The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Facts of Reconstruction, by John R. Lynch
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Title: The Facts of Reconstruction
Author: John R. Lynch
Release Date: July 1, 2005 [EBook #16158]
Language: English
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THE FACTS OF RECONSTRUCTION
John R. Lynch
Copyright, 1913, by The Neale Publishing Company
[Illustration: John R. Lynch]
CONTENTS
PREFACE
CHAPTER
I THE PART PLAYED BY MISSISSIPPI IN THE EARLY DAYS OF
RECONSTRUCTION
II REORGANIZATION OF THE STATE DEPARTMENTS DURING GOVERNOR
ALCORN'S ADMINISTRATION
III THE REPUBLICAN COUNTY CONVENTION OF 1869
IV IMPORTANT EDUCATIONAL AND POLITICAL MEASURES OF THE NEW
LEGISLATURE
V THE CONTEST FOR SPEAKER OF THE MISSISSIPPI HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
VI FUSION OF DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS IN THE STATE ELECTION
OF 1873. REPUBLICAN VICTORY
VII MISSISSIPPI SENDS B.K. BRUCE TO THE UNITED STATES SENATE
VIII IMPROVED FINANCIAL CONDITION OF MISSISSIPPI UNDER THE AMES
ADMINISTRATION
IX WHAT CONSTITUTES "NEGRO DOMINATION"
X OVERTHROW OF THE REPUBLICAN STATE GOVERNMENT IN MISSISSIPPI
XI RISE OF DEMOCRATIC RADICALISM IN THE SOUTH
XII EVENTFUL DAYS OF THE FORTY-THIRD CONGRESS
XIII STATE CAMPAIGN OF 1875. REPUBLICAN VICTORY
XIV INTERVIEW BETWEEN THE AUTHOR AND THE PRESIDENT REGARDING
STATE APPOINTMENTS
XV THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1876 AND ITS RESULTS
XVI EFFECTS OF THE REFORM ADMINISTRATION IN MISSISSIPPI
XVII THE HAYES-TILDEN CONTEST. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION
XVIII ATTITUDE OF THE HAYES ADMINISTRATION TOWARD THE SOUTH
XIX QUESTION OF THE VALIDITY OF SENATOR LAMAR'S ELECTION
XX REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION OF 1880. NOMINATION OF THE
COMPROMISE CANDIDATE, GARFIELD
XXI STORY OF THE MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN GARFIELD AND CONKLING
XXII THE NATIONAL CAMPAIGN OF 1884
XXIII THE ELECTION OF GROVER CLEVELAND
XXIV INTERVIEW WITH SECRETARY LAMAR ON THE RETAINING OF COLORED
MEN IN OFFICE
XXV THE FEDERAL ELECTIONS BILL
XXVI MISSISSIPPI AND THE NULLIFICATION OF THE FIFTEENTH
AMENDMENT
XXVII EFFECT OF THE MCKINLEY TARIFF BILL ON BOTH POLITICAL PARTIES
XXVIII INTERVIEW BETWEEN THE AUTHOR AND PRESIDENT CLEVELAND AND
SECRETARY GRESHAM
XXIX THE NATIONAL REPUBLICAN CONVENTION OF 1900
XXX ARGUMENT ON PROPOSED CHANGE OF REPRESENTATION IN CONVENTION
XXXI COMPARISON OF BRYAN AND CLEVELAND
XXXII THE SOLID SOUTH. FUTURE OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
PREFACE
The author of this book is one of the few remaining links in the chain
by which the present generation is connected with the reconstruction
period,--the most important and eventful period in our country's
history.
What is herein recorded is based upon the author's own knowledge,
contact and experience. Very much, of course, has been written and
published about reconstruction, but most of it is superficial and
unreliable; and, besides, nearly all of it has been written in such a
style and tone as to make the alleged facts related harmonize with what
was believed to be demanded by public sentiment. The author of this work
has endeavored to present _facts_ as they were and are, rather than as
he would like to have them, and to set them down without the slightest
regard to their effect upon the public mind, except so far as that mind
may be influenced by the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the
truth. In his efforts along these lines he has endeavored to give
expression to his ideas, opinions and convictions in language that is
moderate and devoid of bitterness, and entirely free from race
prejudice, sectional animosity, or partisan bias. Whether or not he has
succeeded in doing so he is willing to leave to the considerate
judgment and impartial decision of those who may take the time to read
what is here recorded. In writing what is to be found in these pages,
the author has made no effort to draw upon the imagination, nor to
gratify the wishes of those whose chief ambition is to magnify the
faults and deficiencies in some and to extol the good and commendable
traits and qualities in others. In other words, his chief purpose has
been to furnish the readers and students of the present generation with
a true, candid and impartial statement of material and important facts
based upon his own personal knowledge and experience, with such comments
as in his judgment the occasion and circumstances warranted.
Was the enfranchisement of the black men at the South by act of Congress
a grave mistake?
Were the reconstructed State Governments that were organized as a result
thereof a disappointment and a failure?
Was the Fifteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution premature and
unwise?
An affirmative answer to the above questions will be found in nearly
everything that has been written about Reconstruction during the last
quarter of a century. The main purpose of this work is to present the
other side; but, in doing so, the author indulges the hope that those
who may read these chapters will find that no extravagant and
exaggerated statements have been made, and that there has been no
effort to conceal, excuse, or justify any act that was questionable or
wrong. It will be seen that the primary object the author has sought to
accomplish, is to bring to public notice those things that were
commendable and meritorious, to prevent the publication of which seems
to have been the primary purpose of nearly all who have thus far written
upon that important subject.
But again, the question may be asked, if the reconstructed State
Governments that were organized and brought into existence under the
Congressional Plan of Reconstruction were not a disappointment and a
failure, why is it that they could not and did not stand the test of
time? The author hopes and believes that the reader will find in one of
the chapters of this book a complete and satisfactory answer to that
question.
It will be seen that the State of Mississippi is made the pivotal one in
the presentation of the facts and historical points touched upon in this
work; but that is because Mississippi was the field of the author's
political activities. That State, however, was largely typical, hence
what was true of that one was, in the main, true of all the other
reconstructed States.
The author was a member of Congress during the settlement of the
controversy between Hayes and Tilden for the Presidency of the United
States, resulting from the close and doubtful election of 1876,--a
controversy that was finally decided through the medium of the
Electoral Commission. The reader will find in the chapter on that
subject many important facts and incidents not heretofore published.
Why was it that the able and brilliant statesman from Maine, James G.
Blaine, died, as did Henry Clay, without having reached the acme of his
ambition,--the Presidency of the United States? Why was he defeated for
the Republican Presidential nomination in 1876,--the only time when it
was possible for him to be elected, and defeated for the election in
1884,--the only time when it was possible for him to be nominated? The
answer to these questions will be found in this book.
Then the interviews between the author and Presidents Grant and
Cleveland, and Secretaries Blaine, Lamar, and Gresham will no doubt be
interesting, if not instructive.
If, in writing this book, the author shall have succeeded in placing
before the public accurate and trustworthy information relative to
Reconstruction, his highest ambition will have been fully gratified, his
sense of justice entirely satisfied.
JOHN R. LYNCH.
THE FACTS OF RECONSTRUCTION
CHAPTER I
THE PART PLAYED BY MISSISSIPPI IN THE EARLY DAYS OF RECONSTRUCTION
The year 1866 was an eventful one in the history of this country. A
bitter war was in progress between Congress and President Andrew Johnson
over the question of the reconstruction of the States lately in
rebellion against the National Government. The President had inaugurated
a policy of his own that proved to be very unpopular at the North. He
had pardoned nearly all the leaders in the rebellion through the medium
of amnesty proclamations. In each rebel State he had appointed a
provisional governor under whose direction Legislatures, State officers,
and members of Congress had been chosen, and the Legislatures thus
chosen elected the United States Senators for the Southern States in
accordance with the President's plan of reconstruction. To make
restoration to the Union full and complete nothing remained to be done
but to admit to their seats the Senators and Representatives that had
been chosen. In the mean time these different Legislatures had enacted
laws which virtually re-enslaved those that had been emancipated in
their respective States. For this the North would not stand. Sentiment
in that section demanded not only justice and fair treatment for the
newly emancipated race but also an emancipation that should be thorough
and complete, not merely theoretical and nominal.
The fact was recognized and appreciated that the colored people had been
loyal to the Union and faithful to the flag of their country and that
they had rendered valuable assistance in putting down the rebellion.
From a standpoint of gratitude, if not of justice, the sentiment of the
North at that time was in favor of fair play for the colored people of
the South. But the President would not yield to what was generally
believed to be the dominant sentiment of the North on the question of
reconstruction. He insisted that the leaders of the Republican party in
Congress did not represent the true sentiment of the country, so he
boldly determined to antagonize the leaders in Congress, and to present
their differences to the court of public opinion at the approaching
Congressional elections. The issue was thus joined and the people were
called upon to render judgment in the election of members of Congress
in the fall of 1866. The President, with the solid support of the
Democrats and a small minority of the Republicans, made a brave and
gallant fight. The result, however, was a crushing defeat for him and a
national repudiation of his plan of reconstruction.
Notwithstanding this defeat the President refused to yield, continuing
the fight with Congress which finally resulted in his impeachment by the
House of Representatives for high Crimes and Misdemeanors in office and
in his trial by the Senate sitting as a High Court for that purpose.
When the vote of the court was taken the President was saved from
conviction and from removal from office by the narrow margin of one
vote,--a sufficient number of Republican Senators having voted with the
Democrats to prevent conviction. It was believed by many at the time
that some of the Republican Senators that voted for acquittal did so
chiefly on account of their antipathy to the man who would succeed to
the Presidency in the event of the conviction of the President. This man
was Senator Benjamin Wade, of Ohio,--President _pro tem._ of the
Senate,--who, as the law then stood, would have succeeded to the
Presidency in the event of a vacancy in that office from any cause.
Senator Wade was an able man, but there were others who were much more
brilliant. He was a strong party man. He had no patience with those who
claimed to be Republicans and yet refused to abide by the decision of
the majority of the party organization unless that decision should be
what they wanted. In short, he was an organization Republican,--what has
since been characterized by some as a machine man,--the sort of active
and aggressive man that would be likely to make for himself enemies of
men in his own organization who were afraid of his great power and
influence, and jealous of him as a political rival. That some of his
senatorial Republican associates should feel that the best service they
could render their country would be to do all in their power to prevent
such a man from being elevated to the Presidency was, perhaps, perfectly
natural: for while they knew that he was a strong and able man, they
also knew that, according to his convictions of party duty and party
obligations, he firmly believed that he who served his party best served
his country best. In giving expression to his views and convictions, as
he usually did with force and vigor, he was not always considerate of
the wishes and feelings of those with whom he did not agree. That he
would have given the country an able administration is the concurrent
opinion of those who knew him best.
While President Johnson was retained in office he was practically shorn
of the greater part of the power and patronage that attaches to the
office. This was done through the passage of a bill, over the
president's veto, known as the Tenure of Office Act. The
constitutionality of this act, which greatly curtailed the power of the
President to make removals from office, was seriously questioned at the
time, but it was passed as a political necessity,--to meet an unusual
and unexpected emergency that seemed to threaten the peace and
tranquillity of the country and practically to nullify the fruits of the
victory which had been won on the field of battle. The law was repealed
or materially modified as soon as President Johnson retired from office.
The President also vetoed all the reconstruction bills,--bills
conferring suffrage on the colored men in the States that were to be
reconstructed,--that passed Congress; but they were promptly passed over
the veto.
The rejection by the country of the Johnson plan of reconstruction, had
clearly demonstrated that no halfway measures were possible. If the
colored men were not enfranchised then the Johnson plan might as well be
accepted. The Republican or Union white men at the South were not
sufficient in numbers to make their power or influence felt. The
necessities of the situation, therefore, left no alternative but the
enfranchisement of the blacks. It was ascertained and acknowledged that
to make possible the reconstruction of the States lately in rebellion,
in accordance with the plan which had met with the emphatic approval of
the North, the enfranchisement of the blacks in the States to be
reconstructed was an absolute necessity.
The first election held in Mississippi under the Reconstruction Acts
took place in 1867, when delegates to a Constitutional Convention were
elected to frame a new Constitution. The Democrats decided to adopt what
they declared to be a policy of "Masterly Inactivity," that is, to
refrain from taking any part in the election and to allow it to go by
default. The result was that the Republicans had a large majority of the
delegates, only a few counties having elected Democratic delegates. The
only reason that there were any Democrats in the Convention at all was
that the party was not unanimous in the adoption of the policy of
"Masterly Inactivity," and consequently did not adhere to it. The
Democrats in a few counties in the State rejected the advice and
repudiated the action of the State Convention of their party on this
point. The result was that a few very able men were elected to the
convention as Democrats,--such men, for instance, as John W.C. Watson,
and William M. Compton, of Marshall County, and William L. Hemingway, of
Carroll, who was elected State Treasurer by the Democrats in 1875, and
to whom a more extended reference will be made in a subsequent chapter.
The result of the election made it clear that if the Democratic
organization in the State had adopted the course that was pursued by
the members of that party in the counties by which the action of their
State Convention was repudiated, the Democrats would have had at least a
large and influential minority of the delegates, which would have
resulted in the framing of a constitution that would have been much more
acceptable to the members of that party than the one that was finally
agreed upon by the majority of the members of that body. But the
Democratic party in the State was governed and controlled by the radical
element of that organization,--an element which took the position that
no respectable white Democrat could afford to participate in an election
in which colored men were allowed to vote. To do so, they held, would
not only be humiliating to the pride of the white men, but the
contamination would be unwise if not dangerous. Besides, they were firm
in the belief and honest in the conviction that the country would
ultimately repudiate the Congressional Plan of Reconstruction, and that
in the mean time it would be both safe and wise for them to give
expression to their objections to it and abhorrence of it by pursuing a
course of masterly inactivity. The liberal and conservative element in
the party was so bitterly opposed to this course that in spite of the
action of the State Convention several counties, as has been already
stated, bolted the action of the convention and took part in the
election.
Of the Republican membership of the Constitutional Convention a large
majority were white men,--many of them natives of the State and a number
of others, though born elsewhere, residents in the State for many years
preceding the war of the Rebellion. My own county, Adams (Natchez), in
which the colored voters were largely in the majority, and which was
entitled to three delegates in the convention, elected two white
men,--E.J. Castello, and Fred Parsons,--and one colored man, H.P.
Jacobs, a Baptist preacher. Throughout the State the proportion was
about the same. This was a great disappointment to the dominating
element in the Democratic party, who had hoped and expected, through
their policy of "Masterly Inactivity" and intimidation of white men,
that the convention would be composed almost exclusively of illiterate
and inexperienced colored men. Although a minor at that time, I took an
active part in the local politics of my county, and, being a member of a
Republican club that had been organized at Natchez, I was frequently
called upon to address the members at its weekly meetings.
When the State Constitution was submitted to a popular vote for
ratification or rejection I took an active part in the county campaign
in advocacy of its ratification. In this election the Democrats pursued
a course that was just the opposite of that pursued by them in the
election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention. They decided
that it was no longer unwise and dangerous for white men to take part in
an election in which colored men were allowed to participate. This was
due largely to the fact that the work of the convention had been far
different from what they had anticipated. The newly framed Constitution
was, taken as a whole, such an excellent document that in all
probability it would have been ratified without serious opposition but
for the fact that there was an unfortunate, unwise and unnecessary
clause in it which practically disfranchised those who had held an
office under the Constitution of the United States and who, having taken
an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States, had
afterwards supported the cause of the Confederacy. This clause caused
very bitter and intense opposition to the ratification of the
Constitution. When the election was over it was found that the
Constitution had been rejected by a small majority. This result could
not be fairly accepted as an indication of the strength of the two
parties in the State, for it was a well-known fact that the Republican
party had a clear majority of about 30,000.
Notwithstanding the large Republican majority in the State, which was
believed to be safe, sure and reliable, there were several causes that
contributed to the rejection of the newly framed Constitution. Among the
causes were:
First. In consequence of the bitterness with which the ratification of
the Constitution had been fought, on account of the objectionable clause
referred to, intimidating methods had been adopted in several counties
in which there was a large colored vote, resulting in a loss of several
thousand votes for the Constitution.
Second. There were several thousand Republicans both white and
colored,--but chiefly colored,--who were opposed to that offensive and
objectionable clause, believing the same to be unjust, unnecessary, and
unwise; hence, many of that class refused to vote either way.
Third. There were thousands of voters, the writer being one of that
number, who favored ratification because the Constitution as a whole was
a most excellent document, and because its ratification would facilitate
the readmittance of Mississippi into the Union; after which the one
objectionable clause could be stricken out by means of an amendment.
While all of this class favored and advocated ratification for the
reasons stated, yet their known attitude towards the clause proved to be
a contributary cause of the rejection of the Constitution.
The reader may not understand why there were any colored men, especially
at that time and in that section, that would have any sympathy for the
white men who would have been victims of this clause had the new
Constitution been ratified. But if the reader will closely follow what
this writer will set down in subsequent chapters of this work, he will
find the reasons why there was and still is a bond of sympathy between
the two races at the South,--a bond that the institution of slavery with
all its horrors could not destroy, the Rebellion could not wipe out,
Reconstruction could not efface, and subsequent events have not been
able to change. The writer is aware of the fact that thousands of
intelligent people are now laboring under the impression that there
exists at the South a bitter feeling of antagonism between the two races
and that this has produced dangerous and difficult problems for the
country to solve. That some things have occurred that would justify such
a conclusion, especially on the part of those who are not students of
this subject, will not be denied.
After the rejection of the Constitution no further effort was made to
have Mississippi readmitted into the Union until after the Presidential
and Congressional elections of 1868. The Democratic party throughout the
country was solid in its support of President Andrew Johnson, and was
bitter in its opposition to the Congressional Plan of Reconstruction.
Upon a platform that declared the Reconstruction Acts of Congress to be
unconstitutional, revolutionary, and void, the Democrats nominated for
President and Vice-President, Ex-Governor Horatio Seymour, of New York,
and General Frank P. Blair, of Missouri. The Republicans nominated for
President General U.S. Grant, of Illinois, and for Vice-President
Speaker Schuyler Colfax, of Indiana. These candidates were nominated
upon a platform which strongly supported and indorsed the Congressional
Plan of Reconstruction.
On this issue the two parties went before the people for a decision. The
Republicans were successful, but not by such a decisive majority as in
the Congressional election of 1866. In fact, if all the Southern States
that took part in that election had gone Democratic, the hero of
Appomattox would have been defeated. It was the Southern States, giving
Republican majorities through the votes of their colored men, that saved
that important national election to the Republican party. To the very
great surprise of the Republican leaders the party lost the important
and pivotal State of New York. It had been confidently believed that the
immense popularity of General Grant and his prestige as a brilliant and
successful Union general would save every doubtful State to the
Republicans, New York, of course, included. But this expectation was not
realized. The result, it is needless to say, was a keen and bitter
disappointment, for no effort had been spared to bring to the attention
of the voters the strong points in General Grant. A vote against Grant,
it was strongly contended, was virtually a vote against the Union.
Frederick Douglass, who electrified many audiences in that campaign,
made the notable declaration that "While Washington had given us a
country, it was Grant who had saved us a country." And yet the savior of
our country failed in that election to save to the Republican party the
most important State in the Union. But, notwithstanding the loss of New
York, the Republicans not only elected the President and Vice-President,
but also had a safe majority in both branches of Congress.
One of the first acts of Congress after the Presidential election of
1868 was one authorizing the President to submit Mississippi's rejected
Constitution once again to a popular vote. The same act authorized the
President to submit to a separate vote such clause or clauses of said
Constitution as in his judgment might be particularly obnoxious to any
considerable number of the people of the State. It was not and could not
be denied that the Constitution as a whole was a most admirable
document. The Democrats had no serious objection to its ratification if
the clause disfranchising most of their leaders were eliminated. When it
became known that this clause would be submitted to a separate vote, and
that the Republican organization would not insist upon its retention, no
serious opposition to the ratification of the Constitution was
anticipated. And, indeed, none was made.
The time fixed for holding the election was November, 1869. In the mean
time the State was to be under military control. General Adelbert Ames
was made Military Governor, with power to fill by appointment every
civil office in the State. Shortly after General Ames took charge as
Military Governor the Republican club at Natchez agreed upon a slate to
be submitted to the Military Governor for his favorable consideration,
the names upon said slate being the choice of the Republican
organization of the county for county and city officials. Among the
names thus agreed upon was that of the Rev. H.P. Jacobs for Justice of
the Peace. It was then decided to send a member of the club to Jackson,
the State capital, to present the slate to the Governor in person in
order to answer questions that might be asked or to give any information
that might be desired about any of the persons whose names appeared on
the slate. It fell to my lot to be chosen for that purpose; the
necessary funds being raised by the club to pay my expenses. I accepted
the mission, contingent upon my employer's granting me leave of absence.
Natchez at that time was not connected with Jackson by railroad, so that
the only way for me to reach the capital was to go by steamer from
Natchez to Vicksburg or to New Orleans, and from there by rail to
Jackson. The trip, therefore, would necessarily consume the greater part
of a week. My employer,--who was what was known as a Northern man,
having come there after the occupation of the place by the Federal
troops,--not only granted me leave of absence but agreed to remain in
the city and carry on the business during my absence.
When I arrived at the building occupied by the Governor and sent up my
card, I had to wait only a few minutes before I was admitted to his
office. The Governor received me cordially and treated me with marked
courtesy, giving close attention while I presented as forcibly as I
could the merits and qualifications of the different persons whose names
were on the slate. When I had concluded my remarks the Governor's only
reply was that he would give the matter his early and careful
consideration. A few weeks later the appointments were announced; but
not many of the appointees were persons whose names I had presented.
However, to my great embarrassment I found that my own name had been
substituted for that of Jacobs for the office of Justice of the Peace. I
not only had no ambition in that direction but was not aware that my
name was under consideration for that or for any other office. Besides,
I was apprehensive that Jacobs and some of his friends might suspect me
of having been false to the trust that had been reposed in me, at least
so far as the office of Justice of the Peace was concerned. At first I
was of the opinion that the only way in which I could disabuse their
minds of that erroneous impression was to decline the appointment. But I
found out upon inquiry that in no event would Jacobs receive the
appointment. I was also reliably informed that I had not been
recommended nor suggested by any one, but that the Governor's action was
the result of the favorable impression I had made upon him when I
presented the slate. For this, of course, I was in no way responsible.
In fact the impression of my fitness for the office that my brief talk
had made upon the Governor was just what the club had hoped I would be
able to accomplish in the interest of the whole slate. That it so
happened that I was the beneficiary of the favorable impression that my
brief talk had made upon the Governor may have been unfortunate in one
respect, but it was an unconscious act for which I could not be
censured. After consulting, therefore, with a few personal friends and
local party leaders, I decided to accept the appointment although, in
consequence of my youth and inexperience, I had serious doubts as to my
ability to discharge the duties of the office which at that time was one
of considerable importance.
Then the bond question loomed up, which was one of the greatest
obstacles in my way, although the amount was only two thousand dollars.
How to give that bond was the important problem I had to solve, for, of
course, no one was eligible as a bondsman who did not own real estate.
There were very few colored men who were thus eligible, and it was out
of the question at that time to expect any white property owner to sign
the bond of a colored man. But there were two colored men willing to
sign the bond for one thousand dollars each who were considered eligible
by the authorities. These men were William McCary and David Singleton.
The law, having been duly satisfied in the matter of my bond, I was
permitted to take the oath of office in April, 1869, and to enter upon
the discharge of my duties as a Justice of the Peace, which office I
held until the 31st of December of the same year when I resigned to
accept a seat in the lower branch of the State Legislature to which I
had been elected the preceding November.
When I entered upon the discharge of my duties as a Justice of the Peace
the only comment that was made by the local Democratic paper of the town
was in these words: "We are now beginning to reap the ravishing fruits
of Reconstruction."
CHAPTER II
REORGANIZATION OF THE STATE DEPARTMENTS DURING GOVERNOR ALCORN'S
ADMINISTRATION
The new Constitution of Mississippi, which had been rejected in 1868,
was to be submitted to a popular vote once more in November, 1869. At
the same time State officers, members of the Legislature, Congressmen,
and district and county officers were to be elected. Since the
objectionable clauses in the Constitution were to be put to a separate
vote, and since it was understood that both parties would favor the
rejection of these clauses, there was no serious opposition to the
ratification of the Constitution thus amended. A hard and stubborn fight
was, however, to be made for control of the State Government.
General James L. Alcorn, who had been a general in the Confederate Army
and who had recently openly identified himself with the Republican
party, was nominated by the Republicans for the office of Governor of
the State. Of the other six men who were associated with him on the
state ticket, only the candidate for Secretary of the State, the
Reverend James Lynch,--an able and eloquent minister of the Methodist
Church,--was a colored man. Lynch was a man of fine ability, of splendid
education, and one of the most powerful and convincing orators that the
Republicans had upon the stump in that campaign. He was known and
recognized as such an able and brilliant speaker that his services were
in great demand from the beginning to the end of the campaign. No
Democratic orator, however able, was anxious to meet him in joint
debate. He died suddenly the latter part of 1872. His death was a great
loss to the State and to the Republican party and especially to the
colored race.
Of the other five candidates on the ticket two,--the candidates for
State Treasurer and Attorney General,--were, like General Alcorn,
Southern white men. The candidate for State Treasurer, Hon. W.H. Vasser,
was a successful business man who lived in the northern part of the
State, while the candidate for Attorney General, Hon. Joshua S. Morris,
was a brilliant member of the bar who lived in the southern part of the
State. The other three, the candidates for Lieutenant-Governor, State
Auditor and Superintendent of Education, were Northern men who had
settled in the State after the War, called by the Democrats, "Carpet
Baggers," but they were admitted to be clean and good men who had
lived in the State long enough to become fully identified with its
industrial and business interests. H.C. Powers, the candidate for
Lieutenant-Governor, and H. Musgrove, the candidate for Auditor of
Public Accounts, were successful cotton planters from Noxubee and Clarke
counties respectively; while H.R. Pease, the candidate for State
Superintendent of Education, had been identified with educational work
ever since he came to the State. It could not be denied that it was a
strong and able ticket,--one that the Democrats would find it very
difficult to defeat. In desperation the Democratic party had nominated
as their candidate for Governor a brother-in-law of President Grant's,
Judge Lewis Dent, in the hope that the President would throw the weight
of his influence and the active support of his administration on the
side of his relative, as against the candidate of his own party,
especially in view of the fact that Dent had been nominated not as a
Democrat but as an Independent Republican,--his candidacy simply having
been indorsed by the Democratic organization. But in this they were
disappointed, for if the President gave any indication of preference it
was in favor of the Republican ticket. General Ames, for instance, was
the Military Governor of the State, holding that position at the
pleasure of the President; and Ames was so outspoken in his support of
the Republican ticket, that in an address before the State Republican
Convention that nominated General Alcorn for the Governorship he
announced, "You have my sympathy and shall have my support." This
declaration was received by the convention with great applause, for it
was known that those words from that source carried great weight. They
meant not only that the Republican party would have the active and
aggressive support of the Military Governor,--which was very important
and would be worth thousands of votes to the party,--but they also
indicated the attitude of the National Administration. The campaign was
aggressive from beginning to end. Judge Dent was at a disadvantage,
since his candidacy had failed to bring to his support the influence of
the National Administration, which had been the sole purpose of his
nomination. In spite of that fact Dent made a game and gallant fight;
but the election resulted in an overwhelming Republican victory. That
party not only elected the State ticket by a majority of about 30,000
but it also had a large majority in both branches of the State
Legislature.
The new administration had an important and difficult task before it. A
State Government had to be organized from top to bottom; a new judiciary
had to be inaugurated,--consisting of three Justices of the State
Supreme Court, fifteen Judges of the Circuit Court and twenty Chancery
Court Judges,--who had all to be appointed by the Governor with the
consent of the Senate, and, in addition, a new public school system had
to be established. There was not a public school building anywhere in
the State except in a few of the larger towns, and they, with possibly
a few exceptions, were greatly in need of repairs. To erect the
necessary school houses and to reconstruct and repair those already in
existence so as to afford educational facilities for both races was by
no means an easy task. It necessitated a very large outlay of cash in
the beginning, which resulted in a material increase in the rate of
taxation for the time being, but the Constitution called for the
establishment of the system, and of course the work had to be done. It
was not only done, but it was done creditably and as economically as
possible, considering the conditions at that time.
That system, though slightly changed, still stands,--a creditable
monument to the first Republican State administration that was organized
in the State of Mississippi under the Reconstruction Acts of Congress.
It was also necessary to reorganize, reconstruct and, in many instances,
rebuild some of the penal and charitable institutions of the State. A
new code of laws also had to be adopted to take the place of the old
code and thus wipe out the black laws that had been passed by what was
known as the Johnson Legislature and in addition bring about other
changes so as to make the laws and statutes of the State conform with
the new order of things. This was no easy task, in view of the fact that
a heavy increase in the rate of taxation was thus made necessary, for
the time being at least. That this important work was splendidly,
creditably, and economically done no fair-minded person who is familiar
with the facts will question or dispute.
That the State never had before, and has never had since, a finer
Judiciary than that which was organized under the administration of
Governor Alcorn and which continued under the administration of Governor
Ames is an indisputable and incontrovertible fact. The Judges of the
Supreme Court were E.G. Peyton, H.F. Simrall and J. Tarbell, who in
Mississippi had no superiors in their profession, and who had the
respect and confidence of the bar and of the people without regard to
race or politics. Judge Peyton was the Chief Justice, Simrall and
Tarbell being the Associate Justices. The first two were old residents
of the State, while Mr. Justice Tarbell was what the Democrats would
call a "Carpet Bagger." But that he was an able lawyer and a man of
unimpeachable integrity no one doubted or questioned. During the second
administration of President Grant he held the important position of
Second Comptroller of the United States Treasury. The Circuit Court
bench was graced with such able and brilliant lawyers as Jason Niles,
G.C. Chandler, George F. Brown, J.A. Orr, John W. Vance, Robert
Leachman, B.B. Boone, Orlando Davis, James M. Smiley, Uriah Millsaps,
William M. Hancock, E.S. Fisher, C.C. Shackleford, W.B. Cunningham,
W.D. Bradford and A. Alderson. Judges Brown and Cunningham were the only
ones in the above list who were not old residents of the State. After
leaving the bench, Judge Chandler served for several years as United
States Attorney. Judge Niles served one term as a member of Congress,
having been elected as a Republican in 1875. His son Henry Clay Niles is
now United States District Judge for the State, having been appointed to
that important position by President Harrison. He was strongly
recommended by many members of the bench and bar of the State; and the
very able and creditable way in which he has discharged the duties of
the position has more than demonstrated the wisdom of the selection.
The Chancery Courts as organized by Governor Alcorn and continued by
Governor Ames were composed of men no less able and brilliant than those
who composed the Bench of the Circuit Courts. They were: J.C. Lyon, E.P.
Harmon, E.G. Peyton, Jr., J.M. Ellis, G.S. McMillan, Samuel Young, W.G.
Henderson, Edwin Hill, T.R. Gowan, J.F. Simmons, Wesley Drane, D.W.
Walker, DeWitte Stearns, D.P. Coffee, E.W. Cabiness, A.E. Reynolds,
Thomas Christian, Austin Pollard, J.J. Hooker, O.H. Whitfield, E.
Stafford, W.A. Drennan, Thomas Walton, E.H. Osgood, C.A. Sullivan, Hiram
Cassedy, Jr., W.B. Peyton, J.D. Barton, J.J. Dennis, W.D. Frazee, P.P.
Bailey, L.C. Abbott, H.W. Warren, R. Boyd, R.B. Stone, William Breck,
J.N. Campbell, H.R. Ware and J.B. Deason. The above names composed those
who were appointed both by Governors Alcorn and Ames. A majority of
those originally appointed by Governor Alcorn were reappointed by
Governor Ames. Of the forty appointments of Judges of the Chancery
Courts made under the administrations of Alcorn and Ames, not more than
about seven were not to the "manner born." The administration of James
L. Alcorn as Governor of the State of Mississippi is one of the best
with which that unfortunate State has been blessed. A more extended
reference to the subsequent administration of Governor Ames will be made
in a later chapter.
CHAPTER III
THE REPUBLICAN COUNTY CONVENTION OF 1869
Although it was not charged nor even intimated that my acceptance of the
office of Justice of the Peace was the result of bad faith on my part,
still the appointment resulted in the creation for the time being of two
factions in the Republican party in the county. One was known as the
Lynch faction, the other as the Jacobs faction.
When the Constitution was submitted to a popular vote in November, 1869,
it was provided that officers should be elected at the same time to all
offices created by the Constitution and that they, including members of
the Legislature, were to be chosen by popular vote. The county of Adams
(Natchez) was entitled to one member of the State Senate and three
members of the House of Representatives. Jacobs was a candidate for the
Republican nomination for State Senator. The Lynch faction, however,
refused to support him for that position although it had no objection to
his nomination for member of the House. Since Jacobs persisted in his
candidacy for State Senator the Lynch faction brought out an opposing
candidate in the person of a Baptist minister by the name of J.M.P.
Williams. The contest between the two Republican candidates was
interesting and exciting, though not bitter, and turned out to be very
close.
The convention was to be composed of thirty-three delegates, seventeen
being necessary to nominate. The result at the primary election of
delegates to the convention was so close that it was impossible to tell
which one had a majority, since there were several delegates,--about
whose attitude and preference there had been some doubt,--who refused to
commit themselves either way. In the organization of the convention the
Williams men gained the first advantage, one of their number having been
made permanent chairman. But this was not important since there were no
contests for seats, consequently the presiding officer would have no
occasion to render a decision that could have any bearing upon the
composition of the body over which he presided.
Both sides agreed that the nomination for State Senator should be made
first and that the vote should be by ballot, the ballots to be received
and counted by two tellers, one to be selected by each faction. When the
result of the first ballot was announced, Jacobs had sixteen votes,
Williams, sixteen, and a third man had one. Several ballots were taken
with the same result, when, with the consent of both sides, a recess was
taken until 3 o'clock in the afternoon. The one delegate that refused
to vote for either Jacobs or Williams made no effort to conceal his
identity. To the contrary, he was outspoken in his determination and
decision that he would not at any time or under any circumstances vote
for either. Strange to say, this man was also a colored Baptist
preacher, the Rev. Noah Buchanan, from the Washington district. Members
of both factions approached him during the recess and pleaded with him,
but their efforts and pleadings were all in vain. Nothing could move him
or change him. He stated that he had given the matter his careful and
serious consideration, and that he had come to the conclusion that
neither Jacobs nor Williams was a fit man to represent the important
county of Adams in the State Senate, hence neither could get his vote.
At the afternoon session, after several ballots had been taken with the
same result, an adjournment was ordered until 9 o'clock next morning.
Soon after adjournment each side went into caucus. At the Jacobs meeting
it was decided to stick to their man to the very last. At the Williams
meeting Hon. H.C. Griffin, white leader of the Williams men, suggested
the name of the Rev. H.R. Revels as a compromise candidate. Revels was
comparatively a new man in the community. He had recently been stationed
at Natchez as pastor in charge of the A.M.E. Church, and so far as
known he had never voted, had never attended a political meeting, and of
course, had never made a political speech. But he was a colored man, and
presumed to be a Republican, and believed to be a man of ability and
considerably above the average in point of intelligence; just the man,
it was thought, the Rev. Noah Buchanan would be willing to vote for.
After considerable discussion it was agreed that a committee should be
appointed to wait on Mr. Williams in order to find out if he would be
willing to withdraw in favor of Revels should his friends and supporters
deem such a step necessary and wise. In the event of Williams'
withdrawal, the committee was next to call on Revels to find out if he
would consent to the use of his name. If Revels consented, the committee
was next to call on Rev. Buchanan to find out whether or not he would
vote for Revels. This committee was to report to the caucus at 8 o'clock
next morning.
At the appointed time the committee reported that Williams had stated
that he was in the hands of his friends and that he would abide by any
decision they might make. Revels, the report stated, who had been taken
very much by surprise,--having had no idea that his name would ever be
mentioned in connection with any office,--had asked to be allowed until
7 o'clock in the morning to consider the matter and to talk it over with
his wife. At 7 o'clock he notified the chairman of the committee that
he would accept the nomination if tendered.
Buchanan had informed the committee that he had heard of Revels but did
not know him personally. He too had asked to be allowed until 7 o'clock
in the morning before giving a positive answer, so as to enable him to
make the necessary inquiries to find out whether or not Revels was a
suitable man for the position. At 7 o'clock he informed the chairman of
the committee that if the name of Williams should be withdrawn in favor
of Revels he would cast his vote for Revels. The caucus then decided by
a unanimous vote that upon the assembling of the convention at 9 o'clock
that morning Mr. Griffin should withdraw the name of Williams from
before the convention as a candidate for State Senator, but that no
other name should be placed in nomination. Every member of the caucus,
however, was committed to vote for Revels. This decision was to be
communicated to no one outside of the caucus except to Mr. Buchanan, who
was to be privately informed of it by the chairman of the committee to
whom he had communicated his own decision.
As soon as the convention was called to order Mr. Griffin was recognized
by the chair. He stated that he had been authorized to withdraw the name
of Rev. J.M.P. Williams from before the convention as candidate for
State Senator. This announcement was received by the Jacobs men with
great applause. The withdrawal of the name of Williams without placing
any other in nomination they accepted as evidence that further
opposition to the nomination of their candidate had been abandoned and
that his nomination was a foregone conclusion. But they were not allowed
to labor under that impression very long. The roll-call was immediately
ordered by the chair and the tellers took their places. When the ballots
had been counted and tabulated, the result was seventeen votes for
Revels and sixteen votes for Jacobs. The announcement was received by
the Williams men with great applause. The result was a victory for them
because it was their sixteen votes together with the vote of Rev. Noah
Buchanan that had nominated Revels. The Jacobs men accepted their defeat
gracefully. A motion was offered by their leader to make the nomination
unanimous and it was adopted without a dissenting vote. In anticipation
of his nomination Revels was present as one of the interested spectators
and upon being called upon for a brief address he delivered it with
telling effect, thereby making a most favorable impression. This address
convinced Rev. Noah Buchanan that he had made no mistake in voting for
Revels. Jacobs was then nominated for member of the House of
Representatives without opposition, his associates being John R. Lynch
and Capt. O.C. French, a white Republican. The ticket as completed was
elected by a majority of from fifteen hundred to two thousand, a
Republican nomination in Adams County at that time being equivalent to
an election.
When the Legislature convened at Jackson the first Monday in January,
1870, it was suggested to Lieutenant-Governor Powers, presiding officer
of the Senate, that he invite the Rev. Dr. Revels to open the Senate
with prayer. The suggestion was favorably acted upon. That prayer,--one
of the most impressive and eloquent prayers that had ever been delivered
in the Senate Chamber,--made Revels a United States Senator. He made a
profound impression upon all who heard him. It impressed those who heard
it that Revels was not only a man of great natural ability but that he
was also a man of superior attainments.
