The Project Gutenberg eBook of The historical evolution of the Ukrainian problem
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and
most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online
at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States,
you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located
before using this eBook.
Title: The historical evolution of the Ukrainian problem
Author: Michaelo Hrushevsky
Translator: George Raffalovich
Release date: October 13, 2026 [eBook #79773]
Language: English
Original publication: London: Garden City Press, Ltd., 1915
Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/79773
Credits: Charlene Taylor, Paul Fatula and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE UKRAINIAN PROBLEM ***
The
Historical Evolution of
The Ukrainian Problem
+By+
+Prof.+ MICHAELO HRUSHEVSKY
_Translated with the kind permission of the Editor of
LA REVUE POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE_
+By+
GEORGE RAFFALOVICH
+English Edition Published for S.V.U.+
LONDON
1915
PREFACE BY THE TRANSLATOR
Professor Michaelo Hrushevsky, the author of this highly interesting
and most pathetic sketch of Ukrainian history, which appeared in the
November-December number of _La Revue Politique Internationale_,
is well known on the Continent as not only the most authoritative
historian of his country and nation, but also as one of those obstinate
seekers after historical truths in all the fields that pertain to
the Slav Races and the various European nations with which they came
into contact. He was in fact, of the Ukrainian Leaders, the one who
found it easier to secure adherents in all the many camps into which
the Ukrainian nation is unfortunately divided. At the beginning of
the war, Professor Hrushevsky was in Lemberg, then went to Vienna
and to several neutral countries before he returned to Kiev. He was
shortly afterwards arrested and exiled to a little town on the Siberian
frontier. This, however, need not be taken as an indication of the
future policy of the Russian Government towards the Ukrainians. It is
more likely to be a temporary measure taken by the Police Authorities
in order to impress certain extremist elements among the Ukrainian
Leaders of Russia. After the many and repeated assertions made by the
British and French statesmen on the subject of the small nationalities
of Europe, it is utterly unconceivable that the great majority of the
people in the land of our Slavonic allies should be again thwarted
in their earnest endeavour to secure more liberties not only for the
Russians themselves, but for the subject races of the whole Empire.
All Russian Liberals--with the curious exception of a few so-called
Democrats--realize to-day the necessity of facing the Ukrainian problem
as soon as the war is over in a sincere, honest and fearless fashion.
Whether the reforms be called Autonomy, Home Rule, Devolution or
Local Government, it is obvious from the tone of the Russian Liberal
Press that the initial mistake committed by one or two irresponsible
statesmen during the first occupation of Galicia was one of the most
important causes that led to the sudden Russian retreat and the
dissatisfaction among the Uniat Ruthenes (or Ukrainians) of Eastern
Galicia. As we all know, there is in Russia a remnant of the ancient
Germanophile party which has had its innings unopposed almost ever
since Catherine II, the most German of all the Russian rulers. One
year’s war against Germany has apparently not yet reduced that element
to impotence.
At the end of the pamphlet will be found a short bibliography of
publications that have appeared within the last year in the English
Press. There were also two publications in the French language: one,
a small Ukrainian news-sheet doubtless ironically called intermittent
by its Editor, was so obviously written solely in, and altogether
supported by German interests, that it was only interesting to the
student in so far as it showed indication of possible doubts on the
part of Berlin as to the final issue and as to the possibility of
mischievous bargaining after the war. We may rely upon the overwhelming
majority of the Russian people to refuse to be hoodwinked. We can
therefore hope that the typically Prussian way in which Russia has
once or twice behaved towards her small nationalities will be at once
and for ever repudiated. Pro-Austrian, the Galicians may have had good
causes to remain; pro-German they never were or could be.
Is it not the intention of England and France and presumably also that
of the Russian Government, that the world be shown most palpably that
brute force does not pay, even if a certain amount of brute force has
to be used towards the brute itself?
G. R.
Barnes, _July-August, 1915_.
_The Historical Evolution of the Ukrainian Problem_
The tremendous Continental war which is actually unfolding its
surprises before our eyes has, for the first time in modern history,
brought into prominence the problem of the Ukraine. For many years,
of course, people who had a presentiment of the forthcoming events,
attempted to determine the importance which it was necessary to
attribute to this question, and what place it was to be given in the
Evolution of European politics. The present circumstances have made it
a problem of the first importance.
This work was written in the Russian language before the outbreak of
war, and was intended for an English periodical which was to devote
itself to the problems of the small nationalities. Its publication in
Russian has been rendered difficult by the events through which we are
passing. I have therefore taken advantage of the hospitality offered
me by _La Revue Politique Internationale_ and hope thereby that this
survey of the historical evolution of the Ukrainian aspirations will
help to elucidate a problem which has been ignored too long by public
opinion in Europe in spite of its vital importance for the future.
I
_General Considerations--The Period of the Kiev State_
The history of the Ukrainian question, as it offers itself to us
to-day, dates from the middle of the seventeenth century, that is,
the time of the great Ukrainian Revolution of 1648, which had given
a glaring publicity to the problem, and caused at the same time the
partition of the Ukraine between the Muscovite Empire and the Kingdom
of Poland. From that day began the decadence of National Ukrainian
life. Yet at the same time one could already observe in the people
new aspirations towards the re-establishment of their independence.
These aspirations tended to put aside all obstacles which opposed the
intellectual, social and political development of the country. They can
be traced in the movement now taking place in the Ukrainian provinces
of both the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires. The causes which have
determined the more recent phases of this movement have their origin in
the past centuries. They are a result not only of the political life of
the people, but also of the geographical peculiarities of the territory
inhabited by this people, of its situation, its physical nature, and of
the conditions in which the colonization of the soil was accomplished.
The country inhabited by the Ukrainians is very vast, very fertile, and
well watered. Already, in the days of ancient Greece it was one of its
granaries, and the Greeks drew therefrom their larger supply. Later, at
the beginning of the modern period, these lands provisioned to a large
extent Central and Northern Europe in wheat, cattle, and wood. The
country possesses immense natural riches--such as iron, coal, salt and
other minerals. It furnishes at the present to Eastern Europe most of
its cereals, meat, sugar, salt, iron, mercury, etc.
From the very early times the Ukraine has for various reasons awakened
the thirst for conquest in its neighbours. Its situation at the centre
of the vast plains that join Central Europe to Central Asia on the
broad way which, so far as our memory can stretch, various peoples have
always followed, and which served for the exchange of the products
of civilization--for the coast of the Black Sea offers an especially
favourable road for relations between west, east, and south--all this
made of the Ukraine a land of dreams for each of the neighbouring
States, as soon as they thought of any political expansion. This
longing was facilitated by the fact that the natural frontiers of the
country offer almost nowhere any obstacle of importance to invasion.
Not to go too far back in antiquity it will be enough to recall the
attempts made by the Greeks, by Rome, by Byzantium, by the Italian
republics of the Middle Ages, then by Poland, Hungary, Turkey,
Lithuania and Russia, with a view to occupy the land. For the rest
we may leave out the study of the means employed by these nations in
their attempt to appropriate this territory or to exploit for their own
ends the natural riches of the Ukraine, its commercial highways and
its relations with other countries extending beyond the Caucasus, with
Mesopotamia, Central Asia, Persia, India and China.
The same tendency is to be found in the minds of the conquerors,
marching from east to west, such as the Persians in the time of Darius,
the Arabian Califs or the Turks of Central Asia and Turkestan. Each
political organization which in turn exercised its sway over Ukrainian
territory proceeded in the same fashion. As soon as it acquired a
certain amount of power, it sought to extend its possessions or its
sphere of influence over the neighbouring territory east or west.
_The Slav migration which drifted towards Ukrainian territory with
especial vigour between the sixth and eighth centuries, gave the
country to the southern group of Eastern Slavs._ It is from them
that the real Ukrainians are descended.[1] These peoples settled in
the region of the Middle and Lower Dniepr, the Bug and the Southern
Dniester. They also occupied a considerable portion of the Don,
from whence they were later driven out, during the ninth and tenth
centuries, by the Magyars and the Pazinaks, who expelled them from
the shores of the Black Sea. The political and social evolution which
followed this period of colonial expansion ended by forming a State
in the region of the Dniepr with Kiev as the centre. This became the
State of Kiev. As soon as it had shaken off the yoke of the Kazars,
the Norman conquerors and the rulers of Byzantium and assimilated
new influences from east, north and south, it entered upon a period
of intense activity and expansion from the ninth and tenth centuries
onward. It sought the command of all the commercial highways of Eastern
Europe, and aimed at the extension of its power over the Slav nations
of the east and other parts who had migrated to the territory crossed
by these great highways. In so doing, Kiev had to combat a serious
rival, namely Novgorod, the most northern site of Norman influence,
which contained in itself important commercial and political interests.
In the early pages of the Annals of the State of Kiev (eleventh
century) one often perceives a trace of this rivalry from which Kiev
always emerged victorious. The princes of Kiev--Svjatoslav (died 792),
Vladimir the Great (1015), Yaroslav (1054)--founded the hegemony of
Kiev and the Ukraine on a solid basis owing to the political system of
this State, also called “Russian” State.[2]
[1] The words Ukraine and Ukrainian have only recently been used as
signifying all the inhabitants of the Ukraine, and the whole territory
inhabited by them. They are now also used to designate the different
phases of the historic evolution of this race. We see from the
documents we possess that these phases are first found in the twelfth
century, and are used for the frontiers of the Ukrainian territory at
that period. The events of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth
centuries which have made Eastern Ukraine the centre of the national,
political and intellectual life of the country have led to the word
Ukrainian being applied to the entire nation, in place of the old names
of “Little Russians” or “South Russians.” These terms themselves had
formerly replaced the word “Rusj” (which was also used in the first
instance for the Southern Ukrainians), as soon as the name “Rusj” was
employed to designate also the inhabitants of Great Russia and the
western territory occupied by them. These changes of appellation led to
much confusion.
[2] The origin of the word “Rusj” is not yet known. It is certain
however that in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and perhaps even
earlier, this word was closely associated with Kiev and its territory.
Their possessions extended from the mouth of the Kuban to the San in
the west, in the north to the Big Lakes and the tributaries of the
Volga. The most important centres of control for these distant regions
were Kiev, Tchernicov, and Pereyaslavl. It was here that the political
and intellectual activity of Eastern Europe centred at this period.
