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Title: The Record of a Regiment of the Line
Being a Regimental History of the 1st Battalion Devonshire
Regiment during the Boer War 1899-1902
Author: M. Jacson
Release Date: June 3, 2005 [EBook #15972]
Language: English
*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK RECORD OF A REGIMENT ***
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THE RECORD
OF
A REGIMENT OF THE LINE
BEING
A REGIMENTAL HISTORY OF
THE 1ST BATTALION DEVONSHIRE
REGIMENT DURING THE
BOER WAR
1899-1902
BY
COLONEL M. JACSON
London: HUTCHINSON & CO.
Paternoster Row 1908
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE SIEGE OF
LADYSMITH 1
II. SIEGE OF LADYSMITH 30
III. EVENTS FOLLOWING THE SIEGE OF LADYSMITH,
AND THE ADVANCE NORTH
UNDER. SIR REDVERS BULLER 104
IV. LYDENBURG 149
V. TREKKING IN THE NORTH-EAST TRANSVAAL 176
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
MONUMENT ERECTED TO OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE
DEVONSHIRE REGIMENT WHO FELL ON JANUARY 6TH
ON WAGON HILL, SIEGE OF LADYSMITH. _Frontispiece_
FACE PAGE
EN ROUTE TO LADYSMITH 5
IN THE TRENCHES, LADYSMITH 36
TOWN HALL, LADYSMITH, CLOCK-TOWER DAMAGED BY
SHELL FIRE 44
AFTER A WET NIGHT IN THE TRAVERSES, LADYSMITH 56
THE RAILWAY BRIDGE, WITH CÆSAR'S CAMP IN
DISTANCE, LADYSMITH 62
LIEUT.-COLONEL C.W. PARK 66
NAVAL BATTERY HILL, LADYSMITH }
}
MONUMENT ERECTED TO DEVONS ON WAGON HILL, } 70
ON SPOT WHERE THE CHARGE TOOK PLACE, LADYSMITH }
A PEACEFUL SUNDAY 80
DEVON OFFICERS REMAINING FIT FOR DUTY AT THE
END OF THE SIEGE 102
BRIGADIER-GENERAL WALTER KITCHENER 104
RAILWAY BRIDGE DESTROYED BY BOERS, INGAGANE 108
MAKING BARBED-WIRE ENTANGLEMENT, INGAGANE 110
THE BAGGAGE OF GENERAL BULLER'S ARMY CROSSING
BEGINDERLYN BRIDGE 116
TREKKING WITH GENERAL BULLER 124
DEVONS CROSSING THE SABI RIVER 140
COLONEL C.W. PARK, MISSION CAMP, LYDENBURG 148
WIRE BRIDGE, LYDENBURG 160
MISSION CAMP FORT, LYDENBURG (INTERIOR) 170
REMAINS OF BOER BIG GUN, WATERVAL 180
CROSSING THE STEELPORT RIVER 182
DAWN--AFTER A NIGHT MARCH, TRICHARDTSFONTEIN 200
DEVONS EN ROUTE TO DURBAN 208
MONUMENT ERECTED IN LADYSMITH CEMETERY 218
MAPS
SIEGE OF LADYSMITH
NATAL AND S.E. TRANSVAAL
PREFACE
BY LIEUT.-GENERAL W. KITCHENER
Experience we all know to be a valuable asset, and experience in war is
the most costly of its kind. To enable those coming after us to
reconstruct the picture of war, Regimental Histories have proved of
infinite value. That such a record fills a sentimental want hardly
requires assertion.
My first feelings on being honoured with a request from the Devonshire
Regiment to write a preface to the account of their "Work in South
Africa, 1899-1902," were, I confess, How could I refuse so difficult a
task gracefully? However, on further consideration it seemed to me that
undoubtedly such a preface should be written by some one outside the
corps itself. Onlookers, as the saying goes, often see most of the game,
and, being free from personal bias, can often add something to what
those engrossed in the meshes of life's details can only appreciate from
a narrower point of view.
From this standpoint, and as I was the General under whom the 1st Devons
served longest in South Africa, it seemed obviously my duty to attempt
the task.
The "Work of the 1st Battalion of the Devonshire Regiment" is portrayed
in these pages. It therefore only remains for me to add, for the benefit
of coming generations, what manner of men these were, who by their
dogged devotion to duty helped to overcome the Boer. Associated as one
was with many corps in the close intimacy of veldt life, it was a study
of the deepest interest to note the individuality that characterized
each, and which was often as clearly and as well defined as that of the
men with whom one daily came in contact.
During the many months of our intimate association, and in the varied
situations that presented themselves, I cannot call to mind any single
occasion on which the Devons were ever flurried or even hurried. Their
imperturbability of temper, even under the most trying conditions, could
not be surpassed.
Another characteristic of the corps was its inherent thrift. They were,
in fact, essentially a "self-help" corps. When a flood came and washed
away the bridge leading to the picket line, no sapper was required to
show them how to throw a suspension bridge above the flood from tree to
cliff. It was characteristic of the Regiment that they carried out in
war their peace training, never allowing the atmosphere of excitement to
distort their actions.
If we take Elandslaagte, Wagon Hill, or any of the hundred and one
ticklish night operations in which they took part, this trait will be
ever noteworthy, that they acted as was to be expected of them, and made
no fuss of having done so.
We have all read realistic descriptions of troops on the march in South
Africa, the writer using all his cunning to depict the war-worn dirty
condition of his heroes, seeming to glean satisfaction from their
grease-stained khaki. It must be admitted that the South African War is
responsible for a somewhat changed condition of thought as regards
cleanliness and its relation to smartness. No such abstraction disturbed
the Devons; a Devon man was always clean. Individuals of some corps
could be readily identified by their battered helmets or split boots;
not so the Devons. No helmet badge was necessary for their
identification, and the veriest tyro could not fail to recognize at any
time the crisply washed Indian helmet cover.
It may be open to question whether it is for good or for evil that we
should broaden our views of what goes to make a smart and useful
fighting man, but the regimental system of the Devons was for no
innovation of a careless go-as-you-please style. I thus lay stress on
the individuality of the Devons in South Africa, because it was this
individuality of theirs, born of their regimental system, which enabled
them to claim so full a share in the success of that long-drawn-out
campaign.
No one can quite appreciatively follow the story of the work of the
Devons, unless he realizes the intense feeling of comradeship that
animates these West-country men. To work with Devonshire men is to
realize in the flesh the intensity of the local county loyalty so
graphically depicted by Charles Kingsley in his _Westward Ho!_ and other
novels.
In conclusion, let me add, a more determined crew I never wish to see,
and a better regiment to back his orders a General can never hope to
have.
[Illustration: [Signature - Walter Kitchener]]
DALHOUSIE, _May_, 1906.
PREFACE
BY THE AUTHOR
The story as told is an everyday account and a record of the work of the
men of the 1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment during the South African
War.
It exemplifies the devotion to duty, the stubbornness in adversity, and
the great fighting qualities of the West-country man, which qualities
existed in the time of Drake, and which still exist.
A repeating of their history of the past, a record of the present, and
an example for the generation to come.
CHAPTER I
EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE SIEGE OF LADYSMITH
1899
On returning from the North-West Frontier of India at the close of the
Tirah Expedition, 1897-8, the 1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment, which
had served with distinction under the command of Colonel J.H. Yule in
the campaign against the Afridi clans, was ordered to proceed from
Peshawar to Jullunder, at which place it was quartered in 1898 and in
the summer months of 1899, during which time certain companies and
detachments were furnished for duty at Dalhousie, Kasauli, and Ghora
Dakka (Murree Hills), and located during the hot weather at these
places.
Towards the latter end of August, 1899, news from South Africa appeared
ominous, and war seemed likely to break out between England and the
Transvaal.
On the 8th September, 1899, confidential instructions were received from
army head-quarters at Simla ordering the Regiment to get ready to move
at short notice to South Africa, and a few days later further orders
were received to entrain on the 16th September for Bombay _en route_ to
the Transvaal, which country the Regiment was destined not to reach for
some months, and then only after severe fighting.
The companies quartered at Dalhousie and Ghora Dakka with difficulty
joined the head-quarters at Jullunder before the 16th, and the following
marches are worthy of record:--
The Dalhousie detachment marched to Pathankote, a distance of 54-1/4
miles, in two days. Major Curry, who was in command, gave each man a
coolie for his baggage, and ordered the men to get to Duneera the first
day the best way they could. At Duneera they halted for the night, and
the next day pushed on in the same manner to Pathankote, where they
immediately entrained and proceeded to Jullunder.
The Ghora Dakka detachment under Lieutenant Emerson marched to Rawal
Pindi, a distance of fifty-four miles, in two days, and then entrained
for Jullunder.
No men fell out in either party, and considering the time of year and
the intense heat, they were fine performances.
Some officers were on leave in Cashmere, and only arrived at Jullunder
as the Regiment was entraining.
On September 16th, 1899, the 1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment, under
the command of Major C.W. Park, left Jullunder by rail for Bombay with a
strength as under:--
25 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 842 sergeants, rank and file.
The following officers accompanied the battalion:--
Major C.W. Park, commanding.
Major M.C. Curry, second in command.
Captain M.G. Jacson.
Captain J.O. Travers.
Captain E.C. Wren.
Captain E.M. Morris.
Lieutenant P.H. Price-Dent.
Lieutenant J.E.I. Masterson.
Lieutenant A.F. Dalzel.
Lieutenant N.Z. Emerson.
Lieutenant G.H.I. Graham.
Lieutenant T.B. Harris.
2nd Lieutenant G.I. Watts.
2nd Lieutenant D.H. Blunt.
2nd Lieutenant H.R. Gunning.
2nd Lieutenant S.T. Hayley.
2nd Lieutenant H.W.F. Twiss.
Captain and Adjutant H.S.L. Ravenshaw.
Captain and Quartermaster H. Honner.
Warrant Officer Sergeant-Major G.E. Mitchell.
The following officers were attached for duty to the battalion:--
Major Burnside, R.A.M.C., in medical charge.
Lieutenant E.G. Caffin, Yorkshire Regiment.
Lieutenant H.W.R. Cowie, Dorset Regiment.
Lieutenant A.M. Tringham, The Queen's West Surrey Regiment.
Lieutenant J.A. Byrne, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
Lieutenant E.E.M. Walker, Somersetshire Light Infantry.
[Illustration: En Route to Ladysmith]
The following officers were absent from the battalion on leave in
England:--
Captain W.B. Lafone.
Captain G.M. Gloster.
Lieutenant H.N. Field.
Colonel J.H. Yule, commanding the battalion, was appointed to the
command of the Indian Infantry Brigade, South Africa, with the temporary
rank of brigadier-general. Major A.G. Spratt was placed in charge of the
depot and details left at Jullunder.
The Regiment arrived without incident on September 21st at Bombay,
having halted, for a few hours only, at the following places:--
On September 17th at Aligarh.
" " 18th at Jhansi.
" " 19th at Hoshangabad.
" " 20th at Deolali.
Embarkation took place immediately on arrival, the transport _Sutlej_
taking five companies, head-quarters, band and drums, under Major C.W.
Park; and the transport _City of London_ taking three companies under
Major M.C. Curry.
On the latter vessel sailed also Sir George White's Staff and the Staff
of the Indian Infantry Brigade.
The _Sutlej_ sailed at noon on September 21st, and it was reported that
the ship was under sealed orders, and that her destination was Delagoa
Bay.
The days on board were occupied in keeping the men fit with physical
drill, free gymnastics, etc., and with instruction in first-aid to the
wounded and the use of the field-dressing and the method of adjusting
it.
On September 28th Agalega Island was sighted, and on the 30th the ship
was off the east coast of Madagascar.
On the 2nd October the S.S. _Purnea_ with the 60th Rifles on board was
spoken, and communication by flag signal established, both vessels
inquiring for news. The _Sutlej_ was the last to leave port, but had
nothing new to communicate.
At 7 a.m. on October 5th, in rough and foggy weather, the _Sutlej_
arrived off the coast of Africa, and the fog lifting about midday, she
ran down the coastline for two hours, and arrived outside the bar at
Durban.
The ships conveying the 60th Rifles and the 53rd Battery arrived an hour
later. The _Sutlej_ waited till 2 p.m. to enter the harbour, and arrived
alongside the quay at 4 p.m., when disembarkation commenced at once in
torrents of rain and heavy wind squalls.
A deputation of the Durban "West of England" Association met the
Regiment on arrival and presented an address.
The first news received on landing was that war had not yet been
declared, but that it was inevitable, that President Kruger had seized
half a million of money on its way from Johannesburg to the Cape, and
that orders had been given by him to shoot any one crossing the
frontier. This may or may not have been true; a good deal of _perfectly
reliable_ information was being circulated about this time.
On the night of October 5th-6th the Regiment left in three trains for
Ladysmith. The rain and cold caused some inconvenience to the men, as
they were packed into open trucks, and obtained neither shelter nor
sleep. They were new to the game then, but they saw the inside of many a
coal truck later.
The journey to Pietermaritzburg was in the nature of a triumphal
procession, for at various points along the line small knots of old men
women and children, waving Union Jacks, cheered the troops most lustily
as the trains passed.
A remark frequently heard was "How glad they are to see us," and it was
evident that these people at least, who were interested and possessed
homes in Natal, had not underrated the power and intentions of the
Transvaal. The Regiment had an enthusiastic reception, as indeed did all
troops passing to the front, flags and handkerchiefs being waved from
every house farm and village. At some stations where a short stop was
made to allow of other trains getting on ahead, tea and refreshments
were given out free, by willing hands, to the soldiers in the trucks.
Trains were running with about 500 to 600 yards distance between them.
On October 6th between 7 and 8 a.m. the trains conveying the Regiment
reached Pietermaritzburg, and here the men had breakfast. Pushing on
again with as little delay as possible and passing Estcourt at about 3
p.m., and Colenso about 4 p.m., Ladysmith was reached at 6 p.m.
Detraining took place at once, and the Regiment marched off to Tin Town,
about two miles distant, where camp was pitched in the dark.
The infantry at this time in Ladysmith consisted of:--
The Gordon Highlanders.
The Devonshire Regiment.
The Gloucester Regiment.
The Liverpool Regiment.
Rumours of war and warlike preparation on the part of the Boers were
continually being circulated, and at daybreak on October 11th the
Transvaal Boers crossed the frontier of Natal 18,000 strong with
fourteen guns.
On October 12th, at 2 p.m., orders were received for the Regiment to
prepare at once to go out as part of a flying column towards Acton
Holmes to check the advance of the Free State Boers, who were reported
to be crossing the Biggarsberg by Vanreenen's Pass; and at 2 a.m. a
force consisting of four regiments of cavalry, four batteries R.A., and
three regiments of infantry (Liverpools, Gordons, and Devons) left
Ladysmith, and after great delay reached Dewdrop at 9 a.m.
The cavalry having been sent on to gain touch, failed however to do so,
and the column returned at once to Ladysmith. The information turned out
to be incorrect.
On the return march the Regiment was joined by Captain W.B. Lafone and
Lieutenants Field and Green, who had arrived from England.
On Sunday, October 15th, the Royal Irish Fusiliers, who had arrived
about two days previously, marched out of the Tin Camp Ladysmith to
entrain for Dundee, which place it was reported the Transvaal Boers were
threatening; and on the same day the news was confirmed that the
armoured train at Mafeking had been twice attacked.
It was said that our khaki uniform had completely nonplussed the Boers,
and that they had expected to meet us coming on in red, as in the days
gone by, and that they were consequently rather surprised and annoyed.
The Liverpool Regiment, 18th Hussars, and one battery left Ladysmith by
road for Colenso on October 18th, the Manchester Regiment, the Devons,
and Natal mounted troops covering their march from the direction of
Vanreenen's Pass. Refugees continually coming through into Ladysmith
from Acton Holmes during the day, reported fighting going on between
Boers and Natal Carbineers.
On its return to Ladysmith the same day, the Regiment moved from the Tin
Town Camp and encamped on the football ground under the convent hill,
and towards sunset the whole army marched out of Ladysmith into
strategical positions outside the town. The Regiment at this time was
reserve battalion.
On October 19th the Boers cut the telegraph wire between Dundee and
Ladysmith, and captured near Elandslaagte Station a train containing
forty tons of flour consigned to the force at Dundee, and the following
morning the Devons, Gordons, one battery, 5th Lancers, and some Colonial
mounted infantry, moved out towards Modder Station on the
Ladysmith-Newcastle road.
At about 11 a.m. news was received that a fierce battle was being fought
at Dundee, and that a large force of Free State Boers was advancing
towards Ladysmith from Bester's Station, having crossed the Vanreenen's
Pass. The column was halted about four miles out of Ladysmith, and three
companies of the Devons under Captain Travers were sent to hold Pepworth
Hill on the flank threatened by the Free State Boers. But at 4 p.m. Sir
George White came out and joined the force, and he ordered the column
back into Ladysmith.
He gave an account of the fighting at Dundee, which he had just
received. Dundee Camp was aroused in the morning by shells being pitched
into its midst. The artillery came into action, and the 60th Rifles and
Dublin Fusiliers were then sent to capture the position, which was
occupied by 4000 Boers. This was gallantly carried. Another column of
Boers was then turned on to, and at 1.30 p.m. the enemy broke.
Major-General Penn-Symons was mortally wounded, and Major-General Yule
had taken over command at Dundee.
By next day a detachment of Boers had reached the neighbourhood of
Modder Station and had taken up a position near Elandslaagte.
This detachment consisted of some 650 Boers, with two guns, under the
leadership of General Koch, who was charged with the task of cutting off
the retreat of the forces at Glencoe and Dundee, and who had been sent
forward for that purpose. General Koch had at the same time practically
joined hands with the Free State Boers, who were in the neighbourhood of
Bester's Station on the Ladysmith-Harrismith line.
In order to reoccupy Elandslaagte and to secure General Yule's line of
retreat, Sir George White ordered out a force consisting of infantry,
cavalry, and artillery, of which four companies of the Regiment formed a
part, under the command of General French. These companies went out in
the morning by train under Major Curry, and detrained near Modder
Station.
One company and a Maxim gun under Captain Jacson and a squadron 5th
Lancers were sent at 11 a.m. by road to Pepworth Hill to guard the left
flank of General French's force against the Free State Army, which might
seriously threaten General French's communications with Ladysmith.
At 1 p.m. further reinforcements were sent out to General French, and
the three remaining companies of the Regiment were ordered to proceed by
train to Modder Station to join the wing under Major Curry. The seven
companies were then under the command of Major Park.
The Boers occupied two cones of some low hills overlooking Elandslaagte
railway station. General French's artillery came into action on some
high ground 4400 yards distant from the Boer position, and between the
two forces was an open undulating plain affording little or no cover,
and across which the attack had to be delivered.
The Gordon Highlanders and Manchesters were to attack round the Boers'
left flank, whilst the Devons were to make a frontal attack.
From the nature of the position which they had taken up, no commanding
positions affording flanking fire and protection to their flanks were
obtainable by the Boers. These were open and could be easily threatened
by the cavalry and the mounted infantry.
The Boers had two guns in position on one of the two cones, and with
these guns they did good execution, knocking over a limber of one of
French's batteries at the second shot, and practically before his guns
came into action.
General French's force, now considerably augmented, marched off at 2.30
p.m. The 1st Devon Regiment was formed in company column at fifty paces
as a reserve to the Manchester Regiment. After proceeding about a mile
heavy firing was heard on the right front, direction was changed
half-right, and the Regiment was then ordered to form for attack on the
left of the Manchesters, and to take up a front of 500 yards.
Three companies were placed in the firing-line and supports under Major
Park, and four companies in reserve under Major Curry. At about 3.15
p.m. the firing-line reached the top of a low hill, and came in sight of
the enemy's position distant about 4400 yards. Here a halt of a quarter
of an hour was made, and at 3.30 p.m. orders were received by the
Regiment to make a frontal attack on the position, to advance to within
effective rifle range, and to then hold on till a flank attack by the
Manchesters and Gordons came in on the right. The ground between the
Regiment and the position sloped slightly up to the foot of the low
rocky hills, on which the enemy was posted. There was no cover of any
kind, except a few ant-heaps, in the first half of the distance.
The firing-line advanced keeping intervals and covering a front of about
600 yards, the centre being directed on to a conical hill at the back of
the enemy's camp. The reserve followed in column of companies, in single
rank, at fifty paces distance between companies. The enemy's guns opened
on the Regiment at once with shrapnel, but most of the shells went high,
only one striking the reserve companies.
A steady advance to about 1200 to 1300 yards from the position was made,
when, the rifle fire becoming rather heavy, fire was opened by section
volleys. The light was bad, and it was very difficult to see the enemy
or estimate the distances. In a few minutes the supports reinforced, and
the firing-line then pushed on to the foot of the slope, and established
itself in a shallow ditch 800 to 900 yards from the position. Here it
held on, firing sectional volleys, till the flank attack appeared on the
hill, apparently about 500 yards from the position.
An advance by companies from the right was then ordered, and, the
reserve reinforcing, a further 200 yards was gained. Some bugling and
shouting was then heard on the hill. A rush to 350 yards was now made,
and, after a short pause to allow the men to get breath, bayonets were
fixed and the position charged, four companies assaulting the detached
hill on the left, the remaining three companies assaulting the hill on
which the enemy's guns were. F and G Companies were the first to reach
and take possession of the guns, the Gordon Highlanders coming up on the
right shortly afterwards. The companies then moved on down the reverse
slope and opened fire on the retiring enemy. On the detached hill only
five of the enemy were found alive, and they showed a white flag as the
hill was charged.
The Regiment was then re-formed, and held the detached hill during the
night.
During the three hours it was under fire, the battalion kept line and
intervals carefully throughout, and adjusted sights and fired as
steadily as if on parade. It is to the perfect steadiness of the men and
the absence of all crowding that the very small losses from the enemy's
fire, which at all times was heavy, can be attributed.
The battalion's losses were:--
Captain W.B. Lafone, slightly wounded.
2nd Lieutenants Gunning, Hailey, and Green, severely wounded.
Twenty-nine non-commissioned officers and men wounded.
Parties of men were busy during the night collecting the Boer wounded
and taking them down to the laager. Among them was General Koch, who was
badly hit in several places. He died of his wounds a few days afterwards
in Ladysmith.
The losses of the Boers were estimated at 62 killed, 150 wounded, and
184 prisoners.
The force was moved back into Ladysmith early on the 22nd morning, the
infantry by rail, and cavalry by road. The company of the Regiment and
Maxim gun, which had been on Pepworth Hill during the day and the
following night, got back to camp the same afternoon.
The 23rd was given up to rejoicings and congratulations over the
victory, and the two Boer flags which were captured were displayed
outside the officers' mess tent.
The Free State Army had by now come across to the east, and were in the
neighbourhood of Modder Station, and on October 24th a column was again
ordered out with the object of assisting General Yule's force in from
Dundee.
This column consisted of the 5th Lancers, 19th Hussars, Natal
Carbineers, Border Mounted Rifles, Imperial Light Horse, Devons,
Liverpools, Gloucesters, 60th Rifles, and twenty guns, in all about 5500
men.
The enemy was found posted on Tinta Inyoni Mountain, on the summit of
which they brought a gun into action and fired on to the head of Sir G.
White's force, which was in column of route on the road, but without
doing any damage. The action began at 8.30 a.m.
At the commencement of the action the battalion was in reserve, and was
ordered to extend and lie down at the foot of the first slope facing the
enemy's position, and some 300 yards north-west of the railway line,
sending scouts to the crest of the ridge to watch the front. Four
companies were shortly afterwards ordered to advance in attack
formation, forming their own supports, and to place themselves on the
left of the Gloucester Regiment, which was in front of the Regiment at
the time. The Regiment was then on the extreme left of the firing-line.
The four companies of the reserve worked round under cover to a small
nullah about 300 yards on the left and then advanced up it. The
firing-line advanced, under slight rifle fire, across a rocky plateau
till they gained a small ridge overlooking the front, and opened fire by
section volleys on to a ridge about 800 yards in front, from which a
rather heavy fire was coming.
The Maxim gun under Lieutenant Price-Dent came into action in rear of
the left of the line and fired at the enemy to the left front.
The enemy's fire from this ridge was soon silenced, and from that time
the only objective the line had was a few scattered Boers and their
horses on the rear slope of the high hill to the left front, some 2000
yards distant.
The reserve was deployed into two lines of double companies on and below
a small ridge of rocks some 250 yards in rear of the firing-line. At
about 2 p.m. the retirement commenced, and the battalion gradually
followed the Liverpool Regiment and became rearguard. Ladysmith was
reached about 3.30 p.m., after a sixteen-mile march in torrents of rain.
The casualties of the battalion during the day were:--
1 private killed.[1]
25 privates wounded, none dangerously.
[Footnote 1: This private, the first man of the Regiment killed in the
war, was Private Winsor. He was shot dead through the heart by a stray
bullet.]
This action was known as the action of Reitfontein.
On October 26th General Yule's force marched into Ladysmith. They had
had a bad time, having marched in drenching rain, day and night, from
Sunday till Wednesday. The garrison of Ladysmith gave them food on
arrival, the Regiment supplying the Dublin Fusiliers (officers and men)
with refreshments.
On October 27th it was reported that the Boers were nearing Ladysmith
and attempting to surround the place, and a large force was ordered out
by Sir George White to reconnoitre.
