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Title: The imperial Japanese navy
Author: Fred T. Jane
Release date: October 22, 2024 [eBook #74624]
Language: English
Original publication: London: W. Thacker & Co
Credits: Peter Becker and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY ***
Transcriber’s Notes:
Underscores “_” before and after a word or phrase indicate _italics_
in the original text.
Equal signs “=” before and after a word or phrase indicate =bold=
in the original text.
Small capitals have been converted to SOLID capitals.
Illustrations have been moved so they do not break up paragraphs.
Old or antiquated spellings have been preserved.
Typographical and punctuation errors have been silently corrected.
[Illustration: [_Photo by favour of Commander Takarabé, I.J.N._
THE BATTLESHIP CHIN YEN.
(_The principal capture in the Chino-Japanese War._)]
THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY
BY
FRED. T. JANE
AUTHOR OF
“THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY”
“ALL THE WORLD’S FIGHTING SHIPS” (NAVAL ANNUAL), ETC.
INVENTOR OF THE JANE NAVAL WAR GAME (NAVAL KRIEGSPIEL)
ETC., ETC.
ASSISTED BY OFFICERS OF THE JAPANESE NAVY
WITH OVER 80 ILLUSTRATIONS FROM SKETCHES AND DRAWINGS
BY JAPANESE ARTISTS AND FROM OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPHS
LONDON
W. THACKER & CO., 2, CREED LANE, E.C.
CALCUTTA AND SIMLA: THACKER, SPINK & CO.
1904
_All rights reserved_
TO
MANY FRIENDS
NOW SERVING IN THE JAPANESE
FLEET, AND TO THE MEMORY OF
OTHERS WHO HAVE
DIED DOING THEIR DUTY
THIS VOLUME IS
DEDICATED
PREFACE
This book is uniform with my similar book on the Russian Navy, and
is designed to have an exactly similar scope; that is to say, it
traces the Japanese Navy from the earliest period up to the time of
the outbreak of the war with Russia in February, 1904. It then deals
with the dockyards of Japan, the armament and equipment of her Fleet,
with her _personnel_, both officers and men, and finally with all
those side issues and semi-political questions which have brought the
modern Japanese Fleet into existence and governed the Japanese building
programme. In an Appendix, certain matters that may seem to demand
detailed attention are dealt with separately.
In preparing this book for the press—a task that I began so long ago
as the year 1900—I have received the most kind and willing assistance
of a great many personal friends in the Fleet of “Britain’s ally.”
To them I would express my most cordial thanks. Especially would I
mention my indebtedness in various—I might say innumerable—ways to
Admirals Yamamoto Gombey, Dewa, Kamimura, Ito, and Ijuin; Captains
Yamada, Uchida, Kawashima, and Kashiwabara; Commanders Kuroi,
Takarabé, Hirose, Takeshita, Yamanaka; Lieut.-Commanders Nomaguchi,
Hideshima, Sato, Horiuchi; Staff-Paymaster Minuma; Lieutenants
Ishikawa, Yamamoto, Yamagi, Fukura, Matsui, Sasaki; Engineer-Lieutenant
Kimura; Chief-Constructor Matsuo; Constructor Kondo; and a great many
others—all personal friends, to whose suggestions it is due that I came
to write this book at all.
I am neither pro-Japanese nor pro-Russian. As I write, disaster is
thick upon the Russian Fleet, and to many close friends in it go those
sympathies which, had things been the other way about, would have gone
as surely to the Japanese Fleet. To write this book without bias has
been my special aim; and in view of the enthusiastic admiration which
the Japanese Fleet is now evoking in the Anglo-Saxon world, I have
especially tried not to be blind to such defects as the Japanese Navy
may exhibit. This, however, is obvious in the body of the book, and
needs no mention here, any more than reference is required in this
Preface to the courage and skill which Japanese sailors have shown.
Portions of some of the chapters have, in some form or other, appeared
in the _Engineer_, _Daily Chronicle_, _Daily Mail_, _Fortnightly
Review_, _Collier’s Weekly_, or _Forum_. To the editors of these papers
I desire to make the usual acknowledgments,
F. T. J.
PORTSMOUTH.
1904.
