
attack Catelet Copse and Le Petit Priel Farm.
C Company (Captain J. B. Hales) had orders to form up just west of Sart
Farm, and to direct their attack south and south-east of Tombois.
B Company (Lieutenant M. Bowen) were to form up on the northern side of
the Lempire-Vendhuille Road, clear of Lempire, and to deliver their
attack on the west and north of the farm; D Company (Captain R.
Gregson-Ellis) to proceed in echelon behind C Company, occupying the
trench in front of the farm, until satisfied that the leading companies
had attained their objectives, when they were to go through and capture
a small ridge lying some 200 yards beyond the farm.
Zero was fixed for 11.30 p.m., April 16.
The weather conditions could not conceivably have been more unfavourable
for a night attack, over open country, with few landmarks. It was
pitch-dark, with pouring rain, and a gale blowing in the direction of
the enemy. That the attacking companies were able to find their
forming-up position in such darkness was a creditable performance; that
they should have kept direction and struck Tombois speaks very highly
for their leaders.
At 11.45 p.m. the enemy opened with machine-gun and rifle fire, and sent
up a great number of lights from the farm and the trenches on either
side of it. They also put down a moderate barrage well behind our
attack, mostly on the outskirts of Lempire and on Sart Farm. All
companies encountered a thick belt of wire in front of the enemy
positions, which were strongly held, C and D Companies both being held
up by this wire, which it was impossible to negotiate in face of the
heavy enemy fire. All D Company’s officers had become casualties, and at
12.30 a.m. Captain Hales decided to withdraw both companies to Sart
Farm, and reform them there for another attack.
Meanwhile B Company, on the left, had attracted rather less rifle and
machine-gun fire than the other two companies, and had succeeded in
getting through a thinner belt of wire and penetrating the enemy
trenches at a point just north of where the trench crossed the road.
In consequence of the failure of the two right companies, and in view of
the fact that at that time no news had been received at Battalion
Headquarters of the success of B Company’s attack, three platoons of the
support company (1/5th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment) were ordered
to advance on the farm, one platoon each side of the road and one in
close support, in order to ascertain the situation as regards B Company
and, if necessary, to attack. They arrived at the farm to find B Company
in possession, but the enemy still holding out in the orchard south of
the farm. Our men were finding considerable difficulty in clearing the
orchard owing to the fire of the other two companies who had been held
up.
[Illustration:
MAP Nº. 2.
ATTACK ON TOMBOIS FARM
NIGHT 16/17 APRIL 1917.
]
By 3 a.m., however, both farm and orchard were clear, and a
counter-attack, launched by the enemy down the road, was successfully
broken up by B Company. C and D Companies, who had now reorganised, were
at once sent up to help in the work of consolidation, and trenches were
dug west of the road and north and east of the farm, Major A. B.
Lloyd-Baker going forward to organise this work.
News was received that the 1/4th Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment and
1/5th Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment had both failed to reach
their objectives, on account of wire and heavy enemy fire.
At daylight on April 17, the Battalion was holding three or four hundred
yards of trench on either side of the farm, with no sign of the enemy.
Strong patrols were sent out to right and left, with orders to occupy
every position possible, and by 7.30 a.m. one of these patrols,
consisting of a platoon of Gloucesters, succeeded in entering Le Petit
Priel Farm with little or no opposition. Another patrol from A Company
(holding the old line), which had been sent forward to ascertain the
left of our new line, found Catelet Copse unoccupied. This they reported
to the nearest picquet of the Warwicks, who moved up and occupied it.
It would seem that at dawn the enemy, realising that he had lost
Tombois, had decided to withdraw from the objectives which the battalion
on our left had fought hard all that night to gain.
At least thirty dead Germans were found in and around the farm, and our
captures were nine prisoners with one machine gun. Our casualties were:
_Officers._—Wounded. Capt. R. Gregson-Ellis
(died following day).
2/Lieut. J. Jack.
2/Lieut. N. S. Flint.
2/Lieut. B. C. C. Olivier.
2/Lieut. R. F. Chatham.
_Other ranks._—Killed—18.
Wounded—48.
The strengths of the attacking companies had been:
B Company—4 officers and 136 other ranks.
C Company—3 officers and 125 other ranks.
D Company—4 officers and 134 other ranks.
The following message was received from the Army Commander, General Sir
H. Rawlinson:
“Please convey to 48th Division my admiration of their success last
night. To have carried out a successful attack, on a wide front, in the
midst of such a storm, reflects the highest credit on all ranks and
especially on the leadership of subordinate commanders. My best
congratulations and thanks to all troops engaged.”
Tombois Farm, and the road running from the farm to Lempire, were
shelled throughout the day, making our occupation of the new position
and communication with the rear most unpleasant; but relief, in the
shape of the 1/5th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment, arrived that
evening, and we tramped back, very wet and weary, to a camp in the
neighbourhood of St. Emilie, only to be moved again two days later to
huts and billets in Villers-Faucon.
Numerous mines, laid by the enemy in his retreat, had recently exploded
in this village, the 1/6th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment being
unfortunate enough to lose the whole of their Battalion Headquarters,
including their Commanding Officer, 2nd in Command, Adjutant,
Intelligence Officer, Medical Officer, and a Chaplain attached to them.
The mine exploded underneath a large cellar where these officers were
all sleeping together. The Commanding Officer and Adjutant were brothers
who had come out with the Division in 1915, and had become well known
and popular. The result of this mishap was an order, issued by Division,
that no officers were to live in billets in the town, and huts were
erected to house them.
On the 24th and 25th April the 144th Infantry Brigade made further
attempts to capture Gillemont Farm, and these eventually proved
successful. With this exception, no further active operations were
undertaken by the Division in this area, and at the end of the month the
Division was relieved, the Battalion marching back via Hamel to billets
at Mons-en-Chaussée. Here we had ten days’ strenuous training, though as
usual this was partly interfered with by large working parties, which
had to be provided about every other day for road-mending and filling up
craters.
Those officers who were unable to ride—and there were at this time quite
a number—will not have forgotten their first experiences on a horse in
the fields behind this village. The Commanding Officer had been working
up a “hate” for a considerable time against these unlucky individuals,
and as he determined to be himself the riding master, the blow fell with
full force. The result, however, was splendid, and a month later all
officers in the Battalion were able to ride after a fashion.
Our ration strength at this time had fallen to 570 other ranks, and
though we were hoping to receive reinforcements here, none arrived. Our
officers numbered twenty-five, but many of them were always attending
courses, of which a large number were held continuously.
On May 11 the Battalion started on the first of a series of daily
marches up to a part of the line which we had not yet visited. These
marches, which took us through Flamicourt (one night), Cléry, Maurepas
(one night), Combles, Sailly-Saillisel, and Le Transloy (one night),
were of exceptional interest, embracing as they did such a large part of
the old Somme battle-fields. The roads had been entirely remade by the
British Army and were excellent, but with this exception the whole
country was one great stretch of shell-craters. Over all these acres and
acres of ground there was hardly a yard into which a shell had not
fallen. The sites of the villages through which we passed were marked
only by heaps of rubble, with a few charred tree-trunks standing like
weary sentinels over them. A smell of dead pervaded the whole
atmosphere.
On the night of May 14 we relieved the 7th Battalion South Staffordshire
Regiment, 33rd Infantry Brigade, 11th Division, in the line between
Hermies and Demicourt, the 143rd Brigade taking over the line on our
left and the 1/4th Royal Berkshire Regiment on our right.
The Division spent nearly two months in this sector, the 143rd Brigade
and 144th Brigade relieving each other on the left, and the 145th
Brigade carrying out its own reliefs on the right. As regards the
latter, two battalions held the line, a third was in support round the
village of Beaumetz, while the fourth battalion was in reserve in Vélu
Wood. The line held by the Bucks Battalion ran for the most part just in
front of the village of Hermies, and consisted of a series of
disconnected strong posts, separated from the enemy trenches by fifty
yards on the right and some 300 yards on the left. The Germans were
occupying the Hindenburg Line, their front trenches running mostly along
the eastern side of the Canal du Nord, just in front of the village of
Havrincourt, while opposite our left their line ran forward so as to
include a large spoil-heap. This mound formed a magnificent stronghold
for them and was a source of continual annoyance to us, harbouring as it
did several machine-gun nests with splendid observation over our lines.
Our right post, well known as R3, was situated on either side of the
Hermies-Havrincourt road, behind an old prisoners’ cage which had been
erected by the Germans before their retirement. Parties were at work
nearly every night during the whole of our period in this area, digging
trenches through and around this cage, to the intense displeasure of the
platoon commander in charge of the post, who always had the most
harrowing tales to tell in the evening of the hell which the garrison
had endured in R3 during the day! The post certainly caught the bulk of
the enemy trench-mortar and grenade fire, largely because of the close
proximity of the two front trenches, which were practically separated
only by the canal.
Artillery fire on points behind the lines was active on both sides, the
chief targets for the enemy being the villages of Hermies, Demicourt and
Beaumetz.
Aeroplane bombing, chiefly by night, was becoming increasingly popular
with the enemy, and one bomb, which fell on the quarters of a field
ambulance in Beaumetz, caused a number of casualties.
Our machine-gunners contracted a habit of pouring thousands of rounds of
small-arms ammunition into enemy country each night, hoping no doubt to
inconvenience the enemy infantry to an even greater extent than our own!
Only one operation, and this a small one, was undertaken by the
Battalion during its tenure of these trenches. It had become apparent at
the beginning of June that the enemy had established a night post
amongst a cluster of bushes on our bank of the canal. The sniping from
this post caused us considerable annoyance and some casualties to our
working parties. It was therefore decided to capture it, and to dig a
trench along the bank of the canal with a communicator running back to
our present post. Two platoons of B Company (Captain M. Bowen, M.C.)
were detailed to make the attack, forming up on a line parallel to the
canal bank, each platoon being in two lines at fifteen yards’ distance
and on a frontage of fifty yards. Zero was fixed for midnight June 7/8,
at which time a barrage from one section of field guns was placed on the
enemy trenches. At zero plus five this barrage lifted, and the
assaulting platoons charged with the bayonet. The enemy opened rifle
fire before the assault, but was most effectually silenced by a Lewis
gun posted on the right bank for the purpose of providing covering fire.
This fact was confirmed by an _Unteroffizier_ taken prisoner, who
declared that the Lewis-gun fire forced them to take shelter behind the
bank, and that the next thing they knew was that the English were on top
of them. After the assaulting platoons got in there ensued a bombing
fight which lasted for a few minutes, but the enemy soon gave in. No
attempt at a counter-attack was made, but rifle grenades were fired from
the opposite bank at intervals throughout the remainder of the night.
The report of this operation was afterwards issued for circulation
throughout the IVth Corps, with the following minute added:
“_To 20th Division, 48th Division, Corps Mounted Troops, Corps Schools._
“The Corps Commander considers this report should be circulated down to
company and battery commanders, as it is a good example of the
co-operation of all arms and of covering fire. The action of the Lewis
guns in driving the enemy to take cover and thus letting our troops get
in is especially good.”
Our casualties were two killed and nine wounded. Eleven prisoners were
taken by us and several of the enemy killed. The prisoners belonged to
the 41st Infantry Regiment and stated that the previous artillery
activity had led the picquet to expect an attack, and they had been
ordered to maintain the greatest vigilance. They believed that the post
in question was to have been finally withdrawn the following day as
being tactically unsound. The average _moral_ and physique of these men
was second-rate, and they declared that the longing for peace in all
classes was intense, the more so as it was firmly believed that the war
would end in a draw. One of these prisoners was of special interest, as
he had been on the Russian front in March, where he said there had been
much fraternising between Germans and Russians, to such an extent indeed
that whenever artillery shoots were planned each side warned the other
of the danger zone to be avoided.
Another prisoner, who was a N.C.O., stated that the cage which has been
mentioned above was called by them “Russenlager” (Russian Camp), because
Russian prisoners used to be interned there within the danger zone, as
an act of retaliation on the practice attributed to the English and
French of requiring German prisoners to work within the range of German
artillery.
On July 3 the Division was withdrawn from the line, the Battalion being
relieved by the 4th Battalion Royal Fusiliers, 9th Brigade, 3rd
Division. After a halt for one night at Vélu, we marched the two
following days via Bihucourt, Achiet-le-Grand, Adinfer and Ransart to
Bailleulval, where the most strenuous training was undertaken. Rumours
of an offensive to be started by the British Army in the Ypres area had
for some time been persistent, and it became increasingly evident during
the first few days of our stay in this village that the Battalion was
earmarked to take part in it.
Seconds in Command of battalions were detailed to attend a course at the
XVIIIth Corps School, with a view to learning the general scheme of the
operations and the rôles that the various Divisions in the Corps were to
play in them. Points which required further training were brought out,
but the special feature of the preparation was that every man should not
only know his own job thoroughly but also be made acquainted with the
jobs of all units near him, and not be “in the dark,” as had been
largely the case on previous occasions. In other words, secrecy was to
be to a great extent sacrificed with the hope of gaining greater
efficiency.
Various changes were made in the headquarter staffs of battalions in the
Brigade, and we had most regretfully to part with Major A. B.
Lloyd-Baker, who was transferred to the 1/4th Battalion Oxford and Bucks
Light Infantry as 2nd in Command, Captain P. A. Hall, M.C., being
promoted to fill his place as our own 2nd in Command.
Two drafts were received on July 12 and 15, one of 196 other ranks and
the other of 43 other ranks, which brought the Battalion ration strength
up to about twenty-five officers and 920 other ranks. Two most
instructive and interesting lectures were delivered by Major Hall, on
his return from the Corps School, to all officers and N.C.O.’s, and in
these he was able to state definitely the proposed objectives of the
48th Division.
The Second and Fifth Armies were to attack along the whole of their
fronts. Our XVIIIth Corps was in the Fifth Army, and included the 11th,
39th, 48th, and 51st Divisions. So far as this Corps was concerned, the
initial attack was to be made by the 39th Division on the right and the
51st Division on the left, with the 48th Division in reserve on the
right and 11th Division in reserve on the left.
The Corps front ran roughly from Wieltje to the Ypres-Staden railway.
The final objective on the first day was to include Pilkem Ridge on the
left and St. Julien on the right, from which line the other two
Divisions (11th and 48th) were to continue the attack, immediately guns
could be got forward.
Every arrangement appeared to be so thoroughly thought out that it
seemed impossible that the attack could be anything but a complete
success, the results of which would eventually give us back the whole
Belgian coast and, with any luck, finish the war.
CHAPTER VII
THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES
_August 1917_
_Reference Map No. 3._
At 5 a.m. on July 22 the Battalion left Bailleulval, marching to
Mondicourt station, where we breakfasted and entrained for Belgium.
After seven weary hours in the train we reached a village called
Godewaersvelde (pronounced by the men “God help us”), and detrained.
Hopes had been entertained that we might be allowed to pass the night
here, but instead we were given a four hours’ march to Houtkerque,
eventually arriving there at 12.30 a.m. It had been a long day, and we
were thankful to get into the very meagre accommodation that had been
allotted to us, though before doing so most of us felt compelled to
inform the billeting officer exactly how meagre we thought it. There
never was, and perhaps never will be, a more thankless job than
billeting, or one which bred unpopularity so certainly. The most
suitable officer was found to be a senior one, capable of being
intensely rude to anyone who showed signs of impoliteness to him.
Preparations for the coming battle reached their zenith during the week
at Houtkerque. In consequence of an order that every officer and N.C.O.
was to be in possession of a map of the battle area which would show at
a glance the objectives and contours, mapping became a disease, and the
most hideous productions in the way of colour schemes resulted.
It was laid down that the 2nd in Command, two company commanders, the
assistant adjutant, two company sergeant-majors, with a proportion of
platoon commanders and other ranks, should not be taken into action, but
left at Houtkerque, in order that the Battalion might be reorganised
quickly in the event of heavy casualties. This personnel was accordingly
left behind when, at midnight on July 30/31, we moved to St.
Jans-ter-Biezen, which lay just east of Poperinghe. No sooner had we
reached the camp here at 4 a.m. than all the guns of the two attacking
armies opened fire, and the Third Battle of Ypres had begun.
An intense desire for news of the attack filled the whole of that day.
The weather was dull and cloudy, and towards evening rain fell, which
continued unceasingly throughout the night. Official communiqués from
General Headquarters informed us that the first three objectives had
been gained, but, although it was not so stated, we inferred that our
casualties had been heavy. This was confirmed when, on the following
day, we were ordered to send one company (C) up to the line to assist
the 39th Division in bringing in their wounded.
The rain continued in torrents during the whole of that day and the
next, and the prospect of the operations being successful and working to
plan grew dimmer and dimmer.
Reports from the line of conditions which prevailed there were
depressing in the extreme. The whole area had become a quagmire, and the
task of moving up guns an impossibility. Never had such appalling
weather made its appearance at such an unfortunate time.
A continuance of the operations was therefore postponed until such time
as the guns could be shifted and the movement of troops became possible.
The enemy meanwhile was presented with a priceless opportunity of
reorganising, bringing up reinforcements, and making new positions
preparatory to our next onslaught. He was, moreover, being driven back
on to comparatively clean ground, while our armies were moving forward
on to ground which had been shelled by our own guns for months past, and
where roads no longer existed. For three days we watched the pouring
rain and cursed the British Army’s luck.
On August 4 the Battalion moved through Poperinghe to a spot known as
Dambre Camp, which lay about a mile north of Vlamertinghe. After a day’s
reconnaissance of the line, the Battalion relieved the 1/1st
Hertfordshire Regiment and a battalion of the Cheshire Regiment in
support. These two battalions had suffered heavily in the attack and
were dead-beat.
We found the conditions which prevailed even worse than the reports had
led us to believe, for in addition to the sea of mud, which made
movement almost impossible, enemy shelling was constant. Communication
with companies was difficult in the extreme, as telephone wires were cut
by shelling almost as soon as they were laid. At night, orderlies had a
really terrible task, often under heavy shell-fire, to find the
Headquarters of the Battalion and various companies. We were most
fortunate to possess men so extraordinarily efficient for this ordeal,
and it is safe to say that no body of men in the Battalion deserve more
credit and praise for their magnificent work in the Ypres fighting than
these runners. It was invariably of the most vital nature, including not
only the carrying of important messages, but also the guiding of reliefs
and ration parties. Rations, which had to be brought up to the line on
pack animals (ponies and mules), were the cause of constant anxiety, and
no one who has not accompanied those animals on a pitch-dark night,
across open country pitted with shell-holes and with mud nearly to the
knees, knows what difficulties the pack leaders experienced. Only too
often an animal was killed on the way up, and its load had to be taken
off and reloaded on to another, in the dark, with no possibility of
showing a light.
It must not be imagined that our own artillery were quiet during these
times—far from it. The majority of the guns were in position alongside a
road or track, known as “Admiral’s Road,” which ran, roughly speaking,
through the old “No Man’s Land.” Their positions were necessarily much
exposed, and consequently received the enemy’s earnest attention at
frequent intervals throughout the day and night. This, however, did not
prevent them from throwing back quite as much “stuff” as was hurled at
us, and although conditions underfoot were easier behind the German
lines, the enemy opposite us must have had a very thin time of it. His
nervousness was most apparent at dawn and dusk, when he would often send
up his S.O.S. signal for no good reason and put down an intense barrage.
On several occasions our own gunners replied heatedly, thinking that an
attack was on foot, and a terrific artillery duel would ensue, all owing
to a misapprehension.
It was in this area too that we first made our acquaintance with the
German concrete blockhouse. The large majority of these constructions
had stood the test of the bombardment which preceded our original
attack, and they now provided a few headquarters with good cover; but
the insides of these blockhouses were in most cases too filthy for
words, and several of them were half filled with stagnant water. Cover,
however, was cover, and to get it one was prepared to put up with a good
deal.
[Illustration:
CHEDDAR VILLA, ST. JULIEN.
]
On August 7 the Battalion relieved the 5th Gloucester Regiment in the
front line, on the western outskirts of St. Julien (Map No. 3). A and B
Companies held this outpost line, while C Company was in support round
Canopus Trench, and D Company in reserve in California Drive and
Falkenhayn Redoubt. Battalion Headquarters was at Vanheule Farm, which
now consisted only of a flooded blockhouse. D Company Headquarters, with
one platoon and the Regimental Aid Post, occupied Cheddar Villa, which
was a superior blockhouse to Vanheule, except that the Germans, when
they built it, had made a particularly large entrance which, now that it
was in our hands, was completely exposed to enemy shells. The
accommodation being very limited, the platoon were, on the first night,
packed closely inside the opening trying to get a little sleep. The very
first shell which landed near the blockhouse arrived straight through
the opening and burst in the midst of the slumbering platoon. The effect
was appalling—many were killed, and of those who were not killed,
several lost limbs, many their legs. Happily the Medical Officer
(Captain L. E. Hughes) was unhurt, and, as usual on such occasions,
excelled himself in the relief he gave and the amount of work he
accomplished in the next few hours.
We were relieved on the following night by the 1/5th Battalion Royal
Warwickshire Regiment, and moved back to Dambre Camp. The march from the
line was exceedingly unpleasant, for the Battalion was literally chased
out by shells of the 5·9 variety.
Considering that no active operations had taken place, and that the
Battalion had only been twenty-four hours in the front line, with
forty-eight hours in reserve, our casualties for the tour, amounting to
two officers and sixty-seven other ranks, were certainly heavy, and they
give a fair idea of the daily wastage due to shelling.
The weather had again turned wet, and, although it was known that the
attack was to be resumed at the earliest favourable opportunity, it was
not until the 13th that we got definite orders. From these, it
transpired that the attack was to be carried on along the whole front of
the Second and Fifth Armies, and that the XVIIIth Corps was to employ
the 11th and 48th Divisions. The objective, so far as the 145th Infantry
Brigade was concerned, was the high ground overlooking the valley of the
Stroombeek; the order of battle of this Brigade was the 1/5th Battalion
Gloucestershire Regiment on the right, the 1st Bucks Battalion in the
centre, the 1/4th Battalion Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry on the left,
with the 1/4th Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment in Brigade reserve.
The British front line on the Brigade front lay immediately west of the
Steenbeek, whilst the Germans were holding a line consisting of
organised shell-holes and reinforced houses, along the ridge 200 yards
east of the stream.
Full orders for the Battalion attack and the artillery programme are
given in Appendix IB; it will therefore be sufficient here to say that
the Battalion was to form up for the attack west of the Steenbeek, on a
front of 500 yards immediately north of the St. Julien bridge (Map No.
3). The formation was to be: two companies in front, A (Captain G. R. F.
Knight) on the left and B (2/Lieutenant E. H. Fawcitt) on the right,
each in two waves of two platoons, with C (Captain G. V. Neave) and D
(Captain H. J. Pullman) in artillery formation behind right and left
respectively.
Tanks were to have co-operated, but, owing to the waterlogged state of
the ground, were counter-ordered at the last moment.
On the morning of August 15, the Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel L. L. C.
Reynolds, D.S.O.) marched from Dambre Camp to the canal bank. Here the
afternoon was spent, and at 9.30 p.m. we began to move to the forming-up
positions. It proved a most trying march, the greater part of the route
being over ground a mass of shell-holes full of water, the night
pitch-dark and enemy shelling heavy. There was, or had been, a
trench-board track to guide us part of the way, but this did not help
much, as in many places it had been completely blown away by shells.
With nothing else to aid us in keeping direction, it was no real wonder
that three platoons of C Company lost their way and failed to turn up in
time to take part in the initial assault. The remainder of the Battalion
reached the forming-up positions and were ready twenty minutes before
zero, which was fixed for 4.45 a.m. on August 16, 1917.
At zero minus seven minutes, the two leading companies moved forward to
cross the Steenbeek. At zero, the artillery barrage was put down 200
yards east of the stream and timed to creep forward at the rate of 100
yards every five minutes. The “going” was very bad indeed, as the ground
was a mass of shell-craters and there were but few signs of dawn
breaking. The result was that the barrage lifted off the enemy forward
position before our leading wave could get up to it. A very heavy
machine-gun fire was opened by the enemy from his concrete emplacements,
and this was quickly reinforced by considerable rifle fire from his
shell-hole positions. The fire almost entirely annihilated the leading
wave of the right company, who instantly lost two out of their three
officers. The second wave closed up and engaged the enemy with fire,
while parties worked round the flanks, but the enemy kept up a very
strong resistance, and until the leading platoons of D Company closed up
and charged with the bayonet they showed no signs of giving in. This
charge by the third wave was followed by a bout of hand-to-hand fighting
around the blockhouses on the Hillock Farm-St. Julien road, until the
garrison of one blockhouse put up their hands. After this the other
garrisons soon followed suit. This was the situation on the right about
6 a.m.
The remains of B and D Companies were then quickly reorganised and
pushed on in an attempt to overtake our barrage, which had by this time
got well ahead of them. They could only succeed in advancing some 300
yards north-east of the outskirts of St. Julien, where they were
confronted by a large sheet of water, with a blockhouse and two gunpits
on the far side held by machine guns and riflemen. Every attempt made by
these companies to get forward was stopped by a heavy cross-fire from
these positions and others on the left.
[Illustration:
THE STEENBEEK.
]
[Illustration:
THE BATTLE-FIELD NEAR ST. JULIEN, YPRES.
]
The left leading company (A) met with less resistance at first, but on
topping the slight ridge above the Steenbeek they came under a heavy
cross-fire from Hillock Farm and two old gunpits west of it, as well as
from positions away to their left, in front of the left Battalion, who
had been held up close to the Steenbeck. The leading wave reached the
gunpits with only sixteen men left. The second wave closed up, but its
left platoon was completely stopped by fire from the direction of Maison
du Hibou and Triangle Farm. The right platoon, carrying out their
orders, continued the attack with the remains of the leading wave and
succeeded in reaching their objective at Springfield at about 6.45 a.m.
Many, however, were seen to fall as they passed Hillock Farm, and very
few could actually have reached Springfield. After the first rush by
this gallant party, every effort was made to reach the place and afford
them assistance, but each attempt met with failure and many casualties,
and at 9 a.m. the enemy were seen to rush the house, three or four of
our men being afterwards led away.
At 7 a.m. Battalion Headquarters was established in a blockhouse on the
west side of the Hillock Farm-St. Julien road, and made itself
responsible for that road, whilst the other troops that remained were
sent to reinforce the more forward position on the right. In the
meantime the 5th Gloucesters on the right had got about 300 yards west
of the Steenbeek, where they too were finally held up.
Soon after 8 a.m. the enemy were seen coming over the ridge north of
Springfield in considerable numbers and collecting in a trench below it.
As by this time we had no communication with the artillery, this massing
by the enemy continued, whilst our companies were hastily reorganised
for defence, and three Vickers guns brought into suitable positions. One
platoon of the 1/4th Royal Berks was also got up and placed so as to
protect our left flank, which was quite in the air.
At 9 a.m. three thick waves of the enemy were seen to move down towards
Triangle Farm, where they got under cover. At 10 a.m. the enemy
counter-attacked us heavily from this farm and from each side of it. The
fire from our machine guns, Lewis guns and rifles was, however, too much
for them, for after a short time they commenced to retire over the ridge
by which they had come.
Sniping and machine-gun fire were brisk throughout the day, and we had
several casualties, mostly in the neighbourhood of Hillock Farm, where
our men had little cover and the slightest movement was visible to the
enemy.
At 7.30 p.m., as it was getting dusk, about a hundred Germans attempted
to rush the gunpits we were holding on the left, but they were stopped
and suffered heavily. No further counter-attack occurred until 9.30
p.m., when the enemy again launched a surprise attack from the direction
of Triangle Farm, and succeeded on this occasion in driving in our posts
very slightly round Hillock Farm.
Reconnoitring patrols, sent out during the night, reported the enemy to
be holding the line of the Springfield road.
Owing to enemy sniping, it had been found quite impossible to collect
the wounded during the day, and a great amount of searching and clearing
had to be done that night. Enemy dead lay along the Hillock Farm road in
large numbers, the majority having been bayoneted.
The captures by the Battalion were:
80 prisoners (mostly 7th Bavarian Infantry Regiment).
1 field gun.
3 machine guns.
Large quantities of equipment and medical stores were also taken.
The attack proved that our barrage had no effect whatever on the
garrisons of concrete blockhouses, and that for future operations it was
essential that these houses should be dealt with by the “heavies” prior
to any assault.
For such a comparatively small advance, it had been a costly attack,
but, as our flanks even now were largely in the air, it is difficult to
see how we could have maintained positions farther forward, had we been
able to reach them.
Our casualties were:
_Officers._—Killed. Capt. G. V. Neave.
Capt. G. R. F. Knight.
Wounded. Lieut. F. D. Ollard.
2/Lieut. F. M. Passmore.
2/Lieut. G. A. Johnston.
2/Lieut. E. H. Fawcitt.
2/Lieut. R. E. Norman.
2/Lieut. A. T. Moyle.
2/Lieut. F. C. Marshall.
_Other Ranks._—Killed—54.
Wounded—193.
Missing—35 (14 afterwards reported prisoners of war).
2/Lieutenant G. A. Johnston showed remarkable gallantry during this
action, in which he was very seriously wounded.
The Battalion was relieved the following evening by the 6th Battalion
Royal Warwickshire Regiment, and as a result of this action the
following congratulatory messages were received:
“_To the General Officer Commanding 145th Infantry Brigade._ August 19,
1917.
“In case the exigencies of the service prevent me visiting your
battalions to-day, please tell them that I appreciate very much the
stubborn and determined fighting spirit shown by you, and your officers
and men, in the battle on the 16th. Although the fortunes of war, in the
form of concrete shelters and an unexpectedly strong preliminary
position, prevented us from gaining more than a portion of the
objectives we want, we made a very valuable improvement to our position
for future progress. Besides the capture of over 100 prisoners, very
severe loss was inflicted on the Germans, one small field gun and
several machine guns were captured.
“It is not the mere capture of positions which is going to bring us the
final victory, but the determined fighting, in spite of all
difficulties, like that of the Bucks Battalion, which shows the enemy
that he is beaten and cannot hope to beat us and must give in.
“I have the fullest confidence in your Brigade, and know that they will
continue to fight with the same spirit with which they have always done,
in spite of difficulties.—(_Signed_) R. FANSHAWE, _Major-General_.”
“_To General Sir H. de la P. Gough, K.C.V.O., K.C.B., Commanding Fifth
Army._
“I wish to congratulate you personally, as well as the commanders,
staffs and troops under your command, most warmly, on the successes
gained by the Fifth Army yesterday, under conditions of great difficulty
and in the face of the most determined opposition.
“The bad weather, which delayed the continuance of our offensive,
enabled the enemy to bring up and concentrate considerable forces in
reserve, and to make careful preparations to meet our attack yesterday.
