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Title: The Thirty Years War, Book V.
Author: Frederich Schiller
Release Date: Oct, 2004 [EBook #6774]
[Yes, we are more than one year ahead of schedule]
[This file was first posted on January 14, 2003]
Edition: 10
Language: English
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 30 YEARS WAR, BY SCHILLER, BOOK V. ***
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THE WORKS
OF
FREDERICK SCHILLER
Translated from the German
Illustrated
HISTORY OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR IN GERMANY.
BOOK V.
Wallenstein's death rendered necessary the appointment of a new
generalissimo; and the Emperor yielded at last to the advice of the
Spaniards, to raise his son Ferdinand, King of Hungary, to that dignity.
Under him, Count Gallas commanded, who performed the functions of
commander-in-chief, while the prince brought to this post nothing but
his name and dignity. A considerable force was soon assembled under
Ferdinand; the Duke of Lorraine brought up a considerable body of
auxiliaries in person, and the Cardinal Infante joined him from Italy
with 10,000 men. In order to drive the enemy from the Danube, the new
general undertook the enterprise in which his predecessor had failed,
the siege of Ratisbon. In vain did Duke Bernard of Weimar penetrate
into the interior of Bavaria, with a view to draw the enemy from the
town; Ferdinand continued to press the siege with vigour, and the city,
after a most obstinate resistance, was obliged to open its gates to him.
Donauwerth soon shared the same fate, and Nordlingen in Swabia was now
invested. The loss of so many of the imperial cities was severely felt
by the Swedish party; as the friendship of these towns had so largely
contributed to the success of their arms, indifference to their fate
would have been inexcusable. It would have been an indelible disgrace,
had they deserted their confederates in their need, and abandoned them
to the revenge of an implacable conqueror. Moved by these
considerations, the Swedish army, under the command of Horn, and Bernard
of Weimar, advanced upon Nordlingen, determined to relieve it even at
the expense of a battle.
The undertaking was a dangerous one, for in numbers the enemy was
greatly superior to that of the Swedes. There was also a further reason
for avoiding a battle at present; the enemy's force was likely soon to
divide, the Italian troops being destined for the Netherlands. In the
mean time, such a position might be taken up, as to cover Nordlingen,
and cut off their supplies. All these grounds were strongly urged by
Gustavus Horn, in the Swedish council of war; but his remonstrances were
disregarded by men who, intoxicated by a long career of success, mistook
the suggestions of prudence for the voice of timidity. Overborne by the
superior influence of Duke Bernard, Gustavus Horn was compelled to risk
a contest, whose unfavourable issue, a dark foreboding seemed already to
announce. The fate of the battle depended upon the possession of a
height which commanded the imperial camp. An attempt to occupy it
during the night failed, as the tedious transport of the artillery
through woods and hollow ways delayed the arrival of the troops. When
the Swedes arrived about midnight, they found the heights in possession
of the enemy, strongly entrenched. They waited, therefore, for
daybreak, to carry them by storm. Their impetuous courage surmounted
every obstacle; the entrenchments, which were in the form of a crescent,
were successfully scaled by each of the two brigades appointed to the
service; but as they entered at the same moment from opposite sides,
they met and threw each other into confusion. At this unfortunate
moment, a barrel of powder blew up, and created the greatest disorder
among the Swedes. The imperial cavalry charged upon their broken ranks,
and the flight became universal. No persuasion on the part of their
general could induce the fugitives to renew the assault.
He resolved, therefore, in order to carry this important post, to lead
fresh troops to the attack. But in the interim, some Spanish regiments
had marched in, and every attempt to gain it was repulsed by their
heroic intrepidity. One of the duke's own regiments advanced seven
times, and was as often driven back. The disadvantage of not occupying
this post in time, was quickly and sensibly felt. The fire of the
enemy's artillery from the heights, caused such slaughter in the
adjacent wing of the Swedes, that Horn, who commanded there, was forced
to give orders to retire. Instead of being able to cover the retreat of
his colleague, and to check the pursuit of the enemy, Duke Bernard,
overpowered by numbers, was himself driven into the plain, where his
routed cavalry spread confusion among Horn's brigade, and rendered the
defeat complete. Almost the entire infantry were killed or taken
prisoners. More than 12,000 men remained dead upon the field of battle;
80 field pieces, about 4,000 waggons, and 300 standards and colours fell
into the hands of the Imperialists. Horn himself, with three other
generals, were taken prisoners. Duke Bernard with difficulty saved a
feeble remnant of his army, which joined him at Frankfort.
The defeat at Nordlingen, cost the Swedish Chancellor the second
sleepless night he had passed in Germany.--[The first was occasioned by
the death of Gustavus Adolphus.]--The consequences of this disaster were
terrible. The Swedes had lost by it at once their superiority in the
field, and with it the confidence of their confederates, which they had
gained solely by their previous military success. A dangerous division
threatened the Protestant Confederation with ruin. Consternation and
terror seized upon the whole party; while the Papists arose with
exulting triumph from the deep humiliation into which they had sunk.
Swabia and the adjacent circles first felt the consequences of the
defeat of Nordlingen; and Wirtemberg, in particular, was overrun by the
conquering army. All the members of the League of Heilbronn trembled at
the prospect of the Emperor's revenge; those who could, fled to
Strasburg, while the helpless free cities awaited their fate with alarm.
A little more of moderation towards the conquered, would have quickly
reduced all the weaker states under the Emperor's authority; but the
severity which was practised, even against those who voluntarily
surrendered, drove the rest to despair, and roused them to a vigorous
resistance.
In this perplexity, all looked to Oxenstiern for counsel and assistance;
Oxenstiern applied for both to the German States. Troops were wanted;
money likewise, to raise new levies, and to pay to the old the arrears
which the men were clamorously demanding. Oxenstiern addressed himself
to the Elector of Saxony; but he shamefully abandoned the Swedish cause,
to negociate for a separate peace with the Emperor at Pirna. He
solicited aid from the Lower Saxon States; but they, long wearied of the
Swedish pretensions and demands for money, now thought only of
themselves; and George, Duke of Lunenburg, in place of flying to the
assistance of Upper Germany, laid siege to Minden, with the intention of
keeping possession of it for himself. Abandoned by his German allies,
the chancellor exerted himself to obtain the assistance of foreign
powers. England, Holland, and Venice were applied to for troops and
money; and, driven to the last extremity, the chancellor reluctantly
resolved to take the disagreeable step which he had so long avoided, and
to throw himself under the protection of France.
The moment had at last arrived which Richelieu had long waited for with
impatience. Nothing, he was aware, but the impossibility of saving
themselves by any other means, could induce the Protestant States in
Germany to support the pretensions of France upon Alsace. This extreme
necessity had now arrived; the assistance of that power was
indispensable, and she was resolved to be well paid for the active part
which she was about to take in the German war. Full of lustre and
dignity, it now came upon the political stage. Oxenstiern, who felt
little reluctance in bestowing the rights and possessions of the empire,
had already ceded the fortress of Philipsburg, and the other long
coveted places. The Protestants of Upper Germany now, in their own
names, sent a special embassy to Richelieu, requesting him to take
Alsace, the fortress of Breyssach, which was still to be recovered from
the enemy, and all the places upon the Upper Rhine, which were the keys
of Germany, under the protection of France. What was implied by French
protection had been seen in the conduct of France towards the bishoprics
of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, which it had held for centuries against the
rightful owners. Treves was already in the possession of French
garrisons; Lorraine was in a manner conquered, as it might at any time
be overrun by an army, and could not, alone, and with its own strength,
withstand its formidable neighbour. France now entertained the hope of
adding Alsace to its large and numerous possessions, and,--since a
treaty was soon to be concluded with the Dutch for the partition of the
Spanish Netherlands--the prospect of making the Rhine its natural
boundary towards Germany. Thus shamefully were the rights of Germany
sacrificed by the German States to this treacherous and grasping power,
which, under the mask of a disinterested friendship, aimed only at its
own aggrandizement; and while it boldly claimed the honourable title of
a Protectress, was solely occupied with promoting its own schemes, and
advancing its own interests amid the general confusion.
In return for these important cessions, France engaged to effect a
diversion in favour of the Swedes, by commencing hostilities against the
Spaniards; and if this should lead to an open breach with the Emperor,
to maintain an army upon the German side of the Rhine, which was to act
in conjunction with the Swedes and Germans against Austria. For a war
with Spain, the Spaniards themselves soon afforded the desired pretext.
Making an inroad from the Netherlands, upon the city of Treves, they cut
in pieces the French garrison; and, in open violation of the law of
nations, made prisoner the Elector, who had placed himself under the
protection of France, and carried him into Flanders. When the Cardinal
Infante, as Viceroy of the Spanish Netherlands, refused satisfaction for
these injuries, and delayed to restore the prince to liberty, Richelieu,
after the old custom, formally proclaimed war at Brussels by a herald,
and the war was at once opened by three different armies in Milan, in
the Valteline, and in Flanders. The French minister was less anxious to
commence hostilities with the Emperor, which promised fewer advantages,
and threatened greater difficulties. A fourth army, however, was
detached across the Rhine into Germany, under the command of Cardinal
Lavalette, which was to act in conjunction with Duke Bernard, against
the Emperor, without a previous declaration of war.
A heavier blow for the Swedes, than even the defeat of Nordlingen, was
the reconciliation of the Elector of Saxony with the Emperor. After
many fruitless attempts both to bring about and to prevent it, it was at
last effected in 1634, at Pirna, and, the following year, reduced into a
formal treaty of peace, at Prague. The Elector of Saxony had always
viewed with jealousy the pretensions of the Swedes in Germany; and his
aversion to this foreign power, which now gave laws within the Empire,
had grown with every fresh requisition that Oxenstiern was obliged to
make upon the German states. This ill feeling was kept alive by the
Spanish court, who laboured earnestly to effect a peace between Saxony
and the Emperor. Wearied with the calamities of a long and destructive
contest, which had selected Saxony above all others for its theatre;
grieved by the miseries which both friend and foe inflicted upon his
subjects, and seduced by the tempting propositions of the House of
Austria, the Elector at last abandoned the common cause, and, caring
little for the fate of his confederates, or the liberties of Germany,
thought only of securing his own advantages, even at the expense of the
whole body.
In fact, the misery of Germany had risen to such a height, that all
clamorously vociferated for peace; and even the most disadvantageous
pacification would have been hailed as a blessing from heaven. The
plains, which formerly had been thronged with a happy and industrious
population, where nature had lavished her choicest gifts, and plenty and
prosperity had reigned, were now a wild and desolate wilderness. The
fields, abandoned by the industrious husbandman, lay waste and
uncultivated; and no sooner had the young crops given the promise of a
smiling harvest, than a single march destroyed the labours of a year,
and blasted the last hope of an afflicted peasantry. Burnt castles,
wasted fields, villages in ashes, were to be seen extending far and wide
on all sides, while the ruined peasantry had no resource left but to
swell the horde of incendiaries, and fearfully to retaliate upon their
fellows, who had hitherto been spared the miseries which they themselves
had suffered. The only safeguard against oppression was to become an
oppressor. The towns groaned under the licentiousness of undisciplined
and plundering garrisons, who seized and wasted the property of the
citizens, and, under the license of their position, committed the most
remorseless devastation and cruelty. If the march of an army converted
whole provinces into deserts, if others were impoverished by winter
quarters, or exhausted by contributions, these still were but passing
evils, and the industry of a year might efface the miseries of a few
months. But there was no relief for those who had a garrison within
their walls, or in the neighbourhood; even the change of fortune could
not improve their unfortunate fate, since the victor trod in the steps
of the vanquished, and friends were not more merciful than enemies. The
neglected farms, the destruction of the crops, and the numerous armies
which overran the exhausted country, were inevitably followed by
scarcity and the high price of provisions, which in the later years was
still further increased by a general failure in the crops. The crowding
together of men in camps and quarters--want upon one side, and excess
on the other, occasioned contagious distempers, which were more fatal
than even the sword. In this long and general confusion, all the bonds
of social life were broken up;--respect for the rights of their fellow
men, the fear of the laws, purity of morals, honour, and religion, were
laid aside, where might ruled supreme with iron sceptre. Under the
shelter of anarchy and impunity, every vice flourished, and men became
as wild as the country. No station was too dignified for outrage, no
property too holy for rapine and avarice. In a word, the soldier
reigned supreme; and that most brutal of despots often made his own
officer feel his power. The leader of an army was a far more important
person within any country where he appeared, than its lawful governor,
who was frequently obliged to fly before him into his own castles for
safety. Germany swarmed with these petty tyrants, and the country
suffered equally from its enemies and its protectors. These wounds
rankled the deeper, when the unhappy victims recollected that Germany
was sacrificed to the ambition of foreign powers, who, for their own
ends, prolonged the miseries of war. Germany bled under the scourge, to
extend the conquests and influence of Sweden; and the torch of discord
was kept alive within the Empire, that the services of Richelieu might
be rendered indispensable in France.