CONTENTS
PAGE
PREFACE ix
I. EARLY HISTORY 1
II. THE OPENING OF JAPAN 13
III. EARLY WARSHIPS AND THE CIVIL WAR 21
IV. THE IMPERIAL NAVY 36
V. THE WAR WITH CHINA 101
VI. THE BATTLE OF YALU 115
VII. WEI-HAI-WEI 156
VIII. AFTER THE WAR WITH CHINA 168
IX. THE NEW PROGRAMME 218
X. THE JAPANESE DOCKYARDS 234
1. YOKOSUKA 234
2. TOKIO 236
3. KURÉ 237
4. SASSEBO 238
5. MAITZURU 241
XI. NAVAL HARBOURS 242
1. NAGASAKI 242
2. TAKESHIKI 244
3. OMINATO 245
4. KOBÉ 246
5. KURÉ 246
XII. THE MERCANTILE MARINE 249
XIII. THE JAPANESE ADMIRALTY 252
XIV. ENTRY AND TRAINING OF OFFICERS 257
XV. ENTRY AND TRAINING OF MEN 265
XVI. PAY, ETC. 267
XVII. FLAGS 275
XVIII. UNIFORMS, ETC. 276
XIX. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFICERS 278
XX. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MEN 303
XXI. MESSING 309
XXII. THE ARMAMENT AND EQUIPMENT OF THE FLEET 313
1. GUNS 313
2. GUNNERY ACCESSORIES 322
3. TORPEDOES 325
4. ARMOUR 329
5. ENGINES AND BOILERS 330
XXIII. OTHER NAVIES AS SEEN BY THE JAPANESE 337
XXIV. THE WAR WITH RUSSIA 340
APPENDICES—
OFFICIAL REPORTS, CHINO-JAPANESE WAR 359
LIST OF JAPANESE WARSHIPS 394
JAPANESE SHIP-NAMES (MEANINGS) 398
HISTORICAL SHIP-NAMES 402
A JAPANESE “AT HOME” 403
INDEX TO SUBJECT-MATTER 407
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
PAGE
THE BATTLESHIP CHIN YEN (_photograph_) _Frontispiece_
MAP OF JAPAN 3
THE TSUKUBA 20
THE FUJI YAMA 23
THE ADSUMA 27
JAPANESE OFFICERS IN 1866 30
THE MOISSHIN 31
THE ASAMA 33
BATTLE OF HAKODATE (_from a Japanese print_) 37
THE SEIKI 41
JAPANESE FLEET AT MANŒUVRES (_photograph_) 45
THE CHIN YEN AT EVOLUTIONS (_photograph_) 51
THE TSUKUSHI (_photograph_) 55
THE ESMERALDA (NOW IDZUMI) (_plan_) 58
THE NANIWA (_photograph_) 61
THE NANIWA (_plan_) 63
THE SAI YEN (_photograph and plan_) 65
THE FUSO AT SEA (_photograph_) 69
THE TAKAO (_photograph_) 73
THE UNEBI 75
THE TSCHICHIMA 79
THE HASHIDATE (_photograph_) 83
THE MATSUSHIMA (_photograph_) 83
THE HEI YEN (_photograph_) 87
THE CHIYODA (_photograph_) 89
THE CHIYODA (_plan_) 91
THE AKITSUSHIMA (_photograph_) 93
THE AKITSUSHIMA (_plan_) 95
THE YOSHINO (_plan_) 96
THE YOSHINO (_photograph_) 97
THE TATSUTA (_plan_) 100
THE JAPANESE FLEET IN LINE ABREAST OFF CHEMULPO
DURING THE WAR 107
ADMIRAL ITO (_photograph_) 117
A JAPANESE PICTURE OF YALU 133
SINKING OF THE KING YUEN
(_sketch by a Japanese Officer_) 137
PLANS OF BATTLE OF YALU 121, 125, 129, 141
THE CHEN YUEN AFTER ACTION 145
MAP OF WEI-HAI-WEI 157
CELEBRATING SURRENDER OF CHINESE FLEET AT
NAVAL CLUB, TOKIO 161
JAPANESE FLEET BOMBARDING WEI-HAI-WEI 165
THE SUMA (_photograph_) 169
THE FUJI (_plan_) 173
THE YOSHIMA (_plan_) 173
THE FUJI (_photograph_) 175
THE SHIKISHIMA (_plan_) 177
THE HATSUSE (_photograph_) 179
THE MIKASA (_plan_) 183
THE MIKASA (_photograph_) 187
THE IDZUMO (_photograph_) 193
THE ASAMA (_plan_) 196
THE YAKUMO (_photograph_) 197
THE AZUMA (_plan_) 200
THE NISSHIN (_photograph_) 201
THE KASUGA (_plan_) 204
THE NISSHIN (_plan_) 204
THE KASUGA (_photograph_) 205
THE KASAGI (_photograph_) 209
THE TAKASAGO (_plan_) 211
THE NIITAKA (plan) 212
THE CHIHAYA (_plan_) 214
THE MIYAKO (_plan_) 214
THE FIRST JAPANESE TORPEDO BOAT 216
THE KASHIMA (_plan_) 221
YOKOSUKA (_map_) 235
SASSEBO (_map_) 238
SASSEBO NAVAL CLUB (_photograph_) 239
MAITZURU (_map_) 241
TAKESHIKI (_map_) 244