The duty devolved upon that Legislature to fill three vacancies in the
United States Senate: one, a fractional term of about one year,--the
remainder of the six year term to which Jefferson Davis had been elected
before the breaking out of the Rebellion,--another fractional term of
about five years, and the third, the full term of six years, beginning
with the expiration of the fractional term of one year. The colored
members of the Legislature constituted a very small minority not only of
the total membership of that body but also of the Republican members. Of
the thirty-three members of which the Senate was composed four of them
were colored men: H.R. Revels, of Adams; Charles Caldwell, of Hinds;
Robert Gleed, of Lowndes, and T.W. Stringer, of Warren. Of the one
hundred and seven members of which the House was composed about thirty
of them were colored men. It will thus be seen that out of the one
hundred forty members of which the two Houses were composed only about
thirty-four of them were colored men. But the colored members insisted
that one of the three United States Senators to be elected should be a
colored man. The white Republicans were willing that the colored men be
given the fractional term of one year, since it was understood that
Governor Alcorn was to be elected to the full term of six years and that
Governor Ames was to be elected to the fractional term of five years.
In this connection it may not be out of place to say that, ever since
the organization of the Republican party in Mississippi, the white
Republicans of that State, unlike some in a few of the other Southern
States, have never attempted to draw the color line against their
colored allies. In this they have proved themselves to be genuine and
not sham Republicans,--that is to say, Republicans from principle and
conviction and not for plunder and spoils. They have never failed to
recognize the fact that the fundamental principle of the Republican
party,--the one that gave the party its strongest claim upon the
confidence and support of the public,--is its advocacy of equal civil
and political rights. If that party should ever come to the conclusion
that this principle should be abandoned, that moment it will merit, and
I am sure it will receive, the condemnation and repudiation of the
public.
It was not, therefore, a surprise to any one when the white Republican
members of the Mississippi Legislature gave expression to their entire
willingness to vote for a suitable colored man to represent the state of
Mississippi in the highest and most dignified legislative tribunal in
the world. The next step was to find the man. The name of the Rev. James
Lynch was first suggested. That he was a suitable and fit man for the
position could not be denied. But he had just been elected Secretary of
State for a term of four years, and his election to the Senate would
have created a vacancy in the former office which would have
necessitated the holding of another State election and another election
was what all wanted to avoid. For that reason his name was not seriously
considered for the Senatorship.
[Illustration: HON. HIRAM R. REVELS. The first colored man that occupied
a seat in the U.S. Senate. From a photograph taken by Maj. Lynch at
Natchez, Miss., in 1868.]
The next name suggested was that of the Rev. H.R. Revels and those who
had been so fortunate as to hear the impressive prayer that he had
delivered on the opening of the Senate were outspoken in their advocacy
of his selection. The white Republicans assured the colored members
that if they would unite upon Revels, they were satisfied he would
receive the vote of every white Republican member of the Legislature.
Governor Alcorn also gave the movement his cordial and active support,
thus insuring for Revels the support of the State administration. The
colored members then held an informal conference, at which it was
unanimously decided to present the name of Rev. H.R. Revels to the
Republican Legislative Caucus as a candidate for United States Senator
to fill the fractional term of one year. The choice was ratified by the
caucus without serious opposition. In the joint Legislative session,
every Republican member, white and colored, voted for the three
Republican caucus nominees for United States Senators,--Alcorn, Ames and
Revels,--with one exception, Senator William M. Hancock, of Lauderdale,
who stated in explanation of his vote against Revels that as a lawyer he
did not believe that a colored man was eligible to a seat in the United
States Senate. But Judge Hancock seems to have been the only lawyer in
the Legislature,--or outside of it, as far as could be learned,--who
entertained that opinion.
CHAPTER IV
IMPORTANT EDUCATIONAL AND POLITICAL MEASURES OF THE NEW LEGISLATURE
In addition to the election of three United States Senators this
Legislature had some very important work before it, as has already been
stated in a previous chapter. A new public school system had to be
inaugurated and put in operation, thus necessitating the construction of
schoolhouses throughout the State, some of them, especially in the towns
and villages, to be quite large and of course expensive. All of the
other public buildings and institutions in the State had to be repaired,
some of them rebuilt, all of them having been neglected and some of them
destroyed during the progress of the late War. In addition to this the
entire State Government in all of its branches had to be reconstructed
and so organized as to place the same in perfect harmony with the new
order of things.
To accomplish these things money was required. There was none in the
treasury. There was no cash available even to pay the ordinary expenses
of the State government. Because of this lack of funds the government
had to be carried on on a credit basis,--that is, by the issuing of
notes or warrants based upon the credit of the State. These notes were
issued at par to the creditors of the State in satisfaction of the
obligations. In turn they were disposed of at a discount to bankers and
brokers by whom they were held until there should be sufficient cash in
the treasury to redeem them,--such redemption usually occurring in from
three to six months, though sometimes the period was longer. To raise
the necessary money to put the new machinery in successful operation one
of two things had to be done: either the rate of taxation must be
materially increased or interest bearing bonds must be issued and placed
upon the market, thus increasing the bonded debt of the State. Although
the fact was subsequently developed that a small increase in the bonded
debt of the State could not very well be avoided, yet, after careful
deliberation, the plan agreed upon was to materially increase the rate
of taxation.
This proved to be so unpopular that it came near losing the Legislature
to the Republicans at the elections of 1871. Although it was explained
to the people that this increase was only temporary and that the rate of
taxation would be reduced as soon as some of the schoolhouses had been
built, and some of the public institutions had been repaired, still this
was not satisfactory to those by whom these taxes had to be paid. They
insisted that some other plan ought to have been adopted, especially at
that time. The War had just come to a close, leaving most of the people
in an impoverished condition. What was true of the public institutions
of the State was equally true of the private property of those who were
property owners at that time. Their property during the War had been
neglected, and what had not been destroyed was in a state of decay. This
was especially true of those who had been the owners of large landed
estates and of many slaves. Many of these people had been the
acknowledged representatives of the wealth, the intelligence, the
culture, the refinement and the aristocracy of the South,--the ruling
class in the church, in society and in State affairs. These were the men
who had made and molded public opinion, who had controlled the pulpit
and the press, who had shaped the destiny of the State; who had made and
enforced the laws,--or at least such laws as they desired to have
enforced,--and who had represented the State not only in the State
Legislature but in both branches of the National Legislature at
Washington. Many of these proud sons, gallant fathers, cultured mothers
and wives and refined and polished daughters found themselves in a
situation and in a condition that was pitiable in the extreme. It was
not only a difficult matter for them to adjust themselves to the new
order of things and to the radically changed conditions, but no longer
having slaves upon whom they could depend for everything, to raise the
necessary money to prevent the decay, the dissipation and the ultimate
loss or destruction of their large landed estates was the serious and
difficult problem they had before them. To have the rate of taxation
increased upon this property, especially at that particular time, was to
them a very serious matter,--a matter which could not have any other
effect than to intensify their bitterness and hostility towards the
party in control of the State Government. But since Governor Alcorn,
under whose administration, and in accordance with whose recommendation
this increase had been made, was a typical representative of this
particular class, it was believed and hoped that he would have
sufficient influence with the people of his own class to stem the tide
of resentment, and to calm their fears and apprehensions. That the
Republicans retained control of the Legislature as a result of the
elections of 1871,--though by only a small majority in the lower
house,--is conclusive evidence that the Governor's efforts in that
direction were not wholly in vain. The argument made by the taxpayers,
however, was plausible and it may be conceded that, upon the whole, they
were about right; for no doubt it would have been much easier upon the
taxpayers to have increased at that time the interest-bearing debt of
the State than to have increased the tax rate. The latter course,
however, had been adopted and could not then be changed.
Governor Alcorn also recommended,--a recommendation that was favorably
considered by the Legislature,--that there be created and supported by
the State a college for the higher education of the colored boys and
young men of the State. This bill was promptly passed by the
Legislature, and, in honor of the one by whom its creation was
recommended the institution was named "Alcorn College." The presidency
of this much-needed college was an honorable and dignified position to
which a fair and reasonable salary was attached, so the Governor, who
had the appointing power, decided to tender the office to Senator H.R.
Revels upon the expiration of his term in the Senate. I had the honor of
being named as one of the first trustees of this important institution.
After the Governor, the trustees and Senator Revels had carefully
inspected many different places that had been suggested for the location
of the institution, Oakland College near the town of Rodney in Claiborne
County, was finally purchased, and Alcorn College was established, with
Senator Revels as its first president.
As an evidence of the necessity for such an institution it will not be
out of place to call attention to the fact that when the writer was
first elected to Congress in 1872, there was not one young colored man
in the State that could pass the necessary examination for a clerkship
in any of the Departments at Washington. Four years later the supply was
greater than the demand, nearly all of the applicants being graduates of
Alcorn College. At this writing the institution is still being
maintained by the State, although on a reduced appropriation and on a
plan that is somewhat different from that which was inaugurated at its
beginning and while the Republicans were in control of the State
government. One of the reasons, no doubt, why it is supported by a
Democratic administration, is that the State might otherwise forfeit and
lose the aid it now receives from the National Government for the
support of agricultural institutions. But, aside from this, there are
very many liberal, fair-minded and influential Democrats in the State
who are strongly in favor of having the State provide for the liberal
education of both races.
The knowledge I had acquired of parliamentary law not only enabled me to
take a leading part in the deliberations of the Legislature, but it
resulted in my being made Speaker of the House of Representatives that
was elected in 1871. Shortly after the adjournment of the first session
of the Legislature, the Speaker of the House, Hon. F.E. Franklin, of
Yazoo County, died. When the Legislature reassembled the first Monday in
January, 1871, Hon. H.W. Warren, of Leake County, was made Speaker of
the House. In addition to the vacancy from Yazoo, created by the death
of Speaker Franklin, one had also occurred from Lowndes County, which
was one of the safe and sure Republican counties. Through apathy,
indifference and overconfidence, the Democratic candidate, Dr. Landrum,
was elected to fill this vacancy. It was a strange and novel sight to
see a Democratic member of the Legislature from the rock-ribbed
Republican county of Lowndes. It was no doubt a source of considerable
embarrassment even to Dr. Landrum himself, for he was looked upon by all
as a marvel and a curiosity. When he got up to deliver his maiden speech
a few days after he was sworn in, he was visibly and perceptibly
affected, for every eye was firmly and intently fixed upon him. Every
one seemed to think that the man that could be elected to a seat in the
Legislature from Lowndes County as a Democrat, must be endowed with some
strange and hidden power through the exercise of which he could direct
the movements and control the actions of those who might be brought in
contact with him or subjected to his hypnotic influence; hence the
anxiety and curiosity to hear the maiden speech of this strange and
remarkable man. The voice in the House of a Democrat from the county of
Lowndes was of so strange, so sudden, so unexpected and so remarkable
that it was difficult for many to bring themselves to a realization of
the fact that such a thing had actually happened and that it was a
living reality. To the curious, the speech was a disappointment,
although it was a plain, calm, conservative and convincing statement of
the new member's position upon public questions. To the great amusement
of those who heard him he related some of his experiences while he was
engaged in canvassing the county. But the speech revealed the fact that,
after all, he was nothing more than an ordinary man. No one was
impressed by any word or sentence that had fallen from his lips that
there was anything about him that was strange, impressive or unusual,
and all decided that his election was purely accidental; for it was no
more surprising than was the election of a colored Republican, Hon. J.M.
Wilson, to the same Legislature the year before, from the reliable
Democratic county of Marion.
There was not much to be done at the second session of the Legislature
outside of passing the annual appropriation bills; hence the session was
a short one. Although Governor Alcorn's term as a United States Senator
commenced March 4, 1871, he did not vacate the office of Governor until
the meeting of Congress, the first Monday in the following December. A
new Legislature and all county officers were to be elected in November
of that year. It was to be the first important election since the
inauguration of the Alcorn administration. The Governor decided to
remain where he could assume entire responsibility for what had been
done and where he could answer, officially and otherwise, all charges
and accusations and criticisms that might be made against his
administration and his official acts. The Republican majority in the
State Senate was so large that the holdover Senators made it well nigh
impossible for the Democrats to secure a majority of that body, but the
principal fight was to be made for control of the House. As already
stated the heavy increase in taxation proved to be very unpopular and
this gave the Democrats a decided advantage. They made a strong and
bitter fight to gain control of the House, and nearly succeeded.
When every county had been heard from it was found that out of the one
hundred fifteen members of which the House was composed, the Republicans
had elected sixty-six members and the Democrats, forty-nine. Of the
sixty-six that had been elected as Republicans, two,--Messrs. Armstead
and Streeter,--had been elected from Carroll County on an independent
ticket. They classed themselves politically as Independent or Alcorn
Republicans. Carroll was the only doubtful county in the State that the
Democrats failed to carry. The Independent ticket in that county, which
was supported by an influential faction of Democrats, was brought out
with the understanding and agreement that it would receive the support
of the Republican organization. This support was given, but upon a
pledge that the candidates for the Legislature, if elected, should not
enter the Democratic caucus, nor vote for the candidates thereof in the
organization of the House. These conditions were accepted, which
resulted in the ticket being supported by the Republicans and,
consequently elected. All the other doubtful and close counties went
Democratic, which resulted in the defeat of some of the strongest and
most influential men in the Republican party, including Speaker Warren
of Leake County, Lucas and Boyd of Altala, Underwood of Chickasaw, Avery
of Tallahatchie, and many others. Notwithstanding these reverses, the
Republicans sent a number of able men to the House, among whom may be
mentioned French of Adams, Howe and Pyles of Panola, Fisher of Hinds,
Chandler and Davis of Noxubee, Huggins of Monroe, Stone and Spelman of
Madison, Barrett of Amite, Sullivan and Gayles of Bolivar, Everett and
Dixon of Yazoo, Griggs and Houston of Issaquina, and many others. In
point of experience and ability this Legislature was the equal of its
immediate predecessor.
CHAPTER V
THE CONTEST FOR SPEAKER OF THE MISSISSIPPI HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
The elections being over, and a Republican majority in both branches of
the Legislature being assured, Governor Alcorn was then prepared to
vacate the office of Governor, to turn over the administration of State
affairs to Lieutenant-Governor Powers and to proceed to Washington so as
to be present at the opening session of Congress on the first Monday in
December when he would assume his duties as a United States Senator.
The Legislature was to meet the first Monday in the following
January,--1872. As soon as the fact was made known that the Republicans
would control the organization of the House, the Speakership of that
body began to be agitated. If Speaker Warren had been reëlected he would
have received the Republican caucus nomination without opposition, but
his defeat made it necessary for a new man to be brought forward for
that position. A movement was immediately put on foot to make me the
Speaker of the House.
Upon a careful examination of the returns it was found that of the one
hundred fifteen members of which the House was composed there were
seventy-seven whites and thirty-eight colored. Of the seventy-seven
whites, forty-nine had been elected as Democrats and twenty-eight as
Republicans. The thirty-eight colored men were all Republicans. It will
thus be seen that, while in the composition of the Republican caucus
there were ten more colored than white members, yet of the total
membership of the House there were thirty-nine more white than colored
members. But in the organization of the House, the contest was not
between white and colored, but between Democrats and Republicans. No one
had been elected,--at least on the Republican side,--because he was a
white man or because he was a colored man, but because he was a
Republican. After a preliminary canvass the fact was developed that the
writer was not only the choice of the colored members for Speaker of the
House, but of a large majority of the white Republican members as well.
They believed,--and voted in accordance with that belief both in the
party caucus and in the House,--that the writer was the best-equipped
man for that responsible position. This fact had been demonstrated to
their satisfaction during the two sessions of the preceding Legislature.
The nomination of the writer by the House Republican caucus for Speaker
was a foregone conclusion several weeks before the convening of the
Legislature. With a full membership in attendance fifty-eight votes
would be necessary to perfect the organization. When the Republican
caucus convened sixty members were present and took part in the
deliberations thereof. Four of the Republicans-elect had not at that
time arrived at the seat of government. The two Independents from
Carroll refused to attend the caucus, but this did not necessarily mean
that they would not vote for the candidates thereof in the organization
of the House. But since we had sixty votes,--two more than were
necessary to elect our candidate,--we believed that the organization
would be easily perfected the next day, regardless of the action of the
members from Carroll County.
In this, however, we were sadly disappointed. The result of the first
vote for Speaker of the House was as follows:
Lynch, Republican caucus nominee 55
Streeter, Democratic nominee 47
Chandler, Independent Republican 7
Armstead, Independent Republican 1
Howe, Regular Republican 1
Necessary to elect 56
Judge Chandler of Noxubee, who had been elected as a regular Republican
with four other white Republicans,--all of whom attended and took part
in the caucus the night before,--refused to vote for the nominee of the
caucus for Speaker but voted instead for Chandler. It will be seen that
the vote for Streeter, the Democratic caucus nominee, was two less than
that party's strength; thus showing that two Democrats must have also
voted for Chandler. It will also be seen that if every vote that was not
received by Lynch had been given to Chandler or to any other man, that
man would have received the required number of votes and would have been
elected. The Democrats stood ready to give their solid vote to any one
of the Independents whenever it could be shown that their votes would
result in an election. But it so happened that Chandler and Armstead
were both ambitious to be Speaker and neither would give way for the
other, which, of course, made the election of either impossible. The one
vote cast for Howe was no doubt Mr. Armstead's vote, while the one vote
for Armstead was no doubt cast by his colleague. In the nomination of
Hon. H.M. Streeter, the Democrats selected their strongest man, and the
best parliamentarian on their side of the House. The refusal of the
so-called Independents to vote for the Republican caucus nominee for
Speaker produced a deadlock which continued for a period of several
days. At no time could any one of the regular Republicans be induced
under any circumstances to vote for any one of the Independents. They
would much rather have the House organized by the Democrats than allow
party treachery to be thus rewarded.
While the deadlock was in progress, Senators Alcorn and Ames suddenly
made their appearance upon the scene of action. They had made the trip
from Washington to use their influence to break the deadlock, and to
bring about an organization of the House by the Republican party. But
Senator Alcorn was the one that could render the most effective service
in that direction, since the bolters were men who professed to be
followers of his and loyal to his political interests and leadership.
As soon as the Senator arrived he held a conference with the bolters,
including Messrs. Armstead and Streeter,--the two independents from
Carroll. In addressing those who had been elected as Republicans and who
had attended and participated in the caucus of that party, the Senator
did not mince his words. He told them in plain language that they were
in honor bound to support the caucus nominees of their party, or that
they must resign their seats and allow their constituents to elect
others that would do so. With reference to the Independents from
Carroll, he said the situation was slightly different. They had been
elected as Independents under conditions which did not obligate them to
enter the Republican caucus or support the candidates thereof. They had
pledged themselves not to support the Democratic caucus nominees, nor to
aid that party in the organization of the House. Up to that time they
had not made a move, nor given a vote that could be construed into a
violation of the pledge under which they had been elected, but they had
publicly declared on several occasions that they had been elected as
Independents or Alcorn Republicans. In other words, they had been
elected as friends and supporters of the Alcorn administration, and of
that type of Republicanism for which he stood and of which he was the
representative. If this were true then they should not hesitate to take
the advice of the man to support whose administration they had been
elected. He informed them that if they meant what they said the best way
for them to prove it was to vote for the Republican caucus nominees for
officers of the House, because he was the recognized leader of the party
in the State and that the issue involved in the elections was either an
endorsement or repudiation of his administration as Governor. Republican
success under such circumstances meant an endorsement of his
administration, while Republican defeat would mean its repudiation. The
most effective way, then, in which they could make good their
ante-election pledges and promises was to vote for the candidates of
the Republican caucus for officers of the House.
The two Carroll County Independents informed the Senator that he had
correctly outlined their position and their attitude, and that it was
their purpose and their determination to give a loyal and effective
support, so far as the same was in their power, to the policies and
principles for which he stood and of which he was the accredited
representative; but that they were apprehensive that they could not
successfully defend their action and explain their votes to the
satisfaction of their constituents if they were to vote for a colored
man for Speaker of the House.
"But," said the Senator, "could you have been elected without the votes
of colored men? If you now vote against a colored man,--who is in every
way a fit and capable man for the position,--simply because he is a
colored man, would you expect those men to support you in the future?"
The Senator also reminded them that they had received very many more
colored than white votes; and that, in his opinion, very few of the
white men who had supported them would find fault with them for voting
for a capable and intelligent colored man to preside over the
deliberations of the House.
"Can you then," the Senator asked, "afford to offend the great mass of
colored men that supported you in order to please an insignificantly
small number of narrow-minded whites?"
The Senator assured them that he was satisfied they had nothing to fear
as a result of their action in voting for Mr. Lynch as Speaker of the
House. He knew the candidate favorably and well and therefore did not
hesitate to assure them that if they contributed to his election they
would have no occasion to regret having done so. The conference then
came to a close with the understanding that all present would vote the
next day for the Republican caucus nominees for officers of the House.
This was done. The result of the ballot the following day was as
follows:
Lynch, Republican caucus nominee, 63
Chandler, Independent Republican, 49
Necessary to elect 57
It will be seen that Judge Chandler received the solid Democratic vote
while Lynch received the vote of every voting Republican present,
including Chandler and the two Independents from Carroll,--three
Republicans still being absent and not paired. By substantially the same
vote ex-Speaker Warren, of Leake County, was elected Chief Clerk, and
Ex-Representative Hill, of Marshall County, was elected
Sergeant-at-arms. The Legislature was then organized and was ready to
proceed to business.
At the conclusion of the session, the House not only adopted a
resolution complimenting the Speaker and thanking him for the able and
impartial manner in which he had presided over its deliberations, but
presented him with a fine gold watch and chain,--purchased with money
that had been contributed by members of both parties and by a few
outside friends,--as a token of their esteem and appreciation of him as
a presiding officer. On the outside case of the watch these words were
engraved: "Presented to Hon. J.R. Lynch, Speaker of the House of
Representatives, by the Members of the Legislature, April 19, 1873."
That watch the writer still has and will keep as a sacred family
heirloom.
A good deal of work was to be done by this Legislature. The seats of a
number of Democrats were contested. But the decision in many cases was
in favor of the sitting members. The changes, however, were sufficient
to materially increase the Republican majority.
Among the important bills to be passed was one to divide the State into
six Congressional Districts. The apportionment of Representatives in
Congress, under the Apportionment Act which had recently passed
Congress, increased the number of Representatives from Mississippi,
which had formerly been five, to six. Republican leaders in both
branches of the Legislature decided that the duty of drawing up a bill
apportioning the State into Congressional Districts should devolve upon
the Speaker of the House, with the understanding that the party
organization would support the bill drawn by him.
I accepted the responsibility, and immediately proceeded with the work
of drafting a bill for that purpose. Two plans had been discussed, each
of which had strong supporters and advocates. One plan was so to
apportion the State as to make all of the districts Republican; but in
doing so the majority in at least two of the districts would be quite
small. The other was so to apportion the State as to make five districts
safely and reliably Republican and the remaining one Democratic. I had
not taken a decided stand for or against either plan. Perhaps that was
one reason why the advocates of both plans agreed to refer the matter to
me for a final decision.
The Democrats heard what had been done. One of them, Hon. F.M. Goar, of
Lee County, called to see me so as to talk over the matter. He expressed
the hope that in drawing up the bill, one district would be conceded to
the Democrats.
"If this is done," he said, "I assume that the group of counties located
in the northeastern part of the State will be the Democratic district.
In that event we will send a very strong and able man to Congress in the
person of Hon. L.Q.C. Lamar."
I had every reason to believe that if Mr. Lamar were sent to Congress
he would reflect credit upon himself, his party, and his State. I
promised to give the suggestion earnest and perhaps favorable
consideration. After going over the matter carefully I came to the
conclusion that the better and safer plan would be to make five safe and
sure Republican districts and concede one to the Democrats. Another
reason for this decision was that in so doing, the State could be more
fairly apportioned. The Republican counties could be easily made
contiguous and the population in each district could be made as nearly
equal as possible. The apportionment could not have been so fairly and
equitably made if the other plan had been adopted.
After the bill had been completed, it was submitted to a joint caucus of
the Republican members of the two Houses, and after a brief explanation
by me of its provisions it was accepted and approved by the unanimous
vote of the caucus.
When it was brought before the house, a majority of the Democratic
members,--under the leadership of Messrs. Streeter, Roane and
McIntosh,--fought it very bitterly. They contended that the Democrats
should have at least two of the six Congressmen and that an
apportionment could have been made and should have been made with that
end in view. The truth was that several of those who made such a
stubborn fight against the bill had Congressional aspirations themselves
and, of course, they did not fail to see that as drawn the bill did not
hold out flattering hopes for the gratification of that ambition. But it
was all that Mr. Goar and a few others that he had taken into his
confidence expected, or had any right to expect. In fact, the one
Democratic district, constructed in accordance with their wishes, was
just about what they wanted. While they voted against the bill,--merely
to be in accord with their party associates,--they insisted that there
should be no filibustering or other dilatory methods adopted to defeat
it. After a hard and stubborn fight, and after several days of exciting
debate, the bill was finally passed by a strict party vote. A few days
later it passed the Senate without amendment, was signed by the
Governor, and became a law.
As had been predicted by Mr. Goar, Hon. L.Q.C. Lamar was nominated by
the Democrats for Congress in the first district, which was the
Democratic district. The Republicans nominated against him a very strong
and able man, the Hon. R.W. Flournoy, who had served with Mr. Lamar as a
member of the Secession Convention of 1861. He made an aggressive and
brilliant canvass of the district, but the election of Mr. Lamar was a
foregone conclusion, since the Democratic majority in the district was
very large.
CHAPTER VI
FUSION OF DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS IN THE STATE ELECTION OF 1873.
REPUBLICAN VICTORY
An important election was to be held in Mississippi in 1873, at which
State, district, and county officers, as well as members of the
Legislature, were to be elected. The tenure of office for the State and
county officers was four years. 1873, therefore, was the year in which
the successors of those that had held office since 1869 had to be
elected.
The legislature to be elected that year would elect the successor of
Senator Ames as United States Senator. Senator Ames was the candidate
named to succeed himself. For some unaccountable reason there had been a
falling out between Senator Alcorn and himself, for which reason Senator
Alcorn decided to use his influence to prevent the reëlection of Senator
Ames. This meant that there would be a bitter factional fight in the
party, because both Senators were popular with the rank and file of the
party.
The fact was soon developed, however, that the people favored the return
of Senator Ames to the Senate. This did not necessarily mean opposition
or unfriendliness to Senator Alcorn. It simply meant that both were to
be treated fairly and justly, and that each was to stand upon his own
record and merits, regardless of their personal differences.
If Senator Alcorn had been in Senator Ames' place the probabilities are
that the sentiment of the party would have been just as strongly in his
favor as it was at that time in favor of Ames. But on this occasion
Senator Alcorn made the mistake of making opposition to Senator Ames the
test of loyalty to himself. In this he was not supported even by many of
his warmest personal and political friends. In consequence of the bitter
fight that was to be made by Senator Alcorn to prevent the return of
Senator Ames to the Senate, many of Senator Ames' friends advised him to
become a candidate for the office of Governor. In that way, it was
believed, he could command the situation, and thus make sure his
election to succeed himself as Senator; otherwise it might be doubtful.
But this involved two important points which had to be carefully
considered. First, it involved the retirement of Governor Powers, who
was a candidate to succeed himself. Second, the candidate for
Lieutenant-Governor would have to be selected with great care, since if
that program were carried out he would be, in point of fact, the
Governor of the State for practically the whole term.
After going over the situation very carefully with his friends and
supporters Senator Ames decided to become a candidate for Governor,
public announcement of which decision was duly made. This announcement
seemed to have increased the intensity of Senator Alcorn's opposition to
Senator Ames, for the former did not hesitate to declare that in the
event of Ames' nomination for Governor by the regular party convention
he would bolt the action of the convention, and make the race for
Governor as an independent candidate. This declaration, however, made no
impression upon the friends and supporters of Ames, and evidently had
very little effect upon the rank and file of the party; for the fact
became apparent shortly after the announcement of the candidacy of Ames
that his nomination was a foregone conclusion. In fact, Senator Ames had
such a strong hold upon the rank and file of the party throughout the
State that when the convention met there was practically no opposition
to his nomination. The friends and supporters of Governor Powers
realized early in the campaign the hopelessness of the situation, so far
as he was concerned, and therefore made no serious effort in his behalf.
What gave the Ames managers more concern than anything else was the
selection of a suitable man for Lieutenant-Governor. Many of the colored
delegates insisted that three of the seven men to be nominated should
be of that race. The offices they insisted on filling were those of
Lieutenant-Governor, Secretary of State, and Superintendent of
Education. Since the colored men had been particularly loyal and
faithful to Senator Ames it was not deemed wise to ignore their demands.
But the question was, Where is there a colored man possessing the
qualifications necessary to one in charge of the executive department of
the state?
After going over the field very carefully it was decided that there was
just one man possessing the necessary qualifications,--B.K. Bruce, of
Bolivar County. He, it was decided, was just the man for the place, and
to him the nomination was to be tendered. A committee was appointed to
wait on Mr. Bruce and inform him of the action of the conference, and
urge him to consent to the use of his name. But Mr. Bruce positively
declined. He could not be induced under any circumstances to change his
mind. He was fixed in his determination not to allow his name to be used
for the office of Lieutenant-Governor, and from that determination he
could not be moved.
Mr. Bruce's unexpected attitude necessitated a radical change in the
entire program. It had been agreed that the Lieutenant-Governorship
should go to a colored man, but after Brace's declination the Ames
managers were obliged to take one of two men,--H.C. Carter, or A.K.
Davis. Davis was the more acceptable of the two; but neither, it was
thought, was a fit and suitable man to be placed at the head of the
executive department of the State. After again going over the field, and
after canvassing the situation very carefully, it was decided that Ames
would not be a candidate to succeed himself as United States Senator,
but that he would be a candidate to succeed Senator Alcorn. This
decision, in all probability, would not have been made if Alcorn had
been willing to abide by the decision of the convention. But, since he
announced his determination to bolt the nomination of his party for
Governor and run as an Independent candidate, it was decided that he had
forfeited any claim he otherwise would have had upon the party to
succeed himself in the Senate. Senator Alcorn's term would expire March
4, 1877. His successor would be elected by the Legislature that would be
chosen in November, 1875. If Ames should be elected to the Governorship
his successor in that office would be elected in November, 1877. In the
event of his election to the Senate to succeed Senator Alcorn, his term
as Senator would commence March 4, 1877, yet he could remain in the
office of Governor until the meeting of Congress the following December,
thus practically serving out the full term as Governor.
With that plan mapped out and agreed upon, and the party leaders
committed to its support, Davis was allowed to be nominated for the
office of Lieutenant-Governor. Two other colored men were also placed
upon the State ticket,--James Hill, for Secretary of State, and T.W.
Cardozo, for State Superintendent of Education. While Davis had made
quite a creditable record as a member of the Legislature, it could not
be said that his name added strength to the ticket. Hill, on the other
hand, was young, active, and aggressive, and considerably above the
average colored man in point of intelligence at that time. His
nomination was favorably received, because it was generally believed
that, if elected, he would discharge the duties of the office in a way
that would reflect credit upon himself and give satisfaction to the
public. In point of education and experience Cardozo was admitted to be
entirely capable of filling the office of Superintendent of Education;
but he was not well known outside of his own county, Warren. In fact his
nomination was largely a concession to that strong Republican county.
The three white men nominated,--besides the candidate for
Governor,--were, W.H. Gibbs, for Auditor of Public Accounts; Geo. E.
Harris, for Attorney-General, and Geo. H. Holland, for State Treasurer.
Gibbs had been a member of the Constitutional Convention of 1868, and
subsequently a member of the State Senate. Holland had served as a
member of the Legislature from Oktibbeha County. Harris had been a
member of Congress from the Second (Holly Springs) District, having been
defeated for the nomination in 1872 by A.R. Howe, of Panola County.
While the ticket, as a whole, was not a weak one, its principal strength
was in its head,--the candidate for Governor.
Shortly after the adjournment of the convention Senator Alcorn had
another convention called which nominated a ticket, composed exclusively
of Republicans, with himself at its head for Governor. The Democrats at
their convention endorsed the Alcorn ticket. While it would seem that
this action on the part of the Democrats ought to have increased
Alcorn's chances of success, it appears to have been a contributory
cause of his defeat. Thousands of Republicans who were in sympathy with
the movement, and who would have otherwise voted the Alcorn ticket,
refused to do so for the reason that if it had been elected the
Democrats could have claimed a victory for their party. On the other
hand, both tickets being composed exclusively of Republicans, thousands
of Democrats refused to vote for either, while some of them voted the
Ames ticket. At any rate the election resulted in the success of the
Ames ticket by a majority of more than twenty thousand. The regular
Republicans also had a large majority in both branches of the
Legislature.
[Illustration: HON. B.K. BRUCE United States Senator, 1875-1881]
CHAPTER VII
MISSISSIPPI SENDS B.K. BRUCE TO THE UNITED STATES SENATE
As soon as the result of the election was known, the candidacy of B.K.
Bruce, for United States Senator to succeed Senator Ames, was announced.
Ames' term as Governor was to commence the first Monday in January,
1874. His term as Senator would expire March 4, 1875. Upon assuming the
duties of Governor he had been obliged to tender his resignation as
Senator; thus it devolved upon the incoming legislature to elect a
Senator to serve out the unexpired term, as well as for the full term of
six years. Bruce's candidacy was for the full term.
The secret of Mr. Bruce's positive refusal to allow his name to be used
for the Lieutenant-Governorship, which would have resulted in making him
Governor, was now revealed. He had had the Senatorship in mind at the
time, but, of course, no allusion was made to that fact. As between the
Senatorship and the Governorship he chose the former, which proved to be
a wise decision, in view of subsequent events. It was soon developed
that he was the choice of a large majority of the Republican members of
the Legislature, white as well as colored. His nomination by the party
caucus, therefore, was a foregone conclusion. Before the legislature
met, it had been practically settled that Mr. Bruce should be sent to
the Senate for the long term and Ex-Superintendant of Education, H.R.
Pease, should be elected to serve out the unexpired term of
Governor-elect Ames.
This slate was approved by the joint legislative caucus without a hitch
and the candidates thus nominated were duly elected by the
Legislature,--not only by the solid Republican vote of that body, but
the additional vote of State Senator Hiram Cassidy, Jr., who had been
elected as a Democrat.
Senator Alcorn's keen disappointment and chagrin at the outcome of his
fight with Governor Ames was manifested when Senator Bruce made his
appearance to be sworn in as a Senator. It was presumed that Senator
Alcorn, in accordance with the uniform custom on such occasions, would
escort his colleague to the desk of the President of the Senate to be
sworn in. This Senator Alcorn refused to do. When Mr. Bruce's name was
called Senator Alcorn did not move; he remained in his seat, apparently
giving his attention to his private correspondence. Mr. Bruce, somewhat
nervous and slightly excited, started to the President's desk
unattended. Senator Roscoe Conkling, of New York, who was sitting near
by, immediately rose and extended his arm to Mr. Bruce and escorted him
to the President's desk, standing by the new Senator's side until the
oath had been administered, and then tendering him his hearty
congratulations, in which all the other Republican Senators, except
Senator Alcorn, subsequently joined.
This gracious act on the part of the New York Senator made for him a
lifelong friend and admirer in the person of Senator Bruce. This
friendship was so strong that Senator Bruce named his first and only son
Roscoe Conkling, in honor of the able, distinguished, and gallant
Senator from New York.
Senator Alcorn's action in this matter was the occasion of considerable
unfavorable criticism and comment, some of his critics going so far as
to intimate that his action was due to the fact that Mr. Bruce was a
colored man. But, from my knowledge of the man and of the circumstances
connected with the case, I am satisfied this was not true. His antipathy
to Mr. Bruce grew out of the fact that Mr. Bruce had opposed him and had
supported Ames in the fight for Governor in 1873.
So far as I have been able to learn, I am the only one of the Senator's
friends and admirers who opposed his course in that contest that he ever
forgave. He, no doubt, felt that I was under less personal obligations
to him than many others who pursued the same course that I did, since
he had never rendered me any effective personal or political service,
except when he brought the Independent members of the House in line for
me in the contest for Speaker of that body in 1872; and even then his
action was not so much a matter of personal friendship for me as it was
in the interest of securing an endorsement of his own administration as
Governor.
In Mr. Bruce's case he took an entirely different view of the matter. He
believed that he had been the making of Mr. Bruce. Mr. Bruce had come to
the State in 1869 and had taken an active part in the campaign of that
year. When the Legislature was organized it was largely through the
influence of Governor Alcorn that he was elected Sergeant-at-arms of the
State Senate. When the Legislature adjourned Governor Alcorn sent Bruce
to Bolivar county as County Assessor. Bruce discharged the duties of
that office in such a creditable and satisfactory manner that he was
elected in 1871 Sheriff and Tax Collector of that important and wealthy
county, the most responsible and lucrative office in the gift of the
people of the county. He was holding that office when elected to the
United States Senate. Senator Alcorn felt, therefore, that in taking
sides against him and in favor of Ames in 1873 Mr. Bruce was guilty of
gross ingratitude. This accounted for his action in refusing to escort
Mr. Bruce to the President's desk to be sworn in as Senator. In this
belief, however, he did Mr. Bruce a grave injustice, for I know that
gratitude was one of Mr. Brace's principal characteristics. If Senator
Alcorn had been a candidate from the start for the Republican nomination
for Governor, Mr. Bruce, I am sure, would have supported him even as
against Senator Ames. But it was known that the Senator had no ambition
to be Governor. His sole purpose was to defeat Senator Ames at any cost,
and that, too, on account of matters that were purely personal and that
had no connection with party or political affairs. Mr. Bruce, like very
many other friends and admirers of the Senator, simply refused to follow
him in open rebellion against his own party. I am satisfied, however,
that Mr. Bruce's race identity did not influence the action of Senator
Alcorn in the slightest degree. As further evidence of that fact, his
position and action in the Pinchback case may be mentioned. He spoke and
voted for the admission of Mr. Pinchback to a seat in the Senate when
such a staunch Republican as Senator Edmunds, of Vermont, opposed and
voted against admission. In spite of Senator Alcorn's political defeat
and humiliation in his own State, he remained true and loyal to the
National Republican party to the end of his Senatorial term, which
terminated with the beginning of the Hayes Administration. Up to that
time he had strong hopes of the future of the Republican party at the
South.
CHAPTER VIII
IMPROVED FINANCIAL CONDITION OF MISSISSIPPI UNDER THE AMES
ADMINISTRATION
The administrations of Governor Alcorn and of Governor Ames, the two
Republican Governors, who were products of Reconstruction,--both having
been elected chiefly by the votes of colored men,--were among the best
with which that State was ever blessed, the generally accepted
impression to the contrary notwithstanding. In 1869 Alcorn was elected
to serve for a term of four years. Ames was elected to serve the
succeeding term. Alcorn was one of the old citizens of the State, and
was therefore thoroughly identified with its business, industrial, and
social interests. He had been one of the large and wealthy landowners
and slave-owners, and therefore belonged to that small but select and
influential class known as Southern aristocrats.
