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Title: The Middle Period 1817-1858
Author: John William Burgess
Release Date: March 12, 2011 [EBook #35558]
Language: English
*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE MIDDLE PERIOD 1817-1858 ***
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THE MIDDLE PERIOD
_THE AMERICAN HISTORY SERIES_
THE MIDDLE PERIOD
1817-1858
BY
JOHN W. BURGESS, PH.D., LL.D.
PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, AND DEAN OF THE
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, IN COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF
NEW YORK
_WITH MAPS_
NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
1910
COPYRIGHT, 1897, BY CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
To the memory of my former teacher, colleague, and friend,
JULIUS HAWLEY SEELYE,
philosopher, theologian, statesman, and educator, this volume is
reverently and affectionately inscribed.
PREFACE
There is no more serious and delicate task in literature and morals
than that of writing the history of the United States from 1816 to
1860. The periods which precede this may be treated without fear of
arousing passion, prejudice, and resentment, and with little danger of
being misunderstood. Even the immaculateness of Washington may be
attacked without exciting anything worse than a sort of uncomfortable
admiration for the reckless courage of the assailant. But when we pass
the year 1820, and especially when we approach the year 1860, we find
ourselves in a different world. We find ourselves in the midst of the
ideas, the motives, and the occurrences which, and of the men who,
have, in large degree, produced the animosities, the friendships, and
the relations between parties and sections which prevail to-day.
Serious and delicate as the task is, however, the time has arrived
when it should be undertaken in a thoroughly impartial spirit. The
continued misunderstanding between the North and the South is an ever
present menace to the welfare of both sections and of the entire
nation. It makes it almost impossible to decide any question of our
politics upon its merits. It offers an almost insuperable obstacle to
the development of a national opinion upon the fundamental principles
of our polity. If we would clear up this confusion in the common
consciousness, we must do something to dispel this misunderstanding;
and I know of no means of accomplishing this, save the rewriting of
our history from 1816 to 1860, with an open mind and a willing spirit
to see and to represent truth and error, and right and wrong, without
regard to the men or the sections in whom or where they may appear.
I am by no means certain that I am able to do this. I am old enough to
have been a witness of the great struggle of 1861-65, and to have
participated, in a small way, in it. My early years were embittered by
the political hatreds which then prevailed. I learned before my
majority to regard secession as an abomination, and its chief cause,
slavery, as a great evil; and I cannot say that these feelings have
been much modified, if any at all, by longer experiences and maturer
thought. I have, therefore, undertaken this work with many misgivings.
Keenly conscious of my own prejudices, I have exerted my imagination
to the utmost to create a picture in my own mind of the environment of
those who held the opposite opinion upon these fundamental subjects,
and to appreciate the processes of their reasoning under the
influences of their own particular situation. And I have with sedulous
care avoided all the histories written immediately after the close of
the great contest of arms, and all rehashes of them of later date. In
fact I have made it an invariable rule to use no secondary material;
that is, no material in which original matter is mingled with
somebody's interpretation of its meaning. If, therefore, the facts in
my narration are twisted by prejudices and preconceptions, I think I
can assure my readers that they have suffered only one twist. I have
also endeavored to approach my subject in a reverent spirit, and to
deal with the characters who made our history, in this almost tragic
period, as serious and sincere men having a most perplexing and
momentous problem to solve, a problem not of their own making, but a
fatal inheritance from their predecessors.
I have been especially repelled by the flippant superficiality of the
foreign critics of this period of our history, and their evident
delight in representing the professions and teachings of the "Free
Republic" as canting hypocrisy. It has seemed to me a great misfortune
that the present generation and future generations should be taught to
regard so lightly the earnest efforts of wise, true, and honorable men
to rescue the country from the great catastrophe which, for so long,
impended over it. The passionate onesidedness of our own writers is
hardly more harmful, and is certainly less repulsive.
I recently heard a distinguished professor of history and politics say
that he thought the history of the United States, in this period,
could be truthfully written only by a Scotch-Irishman. I suppose he
meant that the Scotch element in this ideal historian would take the
Northern point of view, and the Irish element the Southern; but I
could not see how this would produce anything more than another pair
of narratives from the old contradictory points of view; and he did
not explain how it would.
My opinion is, on the contrary, that this history must be written by
an American and a Northerner, and from the Northern point of
view--because an American best understands Americans, after all;
because the victorious party can be and will be more liberal,
generous, and sympathetic than the vanquished; and because the
Northern view is, in the main, the correct view. It will not improve
matters to concede that the South had right and the North might, or,
even, that both were equally right and equally wrong. Such a doctrine
can only work injury to both, and more injury to the South than to the
North. Chewing the bitter cud of fancied wrong produces both spiritual
misery and material adversity, and tempts to foolish and reckless
action for righting the imagined injustice. Moreover, any such
doctrine is false, and acquiescence in it, however kindly meant, is
weak, and can have no other effect than the perpetuation of error and
misunderstanding. The time has come when the men of the South should
acknowledge that they were in error in their attempt to destroy the
Union, and it is unmanly in them not to do so. When they appealed the
great question from the decision at the ballot-box to the "trial by
battle," their leaders declared, over and over again, in calling their
followers to arms, that the "God of battles" would surely give the
victory to the right. In the great movements of the world's history
this is certainly a sound philosophy, and they should have held to it
after their defeat. Their recourse to the crude notion that they had
succumbed only to might was thus not only a bitter, false, and
dangerous consolation, but it was a stultification of themselves when
at their best as men and heroes.
While, therefore, great care has been taken, in the following pages,
to attribute to the Southern leaders and the Southern people sincerity
of purpose in their views and their acts, while their ideas and their
reasoning have been, I think, duly appreciated, and patiently
explained, while the right has been willingly acknowledged to them and
honor accorded them whenever and wherever they have had the right and
have merited honor, and while unbounded sympathy for personal
suffering and misfortune has been expressed, still not one scintilla
of justification for secession and rebellion must be expected. The
South must acknowledge its error as well as its defeat in regard to
these things, and that, too, not with lip service, but from the brain
and the heart and the manly will, before any real concord in thought
and feeling, any real national brotherhood, can be established. This
is not too much to demand, simply because it is right, and nothing can
be settled, as Mr. Lincoln said, until it is settled right. Any
interpretation of this period of American history which does not
demonstrate to the South its error will be worthless, simply because
it will not be true; and unless we are men enough to hear and accept
and stand upon the truth, it is useless to endeavor to find a bond of
real union between us. In a word, the conviction of the South of its
error in secession and rebellion is absolutely indispensable to the
establishment of national cordiality; and the history of this period
which fails to do this will fail in accomplishing one of the highest
works of history, the reconciliation of men to the plans of Providence
for their perfection.
I have not, in the following pages, undertaken to treat _all_ of the
events of our experience from 1816 to 1860. The space allowed me would
not admit of that. And even if it had, I still would have selected
only those events which, in my opinion, are significant of our
progress in civilization, and, as I am writing a political history,
only those which are significant of our progress in political
civilization. The truthful record, connection, and interpretation of
such events is what I call history in the highest sense, as
distinguished from chronology, narrative, and romance. Both necessity
and philosophy have confined me to these.
I cannot close these prefatory sentences without a word of grateful
acknowledgment to my friend and colleague, Dr. Harry A. Cushing, for
the important services which he has rendered me in the preparation of
this work.
JOHN W. BURGESS.
323 WEST FIFTY-SEVENTH STREET, NEW YORK CITY.
JANUARY 22, 1897.
CONTENTS
PAGE
CHAPTER I.
THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE OLD REPUBLICAN PARTY, . . . . . . . 1
CHAPTER II.
THE ACQUISITION OF FLORIDA, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
CHAPTER III.
SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES BEFORE 1820, . . . . . . . . . . 39
CHAPTER IV.
THE CREATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MISSOURI, . . . . . . . . 61
CHAPTER V.
THE BEGINNING OF THE PARTICULARISTIC REACTION, . . . . . . . . 108
CHAPTER VI.
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1824, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
CHAPTER VII.
THE DIVISION OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
CHAPTER VIII.
DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION TO INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS AND PROTECTION, 166
CHAPTER IX.
THE UNITED STATES BANK AND THE PRESIDENTIAL CONTEST OF 1832, . 190
CHAPTER X.
NULLIFICATION, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
CHAPTER XI.
ABOLITION, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
CHAPTER XII.
THE BANK, THE SUB-TREASURY, AND PARTY DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN 1832
AND 1842, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
CHAPTER XIII.
TEXAS, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
CHAPTER XIV.
OREGON, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
CHAPTER XV.
THE "RE-ANNEXATION OF TEXAS AND THE RE-OCCUPATION OF OREGON," 318
CHAPTER XVI.
THE WAR WITH MEXICO, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
CHAPTER XVII.
THE ORGANIZATION OF OREGON TERRITORY AND THE COMPROMISE OF
1850, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
CHAPTER XVIII.
THE EXECUTION OF THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW, AND THE ELECTION OF
1852, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365
CHAPTER XIX.
THE REPEAL OF THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE, . . . . . . . . . . . . 380
CHAPTER XX.
THE STRUGGLE FOR KANSAS, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407
CHAPTER XXI.
THE DRED SCOTT CASE, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449
CHAPTER XXII.
THE STRUGGLE FOR KANSAS CONCLUDED, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460
APPENDIX I.
THE ELECTORAL VOTE IN DETAIL, 1820-1856, . . . . . . . . . . . 475
APPENDIX II.
THE CABINETS OF MONROE, ADAMS, JACKSON, VAN BUREN, HARRISON,
TYLER, POLK, TAYLOR, FILLMORE, PIERCE, AND
BUCHANAN--1816-1858, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 485
CHRONOLOGY, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 491
BIBLIOGRAPHY, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 497
INDEX, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 503
LIST OF MAPS.
FACING
PAGE
FLORIDA AT THE TIME OF ACQUISITION, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
TEXAS AT THE TIME OF ANNEXATION, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
OREGON AS DETERMINED BY THE TREATY OF 1846, . . . . . . . . . . 312
CALIFORNIA AND NEW MEXICO IN 1850, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
NEBRASKA AND KANSAS, 1854-1861, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468
THE MIDDLE PERIOD
{1}
CHAPTER I.
THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE OLD REPUBLICAN PARTY
General Character of the Acts of the Fourteenth Congress--Madison's
Message of December 5th, 1815--Change in the Principles of the
Republican Party--The United States Bank Act of 1816--Report of the
Bank Bill by Mr. Calhoun--Mr. Calhoun's Argument in Favor of the
Bill--Webster's Objections to the Bank Bill--Mr. Clay's Support of the
Bank Bill--Passage of the Bank Bill by the House of
Representatives--The Passage of the Bank Bill by the Senate--The
United States Bank of 1816 a Southern Measure--The Tariff Bill Framed
by the Committee on Ways and Means--The Tariff Bill Reported--The
Character of the Tariff Bill--Mr. Calhoun's Speech upon the Tariff
Bill--The Passage of the Tariff Bill--The Army and Navy Bills--The
Bill for National Improvements--Mr. Calhoun's Advocacy of this
Bill--The Opposition to the Internal Improvements Bill--Passage of the
Bill by Congress--Veto of the Bill by the President--The Failure of
Congress to Override the Veto.
It is no part of my task to relate the events of the War of 1812-15.
That has already been sufficiently done in the preceding volume of
this series. I take up the threads of the narrative at the beginning
of the year 1816, and my problem in this chapter will be to expound
the acts and policies of the Fourteenth Congress in the light of the
experiences of that War.
{2} [Sidenote: General character of the acts of the Fourteenth
Congress.]
Those acts and policies were shaped and adopted under the influence of
those experiences, and this influence was so predominant, at the
moment, in the minds of the leading men in the Government and
throughout the country as to exclude, or at least to overbalance, all
other influences. This is especially manifest in the attitude of the
statesmen of the slave-holding Commonwealths, and most especially in
the attitude of their great leader, Mr. Calhoun, who was the chief
champion of some of the most national measures voted by that Congress.
A clear appreciation of his views and his acts at that period of his
career will enable us far better than anything else to understand the
terrible seriousness of the slavery question, which subsequently drove
him into lines of thought and action so widely divergent from those
upon which he set out in early life.
[Sidenote: Madison's message of December 5th, 1815.]
It was the President himself, however, one of the chief founders of
the "States' rights" party, Mr. Madison, who set the direction toward
centralization in the Congressional legislation of 1815-17. In his
annual message of December 5th, 1815, he recommended the increase and
better organization of the army and the navy, the enlargement of the
existing Military Academy and the founding of such academies in the
different sections of the country, the creation of a national
currency, the protection of manufactures, the construction of roads
and canals, and the establishment of a national university.
This is a very different political creed from that promulgated by
President Jefferson when the Republican party first gained possession
of the Government at Washington. Then, decrease in all the elements of
power in the hands of the central Government, and careful maintenance
of all the rights and powers of the {3} "States," were recommended and
urged upon the attention of the national lawgivers.
[Sidenote: Change in the principles of the Republican party.]
From a "States'-sovereignty" party in 1801, the Republican party had
manifestly become a strong national party in 1816; that is, if we are
to take the two Presidential messages, to which we have referred, as
containing the political principles of that party at these two periods
of its existence.
As the Congress of 1801 showed itself, in its legislation, to be in
substantial accord with President Jefferson's views and sentiments, so
did the Congress of 1815 manifest, in its legislation, the same
general harmony with the views and sentiments of President Madison. In
order that the latter part of this statement may be set down as an
established fact of history, we will review with some particularity
the two cardinal acts of this Congress--the United States Bank Act and
the Tariff Act.
[Sidenote: The United States Bank Act of 1816.]
So soon as the reading of President Madison's message before the House
of Representatives was completed, that body resolved to refer that
part of the message which related to the establishment of an uniform
national currency to a select committee. The committee chosen was
composed of Mr. Calhoun, Mr. Macon, Mr. Pleasants, Mr. Tucker, Mr.
Robertson, Mr. Hopkinson, and Mr. Pickering. The first five of these
gentlemen were from Commonwealths south of the Pennsylvania line, and
only two, therefore, from what began now to be called the
"non-slave-holding States." In other words, it was a Southern
committee, and the great South Carolinian was its chairman. It is,
therefore, just to regard the bill which this committee brought in,
and the arguments with which they supported it, as containing the
views and the sentiments of the leading Southern Republicans in the
House.
{4} [Sidenote: Report of the Bank Bill by Mr. Calhoun.]
This committee came speedily to the conclusion that the
nationalization of the monetary system was the most pressing need of
the country, and within a month from the date of the appointment of
its members the chairman of the committee reported a bill for the
creation of an United States Bank, a mammoth national banking
corporation, which should have a capital of thirty-five millions of
dollars; in which the central Government should own one-fifth of the
stock and be represented by one-fifth of the directors; the president
of which should always be selected from among the Government's
directors; the demand notes and bills of which should be received in
all payments to the United States; and the chartered privileges of
which should be made a monopoly for twenty years.
[Sidenote: Mr. Calhoun's argument in favor of the Bill.]
In his great argument in support of the bill, delivered on February
26th, Mr. Calhoun dismissed at the outset any consideration of the
constitutionality of the bill. That is, he simply assumed that
Congress had the power to pass the bill, and declared that the public
mind was entirely made up and settled upon that point.
Only five years before this, even the national-minded Clay had
pronounced the dictum that Congress had no power to grant a national
bank charter, and the fact that Congress then declined to grant such a
charter is good evidence that the majority of the people of the
country held the same view. There can be little question that the
Republican party, down to 1812, regarded the establishment of an
United States bank by Congress as an usurpation of power not granted
by the Constitution.
Five years constitute a short period of time for the accomplishment of
so important a change in the public {5} opinion. Five years of
ordinary experience would not have produced it. It was, without doubt,
the strain brought upon the finances of the country by the necessities
of the War that had developed a powerful national opinion upon the
subject of the financial system of the country.
Mr. Calhoun also declined to discuss the question whether banks were
favorable or unfavorable to "public liberty and prosperity." He
assumed, here again, that public experience had settled that question,
and said that such an inquiry was now purely metaphysical. This
statement is certainly prime evidence that the practical experiences,
made in conducting the Government under the pressure of war, had about
knocked the metaphysics of the year 1800 out of the Republican party,
and had led the party on to a much more positive stage of political
opinion.
Mr. Calhoun furthermore dismissed the question whether a "national
bank would be favorable to the administration of the finances of the
Government," since there was not enough doubt, he said, in the public
mind upon that point to warrant a discussion of it.
He declared, finally, that the only questions which demanded
consideration were those relative to the existing disorders of the
currency, and the efficiency of a national bank in working their cure.
Upon these two points he was distinct, decided, and thoroughly
national. He said that the Constitution had without doubt placed the
monetary system of the country entirely within the control of
Congress; that the "States" had usurped the power of making money by
chartering banks of issue in the face of the constitutional provision
forbidding the "States" to emit bills of credit; that the two hundred
millions of dollars of irredeemable bank-notes, paper, and credits,
issued by these banks, were the cause of the {6} financial disorders
of the country; and that the remedy for this condition of things was,
in his opinion, to be found in a great specie-paying national bank,
sustained by the power of the general Government in the work of
bringing such a pressure upon these "State" banks as would force them
either to pay specie or go into liquidation. This was clear, generous,
and patriotic. No one made a fairer statement of the case, and no one
advocated a more national remedy in its treatment.
[Sidenote: Webster's objections to the Bank Bill.]
On the other hand, it was Webster who, at this time, appeared narrow
and particularistic. He objected to the large amount of the capital,
and to the stock feature of the proposed bank, and expressed alarm at
the proposition to place it under such strong governmental control. He
thought that the bills and paper of the "State" banks would be good
enough, if the general Government would only force them to redeem
their currency in specie by refusing to accept for Government dues the
bills of banks which did not pay specie on demand.
Whatever may be thought of Webster's attitude from the point of view
of political economy, it was certainly, from the point of view of
political science, the attitude of a "States'-rights" man rather than
that of a nationalist. Webster did not, however, call the
constitutionality of the bill in question. That was conceded upon all
sides.
The friends of the measure felt more anxiety in regard to Mr. Clay. He
had, only five years before, as we have seen, pronounced a similar
bill unconstitutional in his opinion, and he was now the Speaker of
the House, with all the power over the procedure in the House which
that position involved. It was generally felt that the fate of the
measure would be largely determined by his attitude toward it.
[Sidenote: Mr. Clay's support of the Bank Bill.]
Mr. Clay did not leave the House long in doubt {7} concerning his
views. He quickly revealed and avowed that noted change of opinion
upon this subject, which has been commonly accounted one of his
greatest inconsistencies, but which may be very properly considered as
simply manifesting that growth in patriotism and national spirit
experienced by almost all the leading men of the country, outside of
New England, in consequence of the vicissitudes of the period of war
under which the nation suffered between the dates of Mr. Clay's two
utterances. He frankly confessed that he had changed his opinion, and
explained the change by saying that the power of Congress in respect
to the matter was contained in the clause of the Constitution which
conferred upon Congress the authority to make all laws necessary and
proper for carrying the powers of the Government into operation; that,
in the interpretation of the words "necessary and proper," reference
must always be had to existing circumstances; that, when conditions
change, the interpretation must be so modified as to meet and satisfy
such change; and that the conditions obtaining in the country in 1816
were so changed from those obtaining in 1811 as to require the
enlarged interpretation of the powers of Congress under this clause
upon the subject of the monetary system of the country.
[Sidenote: Passage of the Bank Bill by the House of Representatives.]
The eloquence and the influence of Mr. Clay counted heavily in favor
of the measure, and it was passed by a substantial majority of votes.
In fact, the privileges of the proposed Bank had been increased by
amendment during the progress of the bill through the House. The Bank
and its branches were made the depositories of the funds of the
Government. This great advantage was, at least, a substantial offset
to the other modifications of the original bill, whereby the clauses
requiring that the president of {8} the Bank should always be chosen
from among the Government directors, and reserving to Congress the
power to permit a temporary suspension of specie payment by the Bank,
were stricken out.
[Sidenote: The passage of the Bank Bill through the Senate.]
During the passage of the bill through the Senate only a single
Senator expressed any doubts of its constitutionality, Mr. Wells, of
Delaware. Mr. Wells did not deny the power of Congress to charter a
national bank, but simply contended that the particular Bank proposed
in the bill exceeded what was "necessary and proper" for carrying into
effect the powers of Congress, and was therefore unconstitutional. On
the other hand, Senators Barbour, of Virginia, Taylor, of South
Carolina, and Bibb, of Georgia, supported the measure, both in
principle and in details, and carried it with a larger relative
majority through the Senate than it had received in the House.
[Sidenote: The United States Bank of 1816 a Southern measure.]
The United States Bank of 1816 was thus a Southern measure, and
Calhoun was its chief author. It was in principle a great national
measure, and its creation by Congress is strong evidence of the great
growth in national opinion and sentiment throughout the country, away
from the national indifference of the Jeffersonian metapolitics of
1800.
[Sidenote: The Tariff of 1816.]
A review of the Tariff Act of 1816 will bring us to the same
conclusions concerning the great nationalizing influence of the War.
The rate of duty upon the principal articles of imported goods was,
before the War, twelve and one-half per centum ad valorem. From a rate
of five per centum upon these articles, imposed by the first Customs
Act, that of July, 1789, the duty had been increased by about a dozen
acts, passed by both Federal and Republican Congresses, until, in
1812, it had reached the {9} above-mentioned per centum. Twelve and
one-half per centum was, as a fact, nothing more than a revenue duty,
and was intended for nothing more by the party in power at that date.
At the outbreak of the War double duties were imposed by the Act of
July 1st, 1812, as a war measure, that is, as a measure for obtaining
additional revenue for the prosecution of the War. It was not intended
as a measure for the protection of manufacturers. This Act was to
expire in one year, at the farthest, after the conclusion of peace
with England.
The ratifications of the Treaty of Ghent were exchanged on February
17th, 1815. At the meeting of Congress, in December, 1815, the war
duties were, therefore, still in force, but the Act establishing them
would expire by its own limitation in less than three months. This
Congress was obliged, therefore, to deal with the tariff anew.
[Sidenote: The Bill framed by the Committee on Ways and Means.]
The recommendations of the President in regard to the matter were
referred to the committee of the House on Ways and Means, the regular
revenue committee. At that moment this committee was composed of seven
members, four from Commonwealths south of Maryland, and three from
those north of Maryland. Mr. Lowndes, of South Carolina, was its
chairman. It is fair, therefore, to call it a Southern committee, and
to regard the bill which it produced as a Southern measure.
[Sidenote: The Tariff Bill reported.]
The committee first asked for a continuation of the existing duties
until the thirtieth day of the following June, in order to give proper
time to mature the bill, which request was voted by both houses of
Congress; and on March 20th, Mr. Lowndes announced that he was
prepared to report the draft of the new Act. The measure contained
virtually the continuation of the war {10} tariff as the permanent
rule and policy in time of peace. It was now manifestly a protective
tariff, and it was intended to be such. Mr. Ingham of the committee
said, at the beginning of the debate upon it, that "its great primary
object was to make such a modification of duties upon the various
articles of importation as would give the necessary and proper
protection and support to the agriculture, manufactures, and commerce
of the country." He went so far as to say that revenue considerations
ought not to have any influence in the decision of the House upon the
committee's propositions.
[Sidenote: The character of the Tariff Bill.]
It is entirely evident, however, that the committee did not regard the
bill as proposing advantages for the manufacturers only, or as having
for its principal aim the increase of the wages of the employees in
the manufacturing establishments, but considered it a great national
measure, a measure necessary to the industrial independence of the
country. It is also evident that the bill was not thought by anybody
to rest upon a perfect and permanent principle. Mr. Clay himself said
of it, "that the object of protecting manufacturers was, that we might
eventually get articles of necessity made as cheap at home as they
could be imported, and thereby to produce an independence of foreign
countries;" that "in three years we could judge of the ability of our
establishments to furnish those articles as cheap as they were
obtained from abroad, and could then legislate with the lights of
experience;" and that "he believed that three years would be
sufficient to place our manufacturers on this desirable footing."
[Sidenote: Mr. Calhoun's speech upon the Tariff Bill.]
It was Calhoun again, however, who surpassed them all in broadness of
view and in patriotic devotion to the interests of the nation. The
immediate occasion of {11} his speech was a motion made by John
Randolph, which seemed to Mr. Calhoun to attack the principle of the
bill. He said, that so long as the debate had been confined to
questions of detail he had refrained from joining in it; but now that
the general policy of the measure had been attacked he felt obliged to
come forward in support of that policy, which he could do with all the
more grace and sincerity since his own private interests were
primarily subserved by the advancement of agriculture, as were those
of his section. He began his argument with the assertions that
commerce and agriculture were the chief sources of the wealth of the
country at the moment, almost the only sources, and that manufactures
must be added to these in order to accomplish industrial independence.
In proof of this latter proposition he referred to the well known
effect of war between a maritime power and the United States upon the
prosperity of the latter. He simply pointed to the historic facts that
such a war destroyed the commerce of the country with foreign powers,
and that the destruction of commerce caused the products of
agriculture, usually exported to pay for manufactured goods imported
from foreign countries, to perish in the hands of the producers.
Domestic manufactures, he contended, would not only relieve us from
dependence upon foreign countries for manufactured goods, but would
create home markets for agricultural products. Encouragement to
manufactures was, therefore, a sound national, a truly American,
policy. As Mr. Calhoun proceeded in his speech, his strong patriotism
became more manifest. He affirmed that the policy of protection to
manufactures was calculated to bind more closely together the
different parts of our widely extended country, since it would
increase the mutual dependence of these different sections on each
{12} other in proportion as it decreased their dependence on foreign
markets. And he declared that he considered the production of this
result to be the most fundamental of all our policies, for the reason
that the absence of such mutual dependence would tend toward disunion,
and disunion comprehended almost the sum and substance of our
political dangers, against which, therefore, we ought to be
perpetually guarded.
[Sidenote: The passage of the Tariff Bill.]
Calhoun was in his thirty-fifth year when he advanced these views. The
sentiments which they revealed cannot, therefore, be ascribed to the
enthusiasm of youth and inexperience. They rested upon the settled
convictions of a mature man. They stand in need of no comment. They
speak for themselves. We shall search the reports of the debate in
vain for anything wiser, nobler, or more patriotic. In comparison with
them the views pronounced by the New Englanders upon the subject
appear narrow and selfish. They were willing to sacrifice the
industrial independence of the nation to their own interests in the
carrying trade upon the sea. Even the name of Webster is not to be
found among those who voted for the final passage of the bill. The
majority in its favor was, however, nearly two to one. In the Senate,
the vote was nearly four to one for it. Though Southern in its
immediate origin, it certainly had the support of the nation, and was
regarded as a great measure of national independence. The opposition
made to it by Randolph and Telfair, and by the remnant of the New
England Federalists, was regarded as unnational and unpatriotic. It
contributed to the complete disappearance of the Federal party from
the arena of national politics.
[Sidenote: The Army and Navy Bills.]
This Congress gave, however, an even surer test of the growth of the
national spirit among the people than either the Bank Act or the
Tariff Act. It was the {13} series of acts for the increase of the
Army and the Navy, and for their thorough reorganization. The
Republican doctrine of 1800 was, that there was no need of a national
army; that the militias of the Commonwealths were a sufficient
military force; and that a standing army was dangerous to liberty. By
the Act of March 16th, 1802, Congress fixed the peace establishment at
two regiments of infantry, and one regiment of artillerists, not more
than thirty-five hundred men. No increase of this force had been
permitted between 1802 and 1812.
During the War of 1812-15, the Commonwealths of Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, and Connecticut taught the nation how much, or rather how
little, reliance was to be placed upon the militias of the
Commonwealths in the defence of the country against foreign attack. In
spite of the plain provision of the Constitution, and the Act of
Congress in accordance therewith, empowering the President to call the
militias of the Commonwealths into the service of the United States,
the Governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut disputed the
President's authority in this respect and refused compliance with his
orders. Well might the President complain that, even upon this most
essential point, the military organization, the United States was not
a nation. With such an experience as this, Congress and the people
were thoroughly converted from the particularistic doctrinism of 1800,
and now manifested their strong national spirit in the willingness to
place a large standing military force in the hands of the central
Government in times of peace.
By the Act of March 3rd, 1816, Congress fixed the peace footing of the
Army at ten thousand men, excluding the corps of engineers; and by the
Act of April 24th, of the same year, it reorganized, or rather {14}
re-created, the general staff, upon the principle that the staff
should be as complete in time of peace as in time of war.
The Navy received similar attention and favor. By the Act of April
29th, 1816, Congress appropriated eight millions of dollars for the
construction of nine seventy-four-gun ships, twelve forty-four-gun
ships, and three steam batteries.
Evidently the fear that the President would, by virtue of his power as
commander-in-chief of a large standing army and navy, declare himself
emperor, and make the military and naval officers his dukes and
counts, had vanished in the smoke of the burned Capitol, and, in place
of this silly terror of crowns and diadems, a thoroughgoing confidence
in the national Government had established itself in the brain and
heart of the people and of their leaders.
These great national measures occupied the attention of Congress to
such a degree, during the session of 1815-16, as to delay the
consideration of the question of a system of national internal
improvements to the second session, that of 1816-17.
[Sidenote: The Bill for National Improvements.]
At the opening of this session, Mr. Calhoun, again, came forward with
a motion for the appointment of a committee, which should consider the
question of setting aside the bonus to be paid by the United States
Bank to the Government for its charter, and the net annual proceeds
received by the Government upon its shares in the Bank, as a permanent
fund for internal improvements. The motion was quickly carried, and
the committee, consisting of two members from the North and two from
the South, with Mr. Calhoun for chairman, was appointed. This was
December 16th, 1816. In a week from this date the committee presented
a bill providing for the setting {15} apart of the funds above
indicated for the construction of roads and canals.
[Sidenote: Mr. Calhoun's advocacy of this Bill.]
Mr. Calhoun opened the debate upon the bill, and his speech abounded
with the same national ideas and patriotic sentiments which
characterized his arguments in support of the Bank and Tariff
measures. After asserting that the moment was most opportune for the
consideration of the question, on account of the fact that all party
and sectional feelings had given way to "a liberal and an enlightened
regard for the general concerns of the nation," Mr. Calhoun again
pronounced his warning concerning the greatest danger to which the
country was exposed, namely, disunion, and declared it to be the
highest duty of American statesmen so to form the policies of the
Government as to counteract all tendencies toward sectionalism and
disunion. He contended that from this point of view nothing could be
more necessary or more advantageous than a large national system of
internal improvements, establishing the great lines of commerce and
intercourse for binding together all the parts of the country in
interests, ideas, and sentiments.
No part of his argument, however, is so instructive to the student of
American constitutional history as the observations upon the question
of the constitutionality of the bill. He said that he was no advocate
of refined reasoning upon the Constitution; that "the instrument was
not intended as a thesis for the logician to exercise his ingenuity
on; that it ought to be construed with plain good sense; and that when
so construed nothing could be more express than the Constitution upon
this very point." The clause to which he referred was that which
confers upon Congress the power "to levy and collect taxes, duties,
imposts, and excises; to pay the {16} debts and provide for the common
defence and general welfare of the United States." Mr. Calhoun claimed
that these words were to be interpreted as vesting in Congress the
power to appropriate money for the common defence and general welfare
of the country at its own discretion, both as to object and amount. He
insisted that a generous interpretation of the power to raise and
appropriate money was absolutely required, in order to avoid the
necessity of placing a forced construction upon other powers. It was
all in his best strain, and showed Mr. Calhoun still as the chief
advocate of national union and national development. No other person
seemed to equal him in breadth of view and purity of patriotism.
[Sidenote: The opposition to the Internal Improvements Bill.]
The measure met, however, with more opposition than the Bank Bill or
the Tariff Bill had experienced. Two years of peace had cooled the
ardor of the national spirit somewhat, and the people were dropping
back into the narrow spheres of ordinary life and business routine.
Moreover, the great hue and cry raised by the demagogues and the press
over the bill, passed at the previous session, changing the pay of the
members of Congress from a per diem of six dollars during attendance
to an annual salary of fifteen hundred dollars, had made the members
timid about the appropriation of money, and disinclined to obligate
the Treasury to anything beyond absolutely necessary expenses.
[Sidenote: Passage of the Bill by Congress.]
Nevertheless, the great power and earnestness with which Mr. Calhoun
addressed himself to the task of carrying the bill through its
different stages were crowned with success. It finally passed both
Houses, in a slightly modified form, during the last week of the
Fourteenth Congress and of President Madison's second term.
{17} [Sidenote: Veto of the Bill by the President.]
To the great surprise of the friends of the measure, the President
returned the bill to Congress on March 3rd, with his objections. These
were, summed up in a single sentence, that there was no warrant in the
Constitution for the exercise of the power by Congress to pass such a
bill. The President held that Congress could appropriate money only to
such objects as were placed by the Constitution under the jurisdiction
of the general Government. He, therefore, repudiated Calhoun's
latitudinarian view that Congress was referred to its own discretion
merely in the appropriation of money for the advancement of the
general welfare. He acknowledged the desirability of attaining the
object contemplated by the bill, and indicated that an amendment to
the Constitution, expressly conferring upon Congress the power in
question, was the proper way to deal with the subject. He had, as we
have seen, recommended the consideration of the question of internal
improvements in both of his annual messages to the Fourteenth
Congress, and it was chiefly for this reason that the veto was so
unexpected. It is true that, in both of these messages, he had
expressed some doubt in regard to the power of Congress over the
subject, but it was supposed that this was only his cautious way of
approaching a new thing, and that he would certainly defer to the
views of the Congressional majority.
It must be remembered, however, that Mr. Madison belonged to the first
generation of the Republicans, and that the principle of the party, in
the period of its origin, was strict construction of the Constitution
in regard to the powers of the general Government. He had been driven
by the younger men into the War, and into the national policies which
it occasioned and produced, and it is at least intelligible that he
returned to his earlier {18} creed as the country settled down again
into the humdrum of ordinary life.
[Sidenote: The failure of Congress to override the veto.]
The national Republicans looked upon his act, however, as an apostasy,
and the House of Representatives repassed the bill by an increased
majority and with considerable feeling. The majority was still,
however, not sufficient to overcome the veto, and thus the first
earnest attempt to commit the nation to a general system of internal
improvements failed, failed through the resurrection of a spirit in
the retiring President, which was destined soon to take possession of
many who denounced it then as mean and narrow, and to lead the whole
country back into those cramping tenets of particularism from which
war and bloodshed alone could deliver it.
{19}
CHAPTER II.
THE ACQUISITION OF FLORIDA
The Influence of Physical Geography upon Political Development--Defect
in the Southern Boundary of the United States before 1819--The Treaty
of Paris of 1763--The Boundary between Louisiana and
Florida--Occupation of Florida by the United States Forces during the
War of 1812--The Hold of the Spaniards on Florida Weakened by the War
of 1812--The British Troops in Florida during and after the War of
1812--Nicholls and his Buccaneer State in Florida--The British
Government's Repulse of Nicholls' Advances--Destruction of the
Nicholls Fort by the United States Forces--The Seminole War--The Fight
at Fowltown--The Seminole War Defensive--McGregor on Amelia
Island--General Gaines sent to Amelia Island--General Jackson placed
in Command in Florida--His Orders--Jackson's Letter to President
Monroe--Jackson's Operations in Florida--The First Treaty for the
Cession of Florida to the United States--Jackson's Popularity in
consequence of the Seminole War--The Attempt in Congress to Censure
Jackson--The same Attempt in the Cabinet--The Failure of the Attempt
to Censure Jackson in Congress--Assumption of the Responsibility for
Jackson's Acts by the Administration--Jackson Triumphant--The Treaty
of Cession Attacked in Congress, but Ratified by the Senate--Rejection
of the Treaty by the Spanish Government--Resumption of
Negotiations--The New Treaty Ratified by the Senate and by the Spanish
Government--Political Results of the Seminole War.
It was entirely natural that the quickening of the national spirit and
the growth of the national consciousness throughout the United States,
in the decade between 1810 and 1820, had, for one of their results,
the {20} extension of the territory of the United States, at some
point or other, to its natural limits.
[Sidenote: The influence of physical geography upon political
development.]
The element of physical geography always plays a large part in
national political development. The natural territorial basis of a
national state is a geographical unity. That is, it is a territory
separated by broad bodies of water, or high mountain ranges, or broad
belts of uninhabitable country, or climatic extremes, from other
territory, and possessing a fair degree of coherence within. If a
national state develops itself on any part of such a territory, it
will inevitably tend to spread to the natural limits of the same. It
will not become a completely national state until it shall have
attained such boundaries, for a completely national state is the
sovereign organization of a people having an ethnic unity upon a
territory which is a geographic unity.
[Sidenote: Defect in the southern boundary of the United States before
1819.]
In the second decade of this century, and down to the latter part of
it, the United States had not acquired the territory of the country as
far as to the natural southern boundary east of Louisiana. This
boundary was, of course, the Gulf of Mexico; but Spain held in quasi
possession a broad strip, and then a long peninsula, of land along and
within this boundary. In other words, the territory called Florida, or
the Floridas, was, politically, a colony of Spain, but geographically
a part of the United States. It was inhabited chiefly by Indian
tribes. Spanish rule in this territory was, therefore, foreign rule,
both from the geographical point of view and the ethnical. Indian rule
was not to be thought of in the nineteenth century. There was but one
natural solution of the question. It was that the United States should
annex this territory and extend the jurisdiction of the general
Government over it.
[Sidenote: The Treaty of Paris of 1763.]
The Treaty of Paris of 1763 was the first great {21} international
agreement which gave a fair degree of definiteness to the claims of
England, France, and Spain, upon the North American continent. In this
Treaty, France surrendered Canada, Cape Breton, and all claims to
territory east of the Mississippi River, from the source of the river
to the point of confluence of the Iberville with it, to Great Britain.
From this latter point, the boundary between the two powers was
declared to be the middle line of the Iberville, and of the Lakes
Maurepas and Pontchartrain, to the Gulf of Mexico. It is also
expressly stated in this Treaty that France cedes the river and port
of Mobile to Great Britain.
In this same instrument, Spain surrendered to Great Britain Florida
and every claim to territory east and southeast of the Mississippi.
[Sidenote: The boundary between Louisiana and Florida.]
The boundary between Louisiana and Florida had, to that time, been the
River Perdido. After the cessions above mentioned to Great Britain,
the British Government united the part of Louisiana received from
France with Florida, and then divided Florida into two districts by
the line of the River Appalachicola. That part lying to the west of
this river was named West Florida, and the part east of it was called
East Florida.
By a secret Treaty of the year 1762, which became known to the world
some eighteen months later, but whose terms were not executed until
1769, France ceded Louisiana to Spain. After this, therefore, the
North American continent was divided between Great Britain and Spain,
and the line of division was, so far as it was fixed, the Mississippi
River to the confluence of the Iberville with it, then the Iberville
and the middle line of the Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain to the
Gulf of Mexico.
{22} The Treaty of 1762 between France and Spain, having been
concluded before the Treaty of 1763 between France and Great Britain,
gave Spain a certain show of title to the territory between the
Mississippi and the Perdido; but the Treaty of 1763, in which France
ceded this same territory to Great Britain, was, as we have just seen,
known first, and was the Treaty which France executed in respect to
this territory. The conflict of claims between Great Britain and
Spain, which was thus engendered, continued to be waged for twenty
years, and was settled in the year 1783, in so far as these two powers
were concerned, by the recession of Florida to Spain.
In this same year, Great Britain recognized the independence of the
United States, with a southern boundary extending from the point where
the Mississippi River is intersected by the thirty-first parallel of
latitude, along this parallel to the River Appalachicola, thence down
the Appalachicola to its confluence with Flint River, thence on the
line of shortest distance to the source of the River St. Mary, and
thence by the course of this stream to the Atlantic. Spain thus held,
as the result of these several treaties, all of the territory south of
this line, unless England reserved in her recession of Florida that
portion of Louisiana lying between the Iberville and the Perdido,
ceded by France to Great Britain in the Treaty of 1763, and united by
Great Britain with Florida. There is no evidence in the text of the
Treaty of 1783 that Great Britain made any such reservation, or in the
subsequent actions of the British Government.
By the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, of October 1st, 1800, also a secret
treaty, Spain receded Louisiana to France. The description of the
territory thus receded was very vague. It reads in the official
translation of the treaty, {23} "His Catholic Majesty promises and
engages, on his part, to cede to the French Republic, six months after
the full and entire execution of the conditions and stipulations
herein relative to his Royal Highness the Duke of Parma, the Colony or
Province of Louisiana, with the same extent that it now has in the
hands of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it; and such as
it should be after the treaties subsequently entered into between
Spain and other states."
There was here certainly opportunity for a dispute between Spain and
France as to the correct boundary between Louisiana and Florida.
France could claim with some reason the Perdido as the eastern
boundary of Louisiana, and Spain could meet this with a counterclaim
that, after the cession in 1763 of all Louisiana east of the Iberville
and the Lakes to Great Britain, and its union by Great Britain with
Florida, the line of the Iberville and the Lakes Maurepas and
Pontchartrain was the eastern boundary of Louisiana.
Before, however, any actual contest arose over the question, France
sold Louisiana to the United States, with the same vague description
of boundary contained in the cession of the territory from Spain to
France by the Treaty of St. Ildefonso. The question of boundary became
now one which must be settled between Spain and the United States.
The United States claimed at once that Louisiana reached to the
Perdido. Spain disputed the claim, and held that Florida extended to
the Iberville and the Lakes. Spain could make out the better abstract
of title. Spain certainly did not intend to recede to France in 1800
anything more as Louisiana than France had ceded to her in 1762. But
the United States had a show of legal title. It could be held that the
ancient boundary of Louisiana was the one intended both in the Treaty
{24} of St. Ildefonso and in that of 1803, in which France passed the
possession of Louisiana to the United States. The reasons of physical
geography and of national development certainly favored the annexation
of the whole of Florida to the United States; and with such forces to
back the apparent legal claim to a large part of it, the result of the
dispute could not well have been otherwise than it was.
The United States enforced its claim by military occupation of the
disputed district before the close of the War of 1812.
[Sidenote: Occupation of Florida by the United States forces during
the War of 1812.]
During the course of the war, the British forces had occupied
Pensacola. The Spanish governor either could not, or would not,
prevent them from doing so. Florida became thus, in spite of its
nominal neutral status, a base of operations for the enemy of the
United States. No more convincing evidence of the necessity for its
annexation to the United States could have been offered. It was thus
seen that not only the geography and the national growth of the Union
demanded it, but that the safety of the Union, in case of war with any
power, required it. The sea is the natural boundary of the United
States on the south, and it was the "manifest destiny" of the Union to
reach it.
The occupation of Florida would have been a sound and justifiable
policy for the United States, had the Government commanded a
sufficient military force for the purpose, when the British troops
took possession of Pensacola. General Jackson did expel the British
from Pensacola, but restored the place to the Spanish authorities, in
order to avoid a conflict with Spain while engaged in war with Great
Britain. We know now that the Congress of the United States had, by
secret acts passed before the beginning of the War, authorized the
{25} President to occupy Florida _east_ of the Perdido temporarily.
The President did not deem it wise, under the circumstances which
prevailed, to make use of this power; but the readiness of the
Congress to intrust the President with the authority to take
possession of the territory of a friendly power certainly shows that a
strong feeling existed among the representatives of the people that
Florida must be acquired by the United States upon the first fair
opportunity.
[Sidenote: The hold of the Spaniards on Florida weakened by the War of
1812.]
The occasion was destined soon to appear. The power of Spain upon the
American continents was everywhere in rapid decline. At the close of
the War of 1812, the Spanish occupation in Florida was confined
substantially to three points--Pensacola, St. Mark's, and St.
Augustine. The remainder of the province, by far the greater part of
it, was a free zone, in which desperate adventurers of every race and
land might congregate, from which they might make their raids for
murder and pillage into the United States, and into which they might
escape again with their prisoners and plunder.
[Sidenote: The British troops in Florida during and after the War of
1812.]
We have noticed the occupation of Pensacola by the British troops
during the War of 1812, and their expulsion by General Jackson from
this position in November of 1814. After this, they concentrated upon
the Appalachicola and established a fort some fifteen miles above the
mouth of this stream for their head-quarters and base of operations.
The British commander, one Colonel Nicholls, pursued from this point
the policy which he had already inaugurated at Pensacola. This policy
was the collection and organization of fugitive negroes, Indians, and
adventurers of every character, and their employment in raids into the
territory, and attacks upon the inhabitants, of the United States.
{26} It appears that Colonel Nicholls did not regard the Treaty
between the United States and Great Britain concluding the War as
putting an end necessarily to his hostile movements. He remained in
command at his fort on the Appalachicola for several months after the
ratification of the Treaty, and then went to London, taking with him
the Indian priest Francis, for the purpose of securing a treaty of
alliance between the British Government and his band of outlaws in
Florida.
[Sidenote: Nicholls and his buccaneer state in Florida.]
Before leaving the Appalachicola, he had incited the Indians and their
negro auxiliaries to continue hostilities against the United States,
by representing to them that the ninth article of the Treaty of Ghent
contained a pledge on the part of the United States to reinstate the
Indians in all lands held by them in the year 1811. He represented to
them that this provision restored to the Creeks the lands in southern
Georgia surrendered by them to the United States in the Treaty between
the Creeks and the United States made at Fort Jackson in August of
1814, although it was well understood by both of the high contracting
parties to the Treaty of Ghent that only those lands were intended
under this provision whose seizure by the United States had not been
confirmed by an agreement with the Indians; and the pledge as to these
only was conditioned upon the immediate cessation of hostilities on
the part of the Indians when the Treaty of Ghent should be announced
to them. This announcement had been made, and the actual continuation
of hostilities, therefore, after the announcement, made this whole
article nugatory.
Nicholls left the fort, with all its munitions, in the hands of the
negroes and Indians. The garrison {27} consisted of some three hundred
negroes and about twenty Indians.
[Sidenote: The British Government's repulse of Nicholls' advances.]
The British Government would not listen to Nicholls' proposition for
an alliance between Great Britain and the buccaneering state which he
was endeavoring to establish upon territory belonging politically to
Spain.
[Sidenote: Destruction of the Nicholls Fort by the United States
forces.]
The United States Government waited a year and a half for the
disbanding of this hostile force, or for its dispersion by the Spanish
authorities, and then, when forbearance had ceased to be a virtue, did
the work itself. The fort was destroyed by the explosion of its
magazine, which was pierced by a red-hot shot from the batteries of
the assailants, and almost the whole garrison perished. It was claimed
that the attack was made by the United States forces with the consent
of the Spanish authorities, whatever the significance of that may have
been.
Professor von Holst, in his great work, has designated the expedition
against the Nicholls Fort as a hunt by the United States army for
fugitive slaves. He does not seem to have recognized the danger to the
peace and civilization of the United States of the growth of a
community of pirates and buccaneers upon its borders. It does not
appear to have occurred to him that the most humane attitude toward
the slaves of Georgia may have been to prevent them from being drawn
into any such connection. He does not seem to have comprehended that
any public interest was subserved by disposing of the negroes captured
in this expedition in such a way as to prevent any future attempts on
their part at co-operation with the Indians in their barbarous warfare
upon the frontiers of the United States. In a sentence, he seems to
have regarded the entire incident as a prostitution of the military
power of the United States to the private greed of {28} slave-hunters,
and to have discovered in it a most convincing proof of the canting
hypocrisy of the free Republic. In view of all the facts of the case,
this certainly appears to be a very crude appreciation of the subject.
[Sidenote: The Seminole War.]
This same historian calls the attack upon the Nicholls Fort the
beginning of the Seminole War. It appears, however, more like the
termination of the War of 1812, so far as the negro outlaws of Florida
were participant in that War, than like the beginning of a new war.
Generals Gaines and Jackson and the War Department of the Government
seem to have so comprehended the event.
After the destruction of the Nicholls Fort, or the Negro Fort, as it
was then called, there was comparative peace, for a few months, on the
frontier. With the beginning of the year 1817, however, hostilities
were renewed. It is not known which party gave the first offence.
Ex-Governor Mitchell of Georgia, then holding the office of Indian
agent for these parts, thought both parties equally at fault. The
point is a matter of little moment. The conflict between civilization
and barbarism is irrepressible, and arises as often from the
encroachments of civilization as from the onslaughts of barbarism.
[Sidenote: The fight at Fowltown.]
In November of 1817, General Gaines endeavored to secure an interview
with the chief of the hostile Indians, but the chief refused to visit
the General, whereupon the General sent a detachment of soldiers to
the chief's village, called Fowltown, to repeat his invitation, and to
conduct the chief and his warriors to a parley-ground. The soldiers
were fired upon by the Indians as they approached the village. They
naturally returned the fire, and then seized and destroyed the
village. A few Indians were killed in the conflict.
{29} The Indian agent, Mitchell, called this event the beginning of
the Seminole War. It was certainly something more like it than was the
capture of the Negro Fort. Still it will be more correct to consider
it as being only the continuation of the War of 1812, in so far as the
participation in that War of Great Britain's Indian allies on the
southern border of the United States was concerned. They had never
really resumed the status of peace after acting during that War, at
the instigation of the British officers in Florida, against the United
States.
[Sidenote: The Seminole War defensive.]
Following the fight at Fowltown hostilities became much more active.
Fowltown was situated north of the Florida line, upon territory ceded
by the Creeks to the United States in the Treaty of Fort Jackson. If,
therefore, the incident of November 20th was the beginning of the
Seminole War, it stamps that War as defensive in its character. The
troops of the United States were attacked upon the territory of the
United States. If the further prosecution of the War should, in the
judgment of the President, or of the officer whom he might vest with
discretionary power in the execution of his will, require the crossing
of the Florida line and the pursuit of the enemy upon Florida
territory, the character of the War could not be changed thereby. This
could not be regarded as making war on Spain. Spain could meet and
satisfy the right of the United States to do this only by dispersing
the Indians herself, and preventing Florida from becoming a base of
hostile operations against the United States. Spain could claim the
rights of neutrality for Florida only when she discharged these duties
of neutrality. The general principles of international custom required
that of her. When, now, we add to this the consideration that Spain
had pledged {30} herself in a specific agreement with the United
States to do these very things, and that Florida, nevertheless, was
actually a free zone, over which no civilized state had any efficient
control, then it certainly appears that the right of the United States
to pursue its enemy into Florida was clearly in keeping with the
recognized law of nations. The President, therefore, ordered the
pursuit of the enemy into Florida, under the qualification that if
they took refuge in a Spanish fortification the fortress should not be
attacked, but the situation should be reported to the War Department
and further orders awaited. This order was issued on December 16th,
1817, to General Gaines, who was then in command of the forces on the
Florida frontier.
[Sidenote: McGregor on Amelia Island.]
Meanwhile an adventurer by the name of McGregor had, with a band of
freebooters, taken possession of Amelia Island, which lies off the
coast of Florida, just below the mouth of the St. Mary's River, and
had, in the name of the Governments of Buenos Ayres and Venezuela,
proclaimed the independence of Florida against Spain. They made the
island an entrepôt for the smuggling of slaves into the United States,
a storehouse for the results of their robberies, and head-quarters
generally for piratical expeditions.
[Sidenote: General Gaines sent to Amelia Island.]
By a secret act of the year 1811, the Congress of the United States
had declared its unwillingness to have Florida, or any part of it,
pass from the hands of Spain into those of any other power, and had
authorized the President to prevent it. Acting upon this authority,
the President instructed General Gaines to go to Amelia Island and
take possession of it.
[Sidenote: General Jackson placed in command in Florida. His orders.]
About ten days later, December 26th, 1817, the President assigned
General Jackson to the command of the {31} troops acting against the
Indians. The day before the issue of the order to General Jackson, the
War Department had received the news of the Indian attack upon
Lieutenant Scott's boat while ascending the Appalachicola with
supplies for the United States troops at Fort Scott. The cold-blooded
massacre of almost the entire crew of the boat apparently moved the
War Department to more energetic measures. The order to General
Jackson, besides investing him with the command, empowered him to call
on the Governors of the adjacent Commonwealths for such military
forces as he might deem necessary, with those already in the field, to
overcome the Indians, and informed him that General Gaines had been
instructed "to penetrate from Amelia Island, through Florida, to the
Seminole towns, if his force would justify his engaging in offensive
operations." "With this view," the order to Jackson continues, "you
may be prepared to concentrate your forces, and to adopt the necessary
measures to terminate a conflict which it has ever been the desire of
the President to avoid, but which is now made necessary by their
settled hostilities."
[Sidenote: Jackson's letter to President Monroe.]
When Jackson received these orders he was in Tennessee. He wrote
immediately to the President: "Let it be signified to me through any
channel (say Mr. J. Rhea) that the possession of the Floridas would be
desirable to the United States and in sixty days it will be
accomplished." General Jackson naturally supposed that this letter was
duly received and read by President Monroe, and that a subsequent
order, giving him discretionary powers in the prosecution of the
campaign, contained the answer to it. As we shall see, however, the
President claimed later that he did not read Jackson's letter until a
year after it was written and sent to him. It was certainly {32} the
President's fault if he did not. General Jackson certainly could not
be held accountable for the President's strange negligence in
examining official correspondence, and he had good reason to think,
from the tone of the order issued to him after his letter had had due
time to be received and read, that the Administration desired him to
occupy Florida.
Upon taking command Jackson called his Tennessee veterans to him, and
reached with them the Florida frontier in March of 1818.
[Sidenote: Jackson's operations in Florida.]
When he advanced into Florida he found that the Spanish officials in
Florida were in collusion with the Indians, and that the instigators
of the hostilities were an Englishman, named Ambrister, and a
Scotchman, named Arbuthnot, together with two Indian chiefs named
Hillis Hajo and Himallemico.
An order from the War Department, of January 16th, 1818, instructed
the commander of the United States forces in Florida that the honor of
the nation required a speedy termination of the War with the
Seminoles, "with exemplary punishment for hostilities so unprovoked."
Jackson naturally considered himself empowered to do speedy and
thorough work. He felt it necessary to seize St. Mark's and Pensacola,
in order to destroy the base of operations and the places of refuge of
the enemy, and he caused the four ringleaders of the enemy to be
executed. By the end of May (1818) the campaign was ended, and Florida
was in the military possession of the United States. The President
assumed the responsibility for Jackson's deeds, but offered to restore
St. Mark's and Pensacola, and therewith the nominal possession of
Florida, to Spain, so soon as Spain would garrison these points with
forces able to maintain peace with the United States and {33} disposed
to do so. Spain accepted the offer, fulfilled in a way the conditions,
and the places were restored to her jurisdiction.
[Illustration: FLORIDA, at the Time of Acquisition.]
[Sidenote: The first Treaty for the cession of Florida to the United
States.]
It was now manifest to Spain, however, that she could not control
Florida, and that her possession of the province was, and could be,
only nominal. She now, therefore, agreed to cede it to the United
States. The treaty bears date of February 22nd, 1819. Its important
provisions are contained in the second and third articles. By these
articles Spain ceded the Floridas, with the adjacent islands dependent
thereon, to the United States; and agreed with the United States that
the boundary between the two powers in North America should be the
west bank of the Sabine River from its mouth to the thirty-second
parallel of north latitude, thence the line of longitude to the Red
River, thence up the course of the Red River to the one-hundredth
parallel of longitude from London, or the twenty-third from
Washington, thence the line of longitude to the Arkansas River, thence
the south bank of the Arkansas to its source, thence the line of
longitude to the forty-second parallel of north latitude, and thence
this line of latitude to the South Sea.
This settlement of boundary included that of all other claims, of
whatever character, of the Government, citizens, or subjects of either
power against the Government, citizens, or subjects of the other. All
such were mutually renounced.
[Sidenote: Jackson's popularity in consequence of the Seminole War.]
The results of the Seminole War raised General Jackson to a still
higher plane of popularity than he possessed as the hero of the War of
1812. It was evident that here was a character who would have to be
reckoned with in future presidential contests. It is possible that
Jackson's chief mentor, William B. Lewis, had {34} conceived, at this
date, the idea of Jackson's candidacy for the highest place in the
gift of the nation. And it is highly probable that the fears of all
the existing aspirants for the presidency were excited by the
appearance of this new and popular rival for public favor. It is
difficult to explain upon any other theory the attempt made in
Congress, during the session of 1818-19, to suppress Jackson by a vote
of censure.
[Sidenote: The attempt in Congress to censure Jackson.]
This procedure certainly had no connection whatsoever with the
question of slavery extension through the acquisition of Florida. When
we find Tallmadge, of New York, the self-same person who introduced,
at the same session, the proposition for restricting slavery in
Missouri, defending Jackson's course in every particular, while Cobb,
of Georgia, attacked it, and when we consider that John Quincy Adams,
the life-long opponent of slavery, sustained Jackson in the cabinet,
while Calhoun moved to bring him to account for disobedience to
orders, we are bound to conclude that we have here nothing whatsoever
to do with the question of slavery.
[Sidenote: The same attempt in the Cabinet.]
Crawford, of Georgia, the Secretary of the Treasury, was the prime
aspirant for presidential honors, after Monroe should have completed
his two terms, and Cobb was Crawford's right-hand man. Clay was also
working up his plans. These two men felt it necessary to discredit
Jackson in every possible way. Clay made a great bugbear out of
Jackson's military heroship, and so threatening did he make it appear
to the principle of civil government and republican institutions that
he really seemed frightened at it himself. Crawford set up the same
strain, through Cobb, in a feebler key. Calhoun seems to have been
animated rather by wrath at what he {35} conceived to be the violation
of his orders, or, at least, the exceeding of his orders, than by
jealousy of a presidential rival. His presidential fever had not, at
that moment, reached a high degree. But what shall we say of Adams,
who undoubtedly then considered himself a candidate for the
successorship to Monroe, and who stood against the whole Cabinet in
Jackson's defence, and carried the day against both Crawford and
Calhoun combined. Of course it may be said that Adams thought his own
turn would come before that of Jackson, and that he would gain
Jackson's support by his attitude. But against such a supposition must
stand the fact that the Cabinet pledged itself to secrecy in regard to
all that was proposed on the subject, and that for ten years Jackson
supposed that Calhoun was the friend in the Cabinet who had
successfully defended him against the other members under the lead of
Crawford. The attitude of Adams in the question was noble and
disinterested, as well as patriotic, and had Jackson known of it in
1824, it is altogether probable that he would never have charged an
unfair bargain with Clay upon Adams for his own defeat.
[Sidenote: The failure of the attempt to censure Jackson in Congress.]
Clay and Cobb represented that every movement made by Jackson, from
the moment of his appointment to the command of the expedition to the
end of hostilities, was illegal and in defiance of the orders of the
War Department. They said he had no right to call upon his old
soldiers instead of asking the Governor of Tennessee for the militia.
They claimed that he waged an offensive war upon his own
responsibility against Spain, when the War Department had expressly
forbidden him to attack the Spanish forts, and they accused him of
murdering two prisoners of war. The House of Representatives showed
what it thought of these accusations by voting {36} down the
resolutions which contained the censure by a majority of nearly two to
one, while the resolutions of like effect introduced into the Senate
were laid on the table and never taken up for consideration.
[Sidenote: Assumption of the responsibility for Jackson's acts by the
Administration.]
The Administration had, under the influence of the Secretary of State,
Mr. Adams, already assumed the responsibility for Jackson's acts, had
upheld their legality, and was even then bringing its negotiations
with Spain, in regard to the cession of Florida, to a successful
close; while the British Government had refrained from any
interference on account of the treatment of Ambrister and Arbuthnot.
[Sidenote: Jackson triumphant.]
The attempt to suppress Jackson broke down thus upon all sides, and he
emerged from the assaults of his rivals with a greater popularity than
he had ever before enjoyed, and with improved prospects as a
presidential candidate. With the worship accorded to a hero he now
enjoyed the sympathy extended to a martyr.
[Sidenote: The Treaty of Cession attacked in Congress, but ratified by
the Senate.]
The Treaty itself, ceding the Floridas, did not escape attack. Adams
regarded it as a great diplomatic triumph for the United States, but
Clay expressed great disappointment with it, because it sacrificed, as
he viewed it, the claims of the United States to the territory between
the Sabine and the Rio del Norte. And Crawford, who was seizing every
opportunity to discredit the Administration, by encouraging it to
false measures from his place in the Cabinet, and then professing
publicly his disapprobation of them, also saw in the point emphasized
by Clay a prime occasion for making political capital.
The Senate showed what its members thought of such manoeuvres by a
speedy and unanimous vote in ratification of the Treaty.
{37} [Sidenote: Rejection of the Treaty by the Spanish Government.]
The Spanish Government, on the other hand, rejected the Treaty. Mr.
Adams felt, at the moment, that this was a blow to his reputation as a
diplomatist, and perhaps to his chances for the presidency. But it did
not prove to be such. Had the Treaty been then ratified three large
land grants made by the Spanish King to certain Spanish nobles, at a
date earlier than Mr. Adams had supposed, would not have been
extinguished by it. The rejection of the Treaty by the Spanish
Government, which at the same time sent another Ambassador, General
Vivês, to take the place of Don Onis, and to renew negotiations on the
subject, gave Mr. Adams the opportunity to insist upon the cession of
Florida with the extinguishment of the above mentioned grants.
[Sidenote: Resumption of negotiations.]
When the new Ambassador arrived, the country was in the midst of the
excitement over the question of slavery extension in the Louisiana
territory, the history of which will be related in a succeeding
chapter. The effect of this agitation was to arouse some doubt in the
minds of those opposed to the extension of slavery in regard to the
expediency of any addition to the territory of the United States
southward. Mr. Adams himself felt the influence of this doubt, and was
prompted, in part at least, by it to assume an attitude of
indifference toward the new propositions of the Spanish Ambassador. He
gave the Ambassador to understand that Spain could make such a treaty
with the United States in regard to the subject as would be
satisfactory to the latter, or take the consequences of leaving things
as they were. The unshakable determination of Mr. Adams won the day,
and the old Treaty, with a new provision extinguishing the above
mentioned land grants, was finally ratified by both Governments, two
years after the date of {38} the original agreement between Mr. Adams
and Don Onis.
[Sidenote: The new Treaty ratified by the Senate and by the Spanish
Government.]
The vote of ratification by the Senate of the United States was again
practically unanimous. Only four votes were recorded against it; and
of these four one was cast by a brother-in-law of Mr. Clay, one by a
subservient friend of the same gentleman, and one by a bitter personal
enemy of General Jackson. The province was soon transferred to the
United States and Jackson became its first territorial governor. With
this the United States attained its natural boundary on the south,
eastward from the mouth of the Mississippi, and a source of chronic
irritation was removed.
[Sidenote: Political results of the Seminole War.]
It was to be expected that this territory would be erected into a
Commonwealth in which the institution of slavery would be legalized;
but this did not deter the statesmen of the North from securing the
great advantages just indicated. Radical abolitionism had not yet
blinded them to the general and paramount interests of the Union. In
fact, the results of the Seminole War and of the diplomacy of the
Administration in connection with it had the immediate effect of
diminishing the ultra-Southern influence in the Government. They
brought Adams and Jackson to the front, and set Crawford and Calhoun
back in the course of their careers. They had, indeed, much to do, as
we shall see later, with the development of the era of personal
politics, which prevailed from 1824 to 1832, and which terminated
finally in the separation of the all-comprehending Republican party
into the Whig party and the Democratic party.
{39}
CHAPTER III.
SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES BEFORE 1820
First Appearance of Slavery in the British North American
Colonies--Early Theory of the Benefits of Slavery--The Earliest Legal
Recognition of Slavery in the Colonies--Northern Colonies not well
Adapted to Negro Labor--The Southern Colonies well Adapted to Negro
Labor--Negro Slavery a Temporary Necessity in the South--Was Negro
Slavery an Error and an Evil from the first?--Slavery Legislation in
the Southern Colonies--Partus Sequitur Ventrem--Definitions of the
Slave Class--The Test of the Slave Status as Fixed by the Virginia
Statute--The Legal Position of the Slave--Tendency Toward Serfage in
the Code of 1705--Public Relations of the Slave System--The General
Object of the Laws in respect to Slaves--Slavery and the Revolutionary
Ideas of the Rights of Man--First Prohibition upon Slave
Importation--Abolition of Slavery in the Northern Commonwealths after
the Beginning of the Revolution--Slavery and the Constitution of
1787--Reaction against the Humanitarian Principles of the
Revolution--Abolition of the Foreign Slave-trade by Congress--Cotton
Culture and the Cotton-gin--The Effect of the Return to the Arts of
Peace upon the Ideas Concerning Slavery--Slavery During the War of
1812 and the Years just before and just after this War--Slavery in the
Louisiana Territory--Slavery in the territory West of North Carolina
and Georgia--Slavery in Louisiana a Different Question from Slavery in
the North Carolina and Georgia Cessions--Interest in Slavery in
Maryland and Virginia Increased by the Acquisition of Louisiana--The
Domestic Slave-trade--The Relation of Slavery to the Diplomacy of the
United States.
It is not easy to define the term slavery in the abstract without
unfitting it for application to the great majority {40} of the systems
of servitude which have ever existed. Especially will it be difficult
to gain a correct conception of the relation between the white man and
the negro in North America previous to 1860 by means of such a
definition.
The institution of negro slavery in the United States was an
historical growth, which was in some respects unique. We shall,
therefore, do better to follow the main stages of that development
than to attempt at the outset any definition whatsoever. We may, in
this manner, build up a true description of it, and escape the error
frequently contained in the brevity of a definition and in the nature
of an abstract proposition.
[Sidenote: First appearance of slavery in the British North American
colonies.]
[Sidenote: Early theory of the benefits of slavery.]
It began its existence, like most institutions and relations, as a
social custom. Most of the historians record the appearance of a Dutch
merchant ship at Jamestown, in the year 1619, having negroes on board,
and inform us that twenty of them were sold to the colonists. What
title the Dutch traders had to such property, exactly what they sold
to the colonists, and what rights the colonists acquired in or over
such property, were defined, guaranteed, and secured by no existing
statutes. If any of the parties to the transaction reflected upon
these subjects at all, they must have supposed that the right of
possession and the freedom of contract covered the whole case. There
is certainly no evidence that any of these parties, or anybody else,
had the faintest conception that the law of any state, or any
principle of natural justice, or of reason, was violated or impaired
by the procedure or the results of the procedure. It was a firmly and
universally established opinion of the time that the attachment of
infidels to Christians in a relation of servant to master was vastly
beneficial to the infidel, certainly so when {41} the infidel was also
a barbarian, and was taken out of slavery to a barbarian master, as
was the case in respect to almost all of the negroes brought to the
English colonies in North America.
We cannot dismiss this opinion as one of the errors of the dark ages.
It lives to-day as a principle of modern political science and
practical politics, under the form of statement that civilized people
have the right and duty to impose civilization upon uncivilized
populations by whatever means they may deem to be just and proper.
There can be no reasonable doubt that the negroes transferred from
slavery in Africa to slavery in the English-American colonies
themselves felt the amelioration of their condition, and were, in
general, entirely contented with their new lot.
[Sidenote: The earliest legal recognition of slavery in the colonies.]
The relation was established in the Northern colonies, as well as in
the Southern, in the early years of their existence, and it was in
Massachusetts rather than in Virginia that it first received legal
recognition, and began to be changed from a purely domestic
institution by suffering governmental regulation. In the Massachusetts
"Fundamentals," or "Body of Liberties," passed by the General Court in
1641, the slavery of negroes and Indians, and the slave-trade, were
expressly legalized. In fact, so far as the colonists themselves were
responsible for the introduction of negro slavery among them, the
impartial historian must place the greater blame upon a Northern
colony. Its citizens were first to develop commerce, and it was their
ships which brought the slave cargoes from the coasts of Africa to all
of the colonies.
[Sidenote: Northern colonies not well adapted to negro labor.]
[Sidenote: The Southern colonies well adapted to negro labor.]
The negroes were not, however, fitted for labor in the Northern
colonies. In the first place, it was too cold for them to thrive
there. A warm, moist air is the natural climate for the negro. In the
second place, the {42} work to be done in these sections was not
suited to his capacity. The Northern colonies had not, indeed, at that
early day, developed the finer forms of industry which have
subsequently distinguished that part of the country. They were then,
as to their internal pursuits, almost as completely agricultural as
the colonies of the South. But their farming required a great deal
more of intelligence, thrift, and industry in the laborer than the
negro of that day possessed. The country was broken, the good soil was
limited in amount, the weather was capricious, and the management of
the crops demanded judgment and discretion. On the other hand, the
vast level areas of good soil, the warm, uniform climate, and the
simple crops of the Southern colonies furnished the conditions
favorable to the employment of negro labor.
[Sidenote: Negro slavery a temporary necessity in the South.]
It is not easy to see how the rich swamp-lands of these colonies could
ever have been reclaimed and made tributary to the civilization of the
world in any way but by the employment of negro labor. And it is no
easier to see how the pure negro could then have been brought to do
this great work save through slavery to the white race, save by being
forced to contribute the muscular effort, under the direction of the
superior intelligence of the white race, to the realization of objects
determined by that superior intelligence. The negro is proof against
malaria, and thrives under the burning sun. The white man is destroyed
by the former and greatly disabled by the latter. And the pure negro
would not at that period of his development labor voluntarily. These
were the elements of the problem which confronted those who undertook
to subject the vast marshes of the Southern colonies to cultivation
and to prepare them for the {43} production of their most valuable
contributions to the comforts of civilized man. The solution of the
problem was negro slavery.
[Sidenote: Was negro slavery an error and an evil from the first?]
We are most of us inclined, at this day, to hold that this was an
erroneous solution, and that we could have discovered a better one;
but it was the solution which was reached, and we shall be wiser if we
seek to understand it clearly, instead of wasting our energies in its
condemnation, remembering that many of the things of the past, which,
from the point of view of the present, we are prone to regard as
error, and even as sin, are only anachronisms. In fact, those who
founded the colony of Georgia thought _then_ that they had a better
solution of the problem. They prohibited slavery at the outset from
that colony. In fourteen years they came to regard this act as a great
mistake, and the noblest spirits among them acknowledged themselves in
error, and joined in the movement for the introduction of negro
slave-labor.
[Sidenote: Slavery legislation in the Southern colonies.]
The conditions above mentioned were undoubtedly the chief causes of
the more rapid and pronounced development of negro slavery in the
Southern colonies. And that more rapid and pronounced development
directs us rather to the legislation of the Southern colonies than to
that of the Northern, in following the legalization of the relation.
[Sidenote: Partus sequitur ventrem.]
Virginia naturally took the lead, and furnished the precedents for the
others. The first question, both as to time and importance, which
required legislative treatment, was the question of the status of the
children of slaves. Where legalized marriage does not exist, the only
certainty in respect to parentage is attained by regarding the mother.
Rights and status in such a condition of society are, therefore,
transmitted through the female line. _Partus sequitur ventrem_ is the
rule {44} not only of the civil law, but of every system of law
regulating the accidents of descent among people where the mingling of
the sexes is not controlled by civilized marriage. Insuperable
obstacles present themselves in the attempt to apply any other rule.
It was no unusual or arbitrary enactment of the Virginia legislature
which, in 1662, prescribed the rule that the status of the slave
mother should determine that of her offspring. This rule was followed
in all the colonies, and many of them enacted it into statute law.
[Sidenote: Definitions of the slave class.]
So long as the slaves were few in number and were not Christians the
necessity for legislation defining the slave class was not felt; but
so soon as the slave-trade became more active, and slaves began to
receive Christian baptism, the old customary test in regard to this
matter, that of infidelity or heathenism, would no longer suffice. The
colonists of that day were too conscientious to cut the knot of this
difficulty by denying Christian baptism to any one seeking it. They
considered it their prime duty to lead the heathen to the knowledge of
Christ. It is evident that their consciences were greatly troubled
over the question of the effect of Christian baptism upon the slave
status. The colonial legislatures, the Home Government, and the Bishop
of London were appealed to for counsel in the dilemma. The answers
received from all of these were to the effect that the status of the
slave was not changed by Christian baptism or conversion.
[Sidenote: The test of the slave status as fixed by the Virginia
statute.]
The test of the slave status was then necessarily fixed by
legislation. The Virginia statute declared all servants brought into
the country by land or sea, who were not Christians in their native
country at the time when they were purchased or procured, nor free in
{45} England or some other Christian country, to be slaves. Exception
was made of Turks and Moors in amity with the King. This statute,
taken together with the rule _partus sequitur ventrem_, which rule was
re-enacted, became the test of the slave class. At the same time heavy
penalties were attached to the marriage or cohabitation of white women
with slaves.
[Sidenote: The legal position of the slave.]
Of course it very soon became necessary that the legal position of the
slave should be definitely fixed. The legislature of Virginia again
set the precedents. Concisely stated, this legislation provided that a
slave could have no standing in the ordinary courts, either as party
or witness; that a slave could own no property; that a slave owed
obedience to the master, who might force the slave to labor, and
chastise the slave even to the extreme of so injuring the slave that
the slave might die in consequence thereof, without incurring the
penalties of felony; that the slave could be sold or inherited as
personal property; and that the offspring of the female slave belonged
to the master owning her at the time of its birth.
[Sidenote: Tendency toward serfage in the Code of 1705.]
The wilful killing of a slave by anyone, even the master, was
accounted murder, and extraordinary tribunals, without a jury, were
constituted for the protection of his person. The Code of 1705 even
contained regulations which indicated that the trend of thought and of
legislation, at that juncture, was toward attaching the slave to the
soil, which would have been a step upward in a course, which, if
consistently followed, would have made the slave a serf. But the still
prevailing rules, which allowed the slave to be seized and sold for
the debts of the master, and regulated the inheritance of slaves
according to the {46} law governing the descent of personal property,
seem to have completely neutralized that tendency before the middle of
the century had been reached.
[Sidenote: Public relations of the slave system.]
Naturally the private law accidents of the relation were first
developed and fixed, but very soon the rights and powers of the
community in regard to the institution began to claim attention. The
public peace and welfare must be safeguarded against the possible
conduct of the slave, on the one hand, and of the master, on the
other.
The legislation of Virginia set the example in these respects also.
That legislation provided that no slave should have, or carry arms, or
go outside of the plantation of his master without a pass from his
master, or lift his hand against a Christian; that a sheriff should
arrest a runaway slave on the warrant of two justices, and might
lawfully kill any slave who resisted arrest; and that no slave should
be emancipated without the consent of the Governor and Council.
On the other hand, it provided that the master should be responsible
for all damage done by his slave at any place where there was no
Christian overseer, and required that any master giving freedom to his
slave should pay the cost of his transportation out of the colony.
[Sidenote: The general object of the laws in respect to slaves.]
Such was substantially the law of negro slavery in all of the colonies
at the beginning of the decade before the Revolution. It was perhaps
more severe than this in South Carolina, and it was certainly less so
in Massachusetts.
The objects which it had in view were to secure the master's property
in the slave, to enable the master to hold the slave in obedience and
force him, if necessary, to labor, and to protect the public peace and
welfare against the abuse of the relation by the master, and against
the vicious nature of the slave.
{47} It does certainly appear that the century of law-making upon the
subject had not ameliorated the condition of the slave. We must
remember, however, that the first stages in the legalization of any
relation sometimes make the situation appear worse than what obtained
before the movement began, although it may not be worse in fact.
[Sidenote: Slavery and the Revolutionary ideas of the rights of man.]
But the period of the Revolution brought with it a great change of
view in regard to the morality of slavery, and this change of idea
produced great modifications in the law of slavery, all of which
tended not only toward an improvement of the condition of the slave,
but also toward the ultimate extinction of slavery.
When we regard the Revolution of the colonies against the motherland
from the point of view of the present, we can easily see that its
purpose was very different from that of the French Revolution. What it
really sought and accomplished was national independence against
foreign rule. Those, however, who formulated the creed of the
Revolution sought its justification in the doctrine of human rights
rather than in that of national rights. The philosophy of the
eighteenth century was a humanitarian outburst. Politically and
legally it is summed up in the very misleading propositions that all
men are born equal and are endowed with freedom, and that the people
have the right to change or abolish existing government at their
pleasure. Whatever we may think of these doctrines now, our ancestors
professed to believe in them, and there is no reason to doubt the
sincerity of their profession, so far as their own consciousness went.
They saw also the inconsistency of slavery with these doctrines, and
quickly came to regard slavery as an evil which should be removed as
soon as possible.
{48} [Sidenote: First prohibition upon slave importation.]
The Continental Congress took the first step in this direction. Two
years before it declared independence it prohibited any further
importation of slaves, and repeated the prohibition two years later.
These acts are good evidence that, at the moment, the question of
slavery was regarded as a matter of national concern.
The Congress was, however, so occupied with the duties pertaining to
the prosecution of the war, that it failed to go forward in this
matter, as well as in many other matters of national concern; and when
the Confederate Congress succeeded the Continental Congress, it did so
upon the basis of a written constitution, or rather articles of union,
which vested no powers whatsoever in it over the subject of slavery.
[Sidenote: Abolition of slavery in the Northern Commonwealths after
the beginning of the Revolution.]
The separate colonies, now become "States" by the theory of the
Articles of Confederation, took up the question. Massachusetts
abolished slavery substantially by her constitution of 1780.
Pennsylvania provided for gradual emancipation by a statute of the
same year. Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Hampshire followed the
example of Pennsylvania. And New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland,
and Virginia forbade any further importation of slaves.
[Sidenote: The Ordinance of 1787.]
Under such impulses and influences the Confederate Congress, in spite
of the fact that no power in respect to slavery had been conferred
upon it, assumed to pass the famous Ordinance of 1787, decreeing the
free status exclusively in all of the territory then belonging to the
United States north of the Ohio River. The power to enact the
Ordinance could not even be derived by the most generous principles of
implication from any provision in the Articles of Confederation. To
justify the exercise of it by the Confederate {49} Congress it is
necessary to go back to the general principle of political science
that, as there was no government for this territory but the
Confederate Congress, and as there were no limitations in the Articles
of Confederation upon the powers of the Congress in this territory,
the powers of that Congress must have extended in this territory to
all subjects usually regulated by government.
The claim sometimes made that this Ordinance was a treaty between the
"States" forming the Confederation, or between them and the "States"
to be formed out of that territory in the future, is altogether
untenable. It was nothing more nor less than a legislative act of the
Congress.
It is an incontrovertible proof of the universality and intensity of
the opposition to the farther spread of slavery that the common
consciousness of the age acquiesced in this most latitudinarian
construction of the powers of the Confederate Congress, and that the
Congress itself voted the measure with but a single dissenting voice.
[Sidenote: Slavery and the Constitution of 1787.]
At the same moment that this measure was being considered in the
Congress, the Constitutional Convention, sitting at Philadelphia, was
framing the national Constitution of 1787. The attitude which the
nation would assume in this new instrument of its organic law toward
the subject of slavery was one of the most, if not the most, important
of the questions which the Convention was called upon to consider.
There can be little doubt that the men of 1787 had come to regard the
question of the rights of man a little more calmly than they did
during the heat of the battle with the motherland. In Luther Martin's
famous letter to the legislature of Maryland upon the work of the {50}
Convention of 1787, a very significant passage concerning the existing
views upon slavery occurs. He wrote: "At this time we do not generally
hold this commerce" (the slave-trade) "in so great abhorrence as we
have done. When our liberties were at stake we warmly felt for the
common rights of men. The danger being thought to be past which
threatened ourselves we are daily growing more insensible to those
rights."
The Constitution of 1787 contains evidence of the correctness of this
statement. Among its provisions were to be found three most important
compromises with the slavery interest, three most important
recognitions of slavery. The first was political in its nature. It
counted the negro for three-fifths of the white man in the
distribution of the representation in the House of Representatives and
in the Presidential Electoral Colleges. The second was commercial in
its nature. It forbade the Congress to prohibit, before the year 1808,
the migration or importation of such persons as the existing "States"
might see fit to admit. The third was a direct guarantee of slave
property. It required the surrender to his master of an escaped slave
wherever found in the United States. These were most momentous
provisions. They secured slave property, increased slave property, and
made slavery a vast political power in the hands of the slave-masters.
There is no doubt that the clock of the ages was turned back full half
a century in regard to this great question by the Constitution of
1787.
[Sidenote: Reaction against the humanitarian principles of the
Revolution.]
From 1787 to 1808 the reactionary course was pursued almost without a
single break. Kentucky was made a Commonwealth with the slave status.
The Congress accepted from North Carolina and Georgia cessions of the
territory which lay to the west of them, and which they claimed as
belonging to them, with a condition {51} that slavery should not be
forbidden therein by Congress. The slave Commonwealth of Tennessee was
immediately formed out of a part of this territory. The vast territory
of Louisiana, in which slavery existed wherever it was inhabited, was
added to the domain of the Union. The District of Columbia, the seat
of the general Government, was made a slave-holding community, through
the adoption by Congress of the laws of Maryland as the code of the
District. A fugitive slave-law was passed by Congress, which enabled
any white man to seize, as his slave, any man of color, and bring him
before any magistrate, and, upon proof satisfactory to the latter, to
demand such papers and certificates as would legally warrant him in
reclaiming the slave and transporting him to the place whence he was
said to have escaped; and petitions to Congress complaining of the
abuse of this arbitrary power were laid aside without consideration.
Even the Territory of Indiana prayed Congress to suspend for it that
part of the Ordinance of 1787 which forbade slavery within its limits.
And South Carolina abolished her law against the importation of
slaves, and opened the way wide for a vast increase of the slave
population.
[Sidenote: Abolition of the foreign slave-trade by Congress.]
These last acts seem to have aroused the consciousness of the Congress
to the rapidity with which the whole country was becoming again
subject to the slave-holding interests. The Congress resisted the
importunities of the Indiana leaders, and after giving South Carolina
a reasonable time to re-enact her law abolishing the foreign
slave-trade, without effect, proceeded itself to abolish the trade
from the first moment that the Constitution permitted this to be done,
from January 1st, 1808.
[Sidenote: Cotton culture and the cotton-gin.]
[Sidenote: The effect of the return to the arts of peace upon the
ideas concerning slavery.]
It has been customary to ascribe the great revulsion {52} of view in
regard to slavery, which certainly manifested itself everywhere in the
United States between 1790 and 1807, to cotton culture and the
cotton-gin. The invention of the cotton-gin, in the first part of the
last decade of the eighteenth century, and the increased demand for
cotton fabrics throughout the world, had made the cultivation of
cotton highly profitable. An increase in cotton culture was naturally
encouraged by such enhanced profits, and this tendency produced an
increased demand for negro labor and for new lands, since the cotton
crop requires a warm climate and low lands, and exhausts the soil very
rapidly. Those parts of the country adapted to cotton-raising felt,
therefore, a renewed interest in the increase of negro labor and in
territorial extension. And those parts not so adapted felt an indirect
interest in the same, since the increased and still increasing profits
of the cotton culture made a market for their slaves and a carrying
trade for their shipowners. There is no doubt that such was the main
cause of the great change of view in regard to the question of negro
slavery which the country experienced between 1790 and 1810, but it
was not the sole cause. It was inevitable that, when the men of that
era passed out of the excited state of mind and feeling produced by
the War with the motherland, and came to the task of re-establishing
the relations of peace and every-day life and business, they should
regain a calmness of judgment, a respect for vested rights, and a
regard for customary relations, which placed the political philosophy
of 1776 under many limitations and qualifications, some of which,
certainly, were sound and valuable. It is only when we take all of
these considerations together that we comprehend the reasoning of the
men of the first decade of this {53} century upon the great question.
They saw a great interest developing which was bringing wealth and
comfort into an impoverished country. They knew that it could be then
sustained only by negro labor. They did not believe that the negro
would work unless forced to it by the white man. They thought it was
better for the negro himself to have food, clothing, and shelter, in
slavery, than to starve, or become a robber, in liberty. They felt, on
the other hand, that the slavery of one human being to another was an
exceptional relation in a political system which rested its own right
to independent existence upon the doctrine of human freedom. It was
not, then, unnatural that they arrived at the conclusion that to
prohibit further importations of the barbarians from Africa was the
only remedy for which the time was ripe. They sincerely believed that
they would place themselves and their slaves in a far more
advantageous position for the gradual elevation of the latter by
having to deal only with negroes born and reared amid civilized
surroundings, and that freedom would finally be attained by all, as
the result of a gradual advancement in intelligence, morals, and
industry, and would be thus attained without any shock to the
civilization and welfare of the country.
This appeared to the men of that day, both of the North and of the
South, to be the only safe way to proceed in solving the question of
the relation between the highly civilized Anglo-American race and the
grossly barbaric negro race in the United States. We think now that
they might have done better, and some of the more unsympathetic
critics of our history affirm that they did nothing of any
consequence, and that in what they did do they acted with a
consciously deceptive purpose. There may have been a few to whom this
criticism can be justly applied, but there is no {54} sufficient
evidence that the mass of them were insincere either in act or
thought. The contention that they were is more partisan than truly
historical.
[Sidenote: Slavery during the War of 1812, and the years just before
and just after this war.]
The decade between 1807 and 1817 was filled with the questions of
foreign relations, of foreign war, and of the results of foreign war.
The suspension, and then the almost entire destruction, of foreign
commerce by the British Orders in Council, the Napoleonic decrees, the
Jeffersonian embargo, and the War of 1812, reduced the exportation in
cotton from about fifty millions of pounds in 1807 to less than twenty
millions of pounds in 1814. The pecuniary interest in the maintenance
of slavery declined thus quite materially, and the majority of the
leading men, both North and South, still regarded negro slavery as
only a temporary status, which would be gradually modified in the
direction of freedom.
[Sidenote: Slavery in the Louisiana territory.]
Notwithstanding all this, however, the slavery interest was steadily
waxing in influence and power throughout this period. First of all the
existence and the extension of slavery in the vast territory purchased
from France was secured. The custom of slave-holding had been
introduced into this territory by the French and Spanish immigrants,
while it was in the possession of France and Spain, before the year
1800. In that year Spain, as we have seen, receded it to France. Nine
years before this date, slavery had been abolished in France by the
National Assembly. It is certainly a question, then, whether the
re-establishment of French supremacy over Louisiana in 1800 did not
produce the abolition of slavery there. It will be remembered that
France was at that moment subject to the consular government of
Bonaparte, and that the Consul was not an enthusiast for the
revolutionary ideals. He did not disturb the custom of slave-holding
{55} in Louisiana, and when he ceded this vast territory to the United
States, in 1803, the custom existed in all its inhabited parts. The
Treaty of cession contained a provision which pledged the Government
of the United States to uphold the rights of property of the
inhabitants of the province. It can be fairly said, therefore, that
the United States Government obligated itself to France to maintain
slavery within the territory ceded until it should be erected into a
Commonwealth, or into Commonwealths, of the Union.
The United States Government might have violated the Treaty, if it had
chosen to do so, and the question then raised would have been one of a
purely diplomatic or international character. There would have been no
question of constitutional power involved. The act of the United
States Government breaking the Treaty would have been the law of the
land for the inhabitants of this territory.
The United States Government, however, not only permitted the
continuance of the custom of slave-holding in Louisiana, but when, in
1804, Congress divided this vast region into two parts by the
thirty-third parallel of latitude, and organized the southern portion
as the Territory of Orleans, and placed the northern portion under the
jurisdiction of the Governor and judges of the Territory of Indiana,
it, at the same time, authorized citizens of the United States
immigrating into the Territory of Orleans, for the purpose of actual
settlement, to take their slaves with them, and provided that the
French laws in force at the date of the division should continue in
the northern part until repealed or modified by the Governor and
judges of Indiana Territory. Any danger to slavery in this district of
Louisiana, which might be contained in the power vested by Congress in
the Governor and judges of the Territory of Indiana to {56} repeal or
modify the French laws which Congress had allowed to continue in the
district, was overcome, the following year, by the independent
organization of this district as the Territory of Louisiana, and by a
provision in the Act of Congress effecting this organization, which
provided for the continuance in force of the laws of the district,
until repealed or modified by the legislature of the Territory.
When, therefore, in 1812, the Territory of Orleans was erected into
the Commonwealth of Louisiana, and the name of the Territory of
Louisiana was changed to Missouri, there was no question about the
status of the new Commonwealth. It was, both in fact and in law, a
slave-holding Commonwealth; and the custom of slave-holding was
perpetuated in the newly named Territory by the provision in the Act
of Congress that the laws and regulations of the Territory of
Louisiana should remain in force in the Territory of Missouri until
repealed or modified by the legislature of the Territory of Missouri.
[Sidenote: Slavery in the territory west of North Carolina and
Georgia.]
The Government of the United States had entered into obligations with
North Carolina and Georgia, as we have seen, not to prohibit slavery
in the territory ceded by them to the United States. Whatever we may
think of the binding force of any such agreement from a legal point of
view, certainly from an ethical point of view it could have been urged
that the Government would have broken faith with some of the citizens
of the United States had the Congress disregarded this understanding.
[Sidenote: Slavery in Louisiana a different question from slavery in
the North Carolina and Georgia cessions.]
It cannot, however, be contended that there was any obligation, legal
or moral, resting upon the Government of the United States toward any
of the citizens of the United States, or any of the Commonwealths, to
maintain slavery in the province of Louisiana and in the {57}
Territories carved out of it. There was, as we have seen, a provision
in the Treaty of cession of 1803, by which the United States
Government obligated itself to France to protect the property of the
inhabitants of the province. But the Government of the United States
was under no obligation to any citizen of the United States, or to any
Commonwealth of the Union, to keep this Treaty inviolate. It may be
affirmed, then, that the United States Government had, in the case of
Louisiana, for the first time, permitted and maintained slavery in
territory where it was perfectly free to act in regard to this subject
as it would, in so far as its own citizens were concerned. This
certainly manifested a great increase in the power of the
slave-holders over the general Government.
[Sidenote: Interest in slavery in Maryland and Virginia increased by
the acquisition of Louisiana.]
In consequence of this vast territorial extension of slavery the
interest of the more Northern of the old slave-holding Commonwealths
in slavery was, during this period, greatly re-enlivened. Maryland and
Virginia were already, in 1807, overstocked with slaves. The opening
up of the virgin lands of the Southwest to the immigration of masters
and slaves from the older Commonwealths, and the abolition of the
foreign slave-trade, now made the Southwest an excellent market for
the surplus slave population of these older Commonwealths.
[Sidenote: The domestic slave-trade.]
The domestic slave-trade began now to be one of the chief sources of
the wealth of Maryland and Virginia especially. Those who participated
in this traffic justified it by the claim that it was better for the
slaves themselves to be removed to new homes, where they could be
better supported, than to be kept in their old homes and suffer for
the want of the necessaries of life, and that the distribution of the
slave {58} population over a larger area would make future
emancipation easier, and less dangerous to the supremacy of the white
race. There was a certain force in this reasoning. The mass of the
slave-holders seem to have been fully convinced of its soundness,
although it did not entirely quiet the consciences of the best men
among them to the many painful incidents connected with the separation
of the slaves, made subject to this traffic, from their old homes and
associations.
It is easy to see, however, that the raising of negro slaves, having
become a most profitable industry in the older Commonwealths, acted as
a vast bribe upon the ideas of men in regard to the questions of the
perpetuation and extension of slavery, and beclouded their consciences
in respect thereto.
[Sidenote: The relation of slavery to the diplomacy of the United
States.]
Finally, the capture and abduction of negro slaves by the British
forces during the War of 1812, and the demand of the slave-holders
that the United States Government should secure the restitution of
their slaves, or compensation for the loss of them, from the British
Government, moved the United States Government to assume its attitude
toward slavery in the administration of the international affairs of
the country. The cardinal political principle of the slave-holding
statesmen, at that period, was that slavery was a "State" matter with
which the United States Government had no concern, and in regard to
which it had no powers. This appeal to the Government to voice and
enforce their demands against Great Britain in respect to their slave
property has seemed, therefore, to some of the later and more radical
critics of American history to have been a gross inconsistency, and
they have represented it as a proof of the insincerity of the
slave-holders wherever their pecuniary interests were involved.
{59} This criticism is rather taking, but a sound view of the
Constitution will hardly support it. In making the United States
Government the _exclusive_ organ for dealing with foreign countries,
the Constitution impliedly confers upon that Government a protectorate
against foreign states over interests which are regulated, internally,
only by the powers of the respective Commonwealths of the Union. It is
true that this doctrine rests upon a national view of the federal
system of government in the United States, a view which the
slave-holding statesmen did not later share. From their later
particularistic principle of the fundamental character of the Union,
such a general protectorate over "State" interests by the United
States Government against foreign countries could hardly be inferred
from the Constitution. If this principle could be assumed by these
critics as having been held at that time by the slave-holding
statesmen, their charge of inconsistency, if not of insincerity, would
be fairly made out. But such, as we have seen, was not the case. Many
of the slave-holding statesmen of 1816 were stronger in the national
view of the character of the Union than were the statesmen of New
England itself.
The United States Government recognized its duty to extend the
protection demanded in the case, and it secured from the British
Government compensation to the masters for the loss of slave property
occasioned by the acts of the British officers during the War.
Such was the status of the slavery question at the close of the War of
1812-15, at the commencement, therefore, of the period when,
withdrawing themselves from foreign complications, the people of the
United States began to adjust the different parts of their political
system, chiefly if not solely, to the demands of their internal
interests, and to solve the problems of their {60} polity from the
point of view of their domestic institutions. It is not strange, then,
that from this point of time onward the powerful institution of negro
slavery recognized more and more clearly its natural relations to all
of these questions of internal policy and law, and sought more and
more determinedly to bring the political system and the policies of
the United States into accord with its own exclusive interests. For
the first three or four years after the close of the War this tendency
did not, as has been pointed out, appear upon the surface, but it was
working in the depths. From 1820 to 1861, certainly, it furnishes the
point of view for the correct elucidation of the majority of the great
problems of the history of the United States.
{61}
CHAPTER IV.
THE CREATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MISSOURI
The Growth of Slavery not Seriously Checked by the Prohibition of the
Foreign Slave-trade--The General Government Powerless Against Slavery
in the Existing Commonwealths--The Powers of the General Government in
Respect to Slavery in the Territories--The Powers of Congress in the
Admission of new "States" into the Union--Slavery in the Missouri
Territory--The First Petition from Missouri Territory for the
Permission to form a Commonwealth--The Second Petition, and the First
Bill in Congress, for the Admission of Missouri--The Tallmadge
Amendment to the Bill--Passage of the Amendment by the House of
Representatives--Passage of the Original Bill by the Senate--The
Missouri Bill during the Session of 1819-20--Mr. Taylor's
Proposition--The Bill for the Admission of Maine Reported and Passed
by the House of Representatives--The Failure of Mr. Taylor's Plan--The
Missouri Bill again before the House of Representatives--Mr. Taylor's
Amendment to the Bill--The Independent Missouri Bill of the
Senate--The Refusal of the Senate to Disconnect the two Measures--The
Conference on the Subject, and the First Missouri
Compromise--President Monroe's Approval of the Compromise--Review of
the Points Involved in the Contest--The Revival of the Missouri
Struggle--The Missouri Constitution in Congress--Mr. Lowndes' Bill for
the Admission of Missouri with the Instrument Unchanged--Defeat of the
Lowndes Bill in the House--Passage of the Senate Bill with a Proviso
by the Senate--The Senate Bill Tabled by the House--Mr. Clay and the
Second Missouri Compromise--Passage of the Second Missouri Compromise
Act--The General Effects of the Decisions Reached in the Missouri
Question.
[Sidenote: The growth of slavery not seriously checked by the
prohibition of the foreign slave-trade.]
Already before the year 1819, as we have seen in the preceding
chapter, had it become manifest that the {62} influences and measures
relied upon by the forefathers for the ultimate extirpation of negro
slavery were not effecting the desired result in the Commonwealths
south of the line of Pennsylvania and of the Ohio. It was evident that
the revolutionary enthusiasm for universal liberty and the rights of
man was not so strongly felt by the generation which grew up after
"'76" as by the generation of "'76," that the laws against the
importation of slaves were being evaded, and that the slaves were
increasing by birth many times more rapidly than they were decreasing
by emancipation and removal to the colonies of the American Society
for Emancipation. Moreover, four new Commonwealths had been
established--Kentucky, Tennessee, Louisiana, and Mississippi--in which
slavery was legalized, and a fifth--Alabama--was even then in process
of creation. It was manifest from all sides to the friends of
universal freedom that other means than those hitherto relied upon
must be found, if any progress was to be made in the advancement of
liberty, yea if the evident retrogression in respect to this prime
element of political civilization was to be checked.
[Sidenote: The general Government powerless against slavery in the
existing Commonwealths.]
All had been done by the United States Government, however, against
slavery within the existing Commonwealths that the Constitution
allowed. Before anything more could be undertaken, the Constitution
itself would have to be so amended as to authorize it. The
extraordinary majorities required for the initiation and adoption of
amendments made it practically impossible to effect anything by such
means. Of the thirteen original Commonwealths, seven had abolished
slavery and six had retained it. To these had now been added
four--Vermont, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois--in {63} which slavery was
forbidden, and five in which it was permitted--Kentucky, Tennessee,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama--making thus the number upon each
side the same. And although the population in the Commonwealths north
of the line of Pennsylvania and the Ohio had outstripped, in increase,
that in those south of this line by near half a million of souls in
thirty years, and the representation in the national House of
Representatives stood consequently in favor of the former section in
the ratio of 104 to 79, still the method of representation in the
Senate, and the equality in the number of the Commonwealths
permitting, with those prohibiting, slavery, stood firmly in the way
of any amendment of the Constitution, either favorable or unfavorable
to the slavery interest.
[Sidenote: The powers of the general Government in respect to slavery
in the Territories.]
The Constitution furnished, however, an indirect way of reaching the
desired result. It gave the Congress general powers within the
Territories and did not restrict these powers in behalf of slavery.
Congress might thus prohibit slavery in the Territories, and the
Territories would thus become settled by a free population, an
anti-slavery population, which would form Commonwealths at the proper
time, in which the free status would be perpetuated by Commonwealth
law. And when a sufficient number of free Commonwealths had been thus
created to give the necessary majorities to amend the Constitution in
the direction of abolition, slavery might be extinguished in the
Commonwealths which had already legalized it. But the first difficulty
in the way of the effectiveness of this line of action was the fact
that Congress had already forfeited, in part, the opportunity, by
failing to keep the southern portion of Louisiana Territory under a
Territorial organization until slavery could have been eradicated in
it. And it was probably, in {64} 1819, already too late to attempt to
keep the remaining parts of this vast region, so far as it had been
settled at all, under Territorial organization until this result could
have been effected. At least, the advocates of freedom in 1819
evidently thought so, for they searched the Constitution to find some
other power in the general Government by which to deal with the
question.
[Sidenote: The powers of Congress in the admission of new "States"
into the Union.]
There was another provision which had been already several times
applied to this very subject and to other subjects. It was the
provision which conferred upon Congress the power to create, or
co-operate in creating, new Commonwealths out of the Territories of
the United States. This power is expressed in general terms, and in
its employment Congress had imposed a number of limitations upon the
powers of the new Commonwealths which the Constitution did not impose
upon those of the original Commonwealths. Here, then, was a possible
way for those seeking the advancement of liberty to effect their
purpose. If their interpretation of the Constitution, in regard to the
extent of this power, was correct, and they could only command the
President and a simple majority in both branches of Congress, they
could abolish slavery in every new Commonwealth at the time of its
creation, and make the continuance of the free status the perpetual
condition of its continued existence as a Commonwealth. It would then
be only a question of time when sufficient majorities would be secured
for so amending the Constitution of the United States as to expel
slavery from the old Commonwealths through the regular forms for
constitutional development. It was an attractive scheme, and appeared
to provide the means for ridding the country peaceably of its great
evil at no very far distant day. It was the last possible means which
the Constitution afforded. It was {65} tried in the creation of the
Commonwealth of Missouri and it failed. It is this which constitutes
the significance of the great movement. The result attained made the
abolition of slavery by the United States Government, through legal
and peaceable means, an utter impossibility. It contributed, at least,
toward making the War of 1861 an historical necessity.
As we have seen in the preceding chapter, slaveholding had become
established by custom in the vast region known as the Louisiana
province, wherever it was inhabited, during the periods when it
belonged to Spain and France, and had been permitted to continue after
its acquisition by the United States; and that in 1812 this province
was divided into one slave-holding Commonwealth, Louisiana, and one
slave-holding Territory, Missouri.
[Sidenote: Slavery in the Missouri Territory.]
From 1812 to 1818 Congress did nothing toward the extinction of
slavery in the Missouri Territory, or preventing the free immigration
of masters with their slaves into the Territory. Neither had the
legislature of the Territory done anything touching these subjects. It
may, therefore, be assumed that in the year 1818, the holding of
negroes as slaves was legal by custom, if not by positive law, in the
whole of the Missouri Territory, so far as it had been settled, and
that unless something should thereafter be done, either by the United
States Government or by the Territorial government, forbidding it,
slavery would be likewise legal wherever the Territory might become
settled.
[Sidenote: The first petition from Missouri Territory for the
permission to form a Commonwealth.]
Before the beginning of the year 1818, the population in the Territory
which looked to the town of St. Louis as its centre had begun to
agitate the question of the establishment of Commonwealth government.
During the Congressional session of 1817-18, petitions {66} appeared
in the House of Representatives from this population, praying for the
erection of that part of Missouri Territory, bounded roughly by the
thirty-sixth parallel of latitude on the south, the line of longitude
passing through the point of confluence of the Kansas River and the
Missouri River on the west, the Falls of the Des Moines River and the
course of that river on the north, and the Mississippi on the east,
into a Commonwealth of the Union. The petitions were referred and
reported on, and the bill presented reached the stage for debate in
the committee of the Whole House, but was not taken up during the
session.
[Sidenote: The second petition, and the first bill in Congress, for
the admission of Missouri.]
Early in the following session, that of 1818-19, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives presented a memorial from the Territorial
legislature of Missouri which contained substantially the same prayer
as the petitions presented at the preceding session. This memorial was
immediately referred to a committee for report, but the bill which
grew out of the petitions and the memorial was not brought forward for
debate in the committee of the Whole House until February 13th, 1819.
[Sidenote: The Tallmadge amendment to the bill.]
It was upon this day, and during this first debate, that Mr. James
Tallmadge, of New York, offered the famous amendment to the bill,
which precipitated a discussion, that lasted for more than a year,
upon the great subject of the distribution of powers between the
United States Government and the Commonwealths, a discussion in which
all the great legal lights of both Houses of Congress participated,
and during the course of which the whole country hung with painful
anxiety upon the outcome. It was the first great trial of the
Constitution under the issue of a domestic question, a question which
threatened to {67} divide the country upon geographic lines, a
question which, therefore, threatened the dissolution of the Union.
The exact words of this amendment are essential to a correct
comprehension of the question involved. It reads: "And provided that
the further introduction of slavery or involuntary servitude be
prohibited, except for the punishment of crimes, whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted; and that all children born within the
said State, after the admission thereof into the Union, shall be free
at the age of twenty-five years."
[Sidenote: The debate upon the Tallmadge amendment.]
The debate upon this motion is not fully reported in the annals of
Congress, but it is sufficiently reported to give a correct idea of
the constitutional questions involved. The discussion proceeded from
the two points of view of constitutional powers and public policy. Of
course the first point for the restrictionists, as those who favored
the amendment were termed, to establish was the constitutionality of
the power of Congress to impose this restriction in erecting a
Territory into a Commonwealth. If Congress has, or had, no such power,
the question of policy need not have been considered. They claimed the
power, and based it upon that paragraph of Article IV. section three,
which reads: "New States may be admitted by the Congress into this
Union." It will be readily seen that this is a very loose statement
concerning the powers of Congress in establishing this most
fundamental relation. Taken apart from all connections, its most
natural meaning is that foreign states may become politically joined
with the United States by an Act of Congress, in so far as this
country is concerned. On the other hand, taken with the context, it
appears to mean that Congress may establish Commonwealth governments,
or, in the language {68} of the Constitution, "States," upon the
territory belonging to the United States, or to some "State" or
"States" already within the Union. This is, without any reasonable
doubt, its only meaning. For if it had any reference to the connection
of foreign states with the United States, it would confer the most
important diplomatic power of the United States Government upon the
Congress, while the Constitution certainly confers the whole of this
class of powers upon the President and the Senate.
[Sidenote: The exact question at issue in the first debate on the
Missouri question.]
This was not, however, the point at issue in the Missouri question.
That point was, whether, in the creation of new Commonwealths by
Congress upon territory already within the Union, and subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the general Government, Congress had the
constitutional power to impose restrictions upon the new Commonwealths
thus created, which the Constitution did not impose upon the original
Commonwealths. The restrictionists, led by Mr. Tallmadge and Mr.
Taylor, of New York, and Mr. Fuller, of Massachusetts, contended that
Congress possessed this power. Their argument, reduced to a pair of
propositions, was, that the Constitution did not _require_ Congress to
"admit new States into this Union," but only _empowered_ Congress to
do so at its discretion; that therefore Congress could _refuse_ to
admit at its discretion, and that if Congress could admit or refuse to
admit at its own discretion, it could admit upon conditions, upon such
conditions as it might deem wise to impose, and could make the
continued existence of the new Commonwealth, as a Commonwealth, depend
upon the continued observance by it of these conditions.
[Sidenote: The precedents cited in support of the Tallmadge
amendment.]
They pointed to the precedents of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, upon
all of which Congress had imposed, as a {69} condition of their
assumption of Commonwealth powers and government as "States of the
Union," the requirement that their constitutions should not be
repugnant to the "Ordinance of the Northwest Territory of 1787," the
sixth article of which provided that there should be neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude, except as a criminal penalty, in the
Territory, from which these Commonwealths were carved out. They
contended that Congress thus prohibited slavery in these new
Commonwealths as the condition of its assent to their assumption of
the status of Commonwealths of the Union and of their continued
existence with that status.
They further pointed to the precedent of Louisiana, upon whose
"admission into the Union as a State," Congress imposed the conditions
that the new Commonwealth should use the English language as its
official language, should guarantee the writ of _habeas corpus_ and
trial by jury in all criminal cases, and should incorporate in its
organic law the fundamental principles of civil and religious liberty.
[Sidenote: Argument for the amendment from the duty of the United
States to guarantee a republican form of government to every
Commonwealth.]
They went so far as to assert that the Constitution not only permitted
Congress to lay the prohibition of slavery upon every new Commonwealth
which it might "admit into the Union," but obligated Congress to do so
by the constitutional provision which makes it the duty of the United
States Government to guarantee a republican form of government to
every Commonwealth of the Union. That is, they claimed that slavery
was incompatible with the republican form of government, and that
Congress was therefore bound by the Constitution to prohibit slavery
whenever called upon to act in regard to it.
[Sidenote: Argument from morals and policy.]
Having thus, from their point of view, vindicated the {70}
constitutional power and duty of Congress to enact the restriction,
they claimed the personal liberty of every human being to be a
self-evident principle of ethics, specifically recognized in the
Declaration of Independence, and therefore a principle of the
political system of the United States. And, finally, they demonstrated
the ruinous policy of the system of slave labor in the economy of the
country.
There is no question that Mr. Tallmadge and his friends had taken
strong ground, and that it would require extraordinary efforts to
dislodge them.
[Sidenote: Replies to the arguments of the restrictionists.]
During the first debate upon the subject, the opponents of the
restriction do not seem to have been so clear in their own minds in
reference to the principles involved as they became later, and their
arguments do not appear so convincing. Nevertheless, they touched the
point which was the real gist of the contention, and dealt with it
ably from the first. Mr. Scott, the delegate from Missouri Territory,
and Mr. P. P. Barbour, of Virginia, made a vigorous attack upon the
claim of a power in Congress to enact the restriction, as a condition
of admitting Missouri, "as a State," into the Union. They demonstrated
quite clearly that the interpretation which the restrictionists placed
upon the constitutional provision empowering Congress "to admit new
States into the Union" would enable Congress to establish inequalities
_ad libitum_ between the original Commonwealths and the new ones;
would, in principle, enable Congress to make mere provinces of the new
Commonwealths. They showed conclusively that the real question of the
controversy was not whether slavery should exist in Missouri or not,
but was whether the Commonwealth of Missouri should be allowed to
determine that matter for herself or should have it determined for her
by the {71} Congress of the United States. They pointed to the facts
that the original Commonwealths exercised, before the formation of the
existing Constitution of the United States, exclusive power over this
matter, each for itself; that the Constitution had not withdrawn this
power from them, nor prohibited it to them; and that the Constitution
declared all powers not delegated to the United States Government, nor
prohibited to the "States," to be reserved to the "States"
respectively or to the people. They, therefore, claimed that the
determination of the question whether slavery should exist in any
Commonwealth or not was a power reserved by the Constitution to each
Commonwealth for itself, and that the attempt to introduce a
distinction between the old Commonwealths and the new, in regard to
the possession of this power, was an attack upon the first principle
of federal liberty, the principle of equality in powers and duties
between the members of the Union, an attack which could be justified
legally only by an express warrant from the Constitution itself.
They disputed outright the constitutionality of the restrictions in
regard to slavery which Congress had imposed upon the Commonwealths of
Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, and held that these Commonwealths might,
at any time, so amend their organic law as to introduce slavery; and
they justified the restrictions imposed upon Louisiana as having
express warrant from the Constitution.
They did not deny the claims of the restrictionists that slavery was
ethically wrong and economically destructive, but they contended that
the evil and the impolicy of it would be mitigated by allowing the
slaves to be spread over a larger extent of territory, reducing thus
their numerical ratio to the white population in the older
Commonwealths, and enabling their masters {72} to emigrate with them
from poor and exhausted lands to rich virgin soil, instead of being
obliged to keep them in want, or sell them to new and, therefore, less
considerate masters. They argued, upon this point, that all
importation of slaves from foreign countries having been strictly
prohibited, not one slave could be added to the number already
existing by allowing their movement into new territory, but that their
condition would be vastly improved by the increased products of their
labor.
[Sidenote: The pledge to maintain slave property in Louisiana in the
Treaty of cession.]
They contended, finally, that the treaty with France by which
Louisiana was ceded to the United States contained an express
provision pledging the United States Government to protect all the
existing property rights of the inhabitants of the province, and to
admit these inhabitants, so soon as consistent with the principles of
the Constitution of the United States, to the enjoyment of
Commonwealth powers on an equality with those of the other
Commonwealths of the Union.
There is no question that hostility to slavery colored the views of
the restrictionists in regard to the constitutional powers of
Congress, and there is also no question that the anxiety of the
slaveholders to maintain the security of their property led them to
exaggerate all of the defences of the Constitution in its behalf. It
must, however, be conceded that the opponents of the restriction had,
from the outset, the better of the argument in the question of
constitutional law, and maintained it throughout the debate. They did
not express themselves as clearly and as exactly as the political
scientist of this age would do, but they demonstrated quite
convincingly that the questions of political ethics and public policy
were, at the moment, entirely impertinent, unless it could be
satisfactorily established that Congress possessed the constitutional
power to act in the {73} premises. And they showed that no federal
system of government could exist, as to the new Commonwealths, if
Congress had the unlimited authority to distribute powers between the
general Government and these Commonwealths, which the interpretation
that the restrictionists placed upon the clause of the Constitution
vesting Congress with the authority to "admit new States into this
Union" involved.