Christianity, brought about by Vladimir the Great in 990, owing to
Byzantine influence, became the basis of the new civilization of Kiev,
which was modelled on the ecclesiastical hierarchy, the literature and
the art of Byzantium. This civilization, together with the Laws of the
State of Kiev, made a path for itself through Southern Ukraine towards
the north and the east right through the territory named White Russia
and Great Russia up to the Finnish region.
This hegemony of the Ukrainian towns in the valley of the Dniepr was
not long preserved however. The pressure from the Turks which made
itself felt in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, was especially
powerful in the territory of Kiev and Pereyaslavl. It shook the
economic foundations upon which the authority of these towns was based,
gradually wearing away the colonization which was afoot in the southern
region. The countries of the north and north-east found themselves in
a much more favourable condition in this respect. The Slav colonies
in Finnish territory, situated on the Northern Volga, where a new
race of mixed Slavs and Mongols from the east sprang up--the Great
Russians--became in the middle of the twelfth century, headed by the
princes of the younger branch of the Kiev dynasty (the Pereyaslavl
branch), a powerful principality, whose leaders, in the last half of
the same century, made vigorous efforts to ruin the Kiev hegemony and
to establish themselves on the ruins of this State. It was to this
end that the dissensions which the history of the Ukrainian princes
relates were encouraged; the younger branch is made jealous of the Kiev
princes, the commerce and the well-being of the nation grow less, and
the esteem in which the metropolis is held disappears. These are the
conditions under which the rivalry waxed between the new State of Great
Russia, from which sprang later the principality of Moscow, and the
Ukrainian metropolis, and to which was due in great measure the ruin of
the political system of Kiev, which was already making itself felt at
the beginning of the thirteenth century.
II
_The Decadence of the Political Life of the Ukraine_
The decadence of the State of Kiev does not by any means coincide
with the ruin of the life of the Ukraine as a State. The princes of
Tchernicov, whose possessions had been less damaged by the Turkish
invasion than the countries of Kiev and Pereyaslavl, were the first to
take up the part that the House of Kiev had played in the political
life of the Ukraine. But these attempts were not successful, for the
Mongolian invasion of 1239 which overflowed the territory of the Dniepr
with tremendous vigour, soon deprived the principality of Tchernicov
of its remaining independence. On the other hand the principality of
Halitch-Volhynia which had sprung up at the end of the twelfth century
(1199) through the reunion of the principality of Vladimir of Volhynia
with the principality of Halitch, showed, in the hands of a descendant
of the eldest branch of the House of Kiev, Prince Roman, a much
greater aptitude for self-development and the acquisition of political
importance.
Turkish pressure, even in the preceding centuries, had forced the
migration of the Ukrainian population from the south towards the east,
in the direction of Volhynia and the Carpathian district. The Mongolian
invasion led by Batu Khan ended the migration to the west of the
political and intellectual life of the Ukrainians of the Dniepr regions.
As soon as Prince Roman and his son Daniel had firmly established
themselves, they sought to make their influence felt in the eastern
part of the Ukraine. These attempts came to naught, however, on
encountering the resistance of the Golden Horde, who supported the
Ukrainian towns in their combat against the princes’ rule, and
made every effort to prevent the development of the power of these
sovereigns. The politics of the House of Halitch-Volhynia also came
in conflict with the aims of Poland and Hungary. For some time these
nations had been endeavouring to seize the western portion of the
Ukraine. In vain did Daniel suggest forming an alliance against the
Tartars. This proposal only met with the indifference of his western
neighbours, and he was forced to abandon his great idea, which,
however, brought him the royal crown presented by the Pope.
The State of Halitch-Volhynia lasted nearly another century and became
the centre of the intellectual and political life of the Ukraine,
with the exception of Eastern Ukraine, which remained untouched by
its influence. This period of Ukrainian history is one of immense
importance, for it was at this time that the Byzantine ideas (till
now predominant) were neutralized by fresh influences coming from the
west, especially from Germany. These influences gave birth to the
system of town communes, modelled on German Law which sprang up in
Halitch-Volhynia at the beginning of the thirteenth century. From this
moment circumstances became more favourable for the development of
Ukrainian culture. But the alliance between Poland and Hungary, through
the treaty of 1336, was soon to put an end to the West Ukrainian State.
The movement started in 1340 by the boyars of Halitch-Volhynia who,
dissatisfied with the politics of Prince George Boleslas, tried to
put in his stead Lubart, a prince of the Lithuanian dynasty--gave the
kings of Poland and Hungary a pretext to march against the kingdom of
Halitch. A bitter struggle began for the possession of the countries
dependent on this kingdom and eventually led to the annexation by
Poland of the district of Halitch and Cholm, thus putting an end not
only to the political independence of the country, but also ruining the
power of the nobles (boyars) and rich townspeople and destroying the
old social system of the Ukraine. The blow was the heavier because at
that moment the kingdom of Halitch-Volhynia had become the last refuge
of the national inheritance.
On the other hand, political and national life, under the leadership
of Lubart, continued its course in Volhynia, which had defended itself
from the Polish attacks. It was during the same century that the
important principalities whose leaders were princes of the Lithuanian
dynasty, _i.e._, those of Kiev, Tchernicov-Hewer, Turov-Pinsk, in the
Pripet district, took their rise in the regions of the Dniepr. Here
continued the old social system, the legal traditions and the culture
of the Kiev period, though in a less virile form, no doubt on account
of the shocks they had undergone: here they continued to live or
developed new lives. As a rule the ancient institutions, as well as
the tradition of the Kiev period, were upheld by the Gedimin dynasty.
The principle of Lithuanian politics was not to interfere with the
national inheritance. Moreover, it often happened that the protectorate
or suzerainty of this dynasty was accepted willingly, as in the case
of Volhynia. _On ascending the throne of the principality they had
conquered, the Lithuanian princes accepted the religion and nationality
of their new subjects._ They protected the Church and the national
traditions, and respected the ancient system and the legal institutions.
In this way the traditions of the political life of the Ukraine
continued into the middle of the fifteenth century, with the exception
of a few changes and interruptions, under the government of princes
who were themselves subject to the suzerainty of the Grand Dukes of
Lithuania. One must wait until the death of Svitrihajlo, prince of
Volhynia (died 1452), and of Simeon Olelkovich, prince of Kiev (died
1470) to see the central and eastern regions of the Ukraine definitely
take their place among the ordinary provinces of the Principality of
Lithuania. From this time, the Ukraine became subject to the immediate
reaction of a social and political evolution, which following the ties
drawn ever closer, of Lithuania and Poland, after the political union
of these two States (1385) exerted about this time a most unfavourable
influence upon the Ukrainian and White Russian element, as well as
on its national interests and traditions. Thanks to the secular
conservatism of the Lithuanian kingdom and to the principle of national
autonomy on which the constitution of this State was founded, the
new forms of a social order, based on Polish models, won ground much
more slowly in the western territory, which was under the immediate
domination of Poland. Among these latter let us mention Galicia, the
district of Cholm, Podolia, in all of which Polish law was introduced
in 1430. Even in Lithuania the Ukrainian element had the misfortune to
watch all its institutions disappear as well as the social system which
contained them.
About this time one can perceive in the Ukrainian aristocracy, under
the Lithuanian regime, the signs of a strong opposition against the
new course which political events were taking. For this evolution
favouring solely the catholic and Lithuanian elements, entirely
sacrificed at one and the same time the Ukrainians and the White
Russians. The Ukrainian aristocracy also found itself quite excluded
from the political life of the principality. In the same way as the
Lithuanian-Polish element strengthened itself by the solidarity created
by the common catholic faith, the Ukrainian aristocracy of that period
sought help from its co-religionists of Muscovy. It was then that
the conspiracy against Prince Olelkovich broke out; he was deposed
in 1481 by the Kiev government; also that against Prince Hlinsky
(1507); and at this period the princes of Tchernicov, near to Moscow,
passed over to Muscovy (1480-1500). At the same time the Ukrainian
aristocracy calls in aid the Voivods of Moldavia. These explosions of
Ukrainian irredentism did not succeed, however, in bringing to the
people any durable amelioration of their condition. Muscovy contrived
that all these events, coming as they did at a time when the orthodox
religion was being oppressed, should serve her as a means of securing
neighbouring regions; she occupied the country of Tchernicov and
the town of Smolensk, and prepared for the occupation of Kiev. The
Ukrainians, undergoing as they were the Lithuanian domination, were
unable to derive any advantage from the circumstances.
III
_The Ukrainian Renaissance of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries_
About the middle of the sixteenth century Ukrainian life had lost much
of its strength. The aristocracy, deprived of any participation in
politics, was forced to submit to the paramount race, while the middle
classes were subjected to every kind of vexation.
_The peasant had lost the right to possess either house or land._ He
had become a serf. Numerous taxes weighed him down till he was a mere
accessory of the earth. The orthodox church, which in those times
was the representative of the nation, had become dependent upon a
government as ill-disposed towards it as to the peasants. It underwent
a crisis which nearly brought about its dissolution. Up to this period
Lithuanian Ukraine had progressed slowly, but from the middle of the
sixteenth century it progresses more rapidly under the influence of the
Polish institutions. Moreover, about 1509, nearly all the districts
of Lithuanian Ukraine were taken from its rule and simply annexed to
the Polish republic. They were Volhynia, Eastern Podolia, Podlachje
(the western Bug district) and Kyjever. The Polish aristocracy came
in numbers to reside in its new territory, the Ukrainian aristocracy
became influenced by the Poles and the individual life of the Ukraine
ceases to exist.
This did not take place without a reaction and a desire for a national
renaissance. The movement appears first among the middle classes of
Western Ukraine, who unite in guilds and try to reconstitute a social
and intellectual life, to diminish the difficulties with which the
Church was surrounded and to bring about an awakening and regeneration
of the national conscience. At their head is the guild of Lemberg,
reorganized in 1540, and again in 1586, under the patronage of the
patriarchs of Constantinople.
Having regard to the special circumstances in Western Ukraine, where
the aristocracy in particular had been nearly demolished, and where
union with the Catholic Church (who brought forward a candidate for the
bishopric), in 1596, had caused a great confusion, one will see that
the intellectual and national regeneration could not hope to succeed in
the long run. It found support, however, in a new social and political
factor which at this critical moment appeared in Eastern Ukraine, that
is to say the Cossacks.