But, in truth, it was not merely interested voices which opposed a
peace; and if both Sweden and the German states were anxious, from
corrupt motives, to prolong the conflict, they were seconded in their
views by sound policy. After the defeat of Nordlingen, an equitable
peace was not to be expected from the Emperor; and, this being the case,
was it not too great a sacrifice, after seventeen years of war, with all
its miseries, to abandon the contest, not only without advantage, but
even with loss? What would avail so much bloodshed, if all was to
remain as it had been; if their rights and pretensions were neither
larger nor safer; if all that had been won with so much difficulty was
to be surrendered for a peace at any cost? Would it not be better to
endure, for two or three years more, the burdens they had borne so long,
and to reap at last some recompense for twenty years of suffering?
Neither was it doubtful, that peace might at last be obtained on
favourable terms, if only the Swedes and the German Protestants should
continue united in the cabinet and in the field, and pursued their
common interests with a reciprocal sympathy and zeal. Their divisions
alone, had rendered the enemy formidable, and protracted the acquisition
of a lasting and general peace. And this great evil the Elector of
Saxony had brought upon the Protestant cause by concluding a separate
treaty with Austria.
He, indeed, had commenced his negociations with the Emperor, even before
the battle of Nordlingen; and the unfortunate issue of that battle only
accelerated their conclusion. By it, all his confidence in the Swedes
was lost; and it was even doubted whether they would ever recover from
the blow. The jealousies among their generals, the insubordination of
the army, and the exhaustion of the Swedish kingdom, shut out any
reasonable prospect of effective assistance on their part. The Elector
hastened, therefore, to profit by the Emperor's magnanimity, who, even
after the battle of Nordlingen, did not recall the conditions previously
offered. While Oxenstiern, who had assembled the estates in Frankfort,
made further demands upon them and him, the Emperor, on the contrary,
made concessions; and therefore it required no long consideration to
decide between them.
In the mean time, however, he was anxious to escape the charge of
sacrificing the common cause and attending only to his own interests.
All the German states, and even the Swedes, were publicly invited to
become parties to this peace, although Saxony and the Emperor were the
only powers who deliberated upon it, and who assumed the right to give
law to Germany. By this self-appointed tribunal, the grievances of the
Protestants were discussed, their rights and privileges decided, and
even the fate of religions determined, without the presence of those who
were most deeply interested in it. Between them, a general peace was
resolved on, and it was to be enforced by an imperial army of execution,
as a formal decree of the Empire. Whoever opposed it, was to be treated
as a public enemy; and thus, contrary to their rights, the states were
to be compelled to acknowledge a law, in the passing of which they had
no share. Thus, even in form, the pacification at Prague was an
arbitrary measure; nor was it less so in its contents. The Edict of
Restitution had been the chief cause of dispute between the Elector and
the Emperor; and therefore it was first considered in their
deliberations. Without formally annulling it, it was determined by the
treaty of Prague, that all the ecclesiastical domains holding
immediately of the Empire, and, among the mediate ones, those which had
been seized by the Protestants subsequently to the treaty at Passau,
should, for forty years, remain in the same position as they had been in
before the Edict of Restitution, but without any formal decision of the
diet to that effect. Before the expiration of this term a commission,
composed of equal numbers of both religions, should proceed to settle
the matter peaceably and according to law; and if this commission should
be unable to come to a decision, each party should remain in possession
of the rights which it had exercised before the Edict of Restitution.
This arrangement, therefore, far from removing the grounds of
dissension, only suspended the dispute for a time; and this article of
the treaty of Prague only covered the embers of a future war.
The archbishopric of Magdeburg remained in possession of Prince Augustus
of Saxony, and Halberstadt in that of the Archduke Leopold William.
Four estates were taken from the territory of Magdeburg, and given to
Saxony, for which the Administrator of Magdeburg, Christian William of
Brandenburg, was otherwise to be indemnified. The Dukes of Mecklenburg,
upon acceding to this treaty, were to be acknowledged as rightful
possessors of their territories, in which the magnanimity of Gustavus
Adolphus had long ago reinstated them. Donauwerth recovered its
liberties. The important claims of the heirs of the Palatine, however
important it might be for the Protestant cause not to lose this
electorate vote in the diet, were passed over in consequence of the
animosity subsisting between the Lutherans and the Calvinists. All the
conquests which, in the course of the war, had been made by the German
states, or by the League and the Emperor, were to be mutually restored;
all which had been appropriated by the foreign powers of France and
Sweden, was to be forcibly wrested from them by the united powers. The
troops of the contracting parties were to be formed into one imperial
army, which, supported and paid by the Empire, was, by force of arms, to
carry into execution the covenants of the treaty.
As the peace of Prague was intended to serve as a general law of the
Empire, those points, which did not immediately affect the latter,
formed the subject of a separate treaty. By it, Lusatia was ceded to
the Elector of Saxony as a fief of Bohemia, and special articles
guaranteed the freedom of religion of this country and of Silesia.
All the Protestant states were invited to accede to the treaty of
Prague, and on that condition were to benefit by the amnesty. The
princes of Wurtemberg and Baden, whose territories the Emperor was
already in possession of, and which he was not disposed to restore
unconditionally; and such vassals of Austria as had borne arms against
their sovereign; and those states which, under the direction of
Oxenstiern, composed the council of the Upper German Circle, were
excluded from the treaty,--not so much with the view of continuing the
war against them, as of compelling them to purchase peace at a dearer
rate. Their territories were to be retained in pledge, till every thing
should be restored to its former footing. Such was the treaty of
Prague. Equal justice, however, towards all, might perhaps have
restored confidence between the head of the Empire and its members--
between the Protestants and the Roman Catholics--between the Reformed
and the Lutheran party; and the Swedes, abandoned by all their allies,
would in all probability have been driven from Germany with disgrace.
But this inequality strengthened, in those who were more severely
treated, the spirit of mistrust and opposition, and made it an easier
task for the Swedes to keep alive the flame of war, and to maintain a
party in Germany.
The peace of Prague, as might have been expected, was received with very
various feelings throughout Germany. The attempt to conciliate both
parties, had rendered it obnoxious to both. The Protestants complained
of the restraints imposed upon them; the Roman Catholics thought that
these hated sectaries had been favoured at the expense of the true
church. In the opinion of the latter, the church had been deprived of
its inalienable rights, by the concession to the Protestants of forty
years' undisturbed possession of the ecclesiastical benefices; while the
former murmured that the interests of the Protestant church had been
betrayed, because toleration had not been granted to their
co-religionists in the Austrian dominions. But no one was so bitterly
reproached as the Elector of Saxony, who was publicly denounced as a
deserter, a traitor to religion and the liberties of the Empire, and a
confederate of the Emperor.
In the mean time, he consoled himself with the triumph of seeing most of
the Protestant states compelled by necessity to embrace this peace. The
Elector of Brandenburg, Duke William of Weimar, the princes of Anhalt,
the dukes of Mecklenburg, the dukes of Brunswick Lunenburg, the Hanse
towns, and most of the imperial cities, acceded to it. The Landgrave
William of Hesse long wavered, or affected to do so, in order to gain
time, and to regulate his measures by the course of events. He had
conquered several fertile provinces of Westphalia, and derived from them
principally the means of continuing the war; these, by the terms of the
treaty, he was bound to restore. Bernard, Duke of Weimar, whose states,
as yet, existed only on paper, as a belligerent power was not affected
by the treaty, but as a general was so materially; and, in either view,
he must equally be disposed to reject it. His whole riches consisted in
his bravery, his possessions in his sword. War alone gave him greatness
and importance, and war alone could realize the projects which his
ambition suggested.
But of all who declaimed against the treaty of Prague, none were so loud
in their clamours as the Swedes, and none had so much reason for their
opposition. Invited to Germany by the Germans themselves, the champions
of the Protestant Church, and the freedom of the States, which they had
defended with so much bloodshed, and with the sacred life of their king,
they now saw themselves suddenly and shamefully abandoned, disappointed
in all their hopes, without reward and without gratitude driven from the
empire for which they had toiled and bled, and exposed to the ridicule
of the enemy by the very princes who owed every thing to them. No
satisfaction, no indemnification for the expenses which they had
incurred, no equivalent for the conquests which they were to leave
behind them, was provided by the treaty of Prague. They were to be
dismissed poorer than they came, or, if they resisted, to be expelled by
the very powers who had invited them. The Elector of Saxony at last
spoke of a pecuniary indemnification, and mentioned the small sum of two
millions five hundred thousand florins; but the Swedes had already
expended considerably more, and this disgraceful equivalent in money was
both contrary to their true interests, and injurious to their pride.
"The Electors of Bavaria and Saxony," replied Oxenstiern, "have been
paid for their services, which, as vassals, they were bound to render
the Emperor, with the possession of important provinces; and shall we,
who have sacrificed our king for Germany, be dismissed with the
miserable sum of 2,500,000 florins?" The disappointment of their
expectations was the more severe, because the Swedes had calculated upon
being recompensed with the Duchy of Pomerania, the present possessor of
which was old and without heirs. But the succession of this territory
was confirmed by the treaty of Prague to the Elector of Brandenburg; and
all the neighbouring powers declared against allowing the Swedes to
obtain a footing within the empire.
Never, in the whole course of the war, had the prospects of the Swedes
looked more gloomy, than in the year 1635, immediately after the
conclusion of the treaty of Prague. Many of their allies, particularly
among the free cities, abandoned them to benefit by the peace; others
were compelled to accede to it by the victorious arms of the Emperor.
Augsburg, subdued by famine, surrendered under the severest conditions;
Wurtzburg and Coburg were lost to the Austrians. The League of
Heilbronn was formally dissolved. Nearly the whole of Upper Germany,
the chief seat of the Swedish power, was reduced under the Emperor.
Saxony, on the strength of the treaty of Prague, demanded the evacuation
of Thuringia, Halberstadt, and Magdeburg. Philipsburg, the military
depot of France, was surprised by the Austrians, with all the stores it
contained; and this severe loss checked the activity of France. To
complete the embarrassments of Sweden, the truce with Poland was drawing
to a close. To support a war at the same time with Poland and in
Germany, was far beyond the power of Sweden; and all that remained was
to choose between them. Pride and ambition declared in favour of
continuing the German war, at whatever sacrifice on the side of Poland.
An army, however, was necessary to command the respect of Poland, and to
give weight to Sweden in any negotiations for a truce or a peace.
The mind of Oxenstiern, firm, and inexhaustible in expedients, set
itself manfully to meet these calamities, which all combined to
overwhelm Sweden; and his shrewd understanding taught him how to turn
even misfortunes to his advantage. The defection of so many German
cities of the empire deprived him, it is true, of a great part of his
former allies, but at the same time it freed him from the necessity of
paying any regard to their interests. The more the number of his
enemies increased, the more provinces and magazines were opened to his
troops. The gross ingratitude of the States, and the haughty contempt
with which the Emperor behaved, (who did not even condescend to treat
directly with him about a peace,) excited in him the courage of despair,
and a noble determination to maintain the struggle to the last. The
continuance of war, however unfortunate it might prove, could not render
the situation of Sweden worse than it now was; and if Germany was to be
evacuated, it was at least better and nobler to do so sword in hand, and
to yield to force rather than to fear.
In the extremity in which the Swedes were now placed by the desertion of
their allies, they addressed themselves to France, who met them with the
greatest encouragement. The interests of the two crowns were closely
united, and France would have injured herself by allowing the Swedish
power in Germany to decline. The helpless situation of the Swedes, was
rather an additional motive with France to cement more closely their
alliance, and to take a more active part in the German war. Since the
alliance with Sweden, at Beerwald, in 1632, France had maintained the
war against the Emperor, by the arms of Gustavus Adolphus, without any
open or formal breach, by furnishing subsidies and increasing the number
of his enemies. But alarmed at the unexpected rapidity and success of
the Swedish arms, France, in anxiety to restore the balance of power,
which was disturbed by the preponderance of the Swedes, seemed, for a
time, to have lost sight of her original designs. She endeavoured to
protect the Roman Catholic princes of the empire against the Swedish
conqueror, by the treaties of neutrality, and when this plan failed, she
even meditated herself to declare war against him. But no sooner had
the death of Gustavus Adolphus, and the desperate situation of the
Swedish affairs, dispelled this apprehension, than she returned with
fresh zeal to her first design, and readily afforded in this misfortune
the aid which in the hour of success she had refused. Freed from the
checks which the ambition and vigilance of Gustavus Adolphus placed upon
her plans of aggrandizement, France availed herself of the favourable
opportunity afforded by the defeat of Nordlingen, to obtain the entire
direction of the war, and to prescribe laws to those who sued for her
powerful protection. The moment seemed to smile upon her boldest plans,
and those which had formerly seemed chimerical, now appeared to be
justified by circumstances. She now turned her whole attention to the
war in Germany; and, as soon as she had secured her own private ends by
a treaty with the Germans, she suddenly entered the political arena as
an active and a commanding power. While the other belligerent states
had been exhausting themselves in a tedious contest, France had been
reserving her strength, and maintained the contest by money alone; but
now, when the state of things called for more active measures, she
seized the sword, and astonished Europe by the boldness and magnitude of
her undertakings. At the same moment, she fitted out two fleets, and
sent six different armies into the field, while she subsidized a foreign
crown and several of the German princes. Animated by this powerful
co-operation, the Swedes and Germans awoke from the consternation, and
hoped, sword in hand, to obtain a more honourable peace than that of
Prague. Abandoned by their confederates, who had been reconciled to the
Emperor, they formed a still closer alliance with France, which
increased her support with their growing necessities, at the same time
taking a more active, although secret share in the German war, until at
last, she threw off the mask altogether, and in her own name made an
unequivocal declaration of war against the Emperor.