The ethical and economical influences and considerations weighed more
heavily in the minds of the Northern members than the arguments from
constitutional law, although they asserted that the Constitution also
was upon their side.
[Sidenote: Passage of the Tallmadge amendment by the House of
Representatives.]
They carried the first part of Mr. Tallmadge's amendment, the
prohibition upon the further introduction of slavery into Missouri, by
a majority of eleven votes, and the second part, the provision for the
emancipation of all slaves born in Missouri, after its admission as a
Commonwealth, when they should have reached the age of twenty-five
years, by a majority of four votes.
The leading men from the North who voted against the amendment were
Parrot, of New Hampshire, Holmes, Mason, and Shaw, of Massachusetts,
Storrs, of New York, Bloomfield, of New Jersey, Harrison, of Ohio, and
McLean, of Illinois. They were strong and fearless men and no friends
to slavery, but they were good constitutional lawyers, and they felt
that it was better to stand by the Constitution with slavery than to
expose it to the strain of exaggerated interpretations.
[Sidenote: The Missouri bill in the Senate.]
It was upon February 17th, 1819, that the Missouri bill was finally
passed by the House and sent to the Senate. It was immediately read
twice in the Senate and referred to the committee in charge of the
bill for admitting Alabama.
{74} On the 22nd, Mr. Tait, of Georgia, in behalf of the committee,
reported the bill to the Senate, with the recommendation that the
Tallmadge amendment be stricken out.
The annals of Congress state that "a long and animated debate" took
place upon this recommendation, but the speeches are not reported. It
may be safely concluded, however, that the argument against the power
of Congress to pass the amendment prevailed very decidedly in the
minds of the members of this more calm and judicial body. They voted,
twenty-two to sixteen, against the first part of the amendment, and
thirty-one to seven against the second part. Such men as Otis, of
Massachusetts, and Lacock, of Pennsylvania, voted against the entire
amendment, and Daggett, of Connecticut, and even Rufus King, of New
York, recorded their voices against the second part of it.
[Sidenote: Passage of the original bill by the Senate.]
The bill admitting Missouri, without the Tallmadge amendment, passed
the Senate on March 2nd, and was returned to the House substantially
in this form. The House immediately refused to agree to the striking
out of the amendment, and the Senate resolved thereupon to adhere to
its own act. The bill was thus lost for the session, and the Missouri
question became the firebrand with which to light up fanatical and
incendiary passions, both at the North and at the South, during the
following recess of the Congress.
[Sidenote: The Missouri bill during the session of 1819-20.]
At the beginning of the session of 1819-20, Mr. Scott secured the
reference of the memorials concerning the admission of Missouri,
presented at the preceding session, to a select committee. On the
following day, December 9th, Mr. Scott reported a bill from this
committee, which authorized the inhabitants of that part of Missouri
Territory already described to form a constitution and Commonwealth
{75} government. This new bill was read twice and referred to the
committee of the Whole House for discussion.
[Sidenote: The policy of the restrictionists to delay the admission of
any new Commonwealths.]
Warned by the experiences of the preceding session, the
restrictionists now took another tack. They developed the plan of
delaying the formation of any more Commonwealths in the Missouri
Territory until Congress could abolish slavery in the whole of it.
During the debate of the preceding session upon the power of Congress
to impose upon new Commonwealths, at the time of their creation,
limitations not prescribed by the Constitution, it had been asserted
by the restrictionists, and not denied by their opponents, that
Congress could control the status of the Territories, and keep slavery
out of them or abolish it in them, at its own discretion, during the
period before the Territories should be permitted to assume
Commonwealth government. This seems to have been considered by nearly
all, if not quite all, as a fair interpretation of that provision of
the Constitution which vests in Congress the power to make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the Territories of the United States.
The friends of slavery restriction now determined to take advantage of
this possibility, even at this late day, and go back to the work of
clearing all the Territories west of the Mississippi of slavery by a
Congressional Act; after which the formation of new Commonwealths in
these Territories might be delayed until they could be settled by a
population, which would, by local law, maintain the free status. Mr.
John W. Taylor, of New York, seems to have formulated the plan. On the
14th of December he moved the appointment of a committee to consider
the question of prohibiting the further introduction of slavery into
the Territories of the United States west of the Mississippi. The
proposition was voted, and Mr. Taylor himself was {76} appointed the
chairman of the committee. Mr. Taylor then moved that the
consideration of the Missouri bill be postponed to the first Monday of
the following February. The friends of this bill objected most
strenuously to this proposition, and Mr. Taylor's party compromised
with them by agreeing to shorten the period of the proposed
postponement to the second Monday of January.
[Sidenote: Mr. Taylor's proposition.]
Mr. Taylor's plan was moderate in its character. He did not propose to
emancipate slaves already held within these Territories or their issue
born therein, but simply to prevent any further increase by
immigration or importation. It is difficult to see how the
slaveholders themselves could have opposed this proposition with much
vigor. They had, nearly all of them, professed to regard slavery as an
evil, though they had suggested that the evil would be mitigated by
the spreading of the slaves over more territory. It was at any rate to
be expected that those Representatives and Senators from the North,
who had voted against the Tallmadge amendment from legal scruples
only, would join with the restrictionists in the support of Mr.
Taylor's measure, since they all regarded slavery restriction as sound
policy wherever the Constitution would permit it. There certainly
seemed to be a fair chance for the passage of a law which would
protect the Territories from, at least, any considerable increase of
the slave population which might already be within them, and give
white immigration a chance to occupy and fill them, and form free
Commonwealths in them. But this passing hope was dashed by a
conjunction of events, the elements of which had already presented
themselves.
[Sidenote: The petition from the convention in Maine for the admission
of Maine.]
[Sidenote: The bill for the admission of Maine reported and passed by
the House of Representatives.]
The people resident in that part of Massachusetts known as the
district of Maine had, through delegates in convention assembled,
framed a Commonwealth constitution and government. The assent of
Massachusetts {77} had been regularly given to the division of the old
Commonwealth. And on December 8th, 1819, Mr. Holmes, of Massachusetts,
presented to the House of Representatives a petition from the
constitutional convention in the district of Maine, praying for the
admission of Maine, as a Commonwealth, into the Union, on an equality
with the Commonwealths already existing. The people of this district
had not asked the permission of Congress to form a constitution and
government, for the reason afterwards alleged that they were already
in the enjoyment of this status as a part of Massachusetts. The reason
offered was not, however, entirely satisfactory, and the people of the
district were hardly able to clear themselves from the charge of an
undue assumption of powers. The petition was, however, immediately
referred to a committee, with Mr. Holmes as chairman. On the 21st, Mr.
Holmes reported a bill to the House providing for the admission of the
district as a Commonwealth. On the 30th, the House, in committee of
the Whole, took up the bill for consideration, and in the course of
the debate upon it Mr. Clay suggested the connection of the Missouri
bill with the Maine bill. Mr. Clay did not, however, put his
suggestion into the form of a motion, and therefore the House came to
no vote upon the point at this juncture. The bill for the admission of
Maine was passed on January 3rd, 1820, without any connection with the
Missouri bill, and without any restrictions or limitations upon the
powers of the new Commonwealth beyond what the Constitution of the
United States placed upon those of the original Commonwealths. Mr.
Clay's suggestion was not, however, lost upon the Senate, as will be
seen later.
{78} [Sidenote: The failure of Mr. Taylor's plan for preventing
slavery extension.]
Meanwhile Mr. Taylor's committee had not been able to come to any
agreement. On December 28th, 1819, before the final passage of the
Maine bill, Mr. Taylor stated to the House that the committee had
instructed him to ask for its discharge. The House agreed to his
request, and he immediately moved that a new committee be appointed,
and "instructed to report a bill" prohibiting the further admission of
slaves into the Territories of the United States west of the
Mississippi River. This motion evidently appeared to the House to be a
prejudgment of the whole question, since it postponed the
consideration of it indefinitely.
[Sidenote: The Missouri bill again before the House of
Representatives.]
The Missouri bill was, however, also allowed to rest until January
24th, 1820, and when, upon that day, the Speaker announced the bill as
the first order, Mr. Taylor moved for another week's delay, and the
motion was lost by only a single vote. On the next day the House, in
committee of the Whole, proceeded to consider the bill. On the 26th,
Mr. Storrs, of New York, undertook to connect the prohibition of
slavery in the region north of the thirty-eighth parallel of latitude
and west of the Mississippi River and the proposed Missouri boundary
with the grant of the permission to form a Commonwealth in Missouri.
The opponents of slavery extension did not, however, regard this as
sufficient compensation for their support of the bill, and Mr. Storrs'
motion was lost.
[Sidenote: Mr. Taylor's amendment to the bill.]
Whereupon Mr. Taylor moved that the people of Missouri should be
required to ordain and establish in their constitution the prohibition
of slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime, in the proposed Commonwealth. Conceding, as the result of the
discussions, and {79} the action of the Congress during the preceding
session, that Congress had no constitutional authority to impose
restrictions upon new Commonwealths, as the condition of their
admission into the Union, which the Constitution did not impose upon
the original Commonwealths, the new question involved in Mr. Taylor's
motion, from the point of view of constitutional law, now was, whether
Congress could require of a new Commonwealth, as the condition of its
admission to the Union, that it should impose any limitations upon
itself which the Constitution of the United States did not impose upon
the original Commonwealths. Could Congress effect indirectly what it
could not do directly?
[Sidenote: Mr. Taylor's argument in support of his amendment.]
Mr. Taylor's argument rested substantially upon the proposition,
upheld by the restrictionists during the preceding session, that if
Congress could admit, it could refuse to admit, and if it could admit
or refuse to admit, it could admit upon conditions. He, however,
advanced other propositions and suggestions. He held that the
admission of a new Commonwealth into the Union was a procedure in the
nature of a contract between the United States Government and the
people of the new Commonwealth, and, therefore, admitted of any terms
accepted by both parties. He further held that the provision of the
Constitution, which impliedly vested in Congress the power to
prohibit, after 1808, the importation or migration of slaves, covered
the case, in that the word migration meant passage from one
Commonwealth into another, in distinction from importation, which
meant the bringing of slaves into the United States from foreign
countries. And he suggested that territory acquired by the United
States subsequent to the formation of the Constitution need not be
treated with the same consideration, as to the rights of its
inhabitants, as that which {80} belonged to the United States at the
time of the formation of the Constitution.
[Sidenote: Replies to Mr. Taylor's reasoning.]
Of course the members from the South resisted Mr. Taylor's
conclusions. But they were not alone in their position. Some of the
strongest opponents of slavery from the North stood up with them in
resisting what they considered to be an attack upon the principle of
federal government. Mr. Holmes, of Massachusetts, was again chief
among them, and it is to his argument that one must look for the most
scientific and unprejudiced view of the subject.
[Sidenote: Mr. Holmes' argument against the amendment.]
After demonstrating most convincingly that the clauses of the
Constitution which vested in Congress the power to prohibit the
migration of persons into the United States after 1808 and to regulate
commerce between the Commonwealths could not be interpreted as giving
Congress the power to prevent the transportation of slaves from one
Commonwealth into another, Mr. Holmes attacked the fundamental
proposition upon which Mr. Taylor relied, the proposition that if
Congress could admit, it could refuse to admit, and if it could admit
or refuse to admit at pleasure, it could admit upon conditions. Mr.
Holmes contended that the power to determine whether slavery should
exist or not in any community was possessed by each Colony before the
Revolution, and by each "State" after the Revolution, and that the
Constitution of 1787 had not deprived the "States" of it, but had
recognized it as belonging to each of them exclusively; that new
"States" admitted by Congress into the Union must have all the rights,
and be subject to all the duties, which the original "States"
possessed, on the one side, and were obligated to discharge, on the
other; that Congress could not increase the powers of the general {81}
Government within the new Commonwealths by selling the Territories a
license to the Commonwealth status, and taking the pay for it in
powers to be exercised by the general Government in the new
Commonwealths, which that Government could not, by the Constitution,
exercise within the original Commonwealths; and that if Congress
assumed to exercise such power, and the people of the Territory
seeking the Commonwealth status should even accept the imposed
condition, the new Commonwealth had the right and the power to free
itself from the condition, and the Congress was powerless to prevent
it.
[Sidenote: Mr. McLane's argument against the amendment.]
Mr. McLane, of Delaware, a Commonwealth whose legislature had
instructed the representatives from the Commonwealth in Congress to
support all measures for preventing the spread of slavery in the
Territories of the Union west of the Mississippi, presented the
question with even greater clearness and conciseness. He simply
analyzed the words of the Constitution which make up the clause
conferring power on Congress "to admit new States into this Union." He
said that the power to admit was not the power to create; that the
very use of the word presupposed that the power to create the "State"
resided elsewhere than in Congress; that Congress must admit a
_"State,"_ not a Territory or a province or anything but a _"State;"_
that a "State," in the system of federal government of the United
States, was an organization whose powers and duties had been
determined by the Constitution of the United States itself, and could
not be altered by Congressional definitions and limitations; that
Congress must admit the "State" into _this Union_, not into some other
union; and that _this Union_ was a system of federal government, in
which the relations between the general Government {82} and the
"States" had been fixed by the Constitution of the United States, and
could not be altered by a mere Congressional act. This was strong
reasoning, and it had a powerful effect upon the minds of all who
heard it and of all who read it.
[Sidenote: The independent Missouri bill of the Senate.]
Meanwhile events were occurring in the Senate which were to exercise a
controlling influence over the fate of the bill in the House. On
December 29th, 1819, a memorial from the Territorial legislature of
Missouri, praying for the admission of that part of the Territory
already described in the memorial to the House, had been presented in
the Senate, and referred to the Judiciary committee. On January 3rd,
1820, the House bill admitting Maine was sent into the Senate. Mr.
James Barbour, of Virginia, immediately gave notice of his intention
to move the connection of the two subjects in the same bill, and on
the same terms. As we have seen, Mr. Clay had already made this
suggestion in the House, but had not formally proposed it.
[Sidenote: The connection of the House bill admitting Maine with the
Senate's bill admitting Missouri.]
The House bill admitting Maine was immediately referred to the
Judiciary committee, which committee already had the Missouri bill in
its charge, and on January 6th, Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, the
chairman of this committee, reported from it to the Senate the House
bill admitting Maine, with an amendment authorizing the people of
Missouri, within the general geographical boundaries already
described, to form a constitution and Commonwealth government. The
amendment contained no restrictions or conditions with regard to
slavery.
On January 13th, the day fixed for considering the report of the
committee, Mr. Roberts, of Pennsylvania, moved the recommitment of the
Maine bill to the {83} Judiciary committee, with the instruction that
the bill should be divested of the amendment in regard to Missouri.
The vote upon this motion would, therefore, reveal the attitude of the
Senate upon the question of tacking the two subjects together. Such
men as Mr. Roberts, Mr. Mellen, Mr. Burrill, and Mr. Otis argued that
they should be disconnected, on the ground of the discordance of the
two provisions. The people of Maine, they said, had already formed
their constitution and government, and were simply asking for
admission, while the Missouri bill was a measure for enabling the
people of a part of the Missouri Territory to form a constitution and
government, under which they might be admitted later, provided that
constitution should prove satisfactory to Congress.
On the other hand, such men as Mr. Barbour, Mr. Smith, and Mr. Macon
contended that the two subjects were entirely germane, and that any
contrary appearance was caused by the unwarranted action of the people
of Maine in proceeding so far as they had done without asking the
consent of Congress, for which wrongful procedure presumptuous Maine
should not be rewarded and respectful Missouri punished.
[Sidenote: The refusal of the Senate to disconnect the two measures.]
On the 14th, the vote was taken upon the motion to recommit, and it
was lost by a majority of seven votes in forty-three. A number of the
Senators from the Northern Commonwealths voted with the Southerners in
refusing to separate the two subjects.
The question then came upon the contents of the bill as reported by
the Judiciary committee. Mr. Roberts immediately moved to amend the
bill by a provision prohibiting the further introduction of slavery
into Missouri. The arguments upon this motion were substantially a
repetition of what had already been said {84} upon the subject in the
House of Representatives. The amendment was voted down, on February
1st, by a large majority.
[Sidenote: Mr. Thomas' amendment to the joint measure.]
On the 3rd, Mr. Thomas, of Illinois, offered an amendment, which was
destined to play a very important part in the further development of
the subject. It was the proposition to exclude slavery from the
Louisiana territory above thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes,
except within the limits of the proposed Commonwealth of Missouri. The
Senate was not yet prepared, however, to consider this, the question
before it, at the moment, being the question of procedure, the
question whether the two subjects should be united in one bill. The
Senate had only voted not to recommit the bill to the Judiciary
committee with instructions, and it was thought necessary to take a
formal vote upon the question of the connection of the two subjects as
proposed by the committee before considering any further amendments to
it. Mr. Thomas, therefore, withdrew his motion for the moment.
[Sidenote: Mr. Pinkney's great argument against the power of Congress
to lay restrictions on new Commonwealths not imposed by the
Constitution on the original Commonwealths.]
It was at this stage of the proceedings, when apparently there was
nothing before the Senate but the question of the union of the two
subjects, that Mr. Pinkney of Maryland made his brilliant and
unanswerable argument upon the question of the powers of Congress in
the premises. It differed logically very little from Mr. McLane's
powerful analysis of the subject in the House, but it was elaborated
and embellished as only Mr. Pinkney's beautiful diction could do it.
The gist of the reasoning was, however, contained in a few sentences
which ran as follows: "What, then, is the professed result? To admit a
State into this Union. What is this Union? A confederation of States,
equal {85} in sovereignty, capable of everything which the
Constitution does not forbid, or authorize Congress to forbid. It is
an equal union between parties equally sovereign. They were sovereign,
independent of the Union. The object of the Union was common
protection for the exercise of already existing sovereignty. The
parties gave up a portion of that sovereignty to insure the remainder.
As far as they gave it up by the common compact, they have ceased to
be sovereign. The Union provides the means for securing the residue;
and it is into _that_ Union that a new State is to come. By acceding
to it, the new State is placed on the same footing with the original
States. It accedes for the same purpose, that is, protection for its
unsurrendered sovereignty. If it comes in shorn of its beams, crippled
and disparaged beyond the original States, it is not into the original
Union that it comes. For it is a different sort of Union. The first
was a Union _inter pares_. This is a Union _inter disparates_, between
giants and a dwarf, between power and feebleness, between full
proportioned sovereignties and a miserable image of power--a thing
which that very Union has shrunk and shrivelled from its just size
instead of preserving it in its true dimensions. It is into _this_
Union, that is the Union of the Federal Constitution, that you are to
admit or refuse to admit. You can admit into no other. You cannot make
the Union, as to the new States, what it is not as to the old; for
then it is not _this_ Union that you open for the entrance of a new
party. If you make it enter into a new and additional compact is it
any longer the same Union?... But it is a State which you are to
admit. What is a _State_ in the sense of the Constitution? It is not a
State in general, but a State as you find it in the Constitution....
Ask the Constitution. It shows you {86} what it means by a State by
reference to the parties to it. It must be such a State as
Massachusetts, Virginia, and the other members of the American
Confederacy--a State with full sovereignty except as the Constitution
restricts it. The whole amount of the argument on the other side is,
that you may refuse to admit a new State, and that, therefore, if you
admit, you may prescribe the terms. The answer to that argument is,
that even if you can refuse, you can prescribe no terms which are
inconsistent with the act you are to do. You can prescribe no
conditions which, if carried into effect, would make the new State
less a sovereign State than, under the Union as it stands, it would
be. You can prescribe no terms which will make the compact of Union
between it and the original States essentially different from that
compact among the original States. You may admit or refuse to admit,
but if you admit, you must admit a State in the sense of the
Constitution--a State with all such sovereignty as belongs to the
original parties; and it must be into _this_ Union that you are to
admit it, not into a Union of your own dictating, formed out of the
existing Union by qualifications and new compacts, altering its
character and effect, and making it fall short of its protecting
energy in reference to the new State, whilst it requires an energy of
another sort--the energy of restraint and destruction."
This is the old-fashioned political and rhetorical way of saying what
the modern publicist would state in such language as this: In a
federal system of government, all powers are distributed by the state,
the nation, the ultimate sovereignty, through the Constitution,
between the central Government and the Commonwealths. The assumption
by the central Government of the authority to redistribute these
powers in a different manner, in any {87} given case, is an assumption
of sovereignty, the Constitution-making power, and the possession of
any such power by the central Government makes a federal system of
government impossible. It makes the Commonwealths only creatures and
agencies of the central Government. It changes the whole system from
federal government to centralized government. In the federal system of
government as it existed, in 1820, in the United States, the
determination of the question whether slavery should exist or not in
any Commonwealth was reserved through the Constitution to each
Commonwealth for itself, since this power was neither vested in the
central Government nor denied to the Commonwealths. If Congress could
assume this power, it could assume any and every other power and right
which the Commonwealths possessed. Such authority in the central
Government would destroy in principle the federal system, at once, and
make the government a centralized form.
[Sidenote: Pinkney's argument successful.]
There was nobody in the Senate who did, or could, answer this
argument. The amendments proposed after this to the bill as reported
from the Judiciary committee contained no further restrictions upon
the Commonwealth powers of Missouri, but had reference only to what
remained of the Louisiana territory north and west of the boundaries
of the proposed Commonwealth.
[Sidenote: The adoption of Mr. Thomas' amendment by the Senate, and
the passage of the Maine-Missouri bill thus amended.]
The formal vote connecting the two subjects of Maine and Missouri was
taken in the Senate on February 16th, and after this was resolved
upon, Mr. Thomas immediately renewed his motion to amend the bill by
the addition of a clause prohibiting slavery in the Louisiana
territory above thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes, outside of the
boundaries of the proposed Commonwealth of Missouri. After an attempt,
on the {88} one side, to carry this line up to the fortieth parallel,
and a counter attempt on the other to make the prohibition extend to
all the territory west of the Mississippi, except that already under
Commonwealth government, or in process of being put under Commonwealth
government by the existing bill--the result of which would have been
the prohibition of slavery in the just organized Territory of
Arkansas--Mr. Thomas' amendment was adopted as the fair compromise.
The bill, as thus amended, passed the Senate on February 18th, 1820,
and was sent immediately to the House of Representatives.
[Sidenote: The House of Representatives' refusal to agree to the
combination.]
[Sidenote: The conference on the subject, and the first Missouri
compromise.]
The form of the bill was now the House bill in regard to Maine, with
the Missouri bill and the Thomas proposition attached to it as
amendments. The House voted to disagree to these amendments, and sent
the bill, stripped of them, back to the Senate. The Senate voted
immediately to insist upon its amendments, and the House answered with
a vote insisting upon its position. Thereupon, the Senate requested a
conference with the House upon the subject, and appointed Mr. Pinkney,
Mr. Barbour, and Mr. Thomas as its representatives. The House acceded
to the request and appointed Mr. Holmes, Mr. Taylor, Mr. Lowndes, Mr.
Parker, and Mr. Kinsey as its representatives. These gentlemen met and
agreed without much difficulty to the following points: That the
Senate should withdraw its amendments to the House bill for the
admission of Maine; that both the Senate and the House should pass the
Missouri bill, without the condition in reference to the restriction
of slavery in the proposed Commonwealth; and that both the Senate and
the House should add a provision to the Missouri bill prohibiting
slavery in the remainder of the Louisiana territory north of
thirty-six degrees and thirty {89} minutes. That is, the House should
gain its point of order in the separation of the two subjects; the
Senate should gain its point of constitutional law in defending the
new Commonwealth against restrictions not imposed by the Constitution
upon the original Commonwealths; and the two should compromise upon a
fair division of the remaining parts of the Louisiana territory
between the interests of the North and those of the South. The Senate
accepted the recommendations of the committee without much difficulty,
and voted the measures contained in them. The House also accepted the
recommendations and voted the necessary provisions upon its part.
[Sidenote: President Monroe's approval of the Compromise.]
When the measures were placed before President Monroe for his
approval, he called a meeting of the Cabinet to consider the subject.
There was no difficulty except upon a single point, the prohibition of
slavery in the remainder of the Louisiana territory above thirty-six
degrees and thirty minutes north latitude. Was this to be taken as
prohibiting slavery in the Commonwealths which might be formed upon
this territory in the future, or did the Congress only intend to lay
this restriction upon this territory merely for the period during
which it might continue subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
general Government, the period of Territorial organization? If the
former, the Missouri question would have to be fought over again
whenever a new Commonwealth should be formed in this territory. The
Cabinet interpreted the prohibition as applying only during the period
before the Commonwealth organization should be established, and upon
the basis of this interpretation advised the President that the
measure was constitutional. The President signed the Maine bill on the
3rd of March and the Missouri bill on the 6th (1820).
{90} [Sidenote: Review of the points involved in the contest.]
So far as the questions of constitutional and parliamentary law were
concerned, the settlement reached was in accordance with right
principles. It was right that the two subjects, which the Senate
united in one bill, should be separated. The only justification for
this act of the Senate was the manifest determination on the part of
the House to impose an unconstitutional restriction as the condition
upon which the people of Missouri should be allowed to assume the
status and the powers of a Commonwealth of the Union. It was the only
weapon left to the more conservative Senate, by which to defend the
Constitution against the rashness of the more radical House. It need
astonish no impartial student of our history that the Senate used it.
No such momentous question was involved in this point of parliamentary
procedure as there was in the exaggerated interpretation of the powers
of Congress by the House. The Senate showed its willingness to yield
its position upon this point so soon as the House would return to
sound constitutional principle in the Missouri question. It was
fortunate for the development of the parliamentary practice of
Congress that the House so changed its position in reference to the
greater question of constitutional law as to enable the Senate to
return to the true parliamentary principle of the separation of
subjects which differ in essence or in circumstances in the slightest
degree. While, therefore, the Senate should not be too strongly
criticised for using its power over its own rules of procedure, as a
means of retaliation, it is a matter of great satisfaction that
expedients were at last found for maintaining right principle and
sound parliamentary custom in the case. And it was surely right that
the attempt to make Congress the distributor of powers between the
general Government and the Commonwealths {91} was abandoned. The power
which _made_ the Constitution can alone set up the metes and bounds
between the realm of authority of the general Government and that of
the Commonwealths. This is the indispensable condition of federal
government. If the general Government possesses such power, the system
is centralized in theory, and may become so in fact at the pleasure of
the general Government. If, on the other hand, the Commonwealths
possess such power, the system is the loosest form of confederation,
an international league.
It is true that the Constitution may authorize the general Government
to limit the powers of the Commonwealths in regard to certain
specified points and the federal system be still preserved, but a
general authority in the general Government to do so, such as was
claimed by the restrictionists from the vague provision vesting in
Congress the power to "admit new States into this Union," amounts to
nothing less than a claim of sovereignty by Congress over the new
Commonwealths. Such was not the system which those who framed and
ratified the Constitution intended to establish. Such is not the
system which comports with the vast territorial extent and the
climatic differences of the United States, and with the ethnical
variety of the population of the country.
It is also true that those who resisted the restriction upon Missouri
used terms and propositions, in reference to the genesis of the Union
and the relation of the general Government to the Commonwealths, which
will hardly bear the test of correct history and exact political
science, but they had the true principle in respect to the point at
issue, when they held that "the State," in the sense of the
Constitution, is defined in the Constitution; that its powers are the
residue after what the Constitution vests exclusively in the general
{92} Government and denies to the "States" shall have been subtracted
from sovereignty; and that Congress cannot vary these relations under
an interpretation of a general provision. They conceded that Congress
might, as the general principle, admit or not admit, as it might judge
proper, with all that this involved in reference to geographical
boundaries and ripeness of the population for self-government, but
they held that the thing admitted was created by the Constitution,
through the people inhabiting the district to be formed into a
Commonwealth, and not by Congress. And they repudiated the idea that
the Declaration of Independence is any part of the constitutional law
of the country, or that Congress can define the republican form of
government which the United States is obligated by the Constitution to
guarantee to every Commonwealth, in any other sense than that
concretely expressed in the original Commonwealths.
They held this ground under enormous strain and pressure brought from
without. Cross-roads assemblies, town and city meetings, and
Commonwealth legislatures poured petitions and memorials in upon them
in behalf of slavery restriction. The excitement, throughout the
Northeast especially, was intense. They had to fight their battle
under an ignoble issue. But it will not be denied by any impartial
constitutional lawyer that they were, for this time, the upholders of
the Constitution against an unwarranted attempt to stretch
Congressional power.
Finally, the compromise provision, drawing the line of thirty-six
degrees and thirty minutes through the Louisiana territory, and
securing all north of it, which was by far the greater part, against
the introduction of slavery during the period that it might remain
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the general Government, was {93}
tantamount to a surrender, forever, of this vast domain to immigration
from the North almost exclusively, and to the creation therein of new
Commonwealths into which slaveholders could not take their slave
property. Many American historians treat the express exclusion of
slavery north of this line as no concession to the North, but as a
mask under which the real concession, the concession to the South, was
hidden. This they claim to have been the implied concession to hold
slaves south of that line. But slavery was legal by custom in the
whole of the province of Louisiana, when the United States received it
from France. That is, a master might have taken slaves into any part
of it, into which he might have gone himself, and would not thereby
have violated any law, and the United States Government had not, down
to 1820, changed this state of things by any act of its own.
The compromise upon the line of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes
was, therefore, a very decided limitation upon the existing rights of
slave-masters. And even if slavery had not already penetrated into
this region, it can hardly be claimed that the balance of advantage
created by the compromise provision lay with the South, except upon
the principle that the South ought not to have had anything, and the
North ought to have had everything. Ethically, perhaps, this is the
correct principle from which to judge the question, but politically
and legally it was not, at that moment.
The Union consisted of Commonwealths, in all of which slavery existed
at the time of and during the War for Independence, in almost all of
which it existed when the Constitution of 1787 was framed and adopted,
and in about half of which it existed, as the most important
institution, at the period of the Missouri controversy. Further, it
can hardly be denied that the Constitution contained recognition and
guarantees of slave property. {94} The vague phrases of the
Declaration of Independence, even if intended to touch the relation of
master and slave within the country, were not law. It is true that
slavery was regarded both in the North and in the South as an evil,
but men differed in opinion as to whether confining the slaves to a
particular section was a better means for its mitigation than
spreading them over a larger area, and reducing thus their number
relative to the white population in any particular section.
Surrounded in thought with the ideas and conditions of 1820, it is
difficult to see why the balance of advantage contained in the
compromise provision of the Missouri bill did not lie with the North.
Compromise or no compromise about the remainder of the Louisiana
territory, Missouri was bound to be admitted without restriction as to
slavery. The customary law of the region seeking to become a
Commonwealth permitted slaveholding. The population was sufficient to
warrant the assumption of Commonwealth powers. The Constitution did
not authorize Congress to impose the slavery restriction, and the
people of the region had protested against it. The admission of
Missouri was, therefore, no legitimate element in the compromise.
Neither was the agreement on the part of the Senate to separate Maine
from Missouri any proper element in the compromise. The restriction
placed by the House on Missouri rested on a false interpretation of
constitutional law, and the connection of the two subjects in the same
bill rested on a false interpretation of parliamentary law. In
principle both had to be abandoned. The compromise was in reality only
about the remainder of the Louisiana territory after the admission of
Missouri, in no part of which had slavery, to that moment, been
prohibited. How much of it should continue open to the further
introduction of slavery by the immigration of {95} masters with their
slaves, and how much should be given over to practically exclusive
immigration from the North--these were the only proper terms of the
compromise. What the South finally obtained out of it was one
Commonwealth, while the vast region from which slavery was excluded
has produced eight or nine Commonwealths. In the light of these
considerations it certainly appears that the cause of free labor won a
substantial triumph in the Missouri compromise, and that, in place of
that shameful surrender of freedom to slavery, so emphasized by
certain historians, a mighty step forward in the progress of liberty
was taken.
It was confidently hoped and believed that the compromise had solved
the slavery problem, in so far as Congress could solve it. The whole
country breathed more easily and the thoughts of men were turned to
other subjects.
[Sidenote: The revival of the Missouri struggle.]
But the peace proved to be only an armistice. In less than twelve
months the battle was raging again with more than its former fury.
The Missouri convention, which drew up and voted, in the middle of the
year 1820, the organic law for the new Commonwealth, inserted a
paragraph therein which made it the duty of the legislature, proposed
to be established by that law, to enact measures for preventing
mulattoes and free negroes from immigrating into and settling within
the Commonwealth.
[Sidenote: The Missouri constitution in Congress.]
On November 14th, 1820, this instrument was presented to the Senate of
the United States, and on the 16th to the House of Representatives,
for the purpose of moving these bodies to pass an act admitting
Missouri into the Union as a Commonwealth. The instrument was
immediately referred by each House to a committee; and on the 23rd,
Mr. Lowndes, the chairman of the House Committee, {96} reported a bill
for effecting this result, and, on the 29th, Mr. Smith reported a bill
of like tenor to the Senate.
[Sidenote: Mr. Lowndes' bill for the admission of Missouri with the
instrument unchanged.]
Mr. Lowndes' bill was prefaced by a statement of views, which
presented the questions of constitutional interpretation to which the
provision referred to in the Missouri instrument gave rise. He alluded
to the possible repugnance of the provision to that clause in the
Constitution of the United States which guarantees to the citizens of
each Commonwealth all the privileges and immunities of citizens in
every other Commonwealth; but said that the provision in the Missouri
instrument could be interpreted to mean only such mulattoes and free
negroes as were not citizens in any Commonwealth. And he held that,
whether this be the true interpretation or not, the judiciary of the
United States, and not the Congress, should determine the question of
repugnance between the Missouri instrument and the Constitution of the
United States. He finally took the ground that Missouri was now
already a Commonwealth by virtue of the Act of Congress giving her
people permission to form Commonwealth government, and by virtue of
the act of her people in forming a Commonwealth constitution, and he
declared that the refusal or failure of Congress, at this time, to
pass a formal act of admission could not reduce her again to the
Territorial status.
[Sidenote: Serious opposition to the Lowndes bill.]
Mr. Sergeant, the spokesman of the opposition to Mr. Lowndes' report,
met these propositions with the counter-propositions, that a Territory
becomes a Commonwealth of the Union only by a Congressional Act
admitting it to that status; that no other kind of a Commonwealth than
a Commonwealth in the Union is known to the political {97} system of
the United States; that all the acts done by Congress and by the
people resident within a Territory before the Congressional Act of
admission are nothing more than preliminaries, and that a Territory
remains a Territory until the passage of this latter act; that the
provision in the Missouri instrument in regard to the exclusion of
mulattoes and free negroes was repugnant to that clause in the
Constitution of the United States which guarantees to the citizens of
any Commonwealth the privileges and immunities of citizens in every
other Commonwealth of the Union into which they may go; and that
Congress, not the Judiciary, is the body which should determine
whether such repugnance exists, and, if so, correct it.
There is no doubt that, from the point of view of a correct political
logic, the opponents of Mr. Lowndes' propositions in regard to the
making of a Commonwealth of the Union stood upon the firmer ground,
despite the fact that the precedents did not sustain fully their
claims. As a fact, Congress had been guilty of such irregularities in
the admission of some of the Commonwealths as to give much support to
the notion that there could be a Commonwealth in the political system
of the United States before its formal admission into the Union. But
the argument is unanswerable, that a Commonwealth not in the Union is
a foreign state; that in order that a Territory shall attain this
latter position and status its constitutional right to secede from the
United States must be recognized, which is absurd; and that,
therefore, the Congressional Act of admission is what makes a
Territory of the Union into a Commonwealth of the Union, the only kind
of a Commonwealth known to the political system of the United States.
They also stood upon the firmer ground in holding {98} that it is the
duty of Congress to scrutinize closely the measures proposed for
enactment by it from the point of view of their constitutionality, and
to pass no act, of the constitutionality of which it is not reasonably
convinced, under the pretext that the Judiciary is the proper body to
correct the usurpation. The members of Congress take the same oath to
uphold the Constitution as the judges do. The revisory powers of the
Judiciary over the acts of Congress were not given in order to excuse
the Congress from exercising its preliminary judgment upon the
constitutionality of its own acts. They were given simply to correct
errors in judgment.
[Sidenote: The protection of the rights of citizens of one
Commonwealth within the territory of another by the United States.]
On the other hand, when a citizen of one Commonwealth immigrated into
and settled in another, it was a question whether he did not lose the
right to be treated as a citizen in the latter Commonwealth, in so far
as the Constitution of the United States, as it was in 1820, was
concerned, and become subject to the laws of the latter Commonwealth
as to his status. If he were only passing through, or sojourning
temporarily in, the latter Commonwealth, it was clear that the
Constitution of the United States protected him as a citizen of
another Commonwealth, but when he changed his residence and
citizenship to the latter Commonwealth, the question became much more
complicated. It was now whether the laws of one Commonwealth were, by
virtue of the Constitution of the United States, valid in another
Commonwealth for the protection of persons against the laws of the
latter Commonwealth, who had become citizens and residents of the
latter Commonwealth.
It must be remembered, however, that the immediate question involved
in the provision of the Missouri instrument was whether a Commonwealth
could prohibit the citizens of other Commonwealths from immigrating
{99} into, and gaining residence and citizenship within, itself. How
it might treat such persons after these things had been accomplished
was a subsequent matter. But even limiting the question to this point,
it was certainly a startling thing to the Southerners to be told that,
by virtue of the Constitution of the United States, a negro citizen of
Massachusetts had the right to immigrate into, and become a citizen
of, South Carolina, when the laws of South Carolina did not admit
negroes to citizenship.
[Sidenote: Defeat of the Lowndes bill in the House.]
On December 13th (1820), after a long, earnest, and, at times,
acrimonious debate, the Lowndes measure for the admission of Missouri
was defeated by a vote of ninety-three to seventy-nine.
[Sidenote: Passage of the Senate bill with a proviso by the Senate.]
The bill presented by Mr. Smith in the Senate was taken up for
consideration on December 4th. The arguments pro and con were about
the same as those offered in the House, but the bitterness of feeling
which seemed to animate the members of the opposition to the measure
in the House was not manifested by those adverse to it in the Senate.
Nevertheless, there was a majority in the Senate against passing a
simple measure for admission without any limitations. They finally
voted the bill, with the proviso attached: "That nothing herein
contained shall be so construed as to give the assent of Congress to
any provision in the constitution of Missouri, if any such there be,
which contravenes that clause in the Constitution of the United States
which declares that 'the citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.'"
[Sidenote: The Senate bill tabled by the House.]
The House tabled this bill on the same day that it rejected the
measure offered by its own committee. But what now was the status of
Missouri? Her people had {100} elected a governor and members of the
legislature under the organic law formed in July, and it was
considered doubtful whether there still existed any Territorial
officials exercising governmental powers. The House, however, would
not even inquire into this fact. They said the question before them
was one of law and not of fact at all.
[Sidenote: Mr. Clay and the second Missouri Compromise.]
After some futile attempts made by Mr. Eustis, of Massachusetts, for
the admission of Missouri upon a future day, provided the obnoxious
clause should be expunged from her organic law before that day, Mr.
Clay came forward and assumed the management of the question.
On January 29th, 1821, he asked the House to go into committee of the
Whole to consider the Senate bill admitting Missouri. This proposition
was naturally agreed to, and, after several unsuccessful attempts made
by others at an immediate amendment of the Senate bill in the
committee of the Whole House, Mr. Clay moved the reference of the bill
to a select committee of thirteen persons. This motion was passed, and
the committee was chosen, with Mr. Clay as its chairman.
On February 10th, 1821, Mr. Clay reported the recommendations of the
committee. They were expressed in the proposition: That Missouri
should be "admitted into this Union on an equal footing with the
original States, in all respects whatever, upon the fundamental
condition that the said State shall never pass any law preventing any
description of persons from coming to and settling in the said State,
who may now be or hereafter become citizens of any of the States of
this Union; _and provided also_, that the legislature of the said
State, by a solemn public act, shall declare the assent of the said
State to the said fundamental condition, and shall transmit to the
President of the United States, on or before the fourth {101} Monday
of November next, an authentic copy of the said act: upon the
reception whereof, the President, by proclamation, shall announce the
fact: whereupon, and without any further proceedings on the part of
Congress, the admission of the said State shall be considered as
complete: _and provided_ further, that nothing herein contained shall
be construed to take from the said State of Missouri, when admitted
into this Union, the exercise of any right or power, which can now be
constitutionally exercised by any of the original States."
[Sidenote: The failure of Mr. Clay's first attempt.]
Mr. Tomlinson, of the committee, took the floor against the report,
and showed so conclusively that the legislature of a Commonwealth
could not bind the makers of the organic law of the Commonwealth, and
that, therefore, any obligation which the legislature of Missouri
might assume toward Congress might prove nugatory, that the Senate
bill, with the amendment offered by Mr. Clay's committee, was voted
down.
[Sidenote: Mr. Clay's second attempt to secure a compromise.]
Mr. Clay waited ten days after this in order to let the feelings of
the members become mollified, and on February 22nd, one of the most
significant days in American history, made his final attempt to secure
a compromise. He moved that members to a conference committee be
appointed by the House. The motion was carried, and on the next day
the members of the House contingent of the committee, consisting of
twenty-three persons, under the lead of Mr. Clay, were appointed. The
Senate met the advance promptly and appointed seven members to
represent it.
[Sidenote: The second Missouri Compromise.]
On the 26th, Mr. Clay reported the results of the conference, in the
form of a resolution of the following tenor: "Resolved, by the Senate
and House of Representatives of the United States, in Congress {102}
assembled, that Missouri shall be admitted into this Union on an equal
footing with the original States in all respects whatever, upon the
fundamental condition, that the fourth clause of the twenty-sixth
section of the third article of the constitution submitted on the part
of said State to Congress shall never be construed to authorize the
passage of any law, and that no law shall be passed in conformity
thereto, by which any citizen of either of the States of this Union
shall be excluded from the enjoyment of any of the privileges and
immunities to which such citizen is entitled under the Constitution of
the United States: Provided that the legislature of the said State, by
a solemn public act, shall declare the assent of the said State to the
said fundamental condition, and shall transmit to the President of the
United States, on or before the fourth Monday in November next, an
authentic copy of the said act; upon the receipt whereof the
President, by proclamation, shall announce the fact; whereupon, and
without any further proceeding on the part of Congress, the admission
of the said State into this Union shall be considered as complete."
[Sidenote: Passage of the second Missouri Compromise Act.]
It will be seen that this recommendation contained the same
objectionable feature as did that of the committee of Thirteen of the
House, that is, the proposition to rely upon the Missouri legislature
to enter into an obligation to Congress, which should bind all future
legislatures and also the constituent power of the Commonwealth. It
was, therefore, attacked upon the same ground, but the supporters
urged so strongly that Congress should put a reasonable faith in the
honor of Missouri to keep the pledge made by her first legislature,
that the resolution was finally adopted by the House, by a very small
majority, on the same day that it was reported. It was immediately
sent to the {103} Senate for concurrence, and, after a brief debate,
was voted by that body on the 28th, by a large majority.
The great struggle was at last over, and it was sincerely hoped that
the "era of good feeling," so suddenly interrupted by it, had been
restored. Apparently it was so, but while the decision finally reached
saved the country from one great danger, it sowed the seeds of
another. A brief review of the effects of that decision upon the
constitutional law, political science, and social conditions of the
Republic will make this apparent.
[Sidenote: The general effects of the decisions reached in the
Missouri question.]
In the first place, the decision involved the constitutional and
political principle that, in the federal system of government
generally, and in the system of the United States in particular, the
powers of government are, and must be, distributed by the sovereignty
behind, and supreme over, both the general Government and the
Commonwealths, and not by either of the two governments, unless
expressly empowered to do so, in specific cases, by the sovereignty
through the Constitution. This is undoubtedly a sound principle, both
of political science and constitutional law, but it taught the
Southerners that protection of their property in slaves would depend
upon strict construction of the Constitution. It caused their leaders
to desert the broad national ground in the interpretation of the
Constitution which they had occupied since 1812, and to seek more and
more to limit and restrict the powers of Congress, in which the
majority of the members of one House, at least, must always come from
the North, and in the other House of which no more than an exact
balance could be maintained.
It introduced, therefore, the principle which led necessarily to a
division of the all-comprehending Republican party into two branches,
the one branch holding {104} to the latitudinarian and national views
of the party from 1812 to 1819, and the other to the earlier creed of
1798 to 1812. The former finally coalesced with the remnants of the
Federal party and formed the National Republican or Whig party, while
the latter called itself the Democratic party.
It is necessary to keep clearly in mind the cause of the division of
the Republican party into its two branches in order to understand the
principles which distinguished them, for their names are somewhat
misleading. For example, it is quite difficult to understand, upon
general principles, why the slaveholders of the South should be called
Democrats, while many of the little farmers and the artisans of the
North should be called Whigs. The element of democracy which was to be
found in the political creed of the Southern masters was strict
construction of governmental powers, the least possible interference
of government in private affairs, and the largest possible individual
autonomy--in a word, individual immunity against government. The
master could take care of himself, if left free to rule his slaves.
In the second place, the Missouri decision involved the principle of
constitutional law that the Congress has general powers of legislation
in the Territories, and may do anything therein not forbidden by the
Constitution. This is also a sound and valuable principle. It was this
which won the great Northwest for free labor, so far as government
could affect the question, and gave the Union the strength to meet the
crisis of 1861-65. The Southerners eventually saw what they had lost
in conceding this interpretation of the powers of Congress, and, as
will be seen further on, sought to repudiate it; but their long
acquiescence in it had allowed it to gain the power of constitutional
precedent, too strong to be successfully overcome.
{105} In the third place, the Missouri decision involved the principle
that there was, before the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, an United
States citizenship which carried with it immunities and privileges
which no Commonwealth could lawfully deny or abridge, and which the
United States Government was bound to protect and defend against any
Commonwealth seeking to impair them. It demonstrated the difficulties
which could arise by allowing a Commonwealth to confer United States
citizenship, and thereby bind the United States Government to sustain
the acts of one Commonwealth within the jurisdiction of another
Commonwealth, whose laws might be directly contradictory to those of
the first Commonwealth upon the subject in point. It did not undertake
to solve the difficulty. It only held firmly to the principle, while
it made many of the best minds aware that this most national provision
of the Constitution would, sooner or later, certainly require an
advance all along the line in the further development of the
governmental system of the country.
In the fourth place, the Missouri decision taught the inhabitants of
the older Commonwealths that the West could not be held in a
provincial or quasi-provincial status; that it must be carved up and
formed into Commonwealths having the same powers and privileges as the
older Commonwealths; and that, therefore, the political centre of the
United States was bound to move westward, and the East was ultimately
to come, in large degree, under the influence of the West. It was this
which has helped powerfully to carry the brain and the money of the
East to the West, and is making in the West a new, and, in some
respects, more enterprising, East.
Finally, the Missouri decision taught the South that there was a
provision in the Constitution of the United {106} States which
probably made it possible for the Northern Commonwealths to force,
through the power of the general Government, a class of persons upon
the Southern Commonwealths, in the enjoyment of the full rights of
citizenship, whom these Commonwealths did not and would not recognize
as citizens in any respect; and that there was a growing disposition
at the North to make an advance against slavery at every possible
point. The effect of this conviction was most baleful both upon the
spirit of the masters and the status of the slaves. It created that
resentment in the minds of the Southerners against interference in
their domestic affairs, which closed their ears to all arguments
against slavery, and it moved them to the enactment of measures in
their several Commonwealths for the purpose of keeping the slaves
under stricter discipline and in denser ignorance. It increased
vastly, if it did not introduce, that utter misunderstanding of each
other's feelings and motives between the people of the two sections,
which made it possible for the people of the North to believe,
finally, that the story of "Uncle Tom's Cabin" was the sober truth,
and the general rule of conduct of master toward slave in the South,
and for the people of the South to believe that jealousy of riches and
comfort was the sole spirit which prompted the attacks of the North
upon slavery--a misunderstanding, therefore, which proved
irreconcilable so long as the subject of it remained.
The Missouri decision made thus both for good and for evil--for good,
surely, in that it produced clearer ideas upon the character of
federal government, and preserved the East from an illiberal political
policy toward the West; and in that it secured the great Northwest for
free labor;--for evil, possibly, in that it estranged the two sections
of the Union, and put a stop to any movement in the South for the
gradual and {107} peaceable emancipation of the slaves, or for the
substantial amelioration of their condition. It is not very likely,
however, that any such movement would have proved successful, and it
is, therefore, probable that what appears on the outside to have been
an evil was in reality a good, in that it drove the disease in the
body politic of the South onward toward the crisis, which must be
passed in order that the permanent cure might be effected.
{108}
CHAPTER V.
THE BEGINNING OF THE PARTICULARISTIC REACTION
Slavery and the Industrial Policies of the Union--President Monroe and
Protection after 1820--The Committee on Manufactures--The Tariff Bill
of 1823--The General Character of the Bill, and its Failure to
Pass--President Monroe's Message of 1823, and Protection--The Tariff
Bill of 1824--Mr. Clay's Argument in its Support--Mr. Clay's Argument
Answered--The First Expression of the Doctrine that Protection and
Slavery were Hostile Interests--The Bill Amended and Passed--The
Tariff of 1824 not yet Considered Sectional Legislation--South
Carolina and the Tariff of 1824--The Historical Development of the
Doctrine of Internal Improvements--Madison's Ideas upon Internal
Improvements--The Bill of 1822 for Internal Improvements--Passage of
the Bill, and Analysis of the Vote upon it--The Bill in the Interests
of the West--President Monroe's Veto, and Communication of May 4th,
1822--President Monroe's Argument, and the Vote upon the
Veto--Congressional Act of 1824 for Distinguishing National from Local
Improvements--Foreign Relations During Monroe's Second Term--Russia
and the Northwest Coast of America--The Holy Alliance--The Congress at
Verona--Mr. Adams' Declaration to Baron Tuyl--Mr. Canning's Proposal
to Mr. Rush--Mr. Canning's Declaration to Prince Polignac--The "Monroe
Doctrine"--The Meaning of the Monroe Propositions in 1824--Failure to
Commit Congress to these Propositions--The Particularistic Reaction
Scarcely Discoverable before 1824.
[Sidenote: Slavery and the industrial policies of the Union.]
It was hoped and believed that the settlement of the Missouri question
and the compromise in reference to the remainder of the Louisiana
cession had put the problem of negro slavery out of the realm of
national politics. In fact, however, the struggle over these questions
had introduced it into that realm, and had {109} first opened the eyes
of the slaveholders to the bearings of the slavery interest upon all
the questions of constitutional law and public policy. From the point
of view of that interest their attitude toward all these questions was
more and more determined as they came to understand more and more
clearly the relation of these questions to that interest. While,
therefore, the settlement and the compromise served to withdraw the
question of slavery from the direct and immediate issue, they, at the
same time, left it the secret influence over views and actions in
many, if not most, directions.
At the next session, beginning in December of 1821, propositions were
introduced into the Senate to limit and decrease the admiralty
jurisdiction of the United States courts, to make the Senate itself a
court of appeal from the regular Judiciary in cases where a "State"
should be a party, and to limit to two hundred the number of members
in the House of Representatives.
The purpose of all these projects is apparent. Indeed, their proposers
said openly and frankly that their purpose was to lessen and limit the
powers of the general Government in the interests of "States'-rights."
It was natural, however, that the new spirit of particularism should
attack the policies of the Government rather than the structure of the
political system, or, more correctly, should undertake to control
these policies before it sought to transform that system.
[Sidenote: President Monroe and protection after 1820.]
We have seen with what unanimity and national enthusiasm the
protection of home industries was regarded, in the half decade between
1815 and 1820, as a measure indispensable to the attainment and
maintenance of industrial independence. Not even Calhoun then
understood the relation between this policy and the interests of
slavery. The Presidents, Madison and {110} Monroe, were utterly
oblivious to it. Even after the Missouri struggle, Mr. Monroe
continued to recommend the protection of manufactures for the
attainment of industrial independence as the true national policy. His
annual messages of 1821 and of 1822 contain this recommendation. He
either did not comprehend the relation of the slavery interests to the
protective system or disregarded it. It could hardly have been the
latter, for, although he was no radical supporter of slavery, he was a
slaveholder and a very conservative man.
[Sidenote: The committee on Manufactures.]
The House of Representatives, the body which had upheld even radically
national views of the character of the political system during the
Missouri struggle, very naturally responded to Mr. Monroe's
recommendation, and referred it to its committee on Manufactures for
consideration and support. Heretofore this subject had been referred
to the committee on Ways and Means, the regular revenue-raising
committee. Its reference now to the committee on Manufactures is good
evidence that the House of Representatives regarded a protective
tariff as a subject which Congress might deal with independently, and
without any necessary connection with the subject of the revenue. Such
a view is radically national. It rests upon the doctrine that Congress
may do anything in the regulation of foreign trade and commerce which,
in its own opinion, is conducive to the general welfare, regardless of
the pecuniary needs of the Government.
[Sidenote: The Tariff Bill of 1823.]
On January 9th, 1823, Mr. Tod, of Pennsylvania, the chairman of the
committee on Manufactures, reported a tariff bill. It proposed to
nearly double the existing duty upon iron, quadruple that upon coarse
woollens, and to increase the custom-house valuation of dyed cotton
goods by some forty per centum.
{111} Moreover, the bill made no provision for the future reduction of
these duties. It therefore indicated that protection was to be the
permanent policy, protection so high as to amount to the prohibition
of the importation of coarse cottons and woollens and bar iron. In
fact, Mr. Tod conceded that the prohibition of the importation of
coarse woollens was intended. He said that the tariff of 1816 on
coarse cotton goods had given a monopoly of the domestic markets for
such goods to the home manufacturers, while the price of the goods had
been reduced through home competition by one-half, and that his
committee desired to bring about the same result in regard to the
manufacture of coarse woollens.
[Sidenote: The general character of the bill, and its failure to
pass.]
Mr. Tod was not able to get a vote upon his bill at this session of
the Congress. Three significant facts, however, were elicited in the
course of the debate upon it, facts which indicated the trend of
political history. These facts were that the bill was a Pennsylvania
measure, that the South would oppose it, and that Massachusetts and
New York City would unite with the South in this opposition. It was,
in fact, a Massachusetts man, Mr. Gorham, who denounced the bill as
sectional legislation, and advised the South to resist it to the
utmost. Cotton and commerce, and that meant slavery and commerce, were
beginning to discover their affinity.
[Sidenote: President Monroe's Message of 1823, and protection.]
President Monroe, however, does not seem to have shared this view of
the subject. In his message of December 2nd, 1823, he again
recommended additional protection to "those articles which we are
prepared to manufacture, or which are more immediately connected with
the defence and independence of the country."
Thus encouraged by the President, the House of {112} Representatives
again referred the question of increasing the tariff to Mr. Tod's
committee.
[Sidenote: The Tariff Bill of 1824.]
On January 9th, 1824, Mr. Tod brought in his new bill. It was a more
moderate proposition than that of the preceding session; still it
provided for a substantial increase of the duties on woollens and
iron.
Mr. Tod assumed the constitutionality of the bill to be a settled
question, and supported the policy of it by arguments from the
necessity of attaining industrial independence in the manufacture of
the necessaries of life, from the necessity of creating new and more
remunerative employments for labor, and from the policy of developing
better home markets for agricultural products. He predicted that an
ultimate reduction of the prices of manufactured goods would be the
result of the increased home competition produced by higher duties. He
did not, however, make out any very satisfactory prospects for
commerce. This branch of the national pursuits was to make the
sacrifice.
[Sidenote: Mr. Clay's argument in its support.]
Mr. Clay made the great argument in defence of the measure. He
elaborated the patriotic reason in every direction. He pointed out the
utter dependence of the country upon foreign markets, both for the
sale of its agricultural products and for the purchase of manufactured
goods. He demonstrated that these relations had been created by the
quarter of a century of war in Europe, forcing the European countries
to buy the agricultural products of the United States to an unusual
amount, and at high prices, and showed how the restoration of general
peace in Europe had reduced the demand for, and the price of, these
products, while it left the United States dependent upon Europe for
manufactured articles. And he urged the accomplishment of industrial
independence {113} as a necessary corollary of political independence.
He contended that the aid granted to the manufacturing interests would
impose no sacrifice upon the agricultural and commercial interests;
that by the establishment of new manufacturing centres new home
markets for the products of agriculture would be created, which would
not only emancipate the country from the necessity of foreign markets
for these products, but would give the country steady and certain
markets, under its own control; and that the growth of manufactures
would speedily result in the establishment of an export trade in
manufactured goods to all parts of the world, and especially to South
America, which would ultimately more than compensate the commercial
interests for the temporary losses they might incur by reason of the
increased duties. This was a strongly tinted picture upon both sides.
It represented the distress of the country too darkly, and it painted
the speculative benefits of the high tariff in too vivid colors.
Moreover, Mr. Clay now omitted any reference to the temporary
character of protection. It now appeared to be a permanent article of
his creed.
[Sidenote: Mr. Clay's argument answered.]
[Sidenote: The first expression of the doctrine that protection and
slavery were hostile interests.]
Webster for Massachusetts, Cambreleng for the city of New York, and
Barbour for the South, denied Mr. Clay's statement in regard to the
intense and general financial distress throughout the country, and
demonstrated the destructive effects of a high tariff upon agriculture
and commerce, and upon the existing manufacturing interests
themselves. They contended that such a tariff would so prohibit
importation of foreign products as to make it impossible for Europe to
buy the agricultural products of the United States, since Europe would
not be able to pay for them; that the promised increase of domestic
markets would not at all compensate for the loss of {114} foreign
markets; that commerce would thus be destroyed both ways; and that
even the manufacturing industries already established would suffer
from the unnatural competition which would be created by the
inducements which the high tariff would hold out to capital otherwise
employed. Mr. Barbour frankly declared that the slave labor of the
South could not be used in the development of manufactures, and that,
therefore, the high tariff must inure to the benefit of the North, by
making the South tributary to the North for all manufactured goods.
The theory accepted by all parties, however, at the moment, was, that
the duties were paid ultimately by the consumers of the imported
goods. Senator Hayne, of South Carolina, pronounced this doctrine
himself. Upon this view the North must pay the duties equally, at
least, with the South. So long, then, as this idea was held, and so
long as the commercial interests of Massachusetts, Maine, and the city
of New York made common cause with the agricultural interests of the
South against the bill, it could not be strictly regarded as sectional
legislation, it could not develop into a political and constitutional
question between the North and the South.
[Sidenote: The bill amended and passed.]
While this combination of interests was not able to prevent the House
from finally passing the bill by a narrow majority, it did succeed in
imposing several very substantial modifications upon it in the
direction of more moderate protection.
In the Senate the bill suffered still further modification in the same
direction. The burden of the Senate's amendments fell, however, on the
wool- and hemp-growing and liquor-distilling West. It was for this
reason that the House of Representatives refused to concur in {115}
them. Recourse was then had to a conference committee, which arranged
a compromise that gave a little less protection than the House had
voted, and a little more than the Senate had voted.
The tariff of May, 1824, was still only a moderately protective
tariff. It was certainly in only one particular anything like
prohibitory; it preserved the high tariff of 1816 on coarse cotton
goods. In other respects it was not much more than a continuation of
the reasonable duties already imposed.
[Sidenote: The tariff of 1824 not yet considered sectional
legislation.]
So long as the tariff remained moderately protective, and was approved
in Kentucky and Missouri, and disapproved in Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Maine, and the city of New York, and so long as its burdens
were generally believed to fall ultimately upon the consumers of the
dutiable articles, it could not take on the form of a sectional issue,
dominated by the question of slavery. Some of the Southerners had,
indeed, discovered that slave labor could not be employed in the
mills, and that, therefore, protection of manufactures would not
secure the establishment of these industries in the South, and had
begun to treat the tariff question in a manner to develop a party
issue out of it. But this tendency had not advanced far enough in 1824
to produce a division of the all-comprehending Republican party. It
needed another four years of personal differences among the leaders,
another revision of the tariff in the direction of higher duties, and
a more complete consolidation of the North for protection, before this
result could be attained.
[Sidenote: South Carolina and the tariff of 1824.]
During the passage of the bill public meetings had been held
throughout South Carolina protesting against it, and the year
subsequent to its enactment the South Carolina legislature denounced
it as unconstitutional, but the people {116} of the Commonwealth
acquiesced, though with very bad temper, in the execution of the law.
The other question of internal policy, to which certain of the
historians refer as suffering under the baleful influences of the
slavery interest immediately after 1820, was the question of national
internal improvements.
[Sidenote: The historical development of the doctrine of internal
improvements.]
This question became a definite issue in Congress for the first time
on December 19th, 1805, when a committee of the Senate, charged with
the duty of reporting to the Senate an opinion as to how the money
appropriated in the Enabling Act for Ohio ought to be applied,
recommended the use of it for the building of a road across the
Alleghanies from Cumberland, in Maryland, to a point upon the Ohio
River, near Wheeling, in Virginia.
If we may take the first Act passed by Congress, that of March 29th,
1806, in regard to the matter as expressing the views of the
Government and the people upon the subject, we must conclude that the
first matured ideas were that the general Government had the power to
lay out and construct roads within and through the Commonwealths, by
and with the consent of the Commonwealths through which they might
pass. The Cumberland road was originally built by the general
Government, after the consent thereto of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia had been obtained. The appropriations for subsequent repairs
upon the road were, however, not considered as requiring the consent
of those Commonwealths before being made or expended.
[Sidenote: Madison's ideas upon internal improvements.]
The second stage in the evolution of opinion upon the subject was
attained in the year 1817, when Mr. Madison vetoed Mr. Calhoun's bill
for setting aside the bonus and the dividends to be paid to the
Government by the United States Bank as a fund for constructing roads
and canals, and {117} improving the navigation of water-courses in the
several Commonwealths. This bill proposed to authorize the general
Government to expend the money, thus appropriated, only with the
consent of the Commonwealth, or Commonwealths, in which the proposed
improvement might lay, antecedently given, and distributed the sum to
be spent among the Commonwealths according to the ratio of their
representation in the national House of Representatives. As has been
pointed out, Madison vetoed this bill on the ground that the power to
enact it was not to be found among the enumerated powers of Congress,
and could not be regarded as a necessary and proper means for carrying
out any of the enumerated powers.
The President drew no distinction between the power to construct
internal improvements and the power to appropriate money for their
construction, nor between such powers and the power to administer
them, or to exercise jurisdiction over them. He regarded all, or any
of these things, as unwarranted by the Constitution. He furthermore
declared that the consent of the several Commonwealths to the exercise
of such powers by the general Government could not make the exercise
of them constitutional, unless that consent should be given in the
form of an amendment to the Constitution.
The vote upon the vetoed bill in the House of Representatives
manifested the fact that a substantial majority of that body remained
unconvinced by the President's argument. It is reasonably certain that
Mr. Madison's views were not the views of the country at that moment.
A large majority of the people felt that he had abandoned his earlier
faith in regard to this subject. An analysis of the vote upon the
vetoed bill shows that New England was almost unanimous in opposing
the measure; that Virginia and North {118} Carolina also opposed it,
though less decidedly; that New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and the
Northwest, together with South Carolina and Georgia, favored it; and
that Kentucky and Tennessee inclined to favor it. Certainly, down to
1817, no influence of the slavery interest upon the question of
internal improvements is discoverable. It was evident that the general
opinion was, that the middle Atlantic section and the Northwest would
receive the larger share of the benefits of a national system of
internal improvements. It was also evident that New England viewed the
matter purely in that light, and that Virginia was impelled wholly by
her ancient principle of strict construction of the powers of the
general Government. It was South Carolina and Georgia whose actions
appeared at this juncture to spring from unselfish and patriotic
motives.
[Sidenote: The bill of 1822 for internal improvements.]
The third stage in the development of constitutional interpretation in
reference to this subject was attained in the year 1822. In May of
that year Congress passed a bill appropriating money for the repair of
the Cumberland road, and authorizing the President to cause the
erection of toll-gates upon it, and to appoint toll-gatherers. The
toll charges, and penalties for attempting to avoid paying them, and
for not keeping to the left in passing, were fixed in the bill itself.
That is, this bill assumed for the general Government not only the
powers of appropriating and expending money for the construction of
the road, but the power of operating the road and jurisdiction over
it. The passage of such a bill is certainly very good evidence that
President Madison's views, as expressed in his veto message of March
3rd, 1817, were not the views of the country in 1822 upon the subject
of internal improvements.
[Sidenote: Passage of the bill, and analysis of the vote upon it.]
It is interesting and instructive to analyze the vote upon this bill.
In the House of Representatives the {119} members from the New England
section were nearly evenly divided, pro and con. The majority of the
New Yorkers voted against it. The Pennsylvanians were nearly balanced.
The Marylanders voted for it. The Virginians were against it by a
decided majority. The North Carolinians were indifferent. The South
Carolinians and Georgians abandoned their high national ground of
1817, and voted unanimously against it. The Representatives from the
Northwest went unanimously for it; and those from Kentucky now wheeled
into line with them. Lastly, while the Tennesseeans still maintained
their attitude of indifference, the members from the Commonwealths
south of Tennessee, and west of Georgia, all voted for the bill.
In the Senate the majority in favor of the measure was very large.
Only the Senators from the Carolinas and Alabama, and one Senator from
Missouri, voted against it.
There is somewhat more of an appearance of slavery influence in the
vote upon this bill than upon the bill of 1817, in that South Carolina
showed herself practically a unit against this bill. Still it is
probable that this opposition rested upon other grounds. Certainly
when we read in the "Annals of Congress," that so stanch a friend of
free labor, so eminent a lawyer, and so honorable a man as John W.
Taylor, of New York, said of this bill that it was so important in its
character, and proposed such a violation of the Constitution, that he
felt obliged to call for the yeas and nays upon it, we must concede
that other motives may have influenced the statesmen of South Carolina
than such as might have sprung from subserviency to the interests of
slavery.
[Sidenote: The bill in the interests of the West.]
If we review the analysis of the vote in the House of Representatives
we shall see that the entire {120} West--taking the Appalachian range
as the dividing line, for that period, between the East and the
West--was for the bill, while the whole East, with the exception of
Maryland, which was specially interested in the road, was either
against it or indifferent to it. The Eastern Commonwealths had made
their roads with Commonwealth money, and did not wish to assist the
Western Commonwealths to make theirs by giving them national money
with which to do it. The West, on the other hand, was new and
comparatively poor, and wanted the nation to help it out of the mud.
This is unquestionably the plain statement of the situation from the
point of view of interests. The interests of slavery played but little
part, if any at all, in the distribution of the vote.
[Sidenote: President Monroe's veto, and communication of May 4th,
1822.]
President Monroe promptly vetoed the bill, on the ground that it was
in excess of the powers granted to Congress by the Constitution. He
also sent a communication, of the same date as the veto, to the House
of Representatives, explaining his views upon those principles of the
Constitution generally, and upon those provisions specially, which
could be regarded as vesting powers in the general Government
concerning internal improvements. The paper is prolix, confused, and
confusing, but, upon the specific question at issue, the propositions
advanced are definite and intelligible. He held that the power of
Congress in regard to internal improvements was to be found in the
Constitution only by implication, by implication from the power to
appropriate money, and that, therefore, its nature and limitations
were to be drawn from the character of the power to appropriate money.
He contended, on the one side, that the power of Congress to
appropriate money was not limited to the objects enumerated in the
{121} Constitution, but was, on the other side, limited by the spirit
of the Constitution to national purposes. He concluded, therefore,
that Congress was empowered to appropriate money to internal
improvements of a national character. But he asserted that Congress
could not, under the power to appropriate money, establish
jurisdiction over such improvements, or authorize the executive
department of the Government to administer them. The bill in question
did just that, and it was for this reason that the President returned
it with his objections.
[Sidenote: President Monroe's argument, and the vote upon the veto.]
The President's views were apparently convincing to many who had voted
for the bill. Upon its passage, the vote in the House of
Representatives was eighty-seven for, and sixty-eight against, the
measure. After the veto, it stood sixty-eight yeas and seventy-two
nays.
It may be safely assumed that the view expressed by President Monroe
in the paper accompanying the veto of this bill was the view which
prevailed throughout the country in the year 1824. It may be also said
that the power of Congress to authorize the President to expend the
appropriation by causing the improvements to be planned and
constructed was generally regarded, in 1824, as a necessary
consequence of the power to appropriate money for the same. The acts
of Congress appropriating money for the construction and repair of
roads, canals, etc., after, as well as before, that date, seem to
proceed upon this theory.
[Sidenote: Congressional Act of 1824 for distinguishing national from
local improvements.]
The great difficulty which lay in the way of the realization of
President Monroe's principle of the appropriation of national money
for internal improvements of a national character was the proper
determination of the question as to what improvements were really of
that character. The danger was that the {122} appropriation bills
would become log-rolling measures for the purpose of obtaining
national money for matters of local concern. This difficulty was
distinctly felt, and Congress undertook to meet it by the Act of April
30th, 1824, which authorized the President to cause "surveys, plans,
and estimates to be made of the routes of such roads and canals as he
might deem of national importance," and required him to lay the same
before Congress.
From all this it is apparent that, down to the presidential election
of 1824, the development of a pro-slavery, strict-constructionist,
"States' rights" party is hardly to be discovered in the attitude of
the different sections of the country toward the question of internal
improvements. Despite the fact that the slaveholders had become
conscious during the Missouri struggle that their interests demanded
the establishment of a particularistic view of the Constitution and a
particularistic practice in the working of the governmental system of
the country, not much progress had been made, in the period between
1820 and 1824, in the way of twisting the policies developed during
the previous eight years into line with such a view. In fact the
foreign relations of the United States were again, in 1822, of a
somewhat threatening character, and the consideration of these
relations was acting as a certain hindrance to the development of
parties upon internal issues.
[Sidenote: Foreign relations during Monroe's second term.]
The menace, or perhaps it would be more correct to say the apparent
menace, came from two quarters; but in neither case did it relate
immediately to the territory or interests of the United States. In
both cases it was consequential and more or less remote.
{123} [Sidenote: Russia and the northwest coast of America.]
In the first place, the movements of Russia in the North Pacific had
created grave apprehensions. At the close of the first decade of the
century the Russian American Company put forward a claim to the
territory of the North American continent along the Pacific coast from
Behring's Strait to the mouth of the Columbia River, and even to
points south of the Columbia. Really this claim came into conflict
only with the rights of Great Britain and Spain, but the United
States, having the presentiment of its future, if not a legal claim to
any part of this territory as a part of Louisiana, regarded the
Russian movement with jealous discontent. And when, on September 16th,
the Russian Czar issued an edict, asserting Russia's rights to the
North Pacific territory from Behring's Strait to the fifty-first
parallel of north latitude, it was natural that this discontent should
become hostile in its nature. The Government of the United States
declared its dissent from the Russian pretensions, and the matter
rested momentarily with that.
[Sidenote: The Holy Alliance.]
At the same time the other danger was developing. The European
reaction against the terrible excesses of the Revolution and the
despotism of Bonaparte had assumed the form of an alliance between the
Governments of the great continental states, Russia, Austria, Prussia,
and France, for the purpose of maintaining each by the power of all
against the reappearance of revolutionary movements anywhere. Great
Britain had scented in this Holy Alliance a combination of continental
powers which might prove, in some degree at least, as dangerous to her
continental relations as the commercial system of Bonaparte had been.
There is no doubt, too, that there was a large party in England which
repudiated the fundamental {124} political doctrine of the Holy
Alliance Powers, the doctrine of the _jure divino_ monarchy. England
had, in fact, repudiated that doctrine at the close of the seventeenth
century. For these reasons the British Government had declined to
enter the Holy League, and regarded it with suspicion and
ill-concealed hostility.
[Sidenote: The Congress at Verona.]
The United States Government paid little attention to its workings so
long as they were confined to purely European relations, but when, in
1822, at the congress of these powers at Verona, which had been
assembled to consider the question of aiding the Spanish Government to
suppress the insurrection against its authority in Spain, the subject
of aiding that Government to re-establish its authority over Spain's
revolting colonies in North and South America was discussed, serious
apprehensions were roused in both Great Britain and the United States.
It was stated, and generally believed, in the United States, that the
plan was the re-establishment of the Spanish power over all of Spain's
American possessions, except Mexico and California, and the cession of
Mexico to France, and of California to Russia, in consideration of the
military aid to be rendered to Spain by these two great powers in the
work of restoration.
[Sidenote: Mr. Adams' declaration to Baron Tuyl.]
To the United States the supposed intentions of Russia in respect to
the Pacific coast appeared the more immediate danger, and the United
States Government addressed its diplomacy to this question first. On
July 17th, 1823, the Secretary of State, Mr. John Quincy Adams,
declared to the Russian Minister at Washington, Baron Tuyl, that "we
should contest the right of Russia to any territorial establishment on
this continent, and that we should assume distinctly the principle
that the American {125} continents are no longer subjects for any new
European colonial establishments."
[Sidenote: Mr. Canning's proposal to Mr. Rush.]
The following month, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr.
George Canning, proposed to the Minister of the United States at the
Court of St. James, Mr. Richard Rush, a joint declaration by the
British Government and the Government of the United States to Europe,
that the two Governments would not remain indifferent to an
intervention by the Holy Alliance Powers to restore the Spanish
authority over Spain's revolting American colonies. Both commercial
interests and political principles moved the British Government to
make this proposition.
[Sidenote: Mr. Canning's declaration to Prince Polignac.]
Mr. Rush had not been instructed by his Government in anticipation of
the British advances, but he offered to assume the responsibility of
joining for the United States in the declaration, provided the British
Government would acknowledge the independence of the revolting Spanish
colonies in America, as the Government of the United States had
already done. The British minister was not then prepared to go so far,
and the plan of the joint declaration fell through. But Mr. Canning
declared for his Government to the French ambassador at St. James,
Prince Polignac, that Great Britain would resist any intervention on
the part of the Holy Alliance Powers in the question between Spain and
her revolting American colonies, and the President of the United
States, in his annual message of December 2nd, 1823, stated the
position which the United States Government and the people of the
United States ought, in his opinion, to assume, and would, in his
opinion, assume, in regard to the whole subject.
[Sidenote: The "Monroe Doctrine."]
Mr. Monroe dealt first with the question of Russian {126} colonization
upon the Pacific coast. After informing Congress of the instructions
which had been given to the Minister representing the United States at
St. Petersburg for negotiating with the Czar's Government, he said:
"In the discussions to which this interest has given rise, and in the
arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged
proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests
of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by
the free and independent condition which they have assumed and
maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future
colonization by any European powers."
Toward the close of the message Mr. Monroe addressed himself to the
other question, the question of intervention by the Holy Alliance
Powers in the contest between Spain and her revolting American
colonies in the following language: "In the wars of European powers,
in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part, nor
does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights
are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make
preparations for our defence. With the movements in this hemisphere we
are, of necessity, more immediately connected, and by causes which
must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The
political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this
respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which
exists in their respective governments, and to the defence of our own,
which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and
matured by the wisdom of our most enlightened citizens, and under
which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is
devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations
existing between the United {127} States and those powers, to declare
that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their
system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and
safety. With the existing colonies of any European power we have not
interfered and shall not interfere, but with the Governments who have
declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence
we have on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we
could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them,
or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European
power, in any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly
disposition toward the United States.... It is impossible that the
allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of
either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can
anyone believe that our Southern brethren, if left to themselves,
would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible,
therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with
indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of
Spain and these new Governments, and their distance from each other,
it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the
true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves,
in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course."
[Sidenote: The meaning of the Monroe propositions in 1824.]
These statements by Mr. Monroe of his opinion as to what the diplomacy
of the United States ought to be, and would be, upon the subjects of
the establishment of new European colonies in America, the
intervention of the Holy Alliance Powers in the question between Spain
and her revolting American colonies, and the forcible imposition by
these powers of the _jure divino_ monarchy {128} upon these peoples,
who had established republican forms of government for themselves,
have had the name fixed upon them by a later generation of "The Monroe
Doctrine." There is no difficulty in understanding these statements as
Mr. Monroe understood them.
Neither he nor his Secretary of State ever called them a "Doctrine."
With them they were simply the opinions of the Administration in
regard to the course which the United States ought to pursue, and
would probably pursue, in meeting certain exigencies, the possibility
of the arising of which passed entirely away before the close of the
first half of this century. These opinions were simply that the United
States ought to resist, and would resist, the planting of any new
colonial establishments in America, or the intervention of the Holy
Alliance Powers in the question between Spain and her revolting
American colonies, or the forcible imposition of the _jure divino_
monarchy, the political system of these powers, upon the new
republican governments of South and Middle America.
[Sidenote: Failure to commit Congress to these propositions.]
The month following the publication of this message, January, 1824,
Mr. Clay attempted to move Congress to indorse that part of the
President's opinions which referred to the intervention of the Allied
Powers in the conflict between Spain and her revolting colonies, but
the resolution which he offered to that effect was laid on the table,
and never called up. Mr. Poinsett, of South Carolina, made a like
attempt later, but with no more success. The Congress of that day had
altogether too much intelligence to make diplomatic opinions, advanced
by the Administration, either laws of the land, or joint or concurrent
resolutions of the legislative department of the Government.
{129} [Sidenote: The particularistic reaction scarcely discoverable
before 1824.]
Thus neither in the question of the tariff, nor in that of internal
improvements, nor, naturally, in the diplomatic questions, is anything
more than the faint beginnings of the particularistic reaction to be
discovered in the period between 1820 and 1824. In fact, it may be
said that the year 1820 marks roughly the date of the extinction of
the old Federal party, and of the almost complete absorption of the
whole voting population in the Republican party. In the presidential
election of that year the candidate of the Republican party, Mr.
Monroe, received two hundred and thirty-one of the two hundred and
thirty-two electoral votes cast, and the one elector who did not vote
for him was a Republican. The Federal party did not even undertake to
present a ticket. From the point of view of the preservation of its
own dominance, the Federal party had committed two grave errors, one
of principle and one of policy. It had held to the principle that the
mass of men are not fit to govern themselves, but should be governed
by the few who are wise and good; and it had adopted the policy of too
close alliance with the commercial interests of the country. The
levelling, not to say debasing, influences of the French political
philosophy, which rolled like a tidal wave over the country during the
last decade of the eighteenth century, and was worked up into a
political dogma by Jefferson and his disciples, together with the
reflex influence of the practical equality which established itself
among the first adventurers who settled the lands beyond the
Alleghanies, destroyed the Federal party, upon the side of principle;
while the great extension of the agricultural interests, produced by
these same settlements, made it intolerable upon the side of policy.
The earlier advantage which the Federal party, as the upholder of
centralization, enjoyed {130} over the Republican party, as the
champion of "States'-rights," had been lost by the nationalization of
the Republican party through the War of 1812, and the
denationalization of the Federal party through the same experiences.
In 1820, therefore, there was only one party in fact and in principle.
It is undoubtedly true that the struggle of the years 1819 and 1820
over the Missouri question had sowed the seeds of dissension in this
all-comprehending party; but four years did not constitute a period of
time sufficient for their completed growth and fructification. The
presidential contest of 1824 could not, therefore, he fought under the
issues of party principles. It was little more, and, under the
circumstances, it could be little more, than a personal contest
between the leaders of the Republican party. The result of it,
however, contributed very largely to the development of political
differences, and to the organization of parties upon the basis of
these differences. It must, therefore, be described with some
particularity.
{131}
CHAPTER VI.
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1824
General Character of the Presidential Contest of 1824--John Quincy
Adams--DeWitt Clinton--William H. Crawford--John C. Calhoun--Daniel
Webster--Henry Clay--Andrew Jackson--The Nomination of Presidential
Candidates in 1824--Failure of the Electors to Elect the
President--Territorial Distribution of the Electoral Vote--New York in
the Election of 1824--South Carolina in the Election of
1824--Pennsylvania in the Election of 1824--The Election in the House
of Representatives--Clay Master of the Situation--Clay's Support of
Adams, and Kremer's Charge of Bargain and Corruption--The Election of
Adams by the House of Representatives--Clay and the Secretaryship of
State--Threats of the Organization of an Anti-administration
Party--The Bargain between Clay and Adams a mere Suspicion--Clay's
Nomination to the Secretaryship of State in the Senate--The
Composition of the new Anti-administration Party.
[Sidenote: General character of the presidential contest of 1824.]
As has been pointed out, from 1820 to 1824 the political arena was
clear of the combats of principles, and furnished the tilting-ground
for the jousts of personal ambition. The "Virginia dynasty" became
extinct with the expiration of Monroe's second term, and the way was
open for anyone to enter the lists who was willing to risk the shocks
of the encounter.
At no time in our history has the roll of our political nobility been
more full of brilliant names and characters.
{132} [Sidenote: John Quincy Adams.]
First of all, there was John Quincy Adams, the Secretary of State, the
"knight without fear and without reproach," blunt, grim, almost rude,
through an unconscious suspicion that politeness might encourage the
approach of temptation; now fifty-seven years old, and trained in
statecraft and diplomacy almost from childhood; the best equipped
statesman and the most experienced statesman that America had up to
that time produced; ready to serve his country in any honorable
capacity to which that country might freely call him, and just as
ready to withdraw from that service when his country indicated the
desire to dispense with him; puritanic, austere, and to the last
degree patriotic, his one qualification for the presidential office
was the capacity to discharge its duties wisely, honestly, and
loyally, a qualification which too rarely wins in popular elections.
[Sidenote: DeWitt Clinton.]
Then, there was DeWitt Clinton, noble in personal appearance,
dignified in manners, eloquent in debate, sagacious and far-sighted in
business, a lover of science and a scientist himself; the great
promoter of the Erie Canal, which was now on the point of completion,
and which was destined to revolutionize the commerce of the country;
still only fifty-five years of age, although he had been considered
more than twenty years before as the most promising man of the nation,
and had within that period been United States Senator, mayor of New
York City, candidate for the presidency against Mr. Madison, and twice
Governor of New York.
[Sidenote: William H. Crawford.]
Then, there was William H. Crawford, a Virginian by birth and a
Georgian by education; a man of large wealth and of imposing bearing;
enjoying a very great reputation for statesmanship without any easily
discoverable foundation therefor; now {133} fifty-two years of age,
and having already been United States Senator, Minister to France,
Secretary of War, and Secretary of the Treasury, which latter office
he still held; with the exception, perhaps, of Martin Van Buren, the
most astute politician among the great men of his time. He had the
political friendship and support of Van Buren. The two seem to have
been attracted to each other by the similarity of their methods. He
was the author of the law of 1820, limiting the term of the officials
of the Treasury to four years, the first step in the direction of
making the United States civil service a political machine, such as
Van Buren and his fellows in the "Regency" had made out of the civil
service of the Commonwealth of New York. It is not astonishing that
he, rather than any of the other aspirants for the presidency,
procured the assembling of a caucus of the members of Congress, and
secured a nomination from it, thus making himself the "regular"
candidate. Not a third of the members, however, appeared at the
caucus, and the nomination did him more harm than good.
[Sidenote: John C. Calhoun.]
Then, there was Calhoun, grave, pure, and patriotic as Adams himself,
and almost as puritanic; South Carolinian by birth, Scotch-Irish by
blood, Presbyterian in religion, and New Englander by education;
great, both in dialectics and in the administration of affairs; rather
more given to introspection than to objective research; speculative,
therefore, rather than inductive in his mental processes; most
fascinating in conversation, kind and generous in his feelings, and a
gentleman everywhere and upon all occasions; a personality to be
looked up to with reverence, admiration, and confidence. He was still
only forty-two years of age, and yet he had already passed fourteen
years in public service, first as member of the South Carolina
Legislature, then as member of Congress, and {134} then as Monroe's
Secretary of War for both terms, which office he still held.
[Sidenote: Daniel Webster.]
Then, there was Webster, of the same age with Calhoun, though as yet
only five years in public service; the most majestic personality which
America has ever produced, though born of the hardy yeomanry of New
England; profound in thought, grandly eloquent in speech, and royally
impressive in bearing; full of good cheer, in spite of the puritanism
of his ancestry, enjoying his friends and adored by his friends; a
splendid lawyer, a great statesman, and an incomparable orator--in a
word, a demigod; by no means so austere in character as in appearance;
liable, as genius too often is, to sometimes break over the restraints
of customary morality, but doing it in so grand and natural a manner
as to make the rule which he had broken seem narrow, insignificant,
and mean.
[Sidenote: Henry Clay.]
And then, there was Clay, the most genuine American of them all;
rather superficial in thought, entrancing in his oratory, with a voice
as winning as the siren's song, elegant and gallant in his manners,
perfectly irresistible in conversation, jovial and cheery and happy,
the prince of good fellows, loved and worshipped by everybody who knew
him; enthusiastic in his patriotism, seeking to make his country not
only independent of the world in all its policies but the leader of
the world in civilization, a zealous propagandist of American
republicanism, the "lion-hearted knight" of American statesmen. He was
now in the prime of his manhood, forty-seven years of age. He had been
a member of the Senate of the United States at thirty, but it was upon
the floor of the House of Representatives, and as Speaker of the
House, which office he again held, that he had won his most brilliant
laurels. He was at the moment the great champion of the {135} tariff,
of national internal improvements, and of the cause of the South
American States in their struggle for independence against Spain and
Portugal--of what he called the American system of political and
industrial independence. Of his competitors only Crawford differed
with him in regard to these principles in anything more than a slight
degree. Crawford was considered as rather more particularistic,
especially in his views on the question of internal improvements. But
Clay, with his genial self-confidence and irresistible self-assertion,
had assumed in the popular mind, as well as in the Congress, the part
of the leading representative of these policies. He had the advantage
or the disadvantage of that, whichever it might prove to be.
[Sidenote: Andrew Jackson.]
And lastly, Jackson, the noblest Roman of them all; ignorant and
irascible indeed, but virtuous, brave, and patriotic beyond any cavil
or question; faithful and devoted in his domestic life, absolutely
unapproachable by pecuniary inducements; the best of friends and the
most implacable of enemies; quick, hasty in forming his judgments and
tenacious beyond expression in holding to them; prone to elevate every
whim and impulse to a behest of conscience; earnest, terrible in the
inflexibility of his purposes; excited by opposition to an
ever-increasing degree of determination; unflinching and recklessly
daring in the performance of what he felt to be his duty; restless
under the legal restraints which might appear to hinder him in the
discharge of duty and the accomplishment of any great enterprise
intrusted to him; hostile to all gradations of power and privilege,
and inclined to break through any official net-work interposed between
himself and the rank and file subject to his command; a great soldier,
and yet a man of the people; the military hero of the country and a
martyr to the persecutions of the {136} politicians--here were
certainly qualities calculated to rouse the enthusiasm of the masses,
if not of the classes. He was now fifty-seven years of age, and was
not in strong health. He had shown no qualities of statesmanship,
although he had been twice a member of the Senate of the United
States, and was at the moment holding that most advantageous position
for a display of civic talent; but he had the fortune to live at a
time and in a country when and where the lower strata of society were
just coming to a full participation in political power, and when and
where high qualifications simply to discharge the duties of an office
were beginning to be regarded by the majority of the people as
disqualifications for holding the office.
These were by no means all of the great characters from among whom the
nation had its choice in 1824, but they were unquestionably the first
on the list. Different as they were in personal qualities, they were
not yet far apart in political opinions. Crawford leaned more toward
"States' rights" than the others. Clay was more pronounced in the
opposite direction. While Jackson was rather more uncommitted.
[Sidenote: The nomination of presidential candidates in 1824.]
Webster was not put forward by anybody, and did not offer himself as a
candidate. Clay was nominated by the legislature of Kentucky. Jackson
was nominated by the legislature of Tennessee, and by two Pennsylvania
conventions. While Adams had the advantage of the precedent which, for
nearly a quarter of a century, had pointed to the Secretary of State
as the natural successor to the presidential office.
[Sidenote: Failure of the electors to elect the President.]
As was to be expected, the electors did not choose any one of the
four, since the Constitution requires a majority of the whole number
of the electors for a choice. Jackson led with ninety-nine votes;
Adams was next with eighty-four; {137} Crawford followed with
forty-one; and Clay came last with thirty-seven.
[Sidenote: Territorial distribution of the electoral vote.]
The electoral vote was distributed territorially as might have been
naturally anticipated, except in two particulars. These were, the
failure of Van Buren to secure the electoral vote of New York for
Crawford, and the solid vote of Pennsylvania and South Carolina for
Jackson. These facts had some significance in connection with
subsequent developments, and require a little explanation.
[Sidenote: New York in the Election of 1824.]
New York was one of the Commonwealths which, down to 1824, permitted
the legislature to choose the presidential electors. In 1823 the
legislature was still under the control of Van Buren and his
colleagues in the "Regency," the Albany machine, and had the election
taken place in 1823 he could doubtless have delivered the electoral
vote entire to Crawford. But one of Jackson's shrewdest supporters,
probably Clinton, started the scheme for transferring the choice of
the electors from the legislature to the voters. This, if successful,
would destroy the control of the "Regency" over the electoral vote.
The opposition of the "Regency" to the bill, when it appeared in the
legislature, caused its rejection by that body; but the popular
indignation was roused to such a pitch against the "Regency" and its
adherents in the legislature, in consequence of this act, that, in the
Commonwealth elections of 1824, the "Regency" party was driven from
power, and the new legislature chose electors who cast the electoral
vote of the Commonwealth chiefly for Adams, as the Northern candidate.
[Sidenote: South Carolina in the Election of 1824.]
The fact that South Carolina cast her electoral vote for Jackson
instead of for Crawford is good evidence that there was still no
question of "States' rights" versus the powers of the Union at issue,
or that South {138} Carolina was still nationally disposed; and that,
either there was no tariff question at issue, or South Carolina had
not yet clearly discovered the hostility of the tariff to her
interests, or she believed Jackson to be opposed to the tariff.
Jackson, or rather his manager, William B. Lewis, a most astute
politician, had written a letter to a Dr. Coleman, of Warrenton, Va.,
upon the subject of the tariff. The letter was ostensibly a reply to
one from Dr. Coleman, inquiring of Jackson his views upon this
question. Very probably, however, Dr. Coleman's letter was also
dictated by Mr. Lewis. Jackson's reply contained nothing definite in
regard to the subject. It was a first-class political document, that
is, it was a document which could be interpreted to mean anything
which might be made necessary or desirable by time, place, and
circumstances. In a word, Lewis had made for Jackson a sort of _tabula
rasa_ record on the subject of the tariff. In such a state of things
it is certainly reasonable to ascribe South Carolina's preference for
Jackson to the facts that he claimed to be her son by birth, and that
Calhoun, rightly discerning Jackson to be the coming man, withdrew
from the race for the presidency, and was regarded as running for the
vice-presidency on the Jackson ticket.
[Sidenote: Pennsylvania in the Election of 1824.]
It is somewhat more difficult to account for the attitude of
Pennsylvania. We are now so accustomed to consider Pennsylvania the
"tariff State" _par excellence_, that it is difficult to conceive of a
time when she was not such. She was indeed, in 1824, for the tariff,
but her interests had not then become so completely linked together
with it as after 1840. In 1824 her vast beds of anthracite had not
been applied to the preparation of her iron ores, in fact {139} had
hardly been discovered. Pennsylvania west of the Alleghanies was then
an agricultural country, and was filled with a population intensely
democratic and almost lawless. So far as they had any political
science it was based upon the most radical postulates of the French
philosophy. The principal "plank" of the platform of the Harrisburg
convention of March 4th, 1824, which nominated Jackson, read as
follows: "This artificial system of cabinet succession to the
presidency is little less dangerous and anti-republican than the
hereditary monarchies of Europe. If a link in this chain of successive
secretary dynasties be not broken now, then may we be fettered by it
forever. Andrew Jackson comes pure, untrammelled, and unpledged from
the people." Adams, Crawford, and Calhoun were then members of
President Monroe's cabinet, and Clay was Speaker of the House of
Representatives. Jackson alone of all the candidates seemed to possess
the qualifications required by the Harrisburg doctrine. While this may
explain the attachment of the Pennsylvania Republicans to Jackson, we
must not forget that the remnant of the Pennsylvania Federalists were
also for him. In 1816 Jackson had written some letters to President
Monroe advising him not to ignore the Federalists in his appointments
to office, but to unite the country by showing himself superior to the
distinctions of party in his Administration. These letters were now
drawn forth and published by Jackson's manager, and the inference
which they conveyed was that Jackson would follow this policy, in case
he should be chosen to the presidency. Even Webster was inclined to
him, and Mrs. Webster was entirely won by his gallantry. Jackson in
the rôle of a fascinating gentleman and a popular ladies' man is
hardly the usual character under which the imagination of this
generation pictures him. It is, {140} nevertheless, strictly true that
the "Old Hero" knew how to make himself very acceptable to the ladies.
Pennsylvania was, chiefly, by this conjunction of influences, carried
for Jackson by an overwhelming majority.
[Sidenote: The Election in the House of Representatives.]
The failure of the electors to give a majority to any one of the
candidates threw the election into the House of Representatives, which
is empowered by the Constitution to choose, in such a case, one of the
three who shall have received the highest number of electoral votes.
[Sidenote: Clay master of the situation.]
From the day when it became known that the new President must be
chosen in this manner to the day of the election by the House, that
is, from about the middle of December to the ninth day of February,
the politicians in Washington were "laying pipe," "pulling wires," and
"making deals." It soon became manifest that Clay, while he could not
be chosen himself, since he could not be legally voted for, was the
master of the situation. So great was his popularity with the House
that, it is almost certain, he would have been chosen to the great
office himself had he been among the three having the highest number
of electoral votes. Everybody reasoned, therefore, that not only the
Representatives from the Commonwealths which had given their electoral
votes to Clay would follow his lead in voting in the House, but that
many others from other Commonwealths would act under inspiration from
him. After a good deal of talk among the members of the House and the
politicians generally as to whether the members were bound to vote as
the electors from their respective Commonwealths had voted, and as to
whether the legislatures of the respective Commonwealths possessed any
power to instruct the members of the House of Representatives from the
several Commonwealths in regard to {141} the casting of their votes,
the opinion finally prevailed that each Representative was entirely
free to vote according to his own judgment and preference; and that
meant that the popular and persuasive Speaker would be able to carry
enough votes with him to elect the candidate upon whom his favor might
fall.
[Sidenote: Clay's support of Adams, and Kremer's charge of bargain and
corruption.]
Propositions were made to him from the friends of the different
candidates, but he held them all at arm's length. It might have been
easily foreseen that he would support Adams. Crawford was a man of
exhausted powers, unfit physically and mentally to discharge the
duties of the great office. Jackson was only a military chieftain,
according to Clay's view a very dangerous character for the
presidency. There remained only Adams, probably the best-fitted man in
the country for the office. It was generally felt, for several days
before the election, that these considerations would determine Clay's
course of action. There were those, however, who were ready to ascribe
Clay's supposed attitude to other, and more selfish, motives. An
insignificant member from Pennsylvania, Kremer by name, gave it out in
public print that there was a bargain between Adams and Clay,
according to which Clay was to support Adams, and to receive in return
the secretaryship of State. This happened on January 28th, 1825, just
after the delegations from Ohio and Kentucky in the House had declared
their intention of supporting Adams. The small mind of Kremer could
not conceive of this attitude on the part of Clay save from the point
of view of selfish interests. Clay immediately called for an
investigation of the charge by the House, but Kremer sneaked out of
it.
[Sidenote: The election of Adams by the House of Representatives.]
On February 9th, 1825, the two Houses of Congress met in joint
assembly to count the electoral vote. It {142} was immediately found
that no candidate had a majority, and that, therefore, the choice lay
with the House. The House, on the same day, and on the first ballot,
elected Adams. The delegations from thirteen of the twenty-four
Commonwealths voted for him. The delegations from seven voted for
Jackson; and those from four for Crawford. Adams received the votes of
the delegations from all of the Commonwealths which had given their
electoral votes, or the majority of their electoral votes, to himself
and to Clay, and from three of the Commonwealths which had given the
majority of their electoral vote to Jackson.
[Sidenote: Clay and the Secretaryship of State.]
The twelfth day of February, 1825, is the date in Mr. Adams' diary
under which he recorded his offer of the secretaryship of State to Mr.
Clay. We find in the diary, for the day before this, an account of a
visit from a Mr. G. Sullivan, who told Mr. Adams "that the Calhounites
said that if Mr. Clay should be appointed Secretary of State, a
determined opposition to the administration would be organized from
the outset; that the opposition would use the name of General Jackson
as its head; and that the administration would be supported only by
the New England States--New York being doubtful, the West much
divided, and strongly favoring Jackson as a Western man, Virginia
already in opposition, and all the South decidedly adverse."
[Sidenote: Threats of the organization of an anti-administration
party.]
Exactly who the Calhounites were at that moment, as distinct from the
followers of Adams and Clay, is difficult to determine, since all the
electors who voted for Adams for President also voted for Calhoun for
Vice-President, except eight electors from Connecticut and one from
New Hampshire, and of the thirty-seven electors who voted {143} for
Clay, at least seven of them voted also for Calhoun. It was Crawford's
supporters who had opposed Calhoun for the second place, not one of
them having voted for him. This declaration made by Mr. Sullivan
meant, therefore, that Jackson's friends were going to organize an
opposition party to the Adams-Clay Administration and that the
Vice-President was going to cast his lot with them.
This was certainly a threat of danger, but Adams was not the man to be
frightened from the course which he had chosen as just and politic. He
immediately offered the first position in the cabinet to Clay, and,
after some six days of reflection and of consultation with friends,
Clay accepted.
[Sidenote: The bargain between Clay and Adams a mere suspicion.]
No sufficient evidence has ever been produced to convince a judicial
mind that Adams and Clay had come to any understanding in regard to
this matter either before Clay announced publicly that he should
support Adams, or afterward. But men generally do not have judicial
minds. "Diffused distrust and indiscriminate suspicion" mark the
attitude of the vulgar mind toward personages in high station.
Politicians know only too well that this is one of the most potent
forces which can be called into play, and they know only too well how
to take advantage of it. Conscious as both Adams and Clay doubtless
were of their own rectitude, they did not sufficiently appreciate the
proneness of the masses to believe in the corruption of their
superiors. Neither did they correctly appreciate the ungenerous and
uncandid spirit of the leaders among their opponents in clinging to
this charge, and reiterating it, after they had failed to substantiate
it by any credible evidence. They certainly did not comprehend that
they had given their opponents a shibboleth which would lead them to
certain victory.
{144} [Sidenote: Clay's nomination to the secretaryship of State in
the Senate.]
The opposition began at once their attack in the Senate under the
issue of Clay's appointment. Fifteen of the forty-one Senators present
voted against it. Among the fifteen was Jackson, who, upon his way, a
few days later, from Washington to his home in Tennessee, repeated and
re-enlivened the charge of "bargain and corruption." It is more than
probable that Jackson believed in it himself. He was so convinced of
his own honesty that he believed every one who differed with him to be
dishonest. This is a trait of character frequently met with, and it is
a most dangerous force with which to deal. The "Old Hero" possessed it
in an extraordinary degree.
[Sidenote: The composition of the new Anti-administration party.]
Despite the fact that there were no material differences in political
principles, and the further fact that Adams retained Monroe's cabinet
so far as he could, appointing new members only to positions made
vacant therein by his own and Calhoun's promotion to the presidency
and the vice-presidency, and by Crawford's refusal to accept the
Treasury for another term, it was now perfectly evident that Jackson,
Calhoun, and Crawford, with their followers, were determined upon an
organized opposition to the Adams-Clay Administration, no matter what
principles and policies that Administration should follow; that
Jackson would, on account of his popularity with the masses, be put
forward as the head of the new party; and that the cry of "bargain and
corruption" between the President and the chief officer of his
Administration, for robbing the "Old Hero" of his rights and the
people of their choice, was to be their watchword in the conflict.
{145}
CHAPTER VII.
THE DIVISION OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
Personal Differences, and Party Division--Military Confederation of
the Spanish-American States--Invitation to the United States to send
Representatives to the Congress at Panama--The Acceptance of the
Invitation--Opposition in the Senate to the sending of Representatives
to Panama--Popular Sympathy in the United States for the
South-American States--The President's Nominations Confirmed--The
Haytian Question at the Congress--Cuba and Porto Rico--Real Nature of
the Opposition to the Panama Mission--The Failure of the Panama
Congress--Adams on Internal Improvements in his Message of December
6th, 1825--Van Buren's Resolution against Internal Improvements--The
Practices of the Adams Administration in respect to Internal
Improvements--The Chief Practical Difficulty in the way of a National
System of Internal Improvements--The Tariff of 1824 a Failure--The
Tariff Bill of 1827--Development of the Industrial Antithesis between
the North and the South--Hostility to the Measure in South
Carolina--The Tariff of 1828--The Character of the Bill as Reflected
in the Analysis of the Vote Upon It--The Tariff of 1828 not a Complete
Party Measure--The Presidential Campaign of 1828 still Dominated by
Personal Considerations--Election of Jackson--Advent of the
Parvenus--Foreign Affairs under Jackson's Administration--The
Democratic Party and its Divisions.
[Sidenote: Personal differences, and party division.]
In the absence of any well defined differences in political opinions,
and in the state of determined {146} personal hostility between the
leaders developed by the election of 1824, the fact that Adams and
Clay took broad national views, placed a liberal construction upon the
Constitution, and insisted upon the employment of all the powers
vested by it in the general Government to the highest point of their
usefulness in the promotion of the general welfare, had the natural
effect of forcing the opposition upon the opposite grounds, and,
therefore, tended to make a particularistic party, the so-called
"States' rights" party, out of the Jackson-Calhoun-Crawford faction.
One of the most patent indications of the correctness of the
proposition that the opposition in principle between the National
Republican party and the Democratic party, as the Administrationists
and the Anti-administrationists were soon termed, took its rise
largely in the personal hostility of the leaders, is to be found in
the history of the chief question of the foreign relations with which
the Adams Administration had to deal in the years 1825 and 1826.
[Sidenote: Spanish-American interpretations of "the Monroe Doctrine."]
The Spanish Americans had taken the cautious utterances of President
Monroe, in his December message of 1823, for much more than he meant
them. They thought, or professed to think, that the Government had
pledged itself to meet any intervention of the Allied Powers of Europe
in American affairs by any resistance necessary to defeat it. They
were also acquainted with the fact that both Mr. Adams and Mr. Clay
were more pronounced than President Monroe in favor of going to the
support of the new republics of South and Middle America. Naturally
then, when these two men came to the head of the Government, on March
4th, 1825, the Spanish Americans felt encouraged to expect some {147}
substantial aid from the United States in the further course of their
struggle with Spain and her possible allies.
[Sidenote: Military Confederation of the Spanish-American states.]
Already in the summer of 1822 the Republic of Colombia had initiated
the plan of a Confederation of the Spanish-American states. By a
treaty with Peru, bearing date of July 12th, 1823, by another with
Chili of the same date, by another with the United Provinces of
Central America, of April 12th, 1825, and by another with Mexico, of
September 20th, 1825, the Republic of Colombia had established a
military confederation between these five states, and had pledged them
to send plenipotentiaries to a "general assembly of American states
... with the charge of cementing, in the most solid and stable manner,
the intimate relations which ought to exist between all and every one
of them." According to this agreement the assembly of
plenipotentiaries was to serve as a council in conflicts, as a
rallying-point in common dangers, as a faithful interpreter of
treaties between their respective states, and as an umpire and
conciliator in the disputes and differences which might arise between
their respective states.
[Sidenote: Invitation to the United States to send representatives to
the congress at Panama.]
During the spring of the year 1825 the Ministers of Colombia and
Mexico sought Mr. Clay, and communicated to him the desires of their
respective governments to have the United States send representatives
to this proposed congress; but before giving the formal invitation
they asked to know if it would be accepted. They stated to Mr. Clay
that they did not expect the United States to abandon the attitude of
neutrality, or to take part in those deliberations of the congress
which might relate to the prosecution of the existing war.
[Sidenote: The President's hesitation to accept the invitation.]
Clay's genial spirit was much excited by the grand prospect of a
league of the American states under the {148} hegemony of the United
States. It satisfied the plan of his daring imagination. It filled the
bounds of his far-reaching vision. He immediately communicated the
propositions of the two ministers, Mr. Salazar and Mr. Obregon, to
President Adams, and urged the President to allow him to give them the
assurance that the invitation to send representatives to the congress,
to be held the following October at Panama, would be accepted by the
United States. The President, however, proceeded rather cautiously. He
was, indeed, very friendly in his feelings toward the Spanish-American
states, and was ready to aid their cause in any manner consistent with
the duties of a neutral. But he had a calmer way of regarding things
than his brilliant Secretary of State, and, moreover, upon him rested
the ultimate responsibility. He required Mr. Clay to procure from
Messrs. Salazar and Obregon some information in regard to the subjects
which would be considered by the congress, the nature and form of the
powers to be given to the diplomatic agents which were to compose it,
and the mode of its organization and procedure. At the same time he
allowed Mr. Clay to encourage them to believe that, if satisfactory
answers should be returned to these inquiries, their invitation would
be accepted. He also caused Mr. Clay to warn them that the United
States could not become a party to the existing war with Spain, or
give any counsel in regard to its further prosecution.
[Sidenote: The acceptance of the invitation.]
The answers to these inquiries were not received until the following
November, and in Mr. Clay's letter acknowledging their receipt, they
were said to be not entirely satisfactory to the President. The
ministers were informed, however, that the President had resolved to
send {149} commissioners to the congress at Panama, in case the
Senate, which was to assemble in a few days, should assent to it; but
that the commissioners would not be empowered to do or say anything
which would compromise the neutrality of the United States.
[Sidenote: The President too hasty after all.]
As a matter of fact, the replies from the Governments of Colombia and
Mexico to President Adams' questions would have been regarded as
highly unsatisfactory by any judicious mind, entirely uncommitted;
for, while they left the President's second and third questions
entirely unanswered, they suggested a joint resistance of all the
American states to European interference in American affairs, and to
any further European colonization upon the American continents, as the
principal subjects in the discussion and determination of which the
United States would be expected to take part. They referred to the
fact that President Monroe in his noted message had characterized
these things as being matters of common interest to both North and
South America.
[Sidenote: Opposition in the Senate to the sending of representatives
to Panama.]
Here was certainly a fine opportunity for all sorts of entanglements;
and it is not at all astonishing that, when the subject was brought
before the Senate of the United States by the President's message of
December 26th, 1825, asking the Senate to approve his nominations of
Richard C. Anderson and John Sergeant as ministers from the United
States to the "Assembly of American Nations at Panama," a very strong
opposition to the project was developed in that body. The Senate
referred the nominations to a committee, and called for the diplomatic
correspondence and other papers relating to the subject, which, upon
examination, revealed the facts briefly stated above.
The committee, which was the regular committee on {150} Foreign
Relations, reported against the nominations, or rather against the
policy of having representatives at the congress at all, on the ground
that it might compromise the neutrality of the United States, and
involve the United States in entangling connections with foreign
powers. This report was made to the Senate on January 16th, 1826. The
Senate debated, in secret session, the questions involved in the
report during the latter half of February and the first half of March.
The view held by those who favored the report was that the Panama
congress was to have the character of a military confederation, and
that membership in it would be inconsistent with a status of
neutrality toward Spain and her revolting American colonies. The view
of those who opposed the report and desired to send representatives to
the congress was, that the congress was only a meeting, in one place,
of the plenipotentiaries of the different states for an interchange of
opinions, and would not necessarily alter the attitude of any of the
powers taking part in it upon any subject, or toward any other power.
[Sidenote: Popular sympathy in the United States for the
South-American states.]
The strong sympathy of the people of the United States for the cause
of independence in Middle and South America really violated the spirit
of neutrality, and the influence of this sympathy upon the Senators
and Representatives in Congress was very disturbing to a cool and
judicial consideration of the attitude which the Government should
preserve in the matter of the Panama mission.
[Sidenote: The President's nominations confirmed.]
[Sidenote: No influence of slavery perceptible in the vote upon the
nominations.]
The friends of the mission at last won the day by a vote of
twenty-four to nineteen. Fifteen Northern Senators voted to send
representatives to the congress, and seven voted against doing so.
Nine Southern Senators voted to send representatives, and twelve voted
against doing so. This {151} vote hardly sustains the claim of certain
of the historians, that the slavery interest was the primal cause of
the opposition to the Panama mission. One of the most eminent among
these says that the historical significance of the contest over the
question was that slavery threw aside its municipal character, its
character as a Commonwealth institution, and demanded to prescribe
both the internal and external policies of the nation. This sounds
dramatic, but if it means, as it appears to mean, that when, in a
federal system of government, any interest or institution regulated by
Commonwealth law asks protection from the general Government against
foreign influence and interference it thereby asserts command over the
nation, it is a proposition which also sounds decidedly _outré_ to an
American lawyer. The Constitution of the United States imposed the
international protection of all such interests and institutions upon
the general Government when it reserved such interests and
institutions to the jurisdiction of the Commonwealths and gave the
general Government alone international standing. When, then, such
interests and institutions claim that protection, they are only asking
for a right guaranteed to them by the Constitution, and are by no
means asserting an authority over the Constitution and the country.
[Sidenote: The Haytian question at the congress.]
It is true that Mr. Salazar said in his communication something about
the status of Hayti being a subject of deliberation for the congress.
It was also true that Hayti had been for thirty years in a state of
chronic insurrection and revolution, and that the former negro slave
population had, by the assassination of their former masters and
mistresses, freed themselves from bondage, taken possession of the
country, and were reducing it to barbarism at a rapid {152} pace. It
is furthermore true that the slaveholders in the United States did not
wish their own homes to be made the scenes of any such ruin and
savagery, or themselves or their families to be made subject to any
such fate; and, it may be confidently hazarded, that no Northerner, at
that day, viewed such possibilities with anything but aversion and
horror. It required a quarter of a century of radical abolition
recklessness, the blunder-crime of secession, and the desperation of
long-continued, and at first unsuccessful, war, to make the men of the
North regard without sympathy such dangers to their Southern brethren.
The North and the South simply could not have divided, at that time,
upon the question of the relation to Hayti. There was only one view
upon that subject, and that was that the example and influence of
Hayti must be held far away from these shores. This could have been
accomplished, however, as well by attending the congress as by staying
away, perhaps better. At least, the Haytian question was no chief
ground of opposition to the mission, and certainly no chief ground in
favor of the mission.
[Sidenote: Cuba and Porto Rico.]