The word “Cossack,” borrowed from the Turco-Tartar language, is applied
to the race which lived on the steppes by means of hunting and plunder.
Their organization acquired considerable force in Eastern Ukraine,
especially when the Tartar hordes from the Crimea had, at the end of
the sixteenth century, reduced a considerable portion of the territory
watered by the Dniepr to the state of a desert. This Ukrainian militia,
growing ever bigger, created a regular guerrilla republic of the steppe
in the second half of the sixteenth century, of which the portion
called “Sitch” became the centre. This district was situated on one
of the inaccessible and marshy islands of the Lower Dniepr, called
“Porohy,” from whence comes the name “Zaporogues of Sitch.” From this
place the Zaporogues extended their influence bit by bit over the
Ukrainian population of the Lower Dniepr, until they became in time a
military and political factor of no little importance.
The Cossacks did not hesitate to proclaim the immunity from all
jurisdiction, all foreign suzerainty, all taxes and all personal
service of those who submitted to the power and jurisdiction of
the Zaporogue army. Thus they drew towards them an enormous number
of peasants, who at the end of the sixteenth century, were leaving
Western and Northern Ukraine for the east in order to escape the heavy
burdens of serfdom. _The Cossacks considered themselves an independent
political power. They made treaties with neighbouring States,
offered them their help and services, and at the same time posed as
representing the national interests of the Ukrainian people._ For this
reason they came into close contact with the remains of the aristocracy
who were faithful to the national ideal and the Orthodox Church. This
Church was re-established at Kiev between 1610-20, under the protection
of the Cossacks. Schools and churches were found in the town, and the
intense intellectual and national movement was transferred from Galicia
to Kiev. About 1590 the Cossacks came into conflict with the Polish
government, and their disagreements grew more serious as time went on.
Fortune smiled now on the one, now on the other of the adversaries, but
the end brought defeat for the Zaporogues and reprisals on the part of
Poland against all who had participated in the movement. This setback
and the consequences of it brought about amongst other things the
emigration of the Cossacks and the Ukrainian peasantry, who rebelling
against the serfdom imposed upon them, crossed the Muscovite frontier
for the desert regions of the Don and Donetz. In the seventeenth
century migrations again took place to this district; the Ukrainians
re-establishing themselves in the provinces of Kharkov, Voronesch and
Kursk (Slobodska Ukraine).
Moreover the social and political disturbances of Eastern Ukraine grew
worse. Each struggle inspired fresh energy in the Ukrainians till at
last prolonged reprisals (1638-47) led to a revolution. In 1648 the
people rose, led by Bohdan Chmielnitzky.
This insurrection was caused by dissensions between the Cossacks
and the Polish government, dissensions which were not more serious
than those which had preceded them. Circumstances, however, were
favourable, the leader was talented, and the movement, contrary to all
expectations, became of supreme importance. The Polish army was beaten,
and the rising spread over the Ukraine, even to the distant regions of
the west.
The demands of the insurgents exceeded all the traditional complaints
which the Cossacks and the Orthodox Church were in the habit of making.
_There had come to life a desire to free the entire people of the
Ukraine within its ethnographical frontiers, to abolish the oppression
of the Polish aristocracy and to reconstitute the ancient State of the
Ukraine._ In spite of the number of insurgents, who totalled about
300,000 men at the beginning of the war in 1648, their leaders did
not consider the liberation of the people possible by the means at
their disposal. Chmielnitzky hesitated between two methods. The one,
according to a prearranged plan of the Church dignitaries of Kiev,
was to create a federation of the Orthodox States, Muscovy, Ukraine,
Moldavia, and the Slavs of the Balkans. This alliance would have
been directed against Poland and Turkey. Several reasons, and above
all the weakness of the Turkish government, inclined Chmielnitzky to
decide for Muscovy. For some time Muscovy had not dared to accept the
Protectorate of the Ukraine. It feared war with Poland and remembered
the cruel defeats which that nation had inflicted at the beginning of
the seventeenth century. Not till 1653 did Moscow decide to extend its
protection to the Cossack army and to the Ukraine by committing itself
to war with Poland. _In March, 1654, the treaty was signed bearing
the name “Articles of Bohdan Chmielnitzky,” therein was defined the
position of the Ukraine to Muscovy._
These Articles were drawn up in haste, without going deeply into the
problem, and many questions were left undecided. The pourparlers which
preceded the signing of the treaty showed at any rate that Chmielnitzky
did not hesitate at any concession, provided that the Muscovites
went to war with Poland. The uncertainty attaching to several points
in the treaty explains why the theorists of political law, whether
Ukrainian or Russian, have never been agreed as to the true nature of
the juridical relations established between Muscovy and the Ukraine
by the treaty of 1654. Some of them see in it the establishment of a
theoretical union, some a real union. Many experts are of the opinion
that the treaty made the Ukraine a vassal of Muscovy; others on the
contrary that it assured it a national autonomy on a broad basis. The
most important clauses guarantee a free choice of “hetman,” that is
to say, the supreme head of the Ukrainian State, an office which was
created under the protection of the Cossack army (1648-54), as well
as the right to engage in diplomatic relations with other States,
the complete independence of the tribunals, the choosing of a leader
for the army of Ukrainian Cossacks over whom the hetman had supreme
command, and lastly the independence of the Ukrainian Church.
The treaty on the other hand makes no mention of the part to be played
by the Muscovite Government in the civil and economic administration of
the Ukraine. It came to pass as a matter of fact that the organization
of political and monetary affairs was left to the “hetman,” but the
Muscovite government refused to guarantee for the future the security
of these administrative branches. Differences soon arose between the
two countries on this point as on that of the autonomy of the Church.
This the Muscovite government recognized in the treaty, but afterwards
sought to suppress at all costs. Moreover, during the last years of the
reign of Chmielnitzky, a complete rupture with Moscow was in course of
preparation. The Ukrainian government counted on the help of Sweden,
and soon tried to conclude a treaty whereby this nation should promise
help to the Ukraine. Furthermore, it was to guarantee the independence
of the country and the integrity of its territory. _The Ukrainian men
of affairs wished to bring it about that their country should rank as a
neutral nation, under the protection of its neighbours._
IV
_The Struggle for Ukrainian Nationalism in the Seventeenth and
Eighteenth Centuries_
The aspirations of the Ukrainian political leaders came into conflict
with the course taken by the Muscovite government, to whom the
Ukraine was bound by the treaty of 1654. Moscow held that the rights
conferred by her on Chmielnitzky were only provisionary and that they
were to be restricted little by little, till the moment came when the
Ukraine would become merely a province of the Muscovite empire. On
the other hand the men at the head of the Ukrainian government made
every effort to maintain in its entirety the independence given to the
administration of the hetmans, as it was in the time of Chmielnitzky.
They endeavoured to fortify and protect it against any attack on
the part of the Muscovite government. The right which the Moscow
government assumed of controlling the choice of and unseating of the
hetmans, of naming Muscovite voivods as military commandants even of
Ukrainian towns, of levying taxes and of interfering with the autonomy
of the Church were the chief points of disagreement. Moscow took
advantage of all Ukrainian troubles and difficulties arising under
the administration of the directors (the “Starchina,” that is to say,
the Elders) in order to restrict the liberties of the country. At the
same time each of these attempts awakened in the Ukrainian government
an ardent desire to safeguard the autonomy of the country against
such movements. Moreover, there was a central idea to their policy,
which was to extend this autonomy to all the ethnographical regions
of the Ukraine, or in other words, to place the entire nation under
the suzerainty of the hetmans, whose rule in the time of Chmielnitzky
extended to the Dniepr district.
At the outset the Ukraine hoped to gain the help of Sweden for this
enterprise; but this country soon called back its expedition against
Poland and signed the peace in 1660. After these happenings, Hetman
Vyhovsky, in order to shake off the yoke of Moscow, decided to make a
treaty with Poland, whereby this kingdom should give to the Ukraine or
to the “Principality of Rusj” autonomy on a broad basis, which should
raise it to the rank of third member of the Polish Union, together with
the Principality of Lithuania (Hadjatch Union, 1658).
The Ukrainian government issued a manifesto whereby it notified the
European Powers of its rupture with Moscow, giving as reason the treaty
with Poland brought about by the attempts of the Muscovite government
to destroy the autonomy of the Ukraine, and to meddle in the local
affairs of the country. The turn which Ukrainian politics had taken
made a deep impression on Moscow which was now ready to give up its
pretensions to administer local Ukrainian affairs and even to withdraw
the voivods from Kiev. But it was not long before the worthlessness of
the new treaty became apparent. Poland, now seriously weakened, was
incapable of helping the hetman to any great extent. Moreover, the
Ukrainian populace, fearing a return of the oppressive rule of Poland,
were in no way anxious to re-establish relations with the new ally.
Neither did Poland desire to stand loyally by the treaty to which she
had just put her seal. She considered that the concessions made by the
Hadjatch Union were excessive. The Ukrainians on the other hand found
them insufficient, Vyhovsky was obliged to give up his post as hetman
and his successors returned to the former policy in their dealings
with Moscow.
When this happened the “Starchina” tried to guarantee its autonomy
against any intrusions from the Muscovite government. But this
latter, cured of the doubts arising out of the treaty of Hadjatch,
went back to its old programme. The events which came about during
the administration of Vyhovsky had thrown light on the differences
existing between the ruling class and that portion of the populace
animated by liberal ideals. These folk disapproved of the efforts of
the “Starchina” to become a privileged class, and from this time onward
they watched its politics with suspicion. The Muscovite government did
not fail to use this social rivalry for its own end, _i.e._, to combat
any Ukrainian aspirations towards a greater national autonomy. To bring
about this end an agreement was entered upon with Poland, by the terms
of which the Ukraine was to be divided between the two countries.
The treaty dated 1667 secured to Poland all the Ukraine west of the
Dniepr, with the exception of Kiev and its environs, which were to
remain under Muscovite rule.
This partition created great dissatisfaction among the Ukrainians, who
saw in it a breach of the former treaty and an attack on the vital
interests of the land. The hatred of the people for Muscovite politics
led to the serious rising of 1668, in which the whole of Eastern
Ukraine rose as one man against the agents of the Muscovite government
and massacred the garrisons they had placed in the country.
The hetman Dorochenko (1665-76) placed himself at the head of the
partisans of autonomy, who had remained faithful to the old ideal
of the union of all the Ukrainian territories in one Cossack State.