Alcorn had taken an active and prominent part in public matters since
his early manhood. Before the War of the Rebellion he had served several
terms as a member of the Legislature. He represented his county,
Coahoma, in the Secession Convention of 1861. He was bitterly opposed
to Secession and fought it bravely; but when he found himself in a
hopeless minority he gracefully acquiesced in the decision of the
majority and signed the ordinance of Secession. He also joined the
Confederate Army and took an active part in raising troops for the same.
He was made brigadier-general, and had command of the Confederate forces
in Mississippi for a good while. But, since the President of the
Confederacy did not seem to be particularly partial to him, he was not
allowed to see very much field service.
When the war was over he took an active part in the work of
rehabilitation and Reconstruction. He strongly supported the Andrew
Johnson plan of Reconstruction, and by the Legislature that was elected
under that plan he was chosen one of the United States Senators, but was
not admitted to the seat to which he had been elected. When the Johnson
plan of Reconstruction was repudiated and rejected by the voters of the
Northern States, and when what was known as the Congressional Plan of
Reconstruction was endorsed and approved, Alcorn decided that further
opposition to that plan was useless and unwise, and he publicly advised
acceptance of it. His advice having been rejected by the Democrats,
nothing remained for him to do but to join the Republican party, which
he did in the early part of 1869.
Since he was known to be a strong, able and influential man,--one who
possessed the respect and confidence of the white people of the State
regardless of party differences,--he was tendered the Republican
nomination for the Governorship at the election that was to be held the
latter part of that year. He accepted the nomination and was duly
elected. He discharged the duties of the office in an able, creditable
and satisfactory manner. The only point upon which the administration
was at all subject to unfavorable criticism was the high rate of
taxation to which the people were subjected for the support of the State
Government; but the reader will see that this could hardly have been
avoided at that particular time. In his message to the Legislature in
January, 1910, Governor E.F. Noel accurately stated the principle by
which an administration is necessarily governed in raising revenue to
carry on the government. This is the same principle that governed the
Alcorn administration when it took charge of the State Government in
1870. In that message Governor Noel said: "The amount of assessment
determines the tax burden of each individual, corporation, town, and
county. The Legislature or local authorities settle the amount necessary
to be provided for their respective treasuries. If all property be
assessed at the same rate,--whether for the full value or for ten per
cent, of the value of the property,--the payment of each owner would be
unaffected; for the higher the assessment, the lower the levy; the lower
the assessment, the higher the levy. Our State revenue is mainly derived
from a six mill ad valorem tax."
When the Alcorn administration took charge of the State Government the
War had just come to a close. Everything was in a prostrate condition.
There had been great depreciation in the value of real and personal
property. The credit of the State was not very good. The rate of
interest for borrowed money was high. To materially increase the bonded
debt of the State was not deemed wise, yet some had to be raised in that
way. To raise the balance a higher rate of taxation had to be imposed
since the assessed valuation of the taxable property was so low.
The figures showing the assessed valuation of taxable property in the
State and the receipts and disbursements prior to 1875 are not
available, but, taking the figures for that year, the reader can form a
pretty accurate idea of what the situation must have been prior to that
time. In 1875 the assessed valuation of real and personal property,
subject to taxation in the State, was $119,313,834. The receipts from
all sources that year amounted to $1,801,129.12. The disbursements for
the same year were, $1,430,192.83.
Now let us see what the situation was after the Ames administration had
been in power about two years,--or half of the term for which it had
been elected. According to a very carefully prepared statement that was
made and published by an expert accountant in the State Treasurer's
office in the latter part of 1875 the ad valorem rate of taxes for
general purposes had been reduced from seven to four mills, and yet the
amount paid into the Treasury was not only enough to meet all demands
upon the State, but to make a material reduction in the bonded debt. The
following is taken from that statement:
"An examination of the report of the State Treasurer, of the first of
January, 1874, at which time the administration of Governor Ames
commenced, exhibits the fact that the indebtedness of the State at that
date, exclusive of the amounts to the credit of the Chickasaw and common
school funds, balance of current funds on hand, and warrants in the
Treasury belonging to the State, was $1,765,554.33 The amount of the tax
of the previous year remaining uncollected on January first, 1874, and
afterward collected, $944,261.51, should be deducted from the above
amount, which will show the actual indebtedness of the State at that
date to be $821,292.82. A further examination of the report of the same
officer, for January first, 1875, shows the indebtedness, after
deducting amounts to the credit of the Chickasaw and common school
funds, balance of current funds on hand and warrants in the Treasury
belonging to the State, to be, $1,707,056.24. Then by deducting the
amount of the tax of the previous year remaining uncollected January
first, 1875, and afterwards collected, $998,628.11, the result shows the
actual indebtedness on January first, 1875, to be $708,428.13. The
forthcoming annual report of the State Treasurer, for January first,
1876, will show the indebtedness of the State, exclusive of the amounts
to the credit of the Chickasaw and common school funds, the balance of
current funds on hand, and warrants in the Treasury belonging to the
State, to be $980,138.33. Then, by proceeding again as above, and
deducting the amount of the tax of the previous year, uncollected on
January first, 1876, and now being rapidly paid into the Treasury, at a
low estimate, $460,000.00, we have as an actual indebtedness of the
State on January first, 1876, $520,138.33. Thus it will be seen that the
actual indebtedness of the State is but little over a half million
dollars, and that during the two years of Governor Ames' administration
the State debt has been reduced from $821,292.82, on January first,
1874, to $520,138.33, on January first, 1876, or a reduction of more
than three hundred thousand dollars in two years--upwards of one third
of the State debt wiped out in that time. Not only has the debt been
reduced as above, but the rate of taxation for general purposes has
been reduced from seven mills in 1873 to four mills in 1875."
Notwithstanding the fact that the rate of taxation under the
administration of Governor Ames had been reduced as shown above from
seven mills in 1873 to four mills in 1875 the amount paid into the State
Treasury was substantially the same as that paid in prior years. This
was due to the great appreciation in the value of taxable property. Then
again, a material reduction in the rate of taxation was made possible
because the public institutions had all been rebuilt and repaired and a
sufficient number of school buildings had been erected, thus doing away
with the necessity for a special levy for such purposes. From this
showing it would seem as if it were reasonable to assume that if such an
administration as the one then in power could have been retained a few
years longer there would not only have been a still further reduction in
the rate of taxation, but the payable debt of the State would have been
entirely wiped out. Instead of this we find the conditions to be about
as follows:
First. Shortly after the first reform State Treasurer had been in charge
of that office it was developed that he was a defaulter to the amount of
$315,612.19.
Second. Notwithstanding the immense increase in the value of taxable
property from year to year, it appears from the official records that
the rate of ad valorem tax for general purposes has been increased from
four to six mills.
Third. There has been a very heavy increase in what is known as the
specific or privilege taxes,--that is, a specific sum that business and
professional persons must pay for the privilege of doing business or of
practicing their professions in the State.
Fourth. The amounts now collected and paid out for the support of the
State Government are more than double what they were a few years ago,
thus showing extravagance, if not recklessness, in the administration of
the affairs of the State,--the natural result of a condition by which
the existence of but one political party is tolerated.
Fifth. Notwithstanding the immense increase in the value of taxable
property, and in spite of the enormous sums paid into the State Treasury
each year, there has been a material increase in the bonded debt of the
State. In fact it has been necessary at different times to borrow money
with which to pay the current expenses of the State Government.
The following statistics for three years, 1907, 1908 and 1909, would
seem to substantiate the above statement:
The value of the taxable property of the State in 1907 was $373,584.960.
Receipts from all sources that year were $3,391,127.15. Disbursements
for the same period were $3,730,343.29. Excess of disbursements over
receipts, $339,216.14.
In 1908 the value of taxable property was $383,823,739. Receipts from
all sources that year were $3,338,398.98. Disbursements, same period,
$3,351,119.46. Excess of disbursements over receipts, $12,720.48.
In 1909 the value of taxable property was $393,297,173. Receipts from
all sources were $3,303,963.65. Disbursements, same period,
$3,315,201.48. Excess of disbursements over receipts, $11,237.83.
On the first day of January, 1907, what is called the payable debt of
the State was reported to be $1,253,029.07. On the first day of January,
1876, it was $520,138.33. Increase, $732,890.74.
CHAPTER IX
WHAT CONSTITUTES "NEGRO DOMINATION"
It is claimed that in States, districts, and counties, in which the
colored people are in the majority, the suppression of the colored vote
is necessary to prevent "Negro Domination,"--to prevent the ascendency
of the blacks over the whites in the administration of the State and
local governments.
This claim is based upon the assumption that if the black vote were not
suppressed in all such States, districts, and counties, black men would
be supported and elected to office because they were black, and white
men would be opposed and defeated because they were white.
Taking Mississippi for purposes of illustration, it will be seen that
there has never been the slightest ground for such an apprehension. No
colored man in that State ever occupied a judicial position above that
of Justice of the Peace and very few aspired to that position. Of seven
State officers only one, that of Secretary of State, was filled by a
colored man, until 1873, when colored men were elected to three of the
seven offices,--Lieutenant-Governor, Secretary of State, and State
Superintendent of Education. Of the two United States Senators and the
seven members of the lower house of Congress not more than one colored
man occupied a seat in each house at the same time. Of the thirty-five
members of the State Senate, and of the one hundred and fifteen members
of the House,--which composed the total membership of the State
Legislature prior to 1874,--there were never more than about seven
colored men in the Senate and forty in the lower house. Of the
ninety-seven members that composed the Constitutional Convention of 1868
but seventeen were colored men. The composition of the lower house of
the State Legislature that was elected in 1871 was as follows:
Total membership, one hundred and fifteen. Republicans, sixty-six;
Democrats, forty-nine. Colored members, thirty-eight. White members,
seventy-seven. White majority, thirty-nine.
Of the sixty-six Republicans thirty-eight were colored and twenty-eight,
white. There was a slight increase in the colored membership as a result
of the election of 1873, but the colored men never at any time had
control of the State Government nor of any branch or department thereof,
nor even that of any county or municipality. Out of seventy-two counties
in the State at that time, electing on an average twenty-eight officers
to a county, it is safe to assert that not over five out of one hundred
of such officers were colored men. The State; district, county, and
municipal governments were not only in control of white men, but white
men who were to the manor born, or who were known as old citizens of the
State--those who had lived in the State many years before the War of the
Rebellion. There was, therefore, never a time when that class of white
men known as Carpet-baggers had absolute control of the State
Government, or that of any district, county or municipality, or any
branch or department thereof. There was never, therefore, any ground for
the alleged apprehension of negro domination as a result of a free,
fair, and honest election in any one of the Southern or Reconstructed
States.
And this brings us to a consideration of the question, What is meant by
"Negro Domination?" The answer that the average reader would give to
that question would be that it means the actual, physical domination of
the blacks over the whites. But, according to a high Democratic
authority, that would be an incorrect answer. The definition given by
that authority I have every reason to believe is the correct one, the
generally accepted one. The authority referred to is the late Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi, H.H. Chalmers,
who, in an article in the _North American Review_ about March, 1881,
explained and defined what is meant or understood by the term "Negro
Domination."
According to Judge Chalmers' definition, in order to constitute "Negro
Domination" it does not necessarily follow that negroes must be elected
to office, but that in all elections in which white men may be divided,
if the negro vote should be sufficiently decisive to be potential in
determining the result, the white man or men that would be elected
through the aid of negro votes would represent "Negro Domination." In
other words, we would have "Negro Domination" whenever the will of a
majority of the whites would be defeated through the votes of colored
men. If this is the correct definition of that term,--and it is, no
doubt, the generally accepted one,--then the friends and advocates of
manhood suffrage will not deny that we have had in the past "Negro
Domination," nationally as well as locally, and that we may have it in
the future.
If that is the correct definition then we are liable to have "Negro
Domination" not only in States, districts, and counties where the blacks
are in the majority, but in States, districts and counties where they
are few in numbers. If that is the correct definition of "Negro
Domination,"--to prevent which the negro vote should be
suppressed,--then the suppression of that vote is not only necessary in
States, districts, and counties in which the blacks are in the majority,
but in every State, district, and county in the Union; for it will not
be denied that the primary purpose of the ballot,--whether the voters be
white or colored, male or female,--is to make each vote decisive and
potential. If the vote of a colored man, or the vote of a white man,
determines the result of an election in which he participates, then the
very purpose for which he was given the right and privilege will have
been accomplished, whether the result, as we understand it, be wise or
unwise.
In this connection it cannot and will not be denied that the colored
vote has been decisive and potential in very many important National as
well as local and State elections. For instance, in the Presidential
election of 1868, General Grant, the Republican candidate, lost the
important and pivotal State of New York, a loss which would have
resulted in his defeat if the Southern States that took part in that
election had all voted against him. That they did not do so was due to
the votes of the colored men in those States. Therefore Grant's first
administration represented "Negro Domination."
Again, in 1876, Hayes was declared elected President by a majority of
one vote in the electoral college. This was made possible by the result
of the election in the States of Louisiana, South Carolina, and Florida,
about which there was much doubt and considerable dispute, and over
which there was a bitter controversy. But for the colored vote in those
States there would have been no doubt, no dispute, no controversy. The
defeat of Mr. Hayes and the election of Mr. Tilden would have been an
undisputed and an uncontested fact. Therefore, the Hayes administration
represented "Negro Domination."
Again, in 1880, General Garfield, the Republican candidate for
President, carried the State of New York by a plurality of about 20,000,
without which he could not have been elected. It will not be denied by
those who are well informed that if the colored men that voted for him
in that State at that time had voted against him, he would have lost the
State and, with it, the Presidency. Therefore, the Garfield-Arthur
administration represented "Negro Domination."
Again, in 1884, Mr. Cleveland, the Democratic candidate, carried the
doubtful but very important State of New York by the narrow margin of
1,147 plurality, which resulted in his election. It cannot and will not
be denied that even at that early date the number of colored men that
voted for Mr. Cleveland was far in excess of the plurality by which he
carried the State. Mr. Cleveland's first administration, therefore,
represented "Negro Domination." Mr. Cleveland did not hesitate to admit
and appreciate the fact that colored men contributed largely to his
success, hence he did not fail to give that element of his party
appropriate and satisfactory official recognition.
Again, in 1888, General Harrison, the Republican Presidential candidate,
carried the State of New York by a plurality of about 20,000, which
resulted in his election, which he would have lost but for the votes of
the colored men in that State. Therefore, Harrison's administration
represented "Negro Domination."
The same is true of important elections in a number of States, districts
and counties in which the colored vote proved to be potential and
decisive. But enough has been written to show the absurdity of the claim
that the suppression of the colored vote is necessary to prevent "Negro
Domination." So far as the State of Mississippi is concerned, in spite
of the favorable conditions, as shown above, the legitimate State
Government,--the one that represented the honestly expressed will of a
majority of the voters of the State,--was in the fall of 1875 overthrown
through the medium of a sanguinary revolution. The State Government was
virtually seized and taken possession of _vi et armis_. Why was this?
What was the excuse for it? What was the motive, the incentive that
caused it? It was not in the interest of good, efficient, and capable
government; for that we already had. It was not on account of
dishonesty, maladministration, misappropriation of public funds; for
every dollar of the public funds had been faithfully accounted for. It
was not on account of high taxes; for it had been shown that, while the
tax rate was quite high during the Alcorn administration, it had been
reduced under the Ames administration to a point considerably less than
it is now or than it has been for a number of years. It was not to
prevent "Negro Domination" and to make sure the ascendency of the whites
in the administration of the State and local governments; for that was
then the recognized and established order of things, from which there
was no apprehension of departure. Then, what was the cause of this
sudden and unexpected uprising? There must have been a strong, if not a
justifiable, reason for it. What was it? That question will be answered
in a subsequent chapter.
CHAPTER X
OVERTHROW OF THE REPUBLICAN STATE GOVERNMENT IN MISSISSIPPI
In the last preceding chapter it was stated that the reason for the
sanguinary revolution, which resulted in the overthrow of the Republican
state government in the State of Mississippi in 1875, would be given in
a subsequent chapter. What was true of Mississippi at that time was
largely true of the other Reconstructed States where similar results
subsequently followed. When the War of the Rebellion came to an end it
was believed by some, and apprehended by others, that serious and
radical changes in the previous order of things would necessarily
follow.
But when what was known as the Johnson Plan of Reconstruction was
disclosed it was soon made plain that if that plan should be accepted by
the country no material change would follow, for the reason, chiefly,
that the abolition of slavery would have been abolition only in name.
While physical slavery would have been abolished, yet a sort of feudal
or peonage system would have been established in its place, the effect
of which would have been practically the same as the system which had
been abolished. The former slaves would have been held in a state of
servitude through the medium of labor-contracts which they would have
been obliged to sign,--or to have signed for them,--from which they, and
their children, and, perhaps, their children's children could never have
been released. This would have left the old order of things practically
unchanged. The large landowners would still be the masters of the
situation, the power being still possessed by them to perpetuate their
own potential influence and to maintain their own political supremacy.
But it was the rejection of the Johnson Plan of Reconstruction that
upset these plans and destroyed these calculations. The Johnson plan was
not only rejected, but what was known as the Congressional Plan of
Reconstruction,--by which suffrage was conferred upon the colored men in
all the States that were to be reconstructed,--was accepted by the
people of the North as the permanent policy of the government, and was
thus made the basis of Reconstruction and readmission of those States
into the Union.
Of course this meant a change in the established order of things that
was both serious and radical. It meant the destruction of the power and
influence of the Southern aristocracy. It meant not only the physical
emancipation of the blacks but the political emancipation of the poor
whites, as well. It meant the destruction in a large measure of the
social, political, and industrial distinctions that had been maintained
among the whites under the old order of things. But was this to be the
settled policy of the government? Was it a fact that the incorporation
of the blacks into the body politic of the country was to be the settled
policy of the government; or was it an experiment,--a temporary
expedient?
These were doubtful and debatable questions, pending the settlement of
which matters could not be expected to take a definite shape. With the
incorporation of the blacks into the body politic of the country,--which
would have the effect of destroying the ability of the aristocracy to
maintain their political supremacy, and which would also have the effect
of bringing about the political emancipation of the whites of the middle
and lower classes,--a desperate struggle for political supremacy between
the antagonistic elements of the whites was inevitable and unavoidable.
But the uncertainty growing out of the possibility of the rejection by
the country of the Congressional Plan of Reconstruction was what held
matters in temporary abeyance. President Johnson was confident,--or
pretended to be,--that as soon as the people of the North had an
opportunity to pass judgment upon the issues involved, the result would
be the acceptance of his plan and the rejection of the one proposed by
Congress.
While the Republicans were successful in 1868 in not only electing the
President and Vice-President and a safe majority in both branches of
Congress, yet the closeness of the result had the effect of preventing
the abandonment of the hope on the part of the supporters of the Johnson
administration that the administration Plan of Reconstruction would
ultimately be adopted and accepted as the basis of Reconstruction. Hence
bitter and continued opposition to the Congressional Plan of
Reconstruction was declared by the ruling class of the South to be the
policy of that section. While the Republicans were again successful in
the Congressional elections of 1870 yet the advocates of the Johnson
plan did not abandon hope of the ultimate success and acceptance by the
country of that plan until after the Presidential and Congressional
elections of 1872. In the meantime a serious split had taken place in
the Republican party which resulted in the nomination of two sets of
candidates for President and Vice-President. The Independent or Liberal
Republicans nominated Horace Greeley of New York, for President, and B.
Gratz Brown, of Missouri, for Vice-President. The regular Republicans
renominated President Grant to succeed himself, and for Vice-President,
Senator Henry Wilson, of Massachusetts, was selected.
The Democratic National Convention endorsed the ticket that had been
nominated by the Liberal Republicans. The Republicans carried the
election by an immense majority. With two or three exceptions the
electoral vote of every state in the Union was carried for Grant and
Wilson. The Republicans also had a very large majority in both branches
of Congress.
Since the result of the election was so decisive, and since every branch
of the government was then in the hands of the Republicans, further
opposition to the Congressional Plan of Reconstruction was for the first
time completely abandoned. The fact was then recognized that this was
the settled and accepted policy of the Government and that further
opposition to it was useless. A few of the southern whites, General
Alcorn being one of the number, had accepted the result of the
Presidential and Congressional elections of 1868 as conclusive as to the
policy of the country with reference to Reconstruction; but those who
thought and acted along those lines at that time were exceptions to the
general rule. But after the Presidential and Congressional elections of
1872 all doubt upon that subject was entirely removed.
The Southern whites were now confronted with a problem that was both
grave and momentous. But the gravity of the situation was chiefly based
upon the possibility,--if not upon a probability,--of a reversal of
what had been the established order of things, especially those of a
political nature.
The inevitable conflict between the antagonistic elements of which
Southern society was composed could no longer be postponed. But the
colored vote was the important factor which now had to be considered and
taken into account. It was conceded that whatever element or faction
could secure the favor and win the support of the colored vote would be
the dominant and controlling one in the State. It is true that between
1868 and 1872, when the great majority of Southern whites maintained a
policy of "masterly inactivity," the colored voters were obliged to
utilize such material among the whites as was available; but it is a
well-known fact that much of the material thus utilized was from
necessity and not from choice, and that whenever and wherever an
acceptable and reputable white man would place himself in a position
where his services could be utilized he was gladly taken up and loyally
supported by the colored voters.
After 1872 the necessity for supporting undesirable material no longer
existed; and colored voters had the opportunity not only of supporting
Southern whites for all the important positions in the State, but also
of selecting the best and most desirable among them. Whether the poor
whites or the aristocrats of former days were to be placed in control of
the affairs of the State was a question which the colored voters alone
could settle and determine. That the colored man's preference should be
the aristocrat of the past was perfectly natural, since the relations
between them had been friendly, cordial and amicable even during the
days of slavery. Between the blacks and the poor whites the feeling had
been just the other way; which was due not so much to race antipathy as
to jealousy and envy on the part of the poor whites, growing out of the
cordial and friendly relations between the aristocrats and their slaves;
and because the slaves were, in a large measure, their competitors in
the industrial market. When the partiality of the colored man for the
former aristocrats became generally known, they--the former
aristocrats,--began to come into the Republican party in large numbers.
In Mississippi they were led by such men as Alcorn, in Georgia by
Longstreet, in Virginia by Moseby, and also had as leaders such
ex-governors as Orr, of South Carolina; Brown, of Georgia, and Parsons,
of Alabama.
Between 1872 and 1875 the accessions to the Republican ranks were so
large that it is safe to assert that from twenty-five to thirty per cent
of the white men of the Southern States were identified with the
Republican party; and those who thus acted were among the best and most
substantial men of that section. Among that number in the State of
Mississippi was J.L. Alcorn, J.A. Orr, J.B. Deason, R.W. Flournoy, and
Orlando Davis. In addition to these there were thousands of others, many
of them among the most prominent men of the State. Among the number was
Judge Hiram Cassidy, who was the candidate of the Democratic party for
Congress from the Sixth District in 1872, running against the writer of
these lines. He was one of the most brilliant and successful members of
the bar in southern Mississippi. Captain Thomas W. Hunt, of Jefferson
County, was a member of one of the oldest, best, and most influential
families of the South. The family connections were not, however,
confined to the South; George Hunt Pendelton of Ohio, for instance, who
was the Democratic candidate for Vice-President of the United States on
the ticket with McClellan, in 1864, and who was later one of the United
States Senators from Ohio, was a member of the same family.
While the colored men held the key to the situation, the white men knew
that the colored men had no desire to rule or dominate even the
Republican party. All the colored men wanted and demanded was a voice in
the government under which they lived, and to the support of which they
contributed, and to have a small, but fair, and reasonable proportion of
the positions that were at the disposal of the voters of the State and
of the administration.
While the colored men did not look with favor upon a political alliance
with the poor whites, it must be admitted that, with very few
exceptions, that class of whites did not seek, and did not seem to
desire such an alliance. For this there were several well-defined
reasons.
In the first place, while the primary object of importing slaves into
that section was to secure labor for the cultivation of cotton, the
slave was soon found to be an apt pupil in other lines of industry. In
addition to having his immense cotton plantations cultivated by slave
labor, the slave-owner soon learned that he could utilize these slaves
as carpenters, painters, plasterers, bricklayers, blacksmiths and in all
other fields of industrial occupations and usefulness. Thus the whites
who depended upon their labor for a living along those lines had their
field of opportunity very much curtailed. Although the slaves were not
responsible for this condition, the fact that they were there and were
thus utilized, created a feeling of bitterness and antipathy on the part
of the laboring whites which could not be easily wiped out.
In the second place, the whites of that class were not at that time as
ambitious, politically, as were the aristocrats. They had been held in
political subjection so long that it required some time for them to
realize that there had been a change. At that time they, with a few
exceptions, were less efficient, less capable, and knew less about
matters of state and governmental administration than many of the
ex-slaves. It was a rare thing, therefore, to find one of that class at
that time that had any political ambition or manifested any desire for
political distinction or official recognition. As a rule, therefore, the
whites that came into the leadership of the Republican party between
1872 and 1875 were representatives of the most substantial families of
the land.
CHAPTER XI
RISE OF DEMOCRATIC RADICALISM IN THE SOUTH
After the Presidential election of 1872 no one could be found who
questioned the wisdom or practicability of the Congressional Plan of
Reconstruction, or who looked for its overthrow, change or modification.
After that election the situation was accepted by everyone in perfect
good faith. No one could be found in any party or either race who was
bold enough to express the opinion that the Congressional Plan of
Reconstruction was a mistake, or that negro suffrage was a failure. To
the contrary it was admitted by all that the wisdom of both had been
fully tested and clearly vindicated. It will not be denied even now by
those who will take the time to make a careful examination of the
situation, that no other plan could have been devised or adopted that
could have saved to the country the fruits of the victory that had been
won on the field of battle. The adoption of any other plan would have
resulted in the accomplishment of nothing but the mere physical
abolition of slavery and a denial of the right of a State to withdraw
from the Union. These would have been mere abstract propositions, with
no authority vested in the National Government for their enforcement.
The war for the Union would have been practically a failure. The South
would have gained and secured substantially everything for which it
contended except the establishment of an independent government. The
black man, therefore, was the savior of his country, not only on the
field of battle, but after the smoke of battle had cleared away.
Notwithstanding the general acceptance of this plan after the
Presidential election of 1872, we find that in the fall of 1874 there
was a complete and radical change in the situation,--a change both
sudden and unexpected. It came, as it were, in the twinkling of an eye.
It was like a clap of thunder from a clear sky. It was the State and
Congressional elections of that year.
In the elections of 1872 nearly every State in the Union went
Republican. In the State and Congressional elections of 1874 the result
was the reverse of what it was two years before,--nearly every State
going Democratic. Democrats were surprised, Republicans were
dumbfounded. Such a result had not been anticipated by anyone. Even the
State of Massachusetts, the birthplace of abolitionism, the cradle of
American liberty, elected a Democratic Governor. The Democrats had a
majority in the National House of Representatives that was about equal
to that which the Republicans had elected two years before. Such veteran
Republican leaders in the United States Senate as Chandler, of Michigan,
Windom, of Minnesota, and Carpenter, of Wisconsin, were retired from the
Senate. When the returns were all in it was developed that the Democrats
did not have a clear majority on joint ballot in the Michigan
Legislature, but the margin between the two parties was so close that a
few men who had been elected as independent Republicans had the balance
of power. These Independents were opposed to the reëlection of Senator
Chandler. That the Democrats should be anxious for the retirement of
such an able, active, aggressive, and influential Republican leader as
Chandler was to be expected. That party, therefore, joined with the
Independents in the vote for Senator which resulted in the election of a
harmless old gentleman by the name of Christiancy. The Michigan
situation was found to exist also in Minnesota, and the result was the
retirement of that strong and able leader, Senator William Windom, and
the election of a new and unknown man, McMillan.
What was true of Michigan and Minnesota was also found to be true of
Wisconsin. The same sort of combination was made, which resulted in the
retirement of the able and brilliant Matt Carpenter, and the election of
a new man, Cameron, who was not then known outside of the boundaries of
his State. Cameron proved to be an able man, a useful Senator, a good
Republican and an improvement, in some respects, upon his predecessor;
but his election was a defeat of the Republican organization in his
State, which, of course, was the objective point with the Democrats.
It was the State and Congressional elections of 1874 that proved to be
the death of the Republican party at the South. The party in that
section might have survived even such a crushing blow as this, but for
subsequent unfortunate events to which allusion has been made in a
previous chapter, and which will be touched upon in some that are to
follow. But, under these conditions, its survival was impossible. If the
State and Congressional elections of 1874 had been a repetition of those
of 1872 or if they had resulted in a Republican victory, Republican
success in the Presidential election of 1876 would have been a
reasonably assured fact. By that time the party at the South would have
included in its membership from forty to fifty per cent of the white men
of their respective States and as a result thereof it would have been
strong enough to stand on its own feet and maintain its own independent
existence, regardless of reverses which the parent organization might
have sustained in other sections. But at that time the party in that
section was in its infancy. It was young, weak, and comparatively
helpless. It still needed the fostering care and the protecting hand of
the paternal source of its existence.
When the smoke of the political battle that was fought in the early part
of November, 1874, had cleared away, it was found that this strong,
vigorous and healthy parent had been carried from the battle-field
seriously wounded and unable to administer to the wants of its Southern
offspring. The offspring was not strong enough to stand alone. The
result was that its demise soon followed because it had been deprived of
that nourishment, that sustenance and that support which were essential
to its existence and which could come only from the parent which had
been seriously if not fatally wounded upon the field of battle. After
the Presidential election of 1872 Southern white men were not only
coming into the Republican party in large numbers, but the liberal and
progressive element of the Democracy was in the ascendency in that
organization. That element, therefore, shaped the policy and declared
the principles for which that organization stood. This meant the
acceptance by all political parties of what was regarded as the settled
policy of the National Government. In proof of this assertion a
quotation from a political editorial which appeared about that time in
the Jackson, Mississippi, _Clarion_,--the organ of the Democratic
party,--will not be out of place. In speaking of the colored people and
their attitude towards the whites, that able and influential paper said:
"While they [the colored people] have been naturally tenacious of their
newly-acquired privileges, their general conduct will bear them witness
that they have shown consideration for the feelings of the whites. The
race line in politics would never have been drawn if opposition had not
been made to their enjoyment of equal privileges in the government and
under the laws after they were emancipated."
In other words, the colored people had manifested no disposition to rule
or dominate the whites, and the only color line which had existed grew
out of the unwise policy which had previously been pursued by the
Democratic party in its efforts to prevent the enjoyment by the
newly-emancipated race of the rights and privileges to which they were
entitled under the Constitution and laws of the country. But after the
State and Congressional elections of 1874 the situation was materially
changed. The liberal and conservative element of the Democracy was
relegated to the rear and the radical element came to the front and
assumed charge.
Subsequent to 1872 and prior to 1875 race proscription and social
ostracism had been completely abandoned. A Southern white man could
become a Republican without being socially ostracized. Such a man was no
longer looked upon as a traitor to his people, or false to his race. He
no longer forfeited the respect, confidence, good-will, and favorable
opinion of his friends and neighbors. Bulldozing, criminal assaults and
lynchings were seldom heard of. To the contrary, cordial, friendly and
amicable relations between all classes, all parties, and both races
prevailed everywhere. Fraud, violence, and intimidation at elections
were neither suspected nor charged by anyone, for everyone knew that no
occasion existed for such things. But after the State and Congressional
elections of 1874 there was a complete change of front. The new order of
things was then set aside and the abandoned methods of a few years back
were revived and readopted.
It is no doubt true that very few men at the North who voted the
Republican ticket in 1872 and the Democratic ticket in 1874 were
influenced in changing their votes by anything connected with
Reconstruction. There were other questions at issue, no doubt, that
influenced their action. There had been in 1873, for instance, a
disastrous financial panic. Then there were other things connected with
the National Administration which met with popular disfavor. These were
the reasons, no doubt, that influenced thousands of Republicans to vote
the Democratic ticket merely as an indication of their dissatisfaction
with the National Administration.
But, let their motives and reasons be what they may, the effect was the
same as if they had intended their votes to be accepted and construed as
an endorsement of the platform declarations of the National Democratic
Convention of 1868, at least so far as Reconstruction was concerned.
Democrats claimed, and Republicans could not deny, that so far as the
South was concerned this was the effect of the Congressional elections
of 1874. Desertions from the Republican ranks at the South, in
consequence thereof, became more rapid than had been the accessions
between 1872 and 1875. Thousands who had not taken an open stand, but
who were suspected of being inclined to the Republican party, denied
that there had ever been any justifiable grounds for such suspicions.
Many who had taken an open stand on that side returned to the fold of
the Democracy in sackcloth and ashes,--upon bended knees, pleading for
mercy, forgiveness and for charitable forbearance. They had seen a new
light; and they were ready to confess that they had made a grave
mistake, but, since their motives were good and their intentions were
honest, they hoped that they would not be rashly treated nor harshly
judged.
The prospects for the gratification and realization of the ambition of
white men in that section had been completely reversed. The conviction
became a settled fact that the Democratic party was the only channel
through which it would be possible in the future for anyone to secure
political distinction or receive official recognition,--hence the return
to the ranks of that party of thousands of white men who had left it.
All of them were eventually received, though some were kept on the
anxious seat and held as probationers for a long time.
It soon developed that all that was left of the once promising and
flourishing Republican party at the South was the true, faithful, loyal,
and sincere colored men,--who remained Republican from necessity as well
as from choice,--and a few white men, who were Republicans from
principle and conviction, and who were willing to incur the odium, run
the risks, take the chances, and pay the penalty that every white
Republican who had the courage of his convictions must then pay. This
was a sad and serious disappointment to the colored men who were just
about to realize the hope and expectation of a permanent political
combination and union between themselves and the better element of the
whites, which would have resulted in good, honest, capable, and
efficient local government and in the establishment and maintenance of
peace, good-will, friendly, cordial, and amicable relations between the
two races. But this hope, politically at least, had now been destroyed,
and these expectations had been shattered and scattered to the four
winds. The outlook for the colored man was dark and anything but
encouraging. Many of the parting scenes that took place between the
colored men and the whites who decided to return to the fold of the
Democracy were both affecting and pathetic in the extreme.
The writer cannot resist the temptation to bring to the notice of the
reader one of those scenes of which he had personal knowledge. Colonel
James Lusk had been a prominent, conspicuous and influential
representative of the Southern aristocracy of ante-bellum days. He
enjoyed the respect and confidence of the community in which he
lived,--especially of the colored people. He, like thousands of others
of his class, had identified himself with the Republican party. There
was in that community a Republican club of which Sam Henry, a well-known
colored man, was president. When it was rumored,--and before it could be
verified,--that Colonel Lusk had decided to cast his fortunes with the
Republican party Henry appointed a committee of three to call on him and
extend to him a cordial invitation to appear before the club at its next
meeting and deliver an address. The invitation was accepted. As soon as
the Colonel entered the door of the club, escorted by the committee,
every man in the house immediately arose and all joined in giving three
cheers and a hearty welcome to the gallant statesman and brave
ex-Confederate soldier who had honored them with his distinguished
presence on that occasion. He delivered a splendid speech, in which he
informed his hearers that he had decided to cast his lot with the
Republican party. It was the first public announcement of that fact that
had been made. Of course he was honored, idolized and lionized by the
colored people wherever he was known.
After the Congressional elections of 1874 Colonel Lusk decided that he
would return to the ranks of the Democracy. Before making public
announcement of that fact he decided to send for his faithful and loyal
friend, Sam Henry, to come to see him at his residence, as he had
something of importance to communicate to him. Promptly at the appointed
time Henry made his appearance. He did not know for what he was wanted,
but he had a well-founded suspicion, based upon the changed conditions
which were apparent in every direction; hence, apprehension could be
easily detected in his countenance. Colonel Lusk commenced by reminding
Henry of the fact that it was before the club of which he was president
and upon his invitation that he, Lusk, had made public announcement of
his intention to act in the future with the Republican party. Now that
he had decided to renounce any further allegiance to that party he
thought that his faithful friend and loyal supporter, Sam Henry, should
be the first to whom that announcement should be made. When he had
finished Henry was visibly affected.
"Oh! no, Colonel," he cried, breaking down completely, "I beg of you do
not leave us. You are our chief, if not sole dependence. You are our
Moses. If you leave us, hundreds of others in our immediate neighborhood
will be sure to follow your lead. We will thus be left without solid and
substantial friends. I admit that with you party affiliation is
optional. With me it is not. You can be either a Republican or a
Democrat, and be honored and supported by the party to which you may
belong. With me it is different. I must remain a Republican whether I
want to or not. While it is impossible for me to be a Democrat it is not
impossible for you to be a Republican. We need you. We need your
prestige, your power, your influence, and your name. I pray you,
therefore, not to leave us; for if you and those who will follow your
lead leave us now we will be made to feel that we are without a country,
without a home, without friends, and without a hope for the future. Oh,
no, Colonel, I beg of you, I plead with you, don't go! Stay with us;
lead and guide us, as you have so faithfully done during the last few
years!"
Henry's remarks made a deep and profound impression upon Colonel Lusk.
He informed Henry that no step he could take was more painful to him
than this. He assured Henry that this act on his part was from necessity
and not from choice.
"The statement you have made, Henry, that party affiliations with me is
optional," he answered, "is presumed to be true; but, in point of fact,
it is not. No white man can live in the South in the future and act with
any other than the Democratic party unless he is willing and prepared to
live a life of social isolation and remain in political oblivion. While
I am somewhat advanced in years, I am not so old as to be devoid of
political ambition. Besides I have two grown sons. There is, no doubt, a
bright, brilliant and successful future before them if they are
Democrats; otherwise, not. If I remain in the Republican party,--which
can hereafter exist at the South only in name,--I will thereby retard,
if not mar and possibly destroy, their future prospects. Then, you must
remember that a man's first duty is to his family. My daughters are the
pride of my home. I cannot afford to have them suffer the humiliating
consequences of the social ostracism to which they may be subjected if I
remain in the Republican party.
"The die is cast. I must yield to the inevitable and surrender my
convictions upon the altar of my family's good,--the outgrowth of
circumstances and conditions which I am powerless to prevent and cannot
control. Henceforth I must act with the Democratic party or make myself
a martyr; and I do not feel that there is enough at stake to justify me
in making such a fearful sacrifice as that. It is, therefore, with deep
sorrow and sincere regret, Henry, that I am constrained to leave you
politically, but I find that I am confronted with a condition, not a
theory. I am compelled to choose between you, on one side, and my family
and personal interests, on the other. That I have decided to sacrifice
you and yours upon the altar of my family's good is a decision for which
you should neither blame nor censure me. If I could see my way clear to
pursue a different course it would be done; but my decision is based
upon careful and thoughtful consideration and it must stand."