It is more probable that one of the reasons which moved President
Adams and Mr. Clay to urge attendance upon the congress was to be in a
position to restrain the Spanish-American states from attempting to
seize Cuba and Porto Rico. During the latter half of the year 1825, at
the very moment when the Government was communicating with the
Spanish-American states in regard to the congress, Mr. Clay was urging
the Czar of Russia, on the one side, to exercise his influence upon
the Spanish court for the cessation of hostilities on the part of
Spain against the revolting American colonies, on the ground that
Spain could never resubjugate them, and would by a continuance of
hostilities exasperate them and excite them to attack {153} Cuba and
Porto Rico with the purpose of expelling the Spanish power from these
islands, and was urging the Spanish-American states, on the other
side, to refrain from such an attack, on the ground that if they did
attempt to seize these islands the Czar would not only cease his good
offices with the Spanish King to end the war, but might bring the
entire power of the Holy Alliance to the aid of the Spanish King for
the resubjection of his former American colonies. The policy of
President Adams' Administration was clearly opposed to the occupation
of Cuba and Porto Rico, either by the Spanish Americans or by any
European state other than Spain herself. In this matter, also, the
Administration and the opposition held the same view.
[Sidenote: Real nature of the opposition to the Panama mission.]
The only natural explanations of the determined opposition to the
Panama mission were, thus, either the dread of embarrassing
entanglements with the Spanish-American states, and the consequent
compromise of the status of neutrality toward them and their
motherland, or the spirit of personal hostility to the Administration.
From the merits of the question the former would seem the more likely.
It was certainly, to any candid mind, a sufficient reason. On the
other hand, an expression uttered by Mr. Van Buren as he left the
Senate chamber, after having just made a most earnest appeal against
the mission and cast his vote against it, would indicate that the
opposition fought the Administration in this matter from factional
motives purely. He is reported to have said: "They have beaten us by a
few votes, after a hard battle; but if they had only taken the other
side and refused the mission, we should have had them."
[Sidenote: The failure of the Panama congress.]
The debate continued so long, however, that the congress at Panama
adjourned to Tacubaya before the {154} representatives from the United
States appeared. Spain ceased to wage war against her former colonies.
The Holy Alliance did not interfere. The Spanish-American states
suspended their operations against Cuba and Porto Rico. Hayti remained
in isolated barbarism. And the congress of the American nations never
reassembled.
It is possible that the jingo policy of the Administration may have
helped to produce all these results. It is probable that the same
results would have followed had the Senate refused the mission to
Panama. It is certainly most fortunate that these results were
attained without the attendance of the representatives of the United
States upon the congress. All possible entanglements were thus
avoided, while the purposes of the Administration, in so far at least
as they subserved the true interests of the country, were
substantially accomplished.
It is true that the special commercial advantages which Clay had hoped
for were not secured, nor his dream of an American Confederacy under
the protectorate of the United States realized. Neither were the
President's ideas in regard to methods for settling mooted questions
of international relations, nor those in regard to the advancement of
religious liberty, fulfilled. But these things were all premature, to
say the least, and none of them would, probably, have been helped
onward by any discussion in the congress of the American nations. With
the exception of the United States, those nations were altogether too
immature to deal with such problems; and the United States itself was
not sufficiently consolidated and powerful to assume the duties of
instructor and guardian over them. It is not probable that any
opportunity for doing good or receiving good was lost by the
non-attendance of representatives {155} from the United States upon
the deliberations of the Panama congress. It is far more probable that
both the doing and the suffering of injury were escaped.
While the question of the relation of the United States to the other
states upon the American continents is by no means transitory, the
question of the Panama mission was so, at least so much so as not to
serve well as an issue for the division of the Republican party into
two permanently hostile forces.
[Sidenote: Adams on internal improvements in his message of December
6th, 1825.]
[Sidenote: Van Buren's resolution against internal improvements.]
The question of internal improvements was a better issue, from this
point of view. In his first annual message President Adams took high
national ground upon this subject. He seemed to attribute to the
general Government unlimited power to construct roads and canals,
establish universities and observatories, and to do any and every
thing conducive to the improvement of the people. Clay himself, it is
said, was a little staggered by the exceeding broadness of Mr. Adams'
ideas. While Mr. Van Buren, the leader of the opposition in the
Senate, offered a resolution in that body, a fortnight after the
message, which declared that Congress did not possess the power to
make roads and canals within the respective Commonwealths, and
proposed the formation of an amendment to the Constitution, which
should prescribe the powers that the general Government should have
over the subject of internal improvements.
[Sidenote: The practices of the Adams Administration in respect to
internal improvements.]
Mr. Adams seems to have yielded before the opposition in this matter,
and to have thus avoided making it a further issue. In his subsequent
messages he confined himself chiefly to observations upon the work
done by the engineers appointed under the Congressional Act of April
30th, 1824, for making surveys, plans, {156} and estimates for
national routes. The Administration and Congress simply put into
practice the Monroe ideas upon the subject. Money was appropriated by
Congress for the construction and repair of roads, and was expended
under the supervision of the President, and stock was taken by the
Government in private corporations, organized under Commonwealth law,
and subject to Commonwealth jurisdiction, for the construction of
canals; but no jurisdiction and no administrative powers were
exercised or asserted by the general Government over such
improvements, except, perhaps, the power of eminent domain.
The opposition, however, which had been excited at first by Mr. Adams'
proposition to make a large advance upon Mr. Monroe's principles, was
not satisfied with his return in practice to those principles. They
professed to entertain the fear that the Administration had a settled
policy of encroachment upon the reserved rights and powers of the
Commonwealths, and they now began to watch and combat the movements of
the Administration chiefly from this point of view. This attitude must
not yet, however, be ascribed wholly or chiefly to the conscious
influences of the slavery interest. Factional hostility to the
Administration, and the general settling back into the "States'
rights" view of the Constitution, which manifests itself all through
the history of the United States as a reaction from the tension of war
and the enthusiasm of strong national exertion, did more to determine
it than the views of the slaveholders in regard to the interests of
their peculiar institution.
[Sidenote: The chief practical difficulty in the way of a national
system of internal improvements.]
The great practical difficulty in regard to the subject was in making
such determinations as to the national or local character of the
proposed improvements as would be satisfactory to the mass of the
people. {157} Naturally every Congressman considered the roads of his
district as matters of national concern; and, in spite of the law of
1824 vesting in the President and his board of engineers the laying
out of such routes as the President might decide to be required by the
general welfare, the scramble for national money to be expended for
local purposes increased from one session to another.
It was the question of the tariff which showed more clearly than
anything else the influence of the interests of slavery in the
attitude which the slaveholders would finally take toward the
industrial policies of the nation, and which would contribute more
than anything else to the division of the Republican party from the
point of view of principle.
[Sidenote: The Tariff of 1824 a failure.]
The great purpose of the Tariff of 1824 was to give the American
manufacturers of coarse woollens a substantial control of the home
markets. In two years of trial this result had not been realized. A
vast amount of capital had been transferred from other enterprises to
build new woollen mills, and the markets were so glutted with their
fabrics that sale for them could only be found by virtually excluding
foreign goods of the same material and grade. It was claimed that the
foreign goods were sold upon foreign account, and not by _bona fide_
American merchants, and that the goods were thus undervalued by the
fictitious parties to the importation, and the duty thus so largely
avoided as to make the importation practically free. It was,
therefore, contended that the agent of the foreign manufacturer or
merchant was ruining the American manufacturer, on the one hand, and
the American merchant, on the other. President Adams himself, in his
message of December 5th, 1826, referred to the frauds thus committed
on the revenue. The {158} manufacturers of woollens in New England and
Pennsylvania memorialized Congress, during the latter part of the year
1826, representing themselves to be in dire distress and praying for
aid. These memorials were referred to the Committee on Manufactures of
the House of Representatives for report. On January 10th, 1827, the
chairman of this committee, Mr. Mallary, of Vermont, introduced a bill
to meet the difficulties above described.
[Sidenote: The Tariff Bill of 1827.]
This bill proposed to introduce a system of minimal valuations at the
custom-house instead of taking the foreign invoice as the basis for
the levy of the duty, as was the existing practice, and it placed the
valuation of coarse woollens so high as practically to prohibit their
importation. The bill proposed, however, to raise the tariff on wool
to such a rate as would deprive the manufacturers very largely of the
benefit to be secured by the system of minimal valuations. It was
questionable whether the manufacturers would get any very material aid
out of this bill, which contained so high a rate of duty upon the raw
material, but it was necessary to incorporate the provision in order
to secure the support of the West to the measure.
[Sidenote: Development of the industrial antithesis between the North
and the South.]
The industrial antithesis between the North and the South became more
exactly organized under the issue presented by this bill.
Massachusetts joined the high protection ranks, and Kentucky went over
to the side of the South. Missouri, however, still voted for the
tariff, while New York City still preserved its attitude of
opposition, and Maine's Representatives were evenly divided in the
final vote on the bill. The protection phalanx from Pennsylvania was
broken, too, by the defection of her two most important
Representatives, Ingham and Buchanan. The attitude of {159} Buchanan
was a matter of especial note. He held that the constitutionality of
the tariff and the policy of a moderate protection had been completely
settled by the founders of the Constitution and by the uniform
practice of the Government, but that so high a tariff as the one now
proposed on woollens was impolitic, from the point of view of the
general welfare, and unjust, from that of an equal distribution of the
burdens of taxation. Mr. Buchanan owed much of his subsequent success
to the moderate views which he advanced and adhered to at this
juncture.
[Sidenote: The bill passed by the House of Representatives.]
It will be seen, however, that the support of, and the opposition to,
the tariff respectively had not yet become entirely sectional, though
an advance had been made since 1824 toward that result. The bill
passed the House on February 10th, 1827, but the Senate did not reach
its consideration before the conclusion of the session.
[Sidenote: Hostility to the measure in South Carolina.]
It had the effect, however, of arousing most intense excitement and
bitter opposition in South Carolina. In fact, it is from this date and
issue that we must trace the history of nullification in South
Carolina. In the summer following the Congressional session of 1826-27
the chief personages of the Commonwealth assembled at Columbia. The
Governor, Mr. Taylor, presided, and the principal orator of the
occasion was the President of the College of the Commonwealth, Dr.
Cooper, a man of rare powers and great learning, an Englishman by
birth and education, a free-trader in his political economy, and a
"States' rights" man in his political science. In his speech he
suggested disunion as preferable to submission to the tariff
legislation of Congress. The resolutions passed by the assembly were
not so inflammatory as the Doctor's speech, but they declared that
such legislation {160} was calculated to give rise to the inquiry
whether the Union was of any benefit, under such conditions, to the
Southern Commonwealths.
[Sidenote: The bill neglected by the Senate.]
Copies of these resolutions were sent to the legislative bodies of the
several Southern Commonwealths, but they evoked no response
whatsoever. The proposed tariff had, by the inaction of the Senate,
been virtually abandoned, and it was therefore unnecessary to protest
against its passage as law, or make threats against its execution.
[Sidenote: The Tariff of 1828.]
At the beginning of the next session of Congress, that of 1827-28, the
committee on Manufactures brought in another bill. It advanced the
duty on iron by from ten to fifteen per centum; it advanced the duty
on wool by from about fifty to more than one hundred per centum,
imposing both a specific and an _ad valorem_ duty upon it. It changed
the duty upon woollen goods costing less than $2.50 a square yard from
an _ad valorem_ to a specific duty, and increased the duty by about
twenty per centum. It retained the _ad valorem_ duty on woollens
costing more than $2.50 a square yard, and increased the same by about
twenty per centum, and in addition thereto it imposed a minimum
valuation of $4 a square yard upon all such goods costing between
$2.50 and $4 a square yard, which would effect an additional increase
of duty of about fifty per centum on the average. It finally increased
the duty on hemp by about twenty-five per centum immediately, and by
about eighty per centum in three years.
This was a far more moderate protection upon woollen fabrics than that
proposed at the previous session, on account of the fact that the duty
on the raw material was so greatly increased. It was at least
questionable whether the manufacturers would receive any substantial
benefit out of the measure. Mr. Mallary, the {161} chairman of the
committee, felt so dubious about this that he dissented from the
committee's report in regard to woollen fabrics, and offered an
amendment to the bill for the purpose of curing this defect. He could
not, however, bring the House to accept his proposition, but his
opposition to the committee's report opened the way for some
modification of the bill to the advantage of the manufacturers. It was
still, however, no great boon to the manufacturers. It was about as
much a wool- and hemp-grower's bill as a manufacturer's bill. Nobody
could tell whether it would be more beneficial to the manufacturers
than to the wool- and hemp-growers.
One thing alone was certain, and that was, that the cotton-planters
and those engaged in foreign commerce would have no direct share in
the benefits of the measure. And it was also very difficult to figure
out any indirect benefits for them. It would not widen the domestic
market for raw cotton. It would increase the price of woollen fabrics.
It would increase the domestic demand for the products of Western
agriculture, and thereby increase the price of these products to the
Southern consumers of them. And it would discourage the importation of
woollen goods. These were all the results easily discernible, and
every one of them bore hard upon the planting and shipping interests.
The representatives from the Southern Commonwealths pointed out these
things, but they were told to establish manufactures themselves, and
then they would be tributary to nobody.
[Sidenote: The Southerners not yet agreed that slave labor could not
be employed in manufacture.]
Some of the Southerners, like Colonel Hayne, frankly replied that they
could not establish manufactures with slave labor; while others, like
Mr. McDuffie, threatened ruin to the Northern manufacturers if they
succeeded in having the duties raised so high as to drive the South,
with its cheap slave labor, into manufactures.
{162} [Sidenote: The character of the bill as reflected in the
analysis of the vote upon it.]
The vote in the House of Representatives reflects quite perfectly the
character of the bill. The members from the wool- and hemp-growing
sections supported the bill; those from the manufacturing section were
indifferent; those from the shipping and commercial sections opposed
it; and those from the planting section opposed it unanimously.
In the Senate, amendments were made to the bill which altered it in
the direction of a slightly increased protection to the manufacturers.
Still, Mr. Webster, who had become a champion of protection since his
section had become a manufacturing section, claimed that the bill was
of little worth to the manufacturers, while the increased duty on hemp
would bear heavily on the shipping interests of New England. He voted
for the bill, however, while his colleague, Mr. Silsbee, voted against
it. The vote in the Senate differed only slightly, as regards
sectional distribution, from that in the House. It was finally passed
by both Houses as amended by the Senate, and was signed by the
President on the nineteenth day of May, 1828; and opposition to it
thereafter must take on the form of petition for its repeal, or that
of resistance to its execution. Before it could come to the latter,
however, three things must be accomplished. The first was the
invention of the morale of such resistance. The second was the
creation of the party of resistance. And the last was the capture of
some existing governmental organization by that party.
[Sidenote: The Tariff of 1828 not a complete party measure.]
While thus it cannot be said that the "Jackson men" voted against this
bill and the Administration men for it, still there was something
which looked like an approach toward this relation. Certainly the
Southern wing of the Jacksonians, or of the Democratic party, as the
Jacksonians now called {163} themselves in distinction from the
National Republicans, opposed the measure with something like
unanimity. Many of Jackson's Northern supporters, however, voted for
the bill, and it may be said that the Democratic party of the North
was then in favor of moderate protection to all the interests of the
country.
The party divisions of 1828 were still largely dominated by
considerations of personal partisanship, and the organization of the
two parties, which had now emerged from the all-comprehending
Republican party, upon the basis of different political creeds, still
lacked much of completion.
[Sidenote: The presidential campaign of 1828 still dominated by
personal considerations.]
The campaign of 1828 was not fought upon the issues of any well
established differences in political and economic policies. Jackson
and his followers simply appealed to the mass of the people,
especially to the lower classes, "to turn the rascals out," on the
ground that the "Old Hero," the friend of the people, had been
cheated, by a corrupt bargain between the two chiefs of the
Administration, out of his rights in 1824, and that the whole pack of
officials serving under them had been corrupted by the venality of
their superiors. The people must take possession of their Government
and send the wicked aristocracy of office holders to the right about,
was the chief demand of the Democracy of 1828, and it was with the
empty phrases, with which they rang the changes upon this demand, that
they won the battle.
[Sidenote: Election of Jackson.]
Jackson and Calhoun were elected by an electoral vote of more than two
to one. Every Commonwealth west of the Alleghanies, and every one
south of Mason and Dixon's line, except Delaware and Maryland, gave
its electoral vote entire to Jackson and Calhoun; and in addition
thereto Pennsylvania {164} gave them its entire vote, New York gave
them twenty of its thirty-six votes, Maine one of its nine, and
Maryland five of its eleven.
[Sidenote: Advent of the parvenus.]
It was a tremendous _bouleversement_. The mob of malcontents had
gotten together, had pulled together, and had accomplished their
purpose. The old ruling class in American society was driven from
place and power, and a new, untried, and inexperienced set of men
seized the reins of Government. It looked something like a combination
of the South and West against the East. They had, however, secured the
two most important Eastern Commonwealths through Van Buren's activity
in New York and Jackson's own popularity in Pennsylvania. It was not
yet, however, a socialistic uprising against the wealth of the East.
It was a political uprising against the monopoly of office-holding by
the old official aristocracy. It was the introduction of a new class
of eligibles into the official positions. Whether the subsequent
effects of this change would be a modification of the structure of the
Union or the policies of the Government remained to be seen.
[Sidenote: Foreign affairs under Jackson's Administration.]
Jackson placed Van Buren at the head of the Department of State, and
under the influence of this most astute politician started out upon
his presidential career. The foreign diplomacy of the Administration
was naturally successful. The disputes with Great Britain in regard to
the northeast boundary of the United States, and in regard to trade
between the United States and the British colonies, and the dispute
with France in regard to indemnity for the spoliations committed by
the French upon American commerce in the first years of the century,
were successfully dealt with, by a judicious admixture of shrewdness,
conciliatoriness, and firmness. These questions were not, however, of
sufficient importance to {165} turn the attention from the internal
questions of constitutional interpretation and governmental policies.
[Sidenote: The Democratic party and its divisions.]
The Jackson party, or the Democratic party, must make its creed, both
political and economic, and it must adjust that creed both to the
Constitution and to the working of the Government. The party was
composed of three tolerably distinct divisions, which may be termed
the Southern, the Western, and the Eastern divisions. Of these, the
Western division alone was a real democracy. The Southern and Eastern
divisions were rather aristocracies. The Southern division was
emphatically so. And when it came to policies, the Western division
favored internal improvements, and the Eastern and Southern divisions
opposed them; the Western division favored a tariff on wool and hemp,
the Eastern favored moderate protection of manufactures, and the
Southern division wanted as nearly free trade as the revenues of the
Government would allow. It was a great task for the Administration to
maintain the combination, and keep a reliable majority in Congress.
{166}
CHAPTER VIII.
DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION TO INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS AND PROTECTION
Jackson's Ideas Concerning Internal Improvements--The Maysville Road
Bill--The Slavery Question not Involved in the Vote on the Bill or in
the Veto--Railway Building Begun--The Commencement of the Struggle for
the Repeal of the Tariff of 1828--Jackson on the Tariff of 1828, in
his First Annual Message--George McDuffie as South Carolina's
Political Economist--Dr. Thomas Cooper--Mr. McDuffie's Tariff
Bill--The Tariff Bill of 1830--McDuffie's Amendment--McDuffie's
Doctrine that the Producers of Exports Pay Finally the Duties on the
Imports--The Acceptance of Mr. McDuffie's Doctrine at the
South--Growing Belief in the Incapacity of Slave Labor for
Manufacture--The Tariff Pronounced Unconstitutional--Growth of the
Protection Idea--Jackson on the Tariff and the Surplus Revenue Derived
therefrom, in the Message of December, 1830--Southern
Disappointment--"The South Carolina Exposition"--Calhoun's Doctrine of
"States' rights"--Nullification in Theory--The Nullification and
Anti-nullification Parties in South Carolina--First Attempt to try the
Validity of the Tariff in the United States Courts--Nullification and
Rebellion--Jackson's Message of December, 1831, on the Tariff
Issue--The Bill from the Committee on Ways and Means--The Tariff Bill
of 1832 from the Committee on Manufactures--Passage of the Tariff of
1832 by the House of Representatives--The "American System."
[Sidenote: Jackson's ideas concerning internal improvements.]
In his first annual message President Jackson referred to the general
dissatisfaction with the manner of {167} dealing with the question of
internal improvements which had prevailed to that time, and proposed
that the general Government should abandon the subject entirely and
should distribute the surplus of the revenue, above the wants of the
Government, among the Commonwealths, and leave to them the expenditure
of the money upon internal improvements.
[Sidenote: The Maysville Road Bill.]
The Congress, however, paid no regard to the President's
recommendation. In May, 1830, it sent up to the President for his
approval a bill authorizing and requiring the Government to take stock
in a Kentucky turnpike, running from Maysville on the Ohio River to
Lexington, some sixty miles inward.
[Sidenote: The veto of the Bill.]
The President vetoed the bill, May 27th. His special reason was that
the road was not a national, but a local, matter. He did not attack
the Monroe principle upon the general subject of internal
improvements, but he referred to the recommendation contained in his
annual message as still expressing his view of the manner in which the
Government should rid itself of the embarrassments into which it was
being farther and farther drawn by the practice of voting national
money for internal improvements. He argued that the subject must be
considered upon its own merits, and not brought into connection with
the tariff policy. He thus saw the prospect of the expenditure of
millions of national money upon internal improvements in order to
relieve the protectionists of the embarrassment of a great surplus,
and denounced it. He contended that the Government should adopt its
policy upon each of these subjects as if the other did not exist. He
urged, finally, that, if the people wanted the general Government to
undertake internal improvements, they should {168} so amend the
Constitution as to give the Government sufficient jurisdiction over
the roads and canals, which it might build, to protect them against
wanton injury, and to collect the tolls necessary to keep them in
repair. This he declared to be necessary to any satisfactory exercise
of powers upon the general subject by the Government.
The veto certainly exerted some influence upon the minds of the
Representatives. A majority still voted for the bill, but it was a
much reduced majority. The vote upon the vetoed bill stood ninety-six
to ninety. The bill was therefore lost.
[Sidenote: The slavery question not involved in the vote on the bill
or in the veto.]
The exact question at issue was not, as we have seen, the general
policy of internal improvements, but it was whether the Maysville road
was a national improvement. An analysis of the vote upon the subject
may not, therefore, have any significance, from the point of view of
the general question. Roughly, we may say that a majority of the
Representatives from the South voted against the bill, a large
majority of those from the Northwest voted for it, a majority of those
from Pennsylvania and New Jersey voted for it, while a majority of
those from New York voted against it, and, lastly, the Representatives
from New England were divided. It thus appears rather far fetched to
ascribe the attitude of the opponents of the bill, in any section, to
the influence of the slavery interest. Those who voted against the
bill said they did so because the object for which the appropriation
was sought was a local affair, managed by a private corporation, for
private gain. That uncompromising enemy of slavery, Mr. John W.
Taylor, of New York, was prominent among those who took this position
and voted against the bill. He even pronounced it unconstitutional,
and was inclined to the {169} view, as we have seen, that internal
improvements generally were left by the Constitution for the
Commonwealths to construct and control.
[Sidenote: Too much influence in determining the national policy
toward internal improvements usually ascribed to the veto.]
It is usual to attribute to the veto of this bill the overthrow of the
policy of internal improvements by the general Government. This
proposition will hardly bear close examination. Congress continued to
make appropriations for internal improvements, which the President
usually vetoed, if they were in separate bills, and usually approved,
if they were included in the general appropriation bills. It is
calculated that while Adams signed appropriations for internal
improvements to the amount of less than two millions and a half of
dollars, Jackson approved disbursements for these purposes to the
amount of more than ten millions of dollars.
[Sidenote: Railway building begun.]
The fact is that the building of railways was the chief force which
put an end to road- and canal-making by the general Government. The
construction of the Mohawk and Hudson Railroad, the parent of the New
York Central system, was begun in 1825. In 1827 the survey of the
Boston and Albany line was begun. The same year the Pennsylvania
system had its origin. One year later the Baltimore and Ohio system
was founded. The year of the veto of the Maysville road bill forty-one
miles of railroad were being operated in the United States, and at the
close of the decade more than two thousand miles. As the railway
system spread over the country, through private enterprise, the
appropriations of national money for internal improvements became more
and more confined to the specific improvements of rivers and harbors.
The roads and canals of a national character were being made
unnecessary by the extension of {170} the railways. It is undoubtedly,
then, far more plausible and natural to attribute the overthrow of the
policy of internal improvements by the general Government to the
growth of the railways, constructed and operated by private
corporations under Commonwealth charters, on the one side, and, on the
other, to the settled conviction that the general Government did not
have the constitutional powers adequate to the successful
establishment and protection of a system of works based upon that
policy, and to the unsatisfactory experience which the country had had
in attempting to distinguish local from national enterprises and to
confine appropriations to those of the latter character.
It is difficult to see any special connection of the interests of
slavery with the decline of the policy. It is true that the
slaveholders were becoming strict constructionists generally. They had
learned from the Missouri struggle that Congress must not be allowed
to magnify its powers when forming the Territories into Commonwealths,
and they had learned from the tariff struggles that Congress must not
be allowed to magnify its powers in regard to the regulation of
foreign commerce and the raising of revenue, but, as to internal
improvements, no reliable evidence of a consciousness, on the part of
the slaveholders, of any particular connection between their peculiar
interest and a policy upon this subject by the general Government is
discoverable.
On the contrary, in the struggle for the repeal of the Tariff of 1828
the influence of the slavery interest is easily remarked, and is
clearly seen to have been controlling.
[Sidenote: The commencement of the struggle for the repeal of the
Tariff of 1828.]
On February 10th, 1829, Mr. William Smith, the senior Senator from
South Carolina, presented to the Senate the protest of the legislature
of South {171} Carolina against Congressional protection to domestic
manufactures. This memorial pronounced all such acts to be
unconstitutional, except as incidental to raising the revenue or
regulating commerce, and impolitic even then, when their operation
would be unequal upon the different sections of the country, and felt
by any section to be oppressive. The language of the paper was
respectful, moderate, dignified, and forcible, and it contained no
threats of disunion, or of violent or unlawful resistance. The
legislature asked that the protest should be entered on the journal of
the Senate. The Senate, however, only ordered it to be printed.
The South Carolinians promised themselves, nevertheless, some measure
of relief from what they supposed would be the policy of the newly
elected President. Being a Southern man, it was naturally supposed
that he would recognize Southern interests in the policy upon this
subject which he would recommend. But, while Jackson had not committed
himself to protection for the sake of the manufacturers or of the
producers of raw material, he was a strong Union man and an American,
and the argument for the tariff from the point of view of national
industrial independence exercised a prevailing influence in
determining his attitude toward the subject.
[Sidenote: Jackson on the Tariff of 1828, in his first annual
message.]
[Sidenote: Jackson's views on the Tariff as a general policy.]
In his message of December 8th, 1829, he wrote that the Tariff of 1828
had not proved itself so beneficial to the manufacturers or so
injurious to commerce and agriculture as had been anticipated; that he
regretted that all nations would not abolish restrictions, and refer
the management of trade to individual enterprise; that since, however,
they would not do so, a tariff was the necessary policy of the United
States; but that in the {172} face of the fact that the national debt
would soon be paid, and the sinking fund would not be much longer
required, a modification of the existing tariff in the direction of a
reduction of duties would soon be the true and necessary policy; and
that the principle to be followed in making such a modification ought
to be to reduce the duties upon such articles as might come into
competition with home products no further than would leave to the
latter a fair chance in such competition; and that from the general
principle of a reduction to this point must be excepted the duties on
the implements and prime necessities of war, all of which should enjoy
a higher protection than that accorded to other articles. Evidently,
according to this doctrine, the chief reductions should fall upon
articles not coming into competition with home products, such articles
as tea, coffee, etc., at that time termed the unprotected articles.
Jackson had thus anticipated Clay's American system of the tariff by
nearly three years, as we shall see.
The South Carolinians were greatly disappointed by this expression of
the President's views, although they claimed that the message
recommended substantial tariff reduction. This part of the message was
referred to the committee on Manufactures, according to the rule of
procedure which had prevailed in the House of Representatives for
nearly a decade, and which showed that the matter of the tariff was
not regarded as something purely incidental to the raising of revenue.
[Sidenote: George McDuffie as South Carolina's political economist.]
[Sidenote: Dr. Thomas Cooper.]
The claim was now put forward, however, that the subject properly
belonged to the domain of the committee on Ways and Means. Mr. George
McDuffie, of South Carolina, was at this moment the chairman of this
committee. He was a man of keen intelligence, strong {173} courage,
and great persistence. He was the political economist of the
slave-labor system, as Calhoun was its political scientist and
constitutional lawyer. It is to be surmised, at least, that he learned
much of his political economy from the notorious, if not famous, Dr.
Thomas Cooper, the British President of South Carolina College. It is
true that Mr. McDuffie's college days had passed before Dr. Cooper
taught in the institution, but the Doctor wrote and published much
upon economic and political subjects between 1820 and 1830. In fact,
he set the direction of thought upon such subjects in South Carolina
and throughout a large portion of the South during that period. As has
been already mentioned, he was an Englishman by birth. He had spent a
part of his earlier life in France, and had imbibed the doctrines of
French republicanism. For this reason he was disliked and shunned by
conservative men in England to such a degree as to make longer
residence in his native country uncomfortable to him. He came to the
United States in the last decade of the eighteenth century. His
radical views and his violent expressions of them soon drew attention
to him here. He was one of the men prosecuted under the Alien and
Sedition laws of 1798. He made his way to South Carolina about the
beginning of the third decade of this century, and found there a well
prepared soil for his Girondist views of federal Government and his
free-trade views in political economy. A true estimate of
responsibilities for the events of 1832 in South Carolina would
probably hold him more culpable than Calhoun himself. It was from such
a thinker, and he was a keen and vigorous thinker, that Mr. McDuffie
received impulse, if not actual instruction, in his reasoning.
Mr. McDuffie argued that the power to impose a tariff {174} was not
expressly vested by the Constitution in the Government; that,
therefore, if it existed at all, as a power of the Government, it must
be incidental to some express provision; and that it could be
incidental only to the power for raising the revenue. He, therefore,
contended further that all tariff bills must originate in the House of
Representatives, and in the regular revenue committee of that House,
the committee of Ways and Means.
[Sidenote: Mr. McDuffie's Tariff Bill.]
Congress had disregarded the protest of the South Carolina Legislature
of the previous February. It was well known that the committee on
Manufactures in the House was favorable to the maintenance of the
existing duties. It seemed, therefore, to Mr. McDuffie, and those who
thought with him, both natural and necessary that the committee of
Ways and Means should claim their constitutional prerogative, and make
an effort to get the ear of Congress to their representations.
Consequently, on February 5th, 1830, Mr. McDuffie reported a tariff
bill from his committee, without having had the subject specifically
referred to them by the House. The bill provided for a moderate
reduction of the tariff all around, but still left a duty of
thirty-three and one-third per centum _ad valorem_ upon woollen
fabrics.
The interest attaching to this proposition lies in the fact that it
contains substantially the terms upon which the South Carolinians were
willing to compromise the tariff question. It shows them to have been
still moderate tariff men, rather than out and out free-traders. To
the unprejudiced mind of the present day it certainly appears to have
been an offer which merited some consideration, but, after a single
reading, it was ordered to lie on the table, from which it was never
taken up.
{175} [Sidenote: The Tariff Bill of 1830.]
Meanwhile the committee on Manufactures were very deliberately
maturing a measure. It was reported to the House early in April, and
taken up for consideration on the 15th. It was nothing more than an
administrative measure for the purpose of securing a stricter
execution of the existing tariff.
[Sidenote: McDuffie's Amendment.]
Mr. McDuffie made another effort to move the House to consider a
reduction of duties, in the form of an amendment to this bill. He
offered such an amendment, which provided for a return to the duties
imposed before 1824 upon woollens, cottons, iron, hemp, etc.
[Sidenote: McDuffie's doctrine that the producers of exports pay
finally the duties on the imports.]
It was in support of this amendment that he made his famous argument
of April 29th, 1830, in which he developed, for the first time, the
doctrine in regard to the final payment of the duties which furnished
the economic basis of nullification. That doctrine was that the
producers of the exports, which are exchanged in the foreign markets
for the imports, pay, finally, the duty upon the imports. His course
of reasoning in the establishment of this doctrine was as follows: He
reduced all trade ultimately to barter between producers, and then
declared it to be self-evident that when a producer of exports should
be obliged to pay a duty of twenty-five per centum upon the imports,
which he had received in pay for his exports, before he could bring
them into the country of his residence, he had received finally
twenty-five per centum less for his exports than he would have
received had he not been compelled to pay any duty upon his imports.
Mr. McDuffie then drew from the statistics of the foreign trade of the
United States the fact that the sections cultivating cotton and rice,
constituting less than {176} one-fifth of the Union, both in territory
and population, produced thirty of the fifty-eight millions' worth of
annual exports; and finally drew the conclusion from these premises
that one-fifth of the people, the population of the planting sections,
paid more than one-half of the duties on the imports of the country.
[Sidenote: The danger in Mr. McDuffie's conclusions.]
If this were true it was indeed a grievous burden. And if the people
of the South, or that part of the South devoted to the production of
these staples, believed it to be true, then would the reason for one
great scruple against resistance to the execution of the tariff laws
be removed, namely, the general belief theretofore prevailing, from
the doctrine that the consumers of the imports ultimately pay the
duties, that the burden of the duties fell nearly equally upon the
different sections. So long as this belief was general the sense of
oppression in any particular part or section of the country could not
become very keen. Substitute for this old idea, however, the new
doctrine advanced by Mr. McDuffie, and, under the existing
distribution of the articles of export, there could not fail to be
developed a most bitter sense of wrong and oppression on the part of
the producers of the Southern staples.
[Sidenote: The acceptance of Mr. McDuffie's doctrine at the South.]
The Southerners, especially the South Carolinians, did embrace the new
doctrine, apparently, at least, with all sincerity. It was utterly
futile that Mr. Gorham and Mr. Everett pointed out to them the fact
that they consumed only a comparatively small portion of the imports
received in exchange for their exports, and sold the rest to the
people of the other sections with the duties added on, thus shifting
the duties upon the other sections. They clung to the new doctrine as
if it were something for which they had long been seeking, and to
which their {177} hearts were already too much attached to be drawn
away by argument.
[Sidenote: Growing belief in the incapacity of slave labor for
manufacture.]
It was in this speech, furthermore, that Mr. McDuffie abandoned his
former view of the capacity of slave labor for manufacturing industry,
and embraced and enounced the doctrine held before this by Colonel
Hayne upon that subject, which was that slave labor could only be
employed successfully in agriculture. This was, of course, another
necessary element in the consolidation of the interests of the South
against the tariff.
[Sidenote: The Tariff pronounced unconstitutional.]
It was in this speech, also, that Mr. McDuffie, for the first time,
pronounced the tariff unconstitutional. He did not yet declare any and
every tariff unconstitutional, but only such a tariff as sacrificed
one interest to another, or the interests of one section to those of
another. This he claimed the existing tariff did do. The belief in the
unconstitutionality of the tariff was, of course, another necessary
element in the preparation for resistance to its execution.
[Sidenote: McDuffie's threat of resistance to the execution of the
Tariff laws.]
Finally, Mr. McDuffie uttered, in this speech, the threat of
resistance to the execution of the tariff laws, the threat of
nullification. It was ill timed, as threats generally are, and it had
the effect of producing the large majority by which Mr. McDuffie's
amendment was voted down.
The bill suffered some modification in the course of its passage, but
its principle remained the same. It reduced the duty on no article
whatever, but only provided for a stricter enforcement of the existing
laws.
[Sidenote: Growth of the protection idea.]
By another bill, which received the President's approval on May 20th
(1830), eight days before this administrative bill was signed, the
duties on tea, coffee, and cocoa had been reduced. This meant that the
protectionists were very {178} willing to free those articles from
duty which did not come into competition with home productions, in
order to preserve and increase the duties on those that did. This was
the direction in which the tariff system was growing. It became, two
years later, the pronounced principle of the "American system," as we
shall see.
[Sidenote: Jackson on the Tariff and the surplus revenue derived
therefrom, in the message of December, 1830.]
In the message of December 7th, 1830, President Jackson defended the
constitutionality of the protective system, said that the existing
tariff needed some corrections in details, and expressed the opinion
that no law reducing duties could be made which would be satisfactory
to the American people that would not leave a considerable surplus in
the Treasury. He suggested the employment of such surplus upon
internal improvements under the direction of the legislatures of the
several Commonwealths.
[Sidenote: Southern disappointment.]
This was a stunning blow to the hopes of the Southerners. The
extinction of the debt and the existence of an unemployed surplus were
the conditions to which they had looked forward as necessitating in
all conservative minds the reduction of the duties. But here was a
plan, suggested by a Southern President, for relieving the Treasury of
any amount of surplus for an indefinite period, without the reduction
of a single penny of duty upon a single article. Thus encouraged the
protectionists in both Houses of Congress refused, during the session
of 1830-31, to consider any propositions looking toward a reduction of
duties.
It is hardly a cause of wonder that the South Carolinians began to
despair of obtaining through Congress any relief from what they
regarded as dire oppression, and that some of them were reviewing the
Constitution, and the political principles upon which it was founded,
with {179} the purpose of finding other means with which to meet the
great emergency. It was in this part of the work that Mr. Calhoun took
the lead.
[Sidenote: "The South Carolina Exposition."]
[Sidenote: Calhoun's doctrine of "States' rights."]
As far back as 1828, just after the enactment of the tariff measure
which was giving so much offence, Mr. Calhoun had started out in this
direction in the paper which he furnished the South Carolina
legislature, which served as the basis of the first pronunciamento
from that body upon the subject, the so-called South Carolina
Exposition. This document by Mr. Calhoun was comparatively temperate
in its language and not very clear in its political doctrines and its
constitutional interpretation. The great debate between Hayne and
Webster on the floor of the Senate, over which body Mr. Calhoun, as
Vice-President, presided, in regard to the fundamental principles of
the Union, taught Mr. Calhoun several very important points in the
evolution of his doctrine of "States' rights." Especially was he
warned against the great error, made by Mr. Hayne, of representing the
United States Government as one of the parties to the "constitutional
pact" and the "States" as the other. Mr. Webster so completely
demolished this theory that Mr. Calhoun was preserved from introducing
this fallacy or any of its corollaries into his reasoning, if he had
ever been inclined to do so. In his "Address on the Relations of the
States and Federal Government," and in his "Address to the People of
South Carolina," both published in the summer of 1831, he shows that
he had maturely reflected upon all that had been said and written upon
the fundamental question of the relation of the "States" to the Union
and to the general Government. He had given up his hope both in the
Congress and in the President. With him the question of the tariff had
now, {180} therefore, been removed from the domain of governmental
policy into that of constitutional powers and political principle.
This was the point of view which he took in the documents just
mentioned.
He began, as innovators generally do, with the assertion that his
interpretation of the Constitution was no new invention of his own,
but was the ancient principle of the Constitution. That principle was,
he contended, that the Constitution was made by the "States," as
sovereign bodies, and that through it the "States" created only a
governmental agent for their general affairs. The term or phrase
United States was only the name of the general governmental agent of
the "States." Sovereignty was in the "States" only. Consequently, when
the United States assumed powers not conferred by the "States" in the
Constitution, the "States," by virtue of the sovereign attribute,
might and should interpose, interpose individually, not collectively
as they, of course, might do constitutionally through the regular form
of procedure for amending the Constitution.
[Sidenote: Nullification in theory.]
Calhoun, like every other real statesman of his day, held that there
is a domain of liberty secured not only to the minority, but to the
individual, by the Constitution, upon which the majority shall not
encroach. The practical question was how to prevent the majority, in
possession of the powers and machinery of the Government, from doing
so. The answer to this question developed by precedent, and formulated
clearly by Webster at that very moment, was that it could be done only
by invoking the aid of the judicial power of the United States. But
Calhoun said in reply to this, that the United States courts were a
part of the Government, substantially under the control of Congress
and the President, through the power of Congress to constitute
judgeships at pleasure, and of the President and the {181} Senate to
fill them, and that they were interested, therefore, in the
usurpations of power by the Government. He further held that these
courts could not decide political questions, although these questions
might incidentally involve the most sacred rights of individuals, and
that, anyhow, they were as much subject to the "States," acting in
their sovereign capacities, as any other part of the Government. He
could see no way for preserving the rights of the minority and of
individuals, in last resort, against governmental usurpation, save
through the power of "_each of the parties_ to the compact" to prevent
the execution within the territory subject to its jurisdiction of such
governmental measures as it might deem usurpations.
[Sidenote: The nullification and anti-nullification parties in South
Carolina.]
Down to the time of these utterances of Calhoun the party in South
Carolina opposed to any resistance, by force, to the execution of the
tariff laws, had been able to prevent the outbreak of nullification.
The leaders of this party were among the most distinguished and
influential men of the Commonwealth. They were Mr. Drayton, the member
of Congress from the Charleston district, Judge Johnson of the United
States Supreme Court, Mr. Petigru, Mr. Grimke, the Lowndes, and others
of scarcely less note. In the first half of the year 1831 they still
held control of the municipal government of Charleston, and of the
legislature of the Commonwealth, although the "States' rights" men had
obtained the governorship. Nearly all of the opponents of
nullification denounced the tariff laws as unjust and oppressive to
the South, but they also denounced the doctrine that the execution of
any law of the United States could be constitutionally resisted,
except by means of the judicial processes provided for the case by the
Constitution itself. Resistance in any other {182} manner, they
declared, would be rebellion at the outset, revolution if successful.
They said that they were not willing to assume any such
responsibilities in opposing the tariff laws, and that they regarded
the blessings of the Union as too great and manifold to hazard
disunion, even if it could be successfully and peaceably accomplished.
Their views were so candid and reasonable that, in spite of the
intense excitement which prevailed during the legislative session
following the failure of the attempt to modify the tariff, they
prevented the nullifiers from securing a sufficient majority in the
legislature to order the call of a convention. The nullifiers had
committed themselves to the doctrine that the nullifying power was a
power of sovereignty, not of government, and that it resided,
therefore, in the convention, not in the legislature. So long, then,
as the assembly of the convention could be prevented, nullification
could be certainly thwarted.
[Sidenote: Capture of the municipal government of Charleston by the
nullifiers.]
But the publication of Calhoun's new doctrine in the summer of 1831
gave great strength to the nullifiers, and in the municipal election
of the latter part of the year they captured the mayorship of
Charleston.
[Sidenote: First attempt to try the validity of the Tariff in the
United States courts.]
One of the strongest moral forces in the hands of the opponents of
nullification against which the nullifiers had to contend was the
generally received doctrine that the constitutional means for meeting
Congressional usurpation in any given case was a process in the United
States courts. Unless they could say that they had tried this means in
vain, they would still have to suffer the imputation of too hasty
action, if nothing more. In order to escape this, two Charleston
lawyers imported a package of dutiable goods, gave bonds for the
payment of the duty, {183} refused payment, and were sued upon their
bonds in the United States District Court. The plan was to have the
question of the constitutionality of the tariff submitted to the jury,
but the court refused to allow the jury to decide any question except
that which pertained to the due execution of the bond.
[Sidenote: Nullification and rebellion.]
The nullifiers could now declare that every means suggested by their
opponents as regular and lawful had been tried and had failed, and
that there now remained only submission to oppression, or
nullification, or rebellion. They said that no true South Carolinian
could accept the first, and that, therefore, the choice lay between
nullification and rebellion. Calhoun taught that there was a vast
difference between the two; that the former was a constitutional, as
well as a sovereign, method of resistance. He asserted that it was the
great conservative principle of the Constitution, and defined it to be
that reserved right whereby a "State," in convention assembled, might
suspend the operation of a Congressional act upon its citizens which
it considered unconstitutional, until conventions in three-fourths of
the "States" should pronounce the Congressional act to be
constitutional. He did not claim that this right was reserved
specifically, but by implication from the general language of the
Tenth Amendment. He was doubtless sincere, or at least thought he was.
Many of his followers certainly were, and the masses, who could not
understand the doctrine, but took it on faith, were so certain of its
truth that they were ready to risk anything for its vindication.
The Unionists, however, branded the doctrine as a deception. An
editorial in one of their principal newspapers contained this
sentence: "But this everlasting cant of devotion to the Union,
accompanied by a recommendation to do those acts that must necessarily
destroy {184} it, is beyond patient endurance from a people not
absolutely confined in their own mad-houses." It was clear to them, at
the outset, that nullification was piecemeal secession and rebellion.
[Sidenote: Jackson's message of December, 1831, on the Tariff issue.]
This was the state of things in South Carolina when Congress assembled
on the first Monday of December, 1831. On the 6th the President's
annual message was laid before the two Houses. It contained a much
more distinct and decided recommendation for the reduction of duties
than he had ever before expressed. He called attention to the prospect
of the early extinguishment of the public debt, when the annual
instalment to the sinking fund would be no longer needed, and
recommended that Congress should at once deal with the question of the
reduction of the duties to a point where they would produce no more
revenue than would be necessary for an economical administration of
the Government. He farther recommended the readjustment of the duties
with a view to equal justice to all national interests, and said that
the interests of both merchant and manufacturer required that the
change should be prospective.
There was no suggestion in the message of increasing the expenditures
of the Government for internal improvements, or for any other purpose.
The plain inference from the message was that by March 4th, 1833, the
debt would all be paid, and the revenue could then be reduced by ten
or twelve millions a year, and should be.
[Sidenote: The question of the proper committee to frame Tariff
Bills.]
This was all that the South Carolinians had asked, and it would have
been the height of folly for them to have pursued extraordinary means
to relieve themselves when regular methods promised at last a prospect
of success. This part of the message was referred to the committee on
Manufactures, of which ex-President John Quincy Adams was then
chairman. Mr. Adams {185} had far more moderate views in regard to the
tariff than the majority of his protectionist brethren, and it could
be reasonably hoped that he would report a bill from his committee
which would be conciliatory in character. The Southerners were not
quite willing, however, to rest entirely on his own good will, and
raised the contention that the subject of the tariff ought to be
referred either to the committee on Ways and Means, or to the
committee on Commerce, since the power to impose duties was incident
either to the raising of revenue or to the regulation of commerce. The
result of the contention was that a resolution was introduced, and
taken up, requesting the committee on Commerce to make a report on the
working of the tariff, and the committee on Ways and Means was allowed
to report a tariff bill, which was read twice and referred to the
committee of the Whole House.
[Sidenote: The bill from the Committee on Ways and Means.]
The bill from the committee on Ways and Means provided for the
reduction of the duty to twelve and one-half per centum _ad valorem_
on all articles; on some, immediately and totally, but on the more
important articles gradually, and in a period of a little more than
three years.
This was undoubtedly an ill digested measure. It was not only a
radical reduction of duties, but it was an indiscriminate reduction.
Mr. McDuffie's own committee were not unanimous in recommending it.
[Sidenote: The Tariff Bill of 1832 from the Committee on
Manufactures.]
On May 23rd Mr. Adams reported the bill from the committee on
Manufactures. Mr. Adams based his bill on the report of the Secretary
of the Treasury, of December 7th, 1831, and proposed the repeal of the
existing system of minimal valuations and the duty on coarse wool
altogether, and a slight reduction of the duties on fine wool and
woollen fabrics.
{186} It was calculated that Mr. Adams' bill would reduce the receipts
from the customs by about five or six millions of dollars, leaving
thus still an annual surplus of some five or six millions after the
extinguishment of the debt.
Mr. McDuffie's bill was taken up first in the committee of the Whole
House. Mr. McDuffie defended it with his argument, already stated,
that the producers of the exports pay finally the duties on the
imports for which the exports are exchanged in the foreign markets,
and cited recent utterances of Professor Senior, the noted political
economist of Oxford University, in support of his position. He could
not, however, convince the House, and his bill was finally disposed of
in less than a week. Mr. Adams' bill was then taken up. It was
understood as proposing a slight reduction all around. It was intended
to do so. But Mr. McDuffie made an argument against it, in which he
undertook to prove, and declared that he did prove, that it
discriminated still further against the South, and imposed a heavier
burden upon that section than it was even then bearing, grievous as
that was. He declared, finally, that he would not submit to it.
[Sidenote: Passage of the Tariff of 1832 by the House of
Representatives.]
The House, however, was neither convinced by his argument nor
intimidated by his threat. It passed the bill on June 28th, by a large
majority, a majority of more than two to one.
Meanwhile the Senate had been occupying itself with an exhaustive
discussion of the principle of the tariff. On January 9th, 1832, Mr.
Clay introduced the famous resolution for making the tariff upon
articles coming into competition with home manufactures a system of
permanent high duties, and for abolishing, or greatly reducing, the
duties upon all other articles.
{187} Senator Hayne immediately grasped the import of this
proposition. He declared that it marked a new era in the tariff
system. He demonstrated that down to that time the protection of
manufactures had been regarded by all persons and parties as a
temporary policy and had been justified as such, while this
proposition looked to its establishment as a permanent principle of
the policy of the country, which neither revenue surplus nor
manufacturing experience should affect.
[Sidenote: The "American System."]
Mr. Clay, who had himself spoken of protection before this as only a
temporary policy, acknowledged the truth of Colonel Hayne's criticism,
and proceeded, in his famous three days' speech, to develop the
arguments for the permanent protective system, the "American System,"
as he termed it, which made up the text-book for the later supporters
of that system. His idea was simply to collect the duties from those
foreign products which come into competition in the home markets with
domestic products, and prevent the accumulation of a Treasury surplus
by fixing the duties so high in rate as to make them largely
prohibitory. As we have seen, this idea had been already foreshadowed
in one of President Jackson's earlier messages. It now received its
complete formulation and its economic justification.
But it was a sad prospect for the South. The South had looked forward
to the extinguishment of the debt as necessarily bringing in its train
the decrease of duties to the gross amount of at least ten millions of
dollars per annum, and now it was called upon to consider the plan for
a decrease of revenue by an increase of duties. It is hardly
astonishing that the disappointment should have been bitter, and that
passionate men should have thought of resistance to what appeared to
them so grievously unjust.
{188} The Senate referred Mr. Clay's resolution, together with an
amendment to it, proposed by Colonel Hayne, for a general reduction of
duties, to its committee on Manufactures. The committee reported a
bill based on Mr. Clay's principle. The Constitution does not,
however, allow the Senate to originate a bill for raising revenue, and
the majority of the Senators voted to lay the bill on the table, and
await the movements in the House.
[Sidenote: The bill in the Senate.]
On June 29th the House bill appeared in the Senate, and was referred
by that body to its committee on Manufactures. On July 2nd Mr.
Dickerson reported from this committee the House bill, with a series
of amendments to it, proposed by the committee. These amendments were
all in the direction of Mr. Clay's idea, and were adopted by the
Senate. The bill as thus amended passed the Senate on July 9th, the
Senators from every Northern Commonwealth voting for it, and those
from every Southern Commonwealth, except Kentucky, Missouri, and
Louisiana, voting against it. Missouri was hardly to be then classed
as a Southern Commonwealth. Louisiana was won by an increase of the
duty on sugar. And only one of the Senators from Kentucky voted
against the measure.
[Sidenote: The bill as finally passed.]
The House of Representatives refused to concur in some of the
amendments, and the measure was sent to a Conference committee. This
committee patched up a compromise, and the bill became a law on July
14th.
On the whole, it was doubtful if the bill, with the changes imposed
upon it by the Senate, would prove to be any relief to the South. Many
of the Southerners claimed that it would increase the burden upon that
section, while none of them appeared to think it would lighten it.
{189} What now were the planters to do? They had waited for the
extinguishment of the debt, and for the period when the Treasury would
no longer require the sixteen millions of dollars per annum applied to
its cancellation, hoping for a general reduction of duties by
something like this sum as the necessary result; but instead of this
they were now offered, as a final solution of the tariff question, a
slight reduction of duties on articles coming into competition with
home products, a practical abolition of the duties on those which did
not come into competition with home products, and an increase in the
expenses of the Government to the amount of the receipts whatever they
might be. This was to be the permanent policy of the country, the
"American System."
They were indeed wofully disappointed, not to say deceived. There
seemed now no further hope of aid to them, from either Congress, the
President, or the courts. They must yield unconditionally and
hopelessly, or resist the execution of the law. The former course was
too much to expect from the proud barons of South Carolina. The only
question was whether some legal basis for the resistance could be
found, or whether it must take on the form of rebellion. We have
already considered Calhoun's doctrine of nullification, and his claim
that it was a constitutional remedy; it now remains for us to trace
briefly the history of the attempt to apply it. Before, however, we
can do this intelligently, we must consider the other political
developments of the year 1832, occasioned chiefly by the presidential
election of that year, but affecting directly or indirectly the
attitude of the Administration toward events in South Carolina, and
the attitude of Congress toward the President in dealing with
nullification.
{190}
CHAPTER IX.
THE UNITED STATES BANK AND THE PRESIDENTIAL CONTEST OF 1832
Jackson and the Bank in his First Annual Message--Jackson's Relations
to the Portsmouth Branch of the Bank--Jackson's Opposition in
Principle to the Bank--The Political Science of the Constitution of
1787--Western Democracy--The West and the "Money Power" of the
East--"States' rights" and the Bank--The Case of Brown and
Maryland--Democracy and Socialism--Benton's Attack on the Bank--Benton
Repulsed--Jackson and Benton--The Bank and the People--The Existence
of the Bank made a Political Issue--Jackson's Second Attack on the
Bank--Jackson's Plan for a Bank--Benton's Resolution against the
Re-charter of the Bank--Jackson's Challenge to make the Continued
Existence of the Bank the Issue in the Campaign of 1832--The Challenge
Accepted--The Bank's Petition for Re-charter--Benton's Charge of
Illegal Practices--Passage of the Bill for Re-charter--The Veto of the
Bank Bill--The Bank and Foreign Powers--The Bank and the West--The
Bank and the Rich--Structure and Powers of the Bank--Jackson on
Executive Independence--Von Holst's Criticism of the Veto Message--The
President's Real Meaning.
[Sidenote: Jackson and the Bank in his first annual message.]
In his first annual message, that of December 8th, 1829, President
Jackson began his war upon the United States Bank. He declared in it
that the constitutionality and expediency of the law creating the Bank
were well questioned by a large portion of the people, and that its
failure to establish a sound and uniform currency, the great end of
its existence, must be admitted by all.
{191} [Sidenote: Jackson's relations to the Portsmouth branch of the
Bank.]
Basing themselves chiefly upon an individual report made by Mr. John
Quincy Adams on May 14th, 1832, in regard to the condition of the
Bank, and upon documents referred to in that report, recent historians
attribute President Jackson's first attack upon the United States Bank
to a personal feud between his friends in New Hampshire and Mr.
Webster's friends there.
Senator Levi Woodbury, of New Hampshire, the leader of the Jackson
party in New Hampshire, endeavored, in the summer of 1829, to have
Jeremiah Mason, Mr. Webster's great friend, removed from the
presidency of the branch of the United States Bank at Portsmouth, N.
H., and Isaac Hill, another New Hampshire friend of the President,
attempted at the same time to have the United States pension agency,
connected with the Portsmouth branch of the United States Bank,
removed to Concord, and connected with a little bank there of which
Hill had been president, and in which he was still interested.
Jackson's Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Ingham, asked Mr. Biddle, the
president of the United States Bank, to have Mason removed, and his
Secretary of War, Mr. Eaton, ordered Mason to transfer the pension
agency to Hill's bank in Concord. Mr. Biddle looked into the matter,
and being convinced that the whole thing was a political scheme,
refused to have Mason removed from office, and prevented the execution
of Eaton's order in regard to the transfer of the pension agency.
These are, very briefly stated, the facts upon which some of the
American historians found the theory that Jackson, entertaining no
opposition in principle to the Bank at the beginning of his
Administration, became so enraged at its managers, because of their
success in these petty bouts with his Cabinet officers, that he {192}
resolved upon its destruction. The treatment which Adams and Clay had
received at the hands of Jackson and his friends from 1824 onward had
led them to feel that Jackson's whole nature was full of personal
rancor, and that he could see nothing except from a personal point of
view. There is little doubt that this feeling largely determined
Adams' ideas of Jackson's attitude in the Bank question, and that the
historians have written the account of the Bank controversy under the
influence of Adams' representations.
[Sidenote: Jackson's opposition in principle to the Bank.]
There is undoubtedly some truth in this view of the matter, but it is
far from being the whole truth. It is not even that part of the truth
which is most valuable to the student of American history. There was
an opposition in principle to the United States Bank, as well as a
personal conflict between leaders in regard to it. That opposition in
principle was the opposition of "States' rights" democracy to
centralized privilege.
In all political systems there is a political science as well as a
public, or constitutional, law. The political science of a state is
based chiefly upon the actual social conditions and relations of its
population, and its public or constitutional law ought to be based
upon its political science. In fact, however, we seldom see social
conditions, political theory, and public law in a state of perfect
harmony. It is the prime problem of political and legal progress to
work out this great result.
[Sidenote: The political science of the Constitution of 1787.]
[Sidenote: Western Democracy.]
[Sidenote: The West and the "money power" of the East.]
The political science or theory upon which the Constitution of 1787
was founded was thoroughly English. It recognized social distinctions,
and its most fundamental principle was compromise between conflicting
interests. It was substantially in harmony with social conditions, on
the one side, {193} and was fairly expressed through the Constitution
of 1787, on the other. Without the interposition of other forces it
would have made out of the United States a new England. But French
political science had already gained a foothold in the country. It was
contained in the Declaration of Independence, and its prime postulate
was "the equality of all men." It did not then comport with the social
condition of the country, and the Constitution did not make its
principle into positive law. It was, therefore, at the beginning,
abstract, and theoretical. The man who taught it, however, became
President, and the party which embraced it became the governing party.
But their practice was not made consistent with their theory, and
could not be, so long as the social conditions of the country
contradicted their theory. It was the settlement of the country west
of the Alleghanies which first created social conditions in harmony
with their theory. The distinction between master and slave was not
permitted to enter the larger portion of it; the distinction between
the rich and the poor could not at first exist, or be, for many years,
developed; and the distinction between the cultivated and the ignorant
was likewise obliged to remain long in abeyance; while the dangers and
the hardships of frontier life developed, speedily, a strong sense of
self-reliance and self-esteem. General equality and practical
self-help were the first social results of the levelling experiences
of the camp, the wilderness, and the prairie. With such influences
operating upon such characters as undertook the making of the West,
the most adventurous part of the population of the East, that bold and
boastful Democracy was produced, which began after 1820 to make itself
powerfully felt in modifying the original conservative principles of
the institutions of the country. Connect with these new social
conditions, and the {194} political principles evolved out of them,
the fact that the West, like all new countries, had little money or
capital, and was a constant borrower from the East, in order to
furnish itself with roads, implements, means of transportation, and
manufactured articles, and we have the forces and the interests which
were bound, under the first general financial pressure, to make an
onslaught upon the "money power and privilege" of the East, as
embodied in the United States Bank.
[Sidenote: "States' rights" and the Bank.]
The "States' rights" opposition to the Bank had been aroused more than
a decade before Jackson's message of 1829. The Bank and its branches
were the sole depositories of the funds of the Government. By refusing
to accept on deposit the bills of Commonwealth banks which did not
redeem their bills in specie on demand, the Bank could prevent the
officers of the Government from accepting such bills for dues to the
Government. The Bank used this power to force the Commonwealth banks
to specie payment. It was one of the purposes for which Congress
created the Bank. It made the Bank, however, very unpopular with the
officers and stockholders of the banks chartered by the Commonwealths.
These persons were, as a rule, men of influence in their respective
communities, and they succeeded in persuading many of the people that
the United States Bank was a centralized monopoly, and was using its
powers and privileges to oppress the institutions of the
Commonwealths.
In 1818 the legislatures of Ohio and Maryland imposed a heavy tax on
the branches of the Bank located within their respective
jurisdictions. The purpose was to drive them out. The Bank resisted
payment, and was sustained by the United States courts.
{195} [Sidenote: The case of Brown and Maryland.]
In the February term of 1819 the Supreme Court of the United States
decided the famous case of McCulloch and Maryland, declaring the act
of Congress creating the Bank constitutional, and the act of the
Maryland legislature undertaking to tax it unconstitutional. Maryland
submitted at once, but the officers of the government of Ohio forced
their way into the branch of the Bank in that State, at Chillicothe,
and took one hundred thousand dollars out of the vault, and that too
in the face of an injunction issued by the United States Circuit
Court. The directors sued the officers of the Commonwealth for
trespass, and the Commonwealth refused the use of its jails to confine
the persons arrested. At the same time the Commonwealth reduced the
tax to ten thousand dollars, and refunded ninety thousand, and finally
receded entirely from its unlawful demand.
This defeat of the "States' rights" attack, and the excellent
management of the Bank by Langdon Cheves, and then by Nicholas Biddle,
seem to have silenced the complaints against the Bank from 1823 to
1828.
[Sidenote: Democracy and Socialism.]
It was during this period, however, that the "State socialistic"
characteristic of radical democracy received a strong development in
the Commonwealth of Kentucky, through the relief measures for debtors;
which measures threatened to destroy the constitutional guarantees of
private property. The "relief party" secured the legislature and the
executive of the Commonwealth. The judiciary, however, stood out
against them, and they did not have the necessary two-thirds majority
in the legislature to remove the judges. The legislature, however,
passed a new judiciary act, and created another supreme court of the
Commonwealth. This scandal of judicial anarchy existed for nearly two
years, when, at last, in 1826, the {196} "anti-relief" party elected a
majority of the legislative members, and the new legislature repealed
the act establishing the new court.
Jackson's friends in Kentucky belonged almost exclusively to the
"relief party," and it is hardly fanciful to attribute to this
movement in Kentucky some influence in the formation of Jackson's
ideas in regard to the United States Bank, and in regard to his plan
for a Government bank, responsible to the people and managed for the
benefit of the people.
[Sidenote: Benton's attack on the Bank.]
On March 3rd, 1828, Senator Benton began his warfare upon the Bank. He
attacked its privilege of being the depository of Government money. He
claimed that there were two or three millions of dollars of Government
money used in loans by the Bank, which earned about one hundred and
fifty thousand dollars a year of interest, all of which went to the
stockholders of the Bank and none of it to the Government, while the
Government was all the time paying interest on the public debt and
taxing the people for the purpose. He wanted to take the surplus
deposits out of the Bank and pay a part of the public debt with them.
This was the first charge of the Western Democracy upon privilege, as
being opposed to the principle of universal equality.
[Sidenote: Benton repulsed.]
There were, however, enough practical men in the Senate who considered
this privilege as only a fair compensation for the service rendered by
the Bank to the Government in transporting the Government funds
without any specific return therefor, and who knew that it is not good
banking to pay interest on deposits, to reject Mr. Benton's
resolution. Benton repeated his motion on January 1st, 1829, but with
no greater success.
[Sidenote: Jackson and Benton.]
After March 4th, 1829, the leadership of the party was {197} in the
hands of the President, and Benton became Jackson's lieutenant in the
Senate. There had been personal feuds between the two men, but they
now harmonized politically, and in no point did that harmony become
more complete than in the war against the Bank.
It is probable that at the moment of his accession to power Jackson
had not thought out the relation of the democratic principle to the
Bank, but he undoubtedly felt it, and the feeling guided him to the
position which he assumed, first toward the questions of detail in the
Bank's policy and management, and then toward the general question of
its existence. The controversy between his Secretaries and the Bank's
officers, upon which Mr. Adams laid so much stress, probably
precipitated matters, but the crisis would have developed under other
circumstances had not these existed. The social and political forces
at play were bound to bring it about under one issue or another. It
may have astonished the politicians and statesmen of the East then,
and it may astonish the casual reader of American history now, that
Jackson attacked the question of the future existence of the Bank in
his first annual message, but there is nothing surprising in it to the
careful student of American history, who comprehends the development
of the democratic spirit of the West during the third decade of the
century.
[Sidenote: The Bank and the people.]
It is doubtful whether the President was correct in saying, as he did
in his message of 1829, that a large portion of the people questioned
the constitutionality and expediency of the law creating the Bank, and
it is certain that the Bank was not considered by all to have failed
in the establishment of a sound and uniform currency. It is far more
probable that the people generally acquiesced in {198} the decision of
the Court pronouncing the Bank law constitutional, and that the
majority of the people, at that moment, regarded it as good policy,
and believed that the Bank had fairly fulfilled the purpose of its
creation. The President was simply assuming that the people thought as
he did, as democratic leaders usually do. Taken in that sense there
was nothing extraordinary in what he said. He had a right to disagree
in opinion with the Court, and to say so, and to make any
recommendation to Congress which seemed wise to him, in regard to the
re-charter of the Bank. That an expiring law is constitutional is not
always a convincing argument for its re-enactment.
[Sidenote: The existence of the Bank made a political issue.]
The President's criticism occasioned an investigation into the
principle and status of the Bank, and brought the Bank question into
the politics of the day.
The committee on Finance of the Senate, and the committee on Ways and
Means of the House, made reports, in March and April of 1830,
vigorously defending the constitutionality, the expediency, and the
management of the Bank, and demonstrating the great political and
financial dangers of such a Government bank as the President
suggested. The chairman of the committee on Ways and Means was, it
will be remembered, Mr. McDuffie, the political economist of the
slavery interest. To his mind the Bank question had evidently little
connection with the slavery question.
[Sidenote: Jackson's second attack on the Bank.]
The President, however, returned to the attack in his message of
December 10th, 1830. He also presented, in this message, an
elaboration of his idea of a Government bank. His proposition was for
a bank as a branch of the Treasury Department, based on the deposits
of the funds of the Government and also on those made by individuals,
but {199} having no power to issue notes or make loans or purchase
property. Its chief purpose would be to do the business of the
Government, and its expenses might be met by selling exchange to
private persons at a small rate.
[Sidenote: Jackson's plan for a bank.]
The President thought that this scheme avoided all the objections to
the existing Bank, and yet preserved all of the latter's advantages.
It would require no charter of incorporation, would have neither
stockholders, nor debtors, nor property, would require few officers,
and would leave to the Commonwealths the creation of their own local
paper currency through their own banks, while the new Government bank
would be able to check the issues of the Commonwealth banks through
its power to refuse to take their bills on deposit or for exchange,
unless they redeemed them with specie. In a sentence, his doctrine now
was that banking must be left as far as possible to Commonwealth law,
and that such powers as the general Government had received from the
Constitution over the subject should be exercised by the Government,
if at all, through its own officials, for the benefit of the people,
and not be conferred as privileges upon a corporation of private
persons, to be exercised for their private gain. This will be at once
recognized as a democratic, "States' rights," socialistic scheme in
the essential elements of its composition.
[Sidenote: Benton's resolution against the re-charter of the Bank.]
Before the report of the Finance committee of the Senate upon this
part of the message was presented Senator Benton offered a resolution,
on February 2nd, 1831, which provided that the charter of the Bank
ought not to be renewed. In his speech supporting the resolution the
senator developed the whole "States' rights," socialistic, democratic
argument against the Bank with great elaboration, both in principle
and in detail.
{200} It is true that Benton did not go so far as Jackson in the
socialistic direction. He said that he was willing to vote for the
President's Government bank scheme, since it would substitute for the
existing Bank an institution which would be divested of the essential
features of a bank, the power to make loans and discounts, but that he
would prefer to see the charter of the Bank expire without any
substitute being created for it.
The Senate was not, however, convinced by Mr. Benton's argument, and
refused to allow him to introduce his resolution.
[Sidenote: Jackson's challenge to make the continued existence of the
Bank the issue in the campaign of 1832.]
In his message of December 6th, 1831, President Jackson referred to
what he had said in former messages concerning the Bank, and closed
his allusion with the following significant words: "Having thus
conscientiously discharged a constitutional duty, I deem it proper, on
this occasion, without a more particular reference to the views of the
subject then expressed, to leave it for the present to the
investigation of an enlightened people and their representatives."
[Sidenote: The challenge accepted.]
This language certainly seemed to imply that the President would, so
far as he was able, make the question of the re-charter of the Bank
one of the issues of the election campaign of 1832. His opponents so
interpreted him, and they gladly accepted the challenge, for they
believed the Bank to be popular with the voters. They thought that the
Senators and Representatives in Congress, a majority of whom favored
the Bank, truly represented the views of their constituencies, and
they calculated to be able to split the Democratic party itself on the
issue.
The president and directors of the Bank, however, were most reluctant
to have the existence of the Bank made a party question. The leaders
of the National {201} Republicans, on the other hand, insisted upon
it. Clay, who, six days after the appearance of the President's
message, had been nominated by a national convention at Baltimore as
the candidate of the National Republicans for the presidency, was
certain that under the issue of the renewal of the Bank's charter
Jackson would be signally defeated. The Bank's officers yielded to his
advice, enforced by that of Mr. Webster, and on January 9th, 1832,
sent in the memorial for a re-charter.
[Sidenote: The Bank's petition for re-charter.]
Senator Dallas presented the memorial, but said that he personally had
discouraged its presentation at that juncture out of apprehension that
the question of the re-charter of the Bank might, at the moment, be
drawn into real or imagined conflict with "some higher, some more
favorite, some more immediate wish or purpose of the American people."
Senator Dallas was a Bank Democrat. The more favorite wish to which he
referred was the re-election of Jackson, and the inference to be drawn
from his words was that the Bank Democrats did not want to be obliged
to choose between the Bank and Jackson at the next election.
The Senate referred the petition for re-charter to a committee
composed of Mr. Dallas, Mr. Webster, Mr. Ewing, Mr. Hayne, and Mr.
Johnston.
[Sidenote: Benton's charge of illegal practices.]
Before the committee made its report Mr. Benton made another attack
upon the Bank. This time he charged it with illegal practices in
issuing drafts which passed as currency. The Senate, however, repelled
the attack and refused to allow Mr. Benton to introduce his resolution
declaring such drafts illegal.
[Sidenote: Passage of the bill for re-charter.]
On March 13th Mr. Dallas brought in the bill from his committee for
the re-charter of the Bank for fifteen years from the expiration of
its existing charter in 1836.
{202} While the bill was passing through the Senate a demonstration
against the Bank was in progress in the House. Mr. Clayton, of
Georgia, an enemy of the Bank, secured the appointment of a committee
by the Speaker of the House, Mr. Stevenson, another enemy of the Bank,
to inquire into the affairs of the Bank, and make report thereof to
the House. A majority report was offered by Mr. Clayton severely
criticising the Bank, and a minority report by Mr. McDuffie defending
the Bank most ably and vigorously, and, if we may judge from the vote
of the House upon the Senate bill for re-charter, which had passed the
Senate, and appeared at this moment in the House for concurrence, most
successfully. The House passed the Senate bill, with a few immaterial
changes, by a vote of one hundred and seven to eighty-five.
The National Republicans felt sure that they had driven Jackson into a
blind alley. But the "Old Hero" stood his ground and hurled a veto at
the bill, which both killed it and conquered the National Republican
party in the election of 1832 with its own chosen weapon.
[Sidenote: The veto of the Bank Bill.]
[Sidenote: The Bank and foreign powers.]
The veto message was a curious _pot-pourri_ of strength and weakness,
of sound statesmanship and cheap demagogism, of shrewd politics and
silly commonplaces. We may arrange its score of points under five
principal heads, or rather ends in view. The first was the attempt to
rouse the national spirit against the Bank, on account of the fact
that some eight millions of dollars' worth of the stock was in the
hands of foreigners. The President made out that this was a great
danger to the United States, both in war and peace. In war, he said,
the Bank would be an internal enemy, more terrible than the army and
navy of the external foe. Just how the possession of the certificates
of stock by foreigners, whose money, which had been paid for {203}
them, was in the United States, and therefore under the control of the
United States Government, could endanger the United States in case of
a war between the United States and the country or countries to which
these foreign stockholders belonged, the President failed to explain.
It would seem to the ordinary mind that this would be an advantage to
the United States, in that the Government of the United States would
have within its grasp a part of the money power of the enemy.
Moreover, the Bank law prevented the foreign stockholders from voting
in the election of the directors of the Bank. How these stockholders
could possibly exercise any hostile influence then, except by selling
their stock to citizens of the United States, and taking the money
which they might receive for it out of the country, was not only not
explained but is inexplicable.
[Sidenote: The Bank and the West.]
The second object was apparently the excitement of the West against
the East. The President declared that the West was being made
financially tributary to the East by the Bank. He presented the
statistics of stockholding and interest-paying throughout the
different sections of the country in proof of this statement. He
affirmed that thirteen millions five hundred and twenty-two thousand
dollars' worth of the stock was owned in the Northeastern and Middle
Commonwealths, that five millions six hundred and twenty-three
thousand dollars' worth of it was held in Virginia, the Carolinas, and
Georgia, and that only one hundred and forty thousand and two hundred
dollars' worth of it was held in the nine Western Commonwealths; while
one million six hundred and forty thousand and forty-eight dollars of
the profits of the Bank came from these Western Commonwealths, one
million four hundred and sixty-three thousand and forty-one dollars of
them {204} from the Northeastern and Middle Commonwealths, and three
hundred and fifty-two thousand and five hundred and seven dollars of
them from the Southern Commonwealths. This seems to ordinary
intelligence to prove that the Bank was accommodating Western
borrowers with Eastern money; and as the Bank was limited by its
charter to a maximum of six per centum interest on its loans, it seems
that the accommodation was being rendered upon quite moderate
consideration. But the President said it proved that the "Eastern
money power" was oppressing the West, and the West was quite willing
to believe anything against the persons or institutions to whom or to
which it owed money.
[Sidenote: The Bank and the rich.]
The third object to which the President addressed himself in the
message was to call the attention of the poor to the proposition that
the Government was favoring the rich through the Bank. The President
called the Bank a monopoly, which means privilege conferred by
Government on a few at the expense of the many. He calculated that the
privilege to be granted to the existing stockholders by the re-charter
of the Bank was worth seventeen millions of dollars, while the bonus
which they would be required to pay was but three millions. Fourteen
millions of dollars would thus be presented by the Government to the
Bank, which sum the Government must take by taxation from the people.
He arrived at these statistics and results by assuming that the Bank
stock, after the re-charter and in consequence of it, would be worth
about one hundred and fifty dollars for one hundred par, that some
other body of stockholders could be found who would pay seventeen
millions for the charter, and that the money thus acquired from the
supposed stockholders by the Government would effect the remission of
just so much taxation upon the people. The President saw also, {205}
with Senator Benton, that the use of the Government deposits by the
Bank was a source of income to the stockholders at the popular
expense. And he denounced the feature in the new bill, which allowed
the Commonwealth banks to pay their indebtedness to any branch of the
United States Bank with the notes of any other branch, but did not
accord the same privilege to individuals, as favoring the rich and
powerful against the poor and weak.
The entire argumentation in this part of the message seems extravagant
and exaggerated, to say the least, but it sounded convincing and
sympathetic to the masses. It was something which brought the question
home to each one of them, and made it appear related to each one's
personal interest. The statement was a powerful vote-catcher. It took
wonderfully.
[Sidenote: Structure and powers of the Bank.]
The fourth proposition, as we have arranged them, was the criticism on
the structure and powers of the Bank provided in the new bill. The
President objected to the unnecessarily large amount of the capital
stock, to the right to be given the Bank to locate its own branches,
to the power of the Government, as a stockholder, to own real estate
for general purposes, and to the power of the Bank to coin money, as
he called the power to issue its notes.
[Sidenote: Jackson on executive independence.]
The final division of the message, according to our arrangement,
contains the disquisition upon the relation of the departments of the
Government to each other in operating the Constitution, and the
relation of the general Government to the Commonwealths in regard to
jurisdiction over the business of banking. The President held, upon
the first of these points, that "if the opinion of the Supreme Court,"
in the case of McCulloch and Maryland, "covered the whole ground of
this act, it ought not to control the {206} co-ordinate authorities of
the Government." "The Congress, the Executive, and the Court," he
said, "must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the
Constitution. Each public officer who takes an oath to support the
Constitution swears that he will support it as he understands it, and
not as it is understood by others. It is as much the duty of the House
of Representatives, of the Senate, and of the President, to decide
upon the constitutionality of any bill or resolution which may be
presented to them for passage or approval, as it is of the Supreme
Judges when it may be brought before them for decision. The opinion of
the Judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of
Congress has over the Judges; and, on that point, the President is
independent of both. The authority of the Supreme Court must not,
therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the Executive when
acting in their legislative capacities, but to have only such
influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve."
The President also said that he could have furnished a plan for a
bank, had it been requested of him, which would have been equal to all
the duties required by the Government, a plan which might have been
enacted by Congress without straining or overstepping its powers, and
without infringing the powers of the Commonwealths; and he complained
that the Bank, as an agent of the Executive Department, should be
thrust upon the Department without the Department being consulted as
to whether it needed or wanted any such agent.
[Sidenote: Von Holst's criticism of the veto message.]
[Sidenote: The President's real meaning.]
One of the most celebrated historians of American politics has
indulged in a very severe criticism upon this part of the message,
claiming that President Jackson virtually asserted therein the power
to initiate legislation, full co-ordination with the Houses of
Congress in legislation, and an {207} independence of Congress, and
especially of the Judiciary, which, in practice, would render
constitutional law an impossibility. An impartial examination of the
text of the message in all its parts will hardly warrant any such
conclusions. It is quite clear, from such examination, that the
President meant that in the formation of administrative measures by
the Congressional committees in charge of the same, the views of the
Administration ought to be obtained; that the President is not limited
by the Constitution to any class of subjects in the use of his veto
power upon proposed legislation; and that when the Congress and the
President are legislating they are not obliged to re-enact a law
simply because the Judiciary have declared it constitutional, nor even
prevented from repealing a law, simply because the Judiciary have
declared it constitutional, and certainly not prohibited from
differing in opinion with the Judiciary in regard to the
constitutionality of any law already on the statute book, or any
proposed measure. Conservative American lawyers, jurists, and
publicists approve all of this as not only the letter but also the
spirit of the Constitution.
[Sidenote: Jackson's vindication of executive independence.]
Instead of destroying the Constitution in theory by the doctrine of
this veto, it looks more as if the President did something to rescue
the "check and balance" system of government, provided in the
Constitution, from the threatened domination of a single department
over the others in it. The fact is, Congress had succeeded, during the
régime of the old Republican party in American politics, in winning a
power over the President which the Constitution did not authorize. The
members of Congress had selected all of the Presidents, from Jefferson
to Jackson, either by nomination or by actual election. {208} The
machinery constructed by the Constitution for the election of the
President was wanting in its most necessary part. It contained no
means of connection between the electoral colleges in the several
Commonwealths in voting for the President and Vice-President, at the
same time that it required a majority of all the electoral votes to
elect. The members of Congress being the only national assembly of
persons in the country, and being the chosen political leaders from
the different Commonwealths, naturally glided into the habit of
constituting themselves, in caucus, the connecting link between the
electoral colleges in the several Commonwealths, and thus the
Congressional caucus, or caucuses, as the case might be, became the
nominating body or bodies to the electoral colleges. If the caucus
nominated anybody, it left to the electors the alternative of
ratifying the nomination, or of so scattering their votes as to give
no person a majority, in which latter case the election of the
President passed into the hands of the members of the House of
Representatives. If, on the other hand, the caucus did not nominate
anybody, the electors were nearly sure to fail to unite a majority of
their votes upon the same person, in which case again the House of
Representatives obtained possession of the election. With such an
increasing control over the tenure of the President, it is not
astonishing that the Congress, and even the individual members of
Congress, exercised an ever increasing control over his acts and his
policy. The encroaching legislature was fast developing the principle
of parliamentary government as the principle of the American system,
while the Constitution provides the principle of executive
independence and presidential administration.
Again, the judicial department had appeared to assume the position
that it possessed the supreme {209} interpreting power of the
Constitution upon every point. It had not then, as it has now, clearly
confined itself to questions immediately involving questions of
private rights. It appeared to be claiming jurisdiction in regard to
questions primarily of political science, public law, and even public
policy.
The President's Bank veto called a halt in these tendencies, and
exerted an influence for the restoration of executive independence,
and of the "check and balance" system, provided in the Constitution;
and it called the people into a closer and more immediate relation to
the President than they had before occupied, in that the President now
appealed to them to decide the question between him and the Congress,
in the election which was then about to take place.
These were the political principles contained in the Bank veto, and
whether they, or the more democratic principle of anti-monopoly, or
the more socialistic principle of government banking, moved the
masses, certainly they were profoundly moved. Had the popular vote
been taken, the day before the appearance of the veto, upon the
question of the Bank's re-charter, it is altogether probable that an
overwhelming majority would have been found in its favor. Against the
veto, however, no sufficient majority could be united in Congress, and
when the results of the presidential election became known, it was
found that Jackson had carried the country with him in the unequal
contest, and that the people had made the principles of the Jacksonian
democracy the ruling spirit of the Constitution.
{210}
CHAPTER X.
NULLIFICATION
The Indian Question in Georgia--The Indian Springs Convention--The
Repudiation of the Agreement--The Controversy between the
Administration and Georgia--The Creek Convention of 1826--The Governor
of Georgia Repudiates the Convention of 1826--The President Submits
the Matter to Congress--Georgia and the Cherokees--Jackson and the
Indian Question--Indian Policy before Jackson--The Case of the
Cherokee Nation--The Case of Worcester against Georgia--The Failure of
the President to Execute the Decision in the Worcester Case--Jackson
and Calhoun--The Call of the Convention of 1832 in South Carolina--The
Nullification Ordinance--The Addresses Issued by the Convention--The
Acts of the Legislature of South Carolina for the Execution of the
Ordinance--The Meaning of Nullification as Understood by the
Nullifiers--Jackson's View of Nullification--The President's
Proclamation of December 10th--The President's Military
Preparations--The President's Instructions to the Customs Officers in
South Carolina--The Popular Approval of the President's Course--The
Verplanck Tariff Bill--Governor Hayne's Counter-Proclamation--The
President's Message of January 16th, 1833--Calhoun's Explanations in
the Senate--The "Force Bill"--The Postponement of the Execution of
Nullification--The Compromise Tariff--Mr. Calhoun's Support of Mr.
Clay's Bill--The Opposition to the Bill--Passage of the "Force Bill"
by the Senate--Passage of the Compromise Tariff Bill and the "Force
Bill" by Congress--The Nullification Ordinance Withdrawn.
[Sidenote: The Indian question in Georgia.]
Before nullification was resolved upon in South Carolina, something
like it had been applied in Georgia. {211} In the year 1802 Georgia
formally ceded the lands claimed by the Commonwealth west of the
Chattahoochee River to the United States for the sum of one million
two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, and upon the condition that
the United States Government would, at its own expense, extinguish the
Indian claims to any lands in Georgia so soon as this could be done
peacefully and upon reasonable terms.
Between 1802 and 1820 the Government made some advance in the
discharge of this obligation. By this latter date, however, designing
white men had joined with the Indian tribes located within the
Commonwealth, and were seeking to organize an Indian State for the
purposes of their own political ambition, and many well disposed white
persons were aiding them from humanitarian motives. The Georgians even
accused the Government of doing things that would contribute to the
same result. The Georgians were forced to face a very serious
question, the question of an Indian State, controlled chiefly by white
adventurers and sentimentalists, within the legal limits of the
Commonwealth.
Under this pressure the Georgians reviewed the whole question of
Indian organization, and rights to territory. They advanced the
propositions, that the Indian tribal organizations were not States and
could not, therefore, exercise dominion, and give title to real
property; that the Indians living within the legal limits of the
Commonwealth were subject to its jurisdiction in the same manner as
other persons, and to the same extent; that the original title to all
land within the limits of Georgia was in the Commonwealth, and every
valid title must be derived from the Commonwealth; that the claim of
the Indians to the lands on which the tribes lived was simply an
incumbrance upon Georgia's {212} title, an incumbrance which the
general Government was obligated to remove; and that, after the
Government should discharge this duty, Georgia's title would be
perfect, without any formal transfer of these lands to Georgia by the
Government.
[Sidenote: The demand of Georgia for the extinguishment of the Indian
claims.]
[Sidenote: The Indian Springs Convention.]
In 1819 the legislature of Georgia memorialized President Monroe to
hasten the work of the Government in extinguishing the Indian claims.
In the year 1824 the Creek chiefs in council resolved that not a foot
of the lands claimed by the Creeks should be relinquished.
Nevertheless, President Monroe's administration succeeded, in February
of 1825, in negotiating an agreement with certain of the Creek
chieftains according to which they relinquished to the United States
the Creek claims to all lands lying within the limits of Georgia, and
also to lands lying to the northwest and to the west of the
Commonwealth. This agreement was ratified by the Senate of the United
States in March of the same year.
[Sidenote: The repudiation of the agreement.]
The Governor of Georgia, Mr. Troup, immediately despatched the public
surveyors to lay out the relinquished territory. They were resisted by
the Indians, who declared their repudiation of the agreement of
February 12th with the general Government.
At the same moment a number of the chiefs were representing to the new
President, Mr. Adams, that that agreement was a fraud upon the
Indians, and that the chiefs who signed were not properly authorized
to do so. The agent of the Government to the Creeks supported their
protest, despite the fact that he was present at the execution of the
agreement. Under these circumstances the Secretary of War, Mr. James
Barbour, wrote to Governor Troup that the President {213} expected him
to abandon the survey until it could be made in accordance with the
provisions of the agreement which allowed the Indians until September
1st, 1826, for their removal, and guaranteed them against all
encroachments before that date.
[Sidenote: The Controversy between the Administration and Georgia.]
The communication from Secretary Barbour gave rise to a spirited
controversy between the Governor of Georgia and himself, in which the
Governor assumed an extreme "States' rights" attitude in defence of
his position. He claimed that Georgia's jurisdiction over, and title
to, the lands formally relinquished by the Creeks to the United States
were not originated by this act, but were only relieved by it of an
incumbrance, and that, therefore, no additional act was necessary on
the part of the Government to authorize Georgia to take possession and
exercise jurisdiction. He declared that he would not postpone the
survey, and advised the legislature of the Commonwealth to defend
Georgia's rights by armed resistance, which recommendation the
legislature seemed about to approve.
The President sent General Gaines to the scene of action, and
authorized him to place the militia of the Commonwealths adjoining
Georgia in readiness for service. The Governor was highly excited by
the approach of the military power of the United States, and wrote to
Secretary Barbour virtually accusing the Government of inciting the
Indians to violence against Georgia and her people, and demanding to
be informed of the purposes of the Administration. Mr. Barbour replied
that the President had decided that the survey should not proceed, and
had sent General Gaines with orders to prevent it, with military power
if necessary. The Governor now turned to the President himself, with
both protest and threat, but the President remained {214} firm, and
the Governor was obliged to yield for the moment.
[Sidenote: The Creek Convention of 1826.]
The Administration was apparently convinced that the agreement of 1825
was not fairly obtained, and, in January of 1826, entered into another
agreement with the Creeks, which, while recognizing the nullity of the
agreement of 1825, secured the extinguishment of their claims to all
lands in Georgia lying east of the Chattahoochee, and to a
considerable tract north and west of this river. The Administration
asserted that all the Creek lands lying within the limits of Georgia
were secured. Senator Berrien of Georgia, who represented the
interests of his Commonwealth when the agreement came before the
Senate for ratification, said, on the contrary, that it failed by a
million of acres of having done so.
[Sidenote: The Governor of Georgia repudiates the Convention of 1826.]
Governor Troup declared that the general Government could not by an
agreement with the Creeks rob Georgia of vested rights, which had
been, once for all, perfected by the agreement of 1825. He ordered the
public surveyors to include in their surveys the lands claimed by
Georgia west of the line designated in the agreement of 1826. The
Indians resisted them, and appealed to the President to protect their
rights as recognized by the latter agreement. The President ordered
the United States District Attorney and Marshal for Georgia to arrest
any one caught in the act of surveying the lands west of the line
fixed by the agreement of 1826. The Governor was informed of this
order, and was given to understand that the President would uphold the
agreement of 1826 by any and all power necessary. The Governor,
however, defied the Administration, ordered the law officers of the
Commonwealth to effect, by any means necessary, the release of the
arrested surveyors, and to {215} secure the arrest and trial of those
persons who had taken or held them in custody, ordered the commanders
of the militia of the Commonwealth to hold their forces in readiness
to resist the threatened invasion by the military power of the United
States, and sent a message to the legislature informing that body of
what he had done in the premises. In this message he took the ground
that questions of jurisdiction--he called them questions of
sovereignty--between the general Government and the Commonwealths
could not be determined by the judicial power of that Government, but
must be settled by agreement between the two parties.
[Sidenote: The President submits the matter to Congress.]
President Adams was deeply impressed with the seriousness of the
situation. He felt that he must uphold the dignity and authority of
the Government at all hazards and by all the means intrusted to him by
the Constitution and the laws; and yet he was unwilling to provoke
civil war, if it could be avoided, or to enter upon the work of
coercion without the practically unanimous support of the country. He
resolved, therefore, to lay the matter before Congress, and await its
action. Congress did practically nothing, and the President was
convinced that the nation was not prepared to have the Indian problem
fought out under the issue of "States' rights" versus the Union.
[Sidenote: Georgia and the Cherokees.]
Encouraged by this success the Georgians now resolved to subject the
Cherokees living within the limits of the Commonwealth to the laws
thereof or force them to emigrate. In December of 1827, the
legislature passed a law extending the criminal jurisdiction of the
Commonwealth over a part of the lands occupied by the Cherokees. The
Indians appealed to the President. The appeal came before the
President during the last month of his official term, and he {216}
discreetly and courteously resolved not to embarrass the new
Administration by committing the Government to any position in the
question.
[Sidenote: Jackson and the Indian question.]
President Jackson was even less inclined than his predecessor to allow
the Indian question to resolve itself into the question of the
constitutional spheres of authority between the Union and the
Commonwealths. Moreover, he believed that Georgia was in the right in
the Indian question. He replied to the Cherokee memorial that he knew
of no alternative to submission to the jurisdiction of Georgia except
emigration beyond the limits of the Commonwealth. His view was that
the general Government could not hinder a Commonwealth from exercising
jurisdiction over every person within its limits, except in such cases
as were reserved from that jurisdiction by the Constitution of the
United States, and could not lend its countenance to the creation of a
new political organization within these limits against the will of the
Commonwealth. This was the latter part of April, 1829. The Cherokees,
influenced largely by the whites among them, resented the President's
advice, and the council of chiefs resolved that no lands claimed by
the Cherokees should be relinquished, except by consent of the tribe
or tribes, under penalty of death for violation of their resolve, and
rejected the overtures of the Government for the relinquishment of
their claims.
In his message of December 8th, 1829, President Jackson devoted much
space to the Indian problem in general, and to it, as it affected
Georgia and Alabama, in particular. He repeated to Congress the views
which he had expressed to the Cherokees themselves, which were, as we
have seen, that the general Government could not lend its countenance
to the creation of an {217} Indian State within the confines of any
Commonwealth of the Union against the will of that Commonwealth, and
that the only alternative to subjection to the laws of the
Commonwealth on the part of the Indians was emigration beyond the
limits of the same. He also suggested the setting apart of a district
in the far West for the permanent home of such Indian tribes as should
prefer to continue in tribal organization, independent of the
jurisdiction of any Commonwealth of the Union, where they might work
out their own customs unmolested.
This was the democratic, "States' rights" view of the subject. It
denied all exemptions from the supremacy of the laws, and it also
denied to the general Government any power to restrain a Commonwealth
from the assertion of its jurisdiction over all persons within its
legal limits, except in cases specially reserved by the Constitution.
[Sidenote: Indian policy before Jackson.]
The Administration of Mr. Adams, and the Administrations of all of his
predecessors, had apparently inclined to the view that the Indian
tribes were already states, having dominion over, and property in, the
territory of the continent when the Europeans arrived upon it; that
the titles of the European states to it were only valid as against
each other, and meant, in relation to the aborigines, only a right of
pre-emption; and that after the Constitution was established no
government except the general Government of the United States could
have anything to do with them.
This was a crude and an impracticable view of the relation. It
contained more of sentiment and humanitarianism than of common sense
and inductive wisdom. The theory broke down completely in the Georgia
case, and could not be re-enlivened for practical purposes {218} even
by judicial decisions. The necessities of civilization have forced the
country to follow the course outlined by President Jackson, and that
is certainly good evidence of its correctness.
The Georgians must have been encouraged by his message, for the
legislature of Georgia immediately passed an act connecting the
Cherokee lands with the counties which they adjoined, and imposing the
full jurisdiction of the Commonwealth upon all persons living or being
within the same.
[Sidenote: The case of the Cherokee Nation.]
The Indians then caused an original bill to be filed in the Supreme
Court of the United States against Georgia, together with a
supplemental bill praying for a temporary injunction to restrain the
Commonwealth from enforcing its jurisdiction, and for the issuing of a
subpoena to Georgia to appear before the Court. The Court issued its
summons, but the Commonwealth made no answer, and the Court decided,
in its January term of 1831, that the Cherokee nation was not a
"State" in the sense of that provision of the Constitution which
designates the parties qualified to sue in the United States Courts.
This decision was pronounced immediately after the execution of the
Cherokee Tassells by the Georgia authorities, in defiance of a writ of
error addressed to the Commonwealth by a United States court,
requiring the Commonwealth to show cause why he should not be
discharged from custody. It is probable that the Supreme Court was
impressed by this demonstration of the impotence of the judiciary to
interfere successfully with the political policy of a Commonwealth,
even in behalf of personal liberty.
[Sidenote: The case of Worcester against Georgia.]
A year later the Court took a more national view and stand. A
Presbyterian missionary to the Cherokees, the Rev. Samuel A.
Worcester, of Vermont, had {219} violated the Georgia statute, which
made it a criminal offence to reside among the Cherokees after March
1st, 1831, without a license from the Governor, and without having
taken an oath to support and defend the laws of the Commonwealth. He
was indicted and tried by a Georgia court, found guilty, and condemned
to imprisonment in the penitentiary of the Commonwealth. A writ of
error was issued by one of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the
United States, requiring the Commonwealth of Georgia to show cause why
the prisoner should not be discharged. The writ was served on the
Governor and the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth. The only answer
which the Commonwealth gave to the summons was the sending up of the
record of the case, signed by the clerk of the court which pronounced
the judgment, and authenticated by the seal of the court. The judge of
the Georgia court did not sign the record. Nevertheless the Supreme
Court of the United States decided that the record of the Georgia
court was properly before it, and the Chief Justice proceeded to make,
in the Court's opinion of the case, an exhaustive review of the Indian
relations of the United States, in accord with the principles of the
Adams Administration, and to pronounce the statute of Georgia,
asserting the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth over the Cherokee lands
and over all persons residing or being on them, unconstitutional,
null, and void, and the arrest, trial, and sentence of Mr. Worcester
under the same to have been, therefore, without warrant of law.
But the Georgia authorities paid no attention to the decision. They
did not liberate the prisoner or accord him a new trial. Later on, the
Governor of the Commonwealth pardoned him as his own act of grace.
[Sidenote: The failure of the President to execute the decision in the
Worcester case.]
It was certainly the duty of the President of the {220} United States
to have executed this decision of the Court with all the power
necessary for the purpose which the Constitution conferred upon him.
He did not do it. It is said on very good authority that he intimated,
at least, that he would not do it. The Commonwealth simply defied the
Court successfully, and the President and Congress acquiesced in the
result. The President agreed in opinion with the Georgians upon the
subject, and the doctrine which here triumphed was one more plank in
the platform of the Jacksonian democracy, a real "States' rights"
principle.
[Sidenote: Jackson and Calhoun.]
There is no doubt that the South Carolinians were encouraged by the
course of events in Georgia to believe that they would have something
like the same experiences and results in their contest with the
Government. In this they do not seem to have fully realized the fact
that President Jackson did not agree with them in their view of the
unconstitutionality of the tariff, as he agreed with the Georgians in
their view of the Indian question. Moreover, there was a personal
element in the controversy which they do not seem to have appreciated
at all. Jackson had, down to 1830, supposed that Mr. Crawford was the
member of the Cabinet of Mr. Monroe, in 1819, who wanted to have him
arrested and tried by a court-martial for disobeying orders, or acting
in excess of orders, during the Seminole War, and that Mr. Calhoun was
his defender. Jackson's hatred of Crawford had been intense during
these years for this reason. In 1830 Governor Forsyth, of Georgia,
revealed to Jackson the truth in regard to this matter, which was that
Calhoun was for arraigning him and Adams was his defender. Jackson
immediately demanded an explanation of Calhoun, but the reply did not
at all satisfy him, and the hostility which he had {221} felt for
Crawford was now turned with redoubled force against Calhoun. Calhoun
was now regarded by Jackson as a traitor to Jackson, and that meant,
in Jackson's mind, that he was a traitor to his country. Any movement
against the Government or the laws of the United States headed by
Calhoun would be considered by Jackson as rebellion, most surely so
while Jackson was President.
[Sidenote: The call of the Convention of 1832 in South Carolina.]
Following the principles developed in Mr. Calhoun's letter of August
28th, 1832, Governor Hamilton issued a call for a special session of
the legislature of South Carolina, in the autumn of 1832, for the
purpose of effecting through it the assembly of the convention of the
Commonwealth. The party in favor of nullification had at last secured
both branches of the legislature, and on October 24th, 1832, the
assembled legislature voted to issue the call for the convention, and
appointed November 19th as the day upon which it should meet.
[Sidenote: The work of the Nullification Convention.]
The convention assembled at the time designated, elected Governor
Hamilton as its chairman, and appointed a committee of twenty-one
members to consider the situation and report a proposition to meet it.
In due time this committee made its report to the convention, in which
was contained, first, a review of the development of the tariff from a
revenue measure to a measure for the protection of manufactures, of
the ten years of fruitless struggle in Congress by the South against
the oppression inflicted by the protective system upon that section,
and of the theories advanced by the fathers of the Republic for
meeting, in last instance, such a condition of affairs; and, second,
the famous Ordinance of Nullification as the remedy of last resort.
The convention voted to receive the report and to adopt its
recommendations. {222} On November 24th the convention passed, in
solemn form, the Ordinance of Nullification of the existing tariff
laws of the United States.
[Sidenote: The Nullification Ordinance.]
The convention declared and ordained in this instrument, that "the
several acts and parts of acts of the Congress of the United States,
purporting to be laws for the imposing of duties and imposts on the
importation of foreign commodities, and now having actual operation
and effect within the United States, and, more especially," the Act of
May 19th, 1828, and that of July 14th, 1832, "are unauthorized by the
Constitution of the United States and violate the true meaning and
intent thereof, and are null and void and no law, nor binding upon
this State, its officers or citizens; and all promises, contracts, and
obligations made or entered into, or to be made or entered into, with
purpose to secure the duties imposed by the said acts, and all
judicial proceedings which shall be hereafter had in affirmance
thereof, are and shall be held utterly null and void."
It further ordained that no appeal should be allowed from the
decisions of the courts of the Commonwealth to the Supreme Court of
the United States in questions involving the validity of the aforesaid
Acts of Congress, or of the Ordinance of the convention annulling
them, or of the acts of the legislature giving effect to the
Ordinance, and that no copy of the proceedings in the courts of the
Commonwealth should be allowed for any such purpose, but that the
courts of the Commonwealth should proceed to execute their decisions
upon such issues without regard to any attempts to appeal therefrom,
and should deal with any person making such attempt as being guilty of
contempt of court. It then commanded that all the officers of the
Commonwealth, civil and military, and the jurors empanelled in the
courts should take the {223} oath to obey, execute, and enforce the
Ordinance, under penalty of dismissal and disqualification; and
finally, it declared that South Carolina would regard her connection
with the Union as absolved, in case Congress should pass any act
authorizing the employment of military force to reduce her to
obedience to the nullified acts, or any act abolishing or closing the
ports, or obstructing the free ingress and egress of vessels, or in
case the United States should undertake to coerce the Commonwealth, or
enforce the nullified acts otherwise than through the civil tribunals
of the country.
For the execution of the provisions of the Ordinance the convention
commanded the legislature to pass such measures as would prevent the
enforcement of the nullified acts, and give full effect to the
nullifying Ordinance, from and after February 1st, 1833, and commanded
the obedience of all persons within the limits of the Commonwealth to
the Ordinance and the legislative acts passed for its execution.
[Sidenote: The Addresses issued by the Convention.]
With the Ordinance the convention issued two addresses, one to the
people of South Carolina, and the other to the peoples of the other
Commonwealths, naming each separately. The one to the people of South
Carolina contained the theory of nullification, as elaborated by
Calhoun, and the justification of its employment in the existing
situation. It closed with an appeal to their love of liberty and a
demand of obedience. The address to the peoples of the several
Commonwealths contained an announcement of the passage of the
nullifying Ordinance, the theory upon which it was based, an assertion
of the unconstitutionality of the protective tariff, and its
oppression upon the people of South Carolina, and a declaration of the
spirit and feeling of the convention, and of the people it
represented, toward the Union, the {224} Constitution and the people
of the manufacturing Commonwealths. The latter part of this address
contained the only new point to be noticed. It was the offer of a plan
for a compromise tariff which would satisfy the South Carolinians. The
plan was the imposition of the same rate of duty upon all articles,
those not coming into competition with the products of the country and
those coming into such competition, and the raising of no more revenue
than should be necessary to meet the demands of the Government for
constitutional purposes.
[Sidenote: The Ordinance communicated to the Legislature of South
Carolina.]
In a message of November 27th, Governor Hamilton communicated to the
legislature of the Commonwealth the Ordinance of Nullification and
recommended the enactment of measures by that body for the execution
of the Ordinance.
On December 13th, the new Governor, Colonel Hayne, who had resigned
his seat in the Senate in order that Mr. Calhoun, who had himself
resigned the vice-presidency, might be made South Carolina's
representative in the Senate, or, as the South Carolinians now
considered it, South Carolina's ambassador to the Government of the
United States, pronounced his inaugural address before the
legislature, dedicating himself to the service of the Commonwealth in
the execution of her Ordinance of Nullification.
[Sidenote: The Acts of the Legislature for the execution of the
Ordinance.]
The legislature immediately passed the acts required by the convention
and recommended by the Governor.
The first act, termed the Replevin Act, authorized any consignee of
merchandise, or any person lawfully entitled to the possession of
merchandise, held or detained for the payment of the duties imposed
upon the same by the nullified Acts of Congress, to recover possession
of the same, with {225} damages for its detention, by a writ of
replevin, that is, by a summary procedure executed by an officer of
the Commonwealth; and the Act authorized this officer, on initiation
of the plaintiff in replevin, to seize the private property of the
person detaining the merchandise to double the value of the latter, in
case this person should refuse to deliver the detained merchandise to
the sheriff, or should put it out of the sheriff's way, and to hold
the property so seized until the merchandise in question should be
produced and delivered to the sheriff.
This Act also authorized any person paying the nullified duties to
recover the money paid, with interest on the same, by an action, in a
court of the Commonwealth, for money had and received; and it
authorized any person suffering arrest or imprisonment by order of any
United States court, in execution of the nullified Acts, to demand the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and to maintain an action for
unlawful arrest and imprisonment.
It declared the sale of any property seized by a United States court,
in execution of the nullified Acts, to be illegal, and ordained that
such sale should convey no title to the purchaser. It forbade any
officer of a court of the Commonwealth to furnish the record, or a
copy of the record, or allow a copy of the record to be taken, of any
case in which the validity of the nullified Acts or the nullifying
Acts should be drawn in question, under penalty of both fine and
imprisonment, and it forbade any person to attempt to recapture the
goods delivered by the sheriff to the plaintiff in replevin, under
threat of the same punishment.
It further forbade the keepers of the jails to receive and detain any
person arrested or committed by virtue of any proceeding for enforcing
the nullified Acts, under penalty of both fine and imprisonment; and
it imposed {226} a similar penalty upon the offence of hiring,
letting, or procuring any place to be used as a place of confinement
for such person.
Finally, it forbade any person to disobey, obstruct, prevent, or
resist any process allowed by this Act, under penalty of both fine and
imprisonment; and it threatened every plaintiff, who should bring suit
against any officer or person executing or aiding in the execution of
the provisions of this Act, with adverse judgment and double costs.
The second Act of the legislature was a measure to provide for the
event of the employment of military power by the general Government to
enforce the nullified Acts in South Carolina. It authorized the
Governor of the Commonwealth to resist the same; and for this purpose
to order into service the whole military power of the Commonwealth at
his discretion, to purchase arms, accoutrements, and ammunitions, and
to appoint his military staff; and it authorized and obligated the
Governor to use military power in suppressing opposition to the laws
of the Commonwealth by combinations too powerful to be controlled by
the civil officers.
The third Act was the test oath, the oath to obey, execute, and
enforce the Ordinance of Nullification, and all the acts of the
legislature for its enforcement, which every officer of the
Commonwealth must take before dealing with any question touching the
nullified Acts or the nullifying Acts, and which the Governor might
require of any officer whatever.
These were the details and the forms of the issue which South Carolina
now offered to the United States. Was it rebellion, or was it
constitutional and legal opposition?
[Sidenote: The meaning of Nullification as understood by the
Nullifiers.]
As we have seen, Calhoun and the members of the {227} nullifying
convention held it to be the latter. They argued that the reserved
powers of the Commonwealths are recognized by the Constitution; that
every conceivable power is reserved to the Commonwealths, except such
as are vested by the Constitution in the general Government
exclusively, or are denied by the Constitution to the Commonwealths;
that the power to pronounce an act of the general Government null and
void had been neither so vested nor so denied; that this was,
therefore, a reserved power of the Commonwealths, and was, like all
other reserved powers, a constitutional power; that South Carolina
proposed to use this power through judicial means only, which means
were legally and constitutionally at her disposal through the
principle of the governmental system of the United States that general
criminal jurisdiction belongs exclusively to the Commonwealths; and
that the employment of military power by the Commonwealth, indicated
in the Ordinance and the legislative acts for its enforcement, was to
be resorted to only in self-defence, only to repel the possible attack
of the military power of the general Government upon South Carolina.
It is entirely evident that the South Carolina statesmen and lawyers
thought they had so fashioned the laws of the Commonwealth as to force
the general Government to the first violation of legal order in
attempting to execute the nullified Acts of Congress--that is, they
thought they had made it impossible for the general Government to
execute these Acts by regular legal methods; and that they had done so
without themselves violating any rule or principle of American
jurisprudence. They repeated the assertion, again and again, that they
did not rest their case on moral, or on revolutionary, principles, but
on strict constitutional {228} right; and it is impossible to prove
that they were insincere.
The great question now was, what attitude the general Government would
take toward the attempt of a Commonwealth to defeat the supremacy of
its laws. Naturally the Executive Department must act first, since
nullification was directed against the execution of existing laws.
[Sidenote: Jackson's view of Nullification.]
In his message of December 4th (1832), President Jackson referred
briefly to the events of the preceding month in South Carolina, but
did not seem to have fully appreciated their purport. He said he hoped
the United States courts would be able to cope successfully with the
difficulties in South Carolina, and that, if they were not, he thought
that the existing laws gave the President sufficient power to suppress
any attempts which might be immediately made against the supremacy of
the Government.
[Sidenote: The Tariff in the Annual Message of 1832.]
He devoted a much larger portion of the message to a consideration of
the tariff, and declared that the time had arrived for the United
States to enter upon the realization of the policy of a tariff for
revenue only, and of the ultimate limitation of protection to those
articles of domestic manufacture indispensable to the country in time
of war.
It is possible that the President did, after all, understand the
serious nature of the situation from the outset, and hoped, by his
pronounced recommendations in regard to the tariff, and his very mild
utterances concerning nullification, to influence the South
Carolinians to a reconsideration of their hasty acts, and give them a
loophole of escape from their very dubious and embarrassing position.
[Sidenote: The President's Proclamation of December 10th.]
He waited for six days, and then issued the noted proclamation of
December 10th, which presented the {229} President's idea of the
relation of the United States, as a nation, and of the general
Government, to the Commonwealths, asserted the supremacy of United
States law over Commonwealth law, demonstrated the true character of
nullification as rebellion, and declared the President's intention to
execute the laws of the United States against any and all opposition.
The President assumed as his cardinal principle that the Union
preceded independence, and that by a joint act the people of the
united colonies declared themselves a nation; that, as a nation, the
people of the United States established the Constitution of 1787, and
placed in that instrument the provision that the Constitution, and the
laws and treaties made in accordance therewith, are "the supreme law"
of the land, and that "the judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the
contrary notwithstanding." From these principles the President derived
the conclusions that no legal processes, which South Carolina could
contrive, could prevent the execution of the laws of the United States
in South Carolina; that to accomplish this South Carolina would be
obliged to have recourse to violence; and that this necessity stamped
nullification as rebellion.
The President stopped the loophole of escape from this reasoning, made
by the claim of the nullifiers that the nullified Acts were not laws
made in accordance with the Constitution, by the declaration that the
Judicial Department of the general Government was the body designated
by the Constitution to determine that question, and not a Commonwealth
convention.
After warning the nullifiers to desist from their unlawful enterprise,
the President closed his message with an eloquent appeal to the people
of South Carolina to {230} withdraw from their unjustifiable and
dangerous position, and an equally eloquent appeal to the people of
the United States for aid and support in preserving the Union and
maintaining the supremacy of the Government and the laws.
[Sidenote: The President's military preparations.]
Already before the passage of the Ordinance of Nullification, the
President had caused the United States military officers stationed in
and about Charleston to be informed of their danger, had ordered two
artillery companies from Fort Monroe to Fort Moultrie, had commanded
General Scott to go to Charleston and do what might be necessary for a
successful defence of the forts and places held by the Army of the
United States, and had directed all the officers in command to defend
their possession of these forts and places to the last extremity.
[Sidenote: The President's instructions to the customs officers in
South Carolina.]
The President had also caused the collectors of the customs at
Charleston, Georgetown, and Beaufort to be reminded of their powers
under the laws of the United States, and had authorized them to make
use of all the revenue cutters in the harbors, and of such other
vessels as they could secure, and to call to their assistance the
officers of the cutters, and to appoint a number of inspectors
sufficient to execute successfully the laws of the United States for
the collection of the duties. The collector at Charleston was
specially authorized to remove the custom-house to Castle Pinckney, at
his discretion; and the United States District Attorney at Charleston
was ordered to aid the collector with counsel and advice.
After the passage of the Ordinance, the President ordered five more
companies of artillery from Fort Monroe to Fort Moultrie, commanded
the removal of the custom-house from Charleston to Castle Pinckney,
and sent General Scott to Charleston Harbor to take command, {231} on
the spot, of all the forts and garrisons there, instructing him to
avoid collision with the forces of the Commonwealth so long as
possible, but, in case the exigency should arise requiring the
exercise of military power, to act with firmness and decision, and to
hold possession of the forts by all means and at every hazard.
[Sidenote: The popular approval of the President's course.]
The brave, loyal, and patriotic, yet wise and considerate, stand taken
by the President was supported with great unanimity and enthusiasm
throughout the North; and though the people of the Southern
Commonwealths felt more sympathy with their South Carolina brethren,
yet the dissent from the President's views and attitude in that
section was rare and feeble. The nation was with the President, and
the President had done his duty nobly and fearlessly.