This reconnaissance was under the command of Colonel Ian Hamilton, and
his column consisted of three cavalry regiments, three batteries, and
four infantry battalions, to which was added later one infantry
battalion and one battery.
Having advanced beyond the Nek between Lombards Kop and Bulwana, and
having crossed the Modder Spruit on the Helpmakaar road, the Regiment
was sent on outpost duty to the left front, whilst the main body of the
force halted on the bank of the stream.
From the outpost line large bodies of the enemy were observed advancing
over Long Hill. Boers were also seen very busy on the kopjes south of
Long Hill, entrenching.
At 8 p.m. orders were received from the officer commanding the column,
in which it was explained that the force was to make a night march and
attack, the infantry to advance at 2 a.m.
The Boer position as seen by the Regiment on the outpost line was some
three miles in length, and the point of attack was to be the extreme
left of their position, viz. Farquhar's Farm.
In the opinion of some the attack would have succeeded and the evil days
of the siege put back; in the opinion of others the attack could not
possibly have succeeded on account of the length of the Boer position,
which they had had time to strengthen and entrench, and which had not
been definitely reconnoitred.
At midnight fresh orders were received from Sir George White in
Ladysmith. The whole force was ordered to retire and to proceed back at
once into their positions in and about the town.
It was reported that the Boers were in great numbers, some 17,000 under
Joubert, and that they had their big guns with them.
The Regiment commenced their retirement as rearguard to the force at 4
a.m., and reached camp at 6.30 a.m. on October 28th.
October 29th was a Sunday, and except for rumours, which were prolific,
a quiet day was spent.
The Boers were reported to be entrenching themselves a mile and a half
out on the Dundee road, and at the same time the Ladysmith defences were
being prepared, and blasting operations were being carried out for the
construction of military roads.
The battle of Farquhar's Farm was fought on October 30th, 1899.
The whole army was ordered out at 3 a.m.
The battalion formed part of the reserve brigade under Colonel Ian
Hamilton. This reserve brigade took up a position under Limit Hill, and
facing Pepworth Hill from the south.
The plan of the day was to have been as follows, had everything gone as
it was proposed:--
Five regiments of infantry, all the mounted troops, and four batteries
of artillery were to move round the enemy's left up the Helpmakaar road
towards Farquhar's Farm (the direction of the proposed night attack on
the night 27th-28th) to attack and drive in his left.
Two regiments of infantry with one mountain battery were to move off to
the left of the British position to hold the enemy's right (which
comprised the whole of the Free State Army), and prevent him from
getting into Ladysmith.
The main attack was to be made in the centre by Colonel Ian Hamilton's
Brigade by an assault on Pepworth Hill, where the Boer big guns were
located, and which was the key of the position.
The above was the plan; the result and the way in which it was carried
out is told in a few words.
The two infantry battalions and mountain battery, detailed to guard the
left flank, knocked up against the Free State Army under Cronje (which
was seen in the forenoon by the main body of General White's force,
coming over Walker's Hoek) on what is known now as Surprise Hill, and
which place is situated a little above and nearer Ladysmith than
Nicholson's Nek. Cronje attacked them in the dark, scattered the gun
mules which stampeded, and after some hours of hard fighting captured
the lot.
The force on the right, under Sir George White's personal command, ran
prematurely into Joubert's Transvaal Army, which had advanced from its
previous and partly reconnoitred position, and which had formed up ready
to receive them in a position somewhat nearer Ladysmith. It received a
very heavy cross fire from big guns, field guns, machine guns, and
musketry, and was put to confusion, the artillery and the cavalry having
some difficulty in extricating themselves. General White took the
Manchester Regiment and the Gordon Highlanders from Hamilton's Brigade
to cover the retirement, and his force came back into Ladysmith fired
into with wonderful accuracy, at a range of about 7000 yards, by the big
gun on Pepworth. Of the remainder of Hamilton's Brigade, the Rifle
Brigade (which had only arrived in Ladysmith that day) and a half
battalion Devon Regiment were told off to bring up the rear, whilst the
other half battalion of the Devons was left on Limit Hill, two miles
outside Ladysmith, to act as a covering force.
* * * * *
The Naval Brigade under Lambton arrived at Limit Hill with three naval
12-pounders just as the retirement was taking place, and they were at
once ordered back into the town. They returned without coming into
action. As they were retiring down the road past the Piggery by the
Orange Free State Junction Station, a well-aimed shell from Pepworth
Hill upset one of their guns, killing some of the ox-team and a gunner
who was being carried back wounded in an ambulance.
The half battalion of the regiment under Major Curry was ordered to take
up a defensive position on Limit Hill and to stay there for the night.
The Boer force was within 1000 yards, and it was thought probable that
they would follow up their defeated foe. Their patrols were continually
coming to within 300-500 yards of the Devons' outpost line.
As the half battalion was well covered from view, it was deemed
expedient and prudent not to expose their position and weakness by
firing, but rather by lying quiet to trust to the Boer imagination,
allowing them to think there was a larger force in position at Limit
Hill than there really was. This plan was eminently successful, for
except for Boer patrols the position was not threatened.
Orders were received by this half battalion at 9 a.m. on November 2nd to
retire on to Ladysmith. The defenders of Ladysmith being unaware of the
fact that any of their own troops were in front of them, and mistaking
friend for foe, got down on their knees to fire as the companies of the
Devons appeared in sight.
The half battalion which had retired with the rest of the force into
Ladysmith on October 30th received orders at 10 a.m. on the 31st to
strike camp, move off and form part of the garrison of section "A" of
the defences of Ladysmith, under the command of Colonel W.G. Knox, C.B.
The second half battalion followed them.
CHAPTER II
SIEGE OF LADYSMITH
1899-1900
The siege of Ladysmith had now commenced; communication to the south was
interrupted on November 2nd, and on the same day the Boers had their
guns in action on Bulwana Mountain and were shelling the works and town
freely.
The perimeter of Ladysmith was divided into four sections, A, B, C, D,
under Colonel W.G. Knox, General Howard, Colonel Hamilton, and Colonel
Royston respectively. Section A extended from Devon Post to Cove
Redoubt; on the west of this was section B, extending as far as Range
Post on the Klip River. Section C included Maiden Castle, Wagon Hill,
and Cæsar's Camp, whilst the plain between Cæsar's Camp and Devon Post
was held by the Natal Volunteers under Colonel Royston.
The battalion was ordered to take up the two posts of Cemetery Hill and
Helpmakaar Hill. These were the most eastern kopjes of the defences.
They skirted the Helpmakaar road and were immediately under Bulwana and
Gun Hill. These were distant only some five thousand yards, and
dominated Devon Post.
The battalion was distributed: three companies on Helpmakaar Hill, two
companies on Cemetery Hill, with three companies in reserve near the
road and river-bed immediately beneath Cemetery Hill.
Devon Post received its first shells on the morning of the 3rd. These
were aimed at the tents of the reserve companies, which were rather
ostentatiously pitched on the plain by the river-bed under Cemetery
Hill. The shells were fired from a high-velocity 3-inch gun on Bulwana.
The tents were immediately moved closer under the hill, where they were
out of sight from Bulwana. The Boer guns were then trained on to the
working parties, and some fifty shells were burst in the works (just
commenced and affording little cover) on Helpmakaar and Cemetery Hill
posts, but without doing much damage. After this, owing to shell fire,
it was impossible to work except at night, or when Bulwana was obscured
by fog. The fortifications and defences were, however, hastily pushed
forward, and the platforms for the two large and ancient howitzers known
as "Castor" and "Pollux" were soon completed.
Shortly after the commencement of the siege one of the few shells fired
into Ladysmith which did any damage, burst amongst a party of Natal
Carbineers on the road under Cemetery Hill, killing five men and seven
horses.
On November 5th the Intombi Camp was formed, and all the wounded and
most of the women and children, with a few of the able-bodied male
civilian inhabitants of Ladysmith, were moved into the neutral camp.
On November 6th and 7th, with the exception of a shell or two, things
were quiet on Devon Post, but on the evening of the 7th a furious
bombardment began at four o'clock, the Boer guns all round firing into
the town and at anything they could see moving. No damage was done.
In addition to the works on Devon Post, which were manned by the
Regiment, a half-company picquet was told off nightly. This picquet
extended and lay down across the main road at the foot of the forward
work. It mounted after dark and was relieved before daylight in the
morning. Many will remember the spot where this picquet was posted as
the most ill-chosen, inconvenient, and hard platform for a bed on a
rainy night.
The nights of the 6th, 7th, and 8th were occupied in making the works
stronger and building additional works.
On November 9th the Boers made their first attempt against Ladysmith.
The attack commenced at 6 a.m. with heavy musketry fire directed on to
the northern defences; and three hours later the attack developed on
Helpmakaar Post and Cæsar's Camp. Shells came very thickly from two
howitzers and three high-velocity Creusot guns into Devon Post. This
lasted till about 2 p.m., when the action was concluded with a royal
salute from the naval batteries and three hearty cheers, which, started
by the Naval Brigade, were taken up all round the defences in honour of
the birthday of H.R.H. the Prince of Wales. A curious ending to a
battle.
During the action a well-directed shell from one of Christie's ancient
howitzers, which were now located on Helpmakaar Hill, pitched with good
effect into the middle of a large group of Boers who were entrenching
themselves on a small rise of ground underneath Gun Hill.
Helpmakaar, which had always been a single-day post, was now turned into
a three days' post, companies remaining in the fort for three days
before being relieved.
On the 11th three companies of the Regiment were sent out under Captain
Lafone to blow up a farm building under Bulwana, about one and half
miles distant from Devon Post. After a long delay, owing to the blasting
materials having been forgotten, the operation was successfully carried
out, and the party returned with only some slight annoyance from the
enemy's pompom and a few shots from a high-velocity gun stationed on
Bulwana.
The Boer artillery on Bulwana and Gun Hill was well served, and their
shooting was excellent. One morning they opened with a 40-pounder
howitzer, known under the name of "Weary Willy," on to the main work at
Devon Post, at a portion of the work occupied by "Walker's Hotchkiss Gun
Detachment." About twelve consecutive shots pitched within a five yards'
radius, and one crashed into and nearly breached the parapet, which was
here about six feet thick and built of large stones.
The men worked on the 11th from dark till 1 a.m., when the works were
practically completed and sufficiently strengthened to answer all
purposes, although building was being carried on till the last day of
the siege, and the men were still building at the actual moment when the
relief cavalry were marching across the plain into Ladysmith.
The willingness and the cheery manner in which the men of the battalion
worked at these defences are worthy of record. On pitch-dark nights in
pouring rain the men, wet to the skin, covered with mud and filth,
without a smoke, groping about in the dark to find a likely stone,
carried on the work in silence; and when the word was passed along to
knock off work, they "turned in" without a grumble into a wet bivouac.
There was no complaining, and the men were never required by their
officers to bring along the stones faster. The only noise that broke the
stillness of the night was the incessant "click, click, click" of the
picks at work loosening the stones, and the men, in spite of the
conditions under which the work was being carried on, joked among
themselves in an undertone.
Work was nightly carried on from dark till midnight and sometimes till 2
a.m., and the men turned out again to stand to arms at 3.30 a.m.
By the middle of November the works at Devon Post were from 4-1/2 to 10
feet high, from 8 to 10 feet thick at the top (the whole built roughly
of stone), with the superior slope nearly flat, exterior slope about
1/1, interior slope nearly upright. The front work had a thickness at
the bottom of about 18 feet, owing to the work being constructed on the
slope of the hill.
[Illustration: In the trenches, Ladysmith]
Things passed quietly with intermittent shell fire till the afternoon of
the 14th, when General Brocklehurst took out the Cavalry Brigade and two
batteries of artillery, with the intention of turning the Boers off
Rifleman's Ridge. This they failed to do, and returned to their lines
about 5 p.m. well peppered by the Boer big guns, one shell from the big
gun on Pepworth pitching into the centre of the road just short of a
battery of artillery which was coming back into Ladysmith, near the
defences on the north-west front held by a detachment of the Dublin
Fusiliers--an accurate shot, and the distance measured on the map 10,500
yards. Shortly afterwards the Naval Brigade in their turn did some good
shooting, pitching a shell on to the muzzle of the big gun on Pepworth,
and a few moments after this shot, another on to his parapet. Boers were
afterwards seen carrying litters away from the work. This big gun never
fired again during the siege, but the Boers patched him up and he lived
to do good work for them against General Buller in his advance north to
Lydenburg, and the Boers finally blew him up in front of the battalion
near Waterval, in the Lydenburg district, when engaged with a column
under General Walter Kitchener.
For the next few days nothing of consequence occurred beyond the usual
shell fire, varied at intervals from day to night time. It rained in
torrents most of the time, and the men were continually wet through.
They however kept very fit, and there were very few in hospital.
An amusing incident occurred on the 17th. Good targets being scarce the
Boers continually fired shell at any moving or stationary object they
could catch sight of--sometimes at a single scout. They often fired
their pompom at a range of about 5000 yards at the vultures feeding on
the dead horses under Devon Post. On this day they sent three 40-lb.
shells at an old man named Brown who contracted for the dead horses.
Brown used to take these out into the open in full view of the Boers, to
some flat ground under the Post, and there skin them at his leisure. The
old man would take his load out once a day in a four-horsed cart. If he
was seen by the Boers he would come back at a gallop pursued by Boer
shells. This time he came back on three wheels, much to the amusement of
Section A of the defences; the fourth wheel had come off and he was in
too great a hurry to readjust it, and it was in consequence left behind.
The old man was never hit.
On November 20th the Boers mounted some more guns on Bulwana and also on
Umbrella Tree Hill, which lay in the Nek between Bulwana and Gun Hill.
Colonel Knox ordered a dummy battery to be made at night on the further
side of the Klip River and out in the open. Wooden imitation guns and
imitation gunners were erected, and these were worked with a string by a
gunner concealed in the bank of the river.
Captain Kincaid-Smith, with the two Maxim-Nordenfeldt guns captured at
Elandslaagte, of which he was now in charge, was to open fire from Devon
Post on to the Boer guns newly placed on Umbrella Tree Hill, and as he
was perfectly concealed and fired smokeless powder, it was supposed that
the Boers would imagine that the firing came from the new dummy battery
just erected.
Kincaid-Smith began firing at about six o'clock on the following
morning. He fired some five shells in perfect silence unanswered by the
Boers. He was then suddenly located by them, and shells were hurled on
to him from all sides and from all descriptions of guns. This continued
for a quarter of an hour and then slackened off. The Boers burst their
shrapnel better than usual, and in the evening just before dark one
shrapnel got into a working party on Devon Post, killing one man and
severely wounding another.
There was some heavy musketry fire during the night at a reconnaissance
party sent out from Ladysmith towards Umbrella Tree Hill. The party had
orders to disturb the Boers and draw their fire. This they very
successfully accomplished. On the 22nd night another "disturbing party"
was sent out under Captain Jacson, consisting of one company of the
Regiment and a party of cavalry, to "stir up" the Boers on Flag Hill. It
was pitch-dark, pouring with rain, and the ground was covered with
boulders of rocks. The cavalry were obliged to leave their horses behind
and proceed on foot in front of the infantry; so little was gained by
the enterprise and no "stirring up" was effected.
Up to this date there had been very little news from the outside world,
but now the Regiment was informed that General French had fought a
successful engagement at Estcourt and had got in with the cavalry. They
were also told that the garrison might expect to be relieved by the 13th
December by one division which was coming up from Durban.
About November 22nd the news was received that the armoured train at
Colenso had been attacked, derailed, and captured.
On the 23rd Kincaid-Smith received orders to proceed with one of his
guns during the following night down to the river-bed near the dummy
battery and open fire if the Boers fired at it in the morning. This they
had done the previous day, much to every one's amusement. At daybreak he
opened fire from the river-bed. After his second shot the Boers found
him and made wonderful practice, bursting shrapnel all over him. No
damage, however, was done as he was well dug into the bank. They
continued their shelling for an hour, after which they turned their big
guns on to Tunnel Hill for a short time. This hill was held by the
Liverpool Regiment, who lost two killed and twelve wounded, of whom five
died of their wounds next day.
The works on Devon Post and Cemetery Hill were strengthened during the
next few nights until the front walls were from twelve to fifteen feet
thick. Most of this work was carried on in heavy rain, which greatly
added to the general discomfort of the men.
On November 28th the garrison was encouraged by the information that the
Boers had been badly beaten near Estcourt, that 3000 of them had gone
off (it was not reported where to!), and that General Clery was at
Colenso.
On November 30th General Clery opened up signalling communication with
Ladysmith by flashing his message with his searchlight at night on to
the clouds. The message, which was in cipher, could be easily read by
every one, but the garrison was unable to reply as they had no
searchlight.
In the early days of December, in order to keep the men as far as
possible in a condition for any eventualities, the Regiment evacuated
their works twice a week at dusk and went for a march twice round the
town. Starting at nightfall the works were regained about 10 p.m. The
exercise was good for the men's limbs and the change of scene
undoubtedly nourishment for their minds, but it is doubtful if it
conduced to the health of the men, as during the march they were
smothered in their own dust, and also in that kicked up by the artillery
horses exercising at the same time and on the same roads. It certainly
gave the men something to think about besides rocks and stones and
building, and the walking stretched their legs.
On December 2nd Colonel Knox, desirous of carrying on the work of
building in the daytime as well as by night, ordered some canvas screens
to be put up in the Post, behind which the men could work concealed from
view. But although stained the colour of the surroundings, the screens
were seen at once by the Boers, and the battalion was much troubled by a
new gun stationed near Pepworth Hill, which opened fire shortly after
they were erected. One shell from this howitzer topping the hill pitched
within a yard of the guard tent underneath, which was full of men. No
damage was done, however, beyond scattering the ammunition boxes and
covering the men with mud. The screens were then taken down, and on the
disappearance of the noxious objects the firing ceased, and the Boers
appeared pacified. At 10 p.m., whilst the Regiment was at work building
on Cemetery Hill, an order came to parade at once and march to a
rendezvous down in the town in Lyle Street. It was given out "for
operations near Limit Hill." On reaching the rendezvous it was learnt
that the force consisted of two brigades of infantry, some batteries,
and all the mounted troops. After half an hour's wait, a staff officer
rode up to say that the operations were cancelled.
About this time the siege newspaper, the _Ladysmith Lyre_, came into
existence. There were only four issues, on account of want of paper.
Shelling continued daily with but little or no result. The Boers were
apparently much incensed with the Town Hall, upon which the Geneva red
cross flag was flying, and which was being used as a hospital, for they
continually fired at it till the flag was taken down early in December,
when they scarcely ever fired at it again.
[Illustration: Town Hall, Ladysmith, Clock-tower damaged by shell fire]
On December 7th General Hunter made his sortie to Gun Hill. The secret
was well kept. In the evening, at dark, the battalion was sent to
Abattis Hill with orders to entrench, the scheme ostensibly being that a
force was to go out and stir up the Boers round Pepworth Hill whilst the
Regiment threatened to attack the Boers on the other flank.
At 11 p.m. a letter was received telling the officer commanding the
Devon Regiment to meet General Hunter under Devon Post at 11.30 p.m.
Shortly after this hour a force of Colonial mounted infantry, with
General Hunter at their head, passed the post to assault Gun Hill. This
they found but sparsely guarded, and, dispersing the small picquet, they
succeeded in blowing up the two big guns and a Maxim located there. The
Regiment remained out till the operation was over. It had been placed in
this position on Abattis Hill to act as a flank guard, with the object
of preventing the Boers attacking from the left round General Hunter's
rear, which was very open, and to act as a support upon which General
Hunter could fall back in case his surprise failed and he was driven in.
This successful operation was accomplished with the loss of seven men
wounded.
The operation that followed was not, however, so successful. Colonel
Knox reported that his mounted troops had gone out eight miles up the
Newcastle road past Limit Hill, and had not met or seen a single Boer.
He suggested that the Cavalry Brigade should go out and capture and burn
the Boer stores at Elandslaagte Station. They proceeded to carry out the
suggestion, starting at 7 a.m., but they fell in with a large force of
Boers under Pepworth Hill who had been in their laagers when the
reconnaissance was made and had thus escaped detection. They came under
heavy musketry fire as well as shell fire, and retired back to Ladysmith
with a loss of three killed and fifteen wounded.
On December 10th an attack on Devon Post was expected, and precautions
taken accordingly. The attack, however, did not come off.
On the night of December 10th the Rifle Brigade made a sortie and blew
up a Boer big gun on Surprise Hill. This attack was admirably planned
and carried out, but the losses sustained by the Rifle Brigade were
heavy, being fourteen killed and fifty wounded out of the five companies
employed. The Boers attacked them as they were retiring; there was a
good deal of indiscriminate firing, and the bayonet was freely used. The
Boers lost considerably, partly in the general mix-up, from their own
fire, and partly owing to the close-quarter combat with the Rifle
Brigade.
The Regiment, with other troops, was ordered out with all baggage on the
night of the 12th, the rendezvous being the iron bridge on the
Vanreenen's Pass road. On arrival there the order was received to go
home. This was supposed to be a rehearsal for a sortie. On December 13th
General Buller's guns were heard for the first time due south from
Ladysmith, and at 8 p.m. the Regiment and transport were inspected by
Colonel Knox to see if everything was complete and in readiness to move
out, and on the 14th the Regiment was placed with other troops in a
flying column formed under the personal command of Sir George White.
It was expected by all that General Buller would relieve the Ladysmith
garrison on December 15th.
The following day, December 15th, a very heavy cannonade commenced at 6
a.m. in the direction of Colenso; and at 7 a.m. a heliograph message was
sent into Ladysmith which told the garrison that "the Boers are
suffering terribly from our thirty guns and 23,000 men." The cannonade
ceased at about 1 p.m.
This day the meat ration was reduced to 9 oz. per man, but 1-1/4 lb. of
bread per man was still being issued.
December 16th being Dingaan's Day, the garrison of Ladysmith was treated
to heavy shell fire at daybreak.
On December 17th the Regiment and the Gordon Highlanders were told off
as reserve battalions under the immediate orders of Sir George White.
It was officially given out that Sir R. Buller had been unable to make
good his advance at Colenso, and that the garrison must be prepared to
hold on for another two weeks. The orders publishing this news stated
that the "Lieutenant-General regrets to have to announce that the
Lieutenant-General Commanding-in-Chief in South Africa failed to make
good his first attack on Colenso; reinforcements will therefore not
arrive as early as expected."
On the evening of December 18th the Regiment gave over the good works
they had completed on Devon Post and Cemetery Hill to the Liverpool
Regiment, and moved into the latter's camp at Tunnel Hill, or, as it was
otherwise known, Railway Cutting Camp.
* * * * *
Helpmakaar Hill, on account of being so exposed, had, at the
commencement of the siege, been considered indefensible and untenable.
Under the vigorous superintendence of Colonel Knox, the commandant of
the section who planned the defences, the works on this hill had by now
been almost completed by the officers and men of the Battalion.
The defences were as complete as possible--flanking works, covered ways,
splinter and shell-proof covers were dug or erected, and the main
trenches had been turned into defensible barracks with head cover to
keep off the rain.
It was possible to proceed from the reserve under Cemetery Hill up to
and round the front and main works, and round the other side of the hill
back to the reserve again, without once coming into view from the Boer
positions on Gun Hill, Bulwana, or elsewhere, a six-feet covering wall
having been built for this purpose. It was thus possible to send
reinforcements to any part of the works without exposure to fire or
view.
During the siege this post was never attacked or seriously threatened.
The Regiment, being now in the general reserve, was ordered to be ready
to jump into mule wagons, and be carted at a gallop to any place where
they might be required, at any moment, and on the 20th the manoeuvre was
put into execution.
It was not altogether a success.
At dusk the Regiment proceeded to the railway station and the men were
duly loaded up in the wagons. A start was then made, but as the second
wagon nearly took the whole station with it in its endeavours to
negotiate the first corner of the galvanized iron goods shed, no great
speed was effected, for this wagon and the demolished corner of the shed
blocked all further egress from the station till the road was cleared.
Shortly afterwards the wagons, at last let loose, came into contact with
the two city filth carts, the "Powerful" and "Terrible," which were
parading about the streets on their own. These exceedingly powerful
ironclads completed the defeat of the mule wagons, upset finally their
order of going, and the retirement was effected in detachments. The
manoeuvre was never repeated.
Wonderful tales and reports were continually being circulated from day
to day. On one day there would perhaps be no news of any value, followed
on the next day by the most woeful tidings; but on the third day, as if
ashamed of themselves for furnishing such bad news the previous day, the
tale-bearers would turn the winter of its discontent into the most
glorious summer, by sending forth to the garrison shaves bubbling over
with pleasing items.
On the evening of the 21st a heliograph message was received from the
2nd Battalion, which was with Sir Redvers Buller, stating that at the
Colenso fight on the 15th December Colonel Bullock, Major Walter, and
Lieutenant Smyth-Osbourne had been taken prisoners, and Captains
Goodwyn, Vigors, and Radcliffe and Lieutenants Gardiner and Storey
wounded.