The Poles and Muscovites, having become reconciled, he sought other
alliances, especially with the princes of Brandenburg, and gained
eventually the help of the Turk. The Porte took the Ukraine under its
protection as a vassal State, and promised assistance to reconquer the
liberty up to the ethnographical frontiers, as far as Przemysl and
Sambor, and the banks of the Vistula and Niemen, even to Sievsk and
Putivl. As a matter of fact, after the campaign of 1672, Poland was
forced to renounce her claim in favour of Dorochenko to that part of
the Ukraine bound by her old frontiers (Treaty of Bulchatch, 1672).
A new campaign was in preparation for the following year in Eastern
Ukraine to put an end to the pretensions of the Muscovite government.
The abandonment of this plan gave Moscow time to recover from her
hesitation. Moreover the Turkish army had behaved very badly on
Ukrainian territory during the expedition of 1672, so that the people
rose in mass and showed great opposition to the policy of Dorochenko.
A general emigration of the whole people took place from the regions
situated on the right bank of the Dniepr, and the population passed to
the other side of the river.
Dorochenko lost his footing. His attempts to extract from the Muscovite
government a few at least of the concessions he desired, failed. He was
forced to surrender his title of hetman and the centralizing policy of
Moscow was again victorious.
The autonomy of the Ukraine became further restricted; in particular
the independence of the Church disappeared. The Muscovite dominion
seemed to be definitely established.
It was only shaken by the wars of the north and the successes of
Charles XII in Poland and Russia. The Ukraine still remembered the
treaty signed with Charles X, predecessor of Charles XII, as well as
her attempt to secure complete independence with the help of Sweden.
These plans had not succeeded, but neither had the inception of them
proved disastrous, as had been the case with so many of the other
political alliances. The most fervent partisans of autonomy sought to
persuade the hetman of the period, the renowned Ivan Mazeppa, not to
let so favourable an opportunity escape. But the old hetman hesitated,
fearing to take a false step and he only took his place at the side
of Charles XII when this latter entered Ukrainian territory (1708).
It was too late; the Muscovite army had also invaded the country to
such purpose that the hetman did not even manage to join the Swedish
army with all his regiments. The population, held back by the strict
measures taken against all those who had in any way participated in
the rising, adopted an entirely passive attitude. It was soon apparent
that the movement stood no chance of success, and many dignitaries
returned to offer their allegiance to Peter the Great. After the
defeat of Poltava, Mazeppa fled with Charles XII to Turkish territory,
accompanied by the dignitaries and Cossacks who remained faithful to
his flag. He was followed by the Zaporogues who had sided with Charles
XII, under Hordianko, one of the most tenacious fighters for the cause
of liberty. In 1710, after the death of Mazeppa, whose end had been
hastened by these events, a constitutional act of some interest took
place on the occasion of the election of a fresh hetman; this had
regard to the power of the hetman and the part to be taken by the army
in the administration of the country. The decree was not made law, for
it was said that the newly-elected hetman, Philip Orlik, as well as
the partisans of Mazeppa, would never return to the Ukraine. The help
of Sweden and Turkey had not brought about any appreciable result,
nor did the later attempts (1720-30) to win the help of the Powers
for his cause have any better result. The only hope of the hetman,
the Zaporogues of the Sitch, were never able to secure the repeal of
the order of banishment pronounced against them. In 1734 they were
compelled to place themselves again under Russian authority.
V
_The End of Ukrainian Autonomy_
Even though the peasantry of the Ukraine and even the greater portion
of the ruling classes, surprised by the troops of Peter the Great,
had not taken part in the Mazeppa rising, this nationalist movement
was construed by the adversaries of Ukrainian autonomy into something
extraordinary and dangerous, and gave Peter the Great and his partisans
the necessary pretext for abandoning the system of progressive
restrictions taken up till then by the Muscovite government. From
then on, there was a rapid and sudden disappearance of Ukrainian
institutions. Until this time, that is to say until 1708, Moscow had
controlled the election of a hetman, forbidding the army to depose
their chief or to proceed to any new election without the knowledge
of the Russian government. Moreover, the voivods and the Russian
garrisons were stationed in the most important towns of Ukraine. The
Ukrainian government was forbidden all diplomatic relations, and the
ecclesiastical hierarchy was subordinate to the Patriarch of Moscow.
The administration, the finances, the army, the elections and the
nomination of public officials were, however, in theory considered the
sole right of the Ukrainian government. The country was ruled by the
hetman chosen by the army, and assisted by the military dignitaries.
The military assembly, the highest authority of the government,
plays no further part beyond that of electing the hetman. The public
officials were chosen either by the army and the nobles, or by the
hetman himself.
After Mazeppa was deposed, the Tsar Peter instituted a supervision
over this autonomous administration which was exercised first through
Russian residents, and then by a college of Muscovite officers through
whose hands passed everything that came in or out of the hetman’s
chancellery. The Tsar then himself chose the Ukrainian commanders of
the regiments quartered in the administrative districts into which the
Ukraine was divided. The country was inundated with Russian troops,
whom the population were forced to support by means of heavy taxes.
Eventually, on the death of the hetman Skoropadsky in 1722 the Tsar
completely suppressed the power of the hetmans. The opposition to
these measures manifested by several high dignitaries of the hetman’s
administration, led to the arrest of the recalcitrants and to their
imprisonment in fortresses. Indeed, after the death of the Tsar Peter,
the Russian government came to the conclusion that its policy with
regard to the Ukraine had been too severe. It was therefore thought
necessary to attenuate in some measure the impression caused by
the turn things had taken. Under the pressure of circumstances the
Ukrainians were authorized in two cases to elect their own hetman,
but even so it was really only a matter of investiture and not of
free election. The considerable period during which the last hetman,
Cyril Razumovsky, ruled, brought a little peace to the country and
left the officials to govern in comparative freedom, thanks to the
exceptional position which the hetman occupied with the Moscow
authorities. Razumovsky was the brother of the morganatic husband of
the Empress Elizabeth. The Ukrainian government employed this period of
tranquillity in bringing order into its administration in conformity
with its own interests, so as to put an end to the chaotic state
in which the administration found itself after the reforms of the
Muscovite government.
From the moment the Empress Catherine came to the throne the days of
the Ukrainian autonomy were, however, over. Using as a pretext the
first suitable occasion--which was in fact a petition to confirm the
hetmanship upon the Razumovskys in a hereditary character--Catherine
caused Razumovsky to be deposed (1764), abolished the post of hetman
and appointed a governor-general assisted by a college composed partly
of Muscovite and partly of Ukrainian members.
This reform aroused a widespread discontent in the Ukraine. When
the instructions were given to the deputies of the new legislative
commission, all classes of Ukrainians rose in unison to demand the
re-establishment of the hetmans and the enforcing of the “Articles of
Bohdan Chmielnitzky” which constituted the foundations of the relations
between the Ukraine and Muscovy, and which had not been abrogated
by any valid legislation. This unanimity of the Ukrainian people,
expressed in so unmistakable a fashion was not enough, however, to
restrain Catherine in her resolve to put an end to the independence of
the Ukraine and to convert it into an ordinary province of the Empire.
In 1775 the “Zaporogues of the Sitch,” the last representatives of the
ancient democratic traditions of the Cossacks, were taken by surprise
and totally defeated.[3]
[3] The Zaporogues again took refuge in Turkey, from whence some went
to Hungary and settled in the “Banat.” The Russian government anxiously
ordered the re-establishment of the Zaporogue army in 1784 and offered
fresh territory to the Cossacks at the mouth of the river Kuban in the
Caucasus. A large number of Zaporogues answered the call, and in 1790
the new “Army of the Black Sea,” was organized. This army still appears
to maintain many Zaporogue traditions, although its character is quite
different. As for the other Cossack bands of Russia, they have nothing
in common with the Cossack army at the time of the hetmans.
In 1780 the old administrative traditions of the time of the hetmans
were replaced by those of the Russian Empire. This brought about at
the same time the disappearance of the military organization of the
Cossacks on all the territory under the jurisdiction of the hetmans.
Prior to this, reforms of the same character had been introduced in
that part of the Ukraine known as “Slobodskaya,” which possessed
similar institutions to those of the Ukraine of the hetmans, even
though from an administrative standpoint this territory was immediately
dependent on the central government of the Empire. The protests of the
population that were formulated in 1787 were never anything more than a
dead letter.
In order to crush the opposition of the ruling classes, who were the
most prominent politically, the Empress made use of a method frequent
in Russian politics. This was to proclaim that the reforms undertaken
were for the sole purpose of protecting the people from exploitation at
the hands of the “Starchina.”
This did not, however, prevent Catherine from subjecting the Ukraine to
serfdom, in its most cruel form, in 1783, nor from abolishing such of
their old liberties as the Ukrainian peasants still continued to enjoy.
Contemporaneous with these measures for the abolition of the political
life of the Ukraine and the destruction of its national character,
_earnest efforts were made to break down its intellectual independence_.
The college of Kiev (which later became an academy), which had
flourished under the protection of the Cossacks and had risen to the
highest rank in Ukrainian political life, was menaced with dissolution
by the Muscovite government, which was only held back from its attempt
by the fear of arousing too profound a discontent throughout the
country. Moscow refused to grant the demands formulated later by the
Ukrainians to transform this college into a university and to build
another at Baturin, the capital of the Ukraine at that time. This
long-felt wish had been expressed in a general way at the Union of
Hadjatch in 1658. The Moscow government preferred to deprive the
population of the Ukraine of its high schools, so that the young people
should frequent Russian schools. This measure had as its object, of
course, the russianization of the country, and to this end it was
further suggested that the Ukrainian government should encourage
matrimonial alliances with the Muscovites in the upper classes.