KOBÉ HARBOUR (_photograph_) 247
ADMIRAL GOMBEY (_photograph_) 253
JAPANESE FLAGS 274
THE SHIKISHIMA ENTERING PORTSMOUTH DOCKYARD 287
“AT HOME” ON BOARD THE KASAGI 291
SCHNEIDER-CANET GUN 24-CM. FOR COAST SERVICE
(_photograph_) 312
12-IN. GUNS OF THE MIKASA (_plan_) 314
CANET GUNS 24-CM. FOR COAST SERVICE (_photograph_) 315
VICKERS 6-IN. GUN (_plan_) 318
VICKERS 6-IN. GUN (_photograph_) 319
CANET 27-CM. GUN (_photograph_) 323
ELSWICK SUBMERGED TUBE (_plan_) 326
CANET 15-CM. GUN (_photograph_) 327
ELSWICK SUBMERGED TUBE (_photograph_) 331
BELLEVILLE BOILER 333
NICLAUSSE BOILER 335
THE VARIAG 341
ADMIRAL TOGO 344
THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY
I EARLY HISTORY
The earliest Japanese history, like that of all other nations, is a
mass of myths and legends. But out of this one solid fact has been
evolved: the Japanese were a race who invaded the island kingdom by way
of Korea, much as the Saxons and other Teutonic tribes invaded Britain.
They therefore used the sea at a very early period of their history.
They found aboriginal tribes when they came, and of these the Ainu
still exist in the north, a race as distinct as our Celts in the north
of Scotland. The immigrant race are always spoken of and accepted as
Mongolians, though in Japanese legend the invaders had, as in similar
Western myths, a divine origin. Incidentally, it is interesting to
note that a Japanese, with kindred tastes to those Western _savants_
who have found the cradle of the human race in Lapland or in Central
Africa, has built a theory by which ancient Egypt was the early home of
the Japanese. To support this theory numerous small similarities were
brought forward; but it does not seem to have made headway in Japan, or
to be known in the Western world. It is, as regards plausibility, about
on a par with the Anglo-Israelite theory that had once quite a vogue in
this country, and is by no means without disciples to-day.
Whence they came, however, is a matter of no moment here. Japanese
national history begins with the expedition led by the Emperor Jimmu,
at a date which a loose chronology fixes at 660 B.C. This is the
earliest over-sea operation unconnected with deities and myths.
Jimmu, who, according to the legends, was the grandson of the Sea
Deity’s daughter, led an expedition eastward from Mount Takachiho,
and eventually found himself on the shores of the Inland Sea, and
here built a fleet, by means of which he reached Naniwa (Osaka), and
consolidated the empire.
For the next seven or eight centuries the nation was forming; but
beyond a legend, suggestive of the story of Jonah, nothing is heard
of ships or boats till 202 A.D., when the Empress Jingo equipped a
great fleet for the invasion of Korea. As an early instance of the
use of “sea-power,” this expedition has laid great hold on Japanese
imagination; but since the transportation of the flagship by legions
of fishes, with which the Empress has made an alliance, is the central
point of the story, its nautical details can hardly be seriously
considered. What is of more moment is the undoubted fact that the
expedition took place, that it was a complete success for Japan, and
laid the foundations of that Japanese interest in Korea which is to-day
so potent a factor in the Far Eastern problem.
[Illustration: MAP OF JAPAN.]