To leave Sweden at full liberty to act against Austria, France commenced
her operations by liberating it from all fear of a Polish war. By means
of the Count d'Avaux, its minister, an agreement was concluded between
the two powers at Stummsdorf in Prussia, by which the truce was
prolonged for twenty-six years, though not without a great sacrifice on
the part of the Swedes, who ceded by a single stroke of the pen almost
the whole of Polish Prussia, the dear-bought conquest of Gustavus
Adolphus. The treaty of Beerwald was, with certain modifications, which
circumstances rendered necessary, renewed at different times at
Compiegne, and afterwards at Wismar and Hamburg. France had already
come to a rupture with Spain, in May, 1635, and the vigorous attack
which it made upon that power, deprived the Emperor of his most valuable
auxiliaries from the Netherlands. By supporting the Landgrave William
of Cassel, and Duke Bernard of Weimar, the Swedes were enabled to act
with more vigour upon the Elbe and the Danube, and a diversion upon the
Rhine compelled the Emperor to divide his force.
The war was now prosecuted with increasing activity. By the treaty of
Prague, the Emperor had lessened the number of his adversaries within
the Empire; though, at the same time, the zeal and activity of his
foreign enemies had been augmented by it. In Germany, his influence was
almost unlimited, for, with the exception of a few states, he had
rendered himself absolute master of the German body and its resources,
and was again enabled to act in the character of emperor and sovereign.
The first fruit of his power was the elevation of his son, Ferdinand
III., to the dignity of King of the Romans, to which he was elected by a
decided majority of votes, notwithstanding the opposition of Treves, and
of the heirs of the Elector Palatine. But, on the other hand, he had
exasperated the Swedes to desperation, had armed the power of France
against him, and drawn its troops into the heart of the kingdom. France
and Sweden, with their German allies, formed, from this moment, one firm
and compactly united power; the Emperor, with the German states which
adhered to him, were equally firm and united. The Swedes, who no longer
fought for Germany, but for their own lives, showed no more indulgence;
relieved from the necessity of consulting their German allies, or
accounting to them for the plans which they adopted, they acted with
more precipitation, rapidity, and boldness. Battles, though less
decisive, became more obstinate and bloody; greater achievements, both
in bravery and military skill, were performed; but they were but
insulated efforts; and being neither dictated by any consistent plan,
nor improved by any commanding spirit, had comparatively little
influence upon the course of the war.
Saxony had bound herself, by the treaty of Prague, to expel the Swedes
from Germany. From this moment, the banners of the Saxons and
Imperialists were united: the former confederates were converted into
implacable enemies. The archbishopric of Magdeburg which, by the
treaty, was ceded to the prince of Saxony, was still held by the Swedes,
and every attempt to acquire it by negociation had proved ineffectual.
Hostilities commenced, by the Elector of Saxony recalling all his
subjects from the army of Banner, which was encamped upon the Elbe. The
officers, long irritated by the accumulation of their arrears, obeyed
the summons, and evacuated one quarter after another. As the Saxons, at
the same time, made a movement towards Mecklenburg, to take Doemitz, and
to drive the Swedes from Pomerania and the Baltic, Banner suddenly
marched thither, relieved Doemitz, and totally defeated the Saxon
General Baudissin, with 7000 men, of whom 1000 were slain, and about the
same number taken prisoners. Reinforced by the troops and artillery,
which had hitherto been employed in Polish Prussia, but which the treaty
of Stummsdorf rendered unnecessary, this brave and impetuous general
made, the following year (1636), a sudden inroad into the Electorate of
Saxony, where he gratified his inveterate hatred of the Saxons by the
most destructive ravages. Irritated by the memory of old grievances
which, during their common campaigns, he and the Swedes had suffered
from the haughtiness of the Saxons, and now exasperated to the utmost by
the late defection of the Elector, they wreaked upon the unfortunate
inhabitants all their rancour. Against Austria and Bavaria, the Swedish
soldier had fought from a sense, as it were, of duty; but against the
Saxons, they contended with all the energy of private animosity and
personal revenge, detesting them as deserters and traitors; for the
hatred of former friends is of all the most fierce and irreconcileable.
The powerful diversion made by the Duke of Weimar, and the Landgrave of
Hesse, upon the Rhine and in Westphalia, prevented the Emperor from
affording the necessary assistance to Saxony, and left the whole
Electorate exposed to the destructive ravages of Banner's army.
At length, the Elector, having formed a junction with the Imperial
General Hatzfeld, advanced against Magdeburg, which Banner in vain
hastened to relieve. The united army of the Imperialists and the Saxons
now spread itself over Brandenburg, wrested several places from the
Swedes, and almost drove them to the Baltic. But, contrary to all
expectation, Banner, who had been given up as lost, attacked the allies,
on the 24th of September, 1636, at Wittstock, where a bloody battle took
place. The onset was terrific; and the whole force of the enemy was
directed against the right wing of the Swedes, which was led by Banner
in person. The contest was long maintained with equal animosity and
obstinacy on both sides. There was not a squadron among the Swedes,
which did not return ten times to the charge, to be as often repulsed;
when at last, Banner was obliged to retire before the superior numbers
of the enemy. His left wing sustained the combat until night, and the
second line of the Swedes, which had not as yet been engaged, was
prepared to renew it the next morning. But the Elector did not wait for
a second attack. His army was exhausted by the efforts of the preceding
day; and, as the drivers had fled with the horses, his artillery was
unserviceable. He accordingly retreated in the night, with Count
Hatzfeld, and relinquished the ground to the Swedes. About 5000 of the
allies fell upon the field, exclusive of those who were killed in the
pursuit, or who fell into the hands of the exasperated peasantry. One
hundred and fifty standards and colours, twenty-three pieces of cannon,
the whole baggage and silver plate of the Elector, were captured, and
more than 2000 men taken prisoners. This brilliant victory, achieved
over an enemy far superior in numbers, and in a very advantageous
position, restored the Swedes at once to their former reputation; their
enemies were discouraged, and their friends inspired with new hopes.
Banner instantly followed up this decisive success, and hastily crossing
the Elbe, drove the Imperialists before him, through Thuringia and
Hesse, into Westphalia. He then returned, and took up his winter
quarters in Saxony.
But, without the material aid furnished by the diversion upon the Rhine,
and the activity there of Duke Bernard and the French, these important
successes would have been unattainable. Duke Bernard, after the defeat
of Nordlingen, reorganized his broken army at Wetterau; but, abandoned
by the confederates of the League of Heilbronn, which had been dissolved
by the peace of Prague, and receiving little support from the Swedes, he
found himself unable to maintain an army, or to perform any enterprise
of importance. The defeat at Nordlingen had terminated all his hopes on
the Duchy of Franconia, while the weakness of the Swedes, destroyed the
chance of retrieving his fortunes through their assistance. Tired, too,
of the constraint imposed upon him by the imperious chancellor, he
turned his attention to France, who could easily supply him with money,
the only aid which he required, and France readily acceded to his
proposals. Richelieu desired nothing so much as to diminish the
influence of the Swedes in the German war, and to obtain the direction
of it for himself. To secure this end, nothing appeared more effectual
than to detach from the Swedes their bravest general, to win him to the
interests of France, and to secure for the execution of its projects the
services of his arm. From a prince like Bernard, who could not maintain
himself without foreign support, France had nothing to fear, since no
success, however brilliant, could render him independent of that crown.
Bernard himself came into France, and in October, 1635, concluded a
treaty at St. Germaine en Laye, not as a Swedish general, but in his
own name, by which it was stipulated that he should receive for himself
a yearly pension of one million five hundred thousand livres, and four
millions for the support of his army, which he was to command under the
orders of the French king. To inflame his zeal, and to accelerate the
conquest of Alsace, France did not hesitate, by a secret article, to
promise him that province for his services; a promise which Richelieu
had little intention of performing, and which the duke also estimated at
its real worth. But Bernard confided in his good fortune, and in his
arms, and met artifice with dissimulation. If he could once succeed in
wresting Alsace from the enemy, he did not despair of being able, in
case of need, to maintain it also against a friend. He now raised an
army at the expense of France, which he commanded nominally under the
orders of that power, but in reality without any limitation whatever,
and without having wholly abandoned his engagements with Sweden. He
began his operations upon the Rhine, where another French army, under
Cardinal Lavalette, had already, in 1635, commenced hostilities against
the Emperor.
Against this force, the main body of the Imperialists, after the great
victory of Nordlingen, and the reduction of Swabia and Franconia had
advanced under the command of Gallas, had driven them as far as Metz,
cleared the Rhine, and took from the Swedes the towns of Metz and
Frankenthal, of which they were in possession. But frustrated by the
vigorous resistance of the French, in his main object, of taking up his
winter quarters in France, he led back his exhausted troops into Alsace
and Swabia. At the opening of the next campaign, he passed the Rhine at
Breysach, and prepared to carry the war into the interior of France. He
actually entered Burgundy, while the Spaniards from the Netherlands made
progress in Picardy; and John De Werth, a formidable general of the
League, and a celebrated partisan, pushed his march into Champagne, and
spread consternation even to the gates of Paris. But an insignificant
fortress in Franche Comte completely checked the Imperialists, and they
were obliged, a second time, to abandon their enterprise.
The activity of Duke Bernard had hitherto been impeded by his dependence
on a French general, more suited to the priestly robe, than to the baton
of command; and although, in conjunction with him, he conquered Alsace
Saverne, he found himself unable, in the years 1636 and 1637, to
maintain his position upon the Rhine. The ill success of the French
arms in the Netherlands had cheated the activity of operations in Alsace
and Breisgau; but in 1638, the war in that quarter took a more brilliant
turn. Relieved from his former restraint, and with unlimited command of
his troops, Duke Bernard, in the beginning of February, left his winter
quarters in the bishopric of Basle, and unexpectedly appeared upon the
Rhine, where, at this rude season of the year, an attack was little
anticipated. The forest towns of Laufenburg, Waldshut, and Seckingen,
were surprised, and Rhinefeldt besieged. The Duke of Savelli, the
Imperial general who commanded in that quarter, hastened by forced
marches to the relief of this important place, succeeded in raising the
siege, and compelled the Duke of Weimar, with great loss to retire.
But, contrary to all human expectation, he appeared on the third day
after, (21st February, 1638,) before the Imperialists, in order of
battle, and defeated them in a bloody engagement, in which the four
Imperial generals, Savelli, John De Werth, Enkeford, and Sperreuter,
with 2000 men, were taken prisoners. Two of these, De Werth and
Enkeford, were afterwards sent by Richelieu's orders into France, in
order to flatter the vanity of the French by the sight of such
distinguished prisoners, and by the pomp of military trophies, to
withdraw the attention of the populace from the public distress. The
captured standards and colours were, with the same view, carried in
solemn procession to the church of Notre Dame, thrice exhibited before
the altar, and committed to sacred custody.
The taking of Rhinefeldt, Roeteln, and Fribourg, was the immediate
consequence of the duke's victory. His army now increased by
considerable recruits, and his projects expanded in proportion as
fortune favoured him. The fortress of Breysach upon the Rhine was
looked upon as holding the command of that river, and as the key of
Alsace. No place in this quarter was of more importance to the Emperor,
and upon none had more care been bestowed. To protect Breysach, was the
principal destination of the Italian army, under the Duke of Feria; the
strength of its works, and its natural defences, bade defiance to
assault, while the Imperial generals who commanded in that quarter had
orders to retain it at any cost. But the duke, trusting to his good
fortune, resolved to attempt the siege. Its strength rendered it
impregnable; it could, therefore, only be starved into a surrender; and
this was facilitated by the carelessness of the commandant, who,
expecting no attack, had been selling off his stores. As under these
circumstances the town could not long hold out, it must be immediately
relieved or victualled. Accordingly, the Imperial General Goetz rapidly
advanced at the head of 12,000 men, accompanied by 3000 waggons loaded
with provisions, which he intended to throw into the place. But he was
attacked with such vigour by Duke Bernard at Witteweyer, that he lost
his whole force, except 3000 men, together with the entire transport. A
similar fate at Ochsenfeld, near Thann, overtook the Duke of Lorraine,
who, with 5000 or 6000 men, advanced to relieve the fortress. After a
third attempt of general Goetz for the relief of Breysach had proved
ineffectual, the fortress, reduced to the greatest extremity by famine,
surrendered, after a blockade of four months, on the 17th December 1638,
to its equally persevering and humane conqueror.