After standing to arms daily at 4.15 a.m. till daylight, the Regiment
was employed in building long stone traverses, behind which the men were
to live, and this work was carried on again in the evening after dark by
the light of candles. The dimensions of the traverses were sixty yards
long, eight feet high, six feet (of stonework) thick at the top, and
nine feet of stonework at the base, the earth from a ditch in front
being thrown up at an angle of 1/1. They had a topping of sand-bags,
with intervals for air passage; and a tent, stretched lengthways from
the top down to ground, afforded the men shelter and accommodation.
On December 22nd a serious catastrophe happened to a party of the
Gloucester Regiment, who were quartered in a small traverse near those
occupied by the Regiment. A shell caught the whole party of twelve men
as they were sitting away from the cover of the traverse. Five were
killed, four died of their wounds almost immediately, and three were
severely wounded.
A man with a telescope was now placed on the look-out, with orders to
blow a whistle if he saw the big gun on Bulwana turned towards the lines
when firing; and as the shell took about thirty seconds from the time of
the discharge to reach its mark, the warning gave the men time to get
under cover.
There were frequently some very amusing incidents when the look-out man
blew his whistle. One morning whilst the business at the orderly-room
was being conducted, and a culprit being told off, the whistle gave
warning that the gun on Bulwana had fired, and in the direction of
Tunnel Hill. As all could not get inside the orderly-room shelter, which
was merely a hole dug into the side of the hill, there was a general
scuttle and _sauve qui peut_. One officer, trying to get into the
orderly-room from outside, ran into another who was escaping from it to
get into the first traverse, and each tumbled over the other. The
Quartermaster, trying to crawl on his hands and knees under the tenting
of the second traverse, got blocked out, and at the same time shut out
another officer flying for safety. At the same moment a man jumped from
above on the Quartermaster's back, and he, fancying that it was the
shell and that his end had come, gave himself up for lost. All, however,
ended happily for the immediate neighbourhood, for the look-out man had
made a mistake, and the shell, instead of arriving at Tunnel Hill,
crashed into the town.
All these incidents and accidents, individually very serious at the
time, were always amusing in the telling as soon as the tyranny was
overpast, and, resulting in a hearty laugh, helped to relieve the
strain.
The London _Gazette_ of October 9th was signalled into Ladysmith by the
2nd Battalion. This stated: "Major Park to be Lieutenant-Colonel;
Davies, 2nd-in-Command; Ellicombe, Major; Radcliffe, Captain."
A list of prices at this time in Ladysmith at the public auction is of
interest:--
Eggs per dozen, 11s. 6d.
Small vegetable marrow, 1s. 6d.
Twelve small carrots, 2s. 6d.
Small water melon (worth 1d.), 6s. 6d.
Condensed milk per tin, 5s. 6d.
Fifty-two small potatoes, £1 10s.
Chickens, each, 8s.
Ducks, 13s. 6d.
Dutch butter in tins, 6s. 6d. per lb.
1/2d. Manilla cigars, 1s.
There was no English smoking tobacco obtainable, and one bottle of
whisky changed hands at £5 10s.
December 25th, Christmas Day.
"Hark, the herald angels sing!" was forcibly brought to notice by the
whistling of shells passing overhead at daylight. No Divine Service was
therefore held. The garrison received the following message from Her
Majesty the Queen: "I wish you and all my brave soldiers and sailors a
happy Christmas. God protect and bless you all.--V.R.I." In the evening
there was a soldiers' sing-song in the lines, which was finished off by
three most hearty cheers for Her Majesty. Christmas Day completed the
eighth week of the siege.
The losses which the 2nd Battalion sustained at Colenso were
heliographed into Ladysmith. These were 15 N.C.O.'s and 10 men killed,
72 wounded, and 33 taken prisoners. This was in addition to the officers
wounded and taken prisoners already mentioned.
On December 27th, shortly after breakfast, a shell from the big gun from
Bulwana pitched and burst in the officers' mess shelter, where fourteen
officers had taken cover on the whistle being blown. Lieutenant A.F.
Dalzel was killed and the following were wounded:--
Lieutenant P.H. Price-Dent, dangerously in the head.
Lieutenant Caffin, dangerously in arm and shoulder.
Lieutenant Byrne, slightly.
Lieutenant Tringham, slightly.
Lieutenant Kane, slightly.
Lieutenant Scafe, slightly.
Lieutenant Twiss, slightly.
Lieutenant Blunt, slightly.
Captain Lafone, slightly.
Private Laycock, mess waiter, slightly.
The wounded were taken into the Railway Cutting and there cared for.
They were then sent down to hospital in a church in the town. Lieutenant
Dalzel was buried that night in the cemetery after dark during a heavy
thunderstorm and in torrents of rain.
The men had a bad experience on the night of the 29th. The rain flooded
their bivouacs, and the morning found blankets and clothes floating
about in the water in the trenches. Later on, however, the weather
cleared, the sun came out, and everything was soon dried.
[Illustration: After a Wet Night in the Traverses, Ladysmith]
At the latter end of December marksmen were sent out daily to the
hill-tops some 1000 yards in front of the line of forts to act as
countersnipers to the Boers, who continually fired at the grazing
guards. One man was hit twice in one day by a Boer sniper, but only
slightly wounded. It would appear from a letter written by a Boer that
these marksmen made it very uncomfortable for the Boer snipers. In the
letter, which was afterwards published in a Boer newspaper, the
correspondent, writing to a friend in Pretoria, said: "I and my two
comrades went out this morning to fire into the English position. We had
only just got to our hiding-place when one of my comrades was shot dead;
shortly after, my other comrade was badly wounded, and I lay down and
hid the whole day till dark, when I got back to the laager." This would
go to prove that, comparing him with the Boer, the British infantry
soldier is not such a duffer with his weapon as some of those in
authority were in the habit of asserting.
There was a good deal of musketry fire whilst the scouts were out, and
it was supposed that shots were being exchanged with the Boer snipers;
but when the marksmen, who were posted on the hills near the Orange Free
State Junction Station and just above the abandoned piggery, came back
with portions of the carcasses of pigs, it was evident that all the
firing had not been at Transvaal Boers.
Lieutenant Price-Dent died at 6 a.m. on the 31st December in the Intombi
Hospital. It was found that a piece of shell had penetrated his brain
and lodged there. He was buried in the Intombi cemetery.
Up to the end of December things had been going fairly well with the
besieged. The Regiment had had plenty of hard work to keep them fit,
although they had been exposed to the elements and had had to rough it
considerably. But nothing in the way of disease had troubled them. With
the advent of January, however, whether it was from want of exercise or
from the surroundings of their new camp, disease in the form of fever
and dysentery became rife. They had been situated formerly for the most
part on a well-drained kopje, whereas now they were down on the flat,
and in a position that was not altogether healthy. There were no longer
any comforts in the shape of tobacco, etc., and the news given to them
from the outside world in the place of food was of so poor a quality
that the men's minds as well as their bodies were becoming affected.
The Regiment kept heart under the depressing circumstances in a
wonderful manner, and when Sir Redvers Buller kept putting off his
arrival from day to day and week to week, the news that he was coming at
last was generally received with a smile as if it was rather a joke.
The Boers were very busy on New Year's Day, 1900. It was supposed that a
number of excursion trains filled with the youth and beauty of the
Transvaal had arrived, and consequently the young Boer blood was all for
showing off. The big gun on Bulwana threw in the aggregate during the
day 1-1/2 tons of iron into the town, with the result that two men were
killed. There was likewise a good deal of sniping, chiefly at the Indian
"grass cuts."
One shell thrown into Ladysmith on New Year's Day had engraved on it
"Compliments of the season," and contained a bursting charge of
liquorice in the place of melinite, and a paper on which was written:--
"Good morning Mr. Franchise, don't be so
cowardly to stay in holes, ye brave hero.
"Your faithfully,
"SMALL LONG TOM."
Another blind shell picked up was full of sweetmeats.
Messages of good wishes to the garrison were received from Her Majesty,
from Sir Redvers Buller, and from the soldiers, sailors, and civilians
of Hong Kong.
Sir George White came round to see the Regiment in the evening, and
informed the officers that Sir Redvers Buller would make no move for a
fortnight. This was definite news, at any rate.
At dawn on January 3rd most of the naval guns fired off a large amount
of shell, and there was considerable guessing amongst the uninitiated as
to what was or were the targets. Shells fell at the foot of Bulwana,
near the searchlight on the top, and also near the big gun. It was
afterwards learnt that all the shells were meant for one particular spot
on Bulwana, viz. the big gun.
On occasions it was the duty of the Regiment to send one company to
dismount the 4.7 gun known as "Lady Anne" and place it on carts
preparatory to its being shifted elsewhere. This was easily accomplished
at the commencement of the siege in one night by 100 men. At the end of
the siege, however, owing to the weakness of the men, the task was never
completed under two nights, and then by 200 men.
About this time one company of the Regiment was ordered down to the
railway station as a station and bridge guard. This was a three-days'
post, and was much appreciated, as the men, being quite concealed
amongst trees, had more freedom, and the officer in command had a
railway carriage to sleep in.
On January 5th the following moves took place, and as the position of
companies is important, they are given in full.
Three companies proceeded under Major Curry to Observation Hill to
relieve the companies of the 60th Rifles ordered to Cæsar's Camp. One
company was ordered to the railway station as bridge guard. A half
company was sent to form the Bell's Spruit picquet, the other half
remaining at the Railway Cutting. In the early hours of January 6th
three fresh companies relieved those on Observation Hill, the latter
returning to the Railway Cutting; the two companies at the railway
bridge and at Bell's Spruit stood fast in their positions of the
previous day.
The Boer attack of January 6th on the positions round Ladysmith
commenced on Wagon Hill at about 2.45 a.m., and the Boers were not
finally repulsed till after dark on the evening of the same day.
As the great attack has been so ably described by various authors, it
will suffice here to give a rough outline of what took place on Cæsar's
Camp and Wagon Hill prior to the companies of the Regiment reaching the
latter place.
The Boers attacked Wagon Hill at about 2.45 a.m., and amidst a good deal
of confusion on the top, where 4:7 gun was in the act of being mounted,
gained possession of the front crest. Their attempt to take Wagon Hill
itself failed. Reinforcements consisting of two companies Gordon
Highlanders and three squadrons of I.L.H. were sent to assist the 60th
Rifles, the men of the I.L.H., and the detachment of Sappers already
engaged with the Boers.
[Illustration: The Railway Bridge, with Cæsar's Camp in Distance,
Ladysmith]
An hour later the attack on Cæsar's Camp developed. The Manchesters were
prepared for them, and one company Gordon Highlanders was sent to
reinforce. The Boers, unable to advance against the front crest of
Cæsar's Camp, attempted to turn the flank of the Manchesters along the
northern slopes. This attempt was foiled by the advance of the one
company Gordon Highlanders, assisted by the 53rd Battery which had come
into action on the plain below. The Rifle Brigade reinforced Cæsar's
Camp at about 7 a.m., and two more companies of the Gordons were sent
there at about 2 p.m. By 10 a.m. the Boers had been pushed back off
Cæsar's Camp, and Wagon Hill was reported nearly clear.
Wagon Hill was further reinforced by the 18th Hussars at 10 a.m.
At 1 p.m. the Boers, who had always hung on to their crest line, again
attempted to rush Wagon Hill point, and though they gained a temporary
advantage failed to establish themselves.
Sir George White ordered that the hill should be cleared of Boers at all
costs before nightfall, and he sent the 5th Lancers and 19th Hussars to
support the troops already at Wagon Hill, and at the same time three
companies of the Devons were ordered to proceed there with all dispatch.
At 10 a.m. the three companies of the Devons, which were in camp,
commanded respectively by Captain W.B. Lafone, Lieutenant Masterson with
Lieutenant Walker, and Lieutenant Field, the whole commanded by
Lieutenant-Colonel Park, had been ordered to proceed to the camp near
Iron Bridge vacated that morning by the Gordon Highlanders, to be ready
as a reserve if wanted.
At about 3.30 p.m. these three companies received orders to proceed at
once to Wagon Hill to reinforce Colonel Ian Hamilton's command and to
push on, as help was urgently required. The Adjutant, Captain H.S.L.
Ravenshaw, was sent back to camp to order rations and water to be sent
out. Wagon Hill was reached at 4.45 p.m., and it was then ascertained
that the 5th Lancers and 19th Hussars had already been merged into the
firing line, and that a party of forty or fifty Boers were still in
possession of the hill some 100 yards in front of the ridge held by the
Imperial Light Horse, and directly in front of where the three companies
were then halted under cover, that these Boers had been holding on all
day there and inflicting great loss, and that our troops had been unable
to dislodge them. Colonel Park was asked if he could turn them out by
rushing them with the bayonet. He answered, "We will try." After the
three companies had been formed up in column with bayonets fixed and
magazines charged, Colonel Park gave the order to advance at fifty paces
interval in quick time, and when the top of the ridge was reached to
charge the position occupied by the Boers.
The charge took place in a blinding hail-storm, a time well chosen, as
the hail was beating into the faces of the Boers. The men, before
reaching the place where they formed up for the charge, were wet
through, and had put on their warm coats which they had carried strapped
on to their belts.
When the storm was at its height, Colonel Park gave the order to charge.
Lieutenant Field, who commanded the leading company, rushed forward up
the slope, shouting, "Company, double charge!" He was immediately
followed at a distance of about ten yards by Masterson's company, which
was immediately followed by Lafone's. As they got to the top of the
crest they came in view of the sangar of rocks held by the I.L.H. At the
corner of this they had to change direction half right, and the moment
they reached it came under fire from the Boers. There was necessarily
some crowding at this corner, owing to the change of direction, and the
fact that the companies in their eagerness had followed so soon the one
behind the other. There was, however, no halting, no dwelling here. On
they went to reach their goal, 130 yards away, over perfectly flat open
ground, fired into at short range from right, left, and front.
Three-parts of the way across Park directed the rear company more to the
right, the position the Boers occupied being in a semicircle.
[Illustration: Lieut.-Colonel C.W. Park]
The enemy held on, firing most heavily, until the charging lines were
within fifteen yards of them, and then ran down the slope and
disappeared behind a ridge of rocks some forty yards ahead, beyond which
the ground was dead and fell steeply away to the front. Almost before
the men could be secured in the position they had won, bullets began to
come in quickly from the right and left, and the cover of the rocks had
to be sought as several men were hit. A few of the Boers who had been
dislodged also crept back to the low ridge of rocks in front and began
firing, and it was at this time that Captain Lafone and Lieutenant Field
were hit. Lieutenant Walker, Somerset Light Infantry, and about
thirty-five men were hit during the charge. Colonel Park was then the
only officer left, the three companies being commanded by
non-commissioned officers.
Lieutenant Walker was one of the last shot dead in the charge. He was
shot through the head (as were most of the killed) within fifteen yards
of the kopje held by the Boers.
Lieutenant Field rushed forward beyond this kopje and lay down in the
open and commenced firing at the Boers at the crest just in front. He
was very shortly afterwards shot through the head.
Captain Lafone was shot shortly before Lieutenant Field. He was in the
act of firing at the time, taking aim, and was shot by a Boer lying in
the grass some twenty-five yards away on his right rear. Before he was
killed he had suggested to Lieutenant Masterton that some one should go
back to the I.L.H. sangar to ask them to direct their fire on to some
Boers on the left front; these were firing into the dead and wounded who
had been hit during the charge and left out in the open.
Lieutenant Masterton at once volunteered, and started to run back over
the 130 yards. He got most of the way across when he was hit in the legs
by a bullet, but he continued his course, and being struck again fell,
and was dragged behind cover by the I.L.H. He delivered his message.
The position won was held until the Boers retired under cover of
darkness. The men were then placed in defensive positions, and picquets
told off.
The wounded were subsequently cared for, and the dead left where they
had fallen till daylight.
Colonel Park described the fire of the Boers as like the crackle of a
piece of gorse in a blazing fire. Colour-Sergeant Palmer, who so greatly
distinguished himself both during and after the charge, said the air was
hot with bullets. His rifle was shot in two at the lower band as he was
taking aim, splinters grazing his face and hands. Half the survivors had
their clothing shot through, and the majority of the killed were found
to have been hit two or three times.
The strength of the force was 5 officers and 184 non-commissioned
officers and men, of whom 3 officers and 14 men were killed and 1
officer and 34 men were wounded.
Although the loss was great, viz. nearly one-third of the total number,
it is a matter of surprise that more were not hit during the run of 130
yards, exposed as they were for about three minutes to magazine fire at
a point-blank range. It can be accounted for by the fact that the Boers
crouching behind the rocks were rather below than above the level of the
men, and their fire being consequently directed upwards, the bullets
passed high and over the heads of the charging companies. This would
explain why the majority of the killed were shot through the head.
Lieutenant Walker was hit in the chin, the bullet cutting his chin-strap
and passing out at the back and top of his head.
The following morning, as the men were collecting and parading
preparatory to marching back to the railway cutting, Sir George White
rode up and addressed them. Shaking Colonel Park by the hand he said: "I
congratulate and thank you for the splendid work you and your men did
yesterday. It was magnificently done. I am afraid you suffered very
heavily, but you must remember that such work as that cannot be done for
the Empire without loss."
Whilst the three companies were performing such gallant deeds on the
southern defences, the three companies under Major Curry were holding
their own on the north-west defences at Observation Hill.
The Boers attacked this post heavily in the morning, and were supported
by six field-guns, which were supposed to have been the Colenso guns of
General Buller's army, shrapnel being continually burst with excellent
precision over the defences.
[Illustration: Naval Battery Hill, Ladysmith]
[Illustration: Monument Erected to Devons on Wagon Hill, on Spot Where
the Charge Took Place, Ladysmith]
The account of the fighting which took place is told in Major Curry's
own words:--
"The battle of Ladysmith commenced between 2 and 3 a.m. on Cæsar's Camp
and soon we were engaged all round. The three companies which had
proceeded to Observation Hill originally had just been relieved by three
fresh companies. At about 4 a.m. Lieutenant Emerson reported to me that
there was a party of Boers to his front, that he had fired on them, and
that they had retired. I thought it was the usual picquet and that they
had gone right back (it was too dark to see much); but such was not the
case, for they had concealed themselves in a fold in the ground about
300 yards to our front. Their strength must have been between seventy
and eighty.
"The enemy brought fire to bear on us from a 40-pounder howitzer, a
field-gun, and a hotchkiss on Surprise Hill, and from one or two
field-guns on the hill to our right over Hyde's Farm. They pounded away
all the morning, and brought a continuous rifle fire on our position as
well. At about 9.30 a.m. I heard a rattle of musketry from our centre
work, and when I went up there I found that the enemy, who had concealed
themselves in the fold in the ground in the early morning, had advanced
right up the hill and had got within a few yards of our sangars before
being seen. We killed nine and wounded twelve. They retired again to
their cover, where they remained for the greater part of the day,
slipping away by ones and twos back to their position. At about 4 p.m. a
tremendous thunder and hail storm came on, which blotted out everything.
The fire, which had ceased as the storm came on, was not renewed. Our
loss was two killed by rifle fire, when the Boers made their attack. Our
sangars were frequently breached by the 40-lb. shell during the day, but
there was no loss from shell fire."
These three companies were relieved by the Leicesters the next evening.
Lieutenant Masterson was rewarded with the Victoria Cross, and the
following is the official account of his gallant deed:--
"During the action at Wagon Hill, on the 6th January, 1900, Lieutenant
Masterson commanded with the greatest gallantry and dash one of the
three companies of his regiment, which charged a ridge held by the
enemy, and captured the position.
"The companies were then exposed to a most heavy and galling fire from
the right and left front. Lieutenant Masterson undertook to give a
message to the Imperial Light Horse, who were holding a ridge some
hundred yards behind, to fire to the left front and endeavour to check
the enemy's fire.
"In taking this message he crossed an open space of a hundred yards,
which was swept by a most heavy cross fire, and although badly wounded
in both thighs managed to crawl in and deliver his message before
falling exhausted into the Imperial Light Horse trench. His unselfish
heroism was undoubtedly the means of saving several lives."
The gallant conduct of Colour-Sergeant Palmer was brought to notice
under the following circumstances: When three companies of the Regiment
were ordered to charge the ridge held by the enemy on Wagon Hill on
January 6th, 1900, Colour-Sergeant Gilbert Palmer was with the leading
company, and he at once dashed out to the front with most conspicuous
bravery, and went straight for the point from which the heaviest fire
was coming. The enemy ran before they were reached, but the three
companies were exposed to a galling fire from the right, left, and
front. Colour-Sergeant Palmer got behind a rock and shot several of the
enemy, at the same time keeping a constant eye upon his own men, telling
them when and where to fire, and when to take cover. When all the
company officers were either killed or wounded, he at once recognized
his position as senior non-commissioned officer, and was invaluable in
getting orders passed to the other companies, and in superintending the
men till dark, when the enemy retired. He then, acting under orders,
personally placed the outpost line, saw to the collection of the dead
and wounded, and, in fact, rendered invaluable assistance in every way.
His dash and pluck during the bayonet charge, his coolness and steady
courage under a heavy cross fire, and the power of command and of quick
and correct judgment displayed by him were most brilliant.
Colour-Sergeant Palmer's name was previously brought to notice for
gallant conduct at the battle of Elandslaagte on October 21st, 1899, so
that this made the second occasion on which he conspicuously
distinguished himself.
The names of the following non-commissioned officers and men were also
brought to notice for gallantry on the occasion:--
Lance-Corporal Gilbert Young.
" " Frank John Rowe.
Private Henry Brimmicombe.
" R.G. Hansford.
" E. Norman.
" H. Cox.
The following message from Her Majesty the Queen was received by Sir
George White for promulgation:--
"To Sir George White,
"Ladysmith.
"Warmly congratulate you and all under your command on your brilliant
success. Greatly admire conduct of Devonshire Regiment.
V.R.I."
The following telegram was also received:--
"O/C Devon Regiment,
"Railway Cutting.
"G.O.C. directs me to convey direct to you the following message from
Sir R. Buller:--
"'Congratulate all troops on gallant defence, especially Devon
Regiment.'"
The losses sustained by the garrison of Ladysmith on the 6th January
were:--
Killed. Wounded.
Officers 18 25
Men 150 224
Total killed and wounded, 417.
By the death of Captain Lafone the Regiment lost one of the
kindest-hearted and best officers that ever led a company.
The Boers' losses are estimated at 64 killed and 119 wounded. This
estimate may be considered low, for the _Standard and Diggers' News_,
copies of which were found later on in the war, gave six full-length
columns of killed and wounded amongst the various commandos.
A large donga was utilized by the Boers as a dressing station. The
violent storm on the afternoon of the 6th filled all the dry dongas and
turned them at once into mountain torrents. It is said that all the
wounded Boers in this donga were swept out into the Klip River and
drowned. The dead of the Regiment were buried with those of other
regiments, in a grave under Wagon Hill. Captain Lafone and Lieutenant
Field were buried in the cemetery in Ladysmith.
On the morning of January 8th all the wounded were sent by train to
Intombi Camp, including Lieutenant Masterson, who was doing well.
On January 9th the Regiment was concentrated at the railway cutting, the
company at the railway station having been permanently relieved from the
post by a company of the Liverpool Regiment. The battalion was thus
ready to be moved to any portion of the defences requiring assistance,
in case of attack.
The estimation in which the battalion was held at this time by the
Ladysmith garrison was well borne out by a remark made by Sir George
White. "The Devons," he said, "have never failed me yet. On the 6th they
held one place and took another."
A scare in the evening that the Boers were to attack again in the
morning caused various preparations to be made for their advent. The
garrison stood to arms at 3.15 a.m. awaiting the attack.
It is a curious fact that the Regiment was never ordered to stand to
arms in the morning before three o'clock at any time previous to or
after the 6th January, and the only time the Boers made a night attack
they did so at 2.15 a.m. This was on January 6th, on which day the
Regiment was ordered to stand to arms at 4.15 a.m.
During the night of January 9th-10th the naval guns fired in the
direction of Surprise Hill, and whilst this was proceeding the mountain
battery's two remaining guns also threw some star shell in the same
direction. The Boers were hugely elated at the sight of the star shell.
This was probably the first time they had seen them. They turned their
searchlight on to the stars when they fell on the ground, and cheered
lustily. They evidently considered that it was a performance got up for
their special entertainment by Messrs. Brock and Co., direct from the
Crystal Palace.
The cause of all this shell fire was not known, but it would appear as
if information had been received that the Boers had been collecting at
the back of Surprise Hill the evening before, with a view to a renewed
attack. Nothing, however, in the shape of an attack occurred, and at 3
a.m. firing ceased, and the sun rose in the morning in tranquillity.
On the 11th three messages were received by the garrison congratulating
them on their good work of January 6th: one from the Governor of Natal,
one from Valparaiso, and one from General Buller. The last named stated
in his telegram that he would relieve Ladysmith as soon as possible.
It was stated that Sir George White had heliographed to Sir Redvers
Buller informing him that there were over 2000 sick and wounded in
Intombi Hospital Camp, that he could not hold out for much longer, and
that he must not expect any assistance from him when he made his effort.
Sir Redvers Buller had replied that he was sparing no effort to push
forward, and that he hoped to be ready soon.
The number of patients in the Intombi Hospital Camp had increased by
January 10th to--
Over 400 cases of dysentery;
" 600 cases of enteric fever;
" 200 cases not yet diagnosed, but probably enteric fever;
" 800 cases wounded and various.