Korea paid tribute without question for some three hundred years. About
the year 520, however, the Emperor Keitai Tenno collected a fleet, and
conducted some operations against the Koreans that served to tighten
Japan’s hold on her over-sea possessions. From this time onward for the
next two or three hundred years Japan grew as a trading nation, and
intercourse with both Korea and China became common. As in those days
every merchant ship became a warship when required, Japan must have
ranked as a considerable naval power.
As for the ships, these may have been either mere boats or small
coasting junks, probably differing very little from the boats and junks
of the present day.
About the year 650 Japanese garrisons were driven out of Korea by
hostile tribes, assisted by the Chinese, and with the expelled Japanese
came many Koreans, an immigration that continued for some considerable
period.
In the middle of the ninth century the Samaurii, or military caste,
whose descendants to-day provide the bulk of naval officers, first
began to arise. The Shoguns, afterwards to become such a power, were
originally generals, there being one in command of each of the four
military districts into which the Emperor Sujin had divided Japan. A
Shogun with any special powers did not arise till the year 1200 or so,
when Yoshinaka made himself _Sei-i-Shogun_ (Chief Shogun).
As he was driven to suicide soon afterwards in the civil war then
desolating the empire, the post did not convey any great advantage to
him; but Yaritomo whose troops had defeated him, became after a time
_Sei-i-tai-Shogun_ (great barbarian compelling Shogun). This civil
war—between the Taira and the Minamoto clans—culminated in a naval
battle. The former are credited with 500 junks, which, in addition to
the soldiers, were crowded with women and children and the fugitive
emperor. At Dan-no-ura, on the Inland Sea, these were overtaken by
the Minamoto with 700 vessels, and the smaller fleet was annihilated.
This decisive action ended the civil war, but it created the system of
Shogun rule, whereby all the governing of the country was in the hands
of Yoritomo, the Emperor being a mere figure-head and puppet in his
hands.
The descendants of Yaritomo, as Shoguns _de jure_, did not exercise
much power _de facto_, for regents (the Hojo) acted for them. In time,
too, tutors came to act for the regents, and under this condition of
government, plunged into a species of anarchy, Japan faced the great
Chinese invasion of 1281.
Having resolved on the capture of Japan, the Chinese sent envoys
demanding its surrender. These, after being sent from pillar to post in
a search for the real governing power, were eventually killed by the
populace. The Chinese then prepared a fleet of 300 of their own and
Korean ships, added the Japanese sun to the consuming dragon on the
Chinese flag, and invaded to consummate the capture. On the water they
encountered no opposition, but on landing they were met and defeated by
the Japanese, united in the presence of a common danger. A great storm
at the same time destroyed the hostile fleet, and the invasion was at
an end.
It was followed by more internal strife, till in 1333 the Hojo were
finally put down. Shortly afterwards the chief power came into the
hands of the Shoguns.
Despite the civil warfare, Japan still made headway as a maritime
State. Trade and piracy were conducted not only with Korea and China,
but Japanese vessels sailed regularly to the distant shores of Siam.
In 1542 the Portuguese first came into touch with Japan. Three cannon
were presented to the Shogun, and a little later Pinto arrived on the
scene, and taught the manufacture of gunpowder. Jesuits followed, and
made such headway that in the next civil war the Christian Japanese, to
the number of 600,000 or more, were a strong political factor.
In 1587 Hideyoshi the _Taikio_, the _de facto_ ruler of Japan, issued
an edict against the Christians, many missionaries were expelled, and
the ports open to foreign vessels were finally limited to one only,
Nagasaki, as at that time the suspicion first began that soldiers would
presently follow the missionaries.
About the same period Hideyoshi, who had designs upon China and Korea,
began to prepare warships. He also endeavoured to create a fleet of
European-built ships, but the traders whom he approached on the matter
refused to sell their vessels. He had, therefore, to content himself
with a junk navy, which was raised much as fleets were raised in
England at the same period, by levies upon the coast districts. The
princes of these districts were required to furnish sailors to man the
ships that they provided.
The invasion of Korea was carried out by two divisions, the first of
which, under Konishi, reached Fusan on April 13, 1592. The town, which
had for some two hundred years been used as a Japanese trading port,
was easily captured, and the army then marched to the capital. The
fleet lay inactive at Fusan for some time, but Konishi, in the midst of
a victorious career on land, presently conceived the idea of using his
fleet also. It was, therefore, sent round to the westward, where it met
a Korean fleet.