[Sidenote: The Verplanck Tariff Bill.]
The turn now came upon Congress. Would Congress sustain the President,
and give him all the means necessary to conquer nullification and
secession in fact, and destroy them in principle? Unfortunately, so
far as finite reason can judge, the first movements made in Congress
were in the opposite direction. That part of the President's message
which dealt with the question of the tariff was referred by the House
of Representatives to its committee on Ways and Means, and on December
27th, 1832, the chairman of that committee, Mr. Verplanck, of New
York, reported a bill from the committee which proposed to reduce and
equalize duties largely, and in the direction of the South Carolina
principle. If this bill should pass, the nullifiers could well assume
that their Ordinance had accomplished its purpose without being
applied, and could with triumphant dignity desist from the application
of it; and they could defer with almost equal dignity the application
of the Ordinance, {232} so long as there was any probability of the
passage of this bill.
[Sidenote: Governor Hayne's Counter-proclamation.]
Seven days before the introduction of this bill, Governor Hayne had
issued a counter-proclamation to the President's proclamation of
December 10th, in which he went over again the ground of nullification
and secession, warned the citizens of South Carolina against the
President's "pernicious" doctrines, and accused the President of
indulging in unwarrantable imputations upon South Carolina. He gave
notice, on the same day, that he would accept the service of
volunteers. The legislature supported the Governor in defiant
resolutions, which it sent to Congress, and caused to be read in that
body.
[Sidenote: The President's Message of January 16th, 1833.]
The President was much ruffled by the arrogant language of the
Governor and legislature, and when the Verplanck bill appeared, it
must have looked to him too much like surrendering the entire field,
which he was not now in any mood to do. He felt that something more
must be done to vindicate the authority and the dignity of the
Government. On January 16th, 1833, he sent another message to
Congress, demonstrating and denouncing again the pernicious character
of the nullification doctrine, informing Congress that he had removed
the custom-house from Charleston to Castle Pinckney, and asking
Congress for the power to change the customs districts and ports of
entry, to exact the payment of duties in cash, and to use the land and
naval forces when necessary for the execution of the revenue laws.
[Sidenote: Calhoun's explanations in the Senate.]
The message was referred by the Houses of Congress to their respective
committees on the Judiciary; but immediately upon the reading of the
message, and before the Senate had passed the motion to refer, Mr.
Calhoun said, in that body, that there was no foundation whatever for
the {233} statement in the message that the movements made by South
Carolina were intended as hostile to the Union, or were so. He called
the attention of the Senate to the fact that before the Ordinance of
Nullification was passed, before the convention had assembled, United
States troops had been sent to Charleston Harbor; and he declared
that, previous to this circumstance, South Carolina had looked to
nothing beyond a civil process, and had intended to give effect to her
opposition merely in the form of a suit at law, and that it was only
when a military force had been displayed on her borders, and in her
limits, and when a menace was thrown out against the lives of her
citizens, that they found themselves driven to an attitude of
resistance.
[Sidenote: The "Force Bill."]
On the 21st of the month (January), Mr. Wilkins, the chairman of the
Judiciary committee of the Senate, reported from his committee the
bill for the collection of the revenue. This bill provided for
extending the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the United States
over all cases in law or equity arising under the revenue laws of the
United States; for making all property taken or detained by any
officer or person under authority of any law of the United States
irrepleviable by any order or process of the tribunals of a
Commonwealth; for effecting the removal of suits commenced in a
Commonwealth court against any officer or person for any act done
under the laws of the United States, or on account of any right,
authority, or title claimed under those laws, to the Circuit Courts of
the United States, by means of proof laid before the Circuit Court
that the defendant had petitioned the Commonwealth court for the
removal of the cause. The bill provided, further, for substituting for
a copy of the record of the proceedings in the {234} Commonwealth
court, in case of the failure of that court to furnish a copy, an
affidavit, or other evidence, as the circumstances of the case might
require; for giving to the United States judges the power to grant
writs of habeas corpus in all cases where persons were in confinement
for acts done in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of an
order, process, or decree of any United States court or judge; for
empowering the United States marshals, under direction of the United
States judges, to provide places of confinement for persons arrested
or committed under the laws of the United States, where any
Commonwealth should refuse the use of its jails for the confinement of
such persons; for allowing the President to change the custom-house
from one place in a collection district to another, and to require the
duties to be paid in cash; and for empowering the President to use the
land and naval forces for suppressing any resistance to the execution
of the revenue laws too powerful to be overcome by the civil officers
of the general Government.
It was a good, stiff measure, but it was constitutional at every
point, and it was demanded by the exigencies of the situation. It was
a complete answer to the Replevin Act of South Carolina, and it would
inevitably throw the responsibility for committing the first act of
violence upon the Commonwealth in any resistance to the collection of
the duties. It pricked the bubble completely of South Carolina's
proposed legal resistance to the execution of the laws of the United
States.
Of course the bill was denounced at once by the South Carolinians as a
"Force Bill." Calhoun attacked it as a measure for coercing a
sovereign "State," and offered a series of "States' rights"
propositions, which he declared to be indisputable, and which must,
therefore, prevent the passage of the bill. The discussion upon {235}
these resolutions, and upon the bill which they were meant to destroy,
dragged on from day to day in the Senate, while that upon the
Verplanck bill in the House proceeded even more slowly.
[Sidenote: The postponement of the execution of nullification.]
The chiefs of the nullifiers, professing to feel that the Government
was yielding, reassembled in convention in the last days of January,
and postponed the execution of their Ordinance until the end of the
existing Congressional session.
On February 8th, Mr. Bell, the chairman of the Judiciary committee of
the House of Representatives, reported to that body that his committee
did not recommend vesting the President with any further powers for
the execution of the revenue laws than those already possessed by him,
and that they could not approve of the employment of military force
for the purpose.
[Sidenote: The Compromise Tariff.]
Such was the situation when, on February 12th, Mr. Clay astonished the
Senate with the noted proposition for compromise. This was his bill
for the gradual reduction of the duties to a revenue basis. The
revenue basis was fixed in the bill at twenty per centum _ad valorem_
on all articles then paying a higher duty, and the excess was to be
remitted in biennial instalments, and entirely abolished from and
after June 30th, 1842. The free list was slightly extended, and cash
payments, from and after June 30th, 1842, were provided.
[Sidenote: Mr. Clay on the situation.]
Mr. Clay said, in introducing this bill, that he had two purposes in
view: one to save what could be saved of the protective tariff, and
the other to allow South Carolina to withdraw with dignity from the
position which she had rashly assumed. He claimed that his feeling
toward the action of South Carolina had changed since her
Representatives and Senators in Congress had disavowed rebellion and
had {236} asserted that they were only trying to invent legal methods
for protecting themselves against the oppression of the tariff Acts.
He demonstrated very clearly the error of supposing that they could do
any such thing, and then urged his brother Senators to join him in the
proposed measure of conciliation.
[Sidenote: Mr. Calhoun's support of Mr. Clay's bill.]
Mr. Calhoun immediately indicated that the bill would have his
support, and would solve the difficulties between South Carolina and
the general Government. He professed to see in it the concession of
about all that South Carolina had asked.
[Sidenote: The opposition to the bill.]
The opposition to the bill came from three quarters--from the
protectionists, who clung to the existing law, from the strong
nationalists, who were against any show of compromise with
nullification, and from the strict parliamentarians, who held that any
bill touching the tariff must originate in the House of
Representatives.
The protectionists were answered, and many of them won over, by the
argument that the Verplanck bill would pass if they did not accept Mr.
Clay's bill. The strong nationalists were told that if Congress should
pass the Wilkins bill before the Clay bill a sufficient vindication of
their position would be attained. They were inclined to accept that
view, but the South Carolinians set themselves against this order of
procedure with all their strength. Mr. Calhoun came forward again with
his "States' sovereignty" exposition of the Constitution, and
denounced the Wilkins bill in the most vehement language as "utterly
unconstitutional, as an attempt to enforce robbery by murder, an
attempt to decree the massacre of the citizens of South Carolina," and
declared that the citizens of South Carolina would, should it become
law, resist its execution "at every hazard, even that of death
itself."
{237} [Sidenote: Passage of the "Force Bill" by the Senate.]
On the following day Mr. Webster answered Mr. Calhoun's argument, and
demonstrated so clearly the nationality of the Constitution, the
supremacy of the laws of the United States, and the rebellious
character of nullification, that the Senate was convinced of the
necessity of passing the Wilkins bill before voting upon Mr. Clay's
bill. On the 20th of the month (February), the Senate passed the
Wilkins bill by a vote of thirty-two to one. The objections of the
strong nationalists to Mr. Clay's bill were now substantially
satisfied; but the high protectionists still held out in considerable
number for some modification of the bill in their favor, and on the
day after the passage of the Wilkins bill by the Senate, Mr. Clay
moved to amend his own bill by the proposition to base the duties on
home valuation instead of on the foreign invoice. The protectionists
were satisfied by this, but Mr. Calhoun immediately declared that
South Carolina would not accept the bill with this change. The
protectionists, in sufficient number to defeat the bill, declared that
they would not accept it without the change. Mr. Calhoun had at last
come to see the peril which lay in South Carolina's course, and to
understand the feeling of the nation toward her. He wisely concluded
to abandon his opposition to the amendment, and to vote for the bill.
[Sidenote: Passage of the Compromise Tariff bill and the "Force Bill"
by Congress.]
The opposition of the strict parliamentarians, on the ground that the
Senate could not originate a revenue bill, was overcome by the action
of the House of Representatives in substituting the Clay bill for the
Verplanck bill, and passing it on the 26th, and sending it to the
Senate for concurrence. The Senate now passed the House bill on March
1st, and the House immediately passed the Wilkins bill, against the
protest of {238} the South Carolinians that it could now have no
purpose since every member of Congress from South Carolina had voted
for the new Tariff Act.
[Sidenote: The nullification ordinance withdrawn.]
The President signed both bills at the same time, March 2nd, and South
Carolina rescinded the Nullification Ordinance.
[Sidenote: Motives and general results.]
It is not easy to see what principles or what party finally triumphed
in this contest, or to comprehend all the motives of the chief actors
in it. It has been said, or hinted, that Mr. Calhoun, chagrined and
disappointed at not gaining the presidency in 1832, was induced to
take the course which he followed in reference to nullification by the
hope of breaking up the Union and winning, thus, the presidency of a
Southern confederacy; that President Jackson was largely influenced,
in the decided attitude which he assumed, by the desire to take
revenge on Mr. Calhoun and South Carolina for Mr. Calhoun's attempt to
court-martial him more than a dozen years before, and for South
Carolina's slight upon him in the election of 1832; and that Mr. Clay
was moved far more by his jealousy of President Jackson, and his fear
of trusting him with extraordinary powers, than by any dread of the
destruction of the Union.
There is probably some truth in certain, if not in all, of these
speculations, but such things are not the matters of chief value in
the search for the line of development of the constitutional history
of this country. They do indeed help us to appreciate the motives for
the particular form of adjustment put upon that development at any
stage of its course; but our chief concern must be with the advance or
retrogression in principle of that development, our question must be
whether the Union and the Constitution were strengthened or weakened
by {239} the events of 1832 and 1833, whether the political
nationality of the country was cemented or suffered disintegration,
and whether strength was gathered, or the seeds of weakness were sown,
in the results attained.
From the point of view of the present, a point so much more national
than any reached before 1860, the settlement of 1833 is usually
regarded as a great misfortune, as a fateful error, which led the
country finally into civil war. It is now usually said that the
national cause lost everything in principle, and that nullification
was virtually acknowledged by the Act of Congress in repealing the
nullified laws, at the same moment that it enacted the measure for
upholding the supremacy of the laws of the United States.
From a purely historical view of the development of the constitutional
law of the country, this proposition does not seem to be true, at
least not without great modification. From such a point of view it
seems more correct to say, that the doctrine formulated by Mr. Calhoun
and his colleagues in South Carolina was only the exact logical
statement of the principles advanced by Mr. Jefferson in 1798,
principles through the advocacy of which Mr. Jefferson and the
Republicans turned the Federalists out of power and captured the
Government; that under the pressure of foreign war and through its
results, the Republican practice in administering the Government had
been driven into lines almost, if not quite, contradictory to the
Republican doctrine; that in the gradual relapse, after 1815, into the
humdrum of peace and business, the conditions were being revived for
the reassertion of the principles of 1800; and that, under such
conditions and in such a period, the doctrines advanced by President
Jackson, doctrines of a far more completely national system of
sovereignty, government, and liberty than were ever expressed {240} by
any preceding President, certainly mark a great advance in the
development of the national theory of the Constitution.
The South Carolinians said that John Quincy Adams invented these
doctrines, and that Jackson first essayed their application. Even Clay
declared that they were an advance upon his own views. And some of
Jackson's friends undertook, it was said with authority from Jackson
himself, to explain them away, so startled were they by their strong
nationalism.
But the spoken word cannot be recalled. It had gone forth, and the
nation had approved it. The politicians might split hairs in its
interpretation, but the people had heard from the highest authority
which they recognized that the United States was a sovereign nation,
and that the attempt of any combination of persons, whether calling
themselves a "State" or not, to resist by violence the execution of
the laws of the United States, or to withdraw themselves from their
operation, was rebellion, which the President was empowered and
required by the Constitution to suppress with the whole physical power
of the nation.
And besides the Proclamation there was the "Force Bill," which rested
upon the same theory of the political system of the country as the
Proclamation. The Congress as well as the President was now
inculcating the national doctrine. Calhoun and his friends knew what
an influence this would exert. He said that he and they would never
rest content until this measure was expunged from among the Acts of
Congress.
It is true that the passage of the new Tariff Act appeared to take the
virtue out of the Proclamation and the "Force Bill;" but it is not at
all probable that the nullifiers would have retreated from their
ground so promptly, to say the least, except for the determined {241}
words of the President and the Congress, and the popular approval with
which they were received; and it is almost certain that, when it came
to the great crisis, twenty-eight years later, the people would not
have understood and supported the great principle that the general
Government has the right of self-preservation, in the exercise of all
its powers, throughout the whole territory of the Union, against
everything and everybody but the sovereign nation itself, except for
the great education in national principles which they received from
the Proclamation, and through the enactment of the law which gave the
sanction of Congress to the enforcement of its principles.
{242}
CHAPTER XI.
ABOLITION
The Philosophy of Abolition--William Lloyd Garrison--The Civil Status
under the Constitution of 1787--Points at which Slavery Could be
Legally Attacked--Garrison's Methods--The Southampton Massacre--The
Attempt to Suppress the Abolition Movement at the North--Growth of the
Abolition Movement--The Methods of the Moderate Abolitionists--The
Abolition Petitions--The Earlier Method of Dealing with the
Petitions--Beginning of the Conflict over the Abolition Petitions--The
New Method for Dealing with Petitions in the House of
Representatives--True View of the Right of Petition--Mr. Polk's Fatal
Error in Regard to the Right of Petition--The Pinckney
Resolutions--The New Rule of the House of Representatives in Regard to
the Abolition Petitions--The Increase of Petitions, and the
Denunciation of the Pinckney Rule--The Final Denial of the Right of
Petition on the Subject of Slavery by the House of
Representatives--The Abolition Petitions in the Senate--Mr. Rives and
Mr. Calhoun in Regard to the Morality of Slavery--Mr. Calhoun's
Resolutions in Regard to the Political Relations of Slavery--The
Anti-Slavery Petition from the Vermont Legislature--The Abolition
Documents and the United States Mails--The Postmaster-General's Ruling
in Regard to the Abolition Documents in the Mails--Jackson on the Use
of the Mails by the Abolitionists--Mr. Calhoun's Report and Bill on
the Subject--Clay's Criticism of Calhoun's Proposition--The Act of
Congress Protecting the Abolition Documents in the Mails--General
Results of the Struggle over the Right of Petition and the Freedom of
the Mails.
[Sidenote: The ends of the state.]
When a state has fairly accomplished the primal end of establishing
its governmental system, its {243} public policy will be found to be
pursuing, in ultimate generalization, two great all-comprehending
purposes, namely, national development and universal human progress.
Rarely, if ever, will any state be found to have succeeded in so
balancing these two principal objects of its public policy as to make
the resultant of its two main lines of progress follow an unchanging
angle. At one period, the principle of national development will
prevail, even to the point of national exclusiveness; at another, an
enthusiastic humanism will almost threaten the existence of national
distinctions. But in all the convulsions of political history,
described as advance and reaction, the scientific student of history
is able to discover that the zigzags of progress are ever bearing in
the general direction which the combined impulses toward nationalism
and humanism compel.
[Sidenote: The purposes of the state, as seen in the history of the
United States.]
After the humanitarian outburst of the revolutionary period in the
latter part of the eighteenth century had expended its force, the
states of the world veered in their policies toward the line of
national development. The United States, which had been excessively
humanitarian during that period, both in its doctrine of rights and in
its policy, became, in the succeeding period, the first three decades
of the nineteenth century, more and more national in disposition and
in practice, until industrial exclusiveness and race domination
appeared, at the close of the period, to be the sole principles of the
policy of the country.
Had the two elements of this policy been equally, or almost equally,
sustained throughout the whole country, there is little question that
the human purpose, the world-purpose, as Hegel calls it, of state
existence, would have been ignored to a higher degree, and for a {244}
longer period, than it was. But curiously and fortunately, the race
domination in the South produced economic conditions which demanded
trade and commerce with the world, and which finally forced upon the
North the conviction that the cause of those conditions--race
domination, slavery--must be removed, in order to secure the
industrial interests of the North against the competition of the
world's markets. The destruction of that domination must proceed,
however, upon a humanitarian principle, namely, the right of man to
personal liberty. Thus it clearly appears that the two elements of the
national exclusiveness of the United States in 1830 were, in the
peculiar relation which finally obtained between them, preparing the
nation for a new advance in the direction of world intercourse and
human rights.
[Sidenote: The Revolution of 1830.]
In the summer of 1830 the wave of revolution rolled again over Europe.
The rights of man, the brotherhood of man, and the sovereignty of the
people, were the principles which pressed again to the front. While no
actual connection can be established between the Revolution of 1830 in
Europe and the rise of Abolition in the United States, yet they belong
to the same period of time, and harmonize in principle. The impulses
which move the human race, or those parts of the human race which
stand upon the same plane of civilization, are not broken by mountain
heights or broad seas. Their manifestations appear spontaneously and
coetaneously in widely separated places.
Before 1830, indeed, as we have so often seen, slavery in the United
States had been regarded as a grievous evil by most of the great
spirits of the age and country, and schemes for gradual emancipation
had been invented, and, in some slight degree, had been put into {245}
operation. It was, however, the humanitarian outburst of 1830, and the
succeeding years, which represented slavery as a sin and a crime
against the universal principle of human liberty and the rights of
man, a sin which called for immediate expiation by instantaneous,
unqualified, and uncompensated abolition.
[Sidenote: The philosophy of Abolition.]
There is nothing strange about the philosophy of Abolition. It is
simply the idealistic view of the beginning and the progress of human
history. It assumes liberty as the original state of man, condemns
every species of modification of liberty suffered by any human being,
or any class of human beings, as resulting from the unrighteous act of
some other human being, or class or race of human beings, and demands
the immediate discontinuance of the tyranny as the only approximately
adequate satisfaction which can be made to those who have suffered
that tyranny. It is the orthodox, paradisaical view of the origin,
unity, and primal perfection of the human race. It is the literal
interpretation of the Declaration of Independence. It is
thorough-going, radical humanitarianism. Its political principle, in
the language of its chief exponent, was: "The world our country, and
all mankind our countrymen."
Over against it stands the pessimistic view of man and of
civilization, which divides the human race into the few intelligent
and good, and the great mass of the ignorant and vicious, and
considers the permanent subjection of the latter to the former as the
divinely constituted, and therefore the permanent, order of the world.
And between the two lies the true historical view, which regards
liberty, equality, and brotherhood as the products of civilization, as
the final, not the primal, status of the human race, and determines
the character of every stage of development from barbarism to {246}
civilization, not by its distance from the perfect condition, but by
the fact of its advance upon, or its retrogression from, the stage
immediately antecedent.
The latter is, unquestionably, the true philosophy of history, but the
former has its uses as well as its abuses. It contains those forces of
mystical enthusiasm, self-sacrifice, and reckless disregard of
consequences so necessary, at times, to drag the world out of the ruts
of materialism and the love of peace. Such was its mission in the
fourth decade of the nineteenth century in American history.
[Sidenote: William Lloyd Garrison.]
If we must give a name, a date, and a place to the first open
appearance of a movement which was a product of the age, that name is
Garrison; the date, the beginning of the year 1831; and the place,
Boston. The character of William Lloyd Garrison, whether noble or
vulgar; his purposes, whether generous or selfish; and the motives
which impelled him, whether narrow and personal or grandly humane, are
not subjects for treatment in a work upon constitutional history.
Constitutional history has to do only with the doctrines of political
ethics and public jurisprudence which he formulated, and with the
means proposed by him, and those who thought and acted with him, for
their realization; and the historian does neither him nor them any
injustice in saying that, while those doctrines are to be justified
from the point of view of an extreme idealism, the means for their
realization, at first only indicated, but later boldly and rudely
expressed, were revolutionary, almost anarchic.
[Sidenote: The civil status under the Constitution of 1787.]
There is now certainly little question that the determination of the
civil status of all persons is, from an ethical point of view, a
matter of national concern, and that that status must be fixed, in
general principle, by a national act. There is just as little question
that {247} the denial of personal liberty to any human being of adult
years does not comport with the civilization of the nineteenth
century. In espousing these principles the Abolitionists were only
prophets ahead of their time, and must be accorded the honor which
belongs to such. On the other hand, it is entirely unquestionable that
the Constitution of the United States recognized to the Commonwealths,
respectively, the exclusive control of the civil status of persons
belonging within their several jurisdictions, and it is entirely
improbable that the Constitution of 1787 could ever have been
established without the guarantees, expressed and implied in it, of
such power to the Commonwealths. There is no question at all that the
slavery or freedom of the negro race within the several Commonwealths
was, under the Constitution of 1787, not only left, as it had been
before, a matter for each Commonwealth to determine for itself, but
that the exclusive power of determination in regard to it was
guaranteed by the Constitution to the several Commonwealths. The
Commonwealths in which slaveholding generally and extensively
prevailed regarded the guarantee as the principal consideration for
their assent to the "compact." The attempt to violate, or weaken, or
even to cast doubt upon, these guarantees appeared to them to be an
attack upon the fundamental covenants of the Union. The Constitution
might, indeed, be so amended as to withdraw these powers and
guarantees from the Commonwealths, by the regular procedure provided
in the Constitution itself; and the general Government was vested by
the Constitution with the general powers of exclusive government in
the Territories, the District of Columbia, and the places owned by the
United States within Commonwealths and used by the general Government
for {248} governmental purposes. But so long as the Constitution
remained what it was, there was no constitutional power in the general
Government to attack slavery in the Commonwealths; and the
slaveholders could certainly claim that, in the exercise of its powers
in the Territories, the District, and other places where those powers
were exclusive, the general Government should act fairly toward all
the members of the Union.
[Sidenote: Points at which slavery could be legally attacked.]
[Sidenote: Garrison's methods.]
Nevertheless, here were legal points of attack for the Abolitionists.
They might memorialize Congress for the abolition of slavery in the
Territories and in the District, and for the initiation of an
amendment which would abolish slavery in the Commonwealths or would
give Congress the power to do so, and they might appeal to the
legislatures of the Commonwealths to demand of Congress the calling of
a constitutional convention of the United States to initiate such an
amendment. But Garrison would have nothing to do with the
Constitution, or with existing legal methods. He denounced the
Constitution, "as a covenant with death and an agreement with hell,"
and declared that he wanted "no union with slaveholders." His violent
language, his repudiation of vested rights and constitutional
agreements, and his fanatical disregard of other men's opinions and
feelings, led the people both of the North and the South to believe
that his methods were incendiary and his morals loose; that he and his
co-workers were planning and plotting slave insurrection, and thereby
the wholesale massacre of slaveholders; and that he and they were
endeavoring to attain, through violence and anarchy, a leadership
which they could not otherwise reach.
[Sidenote: The Southampton massacre.]
In August of 1831, a slave insurrection broke out in Southampton
County, Va., under the leadership of a {249} negro named Nat Turner,
and more than sixty white persons, most of them women and children,
were massacred in cold blood. The Southerners said, no doubt believed,
that the insurrection was incited by the Abolitionists in the North.
Governor Floyd, of Virginia, declared, in his message to the
legislature upon the subject, that there was ample proof of it in the
documents accompanying the message. The great mass of the people at
the North believed the same thing. The Abolitionist historians assert,
on the contrary, that there was no connection between the work of the
Abolitionists and this event. We shall probably never know whether
there was or not. This much we can say, that the radical character of
the Abolition doctrines and the violence of the language in which they
were expressed--not so much before as after this event,
indeed--produced the universal feeling, both in the North and in the
South, that these doctrines and this event were in perfect harmony,
and that the latter might very naturally be the outcome of the former.
The moral sentiment of the North was not prepared for the destruction
of slavery by any such means. It considered these methods as
containing ten times more evil and barbarism than slavery itself. It
is just to say that what appeared to be the methods of the
Abolitionists were revolting to the moral feelings of all the decent
people of the North, and to ninety-nine one-hundredths of all the
people of the North, while the Southerners saw in them nothing but the
destruction of all law and order, the plunder of their property, the
burning of their firesides, and the massacre of their families. The
pronounced and determined manner in which the people of the North went
about the work of suppressing the agitation occasioned by the
Abolitionists is ample evidence to any sane mind that the indignation
of a {250} righteous conscience was fully aroused, and not the fury of
a guilty conscience.
[Sidenote: The attempt to suppress the Abolition movement at the
North.]
The details of the breaking up of the Abolition meetings and of the
destruction of the Abolition printing-presses by the citizens of the
Northern Commonwealths, as well as those of the Southampton massacre,
may be passed over, in a work like this, with a single remark that
only one person, the Rev. Mr. Lovejoy, was murdered in these
collisions; that this happened under circumstances of some
aggravation; and that, if the excitement at the South over the
massacre of sixty-one innocent persons was out of proportion with the
event, then not too much should be made out of the killing of a single
person, who was not entirely guiltless on his part of giving
provocation.
The things of importance to the student of constitutional history in
connection with these events are the increase of the Abolitionists in
number, their organization into societies, the dissatisfaction of the
Southerners with the unofficial, merely popular, way of dealing with
the agitation at the North, and their demands upon the governments of
the Northern Commonwealths to deal with the Abolitionists through the
processes of their criminal law.
So long as men only talk and write, it is the impulse of our
Anglo-Saxon character to place no further restraint upon them than the
law of slander and libel of private character imposes, no matter what
may be, or may be thought to be, the ultimate consequences of acting
according to what they may say or write. To deny this privilege to
anybody appears like a deprivation of the liberty of speech and of the
press, appears like persecution. There is no country in the world in
which the making of martyrs is an easier procedure than in {251} the
United States. Persecution is the soil in which new movements grow
best, no matter what may be the character of the movement.
[Sidenote: Growth of the Abolition movement.]
In a single year from the date of the first number of Garrison's
newspaper, _The Liberator_, that is, in January of 1832, the New
England Anti-slavery Society was formed, and in December of 1833 the
American Anti-slavery Society was organized, which soon established
branches in many quarters. The exaggerated demands of the Southerners,
that the Northern Commonwealths should forbid Abolition agitation by
law, thus identifying the interests of slavery with the denial of the
freedom of speaking and writing in the Northern Commonwealths, helped
greatly to swell the ranks of the Abolitionists, and to mollify public
opinion in the North against them.
[Sidenote: The methods of the moderate Abolitionists.]
The new Abolitionists were naturally of a more moderate type than
Garrison, and most of them would listen only to regular legal methods
for the accomplishment of their purposes. The quickening of the public
opinion in the North, the conviction of the slaveholders themselves of
the error, if not the sin, of slavery, and the appeal to the
Government to do all within its constitutional powers against slavery,
were the only means which many of them were willing to employ. Their
petitions to Congress, and the transmission of their literature of
Abolition to the Southerners through the United States mails, brought
the whole question of their rights and purposes before the Government,
and before the nation, for which that Government was bound to act with
impartial justice to all its parts.
[Sidenote: The Abolition petitions.]
Petitions for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia had
been sent to Congress, generally from {252} Quaker sources, almost
from the day that the capital of the country was established there,
but they were not numerous and were not pushed by any anti-slavery
organization. In the session of 1826-27, a petition from citizens of
Baltimore, probably instigated by Benjamin Lundy, was presented, which
contained the same prayer; and in the session of 1827-28, one of like
tenor from citizens of the District itself was presented. Such
petitions were usually read and referred to the committee on the
District. They were irritating to the slaveholders from the first, but
it was not until after the excitement of the Southampton massacre that
they were angrily resented as an interference with the domestic
institutions of the slaveholding Commonwealths.
It was in the session of 1831-32, that the first mutterings of the
petition storm were heard. On December 12th, 1831, Mr. John Quincy
Adams presented, in the House of Representatives, fifteen petitions
from sundry inhabitants of Pennsylvania, the chief prayer of all of
which was for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia.
Mr. Adams said that he would give no countenance to that prayer, but
that there was a prayer in the petitions for the abolition of the
slave-trade in the District, which, he thought, might properly be
considered, and he moved the reference of the petitions, for this
purpose, to the regular committee of the House for the District.
There was in this little to indicate the terrible earnestness which
Mr. Adams later displayed in behalf of the Abolition petitions. He
seemed at this time to be annoyed at being asked to present them, and
to feel that there were superior moral reasons why a slavery agitation
should not be excited within the halls of Congress. But all this was
soon to change. Mr. Adams's advance {253} toward radical Abolitionism
is as marked a feature of the struggle over the right of petition as
Mr. Calhoun's declaration of the righteousness of slavery.
[Sidenote: The earlier method of dealing with the petitions.]
The committee on the District reported, on December 19th, that as the
District was composed of cessions of territory from Maryland and
Virginia, it would, in the opinion of the members of the committee, be
unwise, if not unjust, for Congress to interfere in the question of
the relation of slave to master in the District, until Virginia and
Maryland should take steps to eradicate the evil from their respective
territories. This report seemed to settle the question for the
session, and no more petitions appeared in either House.
In the middle of the next session, Mr. Hiester, of Pennsylvania,
presented a petition to the House of Representatives from sundry
citizens of Pennsylvania praying for the abolition of slavery in the
District of Columbia. This was again a Quaker petition, as were the
petitions presented by Mr. Adams. Mr. Hiester moved to refer the
petition to the committee on the District, and Mr. Mason, of Virginia,
rashly called for the yeas and nays, which opened the question to
debate. Mr. Adams immediately pointed out this fact to Mr. Mason, and
advised him to withdraw his motion, which advice Mr. Mason wisely
adopted. The petition went to the Committee, and nothing further was
heard of it.
It was first in the session of 1833-34, that petitions for the
abolition of slavery in the District from others than Quakers,
presumably from the members of the new anti-slavery societies,
appeared in both Houses of Congress. Those presented in the Senate
were referred to the committee of the Senate for the District, and
nothing more was heard of them. Those presented in the House of
Representatives were dealt with in the same manner.
{254} It was not until the session of 1834-35, that the first real
note of the conflict was sounded. On January 26th, 1835, Mr. Dickson,
of New York, presented several petitions praying for the abolition of
the slave-trade and of slavery in the District. They were laid over
until February 2nd, when Mr. Dickson called them up, made a rather
irritating speech, in which he said that the committee on the District
had smothered all such petitions referred to it, and moved the
reference of those offered by him to a select committee.
Mr. Chinn, of Virginia, the chairman of the regular committee on the
District, resented Mr. Dickson's rude assault, and moved to lay the
petitions and Mr. Dickson's motion on the table. The House voted Mr.
Chinn's motion by a large majority.
[Sidenote: Beginning of the conflict over the Abolition petitions.]
At length, in the session of 1835-36, the storm broke in all its fury,
in both the Senate and the House. It began in the House, December
16th, 1835, upon the presentation of a petition, containing the usual
prayer in regard to slavery in the District, by Mr. Fairfield, of
Maine. Mr. Cramer, of New York, moved to lay the petition on the
table, and the motion was voted. Mr. Fairfield immediately presented
another petition of like purport, and himself moved that it be laid
upon the table. Mr. Boon, of Indiana, asked that the petition be read,
which was done. Thereupon Mr. Slade, of Vermont, moved that it be
printed. This meant, of course, that Mr. Slade was determined to have
the slavery question agitated in Congress, if he could. Upon him
rather than upon Mr. Adams rests the honor, or the blame, whichever it
may be, of provoking the excitement over the Abolition petitions, and
of upholding the right of petition in the most extreme degree.
The House first voted to lay the petition on the table. {255} The
Speaker, Mr. James K. Polk, then put Mr. Slade's motion to print.
Whereupon Mr. Slade attempted to debate the whole question of slavery
in the District under the motion. The Speaker ruled that the contents
of the petition could not be debated under the motion to print. Mr.
Vanderpoel, of New York, then moved to lay Mr. Slade's motion on the
table, and the House voted to do so by a large majority.
[Sidenote: Mr. Hammond's motion involving the denial of the right of
petition.]
Two days later the play was on again. Mr. Jackson, of Massachusetts,
presented a petition from sundry citizens of Massachusetts, containing
the usual prayer, and moved its reference to a select committee.
Whereupon Mr. Hammond, South Carolina, moved that the petition should
not be received. This was the ultra-Southern position in regard to the
anti-slavery petitions, and Mr. Hammond's enunciation of it in the
House antedates Mr. Calhoun's in the Senate by more than a fortnight.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to assemble
peaceably and petition the Government for redress of grievances. The
right to petition certainly includes the right to have the petitions
heard by the body petitioned. If the body refuses to receive the
petition, it prevents its being heard, and by preventing its being
heard it makes the right itself a mockery. On the other hand, the
Constitution vests in each House of Congress the power to make its own
rules of procedure. This power must, of course, be so used as not to
violate any other clause of the Constitution. Under this power,
however, each House may and should protect itself against all
obstacles thrown by outsiders in the way of the discharge of its
duties in legislating for the country. If any number of people
undertake, by an abuse of the right of petition, to obstruct the
legitimate work of the Congress for the whole people, each House {256}
certainly has the right to meet this attempt in any way which will not
deny the right of petition, the right of any one or any number of the
people to be heard in asking for a redress of grievances.
[Sidenote: The new method for dealing with petitions in the House of
Representatives.]
Down to 1834, the custom of procedure in Congress had been to receive,
hear, and refer all petitions. That was going one step farther than
was required by the constitutional right of petition; still it was the
regular course, and such men as Mr. Adams thought it unwise to depart
from the custom in the case of the Abolition petitions. At any rate,
Mr. Hammond's motion was a new proposition. The Speaker said that he
was "not aware that such a motion had ever been sustained by the
former practice of the House," and appeared to rule Mr. Hammond's
motion out of order. A confused wrangle ensued over the attitude
assumed by the Speaker, during which Mr. Hammond made a motion to
reject the petition, and the Speaker, becoming confused by the two
motions, the one not to receive, and the other to reject, and knowing
that the House could of course reject the prayer of a petition,
yielded to the representations of Mr. Hammond, and put Mr. Hammond's
motion not to _receive_ the petition to the House. The House voted not
to refuse to receive the petition, but the ruling of the Speaker in
putting the motion implied that the House possessed the power to
refuse to receive, that is, to refuse to hear, a petition. Another
confused wrangle ensued over the question whether the House had voted
merely not to refuse to receive the petition, or had voted to consider
its contents at once. After a day of heated debate and three days of
adjournment, during which excited feelings were somewhat calmed, the
House reversed all former action, and voted to lay the petition and
all the motions relating to it on the table.
{257} [Sidenote: True view of the right of petition.]
Another petition, which, during this wrangle had been inadvertently
referred to the committee on the District, was now recalled by a
motion to reconsider the vote of reference. It was upon this motion
that Mr. Adams made his first great appeal for the right of petition.
As we have seen, his view before this was that petitions must be
received, heard, and referred. In this speech, however, he indicated
that there should be a report from the committee, and a vote upon the
report. Mr. Jones, of Virginia, met Mr. Adams' assertions quite
successfully, and showed conclusively that, if the right of petition
should be interpreted to reach any farther than the right to have the
petition received and heard, it would so modify the constitutional
right of the House to establish its own rules of procedure as to put
it in the power of a few determined obstructionists outside the House,
acting with a single member of the House, to prevent the House from
doing anything but consider petitions upon a single subject,
sacrificing thus the interests of the whole people to the obstinacy of
a small number of the people.
[Sidenote: The power of Congress over slavery in the District of
Columbia.]
Mr. Jones' argument was so sound and rational that it would probably
have settled the minds of almost all of the members in regard to the
complicated questions of the right of petition, and the powers of the
House over its rules of procedure, had not Mr. Granger, of New York,
and Mr. Ingersoll, of Pennsylvania, thrown another firebrand into the
House during this debate, in the form of an intimation that Congress
had the constitutional power to abolish slavery in the District of
Columbia. The Southerners now advanced to the position of denying that
power to Congress, and Mr. Wise, of Virginia, in a long and violent
speech, demanded that Congress {258} should pass a resolution
disclaiming the possession of any such power. Mr. Slade immediately
accepted the challenge of Mr. Wise, and delivered an anti-slavery
speech in reply, such as had never before been heard upon the floors
of Congress. He not only vindicated the power of Congress over the
question of slavery in the District, but he discussed the whole
question of slavery upon its merits. His words were simply a
declaration of relentless war upon slavery in the halls of Congress.
They created indescribable consternation in all parts of the House,
and roused the resentment and anger of the slaveholders to a veritable
fury. In the midst of the confusion, Mr. Garland, of Virginia, gained
the Speaker's recognition, and made a good argument against some of
Mr. Slade's more radical statements. So soon as he had finished, Mr.
Mann, of New York, moved to stop the debate with the previous
question. This was voted, and the Speaker then put the motion for the
reconsideration of the reference of the petition, under which motion
this debate had proceeded. This was voted, and immediately the motion
was made to lay the recalled petition, with the reconsidered motion to
refer it, on the table. This was voted by a majority of more than two
to one.
Evidently the House thought that, in receiving and hearing the
petitions and then laying them on the table, it had found the solution
of the question, which neither violated the right of petition in the
people, nor encroached upon the power of the House over its rules of
procedure, nor opened the way for anti-slavery agitation in Congress.
[Sidenote: Mr. Polk's fatal error in regard to the right of petition.]
It would have been wise for the slaveholders to have left this
solution of the question undisturbed, but they did not see it so. On
January 4th, 1836, Mr. Adams presented a petition from sundry citizens
of {259} Massachusetts containing the usual prayer, and said that "in
conformity with the course heretofore adopted, he should move that the
petition, without reading, be laid on the table." Mr. Patton
interrupted Mr. Adams with an inquiry addressed to the Speaker as to
whether the petition had been received by the House, and the Speaker
replied that it had not. He said that, upon looking up the
authorities, he "had formed the opinion that the first question to be
decided, upon the motion of a member, was whether the petition be
received or not." The Speaker, Mr. Polk, had now come out of his
uncertainty about the right of petition including the reception of the
petition by the House, as a constitutional obligation, and now
definitely denied that the right of petition included the right to
have the petition received by the House. This was a fatal move, a
fatal mistake upon his part. The object professedly sought by all
parties, except such Abolitionists as Mr. Slade, was the prevention of
agitation upon the slavery question in the halls of Congress. Whether
all were sincere in this profession is questionable. It had been
insinuated that there were agitators upon this question from both
sections of the country, who were disingenuously claiming to be
classed with the maintainers of peace. It does really seem that the
innuendo was justified as to certain of the Southerners by the
position now assumed by Mr. Patton and Mr. Polk, and then by Mr.
Glascock, who, immediately after the ruling of the Speaker, moved that
this petition be not received. While Mr. Adams, who sincerely believed
that reference as well as reception was a necessary consequence of the
right of petition, had accommodated himself to the decision which the
House had made a fortnight before, these Southern gentlemen were now
proposing to drive the House from {260} the solid middle ground, then
occupied, toward a position which the majority considered to be an
encroachment upon the constitutional right of petition, a movement
upon their part which was certain, and known by all to be certain, to
provoke an excited debate upon the question of slavery. It may be that
they thought the refusal to receive one of these anti-slavery
petitions would prevent any more from being presented, and that it was
better to have it out once for all than to be continually receiving,
and listening to the reading of, these petitions. If so, they were
wofully mistaken.
[Sidenote: Mr. Adams' futile attempt to prevent slavery agitation in
Congress.]
Mr. Adams now made one more effort to preserve the Southerners against
the consequences of their own folly. He undertook to arrest the debate
by calling for the application of the forty-fifth rule of the House,
which required that no petition should be debated or decided on the
day of its presentation. But the Speaker now decided that this rule
could not apply to a petition until it had been received. The gates of
Janus were flung wide open, and the House went into an agitation upon
the subject, to which all that had gone before was only a prelude. The
struggle lasted for more than four months, during which period
petitions for the abolition of slavery in the District, signed by over
thirty thousand persons, were poured into the House. The slavery
question was at last brought before the people of the United States in
a way most highly satisfactory to the most radical Abolitionist, and
no matter what the immediate compromise upon the subject might be, it
was evident to all farseeing minds then that a death-blow had been
struck at slavery.
[Sidenote: The Pinckney resolutions.]
There is not space in this work to recount the scenes enacted on the
floor of the House during these four exciting months, or even to give
a résumé of the debate. {261} The conflict was ended for the moment by
the adoption, on May 25th (1836), of a series of resolutions reported
by a committee appointed for the purpose, of which Mr. Pinckney, of
South Carolina, was the chairman. These resolutions provided: "That
Congress possesses no constitutional authority to interfere in any way
with the institution of slavery in any of the States of this
Confederacy; that Congress ought not to interfere with slavery in the
District of Columbia; and whereas it is extremely important and
desirable that the agitation of this subject should be finally
arrested, for the purpose of restoring tranquillity to the public
mind, ... that all petitions, memorials, propositions, or papers,
relating in any way, or to any extent whatsoever, to the subject of
slavery, or the abolition of slavery, shall, without being printed or
referred, be laid upon the table, and that no further action whatever
shall be had thereon."
[Sidenote: The new rule of the House of Representatives in regard to
the Abolition petitions.]
The solution thus reached by the House of the question of the power of
the House to control its procedure, over against the right of a number
of individuals to excite interminable discussions and paralyze the
business of the House by flooding it with petitions upon one and the
same subject, was the laying of all such petitions on the table _as a
rule of the House_.
Of course this rule must be readopted at the beginning of each
session, and a debate upon the readoption might be thus precipitated,
but, so long as a majority supported the rule, the previous question
could be voted after giving a reasonable opportunity to discuss the
question of readoption, and such discussion was then not likely to be
renewed during the session. It was possible also for petitions to be
{262} presented, at the beginning of the session, before the
readoption of the rule, and these could be disposed of only by a
special vote in each case to lay upon the table. There were thus still
opportunities for the Abolitionists to cause the House to resolve
itself into something more like a bear-garden than an assembly of
Witan, as was evident from the scenes which were enacted on February
6th, 1837, when Mr. Adams came into the House with a petition in
regard to slavery signed by some twenty slaves, and asked the Speaker
if it came under the rule for laying such petitions on the table.
Everybody supposed that the petition contained the usual prayer for
the abolition of slavery, and that the Abolitionists had incited the
slaves to the act. Mr. Adams allowed the excitement produced by this
supposition to rage for a time, and then coolly and derisively
informed the House that the prayer of the petition was not for
abolition but against it. The members now felt that Mr. Adams was
playing with the peace, order, and dignity of the House in a
scandalous way, and for several days the question of censuring him was
considered, but the matter was finally disposed of by a resolution
declaring: "That slaves do not possess the right of petition secured
to the people of the United States by the Constitution."
At the beginning of the next session, that of 1837-38, Mr. Slade
seized the opportunity to present an abolition petition before the
re-enactment of the Pinckney rule, and to provoke a debate on the
subject of slavery. He was substantially foiled, however, by a vote to
adjourn, and, upon reassembly, by a suspension of the rules and a
re-enactment of the resolution to lay everything in reference to
slavery on the table. This rule covered all matters relating to
slavery in the Territories as well as in the Commonwealths and the
District.
{263} [Sidenote: The increase of petitions, and the denunciation of
the Pinckney rule.]
The more the House did to discourage the petitions the more they
increased. In two years from the adoption of the Pinckney resolutions
the number of petitioners was tenfold greater than it was before their
enactment. At the same time the legislatures of the New England
Commonwealths were passing resolutions declaring the rule of the House
of Representatives in regard to the abolition petitions to be a
violation of the people's constitutional right, and also declaring
that Congress possessed the power to abolish slavery in the District
of Columbia.
[Sidenote: The final denial of the right of petition on the subject of
Slavery by the House of Representatives.]
To meet these demonstrations of increasing strength and increasing
determination on the part of the Abolitionists, the House not only
repeated its rule, but made it more stringent, until, at last,
irritated beyond measure at the persistence of the petitioners, it
took the fatal step, and, on January 8th, 1840, enacted as a standing
rule of the House: "That no petition, memorial, resolution, or other
paper, praying the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia,
or any State or Territory, or the slave-trade between the States or
Territories of the United States in which it now exists, _shall be
received by this House, or entertained in any way whatever_."
At last the House had encroached upon the most essential part of the
right of petition, the right to have the petition heard. The moderate
men of the South and twenty-eight members from the North had given way
before the radical men of the South, and had fallen into the ranks
under their lead. The Southern radicals thought that they had won a
great victory, but it was not so. They had only identified the denial
of the right of petition with the interests of slavery. They {264} had
only demonstrated that slavery was a matter of national concern, since
its interests required that limitations should be placed upon the well
understood rights of the people in the non-slaveholding Commonwealths.
They only made it manifest that, sooner or later, the nation must deal
with the question. Their most violent enemies could not have wished
them a more disastrous result.
[Sidenote: The Abolition petitions in the Senate.]
The proceedings in the Senate in regard to the Abolition petitions
must be even more concisely stated. The course pursued and the result
reached were similar to what has been described in the account of the
experiences of the House. The Senate first received and heard the
petitions, and voted immediately to deny their prayer. Then, when it
became evident that this would not prevent anti-slavery agitation on
the floor of the Senate, the body adopted the custom of hearing a
motion not to receive a petition, and voting immediately to lay the
motion not to receive, and along with it the petition itself, on the
table. This practice was modified a little later, by a ruling of the
presiding officer, to the effect that an objection to the petition by
any member would raise the question of the reception of the petition
without a formal motion. Mr. Calhoun had contended for this method of
raising the question in regard to the reception of the petitions from
the beginning of the struggle over the subject, in January of 1836. He
seemed, however, to desire to dispose of them by simply voting not to
receive them. In fact, he made a motion to this effect, at the very
outset of the contest, but without success. While thus the Senate did
not formally adopt the practice finally reached in the House of
refusing to receive the petitions, it arrived at about the same result
in practice. It is true that the presiding officer of the Senate
allowed the petitions to be {265} read before putting the motion upon
their reception, which seems to have been an illogical practice
indeed, and that any member might move to call up the motion not to
receive, and with it the petition or petitions to which that motion
referred; but the reading before the motion not to receive, or before
the objection to receiving, was perfunctory, and there was no member
of the Senate who desired to call up the tabled petitions or persisted
in so doing. As a matter of fact, the public opinion which the
Abolitionists succeeded in creating in the North concerning the
attitude of the Senate toward the Abolition petitions was that the
Senate had done the same violence to the people's constitutional right
of petition that the House had done. It was held and believed
throughout the North, in 1840, that the Congress of the United States,
in both of its branches, had set the interests of slavery above the
liberties of the people of the North.
There were two incidents which happened during the course of the
proceedings in the Senate upon the subject to which brief reference
should be made. One was the noted passage of words between Mr. Calhoun
and Mr. Rives, of Virginia, in regard to the morality of slavery, and
the other was the petition from the legislature of Vermont for the
abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia.
[Sidenote: Mr. Rives and Mr. Calhoun in regard to the morality of
slavery.]
The Abolitionists had assumed to have the ethical principle entirely
upon their side, and this had not, down to 1836, been clearly disputed
by the slaveholders. The slaveholders had, themselves, as we have so
often seen, acknowledged slavery to be an evil, and had, therefore,
defended it chiefly from the point of view of positive law. Of course
so profound a thinker as Mr. Calhoun knew that positive law cannot
permanently withstand the {266} assaults of ethical principle. He knew
that the moral arguments against slavery must be met upon moral
grounds, as well as upon legal grounds. The discussion was carried
over upon ethical premises by the remark of Mr. Rives that he, though
a slaveholder, was not in favor of slavery in the abstract, and
differed on that point with the gentleman from South Carolina. Mr.
Calhoun immediately denied that he had expressed any opinion in regard
to the question of slavery in the abstract, and said he had spoken of
slavery only "as existing where two races of men, of different color,
and striking dissimilarity in conformation, habits, and a thousand
other particulars, were placed in immediate juxtaposition." Mr.
Calhoun elaborated his argument in many directions, but the gist of it
was that where a civilized race and a barbarous race, nearly equal
numerically, must live together, the civilized race must, in the
interests of the civilization of both races, control the barbarous
race, through the relation of the slavery of the latter to the former,
and that the only alternative to this would be the barbarizing of the
whole society by the uncontrolled deeds and passions of the barbarous
race, if the two races are left to themselves, or the establishment of
a barbaric despotism over the civilized race, if the barbaric race be
aided by successful interference from without. In contrast with either
of these conditions, Mr. Calhoun contended that the slavery of the
barbarous race to the civilized race was a moral good.
From a metaphysical point of view the only question between Mr. Rives
and Mr. Calhoun was whether every departure from the perfect good must
be considered an evil, or whether a nearer approximation to the
perfect good may be called a good in contrast with a lower
approximation. Mr. Rives was looking at the subject {267} from an
abstract, transcendental point of view, while Mr. Calhoun was
regarding it from the historical point of view. Mr. Rives was with the
Abolitionists upon the abstract principle, but against them as to the
time and means of applying it. Mr. Calhoun was not against the
Abolitionists upon the abstract principle, but the time of its
possible application appeared to him so far distant, and the
impropriety and unfairness of interference by outsiders in the matter
and the disastrous consequences which must flow from such interference
seemed to him so plain and so certain, that he almost lost sight of
the abstract height upon which the Abolitionists stood behind the many
intervening elevations, which must be first attained and traversed in
order to reach their position.
[Sidenote: The moral ground upon which Calhoun and the Abolitionists
could have met.]
There was a possible moral ground upon which Mr. Calhoun and the
Abolitionists might have met. Could the Abolitionists have conceived
that the existence of certain conditions would justify domestic
slavery as a relation which could _temporarily_ produce a better state
of morals in a particularly constituted society than any other
relation, that is, could they have taken the historical view of
ethics, the evolutionary view of morals, and could Mr. Calhoun have
seen that the time had come for a modification of the existing form of
negro slavery in the South, for a step toward a greater degree of
personal liberty for the slave, an approach between him and them might
have been, at least, begun; but their implacable dogmatism, and his
stern resentment at their persistent interference in what he thought
no concern of theirs, widened the gulf between him and them from day
to day. They regarded him as a sinner and a criminal because he held
persons to service and labor who had not freely agreed to the same,
and he {268} considered them to be greater sinners and criminals
because they would overturn the existing order of society in
communities where they had no personal interests to be affected, and
would introduce into these communities the reign of plunder, rapine,
and murder.
[Sidenote: Mr. Calhoun's resolutions in regard to the political
relations of slavery.]
When Mr. Calhoun saw that he could not bring the Senate to refuse
formally to receive the Abolition petitions, he undertook to bring the
Senate over to his views of the "States' sovereignty" character of the
Union, of the obligation of the general Government to protect slavery
in the slaveholding Commonwealths, of the ethical obligation of the
people of the non-slaveholding Commonwealths not to attack the
institution of slavery, and of the practical impotence of Congress to
deal with slavery in the District of Columbia and in the Territories.
He did not, however, succeed. The Senate did not repudiate his
"States' sovereignty" view of the Union, but, while it was willing to
say that neither the Northern Commonwealths nor the Northern people
had any legal right to attack slavery under moral or religious
pretexts, it would not say that they were under moral or religious
obligations to abstain from the attack. Neither would the Senate say
that the general Government must so exercise its powers as to give
increased security to slavery, nor that the general Government had no
power over the subject of slavery in the District and the Territories.
It modified these demands of Mr. Calhoun so as to make them read, that
the general Government should not so exercise its powers as to
interfere with the security of the domestic institutions of the
Commonwealths, and that the general Government ought not in good faith
to undertake to abolish slavery in the District or in the Territories,
except under certain conditions.
{269} [Sidenote: The anti-slavery petition from the Vermont
legislature.]
The immediate occasion of the presentation of these resolutions of
December 27th, 1837, by Mr. Calhoun, was probably the other incident
to which reference has been made, the introduction, by Senator Swift,
of Vermont, of a petition from the legislature of Vermont praying for
the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. This shaft had
struck Mr. Calhoun in his most vulnerable part. Here was, according to
his own doctrine, a "sovereign State" instructing its governmental
agent for general affairs. Could that agent refuse to receive the
instructions of one of his principals? There certainly was no
precedent for any such procedure as that in any system of
jurisprudence known to the world. Mr. Calhoun recognized fully the
embarrassment of his position. He begged that the communication from
the Vermont legislature might lay upon the table until he could
prepare his mind for action upon the subject, and pledged himself to
call it up very shortly, if no one else should do so. Mr. Swift helped
the Senate, and Mr. Calhoun especially, out of the dilemma by
withdrawing the petition for the time being. This incident occurred on
December 19th.
Mr. Swift assumed that Mr. Calhoun's resolutions of the 27th contained
the results of his preparation of mind to meet the Vermont memorial,
and after the consideration of them by the Senate, Mr. Swift
reintroduced the memorial on January 16th (1838). The Southerners had
been thrown into such confusion by the _coup de surprise_ sprung upon
them by the Vermonters that they had not been able to agree upon any
plan for meeting the exigency. Some of them denounced the action of
the Vermont legislature as incendiary, outrageous, and degrading. Mr.
King gave his "States' sovereignty" creed entirely away in saying: "We
{270} defend the legitimate rights of the States, but we do not defend
a sovereign State when she asserts calumny and falsehood."
Mr. Calhoun was measured in his language, but evidently greatly
disturbed in mind. He said that as a "States' rights" man, in the
strongest sense, he believed that the "State" of Vermont had a right
to come there and be heard; that, on the best reflection he could give
to the matter, he could not vote against receiving the petition; but
that, on the other hand, he considered the language of the memorial so
objectionable that he could not vote to receive it.
It does seem as if this incident should have taught Mr. Calhoun the
fallacy of his logic in insisting upon the power of the Senate to
refuse to receive a petition. Here was a case in which his doctrine of
parliamentary procedure had absolutely broken down, according to his
own acknowledgment. Mr. Strange, of North Carolina, committed the
folly of objecting to the reception of the petition, and moving that
the question of reception, and with it the petition, be laid on the
table. The motion was defeated by a vote of twenty-six to twelve. The
memorial was received and the debate upon it was in order. The
Southerners were helpless, and had not Mr. Swift himself come to their
rescue, no man can say what would have happened. Mr. Swift moved that
the papers from the Vermont legislature be laid upon the table,
without being printed. They had accomplished their immediate purpose,
and it was wise as well as patriotic to let them rest in dignity and
honor.
[Sidenote: The Abolition documents and the United States mails.]
The Abolitionists were more successful in their attempt to use the
United States mails for the distribution of their literature
throughout the South. During the course of the year 1835, it became
known that {271} their opinions and doctrines were being disseminated
by this means. The Southerners considered these opinions to be
incendiary and dangerous to the peace and safety of their communities
and their firesides. They thought that they had the legal right to
prevent the delivery of such mail matter in their respective
communities. They did not wait, however, to deal with the subject
through legal forms. On the night of July 29th, 1835, a mob of
respectables broke into the post-office at Charleston, S. C., in
search of Abolition documents. They found a sack full of them, took it
away with them, and publicly burned its contents. On August 4th
following, a meeting of the citizens took place, at which a committee
of public safety was elected, which should, in understanding with the
postmaster, determine what mail matter should not be delivered by him
to the addressees. The postmaster apparently acquiesced in this
arrangement, but he wrote, upon his own responsibility, a letter to
the postmaster of New York City, whence the Abolition pamphlets had
come, requesting him not to forward any more such documents. The
postmaster at New York endeavored to induce the Abolitionists not to
put any more of their literature into the mails until he could receive
instructions from the Postmaster-General at Washington in regard to
the question; and when the Abolitionists repelled his request, he
refused to forward their documents, pending his conference with the
Postmaster-General.
[Sidenote: The Postmaster-General's ruling in regard to the Abolition
documents in the mails.]
The Postmaster-General, Mr. Amos Kendall, one of the shrewdest of
politicians, though no great constitutional lawyer, answered the
appeal from the postmaster at New York immediately. He instructed his
subordinate that the executive power of the Government had no legal
authority to exclude mail matter, as defined by {272} Congress, from
the mails on account of the character of its contents, real or
supposed. If Mr. Kendall had stopped with this he would have been
entirely correct; but he went on to say that he would not direct the
postmaster at New York to forward the Abolition documents or the
postmaster at Charleston to deliver them, commended their assumption
of the responsibility of withholding them from the addressees, and
declared that the United States officials owed an obligation to the
laws of the United States, but a higher one to the communities in
which they lived. Mr. Kendall probably meant this part of his
communication as the advice of one private citizen to another. Looked
at in the most charitable light possible, however, it was
unjustifiable and pernicious. It was nothing less than an
encouragement to his subordinates to suspend the execution of the laws
which they were appointed to execute and sworn to execute, when in
their several opinions the welfare of the communities in which they
might live should require it. This was nullification, not by a "State"
convention, but by an individual United States officer. How the
President, who had always so sternly denounced any attempt to prevent
the execution of the laws, could approve this is difficult to
understand. His indignation at the Abolitionists in persisting in what
he considered an abuse of the freedom of the mails probably blinded
him to the real significance of the matter.
[Sidenote: Jackson on the use of the mails by the Abolitionists.]
In his message of the following December, the President denounced the
methods of the Abolitionists in sending their incendiary literature
into the South as calculated and intended to excite a servile war with
all its horrors, and recommended Congress to pass a law prohibiting,
"under severe penalties, the circulation in the Southern States, {273}
through the mail, of incendiary publications intended to instigate the
slaves to insurrection."
Mr. Calhoun himself moved the reference of this part of the
President's message to a select committee in the Senate. Mr. Calhoun
was appointed the chairman of the committee, and on February 4th,
1836, he brought in a report and a bill.
[Sidenote: Mr. Calhoun's report and bill on the subject.]
In the report Mr. Calhoun took the ground that the freedom of the
mails was a necessary part of the freedom of the press, and argued
that, as Congress was prohibited by the first amendment to the
Constitution from passing any law abridging the freedom of the press,
so Congress possessed no power to pass any law excluding mail matter
from the mails on account of the character of its contents or
authorizing such matter to be withheld from the addressees. Mr.
Calhoun's conclusion was that only the "States" could make such laws
as would effect these things. He proposed in his bill, therefore, that
no deputy postmaster in any "State," Territory, or district of the
Union should knowingly receive and put into the mail any printed or
written paper or pictorial representation touching the subject of
slavery, addressed to a person or a post-office within any "State,"
Territory, or district in which the circulation of such papers and
representations was forbidden by the local laws; that the officers and
agents of the Post-Office Department should co-operate with the local
officials in preventing the circulation of such papers and
representations where their circulation was prohibited by the local
laws; that the matter so detained from transmission by a post-office
official should be burned, after one month's notice, if the person
depositing the same should not claim it within that period; and that
the post-office officials who should violate these duties should not
be {274} protected by the laws of the United States against the
jurisdiction of the local law and government.
[Sidenote: Clay's criticism of Calhoun's proposition.]
Mr. Clay immediately pointed out the fatal weaknesses of this
proposition. He argued that it attributed to Congress either the power
to adopt the laws of the "States" upon subjects in regard to which
Congress itself had not the power to legislate, or the power to pass
laws in execution of laws which it had no power to make. The argument
was unanswerable, and the conclusion was unavoidable that if Congress
could not itself pass a law excluding the Abolition papers and
documents from the mail, or forbidding their delivery to the
addressees, it could not enact Mr. Calhoun's proposition. After four
months of deliberation the Senate rejected the proposed bill by a vote
of twenty-five to nineteen. Mr. Calhoun thus lost the aid of the
general Government in his contest with the Abolitionists over the use
of the mails chiefly through his exaggerated "States' rights"
doctrine.
[Sidenote: The act of Congress protecting the Abolition documents in
the mails.]
Encouraged by this victory, the friends of free mails succeeded in
having a provision incorporated into the Act of July 2nd, 1836, for
changing the organization of the Post-Office Department, which ordains
that any postmaster intentionally detaining any mail matter from the
addressees shall be fined and imprisoned, and incapacitated to hold
thereafter the office of a postmaster in the United States.
[Sidenote: General results of the struggle over the right of petition
and the freedom of the mails.]
It would not be extravagant to say that the whole course of the
internal history of the United States from 1836 to 1861 was more
largely determined by the struggle in Congress over the Abolition
petitions and the use of the mails for the distribution of the
Abolition literature than by anything else.
{275} In the first place, it did more than anything else to make a
political party out of the Abolitionists, through the conviction which
it produced throughout the North that the demands of the slavery
system in the South would ultimately destroy civil and political
liberty in the North, and it increased the strength of the
Abolitionists an hundredfold in less than four years. The development
and ultimate triumph of this party in the North became inevitable from
the moment that it was clearly recognized that the preservation of
slavery at the South required and demanded the denial of the freedom
of speech and of the press, and of the right of petition, to the
people of the North.
In the second place, it taught the South that there was a growing
party in the North which was determined to attack slavery at every
possible legal point, and prosecute its warfare at every hazard, and
that the only safety for the South, with its slavery system, in the
Union, was to hold at least equal power in the Congress with the
representation from the North. In self-defence the South must secure,
therefore, the formation of new slaveholding Commonwealths. At the
moment the representation in the Senate was evenly balanced, but in
the House it stood against the South, one hundred and forty-one to
ninety-nine. One more non-slaveholding Commonwealth, without an offset
on the other side, would destroy the balance in the Senate and enable
the North to undertake legislation hostile to slavery. The extension
of slavery to new Commonwealths was thus manifestly a necessity to its
permanent security, and even continuance, in the Commonwealths where
it already existed. The policy of the slaveholders must be to allow no
new non-slaveholding Commonwealth to be formed without another
slaveholding Commonwealth to match it, and to secure the {276}
extension of the territory of the United States toward the South.
In the third place, it aroused the apprehension of slave insurrection,
by Abolition incitement, throughout the South, and caused thereby two
marked movements in the South, the one legal and the other social. The
first was the legislation sharpening and increasing the police power
of the public authorities over the slaves, for the purpose of
preventing the access of the Abolition doctrines to their minds, and
of preventing communication and intercourse between strangers and
slaves, and between the slaves themselves. The control of the slave by
the master was thus more and more interfered with by the public
authorities, for the purpose indeed of aiding the master, which,
however, did not alter the fact that from being primarily for the most
part a household affair, slavery was becoming more and more an affair
of the community. This meant no improvement to the condition of the
slave; quite the contrary. The intervention of the whites in the South
who owned no slaves in the control of the slaves marks an increase of
rigor in the treatment of the slaves. In fact much of the cruelty
inflicted upon the slaves during the twenty years between 1840 and
1860 was executed by non-slaveholders, by virtue of the increased
control assumed by the public authorities over the relation between
master and slave, through the local legislation of that period. The
other movement was toward the development of a military caste in the
society. The slaveholders, and especially the sons of the
slaveholders, now began to understand that they must unite in military
organization and make themselves the exclusive military class. The
spirit of chivalry and the practices of knighthood were largely
developed during this period, with both their good and their bad
consequences. On the one side they produced {277} a high-toned society
of proud, noble women, and courtly, haughty men, among the
slaveholders. On the other, they degraded all other classes, both
white and black. In fact they degraded the poor whites more than they
did the blacks. The blacks felt, and were proud of, the increased
importance of their masters. And, naturally, this spirit and life
among the slaveholding class made the generation which grew up under
them eager for adventure and war, intensely tenacious of rights,
sensitive to every only apparent discourtesy, and resentful of every
semblance of interference from without. The War with Mexico, the
filibustering expeditions, and the Civil War itself, were all national
consequences of the social development in the South after 1836.
{278}
CHAPTER XII.
THE BANK, THE SUB-TREASURY, AND PARTY DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN 1832 AND
1842
Jackson and the Bank after the Election of 1832--The Power of the
Secretary of the Treasury over the Government Deposits--Removal of
McLane and Duane--Taney's Report to Congress of December 3rd,
1835--Abuses of Power by Jackson and Taney--The Senate's Censure of
the President and Secretary of the Treasury--National Republicans Take
the Name of Whigs--The Cardinal Doctrine of the Whigs--The Change of
the Deposits, and the Specie Order of 1836--Van Buren's Election and
the Panic of "'37"--The Sub-Treasury Idea--The Establishment of the
Sub-Treasury System--The Election of 1840--Whig Legislative Projects
in Regard to the Bank and the Tariff--The Party Treason of Tyler and
the Whig War upon the President's Veto Power--The Whigs Unable to
Encounter the Questions of Territorial Extension and Slavery
Extension.
When the violent agitation of the slavery question, in the middle of
the fourth decade, came so suddenly upon the nation, it found the
great political parties divided upon issues which partook more of the
character of economic policies than that of rights, or of governmental
forms and powers. It is true that the protective tariff, the Bank, and
internal improvements had been denounced by some persons as
unconstitutional, but neither party held this view of these subjects
at the beginning of the fourth decade of the century. They were
regarded by the two great parties from the point {279} of view of
economic policy, and were supported or opposed by them on the ground
of conduciveness or lack of conduciveness to the public welfare. More
exactly, the Bank was the chief political issue between 1832 and 1840.
It was in the conflict between Congress and the President in regard to
the Bank that the national Republicans took the title of Whigs,
anti-prerogative men.
[Sidenote: Jackson and the Bank after the election of 1832.]
After the election of 1832 upon the Bank issue, President Jackson,
naturally for him, regarded himself as the only representative of the
present will of the people in the Government. The Congress, at the
time of the election, was, as we know, favorable to the Bank. The
newly elected members of the House of Representatives would not
assemble for a year probably, and the Senate would probably sustain
the Bank after that. The President, therefore, resolved to do by edict
what Congress would not do by statute--destroy the Bank.
[Sidenote: The power of the Secretary of the Treasury over the
Government deposits.]
The sixteenth section of the Bank Act provided that the funds of the
United States should be deposited in the Bank or its branches, unless
the Secretary of the Treasury should at any time otherwise order and
direct. The Secretary of the Treasury was thus impliedly authorized by
Congress to cease depositing these funds in the Bank or its branches
at his own discretion, and was made directly responsible to Congress
in the exercise of this authority, by the provision that he must
report, so soon as possible, to Congress his reasons for making use of
the power. The President thus had no direct authority in the matter.
He could exercise only an indirect control through his power over the
tenure of the Secretary. At this period in the history of the tenure
of office in the United States, the power of removal was regarded as a
prerogative of the President alone.
{280} [Sidenote: Removal of McLane and Duane.]
President Jackson was within the letter of his prerogative when, in
the spring of 1833, he removed Mr. McLane, and later, Mr. Duane, from
the secretaryship of the Treasury. That he did this because of their
refusal to be controlled by him in regard to the deposit of the funds
of the United States in the Bank and its branches was, legally, no
concern of anybody else.
[Sidenote: Taney's report to Congress of December 3rd, 1835.]
The new Secretary, Mr. Taney, appointed to succeed Mr. Duane, was also
acting within the letter of his authority when he ceased to make
deposit of the Government funds in the Bank and its branches, and
reported his action to Congress at the commencement of the session
following the recess of Congress during which he made this change.
[Sidenote: Abuses of power by Jackson and Taney.]
On the other hand, it was very questionable whether the President was
not abusing his power of dismissal from office, in spirit, by
requiring the obedience of the Secretary of the Treasury to himself in
regard to a subject concerning which Congress had vested discretionary
power in the Secretary, and in the use of which power Congress had
made the Secretary directly and exclusively responsible to itself. And
it was likewise very questionable whether the Secretary was not
abusing his authority, in spirit, in ceasing, during a recess of
Congress, to deposit the funds of the United States in the Bank and
its branches, when, less than a year before this, Congress had made a
full investigation of the condition of the Bank and had disapproved,
by large majorities in both Houses, of the President's recommendation
that the deposits be made elsewhere than in the Bank and its branches.
Secretary Taney, afterward Chief Justice, to whose legal opinions,
therefore, great respect must be paid, {281} contended that Congress
itself could not have caused the removal of the deposits without
violating the contract with the Bank, as expressed in the Bank's
charter, and that the Secretary of the Treasury alone was exempted
from this obligation by the provisions of the contract. The Secretary
alone, he said, could, therefore, act for the welfare of the people in
the matter, and by the oath which he had sworn upon the Constitution
he must so act. He declared it to be his conviction that the public
welfare would suffer by his continuing to deposit the funds of the
Government in the Bank and its branches, and that he felt, therefore,
in duty bound to make the order discontinuing the same.
[Sidenote: The Senate's censure of the President and Secretary of the
Treasury.]
The Senate, however, took a different view of the subject. It
considered the act of the Secretary to have been done under the order
of the President, and in condemnatory resolutions held the President
responsible therefor. These resolutions of censure connected the
Secretary with the President, however, by declaring the reasons
offered by the Secretary for the change in regard to the deposits to
be "unsatisfactory and insufficient." The President made a vigorous
protest against the Senate's resolution charging him with usurpation,
and flung the accusation back at the body. He certainly showed that
the Senate had no constitutional power to make any such charge against
the President; and Senator Benton immediately gave notice that he
should move the expunging of the resolutions from the journal at every
session of Congress until it should be accomplished.
[Sidenote: National Republicans take the name of Whigs.]
It was in the midst of this conflict, and in consequence of it, a
conflict in principle between the legislative and executive
departments of the Government, in regard to the extent of their
respective powers, that Mr. James Watson {282} Webb, the editor of the
_New York Courier and Enquirer_, began, about February, 1834, to
denominate, in his newspaper articles, the opposition party to the
President, led by Mr. Clay, Whigs. This title signified opposition to
high executive prerogative, and approval of strong Congressional
control over the President. The name was gradually substituted for
that of National Republicans, as the different members and factions of
the party came together upon the principle involved in the name.
[Sidenote: The cardinal doctrine of the Whigs.]
It seemed, for the moment, as if the parties had returned to the
condition of bands of retainers under the lead of Clay and Jackson
respectively, but this was more apparent than real. There was a real
and comprehensive question at issue, one of the most fundamental
questions of political science, the question of parliamentary
government or presidential government in the United States. The
triumph of President Jackson in this conflict--for the Bank was not
rechartered, the deposits were not restored, and the President was not
impeached, but the Senate's resolutions of censure were
expunged--settled that question, and preserved the American system of
government from further following the tendency which, from the
accession of Jefferson to that of Jackson, had been slowly asserting
itself, the tendency toward Congressional control over the
Administration.
The original character of the Whig party explains many important
things in its composition and subsequent history. In the first place,
it explains why the party was composed, as to its leading element, of
high-toned, courteous gentlemen--the larger part of the aristocracy of
the land--since it is the instinct of the aristocracy to control the
executive through the legislature. It explains further why the Whig
party was unable to {283} cope with the problem of slavery, since its
fundamental principle was not a doctrine of rights, but of
governmental form. It explains, lastly, why, in the development of the
country's history, the defeat of the Whig party was necessary to the
very existence of the country, when the great struggle should come,
since its principle of Congressional control of the Administration
would, if realized, have greatly weakened that executive independence,
power, and unity, without which victory could hardly have been won.
[Sidenote: The change of the deposits, and the specie order of 1836.]
The failure of the Whigs in the campaign of 1836, and their momentary
triumph in that of 1840, were experienced under the true issue of the
Whig principle. The modification of the tariff by the Act of 1833, and
the change of the place of deposit of the funds of the Government,
after October 1st, 1833, from the United States Bank and its branches
to certain Commonwealth banks, designated by the Secretary of the
Treasury, had brought about much business embarrassment, since the one
depressed the manufacturing interests, and the other forced the United
States Bank and its branches to call in the loans made upon the
strength of the Government's deposits. This embarrassment was greatly
increased by the issue of the executive order of July 11th, 1836,
directing that only specie should be taken at the land offices for
public lands. At the moment there was a general speculation in Western
lands, and only those banks which held Government deposits could
furnish their customers with specie; the others, when called upon for
gold and silver in exchange for their notes, were compelled to
suspend.
The Congress, disapproving the favoritism shown by the Secretary of
the Treasury, and, probably foreseeing that a financial crisis of some
sort was impending, had, {284} on June 23rd preceding, passed an Act
ordering a more general distribution of the deposits than the
Secretary of the Treasury had made. After the specie order, and a
little experience with its effect, the demand was raised from every
quarter for an immediate execution of the Act of Congress of June
23rd. The Secretary hastened to carry out the provision, with the
result of driving those banks into insolvency which had been able to
stand, the existing deposit banks, since they had loaned the money of
the Government deposited in them, and were compelled to call in these
loans in the proportion that they were called upon to give up these
deposits, and were left also without the gold and silver of the
Government to redeem their own notes. The sudden calling in of the
loans also forced a great number of the borrowers into insolvency.
[Sidenote: Van Buren's election and the panic of "'37."]
Had the full force of the financial distress come in 1836, instead of
a year later, it might have turned the election against Jackson's
heir, Mr. Van Buren; but as things were, the Van Buren Administration
was established, and had had an opportunity to get a little foothold,
when the financial panic spread over the land. Mr. Van Buren and his
advisers decided very properly not to involve the Government, but to
let the people work themselves through the disaster by the natural
course of business. This, as is usual in such cases, turned hosts of
supporters into opponents.
[Sidenote: The Sub-Treasury idea.]
The Administration, however, pursued the even tenor of its way, and
endeavored to draw the lesson of the experiences with banks as places
of deposit for the funds of the Government. In his message of
September 4th, 1837, President Van Buren recommended that the
Government should cut loose entirely from banks, and should keep its
funds in the {285} United States Treasury, and in branches of the
Treasury, under the control of the officers of the Treasury. The idea
was not original with Mr. Van Buren. Mr. Gordon, of Virginia, had
suggested it in the House of Representatives, during the session of
1834-35, and had offered a plan for its realization, in the form of an
amendment to the bill, then before the House, for regulating the
deposits. Mr. Gordon's amendment was rejected on February 11th, 1835.
The significant thing about it was that the plan was then supported by
Whigs almost exclusively, only one Democrat voting in favor of it. It
is true that only about one-half of the Whigs in the House supported
it, and that it could hardly, therefore, be called a Whig party
measure in 1835. On the other hand, it was certainly then opposed by
the Democratic party.
[Sidenote: The establishment of the Sub-Treasury system.]
Under these circumstances, it was a courageous thing in Mr. Van Buren
to take up the idea anew and recommend it to Congress. Not until the
session of 1839-40, however, was Congress brought to approve the plan
and pass the law of July 4th, 1840, establishing the Sub-Treasury
system for the keeping of the funds of the Government. During the
discussion of the bill in Congress, its principle developed into a
strict party question, the Democrats supporting it and the Whigs
opposing it. The Whigs represented the scheme as an attempt to break
down all the banks in the country, to keep the people's money locked
up in the vaults of the Treasury, instead of maintaining it in
circulation for their benefit, and to make the President the arbiter
of the business of the country, and thus develop still further his
autocratic power. The Whig protest was a capital piece of demagogism,
and it proved immediately and immensely attractive to the people.
Before the summer of 1840 wore {286} away it was entirely clear that
the people had made up their minds to try a Whig administration, and
had arrived at this resolution under the issue of the financial
questions.
[Sidenote: The election of 1840.]
The Whig National Convention had met in December, 1839, and had
adopted no platform of principles. It had conciliated the factional
differences in the Whig ranks by dropping Clay and nominating General
Harrison, the military hero of the party, and the Whigs were now,
therefore, free to strike any note in the campaign which would please
the popular ear. The victory was a clean sweep, and the Whigs
immediately set about the financial legislation, which was, as they
thought, to redeem the country.
[Sidenote: Whig legislative projects in regard to the Bank and the
tariff.]
They had attributed the distress in the country chiefly to the failure
to re-charter the Bank and to the reduction of the tariff.
Consequently, they immediately passed a bill for the incorporation of
a bank, when, to their dismay and confusion, Mr. Tyler, elected
Vice-President, and, upon the sudden death of Mr. Harrison, successor
to the presidential office, vetoed the bill. The leaders of the party
in Congress consulted with the President in regard to a bank bill
which would be acceptable to him, and drafted one which followed his
suggestions in all essential principles, and contained only a few
divergent details, put in probably for the purpose of preserving a
show of legislative independence, but the President considered these
differences essential and vetoed the second bill. The bills for
suspending the reductions of the duties met with the same fate, two of
them being successively vetoed.
After the Bank vetoes all the members of the Cabinet, except the
Secretary of State, Mr. Webster, resigned, and after the tariff vetoes
Mr. Webster retired, so soon {287} as the diplomatic negotiations with
Great Britain, then in progress, permitted.
[Sidenote: The party treason of Tyler and the Whig war upon the
President's veto power.]
The Whigs regarded Mr. Tyler as a traitor to the party and began a war
upon the veto power of the President. They had come back again to
their original principle of government--the supremacy of the
legislature over the executive.
From this account, it is clearly manifest that the Whig party did not
stand upon any fundamental principle which would enable it to meet
successfully those questions which, after the final settlement given
to the bank and tariff issues by the vetoes of President Tyler, came
to the front--the questions of territorial extension and of slavery
extension.
[Sidenote: The Whigs unable to encounter the questions of territorial
extension and slavery extension.]
It might be thought, at first view, that the Democratic party of that
day was no better prepared than the Whig party to encounter these
questions, since it, too, had reached its distinctive position through
its attitude in economic issues. But the strength of the Democratic
party lay in the South, and the South had a strong interest in
territorial extension for the purpose of slavery extension, which, so
long as the Southern wing of the Democratic party ruled the party,
would furnish a clear and definite aim to the policy of the party, and
would, thereby, give it great advantage over the Whigs, whose Northern
and Southern contingents were much more evenly balanced, and,
therefore, as to these questions, less able, or, rather, entirely
unable, to gain a position upon which they might make a common stand.
In a word, as to the Whig party, there was, after 1842, nothing to
take the place of their overthrown economic policies, while, as to the
Democratic party, there was territorial extension for the sake of
slavery extension. When {288} these latter questions came to the
front, therefore, they were destined, sooner or later, to disrupt the
Whig party and destroy it altogether. The whole South would be for
territorial extension, chiefly for the sake of slavery extension, and
a large party at the North would be for territorial extension _per
se_. The opposition to territorial extension must, therefore, become
sectional, and as that opposition came chiefly from the Whig party it
was the Whig party which would be degraded from its national character
by this question, and then destroyed by it and its attendant question
of slavery extension.
{289}
CHAPTER XIII.
TEXAS
Arkansas and Michigan--Florida and Iowa--Texas--The Austin
Grant--Local Government in Texas--The Attempts by the United States to
Purchase Texas--The Texan Revolution--General Sam Houston--San Jacinto
and Independence--The Recognition of the Independence of
Texas--Calhoun's frank Declaration in Regard to the Annexation of
Texas--The Mission of Mr. Morfit to Texas, His Report and
Advice--Jackson's Recommendation to Delay the Recognition of Texan
Independence--Jackson's Request of Congress for Authority to Issue an
Ultimatum to Mexico in the Claims Question--Texan Independence
Recognized by the United States--The Question of Annexation--Texan
Proposition for Annexation--The Mexican Claims Commission and its
Work--Tyler as an Advocate of Annexation--Mr. Webster in the Way of
Annexation--The Adams Address on Annexation--The Retirement of
Webster--The Promotion of Upshur, and His Negotiations with the
Texans--The Threat of the Mexican Government to Consider the
Annexation of Texas a Cause of War--The Administration Proposes
Annexation to the Texan Agent--The Difficulty in the Way of Acceptance
of the Proposition--The Demand of the Texans for Protection in the
Interim--Mr. Calhoun in the State Department--The Treaty of Annexation
Signed--The Treaty in the Senate and its Rejection--Mr. Archer's
Opposition to the Treaty--The New Plan for Annexation.
After the admission of Missouri there remained as territory, upon
which, according to existing law, it was {290} probable that
slaveholding Commonwealths would be established, only Arkansas and
Florida.
[Sidenote: Arkansas and Michigan.]
[Sidenote: Florida and Iowa.]
In 1836, Arkansas was admitted as a slaveholding Commonwealth, and
Michigan as a non-slaveholding Commonwealth, thus keeping the exact
balance in the Senate. By a compact of the year 1832, the Seminoles in
Florida had agreed to emigrate within three years to the west bank of
the Mississippi. At the end of this period, one of their chiefs,
Osceola, repudiated the agreement, and with a large following began
hostilities. By a long and expensive war the Indians were at last
expelled; and the white inhabitants immediately chose delegates to a
convention, who met, in December of 1838, formed a Commonwealth
constitution, one of the provisions of which legalized slavery, and
demanded of Congress admission into the Union. Congress kept Florida
waiting, however, for six years, until Iowa was ready, and then
admitted the two at the same time and by the same Act.
[Sidenote: Texas.]
Meanwhile the events in the Southwest had been so shaping themselves
as to open up prospects for the long desired territorial extension in
that quarter. The long dispute between Spain and France, and then
after 1803, between Spain and the United States, in regard to the
territory between the Rio Grande del Norte and the Sabine Rivers,
called Texas, was first definitely settled in 1819, or rather in the
Treaty of that year, between the United States and Spain, which Treaty
was not executed, as we have seen, until a little later. In it this
territory was recognized by the United States as belonging to Spain.
It seems that a few persons from the United States had settled upon
this territory, while it was disputed ground, and raised some
complaint at having been left unprotected by the Government in the
Treaty with Spain.
{291} [Sidenote: The Austin grant.]
The successful rebellion of Mexico against Spain made this territory a
part of the new Mexican state, and before Mexico had had time to
consolidate its powers or estimate the value of its northern
possessions, a shrewd Yankee from Connecticut, who had removed to
Missouri, and had become well skilled in the arts and practices of
border life, Moses Austin, went to Mexico, and representing himself,
it is said, as the leader of a company of Roman Catholics, who had
suffered persecution in the United States, for their religion's sake,
solicited a grant of land from the Catholic government of Mexico, and
permission to make a settlement upon it. The Mexicans gave ready ear
to his complaints and petition, and made him a large grant of land in
the central part of Texas on the Colorado River. Mr. Austin died
before effecting the settlement, and left the work to his son, S. F.
Austin, who, in 1822, colonized the grant, and received a ratification
of the same from the Mexican Government, the following year.
[Sidenote: Local government in Texas.]
At that moment, Texas and Coahuila formed a single Mexican province,
and, after the establishment of the federal system of government in
Mexico, the province became, in 1827, a Commonwealth. In the Coahuila
part the population was Mexican, and as it was much larger than the
Anglo-American population in the Texas part, the government of the
Commonwealth was practically in the hands of Mexican officials. The
rule of these officials was arbitrary and uncertain, and the race
prejudice between Spaniard and Anglo-Saxon was immediately excited by
it. It was pretty evident that the expulsion of the Americans from
Texas was intended. In 1830, came at last the decree from the Mexican
President, Bustamente, prohibiting further immigration into Texas from
the United States.
{292} The Texan colonists now numbered some twenty thousand, mostly
bold and hardy men, and it was not to be expected that they would
either give up their lands, or assist in preventing further
immigration, or submit much longer to the foreign rule, as they felt
it to be, of Mexico or Coahuila.
[Sidenote: The attempts by the United States to purchase Texas.]
Both in 1827 and in 1829, the United States Government attempted to
purchase Texas, and in the latter year the proposition was actually
made to the Mexican Government to sell to the United States the
territory lying to the northwest of the watershed of the River Nueces.
It was, however, promptly rejected by that Government.
Naturally these attempts encouraged the colonists in Texas to feel
that the United States sympathized with them in their desire for
emancipation from Mexican rule, and to hope that this sympathy might,
at some future time, lead to positive assistance.
[Sidenote: Overthrow of the federal system in Mexico.]
The Texans were, however, for the moment, left to their own devices.
They first tried to have Texas separated from Coahuila and made a
separate Commonwealth of the Mexican Union, but the Mexican central
government refused to assent to this. This was in 1833. Two years
later Santa Anna, the Mexican President, forcibly displaced the
federal system of government established in Mexico by the constitution
of 1824, and instituted the centralized system, virtually by a
presidential edict.
Some of the Commonwealths of the Mexican Union resisted this
usurpation of the President, and among them, naturally, was
Coahuila-Texas. Moreover, some of the Coahuila members of the
legislature of the Commonwealth, partisans of Santa Anna, withdrew
from that body, and the Texan members found themselves, for the first
time, in a majority in it. Of course the feeling {293} of resistance
to the overthrow of the right of local self-government became now a
settled and resolute purpose with them, and Santa Anna, upon learning
their attitude, resolved to reduce them to obedience by military
power.
[Sidenote: The Texan revolution.]
In September of 1835, a Mexican war-ship appeared upon the Texan
coast, and its commander declared the Texan ports in a state of
blockade. About the same time, the Mexican General Cos appeared, with
a force of some fifteen hundred soldiers, at the Texan village of
Gonzales. The resistance of the inhabitants of the town to Cos' order
to surrender their arms precipitated the struggle. The Texans
immediately organized a temporary government, drove the Mexicans out
of the country before the close of the year, and, on March 2nd, 1836,
declared their independence of Mexico.
While the Texan convention, which had declared independence and was
framing the constitution for the state of Texas, was still in session,
the Mexican soldiery, under the command of Santa Anna himself,
returned to Texas and committed the atrocities of the Alamo and of
Goliad. After these barbarous deeds there could no longer be any hope
of an accommodation between the Mexicans and the Texans. It was
independence or extermination.
[Sidenote: General Sam Houston.]
[Sidenote: San Jacinto and independence.]
Happily for the Texans they had now found their proper leader, General
Sam Houston. Many of the descriptions of this hero are caricatures. Of
those which approach the truth, that given by Senator Benton is
perhaps most nearly correct. Benton was the lieutenant-colonel of the
regiment in which Houston served during the war with the Creeks; and
said later of his old comrade, "I then marked in him the same
soldierly and gentlemanly qualities which {294} have since
distinguished his eventful career; frank, generous, and brave, ready
to do, or to suffer, whatever the obligations of civil or military
duty imposed; and always prompt to answer the call of honor,
patriotism, and friendship." He was a Virginian by birth, but an early
resident of Tennessee, and had been Governor of Tennessee before
attaining his thirty-fifth year. He appeared in Texas in 1833, and in
1835 was made commander of the Texan army. It was chiefly his skill
and bravery, which effected the expulsion of Cos and his army in the
winter of 1835-36. After the disasters at the Alamo and at Goliad, he,
in command of the remnants of the Texan army, retreated slowly before
Santa Anna's comparatively large force, until Santa Anna made the
blunder of dividing his army by the swollen waters of the San Jacinto,
when he turned suddenly upon the Mexicans, and inflicted upon them the
crushing defeat known as the battle of San Jacinto, in which the
Mexican loss was double the number of Houston's army, some sixteen
hundred men, including Santa Anna himself among the captives. The part
of the Mexican army which had not crossed the river retreated
precipitately from Texan soil, and the new state had won its
independence.
[Sidenote: Texas as a constitutional Republic.]
The battle of San Jacinto was fought on April 21st, 1836. The
convention had finished the constitution more than a month before. In
September following, General Houston was elected President of the new
republic, and the constitution was almost immediately put into
operation. This constitution legalized the existence of slavery in
Texas, as a constitutional right of the masters, prohibited the
residence of free negroes within the State without special official
permission, and interdicted the importation of negro slaves, except
from the United States.
{295} [Sidenote: The recognition of the independence of Texas.]
A little more than a month after the battle of San Jacinto, the
legislature of Connecticut set the ball in motion for the recognition
of the independence of Texas by the Government of the United States.
On May 27th, 1836, the two Houses of that body passed a resolution
instructing the Senators, and requesting the Representatives, in
Congress from Connecticut "to use their best endeavors to procure the
acknowledgment, on the part of the United States, of the independence
of Texas." Evidently the Yankee Commonwealth considered itself, in an
especial degree, the motherland of the new state. The founder of the
colony, which had now become an independent state, was one of its
children, and it hastened to anticipate Virginia, the birthplace of
Houston, in owning its offspring. A careful perusal of the whole of
this Connecticut document will certainly leave the impression upon the
mind of the impartial reader, at this day, that the people of the
North then considered the Texan revolution to have been provoked by
Mexican misrule and barbarism, and to have been fully justified in
political ethics as well as by practical success.
On June 13th, Senator Niles, of Connecticut, presented the Connecticut
memorial to the Senate, and it was immediately referred to the
committee on Foreign Relations. On the 18th, Mr. Clay, the chairman of
the committee, reported a resolution: "That the independence of Texas
ought to be acknowledged by the United States whenever satisfactory
information shall be received that it has, in successful operation, a
civil government capable of performing the duties and fulfilling the
obligations of an independent Power." The resolution was adopted by
the Senate, on July 1st, without a dissenting voice.
[Sidenote: Calhoun's frank declaration in regard to the annexation of
Texas.]
During the course of the debate upon it, Mr. Calhoun {296} frankly
told the Senate that he regarded the great importance of the
recognition of the independence of Texas to consist in the fact that
it prepared the way for the speedy admission of Texas into the Union,
which would be a necessity to the proper balance of power in the Union
between the slaveholding and the non-slaveholding Commonwealths, upon
which the preservation of the Union and the perpetuation of its
institutions rested. After such a statement it is difficult to see how
anybody could speak of the annexation of Texas being a slaveholders'
secret intrigue. Mr. Calhoun, the great leader of the slaveholders,
the director of their policy, here at the very outset openly
proclaimed their purpose. The fact is that, at the time of the Texan
declaration of independence, almost everybody would have favored the
annexation of Texas to the United States, out of race sympathy with
the Texans and desire for territorial extension, except for the
international complications with Mexico, which must inevitably result.
It was the struggle over the Abolition petitions in 1836, 1837, and
1838 which turned the thoughts of men upon the internal questions
involved in the movement, and caused the North generally to reconsider
its attitude upon the question.
On July 4th, 1836, the House of Representatives passed a resolution of
the same tenor, and expressed in nearly the same words, as the Senate
resolution of July 1st. It seems to have been called forth by
memorials from citizens of Ohio and Pennsylvania.
[Illustration: TEXAS, at the Time of Annexation.]
[Sidenote: The mission of Mr. Morfit to Texas, his report and advice.]
Assured thus of the feeling of Congress, the President sent an agent,
Mr. Henry M. Morfit, to Texas during the summer of 1836, in order to
procure exact information of the state of affairs there. Mr. Morfit
wrote to the Secretary of State, Mr. Forsyth, that the {297}
constitution of March 17th was soon to be put into operation; that
General Houston had been elected President; that the constitution was
fashioned after that of the United States; that the desire for
annexation to the United States was universal; that the boundaries
asserted by the new state were the Rio Grande del Norte on the south
and southwest, the longitude from the source of the Rio Grande to the
boundary of the United States on the west, the southern boundary of
the United States on the north and northeast, and the Gulf of Mexico
on the east; that the population amounted to about sixty-five thousand
souls, of whom about fifty thousand were Anglo-Americans; that the
standing army numbered about twenty-two hundred men, and could be
increased to seven or eight thousand in an emergency; that the navy
consisted of four vessels, carrying twenty-nine guns; that the funds
of the State consisted of from fifty to one hundred millions of acres
of public lands, worth, at least, ten millions of dollars, and that
contributions were flowing in from private individuals in the United
States; that the debt was about twelve hundred and fifty thousand
dollars; that the supplies for the winter campaign were already
provided; and that there was not a Mexican soldier north of the Rio
Grande, although there were rumors that the Mexican government was
making preparations for a new invasion in the winter, which were not,
however, credited by the Texans.
This was certainly a good showing for Texas. If with an army of seven
hundred men, under a provisory government, the Texans drove the
Mexicans out of Texas, they could, under well established government,
and with an army ten times as large, most surely keep them out. It
must also be remembered that Santa Anna was still a prisoner in their
hands. Mr. Morfit, {298} however, expressed the belief that most of
the men and money for the army came from the United States, and,
therefore, advised delay in assuming a definite attitude toward the
new state.
[Sidenote: Jackson's recommendation to delay the recognition of Texan
independence.]
President Jackson transmitted this information to Congress, in his
message of December 21st, 1836, and recommended delay in recognizing
the independence of Texas. On January 11th, 1837, however, Senator
Walker, of Mississippi, offered a resolution in the Senate to the
effect that it would be expedient and proper to recognize the
independence of Texas, and stated that he had information that the
projected invasion of Texas by a new Mexican army, the rumors of which
were reported by Mr. Morfit, had most probably been abandoned.
[Sidenote: The question of Mexico's obligations to the United States.]
Before the resolution offered by Mr. Walker was taken up for
discussion, a message from the President was communicated to Congress
recommending the passage of an act, authorizing the President to make
reprisals upon Mexico, in case Mexico should refuse another demand
made upon her for an amicable adjustment of the matters in controversy
between her and the United States. The citizens and the Government of
the United States had many claims against Mexico and the Mexicans for
depredating the commerce, seizing the seamen, and insulting the flag
of the United States, and the demands for the satisfaction of these
claims had been almost uniformly disregarded. The relations between
the two Governments were already greatly strained on this account, and
when, in the autumn of 1836, President Jackson authorized General
Gaines to advance his troops into northwestern Texas, if he should
deem it necessary for the protection of the frontiers of the United
States against the Indians in Texas, who, on account of the {299} War
between Mexico and Texas, had been thrown into a great state of
excitement and unrest, the Mexican Minister, Señor Gorastiza, demanded
his passports, issued a sort of manifesto to the people of the United
States, and left Washington.
[Sidenote: Jackson's request of Congress for authority to issue an
ultimatum to Mexico in the claims question.]
It was hardly to be expected that President Jackson would quietly
brook such defiance from a half civilized state and its agents. He
immediately caused Mr. Ellis, the Chargé d'Affaires of the Government
at the Mexican capital, to make a final demand on the Mexican
government. Mr. Ellis made his demand in writing, on September 26th.
After much delay the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs replied,
admitting the justice of some of the claims, and requiring more
information about others, but offering no reparation at all for
insults to the flag and to the consular officers of the United States.
The President's patience was exhausted, and he sent the message of
February 6th, 1837, to Congress, asking for authority to make a final
demand from the decks of a war-ship.
[Sidenote: Texan independence recognized by the United States.]
Congress was not, however, willing to invest the President with the
contingent power to make offensive war. The recommendation of the
President in the case had, nevertheless, considerable influence in
determining the minds of the Senators in regard to the question of
recognizing the independence of Texas. On March 1st, 1837, the Senate
adopted Mr. Walker's resolution. On the previous day the House of
Representatives had voted to insert in the civil and diplomatic
appropriation bill an item for the expenses of a diplomatic agent to
Texas, whenever the President should receive satisfactory evidence
that Texas was an independent Power and should consider it expedient
to appoint such a minister. President Jackson had invited this
expression of the {300} views of Congress in his message of the
previous December, in which he expressed the view that Congress ought
to determine the expediency of recognizing the independence of Texas,
and, although the resolutions of the two Houses of February 28th and
March 1st, 1837, did not formally assume to recognize that
independence, the President evidently attributed to them some virtue,
since he soon opened diplomatic intercourse with the Texan agent at
Washington. The resolutions of the two Houses of Congress and this act
of the President, taken together, were regarded by the people of the
United States and by foreign Powers as a recognition of Texan
independence.
[Sidenote: The question of annexation.]
It was clear to all thinking minds that the next step after
independence would be annexation to the United States. There is little
question that Texas was big enough and strong enough to stand alone
against Mexico, certainly with the aid which she was sure to receive
from without and with the growth which she was destined to enjoy; but
there was no natural boundary between the United States and Texas, and
the inhabitants of Texas were chiefly Anglo-Americans. The natural
boundary of the United States on the southwest is the desert between
the Nueces and the Rio Grande, and the territorial extension of the
United States to that limit was simply the fulfilment of the moral
order of the world, which tends to make the lines of states correspond
with the lines of physical geography and of ethnical differences.
Except for the connection of the question of slavery extension with
that of territorial extension after 1836, the question of the
annexation of Texas would have been generally viewed in this natural
and national light. That connection, however, made the North generally
assume the attitude {301} of opposition to annexation, while it
greatly excited the desires of the South in favor of it.
[Sidenote: Webster on annexation.]
On his way homeward from the Congress which voted in favor of
annexation, Mr. Webster made a great speech in New York, in which he
declared himself opposed to annexation on the ground that it would
extend slavery. Mr. Calhoun had, nearly a year before, as we have
seen, declared himself in favor of it for the same reason. After these
two declarations, from such leaders, the eyes of the people were open
to every feature of the question, and it could not have been any
longer a matter of intrigue.
[Sidenote: Texan proposition for annexation.]
In August, 1837, the Texan agent at Washington, General Hunt, proposed
to President Van Buren the annexation of Texas to the United States.
The President promptly and firmly declined, and the matter rested
during the remainder of his Administration.
The sudden and unexpected accession of Vice-President Tyler to the
presidency, in 1841, was the event which opened the way for the
commencement of negotiations for annexation. The new President was
known to be favorable to the project.
[Sidenote: The Mexican Claims Commission and its work.]
Meanwhile the diplomatic relations between the United States and
Mexico, so suddenly broken off in the latter part of President
Jackson's Administration, had been renewed in the early part of
President Van Buren's Administration, and, after considerable
negotiation in regard to the claims against Mexico, a convention
between the two Powers had been arranged, and, on April 8th, 1840,
proclaimed by the President as definitely concluded. The convention
provided that the claims of the citizens of the United States against
Mexico should be submitted to, and decided by, a commission, which
should be {302} composed of two members appointed by the President of
the United States, and of two other members appointed by the President
of Mexico; that the commissioners should meet in Washington within
three months from the date of the exchange of ratifications of the
convention; that the commission should terminate its duties within
eighteen months from the time of its first meeting; and that when the
commissioners could not come to any decision, the question upon which
they might disagree should be referred to an arbiter appointed by the
King of Prussia, etc. With this the question of the private claims
against Mexico, already submitted, was, momentarily, put at rest. The
claim of satisfaction for public injuries and affronts remained
unsettled, and no provision was made for the consideration of private
claims which had not been submitted before the ratification of the
convention, or of those which might arise after the same date. Plenty
of opportunities were thus left for the rise of difficulties in the
claims question which might lead to hostile relations between the two
Powers.
[Sidenote: Tyler as an advocate of annexation.]
As early as the winter of 1841-42, it was suspected that President
Tyler's Administration was preparing to move in the matter of
annexation. In fact, Mr. Wise, of Virginia, the President's bosom
friend, and his organ in the House of Representatives, reiterated upon
the floor of the House, on January 26th, 1842, Mr. Calhoun's doctrine
about annexation, pronounced in 1836, that the annexation of Texas was
essential to slavery extension, that slavery extension was necessary
to preserve the balance of power between the North and the South in
the Union, and that the preservation of this balance of power was the
necessary condition of the perpetuity of the Union.
{303} Mr. Wise expressed this opinion in the midst of an acrimonious
debate, and whether he, in an unguarded moment, betrayed the policy of
the President, or simply gave vent to his own excited feelings, is
still one of the speculations of American history.
[Sidenote: Mr. Webster in the way of annexation.]
[Sidenote: The Adams address on annexation.]
So long, however, as Mr. Webster remained at the head of the State
Department it was impossible for the President to make any progress
with a definite plan for annexation, even if he entertained one.
Nevertheless, thirteen anti-slavery Whig members of Congress, led by
Mr. John Quincy Adams, issued, on March 3rd, 1843, an address to the
people of the non-slaveholding Commonwealths, declaring that there was
a definite plan of annexation already settled upon, and about to be
consummated, and denouncing the execution of it as being tantamount to
a dissolution of the Union.
[Sidenote: The retirement of Webster.]
On May 8th, 1843, Mr. Webster resigned the secretaryship of State. It
was said by some that the President drove him out, in order to appoint
a Secretary who would carry out his plans for the annexation of Texas;
but Mr. Webster himself indicated by his acts and words that he had
determined to resign more than a year before, and had remained in
office only for the purpose of concluding the negotiations with Great
Britain which culminated in the Ashburton Treaty, an agreement in
which Mr. Webster's section had an especial interest.
There is little question, however, that President Tyler was glad to
have him go, for the President placed the annexation of Texas before
every other policy of his Administration.
[Sidenote: The promotion of Upshur, and his negotiations with the
Texans.]
Soon after Mr. Webster's resignation the President transferred Mr.
Upshur from the secretaryship of the {304} Navy to that of State. Mr.
Upshur was the man whom suspicion had already marked as the confidant
of the President in the annexation scheme. This suspicion was speedily
confirmed by his entering, almost immediately, upon negotiations with
the Texan agent at Washington, Mr. Van Zandt, for annexation.
Soon after the recognition of the independence of Texas by the United
States, Great Britain, France, and Belgium took the same step,
presumably for the purpose of establishing commercial relations with
the new state. But, in the summer of 1843, the British Government
appeared in the character of the most favored mediator between Mexico
and Texas for the recognition of the independence of Texas by Mexico;
and a friend of President Tyler's Administration wrote, from London,
that a representative of the anti-slavery men in Texas was in London,
negotiating a loan of money from an English company, with which to pay
for the liberation of all the slaves in Texas, and that the interest
upon the loan was to be guaranteed by the British Government, on the
condition that the Texan Government would abolish slavery.
The Administration professed to credit this story, and Mr. Upshur
wrote to General Murphy, the diplomatic agent of the United States in
Texas, informing him of this communication from London, and arguing
the double danger to the United States of British interference in
Texas, and of the abolition of slavery there. This letter bears date
of August 8th, 1843, and is considered as marking the beginning of the
actual negotiations for annexation. It was certainly intended to
prompt General Murphy to sound the Texan Government upon the question
of annexation.
[Sidenote: The threat of the Mexican Government to consider the
annexation of Texas a cause of war.]
[Sidenote: The Administration proposes annexation to the Texan agent.]
The Mexican Government evidently discovered the {305} movement
immediately, for, on August 23rd, the Mexican Secretary of State
declared to Mr. Thompson, the Minister of the United States to Mexico,
that the Mexican Government would consider any act of the United
States to annex Texas as a declaration of war on Mexico. For seven
years Mexico had made no war on Texas, though professing to regard the
new state as only a rebellious province. In September of 1842, several
marauding expeditions had crossed the Rio Grande, raided around for a
few days, and then returned to Mexico. The Mexican Government called
this a continuance of the war, and demanded that the states of the
world should observe the attitude of neutrals toward a friendly Power
engaged in suppressing a rebellion on the part of certain of its
lawful subjects. This was absurd. From the point of view of
international law Texas had won her independence, and might make what
agreements she pleased with any other Power. The President paid no
attention to the Mexican threat. On October 16th, 1843, Mr. Upshur
formally proposed annexation to Mr. Van Zandt, and in his message to
Congress, at the beginning of the session of 1843-44, the President
indicated to Congress that the negotiations for annexation were in
progress, and referred to the fact that Mexico threatened war in case
the United States should resolve to annex Texas.
[Sidenote: The difficulty in the way of acceptance of the
proposition.]
The great difficulty in the way of the negotiations was the fear on
the part of the Texans that, upon the signature of the Treaty by the
Presidents of the two countries, and before its ratification by the
respective Senates, as required by the respective Constitutions, the
Mexicans would collect all their forces and make one supreme effort to
reconquer Texas. The Texans wanted the {306} protection of the United
States in this interim, and the embarrassing question for Mr. Tyler's
Administration was whether the President of the United States had the
constitutional power to extend it. Would not war, undertaken in
defence of one foreign Power against another, be offensive war, in the
sense of the Constitution of the United States, such war as Congress
alone can authorize? Or, could Texas be considered a part of the
United States from the moment that the two Presidents signed the
Treaty of annexation, and before its ratification by the respective
Senates, thus making war in her defence defensive war, such war as the
President of the United States may, of his own power, undertake?
[Sidenote: The demand of the Texans for protection in the interim.]
About the middle of January, 1844, Mr. Van Zandt demanded of Mr.
Upshur whether, in case the President of Texas should agree to the
proposition of the President of the United States for annexation, the
President of the United States would protect Texas, from the moment of
this agreement between the two Presidents, against all foreign attack.
Mr. Upshur seems to have been greatly perplexed by the question, for
he made no reply.
About the middle of February, the President of Texas caused the same
question to be put to the United States agent in Texas, General
Murphy. Murphy was a blunt, brave man, full of chivalry, but quite
empty of constitutional and international law. He immediately returned
an affirmative answer, whereupon President Houston sent a special
envoy to Washington, armed with plenary power to conclude a treaty of
annexation.
Whether Secretary Upshur, and, of course, the President, knew of the
promise which Murphy had made for his Government to Texas, before the
sudden death of Mr. Upshur, on February 28th, has never been
determined.
{307} During the second week of March, Mr. John Nelson, the Secretary
of the Navy, was temporarily transferred to the State Department, and
one of his first acts was to officially disavow Murphy's promise to
President Houston. He very nearly informed Murphy, however, that
President Tyler was personally pleased with what he had done. The
Texan agents at Washington refused, however, to proceed with the
negotiations until President Tyler would ratify Murphy's promise. Mr.
Nelson would not risk his reputation as a constitutional lawyer by
inventing an interpretation of the Constitution which would warrant
this. At the end of the month Mr. Calhoun was put in his place, and he
was remanded to the Department of the Navy.
[Sidenote: Mr. Calhoun in the State Department.]
[Sidenote: The Treaty of annexation signed.]
About a fortnight after taking possession of his office, Mr. Calhoun
officially informed the Texan agents at Washington that the President
had ordered the concentration of a strong squadron of war-vessels in
the Gulf of Mexico, and had commanded the movement of land forces to
the southwestern boundary of the United States to meet all
eventualities, and that the President would use "all the means placed
within his power by the Constitution" to protect Texas against foreign
invasion during the pendency of the Treaty of annexation. On the day
following this communication, the Treaty of annexation was signed by
the President of the United States and by the Texas plenipotentiary
for the President of Texas.
Ten days after this, the Treaty was sent to the Senate of the United
States for ratification. In the message accompanying the Treaty the
President informed the Senate of the disposition he had made of the
troops and naval vessels, and justified the same by the claim that the
President _makes_ the treaties, that the Senate only ratifies {308}
them, that the validity of the treaties, therefore, dates from the
President's agreement, and that, therefore, in this case, Texas was,
from and after April 12th, 1844, a part of the territory of the United
States, all of which the President was bound to defend against foreign
attack. Whether this was President Tyler's constitutional law or Mr.
Calhoun's we do not know. If this doctrine is to be ascribed to Mr.
Calhoun it certainly marks a great departure from the general
principles taught by him after 1830. One would think that his "States'
sovereignty" theory of the Union would have led him to attribute as
little power as possible to the general Government, and as much of
that little as possible to the Senate, but here were both nationalism
and Cæsarism combined.
[Sidenote: The Treaty in the Senate and its rejection.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Archer's opposition to the Treaty.]
The Treaty was before the Senate, in secret session, from April 22nd
until June 8th, when it was rejected by a vote of thirty-five to
sixteen. It is not necessary to examine the reasons which moved the
Northern Senators to vote against it, but it is important to
understand some of the grounds upon which Senators from the
slaveholding Commonwealths opposed it. Senator Benton declared that
the Treaty annexed not only Texas but parts of four other Mexican
provinces, which would be an international outrage upon Mexico. Most
of the Southern Senators, however, were influenced by the fear of war
with Mexico. But the most significant objection to it, from the point
of view of subsequent events, was that urged by Mr. Archer, of
Virginia, the chairman of the Senate committee for Foreign Affairs. He
claimed that a foreign state could not be annexed to the United States
by means of a treaty, and that, if a foreign state could become
connected with the Union at all, it must be by means of an act of
Congress. A large number of the Senators approved of this {309}
doctrine. It was a pregnant idea to the President and Mr. Calhoun. It
indicated that there was another way to accomplish annexation.
While the Treaty was under consideration in the Senate, the national
conventions for the nomination of presidential candidates had
assembled. The Whigs had nominated Mr. Clay, who was regarded as
opposed to annexation. The friends to annexation in the Democratic
party had been able to put Mr. Van Buren aside, and had nominated
James K. Polk, of Tennessee, an outspoken advocate of immediate
annexation, and had made the "re-occupation of Oregon and the
re-annexation of Texas" the chief plank in the party platform.
[Sidenote: The new plan for annexation.]
Here now were all the elements of a new plan for annexation, which
promised more success. They were, the doctrine unwittingly advanced by
Mr. Archer, and as unwittingly approved by many of the Senators, that
Texas could be connected with the United States only by means of an
act of Congress admitting her as a Commonwealth into the Union, the
plank of the platform making annexation the chief issue of the
campaign for the election of a new President and a new House of
Representatives, and the connection of the Oregon question with that
of annexation, in order to get votes in the North for both projects at
once.
On June 11th, President Tyler took the first step in the combination
of these elements. He sent a copy of the rejected Treaty, and all the
papers connected with it, to the House of Representatives, together
with a message, in which he reviewed the subject and justified his
position in regard to it, and declared, finally, that while he had
regarded a treaty as the most suitable means for accomplishing
annexation, he would {310} co-operate with Congress in the use of any
other means compatible with the Constitution and likely to accomplish
the result.
Before, however, following the history of the annexation of Texas
further, we must present briefly the main points in the development of
the Oregon question.
{311}
CHAPTER XIV.
OREGON
Extent of Oregon and Claims to it--The Nootka Convention--Louisiana
and Oregon--Astoria--The Joint Occupation Agreement of 1818--Spain's
Claims on Oregon Ceded to the United States--Renewal of the Convention
of 1818--The British Policy in Reference to Oregon--The Ignorance of
Oregon in the United States--Dr. Marcus Whitman--Dr. Whitman's Mission
to the United States Government--Dr. Whitman's Colony--The Democratic
Party on the Oregon Question.
[Sidenote: Extent of Oregon and claims to it.]