In spite of this, the determination and gallantry of the troops under
your command succeeded in striking another of the successful blows, the
cumulative effects of which are shattering the enemy’s power of
resistance and will ultimately lead to his complete defeat.—(_Signed_)
D. HAIG, _Field-Marshal_.”
Eight days’ rest in Dambre Camp was allowed us, before we again moved up
to the line to take part in further operations. This time it was the
turn of the 143rd and 144th Brigades to attack, the former on the right,
the latter on the left, their objective being the red line shown on Map
No. 3.
[Illustration:
MAP Nº. 3.
THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES
JULY TO OCTOBER 1917.
]
The 145th Brigade was to be in reserve until zero plus five hours, when
it was to move through the leading brigades, and capture the line of
farms included by the dotted blue line (Map No. 3). So far as this
Brigade was concerned, the 1/4th Royal Berks and 1/4th Oxford and Bucks
Light Infantry were to leave the canal bank at zero, move across country
to assembly positions about the green line, and be ready to carry out
the attack on the dotted blue line at zero plus five hours. The 1/5th
Gloucesters and the Bucks Battalion were to leave the canal bank at zero
plus three hours, and move to the assembly positions vacated by the
other two battalions.
Zero was fixed for 1.55 p.m. August 27, 1917. At 4.55 p.m. the head of
the Battalion, marching by platoons, passed the canal bank. There
appeared to be every prospect of a thoroughly disagreeable march, as
shells are never so plentiful as during the few hours succeeding an
attack, but we were most fortunate, for the Steenbeek was reached with
hardly a casualty. The ground, however, between that stream and the
Triangle Farm-St. Julien road was being very heavily shelled. This
caused us casualties, but they were few compared with the immense number
of shells falling around us. This was largely due to the state of the
ground, which, whilst so deep in mud as to make progress almost
impossible for us, minimised the resistance to the bursting shells and
so diminished the force of their explosion.
Heavy rain had fallen throughout the previous night, with the result
that the battle area was nothing more or less than a sea of mud. Many
who were wounded and fell got sucked in, and were not discovered till
long afterwards, often when it was too late.
The situation on our arrival was most obscure, but it was evident that
very little, if any, progress had been made by the two leading brigades.
It had been a case of pulling one foot out of the mud and putting the
other in, whilst the enemy took full advantage of the weary process and
shot hard at good and slowly moving targets. Rifles, bombs and Lewis
guns became coated with muddy slime, which quickly put them out of
action. Apart from this, the way was perilous in the extreme. Under such
conditions the task set was impossible of achievement, and further
progress was out of the question. The only real gain was the capture of
Springfield by the 1/8th Battalion Worcestershire Regiment.
The night, passed in the neighbourhood of Maison du Hibou, was intensely
dark; the evacuation of wounded presented even greater difficulties than
on the 16th, and at least eight men to a stretcher were found to be
necessary.
The following day, August 28, the whole Division was relieved in the
line, the Bucks Battalion handing over to the 2/7th Battalion London
Regiment.
CHAPTER VIII
THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES—VIMY
_September to Mid-November 1917_
In our joy to be rid of the Ypres area, we began at once to entertain
hopes of never seeing it again. Vain hopes, for we were back again in
under a month.
The first fortnight of our rest and preparations for future offensives
was spent in camp close to St. Janster-Biezen. This was not sufficiently
far behind the line to be entirely clear of the war, for enemy bombing
planes paid us a most unwelcome visit every night that the weather was
fine, and the Division suffered quite a number of casualties through
them.
Leave reopened at once in a very fairly generous way, and everything
that could be effected to make life more possible was done. Training was
more important than anything, but this was completed in four and a half
hours in the morning, and the afternoon and evening were given up to
games. On one of these afternoons a number of officers and men of our
2nd line Battalion visited us, this being the first occasion on which
the two Battalions had had any good opportunity of seeing each other
since our second line came out.
Before we moved from this camp no fewer than thirteen officers had
joined the Battalion as reinforcements, from the 1st Battalion Artists
Rifles.
Our next move was carried out by train on September 16, the Battalion
entraining at Abeele and detraining at Audruicq (north-west of St.
Omer), whence a twelve-mile march brought us to Licques. Here the
billets were excellent, as they had not been used as such before; and
with the country and weather perfect, the rest promised to be all that
one could desire. The training area included an excellent field-firing
range, and in a company competition held throughout the Division C
Company succeeded in gaining second place. A most successful Brigade
horse show was also held on September 23, and the Battalion carried off
more than its fair share of prizes.
The days in fact went all too quickly, and it was with feelings of
genuine regret that we left the place at two o’clock on the morning of
September 27, and, entraining at Audruicq, found ourselves at our old
friend the canal bank on the same afternoon. Here we stayed for three
days in reserve to the remainder of the Brigade, which had taken over
the old divisional front close to St. Julien.
On our taking over the line from the 1/4th Battalion Oxford and Bucks
Light Infantry on the night of September 30–October 1, it appeared that
an appreciable though not very large advance had been made in our
absence. The farms which we had seen so often on the map, but which
wanted so much taking, namely, Hubner, Genoa, Von Tirpitz and the
others, were at last ours, and the front line now ran along Cemetery
Trench just in front of Quebec, and thence due south. The enemy shelling
was as heavy as ever, especially at night, when the whole front area as
far back as the Steenbeek became most “unhealthy.” The ground at this
time was not quite at its worst, but this was sure to be the case when
no attack was in progress. It was only necessary for the 1/6th and 1/7th
Battalions Royal Warwickshire Regiment to march up and relieve us, with
a view to attacking the following morning, for the rain to come down in
torrents. The Battalion was ordered to leave one company in the line to
act as an outpost company during the forming up and first phase of the
attack to be made by the Royal Warwicks, the remainder of the Battalion
moving back to a camp about half a mile behind the canal bank.
The objectives of this attack were: 1st—Tweed House, York and Winchester
Farms, and Albatross Farm; 2nd—County cross-roads, Vacher Farm and Burns
House (Map No. 3).
Divisions on the right and left were co-operating, and zero was fixed
for 6 a.m., October 4.
The whole of the first objective was gained by 8.30 a.m. The second
objective, excepting Vacher Farm and Burns House, was captured by 10.30
a.m. Three officers and about 320 other ranks belonging to the 369th,
370th and 371st German Infantry Regiments were taken prisoners, and two
anti-tank guns and numerous machine guns captured.
The attack in fact was successful, and, provided that we could be spared
a little fine weather, there appeared reasonable prospects of our being
able to make some substantial progress. On the 5th, however, it rained
off and on all day; on the 6th it came down in torrents without ceasing;
and on the 7th, when we were moved back to Dambre Camp, there were
frequent heavy showers. We had not been two hours in this camp before we
were warned to get ready to leave again for the line in relief of the
6th and 7th Royal Warwicks, who were dead-beat, soaked to the skin and
plastered from head to foot in mud. Sorry as we were for those in the
line, we were none too well pleased at the prospect of going in again
ourselves, especially as we had been marching hard in the opposite
direction within the last two hours. Our feelings, however, were
distinctly appeased on finding that we were to have a fleet of motor
buses to take us up. These took us as far as Wieltje, where we debussed,
proceeding by platoons up to the line via St. Julien. The relief was
much complicated by the extreme darkness of the night and the
indescribable condition of the forward area; in fact it was not until 2
a.m. that the relief was complete.
The Battalion dispositions then were (Map No. 3):
Battalion Headquarters—Hubner Farm.
C Company (front line)—Terrier Farm, County cross-roads, Cemetery.
B Company (front line)—Cemetery, Trench 400 yards east of Winchester
Farm.
D Company (support)—In front of Tweed House.
A Company (support)—By York Farm.
The 11th Division were on the left, and the 1/4th Royal Berks on the
right.
Shelling throughout the night was heavy, and towards dawn the rain once
again came down in great lumps. About 4 p.m. the Battalion received
notice that it would be relieved during the evening by the 1/4th
Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment on the left and the 1/6th Battalion
of the same regiment on the right, and that these two battalions in
conjunction with other Divisions on their flanks would attack at dawn.
The relief of the right by the 1/6th Gloucesters was a comparatively
easy matter, as trench boards had been laid almost up to the front. The
relief of the left was a very different affair, and turned out to be a
perfect nightmare. No trench boards had been laid in that direction from
Hubner, and the road shown as leading past Quebec Farm and Tweed House
had long ceased to exist and had become amalgamated with the general
quagmire which swamped the whole area. Tweed and Quebec existed as spots
on the map, but were not there to be identified on the ground.
As we had only been in the area some twenty hours, during the greater
part of which time it had been light and no movement had consequently
been possible, guides who could really find their way without landmarks,
in pitch darkness and with the rain teeming down, were very scarce. One
had, however, been found for each platoon of the 1/4th Gloucesters, and
some idea of the conditions will be obtained when it is said that this
number proved wholly insufficient. It was impossible to walk twelve
yards without either falling into a shell-hole or getting stuck fast in
the mud, so that touch was constantly being lost between one man and the
next. By 3 a.m. a few incomplete platoons of the 4th Gloucestershire
Regiment had reached their assembly positions, many more were lost, and
some had, after being lost, found their way back to Hubner and were
wanting fresh guides. Nevertheless by zero we just succeeded in getting
the majority of that Battalion to its positions, and this was largely
due to the untiring efforts of two of our runners, by name L/Cpl. H. E.
Collins and Pte. W. W. Cattell.
By zero the Battalion, with the exception of an outpost company (which
had been left in the line to cover the forming up of the attacking
Battalion), was concentrated round Cheddar Villa in divisional reserve.
Zero was at 5.20 a.m., October 9. Although the rain ceased just before
this time, the condition of the ground was such as to render the chances
of a successful attack exceedingly small, if not quite impossible, but
the progress actually made was considerably greater than expected,
though casualties were heavy.
On the evening of October 10, the Division was relieved in the line by
the 9th Division, and the Battalion left the Ypres battle area for good,
being carried back to Dambre Camp from Wieltje in motor lorries. On
leaving the Ypres sector the Divisional Commander received the following
message from General Gough, commanding the Fifth Army:
“The 48th Division have taken part in much hard fighting during the past
two months, including five general engagements. Their spirit and
determination on all occasions have been admirable, and temporary
setbacks have in no way affected their _moral_. I am very sorry to bid
good-bye to such a dependable division and feel sure that the future
holds many further successes for them.”
After a twenty-four hours’ halt at Dambre Camp and forty-eight hours at
St. Jans-ter-Biezen, the Battalion entrained at Hopoutre on the evening
of October 14, and proceeded by rail to Ligny-St. Flochiel, just east of
St. Pol. Breakfasts were eaten here before we started on a long march to
Mesnil-Bouché; after three days there we moved to Villers-au-Bois, where
the remainder of the month was spent.
The Division had now come under the orders of the Vth Corps, taking the
place of the 2nd Canadian Division. As usual on our arrival in a new
area, statements of impending operations were prevalent, and it was now
freely rumoured that the corps was to take Lens before Christmas.
Nothing tangible, however, pointed to any such offensive, and when, on
November 1, the Battalion went into the line in front of Vimy, it became
clear that we had taken over some very good and reasonably quiet
trenches. Our chief occupation in this part of the line was preparing
trenches for the coming winter. That we were successful in this respect
is proved by the following message, received by the Division after its
withdrawal from the line in the middle of November, on relief again by
the 2nd Canadian Division:
“On my own behalf and on behalf of the troops under my command, I would
be glad if you would cause to be conveyed to the G.O.C. 48th Division,
an appreciation of the excellent work carried out in this area by the
troops under his command during the period between 18th October and 18th
November. The erection of the four Battalion camps in Neuville-St. Vaast
has been so exceptionally well carried out that the G.O.C. 2nd Canadian
Division reports that his troops have never been housed in greater
comfort. The amount of work in the forward area, and the thoroughness
with which it has been carried out, bear testimony to the unremitting
labour and zeal of all concerned.
“(_Sd._) A. W. CURRIE, _Lieutenant-General_
“_Cdg. Canadian Corps._”
When the 48th Division took over the Vimy sector, everything seemed to
point to our settling down there for the winter; consequently, it was
with considerable surprise, not unmixed with regret, that we heard we
were to be withdrawn.
Speculation of the wildest sort was rife as to our destination. Every
sphere of operations, from Russia to German East Africa, was suggested.
But the bulk of opinion, fully conscious of the gravity of the situation
in Italy, inclined to consider this as our probable destination,
although a good many believed a move to the Cambrai area more probable,
as whispers of an impending offensive in that neighbourhood were
beginning to reach us.
The situation, however, did not remain doubtful very long. When the
Division reached the Aubigny area (November 14), where we were given a
fortnight to refit, the fact that we were intended for Italy had become
fairly common knowledge. The news, on the whole, was welcomed. That life
on the Western front was thoroughly unpleasant and precarious we knew;
but Italy, despite the long months’ disasters, only seemed to call up
visions of sunshine, blue skies, and a general atmosphere of _dolce far
niente_.
CHAPTER IX
ITALY
_Mid-November 1917 to April 1918_
It was in excellent spirits therefore that the move was begun, in spite
of the obscurity of the military situation in Italy, and the prospects
of immediate fighting of the unpleasant rearguard type. Our cheerfulness
was amply justified, and the journey itself proved to be one of the most
magnificent holidays the Battalion ever had. It was accomplished in two
trains, which followed each other at about twelve hours’ interval: the
first containing half Battalion Headquarters (Commanding Officer,
Adjutant and Transport Officer), Transport, and A and C Companies; the
second containing the other half of Headquarters (second in Command,
Assistant Adjutant, Medical Officer and Intelligence Officer), and B and
D Companies.
The first half of the Battalion marched out of Tinques at 9 p.m. on
November 23, 1917, and entrained at Savy, leaving about midnight. The
second half left Tinques at 6 a.m. the next day, and pulled out of Savy
about 9 a.m.
The route followed by both trains on the journey was the same, and the
following names will indicate the line taken: Arras, Achiet-le-Grand,
Albert, Amiens, Dijon, Pierrelatte, Avignon, Marseilles, Nice, Voghera,
Piacenza, Bologna, and thence north to the Mantua and Este line.
The total time spent on the journey was six days. The experiences were
very much the same in both trains, which ran most of the time within a
very few hours of each other; the account of one train’s week will
therefore suffice to cover the history of both.
On November 24 the train passed, in bright sunny weather, through the
Ancre Valley and Albert, which we had last seen on our way out of the
hideous Le Sars sector about a year previously. Thence through Amiens,
and on south towards Paris, round which we skirted at dusk.
The train was unusually commodious, there being enough of the usual
cattle-trucks for the men to allow of something narrowly approaching
comfort, while the officers were three to a compartment, so that if one
slept on the floor, all of them could get a comfortable night’s rest. In
addition, there were a certain number of flats, which were not needed
for our transport vehicles, but which afforded superb observation on
sunny days. Comfort became almost a fine art. Every time the train
stopped the men seemed to have a meal, as not only did the cooks achieve
marvels on the cookers, which were at full blast all the day long, but
also there were numerous _halte-repas_, at which hot water was always
available, and, often enough, tea or coffee. As for the officers, they
lived in that luxury which is only achieved by mess cooks when there is
no facility for it. Adequate supplies had, of course, been laid in
before we started, and the chances of buying eggs and other things on
the journey were frequent. The nights were cold, but the cold was kept
out as far as possible by braziers standing on tins in the trucks, and a
carefully distributed rum ration.
The second day broke dull and raining, and this continued until evening,
but a brisk, cold, sunny morning found us at Pierrelatte in the Rhone
valley, and a glorious day followed of fine open country round the
Rhone, with sudden sharp cliffs, offshoots of the Maritime Alps, and
far-away views of blue-grey mountains, shutting in the rich plain which
forms the delta of that great river. And so we passed through a charming
landscape, made the more charming by the very friendly faces and the
waving handkerchiefs of the inhabitants, to Avignon, with its castle
glittering in the sunlight.
It was here that trains began to lose men, as from now onwards stops
were always of somewhat doubtful duration. We came into Marseilles that
evening, with the streets and harbour glowing with lights below us.
Early next morning (27th) we reached Les Arcques, where the men had
breakfast. Then followed the best day of the whole journey. The weather
was absolutely perfect, and sitting out on the open flats we rattled
along the glorious coast of the French Riviera. Everywhere the people
waved to us, cheered and threw us oranges, a compliment which we
returned by throwing cigarettes to the French colonial sentries, who
grinned and flashed at us their rows of perfect teeth.
By the afternoon we had crossed the frontier, where at Vintimiglia we
detrained the men, and took them for a short, sharp march through the
town and along the sea-front.
The journey from now onwards became far less interesting. There were
interminable stops at out-of-the-way stations; and signs of the disorder
in Italy, the result of the Caporetto disaster, became more frequent. At
Bologna, where all the officers were very kindly provided with
lunch-baskets by the Italian Comando di Tappa, refugees crowded the
station, and that most pitiful spectacle was presented of strings of
Italian deserters, chained together. It was clear that firmness was to
be the order of the day.
From Bologna we went northwards, crossing the river Po, and the two
trains reached their respective destinations. The first arrived at
Bevilacqua at 7 p.m. on November 29. Here the most hopeless confusion
reigned, owing to the entire absence of any R.T.O. or orders of any
sort. Endless interviews with the magnificent station-master took place,
but as he could understand neither English nor French, and we were none
of us able to speak Italian, the interviews were entirely fruitless.
Eventually, however, having dispatched an officer to the R.T.O. at the
previous station, we received orders to billet in Bevilacqua for the
night, and were presented with an Italian interpreter.
The second train reached Este at 8 a.m. on November 30, where the
remainder of the day and that night were spent. Orders were received to
march next day to Agugliaro, where the two halves of the Battalion
joined hands. For the next four days we marched every day and all day,
billeting during the nights in the villages of Bosco di Nanto,
Villafranca and Marsango, and eventually reaching Villa del’ Conte on
December 8. Lorry transport was very scarce during these marches, and
the greatest difficulties were experienced in moving our 1,800 blankets
from place to place. Our troubles in this respect were increased by
having to move an unusually large number of valises, as we were at this
time in possession of no less than forty-three officers. Twelve of these
officers, however, were now dispatched to the base, and this relieved
the congestion considerably.
Our arrival in Italy had been of a very different character from the one
we had pictured. There was no dramatic deployment from the train to stem
the Austrian onrush; as, indeed, there appeared at this time to be very
little onrush to stem. The Italians were evidently making a firm stand
on the Piave, a stand which became all the firmer as the knowledge grew
that elements of the French and British Armies were at their backs in
case of need.
Throughout the week spent in Villa del’ Conte the Battalion was at two
hours’ notice to move to support the Italian army; but in spite of
expecting hourly to receive such orders, nothing momentous occurred
until the 14th, when we were moved some twelve miles to the village of
S. Croce Bigolina, which lies about six miles west of Cittadella.
That this village rivalled in popularity the much-beloved village of
Beauval in France, is astonishing and almost unaccountable. The billets
were bad, crowded and scattered. There were no shops. Footballs were
scarce, and grounds still scarcer. On the other hand, the inhabitants
were most friendly, if not entirely honest, and the weather was perfect.
It must surely have been those heavenly blue skies which entered into
our souls and made us think so well of S. Croce.
The Division now formed part of the XIXth Corps, which was in reserve to
the Italian Army, holding the line astride the Brenta valley in front of
Valstagna.
Here a formidable attack by the enemy was confidently expected, as
although the original onrush was being successfully stemmed by the
Italian forces and those portions of the French and our own which were
now in the line, it was thought very probable that the enemy, by using
the remainder of the reserves collected from the Russian front, might
try to increase the weight of their attack and break through from the
mountains into the plains. In the event of this attack being delivered,
the Division had orders to hold a reserve line in the mountains, which
lay about Conco, Rubbio and Campolungo.
Thorough reconnaissances of this line were therefore most necessary, and
some of us were sent on almost daily excursions in a F.I.A.T. lorry to
that coldest of all bleak spots, Rubbio. The journey occupied some two
and a half hours, along one of the most amazingly constructed roads in
the country. Hewn for the most part out of solid rock, the road climbed
1,800 feet from our billets to Rubbio, zigzagging up the mountain, with
a cliff on one side and a sheer drop of about 100 feet on the other.
The difference in the atmosphere between S. Croce and Rubbio was almost
paralysing, and few of us will forget the frigid sensation and biting
wind that assailed us on getting out of the lorry at the last-named
village.
The line consisted of a rock-hewn fire-trench, sited on the forward
slopes of a succession of hills or, rather, mountains. Communication
with this line would have been most difficult, had we occupied it, for
mule-tracks were rare, and none too good when found. To our relief,
however, no enemy attack developed, and we were left in peace at S.
Croce, where the Battalion spent its third Christmas away from home. In
spite of these continual visits to Rubbio and constant hard field
training, we had not allowed the time to slip by without a thought for
Christmas festivities, and when the day arrived every man was able to
eat turkey and plum pudding to his tummy’s content, helping it down with
more than sufficient _vino_.
This latter, nasty as it really was, had become a most popular tipple,
and orderly room had for some time past been much troubled by its
existence. It was not so much that it was a potent beverage, as that the
men were unaccustomed to it, and thought that it could be treated in the
same manner as the French wine. Only when a number of men found
themselves in the throes of no less than twenty-eight days’ field
punishment No. 1 was _vino_ shown the respect to which it had proved
itself entitled.
With the exception of some snow falling at the beginning of January, the
weather continued perfect, and we considered our Italian campaign one of
the better things in life, to which the only drawbacks were no E.F.C., a
most irregular mail, and a succession of the very coldest church parades
in a field at Villa Jonoch.
Unfortunately, all good things come to an end at some time, and this
particular one ended on January 24, 1918, when the Battalion took an
affectionate farewell of the natives of S. Croce and marched off towards
the Piave, though it was not until a month later that we arrived there.
The billeting area in which we found ourselves, after two days’
marching, was really far better than the one we had just left, though
the general atmosphere was perhaps not quite so friendly. D Company, at
first, revelled in being the sole British occupants of the village of
Casacorba, while Battalion Headquarters and the remaining three
companies had to content themselves with the rather inferior billets of
Albaredo. Later, however, sufficient accommodation was found in
Casacorba and the adjoining village of Viciliese to house the whole
Battalion, and Albaredo was evacuated.
Our stay here was chiefly notable for a most virulent attack of
“outposts” which seized the higher command, and the question whether it
is better to fight the post or the piquet line was more than thoroughly
debated. Suitable antidotes were soon found in the shape of plenty of
football for the men, and a very limited allotment of Rome leave for the
officers.
A further move was made on February 14 to Paese, which lies some six
miles west of Treviso. This area had been very much troubled by constant
bombing raids, carried out by the Austrian and German airmen at night;
in fact, the hospital in our village had been hit a few days prior to
our arrival, but during our occupation of Paese no further bombing of
the village took place, although Treviso continued an almost nightly
target, with the result that large numbers of civilians were evacuating
it, and the place was becoming a town of ruins.
The knowledge that we were to take over the line on the Piave had now
become common property, and on February 27 the Battalion relieved the
21st Battalion Manchester Regiment, 91st Brigade, 7th Division, in
support positions on the Montello.
A few days later (March 3) we took over the front line, which for the
most part consisted of a series of trench-posts, situated at intervals
of 40 or 50 yards along the banks of the river. Our right included the
village of Nervesa, and the posts here were dug out of the asphalt
promenade on which the fashion of Italy besported itself in times of
peace. The breadth of the Piave in front of us was at least half a mile,
and consisted of numerous channels, dotted with islands, some of which,
lying about 50 yards from our bank, we occupied, but the flimsy
character of the bridges leading on to them made their occupation
uncertain.
The current of the river varied according to the channels. In the main
channel it ran at a rate of at least ten miles an hour in time of flood,
and never dropped below three and a half miles an hour at summer level.
During our fortnight’s stay here the river became one broad, rushing
torrent, owing to the heavy rains, and any attempt on the part of a
patrol to cross the river was generally out of the question; but on one
night, after the river had gone down considerably, a patrol did succeed
in getting across, though it should be described as a feat of endurance
rather than a military accomplishment, as the men were so cold when they
reached the other side that it is doubtful whether they could have used
their arms had this been required of them.
The river, being unfordable at this time, deprived us of any means of
getting at close quarters and really making our first acquaintance with
a new enemy.
His shooting, so far as artillery was concerned, was decidedly good, and
on more than one occasion he troubled us not a little with it. Nervesa
was naturally his most popular target, and about the time of our
departure he was rapidly demolishing it, chiefly by means of incendiary
shells, with which he was most successful in setting the largest houses
on fire.
We had not been in the sector a week before rumours of our being moved
reached us. These rumours proved correct, and on March 14 the Division
was relieved by the Italians. Preparations to ensure a really
well-organised relief have no doubt been made by all units during the
war, but whether any relief was ever prepared with such hyper-efficiency
as this particular one may be doubted. Certainly “eyewash” never figured
more prominently, or with so little effect; but our friends the Italians
were not nearly so much impressed as had been intended, and our relief
by the 163rd Italian regiment proved to be quite a normal proceeding,
the greatest good-feeling existing on both sides.
The French, who had been on our left in the M. Tomba sector, were also
withdrawn from the line about this time, and it became clear that both
armies were intended to take over a new sector in the mountains in the
neighbourhood of the Asiago plateau.
The march westward was commenced on the 15th, and after a series of long
treks on exceedingly hot days, interspersed with a few days’ rest at
Piombino, Borgoricco, S. Georgio dell’ Pertiche and Busiago Vecchia, we
eventually reached S. Urbano on April 3. This village, charmingly
situated amongst the foothills which lie between Vicenza and Verona,
harboured us for just two weeks, while preparations were made for
equipping ourselves suitably for mountain warfare.
Practice attacks were delivered on all the neighbouring hills, and
several days were spent by officers in reconnoitring the line on the
Asiago plateau.
Our transport was increased by the arrival of some twenty-five
additional pack-mules, and although these threatened to displace all our
heavy draught horses, G.S. waggons and cookers, we were eventually
allowed to retain them all.
On April 17 the Battalion started on its move to the mountain line,
halting for nights at Grumo, S. Maria (just east of Thiene) and Mare,
which lies at the foot of the mountains that guard the Venetian plain
from the North and rise from a series of low foothills, almost sheer, to
a height of 4,000 feet. Military roads zigzagged their endless,
wearisome way backwards and forwards, and hardly discoverable tracks led
up in slippery, stony twists to the summit.
The day of our first journey to the top (April 23) gave us an excellent
taste of the changed conditions before us. The ascent was made in single
file up one of these mule-tracks, and occupied some four and a half
hours; the system of progression adopted being twenty minutes’ climbing
and ten minutes’ halting.
The actual climb to within a few hundred feet of the top was made in
bright sunshine. Then abruptly came the change. The sun was clouded
over, cold air seemed to come from nowhere, and a slight drizzle began
to fall. In such conditions the climb was finished, and the road past
Tattenham Corner, with a slight dip in the crest line, followed. A
little farther on was a small level space, perhaps 600 yards long and
half as many wide, between the masses of rough rock piled up on either
side. In this space and round the edge of it nestled the hutment camp of
Granezza. Here, and in offshoots of this little plateau, were
concentrated two battalions of Infantry, Divisional Headquarters,
Brigade Headquarters, a cinema, canteens, dumps, and all the other
paraphernalia of a Division in the field.
A more depressing spot than this was when we arrived can hardly be
imagined. The drizzle continued to fall, the road was a mass of mud,
water dripped and oozed from the wooden huts, whose tarred-felt roofs
were covered with dead branches as camouflage. Isolated fir trees,
stripped of all their lower branches, stood here and there around the
camp, gaunt and miserable, like sentries on a rainy night in the line.
Dirty patches of unthawed snow lay among the rocks, and a motley
collection of wet and muddy soldiers—English, French and Italian—flowed
backwards and forwards along the grey, sticky road.
This, however, was Granezza in one of its worst moods. The next day,
though different, was little better, for rain which was falling in the
morning changed by mid-day to a full-dress snowstorm, accompanied by
thunder and lightning. Snow fell for two or three more days, and all our
time and energy were concentrated on clearing roads and tracks. But this
was the last of the snow, and was succeeded by a period of bright
sunshine, alternating with violent thunderstorms, which gradually
changed to the glorious weather of August, September and October. During
these months the sun shone all day, there was very little rain, and the
heat was not sufficient to be uncomfortable by day nor the cold by
night. The particular charm of this glorious weather lay in the fact
that we had been assured that on the plateau there were only twenty-five
fine days in the year, of which seventeen had already passed.
With the improvement in the weather came equally a difference in the
country, which had at first seemed so desolate. The area taken over by
the British troops was divided by nature into two sectors, each of which
was held by a Division. Two roughly parallel roads, about four
kilometres apart, led to the front line, each feeding one Division’s
front. These roads were joined laterally by two other parallel roads,
the one about two and a half, the other about six kilometres, behind the
line. All intervening spaces were filled with rough rocky mountains,
devoid of trees on the south side, but thickly wooded on the north side.
The country gradually fell away towards the front line, which ran rather
more than 1,000 feet below the level of Granezza. The line itself, cut
partly in solid rock and partly in chalk, ran for the most part just
inside the trees, which here stop short on the edge of the Asiago
plateau. The plateau, about four kilometres wide, consists of undulating
grassy land, treeless, but dotted here and there with farmhouses and
tiny villages, all more or less damaged by shell-fire. About a kilometre
off lay the Austrian front line, well out in the open, and away behind
it the mountains rose up in a tremendous barrier 6,000 feet high,
protecting the Val Sugana. To all of us it seemed a position that no
troops in the world could capture, and we little guessed during the long
months that we faced those mountains, that in the end we should
ourselves successfully attack and overcome them.
CHAPTER X
THE AUSTRIAN ATTACK OF JUNE 15
_May and June 1918_
_Reference map No. 4_
One of the greatest problems when we lived in the mountains was the
question of transport and supply. The Divisional ration-dump was made in
the foothills, so it was obviously impossible for us to have all our
transport with us in the mountains and send it to the ration-dump daily,
as waggons would have been some ten hours on the roads. It was equally
impossible to have all the transport living near the ration-dump and
making daily pilgrimages up to the mountains. It was therefore decided
to leave the 2nd echelon transport in the foothills at Fara, and to have
the 1st echelon with us at Granezza. The former then brought the
Battalion’s rations each day as far as Tezze Sciessere, which lay
half-way up the mountain by road, while the 1st echelon met it there and
brought the supplies on to us.
Even this proved to be intensely hard on the horses, and it was
afterwards arranged to do much of the work by a more generous use of
Army motor lorries. There had been much discussion as to whether we
should take up the cookers, and it was eventually decided to do so. One
of these—namely, A Company’s—was the victim of the only accident which
befell us on our first journey up, as together with horses and driver it
fell over the cliff from the roadside. By a miracle neither the driver
nor the two horses were much hurt, in spite of their rolling with the
vehicle for 50 feet down the mountain-side and taking a 10-feet drop at
the end! As much cannot be said for the cooker, which was smashed beyond
hope of repair.