The Koreans, whose ships were constructionally superior, made out to
sea, and the Japanese following, sustained a defeat that caused them to
retire to Fusan again.
After this Chinese troops appeared in large numbers, and, though the
invaders won a few battles, they were checked, and compelled to fall
back.
Peace negotiations were opened in 1596, but these fell through, and in
1597 130,000 fresh Japanese troops were sent to Korea.
In the latter part of this same year the Korean fleet attempted to
signally defeated by the Japanese vessels. Most of the attacking fleet
were destroyed. No headway was, however, made by the Japanese land
force, and in 1598 the expedition withdrew.
In the year 1600 William Adams, an Englishman, reached Japan, and,
though for a time imprisoned at the instigation of the Jesuits, he
eventually gained liberty and consideration from Ieyasu, the Shogun.
He built for the Shogun, first a small 18-tonner, and then, in 1609,
a ship of 120 tons. In this ship some Spaniards who had been wrecked
on the east coast of Japan were sent to Acapulco. They appear to have
navigated themselves, and the vessel was kept, but a much larger ship
was sent to the Shogun as a present in return for his kindness.
In 1611, owing to Adams’s partiality for the Dutch, these secured from
the Shogun permission to trade with any port in the country. A little
later the British East India Company secured the same advantages, but,
owing to the outbreak of war between England and Holland, a good deal
of isolated fighting took place between the traders, till it ended in
the withdrawal or destruction of the English.
In 1614 the Japanese ruler began to be thoroughly alarmed at the
progress of Christianity, and the expected advent of Portuguese
soldiers to take possession of the land. All foreign Christians were
ordered to leave the country, all native ones to renounce their creed.
In 1616 the majority of Christians who still held to their faith were
disposed of by the same means that in Europe were used to ensure
conversion to Christianity.
In 1637 a revolution broke out amongst some of the Samaurai, or soldier
class, who had been compelled to become farmers. Such Christians as had
survived the massacres joined these.
After some defeats, the rebels were shut up in a large deserted castle
at Hara, where 160,000 men besieged them. A tremendous defence was
made, and the besiegers, failing to make much headway, applied for
and secured aid from the Dutch factory at Hivado. Guns were lent, and
finally a Dutch warship, the de Ryp, 20 guns, bombarded the castle from
the bay, without, however, effecting its reduction. Eventually the
castle was taken, and practically the whole garrison executed.
In 1640 the rivalry between the Dutch and Portuguese, of which the
Dutch assistance against the rebellious Jesuit converts was probably an
incident, came to a head. It ended in the expulsion of the Portuguese,
and the establishment of the Dutch at Nagasaki as the sole Western
nation having dealings with Japan.
Here for two hundred years the Dutch traded unmolested. The civil
commotion quieted down, and with her seclusion from the outside world
Japan entered upon an era of domestic peace. There were no more great
civil wars, and, save for the conflicts of the Samaurai against each
other, the nation grew ignorant of the art of war.
As these Samaurai were the ancestors of modern Japanese naval officers,
some account of their methods of training may be worthy of study, for
to them it is undoubtedly due that Japan exists as one of the great
Powers to-day. Otherwise she would assuredly have sunk to the Chinese
level of an ultra-high civilisation in which courage has no place,
and in which the military profession is lower than the meanest civil
calling. From all this the Samaurai saved Japan.
The country was then under a feudal system. The Emperor, the nominal
head of the State, was a mere figure-head, too sacred to concern
himself with mundane affairs—a condition of mind which generations of
clever tutelage at the hands of various Shoguns had produced. More
often than not the Shogun’s rule was of a similar nature, a regent
being the real head of the State. Under the Shogun or his regent were
the governors of provinces; under these the great feudal lords, each of
whom maintained his Samaurai, or fighting men. The soldier-ant is the
nearest natural equivalent to these Samaurai, who only very partially
resembled our knights of the Middle Ages. Below the Samaurai, and
cordially despised by them, were the lower classes, engaged in trade
and agriculture. The exact social equivalent of the Samaurai in our
society system does not exist, but probably the old “squireens,” a now
almost extinct class of small country gentry, would most nearly occupy
the same social status. The Samaurai might be richer or poorer than
the working class, but in all cases they cordially despised them, and
were in turn respected or feared.