At the close of the eighteenth century, Oregon was universally
recognized as the territory lying along the North Pacific Ocean from
the forty-second parallel of latitude to that of fifty-four degrees
and forty minutes, and reaching inward to the Rocky Mountains. At that
time it was claimed by Spain both by discovery and first settlement.
[Sidenote: The Nootka Convention.]
In the year 1790, Great Britain advanced claims upon it. A diplomatic
discussion arose between the two Powers, which ended temporarily in an
agreement called the Nootka Convention, by which no territorial or
sovereign rights or powers were recognized by Spain to Great Britain,
but only certain easements, so to speak, in and upon this territory,
such as the right to navigate the waters and to fish in them, to trade
with the natives, and to make such temporary {312} settlements as
might be necessary for the reasonable enjoyment of these rights.
In the year 1796, war was waged between Spain and Great Britain, and,
according to the British principles of that day, every agreement
between the two Powers was abrogated in consequence thereof; so that
Spain, while retaining her sovereignty over Oregon, was now relieved
of the encumbrance of the British rights.
[Sidenote: Louisiana and Oregon.]
This was the status of Oregon when Spain ceded Louisiana to France in
1800, and when France ceded the same territory to the United States in
1803; and the matter of first concern to the United States was the
question whether Louisiana contained Oregon or any part of it. It is
probable that President Jefferson thought it did, since the Lewis and
Clark expedition, sent out by him to examine the new purchase, crossed
the Rockies, discovered the sources of the Columbia River, followed
this stream to the Pacific, and made report thereof to the President.
But if he did, he was certainly mistaken. It is true that Louisiana
had no western boundary positively fixed by any agreement between the
Powers, but the general principles of international law, to which
recourse must always be had in the absence of specific agreements,
made the water shed of the Mississippi the western boundary, and the
Treaty of Utrecht, of 1713, to which France and Great Britain were
parties, made the forty-ninth parallel of latitude the northern
boundary, westward from the Lake of the Woods.
[Illustration: OREGON, as Determined by the Treaty of 1846.]
[Sidenote: Astoria.]
The founding of Astoria, in 1811, on the south bank of the Columbia
River, about nine miles from its mouth, is also evidence that the
Government of the United States thought it had a claim upon Oregon as
a part of Louisiana, since the undertaking {313} proceeded upon an
understanding between Mr. John Jacob Astor and the Government.
[Sidenote: The joint occupation agreement of 1818.]
The British Government now did a thing which seemed to acknowledge a
claim of some sort by the United States upon Oregon, so far as Great
Britain could do so. Having taken forcible possession of Astoria in
the War of 1812, it restored the place, at the close of the War, to
the possession of the United States; and in a convention, concluded on
October 18th, 1818, the two Powers agreed upon the forty-ninth
parallel of north latitude as the boundary between their territories,
from the Lake of the Woods to the Rocky Mountains, and upon joint
occupation, as it was termed, in all territories and waters claimed by
either party in North America west of the Rocky Mountains, without
prejudice to any claims which either party might have to any part of
the said territory, or to any claims which any other Power might have
to it, or to any part of it. This agreement was to run for ten years.
[Sidenote: Spain's claims on Oregon ceded to the United States.]
An event happened the following year which made the Washington
Government doubt the wisdom of basing its claims upon the Louisiana
cession. It was the Treaty with Spain ceding the Floridas. As we have
seen in one of the earlier chapters of this work, this Treaty
contained a provision ceding to the United States all the rights and
sovereignty of Spain in and over the territory lying west of the Rocky
Mountains and north of the forty-second parallel of north latitude.
Here was a much better claim, both as to quantity of territory and
quality of right, than could be founded on the Louisiana cession. If
the United States had possessed this claim in 1803, it is doubtful if
we should ever have heard of the notion that Oregon was a part of
Louisiana.
{314} [Sidenote: Continuation of the convention of 1818.]
In 1828, the agreement of 1818 was indefinitely continued, but might
be terminated by a twelvemonth's notice by either party, at any time.
The United States, was, however, in a better position than before, on
account of having now the Spanish claims to all territory above the
forty-second parallel on the Pacific.
The element of greatest importance in the settlement of the question
was, of course, colonization within the territory, and neither party
had really undertaken that. The hunters and trappers and agents of the
Hudson's Bay Company had temporary abodes within the territory,
especially north of the Columbia, and there was one settlement on the
south bank under the protection of the United States, and that was
all.
[Sidenote: The British policy in reference to Oregon.]
For some fourteen years longer, now, this indefinite status continued.
In the negotiations between Mr. Webster and Lord Ashburton, in 1841
and 1842, Mr. Webster sounded Lord Ashburton on the Oregon question,
and found that the Queen's agent had received no power to deal with
the matter, but drew the conclusion that the British policy in regard
to Oregon was to prolong the existing _modus vivendi_, give the
Hudson's Bay Company time to settle the country north of the Columbia,
and then agree to a division on the line of that river.
[Sidenote: The ignorance of Oregon in the United States.]
It was well for the United States that the Oregon question did not
enter into those negotiations, for down to that moment the Government
at Washington knew almost nothing about the character of Oregon north
of the Columbia. The officers of the Hudson's Bay Company had
continually represented it as a worthless waste, fit only for hunting
and trapping ground, and almost worn out even for those purposes. It
is more than probable that the {315} Government at Washington credited
these statements, and it is quite possible that, in 1842, it would
have compromised with England on the line of the Columbia. The delay
in the settlement of the question now gave the Government the
opportunity to learn something more about Oregon from one who knew the
region better than any other living man, and whose interests did not
lie with those of the Hudson's Bay Company and Great Britain.
[Sidenote: Dr. Marcus Whitman.]
The actor who now came upon the scene was Dr. Marcus Whitman, a man of
great intelligence, courage, energy, and high purpose. He had been
sent out by the American Board of Missions, in the year 1835, as one
of the exploring delegates among the Indians in Oregon. Dr. Whitman
soon made up his mind in regard to his life work. He returned to the
East in the summer of 1836, married, and went back to Oregon,
accompanied by his bride and by the Rev. H. H. Spaulding and wife.
This was the beginning of the settlement of Northern Oregon.
[Sidenote: Dr. Whitman's mission to the United States Government.]
In some way, we know not exactly how, Dr. Whitman learned that the
United States Government might be induced to sacrifice Northern Oregon
in ignorance of its true value; and, in the latter part of the year
1842, he set out from the mission on the Walla Walla to go to
Washington and inform the Government of the real character of the
country which he had explored. He arrived in Washington in March of
1843, and gave President Tyler such full and truthful information
concerning the great value of Oregon north of the Columbia as settled
the fate of that region.
[Sidenote: Dr. Whitman's colony.]
Dr. Whitman had come also for another purpose. He saw clearly that the
way to get Oregon was to colonize it. President Tyler's Administration
supported him {316} in this view and purpose. The Administration
caused Dr. Whitman's descriptions of Oregon to be printed and
distributed throughout the United States, and also his offer to lead a
colony to take possession of the country. The place of rendezvous
appointed by him was Westport, near the site of the present Kansas
City, and the time was June of 1843. Nearly a thousand people, with
two hundred wagons, met him there, and were successfully led by him
back to the Walla Walla. He arrived there with this large colony in
October of 1843; and news of his safe arrival reached Washington in
January of 1844.
The decisive movement for the possession of Oregon was thus made.
Claims based upon discovery, or treaty, or privileges for hunting,
trapping, or trading, must all give way before actual colonization.
British diplomacy was confused by the success of the movement, while
the people of the United States were filled with pride and enthusiasm
at the achievement.
The moment had come, at last, when the United States could deal with
Great Britain from the basis of actual conditions, instead of from the
point of view of international theory. The connection of the Oregon
question with the question of the annexation of Texas in the
Democratic platform of 1844, was, therefore, by no means far fetched
or artificial. It was, indeed, a clever stroke of practical politics,
but it was suggested by existing conditions.
[Sidenote: The Democratic party on the Oregon question.]
The Democrats had struck a high note in the international questions,
one which was bound to catch the ear of the younger men throughout the
country. Moreover, the policy in both cases rested upon sound national
principles. Texas, at least to the Nueces, and Oregon, at least to the
northern water shed of the Columbia, belonged {317} geographically to
the United States, and they were settled, so far as they were settled
at all, by Anglo-Americans. On the other hand, the slaveholders of the
South were not particularly pleased with the connection of the two
questions. Some of them had already come to doubt whether the
annexation of Texas alone would subserve their interests, since the
slave population might be thereby drawn away from the border
slaveholding Commonwealths, and these Commonwealths might then abolish
slavery by their own several acts; and now that it must be paid for by
the addition of a region to the Northern side, large enough to hold a
dozen such Commonwealths as New York, the price appeared to them too
great. Mr. Waddy Thompson, of South Carolina, the Minister to the
Mexican Government, was decidedly of this opinion; and from an
original friend of annexation he became a determined opponent. To the
far-seeing mind, it was certainly very questionable whether the
annexation of Texas would prove any advantage to the slavery interest,
and it was certain that the possession of Oregon would not.
But they would subserve, they have subserved, the interests of a true
national development. The Democrats of 1844 builded better than they
knew, when they made the "re-annexation of Texas and the re-occupation
of Oregon" the issues of the campaign of that year. In the platform
the Oregon question was given the precedence. The country, however,
understood the stratagem, and the question of annexation assumed the
foremost place in the great contest.
{318}
CHAPTER XV.
THE "RE-ANNEXATION OF TEXAS AND THE RE-OCCUPATION OF OREGON"
The Popularity of the Democratic Position, and Mr. Clay's Letter of
August 16th--The Abolitionists Declare against Mr. Clay--The Triumph
of Polk--Tyler's Recommendation to Annex Texas by a Joint Resolution
or an Act--The Resolution for Annexation in the House of
Representatives--Passage of an Enabling Act for Texas by the House of
Representatives--The Resolution in the Senate, and Mr. Archer's
Inconsistencies--The Senate's Amendment to the Resolution of the
House--The Concurrence of the House in the Senate's Amendment, and the
Passage of the Act for Admission--The British Proposition in Regard to
Oregon--The American Proposition--Polk's recommendation in Regard to
the Matter--The Debate upon the President's Recommendation--The
Conclusion Reached by Congress--The President's Retort upon
Congress--The Oregon Treaty.
The language of the Democratic platform signified that Texas had been
once annexed to the United States, as a part of Louisiana, by the
Treaty of 1803 with France, and had been sacrificed by the Treaty of
1819 with Spain, and that Oregon had been once occupied by the United
States, either under the Treaty of 1803, or under that of 1819, or by
the right of the prior discovery of the Columbia River and the
establishment of a settlement upon its banks. It is thus that mortal
men always seek to purge any movement which they undertake of the
taint of innovation, no matter how justifiable in reason that movement
may be.
{319} [Sidenote: The popularity of the Democratic position, and Mr.
Clay's letter of August 16th.]
In the beginning of June, the election of Mr. Clay seemed a certainty.
As the campaign wore on it became manifest that annexation was rapidly
growing in the popular favor, and that Mr. Clay would lose some of his
Southern support, unless the opinion which prevailed in that section
concerning his opposition to annexation should be modified. With this
in view, and under the belief that the state of feeling upon the
subject at the North had become less hostile, Mr. Clay caused to be
published in an Alabama newspaper, on August 16th, a letter defining
again his attitude toward annexation.
No sane and impartial mind can, at this day, see any material
difference between the opinion expressed by Mr. Clay in his letter of
April 17th, and that in his letter of August 16th. In the former, he
took the ground that the United States ought not to annex Texas
without the consent of Mexico, or against the decided opposition of a
considerable and respectable portion of the Union. In the latter, he
said he should be glad to see Texas annexed, if it could be done
"without dishonor, without war, with the common consent of the Union,
and upon just and fair terms." He added that he did not think the
slavery question ought to enter into the consideration at all, that
slavery was destined to become extinct in the United States, and that
its duration would neither be lengthened nor shortened by the
acquisition of Texas.
[Sidenote: The Abolitionists declare against Mr. Clay.]
The Abolitionists, however, could see the question only from a single
point of view. They wanted Mr. Clay to say that the annexation of
Texas meant permanent slavery extension, and that he opposed it upon
that ground. They were not satisfied by Mr. Clay's causing another
letter to be published, in the _National Intelligencer_, declaring
that {320} his two former letters were entirely consistent with each
other, and that he held inflexibly to the principles of the first one.
They even went so far in their extravagant fanaticism as to represent
to the people that Mr. Clay's election would be more favorable to
annexation than that of Mr. Polk.
[Sidenote: The triumph of Polk.]
It is usually said that Mr. Clay's Alabama letter turned a sufficient
number of votes to the Abolitionist candidate, Mr. Birney, to cause
Mr. Clay to lose the electoral votes of New York and Michigan, and
thus insured the election of Mr. Polk, and consequently the annexation
of Texas and the War with Mexico. It is probably true that it did
cause the loss of New York and Michigan, but it is possible that it
held North Carolina, Kentucky, and Tennessee in line. The failure of
Mr. Clay is, therefore, more probably to be ascribed to Abolitionist
fanaticism than to his own blundering. At any rate, this was the view
held by Mr. Greeley, a very competent observer. He said that "the
triumph of annexation was secured by the indirect aid of the more
intense partisans of abolition."
[Sidenote: Tyler's recommendation to annex Texas by a joint resolution
or an act.]
The result of the election was regarded as the plebiscite upon the
question of annexation, and also upon the Oregon question, but more
especially upon the former. In his message to Congress at the opening
of the session of 1844-45, President Tyler informed Congress that,
since the rejection of the Treaty for annexation by the Senate, Mexico
had threatened to renew war against Texas, and prosecute the same by
barbarous means and methods, and that he had caused the Minister of
the United States to Mexico to inform the Mexican Government that the
question of annexation was still before the American people, and that,
until their decision had been pronounced, any serious invasion of
Texas could not be {321} regarded by them with indifference. He
declared that, in the late general election, the people had pronounced
for immediate annexation; and he recommended that Congress should
incorporate the terms of the late agreement for annexation into the
form of an act or a joint resolution, which should be binding upon
both parties when adopted in like manner by the Texan Congress. He
also informed Congress that negotiations had been opened with Great
Britain relative to the respective rights of the two Powers in, and
over, the Oregon territory.
[Sidenote: The resolution for annexation in the House of
Representatives.]
That part of the message relating to the question of annexation was
referred, in the House of Representatives, to the committee on Foreign
Affairs, and, on December 12th, Mr. Ingersoll, of Pennsylvania,
reported from that committee the draft of a joint resolution for the
annexation of Texas. It was simply the articles of the agreement of
April 12th preceding put into that form. The principal points of it
were, the cession of the territory of Texas to the United States, the
transfer of the public lands of Texas to the Government of the United
States, the pledge of the United States to assume the debt of Texas up
to ten millions of dollars, the guarantee of liberty and property to
the citizens of Texas, now to be citizens of the United States, and
the accordance of Commonwealth local government to Texas as soon as
consistent with the Constitution of the United States.
As we have seen, the President and Mr. Calhoun had thought that the
proper way to annex a foreign state to the United States was by means
of a treaty, in which the foreign state should cede its territory to
the United States; and that the matter of local government for the
ceded territory and its population would then be a question of
legislation. We have also seen that the {322} opponents of the
proposed Treaty in the Senate took the ground, among other things,
that Texas was already a state, seeking admission into the Union as a
"State" (Commonwealth), and that this could be effected only by an act
of Congress. But now the opposition in the House of Representatives to
the joint resolution, expressed in the very words of the proposed
Treaty, declared that the resolution provided for a cession of
territory by a foreign state to the United States, which cession could
be made and accepted only through the form of a treaty. The House had
never, however, committed itself to the view of the Senate, and the
friends of the resolution wasted no time in demonstrating the
inconsistency, but sought to so amend the resolution as to make it an
act for the formation of a new Commonwealth, or, as it is usually
phrased, an act for the admission of a new "State" into this Union.
[Sidenote: Passage of an enabling act for Texas by the House of
Representatives.]
On January 25th, 1845, the House passed a substitute for the
committee's resolution, which substitute was a resolution for enabling
the people of Texas to form a Commonwealth constitution and
government, preparatory to admission into this Union, and prescribing
certain conditions for the assent of Congress to the same.
[Sidenote: The resolution in the Senate, and Mr. Archer's
inconsistencies.]
When this resolution reached the Senate, it was referred to the
committee of that body for Foreign Affairs, and on February 4th, Mr.
Archer, the chairman of the committee, presented a report from his
committee, and a recommendation that the proposition from the House be
rejected. The ground for this recommendation, as contained in the
report, was that the House had undertaken to do by an act of Congress
what could be done only by means of a treaty. And this was from that
same Mr. Archer, who, on June 8th preceding, had opposed the {323}
ratification of the Treaty, on the ground that what was proposed to be
effected by a treaty could be done only by means of an act of
Congress.
[Sidenote: The Senate's amendment to the resolution of the House.]
It was not to be expected that the Senate or the country would put up
with any such inconsistent trifling. The Senators were, however, much
concerned in preserving the treaty-making power of the Senate, and
hesitated long, attempting to find the way out of the embarrassment,
which they had prepared for themselves, by their attitude, during the
preceding session, toward the proposed Treaty. At last, on February
27th, Mr. Walker, of Mississippi, offered an apparent method of
escape. He moved to amend the resolution sent from the House by the
provision that, if the President should deem it more advisable to
negotiate with Texas for her admission into the Union than to submit
the joint resolution as an overture to her, he might do so, and then
might submit the agreements, which might thus be made, either to the
Senate to be approved of as a treaty, or to both Houses to be approved
of as an act. Everybody knew, of course, that this was a mere
subterfuge to save appearances, and that the President would
immediately communicate the joint resolution to the Texan authorities.
[Sidenote: The concurrence of the House in the Senate's amendment, and
the passage of the measure for Admission.]
The House of Representatives concurred in the Senate's amendment, and
the President signed the measure on March 1st, 1845. He immediately
submitted the resolution to the Texan authorities, and on December
29th, 1845, Texas was formally admitted as a "State" into this Union.
There is little question that the President and Mr. Calhoun were
correct as regards the manner in which a foreign state should be
annexed to the United States, but they can hardly be justly blamed or
criticised for {324} following the method insisted upon by Congress as
the constitutional form and prescript.
[Sidenote: The British proposition in regard to Oregon.]
[Sidenote: The American proposition.]
In his first annual message President Polk informed Congress that when
he came into office he found that Great Britain had proposed to settle
the Oregon question by making the divisional line between the
possessions of the two Powers, west of the Rocky Mountains, the
forty-ninth parallel of latitude to the northeasternmost branch of the
Columbia River, and, from this point, the course of the river to the
Pacific; that his predecessor had refused this; that he himself had,
upon invitation from the British plenipotentiary to make a
proposition, offered the forty-ninth parallel from the Rocky Mountains
to the Pacific, although he believed the claim of the United States to
the territory up to the parallel of fifty-four degrees and forty
minutes to be good; and that this proposition had been rejected by the
British minister.
[Sidenote: Polk's recommendation in regard to the matter.]
The President further declared that all attempts to compromise with
Great Britain had failed, and he recommended that Congress should give
the notice, required by the convention of joint occupancy, for the
termination of that agreement, as the first step toward asserting the
power of the Government over the whole of Oregon. He also recommended
the establishment of a line of posts along the Oregon route for the
protection of emigrants to Oregon, and the immediate extension of the
jurisdiction of the United States Government over the citizens of the
United States in Oregon.
This was distinct enough and belligerent enough. The Abolitionists and
anti-slavery Whigs, who had been twitting the Administration with
indifference about Oregon, now that Texas had been secured, could
{325} certainly find no fault with the President's attitude toward the
question. At any rate, it was a challenge to them which could not be
ignored.
[Sidenote: The debate upon the President's recommendation.]
Both Houses entered immediately upon the discussion of the question of
giving the notice. As the debate progressed the war fever became
allayed, and the conviction grew that the claim to the line of
fifty-four forty was extravagant. The majority, at least, saw that the
claim by occupation and settlement was the right basis for the
determination of the dispute, and that this claim would give the
United States the territory only to the line of the northern watershed
of the Columbia.
This line does, indeed, reach at points above the forty-ninth
parallel, but the fact that this parallel was already the divisional
line between the possessions of the two Powers from the Great Lakes to
the Rockies, and that the United States had already proposed to Great
Britain the continuation of this line to the Pacific, produced the
general feeling that the United States should be satisfied with the
forty-ninth parallel as the northern boundary of Oregon, rather than
risk war for the more northern line. Still, the opponents of the
Administration had been so quick to charge the President with
indifference to the acquisition of territory, upon which
non-slaveholding Commonwealths would be established, that they were
now fairly ashamed to lag behind him.
[Sidenote: The conclusion reached by Congress.]
Owing to the course taken by the Senate, Congress did not, however,
come to any conclusion upon the recommendation of the President until
April 23rd, 1846, and then, in the resolution finally passed, it
almost emasculated the President's proposition. It empowered the
President to give the notice, but explained that the purpose of the
same was {326} to direct the attention of the two Governments toward
the adoption of more earnest measures for the amicable settlement of
the question, and it threw upon the President the responsibility as to
the time of giving the notice, by placing that matter entirely within
his discretion.
[Sidenote: The President's retort upon Congress.]
The President had already reopened negotiations with Great Britain
upon the subject, and, on June 10th, he laid before the Senate a
proposal, from the British Envoy, of the forty-ninth parallel for the
boundary, and asked the Senate to advise him as to whether he should
close with the offer. It was not customary to consult the Senate at
this point of the negotiations, but there was precedent for it, and
the letter of the Constitution appears to warrant it, and the
President was determined to retort upon the Senate, for its action in
the matter of the notice, by throwing the responsibility upon that
body of sacrificing the claims of the United States to territory above
the forty-ninth parallel. He plainly informed the Senate that he would
reject the offer unless advised by it to accept.
[Sidenote: The Oregon Treaty.]
The Senate was fairly caught in its own net, and had the good sense to
refrain from a resistance which would have been only an undignified
floundering in meshes prepared by itself. On the 12th, the Senate
advised the President to accept the British overture. On the 15th, the
President signed the treaty, and, on the 18th, the Senate ratified it
by a large majority.
Not many realized, at the moment, that the extension of the
sovereignty of the United States to the Pacific above the forty-second
parallel of north latitude would require the like extension to the
south of it. Once across the Rockies it was inevitable that the
natural boundary in the southwest, as well as in the northwest, should
be ultimately attained. It came sooner than anybody expected.
{327}
CHAPTER XVI.
THE WAR WITH MEXICO
Slidell's Mission to Mexico--The Failure of the Mission--The
Concentration of the Mexican Forces at Matamoras--The United States
Forces Ordered to the Rio Grande--Hostilities Opened--The Battles of
Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma--The Attitude of Congress toward the
War--Congressional Approval of the War--The Occupation of New Mexico
and Upper California, and the Advance into Mexico--California's
Importance--The Battle of Buena Vista--Vera Cruz and Cerro
Gordo--Contreras, San Antonio, and Cherubusco--The Plan for a Cession
of Territory from Mexico--The Wilmot Proviso--The Fate of the Wilmot
Proviso in the Senate--The Proviso Again Voted by the House of
Representatives--The Upham Amendment in the Senate--The Amendment
Defeated by the Efforts of Mr. Cass--The Wilmot Proviso Dropped in the
House--The Mission of Mr. Trist--Rejection of Mr. Trist's Propositions
by the Mexicans--Negotiations Broken off--Molino del Rey, Chapultepec,
Mexico--The Recall of Mr. Trist, and the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo--Ratification of the Treaty.
[Sidenote: Slidell's mission to Mexico.]
As we have seen, the Mexican Government had announced to the
Government of the United States that the annexation of Texas would be
regarded by Mexico as a _casus belli_. Consequently, as soon as the
matter was concluded, the Mexican Envoy left Washington, and all
diplomatic relations between the two Powers were suspended. Some six
months later, President Polk made overtures for the resumption of
these relations, and, upon meeting a somewhat friendly response,
commissioned Mr. John Slidell, of Louisiana, to go to Mexico and
negotiate a treaty, which should settle all the differences between
the two Powers.
{328} Mr. Slidell arrived at Vera Cruz on November 30th, 1845, and
found that President Herrera's Administration was afraid to receive
him, because the military or war party in Mexico, led by General
Paredes, was greatly excited by the attitude of the Administration
toward the United States, and threatened revolution. The Mexican
Government actually refused audience to Mr. Slidell, on December 21st.
[Sidenote: The failure of the mission.]
Before the end of the year, President Herrera gave way to General
Paredes, who assumed the presidency of the Republic, and, under
direction from President Polk, Mr. Slidell announced himself to the
new Administration. This was March 1st, 1846. On the 12th, he received
the refusal of the Paredes Government to give him audience, and
immediately left Mexico.
[Sidenote: The concentration of the Mexican forces at Matamoras.]
During the summer of 1845, the Mexican Government had begun to collect
troops and munitions of war at Matamoras, on the south bank of the Rio
Grande near its mouth. The purpose of all this was without question an
expedition across the Rio Grande, and into the region north of it.
By an act of the Texan Congress, of December 19th, 1836, the Rio
Grande was designated as the southwestern boundary of Texas. The
United States took Texas with this boundary, reserving in the
resolution of annexation the right of adjusting the Texan boundaries
with foreign states. This meant, of course, that the United States
might change the boundary which Texas had given herself, as the result
of her successful rebellion, her revolution, against Mexico, by an
agreement with Mexico, in so far as Texas was concerned. It further
meant that any such change must be made either by an act of the
Congress of the United States or by a treaty between the United States
and Mexico. Until, {329} however, this adjustment should take place,
it was the duty of the President of the United States to defend the
boundary with which Texas came into the Union. Moreover, Congress had
passed an act, on December 31st, 1845, in which Corpus Christi, a town
situated on the south side of the river Nueces, was made an United
States port of delivery. The town was, also, the head-quarters of the
United States army in Texas, and had been so from the period of
annexation.
[Sidenote: The United States forces ordered to the Rio Grande.]
When now the Mexican Government refused to receive Mr. Slidell, and
continued to increase the forces at Matamoras, President Polk felt it
to be his duty to defend the line of the Rio Grande. On January 13th,
he ordered General Taylor, then in command at Corpus Christi, to
advance to the northern bank of the Rio Grande. The General, with his
little army of about 2,000 men, arrived upon the Rio Grande, at a
point opposite Matamoras, on March 28th, and began fortifying his
position.
[Sidenote: Hostilities opened.]
On April 12th, the Mexican commander, General Ampudia, demanded the
withdrawal of Taylor's forces within twenty-four hours, and their
retirement across the Nueces, under threat of the appeal to arms.
Taylor paid no attention to the demand, and, on the 24th, he received
notice from General Arista, the successor of Ampudia, that hostilities
were opened.
[Sidenote: The battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma.]
On the same day, a reconnoitring party of United States dragoons
encountered a large detachment of Mexican soldiers, who had just
crossed the river farther up, and were all killed or captured. General
Taylor moved out from Fort Brown, opposite Matamoras, in order to
cover his base of supplies at Point Isabel, and, having accomplished
this, faced about again to relieve Fort Brown against assault from
Matamoras. {330} While executing this movement he found himself, on
May 8th, face to face with a Mexican army numbering three times as
many men as his own. Nevertheless, he inflicted a crushing defeat upon
the Mexicans in this battle of Palo Alto, and struck them again the
next day at Resaca de la Palma, routing them completely, and driving
the remnants of this once apparently formidable force across the Rio
Grande.
As soon as the news of these events reached Washington, the President
informed Congress of them, claimed that war existed by the act of
Mexican invasion, and asked for the means for its successful
prosecution.
[Sidenote: The attitude of Congress toward the war.]
From the reception of this message to the end of the War, the Whigs in
both Houses condemned the War, but only a few of them voted against
furnishing the means for its prosecution. Strangely enough, they were
aided by Mr. Calhoun, who opposed the whole war policy from the
beginning to the end. He even opposed recognizing the existence of
war. He was getting old and more peaceable in disposition, and also
had probably seen, with Mr. Thompson, that any further slavery
extension toward the Southwest meant the extinction of slavery in the
border Commonwealths, and the greater exposure of the planting section
to the influences of Abolition. Some of the Whigs claimed that if war
existed at all, it was offensive war, and that the President had
exceeded his constitutional powers in bringing it on, and should be
impeached for so doing.
The truth of this proposition depended, of course, upon the
recognition by the United States of Mexico's title to the territory
between the Rio Grande and the Nueces, or, at least, upon the
recognition of it as a free zone, a proposition difficult to reconcile
with the Acts {331} of Congress annexing Texas, and extending the
revenue laws of the United States over this very district. The fact
is, it was a defensive war at the outset, and if the Mexicans were
excited to their move across the Rio Grande by the appearance of
United States troops on the northern bank, they had only to thank
themselves for bringing them there by previously massing their own
troops on the south bank.
[Sidenote: Congressional approval of the war.]
Of course the Abolitionists could see nothing in the matter but a
wicked scheme for the extension of slavery. Their attitude was,
however, too narrow and bigoted to win much attention. And, as the
debate on the President's message progressed, it became manifest that
all the elements of the opposition were getting deeper and deeper into
the quicksands. The bill for recognizing the existence of war, and
authorizing the President to call for 50,000 volunteers, and for
appropriating $10,000,000 to defray the expenses of the campaign, was
passed by an overwhelming majority, in both Houses, on May 11th and
12th, and approved by the President on the 13th.
The President was now, certainly, authorized to carry the War into
Mexico, if, indeed, he needed Congressional authority, at all, after
the war had been once begun as defensive war. At any rate, General
Taylor's occupation of Matamoras did not occur until May 18th, six
days after Congress had recognized war.
[Sidenote: The occupation of New Mexico and Upper California, and the
advance into Mexico.]
The President now ordered General Kearny to occupy New Mexico,
Commodores Sloat and Stockton to make sure of Upper California, and
General Taylor to prosecute the war upon Mexican soil. Kearny, Sloat,
and Stockton quickly accomplished the work assigned them, and without
much difficulty, and Taylor advanced, in September, from Matamoras
upon Monterey. After a {332} three days siege, he captured the place,
on the 24th, and established winter-quarters within its walls.
At the same time, General Kearny sent Colonel Doniphan with a
detachment of his army to Monterey, by way of Chihuahua, and marched
himself with another detachment to San Diego in California. Doniphan's
capture of Chihuahua brought the entire southern valley of the upper
Rio Grande under the military control of the United States, and
Kearny's successful march into California secured that territory
against all eventualities.
[Sidenote: California's importance.]
The occupation of California was the matter of most vital importance
to the United States. It is the way to Asia. Its government by Mexico
was a farce. It would have been purchased or seized by Great Britain,
or some other commercial Power, if the United States had not taken
possession of it. Nothing was known of its vast mineral wealth at the
time. Mere greed, therefore, did not prompt the movement. It was a
great and correct stroke of public policy, supported by geographical,
commercial, and political reasons.
Still Mexico would not yield, and the Administration at Washington now
determined to carry the war into the very vitals of the Mexican state.
The campaign against the Mexican capital, by way of Vera Cruz, was now
resolved on, and General Scott was directed to execute it.
Santa Anna, who had now arrived in Mexico again from Cuba, and had
again taken up the reins of government, thought that the army of
General Scott would be unable to capture Vera Cruz without a long and
painful siege, and planned to advance rapidly from the capital with
the main body of his army to the north, crush Taylor, and return to
the capital before Scott could pass Vera Cruz.
[Sidenote: The battle of Buena Vista.]
On February 20th, 1847, General Taylor, whose advance was now some
hundred miles to the southwest of {333} Monterey, suddenly discovered
a large Mexican force in front of him. It was Santa Anna, with about
twenty thousand of his best troops. Taylor ordered his little army of
about five thousand men to retire for a few miles, and take position
on the rising ground at Buena Vista. The Mexicans soon caught up, and
on the 23rd, Santa Anna demanded unconditional surrender. Taylor
promptly declined, and the battle immediately opened. Both sides knew
the serious character of the wager. California, New Mexico, and,
perhaps, a large part of Texas were staked upon the issue. Before the
day closed, Taylor and his little army had won a complete victory, and
the Mexicans were in full retreat, after the loss of some two thousand
men. Taylor lost about eight hundred men. With this the campaign in
the north was closed, and attention turned almost exclusively to the
operations of General Scott.
[Sidenote: Vera Cruz and Cerro Gordo.]
On March 9th, General Scott effected a landing near Vera Cruz, and on
the 29th captured that city. He immediately took up his line of march
for the city of Mexico.
The first great difficulty which he was compelled to encounter was,
naturally, the forcing of the mountain pass of Cerro Gordo, through
which the national road from Vera Cruz to the city of Mexico led.
Santa Anna had gathered here an army of some fifteen thousand men, and
had thrown up strong earthworks commanding the defile. On the morning
of April 18th, General Scott stormed the heights of Cerro Gordo, and
in a sanguinary battle routed the Mexicans completely. Some three
thousand Mexicans were captured, with five thousand muskets and
forty-three pieces of artillery. Scott's loss was not over four
hundred men. Jalapa, Perote, and Puebla fell into his hands as the
immediate consequences of this victory.
{334} General Scott rested his army for two months at Puebla, and in
the beginning of August resumed his march upon the capital, with an
army of about eleven thousand men. On the 18th, he arrived within ten
miles of the city, and found himself confronted by an army of nearly
thirty thousand men, commanded by President Santa Anna himself.
[Sidenote: Contreras, San Antonio, and Cherubusco.]
On the morning of the 19th, the struggle began, and lasted through the
20th. Three distinct battles were fought--Contreras, San Antonio, and
Cherubusco. The Mexicans outnumbered Scott's army three to one, and
fought desperately to save their capital, but all to no avail. After
killing, wounding, and capturing between seven and eight thousand
Mexicans, General Scott dispersed the remainder of their army and
opened his way into the city. The General was willing, however, to
save the proud Mexicans from the humiliation of seeing their capital
in the hands of the invader, and agreed to an armistice for the
purpose of negotiating a peace.
[Sidenote: The plan for a cession of territory from Mexico.]
On August 8th, 1846, President Polk had asked of Congress that two
millions of dollars be placed at his disposal for use in negotiating a
treaty of peace with Mexico. It was quite evident from this that the
President was going to demand a large cession of territory from
Mexico. Mexico had not yet paid any of the claims awarded by the
Claims Commission of 1840 to the citizens of the United States. There
were also millions of dollars of claims unadjudged. And then there was
the war indemnity, which would undoubtedly be required. Two millions
of dollars, in addition to all this, to be paid by the victorious
party for peace, could mean nothing less, or other, than a vast
territorial cession from the vanquished. It was evident to all that
California and New Mexico, already in the possession of {335} the
United States, must constitute the sacrifice which Mexico must make.
[Sidenote: The Wilmot Proviso.]
[Sidenote: The fate of the Wilmot Proviso in the Senate.]
Mr. McKay, of North Carolina, immediately introduced into the House of
Representatives a bill making the appropriation asked by the
President. Discussion upon the bill was scarcely under way, when a
Northern Democrat, a supporter of the War and of the policy of
territorial extension, Mr. David Wilmot, of Pennsylvania, moved to
amend the bill by inserting in it the condition that neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude should exist in any territory acquired by
treaty from Mexico. The House passed the bill, with the Wilmot
proviso, as it was termed, on the day of its introduction, August 8th.
Territorial extension, but not slavery extension, was its principle,
and therefore the South voted almost solidly against it. The bill
appeared in the Senate on the 10th, which was the last day of the
session, and was still under discussion when the hour for the
adjournment of the body _sine die_ arrived. It was thought by some
competent judges that the Senate would have passed the bill, if it had
then come to a vote, and would have thus settled, at the outset, the
question of slavery extension; but this is at least doubtful. At the
moment, the South had four more votes in the Senate than the North,
and it is probable that the Whig Senators from the South would have
united with their Democratic brethren upon this question.
[Sidenote: The Proviso again voted by the House of Representatives.]
At the beginning of the session of 1846-47, the President again
preferred his request for an appropriation for the same purpose, and
during the month of January, 1847, bills were introduced into the two
Houses, providing an appropriation of three millions of dollars for
the President's use in his negotiations with Mexico.
{336} When the House took up its bill for consideration, on February
1st, Mr. Wilmot immediately asked permission to move the attachment of
his proviso to the appropriation, and made a strong argument in favor
of the same. On the 15th, the proviso was again voted, but by a
reduced majority. The members from the South voted, this time, solidly
against it. A few Northern Democrats voted with them; among these was
Stephen A. Douglas.
[Sidenote: The Upham amendment in the Senate.]
[Sidenote: The amendment defeated by the efforts of Mr. Cass.]
[Sidenote: The Wilmot Proviso dropped in the House.]
On March 1st, Senator Upham, of Vermont, introduced an amendment to
the Senate bill, of the same tenor as the Wilmot proviso in the House,
and urged its adoption in a strong and convincing argument. It really
seemed as if the victory for Free-soil in the new acquisitions,
whatever they might be, was about to be won, when, to the surprise of
at least a considerable number of the Senators, General Cass, of
Michigan, who was thought to have indicated his favor to the Wilmot
proviso at the last session, made a determined effort against Mr.
Upham's motion. Mr. Cass declared the measure premature, and contended
that its only effect, if passed, at the moment would be to weaken the
Government by internal dissensions upon the slavery question, and
consequently encourage the Mexicans to continue the War. He urged the
Senators to stand solidly together for the vigorous prosecution of the
War to its successful close, and then, after the peace, take up the
internal questions arising out of the settlement. The Senate rejected
Mr. Upham's amendment, passed the bill without it, and, on the last
day of the session, the House accepted the bill as it passed the
Senate. Mr. Cass's idea that the anti-slavery proviso would embarrass
the President in his negotiations with Mexico, and would {337}
encourage the Mexicans to continue the War seems to have convinced the
House as well as the Senate.
[Illustration: CALIFORNIA AND NEW MEXICO in 1850.]
The President had now the tacit consent of Congress to the acquisition
of California and New Mexico, and the means to pay for them in hand.
And the greater military successes of General Scott from Vera Cruz to
the Mexican capital prepared the way for the President to make use of
his power.
[Sidenote: The mission of Mr. Trist.]
The President sent Mr. N. P. Trist, of Virginia, to the head-quarters
of General Scott with the draft of a treaty to be offered the Mexican
Government. It designated the Rio Grande from the Gulf to the point
where the River touched the line of New Mexico as the boundary between
Mexico and the United States from the Gulf to that point, and provided
for the cession of New Mexico and the Californias to the United
States, and the privilege of the right of way across the Isthmus of
Tehuantepec. Mr. Trist was instructed, however, that he might withdraw
the demands for Lower California and for the right of way across the
Isthmus, and might also offer a payment of money, if he should find
these things necessary.
[Sidenote: Rejection of Mr. Trist's propositions by the Mexicans.]
After the armistice of August 24th, the Mexican Government sent
commissioners to meet Mr. Trist. They promptly rejected Mr. Trist's
propositions, and offered, as their ultimatum, the Nueces boundary,
the cession of Upper California above the thirty-seventh parallel of
latitude for a pecuniary consideration, the payment by the United
States of an indemnity for private injuries inflicted by the United
States troops during the invasion, etc. Nothing, moreover, was said in
their offer concerning the claims of the citizens of the United States
against Mexico.
[Sidenote: Negotiations broken off. Molino del Rey, Chapultepec,
Mexico.]
The proposals were so far apart, and the Mexicans {338} bore
themselves with so much arrogance, that the negotiations were broken
off, the armistice was terminated, and General Scott resumed military
operations. On September 8th, he inflicted a crushing defeat upon the
Mexicans at Molino del Rey. On the 13th, he stormed successfully the
heights of Chapultepec and two gates of the city. And on the 14th, he
captured the city.
President Polk now recalled Mr. Trist, and informed Congress of the
failure of the negotiations, at the same time intimating that the
policy of the Administration would be war _à outrance_. The opposition
to the Administration in Congress declared that the total
dismemberment of the Mexican Republic was intended, and raised their
voices against it. The outcry helped the Administration, in that it
called the attention of the Mexicans to the great danger they were
incurring in not accepting the terms of peace which had been offered
them.
[Sidenote: The recall of Mr. Trist, and the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo.]
Mr. Trist did not, however, return to the United States, but waited in
and around the City of Mexico for something to turn up. It seems that
he did not even acquaint the Mexican Government with the fact of his
recall. In the latter part of January, 1848, the Mexican commissioners
approached him, and, on February 2nd, they signed with him, at
Guadalupe Hidalgo, a treaty of peace, which provided for the Rio
Grande boundary between the two Powers, the cession of New Mexico and
Upper California to the United States, the payment of $15,000,000 by
the United States to Mexico, and the assumption by the United States
of all the obligations of Mexico to citizens of the United States
incurred before the conclusion of the Treaty.
[Sidenote: Ratification of the Treaty.]
Mr. Trist immediately took the proposed Treaty to {339} Washington,
and President Polk immediately laid it before the Senate for
ratification. After three weeks of determined opposition by Senators
from both parties and both sections, ratification was voted by the
requisite two-thirds majority, on March 16th, 1848. With this the
whole political energy of the nation was turned away from the
international question to the internal questions involved in the
organization of the vast territorial empire upon the Pacific, which
had now been added to the United States by the Treaties with Great
Britain and Mexico.
{340}
CHAPTER XVII.
THE ORGANIZATION OF OREGON TERRITORY AND THE COMPROMISE OF 1850
Bills for Oregon Territory--Thirty-six Degrees and Thirty Minutes to
the Pacific--Mr. Rhett on the Rights of the South in the
Territories--The Third Oregon Bill--The Party Platforms of 1848--The
President Urges the Organization of California and New Mexico--Mr.
Clayton's Attempt at Compromise--Passage of the Oregon Bill by
Congress--The Free-soil Party in 1848--The President's Approval of the
Oregon Bill--Gold and Silver in California--The Election of Taylor,
and the Disaffection of the Northern Democrats--Plans for the
Organization of California and New Mexico--The House Bill for the
Territorial Organization of Upper California--Mr. Walker's Scheme in
the House--Mr. Webster and Mr. Berrien on the Status of Slavery in the
Territory Acquired from Mexico--Emigration to California--President
Taylor's Scheme--The Convention at Monterey--The Policy of the
Administration--The Policy of the Slavery Extensionists--The Elements
of the Slavery Question in Congress--Mr. Clay's Plan of
Compromise--Objections to Mr. Clay's Plan--California's Application
for Admission--Mr. Calhoun's Last Speech--Mr. Webster's March 7th
Speech--Mr. Bell's Proposition--The Death of Mr. Calhoun--Mr. Foote's
Motion and the Committee of Thirteen--The Report and Recommendations
of the Committee--The Debate Upon the Bills Proposed by the Committee,
and the Failure to Pass Them--The Temper of the Country--The
Succession of Fillmore and His Message of August 6th--The Passage of
Bills, Separately, Covering All Questions Contained in Mr. Clay's
Compromise Measures.
[Sidenote: First bill for Oregon Territory.]
On August 6th, 1846, Mr. Douglas, of Illinois, chairman of the
committee on Territories, asked the House {341} of Representatives to
consider a bill prepared by that committee for the organization of
Oregon as a Territory. The House consented, and immediately upon the
second reading of the bill, Mr. Thompson, of Pennsylvania, a Democrat
and friend of the Administration, moved to amend the bill by the
provision "that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall ever
exist in said Territory, except for crimes, whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted." The amendment was adopted by a very large
majority, and the bill, as thus amended, was passed. On the following
day, the bill was presented in the Senate, and referred by that body
to its Judiciary committee, which committee did not report the bill
during the session.
[Sidenote: The second bill.]
At the beginning of the next session, Mr. Douglas introduced a new
bill for the same purpose. This bill virtually contained the Thompson
amendment in the proviso that all the restrictions in the Ordinance of
1787, in regard to the Northwest Territory, should apply to Oregon.
[Sidenote: Thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes to the Pacific.]
On January 12th, 1847, Mr. Burt, of South Carolina, moved to insert
before this proviso the words, "inasmuch as the whole of the said
Territory lies north of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes north
latitude, known as the line of the Missouri Compromise." The purpose
of this was, of course, to commit Congress and the North to that line
to the Pacific. This was so evident that the Northern members voted
the amendment down. We can, however, hardly charge the invention of
this idea to the South Carolinian. On August 8th preceding, Mr. Wick,
of Indiana, had moved to amend the Wilmot proviso, so as to make it
read, that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude should exist, in
any territory {342} acquired from Mexico _north of thirty-six degrees
and thirty minutes_.
[Sidenote: Mr. Rhett on the rights of the South in the Territories.]
It was during the debate on this bill, just after Mr. Burt's amendment
had been rejected, that Mr. Rhett, of South Carolina, made his noted
speech, in which the new view, which the South was now beginning to
take upon the rights of the two sections in the Territories, was first
pronounced. That view was, briefly expressed, that the "States" were
joint owners of the Territories, and "co-Sovereigns" in them; that the
general Government was only the agent of the "States" therein, and had
only the power "to dispose of, and make all needful rules and
regulations respecting the territory, or other property of the United
States," from which power, the power to determine in what property
should consist within the Territories could not be derived; and that
the "ingress of the citizen" of any "State" into any Territory, "is
the ingress of his Sovereign," his "State," who is bound to protect
him in his settlement.
Mr. Rhett qualified this conclusion by saying that it did not mean
that each "State" should set up government in the Territories over its
citizens immigrating into them, but that it meant that the citizens of
each "State" should have equal right to enter the Territories and
settle and occupy them with their property, with whatever was
recognized as property by their respective "States." Stated more
clearly, it meant that the general Government must execute the laws of
each "State;" defining and protecting property, in each Territory of
the Union--of each "State" from which citizens had emigrated into the
Territory concerned--and must execute these several "State" laws over
the immigrants from the several "States" separately.
{343} In plain, blunt Anglo-Saxon, it meant that the general
Government must recognize and protect, as property, in any Territory,
anything which was so recognized and protected by any "State" of the
Union. It meant the establishment of slavery in every Territory of the
Union.
This was a new doctrine in 1847, and it could not immediately prevail,
but its appearance is a mark of the progress which the political
system of the United States was making toward confederatism and
dissolution.
[Sidenote: The failure of the bill in the Senate.]
The bill passed the House on January 16th, 1847, by a vote of nearly
four to one, and was immediately sent to the Senate. The Senate
referred it to its Judiciary committee. The committee reported on it,
and the bill was laid on the table, the last day of the session.
[Sidenote: The third Oregon bill.]
During the next session, bills were introduced into both Houses for
organizing Oregon as a Territory. On January 10th, 1848, Mr. Douglas,
who had been transferred from the House to the Senate, presented in
the Senate a bill for the organization of a Territorial government for
Oregon, which provided, among other things, that the laws which the
Oregon settlers had constructed for themselves should, in so far as
they were compatible with the Constitution and laws of the United
States, remain in force until the Territorial legislature should
change them. These laws excluded slavery. Here was the germ of
"squatter-sovereignty," afterward developed by Mr. Douglas in his
Kansas-Nebraska bill.
The House bill, containing substantially the same provision as the
bill of the preceding session, was introduced on February 9th, 1848,
but this time it met with much more opposition, and the discussion on
it revealed the fact that Mr. Rhett's doctrine had, within the year,
made many converts.
{344} [Sidenote: The President urging action on the bill.]
The bills were dragging along slowly in both Houses, when, on May
29th, the President sent a special message to Congress urging
immediate action on the subject. This gave some impetus to the
proceedings in both Houses.
[Sidenote: Mr. Hale's amendment.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Davis' amendment.]
On May 21st, Mr. Hale, of New Hampshire, moved to amend the Senate
bill by a provision excluding slavery, and insisted upon the power and
the duty of Congress to settle the question of slavery in the
Territories, and to settle it in the interest of freedom. The debate
in the Senate upon Mr. Hale's motion was long and acrimonious, during
which the Southerners advanced to more and more radical ground, until
Mr. Calhoun and his disciple, Mr. Jefferson Davis, expressed the same
constitutional doctrine upon the subject of the extension of slavery
to the Territories as Mr. Rhett had done, which was, in brief, that
neither Congress nor the inhabitants of a Territory had any
constitutional power to abolish slavery in, or exclude it from, a
Territory. On June 23rd, Mr. Davis moved to amend the Oregon bill by
the provision that nothing in the bill should be so construed as to
authorize the prohibition of domestic slavery in said Territory while
it remained in the condition of a Territory. The direct contradiction
between the two amendments expressed, at last, the difference of
attitude now assumed between the North and the South upon the question
of the extension of slavery.
[Sidenote: The party platforms of 1848.]
It cannot be said, however, that it represented the difference of
attitude of the two great parties upon the subject. The National
conventions of these parties for the nominations of candidates for the
presidency had just been held. The convention of the Democratic party
had refused to insert the declaration in its platform that Congress
had no {345} power to interfere with slavery in the Territories, in
spite of the fact that the candidate nominated by it, General Cass,
had acknowledged a leaning to something akin to that view, some five
months previous, in a letter to Mr. Nicholson, of Tennessee, which was
probably intended for circulation in the South. The exact wording of
Mr. Cass' letter does not warrant us in representing him as holding to
anything more, at that time, than that it was sound policy for
Congress to leave the matter of the admission of slavery to, or its
exclusion from, the Territories to the people of the Territories
themselves. It was hardly time for Northern men to take the view of
Congressional impotence in the matter held by Messrs. Rhett, Calhoun,
and Davis.
On the other hand, the convention of the Whig party had refused to
make the principle of the Wilmot proviso a plank in its platform, in
fact had dodged the whole question of principles by adopting no
platform at all, and by nominating a military man, with no political
record at all, for its candidate, the old hero of Buena Vista, General
Taylor.
The contradiction of view upon the question of the extension of
slavery to the Territories was, thus, not one between the parties, but
one between the sections. The parties were yet to be transformed by
the differences between the sections. That this was to be the outcome
no far-seeing eye ought then to have failed to perceive.
[Sidenote: The President urges the organization of California and New
Mexico.]
For a fortnight more the confusion produced by the contradictory
propositions of Mr. Hale and Mr. Davis paralyzed the efforts of the
Senate to pass the Oregon bill, when, on July 6th, 1848, the President
sent a special message to Congress urging the immediate organization
of Territorial governments for California and New Mexico, {346} which
were still under the military régime established at the time of their
occupation.
[Sidenote: Mr. Clayton's attempt at compromise.]
It appeared to some of the Senators that here was now offered the
opportunity for settling the whole question of the extension of
slavery to the Territories, by compromise; and, on July 12th, Mr.
Bright, of Indiana, moved to refer the whole matter of the
organization of Territorial governments in Oregon, California, and New
Mexico, to a select committee, composed of four Whigs and four
Democrats, two of each party from the North and the South,
respectively. Mr. Bright's motion was in the form of an amendment or
suggestion to a motion made by Mr. Clayton, that the Oregon bill be
referred to such a committee. Mr. Clayton accepted Mr. Bright's
modification of his motion, and the Senate immediately voted the
resolution, and appointed the committee, with Mr. Clayton as chairman.
On the 18th, Mr. Clayton reported the bill from his committee, which
provided for the organization of Oregon, with its existing
anti-slavery laws, and with the recognition of the power to the
Territorial legislature to change them; and for the organization of
California and New Mexico, referring the question of the legality of
slavery in them to the Territorial courts, with appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States, as a constitutional question. That is, the
proposition with reference to slavery in California and New Mexico
was, that slaveholders might take their slaves into these Territories
upon their own responsibility, and that if any slaveholder should be
disturbed in the possession of his slave, he might bring an action in
the Territorial courts against the party disturbing him, with the
right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, which final
tribunal should determine the question as a matter {347} of
constitutional law, and, therefore, upon its own independent
interpretation of the Constitution.
[Sidenote: Passage of Mr. Clayton's bill in the Senate, and rejection
of it in the House.]
The Senate debated this bill for a week, during which time the flimsy
character of the makeshifts became painfully apparent. The Senate
passed the bill, however, on the 26th, and sent it to the House.
The House rejected it, and proceeded with its own bill, and, on August
2nd, passed the latter by a strict sectional vote, and sent it to the
Senate for concurrence.
[Sidenote: The House bill in the Senate, and Mr. Douglas' amendment.]
[Sidenote: Passage of the Oregon bill by Congress.]
On the 10th, the Senate passed this bill, with an amendment, proposed
by Mr. Douglas, extending the Missouri Compromise line of thirty-six
degrees and thirty minutes to the Pacific. The House immediately
rejected the amendment, and the Senate was compelled to recede, or let
Oregon go without Territorial government. It wisely voted, on the
12th, to recede from its amendment, and passed the bill, with the
Congressional prohibition of slavery, and without compromise as to the
settlement of the slavery question in California and New Mexico. Among
the Senators who changed their votes upon the amendment were Douglas
from the North, and Benton and Houston from the South.
[Sidenote: The Free-soil party in 1848.]
The feeling aroused outside of Congress by the contest within the body
was most intense, and had, for its permanent result the organization
of the Anti-slavery-extension party. It called itself then the
"Free-soil" party. It held a National convention at Buffalo, New York,
on August 9th, and nominated Mr. Van Buren for the presidency, on a
platform which distinctly affirmed the power of Congress to exclude
slavery from the Territories, and its duty to exercise the power. Here
was, at last, the {348} principle and the party of the future. Those
who composed it held to the Union and the Government, vindicated the
national character of both, and while they denied none of the
constitutional rights of the Southern Commonwealths, and none of the
compromises of the Constitution with the slaveholders, yet they
refused to allow the great evil under which the country suffered to
spread into regions uncontaminated by it.
[Sidenote: The President's approval of the Oregon bill.]
The President signed the Oregon bill, on August 14th, for the reason,
he said, among other reasons, that it preserved the principle of the
Missouri Compromise, making the territory north of thirty-six degrees
and thirty minutes free soil. And in his message of December 5th,
following, he urged the speedy organization of California and New
Mexico, either upon that principle, or upon the principle of
non-interference by Congress with the question of slaveholding in
them, or upon the basis of an appeal of the question to the Supreme
Court of the United States, which body should interpret the
Constitution upon the subject. He said he believed the first way
contained the true principle, and was the fair thing, but that he was
willing to proceed in either of the other two ways.
[Sidenote: Gold and silver in California.]
At the same time, the President gave official verification to the
rumors of the discovery of great quantities of gold and silver in
California, which quickened the emigration of the bold and adventurous
spirits from all parts of the country to the new El Dorado.
[Sidenote: The election of Taylor, and the disaffection of the
Northern Democrats.]
[Sidenote: Plans for the organization of California and New Mexico.]
The temper of Congress against slavery extension was even stronger in
the session of 1848-49, than in the preceding session. The Whig
majority in the House of Representatives remained, and now came a
support to the anti-slavery-extension principle of the Northern {349}
Whigs from Northern Democrats, which had not been before accorded. The
elections of 1848 had greatly surprised the Northern Democrats. The
Whig candidate, General Taylor, carried a majority of the Southern
Commonwealths, and was chosen President. The Democrats of the North
considered that they had been left in the lurch by the Democrats of
the South, and came to the session of 1848-49 with revenge in their
hearts. They were disposed to join hands with the Northern Whigs
against the extension of slavery into any more of the Territories of
the Union. This spirit was, however, far more manifest in the House of
Representatives than in the Senate. On December 11th, 1848, Mr.
Douglas brought into the Senate a plan for avoiding the question in
respect to slavery in California and New Mexico, by immediately
erecting the whole of the territory acquired from Mexico into a single
Commonwealth, and reserving the right to Congress to create new
Commonwealths in that part of this territory lying east of the Sierra
Nevada Mountains. This proposition was referred to the Judiciary
committee for report; but before the report was presented Mr. Smith,
of Indiana, chairman of the committee on Territories, brought in bills
for the organization of Upper California and New Mexico, with the
slavery restriction of the Ordinance of 1787 in them. On January 9th,
1849, Mr. Berrien, chairman of the Judiciary committee, reported
adversely upon Mr. Douglas' proposition, on the grounds, alleged by
him, that Congress could not create a Commonwealth, but could only
admit a Commonwealth into the Union after it had been created by the
sovereign act of the people residing in it, for the performance of
which act the status of Territorial organization was necessary, and
that Congress could never {350} constitutionally disconnect from any
Commonwealth any portion of its territory for the purpose of forming
it into another Commonwealth, without the consent of the Commonwealth
itself.
[Sidenote: Mr. Douglas' plan.]
Mr. Douglas immediately modified his bill so as to meet the latter
objection; and on January 24th, offered a substitute for his former
proposition, which provided for a Commonwealth of California that
would not quite cover the territory which the Mexicans included under
the title of the Province of Upper California. On Mr. Douglas' own
motion, this proposition was referred to a select committee, of which
he was appointed chairman; and, on the 29th, he reported a bill from
the committee for forming the territory acquired from Mexico into two
Commonwealths, to be called California and New Mexico; but the Senate
showed so much opposition to the project that it was dropped. More
than half the session had now passed, and the Senate appeared to be
farther than ever from any consensus in regard to what should be done
for California and New Mexico. It was a serious condition of things.
The inhabitants of these Territories were importunately demanding the
establishment of civil government over them for the protection of
life, liberty, and property, and Congress was apparently to do nothing
for them during the current session.
[Sidenote: Mr. Walker's expedient.]
On February 19th, Mr. Walker, of Wisconsin, came forward in the Senate
with an expedient. He moved to attach to the Civil and Diplomatic
Appropriation Bill a provision for extending the Constitution, and the
laws of the United States naturally applicable, over all the territory
acquired from Mexico, and for authorizing the President to make all
needful rules and regulations, and to appoint civil officials, for
their execution. The Senate passed this amendment, {351} and sent the
Appropriation Bill thus modified back to the House for concurrence.
[Sidenote: The House bill for the Territorial organization of Upper
California.]
Meanwhile the bill in the House for the Territorial organization of
Upper California, with the slavery prohibition clause in it, was
proceeding through a most exciting debate, but with increasing
prospect of final passage. On February 27th, it was passed, by an
almost sectional vote, and sent to the Senate. The Senate referred it
to its committee on Territories, and there it slept as in "the tomb of
all the Capulets."
[Sidenote: Mr. Walker's scheme in the House.]
On March 1st, the House took up the Senate's amendment to the Civil
and Diplomatic Appropriation Bill, and referred it to the committee on
Ways and Means. This committee reported, on March 2nd, an amendment to
the Senate's amendment, which provided for the continuance of the
status of military possession and of the Mexican laws in all the
territory acquired from Mexico, until six months after the close of
the next session of Congress. The purpose of this amendment was the
continuance of the Mexican law excluding slavery. The House did not,
however, adopt this proposition, but sent the Appropriation Bill back
to the Senate stripped of the Senate's amendment. The Senate asked a
conference upon the subject, which was granted by the House, but the
Conference committee could come to no agreement.
[Sidenote: Mr. Webster and Mr. Berrien on the status of slavery in the
territory acquired from Mexico.]
The House now passed the proposition of the Ways and Means committee,
slightly modified in form, and sent it to the Senate. Mr. Webster
moved concurrence with the House in this proposition, and said that it
meant no more than the existing status, which would continue if
nothing were done. Mr. Berrien contended, on the contrary, that only
the private law of the ceding country, {352} the law regulating the
relations between individuals, remains in force in the territory
ceded, until changed by the positive acts of the country receiving the
cession; that the public law of the receiving country is extended at
once, by virtue of the occupation, over the cession; and that slavery
was a part of the public law of the United States, since both the
system of taxation and that of representation rested in part upon it.
Mr. Berrien concluded from these postulates of international and
constitutional law that, if Congress did nothing in the premises, the
President would continue to administer, by means of his military
officials, the private law of Mexico, and the public law of the United
States, in the territory acquired from Mexico, and that this would
allow slaveholders to take their slaves into this territory, and hold
them in slavery; but that if Congress, by a positive enactment, should
adopt the Mexican laws, _en bloc_, for this territory, slavery would
be thereby excluded from it. In a word, he demonstrated, or thought he
did, that the proposition of the House of Representatives contained
the principle of the Wilmot proviso. The Senate was so deeply
impressed by Mr. Berrien's argument, and so much opposition to the
proposition of the House was manifested, that Mr. Webster offered to
withdraw his motion, if the Southerners would agree to recede from the
Senate's amendment. The bargain was struck, and the Thirtieth Congress
expired without having done anything for the governmental organization
of California and New Mexico, and without having advanced, in the
slightest measure, toward the solution of the fateful question of
slavery extension in the vast empire conquered from Mexico.
[Sidenote: Emigration to California.]
The official announcement made by President Polk of the mineral wealth
of California had increased the excitement for emigration thither to a
fever, and by the {353} close of the spring of 1849, California had a
population within her provincial limits numerous enough, according to
prevailing conceptions, to make a Commonwealth.
[Sidenote: President Taylor's scheme.]
The new President, Taylor, thought that all further controversy about
the Territorial organization of California might now be avoided, by
skipping the Territorial period and status altogether, and organizing
California immediately as a Commonwealth. He sent a commissioner to
examine the situation on the ground and make report. Whether the
commissioner imparted the President's scheme to General Riley, the
military Governor, or not, we are not informed. We have good reason,
however, to suspect it, since Riley immediately issued a call for a
convention of the people of California to frame a Commonwealth.
[Sidenote: The convention at Monterey.]
The people quickly responded by choosing delegates, and the delegates
met at Monterey on September 1st, 1849. By October 13th, their work
was completed, and the organic law which they drafted was ratified by
the people, on November 13th. One of its provisions was the
prohibition of slavery. The filling up of California by immigration
had been too sudden for the holders of slaves to take part in the
movement. It was accomplished, it could be accomplished, only by bold,
alert, shrewd adventurers, untrammelled by families or stupid African
retainers. It was reported that every delegate in the convention voted
for the prohibition of slavery, and the people ratified the instrument
containing it by a vote of fifteen to one.
[Sidenote: The policy of the Administration.]
The President informed Congress, in his message of December 4th, 1849,
of the proceedings in California, and manifested his desire to admit
California into the Union at once. He also predicted that the people
of {354} New Mexico would soon follow the example of the Californians.
The policy of the Administration in reference to this question was
thus clearly defined, and was, whether intentional or not, a policy
favorable to the prohibition of slavery in both California and New
Mexico. The slaveholders, or rather the slavery extensionists,
regarded the President's position as treachery to his section.
[Sidenote: The policy of the slavery extensionists.]
The policy of the slavery extensionists was to organize California and
New Mexico as Territories, without the prohibition of slavery in them,
giving thus time and opportunity for slaveholders to settle in them,
with their slaves, and, when the time should come for the formation of
Commonwealth governments in them, to vote an organic law perpetuating
slavery. This policy was manifested anew in the bill introduced into
the Senate, on the last day of December, 1849, by Mr. Foote, of
Mississippi, for the organization of the entire Mexican cession into
three Territories--California, Deseret or Utah, and New Mexico.
[Sidenote: The elements of the slavery question in Congress.]
The slavery question in Congress had now come, however, to include
more than the matter of the governmental organization of the territory
acquired from Mexico. There was, in the first place, the question of
the Texas boundary, in that, by the Joint Resolution annexing Texas,
the adjustment of that boundary, as regarded foreign states, at least,
was reserved to Congress. Texas, as we know, claimed the Rio Grande
from mouth to source, and thence the longitude to the forty-second
parallel of latitude as her southwestern and western boundary. She
came into the Union with a law on her statute book asserting this
boundary. The Treaty with Mexico, recognizing the line of the Rio
Grande to the {355} limits of New Mexico, and ceding New Mexico, made
the question of the Texan boundary a purely internal question for the
United States, if it was any longer a question. The Abolitionists and
anti-slavery-extensionists wanted to reduce Texas in area, since
slavery was established by the law of the Commonwealth throughout its
entire extent. They therefore interpreted the Resolution of annexation
as reserving that power to Congress, even after the question had
become purely internal. The slavery extensionists, on the contrary,
contended that the power reserved to Congress in reference to the
Texan boundary was now obsolete, since it expressly related only to
the adjustment of the same with Mexico, and that had been accomplished
by the Treaty. Then, there was the war debt of Texas, which was justly
a charge upon the United States--although the Resolution of annexation
repudiated it--since it was hypothecated upon revenue, the proceeds
from which were being covered into the United States Treasury, the
customs collected in the Texan ports. And, then, there was the
question of the rendition of fugitive slaves, since the execution of
the existing law, that of 1793, in regard to this matter, had been
rendered so difficult by the movements of the Abolitionists, after
1835, as to make a more strenuous measure necessary, unless the
slaveholders would abandon their constitutional rights to the
rendition of their escaped slaves. And, lastly, there was the
ever-recurring question of slavery and the slave-trade in the District
of Columbia, which was still clamoring for a hearing.
Already, before the closing week of January, 1850, had bills been
brought forward, both in the Senate and in the House, touching all of
these subjects, except, perhaps, the last, when, on the 29th, Mr. Clay
came forward with his famous proposition for the adjustment of them
all in one grand scheme.
{356} [Sidenote: Mr. Clay's plan of compromise.]
This proposition provided, in the first place, for the immediate
admission of California as a Commonwealth, with suitable boundaries,
and without any restrictions as to slavery; in the second place, for
the establishment of Territorial governments in all of the remainder
of the Mexican cession, without any restrictions as to slavery; in the
third place, for fixing the western boundary of Texas, so as to
exclude any portion of New Mexico; in the fourth place, for the
assumption of the Texan debt contracted before annexation and
hypothecated upon the Texan customs, on condition of the
relinquishment by Texas of all claims on New Mexico; in the fifth
place, for the abolition of the slave-trade in the District of
Columbia, in slaves brought into the District from the outside for the
purpose of sale; and in the sixth place, for a more effective law for
the rendition of fugitive slaves. The resolutions also contained
declarations that slavery did not then exist in any of the territory
acquired from Mexico, and that Congress had no power to prohibit or
obstruct trade in slaves between the slaveholding Commonwealths.
[Sidenote: Slaveholders' objections to Mr. Clay's plan.]
In spite of the fact that Mr. Clay asked the Senators to consider his
propositions carefully before committing themselves, and suggested
that they should lay over for a week, the Southern Senators
immediately proceeded to attack the plan at several points. They
objected to California being allowed to jump the Territorial period of
probation and preparation for Commonwealth government. They declared
Mr. Clay's dictum about the existing illegality of slavery in the
territory acquired from Mexico to be an assumption, and asserted that
slavery was legal everywhere in the United States, unless a positive
law forbade it. They vindicated the claims of Texas to the boundaries
designated by the Act of the Texan {357} Congress in 1836. And while
some of them were not decidedly opposed to the abolition of the
slave-trade in the District of Columbia, most of them deprecated
meddling with the subject at all, and wanted to substitute for Mr.
Clay's proposition on the subject a declaration of the lack of any
power in Congress to deal with slavery in the District. The
improvement of the fugitive slave-law was about the only thing in the
entire plan which met with their approval. Mr. Jefferson Davis said
outright that he wanted a positive recognition from Congress of the
legality of slavery in the new territory south of the parallel of
thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes.
[Sidenote: Anti-slavery objections to Mr. Clay's plan.]
On the other hand, the Abolitionists and the
anti-slavery-extensionists insisted upon the immediate admission of
California, with its anti-slavery constitution; upon the insertion of
the principle of the Wilmot proviso in the Territorial organization of
the remainder of the acquisition from Mexico; upon the contraction of
the Texan limits, without any compensation to Texas; upon the
abolition of the slave-trade in the District of Columbia, and a
declaration of the power of Congress to deal with slavery in the
District; and upon a jury trial, at the place of apprehension, for
every claimed fugitive from labor.
[Sidenote: California's application for admission.]
The contradiction between these views appeared irreconcilable. We may
say, however, that a start toward an approach was caused by the
transmission of California's application to Congress for admission, as
a Commonwealth, into the Union.
This happened on February 13th. On the following day, Mr. Douglas
moved to take up the President's message accompanying the application,
and thus to consider the California question separately from the
others. Mr. Clay agreed to this. Mr. Foote, of Mississippi, scolded
Mr. Clay for thus betraying the South, but the {358} Southerners were
made to feel that they must modify their opposition to Mr. Clay's
plan, if they desired to avoid something like this.
[Sidenote: Mr. Calhoun's last speech.]
On March 4th, Mr. Calhoun made his last great speech upon the whole
political situation, its threatening character, and its possible
rectification. He was too feeble to pronounce it himself, and it was
read for him by Senator Mason. Mr. Calhoun's propositions were, that
the Union was endangered; that the immediate cause of the danger was
the universal discontent prevailing in the South from the feeling that
the South could no longer remain with safety and honor in the Union;
and that the cause of this feeling was the fact that the balance of
power between the two sections of the country in the Government was
gone, and the stronger section was endeavoring to make the Government
an unlimited centralized democracy, and use it for interfering in the
internal affairs of the weaker, and for absorbing the substance, as
well as destroying the rights, of the weaker.
He suggested as remedies for the evils, which he thought existed and
impended, an equal division of the territory to the Pacific between
the North and the South, an amendment to the Constitution restoring
the balance of power between the two sections, proper laws for the
rendition of fugitives from labor, and cessation of the agitation of
the slavery question.
What should be the provisions of the amendment, restoring the balance
of power in the Government, and how the cessation of the agitation
could be compelled, were not explained. It was not easy to see how
these points could be advanced beyond the position of general
propositions. It was, however, a great and solemn presentation of the
whole question, and it made a great impression.
{359} [Sidenote: Mr. Webster's March 7th speech.]
On March 7th, Mr. Webster made his famous speech, giving his great
influence to pacification and compromise, and to the preservation of
the Constitution. He told the Northerners that they were bound by the
agreement with Texas to admit four new Commonwealths from Texan
territory, under the usual conditions; that they were bound by the
Constitution to deliver up fugitive slaves; and that since nature had
made slavery impossible in California and New Mexico, they ought not
to irritate the Southerners by demanding a Congressional prohibition
of slavery therein. He told the Southerners, on the other hand, that
they should desist from denying to citizens from Northern
Commonwealths, temporarily within the jurisdiction of Southern
Commonwealths, the rights of citizens. And he told the Abolitionists
that they should measure their ideas of right, in some degree at
least, by the standard of the common consciousness of the country, and
modify them, in some degree, thereby. His words were received with
great satisfaction by all moderate and prudent men. Of course, they
did not satisfy the extremists, either in the North or the South, but
they settled the minds of many who were wavering, and moved the work
of temporary pacification, at least, several stages onward.
[Sidenote: Mr. Bell's proposition.]
During the course of the debate upon Mr. Clay's resolutions, and
before the great efforts either of Mr. Calhoun or Mr. Webster, Mr.
Bell, of Tennessee, had offered some propositions, looking to the
admission of California as a Commonwealth, and to the formation of
Territorial government for New Mexico. On the day after Mr. Webster's
great speech, Mr. Foote moved the reference of Mr. Bell's resolutions
to a select committee of thirteen members. No vote, however, was
immediately taken, but the debate upon {360} both sets of resolutions
dragged on from day to day, and was made more complicated by the
introduction of a bill from the committee on Territories, providing
for the immediate admission of California, and the formation of
Territorial governments for New Mexico and Utah.
[Sidenote: The death of Mr. Calhoun.]
On March 31st, Mr. Calhoun passed away. The announcement of his death,
the eulogies pronounced upon his memory, and the funeral rites, were
most solemn and impressive occasions. The influence of the sad event
seemed, for the moment, to soften the hearts of those who had
associated with him toward one another. It seemed as if political foes
would be willing to join hands across his bier.
[Sidenote: Mr. Foote's motion and the Committee of Thirteen.]
On April 11th, Mr. Mangum, of North Carolina, moved to refer the
resolutions of Mr. Clay, along with those of Mr. Bell, to the
committee suggested by Mr. Foote. Mr. Foote accepted Mr. Mangum's
motion as an amendment to his own. After a most determined opposition
by Senator Benton to Mr. Foote's motion, during which temper rose so
high that Mr. Benton threatened to cudgel Mr. Foote, and Mr. Foote
actually drew a pistol upon Mr. Benton, both in the course of the
debate in the Senate chamber, Mr. Foote's motion was passed. On the
next day, April 19th, the members of the committee were chosen by
ballot. They were Mr. Clay, Mr. Bell, Mr. Berrien, Mr. Bright, Mr.
Cass, Mr. Cooper, Mr. Dickinson, Mr. Downs, Mr. King, Mr. Mason, Mr.
Mangum, Mr. Phelps, and Mr. Webster. Seven members, including the
chairman, Mr. Clay, were from the South and six from the North.
[Sidenote: The report and recommendations of the committee.]
On May 8th, Mr. Clay made the report, and offered the bills, from the
grand committee, covering all the {361} subjects referred. The first
bill provided for the admission of California, with the Commonwealth
organization formed by her people the preceding autumn; for the
Territorial organization of Utah and New Mexico, without any slavery
restriction, and with restrictions upon the Territorial legislatures
against passing any acts in regard to slavery; for fixing the northern
boundary of Texas upon a line drawn from a point on the Rio Grande
twenty miles above El Paso to the point on the Red River where the
line of the one hundredth degree of longitude intersects this river;
for quit-claiming, so to speak, to Texas the claims of the United
States to the country between the Nueces and the Rio Grande; and for
paying Texas a sum of money, in consideration of the discharge of the
United States from all obligations to pay the Texan debt, and of the
surrender of all claims by Texas to country north of the northern
boundary as fixed in the bill.
The second bill provided that a fugitive from labor must be delivered
up on the order of any judge or commissioner of the United States
authorized by the laws of the United States so to act, and that such
judge or commissioner was authorized to issue such order on
presentation to him, by the claimant of the fugitive, of a copy of the
record of a competent court in the Commonwealth, Territory, or
District from which the fugitive was said to have escaped, before
which the facts of ownership, identity, and escape had been
satisfactorily proven. The judge or commissioner issuing such order
was required, in case the fugitive declared himself to be a free man,
to demand of the claimant of the fugitive a bond, with surety, for
$1,000, pledging the claimant to accord the fugitive a trial by jury
of the question of his freedom, in a competent court of the
Commonwealth, {362} Territory, or District from which he was said to
have escaped.
The third bill provided for the abolition of the slave-trade in the
District of Columbia, and for the liberation of any slave brought into
the District for the purposes of sale or dépôt.
[Sidenote: The debate upon the bills proposed by the committee, and
the failure to pass them.]
The debate began immediately upon the first bill, and the opposition
to it from both sections advanced about the same arguments as were
employed against these same subjects when presented in the form of Mr.
Clay's resolutions. The discussion continued through May, June, and
July, until, at the end of July, nothing remained of the bill but that
part of it which provided for the Territorial organization of Utah.
The general plan of the compromise was lost.
[Sidenote: The temper of the country.]
The whole country was amazed, disappointed, and angry. The Senators
were quickly and decidedly made to feel that they dare not separate
without doing something to heal the distractions of the land.
[Sidenote: The succession of Fillmore and his message of August 6th.]
The death of President Taylor, on July 9th, and the accession of Mr.
Fillmore, made the Administration more favorable to the measures
included in the compromise plan. On August 6th, he communicated to
Congress the fact that the Governor of Texas, P. H. Bell, in execution
of an act of the Texas legislature, was extending the jurisdiction of
Texas over the disputed territory on the eastern border of New Mexico,
and that the President, as military Governor, in highest instance, of
New Mexico, felt obliged to resist the movement, and that he had
informed the Governor of Texas of his purpose. He besought Congress to
avert the calamity which now threatened, by attending at once {363} to
the matter of the boundary between Texas and New Mexico.
[Sidenote: The passage of bills, separately, covering all the
questions contained in Mr. Clay's compromise measures.]
Under this pressure, the Senate took up the Texan boundary bill,
introduced by Mr. Pierce, of Maryland, which provided that the
northern boundary of Texas should be the parallel of thirty-six
degrees and thirty minutes from the one hundredth degree of longitude
to the one hundred and third degree; that the western and southwestern
boundary should be the one hundred and third parallel of longitude
from the northern line to latitude thirty-two degrees, thence along
this parallel westward to the Rio Grande, thence the Rio Grande to the
Gulf; and that ten millions of dollars should be paid Texas for
agreeing to this boundary, and for relinquishing all claims on the
United States in regard to the payment of her public debt. On August
9th, the bill passed the Senate.
On the 13th, the Senate took up the bill for the immediate admission
of California, reported from the committee on Territories, and passed
it by a large majority.
On August 15th, the Senate passed the bill from the committee on
Territories for the Territorial organization of New Mexico, without
any provision as to slavery. The bill for the organization of Utah had
passed, it will be remembered, on August 1st, as the remnant of the
compromise plan.
The Senate then took up the Fugitive Slave Bill reported in March from
the Judiciary committee. Inasmuch as the United States Supreme Court
had given its opinion, in the case of Prigg versus Pennsylvania, that
Commonwealth officers were not required by the Constitution of the
United States to render any assistance in the rendition of fugitive
slaves, the Judiciary {364} committee had so constructed its bill as
to make use of the machinery of the central Government alone in the
execution of the proposed law. The bill was a somewhat more stringent
measure than that proposed by Mr. Clay's committee. It did away with
the right of a fugitive claiming to be a freeman to a trial by jury of
the question of his freedom in a competent court of the Commonwealth,
Territory, or District from which he was said to have escaped. It made
it the duty of the marshals and deputy marshals of the United States
courts to obey and execute all of the warrants and precepts issued
under the provisions of the Act. It imposed a penalty of fine and
imprisonment upon any person knowingly hindering the arrest of a
fugitive, or attempting to rescue one from custody, or harboring one,
or aiding one to escape. And it made the fee of the commissioner $10
in case he should issue the certificate of arrest to the claimant of
the fugitive, and only $5 in case he should not. Otherwise it was
substantially the same as the bill proposed by the Clay committee. The
Senate passed this bill, on August 26th.
At last, on September 16th, the Senate passed the bill recommended by
Mr. Clay's committee, for the abolition of the slave-trade in the
District of Columbia.
One after another, all these bills passed the House of
Representatives, against great opposition, but with no material
alteration, except the connection of the bill for the organization of
Territorial government in New Mexico with that for the adjustment of
the Texan boundary, in which change the Senate acquiesced, and were
all signed by the President; and before the first session of the
Thirty-first Congress expired, on September 30th, 1850, the great work
of pacification, as it was hoped and believed to be, had been
accomplished.
{365}
CHAPTER XVIII.
THE EXECUTION OF THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW, AND THE ELECTION OF 1852
Change of Attitude of the Slaveholders by the Fugitive Slave Law of
1850--The First Cases Under the New Law--The Opposition to the
Execution of the Law--Establishment of the "Underground"--The Support
of the Law by the Political Leaders--The President's Support of the
Law--Joshua R. Giddings--Petitions for the Repeal of the Law--The
Shadrach Case--The Investigation of the Case by Congress--The Question
of Increasing the Power of the President to Execute the Law--The Sims
Case--Excitement in Boston Over the Rendition of Sims--The "Jerry
Rescue"--The President's Rebuke--Mr. Foote's Finality Resolutions--The
Failure of the Resolutions to Pass the Senate, but Their Success in
the House--The National Conventions of 1852 and the Finality of the
Compromise Measures--The Deaths of Clay and of Webster, and the
Appearance of a Free-soil Candidate--The Overwhelming Democratic
Victory of 1852--The True Policy of the Slaveholders, and Their
Failure to Discern It.
[Sidenote: Change of attitude of the slaveholders by the Fugitive
Slave Law of 1850.]
Down to the time of the enactment of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850,
it may be said that the slaveholders were acting, in a certain sense,
on the defensive. Before 1787, slavery had been regarded as a
temporary relation, demanded by the moral and intellectual degradation
of the Africans, and by the necessities of the social structure in
which Anglo-Saxon and negro were brought together. It had been
considered that the rise of the negro in civilization, by his contact
with the white race, {366} would gradually change this relation in the
direction of freedom. In fact it had done so, in a considerable
degree. But the formation of the Constitution of 1787, the invention
and use of the cotton-gin, the acquisition of Louisiana, and the
general subsidence of the revolutionary spirit of the eighteenth
century, were all unfavorable to further progress in this only proper
and correct direction. Between 1830 and 1840, a strong retrogressive
movement set in, as we have seen, provoked indeed, in a considerable
degree, by the Abolition propaganda; and in consequence of it, the
slaveholders abandoned the only moral principle upon which slavery
could be justified, and began to adopt the idea of the permanency of
the relation, and to undertake the adjustment of the laws, customs,
institutions, and policies of the country to this idea. And, at last,
by the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, they committed the whole country to
this course. In a word, they made slavery by this law a national
matter, and they did it from the property point of view of slavery,
the point of view which exhibits it in its most hateful light, and
from which no moral justification whatsoever for its existence can be
found.
It is true that the Constitution commanded the return of fugitive
slaves, and that the Supreme Court of the United States had
interpreted the provision as vesting the power of executing this
command in, and imposing the duty of its execution exclusively upon,
the general Government, but it was a fatal policy for the slaveholders
to insist upon the realization of this right through the general
Government. In fact, it was a fatal policy to insist upon its
realization at all. There was no way to effect it without requiring
the aid of the North in the perpetuation of slavery. The attempt to
effect it was, therefore, the assumption of an offensive attitude on
the part of the slaveholders, an attitude which was bound to {367}
provoke a general hostility to slavery throughout the North, instead
of the indifference which had prevailed under the idea that slavery
was an institution of the Southern Commonwealths, with which the North
and the general Government had no concern. Calhoun and Rhett and Davis
had seen this danger, and they were not supporters of a national
fugitive slave law. They preferred to consider the matter of the
rendition of fugitive slaves as a special compact between the
"States," and treat its non-fulfilment as a rupture of the Union.
Possibly, protected as their "States" were by the border slaveholding
Commonwealths, they did not feel the necessity of such a law. At any
rate, it was the border slaveholding Commonwealths which wanted the
law.
[Sidenote: The first cases under the new law.]
The first apprehension of an escaped slave, under the new Act, was
made in the city of New York. One James Hamlet, who had three years
before left his mistress, Mary Brown, of Baltimore, was the victim. He
had a wife and children in New York. He was surprised at his work,
hastily tried, and delivered to Mrs. Brown's agent, who conducted him
back to Baltimore. When the news of the event spread abroad it created
great excitement among the negro population throughout the North, and
great indignation on the part of the white citizens in many quarters.
[Sidenote: The opposition to the execution of the law.]
It was calculated that there were from fifteen to twenty thousand
escaped slaves living at that time in the non-slaveholding
Commonwealths who were liable to apprehension under the law; and every
person having any negro blood, whether escaped from slavery or not,
felt the insecurity created by the law. Meetings of persons belonging
to these classes were immediately held in Boston and New York, and
resolutions were passed at them, praying the white people to move for
the repeal of the law.
{368} In answer, so to speak, to these appeals, mass-meetings of white
people were held in Lowell, Syracuse, and Boston, at which the law was
denounced, its repeal demanded, and aid pledged to the negroes in the
North in resisting the execution of the law. Ministers of the Gospel,
such as Beecher, Storrs, Furness, Spear, and Cheever, rained down
denunciations upon the law from their pulpits, declared it to be in
direct contravention of the law of God, and counselled resistance to
its execution.
[Sidenote: Establishment of the "Underground."]
In the midst of this excitement two Georgia slaves, named William and
Ellen Crafts, had succeeded in reaching Boston, and were concealed by
some of the most high-toned people of that city, the Hillards,
Lorings, and Parkers, from their pursuers, and aided in a successful
escape to England. The first branch of the "Underground," established
after the passage of the law, ran through very respectable quarters.
[Sidenote: The support of the law by the political leaders.]
The lawyers, politicians, and statesmen now felt that it was high time
for them to call the people back to the proper comprehension and
observance of their constitutional duties. Clay, Webster, Cass,
Douglas, Buchanan, Shields, Curtis, Choate, and many others,
instructed the people, both in speeches and written articles, in
regard to the constitutionality of the law, and their duty to obey its
requirements. With this the tide of public opinion began to change,
and the idea that it was the constitutional duty of the North to the
South to secure the execution of the law began to prevail. Such was
the state of feeling when the Congressional session of 1850-51 opened,
on December 2nd.
[Sidenote: The President's support of the law.]
In his message to Congress President Fillmore proclaimed his adherence
to the Compromise Measures, as a {369} final settlement of the
subjects to which they related, said that he believed the great mass
of the American people sympathized with him, indicated that he would
veto any measure for the repeal of the Fugitive Slave Law, and
declared that he would execute the laws to the utmost of his ability
and to the extent of the power vested in him.
This bold and determined language on the part of the President, who
had been considered in the North as personally hostile to the Fugitive
Slave Law, took the North somewhat by surprise, painfully so in some
quarters, while it was highly approved at the South. It undoubtedly
contributed, ultimately and in large degree, to the suppression of the
resistance in the North to the execution of the law. At the moment,
however, it drew out some of the bitterest denunciations of the law
which were ever pronounced.
[Sidenote: Joshua R. Giddings.]
Mr. Joshua R. Giddings, of Ohio, moved the reference of this part of
the message to the Judiciary committee in the House of
Representatives, and made a speech in support of his motion, which was
an anti-slavery harangue of the most radical and violent character,
and in the course of which he denounced the President and Mr. Webster
in unmeasured language as apostates from principle and suitors for
Southern favor. The reckless outburst of radical extravagance,
although somewhat balanced by many points of sound sense, disgusted
the House, and it voted down Mr. Giddings' motion by a large majority.
[Sidenote: Petitions for the repeal of the law.]
[Sidenote: The Shadrach case.]
Petitions began now to flow into Congress for the repeal of the law.
Generally they were laid upon the table, but more than once a fierce
debate was opened, which threatened to precipitate another contest
over the right of petition. It was about the time that the Senate was
considering what {370} to do with one of these petitions, offered by
Mr. Hamlin, of Maine, in February of 1851, that the news of the
failure of the law in the Shadrach case reached Washington. Shadrach,
claimed slave of John DeBree, of Norfolk, Va., was rescued by a negro
mob, while held in custody in the court-house in Boston under a
warrant from the United States Commissioner, Mr. George T. Curtis, and
was spirited away to Canada. The mob seems to have had no difficulty
in accomplishing its purpose.
[Sidenote: The investigation of the case by Congress.]
The Senate, on motion of Mr. Clay, passed a resolution, on February
18th, 1851, calling upon the President for information concerning the
failure of the law in the Shadrach case, and the means he had adopted
to meet the occurrence, and asking the President if, in his opinion,
further means should be placed at his disposal by Congress for
enabling him to execute the laws with more success.
On the 21st, the reply of the President was received. It contained an
account of the occurrence in Boston; a summary of the laws of the
United States and of Massachusetts on the subject of confining United
States prisoners in the jails of the Commonwealth, which demonstrated
the fact that Massachusetts had forbidden the use of her jails and the
aid of her officials in fugitive slave cases; a declaration of opinion
that the President was authorized by the Constitution to use the
regular army and navy, when, in his judgment, it was necessary for the
suppression of violence and the execution of the laws, and without
giving warning of his intention by any proclamation; and a suggestion
to Congress to confirm this opinion by a positive act, which would
include the militia as well as the regular army and navy, and would
authorize a marshal or commissioner of the {371} United States to
summon an organized militia force as a part of the posse comitatus.
[Sidenote: The question of increasing the power of the President to
execute the law.]
Mr. Clay immediately moved the reference of the communication to the
Judiciary committee. This motion called out a three days debate in the
Senate, during which it became manifest that the extremists, from both
the North and the South, had little faith in the power of the
Government to execute the law, and were unfavorable to the policy of
using the military power in its execution. Mr. Chase and Mr. Hale, on
the one side, and Mr. Butler, Mr. Davis, and Mr. Rhett, on the other,
contended that the provision of the Constitution guaranteeing the
rendition of fugitive slaves did not require a Congressional act, even
if it authorized one. Mr. Davis said that he would see Massachusetts
quit the Union rather than execute the law by military power within
her limits. It was evident that these men were not anxious to have the
law executed at all. Their motives for the same must have been very
different, but it would hardly be an unfair speculation if one should
imagine that the slaveholders were not averse to having the failure of
the law for another count in their indictment against the Union.
The moderate men, however, of both the North and the South, claimed
that the law was constitutional, that it was politic and necessary,
that it had been successfully executed in a number of cases, that it
could be executed in practically all cases, that it must be, even
though it should require the whole military power of the country, and
that the great mass of the people would sustain it as carrying out the
pledges of the Constitution.
Mr. Clay's motion was finally unanimously voted, and, on March 3rd,
two reports were presented to the {372} Senate, one signed by all the
members of the Judiciary committee except Mr. Butler, of South
Carolina, and the other by Mr. Butler alone. The former expressed the
opinion that the President already possessed full and adequate powers
to execute the laws, and that no further legislation upon the subject
was necessary. It also held that the organized military could be
summoned and used by a civil officer as a part of the posse comitatus.
Mr. Butler, while agreeing with the other members in recommending no
further legislation for the execution of the law, denied that the
President had the power from the Constitution to use the regular army
and navy at his own discretion in suppressing insurrections and
executing the laws, and held that the President could employ these
forces for such purposes in the same manner only that he could employ
the militia, that is, under the Congressional Acts of 1795 and 1807,
which required, among other things, that a proclamation should precede
the actual employment of military power in such cases.
Congress closed its session, on the next day, without having changed
or modified the law, and without having given the President any
additional means for its execution. The thoughts of men were turned
again upon the incidents of its execution.
[Sidenote: The Sims case.]
During the spring of 1851, several cases of slave apprehension
occurred, the most exciting of which was that of Thomas Sims, claimed
in Boston by Mr. James Potter, of Georgia. He was arrested by the City
Marshal on the charge of having committed a larceny, and put under
guard in the Court House. Charles G. Loring, Robert Rantoul, Jr., and
Samuel E. Sewall, lawyers of much ability and men of high social
standing, offered their services in defence of the negro. After
applying to several judges of the {373} supreme court of the
Commonwealth, without success, for a writ of habeas corpus, they
finally obtained one from Judge Woodbury, and argued the case before
him. The Judge finally refused to interfere with the possession of the
negro by the United States Marshal. The United States Commissioner,
Mr. George T. Curtis, then heard the case, and issued the certificate
for the rendition of the fugitive to his master. In the early morning
of the next day, the negro was conducted by three hundred armed
policemen to the wharf and placed on board a vessel bound for
Savannah. The vessel sailed safely out of port, and the Fugitive Slave
Law was, at last, executed in Boston.
[Sidenote: Excitement in Boston over the rendition of Sims.]
During the trial, and for a week afterward, the city was in a fever of
excitement. Meetings of the citizens were held in Tremont Temple and
Washington Hall, and on the Common, at which the eloquence of
Phillips, Channing, Edmund Quincy, and Horace Mann, and the violent
words of Garrison and Parker, stirred the indignation of their hearers
and lashed it into an almost rebellious fury. A very large part of the
inhabitants felt that a stain had been put upon the city, which must
be wiped out by any means necessary to accomplish it.
The summer months of 1851 now passed without any notable instances of
resistance to the law, and conservative men, of both the North and the
South, began to hope that the worst was over, and that the North would
acquiesce without further opposition in the execution of the odious
Act.
[Sidenote: The "Jerry rescue."]
In the early autumn, however, violence again appeared. The minor
outbreaks were soon overshadowed by an event which occurred at
Syracuse, N. Y., in October, 1851. A negro, named Jerry McHenry, who
had lived for several years in Syracuse, was suddenly {374} seized and
carried before the United States Commissioner. In the course of the
hearing he eluded the officer having him in charge, and bounded out of
the court-room. He was, however, overtaken and, after a fierce
struggle, recaptured and brought back. A little later, a party of
highly respectable men, led by Gerrit Smith and the Rev. S. J. May,
broke into the court-room, rescued the negro, and smuggled him safely
across the Canadian boundary. Eighteen of these gentlemen were
indicted and ordered to appear for trial. But the whole community
manifested so much active sympathy with them that the matter was
quietly dropped.
[Sidenote: The President's rebuke.]
In his message to Congress, of December 2nd, 1851, President Fillmore
referred to these cases of resistance to the execution of the law;
declared the law to be required by the Constitution; denounced the
opposition to its execution as directed against the Constitution and
the Union itself; repeated his dictum that the Compromise Measures
were a final settlement of the subjects embraced in them; and
congratulated the country upon the general acquiescence in these
Measures manifested throughout the Union.
[Sidenote: Mr. Foote's finality resolutions.]
Two days later, Mr. Foote introduced into the Senate a resolution
declaring these Measures to be a definite settlement of the questions
embraced in them, and recommending acquiescence in them by all good
citizens.
[Sidenote: The failure of the resolutions to pass the Senate, but
their success in the House.]
The debate upon this proposition, which began December 8th, and
lasted, off and on, until February 28th, was, in the main, a
discussion between four Southern members--Mr. Foote, Mr. Butler, Mr.
Rhett, and Mr. Clemens--during which the history of the movements of
the Southern leaders in 1850 and 1851 were brought to light, beginning
with the Southern Address, issued {375} from Washington before the
passage of the Compromise Measures, for the purpose of producing a
united action on the part of the South in behalf of Southern rights,
and the call of the Nashville convention by the Mississippi
legislature, and ending with the demand of the convention for the line
of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes to the Pacific Ocean, and the
declaration by the convention and by conventions in Mississippi,
Georgia, and South Carolina, of the abstract right of secession as a
principle of the political system of the Union. It was evident that
these movements had approached dangerously near to an attempt at
something like practical secession, and that the Southern leaders were
now anxious to underrate their significance. The Northern Senators
allowed these Southern brethren to proceed with criminations and
recriminations against each other, until they themselves were
convinced that they would lose more by the continuance of the debate
than they could gain by the passage of the resolution. After a fiery
speech by Mr. Clemens, on February 28th, 1852, the attempt to pass the
resolution was abandoned in the Senate.
The House of Representatives, on the other hand, incited by memorials
sent into it by the legislatures of New Jersey and Iowa, actually
passed resolutions, on April 5th, 1852, by a large majority, declaring
the finality of the Measures.
Petitions began again to pour into the Senate for the repeal of the
law. Mr. Seward, Mr. Hale, and Mr. Sumner presented such petitions and
tried to get a hearing upon them, but the Senate voted to lay them all
on the table.
[Sidenote: The National conventions of 1852 and the finality of the
compromise measures.]
Such was the situation when the two great parties assembled in their
National conventions for the {376} nomination of their respective
candidates for the presidency and vice-presidency. It was indicated
from the first day of the Congressional session of 1851-52, that the
finality of the Compromise Acts would be a plank in the platforms of
both parties, although it was soon revealed that the Whig party
leaders were divided upon the subject.
The Democratic convention met June 1st, at Baltimore, and, on account
of the three-cornered fight between Buchanan, Cass, and Douglas, was
obliged to produce a "dark horse." This proved to be General Franklin
Pierce, of New Hampshire, a good lawyer, a brave soldier, a fine
orator, and a courtly gentleman. He was known to be a true friend to
the Compromise Acts, and was entirely acceptable to the South. The
platform contained the finality plank.
The Whig convention met fifteen days later, at the same place. The
Northern Whigs, under the lead of Seward, were determined to defeat
both Fillmore and Webster, chiefly on account of their fidelity in the
execution of the Fugitive Slave Law. The Southerners were for Fillmore
first, and then Webster, for the same reason. A sufficient number of
the Northern delegates voted with the Southerners to put the finality
plank into the platform, and then offered the Southerners one of their
own fellow-citizens, General Scott, the military hero of the country.
The Southerners finally accepted the offer.
If Seward desired the defeat and destruction of the Whig party, he
could not have acted more adroitly. It was to be foreseen that the
Northern Whigs would not be wholly faithful to their own choice upon
that platform, and that many of the Southern Whigs would arrive at the
conclusion that the Democratic platform and the Democratic candidate
furnished stronger guarantees for {377} the finality of the Compromise
Measures than the Whig platform and candidate did.
[Sidenote: The deaths of Clay and of Webster, and the appearance of a
Free-soil candidate.]
Clay died at the beginning of the campaign, and Webster at the end of
it; and, in the midst of it, Sumner succeeded in getting in his
ferocious attack on the Fugitive Slave Law, in a four hours speech
before the Senate, and the Free-soilers set up a candidate, Mr. Hale,
for the suffrages of the Abolitionists and the
anti-slavery-extensionists. All of these events were unfavorable to
the Whigs; still, they did not probably determine the result. The
people were determined to have peace in regard to the slavery
question, and they felt that the Democratic party was more likely to
give them the peace they desired than the Whig party.
[Sidenote: The overwhelming Democratic victory of 1852.]
The Democratic victory was overwhelming. Twenty-seven Commonwealths
gave their electoral vote for General Pierce, and only four gave
theirs for General Scott; while the popular vote cast for Mr. Hale was
only about one-half as large as that cast for Mr. Van Buren in 1848.
The Democrats themselves were surprised. Since the "era of good
feeling," no presidential candidate had received such a vote, either
popular or electoral, as that now given to General Pierce. The country
accepted the decision, and settled down into universal acquiescence in
the Compromise Measures, and in the execution of the Fugitive Slave
Law, in most sections cheerfully, but in some sullenly and with
bitterness of heart.
[Sidenote: The true policy of the slaveholders, and their failure to
discern it.]
Had the slaveholders made a wise use of this, to them, most favorable
turn in affairs, there is little question that they might have
preserved indefinitely their peculiar institution where it existed.
But wisdom in the case meant that the slaveholders should themselves
give no further {378} occasion for slavery agitation. It meant that
they should cease to claim the rendition of their fugitive slaves by
the general Government; that they should turn their attention to
perfecting the police administration in the slaveholding Commonwealths
for preventing the escape of their slaves, and let the few slaves who
might have cleverness enough to elude the police of these
Commonwealths go; and that they should, above all things, abstain from
any attempt to extend slavery beyond the limits placed upon it by
existing law. The status of every inch of the territory of the United
States, in reference to the legality or illegality of slavery, was now
fixed, and the public opinion of the country, of the world, and of the
age, would never permit that status to be altered to the advantage of
slavery.
It is an interesting, though by no means an inexplicable, fact that
the slaveholders in the Commonwealths south of Virginia, Kentucky, and
Missouri, showed more tendency to follow this view of their best
policy than those within these border Commonwealths. These latter were
an efficient protection to the former in preventing the escape of
slaves, while they were themselves exposed in much higher degree to
loss. Still, it would have been the true policy for the slaveholders
in these also to have looked to their own police administration for
the recapture of their runaways before the latter had reached free
soil, and to have considered that a slave having sufficient
intelligence to elude this had already attained the point of mental
activity and of courage which required in good morals his liberation,
and made his further retention in slavery both a wrong to himself and
a danger to the peace of the slaveholding community in which he might
be held in bondage.
We may fairly say that the slaveholders in the more southern
Commonwealths sustained the Fugitive Slave {379} Law more out of
consideration for their brothers in the border Commonwealths than for
the sake of their own immediate interests, or from their own
convictions of its policy, while they would have greatly preferred the
restriction of slavery to the territory south of the line of
thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes to the Pacific, with some sort
of a guarantee of its existence there during the Territorial period,
to any chance of extending slavery north of that line by the repeal of
the prohibitions already existing. It is not at all surprising, in
view of this state of feeling in 1852, that, ten years later, the
Confederates considered themselves left in the lurch by the border
Commonwealths, in the support of whose views and interests they had
done so much to provoke the North to the contest.
{380}
CHAPTER XIX.
THE REPEAL OF THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE
The Connection of California with the Mississippi
Valley--Nebraska--Mr. Douglas' Nebraska Bill and Report--The
Surprising Assumptions in the Report--Mr. Douglas' Purpose--The Report
and Bill Together in Conflict with the Act of 1820--The New
Section--Mr. Dixon's Proposed Amendment--Mr. Blair's Letter in
Reference to Mr. Seward's Connection with Dixon's Proposition--Douglas
and Dixon--Mr. Douglas' New Bill--The Free-soil Protest Against the
Bill--Mr. Douglas' Reply to the Address--Mr. Chase's First Amendment
to the Bill--The Southern Whigs Aroused by Mr. Wade's Accusations--Mr.
Chase's Amendment Lost--Mr. Douglas' Last Change in the Wording of the
Clause--Mr. Everett's Views--Mr. Houston's Opposition to the Bill--Mr.
Bell's Attitude Toward the Bill--Mr. Douglas' Amendment Passed by the
Senate--Mr. Chase's Amendments--Mr. Bell's Argument Against the
Bill--Mr. Douglas' Final Argument--The Passage of the Kansas-Nebraska
Bill by the Senate--Analysis of the Vote Upon the Bill--Development of
Popular Opposition to the Bill--The Kansas-Nebraska Bill in the
House--The Relation of the Administration to the Bill--President
Pierce and Mr. Davis--The Bill Taken up in the Committee of the Whole
of the House of Representatives--Mr. A. H. Stephens' Management of the
Bill--The Bill Passed and Signed by the President--Analysis of the
Vote on the Bill in the House--What the Figures Taught--The
Kansas-Nebraska Act a Stupendous Fallacy.
When President Fillmore's last annual message to Congress was sent in,
on December 6th, 1852, the quiet of the country in regard to the
slavery question was more {381} complete than it had been since 1830.
The President did not even mention the subject. Evidently the people
believed that the Measures of 1850, and their cordial endorsement in
the elections just passed, had finally solved the great question, in
so far as the Congress could solve it at all. But never was there a
more deceptive peace. It was merely the dead calm before the dread
cyclone.
[Sidenote: The connection of California with the Mississippi valley.]
This time the storm came from the Northwest. After the acquisitions of
the territory upon the Pacific coast, it was immediately apparent that
these new possessions must be connected, so soon as possible, with the
line of Commonwealths on the west bank of the Mississippi by the
Territorial organization of the country lying between. Mr. Douglas had
conceived this idea as far back as 1847, and had endeavored from that
time forward to secure the attention of Congress for its realization.
The seemingly more important questions involved in the Compromise
Measures gave little room for the consideration of other subjects
between 1848 and 1850. Now, however, that these questions had
apparently received their final settlement, the moment seemed
opportune for the solution of the problem of binding the Pacific slope
with the settled country of the west valley of the Mississippi.
[Sidenote: Nebraska.]
In the Congressional session of 1852-53, a bill passed the House of
Representatives for organizing the region lying between Missouri and
the Rocky Mountains, and between the latitudes thirty-six degrees,
thirty minutes, and forty-three degrees, into the Territory of
Nebraska. A vote upon the measure was, however, not reached in the
Senate before the close of the session.
During the consideration of the bill in the House, Mr. Howe, of
Pennsylvania, asked Mr. Giddings, of Ohio, {382} who was a member of
the committee on Territories, from which the bill had come, why there
was no clause in the bill prohibiting slavery. Mr. Giddings replied
that the Act of 1820 did that for all of this territory. Whereupon Mr.
Howe used these significant words: "I should like to know of the
gentleman of Ohio, if he has not some recollection of a compromise
made since that time." Mr. Giddings quietly replied: "That does not
affect this question."
During the discussion of the bill in the Senate, Mr. Atchison, of
Missouri, said that one of his objections to the organization of this
Territory was that Missouri would be surrounded on three sides by free
soil, into which the slaves of the citizens of Missouri could easily
escape, but that, as he could see no prospect of a repeal of the Act
of 1820 making this region free soil, he would not be willing to delay
the organization of the Territory on that account.
There is no explanation of the language used by these three gentlemen,
except that Mr. Howe had conceived that, in some way or other, the
Measures of 1850 had modified the Act of 1820 prohibiting slavery in
the Louisiana territory above thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes,
and that Mr. Giddings and Mr. Atchison had never thought of such a
thing.
On December 14th, 1853, Mr. Dodge, of Iowa, introduced a bill into the
Senate for the organization of Nebraska Territory. It was referred to
the committee on Territories, of which Mr. Douglas was chairman.
[Sidenote: Mr. Douglas' Nebraska bill and report.]
On January 4th, 1854, Mr. Douglas presented a bill from the committee,
with a special report, in which latter document the principles of the
laws of the United States in respect to slavery in the Territories, as
understood by the committee, or rather as Mr. Douglas {383} understood
them, were stated. The report was a more important document than the
bill, since the bill, drawn in vague terms upon this subject, was to
be interpreted by the principles declared in the report. The first
paragraph of the report read: "The principal amendments which your
committee deem it their duty to commend to the favorable action of the
Senate, in a special report, are those in which the principles
established by the Compromise Measures of 1850, so far as they are
applicable to Territorial organization, are proposed to be affirmed
and carried into practical operation within the limits of the new
Territory." The report then declares these principles to be: "That all
questions pertaining to slavery in the Territories, and in the new
States to be formed therefrom, are to be left to the decision of the
people residing therein, by their appropriate representatives, to be
chosen by them for that purpose: That all cases involving title to
slaves, and questions of personal freedom, are to be referred to the
adjudication of the local tribunals, with the right of appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States: That the provisions of the
Constitution of the United States, in respect to fugitives from
service, are to be carried into faithful execution in all the
organized Territories the same as in the States."
[Sidenote: The surprising assumptions in the report.]
These were most astonishing and confusing propositions in a variety of
respects. In the first place, the claim that the Compromise Acts of
1850 contained any general principles of Territorial organization in
respect to slavery, which were applicable to any other Territories
than those organized under these Acts, was a surprising assumption. It
was an induction from one precedent when there were half a dozen
precedents against it. The fact was that the Acts of 1850 only set up
a rule for a single case, a rule patched {384} up by compromise, and
not derived from any general principle. This claim was also, if
admitted, highly confusing. Was it a principle of the Constitution,
and therefore supreme over all Congressional policies in the case? Or
was it simply a principle of Congressional policy? If the former, then
it had already rendered the prohibition upon slavery in the Louisiana
territory, by the Act of 1820, nugatory. If it was the latter, then it
would require a new act of Congress to apply it to any other Territory
than Utah and New Mexico. In the second place, the statement, also
contained in the report, that there was a pronounced conflict of
opinion in the country upon the question of the constitutional
validity of the Act of 1820, prohibiting slavery in the Louisiana
territory above thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes, was equally
surprising. Nobody had heard the noise of any such conflict. The fact
is, that conflict was yet to be aroused. And, lastly, it was most
highly surprising and confusing that the attempt to rouse this
conflict should proceed from the bosom of the party which had won its
splendid victory under the peace issue upon the subject of slavery,
and should be inaugurated by a member of that party from the North.
[Sidenote: Mr. Douglas' purpose.]
What was, or what could have been, Mr. Douglas' purpose? It is held by
most historians that it was simply a reckless and dishonest bid for
Southern support, in his ambitious plans to gain the presidency. Most
of Mr. Douglas' political opponents at the time believed that he was
animated solely by that desire. His character was, according to their
view, that of a scheming politician, who would sacrifice anything and
anybody for his own advancement. While we can understand this radical
estimate of him by those with whom he was in daily conflict, it does
seem that the historians, with his subsequent career before them,
might {385} suspect, at least, that some conviction of the
rightfulness of his views may have aided in moving him to the position
which he took. Mr. Douglas was a Western Democrat; that is, he was a
radical Democrat. He had, therefore, an exaggerated notion of the
virtues of the people, and of the importance of local autonomy. He
resented the idea that the sturdy adventurers who accomplished the
first settlement of a Western Territory were not as fully capable of
local self-government, from the very outset, as the "effeminate"
inhabitants of an Eastern Commonwealth. He repudiated the notion that
they needed any pupilage from the general Government in the management
of public affairs. He was not alone in such views. It is safe to say
that the mass of the people in his section held the same views at that
time. They have not progressed much beyond them now. Is it not, then,
fair to say that Mr. Douglas, in all probability, really believed that
the reference of the questions in regard to slavery to the residents
of each Territory, as well as to those of each "State," was the true
principle of the political science of the Republic, and the true
policy of its legislation? If his convictions and his ambition went
hand in hand, and if his convictions were not the product of his
ambition, should he be so harshly criticised for declaring them? It is
true that his announcement of them filled the land with clamor and
angry dispute, and that their adoption by Congress led to violence,
bloodshed, and war; but can we conclude that he had any conception
whatsoever that this could be the result of them? Is it not far more
probable that he thought the quiet of the country would be confirmed
and forever established by their general acceptance? There is
certainly ground for this view of his motives. It is certainly very
improbable that there was ever any balancing, in his mind, of risks to
his country's peace {386} and safety against his ambition for the
presidency. It is much more probable that he believed his principles,
without his presidency, would contribute, in high degree, to the peace
and welfare of his country, but that, taken together with his
presidency, they would shed untold blessings upon the land. This is no
unusual psychology. It is decidedly common.
[Sidenote: The doctrines of the report at first not inserted in the
bill.]
Mr. Douglas did not, however, insert his doctrine of popular
sovereignty in the Territories, and his dictum as to the repeal of the
slavery prohibition in the Act of 1820 by the principles of the Acts
of 1850, in the bill. Possibly he thought it unnecessary. Possibly he
did not venture to do so. Possibly he did intend to leave things in
such an ambiguous shape that one interpretation might be put upon them
in one section, and a somewhat different one in another. He would
hardly have been an American politician if he had not, at some time or
other in his life, practised something of this kind. This is what they
call feeling the public pulse, which is a main point in the practice
of democratic statesmanship. It is not particularly edifying to the
academic statesman, but it is business, and Americans are a business
people. Mr. Douglas simply modelled the bill after the Utah and New
Mexico bills, in respect to slavery, that is, he made no mention of
the subject in that part of the bill which provided for the
Territorial period, but added a clause which read: "When admitted as a
State, the said Territory, or any portion of the same, shall be
received into the Union, with or without slavery, as its Constitution
may prescribe at the time of its admission."
[Sidenote: The report and bill together in conflict with the Act of
1820.]
Taken apart from the report, the bill might be interpreted as not in
conflict with the Act of 1820, but taken with the report, it meant the
repeal of the Act of 1820, and the attribution of all power over the
question of {387} slavery in the Territory to those who might squat
upon its soil. Of course it was entirely within the power of Congress
to repeal the Act of 1820. The restraints resting upon Congress in
regard to this matter were moral, not legal. If Congress would,
nevertheless, do it, it must do it in the form of a statute, and not
in that of a report doubting the constitutionality of the Act, or even
declaring it unconstitutional. It was entirely natural that the demand
should be made for clearing the bill of its ambiguities.
[Sidenote: The new section.]
Before the demand came, however, the committee itself did something in
this direction. When the bill was printed, on January 7th, it
contained twenty sections. On the 10th, a revised edition of it
appeared, which contained twenty-one sections. The last section was
the dictum of the report in regard to the principles of the Measures
of 1850 upon the subject of slavery in the Territories. The committee
explained that it had been left out of the first draft by a clerical
error. This change did not, however, clear the bill of all ambiguity.