The daily rations of the garrison now consisted of 1/2 lb. of tinned
meat and 1 lb. of bread per man.
Had it not been for the Indian Contingent there would have been no flour
at all in Ladysmith. All the flour, all the rum, in fact almost
everything that the garrison lived upon with the exception of meat, was
brought from India with the Indian Contingent, which carried with it six
months' supply of every description.
From January 12th, another duty assigned to the Regiment was the sending
of two companies every morning at two o'clock to the examining guard on
the Newcastle road, which was situated just under the 4.7 naval gun
"Lady Anne." They had orders to stop there till 4.30 a.m. to check any
rush of Boers into Ladysmith down the Newcastle road. Later on, the
ground in front of this post was covered with barbed wire entanglement,
but up to this time there was nothing at this point to prevent the Boers
galloping right into the town.
[Illustration: A Peaceful Sunday]
[Illustration: Klip River and Camp of the Imperial Light Horse,
Ladysmith]
As these two companies went to their places on the 12th, the Boer
searchlight on Bulwana was flashing everywhere, and the mountain guns
throwing star shell. It looked as if both sides expected an attack. The
officer commanding the two companies had orders to operate on the flank
of any attack made on the northern defences.
On the following morning the garrison was told that General Buller was
moving round by Springfield; in the evening it was given out that he was
moving west of Chieveley and Colenso, and was twelve miles from
Ladysmith; and on the 14th the news came in that he was at Potgieter's
Drift, and that General Warren was across the Tugela River; and in
confirmation of this last information heavy gun fire was heard on the
17th in the direction of Potgieters, and the relieving army's balloon
was seen on the following day in the same direction.
As an attack was expected on the night of the 19th on Observation Hill,
three companies of the Regiment under Major Curry proceeded there in the
evening and bivouacked, the remainder of the Regiment being under orders
to hold themselves in readiness to proceed there at a moment's notice.
The night, however, passed quietly, and the companies returned to their
camp before dawn.
On January 20th better news was received from Sir Redvers Buller; his
advance had been very satisfactory. Reports stated that he had reached
Acton Holmes, and that four brigades had crossed the Tugela. His shells
were seen falling thickly on Thabba Nyama mountain.
The tea and sugar rations were, however, cut down to half. The health of
the men began now to generally improve, probably owing to better
drinking water which was obtainable from the condenser, recently
arranged for, at the railway station.
Very heavy gun fire, night and day, was continually heard from the
direction of Spion Kop and Acton Holmes, and on the 23rd a demonstration
was made from Ladysmith, the mounted troops going out under cover of the
fire of all the guns. The Ladysmith guns on all the fronts opened, but
were answered only by the Boer guns on Gun Hill and Bulwana. There was
but little musketry fire from Pepworth direction, and Surprise Hill
seemed deserted.
Still no relief appeared, and the rations were:--
12 oz. of beef,
1 lb. of bread.
Half ration of sugar.
Half ration of tea.
An order published on the 23rd gave hope:--
"Sir George White has received further satisfactory news as to Sir R.
Buller's advance. The relief of Ladysmith may be said to be within
measurable distance."
Very heavy gun fire was heard from 3 a.m. on the 24th till 2 p.m., and
in the evening further encouragement was circulated:--
"Reassuring news has been received from Sir R. Buller."
No news from the relieving army was received on the 25th. Heavy firing
continued, and in the evening the Boers were seen trekking from the
direction of Spion Kop, all the laagers on the rear slopes of the
mountain clearing off and making for Vanreenen's Pass and Newcastle. In
fact, the whole country round Spion Kop seemed about to be hurriedly
abandoned by the Boers. Great excitement prevailed in Ladysmith.
An investigation of the slopes of Spion Kop through the glasses at
daybreak on the following morning proved, however, disappointing, for
the laagers which had cleared off the night before were back again in
their places. Moreover, the Boers round Ladysmith were very truculent on
the morning of the 26th, which necessitated the garrison standing to
arms till 6 a.m.
Prices at the weekly auction had gone up considerably.
Two vegetable marrows were sold for 5s. 6d.
Pumpkins fetched 2s. 6d. each.
A small plate of potatoes reached 11s.
Whilst four sticks (4 oz.) of black tobacco, "Fair-maid" brand, changed
hands at £5 10s.
From now till the end of the siege two companies of the Regiment were
moved to a healthier spot, known as the "Convalescent Camp." It was
situated at the eastern end of Convent Hill. This post was relieved
weekly, and as the men were concealed and in a healthier position the
change was much appreciated.
On the morning of January 27th a native runner brought in news. His
account was:--
"Boers lost heavily from artillery fire on Wednesday, and say that the
British artillery is too much for them. I saw six field cornets dead on
one wagon. Some English were taken prisoners, and they were from the
left flank attack. The English attacked Spion Kop and surrounded the
base of the hill, and the Boers lost heavily from the English shrapnel
fire. When the English got to the top of the hill the Boers ran down the
other side. The Boers are much disheartened by their losses."
Judging from the above, the native must have then run away and not have
waited to see the finish, for in the evening the following news came
in:--
"Buller attacked Spion Kop, seized and occupied it, but was driven off
again the next night. Our loss is estimated at 200 killed and 300
wounded."
With the knowledge that history has given the world about the battle of
Spion Kop, further comment is needless. The news above is given as it
was received by the garrison of Ladysmith, who of course knew nothing
but what was sent in in scraps by Sir Redvers Buller, and what came in
to the Intelligence Department by native runners.
On the 30th the daily ration was further cut down to 1/2 lb. of meat, 2
biscuits, 1/6 oz. of tea, and 1/2 oz. of sugar per man. Horses, except
those belonging to the artillery, went rationless.
On January 31st horse-flesh was issued for the first time as a ration.
One dozen whisky was raffled in the town, and fetched £144--£1 10s. per
wineglass!
The only news received from the outside world on February 2nd was that--
"Sir R. Buller has retired behind the Tugela to rearrange, and Sir John
Lubbock has been made a peer."
The question asked is, Who is Lubbock, and is he connected in any way
with the evacuation of Spion Kop?
Some say that the news is the wrong way about, and that Lubbock has
retired and Sir R. Buller been made a peer. Confirmation of the news was
anxiously awaited.
Whichever way it was, in the face of the evacuation of Spion Kop it was
poor news to feed a half-starved and anxious garrison on. However, in
the meantime the big gun on Bulwana had fired his great shells into the
Railway Cutting Camp and killed the doctor's horse.
About this time a decoction called "chevril" was issued to the men. It
was supplied by the 18th Hussars' horses, whose bodies were boiled down
for the purpose. It was nourishing and the men liked it, which was a
good thing. There was nothing else by which to recommend it. The men
were also allowed to go down to the chevril factory, which was close to
the station, and buy the flesh of the horse after it had passed through
the boiling process. This did not appear appetizing, but again the men
liked it, and when cooked up with wild spinach which grew about the
lines it was considered very tasty.
Two items of news were received on February 4th, one being that General
Buller had again crossed the Tugela in three places and was to be
expected shortly, and the other that the garrison of Ladysmith was to be
attacked again next morning by 10,000 Boers. Arrangements were made to
meet the latter, the arrival of the former being considered
hypothetical. The garrison stood to arms at three o'clock the following
morning and anxiously awaited the dawn, but everything went off quietly,
and at 5.30 a.m. General Buller's guns commenced in three different
directions. The sound of the heavy gun fire increased in intensity, till
at 2.30 p.m. the noise could be compared to a heavy storm with incessant
thunder.
The Regiment was now told off as part of a flying column. This was
hopeful, as it was supposed that arrangements were being made to
co-operate with the relieving army.
At 5.15 a.m. on the 5th Buller's guns began firing again and continued
the whole day.
For the next few days there was no news from the outside world. Buller's
guns were heard incessantly, and one Boer big gun was seen firing on
Dornkloof, south of Manger's Hill. A few of Buller's lyddite shells were
bursting near him, and one shell was seen to strike his magazine and
explode it.
On the seventh night 100 men of the Regiment were again engaged in
shifting the 4.7 gun "Lady Anne."
On the 9th nothing was heard of Buller's guns--perfect silence!
This gave rise to all sorts of reports, one actually given out being
that Buller had taken his position and could come in at any time he
liked, but he had been stopped by a telegram from the Cape in order to
allow of Lord Roberts pushing up through the Free State; and then both
Buller and Roberts would relieve Ladysmith and take Bloemfontein
respectively on the same day. And this on the very day on which Buller
was retiring south of Tugela again from Vaal Krantz.
It was now considered advisable to strengthen the defences held by the
Regiment by an additional work, and the men were kept hard at it from
7.15 p.m. till 10 p.m. A dish of chevril was served out to each man of
the working party before turning in.
On February 13th information was received that Buller had taken two
positions on the north side of the Tugela with small loss--one Krantz
Kloof, and the other Vaal Krantz Spruit. This information seemed
somewhat belated. A message was also received from Lord Roberts in which
he stated that he had entered the Free State with a very large force,
chiefly of artillery and cavalry, and hoped that the pressure on
Ladysmith would shortly be reduced. Heavy gun fire commenced in the
Colenso direction on the night of February 14th, and continued with
slight interruption till the 18th; and on the 15th the Boer pompom was
heard in action, which went to show that the opposing forces were not
very far from each other.
At the last public auction ever held in the town, i.e. on the 14th
evening, the prices were:--
Eggs, 48s. per dozen.
Vegetable marrows, 28s. each.
Mealies, 3s. 8d. each.
Pot of jam, 32s. 6d.
Crosse & Blackwell's piccalilli, 19s. 6d.
Tin of ox tongue, 20s. 6d.
2 oz. stick of cake tobacco, 22s.
Fifty cigars, 10 guineas.
As much as 25s. per stick was paid about this time for two ounces of
cake tobacco. No Kaffir leaf tobacco was to be bought in the town,
although as much as £5 per leaf was offered.
On the 15th the Railway Cutting Camp again received the attention of the
Long Tom gunners on Bulwana, who pitched some shells into the lines, but
without doing damage.
The news of the relief of Kimberley was received by the garrison on
February 17th, and it was reported that General French had captured five
laagers.
On Sunday, the 18th, the battalion and 13th Battery, the remains of the
Gloucester Regiment, and the Mountain Battery assembled as usual under
"Liverpool Castle" for Divine service. The Reverend J. Tuckey
officiated. The usual "extermination" service and prayers for the
"Right" were said, the hymns chosen being--
There is a blessed home
Beyond this land of woe;
and
There is a green hill far away,
sung sadly to the accompaniment of Buller's guns.
He appears to be nearer, and his shells have been bursting on a hill and
ridge in the distance, Colenso way.
The following statistics are of interest:--
Early in November the garrison of Ladysmith numbered about 13,500 men.
During the siege there were over 10,500 admissions to hospital.
Thirty-eight men had been killed by shell fire, and 430 men had died of
disease. Four shells only had accounted for nearly all the thirty-eight.
On February 19th news was sent in that General Buller had captured
Cingolo Mountain and Monte Christo, and that excellent progress was
being made by him. The Boers were seen trekking north all day; and in
the evening Buller's heliographs were seen flashing from Monte Christo,
and two guns on the same hill firing at the Boers. With the exception of
Buller's heliograph and balloon this was the first occasion that the
relieving army was seen from Ladysmith.
On February 22nd, with the intention of finding out whether there had
been any reduction in the investing force, the Regiment with some
mounted infantry were ordered to reconnoitre in the direction of Flag
Hill. A start was made at 3.30 a.m. Some sixty Boers were encountered,
and the Regiment was ordered back to camp at 6.15 a.m., fired at by the
sixty Boers.
Buller's guns were heard firing incessantly all day and every day. His
shells were now seen bursting on a southern spur of Bulwana and near
Intombi Camp.
During the siege the Boers conceived the idea of flooding the Ladysmith
plain and the town by damming the Klip River below Intombi Camp. This
dam was commenced towards the end of the siege, but was not completed
when Ladysmith was relieved. It was a good target for the naval
12-pounder guns on Cæsar's Camp, which frequently fired at it. These in
their turn received on such occasions a good deal of attention from the
Boer big gun on Bulwana.
On the night of the 24th the 4.7 gun "Lady Anne" was again moved; this
was for the fourth and the last time. On the same night very heavy rifle
and Maxim gun fire was heard on the hills south of Cæsar's Camp. This
continued for about one hour, when the firing was taken up by the Boer
outposts all round Ladysmith, a few bullets reaching the Convalescent
Camp on Convent Hill.
February 27th being Majuba Day, the garrison, expecting a demonstration
from the Boers, stood to arms at 4.15 a.m., but, much to the
astonishment of everybody, not a shot was fired. General Buller sent the
garrison in the following message:--
"Colenso rail bridge, which was totally destroyed, is under repair; road
bridge partially destroyed; am doing very well, but the country is
difficult and my progress is slow; hope to be with you soon."
Official news was also received that Lord Roberts had surrounded Cronje,
who had surrendered with 4000 Boers, the English losses being given as
1700 killed and wounded.
On the 28th rations were further cut down to one biscuit and three
ounces of mealies, with one pound of horse as before per man. This was
perhaps the most distressing circumstance connected with the siege, and
it had a most depressing effect. It was not so much the reduction of the
ration that was of consequence, as the reason for the reduction. This
could not be guessed at, and it gave rise to conjectures, the chief
being that Buller had again failed, and could not get through. His
shells had been seen bursting on the hills, and that had encouraged the
garrison; but the garrison had been encouraged before by the sight of
Buller's shells bursting on Thabba Nyama. Three days previously, owing
to the good news received from Buller, the garrison had been put on full
rations, but now, after further good news, the order was promulgated:--
"Highly satisfactory reports have been sent from General Buller as to
his advance, but the country is difficult and progress slow, therefore I
am obliged to reduce the ration, etc. etc."
This sudden cancelling of the increase of the ration, and its still
further reduction in the face of the news received and in the sight of
Buller's shells, was disappointing. Having ascertained that the garrison
could exist till April 15th and not longer, and that then there would
not be a horse, ox, or mule left, Sir George White, much against his
will, but to make things certain in case General Buller was again
checked, gave the orders for the reduction on the day before the relief.
During the day the big gun on Bulwana made an attempt to reach
Observation Hill Post, which were the furthest works from him in that
direction. His attempt succeeded, and he put many shells into the works.
His record for the siege was an attempt to reach Wagon Hill. He failed
in this, but his range, as measured on the map, was 11,560 yards, or 6
miles and 1000 yards.
February 28th, the last day of the siege, was very hot and oppressive;
everybody seemed depressed, trying to guess at some reason for the
ration reduction. At about 2 p.m., however, Major Riddel, brigade-major
to Colonel Knox, came up to the officers' mess smiling all over, and
said that excellent news, the very best, had come in, but that "_it is
confidential, and I am not allowed to say what it is_." He called for
volunteers who were willing and able to march seven miles and fight at
the end of it. The whole Regiment, officers and men, volunteered, but
after a medical examination had been made of the battalion, only one
hundred men were found to come up to requirements.
At about 3.30 p.m. the news was distributed that General Buller had
gained a complete victory over the Boers, who were in full retreat.
Hundreds of wagons were seen going off north towards Modder Station and
Vanreenens, and at 4 p.m. a derrick was seen hoisted over the big gun on
Bulwana, and the naval guns opened fire on him. The Boers dismounted him
under a heavy fire from one 4.7 and two naval 12-pounders, and got him
away.
At 6.20 p.m. a welcome sight greeted the eyes of the weary garrison, for
suddenly out of the bush appeared two squadrons of mounted men, riding
leisurely in across the plain from the direction of Intombi, and the
truth dawned on the garrison that Ladysmith was at last and in reality
relieved.
The siege had lasted four calendar months to the day.
Frantic cheering greeted them as they crossed the ford and reached the
town.
On the following day a column, consisting of the Devons, Gordon
Highlanders, three batteries of artillery, all the cavalry who had
horses, and the two mounted colonial corps, the whole under the command
of Colonel W.G. Knox, sallied forth at 10 a.m. towards Modder Station to
pursue and to stop the Boers getting their big guns away by train. On
arriving abreast of Pepworth Hill, which the Boer rear-guard had
occupied, the advanced troops, consisting of Devons and the batteries,
came under rather a sharp fire. All further progress was stopped, and
the column returned to camp. The Devons had two men wounded. Camp was
reached at 4.30 p.m. The battalion was met on the way home by Major
Davies, Captains Bols and Vigors, Lieutenants Lafone and Munro, all of
the 2nd Battalion. These had ridden in from their camp, and brought with
them tobacco, whisky, rum, and milk. The companies of the 2nd Battalion
sent in to their corresponding companies tea, sugar, tobacco, matches,
etc. These were all most eagerly accepted.
Sir Redvers Buller and his staff rode into Ladysmith in the afternoon.
Explosions at Modder Station and on the railway could be heard,
signifying that the Boers were making good their retreat by blowing up
the bridges.
On March 3rd General Buller made his public entry into Ladysmith at the
head of his army. The march of Buller's army through Ladysmith was a
pageant which those who took part in the siege will never forget.
The garrison of Ladysmith lined the streets. Sir George White with his
staff took his stand mounted, under the damaged clock tower of the Town
Hall--the Gordons on the one hand, the Devons on the other--the Gordon
pipers facing him on the opposite side of the road.
It was a great sight, and those who had been through the siege and had
heard the words of their leader at the end, "Thank God we have kept the
flag flying," knew it for a great sight.
General Buller rode at the head of his army, and received an immense
ovation, as did all his regiments and artillery as they passed through
the lines of the weedy, sickly-looking garrison. These with their thin,
pale faces cheered to the full bent of their power, but after standing
in the sun for some time they became exhausted, and Sir Redvers sent
back word for them to sit down, which they gladly did, whilst the
relievers, as they passed along, chucked them bits of tobacco, ready cut
up, from their small store, small because they themselves were also hard
put for luxuries.
The tramp! tramp! of these men, who to the weakly garrison appeared as
veritable giants, will never be forgotten, as they hurried past to the
strains of the Gordons' pipes, cheering with the utmost enthusiasm the
figure of Sir George White as they passed him. They were almost to a man
reservists, well covered, hard, and well set up. They were filthy, their
clothes were mended and patched, and most of them had scrubby beards.
Tied on to their belts in almost all cases was a Boer blanket, telling
that they had been busy in some Boer laager; on the top of this a small
bundle of sticks for each man to cook his own tea, and by his side,
attached to his belt, hung his black tin pot. But how well they
looked--the picture of vigour, health, and strength, as they "tramp,
tramp"--"tramp, tramp" through the town.
A corps that came in for a good deal of notice was the Bearer Company.
They were at first taken for Boer prisoners, but when it became known
who they were they were much cheered. Clad in worn-out "slops" they
slouched along, in each man's hand a pot of sorts, enamel or china, and
a bundle of something over each man's shoulder.
The meeting of the two battalions was not quite so emotional as has been
depicted by some authors. The 2nd Battalion, the relievers, came through
late at the rear of Buller's army, and by that time the 1st Battalion,
the relieved, had been in the sun, standing or sitting down on the
curbstone, for some hours, and a great many men had fallen out
exhausted. Still the meeting was very hearty, officers recognizing men
and men old comrades. There was little time to enact the scene so
graphically described by one author "which would make old men weep."
Buller's army was straggled out a good deal and the rear had to catch
up, so if a pal was seen he was gone next moment to give way to another
pal. Most of the reservists had been through the ranks of the 1st
Battalion, and with it through the Tirah Campaign; almost all were
hurriedly recognized, and a hearty and hasty shake of the hand was all
the greeting exchanged. Old jokes came to the fore, and were bandied
from one to the other as the 2nd Battalion hurried along. There was no
time for more--one battalion was in a hurry and the other exhausted.
[Illustration: Devon Officers Remaining Fit For Duty At The End of the
Siege (Rajab--Regimental Barber)]
It was well on in the day before the 1st Battalion got back to its camp
at the Railway Cutting.
On Sunday, March 4th, a Thanksgiving Service was held on the flat ground
between the Convent Hill and the Naval Brigade Hill, which was attended
by Generals Buller and White, and on its conclusion the battalion moved
into tents outside the works and in front of Gloucester Post.
It was a strange experience moving out into the open, away from the
protection of the works. The nerves of most had had a severe strain from
want of food and continual anxiety.
It was the anxiety which killed. There is nothing more conducive to the
deterioration of men's minds than false alarms on an empty stomach.
CHAPTER III
EVENTS FOLLOWING THE SIEGE OF LADYSMITH, AND THE ADVANCE NORTH UNDER SIR
REDVERS BULLER
1900
The first few days following the relief were employed in the sorting and
reading of four months' mails and the opening up of presents. Many
complimentary telegrams were received by the battalion from England.
Major Davies, Captain Bartlett, and Lieutenant Willis, all of whom had
been doing duty with the 2nd Battalion during the relief operations,
joined the battalion on the 7th with some eighty-six men who had been
sent from Jullunder.
The two battalions were together for a few days only, as the 2nd
Battalion after a short rest proceeded with Sir Redvers Buller's force
towards Modder Spruit.
On March 10th the Ladysmith garrison was reorganized, the battalion
being placed in the 7th Brigade with the Gordon Highlanders, the
Manchester Regiment, and the 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade. This brigade
was commanded by Colonel W.G. Knox, C.B.
Colonel Park, unfortunately struck down with enteric fever on the last
day of the siege, was shortly afterwards invalided to England. In his
absence Major Davies took over command of the battalion, and Major Curry
having been appointed Commandant of Ladysmith, Captain Jacson took over
the duties of Second-in-Command. On March 14th the 7th Brigade marched
to Arcadia, seven miles out of Ladysmith on the Vanreenen's Pass road,
camping on a kopje overlooking Dewdrop Spruit. The men were then
occupied in route marching and generally getting fit.
[Illustration: Brigadier-General Walter Kitchener]
Brigadier-General Walter Kitchener arrived in camp on the 26th March and
took over the command of the 7th Brigade from Colonel Knox, and on April
2nd the battalion, accompanied by General W. Kitchener, marched to
Brakfontein, seventeen miles distant under Spion Kop, stopped there in
camp on the 3rd, when parties of men went off to view the Boer positions
on Spion Kop and Vaal-Krantz, and returned to Arcadia on the 4th.
Innumerable presents were continually arriving from England for the
battalion, and the thanks of all are due especially to Mr. Young of
Torquay for the indefatigable manner in which he worked, and for the
numerous bundles and boxes of presents which he was instrumental in
collecting and dispatching both at this time and also afterwards. All
these presents were highly appreciated.
A draft of 180 men, consisting of reservists, section "D" Militia
Reservists, and recruits joined the battalion on the 7th; amongst these
were 120 married men.
At 11.30 a.m. on April 11th orders were received to move at once into
Ladysmith, which was to be reached at 2 p.m. The reason for the sudden
move was not explained. There was no transport. Out of six wagons, the
complement for a battalion on light field service scale, there were only
two in camp at the time. At Arcadia the battalion, in common with the
rest of the brigade, was allowed tents, and told that it could have
anything it liked to take with it. There was consequently a good deal
more than six carts could carry.
Towards evening, after the tents had been struck, packed, and sent on
ahead, and the battalion was waiting in the open for more wagons, a most
violent thunderstorm came on, lasting about two hours. Ten men of one
company which was holding a work on Rifleman's Ridge, between Arcadia
and Ladysmith, were struck by lightning, none, however, being killed.
The battalion eventually reached camp at Star Hill, just above the iron
bridge outside Ladysmith, at 3 a.m. wet to the skin. It was found that
the tents had arrived. These were pitched and the men turned in. The
greater part of the brigade did not reach Star Hill till the following
day.
On the 13th the Gordons and Devons moved camp to Hyde's Farm under
Surprise Hill, the Devons proceeding next day to a camp under
Thornhill's Kopje, throwing out picquets on that hill and also on
another kopje further out towards Nicholson's Nek known as Devon Kopje.
From this time till May 15th the battalion remained quietly encamped
under Thornhill's Kopje. Route marching and field days occupied the men
most mornings, hockey and football most afternoons. The men suffered a
good deal at first from jaundice, which was chiefly the result of
over-eating after their long abstinence, but they got fit and recovered
their strength gradually; it was, however, fully six weeks to two months
before they were really ready to take the field.
In the meantime General Buller had turned the Biggarsberg, and the Boers
had fallen back on Laing's Nek.
The 7th Brigade now formed part of the 4th Division under the command of
Major-General Neville Lyttleton, and on May 16th the Regiment was
ordered to proceed north to Modder's Spruit. Here it remained till the
20th, on which day it continued its march to Elandslaagte, and encamped
near the railway station. On the 23rd, having handed in all tents and
excess baggage, the Regiment marched to Sunday's River, where it joined
up with the divisional head-quarters, and on the following day formed
the rear-guard on the march to Black Craig Farm. Here the division
encamped in the heart of the Biggarsberg.
Halting at Kalabis on the 25th, the division reached Ingagane on the
26th.
[Illustration: Railway Bridge Destroyed by Boers, Ingagane]
The brigade was now split up and placed on the line of communications,
and it was thought probable that the Regiment would see no more fighting
and that the war would soon be brought to a conclusion. Of the four
regiments in the brigade, the Manchester Regiment had been left behind
to garrison Jonono's Kop and the railway line near Elandslaagte, the
Devons were left to garrison Ingagane on the railway, and the Rifle
Brigade was at Newcastle and between that place and Ingogo at the foot
of the Laing's Nek pass. The Gordon Highlanders were at Ingogo and
guarded the railway line still further north.