These Samaurai lived in a constant state of killing and being killed.
If one of them left his house, he took his life in his hand from that
moment. Duels were frequent, murders common, and the fearful form of
suicide known as hari-kari was performed by them without a shudder at
the slightest hint of an insult that could not be avenged. Vendettas,
too, were everlasting, so that altogether the Samaurai were by heredity
inured to a callous disregard of life and suffering. In all their
crimes and vices they cultivated the grand Spartan virtues, and Japan
will yet, perhaps, reap the benefit of those centuries of training.
II THE OPENING OF JAPAN
The knowledge of the Dutch hold upon Japan inspired other nations with
a desire to secure similar benefits. Russia, in particular, strove to
secure a footing, but all her attempts were unavailing. British and
Americans met with a like fate; there was no Government that would deal
with them, the law of isolation had gone forth, and isolated Japan
remained. So greatly, too, did the nation esteem its state, that a law
long existed whereby the building of a ship of any size was a crime
punishable by death.
At last, in 1848, the United States, which had deep interests in the
whale fisheries in Far Eastern waters, and was also concerned in
establishing a line of steamers between California and the recently
opened free ports in China, took official instead of merely individual
measures to open up communication with Japan. A coaling station in
Japan was an absolute necessity if the projected line of steamers was
to be realised; but the reaching of any governing body with power to
grant such a station was the difficulty. However, in 1852, Commodore
Perry was sent with a squadron to Japan, and reached the Bay of Yeddo
in July, 1853, bearing a friendly letter from the President of the
United States to the Emperor of Japan.[1] The commodore had orders to
use force, if necessary, as a last resort;[2] but the thousands of
troops that were gathered to meet him made no attack. Having managed to
deliver his message and impress the authorities with the fact that an
answer would be required, the commodore left.
[1] The message was to the Shogun, whom all foreigners regarded as the
Emperor.
[2] “Official Narrative of the Japan Expedition.”
So soon as he had gone the Shogun’s Government found itself on the
horns of a dilemma. If a treaty were made with the foreigners, internal
trouble from a people already permeated with a desire to restore to
power the real Emperor might be expected to a certainty; if they
refused, the American show of force convinced them that grave trouble
would lie ahead, trouble which the Japanese, with their old-fashioned
fighting methods, could never successfully combat.
The most prominent personage in Japan at that moment was the Daimio of
Mito. He advocated absolute refusal of the American demands, and the
exclusion of all foreigners by force of arms, if necessary. He recalled
the famous wars of the past, and nearly every Daimio in the country
followed his lead. Forts were erected on the shore, the bells of
temples melted and made into cannon, and as many Samaurai as possible
were drilled with the most modern fire-arms procurable. They got these
through the Dutch at Nagasaki.
In the midst of this a Russian squadron appeared, also demanding a
treaty and the opening up of the country, but again no force was used.
Seven months after his first visit, Commodore Perry returned for his
answer, and the war fever having evaporated to some extent, a treaty
was actually signed on March 31, 1854.
This treaty provided for peace and goodwill between the United States
and Japan, the opening of Shimoda as a treaty port, and the similar
opening of Hakodate after an interval, the Americans agreeing that
their ships should visit no other ports except from necessity. The
other articles dealt with the care of shipwrecked mariners and the
like, and “the most favoured nation” clause. England, Russia, and
Holland soon secured similar treaties, Russia having the same ports as
America, England and Holland having Nagasaki instead of Shimoda.
All this split Japan into two hostile parties, the _Jo-i_ and the
_Kai-koku_. The former, under the leadership of the Daimio of Mito,
were bitterly anti-foreign, and also desirous of restoring the Emperor.
The _Kai-koku_, on the other hand, supported the Shogun action, and had
as their watchword the words spoken by one of them at the debate over
Commodore Perry’s demands: “As we are not the equals of the foreigners
in the mechanical arts, let us have intercourse with foreign lands, let
us learn their drill and tactics. Then, when we shall have made our
nation united as one family, we shall be able to go abroad, and give
lands in foreign countries to those who have distinguished themselves
in battle.”