The added provision was declaratory only, and did not expressly repeal
the Act of 1820.
[Sidenote: Mr. Dixon's proposed amendment.]
At length, on the 16th, Mr. Dixon, of Kentucky, gave notice to the
Senate that he should move, as an amendment to the bill, a provision
expressly repealing the Act of 1820 in so far as it prohibited slavery
in any of the Territories of the United States.
[Sidenote: Mr. Blair's letter in reference to Mr. Seward's connection
with Dixon's proposition.]
In a letter of May 17th, 1873, to Mr. Gideon Welles, Mr. Montgomery
Blair wrote of Mr. Seward: "I shall never forget how shocked I was at
his telling me that he was the man who put Archy Dixon, the Whig
Senator from Kentucky in 1854, up to moving the repeal of the {388}
Missouri compromise, as an amendment to Douglas' first Kansas
[Nebraska?] bill, and had himself forced the repeal by that movement,
and had thus brought to life the Republican Party. Dixon was to
out-Herod Herod at the South, and he was to out-Herod Herod at the
North."
If this be true, it was a most reprehensible trick of unscrupulous
politics. Mr. Seward scoffed at the doctrine of "popular sovereignty"
in the Territories as arrant nonsense, and knew that the assertion of
any such doctrine as a principle of the law of the country in respect
to Territorial organization would rouse the North to angry and bitter
resistance. What he did, he did with his eyes open. His vision did not
probably reach so far as to civil war, but he knew that the risks of
another slavery agitation were very grave. Neither could the ambiguity
in Mr. Douglas' bill, and the necessity for relieving it of this
obscurity, palliate such an offense. If he desired to make Mr.
Douglas' bill entirely plain he should have done this, not by holding
out a temptation to the South to enter upon a new course of slavery
extension, but by an amendment asserting the continuing validity of
the slavery prohibition in the Act of 1820. Mr. Sumner did this very
thing on the next day. It was, however, too late to chain the spirit
which Dixon's fatal move had loosed.
[Sidenote: Douglas and Dixon.]
It is said that Mr. Douglas was surprised and disconcerted by Mr.
Dixon's notice, and endeavored to dissuade him from carrying out his
expressed intention, but was finally convinced by Mr. Dixon that the
proposed amendment was only the fair and honest statement of
constitutional principles, and of the legal results of the Compromise
of 1850, and only made distinct and express what was unclear, though
implied, in the bill.
{389} [Sidenote: Mr. Douglas' new bill.]
On the 23rd, Mr. Douglas brought in a new bill, and offered it as a
substitute for the original bill. The new bill contained a clause
declaring that that part of the Act of 1820 prohibiting slavery in the
Louisiana territory above thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes was
inoperative, being contrary to, and superseded by, the principles of
the legislation of 1850. Mr. Douglas' new bill changed the southern
boundary from thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes to thirty-seven
degrees, made the northern boundary run up to the forty-ninth parallel
west of Minnesota Territory, and cut this vast domain of nearly five
hundred thousand square miles in area into two Territories by the
fortieth parallel of latitude, the one to the north of it to be called
Nebraska, and the one to the south of it Kansas. Mr. Dixon immediately
expressed himself as satisfied with the provisions of the new bill,
and said that they fulfilled the purposes of the amendment which he
had intended to offer, and that he should, therefore, withhold the
same. The Senate agreed to take up the bill on the following Monday.
[Sidenote: The Free-soil protest against the bill.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Douglas' reply to the address.]
On the same day that Mr. Douglas presented this second bill, there
appeared in the _National Era_, the Abolition journal at Washington,
and in several New York City papers, the noted address, signed by
Messrs. Chase, Sumner, Wade, Smith, and De Witt, in which the Douglas
bill was denounced in the most trenchant language as "a gross
violation of a sacred pledge, as a criminal betrayal of precious
rights, as a part and parcel of an atrocious plot to exclude from a
vast unoccupied region immigrants from the Old World and free laborers
from our own States, and convert it into a dreary region of despotism
inhabited by masters and slaves." The contents of this celebrated
paper constituted, it may be said, the {390} first draft of the creed
of the party to be founded on the doctrine of resistance to slavery
extension, the Republican party. The propositions contained in it
drove Mr. Douglas to a fierce diatribe against their authors, in which
he included an elaborate argument in defence of his dictum, that the
Measures of 1850 had rendered the slavery prohibition in the Act of
1820 inoperative. He contended that the fact that Congress had, in the
joint resolution admitting Texas, provided that in Texan territory
north of the line of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes slavery
should be prohibited, proved that Congress and the people of the
United States understood the legislation of 1820 to mean that the line
of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes was to be run through any and
all territory that might be subsequently acquired by the United
States; that the refusal of Congress to do this in regard to the
territory acquired from Mexico had made the establishment of a new
principle in regard to slavery in the Territories necessary; that that
principle, as established by the legislation of 1850, was the
neutrality of Congress in the question, and the right of the residents
in each Territory to settle the question for themselves; and that this
new principle had superseded the old principle and rendered all
legislation under the old principle inoperative.
[Sidenote: Mr. Chase's amendment to the bill.]
[Sidenote: The Southern Whigs aroused by Mr. Wade's accusations.]
[Sidenote: The Douglas doctrine convincing to many.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Chase's amendment lost.]
Such jurisprudence in respect to the effect upon each other of
statutes relating to different and distinct Territories had never been
heard before, and it was easy to show it to be a tissue of sophistries
from beginning to end. It was entirely evident that Mr. Douglas and
his committee shrank from proposing a bare and bald repeal of the
slavery prohibition in the Act of 1820, and sought to avoid the
responsibility of doing so under the convenient claim that it had
already been repealed. But {391} Mr. Chase was determined to make them
take this responsibility, and to expose their fallacies in their
attempts to escape it. On February 3rd, Mr. Chase moved to remove from
the bill the words referring to the Measures of 1850, and their effect
upon the Act of 1820, and make the bill simply repeal the slavery
prohibition of the Act of 1820, in so far as it applied to the
Territories to be organized by the bill. Mr. Chase supported his
amendment in a powerful speech, in which he demonstrated most clearly
the fallacy and the duplicity of the doctrine which held that the
legislation of 1850 in regard to Utah and New Mexico had repealed the
legislation of 1820 in regard to the Louisiana territory north of
thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes. Both he and his colleague, Mr.
Wade, went, however, too far in denouncing the subterfuge as a
conspiracy between the Southerners and the friends of Douglas to
extend slavery. It was especially imprudent, to say the least, in Mr.
Wade to do so. The Southern Whigs were highly incensed at the charge
of conspiring with Northern Democrats, made by one of their own party,
and they repudiated the accusation with great earnestness. Besides
this, the Douglas idea of "popular sovereignty," or, as we now call
it, home rule, in the Territories, had won many adherents. There is no
question that a great many men, in both the North and the South, now
began to feel that Mr. Douglas had discovered the true principle in
regard to slavery in the Territories. Mr. Chase's amendment was lost
by a vote of thirty to thirteen. The thirteen voting in favor of the
amendment were all from the North. Of those voting against it, ten
were from the North, and twenty from the South. Nineteen Senators, ten
of whom were from the South, did not vote at all. The {392} vote meant
that the large majority of those voting held that, in some way or
other, the legislation of 1850 had repealed the slavery prohibition in
the legislation of 1820. This was execrable jurisprudence, and even
Mr. Cass, who was really the father of the idea of home rule in the
Territories, dissented from it, and voted for Mr. Chase's amendment.
[Sidenote: Mr. Douglas' last change in the wording of the clause.]
In spite of this support by the majority, Mr. Douglas was apparently
disquieted by the attitude of Mr. Cass, and by the arguments against
the correctness of his doctrine. He, himself, now moved to strike out
of the bill the words: "which was superseded by the principles of the
legislation of 1850, commonly called the Compromise Measures, and is
hereby declared inoperative," and to insert instead thereof the words:
"which being inconsistent with the principle of non-intervention by
Congress with slavery in the States and Territories, as recognized by
the legislation of 1850, commonly called the Compromise Measures, is
hereby declared inoperative and void, it being the true intent and
meaning of this Act not to legislate slavery into any Territory or
State, nor exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof
perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in
their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States."
[Sidenote: Mr. Everett's views.]
In a most able argument, remarkable both for its strong logic and its
admirable temper, Mr. Everett demonstrated the weakness of Mr.
Douglas' proposition in its last form, the declaration of
inconsistency between the legislation of 1820 and that of 1850. He
showed conclusively that, in place of an inconsistency, here were
simply two policies in reference to different Territories, in which
different conditions and relations obtained. He predicted that the
{393} insistence upon the same policy for all the Territories would
lead to the struggle for determining whether they should be all slave
or all free, and he demonstrated that "popular sovereignty" in the
Territories was an illusion, since Congress could not by any act of
its own divest itself of its duty, laid upon it by the Constitution,
to legislate for the Territories. Mr. Everett was a member of the
committee on Territories, from which the bill had proceeded, and his
views should, on this account, have possessed an added weight.
[Sidenote: Mr. Houston's opposition to the bill.]
Mr. Houston, of Texas, another member of the committee, now declared
himself against the bill, on the ground, among other reasons, that it
would reopen the slavery question by the destruction of one of the
great measures upon which the settlement of that question rested.
[Sidenote: Mr. Bell's attitude toward the bill.]
It was furthermore suspected that Mr. Bell, of Tennessee, another
member of the committee, was opposed to the bill. This suspicion
turned out to be true. The bill can hardly be regarded therefore as
having been reported by the committee at all. The committee consisted
of six Senators, and it was at last found that it had, at no time,
received the support of more than three. Of these three, two were from
the North, Douglas, of Illinois, and Jones, of Iowa, and one was from
the South, Johnson, of Arkansas.
[Sidenote: Mr. Douglas' amendment passed by the Senate.]
The vote upon this amendment was taken on February 15th. Thirty-five
Senators voted for it, and ten against it. Of those voting for it,
twenty-four were from the North and eleven from the South. Of those
voting against it, nine were from the North and one, Mr. Houston, was
from the South. Mr. Bell voted for the amendment for the reason, as he
afterwards explained, that he thought Mr. Douglas ought to be allowed
to perfect his bill.
{394} [Sidenote: Mr. Chase's second amendment.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Pratt's amendment to Mr. Chase's amendment.]
Mr. Chase now suspected that there might be some catch concealed in
the last words of the amendment just adopted. These words, it will be
remembered, were: "subject only to the Constitution of the United
States." Mr. Chase, therefore, moved to add the words: "under which
the people of the Territory, through their appropriate
representatives, may, if they see fit, prohibit the existence of
slavery therein." Mr. Chase now put the home rule principle in regard
to slavery in the Territories to the test, for if the people of a
Territory could not, under the Constitution of the United States,
prohibit slavery in the Territories, then was the Douglas doctrine a
mere deception, a mere jugglery of words. Mr. Chase put his
proposition, however, in a form which appeared one-sided, and Mr.
Badger, of North Carolina, the best constitutional lawyer from the
South in the Senate, contended that Mr. Chase's amendment would have
the effect of denying to the Territories the power to admit slavery,
and thus destroy, from that side, the home rule principle of the bill.
To remedy this defect, Mr. Pratt moved to amend Mr. Chase's
proposition so as to make it read that the people might introduce or
prohibit slavery in the Territories. But this was an amendment to Mr.
Chase's amendment to Mr. Douglas' amendment, and was held to be
unparliamentary, unless Mr. Chase would accept it, and incorporate it
into his amendment. This he refused to do, on the ground, first, that
he did not believe that the Territories could, under the Constitution,
introduce slavery, and, second, on the ground that the union of his
proposition and that of Mr. Pratt in a single amendment would unite
those who did not believe that the people of a Territory could
introduce slavery with those who did not believe they could prohibit
slavery {395} against the entire amendment, and probably defeat it,
while, if the two propositions could be voted on separately, they
would both probably pass, and the bill would be cleared of all
ambiguity.
[Sidenote: Mr. Chase's amendment lost.]
Mr. Chase's attitude toward Mr. Pratt's motion compelled the Senate to
vote upon his proposition separately, and the amendment was lost by a
vote of thirty-six to ten.
[Sidenote: Mr. Badger's amendment.]
Just before the close of the debate on Mr. Chase's motion, Mr. Walker,
of Wisconsin, startled the Senate by the declaration that the repeal
of the Act of 1820 prohibiting slavery would revive the old French law
legitimizing slavery in all of the territory acquired from France.
Both Mr. Benjamin and Mr. Badger said it would not have that effect,
but on different grounds. In order to quiet apprehension on this
point, and remove the difficulty out of the way of the passage of the
bill, Mr. Badger gave notice that so soon as the vote should be taken
on Mr. Chase's motion, he should move an amendment to the bill
providing that "nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to
revive or put in force any law or regulation, which may have existed
prior to 1820, either protecting, establishing, prohibiting, or
abolishing slavery." After the vote upon Mr. Chase's motion, Mr.
Badger offered this amendment, and it was voted, without debate, by a
very large majority.
[Sidenote: Mr. Chase's third amendment.]
Mr. Chase now turned his assaults upon other points of the bill. Mr.
Douglas had been impressed by the taunts of the opponents of the bill
that home rule was to be granted to the people of the Territories only
upon the subject of slavery, but that they were to continue in all
other respects subject to the control of the general Government, and
he now moved to strike out the veto power of {396} Congress over
Territorial legislation, in the cases in hand, and to so modify the
usual veto power of the Territorial governors as to allow a two-thirds
majority of the Territorial legislatures to overcome it. These
propositions were voted without debate. Whereupon Mr. Chase moved that
the governors, secretaries, and judges of the two Territories be
elected by the people instead of being appointed by the President.
This was logical, but it made the "squatter-sovereignty" doctrine
ridiculous. It was, therefore, rejected with a considerable show of
spirit.
[Sidenote: Mr. Chase's fourth amendment.]
Mr. Chase now moved that the whole country should be organized as one
Territory instead of two. He seemed to anticipate that if two should
be established at the same time, the slaveholders would claim one.
This proved to be a correct suspicion. It was subsequently declared
throughout the South that the purpose in forming two Territories was
to give one to the North and the other to the South. And when the
North made the fight for Kansas, it was really felt in the South by
the mass of the people that a tacit agreement had been violated. The
Senators in favor of the bill had now come to think that Mr. Chase was
simply endeavoring to discredit the bill, and they quickly voted this
motion down by a large majority.
[Sidenote: Mr. Bell's argument against the bill.]
Down to this juncture, the bill had been considered in the Senate as a
committee of the Whole. It was now reported to the Senate as amended
by this committee, and, on March 3rd, it came to the vote upon its
final passage. It was at this point that Mr. Bell revealed his
opposition to the bill, and made his great argument, the greatest
effort of his long and useful life, against it. The speech was chiefly
a logical and an eloquent elaboration of the three propositions, that
popular sovereignty could not be {397} established in the Territories
by an Act of Congress, that the passage of the bill before the Senate
attempting it would produce a vast development of the anti-slavery
sentiment at the North, and that no practical benefits whatsoever
could accrue to the South by the repeal of the restriction upon
slavery extension in the Act of 1820. But the Southerners would not
listen to these words of wisdom from their own greatest colleague.
[Sidenote: Mr. Douglas' final argument.]
Mr. Douglas is generally represented as having closed the debate,
although Mr. Houston spoke briefly after him in opposition to the
measure. Mr. Douglas' argument was masterful from every point of view
but the highest. His chief proposition was, that, when his committee
were charged with the duty of framing the bill, they were forced to
choose between the principle of Congressional intervention in the
Territories, in the matter of slavery, on the one hand, the principle
of 1820, the principle which had, for thirty years, filled the land
with agitation and conflict, and had been a standing menace to the
existence of the Union, and the principle of Congressional
non-intervention, on the other hand, the principle of the Measures of
1850, the principle which had tranquillized the country and cemented
anew the Union, the principle which both of the two great political
parties had unequivocally approved in their platforms of 1852, and
which the people of the whole country had just as unequivocally
approved in the elections of 1852. And his conclusion from this
proposition was, that, as servants of the people who had established
this principle of Congressional non-intervention, his committee were
morally obligated to make it the principle of the bill presented by
them for the organization of the new Territories, and that whoever
arraigned him and his committee for so doing virtually arraigned the
people of the United States. It was a {398} most excellent and refined
bit of demagogy, and it fell upon an audience whose mental _niveau_
was not quite high enough to distinguish between it and sound
reasoning. He enforced this argument by another piece of catching
demagogism, which, though not quite so refined, was equally effective.
It was the proud and boastful assertion that American citizens were
capable of self-government anywhere, whether in "States" or
Territories, and under all conditions, whether aided by long
established customs, or without any such guides to steady them in
their progress. It was evident that his opponents preferred to avoid
this point, and that he was sure he had them upon it. He was so
thoroughly democratic in his own feelings that he entertained no doubt
as to the triumph of his argument when stated in this form.
[Sidenote: The passage of the Kansas-Nebraska bill by the Senate.]
A few minutes before five o'clock on the morning of March 4th, after a
continuous session of seventeen hours, the vote upon the bill was
taken, resulting in thirty-seven voices in its favor and fourteen
against it. Eleven Senators had not voted. Of these, three sent word
that, if they could have been present, they would have voted for the
bill, and one that he would have voted against it. There were also two
vacancies at the moment, one in the Vermont delegation, and one in
that of North Carolina. This reduced the number of those who actually
refrained from voting, though present, to five. These gentlemen were
Mr. Everett, of Massachusetts, Mr. Wright, of New Jersey, Mr. Cooper,
of Pennsylvania, Mr. Clayton, of Delaware, and Mr. Pearce, of
Maryland, all Whigs with the exception of Mr. Wright.
[Sidenote: Analysis of the vote upon the bill.]
Counting the names of those who announced how they would have voted
had they been able to be present, and considering the Commonwealths in
whose delegations there were vacancies as represented fully by the one
{399} member from each, we may say that, in the Senate, New Hampshire,
Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, California, Virginia, Kentucky,
Missouri, North Carolina, Arkansas, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama,
Mississippi, Florida, and Louisiana voted for the bill; that Maine,
Vermont, Rhode Island, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin voted against the
bill; that Connecticut, Tennessee, and Texas were divided; and that
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland were
doubtful. Not a single Northern Whig voted for the bill, and only two
Northern Whigs failed to vote against it. One Southern Whig, Mr. Bell,
voted against it, and two Southern Whigs, Mr. Clayton and Mr. Pearce,
failed to vote for it. Every Southern Democrat, except only Mr.
Houston, voted for the bill, while, even if we count Mr. Chase and Mr.
Sumner as Democrats, only six Northern Democrats voted against it. The
bill may thus be fairly considered to have been a Western and Southern
measure, and a Democratic measure. The Western Democracy, with its
crude and radical notions about local self-government, invited the
South into a position which turned out to be a snare and a pitfall. It
is not meant by this that the Western Democracy was insincere, but
only that it was crude and vulgarly over self-confident. And it is not
meant that the South was insincere, but only too eager to vindicate
its honor and dignity, by obliterating the inequality with the North
in regard to the common territory of the Union, under which it fancied
it had suffered since the restriction placed upon slavery extension by
the Act of 1820.
[Sidenote: Development of popular opposition to the bill.]
If the bill had been subjected to the plebiscite on February 1st, it
is very probable that the people in the Northern Commonwealths would
have sustained the positions taken by their respective Senators. Had
this been {400} done on March 1st, it is probable that this would not
have been the case in some of the Northern Commonwealths, whose
Senators voted for the measure. And had it been done on April 1st, it
is practically certain that it would not have been. After February
1st, there was developed throughout the North a very strong opposition
to the bill among the people. The most influential newspapers
denounced it. Numerous meetings, largely attended, protested against
it. The legislatures of several of the Commonwealths passed
resolutions condemning it. And the clergy generally arraigned it as
immoral, inhuman, and irreligious. The movements against it seem to
have been spontaneous and to have been connected with each other only
by the common sentiment against the extension of slavery. It is,
however, probable that the Address to the people, issued by Mr. Chase
and his Free-soil friends in the latter part of January, furnished the
necessary excitant. The Address seems to have been the text from which
most of these articles, protests, memorials, speeches, and sermons
were drawn. When the bill was sent to the House of Representatives, it
was thus evident to all impartial observers that its growing
unpopularity at the North would be a very great obstacle to its
passage by the House. Its friends felt that they must get it through
speedily or see it lost altogether.
Already, on January 31st, Mr. Richardson, of Illinois, Mr. Douglas'
lieutenant in the House of Representatives, had reported from the
House committee on Territories a bill for the organization of the
Territories of Kansas and Nebraska, which was the same in substance
and language as that reported by Mr. Douglas to the Senate. It had
been discussed a little in the committee of the Whole House, but had
slumbered there after February 15th.
{401} [Sidenote: The Kansas-Nebraska bill in the House.]
On March 7th, the Senate bill was sent into the House for concurrence.
It was taken up for consideration on the twenty-first, and, after some
parliamentary passes, was referred to the House committee on
Territories.
[Sidenote: The relation of the Administration to the bill.]
Some of the historians teach that this would have been the end of the
bill, except for the interference of President Pierce and his two most
trusted advisers, Mr. Caleb Cushing and Mr. Jefferson Davis. Mr. Davis
relates his connection with the matter in his own book. He says that,
on Sunday morning, January 22nd, gentlemen from the two Congressional
committees on Territories called at his house and asked his aid in
obtaining an interview with the President; that he went with them to
the executive mansion, and secured for them the desired access to the
President; that the President listened patiently to the reading of the
bill for organizing Kansas and Nebraska; and that the President
decided that the bill "rested upon sound constitutional principles,
and recognized in it only a return to that rule which had been
infringed by the Compromise of 1820, and the restoration of which had
been foreshadowed by the legislation of 1850." Mr. Davis furthermore
specifically denies that the measure was inspired by President Pierce
or any member of his Cabinet. Of course, though not inspired, it may
have been aided on the way of its passage through Congress by the
Administration. The proof upon which these historians chiefly rely, in
their assertion that it was so aided, was the fact that the editorials
in the Washington _Union_ supported the bill, and the claim that this
paper was the organ of the Administration. But Mr. Sidney Webster,
President Pierce's private secretary at the time, has recently
declared that the Washington _Union_ was not President {402} Pierce's
organ in the Kansas-Nebraska matter, or in any other matter; that
President Pierce had no organ.
[Sidenote: President Pierce and Mr. Davis.]
The character of President Pierce was that of a punctilious gentleman.
Mr. Davis resembled him much in this general trait. In fact, it was
said to have been this likeness which drew them so closely together in
their friendship for each other. Men of such character are not
inclined to meddle, and a strong positive evidence is necessary to
substantiate any such charge against them. There is no doubt that the
President's view of the doctrine of the bill was well known. There is
no doubt that there were members of Congress who made a chief point of
coinciding with the Administration upon every subject, and who thought
that such servility would give weight to their recommendations for
official positions. And there is no doubt that the President appointed
some persons to office recommended by such members. But no
satisfactory evidence has been as yet produced to prove that President
Pierce gave or promised any patronage to any member for supporting the
bill, or withheld any to punish any member for not supporting it. In
fact, the President's attitude toward the two factions of the
Democratic party in New York in the matter of appointments, making
selections from both in almost equal numbers, without regard to the
Free-soil sentiments of the "Softs," manifests a quite different
spirit from that with which these historians represent him to have
been animated in meddling with the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska
bill.
[Sidenote: The President's consistency.]
And, finally, the inconsistency which these historians find between
the President's message of December preceding and his attitude toward
the Kansas-Nebraska bill can be so explained as to appear a perfect
consistency. What the President said in his message was that the {403}
acquiescence of distinguished citizens in the Compromise Measures of
1850 had given renewed vigor to our institutions, and restored a sense
of repose and security to the public mind throughout the Union, and
that this repose should suffer no shock during his official term. If,
now, we consider these measures of 1850 as containing the principle of
home rule in the Territories in regard to the question of slavery, and
if we attribute the repose of the public mind upon this subject to
that principle, would it not be maintaining that repose to apply this
principle in the organization of the new Territories, and would it not
be destructive of that repose to undertake to settle the slavery
question in the new Territories by an act of Congress, either original
or confirmatory? This view is certainly intelligible. It was professed
and advanced by all the supporters of the bill. It was unquestionably
the view which the President took of the matter. It proved to be an
erroneous view, but the views which mortal men hold, and
conscientiously hold, are very frequently erroneous.
[Sidenote: The bill taken up in the committee of the Whole of the
House of Representatives.]
[Sidenote: Mr. A. H. Stephens' management of the bill.]
[Sidenote: The bill passed and signed by the President.]
The Senate bill slept in the committee of the Whole of the House of
Representatives from March 21st until May 8th. During this period its
friends were undoubtedly working for it, and its opponents against it.
By the latter date the leaders in favor of the bill knew that they had
a reliable majority in the House, and, on that day, Mr. Richardson
moved that the House go into committee of the Whole, for the purpose
of taking up the House Kansas-Nebraska bill for consideration. After
much parliamentary fencing, this was accomplished. Mr. Richardson then
proposed to substitute the Senate bill, shorn of the provision in it
confining suffrage and office-holding in these Territories {404} to
American citizens, for the House bill. The opponents of the bill now
entered upon a course of obstruction, and, although there was a safe
majority of about twenty in favor of the bill, they prevented such a
vote being taken in the committee of the Whole, as would bring the
matter to a crisis, for about two weeks. By this time Mr. Richardson
seems to have been completely demoralized, and Mr. Alexander H.
Stephens came forward and took the management of the bill into his own
hands. He moved to strike out the enacting clause of the House bill.
According to the rules of the House, this motion took the precedence
of all motions to amend, and the effect of it would be, if passed,
equivalent to the rejection of the bill, upon the happening of which
the committee must rise and report its action to the House. The House
could then refuse to concur with the report of the committee of the
Whole, upon the happening of which Mr. Richardson could then offer the
Senate bill, as a substitute, in the House, and in the House the
obstructive tactics of the opposition could be dealt with as they
could not be in the committee of the Whole. Mr. Stephens explained his
tactics to the committee, in order that the friends of the bill might
know how to vote. The opponents of the bill called this procedure a
new "gag," but Mr. Stephens remained firm, and drove the Senate bill
in this manner through the House by a vote of one hundred and thirteen
to one hundred. The Senate concurred in the omission of the provision
limiting suffrage and office-holding in the Territories to American
citizens; and the President signed the bill, on May 30th.
[Sidenote: Analysis of the vote on the bill in the House.]
Eighty-seven members from the North, of whom forty-five were Whigs,
counting the Free-soilers as Whigs, and forty-two of whom were
Democrats, voted against {405} the bill; while only forty-four members
from the North, all Democrats, voted for it. Sixty-nine members from
the South, of whom fifty-seven were Democrats and twelve were Whigs,
voted for the bill; while seven Whigs and two Democrats from the South
voted against it.
[Sidenote: What the figures taught.]
These figures pretty well disposed of the claim that the bill was a
tender from the North to the South. It was simply a Western and
Southern Democratic measure. Taken together with the vote in the
Senate, these figures also showed that the Whig party was a party
opposed to slavery extension, unanimously so in the North, and in some
degree in the South. They revealed that the Whig party in the North
was to be merged in a Northern party with the Free-soil element of the
Democratic party, and was to be overwhelmed in the South by the union
of the proslavery-extension Whigs with the Democrats. They indicated
that one sectional party was soon to hold the majority in the North,
and another in the South; and gave thus the fearful warning that the
North was, at last, to be arrayed against the South upon the subject
which was of greater interest to the South, in the minds of the
slaveholders, than the Union itself.
[Sidenote: The Kansas-Nebraska Act a stupendous fallacy.]
From the point of view of the present, we are compelled to regard the
passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act as probably the greatest error
which the Congress of the United States ever committed, and the
arguments by which it was supported as among the most specious
fallacies that have ever misled the minds of men. We must take this
ground, unless we assume that we could not have solved the slavery
problem in any other way than we did, and at any less cost. If we make
this assumption, we may then consider this Act as providential, in
{406} that it precipitated a crisis, which was bound to come, and
which would only have been made more terrible by delay. While,
however, we of the succeeding generation may explain the place of this
Act in our history in this way, no considerations of this kind can
justify the men who produced it, and placed it upon the statute-book.
That God should "make the wrath of man to praise him" does not excuse
the wrath of man.
{407}
CHAPTER XX.
THE STRUGGLE FOR KANSAS
Eli Thayer and His Emigrant Aid Scheme--Reports in Regard to its
Character and Purposes--The Missouri "Border Ruffian" of
1854--Nebraska for the North and Kansas for the South--General
Atchison--Dr. Charles Robinson--The First Party of Emigrants--The
"Platte County Self-defensive Association"--The Founding of
Lawrence--First Invasion of the Missourians--Governor A. H.
Reeder--The Second Invasion of the Missourians and the Election of the
Delegate to Congress--The Indignation of the North--The Republican
Party--The Third Invasion of the Missourians--Governor Reeder and the
Territorial Elections--The Organization of the First Legislature of
Kansas Territory--The Topeka Constitution--The Removal of Governor
Reeder; and His Election as Congressional Delegate--Establishment of
the "Free-state" Government--The First Violence--The "Free-state"
Government and the Administration--The New Governor, Shannon, and the
"Law and Order" Party--John Brown--The President's Proclamation--The
Congressional Committee to the Territory--Application for
Admission--The "Treason Indictments"--The Sacking of Lawrence--The
Attack on Senator Sumner--The Pottawattomie Massacres--The Battle at
Black Jack--The Governor's Proclamation, Enforced by United States
Soldiers--The Passage of the Bill for the Admission of Kansas by the
House--Dispersal of the "Free-state" Legislature by Colonel
Sumner--The "Free-state" Directory--The Treaty of August 17th--The New
Invasion from Missouri--General Smith's Attitude Toward Invaders--The
failure of "Popular Sovereignty" in the Territories--The New Governor
Establishes Peace by Means of the Army of the United States--The
Judicial Contribution to Kansas History.
The passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the purchase of nearly fifty
thousand square miles of territory {408} from Mexico on the Southern
boundary of New Mexico, and the issue of a manifesto from Ostend by
the Ministers of the United States to Great Britain, France, and
Spain, Messrs. Buchanan, Mason, and Soulé, advising the acquisition of
Cuba by the United States, together with the preparation of
filibustering expeditions in the South for the execution of this and
similar designs, all coming within the same year, 1854, seemed to be
sufficient evidence of a fixed plan among the slaveholders for the
extension of slavery and the increase of the number of slaveholding
Commonwealths in the Union, and roused the people of the North to an
appreciation of the impending danger and to extraordinary exertions
for meeting the same and warding it off.
[Sidenote: Eli Thayer and his emigrant aid scheme.]
During the debate upon the Kansas-Nebraska bill in Congress, it does
not seem to have been generally appreciated that it might, after all,
turn out to be a Free-soil measure, and that the question whether it
would be such or not in a specific case resolved itself into the
problem of immigration. There lived, however, in the town of
Worcester, Mass., a shrewd, far seeing business man, with whose
shrewdness, however, ideality and patriotism were mingled in an
uncommon degree, who immediately comprehended the situation from this
point of view. This man was the now well known and universally honored
Eli Thayer. Before the Kansas-Nebraska bill had become law, the idea
in his mind had ripened into a wide-reaching plan. This plan was the
organization of an emigrant aid society, with an immense capital, the
purpose of which should be to foster emigration from the Northern
Commonwealths and the European states into the Territories and the
slaveholding Commonwealths of the Union, to the end that a Free-soil
population should gain control of them, and prohibit or abolish
slavery in them by their {409} own local acts. Mr. Thayer reasoned
with himself that masters would be very timid about immigrating into a
Territory with their slaves until the question should be determined
whether slavery should have a legal existence in the Territory, while
men without such impediments would go boldly forward and occupy the
country, and vote the free status for the Territory; and again, that
with only about one-fourth of the white population of the slaveholding
Commonwealths pecuniarily interested in slavery, the immigration of a
few thousand active anti-slavery men into these would finally turn the
balance at the polls against the further existence of the institution
in the slaveholding Commonwealths themselves. The plan was so
comprehensive that most of Mr. Thayer's friends thought it visionary,
and he modified it, after having obtained his charter from the
legislature of Massachusetts, limiting it to the settlement of the
Territories, and especially to that of Kansas Territory, by
anti-slavery men. The organization, as thus finally effected, counted
among its directors some of the purest, most patriotic, and most
capable men of the country--Mr. A. A. Lawrence, Dr. Samuel Cabot, Mr.
John Lowell, Mr. Moses H. Grinnell, Rev. Edward E. Hale, Rev. Horace
Bushnell, Professor Benjamin Silliman, and others of the like fame and
fortune. The way in which they proposed to accomplish their purpose
was by lessening the hardships of the journey to the distant country,
and the hardships of life in the new country. They proposed to
organize the emigrants into companies, procure transportation for them
at the most favorable rates, build hotels, boarding-houses, mills,
school-houses, churches--in a word to send capital in advance of
population, in order to attract a good, law-abiding population by
planting for them the advantages and conveniences of civilization in
the new country. It was a {410} noble scheme, and none the less so
because of the idea of making it pay ultimately as a business venture.
[Sidenote: Not an entirely new thing in American history.]
[Sidenote: Denunciations of it as an odious innovation.]
It cannot be said that it was a movement entirely new in American
history, although this was charged by many of the politicians, both of
the North and of the South. A number of the American colonies were
originally planted under the auspices of corporations in the
motherland, and others were formed by companies of immigrants for the
purpose of securing more freedom than the Old World afforded. It is
difficult to see how any objection could have been found to such an
association, animated with such motives and purposes, and operating
through such means, and yet it was charged, even by Northern men, with
the responsibility for all the outrages perpetrated in Kansas during
the stormy period of 1855-56. Even the President of the United States
denounced it with great severity.
The view held by the President and his friends, both of the North and
of the South, was that no aid should be allowed to be given, and no
incentive offered, by any person or organization to any other person,
to go to, and settle in, the common Territories of the Union, but that
every emigrant should go entirely upon his own impulse, and be
sustained entirely by his own means. This they regarded as the only
natural and fair method for carrying into effect the principle of
popular sovereignty in the Territories. Such a view was a perfect
travesty of popular liberty, and manifests the tyranny which slavery
was imposing upon the minds of freemen.
[Sidenote: The organization of Mr. Thayer's company.]
Mr. Thayer's company was never organized under its original charter,
but under a charter obtained in 1855. During the period when the
counter movements, to be described, were set on foot against it in
Missouri, it had no corporate existence at all, but was a movement
{411} conducted by three private gentlemen, Mr. Thayer, Mr. Lawrence,
and Mr. J. M. S. Williams. Moreover, the establishments which they
founded in Kansas were open to use by immigrants from any and every
part of the Union, or of the world, without distinction. Such was the
organization which was made the justification, or better the
subterfuge, for excesses, which had never before been committed in the
history of the building of the Commonwealths of the Union.
[Sidenote: Reports in regard to its character and purposes.]
During the early summer of 1854, exaggerated and false reports in
regard to the character, purposes, and means of the proposed Emigrant
Aid Company were circulated through Missouri and the entire South. It
was said that an organization, chartered by the legislature of
Massachusetts, possessing an immense capital, was preparing to
abolitionize Kansas by means of military colonies, recruited from the
slums of the Eastern cities, and planted in Kansas with all the
munitions of war, to be used not only when necessary for their own
defence, but for keeping out immigrants from the South. The notorious
B. F. Stringfellow, co-editor with one Kelly of the _Squatter
Sovereign_, a paper published at Atchison, which professed to be the
organ of the Washington Government in western Missouri, rang the
changes upon these misrepresentations in his newspaper, and advised
that the emigrants sent out by the Aid Society be met with the weapons
of their choice, which he charged were those of violence.
[Sidenote: The Missouri "border ruffian" of 1854.]
[Sidenote: Nebraska for the North and Kansas for the South.]
The population of western Missouri was then such as to receive ready
impression from such representations, and respond heartily to such
counsel. This region was then the frontier between civilization and
savagery, and into it had gathered a horde of desperate characters,
{412} vulgar, fearless, brutal, without respect for civilization or
reverence for God, usually inflamed with whiskey and stained with
tobacco, gambling by day and jayhawking by night, always ready for any
adventure which promised fun, blood, or booty. It is true that they
had no special interest in slavery. They were simply the ready
material out of which the slaveholders of Missouri might recruit their
mercenaries for any villainous work which might be found necessary.
Such was the Missouri "border ruffian" of 1854. It must not be
understood that western Missouri contained no other sort of people.
There were many generous-hearted, fair-minded, upright men there,
among both the slaveholders and the non-slaveholders, who would no
sooner have done wrong than suffered wrong. Most of them felt,
however, that Kansas for the South and slavery, and Nebraska for the
North, was the fair thing, the only fair thing, the thing understood
and intended in the organization of the two Territories by one Act,
and that any attempt on the part of the North to make Kansas a
non-slaveholding Territory was a breach of faith, which ought to be
resisted by the South, and especially by Missouri.
[Sidenote: General Atchison.]
General D. R. Atchison was such a man, and such was his view of the
case. He was, at the time, the leading man of western Missouri, had
represented Missouri in the Senate of the United States, and had been
president _pro tem._ of the Senate. His opinion and his advice
naturally determined the course which the people of western Missouri
would pursue toward Kansas. In justice to his memory, however, it must
be said that, while he was resolved to make Kansas a slaveholding
Territory, and then a slaveholding Commonwealth, his presence and
counsel exerted a moderating influence upon his fierce and reckless
followers. He {413} left Washington soon after the passage of the
Kansas-Nebraska Act, and repaired to the scene of the coming conflict,
for the purpose of organizing and conducting his forces.
[Sidenote: Dr. Charles Robinson.]
In June of 1854, Mr. Thayer, Mr. Lawrence, and Mr. Williams invited
Dr. Charles Robinson, of Fitchburg, Mass., to meet them in council, in
regard to the projects of the Emigrant Aid Company. Dr. Robinson was a
prominent "forty-niner," and the leader of the California squatters in
the war against the Sutter land claims. He was shrewd, calm,
courageous, and full of expedients. These qualities, together with his
large experience in organizing the forces of an embryonic
Commonwealth, fitted him exactly for the work which Mr. Thayer and his
colleagues were seeking to accomplish. Dr. Robinson was not an
Abolitionist, and neither was Thayer, Lawrence, nor Williams. They
were simply working to prevent the extension of slavery. They were all
Whigs or Free-soil Democrats. They were thus by their moderation in
principles and their conservatism in character admirably fitted to
undertake the great work of making Kansas a free Commonwealth.
[Sidenote: Mr. C. H. Branscomb.]
The conference resulted in the sending of Dr. Robinson to the front to
inspect the Territory of Kansas and make arrangements for settlements.
Accompanied by Mr. C. H. Branscomb, a young lawyer, of Holyoke, Mass.,
he started for Kansas in the last days of June, 1854. They went by way
of St. Louis and Kansas City. When they arrived in Missouri they found
the excitement in reference to the reported doings of the Emigrant Aid
Company already at a high pitch. They heard threats that no
anti-slavery man would be allowed to settle in Kansas, and they heard
of rewards offered for the head of Eli Thayer. They found also that a
goodly number of pro-slavery Missourians had already {414} immigrated
into the Territory, had held a popular convention or assembly at Salt
Creek Valley, at which they had declared slavery to be an existing
institution in the Territory, and called upon its friends to aid in
its firmer establishment and its wider extension.
[Sidenote: Dr. Robinson and Mr. Branscomb in Kansas.]
From Kansas City Mr. Branscomb proceeded alone up the Kansas River to
Fort Riley, while Dr. Robinson went up the Missouri to Fort
Leavenworth. The Doctor found surveyors laying off a town near Fort
Leavenworth, despite the fact that the Government at Washington had
not yet opened the country for purchase. He immediately returned to
Kansas City, where he received a letter from Boston informing him that
the first party of emigrants was on the eve of starting for Kansas,
and instructing him to join them at St. Louis. Upon meeting them at
St. Louis, a letter was handed him asking for his immediate presence
in Boston. He wrote to Mr. Branscomb to join the party at Kansas City
and lead them to a settlement, while he himself hurried to Boston.
[Sidenote: The first party of emigrants.]
Mr. Branscomb and a Colonel Blood, of Wisconsin, who had also been
sent out by Mr. Lawrence, met the emigrants at Kansas City, and, after
a good deal of deliberation, led them to the spot on the Kansas River,
above the confluence of the Wakarusa with the Kansas, on which the
town of Lawrence was afterward built.
[Sidenote: The "Platte County self-defensive association."]
A few days before this first party of emigrants had arrived from the
East, a meeting of residents of Platte County in Missouri took place
at Weston, and, under the lead of B. F. Stringfellow, an organization
was formed, which called itself the "Platte County Self-defensive
Association," with the declared purpose of aiding in the removal of
all persons from the soil of Kansas who might go there through {415}
the aid or protection or guidance of emigrant aid societies in the
North. Other such associations were formed in other localities of
western Missouri, and before the autumn of 1854 had hardly opened,
from five to ten thousand persons, mostly desperate and reckless
characters, were organized in the border counties of western Missouri,
and ready to invade Kansas for the purpose of protecting the settlers
in the Territory from Missouri and the South generally in the
exclusive possession of the Territory.
[Sidenote: The founding of Lawrence.]
In September, the little party of about thirty men, who had pitched
their tents upon the site of the present city of Lawrence, were joined
by Dr. Robinson and S. C. Pomeroy, with the second party from the
East, numbering some two hundred men. Upon the arrival of these the
work of laying out and building the town was begun, and the place was
named, in honor of the strong financial supporter of the Emigrant Aid
enterprise, Lawrence.
[Sidenote: First invasion of the Missourians.]
When the first party arrived at the site they found it occupied by a
single settler, named Stearns. Mr. Branscomb immediately purchased
Stearns' claim and improvements for the company. The Missourians had,
however, rushed into the Territory, at the earliest moment after the
passage of the organic Act, and marked all the best lands as taken,
leaving very little for bona fide settlers. As the result of this
procedure, another claimant to the site of Lawrence soon appeared, one
John Baldwin, and ordered the Yankees to decamp. Robinson proposed
that each settler be left in possession until some authorized tribunal
could pass upon the claims, and declared that his party would hold
possession until removed by a legal act. Baldwin and his party
rejected the proposition, and summoned their Missouri friends to
assist them. Some came, {416} but not enough to overcome the Yankees.
The Yankees stood firm and the Missourians retired, declaring that
they would come again, and breathing out threats of war and bloodshed
upon their return. This was October 6th, 1854, and such was the first
invasion of the Missourians.
[Sidenote: Governor A. H. Reeder.]
On the next day, the Governor of the Territory, the President's
representative, the Hon. A. H. Reeder, of Pennsylvania, arrived at
Fort Leavenworth, and began his régime in the Territory. From this
time forward the history of the Territory is the resultant of four
elemental forces in contact with each other--the general Government,
the pro-slavery inhabitants, the anti-slavery inhabitants, and the
Missourians.
Governor Reeder was a genial, intelligent, upright man, a good lawyer
and a fine orator. He was a Union-loving Democrat, and a firm believer
in the doctrine of home rule in the Territories. He declared that he
would maintain peace and order in the Territory, and immediately set
out on a tour of inspection through the Territory. After having
finished this, he caused the Territory to be districted, and ordered
the election of a delegate to Congress.
[Sidenote: The second invasion of the Missourians and the election of
the delegate to Congress.]
There is little question that at the moment a majority of the bona
fide settlers in the Territory were pro-slavery, and would have
elected the delegate to Congress without any outside aid, but the
pro-slavery men in Kansas and Missouri had become excited by the
rumors of the vast schemes in the East for planting anti-slavery
military colonies in the Territories, and also in the slaveholding
Commonwealths, and were in no state of mind to think quietly and act
calmly. They felt that they must make sure of all of the elements of
government in {417} Kansas at the outset. The Missourians consequently
committed the fatal and unnecessary blunder of going over into Kansas,
to the number of some seventeen hundred or more, and voting for the
pro-slavery candidate for Congress, J. W. Whitfield, who was thus
elected by a large majority. Without the vote of the Missourians,
Whitfield had still a substantial majority, but this travesty of the
principle of home rule in the Territories, this pollution of
republican principles at the very fountain-head, roused the North to
the highest pitch of indignation.
[Sidenote: The indignation of the North.]
This election took place on November 29th, 1854. Had it occurred
before the Congressional elections of that year, it would most
probably have caused a much more rapid development of the Republican
party than happened, and the election of the Republican candidate for
the presidency two years later. As it was, the struggle over the
Kansas-Nebraska bill, and its final passage, had started the
amalgamation of the Northern Whigs, the Free-soilers, and the Northern
Democrats who opposed the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, into the
Republican party, and had, in the Congressional elections of 1854,
been the chief cause in changing a Democratic majority of more than
eighty in the House of Representatives into a minority by more than
seventy.
[Sidenote: The Republican party.]
Of course the disintegration of the two old parties would, under
ordinary conditions, proceed slowly. The members of neither were
willing to enter the organization, or bear the name, of the other. As
the Northern Whigs had unanimously opposed the repeal of the
restriction of 1820 upon slavery in the Territories, it was not
unnatural that they should at first feel that they were already the
anti-slavery-extension party, and that all persons holding to that
principle should be {418} willing to march under their banner. Some of
the more liberal minds among them in the Northwest, especially in
Wisconsin and Michigan, had, already in the summer of 1854, joined
with the Free-soilers, and the Democrats who opposed the repeal of the
Missouri Compromise, to form a new party, under a new name, the
Republican party, which, indeed, had no other principle than that
already represented by the Northern Whigs, but which did not repel the
Democrats by requiring them to desert to their old enemy. The great
majority of both Whigs and Democrats were, however, rather waiting to
see how home rule in the Territories would work, and were in the
meantime busying themselves, in large degree, with other questions,
chief among which was the question whether the country ought not to be
preserved against foreign Roman Catholic immigration, the question
which gave rise to the short-lived Know-nothing party, with its
principle of America for Americans, the only real service of which
movement was the aid which it lent to the dissolution of the Whig
party, and to the preparation of the way for the union of the Northern
Whigs with the anti-slavery-extension elements of the other parties
into the Republican party.
The interference of the Missourians in the first election in Kansas,
demonstrating the impracticability of "popular sovereignty" in the
Territories, was the very thing necessary to hasten the development of
the Republican party, but it came too late to influence the elections
of 1854, and the shock which it caused lost some of the sharpness of
its effect before the autumn of 1856.
The Congress to which Whitfield presented his credentials was the one
whose House of Representatives had been chosen in 1852. His claim to
his seat was at first not resisted, and the first step in the
programme for making Kansas a slaveholding Territory was thus
successful.
{419} [Sidenote: The Territorial legislature.]
Of far more importance, however, than the election of the delegate to
Congress was the election of the members of the first Territorial
legislature, since, according to the principle of "popular
sovereignty" in the Territories, it would have the power probably of
determining primarily the legality or illegality of slavery in Kansas.
In February of 1855, the Territorial authorities took a census of the
inhabitants of the Territory, and it was estimated that there were
between eight and nine thousand bona fide settlers in the Territory,
about three thousand of whom were voters. It was also found that about
four-sevenths of the legal voters had emigrated from the South. It is
not probable, however, that all of these were pro-slavery men.
[Sidenote: The third invasion of the Missourians.]
March 13th following was the day appointed for the election. All
through the month the Missourians of the border counties were
assembling in their "Blue Lodges," arming, organizing and drilling. On
the day of the election some four or five thousand of them marched,
fully armed, to the voting places in the more eastern districts of the
Territory, and compelled the acceptance of their ballots by the
regular judges of the elections, or by judges appointed by themselves.
About six thousand three hundred votes were cast at this election, and
it was estimated that three-fourths of them were cast by the Missouri
invaders. Some of them pretended to be residents of the Territory, but
most of those who thought it necessary to justify the procedure at all
claimed that the Emigrant Aid Company had sent out men for the sole
purpose of voting, and that their own action was retaliatory. The
invasion was a notoriously public deed. The Missourians came in
companies, with music and banners, and made no attempt at concealment.
The {420} Governor of the Territory resided, at the time, near the
Missouri border, and probably had ocular proof of the outrage. The
anti-slavery men thought that he would set the entire election aside.
He did call for protests, and appointed April 5th as the time for
hearing the same and canvassing the returns.
When the day arrived protests had been received from only six or seven
of the eighteen election districts, and affected the elections of not
more than three of the thirteen persons returned as elected to the
upper house, and of not more than nine of the twenty-six persons
returned as elected to the lower house, of the Territorial
legislature.
[Sidenote: Governor Reeder and the Territorial elections.]
Dr. Robinson and the anti-slavery men who had gathered about the
Governor as a sort of body-guard wanted the Governor to declare the
entire election null and void, but the Governor was a good lawyer, and
he quickly determined that he could not pronounce an election null and
void in a district from which no charges of fraud were presented, on
account of fraud charged in some other district, and that he could not
refuse his certificate to any one elected on the face of the returns,
if nobody disputed the regularity of his election. Upon examining the
disputed cases he decided to refuse his certificate to eight of the
twelve persons chosen on the face of the disputed returns. Thirty-one
members were thus duly qualified to take their seats, and new
elections for eight seats were ordered. Of these thirty-one,
twenty-eight were counted as pro-slavery men, a large majority in both
houses.
Dr. Robinson and the anti-slavery men found great fault with the
Governor, and charged him with being frightened out of his original
purpose to set the entire election aside, but it is difficult to see
how he could have done this without protests against the return of
each {421} and every person. It would certainly have been an arbitrary
procedure to have done so. If the anti-slavery men were not brave
enough to protest, it certainly did not become them to taunt the
Governor with backing down, when they gave him nothing upon which to
base the refusal to issue his certificates.
[Sidenote: The new elections to the legislative seats unfilled at the
first elections.]
The 22nd day of the following month (May) was appointed for holding
the elections for the seats declared unfilled by the Governor. The
anti-slavery candidates were elected to all of them. The pro-slavery
men ignored the election. This meant that those holding the Governor's
certificate by virtue of this election would be rejected by the
legislature itself, and those returned as elected at the first
election would be seated, under the power of the legislature to
determine finally upon the legitimacy of its members. This happened as
soon as the legislature assembled and organized itself in the first
days of July.
[Sidenote: The organization of the first legislature of Kansas
Territory.]
The legislature as thus organized contained only a single anti-slavery
man, a Mr. Houston, and he voluntarily vacated his seat a few weeks
later in great disgust. From a technical point of view this
legislature was a legitimate body, but from a moral and a political
point of view it did not represent the people of the Territory. It
represented simply the pro-slavery party, and used its powers in utter
disregard of justice and right reason.
[Sidenote: The problem for the anti-slavery men. Dr. Robinson's plan.]
The great problem for the anti-slavery men now was to repudiate the
jurisdiction of this legislature without rebelling against the general
Government and its agent in the Territory, the Governor. Dr. Robinson
had had the experience in California of aiding to make a Commonwealth
in the Union, without the transitional period of {422} Territorial
organization. He now applied this experience to the solution of the
Kansas question.
The idea of Dr. Robinson and his colleagues was, to hold a convention
of the people of the Territory for the purpose of framing an organic
statute for Commonwealth government, which, after adoption by the
people, should be sent to Congress, with a petition for the admission
of Kansas into the Union as a Commonwealth. They proposed in the
meantime to get on without any Territorial government as best they
could.
Their idea was, in the second place, to ignore the Territorial
government altogether as bogus, but to yield obedience to the
officials of the general Government in the Territory. This distinction
might be made, so far as the Territorial legislature was concerned,
upon the "popular sovereignty" principle. The difficulty was in
applying it to the Governor and the Territorial judges appointed by
the President. To distinguish between their functions in such a way as
to deny their authority when administering the acts of the Territorial
legislature, and yield to it when administering the acts of Congress
in the Territory, was certainly a very delicate procedure, if possible
at all. Such distinctions would have to be very clearly understood,
and very correctly applied in each case, in order to avoid the charge
of rebellion and treason.
[Sidenote: Conflict between the Governor and the Territorial
legislature.]
Had the Governor remained true to the legislature it is possible that
this plan of rebellion against the Territorial government might have
been suppressed at the outset, but such was not to be the course of
history. He called the legislature to assemble at Pawnee on July 2nd.
It remained in session there only four days. It did little more than
unseat the persons holding the Governor's certificate by virtue of the
second election, and seat {423} those to whom he had denied his
certificate on account of fraud at the first election. It then
adjourned itself to Shawnee Mission, a place nearer the Missouri
border. The Governor denied the power of the legislature to do this,
since by the Act organizing the Territory, the legislature must first
meet at the time and place appointed by the Governor, and was vested
by the Act with power, thereafter, only over the time of commencing
its regular sessions. The Governor vetoed the proposition of the
legislature to change its place of meeting. The legislature passed the
project over his veto, and removed to Shawnee Mission; after which the
Governor broke off all official connection with it. There is little
doubt that the pro-slavery legislature wanted to be where it could be
easily supported by the Missourians, and that the Governor considered
this a menace to his own independence, and an outrage upon the people
of Kansas, and upon the principle of "popular sovereignty" in the
Territories.
[Sidenote: Sharpe's riles.]
The attitude now assumed by the Governor toward the legislature at
Shawnee Mission was a great encouragement to the anti-slavery men. Dr.
Robinson had already sent to Mr. Thayer for Sharpe's rifles, and, at
the time of the Governor's quarrel with the legislature, a sufficient
number of these had arrived to furnish almost every anti-slavery man
with a good outfit.
[Sidenote: Factional movements among the anti-slavery men suppressed.]
Dr. Robinson had, at the same time, overcome the attempts of James S.
Lane to separate the anti-slavery men into parties, by the
organization of a Democratic party in Kansas. In a powerful speech at
Lawrence, on July 4th, 1855, the Doctor convinced his hearers of the
necessity for all anti-slavery men standing together until Kansas
should be admitted into the Union as a {424} non-slaveholding
Commonwealth. It was in this address that the Doctor repudiated the
existing legislature as a Missouri institution, advising resistance to
the execution of its acts, and made his noted declaration, that, if
slavery in Missouri was impossible with freedom in Kansas, then
slavery in Missouri must die in order that freedom in Kansas might
live.
[Sidenote: Excitement in Missouri and throughout the country over the
"Free-state" movement.]
These bold utterances startled the North and the South, the people of
Kansas and, especially, the people of Missouri. This speech, together
with the letter of M. F. Conway to Governor Reeder, resigning his seat
in the legislature and repudiating that body "as derogatory to the
respectability of popular government and insulting to the virtue and
intelligence of the age," set the "Free-state" scheme in motion.
[Sidenote: The enactments of the Territorial legislature.]
The enactments of the Territorial legislature greatly aided the
movement by demonstrating to the people what they had to expect from
the dominance of that body. They made the decoying, or aiding therein,
of a slave away from his master in the Territory grand larceny,
punishable by death. They made the decoying into Kansas of any slave
away from his master in any other place, for the purpose of effecting
his freedom, grand larceny, punishable by death. And they made the
denial of the right to hold slaves in Kansas, either by word of mouth
or in writing or printing, a felony, punishable by imprisonment at
hard labor for not less than two years.
[Sidenote: The North aroused by this legislation.]
When the knowledge of this infamous legislation spread throughout the
North, it roused that section of the country to new efforts for
peopling Kansas with anti-slavery men, who would rescue the Territory
from the reign of such laws and such law-makers. The necessary
reinforcements {425} were being assembled in the North when the
creation of the "Free-state" government was begun.
[Sidenote: The Topeka constitution.]
A series of conventions, beginning with the convention at Lawrence on
August 14th, and culminating with that assembled at Topeka on the 23rd
day of October, 1855, consolidated the anti-slavery men in the
Territory into the "Free-state" party, constructed a temporary
election machinery, and produced, finally, a proposed Commonwealth
constitution, which, in addition to the provisions for the structure
of a Commonwealth government for Kansas, contained a clause
prohibiting slavery in Kansas after July 4th, 1857, and excluding
negroes from residence in Kansas after that date.
[Sidenote: The removal of Governor Reeder; and his election as
Congressional delegate.]
In the meantime Governor Reeder had been removed by the President from
the governorship of the Territory, and the Secretary of the Territory,
one Daniel Woodson, a pro-slavery man, had become acting Governor for
the time being. Ex-Governor Reeder now went over to the anti-slavery
men, and was chosen by them on October 9th, at the same election at
which the delegates to the Topeka convention were chosen, as delegate
to Congress. Over twenty-seven hundred votes were cast at this
election.
[Sidenote: The ratification of the Topeka constitution; and the
establishment of the "Free-state" government.]
On December 15th, the Topeka constitution was submitted to the
suffrages of the people. Seventeen hundred and thirty-one votes were
cast in favor of its adoption, and forty-six votes against it. The
pro-slavery men took no part in the voting. It is probable, however,
that a majority of the legal voters in Kansas ratified this
constitution. On January 5th, 1856, the elections for the legislative
members and officials of the government provided by this constitution
were held, and Dr. Robinson was chosen Governor.
{426} [Sidenote: The first violence.]
It was at this election that the conflict of arms between the
"Free-state" government and the Territorial government began. A
Territorial military company, called the Kickapoo Rangers, threatened
to interfere with the elections at the town of Easton. A captain, R.
P. Brown, organized a company of "Free-state" men at Leavenworth, and
went to Easton to protect the ballot box. As the evening drew on a
fight ensued, in which a Territorial man was killed. The next day the
Leavenworth company was attacked, on their return, by the Kickapoo
company, and Captain Brown was taken prisoner. Some movements were in
progress for trying him, when one of the ruffians put an end to the
matter by striking him on the head with a hatchet.
[Sidenote: The "Free-state" government and the Administration.]
Two local governments of Kansas were now in existence. One, the
Territorial, had been recognized as legitimate by the Washington
Government. What, then, was the other? Was it a body of
insurrectionists? If so, must the general Government suppress it? And,
if the general Government must suppress it, must it do so at once, or
should it wait until the insurrectionists should undertake to exercise
some governmental power? These were knotty problems for the
Administration at Washington, but they were problems which had to be
solved. From the inaction of the Washington authorities we must
conclude that the prevailing view with them was that the new
government in Kansas must do something before it could be dealt with.
[Sidenote: The acts of the "Free-state" legislature.]
The "Free-state" legislature met March 4th, 1856. It prepared a
memorial to Congress, praying for the entrance of Kansas as a
Commonwealth into the Union, under the Topeka constitution. It elected
Reeder and Lane United States Senators. It appointed a committee to
put the {427} legislative business into shape for the next session.
And it passed a few laws.
None of these acts were treasonable. Treason, by the Constitution, is
levying war against the United States or any of the "States," or
adhering to those who are doing so, giving them aid and comfort; and
levying war has been defined by the Supreme Court to be the actual
assembly of armed men for the treasonable purpose. Not even the
voluntary submission to the laws passed by the "Free-state"
legislature was treason or rebellion. The danger point would be
reached when the "Free-state" government should undertake to enforce
its laws, or should interpose armed resistance to the enforcement of
the laws of the United States, or of the acts of the Territorial
government, which government had been recognized as legitimate by the
general Government, which was, in fact, but the local agent of the
general Government.
[Sidenote: Governor Robinson's message.]
Governor Robinson understood the situation. In his message to the
legislature he recommended "no course to be taken in opposition to the
general Government, or to the Territorial government, while it shall
remain with the sanction of Congress."
[Sidenote: The new Governor, Shannon, and the "law and order" party.]
In the midst of these movements by the "Free-state" men, the
pro-slavery men organized themselves more closely for aggressive
action. The new Governor appointed by the President, Wilson Shannon,
ex-Governor of Ohio, a man of intelligence and high character, arrived
at Shawnee Mission on September 3rd, 1855. The pro-slavery men did not
like his appointment. They wanted the acting Governor, Woodson, to be
made Governor. However, they received the new Governor with much pomp
and ceremony, and succeeded in imposing upon him, at the outset, their
view of the situation. On {428} November 14th, they held a pro-slavery
convention at Leavenworth. They called it an assembly of "the lovers
of law and order." The Governor presided over it, and made a rather
violent speech, in which he declared that the Territorial government
had the support of the Administration at Washington. The practical
work of this convention was the organization of the "law and order"
party; that is, the party for enforcing the acts and authority of the
Territorial government.
[Sidenote: The attempt to enforce the Territorial laws upon the
"Free-state" men.]
Naturally a dispute about a land claim furnished the occasion for
trying the powers of the Territorial government. In the course of this
quarrel, which took place in the latter part of November, 1855, a
pro-slavery man, named Coleman, killed a "Free-state" man, named Dow.
The friends of Dow gathered about the spot where his dead body was
found, and indulged in threats of vengeance. Among them was one Jacob
Branson, who uttered threats against one Buckley, as the instigator of
the murder of his friend. Buckley secured a peace warrant against
Branson, and put it in the hands of one S. J. Jones, the sheriff,
under the Territorial government, of Douglas County. The arrest of
Branson under this warrant inaugurated the contest for imposing the
authority of the Territorial government upon the "Free-state" men.
[Sidenote: The Branson rescue.]
Sheriff Jones arrested Branson, and started for Lecompton with him, by
way of Lawrence. His purpose in going through the head-quarters of the
"Free-state" men was undoubtedly to tempt them to the rescue of
Branson. But Branson was rescued several miles away from Lawrence by a
company of "Free-state" men, under the lead of a Captain Abbott. This
party, however, immediately repaired to Lawrence, while the sheriff
went to Franklin, and from {429} this place summoned his Missouri
friends to his aid, and then reported his trouble to the Governor, and
asked for his support.
[Sidenote: The advance of the Missourians on Lawrence.]
The Governor immediately ordered the officers of the Territorial
militia to collect the forces, and march to Lawrence. Although the
sheriff asked for three thousand men, not one hundred residents of the
Territory answered the call of the militia officers; but a great horde
came from Missouri. By December 5th, 1855, more than a thousand
Missourians had arrived, and had encamped upon the Wakarusa, a few
miles to the east of Lawrence. General Atchison was with them.
Naturally the people of Lawrence were much excited, and set about
preparing for defence. They constructed several small forts, and
organized a military force of some six or seven hundred men, pretty
well armed and equipped. They stood a very good chance to win in the
trial of battle, but they resolved, most wisely, to rely upon the
justice of their cause more than upon the power of their arms.
[Sidenote: Lawrence's demand of protection from Governor Shannon.]
The committee of safety, which was directing matters in Lawrence, sent
commissioners to Governor Shannon to enlighten him, from the point of
view of the "Free-state" men, in regard to the situation. They made
their way to Shawnee Mission, where they were coldly received by the
Governor, who charged the "Free-state" men with rebellion against his
government. The commissioners disputed his charge, told him that
nobody in Lawrence had had anything to do with the rescue of Branson,
that his rescuers had been warned out of the town as soon as they came
into it, and had obeyed the warning, and gave him the committee's
message demanding his protection against the invaders.
{430} [Sidenote: Shannon at Lawrence, and his agreement with the
"Free-state" men.]
The Governor was somewhat staggered by these statements, and decided
to go to Lawrence himself, and examine affairs on the spot. This was
just what the "Free-state" men wanted. He arrived in Lawrence on
December 7th. Dr. Robinson and Colonel Lane immediately stated the
situation and the views of the "Free-state" men to him. The Governor
saw, at once, that they were in the right, and could not be attacked.
He recognized, at once, that his task was to send the Missourians out
of the Territory. He entered into a sort of written agreement with the
citizens of Lawrence, in which the people of Lawrence pledged
themselves not to resist the legal service of any criminal process,
but to aid in the execution of the laws, when called on by proper
authority, and the Governor declared that he had no authority to call
upon non-residents of Kansas to aid him in the execution of the laws,
had not done so, and would not do so. The last clause provided that
nothing in the agreement should be taken as a recognition of the
validity of the acts of the Territorial legislature by the
"Free-state" men.
[Sidenote: The retreat of the Missourians.]
The Governor felt that he would have difficulty in reconciling the
Missourians to his agreement, and insisted that Dr. Robinson and
Colonel Lane should accompany him to Franklin, and aid him in his
task. The calm statements of the Governor and of Dr. Robinson
prevailed, and the Missourians saw the error into which they had been
betrayed by the inconsiderate pro-slavery zeal of Sheriff Jones.
General Atchison told his followers plainly that Dr. Robinson's
position was impregnable, and that if they should persist in an attack
upon Lawrence, contrary to the Governor's orders, they were only a
mob. He added, that such a movement was not only without show of
legality, but would ruin the Democratic {431} party, and cause the
election of an Abolitionist President the next year. By these efforts
and representations on the part of the Governor, Dr. Robinson, and
General Atchison, the Missourians were induced to break camp and turn
their faces homeward.
[Sidenote: John Brown.]
At the moment of this victory of the "Free-state" men, won by moral
forces and diplomatic address, appeared the Loki of Kansas
"Free-state" history, John Brown. He mounted a box in one of the
streets of Lawrence, railed and ranted against the settlement which
had been reached, and breathed out words of slaughter and pillage,
until some man of common sense pulled him down, and stopped his
murderous canting babble.
[Sidenote: Shannon's report to the President.]
The Governor reported the affair to the President, expressed to him
his forebodings as to the future, and suggested that he be allowed to
call upon the United States troops stationed at Fort Leavenworth at
his discretion, as a call for the militia would only end in a party
struggle. This communication seems to have opened the eyes of the
President, for the first time, to the true situation.
[Sidenote: The appeal of the "Free-state" men to the President.]
The "Free-state" men now addressed the President and demanded his
protection against another invasion from Missouri, which they claimed
was in preparation. On January 23rd, 1856, the leaders at Lawrence
telegraphed the President that the outrage was on the point of
consummation, and besought the President to issue his proclamation, at
once, forbidding the invasion. At the same time, they informed certain
members of Congress and the Governors of certain Northern
Commonwealths of the impending danger; and they sent commissioners
into the Northern Commonwealths to inform the people of the {432}
North in regard to the situation in Kansas, and to appeal to them to
emigrate thither in sufficient numbers to save the Territory against
the pro-slavery movement.
[Sidenote: The President's proclamation.]
The agitation became now so general throughout the country, that the
President felt constrained to interfere. On February 11th, he issued
his proclamation, in which he warned all persons concerned that "an
attempted insurrection" in the Territory of Kansas or "an aggressive
intrusion into the same" would be resisted by the employment of the
United States troops in Kansas, as well as the local militia; and
called upon all good citizens outside of Kansas to abstain from
intermeddling with the local affairs of the Territory, and upon all
good citizens in Kansas to render obedience to the laws.
[Sidenote: The situation made more embarrassing for the "Free-state"
men.]
The "Free-state" men did not regard the proclamation as particularly
friendly to them. While it forbade invasion, it commanded obedience to
the existing Territorial government within. They were afraid that they
would not be allowed to organize their "Free-state" government,
created by the Topeka constitution. But, as we have seen, the day came
and went for this, without any interference on the part of the
President or the Governor against the movement, although the President
had authorized the Governor to call upon the United States troops at
Fort Leavenworth at his discretion. Under these circumstances it was
certainly the part of wisdom for the "Free-state" men to do nothing
superfluous or sensational in the organization of the new government,
and to delay operations under it for the time being. The question of
the recognition of the "Free-state" movement was before Congress,
under the issue of the contest between Whitfield and Reeder for the
seat in the House of Representatives. The policy, therefore, {433} of
representing the organization of the new government as tentative, and
as conditioned upon the presumption of Congressional recognition, and
as holding its powers in abeyance until that recognition should be
secured, was wise and necessary.
[Sidenote: The Congressional committee to the Territory.]
The discussion of Kansas affairs in the House of Representatives
revolved about the question of the admission of Whitfield or Reeder
from the middle of February to March 19th, 1856, when it was voted to
send a special committee of investigation to the Territory. The
gentlemen selected were Mr. Howard, of Michigan, Mr. Sherman, of Ohio,
and Mr. Oliver, of Missouri. They proceeded to the Territory and
opened their investigations about the middle of April.
[Sidenote: Application for admission.]
A week before this, the memorial from the "Free-state" legislature
praying for the admission of Kansas, as a Commonwealth, under the
Topeka constitution, was presented in both Houses of Congress, and
placed upon the calendar in each. The slavery question was herewith
again before Congress in both principle and detail. The measure which
was intended to put its discussion out of the halls of Congress had
thus, in less than two years, proved itself an utter fiasco.
[Sidenote: Sheriff Jones again at Lawrence; and the attempts to
assassinate him.]
[Sidenote: The outrage repudiated by the "Free-state" men.]
In the Territory the pro-slavery men pursued their policy of bringing
the "Free-state" men into conflict with the general Government. The
"Free-state" men sought just as diligently to avoid it. Both sides
recognized this as the crucial test. By the middle of April, some of
the men who participated in the rescue of Branson had made their way
back to Lawrence, and Sheriff Jones laid his plans for arresting them.
On April 19th, he rode into Lawrence and served a writ upon S. N.
Wood, but the crowd jostled them apart, and Wood escaped. The {434}
Sheriff returned on the next day with more writs, and undertook to
arrest S. F. Tappan. Tappan resisted and struck the Sheriff. Jones
went at once to the Governor, and the Governor gave him a detachment
of United States soldiers. With these he returned to Lawrence, but
they could find no one for whom the Sheriff had a writ. The party
pitched tent at Lawrence to spend the night. After darkness came on,
some wretch, then unknown to the "Free-state" leaders, approached the
tent and shot the Sheriff, wounding him dangerously. This was an
almost irreparable blow to the "Free-state" cause. The very thing
which the "Free-state" leaders had sought most earnestly to avoid had
been thrust upon them by the criminal deed of some meddlesome crank.
The "Free-state" men recognized at once the seriousness of the
situation, and, on the morning following the event, held a meeting, at
which the outrage was repudiated and denounced, and a reward of five
hundred dollars offered for the apprehension of the criminal. Colonel
Sumner, the commander of the United States troops in Kansas, wrote to
Dr. Robinson, urging him to use every effort to move the citizens of
Lawrence to bring the assassin to justice, as his act would be charged
by the pro-slavery men upon the whole community. The Doctor replied at
once that the community repudiated the foul deed, and would certainly
bring the guilty party to justice if he could be found. There was no
municipal government in Lawrence at the time, and Dr. Robinson acted,
in his reply to Colonel Sumner, as a sort of self-constituted
representative of the citizens. He certainly represented the views of
the large majority of them, but there were some who, at the time, knew
who the guilty person was, and gave no sign which would aid in his
discovery.
{435} [Sidenote: Judge Lecompte's charge to the Grand Jury.]
The Sheriff's wound was not fatal, but it was reported that he was
dead, and the Missourians began to organize for another invasion.
Before they were ready, the Territorial judiciary came to their
assistance. Chief Justice Lecompte charged the Grand Jury of Douglas
County, in the early part of May, that resistance to the Territorial
laws was high treason against the United States, and that entering
into combinations for the purpose of making such resistance was
constructive treason, and instructed the body to find true bills
against all persons guilty of such offences. This was a most
astounding piece of jurisprudence. It looked like nothing but a trick
to deprive the "Free-state" men of their leaders, since one arrested
for treason was considered as not having the privilege of bail.
[Sidenote: The "treason indictments."]
The Grand Jury found indictments against nine or ten persons, among
them Robinson, Reeder, and Lane, and also against two newspapers
published in Lawrence, and the Emigrant Aid Company's hotel there. The
indictments were put in the hands of the United States Marshal for the
Territory, J. B. Donaldson. On May 11th, Donaldson issued a
proclamation, declaring that the service of these writs by his deputy
had been resisted in Lawrence, and calling "the law-abiding citizens
of the Territory to appear at Lecompton, as soon as possible, and in
numbers sufficient for the proper execution of the law." As a matter
of fact, only Reeder had resisted service, and had succeeded in
escaping. All the others, except Lane and Wood, were taken into
custody without difficulty. Reeder's justification was that he was at
the moment in attendance, as a witness, upon the Congressional
committee sent to the Territory, and was, therefore, legally exempt
from arrest at the time.
{436} [Sidenote: The Marshal's proclamation in Lawrence.]
The Marshal did not publish his proclamation in Lawrence, but a copy
of it fell into the hands of a Lawrence citizen, who hastened to make
known to the people the peril which was impending. The citizens
already knew of forces being organized, both in the Territory and in
Missouri, against Lawrence, and had demanded the Governor's protection
against them. The Governor had replied that he knew of no force near
or approaching Lawrence, except the posse under the orders of the
United States Marshal and the Sheriff of Douglas County, who had writs
to serve in Lawrence, and that he should not interfere.
[Sidenote: The action of the citizens of Lawrence.]
The citizens of Lawrence now held a meeting and passed formal
resolutions, declaring that the charges contained in the Marshal's
proclamation were untrue, and that the citizens were not only ready to
acquiesce in the service of any judicial writs against them by the
United States Marshal, but to furnish him a posse, if required, to aid
him in the discharge of his duty. And after receiving the Governor's
reply, they appealed to the Marshal, asking him to state his demands,
promising not to resist the service of his processes, but to aid him
in the discharge of his legal duties, and praying his protection
against the lawless bands collecting about their town for the purpose
of its destruction.
[Sidenote: The Marshal's reply.]
The Marshal replied in a flippant and sarcastic manner, saying that
his correspondents must be strangers in Lawrence if they were ignorant
of the demands against the citizens of the town, referring in
exaggerated language to the shooting of Jones, and Reeder's resistance
to his deputy, and to the military organization and equipment of the
people of Lawrence, and declaring that he should execute all processes
in his hands in his own time and way.
{437} [Sidenote: Appeal of the citizens to the Marshal and the
Governor.]
Three days later, on May 17th, the citizens communicated again with
the Marshal, calling his attention to the depredations committed by
the bands around Lawrence, asking if he was responsible for these
bodies, and demanding protection from him against them. At the same
time, the managers of the hotel appealed to the Governor to protect
their property, and carried with them an offer from the citizens to
give up their arms to Colonel Sumner, if he would station a detachment
of United States soldiers in the town for their protection.
[Sidenote: The hotel and the printing offices.]
The Marshal and the Governor thought favorably of this proposition.
They were willing to guarantee the safety of the citizens and their
individual property, but they thought they must consult with the
captains of the squads composing the posse before they could give such
assurances in regard to the hotel and the printing offices. These
persons were found to be determined on the destruction of the printing
offices, certainly, and of the hotel, probably. Colonel Titus, of
Florida, declared that the South Carolina boys in the posse would be
satisfied with nothing short of the destruction of the printing
offices.
The hotel managers and the representatives of the citizens turned
again to the Governor and implored him to send the United States
soldiers for the protection of the town, but he again refused to
interfere; and, finally, when they said to him that they feared the
citizens would be compelled to defend themselves by armed power, and
precipitate the horrors of civil war, he answered angrily, while
striding out of their presence: "War then it is, by God!"
[Sidenote: The sacking of Lawrence.]
On the morning of the 21st, the Marshal's armed force appeared upon
one of the heights overlooking the town, displaying first a white
flag, then a red one, and, lastly, {438} the flag of the United
States. The Deputy-marshal then entered the town with a small posse,
and called the managers of the hotel and several of the citizens to
join his posse and assist him in the service of his writs. They
obeyed, and two persons were arrested. The Deputy, with his force and
his prisoners, returned to the camp. Colonel C. W. Topliff, a
prominent citizen, went with them, bearing a communication from the
committee of safety of Lawrence to the Marshal, in which the promise
of obedience to his processes was again made, and his protection
claimed.
It was hoped that the crisis was now passed. The Marshal dismissed his
posse. But the Sheriff immediately reorganized the bands as _his_
posse. This was most ominous of evil. The Sheriff was burning with
passion for personal revenge. In the middle of the afternoon (May
21st), he rode into the town at the head of his army, and, in spite of
every plea and remonstrance, caused the contents of the printing
offices to be scattered through the streets and the hotel to be
burned, and allowed the pillage, and even the burning, of private
houses.
[Sidenote: Repudiation of the deed by Atchison and others.]
The atrocious and disgraceful deed of sacking Lawrence was denounced
by many of the persons who had joined the Marshal's posse. General
Atchison tried to prevent the Sheriff from thus wreaking his
vengeance, and denounced his deed afterward. Jackson, the leader of
the Georgians, and Buford, the captain of the Alabama squad, also
denounced the vile procedure, and declared that they had not come to
Kansas to destroy property.
Atchison knew well enough that a great blow had been given to the
prospects of the Democratic party in the now approaching presidential
election. What, then, must have been his despair upon learning that an
attack, {439} even more outrageous than the sacking of Lawrence, had
been made, at the same time, upon the defender of "Free-state" Kansas
in the Senate chamber at Washington?
[Sidenote: The attack on Senator Sumner.]
The debate on the bills for the admission of "Free-state" Kansas had
progressed from day to day, in both Houses of Congress, with
increasing earnestness and excitement. At length, on May 19th and
20th, Mr. Sumner delivered his fierce philippic on the "Crime against
Kansas." It was not only an unvarnished statement of the case from the
Abolitionist point of view, but it was a personal arraignment of
several of the Senators. The attack contained in it upon Senator
Butler, of South Carolina, a gentleman of great refinement and
politeness, and much honored and esteemed by his associates, was
especially coarse and brutal. Almost all the Senators felt the attack
to be more than a discourtesy. Senator Butler was in ill health and
was absent from his seat, both of which circumstances made the affair
all the more exasperating. For two days the Capital rang with
denunciations of the insulting speech, when Preston S. Brooks, a
nephew of Senator Butler, and a member of the House of
Representatives, demanded and took satisfaction of Mr. Sumner for the
attack upon his kinsman. Had he carried out his purpose in a brave and
manly way, he would have been generally applauded for it, but being no
match physically for Sumner, Brooks had recourse to a method which
stamped him as a coward, and his attack upon Sumner as a brutal
outrage. He entered the Senate chamber on May 22nd, after the
adjournment of the body, and approaching Mr. Sumner, who was seated
and bending over his desk, charged him with libel on South Carolina
and her sons, and struck him with a cane upon the head {440} until the
Senator became helpless and unconscious. With this, Sumner's outrage
upon Butler was entirely lost sight of in Brooks's far more brutal
outrage upon Sumner.
The cowardly deed was looked upon everywhere in the North as the fit
companion-piece to the sacking of Lawrence. The indignation of the
North was roused to the highest pitch, and it seemed as if the
elections of 1856 must bring the anti-slavery party into the seats of
power.
[Sidenote: The Pottawattomie massacres.]
But just at this most critical juncture, when everything depended on
calmness and moderation on the part of the "Free-state" men to secure
immediate victory, and when immediate victory, thus pursued, was, so
far as human eye can discern, within their grasp, an outrage was
perpetrated by a gang of men, or rather fiends, who claimed some sort
of relation to the "Free-state" party, which so far overshadowed in
cruel atrocity all that had gone before as to produce a revulsion of
feeling most damaging to the "Free-state" cause. On May 23rd, John
Brown, with six or seven others, all, except two, members of his own
family, went to the settlement about Dutch Henry's Crossing on the
Pottawattomie Creek, and, on the night of the 24th, took five men,
innocent of anything which could even justify arrest by proper
authorities, from their cabins, and murdered them, cutting and
slashing their bodies with cutlasses, until their savage thirst for
blood was partially satiated. So barbarously atrocious was the deed,
so calculated to rouse the sentiment of the whole country against the
"Free-state" cause in Kansas, that the Republican members of the
Congressional committee of investigation in the Territory refused to
make the event a part of their inquiry. The Democratic member, Mr.
Oliver, investigated it, and reported it to Congress and to the
public.
{441} No sane mind can find the slightest justification, excuse, or
palliation for this atrocious crime. It was murder, pure and simple.
And when we consider the purpose for which, as well as the mind with
which, it was committed, it became, in addition to common crime, also
public crime of the most grievous nature. Dr. Robinson says it was
done for the purpose of involving the North and the South in war
against each other. Thus to the murderous mind was added the seditious
purpose. Some men have professed to find virtue in this noxious
compound, but such minds have lost their moorings, and are roaming
without star or compass over the border lands between reason and
insanity. To murder, Brown and his vile brood added robbery; but this
was so slight a crime in comparison with the other that it may be
passed without further notice.
[Sidenote: The excitement produced by them.]
The inhabitants of the region were thrown into the greatest
consternation and excitement. The pro-slavery and the anti-slavery men
assembled together, denounced the horrible deed as foulest murder, and
resolved to act together as men of reason and common sense for the
maintenance of peace and order and the suppression of crime.
[Sidenote: The battle at Black Jack.]
[Sidenote: The Governor's proclamation, enforced by United States
soldiers.]
For a few days it was not known who the authors of these murders were,
but suspicion soon pointed to Brown and his gang, and steps were taken
to procure warrants for their arrest. The Governor, also, sent down a
body of troops to the scene of the massacre. The troops were
volunteers, chiefly Missourians, commanded by a Captain Pate. Pate's
force met Brown's at Black Jack, and Brown captured Pate and his men.
This was June 2nd. With nothing to hinder him for the moment, Brown
now robbed and pillaged all around. By the 3rd, however, the
Missourians, led by Whitfield, were rallying to the aid of their
pro-slavery friends in {442} Kansas, and by the 5th, battle was
impending between the Missourians and the "Free-state" men, who had
gathered in the neighborhood of the excitement. The Governor had at
last comprehended the serious character of the situation. He issued
his proclamation warning invaders to retire, and commanding armed and
illegal organizations to disperse. And he sent Colonel Sumner with a
company of regular cavalry to the scene of action.
Sumner rescued Pate and his men, dispersed Brown's gang, and ordered
the Missourians to get out of Kansas. He did not arrest Brown, because
he had no warrant for his apprehension, and did not know, at the time,
that he was the author of the Pottawattomie murders. Sumner remained a
fortnight or more in southern Kansas until the excitement was somewhat
spent, and then returned to Fort Leavenworth. Brown disappeared, and a
measure of peace was momentarily restored.
[Sidenote: The "Free-state" cause greatly injured by Brown's deeds.]
[Sidenote: The passage of the bill for the admission of Kansas by the
House.]
The Pottawattomie murders, and the robberies succeeding them, had,
however, greatly damaged the "Free-state" cause. The great advantage
which had accrued to it through the sacking of Lawrence and the
outrage upon Senator Sumner was now largely lost again. Still,
emigration from the Northern Commonwealths to Kansas continued in
great activity, and the House of Representatives at Washington was
steadily advancing toward the passage of the resolution for the
admission of "Free-state" Kansas into the Union, although the flight
of its committee of investigation from the Territory, in consequence
of the excitement following the murders on the Pottawattomie, and the
two reports which its members made of the situation in Kansas,
exercised an unfavorable influence on the movement. The House passed
the bill, {443} however, on July 3rd, by a majority of two votes, but
it would admit neither of the claimants to a seat in the House.
[Sidenote: Dispersal of the "Free-state" legislature by Colonel
Sumner.]
On the other hand, Colonel Sumner, while personally in sympathy with
the "Free-state" cause, felt it to be his official duty to disperse
the "Free-state" legislature which assembled at Topeka on July 4th.
The President and the Secretary of War, Mr. Jefferson Davis,
subsequently disapproved of this act, and denied that the authority
for it was either expressed or implied in any of their instructions to
Colonel Sumner. The Colonel thought the contrary, and felt that the
unpopularity of the procedure throughout the North had caused the
President and the Secretary to disavow a responsibility for it which
was rightfully their own. A careful reading of the dispatches leads to
the conclusion that the Colonel did exceed his powers. He was,
doubtless, led to do so unconsciously by the violent deeds of men
professing connection with the "Free-state" party. The
misunderstanding led finally to the retirement of Colonel Sumner from
the command of the United States forces in Kansas, and the assignment
of General P. F. Smith to that duty.
[Sidenote: The "Free-state" Directory.]
After the dispersion of the "Free-state" legislature, the "Free-state"
men, who were gathered in Lawrence, held a convention, and elected a
committee, whose duty it should be to look after the interests of the
people. This committee selected from among its members a sub-committee
of five, and transferred all of its powers and duties to this
sub-committee. The "Free-state" government had now become a
directorial board of five persons, chief among whom were William
Hutchinson and James Blood. The seat of this Directory was Lawrence.
{444} [Sidenote: The organization of the "Free-state" military.]
The Directory organized a strong military force under the command of
Colonel Walker. This force attacked and broke up three pro-slavery
bands during the month of August, the last one at Fort Titus, near
Lecompton, and commanded by the noted Colonel Titus himself. Titus and
his men were captured.
[Sidenote: The Treaty of August 17th.]
[Sidenote: Resignation of Shannon.]
The Governor now became alarmed for his own safety. Accompanied by
Major Sedgwick, he went to Lawrence, on August 17th, and concluded
with the Directory the noted agreement of that date, the terms of
which were, that the "Free-state" men should keep the arms which they
had captured from the pro-slavery bands; that the howitzer taken from
Lawrence should be returned to the town; that all persons arrested by
the United States Marshal, under charge of participating in the attack
upon the pro-slavery band at Franklin, should be delivered unharmed to
the Directory; that the Governor should disband the Territorial
militia, order all bands of armed men to disperse, and command all
armed bands of nonresidents to leave the Territory. The Directory
engaged, upon its side, to release Titus and his men. The Governor
virtually surrendered to the Directory. He then returned to Lecompton,
resigned his office, and made his way back to Ohio.
[Sidenote: Woodson's proclamation, and the new invasion from
Missouri.]
Secretary Woodson was now again in the Governor's chair, and this, of
itself, was notice to the Missourians to come on. They had already
gathered on the border. On August 25th, Woodson published a
proclamation, in which he declared the Territory to be "in a state of
open insurrection and rebellion," called "upon all law-abiding
citizens of the Territory to rally to the support of their country and
its laws," and commanded "all officers, {445} civil and military, and
all other citizens of the Territory, to aid and assist by all means in
their power in putting down the insurrectionists."
The Missourians took this as an invitation to advance. They entered
the Territory again, on the 29th, and pitched their camp on Bull
Creek. Atchison was in command. On the 13th, a detachment of them
attacked and destroyed Ossawattomie. About a dozen men were killed in
the fight.
[Sidenote: General Smith's attitude toward invaders.]
General Smith now issued instructions that the United States troops
should not "interfere with persons who may have come from a distance
to give protection to their friends or others, and who may be behaving
themselves in a peaceable and lawful manner." This attitude seemed at
first view to be friendly to the pro-slavery men; but the friends of
the "Free-state" men were now pouring into the Territory by way of
Iowa and Nebraska, and Smith's order worked ultimately to their
advantage. Unquestionably the General intended to be impartial.
[Sidenote: Marching and counter-marching.]
The attack on Ossawattomie roused the "Free-state" men to new
exertions. Three hundred of them, commanded by Lane, advanced upon the
camp at Bull Creek. The two forces drew up in battle array, but, after
a slight skirmish, they both drew off.
Acting Governor Woodson now ordered Colonel Cooke to attack Topeka
with United States troops, but the Colonel refused to obey the order,
and General Smith sustained him.
The "Free-state" men now planned an attack upon Lecompton. They moved
in two separate columns, one commanded by Harvey and the other by
Lane. The attack was to be made on September 4th, but the failure of
Lane's column to arrive until the 5th enabled the {446} United States
soldiers to reach the town first. When the "Free-state" men learned
that the regulars were in the town, they returned to Lawrence.
[Sidenote: The failure of "Popular Sovereignty" in the Territories.]
The Missourians were now roused to serious and decided action. An army
of some three thousand of them had gathered on the border, and was on
the point of marching in for the purpose of destroying every
"Free-state" settlement in the Territory. Only one thing could now
save the Territory from thoroughgoing and relentless civil war, and
that was the interference of the United States army. The fiasco of
"popular sovereignty" in the Territories was at last complete. The
general Government must assume control.
[Sidenote: Release of the "treason prisoners," and appointment of
Geary.]
[Sidenote: The new Governor establishes peace by means of the army of
the United States.]
The President's eyes had at last been opened to the fact, that if he
allowed things to drift any farther in Kansas, the Republicans would
win the presidential election in November. He, therefore, resolved to
put the government of the Territory into impartial hands. He ordered
the United States Marshal to release Robinson and his colleagues;
appointed J. W. Geary, of Pennsylvania, a man of strong character,
Governor of the Territory; and authorized Geary to call the United
States troops to his assistance. Geary arrived at Lecompton on
September 10th. On the 12th, he went to Lawrence, and, after promising
the "Free-state" men protection against the Missourians, returned to
Lecompton. On the 14th, the force advancing on Lawrence arrived in the
neighborhood of the town. Word was immediately sent to the Governor.
The Governor summoned a detachment of United States soldiers, and set
out for the scene of action. On the morning of the 15th, he met the
army of Missourians and interposed the United States army between
{447} them and Lawrence. The Governor informed the Missouri leaders
that they must leave the Territory. They dared not put themselves in
an attitude of hostility to the military power of the Union, and
quickly retreated back to Missouri. With this the warfare inaugurated
by the murders on the Pottawattomie ended. The Governor had at last
brought peace to the distracted Territory, but at the expense of the
principle of home rule in the Territory, and upon the point of the
sword of the Union.
[Sidenote: Geary and the Administration.]
The establishment of order in Kansas saved the Democratic party,
according to the general opinion, from the threatened defeat in the
November election, and made Buchanan, instead of Frémont, President.
After the danger was over, the Administration became less hearty in
its support of Geary; and when Geary virtually espoused the
"Free-state" cause, as he did during the winter of 1856-57, the
Administration became largely estranged from him. He resigned in
disgust on the day of Buchanan's inauguration to power.
[Sidenote: The judicial contribution to Kansas history.]
The next contribution to the history of the struggle for Kansas was to
come from an entirely new quarter. The new President indicated, in his
inaugural, whence it was to come, if not what it was to be. He said:
"A difference of opinion has arisen in regard to the point of time
when the people of a Territory shall decide this question"--the
question of slavery--"for themselves. This is, happily, a matter of
but little practical importance. Besides it is a judicial question,
which legitimately belongs to the Supreme Court of the United States,
before whom it is now pending, and will, it is understood, be speedily
and finally settled." The President referred to the Dred Scott case,
which had been twice argued before the {448} Supreme Court, and
decision upon which, it was understood, would be published to the
world in a few days. We must, therefore, break the thread of Kansas
history here for a moment, and trace the history of this case down to
the point where it becomes connected with the further history of the
Territory.
{449}
CHAPTER XXI.
THE DRED SCOTT CASE
The Origin of the Dred Scott Case--Two Dred Scott Cases--The Facts of
the Cases--The Case in the Missouri Courts--The Case in the United
States Courts--The Case a Genuine Proceeding--The Decision by the
Supreme Court of the United States--The Dissenting Opinion of Mr.
Justice Curtis--Criticism of the Court's Opinion--The Obiter
Dictum--The Chief Justice and the President--Justice Curtis' Dissent
Continued--The Printing and Distribution of the Decision and the
Dissenting Opinion--The Doctrine of Popular Sovereignty in the
Territories Overthrown by the Opinion of the Court.
[Sidenote: The origin of the Dred Scott case.]
The time has come when the correct story of the Dred Scott case may be
told, and should be told. The author of this volume has been so
fortunate as to obtain from A. C. Crane, Esq., of St. Louis, an
account of the early history of the case, which is entirely original
and authentic. Mr. Crane was, at the time that the case was brought in
the Circuit Court of the United States, a clerk in the law office of
the great lawyer who espoused Dred Scott's case, and who freely gave
his legal services to the work of securing the negro's freedom,
Roswell M. Field. Mr. Field was a native of Vermont, and a strong
anti-slavery man. He was utterly incapable of any collusion with
slaveholders for the getting up of a case, through which the Supreme
Court of the United States might be brought to support the cause of
slavery in the Territories, the purpose charged by many of the
anti-slavery {450} men of the North for which this case was created.
Mr. Crane most emphatically declares that Mr. Field was influenced to
undertake the case only by humanitarian motives of the highest order.
[Sidenote: Two Dred Scott cases.]
There were, indeed, two Dred Scott cases, one in the courts of
Missouri, and one in the United States courts, but they had no
connection with each other. The case decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States originated in the Circuit Court of the United
States, and did not come up on a writ of error from the Missouri
court.
[Sidenote: The facts of the cases.]
The facts in the two cases were, however, the same. One Dr. Emerson,
the owner of Dred Scott, had taken Dred, as his slave, into Illinois,
a Commonwealth in which slavery was forbidden, and then into the
Louisiana territory above the latitude thirty-six degrees and thirty
minutes, where slavery was prohibited by the Congressional Act of
1820; had allowed Dred to marry in the free territory; had purchased
the woman he married from an army officer at a post within the same;
and had taken Dred back to Missouri, with his wife and a child born to
them on free territory, and held them as slaves in Missouri. Dr.
Emerson's return to Missouri was in 1838. In 1844 the Doctor died,
leaving Dred and his wife and child to Mrs. Emerson. According to the
statement of facts recited by the Chief Justice of the United States,
Dr. Emerson sold Dred and his family to a Mr. Sandford, a citizen of
New York, the defendant in the case before the Supreme Court, but Mr.
Crane says that Dr. Emerson's will, in the Probate Office at St.
Louis, shows that Dred and his family belonged to the Doctor at the
time of the latter's death, and that Dred told him that such was the
case. Mr. Crane also says that Dred told him that, after the Doctor's
death, Mrs. {451} Emerson hired him out to different persons, and that
he became dissatisfied with this treatment, and resolved to sue for
his freedom.
[Sidenote: The case in the Missouri courts.]
This first suit was brought in one of the inferior courts of Missouri,
and was decided in Dred's favor. Mrs. Emerson appealed the case to the
supreme court of Missouri, and two of the three judges upon that bench
held that the condition of slavery reattached to the negro upon his
being brought back into Missouri, and reversed the decision of the
lower court.
While the case in the Missouri courts was in progress Mrs. Emerson
made over the control of the Scotts to a relative of hers, a Mr.
Sandford, then a citizen of New York, who hired them out to residents
of Missouri. It was then, and for this reason, that Dred appealed to
Roswell M. Field for his powerful aid in bringing suit against
Sandford in the Courts of the United States.
[Sidenote: The case in the United States courts.]
The case in the Circuit Court of the United States was begun before
the case in the Missouri court was concluded. The defendant in the
Circuit Court of the United States first pleaded that Dred was not a
citizen of Missouri, and could not be, since he was a negro and
descended from slaves held in the United States, but the court
overruled the plea, that is, decided that Dred Scott could be party in
a suit in the courts of the United States.
The evidence in the case consisted simply of a statement of facts
agreed upon by the two parties. The pleas then put forward by the
defendant in bar of the action were argued, on the basis of this
statement, and the court ordered the jury to find for the defendant.
Judgment was rendered in his favor in the month of April, 1854.
Mr. Field then carried the case to the Supreme Court {452} of the
United States, upon a writ of error, and secured the services of his
friend, the Hon. Montgomery Blair, for the negro. Mr. Blair undertook
the management of the case at Washington, and, like Mr. Field, gave
his time and labor without pecuniary reward. The court costs incurred
by Dred in both cases were paid by Taylor Blow, son of the man who
sold Dred to Doctor Emerson.
[Sidenote: The case a genuine proceeding.]
There is certainly not the slightest evidence in this history of the
case that the case was anything but a genuine proceeding from
beginning to end, conducted by anti-slavery men, for the purpose of
securing the freedom of an intelligent and worthy African, who had
been taken voluntarily by his master upon free soil, and had thus been
made, by the principles of the common law, a free man.
[Sidenote: The decision by the Supreme Court of the United States.]
The case was argued twice with great learning before the Supreme
Court, and the decision finally reached was virtually acquiesced in by
seven of the nine Justices, although Justice Nelson did not give his
assent to any part of the opinion except that which decided that, on
the return of Dred to Missouri with his master, any effect upon his
slavery, which the taking of him into Illinois and the Louisiana
territory above the latitude thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes
might have had, disappeared. This seemed to Justice Nelson sufficient
to the decision of the case, and he was unwilling to go farther, but
some of his brethren, especially Justice Wayne, thought that the
entire record of the case in the Circuit Court was brought up for
examination by the Supreme Court, and that the Supreme Court ought to
decide every point contained in the record. Justice Nelson had been,
at first, selected by his colleagues to write the opinion, and it is
thought that this attitude of his was what moved the Chief Justice to
write the opinion himself.
{453} Justice Catron also thought that there was nothing before the
Supreme Court but the question whether, after the return of the Scotts
to Missouri, their temporary sojourn on free territory could be held
to have worked their emancipation. Justice Catron presided at the
trial in the Circuit Court and ruled, as we have seen, in favor of
Dred Scott on the point of his having a standing in the United States
Courts, and the Justice thought that Scott could not bring up to the
Supreme Court, on a writ of error, a point decided in his favor in the
court below.
The Chief Justice, Mr. Taney, held that there were two leading
questions presented by the record from the Circuit Court. The first
was the question whether the Circuit Court had jurisdiction over the
case, and the second was whether the judgment it gave was correct or
erroneous.
The Chief Justice was right in holding that the writ of error brought
up the entire record for examination by the Supreme Court, but it was
not necessary that the Supreme Court should include every point of the
record in its decision. And he was certainly wrong when he extended,
as is now generally conceded he did, the opinion of the court beyond
the points in the record of the case in the Circuit Court. The form of
the judgment pronounced by the Chief Justice as the opinion of the
Court, that is, of the majority of the Justices, was that the Circuit
Court did not have jurisdiction of the case, since the Scotts were not
citizens of Missouri, in the meaning of the Constitution of the United
States, and that the judgment of the Circuit Court for the defendant
must, therefore, be set aside, and a mandate be issued, directing the
suit to be dismissed by the Circuit Court for want of jurisdiction.
The Chief Justice undertook to sustain his opinion by a long argument,
{454} the principal propositions of which were, that negroes descended
from negro slaves held in this country were not citizens in any of the
"States" of the Union at the time of the formation of the Constitution
of 1787; that by that Constitution the "States" transferred all power
to make new classes of persons citizens to the Congress of the United
States, and limited the power of Congress in this respect to the
naturalization of persons born outside of the dominion of the United
States; and that, consequently, negroes born of negro slave parents in
the United States were not only not citizens of any of the "States" at
the time of the formation of the Constitution of 1787, but could not
be made such, either by the "States" or by Congress, subsequent to the
adoption of that Constitution.
[Sidenote: The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Curtis.]
In his powerful dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Curtis demolished this
argument completely, by simply showing from the statute books and the
judicial decisions of several of the "States" that, at the time of the
formation of the Constitution of 1787, negroes descended from
Africans, who had been held as slaves in the country, were citizens,
even to the point of possessing the suffrage, in several of the
"States" of the Union. The great argument of the Chief Justice turned
out to be only a political essay, without fact, law, or jurisprudence
to sustain it. Mr. Justice Curtis, therefore, held that, as nothing
against Dred Scott's citizenship had been alleged by the defendant in
the Circuit Court, except that he was a negro, and descended from
negroes who had been held as slaves in this country, the jurisdiction
assumed by the Circuit Court ought to be sustained by the Supreme
Court.
[Sidenote: Criticism of the Court's opinion.]
But if the opinion of the Court should be accepted as correct upon
this point, it is difficult to see why the opinion should not have
ended with the decision upon {455} this point. Nothing further was
necessary in the determination of the case. And it is certainly most
difficult to see what connection the Act of 1820, prohibiting slavery
in the Louisiana territory, north of the latitude thirty-six degrees
and thirty minutes, had with the case. No decision upon that point was
rendered by the Circuit Court, whose record the Supreme Court was
reviewing.
If the Supreme Court had confirmed the jurisdiction of the Circuit
Court in the case, and had then ruled that the Circuit Court was in
error in holding that slavery reattached to the Scotts by Missouri
law, upon their return to Missouri, even if they had been made free by
their temporary sojourn upon free soil, probably the Supreme Court
should have decided the question as to what effect that sojourn may
have had, and, in this way, included the question of the
constitutionality of the slavery prohibition clause in the Act of
1820. But the majority of the Supreme Court approved the view of the
Circuit Court upon this point.
There is little doubt that the majority of the Justices thought that a
declaration from the Supreme Court in regard to the mooted question of
slavery in the Territories would aid in bringing quiet to the country,
and that they had persuaded themselves that it was necessary to the
decision of the point in issue. But they were certainly in error, as
to the first consideration, and it is difficult to see that they were
not as to the second.
[Sidenote: The obiter dictum.]
The Chief Justice advanced to his conclusion in this part of the
opinion through a most labored argument. He started with the dictum
that there was no clause in the Constitution which gave Congress any
power over territory acquired subsequently to the adoption of the
Constitution, interpreting the provision which vests in Congress "the
power to make {456} all needful rules and regulations concerning the
territory and other property of the United States," as applying only
to territory held by the United States at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution. He then founded the power to govern the territory
subsequently acquired upon the right to acquire territory; and
declared that in governing such territory, or providing for its
government, Congress was limited by all those provisions of the
Constitution which protect private rights against governmental power.
He claimed, finally, that that one of these provisions which ordains
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law protected property in slaves, taken into the
Territories by their masters, against both the power of Congress and
of the agents of Congress in the Territories, the Territorial
governments, to free them. The conclusion from this reasoning was that
anybody could take slaves into a Territory of the United States, and
hold them there in slavery, no matter what might be the disposition of
Congress or of the Territorial government in regard to the subject,
and that the question whether slavery was to be permanently
established in a Territory or not could not be determined until the
Territory should become a "State," and then only by an act of the
"State."
[Sidenote: The Chief Justice and the President.]
This was the point which the Kansas-Nebraska Act had not covered, and
which the President said, in his inaugural address, would be decided
in the forthcoming opinion on the Dred Scott case. The opinion was
pronounced several days after the inaugural, and it was later charged
by Mr. Seward, and intimated by Mr. Lincoln, and believed by a large
number of persons, that the Chief Justice imparted the opinion of the
Court to the President before it was pronounced. But this point,
though {457} not necessarily involved in the case, had been argued by
counsel, and the newspapers had declared that it would be decided, and
both Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Taney were men of the highest personal and
official integrity, and possessed the most delicate sense of the
requirements and proprieties of the great stations which they
occupied. It is almost certain that the charge was an unfounded
suspicion. The prevalence of the suspicion was, however, an ominous
sign of the danger impending over the land.
[Sidenote: Justice Curtis's dissent continued.]
Justice Curtis found no more difficulty in controverting these
propositions than those upon the first point treated in the opinion of
the Chief Justice. He first referred to the undoubted facts that not
all the territory claimed by the several "States" had been ceded to
the United States at the time that the Constitution of 1787 was
adopted, but that it was expected that what remained would soon be so
ceded, and that therefore the clause vesting in Congress "the power to
make all needful rules and regulations concerning the territory of the
United States" must have been framed with these future acquisitions in
view, and intended to apply to them also. He then demanded to know
why, if the Court could derive the power of Congress to govern
territory acquired from foreign states from a right which is not
expressed in the Constitution, but is itself implied, the right to
acquire, should it hesitate to derive it from a power in respect to
the territory of the United States which is expressed in the
Constitution. He contended that until Congress or the Territorial
legislature had legalized slavery in a Territory, no one could be said
to be deprived of his property in slaves in the given Territory,
either by a Congressional act forbidding the existence of such
property, or by the failure of Congress or the Territorial {458}
legislature to enact laws for the security of such property. He
repudiated the idea that a holder of slaves could take the law of the
place from which he emigrated, securing such property, into a
Territory with him as a monstrosity in jurisprudence, since it would
introduce into a given Territory as many slave codes as there were
slaveholding Commonwealths represented therein by their slaveholding
emigrants, and he indicated, finally, that the reasoning of the Court
must reach ultimately the proposition that Congress was required by
the Constitution to establish slavery in every Territory of the Union,
and consequently to make every new "State" a slaveholding "State."
[Sidenote: The printing and distribution of the decision and the
dissenting opinion.]
[Sidenote: The doctrine of popular sovereignty in the Territories
overthrown by the opinion of the Court.]
The slaveholders and the Douglas Democrats of the North were in high
glee over the decision, and hardly stopped to read the powerful
dissenting opinion which had shattered it to atoms. They caused
thousands upon thousands of copies of the decision to be printed and
distributed among the masses of the people. The Free-soilers did the
same thing with the opinion of Justice Curtis. It was not many weeks
before it became entirely manifest that the cause of slavery had lost
immensely by the decision, and the cause of free-soilism had gained in
the same degree. Justice Curtis had demonstrated that the decision had
cast the responsibility for the further extension of slavery upon the
nation, and the nation now began to show its resolution to meet its
responsibility by acquitting itself of any participation in this great
wrong, in the only manner now left to it, that is, by preventing it.
The nation could no longer deceive itself with the idea that it could
stand neutral. The Court had actually swept away the dogma of "popular
sovereignty" in the Territories. The nation must now {459} neither
prohibit, nor allow the Territorial governments to prohibit, slavery
within the Territories, as the decision would have it, or the nation
must itself prohibit it, as the dissenting opinion would have it. When
these alternatives were distinctly recognized as necessary and
exhaustive, it did not take the nation long to decide which course it
must pursue.
{460}
CHAPTER XXII.
THE STRUGGLE FOR KANSAS CONCLUDED
The Lecompton Convention Ordered--Robert J. Walker and F. P.
Stanton--Stanton and the "Free-state" Men--Walker's Address--The
"Free-State" Legislature and Mass-meeting--The Plan to Capture the
Territorial Legislature by the "Free-state" Men--The "Free-state" Men
in Majority in the Territorial Legislature--The Lecompton
Convention--The Lecompton Constitution--Only the Slavery Article to be
Submitted Fully to the People--Protest of the "Free-state" Men--The
Extra Session of the New Territorial Legislature--Stanton
Removed--Lecompton Constitution With Slavery Adopted--The "Free-state"
Men Capture the Lecompton Government and Reject the Lecompton
Constitution--Denver Advises the President Against the Admission of
Kansas Under the Lecompton Instrument--The President's Message of
February 2nd (1858)--The Passage of the Lecompton Bill by the
Senate--The Rejection of the Bill by the House--The English Bill--The
Rejection of the Lecompton Constitution by the People of Kansas--A
Fourth Government for Kansas--The Struggle for Kansas Closed--Dr.
Robinson--The General Government--Mr. Jefferson Davis--The Beginning
of Error and Wrong--Brown's Atrocities--The Forerunners of War.
According to the dictum of the Court in the great case reviewed in the
preceding chapter, slave property was lawful in Kansas during the
Territorial period, and could be first dealt with by the
constitutional convention, which should prepare the organic law for
Kansas as a Commonwealth of the Union.
{461} [Sidenote: The Lecompton convention ordered.]
Already before the promulgation of the decision, the Territorial
legislature had provided for the holding of the constitutional
convention at Lecompton, and for the election of the delegates
thereto. This election was appointed for June 15th, 1857.
It was certain that the "Free-State" men now outnumbered the
pro-slavery men, and that upon a fair census, registration, and
distribution of seats, and with a fair election and count, they would
be able to secure the majority in the convention. But could they
consistently participate in an election ordered by, and under the
control of, the Territorial government? Many of them felt that they
could not. Others, however, were inclined to do so, if the regulations
were impartial. They examined the provisions made by the Territorial
legislature for the machinery of the registration and the election,
and found that they were grossly favorable to the pro-slavery party.
They also found that the legislature had made no provision for
submitting the constitution which might be framed to the vote of the
people.
[Sidenote: Robert J. Walker, and F. P. Stanton.]
While the "Free-state" men were deliberating upon this matter, the new
Territorial officials appointed by the new President appeared.
President Buchanan had selected Robert J. Walker, of Mississippi, to
be Governor, and F. P. Stanton, of Tennessee, to be Secretary, of the
Territory. Both of these men were capable, honest, and resolute.
Walker was a shrewd politician, indeed, but he was fair-minded and
faithful to his plighted word. Stanton arrived on the scene about the
middle of April. Walker came a month later. Stanton, therefore, was
Acting Governor during the first month of his residence in the
Territory.
[Sidenote: Stanton and the "Free-state" men.]
Stanton went to Lawrence, on the 24th, and urged the {462}
"Free-state" men to take part in the approaching election. He had,
however, already apportioned the representation in the convention on
the basis of the existing census. It was evident that he was unaware
that this was unjust to the "Free-state" men. Seeing this, the
"Free-state" men made a counter proposition for a new census and
apportionment, and for an impartial control of the elections. Stanton
did not think he had the power to conclude an agreement with them on
this basis, and the negotiations fell through.
[Sidenote: Walker's address.]
The new Governor now arrived, and bent all his energies to induce the
"Free-state" men to participate in the election. He issued an address,
in which he solemnly declared that he would secure honest elections
and returns, and pledged himself that the constitution, which the
convention might form, should be submitted to the people for
ratification or rejection. He also threatened that he would enforce
the laws of the Territory. His idea seems to have been to create an
Administration party, which would win a majority of the seats in the
convention and make Kansas a Democratic non-slaveholding Commonwealth.
The pro-slavery men discovered the plan at once, and accused the
Governor of leaning toward the "Free-state" party.
[Sidenote: The "Free-state" legislature and mass-meeting.]
The "Free-state" men were not yet, however, ready to trust the
Governor. They thought it wisest to maintain their own organization,
and make the Governor feel their power. On June 9th the "Free-state"
legislature assembled, to provide for the election of successors to
the existing members and officials. Along with it was convoked a sort
of mass-meeting of citizens. The legislature was at first without a
quorum, and never had an honest quorum. {463} This fact was sedulously
concealed from the Governor, while the orators at the mass-meeting
raised enough dust and smoke to cover up the real condition of
affairs. They made the place fairly blue with their bluster and their
threats, and the little Governor was greatly impressed by the apparent
seriousness of the situation.
[Sidenote: The plan to capture the Territorial legislature by the
"Free-state" men.]
By this time, however, the "Free-state" men had become considerably
discouraged in regard to the admission of Kansas into the Union under
the Topeka constitution. The Senate had given the application the cold
shoulder, and had, apparently, laid it aside permanently. The
prevarications of Lane were said to have produced this result. As
matters now stood, Robinson and the more conservative men of the
"Free-state" party began to consider the advisability of attempting to
capture the Territorial legislature, by participating in the election
of members, which was to take place in the following October. They
felt certain that upon a true census and a fair apportionment, and
with an honest election, they could win a majority of the seats in the
legislature, and would then be in a position to nullify the work of
the Lecompton convention, which, on account of the abstention of the
"Free-state" men from the election of the delegates, would be packed
with pro-slavery representatives.
The matter of first importance was to obtain a true census. Senator
Wilson, of Massachusetts, was at the moment in Lawrence, conferring
with Robinson and his friends concerning the state of affairs, and he
strongly advised these gentlemen to take a correct census under the
auspices of the "Free-state" government, and to nominate candidates
for seats in the Territorial legislature, and elect them. He felt so
decidedly about the matter that he offered to secure the funds
necessary to defray the expenses of taking the new census.