The capture of Breysach opened a boundless field to the ambition of the
Duke of Weimar, and the romance of his hopes was fast approaching to
reality. Far from intending to surrender his conquests to France, he
destined Breysach for himself, and revealed this intention, by exacting
allegiance from the vanquished, in his own name, and not in that of any
other power. Intoxicated by his past success, and excited by the
boldest hopes, he believed that he should be able to maintain his
conquests, even against France herself. At a time when everything
depended upon bravery, when even personal strength was of importance,
when troops and generals were of more value than territories, it was
natural for a hero like Bernard to place confidence in his own powers,
and, at the head of an excellent army, who under his command had proved
invincible, to believe himself capable of accomplishing the boldest and
largest designs. In order to secure himself one friend among the crowd
of enemies whom he was about to provoke, he turned his eyes upon the
Landgravine Amelia of Hesse, the widow of the lately deceased Landgrave
William, a princess whose talents were equal to her courage, and who,
along with her hand, would bestow valuable conquests, an extensive
principality, and a well disciplined army. By the union of the
conquests of Hesse, with his own upon the Rhine, and the junction of
their forces, a power of some importance, and perhaps a third party,
might be formed in Germany, which might decide the fate of the war. But
a premature death put a period to these extensive schemes.
"Courage, Father Joseph, Breysach is ours!" whispered Richelieu in the
ear of the Capuchin, who had long held himself in readiness to be
despatched into that quarter; so delighted was he with this joyful
intelligence. Already in imagination he held Alsace, Breisgau, and all
the frontiers of Austria in that quarter, without regard to his promise
to Duke Bernard. But the firm determination which the latter had
unequivocally shown, to keep Breysach for himself, greatly embarrassed
the cardinal, and no efforts were spared to retain the victorious
Bernard in the interests of France. He was invited to court, to witness
the honours by which his triumph was to be commemorated; but he
perceived and shunned the seductive snare. The cardinal even went so
far as to offer him the hand of his niece in marriage; but the proud
German prince declined the offer, and refused to sully the blood of
Saxony by a misalliance. He was now considered as a dangerous enemy,
and treated as such. His subsidies were withdrawn; and the Governor of
Breysach and his principal officers were bribed, at least upon the event
of the duke's death, to take possession of his conquests, and to secure
his troops. These intrigues were no secret to the duke, and the
precautions he took in the conquered places, clearly bespoke the
distrust of France. But this misunderstanding with the French court had
the most prejudicial influence upon his future operations. The
preparations he was obliged to make, in order to secure his conquests
against an attack on the side of France, compelled him to divide his
military strength, while the stoppage of his subsidies delayed his
appearance in the field. It had been his intention to cross the Rhine,
to support the Swedes, and to act against the Emperor and Bavaria on the
banks of the Danube. He had already communicated his plan of operations
to Banner, who was about to carry the war into the Austrian territories,
and had promised to relieve him so, when a sudden death cut short his
heroic career, in the 36th year of his age, at Neuburgh upon the Rhine
(in July, 1639).
He died of a pestilential disorder, which, in the course of two days,
had carried off nearly 400 men in his camp. The black spots which
appeared upon his body, his own dying expressions, and the advantages
which France was likely to reap from his sudden decease, gave rise to a
suspicion that he had been removed by poison--a suspicion sufficiently
refuted by the symptoms of his disorder. In him, the allies lost their
greatest general after Gustavus Adolphus, France a formidable competitor
for Alsace, and the Emperor his most dangerous enemy. Trained to the
duties of a soldier and a general in the school of Gustavus Adolphus, he
successfully imitated his eminent model, and wanted only a longer life
to equal, if not to surpass it. With the bravery of the soldier, he
united the calm and cool penetration of the general and the persevering
fortitude of the man, with the daring resolution of youth; with the wild
ardour of the warrior, the sober dignity of the prince, the moderation
of the sage, and the conscientiousness of the man of honour.
Discouraged by no misfortune, he quickly rose again in full vigour from
the severest defeats; no obstacles could check his enterprise, no
disappointments conquer his indomitable perseverance. His genius,
perhaps, soared after unattainable objects; but the prudence of such
men, is to be measured by a different standard from that of ordinary
people. Capable of accomplishing more, he might venture to form more
daring plans. Bernard affords, in modern history, a splendid example of
those days of chivalry, when personal greatness had its full weight and
influence, when individual bravery could conquer provinces, and the
heroic exploits of a German knight raised him even to the Imperial
throne.
The best part of the duke's possessions were his army, which, together
with Alsace, he bequeathed to his brother William. But to this army,
both France and Sweden thought that they had well-grounded claims; the
latter, because it had been raised in name of that crown, and had done
homage to it; the former, because it had been supported by its
subsidies. The Electoral Prince of the Palatinate also negociated for
its services, and attempted, first by his agents, and latterly in his
own person, to win it over to his interests, with the view of employing
it in the reconquest of his territories. Even the Emperor endeavoured
to secure it, a circumstance the less surprising, when we reflect that
at this time the justice of the cause was comparatively unimportant, and
the extent of the recompense the main object to which the soldier
looked; and when bravery, like every other commodity, was disposed of to
the highest bidder. But France, richer and more determined, outbade all
competitors: it bought over General Erlach, the commander of Breysach,
and the other officers, who soon placed that fortress, with the whole
army, in their hands.
The young Palatine, Prince Charles Louis, who had already made an
unsuccessful campaign against the Emperor, saw his hopes again deceived.
Although intending to do France so ill a service, as to compete with her
for Bernard's army, he had the imprudence to travel through that
kingdom. The cardinal, who dreaded the justice of the Palatine's cause,
was glad to seize any opportunity to frustrate his views. He
accordingly caused him to be seized at Moulin, in violation of the law
of nations, and did not set him at liberty, until he learned that the
army of the Duke of Weimar had been secured. France was now in
possession of a numerous and well disciplined army in Germany, and from
this moment began to make open war upon the Emperor.
But it was no longer against Ferdinand II. that its hostilities were to
be conducted; for that prince had died in February, 1637, in the 59th
year of his age. The war which his ambition had kindled, however,
survived him. During a reign of eighteen years he had never once laid
aside the sword, nor tasted the blessings of peace as long as his hand
swayed the imperial sceptre. Endowed with the qualities of a good
sovereign, adorned with many of those virtues which ensure the happiness
of a people, and by nature gentle and humane, we see him, from erroneous
ideas of the monarch's duty, become at once the instrument and the
victim of the evil passions of others; his benevolent intentions
frustrated, and the friend of justice converted into the oppressor of
mankind, the enemy of peace, and the scourge of his people. Amiable in
domestic life, and respectable as a sovereign, but in his policy ill
advised, while he gained the love of his Roman Catholic subjects, he
incurred the execration of the Protestants. History exhibits many and
greater despots than Ferdinand II., yet he alone has had the unfortunate
celebrity of kindling a thirty years' war; but to produce its lamentable
consequences, his ambition must have been seconded by a kindred spirit
of the age, a congenial state of previous circumstances, and existing
seeds of discord. At a less turbulent period, the spark would have
found no fuel; and the peacefulness of the age would have choked the
voice of individual ambition; but now the flash fell upon a pile of
accumulated combustibles, and Europe was in flames.
His son, Ferdinand III., who, a few months before his father's death,
had been raised to the dignity of King of the Romans, inherited his
throne, his principles, and the war which he had caused. But Ferdinand
III. had been a closer witness of the sufferings of the people, and the
devastation of the country, and felt more keenly and ardently the
necessity of peace. Less influenced by the Jesuits and the Spaniards,
and more moderate towards the religious views of others, he was more
likely than his father to listen to the voice of reason. He did so, and
ultimately restored to Europe the blessing of peace, but not till after
a contest of eleven years waged with sword and pen; not till after he
had experienced the impossibility of resistance, and necessity had laid
upon him its stern laws.
Fortune favoured him at the commencement of his reign, and his arms were
victorious against the Swedes. The latter, under the command of the
victorious Banner, had, after their success at Wittstock, taken up their
winter quarters in Saxony; and the campaign of 1637 opened with the
siege of Leipzig. The vigorous resistance of the garrison, and the
approach of the Electoral and Imperial armies, saved the town, and
Banner, to prevent his communication with the Elbe being cut off, was
compelled to retreat into Torgau. But the superior number of the
Imperialists drove him even from that quarter; and, surrounded by the
enemy, hemmed in by rivers, and suffering from famine, he had no course
open to him but to attempt a highly dangerous retreat into Pomerania, of
which, the boldness and successful issue border upon romance. The whole
army crossed the Oder, at a ford near Furstenberg; and the soldiers,
wading up to the neck in water, dragged the artillery across, when the
horses refused to draw. Banner had expected to be joined by General
Wrangel, on the farther side of the Oder in Pomerania; and, in
conjunction with him, to be able to make head against the enemy. But
Wrangel did not appear; and in his stead, he found an Imperial army
posted at Landsberg, with a view to cut off the retreat of the Swedes.
Banner now saw that he had fallen into a dangerous snare, from which
escape appeared impossible. In his rear lay an exhausted country, the
Imperialists, and the Oder on his left; the Oder, too, guarded by the
Imperial General Bucheim, offered no retreat; in front, Landsberg,
Custrin, the Warta, and a hostile army; and on the right, Poland, in
which, notwithstanding the truce, little confidence could be placed. In
these circumstances, his position seemed hopeless, and the Imperialists
were already triumphing in the certainty of his fall. Banner, with just
indignation, accused the French as the authors of this misfortune. They
had neglected to make, according to their promise, a diversion upon the
Rhine; and, by their inaction, allowed the Emperor to combine his whole
force upon the Swedes. "When the day comes," cried the incensed General
to the French Commissioner, who followed the camp, "that the Swedes and
Germans join their arms against France, we shall cross the Rhine with
less ceremony." But reproaches were now useless; what the emergency
demanded was energy and resolution. In the hope of drawing the enemy by
stratagem from the Oder, Banner pretended to march towards Poland, and
despatched the greater part of his baggage in this direction, with his
own wife, and those of the other officers. The Imperialists immediately
broke up their camp, and hurried towards the Polish frontier to block up
the route; Bucheim left his station, and the Oder was stripped of its
defenders. On a sudden, and under cloud of night, Banner turned towards
that river, and crossed it about a mile above Custrin, with his troops,
baggage, and artillery, without bridges or vessels, as he had done
before at Furstenberg. He reached Pomerania without loss, and prepared
to share with Wrangel the defence of that province.
But the Imperialists, under the command of Gallas, entered that duchy at
Ribses, and overran it by their superior strength. Usedom and Wolgast
were taken by storm, Demmin capitulated, and the Swedes were driven far
into Lower Pomerania. It was, too, more important for them at this
moment than ever, to maintain a footing in that country, for Bogislaus
XIV. had died that year, and Sweden must prepare to establish its title
to Pomerania. To prevent the Elector of Brandenburg from making good
the title to that duchy, which the treaty of Prague had given him,
Sweden exerted her utmost energies, and supported its generals to the
extent of her ability, both with troops and money. In other quarters of
the kingdom, the affairs of the Swedes began to wear a more favourable
aspect, and to recover from the humiliation into which they had been
thrown by the inaction of France, and the desertion of their allies.
For, after their hasty retreat into Pomerania, they had lost one place
after another in Upper Saxony; the princes of Mecklenburg, closely
pressed by the troops of the Emperor, began to lean to the side of
Austria, and even George, Duke of Lunenburg, declared against them.
Ehrenbreitstein was starved into a surrender by the Bavarian General de
Werth, and the Austrians possessed themselves of all the works which had
been thrown up on the Rhine. France had been the sufferer in the
contest with Spain; and the event had by no means justified the pompous
expectations which had accompanied the opening of the campaign. Every
place which the Swedes had held in the interior of Germany was lost; and
only the principal towns in Pomerania still remained in their hands.
But a single campaign raised them from this state of humiliation; and
the vigorous diversion, which the victorious Bernard had effected upon
the Rhine, gave quite a new turn to affairs.
The misunderstandings between France and Sweden were now at last
adjusted, and the old treaty between these powers confirmed at Hamburg,
with fresh advantages for Sweden. In Hesse, the politic Landgravine
Amelia had, with the approbation of the Estates, assumed the government
after the death of her husband, and resolutely maintained her rights
against the Emperor and the House of Darmstadt. Already zealously
attached to the Swedish Protestant party, on religious grounds, she only
awaited a favourable opportunity openly to declare herself. By artful
delays, and by prolonging the negociations with the Emperor, she had
succeeded in keeping him inactive, till she had concluded a secret
compact with France, and the victories of Duke Bernard had given a
favourable turn to the affairs of the Protestants. She now at once
threw off the mask, and renewed her former alliance with the Swedish
crown. The Electoral Prince of the Palatinate was also stimulated, by
the success of Bernard, to try his fortune against the common enemy.