The Regiment itself was also split up. A detachment of one company under
Captain Travers (increased afterwards to two companies) proceeded to
occupy Dannhauser, and two companies under Captain Bartlett were ordered
to Rooi Pint on the high ground between Ingagane and Newcastle. A
battery of artillery was also stationed at this place.
The remaining companies of the Regiment, including a 9th or K company
which had been created shortly after the siege, were posted on the low
hill overlooking Ingagane railway station.
On June 4th the 1st Cavalry Brigade arrived to form part of the garrison
of Ingagane. This brigade was commanded by Brigadier-General Burn
Murdoch, who was in charge of the line of communication
Newcastle-Dannhauser.
At Ingagane Hill the Regiment found itself again employed in building
stone walls. Entrenchments against attack were considered necessary, for
it was thought probable that the Boers would attempt to break through
from the north-east of the Free State on the west and cross into Utrecht
and Vryheid districts. The real danger, however, lay on the east, for
the Vryheid district long remained a Boer stronghold, and parties of
Boers frequently raided to the Blood River in the immediate
neighbourhood of Dannhauser.
It was owing to this that on June 15th a second company was sent to
reinforce Captain Travers at Dannhauser. The hill selected by Captain
Travers for defence overlooked Dannhauser railway station, and commanded
a large extent of ground to the east of the post. This hill was very
strongly fortified, and the works on it, designed and built by Captain
Travers and his men, were perhaps the best works for protection against
musketry fire constructed by the Regiment during the war.
[Illustration: Making Barbed-Wire Entanglement, Ingagane]
News was received daily that thousands of Boers with dozens of guns were
on the eastern flank, with every intention of raiding, cutting the line,
and attacking Dannhauser. Dundee also, according to the newspapers and
the evidence of native scouts, was in deadly peril from attack by Chris.
Botha. It was, perhaps, on account of these rumours that a column was
formed to reconnoitre Utrecht. In conjunction with another column which
moved out from Ingogo, three companies of the Regiment, with the Royal
Dragoons and the 5th Dragoon Guards and two field guns, moved out on the
afternoon of July 1st from Ingagane and camped at Tundega Farm. On the
following morning Tundega Hill was occupied by the infantry whilst the
cavalry reconnoitred over the Buffalo River to Utrecht, which was
distant twenty miles. This place was found occupied by about four
hundred Boers, and after some skirmishing and a good deal of firing the
cavalry returned with a loss of one Royal Dragoon taken prisoner. Next
morning the force returned to Ingagane. The operations were supposed to
have been very successful.
By the end of July the Regiment had quite recovered tone and vigour, and
was well and fit for any work, and on August 2nd, 1900, orders were
received to pack up and proceed by rail the following day to Zandspruit.
On the afternoon of the 3rd the Regiment entrained in coal trucks for
the north. Majuba and Laing's Nek were passed next morning at dawn, and
at 7.30 a.m. Zandspruit was reached.
The strength of the battalion was now 938 of all ranks. All tents and
excess baggage had been returned to store, and on the 6th the Regiment
marched to Meerzicht, where the remainder of General Lyttleton's 4th
Division was found in bivouac. The 4th Division was now complete and
ready to march north with Sir Redvers Buller.
General Buller's force moved out from Meerzicht on August 7th. For some
days previously the Boers had been occupying in force some high ground
known as Rooi Kopjes, a few miles north of Meerzicht, and the Gordon
Highlanders had already twice been slightly engaged with them. The 7th
Brigade advanced out of their camp in attack formation, the Gordons
leading the advance, the Devons in support. Their objective was the Rooi
Kopjes. These were found unoccupied, and, having gained the summit, the
7th Brigade were ordered to make a sweep round to the right.
The new objective was the high ground above Amersfoort. General Buller's
line now occupied some five miles of front. A very high wind was
blowing, and it was not for some time that the Head-quarter Staff, who
at the time were with the 7th Brigade, knew that the artillery of the
8th Brigade, which had marched direct on Amersfoort, were in action,
firing at some Boer guns mounted on the Amersfoort Hills. The Boers were
strongly entrenched on these hills to the number of about 3000 to 4000
with fourteen guns under Chris. Botha and D. Joubert. The 7th Brigade
advanced across a large undulating plain, the Devons leading. The
Gordons had been sent round to the left to support Dundonald's Mounted
Brigade, who had been checked by some fifty Boers. About 6000 yards from
the position Boer shells began to fall among the companies of the
leading battalion. One half battalion under Major Davies thereupon
opened out and advanced, while the other half battalion was sent to the
left under Captain Jacson, with orders to proceed as rapidly as possible
to the assistance of the Gordon Highlanders, who, it was reported, were
being heavily threatened by the Boers on the extreme left. With the
exception of some shell fire the main advance was continued unopposed.
The left half battalion of the Regiment had to make a very long detour,
and on its arrival to the assistance of the Gordons it was found that
the Boer force, which was threatening the left flank, was simply
Dundonald's mounted troops drawing up stationary behind some rising
ground.
After a stiff climb the summit of the Amersfoort Hills was reached just
before dark.
It was found that the Boers had evacuated their position, on their left
flank and rear being threatened by the 8th Brigade. The leading
battalion of this brigade, the 60th Rifles, came under some heavy
musketry fire from the houses in the town, and after several casualties,
which included four officers, Major Campbell, commanding the 60th,
threatened to burn the town if the firing was not discontinued. The
firing then ceased, and the Boers retired to the hills north of the
town.
The Boers had set fire to the long dry grass in every direction, and it
was chiefly by the light of these fires that regiments, companies, and
parties of mounted men found their way off the hill on a pitch-dark
night.
No orders had been circulated as to where the force was to halt and
bivouac for the night, and from every direction various bodies of men
groped their way in the dark towards the town, in the hopes that when
once there some orders might be obtained. It was late when the half
battalion under Captain Jacson found its bivouac and joined hands again
with that of Major Davies just outside the town. One company came in
later, having unfortunately lost its way in the dark.
Some of the leading wagons of the transport, which had been sent along
the direct road from Meerzicht to Amersfoort, broke down in a bad drift,
thus blocking the remainder. No wagons arrived in Amersfoort that night,
and the men after their long tramp, a continuous march without a halt
from 7.30 a.m. till about 8.30 at night, were without greatcoats or
blankets. The night was bitterly cold, with a hard frost. Gangs of men
went down to the town and brought back wood. Soon fires began to light
up in the Devons' and Gordons' bivouacs, which were adjoining, and for
the remainder of the night groups of men sat round them trying to keep
warm. The four companies of the Regiment on outpost duty suffered very
severely, as they were without fires, none being allowed in the outpost
line.
The force halted at Amersfoort on the following day, owing firstly to
the fog which enveloped everything, and secondly to allow of the baggage
train coming up. This began to arrive at 10 a.m., having been detained
at the drift the whole night.
During the fog a few Boers came down from the high ground above the
river and fired into the horses watering, at very close range. They
failed, however, to do any damage.
On August 9th the army continued its advance. On leaving Amersfoort, a
bad drift with a steep climb of half a mile on the further side was met
with, and the baggage was formed into two columns. This was assisted up
the hill by two companies of the Regiment, Sir Redvers Buller personally
superintending. Klippaal Drift was reached late in the afternoon after a
difficult march of ten miles.
General Buller's army was now on the high veldt in winter time. The cold
was intense, especially at night, when there were several degrees of
frost. Owing to the intense cold, two men of the Rifle Brigade died from
exposure during the night.
[Illustration: The Baggage of General Buller's Army Crossing Beginderlyn
Bridge]
On the following day the force continued its march to Beginderlyn
Bridge. This was found intact, and there was no opposition, and the
march was resumed on the 11th as far as Kleinfontein. On August 12th
Ermelo was occupied, and a few of the leading Boers belonging to the
place surrendered.
So far, and until Twyfelaar was reached, Buller's army received little
or no opposition from the Boers. Chris. Botha, who had occupied
Amersfoort, had retired east after evacuating that place, and was
marching parallel to the British force and at a distance of about ten
miles on its right flank. They were evidently watching Buller, probably
thinking that he would turn east towards Piet Retief, where almost all
their stock, sheep, and cattle had been driven, the mountainous and
difficult country there being suitable for its concealment and
protection.
The main body of the Boers was concentrated between Belfast and
Machadodorp, north-east of Twyfelaar, in a country eminently suited for
what was considered their final effort. The valley of the Komati River
was exceedingly difficult country for the British army to operate over.
The Boers to the end of the war were very fond of this country, and it
was there, or in the vicinity towards Lake Chrissie, that several
engagements took place later on, during the guerilla stage of the war,
not always in favour of the British.
The town of Ermelo, which the Regiment was destined to see again on
several future occasions, was left on August 13th, on the evening of
which day the force reached Klipfontein. The Regiment, being rear-guard,
did not reach its bivouac till after dark. Witbank was reached the
following day, and communication was opened up with General French's
column, fifteen miles to the north-west. Carolina could be seen eight
miles away to the north-east.
The force marched next day to Twyfelaar, and here a halt was made till
August 21st, in order to allow of Lord Roberts's army, which was
advancing east from Pretoria along the Lorenzo Marques railway, joining
hands with General Buller's army.
The rear-guard of the force was attacked by the Boers on August 21st on
its march from Twyfelaar to Van Wycks Vlei. The Gordon Highlanders lost
nine killed and eight wounded, and the Liverpool Mounted Infantry eight
killed.
On the following morning a force consisting of Devons, Manchesters,
Gordons, South African Light Horse, one field battery, and the
howitzers, advanced from Van Wycks Vlei under General W. Kitchener, for
the purpose of reconnoitring and driving some Boers off the hills east
of General Buller's camp, so that the road for the next day's march
might be cleared of the enemy. A large number of Boers was seen in the
direction of Carolina, and it was supposed that Chris. Botha's force was
opposed to the column. The Manchester Regiment led the advance,
supported by the Devon Regiment. The former, on crossing a nek to a low
underlying hill, came under a heavy rifle fire from the Boers below and
across the valley, and lost two killed and nine wounded. The force
returned to camp at 6 p.m.
On the following day Buller's army advanced to Geluk, some five or six
miles, the battalion with the Gordons and mounted troops of Dundonald's
Brigade, acting as rear-guard. A very difficult spruit, with steep
sides, was crossed, and the high hills on the further side occupied.
These had been held by the Boers in strength, but they had retired on
Buller's approach. As soon as the infantry of the rear-guard had arrived
in camp, the mounted troops of the rear-guard were attacked rather
sharply, but they managed to hold their own and to beat off the Boers.
Two companies of the Liverpool Regiment, who formed part of the advance
guard, fell into an ambush and lost considerably, leaving, it was
reported, some eighty men either killed, wounded, or prisoners in the
hands of the Boers. Shortly after arrival in camp, five companies of the
Regiment were sent out on outpost duty, taking up a short line and
entrenching--two companies were entrenched in front and furnished
sentries, with three companies entrenched in rear in support.
On August 24th and 25th the force stood fast, exchanging occasional big
gun and musketry fire with the Boers. Information was received that Lord
Roberts had entered Belfast on the 24th, thus practically joining hands
with Sir Redvers Buller.
The position taken up by the Boers already referred to, an immensely
powerful one, straddled the Pretoria-Lorenzo railway east of Belfast and
west of Machadodorp. Botha had taken up a front of some fifty miles in
length, and his force numbered about 5000 men. His right rested on the
broken mountainous country of Elandskloof to the north, and his left on
the mountains overlooking the Komati to the south. His centre was at
Bergendal Farm and the rugged and precipitous hills in the rear of the
farm, through which wound the railway and road, his line of retreat,
quite concealed from the fire and view of the British force. On the
extreme left a big gun with two or three smaller pieces were mounted,
but these were useless to give much support to the centre, as they were
too distant. The line of retreat to Komati Poort, which, from the nature
of the country, could not be threatened except by an extended movement
round the north or south, lay along the Belfast-Machadodorp road and the
railway line.
Briefly, the course of the two days' battle may be described as
follows:--
While Pole Carew threatened the centre at Belfast and the position north
of the railway, French was sent with his cavalry division still further
north to threaten the Boer line of retreat towards Pilgrim's Rest, and
their right flank. Buller attacked the Boers' left with the intention of
driving it in and getting behind their centre on their line of retreat.
He on the first day, however, could make no impression on them, and the
two forces held on to the position they were in for the night. On the
morning of the second day Buller, leaving a brigade of infantry and
Dundonald's mounted brigade to watch the Boers' left, moved across their
front under cover of the undulating slopes of ground, and made an attack
at Bergendal Farm and Kopje. After a sharp fight this was carried, and
the Boers retired all along their line in the direction of Machadodorp.
It is necessary to state in detail the part played by the Regiment.
On the morning of Sunday, August 26th, Buller's force was put in motion.
The Regiment was advance guard to the division. When about half a mile
from the camp, the four advanced and extended companies under Captain
Jacson came under fire from some high ground on their right flank,
losing two men. Major Davies, proceeding along this ridge of high ground
with the remainder of the Regiment, forced the Boers posted there off
the hills. The advance guard companies then continued their march with
orders to make Bergendal Farm their point, but not to go beyond it.
When these companies had proceeded some four or five miles, it was found
that General Buller's main body had changed direction to the right and
had gone east. On retracing their steps, the companies with great
difficulty ascertained the whereabouts of Buller's force. Sir Redvers
was now attacking the Boer left within a mile or two of his former
camping ground. A message was then received stating that the Regiment
was at that time a left flank guard to Buller's army, and that the
former advance guard companies were to join the remainder of the
Regiment.
The Boers, opposed to Buller in very considerable numbers, were sangared
on some low hills about 800 yards distant from and in front of and below
the high ridge over which his force had to advance. Buller made his
dispositions behind this high ridge. The reverse slope was completely
raked by the Boer fire, and no cover except that afforded by some
ant-hills was obtainable. The dropping bullets followed the form and
slope of the hill, so that neither front nor rear was secure.
[Illustration: Trekking with General Buller; 5-Inch Guns on the March]
As soon as the Regiment was formed up, an order was sent to advance.
Captain Emerson with fifteen men extended, rushed down the forward slope
under a heavy fire, and took cover behind some ant-hills. The moment the
men showed over the crest line they were met by a hail of bullets, and
further advance was impossible.
Later, another order was sent to advance, but owing to the want of cover
it was found impossible for the line to make headway in the face of the
fire brought to bear upon it. It was not until the Howitzer Battery was
brought into action late in the day, to cover the retirement of the
advanced companies, that Captain Emerson and his men were able to get
back. This they did under a very heavy fire from rifles and machine
guns.
One company under Lieutenant Harris, which had been moved off to the
right, had advanced and got into an exposed place. The men took cover
behind ant-hills, and remained there for the rest of the day. Three
companies had been moved to the neighbourhood of the guns. These came
under shell fire from the Boer guns and had some casualties, amongst
whom was Colour-Sergeant Burchell, who was shot through the shoulder.
Under General Buller's direct supervision one company was ordered
forward. Immediately their four scouts showed over the crest line a
storm of bullets met them, and they were all hit. The four scouts were
found dead on the second day afterwards by the Liverpool Mounted
Infantry.
Dusk found the companies posted as under: Three companies extended on
the ridge on the left, with two companies extended in support on the
rear side of the hill. One company was extended on the ridge in the
centre, whilst three companies were near the guns, three-quarters of a
mile away on the right. One man was killed and one wounded just at dark
by unaimed fire and by the last shots fired. The companies on the ridge
retired to the crest of the hill after dark and took up an entrenched
outpost line for the night. Rations were then issued for the following
day. It was a pitch-black night, and two cooks' orderlies who had gone
to fetch their company's tea and sugar rations from their wagon, missed
their way in the dark when returning, and walked into the Boer position,
distant only a few hundred yards, and were made prisoners. These two men
were the first prisoners of war lost to the battalion up to this date;
and with the exception of one other prisoner, who was temporarily in the
hands of the Boers in the Badfontein valley in the following year, they
were the only men of the battalion taken prisoners during the war. The
casualties of the battalion for the day were 6 killed, 15 wounded, and 2
prisoners.
Early the following morning the 7th Brigade, with the exception of the
Manchester Regiment, moved off to the left, the Rifle Brigade, whose
turn it was to lead, being in front. The guns accompanied the brigade.
There was little or no opposition till the scouts came under fire from
Bergendal Kopje, or Drie Kraal as it was otherwise known. This rocky
kopje was strongly fortified and held by the Boers. A Field Battery
opened fire on to the kopje at about 3000 yards' range from some rising
ground. Shortly afterwards the remaining guns--5-inch, 4.7's, naval
12-pounders, in all to the number of about thirty-nine--commenced
pouring shells on to this one spot in the Boer position. This shelling
continued for about three hours.
Very early in the morning a train had been seen coming out from
Machadodorp with reinforcements. These, it was ascertained, were the
Johannesburg Police, to the number of about eighty, and they formed the
garrison of the kopje, about a hundred more being in the farm behind the
kopje. This kopje was a small hill covered with large boulders. The
rocks had been connected with large stones to form sangars, behind which
the garrison found cover. A pompom was included in the armament of the
position, which measured about eighty yards by forty yards only. It fell
away abruptly in the rear, the farm and outbuildings lying very close
under the steep rear side of the hill.
The English shells fell with terrible accuracy into the sangars, and
there was an almost continuous explosion on the hill. Yet the Boers kept
up their fire till the Rifle Brigade were within ten yards of them, and
their pompom was in action, although partly jammed and firing single
shots, till the very end. This pompom was bravely served by one man, the
remainder of the gun team having been either killed or wounded. It is
not known whether this plucky fellow survived or not.
General Walter Kitchener, who was commanding the infantry attack,
decided to attack with the Rifle Brigade along the ridge which ended in
the kopje, which was slightly above the level of the ridge. At the same
time he ordered the Inniskilling Fusiliers to attack over the low ground
on the Rifle Brigade's right, whilst the Gordon Highlanders and the
Devonshire Regiment were held in support.
The Rifle Brigade started from the foot of the hills under which they
had taken cover, and which was about 1200 yards from the Boer position,
and almost immediately came under heavy musketry fire, being much
exposed on the high open ridge.
They, however, continued their advance in perfect order and eventually
rushed the kopje, the British shells dropping and the Boers firing till
the assault had been delivered. The Inniskillings advanced across the
low ground underneath the Rifle Brigade. Their advance was slightly
delayed, and their delivery of the assault was consequently later than
that of the Rifle Brigade. Captain Emerson with one company of the
Regiment which had been told off as escort to the Maxim guns, advanced
with the leading company of the Inniskillings.
The whole Boer position was evacuated as soon as their line had been
penetrated by the capture of the Bergendal Kopje.
The casualties amongst the Rifle Brigade were severe, owing to the much
exposed ground over which it was necessary for the attack to be
delivered, and to the fact that, as the extended lines converged on to
the small kopje, the men naturally became crowded and formed a better
mark for the Boer rifles. They lost two officers and fourteen men killed
and five officers and fifty men wounded, of whom two officers died of
their wounds the following day. The Regiment had one man wounded.
The position was soon made good, although the Boers held on tenaciously
to a long rocky ridge in their rear to which they had retired, till
nightfall. The force bivouacked for the night near the farm.
This action was known officially as the battle of Belfast.
A quiet night was passed, and next morning, August 28th, the force
occupied Machadodorp with slight opposition. The Boers were seen
retreating up the road leading to Lydenburg, and on the high ground
above the town they brought two big guns into action.
The Gordon Highlanders, in support of Dundonald's Mounted Brigade, were
sent on through the town and occupied the high ground on the far side,
and the Boers retired before them.
The Boers had made a very hurried retirement. In Machadodorp on the
evening of the day of the fight, guns and cartloads of ammunition were
parked in the big open space in the centre of the town. These were moved
off very hurriedly on the approach of the British force, and the guns
had only reached the top of the hills on the further side of Machadodorp
when General Buller's infantry came in view. General Buller brought some
long-range guns into action and shelled them as they ascended the hill,
but without result.
From lack of efficient pursuit after the battle the evening before, and
a too cautious advance in the morning, an opportunity to do the Boer
forces considerable damage was apparently lost. A wagon containing
pompom ammunition was captured by Dundonald's Mounted Brigade, but the
pompom itself got away, notwithstanding the very slight opposition
offered by the Boers.
The following day General Buller's forces reached Helvetia Farm, where
General French's column and General Pole Carew's division joined up.
With the object of releasing the prisoners who had been sent by the
Boers from Pretoria to Noitgedacht down the railway line towards Komati
Poort, General Buller's force now turned eastwards and marched along the
heights on the north side of the railway. On the first day out from
Helvetia his cavalry saw some 2000 released English prisoners marching
up the line towards Waterval Onder from the direction of Noitgedacht,
and having been unable to obtain touch with the Boers, the force
retraced their steps, and encamped some six miles from Helvetia at
Vluchtfontein, and at this place a halt was made on the following day.
From here General Buller turned north, and on September 1st, advancing
up the Lydenburg road, reached Badfontein on the Crocodile River. Here
the army bivouacked for the night, and an advance was made up the
Badfontein valley next morning, but coming into contact with the Boers
who were holding the northern end of the valley, his further progress
was checked. The Boer position extended along the high hills which
straddled the road in a semicircular position some eight miles from
Badfontein.
The Regiment formed the infantry advance guard of the army, and on
reaching what was then named Redvers' Kopje and afterwards known as
Devon Kopje, came under shell fire from three big guns which the Boers
had brought into action on the hills above. At this place the Regiment
stopped for the day, taking cover from shell fire behind the large
boulders of rocks of which the kopje was composed. The remainder of Sir
Redvers Buller's force returned to its old encampment of the previous
night.
The two mounted brigades and one battery R.H.A., which had advanced to
the foot of the hills occupied by the Boers, returned to camp at dusk.
As soon as it was dark, four companies of the Regiment were left on
Devon Kopje as an advanced post, whilst the remainder of the Regiment
retired to the rear of the hill and bivouacked. The kopje was entrenched
and everything made comfortable for the following day. All the baggage
wagons were sent back to the main camp during the night.
September 3rd, 4th, and 5th were spent quietly in position, the Boers on
the 5th firing over the heads of the Regiment into the brigade camp, but
doing very little damage. On the evening of the 5th a hill to the east
was shelled, and after some opposition from the Boers, when Strathcona's
Horse had some casualties, the hill was occupied by the 60th Rifles and
the Leicester Regiment. A battery of artillery was then hauled up the
steep incline to the top.
On the 6th, General Ian Hamilton having brought up reinforcements
consisting of a brigade, from Belfast by way of Dullstrom, thus turning
the Boers' right, General Buller advanced the following day and found
that the Boers had evacuated their position. But, in ignorance of this
retirement, great preparations were made for a big fight.
The Devonshire Regiment headed the advance of the infantry. It was
divided into two half battalions, one half battalion under Major Davies
proceeding up the road in support of the mounted troops, whilst five
companies under Captain Jacson were sent more to the left to attack the
large farm at the foot of the hill, with orders "to proceed as far as
possible without severe loss." These manoeuvres having been accomplished
in safety without a shot being fired, the force reached the top and
bivouacked some two miles further on for the night. Owing to the
steepness of the road the baggage did not arrive till after midnight.
Lydenburg was occupied next day without opposition, the Boers having
retired to a position on Paardeplaats, a range of high and irregular
hills five miles distant from and overlooking Lydenburg on the
Mauchberg-Spitzkop road. From this position the Boers shelled the
baggage, bursting shrapnel over it as it defiled into the open in front
of the town. The train formed up and halted under cover behind a hill,
and came into camp at dusk.
The following morning, September 8th, Sir Redvers Buller decided to
attack the Boer position on Paardeplaats, and for this purpose he
detailed General Walter Kitchener's brigade to advance up the spurs of
the hills against the Boers' right, whilst General Ian Hamilton's
brigade was to turn the Boers' left, the attack being covered by the
artillery which proceeded up the main road in the centre.
General Kitchener's brigade moved out from Lydenburg on to the
race-course. The battalion being the leading regiment deployed and
advanced towards a hill jutting out into the plain, with the mounted
brigade of General Dundonald working round the left. This hill was
afterwards known to the Regiment as Ben Tor. As the Regiment deployed
into the open it came under shrapnel fire from two big guns posted on
Paardeplaats. The Regiment was, however, extended, and had only one man
wounded.
The Gordon Highlanders, who were in support, marched across the Boers'
front, in rear of the extended Devons, in column of companies. Several
shells burst amongst them, and one shell, bursting thirty feet above
graze, took their volunteer company end on and killed and wounded
fifteen.
With Dundonald's men on their left flank, four companies of the Regiment
under Captain Jacson advanced up the spurs without opposition, whilst
Major Davies, in command of the remaining companies, climbed the spurs
on Jacson's right. Little or no opposition was met with on this flank.
Jacson's companies were reinforced by four companies of the Gordon
Highlanders and the 60th Rifles, and at 4 p.m., when nearing the summit,
a thick mist came on, and the flanking brigade halted. Meanwhile Davies,
with two of his companies, had reached the top of the hill and was
proceeding down the far side when the fog lifted. It was then
ascertained that the Boers, under cover of the fog, had left the
position to which they had clung with great determination, and had
retired. The position had been turned by Ian Hamilton's right flank
attack.