{464} Robinson and his friends were now convinced that this was the
wise course, but they knew that it would be difficult to persuade the
radical elements in their party to go with them. The mass-meeting at
Topeka of June 9th had voted to stick to the "Free-state" government,
and a convention of the "Free-state" men had assembled on July 15th to
provide for its continuance. This convention, after nominating
candidates for the legislative seats and for the offices, and
resolving to adhere to the "Free-state" government, recommended the
people to assemble in mass convention, at Grasshopper Falls, on the
26th of the following August, to take action in regard to the
participation of the "Free-state" men in the October election of
members of the Territorial legislature, since Governor Walker had
declared that this election would be held under the laws of Congress,
and not under the acts of the Territorial legislature, and had pledged
himself to secure an honest election. It was evident from this that
the conservative element in the "Free-state" party had won the day.
Before the day appointed for the Grasshopper Falls convention had
arrived, the new census had been completed under the direction of the
"Free-state" government, and it was morally certain that the
"Free-state" men could elect a majority of the members of the new
Territorial legislature. When the convention assembled, it therefore
resolved, by a large majority, that the "Free-state" men should
participate in the October election, warning the people, however, of
the seriousness of the undertaking, and cautioning them against
over-confidence in success.
The Lecompton convention assembled on the seventh day of September,
and, after organizing, adjourned to October 19th, as if to await the
result of the election of the members of the Territorial legislature.
{465} [Sidenote: The "Free-state" men in majority in the Territorial
legislature.]
This election came off on October 5th. The Governor remained true to
his pledge of protecting the ballot-box. The presence of United States
soldiers discouraged any movements from Missouri, and peace reigned at
the polls. The returns from the counties of McGee and Johnson were,
however, so manipulated by the pro-slavery election officers as to
give the majority of the seats in the legislature to the pro-slavery
party. These returns, as well as those from the other counties, were,
however, to be canvassed finally by the Governor and Secretary. The
"Free-state" men now demanded of them the fulfilment of their pledge
of pure elections. The "Free-state" men had their newly taken census,
and they convinced the Governor and Secretary that about ten times as
many votes had been returned from these localities as there were
residents in them. Walker and Stanton threw out the fraudulent
returns, and gave, thus, the Territorial legislature to the
"Free-state" men.
[Sidenote: The Lecompton convention.]
Two days before the Governor announced his intention of purging the
returns of the frauds committed by the pro-slavery men in regard to
them, and while the excitement about them was intense, it was suddenly
discovered by the conservative "Free-state" men that Lane was working
up a conspiracy for using violence against the members of the
Lecompton convention. He, as commander-in-chief, had ordered the
"Free-state" forces to assemble in Lawrence on October 19th for that
purpose. The conservative men at once set themselves against this
movement, and after a serious struggle happily won the day. They
appointed a mass-meeting of the party at Lecompton for the following
week, as much to protect the members of the convention against any
sudden attack by {466} Lane and his reckless adherents as to watch
their constitution-framing work. Before the meeting took place the
Governor had announced the rejection of the fraudulent returns, and
had thus deprived the "Free-state" men of all excuse for violence.
Some boisterous speeches were, nevertheless, indulged in at the
meeting, but the convention was allowed to complete its work in peace.
[Sidenote: The Lecompton constitution.]
[Sidenote: Only the Slavery article to be submitted fully to the
people.]
The convention framed an instrument after the Missouri model, and
incorporated in it an article guaranteeing the property in slaves
already within the Territory. The convention then framed an
independent provision in regard to slavery as a permanent institution
of the new Commonwealth. This provision alone was to be fully
submitted to the vote of the people. The people must take the
Lecompton constitution with slavery as a permanent institution, or the
Lecompton constitution without slavery as a permanent institution but
containing a guarantee of the slave property already in the Territory.
The day appointed by the convention for the voters to signify their
approval or disapproval of the provision in regard to slavery as a
permanent institution was December 21st, 1857, and the day designated
for the election of members and officers under the new constitution
was January 4th following.
[Sidenote: Protest of the "Free-state" men.]
The "Free-state" men regarded this submission of only a single article
of the constitution to popular vote as a fraud upon the principle of
"popular sovereignty," and demanded of Stanton, who was then
discharging the Governor's duties, in the temporary absence of the
latter, that the Governor's pledge as to the full submission of the
proposed constitution to the people at the polls should be redeemed.
Stanton bravely resolved to keep the Governor's word of {467} honor,
although he believed it would cost him his position.
[Sidenote: The extra session of the new Territorial legislature.]
What the "Free-state" men asked of him was to convene at once the new
Territorial legislature, in which the "Free-state" men now had a
majority of the seats, for the purpose of giving it the opportunity to
order the full submission of the Lecompton constitution to the
suffrages of the people. Stanton yielded to their request, and called
the legislature to meet at Lecompton on December 7th. This body at
once resolved to submit the proposed constitution fully and in all its
parts to the people, to be adopted or rejected by them at their
pleasure, and appointed the 4th day of the following January as the
time for taking the vote.
[Sidenote: Stanton removed.]
Stanton was immediately removed from office by the Administration, and
General John W. Denver, of Virginia, at the moment Indian
Commissioner, was assigned to the duties of Acting Governor in the
Territory.
[Sidenote: Lecompton constitution with slavery adopted.]
The "Free-state" men resolved to take no part in voting upon the
slavery article of the Lecompton constitution, since they must take
this constitution either with or without slavery as a permanent
institution, and could not vote against the constitution as a whole.
Consequently the Lecompton constitution with slavery as a permanent
institution was, so far as the returns of the voting on December 21st
were concerned, adopted. According to these returns six thousand two
hundred and sixty-six votes were cast for it. Of these, nearly three
thousand were afterward shown to be fraudulent. Between five and six
hundred votes were cast for this constitution without slavery as a
permanent institution. None were counted against it _in toto_. That is
to say, out of a {468} voting population of about fifteen thousand,
less than four thousand were in favor of this constitution in either
form.
The more prudent of the "Free-state" men now thought, however, that it
would be wise to participate in the election of members and officers
of the Lecompton "State" government on the day fixed by the Lecompton
constitution, January 4th, 1858. They were to vote fully at that time,
as we have seen, upon the Lecompton constitution, by order of the
Territorial legislature, now in their hands. They felt certain of
defeating the constitution, and they knew that they could win in the
election of the officers and members. They nominated a ticket with G.
W. Smith at its head, as their candidate for Governor.
[Sidenote: The "Free-state" men capture the Lecompton government and
reject the Lecompton constitution.]
On January 4th, more than ten thousand votes were cast against the
Lecompton constitution entire, and only about one hundred and fifty
votes were cast in its favor. The "Free-state" men also elected their
candidates for the offices and seats in the government created by the
Lecompton constitution.
The "Free-state" men now had possession of the Topeka "Free-state"
government, of the Territorial legislature, and of the Lecompton
"State" government, and had rejected the Lecompton constitution by an
undoubted majority of the suffrages of the citizens of Kansas.
[Illustration: NEBRASKA & KANSAS, 1854-61.]
[Sidenote: Denver advises the President against the admission of
Kansas under the Lecompton instrument.]
As yet the Lecompton constitution had not been presented by the
President to Congress, and Acting Governor Denver hastened to give him
a truthful statement of the condition of affairs in the Territory, and
to urge him not to recommend to Congress the admission of Kansas under
this constitution, but to suggest to that body the passage simply of
an enabling {469} act, under which the people of Kansas might begin
again the work of forming a Commonwealth constitution.
[Sidenote: The President's message of February 2nd (1858).]
But the President did not heed this wise warning. On February 2nd,
1858, he sent the Lecompton constitution, with the provision making
slavery a permanent institution in Kansas, to Congress, and
recommended the admission of the distracted Territory into the Union,
as a "State," under it. His line of argument was that every step in
the procedure of framing and adopting this constitution had been
regularly and legally taken, and that all the voters could have
participated in the work if they had chosen to do so. He claimed that
the act of the Territorial legislature, after it came under the
control of the "Free-state" men, in ordering another vote, and a
different sort of vote, upon the constitution, than and from that
appointed and required by the convention, was irregular; and he
undertook to comfort the "Free-state" men with the suggestion that,
Kansas once admitted, they could change its constitution to suit
themselves, if they were really in majority.
[Sidenote: The passage of the Lecompton bill by the Senate.]
The President's argument carried the Senate with him despite the
powerful opposition of Mr. Douglas, who bravely antagonized the
Administration, and held firmly that his great principle of "popular
sovereignty" required the unreserved submission of every part of the
constitution to the free suffrages of the people, in order to
establish its validity. He declared that unless this should be done
Congress could not know whether the people of Kansas had made a
constitution or not, and that without that knowledge the admission of
Kansas under the constitution before the Senate was tantamount to
making a {470} constitution for Kansas by Congressional act. The
honest and manly stand taken by Mr. Douglas upon this great subject
certainly presents him in the rôle of a patriotic statesman, rather
than in his usual character of the shrewd politician.
[Sidenote: The rejection of the bill by the House.]
The Senate passed the Lecompton bill on March 23rd, 1858, by a
substantial majority, but the House promptly rejected it. The House
passed a measure, instead, for referring the Lecompton constitution
back to the people of Kansas, who should vote freely upon it in all
its parts, and for admitting Kansas, without further Congressional
action, under this constitution, if it should receive the popular
ratification; but the Senate rejected this substitute for its bill.
[Sidenote: The English bill.]
The matter was then sent to a conference committee of the two Houses.
After long deliberation a measure was matured by this committee which
appeared to deal with a subsidiary question only, but which, by some
sort of an understanding, was held to give the people of Kansas the
chance to reject the Lecompton constitution _in toto_ at the polls.
The measure is known as the English bill from its projector, Mr. W. H.
English, a member of the conference committee from the House of
Representatives. It provided for a reduction of the land grants from
twenty-three millions of acres, asked for by Kansas under the
Lecompton constitution, to about four millions of acres, and proposed
the submission of this change to a vote of the people of Kansas. If
the people adopted the change, they would be considered as having
adopted the Lecompton constitution _in toto_. If, on the other hand,
they rejected this change, they would be considered as having rejected
this constitution _in toto_.
{471} [Sidenote: The rejection of the Lecompton constitution by the
people of Kansas.]
The English bill was agreed to by both Houses; and on August 2nd,
1858, the people of Kansas voted upon the measure. They rejected it,
and with it the Lecompton constitution, by a vote of more than eleven
thousand in a total vote of about thirteen thousand.
[Sidenote: A fourth government for Kansas.]
In the meantime, fearing that Congress might pass the bill for
admitting Kansas under the Lecompton constitution, the Territorial
legislature, now in the hands of the "Free-state" men, passed a bill
ordering a new constitutional convention. The bill was passed within a
few days of the end of the session, and Governor Denver, thinking that
Kansas had about enough governments already, pocketed the measure. The
convention was, however, held, and a constitution was framed and
submitted to the people which received some three thousand votes in
favor of its adoption, while none were cast against it. Officers were
chosen under it, and thus a fourth government for Kansas was created.
All of these governments were now, however, in the hands of the
conservative men of the "Free-state" party.
[Sidenote: The struggle for Kansas closed.]
[Sidenote: Dr. Robinson.]
With the rejection of the Lecompton constitution by the people of
Kansas, on August 2nd, the struggle for Kansas was closed. It was to
be a non-slaveholding Commonwealth and a Republican Commonwealth. The
record of this struggle is certainly one of the most remarkable
chapters in the history of the United States. There is much to admire
in it, much to be ashamed of, and much to be repudiated as foul and
devilish. The prudence, moderation, tact, and bravery of Dr. Robinson
and his friends have rarely been excelled by the statesmen and
diplomatists of the New World or of the Old. They were placed in a
most trying situation {472} both by their foes and by those who,
professing to be their friends, endangered the cause more by violent
and brutal deeds than did their open enemies. Their triumph over all
these difficulties is a marvel of shrewd, honest, and conservative
management, which may well serve as one of the best object-lessons of
our history for succeeding generations.
[Sidenote: The general Government.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Jefferson Davis.]
The attitude of the general Government was also honorable and
praiseworthy. It did its best to hold the balance even and impartial
between the contending forces. It sent out intelligent, honest, and
resolute men as Governors; and it used the army to maintain the peace,
and protect person and property from violence. Even President Pierce's
Secretary of War, Mr. Jefferson Davis, who was considered the very
high-priest of the slavery interest, sent a military commander,
Colonel E. V. Sumner, to Kansas, whom he knew to be in sympathy with
Free-soil principles, and instructed him only to do what was just
between all parties; and when Colonel Sumner, fearing that, from
personal sympathy with the cause of the "Free-state" men, he might
unconsciously act too favorably toward them, really went farther than
his duty required against them, in dispersing their legislature, Mr.
Davis expressed the opinion that the United States forces ought not to
have interfered with the "Free-state" government until it had
undertaken to execute some of its measures. It was said at the time
that Mr. Davis' quasi disavowal of Colonel Sumner's act was caused by
its unpopularity throughout the North; but Mr. Davis was not to any
such degree sensitive to Northern opinion. Personally and officially
Mr. Davis was a remarkably upright man, and was accustomed to take
counsel chiefly of his own judgment and conscience, and to disturb
himself very little about the views of {473} others concerning his
duties and acts. Governor Robinson has recently testified to the
impartial attitude of the military power of the United States in
Kansas, and has declared that "had it not been for the officers of the
United States army, the 'Free-state' struggle would have ended in
disaster on more than one occasion."
[Sidenote: The beginning of error and wrong.]
[Sidenote: Brown's atrocities.]
Error began, unquestionably, with the repeal of the Act prohibiting
slavery in the Louisiana territory above thirty-six degrees and thirty
minutes north latitude, and wrong began, just as unquestionably, with
the incursion of the Missourians, and their fraudulent voting at the
Territorial election in March of 1855. A bogus legislature was thus
thrust upon Kansas Territory at the outset. It was a political outrage
of the first degree, and it would have justified rebellion against the
execution of the enactments of this body. But it does not excuse, or
even palliate, the criminal atrocities inaugurated by John Brown at
Dutch Henry's Crossing, and the wild reign of murder and robbery which
followed in their train. All this was common crime of the blackest and
most villainous sort, and the men who engaged in it were cutthroats
and highwaymen, who took advantage of the confusion in Kansas to
prosecute their nefarious work.
It is often said that the Civil War began in Kansas, and simply spread
from there over the country. It is true that violence began there, and
in its degeneration into savagery developed those devilish
dispositions that carried murder and robbery into Virginia, and
thereby helped mightily to create that intensely hostile feeling
between the North and the South which resulted in Civil War, but we
affront good morals and common sense when we dignify those Kansas
atrocities by the title of war; and we obliterate moral distinctions
when {474} we attempt to justify them by the end which their authors
professed to have in view, the extermination of African slavery
throughout the country. Such deeds are not means to anything except
the establishment of the reign of hell on earth, and the maudlin
adoration sometimes accorded their doers is evidence of an unbalanced
moral sense. It is a source of congratulation that the juristic sense
of the last decades of the nineteenth century refuses to place the
crank who kills or robs for what he considers, or professes to
consider, the welfare of society under any other class than that of
the most dangerous criminals. It remains for the ethical sense of the
twentieth century to sweep the hero-worship too often accorded such
characters out of the world's literature.
* * * * * * *
[Sidenote: The forerunners of war.]
But if the murders, and robberies, and arson committed in Kansas were
not war, they were the forerunners of war. The last expedient which
the minds of men could invent for putting the slavery question in the
position of a purely local matter had been tried, and had utterly and
miserably failed. The nation must now settle the question, by
peaceable means if it could, but if it could not, then by force. The
record of its attempts, first upon the one line, and then upon the
other, will be the chief subject of the next and last volume of this
series.
APPENDIX I.
THE ELECTORAL VOTE IN DETAIL, 1820-1856.
ELECTORAL VOTE IN 1820.
PRESIDENT.
| James | John Quincy
| Monroe, | Adams,
| of | of
STATES. | Virginia. | Massachusetts.
--------------+-----------+---------------
Alabama | 3 | ..
Connecticut | 9 | ..
Delaware | 4 | ..
Georgia | 8 | ..
Illinois | 3 | ..
Indiana | 3 | ..
Kentucky | 12 | ..
Louisiana | 3 | ..
Maine | 9 | ..
Maryland | 11 | ..
Massachusetts | 15 | ..
Mississippi | 2 | ..
Missouri[1] | 3 | ..
New Hampshire | 7 | 1
New Jersey | 8 | ..
New York | 29 | ..
North Carolina| 15 | ..
Ohio | 8 | ..
Pennsylvania | 24 | ..
Rhode Island | 4 | ..
South Carolina| 11 | ..
Tennessee | 7 | ..
Vermont | 8 | ..
Virginia | 25 | ..
--------------+-----------+---------------
Total | 231 | 1
VICE-PRESIDENT.
| Daniel D. | Richard | Daniel | Richard | Robert G.
| Tompkins, | Stockton, | Rodney, | Rush, | Harper,
| of | of | of | of | of
STATES. | New York. | New | Dela- | Pennsyl- | Maryland.
| | Jersey. | ware. | vania. |
--------------+-----------+-----------+---------+----------+----------
Alabama | 3 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Connecticut | 9 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Delaware | .. | .. | 4 | .. | ..
Georgia | 8 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Illinois | 3 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Indiana | 3 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Kentucky | 12 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Louisiana | 3 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Maine | 9 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Maryland | 10 | .. | .. | .. | 1
Massachusetts | 7 | 8 | .. | .. | ..
Mississippi | 2 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Missouri[1] | 3 | .. | .. | .. | ..
New Hampshire | 7 | .. | .. | 1 | ..
New Jersey | 8 | .. | .. | .. | ..
New York | 29 | .. | .. | .. | ..
North Carolina| 15 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Ohio | 8 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Pennsylvania | 24 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Rhode Island | 4 | .. | .. | .. | ..
South Carolina| 11 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Tennessee | 7 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Vermont | 8 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Virginia | 25 | .. | .. | .. | ..
--------------+-----------+-----------+---------+----------+----------
Total | 218 | 8 | 4 | 1 | 1
[Footnote 1: Missouri was not formally admitted as a state until
August, 1821.]
ELECTORAL VOTE IN 1824.
PRESIDENT.
| Andrew | John Quincy | William H. | Henry
| Jackson, | Adams, | Crawford, | Clay,
| of | of | of | of
STATES. | Tennessee. | Massachu- | Georgia. | Kentucky.
| | setts. | |
--------------+------------+-------------+------------+----------
Alabama | 5 | .. | .. | ..
Connecticut | .. | 8 | .. | ..
Delaware | .. | 1 | 2 | ..
Georgia | .. | .. | 9 | ..
Illinois | 2 | 1 | .. | ..
Indiana | 5 | .. | .. | ..
Kentucky | .. | .. | .. | 14
Louisiana | 3 | 2 | .. | ..
Maine | .. | 9 | .. | ..
Maryland | 7 | 3 | 1 | ..
Massachusetts | .. | 15 | .. | ..
Mississippi | 3 | .. | .. | ..
Missouri | .. | .. | .. | 3
New Hampshire | .. | 8 | .. | ..
New Jersey | 8 | .. | .. | ..
New York | 1 | 26 | 5 | 4
North Carolina| 15 | .. | .. | ..
Ohio | .. | .. | .. | 16
Pennsylvania | 28 | .. | .. | ..
Rhode Island | .. | 4 | .. | ..
South Carolina| 11 | .. | .. | ..
Tennessee | 11 | .. | .. | ..
Vermont | .. | 7 | .. | ..
Virginia | .. | .. | 24 | ..
--------------+------------+-------------+------------+----------
Total | 99[2] | 84 | 41 | 37
[Footnote 2: Since no President was elected, the House of
Representatives proceeded to elect one, and John Quincy Adams was
chosen on the first ballot, the vote standing Adams, 13 States;
Jackson, 7 States; Crawford, 4 States.]
VICE-PRESIDENT.
| John C. | Nathan | Henry | Andrew | Martin
| Calhoun, | Sanford, | Clay, | Jackson, | Van Buren,
| of | of | of | of | of
STATES. | South | New | Ken- | Tenne- | New
| Carolina. | York. | tucky. | see. | York.
--------------+-----------+----------+--------+----------+-----------
Alabama | 5 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Connecticut | .. | .. | .. | 8 | ..
Delaware | 1 | .. | 2 | .. | ..
Georgia | .. | .. | .. | .. | 9
Illinois | 3 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Indiana | 5 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Kentucky | 7 | 7 | .. | .. | ..
Louisiana | 5 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Maine | 9 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Maryland | 10 | .. | .. | 1 | ..
Massachusetts | 15 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Mississippi | 3 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Missouri | .. | .. | .. | 3 | ..
New Hampshire | 7 | .. | .. | 1 | ..
New Jersey | 8 | .. | .. | .. | ..
New York | 29 | 7 | .. | .. | ..
North Carolina| 15 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Ohio | .. | 16 | .. | .. | ..
Pennsylvania | 28 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Rhode Island | 3 | .. | .. | .. | ..
South Carolina| 11 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Tennessee | 11 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Vermont | 7 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Virginia | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
--------------+-----------+----------+--------+----------+----------
Total | 182 | 30 | 2 | 13 | 9
VICE-PRESIDENT (Continued).
| Nathaniel |
| Macon, |
| of | Vacancies.
STATES. | North |
| Carolina. |
--------------+-----------+-----------
Rhode Island | .. | 1
Virginia | 24 | ..
--------------+-----------+-----------
Total | 24 | 1
ELECTORAL VOTE IN 1828.
PRESIDENT. | VICE-PRESIDENT.
| | John | | |
| Andrew | Quincy | John C. | Richard | William
| Jackson, | Adams, | Calhoun, | Rush, | Smith,
| of | of | of | of | of
STATES. | Tenne- | Massach- | South | Pennsyl- | South
| see. | usetts. | Carolina. | vania. | Carolina.
--------------+----------+----------+-----------+----------+----------
Alabama | 5 | .. | 5 | .. | ..
Connecticut | .. | 8 | .. | 8 | ..
Delaware | .. | 3 | .. | 3 | ..
Georgia | 9 | .. | 2 | .. | 7
Illinois | 3 | .. | 3 | .. | ..
Indiana | 5 | .. | 5 | .. | ..
Kentucky | 14 | .. | 14 | .. | ..
Louisiana | 5 | .. | 5 | .. | ..
Maine | 1 | 8 | 1 | 8 | ..
Maryland | 5 | 6 | 5 | 6 | ..
Massachusetts | .. | 15 | .. | 15 | ..
Mississippi | 3 | .. | 3 | .. | ..
Missouri | 3 | .. | 3 | .. | ..
New Hampshire | .. | 8 | .. | 8 | ..
New Jersey | .. | 8 | .. | 8 | ..
New York | 20 | 16 | 20 | 16 | ..
North Carolina| 15 | .. | 15 | .. | ..
Ohio | 16 | .. | 16 | .. | ..
Pennsylvania | 28 | .. | 28 | .. | ..
Rhode Island | .. | 4 | .. | 4 | ..
South Carolina| 11 | .. | 11 | .. | ..
Tennessee | 11 | .. | 11 | .. | ..
Vermont | .. | 7 | .. | 7 | ..
Virginia | 24 | .. | 24 | .. | ..
--------------+----------+----------+-----------+----------+----------
Total | 178 | 83 | 171 | 83 | 7
ELECTORAL VOTE IN 1832.
PRESIDENT.
| Andrew | Henry | John | William |
| Jackson, | Clay, | Floyd, | Wirt, | Vacancies.
| of | of | of | of |
STATES. | Tenne- | Ken- | Virginia. | Maryland. |
| see. | tucky. | | |
--------------+----------+--------+-----------+-----------+-----------
Alabama | 7 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Connecticut | .. | 8 | .. | .. | ..
Delaware | .. | 3 | .. | .. | ..
Georgia | 11 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Illinois | 5 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Indiana | 9 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Kentucky | .. | 15 | .. | .. | ..
Louisiana | 5 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Maine | 10 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Maryland | 3 | 5 | .. | .. | 2
Massachusetts | .. | 14 | .. | .. | ..
Mississippi | 4 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Missouri | 4 | .. | .. | .. | ..
New Hampshire | 7 | .. | .. | .. | ..
New Jersey | 8 | .. | .. | .. | ..
New York | 42 | .. | .. | .. | ..
North Carolina| 15 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Ohio | 21 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Pennsylvania | 30 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Rhode Island | .. | 4 | .. | .. | ..
South Carolina| .. | .. | 11 | .. | ..
Tennessee | 15 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Vermont | .. | .. | .. | 7 | ..
Virginia | 23 | .. | .. | .. | ..
--------------+----------+--------+-----------+-----------+-----------
Total | 219 | 49 | 11 | 7 | 2
VICE-PRESIDENT.
| Martin | | | |
| Van | John | William | Henry | Amos
| Buren, | Sergeant, | Wilkins, | Lee, | Ellmaker,
| of | of | of | of | of
STATES. | New | Pennsyl- | Pennsyl- | Massach- | Pennsyl-
| York. | vania. | vania. | usetts. | vania.
--------------+---------+-----------+-----------+----------+----------
Alabama | 7 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Connecticut | .. | 8 | .. | .. | ..
Delaware | .. | 3 | .. | .. | ..
Georgia | 11 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Illinois | 5 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Indiana | 9 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Kentucky | .. | 15 | .. | .. | ..
Louisiana | 5 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Maine | 10 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Maryland | 3 | 5 | .. | .. | ..
Massachusetts | .. | 14 | .. | .. | ..
Mississippi | 4 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Missouri | 4 | .. | .. | .. | ..
New Hampshire | 7 | .. | .. | .. | ..
New Jersey | 8 | .. | .. | .. | ..
New York | 42 | .. | .. | .. | ..
North Carolina| 15 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Ohio | 21 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Pennsylvania | .. | .. | 30 | .. | ..
Rhode Island | .. | 4 | .. | .. | ..
South Carolina| .. | .. | .. | 11 | ..
Tennessee | 15 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Vermont | .. | .. | .. | .. | 7
Virginia | 23 | .. | .. | .. | ..
--------------+---------+-----------+-----------+----------+----------
Total | 189 | 49 | 30 | 11 | 7
ELECTORAL VOTE IN 1836.
PRESIDENT.
| Martin | William | | | Willie
| Van | Henry | Hugh L. | Daniel | P.
| Buren, | Harrison, | White, | Webster, | Mangum,
| of | of | of | of | of
STATES. | New | Ohio. | Tenne- | Massach- | North
| York. | | see. | usetts. | Carolina.
--------------+---------+-----------+---------+----------+----------
Alabama | 7 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Arkansas | 3 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Connecticut | 8 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Delaware | .. | 3 | .. | .. | ..
Georgia | .. | .. | 11 | .. | ..
Illinois | 5 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Indiana | .. | 9 | .. | .. | ..
Kentucky | .. | 15 | .. | .. | ..
Louisiana | 5 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Maine | 10 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Maryland | .. | 10 | .. | .. | ..
Massachusetts | .. | .. | .. | 14 | ..
Michigan[3] | 3 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Mississippi | 4 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Missouri | 4 | .. | .. | .. | ..
New Hampshire | 7 | .. | .. | .. | ..
New Jersey | .. | 8 | .. | .. | ..
New York | 42 | .. | .. | .. | ..
North Carolina| 15 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Ohio | .. | 21 | .. | .. | ..
Pennsylvania | 30 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Rhode Island | 4 | .. | .. | .. | ..
South Carolina| .. | .. | .. | .. | 11
Tennessee | .. | .. | 15 | .. | ..
Vermont | .. | 7 | .. | .. | ..
Virginia | 23 | .. | .. | .. | ..
--------------+---------+-----------+---------+----------+----------
Total | 167 | 73 | 26 | 14 | 11
VICE-PRESIDENT.
| Richard M. | Francis | John | William
| Johnson, | Granger, | Tyler, | Smith,
| of | of | of | of
STATES. | Kentucky. | New York. | Virginia. | South Carolina.
--------------+------------+-----------+-----------+----------------
Alabama | 7 | .. | .. | ..
Arkansas | 3 | .. | .. | ..
Connecticut | 8 | .. | .. | ..
Delaware | .. | 3 | .. | ..
Georgia | .. | .. | 11 | ..
Illinois | 5 | .. | .. | ..
Indiana | .. | 9 | .. | ..
Kentucky | .. | 15 | .. | ..
Louisiana | 5 | .. | .. | ..
Maine | 10 | .. | .. | ..
Maryland | .. | .. | 10 | ..
Massachusetts | .. | 14 | .. | ..
Michigan[3] | 3 | .. | .. | ..
Mississippi | 4 | .. | .. | ..
Missouri | 4 | .. | .. | ..
New Hampshire | 7 | .. | .. | ..
New Jersey | .. | 8 | .. | ..
New York | 42 | .. | .. | ..
North Carolina| 15 | .. | .. | ..
Ohio | .. | 21 | .. | ..
Pennsylvania | 30 | .. | .. | ..
Rhode Island | 4 | .. | .. | ..
South Carolina| .. | .. | 11 | ..
Tennessee | .. | .. | 15 | ..
Vermont | .. | 7 | .. | ..
Virginia | .. | .. | .. | 23
--------------+------------+-----------+-----------+----------------
Total | 144 | 77 | 47 | 23
[Footnote 3: Michigan had not been formally admitted as a State at the
time when the electors were chosen. When the votes were counted the
President of the Senate declared Martin Van Buren elected President,
no election for Vice-President. The Senate then elected a
Vice-President, Richard M. Johnson receiving 33 votes and Francis
Granger 16.]
ELECTORAL VOTE IN 1840.
PRESIDENT.
| William | Martin
| Henry | Van
| Harrison, | Buren,
| of | of
STATES. | Ohio. | New York.
--------------+-----------+----------
Alabama | .. | 7
Arkansas | .. | 3
Connecticut | 8 | ..
Delaware | 3 | ..
Georgia | 11 | ..
Illinois | .. | 5
Indiana | 9 | ..
Kentucky | 15 | ..
Louisiana | 5 | ..
Maine | 10 | ..
Maryland | 10 | ..
Massachusetts | 14 | ..
Michigan | 3 | ..
Mississippi | 4 | ..
Missouri | .. | 4
New Hampshire | .. | 7
New Jersey | 8 | ..
New York | 42 | ..
North Carolina| 15 | ..
Ohio | 21 | ..
Pennsylvania | 30 | ..
Rhode Island | 4 | ..
South Carolina| .. | 11
Tennessee | 15 | ..
Vermont | 7 | ..
Virginia | .. | 23
--------------+-----------+----------
Total | 234 | 60
VICE-PRESIDENT.
| John | Richard M. | Littleton W. | James K.
| Tyler, | Johnson, | Tazewell, | Polk,
| of | of | of | of
STATES. | Virginia. | Kentucky. | Virginia. | Tennessee.
--------------+-----------+------------+--------------+-----------
Alabama | .. | 7 | .. | ..
Arkansas | .. | 3 | .. | ..
Connecticut | 8 | .. | .. | ..
Delaware | 3 | .. | .. | ..
Georgia | 11 | .. | .. | ..
Illinois | .. | 5 | .. | ..
Indiana | 9 | .. | .. | ..
Kentucky | 15 | .. | .. | ..
Louisiana | 5 | .. | .. | ..
Maine | 10 | .. | .. | ..
Maryland | 10 | .. | .. | ..
Massachusetts | 14 | .. | .. | ..
Michigan | 3 | .. | .. | ..
Mississippi | 4 | .. | .. | ..
Missouri | .. | 4 | .. | ..
New Hampshire | .. | 7 | .. | ..
New Jersey | 8 | .. | .. | ..
New York | 42 | .. | .. | ..
North Carolina| 15 | .. | .. | ..
Ohio | 21 | .. | .. | ..
Pennsylvania | 30 | .. | .. | ..
Rhode Island | 4 | .. | .. | ..
South Carolina| .. | .. | 11 | ..
Tennessee | 15 | .. | .. | ..
Vermont | 7 | .. | .. | ..
Virginia | .. | 22 | .. | 1
--------------+-----------+------------+--------------+-----------
Total | 234 | 48 | 11 | 1
ELECTORAL VOTE IN 1844.
PRESIDENT. | VICE-PRESIDENT.
| James K. | Henry | George M. | Theodore
| Polk, | Clay, | Dallas, | Frelinghuysen,
| of | of | of | of
STATES. | Tennessee. | Ken- | Pennsylvania. | New Jersey.
| | tucky. | |
--------------+------------+---------+---------------+---------------
Alabama | 9 | .. | 9 | ..
Arkansas | 3 | .. | 3 | ..
Connecticut | .. | 6 | .. | 6
Delaware | .. | 3 | .. | 3
Georgia | 10 | .. | 10 | ..
Illinois | 9 | .. | 9 | ..
Indiana | 12 | .. | 12 | ..
Kentucky | .. | 12 | .. | 12
Louisiana | 6 | .. | 6 | ..
Maine | 9 | .. | 9 | ..
Maryland | .. | 8 | .. | 8
Massachusetts | .. | 12 | .. | 12
Michigan | 5 | .. | 5 | ..
Mississippi | 6 | .. | 6 | ..
Missouri | 7 | .. | 7 | ..
New Hampshire | 6 | .. | 6 | ..
New Jersey | .. | 7 | .. | 7
New York | 36 | .. | 36 | ..
North Carolina| .. | 11 | .. | 11
Ohio | .. | 23 | .. | 23
Pennsylvania | 26 | .. | 26 | ..
Rhode Island | .. | 4 | .. | 4
South Carolina| 9 | .. | 9 | ..
Tennessee | .. | 13 | .. | 13
Vermont | .. | 6 | .. | 6
Virginia | 17 | .. | 17 | ..
--------------+------------+---------+---------------+---------------
Total | 170 | 105 | 170 | 105
ELECTORAL VOTE IN 1848.
PRESIDENT. | VICE-PRESIDENT.
| | | |
| Zachary | Lewis | Millard | William O.
| Taylor, | Cass, | Fillmore, | Butler,
| of | of | of | of
STATES. | Louisiana. | Michigan. | New York. | Kentucky.
--------------+------------+-----------+-----------+-----------
Alabama | .. | 9 | .. | 9
Arkansas | .. | 3 | .. | 3
Connecticut | 6 | .. | 6 | ..
Delaware | 3 | .. | 3 | ..
Florida | 3 | .. | 3 | ..
Georgia | 10 | .. | 10 | ..
Illinois | .. | 9 | .. | 9
Indiana | .. | 12 | .. | 12
Iowa | .. | 4 | .. | 4
Kentucky | 12 | .. | 12 | ..
Louisiana | 6 | .. | 6 | ..
Maine | .. | 9 | .. | 9
Maryland | 8 | .. | 8 | ..
Massachusetts | 12 | .. | 12 | ..
Michigan | .. | 5 | .. | 5
Mississippi | .. | 6 | .. | 6
Missouri | .. | 7 | .. | 7
New Hampshire | .. | 6 | .. | 6
New Jersey | 7 | .. | 7 | ..
New York | 36 | .. | 36 | ..
North Carolina| 11 | .. | 11 | ..
Ohio | .. | 23 | .. | 23
Pennsylvania | 26 | .. | 26 | ..
Rhode Island | 4 | .. | 4 | ..
South Carolina| .. | 9 | .. | 9
Tennessee | 13 | .. | 13 | ..
Texas | .. | 4 | .. | 4
Vermont | 6 | .. | 6 | ..
Virginia | .. | 17 | .. | 17
Wisconsin | .. | 4 | .. | 4
--------------+------------+-----------+-----------+---------------
Total | 163 | 127 | 163 | 127
ELECTORAL VOTE IN 1852.
PRESIDENT. | VICE-PRESIDENT.
| | | William |
| Franklin | Winfield | Rufus | William A.
| Pierce, | Scott, | King, | Graham,
| of | of | of | of
STATES. | New | Virginia. | Alabama. | North
| Hampshire. | | | Carolina.
--------------+------------+-----------+-----------+-----------
Alabama | 9 | .. | 9 | ..
Arkansas | 4 | .. | 4 | ..
California | 4 | .. | 4 | ..
Connecticut | 6 | .. | 6 | ..
Delaware | 3 | .. | 3 | ..
Florida | 3 | .. | 3 | ..
Georgia | 10 | .. | 10 | ..
Illinois | 11 | .. | 11 | ..
Indiana | 13 | .. | 13 | ..
Iowa | 4 | .. | 4 | ..
Kentucky | .. | 12 | .. | 12
Louisiana | 6 | .. | 6 | ..
Maine | 8 | .. | 8 | ..
Maryland | 8 | .. | 8 | ..
Massachusetts | .. | 13 | .. | 13
Michigan | 6 | .. | 6 | ..
Mississippi | 7 | .. | 7 | ..
Missouri | 9 | .. | 9 | ..
New Hampshire | 5 | .. | 5 | ..
New Jersey | 7 | .. | 7 | ..
New York | 35 | .. | 35 | ..
North Carolina| 10 | .. | 10 | ..
Ohio | 23 | .. | 23 | ..
Pennsylvania | 27 | .. | 27 | ..
Rhode Island | 4 | .. | 4 | ..
South Carolina| 8 | .. | 8 | ..
Tennessee | .. | 12 | .. | 12
Texas | 4 | .. | 4 | ..
Vermont | .. | 5 | .. | 5
Virginia | 15 | .. | 15 | ..
Wisconsin | 5 | .. | 5 | ..
--------------+------------+-----------+-----------+---------------
Total | 254 | 42 | 254 | 42
ELECTORAL VOTE IN 1856.
PRESIDENT.
| James | John C. | Millard
| Buchanan, | Frémont, | Fillmore,
| of | of | of
STATES. | Pennsylvania. | California. | New York.
--------------+---------------+-------------+----------
Alabama | 9 | .. | ..
Arkansas | 4 | .. | ..
California | 4 | .. | ..
Connecticut | .. | 6 | ..
Delaware | 3 | .. | ..
Florida | 3 | .. | ..
Georgia | 10 | .. | ..
Illinois | 11 | .. | ..
Indiana | 13 | .. | ..
Iowa | .. | 4 | ..
Kentucky | 12 | .. | ..
Louisiana | 6 | .. | ..
Maine | .. | 8 | ..
Maryland | .. | .. | 8
Massachusetts | .. | 13 | ..
Michigan | .. | 6 | ..
Mississippi | 7 | .. | ..
Missouri | 9 | .. | ..
New Hampshire | .. | 5 | ..
New Jersey | 7 | .. | ..
New York | .. | 35 | ..
North Carolina| 10 | .. | ..
Ohio | .. | 23 | ..
Pennsylvania | 27 | .. | ..
Rhode Island | .. | 4 | ..
South Carolina| 8 | .. | ..
Tennessee | 12 | .. | ..
Texas | 4 | .. | ..
Vermont | .. | 5 | ..
Virginia | 15 | .. | ..
Wisconsin | .. | 5 | ..
--------------+---------------+-------------+----------
Total | 174 | 114 | 8
VICE-PRESIDENT.
| J. C. | William L. | A. J.
| Breckinridge, | Dayton, | Donelson,
| of | of | of
STATES. | Kentucky. | New Jersey. | Tennessee.
--------------+---------------+-------------+-----------
Alabama | 9 | .. | ..
Arkansas | 4 | .. | ..
California | 4 | .. | ..
Connecticut | .. | 6 | ..
Delaware | 3 | .. | ..
Florida | 3 | .. | ..
Georgia | 10 | .. | ..
Illinois | 11 | .. | ..
Indiana | 13 | .. | ..
Iowa | .. | 4 | ..
Kentucky | 12 | .. | ..
Louisiana | 6 | .. | ..
Maine | .. | 8 | ..
Maryland | .. | .. | 8
Massachusetts | .. | 13 | ..
Michigan | .. | 6 | ..
Mississippi | 7 | .. | ..
Missouri | 9 | .. | ..
New Hampshire | .. | 5 | ..
New Jersey | 7 | .. | ..
New York | .. | 35 | ..
North Carolina| 10 | .. | ..
Ohio | .. | 23 | ..
Pennsylvania | 27 | .. | ..
Rhode Island | .. | 4 | ..
South Carolina| 8 | .. | ..
Tennessee | 12 | .. | ..
Texas | 4 | .. | ..
Vermont | .. | 5 | ..
Virginia | 15 | .. | ..
Wisconsin | .. | 5 | ..
--------------+---------------+-------------+----------
Total | 174 | 114 | 8
APPENDIX II.
THE CABINETS OF MONROE, ADAMS, JACKSON, VAN BUREN, HARRISON, TYLER,
POLK, TAYLOR, FILLMORE, PIERCE, AND BUCHANAN--1816-1858.
THE SECRETARIES OF STATE.
Department created by Act of Congress, September 15, 1789.
NAME. STATE. FROM
----------------------+----------+------------------------------
John Quincy Adams | Mass. | March 5, 1817.
Henry Clay | Ky. | March 7, 1825.
James A. Hamilton | N. Y. | March 4, 1829, _ad int._
Martin Van Buren | N. Y. | March 6, 1829.
Edward Livingston | La. | May 24, 1831.
Louis McLane | Del. | May 29, 1833.
John Forsyth | Ga. | June 27, 1834.
J. L. Martin | N. C. | March 3, 1841, _ad int._
Daniel Webster | Mass. | March 5, 1841.
Hugh S. Legaré | S. C. | May 9, 1843, _ad int._
Abel P. Upshur | Va. | June 24, 1843, _ad int._
Abel P. Upshur | Va. | July 24, 1843.
John Nelson | Md. | February 29, 1844, _ad int._
John C. Calhoun | S. C. | March 6, 1844.
James Buchanan | Penna. | March 6, 1845.
John M. Clayton | Del. | March 7, 1849.
Daniel Webster | Mass. | July 22, 1850.
Charles M. Conrad | La. | September 2, 1852, _ad int._
Edward Everett | Mass. | November 6, 1852.
William Hunter | R. I. | March 3, 1853, _ad int._
William L. Marcy | N. Y. | March 7, 1853.
Lewis Cass | Mich. | March 6, 1857.
----------------------+----------+------------------------------
THE SECRETARIES OF THE TREASURY.
Department created by Act of Congress, September 2, 1789.
NAME. STATE. FROM
-----------------------+----------+------------------------------
William H. Crawford | Ga. | October 22, 1816.
Samuel L. Southard | N. J. | March 7, 1825, _ad int._
Richard Rush | Penna. | March 7, 1825.
Samuel D. Ingham | Penna. | March 6, 1829.
Asbury Dickins | N. C. | June 21, 1831, _ad int._
Louis McLane | Del. | August 8, 1831.
William J. Duane | Penna. | May 29, 1833.
Roger B. Taney | Md. | September 23, 1833.
McClintock Young | Md. | June 25, 1834, _ad int._
Levi Woodbury | N. H. | June 27, 1834.
McClintock Young | Md. | March 3, 1841, _ad int._
Thomas Ewing | Ohio | March 5, 1841.
McClintock Young | Md. | September 13, 1841, _ad int._
Walter Forward | Penna. | September 13, 1841.
McClintock Young | Md. | March 1, 1843, _ad int._
John C. Spencer | N. Y. | March 3, 1843.
McClintock Young | Md. | May 2, 1844, _ad int._
George M. Bibb | Ky. | June 15, 1844.
Robert J. Walker | Miss. | March 6, 1845.
McClintock Young | Md. | March 6, 1849, _ad int._
William M. Meredith | Penna. | March 8, 1849.
Thomas Corwin | Ohio | July 23, 1850.
James Guthrie | Ky. | March 7, 1853.
Howell Cobb | Ga. | March 6, 1857.
-----------------------+----------+------------------------------
THE SECRETARIES OF WAR.
Department created by Act of Congress, August 7, 1789.
NAME. STATE. FROM
-----------------------+----------+-----------------------------
Isaac Shelby | Ky. | March 5, 1817.
George Graham | Va. | April 7, 1817, _ad int._
John C. Calhoun | S. C. | October 8, 1817.
James Barbour | Va. | March 7, 1825.
Samuel L. Southard | N. J. | May 26, 1828, _ad int._
Peter B. Porter | N. Y. | May 26, 1828.
John H. Eaton | Tenn. | March 9, 1829.
Philip G. Randolph | Va. | June 18, 1831, _ad int._
Roger B. Taney | Md. | July 21, 1831, _ad int._
Lewis Cass | Ohio | August 1, 1831.
Benjamin F. Butler | N. Y. | October 25, 1836, _ad int._
Joel R. Poinsett | S. C. | March 7, 1837.
John Bell | Tenn. | March 5, 1841.
John McLean | Ohio | September 13, 1841.
John C. Spencer | N. Y. | October 12, 1841.
James M. Porter | Penna. | March 8, 1843.
William Wilkins | Penna. | February 15, 1844.
William L. Marcy | N. Y. | March 5, 1845.
George W. Crawford | Ga. | March 8, 1849.
Winfield Scott | Va. | July 23, 1850, _ad int._
Charles M. Conrad | La. | August 15, 1850.
Jefferson Davis | Miss. | March 7, 1853.
Samuel Cooper | N. Y. | March 3, 1857, _ad int._
John B. Floyd | Va. | March 6, 1857.
-----------------------+----------+-----------------------------
THE SECRETARIES OF THE NAVY.
Department created by Act of Congress, April 30, 1798.
NAME. STATE. FROM
--------------------------+---------+------------------------------
Benjamin W. Crowninshield | Mass. | December 19, 1814.
Smith Thompson | N. Y. | November 9, 1818.
John Rodgers | Md. | September 1, 1823, _ad int._
Samuel L. Southard | N. J. | September 16, 1823.
John Branch | N. C. | March 9, 1829.
Levi Woodbury | N. H. | May 23, 1831.
Mahlon Dickerson | N. J. | June 30, 1834.
James K. Paulding | N. Y. | June 25, 1838.
George E. Badger | N. C. | March 5, 1841.
Abel P. Upshur | Va. | September 13, 1841.
David Henshaw | Mass. | July 24, 1843.
Thomas W. Gilmer | Va. | February 15, 1844.
John Y. Mason | Va. | March 14, 1844.
George Bancroft | Mass. | March 10, 1845.
John Y. Mason | Va. | September 9, 1846.
William B. Preston | Va. | March 8, 1849.
William A. Graham | N.C. | July 22, 1850.
John P. Kennedy | Md. | July 22, 1852.
James C. Dobbin | N. C. | March 7, 1853.
Isaac Toucey | Conn. | March 6, 1857.
--------------------------+---------+------------------------------
THE SECRETARIES OF THE INTERIOR.
Department created by Act of Congress, March 3, 1849.
NAME. STATE. FROM
-----------------------+----------+---------------------
Thomas Ewing | Ohio | March 8, 1849.
Thomas M. T. McKennan | Penna. | August 15, 1850.
Alexander H. H. Stuart | Va. | September 12, 1850.
Robert McClelland | Mich. | March 7, 1853.
Jacob Thompson | Miss. | March 6, 1857.
-----------------------+----------+---------------------
THE ATTORNEYS-GENERAL.
Duties prescribed by the Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789.
Department reorganized in 1870.
NAME. STATE. FROM
--------------------+----------+---------------------
Richard Rush | Penna. | February 10, 1814.
William Wirt | Va. | November 3, 1817.
John M. Berrien | Ga. | March 9, 1829.
Roger B. Taney | Md. | July 20, 1831.
Benjamin F. Butler | N. Y. | November 15, 1833.
Felix Grundy | Tenn. | July 5, 1838.
Henry D. Gilpin | Penna. | July 11, 1840.
John J. Crittenden | Ky. | March 5, 1841.
Hugh S. Legaré | S. C. | September 13, 1841.
John Nelson | Md. | July 1, 1843.
John Y. Mason | Va. | March 6, 1845.
Nathan Clifford | Me. | October 17, 1846.
Isaac Toucey | Conn. | June 21, 1848.
Reverdy Johnson | Md. | March 8, 1849.
John J. Crittenden | Ky. | July 22, 1850.
Caleb Cushing | Mass. | March 7, 1853.
Jeremiah S. Black | Penna. | March 6, 1857.
--------------------+----------+---------------------
THE POSTMASTERS-GENERAL.
A Bureau of the Treasury until 1829. Made a Cabinet office in that
year.
NAME. STATE. FROM
----------------------+----------+---------------------
Return J. Meigs, Jr. | Ohio | March 17, 1814.
John McLean | Ohio | June 26, 1823.
William T. Barry | Ky. | March 9, 1829.
Amos Kendall | Ky. | March 1, 1835.
John M. Niles | Conn. | May 19, 1840.
Francis Granger | N. Y. | March 6, 1841.
Charles A. Wickliffe | Ky. | September 13, 1841.
Cave Johnson | Tenn. | March 6, 1845.
Jacob Collamer | Vt. | March 8, 1849.
Nathan K. Hall | N. Y. | July 23, 1850.
Samuel D. Hubbard | Conn. | August 31, 1852.
James Campbell | Penna. | March 7, 1853.
Aaron V. Brown | Tenn. | March 6, 1857.
----------------------+----------+---------------------
CHRONOLOGY
Territory of Missouri erected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . June 4, 1812
Treaty of Fort Jackson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . August 10, 1814
Treaty of Ghent signed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . December 24, 1814
Commonwealth of Indiana admitted . . . . . . . . . December 11, 1816
Madison's veto of internal improvements bill . . . . . March 3, 1817
Attack on Fowltown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . November 21, 1817
Commonwealth of Mississippi admitted . . . . . . . December 10, 1817
Jackson's "Rhea" letter to Monroe . . . . . . . . . . January 6, 1818
Execution of Ambrister and Arbuthnot . . . . . . . . . April 29, 1818
Convention with Great Britain as to Oregon . . . . . October 20, 1818
Commonwealth of Illinois admitted . . . . . . . . . . December 3, 1818
Tallmadge amendment offered . . . . . . . . . . . . February 13, 1819
Treaty with Spain as to Florida . . . . . . . . . . February 22, 1819
Decision in McCulloch vs. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1819
Commonwealth of Alabama admitted . . . . . . . . . December 14, 1819
Thomas amendment offered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . February 3, 1820
Maine bill approved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . March 3, 1820
First Missouri bill approved . . . . . . . . . . . . . March 6, 1820
Commonwealth of Maine admitted . . . . . . . . . . . . March 15, 1820
Report of Clay's Committee of Thirteen . . . . . . February 10, 1821
Second Missouri bill approved . . . . . . . . . . . . . March 2, 1821
Jackson, as Governor, takes command in Florida . . . . July 17, 1821
Commonwealth of Missouri admitted . . . . . . . . . . August 10, 1821
Congress of Verona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . October-December, 1822
Monroe's veto of internal improvements bill . . . . . . . May 4, 1822
Clay nominated for presidency by the Kentucky
legislature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . November 18, 1822
"Monroe Doctrine" announced . . . . . . . . . . . . . December 2, 1823
Congressional caucus nominates Crawford . . . . . . February 14, 1824
Harrisburg convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . March 4, 1824
Jackson's "Coleman Letter" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . April 26, 1824
Presidential election in House of Representatives . . February 9, 1825
Indian Springs convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . February 12, 1825
Mexico-Columbia treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . September 25, 1825
The Creek treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . January, 1826
Abduction of Morgan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . September 11, 12, 1826
Protectionist convention at Harrisburg . . . . . . . . July 30, 1827
Treaty with Great Britain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . August 6, 1827
Tariff bill approved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . May 19, 1828
The "South Carolina Exposition" published . . . . . . . . . . . . 1828
Hayne's speech on Foote's resolution . . . . . . . . January 19, 1830
Webster's reply to Hayne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . January 26, 1830
Jackson's speech on the Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . April 13, 1830
Veto of the Maysville Road bill . . . . . . . . . . . . . May 27, 1830
Publication of the "Liberator" begun . . . . . . . . January 1, 1831
"Address to the People of South Carolina" published . . July 26, 1831
The Southampton massacre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . August, 1831
Anti-Masonic convention at Baltimore . . . . . . . September 26, 1831
National Republican convention at Baltimore . . . . December 12, 1831
New England Anti-Slavery Society formed . . . . . . . January 6, 1832
Bank of the United States asks re-charter . . . . . . January 9, 1832
National Democratic convention at Baltimore . . . . . . . May 21, 1832
Calhoun's letter to Governor Hamilton . . . . . . . . August 28, 1832
South Carolina convention meets at Columbia . . . . November 19, 1832
Ordinance of nullification . . . . . . . . . . . . November 24, 1832
President Jackson's nullification proclamation . . December 10, 1832
Clay proposes compromise tariff . . . . . . . . . . February 12, 1833
The "Force Bill" approved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . March 2, 1833
Compromise tariff bill approved . . . . . . . . . . . . March 2, 1833
Re-assembling of the South Carolina convention . . . . March 11, 1833
The "Paper read in the Cabinet" . . . . . . . . . . September 18, 1833
Removal of the deposits ordered . . . . . . . . . . September 26, 1833
American Anti-Slavery Society formed . . . . . . . . . December, 1833
Van Buren nominated by Baltimore convention . . . . . . . May 20, 1835
Charleston, S. C., post-office robbed . . . . . . . . . July 29, 1835
Provisional declaration of Texan independence . . . . November 7, 1835
Meeting of Texas convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . March 1, 1836
Declaration of Texan independence . . . . . . . . . . . March 2, 1836
The Alamo massacre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . March 6, 1836
Battle of San Jacinto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . April 21, 1836
House adopts the "gag" resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . May 26, 1836
Commonwealth of Arkansas admitted . . . . . . . . . . . June 15, 1836
The "Specie Circular" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . July 11, 1836
Senate passes the "expunging resolution" . . . . . . January 16, 1837
Commonwealth of Michigan admitted . . . . . . . . . . January 26, 1837
Financial panic begins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . April, 1837
Murder of Lovejoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . November 7, 1837
Harrisburg "harmony" convention . . . . . . . . . . September 4, 1839
Whig convention at Harrisburg . . . . . . . . . . . . December 4, 1839
Democratic Republican convention at Baltimore . . . . . . May 5, 1840
Independent Treasury bill approved . . . . . . . . . . . July 4, 1840
Death of President Harrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . April 4, 1841
The Ashburton treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . August 9, 1842
Veto of National Bank bill . . . . . . . . . . . . . August 16, 1842
Second bank bill vetoed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . September 9, 1842
Abolition convention at Buffalo . . . . . . . . . . . August 30, 1843
Whitman's party reaches the Columbia . . . . . . . September 5, 1843
Whig convention at Baltimore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . May 1, 1844
Democratic convention at Baltimore . . . . . . . . . . . May 27, 1844
Commonwealth of Florida admitted . . . . . . . . . . . March 3, 1845
Polk's message on Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . December 2, 1845
Commonwealth of Texas admitted . . . . . . . . . . December 29, 1845
Mexicans cross the Nueces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . April 23, 1846
Arista notifies Taylor of beginning of hostilities . . April 24, 1846
Battle of Palo Alto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . May 8, 1846
Congress declares war begun by Mexico . . . . . . . . May 12, 13, 1846
Treaty with Great Britain as to Oregon . . . . . . . . June 15, 1846
Kearny takes Santa Fé . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . August 18, 1846
Battle of Monterey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . September 21-23, 1846
Commonwealth of Iowa admitted . . . . . . . . . . . December 28, 1846
Battle of Buena Vista . . . . . . . . . . . . . February 22, 23, 1847
Capture of Vera Cruz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . March 27-29, 1847
Battle of Cerro Gordo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . April 18, 1847
Battle of Chapultepec . . . . . . . . . . . . . September 12, 13, 1847
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo . . . . . . . . . . . . . February 2, 1848
Democratic convention at Baltimore . . . . . . . . . . . May 22, 1848
Special message on Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . May 29, 1848
Commonwealth of Wisconsin admitted . . . . . . . . . . . May 29, 1848
Abolition convention at Rochester . . . . . . . . . . . . June 2, 1848
Whig convention at Philadelphia . . . . . . . . . . . . . June 7, 1848
Special message on California and New Mexico . . . . . . July 6, 1848
Free-soil convention at Buffalo . . . . . . . . . . . . August 9, 1848
Territory of Oregon organized . . . . . . . . . . . . August 14, 1848
California convention at Monterey . . . . . . . . . September 1, 1849
Clay proposes his compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . January 29, 1850
Calhoun's last speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . March 4, 1850
Webster's speech on the Constitution . . . . . . . . . March 7, 1850
Death of Calhoun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . March 31, 1850
Clayton-Bulwer treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . April 19, 1850
Clay reports on the compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . May 8, 1850
Death of President Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . July 9, 1850
Commonwealth of California admitted . . . . . . . . September 9, 1850
President's message on the fugitive slave law . . . February 21, 1851
The "Jerry rescue" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . October, 1851
Democratic convention at Baltimore . . . . . . . . . . . June 1, 1852
Whig convention at Baltimore . . . . . . . . . . . . . June 16, 1852
Death of Clay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . June 29, 1852
Free-soil Democratic convention at Pittsburg . . . . August 11, 1852
Death of Webster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . October 23, 1852
The Gadsden treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . December 30, 1853
Douglas reports on Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . . January 4, 1854
Kansas-Nebraska bill approved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . May 30, 1854
Salt Creek Valley convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . June 10, 1854
The Ostend manifesto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . October 18, 1854
Congressional election in Kansas . . . . . . . . . November 29, 1854
Territorial election in Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . March 30, 1855
Kansas legislature meets at Pawnee . . . . . . . . . . . July 2, 1855
Robinson's speech at Lawrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . July 4, 1855
Convention at Lawrence, Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . August 14, 1855
Convention at Big Springs, Kansas . . . . . . . . . September 5, 1855
Convention at Topeka, Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . September 19, 1855
Convention at Topeka, Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . October 23, 1855
Popular vote on the Topeka constitution . . . . . . December 15, 1855
Robinson elected governor of Kansas . . . . . . . . . January 5, 1856
President's proclamation on Kansas . . . . . . . . February 11, 1856
Kansas Free-state legislature meets . . . . . . . . . . March 4, 1856
Philadelphia convention of the "American party" . . February 22, 1856
Congressional committee begins sessions at Kansas City April 14, 1856
Sumner's speech on the "Crime against Kansas" . . . . May 19, 20, 1856
The sack of Lawrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . May 21, 1856
Brooks's attack on Sumner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . May 22, 1856
Massacre at Dutch Henry's Crossing . . . . . . . . . . . May 24, 1856
Affair at Black Jack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . June 2, 1856
Democratic national convention at Cincinnati . . . . . . June 2, 1856
Republican national convention at Philadelphia . . . . June 17, 1856
Assault on Sheriff Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . June 23, 1856
House Committee reports on Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . July 1, 1856
Dispersal of Free-state legislature at Topeka . . . . . . July 4, 1856
Oliver makes minority report on Kansas . . . . . . . . July 11, 1856
Treaty at Lawrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . August 17, 1856
Woodson's proclamation in Kansas . . . . . . . . . . August 25, 1856
Destruction of Ossawattomie . . . . . . . . . . . . . August 29, 1856
Whig convention at Baltimore . . . . . . . . . . . September 17, 1856
Free-state legislature dispersed at Topeka . . . . . January 6, 1857
Territorial legislature meets at Lecompton . . . . . January 12, 1857
Dred Scott decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . March 6, 1857
Election of Lecompton constitutional convention . . . . June 15, 1857
Meeting of Free-state convention at Topeka . . . . . . July 15, 1857
Convention at Lecompton, Kansas . . . . . . . . . . September 7, 1857
Free-state election in Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . October 5, 1857
Convention at Lecompton, Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . October 19, 1857
Mass-meeting at Lawrence, Kansas . . . . . . . . . . December 2, 1857
Kansas legislature meets at Lecompton . . . . . . . . December 7, 1857
Pro-slavery vote on the Lecompton constitution . . December 21, 1857
Free-state vote on the Lecompton constitution . . . . January 4, 1858
Buchanan's message on Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . February 2, 1858
Commonwealth of Minnesota admitted . . . . . . . . . . . May 11, 1858
Vote in Kansas on the English bill propositions . . . . August 2, 1858
Commonwealth of Oregon admitted . . . . . . . . . . February 14, 1859
BIBLIOGRAPHY
This bibliography must not be taken as containing the material used in
the preparation of this volume, but as a list of good books
recommended to the general reader, which treat of, or touch upon, the
subjects considered. Only a few of the books in this list have been
consulted by the author in the preparation of this work. As indicated
in the preface, the author has endeavored, in all cases, to go back to
original matter, which is usually disconnected and fragmentary, and
practically inaccessible to the general reader.
LIST OF TITLES
_The alphabetical arrangement is, in most instances, based upon the
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Adams, C. F.: Railroads; their origin and problems. New York, 1878.
Adams, H.: Life of Albert Gallatin. Philadelphia, 1879.
Adams, H.: History of the United States. 9 vols. New York, 1889-91.
Adams, H.: John Randolph. Boston, 1882.
Adams, J. Q.: Memoirs; Comprising Parts of His Diary from 1795 to
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Alfriend, F. H.: Life of Jefferson Davis. Cincinnati, 1868.
Baker, G. E. [Ed.]: Works of William H. Seward. 5 vols. New York,
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Bancroft, H. H.: Arizona and New Mexico, 1530-1888. San Francisco,
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Bancroft, H. H.: History of California. 7 vols. San Francisco,
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Bancroft, H. H.: North Mexican States and Texas, 1531-1889. 2 vols.
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Bancroft. H. H.: Oregon, 1834-1888. 2 vols. San Francisco, 1886-88.
Barrows, W.: Oregon: The Struggle for Possession. Boston, 1883.
Benton, T. H.: Thirty Years' View; or, History of the Working of the
American Government for Thirty Years, from 1820 to 1850. 2 vols. New
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Birney, W.: James G. Birney and His Times. New York, 1890.
Blaine, J. G.: Twenty Years of Congress (1860-80). 2 vols. Norwich,
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Bolles, A. S.: The Financial History of the United States. 3 vols. New
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Bolles, A. S.: Industrial History of the United States. Norwich, 1878.
Bourne, E. G.: History of the Surplus Revenue of 1837. New York, 1885.
Bruce, H.: Life of General Houston. New York, 1891.
Bryce, J.: The American Commonwealth. 2 vols. New York, 1895.
Cairnes, J. E.: Slave Power: Its Character, Career, and Probable
Designs. New York, 1862.
Calhoun, J. C.: Works. 6 vols. New York, 1853-55.
Carr, L.: Missouri, a Bone of Contention. Boston, 1888.
Channing, E.: The United States of America, 1765-1865. New York, 1896.
Choate, R.: Works, with a Memoir by S. G. Brown. 2 vols. Boston, 1862.
Chase, L. B.: History of the Polk Administration. New York, 1850.
Cobb, T. R. R.: Historical Sketch of Slavery. Philadelphia, 1858.
Cobb, T. R. R.: Enquiry into the Law of Negro Slavery in the United
States. Philadelphia, 1858.
Colton, C. [Ed.]: Works of Henry Clay. 6 vols. New York, 1857.
Colton, C.: Life and Times of Henry Clay. 2 vols. New York, 1846.
Colton, C. [Ed:]: Private Correspondence of Henry Clay. New York,
1855.
Colton, C.: The Last Seven Years of the Life of Henry Clay. New York,
1856.
Cooper, T.: Lectures on the Elements of Political Economy. Columbia,
1826.
Curtis, G. T.: Constitutional History of the United States. 2 vols.
New York, 1889, 1896.
Curtis, G. T.: Life of James Buchanan. 2 vols. New York, 1883.
Curtis, G. T.: Life of Daniel Webster. 2 vols. New York, 1870.
Davis, J.: The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government. 2 vols.
New York, 1881.
Davis, V. H.: Jefferson Davis, ex-President of the Confederate States.
2 vols. New York, 1890.
Douglass, F.: Life and Times. Written by himself. Hartford, 1881.
Draper, J. W.: History of the American Civil War. 3 vols. New York,
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Dunbar, C. F.: Laws of the United States relating to currency, finance
and banking from 1789 to 1891. Boston, 1893.
Frémont, J. C.: Memoirs of My Life. Chicago, 1887.
Frothingham, O. B.: Gerrit Smith; A Biography. New York, 1879.
Frothingham, O. B.: Theodore Parker; A Biography. Boston, 1874.
Gannett, H.: Boundaries of the United States, and of the several
States and Territories. Washington, 1885.
Giddings, J. R.: Speeches In Congress. Boston, 1853.
Gillet, R. H.: Democracy in the United States. New York, 1868.
Gilman, D. C.: James Monroe in his Relation to the Public Service.
Boston, 1883.
Greeley, H.: The American Conflict. 2 vols. Hartford, 1864-67.
Greeley, H.: Recollections of a Busy Life. New York, 1868.
Greeley, H.: History of the Struggle for Slavery Extension or
Restriction in the United States. New York, 1856.
Hall, B. F.: The Republican Party, 1796-1832. New York, 1856.
Hammond, J. D.: The History of Political Parties in the State of New
York. 4th edit. 2 vols. Cooperstown, 1846.
Hay, J.: see Nicolay, J. G.
Helper, H. R: Impending Crisis of the South, and how to meet it. New
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Hildreth, R.: The History of the United States. 6 vols. New York,
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Holst, H. E. von: The Constitutional History of the United States. 8
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Holst, H. E. von: John Brown. Boston, 1888.
Holst, H. E. von: John C. Calhoun. Boston, 1882.
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Julian, G. W.: Life of Joshua R. Giddings. Chicago, 1892.
Kapp, F.: Die Sklaverei in den Vereinigten Staaten. Hamburg, 1861.
Kinley, D.: History, Organization, and Influence of the Independent
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Knox, J. J.: United States Notes. New York, 1888.
Lalor, J. J.: Cyclopædia of Political Science, Political Economy, and
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1881-84.
Lodge, H. C.: Daniel Webster. Boston, 1883.
Lyman, T.: Diplomacy of the United States. Boston, 1826.
Mackenzie, W. L.: Life and Times of M. Van Buren. Boston, 1846.
McLaughlin, A. C.: Lewis Cass. Boston, 1891.
McCulloch, H.: Men and Measures of Half a Century. New York, 1888.
Mallory, D.: Life and Speeches of Henry Clay. 2 vols. New York, 1843.
May, S. J.: Memoirs: Consisting of Autobiography and Selections from
his Diary and Correspondence. Boston, 1873.
May, S. J.: Some Recollections of our Anti-Slavery Conflict. Boston,
1869.
Morse, J. T., Jr.: Abraham Lincoln. 2 vols. Boston, 1893.
Morse, J. T., Jr.: John Quincy Adams. Boston, 1882.
Nicolay, J. G. and Hay, J.: Abraham Lincoln: A History. 10 vols. New
York, 1890.
Nicolay, J. G. and Hay, J. [Eds.]: Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln.
2 vols. New York, 1894.
Nixon, O. W.: How Marcus Whitman Saved Oregon. Chicago, 1895.
Ormsby, R. McK.: History of the Whig Party. Boston, 1860.
Parker, J.: Personal Liberty Laws. Boston, 1861.
Parton, J.: General Jackson. New York, 1893.
Parton, J.: Life of Andrew Jackson. 3 vols. Boston, 1883.
Phillips, W.: Conquest of Kansas. Boston, 1856.
Phillips, W.: Speeches, Lectures, and Letters. Boston, 1863.
Pierce, E. L.: Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner. 4 vols. Boston,
1893.
Pike, J. S.: First Blows of the Civil War. New York, 1879.
Pollard, E. A.: The Lost Cause. New York, 1868.
Quincy, E.: Life of Josiah Quincy. Boston, 1867.
Quincy, J.: Memoirs of the Life of John Quincy Adams. Boston, 1858.
Redpath, J.: Public Life of Capt. John Brown. Boston, 1860.
Rhodes, J. F.: History of the United States from the Compromise of
1850. 3 vols. New York, 1893-95.
Robinson, C.: The Kansas Conflict. New York, 1892.
Robinson, S. T. L.: Kansas, Its Interior and its Exterior Life.
Boston, 1856.
Roosevelt, T.: Thomas Hart Benton. Boston, 1887.
Royce, J.: California from the Conquest in 1846 to the Second
Vigilance Committee in San Francisco. Boston, 1886.
Schouler, J.: History of the United States Under the Constitution. 5
vols. New York, 1893.
Schurz, C.: Life of Henry Clay. 2 vols. Boston, 1887.
Schuyler, E.: American Diplomacy. New York, 1886.
Seward, W. H.: Autobiography, from 1801 to 1834, with a Memoir of His
Life. New York, 1877.
Seward, W. H.: Life and Public Services of John Quincy Adams. Auburn,
1849.
Shepard, E. M.: Martin Van Buren. Boston, 1888.
Smith, W. L. G.: Fifty Years of Public Life; the Life and Times of
Lewis Cass. New York, 1856.
Spring, L. W.: Kansas; the Prelude to the War for the Union. Boston,
1885.
Stanwood, E.: A History of Presidential Elections. Boston, 1892.
Stephens, A. H.: A Constitutional View of the Late War between the
States. 2 vols. Philadelphia, 1868-70.
Stickney, W. [Ed.]: Autobiography of Amos Kendall. Boston, 1872.
Story, W. W.: Life and Letters of Joseph Story. 2 vols. Boston, 1851.
Story, W. W. [Ed.]: Miscellaneous Writings of Joseph Story. Boston,
1835.
Strohm, I. [Ed.]: Speeches of Thomas Corwin. Dayton, 1859.
Sumner, C.: Works. 15 vols. Boston, 1870-83.
Sumner, W. G.: Andrew Jackson as a Public Man. Boston, 1882.
Sumner, W. G.: History of American Currency. New York, 1884.
Taussig, F. W.: State Papers and Speeches on the Tariff. Cambridge,
1893.
Taussig, F. W.: Tariff History of the United States, 1789-1888. New
York, 1888.
Thayer, E.: History of the Kansas Crusade. New York, 1889.
Tyler, L. G.: Letters and Times of the Tylers. 2 vols. Richmond, 1884.
Tyler, S.: Memoir of R. B. Taney. Baltimore, 1872.
Van Buren, M.: Inquiry into the Origin and Growth of Political Parties
in the United States. New York, 1867.
Webster, D.: Works. 6 vols. Boston, 1851.
Webster, F. [Ed.]: Private Correspondence of Daniel Webster. 2 vols.
Boston, 1857.
Williams, A. M.: Sam Houston and the War of Independence in Texas.
Boston, 1893.
Williams, E.: The Statesman's Manual. 4 vols. New York, 1849.
Wilson, H.: History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in
America. 3 vols. Boston, 1872-77.
Wilson, W.: Division and Reunion, 1829-1889. New York, 1893.
Wise, H. A.: Seven Decades of the Union. Philadelphia, 1876.
Woodbury, L.: Writings, Political, Judicial, and Literary. 3 vols.
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Yoakum, H. K.: History of Texas, from its First Settlement in 1685, to
its Annexation to the United States in 1846. 2 vols. New York, 1856.
INDEX
Material in the Appendices is not included in this Index.
ABBOTT, J. B., leader of "Free-state" Company, 428
Abolition, 242 _et seq._;
relation to Revolution of 1830, 244, 245;
its philosophy, 245;
the opposite theory, 245;
the true philosophy of history, 245, 246;
the beginning of abolition, 246 (_see_ Garrison, William Lloyd);
possible ways of attacking slavery, 248;
charges as to Southampton massacre, 249;
denials by abolitionist historians, 249;
abolitionist methods, 249, 250;
killing of Lovejoy, 250;
significance of abolition movement, 250, 251;
its growth, 251;
the moderates, 251;
petitions for abolition in District of Columbia, 251, 252;
position of Adams, 252, 253;
Quaker petition, 253;
position of Mason and Adams, 253;
more petitions, 253 (_see_ Petition, right of);
Dickson presents petitions, 254;
his controversy with Chinn, 254;
the Fairfield petitions, 254;
excitement begun by Slade's motion, 254;
Polk's ruling, 255;
action on Jackson's petitions, 255 _et seq._;
assumption as to ethical position, 265;
attitude of Calhoun and Rives, 267, 268;
the Vermont petition, 269;
the Calhoun resolutions, 269;
use of mails, 270 _et seq._ (_see_ Mail, United States);
significance of the contests over petitions and the mails, 274-277;
result of struggle over petitions, 296;
demands of Clay, 319;
criticism of Clay as to annexation, 320;
candidacy of Birney, 320;
position on Polk's first message, 324, 325;
as to war with Mexico, 330, 331;
attitude on Texan boundary, 355;
attitude to fugitive slave law of 1793, 355;
attitude to Clay's proposals, 357;
Webster's Seventh of March speech, 359;
effect of propaganda, 366;
nomination of Hale for presidency, 377;
the _National Era_ address, 389;
effect of the address, 400;
as to leaders of Emigrant Aid Company, 413;
relation of Kansas affairs to presidential nominee, 431;
point of view of the "Crime against Kansas," 439
Abolitionists, _see_ Abolition
Adams, John Quincy,
relation to Jackson, 34-36;
opinion of treaty with Spain, 36;
negotiations with Spain, 37, 38;
effect of Seminole War, 38;
declaration to Tuyl, 124, 125;
qualification as presidential candidate in 1824, 132-136;
electoral vote of 1824, 136, 137;
supported in House by Clay, 141;
the Kremer charge, 141;
elected president, 142;
offers State Department to Clay, 142, 143;
threats of opposition, 142, 143;
no proof of bargain with Clay, 143;
opposition to Administration organized, 144-146;
relation to Panama Congress, 148, 149;
nominates commissioners to the Congress, 149;
nomination confirmed, 150;
relation to Spain's colonies, 152, 153;
as to internal improvements, 155, 156;
message of December, 1826, 157;
appropriations approved for internal improvements, 169;
chairman of committee, 184;
reports tariff bill, 185;
bill passed, 186;
report on Bank, 191;
relation to Bank history, 192;
representations from Creek chiefs, 212;
orders Gaines to Georgia, 213;
controversy with Troup, 213, 214;
steps to carry out agreement of 1826, 214;
defiance of Georgia, 214;
submits matter to Congress, 215;
refers Cherokee affair to Jackson, 215, 216;
view of Indian titles, 217;
principles of administration reviewed by Supreme Court, 219;
relation to Cabinet intrigue against Jackson, 220;
as to authorship of Jacksonian principles, 240;
presents abolition petitions, 252;
his position on abolition, 252, 253;
prevents debate on abolition petitions, 253;
compared with Slade, 254;
opinion as to procedure on petitions, 256;
appeal for right of petition, 257;
presents petition on abolition, 258, 259;
his belief as to the right involved, 259;
effort at settlement, 260;
affair of February 6, 1837, 262;
address on annexation, 303
"Address on the Relations of the States and Federal Government," 179
"Address to the People of South Carolina," 179
Admiralty jurisdiction, proposal to decrease that of federal courts,
109
Africa, 41
Alabama, Commonwealth of,
in process of creation, 62;
slavery allowed, 63;
Indian problem in Jackson's message of 1829, 216, 217;
Alabama letter of Clay, 319, 320;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399;
Buford's men in Kansas, 438
Alamo atrocities, 293, 294
Albany Regency, The, 133;
in election of 1824, 137
Alien and Sedition Laws, 173
Alleghanies, The, 116, 129, 139, 163, 193
Ambrister, Robert C., 32, 36
Amelia Island, 30, 31
America for Americans, principle of, 418
American Anti-Slavery Society, formed, 251
American Board of Missions, sends out Whitman, 315
American Society for Emancipation, 62
"American System," The, 178, 189 (_see_ Clay, H.)
Ampudia, Pedro de, demands Taylor's withdrawal, 329
Anderson, Richard Clough, Jr.,
nominated commissioner to Panama Congress, 149;
nomination confirmed, 150
Appalachicola River, The, 21, 22, 25, 26, 31
Arbuthnot, Alexander, 32, 36
Archer, William S.,
opposition to Texas treaty, 308, 309;
his doctrine adopted by Tyler, 309;
report on Texas resolution, 322, 323
Arista, Mariana, notifies Taylor of beginning of hostilities, 329
Arkansas, Commonwealth of,
admitted, 290;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399
Arkansas, Territory of, 88
Arkansas River, the, 33
Army of the United States,
legislation upon, 13, 14;
troops in Florida, 24 _et seq._ (_see_ Mexico, and Kansas, Territory
of);
as to South Carolina, 230
Ashburton, Alexander Baring, first Baron, negotiations with Webster,
314
Ashburton Treaty, 303
Asia, California the road to, 332
Astor, John Jacob, understanding with the Government, 313
Astoria, founded, 312, 313
Atchison, Missouri, place of publication of _Squatter Sovereign_, 411
Atchison, David R.,
criticism of organization of Nebraska Territory, 382;
his record and influence, 412, 413;
on the Wakarusa, 429;
agrees with Robinson, 430;
causes Missourians to withdraw, 431;
repudiates the sacking of Lawrence, 438;
in command at Bull Creek, 445
Austin, Moses, secures Texan grant from Mexico, 291
Austin, Stephen Fuller, colonizes grant in Texas, 291
Austria, in Holy Alliance, 123
BADGER, GEORGE EDMUND,
contention as to Chase's amendment, 394;
offers amendment, 395
Baldwin, John, claims site of Lawrence, 415
Baltimore, Maryland,
petition for abolition, 252;
Hamlet case, 367;
conventions of 1852, 376
Baltimore & Ohio railroad, system begun, 169
Bank of the United States,
bill for its creation, 3;
Calhoun's argument, 4, 5, 6;
Clay's early view, 4;
Webster's objections, 6;
Clay's support, 6, 7;
modified bill passed by House, 7, 8;
attitude of Barbour, Bibb, Taylor, Wells, 8;
passed by Senate, 8;
bill of 1816 a Southern and national measure, 8, 14;
bank bill under comparison, 15, 16;
Jackson's message of 1829, 190;
later interpretations of Jackson's attack, 191, 192;
the troubles in New Hampshire, 191;
the opposition of principle, 192, 193;
origin of opposition to "money power," 193, 194;
origin of "State's rights" opposition to Bank, 194;
tax on branches in Ohio and Maryland, 194;
the results, 195;
relation to "relief party" in Kentucky, 195, 196;
Benton's attack, 196;
his resolution defeated, 196;
attitude of Benton, 197;
and of Jackson, 197, 198;
Bank supported by committees, 198;
Jackson's message of December, 1830, 198, 199;
relation of question to slavery, 198;
relation to politics, 198;
Jackson's second attack, 198, 199;
Benton's resolution of 1831, 199, 200;
Jackson's message of 1831, 200;
the Bank question before the people, 200, 201;
advice of Clay and Webster, 201;
petition for re-charter, 201;
relation of Bank question to question of Jackson's election, 201;
action by the Senate, 201, 202;
Clayton committee report in House, 202;
McDuffie's report on Bank, 202;
House passes the Senate bill, 202;
veto by Jackson, 202;
analysis of his message, 202-206;
interpretation of the message, 206-209;
the principles of Jackson ratified by the people, 209;
effect on Jackson's views of election on Bank issue, 279;
control of deposits, 279;
removal of McLane and Duane, 280;
deposits suspended by Taney, 280;
Taney's contention, 280, 281;
Senate's resolutions of censure, 281;
attitude of Benton, 281;
Jackson successful in all points, 282;
result of removal of deposits, 283;
enforcement and effect of Act of June 23, 283, 284;
Bank bills vetoed by Tyler, 286
Barbour, James,
supports bank bill, 8;
proposes union of Maine and Missouri bills, 82;
position on Maine-Missouri bill, 83;
on conference committee, 88;
letter to Troup, 212, 213;
controversy with Troup, 213
Barbour, Philip Pendleton,
in Missouri bill debate, 70;
opposes tariff bill of 1824, 113, 114
Beaufort, South Carolina, instructions to collector, 230
Beecher, Henry Ward, opposes fugitive slave law, 368
Behring's Strait, 123
Belgium, recognizes Texan independence, 304
Bell, John,
report on President's powers, 235;
proposition as to California and New Mexico, 359;
its reference, 359, 360;
on Committee of Thirteen, 360;
attitude to Kansas-Nebraska bill and to Douglas's amendment, 393;
speech against the bill, 396, 397;
vote on the bill, 399
Bell, P. H., extends jurisdiction of Texas, 362, 363
Benton, Thomas Hart,
attacks the Bank, 196;
resolution defeated, 196;
becomes Jackson's lieutenant, 197;
resolution against the Bank, 199;
his resolution not accepted, 200;
attack on practices of Bank, 201;
opinion on use of Government deposits by the Bank, 205;
defends Jackson against censure of Senate, 281;
criticism of Texas treaty, 308;
changes vote, 347;
opposition to Foote's motion, 360;
offers to cudgel Foote, 360
Berrien, John McPherson,
opinion of Indian agreement of 1826, 214;
report on Calhoun's proposition, 349, 350;
views on slavery in Mexican acquisition, 351, 352;
on Committee of Thirteen, 360
Bibb, William Wyatt, supports bank bill, 8
Biddle, Nicholas,
beginning of bank trouble, 191;
management of bank, 195
Birney, James G., effect of Clay's Alabama letter, 320
Bishop of London, 44
Black Jack, Brown captures Pate at, 441
Blair, Montgomery, letter to Welles on Seward, 387, 388
Blood, James,
at Kansas City, and at site of Lawrence, 414;
in "Free-State" directory, 443
Bloomfield, Joseph, voting, 73
Blow, Taylor, connection with Dred Scott case, 452
"Blue Lodges," in Missouri, 419
Body of Liberties, Massachusetts, 41
Bonaparte, Napoleon,
relation to slavery in Louisiana, 54, 55;
commercial system, 123;
relation to Holy Alliance, 123
Boon, Ratliff, in House proceedings, 254
Boston, Massachusetts,
beginning of Abolition, 246;
meetings on fugitive slave law, 367;
the Crafts case, 368;
the Shadrach case, 370;
the Sims case, 372, 373;
Kansas emigrants departing, 414
Boston and Albany railroad, survey begun, 169
Branscomb, Charles H.,
goes to Kansas, 413, 414;
at the site of Lawrence, 414;
buys claim of Stearns, 415
Branson, Jacob,
threatens Buckley, 428;
arrested by Sheriff Jones, 428;
rescued by "Free-state" men, 428, 429;
charges as to the rescue, 429;
effort to arrest participants in rescue, 433
Bright, Jesse D.,
motion as to Territorial governments, 346;
on Committee of Thirteen, 360
Brooks, Preston Smith,
assault upon Sumner, 439, 440;
effect of assault modified by Pottawattomie massacre, 442
Brown _vs._ Maryland [12 Wheaton, 419], 195, 198
Brown, John,
appears at Lawrence, 431;
the Pottawattomie massacre, 440;
the massacre characterized, 441;
captures Pate at Black Jack, 441;
dispersal of the gang and disappearance of Brown, 442;
effect of massacre, 442;
his work characterized, 473, 474
Brown, Mary, arrest of Hamlet, 367
Brown, R. P.,
organizes company of "Free-state" men, 426;
captured and murdered, 426
Buchanan, James,
position upon tariff bill of 1827, 158, 159;
attitude to fugitive slave law, 368;
candidate for presidential nomination, 376;
the Ostend manifesto, 408;
relation of his election to events in Kansas, 447;
inaugural address quoted, 447;
charge as to improper official conduct, 458;
appoints Walker and Stanton to office in Kansas, 461;
special message of February 2, 1858, 469
Buckley, ----, secures peace warrant against Branson, 428
Buenos Ayres, 30
Buffalo, New York, Free-soil convention, 347
Buford, Jefferson, repudiates sacking of Lawrence, 438
Bull Creek, Kansas,
Missourians encamped on, 445;
skirmish at, 445
Burrill, James, Jr., position on Maine-Missouri bill, 83
Burt, Armistead, moves amendment to Douglas's bill, 341
Bushnell, Horace, member of Emigrant Aid Society, 409
Bustamente, Anastasio, decree on immigration, 291
Butler, Andrew Pickens,
contention as to fugitive slave law, 371;
minority report on president's powers, 372;
in debate on Foote's resolutions, 374;
attacked by Sumner, 439
CABOT, SAMUEL, member of Emigrant Aid Society, 409
Calhoun, John Caldwell, 2;
committee service, 3;
argument for the bank, 4-6;
chief author of bank bill, 8;
speech on tariff bill, 10-12;
on internal improvements, 14-16;
views rejected by Madison, 17;
relation to Jackson, 34, 35;
effect of Seminole War, 38;
as to relation between protection and slavery, 109;
bill for internal improvements vetoed, 1817, 116, 117;
qualifications as presidential candidate in 1824, 133, 134;
as to vice-presidency, 138;
elected vice-president, 142, 143;
relation to administration, 143;
relation to Adams's administration, 144, 146;
elected vice-president, 163, 164;
political scientist of slavery, 173;
publishes "South Carolina Exposition," "Address on Relation of
States and Federal Government," and "Address to the People of
South Carolina," 179;
his argument, 180, 181;
his doctrine of nullification, 189;
relation to Jackson and Seminole War, 220;
the Forsyth letter, 220;
hostility of Jackson and Calhoun, 220, 221;
his letter to Governor Hamilton, 221;
his theory of nullification reproduced, 223;
resigns vice-presidency and becomes Senator, 224;
opinion on the position of South Carolina, 226, 227;
statement in Senate as to South Carolina's acts, 232, 233;
opinion of the "Force Bill," 234;
attitude to Clay's compromise tariff, 236;
attitude to the Wilkins "Force Bill," 236;
argument answered by Webster, 237;
attitude to Clay's bill, 237;
motive in course on nullification, 238;
restatement of Jefferson's principles, 239;
opinion of slavery cited, 253;
antedated by Hammond, 255;
contention as to petitions, 264;
view of slavery, 265-268;
resolutions of December 27, 1837, 269;
fallacy of his position, 270;
makes committee report, with bills, on use of mails, 273, 274;
his plan defeated, 274;
views on recognition of Texas, 295, 296;
view on annexation of Texas, 301;
his views expressed by Wise, 302;
again Secretary of State, 307;
notifies Texas of proposal to move forces, 307;
view of constitutional position of Texas, 308;
adopts idea of Archer as to annexation, 309;
views as to method of annexation, 321;
characterization of his views on annexation, 323, 324;
attitude to Mexican War, 330;
views as to slavery in Territories, 344, 345;
his last speech, 358;
his death, 360;
views on fugitive slave laws, 367
California,
as to Congress of Verona, 124;
occupied by Kearny, 332;
importance of its occupation, 332;
importance of Buena Vista, 333;
about to be transferred, 334;
acquisition in view, 337;
in negotiations, 337 (_see_ Upper California);
Polk's message of July 6, 1848, 345, 346;
motions of Bright and Clayton, 346;
the Clayton bill, 346, 347;
Polk's message of December, 1848, 348;
gold and silver discoveries, 348;
Douglas's bill, 349;
Smith's bill, 349;
Berrien's report, 349, 350;
new bill by Douglas, 350;
motion by Walker, 350, 351;
proceedings in Congress, 351;
views of Berrien and Webster, 351, 352;
failure of Congress to act, 352;
effect of discoveries, 352, 353;
plan of Taylor, 353;
the Monterey Convention, 353;
Taylor's message of December 4, 1849, 353, 354;
Foote's bill, 354;
Clay's plan, 355, 356;
objections of Southerners, 356;
attitude of abolitionists, 357;
application for admission, 357;
consideration begun, 357, 358;
Calhoun's last speech, 358;
Webster's Seventh of March speech, 359;
Bell's proposition, 359;
report of Committee on Territories, 360;
Committee of Thirteen, 360;
Clay's report, 360-362;
passage of bill for admission, 363, 364;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399;
Robinson in, 413;
Sutter land troubles, 413;
Robinson's experience in, applied to Kansas, 421, 422
Cambreleng, Churchill C., opposes tariff bill of 1824, 113
Canada, 21, 370, 374
Canning, George,
proposal to Rush, 125;
declaration to Polignac, 125
Cape Breton, 21
Capulets, tomb of the, 351
Cass, Lewis,
opposes Upham's amendment, 336;
views on relation of slavery and Mexican War, 338;
Presidential nominee, 345;
letter to Nicholson, 345;
on Committee of Thirteen, 360;
attitude to fugitive slave law, 368;
candidate for Presidential nomination, 376;
attitude to Chase and Douglas, 392
Castle Pinckney,
becomes seat of custom-house for Charleston district, 230;
Congress notified of change, 232
Catron, John, opinion on Dred Scott case, 453
Cerro Gordo, battle of, 333
Channing, William Ellery, opposition to fugitive slave law, 373
Chapultepec, battle of, 338
Charleston, South Carolina,
Government in control of anti-nullifiers, 181;
nullifiers elect mayor, 182;
test of tariff law, 182;
Scott ordered to, 230;
instructions to collectors, 230;
removal of custom-house, 230;
Congress notified, 232;
post-office robbed, 271;
committee of public safety elected, 271;
postmaster communicates with New York postmaster, 271;
the position of Postmaster-General Kendall, 271, 272
Chase, Salmon Portland,
contention as to fugitive slave law, 371;
signs _National Era_ address, 389;
moves amendment to Kansas-Nebraska bill, 391;
speech in Senate, 391;
proposes further amendment, 394;
contention with Pratt, 394, 395;
proposes third amendment, 395, 396;
proposes fourth amendment, 396;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399;
effect of _National Era_ address, 400
Chattahoochee River, the, 211, 214
Cheever, George Burrell, opposes fugitive slave law, 368
Cherokee Nation _vs._ Georgia [5 Peters, 1], 218
Cherokees,
brought under criminal jurisdiction of Georgia, 215;
appeal to President, 215, 216;
Jackson's reply, 216;
Cherokees refuse offers for cession of claims, 216;
the question in Jackson's message of 1829, 216, 217;
different views of Indian land titles, 217, 218;
Cherokee lands incorporated by Commonwealth of Georgia, 218;
the Cherokee nation case, 218;
the case of Worcester against Georgia, 218, 219
Cherubusco, battle of, 334
Cheves, Langdon, management of bank, 195
Chihuahua, captured by Doniphan, 332
Chili, treaty of 1823 with Columbia, 147
Chillicothe, O., bank trouble, 195
Chinn, Joseph W., resents Dickson's attack, 254
Choate, Rufus, attitude to fugitive slave law, 368
Christian baptism, relation to slavery, 44
Clark, George Rogers, sent out by Jefferson, 312
Clay, Henry,
views on the bank in 1812, 4;
Speaker of House, 6;
support of bank bill, 6, 7;
on tariff bill, 10;
relation to Jackson, 34, 35;
opinion of treaty with Spain, 36, 38;
suggests union of Maine and Missouri bills, 77;
plan of Clay, 100;
report of Committee of Thirteen, 100, 101;
first plan defeated, 101;
conference committee and its report on Missouri, 101, 102;
plan accepted, 102, 103;
supports tariff bill of 1824, 112, 113;
opposed by Barbour, Cambreleng and Webster, 113, 114;
efforts with reference to "Monroe Doctrine," 128;
qualifications as presidential candidate in 1824, 134-136;
electoral vote of 1824, 137;
in control of situation, 140, 141;
supports Adams, 141;
the Kremer charge, 141;
offer of secretaryship of state, 142, 143;
opposition threatened, 142, 143;
Clay accepts office, 143;
no proof of corruption, 143;
opposition in Senate to his appointment, 144;
approached by ministers of Mexico and Columbia, 147;
negotiations, 148, 149;
negotiations with Czar of Russia and with Spanish-American colonies,
152, 153;
his "American System" anticipated by Jackson, 172;
resolution on tariff, 186;
speech on the "American System," 187;
bill reported and tabled, 188;
his ideas used, 188;
nominated for presidency in 1831, 201;
advice to Bank party, 201;
proposes compromise tariff, 235;
his purposes, 235, 236;
attitude of Calhoun, 236;
his bill amended and passed by both Houses, 237, 238;
signed by President, 238;
motive in course on nullification, 238;
opinion of Jacksonian principles, 240;
criticises Calhoun's bill as to use of mails, 274;
his followers called Whigs, 282;
dropped by Whigs, 286;
reports resolution on Texas, 295;
nominated for presidency, 309;
election an apparent certainty, 319;
demands of abolitionists, 319;
the _National Intelligencer_ letter, 319, 320;
effect of the Alabama letter, 320;
presidential election of 1844, 320;
the Alabama letter, 329;
plan as to California, New Mexico and Texas, 355, 356;
objections of Southerners, 356, 357;
agrees to Douglas's motion, 357;
relations with Foote, 357, 358;
debate on Clay's resolutions, 358, 359;
their reference, 360;
chairman of Committee of Thirteen, 360;
Clay's report, 360-362;
results of debates, 362;
passage of bills separately, 363, 364;
attitude to fugitive slave law, 368;
motion on Shadrach case, 370;
motion on President's message, 371;
death, 377
Clayton, John Middleton,
secures appointment of committee on Bank, 202;
makes committee report against Bank, 202;
motion as to Territorial government, 346;
reports bill, 346, 347;
not voting on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 398, 399
Clemens, Jeremiah, in debate on Foote's resolutions, 374, 375
Clinton, DeWitt, qualifications as presidential candidate in 1824, 132
Coahuila-Texas,
a province and Commonwealth of Mexico, 291;
local government, 291;
resistance to Santa Anna, 292;
Texans in control, 292, 293;
war begun by Mexicans, 293;
declaration of independence, 293. _See_ Texas
Cobb, Thomas A., relation to Jackson, 34, 35
Coleman, L. H., letter from Jackson, 138
Coleman, F. N., murders Dow, 428
Columbia, treaties with Chili, Mexico, Peru, and Central America, 147
Colorado River, 291
Columbia, South Carolina, convention of 1827, 159, 160
Columbia River, 123;
sources discovered, 312, 314, 316, 318, 324, 325
Committee on Commerce of the House of Representatives, 185
Committee on District of Columbia of House of Representatives, 252,
253, 254, 257
Committee on the District of Columbia of the Senate, 253
Committee on Finance of the Senate, 198, 199
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, 321
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, 150, 295, 308, 322
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 232, 235,
369
Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, 82, 83, 84, 87, 232, 233,
341, 343, 349, 363, 371, 372
Committee on Manufactures of the House of Representatives, 110, 112,
158, 160, 172, 174, 175, 184, 185
Committee on Manufactures of the Senate, 188
Committee on Territories of the House of Representatives, 340, 382,
400, 401
Committee on Territories of the Senate, 349, 363, 382, 401
Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, 9, 10,
110, 172, 174, 185, 198, 231, 351
Compromise Measures of 1850,
in Fillmore's message, 368, 369;
in Fillmore's message of December 2, 1851, 374;
memorials on finality, 375;
Democratic platform of 1852, 376;
Whig platform of 1852, 376;
unity of Whig party imperilled, 376, 377;
effect of election of 1852, 377;
situation in December, 1852, 381;
the Howe-Giddings colloquy, 381, 382;
interpretation of the compromise, 382;
the Douglas report on Nebraska, 383-387;
dictum of the committee, 387;
claim of Dixon, 388;
as to Kansas-Nebraska bill, 389;
dictum of Douglas, 390;
the amendment of Chase, 391;
the amendment of Douglas, 392;
views of Everett, 392, 393 (_see_ Kansas, Territory of, and
Nebraska, Territory of);
effect of acquiescence, 403
Concord, New Hampshire, 191
Confederation of Spanish-American States,
plan initiated, 147;
proposed congress and relations of United States, 147 _et seq._
Congress of the Confederation,
lack of power over slavery, 48;
passed Ordinance of 1787, 48;
power in the case, 49
Congress, Continental, forbids importation of slaves, 48
Congress of the United States,
Acts of the Fourteenth, 1, 2;
Congress of 1801 and 1815, 3;
power over Bank, 4, 5;
early action on tariff, 8;
meeting in December, 1815, 9;
vote as to tariff, 9;
acts of the Fourteenth, 12-14;
discussion of its powers by Calhoun, 13, 14;
powers discussed by Monroe, 15;
pay of members, 16;
passage of internal improvements bill, 16;
acts as to Florida, 24, 25;
acts of 1811 as to Florida, 30;
limitation as to slavery, 50;
abolition of slave trade, 51;
division of Louisiana territory, 55, 56;
power over Territories, 63;
power to erect Commonwealths, 64;
attitude to slavery, 65;
debate on powers of Congress, 67 _et seq._;
annals of, 74;
powers discussed by Taylor, 79, 80, and by Holmes, 80, 81, and by
McLane, 81, 82;
Pinckney's argument on powers of, 84-87;
conference committee on Missouri, 88, 89;
interpretation of Act of Congress, 89;
significance of the Compromise, 90-95;
powers considered by Lowndes, 96;
Sergeant on power of creating Commonwealths, 96, 97;
course of Congress considered, 97, 98;
oath of members, 98;
second conference committee on Missouri, 101-103;
significance of the compromise, 104;
doctrine of its control of commerce, 110;
conference committee on tariff, 114, 115;
early practice as to internal improvements, 116, 117;
vote on internal improvements bill of 1822, 118;
Monroe on the powers of, 120, 121;
power over expenditures, 121;
act of April 30, 1824, 122;
inaction upon "Monroe Doctrine," 128;
Calhoun a member of, 133;
joint session for count of electoral votes, 141, 142;
as to power over roads, 155;
Act of April 30, 1824, 155, 156;
memorials to, 158;
attitude of South Carolina to, 159 _et seq._;
passes Maysville Road bill, 167;
appropriations for internal improvements, 169;
as to powers of, 170;
attitude to tariff, 178;
Calhoun's attitude to, 179;
control of courts by, 180;
President's message before, 184;
conference committee on tariff, 188;
attitude to the planters, 189;
decision on Bank Act of, 195;
relation to President as to legislation, 206, 207;
as a nominating body, 208;
failure to override Jackson's veto, 209;
inaction as to Indian problem, 215;
Jackson's message to, 216;
ten years' struggle of South in, 221;
its acts nullified, 222;
Jackson's messages on South Carolina, 231, 232;
abolition petitions to, 251, 252;
abolition petitions before, 253;
recommendations of Jackson, 272, 273;
argument as to power over mails, 273 _et seq._;
conflict with President over Bank, 279 _et seq._;
passage of Independent Treasury bill, 285, 286;
erection of new Commonwealths, 290;
President's message on Texas, 298;
action of Congress, 298-300;
effect of its action, 300;
address of certain Whig members, 303;
message of Tyler to, 305;
affairs of Texas, 306 _et seq._;
Tyler's message of December, 1844, 320, 321;
competency as to matters of treaty, 322;
Polk's message on Oregon, 324;
action as to Oregon, 325, 326;
power over Texan boundary, 328;
Act as to Corpus Christi, 329-331;
Polk's message on Mexican War, 330;
action on war, 331;
Polk's message to, August 8, 1846, 334;
consent to acquisition of California and New Mexico, 337;
Polk's message on Trist, 338;
as to attitude to Missouri Compromise, 341;
special message on Oregon, 344;
discussion of powers of, 344;
Cass on policy of, 345;
special message of July 6, 1848, to, 345, 346;
as to power in Territories, 347;
attitude to slavery, 348;
Taylor's message of December 4, 1849, 353, 354;
action on new Territories, 353 _et seq._;
Fillmore's message of August 6, 1850, 362;
completion of compromise measure, 363, 364;
Fillmore's message of December, 1850, 368;
petitions on fugitive slave law, 369;
Fillmore's message of December 2, 1851, 374;
Fillmore's message of December 6, 1852, 380;
action on organization of Kansas and Nebraska, 381 _et seq._;
Kansas election for delegate to, 416, 417;
Whitfield in, 418;
as to powers in Kansas, 422;
memorial from Kansas, 426;
Kansas question before, 432;
slavery question before, 433;
laws of, in Kansas, 464;
President's message of February 2, 1858, 469
Connecticut, Commonwealth of, 13;
legislation on slavery, 48;
in election of 1824, 142;
resolution on independence of Texas, 290;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399
Constitution of the Confederation, 48;
relation to Ordinance of 1787, 48, 49
Constitution of the United States of America, the,
as to Bank, 5;
as cited by Calhoun, 13;
as interpreted by Monroe, 17;
relative to parties, 17, 18;
slavery in, 49, 50;
interpreted with reference to national character of slavery, 59;
the control of slavery, 62, 65;
powers of Congress, 63, 64;
test of the Tallmadge amendment, 66 _et seq._;
Taylor as to powers of Congress, 79;
Holmes' speech, 80, 81;
McLane's argument, 81, 82;
limitations on new Commonwealths, 85;
as to restriction on Commonwealths, 89;
significance of the first Missouri Compromise, 90-95;
as cited by Lowndes, 97;
cited by Sergeant, 97;
extent of its protection, 98, 99;
second Missouri compromise, 102, 103;
significance of the compromise, 104, 106;
as to fourteenth amendment, 105;
Taylor's interpretation of, 119;
Monroe's interpretation of, 120, 121;
development of the particularistic interpretation, 122;
as construed by Adams, and Clay, 146;
as to international status of slavery, 151;
amendment proposed, 155;
reaction as to interpretation of, 156;
as interpreted by Buchanan, 159;
amendment suggested by Jackson, 167, 168;
as interpreted by Taylor, 168, 169;
as interpreted by McDuffie, 173, 174;
as interpreted by Calhoun, 178-181;
regard for processes of, 181;
as interpreted by Calhoun, 183;
as to origin of revenue bill, 188;
political science of, 192, 193;
decision as to constitutionality of Bank Act, 195;
as construed by Jackson, 199;
Jackson on operation of, 205, 206;
effect of his Bank veto, 207-209;
as cited by Jackson, 216, 217;
the Cherokee nation case, 218;
case of Worcester _vs._ Georgia, 218, 219;
powers conferred on President by, 220;
as interpreted in the Nullification Ordinance, 222;
as construed by the nullifiers, 227;
as interpreted in Jackson's proclamation, 229;
as expounded by Calhoun, 236;
as explained by Webster, 237;
effect of events of 1832 and 1833 on, 238-241;
as to control of civil status, 247, 248;
attitude of Garrison to, 248;
guarantees as to right of petition, 255, 256;
in Calhoun's argument, 273;
provision as to treaties, 305;
nature of war according to, 306;
as to treaty-making powers, 307, 308;
as to annexation of Texas, 321;
as to procedure on treaties, 324;
as interpreted by Rhett, 342;
as to Oregon bill, 343;
compromises of, 348;
as to extension of its effect, 350;
amendment suggested by Calhoun, 358;
Webster on the, 359;
effect of formation of, 366;
as to fugitive slaves, 366, 367;
as interpreted by Fillmore, 370;
as interpreted by Butler, 372;
as cited by Fillmore, 374;
in Douglas's report, 383, 392;
as viewed by Everett, 393;
in Chase's amendment, 394;
treason, as defined by, 427;
the Dred Scott case, 449 _et seq._
Continental Congress. _See_ Congress, Continental
Contreras, battle of, 334
Convention, Federal Constitutional, of 1787, attitude to slavery, 49,
50
Convention. _See_ Treaty
Conway, M. F., letter to Governor Reeder, 424
Cooke, P. St. George,
ordered to attack Topeka, 445;
refuses to obey, 445
Cooper, James,
on committee of Thirteen, 360;
not voting on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 398
Cooper, Thomas,
speech at Columbia, 159;
his life and views, 173;
his relation to slavery and to McDuffie, 173
Corpus Christi,
made port of delivery, 329;
advance of Taylor, 329
Cos, Martin Perfectos de,
attacks Gonzales, 293;
driven from Texas, 294
Cotton,
relation to slavery, 52, 53;
exportation reduced, 54
Crafts, Ellen, escape, 368
Crafts, William, escape, 368
Cramer, John, motion in House, 254
Crane, A. C., statement as to Dred Scott case, 449, 450
Crawford, William Harris,
relation to Jackson, 34, 35;
opinion of treaty with Spain, 36;
effect of Seminole War, 38;
qualifications as presidential candidate in 1824, 132, 133, 136,
141;
electoral vote of 1824, 137;
relation to Adams' administration, 144-146;
relation to Jackson and the Seminole War, 220
Creeks, the, 26, 29;
Council of 1824, 212;
Indian Springs convention, 212;
its repudiation, 212;
resistance to Georgia, 212;
protest to general government, 212, 213;
controversy as to Creek lands, 213, 214;
new agreement of 1826 as to lands, 214;
agreement repudiated by Georgia, 214
"Crime against Kansas," the, delivered, 439
Cuba,
in the Spanish-American troubles, 152-154;
the Ostend manifesto, 408
Cumberland Road,
built, 116;
bill of 1822, 118;
analysis of vote, 118, 119;
attitude of East and West, 119, 120
Curtis, Benjamin Robbins, opinion on Dred Scott case, 454, 457, 458
Curtis, George Ticknor,
attitude to fugitive slave law, 368;
in Shadrach case, 370;
connection with Sims case, 373
Cushing, Caleb, relation to Kansas-Nebraska bill, 401
Customs Act,
of 1789, 8;
of 1812, 9
DAGGETT, DAVID, voting, 74
Dallas, Alexander James,
presents Bank memorial, 201;
on Senate committee, 201;
reports Bank bill, 201
Davis, Jefferson,
views as to slavery in Territories, 344, 345;
moves amendment to Oregon bill, 344;
effect of his action, 345;
attitude to Clay's proposal, 357;
views on fugitive slave law, 367;
contention as to fugitive slave law, 371;
relation to Kansas-Nebraska bill, 401, 402;
disapproves Col. Sumner's course, 443;
attitude to Kansas affairs, 472, 473
De Bree, John, owner of Shadrach, 370
Declaration of Independence, the, 70, 92, 94, 193, 229, 245
Delaware, Commonwealth of, 8;
legislation on slavery, 48;
in election of 1828, 163;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399
Democratic party,
appearance, 38, 104;
principles, 104;
circumstances of its appearance, 146;
party nomenclature, 162, 163;
demands of 1828, 163;
the making of its creed, 165;
divisions of the party and policies of each, 165;
origin and influence, 193, 194;
radical development in Kentucky, 195, 196;
attack of western element upon privilege, 196;
Jackson becomes leader, 196, 197;
opposes Gordon's proposal as to independent treasury, 285;
supports Independent Treasury Bill of 1840, 285;
relation to the questions of slavery and territorial extension, 287,
288;
nominates Polk for presidency, 309;
the platform, 309, 316;
views of the union of Texas and Oregon in platform, 317;
Thompson's opinion, 317;
characterization the work of the Democrats, 317;
platform of 1844, 318;
attitude to Wilmot proviso, 338;
platform of 1848 as to slavery in Territories, 344, 345;
the Clayton committee, 346;
election of 1848, 348, 349;
convention of 1852, 376;
election of 1852, 377;
controversy on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 391;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399;
attitude of Pierce to New York factions, 402;
vote in House on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 404, 405;
meaning of the vote, 405, 406;
as to leaders of Emigrant Aid Company, 413;
effect of Kansas struggle, 417;
relation to rise of Republican party, 418;
Lane's effort at organization in Kansas, 423;
relation of Kansas affairs to national party organization, 430, 431;
effect on party prospects of sacking of Lawrence, 438;
as to effect of events in Kansas, 447;
effect of Dred Scott decision, 458;
plan as to Democracy in Kansas, 462
Denver, John W.,
appointed Acting-Governor of Kansas Territory, 467;
his report to the President, 468, 469;
pockets bill for constitutional convention, 471
Deseret, Foote's bill, 354
Des Moines River, the, Falls of, 66
De Witt, Alexander, signs _National Era_ address, 389
Dickerson, Mahlon, reports tariff bill in Senate, 188
Dickinson, Daniel Stevens, on Committee of Thirteen, 360
Dickson, John,
presents abolition petitions, 254;
controversy with Chinn, 254
District of Columbia,
adoption of Maryland laws, 51;
exclusive government vested in central Government, 247, 248;
petitions for abolition of slavery in, 251, 252;
report on slavery in District, 253;
disposal of Quaker petitions, 253;
more petitions in House, 254;
contest begins, 254;
petitions presented by Dickson and Fairfield, 254;
the Dickson-Chinn controversy, 254;
Slade's motion, 254;
Granger's intimation, 257;
the demand of Wise, 257, 258 (_see_ Petition, Right of);
Pinckney resolutions quoted, 261;
re-enacted, 262;
Vermont petition, 265, 269;
effort of Calhoun as to slavery in the District, 268;
recurrence of the slavery question, 355;
Clay's plan, 356;
attitude of Southerners, 357;
attitude of abolitionists, 357;
Clay's report, 362;
bill passed, 364.
_See_ Washington, D. C.