Raising troops in Holland with English money, he formed a magazine at
Meppen, and joined the Swedes in Westphalia. His magazine was, however,
quickly lost; his army defeated near Flotha, by Count Hatzfeld; but his
attempt served to occupy for some time the attention of the enemy, and
thereby facilitated the operations of the Swedes in other quarters.
Other friends began to appear, as fortune declared in their favour, and
the circumstance, that the States of Lower Saxony embraced a neutrality,
was of itself no inconsiderable advantage.
Under these advantages, and reinforced by 14,000 fresh troops from
Sweden and Livonia. Banner opened, with the most favourable prospects,
the campaign of 1638. The Imperialists who were in possession of Upper
Pomerania and Mecklenburg, either abandoned their positions, or deserted
in crowds to the Swedes, to avoid the horrors of famine, the most
formidable enemy in this exhausted country. The whole country betwixt
the Elbe and the Oder was so desolated by the past marchings and
quarterings of the troops, that, in order to support his army on its
march into Saxony and Bohemia, Banner was obliged to take a circuitous
route from Lower Pomerania into Lower Saxony, and then into the
Electorate of Saxony through the territory of Halberstadt. The
impatience of the Lower Saxon States to get rid of such troublesome
guests, procured him so plentiful a supply of provisions, that he was
provided with bread in Magdeburg itself, where famine had even overcome
the natural antipathy of men to human flesh. His approach spread
consternation among the Saxons; but his views were directed not against
this exhausted country, but against the hereditary dominions of the
Emperor. The victories of Bernard encouraged him, while the prosperity
of the Austrian provinces excited his hopes of booty. After defeating
the Imperial General Salis, at Elsterberg, totally routing the Saxon
army at Chemnitz, and taking Pirna, he penetrated with irresistible
impetuosity into Bohemia, crossed the Elbe, threatened Prague, took
Brandeis and Leutmeritz, defeated General Hofkirchen with ten regiments,
and spread terror and devastation through that defenceless kingdom.
Booty was his sole object, and whatever he could not carry off he
destroyed. In order to remove more of the corn, the ears were cut from
the stalks, and the latter burnt. Above a thousand castles, hamlets,
and villages were laid in ashes; sometimes more than a hundred were seen
burning in one night. From Bohemia he crossed into Silesia, and it was
his intention to carry his ravages even into Moravia and Austria. But
to prevent this, Count Hatzfeld was summoned from Westphalia, and
Piccolomini from the Netherlands, to hasten with all speed to this
quarter. The Archduke Leopold, brother to the Emperor, assumed the
command, in order to repair the errors of his predecessor Gallas, and to
raise the army from the low ebb to which it had fallen.
The result justified the change, and the campaign of 1640 appeared to
take a most unfortunate turn for the Swedes. They were successively
driven out of all their posts in Bohemia, and anxious only to secure
their plunder, they precipitately crossed the heights of Meissen. But
being followed into Saxony by the pursuing enemy, and defeated at
Plauen, they were obliged to take refuge in Thuringia. Made masters of
the field in a single summer, they were as rapidly dispossessed; but
only to acquire it a second time, and to hurry from one extreme to
another. The army of Banner, weakened and on the brink of destruction
in its camp at Erfurt, suddenly recovered itself. The Duke of Lunenburg
abandoned the treaty of Prague, and joined Banner with the very troops
which, the year before, had fought against him. Hesse Cassel sent
reinforcements, and the Duke of Longueville came to his support with the
army of the late Duke Bernard. Once more numerically superior to the
Imperialists, Banner offered them battle near Saalfeld; but their
leader, Piccolomini, prudently declined an engagement, having chosen too
strong a position to be forced. When the Bavarians at length separated
from the Imperialists, and marched towards Franconia, Banner attempted
an attack upon this divided corps, but the attempt was frustrated by the
skill of the Bavarian General Von Mercy, and the near approach of the
main body of the Imperialists. Both armies now moved into the exhausted
territory of Hesse, where they formed intrenched camps near each other,
till at last famine and the severity of the winter compelled them both
to retire. Piccolomini chose the fertile banks of the Weser for his
winter quarters; but being outflanked by Banner, he was obliged to give
way to the Swedes, and to impose on the Franconian sees the burden of
maintaining his army.
At this period, a diet was held in Ratisbon, where the complaints of the
States were to be heard, measures taken for securing the repose of the
Empire, and the question of peace or war finally settled. The presence
of the Emperor, the majority of the Roman Catholic voices in the
Electoral College, the great number of bishops, and the withdrawal of
several of the Protestant votes, gave the Emperor a complete command of
the deliberations of the assembly, and rendered this diet any thing but
a fair representative of the opinions of the German Empire. The
Protestants, with reason, considered it as a mere combination of Austria
and its creatures against their party; and it seemed to them a laudable
effort to interrupt its deliberations, and to dissolve the diet itself.
Banner undertook this bold enterprise. His military reputation had
suffered by his last retreat from Bohemia, and it stood in need of some
great exploit to restore its former lustre. Without communicating his
designs to any one, in the depth of the winter of 1641, as soon as the
roads and rivers were frozen, he broke up from his quarters in
Lunenburg. Accompanied by Marshal Guebriant, who commanded the armies
of France and Weimar, he took the route towards the Danube, through
Thuringia and Vogtland, and appeared before Ratisbon, ere the Diet could
be apprised of his approach. The consternation of the assembly was
indescribable; and, in the first alarm, the deputies prepared for
flight. The Emperor alone declared that he would not leave the town,
and encouraged the rest by his example. Unfortunately for the Swedes, a
thaw came on, which broke up the ice upon the Danube, so that it was no
longer passable on foot, while no boats could cross it, on account of
the quantities of ice which were swept down by the current. In order to
perform something, and to humble the pride of the Emperor, Banner
discourteously fired 500 cannon shots into the town, which, however, did
little mischief. Baffled in his designs, he resolved to penetrate
farther into Bavaria, and the defenceless province of Moravia, where a
rich booty and comfortable quarters awaited his troops. Guebriant,
however, began to fear that the purpose of the Swedes was to draw the
army of Bernard away from the Rhine, and to cut off its communication
with France, till it should be either entirely won over, or
incapacitated from acting independently. He therefore separated from
Banner to return to the Maine; and the latter was exposed to the whole
force of the Imperialists, which had been secretly drawn together
between Ratisbon and Ingoldstadt, and was on its march against him. It
was now time to think of a rapid retreat, which, having to be effected
in the face of an army superior in cavalry, and betwixt woods and
rivers, through a country entirely hostile, appeared almost
impracticable. He hastily retired towards the Forest, intending to
penetrate through Bohemia into Saxony; but he was obliged to sacrifice
three regiments at Neuburg. These with a truly Spartan courage,
defended themselves for four days behind an old wall, and gained time
for Banner to escape. He retreated by Egra to Annaberg; Piccolomini
took a shorter route in pursuit, by Schlakenwald; and Banner succeeded,
only by a single half hour, in clearing the Pass of Prisnitz, and saving
his whole army from the Imperialists. At Zwickau he was again joined by
Guebriant; and both generals directed their march towards Halberstadt,
after in vain attempting to defend the Saal, and to prevent the passage
of the Imperialists.
Banner, at length, terminated his career at Halberstadt, in May 1641, a
victim to vexation and disappointment. He sustained with great renown,
though with varying success, the reputation of the Swedish arms in
Germany, and by a train of victories showed himself worthy of his great
master in the art of war. He was fertile in expedients, which he
planned with secrecy, and executed with boldness; cautious in the midst
of dangers, greater in adversity than in prosperity, and never more
formidable than when upon the brink of destruction. But the virtues of
the hero were united with all the railings and vices which a military
life creates, or at least fosters. As imperious in private life as he
was at the head of his army, rude as his profession, and proud as a
conqueror; he oppressed the German princes no less by his haughtiness,
than their country by his contributions. He consoled himself for the
toils of war in voluptuousness and the pleasures of the table, in which
he indulged to excess, and was thus brought to an early grave. But
though as much addicted to pleasure as Alexander or Mahomet the Second,
he hurried from the arms of luxury into the hardest fatigues, and placed
himself in all his vigour at the head of his army, at the very moment
his soldiers were murmuring at his luxurious excesses. Nearly 80,000
men fell in the numerous battles which he fought, and about 600 hostile
standards and colours, which he sent to Stockholm, were the trophies of
his victories. The want of this great general was soon severely felt by
the Swedes, who feared, with justice, that the loss would not readily be
replaced. The spirit of rebellion and insubordination, which had been
overawed by the imperious demeanour of this dreaded commander, awoke
upon his death. The officers, with an alarming unanimity, demanded
payment of their arrears; and none of the four generals who shared the
command, possessed influence enough to satisfy these demands, or to
silence the malcontents. All discipline was at an end, increasing want,
and the imperial citations were daily diminishing the number of the
army; the troops of France and Weimar showed little zeal; those of
Lunenburg forsook the Swedish colours; the Princes also of the House of
Brunswick, after the death of Duke George, had formed a separate treaty
with the Emperor; and at last even those of Hesse quitted them, to seek
better quarters in Westphalia. The enemy profited by these calamitous
divisions; and although defeated with loss in two pitched battles,
succeeded in making considerable progress in Lower Saxony.
At length appeared the new Swedish generalissimo, with fresh troops and
money. This was Bernard Torstensohn, a pupil of Gustavus Adolphus, and
his most successful imitator, who had been his page during the Polish
war. Though a martyr to the gout, and confined to a litter, he
surpassed all his opponents in activity; and his enterprises had wings,
while his body was held by the most frightful of fetters. Under him,
the scene of war was changed, and new maxims adopted, which necessity
dictated, and the issue justified. All the countries in which the
contest had hitherto raged were exhausted; while the House of Austria,
safe in its more distant territories, felt not the miseries of the war
under which the rest of Germany groaned. Torstensohn first furnished
them with this bitter experience, glutted his Swedes on the fertile
produce of Austria, and carried the torch of war to the very footsteps
of the imperial throne.
In Silesia, the enemy had gained considerable advantages over the
Swedish general Stalhantsch, and driven him as far as Neumark.
Torstensohn, who had joined the main body of the Swedes in Lunenburg,
summoned him to unite with his force, and in the year 1642 hastily
marched into Silesia through Brandenburg, which, under its great
Elector, had begun to maintain an armed neutrality. Glogau was carried,
sword in hand, without a breach, or formal approaches; the Duke Francis
Albert of Lauenburg defeated and killed at Schweidnitz; and Schweidnitz
itself with almost all the towns on that side of the Oder, taken. He
now penetrated with irresistible violence into the interior of Moravia,
where no enemy of Austria had hitherto appeared, took Olmutz, and threw
Vienna itself into consternation.
But, in the mean time, Piccolomini and the Archduke Leopold had
collected a superior force, which speedily drove the Swedish conquerors
from Moravia, and after a fruitless attempt upon Brieg, from Silesia.
Reinforced by Wrangel, the Swedes again attempted to make head against
the enemy, and relieved Grossglogau; but could neither bring the
Imperialists to an engagement, nor carry into effect their own views
upon Bohemia. Overrunning Lusatia, they took Zittau, in presence of the
enemy, and after a short stay in that country, directed their march
towards the Elbe, which they passed at Torgau. Torstensohn now
threatened Leipzig with a siege, and hoped to raise a large supply of
provisions and contributions from that prosperous town, which for ten
years had been unvisited with the scourge of war.
The Imperialists, under Leopold and Piccolomini, immediately hastened by
Dresden to its relief, and Torstensohn, to avoid being inclosed between
this army and the town, boldly advanced to meet them in order of battle.
By a strange coincidence, the two armies met upon the very spot which,
eleven years before, Gustavus Adolphus had rendered remarkable by a
decisive victory; and the heroism of their predecessors, now kindled in
the Swedes a noble emulation on this consecrated ground. The Swedish
generals, Stahlhantsch and Wellenberg, led their divisions with such
impetuosity upon the left wing of the Imperialists, before it was
completely formed, that the whole cavalry that covered it were dispersed
and rendered unserviceable. But the left of the Swedes was threatened
with a similar fate, when the victorious right advanced to its
assistance, took the enemy in flank and rear, and divided the Austrian
line. The infantry on both sides stood firm as a wall, and when their
ammunition was exhausted, maintained the combat with the butt-ends of
their muskets, till at last the Imperialists, completely surrounded,
after a contest of three hours, were compelled to abandon the field.