The subordination of the Ukrainian Church to the Patriarch of Moscow
plays an important part in the history of the oppression of the
Ukrainian national idea. When one takes note of the close relations
that existed at that time in the Ukraine between teaching, printing
and literary production on the one hand and the Church on the other we
see that the measure alluded to above inevitably subjected the entire
intellectual life of the country to a vexatious clerical censorship
in Moscow. To this end was published in 1720 the celebrated Ukase
establishing in Kiev a special censor for the purpose of prohibiting
the publication in Ukraine of any book other than those of a religious
nature. The printing of the latter was only allowed when the matter was
taken from old editions, tallying in every respect with the Muscovite
editions, “so that no religious differences should arise and no
special dialect should creep into the country.” This decree sterilized
at once the development of Ukrainian literature, which explains why
from this moment until the end of the eighteenth century no work was
printed in the Ukrainian language, or in the mixed language composed
of Ukrainian and Slavo-ecclesiastic elements formerly used for works
of literature. The Guild “Laura” of Kiev was not even able to obtain
permission to edit a Ukrainian Bible, even though it was able to show
that the Ukrainian population absolutely refused to use Muscovite
Bibles. It is convenient to observe here the severity with which the
Russian government persecuted anything which might be a reminder of
Ukrainian independence. Moscow did not hesitate in this respect before
instigating the most cruel acts of violence against the most worthy
and most distinguished people. It exercised an oppressive influence
on the population, compelling it to restrain every sign of patriotic
aspiration and forcing it in a general way to reduce its national life
to a minimum. Consequently memories of the old national life grew
fainter and fainter by reason of the russianizing imposed upon the
superior classes.
The evil results of the submission of the Ukrainian Church of the
hetmans to the Patriarch of Moscow were not limited to the national
life of Eastern Ukraine. The hierarchal unity that existed between it
and Eastern Ukraine suffered as a result and a definite schism arose
between the two Churches. The outcome of this measure was consequently
to widen further the intellectual, ecclesiastical and political
divergences which already existed owing to the national frontiers and
the different lines between Eastern and Western Ukraine. All this was
no small help to the successful Polonizing schemes which on the one
hand threatened the life of the peasantry of Western Ukraine, while in
Eastern Ukraine the Russian element also gathered strength.
VI
_The National Life of the Ukraine in the First Half of the Nineteenth
Century_
In 1772, when Poland was first divided up, Western Ukraine, now Eastern
Galicia, became part of the Habsburg kingdom[4] in virtue of certain
longstanding claims of the Hungarian crown to this country. Some
years later, Bukovina (the present region), which formerly belonged
to Moldavia, was added to it. This passing of Western Ukraine into
the rule of Austria awoke a new national fervour in the country. The
Austro-Hungarian government had but lately learnt--at the time of the
movement against ecclesiastic union in Galicia--of the deplorable
condition in which the Ukrainian population of Hungary found itself.
Steps were taken to ameliorate the moral and material condition of
the priests of the United Greek Church in Galicia and in Hungary. A
particular importance attached to the United Church in this province
during the eighteenth century, for it became transformed here into the
Ukrainian National Church. The measures that were established by the
Austro-Hungarian government had therefore far-reaching consequences; as
had also the efforts it made to disseminate instruction among the urban
and rural population, together with the attempts to ameliorate the
economic condition of the people. Insignificant as were in reality the
reforms brought about, and fleeting as was the current of ruthenophil
sentiment in the policy of the government, this attitude nevertheless
created a deep impression upon the Ukrainian population, which once
again enjoyed a sense of nationality and lost the feeling of despair
with which it was stricken during the later years of Polish supremacy.
Even after the Austrian government, under the influence of the Polish
aristocracy, had characterized its Ukrainian policy by a strongly
reactionary feeling, the energy of the national movement was not
completely dissipated. Development of culture and of the national ideal
were still apparent in the first half of the nineteenth century.
[4] In view of repeated assertions in the Press it is not superfluous
to insist upon the fact that Western Ukraine never belonged to Russia
at any period until the occupation of 1915.--_Translator._
On the other hand the Ukrainian territory which had fallen to the
share of Russian rule on the partition of Poland (Volhynia, Podolia,
the land west of the Bug and that around Kiev) had no cause to look
for any revival of nationalist aspirations. The rigour with which
the Polish or Polonized aristocracy ruled the Ukrainian peasantry
became now more merciless still, supported as the Poles were by the
authority of Russia. The subordinate administrative officials were
for the most part the docile servants of this aristocracy. Certain
attempts to appeal to orthodox tendencies that were hostile to Poland,
which had been made by the Russian government in order to protect
the serfs of the Ukraine, were quite futile. Opposition to serfdom
was treated as treason. _Everything which was not in the hands of
the Polish aristocracy--education, Church or literature, in a word
the intellectual life of the country--had to combat unscrupulous
russophil tendencies._ The government even went to the length of
forbidding in the Church all the national rites, including even the
Slavo-ecclesiastic tongue, which was the matrix of the Ukrainian
language. These circumstances explain why the signs of a national
revival first showed themselves in Eastern Ukraine, notwithstanding the
russianizing it was undergoing.
The memories of the Ukrainian nation were still alive there. In spite
of all the social advantages conferred by the Government on the ruling
classes, at the time of the abolition of the constitutional rule of
the hetmans, the intellectual aristocracy suffered much in spirit at
the loss of national autonomy. The enthusiasts dreamed of a foreign
intervention which should re-establish Ukrainian autonomy, if not its
political independence. These projects were always concealed from
the suspicious eye of the Russian administration. They were handed
down by word of mouth and only came to light occasionally and then
in an incomplete form. Thus the journey to Berlin made by one of the
most eminent members of the Ukrainian aristocracy, Count Kapnist,
who went thither in 1791 to communicate to the Prussian government
the grievances of the Ukrainians, has only recently come to light.
The ambassador spoke of the discontent aroused among the Cossacks by
the suppression of their former privileges and of the great sorrows
experienced by the Ukrainian people plunged into despair by the tyranny
of the Russian government and Prince Potemkin. As a matter of fact the
Ukrainians were anxious to know if they could count on the assistance
of Prussia in the event of an uprising, but this kingdom returned to
Kapnist only a vague and unsatisfactory reply. Ukraine then turned in
the direction of France and invoked in turn her aid. Traces of these
diplomatic adventures may be found still in the archives of the French
government.
For a while it looked as though the old institutions of the hetman
period were about to be re-established: the Tsar Paul, who strongly
opposed the policy of his mother, gave evidence of a wish from the
beginning of his reign to give new life to some of the old political
liberties. It is said that it was the minister Bezborodko, a Ukrainian
patriot, who inspired his master with these designs. The reign of
Paul was a short one, however, and his successor Alexander returned
to the principles of Catherine and set up again in the Ukraine the
organization established there by the Empress. Nothing remained to
remind the people of the time of the hetmans save the civil law,
applicable to this day in the governments of Tchernicov and Poltava,
the country of the hetmans of old.
The longing to see the old constitution restored made itself manifest
from time to time, especially on such occasions as the Russian
government sought to recruit the Cossack militia in the Ukraine. This
happened in 1812 and again during the Polish rising in 1831, on both of
which occasions the authorities sought to blind the eyes of the people
with various promises of ameliorative measures. During the Crimean War
especially the enrolling of volunteers aroused intense excitement among
the peasantry, in whom national aspirations were still vigorous. All
expectations of this kind met only with disappointment, but they helped
to keep alive the nationalist feeling among the Ukrainian people. The
Russian government made a pretext of these aspirations for looking with
even greater suspicion upon certain candidates for the hetmanship, as
well as of frowning upon other real or imaginary manifestations of
Ukrainian irredentism.
It was not only in matters of sentiment, but in political ideas as
well that the tradition of the Cossacks tinged all memories of their
heroic struggles for liberty, the idealized figures of their knights,
and the freedom which continued to exist among the intellectual classes
and in the poetry of the Ukraine, especially in the district of the
Dniepr. The study of the past and of historic documents which were
taken up with devotion by Ukrainian families in direct descent from the
Cossacks, the collecting of popular traditions, which became numerous
after 1820 or 1830--all this brought back to mind the symbols of
national heroism and was handed down from generation to generation as a
sacred legacy from the past and a promise for the future.
The feeling of romantic affection for everything concerning the
immigrants coming from Germany and the Slav countries of the West,
took root among the educated classes of the Ukraine, especially about
the year 1820. It strengthened the interest shown up till then for old
traditions, ethnography and the language of the people, exerting a deep
influence on the future development of the nationalist tendency. The
study of ethnography and dialects, the researches into the life of the
people, the renaissance of the Ukrainian language and literature, such
as we see at the end of the eighteenth century and especially in the
first half of the nineteenth century brought together the intellectual
classes. This movement removed the lack of sympathy between nobles and
people, which had been one of the causes of the political weakness of
the Ukrainian upper classes, in addition to the national decadence
and the russianization during the eighteenth century. The educated
Ukrainians in the nineteenth century regarded the people as the
guardians of the national culture, and of an art and genius full of
unparalleled beauty. This recognition of the æsthetic value of the
people slowly gave birth to a social and political democracy, founded
on the sentiment of an ultimate alliance with the people which alone
could be the foundation of Ukrainian regeneration.
On the other hand, the discovery of the inexhaustible genius of the
people increased the intensity of the national ideal in the minds of
the educated classes. _A people of such numerical strength, covering
such a vast extent of land, which had kept its patriotism intact in
spite of all the difficulties created by political and religious
disintegration; a nation which had maintained the fundamental purity
of its language, its customs, traditions and poetry, which had
founded such a remarkable material civilization: such a nation could
not disappear, for it contains in itself the promise of its own
resurrection._ Such are the principles which make up the faith of
educated Ukrainians as the tendencies we have endeavoured to point out
develop. Profiting by the old mistakes the governing classes of the
Ukraine assert their ideal from a firmer standpoint.
VII
_The Development of the Ukrainian Ideal about the Middle of the
Nineteenth Century_
Under the influences of which we have just spoken, and thanks to the
ideals imported from Western Europe, Ukrainian political thought
abandoned its aspirations towards an independence that was no longer
feasible, as well as to the establishment of a Cossack State, in order
to replace them by a realizable political programme adapted to the
existing circumstances. The oldest of these programmes that was in
any way realized, dates from 1846. It was started by the Ukrainian
organization of Kiev, known as the Guild of Cyril and Methodius, which
played an important part in the course of later events. This body was
organized at the beginning of the year 1846. It included the most
eminent representatives of Ukrainian learning (the poet Shevtchenko,
the ethnographist Kulich, the historian Kostomarov, the lawyer Hulak,
etc.) and soon found many partisans. As one of them says, the number
of members of the guild was raised to a hundred in the space of a
year in the different towns of the Ukraine, and this in spite of the
secret nature of the body. The guild aspired to a Slav Federation, an
alliance between the “Slav republics” of which that of the Ukraine
would be a member. They desired a democratic and liberal constitution
which would abolish privileges and classes and everything in fact of a
nature to debase the people. Absolute freedom of speech, of thought,
and of religion was to be guaranteed. Measures were to be taken to
educate the people and to enlighten their political conscience. They
counted on the creation of a popular literature to attain this end,
on the bringing together of the upper classes and the people, and of
working on the mind of the youth of the lycées and high schools so
as to instil into them the ideas of confederation. Actually all this
practical activity was killed at birth. For in the year 1847 one of
the students informed on the leaders and denounced them, with the
result that they were arrested and condemned. This repression put
a stop to any development of political thought in the Ukraine, now
that the most talented and active leaders were reduced to silence.