Dixon, Archibald,
proposes amendment to Nebraska bill, 387;
Blair's letter on Dixon, 387, 388;
attitude of Douglas, 388
Dodge, Augustus Cæsar, introduces bill on Nebraska, 382
Donaldson, J. B.,
proclamation as to resistance to service of writs, 435;
dealings with citizens of Lawrence, 436, 437;
appears with force before Lawrence, 437;
dismisses posse, 438;
the sacking of Lawrence, 438
Doniphan, Alexander William, captures Chihuahua, 332
Douglas, Stephen Arnold,
attitude to Wilmot proviso, 338;
presents bill on Oregon in House, 340, 341;
presents bill in Senate on Oregon, 343;
moves amendment, 347;
changes vote, 347;
reports bill, 349;
Berrien's adverse report, 349, 350;
new bill on Territories, 350;
motion as to California, 357;
attitude to fugitive slave law, 368;
candidate for presidential nomination, 376;
early plans for organization of territory west of the Mississippi,
381;
presents bill and report on Nebraska, 382, 383;
consideration of report and its author, 383-387;
attitude to Dixon, 388;
presents new bill on Nebraska and Kansas, 389;
_National Era_ address, 389, 390;
Douglas's reply, 390;
charged with conspiracy, 391;
his principle as to slavery in Territories, 391;
amendment to bill, 392;
vote on his amendment, 393;
debate on further amendments, 394-397;
proposes amendment, 395, 396;
final argument on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 397, 398;
substance of bill reported in House bill, 400;
Douglas's bill in House, 401, 403;
effect of Dred Scott decision on Douglas Democrats, 458;
opposition to Buchanan, 469, 470
Douglas county, Kansas,
Sheriff Jones of, 428;
charge of Chief Justice Lecompte, 435;
indictment by Grand Jury, 435
Dow, C. M., murdered by Coleman, 428
Downs, Solomon W., on Committee of Thirteen, 360
Drayton, William, relation to nullification, 181
Dred Scott _vs._ Sandford [19 Howard, 293], 447, 449 _et seq._
Duane, William John, removed from head of Treasury Department, 280
Dutch Traders, at Jamestown, 40
Dutch Henry's Crossing, massacre at, 440;
the massacre characterized, 441;
and denounced by settlers, 441;
effect of massacre, 442;
the work characterized, 473, 474
EAST FLORIDA, 21
Eaton, John Henry, as to Bank trouble, 192
Easton, Kansas, election trouble at, 426
Election, presidential,
of 1820, 129;
of 1824, 130-137;
in House of Representatives, 140-142;
of 1828, 163, 164;
of 1832, 189, 190 _et seq._;
of 1836, 283;
of 1840, 286;
of 1844, 320;
of 1848, 349;
of 1852, 377;
of 1856, relation to election of Whitfield in Kansas, 417;
indications as to election of 1856, 440;
of 1856, as related to affairs in Kansas, 446, 447
Electoral Colleges, 50
Ellis, Powhatan, ordered to make final demand on Mexican Government,
299
El Paso, 361
Emancipation, early schemes for, 243, 245
Embargo, of 1807, 54
Emerson, Dr.,
owner of Dred Scott, 450;
his will, 450
Emerson, Irene,
owner of Dred Scott, 450;
sells him to Sandford, 451
Emigrant Aid Company,
misrepresentations as to, 411;
conference with Robinson, 413;
excitement occasioned in Missouri, 413;
claims as to its purpose, 419;
indictment against hotel in Lawrence, 435
England, 21, 45, 368
English, William Hayden, bill on Kansas, 470, 471
Erie Canal, 132
Eustis, William, efforts for admission of Missouri, 100
Everett, Edward,
reply to McDuffie, 176;
speech on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 392, 393;
not voting on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 398
Ewing, Thomas, on Bank Committee of Senate, 201
FAIRFIELD, JOHN, presents abolition petition, 254
Federal Party, 12, 104;
extinction, 129;
its errors, 129;
effects of War of 1812, 130;
principles on which it lost power, 239
Field, Roswell M., connection with Dred Scott case, 449, 452
Fillmore, Millard,
becomes President, 360;
message on Texas, 360;
message of December, 1850, 368, 369;
opposition of Giddings, 369;
message on Shadrach case, 370, 371;
report on President's powers, 372;
message of December 2, 1851, 374;
contest in Whig Convention of 1852, 376;
message of December 6, 1852, 380, 381
Fitchburg, Massachusetts, home of Charles Robinson, 413
Flint River, 22
Florida,
its acquisition, 19-38;
treaty of Florida Seminoles, 290;
constitution formed, 290;
admitted as Commonwealth, 290;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 390
Floyd, John, message on Southampton massacre, 249
Foote, Henry Stuart,
bill for Territories, 354;
criticises Clay, 357, 358;
motion on Bell's resolutions, 359;
accepts amendment, 360;
draws pistol on Benton, 360;
introduces finality resolutions, 374;
passed by House and rejected by Senate, 375
"Force Bill," the. _See_ Wilkins, William
Foreign affairs,
relation to party development, 122;
the Holy Alliance, 123-125;
the "Monroe Doctrine," 125-128;
significance of the diplomatic questions, 129;
success of Van Buren, 164.
_See_ Committee on Foreign Relations
Forsyth, John,
letter as to intrigue against Jackson, 220;
letter from Morfit, 296, 297
Fort Brown, attempt at relief, 329
Fort Jackson, treaty of, 26, 29
Fort Leavenworth,
Robinson at, 414;
arrival of Governor Reeder, 416;
Governor authorized to call troops from, 432;
Sumner returns to, 442
Fort Monroe, transfer of artillery, 230
Fort Moultrie, transfer of artillery, 230
Fort Riley, Branscomb at, 414
Fort Scott, 31
Fort Titus, Kansas conflict at, 444
Fowltown, destroyed, 28, 29
France, 21, 22, 23, 24;
abolition of slavery, 54;
gets Louisiana territory, 54, 65;
in Holy Alliance, 123;
relation to Congress of Verona, 124;
boundary dispute with Spain, 290;
recognizes Texan independence, 304;
cedes Louisiana to United States, 312, 318, 395. _See_ Treaty
Francis, Indian priest, 26
Franklin, Kansas,
Jones goes to, 428;
Lane and Robinson accompany Shannon to, 430, 431;
as to treaty of August 17, 444
Free-Soil party,
Buffalo convention of 1848, 347;
nomination and platform, 347, 348;
nomination of Hale, 377;
the _National Era_ address, 389;
its effect, 400;
vote in House on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 404, 405;
meaning of the vote, 405, 406;
appearance of Eli Thayer, 408, 409;
as to leaders of Emigrant Aid Company, 413;
effect of Kansas struggle, 417;
relation of Free-soil party to rise of Republican party, 418;
effect of Dred Scott decision, 458
Frémont, John Charles, effect of events in Kansas on his candidacy in
1856, 447
French Republic, the, 23
Fugitive slave law,
passed by Congress, 51;
law of 1850, 363, 364 (_see also_ Slavery);
law of 1850 makes slavery a national matter, 366;
its further effect, 366, 367;
views of Calhoun, Davis, and Rhett, 367;
the Hamlet case, 367;
efforts at repeal of law, 367, 368;
the Crafts case, 368;
the "Underground" established, 368;
attitude of the lawyers, 368;
Fillmore's message of December, 1850, 368, 369;
Fillmore's message, 369;
motion of Giddings, 369;
petitions for repeal, 369, 370;
the Shadrach case, 370;
Fillmore's message, 370, 371;
debate on Clay's motion, 371;
report on powers of President, 371, 372;
the Sims case, 372, 373;
Boston meetings, 373;
leaders of opinion, 373;
the "Jerry rescue," 373, 374;
Fillmore's message of December 2, 1851, 374;
debate on Foote's finality resolutions, 374, 375;
the result, 375;
petitions for repeal, 375;
Whig convention of 1852, 376;
attack by Sumner, 377;
effect of election of 1852, 377;
various policies as to slavery, 377-379
Fuller, Timothy, in Missouri bill debate, 68
"Fundamentals," Massachusetts, 41
Furness, William Henry, opposes fugitive slave law, 368
GAINES, EDMUND PENDLETON,
in Florida, 28, 30, 31;
ordered to Georgia, 213;
authorized to advance into Texas, 298
Garland, James, reply to Slade, 258
Garrison, William Lloyd,
beginning of abolition, 246;
estimate, 246;
the constitutional situation, 246-248;
attack on the Constitution, 248;
publishes the _Liberator_, 251;
compared with moderates, 251;
opposition to fugitive slave law, 373
Geary, John White,
appointed governor of Kansas with authority over troops, 446;
at Lecompton and Lawrence, 446;
enforces withdrawal of Missourians, 446, 447;
his resignation, 447
Geography, relation to political development, 20
Georgetown, South Carolina, instructions to collector, 230
Georgia, Commonwealth of, 8, 26, 27, 28, 33;
slavery prohibited, 43;
conditional cession of western lands, 50, 56;
attitude to internal improvements bill of 1817, 118;
attitude to internal improvements bill of 1822, 119;
stock held in United States Bank, 203;
nullification in Georgia, 210;
conditional cession of lands of 1802, 211;
the attempt to erect an Indian State, 211;
problem of land titles in Georgia, 211, 212;
legislature memorializes for quieting of Indian claims, 212;
the Indian Springs convention, 212;
its repudiation, 212;
the attempt to survey the lands, 212;
Barbour's letter to Troup, 212, 213;
quieting of Indian titles by agreement of 1826, 214;
Georgia repudiates the agreement, 214;
defiance of central Government, 214, 215;
President refers matter to Congress, 215;
Congress fails to act, 215;
legislature extends criminal jurisdiction over Cherokees, 215;
Jackson's opinion of Georgia's position, 216;
obstinacy of the Cherokees, 216;
the question in Jackson's message of 1829, 216, 217;
opinions of Indian titles, 217;
the solution in Georgia, 217, 218;
legislature incorporates Cherokee lands in the Commonwealth, 218;
the Cherokee Nation case, 218;
the case of Worcester against Georgia, 218, 219;
failure to execute decision, 219, 220;
convention in, 375;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399;
Jackson's Georgians in Kansas, 438
Ghent, treaty of, 9, 26
Giddings, Joshua Reed,
denounces Fillmore and Webster, 369;
colloquy with Howe, 381, 382
Glascock, Thomas, attitude on procedure as to petitions, 259
Goliad, atrocities, 293
Gonzales, attacked, 293
Gordon, William F.,
proposal as to independent treasury, 285;
relation of parties to its rejection, 285
Gorham, Benjamin,
attitude to tariff bill of 1823, 111;
reply to McDuffie, 176
Gorostiza, Manuel Eduardo de, leaves Washington, 299
Granger, Francis, claim as to District of Columbia, 257
Grasshopper Falls, Kansas, convention at, 464
Great Britain,
treaty of 1763, 21, 23;
treaty of 1783, 22;
war of United States with, 24;
treaty of 1814, 26;
Nicholls's proposition to, 27;
Indian allies of, 29;
relations with United States as to slaves, 58, 59;
claims in North Pacific, 123;
relation to Holy Alliance, 123, 124;
proposal as to Holy Alliance, 125;
Canning's declaration, 125;
diplomatic relations, 287;
Ashburton Treaty, 303;
recognizes Texan independence, 304;
as mediator between Mexico and Texas, 304;
the London letter of British plans, 304;
claims to Oregon, 311;
Nootka Convention, 311, 312;
effect of war with Spain, 312;
Treaty of Utrecht, 312;
claim of United States, 312, 313;
treaty of 1818 with United States, 313;
effect of treaty of 1819 between United States and Spain, 313;
agreement of 1828 with United States, 314;
in Ashburton-Webster negotiations, 314;
ignorance as to Oregon, 314, 315;
the work of Whitman, 315, 316;
Democratic platform of 1844, 316;
negotiations as to Oregon, 321;
statement of negotiations in Polk's first message, 324;
his recommendations, 324;
action of Congress, April, 1846, 325, 326;
treaty of June, 1846, 326;
possibility of holding California, 332;
result of treaty with, 339;
United States minister to, 408
Great lakes, 325
Greeley, Horace, views on election of 1844, 320
Grimke, Thomas Smith, relation to nullification, 181
Grinnell, Moses H., member of Emigrant Aid Society, 409
Guadalupe Hidalgo, treaty of,
terms, 336;
ratified by Senate, 339
HALE, EDWARD EVERETT, member of Emigrant Aid Society, 409
Hale, John Parker,
moves amendment to Oregon Bill, 344;
effect of his action, 345;
contention as to fugitive slave law, 371;
presents petitions for repeal of fugitive slave law, 375;
nominated for presidency, 377;
popular vote compared with Van Buren's in 1848, 377
Hamilton, James,
the Calhoun letter, 221;
calls special meeting of legislature, 221;
chairman of nullification convention, 221;
sends ordinance of nullification to legislature, 224
Hamlet, James, arrest, 367
Hamlin, Hannibal, presents petition in Senate, 370
Hammond, James Hamilton,
motion not to receive abolition petitions, 255;
wrangle over his two motions, 256
Harrisburg, Penn., convention of 1824, 139
Harrison, William Henry,
voting, 73;
nominated for presidency, 286;
succeeded, on his death, by Tyler, 286
Harvey, James Madison, commands column of "Free-state" force, 445
Hayne, Robert Young,
theory on tariff, 114;
view of slave labor, 161;
view repeated by McDuffie, 177;
Calhoun and the Webster debate, 179;
criticism of Clay's resolution on tariff, 187, and amendment of it,
188;
on Bank committee of Senate, 201;
his inaugural as governor of South Carolina, 224
Hayti,
its affairs mentioned by Salazar, 151;
consideration of its example in the United States, 152;
isolated, 154
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, cited on human purpose, 243, 244
Heister, William, presents abolition petition, 253
Herrera, José Joaquin de,
refuses to receive Slidell, 328;
gives way to Paredes, 328
Hill, Isaac, in Bank trouble, 191
Hillards, the, in Crafts case, 368
Hillis Hajo, 32
Himallemico, 32
Holmes, John,
voting, 73;
presents Maine petition for admission, 77;
reports bill, 77;
speech on Missouri, 80, 81;
on conference committee, 88
Holy Alliance,
formation, 123;
relation to England, 124;
Congress of Verona, 124;
Canning's declaration to Polignac, 125;
the "Monroe Doctrine," 125-128;
relation to Spain's colonies, 153, 154
Holst, Hermann Edouard von,
opinions reviewed, 27;
opinion of Jackson's veto message considered, 206, 207
Holyoke, Massachusetts, residence of Branscomb, 413
Home Government [of England], as to baptism of slaves, 44
Hopkinson, Joseph, committee service, 3
House of Representatives, of the United States,
action on Madison's message, 3;
Clay, Speaker of, 6;
passage of Bank bill, 7, 8;
reference of tariff matters, 9;
debate on tariff, 10-12;
passage of tariff bill, 12;
debate on internal improvements, 13, 14;
pay of members, 16;
passage of internal improvements bill, 18;
second passage of internal improvements bill, 18;
vote on censure of Jackson, 35, 36;
representation in, 63;
petitions from Missouri, 66;
debate on the Tallmadge amendment, 66 _et seq._;
passage of Tallmadge amendment and Missouri bill, 73;
disagreement with Senate, 74;
petition from Maine referred, 75;
Maine bill passed by House, 75;
Missouri bill and Taylor's amendment, 78-80;
Holmes's speech, 80, 81;
McLane's speech, 81, 82;
Pinkney's speech on powers of Congress, 84-87;
disagreement with Senate, 88;
conference committee, 88-89;
significance of the compromise, 90-95;
Missouri constitution considered, 95, 96;
report of Lowndes, 96;
speech of Sergeant, 96, 97;
consideration of the question, 97, 98;
defeat of the Lowndes bill, 99;
tables Senate bill, 99;
Clay's proposals, 100;
report of committee of thirteen, 100, 101;
defeat of the bill and amendment, 101;
second conference committee, 101, 103;
plan to limit membership, 109;
reference of Monroe's recommendations, 110;
tariff bill of 1823, 110, 111;
tariff bill of 1824, 112;
Clay's argument, 112, 113;
replies to Clay, 113, 114;
conclusion in conference committee, 114, 115;
early votes on internal improvements, 117;
vote on internal improvements bill of 1822, 117, 118, 119, 120;
Monroe's letter on internal improvements, 120, 121;
vote on vetoed bill, 121;
Clay, Speaker of, 134;
election of President in, 140-142;
memorials on tariff, 158;
tariff bill passed, 159;
tariff bill reported, 160;
vote on tariff bill, 162;
vote on vetoed Maysville road bill, 168;
question as to reference of President's message, 172-174;
tariff bill before House, 174, 175;
McDuffie's argument, 175, 176, 177;
reference of President's message, 184, 185;
tariff bill before, 185, 186;
tariff bill passed, 186;
refusal to concur with Senate, 188;
conference committee, 188;
report on the Bank, 198;
relation of members of constituencies, 200;
reports on Bank, 202;
bill for re-charter passed, 202;
Jackson on duty of members, 206;
early control of presidential elections, 208;
action on President's message, 231, 232;
bill reported on President's powers, 235;
claim as to origin of tariff bills, 236;
passage of tariff bill and "Force Bill," 237;
abolition petitions in, 252;
report on petitions, 253;
more petitions referred, 253;
action on Dickson's motion, 254;
conflict over right of petition, 254 _et seq._;
adoption of the Pinckney resolutions, 261;
further work of Adams and Slade, 262;
rule of January 8, 1840, 263;
Gordon's amendment in, 285;
resolutions as to recognition of Texan independence, 296;
contingent action as to Texan independence, 299, 300;
effect of action, 300;
Wise's speech in, 302;
Tyler's message on Texan treaty, 309;
action on annexation of Texas, 321, 322;
action on admission of Texas, 322;
concurrence with Senate's action on Texas, 323;
McKay's bill, 335;
the Wilmot proviso, 335, 336;
Oregon bill in, 341;
action on Oregon bills, 343;
rejects Clayton bill, 347;
final agreement with Senate, 347;
action on erection of California and New Mexico, 349 _et seq._;
completion of compromise measures, 363, 364;
action on President's message, 369;
passage of finality resolutions, 375;
action on organization of Kansas and Nebraska, 381 _et seq._;
contest for seat in, 432;
appointment of committee of investigation for Kansas affairs, 433;
memorials from Kansas, 433;
bill for admission of Kansas, 442, 443;
action on Kansas, 470.
_See_ Congress of the United States
Houston, Samuel,
leader of Texans, 293;
Benton's description, 293, 294;
his early record, 294;
San Jacinto and the presidency of Texas, 294;
sends special envoy to Washington, 306;
promise of Murphy disavowed, 307;
changes vote, 347;
speech on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 393;
vote on Douglas's amendment, 393;
speech on the bill, 397;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399
Houston, S. D., withdraws from Kansas Territorial legislature, 421
Howard, William A., on committee for Kansas investigation, 433
Howe, John W., discussion with Giddings, 381, 382
Hudson Bay Company,
agents in Oregon, 314;
relation to policy of Great Britain, 314;
representations as to Oregon, 314, 315
Hunt, Memucan, proposes Texan annexation to Van Buren, 301
Hutchinson, William, in "Free-state" directory of Kansas, 443
IBERVILLE RIVER, the, 21, 22
Illinois, Commonwealth of,
slavery forbidden, 62, 63;
condition on erection, 68, 69, 71;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399;
as to Dred Scott case, 450
Independent treasury,
Van Buren's message of September 4, 1837, 284, 285;
Gordon's proposal, 285;
attitude of the parties, 285;
Act of July 4, 1840, 285;
party contest over the bill, 285, 286
Indian Springs, Convention at, 212
Indiana, Commonwealth of,
slavery forbidden, 62, 63;
condition on erection, 68, 69, 71;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399
Indiana, Territory of,
relation to slavery, 51;
jurisdiction over part of Louisiana Territory, 55
Ingersoll, Joseph R.,
claim as to District of Columbia, 257;
reports joint resolution on Texas, 321
Ingham, Samuel D.,
in debate, 10;
position upon tariff bill of 1827, 158;
as to Bank trouble, 191
Internal improvements,
bill presented, 14;
Calhoun's speech, 15, 16;
bill passed, 16;
President's veto, 17;
Madison's earlier recommendations, 17;
failure to overcome veto, 18;
development in theory, 116-119;
the Act of 1806, 116;
Calhoun's bill of 1817 vetoed by Madison, 116, 117;
analysis of vote, 117, 118;
Cumberland road bill of 1822, 118;
analysis of vote, 118, 119;
Taylor's position, 119;
attitude of East and West, 119, 120;
Monroe's veto, 120, and message, 120, 121;
vote on vetoed bill, 121;
Act of April, 1824, 122;
relation to foreign affairs, 122;
significance of the questions, 129;
Adams's first message, 155;
Van Buren's opposition, 155;
relation to political divisions, 156;
practical difficulties, 156, 157;
Jackson's views in 1829, 167;
passage of Maysville road bill, 167;
the veto, 167, 168;
vote on vetoed bill, 168;
analysis of vote, 168;
significance of veto, 169;
appropriations approved by Adams and Jackson, 169;
relation to private enterprise, 169, 170;
relation to slavery, 170;
Jackson's message of December, 1830, 178;
Jackson's message of December, 1831, 184
Iowa, Commonwealth of,
admitted, 290;
memorial of legislature on finality resolutions, 375;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399
JACKSON, ANDREW,
in Florida, 24, 25, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33;
attempt at censure, 34, 35, 36;
vindicated, 36;
Territorial governor of Florida, 38;
effect of Seminole War, 38;
qualifications as presidential candidate in 1824, 135, 136, 139,
141;
electoral vote of 1824, 136, 137;
the Coleman letter, 138;
opposition to Adams threatened, 142, 143, and begun, 144, 146;
elected President, 163, 164;
makes Van Buren secretary of state, 164;
vigorous foreign policy, 164;
first annual message, 166, 167;
vetoes Maysville road bill, 167, 168;
significance of the veto, 169;
appropriations approved by Adams and Jackson, 169;
message of December, 1829, as to tariff, 171, 172;
its reference, 172;
message of December, 1830, 178;
message of December, 1831, 184;
message of December, 1829, 190;
later interpretations of his attack on Bank, 191, 192;
relation to "relief party" in Kentucky, 196;
leader of Democratic party, 196, 197;
attitude to Bank, 197, 198;
his views opposed by committees, 198;
message of December, 1830, 198, 199;
his message of December, 1831, 200;
puts the Bank question before the people, 200;
relation of Bank question to question of Jackson's election, 201;
effect of his veto of Bank bill, 202;
analysis of his message, 202-206;
opinion of von Holst on the veto message considered, 206, 207;
the message interpreted, 206-209;
relation of Congress to his election as President, 207;
the people accept the principles of Jacksonian democracy, 209;
opinion of Georgia's claims, 216;
reply to Cherokees, 216;
message of December, 1829, 216, 217;
different opinions of Indian titles, 217;
failure to execute decision of Supreme Court, 219, 220;
view on South Carolina's opinion of tariff, 220;
supposition as to Cabinet intrigue of 1819, 220;
the Forsyth letter, 220;
hostility of Jackson and Calhoun, 220, 221;
message of December, 1832, 228;
proclamation of December 10, 1832, 228-230;
active military preparations, 230, 231;
instructions to collectors, 230;
instructions to Scott, 230, 231;
popular approval of Jackson's course, 231;
attitude of Congress, 231;
Hayne's proclamation, 232;
Jackson's message of January, 1833, 232;
Bell's report on President's powers, 235;
signs Compromise Tariff, and "Force Bill," 238;
motive in course on nullification, 238;
significance of his doctrines, 239, 240;
as to responsibility for Jacksonian principles, 240;
message of 1835 as to use of mails, 272, 273;
decides to destroy the Bank, 279;
power of removal, 279;
removal of McLane and Duane, 280;
the work of Taney, 280;
consideration of the proper exercise of power, 280;
censured by Senate, 281;
Benton begins effort at removal of censure, 281;
his contest successful, 282;
tendency of government to his day, 282;
his successor, 284;
sends Morfit to Texas, 296;
message of December 21, 1836, on Texas, 298;
special message as to reprisals, 298;
authorizes Gaines to advance into Texas, 298;
orders Ellis to make demands on Mexico, 299;
satisfaction not given, 299;
special message of February 6, 1837, 299;
request for unusual powers not granted by Congress, 299;
recognizes Texas and her agent, 300;
ends diplomatic relations with Mexico, 301
Jackson, William, presents abolition petition, 255
Jackson, Zadock, repudiates sacking of Lawrence, 438
Jalapa, captured by Scott, 333
Jamestown, slaves introduced at, 40
Janus, gates open, 260
Jefferson, Thomas, 2, 3;
relation to French philosophy, 129;
share of Congress in his election as President, 207;
principles restated by Calhoun, 239;
tendency of government from his day, 282;
sends out Lewis and Clark, 312;
view as to extent of Louisiana, 312
Johnson, Robert Ward, position on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 393
Johnson, William, relation to nullification, 181
Johnson County, Kansas, contested election, 465
Johnston, Josiah S., on bank committee of Senate, 201
Jones, George Wallace, position on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 393
Jones, John W., reply to Adams on right of petition, 257
Jones, Samuel J.,
as sheriff, arrests Branson, 428;
rescue of Branson, 428;
goes to Franklin and calls help from Missouri, 428, 429;
his error recognized, 430;
serves writ on Wood, 433;
tries to arrest Tappan, 434;
attempt to assassinate, 434;
Donaldson's reference to the shooting, 436;
the sacking of Lawrence, 438
KANSAS CITY, MO., 316;
Branscomb and Robinson at, 413, 414
Kansas, Territory of,
bill for organization of, 389;
the abolition protest, 389, 390;
reply of Douglas, 390;
amendment of Chase, 391, 392;
position of Wade, 391;
amendment of Douglas, 392;
views of Everett, 392, 393;
speech of Houston, 393;
position of Bell and the committee, 393;
vote on the amendment, 393;
Chase's amendment, 394, 395;
Pratt's amendment, 394;
Walker's declaration and Badger's amendment, 395;
Chase's third amendment, 395, 396;
Douglas's amendment, 395, 396;
Chase's fourth amendment, 396;
speech of Bell against bill, 396, 397;
speech of Houston, 397;
final argument of Douglas, 397, 398;
vote on bill in Senate, 398;
analysis of vote, 398, 399;
rise of popular opposition, 399, 400;
the Richardson bill, 400;
the Senate bill in the House, 401;
position of Cushing, Davis, and Pierce, 401-403;
action in House, 403;
management of bill by Stephens, 404;
bill signed by President, 404;
analysis of vote, 404, 405;
meaning of the vote, 405, 406;
relation of Act to slavery, 407, 408;
the struggle for Kansas, 407 _et seq._;
the plan of Thayer and his associates, 409;
organization of the society, 409, 410;
opposition, 410;
incorporation of the society, 410, 411;
misrepresentations as to Emigrant Aid Company, 411;
considered as of the South, 412;
influence of Atchison, 412, 413;
expedition of Robinson and Branscomb, 413, 414;
"Platte County Self-defensive Association," 414, 415;
the founding of Lawrence, 415;
trouble over contesting claimants, 415, 416;
arrival of Governor Reeder, 416;
election of Whitfield, 417;
effect on Republican party of interference of Missourians in Kansas,
418;
significance of the seating of Whitfield, 418;
census of Kansas, 419;
interference of Missourians in election of first Territorial
legislature, 419, 420;
action on contested election cases, 420;
supplementary elections, 421;
first Territorial legislature, 421;
Robinson's plan for anti-slavery party, 421, 422;
legislature meets at Pawnee, 422;
pro-slavery members seated, 422, 423;
trouble over adjournment to Shawnee Mission, 423;
arrival of Sharpe's rifles, 423;
Lane's faction checked by Robinson's Lawrence speech, 423, 424;
Robinson's declaration as to slavery, 424;
Conway's letter to Reeder, 424;
beginning of the "Free-state" movement, 424;
legislation upon slavery, 424;
its effect on the North, 424, 425;
the Lawrence and Topeka conventions, 425;
the adoption of the Topeka constitution, 425;
removal of Governor Reeder, 425;
Woodson Acting-Governor, 425;
election of Reeder as Congressional delegate, 425;
election of Robinson as Governor, 425;
conflicts between "Free-state" and Territorial Governments, 426;
petition for admission and election of Senators by "Free-state"
party, 426, 427;
characterization of "Free-state" acts, 427;
Robinson's message to legislature, 427;
arrival of Governor Shannon, 427;
the Leavenworth convention, 428;
conflict between the two governments, 428;
the Branson rescue, 428, 429;
invasion of Missourians, 429;
Lawrence committee meet Governor Shannon, 429;
Shannon goes to Lawrence, 430;
agreement of Shannon with citizens of Lawrence, 430;
Lane, Robinson, and Shannon at Franklin, 430;
Atchison and the withdrawal of the Missourians, 430, 431;
appearance of John Brown, 431;
Shannon's report to President, 431;
appeal of leaders at Lawrence, 431;
the President's proclamation, 432;
attitude of "Free-state" party to proclamation, 432;
difficulty of the situation, 432, 433;
organization under Topeka constitution, 432;
contest for seat in House of Representatives, 432, 433;
House appoints committee of investigation, 433;
application for admission under Topeka constitution, 433;
work of Jones and attempt to assassinate him, 433, 434;
the assault repudiated by the "Free-state" party, 434;
letters of Robinson and Sumner, 434;
Lecompte's charge to grand jury, 435;
the "treason indictments," 435;
Donaldson's proclamation, 435, 436;
dealings of citizens of Lawrence with Shannon and Donaldson, 436,
437;
the sacking of Lawrence, 438;
repudiation by Atchison and others, 438;
the "Crime against Kansas," 439;
the attack on Sumner, 439, 440;
the Pottawattomie massacres, 440;
attitude of the Congressional committee, 440;
characterization of the massacre, 441;
denunciation by settlers, 441;
Brown and Pate at Black Jack, 441;
Shannon's proclamation and the work of the troops, 442;
effect of massacre on "Free-state" cause, 442, 443;
committee report and bill in House, 442, 443;
dispersal of legislature at Topeka, 443;
Smith succeeds Sumner, 443;
the Lawrence convention and the directory, 443;
"Free-state" military force organized and in conflict, 444;
capture of Titus, 444;
treaty of August 17, at Lawrence, 444;
resignation of Shannon, 444;
Woodson again Acting-Governor, 444;
proclamation of August 25, 444;
Missourians under Atchison in camp on Bull Creek, 445;
destruction of Ossawattomie, 445;
Smith's orders as to invaders, 445;
Lane leads in skirmish at Bull Creek, 445;
Woodson's order and Cooke's refusal to attack Topeka, 445;
failure of plan to attack Lecompton, 445, 446;
active steps by President, 446;
actions of Geary, 446;
retirement of the Missourians, 446, 447;
resignation of Geary, 446;
effect of events on presidential election, 447;
Buchanan's inaugural address, 447, 448;
plan for convention at Lecompton, 461;
Walker and Stanton in charge, 461;
negotiations of Stanton with "Free-state" men, 461, 462;
address by Walker, 462;
the party situation, 462;
the "Free-state" legislature, 462;
the "Free-state" mass-meeting, 463;
chances of the Topeka constitution, 463;
Robinson's plan to capture Territorial government, 463;
Wilson's advice, 463;
the Topeka mass-meeting, 464;
the Grasshopper Falls convention, 464;
census completed, 464;
Lecompton convention assembles, 464;
the election of October 5, 465;
contests in McGee and Johnson counties, 465;
Lane's conspiracy and its failure, 465, 466;
mass-meeting and convention at Lecompton, 465, 466;
the Lecompton constitution, 466;
"Free-state" demands on Stanton, 466, 467;
constitution to be submitted in full, 467;
Stanton removed, 467;
Denver appointed Acting-Governor, 467;
Lecompton Constitution accepted in election of December 21, 467;
Lecompton Constitution rejected in election of January 4, 1858, 468;
"Free-state" men in control of three Governments in Kansas, 468;
Denver's report to the President, 468, 469;
President submits Lecompton constitution to Congress, 469;
attitude of Douglas, 469, 470;
Lecompton bill passed by Senate and rejected by House, 470;
the House proposal rejected, 470;
the English bill, 470, 471;
the proposals rejected in Kansas, 471;
a fourth government erected, 471;
close of the struggle, 471;
characterization of the leaders, 471, 472;
attitude of the general government, of Davis, and of Sumner, 472,
473;
Act of 1854 the beginning of error, Missourians the beginners of
wrong, 473;
characterization of John Brown's work, 473, 474;
relation of events in Kansas to Civil War, 473, 474.
_See_ Nebraska, Territory of
Kansas-Nebraska bill, 343, 456 (_see_ Kansas, Territory of; and
Nebraska, Territory of);
effect of the Dred Scott dictum, 460
Kansas river, 66, 414
Kearny, Philip,
ordered to occupy New Mexico, 331;
orders to Doniphan, 332;
occupies California, 332
Kelly, ----, Editor of _Squatter Sovereign_, 411
Kendall, Amos, instructions to New York postmaster, 271, 272
Kentucky,
created Commonwealth with slavery, 50, 62, 63;
attitude to tariff of 1824, 115;
attitude to internal improvements bill of 1817, 118;
attitude to internal improvements bill of 1822, 119;
legislature nominates Clay for presidency, 136;
attitude toward tariff bill of 1827, 158;
relation to tariff of 1832, 188;
relief measures for debtors, 195, 196;
electoral vote in 1844, 320;
views as to slave policy, 378;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399
Kickapoo Rangers,
organized, 426;
capture Captain Brown, 426
King, Rufus, voting, 74
King, William Rufus,
states his creed on State sovereignty, 269, 270;
on Committee of Thirteen, 360
Kinsey, Charles, on conference committee, 88
Know Nothing party, 418
Kremer, George, charge against Adams and Clay, 141
LACOCK, ABNER, voting, 74
Lake of the Woods, 312, 313
Lane, James S.,
effort to organize Democratic party in Kansas, 423;
elected Senator by "Free-state" party, 426;
negotiations with Shannon, 430;
at Franklin, 430;
indictment against, 435;
as to service of indictment, 435;
in command of "Free-state" force, 435;
failure to arrive at Lecompton for attack, 445, 446;
result of his prevarications, 463;
conspiracy against Lecompton convention, 465;
thwarted, 465, 466
Lawrence, Amos Adams,
member of Emigrant Aid Society, 409;
his work, 411;
conference with Robinson, 413;
town named in honor of, 415
Lawrence, Kansas,
site occupied, 411;
town founded, 415;
quarrels as to claims, 415, 416;
Robinson's speech of July 4, 1855, 423;
convention at, 425;
the Branson rescue, 428;
Missourians approach, 429;
committee sent to Shannon, 429;
Shannon goes to, 430;
agreement of citizens with Governor Shannon, 430;
appearance of John Brown, 431;
appeal of citizens to President, 431;
Jones serves writ on Wood, 433;
trouble with Tappan, 434;
attempt to assassinate Jones, 434;
communications of Robinson and Sumner as to assault on Jones, 434;
indictment against hotel and newspapers in, 435;
Donaldson's proclamation, 435, 436;
dealings of citizens with Shannon and Donaldson, 436, 437;
Donaldson's force approaches the town, 437;
sacking of the town, 438;
repudiation of the deed, 438;
effect of the sacking and of assault on Sumner, 440;
effect of sacking modified by Pottawattomie massacre, 442;
"Free-state" convention at, 443;
treaty of August 17, 444;
Geary at, 446;
Stanton at, 461;
Wilson meets Robinson at, 463;
"Free-state" forces ordered to meet at, 465
Leavenworth, Kansas,
"Free-state" company organized at, 426;
convention at, 428
Lecompte, S. D., charge to grand jury of Douglas County, 435
Lecompton, Kansas,
the Branson rescue, 428;
citizens summoned to, by Donaldson, 435;
conflict at Fort Titus, 444;
failure of plan to attack Lecompton, 445, 446;
Geary at, 446;
plan for convention at, 461;
as to work of convention, 463;
convention assembles at, 464;
Lane's conspiracy against convention at, 465;
"Free-state" mass-meeting at, 465, 466;
constitution formed at, 466;
legislature meets at, 467.
_See_ Kansas
Lewis, Meriwether,
sent out by Jefferson, 312;
on the Columbia, 312
Lewis, William B., 33;
the Coleman letter, 138
Lexington, Kentucky, 167
_Liberator, The_, publication begun, 251
Liberties, Body of, 41
Lincoln, Abraham, intimation as to official conduct of Taney, 456
Loki, the, of Kansas, appears, 431
London, 26, 33
London, Bishop of, as to baptism of slaves, 44
Loring, Charles Greeley, in Sims case, 372
Lorings, the, in Crafts case, 368
Louisiana, Commonwealth of,
erected, 56;
slavery in, 56, 62, 63, 65;
condition on erection, 69, 71;
relation to tariff of 1832, 188;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399
Louisiana territory, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 37;
added to public domain, 51;
slavery in, 54, 55, 56, 57;
owned by France and Spain, 54;
ceded to United States, 55;
divided, 55;
early ownership and division, 65;
condition on cession to United States, 72;
motion of Thomas as to slavery, 84;
motion renewed, 87;
carried, 88;
conference report, 88;
relation to Missouri bill, 92, 93;
ceded to France, and to United States, 312;
as to inclusion of Oregon, 312;
cession of 1803, 318;
effect of acquisition, 366;
act of 1820, 382;
as to the Douglas report on Nebraska, 384;
as to repeal of Acts of 1820, 391;
as to Dred Scott case, 450, 452
Louisiana, Territory of,
organized, 56;
name changed, 56.
_See_ Missouri, Territory of
Lovejoy, Owen, killed, 250
Lowell, John, member of Emigrant Aid Society, 409
Lowell, Massachusetts, meetings on fugitive slave law, 368
Lower California, 337
Lowndes, William,
committee service, 9;
on conference committee, 88;
reports bill on Missouri, 95, 96;
bill defeated, 99;
relation of family to nullification, 181
Lundy, Benjamin, instigates abolition petition, 252
MCCULLOCH _vs._ Maryland [4 Wheaton, 316], 205
McDuffie, George,
opinion on slave labor, 161;
chairman ways and means committee, 172;
relation to Dr. Cooper, 173;
contention as to origin of tariff bills, 173, 174;
reports a tariff bill, 174;
its terms and disposal, 174;
forms economic basis of nullification, 175, 176, 177;
opposition to tariff, 177;
amendment lost, 177;
as to bill of 1832, 185;
tariff bills in House, 186;
attitude to the Bank, 198;
makes minority report in support of Bank, 202
McGee County, Kansas, contested election, 465
McGregor, Gregor, 30
McHenry, Jerry, rescue of, 373, 374
McKay, James J., introduces bill, 335
McLane, Louis,
speech on Missouri, 81, 82;
removed from head of Treasury Department, 280
McLean, John, voting, 73
Macon, Nathaniel,
committee service, 3;
position on Maine-Missouri bill, 83
Madison, James,
his message of 1815, 2, 3;
vetoes internal improvements bill, 17;
earlier recommendations, 17;
relation to Republican party, 17;
relation to War of 1812, 17;
as to relation between slavery and protection, 109;
vetoes bill, 1817, for internal improvements, 116, 117;
his views, 117
Mail, United States,
effect of presence of abolition literature, 251;
use by abolitionists, 270 _et seq._;
Charleston, South Carolina, post-office robbed, 271;
request of Charleston postmaster to New York postmaster, 271;
refusal to receive abolitionist documents in New York post-office,
271;
Kendall's instructions to the postmasters, 271, 272;
the question in Jackson's message, 272, 273;
Calhoun's report and bill, 273, 274;
criticism by Clay, 274;
defeat of the bill, 274;
Act of July 2, 1836, 274;
significance of the contest, 274-277
Maine, Commonwealth of,
constitution formed, 76;
petition for admission, 77;
bill introduced and passed by House, 77;
bill in Senate, 82;
connection with Missouri bill, 82, 83, 87;
amended bill passed in Senate, 88;
House disagrees, 88;
conference committee report, 88, 89;
bill approved by president, 89;
significance of the controversy, 88, 90 _et seq._;
attitude to tariff of 1824, 114;
attitude toward tariff of 1824, 115;
attitude toward tariff bill of 1827, 158;
in election of 1828, 164;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399
Mallary, Daniel,
reports tariff bill of 1827, 158;
opposes bill of 1828 as reported, 160, 161
Mangum, Willie Person,
motion as to Clay's and Bell's resolutions, 360;
on Committee of Thirteen, 360
Mann, Abijah, Jr., motion in House, 258
Mann, Horace, opposition to fugitive slave law, 373
Martin, Luther, letter to Maryland legislature, 49, 50
Maryland, Commonwealth of, 9;
legislation on slavery, 48;
Martin's letter to legislature, 49, 50;
laws of, in District of Columbia, 51;
domestic slave trade, 57, 58;
relation to Cumberland road, 116;
attitude to internal improvements bill of 1817, 118;
attitude to internal improvements bill of 1822, 119, 120;
in election of 1828, 163, 164;
tax on Bank of the United States, 194;
decision on the tax, 195;
relation to slavery in District of Columbia, 253;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399
Mason, James Murray,
reads Calhoun's speech, 358;
on Committee of Thirteen, 360
Mason, Jeremiah, in Bank trouble, 191
Mason, John Young,
calls yeas and nays, 253;
yields to Adams, 253;
the Ostend manifesto, 408
Mason, Jonathan, voting, 73
Mason and Dixon's Line, 163
Massachusetts, Commonwealth of, 13;
slavery recognized, 41;
slave laws, 46;
substantial abolition of slavery, 48;
separation of Maine, 76 _et seq._;
as a type, 86;
as to citizenship law, 99;
attitude to tariff bill of 1823, 111;
and to that of 1824, 114;
attitude toward tariff of 1824, 115;
attitude toward tariff bill of 1827, 158;
abolition petition in House, 255;
laws on jails, 370;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399;
legislature grants charter to Thayer's society, 409
Matamoras,
concentration of Mexican troops at, 328;
approach of Taylor, 329;
occupied by Taylor, 331
Maurepas, Lake, 21, 23
May, Samuel Joseph, the "Jerry rescue," 374
Maysville road bill,
passed, 167;
vetoed, 167, 168;
vote on vetoed bill, 168;
analysis of vote, 168
Mellen, Prentiss, position on Maine-Missouri bill, 83
Mexico,
as to Congress of Verona, 124;
treaty of 1825 with Colombia, 147;
revolts from Spain, 291;
the Austin grant, 291;
establishment of federal government, 291;
Bustamente's decree on immigration, 291;
refuses to sell any Texan territory, 292;
overthrow of federal government, 292;
possibility of complications with, 296;
minister leaves Washington, 298, 299;
demand by Ellis, 299;
full satisfaction refused, 299;
impossibility of regaining Texas, 300;
diplomatic relations with United States resumed, 301;
the claims commission, 301, 302;
Great Britain as mediator between Mexico and Texas, 304;
threatens war on United States, 305;
claims Texans are still rebels, 305;
Benton's criticism of the Texas treaty, 308;
relation of war to election of Polk, 320;
threatens war, 320;
Tyler's message of 1844, 320, 321;
makes annexation of Mexico a casus belli, 327;
envoy leaves Washington, 327;
Slidell's mission, 327, 328;
governments of Herrera and Paredes, 328;
gathering of forces at Matamoras, 328;
position of Mexico with reference to Texan boundary, 328;
war with United States, 329-334;
title between Nueces and Rio Grande, 330, 331;
persistence of the Government, 332;
Santa Anna again in control, 332;
Polk's message of August 6, 1846, 334, 335;
McKay's bill and the Wilmot proviso, 335-337;
Polk's message of December, 1846, 335;
the First embassy, 337;
rejection of proposals, 337;
the Mexican offer, 337;
war resumed, 337, 338;
treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 338;
result of treaty with, 339;
proposal as to Mexican acquisitions, 341, 342, 349, 350;
views of Berrien and Webster as to slavery in Mexican acquisitions,
351, 352;
Foote's bill, 354;
problem of Texan boundary, 354, 355;
Clay's plan, 356;
opposition of Southerners, 356;
attitude of abolitionists, 357;
relation of Mexican acquisition to slavery, 408
Mexico, City of, captured, 338
Mexico, Gulf of, 20, 21, 297, 307, 337, 363
Michigan, Commonwealth of, 290;
electoral vote in 1844, 320;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399;
early Republican party in, 418
Mississippi, Commonwealth of,
created with slavery, 62, 63;
legislature calls Nashville convention, 375;
convention in, 375;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399
Mississippi River, the, 21, 22, 38, 66, 78, 290, 381
Missouri, Commonwealth of, 33;
creation, 61-107;
significance of the circumstance, 65;
petition for erection, 66;
memorial for erection, 66;
the Tallmadge amendment, 66-73;
bill for erection passed by House, 73;
bill passes Senate without Tallmadge amendment, 74;
disagreement, 74;
question again presented, 74, 75;
Taylor's plan, 75, 76, 78;
Storrs's plan, 78;
Taylor's motion and argument on it, 78 _et seq._;
Holmes's speech, 80, 81;
McLane's speech, 81, 82;
memorial for admission referred, 82;
connection with Maine bill, 82, 83, 87;
argument of Pinkney, 84-86;
motion of Thomas, 84, 87, 88;
amended bill carried in Senate, 88;
House disagrees, 88;
agreement of conference committee, 88, 89;
report accepted, 89;
bill signed by President, 89;
consideration of the results, 90-95;
proposed constitution before Congress, 95;
the Lowndes bill, 95, 96;
opposition of Sergeant, 96, 97;
consideration of the situation, 97, 98, 99;
defeat of Lowndes bill, 99;
Smith bill passes Senate, 99;
tabled by House, 99;
efforts of Eustis, 100;
Clay's plan, 100;
report of Committee of Thirteen, 100, 101;
plan defeated, 101;
opposition of Tomlinson, 101;
conference committee and its report, 101, 102;
report attached, 102;
resolution passed, 102, 103;
effects of the compromise, 103-107;
decision brings slavery into national politics, 108;
attitude toward tariff of 1824, 115;
attitude toward tariff bill of 1827, 158;
relation to tariff of 1832, 188;
admitted as Commonwealth, 289;
line of compromise in Burt's amendment, 341, and in Douglas's
amendment, 347;
the compromise in connection with the Oregon bill, 348;
views as to slavery policy, 378;
bill to organize territory west of, 381;
Atchison's objection to such organization, 382;
Dixon and the repeal of the Compromise, 387, 388;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399;
misrepresentations as to Emigrant Aid Company, 411;
the "border ruffians," 411, 412;
attitude to slavery in Kansas, 412;
influence of Atchison, 412, 413;
"Platte County Self-defensive Association," 414, 415;
claimants to site of Lawrence, Kansas, 415, 416;
interference in election of Whitfield in Kansas, 416, 417;
relation of Missouri Compromise and Republican party, 417, 418;
effect on Republican party of Missourian interference in Kansas,
418;
organization in "Blue Lodges," 419;
interference in Kansas Territorial election, 419, 420;
Kansas legislature at Shawnee Mission, 423;
Robinson's declaration as to slavery in, 424;
Missourians summoned by Sheriff Jones, 429;
Missourians on the Wakarusa, 429;
attitude of Shannon toward Missourians, 430;
influenced by Atchison to withdraw, 430, 431;
claims of intended invasion, 431, 432;
preparation for further invasion, 435, 436;
volunteers under Pate, 441;
dispersal of volunteers under Whitfield in Kansas, 441, 442;
import of Woodson's accession to power, 444;
Missourians on Bull Creek and at Ossawattomie, 445;
new invasion of Kansas, 446;
forced to retire by United States troops, 446, 447;
as to Dred Scott case, 450-452;
decision of Supreme Court of Missouri, 451;
the Missourians the beginners of wrong, 473
Missouri, Territory of,
organized, 56;
slavery in, 56, 65
Missouri River, the, 66, 414
Mitchell, David B., 28, 29
Mobile, cession of river and port of, 21
Mohawk and Hudson railroad, begun, 169
Molino del Rey, battle of, 338
Monroe, James,
relation to Jackson, 31, 34, 35;
as to relation between protection and slavery, 110;
messages of 1821 and 1822, 110;
message of 1823, 111;
veto of 1822, 120;
message on internal improvements, 120, 121, 156;
message of December, 1823, 125-128;
electoral vote of 1820, 129;
interpretation of message of 1823 by Spanish-Americans, 146, 147,
149;
cabinet intrigue against Jackson, 220
"Monroe Doctrine," the, 125-128, 146
Monterey,
captured by Taylor, 331, 332;
Doniphan sent to, 332
Monterey, California, convention at, 343
Moors, 45
Morfit, Henry M.,
agent to Texas, 296;
report to Forsyth, 296, 297
Murphy, W. S.,
letter from Upshur, 304;
assurance to Texas of protection, 306;
promise to Houston disavowed, 307
NAPOLEON. _See_ Bonaparte
Napoleonic decrees, 54
Nashville convention, 375
National Assembly of France, 54
_National Era_, the,
protest against Kansas-Nebraska bill, 389;
effect of the address, 400
_National Intelligencer_, letter of Clay, 319, 320
National Republican party,
the origin, 104;
circumstance of appearance, 146;
party nomenclature, 162, 163;
insists on taking the Bank as a campaign issue, 200, 201;
nominates Clay for presidency, 201;
feeling toward Jackson, 202;
its defeat in 1832, 202;
basis of party action, 278, 279;
known as Whig party, 281, 282. _See_ Whig Party
Navy of the United States, legislation upon, 13, 14
Nebraska, Territory of,
bill for organization passed by House, 381;
the Howe-Giddings colloquy, 381, 382;
speech of Atchison, 382;
bill introduced by Dodge, 382;
bill and report by Douglas, 382, 383;
consideration of the report and its author, 383-387;
dictum of the committee, 387;
Dixon's proposal, 387;
Seward and Dixon, 387, 388;
new bill presented by Douglas, 389;
abolition protest in _National Era_, 389;
reply of Douglas, 390;
amendment of Chase, 391;
position of Wade, 391;
amendment of Douglas, 392;
views of Everett, 392, 393;
Houston's speech, 393;
position of Bell and committee, 393;
vote on amendment, 393;
Chase's amendment, 394, 395;
contention of Badger and Pratt, 394;
declaration of Walker and Badger's amendment, 395;
Chase's third amendment, 395, 396;
Douglas's amendment, 395, 396;
Chase's fourth amendment, 396;
speech of Bell against bill, 396, 397;
speech of Houston, 397;
final argument of Douglas, 397, 398;
vote in Senate on bill, 398;
analysis of vote, 398, 399;
rise of popular opposition, 399, 400;
the Richardson bill, 400;
Senate bill in House, 400;
position of Cushing, Davis, and Pierce, 401-403;
actions in House, 403;
management of bill by Stephens, 404;
bill signed by President, 404;
analysis of vote, 404, 405;
meaning of the vote, 405, 406;
relation of Act to slavery, 407, 408;
considered as of North, 412;
immigrants to Kansas through, 445;
the Act of 1854 the beginning of error, 473
Negro Fort, 28, 29
Negro labor, adapted to the South, 42
Negro slavery. _See_ Slavery
Nelson, Samuel, position on Dred Scott case, 452
Nelson, John, Secretary of State,
disavows Murphy's promise to Houston, 307;
relation to Texas question, 307
New England, 7, 59;
opposed to internal improvements bill of 1817, 117;
attitude to improvements bill of 1822, 119;
attitude upon Maysville road bill, 168;
votes as to Pinckney resolution, 263
New England Anti-Slavery Society, formed, 251
New Hampshire, Commonwealth of,
legislation on slavery, 48;
attitude toward tariff of 1824, 115;
in election of 1824, 142;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399
New Jersey, Commonwealth of,
legislation on slavery, 48;
attitude on Maysville road bill, 168;
legislative memorial on finality resolutions, 375;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399
New Mexico,
Kearny ordered to occupy, 331;
importance of Buena Vista, 333;
about to be transferred, 334;
acquisition in view, 337;
in negotiations, 337;
treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 338;
Polk's message of July 6, 1848, 345, 346;
motions of Bright and Clayton, 346;
the Clayton bill, 346, 347;
Polk's message of December, 1848, 348;
Douglas's bill, 349;
Smith's bill, 349;
Berrien's report, 349, 350;
new bill by Douglas, 350;
motion of Walker, 350, 351;
failure of Congress to act, 352;
Taylor's message of December 4, 1849, 354;
Foote's bill, 354, as to question of Texan frontier, 355, Clay's
plan, 355, 356;
Webster's Seventh of March Speech, 359;
Bell's propositions, 359, 360;
report from committee on Territories, 360;
Committee of Thirteen, 360;
Clay's report, 360, 361;
encroachments of Bell, 362, 363;
passage of bill for territorial organization, 363, 364;
as to the Douglas report on Nebraska, 384;
Chase on Act of 1850, 391
New York, Commonwealth of,
legislation on slavery, 48;
attitude to internal improvements bill of 1817, 118;
attitude to internal improvements bill of 1822, 119;
in election of 1824, 137;
in election of 1828, 164;
attitude on Maysville road bill, 168;
electoral vote in 1844, 320;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399
New York Central Railroad, system begun, 169
New York City,
attitude to tariff bill of 1823, 111;
and to that of 1824, 114;
attitude to tariff of 1824, 115;
attitude toward tariff bill of 1827, 158;
postmaster refuses to receive abolitionist documents, 271;
the instructions from Kendall, 271, 272;
arrest of Hamlet, 367;
meetings on fugitive slave law, 367;
publication of protest against Kansas-Nebraska Act, 389
New York _Courier and Enquirer_, applies name to Whig Party, 282
Nicholls, Edward, 25, 26, 27, 28
Nicholls Fort, 27, 28
Nicholson, A. O. P., letter from Cass, 345
Niles, John Milton, presents memorial on Texas, 295
Nootka Convention, 311
North Carolina, Commonwealth of,
conditional cession of western lands, 50, 56;
attitude to internal improvements bill of 1817, 117, 118;
attitude to internal improvements bill of 1822, 119;
stock held in United States Bank, 203;
electoral vote in 1844, 320;
vacancy in Senate delegation, 398;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399
Northwest, the,
attitude to internal improvements bill of 1817, 118;
attitude to internal improvements bill of 1822, 119
Nueces, River, 300, 316, 329, 330, 337, 361
Nullification,
origin, 169;
economic basis, 175, 176, 177;
attitude of South Carolina, 176;
threatened by McDuffie, 177;
Calhoun's publications, 179, and argument, 180, 181;
parties in South Carolina, 181, 182;
nullification or rebellion, 183, 184;
Calhoun's theory, 189;
in Georgia and South Carolina, 210;
the South Carolina convention, 221;
the Ordinance of Nullification, 222, 223;
Ordinance sent to the legislature, 224;
Hayne's attitude, 224;
acts for enforcement of Ordinance, 224-226;
views on the position of South Carolina, 226-228;
South Carolina in Jackson's message of 1832, 228;
Jackson's proclamation of December 10, 1832, 228-230;
Jackson's message of January, 1833, 232;
execution of Ordinance postponed, 235;
character of nullification defined by Webster, 237;
Ordinance of Nullification withdrawn, 238;
motive of leaders in affairs of nullification, 238;
nullification as represented by Amos Kendall, 272
OBREGON, PABLO, negotiations as to Panama Congress, 147, 148, 149
Ohio, Commonwealth of,
slavery forbidden, 62, 63;
condition on erection, 68, 69, 71;
appropriation of enabling act, 116;
tax on Bank of United States, 194;
the result, 195;
memorial on Texas, 296;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399
Ohio River, the, 48, 62, 63, 167
Oliver, Mordecai,
on committee for Kansas investigation, 433;
investigates Pottawattomie massacre, 440
Onis, Luis de, 37, 38
Orders in Council, British, 54
Ordinance of 1787,
passed, 48;
authority of the Congress, 49;
restriction on slavery, 69;
in Douglas's bill, 341;
in the Smith bills, 349
Oregon,
its "re-occupation" in the Democratic platform, 309;
points in the question, 310;
Oregon of the last century, 311;
Spanish and English claims, 311;
the Nootka Convention, 311, 312;
effect of war between Spain and Great Britain, 312;
ceded to France and to United States, 312;
work of Lewis and Clark, 312;
treaty of Utrecht, 312;
Astoria founded, 312, 313;
joint occupation agreement, 313;
agreement of 1828, 314;
effect of Whitman's work, 316;
in platform of 1844, 318;
effect of election of 1844, 320;
Tyler's message of 1844, 321;
Polk's first message, 324;
his recommendations, 324;
the question before Congress, 324;
the action of Congress, 324, 325;
treaty of June, 1846, 326;
bill reported by, 340, 341;
Thompson's amendment, 341;
the Douglas bill, 341;
defeat of Burt's amendment, 341;
Wick's proposal, 341, 342;
speech by Rhett, 342, 343;
end of the second bill, 343;
new bill by Douglas, 343;
special message of Polk, 344;
Hall's amendment, 344;
views of Calhoun and Davis, 344;
Davis moves amendment, 344;
effect of Davis and Hale on action of Senate, 345;
motions of Bright and Clayton, 346;
the Clayton bill, 346, 347;
the final settlement, 347;
bill approved, 348
Orleans, Territory of,
organized, 55;
slavery in, 55;
erected into Commonwealth, 56
Osceola,
begins hostilities, 290;
defeated, 290
Ossawattomie, Kansas,
destroyed by Missourians, 445;
effect of the attack, 445
Ostend, the manifesto from, 408
Otis, Harrison Gray,
voting, 74;
position on Maine-Missouri bill, 83
Oxford University, Professor Senior of, 186
PACIFIC OCEAN, claims in the north of various nations, 123, 311, 324,
325, 326, 341, 358, 375, 379, 381
Palo Alto, battle of, 330
Panama Congress,
early negotiations, 147, 148, 149;
commissioners of United States named, 149, 150;
popular views of the movement, 150;
analysis of vote in Senate, 150, 151;
relation of vote to slavery, 151;
nature of opposition, 153;
adjournment of the congress, 153, 154;
discussion of the results, 154, 155;
effect of question on Republican party, 155
Paredes y Arrillago, Mariano,
leader of military party, 328;
overthrows Herrera, 328;
refuses to receive Slidell, 328
Paris, treaty of. _See_ Treaty
Parker, Severn E., on Conference Committee, 88
Parker, William, opposition to fugitive slave law, 373
Parkers, the, in Crafts case, 368
Parma, Duke of, 23
Parrot, John T., voting, 73
_Partus sequitur ventrem_, 43, 44, 45
Pate, H. C.,
captured at Black Jack by Brown, 441;
rescued by Sumner, 442
Patton, John M.,
speaks in House, 259;
conclusion from his position, 259
Pawnee, Kansas, legislature meets at, 422
Pearce, James Alfred,
introduces bill on Texan boundary, 363;
not voting on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 398, 399
Pennsylvania, Commonwealth of, 3;
provision for gradual emancipation, 48, 62, 63;
attitude to tariff bill of 1823, 111;
relation to Cumberland Road, 116;
attitude to internal improvements bill of 1817, 118;
attitude to internal improvements bill of 1822, 119;
conventions nominate Jackson for presidency, 136;
in election of 1824, 137, 138, 139;
attitude toward tariff bill of 1827, 158;
in election of 1828, 162, 164;
attitude on Maysville road bill, 168;
petitions for abolition, 252, 253;
memorial on Texas, 296;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399
Pennsylvania railroad, system begun, 169
Pensacola, 24, 25, 32
Perdido River, the, 21, 22, 23, 25
Perote, captured by Scott, 333
Peru, treaty of 1823 with Columbia, 147
Petition, Right of,
early action on abolition petitions, 253;
the Chinn-Dickson controversy, 254;
Slade's motion, 254;
Polk's ruling, 255;
Jackson's petition and Hammond's motion, 255;
relation of the Constitution to the right of petition, 255, 256;
customary procedure before 1834, 256;
wrangle over Hammond's two motions, 256;
the final arrangement, 256;
Adams's appeal for right of petition, 257;
reply by Jones, 257;
Granger's and Ingersoll's claim as to District of Columbia, 257;
demand of Wise, 257, 258;
Slade's declaration of war on slavery, 258;
Garland's argument, 258;
disposal of the question, 258;
revived by Adams, 258, 259;
ruling of Speaker, 259;
Southern members take advanced ground, 259, 260;
effort of Adams at peace, 260;
decision on the fifty-fourth rule, 260;
the contest precipitated, 260;
Pinckney resolutions quoted, 261;
the new rule of procedure, 261, 262;
affair of February 6, 1837, 262;
rule as to petition by slaves, quoted, 262;
further attempt at agitation by Slade, 262;
increase of petitions, 263;
the standing rule of 1840, quoted, 263;
effect of this step, 263, 264;
disposal of the question by the Senate, 264, 265;
the Vermont petition, 265-269;
position of Calhoun, 270;
disposal by Swift's motion, 270;
significance of the contest, 274-277;
result of the struggle, 296
Petigru, James L., relation to nullification, 181
Phelps, Samuel Shethar, on Committee of Thirteen, 360
Philadelphia, Pa., constitutional convention at, 49
Phillips, Wendell, opposes fugitive slave law, 373
Philosophy of the eighteenth century, 47
Philosophy of 1776, 52
Pickering, Timothy, committee service, 3
Pierce, Franklin,
nominated for presidency, 376;
elected, 377;
relation to Kansas-Nebraska bill, 401, 403;
views of historians stated and considered, 401, 402;
signs Kansas-Nebraska bill, 404;
views on emigration to Territories, 410;
appoints Shannon Governor of Kansas Territory, 427;
Shannon's report to, 431;
appeal from "Free-state" party in Kansas, 431;
proclamation as to Kansas, 432;
disapproves Col. Sumner's course, 443;
takes active steps as to Kansas, 446
Pinckney, Henry Laurens,
reports resolution on control of slavery, 261;
resolution re-enacted, 262
Pinkney, William,
argument on powers of Congress, 84-86;
argument restated, 86, 87;
effect of his argument, 87;
on conference committee, 88
"Platte County Self-defensive Association," formed, 414, 415
Pleasants, James, committee service, 3
Poinsett, Joel Roberts, effort with reference to "Monroe Doctrine,"
128
Point Isabel, base of supplies, 329
Polignac, Jules Auguste Armand Marie de, declaration of Canning, 125
Political philosophy, French, 129, 139, 193
Polk, James Knox,
ruling as Speaker, 255;
quoted, 256;
confused rulings, 256;
further ruling on procedure as to petitions, 259;
conclusion from his position, 259;
decision on fifty-fourth rule, 260;
nominated for presidency, 309;
attitude of abolitionists, 320;
elected President, 320;
first annual message, 324;
his recommendations, 324;
the question before Congress, 325;
the action of Congress, 325, 326;
Polk's dealings with the Senate, 326;
treaty of June, 1846, 326;
overtures to Mexico, 327;
the Slidell mission, 327, 328;
duty as to Texan boundary, 329;
orders to General Taylor, 329;
message on Mexican War, 330;
authorized to call for volunteers, 331;
orders to Kearny, Sloat, Stockton, and Taylor, 331;
message of August 6, 1846, 334;
McKay's bill, 335;
Wilmot's amendment, 335;
Polk's message of December, 1846, 335;
empowered tacitly to secure California and New Mexico, 337;
the treaty offered through Trist, 337;
rejected by Mexico, 337;
recalls Trist, 338;
message to Congress, 338;
treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 338;
sends treaty to Senate, 339;
special message on Oregon, 344;
message on California and New Mexico, 345, 346;
approves Oregon bill, 348;
message on California and New Mexico, 348;
effect of message on California, 352, 353
Pomeroy, S. C., at Lawrence, 415
Pontchartrain, Lake, 21, 23
Porto Rico, in Spanish-American troubles, 152, 153, 154
Portsmouth, New Hampshire, 191
Portugal, Clay's attitude to its colonies, 135
Pottawattomie Creek,
massacre on, 440;
the massacre characterized, 441;
and denounced by the settlers, 441;
effect of massacre, 442;
end of fighting occasioned by massacre, 447
Potter, James, owner of Sims, 372
Pratt, Thomas George, contention as to amendment of Chase's amendment,
394, 395
Prigg _vs._ Pennsylvania [16 Peters, 539], 363
Protection,
as regarded between 1815 and 1820, 109;
as voiced by the House in 1822, 110;
Monroe's messages of 1821 and 1822, 110;
bill of 1823, 111;
Monroe's message of 1823, 111;
bill of 1824, 112.
_See_ Tariff
Prussia, King of, as arbiter for claims commission, 302
Prussia, in Holy Alliance, 123
Puebla, captured by Scott, 333
QUAKERS, petitions for abolition of slavery, 252, 253
Quincy, Edmund, opposition to fugitive slave law, 373
RAILROADS,
begun in the United States, 169;
relation to national improvements, 169, 170
Randolph, John, 11;
opposition to tariff of 1816, 12
Rantoul, Robert, Jr., in Sims case, 372
Red River, the, 33
Reeder, Andrew H.,
arrives at Fort Leavenworth, 416;
character and work, 416;
action upon contested election cases, 420;
criticism by Robinson, 420, 421;
disregard of his certificates of election, 421, 422;
attitude of anti-slavery party, 421;
difficulties in treatment proposed by Robinson, 422;
calls legislature to meet at Pawnee, 422;
breaks with legislature over question of adjournment to Shawnee
Mission, 423;
letter from Conway, 424;
removed from governorship of Kansas Territory, 425;
elected Congressional delegate, 425;
elected Senator by "Free-state" party, 426;
contest for seat in House of Representatives, 432, 433;
indictment against, 435;
avoids arrest, 435;
Donaldson's reference to his resistance, 436
Representatives, House of. _See_ House of Representatives
[Jeffersonian] Republican Party,
its nationalization, 1-18;
its principles in 1801 and 1816, 3;
position on national bank, 4, 5;
early principles, 17;
division, 38, 103, 104, 115;
absorption of Federal party, 129;
effect of War of 1812, 130;
nature of the struggle of 1824, 130;
division of the party, 145 _et seq._;
effect of Panama Congress, 155;
effect of tariff on division of party, 157;
power of Congress in its régime, 207;
principles on which it gained power, 239;
effect of War of 1812, 239
Republican Party,
brought to life, 388;
creed in the _National Era_ address, 390;
effect of troubles in Kansas, 417;
the union of the various elements, 417, 418;
effect of interference of Missourians in Kansas, 418;
as to possible effect of events in Kansas, 446;
Kansas assured to the party, 471
Resaca de la Palma, battle of, 330
Revenue. _See_ Tariff
Revolution of 1830, relation to abolition, 244
Revolution, the American,
slave laws before, 46;
effect upon slavery, 47, 80
Revolution, the French, 47
Rhea, John, 31
Rhett, Robert Barnwell,
speech on control of Territories, 342, 343, 345;
views adopted by Calhoun and Davis, 344;
views on fugitive slave law, 367;
contention as to fugitive slave law, 371;
in debate on Foote's resolutions, 374
Rhode Island, Commonwealth of, 13;
legislation on slavery, 48;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399
Richardson, William A.,
reports bill on Kansas and Nebraska, 400;
motion in House, 403;
yields management of Kansas-Nebraska bill to Stephens, 404
Riley, Bennett, calls California convention, 353
Rio del Norte River, 36
Rio Grande River, 297, 300, 305;
Mexican troops on, 328;
claimed by Texas a boundary, 328;
scene of conflict, 329, 330, 331, 332;
upper valley occupied by Doniphan, 332, 337, 338, 354, 361, 363
Rio Grande del Norte River, 290, 297
Rives, William Cabell, view of slavery, 265-267
Roberts, Jonathan,
motion on Maine-Missouri bill, 82;
position as to the bill, 83;
moves to amend, 83
Robertson, George, committee service, 3
Robinson, Charles,
conference with leaders of Emigrant Aid Company, 413;
expedition to Missouri and Kansas, 413, 414;
the founding of Lawrence, 415;
criticism of Reeder's action on contested election cases, 420, 421;
plan of procedure for anti-slavery party in Kansas, 421, 422;
sends for Sharpe's rifles, 423;
checks factions by the Lawrence speech, 423, 424;
elected Governor of Kansas, 425;
message to legislature, 427;
negotiations with Shannon, 430;
at Franklin, 430;
communication with Sumner as to assault on Jones, 434;
indictment against, 435;
opinion as to purpose of Pottawattomie massacre, 441;
his release ordered, 446;
plan to capture Territorial government, 463;
conference with Wilson, 463;
difficulty of the situation, 464;
his work characterized, 471, 472;
his work quoted, 473
Rocky Mountains, 312, 313, 324, 325, 326, 381
Rush, Benjamin, proposal of Canning, 125
Russia,
in the North Pacific, 123;
edict as to northwest lands, 123;
in Holy Alliance, 123, 124;
Adams's statement to Tuyl, 124, 125;
the Czar in negotiation with Clay, 152, 153
Russian American Company claims in North Pacific, 123
SABINE RIVER, the, 33, 36, 290
St. Augustine, 25
St. Ildefonso, treaty of, 22, 23, 24, 54, 312
St. Louis, 65;
Branscomb and Robinson at, 413, 414
St. Mark's, 25, 32
St. Mary's River, the, 22, 30
Salazar, José Maria,
negotiations as to Panama Congress, 147, 148, 149;
cites Haytian affairs, 151
Salt Creek Valley, pro-slavery convention, 414
San Antonio, battle of, 334
Sandford, John F. A.,
owner of Dred Scott, 451;
defendant in federal courts, 451 _et seq._
San Diego, Cal., occupied by Kearny, 332
San Jacinto, battle of, 294, 295
San Jacinto River, 294
Santa Anna, Antonio Lopez de,
establishes presidential government in Mexico, 292;
opposition in Coahuila-Texas, 292;
war of Texan independence, 293, 294;
a prisoner, 297;
in power again, 332;
his plan of action, 332;
battle of Buena Vista, 332, 333;
battle of Cerro Gordo, 333;
battles of Contreras, San Antonio and Cherubusco, 334
Savannah, Ga., 373
Scott, Dred,
his case as referred to in Buchanan's inaugural address, 447, 448;
origin of the case, 449, 450;
facts of the case, 450, 451;
decision of Missouri Supreme Court, 451;
sold to Sandford, 451;
judgment in Circuit Court, 451;
case before Supreme Court, 451;
opinion of Justice Nelson, 452;
opinion of Justice Catron, 453;
opinion of Chief Justice Taney, 453, 454;
opinion of Justice Curtis, 454;
criticism of the decision, 455;
criticism of Taney's argument, 455, 456;
relation of inaugural and decision, 456, 457;
opinion of Justice Curtis, 457, 458;
distribution of the opinions, 458;
effect of the decision, 458, 459;
effect of the dictum, 460
Scott, John, secures reference of Missouri memorials, 74
Scott, Martin, in Florida, 31
Scott, Winfield,
ordered to Charleston, 330;
his instructions, 330, 331;
ordered against Vera Cruz, 332;
captures Vera Cruz, 333;
battle of Cerro Gordo, 333;
captures Jalapa, Perote, Puebla, 333;
effect of his successes, 337;
Trist at his head-quarters, 337;
battles of Molino del Rey and Chapultepec, 338;
takes Mexico, 338;
nominated for presidency, 376;
defeated, 377
Sedgwick, Major, accompanies Shannon to Lawrence, 444
Seminole War, 28, 29, 33;
results, 38;
cabinet intrigue on conduct of war, 220
Seminoles, 32;
treaty of 1832, 290;
repudiate treaty and are expelled, 290
Senate of the United States,
passage of Bank bill, 8;
passage of tariff bill, 12;
pay of members, 16;
passage of internal improvements bill, 16;
action on censure of Jackson, 36;
ratifies treaty of 1819, 36, 38;
effect of method of representation in, 63;
Missouri bill referred, 73;
vote on Tallmadge amendment, 74;
disagreement with House, 74;
Clay's suggestion of effect, 75;
Maine and Missouri bills in, 82, 83;
the Thomas amendment, 84;
Pinkney's speech, 84-87;
Missouri-Maine bill, and Thomas amendment, 87, 88;
the conference committee, 88, 89;
significance of the compromise, 90-95;
Missouri constitution considered, 95, 96;
passage of Smith bill on Missouri, 99;
bill defeated in House, 101;
work of second conference committee, 101-103;
plan to alter judicial system and limit number of Representatives,
109;
conference committee on tariff, 114, 115;
recommendation of Cumberland road, 116;
vote on internal improvements bill of 1822, 118, 119;
Clinton a member of, 132;
Crawford a member of, 133;
Clay a member of, 134;
Jackson a member of, 136;
opposition to Clay's appointment, 144;
action on Panama mission, 149, 150;
Van Buren's statement on action of, 153;
Van Buren leader of opposition in, 155;
action on tariff bill, 159, 160;
passage of tariff bill, 162;
South Carolina memorial in, 171;
Clay's proposal as to tariff, 186;
speeches of Clay and Hayne, 187;
vote on House tariff bill, 188;
conference committee, 188;
Benton's attack on Bank, 196;
report on the Bank, 198;
Benton's resolution on the Bank, 199, 200;
relation of members to constituencies, 200;
memorial for recharter of Bank, 201;
Benton's attack on Bank, 201;
bill, for recharter passed, 201, 202;
Jackson on duty of members, 206;
ratifies Indian Springs convention, 212;
Calhoun takes Hayne's seat in, 234;
Calhoun's statement in, 232, 233;
"Force Bill" reported, 233, 234;
Clay's proposition in, 235, 236;
support of Calhoun, 236;
passage of "Force Bill" and of tariff bill, 237;
abolition petitions referred, 253;
contest on right of petition, 264, 265;
Calhoun's efforts as to policy of, 268;
incident of the Vermont memorial, 269, 270;
reference of President's message, 273;
Connecticut memorial on Texas, 295;
Clay resolutions adopted, 295;
Calhoun's statement, 295, 296;
the Walker resolution on Texas, 298, 299;
action on President's message as to refusals, 298, 299;
effect of action, 300;
as to power over treaties, 307, 308;
treaty with Texas, 308, 309;
action as to Texas, 322, 323;
action as to Oregon, 325, 326;
bills on Mexico, and the Wilmot proviso, 335, 336;
ratifies treaties with Mexico, 339;
Oregon bill in, 341;
action on Oregon bills, 343;
debate on Oregon bill, 344;
lack of result, 345;
Bright and Clayton on Oregon, 346;
passes Clayton bill, 347;
final agreement with House, 347;
action on erection of California and New Mexico, 349 _et seq._;
Calhoun's last speech, 358;
Webster's Seventh of March speech, 359;
action on Texan boundary, 363, 364;
completion of compromise measures, 363, 364;
action on Shadrach case, 370;
action on President's powers, 371, 372;
Foote's finality resolutions, 374, 375;
petitions to, 375;
action on organization of Kansas and Nebraska, 381 _et seq._;
Atchison, President _pro tem._, 412;
memorials from Kansas, 433;
speech on the "Crime against Kansas," 439;
Brooks' assault, 439, 440;
action on Kansas, 469, 470.
_See_ Congress of the United States
Senior, Nassau William, cited, 186
Sergeant, John,
opposition to Lowndes's bill, 96, 97;
nominated commissioner to Panama Congress, 149;
nomination confirmed, 150
Sewall, Samuel E., in Sims case, 372
Seward, William Henry,
presents petitions for repeal of fugitive slave law, 375;
contest in convention of 1852, 376;
relation to Dixon and Nebraska bill, 387, 388;
charge as to official conduct of Taney, 456
Shadrach,
escape to Canada, 370;
Clay's motion and Fillmore's message, 370, 371
Shannon, Wilson,
becomes Governor of Kansas Territory, 427;
presides over Leavenworth convention, 428;
orders to Territorial militia, 429;
meets Lawrence committee at Shawnee Mission, 429;
goes to Lawrence, 430;
agreement with citizens of Lawrence, 430;
treats with Missourians at Franklin, 430, 431;
report to President, 431;
gives troops to Sheriff Jones, 434;
dealings with citizens of Lawrence, 436, 437;
orders troops to the Pottawattomie, 441;
his proclamation, 442;
orders troops out under Sumner, 442;
goes to Lawrence, 444;
treaty of August 17, 444;
resigns office, 444
Shaw, Henry, voting, 73
Shawnee Mission, Kansas,
removal of legislature to, 423;
arrival of Governor Shannon, 427;
Lawrence committee at, 429
Sherman, John, on committee for Kansas investigation, 433
Shields, James, attitude to fugitive slave law, 368
Sierra Nevada Mountains, 349
Silliman, Benjamin, member of Emigrant Aid Society, 409
Silsbee, Nathaniel, attitude to tariff of 1828, 162
Sims, Thomas,
arrest, 372;
trial and rendition, 372, 373
Slade, William,
motion to print abolition petitions, 254;
compared with Adams, 254;
Polk's ruling on his attempt to debate, 255;
his motion tabled, 255;
declares war on slavery, 258;
his object, 259;
further attempt at agitation, 262
Slave Code, Virginia code of 1705, 45
Slavery,
beginnings in United States, 40;
early view of system, 40;
legal recognition, 41;
prohibited in Georgia, 43;
legislation in Virginia, 43;
Virginia statute of 1662, 44, 45;
relation to Christian baptism, 44;
Virginia code of 1705, 45;
legislation on public relations of slavery, 46;
law of slavery before the Revolution, 46;
substantially abolished in Massachusetts, 48;
legislation in Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Hampshire,
Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland and
Virginia, 48;
letter of Luther Martin, 49, 50;
in Constitution of 1787, 50;
status in Georgia and North Carolina cessions and in Kentucky, 50,
51, 56;
passage of fugitive slave law, 51;
abolition of slave trade by Congress, 51;
relation to cotton culture, 52, 53;
in Louisiana territory, 54, 55, 57, 65, 72, 88;
in Orleans Territory, 55;
in Louisiana Territory, 55, 56;
in Missouri Territory and Commonwealth of Missouri, 56, 65;
effect of abolition of foreign slave-trade, 57;
domestic slave-trade, 57, 58;
relation of slavery to diplomacy, 58;
international status, 59;
relation of slavery to public policy, 60;
status in various States, 62, 63;
division of Congress on territorial basis as to slavery, 63;
in the Territories, 63;
in Northwest Territory, 69;
in the Tallmadge amendment, 73;
slavery in Territories, 75;
Taylor's plan as to Missouri, 75, 76, 78;
Storrs's plan as to Missouri, 78;
Taylor's motion, 78 _et seq._;
motion of Thomas, 84, 87, 88;
relation of slavery to Missouri struggle, 92, 93, 106, 107;
status of slavery in 1776, 1787, 1820, 93;
slavery in national politics after 1820, 108;
relation of slavery to protection, 109, 110;
relation of slavery to Panama Congress, 151;
relation to tariff, 157;
relation to Maysville road bill, 168;
relation to internal improvements, to Missouri struggle, and to
tariff of 1828, 170;
view of Hayne and McDuffie, 177;
relation to the Bank question, 198;
effect of race domination, 244;
as regarded before 1830, 244;
humanitarianism of 1830, 244;
the philosophy of abolition and of its opponents, 245;
the true philosophy, 245, 246;
slavery in the Constitution, 246-248;
possible ways of attacking slavery, 248;
Southampton insurrection, 248, 249;
Floyd's message, 249 (_see_ Petition, Right of);
declaration of war by Slade, 258;
the contest precipitated, 260;
the Pinckney resolutions evoked, 261;
relation to denial of right of petition, 263, 264;
views of Rives, 265-267;
views of Calhoun, 265-268;
significance of the contest over petitions and the mails, 274-277;
relation of Whig principles to slavery, 283;
relation of Whig and Democratic parties to slavery extension, 287,
288;
slavery in Florida constitution of 1838, 290;
slavery in the Texas constitution of 1836, 294;
relation of slavery to recognition of Texas, 296;
relation of slavery to question of Texan annexation, 300, 301, 302;
Clay's views of relation of slavery and annexation, 319;
relation of slavery to Mexican War, 330, 331;
the Wilmot proviso, 335, 336;
Cass's view of relation of Mexican war and slavery, 338;
Thompson's amendment, 341;
Burt's motion as to the Wilmot proviso, 341, 342;
meaning of Rhett's views, 343;
views of Calhoun and Davis as to slavery in territories, 344;
Democratic platform of 1848, 344, 345;
Cass's letter to Nicholson, 345;
Whig platform of 1848, 345;
the Clayton bill, 346, 347;
Free-soil platform of 1848, 347, 348;
as to signature of Oregon bill, 348;
Douglas's and Smith's bills, 349;
Berrien's report, 349, 350;
views of Berrien and Webster on slavery in Mexican acquisitions,
351, 352;
Taylor's message of December 4, 1849, 354;
indication of policy in the Foote bill, 354;
relation of slavery to question of Texan boundary, 354, 355;
question of slavery in District of Columbia, 355;
Clay's plan of compromise, 355, 356;
opposition of Southerners, 356, 357;
attitude of Davis, and of abolitionists, 357;
Calhoun's last speech, 358;
Webster's Seventh of March speech, 359;
Clay's report, 361, 362;
the bills as adopted, 363, 364;
slavery before and after 1850, 365-367;
relation of parties to slavery question, 377;
various policies as to slavery, 377-379;
situation in December, 1852, 380, 381;
Douglas's report on Nebraska, 382-387;
dictum of the committee, 387;
Dixon's motion, 387;
dictum of Douglas as to act of 1820, 390;
controversy on the Kansas-Nebraska bill, 390 _et seq._;
speech of Houston, 393;
the _National Era_ address, 399, 400;
the struggle for Kansas, 407 _et seq._;
indications of plan for extension, 408;
the question in Kansas, 412;
Robinson's declaration as to slavery in Kansas and Missouri, 424;
Kansas legislation on slavery, 424;
its effect on the North, 424, 425;
the Topeka constitution, 425;
the Dred Scott case, 449-459;
effect of the Dred Scott dictum, 460;
further struggle in Kansas, 460-474;
the Lecompton constitution, 467, 468.
_See_ Kansas, Territory of
Slaves, introduced at Jamestown, 40.
_See_ Slavery
Slidell, John,
sent to Mexico, 327;
refused audience, and leaves Mexico, 328;
effect of his rejection, 329
Sloat, John Drake, ordered to Upper California, 331
Smith, Caleb B., reports bills on New Mexico and Upper California, 349
Smith, Gerrit,
the "Jerry rescue," 374;
signs _National Era_ address, 389
Smith, Persifer Frazer,
assigned to command in Kansas, 443;
orders as to invaders of Kansas, 445;
sustains Cooke in disobeying Woodson, 445
Smith, George W., candidate for Governor of Kansas, 468
Smith, William,
reports Maine-Missouri bill, 82;
position on the bill, 83;
presents bill to Senate on Missouri, 99;
bill passed by Senate and tabled by House, 99;
presents protest as to tariff, 170
"Softs," the, attitude of Pierce, 402
Soulé, Pierre, the Ostend manifesto, 408
South Carolina, 8, 9;
slave laws, 46;
repeals law against slave importation, 51;
as to citizenship law, 99;
protest against tariff of 1824, 115, 116;
attitude to internal improvements bill of 1817, 118;
attitude to internal improvements bill of 1822, 119;
in election of 1824, 137, 138;
opposition to tariff bill of 1827, 159, 160;
legislature protests against tariff of 1828, 170, 171, 174;
attitude to Jackson's views, 172;
relation to McDuffie bill of 1830, 174;
attitude to McDuffie's argument, 176;
attitude to Congress in 1830-31, 178;
the tariff and Calhoun's work, 179, 181, 183;
nullification or rebellion, 183;
relation to Jackson's message of 1831, 184;
stock held in United States Bank, 203;
nullification earlier in Georgia, 210;
relation to the Indian troubles in Georgia, 220;
special meeting of legislature, 221;
the nullification convention and its work, 221;
the ordinance of nullification, 222;
committee to the legislature, 223;
addresses of the convention, 223, 224;
Hamilton's message, 224;
Hayne's inaugural, 224;
the Replevin Act, 224-226;
change of representation in Senate, 224;
acts to enforce ordinance of nullification, 226;
opinion of Calhoun and others as to position of South Carolina,
226-228;
South Carolina in Jackson's' message of 1832, 228;
Jackson's proclamation of December 10, 1832, 228-230;
active steps taken by Jackson, 230, 231;
feeling of the other States, 231;
Hayne's proclamation and the action of South Carolina, 232;
Jackson's message of January, 1833, 232;
Calhoun's statement in the Senate, 232, 233;
the "Force Bill" reported, 233, 234;
answers Replevin Act, 234;
attitude of Calhoun, 234;
postponement of execution of nullification ordinance, 235;
Bell's report on President's powers, 235;
Clay's proposals, 235, 236;
attitude of Calhoun, 236, 237;
attitude to Clay's bill, 237, 238;
ordinance of nullification withdrawn, 238;
motive of leaders in affairs of nullification, 238;
effect of nullification considered, 238-241;
opinion of Jacksonian principles, 240;
convention in, 375;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399;
demands of South Carolinians in Kansas, 437;
the assault upon Sumner, 439
South Carolina College, 173
"South Carolina Exposition, The," 179
South Sea, the, 33
Southampton County, Virginia,
slave insurrection, 248, 249;
Floyd's message, 249;
passed over, 250;
effect on consideration of abolition petitions, 252
"Southern Address," the, 374
Spain,
as to American possessions, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29, 30, 32, 33,
35, 36;
cedes Louisiana territory, 54, 65;
claims in North Pacific, 123;
relation to colonies and to Congress of Verona, 124;
attitude of Great Britain and United States as to her colonies, 125;
the "Monroe Doctrine," 125-128;
Clay's attitude to Spain's colonies, 135, 152, 153;
trouble in the colonies, 147, 151-153;
boundary disputes with France and United States, 290;
treaty of 1819, 290;
revolt of Mexico, 291;
claim to Oregon, 311;
the Nootka Convention, 311, 312;
effect of war with Great Britain, 312;
cedes Louisiana to France, 312;
cedes Florida, 313;
treaty of 1819, 318
Spalding, Henry Harmon, missionary to Oregon, 315
Spanish Government, 37
Spear, Samuel T., opposes fugitive slave law, 368
"Specie Circular," its results, 283
_Squatter Sovereign_, the, misrepresentations as to Emigrant Aid
Company, 411
Stanton, F. P.,
appointed secretary of Kansas Territory, 461;
as Acting Governor, negotiates with "Free-state" men, 461, 462;
action on fraudulent elections, 465;
demands of "Free-state" men, 466, 467;
calls legislature at Lecompton, 467;
removed, 467
"States' rights,"
founder of party, 2;
position of Webster, 6;
early condition of party, 122;
nucleus of party, 146;
Calhoun's doctrine, 179 _et seq._;
as to the Bank, 194, 195;
Benton's speech, 199;
Troup's attitude, 213;
Calhoun's position, 234, 236, 268, 269, 270;
King's views, 269, 270;
and _see_ 3, 49, 109, 130, 136, 137, 159, 192, 215, 217, 274
Stearns, ----, sells rights to site of Lawrence, 415
Stephens, Alexander Hamilton, management of the Kansas-Nebraska bill,
404
Stockton, Robert Field, ordered to Upper California, 331
Storrs, Henry R.,
voting, 73;
on Missouri affair, 78
Storrs, Richard Salter, opposes fugitive slave law, 368
Strange, Robert, motion in Senate, 270
Stringfellow, B. F.,
coeditor of _Squatter Sovereign_, 411;
formation of "Platte County Self-defensive Association," 414
Sullivan, G., interview with Adams, 142, 143
Sumner, Edwin Vose,
communication with Robinson as to assault on Jones, 434;
conditional offer of Lawrence citizens to surrender arms to, 437;
rescues Pate, 442;
returns to Fort Leavenworth, 442;
disperses legislature at Topeka, 443;
his act disapproved, 443;
retirement, 443;
attitude to Kansas affairs, 472
Sumner, Charles,
presents petitions for repeal of fugitive slave law, 375;
speech on fugitive slave law, 377;
effort to improve Nebraska bill, 388;
signs _National Era_ address, 389;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399;
speech on the "Crime against Kansas," 439;
assaulted by Brooks, 439, 440;
effect of assault modified by Pottawattomie massacres, 442
Supreme Court of the United States, decisions by:
Brown _vs._ Maryland, 195, 198;
McCulloch _vs._ Maryland, 205;
Cherokee Nation case, 218;
Worcester _vs._ Georgia, 218, 219;
_see also_ 109, 207, 222, 229, 346, 348, 366, 383, 427, 447, 460;
Prigg _vs._ Pennsylvania, 363;
Dred Scott _vs._ Sandford, 447, 449, _et seq._
Sutter land claims, war against, 413
Swift, Benjamin,
presents abolition petition, 269;
motion to lay on table, 270
Syracuse, New York,
meetings on fugitive slave law, 368;
the "Jerry rescue," 373, 374
TACUBAYA, 153
Tait, Charles, report, 74
Tallmadge, James, 34;
amendment to Missouri bill, 66-74;
leader of restrictionists, 68
Taney, Roger Brooke,
appointed secretary of the treasury, 280;
ceases deposits in United States Bank, 280;
the contention as to propriety and legality, 280, 281;
criticism by the Senate, 281;
opinion on Dred Scott case, 453, 454;
criticism of his argument, 455, 456;
charge as to divulging court secrets, 456, 457
Tappan, S. F., resists Sheriff Jones, 434
Tariff,
bill of 1816, 3, 8, 9, 10;
views of Clay, 10;
speech of Calhoun, 10, 11, 12;
passed by House and Senate, 12;
attitude of Randolph and Telfair, and the New Englanders, 12;
act under comparison, 15, 16;
Monroe's messages of 1821 and 1822, 110;
bill of 1823, 110, 111;
failure of the bill, 111;
Monroe's message of 1823, 111;
bill of 1824, 112;
support of Tod, 112, and of Clay, 112, 113;
opposition of Webster, Cambreleng and Barbour, 113, 114;
Hayne's theory, 114;
modified bill passed by House, 114;
House rejects Senate amendments, 114;
conference committee, 114, 115;
characterization of tariff of 1827, 115;
attitude of various States toward tariff of 1824, 115;
protest of South Carolina, 115, 116;
significance of the question, 129;
relation to slavery, 157;
act of 1824 a failure, 157;
memorials, 158;
Mallary bill of 1827, 158;
provisions, 158;
attitude of the various sections, 158, 159;
bill passed by House, 159;
opposition of South Carolina, 159, 160;
bill abandoned in Senate, 160;
bill of 1828 reported, 160;
its provisions, 160;
opposed and modified, 160, 161;
analysis of vote in House, 162;
passed by Senate and approved, 162;
relation to party lines, 162, 163;
South Carolina protests against bill of 1828, 170, 171, 174;
Jackson's message of December, 1829, 171, 172;
its reception in South Carolina, 172;
its reference, 172;
question of origin of tariff bills, 173, 174;
bill reported by McDuffie, 174;
its terms and disposal, 174;
manufactures committee bill, 175;
argument of McDuffie, 175, 176, 177;
passage of bills of 1830, 177, 178;
Jackson's message of December, 1830, 178;
the work of Calhoun, 179-181, 183;
the law in court, 182, 183;
Jackson's message of December, 1831, 184;
two bills of 1832, 185;
disposal in House, 186;
Clay's resolution in Senate, 186, 187, 188;
House bill in Senate, 188;
amended and passed, 188;
distribution of vote in Senate, 188;
conference and bill becomes law, 188;
its effect on the situation, 188, 189;
proposal in address of South Carolina convention, 224;
Jackson's message of December, 1832, 228;
bill reported by Verplanck, 231, 232;
discussion of Verplanck bill, 235;
Clay proposes compromise tariff, 235;
his purposes, 235, 236;
attitude of Calhoun, 236;
controversy over the bill, 236;
Clay's bill amended and substituted for Verplanck's bill, 237;
attitude of South Carolina, 238;
President's approval, 238;
result of modified bill of 1833, 283;
tariff bills vetoed by Tyler, 286
Tassells, Cherokee Indian, executed, 218
Taylor, John,
supports Bank bill, 8;
presides over Columbia convention, 159
Taylor, John W.,
in Missouri bill debate, 68;
plan as to Missouri, 75, 76, 78;
new motion and argument, 78 _et seq._;
on conference committee, 88;
attitude toward internal improvements bill of 1822, 119;
vote upon Maysville road bill, 168
Taylor, Zachary,
ordered to advance from Corpus Christi, 329;
demand of Ampudia, 329;
hostilities begun, 329;
battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, 329, 330;
occupies Matamoras, 331;
takes Monterey, 331, 332;
battle of Buena Vista, 332, 333;
battles of Contreras, San Antonio, and Cherubusco, 334;
armistice, 334;
presidential nominee, 345;
elected President, 349;
plan as to California, 353;
message of December 4, 1849, 353, 354;
special message under consideration, 357, 358;
death, 362
Tehuantepec, Isthmus of, 337
Telfair, Thomas, opposition to tariff of 1816, 12
Tennessee, 31, 32, 35;
created a Commonwealth, 51;
with slavery, 62, 63;
attitude to internal improvements bill of 1817, 118;
attitude to internal improvements bill of 1822, 119;
legislature nominates Jackson for the presidency, 136;
electoral vote in 1844, 320;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399
Territorial extension, position of Whig and Democratic parties, 287,
288
Texas,
early boundary dispute, 290;
Austin grant, 291;
efforts of United States to buy Texas, 292;
declares independence, 293;
the Mexicans defeated, 294;
constitution formed and Houston elected President, 294;
the Connecticut resolution, 295;
the Senate's resolution, 295;
Calhoun's position, 295, 296;
House passes resolution, 296;
Morfit's mission, 296-298;
Jackson's message of December 21, 1836, 298;
Walker's resolution, 298;
Jackson's special message as to reprisals, 298;
Walker resolution adopted, 299;
Texas in diplomatic appropriation bill 299;
Jackson deals with agent of Texas, 300;
Texan independence recognized, 300;
the question of annexation, 300, 301;
Wise's doctrine as to annexation, 302;
Whig address on annexation, 303;
negotiations of Upshur and Van Zandt, 304;
independence recognized by Powers, 304;
possibility of British interference, 304;
relations to Mexico, 305, 306;
proposal of annexation, 305;
legal position, 306;
Murphy's assurance to President of Texas, 306;
Houston sends special envoy to Washington, 306;
Murphy's assurance disavowed, 307;
President's proposal to move forces, 307;
Texas treaty sent to Senate, 307, 308;
President's view of constitutional position of Texas, 308;
treaty rejected by Senate, 308;
Benton's claim, 308;
opposition of Archer, 308, 309;
"reannexation" in the Democratic platform, 309;
documents sent to House, 309, 310;
in Democratic platform of 1844, 316, 317, 318;
the Clay letters, 319;
demands of abolitionists, 319;
the _National Intelligencer_ letter, 319, 320;
relation to annexation of election of Polk, 320;
Greeley's views as to triumph of annexation, 320;
Tyler's message of 1844, 320, 321;
Ingersoll reports joint resolution, 321;
various views as to method of annexation, 321, 322;
House passes enabling act, 322;
the Archer report in the Senate, 322, 323;
the Walker amendment, 323;
measure signed by President, 323;
Texas admitted, 323;
annexation a casus belli for Mexico, 327;
Texas congress of December, 1836, 328;
the Rio Grande as boundary, 328;
President's duty as to Texan boundary, 329;
Congressional acts as to Corpus Christi, 329;
importance of Buena Vista, 333;
problem of Texan boundary, 354, 355;
Clay's plan, 355, 356;
opposition of Southerners, 356, 357;
attitude of abolitionists, 357;
Webster's Seventh of March speech, 359;
Clay's report, 361;
extension of jurisdiction by Bell, 362, 363;
passage of bill as to Texan boundary, 363, 364;
dictum of Douglas as to annexation of Texas, 390;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399.
_See also_ Coahuila-Texas
Thayer, Eli,
beginning of his work, 408, 409;
his reasoning, 409;
organization effected, 409, 410;
incorporation, 410, 411;
conference with Robinson, 413;
reward offered for his head, 413;
sending of Sharpe's rifles, 423
Thomas, Jesse B.,
motion as to slavery, 84, 87, 88;
on conference' committee, 88
Thompson, James,
moves amendment to Oregon bill, 341;
amendment in Douglas bill, 341
Thompson, Waddy,
as minister to Mexico receives threat of war, 305;
opinion on slavery extension, 330
Titus, Colonel,
in troubles at Lawrence, 437;
captured, 444;
his release promised, 444
Tod, John,
reports tariff bill, 110;
bill fails, 111;
reports tariff bill of 1824, 112;
supports the bill, 112
Tomlinson, Gideon, opposes report of Committee of Thirteen, 101
Topeka, Kansas,
convention at, 425 (_see_ Kansas, Territory of);
legislature at, dispersed, 443;
Cooke refuses to obey Woodson's order to attack Topeka, 445;
mass-meeting at, 464
Topliff, C. W., dealings with Donaldson for Lawrence citizens, 438
Treaty of April 11, 1713 (Utrecht), 312
Treaty of 1762, between France and Spain, 21, 22, 23
Treaty of Paris, February 10, 1763, between France, Great Britain, and
Spain, 20, 21, 22, 23
Treaty of Paris, September 3, 1783, 22
Treaty of 1790 (Nootka Convention), between Great Britain and Russia,
311
Treaty of 1800 (St. Ildefonso), between France and Spain, 22, 23, 24,
54, 312
Treaty of April 30, 1803, between France and the United States, 23,
24, 55, 57, 72, 312, 318
Treaty of Fort Jackson, 1814, 26, 29
Treaty of December 24, 1814, between Great Britain and the United
States, 9, 26
[Convention] of October 20, 1818, between Great Britain and the United
States, 313, 314
Treaty of February 22, 1819, between Spain and the United States, 33,
36, 37, 38, 290, 313, 318
Treaty of July 12, 1823, between Colombia and Peru, 147
Treaty of July 12, 1823, between Colombia and Chili, 147
Treaty of February 12, 1825, between United States and Creek Indians,
212, 214
Treaty of April 12, 1825, between Colombia and United Provinces of
Central America, 147
Treaty of September 20, 1825, between Colombia and Mexico, 147
Treaty of January, 1826, between United States and Creek Indians, 214
[Convention] of August 6, 1827, between Great Britain and the United
States, 314, 324
Treaty of 1832, between United States and Seminole Indians, 290
[Treaty] of April 11, 1839, between Mexico and the United States, 301
Treaty of August 9, 1842, between Great Britain and the United States,
303
Treaty of April 12, 1844, between Texas and the United States, 307,
308, 309
Treaty of June 15, 1846, between Great Britain and the United States,
326, 339
Treaty of February 2, 1848, between Mexico and the United States, 338,
339, 354, 355
Tremont Temple, fugitive slave law meetings, 373
Trist, Nicholas P.,
offers treaty to Mexico, 337;
proposals rejected, 337;
signs treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 388;
returns to Washington, 338, 339
Troup, George McIntosh,
attempts survey of Creek land, 212;
letter from Barbour, 212, 213;
controversy with Barbour and Adams, 213, 214;
repudiates agreement of 1826, 214;
controversy with Administration as to surveys, 214, 215;
his message to the legislature, 215
Tucker, George, committee service, 3
Turks, 45
Turner, Nat, leads slave insurrection, 249
Tuyl, Baron, declaration from Adams, 124, 125
Tyler, John,
succeeds Harrison, 286;
vetoes bank bills and tariff bills, 286;
Cabinet resignations, 286, 287;
friction with Whigs, 287;
accession to presidency, 301;
opens negotiations with Texas, 301;
relation to annexation, 302;
resignation of Webster, 303;
makes Upshur secretary of state, 303, 304;
the London story of interference in Texas, 304;
attitude to Mexican threat of war, 305;
relation to Texan negotiation, 307;
as to defence of Texas, 307;
sends treaty to Senate, 307, 308;
view of constitutional position of Texas, 308;
significance of Archer's criticism of annexation treaty, 309;
sends Texas documents to House, 309, 310;
relations with Whitman, 315, 316;
message of 1844, 320, 321;
views as to method of annexation, 321;
signs measure for annexation of Texas, 323;
characterization of his acts, 323, 324
"UNCLE TOM'S CABIN," 106
"Underground," the, established, 368.
_See_ Fugitive Slave Law
United Provinces of Central America, treaty of 1825, with Colombia,
147
United States Bank. _See_ Bank of the United States
United States of America, the,
effect of military statutes, 13;
national spirit in, 19;
territorial extension of, 20;
independence recognized, 22;
purchase of Louisiana, 23;
claims on Florida, 23, 24;
occupation of Florida, 24, 25;
effect of treaty of Ghent, 26;
affair at Nicholls Fort, 27, 28;
character of Seminole War, 29, 30;
relations with Spain as to occupation of Florida, 32, 33;
treaty with Spain, 33, 36, 37, 38;
transfer of Florida, 38;
slavery in, 40, 50, 52, 53;
treaty of 1803, 55;
obligations to Georgia and North Carolina, 56, and to France, 57;
attitude to slavery, 58, 59, 60, 62-65;
debate on powers of general Government, 66 _et seq._;
Taylor's discussion of powers, 79, 80;
federal system of 1820, 87;
nature of the Union, 97;
effect of second Missouri compromise, 103;
significance of the compromise, 104-106;
commercial position, 112, 113;
foreign relations of, in 1822, 122;
claims in the North Pacific, 123;
relation to Spain's American possessions, 124 _et seq._;
attitude to Holy Alliance, 124 _et seq._;
relations with Spanish-American states, 146 _et seq._;
constitutional interpretation in the history of, 156;
relations with Great Britain, 164;
railroads in, 169;
tariff the necessary policy of, 171;
statistics from foreign trade of, 175, 176;
meaning of the term, 180;
regard for laws of, 181;
danger of bank to, 202;
Jackson's view considered, 203;
as to veto power, 207;
effect of Jackson's bank veto, 207-209;
cession by Georgia to, 211;
treaty with Creek Indians, 212;
dispute as to title, 213;
treaty with Creek Indians, 214;
trouble with Georgia, 214 _et seq._;
the issue as offered by South Carolina, 226;
principle of the governmental system of, 227;
the time for a revenue tariff, 228;
Jackson on the character of the Union, 229;
officers of, in South Carolina, 230;
resistance to laws checked, 234;
effect of events of 1832 and 1833, 238-241;
development of national purposes, 243, 244;
abolition and opinion of slavery in, 244;
contest over use of mails of, 270 _et seq._;
disputes as to deposits of, 280 _et seq._;
treaty with Seminoles, 290;
recognition of Spanish rights, 290;
immigration into Texas from, forbidden, 291;
attempts to purchase Texas, 292;
importation of slaves into Texas from, allowed, 294;
as to recognition of Texan independence by, 295, 296;
Morfit's report on Texas, 297;
question of natural boundaries, 300, 301;
annexation of Texas proposed, 301;
diplomatic relations with Mexico, 301, 302;
recognition of Texan independence by, 304;
relations with Mexico and Texas, 305 _et seq._;
as to admission of Texas, 310;
purchase of Louisiana, 312;
claims in Oregon, 312, 313;
conventions with Great Britain, 313, 314;
Oregon and Great Britain, 314 _et seq._;
as to claim on Texas and Oregon, 318;
Clay's views as to policy of, 319, 320;
relations with Mexico, 320, 321;
as to annexation of Texas, 321;
as to method of annexation to, 323, 324;
claims to Oregon, 324 _et seq._;
negotiations with Great Britain, 326;
suspension of diplomatic relations with Mexico, 327;
mission to Mexico, 328;
question of the Texan frontier, 328, 329;
relations with Mexico, 329 _et seq._;
military power in California, 332;
the Trist mission, 337, 338;
treaty with Mexico, 338;
Rhett on the nature of the union, 342, 343;
extension of public law of, 352;
relations to Cuba, 408;
relation to affairs in Kansas, 445 _et seq._
Upham, William,
introduces amendment, 338;
opposition of Cass and rejection, 338
Upper California,
to be occupied to Sloat and Stockton, 331;
treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 338;
Smith's bill, 349.
_See_ California
Upshur, Abel P.,
made secretary of state, 303, 304;
negotiations with Van Zandt, 304;
letter to Murphy, 304;
formally proposed annexation, 305;
demand from Van Zandt, 306;
relation to Murphy's promise, 306;
death, 306
Utah,
Foote's bill for territorial organization, 254;
report of committee on territories, 360;
Committee of Thirteen, 360;
Clay's report, 360, 361;
bill as to Utah passed, 362;
as to the Douglas report on Nebraska, 384;
Chase on Act of 1850, 391
Utrecht, treaty of, 312
VAN BUREN, MARTIN,
relation to Crawford, 133;
attitude toward civil service reform, 133;
in election of 1824, 137;
attitude upon Panama Congress, 153;
opposition to Adams on internal improvements, 155;
share in election of 1828, 164;
made secretary of state, 164;
his success in diplomacy, 164;
relation of Administration to the financial situation, 284;
message of September 4, 1837, 284, 285;
origin of independent treasury idea, 285;
Van Buren's recommendation and the law of July 4, 1840, 285, 286;
declines proposition of Texan annexation, 301;
resumed diplomatic relations with Mexico, 301;
treaty proclaimed, 301, 302;
put aside by his party, 309;
nominated for presidency, 347;
popular vote in 1848 compared with that for Hale in 1852, 377
Vanderpoel, Aaron, motion in House, 255
Van Zandt, Isaac,
negotiations with Upshur, 304;
proposal of Upshur, 305;
demand upon Upshur, 306
Venezuela, 30
Vera Cruz,
campaign against, ordered, 332;
captured by Scott, 333
Vermont,
slavery forbidden, 62, 63;
Rev. S. A. Worcester, of, 218;
abolition petition, 265, 269;
position of Calhoun, 270;
disposal of Swift's motion, 270;
vacancy in Senate delegation, 398;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399
Verona, Congress of, 124
Verplanck, Gulian Crommelin,
reports tariff bill, 231, 232;
bill discussed, 235;
bill used in argument, 236;
Clay's bill substituted for Verplanck's bill, 237
Virginia, Commonwealth of, 8, 41;
legislation on slavery, 43;
statute of 1662, 44, 45;
slave code of 1705, 45;
legislation on public elements of slavery, 46;
forbids importation of slaves, 48;
domestic slave-trade, 57, 58;
as a type, 86;
relation to Cumberland road, 116;
attitude to internal improvements bill of 1817, 117;
attitude to improvements bill of 1822, 119;
stock held in United States Bank, 203;
relation to slavery in District of Columbia, 253;
anticipated by Connecticut in recognizing Texas, 295;
views as to policies on slavery, 378;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399
"Virginia dynasty," the, extinct, 131
Vivês, Francisco D., 37
WADE, EDWARD,
signs _National Era_ address, 389;
opposition to Douglas, 391
Wakarusa River, the,
settlement near, 414;
Missourians on, 429
Walker, Isaac P.,
motion as to Mexican acquisitions, 350, 351;
declaration as to repeal of act of 1820, 395
Walker, Robert John,
offers resolution as to Texas, 298;
adopted, 299;
offers amendment to Texas resolution, 323;
appointed Governor of Kansas Territory, 461;
his address, 462;
party relations, 462;
declaration as to law controlling territorial election, 464;
action on fraudulent elections, 465
Walker, Samuel, in command of "Free-state" forces in Kansas, 444
Walla Walla, mission on the, 315, 316
War of 1812, 1, 5, 8, 9, 13, 17, 24, 25, 28, 29, 33, 54, 58, 59;
effect upon political parties, 130;
effect on Republican party, 239;
as to Astoria, 313
War with Mexico,
a result of social development, 277;
relation of war to election of Polk, 320;
details, 327 _et seq._;
the casus belli, 327;
the concentration of forces, 328;
point of conflict, 328, 329;
beginning of hostilities, 329;
battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, 329, 330;
attitude of parties to war, 330;
character of war, 330, 331;
Congress authorizes war, 331;
occupation of New Mexico and Upper California, 331;
capture of Monterey, 331, 332;
seizure of California, 332;
return of Santa Anna and plans against Vera Cruz, 332;
battle of Buena Vista, 333;
capture of Vera Cruz, 333;
battle of Cerro Gordo, 333;
capture of Jalapa, Perote, and Puebla, 333;
battles of Contreras, San Antonio, and Cherubusco, 334;
armistice, 334;
Cass's view of relation of the war and slavery, 338;
battles of Molino del Rey and Chapultepec, 338;
capture of Mexico, 338;
opposition to the war, 338;
treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 338
War of 1861,
an historical necessity, 65;
a result of social development, 277;
relation of events in Kansas to, 473, 474
War Department, 28, 30, 31, 32, 35
Warrenton, Virginia, 138
Washington, D. C., 2, 33, 124, 299, 300, 301, 302, 304, 307, 313, 315,
327, 330, 339, 375, 389, 401, 426, 428, 439
Washington Hall, fugitive slave law meetings, 373
Washington _Union_, the, relation to President Pierce, 401, 402
Webb, James Watson, applies name to Whig party, 281, 282
Webster, Daniel,
objection to Bank bill, 6;
as to tariff bill, 12;
qualifications as presidential candidate in 1824, 134, 136;
attitude to tariff of 1828, 162;
Calhoun and the Hayne debate, 179;
relation to Jackson and the Bank, 191;
advice to Bank party, 201;
on Bank committee of Senate, 201;
answers Calhoun's argument, 237;
retires from Tyler's cabinet, 286, 287;
New York speech on Texas, 301;
checks annexation plans, 303;
resigns from State Department, 303;
the Ashburton treaty, 303;
negotiation with Ashburton, 314;
views on slavery in Mexican acquisitions, 351, 352;
Seventh of March speech, 359;
on Committee of Thirteen, 360;
attitude to fugitive slave law, 368;
denounced by Giddings, 369;
contest in Whig convention of 1852, 376;
death, 377
Webster, Sidney, statement as to position of Washington _Union_, 401,
402
Welles, Gideon, Blair to Welles on Seward, 387, 388
Wells, William, as to Bank bill, 8
West Florida, 21
Weston, Missouri, meeting of residents of Platte County, 414
Westport, Missouri, meeting of Whitman colonists, 316
Wheeling, West Virginia, 116
Whig party,
appearance, 38, 104;
acquisition of name, 279, 281, 282;
significance of its composition and principles, 282, 283;
relation to Gordon's independent treasury proposal, 285;
opposes independent treasury bill of 1840, 285, 286;
convention of 1839, 286;
election of 1840, 286;
Bank bill and tariff bill as party measures, 286;
friction between Congress and President, 286, 287;
relation of its principle to the new question of slavery and
territorial extension, 287, 288;
address on Texas annexation, 303;
convention nominates Clay for presidency, 309;
position on Polk's first message, 324, 325;
attitude to Mexican War, 330;
platform of 1848, 345;
the Clayton bill, 346, 347;
election of 1848, 348, 349;
convention of 1852, 376;
tendency to division of party, 376, 377;
election of 1852, 377;
controversy over Kansas-Nebraska bill, 391;
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 398, 399;
vote in House on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 404, 405;
meaning of the vote, 405, 406;
as to leaders of Emigrant Aid Company, 413;
effect of Kansas struggle, 417;
tendency to dissolution, 417, 418
Whitfield, John W.,
elected to Congress in Kansas, 417;
credentials accepted, 418;
contest for seat in House of Representatives, 432, 433;
leads Missourians in Kansas, 441
Whitman, Marcus,
missionary to Oregon, 315;
settlement, and visit to Tyler, 315;
helped by the Administration, 315, 316;
the Oregon colony, 315
Wick, William W., moves amendment, 341, 342
Wilkins, William,
reports "Force Bill," 233, 234;
bill used in argument, 236;
attitude of Calhoun, 236;
bill passed by Senate, 237;
and by House, 237, 238;
approved, 238;
"Force Bill" considered, 240
Williams, J. M. S.,
in emigrant aid work, 411;
conference with Robinson, 413
Wilmot, David,
moves amendment, 335;
passed by House, 335;
no action in Senate, 336;
amendment again passed by House, 336 (_see_ Upham, William);
motion for amendment of Wilmot proviso, 341, 342;
the proviso and the Whig platform of 1848, 345;
the proviso in Berrien's speech, 352;
the proviso in abolitionist demands, 357
Wilson, Henry,
meets Robinson at Lawrence, 463;
urges new census for Kansas, 463
Wisconsin, Commonwealth of,
vote on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 399;
early Republican party in, 418
Wise, Henry A.,
demand as to District of Columbia, 257;
doctrine on Texan annexation, 302;
connection of speech with President's policy, 303
Witan, 262
Wood, S, N.,
Jones serves writ on, 433;
as to "treason indictment," 435
Woodbury, Charles Levi, connection with Sims case, 373
Woodbury, Levi, beginning of Bank trouble, 191
Woodson, Daniel,
Acting-Governor of Kansas Territory, 425;
superseded by Shannon, 427;
again Acting-Governor, 444;
proclamation of August 25, 444, 445;
orders Cooke to attack Topeka, 445
Worcester _vs._ Georgia [6 Peters, 515], 218, 219
Worcester, Samuel A.,
violation of Georgia statute, 218, 219;
case of Worcester against Georgia, 219
Worcester, Massachusetts, home of Eli Thayer, 408
Wright, William, not voting on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 398
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