The generals on both sides had more than once to rally their flying
troops; and the Archduke Leopold, with his regiment, was the first in
the attack and last in flight. But this bloody victory cost the Swedes
more than 3000 men, and two of their best generals, Schlangen and
Lilienhoeck. More than 5000 of the Imperialists were left upon the
field, and nearly as many taken prisoners. Their whole artillery,
consisting of 46 field-pieces, the silver plate and portfolio of the
archduke, with the whole baggage of the army, fell into the hands of the
victors. Torstensohn, too greatly disabled by his victory to pursue the
enemy, moved upon Leipzig. The defeated army retired into Bohemia,
where its shattered regiments reassembled. The Archduke Leopold could
not recover from the vexation caused by this defeat; and the regiment of
cavalry which, by its premature flight, had occasioned the disaster,
experienced the effects of his indignation. At Raconitz in Bohemia, in
presence of the whole army, he publicly declared it infamous, deprived
it of its horses, arms, and ensigns, ordered its standards to be torn,
condemned to death several of the officers, and decimated the privates.
The surrender of Leipzig, three weeks after the battle, was its
brilliant result. The city was obliged to clothe the Swedish troops
anew, and to purchase an exemption from plunder, by a contribution of
300,000 rix-dollars, to which all the foreign merchants, who had
warehouses in the city, were to furnish their quota. In the middle of
winter, Torstensohn advanced against Freyberg, and for several weeks
defied the inclemency of the season, hoping by his perseverance to weary
out the obstinacy of the besieged. But he found that he was merely
sacrificing the lives of his soldiers; and at last, the approach of the
imperial general, Piccolomini, compelled him, with his weakened army, to
retire. He considered it, however, as equivalent to a victory, to have
disturbed the repose of the enemy in their winter quarters, who, by the
severity of the weather, sustained a loss of 3000 horses. He now made a
movement towards the Oder, as if with the view of reinforcing himself
with the garrisons of Pomerania and Silesia; but, with the rapidity of
lightning, he again appeared upon the Bohemian frontier, penetrated
through that kingdom, and relieved Olmutz in Moravia, which was hard
pressed by the Imperialists. His camp at Dobitschau, two miles from
Olmutz, commanded the whole of Moravia, on which he levied heavy
contributions, and carried his ravages almost to the gates of Vienna.
In vain did the Emperor attempt to arm the Hungarian nobility in defence
of this province; they appealed to their privileges, and refused to
serve beyond the limits of their own country. Thus, the time that
should have been spent in active resistance, was lost in fruitless
negociation, and the entire province was abandoned to the ravages of the
Swedes.
While Torstensohn, by his marches and his victories, astonished friend
and foe, the armies of the allies had not been inactive in other parts
of the empire. The troops of Hesse, under Count Eberstein, and those of
Weimar, under Mareschal de Guebriant, had fallen into the Electorate of
Cologne, in order to take up their winter quarters there. To get rid of
these troublesome guests, the Elector called to his assistance the
imperial general Hatzfeldt, and assembled his own troops under General
Lamboy. The latter was attacked by the allies in January, 1642, and in
a decisive action near Kempen, defeated, with the loss of about 2000 men
killed, and about twice as many prisoners. This important victory
opened to them the whole Electorate and neighbouring territories, so
that the allies were not only enabled to maintain their winter quarters
there, but drew from the country large supplies of men and horses.
Guebriant left the Hessians to defend their conquests on the Lower Rhine
against Hatzfeldt, and advanced towards Thuringia, as if to second the
operations of Torstensohn in Saxony. But instead of joining the Swedes,
he soon hurried back to the Rhine and the Maine, from which he seemed to
think he had removed farther than was expedient. But being anticipated
in the Margraviate of Baden, by the Bavarians under Mercy and John de
Werth, he was obliged to wander about for several weeks, exposed,
without shelter, to the inclemency of the winter, and generally
encamping upon the snow, till he found a miserable refuge in Breisgau.
He at last took the field; and, in the next summer, by keeping the
Bavarian army employed in Suabia, prevented it from relieving
Thionville, which was besieged by Conde. But the superiority of the
enemy soon drove him back to Alsace, where he awaited a reinforcement.
The death of Cardinal Richelieu took place in November, 1642, and the
subsequent change in the throne and in the ministry, occasioned by the
death of Louis XIII., had for some time withdrawn the attention of
France from the German war, and was the cause of the inaction of its
troops in the field. But Mazarin, the inheritor, not only of
Richelieu's power, but also of his principles and his projects, followed
out with renewed zeal the plans of his predecessor, though the French
subject was destined to pay dearly enough for the political greatness of
his country. The main strength of its armies, which Richelieu had
employed against the Spaniards, was by Mazarin directed against the
Emperor; and the anxiety with which he carried on the war in Germany,
proved the sincerity of his opinion, that the German army was the right
arm of his king, and a wall of safety around France. Immediately upon
the surrender of Thionville, he sent a considerable reinforcement to
Field-Marshal Guebriant in Alsace; and to encourage the troops to bear
the fatigues of the German war, the celebrated victor of Rocroi, the
Duke of Enghien, afterwards Prince of Conde, was placed at their head.
Guebriant now felt himself strong enough to appear again in Germany with
repute. He hastened across the Rhine with the view of procuring better
winter quarters in Suabia, and actually made himself master of Rothweil,
where a Bavarian magazine fell into his hands. But the place was too
dearly purchased for its worth, and was again lost even more speedily
than it had been taken. Guebriant received a wound in the arm, which
the surgeon's unskilfulness rendered mortal, and the extent of his loss
was felt on the very day of his death.
The French army, sensibly weakened by an expedition undertaken at so
severe a season of the year, had, after the taking of Rothweil,
withdrawn into the neighbourhood of Duttlingen, where it lay in complete
security, without expectation of a hostile attack. In the mean time,
the enemy collected a considerable force, with a view to prevent the
French from establishing themselves beyond the Rhine and so near to
Bavaria, and to protect that quarter from their ravages. The
Imperialists, under Hatzfeldt, had formed a junction with the Bavarians
under Mercy; and the Duke of Lorraine, who, during the whole course of
the war, was generally found everywhere except in his own duchy, joined
their united forces. It was resolved to force the quarters of the
French in Duttlingen, and the neighbouring villages, by surprise; a
favourite mode of proceeding in this war, and which, being commonly
accompanied by confusion, occasioned more bloodshed than a regular
battle. On the present occasion, there was the more to justify it, as
the French soldiers, unaccustomed to such enterprises, conceived
themselves protected by the severity of the winter against any surprise.
John de Werth, a master in this species of warfare, which he had often
put in practice against Gustavus Horn, conducted the enterprise, and
succeeded, contrary to all expectation.
The attack was made on a side where it was least looked for, on account
of the woods and narrow passes, and a heavy snow storm which fell upon
the same day, (the 24th November, 1643,) concealed the approach of the
vanguard till it halted before Duttlingen. The whole of the artillery
without the place, as well as the neighbouring Castle of Honberg, were
taken without resistance, Duttlingen itself was gradually surrounded by
the enemy, and all connexion with the other quarters in the adjacent
villages silently and suddenly cut off. The French were vanquished
without firing a cannon. The cavalry owed their escape to the swiftness
of their horses, and the few minutes in advance, which they had gained
upon their pursuers. The infantry were cut to pieces, or voluntarily
laid down their arms. About 2,000 men were killed, and 7,000, with 25
staff-officers and 90 captains, taken prisoners. This was, perhaps, the
only battle, in the whole course of the war, which produced nearly the
same effect upon the party which gained, and that which lost;--both
these parties were Germans; the French disgraced themselves. The memory
of this unfortunate day, which was renewed 100 years after at Rosbach,
was indeed erased by the subsequent heroism of a Turenne and Conde; but
the Germans may be pardoned, if they indemnified themselves for the
miseries which the policy of France had heaped upon them, by these
severe reflections upon her intrepidity.
Meantime, this defeat of the French was calculated to prove highly
disastrous to Sweden, as the whole power of the Emperor might now act
against them, while the number of their enemies was increased by a
formidable accession. Torstensohn had, in September, 1643, suddenly
left Moravia, and moved into Silesia. The cause of this step was a
secret, and the frequent changes which took place in the direction of
his march, contributed to increase this perplexity. From Silesia, after
numberless circuits, he advanced towards the Elbe, while the
Imperialists followed him into Lusatia. Throwing a bridge across the
Elbe at Torgau, he gave out that he intended to penetrate through
Meissen into the Upper Palatinate in Bavaria; at Barby he also made a
movement, as if to pass that river, but continued to move down the Elbe
as far as Havelburg, where he astonished his troops by informing them
that he was leading them against the Danes in Holstein.
The partiality which Christian IV. had displayed against the Swedes in
his office of mediator, the jealousy which led him to do all in his
power to hinder the progress of their arms, the restraints which he laid
upon their navigation of the Sound, and the burdens which he imposed
upon their commerce, had long roused the indignation of Sweden; and, at
last, when these grievances increased daily, had determined the Regency
to measures of retaliation. Dangerous as it seemed, to involve the
nation in a new war, when, even amidst its conquests, it was almost
exhausted by the old, the desire of revenge, and the deep-rooted hatred
which subsisted between Danes and Swedes, prevailed over all other
considerations; and even the embarrassment in which hostilities with
Germany had plunged it, only served as an additional motive to try its
fortune against Denmark.
Matters were, in fact, arrived at last to that extremity, that the war
was prosecuted merely for the purpose of furnishing food and employment
to the troops; that good winter quarters formed the chief subject of
contention; and that success, in this point, was more valued than a
decisive victory. But now the provinces of Germany were almost all
exhausted and laid waste. They were wholly destitute of provisions,
horses, and men, which in Holstein were to be found in profusion. If by
this movement, Torstensohn should succeed merely in recruiting his army,
providing subsistence for his horses and soldiers, and remounting his
cavalry, all the danger and difficulty would be well repaid. Besides,
it was highly important, on the eve of negotiations for peace, to
diminish the injurious influence which Denmark might exercise upon these
deliberations, to delay the treaty itself, which threatened to be
prejudicial to the Swedish interests, by sowing confusion among the
parties interested, and with a view to the amount of indemnification, to
increase the number of her conquests, in order to be the more sure of
securing those which alone she was anxious to retain. Moreover, the
present state of Denmark justified even greater hopes, if only the
attempt were executed with rapidity and silence. The secret was in fact
so well kept in Stockholm, that the Danish minister had not the
slightest suspicion of it; and neither France nor Holland were let into
the scheme. Actual hostilities commenced with the declaration of war;
and Torstensohn was in Holstein, before even an attack was expected.
The Swedish troops, meeting with no resistance, quickly overran this
duchy, and made themselves masters of all its strong places, except
Rensburg and Gluckstadt. Another army penetrated into Schonen, which
made as little opposition; and nothing but the severity of the season
prevented the enemy from passing the Lesser Baltic, and carrying the war
into Funen and Zealand. The Danish fleet was unsuccessful at Femern;
and Christian himself, who was on board, lost his right eye by a
splinter. Cut off from all communication with the distant force of the
Emperor, his ally, this king was on the point of seeing his whole
kingdom overrun by the Swedes; and all things threatened the speedy
fulfilment of the old prophecy of the famous Tycho Brahe, that in the
year 1644, Christian IV. should wander in the greatest misery from his
dominions.
But the Emperor could not look on with indifference, while Denmark was
sacrificed to Sweden, and the latter strengthened by so great an
acquisition. Notwithstanding great difficulties lay in the way of so
long a march through desolated provinces, he did not hesitate to
despatch an army into Holstein under Count Gallas, who, after
Piccolomini's retirement, had resumed the supreme command of the troops.
Gallas accordingly appeared in the duchy, took Keil, and hoped, by
forming a junction with the Danes, to be able to shut up the Swedish
army in Jutland. Meantime, the Hessians, and the Swedish General
Koenigsmark, were kept in check by Hatzfeldt, and the Archbishop of
Bremen, the son of Christian IV.; and afterwards the Swedes drawn into
Saxony by an attack upon Meissen. But Torstensohn, with his augmented
army, penetrated through the unoccupied pass betwixt Schleswig and
Stapelholm, met Gallas, and drove him along the whole course of the
Elbe, as far as Bernburg, where the Imperialists took up an entrenched
position. Torstensohn passed the Saal, and by posting himself in the
rear of the enemy, cut off their communication with Saxony and Bohemia.
Scarcity and famine began now to destroy them in great numbers, and
forced them to retreat to Magdeburg, where, however, they were not much
better off. The cavalry, which endeavoured to escape into Silesia, was
overtaken and routed by Torstensohn, near Juterbock; the rest of the
army, after a vain attempt to fight its way through the Swedish lines,
was almost wholly destroyed near Magdeburg. From this expedition,
Gallas brought back only a few thousand men of all his formidable force,
and the reputation of being a consummate master in the art of ruining an
army. The King of Denmark, after this unsuccessful effort to relieve
him, sued for peace, which he obtained at Bremsebor in the year 1645,
under very unfavourable conditions.
Torstensohn rapidly followed up his victory; and while Axel Lilienstern,
one of the generals who commanded under him, overawed Saxony, and
Koenigsmark subdued the whole of Bremen, he himself penetrated into
Bohemia with 16,000 men and 80 pieces of artillery, and endeavoured a
second time to remove the seat of war into the hereditary dominions of
Austria. Ferdinand, upon this intelligence, hastened in person to
Prague, in order to animate the courage of the people by his presence;
and as a skilful general was much required, and so little unanimity
prevailed among the numerous leaders, he hoped in the immediate
neighbourhood of the war to be able to give more energy and activity.