Our first tour in a mountain sector, although interesting, was not
eventful, and only lasted a month. This, however, was quite long enough
in view of the climatic conditions at this time of year, for the weather
had been vile, and one more often wore wet clothes than dry ones.
A complete change was experienced on arrival in the plains (May 19), for
here the heat was intense. The villages of Grumo and Cereda, which had
been allotted to us for billets, lay some thirty miles from Fara, our
marches to these places being carried out at night to avoid the heat of
the day. Khaki drill was now issued to replace the usual serge clothing,
and this, with pith helmets for headgear, made a hot life possible.
Training was carried out between six and ten o’clock in the morning, and
again in the cool of the evening. During the other hours of daylight we
lay and gasped.
We had been led to expect that the Division (less the 144th Brigade, who
were still in the mountains) would be kept in billets in the plains for
three weeks or a month, but this did not materialise, owing to receipt
of rather sudden orders to relieve the 7th Division in the line. Two
long marches, carried out in the early mornings, took us to Camisino, at
the foot of the mountains, and on June 1 the Battalion negotiated the
3,000-feet climb, which occupied close on five hours. The rough and very
steep mule-track, up which our path lay, seemed interminable, and in
spite of making the start at 4.30 a.m., the heat during the last hour of
the ascent proved very trying.
We were now in the left Divisional sector of the British front, whereas
before we had been in the right. It was strange how very similar the two
sectors were in the matter of roads, general formation of the country,
and forestry. Our front line lay towards the foot of the northern slopes
of M. Lemerle, and was sited well inside the wood, thus providing very
bad observation for the enemy. His own front trenches, on the other
hand, were right in the open, towards the other side of the plateau and
distant from us some 1,400 yards. It was indeed for us a gunner’s
paradise. He had only to install himself in a carefully concealed
observation post in one of the trees, and choose targets from the varied
assortment which the trenches, villages and farms, provided for him.
The portion of line allotted to the Battalion lay on the extreme right
of the Divisional line, and ran from a point about 700 yards due south
of the village of Roncalto, where we joined with the 23rd Division, to
the Ghelpac Fork (Map No. 4).
By night, outposts were pushed out well in front of this line, in many
cases half-way across the broad “No Man’s Land.” These posts occupied
all points of tactical importance, such as high ground on the plateau,
and guarded the main approaches to our line.
In our case the Battalion outpost line ran from Pesaventi along the
valley of the dried-up Ghelpac, with a standing patrol covering a hill
known as 1002. Fighting patrols were sent out nightly in front of this
outpost line, and reconnoitred the ground almost up to the enemy
trenches. The enemy’s style in “No Man’s Land” was thus considerably
cramped. He did, however, screw up his courage sufficiently to occupy at
night two houses called Vaister, which were situated about 1,300 yards
in front of our line and 500 yards in front of that of the enemy.
As we expected soon to undertake an offensive it was thought that his
occupation of Vaister might prove an inconvenience to us, so it was
consequently decided to turn him out of it. The scheme for this was to
attack Vaister during the night (June 8/9) with two platoons, who were
to be relieved by two fresh sections shortly before dawn. It was
inadvisable to have a larger garrison there by day, as there was very
little cover and they would become an easy target for the Austrian
gunners, should they be spotted. Two platoons of B Company, under
2/Lieutenant R. W. Grace and 2/Lieutenant W. G. Butler, were detailed
for this duty.
The artillery fired salvoes at the houses at half-hour intervals,
starting at dusk, and at 1.15 a.m. the 18-pounders put down a one-minute
barrage 150 yards north of the houses, in order to make the garrison
keep their heads down. This barrage, which was the signal for the
assault, was timed to lift 300 yards north of the houses after one
minute, and to remain there for five minutes. The two platoons, who made
a converging attack from south-east and south-west, got through the wire
without much difficulty and reached the houses. They were empty. Rifle
fire, however, came from some distance beyond, and it seemed pretty
evident that our artillery fire had driven out the enemy, who had
decided to take up a position on the spur behind.
At 1.45 a.m. the enemy suddenly assaulted the houses, but were driven
off by our rifle and Lewis-gun fire, which caused them considerable
loss. A flare, fired by our men, showed up the enemy as they retired,
carrying their casualties, and a section was sent out to pursue them,
but they only succeeded in catching one man, who stated that they had
had twenty casualties.
Between 2.30 a.m. and 3 a.m. the enemy made two further attempts to
assault from the direction of Canove, but each attempt was stopped by
our fire.
At 3.30 a.m. two sections of D Company, under 2/Lieutenant F. J. Wilcox,
relieved the two platoons of B Company, and established three posts
covering the houses. They had not been there more than a very few
minutes before the Austrians again attacked. Once more they were
stopped, and our left section was pushed forward in the hope of catching
the enemy retiring.
Later the enemy delivered a further assault from each side of the
houses, and in this case succeeded in overrunning our right post. The
position, however, was soon restored to us, and at 5.40 a.m. the section
was ordered by Battalion Headquarters to withdraw to our lines.
During this tour in the trenches, the prevailing disease, a sort of very
acute type of influenza, attacked the Battalion. Every company had some
fifteen or twenty men affected and laid out by it, but as the effects,
in the majority of cases, were felt for two or three days only, a
comparatively small number of men were sent to hospital. There was good
reason for conserving our man power as far as possible since orders were
out for an offensive by the British Army in conjunction with the French
on our right. These operations were to be undertaken with a view to
driving the enemy off the actual plateau, and forcing him back on to the
Winter Stellung, which was a trench system which he had constructed in
front of M. Catz and M. Interrotto, some one and a half miles behind his
present front line. Our positions in the event of the attack being
successful would not be as favourable to us as they were at the present
time, but it was hoped that the losses inflicted on the enemy would be
great, and that we should be so much nearer to the key of all the
Austrian positions—namely, M. Catz, M. Interrotto, and the mountains
overlooking the Val d’Assa (Map No. 4).
Thus, from June 9 to the 14th our minds and plans were concentrated on
this prospective attack. Major P. A. Hall was now in command of the
Battalion, owing to Lieutenant-Colonel Reynolds having assumed temporary
command of the Brigade.
On the 9th we were relieved in the front line, moving back to Brigade
support positions in the Lemerle Switch and Polderhoek Trench. On the
evening of the 14th, at a conference at Brigade Headquarters, commanding
officers were warned of a suspected attack by the enemy in the Brenta
valley and on the Piave, which was thought likely to take place the
following morning. It was not expected that the actual attack would
affect the British, though it was probable that the enemy’s bombardment
might extend as far west, in order to mislead us as to the real point of
attack. Plans and preparations for our own attack were to continue, zero
day for which had been fixed for June 16.
Such were our information and ideas for the future on the night of the
14th. All were doomed to be frustrated by the enemy, and that within a
very few hours.
At 3 a.m. the following morning the Austrians opened an intense
bombardment, with guns of every calibre, on all our lines of defence. A
large amount of gas shell was employed. The whole wood resounded with
high-explosive shells bursting among the rocks. Ammunition dumps took
fire, and became as dangerous as the enemy’s shells. Trees crashed to
the ground on all sides, and within a few minutes death was everywhere.
The Bucks Battalion immediately took up its battle stations in the
Lemerle Switch and Polderhoek Trench, astride the Boscon road. The
orders for the battalion holding these positions, in the event of the
enemy breaking through the front line, were to hold on to the last man.
This battalion was not to be used to reinforce forward positions. For
the next four or five hours shells rained down upon and around this
line, the shooting of the enemy being exceedingly good. Although a break
through of the front line was effected, the 1/4th Battalion Oxford &
Bucks Light Infantry, who were in the front trenches, fought every yard
of ground whilst giving way, and finally succeeded in definitely holding
up the attack in the neighbourhood of Pelly Cross.
Thus the enemy never actually reached the line that the Bucks Battalion
were holding, except on the extreme right, where he attempted to work
round the Oxfords’ flank; and the effects of the Austrian attack will be
better understood if the attack is described from the Brigade point of
view.
The 48th Division had two Brigades in the line: the 143rd in depth on a
one-battalion front on the left, and the 145th on a two-battalion front
on the right, the whole divisional frontage of four kilometres extending
from Roncalto to Schulazzon. The 23rd British Division were on the
right, and the 12th Italian Division on the left. Our 144th Brigade was
in Divisional reserve, with three battalions in camps at Carriola and M.
Brusabo, and one on the plains at the foot of the mountains.
The Divisional front trench line was of a very irregular trace,
consisting of a series of acute salients and reentrants, making it
impossible for most posts to see what was occurring on either side of
them or to give each other mutual assistance. The dry bed of the Ghelpac
ran in front of the left Brigade’s line, the western part of it lying in
a deep gorge. It was between this gorge and Cesuna Wood that the maximum
weight of the Austrian onslaught fell, and this was the extreme western
limit of the whole enemy attack.
At 3 a.m. the enemy’s heavy bombardment opened. At 7 a.m. his infantry
attack was launched, following a concentrated bombardment of the front
line. Owing to the trees and irregular features of the ground, it was in
most cases impossible for our men to observe the advance, or bring
effective fire to bear on the attacking columns, until they were
actually on our wire. There was also a thick ground mist, which
prevented observation from our look-out posts.
The first real break in the Divisional line occurred about the high
ground near Perghele, where the enemy were seen advancing in large
numbers about 7.50 a.m. From here they swept down the valley behind the
5th Gloucestershire Regiment, which held the centre of the Divisional
line, and, taking this battalion in reverse, cut off all communication
forward of the Battalion Headquarters. The support company took up a
position astride the valley, but the enemy soon enveloped their left,
and the company was gradually forced to retire on to the Cesuna-Canove
road. This line they held for some time, until a heavy attack was
delivered on their right, which forced them back astride the railway and
severed their connection with the 1/4th Battalion Oxford & Bucks Light
Infantry.
In the meantime, the Oxfords on the right had been putting up a very
fine resistance. The enemy had, very early on, succeeded in driving a
wedge between them and the Northumberland Fusiliers, who were holding
the left of the 23rd Divisional line. The latter had been driven on to
their switch line. The right flank of the Oxfords thus became exposed,
and the enemy immediately began to work round it. This, however, was
prevented by the extreme right of the Bucks Battalion in the Lemerle
Switch.
By means of Bangalore torpedoes and flammenwerfers, the Austrians did
succeed in forcing an entry about the centre of the Oxfords’ line, and
by 9 a.m. were in complete possession of the front line.
Throughout the morning, the Oxfords held up the attack in the most
determined manner, never giving ground more than 200 yards behind the
original line. By afternoon, however, the situation on their left became
so serious that they were obliged to fall back on Pelly Cross Roads,
where they linked up with the 1/4th Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment,
two of whose companies had been ordered forward in support of the
Gloucesters.
Later in the day the enemy attack was further reinforced, and a swaying
fight went on until night fell.
The enemy made little further ground, and at 6 p.m. the 145th Brigade
front ran from the top of Hill 1021 to Pelly Cross Roads, and thence
along Pine Avenue to the Cesuna Switch, where junction was made with the
143rd Brigade.
About 7 p.m. two battalions of the 144th Brigade commenced a
counter-attack, from the Cesuna Switch in a north-easterly direction,
with a view to clearing the “pocket” that the enemy had been held in.
This made little headway, owing to the immense number of enemy machine
guns, which were most difficult to dislodge from among the rocks and
trees. Moreover, these battalions found it hard to keep direction,
fighting through the middle of the wood, with no roads or paths to guide
them. The attack, however, had the effect of reducing the pocket, and
certainly impressed the enemy with the fact that he was firmly
contained, as he made no further attempt to advance after this.
During the night arrangements were made for a general counter-attack to
take place the next morning at 4.30. This attack was completely
successful, meeting with what then appeared to be surprisingly little
resistance. By 5.45 a.m. our original front line was entirely reoccupied
and many prisoners were taken. A message was found on the body of a dead
Austrian officer, timed 2.50 a.m., ordering a complete withdrawal to
their own original line. Thus the slight resistance met with in our
counter-attack was accounted for, as the movement had by then been
largely effected.
The enemy casualties in the attack had been very severe indeed, as was
proved by the immense number of their dead, which lay strewn over the
whole of the recaptured area. Of prisoners also we had a great number,
and these included representatives of every unit of no fewer than two
divisions, and of several units of two other divisions. A striking
feature of the attack was the quantity and surprisingly good quality of
the stores and equipment brought forward. Practically every man had
evidently been issued with a new set of equipment previous to the
attack. An enormous number of machine guns had been brought forward,
many of which were left behind on retirement. Nearly all these were of
the heavy type, and consequently most unsuited to a rapid advance over
mountainous country on the scale which they had evidently anticipated,
judging from the operation orders captured. These orders showed the
enemy to have had the most far-reaching objectives, which, to those of
us who knew the country, were almost impossible of attainment, even if
resistance had been of the weakest, and Austrian infantry the finest
soldiers in the world—which they most assuredly were not. Weight of
numbers carried them so far as they got, and it may be considered partly
due to their lack of push and enterprise that they failed to exploit a
successful initial break through into and behind the line of the centre
battalion.
Although the Bucks Battalion did not have a leading part to play in this
battle, as the line it was holding was never attacked, it nevertheless
did a great deal of important work.
C Company, on the right, stopped the enemy attempt to envelop the 1/4th
Oxfords’ right. Several large officers’ patrols were sent out to keep in
touch with the two forward battalions, and on a few occasions they found
themselves in a position to hold up parties of the enemy who had worked
their way through. Much was done to maintain communication between the
forward line and Brigade Headquarters, all the telephone lines having
been broken shortly after the bombardment commenced.
Naturally, the Battalion did not suffer casualties to the same extent as
other units in the Brigade:
_Officers._—Wounded. 2/Lieut. H. R. Pigott.
2/Lieut. W. G. Butler.
2/Lieut. P. T. Herbert.
2/Lieut. F. J. Wilcox.
2/Lieut. E. T. C. Coxon.
Capt. H. Noke, C.F.
_Other ranks._—Killed—8.
Wounded—42.
The days following the attack were fully occupied in mending our wire,
burying the dead, and generally clearing the battle-field. The enemy
himself, for the next three or four days, appeared to be in a state of
confusion and suffering from lack of _moral_. Their men were to be seen
walking about in daylight behind their trenches, having left lengths of
their line unoccupied, while other parts were crowded. Two or three
mountain guns, left out in “No Man’s Land” after the enemy’s withdrawal,
were brought in by us in broad daylight. This state of affairs was
exploited further by the 143rd and 144th Brigades, which were now
holding the line, by sending out large patrols with the object of
persuading the enemy to come back to our lines with them. This, however,
was only partially successful, and their resistance soon stiffened
again. It was evident, nevertheless, that the failure of the attack had
left its mark on the Austrian troops opposite, and that their _moral_
was thoroughly shaken by it.
On June 20, Major-General Sir Robert Fanshawe, K.C.B., gave up command
of the Division. This was a very heavy blow, and was received with the
greatest dismay throughout the Division. He had commanded it for three
years, and during this time had won the unbounded confidence and
affection of all ranks.
He was succeeded by Major-General Sir H. B. Walker, K.C.B., D.S.O.
CHAPTER XI
RAIDS
_July to October 1918_
_Reference Map No. 4_
Very shortly after the Austrian attack the Division was relieved in the
line by the 7th Division.
The 145th Brigade remained in the mountains for a week longer than the
other two Brigades, acting as an additional reserve to the 7th Division
in case the Austrians should venture to renew their attempt. But the
situation soon became perfectly normal, and on June 30, at 12.30 in the
morning, the Battalion marched to the Centrale district in the plains.
Two days later we moved again to billets at Grumo and Cereda. Here an
intensely hot fortnight was passed, the heat during the day frequently
reaching over 90° in the shade, and we were by no means displeased when
we received orders to return to the mountains, and to relieve the 23rd
Division in the right sector of the British front.
On July 19 the Battalion reached Granezza. This tour in the line proved
to be one of exceptional activity, and ended with the astounding
collapse of the Austro-Hungarian army.
Artillery action was considerable and constant on both sides. The
Austrians, whatever their other failings may have been, were by no means
to be despised as gunners, their shooting being extremely accurate.
Raids on the enemy’s lines were of an almost nightly occurrence along
the British and French fronts, the raiding parties usually consisting of
one or more battalions. They met with a large amount of success on
nearly every occasion, chiefly owing to the fact that the more often we
raided, the more men did the enemy put into his front line, so
increasing his casualties from our barrage and providing more prisoners
for us to round up.
On August 8 and 9 raids were carried out on the enemy’s trenches along
practically the whole British and French fronts. These proved entirely
successful and several hundreds of prisoners were taken, while but few
casualties were incurred by the raiding troops.
Preparations and plans for these raids were organised with the very
greatest care, and worked out to the smallest detail. This was in all
cases the secret of success.
On the night August 26/27, the Battalion, in conjunction with the 1/4th
Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment, carried out one of these raids, for
which the full orders are given in Appendix Ic, with a view to showing
the amount of detail to be dealt with. The object of the raid was to
kill or capture the garrison of the Austrian trenches in the
neighbourhood of Sec and Ave (Map No. 5). Owing to the absence of
Lieutenant-Colonel L. L. C. Reynolds, D.S.O., on leave, the general plan
of the raid was worked out by Major P. A. Hall, M.C., though the former
returned in time to arrange the details.
The boundary between the 1/4th Royal Berkshire Regiment and the Bucks
Battalion was the road running through the Austrian line midway between
Sec and Ave, our Battalion’s right boundary being the Clama-S. M.
Maddalena road. We had the assistance of four 18-pounder batteries, 4·5
and 6-inch howitzers; and French ·77’s also engaged selected targets.
[Illustration:
MAP Nº. 5.
AREA RAIDED ON NIGHT 26/27 AUG. 1918.
]
At zero (10.40 p.m., August 26) the 18-pounders put down a barrage on
the enemy front line for five minutes. At zero plus five minutes the two
right batteries lifted on to the sunken road for nine minutes, while the
two left batteries first lifted for four minutes on to the group of
dugouts north-east of Lone Tree House, and then on to the dugouts about
S. M. Maddalena for five minutes, lifting again at zero plus 14 to form
a protective barrage beyond.
The two right batteries at zero plus 14 lifted on to the portion of
enemy front line facing south-east (between Sec and the Clama road) for
eight minutes, when they, too, finally lifted off the area to form a
protective barrage beyond.
The Battalion formed up behind the Midway House ridge. The point of
entry for the whole Battalion was the trenches between Lone Tree House
road and Sec, the enemy’s front trenches to the right facing south-east
being taken in reverse in the last phase.
Three platoons of A Company (Captain J. E. Firminger) were responsible
for the front line between Sec and Lone Tree House, and the fourth
platoon for the dugouts north-east of Lone Tree House.
Closely following the barrage D Company (Captain B. C. Rigden, M.C.)
passed through A Company, two platoons dealing with the remainder of the
dugouts north-east of Lone Tree House, the other two platoons those
dugouts round S. M. Maddalena.
B Company (Lieutenant A. L. Brightman) and C Company (2/Lieutenant P. T.
Herbert) had a more difficult task. C Company and two platoons of B
Company passed through A Company, and moved along the west side of a
communicator running north from Sec. Along this they formed up in two
lines facing east. The first line took the dugouts in the sunken road,
while the second line passed through the first, taking the front-line
trench between Sec and the Clama road from behind. The other two
platoons of B Company remained outside the front line until the barrage
had lifted clear, when they entered the front line just left and right
of the sunken road.
The whole attack went according to programme. The 18-pounder barrages
were perfect on all lines. The timing of “lifts” could not have been
better. The wire in front of the front-line trench proved a serious
obstacle, and the leading company had a good many casualties in getting
through it.
The front line was strongly held, the garrison putting up a good fight
with rifle and machine-gun fire. When our leading platoons, however,
closed with the bayonet, the enemy mostly surrendered.
At Sec, a machine gun was captured and the crew shot. A deep dugout,
found about fifteen yards west of the sunken road, refused to divulge
its occupants. A smoke bomb changed their ideas and no fewer than thirty
eventually swarmed out, but as they brought their arms with them, the
majority got killed.
The platoons that went to S. M. Maddalena found but few of the enemy
there.
The attack on the sunken road and front line facing south-east went
without a hitch. The former was found to be full of dugouts, and a large
number of Austrians were killed or taken prisoner.
The signal to withdraw was given at 12.30 a.m. The withdrawal was
carried out according to programme, and as far as could be then
ascertained all our casualties had been brought in.
The enemy barrage was at no time very heavy, and the Austrian
infantryman showed but little inclination to fight.
Prisoners taken amounted to about 165, while the number killed was
estimated to be at least 150, and even more if one was to judge from the
number of men who returned with bloody bayonets.
Our casualties were:
_Officers._—Wounded. Capt. J. E. Firminger.
Lieut. A. L. Brightman.
2/Lieut. L. W. G. Lorns.
2/Lieut. F. W. Blackmore.
2/Lieut. F. J. Wilcox.
2/Lieut. F. P. Bates.
_Other ranks._—Killed—4.
Wounded—75.
Wounded and prisoner—1.
Missing—4 (afterwards presumed killed).
The raid carried out by the 1/4th Royal Berks on our right was equally
successful.
The Commander-in-Chief sent the following message:
“Please convey my hearty congratulations to men of Bucks Battalion and
1/4th Royal Berks, and to Brigadier-General Watt and staff, on their
gallant, well-planned and successful raid. The results are of the
greatest importance in ascertaining the enemy’s intentions.”
Several decorations were awarded to the Battalion for this operation,
the Commander-in-Chief himself presenting the medal ribbons at Granezza.
During the next six weeks trench life, combined with a few days’
periodical rest at Granezza, continued uninterruptedly.
On August 27, Brigadier-General D. M. Watt, D.S.O., handed over command
of the 145th Brigade to Brigadier-General W. W. Pitt-Taylor, C.M.G.,
D.S.O., but the latter was shortly afterwards appointed B.G.G.S. of the
XIVth Corps and Brigadier-General G. W. Howard, C.M.G., D.S.O., then
assumed command of the Brigade.
About this time all brigades throughout the British Force in Italy were
reduced to three battalions. The 1/5th Battalion Gloucestershire
Regiment was consequently taken from the 145th Infantry Brigade and
dispatched to France.
On October 3, Major P. A. Hall, M.C., was appointed to command the 1/7th
Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment. He had, except for short
intervals, been with the Battalion ever since mobilisation, and had
rendered it invaluable service.
Captain P. L. Wright, M.C., was now promoted to fill his place as
2nd-in-command.
In connection with these changes on the Battalion Headquarters staff, it
is worthy of record that no little success had been attained by the
officers who originally embarked with the Battalion, or joined it very
shortly afterwards. The original senior company commander, then Captain
Reynolds, had assumed command of the Battalion early in 1916, and had
commanded continuously ever since. Promotions to 2nd-in-command had
invariably been made from officers within the Battalion. In addition,
three of our officers had been appointed to command other battalions,
and two others appointed as 2nds-in-command of other units, whilst four
others had received staff appointments.
The 48th Division was now the only British Division holding the line, as
the 23rd Division had shortly before been relieved on our left by troops
of the 12th Italian Corps. It had been intended to send the 23rd and 7th
Divisions to France, but the situation changed, and finally all three
divisions remained in Italy.
[Illustration:
RESERVE BATTALION H.Q., KABERLABA N.
]
[Illustration:
THE C.-IN-C. PRESENTING MEDALS TO THE BATTALION AT GRANEZZA, AUGUST
1918.
]
At the beginning of October, the British Commander-in-Chief accepted the
command of a mixed Italian-British Army, with a view to undertaking
offensive operations on the Piave. The 7th and 23rd Divisions, being at
this time in reserve, were to form part of this new Army, while the 48th
Division, in order to make as little apparent change as possible, were
to remain on the Asiago plateau, passing temporarily under the command
of General Pennella, commanding XIIth Italian Corps.
When raids were not taking place, the sector, and more especially our
headquarters at Kaberlaba North, was peaceful enough, but raids on the
enemy lines now became more and more frequent, the French on our right
being particularly successful.
The following figures show the number of prisoners captured during
October by means of these raids:
October 3:
6th Battalion R. Warwickshire Regiment 149
October 10:
7th Battalion Worcestershire Regiment 35
French Battalion 300
Italians 10
October 23:
1/4th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment 210
3 Battalions French 700
On the night October 28/29, the Bucks Battalion raided the area Sec—S.
M. Maddalena—Cassordar, full of hope, and anxious to beat all records in
prisoners. The result was a disappointment. The whole area was found to
have been completely evacuated by the enemy, who had that very night at
dusk withdrawn to a line 3,000 yards in rear. This line was sited at the
foot of the mountains which rose from the northern edge of the plateau.
The enemy had been working on it for the past three months, and we had
learned from prisoners that it was to be their position for the coming
winter and was called the “Winter Stellung.” One wretched Austrian had
been left behind in the old line to loose off Verey lights, and he
formed our only capture.
The discovery of the retirement was, however, most important. The
following day, patrols sent out by the battalion holding the front line
gained touch with the enemy at the Winter Stellung, the town of Asiago
being occupied by the British.
The enemy’s retirement, coupled with his diminishing _moral_ and the
fact that our attack had opened successfully on the Piave, made it clear
that the time was now ripe for dealing him a decisive blow.
For this we now waited expectantly.
CHAPTER XII
THE AUSTRIAN DÉBÂCLE
_November 1 to 4, 1918_
_Reference Map No. 4_
The sole orders for the initial attack leading up to the final
operations of the war on the Italian front were received in the form of
a brief telephone message. (Appendix I D.)
The 48th British Division, in conjunction with the 24th French Division
on the right and the 20th Italian Division on the left, was to attack
and capture the line Croce di S. Antonio—M. Mosciagh, the infantry
attack to commence at 5.45 a.m. on November 1, 1918. The 48th Division
was to attack with the 145th Brigade on the right, the 144th Brigade on
the left, and the 143rd Brigade in reserve; the 145th Brigade to attack
with the Bucks Battalion on the right, the 1/4th Battalion Royal
Berkshire Regiment on the left, and the 1/4th Battalion Oxford & Bucks
Light Infantry in reserve. The Bucks Battalion was to form up on a line
Rendela—Ferragh, and to take as its right boundary the line Ferragh—west
edge of Gallio Wood—road C. Giardini to Croce di S. Antonio. Our final
objective was to be a line of, roughly, 800 yards of front due east of
Croce di S. Antonio.
A glance at the map contours will give some idea of the mountainous
nature of country to be advanced over.
The order to attack arrived when we were in Brigade reserve in
rest-huts, just north of the Kaberlaba road. It was delivered on
November 1 at the somewhat inconvenient hour of 1 a.m., when everyone,
except telephone operators and sentries, was asleep. Companies were
scattered, and it was consequently impossible for every man to be up and
about for at least half an hour, and even more.
Zero was fixed for 5.50 a.m., at which hour we were to enter the first
objective, the Winter Stellung, which lay some seven miles distant. Not
a second must be wasted if the Battalion was to be formed up in time.
Companies were to wear fighting order; water-bottles were to be full and
haversack rations issued. Iron rations were, of course, included in
fighting order. Packs and blankets had to be left in the huts we were
vacating, and an officer with half a dozen men remained behind to
arrange with the Quartermaster as to their removal.
The transport and quartermaster’s stores being at Granezza, were too far
away to be of any immediate assistance. Lewis gunners were consequently
obliged to carry their guns and ammunition during the two-hour march to
the forming-up positions.
Great efforts were made to provide tea for the men before setting out,
but the time available was quite insufficient, and many had to start
without it. Even so, when finally the whole Battalion had been got on
the road and started off, it was evident that only if we were favoured
with good going could we arrive to time.
The road, which ran over the old “No Man’s Land” and through Asiago, had
been fairly well repaired during the last day or two, and the going was
not too bad.
It was not until the Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel L. L. C. Reynolds,
D.S.O.) reached the northern outskirts of Asiago that we encountered
enemy shelling. From here onwards to Rendela progress became most
uncomfortable, although our casualties were wonderfully few.
The river-bed of the Ghelpac runs here between Rendela and Ferragh, on
its way from the hills above Gallio. The enemy was paying much attention
to this valley, by putting down a brisk barrage on it. It was decided,
consequently, to form up on the line of the road Rendela—Gallio, with
the Battalion’s left on Rendela, and occupying a frontage of 600 yards.
A Company (Captain N. S. Flint) formed on the left, B Company
(Lieutenant E. C. J. Allday) on the right, each on a two-platoon
frontage.
C Company (Captain G. W. Higlett, M.C.) and D Company (Lieutenant H. A.
Beaver) formed behind in depth in artillery formation.
It was 5.30 a.m. exactly when the forming-up was completed. Our hurried
departure from rest-huts had been none too much hurried, and no slower
pace could have been afforded on the road. We were just in time, with
nothing to spare.
With the opening of our very thin barrage the enemy’s barrage quickened,
and as the advance proceeded, shells whistled their way in both
directions just over our heads. Soon, sufficient daylight appeared for
the enemy to see the attack, and rifle and machine-gun fire were quickly
directed on us from Reutte, Costa, Straite and M. Catz.
The leading wave met with little difficulty in occupying the Winter
Stellung from Villa Rossi to Reutte, but, on attempting to advance from
it, met with heavy enfilade fire from Costa and M. Catz.
There was no sign of the attack on the left, from which direction this
enemy fire came.
It was obviously impossible for our men to make progress without first
silencing the enemy’s machine guns on M. Catz. A Company therefore
attacked Costa, and C and D Companies assaulted Straite and Rigoni di
Sotto, where four machine guns were captured. A Company succeeded in
rushing Costa, but then got temporarily held up by two machine guns on
the southern slopes of M. Catz. Finally, one of these was put out of
action by one of our Lewis guns, and the other was outflanked and its
crew killed.
Meanwhile, C and D Companies continued their advance, working up the
eastern side of M. Catz and assaulting the crest, where four more
machine guns were taken. By 7 a.m. M. Catz was ours, and the whole
garrison had either been killed or taken prisoner.
The enemy’s heavy gunners were not long in spotting the khaki figures
hurrying about the top of M. Catz, like ants on a mole-hill. They
directed their fire accordingly, and soon covered the hill in a black
pall of smoke, given off by the bursting of 5·9’s. The hill, however,
was ours, and it was our job to get on beyond it.
On the right, B Company had made excellent progress, but were now held
up by fire from some trenches half-way up the western side of Gallio
Wood. There were but few signs of the French blue uniforms, but it was
thought possible that they had been attracted to their right, just as we
had been forced to bear to the left on account of M. Catz. Moreover, so
long as they were working through Gallio Wood it was difficult for us to
see their progress.