Of course a stubborn and bitter fight for control of the Democratic
organization was now on between the antagonistic and conflicting
elements among the whites. It was to be a desperate struggle between the
former aristocrats, on one side, and what was known as the "poor
whites," on the other. While the aristocrats had always been the weaker
in point of numbers, they had been the stronger in point of wealth,
intelligence, ability, skill and experience. As a result of their wide
experience, and able and skillful management, the aristocrats were
successful in the preliminary struggles, as illustrated in the persons
of Stephens, Gordon, Brown and Hill, of Georgia; Daniels and Lee, of
Virginia; Hampton and Butler, of South Carolina; Lamar and Walthall, of
Mississippi, and Garland, of Arkansas. But in the course of time and in
the natural order of things the poor whites were bound to win. All that
was needed was a few years' tutelage and a few daring and unscrupulous
leaders to prey upon their ignorance and magnify their vanity in order
to bring them to a realization of the fact that their former political
masters were now completely at their mercy, and subject to their will.
That the poor whites of the ante-bellum period in most of the late
slaveholding or reconstructed States are now the masters of the
political situation in those States, is a fact that will not be
questioned, disputed or denied by anyone who is well informed, or who is
familiar with the facts. The aristocrats of ante-bellum days and their
descendants in the old slave States are as completely under the
political control and domination of the poor whites of the ante-bellum
period as those whites were under them at that time. Yet the reader must
not assume that the election returns from such States indicate the
actual, or even the relative, strength of the opposing and antagonistic
elements and factions. They simply indicate that the poor whites of the
past and their descendants are now the masters and the leaders, and
that the masters and the leaders of the past are now the submissive
followers.
In the ranks of those who are now the recognized leaders is to be found
some of the very best blood of the land,--the descendants of the finest,
best, most cultivated, and most refined families of their respective
States. But as a rule they are there, not from choice, but from
necessity,--not because they are in harmony with what is being done, or
because they approve of the methods that are being employed and pursued,
but on account of circumstances and conditions which they can neither
control nor prevent. They would not hesitate to raise the arm of revolt
if they had any hope, or if they believed that ultimate success would be
the result thereof. But as matters now stand they can detect no ray of
hope, and can see no avenue of escape. Hence nothing remains for them to
do but to hold the chain of political oppression and subjugation, while
their former political subordinates rivet and fasten the same around
their unwilling necks. They find they can do nothing but sacrifice their
pride, their manhood, and their self-respect upon the altar of political
necessity. They see, they feel, they fully realize the hopelessness of
their condition and the helplessness of their situation. They see, they
know, they acknowledge that in the line of political distinction and
official recognition they can get nothing that their former political
subordinates are not willing for them to have. With a hope of getting a
few crumbs that may fall from the official table they make wry faces and
pretend to be satisfied with what is being done, and with the way in
which it is done. They are looked upon with suspicion and their loyalty
to the new order of things is a constant source of speculation,
conjecture, and doubt. But, for reasons of political expediency, a few
crumbs are allowed occasionally to go to some one of that class,--crumbs
that are gratefully acknowledged and thankfully received, upon the
theory that some little consideration is better than none at all,
especially in their present helpless and dependent condition. But even
these small crumbs are confined to those who are most pronounced and
outspoken in their declarations and protestations of loyalty, devotion,
and subservient submission to the new order of things.
CHAPTER XII
EVENTFUL DAYS OF THE FORTY-THIRD CONGRESS
The Mississippi Constitution having been ratified in 1869,--an odd year
of the calendar,--caused the regular elections for State, district and
county officers to occur on the odd year of the calendar, while the
National elections occurred on the even years of the calendar, thus
necessitating the holding of an election in the State every year.
Therefore, no election was to be held in 1874, except for Congressmen,
and to fill a few vacancies, while the regular election for county
officers and members of the Legislature would be held in 1875.
Since the regular session of the 44th Congress would not convene before
December, 1875, in order to avoid the trouble and expense incident to
holding an election in 1874, the Legislature passed a bill postponing
the election of members of Congress until November, 1875. There being
some doubt about the legality of this legislation, Congress passed a
bill legalizing the act of the Legislature. Consequently no election was
held in the State in 1874 except to fill a few vacancies that had
occurred in the Legislature and in some of the districts and counties.
One of the vacancies to be filled was that of State Senator, created by
the resignation of Senator Hiram Cassidy, Jr. Senator Cassidy, who was
elected as a Democrat in 1873, and who had voted for Mr. Bruce, the
Republican caucus nominee, for United States Senator, had in the mean
time publicly identified himself with the Republican party, thus
following in the footsteps of his able and illustrious father, Judge
Hiram Cassidy, Sr., who had given his active support to the Republican
candidate for Governor in 1873.
Governor Ames had appointed Senator Cassidy a Judge of the Chancery
Court, to accept which office it was necessary for him to resign his
seat as a member of the State Senate. A special election was held in
November, 1874, to fill that vacancy. The Democrats nominated a strong
and able man, Judge R.H. Thompson, of Brookhaven, Lincoln County. The
Republicans nominated a still stronger and abler man, Hon. J.F.
Sessions, of the same town and county,--a Democrat who had represented
Franklin County for several terms, but who had that year identified
himself with the Republican party. Sessions was Chancellor Cassidy's law
partner.
Since the counties comprising that senatorial district constituted a
part of the district that I then represented in Congress, I took an
active part in the support of the candidacy of Sessions. Although a
Democrat, Hiram Cassidy, Jr., had been elected from that district in
1873, Sessions, a Republican, was elected by a handsome majority in
1874. A vacancy had also occurred in the Legislature from Franklin
County, to fill which the Republicans nominated Hon. William P. Cassidy,
brother of Chancellor Cassidy; but the Democratic majority in the county
was too large for one even so popular as Wm. P. Cassidy to overcome;
hence he was defeated by a small majority.
From a Republican point of view Mississippi, as was true of the other
reconstructed States, up to 1875 was all that could be expected and
desired and, no doubt, would have remained so for many years, but for
the unexpected results of the State and Congressional elections of 1874.
While it is true, as stated and explained in a previous chapter, that
Grant carried nearly every state in the Union at the Presidential
election in 1872, the State and Congressional elections throughout the
country two years later went just the other way, and by majorities just
as decisive as those given the Republicans two years before.
Notwithstanding the severe and crushing defeat sustained by the
Republicans at that time, it was claimed by some, believed by others,
and predicted by many that by the time the election for President in
1876 would roll around it would be found that the Republicans had
regained substantially all they had lost in 1874; but these hopes,
predictions, and expectations were not realized. The Presidential
election of 1876 turned out to be so close and doubtful that neither
party could claim a substantial victory. While it is true that Hayes,
the Republican candidate for President, was finally declared elected
according to the forms of law, yet the terms and conditions upon which
he was allowed to be peaceably inaugurated were such as to complete the
extinction and annihilation of the Republican party at the South. The
price that the Hayes managers stipulated to pay,--and did pay,--for the
peaceable inauguration of Hayes was that the South was to be turned over
to the Democrats and that the administration was not to enforce the
Constitution and the laws of the land in that section against the
expressed will of the Democrats thereof. In other words, so far as the
South was concerned, the Constitution was not to follow the flag.
In the 43rd Congress which was elected in 1872 and which would expire by
limitation March 4, 1875, the Republicans had a large majority in both
Houses. In the House of Representatives of the 44th Congress, which was
elected in 1874, the Democratic majority was about as large as was the
Republican majority in the House of the 43rd Congress. The Republicans
still retained control of the Senate, but by a greatly reduced majority.
During the short session of the 43rd Congress, important legislation was
contemplated by the Republican leaders. Alabama was one of the States
which the Democrats were charged with having carried in 1874 by
resorting to methods which were believed to be questionable and illegal.
An investigation was ordered by the House. A committee was appointed to
make the investigation, of which General Albright, of Pennsylvania, was
chairman. This committee was authorized to report by bill or otherwise.
After a thorough investigation, the chairman was directed, and
instructed by the vote of every Republican member of the committee,
which constituted a majority thereof, to report and recommend the
passage of what was called the Federal Elections Bill. This bill was
carefully drawn; following substantially the same lines as a previous
temporary measure, under the provisions of which what was known as the
Ku Klux Klan had been crushed out, and order had been restored in North
Carolina.
It is safe to say that this bill would have passed both Houses and
become a law, but for the unexpected opposition of Speaker Blaine. Mr.
Blaine was not only opposed to the bill, but his opposition was so
intense that he felt it his duty to leave the Speaker's chair and come
on the floor for the purpose of leading the opposition to its passage.
This, of course, was fatal to the passage of the measure. After a
desperate struggle of a few days, in which the Speaker was found to be
in opposition to a large majority of his party associates, and which
revealed the fact that the party was hopelessly divided, the leaders in
the House abandoned the effort to bring the measure to a vote.
Mr. Blame's motives in taking this unexpected position, in open
opposition to the great majority of his party associates, has always
been open to speculation and conjecture. His personal and political
enemies charged that it was due to jealousy of President Grant. Mr.
Blaine was a candidate for the Republican Presidential nomination the
following year. It was a well-known fact that President Grant was not
favorable to Mr. Blaine's nomination, but was in sympathy with the
movement to have Senator Roscoe Conkling, of New York, Mr. Blaine's
bitterest political enemy, nominated. Mr. Blaine was afraid, his enemies
asserted, that, if the Federal Elections Bill,--under the provisions of
which great additional power would have been conferred upon the
President,--had become a law, that power would be used to defeat his
nomination for the Presidency in 1876; hence his opposition to the Bill.
But, whatever his motives were, his successful opposition to that
measure no doubt resulted in his failure to realize the ambition of his
life,--the Presidency of the United States. But for the stand he took
on that occasion, he would probably have received sufficient support
from Southern delegates in the National Convention to secure him the
nomination, and, had he been nominated at that time, the probabilities
are that he would have been elected. But his opposition to that bill
practically solidified the Southern delegates in that convention against
him, and as a result he was defeated for the nomination, although he was
the choice of a majority of the Northern delegates.
Even when Blaine received the nomination in 1884 it was developed that
it could not have happened had the Southern delegates been as solidly
against him at that time as they were in 1876. But by 1884 the Southern
Republicans had somewhat relented in their opposition to him, and, as a
result thereof, he received sufficient support from that section to give
him the nomination. But he was defeated at the polls because the South
was solid against him,--a condition which was made possible by his own
action in defeating the Federal Elections Bill in 1875. In consequence
of his action in that matter he was severely criticised and censured by
Republicans generally, and by Southern Republicans especially.
Although I was not favorable to his nomination for the Presidency at any
time, my relations with Mr. Blaine had been so cordial that I felt at
liberty to seek him and ask him, for my own satisfaction and
information, an explanation of his action in opposing and defeating the
Federal Elections Bill. I therefore went to him just before the final
adjournment of the 43rd Congress and informed him that I desired to have
a few minutes' private audience with him whenever it would be convenient
for him to see me. He requested me to come to the Speaker's room
immediately after the adjournment of the House that afternoon.
When I entered the room Mr. Blaine was alone. I took a seat only a few
feet from him. I informed him of the great disappointment and intense
dissatisfaction which his action had caused in defeating what was not
only regarded as a party measure, but which was believed by the
Republicans to be of vital importance from a party point of view, to say
nothing of its equity and justice. I remarked that for him to array
himself in opposition to the great majority of his own party
associates,--and to throw the weight of his great influence against such
an important party measure as the Federal Elections Bill was believed to
be,--he must have had some motive, some justifiable grounds of which the
public was ignorant, but about which I believed it was fair to himself
and just to his own friends and party associates, that he give some
explanation.
"As a southern Republican member of the House, and as one that is not
hostile or particularly unfriendly to you," I said, "I feel that I have
a right to make this request of you."
At first he gave me a look of surprise, and for several seconds he
remained silent. Then, straightening himself up in his chair, he
answered:
"I am glad, Mr. Lynch, that you have made this request of me, since I am
satisfied you are not actuated by any unfriendly motive in doing so. I
shall, therefore, give a frank answer to your question. In my judgment,
if that bill had become a law the defeat of the Republican party
throughout the country would have been a foregone conclusion. We could
not have saved the South even if the bill had passed, but its passage
would have lost us the North; indeed, I could not have carried even my
own State of Maine, if that bill had passed. In my opinion, it was
better to lose the South and save the North, than to try through such
legislation to save the South, and thus lose both North and South. I
believed that if we saved the North we could then look after the South.
If the Southern Democrats are foolish enough to bring about a Solid
South the result will be a Solid North against a Solid South; and in
that case the Republicans would have nothing to fear. You now have my
reasons, frankly and candidly given, for the action taken by me on the
occasion referred to. I hope you are satisfied with them."
I thanked Mr. Blaine cordially for giving me the desired explanation.
"I now feel better satisfied with reference to your action upon that
occasion," I assured him. "While I do not agree with you in your
conclusions, and while I believe your reasoning to be unsound and
fallacious, still I cannot help giving you credit for having been
actuated by no other motive than to do what you honestly believed was
for the best interest of the country and the Republican party."
CHAPTER XIII
STATE CAMPAIGN OF 1875. REPUBLICAN VICTORY
When I returned to my home after the adjournment of Congress in March,
1875, the political clouds were dark. The political outlook was
discouraging. The prospect of Republican success was not at all bright.
There had been a marked change in the situation from every point of
view. Democrats were bold, outspoken, defiant, and determined. In
addition to these unfavorable indications I noticed that I was not
received by them with the same warmth and cordiality as on previous
occasions. With a few notable exceptions they were cold, indifferent,
even forbidding in their attitude and manner. This treatment was so
radically different from that to which I had been accustomed that I
could not help feeling it keenly. I knew it was indicative of a change
in the political situation which meant that I had before me the fight of
my life.
My advocacy and support of the Federal Elections Bill, commonly called
the "Force Bill," was occasionally given as the reason for this change;
but I knew this was not the true reason. In fact, that bill would hardly
have been thought of but for the fact that Mr. Blaine, the Republican
Speaker of the House, had attracted national attention to it through his
action in vacating the chair and coming on the floor of the House to
lead the opposition to its passage. This act on the part of the
statesman from Maine made him, in the opinion of many Southern
Democrats, the greatest man that our country had ever produced,--George
Washington, the Father of the Republic, not excepted. They were loud in
their thanks for the valuable service he had thus rendered them and, as
evidence of their gratitude to him, they declared their determination to
show their appreciation of this valuable service in a substantial manner
whenever the opportunity presented itself for it to be done.
No man in the country was stronger, better or more popular than the
statesman from Maine, until his name came before them as a candidate for
President of the United States on a Republican ticket. A sudden
transformation then took place. It was then discovered, to their great
surprise and disappointment, that he was such an unsafe and dangerous
man that no greater calamity could happen to the country than his
elevation to the Presidency. Nothing, therefore, must be left undone to
bring about his defeat.
I was well aware of the fact at the time that it was the result of the
State and Congressional elections at the north in 1874 that had
convinced Southern Democrats that Republican ascendency in the National
Government would soon be a thing of the past--that the Democrats would
be successful in the Presidential and Congressional elections of 1876
and that that party would, no doubt, remain in power for at least a
quarter of a century. It was this, and not the unsuccessful effort to
pass a Federal Elections Bill, that had produced the marked change that
was noticeable on every hand. Every indication seemed to point to a
confirmation of the impression that Democratic success at the
Presidential election was practically an assured fact.
There had been a disastrous financial panic in 1873 which was no doubt
largely responsible for the political upheaval in 1874; but that was
lost sight of in accounting for that result. In fact they made no effort
to explain it except in their own way. The Democrats had carried the
country; the reasons for this they construed to suit themselves. The
construction they placed upon it was that it was a national condemnation
and repudiation of the Congressional Plan of Reconstruction, and they
intended to govern themselves accordingly.
The election in Mississippi in 1875 was for members of Congress, members
of the Legislature, and county officers, and also a State Treasurer to
serve out the unexpired term of Treasurer Holland, deceased. My own
renomination for Congress from the Sixth (Natchez) District was a
foregone conclusion, since I had no opposition in my own party; but I
realized the painful fact that a nomination this time was not equivalent
to an election. Still, I felt that it was my duty to make the fight, let
the result be what it might.
If Congressmen had been elected in 1874 the State would have returned
five Republicans and one Democrat as was done in 1872; but in 1875 the
prospect was not so bright, the indications were not so favorable. The
Democrats nominated for State Treasurer Hon. Wm. L. Hemmingway, of
Carroll County. He was an able man, and had been quite prominent as a
party leader in his section of the State. The defiant attitude assumed,
and the bold declarations contained in the platform upon which he was
nominated were accepted by the Republicans as notice that the Democrats
intended to carry the election--"peaceably and fairly."
The Republicans nominated Hon. George M. Buchanan, of Marshall County,
upon a platform which strongly endorsed the National and State
administrations. Mr. Buchanan was a strong and popular man. He had been
a brave and gallant Confederate soldier. He had been for several years
Sheriff and Tax Collector of his county, and was known to be especially
fitted for the office of State Treasurer. As Sheriff and Tax Collector
of Marshall County,--one of the wealthiest counties in the State,--he
had handled and disbursed many thousands of dollars, every dollar of
which had been faithfully accounted for. His honesty, integrity,
ability, fitness, and capacity, everyone, regardless of race or party,
unhesitatingly admitted.
The administration of Governor Ames was one of the best the State had
ever had. The judiciary was quite equal to that which had been appointed
by Governor Alcorn. The public revenues had been promptly collected, and
honestly accounted for. There had not only been no increase in the rate
of taxation, but, to the contrary, there had been a material reduction.
Notwithstanding these things the Democrats, together with the radical
element in charge of the party machinery, determined to seize the State
Government _vi et armis_; not because it was at all necessary for any
special reason, but simply because conditions at that time seemed to
indicate that it could be safely done.
After the nominations had all been made, the campaign was opened in dead
earnest. Nearly all Democratic clubs in the State were converted into
armed military companies. Funds with which to purchase arms were
believed to have been contributed by the National Democratic
organization. Nearly every Republican meeting was attended by one or
more of those clubs or companies,--the members of which were
distinguished by red shirts, indicative of blood,--the attendance being
for the purpose, of course, of "keeping the peace and preserving
order." To enable the Democrats to carry the State a Republican majority
of between twenty and thirty thousand had to be overcome. This could be
done only by the adoption and enforcement of questionable methods. It
was a case in which the end justified the means, and the means had to be
supplied.
The Republican vote consisted of about ninety-five per cent of the
colored men, and of about twenty-five per cent of the white men. The
other seventy-five per cent of the whites formerly constituted a part of
the flower of the Confederate Army. They were not only tried and
experienced soldiers, but they were fully armed and equipped for the
work before them. Some of the colored Republicans had been Union
soldiers, but they were neither organized nor armed. In such a contest,
therefore, they and their white allies were entirely at the mercy of
their political adversaries.
Governor Ames soon took in the situation. He saw that he could not
depend upon the white members of the State militia to obey his orders,
to support him in his efforts to uphold the majesty of the law, and to
protect the law-abiding citizens in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and
property. To use the colored members of the militia for such a purpose
would be adding fuel to the flames. Nothing, therefore, remained for him
to do but to call on the National administration for military aid in
his efforts to crush out domestic violence and enforce the laws of the
State. He did call for such aid, but for reasons that will be given
later it was not granted.
When the polls closed on the day of the election, the Democrats, of
course, had carried the State by a large majority,--thus securing a
heavy majority in both branches of the Legislature. Of the six members
of Congress the writer was the only one of the regular Republican
candidates that pulled through, and that, by a greatly reduced majority.
In the Second (Holly Springs) District, G. Wiley Wells ran as an
Independent Republican against A.R. Howe, the sitting member, and the
regular Republican candidate for reëlection. The Democrats supported
Wells, who was elected.
The delegation, therefore, consisted of four Democrats, one Republican,
and one Independent Republican. While the delegation would have
consisted of five straight Republicans and one Democrat had the election
been held in 1874, still, since the Democrats had such a large majority
in the House, the political complexion of the Mississippi delegation was
not important. The election of the writer, it was afterwards developed,
was due in all probability to a miscalculation on the part of some of
the Democratic managers. Their purpose was to have a solid delegation,
counting Wells as one of that number, since his election would be due
to the support of the Democratic party.
But in my district the plan miscarried. In one of the counties there
were two conflicting reports as to what the Democratic majority was;
according to one, it was two hundred and fifty, according to the other,
it was five hundred. The report giving two hundred and fifty was, no
doubt, the correct one, but the other would probably have been accepted
had it been believed at the time that it was necessary to insure the
election of the Democratic candidate. To overcome the majority in that
district was more difficult than to overcome it in any of the other
districts. While their candidate, Colonel Roderick Seal, was quite a
popular man, it was well known that I would poll a solid Republican vote
and some Democratic votes in addition. Fortunately for me there was a
split in the party in my own county (Adams) for county officers, which
resulted in bringing out a very heavy vote. This split also made the
count of the ballots very slow,--covering a period of several days. My
name was on both tickets. The election took place on Tuesday, but the
count was not finished until the following Friday evening. Hence, the
result for member of Congress in that county could not be definitely
ascertained until Friday night.
The Democratic managers at the State Capital were eager to know as soon
as possible what the Republican majority in Adams County would be for
Congressman, hence, on Wednesday evening, the editor of the local
Democratic paper received a telegram from the Secretary of the
Democratic State Committee, requesting to be informed immediately what
the Republican majority for Congressman would be in Adams County. The
editor read the telegram to me and asked what, in my opinion, would be
my majority in the county. My reply was that I did not think it would
exceed twelve hundred; whereupon he sent in the following report:
"Lynch's majority in Adams will not exceed twelve hundred."
Upon receipt of this telegram the majority of two hundred and fifty
instead of five hundred was deemed sufficient from the county heretofore
referred to. If the Republican majority in Adams would not exceed twelve
hundred, the success of the Democratic Congressional candidate by a
small but safe majority was assured on the face of the returns. Since
Adams was the last county to be reported, no change could thereafter be
made. When the count was finally finished in Adams it was found I had a
majority of over eighteen hundred. This gave me a majority in the
district of a little over two hundred on the face of the returns.
The disappointment and chagrin on the part of the Democratic managers
can better be imagined than described. But the agreeable surprise to the
Republicans was at least equal to the Democrats' disappointment. The
defeated Democratic candidate threatened to make a contest for the seat
on the ground of violence and fraud; but this was so ridiculous that the
managers of his own party would not allow him to carry the threat into
execution.
CHAPTER XIV
INTERVIEW BETWEEN THE AUTHOR AND THE PRESIDENT REGARDING STATE
APPOINTMENTS
Shortly after I reached Washington in the latter part of November, 1875,
I called on the President to pay my respects, and to see him on business
relating to a Civil Service order that he had recently issued, and that
some of the Federal office-holders had evidently misunderstood.
Postmaster Pursell, of Summit, an important town in my district, was one
of that number. He was supposed to be a Republican, having been
appointed as such. But he not only refused to take any part in the
campaign of 1875, but he also declined to contribute a dollar to meet
the legitimate expenses of that campaign. The President's Civil Service
order was his excuse. According to Pursell's construction of that order,
Federal office-holders must not only take no part in political or party
campaigns, but they must make no contributions for political purposes.
He not only said nothing and did nothing in the interest of his party in
that campaign, but it was believed by some that he did not even vote the
Republican ticket.
After paying my respects to the President I brought this case to his
attention. I informed him that I very much desired to have Postmaster
Pursell removed, and a good Republican appointed in his stead.
"What is the matter with him?" the President asked. "Is he not a good
postmaster?"
"Yes," I replied, "there is nothing to be said against him, so far as I
know, with reference to his administration of the office. I only object
to him on account of politics. He may be,--and no doubt is,--a good,
capable, and efficient postmaster; but politically he is worthless. From
a party point of view he is no good. In my opinion, there ought to be a
man in that office who will not only discharge his duties in a
creditable manner, but who will also be of some service to the party and
to the administration under which he serves. In the present postmaster
of the town of Summit we have not such a man, but we can and will have
one if you will appoint the one whose name I now present and for whom I
ask your favorable consideration. We had, as you know, a bitter and
desperate struggle. It was the very time that we stood sadly in need of
every man and of every vote. We lost the county that Summit is in by a
small majority. If an active and aggressive man, such as the one whose
name I now place before you, had been postmaster at Summit, the result
in that County might have been different. I therefore earnestly
recommend that Pursell be removed, and that Mr. Garland be appointed to
succeed him."
The President replied: "You have given good and sufficient reasons for a
change. Leave with me the name of the man you desire to have appointed,
and his name will be sent to the Senate as soon as Congress meets." I
cordially thanked the President, and assured him that he would have no
occasion to regret making the change. In explanation of his Civil
Service order the President remarked that quite a number of
office-holders had seemed to misunderstand it, although it was plainly
worded, and, as he thought, not difficult to understand. There had never
been any serious complaints growing out of active participation in
political campaigns on the part of office-holders, and that it was not,
and never had been, the purpose of the administration, by executive
order or otherwise, to limit or restrict any American citizen in the
discharge of his duties as a citizen, simply because he happened to be
an office-holder, provided that in so doing he did not neglect his
official duties. There had, however, been serious complaints from many
parts of the country about the use and abuse of Federal patronage in
efforts to manipulate party conventions, and to dictate and control
party nominations. To destroy this evil was the primary purpose of the
civil service order referred to.
I told the President that his explanation of the order was in harmony
with my own construction and interpretation of it. That is why I made
the recommendation for a change in the postmastership at Summit. The
change was promptly made. I then informed the President that there was
another matter about which I desired to have a short talk with him, that
was the recent election in Mississippi. After calling his attention to
the sanguinary struggle through which we had passed, and the great
disadvantages under which we labored, I reminded him of the fact that
the Governor, when he saw that he could not put down without the
assistance of the National Administration what was practically an
insurrection against the State Government, made application for
assistance in the manner and form prescribed by the Constitution, with
the confident belief that it would be forthcoming. But in this we were,
for some reason, seriously disappointed and sadly surprised. The reason
for this action, or rather non-action, was still an unexplained mystery
to us. For my own satisfaction and information I should be pleased to
have the President enlighten me on the subject.
The President said that he was glad I had asked him the question, and
that he would take pleasure in giving me a frank reply. He said he had
sent Governor Ames' requisition to the War Department with his approval
and with instructions to have the necessary assistance furnished without
delay. He had also given instructions to the Attorney-General to use
the marshals and the machinery of the Federal judiciary as far as
possible in coöperation with the War Department in an effort to maintain
order and to bring about a condition which would insure a peaceable and
fair election. But before the orders were put into execution a committee
of prominent Republicans from Ohio had called on him. (Ohio was then an
October State,--that is, her elections took place in October instead of
November.) An important election was then pending in that State. This
committee, the President stated, protested against having the
requisition of Governor Ames honored. The committee, the President said,
informed him in a most emphatic way that if the requisition of Governor
Ames were honored, the Democrats would not only carry Mississippi,--a
State which would be lost to the Republicans in any event,--but that
Democratic success in Ohio would be an assured fact. If the requisition
were not honored it would make no change in the result in Mississippi,
but that Ohio would be saved to the Republicans. The President assured
me that it was with great reluctance that he yielded,--against his own
judgment and sense of official duty,--to the arguments of this
committee, and directed the withdrawal of the orders which had been
given the Secretary of War and the Attorney-General in that matter.
This statement, I confess, surprised me very much.
"Can it be possible," I asked, "that there is such a prevailing
sentiment in any State in the North, East or West as renders it
necessary for a Republican President to virtually give his sanction to
what is equivalent to a suspension of the Constitution and laws of the
land to insure Republican success in such a State? I cannot believe this
to be true, the opinion of the Republican committee from Ohio to the
contrary notwithstanding. What surprises me more, Mr. President, is that
you yielded and granted this remarkable request. That is not like you.
It is the first time I have ever known you to show the white feather.
Instead of granting the request of that committee, you should have
rebuked the men,--told them that it is your duty as chief magistrate of
the country to enforce the Constitution and laws of the land, and to
protect American citizens in the exercise and enjoyment of their rights,
let the consequences be what they may; and that if by doing this Ohio
should be lost to the Republicans it ought to be lost. In other words,
no victory is worth having if it is to be brought about upon such
conditions as those,--if it is to be purchased at such a fearful cost as
was paid in this case."
"Yes," said the President, "I admit that you are right. I should not
have yielded. I believed at the time that I was making a grave mistake.
But as presented, it was duty on one side, and party obligation on the
other. Between the two I hesitated, but finally yielded to what was
believed to be party obligation. If a mistake was made, it was one of
the head and not of the heart. That my heart was right and my intentions
good, no one who knows me will question. If I had believed that any
effort on my part would have saved Mississippi I would have made it,
even if I had been convinced that it would have resulted in the loss of
Ohio to the Republicans. But I was satisfied then, as I am now, that
Mississippi could not have been saved to the party in any event and I
wanted to avoid the responsibility of the loss of Ohio, in addition.
This was the turning-point in the case.
"And while on this subject," the President went on, "let us look more
closely into the significance of this situation. I am very much
concerned about the future of our country. When the War came to an end
it was thought that four things had been brought about and effectually
accomplished as a result thereof. They were: first, that slavery had
been forever abolished; second, that the indissolubility of the Federal
Union had been permanently established and universally recognized;
third, that the absolute and independent sovereignty of the several
States was a thing of the past; fourth, that a national sovereignty had
been at last created and established, resulting in sufficient power
being vested in the general government not only to guarantee to every
State in the Union a Republican form of government, but to protect, when
necessary, the individual citizen of the United States in the exercise
and enjoyment of the rights and privileges to which he is entitled under
the Constitution and laws of his country. In other words, that there had
been created a National citizenship as distinguished from State
citizenship, resulting in a paramount allegiance to the United
States,--the general Government,--having ample power to protect its own
citizens against domestic and personal violence whenever the State in
which he may live should fail, refuse, or neglect to do so. In other
words, so far as citizens of the United States are concerned, the States
in the future would only act as agents of the general Government in
protecting the citizens of the United States in the enjoyment of life,
liberty, and property. This has been my conception of the duties of the
President, and until recently I have pursued that course. But there
seems to be a number of leading and influential men in the Republican
party who take a different view of these matters. These men have used
and are still using their power and influence, not to strengthen but to
cripple the President and thus prevent him from enforcing the
Constitution and laws along these lines. They have not only used their
power and influence to prevent and defeat wise and necessary legislation
for these purposes, but they have contributed, through the medium of
public meetings and newspaper and magazine articles, to the creation of
a public sentiment hostile to the policy of the administration. Whatever
their motives may be, future mischief of a very serious nature is bound
to be the result. It requires no prophet to foresee that the national
government will soon be at a great disadvantage and that the results of
the war of the rebellion will have been in a large measure lost. In
other words, that the first two of the four propositions above stated
will represent all that will have been accomplished as a result of the
war, and even they, for the lack of power of enforcement in the general
government, will be largely of a negative character. What you have just
passed through in the State of Mississippi is only the beginning of what
is sure to follow. I do not wish to create unnecessary alarm, nor to be
looked upon as a prophet of evil, but it is impossible for me to close
my eyes in the face of things that are as plain to me as the noonday
sun."
It is needless to say that I was deeply interested in the President's
eloquent and prophetic talk which subsequent events have more than fully
verified.
CHAPTER XV
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1876 AND ITS RESULTS
The Presidential election was held in 1876. The Republicans had carried
the country in 1872 by such a decisive majority that it indicated many
years of continued Republican ascendency in the National Government. But
the severe reverses sustained by that party at the polls two years later
completely changed this situation and outlook. Democrats confidently
expected and Republicans seriously apprehended that the Presidential
election of 1876 would result in a substantial Democratic victory. Mr.
Blaine was the leading candidate for the Republican nomination, but he
had bitter opposition in the ranks of his own party. That opposition
came chiefly from friends and supporters of Senator Conkling at the
North and from Southern Republicans generally. The opposition of the
Conkling men to Mr. Blaine was largely personal; while southern
Republicans were opposed to him on account of his having caused the
defeat of the Federal Elections Bill. The great majority of southern
Republicans supported Senator Oliver P. Morton of Indiana.
After the National Convention had been organized, it looked for a while
as if Mr. Blaine's nomination was a foregone conclusion. Hon. Edward
McPherson, of Pennsylvania,--a strong Blaine man,--had been made
President of the Convention. In placing Mr. Blaine's name in nomination,
Hon. Robert G. Ingersoll of Illinois made such an eloquent and effective
speech that he came very near carrying the Convention by storm, and thus
securing the nomination of the statesman from Maine. But the opposition
to Mr. Blaine was too well organized to allow the Convention to be
stampeded, even by the power and eloquence of an Ingersoll. It was this
speech that gave Mr. Ingersoll his national fame and brought him to the
front as a public speaker and lecturer. It was the most eloquent and
impressive speech that was delivered during the sitting of the
Convention. After a bitter struggle of many hours, and after a number of
fruitless ballots, the Convention finally nominated Gov. R.B. Hayes, of
Ohio, as a compromise candidate. This result was brought about through a
union of the combined opposition to Mr. Blaine. Hon. Wm. A. Wheeler, of
New York, was nominated for Vice-President and the work of the
Convention was over.
The Democrats nominated ex-Governor Samuel J. Tilden, of New York, for
President, and Thomas A. Hendricks, of Indiana, for Vice-President.
Their platform pledged many radical reforms in the administration of the
government. This ticket was made with the hope that it would be
successful in the doubtful and debatable States of New York, New Jersey,
Indiana, and Connecticut, which, with the Solid South, would constitute
a majority of the electoral college, even if all the other States should
go Republican, which was not anticipated.
That the prospect of Democratic success was exceedingly bright and the
probability of a Republican victory extremely dark, was generally
conceded. The South was counted upon to be solid in its support of the
Democratic ticket, for the methods that had been successfully
inaugurated in Mississippi the year before, to overcome a Republican
majority of more than twenty thousand, were to be introduced and adopted
in all the other States of that section in which conditions were
practically the same as in Mississippi.
To insure success, therefore, it was only necessary for the Democrats to
concentrate their efforts upon the four doubtful States outside of the
Solid South. Up to a certain point the plan worked well. Every
indication seemed to point to its successful consummation. As had been
anticipated, the Democrats were successful in the four doubtful Northern
States, and they also carried, on the face of the returns, every
Southern State, just as had been planned; the Mississippi methods
having been adopted in such of them as had Republican majorities to
overcome. Since through those methods the Democrats had succeeded in
overcoming a large Republican majority in Mississippi, there was no
reason why the same methods should not produce like results in South
Carolina, in Louisiana, and in Florida. In fact, it was looked upon as a
reflection upon the bravery and party loyalty of the Democracy of those
States if they could not do what had been done under like conditions in
Mississippi. Hence those States _had_ to be carried, "peaceably and
fairly," of course, "but they must be carried just the same." Failure to
carry them was out of the question, because too much was involved.
According to the plans and calculations that had been carefully made, no
Southern State could be lost. While it might be possible to win without
all of them, still it was not believed to be safe to run any such risk,
or take any such chance. If the Democrats should happen to carry a state
that was not included in the combination, so much the better.
Everything seemed to work admirably. That it was a plan by which
elections could be easily carried, with or without votes, had been
clearly demonstrated. On the face of the returns the majorities were
brought forth just as had been ordered and directed. But it seems that
such methods had been anticipated by the Republican governments in South
Carolina, Louisiana, and Florida, and that suitable steps had been
taken to prevent their successful consummation through the medium of
State Returning Boards. When the Returning Boards had rejected and
thrown out many of the majorities that had been returned from some of
the counties and parishes, the result was changed, and the Republican
candidates for Presidential electors were officially declared elected.
This gave the Republican candidates for President and Vice-President a
majority of one vote in the Electoral College. It has, of course, been
alleged by many,--and it is believed by some,--that the actions of those
Returning Boards defeated the will of the people as expressed at the
polls, thus bringing about the seating in the Presidential chair of the
man that had been fairly and honestly defeated. Yet, no one who is
familiar with the facts, and who is honest enough to admit them, will
deny that but for the inauguration in South Carolina, Florida, and
Louisiana, of the Mississippi methods, those three States would have
been as safely Republican at that time and in that election as were the
States of Pennsylvania and Vermont. But the plans of the Democratic
managers had been defeated. It was hard for them to lose a victory they
felt and believed to have been won by them, notwithstanding the
extraneous methods that had been employed to bring about such results.
CHAPTER XVI
EFFECTS OF THE REFORM ADMINISTRATION IN MISSISSIPPI
Because the Democrats carried the election in Mississippi in 1875, they
did not thereby secure control of the State Government. That election
was for members of the Legislature, members of Congress and county
officers. Only one State officer was elected,--a State Treasurer,--to
fill the vacancy created by the death of Treasurer Holland. All the
other State officers were Republicans. But the Democrats could not
afford to wait until Governor Ames' term expired. They were determined
to get immediate control of the State Government. There was only one way
in which this could be done, and that was by impeachment.
This course they decided to take. It could not be truthfully denied that
Governor Ames was a clean, pure, and honest man. He had given the State
an excellent administration. The State judiciary had been kept up to the
high standard established by Governor Alcorn. Every dollar of the public
money had been collected, and honestly accounted for. The State was in a
prosperous condition. The rate of taxation had been greatly reduced,
and there was every prospect of a still further reduction before the end
of his administration. But these facts made no difference to those who
were flushed with the victory they had so easily won. They wanted the
offices, and were determined to have them, and that, too, without very
much delay. Hence, impeachment proceedings were immediately instituted
against the Governor and Lieutenant-Governor,--not in the interest of
reform, of good government or of low taxes, but simply in order to get
possession of the State Government.
The weakness of the case against the Governor was shown when it
developed that the strongest charge against him was that he had entered
into an alleged corrupt bargain with State Senator Cassidy, resulting in
Cassidy's appointment as one of the Judges of the Chancery Court.
Cassidy had been elected a member of the State Senate as a Democrat.
Notwithstanding that fact he voted for Mr. Bruce, the Republican caucus
nominee for United States Senator, and subsequently publicly identified
himself with the Republican party. Later his brother, William P.
Cassidy, and his law partner, Hon. J.F. Sessions, did likewise. In 1874
Sessions was elected to the State Senate as a Republican to serve out
the unexpired term of his law partner, Cassidy, who had resigned his
seat in the Senate upon his appointment as a Judge of the Chancery
Court.
Cassidy was a brilliant young man, and an able lawyer. That the
Governor should have selected him for an important judicial position was
both wise and proper. It was one of his best and most creditable
appointments and was generally commended as such when it was made. The
fact that he had been elected to the State Senate as a Democrat, and
shortly thereafter joined the Republican party was made the basis of the
charge that his change of party affiliation was the result of a corrupt
bargain between the Governor and himself, for which the Governor, but
not the Judge, should be impeached and removed from office. There were a
few other vague and unimportant charges, but this one, as weak as it
was, was the strongest of the number.
When the articles of impeachment were presented to the House, it was
seen that they were so weak and so groundless that the Governor believed
it would be an easy matter for him to discredit them even before an
antagonistic legislature. With that end in view, he employed several of
the ablest lawyers in the country to represent him. They came to Jackson
and commenced the preparation of the case, but it did not take them long
to find out that their case was a hopeless one. They soon found out to
their entire satisfaction that it was not to be a judicial trial, but a
political one and that the jury was already prepared for conviction
without regard to the law, the Constitution, the evidence, or the
facts. Governor Ames was to be convicted, not because he was guilty of
any offense, but because he was in the way of complete Democratic
control of the State Government.