In obedience to his orders, Hatzfeldt assembled the whole Austrian and
Bavarian force, and contrary to his own inclination and advice, formed
the Emperor's last army, and the last bulwark of his states, in order of
battle, to meet the enemy, who were approaching, at Jankowitz, on the
24th of February, 1645. Ferdinand depended upon his cavalry, which
outnumbered that of the enemy by 3000, and upon the promise of the
Virgin Mary, who had appeared to him in a dream, and given him the
strongest assurances of a complete victory.
The superiority of the Imperialists did not intimidate Torstensohn, who
was not accustomed to number his antagonists. On the very first onset,
the left wing, which Goetz, the general of the League, had entangled in
a disadvantageous position among marshes and thickets, was totally
routed; the general, with the greater part of his men, killed, and
almost the whole ammunition of the army taken. This unfortunate
commencement decided the fate of the day. The Swedes, constantly
advancing, successively carried all the most commanding heights. After
a bloody engagement of eight hours, a desperate attack on the part of
the Imperial cavalry, and a vigorous resistance by the Swedish infantry,
the latter remained in possession of the field. 2,000 Austrians were
killed upon the spot, and Hatzfeldt himself, with 3,000 men, taken
prisoners. Thus, on the same day, did the Emperor lose his best general
and his last army.
This decisive victory at Jancowitz, at once exposed all the Austrian
territory to the enemy. Ferdinand hastily fled to Vienna, to provide
for its defence, and to save his family and his treasures. In a very
short time, the victorious Swedes poured, like an inundation, upon
Moravia and Austria. After they had subdued nearly the whole of
Moravia, invested Brunn, and taken all the strongholds as far as the
Danube, and carried the intrenchments at the Wolf's Bridge, near Vienna,
they at last appeared in sight of that capital, while the care which
they had taken to fortify their conquests, showed that their visit was
not likely to be a short one. After a long and destructive circuit
through every province of Germany, the stream of war had at last rolled
backwards to its source, and the roar of the Swedish artillery now
reminded the terrified inhabitants of those balls which, twenty-seven
years before, the Bohemian rebels had fired into Vienna. The same
theatre of war brought again similar actors on the scene. Torstensohn
invited Ragotsky, the successor of Bethlen Gabor, to his assistance, as
the Bohemian rebels had solicited that of his predecessor; Upper Hungary
was already inundated by his troops, and his union with the Swedes was
daily apprehended. The Elector of Saxony, driven to despair by the
Swedes taking up their quarters within his territories, and abandoned by
the Emperor, who, after the defeat at Jankowitz, was unable to defend
himself, at length adopted the last and only expedient which remained,
and concluded a truce with Sweden, which was renewed from year to year,
till the general peace. The Emperor thus lost a friend, while a new
enemy was appearing at his very gates, his armies dispersed, and his
allies in other quarters of Germany defeated. The French army had
effaced the disgrace of their defeat at Deutlingen by a brilliant
campaign, and had kept the whole force of Bavaria employed upon the
Rhine and in Suabia. Reinforced with fresh troops from France, which
the great Turenne, already distinguished by his victories in Italy,
brought to the assistance of the Duke of Enghien, they appeared on the
3rd of August, 1644, before Friburg, which Mercy had lately taken, and
now covered, with his whole army strongly intrenched. But against the
steady firmness of the Bavarians, all the impetuous valour of the French
was exerted in vain, and after a fruitless sacrifice of 6,000 men, the
Duke of Enghien was compelled to retreat. Mazarin shed tears over this
great loss, which Conde, who had no feeling for anything but glory,
disregarded. "A single night in Paris," said he, "gives birth to more
men than this action has destroyed." The Bavarians, however, were so
disabled by this murderous battle, that, far from being in a condition
to relieve Austria from the menaced dangers, they were too weak even to
defend the banks of the Rhine. Spires, Worms, and Manheim capitulated;
the strong fortress of Philipsburg was forced to surrender by famine;
and, by a timely submission, Mentz hastened to disarm the conquerors.
Austria and Moravia, however, were now freed from Torstensohn, by a
similar means of deliverance, as in the beginning of the war had saved
them from the Bohemians. Ragotzky, at the head of 25,000 men, had
advanced into the neighbourhood of the Swedish quarters upon the Danube.
But these wild undisciplined hordes, instead of seconding the operations
of Torstensohn by any vigorous enterprise, only ravaged the country, and
increased the distress which, even before their arrival, had begun to be
felt in the Swedish camp. To extort tribute from the Emperor, and money
and plunder from his subjects, was the sole object that had allured
Ragotzky, or his predecessor, Bethlen Gabor, into the field; and both
departed as soon as they had gained their end. To get rid of him,
Ferdinand granted the barbarian whatever he asked, and, by a small
sacrifice, freed his states of this formidable enemy.
In the mean time, the main body of the Swedes had been greatly weakened
by a tedious encampment before Brunn. Torstensohn, who commanded in
person, for four entire months employed in vain all his knowledge of
military tactics; the obstinacy of the resistance was equal to that of
the assault; while despair roused the courage of Souches, the
commandant, a Swedish deserter, who had no hope of pardon. The ravages
caused by pestilence, arising from famine, want of cleanliness, and the
use of unripe fruit, during their tedious and unhealthy encampment, with
the sudden retreat of the Prince of Transylvania, at last compelled the
Swedish leader to raise the siege. As all the passes upon the Danube
were occupied, and his army greatly weakened by famine and sickness, he
at last relinquished his intended plan of operations against Austria and
Moravia, and contented himself with securing a key to these provinces,
by leaving behind him Swedish garrisons in the conquered fortresses. He
then directed his march into Bohemia, whither he was followed by the
Imperialists, under the Archduke Leopold. Such of the lost places as
had not been retaken by the latter, were recovered, after his departure,
by the Austrian General Bucheim; so that, in the course of the following
year, the Austrian frontier was again cleared of the enemy, and Vienna
escaped with mere alarm. In Bohemia and Silesia too, the Swedes
maintained themselves only with a very variable fortune; they traversed
both countries, without being able to hold their ground in either. But
if the designs of Torstensohn were not crowned with all the success
which they were promised at the commencement, they were, nevertheless,
productive of the most important consequences to the Swedish party.
Denmark had been compelled to a peace, Saxony to a truce. The Emperor,
in the deliberations for a peace, offered greater concessions; France
became more manageable; and Sweden itself bolder and more confident in
its bearing towards these two crowns. Having thus nobly performed his
duty, the author of these advantages retired, adorned with laurels, into
the tranquillity of private life, and endeavoured to restore his
shattered health.
By the retreat of Torstensohn, the Emperor was relieved from all fears
of an irruption on the side of Bohemia. But a new danger soon
threatened the Austrian frontier from Suabia and Bavaria. Turenne, who
had separated from Conde, and taken the direction of Suabia, had, in the
year 1645, been totally defeated by Mercy, near Mergentheim; and the
victorious Bavarians, under their brave leader, poured into Hesse. But
the Duke of Enghien hastened with considerable succours from Alsace,
Koenigsmark from Moravia, and the Hessians from the Rhine, to recruit
the defeated army, and the Bavarians were in turn compelled to retire to
the extreme limits of Suabia. Here they posted themselves at the
village of Allersheim, near Nordlingen, in order to cover the Bavarian
frontier. But no obstacle could check the impetuosity of the Duke of
Enghien. In person, he led on his troops against the enemy's
entrenchments, and a battle took place, which the heroic resistance of
the Bavarians rendered most obstinate and bloody; till at last the death
of the great Mercy, the skill of Turenne, and the iron firmness of the
Hessians, decided the day in favour of the allies. But even this second
barbarous sacrifice of life had little effect either on the course of
the war, or on the negociations for peace. The French army, exhausted
by this bloody engagement, was still farther weakened by the departure
of the Hessians, and the Bavarians being reinforced by the Archduke
Leopold, Turenne was again obliged hastily to recross the Rhine.
The retreat of the French, enabled the enemy to turn his whole force
upon the Swedes in Bohemia. Gustavus Wrangel, no unworthy successor of
Banner and Torstensohn, had, in 1646, been appointed Commander-in-chief
of the Swedish army, which, besides Koenigsmark's flying corps and the
numerous garrisons disposed throughout the empire, amounted to about
8,000 horse, and 15,000 foot. The Archduke, after reinforcing his army,
which already amounted to 24,000 men, with twelve Bavarian regiments of
cavalry, and eighteen regiments of infantry, moved against Wrangel, in
the hope of being able to overwhelm him by his superior force before
Koenigsmark could join him, or the French effect a diversion in his
favour. Wrangel, however, did not await him, but hastened through Upper
Saxony to the Weser, where he took Hoester and Paderborn. From thence
he marched into Hesse, in order to join Turenne, and at his camp at
Wetzlar, was joined by the flying corps of Koenigsmark. But Turenne,
fettered by the instructions of Mazarin, who had seen with jealousy the
warlike prowess and increasing power of the Swedes, excused himself on
the plea of a pressing necessity to defend the frontier of France on the
side of the Netherlands, in consequence of the Flemings having failed to
make the promised diversion. But as Wrangel continued to press his just
demand, and a longer opposition might have excited distrust on the part
of the Swedes, or induce them to conclude a private treaty with Austria,
Turenne at last obtained the wished for permission to join the Swedish
army.
The junction took place at Giessen, and they now felt themselves strong
enough to meet the enemy. The latter had followed the Swedes into
Hesse, in order to intercept their commissariat, and to prevent their
union with Turenne. In both designs they had been unsuccessful; and the
Imperialists now saw themselves cut off from the Maine, and exposed to
great scarcity and want from the loss of their magazines. Wrangel took
advantage of their weakness, to execute a plan by which he hoped to give
a new turn to the war. He, too, had adopted the maxim of his
predecessor, to carry the war into the Austrian States. But discouraged
by the ill success of Torstensohn's enterprise, he hoped to gain his end
with more certainty by another way. He determined to follow the course
of the Danube, and to break into the Austrian territories through the
midst of Bavaria. A similar design had been formerly conceived by
Gustavus Adolphus, which he had been prevented carrying into effect by
the approach of Wallenstein's army, and the danger of Saxony. Duke
Bernard moving in his footsteps, and more fortunate than Gustavus, had
spread his victorious banners between the Iser and the Inn; but the near
approach of the enemy, vastly superior in force, obliged him to halt in
his victorious career, and lead back his troops. Wrangel now hoped to
accomplish the object in which his predecessors had failed, the more so,
as the Imperial and Bavarian army was far in his rear upon the Lahn, and
could only reach Bavaria by a long march through Franconia and the Upper
Palatinate. He moved hastily upon the Danube, defeated a Bavarian corps
near Donauwerth, and passed that river, as well as the Lech, unopposed.
But by wasting his time in the unsuccessful siege of Augsburg, he gave
opportunity to the Imperialists, not only to relieve that city, but also
to repulse him as far as Lauingen. No sooner, however, had they turned
towards Suabia, with a view to remove the war from Bavaria, than,
seizing the opportunity, he repassed the Lech, and guarded the passage
of it against the Imperialists themselves. Bavaria now lay open and
defenceless before him; the French and Swedes quickly overran it; and
the soldiery indemnified themselves for all dangers by frightful
outrages, robberies, and extortions. The arrival of the Imperial
troops, who at last succeeded in passing the Lech at Thierhaupten, only
increased the misery of this country, which friend and foe
indiscriminately plundered.
And now, for the first time during the whole course of this war, the
courage of Maximilian, which for eight-and-twenty years had stood
unshaken amidst fearful dangers, began to waver. Ferdinand II., his
school-companion at Ingoldstadt, and the friend of his youth, was no
more; and with the death of his friend and benefactor, the strong tie
was dissolved which had linked the Elector to the House of Austria. To
the father, habit, inclination, and gratitude had attached him; the son
was a stranger to his heart, and political interests alone could
preserve his fidelity to the latter prince.
Accordingly, the motives which the artifices of France now put in
operation, in order to detach him from the Austrian alliance, and to
induce him to lay down his arms, were drawn entirely from political
considerations. It was not without a selfish object that Mazarin had so
far overcome his jealousy of the growing power of the Swedes, as to
allow the French to accompany them into Bavaria. His intention was to
expose Bavaria to all the horrors of war, in the hope that the
persevering fortitude of Maximilian might be subdued by necessity and
despair, and the Emperor deprived of his first and last ally.
Brandenburg had, under its great sovereign, embraced the neutrality;
Saxony had been forced to accede to it; the war with France prevented
the Spaniards from taking any part in that of Germany; the peace with
Sweden had removed Denmark from the theatre of war; and Poland had been
disarmed by a long truce. If they could succeed in detaching the
Elector of Bavaria also from the Austrian alliance, the Emperor would be
without a friend in Germany and left to the mercy of the allied powers.