It had now become necessary to send help to B Company. D Company were
therefore dispatched to the spur north of Rigoni di Sopra. This made it
too hot for the enemy holding up B Company, and they decided to go.
C Company continued their advance, and made good Roccolo N.E.
At 7.30 a.m. a company of the Royal Berkshires had come up to the
trenches on the southern slopes of M. Catz. Their arrival enabled us to
straighten out our line, preparatory to a further advance.
The enemy had now been decisively beaten, and even his heels were
nowhere to be seen. Some isolated posts and refugees from the Winter
Stellung were encountered here and there, but they soon surrendered,
several of them with machine guns.
By 10.30 a.m. the Battalion had reached a line corresponding
approximately with the 1,400 metre contour line just south-west of Croce
di S. Antonio. We were again out of touch with both the French and the
Royal Berkshires.
Companies were reorganised on their final objective, which had now been
attained, while patrols were pushed forward and to both flanks.
No sign of the enemy could be found, except a few stragglers who were
brought in. The French left was found on the east side of the Valle di
Nos, and a company of the Royal Berkshires came up on our left a little
later.
We had known, to our cost, for many months, that the enemy had gun
positions in the Valle di Nos. Reconnoitring parties were accordingly
sent out to see what could be found there. A number of guns of various
calibres were found. Some had been firing until their ammunition supply
was exhausted. Others had evidently been fired until we were almost up
to them, when their breech-blocks had been removed and the crew had
taken to their heels. Efforts had been made to get some of the guns
away, but they had all eventually been abandoned.
In all, the Battalion captured on this day some hundreds of prisoners
and a large quantity of material, including at least twenty-one guns of
all calibres, fifteen machine guns and three motor lorries, besides a
number of waggons.
Our casualties had so far been extraordinarily slight:
_Officers._—Wounded. 2/Lieut. J. W. C. Read.
_Other ranks._—Killed—8.
Wounded—30.
Missing—1.
On the left of the Divisional attack little progress had been made. The
144th Brigade were held up in front of Camporovere, and the 20th Italian
Division had been unable to get forward at all. Thus it seemed that,
whatever he was to lose elsewhere, the enemy was determined to keep his
hold on the Val d’Assa. To lose this would assuredly mean losing all.
But our progress on the right, together with that of the French, had
been so great, that even our present positions threatened the rear of
the enemy force who were holding up the 144th Brigade. The following day
was to see this put to still better advantage.
The Battalion remained on the line it had reached at mid-day on November
1 throughout the afternoon and night. Very great care was taken to
select the best defensive positions, in view of the possible
reappearance of the enemy in force to counter-attack the ground he had
lost. Officers and men were tired out, and lack of a cup of tea began to
make itself felt. The marching, fighting and general excitement of the
whole day, which had begun at 1 a.m., made us all thankful for even a
few hours’ halt, but there was little enough rest, especially for the
officers, who had to reconnoitre the ground all round them before
nightfall. Being in the middle of a wood on the top of a mountain, as we
now were, made this all the more difficult and all the more necessary.
[Illustration:
_PRE WAR PANORAMA TAKEN FROM M^T TOPLE (1295) LOOKING NORTH i.e. INTO
AUSTRIAN TERRITORY_
]
The getting forward of our rations caused us much anxiety. We had not
been in touch with the Quartermaster at Granezza since the evening
before our orders to attack arrived. He had, however, been instructed to
bring our rations up the road past Reutte. Guides were to be sent there
to bring him on. Unfortunately, but not unnaturally, in an absolutely
strange country, much of which was wooded, these guides lost their way
without finding him, and remained out all night. The darkness amongst
the woods was intense. Of mule-tracks leading down the mountain there
were several, though only one right one; when found, it was no easy
matter to keep to it. The 2nd-in-command finally set forth in an
endeavour to gain touch with the transport column. He also lost himself
for some three hours, before he eventually found the longed-for rations
towards dawn. Without further mishap, they were taken forward, but only
to reach the Battalion’s positions a good half-hour after the Battalion
had moved off. A party had been left behind to manhandle the rations
after them.
Thus, for the second day we set out without tea, and this time we were
also without water or rations.
At dawn, the 1/7th Battalion Worcestershire Regiment, who had been
concentrated during the night at Roccolo N.E., attacked and captured M.
Mosciagh from the east. This made untenable the enemy positions on M.
Interrotto, which had given so much trouble to the 144th Brigade the
previous day.
The 1/4th Battalion Oxford & Bucks Light Infantry were at once moved
against M. Meatta, where they disposed of the enemy garrison with little
difficulty.
This turning movement on the part of the Worcesters and Oxfords
threatened the main, and indeed only, line of Austrian retirement—along
the Val d’Assa. The enemy holding out at the entrance to the valley beat
a hurried retreat, and when the 143rd Brigade (which had been in reserve
the previous day) attacked Camporovere at 10 a.m., they met with little
resistance and advanced very rapidly up the Val d’Assa. By dusk they
were in touch with the enemy, who were in prepared positions on the line
Bosson—Vezzena—Marcia di Sotto. Here the Austrians were in considerable
strength.
At 7 a.m. on the 2nd, the Bucks Battalion turned due west, and after
making good M. Dorbelle, scaled M. Mosciagh, relieving the 7th Battalion
Worcestershire Regiment there. Here, at 2 p.m., our long-lost rations
and water reached us. We were getting done up for want of them, and
never, never did tea taste so good. Even so, we had to be most careful
with both the water and the food, as at our present rate of progression
and most uncertain direction, it might be a long while before further
supplies reached us.
On M. Mosciagh were Austrian guns of all calibres; stores and equipment
left behind in all the huts testified to the hurried retreat of the
enemy, and souvenirs lay on all sides.
At 3 p.m. we received orders to move down into the Valle di Portule,
where the whole Brigade, less one company of the 1/4th Oxfords who
remained on M. Meatta, bivouacked for the night. We found a large number
of enemy huts here, but not sufficient to shelter the whole Brigade.
Many of us were consequently obliged to spend another freezing cold
night in the open, with no greatcoats and no blankets. These huts, which
the Austrians had made themselves, were well fitted up. There was no
lack of stoves, which worked well and gave out a good amount of heat.
Tables, chairs and wire beds were quite numerous, all of them having
been obviously made by the enemy on the spot. Packs, greatcoats and
small articles of equipment, together with papers, magazines, books and
orders, were strewn over the whole encampment. The clothing for the most
part was infested with vermin, which was natural, seeing the general
state of filth which had been allowed to accumulate everywhere. A fairly
well-stocked canteen was also found and promptly raided. In an adjoining
hut a cask of brandy was unearthed, but the finders gave vent to such a
shout of joy that the Adjutant took steps to ascertain the cause, and,
on learning it, decided to place a strong guard over the cask.
Evidence abounded of the extreme haste of the enemy to get clear of the
place. Judging from appearances, the flight had been considerably
hampered by our shelling. Transport waggons, motor lorries and guns had
become ditched by the roadside and so left. Horses, still harnessed to
their carts, lay across the road, dead or dying; while their drivers
had, in many instances, suffered a like fate.
It was the novelty of these sights, and the general feeling that we were
really getting on with the war, which kept us all going, tired as we
were.
At 3 a.m. the following day (November 3) the whole Division resumed the
advance.
At 4.30 a.m. the Advanced Guard (143rd Brigade, with a Brigade of Field
Artillery) commenced its attack on the Vezzena position. Considering the
strength of the enemy on this line, a very feeble resistance was
offered, and by 8 a.m. a large force, consisting of some fourteen
battalions, was surrounded and captured.
The IIIrd Austrian Corps commander and three divisional commanders, with
their staffs, were amongst the prisoners taken.
Vezzena had been their corps headquarters. The huts, of which there were
a large number, contained food and fodder sufficient to last a corps for
very many weeks. One huge hut contained nothing but flour, another dried
vegetables, another hay and straw, and so on, embracing everything which
an army in the field requires. The tale of shortage of food in the
Austrian army appeared an unlikely one when we saw a sight of this kind,
and yet shortage there must have been, or their men would not have
looked so thin and badly nourished as they did.
The march of the main body, headed by the Battalion, proved to be a most
memorable one. Abandoned guns, waggon parks, ammunition dumps, lay by
the side of the whole route; the roads were littered with articles of
Austrian equipment. In their anxiety to travel as fast and as lightly as
possible, the enemy had cast away all that encumbered him. Gas masks,
helmets, packs, haversacks, and, finally, rifles lay scattered along the
road, down which but a few hours before the routed army had passed in
their helpless, panic-stricken flight. One’s dream of the typical army
rout of history days had come true, and indeed surpassed all
imagination.
As we neared Vezzena, we met whole battalions of the enemy marching to
the rear, under the escort of a handful of British soldiers. In many
cases an Austrian battalion commander led back his battalion complete,
while in front of him walked a man with the white flag. Generals were
permitted to ride, at footpace.
It was a pathetic sight to see these thousands of men trudging their
weary way to our rear. Their spirit was broken, and tragedy was written
plain on every officer’s face.
Our Divisional commander had sent forward a car to pick up and bring
back the Austrian corps commander, doubtless with the idea of eliciting
full information from him as speedily as possible.
Just short of Vezzena we halted for a meal. We had been on the road for
seven hours, and had begun to feel the effects. Excitement had kept
every man going, and even the most sore-footed and weary held on, hoping
that round the next corner he would see the Emperor Charles, with his
hands up and shouting “Kamerad!”
On passing Vezzena, on the road towards M. Rovere, the same strange
sights continued to present themselves. As we advanced along the valley,
a party of the enemy 500 or 600 strong were seen wending their way
towards us down the side of the hill. Curiosity developed into
astonishment when it was noticed that every man of them was armed with a
rifle, while machine guns could be seen on the backs of mules which
brought up their rear. This party seemed to think little of an enemy
division marching in column of route through their country, while the
idea that a few bursts from their machine guns, fired from the
commanding position they held, would wipe us off the road, had not
apparently struck them, as it had certainly struck us. So far as we were
concerned there was no time, and apparently no necessity, to discontinue
our march. The whole situation was so entirely favourable to us, that
delay even now might mar the full fruits of what should be the most
gigantic victory. So only one officer with a platoon was fallen out to
deal with the enemy column. This officer, by means of an interpreter,
ordered the column to halt, and requested the officer in charge to come
down to him. The lieutenant-colonel who complied with this request
appeared surprised when told that his battalion must march past, and
every man lay down his arms as he did so. He was apparently under the
impression that an armistice existed. However, on our further
explanation that the rest of his corps had already performed the
trifling ceremony that was required of him, and that his corps commander
was in our hands, he decided to comply with the demand.
Advancing down the precipitous slopes of M. Rovere into the Val Sugana,
the Battalion occupied Caldonazzo at 3.30 p.m. This town turned out to
be either an Army or Corps railhead, and a large quantity of
rollingstock lay in the station and sidings. One complete train, loaded
with 200 field-guns, had failed to get away, presumably owing to
shortage of engines. Quantities of munitions, equipment and stores lay
there ready for loading, while in an adjoining field was a large park of
guns of all calibres, including one 17-inch howitzer.
On this afternoon, November 3, 1918, the G.S.O.I. of the division
proceeded to Trent, the headquarters of the Third Austro-Hungarian Army,
demanding the surrender of Trent and Pergine, with all hostile troops in
the area. This demand was complied with.
The 144th and 145th Brigades billeted for the night November 3/4 in
Caldonazzo. There was again little enough rest on that night, as some
10,000 prisoners had been collected here and guards had to be furnished
over them.
The Battalion had on this day been fourteen hours on the move, and
covered twenty-five miles. With little sleep and often short of water,
the test had been severe, and one wondered how much longer it was to
continue. Our astonishing experiences, and the knowledge that the 48th
Division was the first British Division to enter an enemy’s country on
the Western front, had done wonders towards helping us along.
It was with little surprise that, about 7 a.m. the next day, November 4,
1918, we received this message:
“Armistice with Austria-Hungary has been signed 3rd November.—Armistice
will come into effect from 15.00 hours (3 p.m.), 4th November.—Moves
ordered for 4th Nov. will take place, but all troops will halt on the
line gained at 15.00 hours exactly.—All Austrians within the line gained
this hour will be considered prisoners-of-war.—Austrians not within this
line will at 15.00 hours retire for a distance of at least three
kilometres.—The utmost care will be taken to see that these instructions
are carried out.—The contents of this wire will be immediately passed to
all units who are in touch, in case they should not receive them by
other methods.—Acknowledge.”
The Battalion took the news quietly. We were too weary to be jubilant;
besides which, our rations for the day had not arrived, and there is
never cause for joy under those conditions. Nor would these rations have
turned up before we moved, had it not been for the strenuous efforts of
the Quartermaster, Captain E. Nichol.
At 10 a.m. the Brigade (less 1/4th Battalion Oxford & Bucks Light
Infantry, who remained in charge of the prisoners) once more took to the
roads, and, after marching sixteen miles, reached by 3 p.m. the little
village of Madrano, just east of Pergine. The towns and villages through
which we passed were filthy in the extreme. Dead horses lay at intervals
along the road, while the villagers were getting to work cutting
rump-steaks off them.
Except for a few stragglers, no further signs of the enemy were seen.
The captures made by the Division since November 1 amounted to some
22,000 prisoners, 165 howitzers, 263 guns, besides uncountable small
arms, machine guns, and material of all kinds. In addition, there were
large numbers of abandoned guns in the neighbourhood of Vezzena and
along the Val d’Assa, of which no count could be made.
On the evening of November 4, the Divisional Commander issued the
following Order of the Day:
“OFFICERS, N.C.O.’S AND MEN OF THE 48TH DIVISION,
“Your achievement during the last few days of the most profound military
events deserves unstinted praise. After fourteen weeks of trench warfare
and arduous work, chiefly at night, combined with frequent raids of the
most difficult though successful nature, you have undertaken an attack
on a front originally allotted to two divisions, against what ought to
have been impregnable mountain positions; you have swept away the enemy
rearguards, and, acting as the vanguard of the Sixth Italian Army, you
have advanced so rapidly and with such resolution, that the retiring
enemy have had no time to reform and have left over 20,000 prisoners,
hundreds of guns and immeasurable booty in the hands of the Division.
“The mere performance of the march in the time, and under the conditions
you endured, would have been, even without opposition, considered a
creditable feat. You can justly claim that the favourable situation of
the Italian Armies on this front at 15.00 hours to-day, when one of the
most memorable armistices in history was signed, is largely due to your
exertions and resolution.
“As your Divisional Commander I cordially thank you.
“(_Sd._) H. B. WALKER, _Major General,
“Cdg. 48th Division._”
A few’ days later the Divisional Commander received the following
message from General F. R. Earl of Cavan, K.P., K.C.B., M.V.O.,
Commanding-in-Chief British Force in Italy:
“I have been waiting to hear from Sixth Army Commander outlines of your
great victory. I have also been waiting for the definite order for your
concentration with the XIVth Corps. To-day I have received both, and I
hasten to send all ranks my intense appreciation of their great service,
and my sincere thanks to you personally for the drive and determination
with which you conducted your arduous operations.
“The C.I.G.S. sent his special congratulations to the 48th Division
to-day by King’s Messenger. British troops may well be proud of their
actions in mountains and in plains, but the pride I feel in them exceeds
all.”
And this, incredible as it seemed, was really the end of the war for the
Bucks Battalion.
How little had we guessed, when we left that cold dark camp by the
Kaberlaba road four days before, that we were setting out on an attack
which would so swiftly complete an overwhelming disaster to Austrian
arms and Austrian Empire, greater and more fatal than Austerlitz or
Sadowa!
CHAPTER XIII
AFTER THE ARMISTICE—THE END
_November 1918 to March 1919_
Although we had good reason to hope that, for us, the Great War was
over, there still remained the possibility that we might be called upon
for an attack on Germany through Austria, and rumour, always busy when
hopes were high, was inclined to send us back to the Western front,
despite the news that operations were going wondrously well there
without us. Our fate was decided, at any rate temporarily, on November
6, by receipt of orders to march back to Caldonazzo on the following
morning. This proved to be the first of a six days’ march, covering in
all some eighty miles. Other nights were spent at our old haunts
Vezzena, Val Portule, Granezza, Thiene, and on November 13 we reached
the rest-billets allotted to the Battalion in the villages of Maglio and
Novale.
Before the start on this march from Madrano, the Battalion had collected
a motley assortment of additional transport which we had captured during
the advance. It included five Austrian waggons with their horses, all of
an indifferent stamp, underfed and ill-cared for, and a cooker drawn by
two white ponies, rather bigger than mice. These must have been the
favourites of the Austrians, and they were the delight of our own
Transport section, every man clamouring to be detailed as their driver.
The various Austrian dumps provided more than sufficient material
wherewith to fill our extra waggons, while at Vezzena it became most
difficult to determine what should be taken and what left; for, as has
been previously mentioned, this place had formed the dump of an Austrian
Corps.
It was decided that flour, oats and hay would best repay their carriage,
so our loads were made up largely of these.
To every company was allotted a sack of the captured flour, from which
each man could make his own pudding. One man, however, thought stolen
flour, like stolen kisses, the sweetest, and preferred to disregard
orders and loot his portion; but he broke into the wrong hut, and was
found later endeavouring to make his pudding out of cement.
At Granezza we received the great news that an armistice had been signed
with Germany. We knew, of course, that this meant complete victory, but
already we had lived ten crowded days of glorious life: hard fighting
and hard marching, the utter rout of the whole Austrian Army, captures
of prisoners, guns and material beyond our wildest dreams, the surrender
of Trent, an armistice at our dictation, the daily rising flood of good
news from France, bearing on its crest the certainty of speedy triumph.
Enthusiasm could hardly mount higher.
It would be difficult to explain why so many of us were sorry to bid a
last farewell to Granezza, for there was remarkably little attractive
about it. But there had been so many occasions when, during a long turn
in the trenches, we had looked forward intensely to a rest here, that no
doubt it had come to frame itself in our minds as a pleasant spot. We
had thought of Granezza when pleasant spots were rare, and our ideas of
pleasure and comfort easily satisfied. But with visions of home in
England, there was really little sense in our regrets at leaving.
The march down the hill and on south to Thiene was a long one of some
twenty-two miles. The men, as usual, marched exceedingly well, in spite
of having been on the road throughout the four previous days.
At Thiene we were ordered to hand over to the Italian authorities the
whole of our captured transport, including even the two white ponies,
which the Transport section dearly loved and longed to retain.
The following day’s march of eighteen miles carried us to the villages
of Maglio and Novale. It had been hinted that these were to be our final
billets, so that we were most anxious that they should be comfortable
or, at any rate, prove capable of being made so. Demobilisation was an
uncertain quantity, and no man knew how much longer it would be
necessary for him to remain in Italy. Though of one thing, every
officer, N.C.O. and man was quite convinced—that when demobilisation did
start he himself should be the very first man to be released.
On the whole, the billets did prove good, and were soon made still
better.
“Spit and polish” at once became the order of the day. Discipline, so
far from being relaxed, became stricter. On the other hand, the hours of
training were considerably reduced, and sports and games organised and
encouraged to fill the hours of leisure. Competitions of every
description, organised by every unit and formation, became almost
bewildering.
[Illustration:
THE LAST QUARTER GUARD, ITALY, 1919.
]
Of the Brigade events the Battalion won the cross-country race, and the
inter-battalion and inter-company football competitions. C Company, who
always seemed to shelter at least a dozen first-class players, were
responsible for winning the Battalion competition, and represented the
Brigade in the Divisional competition, where they reached the final
before being beaten by a company of the 1/7th Battalion Worcestershire
Regiment.
Training became largely a matter of drill, though difficulty was
experienced even in this, as the size of the biggest field was only just
large enough to allow of battalion drill being carried out on it.
All the necessaries were obtained to enable every man to turn himself
out as smartly as possible, and at the end of a few weeks the Battalion
probably looked smarter than it had ever done since the day it left
Chelmsford on March 30, 1915.
The results showed themselves in inspections carried out by the
Divisional and Brigade Commanders, and by a French Divisional Commander,
by all of whom the Battalion was congratulated on its turn-out,
smartness and march past.
Christmas was anticipated by the purchase in November of three large
pigs, and a pig “board,” which was specially appointed to superintend
their welfare and organise their rations, became the target of no little
humour—and this in spite of its members’ efficiency.
In the past we had always been rather proud of being able to secure
sufficient turkeys for the Battalion, but this year the home-fed pig was
even more popular, and Christmas dinners of pork, vegetables, plum
pudding, oranges, nuts and beer, were voted a huge success.
Demobilisation, which at first proceeded slowly, quickened up about the
middle of January, and gradually increased throughout February, when men
were dispersed at the rate of over fifty a week.
Those men who had enlisted during and after 1916, and who were
consequently retained in the Service, were given the choice of two
battalions to which they could transfer, the 1/5th Battalion Royal
Warwickshire Regiment and the 1/6th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment,
these being the two which had been detailed to represent the Division in
the Army of Occupation. The Royal Warwicks were to remain in Italy,
while the Gloucesters were to be moved to Scutari.
The large majority of our men voted for the 5th Royal Warwicks, partly
on account of their destination, but chiefly because they were now
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel P. A. Hall, D.S.O., M.C., a Bucks
officer.
To those of us who were left with the Battalion, this form of
demobilisation became a most melancholy proceeding. To watch the
Battalion, of which we were all so proud, being gradually reduced to
nothing, was depressing in the extreme. One longed that the end could
have come with a last and final dismissal of the full Battalion on a
parade ground in England.
By the middle of March we were reduced to a cadre of five officers and
fifty other ranks, which was the most that any infantry unit was allowed
to retain in order to bring home the Regimental stores.
On March 23 the cadre left Novale, reaching Aylesbury on the 31st. Here
these remnants, under Lieutenant-Colonel L. L. C. Reynolds, D.S.O.,
paraded once again on that Square in front of the Town Hall where, more
than four and a half years ago, the whole Battalion had paraded on
mobilisation.
[Illustration:
THE CADRE, 1919.
]
And so ended for us those wonderful years, in our brief record of which
no claim is made of greater deeds than were achieved by others; enough
that the Battalion never failed to uphold the great traditions of the
British Army. Throughout those long, hard years, trying to the utmost
the patience, the resolution, the courage and the endurance of all
ranks, every officer, N.C.O. and man did his duty cheerfully.
In many a Midland home, for generations to come, names shall be held in
honour, and question shall be asked, “What did they do?” Let the answer
be: “In the Great War they served with The First Bucks Battalion.”
APPENDIX I
OPERATION ORDERS
_Secret._ 0.0./2.
A
1ST BUCKS BATTALION
TOMBOIS FARM
_April 1917_
1. _48th Division_ will continue its advance to-night. Bucks Battalion
will capture Tombois Farm, with a second objective the ridge due E. of
the farm. 4th R. Berks Regiment will capture Gillemont Farm. 143rd
Infantry Brigade will capture Catalet Copse and Le Petit Priel Farm.
2. _Zero hour_—11.30 p.m.
Zero hour for 143rd Infantry Brigade will be—10 p.m.
3. Bucks Battalion will attack with three Companies,—C Company right, B
Company left, D Company will be in echelon behind C Company, and will go
through to second objective.
A Company will take over outpost line as early as possible after dusk.
One Company 1/5th Gloucester Regiment, with half-section machine-gun
company, will be in support about F.16.b.1.9.
4. _Formation._—Attacking companies will be deployed (by zero—30
minutes) on a two-platoon frontage of 150 yards, each platoon in two
lines, 25 yards’ distance between lines.
Each of the attacking companies will have one Bombing Section equipped
as such.
5. _Forming-up positions:_
Right Company W. of Sart Farm.
Left Company About F.10.d.5.7.
Third Company About F.16.b.7.6.
6. _Objectives:_
(_a_) _Right Company_ will direct its attack S. and E. of Tombois Farm.
(_b_) _Left Company_ on W. and N. of Tombois Farm.
Each of the above companies will arrange to leave one section at point
where its outer flank crosses enemy trench, to protect its flank against
possible counter-attack up trench.
(_c_) _Third Company_ will follow Right Company, and occupy enemy trench
F.11.b.3.1. to F.11.d.5.9., and remain on line until satisfied that
leading companies have attained their objectives, retaining its
formation (i.e. rear lines not closing up), when it will go through and
occupy ridge E. of Tombois Farm, approximately E. of road running N. and
S. through F.12.a.
7. _Consolidation:_
(_a_) _Right Company_, on attaining its objective, will establish itself
from road F.11.b.3.5. (exclusive) to F.12.c., with support about trench
F.11.c.0.5.
(_b_) _Left Company_ will establish itself from road F.11.b.3.5.
(inclusive) to F.3.c., gaining touch with 143rd Brigade (1/5th R.
Warwick Regiment), with support about F.10.b.
(_c_) _Third Company_ will establish itself on ridge, extending S. to
gain touch with 1/4th R. Berks Regiment, in F.12.c., with support dug in
on our side of slope.
8. _Artillery Barrage_ as communicated to companies this afternoon.
9. Attacking companies will carry S.O.S. signal lights, Very lights and
pistols, aeroplane flares. Every man will carry one extra bandolier
S.A.A. All available wire-cutters will also be taken forward.
10. _Dump for S.A.A._ will be formed about road junction in F.15.b.,
under Regimental Sergeant-Major.
11. _Dump of Tools_ will be formed at road junction F.16.a.9.7. Support
Company will be prepared to take these forward without delay.
12. _Dividing Line_ between the Battalion and 1/4th R. Berks Regiment,
during attack and after capture of objectives, will be line
F.17.c.0.0.—A.7.b.0.0.
13. _Covering Parties_ will be pushed forward during the work of
consolidation.
14. _Countersign_ to be made known to all concerned. This has been
communicated to 143rd Infantry Brigade.
15. One section Royal Engineers and one platoon R. Sussex Regiment will
be available to help with work of consolidation.
16. _Contact Aeroplane_ will fly over at about 6.30 a.m., or, if misty,
one hour after mist lifts. Advanced troops will be careful to answer the
call for flares.
17. _Battalion Headquarters_—F.15.d.9.7. (present C Company
Headquarters).
18. _Report Centre_—F.16.a.9.8.
19. _Dressing Station_—F.15.b.4.0.
(_Sd._) P. L. WRIGHT,
_Captain and Adjutant, 1st Bucks Battalion_.
16.4.17.
Copies to:
1–4 Companies.
5 Support Company.
6–7 Battalion Headquarters.
8 1/5th Gloucester Regiment.
9 File.
10–11 War diary.
_Secret._ 0.0.25., _Copy_ 6.
B
1ST BUCKS BATTALION
STEENBEEK AND ST. JULIEN
_August 1917_
1. Fifth Army will attack on “Z” day.
2. The Battalion will capture two objectives and push out an outpost
line in front of second objective.
3. Objectives and boundaries as in plan issued herewith.
4. 1/5th Gloucesters will attack on right, and 1/4th Oxfords on left of
this Battalion. 1/4th R. Berks are in Brigade Reserve.
5. The Battalion will attack on a two-company frontage and in four
waves. Each company on a two-platoon front. A Company on left and B
Company on right, will form the first and second waves. C Company on
left and D Company on right, will form third and fourth waves.
6. Deployment will be covered by troops of 143rd Infantry Brigade,
located 150 yards E. of Steenbeek.
(_This did not take place, as Warwicks were unable to get their outposts
across the stream, the enemy being too close._)
7. The two leading companies will deploy E. of the Steenbeek, with 15
yards between lines and 30 yards between waves. The two rear companies
will be in Artillery formation between the Steenbeek and a line 350
yards W. of it, and will advance in this formation to deploy 350 yards
behind the Green Line, unless rifle or machine-gun fire is encountered,
when they will deploy any time after crossing Steenbeek.
7_a_. The initial deployment is close to avoid enemy barrage. When
advance begins, waves will open out to obtain a distance of 350 yards.
8. First wave will halt on and consolidate a line running through
Hillock Farm and the line of gunpits to its right. Each platoon will be
followed by a mopping-up party of one bombing section, which will deal
with the enemy strong point in its line of advance, and will hold this
until further orders are received.
9. Second wave at zero + 35 minutes will capture, mop up and consolidate
the Green Line (Spot Farm—Springfield—Langemarck Road). Each platoon
will be followed by a mopping-up party of one bombing section, which
will deal with any enemy strong points or trenches which may be met with
after passing through first wave.
10. Third wave will be ready to cross Green Line at zero + 55 minutes,
and follow barrage.
Right Company third wave, at zero + 1.30, will capture, mop up and
consolidate the Red Line from Bend to South. Consolidation will be
carried out W. of old enemy wire. This company will immediately put out
a temporary outpost line from D.7.b.0.8., where it will link up with
Gloucesters, through the houses at D.7.a.3.9. to I.9.
Left Company third wave, at same hour, will double-block the Red Line at
the Bend, and put out a temporary outpost line from this point to our
junction with the Oxfords, on the Green Line facing N.
At zero + 3 hours, this third wave will capture, mop up and consolidate
the remainder of the Red Line, having swung to the right with the
barrage from zero + 2.35.
11. Fourth wave at zero + 3 hours will capture and consolidate the Blue
Line.
Right Company: Stroppe Farm, and link up with Left Company.
Left Company: Genoa and Hubner Farm.
Posts will be thrown out in front of these points to cover
consolidation.
12. Gloucesters will capture their portion of Red and Blue Lines at zero
+ 1.30.
Oxfords will capture their Red and Blue Lines at zero + three hours.
13. In each case, before advance of barrage begins, it will quicken up
for the preceding five minutes.
14. Machine-gun barrages will conform to Artillery.
15. During pause on Green Line there will be a smoke barrage.
(_Sd._) L. L. C. REYNOLDS,
_Lieutenant-Colonel,
Comdg. 1st Bucks Battalion_.
12.8.17.
Copies to:
1–4—Companies.
5—Headquarters.
6—File.
7–8—War Diary.
_Secret._ _Copy No. 6_
1ST BUCKS BATTALION
_Amendment No._ 1 _to_ 1_st Bucks Battalion_ 0.0.25.
1. Paragraph 11, delete lines 1 and 2, and substitute:
“Fourth wave at zero + 3 hours will pass through third wave, after the
latter has assaulted and captured the remainder of the Red Line, and
will follow the barrage to assault, capture and consolidate their
objectives on the Blue Line.”
2. Each wave, having captured its objective, will at once reorganise,
and be prepared to assist the next wave in the capture of its objective
if required.
(_Sd._) L. L. C. REYNOLDS,
_Lieutenant-Colonel,
Comdg. 1st Bucks Battalion._
13.8.17.