The thick mist saved the Boers, who would otherwise undoubtedly have
lost their big guns in their retirement.
Just before dark the companies of the Regiment, which had become
scattered, were collected, and Captain Jacson received an order to
return with these to the old camp on the far side of Lydenburg; seven
companies were thus taken down the hills over very rough country to the
old camp, a distance of nearly six miles. On arrival there a message was
received which stated that the army was encamped half-way up the hill
towards Paardeplaats. The seven companies then returned, and finally
reached camp very late. They had been marching and climbing incessantly
from 7.30 a.m. till 10 p.m.
The brigades had by this time become rather intermingled. Of General
Kitchener's brigade the Manchester Regiment had been left behind at
Witklip, at the north end of the Badfontein valley. A garrison had also
been left at Lydenburg under General Howard, consisting of the Rifle
Brigade and Leicesters, with General Brocklehurst's Cavalry Brigade.
The Devonshire Regiment was now left behind at Paardeplaats, while
General Buller's force, consisting of the Gordon Highlanders and the
60th Rifles, with Dundonald's Mounted Brigade, two Field Batteries, and
the 5-inch guns, advanced on the 9th, the day following the capture of
Paardeplaats, in the direction of the Mauchberg.
The country was extremely difficult, and the Boer guns and pompoms well
served, and considerable opposition was met with in the advance.
General Buller's force reached the Mauchberg that evening and proceeded
on the following day to Devil's Knuckles, down the steep Mauchberg road
(known as Hell's Gate), where the two Boer big guns again narrowly
escaped capture, and so on to Spitzkop, just north of Nelspruit on the
Pretoria-Lorenzo Marques railway.
On the 10th four companies and two guns under Captain Jacson were
ordered to the Mauchberg. The companies got off by midday, and after a
stiff climb occupied the mountain just before dark. The top of the
Mauchberg, 8720 feet high, was found to be very extended, and the
garrison was much split up. Company forts were erected on the main
features, and the place was held till the 20th, mostly in thick fog and
rain.
The Mauchberg post was the terminus of the telegraph line, communication
thence with General Buller's head-quarters being continued by visual
signalling. The mountain was intersected by deep kloofs and ravines,
into most of which the Boers had collected their families and supplies,
in the hope that neither would be found. These were all disclosed from
the summit of the mountain, which commanded a view of a great extent of
country. General Buller succeeded in collecting a large amount of stores
from these "caches."
The families of Boers who surrendered with their stock were sent into
Lydenburg, together with any prisoners that had been taken.
On the 11th two of the Mauchberg companies with the two guns were
ordered to proceed to Devil's Knuckles, to supply picquets for
Dundonald's Mounted Brigade which was stationed there, and on September
20th the companies of the Regiment stationed at Paardeplaats marched to
the Mauchberg, being relieved at the former place by the Leicesters, the
remaining two Mauchberg companies proceeding to Devil's Knuckles.
On the 21st the Regiment was again united and marched with Dundonald's
Brigade down the Sabi Valley, reaching Sabi Drift that evening, where
the force bivouacked. The column under General Dundonald remained at
Sabi Drift till the 26th awaiting the arrival of General Buller, who was
returning from Spitzkop.
[Illustration: Devons Crossing the Sabi River]
A story is told anent the positions out of which General Buller's
infantry had turned the Boers, which goes to show the estimation in
which the British infantry were held by their opponents. The words are
those of General Botha, and were told to an officer of the Head-quarter
Staff. "I shall give it up," he said. "I have taken up position after
position which I considered impregnable; I have always been turned off
by your infantry, who come along in great lines in their dirty clothes
with bags on their backs. Nothing can stop them. I shall give it up."
On September 25th the remainder of General Buller's force marched into
Sabi Drift, and on the 26th the army, united again, advanced north for
Pilgrim's Rest. Burgher's Nek and Mac-Mac diggings were reached about
noon on that day.
The pass over Burgher's Nek was held by the Boers under Gravett, Botha
and the State treasure with a small escort having crossed only a few
hours before, whilst a portion of their army under Viljoen retired at
the same time to the north towards Pietersburg.
The infantry of the advance guard was composed of four companies of the
Regiment under Captain Jacson. On reaching the foot of the pass the
mounted troops were checked and the artillery came into action. The
position occupied by the Boers was formidable--a long stretch of high
rugged hills, with the forward slope ending precipitously. The pass lay
over a Nek between two high shoulders of hills. The Boers, exceedingly
well posted, occupied the hills on either side of the Nek, taking cover
behind the immense boulders on the summit.
After the artillery had been bombarding the south side of the Nek for
some considerable time, the mounted infantry were sent forward to occupy
the hill known as Grass Kop, but were unable to proceed. In the
meantime, the four companies of the advance guard had been moved off to
the left and nearer to the hills. They now got the order to attack and
occupy the hill. Whilst these companies moved off under cover of the
undulating ground to the foot of the hills, two companies with the Maxim
gun took up a position in rear to cover the advance, firing with a range
of 1700 yards at the top of the hill. Most of the artillery came into
action at the same time and at the same objective. The foot of the hill
was reached by the attacking force with two casualties. One company was
then directed to the left to attack round the flank, and the ascent of
the precipitous side of the hill was commenced. Crawling up a goat's
track in single file, on hands and knees, through dense bush, the first
portion of the ascent was accomplished, and the little force formed up
under a spur to get breath before debouching into the open for the final
rush to the top. After a short halt the advance was continued to the
summit, the companies on their way coming under a smart shell fire from
their own guns (happily without casualties), which were bursting
shrapnel with wonderful precision between the two leading companies.
Just before reaching the top the flanking company, coming in from the
left with a well-timed advance, joined the general advance to the
summit. It was found that the Boers had retired, and fire was brought to
bear on them as they descended the rear slope of the hill. The high hill
on the left of the pass was then occupied, and the Nek over which the
road passed cleared of Boers.
A heliograph message from Sir Redvers Buller was received on the summit,
"Well done Devons!" and in Lord Roberts' official dispatch for the day
it was notified that General Buller had occupied Burgher's Nek, and that
"the pass had been turned by a half battalion of the Devonshire
Regiment, well led by Captain Jacson."
The four companies bivouacked on the top. Efforts were made by those
down below to get food and blankets up to them, but owing to the
steepness and difficulties of the climb and the darkness, it was found
impossible.
The head-quarter companies of the Regiment were engaged on outpost duty
at the foot of the pass, where the army had bivouacked, almost all the
men being on duty.
On the following day the march was resumed, the head-quarter companies
of the Regiment being rear-guard to the force. The companies on the hill
were relieved by two companies of the Regiment under Captain Wren. The
road was extremely bad and crossed by many drifts, which caused
considerable delay, and it was not till the early hours of morning that
the rear-guard companies got into camp. The bivouac was formed amongst
the hills, some five miles from Pilgrim's Rest, which had been occupied
the previous day by Strathcona's Horse.
On the 28th the march was continued through Pilgrim's Rest to the foot
of Morgenzon Hill, the mounted troops surprising the Boers on the summit
and putting them to flight.
The baggage was safely brought up the six miles of steep hill on the
following day. The road, which was the old coaching highway Pilgrim's
Rest-Lydenburg, was found in excellent condition, but it was heavy work
for the oxen, and all wagons were double spanned. The force camped on
the summit, and halted there on the 30th.
A good number of Boers were reported in the vicinity to the west and
north, but they did not make their presence felt and Sunday was spent
quietly.
On October 1st Morgenzon was left and the march continued towards
Kruger's Post and Lydenburg. It was a long, dusty road through narrow
valleys. Opposition was encountered at the bifurcation of the
Lydenburg-Morgenzon and Lydenburg-Ohrigstadt roads, which, however, was
soon overcome, the Boers retiring to the hills out of reach of the guns,
and Kruger's Post was reached at 2 p.m.
Shortly after the Regiment had settled itself in its bivouac a Boer big
gun opened on to it from a hill about 6000 yards distant, and not very
far from the road. This gun also shelled the wagons as they came into
camp, necessitating their halting under cover and coming in later. In
the evening, about 6.30, the Boers brought another gun into action on a
hill due west of the camp, and shelled the cavalry and infantry bivouacs
for one and a half hours in the dark. After several shells had pitched
into their midst the Regiment moved out and formed up into two long
lines and entrenched.
It was whilst marching out to take up this position in the dark that a
shell emptied itself into the head of one company, killing Lieutenant
Cumin and severely wounding Captain Luxmoore and one man. The South
African Light Horse and Strathcona's Horse had a number of casualties
amongst their men and horses.
The Boers by a skilful manoeuvre had kept their guns concealed, ready to
be brought into action as soon as General Buller's army had settled
itself quietly in its bivouac. They expended some cartloads of
ammunition in this manner without interference. In the early hours of
the following morning a band of volunteers ascended the hill to capture
the guns. They had both been withdrawn and were not traced.
On the morning of October 2nd Buller's army reached Lydenburg without
further opposition. Lieutenant Cumin was buried in the evening in
Lydenburg cemetery.
On Saturday, October 6th, Sir Redvers Buller bade farewell to his army.
The troops lined the streets and roads and gave him a hearty send-off.
He was immensely popular with the men and they were sorry to see him go.
General W. Kitchener took over command of the Lydenburg district and its
garrison, on Sir Redvers Buller's departure.
On the writer asking Sir Redvers on the eve of the day of his departure
which was his best army--the one he commanded into Ladysmith or the one
with which he trekked north--he replied, "The army I went north with was
the best. I watched the Devons pass me at Burgher's Nek and it struck me
how wonderfully well they looked. I considered they were ready for
anything I asked them to do; but," he added, "they surprised me with the
pace they went up the hill at Burgher's Nek."
CHAPTER IV
LYDENBURG
1900-1901
On October 8th, 1900, the battalion moved out of Lydenburg to the
Mission Station, three miles north of the town on the Kruger's Post
road. The Mission Station was a collection of Kaffir houses, containing
some 500 Christian men, women, and children. The mission-house was taken
over as a post and fortified as soon as the German pastor, who was found
to be communicating with the Boers, had been sent to Pretoria to be
locked up.
[Illustration: Colonel C.W. Park, Mission Camp, Lydenburg]
The site of the camp having been chosen, it was immediately surrounded
by company forts consisting of ditches four feet deep and two feet wide
for protection against shell fire, which it was considered possible
would be brought to bear on the camp. This entrenchment was finished in
one afternoon.
Two guns of the 53rd Battery under Lieutenant Higgins, and one 5-inch
gun under Second Lieutenant McLellan, were added to the garrison.
The battalion stood to arms daily just before dawn.
On the 9th two companies under Captain Bartlett were moved to
Paardeplaats as a permanent garrison, whilst two companies under Captain
Travers were sent to Ben Tor.
On the 10th two companies of the Regiment, two guns, and one company
mounted infantry proceeded just before daylight to a farm some six miles
away, and burnt it. They encountered no opposition. This company of
mounted infantry was then added to the garrison for permanent duty.
The two following days were employed in collecting forage from different
farm-houses. Very few Boers were seen, and there was little or no
opposition.
On the 24th, it having been ordained that all the Boer women in the
various towns were to be sent out to their husbands in the laagers, two
companies and two guns under Captain Ravenshaw were ordered to escort
the ladies of Lydenburg over the Spekboom Bridge on the Kruger's Post
road, and there hand them over to their husbands and friends. Captain
Ravenshaw went out with a flag of truce and met the Boers, amongst whom
was Erasmus. They were most affable, and shook hands cordially. The
women reached Kruger's Post that evening.
The next day General Walter Kitchener started out at 2 a.m. with a
column of infantry (Devons), mounted infantry and guns towards Kruger's
Post for the purpose of shelling the farm. At dawn the column crossed
the Spekboom Bridge and mounted the hills in the face of slight
opposition. A 5-inch gun was then brought to the front and shells
dropped into Kruger's Post, after which the column returned to camp. A
patrol of four Boers was captured, and there were no casualties on the
British side.
Very shortly after this the order concerning the Boer women was
cancelled and a fresh order was issued, which ordained that all Boer
women who were captured or gave themselves up should be confined in
large concentration camps on the railway line.
On the evening of the 24th one company was ordered down from Ben Tor to
be posted on the hill overlooking the Spekboom Bridge. The company
proceeded there on the 25th escorted by two companies, two guns, and
some mounted infantry.
On the following day, as the Boers were threatening the Bridge Post
before the works were complete, one company and two guns were sent out
as a covering party.
The battalion was now split up; two companies under Lieutenant Tringham
proceeded to Witklip, two companies under Captain Bartlett were at
Paardeplaats, one company under Lieutenant Cowie was at Ben Tor, one
company under Captain Travers was at Bridge Post. Of the three remaining
companies one was holding the Mission House, and the two others with the
5-inch gun and the two field guns formed the garrison of the main camp.
On October 30th two companies from Mission Camp were ordered to march at
sunset through Lydenburg to the bank of the river. Here they halted and
had supper, being eventually joined by the Rifle Brigade. Starting again
at 9 p.m. and marching all through the night, they attacked some Boer
laagers at dawn. After some heavy firing the laagers, which had been
completely surprised, were captured with all their tents, etc. The
column returned at 5 p.m. the same day, when the companies redistributed
themselves to their various posts, having marched from 4 a.m. till 10.30
p.m. a distance of thirty-five miles. There were four casualties, one of
which was a Devon man slightly wounded.
November was spent rather quietly by the battalion, the men being
employed in strengthening the various posts and making them comfortable.
On November 7th one company was sent off to garrison Strathcona Hill on
the southern side of the town.
On the 8th General Walter Kitchener again attacked the Boers, this time
employing entirely mounted troops, He brought back with him 1000 sheep,
50 ponies, and 20 wagons. Five Boers were killed, and the mounted troops
had two casualties.
Colonel Park returned from sick leave on the 9th, when Major Davies
resumed his position as second in command. Lieutenants Hext and Kane
left shortly afterwards to join the mounted infantry at Pretoria, and at
the end of November Lieutenant Woollcombe rejoined the Regiment from
Maritzburg, Lieutenant Harris returned from Pretoria with a draft of
thirty-eight men, and Lieutenant Twiss rejoined from hospital at
Newcastle.
At the beginning of December the following was the distribution of the
companies of the Regiment:--
Two companies at Paardeplaats under Captain Bartlett.
One company at Bridge Post under Captain Travers.
One company at Strathcona Hill under Lieutenant Willis; and
Four companies at Mission Camp.
On December 9th and 10th a foraging expedition with three guns and four
companies of the Rifle Brigade went out towards Van Der Merves' Farm
under Colonel Park. These brought back twenty-eight wagon loads of
forage without experiencing any opposition.
It was reported on the 12th that Nelspruit had been cut off by the Boers
and required assistance. A column was immediately formed, composed of
one squadron 19th Hussars, four companies Devons under Major Davies, and
four companies Rifle Brigade with some guns; the whole proceeding under
General Kitchener _en route_ to the Mauchberg and Devil's Knuckles.
Three companies of the Regiment had been taken from Mission Camp and one
from Paardeplaats.
A blizzard blowing all night and the following morning, accompanied with
thunder and heavy rain, delayed the advance of the troops till noon,
when a start was effected, and the Mauchberg was occupied by the Devons
without opposition.
Further advance down Hell's Gate to the Devil's Knuckles was found
impracticable owing to the state of the road. Troops from Machadodorp
had been sent to Lydenburg to act as a garrison whilst the column was
out; but instructions were received from head-quarters on the 15th
ordering the immediate return of the column to Lydenburg, as well as of
the reinforcements back to Machadodorp. The Devons had been, however,
sent out from the Mauchberg previous to the receipt of the order to
retire. They skirmished down the road towards Devil's Knuckles, and in a
very thick fog Boers and British nearly walked into each other's arms.
There was a good deal of musketry fire, with the result to the British
side of one Devon wounded. As was usually said on such occasions,
"Boers' loss was probably very great." The three companies returned to
Mission Camp late on the evening of the 16th.
On the 18th Major Davies was ordered to Witklip to take command of the
forts; he took with him one company as a reinforcement to the garrison.
On Christmas Day the Regiment received a number of telegrams from
friends in England wishing them good luck. A race meeting was held in
the afternoon on the Lydenburg race-course. The public went armed, and
two field guns were brought into action on the course. These precautions
were necessary, for the Boers at this time were very busy, and on the
night of December 28th-29th attacked the post at Helvetia, near
Machadodorp, and captured it.
The post contained a 4.7 naval gun called "Lady Roberts," and this, with
the garrison of three companies of the Liverpool Regiment, was taken,
only one small fort manned by a small contingent of about fifteen men
holding out. General Walter Kitchener left at once with four companies
of the Rifle Brigade, two companies of the Regiment (from Witklip), two
guns, and the mounted troops, in the hope of intercepting the Boers and
recovering the gun. The Boers, however, had made good their retirement
to the hills, and General Kitchener returned to Lydenburg with the
column on the 31st.
The Liverpool Regiment lost at Helvetia 4 killed, 27 wounded, and 200
prisoners.
The Boers about this time attacked all along the line from Lydenburg to
Pretoria. The defences, except at Lydenburg, were of the most meagre
description. In fact, the works constructed by the Rifle Brigade and the
Devons at Lydenburg were the only works of any strength, and these were
as complete as possible. Witklip was being placed in a fortified
condition, but up to the time of the taking of Helvetia Post little had
been done anywhere, except at Lydenburg.
For the next few nights all posts round Lydenburg stood to arms at 1.30
a.m. owing to the activity of the Boers, but it was not till January 4th
that they attacked the Bridge Hill Post. They attempted to capture the
picquet on the bridge over the Spekboom River, but were beaten off.
About this time one company was ordered down from Paardeplaats to
Mission Camp, the garrison at Paardeplaats being thus reduced to one
company; and Witklip garrison was reinforced by the addition of one
company, which was sent there from Mission Camp.
On the early morning of January 8th the Boers made a simultaneous attack
on almost all posts on the line between Belfast and Lydenburg. The
following posts were attacked: Badfontein, Schwarzkop, Helvetia,
Machadodorp, Belfast, Pan, and Noitgedacht. The Badfontein Post was
shelled only, by a big gun mounted on the hills west of the fort, which
failed, however, to reach the post. The result of the general attack was
that two posts only, those at Belfast, were captured by the Boers. These
were not held, and the Boers retired, leaving twenty-four dead upon the
ground. The posts had been well prepared for defence after the disaster
at Helvetia.
A wire bridge over the Lydenburg River, constructed by Lieutenant Green
and the twelve men of the Maxim gun team, was completed about this time,
and as it attracted a good deal of attention a description of it may be
interesting.
The bridge had a span of sixty feet, and was constructed on the system
of the "jhula," or rope bridge, of Cashmere, out of telegraph wire. The
roadway, to admit of one person at a time, was made of two lengths of
twisted wire, each ten strands thick. These being stretched tightly
across the river, and the ends well worked into the ground and pegged
down, were joined together by small laths of wood two inches apart. Two
more lengths, each ten strands thick, were stretched from two uprights
on each bank, at a convenient height above the roadway, to form a
support for it. These were joined on to the roadway by stout sticks,
about one to two feet apart, on either side to give stability. The
bridge was then secured up and down stream by wires to keep it steady.
The height of the bridge above the stream was about twenty feet.
[Illustration: Wire Bridge, Lydenburg]
The chief cause of attraction and interest in the bridge to outsiders
was the fact that it had been constructed entirely by British infantry
without the aid of the Royal Engineers, and that the plan had been
thought out by them alone, and was not "in the book." The idea had been
taken from some photographs of a Cashmere "jhula," and the work had been
carried out from descriptions of the rope bridges furnished by an
officer of the Regiment who had crossed them. All previous bridges had
been washed away, but this bridge was still standing at the end of the
war, and was being utilized then by the Kaffirs at Mission Camp as an
easy access and short cut to their cultivated fields.
On January 12th, as a larger convoy than usual was coming through to
Lydenburg, a small force under Captain Jacson, consisting of two
companies Devons, one company mounted infantry and one gun went out from
Mission Camp to demonstrate towards Schoeman's Laager on the west. No
Boers, however, were seen, and the convoy came safely into Lydenburg
without opposition.
Several changes occurred in the disposition of the companies of the
Regiment during the latter half of January, 1901.
The head-quarters with three companies were stationed at Witklip under
Colonel Park. Two companies proceeded to Badfontein as a garrison under
Major Davies. One company held each of the posts at Bridge Hill and
Paardeplaats respectively. One company was in charge of the Mission
House, whilst one company was left at Mission Camp to commence the
construction of a new work south of the old camp.
[Illustration: Wire Bridge, Lydenburg (General Kitchener and Colonel
Park)]
These changes were made on account of some large convoys going and
coming to and from the railway line, larger escorts having to be
provided owing to the proximity and increased activity of the Boers on
the lines of communication. The convoys came through safely without any
trouble, and on January 30th Major Davies with his two companies
returned to Witklip. The head-quarters of the Regiment, with three
companies, left Witklip the following day and proceeded to Mission Camp.
Further changes were made during February, 1901, the post at
Paardeplaats being given up and the company posted there returning to
Mission Camp.
Towards the latter end of January a flying column was organized by
General Walter Kitchener. The objective of this column was the high
hills south of Lydenburg towards Witpoort and Belfast. It was under the
personal command of the General, and was composed of the following
troops:--
1 squadron 19th Hussars.
1 battery R.F.A.
1 naval 12-pounder.
1 pompom.
1 company Manchester Mounted Infantry.
3 companies Devons under Captain Travers.
The column set out at 1 a.m. in the direction of Elandskloof. It was a
bright night, although a thick white mist hung everywhere. The 19th
Hussars, who knew the difficult country, conducted the advance. After
marching for two hours the column found itself in the hills. A halt was
made whilst the three companies of the Regiment extended and occupied
the high ground which barred the advance, to drive off any Boers who
might be in possession. This manoeuvre was executed without opposition.
It was learnt, however, that a Boer picquet had been on the top, and had
galloped off on the approach of the infantry. Daylight found the column
in possession of Elandskloof, which was reached after a difficult climb
by steep and circuitous paths. Shortly after daylight several Boers were
observed to be driving their cattle into kloofs above the Badfontein
valley for safety. An advance was made shortly afterwards towards
Schwartz Kopjes, which place was reached without much opposition towards
dark. At Schwartz Kopjes camp was formed for the night, the infantry
entrenching themselves in the kopjes round the camp, with one company
posted in a farmhouse about 400 yards west of the main camp.
On the following day General Kitchener ordered the mounted troops and
guns to make a reconnaissance towards Dulstroom. Whilst the rest of the
force remained in camp, the baggage under escort was sent towards
Belfast. The reconnoitring force fared badly, for after advancing a few
miles Boers in large numbers were seen collecting on the high hills due
west, and approaching at a rapid pace. The reconnoitring force was
shortly afterwards heavily engaged, and compelled to retire on to the
camp.
The infantry were now ordered to retire as rapidly as possible to a
ridge in rear, distant about 2000 to 2500 yards. The cavalry retired
hard pressed on to Schwartz Kopjes, which they held until the infantry
had completed their movement, when the cavalry again retired back to the
neighbourhood of the infantry. Schwartz kopjes were immediately occupied
by the Boers, who collected there in large numbers and endeavoured to
get round the flanks of the column.
Followed hotly by the Boers, the column made a rapid retirement, units
covering each other until camp was reached. It was only then that the
Boers drew off. There was no further engagement that day or during the
night, and the column completed its advance next day to Belfast, where
it arrived about midday and camped to the south side of the railway.
The distribution of the garrison, carried out at the commencement of
February, continued more or less the same till the time the Regiment
left Lydenburg. Three companies were north of Lydenburg, and were
stationed at the Mission House, Mission Camp Fort, and Bridge Hill. One
company was at Strathcona Hill, south of the town, two companies under
the command of Major Davies were at Witklip, whilst the three companies
which had proceeded with General Kitchener to Belfast were quartered on
their return in Lydenburg.
During this time Colonel Park was commanding the Lydenburg district with
Captain Ravenshaw as Brigade Major.
On February 5th the Boers attacked all the Lydenburg posts. The attacks
were not heavily pressed. There were no casualties on the side of the
defenders, whilst the Boers lost, as far as could be ascertained, two
killed and seven wounded.
On February 16th two Boers surrendered at Mission Camp. These stated
that their friends in the laagers were badly off for meat and had hardly
any horses left, most of them having died of horse-sickness.
Early in March, 1901, Colonel Park decided on raiding Piet Schwartz's
laager, which was stationed on the ridge to the north of and overlooking
Kruger's Post. His force consisted of three companies Devons under
Captain Jacson, three companies Rifle Brigade, three companies Royal
Irish, one squadron 19th Hussars, three companies mounted infantry,
three guns 53rd Battery, one howitzer, and one pompom, and by the 12th
his arrangements were complete. The infantry were to make a night march
and to attack at dawn, whilst the mounted troops and guns were to be at
Kruger's Post just after dawn to assist.
Under cover of darkness, the column rendezvoused at the Spekboom Bridge,
one company having gone on ahead to seize any Boers who might be coming
down at nightfall, as was their wont, to form a picquet there.