Ferdinand III. saw his danger, and left no means untried to avert it.
But the Elector of Bavaria was unfortunately led to believe that the
Spaniards alone were disinclined to peace, and that nothing, but Spanish
influence, had induced the Emperor so long to resist a cessation of
hostilities. Maximilian detested the Spaniards, and could never forgive
their having opposed his application for the Palatine Electorate. Could
it then be supposed that, in order to gratify this hated power, he would
see his people sacrificed, his country laid waste, and himself ruined,
when, by a cessation of hostilities, he could at once emancipate himself
from all these distresses, procure for his people the repose of which
they stood so much in need, and perhaps accelerate the arrival of a
general peace? All doubts disappeared; and, convinced of the necessity
of this step, he thought he should sufficiently discharge his
obligations to the Emperor, if he invited him also to share in the
benefit of the truce.
The deputies of the three crowns, and of Bavaria, met at Ulm, to adjust
the conditions. But it was soon evident, from the instructions of the
Austrian ambassadors that it was not the intention of the Emperor to
second the conclusion of a truce, but if possible to prevent it. It was
obviously necessary to make the terms acceptable to the Swedes, who had
the advantage, and had more to hope than to fear from the continuance of
the war. They were the conquerors; and yet the Emperor presumed to
dictate to them. In the first transports of their indignation, the
Swedish ambassadors were on the point of leaving the congress, and the
French were obliged to have recourse to threats in order to detain them.
The good intentions of the Elector of Bavaria, to include the Emperor in
the benefit of the truce, having been thus rendered unavailing, he felt
himself justified in providing for his own safety. However hard were
the conditions on which the truce was to be purchased, he did not
hesitate to accept it on any terms. He agreed to the Swedes extending
their quarters in Suabia and Franconia, and to his own being restricted
to Bavaria and the Palatinate. The conquests which he had made in
Suabia were ceded to the allies, who, on their part, restored to him
what they had taken from Bavaria. Cologne and Hesse Cassel were also
included in the truce. After the conclusion of this treaty, upon the
14th March, 1647, the French and Swedes left Bavaria, and in order not
to interfere with each other, took up different quarters; the former in
Wuertemberg, the latter in Upper Suabia, in the neighbourhood of the
Lake of Constance. On the extreme north of this lake, and on the most
southern frontier of Suabia, the Austrian town of Bregentz, by its steep
and narrow passes, seemed to defy attack; and in this persuasion, the
whole peasantry of the surrounding villages had with their property
taken refuge in this natural fortress. The rich booty, which the store
of provisions it contained, gave reason to expect, and the advantage of
possessing a pass into the Tyrol, Switzerland and Italy, induced the
Swedish general to venture an attack upon this supposed impregnable post
and town, in which he succeeded. Meantime, Turenne, according to
agreement, marched into Wuertemberg, where he forced the Landgrave of
Darmstadt and the Elector of Mentz to imitate the example of Bavaria,
and to embrace the neutrality.
And now, at last, France seemed to have attained the great object of its
policy, that of depriving the Emperor of the support of the League, and
of his Protestant allies, and of dictating to him, sword in hand, the
conditions of peace. Of all his once formidable power, an army, not
exceeding 12,000, was all that remained to him; and this force he was
driven to the necessity of entrusting to the command of a Calvinist, the
Hessian deserter Melander, as the casualties of war had stripped him of
his best generals. But as this war had been remarkable for the sudden
changes of fortune it displayed; and as every calculation of state
policy had been frequently baffled by some unforeseen event, in this
case also the issue disappointed expectation; and after a brief crisis,
the fallen power of Austria rose again to a formidable strength. The
jealousy which France entertained of Sweden, prevented it from
permitting the total ruin of the Emperor, or allowing the Swedes to
obtain such a preponderance in Germany, as might have been destructive
to France herself. Accordingly, the French minister declined to take
advantage of the distresses of Austria; and the army of Turenne,
separating from that of Wrangel, retired to the frontiers of the
Netherlands. Wrangel, indeed, after moving from Suabia into Franconia,
taking Schweinfurt, and incorporating the imperial garrison of that
place with his own army, attempted to make his way into Bohemia, and
laid siege to Egra, the key of that kingdom. To relieve this fortress,
the Emperor put his last army in motion, and placed himself at its head.
But obliged to take a long circuit, in order to spare the lands of Von
Schlick, the president of the council of war, he protracted his march;
and on his arrival, Egra was already taken. Both armies were now in
sight of each other; and a decisive battle was momentarily expected, as
both were suffering from want, and the two camps were only separated
from each other by the space of the entrenchments. But the
Imperialists, although superior in numbers, contented themselves with
keeping close to the enemy, and harassing them by skirmishes, by
fatiguing marches and famine, until the negociations which had been
opened with Bavaria were brought to a bearing.
The neutrality of Bavaria, was a wound under which the Imperial court
writhed impatiently; and after in vain attempting to prevent it, Austria
now determined, if possible, to turn it to advantage. Several officers
of the Bavarian army had been offended by this step of their master,
which at once reduced them to inaction, and imposed a burdensome
restraint on their restless disposition. Even the brave John de Werth
was at the head of the malcontents, and encouraged by the Emperor, he
formed a plot to seduce the whole army from their allegiance to the
Elector, and lead it over to the Emperor. Ferdinand did not blush to
patronize this act of treachery against his father's most trusty ally.
He formally issued a proclamation to the Bavarian troops, in which he
recalled them to himself, reminded them that they were the troops of the
empire, which the Elector had merely commanded in name of the Emperor.
Fortunately for Maximilian, he detected the conspiracy in time enough to
anticipate and prevent it by the most rapid and effective measures.
This disgraceful conduct of the Emperor might have justified a reprisal,
but Maximilian was too old a statesman to listen to the voice of
passion, where policy alone ought to be heard. He had not derived from
the truce the advantages he expected. Far from tending to accelerate a
general peace, it had a pernicious influence upon the negociations at
Munster and Osnaburg, and had made the allies bolder in their demands.
The French and Swedes had indeed removed from Bavaria; but, by the loss
of his quarters in the Suabian circle, he found himself compelled either
to exhaust his own territories by the subsistence of his troops, or at
once to disband them, and to throw aside the shield and spear, at the
very moment when the sword alone seemed to be the arbiter of right.
Before embracing either of these certain evils, he determined to try a
third step, the unfavourable issue of which was at least not so certain,
viz., to renounce the truce and resume the war.
This resolution, and the assistance which he immediately despatched to
the Emperor in Bohemia, threatened materially to injure the Swedes, and
Wrangel was compelled in haste to evacuate that kingdom. He retired
through Thuringia into Westphalia and Lunenburg, in the hope of forming
a junction with the French army under Turenne, while the Imperial and
Bavarian army followed him to the Weser, under Melander and Gronsfeld.
His ruin was inevitable, if the enemy should overtake him before his
junction with Turenne; but the same consideration which had just saved
the Emperor, now proved the salvation of the Swedes. Even amidst all
the fury of the conquest, cold calculations of prudence guided the
course of the war, and the vigilance of the different courts increased,
as the prospect of peace approached. The Elector of Bavaria could not
allow the Emperor to obtain so decisive a preponderance as, by the
sudden alteration of affairs, might delay the chances of a general
peace. Every change of fortune was important now, when a pacification
was so ardently desired by all, and when the disturbance of the balance
of power among the contracting parties might at once annihilate the work
of years, destroy the fruit of long and tedious negociations, and
indefinitely protract the repose of Europe. If France sought to
restrain the Swedish crown within due bounds, and measured out her
assistance according to her successes and defeats, the Elector of
Bavaria silently undertook the same task with the Emperor his ally, and
determined, by prudently dealing out his aid, to hold the fate of
Austria in his own hands. And now that the power of the Emperor
threatened once more to attain a dangerous superiority, Maximilian at
once ceased to pursue the Swedes. He was also afraid of reprisals from
France, who had threatened to direct Turenne's whole force against him
if he allowed his troops to cross the Weser.
Melander, prevented by the Bavarians from further pursuing Wrangel,
crossed by Jena and Erfurt into Hesse, and now appeared as a dangerous
enemy in the country which he had formerly defended. If it was the
desire of revenge upon his former sovereign, which led him to choose
Hesse for the scene of his ravage, he certainly had his full
gratification. Under this scourge, the miseries of that unfortunate
state reached their height. But he had soon reason to regret that, in
the choice of his quarters, he had listened to the dictates of revenge
rather than of prudence. In this exhausted country, his army was
oppressed by want, while Wrangel was recruiting his strength, and
remounting his cavalry in Lunenburg. Too weak to maintain his wretched
quarters against the Swedish general, when he opened the campaign in the
winter of 1648, and marched against Hesse, he was obliged to retire with
disgrace, and take refuge on the banks of the Danube.
France had once more disappointed the expectations of Sweden; and the
army of Turenne, disregarding the remonstrances of Wrangel, had remained
upon the Rhine. The Swedish leader revenged himself, by drawing into
his service the cavalry of Weimar, which had abandoned the standard of
France, though, by this step, he farther increased the jealousy of that
power. Turenne received permission to join the Swedes; and the last
campaign of this eventful war was now opened by the united armies.
Driving Melander before them along the Danube, they threw supplies into
Egra, which was besieged by the Imperialists, and defeated the Imperial
and Bavarian armies on the Danube, which ventured to oppose them at
Susmarshausen, where Melander was mortally wounded. After this
overthrow, the Bavarian general, Gronsfeld, placed himself on the
farther side of the Lech, in order to guard Bavaria from the enemy.
But Gronsfeld was not more fortunate than Tilly, who, in this same
position, had sacrificed his life for Bavaria. Wrangel and Turenne
chose the same spot for passing the river, which was so gloriously
marked by the victory of Gustavus Adolphus, and accomplished it by the
same means, too, which had favoured their predecessor. Bavaria was now
a second time overrun, and the breach of the truce punished by the
severest treatment of its inhabitants. Maximilian sought shelter in
Salzburgh, while the Swedes crossed the Iser, and forced their way as
far as the Inn. A violent and continued rain, which in a few days
swelled this inconsiderable stream into a broad river, saved Austria
once more from the threatened danger. The enemy ten times attempted to
form a bridge of boats over the Inn, and as often it was destroyed by
the current. Never, during the whole course of the war, had the
Imperialists been in so great consternation as at present, when the
enemy were in the centre of Bavaria, and when they had no longer a
general left who could be matched against a Turenne, a Wrangel, and a
Koenigsmark. At last the brave Piccolomini arrived from the
Netherlands, to assume the command of the feeble wreck of the
Imperialists. By their own ravages in Bohemia, the allies had rendered
their subsistence in that country impracticable, and were at last driven
by scarcity to retreat into the Upper Palatinate, where the news of the
peace put a period to their activity.
Koenigsmark, with his flying corps, advanced towards Bohemia, where
Ernest Odowalsky, a disbanded captain, who, after being disabled in the
imperial service, had been dismissed without a pension, laid before him
a plan for surprising the lesser side of the city of Prague.
Koenigsmark successfully accomplished the bold enterprise, and acquired
the reputation of closing the thirty years' war by the last brilliant
achievement. This decisive stroke, which vanquished the Emperor's
irresolution, cost the Swedes only the loss of a single man. But the
old town, the larger half of Prague, which is divided into two parts by
the Moldau, by its vigorous resistance wearied out the efforts of the
Palatine, Charles Gustavus, the successor of Christina on the throne,
who had arrived from Sweden with fresh troops, and had assembled the
whole Swedish force in Bohemia and Silesia before its walls. The
approach of winter at last drove the besiegers into their quarters, and
in the mean time, the intelligence arrived that a peace had been signed
at Munster, on the 24th October.
The colossal labour of concluding this solemn, and ever memorable and
sacred treaty, which is known by the name of the peace of Westphalia;
the endless obstacles which were to be surmounted; the contending
interests which it was necessary to reconcile; the concatenation of
circumstances which must have co-operated to bring to a favourable
termination this tedious, but precious and permanent work of policy; the
difficulties which beset the very opening of the negociations, and
maintaining them, when opened, during the ever-fluctuating vicissitudes
of the war; finally, arranging the conditions of peace, and still more,
the carrying them into effect; what were the conditions of this peace;
what each contending power gained or lost, by the toils and sufferings
of a thirty years' war; what modification it wrought upon the general
system of European policy;--these are matters which must be relinquished
to another pen. The history of the peace of Westphalia constitutes a
whole, as important as the history of the war itself. A mere abridgment
of it, would reduce to a mere skeleton one of the most interesting and
characteristic monuments of human policy and passions, and deprive it of
every feature calculated to fix the attention of the public, for which I
write, and of which I now respectfully take my leave.
[Note From the first PG etext of this work:
Separate sources indicate that at the beginning of this war there were
about 15 million people in Germany, and at the end of the war there were
about 4 million. If this is not surprising enough, war broke out again
only 10 years after the conclusion of this war.]
*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 30 YEARS WAR, BY SCHILLER, BOOK V. ***
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