Personally they had nothing against Ames. It was not the man but the
office they wanted, and that they were determined to have. They knew he
had committed no offense, but, as matters then stood, being a Republican
was an offense which justified removal from office. To punish him
otherwise, for anything he had done or failed to do, did not at any time
enter into their calculations. The Governorship was the prize at stake.
In this matter there was no concealment of their purposes and
intentions. As soon as the Governor's legal advisers found out what the
actual situation was, they saw it was useless to continue the fight.
Upon their advice, therefore, the Governor tendered his resignation,
which was promptly accepted. He then left the State never to return
again. If the impeachment proceedings had been instituted in good
faith,--upon an honest belief that the chief executive had committed
offenses which merited punishment,--the resignation would not have been
accepted. The fact that it was accepted,--and that, too, without
hesitation or question,--was equivalent to a confession that the purpose
of the proceedings was to get possession of the office. Short work was
made of the Lieutenant-Governor's case; and State Senator John M.
Stone, the Democratic President pro tem. of the State Senate, was duly
sworn in and installed as the acting Governor of the State. Thus
terminated a long series of questionable acts, the inauguration of which
had no other purpose than to secure the ascendency of one political
party over another in the administration of the government of the State.
The sanguinary revolution in the State of Mississippi in 1875 was
claimed to be in the interest of good administration and honest
government; it was an attempt to wrest the State from the control of
dishonest men,--negroes, carpet baggers, and scalawags,--and place it in
control of intelligent, pure, and honest white men. With that end in
view, Geo. M. Buchanan, a brave and gallant ex-Confederate soldier, was,
through questionable and indefensible methods, defeated for the office
of State Treasurer, and Wm. L. Hemmingway was declared elected. Yet when
the change took place it was found that every dollar of the public money
was accounted for. During the whole period of Republican administration
not a dollar had been misappropriated, nor had there been a single
defalcation, although millions of dollars had passed through the hands
of the fiscal agents of the State and of the different counties.
How was it with the new reform administration? Treasurer Hemmingway had
been in office only a comparatively short while when the startling
information was given out that he was a defaulter to the amount of
$315,612.19. William L. Hemmingway a defaulter! Could such a thing be
possible? Yes, it was an admitted and undisputed fact.
Mr. Hemmingway had been quite prominent in the politics of the State;
but those who knew the man, and I was one of those, had every reason to
believe that he was an honest man, and that he was the personification
of integrity. He was neither a speculator nor a gambler. Even after the
defalcation was made known there was nothing to indicate that any part
of the money had been appropriated to his own use. Yet the money had
mysteriously disappeared. Where was it? Who had it? These were questions
the people of the State desired to have answered, but they have never
yet been answered and, it is safe to say, they never will be. Hemmingway
no doubt could and can answer those questions, but he has not done so
and the probabilities are that he never will. He evidently believed that
to turn State's evidence would render him more culpable than to be
guilty of the act which he had allowed to be committed. He might have
been forced to make a confession, or at least been compelled to give the
prosecution a clue to the real criminal or criminals if the prosecution
had been in charge of persons who could not be suspected of being the
political beneficiaries of the methods by which it was possible for him
to be placed in charge of the office. It was hardly reasonable to expect
such men to make very much of an effort to secure a confession. In fact,
it seems to have been a relief to them to have the accused take the
position that he alone was the responsible party and that he was willing
to bear all the blame and assume all the consequences that would result
from the act. The names, therefore, of those who were the beneficiaries
of this remarkable defalcation will, no doubt, remain a secret in the
bosom of William L. Hemmingway, and will be buried with him in his
grave.
Hemmingway was tried, convicted, sentenced and served a term in the
State Prison; all of which he calmly endured rather than give the name
of any person having connection with that unfortunate affair. All the
satisfaction that the public can get with reference to it,--other than
the punishment to which Hemmingway was subjected,--is to indulge in
conjectures about it. One conjecture, and the most reasonable and
plausible one, is that if Hemmingway had made a full confession it might
have involved not only some men who were prominent and influential, but
perhaps the Democratic State organization as well. For it was a
well-known fact that in 1875 nearly every Democratic club in the State
was converted into an armed military company. To fully organize, equip,
and arm such a large body of men required an outlay of a large sum of
money. The money was evidently furnished by some persons or through some
organization. Those who raised the money, or who caused it to be raised,
no doubt had an eye to the main chance. A patriotic desire to have the
State redeemed (?) was not with them the actuating motive. When the
redemption (?) of the State was an accomplished fact they, no doubt,
felt that they were entitled to share in the fruits of that redemption.
Their idea evidently was that the State should be made to pay for its
own salvation and redemption, but the only way in which this could be
done was to have the people's money in the State treasury appropriated
for that purpose otherwise than by legislative enactment. This, as I
have already stated, is only a conjecture, but, under the circumstances,
it is the most reasonable and plausible one that can be imagined.
The case of Treasurer Hemmingway is conclusive evidence that in point of
efficiency, honesty and official integrity the Democratic party had no
advantage over the party that was placed in power chiefly through the
votes of colored men. What was true of Mississippi in this respect was
also true,--in a measure, at least,--of the other reconstructed States.
CHAPTER XVII
THE HAYES-TILDEN CONTEST. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION
Although the action of the returning boards in South Carolina,
Louisiana, and Florida, gave Mr. Hayes a majority of one vote in the
Electoral College, the Democrats, who were largely in the majority in
the National House of Representatives, were evidently not willing to
acquiesce in the declared result,--claiming that Mr. Tilden had been
fairly elected and that he ought to be inaugurated.
Hon. Henry Watterson, of Kentucky,--who was at that time a member of the
House,--delivered a fiery speech in which he declared that a hundred
thousand armed men would march to Washington to see that Mr. Tilden was
inaugurated. The situation for a while looked very grave. It seemed as
if there would be a dual government, Hayes and Tilden each claiming to
be the legally elected President. To prevent this was the problem then
before Congress and the American people. Conferences, composed of
influential men of both parties, were being frequently held in different
parts of the city.
The creation of an electoral commission to pass upon and decide the
disputed points involved was finally suggested, and was accepted by a
majority of both parties. The name of the originator of this suggestion
has never been made public; but it is believed by many that Senator
Edmunds, of Vermont, was the man, since he was the principal champion of
the measure in the Senate. Subsequent events appeared to indicate that
Hon. Wm. M. Evarts of New York, was also an influential party to the
scheme, if not the originator of it. At any rate, no one seemed to have
been sufficiently proud of it to lay claim to its paternity. It was
merely a temporary scheme, intended to tide over an unpleasant, and
perhaps dangerous, condition which existing remedies did not fully meet.
It was equivalent to disposing of the Presidency by a game of
chance,--for the composition of the proposed commission was,
politically, purely a matter of chance.
As finally agreed upon, the measure provided for a commission to be
composed of fifteen members,--five from the House, five from the Senate,
and five Justices of the Supreme Court. As the Democrats had a majority
in the House, it was agreed that they should have three, and the
Republicans two of the five members of that body. Since the Republicans
had a majority in the Senate it was agreed that they should have three,
and the Democrats two of the five members of that body. Of the five
justices of the Supreme Court, two were to be Republicans and two,
Democrats; the fifth Justice to be an independent,--or one who was as
near an independent as could be found on the bench of that Court.
When the bill creating this commission came before the House I spoke
against it, and voted against it, for two reasons. In the first place, I
believed it was a dangerous precedent to subject the Presidency of the
United States to such a game of chance as was contemplated by the bill
then under consideration. Either Hayes or Tilden had been elected, and
the result ought to be ascertained according to legal forms. In the
second place, I had a suspicion that it was the outgrowth of an
understanding or agreement which would result in the abandonment of
Southern Republicans by the National Administration.
Mr. Lamar, for instance, did not hesitate to declare that it was more
important that the South should have local self-government than that the
President should be a Democrat. In other words, what Southern Democrats
wanted was to be let alone,--was to have the National Administration
keep its hands off, and allow them to manage their own affairs in their
own way, even if that way should result in a virtual nullification, in
part at least, of the War Amendments to the Federal Constitution.
I had a suspicion that this concession had been granted upon condition
that the southern Democratic leaders in Congress would consent to the
creation of the proposed commission, and to the ratification of its
decision, whatever that decision might be. To such a bargain I did not
care to be even an innocent party. My suspicions were strengthened by
the fact that the principal opposition among Democrats to the creation
of the commission and to the ratification of its decision came from
northern Democrats. Southern Democrats, with a few notable exceptions,
not only favored the creation of the commission and the ratification of
its decision, but even the fiery Watterson was induced to hold his peace
and to give expression to his righteous indignation through the medium
of a silent vote. That my suspicions were well founded subsequents
events more than demonstrated. I took the position that Mr. Hayes had
been legally elected, at least according to the forms of law and in the
manner prescribed by the Constitution,--and that he should, therefore,
be duly inaugurated even if it should be necessary for President Grant,
as Commander-in-chief of the Army, to use the military force of the
Government for that purpose. I contended that, having been thus legally
elected, Hayes should not be subjected to the chance of losing his title
to the office and that the incoming President should not be bound by
any ante-inauguration pledges, which, in the opinion of some, would have
a tendency to cast a cloud upon his title to the office. But the bill
was passed and the commission was duly appointed.
At this point the game of chance turned in favor of the Republicans. It
was generally understood that Justice David Davis, of Illinois, would be
the fifth Justice to be placed on the commission. He was said to be an
Independent,--the only member of the Supreme Court that could be thus
classed politically. But, in point of fact, he was more of a Democrat
than an Independent. Had he been made a member of the commission it is
more than probable that Mr. Tilden, and not Mr. Hayes, would have been
made President. The Legislature of Illinois was at that time engaged in
an effort to elect a United States Senator. The Legislature was composed
of about an equal number of Republicans and Democrats,--three
Independents holding the balance of power. The Independents at length
presented the name of Justice David Davis as their choice for Senator.
In order to make sure of the defeat of a Republican, the Democrats
joined the Independents in the support of Justice Davis, which resulted
in his election. This took place only a few days before the time
appointed for the selection of the commissioners.
As soon as it was announced that Justice Davis had been elected to the
Senate the Republican leaders in Congress insisted that he was no
longer eligible to a seat on the Electoral Commission. This was at first
strongly combated by the Democrats, who contended that the Justice was
only a Senator-elect, and that he did not cease to be a member of the
Court until he tendered his resignation as such; this he was neither
required nor expected to do until shortly before the beginning of his
term as a Senator. But the Republicans pressed their objections so
strongly that the Democrats were induced to yield the point, and Justice
Bradley was selected as the fifth Justice. Next to Davis, Bradley came
as near being an Independent as any member of the Court. Although he had
been appointed as a Republican by President Grant,--as had Justice Davis
by President Lincoln,--yet he had rendered several decisions which gave
the Democrats hope that he might give the deciding vote in their favor
and thus make Mr. Tilden President. In this they were disappointed; for
it turned out that the substitution of Bradley for Davis made Hayes
President of the United States. It would, perhaps, be unfair to say that
the decisions of the commission were rendered regardless of the
evidence, the law, and the arguments, yet it so happened that every
important point was decided by a strict party vote,--eight to seven.
In this connection it will not be out of place to refer to a scene that
was created on the Democratic side of the House by Hon. Ben. Hill, of
Georgia. Mr. Hill entered the House one afternoon, having just returned
from the Supreme Court Chamber, where the commission was in session. He
remarked to one of his colleagues in a low tone that he had just
returned from where the sessions of the commission were being held, and
that while there the important and valuable information had been
imparted to him that on a most vital point the Democrats could with
absolute certainty depend upon the vote of Mr. Justice Bradley.
"Can that be possible?" exclaimed his excited and highly elated
colleague.
"Yes," replied Mr. Hill, "there can be no doubt about it. I know whereof
I speak. It came to me through a source that cannot be questioned."
"Then wait until I can call several of our friends," replied his
colleague, "I want them to hear the good news at the same time it is
heard by me, so that we can rejoice together."
Mr. Hill was soon surrounded by an eager, excited, and interested group
of anxious Democratic members. "We are now ready," said his delighted
colleague, whose face was covered with a smile of satisfaction, "to hear
the good news."
"Well," replied Mr. Hill, whose manner was grave and whose countenance
gave every evidence of deep emotion, "whenever a motion to adjourn is
made by a Democratic member of the commission we can safely depend upon
the vote of Mr. Justice Bradley being cast in the affirmative."
The heads of the anxious group immediately fell in deep disappointment
and despair. But, of course, they did not fail to see the irony of Mr.
Hill's remark. It did transpire that whenever a motion to adjourn was
made by a Democratic member of the commission it was usually carried by
a vote of eight to seven,--Mr. Justice Bradley voting in the affirmative
with the Democrats. On no other question, however, could they depend on
his vote.
The decision of the Electoral Commission was finally rendered in favor
of Mr. Hayes by a strict party vote,--eight to seven. Strong and bitter
opposition to the approval of the decision was made in the House by
quite a number of northern Democrats, but the majority of southern
Democrats, aided by such northern Democrats as represented districts
having large commercial interests,--interests that are at all times
willing to pay any price for peace,--accepted the decision, and Mr.
Hayes was allowed to be peacefully inaugurated.
CHAPTER XVIII
ATTITUDE OF THE HAYES ADMINISTRATION TOWARD THE SOUTH
The new administration had been in power only a short while before it
became apparent to southern Republicans that they had very little to
expect from this administration. It was generally understood that a
southern man would be made Postmaster General in the new cabinet, but it
was assumed, of course, by those, at least, who were not fully informed
about the secret deals and bargains that had been entered into as a
condition precedent to a peaceable inauguration of the new
administration,--that he would be a Republican.
Senator Alcorn, of my own State, Mississippi, who had just retired from
the Senate, had an ambition to occupy that position. I was one to whom
that fact was made known. I did not hesitate to use what little
influence I had to have that ambition gratified. I was so earnest and
persistent in pressing his claims and merits upon those who were known
to be close to the appointing power, that I succeeded in finding out
definitely and authoritatively the name of the man that had been agreed
upon and would, no doubt, be appointed to that position. Ex-Senator
Key, a Democrat from Tennessee, was the man. When I informed Senator
Alcorn of that fact the manifestation of surprise, disappointment, and
disgust with which he received it can better be imagined than described.
This was not due so much to the fact that some other one than himself
had been selected, but to the fact that the fortunate man was a Southern
Democrat. For the first time the Senator became convinced that southern
Republicans had been made the subjects of barter and trade in the
shuffle for the Presidency, and that the sacrifice of southern
Republicans was the price that had to be paid for the peaceable
inauguration of Mr. Hayes. This, in Senator Alcorn's opinion, meant that
the Republican party in the reconstructed States of the South was a
thing of the past. There was no hope for it in the future.
"It would have been far better," said the Senator, "not only for the
Republican party at the South but for the country at large, to have
allowed the Democrats to inaugurate Tilden, and to have taken charge of
the Government, than to have purchased Republican victory at such a
fearful cost. What inducement can a southern white man now have for
becoming a Republican? Under the present state of things he will be
hated at home, and despised abroad. He will be rejected by his old
friends and associates, and discountenanced by his new ones. He will
incur the odium, and merit the displeasure and censure of his former
friends, associates, and companions with no compensating advantages for
the sacrifices thus made."
The Senator spoke with deep feeling. He could see that his efforts to
build up a strong Republican party at the South must necessarily fail
under such conditions, and that it was useless to make any further
effort in that direction. Under his influence and leadership very many
of the best and most influential white men in his state had identified
themselves with the Republican party. His efforts in that direction
would have been continued, in spite of the temporary defeat of the party
at the polls, however severe that defeat might have been, if those
efforts had been appreciated and appropriately recognized by the
national leaders of the organization. But when he saw that not only was
this not to be done, but that one of those who was known to be fully
identified with the political persecutors of southern Republicans was to
be recognized,--thus placing the stamp of approval upon their work by an
administration that was supposed to be Republican and therefore opposed
to such methods,--it was time for southern white men, who had been
acting with the Republican party and for those who may have such action
in contemplation, to stop and seriously consider the situation. It was
now in order for each one of them to ask himself the question: "Can I
afford to do this?"
The appointment of a southern Democrat to a seat in the Cabinet of a
Republican President, especially at that particular time, was a crushing
blow to southern Republicans. It was the straw that broke the camel's
back. Senator Alcorn was a man suitable in every way for the office of
Postmaster-General. He had a commanding presence, he was an eloquent
speaker, and an able debater,--by nature a leader and not a follower. He
had taken an active part in the politics of his state before and after
the War. After he identified himself with the Republican party he was
ambitious to be chiefly instrumental in building up a strong party in
his State and throughout the South which would not only recognize merit
in the colored people and accord absolute justice and fair play to them,
but which would include in its membership a large percentage, if not a
majority, of the best and most substantial white men of that section.
That he had made splendid progress along those lines cannot be denied.
The announced southern policy of the Hayes administration not only
completed the destruction of what had been thus accomplished, but it
made any further progress in that direction absolutely impossible. The
selection of ex-Senator Key was, however, not the only Cabinet
appointment which clearly indicated the southern policy of the
administration. There were two others,--those of William M. Evarts and
Carl Schurz. Those men had been prominent in their bitter opposition to
the southern policy of President Grant. Mr. Schurz had been one of the
leaders in the Greeley movement against President Grant and the
Republican party in 1872, while Mr. Evarts was later the principal
speaker at a public indignation meeting that was held at New York to
denounce the southern policy of the Grant administration. In fact, John
Sherman was the only one of the Cabinet ministers that had a positive
national standing, and even his brilliant star was somewhat marred on
account of the impression that, as one of the Hayes managers, he had
been a party to the deals and agreements that had been made and entered
into as a condition precedent to the peaceable induction of Mr. Hayes
into office. It was known, or at any rate believed, that Mr. Sherman's
appointment as Secretary of the Treasury was for the one specific
purpose of bringing about the resumption of specie payments. He was the
author of the act which fixed the date when specie payments should be
resumed. He had the reputation of being one of the ablest financiers the
country had produced. That he should be named to carry into effect the
act of which he was the author was to be expected. For the reasons above
stated, it was the one Cabinet appointment that met with general
approval.
It was soon seen, however, that the Cabinet was so constructed as to
make it harmonize with the southern policy of the administration. It was
not long before the announcement was officially made in prolix
sentences, of which Secretary Evarts was no doubt the author, that the
army could not and would not be used to uphold and sustain any State
Government in an effort to maintain its supremacy and enforce obedience
to its mandates. In other words, it was a public announcement of the
fact that if there should be an armed revolt in a State against the
lawful State Government which would be strong enough to seize and take
possession of that government, the National Government would refuse to
interfere, even though a request for assistance should be made by the
Chief Executive of the State in the manner and form prescribed by the
Constitution. I have never believed that this policy,--which was meant,
of course, for the South,--was in harmony with Mr. Hayes' personal
convictions; especially in view of his public utterances during the
progress of the campaign and immediately after the announcement had been
made that he had been defeated. But he no doubt asked himself the
question: "What can I do?" This is what he had been bound to do, by his
managers through the medium of an ante-inauguration pledge, which he
felt in honor bound to respect. Mr. Hayes was not a man of sufficient
force of character to disregard and repudiate such a pledge or bargain.
Had he been a Napoleon, or even an Andrew Jackson, he would have
declared that no man or set of men had any authority to make for him any
ante-inauguration pledge, promise, or bargain by which he would be bound
as chief magistrate of the country. To the contrary, he would have
openly and publicly declared:
"I am President, or I am not. That I am the legally elected President is
a recognized and undisputed fact, and, as such, I shall neither
recognize nor respect any pledge, promise or bargain which involves
dishonor on my part or acquiescence in the suspension, violation or
evasion of the Constitution or of any law made in pursuance thereof. As
President of the United States I have taken and subscribed to an oath by
which I am bound to uphold the Constitution of my country, and to see
that the laws are duly executed and enforced. That oath I am determined
to respect and honor. I shall not only do all in my power to see that
the Constitution and the laws of the land are obeyed and enforced,--both
in letter and in spirit,--but it is also my determination to see that
every American citizen is protected in the exercise and enjoyment of his
rights, as far as it may be in the power of the President to protect
him." Such a declaration, accompanied by an honest effort to carry the
same into effect, even if he had been unsuccessful, would have carried
the name of R.B. Hayes down in history as one of the greatest and most
brilliant statesmen our country had ever produced. But, he was not equal
to the occasion, and therefore failed to take advantage of such a golden
opportunity. On the contrary, he decided to live up to and carry out to
the very letter, every pledge, promise, agreement or bargain that had
been made in his behalf, which involved the dishonor of his own name and
the disgrace of his country. Packard, for Governor of Louisiana, and
Chamberlain, for Governor of South Carolina, were voted for at the same
time that the Hayes electors were voted for in their respective States.
Each of these candidates polled a much larger vote than that of the
Hayes electors. If, therefore, Mr. Hayes was legally or mortally
entitled to the electoral votes of those States, without which he could
not have been elected, those men were entitled to be recognized and
supported as Governor of their respective States. But it was a
well-known fact that without the support and backing of the National
Administration at that particular time, they could not maintain and
enforce their authority against the organization of the Democratic
party. The public announcement of the southern policy of the National
Administration put an effectual end to any further effort on the part
of either Packard or Chamberlain. The Administration not only deserted
and abandoned those two men and the party for which they had so bravely
and so gallantly stood, but it allowed the very men whose votes made Mr.
Hayes President to be harassed and persecuted for what they had done in
that direction. After Packard surrendered to the inevitable he was
tendered a position in the foreign service, which he accepted. When
Chamberlain was forced to abandon the hopeless struggle in South
Carolina, he moved to New York and engaged in the practice of law.
Politically he affiliated with the Democratic party until his death.
CHAPTER XIX
QUESTION OF THE VALIDITY OF SENATOR LAMAR'S ELECTION
Mr. Blaine had been elected to the United States Senate from Maine, his
term beginning March 4th, 1877. The term for which Mr. Lamar, of
Mississippi, had been elected, commenced at the same time. It was not
possible to have a Congressional investigation of the Mississippi
election of 1875 unless the same should be ordered by the Senate,--the
Republicans having a small majority in that body. Each House being the
sole judge of the elections and qualifications of its own members, the
Senate could, of course, have Mr. Lamar's credentials referred to the
Committee of Privileges and Elections, with instructions to make an
investigation of the methods used to carry the election. This committee
would ascertain and report whether or not there had been a legal and
valid election in that State, and, pending the investigation and report
by the committee and the disposition of the same by the Senate, the seat
to which Mr. Lamar had been elected would remain vacant. As the result
of a number of conferences between Republican Senators and
representative Mississippi Republicans, this course was decided upon as
the one to be pursued. But, in order to do this, the Senate must have
something upon which to base its contemplated action. It could not be
expected to take official notice of rumors or newspaper reports of what
had taken place. It was therefore decided that a memorial should be
drawn up and signed by a number of reputable and well-known citizens of
the State, making specific allegations with reference to that election,
and concluding with a request that a thorough investigation be made
before the Senator, chosen by the Legislature that had been brought into
existence by that election, could be admitted to the Senate.
In support of this contemplated action there had been a number of
precedents,--the recent case of Mr. Pinchback, of Louisiana, being one
of them. It fell to my lot to draw up the memorial. It was to be
presented to the Senate and championed in that body by Senator Morton,
of Indiana. The Republican majority in the Senate was small. The
Democrats, of course, would bitterly oppose the Morton motion. To make
sure of its adoption the affirmative vote of nearly every Republican
Senator was necessary. At any rate there could be no serious defection
in the Republican ranks, otherwise the Morton proposition could not
prevail. That anyone on the Republican side would oppose it was not
anticipated, for every one that had been approached expressed his
intention of supporting it. No one of the newly elected Senators had
been approached. It was not deemed necessary. It was not anticipated
that any one of them would do otherwise than support the program that
had been agreed upon by the older members of the Senate. Senator Morton
was to submit the memorial and make the motion when the name of Mr.
Lamar was called to take the oath of office.
The names of the States were called in alphabetical order, about three
being called at a time. Maine was reached before Mississippi, and Mr.
Blaine was duly sworn in as a Senator from that State. No one expected
that he would do otherwise than support the program that had been agreed
upon, but, contrary to expectations, as soon as Mississippi was called
Mr. Blaine was on his feet, demanding recognition. Of course he was
recognized by the chair. He made a motion that Mr. Lamar be sworn in
_prima facie_ as the Senator from Mississippi. His contention was that,
since his credentials were regular, the Senator-elect should be sworn
in; and if there should be any question about the legality of the
election it could be made the subject of a subsequent investigation.
This unexpected action on the part of Mr. Blaine took everyone by
surprise, with the possible exception of Mr. Lamar, who, no doubt, was
well aware of what was in contemplation. It produced consternation and
caused a panic among the Republican leaders in the Senate. Hurried and
excited conferences were being held while the subject was being debated.
For the seriousness of the situation was recognized. Mr. Blaine's
defection meant the defeat of the Morton motion should it be made, and
the adoption of the Blaine motion by the solid vote of the Democrats, to
which would be added a small minority of the Republicans. This division
in the ranks of the party at the beginning of the Hayes administration
had to be avoided if possible. That Mr. Blaine should recede from his
position was, of course, out of the question. Nothing, therefore,
remained to be done but for Senator Morton to refrain from making his
motion; for a hurried canvass of the Senate had revealed the fact that
the motion, if made and brought to a vote, would be defeated, and the
effect of such a defeat would be worse than if the motion had not been
made. So the Blaine motion was allowed to go by default, and Mr. Lamar
was duly sworn in as a Senator from Mississippi. Of course it was well
known at the time by many,--Mr. Blaine among the number,--that this
ended the controversy and that no subsequent investigation would be
made. That Mr. Blaine was sadly and seriously disappointed at the
result of his action in this case, as well as in his action in defeating
the Federal Elections Bill, will be made clear in subsequent chapters.
CHAPTER XX
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION OF 1880. NOMINATION OF THE COMPROMISE
CANDIDATE, GARFIELD
Since the indications were that the Democrats would be successful in the
Congressional elections of 1878, the election in the "shoe-string
district" that year was allowed to go by default.
In 1880, the year of the Presidential election, I decided that I would
again measure arms with Chalmers for Representative in Congress from
that district. It was practically a well-settled fact that there was to
be a bitter fight for the Republican Presidential nomination that year.
There were three prominent candidates in the field for the
nomination,--James G. Blaine, U.S. Grant, and John Sherman. Grant was
especially strong with southern Republicans, while Blaine had very
little support in that section. Sherman was well thought of on account
of the splendid record he had made as a member of the United States
Senate, and, in addition to that, he had the influence and the support
of the National Administration, of which he was a member,--being at that
time Secretary of the Treasury.
In the State of Mississippi Bruce, Hill and I,--the three leading
colored men,--had formed an offensive and defensive alliance. Bruce was
United States Senator, which position he had secured largely through the
influence and active support of myself and Hill,--of Hill especially,
since he was on the ground at the time of the election, which enabled
him to take personal charge of the campaign before the Legislature in
the interest of Mr. Bruce.
Hill had been elected Secretary of State on the ticket with Ames in 1873
and, after the expiration of his term, was, through the influence and
support of Bruce and myself, made Collector of Internal Revenue for the
State of Mississippi. The office of Secretary of State, to which he was
elected in 1873, was one that the Democrats did not take possession of
in 1876. Unlike the Governor and Lieutenant-Governor, the removal of the
incumbent was not necessary to put that party in possession of the State
Government.
I, Lynch, was at that time a member of the National House of
Representatives, which position I was able to retain for a long time
with the active assistance and support of Bruce and Hill,--especially of
Bruce.
That we three should work in perfect political harmony was both natural
and proper, since, in doing so, we protected our own interests and
secured for ourselves, and for our friends and supporters, appropriate
official recognition. At nearly every State convention either Bruce or I
was made chairman of the convention, with Hill as floor manager.
The State committee was organized and controlled in the same way.
Through that thorough and effective organization I was Chairman of the
Republican State Committee from 1881 to 1892, and I could have retained
it longer had I consented to serve; notwithstanding the dissolution of
the combination, which took place about that time, as will be shown and
explained later.
There was a faction in the party that was opposed to the leadership of
these three influential colored men, but it was never strong enough to
organize or control a State Convention as long as we three worked in
union. While this union had the effect of keeping us at the front as
recognized leaders of the party it could not be said it was detrimental
to the party organization, for the reason that under that leadership the
organization never failed to support the men that the party believed to
be the strongest. In other words, while we used the party machinery to
prevent our own political extinction we never allowed our own ambitions
to conflict with what was believed by other influential members of the
party to be for the best interest of the organization.
It looked for a while as if the State Convention of 1880 would result
in a dissolution of this combination which had so successfully
controlled the party organization in the State so many years. Bruce and
Hill were supporters of Secretary Sherman for the Republican
Presidential nomination, while I was favorable to the candidacy of
ex-President Grant. That Grant was the choice of a large majority of the
Republicans of the State could not be truthfully denied. Mr. Bruce was
the Republican United States Senator in harmony with the administration.
Mr. Hill was an office-holder under that administration, and Secretary
Sherman was believed to be the administration candidate for the
nomination.
As soon as the fact was developed that Bruce and Hill were for Sherman
and that I was for Grant, the faction which had always opposed and
fought the leadership of the Bruce-Lynch-Hill combination took up the
fight for Grant, with the determination to take advantage of Grant's
strength and popularity in order to secure control of the party
machinery. It was this that prevented at that time a dissolution of the
Bruce-Hill-Lynch combination. The situation with which we were
confronted made it necessary for the three to come together and, in a
spirit of concession, agree upon a common line of action. Upon the
suggestion of Mr. Bruce a conference soon took place at which I agreed
that, since it was my purpose to be a candidate for the Congressional
nomination in the Sixth or "shoe-string district," I would not be a
candidate for delegate to the National Convention, but that I would
support Bruce and Hill as delegates from the State at large, with the
understanding that, if at any time Sherman's name should be withdrawn
and Grant's nomination were possible, they should support Grant. It was
further agreed that I should support the Bruce-Lynch-Hill combination in
the fight for the organization of the State Convention, but that I
should be at liberty to use my influence for the election of Grant men
as delegates other than Bruce and Hill.
At the conclusion of this conference I made public announcement of the
fact that, since it was my purpose to become a candidate for Congress in
the Sixth or "shoe-string district," I would not be a candidate for
delegate to the National Convention but would give my support to Bruce
and Hill, for two of the four places on the delegation from the State at
large, with the understanding that the delegation, if controlled by
them, would not be hostile to Grant. I had reasons to know that Mr.
Bruce, in consequence of his cordial relations with Senator
Conkling,--the national leader of the Grant forces,--was not unfriendly
to Grant, and that he would use his influence to prevent the delegation
from going into any combination for the sole purpose of defeating the
nomination of Grant. In other words, Grant was Brace's second choice for
the nomination.
The fight for the delegation was waged with a good deal of heat and
bitterness. The canvass had not progressed very far before it was
developed that Grant was much stronger than the faction by which he was
being supported. The fight was so bitter, and the delegates to the State
Convention were so evenly divided, that the result was the election of a
compromise delegation which was about evenly divided between Grant and
Sherman. Bruce and Hill were among those that were elected.
The National Convention, which was held in Chicago in June of that year,
was one of the most exciting and interesting in the history of the
party. It was that convention that abolished what was known as "the unit
rule." Up to that time the right of a State Convention to elect all the
delegates to which the State was entitled,--district as well as
State,--and to instruct them as a body had never before been questioned.
New York, as well as other States, had instructed the delegates to cast
the entire vote of the State for Grant. This was the unit rule. It is a
rule which even now is enforced in National Conventions of the
Democratic party. It was through the enforcement of this rule that Mr.
Cleveland was renominated, when he was so bitterly opposed by a portion
of the delegation from his own State,--especially the Tammany
delegates,--that General Bragg was moved to make the celebrated
declaration that he "loved Mr. Cleveland on account of the enemies he
had made." Notwithstanding the fact that those delegates were strongly
opposed to Mr. Cleveland, and though they protested against having their
votes recorded for him, they were so recorded through the application
and enforcement of the unit rule. It was the enforcement of this rule
upon which Mr. Conkling insisted in the National Republican Convention
of 1880. About twenty of the New York district delegates, under the
leadership of Judge W.H. Robertson, refused to be governed by the
instructions of the State Convention. Their contention was that the
State Convention had no right to bind by instructions any delegates
except the four from the State at large. After a lengthy and heated
debate the convention finally sustained this contention, and since that
time the unit rule has not been recognized in a National Republican
Convention.
This action, no doubt, resulted in the defeat of General Grant for the
nomination; for it was a well-known fact that his nomination was
possible only through the enforcement of the unit rule. His friends and
supporters, however, under the leadership of Senator Conkling, made a
strong and desperate fight with the hope that the tide might ultimately
turn in their favor, but with the intention, in any event, of
preventing if possible the nomination of Mr. Blaine. General Grant's
name was placed before the Convention by Senator Conkling in one of his
most eloquent and masterly efforts.
"The man whose name I shall place in nomination," he said, "does not
hail from any particular State; he hails from the United States. It is
not necessary to nominate a man that can carry Michigan. Any Republican
can carry Michigan. You should nominate a man that can carry New York.
That man is U.S. Grant."
Mr. Blaine's name was placed in nomination by a delegate from Michigan
by the name of Joy. His effort did not come up to public expectation.
The eloquent speech of Senator Frye, of Maine, who seconded the
nomination, made up in part for the public disappointment in Mr. Joy's
effort. The name of Secretary John Sherman was placed before the
Convention in one of General Garfield's most powerful and convincing
efforts. It is safe to say that the speech delivered by General Garfield
on that occasion made him the nominee of that convention. After drawing
an eloquent and vivid picture of the kind of man that should be made
President,--with the intention of naming John Sherman as the man thus
described,--he asked in a tone of voice that was pitched in a high key:
"Who is that man?"
The response came from different parts of the hall, "Garfield."
And sure enough it was Garfield. After a number of fruitless ballots it
became apparent that neither of the three leading candidates could
possibly be nominated. Very few, if any, of the Grant men would at any
time go to either Blaine or Sherman. Very few, if any, of the Sherman
men would go to Blaine, while Blaine men could not in any considerable
numbers, be induced to go either to Grant or Sherman. While a number of
Sherman men would have supported Grant in preference to Blaine, there
were not enough of them, even with the Grant men, to constitute a
majority. When Garfield's name was suggested as a compromise candidate
he was found to be acceptable to both the Blaine and the Sherman men as
well as to some of the Grant men, who had abandoned all hope of Grant's
nomination. The result was that Garfield was finally made the unanimous
choice of the convention. The New York delegation, being allowed to name
the man for Vice-President, nominated Chester A. Arthur, of that State.
Although General Garfield was nominated as a compromise candidate his
election was by no means a foregone conclusion. The Democrats had
nominated a strong and popular man, General W.S. Hancock, one of the
most brilliant and successful generals in the Union Army. Associated on
the ticket with him was a popular Indiana Democrat, William H. English.
It looked for a while as if Democratic success were reasonably certain,
especially after the September State and Congressional elections in the
State of Maine, the result of which was virtually a Democratic victory.
What was known as the celebrated Mentor Conference then took place.
Mentor was the home of General Garfield. The conference consisted of
General Garfield, General Grant, and Senator Conkling. Who was
instrumental in bringing that conference into existence perhaps will
never be known, and what was actually said and done on that occasion
will, no doubt, remain a mystery. But it resulted in bringing the
Grant-Conkling wing of the party,--which up to that time had been
lukewarm and indifferent,--into the active and aggressive support of the
ticket. Senator Conkling immediately took the stump and made a brilliant
and successful campaign, not only in New York but also in the other
close and doubtful States. The result was that Garfield carried New York
by a majority of about twenty thousand and was elected. Without New York
he would have been defeated; for the South this time was unquestionably
solid in its support of the Democratic ticket; at least, according to
the forms of law. It was not necessary to resort to the questionable
expedient of an electoral commission to determine the result of that
election. It is safe to say that, but for the active support given the
ticket in that campaign by General Grant and Senator Conkling, New York
would have been lost to the party and Garfield would have been defeated.
With the election of Garfield the National House of Representatives was
also Republican. The majority was small, but it was large enough to
enable the party to organize the House. The Garfield administration
started out under very favorable auspices. How it ended will be told in
another chapter.
CHAPTER XXI
STORY OF THE MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN GARFIELD AND CONKLING
The Garfield Administration, as I have said, started out under most
favorable auspices. Mr. Conkling took an active part in the Senate as a
champion and spokesman of the administration. He seemed to have taken it
for granted, that,--although his bitter enemy, Mr. Blaine, was Secretary
of State,--his own influence with the administration would be potential.
In conversation with his personal friends he insisted that this was a
part of the agreement that had been entered into at the famous Mentor
Conference, about which so much had been said and published. If it were
true that Mr. Conkling's control of the Federal patronage in New York in
the event of Republican success was a part of that agreement, it
transpired that Mr. Blaine had sufficient influence with the President
to bring about its repudiation.
It is a fact well known that the President was anxious to avoid a break
with Senator Conkling. Judge W.H. Robertson, who was a candidate for the
Collectorship of the port of New York was strongly supported by Mr.
Blaine. Judge Robertson had been one of the influential leaders of the
Blaine movement in New York. It was he who had disregarded the action of
the State Convention in instructing the delegates to cast the vote of
the State as a unit for General Grant. In bolting the action of the
State Convention Judge Robertson carried about nineteen other delegates
with him over to Mr. Blaine. Therefore Mr. Blaine insisted upon the
appointment of Judge Robertson to the Collectorship of the port at New
York. Senator Conkling would not consent under any circumstances to this
appointment. Mr. Blaine, it appears, succeeded in convincing the
President that, but for Judge Robertson's action, his, Garfield's,
nomination would have been impossible and that consequently it would be
base ingratitude not to appoint Robertson to the position for which he
was an applicant. Mr. Blaine contended that the administration would not
only be guilty of ingratitude should it refuse to appoint his candidate,
but that it would thereby allow itself to be the medium through which
this man was to be punished for his action in making the existence of
the administration possible.
"Can you, Mr. President, afford to do such a thing as this?" asked Mr.
Blaine.
To which the President gave a negative answer. Perhaps it did not occur
to Mr. Blaine at that time that, while the action of Judge Robertson
may have made the nomination of Mr. Garfield possible, the subsequent
action of Senator Conkling made his election possible. But,
notwithstanding this, the President decided that Judge Robertson should
have the office for which he was an applicant.