_Copies to all recipients of 0.0.25._
_Secret._ _Copy No. 6_
1ST BUCKS BATTALION
_Amendment No. 2 to 1st Bucks Battalion 0.0.25_
Reference paragraph 7, the two leading companies will deploy W. of
Steenbeek, and will start to cross it at zero − 7 minutes, reforming on
E. side before advancing.
(_Sd._) L. L. C. REYNOLDS,
_Lieutenant-Colonel,
Comdg. 1st Bucks Battalion._
14.8.17.
_Copies to all recipients of 0.0.25._
_Secret._ _0.0.26., Copy 6_
_1st Bucks Battalion_
_Reference 0.0.25._
_ARTILLERY BARRAGES._
1. The Artillery Barrage will commence at zero, 300 yards E. of
Steenbeek, and creep forward at the rate of 100 yards every five
minutes, to lift off the Green Line at zero + 35 minutes, i.e. second
wave has 35 minutes to go 900 yards—nearly four minutes for every 100
yards.
2. Barrage halts 200 yards in front of Green Line, from zero + 50 to
zero + 1.10. It will slow down, but will quicken up at zero + 1.5, i.e.
five minutes before again moving forward; this will be the signal for
the next (third) wave to get up to it.
3. At zero + 1.10, barrage will again move forward, at same rate on the
right flank but slower on the left, to lift off the Red Line from the
Bend to the S. at zero + 1.20.
4. Barrage halts 150 yards in front of Dotted Green and Blue Lines, from
zero + 1.40 to zero + 2.35. It will slow down to quicken up again five
minutes before moving on.
5. At zero + 2.35, that part of the barrage W. of Red Line will roll
back to lift off remainder of Red Line, i.e. that part N. of the Bend,
at zero + 3.0.
6. The barrage will continue to roll back from zero + 3.0 to zero +
3.35, when it will be about 200 yards E. of the Blue Line, and will
continue here until zero + 5.35, when it will cease.
(_Sd._) L. L. C. REYNOLDS,
_Lieutenant-Colonel,
Comdg. 1st Bucks Battalion_.
12.8.17.
Copies to:
1–4—Companies.
5—Headquarters.
6—File.
7–8—War Diary.
_Secret._ _Copy No. 6_
1ST BUCKS BATTALION
_Instructions Reference 1st Bucks Battalion_ 0.0.25.
1. _Battalion Headquarters_ at zero will be at C.12.c.0.3.—House. It
will probably move forward after capture of Green Line to about
C.12.c.5.9.
2. _Brigade Headquarters_ will be at Cheddar Villa. Brigade Forward
Station from zero −2 hours will be at C.12.a.0.7. After zero it will
move forward to Hillock Farm, C.12.a.5.5., as soon as situation permits.
3. _Dressing Station_ will be at Battalion Headquarters at C.12.c.0.3.
4. Reports of completion of assembly will be sent to Battalion
Headquarters.
5. Each post will have a plan of action ready to meet a counter-attack.
This must be explained to all.
6. Troops will keep close to barrage and conform with it.
7. The word “Retire” will not be used. Any one heard to say it will be
shot immediately.
8. Compass-bearings will be required to march on. Compasses will be
carried by all officers and sergeants.
9. German counter-attacks are now often led by lowflying aeroplanes.
These will be fired on by Lewis guns and rifles. Care will be taken to
aim well in front of the aeroplanes. Look-out will be kept to avoid
shooting any of our own machines which may dive on the enemy planes.
10. All troops will be warned not to bunch behind tanks, as these draw
enemy fire.
11. _Tanks._ All ranks will be warned to look out for tank signals.
Officers and as many N.C.O.’s as possible will carry “Tank Coloured Disc
and Light Code.”
12. A derelict tank may be used to form a strong point.
13. Mopping up will be done carefully, as enemy may hide in cellars or
ditches, etc., some distance from his fighting positions. Search will be
thorough.
14. All ranks will be warned that prisoners are only required to give
name and regiment, and that any further information given to the enemy
means loss of their comrades’ lives.
15. _Contact Aeroplanes_:
(_a_) Markings—Two black rectangular flags, 2′ × 1′ 3″, attached to and
projecting from lower plane on either side of fuselage.
(_b_) Contact aeroplanes will be flying at approximately:
Zero + 1 hour.
Zero + 1 hour 45 minutes.
Zero + 3 hours 15 minutes.
Zero + 4 hours 15 minutes.
At these hours Infantry will be particularly on the look-out for a call
to light flares, although calls may come at other times as well.
(_c_) Leading line _only_ to show flares, which will be lighted in
groups of three when actually called for.
(_d_) A protection aeroplane will work all day “Z” day to warn Artillery
of any enemy counter-attacks.
16. Use of dummy trenches to distract enemy’s fire should be remembered.
17. The greatest care will be taken over synchronisation of watches.
18. No barrage maps, orders or notes of operations will be carried into
action.
19. The following maps only will be taken:
Poelcappelle, 1/10,000, Edn. 1 (Paper Map), and the Message Maps
issued.
20. _Distinguishing Marks._ Third and fourth waves will wear white patch
on back. The same will be worn by the leading Battalion of 143rd and
144th Infantry Brigades. Arm-bands, as issued, will be worn by
signallers, runners, etc.
21. C Company’s left platoon on the Red Line will dig a strong point
about C.6.d.7.8., which will be named Bucks Fort.
22. Visual Signalling stations will be established at Mouse Trap Farm,
Cheddar Villa and Hillock Farm.
23. _Prisoners of War._ Companies will escort prisoners back as far as
the Steenbeek, where they will be taken over by escort detailed by 143rd
Infantry Brigade at St. Julien Road Bridge, and by 144th Infantry
Brigade at C.11.b.6.4., just N.E. Hugel Hollow. All documents and other
belongings of prisoners will be sent with the prisoners as far as
Divisional Headquarters. This is most important, and must be made known
to all ranks.
(_Sd._) P. L. WRIGHT,
_Lieutenant and Adjutant, 1st Bucks Battalion._
14.8.17.
_Copies to all recipients of 0.0.25._
_Secret._ _Copy No. 9_
C
BUCKS BATTALION ORDER NO. 232
RAID ON AUSTRIAN TRENCHES
_Reference Map_: _Camporovere_ 1/10,000
1. The Bucks Battalion (on right) and 1/4th Battalion R. Berks Regiment
(on left) will raid area of Austrian trenches shown on attached tracing,
on “X” day, at a time to be notified later, and capture or kill the
garrison.
2. The Battalion will mop up the whole of the area shown from Centre
Road (inclusive) to the right.
Objectives as given on map issued to companies yesterday.
3. The Battalion will be formed up ready to attack by zero −15 minutes,
according to plan issued to companies yesterday.
4. The forming-up positions will be 50 yards S. of track Ave—Midway
House, and immediately to west of latter point.
5. Two platoons of B Company will cover the front and right flank of
Battalion while forming up. Should any enemy be in a position to
interfere with the forming-up, they will be rushed silently with the
bayonet.
As soon as the forming up is complete, these platoons will withdraw
silently to their allotted position on the right flank, and be
responsible for that flank until the time arrives for them to proceed to
their own objective.
6. Point of entry into enemy lines, except for two flank platoons of B
Company, will be from _E_ in S_E_C on right to Battalion left boundary.
The two flank platoons of B Company will move at zero to a position
south of Sec, and will rush their objective from there as barrage lifts
at zero + 22 minutes.
7. _The Attack._ All platoons, except two platoons of B Company
mentioned above, will advance to the attack in the order of forming-up:
A Company will move direct to its objective;
D Company will pass through A Company direct to its objectives, as
artillery barrage permits;
C Company and leading two platoons of B Company will take disused trench
running north from _E_ in S_E_C as a guide. They will move up close to
west side of this trench until opposite their objectives, when they will
turn to the right.
The right platoons will gain a position to rush their objectives in
Sunken Road, when artillery barrage lifts at zero + 14 minutes.
The left platoons will pass through the right platoons, and rush their
objectives on enemy front line facing S.E., when Royal Artillery barrage
lifts at zero + 22 minutes. At this same time the two flank platoons of
B Company will rush their objective in enemy front line, and will be
prepared to help their platoon in Sunken Road if necessary.
8. Platoons will be prepared to remain in their objectives until zero +
90 minutes.
9. _Withdrawal._ The withdrawal will not commence until the party of the
R. Berks at the farthest objective have completed their task. A
liaison-post with the R. Berks will be established at H.728.559. D
Company will detail a section under a sergeant for this duty, who will
receive special instructions.
The signal for withdrawing will be Gas Rattles.
When withdrawal commences it will be from the farthest objectives first.
Platoons will remain in their objectives until those in front of them
are reported all clear, A and B Companies’ platoons in the front line
being the last to withdraw.
10. The Artillery action will consist of five phases. 18-pounder
barrages, as shown on attached tracing.
6-inch howitzers, 4·5 howitzers and French Artillery will engage special
targets.
11. The Battalion will move to forming-up position by San Sisto—Ave
road, and thence through gap which will be made in piquet-line wire
about H.725.483. Road allotted to this Battalion from 9.30 p.m. to 10
p.m., by which time it will be clear for the R. Berks.
12. The withdrawal will be by the same route.
13. A “Checking-in” Post will be established at the gap in piquet-line
wire, to which all parties will report on withdrawal.
14. On morning of zero day the Battalion will move into support position
in Right Brigade Sector, and will be relieved there on zero + one day.
15. “Special Instructions” are issued separately.
16. Battalion Command Post will be at western end of Gun-pit Post,
H.730.485.
17. Aid Post position will be notified later.
(_Sd._) L. L. C. REYNOLDS,
_Lieutenant-Colonel,
Comdg. Bucks Battalion_.
23.8.18.
Copies to:
1–4—Companies.
5—1/4th Battalion R. Berks Regiment.
6—145th Infantry Brigade.
7—File.
8–9—War Diary.
_Secret._
_Amendment No. 1 to Bucks Battalion Order No. 232_
1. Paragraph 16 cancelled, substitute: Battalion Command Post until zero
will be Midway House; after zero it will move forward to Lone Tree
House, H.726.548.
2. Reference tracing of R. Artillery barrages, the barrage at zero will
come down 100 yards in front of enemy front line. At zero + 1 it will
lift to front line, where it will remain until zero + 5, as before
arranged.
3. Reference paragraph 17.
R.A.P. will be off S. Sisto road at H.718.423, a dugout usually used by
machine-gun Battalion. There will be a guide on road to show any wounded
the place.
(_Sd._) L. L. C. REYNOLDS,
_Lieutenant-Colonel,
Comdg. Bucks Battalion_.
25.8.18.
_Secret._
_Special Instructions for Raid on “X” Day, to accompany Bucks Battalion
Order No. 232_
1. All officers will wear camouflage dress and carry rifles. Sticks are
forbidden.
2. Other ranks will wear drill order.
3. All will wear a white band, 6 inches wide, on each upper arm.
4. Distinctive marks for parties detailed for separate objectives will
not be worn.
5. All will blacken their faces.
6. An inspection will be held to ensure that no papers, maps or identity
discs, or other marks, are carried.
7. Rifle grenades will be taken.
8. Each man will carry two bombs in bandoliers or special bags. Adjutant
will arrange.
9. P. bombs (forty per Battalion) will be taken.
10. S.A.A. only 50 rounds per man. Reserve will be obtained from Piquet
Line if required.
11. Wire-cutters (thirty-two per Battalion) will be taken.
12. Torches (fifty per Battalion) will be taken.
13. One T.M. will be attached to each battalion. Thirty rounds per gun
will be carried. Reserve of twenty per gun will be placed in Piquet
Line. Pack transport will be used.
14. Battalion Command Post will have two separate telephones, placed so
that one shell will not destroy both. Wires also will be well separated.
15. Sufficient runners and visual signalling will be arranged.
16. Each battalion provides a Liaison Officer with two runners for the
other, and the two battalion command posts will be connected by a
special wire and telephones.
17. The Second-in-Command will be responsible for all assembly
arrangements, including forming up tapes, tapes from Front Line through
Piquet Line, wire to Deployment positions, and a supply of tapes to take
forward to enemy front line.
18. 144th Infantry Brigade will arrange to:
(1) Take over all prisoners at Piquet Line.
Escorts from Front, on handing over, will form a Battalion
Reserve.
(2) Provide extra stretcher-bearers.
(3) Cover the flanks if required.
(4) Keep all routes clear.
19. One R.A. officer will be at Brigade Command Post, and one at each
Battalion Command Post, with separate telephone and wire.
20. Red flares will be the signal for the protective barrage to re-open
for ten minutes on each call.
21. All ranks will be shown all available photos and plans.
22. Every officer and sergeant will read S.S. 602 on X − 1 day.
23. All will be warned that if wounded (unless seriously) it is their
duty to fight on, unless permission to fall out is obtained from a
senior officer.
24. Wounded will, if at all capable, bring back their arms and
equipment.
25. Moppers-up will be detailed fully.
26. Each Battalion will establish one block on the outer flank.
27. Every dugout will be bombed.
28. All will be cautioned to shoot at once anyone saying “Retire.”
29. Every man cutting wire will be covered by a comrade.
30. Countersign will be notified later.
31. Watches will be checked at Battalion Command Post at an hour to be
notified.
32. Battalions will be reported ready in position by code word LION.
33. Signal for retire will be Gas Rattles.
34. Instructions, reference routes, etc., for move to front and
withdrawal through Front Line will be issued later.
35. (_a_) A Company’s right platoon in enemy front line will detail a
Lewis gun and bombers to stop in trench between _E_ in S_E_C and house
until B Company’s platoon join them.
(_b_) C Company’s northern platoon in enemy front line will detail a
similar party to block trench where it crosses road and stop any attempt
of enemy to counter-attack from N. and N.E.
(_c_) C Company’s platoons in Sunken Road, and D Company’s platoons at
S. M. Maddalena, will each post two Lewis guns to stop any enemy
interference from N.
(_Sd._) L. L. C. REYNOLDS,
_Lieutenant-Colonel,
Comdg. Bucks Battalion_.
24.8.18.
_Secret._
_Special Instructions No. 2 for Raid on “X” Day, to accompany Bucks
Battalion Order No. 232_
In order to mystify and mislead the enemy, the following arrangements
will be made:
I. (1) Each platoon detailed to occupy the front line will tell off a
selected lance/corporal and two men, whose duty will be to fire Very
lights from the Austrian front line _towards the British line_.
(2) Each party will take a Very pistol and such ammunition as can be
arranged—Austrian, if available—and if not, twelve rounds British.
(3) They will be instructed to fire only from parts of the trench where
enemy posts are found, or show signs of such occupation.
(4) They will also be provided with torches and will search for stores
of white Austrian Very lights. Only white ones must be fired.
(5) Care will be taken that no coloured lights are fired by these
parties.
II. (1) Each Battalion Headquarters will be provided with red and green
Very lights.
(2) These will be used by order of the C.O. only.
(3) Special and reliable men will be told off for these and provided
with Very pistols.
(4) Close observation will be made, and if it is seen that red lights
bring down the Austrian barrage, green will be fired.
(5) If green lights bring down the enemy’s barrage, then red will be
fired.
(_Sd._) L. L. C. REYNOLDS,
_Lieutenant-Colonel,
Comdg. Bucks Battalion_.
25.8.18.
Prisoners will be taken over by the 144th Infantry Brigade at Yellow
House.
_Secret._
_Special Instructions No. 3. for Raid on “X” Day, to accompany Bucks
Battalion Order No. 232_
1. “Checking-in” Post will be established at gap in piquet-line wire
immediately W. of Gun-pit Post, consisting of:
R.S.M.,
Provost Sergeant,
Police,
Pioneers.
2. Prisoners will be sent to “Checking-in” Post, where they will be
taken over by Provost Sergeant, who will send them back to junction of
S. Sisto Road with Front Line, where they will be handed over to 144th
Brigade and a receipt obtained.
Escorts from front will return to their platoons after handing over to
Provost Sergeant.
Previous order concerning prisoners is cancelled.
3. Only officers will carry Gas Rattles.
4. Platoons of B and C Companies in enemy front line will watch right
flank, especially during the withdrawal, in case enemy should attempt to
counter-attack from direction of Clama.
5. All Lewis guns will be taken into action.
6. All ranks will be cautioned of the importance of silence while
advancing to forming-up position and while forming up, to move quietly
and prevent arms rattling.
7. Leading platoons in the advance must be prepared to cut rapidly any
wire which causes obstruction.
8. Platoons will be warned of the importance of keeping locked up close
during the advance to forming-up position. The Platoon Commander will
lead his platoon, and the next senior will march in rear to see that
those in front are closed up.
9. Advance guard platoons of B Company will report to Major Hall, at
junction of S. Sisto Road and Front Line, at 9 p.m.
10. Companies will move up in the following order, passing point on road
opposite present Battalion Headquarters at times stated, maintaining 100
yards between platoons; formation—file:
Battalion Headquarters 9.00 p.m.
A Company 9.02 p.m.
C „ 9.06 p.m.
B „ (less two platoons) 9.10 p.m.
D „ 9.12 p.m.
On reaching gap in front-line wire single file will be formed and
maintained until Assembly position is reached, when units will reform
file.
The leading platoon, after passing front line, will move at a very slow
pace to enable platoons in rear to close up to twenty paces’ interval,
which will be strictly maintained.
11. Watches will be synchronised at Battalion Headquarters at 5 p.m.
One officer per company, with two reliable watches, will report at that
time.
(_Sd._) L. L. C. REYNOLDS,
_Lieutenant-Colonel,
Comdg. Bucks Battalion_.
26.8.18.
D
ATTACK OF NOVEMBER 1, 1918
[COPY OF WIRE]
────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────────┬────────
Words, 160. │ Received. │
│ From: H.R.Q. │
│ By: L/Cpl. Witney. │
────────────────────┴─────────────────────────────────────────┼────────
SERVICE INSTRUCTIONS: H.R.Q. Urgent Priority. │
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┴────────
────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────────────────
TO │ Rush.
────────────────────┼─────────────────┬───────────────────────┬────────
Sender’s Number │ Day of Month │ In reply to Number │ AAA
BM 157 │ 1 │ — │
────────────────────┴─────────────────┴───────────────────────┴────────
Divn. will capture line Croce San Antonio—Mosciagh to-day aaa French are
attacking M. Longara aaa Right bdy. west edge of Gallio Wood along C.
Giardini—S. Antonio road inclusive aaa Left boundary of Bde. Capitello
Mulche—Bosco—C. Sichestal Mosciagh road inclusive aaa Interbattn.
boundary L of RENDE_L_A—first E of _E_BENE—300 yards E. of Z in M. CATZ
to grid line at 70 and north to 71 aaa Arty. bombardment commencing 0500
hours on back area aaa Barrage on Winter Stellung 0545 to 0550 aaa M.
Catz and grid line 69.79.89 0550 to 0635 aaa Grid line 60.70.80 0635 to
0735 aaa Grid line 61.71.81 0735 to 0935 aaa Objectives to be captured
at last-named hours in each case aaa Rush right Roar left Run reserve
aaa Rapid will not move aaa Other arrangements as fixed by telephone aaa
ref. map C. Dodici and Asiago 1/25000.
───────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
FROM │Race.
───────────────┴───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
APPENDIX II
ROLLS OF OFFICERS WHO TOOK PART IN THE MAIN ACTIONS OF 1916–1917–1918
ROLL OF OFFICERS WHO TOOK PART IN THE ATTACK ON THE GERMAN TRENCHES
BETWEEN OVILLERS AND POZIÈRES, ON THE NIGHT JULY 20/21, 1916.
_Battalion Headquarters_
Lieut.-Col. L. L. C. Reynolds (commanding Battalion).
Lieut. P. L. Wright (Adjutant).
2/Lieut. J. B. Hales (Intelligence Officer).
Capt. L. E. Hughes, R.A.M.C. (Medical Officer).
_A Company (attacking Company)_
Capt. N. S. Reid, M.C.
2/Lieut. B. C. Rigden (wounded).
2/Lieut. C. G. Abery (killed).
2/Lieut. H. E. Molloy.
_B Company (attacking Company)_
Capt. L. W. Crouch (killed).
Lieut. R. Gregson-Ellis.
Lieut. R. E. M. Young.
2/Lieut. H. C. E. Mason (wounded).
_C Company (attacking Company)_
Capt. G. G. Jackson (wounded and prisoner).
2/Lieut. H. M. Shepherd (wounded).
2/Lieut. A. P. Godfrey (wounded).
2/Lieut. J. P. Chapman (killed).
2/Lieut. C. W. Trimmer (killed).
_D Company (Company in reserve)_
Capt. E. V. Birchall.
2/Lieut. F. D. Earle.
2/Lieut. F. H. Rover.
2/Lieut. J. F. Arnott.
ROLL OF OFFICERS WHO TOOK PART IN THE ATTACK ON THE GERMAN TRENCHES AT
6.30 A.M. ON JULY 23, 1916.
_Battalion Headquarters_
Lieut.-Col. L. L. C. Reynolds (commanding Battalion).
Lieut. P. L. Wright (Adjutant).
2/Lieut. J. B. Hales (Intelligence Officer).
Capt. L. E. Hughes, R.A.M.C. (Medical Officer).
_A Company (Company in support)_
Capt. N. S. Reid, M.C.
2/Lieut. H. E. Molloy.
_B Company (attacking Company)_
Capt. O. V. Viney (wounded).
Lieut. E. N. C. Woollerton (wounded).
2/Lieut. E. R. Hillman.
2/Lieut. F. Niall (wounded).
_C Company (Company in reserve)_
Capt. P. A. Hall.
2/Lieut. E. G. H. Bates.
_D Company (attacking Company)_
Capt. E. V. Birchall (wounded, died of wounds).
2/Lieut. F. D. Earle.
2/Lieut. F. H. Rover.
2/Lieut. J. F. Arnott.
ROLL OF OFFICERS WHO TOOK PART IN THE ATTACK ON SKYLINE TRENCH ON AUGUST
14 AND 15, 1916
_Battalion Headquarters_
Lieut.-Col. L. L. C. Reynolds (commanding Battalion).
Lieut. P. L. Wright (Adjutant).
2/Lieut. J. B. Hales (Intelligence Officer).
Capt. L. E. Hughes, R.A.M.C. (Medical Officer).
_A Company_
Capt. N. S. Reid, D.S.O., M.C.
Capt. V. C. Heathcote-Hacker (wounded).
2/Lieut. W. R. Heath.
_B Company_
Capt. G. R. Crouch.
Lieut. R. Gregson-Ellis.
2/Lieut. E. R. Hillman.
_C Company_
Capt. P. A. Hall.
2/Lieut. E. G. H. Bates.
2/Lieut. D. Fallon (wounded).
2/Lieut. H. M. Breton.
D Company
Lieut. F. D. Earle (wounded).
2/Lieut. J. F. Arnott.
2/Lieut. F. C. Dixon (wounded).
ROLL OF OFFICERS WHO TOOK PART IN THE ATTACK ON THE GERMAN TRENCHES
BETWEEN OVILLERS AND POZIÈRES ON AUGUST 23, 1916.
_Battalion Headquarters_
Lieut.-Col. L. L. C. Reynolds (commanding Battalion).
Lieut. P. L. Wright (Adjutant).
2/Lieut. J. B. Hales (Intelligence Officer).
Capt. L. E. Hughes, R.A.M.C. (Medical Officer).
_A Company (attacking Company)_
Capt. N. S. Reid, D.S.O., M.C.
Lieut. M. Bowen (wounded).
2/Lieut. W. R. Heath (killed).
_B Company_
Capt. G. R. Crouch.
Lieut. R. E. M. Young.
_C Company (attacking Company)_
Capt. P. A. Hall.
2/Lieut. E. G. H. Bates (killed).
2/Lieut. H. M. Breton (wounded).
_D Company_
Capt. R. Gregson-Ellis.
2/Lieut. J. F. Arnott.
2/Lieut. F. H. Rover.
ROLL OF OFFICERS WHO TOOK PART IN THE OPERATION OF TOMBOIS FARM ON NIGHT
APRIL 16/17, 1917.
_Battalion Headquarters_
Lieut.-Col. L. L. C. Reynolds, D.S.O. (commanding Battalion).
Major A. B. Lloyd-Baker (2nd-in-Command of Battalion).
Capt. P. L. Wright, M.C. (Adjutant).
Lieut. H. J. Pullman (Intelligence Officer).
Capt. L. E. Hughes, R.A.M.C. (Medical Officer).
_A Company_
Capt. N. S. Reid, D.S.O., M.C.
2/Lieut. P. A. Coates.
_B Company_
Lieut. M. Bowen.
2/Lieut. G. A. Johnston.
2/Lieut. R. F. Chatham.
2/Lieut. E. H. Fawcitt.
_C Company_
Lieut. J. B. Hales.
Lieut. G. R. F. Knight.
Lieut. F. D. Ollard.
_D Company_
Capt. R. Gregson-Ellis (wounded, died of wounds).
2/Lieut. J. Jack (wounded).
2/Lieut. B. C. C. Olivier (wounded).
2/Lieut. N. S. Flint (wounded).
ROLL OF OFFICERS WHO TOOK PART IN THE ATTACK ON GERMAN POSITIONS N.W. OF
ST. JULIEN, ON AUGUST 16, 1917.
_Battalion Headquarters_
Lieut.-Col. L. L. C. Reynolds, D.S.O. (commanding Battalion).
Capt. M. Bowen (asst. 2nd-in-Command of Battalion).
Capt. P. L. Wright, M.C. (Adjutant).
Lieut. J. E. Firminger (Signal Officer).
2/Lieut. G. A. Johnston (Intelligence Officer) (wounded).
Capt. L. E. Hughes, R.A.M.C. (Medical Officer).
Capt. H. Noke (Chaplain).
_A Company_
Capt. G. R. F. Knight (killed).
2/Lieut. F. M. Passmore (wounded).
2/Lieut. F. C. Marshall (wounded).
_B Company_
2/Lieut. E. H. Fawcitt (wounded).
2/Lieut. F. G. Vaughan.
2/Lieut. R. E. Norman (wounded).
_C Company_
Capt. G. V. Neave (killed).
Lieut. F. D. Ollard (wounded).
2/Lieut. W. O’B. Rigden.
2/Lieut. A. T. Moyle (wounded).
_D Company_
Lieut. H. J. Pullman.
2/Lieut. C. G. Reeves.
ROLL OF OFFICERS PRESENT WITH THE BATTALION IN THE LINE DURING THE
AUSTRIAN ATTACK ON OUR TRENCHES ON THE ASIAGO PLATEAU, ON JUNE 15, 1918.
_Battalion Headquarters_
Major P. A. Hall, M.C. (commanding Battalion).
Capt. G. R. Crouch (2nd-in-Command of Battalion).
Capt. C. G. Reeves, M.C. (Adjutant).
2/Lieut. F. P. Bates (Intelligence Officer).
2/Lieut. F. J. A. Corfield (Signal Officer).
Capt. H. S. Thomas, R.A.M.C. (Medical Officer).
Capt. H. Noke, C.F. (Chaplain).
_A Company_
Capt. J. E. Firminger.
Capt. G. L. Troutbeck.
Lieut. N. S. Flint.
2/Lieut. H. R. Pigott (wounded).
2/Lieut. L. W. G. Lorns.
_B Company_
Capt. A. P. Darby.
Lieut. A. L. Brightman.
2/Lieut. W. G. Butler (wounded).
_C Company_
Lieut. G. W. Higlett.
2/Lieut. P. T. Herbert (wounded).
_D Company_
Capt. B. C. Rigden, M.C.
2/Lieut. G. B. Baker.
2/Lieut. E. T. C. Coxon (wounded).
2/Lieut. F. J. Wilcox (wounded).
2/Lieut. J. R. Pike.
ROLL OF OFFICERS WHO TOOK PART IN THE RAID ON THE AUSTRIAN TRENCHES ON
THE ASIAGO PLATEAU ON AUGUST 26, 1918.
_Battalion Headquarters_
Lieut.-Col. L. L. C. Reynolds, D.S.O. (commanding Battalion).
Major P. A. Hall, M.C. (2nd-in-Command of Battalion).
Capt. C. G. Reeves, M.C. (Adjutant).
2/Lieut. L. McCracken (Intelligence Officer).
2/Lieut. F. J. A. Corfield (Signal Officer).
Capt. H. S. Thomas, R.A.M.C. (Medical Officer).
_A Company_
Capt. J. E. Firminger (wounded).
2/Lieut. L. W. G. Lorns (wounded).
2/Lieut. M. W. Butlin.
_B Company_
Lieut. A. L. Brightman (wounded).
2/Lieut. F. W. Blackmore (wounded).
2/Lieut. A. H. Herbert.
_C Company_
2/Lieut. P. T. Herbert, M.C.
2/Lieut. F. B. Bates (wounded).
2/Lieut. L. R. Curram (wounded).
_D Company_
Capt. B. C. Rigden, M.C.
2/Lieut. G. B. Baker.
2/Lieut. F. J. Wilcox.
ROLL OF OFFICERS WHO TOOK PART IN THE ATTACK ON THE AUSTRIAN POSITIONS
ON THE ASIAGO PLATEAU, ON NOVEMBER 1, 1918, AND THE SUBSEQUENT ADVANCE
INTO THE TRENTINO.
_Battalion Headquarters_
Lieut.-Col. L. L. C. Reynolds, D.S.O. (commanding Battalion).
Major P. L. Wright, M.C. (2nd-in-Command of Battalion).
Capt. C. G. Reeves, M.C. (Adjutant).
2/Lieut. F. J. A. Corfield (Signal Officer).
2/Lieut. A. H. Herbert (Intelligence Officer).
Capt. H. S. Thomas, R.A.M.C. (Medical Officer).
_A Company_
Capt. N. S. Flint.
2/Lieut. G. B. Baker.
Lieut. F. H. Rover (advance only).
2/Lieut. D. Cullinan (advance only).
_B Company_
Lieut. E. C. J. Allday.
2/Lieut. W. G. Butler.
2/Lieut. R. W. Grace.
_C Company_
Capt. G. W. Higlett, M.C.
2/Lieut. P. T. Herbert, M.C.
_D Company_
Lieut. H. A. Beaver.
2/Lieut. J. W. C. Read (wounded).
2/Lieut. J. R. Pike.
2/Lieut. C. B. Ellwood.
APPENDIX III
HONOURS AND DECORATIONS GAINED BY OFFICERS OF THE 1ST BUCKS BATTALION
C.M.G.
Lieut.-Col. F. O. Wethered, attached 6th Battalion Royal Warwickshire
Regiment.
BAR TO D.S.O.
Lieut.-Col. L. L. C. Reynolds.
Lieut.-Col. A. J. N. Bartlett, attached 1/4th Battalion Oxford & Bucks
Light Infantry.
D.S.O.
_Gained while serving with the Battalion_
Lieut.-Col. C. P. Doig, Seaforth Highlanders (attached).