A start was made from the bridge at about 9 p.m. Leaving the main road
on their left, the column proceeded in single file, Devons leading,
along a footpath which led them over a Nek in the hills and thence down
into a donga. An accident, which might have been attended with very
unfortunate results, occurred at the very commencement. The Royal Irish,
who were in the rear, instead of following and keeping in touch with the
remainder of the column missed connection, and went up the main road, on
which, about two miles ahead, was a Boer picquet. They were, however,
stopped just in time and turned back. This delayed the advance for about
an hour. Along the donga the march was continued for some six miles,
when a cross donga was met with, the sides of which were steep and about
fifteen feet high. The leading troops crossed and halted on the far side
till the rear closed up. The Maxim gun mules with difficulty negotiated
the obstacle, and the advance was, after one hour's halt, continued to
Kruger's Post.
The force kept to the donga almost the whole march, scarcely for a
moment leaving its shelter. Terribly rough going it was, with long high
grass soaking wet, and the men tumbling about into ruts and over rocks.
On they trudged, twisting and turning, up and down, falling about, with
every now and then a suppressed exclamation and an imprecation on rocks
and ruts in general and night marches in particular--no lights, no
smoking. No one except he who has done it knows what a strain it is
marching along through the dark night, without a word and without the
company of a pipe.
On emerging from the donga at Kruger's Post on to the open veldt a
further halt was made; the leading troops lay down in the soaking grass
and were fast asleep in a moment.
It was found that the column had opened out considerably, and must have
stretched for some four miles from lead to end. The rate of marching at
the head of the column had been about two miles per hour. This was
found, over the rough ground, to be too quick to allow of the rear
keeping closed up--the pace should not have exceeded one mile an hour.
The column having closed up and the sleeping men having with difficulty
been found and turned up out of the wet grass, a further advance was
made. But now the direction was to the right in order to avoid Kruger's
Post Farm, which was occupied by the Boers. This took the column over
some millraces, a biggish jump for the men. The mules, having been
relieved of their loads, were man-handled across. Once over these and
then a wade through a stream knee deep, the ghostly column again halted.
It was now 3.30 a.m. The foot of the low hills behind which was the
laager, had been reached, and the officers were busy getting their men
collected.
An intelligence officer reports that if there is the slightest delay
dawn will break before the positions are reached. The first streak of
dawn is 4.45 a.m.
"May we go off now on our own?" is the question asked.
"All right; off you go!" is the cheery answer from Colonel Park.
The Devons had the furthest to go, perhaps one and a half miles to reach
the far side of the laager. The Royal Irish were already at the foot of
the hill on the top of which was the position assigned to them.
Two of the Rifle Brigade companies had unfortunately missed connection
and had gone off into the "Ewigkeit" in the dark, but one company was
ready and handy to the Nek which they had to occupy, to fill up the gap
between the Devons and the Royal Irish.
The Devons, who by this time were well together, started off, Captain
Travers with a guide leading. He had orders to take on with him the two
first companies, the guide showing him where to place his men. On they
went, running and walking, walking and running, up the slippery road,
across the Nek and then down into the valley below. Two small groups of
men were posted in the ditch leading up to the Nek.
As the last man reached the knoll overlooking the Nek at the place where
the main road crossed it, and which was the right of the Devons'
allotment of position, the two leading companies could be heard down in
the valley below stumbling amongst the stones, getting into a position
that would entirely cut off the Boers' retreat down the main road
leading north.
[Illustration: Mission Camp Fort, Lydenburg]
Suddenly all was still: everything was ready. It was exactly 4.45 a.m.
All lay down and waited in breathless silence for the coming dawn. The
Devons had orders to withhold their fire as long as possible, to make
sure of the other units being in their places. "That's the position of
the laager, just behind that little knoll," whispered an intelligence
scout; "but it seems as if the bird has flown."
[Illustration: Mission Camp Fort, Lydenburg (Interior)]
For some ten minutes the silence continued, with not so much as the
crack of a twig to interrupt it. What's that? It's a cock crowing! There
it is again! There's another! The laager's there right enough, and we've
got them!
In the far distance, Lydenburg way, the faint noise of musketry fire
could be heard; it was the mounted troops advancing and driving in the
Boer picquets on the road above the Spekboom Bridge, eight miles back.
In about five minutes' time the laager was roused by a Boer, who
commenced swearing roundly at some one in a very loud voice. One man
came out and posted himself on a little rise of ground, and gazed,
listening, Kruger's Post way. He was joined by another, then another,
until there was a group of nine of them, two dressed in long white
robes. It was thought that these were women. Suddenly they all returned
into the laager out of sight, only to appear again in a few minutes on
horseback. Three of them came straight up to the high road just under
the knoll where the Devons were in readiness. They were allowed to go
on, and they continued their career down the road towards Kruger's Post.
Now the utility of posting the groups in the ditch by the side of the
road became manifest. Suddenly from their direction crack! went a single
rifle, then a burst of rifle fire, which was immediately taken up all
round the circle.
No, not quite round; there was silence from the hill which should have
been occupied by the Royal Irish. A party of some twenty Boers were seen
ascending this hill, the top of which was covered with big rocks. The
Devons' rifles as well as their Maxim gun were turned on to them. The
Boers, however, succeeded in reaching the safety of the rocks a few
moments before the ascending Irish.
Meanwhile the firing had become general, and in the dim light also a
trifle mixed. The Rifle Brigade fired into the two Devon companies down
in the valley and across the laager. The latter in their turn fired at
some Boers trying to escape through the gap left open by the Royal
Irish. These were striving with the Boers for the possession of the
rock-capped hill, and both were being fired into by the Devons across
the valley.
After some twenty minutes of sharp musketry fire the "cease fire"
sounded, and everything was again quiet; it was then found that the
whole laager had fallen into British hands. Two Boers were killed, three
wounded, and thirty-six captured, whilst the British casualties were two
killed and four wounded, all of them Royal Irish.
The distance from Lydenburg to Piet Schwartz's laager by road is about
eighteen miles; the distance marched by the column could not have been
under twenty miles, and this over very difficult ground. The column had
left Lydenburg at 7 p.m., and reached its destination at 4.45 a.m.
Unfortunately, Piet Schwartz himself escaped capture, as he was not in
the laager; he had left it the previous day.
The mounted troops and guns were very slow in coming out, with the
result that a large quantity of cattle located in the various kloofs
which should have been captured, escaped. Abel Erasmus was taken the
following day.
The force bivouacked at Kruger's Post for the night, and returned to
Lydenburg next day, bringing with it fifteen Boer families in addition
to the prisoners. On their return a wire was received by Colonel Park
from Lord Kitchener: "Highly appreciate successful operation of Colonel
Park and troops engaged."
The remainder of the month was spent mostly in convoy work between
Witklip and Lydenburg. Whilst returning to Lydenburg with one of these
convoys, General Walter Kitchener, who was riding ahead with a small
escort, suddenly came across some Boers lying concealed in the grass. He
lost two of his own personal escort killed, his own horse also being
shot. He himself narrowly escaped capture.
On April 10th an order was issued for the battalion to concentrate in
Lydenburg, preparatory to a general advance of three columns. The posts
at Bridge Hill, Mission Village, Strathcona, and Paardeplaats were
evacuated, and the company at Witklip withdrawn.
The destinations of the columns were as follows:--
One column under Colonel Park was to proceed in the Kruger's Post
direction and to scour the country towards the north, and later to join
hands with General Kitchener's column, which was to proceed in a
north-westerly direction, and the third column under Colonel Douglas was
to proceed from Witklip in a westerly direction.
On the 12th, Lieutenant-Colonel Park handed over the command of the
battalion to Major Davies, who had arrived from Witklip, and Captain
Jacson took over the duties of second in command.
CHAPTER V
TREKKING IN THE NORTH-EAST TRANSVAAL
On April 13th, 1901, General Walter Kitchener commenced his long trek
with a night march.
His force consisted of--
Two guns 53rd F.B.R.A. under Major Johnson and Captain Talbot-Ponsonby.
One 5-inch gun.
One 5-inch howitzer.
One naval 12-pounder.
One company mounted infantry.
1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment (20 officers and 900 men).
2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade.
The 6th Western Australians.
General Walter Kitchener's column formed one of the many operating at
the time in a combined movement in the Northern Transvaal and bush
veldt, under the direction of General Sir Bindon Blood.
Two columns were sent north to drive the bush veldt, forcing any Boers
that might be located there on to the other columns, who were acting as
stops near the Tautes Berg and Bothas Berg, immediately north of the
Pretoria-Lorenzo railway line.
General Walter Kitchener decided to start his operations with an attack
on Schoeman's laager, and for this purpose the Regiment was ordered to
take up a position before dawn which would cut off the laager, situated
in the Steenkampsberg mountains, near the entrance of the Lydenburg road
into the hills, from the north. This entailed a night march of about
sixteen miles. The remainder of the column was to proceed by the main
road and attack the laager at daybreak.
The Regiment rendezvoused on the west side of the river, clear of the
town, before dusk. Here the men had food, and a start was made at 7 p.m.
The going at first was fairly simple, but once the track was left the
ground became rough, stony, and intersected with dongas. The advance was
then made in single file.
As an instance of how a small obstruction delays troops marching in the
dark, one small water-course 1-1/2 feet wide and about 1 foot deep
delayed the head of the column for some thirty-five minutes, till all
the men had crossed and were closed up again, and then in crossing one
in every ten fell into it. The top of the Steenkampsberg was reached at
about 1 a.m., after a steep climb over a rough track. The difficulty of
the march was increased by a thick fog. On the far side a steep cliff,
at the bottom of which was a deep donga and a mountain torrent, was
encountered, and this had to be negotiated on hands and knees. Slipping
and sliding down, the bottom of the donga was reached and the mountain
torrent waded, and then after a steep ascent the top of the plateau was
reached.
It was here that the laager was supposed to be situated, and an
extension was made and the advance continued. Just as the dawn was
breaking some flying Boers, appearing and disappearing in the fog, were
fired at by the leading extended company. The Boers had been disturbed
prematurely and had escaped, taking with them their pompom, but the
wagon containing its ammunition fell into the hands of the Regiment.
The actual position of the laager was found to be about one mile away
from where it had been previously located, and was very difficult to
find in the dark owing to the undulations of the ground at the top of
the ridge. Complete success under these circumstances was scarcely
probable, but as a test as to what a regiment could do when called upon,
the undertaking was effective and complete.
After the Regiment had been engaged in long-range firing for some time,
the head of the main column appeared on the Lydenburg road, and the
force finally went into bivouac for the night at Boshhoek. About 400
sheep and some cattle were picked up on the neighbouring farms.
The following morning the column marched north down the Waterval valley,
and after the mounted troops had experienced some opposition in very
hilly and rough country, Boshfontein was reached.
Shortly after the force had settled into camp heavy gun fire was heard
from the direction of Waterval. The Boers' shells exploded in the valley
immediately to the north of the camp and in the vicinity of a farm,
where it would appear the Boers considered the column should have
bivouacked. After the explosion of some twenty shells a louder report
than usual was heard, and the shelling ceased.
The mounted troops reported that the Boers were in position above
Waterval, where there was a large women's laager.
In the dark of the morning, at three o'clock, General Kitchener set his
column in motion: four companies, with a 12-pounder and two 5-inch guns,
under Major Davies, preceded the force, with the intention of capturing
the big Boer gun; four companies, with two field guns, under Captain
Jacson, made a flanking movement through scrub and dongas round the
left. Very little opposition was met with. The mounted troops captured a
few prisoners, and it was found that the Boers had blown up their big
gun. This was the gun that had been situated on Pepworth Hill, and which
had been disabled by one of the Naval Brigade's shells during the siege
of Ladysmith. Its muzzle had been shortened, showing that it had been
damaged. The Boers had blown the gun to pieces. The barrel of the gun
was blown about fifty yards in front of the emplacement, whilst the
breech-block was found afterwards 1-1/2 miles in rear. They had
destroyed also one pompom and one Maxim. Twenty-eight Boers were
captured, with about sixty head of cattle and thirteen wagons. The
Australians had one man killed and one man wounded.
[Illustration: Remains of Boer Big Gun, Waterval]
The Waterval valley was well watered and exceedingly rich in crops, and
the numerous farm-houses were full of families. These were collected
afterwards by Colonel Park's column and sent into Lydenburg.
On the 16th the column set out from Waterval in a north-westerly
direction, the objective being Secoconi's country and Magnet Heights.
The first day found the force on the east bank of the Steelpoort River.
The Dwars River, which was found in full flood owing to a very violent
thunderstorm, had been forded on the way. The Regiment was rear-guard to
the column, and, owing to delay in passing the baggage over the river,
reached camp some considerable time after dark. The Australian mounted
troops did not halt at the Steelpoort, but, fording the river, pushed on
to Magnet Heights, which they occupied the same night. Park's column had
been in touch with Kitchener's in the morning.
[Illustration: Crossing the Steelport River]
On the banks of the Dwars River Secoconi's men were first met with.
These, armed with rifles of various patterns ancient and modern, were
out scouting for General Kitchener in all directions.
At dawn on April 17th the crossing of the Steelpoort River was
commenced. One company of the Regiment was first sent across to occupy
the high ground on the far side and to cover the crossing. The river was
in flood owing to the heavy rain of the previous day, and the water
above the men's waist. The advanced company having got safely across and
having occupied the high ground, the remainder of the infantry were sent
over without casualty. The march was then continued towards Magnet
Heights, which was reached at dusk. Here camp was formed, and on the
following day the march was again resumed with mule transport only,
through Secoconi's land.
Secoconi was at the time at war with a neighbouring tribe, and a fringe
of hills only, divided the combatant parties, but an interval was called
in their operations by mutual consent to allow of the passage of the
British through their respective countries. On leaving behind the
outposts of one, the outposts of the other were met with.
Having reached this point to the north of the Transvaal, General
Kitchener's column was in a position to turn south, and, in conjunction
with other columns on his right and left hand, to sweep the bush veldt
and mountains southward towards the railway, near which another force
under the personal command of Sir Bindon Blood, who was in charge of the
entire operations, was drawn up ready to intercept any Boers who might
try to move across the railway from north to south.
At Vergelegen, where the column halted for the night of the 18th, some
of Secoconi's headmen came into camp for an interview. They were much
impressed with what they saw, patted the 5-inch gun with friendly
concern, and having relieved the General of his tobacco-pouch and a box
of cigars, and offering their assistance when not busy with their
neighbours, returned to their kraals.
The mounted troops were sent on ahead the same day to Pokwani town,
where it was supposed the Boers had collected a quantity of cattle. No
trace, however, of either Boers or cattle was found there.
The columns comprising the drive southward were in constant
communication with each other by signalling. Plumer's column was
immediately on Kitchener's right, holding the line of the Oliphant's
River, thus preventing the Boers, who were scattered in small groups in
the bush veldt, from escaping in the direction of Pietersburg, whilst
Park's column was operating on Kitchener's left, thus preventing the
Boers breaking back towards Waterval and the Steenkampsberg mountains.
Gradually Kitchener's column moved southward, driving the Boers off the
high ground and picking them up with their cattle and families in the
low or bush veldt. To do this with greater effect the column was
divided, one portion consisting of the battalion, one gun, the I.L.H.
and Australians under Colonel Davies proceeding in a north-westerly
direction to stop the Boers breaking back into the bush veldt in rear,
whilst General Kitchener with the remainder of the column marched over
the high ground overlooking the bush veldt, and on the direct road to
the south. On the 22nd Davies' column reached Enkeldedoorn, whilst
General Kitchener with the Rifle Brigade occupied Vaal Kop on the
morning of the 23rd. On the first day out the mounted troops of Davies'
force, scouring the bush in their advance, captured 23 prisoners, 8
wagons, 450 head of cattle, and 4000 sheep. They also brought in a
number of families, some of whom had been hiding for months in kloofs
and dongas in great fear of the Kaffirs. One woman with her children was
seen weeping by the side of the track, and on being asked the reason,
she implored that she also might be taken into the railway and not left
behind. She was comforted by an assurance that the column would return
and that she would be taken in.
Stores were now running short, and the biscuit and sugar rations were
reduced to half.
In order to keep connection between the two portions of General
Kitchener's column, two companies were left at Enkeldedoorn under the
command of Captain Bartlett. These also formed a "stop" to prevent the
Boers breaking back, and a post to which prisoners' families and cattle
could be forwarded on their way to join the head-quarters at
Paardeplaats, whither General Kitchener had gone from Vaal Kop.
The Regiment, with the Australian mounted troops, operating through
dense bush proceeded in the direction of the Oliphant's River, capturing
a considerable number of prisoners, cattle, wagons, and families,
amongst the prisoners being Commandant Fourie.
Eight privates of the Regiment, who were escorting an ammunition cart,
and who had lost their way, captured six Boers with all their cattle and
brought them into camp.
When within twelve miles of the Oliphant's River, Davies, hearing that
Commandant Schroeder with a small commando was directly between him and
Plumer's column on the Oliphant's River, split his force into two. The
infantry, comprising five companies of the Regiment, were sent back
under Captain Jacson, with all the prisoners wagons and families to
Enkeldedoorn, while Davies himself, with the Australians and one gun,
started in pursuit of Schroeder. On nearing the Oliphant's River it was
ascertained that Schroeder, with forty-one men and one Maxim gun and
several wagons, had been forced by Davies' mounted troops across the
river into the hands of Plumer, who had them in safe keeping.
Jacson's train of prisoners reached Enkeldedoorn on April 26th, and on
the following day he received orders to proceed at once to
Zuikerboschplaats and to take with him Bartlett's two companies from
Enkeldedoorn. This place was reached at dusk, and shortly afterwards
Davies brought up his Australians to the same camp, his column being
then again united. The northern part of the bush veldt having been swept
clear of Boers, Davies then moved due south and scoured the country
round the Tafel Kop mountain, capturing a number of prisoners and
wagons. Haartebeestfontein was reached late in the evening of the 28th,
some of the companies of the Regiment having marched over hill and dale
through thick scrub more than twenty miles. Four men had lost their way
and were missing.
Orders were received on the following day from General Kitchener for
Davies' force to rejoin head-quarters at Paardeplaats. An early start
was made at 6 a.m. Lackau, 12-1/2 miles, was reached at 11 a.m., and
here the column halted and the cattle outspanned till 2.30 p.m. The heat
in the bush veldt was excessive, and was very trying to the men and
cattle. At 2.30 p.m. the march was again resumed, and after another ten
miles Paardeplaats was reached at dusk.
It had been a hot and dusty march of 22-1/2 miles, and the men and
cattle were rather "done up." On arrival it was found that the General
had moved on to Goedgedacht.
As soon as it was dark rockets were fired to try and direct the four
missing men into camp, but without success.
On the following day the battalion with the Australians marched down the
steep Zaaiplaats Pass to Buffelsvlei, bivouacking for the night on the
banks of the Buffelsvlei River.
On arrival there it was again found that the General had moved on to
Rooi Plaats, and that the 2nd Rifle Brigade had proceeded by the
Tautesberg road with prisoners and families and cattle to Wonderfontein
on the railway line.
May 1st found the force at Rooi Plaats, and here a halt was made on the
2nd. Two companies under Captain Bartlett were dispatched to Diepkloof
and two companies under Captain Wren to Waterval in order to block the
two roads to the north from the Botha's Berg, and to stop the Boers
breaking back.
On May 3rd the Regiment with the Australian mounted infantry reached
Waterval, and on the following day proceeded to Blinkwater. Two
companies with two guns under Captain Ponsonby, R.A., were left behind
to cover the retirement of some mounted infantry, with orders to rejoin
in the evening.
General Blood, with the whole of his personal command, had left
Blinkwater on the previous day for Middleburg, and on the 5th General
Kitchener received orders to follow him. The column marched that day to
Rooi Kop, twelve miles distant on the Middleburg road, and on the
following day two companies Devon Regiment, two companies Rifle Brigade,
five guns and one howitzer, with the sick, the whole under Captain
Jacson, left for Bankfontein, where they were joined next morning by the
remainder of General Kitchener's column.
At Bankfontein a telegram was received which announced that Major Davies
had been promoted to the brevet rank of lieutenant-colonel, Major Curry
granted a D.S.O., and Captain Jacson was to be promoted to the brevet
rank of lieutenant-colonel on attaining the rank of major.
A halt was made at Bankfontein from the 8th till the 11th, when the
force refitted, and on May the 12th the column marched to Rondebosch on
the outskirts of Middleburg.
In the early part of May, 1901, a further drive on a large scale was
organized by head-quarters. This was intended to traverse the whole of
the Eastern Transvaal south of the railway. The columns were to be
extended from Middleburg through Carolina up to the Swazi border on the
east, and then, with a circling movement based on Middleburg, gradually
to sweep the country through Ermelo towards Bethel. Having rounded up
all this country, the drive, extending from Bethel on the south to the
Pretoria-Lorenzo railway on the north, was by a combined movement to the
westward, to push all the Boers remaining in this part of the country
with their cattle on to Johannesburg-Springs and the Pretoria-Standerton
railway lines, which were guarded. The movement was under the direction
of Sir Bindon Blood, and his forces consisted of eight columns.
The battalion found itself again under the command of General Walter
Kitchener, forming part of his column, which was composed of the
following troops:--
1st Devonshire Regiment.
2nd Rifle Brigade.
6th West Australians (450 strong).
2nd I.L.H. (800 strong).
Four guns 53rd Field Battery R.A.
One 5-inch gun.
One naval 12-pounder.
Its position in the drive was on the left or outside edge of the circle
of the operations.
The forces were put in motion on the 13th May, on which day Kitchener,
advancing in the direction of the Swazi border, marched to Zaaiplaats
(12-1/2 miles), and thence without incident through Riet Kuil, reaching
Schoonora on the 15th. In the neighbourhood of Schoonora Commandant
Trichardt, with 170 of his followers, was surprised by the Australian
mounted infantry, who killed one Boer and captured 300 head of cattle. A
considerable number of Boers were reported to be in the neighbourhood.
The drifts over which the column had to pass after leaving Riet Kuil
were bad, and only two companies reached Schoonora that night. The
remainder of the battalion, which was rear-guard to the column,
bivouacked with the baggage three miles out of camp near a branch of the
Klein Oliphants River, and joined up with the column next morning. The
following day Mooiplaats was reached, when a large number of cattle and
some families were taken.
On May 16th the column moved to Grobellars Recht. Here the Boers were
found in large numbers under Botha. The 5th and 6th West Australians
whilst operating on the right flank of the column were ambushed, losing
one officer and six men killed and thirteen wounded. The Boers were very
truculent and gave considerable trouble, and the force was not in camp
till dark. It was not, however, disturbed during the night.
The column left Grobellars Recht on the 16th with the 5th and 6th West
Australians as rear-guard, supported by the Devonshire Regiment. The
Boers followed up smartly for some hours, but there were no casualties,
and camp was reached at Kromkrans at about 4 p.m. Smutsoog was reached
the next day. On the march Pulteney's column, which was seen in the
distance, mistaking Kitchener's column for a commando of Boers, shelled
them with field guns. Their shooting was accurate, and it was not till
General Kitchener threatened to send a 5-inch shell at them that they
desisted. Fortunately no damage was done. From Smutsoog the column
proceeded to Goedevervachting, a few Boers sniping the column on the
march.
Much inconvenience was experienced from the cold, as it froze hard every
night.
On the 20th the column marched to Florence, passing Bothwell and Lake
Chrissie, and on the following day reached Veltevreden. Here the 2nd
Rifle Brigade and the West Australians left the column. On the march to
Veltevreden a few Boers were seen, and there was some firing at the
rear-guard.
On the following day a short march brought the force to Uitkyk, where a
halt was made on the 23rd.
On the 24th the column on its march to Schapenberg captured 800 cattle
and 4000 sheep, and five Boers surrendered.
A halt was made on the 25th and 26th at Schapenberg. Here 16,000 sheep,
which were being driven along with the column, were slaughtered. These,
daily increasing in number, hampered the movements of the rearguard on
the march to such an extent, that it was found impossible to drive them
on to the railway; they were therefore slaughtered.
Lekkerloop was reached on the 27th, on which day the I.L.H. captured
twenty-two prisoners. A halt was made at Lekkerloop from the 28th to
31st, during which time the I.L.H. under Colonel Mackenzie were busy
capturing prisoners and clearing the country.
On June 1st the column marched to Bushman's Kop, proceeding on the
following day to Vierwonden, crossing the Theespruit _en route_. The
I.L.H. brought six prisoners into camp with them. The main column halted
at Vierwonden from the 3rd till the 8th, whilst Captain Bartlett left
for Hoilake on the 3rd in command of three companies as escort to a
convoy, and on the 4th Captain Wren was ordered with one company and
five guns to Bonnybraes. On the 9th the column marched to Bonnybraes,
Colonel Mackenzie and the I.L.H. bringing in eighteen Boers and about
400 cattle and some families.
A halt was made at Bonnybraes on the 10th. The column was reunited on
the 11th at Fernyhaugh, and on the 12th marched to Busby, the march
being greatly delayed by a bad drift over the Umpolosi River. Ring Kink
was reached on the 13th, and Woodstock on the 14th. Thirty Boer rifles
were found on Woodstock Farm.
The column was then divided. Seven companies of the Regiment under
Lieutenant-Colonel Davies, with the 2nd I.L.H. and the 5th and 6th West
Australians, left Woodstock at 1 a.m., the remainder of the column
proceeding, under General Kitchener's personal command, further south
towards Bank Kop to round up some Boers reported in that neighbourhood.