When they returned from their exile and assumed their patriotic task,
circumstances, such as the suppression of serfdom in Russia and the
amelioration of the lot of the peasantry, compelled them to labour
chiefly for the comfort of the peasants. They were occupied in teaching
the agricultural classes and in educational work of various kinds as
well as in creating a popular literature, etc. Yet this activity,
though it was purely of an educative nature, was suppressed by the
government, in conformity with the principle proclaimed by the Minister
of the Interior Valujev in 1863: “The Ukrainian language,” he said,
“never has existed, does not exist, and must not exist.” As soon as
the reprisals became less severe, about 1870, the work began again.
It was directed in particular by an organization established at Kiev
and known by the name of “Hromada” containing the best representatives
of the new generation in the Ukraine. As in the preceding period, its
activity was concentrated chiefly in the direction of general culture,
scientific researches, studies in history and ethnographical work.
Moreover, efforts were made to develop the literature, the music and
the theatre of the Ukraine. The Ukrainian ruling classes disapproved
of the secret revolutionary or terrorist associations which attracted
towards them the greater part of the Ukrainian youth. They reproached
them for their centralizing tendency, and their lack of interest
in the national aspirations of the downtrodden peoples of Russia,
especially those of the Ukraine. The Ukrainian nationalists preferred
liberal-constitutional ideals and were broad-minded with regard to the
question of national autonomy. They especially favoured the scientific
and intellectual side of the Ukrainian movement.
In spite of such moderation in thought the Russian government regarded
this activity with an unfavourable eye, because at the outset it
hated any national Ukrainian movement, however moderate it might be.
Moscow held strongly to the doctrine of “the unity of the Russian
people,” the complete unifying of the literary tongue, the schools
and the general culture of all the Slav peoples of the East, whether
inhabiting Ukraine, Great Russia or White Russia. Moreover, it regarded
as dangerous any desire to establish a separate Ukrainian literature,
any endeavour to awaken national feeling in this unfortunate race, and
therefore any study which concerned its origin. Intellectual separatism
was for it the first step which might lead to political separation
between the two States. So whether it is intellectual or political,
Ukrainian “separatism” is the scarecrow which dictates the movements of
the Russian government with regard to Ukrainian aspirations.
For these several reasons then, the activities of the Ukrainians of
Kiev were suppressed, no matter how modest or how politically innocent
they might be. Any establishments or organizations where Ukrainian
scientific workers congregated were forbidden and in the spring of 1876
the celebrated Ukase appeared determining the fate of the movement for
many years. _This Ukase forbade the publishing in Ukrainian of any work
other than those of an historical or literary nature._ It also required
that Russian spelling should be used while every work was to be
censored. Conferences, theatrical representations or Ukrainian concerts
were absolutely forbidden.
These limitations were in themselves sufficiently severe, yet their
severity was augmented by the arbitrary interpretations of the
censorship. So that not only was popular and scientific literature
suppressed, according to the letter of the Ukase, but even the printing
of any other work in the Ukrainian language, for only works lacking
interest or importance were authorized for publication. This state of
things lasted a long time, for the Ukase was not repealed till 1906.
However, the order with regard to concerts and theatres was soon
repealed, on the advice of the local authorities, who became convinced
that the prohibition was foolish and only served to excite the people.
Nevertheless, all artistic manifestations were very strictly supervised.
The Ukrainian movement, however, was not to be extinguished by such
coercive measures. They served on the contrary to keep it alive
by putting obstacles in the way of any attempt made by so-called
“Ukrainophils” to adopt any loyal line of conduct. The Russian
government did not approve of this attitude any more than of a radical
one.
The impossibility of simply suppressing the Ukrainian movement was
from now onwards demonstrated. It was to be explained by the political
and intellectual force acquired by the nation during the nineteenth
century. A lasting success had already been secured to it in the
domain of literature and general culture. The movement had its footing
on the masses in a nation of twenty million inhabitants (now nearly
thirty-five million) holding to their nationality at any price, and
showing an inexhaustible power of evolution, hitherto only held in
check by the bonds of a reactionary regime.
The educated classes of the Ukraine fought incessantly in Russia for
the national movement from 1880 to 1900 and endeavoured to turn to
their own advantage any possibilities which offered themselves. When
the movement became no longer possible in Russia, it sought an outlet
beyond the frontier in the territory of Austrian Ukraine.
VIII
_The Contemporary Ukrainian Movement_
The exodus of the Ukrainians or the divergence of the national activity
towards Austrian Ukraine, towards Lemberg, which became a centre for
the national life, was weighty with results not only for the Ukrainian
movement in Russia, but also for the development of Austrian Ukraine
itself. Already, about the year 1860, after the first prohibition of
the Ukrainian language in Russia, this event had contributed to the
sustenance of the Ukrainian national life in Austria at a very critical
moment in the development of this section of the subject people. After
the movement had gradually grown weaker in the second quarter of the
nineteenth century, under the pressure of the general reactionary
movement in Galicia, the story year of 1848 poured a refreshing
breath over the Ukrainians of Austria. The Austrian government sought
in the Ukrainian population something to set off against the Polish
revolutionary movement. The final liberation of the serfs, the
admission of the moral and political rights of the Ukrainian people (or
Ruthenians) the creation of the first institution of any importance in
the domain of culture and politics, the nationalization of the schools,
the formal promise of a university for Lemberg, the administrative
separation of the two Galicias (Ukrainian and Polish) which had been
artificially united in 1772: all these influences assisted the birth of
a new era in the life of the Austrian Ukraine.
But these years that were so full of hope soon passed, to be followed
in their turn by the reaction of 1850, which brought to the Ukrainians
of Galicia the most bitter deceptions. The promises made were
completely forgotten for the most part, and the Ukrainians of Galicia,
this “Tyrol of the East,” after having aided the Austrian government
in its combat against the rising of the Polish aristocracy were left
to the unscrupulous rule of these same nobles, into whose hands the
whole administration of Galicia passed once again in the year 1850. The
Polish aristocracy and bureaucracy utilized the growing influence which
they possessed for the purpose of insinuating to the Austrian rulers
that the Ukrainian population of Galicia was an uncertain element,
devoted to Russia and the orthodox faith. These intrigues were an
obstacle to any attempts on the part of the Ukrainians to open the eyes
of the government to the fatal consequences of a Polish predominancy in
Galicia, under which the Ukrainians suffered horribly.
Thus arose a painful crisis in the national life of the Ukrainians of
Galicia. Disillusions and doubts followed one another, and the way was
open for the Russophil current towards which the Polish aristocracy
was eagerly driving the Ukrainian element. Certain intelligences,
despairing of any Ukrainian regeneration, turned to Russian culture in
order to escape complete Polonization.
The arrival of fresh Ukrainian immigration, coming in 1863 to employ
their activity on Galician soil, after the suppression of the Ukrainian
movement in Russia, cannot under the circumstances be too highly
appreciated. At a critical moment this influence brought the necessary
aid to the Ukrainian element, chiefly of the younger generation--which
had remained faithful to the programme of 1848. It helped them to
strengthen their morale and to play their part in the life of Galicia.
From about 1880 this “popular” Ukrainian movement, as it was called,
took a firm hold of the people in Galicia, nor did it fail to keep
in touch with the Ukrainian movement in Russia as well. It acquired
considerable influence over the masses. This was especially so with
the left wing of the movement which was the more radical part and
originated in 1890. Moreover the close bond which, uniting Russian and
Austrian Ukrainians, enabled the latter to utilize the resources of
Galicia for their own development. The writers of Russian Ukraine took
part in propaganda work and education in Galician Ukraine. From 1880
to 1905, that is to say for a quarter of a century, Galicia was, so
to speak, a kind of intellectual Piedmont for the Ukrainian movement.
Galician newspapers became the political tribune for the discussions
and resolutions of the questions which were agitating the big
Russian Ukraine and the small Austrian Ukraine. Galician educational
establishments became the meeting places of the élite of both regions,
who came together to combine their intellectual resources with the
object of preserving their common patrimony.
One can easily understand that this movement, almost entirely banished
from Russia, took up an irreconcilable attitude in regard to the
centralizing policy of the Russian government. It was further equally
intransigent in its hostility to the Polish oppression in Galicia. It
goes without saying that the Russian government, always hostile to
anything which would favour Ukrainian “separatism” in a broad sense,
put a stop to any opportunism in the Ukrainian movement. _In Austria
Polish supremacy raised an insuperable obstacle between the Ukrainians
and the government_; any compromise with the latter was subject to the
assent of the masters of Galicia, which meant, of course, the surrender
of all Ukrainian aspirations. And as soon as one of the political
leaders of Galicia showed any intention of making generous concessions,
the Galician masses and the radical Russian Ukrainians were not long
before they exhibited a vigorous disapproval.
This is what happened in 1890, when some leaders tried to arrive at a
compromise with the government. The Austrian and Russian Ukrainians
united in offering such opposition to the plan that it could not be
carried out.
The end of the century was signalized by a rapprochement between the
two Ukraines. This had a most happy result for the national life,
thanks to the reciprocal control exerted on political questions.
From this moment the progress of national culture in Russian Ukraine
has made rapid progress, in spite of all attempts made to stop its
course. The present time shows a remarkable development in the Ukraine
which, benefiting by the enthusiasm of all classes, has reached a high
state of culture, thus rendering service to the progress of national
feeling. Ukrainian literature has produced a number of excellent
writers. It has at last succeeded in securing the abrogation of the law
which forbade the popularizing of scientific works. However, it was not
until the advent of the new period which followed the Russo-Japanese
war that the daily Press regained its liberty.