As previously stated, however, the President was anxious to avoid a
break with Senator Conkling. To get the Senator to consent to the
appointment of Judge Robertson was the task the President had before
him. With that end in view the President invited Mr. Conkling to a
private conference, at which he expressed a willingness to allow the New
York Senator to name every important Federal officer in New York except
the Collector of the Port, if he would consent to the appointment of
Judge Robertson to that office. But the only concession Senator Conkling
was willing to make was to give his consent to the appointment of Judge
Robertson to any position in the foreign service. This was not
satisfactory, hence the conference was a failure. The President was thus
placed in a very disagreeable dilemma, being thus forced, very much
against his inclination, to take a decided stand in a very unpleasant
controversy. He was thus forced to choose between Mr. Blaine, his own
Secretary of State, on one side, and Senator Conkling on the other. To
one he felt that he was indebted for his nomination. To the other he
believed that his election was largely due. It was asserted by some who
were in a position to know that, if the President had taken sides with
Mr. Conkling, Mr. Blaine would have immediately tendered his
resignation, and thus would have severed his official connection with
the administration. While no intimation of this was made known to the
President, yet he no doubt believed, in consequence of the deep and
intense interest Mr. Blaine had shown in the matter, that such action on
his part, in the event of an adverse decision, was more than probable.
When the President saw that there was no escape,--that he was obliged to
take a decided stand one way or the other,--he decided to sustain the
contention of his Secretary of State. Consequently, after the fruitless
conference between the President and Senator Conkling, the name of Judge
Robertson for Collector of the port at New York, was sent to the Senate.
Senator Conkling, joined by his colleague, Senator Platt, at first made
an effort to have the nomination rejected, but the other Republican
Senators were not willing to place themselves in open opposition to the
administration. When the fact was developed that the nomination would be
confirmed, Senators Conkling and Platt immediately tendered their
resignations.
This in my opinion was a grave blunder on their part, as subsequent
events more than proved. They had before them the example of Senator
Sumner, by which they should have profited. Senator Sumner was greatly
humiliated, when, through the influence of the administration, he was
supplanted by Senator Cameron as Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations on account of a misunderstanding with President Grant,
growing out of the effort on the part of the administration to bring
about the annexation of Santo Domingo, to which Senator Sumner was
bitterly opposed. Yet he did not,--because he was thus, as he felt,
unjustly humiliated,--resign his seat in the Senate. He realized that
while he was commissioned to speak for his own State, his great power
and immense influence were not confined solely to that particular State.
He appreciated the fact that when he spoke and voted as a Senator, he
did so, not merely as a Senator from the State of Massachusetts, but as
a Senator of the United States. He belonged to no one State, but to the
United States. He had,--on account of his great intellect, power,
influence, and ability,--long since ceased to be the spokesman and
representative of any particular State or section; he was a
representative of his country--recognized as such throughout the
civilized world. Knowing these things to be true Sumner did not feel
that he should deprive the people of his valuable services simply
because he was not in harmony with the administration upon some one
matter, however important that matter might be. In this Senator Sumner
was unquestionably right.
What, then, was true of Senator Sumner was equally true of Senators
Conkling and Platt in their misunderstanding with President Garfield
about the Collectorship of the port of New York.
Mr. Conkling was one of the greatest men our country had ever produced.
He was a man of much influence and great power. He was not only an
intellectual giant, but he was a man of commanding presence and
attractive personality. As an orator he had few equals and no superiors.
As in the case of Senator Sumner he spoke and voted as a Senator not
merely for his State, but for his country; not for any particular
section or locality, but for the United States. He was too great a man,
and his services were too important and valuable for his country to be
deprived of them merely on account of a misunderstanding between the
President and himself about Federal patronage in New York. He and his
colleague should have retained their seats in the Senate and trusted to
the judgment of their fellow-citizens for a vindication of their course
and action in that as in other matters. They not only made a mistake in
resigning their seats in the Senate, but consummated it when they went
before the Legislature of their State, which was then in session, and
asked for a vindication through the medium of reëlection. This was
subjecting their friends to a test to which they were not willing to
submit. Their friends, both in the Legislature and out of it, were loyal
to them, and this loyalty would have been demonstrated at the proper
time and in the right way had the two Senators remained in a position
which would have enabled their adherents to do so without serious injury
to the party organization. But when these men were asked, as the price
of their loyalty, to place the party organization in the State in open
opposition to the National Administration for no other reason than a
misunderstanding about Federal patronage in the city of New York, they
did not think that the controversy was worth the price; hence the
request was denied. The result was the defeat of Conkling and Platt, and
the election of two Administration Republicans, Warner Miller and E.G.
Lapham.
This foolhardy act of Conkling's had the unfortunate effect of
eliminating him from public life, at least so far as an active
participation in public affairs was concerned. But this was not true of
Mr. Platt. He was determined to come to the front again, and in this he
was successful. At the very next National Convention (1884) he turned up
as one of the Blaine delegates from New York, and was one of the
speakers that seconded Mr. Blaine's nomination. That was something Mr.
Conkling never could have been induced to do. He was proud, haughty and
dictatorial. He would never forget a friend, nor forgive an enemy. To
his friends he was loyal and true. To his enemies he was bitter and
unrelenting. For his friends he could not do too much. From his enemies
he would ask no quarter and would give none. More than one man of
national reputation has been made to feel his power, and suffer the
consequences resulting from his ill-will and displeasure. But for the
unfriendliness of Mr. Conkling, Mr. Blaine no doubt would have attained
the acme of his ambition in reaching the Presidency of the United
States. It was Mr. Blaine's misfortune to have made an enemy of the one
man who, by a stroke of destiny, was so situated as to make it possible
for him to prevent the realization of Mr. Blaine's life ambition. It was
due more to Mr. Conkling than to any other one man that Mr. Blaine was
defeated for the Republican Presidential nomination in 1876,--the year
in which he could have been elected had he been nominated.
Mr. Conkling was too much of a party man to support the Democratic
ticket under any circumstances, hence, in 1884, when Mr. Blaine was at
length nominated for the Presidency, Mr. Conkling gave the ticket the
benefit of his silence. That silence proved to be fatal. In consequence
of Mr. Conkling's silence and apparent indifference in 1884, Mr. Blaine
lost New York, the pivotal State, and was defeated by Mr. Cleveland for
the Presidency. The falling off in the Republican vote in Mr. Conkling's
home county alone caused the loss of the State and of the Presidency of
the United States to the Republican party.
The quarrel between Blaine and Conkling originated when both of them
were members of the House of Representatives. In a controversy that took
place between them on the floor of the House Mr. Blaine referred to Mr.
Conkling as the member from New York with the "turkey gobbler strut."
That remark made the two men enemies for life. That remark wounded Mr.
Conkling's pride; and he could never be induced to forgive the one who
had so hurt him.
As a United States Senator Conkling was both felt and feared. No Senator
ever desired to get into a controversy with him, because he was not only
a speaker of great power and eloquence, but as a debater he was cutting
and scathing in his irony. Senator Lamar, of Mississippi, who as an
eloquent orator compared favorably with the best on both sides of the
Chamber, had the misfortune to get into a controversy on one occasion
with the distinguished New York Senator. In repelling an accusation that
the Senator from Mississippi had made against him, Mr. Conkling said:
"If it were not that this is the United States Senate I would
characterize the member from Mississippi as a coward and a
prevaricator."
If those words had been uttered by any other Senator than Roscoe
Conkling it is more than probable that he would have been severely
reprimanded; no other Senator, however, cared to incur Conkling's
displeasure by becoming the author of a resolution for that purpose.
Senator John J. Ingalls, of Kansas, was the only other Senator that ever
came near holding a similar position; for, while he was by no means the
equal of Conkling, he was both eloquent and sarcastic. For that reason
Senators were not anxious to get into a controversy with him. On one
occasion it seemed that he came near getting into a dispute with Senator
Manderson, of Nebraska. While the Senator from Nebraska was delivering a
speech, he made a remark to which the Senator from Kansas took
exceptions. When the Kansas Senator arose,--flushed with anger, and
laboring under intense excitement,--to correct what he declared in words
that were more forcible than elegant, to be a misstatement of his
position, the Senator from Nebraska did not hesitate for a moment to
accept the correction, remarking by way of explanation and apology that
he had not distinctly heard the remark the Senator from Kansas had made,
and to which he was alluding when interrupted.
"Then," retorted the Senator from Kansas, "that is your misfortune."
"I admit," the Senator from Nebraska quickly replied, "that it is always
a misfortune not to hear the Senator from Kansas."
The unfortunate controversy between President Garfield and Senator
Conkling resulted in a national calamity. The bitterness that grew out
of it had the effect of bringing a crank on the scene of action. Early
in July, 1881,--when the President, in company with Mr. Blaine, was
leaving Washington for his summer vacation,--this cowardly crank, who
had waited at the railroad station for the arrival of the distinguished
party, fired the fatal shot which a few months later terminated the
earthly career of a President who was beloved by his countrymen without
regard to party or section.
Whatever may have been the merits of this unfortunate controversy, it
resulted in the political death of one and the physical death of the
other; thus depriving the country of the valuable services of two of the
greatest and most intellectual men that our country had ever produced.
When the President died I was at my home, Natchez, Mississippi, where a
memorial meeting was held in honor of his memory, participated in by
both races and both parties. I had the honor of being one of the
speakers on that occasion. That part of my remarks which seemed to
attract most attention and made the deepest impression was the
declaration that it was my good fortune, as a member of the National
House of Representatives, to sit within the sound of his eloquent voice
on a certain memorable occasion when he declared that there could never
be a permanent peace and union between the North and the South until the
South would admit that, in the controversy that brought on the War the
North was right and the South was wrong. Notwithstanding that
declaration, in which he was unquestionably right, I ventured the
opinion that, had he been spared to serve out the term for which he had
been elected, those who had voted for him would have been proud of the
fact that they had done so, while those who had voted against him would
have had no occasion to regret that he had been elected.
Upon the death of President Garfield Vice-President Arthur,--who had
been named for that office by Mr. Conkling,--became President; but he,
too, soon incurred the displeasure of Mr. Conkling. Mr. Conkling had
occasion to make a request of the President which the latter could not
see his way clear to grant. For this Mr. Conkling never forgave him. The
President tried hard afterwards to regain Mr. Conkling's friendship, but
in vain. He even went so far, it is said, as to tender Mr. Conkling a
seat on the bench of the Supreme Court; but the tender was
contemptuously declined.
President Arthur aspired to succeed himself as President. As a whole he
gave the country a splendid administration, for which he merited a
renomination and election as his own successor. While there was a strong
and well-organized effort to secure for him a renomination, the
probabilities are that the attitude of Mr. Conkling towards him
contributed largely to his defeat; although the ex-Senator took no
active part in the contest. But, as in the case of Mr. Blaine, his
silence, no doubt, was fatal to Mr. Arthur's renomination.
CHAPTER XXII
THE NATIONAL CAMPAIGN OF 1884
When the Forty-seventh Congress expired March 4th, 1883, I returned to
my home at Natchez, Mississippi. 1884 was the year of the Presidential
election. Early in the year it was made clear that there was to be a
bitter fight for the Presidential nomination.
President Arthur was a candidate to succeed himself; but Mr. Blaine, it
was conceded, would be the leading candidate before the Convention.
Senator John Sherman was also a candidate. It was generally believed
that Senator Edmunds of Vermont would get a majority of the delegates
from the New England States. Mr. Blaine was weaker in his own section,
New England, than in any other part of the country except the South. The
South, however, had somewhat relented in its opposition to him, as
previously stated, in consequence of which he had a stronger support
from that section than in any of his previous contests for the
nomination; to this fact may be attributed his nomination by the
Convention. That support, it was believed, was due more to a deference
to public opinion at the North,--the section that must be depended upon
to elect the ticket,--than confidence in Mr. Blaine.
The delegation from my own State, Mississippi, was, with one exception,
solid in its support of President Arthur. The one exception was Hon.
H.C. Powers, one of the delegates from the first district.
Two active, aggressive, able and brilliant young men had just entered
the field of national politics, both of them having been elected
delegates to this convention. Those men were Theodore Roosevelt, of New
York, and H.C. Lodge, of Massachusetts. Both were vigorously opposed to
the nomination of Mr. Blaine. Roosevelt's election as a delegate from
New York was in the nature of a national surprise. Mr. Blaine was
believed to be very strong in that State. The public, therefore, was not
prepared for the announcement that Theodore Roosevelt,--an anti-Blaine
man,--had defeated Senator Warner Miller,--the able and popular leader
of the Blaine forces in that State,--as delegate to the National
Convention from the State at large. The Blaine leaders were brought to a
realization of the fact, that, in consequence of their unexpected defeat
in New York, it was absolutely necessary, in order to make sure of the
nomination of their candidate, to retain the support they had among the
Southern delegates.
With that end in view the National Committee, in which the Blaine men
had a majority, selected a Southern man, Hon. Powell Clayton, of
Arkansas, for temporary chairman of the Convention. The anti-Blaine
men,--under the leadership of Messrs. Roosevelt, Lodge, Hoar, Hanna,
Geo. William Curtis and others,--decided to select another Southern man
to run against Clayton. For that purpose a conference was
held;--composed of many of the active supporters of Arthur, Sherman, and
Edmunds,--to select the man to put up against Clayton.
I did not attend the conference. Senator Hoar suggested my name and
insisted that I was the man best fitted for the position. After a brief
discussion it was decided unanimously to select me. A committee was
appointed, of which ex-Governor Pinchback, of Louisiana, was chairman,
to wait on me and inform me of what had been done, and to insist upon my
acceptance of the distinguished honor which had thus been conferred upon
me. Another committee was appointed,--of which Hon. M.A. Hanna, of Ohio,
was chairman, to poll the Convention to find out the strength of the
movement. This committee subsequently reported that Clayton would be
defeated and Lynch elected by a majority of about thirty-five votes. For
two reasons I had some doubt about the propriety of allowing my name to
be thus used. First, I doubted the wisdom of the movement. It had been
the uniform custom to allow the National Committee to select the
temporary chairman of the Convention, and I was inclined to the opinion
that a departure from that custom might not be a wise step. Second, I
did not think it could possibly win. My opinion was that a number of
delegates that might otherwise vote for me could not be induced to vote
in favor of breaking what had been a custom since the organization of
the party.
I did not come to a definite decision until the morning of the day that
the Convention was to be organized. Just before that body was called to
order I decided to confer with Maj. William McKinley and Hon. M.A.
Hanna, of Ohio, and act upon their advice. McKinley was for Blaine and
Hanna was for Sherman, but my confidence in the two men was such that I
believed their advice would not be influenced by their personal
preference for the Presidential nomination. I did not know at that time
that Mr. Hanna had taken an active part in the deliberations of the
conference that resulted in my selection for temporary chairman of the
Convention. I first consulted Major McKinley. I had served with him in
Congress and had become very much attached to him. He frankly stated
that, since he was a Blaine man, he would be obliged to vote against me,
but he told me that this was an opportunity that comes to a man but once
in a lifetime.
"If you decline," he said, "the anti-Blaine men will probably put up
someone else who would, no doubt, receive the same vote that you would
receive. If it is possible for them to elect anyone, I know of no man I
would rather have them thus honor than you. While, therefore, I shall
vote against you and hope you will not be elected,--simply because I am
a Blaine man, and a vote for you means a vote against Blaine,--I shall
not advise you to decline the use of your name."
I then approached Mr. Hanna, who appeared to be surprised that I
hesitated about consenting to the use of my name.
"We have you elected," he said, "by a majority of about thirty-five. You
cannot decline the use of your name, for two reasons; first, since we
know we have the votes necessary to elect you, should you now decline
the public would never believe otherwise than that you had been
improperly influenced. This you cannot afford. In the second place, it
would not be treating us fairly. We have selected you in perfect good
faith, with the expectation that you would allow your name to be thus
used; or, if not, you would have declined in ample time to enable us to
reconvene, and select someone else. To decline now, on the eve of the
election, when it is impossible for us to confer and agree upon another
man for the position, would be manifestly unfair to us as well as to
your own candidate for the Presidential nomination, whose chances may
be injuriously affected thereby."
This argument was both impressive and effective. I then and there
decided to allow my name to be used. I learned afterwards that it was
under the direction and management of Mr. Hanna that the Convention had
been so carefully and accurately polled. That his poll was entirely
correct was demonstrated by the result. This also established the fact
that as an organizer Mr. Hanna was a master, which was subsequently
proved when he managed Mr. McKinley's campaign both for the nomination
and election to the Presidency in 1896.
When the Convention was called to order, and the announcement was made
that the National Committee had selected Hon. Powell Clayton, of
Arkansas, for temporary chairman of the Convention, an attractive young
man in the Massachusetts delegation was recognized by the chair. He gave
his name, as H.C. Lodge. He said he rose to place the name of another
gentleman in nomination; and, after making a neat and appropriate speech
in commendation of his candidate,--a speech that created a very
favorable impression,--he named ex-Congressman John R. Lynch, of
Mississippi, whom he believed to be a suitable man for the position. The
ball was then opened. This was an indication of a combination of the
field against Blaine. Many speeches were made on both sides, but they
were temperate in tone, and free from bitterness. Among those that spoke
in support of my candidacy were Messrs. Theodore Roosevelt, and Geo.
William Curtis, of New York. When the debate was over the chairman
directed that the States be called in alphabetical order,--the roll of
delegates from each State to be called, so as to allow each individual
delegate to cast his own vote. When Mississippi was reached, I joined
with H.C. Powers, the Blaine member of the delegation, in voting for
Clayton. The result was just about what Mr. Hanna said it would be.
The Blaine men were discouraged and the anti-Blaine men were jubilant.
It was claimed by the latter, and apprehended by the former, that it was
indicative of Mr. Blaine's defeat for the nomination. It certainly
looked that way, but the result of the election for the temporary
chairmanship proved to be misleading. Mr. Hanna's poll was not to find
out how many delegates would vote for the nomination of Mr. Blaine, but
how many would vote for Lynch for temporary chairman. On that point his
poll was substantially accurate. It was assumed that every Blaine man
would vote for Mr. Clayton. This is where the mistake was made. It
turned out that there were some Blaine men, especially from the South,
that voted for Lynch. The result, therefore, was not, as it was hoped it
would be, an accurate test of the strength of the Blaine and
anti-Blaine forces in the Convention.
Since my election had not been anticipated,--at least, by me,--my speech
of acceptance was necessarily brief. I presided over the deliberations
of the Convention the greater part of two days, when Hon. John B.
Henderson, of Missouri, was introduced as the permanent chairman. This
is the same Henderson, who, as a Republican United States Senator from
Missouri, voted against the conviction of President Andrew Johnson, who
had been impeached by the House of Representatives for high crimes and
misdemeanors in office. The Democratic Senators needed but seven votes
from the Republican side of the chamber to prevent conviction. They
succeeded in getting the exact number, Senator Henderson being one. He
appears to have been the only one of that number that politically
survived that act. All others soon passed into political oblivion;
although several of them subsequently identified themselves with the
Democratic party. While it may be said that Senator Henderson survived
the act, it is true that his election as a delegate to the National
Republican Convention of 1884 and his selection as the permanent
chairman thereof are the only prominent illustrations of that fact.
During the deliberations of the Convention Mr. Bishop, one of the
delegates from Massachusetts, introduced a resolution to change the
basis of representation in future National Conventions of the party. His
plan was to make the number of Republican votes cast, counted, certified
and returned at the last preceding National election, the basis of
representation in succeeding National Conventions.
Hon. W.O. Bradley, of Kentucky, led off in a very able, eloquent, and
convincing speech in opposition to the resolution. The colored delegates
from the South selected me to present their side of the question. For
that purpose I was recognized by the chair, and spoke against the
resolution. In the first place I called attention to the fact that if
elections were fair, and the official count honest in every State, the
probabilities were that there would be no occasion for the proposed
change. That the change proposed would result in a material reduction in
the representation in future conventions chiefly from Southern States
was because the greater part of the Republican votes in some of said
States were suppressed by violence or nullified by fraud. The effect of
the change proposed would be simply to make such questionable methods
the basis of representation in future Republican National Conventions.
This, I claimed, the Republican party could not afford to do. At the
conclusion of my remarks the resolution was withdrawn by its author, Mr.
Bishop, who came over to my seat, and congratulated me upon the way in
which I had presented the case; stating at the same time that my speech
had convinced him that his proposition was a mistake.
After a hotly contested fight Mr. Blaine was finally nominated. Senator
John A. Logan, of Illinois, was named as the candidate for
Vice-President. It looked as if the time had at last come when the
brilliant statesman from Maine would have the acme of his ambition
completely realized.
I was honored by the delegation from my State with being made a member
of the National Committee, and also a member of the committee that was
named to wait on Mr. Blaine and notify him officially of his nomination.
The notification committee went all the way to Mr. Blaine's home,
Augusta, Maine, to discharge that duty.
The ceremony of notification took place in Mr. Blaine's front yard. The
weather was fine. The notification speech was delivered by the chairman,
Senator Henderson, to which Mr. Blaine briefly responded, promising to
make a more lengthy reply in the form of a letter of acceptance. At the
conclusion of the ceremony he called me to one side and asked what was
the outlook in Mississippi. I informed him that he could easily carry
the State by a substantial majority if we could have a fair election and
an honest count; but that under the existing order of things this would
not be possible, and that the State would be returned against him.
"Oh, no," he replied, "you are mistaken about that. Mr. Lamar will see
that I get a fair count in Mississippi."
I confess that this remark surprised me very much.
"Mr. Blame," I replied, "you may understand the political situation in
Mississippi better than I do, but I know whereof I speak when I say that
Mr. Lamar would not if he could and could not if he would, secure you a
fair count in Mississippi. The State will be returned against you."
"You will find," he said, "that you are mistaken. Mr. Lamar will see
that I get a fair count in Mississippi."
Mr. Lamar not only made an aggressive campaign against Mr. Blaine, but
it was chiefly through his influence and efforts that the State was
returned against Mr. Blaine by a very large majority. And yet no one who
knew Mr. Lamar could justly accuse him of being an ingrate. He was
essentially an appreciative man; as he never failed to demonstrate
whenever and wherever it was possible for him to do so. No one knew
better than did Mr. Lamar that he was under deep and lasting obligations
to Mr. Blaine; but it seems that with all his wisdom and political
sagacity and foresight Mr. Blaine was unable to distinguish between a
personal and a political obligation. Mr. Lamar felt that what Mr. Blaine
had done for him was personal, not political, and that if
his,--Lamar's,--party was in any respect the beneficiary thereof, it
was merely incidental. At any rate, it was utterly impossible for him to
serve Mr. Blaine in a political way. Had he made the effort to do so he
not only would have subjected himself to the accusation of party
treachery, but it would have resulted in his own political downfall. To
expect any ambitious man to make such a sacrifice as this was contrary
to human nature.
The truth was that Mr. Blaine had been chiefly instrumental in bringing
about a condition of affairs at the South which made it impossible for
any of his Democratic or Republican friends in that section to be of any
material service to him at the time he most needed them. And yet, he
could not see this until it was too late. In spite of this he would have
been elected, but for the fact that he lost the pivotal State of New
York by a small plurality, about eleven hundred and forty-seven, the
reasons for which have been given in a previous chapter. It is therefore
sad, but true, that by his own act this able and brilliant statesman,
like Henry Clay, died without having reached the acme of his
ambition,--the Presidency of the United States.
CHAPTER XXIII
THE ELECTION OF GROVER CLEVELAND
The Republicans of my district insisted that I make the race for
Congress again in 1884, and I decided to do so, although I knew it would
be useless for me to do so with any hope of being elected, for I knew
the prospect of success was not as favorable as two years previous.
Judge Van Eaton, the Democratic candidate for Congressman in 1882, was a
representative of the better element, and would, therefore, rather be
defeated than be declared elected through the enforcement and
application of questionable methods. He publicly declared on several
occasions that, as anxious as he was to be a member of Congress, he
would rather be defeated than have a certificate of election tainted
with fraud. In other words, if he could not be fairly and honestly
elected he preferred to be defeated. He insisted upon a fair election
and an honest count. This was not agreeable to many of his party
associates. They believed and privately asserted that his open
declarations on that point not only carried an implied reflection upon
his party in connection with previous elections, but that he was taking
an unnecessary risk in his own case. Chiefly for these reasons, the
Judge, though a strong and able man, was denied the courtesy of a
nomination for a second term. It had always been the custom to allow a
member to serve at least two terms; but this honor was denied Judge Van
Eaton, the nomination being given to Honorable T.R. Stockdale, of Pike
county.
Stockdale was a different type of a man from Van Eaton. He was in
perfect accord with the dominant sentiment of his party. He felt that he
had been nominated to go to Congress,--"peaceably and fairly," if
possible, but to go in any event. Then, again, that was the year of the
Presidential election, and the Democrats were as confident of success
that year as they had been in 1876 and in 1880.
For President and Vice-President the candidates were Blaine and Logan,
Republicans, and Cleveland and Hendricks, Democrats.
Mr. Cleveland had the prestige of having been elected Governor of New
York by a majority of about one hundred thousand. New York was believed
to be the pivotal and the decisive State, and that its votes would
determine the election for President. That the Republicans, even with
such a popular man as Mr. Blaine as their candidate, would be able to
overcome the immense majority by which Mr. Cleveland had carried the
State for Governor was not believed by any Democrat to be possible. The
Democrats did not take into account any of the local circumstances that
contributed to such a remarkable result; but they were well known to
Republicans in and out of that State. One of the principal contributory
causes was a determination on the part of thousands of Republican voters
in that State to resent at the polls National interference in local
State affairs.
Judge Folger, President Arthur's Secretary of the Treasury, was the
Republican candidate against Mr. Cleveland for the Governorship when the
latter was elected by such an immense majority. It was a well-known fact
that Judge Folger could not have been nominated but for the active and
aggressive efforts of the National Administration, and of its agents and
representatives. The fight for the Republican nomination for Governor
that year was the beginning of the bitter fight between the Blaine and
the Arthur forces in the State for the delegation in 1884. In the
nomination of Judge Folger the Blaine men were defeated. To neutralize
the prestige which the Arthur men had thus secured, thousands of the
Blaine men, and some who were not Blaine men, but who were against the
National Administration for other reasons, refused to vote for Judge
Folger, and thus allowed the State to go Democratic by default. In 1884,
when Mr. Blaine was the candidate of the Republicans for the
Presidency, a sufficient number of anti-Blaine men in New York,--in a
spirit of retaliation, no doubt,--pursued the same course and thus
allowed the State again to go Democratic by default. The loss which Mr.
Blaine sustained in the latter case, therefore, was much greater than
that gained by him in the former.
But, let the causes, circumstances, and conditions be what they may,
there was not a Democrat in Mississippi in 1884 who did not believe that
Mr. Cleveland's election to the Presidency was a foregone conclusion.
That he would have the support of the Solid South there was no doubt.
Those States, they believed, were as certain to be returned Democratic
as the sun would rise on the morning of the day of the election.
Although I accepted the nomination for Congress, I as chairman of the
Republican State Committee, devoted the greater part of my time to the
campaign throughout the State. Mr. Blaine had many warm friends and
admirers among the white men and Democrats in the State, some of them
being outspoken in their advocacy of his election. In making up the
electoral ticket I made every effort possible to get some of those men
to consent to the use of their names. One of them, Joseph N. Carpenter,
of my own home town, Natchez, gave his consent to the use of his name.
He was one of the solid business men of the town. He was not only a
large property owner but the principal owner of a local steamboat that
was engaged in the trade on the Mississippi River between Natchez and
Vicksburg. He was also the principal proprietor of one of the
cotton-seed-oil mills of the town. In fact his name was associated with
nearly every important enterprise in that community. Socially no family
stood higher than his in any part of the South. His accomplished wife
was a Miss Mellen, whose brother, William F. Mellen, was one of the most
brilliant members of the bar that the State had ever produced. She had
another brother who acquired quite a distinction as a minister of the
gospel.
When the announcement was made public that Joseph N. Carpenter was to be
an elector on the Republican ticket, intense excitement was immediately
created. The Democratic press of the State immediately turned their
batteries upon him. Personal friends called upon him in large numbers
and urged him to decline. But he had consented to serve, and he felt
that it was his duty, and ought to be his privilege to do so. Besides,
he was a sincere Blaine man. He honestly believed that the election of
Mr. Blaine would be conducive to the best interests of the country, the
South especially. To these appeals, therefore, he turned a deaf ear. But
it was not long before he was obliged to yield to the pressure. The fact
was soon made plain to him that, if he allowed his name to remain on
that ticket, the probabilities were that he would be financially
ruined. He would soon find that his boat would be without either
passengers or freight; his oil mill would probably be obliged to close
because there would be no owners of the raw material of whom he could
make purchases at any price, and even his children at school would, no
doubt, be subjected to taunts and insults, to say nothing of the social
cuts to which his family might be subjected. He was, therefore, brought
to a painful realization of the fact that he was confronted with
conditions which he had not fully anticipated. He could then see, as he
had never seen before, that he had been brought face to face with a
condition and not a theory. He was thus obliged to make his choice
between accepting those conditions upon the one hand, and on the other
the empty and temporary honor of serving as an elector on the Blaine
Republican ticket. His convictions, his manhood and his self-respect
were on one side; his material interests and family obligations were on
the other. His mental condition during that period can better be
imagined than described. After giving thoughtful consideration and
sleepless nights to the matter, he at length decided to yield to the
pressure and decline the use of his name. He informed me of his decision
through the medium of a private letter which he said he had written with
great reluctance and sincere regret. The committee thereupon named Dr.
Jackson, of Amite County, an old line Republican, to fill the vacancy.
It will thus be seen that in pursuing a course that Mr. Blaine thought
would place southern Democrats under obligations to him he placed a
weapon in the hands of his own personal and political enemies by which
they were enabled to crush and silence his friends and supporters; for
after all it is not so much the love of fair play, as it is the fear of
punishment, that actuates the average man in obeying the laws and
respecting the rights and privileges of others. Mr. Blaine's friends and
supporters at the South were the very people who stood most in need of
that security and protection which can come only through a thorough and
impartial enforcement of laws for the protection of citizens in the
exercise and enjoyment of their civil and political rights, as well as
the enforcement of laws for the protection of life, liberty and
property.
Judge H.F. Simrall, one of the most brilliant lawyers in the State,--who
came into the Republican party under the leadership of General Alcorn in
1869, and who had served as a Justice of the Supreme Court of the
State,--made an effort to canvass the State for Mr. Blaine, but his
former associates, with whom he tried to reason, treated him with such
scanty courtesy that he soon became discouraged and abandoned the
effort.
There were two factions in the Democratic party, Mr. Lamar being the
recognized head of one of them. His political enemies suspected and some
of them accused him of being partial to Mr. Blaine. To save himself and
his friends from humiliation and defeat in his own party it was
necessary for him to dispel that suspicion, and disprove those
accusations. With that end in view he made a thorough canvass of the
State in the interest of Mr. Cleveland and the Democratic party. The
State was returned for Mr. Cleveland by a large majority, for which Mr.
Lamar was in a great measure credited. Mr. Blaine finally saw his
mistake, which he virtually admitted in the speech delivered by him at
his home immediately after the election; but it was then too late to
undo the mischief that had been done. It was like locking the stable
door after the horse had been stolen. That Mr. Blaine died without
having attained the goal of his ambition was due chiefly to his lack of
foresight, poor judgment, political blunders, and a lack of that
sagacity and acumen which are so essential in a successful party leader.
CHAPTER XXIV
INTERVIEW WITH SECRETARY LAMAR ON THE RETAINING OF COLORED MEN IN OFFICE
In selecting his first cabinet Mr. Cleveland did Mr. Lamar and the State
of Mississippi the honor of making him his Secretary of the Interior.
Early in the administration, upon the occasion of my first visit to
Washington after the inauguration of Mr. Cleveland, I called on
Secretary Lamar to pay him my respects and tender him my congratulations
upon his appointment. When I entered his office he was engaged in
conversation with some prominent New York Democrats, Mayor Grace, of New
York City, being one of the party. The Secretary received me cordially;
and, after introducing me to the gentlemen with whom he was conversing,
requested me to take a seat in the adjoining room, which was used as his
private office, until the departure of the gentlemen with whom he was
then engaged; remarking at the same time that there was an important
matter about which he desired to talk with me.
I had been seated only a short while before he made his appearance. As
soon as he had taken his seat he said:
"Lynch, you have shown me some favors in the past, and I desire to
manifest in a substantial way my appreciation of what you have done for
me and the friendly interest you have taken in me. No one knows better
than I do, or can appreciate more keenly than I can, the value of the
services you have rendered me, and the satisfactory results of your
friendly interest in me. In saying this I do not wish to even intimate
that you have done anything for me that was inconsistent with the
position occupied by you as an influential leader of the Republican
party of our State. The truth is, you were, fortunately, placed in such
a position that you were enabled to render a great service to a
Mississippi Democrat without doing a single act, or giving expression to
a single thought, that was not in harmony with your position as a leader
of your own party. That you saw fit to make me, rather than some other
Democrat, the beneficiary of your partiality is what I keenly
appreciate, highly value and now desire to reciprocate. The Republican
party is now out of power, and it is likely to remain so for the next
quarter of a century. Fortunately for me I am now so situated that I can
reciprocate, in a small measure, the friendly interest you have taken in
me in the recent past; and this, I hope, you will allow me to do. I have
an office at my disposal that I want you to accept. I know you are a
pronounced Republican. I neither ask nor expect you to change your
politics. Knowing you as I do, it would be useless for me to make such a
request of you even if I desired to have you make such a change. All I
shall ask of you is that you be not offensively active or boldly
aggressive in political matters while you hold a commission from me. In
other words, I want to render you a service without having you
compromise your political standing, and without making the slightest
change in your party affiliations. However, recognizing as you must the
delicacy of the situation resulting from the position I occupy and the
relation that I sustain to the administration, you will, I know, refrain
from saying and doing anything that will place me in an embarrassing
position before the public and before the administration with which I am
identified. The office to which I refer is that of special agent of
public lands. The salary is fifteen hundred a year and expenses. The
place is worth from two thousand to two thousand five hundred a year. I
shall not send you down South, where you may have some unpleasant and
embarrassing experiences, but I will send you out into the Black Hills,
where you will not be subjected to the slightest inconvenience and where
you will have very little to do, but make your reports and draw your
pay. If you say you will accept the appointment I shall give immediate
directions for the commission to be made out and you can take the oath
of office within the next twenty-four hours."
Of course I listened with close attention and with deep interest to what
the honorable Secretary said. When he had finished, I replied in about
these words:
"Mr. Secretary, I fully appreciate the friendly interest you manifest in
me, and I also appreciate what you are willing to do for me. If I have
rendered you any services in the past, I can assure you that they were
not rendered with the expectation that you would thereby be placed under
any obligations to me whatever. If I preferred you to others in your own
party it was because I believed in you the State would have the services
of one of its best, most brilliant and most eloquent representatives. It
was the good of the State and the best interests of its people rather
than the personal advancement of an individual that actuated me. The
exalted position now occupied by you I consider a confirmation of the
wisdom of my decision. But the fact cannot be overlooked that while you
are an able and influential leader in the Democratic party, I am, though
not so able nor so influential, a leader,--locally, if not
nationally,--in the Republican party. While I can neither hope nor
expect to reach that point of honor and distinction in the Republican
party that you have reached in the Democratic, I am just as proud of
the position I occupy to-day as a Republican, as it is possible for you
to be of yours as a Democrat. Even if it be true, as you predict--of
course I do not agree with you--that the Republican party will be out of
power for the next quarter of a century, or even if that party should
never again come into power, that fact cannot and will not have the
slightest weight with me. Therefore, I do not feel that you, as a member
of a National Democratic Administration, can afford to tender me any
position that I can see my way clear to accept. While I fully and keenly
appreciate your friendly interest in me and your desire and willingness
to serve me, I cannot accept the position you have so gracefully
tendered me, nor can I accept any other you may see fit to offer me.
"But, if you want to render me a service, I can tell you wherein it can
be done,--a service that will be just as much appreciated as any you can
possibly render me. When I was a member of Congress I secured the
appointment of quite a number of young colored men to clerkships in the
Pension Bureau of your department. I understand that all these men have
excellent records. If you will retain them in their positions I shall
feel that you have repaid me for whatever you may think I have done for
you in the past."
"That," the Secretary replied, "is a very reasonable request. Come to
see me again in a day or two and bring a list of their names and I will
then see just what I can do along those lines."
I then bade Mr. Lamar good-bye and left his office. A few days later I
returned with the list. But upon that list I had placed the names of two
men who had not been appointed on my recommendation. One was a colored
man, a physician; the other was a white man, a lawyer. The physician
occupied a position that was in the line of his profession. The lawyer
was a clerk in the Pension Bureau, who had been recently appointed upon
the recommendation of Senator Bruce. The physician had been connected
with the public service a long time. I knew both men favorably and felt
that it was my duty to save them if in my power. Both were married and
had interesting families.
When I placed the list in the Secretary's hands he read it over very
carefully, and then said:
"I think I can safely assure you that the name of every one on this list
will be retained except these two"--indicating the colored physician and
the white lawyer. "This physician," the Secretary said, "is a colored
man, and the husband of a white wife. The lawyer is a white man, and the
husband of a colored wife. I cannot promise you, therefore, that they
will be retained, however capable and efficient they may be. So far as I
am personally concerned, it would make no material difference; I should
just as lief retain them as any of the others. But I cannot afford to
antagonize public opinion in my State on the question of amalgamation.
One of these men, the white lawyer, is from my own State, where he is
well known. His case is recent, and fresh in the public mind. So far as
he is concerned, I can see no escape. With the colored physician it may
be different. He is not from my State and is not known in the State. I
doubt very much if anyone in the State knows anything about him, or is
aware of the fact that the position occupied by him is under my
department. If attention is not called to his case, I shall let him
alone.
"But with the lawyer it is different. A representative of a Mississippi
newspaper that is unfriendly to me is now on the ground. He has a list
of all the Republicans,--especially the colored ones,--holding positions
in this department. The name of this lawyer is on that list. It is the
intention of the faction his paper represents to bring pressure to bear
upon me to force me to turn all of these men out of office for political
reasons, regardless of their official standing. But, so far as your
friends are concerned, I shall defy them except in the case of this
lawyer, and also in the case of this physician if attention is called to
him. In their cases, or either of them, I shall be obliged, for reasons
already given; to yield."
Strange to say, attention was never called to the case of the physician
and he remained in office during the whole of Mr. Cleveland's first
administration. I made a strong appeal to the Secretary in behalf of my
friend, the white lawyer. I said in substance:
"Mr. Secretary, you ought not to allow this deserving man to be punished
simply because he was brave enough to legally marry the woman of his
choice. You know him personally. You know him to be an able and
brilliant young man. You know that he is now discharging the responsible
duties of the position which he occupies in your department with credit
to himself, and to the satisfaction of his official superiors. You know
that you have not a better nor a more capable official connected with
the public service than you have in this able young man. Under these
circumstances it is your duty, as the responsible head of your
department, to protect him and his estimable family from this gross
wrong,--this cruel injustice. For no one knows better than you do, Mr.
Secretary, that this alleged opposition to amalgamation is both
hypocritical and insincere. If a natural antipathy existed between the
two races no law would be necessary to keep them apart. The law, then,
against race intermarriage has a tendency to encourage and promote race
intermixture, rather than to discourage and prevent it; because under
existing circumstances local sentiment in our part of the country
tolerates the intermixture, provided that the white husband and father
does not lead to the altar in honorable wedlock the woman he may have
selected as the companion of his life, and the mother of his children.