Lieut.-Col. L. L. C. Reynolds.
Major P. A. Hall.
Major P. L. Wright.
Capt. E. V. D. Birchall.
Capt. N. S. Reid.
_Gained while serving with other Units_
Lieut.-Col. A. B. Lloyd-Baker, attached 1/4th Battalion Royal
Berkshire Regiment.
Lieut.-Col. A. J. N. Bartlett, attached 1/4th Battalion Oxford & Bucks
Light Infantry.
Major C. J. Mitchell, G.S.O.3, 48th Division.
Major H. V. Combs, 23rd Battalion Machine Gun Corps.
BAR TO MILITARY CROSS
_Gained while serving with the Battalion_
Capt. B. C. Rigden.
MILITARY CROSS
_Gained while serving with the Battalion_
Capt. N. S. Reid.
„ H. V. Combs.
„ P. A. Hall.
„ P. L. Wright.
„ E. Nichol.
„ J. E. Firminger.
„ H. J. Pullman.
„ A. P. Darby (Essex Regiment, attached).
„ L. E. Hughes (R.A.M.C., attached).
„ N. S. Flint.
Lieut. M. Bowen.
„ A. D. B. Brown.
„ G. W. Higlett.
2/Lieut. B. C. Rigden.
„ J. F. Arnott (Wiltshire Regiment, attached).
„ G. A. Johnston.
„ C. G. Reeves.
„ D. Fallon.
„ G. B. Baker.
„ F. P. Bates.
„ F. W. Blackmore.
„ W. G. Butler.
„ C. B. Ellwood.
„ P. T. Herbert.
„ F. J. Wilcox.
Capt. H. Noke, C.F.
_Gained while serving with other Units_
Major G. R. Crouch, attached 1/5th Gloucestershire Regiment.
Capt. G. E. W. Bowyer, attached 61st Division.
„ B. Green, attached Machine Gun Corps.
„ F. L. Wright, attached 11th Division, G.S.O.3.
Capt. J. B. Hill, attached 144th Infantry Brigade (Staff Captain).
„ J. B. Hales, attached 48th Division, G.S.O.3.
2/Lieut. F. M. Passmore, attached 2/1st Bucks Battalion.
„ C. E. Clothier, attached 145th Trench Mortar Battery.
ORDER OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE
Capt. J. B. Hill, attached 144th Infantry Brigade (Staff Captain).
MENTIONED IN DISPATCHES
_While serving with the Battalion_
Lieut.-Col. C. P. Doig (Seaforth Highlanders, attached).
„ L. L. C. Reynolds (five times).
Major A. B. Lloyd-Baker (twice).
„ P. A. Hall.
„ P. L. Wright (twice).
Capt. E. V. D. Birchall.
„ N. S. Reid.
„ H. V. Combs.
„ G. R. Crouch.
„ R. Gregson-Ellis.
„ J. E. Firminger.
„ B. Green.
„ G. L. Troutbeck.
„ J. B. Hales.
„ C. G. Reeves.
„ L. E. Hughes (R.A.M.C., attached).
„ H. S. Thomas (R.A.M.C., attached).
„ A. P. Darby (Essex Regiment, attached).
Lieut. W. Maggs.
„ L. McCracken.
„ G. V. Neave.
„ E. Nichol.
2/Lieut. F. J. A. Corfield.
„ F. M. Passmore.
_While serving with other Units_
Lieut.-Col. A. B. Lloyd-Baker, attached 1/4th Battalion Royal
Berkshire Regiment.
Lieut.-Col. P. A. Hall, attached 1/7th Battalion Royal Warwickshire
Regiment.
Major C. J. Mitchell, attached 48th Division, G.S.O.3.
Major H. V. Combs (twice), attached 23rd Battalion Machine Gun Corps.
Capt. E. L. Wright (twice), attached VIIth Corps, G.S.O.3., and 2nd
Division, Brigade Major 6th Infantry Brigade.
Capt. J. B. Hill (twice), attached 144th Infantry Brigade (Staff
Captain).
FOREIGN DECORATIONS
FRENCH CROIX DE GUERRE AVEC PALME
Lieut.-Col. L. L. C. Reynolds.
ITALIAN SILVER MEDAL FOR VALOUR
Lieut.-Col. L. L. C. Reynolds.
Capt. J. E. Firminger.
2/Lieut. L. W. G. Lorns.
ITALIAN BRONZE MEDAL FOR VALOUR
Capt. N. S. Flint.
2/Lieut. L. R. Curram.
_Gained while serving with other Units_
Lieut.-Col. P. A. Hall, attached 1/7th Battalion Royal Warwickshire
Regiment.
ITALIAN CROCE DI GUERRA
_Gained while serving with other Units_
Lieut.-Col. A. B. Lloyd-Baker, attached 1/4th Battalion Royal
Berkshire Regiment.
Capt. J. B. Hill, attached 144th Infantry Brigade (Staff Captain).
APPENDIX IV
HONOURS AND DECORATIONS GAINED BY WARRANT OFFICERS, N.C.O.’s, AND MEN OF
THE 1ST BUCKS BATTALION WHILE SERVING WITH THE BATTALION
MILITARY CROSS
Regtl. No. Rank. Name.
265001 C.S.M. Sirett, A. G.
212 „ Smith, F.
52414 R.S.M. Vincent, H.
265039 C.S.M. Watts, H.
DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MEDAL
2403 Corpl. Atkins, T. W.
2405 Sergt. Baker, H. C.
1855 „ Baldwin, W. J.
2244 Corpl. Barnwell, W. G.
265078 C.S.M. Bishop, S. G.
265791 Sergt. Bowery, G.
266100 „ Bridges, E.
266447 Corpl. Buckland, W.
1208 L/Cpl. Gostelow, G.
265094 Sergt. Golding, T.
266610 „ Hopcraft, T. P.
2582 Sergt. Jennings, P.
265052 C.S.M. Loveday, C.
2710 Pte. Nolan, M.
200212 L/Cpl. Merriman, H.
265046 C.S.M. Richardson, G. A.
265146 Sergt. Saunders, W. G.
2238 Bugler Scragg, J. E.
266343 Sergt. Smith, W.
265698 Pte. Stevens, E. J.
266851 Corpl. Yeo, A. C.
MILITARY MEDAL
265114 Sergt. Allaway, C. W.
3566 L/Cpl. Auger, C.
2031 Corpl. Baldwin, C.
1935 Sergt. Baldwin, J. W.
2244 Corpl. Barnwell, W. G.
265791 L/Sgt. Bowery, G.
33905 L/Cpl. Brolley, J.
2875 Pte. Busby, C. C.
201335 „ Bushnell, C.
33818 „ Carey, A. A.
265657 „ Cattell, W. W.
202073 „ Clark, J.
267670 „ Cohen, M.
265473 „ Cripps, F. T.
265296 „ Cross, H. E.
266058 „ Cutter, F.
266352 „ Dickens, W.
285002 Sergt. Dixon, G. H.
33569 L/Cpl. Evans, J.
265135 Sergt. Fountain, A. G.
2973 L/Cpl. Garrett, F. R.
34033 Pte. Getting, J. T.
1908 L/Cpl. Goldswain, J.
266452 Corpl. Guise, W. F.
33496 Corpl. Guise, T. H.
265036 Sergt. Hart, A. J.
1805 L/Cpl. Haynes, J. G.
266461 Pte. Herbert, A.
2072 L/Cpl. Hicks, F. A.
265803 Corpl. Hines, W.
265119 „ Hollyoake, A. G.
2582 L/Cpl. Jennings, P.
265498 Pte. Lambourne, W.
265712 Sergt. Lovell, S.
285074 Pte. Moore, F.
33999 „ Murphy, J.
265478 Sergt. Niblett, T. W.
265670 Pte. Piddington, F.
265642 Corpl. Plumridge, P.
265107 „ Porterfield, V. E.
33940 L/Cpl. Pounteney, T. F.
1392 „ Odell, G. H.
265046 Sergt. Richardson, G. A.
266371 L/Cpl. Robbins, W. G.
265923 Sergt. Rogers, S. G.
2299 Corpl. Rogers, F. L.
201637 Corpl. Salcombe, G.
33689 Pte. Saunders, J.
267533 L/Cpl.[1] Seward, F. G.
266286 Pte. Seymour, A. E.
1246 L/Cpl. Shaw, F. T.
266469 Corpl. Shillingford, J.
33947 L/Cpl. Shepperd, W.
265974 Sergt. Sinclair, F. J.
278 Corpl. Smewin, G.
266266 Pte. Smith, F.
285065 „ Smith, S.
265105 Sergt. Stokes, A.
266733 Corpl. Stone, S.
2097 L/Cpl. Timson, F. W.
266528 L/Cpl. Tipping, T.
265279 Pte. Twitchen, G.
267535 L/Cpl. Underwood, W.
33874 „ Vigurs, W.
2217 „ Vincent, T. W.
265622 „ Way, H. J. P.
265292 Sergt.[1] Wellington, G.
266899 Corpl. Waters, T. H.
33584 Pte. Wellington, R.
266045 Corpl. West, J.
266275 L/Cpl. Windsor, R.
265405 Sergt. Woodham, S. T. H.
267542 Pte. Worling, A.
34011 „ Wright, H.
266078 L/Cpl. Young, A. E.
MERITORIOUS SERVICE MEDAL
265095 R.Q.M.S. Benning, W. J.
265054 C.Q.M.S. Jolliffe, B.
265021 Q.M.S. McBright, S.
265038 Sergt. Newton, S. W.
265128 L/Cpl. Read, J.
265334 C.Q.M.S. Sawyer, H.
265358 Sergt. Steptoe, F. J.
MENTIONED IN DISPATCHES
265095 R.Q.M.S. Benning, W. J.
265615 Sergt. Canvin, H. A.
265641 „ Carter, H.
265921 Private Crook, E. H.
265098 C.Q.M.S. How, W. E.
265655 L/Cpl. Hyde, E. V.
265054 C.Q.M.S. Jolliffe, B.
265038 Sergt. Newton, S. W.
265478 „ Niblett, T. W.
265066 „ Nicholson, S. R.
265260 „ Orchard, R.
265046 C.S.M. Richardson, G. A. (twice)
265375 Sergt. Rivers, G.
265923 „ Rogers, S. G.
265334 C.Q.M.S. Sawyer, H.
265974 Sergt. Sinclair, F. J.
265358 „ Steptoe, F. J.
265105 „ Stokes, A.
265602 Sergt. Taberner, T. M.
265651 L/Cpl. Witney, F.
FOREIGN DECORATIONS
CROIX DE GUERRE
265078 C.S.M. Bishop, S. G.
(BELGIAN) CROIX DE GUERRE
33548 Corpl. Collins, H. E.
ITALIAN CROCE DI GUERRA
265114 Sergt. Allaway, C. W.
200212 Pte. Merriman, H.
265140 L/Cpl. Odell, G. H.
266343 Sergt. Smith, W.
265046 C.S.M. Richardson, G. A.
267548 Pte. Worraker, A.
MEDAL OF ST. GEORGE (2ND CLASS)
2244 Corpl. Barnwell, W. G.
(ITALIAN) MEDAGLIO DI BRONZO
33900 Pte. Campbell, A.
265974 Sergt. Sinclair, F. J.
BELGIAN ORDER DE LEOPOLD II CHEVALIER
265260 Sergt. Orchard, R.
APPENDIX V
ROLL OF OFFICERS WHO SERVED WITH THE 1ST BUCKS BATTALION DURING THE
PERIOD MARCH 1915–DECEMBER 1918
NOTES
1. Where no dates are shown against decorations, these decorations have
been gained when the officer concerned was serving away from the
Battalion.
2. Several dates of gazettes of decorations are not available; when this
is the case the date of the action for which these decorations were
awarded has been given.
3. “Mentions” gained while serving with other units are _not_ given.
─────────────────┬────────┬──────────┬──────────┬────────────
Name. │Date of │ Rank on │Promotion.│Decorations.
│Joining.│ Joining. │ │
─────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────────┼────────────
Doig, Claude │ │T/Lt.-Col.│ │ D.S.O
Prendergast │ │ │ │ 11.1.16
(Seaforth │ │ │ │
Highlanders) │ │ │ │
Hawkins, Lionel │ Pre-│War │ T/Major │
Comber │ │ │ 1.9.14 │
│ │ │ Major │
│ │ │ 9.3.16 │
│ │ │T/Lt.-Col │
│ │ │ 27.2.16 │
Reynolds, Lewis │ Pre-│War │ Capt. │ D.S.O
Leslie Clayton │ │ │ 18.7.03 │1.10.16 Bar
│ │ │ T/Major │ to D.S.O.
│ │ │ 26.2.15 │ 6.9.17
│ │ │ Major │ Italian
│ │ │ 1.6.1 │Silver Medal
│ │ │ Bt/Lt.- │ for Valour
│ │ │ Col. │ 28.8.18
│ │ │ 3.6.18 │French Croix
│ │ │ Lt.-Col. │ de Guerre
│ │ │ 3.6.1 │ 9.12.18
Crouch, Lionel │ Pre-│War │ Capt. │
William │ │ │ 19.6.12 │
Birchall, Edward │ Pre-│War │ Capt. │ D.S.O.
Vivian Dearman │ │ │ 5.10.13 │ 23.7.16
Bowyer, George │ Pre-│War │ Capt. │ M.C.
Edward │ │ │ 1.9.14 │
Wentworth │ │ │ │
Crouch, Guy │ Pre-│War │ T/Capt. │ M.C.
Robert │ │ │ 1.9.14 │
│ │ │ Capt. │
│ │ │ 1.6.16 │
Hall, Philip │ Pre-│War │ T/Capt. │M.C. 1.1.17
Ashley │ │ │ 1.9.14 │ D.S.O.
│ │ │ Capt. │ 1.1.19
│ │ │ 1.6.16 │ Italian
│ │ │ A/Major │Bronze Medal
│ │ │ 29.7.17 │ for Valour
Jackson, Gerald │ Pre-│War │ T/Capt. │
Goddard │ │ │ 1.9.14 │
│ │ │ Capt. │
│ │ │ 1.6.16 │
Reid, Noel │ Pre-│War │ T/Capt. │M.C. 11.1.16
Spencer │ │ │ 12.9.14 │ D.S.O.
│ │ │ Capt. │ 25.8.16
│ │ │ 1.6.16 │
Combs, Hugh │ Pre-│War │ T/Capt. │M.C. 16.5.16
Vivian │ │ │ 21.5.15 │ D.S.O.
│ │ │ Capt. │
│ │ │ 1.6.16 │
Vernon, Arthur │ Pre-│War │ Lieut. │
Stanley │ │ │ 5.8.14 │
│ │ │ T/Capt. │
│ │ │ 6.6.15 │
│ │ │ Capt. │
│ │ │ 1.6.16 │
Viney, Oscar │ Pre-│War │ Lieut. │
Vaughan │ │ │ 1.9.14 │
│ │ │ T/Capt. │
│ │ │ 6.6.15 │
│ │ │ Capt. │
│ │ │ 1.6.16 │
Green, Bernard │ Pre-│War │ T/Lieut. │ M.C.
│ │ │ 1.9.14 │
│ │ │ Lieut. │
│ │ │ 20.10.15 │
│ │ │ Capt. │
│ │ │ 17.6.17 │
Backhouse, John │ 1.9.14 │ 2/Lieut.│ T/Lieut. │
William │ │ │ 1.9.14 │
│ │ │ T/Capt. │
│ │ │ 10.6.15 │
Wright, Egerton │ 3.9.14 │ 2/Lieut.│ T/Lieut. │ M.C.
Lowndes │ │ │ 3.9.14 │
│ │ │ Lieut. │
│ │ │ 27.9.16 │
│ │ │ T/Capt. │
│ │ │ 10.6.15 │
│ │ │ Capt. │
│ │ │ 10.8.16 │
Bartlett, Alfred │ 52nd Light Infty. │ │ D.S.O. Bar
James Napier │ │ │ to D.S.O.
Lloyd-Baker, │ Pre-│War │ Capt. │ D.S.O.
Artur B. │ │ │ 19.6.12 │
│ │ │ A/Major │
│ │ │ 3.6.16 │
│ │ │ Major │
│ │ │ 1.6.16 │
Hill, John Burrow│10.9.14 │ 2/Lieut.│ T/Lieut. │M.C. 4.6.17
│ │ │ 10.9.14 │ Italian
│ │ │ Lieut. │ Croce di
│ │ │ 1.6.16 │ Guerra
│ │ │ T/Capt. │ O.B.E.
│ │ │ 22.6.16 │
│ │ │ Capt. │
│ │ │ 17.6.17 │
Kennish, Alan │10.9.14 │ 2/Lieut.│ T/Lieut. │
Charles Edward │ │ │ 28.2.15 │
Forbes │ │ │ Lieut. │
│ │ │ 20.10.15 │
Reynolds, Francis│ 1.9.14 │ 2/Lieut.│ T/Lieut. │
Godfrey Baylie │ │ │ 21.4.15 │
│ │ │ Lieut. │
│ │ │ 20.10.15 │
│ │ │ Capt. │
│ │ │ 1.6.16 │
Brown, Alexander │ 2.9.14 │ 2/Lieut.│ T/Lieut. │M.C. 11.1.16
Denis Burnett │ │ │ 6.5.15 │
│ │ │ Lieut. │
│ │ │ 21.7.16 │
│ │ │ Capt. │
│ │ │ 1.6.16 │
Woollerton, Edwin│ 2.9.14 │ 2/Lieut.│ T/Lieut. │
Norman Collet │ │ │ 6.5.15 │
│ │ │ Lieut. │
│ │ │ 10.8.10 │
│ │ │ T/Capt. │
│ │ │ 22.6.16 │
│ │ │ Capt. │
│ │ │ 21.7.16 │
Earle, Francis │ 2.9.14 │ 2/Lieut.│ T/Lieut. │
Douglas │ │ │ 1.7.15 │
│ │ │ Lieut. │
│ │ │ 27.9.16 │
│ │ │ T/Capt. │
│ │ │ 22.7.16 │
│ │ │ Capt. │
│ │ │ 10.8.16 │
Hobart-Hampden, │ 2.9.14 │ 2/Lieut.│ T/Lieut. │
Geo. Miles │ │ │ 6.5.15 │
Awdry │ │ │ Lieut. │
│ │ │ 20.9.16 │
Gregson-Ellis, │21.9.14 │ 2/Lieut.│ T/Lieut. │
Rex │ │ │ 10.6.15 │
│ │ │ T/Capt. │
│ │ │ 22.7.16 │
Wright, Philip │ 2.1.15 │ 2/Lieut.│ T/Lieut. │M.C. 1.1.17
Lowndes │ │ │ 10.6.15 │ D.S.O.
│ │ │ Lieut. │ 3.6.19
│ │ │ 1.6.16 │
│ │ │ A/Capt. │
│ │ │ 11.8.16 │
│ │ │ 4.8.17 │
│ │ │ Capt. │
│ │ │ A/Major │
│ │ │ 24.9.18 │
Neave, Gerald V. │20.2.15 │ 2/Lieut.│ T/Lieut. │
│ │ │ 11.2.16 │
│ │ │ Lieut. │
│ │ │ 1.6.16 │
│ │ │ A/Capt. │
│ │ │ 23.1.17 │
Nichol, Edward │ Pre-│War │ Lieut. │M.C. 1.1.19
│ │ │ 17.2.15 │
│ │ │ Capt. │
│ │ │ 14.3.18 │
Williamson, │20.2.15 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Norman Bruce │ │ │ │
Norwood, Robert │24.5.15 │ 2/Lieut.│ Lieut. │
Cecil │ │ │ 11.1.16 │
Hales, John │27.6.15 │ 2/Lieut.│ Lieut. │M.C. 1.1.19
Baseley │ │ │ 1.6.16 │
│ │ │ T/Capt. │
│ │ │ 15.4.18 │
Pullman, Harold │27.6.15 │ 2/Lieut.│ Lieut. │ M.C.
John │ │ │ 20.9.16 │ 18.10.17
│ │ │ A/Capt. │
│ │ │ 1.9.17 │
Young, Ralph │27.7.15 │ 2/Lieut.│ Lieut. │
Ernest Markham │ │ │ 5.2.16 │
│ │ │ Capt. │
│ │ │ 1.6.16 │
Newbery, Basil │ 2.8.15 │ 2/Lieut.│ Lieut. │
James │ │ │ 10.8.16 │
Godfrey, Arthur │5.12.15 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Poole │ │ │ │
Hall, Charles │12.12.15│ 2/Lieut.│ │
Furley, Robert │11.1.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Basil │ │ │ │
Rigden, Brian │13.1.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ Lieut. │M.C. 18.8.16
Cawes │ │ │ 1.7.17 │Bar to M.C.
│ │ │ A/Capt. │ 24.9.18
│ │ │ 18.10.17 │
Jones, Cecil Ynyr│ 5.3.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
(13th Battn. │ │ │ │
London Regt.) │ │ │ │
Rolleston, John │12.3.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ Lieut. │
Marcus │ │ │ 1.6.16 │
Chapman, John │18.3.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Percy │ │ │ │
Bates, Eric │18.3.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ T/Lieut. │
George Henry │ │ │ 20.7.16 │
Abrey, C. G. │21.3.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Aitken, Robert │25.3.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Rover, Fredk. │ 7.5.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ Lieut. │
Harold │ │ │ 1.7.17 │
Trimmer, Charles │ 5.6.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
William │ │ │ │
Mason, H. C. E. │23.6.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Shepherd, Hugh │ 1.7.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Vincent │ │ │ │
(Middlesex │ │ │ │
Regt.) │ │ │ │
Hillman, Eric │ 1.7.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Rodman │ │ │ │
(Middlesex │ │ │ │
Regt.) │ │ │ │
Niall, Francis │ 1.7.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
(Wilts. Regt.) │ │ │ │
Arnott, John │ 3.7.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ │M.C. 28.9.16
Frederick │ │ │ │
(Wilts. Regt.) │ │ │ │
Molloy, Henry │10.7.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Edmund │ │ │ │
Fallon, David │31.7.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ │M.C. 1.1.17
Heathcote-Hacker,│ 7.8.16 │ T/Capt.│ │
Victor Clare │ │ │ │
(Manchester │ │ │ │
Regt.) │ │ │ │
Breton, Harold │ 7.8.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Moyle │ │ │ │
(Manchester │ │ │ │
Regt.) │ │ │ │
Dixon, Frank │ 7.8.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Charles │ │ │ │
(Manchester │ │ │ │
Regt.) │ │ │ │
Heath, Walter │12.8.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Rowland │ │ │ │
Bowen, Martin │20.8.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ Lieut. │M.C. 15.6.17
│ │ │ 11.1.16 │
│ │ │ Capt. │
│ │ │ 1.6.16 │
Alloway, William │27.8.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Victor (Army │ │ │ │
Cyclist Corps) │ │ │ │
Vaughan, Francis │28.8.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ Lieut. │
Gerald │ │ │ 1.7.17 │
Firminger, John │ 5.9.16 │ Lieut.│ Lieut. │M.C. 26.8.18
Egerton │ │ │ 1.6.16 │ Italian
│ │ │ Capt. │Silver Medal
│ │ │ 9.7.17 │ for Valour
│ │ │ │ 26.8.18
Warwick, John │10.9.16 │ Capt.│ │
Douglas Barford│ │ │ │
(Hunts Cyclist │ │ │ │
Battn.) │ │ │ │
Fordham, Reginald│10.9.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Fredk. (Essex │ │ │ │
Regt.) │ │ │ │
Pether, Wilfred │12.9.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Guy (Essex │ │ │ │
Regt.) │ │ │ │
Wiseman, Stanley │12.9.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
(Essex Regt.) │ │ │ │
Knight, Gerald │14.9.16 │ Lieut.│ │
Robert Frank │ │ │ │
(Essex Regt.) │ │ │ │
Maggs, William │14.9.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ Lieut. │
│ │ │ 1.7.17 │
│ │ │ A/Capt. │
│ │ │ 8.9.18 │
Johnston, George │14.9.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ Lieut. │M.C. 16.8.17
Adam │ │ │ 7.5.17 │
Tucker, James │14.9.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Millard (Essex │ │ │ │
Regt.) │ │ │ │
Darby, Alexander │14.9.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ Lieut. │M.C. 3.6.19
Pierre (Essex │ │ │ 1.7.17 │
Regt.) │ │ │ A/Capt. │
│ │ │ 5.1.18 │
Mann, Herbert │14.9.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Edmond (Essex │ │ │ │
Regt.) │ │ │ │
Cooper-Smith, │14.9.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Reginald │ │ │ │
Burston (Essex │ │ │ │
Regt.) │ │ │ │
Clarke, John │14.9.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
James Gordon │ │ │ │
(Essex Regt.) │ │ │ │
Sloan, Archibald │14.9.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
(Essex Regt.) │ │ │ │
Coates, Philip │14.9.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Adrian (Essex │ │ │ │
Regt.) │ │ │ │
Jack, James │15.9.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
(Essex Regt.) │ │ │ │
Bore, Thomas │5.10.16 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Edgar │ │ │ │
Piperno, Joseph │19.10.16│ 2/Lieut.│ │
Henry │ │ │ │
Rydings, Douglas │20.10.16│ 2/Lieut.│ │
Gerald │ │ │ │
Brettelle, │20.10.16│ 2/Lieut.│ │
Leonard Maurice│ │ │ │
Clifford │ │ │ │
Olivier, Basil │20.10.16│ 2/Lieut.│ │
Coutts Carr │ │ │ │
Chatham, Robert │20.10.16│ 2/Lieut.│ │
Felton │ │ │ │
Rigden, Walter │26.1.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ Lieut. │
O’Brien │ │ │ 26.3.18 │
Stephens, R. │31.1.17 │ Capt.│ │
(43rd Light │ │ │ │
Infantry) │ │ │ │
Flint, Norman │24.2.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ Lieut. │M.C. 1.11.18
Samuel │ │ │ 1.7.17 │ Italian
│ │ │ A/Capt. │Bronze Medal
│ │ │ 9.10.18 │ for Valour
│ │ │ │ 1.11.18
Ollard, Francis │12.3.17 │ Lieut.│ │
Douglas │ │ │ │
Passmore, Francis│12.3.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ │ M.C.
Marsland │ │ │ │
Fawcitt, Edwin │ 1.4.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Henry │ │ │ │
Stevens, George │ 1.4.17 │ A/Capt.│ │
Cecil │ │ │ │
Reeves, Cecil │ 2.5.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ Lieut. │ M.C.
Gilbert │ │ │ 11.12.17 │ 18.10.17
│ │ │ A/Capt. │
│ │ │ 29.12.17 │
Dipple, Thomas │ 2.5.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Denis │ │ │ │
Marshall, │ 8.5.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Frederick │ │ │ │
Charles │ │ │ │
Troutbeck, George│27.7.15 │ 2/Lieut.│ Lieut. │
Lancelot │ │ │ 17.6.17 │
│ │ │ Capt. │
│ │ │ 17.6.17 │
Norman, Raymond │18.5.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Elder │ │ │ │
Moyle, Arthur │28.7.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Thomas │ │ │ │
Fleeming, William│25.8.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ Lieut. │
Henry │ │ │ 26.3.18 │
│ │ │ A/Capt. │
│ │ │ 9.10.18 │
Newton, Henry │30.8.17 │ Lieut.│ │
James Hall │ │ │ │
(Hunts Cyclist │ │ │ │
Battn.) │ │ │ │
McNish, John │30.8.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Archibald │ │ │ │
(Hunts Cyclist │ │ │ │
Battn.) │ │ │ │
Morfey, Percy │30.8.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Albert (Hunts │ │ │ │
Cyclist Battn.)│ │ │ │
Fisher, George │30.8.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Alfred │ │ │ │
Browne, Sidney │ 7.9.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ Lieut. │
Noel │ │ │ 23.11.18 │
Caulfield, Robert│ 7.9.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ Lieut. │
Charles Fredk. │ │ │ 26.12.18 │
(Essex Regt.) │ │ │ │
Smith, Charles │ 7.9.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Vivian │ │ │ │
Salisbury │ │ │ │
(Essex Regt.) │ │ │ │
Seago, George │ 9.9.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
William Edward │ │ │ │
(E. Kent) │ │ │ │
Regt.) │ │ │ │
Sanders, Chas. │ 9.9.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Hayden George │ │ │ │
(E. Kent Regt.)│ │ │ │
Clothier, │ 9.9.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ │ M.C.
Clarence Edwin │ │ │ │
(Oxford & Bucks│ │ │ │
L.I. attd.) │ │ │ │
Stanway, Percy │10.9.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Anderton │ │ │ │
Cowlishaw, Vernon│15.9.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Clarke Paine │ │ │ │
Bates, Frederick │15.9.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ │M.C. 2.12.18
Percy │ │ │ │
Ellwood, Claude │15.9.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ │M.C. 1.11.18
Bertram │ │ │ │
Stokes, Wilfred │15.9.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Victor │ │ │ │
Corfield, │25.9.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Frederick John │ │ │ │
Arthur │ │ │ │
Lorns, Lionel │22.9.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ │ Italian
William │ │ │ │Bronze Medal
Goldhawk │ │ │ │ for Valour
│ │ │ │ 26.8.18
Bocking, Harry │22.9.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Charles │ │ │ │
McCracken, Leslie│22.9.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ Lieut. │
│ │ │ 1.2.19 │
Baker, Gerald │25.9.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ Lieut. │M.C. 2.12.18
Broadbent (R. │ │ │ 1.2.19 │
West Kent │ │ │ │
Regt.) │ │ │ │
Hayes, Gordon │25.9.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Stanley (R. │ │ │ │
West Kent │ │ │ │
Regt.) │ │ │ │
Phinn, Charles │25.9.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Walter │ │ │ │
Pigott, Henry │12.10.17│ 2/Lieut.│ │
Rudolph (Oxford│ │ │ │
& Bucks L.I. │ │ │ │
attd.) │ │ │ │
Higlett, George │12.10.17│ 2/Lieut.│ Lieut. │ M.C.