The stormy years 1904-6 brought to the fore the whole question of
the Russian reactionary powers. The chief reform desired by the
Ukrainian peasantry--the backbone of the Ukraine--was in the matter of
agriculture. The educated classes concern themselves with the solution
of political questions. With the spokesmen of other disinherited
races they unite to give voice to the national grievances. Their
first demand is for the repeal of the law forbidding the use of the
Ukrainian language. _The Russian government has examined this question
and found that the restrictions placed on the Ukrainian movement are
quite unjustifiable._ In answer to a question from the government the
southern universities and those of Russia have given a similar reply.
The Petrograd Academy addressed a memorandum to the Russian government
proving that the current conception that the Russian literary language
(Great Russian) was employed by the whole of Russia, was false, and
did not include the Little Russians (Ukrainians). In the most positive
manner this memoir affirms the right of existence to the Ukrainian
language and literature. In spite of this, the delay brought about in
the progress of the language was not immediately dissipated; this only
occurred in 1906 when the law concerning newspapers was repealed. This
law did away with all restrictions in respect of special idioms, under
which term the Ukrainian language was included.
From this time on the Ukraine was freed of its shackles and was enabled
to found papers, associations and all kinds of organizations with a
certain amount of freedom. The constitution of 1906, although it left
many restrictions still in existence, enabled the Ukrainians to choose
their representatives. As a consequence the first and even the second
Duma contained an important fraction of deputies elected by Ukrainian
peasantry; yet the short duration of these assemblies prevented the
representatives from accomplishing anything of importance.
It looked at this period as if the most joyous future were in store for
the Ukrainian movement in Russia. Influenced by the aspirations towards
political liberty shown by their brethren, the Austrian Ukrainians
also claimed universal suffrage. Galicia was moved by a stronger
national impulse than it had ever known before. It was hoped that once
“œcumenical” Ukraine achieved freedom in Russia its intellectual and
political power would be strong enough to release its sister States
from foreign hegemony. These hopes, however, were not realized. A new
reactionary movement disappointed all hopes, and all the promises made
to the Russian people in 1905 and 1906 were completely forgotten.
This blow was especially hard for Ukrainians. They suffered from the
modifications introduced in the election laws, modifications which
revoked the suffrage of the peasantry. At the same time the Ukraine
lost its representation in the Duma. The promised liberties--freedom
for the Press and for associations--have never come into force, and
a strict censor is still kept over printed works, newspapers and
associations in the country.
The Russian Senate, and also Stolypin in his celebrated circular,
“Associations among members of subject nations speaking a foreign
language,” affirmed once more the old principle of the unity and
indivisibility of the Russian people, and labelled as “dangerous
separatism” all Ukrainian national activity, even in the domain of
culture. There is certainly a strange contradiction in the fact that
Ukrainians as members of an indivisible Russia are forbidden to use
their own language, and that at the same time they are considered
as “people of a foreign tongue” of the Empire, who must undergo
restrictions for the benefit of “the Russian people.”
The Ukrainian associations which were set on foot in former years
were nearly all dissolved and the establishment of new ones was
forbidden. The daily and periodical Press was subjected to intolerable
administrative restrictions, so much so that it became impossible
for it to reach the agricultural community. Anything which showed
the slightest sympathy for the Ukrainian ideal was considered as a
crime, and the most vigorous reprisals were taken against officials,
employees, students, etc., suspected of nationalist sympathies. The
Ukrainian movement in Russia was forced back to its old position.
Nor were the Austrian Ukrainians spared the most cruel disillusions
in their turn. They saw their chances of improving their condition
disappear as the hope of a solution of the Ukrainian problem in Russia
faded away. The electoral reforms had proved inadequate and the new
“Volksparlament” on which were set such great hopes appeared absolutely
powerless either to solve the complicated problem of nationalities,
or to reduce the general chaos to order. Polish domination lost none
of its rigours. Moreover the government, not wishing to quarrel with
the Poles, stipulated for a compromise between them before they would
promise any amelioration in Ukrainian conditions. Under governmental
pressure and in spite of the opposition of Ukrainian opinion, a
compromise was brought about at the beginning of 1914, on the basis of
a reform in the law concerning the elections to the Galician Landtag.
This arrangement soon proved itself to be insecure.
Under the blow of the survival of the old aspirations and the
disillusions they had received there arose a party in the Ukraine
who wished to attempt once again the fight for the independence of
the country. Such hopes which are found in the associations of the
nationalist youth at the end of the nineteenth century awoke once again
with renewed energy in spite of the ill-luck which had always hitherto
pursued them. But the majority of educated Ukrainians only see in such
aspirations a Utopia whose realization would bring about a political
cataclysm.
Since it has been shown that the position of the Russian Ukrainians
has no attractions for their Austrian brethren, while on the other
hand the lot of the Austrian Ukrainians governed by the Poles does not
seem at all enviable to the Russian Ukrainians, the educated classes
of both Ukraines have come to the conclusion that it is preferable to
strive for a broad administrative autonomy suitable to both monarchies,
without having recourse to extreme measures.[5]
[5] Moreover, many are of the opinion that an economic rupture with the
metropolis would be a risky and dangerous undertaking.
But even this policy has met with many difficulties in Austria,
combated as it has been by the groups of Polish leaders. The same
has happened in Russia, where, without counting the government, the
liberal educated classes, although in close contact with the élite
of the Ukraine, were yet hostile to the idea of autonomy. It is only
about 1913 and 1914 that one observes a change of opinion among the
progressive parties in Russia. Then for the first time do the claims
of the Ukraine seem worthy of any attention. Such liberal views
characterize the well-known efforts made in the Duma of 1913-14 by the
constitutionalists, the socialists and the labour party.
Such was the situation when, sooner than one expected, there broke over
Europe the cataclysm from which one expects a radical transformation
of the conditions of existence of many subordinate nations, and the
solution of numerous problems. It is difficult to say whether it will
solve the Ukrainian problem. Whatever may happen, those who have
followed the development of this question know that if present events
do not bring about a solution of it, or at least open the way to such
a solution, it will remain a source of new convulsions, not less
terrible than those of to-day. Let the statesmen say to themselves:
The Ukrainian question will not be solved by ignoring it or by further
oppression. It can only be solved by adopting a policy of active
realization in regard to the two Ukraines.
MICHAELO HRUSHEVSKY
(_Professor of History at the University of Lemberg_).
APPENDIX.
Selected List of Publications dealing with the Ukraine Question since
the outbreak of War.
APPENDIX
+List of Principal Publications dealing with the Ukraine Question since
the Outbreak of War.+
While this list does not claim to be either absolutely accurate or
complete, the editor has attempted to tabulate all the articles which
were either typical of many or of sufficient importance to the student.
Articles dealing with purely military matters had perforce to be
excluded. However incomplete this list may be it will be sufficient for
the informed reader to look up all that is mentioned therein to realize
how ill acquainted with the truth and yet how credulous even a London
newspaper writer can be.
+Volumes+:
“Nationality and the War” Arnold J. Toynbee Dent & Sons (522 pp.).
“The Ukraine” Bedwin Sands Enlarged reprint of
an earlier edition.
“Russia and the Great War” Gregor Alexinsky Fisher Unwin.
+Longer Articles in Reviews+:
July, 1915 “The Future of Bedwin Sands _British Review._
the Ruthenians”
„ „ “Life in Eastern W. F. Bailey, C.B. _Fortnightly Review._
Galicia”
+Shorter Articles+:
17/9/14 “The Fate of Eastern George _New Age._
Galicia” Raffalovich
24/9/14 “The Conquest of Galicia” „ „
8/10/14 “The Darkest Russia Bogey” „ „
24/10/14 “Eastern Galicia” „ _The Queen_
(Illustrated).
10/12/14 “The War: A Russian Plot?” „ _Labour Leader._
17/12/14 „ „ „
17/12/14 “The War in Galicia” „ _New Age._
14/1/15 “The Ukraine and the Small „ „
Nations”
19/12/15 “The Uniat Church of „ _The Universe._
Galicia”
14/9/14 “The Cossacks” Barnes Steveni _Daily Despatch._
18/9/14 “The Capture of Lemberg” _Daily Telegraph._
31/8/14 “Two Nations in East _Daily Chronicle._
Europe”
30/7/14 „ _The Times._
18/12/14 “Russia and the Catholic _Catholic Times._
Church”
1/10/14 “The Darkest Russia Bogey” Geoffrey Dennis _New Age._
25/7/14 “Teaching the Ruthenians” “S.” _Canada._
13/10/14 “Racial Problems” George Trevelyan _Daily Chronicle._
14/11/14 “Winnipeg’s Ukrainians” Florence R. _Canada._
Livesay
10/12/14 “The Burglar” Vasil Stefanik _New Age._ Trans.
by G. R.
12/12/14 “The Great Coming A Pole _Outlook._
Settlement”
31/12/14 “The Literature of the Vasil Levitzky _New Age._ Trans.
Ukraine” by P. Selver.
31/12/14 “The Ironic Spirit in Rosalind Travers _Justice._
Russia” Hyndman
14/1/15 “Russia and Bukovina” „ „
26/2/15 “In Bukovina” „ _Manchester
Guardian._
3/5/15 “The Carpathians” „ „
15/7/15 “Lemberg” „ „
27/10/14 “The Slav Question in Raseur _The ’Varsity._
Austria”
19/1/15 “Galicia in 1914” „ „
26/1/15 „ „ „
9/2/15 „ „ „
16/2/15 „ „ „
23/2/15 „ „ „
2/3/15 „ „ „
9/3/15 „ „ „
27/4/15 „ „ „
11/5/15 „ „ „
18/5/15 „ „ „
25/5/15 „ „ „
1/6/15 „ „ „
8/6/15 „ „ „
28/1/15 “We cannot be Silent” _Labour Leader._
28/1/15 “How Russia treats her „
Refugees”
17/2/15 “Russia and Us” _Globe._
16/2/15 “The Russians in _Liverpool Post._
Czernovitz”
3/3/15 “The Church in Galicia” _Catholic Herald._
3/3/15 “Vicissitudes of _Morning Post._
Czernovitz”
4/6/15 “Poor Przemysl” _Daily Mail._
9/6/15 “On the Battlefield of _Manchester
Galicia” Guardian._
21/1/15 “Russian Culture” P. Selver _New Age._
28/1/15 “Partial Truth about the „ „
Slavs”
11/3/15 “Classification of the „ „
Slavs”
21/1/15 “Our Eastern Ally” _Christian World._
21/1/15 “Battle on the Oilfields” _Star._
13/3/15 “Notes from Russia” _Westminster
Gazette._
20/1/15 “The New Map” H. J. Mackinder, _Glasgow Herald._
M.P.