Davies' mounted troops captured during the day fourteen Boers, some
families, 100 cattle, 1000 sheep, and six wagons. This column marched
twenty-two miles and camped for the night at Blaukrans, where Colonel
Davies rested his men on the 16th.
Colbank was reached on the 17th, when all mounted troops left to join
Kitchener's column at Bank Kop.
The following day the Regiment marched to Kranspan and joined up with
General Kitchener. The column captured that day several families and
twenty-two Boers. On the 19th the whole column marched in the direction
of Ermelo, and camped for the night on a hill overlooking the town. Camp
was reached at nightfall after a very long, dusty, and tiring march, the
rear-guard getting in after dark.
On the 20th the force marched through Ermelo to Driehook. A number of
Boers followed up the rear-guard, and there was a good deal of firing,
but no casualties. The march was resumed on the following day and
Kranspoort was reached. On the 22nd the column marched to Witbank, the
rear-guard being engaged almost the whole march. A halt was made at
Witbank. The West Australians were here again ambushed, losing two men
killed, one officer and two men wounded, and five taken prisoners.
Three hundred Boers were reported on the left flank at nightfall, and
preparations were made to receive a night attack, which, however, did
not come off. On the following day a dense fog delayed the march till 9
a.m., and it was not till late that Vaal Bank was reached. The
rear-guard, consisting of the Devon Regiment and the 6th West
Australians, was engaged the whole day with the Boers, who followed the
column right up to the new camp. That night the whole Regiment was on
outpost duty.
The rear-guard was engaged heavily the following day during the march to
Bankpan.
Campbell's and Babington's columns were on the immediate right. The
Devons halted for the day at Bankpan, when the 5th and 6th West
Australians left to join Campbell's column at Middlekraal, the 18th
Hussars exchanging over to Kitchener's column.
A night march was made on the 26th for the purpose of surrounding a farm
some eight miles distant. This was accomplished by midnight. No Boers
were taken. The column halted till daylight, when the march was again
resumed, and Erstegeluk reached in the afternoon. A number of Boers were
surprised in the neighbouring farms by the mounted troops; and shortly
after camp was formed, a body of Boers attempted to drive in the
outposts and to attack the camp, but without success.
The following day Bethel was reached, and camp was formed close to
Colonel Babington's column. The 18th Hussars, reconnoitring to the
south-east of Bethel, were surprised by a large party of Boers.
Lieutenant Green, Devonshire Regiment, who was in charge of the Colt gun
attached to the 18th Hussars and which was manned by men of the
Devonshire Regiment, behaved very gallantly in bringing his gun at once
into action and engaging the Boers within a range of 500 yards, thus
covering the cavalry and giving them time to rally.
On June 29th the march was resumed, and the column reached Schurvekop,
the rear-guard receiving a good deal of attention from the Boers. Camp
was formed at Middlekraal on the following day. Here Campbell's column
was again met with.
Middlekraal was left on July 1st, and the column marched in the
direction of Springs. A number of Boers were in the vicinity of the
first camp, Witbank, and the camp was sniped during the night. The
following day the column marched to Bakenlaagte, the scene of the
disaster to Benson's column, the rear-guard being followed up by a few
Boers.
After a short march the following day Grootpan was reached, and at 8
p.m. three companies of the Regiment under Captain Bartlett, and the 5th
and 6th West Australians, made a night march to the south, capturing a
picquet of six Boers early next morning. The column, after a
twelve-miles' march, reached Sondagskraal on the 4th at 1 p.m. On
arrival there news was received that a Boer convoy, accompanied by Louis
Botha, was in the neighbourhood of Trichardtsfontein, about fifteen
miles from Sondagskraal.
General Kitchener determined to intercept this convoy, and for this
reason the following force under his personal command, viz. two
squadrons 19th Hussars, 5th and 6th West Australians, and four companies
of the Devonshire Regiment under Captain Jacson, set out the same
evening. The mounted troops of Colville's column co-operated.
Trichardtsfontein was reached an hour before dawn, when the place was
found deserted. A halt was made there for the day, when Colville's
column left.
[Illustration: Dawn--After a Night March, Trichardtsfontein]
At nightfall several Boers were seen on the hills in the vicinity, and
there was every reason to suppose that a night attack was contemplated
by them. Preparations were made accordingly, but the night was passed
quietly.
At dawn the return march was commenced. The Boers attacked the
rear-guard before it left camp and before it was formed up, and engaged
it the whole way back to Sondagskraal, until finally they came under
fire of the 5-inch gun in position in that camp.
During the preceding thirty-one hours the four companies of the Regiment
had marched forty-two miles.
Whilst this enterprise was being undertaken the remainder of the
battalion, with the transport of the column, had remained at
Sondagskraal under Colonel Davies.
On the 7th the force marched to Goedehoop, and proceeding without
incident on the 8th to Brakfontein, on the 9th to Strypan, reached
Springs on the 10th. The last two marches were long and tiring, and what
little strength was left in the oxen was exhausted. The men likewise
required a rest and a refit after their long trek from Lydenburg, which
had extended through Secoconi's country in the Northern Transvaal, down
south to Middleburg, thence east to the Swazi border and over the
Eastern Transvaal, reaching as far south as Bethel, to Springs, near
Johannesburg. Eighty per cent of the men had on arrival at Springs
neither shirts nor socks, and the bitter cold of the high veldt pierced
keenly through the thin Indian khaki drill. The column required
generally doing up before again "taking the floor." It was expected by
all that the infantry at least would be relieved by a fresh battalion.
But it was not to be, for General Walter Kitchener insisted on the
Devons accompanying him, and his column set out again from Springs on
the 14th on a trek to the north, and without much fighting or incident
reached Middleburg on July 22nd. The country through which the column
passed was cleared of everything living, including Kaffirs.
Three days' halt was allowed the column at Middleburg, and on the 25th a
start was again made for the north. It was now composed as under:--
Four guns 81st Field Battery R.A., under Major Simpson.
One pompom.
19th Hussars.
5th and 6th West Australians.
Half company Scottish Horse.
Half company Mounted Infantry.
Seven companies Devonshire Regiment.
Two companies under Captain Bartlett had left on the 24th July to
garrison Elands River station, on the Pretoria-Lorenzo railway.
The seven companies with General Kitchener marched out 723 strong.
Two other columns were operating with General Kitchener, one under
Colonel Park and the other under Colonel Campbell. The whole were under
the supreme command of General Walter Kitchener.
On the first day out the 19th Hussars captured a pompom and about sixty
prisoners of Ben Viljoen's and Muller's commandos after a very gallant
little action in which five men of the 19th Hussars especially
distinguished themselves. A great number of cattle and many wagons were
also taken, and the Boers lost about twelve killed and twenty wounded.
General Walter Kitchener's column encamped at Rooi Kraal for a few days
before moving to a camp at Diep Kloof, from which place convoys were
sent to the railway for stores for the three columns.
The first of these convoys under Lieutenant-Colonel Jacson left on
August 1st, marched to Middleburg, by Blinkwater and Elandslaagte, and
reached Middleburg in three days; halted one day there to load up, and
returned via Elandslaagte and Noitgedacht to Diepkloof in three more
days, receiving on their return the congratulations of General Kitchener
on their performance.
On the 10th another convoy, again under Lieutenant-Colonel Jacson, with
an escort composed of men of the Devons and Leicesters and some Scottish
mounted infantry and two field guns, started for Wonderfontein.
This convoy consisted of all the wagons of the columns of Colonels Park
and Campbell and General Kitchener, which had to be filled up at the
railway line and brought back.
Waterval was reached on the 10th, Rhenoster Hoek on the 11th, Sterkloop
on the 12th, Uitflucht on the 13th, and Wonderfontein on the 14th.
Slight opposition was met with, and three Boers were captured with
wagons containing a quantity of grain.
The convoy having halted and loaded up on the 15th, started on its
return journey on the 16th.
The journey to Wonderfontein had been up the Steelpoort valley, and the
road had been found difficult. It was very much intersected with
water-courses running off the high veldt, and these necessitated
frequent halts to allow of the passage of the wagons in single file, and
the reclosing up of the convoy after crossing.
A different road over the high veldt, thus avoiding the water-courses,
was chosen for the return journey, and it was perhaps fortunate that
this new road was selected, as it was reported afterwards that Ben
Viljoen had taken up a position at the time in the Steelpoort valley to
intercept the return column.
On the 16th the convoy marched to Panplaats; on the 17th to Roedekop
(where some of Viljoen's men were met with and some more of his grain
carts captured), Blinkwater on the 18th, and Diepkloof on the 19th.
After a few days' scouring of the country round Diepkloof and the valley
towards the Oliphants River, the three columns concentrated at
Blinkwater. Here an entrenched camp was formed under the command of
Lieutenant-Colonel Jacson, consisting of the baggage of the three
columns, the hospitals, and most of the field guns, with a garrison
included amongst which were four companies of the Regiment.
Park's and Campbell's columns marched east into the hills in the
Ohrigstadt direction, Park penetrating almost as far as Pilgrim's Rest,
while General Kitchener's column moved south towards Middleburg. On
September 3rd the force was broken up, Colonel Park's column being left
in the neighbourhood of Blinkwater, whilst General Kitchener's column
marched towards the railway at Wonderfontein, which was reached on
September 5th.
On arrival at Wonderfontein it was found that trekking was for the time
being, finished. Orders were received for the Regiment to entrain for
Machadodorp for the purpose of garrisoning the railway blockhouses.
The General's farewell order to the Regiment on its leaving the column
with which it had been so long associated was as follows:--
"COLUMN ORDER BY MAJOR-GENERAL F.W. KITCHENER
"_Wonderfontein, September 5th, 1901._
"It has been the privilege of the Major-General to include the 1st Devon
Regiment in his command since the relief of Ladysmith, and it is with
great regret that he has now to part with the last fighting unit of the
7th Brigade. The reputation earned by the Regiment at Elandslaagte and
Ladysmith is a matter of history. Since that time this excellent corps
has fought and marched in summer rain and winter frost during many long
months, through the length and breadth of the Eastern Transvaal.
"The face of the country will remain for many years scarred with the
trenches they have dug and the works they have made. They have proved on
all occasions what a sound regimental system worked by thoroughly sound
officers, N.C.O.s, and men can do.
"The Major-General and all in number one column wish the Devons good
luck and a pleasant time in the near future."
On September 6th the Regiment entrained. The General and his staff and
the whole column turned out to give the Regiment a hearty farewell.
Machadodorp was reached at about 2 p.m., and all the posts round the
town were taken over from the Royal Irish Fusiliers. The railway
blockhouses in the neighbourhood of Machadodorp were also taken over.
Colonel Davies was appointed commandant of the station, and Captain
Ravenshaw station staff officer.
During September and October six companies were located on the Lydenburg
road as far as Witklip, holding the following posts:--Helvetia,
Schwartzkop, Schoeman's Kloof, Badfontein, and Witklip. Two companies
remained at Machadodorp with the battalion head-quarters.
In October, one company under Captain Holland and Lieutenant Willis,
whilst acting as escort to a party erecting blockhouses in the
Badfontein valley, was attacked by Ben Viljoen and about three hundred
Boers. The Boers galloped down from the hills on to the extended
company. The men behaved with great gallantry, and finally, after a
sharp and mixed-up fight, drove off the Boers. One man of the company
fell into their hands and was stripped and left. Lieutenant Willis, for
gallantry on this occasion, was rewarded with the D.S.O., and
Lance-Corporal Cummings was promoted corporal by the Commander-in-Chief
for gallantry in the field.
During the first week of November, orders were received for the 1st
Battalion to proceed to Standerton _en route_ to India. The 2nd
Battalion had been quartered there for a considerable time, and a
transfer of men was effected from one battalion to the other. The two
battalions spent Christmas together.
[Illustration: Devons En Route to Durban]
On January 1st (1902) the 1st Battalion entrained at daylight for
Durban.
The battalion met with a great reception at Maritzburg, where a halt was
made for nine hours. Here each man was presented by the ladies of that
place with a pipe, half a pound of tobacco, and a pockethandkerchief.
The battalion sailed from South Africa for India, with the following
officers and 922 rank and file:--
Bt. Lieutenant-Colonel T.A.H. Davies, D.S.O.
Bt. Lieutenant-Colonel M.G. Jacson.
Captain E.C. Wren.
" T.C.B. Holland.
" G.H.I. Graham.
Lieutenant T.B. Harries.
" G.I. Watts.
" D.H. Blunt.
" H.R. Gunning.
" S.T. Hailey.
" H.W.F. Twiss.
" E.S.C. Willis.
" W.E. Scafe.
" G.F.A. Kane.
2nd Lieutenant C. Edward-Collins.
" " M.D. Young.
" " C.W. Hext.
" " A.M. Mills.
" " R.C. Wrey.
Brevet-Major and Adjutant H.S.L. Ravenshaw.
Of the above, it may be noted that the following left India with the
battalion in 1899:--
Bt. Lieut.-Colonel M.G. Jacson.
Captain E.C. Wren.
" G.H.I. Graham.
Lieutenant T.B. Harries.
" G.I. Watts.
" D.H. Blunt.
" H.R. Gunning.
" S.T. Hayley.
" H.W.F. Twiss.
Bt-Major and Adjutant H.S.L. Ravenshaw.
The following officers of the battalion remained behind in South
Africa:--
Colonel C.W. Park, A.D.C., commanding a column.
Captain and Bt.-Major E.M. Morris, South African Constabulary.
Captain Bartlett, D.A.A.G. for Intelligence.
" Vyvyan, Provost Marshal, Barberton.
" Travers, South African Constabulary.
Lieutenant-General Lyttleton met the battalion at Howick on its way to
Durban, and wished them "farewell."
The following telegram was received at Durban from Lord Kitchener,
commanding the forces in South Africa:--
"To O.C. 1st Devon Regiment,
Durban.
"From Lord Kitchener,
Johannesburg.
"Please express to officers and men of the Regiment under your command
my high appreciation of their services in South Africa during the war,
which has already enhanced the great reputation of the Regiment. In
bidding you good-bye, I associate myself with all your comrades
remaining in the country in hearty wishes for your future good luck."
It should be added to the records of the battalion, which throughout two
years and three months had fought and marched incessantly in South
Africa, that it had never once experienced the slightest trace of an
"unfortunate incident," and had during that time lost only three
prisoners of war, two of whom lost their way in the dark at Geluk and
marched into enemy's lines, the third having been taken during the
company fight in the Badfontein valley against 300 of Ben Viljoen's men.
The miles traversed by the battalion in the long continuous treks during
the war are summarized as under. The miles are measured off the map
simply from place to place and from camp to camp, and they do not
include the distances marched in fighting, flanking, or other movements,
or in convoy work and expeditions in the Lydenburg district, which, if
included, would probably double the distance marched.
_Trek under Sir Redvers Buller._
August 7th till October 2nd, 1900.
Zandspruit to Lydenburg, 271 miles in 54 days, including all halts.
_Trek under General Walter Kitchener._
April 13th till September 2nd, 1901.
Lydenburg, Secoconi's country, Middleburg, Swazi Border, Bethel,
Springs, Middleburg, Bothas Berg, and country north of the railway line.
1006 miles in 141 days, including all halts.
On the evening of January 1st the Regiment embarked on the s.s.
_Armenian_, and was followed by the 2nd battalion Gordon Highlanders,
who embarked on January 2nd.
On January 3rd the ship conveying the two regiments sailed for Bombay,
which port was reached on January 18th.
Lord Northcote, the Governor of Bombay, received the two regiments on
disembarkation and addressed them, congratulating them on their good
work in South Africa.
The Devons entrained the same evening for Shahjehanpur in the United
Provinces.
The honours gained by the officers and men of the battalion were as
follows:--
1. Colonel Yule to be C.B.
2. Lieutenant-Colonel Park to be Brevet-Colonel and Aide-de-Camp to the
King.
3. Major Davies, D.S.O., to be Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel.
4. Major Curry granted D.S.O.
5. Captain Jacson to be Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel on promotion to the
rank of Major.
6. Captain Norton Goodwyn, D.S.O., to be Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel on
promotion to the rank of Major.
7. Captain Travers granted D.S.O.
8. Captain and Adjutant Ravenshaw to be Brevet-Major.
9. Captain Masterson to be Brevet-Major and awarded the Victoria Cross.
10. Captain E.M. Morris to be Brevet-Major.
11. Lieutenant Emerson granted D.S.O.
12. " Willis granted D.S.O.
_Attached Officers_.
13. Lieutenant Tringham, the Queen's, granted D.S.O.
14. Lieutenant Cowie, Dorset Regiment, granted D.S.O.
The following officers of the 1st Battalion were mentioned in
dispatches:--
Colonel Yule--once.
Brevet-Colonel Park, A.D.C.--twice.
Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Davies, D.S.O.--twice.
Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Jacson--twice.
" " Goodwyn--twice.
Major Curry, D.S.O.--twice.
Brevet-Major Ravenshaw--four times.
" Masterson, V.C.--twice.
Captain W.B. Lafone--twice.
" Bartlett--once.
" Travers, D.S.O.--once.
" Wren--once.
" Smyth-Osbourne--twice.
" Luxmore--once.
Lieutenant Field--twice.
" Emerson, D.S.O.--three times.
" Willis, D.S.O.--once.
" Tringham, D.S.O. (attached)--once.
" Cowie, D.S.O. (attached)--twice.
" Twiss--once.
" Harris--once.
" Green--once.
" Watts--once.
" Gardiner--once.
_Non-commissioned Officers and Men._
The following were granted Distinguished Conduct Medals:--
Colour-Sergeant Payne.
" Horswell.
" Palmer.
" Burnell.
" Webb.
" Aplin.
Sergeant Pitt.
" Downing.
" Hudson.
" Williams.
Lance-Sergeant Poulter.
" Young.
" Rowe.
Corporal Hansford.
Private Boulton.
" Davies.
The following non-commissioned officers and men were mentioned in
dispatches:--
Colour-Sergeant Palmer--four times.
" Payne--twice.
" Horswell--once.
" Burnell--once.
" Webb--once.
" Burchell--once.
Sergeant Hudson--once.
" Downing--once.
" Young--twice.
" Poulter--once.
" Curtis--once.
Lance-Sergeant Rowe--twice.
Corporal Hayes--once (promoted sergeant).
Lance-Corporal Cummings--once (promoted corporal).
Private Brimicombe--twice.
" Norman--three times.
" Cox--twice.
" Smith--once.
" Youlden--once.
" Clay--once.
" Edwards--once.
" Hayman--once.
" Davies--once.
" Hansford--twice.
" Boulton--once.
[Illustration: Monument Erected in Ladysmith Cemetery]
The following is a list of the killed and wounded and of those who died
of disease during the campaign:--
_Officers: Killed._
Captain W.B. Lafone.
Lieutenant Field.
" Dalzel.
" Price-Dent.
2nd Lieutenant Cumin.
" Carey.
Lieutenant Walker, Somerset Light Infantry (attached).
_Wounded._
Captain Lafone--twice.
" Masterson.
" Luxmore.
2nd Lieutenant Twiss.
" " Scafe.
" Kane.
Lieutenant Caffin (attached).
" Tringham (attached).
" Byrne (attached).
2nd Lieutenant Gunning.
" Hayley.
" Green.
_N.C.O.'s and Men._
_Killed and died of wounds and diseases._
Private Taylor, died of disease Ladysmith.
" Forman, killed Ladysmith.
" Salter " "
" Nolloth, died of disease Ladysmith.
" Richards " " "
" Edwards " " "
" Paddon " " Transvaal.
" Hayward " " "
" Morgan, died of wounds "
" Manley, died of disease "
" Goff, killed Transvaal.
" Brockett, killed Ladysmith.
" Cook, died of disease Ladysmith.
" Banfield, died of wounds Ladysmith.
" Sullivan, died of disease "
" Woolacott, died of disease Transvaal.
" Penfold " " "
" Silvester " " Ladysmith.
" Marsh " " "
" Nunn " " "
Lance-Corporal Leonard, died of disease
Ladysmith.
Private Evans, died of disease Ladysmith.
" Parrott, killed Transvaal.
" Arthur, died of disease Transvaal.
" Luck " " "
" Mathews " " "
" Clements " " Ladysmith.
" Seager, died of wounds "
" Connabeer, died of disease "
" Swannell " " "
Lance-Corporal Spear, died of disease.
Private Litton, killed Ladysmith.
" Vinnicombe, died of disease.
" Down " "
" Rowland " "
Lance-Corporal Pratt, killed Ladysmith.
Private Bibb, killed Ladysmith.
" Harvey " "
" Woods, died of wounds received Ladysmith.
" Hornsby, died of wounds received Ladysmith.
Private Milton, died of disease Ladysmith.
" Firminger " " "
" Vicary " " "
" Newbury " " "
" Lane " " "
" Sheridan " " "
" Horswell " " "
Lance-Corporal Vern, killed Ladysmith.
Private Bamsey, killed Ladysmith.
" Fair " "
" Roper " "
" Davidson " "
" Curtis " "
" Marden " "
" Brown " "
" Newcombe " "
Lance-Corporal Pigeon, died of wounds
received Ladysmith.
Private Bevan, died of wounds received
Ladysmith.
Private Page, died of wounds received
Ladysmith.
Private Vern, died of disease.
" Rosser died of disease.
" Clotworthy " "
" Turner " "
" Ponting " "
" Rawbone " "
" Jeffries, died of wounds.
" Young, died of disease.
" Davidson " "
" Cunningham " "
Lance-Corporal Murfin, died of disease.
Private Livermore " "
Corporal Wright " "
Private Humphrey, killed.
" Bowles, died of disease.
" Watts " "
" Meade " "
" Phillips " "
" Kingham " "
" Winsor, killed Reitfontein.
" Mayne, died of disease.
" Tayler " "
" Pike " "
" Trenchard " "
" Salter, killed Geluk.
" Cole " "
" Mcgrath " "
" Smith " "
" Lashbrook, died of wounds.
" Rowe, died of disease.
" Holmes " "
" Conian " "
_N.C.O.'s and Men Wounded._
Private Bidwell.
" Turner.
" Pirouet.
" Spiller.
" Laycock.
" Wright.
Col.-Sergeant Webb.
Corporal Shapland.
" Bradford.
Lance-Corporal Millward.
Lance-Corporal Bennet.
Lance-Corporal Whitman.
Private Cox.
" Norman.
" Palmer.
" Webber.
" Lemon.
Private Lock.
" Hutchings.
" Bevan.
" Orchard.
" Spreadbury.
" Barnett.
" Cox.
" Hay.
" Page.
" King.
" Saunders.
" Wheaton.
" Stapley.
" Brazil.
" West.
" Onyett.
" Winson.
" Dudley.
" Lott.
" Hornsby.
" Fordham.
" Turner.
" Varndell.
" Mower.
" Taylor.
Colour-Sergeant Burchell.
Sergeant Williams.
" Hawkins.
Corporal Lovell.
" Saunders.
Private Lupton.
" Harford.
" Parrott.
" Mahoney.
" Allen.
" Curtiss.
" O'Brien.
" Brown.
" Gray.
" Anstey.
" Lucas.
Sergeant Leach.
Private Capp.
" Gander.
Private Gregory.
" Reynolds.
" Devitte.
" Osmonde.
" Burge.
" Newton.
" Reed.
Lance-Corporal Bromford--twice.
Private Rowe.
" Sussex.
" Ward.
" Smith.
" Easton.
" Legatt.
Col.-Sergeant Palmer.
Private Bray.
Lance-Corporal Spear.
Private Kean.
" Welch.
" Peckham.
Lance-Corpl. Quick.
Private Burns.
" Simmons.
" Palmer.
Total number of killed and wounded and died of disease:--
Killed and died of disease. Wounded.
Officers 7 12
N.C.O.'s and men 91 85
Total casualties 195
A large memorial is erected to the memory of those who fell on January
6th at Wagon Hill, Ladysmith, on the spot where the charge took place.
It bears the following inscription:
To the glory of God,
and in memory of
the following Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers,
and Men of the
1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment,
who fell in the gallant and
successful charge made across this
place by three companies during the
fight on 6th January, 1900.
Siege of Ladysmith.
Captain W.B. Lafone.
Lieutenant H.N. Field.
Lance-Corpl. J. Pigeon.
" " W.D. Pratt.
" " A. Vern.
Private T. Bamsey.
" A. Bevan.
" J. Bibb.
" W. Brown.
" A. Curtis.
" W. Davidson.
Private W. Fair.
" W. Harvey.
" E. Hornsby.
" T. Litton.
" H. Marden.
" W. Newcombe.
" F.W.J. Page.
" G. Roper.
" J. Seager.
" W. Woods.
Lieutenant E.E.M. Walker, Somerset Light Infantry
(attached).
"Semper Fidelis."
A marble monument is erected in Ladysmith cemetery to those who were
killed or died of disease during the siege of Ladysmith, and their names
are recorded on it. A small iron cross was also placed at the head of
the grave of every man of the Regiment who was killed or who died of
disease during the war.
These memorials were erected by the officers, non-commissioned officers,
and men of the 1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment, to the memory of their
gallant comrades.
WILLIAM BRENDON AND SON, LTD. PRINTERS,
PLYMOUTH
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