If, instead of prohibiting race intermarriage, the law would compel
marriage in all cases of concubinage, such a law would have a tendency
to discourage race intermixture; because it is only when they marry
according to the forms of law that the white husband and father is
socially and otherwise ostracized. Under the common law,--which is the
established and recognized rule of action in all of our States in the
absence of a local statute by which a different rule is established,--a
valid marriage is nothing more than a civil contract entered into
between two persons capable of making contracts. But under our form of
government marriage, like everything else, is what public opinion sees
fit to make it.
"It is true that in our part of the country no union of the sexes is
looked upon as a legal marriage unless the parties to the union are
married according to the form prescribed by the local statutes. While
that is true it is also true that there are many unions, which, but for
the local statutes, would be recognized and accepted as legal marriages
and which, even under existing conditions, are tolerated by local
sentiment and sanctioned by custom. Such unions are known to exist, and
yet are presumed not to exist. None are so blind as those who can see
but will not see. One of the unwritten but most effective and rigid laws
of our section,--which everyone respects and never violates,--is that a
man's private and domestic life must never be made the subject of
political or public discussion or newspaper notoriety. The man, who at
any time or under any provocation will so far forget himself as to say
or do anything that can be construed into a violation of that unwritten
law, will be likely to pay the penalty with his own life and that, too,
without court, judge, or jury; and the one by whom the penalty may be
inflicted will stand acquitted and justified before the bar of public
opinion. If, then, this able and brilliant young man,--whose bread and
meat you now have at your disposal,--had lived in concubinage with the
mother of his children, no law against custom and tradition would have
been violated, and no one would suggest that he be punished for what he
had done. Knowing these facts as you do, you ought to rise to the
dignity of the occasion and protect this good and innocent man from the
cruel, unjust, and unreasonable demands that are now being made upon you
to dispense with his valuable services. This gentleman, to my personal
knowledge, is not only worthy of whatever you may do for him, but his
elegant and accomplished wife is one of the finest and most cultivated
ladies it has ever been my good fortune to know. She is not only
remarkably intelligent, but she is a woman of fine natural ability and
of superior attainments. She is such a brilliant conversationalist,--so
interesting, so instructive and so entertaining,--that it is a great
pleasure and satisfaction to have the opportunity of being in her
delightful presence, and of sitting within the sound of her sweet,
charming, and musical voice. In physical development she is as near
perfection as it is possible for a woman to be. I have had the good
fortune of knowing her well for a number of years, and I have always
admired her for her excellent traits and admirable qualities. She is a
woman that would ornament and grace the parlor and honor the home of the
finest and best man that ever lived, regardless of his race or
nationality or the station he may occupy in life, however exalted that
station may be. She married the man of her choice because she had
learned to love and honor him, and because, in her opinion, he possessed
everything, except wealth, that was calculated to contribute to her
comfort, pleasure and happiness. In a recent conversation I had with
her, her beautiful, large dark eyes sparkled with delight, and her sweet
and lovely face was suffused with a smile of satisfaction when she
informed me that she had never had occasion to regret her selection of a
husband. She was then the mother of several very handsome children, to
whom she pointed with pardonable pride. The products of such a union
could not possibly be otherwise than attractive, for the father was a
remarkably handsome man, while the mother was a personification of the
typical southern beauty. The man was devoted to his family. How could he
be otherwise? Husband and wife were so strongly attached to each other
that both were more than willing to make any sacrifice that cruel fate
might have in store for them.
"I therefore appeal to you, Mr. Secretary, in behalf of this charming
and accomplished woman and her sweet and lovely children. In taking this
position I am satisfied you will have nothing to lose, for you will not
only have right on your side, but the interest of the public service as
well. Rise, then, to the dignity of the occasion and assert and maintain
your manhood and your independence. You have done this on previous
occasions, why not do it again? As a member of the Senate of the United
States you openly and publicly defied the well-known public sentiment of
your party in the State which you then had the honor in part to
represent, when you disregarded and repudiated the mandate of the State
Legislature, instructing you to vote for the free and unlimited coinage
of silver. It was that vote and the spirit of manly independence shown
by you on that occasion that placed you in the high and responsible
position you now occupy, the duties of which your friends know will be
discharged in a way that will reflect credit upon yourself and honor
upon your State.
"You again antagonized the dominant sentiment of the Democratic party of
your State when you pronounced an eloquent eulogy upon the life and
character of Charles Sumner. And yet you were able to overcome the
bitter opposition you had encountered on each of those occasions. You
can do the same thing in this case. I therefore ask you to promise me
that this worthy and competent public servant shall not be discharged as
long as his official record remains good."
The Secretary listened to my remarks with close and respectful
attention. When I had finished he said:
"I agree with nearly all you have said. My sympathies are with your
friend and it is my desire to retain him in the position he now so
satisfactorily fills. But when you ask me to disregard and openly defy
the well-known sentiment of the white people of my State on the question
of amalgamation, I fear you make a request of me which I cannot safely
grant, however anxious I may be to serve you. I could defend myself
before a public audience in my State on the silver question and on the
Sumner eulogy much more successfully than on the question of
amalgamation; although in the main, I recognize the force and admit the
truth of what you have said upon that subject. Hypocritical and
insincere as the claim may be with reference to maintaining the absolute
separation of the two races, the sentiment on that subject is one which
no man who is ambitious to have a political future can safely afford to
ignore,--especially under the new order of things about which you are
well posted. While I am sorry for your friend, and should be pleased to
grant your request in his case, I cannot bring myself to a realization
of the fact that it is one of sufficient national importance to justify
me in taking the stand you have so forcibly and eloquently suggested."
This ended the interview. I went to the home of my friend that evening,
and informed him and his amiable wife of what had been said and done.
They thanked me warmly for my efforts in their behalf, and assured me
that there was a future before them, and that in the battle of life they
were determined to know no such word as "fail." A few weeks later my
friend's official connection with the public service was suddenly
terminated. He and his family then left Washington for Kansas, I think.
About a year thereafter he had occasion to visit Washington on business.
I happened to be there at that time. He called to see me and informed me
that, instead of regretting what had occurred, he had every reason to be
thankful for it, since he had done very much better than he could have
done had he remained at Washington. I was, of course, very much
gratified to hear this and warmly congratulated him. Since that time,
however, I have not seen him nor any member of his family, nor have I
heard anything from them except indirectly, although I have made a
number of unsuccessful efforts to find them. I am inclined to the
opinion that, like thousands of people of the same class, their identity
with the colored race has long since ceased and that they have been
absorbed by the white race, as I firmly believe will be true of the
great mass of colored Americans. It is to prevent any embarrassment
growing out of the probability of this condition that has actuated me in
not making public the names of the parties in question. No good could
come of the disclosure, and much harm might follow. I can, however, most
positively assure the public that this is not a fiction,--that it is not
a mere picture that is painted from the vividness of my imagination, but
that the story as related in all its details is based upon actual
occurrences.
With this one exception, Secretary Lamar retained in office every clerk
whose name appeared on the list that I gave him. They were not only
retained throughout the Administration but many of them were promoted.
It can be said to the credit of Secretary Lamar that during his
administration very few changes were made in the clerical force of the
department for political reasons, and, as a rule, the clerks were
treated with justice, fairness and impartiality.
CHAPTER XXV
THE FEDERAL ELECTIONS BILL
It was during the administration of President Harrison that another
effort was made to secure the enactment by Congress of the necessary
legislation for the effective enforcement of the war amendments to the
National Constitution,--a Federal Elections Bill. Mr. Lodge, of
Massachusetts, was the author of the bill. But the fact was soon
developed that there were so many Republicans in and out of Congress who
lacked the courage of their convictions that it would be impossible to
secure favorable action. In fact there were three classes of white men
at the South who claimed to be Republicans who used their influence to
defeat that contemplated legislation. The white men at the South who
acted with the Republican party at that time were divided into four
classes.
First, those who were Republicans from principle and conviction--because
they were firm believers in the principles, doctrines, and policies for
which the party stood, and were willing to remain with it in adversity
as well as in prosperity,--in defeat as well as in victory. This class,
I am pleased to say, while not the most noisy and demonstrative,
comprised over seventy-five per cent, of the white membership of the
party in that part of the country.
Second, a small but noisy and demonstrative group, comprising about
fifteen per cent of the remainder, who labored under the honest, but
erroneous, impression that the best and most effective way to build up a
strong Republican party at the South was to draw the color line in the
party. In other words, to organize a Republican party to be composed
exclusively of white men, to the entire exclusion of colored men. What
those men chiefly wanted,--or felt the need of for themselves and their
families,--was social recognition by the better element of the white
people of their respective localities. They were eager, therefore, to
bring about such a condition of things as would make it possible for
them to be known as Republicans without subjecting themselves and their
families to the risk of being socially ostracized by their white
Democratic neighbors. And then again those men believed then, and some
of them still believe or profess to believe, that southern Democrats
were and are honest and sincere in the declaration that the presence of
the colored men in the Republican party prevented southern white men
from coming into it. "Draw the race line against the colored
man,--organize a white Republican party,--and you will find that
thousands of white men who now act with the Democratic party will join
the Republicans." Some white Republicans believed that the men by whom
these declarations were made were honest and sincere,--and it may be
that some of them were,--but it appears not to have occurred to them
that if the votes of the colored men were suppressed the minority white
vote, unaided and unprotected, would be powerless to prevent the
application of methods which would nullify any organized effort on their
part. In other words, nothing short of an effective national law, to
protect the weak against the strong and the minority of the whites
against the aggressive assaults of the majority of that race, would
enable the minority of the whites to make their power and influence
effective and potential; and even then it could be effectively done only
in coöperation with the blacks. Then again, they seemed to have lost
sight of the fact,--or perhaps they did not know it to be a fact,--that
many leading southern Democrats are insincere in their declarations upon
the so-called race question. They keep that question before the public
for political and party reasons only, because they find it to be the
most effective weapon they can use to hold the white men in political
subjection. The effort, therefore, to build up a "white" Republican
party at the South has had a tendency, under existing circumstances, to
discourage a strong Republican organization in that section. But, even
if it were possible for such an organization to have a potential
existence, it could not be otherwise than ephemeral, because it would be
wholly out of harmony with the fundamental principles and doctrines of
the national organization whose name it had appropriated. It would be in
point of fact a misnomer and, therefore, wholly out of place as one of
the branches of the national organization which stands for, defends, and
advocates the civil and political equality of all American citizens,
without regard to race, color, nationality, or religion. Any
organization, therefore, claiming to be a branch of the Republican
party, but which had repudiated and denounced the fundamental and sacred
creed of that organization, would be looked upon by the public as a
close, selfish and local machine that was brought into existence to
serve the ends, and satisfy the selfish ambition of the promoters and
organizers of the corporation. Yet there were a few well-meaning and
honest white men in some of the Southern States who were disposed,
through a mistaken sense of political necessity, to give such a movement
the benefit of their countenance. But the movement has been a lamentable
failure in States where it has been tried, and it cannot be otherwise in
States where it may yet be tried. Men who were in sympathy with a
movement of this sort took a pronounced stand against the proposed
Federal Elections Bill, and used what influence they had to prevent its
passage; their idea being that, if passed, it would have a tendency to
prevent the accomplishment of the purposes they had in contemplation.
Third, a group that consisted of a still smaller number who were
Republicans for revenue only,--for the purpose of getting office. If an
office were in sight they would be quite demonstrative in their advocacy
of the Republican party and its principles; but if they were not
officially recognized, their activities would not only cease, but they
would soon be back into the fold of the Democracy. But should they be
officially recognized they would be good, faithful, and loyal
Republicans,--at least so far as words were concerned,--until they
ceased to be officials, when they would cease at the same time to be
Republicans. Men of this class were, of course, opposed to the proposed
legislation for the enforcement of the war amendments to the
Constitution.
Fourth, a group that consisted of an insignificantly small number of
white men who claimed to be national Republicans and local
Democrats,--that is, they claimed that they voted for the Republican
candidate for President every four years, but for Democrats in all other
elections. Of course they were against the proposed legislation. These
men succeeded in inducing some well-meaning Republican members of
Congress, like Senator Washburne, of Minnesota, for instance, to believe
that the passage of such a bill would have a tendency to prevent the
building up of a strong Republican organization at the South. Then
again, the free silver question was before the public at that time. The
Republican majority in the Senate was not large. Several of those who
had been elected as Republicans were free silver men. On that question
they were in harmony with a majority of the Democrats, and out of
harmony with the great majority of Republicans. The Free Silver
Republicans, therefore, were not inclined to support a measure that was
particularly offensive to their friends and allies on the silver
question. After a careful canvass of the Senate it was developed that
the Republican leaders could not safely count on the support of any one
of the Free Silver Republicans in their efforts to pass the bill, and,
since they had the balance of power, any further effort to pass it was
abandoned. It was then made plain to the friends and supporters of that
measure that no further attempt would be made in that direction for a
long time, if ever.
I wrote and had published in the Washington _Post_ a letter in which I
took strong grounds in favor of having the representation in
Congress,--from States where the colored men had been practically
disfranchised through an evasion of the Fifteenth Amendment,--reduced
in the manner prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment. In that letter I
made an effort to answer every argument that had been made in opposition
to such a proposition. It had been argued by some fairly good lawyers,
for instance, that the subsequent ratification of the Fifteenth
Amendment had so modified the Fourteenth as to take away from Congress
this optional and discretionary power which had been previously
conferred upon it by the Fourteenth Amendment. I tried in that
letter,--and I think I succeeded,--to answer the argument on that point.
It was also said that if Congress were to take such a step it would
thereby give its sanction to the disfranchisement of the colored men in
the States where that had been done. This I think I succeeded in proving
was untrue and without foundation. The truth is that the only material
difference between the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments on this
particular point is that, subsequent to the ratification of the
Fourteenth and prior to the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, a
State could legally disfranchise white or colored men on account of race
or color, but, since the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, this
cannot be legally done. If, then, Congress had the constitutional right
under the Fourteenth Amendment to punish a State in the manner therein
prescribed, for doing what the State then had a legal and
constitutional right to do, I cannot see why Congress has not now the
same power and authority to inflict the same punishment upon the State
for doing or permitting to be done what it now has no legal and
constitutional right to do.
No State, in my opinion, should be allowed to take advantage of its own
wrongs, and thus, by a wrongful act, augment its own power and influence
in the government. To allow a majority of the white men in the State of
Mississippi, for instance, to appropriate to themselves through
questionable methods the representative strength of the colored
population of that State, excluding the latter from all participation in
the selection of the representatives in Congress, is a monstrous wrong,
the continuance of which should not be tolerated.
For every crime there must be a punishment; for every wrong there must
be a remedy, and for every grievance there must be a redress. That this
state of things is wrong and unjust, if not unlawful, no fair-minded
person will deny. It is not only wrong and unjust to the colored people
of the State, who are thus denied a voice in the government under which
they live and to support which they are taxed, but it also involves a
grave injustice to the States in which the laws are obeyed and the
National Constitution,--including the war amendments to the same,--is
respected and enforced. I am aware of the fact that it is claimed by
those who are responsible for what is here complained of that, while
the acts referred to may be an evasion if not a violation of the spirit
of the Constitution, yet, since they do not violate the letter of the
Constitution the complaining parties are without a remedy, and therefore
have no redress. This contention is not only weak in logic but unsound
in law, even as construed by the Supreme Court of the United States,
which tribunal seems to be the last to which an appeal can be
successfully made, having for its object the enforcement of the
Constitution and laws so far as they relate to the political and civil
rights of the colored Americans. That a State can do by indirection what
it cannot do directly, is denied even by the Supreme Court of the United
States.
That doctrine was clearly and distinctly set forth in a decision of the
Court rendered by Mr. Justice Strong, which was concurred in by a
majority of his associates. In that decision it was held that
affirmative State action is not necessary to constitute race
discrimination by the State. In other words, in order to constitute
affirmative State action in violation of the Constitutional mandate
against distinction and discrimination based on race or color, it is not
necessary that the State should pass a law for that purpose. The State,
the Court declared, acts through its agents, Legislative, Executive and
Judicial. Whenever an agent or representative of the State acts, his
acts are binding upon the State, and the effect is the same as if the
State had passed a law for that purpose. If a judge, for example, in the
selection of jurors to serve in his court should knowingly and
intentionally allow a particular race to be excluded from such service
on account of race or color, the effect would be the same as if the
State, through its Legislature, had passed a law for that purpose. The
colored men in the States complained of, have been disfranchised in
violation of the spirit if not the letter of the Constitution, either by
affirmative State action, or through and by the State's agents and
representatives. Their acts, therefore, constitute State action as fully
as if the Legislature had passed a law for that purpose.
CHAPTER XXVI
MISSISSIPPI AND THE NULLIFICATION OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT
The defeat or abandonment of the Lodge Federal Elections Bill was
equivalent to a declaration that no further attempts would be made for a
good while, at least, to enforce by appropriate legislation the war
amendments to the Constitution. Southern Democrats were not slow in
taking advantage of the knowledge of that fact.
My own State, Mississippi, was the first to give legal effect to the
practical nullification of the Fifteenth Amendment. On that question the
Democratic party in the State was divided into two factions. The radical
faction, under the leadership of Senator George, advocated the adoption
and enforcement of extreme methods. The liberal or conservative
faction,--or what was known as the Lamar wing of the party under the
leadership of Senator Walthall,--was strongly opposed to such methods.
Senator George advocated the calling of a Constitutional Convention, to
frame a new Constitution for the State. Senator Walthall opposed it,
contending that the then Constitution, though framed by Republicans,
was, in the main, unobjectionable and should be allowed to stand. But
Senator George was successful, and a convention was called to meet in
the fall of 1890. In order to take no chances the Senator had himself
nominated and elected a member of the Convention.
When the Convention met, it was found that there were two strong
factions, one in favor of giving legal effect to the nullification of
the Fifteenth Amendment, and the other opposed to it. The George faction
was slightly in the majority, resulting in one of their
number,--nullificationists, as they were called,--Judge S.S. Calhoun,
being elected President of the Convention. The plan advocated and
supported by the George faction, of which Senator George was the author,
provided that no one be allowed to register as a voter, or vote if
registered, unless he could read and write, or unless he could
understand any section of the Constitution when read to him and give a
reasonable interpretation thereof. This was known as the "understanding
clause." It was plain to every one that its purpose was to evade the
Fifteenth Amendment, and disfranchise the illiterate voters of one race
without disfranchising those of the other.
The opposition to this scheme was under the leadership of one of the
ablest and most brilliant members of the bar, Judge J.B. Christman, of
Lincoln County. As a substitute for the George plan or understanding
clause, he ably and eloquently advocated the adoption of a fair and
honest educational qualification as a condition precedent to
registration and voting, to be equally applicable to whites and blacks.
The speeches on both sides were able and interesting. It looked for a
while as if the substitute clause proposed by Judge Christman would be
adopted. In consequence of such an apprehension, Judge Calhoun, the
President of the Convention, took the floor in opposition to the
Christman plan, and in support of the one proposed by Senator George.
The substance of his speech was that the Convention had been called for
the purpose of insuring the ascendency of the white race,--the
Democratic party,--in the administration of the State Government through
some other methods than those which had been enforced since 1875.
"If you fail in the discharge of your duties in this matter," he
declared, "the blood of every negro that will be killed in an election
riot hereafter will be upon your shoulders."
In other words, the speaker frankly admitted, what everyone knew to be a
fact, that the ascendency of the Democratic party in the State had been
maintained since 1875 through methods which, in his opinion, should no
longer be sanctioned and tolerated. These methods, he contended, were
corrupting the morals of the people of the State and should be
discontinued; but the ascendency of the Democratic party must be
maintained at any cost. The George plan, he urged, would accomplish this
result, because if the negroes were disfranchised according to the forms
of law, there would be no occasion to suppress his vote by violence
because he would have no vote to suppress; and there would be no
occasion to commit fraud in the count or perjury in the returns.
Notwithstanding this frank speech, which was intended to arouse the
fears of the members of the Convention from a party standpoint, the
defeat of the Christman substitute was by no means an assured fact. But
the advocates of the George plan,--the "understanding clause,"--were
both desperate and determined. Contrary to public expectation two
Republicans, Geo. B. Melchoir and I.T. Montgomery, had been elected to
the Convention from Bolivar County. But their seats were contested, and
it was assumed that their Democratic contestants would be seated. Still,
pending the final disposition of the case, the two Republicans were the
sitting members. Montgomery was colored and Melchoir was white. But the
George faction needed those two votes. No one suspected, however, that
they would get them in any other way than by seating the contestants.
The advocates and supporters of the Christman substitute were,
therefore, very much surprised and disappointed when they learned that
Mr. Montgomery, the only colored member of the Convention, intended to
make a speech in favor of the adoption of the George plan, and vote for
it; which he did. Why this man, who had the reputation of being honest
and honorable, and who in point of intelligence was considerably above
the average of his race, should have thus acted and voted has always
been an inexplicable mystery. It is difficult to believe that he was
willing to pay such a price for the retention of his seat in the
Convention, still it is a fact that the contest was never called and
Montgomery and his colleague were allowed to retain their seats.
The adoption of the George plan was thus assured, but not without a
desperate fight. The opponents of that scheme made a brave, though
unsuccessful, fight against it. But it was soon made plain to the
advocates of the George plan that what they had succeeded in forcing
through the Convention would be defeated by the people at the
ballot-box. In fact, a storm of protest was raised throughout the State.
The Democratic press, as well as the members of that party, were
believed to be about equally divided on the question of the ratification
of the Constitution as thus framed. Since it was well known that the
Republicans would be solid in their opposition to ratification, the
rejection of the proposed Constitution was an assured fact. But the
supporters of the George scheme felt that they could not afford to have
the results of their labors go down in defeat. In order to prevent this
they decided to deny the people the right of passing judgment upon the
work of the Convention. The decision, therefore, was that the Convention
by which the Constitution was framed should declare it duly ratified and
approved, and to go into effect upon a day therein named. The people of
that unfortunate State, therefore, have never had an opportunity to pass
judgment upon the Constitution under which they are living and which
they are required to obey and support, that right having been denied
them because it was known that a majority of them were opposed to its
ratification and would have voted against it.
But this so-called "understanding clause," or George scheme, is much
more sweeping than was intended by its author. The intent of that clause
was to make it possible to disfranchise the illiterate blacks without
disfranchising the illiterate whites. But as construed and enforced it
is not confined to illiterates but to persons of intelligence as well.
No man, for instance, however intelligent he may be, can be registered
as a voter or vote if registered, if the registering officers or the
election officers are of the opinion that he does not understand the
Constitution. It is true, the instrument is so worded that no allusion
is made to the race or color of those seeking to be registered and to
vote; still, it is perfectly plain to everyone that the purpose was to
enable the State to do, through its authorized and duly appointed agents
and representatives, the very thing the Fifteenth Amendment declares
shall not be done. According to the decision of the Supreme Court, as
rendered by Mr. Justice Strong, the effect is the same as if the
instrument had declared in so many words that race or color should be
the basis of discrimination and exclusion.
The bitter and desperate struggle between the two factions of the
Democratic party in the State of Mississippi in this contest, forcibly
illustrates the fact that the National Republican party made a grave
mistake when it abandoned any further effort to enforce by appropriate
legislation the war amendments to the Constitution. In opposing and
denouncing the questionable methods of the extreme and radical faction
of their own party, the conservative faction of the Democrats believed,
expected, and predicted that such methods would not be acquiesced in by
the Republican party, nor would they be tolerated by the National
Government. If those expectations and predictions had been verified they
would have given the conservative element a justifiable excuse to break
away from the radicals, and this would have resulted in having two
strong political parties in that section to-day instead of one. But
when it was seen that the National Republican party made no further
opposition to the enforcement of those extraneous, radical and
questionable methods, that fact not only had the effect of preventing
further opposition on the part of the conservative Democrats, but it
also resulted in many of the politically ambitious among them joining
the ranks of the radicals, since that was then the only channel through
which it was possible for their political aspirations to be gratified.
The reader cannot fail to see that under the plan in force in
Mississippi there is no incentive to intelligence; because intelligence
does not secure access to the ballot-box, nor does the lack of it
prevent such access. It is not an incentive to the accumulation of
wealth; because the ownership of property does not secure to the owner
access to the ballot-box, nor does the lack of it prevent such access.
It is not a question of intelligence, wealth or character, nor can it be
said that it is wholly a question of party. It is simply a question of
factional affiliation. The standard of qualification is confined to such
white men as may be in harmony with the faction that may happen to have
control for the time being of the election machinery. What is true of
Mississippi in this respect is equally true of the other States in which
schemes of various sorts have been invented and adopted to evade the
Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
CHAPTER XXVII
EFFECT OF THE MCKINLEY TARIFF BILL ON BOTH POLITICAL PARTIES
The Congressional elections of 1890 resulted in a crushing defeat for
the Republicans. This was due, no doubt, to the McKinley Tariff Bill
which became a law only about a month before the elections of that year.
Congress convened the first Monday in December, 1889, and that session
did not come to a close until the following October. The Democrats in
Congress made a bitter fight against the McKinley Tariff Bill, and,
since it was a very complete and comprehensive measure, a great deal of
time was necessarily consumed in its consideration and discussion. When
it finally became a law the time between its passage and the elections
was so short that the friends of the measure did not have time to
explain and defend it before the elections took place. This placed the
Republicans at a great disadvantage. They were on the defensive from the
beginning. The result was a sweeping Democratic victory.
But, strange to say, the same issues that produced Democratic success
and Republican defeat at that election brought about Republican success
and Democratic defeat at the Presidential and Congressional elections in
1896. The McKinley Tariff Bill of 1890 was so popular six years later,
that the author of that measure was deemed the strongest and most
available man to place at the head of the Republican ticket as the
candidate of that party for President. His election was a complete
vindication of the wisdom of the measure of which he was the author and
champion. In 1890 his bill was so unpopular that it resulted in his own
defeat for reëlection to Congress. But this did not cause him to lose
faith in the wisdom and the ultimate popularity of the bill which he was
proud to have bear his name.
"A little time," said McKinley, "will prove the wisdom of the measure."
In this he was not mistaken. His defeat for reëlection to Congress
ultimately made him President of the United States; for the following
year the Republicans of his State elected him Governor, which was a
stepping-stone to the Presidency. All that was needed was an opportunity
for the merits of his bill to be thoroughly tested. Shortly after its
passage, but before it could be enforced or even explained, the people
were led to believe that it was a harsh, cruel, and unjust measure,
imposing heavy, unreasonable, and unnecessary taxes upon them,
increasing the prices of the necessaries of life without a
corresponding increase in the price of labor. The people were in an
ugly mood in anticipation of what was never fully realized.
It is true that the tariff was not the sole issue that resulted in such
a sweeping Republican victory in the National elections of 1896. The
financial issue, which was prominent before the people at that time, was
one of the contributory causes of that result. Still it cannot be denied
that McKinley's connection with the Tariff Bill of 1890 was what gave
him the necessary national prominence to make him the most available man
to be placed at the head of his party ticket for the Presidency that
year.
CHAPTER XXVIII
INTERVIEW BETWEEN THE AUTHOR AND PRESIDENT CLEVELAND AND SECRETARY
GRESHAM
When Mr. Cleveland was inaugurated in 1893, I was Auditor of the
Treasury for the Navy Department. Hon. J.G. Carlisle, of Kentucky, had
been made Secretary of the Treasury. My resignation had been tendered,
the acceptance of which I expected to see announced any day, but the
change did not take place until August of that year.
While seated at my desk one day a messenger from the White House made
his appearance, and I was informed that the President desired to see me
in person. When I arrived at the White House I was immediately ushered
into the President's private office, where he was seated alone at a desk
engaged in reading a book or a magazine. It was at an hour when he was
not usually accessible to the public. He received me in a very cordial
way. He informed me that there was an important matter about which he
desired to talk with me--to get the benefit of my opinion and
experience. He assured me of his friendly interest in the colored
people. It was his determination that they should have suitable and
appropriate recognition under his administration. He said he was very
much opposed to the color line in politics. There was no more reason why
a man should be opposed or discriminated against on account of his race
than on account of his religion. He believed it to be the duty of the
Democratic party to encourage the colored voters to divide their votes,
and the best way to do this was to accord to that race the same relative
consideration, the same treatment, and to give the race the same
recognition that is given other races and classes of which our
citizenship is composed. The party line is the only one that should be
drawn. He would not appoint a colored Republican to office merely for
the purpose of giving official recognition to the colored race, nor
would he refuse to appoint a colored Democrat simply because he was
colored. If this course were pursued, and this policy adopted and
adhered to by the Democratic party, the colored voters who are in
harmony with that party on questions about which white men usually
divide, could see their way clear to vote in accordance with their
convictions upon such issues, and would not be obliged to vote against
the party with which they may be in harmony on account of that party's
attitude towards them as a race. "In other words," he said, "it is a
well-known fact that there are thousands of colored men who vote the
Republican ticket at many important elections,--not from choice but
from what they believe to be a necessity. If the views entertained by me
on this subject should be accepted by the Democratic party, as I hope
and believe they will be, that necessity,--real or imaginary,--would no
longer exist, and the gradual division of the colored vote would
necessarily follow."
He went on to say that he had not hesitated to express himself fully,
freely and frankly with members of his own party on the subject, and
that he had informed them of the course he intended to pursue; but that
he had been advised against appointing any colored man to an office in
which white women were employed.
"Now," said the President, "since you have been at the head of an
important bureau in the Treasury Department during the past four years,
a bureau in which a number of white women are employed as clerks, I
desire very much to know what has been your experiences along those
lines." I informed the President that I would take pleasure in giving
him the information desired. I assured him that if my occupancy of that
office had been the occasion of the slightest embarrassment to anyone
connected with the public service,--whether in the office over which I
presided or any other,--that fact had never been brought to my notice.
On the contrary, I had every reason to believe that no one who had
previously occupied the position enjoyed the respect, good-will and
friendship of the clerks and other employees to a greater extent than
was enjoyed by me. My occupancy of that office had more than
demonstrated the fact, if such were necessary, that official position
and social contact were separate and distinct. My contact with the
clerks and other employees of the office was official, not social.
During office hours they were subject to my direction and supervision in
the discharge of their official duties, and I am pleased to say that all
of them, without a single exception, have shown me that courtesy,
deference and respect due to the head of the office. After office hours
they went their way and I went mine. No new social ties were created and
none were broken or changed as the result of the official position
occupied by me. I assured the President, that, judging from my own
experience, he need not have the slightest apprehension of any
embarrassment, friction or unpleasantness growing out of the appointment
of a colored man of intelligence, good judgment and wise discretion as
head of any bureau in which white women were employed.
I could not allow the interview to close without expressing to the
President my warm appreciation of his fair, just, reasonable and
dignified position on the so-called race question.
"Your attitude," I said, "if accepted in good faith by your party, will
prove to be the solution of this mythical race problem. Although I am a
pronounced Republican, yet, as a colored American, I am anxious to have
such a condition of things brought about as will allow a colored man to
be a Democrat if he so desires. I believe you have stated the case
accurately when you say that thousands of colored men have voted the
Republican ticket at important elections, from necessity and not from
choice. As a Republican, it is my hope that colored as well as white
men, act with and vote for the candidates of that party when worthy and
meritorious, but as a colored American, I want them to be so situated
that they can vote that way from choice and not from necessity. No man
can be a free and independent American citizen who is obliged to
sacrifice his convictions upon the altar of his personal safety. The
attitude of the Democratic party upon this so-called race question has
made the colored voter a dependent, and not an independent, American
citizen. The Republican party emancipated him from physical bondage, for
which he is grateful. It remains for the Democratic party to emancipate
him from political bondage, for which he will be equally grateful. You
are engaged, Mr. President, in a good and glorious work. As a colored
man I thank you for the brave and noble stand you have taken. God grant
that you, as a Democrat, may have influence enough to get the Democratic
party as an organization to support you in the noble stand you have so
bravely taken."
The President thanked me for my expressions of good-will, and thus
terminated what to me was a remarkable as well as a pleasant and most
agreeable interview.
A few days later a messenger from the State Department called at my
office and informed me that the Secretary of State, Judge Gresham,
desired to see me. Judge Gresham and I had been warm personal friends
for many years. He had occupied many positions of prominence and
responsibility. He had been a major-general in the Union army, and was
with Sherman's army during that celebrated March through Georgia. He was
one of the leading candidates for the Presidential nomination before the
National Republican Convention at Chicago in 1888, when General Benjamin
Harrison, of Indiana, was nominated.
I was a member of that Convention and one of Judge Gresham's active
supporters. In the campaign that followed Judge Gresham gave General
Harrison his active and loyal support, but, for some unaccountable
reason, he supported Mr. Cleveland against General Harrison in 1892. Mr.
Cleveland was not only elected, but, contrary to public expectation, he
carried the State of Illinois,--a State in which Judge Gresham was known
to be very popular, especially among the colored people of Chicago;
many of whom, it was said, voted for Mr. Cleveland through the efforts
and influence of Judge Gresham. Mr. Cleveland evidently believed that
his success in Illinois was due largely to Judge Gresham, and as
evidence of that fact, and because Judge Gresham was known to be a very
able man, Mr. Cleveland paid him the distinguished honor of appointing
him to the leading position in his cabinet,--that of Secretary of State.
When I called at the State Department the Judge invited me to a seat in
his private office. He said there was an important matter about which he
desired to talk with me. My name, he said, had been the subject of a
recent conversation between the President and himself. The President, he
said, was well aware of the cordial relations existing between us, and
believed that if any man could influence my action he, Gresham, was that
man.
"Now," said the Judge, "the President has formed a very favorable
opinion of you. He is anxious to have you remain at the head of the
important bureau over which you are now presiding in such a creditable
and satisfactory manner. But you understand that it is a political
office. As anxious as the President is to retain you, and as anxious as
I am to have him do so, he could not do it and you could neither ask nor
expect him to do it, unless you were known to be in sympathy with, and a
supporter of, his administration,--at least in the main. Now, you know
that I am not only your friend, but that I am a friend to the colored
people. I know you are a Republican. So am I; but I am a Cleveland man.
Cleveland is a better Republican than Harrison. In supporting Cleveland
against Harrison I am no less a Republican. As your friend I would not
advise you to do anything that would militate against your interests.
Knowing, as you do, that I am not only your friend but also a good
Republican, you can at least afford to follow where I lead. I want you,
then, to authorize me to say to the President that you are in sympathy
with the main purposes of his administration as explained to you by me,
and that his decision to retain you in your present position will be
fully and keenly appreciated by you."
In my reply I stated that while I was very grateful to the Judge for his
friendly interest in me, and while I highly appreciated the President's
good opinion of me, it would not be possible for me to consent to retain
the position I then occupied upon the conditions named.
"If," I said, "it is the desire of the President to have me remain in
charge of that office during his administration or any part thereof, I
would be perfectly willing to do so if I should be permitted to remain
free from any conditions, pledges, promises or obligations. The
conditions suggested mean nothing more nor less than that I shall
identify myself with the Democratic party. The President has no office
at his disposal the acceptance or retention of which could be a
sufficient inducement for me to take such a step as that. I agree with
what you have said about Mr. Cleveland, so far as he is personally
concerned. I have every reason to believe that he has a friendly
interest in the colored people and that he means to do the fair thing by
them so far as it may be in his power. But he was elected as a Democrat.
He is the head of a National Democratic Administration. No man can be
wholly independent of his party,--a fact recognized in the conditions
suggested in my own case. I don't think that Mr. Cleveland is what would
be called in my part of the country a good Democrat, because I believe
he is utterly devoid of race prejudice, and is not in harmony with those
who insist upon drawing the color line in the Democratic party. In my
opinion he is in harmony with the Democratic party only on one important
public question,--the tariff. On all others,--the so-called race
question not excepted,--he is in harmony with what I believe to be
genuine Republicanism. Still, as I have already stated, he was elected
as a Democrat; and, since he holds that the office now occupied by me is
a political one, it ought to be filled by one who is in political
harmony with the administration. I am not that man; for I cannot
truthfully say that I am in harmony with the main purposes of the
administration."
The Judge remarked that my decision was a disappointment to him, and he
believed that I would some day regret having made it, but that he would
communicate to the President the result of our interview. In spite of
this, my successor, Morton, a Democrat from Maine, was not appointed
until the following August.
CHAPTER XXIX
THE NATIONAL REPUBLICAN CONVENTION OF 1900
As a delegate to the National Republican Convention of 1900, I was
honored by my delegation with being selected to represent Mississippi on
the Committee on Platform and Resolutions; and by the chairman of that
committee, Senator Fairbanks, I was made a member of the sub-committee
that drafted the platform. At the first meeting of the sub-committee,
the Ohio member, Senator J.B. Foraker, submitted the draft of a platform
that had been prepared at Washington which was made the basis of quite a
lengthy and interesting discussion. This discussion developed the fact
that the Washington draft was not at all satisfactory to a majority of
the sub-committee. The New York member, Hon. L.E. Quigg, was especially
pronounced in his objections, not so much to what was declared, but to
the manner and form in which the declarations were made. In his opinion,
the principles of the party were not set forth in the Washington draft
in language that would make them clearly understood and easily
comprehended by the reading public. After every member who desired to
speak had done so, it was agreed that those who desired amendments,
changes, or additions should submit the same in writing, and that these
with the Washington draft be turned over to Mr. Quigg as a sub-committee
of one. A platform in harmony with the views expressed by members of the
committee would then be carefully prepared, and the same submitted to
the sub-committee at an adjourned meeting to be held at an early hour
the next morning.
The only amendment suggested by me was one, the purpose of which was to
express more clearly the attitude of the party with reference to the
enforcement of the war amendments to the National Constitution. When the
sub-committee met the next morning Mr. Quigg submitted an entirely new
draft, which he had prepared the afternoon and night before, using the
Washington draft and the amendments submitted by members of the
sub-committee as the basis of what he had done. His draft proved to be
so satisfactory to the sub-committee that it was accepted and adopted
with very slight modifications. Mr. Quigg seemed to have been very
careful in the preparation of his draft, not only giving expression to
the views of the sub-committee, which had been developed in the
discussion, and as had been set forth in the suggested amendments
referred to him, but the manner and form of expression used by him
impressed the committee as being a decided improvement upon the
Washington draft, although the subject matter in both drafts was
substantially the same. Mr. Quigg's draft, with very slight changes and
alterations, was not only accepted and adopted, but he was the recipient
of the thanks of the other members for the excellent manner in which he
had discharged the important duty that had been assigned him.
The full committee was then convened by which the unanimous report of
the sub-committee was adopted without opposition and without change. But
I had anticipated a renewal of the effort to change the basis of
representation in future National Republican Conventions, and had,
therefore, made some little mental preparation to take a leading part in
opposition to its adoption. Such a proposition had been submitted at
nearly every National Convention of the party since 1884. That a similar
effort would be made at this convention I had good reasons to believe.