7/2/15 “Austria’s Peace Terms” _Sunday Chronicle._
8/2/15 “Russia and the Ukraine” Joseph King, Three Questions in
M.P. House of Commons.
12/2/15 “Where Three Empires Meet” M. H. Donohoe _Daily Chronicle._
29/1/15 “The Archbishop of Correspondence _Universe._
Lemberg”
5/2/15 „ „ „
12/2/15 „ „ „
26/2/15 “The Uniat Church of „ „
Galicia”
5/3/15 „ „ „
12/3/15 „ „ „
14/2/15 “The Battle Ground of Sergius _Sunday Times._
Galicia”
18/2/15 “Nationalism,” etc. Le Vin _Justice._
3/3/15 “Archbishop of Lemberg” Mr. Ginnell, Questions in House
M.P. of Commons.
10/3/15 „ „ „
11/3/15 “Nationality and the War” H. N. Brailsford _Labour Leader._
23/3/15 “Galician Oilfields” _Financial Times._
1/4/15 “Zapovit” T. Shevchenko _New Age_ (Trans.
P. Selver).
8/4/15 “In the Russian Duma” _Justice._
13/4/15 “Galician Refugees” _Morning Post._
16/4/15 “Przemysl after the Fall” _The Times._
28/4/15 “The Transition of Lvov” Harold Williams _Daily Chronicle._
26/5/15 “Through Galicia” „ „
8/5/15 “A Polish People” Weyland Keen _Spectator._
26/9/14 “Russians in Galicia” C. Ua S. _Irish Volunteer._
17/6/15 “The Present State of M. Phillips _Economist._
Galicia” Price
24/6/15 “Letter from Russia” C. E. Bechöfer _New Age._
1/7/15 „ „ „ (On Shevchenko’s
Grave.)
5/6/15 “Galicia’s Vanishing _Literary Digest._
Church”
30/6/15 “Eastern Galicia” _Irish Times._
28/6/15 “The Russians in Galicia” Robert McCormack _The Times._
22/6/15 “About Lemberg” H. Julian Fuller _Evening News._
3/7/15 “Notes on Galicia” _Nation._
7/7/15 “Russian Denial” _Globe._
16/7/15 “Austrian Regiments of „
Russians”
17/7/15 “Life in Galician War John Foster _Standard._
Zone” Fraser
1st no./7/15 _La Revue Ukrainienne_ (in French) Pub. monthly in Lausanne,
2/- a copy.
_L’Ukraine_ „ Intermittent. Lausanne.
_The Ukraine (British) Committee_
+London+,
1914-15.
The members intend to study the Ukrainian question with an unbiased
mind, to further knowledge of its problems, to inform one another
through the Secretary of their historical, artistic and literary
discoveries, to write or speak on the subject whenever possible, to
bring the Ukrainian and the British nations into closer touch, to bring
their influence as readers or subscribers to periodicals to bear upon
Editors, in order that they may be forced to recognize the value of the
claims of the Ukraine, and the unconscious insult to 37,000,000 people
contained in the appellation _Little Russians_ and _Malorussians_,
or even _Ruthenians_, which in England and America alone they still
persist in using.
No Subscription or Entrance Fee is required; no public or private
appeal is made for funds. Members who wish to contribute to the work
of the Committee can do so by arranging with the Hon. Secretary for
publication of literature concerning the Ukraine at popular prices.
The membership of the Ukraine Committee is drawn from every part of
the British Empire. Non-British Ukrainian members are not accepted.
This excludes the possibility of friction and ensures an absolute free
hand for the members of the Committee. The Committee, however, will
always welcome co-operation from the Ukraine. Although the membership
is increasing rapidly, no names shall be published until a meeting has
been called to consider both this question and that of extending the
appeal for members to U.S.A. and to all parts of the English-speaking
world.
--------------------
To +Mr. George Raffalovich+, _Hon. Secretary_,
22, Church Road, Barnes, Surrey, England.
_I_, ..............................................
_of_ .......................... _wish to become a
member of the Ukraine Committee_.
_Signature_ .................................
_Date_ ......................................
Garden City Press Ltd.,
Printers,
Letchworth :: Herts.
Transcriber’s Notes
In the .txt version, surrounding characters have been used to indicate
_Italics_ and +Smallcaps+
Footnotes have been renumbered and moved to follow the paragraph from
which they are referenced.
Minor typographical, formatting and spelling errors have been corrected.
*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE UKRAINIAN PROBLEM ***
Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will
be renamed.
Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright
law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works,
so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United
States without permission and without paying copyright
royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part
of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project
Gutenberg™ electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG™
concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark,
and may not be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following
the terms of the trademark license, including paying royalties for use
of the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for
copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is very
easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation
of derivative works, reports, performances and research. Project
Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and printed and given away—you may
do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected
by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark
license, especially commercial redistribution.
START: FULL LICENSE
THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG™ LICENSE
PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK
To protect the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting the free
distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work
(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase “Project
Gutenberg”), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full
Project Gutenberg License available with this file or online at
www.gutenberg.org/license.
Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg
electronic works
1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg
electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to
and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property
(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all
the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or
destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg electronic works in your
possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a
Project Gutenberg electronic work and you do not agree to be bound
by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person
or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.
1.B. “Project Gutenberg” is a registered trademark. It may only be
used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who
agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few
things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg electronic works
even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See
paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project
Gutenberg electronic works if you follow the terms of this
agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg
electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below.
1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation (“the
Foundation” or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection
of Project Gutenberg electronic works. Nearly all the individual
works in the collection are in the public domain in the United
States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the
United States and you are located in the United States, we do not
claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing,
displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as
all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope
that you will support the Project Gutenberg mission of promoting
free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg
works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the
Project Gutenberg name associated with the work. You can easily
comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the
same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg License when
you share it without charge with others.
1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern
what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are
in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States,
check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this
agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing,
distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any
other Project Gutenberg work. The Foundation makes no
representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any
country other than the United States.
1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:
1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other
immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg License must appear
prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg work (any work
on which the phrase “Project Gutenberg” appears, or with which the
phrase “Project Gutenberg” is associated) is accessed, displayed,
performed, viewed, copied or distributed:
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
of the Project Gutenberg™ License included with this eBook or online
at www.gutenberg.org. If you
are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws
of the country where you are located before using this eBook.
1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg electronic work is
derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not
contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the
copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in
the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are
redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase “Project
Gutenberg” associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply
either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or
obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg
trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg electronic work is posted
with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution
must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any
additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms
will be linked to the Project Gutenberg License for all works
posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the
beginning of this work.
1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg
License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this
work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg.
1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this
electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with
active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project
Gutenberg License.
1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including
any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access
to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg work in a format
other than “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other format used in the official
version posted on the official Project Gutenberg website
(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense
to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means
of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original “Plain
Vanilla ASCII” or other form. Any alternate format must include the
full Project Gutenberg License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.
1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,
performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg works
unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing
access to or distributing Project Gutenberg electronic works
provided that:
• You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
the use of Project Gutenberg works calculated using the method
you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed
to the owner of the Project Gutenberg trademark, but he has
agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid
within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are
legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty
payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in
Section 4, “Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg
Literary Archive Foundation.”
• You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies
you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he
does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg™
License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all
copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue
all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg™
works.
• You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of
any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the
electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of
receipt of the work.
• You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
distribution of Project Gutenberg™ works.
1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project
Gutenberg™ electronic work or group of works on different terms than
are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing
from the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the manager of
the Project Gutenberg™ trademark. Contact the Foundation as set
forth in Section 3 below.
1.F.
1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable
effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread
works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project
Gutenberg™ collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg™
electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may
contain “Defects,” such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate
or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other
intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or
other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or
cannot be read by your equipment.
1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the “Right
of Replacement or Refund” described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project
Gutenberg™ trademark, and any other party distributing a Project
Gutenberg™ electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all
liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal
fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT
LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE
PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE
TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE
LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR
INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
DAMAGE.
1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a
defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can
receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a
written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you
received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium
with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you
with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in
lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person
or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second
opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If
the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing
without further opportunities to fix the problem.
1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth
in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you ‘AS-IS’, WITH NO
OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT
LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.
1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied
warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of
damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement
violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the
agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or
limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or
unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the
remaining provisions.
1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the
trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone
providing copies of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works in
accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the
production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg™
electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses,
including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of
the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this
or any Project Gutenberg work, (b) alteration, modification, or
additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg work, and (c) any
Defect you cause.
Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg
Project Gutenberg is synonymous with the free distribution of
electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of
computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It
exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations
from people in all walks of life.
Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the
assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg’s
goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg collection will
remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure
and permanent future for Project Gutenberg and future
generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see
Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org.
Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-profit
501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the
state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal
Revenue Service. The Foundation’s EIN or federal tax identification
number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by
U.S. federal laws and your state’s laws.
The Foundation’s business office is located at 41 Watchung Plaza #516,
Montclair NJ 07042, USA, +1 (862) 621-9288. Email contact links and up
to date contact information can be found at the Foundation’s website
and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact
Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg
Literary Archive Foundation
Project Gutenberg™ depends upon and cannot survive without widespread
public support and donations to carry out its mission of
increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be
freely distributed in machine-readable form accessible by the widest
array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations
($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt
status with the IRS.
The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating
charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United
States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a
considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up
with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations
where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND
DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular state
visit www.gutenberg.org/donate.
While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we
have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition
against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who
approach us with offers to donate.
International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make
any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from
outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.
Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current donation
methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other
ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To
donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate.
Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg electronic works
Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project
Gutenberg concept of a library of electronic works that could be
freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and
distributed Project Gutenberg eBooks with only a loose network of
volunteer support.
Project Gutenberg eBooks are often created from several printed
editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in
the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not
necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper
edition.
Most people start at our website which has the main PG search
facility: www.gutenberg.org.
This website includes information about Project Gutenberg,
including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to
subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks.