Willibert │ │ │ 31.12.17 │ 19.10.18
│ │ │ A/Capt. │
│ │ │ 29.7.18 │
Butler, William │12.10.17│ 2/Lieut.│ Lieut. │M.C. 1.11.18
George │ │ │ 1.2.19 │
Cornish, Thomas │12.10.17│ 2/Lieut.│ │
Martin │ │ │ │
Grace, Reginald │12.10.17│ 2/Lieut.│ Lieut. │
William │ │ │ 1.2.19 │
Coxon, Edward │12.10.17│ 2/Lieut.│ │
Thomas Charles │ │ │ │
(R. West Kent │ │ │ │
Regt.) │ │ │ │
Brightman, Arthur│24.10.17│ T/Lieut.│ Lieut. │
Lindrea │ │ │ 16.2.18 │
Wilcox, Francis │25.10.17│ 2/Lieut.│ │M.C. 24.9.18
John │ │ │ │
Herbert, Percy │25.10.17│ 2/Lieut.│ │M.C. 24.9.18
Thomas │ │ │ │
Sherwin, George │25.10.17│ 2/Lieut.│ │
Blackmore, Frank │8.11.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ │M.C. 2.12.18
William │ │ │ │
Read, John │8.11.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
William Charles│ │ │ │
Curram, Leslie │8.11.17 │ 2/Lieut.│ │ Italian
Reginald │ │ │ │Bronze Medal
│ │ │ │ for Valour
│ │ │ │ 26.8.18
Butlin, Max │ 6.1.18 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
William │ │ │ │
Pike, John Robert│ 6.1.18 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Herbert, Albert │ 6.1.18 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
Henry │ │ │ │
Beaver, Henry │2.10.18 │ Lieut.│ │
Allan (52nd │ │ │ │
L.I. attd.) │ │ │ │
Allday, Edward │2.10.18 │ Lieut.│ │
Cyril James │ │ │ │
(52nd L.I. │ │ │ │
attd.) │ │ │ │
Cullinan, Daniel │7.10.18 │ 2/Lieut.│ │
(R. Munster │ │ │ │
Fus. attd.) │ │ │ │
Campbell, Harry │19.11.18│ Lieut.│ │
Douglas │ │ │ │
Caulfield (52nd│ │ │ │
L.I. attd.) │ │ │ │
MEDICAL OFFICERS AND CHAPLAINS ATTACHED TO BATTALION
Hughes, Leslie │ Feb. │ Lieut.│ Capt. │M.C. 1.1.18
Edward │ 1915 │ │ 12.7.15 │
(R.A.M.C. [T.])│ │ │ │
Noke, Hubert │ 1.4.17 │ Capt.│ │M.C. 1.1.19
(C.F.) │ │ │ │
Thomas, Harold │ Sept. │ T/Lieut.│ T/Capt. │
Seburt │ 1917 │ │ 14.3.18 │
(R.A.M.C.) │ │ │ │
─────────────────┬───────────┬──────────┬─────────┬────────────────
Name. │Mentions in│Casualty. │ Date of │ Remarks.
│Dispatches.│ │Casualty.│
─────────────────┼───────────┼──────────┼─────────┼────────────────
Doig, Claude │ 11.1.16 │ Accident │ 27.1.16 │Embarked with
Prendergast │ │ while │ │ Battn. as C.O.
(Seaforth │ │ riding │ │
Highlanders) │ │ │ │
Hawkins, Lionel │ │ Accident │ 2.6.16 │Embarked with
Comber │ │ while │ │ Battn. 31.3.15
│ │ riding │ │ as 2nd-in-C.
│ │ │ │ Commanded.
│ │ │ │ Battn. from
│ │ │ │ 27.1.16 to
│ │ │ │ 2.6.16
Reynolds, Lewis │ 1.\1.17 │ Wounded │ 6.5.15 │Embarked with
Leslie Clayton │ 21.\12.17 │ Rejoined │ 27.7.15 │ Battn. as O.C
│ 30.\5.18 │ │ │ A Coy.
│ 6.\1.19 │ │ │ 2nd-in-C. of
│ 3.\6.19 │ │ │ Battn. from
│ │ │ │ 27.1.16 to
│ │ │ │ 2.6.16.
│ │ │ │ Commanded
│ │ │ │ Battn. from
│ │ │ │ 2.\6.16 until
│ │ │ │ cessation of
│ │ │ │ hostitities.
│ │ │ │ Took part in
│ │ │ │ all main
│ │ │ │ actions
│ │ │ │ undertaken by
│ │ │ │ Battn. in
│ │ │ │ Belgium,
│ │ │ │ France and
│ │ │ │ Italy.
Crouch, Lionel │ │ Killed │ 21.7.16 │Embarked with
William │ │ │ │ Battn. as O.C.
│ │ │ │ B Coy.
Birchall, Edward │ 1.1.17 │ Wounded │ 23.7.16 │Embarked with
Vivian Dearman │ │ Died of │ │ Battn. as O.C.
│ │ Wounds │ │ D Coy.
Bowyer, George │ │ Wounded │ 6.5.15 │Embarked with
Edward │ │ │ │ Battn. as O.C.
Wentworth │ │ │ │ C Coy. Joined
│ │ │ │ 61st Div.
│ │ │ │ after being
│ │ │ │ wounded.
Crouch, Guy │ │ Hospital │ 21.4.15 │Embarked with
Robert │ │ Rejoined │ 7.8.16 │ Battn. as
│ │ Wounded │ 28.2.17 │ 2nd-in-C. of B
│ │ Rejoined │ 24.5.17 │ Coy. Commanded
│ │ │ │ B Coy. latter
│ │ │ │ half of 1916
│ │ │ │ and beginning
│ │ │ │ of 1917.
│ │ │ │ Appointed
│ │ │ │ 2nd-in-C. of
│ │ │ │ 1/5th
│ │ │ │ Gloucester
│ │ │ │ Regt. 26.7.18
Hall, Philip │ 6.1.19 │ │ │Embarked with
Ashley │ 12.1.20 │ │ │ Battn. as
│ │ │ │ 2nd-in-C. of D
│ │ │ │ Coy. Commanded
│ │ │ │ C Coy. for
│ │ │ │ greater part
│ │ │ │ of two years.
│ │ │ │ Appointed
│ │ │ │ 2nd-in-C. of
│ │ │ │ Battn. in July
│ │ │ │ 1917.
│ │ │ │ Appointed to
│ │ │ │ command 1/7th
│ │ │ │ R. Warwick
│ │ │ │ Regt. in Oct.
│ │ │ │ 1918. Took
│ │ │ │ part in Somme
│ │ │ │ battles,
│ │ │ │ Peronne
│ │ │ │ advance, and
│ │ │ │ actions on
│ │ │ │ Asiago
│ │ │ │ plateau.
Jackson, Gerald │ │ Wounded │ 21.7.16 │Embarked with
Goddard │ │ and │ │ Battn. as
│ │ Prisoner │ │ 2nd-in-C. of C
│ │ of War │ │ Coy. Was
│ │ Wounded │ │ commanding C
│ │ │ │ Coy. in action
│ │ │ │ of 21.7.16 on
│ │ │ │ the Somme.
Reid, Noel │ 4.1.17 │ │ 16.8.17 │Embarked with
Spencer │ │ │ │ Battn. as
│ │ │ │ 2nd-in-C. of A
│ │ │ │ Coy. Commanded
│ │ │ │ A Coy. for
│ │ │ │ greater part
│ │ │ │ of 1916 and
│ │ │ │ first 5 months
│ │ │ │ of 1917.
│ │ │ │ Attached to
│ │ │ │ 145th Inf.
│ │ │ │ Bde. to learn
│ │ │ │ Staff work
│ │ │ │ from May 1917
│ │ │ │ to Aug. 1917.
│ │ │ │ Took part in
│ │ │ │ Somme battles,
│ │ │ │ Peronne
│ │ │ │ advance, and
│ │ │ │ 3rd battle of
│ │ │ │ Ypres.
Combs, Hugh │ 15.6.16 │ │ │Embarked with
Vivian │ │ │ │ Battn. as
│ │ │ │ Machine Gun
│ │ │ │ Officer.
│ │ │ │ Proceeded to
│ │ │ │ England on
│ │ │ │ 22.6.16 for
│ │ │ │ transfer to
│ │ │ │ M.G.C.
│ │ │ │ Afterwards
│ │ │ │ served with
│ │ │ │ 23rd Div.
Vernon, Arthur │ │ │ │Embarked with
Stanley │ │ │ │ Battn. as
│ │ │ │ platoon comdr.
│ │ │ │ in A Coy.
│ │ │ │ Proceeded to
│ │ │ │ England on
│ │ │ │ 22.6.16 for
│ │ │ │ transfer to
│ │ │ │ M.G.C.
Viney, Oscar │ │ Wounded │ 23.7.16 │Embarked with
Vaughan │ │ Rejoined │ 21.2.17 │ Battn. as
│ │ To │ 12.3.17 │ Scout and
│ │ hospital │ │ Intelligence
│ │ │ │ Officer. Was
│ │ │ │ commanding B
│ │ │ │ Coy. in action
│ │ │ │ of 23.7.16 on
│ │ │ │ the Somme.
Green, Bernard │ │ Wounded │ 6.5.15 │Embarked with
│ │ Rejoined │ 27.7.15 │ Battn. as
│ │ │ │ platoon comdr.
│ │ │ │ in A Coy.
│ │ │ │ Seconded for
│ │ │ │ duty with
│ │ │ │ 145th M.G.
│ │ │ │ Coy.—11.1.16.
Backhouse, John │ │ Killed │ 10.2.16 │Embarked with
William │ │ │ │ Battn. as
│ │ │ │ platoon comdr.
│ │ │ │ in C Coy.
Wright, Egerton │ │ Killed │ 11.5.18 │Embarked with
Lowndes │ │ (while │ │ Battn. as
│ │ serving │ │ platoon comdr.
│ │ with 6th │ │ in C Coy.
│ │Inf. Bde.)│ │ Attached 145th
│ │ │ │ Inf. Bde. for
│ │ │ │ Staff duty in
│ │ │ │ June 1915.
│ │ │ │ Afterwards
│ │ │ │ appointed
│ │ │ │ G.S.O.3 VII
│ │ │ │ Corps, and
│ │ │ │ then G.S.O.3
│ │ │ │ 11th Div.
│ │ │ │ Appointed Bde.
│ │ │ │ Major 6th Bde.
│ │ │ │ in Dec. 1916.
Bartlett, Alfred │ 1.1.16 │ │ │Embarked with
James Napier │ │ │ │ Battn. as
│ │ │ │ Adjt.
│ │ │ │ Proceeded to
│ │ │ │ 3rd Army Inf.
│ │ │ │ School as
│ │ │ │ Instructor on
│ │ │ │ 10.11.15.
│ │ │ │ Afterwards
│ │ │ │ appointed to
│ │ │ │ command 1/4th
│ │ │ │ Oxford & Bucks
│ │ │ │ L. I.
Lloyd-Baker, │ 7.1.17 │ │ │Embarked as
Artur B. │ │ │ │ Staff Capt.
│ │ │ │ 145th Inf.
│ │ │ │ Bde. Rejoined
│ │ │ │ Battn. for
│ │ │ │ duty on
│ │ │ │ 16.2.16.
│ │ │ │ Commanded C
│ │ │ │ Coy. for 2
│ │ │ │ months.
│ │ │ │ Appointed
│ │ │ │ 2nd-in-C. of
│ │ │ │ Battn. 2.6.16.
│ │ │ │ Attached to
│ │ │ │ 1/4th Oxford &
│ │ │ │ Bucks L.I. on
│ │ │ │ 14.7.17 as
│ │ │ │ 2nd-in-C.
│ │ │ │ Afterwards
│ │ │ │ appointed to
│ │ │ │ command of
│ │ │ │ 1/4th R. Berks
│ │ │ │ Regt.
Hill, John Burrow│ │ │ │Embarked with
│ │ │ │ Battn. as
│ │ │ │ Transport
│ │ │ │ Officer.
│ │ │ │ Attached to
│ │ │ │ 145th Inf.
│ │ │ │ Bde. for Staff
│ │ │ │ duty.
│ │ │ │ Appointed
│ │ │ │ Staff Capt.
│ │ │ │ 144th Inf.
│ │ │ │ Bde. on
│ │ │ │ 27.7.17.
Kennish, Alan │ │ │ │Embarked with
Charles Edward │ │ │ │ Battn. as
Forbes │ │ │ │ platoon cmdr.
│ │ │ │ in B Coy.
│ │ │ │ Seconded for
│ │ │ │ duty with 90th
│ │ │ │ T.M.B., and
│ │ │ │ transferred to
│ │ │ │ England sick
│ │ │ │ in 1916.
Reynolds, Francis│ │ │ │Embarked with
Godfrey Baylie │ │ │ │ Battn. as
│ │ │ │ platoon comdr.
│ │ │ │ in A Coy.
│ │ │ │ Transferred to
│ │ │ │ R.F.C.
│ │ │ │ 21.6.16.
Brown, Alexander │ │ Wounded │ 12.7.15 │Embarked with
Denis Burnett │ │ Rejoined │ 10.1.16 │ Battn. as
│ │ Wounded │ 13.6.16 │ platoon comdr.
│ │ │ │ in D Coy.
│ │ │ │
│ │ │ │
Woollerton, Edwin│ │ Wounded │ 23.7.16 │Embarked with
Norman Collet │ │ Rejoined │ 12.3.17 │ Battn. as
│ │ Hospital │ 23.3.17 │ platoon comdr.
│ │ Rejoined │13.10.17 │ in B Coy. Took
│ │ Hospital │21.12.17 │ part in the
│ │ │ │ Somme fighting
│ │ │ │ and part of
│ │ │ │ the Peronne
│ │ │ │ advance.
Earle, Francis │ │ Wounded │ 15.8.16 │Embarked with
Douglas │ │ │ │ Battn. as
│ │ │ │ platoon comdr.
│ │ │ │ in D Coy. Took
│ │ │ │ part in Somme
│ │ │ │ fighting.
│ │ │ │
│ │ │ │
Hobart-Hampden, │ │ Wounded │ 1.6.15 │Embarked with
Geo. Miles │ │ Rejoined │ 5.9.16 │ Battn. as
Awdry │ │ │ │ platoon cmdr.
│ │ │ │ in D Coy.
│ │ │ │ Transferred to
│ │ │ │ R.F.C. in Dec.
│ │ │ │ 1916, and was
│ │ │ │ afterwards
│ │ │ │ killed while
│ │ │ │ flying.
Gregson-Ellis, │ 25.5.17 │ Wounded │ 16.4.17 │Embarked with
Rex │ │ Died of │ 17.4.17 │ Battn. as
│ │ wounds │ │ platoon cmdr.
│ │ │ │ in B Coy.
│ │ │ │ Attached to
│ │ │ │ No. 1
│ │ │ │ Entrenching
│ │ │ │ Battn. at the
│ │ │ │ Base for 11
│ │ │ │ months during
│ │ │ │ 1915 and 1916.
│ │ │ │ Commanded D
│ │ │ │ Coy. for 8
│ │ │ │ months. Took
│ │ │ │ part in Somme
│ │ │ │ battles and
│ │ │ │ advance from
│ │ │ │ Peronne.
Wright, Philip │ 30.5.18 │ │ │Embarked with
Lowndes │ 3.6.19 │ │ │ Battn. as
│ │ │ │ platoon comdr.
│ │ │ │ in C Coy.
│ │ │ │ Adjt. to the
│ │ │ │ Battn.
│ │ │ │ throughout
│ │ │ │ 1916 and 1917.
│ │ │ │ Acted as Bde.
│ │ │ │ Major 144th
│ │ │ │ Inf. Bde. from
│ │ │ │ 24.5.18 to
│ │ │ │ 25.7.18.
│ │ │ │ Appointed
│ │ │ │ 2nd-in-C. of
│ │ │ │ Battn. Oct.
│ │ │ │ 1918. Took
│ │ │ │ part in all
│ │ │ │ main actions
│ │ │ │ undertaken by
│ │ │ │ Battn. in
│ │ │ │ Belgium,
│ │ │ │ France and
│ │ │ │ Italy.
Neave, Gerald V. │ 4.1.17 │ Killed │ 16.8.17 │Embarked with
│ │ │ │ Battn. as
│ │ │ │ platoon cmdr.
│ │ │ │ in A Coy.
│ │ │ │ Acted as Bde.
│ │ │ │ Bombing
│ │ │ │ Instructor for
│ │ │ │ 14 months
│ │ │ │ during 1915
│ │ │ │ and 1916.
│ │ │ │ Commanded C
│ │ │ │ Coy. during
│ │ │ │ 1917. Took
│ │ │ │ part in Somme
│ │ │ │ battles,
│ │ │ │ advance from
│ │ │ │ Peronne, and
│ │ │ │ 3rd battle of
│ │ │ │ Ypres.
Nichol, Edward │ 21.12.17 │ │ │Embarked with
│ │ │ │ Battn. as
│ │ │ │ Quartermaster.
│ │ │ │ Present with
│ │ │ │ Battn.
│ │ │ │ throughout its
│ │ │ │ period on
│ │ │ │ active
│ │ │ │ service.
Williamson, │ │ Wounded │ 4.4.15 │Embarked with
Norman Bruce │ │ Rejoined │ 11.1.16 │ Battn. as
│ │ │ │ platoon cmdr.
│ │ │ │ in A Coy.
│ │ │ │ Transferred to
│ │ │ │ 145th Bde.
│ │ │ │ M.G. Coy.
│ │ │ │ immediately
│ │ │ │ after
│ │ │ │ rejoining on
│ │ │ │ 11.1.16.
Norwood, Robert │ │ Killed │ 18.7.16 │Platoon cmdr. in
Cecil │ │ │ │ D Coy.
Hales, John │ 4.1.17 │ │ │Platoon cmdr. in
Baseley │ 30.5.18 │ │ │ D Coy. for
│ │ │ │ nearly 12
│ │ │ │ months on
│ │ │ │ joining.
│ │ │ │ Afterwards
│ │ │ │ Battn.
│ │ │ │ Intelligence
│ │ │ │ Officer.
│ │ │ │ Commanded C
│ │ │ │ and D Coys,
│ │ │ │ during 1917.
│ │ │ │ Attached to
│ │ │ │ Bde. and Div.
│ │ │ │ during latter
│ │ │ │ part of 1917
│ │ │ │ to learn Staff
│ │ │ │ duties.
│ │ │ │ Appointed
│ │ │ │ G.S.O.3 48th
│ │ │ │ Div. 15.4.18.
│ │ │ │ Took part in
│ │ │ │ Somme battles,
│ │ │ │ advance from
│ │ │ │ Peronne, and
│ │ │ │ 3rd battle of
│ │ │ │ Ypres.
Pullman, Harold │ │ │ │Platoon cmdr. in
John │ │ │ │ C Coy. for 9
│ │ │ │ months. In
│ │ │ │ hospital
│ │ │ │ greater part
│ │ │ │ of 1916.
│ │ │ │ Commanded D
│ │ │ │ Coy. for
│ │ │ │ several months
│ │ │ │ during 1917.
│ │ │ │ Afterwards
│ │ │ │ commanded C
│ │ │ │ Coy. for
│ │ │ │ nearly 12
│ │ │ │ months in
│ │ │ │ France and
│ │ │ │ Italy.
│ │ │ │ Transferred to
│ │ │ │ England June
│ │ │ │ 18 for duty
│ │ │ │ with 52nd R.
│ │ │ │ Warwick Regt.
│ │ │ │ Took part in
│ │ │ │ advance from
│ │ │ │ Peronne and
│ │ │ │ 3rd battle of
│ │ │ │ Ypres.
Young, Ralph │ │ Wounded │ 23.7.16 │Platoon cmdr. in
Ernest Markham │ │ Rejoined │ 22.8.16 │ B Coy. Took
│ │ │ │ part in battle
│ │ │ │ of Somme.
│ │ │ │ Attached to
│ │ │ │ Bde. during
│ │ │ │ greater part
│ │ │ │ of 1917.
Newbery, Basil │ │ │ │To hospital sick
James │ │ │ │ in Jan. 1916.
│ │ │ │ Afterwards
│ │ │ │ served with
│ │ │ │ 61st Div.
Godfrey, Arthur │ │ Wounded │ 21.7.16 │Platoon cmdr. in
Poole │ │ │ │ C Coy.
│ │ │ │ Afterwards
│ │ │ │ served with
│ │ │ │ Household
│ │ │ │ Battn. and was
│ │ │ │ killed in
│ │ │ │ action.
Hall, Charles │ │ Wounded │ 17.7.16 │Platoon cmdr. in
│ │ Died of │ 13.8.16 │ A Coy.
│ │ Wounds │ │
Furley, Robert │ │ Killed │ 25.1.16 │Platoon cmdr. in
Basil │ │ │ │ B Coy.
Rigden, Brian │ │ Wounded │ 21.7.16 │Platoon cmdr. in
Cawes │ │ Rejoined │ 30.8.17 │ A Coy.
│ │ │ │ Commanded D
│ │ │ │ Coy. for about
│ │ │ │ 8 months
│ │ │ │ during 1918.
│ │ │ │ Proceeded to
│ │ │ │ England
│ │ │ │ 11.11.18 for
│ │ │ │ transfer to
│ │ │ │ Indian Army.
Jones, Cecil Ynyr│ │ Hospital │ 30.5.16 │Battn. Signal
(13th Battn. │ │ │ │ Officer for 2
London Regt.) │ │ │ │ months.
│ │ │ │ Rejoined his
│ │ │ │ own Regt. on
│ │ │ │ leaving
│ │ │ │ hospital.
Rolleston, John │ │ Wounded │ 16.6.16 │Platoon cmdr. in
Marcus │ │ │ │ B Coy.
│ │ │ │ Afterwards
│ │ │ │ served with
│ │ │ │ 61st Div.
Chapman, John │ │ Killed │ 21.7.16 │Platoon cmdr. in
Percy │ │ │ │ C Coy.
Bates, Eric │ │ Killed │ 23.8.16 │Platoon cmdr. in
George Henry │ │ │ │ C Coy.
Abrey, C. G. │ │ Killed │ 21.7.16 │Platoon cmdr. in
│ │ │ │ A Coy.
Aitken, Robert │ │ Wounded │ 9.4.16 │Platoon cmdr. in
│ │ │ │ B Coy.
│ │ │ │ Afterwards
│ │ │ │ served with
│ │ │ │ 61st Div.
Rover, Fredk. │ │ Wounded │ 17.2.17 │Platoon cmdr. in
Harold │ │ Rejoined │ 8.11.17 │ D Coy.
│ │ │ │ Instructing at
│ │ │ │ Base from
│ │ │ │ Sept. 16 to
│ │ │ │ Feb. 17, when
│ │ │ │ wounded in
│ │ │ │ bombing
│ │ │ │ accident.
│ │ │ │ Served with
│ │ │ │ Battn.
│ │ │ │ throughout
│ │ │ │ 1918. Took
│ │ │ │ part in Somme
│ │ │ │ fighting.
Trimmer, Charles │ │ Killed │ 21.7.16 │Platoon cmdr. in
William │ │ │ │ C Coy.
Mason, H. C. E. │ │ Wounded │ 21.7.16 │Platoon cmdr. in
│ │ Rejoined │ 24.5.17 │ B Coy. in 1916
│ │ Wounded │ 6.8.17 │ and in D Coy.
│ │ │ │ 1917. Took
│ │ │ │ part in action
│ │ │ │ of 21.7.16 on
│ │ │ │ Somme.
Shepherd, Hugh │ │ Wounded │ 21.7.16 │Platoon cmdr. in
Vincent │ │ │ │ C Coy. Took
(Middlesex │ │ │ │ part in Somme
Regt.) │ │ │ │ battle.
Hillman, Eric │ │ │ │Platoon cmdr. in
Rodman │ │ │ │ B Coy. Took
(Middlesex │ │ │ │ part in Somme
Regt.) │ │ │ │ battles.
│ │ │ │ Transferred to
│ │ │ │ Special Works’
│ │ │ │ Park, R.E., in
│ │ │ │ March 1917.
Niall, Francis │ │ Wounded │ 8.8.16 │Platoon cmdr. in
(Wilts. Regt.) │ │ (bombing │ │ B Coy. Took
│ │accident) │ │ part in Somme
│ │ │ │ battle.
Arnott, John │ │ │ │Platoon cmdr. in
Frederick │ │ │ │ D Coy. Took
(Wilts. Regt.) │ │ │ │ part in Somme
│ │ │ │ battles. To
│ │ │ │ hospital sick,
│ │ │ │ Sept. 1916.
Molloy, Henry │ │ Wounded │ 8.8.16 │Platoon cmdr. in
Edmund │ │ (bombing │ │ A Coy.
│ │accident) │ │ Afterwards
│ │ │ │ killed in
│ │ │ │ action with
│ │ │ │ 61st Div.
Fallon, David │ │ Wounded │ 15.8.16 │Platoon cmdr. in
│ │ Rejoined │ 4.9.16 │ C Coy. Took
│ │ Wounded │16.11.16 │ part in Somme
│ │ │ │ battles.
Heathcote-Hacker,│ │ Wounded │ 15.8.16 │2nd-in-C. of A
Victor Clare │ │ │ │ Coy.
(Manchester │ │ │ │
Regt.) │ │ │ │
Breton, Harold │ │ Wounded │ 23.8.16 │Platoon cmdr. in
Moyle │ │ │ │ C Coy.
(Manchester │ │ │ │
Regt.) │ │ │ │
Dixon, Frank │ │ Wounded │ 15.8.16 │Platoon cmdr. in
Charles │ │ │ │ D Coy.
(Manchester │ │ │ │
Regt.) │ │ │ │
Heath, Walter │ │ Killed │ 23.8.16 │Platoon cmdr. in
Rowland │ │ │ │ A Coy.
Bowen, Martin │ │ Wounded │ 23.8.16 │Embarked with
│ │ Rejoined │ 10.9.16 │ 48th Divl.
│ │ Wounded │ 3.10.17 │ Cyclists.
│ │ Died of │ 7.10.17 │ Posted to B
│ │ wounds │ │ Coy. on
│ │ │ │ joining Battn.
│ │ │ │ Afterwards
│ │ │ │ commanded that
│ │ │ │ company. Took
│ │ │ │ part in Somme
│ │ │ │ battles and
│ │ │ │ 3rd battle of
│ │ │ │ Ypres.
Alloway, William │ │ │ │Platoon comdr.
Victor (Army │ │ │ │ in C Coy. To
Cyclist Corps) │ │ │ │ hospital sick
│ │ │ │ 19.9.16.
Vaughan, Francis │ │ │ │Platoon cmdr. B
Gerald │ │ │ │ Coy. Took part
│ │ │ │ in the advance
│ │ │ │ from Peronne
│ │ │ │ and 3rd battle
│ │ │ │ of Ypres. In
│ │ │ │ hospital for
│ │ │ │ several weeks
│ │ │ │ during 1917.
│ │ │ │ Finally to
│ │ │ │ hospital
│ │ │ │ 13.10.17.
Firminger, John │ 30.5.16 │ Wounded │ 26.8.18 │Battn. Signal
Egerton │ │ │ │ Officer
│ │ │ │ 25.9.16 to
│ │ │ │ 3.1.17.
│ │ │ │ Afterwards
│ │ │ │ commanded A
│ │ │ │ Coy. for
│ │ │ │ nearly 12
│ │ │ │ months. Took
│ │ │ │ part in 3rd
│ │ │ │ battle of
│ │ │ │ Ypres, part of
│ │ │ │ the Peronne
│ │ │ │ advance, and
│ │ │ │ some actions
│ │ │ │ on Asiago
│ │ │ │ plateau.
Warwick, John │ │ Killed │ 10.3.17 │Commanded A Coy.
Douglas Barford│ │ │ │ for 3 months.
(Hunts Cyclist │ │ │ │
Battn.) │ │ │ │
Fordham, Reginald│ │ Killed │30.10.17 │Served with
Fredk. (Essex │ │ (with │ │ 145th T.M.B.
Regt.) │ │ T.M.B.) │ │ from Oct. 1916
│ │ │ │ to date of
│ │ │ │ death.
Pether, Wilfred │ │ │ │To hospital very
Guy (Essex │ │ │ │ soon after
Regt.) │ │ │ │ joining.
Wiseman, Stanley │ │ Killed │ 10.3.17 │Platoon cmdr. in
(Essex Regt.) │ │ │ │ A Coy.
Knight, Gerald │ │ Killed │ 16.8.17 │Platoon cmdr. in
Robert Frank │ │ │ │ C Coy.
(Essex Regt.) │ │ │ │ Commanded A
│ │ │ │ Coy. in July
│ │ │ │ and Aug. 1917.
Maggs, William │ 30.5.18 │ │ │Platoon cmdr. in
│ 3.6.19 │ │ │ B Coy. Battn.
│ │ │ │ Transport
│ │ │ │ Officer for
│ │ │ │ over 12
│ │ │ │ months.
│ │ │ │ Afterwards
│ │ │ │ Bde. Transport
│ │ │ │ Officer.
Johnston, George │ │ Wounded │ 16.8.17 │Platoon cmdr. B
Adam │ │ │ │ Coy. for 3
│ │ │ │ months.
│ │ │ │ Attached 4th
│ │ │ │ Army Musketry
│ │ │ │ Camp, Dec.
│ │ │ │ 1916 to March
│ │ │ │ 1917, as
│ │ │ │ instructor.
│ │ │ │ Appointed
│ │ │ │ Assist. Adjt.
│ │ │ │ 1.5.17. Took
│ │ │ │ part in
│ │ │ │ advance from
│ │ │ │ Peronne and
│ │ │ │ 3rd battle of
│ │ │ │ Ypres.
Tucker, James │ │ Hospital │ 6.3.17 │Platoon cmdr. in
Millard (Essex │ │ │ │ C Coy.
Regt.) │ │ │ │
Darby, Alexander │ 6.1.19 │ │ │Platoon cmdr. in
Pierre (Essex │ │ │ │ C Coy. for 12
Regt.) │ │ │ │ months. Battn.
│ │ │ │ Lewis Gun
│ │ │ │ Officer.
│ │ │ │ Commanded B
│ │ │ │ Coy. for 12
│ │ │ │ months. Took
│ │ │ │ part in
│ │ │ │ advance from
│ │ │ │ Peronne.
│ │ │ │ Present with
│ │ │ │ Battn. until
│ │ │ │ cessation of
│ │ │ │ hostilities.
Mann, Herbert │ │ │ │Reposted to 2nd
Edmond (Essex │ │ │ │ Oxford & Bucks
Regt.) │ │ │ │ L.I. on
│ │ │ │ 24.11.16.
Cooper-Smith, │ │ Killed │ 10.3.17 │Platoon cmdr. in
Reginald │ │ │ │ A Coy.
Burston (Essex │ │ │ │
Regt.) │ │ │ │
Clarke, John │ │ │ │Reposted to 2nd
James Gordon │ │ │ │ Battn. Oxford
(Essex Regt.) │ │ │ │ & Bucks L.I.
│ │ │ │ on 24.11.16.
Sloan, Archibald │ │ │ │To hospital sick
(Essex Regt.) │ │ │ │ one month
│ │ │ │ after joining.
Coates, Philip │ │ Wounded │ 27.8.17 │Platoon cmdr. in
Adrian (Essex │ │ │ │ A Coy. Took
Regt.) │ │ │ │ part in
│ │ │ │ advance from
│ │ │ │ Peronne and
│ │ │ │ 3rd battle of
│ │ │ │ Ypres.