In this I was not mistaken. It was introduced by Senator Quay, of
Pennsylvania. His proposition, like the others, was that in the future
delegates to the National Convention should be apportioned among the
different States upon the basis of the votes polled for the party
candidates at the last preceding national election, instead of upon the
basis of the States' representation in Congress. On the first view this
proposition seems to be both reasonable and fair, but it cannot stand
the test of an intelligent analysis. As soon as I sought and secured
the recognition of the chair, I offered an amendment in the nature of a
substitute, declaring it to be the judgment of the party that in all
States in which there had been an evasion of the Fifteenth Amendment by
State action, that there should be a reduction in the representation in
Congress from such State or States in the manner and for the purpose
expressed in the Fourteenth Amendment. A point of order was immediately
made against the amendment, but the occupant of the chair, Senator
Lodge, stated that he would hold his decision in reserve pending an
explanation by me of the amendment I had submitted. At that time a
suggestion was made that the whole subject be postponed until the next
day, to which I assented, and then yielded the floor. But it was not
again called up, hence my speech was never delivered. Since it may be of
some interest to the reader to get an idea of what I had in mind, I
shall here set down in the main what I intended to say on that occasion
had the opportunity been presented.
"Mr. Chairman, while there may be some doubt, in a parliamentary sense,
as to whether or not the amendment I have submitted can be entertained
as a substitute for the original proposition, it cannot be denied that
it relates to the same subject matter. I hope, therefore, that the
Convention will have an opportunity in some way of voting upon it in
lieu of the one that has been presented by the distinguished gentleman
from Pennsylvania. It is a well-known fact that under the present system
each State is entitled to double the number of delegates that it has
Senators and Representatives in Congress. The plan now proposed is that
the apportionment in future conventions be based upon the number of
votes polled for the candidates of the party at the last preceding
National election, according to what is known as the 'official returns,'
although it may be a fact, as is unquestionably true in some States,
that the 'official returns' may not be free from fraud,--that they may
represent in some instances not the actual party vote polled, but the
party vote counted, certified, and returned. This plan, therefore, means
that representation from some States in future National Republican
Conventions will not be based upon Republican strength, nor determined
by Republican votes, but will be fixed and determined by Democratic
election officials. In other words, Democrats, and not Republicans, will
fix and determine in a large measure, representation in future
Conventions of the Republican party.
"The proposed change is predicated upon the assumption that elections
are fair and returns are honest in all the States at each and every
National election. If that were true the difference in the
representation from the several States would be unimportant and
immaterial, even under the proposed change, hence there would be no
occasion for the change. The fact that this assumption is not true
furnishes the basis for the alleged inequality in representation, and
the apparent necessity for the change proposed. In addition to this it
is a well-known fact that in several of the Southern States,--my own,
Mississippi, among the number,--the Fifteenth Amendment to the National
Constitution has been practically nullified, and that the colored men in
such States have been as effectually disfranchised as if the Fifteenth
Amendment were not a part of the organic law of the land. If the plan
that is now proposed by the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania
should be adopted, the National Republican party by accepting them and
making them the basis of representation in future National Conventions
of the party will have thereby placed itself on record as having given
its sanction to the questionable methods by which these results have
been accomplished. I frankly confess that the plan I have presented is
based upon the humiliating confession that the Government is without
power under the Constitution as construed by the Supreme Court to
effectually enforce the war amendments; and that in consequence thereof
nothing is left to be done but to fall back upon the plan prescribed by
the Fourteenth Amendment, which is to reduce the representation in
Congress from such States in the manner and for the purposes therein
stated.
"It is true that the Fourteenth Amendment having been proposed and
submitted prior to the Fifteenth, the provision with reference to
reduction of representation in Congress was predicated upon the
assumption that the different States could then legally make race or
color a ground of discrimination in prescribing the qualification of
electors. Still, it occurs to me that if a State could be thus punished
for doing that which it had a legal right to do, the same punishment can
now be inflicted for doing that which it can no longer legally do. If
the plan proposed by the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania
should be adopted, the Republican party will not only have placed itself
on record as having given its sanction to the methods by which these
results will have been accomplished, but it will be notice to the
different States, north as well as south, that any of them that may see
fit to take advantage of their own wrongs will have no occasion to fear
any future punishment being inflicted upon the State for so doing. Under
the plan thus proposed the State that may thus take advantage of its own
wrongs will not only receive no punishment in the reduction of its
representation in Congress, but its methods and practices will have been
approved and adopted by the Republican party.
"On the other hand, the plan I propose is one which is equivalent to a
notice to the different States that, while the National Government may
not be able to enforce by appropriate legislation the war amendments to
the Constitution, the Legislative department of the Government can
prevent a State from taking advantage of its own wrongs, through the
infliction of a punishment upon the State in the reduction of its
representation in Congress. Since representation in the National
Convention is based upon the States' representation in Congress, it will
be seen that if the representation in Congress from such States should
be reduced, it would result in a reduction in the representation from
such States in the National Convention. The main purpose, therefore,
which the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania seems to have in
view will have been practically accomplished, but in a far different and
in a much less objectionable way. It will be some satisfaction to
southern Republicans, who are denied access to the ballot-box through an
evasion of the National Constitution, to know that if they are to be
denied a voice in future National Conventions of the party to which they
belong, because they are unable to make their votes effective at the
ballot-box, the party or State by which they are thus wronged will not
be allowed to take advantage of, and enjoy the fruits thereof. They will
at least have the satisfaction of knowing that if they cannot vote
themselves, others cannot vote for them, and thus appropriate to
themselves the increased representation in Congress and in the electoral
college to which the State is entitled, based upon their representative
strength.
"The strongest point in favor of this proposed change, as I have
endeavored to show, grows out of the apparent inequality in
representation in the National Convention due to the denial of access to
the ballot-box to Republicans through an evasion of the Fifteenth
Amendment. I cannot believe, Mr. Chairman, that this convention can be
induced to favorably consider any proposition, the effect of which will
be to sanction and approve the questionable methods by which the colored
Republicans in several Southern States have been disfranchised. I cannot
believe that this convention can be induced to favorably consider any
proposition, the effect of which will be the sending of a message of
sympathy and encouragement to the Democrats of North Carolina, who are
now engaged in an effort to disfranchise the colored Republicans of that
State.
"The colored Americans ask no special favors as a class,--and no special
protection as a race. All they ask and insist upon is equal civil and
political rights, and a voice in the government under which they live,
and to which they owe allegiance, and for the support of which they are
taxed. They feel that they are entitled to such consideration and
treatment, not as a matter of favor but as a matter of right. They came
to the rescue of their country when its flag was trailing in the dust of
treason and rebellion, and freely watered the tree of liberty with the
precious and patriotic blood that flowed from their loyal veins.
"There sits upon the floor of this convention to-day a distinguished
gentleman whose name is upon the lips of every patriotic American
citizen. The gentleman to whom I refer, is the member from the great and
important State of New York, Theodore Roosevelt, who, as the brave
leader of the American troops, led the charge upon San Juan Hill. In
following the lead of that gallant officer on that momentous occasion,
the colored American again vindicated his right to a voice in the
government of his country. In his devotion to the cause of liberty and
justice the colored American has shown that he was not only willing and
ready at any and all times to sacrifice his life upon the altar of his
own country, but that he is also willing to fight side by side with his
white American brother in an effort to plant the tree of liberty upon a
foreign soil. Must it now be said, that, in spite of all this, the
colored American finds himself without a home, without a country,
without friends, and even without a party? God forbid!
"Mr. Chairman, the colored American has been taught to believe that when
all other parties and organizations are against him, he can always look
with hope and encouragement to conventions of the Republican party. Must
that hope now be destroyed? Must he now be made to feel and to realize
the unpleasant fact that, as an American citizen, his ambition, his
hopes and his aspirations are to be buried beneath the sod of
disappointment and despair? Mr. Chairman, the achievements of the
Republican party as the friend and champion of equal civil and political
rights for all classes of American citizens, constitute one of the most
brilliant chapters in the history of that grand and magnificent
organization. Must that chapter now be blotted out? Are you now prepared
to confess that in these grand and glorious achievements the party made
a grave mistake?
"It was a most beautiful and imposing scene that took place yesterday
when a number of venerable men who took part in the organization of the
Republican party, occupied seats upon the platform of this convention.
The presence of those men brought to mind pleasant and agreeable
recollections of the past. Until the Republican party was organized, the
middle classes, the laboring people, the oppressed and the slave had no
channel through which to reach the bar of public opinion. The Democratic
party was controlled by the slave oligarchy of the South, whilst the
Whig party had not the courage of its convictions. The Republican party
came to the front with a determination to secure, if possible, freedom
for the slave, liberty for the oppressed, and justice and fair play for
all classes and races of our population. That its efforts in these
directions have not been wholly in vain are among the most glorious and
brilliant achievements that will constitute a most important part of the
history of our country; for it had been the unmistakable determination
of that party to make this beautiful country of ours in truth and in
fact the land of the free and the home of the brave. Surely it is not
your purpose now to reverse and undo any part of the grand and noble
work that has been so successfully and so well done along these lines.
"And yet that is just what you will have done if you adopt the
proposition presented by the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania.
While I do not assert and cannot believe that such was or is the purpose
and desire of the author of that proposition, yet no one that will give
the matter careful consideration can fail to see that the effect of it
will be to undo, in part at least, what the Republican party has
accomplished since its organization. As a colored Republican, speaking
in behalf of that class of our fellow citizens who honor and revere the
Republican party for what it has accomplished in the past, I feel that I
have a right to appeal to you not to cloud the magnificent record which
this grand organization has made. So far as the colored man is
concerned, you found him a slave; you have made him a free man. You
found him a serf; you have made him a sovereign. You found him a
dependent menial; you have made him a soldier. I therefore appeal to the
members of this Convention, in the name of the history of the Republican
party, and in behalf of justice and fair-play, to vote down this unjust,
unfair, unwise and unnecessary proposition which has been presented by
the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania."
CHAPTER XXX
ARGUMENT ON PROPOSED CHANGE OF REPRESENTATION IN CONVENTION
In addition to the reasons already given there are many others that
might be urged against the proposed change of representation.
In the first place, the present plan is based upon the sound and stable
principle upon which the Government was organized. Representation in
Congress is not based upon votes or voters, but upon population. The
same is true of the different State Legislatures. All political
parties,--or, at any rate, the principal ones,--have adopted the same
system in the make-up of their State and National Conventions. The
membership of the National Convention being based upon each State's
representation in Congress, the State Conventions, with perhaps a few
exceptions, are based upon the representation in the State Legislatures
from each county, parish, or other civil division. It is the fairest,
safest, best, and most equitable plan that can be devised or adopted.
Under this plan or system, no State, section or locality can gain or
lose representation in any party convention through the application of
extraneous or questionable methods, either by the action of the
government or of a political party. The representation in Congress and
in the different State Legislatures, which is based upon population,
fixes the representation from each State in the different National
Conventions and in many of the State Conventions. Any other plan or
system,--especially that which is based upon the number of votes cast
for the candidates of the party as officially ascertained and
declared,--would have a tendency to work serious injustice to certain
States and sections. In fact, it would have a tendency to sectionalize
the party by which the change is made.
Under the present system, for instance, Pennsylvania and Texas have the
same representation in a National Democratic Convention that they have
in a National Republican Convention, although one is usually Republican
in National elections and the other Democratic. And why should not the
representation from those States be the same in both conventions? Why
should Texas, because it is believed to be safely Democratic, have more
power and influence in a Democratic Convention on that account than the
Republican State of Pennsylvania? The answer may be because one is a
Democratic and the other a Republican State--because one can be relied
upon to give its electoral votes to the candidates of the Democratic
party while the other cannot. But this is not in harmony with our
governmental system. Representation in Congress being based upon
population, every State, section and locality has its relative weight
and influence in the government in accordance with the number of its
inhabitants.
That this is the correct principle will not be seriously questioned when
it is carefully considered. What is true of Pennsylvania and Texas in a
National Democratic Convention is equally true of the same States in a
National Republican Convention, and for the same reasons. The argument
that Pennsylvania should have relatively a larger representation in a
National Republican Convention than Texas, because the former is
reliably Republican while the latter is hopelessly Democratic, is just
as fallacious in this case as in the other. But it is said that
delegates from States that cannot contribute to the success of the
ticket should not have a potential voice in nominating a ticket that
other States must be depended upon to elect. Then why not exclude them
altogether, and also those from the territories and the District of
Columbia?
The argument is unsound, and unreasonable; a State may be reliably
Republican at one election and yet go Democratic at the next. In 1872
General Grant, the Republican candidate for President, carried nearly
every State in the Union, in the South as well as in the North. Four
years later Governor Hayes, the Republican candidate for President,
came within one vote of being defeated in the electoral college; and
even then his election was made possible only through the decision of
the Electoral Commission. In 1880 General Garfield, the Republican
candidate for President, carried New York, and was elected; while four
years later Mr. Blaine, the candidate of the same party, lost it and was
defeated. In 1888 Harrison, the Republican Presidential candidate,
carried New York, and was elected; four years later he not only lost New
York, but also such important States as Indiana and Illinois, and came
within a few votes of losing Ohio. This was due to a slump in the
Republican vote throughout the country, which would have made a very
radical change in the National Convention of 1896 if the apportionment
of delegates to that convention had been based upon the votes cast for
Harrison in 1892. While McKinley, the Republican Presidential candidate,
was elected by a large majority in 1896, he lost such important Western
States as Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, Montana, Washington and Nevada.
While he was reëlected four years later by an increased majority, he
again lost some of the same States. While Roosevelt, the Republican
Presidential candidate in 1904, carried every State that McKinley
carried in 1900, and several others besides, Mr. Bryan, the Democratic
candidate in 1908, though defeated by a large majority, regained some
of the Western States that Roosevelt carried in 1904,--notably his own
State of Nebraska.
There was a time when such States as Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia,
Kentucky, Missouri, and Tennessee were as safely Democratic as Texas and
Georgia. Will anyone assert that such is true of them now? There also
was a time when such States as Nebraska, Colorado and Nevada were as
reliably Republican as Pennsylvania and Vermont. Is that true of them
now? In addition to these, taking into consideration important elections
that have been held since 1880, the Republicans cannot absolutely rely
upon the support of such States as Massachusetts, Maine, Connecticut,
New York, New Jersey, Indiana, Illinois, Kansas, and even Ohio. Even the
strong Republican State of Pennsylvania has occasionally gone Democratic
in what is called an "off year." Other Republican States,--or States
that usually go Republican,--have gone Democratic when it was not an off
year,--Illinois, for instance, in 1892. All of this goes to prove how
unreliable, unsafe, unsatisfactory, unjust and unfair would be the
change in the basis of representation as thus proposed.
Another argument in support of the proposed change is that delegates
from Democratic States are, as a rule, controlled by the administration
then in power, if Republican, and that such delegates can be depended
upon to support the administration candidate whoever he may be,
regardless of merit, strength or availability. This argument, of course,
is based upon the assumption that what is true of Democratic States in
this respect is not true of Republican States. The slightest
investigation will easily establish the fallacy of this assumption. The
truth is that the federal office-holders--especially those holding
appointive offices,--can, with a few exceptions, always be depended upon
to support the Administration candidate, whoever he may be. The only
difference between the North and the South in this respect is that in
some of the Southern States, where but one party is allowed to
exist,--the Democratic party,--the Republican office-holders can more
easily manipulate and control the conventions of their party in such
States. But that the office-holders of all sections constitute an
important factor in the election of delegates to the National
Conventions will not be denied by those who are familiar with the facts,
and are honest enough to admit them.
For purposes of illustration we will take the National Republican
Convention of 1908, which nominated Judge Taft. It was known that Judge
Taft was the man whose candidacy was supported by the Administration.
The proceedings of the Convention revealed the fact that outside of five
States that had what were called "favorite son" candidates of their
own, there were perhaps not more than fifty votes in the whole
Convention that were opposed to the administration candidate, although
it is more than probable that Judge Taft would not have been nominated
but for the fact that he was the choice of the administration.
I am sure no fair-minded person will assert that, in thus voting, the
delegates from the Democratic States were influenced by the
administration, while those from Republican States were not. It is not
my purpose to assert or even intimate that any questionable methods were
used to influence the election, or control the votes of the delegates in
the interest of any one candidate. Nothing of that sort was necessary,
since human nature is the same the world over.
That the office-holders should be loyal to the administration to which
they belong is perfectly natural. That those who wish to become
office-holders should be anxious to be on the winning side is also
natural, and that, too, without regard to the locality or section in
which they live. It is a fact, therefore, that up to 1908 no candidate
has ever been nominated by a Republican National Convention who did not
finally receive a sufficient number of votes from all sections of the
country to make his nomination practically the choice of the party
without regard to sectional lines.
If, then, it be a fact that in 1908, for instance, delegates to the
National Republican Convention were elected and controlled through
administration influences in the interest of any one candidate, such
influences were no less potential in Republican than in Democratic
States. Outside of the administration candidate there were at that
Convention five very important States that presented candidates of their
own. They were New York, Indiana, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
That the delegation from each of said States were practically solid in
the support of its "favorite son" was due largely to the wise decision
of the managers of the administration candidate to concede to each of
said "favorite sons" the delegation from his own State without a
contest. But for this decision, which was wisely made in the interest of
party harmony, no one of those "favorite sons" would have had the solid
delegation from his own State. As it was, a large majority of the
delegates from the five States named was not unfriendly to the
Administration candidate. These delegates voted for their "favorite
sons" simply because they knew that in doing so they were not
antagonizing the administration. There never was a time, therefore, when
they could have been united upon any one candidate in opposition to the
one that had at his back the powerful support of the Administration. Our
government has reached that point in its growth, where it is not only
possible, but comparatively easy, for an administration to secure the
nomination of the one by whom it desires to be succeeded,--especially
under the present system of electing delegates. It was in anticipation
of this, and to prevent any one man from perpetuating himself in power,
that Washington established the precedent against a third successive
term.
If the advocates of this proposed change are to be believed, and if they
wish to be consistent, they should include the National Committee. The
composition of that body is somewhat similar to that of the United
States Senate. In the Senate Nevada and Delaware have the same
representation as New York and Pennsylvania. In the National Committee
each State, territory, and the District of Columbia has one vote. If any
change in the interest of reform is necessary, the National Republican
Committee is the organization where it should first be made; for it
often happens that that committee can not only shape the policy of the
party but control the nomination as well,--especially when the result
between opposing candidates is close and doubtful. In such a contest the
candidate that has the support of a majority of the National Committee
has a decided advantage over his rivals for the nomination. If the
result should be close that advantage will be more than likely to secure
him the nomination.
The National Committee prepares the roll of the delegates to the
Convention, and, in doing so, it decides primarily every contested
seat. If the contests thus decided should give any one candidate a
majority, that majority will be sure to retain the advantage thus
secured. It will thus be seen that if any change is necessary this is
the place where it should first be made. It occurs to me that instead of
changing the basis of representation the most effective remedy for the
evils now complained of is to have the delegates to National Conventions
elected at popular primaries, instead of by State and district
conventions.
CHAPTER XXXI
COMPARISON OF BRYAN AND CLEVELAND
It was upon the territory which now comprises the States of Kansas and
Nebraska that the preliminary battles in the interest of freedom were
successfully fought. This is especially true of that part of the
territory which now comprises the State of Kansas. But not only for that
reason has that State occupied a prominent place before the public;
other events of national importance have had their birth there. It was
Kansas that furnished one of the Republican United State Senators who
voted against the conviction, of Andrew Johnson,--who had been impeached
by the House of Representatives for high crimes and misdemeanors in
office,--and thus secured the President's acquittal. That State also
furnished one of the most remarkable men that ever occupied a seat in
the United States Senate, John J. Ingalls.
I distinctly remember him as an able and brilliant young Senator
when,--in 1875, under the leadership of Senator George F. Edmunds, of
Vermont,--he took a prominent part in the successful fight that was made
in that body to secure the passage of the Sumner Civil Rights Bill. It
was this fight that demonstrated his fitness for the position he
subsequently occupied as one of the distinguished leaders on the
Republican side of the Senate. He was a natural born orator, having a
wonderful command of the English language; and, while he was somewhat
superficial and not always logical, he never failed to be interesting,
though he was seldom instructive. For severe satire and irony he had few
equals and no superiors. It was on this account that no Senator was
anxious to get into a controversy with him. But for two unfortunate
events in the career of John J. Ingalls he would have filled a much more
important position in the history of his country than it is now possible
for the impartial historian to give him.
Kansas, unfortunately, proved to be a fertile field for the growth and
development of that ephemeral organization known as the Populist
party,--a party that had secured a majority in the Legislature that was
to elect the successor to Mr. Ingalls. The Senator evidently had great
confidence in his own oratorical ability. He appeared to have conceived
the idea that it was possible for him to make a speech on the floor of
the Senate that would insure his reëlection even by a Populist
Legislature. In this,--as he soon found out, to his bitter
disappointment,--he was mistaken. He no doubt came to the same
conclusion that many of his friends and admirers had already come to,
that in bidding for the support of the Populists of his State he had
made the mistake of his life. The impression he made upon the public
mind was that he was devoid of principle, and that he was willing to
sacrifice his own party upon the altar of his ambition.
But it was neither known nor suspected that he contemplated making a bid
for the support of the Populist members of the Legislature until he
delivered his speech. When, therefore, it was announced that Senator
Ingalls would address the Senate on a certain day, he was greeted, as on
previous occasions, with a large audience. But this was the first time
that his hearers had been sadly disappointed. This was due more to what
was said than how it was said. Then it was plain to those who heard him
that his heart was not in what he was saying; hence the speech was
devoid of that fiery eloquence which on previous occasions had charmed
and electrified his hearers. But, after that speech, when one of his
auditors would ask another what he thought of it, the reply invariably
was a groan of disappointment. When the immense crowd dispersed at the
conclusion of the speech instead of smiling faces and pleasing
countenances as on previous occasions, one could not help noticing
marked evidences of disappointment in every face. The impression that
had been made was, that it was an appeal to the Populist members of the
Legislature of his State to return him to the Senate, in exchange for
which he was willing to turn his back upon the party which he was then
serving. It was almost equivalent to an open declaration of his
willingness to identify himself with the Populists, and champion their
cause if they would reelect him to the seat he then occupied. From the
effects of that fatal blunder the Senator never recovered.
Another thing that lessened the distinguished orator and Senator in the
estimation of the public was his radically changed attitude upon
questions affecting the political, social and industrial status of the
colored Americans. From a brilliant and eloquent champion and defender
of their civil and political rights he became one of their most severe
critics. From his latest utterances upon that subject it was clear to
those who heard what he said that the colored Americans merited nothing
that had been said and done in their behalf, but nearly everything that
had been said and done against them. Why there had been such a radical
change in his attitude upon that subject, has been an inexplicable
mystery. The only explanation that I have heard from the lips of some of
his former friends and admirers was that it was in the nature of an
experiment,--the expectation being that it would give him a sensational
fame throughout the country, which could be utilized to his financial
advantage upon his retirement to private life. This explanation would
have been rejected without serious consideration, but for the fact that
some others have pursued the same course for the same reason, and their
hopes have been, in a large measure, realized. In his bid for the
support of the Populist members of the Legislature of his State the
Senator had established the fact that he did not have very strong
convictions upon any subject, and that those he had could be easily
changed to suit the times and the occasion.
Nebraska, though not very strong politically, is one of the most
important States in the West. It has sent a number of men to the front
who have made an impression upon the public mind. For many years no
State in the Union was more reliably Republican than Nebraska. A large
majority of its voters, I am sure, are not now in harmony with the
Democratic party,--nor have they ever been so,--but it is true, at the
same time, that thousands of those who for many years acted with the
Republican party, and voted for its candidates, have become alienated,
thus making Republican success at any election in the State close and
doubtful, and that, too, regardless of the merits of opposing candidates
or the platform declarations of opposing parties.
For this remarkable change there must be a good and sufficient reason.
The State in its early history was sparsely populated, and stood very
much in need of railroads for the development of its resources. In
those days, railroads were very popular, and the people were in a mood
to offer liberal inducements to those who would raise the means to
furnish them with the necessary transportation facilities.
For the same reason the Federal Government made valuable concessions in
the interest of railroad construction in the Western States. Since the
railroads, thus aided, were in a large measure the creatures of the
State and Nation they thereby acquired an interest in the administration
of the National and State Governments,--especially those of the
State,--that they otherwise would not have had.
The construction of the roads went on at such a rapid rate that they
soon acquired such a power and influence in the administration of the
State Government that the people looked upon it as being dangerous to
their liberties. In fact it was claimed,--a claim, no doubt, largely
supported by the facts,--that the State Government was actually
dominated by railroad influence. No one, it was said, could be elected
or appointed to an important office who was not acceptable to the
railroad interests. This state of affairs produced a revulsion among the
common people; thousands of whom decided that they would vote against
the Republican party, which was then,--as it had been for many
years,--in control of the State Government because of its having
allowed such a state of affairs to be brought about.
Edward Rosewater, editor and proprietor of the Omaha _Bee_, the most
influential Republican paper in the State, took sides against the
railroad interests. The result was that Nebraska, for the first time,
elected a Democratic governor.
But many of the Republicans who acted with the Democrats on that
occasion could not see their way clear to remain in that party, though
some of them were not willing to return to the ranks of the Republicans.
So they decided to cast their lot with the Populist party, which in the
meantime had made its appearance upon the field of political activity.
While the Democratic party remained the minority party in the State, it
was seldom that the Republicans could poll more votes than the Democrats
and Populists combined, and since, under the then leadership of the
Democratic party in the State, that party and the Populist stood
practically for the same things, it was not difficult to bring about
fusion of the two parties against the Republicans. This gave the
Fusionists control of the State Government for a number of years.
In the meantime a brilliant, eloquent and talented young man had come
upon the stage of political activity. This man was William J. Bryan. His
first entry into public life was his election to Congress as a Democrat
from a Republican district. While a member of the House he made a
speech on the tariff question which gave him national fame. As a speaker
William Jennings Bryan has always been plausible and captivating. He can
clothe his thoughts in such beautiful and eloquent language that he
seldom fails to make a favorable impression upon those who hear him. It
was this wonderful faculty that secured him his first nomination for the
Presidency. His name was hardly thought of in connection with the
nomination by that convention. In fact his right to a seat as a member
of the convention was disputed and contested. But, after he had
delivered his cross of gold and crown of thorns speech before that body,
he carried the Convention by storm. His nomination was then a foregone
conclusion.
It was under the leadership and chiefly through the influence of Mr.
Bryan that the fusion between the Democrats and the Populists of his
State was brought about. But for his advocacy of Free Silver and his
affiliation with the Populists, he might have reached the goal of his
ambition. The result of the election showed that while he commanded and
received the support of not less than eighty per cent of his own party,
the remaining twenty per cent proved to be strong enough to insure his
defeat. In fact the business interests of the country were almost solid
against him; and it is safe to say that no man can ever hope to become
President of the United States who cannot at least divide the
substantial and solid business interests. The business men were
apprehensive that the election of Mr. Bryan would bring about financial
and commercial disaster, hence they, almost regardless of previous party
affiliations, practically united in an effort to defeat him.
The State of Nebraska, therefore, will always occupy a prominent place
in the history of the country, because,--though young, small, and
politically weak,--it has produced the most remarkable man of whom the
Democratic party can boast. It has also produced a number of very able
men on the Republican side, such men, for instance, as C.F. Manderson,
and John M. Thurston,--who both served the State in the United States
Senate, and made brilliant records. But Mr. Bryan had an advantage over
these two when he stood before a popular audience in Nebraska, because
they had been identified with the railroad interests, while he had not.
That Mr. Bryan is a strong man and has a wonderful hold upon his party
is shown by the fact that he has been three times the party candidate
for the Presidency. While it may be true that he can never be elected to
the Presidency, it is no doubt equally true that while he lives no other
Democrat can become President who is not acceptable to him and to his
friends.
In one respect at least, Mr. Cleveland and Mr. Bryan were very much
alike. As already stated, Mr. Bryan is a Democrat. The same was true of
Mr. Cleveland; and yet they were as radically different as it is
possible for two men to be. They were not only different in temperament
and disposition, but also in their views and convictions upon public
questions,--at least, so far as the public is informed,--with the
possible exception of the tariff. There was another question that came
to the front after the Spanish American war,--the question of
"Imperialism,"--upon which they may have been in accord; but this is not
positively known to be a fact. Indeed, the tariff is such a complicated
subject that they may not have been in perfect accord even on that. Mr.
Cleveland was elected President in 1892 upon a platform pledged to a
tariff for revenue only. The Democrats had a majority in both Houses of
Congress; but when that majority passed a tariff bill, it fell so far
short of Mr. Cleveland's idea of a tariff for revenue only that he not
only denounced it in strong language, but refused to sign it. Whether or
not Mr. Bryan was with the President or with the Democratic majority in
Congress in that fight is not known; but, judging from his previous
public utterances upon the subject, it is to be presumed that he was in
accord with the President.
It is claimed by the friends and admirers of both Mr. Cleveland and Mr.
Bryan that each could be truly called a Jeffersonian Democrat; which
means a strong advocate and defender of what is called States Rights, a
doctrine on which is based one of the principal differences between the
Republican and Democratic parties. Yet President Cleveland did not
hesitate to use the military force of the government to suppress
domestic violence within the boundaries of a State, and that too against
the protest of the Governor of the State, for the alleged reason that
such action was necessary to prevent the interruption of the carrying of
the United States mail. Mr. Bryan's views upon the same subject appear
to be sufficiently elastic to justify the National Government, in his
opinion, in becoming the owner and operator of the principal railroads
of the country. His views along those lines are so far in advance of
those of his party that he was obliged, for reasons of political
expediency and party exigency, to hold them in abeyance during the
Presidential campaign of 1908. Jeffersonian democracy, therefore, seems
now to be nothing more than a meaningless form of expression.
CHAPTER XXXII
THE SOLID SOUTH, PAST AND PRESENT. FUTURE OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
To turn again to the South. This section has been a fertile field for
political experimental purposes by successive Republican
administrations, ever since the second administration of President
Grant. The Solid South, so-called, has been a serious menace to the
peace and prosperity of the country. How to bring about such a condition
of affairs as would do away with the supposed necessity for its
continuance has been the problem, the solution of which has been the
cause of political experiments. President Hayes was the first to try the
experiment of appointing Democrats to many of the most important
offices, hoping that the solution would thus be found. But he was not
given credit for honest motives in doing so, for the reason that the
public was impressed with the belief that such action on his part was
one of the conditions upon which he was allowed to be peaceably
inaugurated. At any rate the experiment was a complete failure, hence,
so far as the more important offices were concerned, that policy was not
continued by Republican administrations that came into power subsequent
to the Hayes administration, and prior to that of Taft's.
I do not mean to say that no Democrats were appointed to important
offices at the South by the administrations referred to, but such
appointments were not made with the belief or expectation that they
would contribute to a solution of the problem that was involved in what
was known as the Solid South. Political and social conditions in that
section of the country are such that the appointment to some of the
federal offices of men who are not identified with the Republican party
is inevitable. The impression that the writer desires to make upon the
mind of the reader is that, between the administration of Hayes and that
of Taft no Republican administrations made such appointments with the
expectation that they would contribute to a breaking up of the solid
south. President Roosevelt tried the experiment of offering
encouragement and inducements in that direction to what was known as the
Gold-standard Democrats, but even that was barren of satisfactory
results. President Taft seems to be the only Republican President since
Mr. Hayes who has allowed himself to labor under the delusion that the
desired result could be accomplished through the use and distribution of
Federal patronage. The chief mistake on the part of those who thus
believe, and who act in accordance with that belief, grows out of a
serious lack of information about the actual situation. In the first
place their action is based upon the assumption that the Solid
South,--or what remains of it,--is an outgrowth of an honest expression
of the wishes of the people of that section, whereas, in point of fact,
the masses had very little to do with bringing about present conditions
and know less about them. Those conditions are not due primarily to the
fact that colored men are intimidated by white men, but that white men
are intimidated by the Democratic party. They are not due primarily to
the fact that colored men are disfranchised, but that white men are
prevented from giving effective expression to their honest political
opinions and convictions.
The disfranchisement of the colored men is one of the results growing
out of those conditions, which would not and could not exist if there
were absolute freedom of thought and action in political matters among
the white people. The only part that the so-called Race Question plays
in this business is that it is used as a pretext to justify the coercive
and proscriptive methods thus used. The fact that the colored man is
disfranchised and has no voice in the creation and administration of the
government under which he lives and by which he is taxed does not change
the situation in this respect. His presence,--whether he can vote or
not,--furnishes the occasion for the continuance of such methods, and,
as long as intelligent persons, especially at the North and particularly
in the Republican party, can be thus fooled and deceived they will not
be discontinued.
The announcement of President Taft's Southern policy, therefore, was
received by the present leaders of the Democratic party at the South
with satisfaction and delight, not on account of the official
recognition that members of their party were to receive, for that was of
secondary importance, but on account of the fact that they could clearly
see that their contention about the so-called race question was thus
given a national sanction, which would have the effect of making that
question serve them for several more Presidential campaigns. It was
giving a new market value to this "watered stock," from which they would
derive political dividends for a much longer period than they otherwise
would. They could thus see to their unbounded glee that if a man of
President Taft's intelligence and experience could thus be deceived as
to conditions at the South, they would not have very much difficulty in
deceiving others who were not believed to be so well informed.
To solve this problem, therefore, the disposition of the federal
patronage will cut a very small figure. The patronage question is not
half so important, in a political or party sense, as many have been led
to believe. It really makes very little difference by whom the few
offices are held, whether they be all Democrats, all Republicans, some
white, some colored, provided they be honest, capable, and efficient For
political, personal or party reasons some feeling may be created, and
some prejudice may be aroused on account of the appointment of a certain
person to an office; but if no attention should be paid to it, and the
fact should be developed that the duties of the same are being
discharged in a creditable and satisfactory manner the public will soon
forget all about it. The fact remains, however, that the disposition of
the federal patronage will not produce the slightest change in the
political situation in such localities. If a national Republican
administration should refuse to appoint a colored man, for instance, to
any office in any one of the Southern States for the alleged reason that
it might be objectionable to the white people of the community,--and
therefore might have a tendency to prevent white men from coming into
the Republican party,--at the very next election in that community the
fact would be demonstrated that the Republican party had not gained and
that the Democratic party had not lost a single vote as a result
thereof. The reason for this result would be in the first place that the
excuse given was insincere and untrue, and in the second place, because
the incumbent of the office, whoever he might be, would produce no
effect whatsoever in the local situation in consequence of his
appointment to the office and his acceptance of it. If there should be
any change at all in the situation it would doubtless be to the
detriment of the Republican party; for there would, no doubt, be some
who would be disposed to resent what would seem to them to be political
or party ingratitude.
So far as the colored Republicans are concerned they have been in the
past, and must be in the future, nothing more than party allies. They
have never dominated a State, nor have they controlled the Republican
organization of any State to the exclusion of the white men thereof.
They have simply been the allies of white men who could be induced to
come forward and assume the leadership. This is all they have been in
the past; it is all they desire to be in the future. They are perfectly
willing to follow where others lead provided those others lead wisely
and in the right direction. All they ask, desire and insist upon is to
be recognized as political allies upon terms of equality and to have a
voice in the councils of the party of their choice and in the creation
and administration of the government under which they live, and by which
they are taxed, and also a fair and reasonable recognition as a result
of party success, based, all things else being equal, upon merit,
fitness, ability and capacity. Even in States where it is possible for
them to wield a sufficient influence to be potential in party
conventions, and to help shape the policy and select the candidates of
that party, they never fail to support the strongest and best men among
the white members of the organization. If it be true that they were
sometimes the victims of misplaced confidence, it cannot, and will not,
be denied that the same is equally true of white men of far more
experience in such matters.
If there is ever to be again, as there once was, a strong and
substantial Republican party at the South, or a party by any other name
that will openly oppose the ruling oligarchy of that section,--as I have
every reason to believe will eventually take place,--it will not be
through the disposition of federal patronage, but in consequence of the
acceptance by the people of that section of the principles and policies
for which the National Organization stands. For the accomplishment of
this purpose and for the attainment of this end time is the most
important factor. Questionable methods that have been used to hold in
abeyance the advancing civilization of the age will eventually be
overcome and effectually destroyed. The wheels of progress, of
intelligence, and of right cannot and will not move backwards, but will
go forward in spite of all that can be said and done. In the mean time
the exercise of patience, forbearance, and good judgment are all that
will be required.
Another fact which seems to be overlooked by many is that the so-called
Solid South of to-day is not the menace to the country that it was
between 1875 and 1888. During that period the Solid South included the
States of Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri.
Those States at that time were as reliably Democratic as Texas and
Georgia. Such does not seem to be true of them now, and yet I venture
the assertion that the disposition of the federal patronage in them had
very little, if anything, to do with bringing about the change. What has
been done and is being done in those States can be done in others that
are located south of them. As strong as the Republican party is there is
one thing it cannot afford to do, and that is to encourage or tolerate
the drawing of the race or color line in any efforts that may be made to
break up and dissolve what now remains of the Solid South. One of the
cardinal principles and doctrines of the Republican party,--the
principle that has, more than any other, secured for it the loyal and
consistent support of those who represent the moral sentiment of the
country,--is its bold and aggressive advocacy and defense of liberty,
justice, and equal civil and political rights for all classes of
American citizens. From that grand and noble position it cannot afford
to descend in an effort to find new and doubtful allies. If it should in
an evil moment allow itself to make such a grave blunder, such a
criminal mistake, it will thereby forfeit the confidence and support of
the major part of those upon whom in the past it has relied,--and never
in vain,--for its continuance in power. There is nothing in the
situation that would justify the experiment, even if it were thought
that a little temporary and local advantage would be secured thereby.
The Fifteenth Amendment to the National Constitution was not intended to
confer suffrage upon any particular race or class of persons, but merely
to place a limit upon the National Government and that of the several
States in prescribing the qualifications of electors. Whatever power the
national or any state government may have had in prescribing the
qualification of electors prior to the ratification of the Fifteenth
Amendment it still has, save that it cannot legally and constitutionally
make race or color a ground of disqualification. In other words,
whatever qualifications may be prescribed and fixed as a condition
precedent to voting, must be applicable to white and colored alike. A
few States, under the false plea of political necessity, have resorted
to certain schemes of doubtful constitutionality, for the sole purpose
of evading this plain provision of the National Constitution. They may
stand for a while, but, even if they could stand indefinitely, that fact
would furnish no excuse for the party,--a party that has stood so long,
and fought so hard for liberty, justice, equal rights, and fair
play,--to enter into a political alliance with any other party or
faction which would involve a compromise or an abandonment of those
grand and noble principles. The Republican party is still in the prime
and glory of its usefulness. It is still strong in the confidence and
affections of the masses of the people, at least such was the case in
1908, because it had not up to that time allowed itself to compromise or
abandon,--so far as its platform utterances were concerned,--the
fundamental principles which called it into existence and which caused
it to be placed in control of the National Government, and which have
caused its continuance in power for so many years. Whether or not the
unwise and unfortunate southern policy inaugurated by the Taft
Administration will result in disaster to the party is not and cannot be
known at this writing. We can only hope.
THE END
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