Jack, James │ │ Wounded │ 16.4.17 │Platoon cmdr. in
(Essex Regt.) │ │ │ │ D Coy. Took
│ │ │ │ part in
│ │ │ │ advance from
│ │ │ │ Peronne.
Bore, Thomas │ │ │ │To hospital sick
Edgar │ │ │ │ 6 weeks after
│ │ │ │ joining.
Piperno, Joseph │ │ │ │Reposted to 2nd
Henry │ │ │ │ Battn. Oxford
│ │ │ │ & Bucks
│ │ │ │ L.I.—24.11.16.
Rydings, Douglas │ │ │ │Reposted to 2nd
Gerald │ │ │ │ Battn. Oxford
│ │ │ │ & Bucks
│ │ │ │ L.I.—24.11.16.
Brettelle, │ │ │ │To hospital sick
Leonard Maurice│ │ │ │ 6 weeks after
Clifford │ │ │ │ joining.
Olivier, Basil │ │ Wounded │ 16.4.17 │Platoon cmdr. in
Coutts Carr │ │ │ │ D Coy. Took
│ │ │ │ part in
│ │ │ │ advance from
│ │ │ │ Peronne.
Chatham, Robert │ │ Wounded │ 16.4.17 │Platoon comdr.
Felton │ │(slightly)│ 21.4.17 │ in B Coy. Took
│ │ Wounded │ │ part in
│ │ │ │ advance from
│ │ │ │ Peronne.
Rigden, Walter │ │ │ │Platoon cmdr. in
O’Brien │ │ │ │ C Coy. Took
│ │ │ │ part in 3rd
│ │ │ │ battle of
│ │ │ │ Ypres.
│ │ │ │ Transferred to
│ │ │ │ R.A.F. June
│ │ │ │ 1918.
Stephens, R. │ │ │ │Appointed to
(43rd Light │ │ │ │ command 48th
Infantry) │ │ │ │ Divl. School
│ │ │ │ very shortly
│ │ │ │ after joining.
│ │ │ │ Afterwards
│ │ │ │ commanded
│ │ │ │ 1/4th Battn.
│ │ │ │ Oxford & Bucks
│ │ │ │ L.I. for short
│ │ │ │ period.
Flint, Norman │ │ Wounded │ 16.4.17 │Platoon cmdr. in
Samuel │ │ Rejoined │ 6.1.18 │ several
│ │ │ │ companies.
│ │ │ │ Commanded A
│ │ │ │ Coy. during
│ │ │ │ last 3 months
│ │ │ │ of 1918.
Ollard, Francis │ │ Wounded │ 16.8.17 │Platoon cmdr. in
Douglas │ │ │ │ C Coy. Took
│ │ │ │ part in 3rd
│ │ │ │ battle of
│ │ │ │ Ypres.
Passmore, Francis│ 21.12.17 │ Wounded │ 16.8.17 │Platoon cmdr. in
Marsland │ │ │ │ A Coy. Took
│ │ │ │ part in 3rd
│ │ │ │ battle of
│ │ │ │ Ypres.
Fawcitt, Edwin │ │ Wounded │ 16.8.17 │Platoon cmdr. in
Henry │ │ │ │ B Coy. Took
│ │ │ │ part in 3rd
│ │ │ │ battle of
│ │ │ │ Ypres.
Stevens, George │ │ │ │To hospital sick
Cecil │ │ │ │ few days after
│ │ │ │ joining.
Reeves, Cecil │ 6.1.19 │ │ │Platoon cmdr. in
Gilbert │ │ │ │ D Coy. 3–1/2
│ │ │ │ months.
│ │ │ │ Assist. Adjt.
│ │ │ │ from Aug. 1917
│ │ │ │ to Dec. 1917.
│ │ │ │ Adjt. from
│ │ │ │ Dec. 1917
│ │ │ │ until
│ │ │ │ cessation of
│ │ │ │ hostilities.
│ │ │ │ Took part in
│ │ │ │ 3rd battle of
│ │ │ │ Ypres and in
│ │ │ │ all actions on
│ │ │ │ Asiago
│ │ │ │ plateau.
Dipple, Thomas │ │ Wounded │ 5.8.17 │Platoon cmdr. in
Denis │ │ │ │ B Coy. Took
│ │ │ │ part in 3rd
│ │ │ │ battle of
│ │ │ │ Ypres.
Marshall, │ │ Wounded │ 16.8.17 │Platoon cmdr. in
Frederick │ │ │ │ A Coy. Took
Charles │ │ │ │ part in 3rd
│ │ │ │ battle of
│ │ │ │ Ypres.
Troutbeck, George│ 3.6.19 │ │ │(Attached H.Q.
Lancelot │ │ │ │ 3rd Army as
│ │ │ │ R.S.O. from
│ │ │ │ 5.8.15 to
│ │ │ │ 6.7.17.)
│ │ │ │ Platoon cmdr.
│ │ │ │ in A Coy.
│ │ │ │ Afterwards
│ │ │ │ 2nd-in-C. of A
│ │ │ │ Coy.,
│ │ │ │ commanded C
│ │ │ │ and D Coys. at
│ │ │ │ different
│ │ │ │ periods.
Norman, Raymond │ │ Wounded │ 16.8.17 │Platoon cmdr. in
Elder │ │ │ │ B Coy. Took
│ │ │ │ part in 3rd
│ │ │ │ battle of
│ │ │ │ Ypres.
Moyle, Arthur │ │ Wounded │ 16.8.17 │Platoon cmdr. in
Thomas │ │ │ │ C Coy. Took
│ │ │ │ part in 3rd
│ │ │ │ battle of
│ │ │ │ Ypres.
Fleeming, William│ │ Wounded │ 27.8.17 │Platoon cmdr. in
Henry │ │ Rejoined │12.10.17 │ D Coy.
│ │ │ │ Commanded A,
│ │ │ │ C, and D Coys.
│ │ │ │ for short
│ │ │ │ periods. Took
│ │ │ │ part in 3rd
│ │ │ │ battle of
│ │ │ │ Ypres.
Newton, Henry │ │ │ │Platoon cmdr. in
James Hall │ │ │ │ D Coy.
(Hunts Cyclist │ │ │ │ Employed away
Battn.) │ │ │ │ from Battn.
│ │ │ │ for nearly 8
│ │ │ │ months.
│ │ │ │ Finally to
│ │ │ │ G.H.Q.
│ │ │ │ Musketry
│ │ │ │ School as
│ │ │ │ instructor,
│ │ │ │ 8.5.15.
McNish, John │ │ │ │To hospital one
Archibald │ │ │ │ week after
(Hunts Cyclist │ │ │ │ joining.
Battn.) │ │ │ │
Morfey, Percy │ │ │ │Reposted to
Albert (Hunts │ │ │ │ 1/5th Battn.
Cyclist Battn.)│ │ │ │ Gloucester
│ │ │ │ Regt. on
│ │ │ │ 18.10.17.
Fisher, George │ │ │ │Platoon cmdr. in
Alfred │ │ │ │ A Coy. Assist.
│ │ │ │ Transport
│ │ │ │ Officer for 6
│ │ │ │ months. Battn.
│ │ │ │ Transport
│ │ │ │ Officer 6
│ │ │ │ months.
Browne, Sidney │ │ │ │Platoon cmdr. in
Noel │ │ │ │ B Coy.
│ │ │ │ Attached to
│ │ │ │ G.H.Q. Italy
│ │ │ │ for several
│ │ │ │ months in
│ │ │ │ 1918.
Caulfield, Robert│ │ │ │Platoon cmdr. in
Charles Fredk. │ │ │ │ C Coy.
(Essex Regt.) │ │ │ │ Attached to
│ │ │ │ 145th T.M.B.
│ │ │ │ for several
│ │ │ │ months in
│ │ │ │ 1918.
Smith, Charles │ │ │ │To 145th T.M.B.
Vivian │ │ │ │ on 7.11.17,
Salisbury │ │ │ │ with whom he
(Essex Regt.) │ │ │ │ served until
│ │ │ │ cessation of
│ │ │ │ hostilities.
Seago, George │ │ │ │Reposted to
William Edward │ │ │ │ 1/5th Battn.
(E. Kent) │ │ │ │ Gloucester
Regt.) │ │ │ │ Regt.
│ │ │ │ 18.10.17.
Sanders, Chas. │ │ │ │Reposted to
Hayden George │ │ │ │ 1/5th Battn.
(E. Kent Regt.)│ │ │ │ Gloucester
│ │ │ │ Regt.
│ │ │ │ 18.10.17.
Clothier, │ │ Wounded │ 28.9.17 │Platoon cmdr. in
Clarence Edwin │ │ │ │ A Coy. To
(Oxford & Bucks│ │ │ │ 145th T.M.B.
L.I. attd.) │ │ │ │ on 6.2.18,
│ │ │ │ with whom he
│ │ │ │ served until
│ │ │ │ cessation of
│ │ │ │ hostilities.
Stanway, Percy │ │ │ │To hospital 5
Anderton │ │ │ │ days after
│ │ │ │ joining.
Cowlishaw, Vernon│ │ │ │Platoon cmdr. in
Clarke Paine │ │ │ │ D Coy. Several
│ │ │ │ months in
│ │ │ │ hospital.
│ │ │ │ Proceeded to
│ │ │ │ England for
│ │ │ │ Intelligence
│ │ │ │ course,
│ │ │ │ 4.10.18.
Bates, Frederick │ │ Wounded │ 28.8.18 │Platoon cmdr. in
Percy │ │ │ │ C Coy.
│ │ │ │ Afterwards
│ │ │ │ became Battn.
│ │ │ │ Scout and
│ │ │ │ Intelligence
│ │ │ │ Officer.
Ellwood, Claude │ │ │ │Platoon cmdr. in
Bertram │ │ │ │ D Coy. With
│ │ │ │ Battn. until
│ │ │ │ cessation of
│ │ │ │ hostilities.
Stokes, Wilfred │ │ Hospital │ 12.1.18 │Platoon cmdr. in
Victor │ │ │ │ A Coy.
Corfield, │ 3.6.19 │ │ │Platoon cmdr. in
Frederick John │ │ │ │ B Coy.
Arthur │ │ │ │ Afterwards
│ │ │ │ became Battn.
│ │ │ │ Signal
│ │ │ │ Officer. With
│ │ │ │ Battn. until
│ │ │ │ cessation of
│ │ │ │ hostilities.
Lorns, Lionel │ │ Wounded │ 26.8.18 │Platoon cmdr. in
William │ │ │ │ A Coy.
Goldhawk │ │ │ │
│ │ │ │
Bocking, Harry │ │ Wounded │ 24.8.18 │Platoon cmdr. in
Charles │ │ │ │ B Coy.
McCracken, Leslie│ 3.6.19 │ │ │Platoon cmdr. in
│ │ │ │ D Coy. Assist.
│ │ │ │ Adjt. from
│ │ │ │ April 1918
│ │ │ │ until
│ │ │ │ cessation of
│ │ │ │ hostilities.
Baker, Gerald │ │ │ │Platoon cmdr. in
Broadbent (R. │ │ │ │ D Coy.
West Kent │ │ │ │ Afterwards
Regt.) │ │ │ │ commanded A
│ │ │ │ Coy. on
│ │ │ │ several
│ │ │ │ occasions.
│ │ │ │ Served with
│ │ │ │ Battn. until
│ │ │ │ cessation of
│ │ │ │ hostilities.
Hayes, Gordon │ │ │ │Reposted 1/5th
Stanley (R. │ │ │ │ Battn.
West Kent │ │ │ │ Gloucester
Regt.) │ │ │ │ Regt. 29.9.17.
Phinn, Charles │ │ │ │Reposted 1/5th
Walter │ │ │ │ Battn.
│ │ │ │ Gloucester
│ │ │ │ Regt. 29.9.17.
Pigott, Henry │ │ Wounded │ 15.6.18 │Platoon cmdr. in
Rudolph (Oxford│ │ │ │ A Coy.
& Bucks L.I. │ │ │ │
attd.) │ │ │ │
Higlett, George │ │ │ │Platoon cmdr. in
Willibert │ │ │ │ C Coy.
│ │ │ │ Afterwards
│ │ │ │ commanded C
│ │ │ │ Coy. Served
│ │ │ │ with Battn.
│ │ │ │ until
│ │ │ │ cessation of
│ │ │ │ hostilities.
Butler, William │ │ Wounded │ 15.6.18 │Platoon cmdr. in
George │ │ Rejoined │ 25.8.18 │ B Coy. With
│ │ │ │ Battn. until
│ │ │ │ cessation of
│ │ │ │ hostilities.
Cornish, Thomas │ │ │ │Platoon cmdr. in
Martin │ │ │ │ C Coy.
│ │ │ │ Transferred to
│ │ │ │ R.A.F.
│ │ │ │ 11.6.18.
Grace, Reginald │ │ │ │Platoon cmdr. in
William │ │ │ │ B Coy.
│ │ │ │ Appointed
│ │ │ │ Battn.
│ │ │ │ Demobilisation
│ │ │ │ Officer after
│ │ │ │ cessation of
│ │ │ │ hostilities.
Coxon, Edward │ │ │ │Platoon cmdr. in
Thomas Charles │ │ │ │ C Coy. and
(R. West Kent │ │ │ │ later in D
Regt.) │ │ │ │ Coy.
│ │ │ │ Transferred to
│ │ │ │ R.A.F. 6.7.18.
Brightman, Arthur│ │ Wounded │ 26.8.18 │2nd-in-C. of B
Lindrea │ │ │ │ Coy. Commanded
│ │ │ │ that company
│ │ │ │ on several
│ │ │ │ occasions.
Wilcox, Francis │ │ Wounded │ 15.6.18 │Platoon cmdr. in
John │ │(slightly,│ 26.8.18 │ D Coy.
│ │ at duty) │ │
│ │ Wounded │ │
Herbert, Percy │ │ Wounded │ 15.6.18 │Platoon cmdr. in
Thomas │ │(slightly,│ │ C Coy. Served
│ │ at duty) │ │ with Battn.
│ │ │ │ until
│ │ │ │ cessation of
│ │ │ │ hostilities.
Sherwin, George │ │ Wounded │29.10.18 │Platoon cmdr. in
│ │ │ │ A Coy.
Blackmore, Frank │ │ Wounded │ 26.8.18 │Platoon cmdr. in
William │ │ │ │ B Coy.
Read, John │ │ Wounded │ 1.11.18 │Platoon cmdr. in
William Charles│ │ │ │ D Coy.
Curram, Leslie │ │ Wounded │ 26.8.18 │Platoon cmdr. in
Reginald │ │(slightly,│29.10.18 │ C Coy. Served
│ │ at duty) │16.12.18 │ with Battn.
│ │ Wounded │ │ until
│ │ Rejoined │ │ cessation of
│ │ │ │ hostilities.
Butlin, Max │ │ │ │Platoon cmdr. in
William │ │ │ │ A Coy. Served
│ │ │ │ with Battn.
│ │ │ │ until
│ │ │ │ cessation of
│ │ │ │ hostilities.
Pike, John Robert│ │ │ │Platoon cmdr. in
│ │ │ │ D Coy. Served
│ │ │ │ with Battn.
│ │ │ │ until
│ │ │ │ cessation of
│ │ │ │ hostilities.
Herbert, Albert │ │ │ │Platoon cmdr. in
Henry │ │ │ │ B Coy. and
│ │ │ │ afterwards
│ │ │ │ with C Coy.
│ │ │ │ Served with
│ │ │ │ Battn. until
│ │ │ │ cessation of
│ │ │ │ hostilities.
Beaver, Henry │ │ │ │2nd-in-C. of D
Allan (52nd │ │ │ │ Coy. Commanded
L.I. attd.) │ │ │ │ that company
│ │ │ │ for several
│ │ │ │ months after
│ │ │ │ cessation of
│ │ │ │ hostilities.
Allday, Edward │ │ │ │2nd-in-C. of B
Cyril James │ │ │ │ Coy.
(52nd L.I. │ │ │ │
attd.) │ │ │ │
Cullinan, Daniel │ │ │ │Platoon cmdr. in
(R. Munster │ │ │ │ A Coy.
Fus. attd.) │ │ │ │
Campbell, Harry │ │ │ │Platoon cmdr. in
Douglas │ │ │ │ C Coy.
Caulfield (52nd│ │ │ │
L.I. attd.) │ │ │ │
MEDICAL OFFICERS AND CHAPLAINS ATTACHED TO BATTALION
Hughes, Leslie │ 1.1.17 │ Hospital │ 26.8.17 │Medical Officer.
Edward │ │ │ │ Took part in
(R.A.M.C. [T.])│ │ │ │ Somme battles,
│ │ │ │ advance from
│ │ │ │ Peronne, and
│ │ │ │ 3rd battle of
│ │ │ │ Ypres.
Noke, Hubert │ │ │ │Chaplain. Took
(C.F.) │ │ │ │ part in
│ │ │ │ advance from
│ │ │ │ Peronne, 3rd
│ │ │ │ battle of
│ │ │ │ Ypres, and
│ │ │ │ several
│ │ │ │ actions on
│ │ │ │ Asiago
│ │ │ │ plateau. With
│ │ │ │ Battn. until
│ │ │ │ cessation of
│ │ │ │ hostilities.
Thomas, Harold │ 1.1.19 │ │ │Medical Officer.
Seburt │ │ │ │ Took part in
(R.A.M.C.) │ │ │ │ 3rd battle of
│ │ │ │ Ypres and
│ │ │ │ actions on
│ │ │ │ Asiago
│ │ │ │ plateau. With
│ │ │ │ Battn. until
│ │ │ │ cessation of
│ │ │ │ hostilities.
APPENDIX VI
NOMINAL ROLL OF WARRANT OFFICERS, N.C.O.’S AND MEN WHO SERVED WITH THE
BATTALION DURING THE PERIOD MARCH 1915–DECEMBER 1918
Abbey, H. E.
Abbott, A.
Abbott, G.
Abbott, S.
Abbott, W.
Abrahams, H.
Absolem, G. J. S.
Adams, A. E.
Adams, E.
Adams, F.
Adams, H.
Adams, H. R.
Adams, J.
Adamson, T.
Aitken, R. S.
Alcock, J.
Alcock, L. J.
Alderman, R. H.
Aldous, A.
Aldred, A.
Aldridge, G.
Alexander, A.
Allaway, C. W.
Allchurch, H.
Allen, A.
Allen, G. H.
Allen, H.
Allen, L. B.
Allen, R.
Allen, S.
Allport, S.
Allum, E. G.
Alworthy, A.
Anderson, A. M.
Anderson, J. A.
Andrews, W.
Annear, L. G.
Anstead, E.
Anstee, W. A.
Anstiss, F. W.
Appleby, J.
Arlick, H.
Arlick, R.
Armitage, C.
Armitage, H.
Armstrong, T.
Arnold, B.
Ashford, A.
Ashley, F. L.
Ashley, G. W.
Aston, D.
Aston, H. E.
Atkins, A.
Atkins, D.
Atkins, E.
Atkins, G.
Atkins, H.
Atkins, J.
Atkins, S. J.
Atkins, T. C.
Atkins, T. W.
Atkins, W. H.
Atkinson, J.
Attwood, T.
Auger, C.
Austin, A. G.
Austin, J.
Austin, T.
Avery, H.
Avery, T. W.
Axtell, A. E.
Axtell, A.
Ayres, R.
Bacon, T.
Badger, C.
Badrick, E.
Badrick, H.
Badrick, T. C.
Bailey, A.
Bailey, C.
Bailey, C. H.
Bailey, F.
Bailey, F.
Bailey, H. J.
Bailey, P. L.
Bailey, V. G.
Baker, C. H.
Baker, F.
Baker, F.
Baker, G. C.
Baker, H. C.
Baker, J. T.
Baker, W. J.
Bakewell, R. T.
Balcombe, L.
Balding, A. J.
Balding, F.
Baldock, W. C.
Baldwin, A. E.
Baldwin, C.
Baldwin, J.
Baldwin, J. F.
Baldwin, J. W.
Baldwin, O.
Baldwin, R.
Baldwin, W. J.
Balkin, P.
Ball, A.
Ball, E. A.
Ball, G.
Ball, G. J.
Ball, H.
Ball, H.
Ball, S.
Ball, W. H.
Ballard, C. W.
Bandy, F. J.
Banks, A.
Banks, C.
Barber, T.
Bardell, A.
Barlow, J.
Barmer, A. C.
Barnard, F.
Barnes, C.
Barnes, E.
Barnes, F.
Barnes, H.
Barnes, L.
Barnett, A.
Barnett, G.
Barnsley, F.
Barnwell, W. G.
Barrass, W. H.
Barratt, H.
Barrell, L. J.
Barrett, E. J.
Barrett, F.
Barrett, H. F.
Barrett, L. G.
Barrett, P.
Barrett, P.
Barrie, R.
Bartlett, P. J.
Bartlett, R.
Bartlett, S. W.
Barton, A.
Barton, T.
Baskerville, F. W.
Bass, F.
Batchelor, A.
Batchelor, C.
Batchelor, W.
Bateman, R. J.
Bateman, R. R.
Bates, A.
Bates, F.
Bath, T. H.
Batterson, W.
Baxter, A. E.
Baxter, H.
Baxter, P. E.
Beadle, G. W.
Beal, E. G.
Beales, H. W.
Beament, F.
Beasley, J.
Beck, R.
Beckett, A.
Beckett, F. E.
Beckett, G.
Beckett, L.
Beckley, F. P.
Bedford, H.
Bedwell, W.
Beechey, H.
Beedham, G. E.
Beer, J.
Beere, J.
Belcher, G.
Belgrove, F.
Bell, T.
Bennell, T. J.
Bennett, A. J.
Bennett, A. W.
Bennett, C.
Bennett, L.
Bennett, W. C.
Benney, J.
Benning, B.
Benning, W. J.
Bentley, H.
Bentley, W.
Bensusan, B.
Berg, I.
Bernstein, M.
Berrett, A. H.
Berridge, G.
Bibby, W. G.
Bierton, T.
Biggey, W.
Biggs, A. E.
Biggs, E. G.
Biggs, E. W.
Biggs, F. J.
Biggs, J. A.
Bignall, L.
Bignell, F.
Bignell, F.
Bignell, R.
Biles, R.
Binns, H.
Birch, E.
Birch, W.
Birchell, S. T.
Bird, C.
Bird, H. T.
Bird, J.
Bird, T. A.
Bishop, A.
Bishop, S. G.
Bishop, W. S.
Bissell, W.
Biswell, H.
Blackburn, J. M.
Blackwell, F. J.
Blackwell, W.
Blake, E.
Blake, H.
Blake, W. A.
Bland, A. R.
Blay, C. F. J.
Blick, C.
Bloomfield, W.
Bloomstein, M.
Boast, O.
Boast, W.
Boddy, G.
Bodsworth, P.
Bolland, G.
Bond, H. J.
Bond, R.
Bone, E.
Bone, F.
Bone, H.
Bonham, A. T.
Bonham, E.
Bonham, H.
Bonham, J. W.
Boon, A. E.
Boot, A. F.
Booth, C. H.
Booth, F.
Botley, C.
Botley, P.
Boughton, A. J.
Boughton, H.
Bowden, C.
Bowden, F.
Bowden, P. J.
Bowden, W.
Bowery, E. A.
Bowery, G.
Bowler, F. H.
Bowles, A. J. G.
Boyce, A. H.
Boyle, H. E.
Boyles, F.
Brack, J.
Brackley, A.
Bradbury, F.
Bradbury, F. J.
Bradbury, J.
Bradbury, J.
Bradley, W.
Braes, J.
Brain, H.
Brain, J.
Brandon, H.
Brandon, J. C.
Bravington, F. H.
Bravington, V.
Bravington, W.
Brawn, A.
Brazier, J.
Brelly, F.
Brett, P. S.
Brewer, R. E.
Brewer, T.
Brice, W. G.
Bridges, E.
Bridges, J.
Bridges, N. C.
Bridgett, T. J.
Bright, H. G.
Brightman, E.
Brill, A.
Brinton, J. C.
Brion, C.
Brion, E. J.
Briscoe, H.
Bristow, A. G.
Bristow, A. T.
Bristow, L. W.
Bristow, V. F.
Bristow, W. E.
Bristowe, H. J.
Britton, S.
Brogden, C. J.
Brolly, J.
Brook, W. S. J.
Brooke, G. E.
Brooks, A.
Brooks, A. W.
Brooks, E. A.
Brooks, H. J.
Brooks, J.
Brooks, L.
Brooks, W. G.
Brown, A.
Brown, E.
Brown, E. H.
Brown, F.
Brown, G.
Brown, J.
Brown, J. B.
Brown, J. C.
Brown, J. W.
Brown, J. W.
Brown, T.
Brown, W.
Brownjohn, O. E.
Brownsell, J.
Bruce, A.
Bruce, A. E.
Bruce, W. H.
Bruton, G.
Bruton, W. C.
Bryant, A.
Bryant, G.
Bryant, G.
Buchanan, G.
Buckingham, A.
Buckland, E.
Buckland, F. C.
Buckland, W.
Bull, S.
Bull, W. H.
Bunby, A. E.
Bunce, C. W.
Bunce, G.
Bunyan, A.
Bunyan, W.
Burch, C.
Burden, J. R.
Burden, W. A.
Burgess, A. W.
Burgess, C.
Burgess, W.
Burnham, G.
Burnham, G.
Burnham, J.
Burnham, J.
Burnham, W. J.
Burns, H. H.
Burrell, C.
Burrows, F.
Burrows, J.
Burrows, T. G.
Burton, L. B.
Busby, C. C.
Bushnell, C. M.
Bushrod, P. J. T.
Buss, P. A.
Butcher, H.
Butcher, J.
Butler, G. G.
Butler, J. A.
Butler, R.
Button, G.
Byron, F.
Cadwallader, W. T.
Caldwell, A. E. C.
Callaway, C. G.
Campbell, A.
Campbell, C. S.
Cannell, A.
Cannon, A. A.
Canvin, H. A.
Capel, C.
Capt, E. E. H.
Careless, J. R.
Carey, A. A.
Carey, W.
Carney, W.
Carpenter, J.
Carpenter, R.
Carr, D.
Carr, R.
Carrick, W.
Carroll, S.
Carter, H.
Carter, W.
Cartwright, F.
Cartwright, W. G.
Cashmore, C. V.
Cassenbaum, J.
Casson, P. W.
Castle, H. P.
Castle, T.
Catchpole, H.
Cattell, W.
Cave, F. W.
Cave, W. E.
Chamberlain, J. E.
Chamberlain, W.
Chambers, A.
Chandler, E. S.
Chapman, A.
Chapman, A.
Chapman, C.
Chapman, F.
Chapman, H. G.
Chapman, W. H.
Chaplin, F. E.
Chappell, A. G.
Chappell, T.
Chappell, W. E.
Chenhalls, J.
Cherrett, W. A.
Cherry, A.
Cherry, J.
Cheshire, A. B.
Cheshire, J. H.
Childs, J.
Chilton, W. E.
Chimes, G. D.
Chinn, E. T.
Chirgwin, A.
Chown, C. A.
Christie, W.
Chubb, V. H.
Church, H.
Clarfelt, S.
Claridge, R.
Clark, C.
Clark, S.
Clark, W.
Clark, W. W.
Clarke, C.
Clarke, G.
Clarke, J.
Clarke, J.
Clarke, J. C.
Clarke, S.
Clarke, T. F.
Clarke, W.
Clarke, W. C.
Clarke, W. H.
Claydon, W. J.
Cleaver, A. H.
Cleaver, L.
Clee, G. H.
Clegg, J. W.
Clements, A.
Clements, G. E.
Clewlow, A. E.
Clibbon, A.
Cliff, J.
Close, R.
Clutton, S.
Coates, J.
Coates, W. A.
Cock, W.
Cockburn, W. L.
Cockle, E.
Coggins, T.
Cohen, B.
Cohen, G.
Cohen, I.
Cohen, J.
Cohen, M.
Cohen, M.
Cohen, S.
Colbrook, R.
Cole, J. G. J.
Cole, P. C.
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APPENDIX VII
(A) COPY OF WAR OFFICE LETTER
WAR OFFICE, LONDON, S.W.
_27th July, 1920._
SIR,
I am commanded by the Army Council to inform you that they have recently
received through the Foreign Office for distribution to the Army seven
bronze reproductions of a Gold Medal which was presented to His Majesty
the King of Italy by a National Committee in commemoration of the War.
Four others, it is understood, have been allotted to the Navy, and one
to the Royal Air Force.
The Council, after consultation with Lieutenant-General the Earl of
Cavan, have selected the following units to receive these medals, as
representatives of the British Military Forces which were engaged on the
Italian Front:
Northamptonshire Yeomanry.
Bucks Battalion, Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry.
1st Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
Royal Artillery Mess, Woolwich.
Royal Engineer Mess, Chatham.
Honourable Artillery Company.
Royal Army Medical Corps Mess, Millbank Hospital.
I am accordingly to transmit herewith a copy of the diploma which
accompanied the medals, together with a translation of the same, and to
inform you that the medal will be forwarded to you forthwith by
registered post. I am at the same time to request that you will be good
enough to furnish a formal receipt at your earliest convenience.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
H. J. CREEDY.
The Officer Commanding
Bucks Battalion,
Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire
Light Infantry.
14, Temple Square, Aylesbury.
(B) TRANSLATION OF THE ITALIAN DIPLOMA
THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE ARMY AND NAVY COMMEMORATIVE MEDAL,
instituted in Rome with the object of offering to His Majesty the King
of Italy, Vittorio Emanuele III, as Supreme Head of the Army and Navy, a
large medal in gold, in memory of the War fought in the cause of Freedom
and Civilization, presented this medal to the August Sovereign on the
10th December, 1919.
The National Committee has also offered a facsimile of the medal to all
the Ships and Regiments which took part in the Great War, and each
individual Italian soldier and sailor who distinguished himself on
active service.
With the desire that this medal should also be a solemn emblem of
distinction for the Armies and Navies of the Great and Valiant Allied
Nations, the National Committee has decided to present to them
reproductions of the same as a token of the profound sentiments of
fraternity by which it is animated.
This diploma, together with a facsimile in bronze of the medal, is
presented to:
The Bucks Battalion,
Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry.
_For the Executive Committee_,
THE PRESIDENT.
ROME, _28th March, 1920_.
[Illustration:
ITALIAN MEMORIAL CERTIFICATE.
]
[Illustration:
Map No. 4. THE ASIAGO PLATEAU. April-November, 1918.
]
-----
Footnote 1:
Denotes award of Bars.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES
● Fixed typos; non-standard spelling and dialect retained.
● Renumbered footnotes and moved them all to the end of the final
chapter.
● Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.
● The caret (^) is used to indicate superscript.
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