For a time this party had the upper hand. Commercial treaties were
made, and by 1860 Ni-igata, Hyogo, and Yokohama had been opened, with
the Consuls of most nations established there. Ii-Kamon-no-kami, head
of the _Kai-Koku_ party, imprisoned the Daimio of Mito, and executed
several Samaurai who had killed his adherents. Then, in 1860, on
March 23, Ii-Kamon-no-kami was assassinated, and his party, no longer
with a powerful head, made isolated preparations for civil war. Ships
were purchased and manned by the retainers of the local governors of
provinces, and troops raised. Meanwhile the foreign Legations were
attacked, an American secretary was murdered, and other foreigners
injured. Other murders, notably that of an English merchant named
Richardson, followed, and an indemnity was refused. This led to the
arrival of Admiral Kuper with seven ships at Kagoshima, August 11,
1863. He bombarded the forts and city, and also sank or burned three
steamers belonging to the Daimio of Satsuma, whose men had committed
the murder. After this the indemnity was forthcoming, but the Daimio
promptly ordered more warships, and sent many of his naval officers to
Holland to learn European methods.
In this same year the Daimio of Choshu, a member of the Jo-i, who had
also secured a small fleet for himself, fired upon an American steamer,
and afterwards upon the French gunboat Kienchang, which latter he
damaged severely. The Dutch frigate Medusa was also roughly handled by
his shore batteries at Shimonoseki, but replying, silenced them.
Both these acts led to reprisals. The United States warship Wyoming at
once proceeded to Shimonoseki, where she blew up one Japanese steam
warship, and sank a second, a small brig. The French warships Sémiramis
and Tancrède followed, and subjected Shimonoseki to a bombardment that
did considerable damage.
An indemnity was demanded and paid by the Shogun’s Government for these
attacks of foreign shipping, while the suppression of the Daimio of
Choshu at Shimonoseki was also promised. This, however, was a task
beyond the power of the Government, and finally the Powers interested
decided to take action. A combined fleet, consisting of nine British,
four Dutch, three French, and one hired United States steamer, went to
Shimonoseki to reduce this bar to passage on the Inland Sea.
The attacking vessels were:—
British Tartar (screw corvette), 20 guns.
Barrosa (screw corvette), 22 guns.
Leopard (paddle frigate), 18 guns.
Conqueror (two-decker), 101 guns.
Euryalus (screw frigate), 51 guns.
Perseus, 4 guns.
Bouncer (screw gunboat), 4 guns.
Coquette (screw gunboat), 4 guns.
Argus (paddle sloop), 6 guns.
French Dupleix (screw corvette), 24 guns.
Sémiramis (frigate), 36 guns.
Tancrède (gunboat), 4 guns.
Dutch Amsterdam.
Djambi.
Metal Cruyis.
Medusa (frigate), 36 guns.
United States Takiang, no guns.
The United States ship was merely chartered to indicate American
interest; all American vessels were then busy sinking each other in the
civil war.
This fleet left Yokohama on August 28, 1864, and from September 5th
to 9th it bombarded all the new forts that the Daimio had erected. At
the end of that time Shimonoseki surrendered unconditionally, and an
indemnity of three million dollars was claimed from the Shogun, and
eventually paid.
For the next two years the Shogun’s Government was busy trying
conclusions with the Daimio, but as he had raised a large force of the
common people, and drilled these in Western fashion, he easily held his
own. British and French troops meanwhile were permanently stationed at
Yokohama to guard foreign interests. Friction between these and the
_Jo-i_ party was common, and more than one assassination took place,
but no naval demonstrations followed.
[Illustration: [_By a Japanese artist._
THE FIRST SHIP OF THE JAPANESE NAVY, THE TSUKUBA.]
III EARLY WARSHIPS AND THE CIVIL WAR
As already recounted, the sight of foreign ships had gradually put
ideas of sea-power into the minds of the various governors of Japanese
provinces. One of the first, if not the first, ships to be acquired was
the Tsukuba, which still survives as a hulk. Her first name was the
Malacca, and she was launched in the United States in 1851. She was, in
her time, a fine-looking screw frigate of 1950 tons, carrying 20 guns,
and able to steam at the then satisfactory speed of 8 knots.
The Riaden, a small screw yacht of 370 tons, and the Chiyoda-nata
(Chiyoda type), of less than 140 tons, both schooner rigged, were
enrolled about the same time, and then followed by the Kasuga, a
two-funnelled, three-masted paddler, originally the Kiang-tse. She
carried six guns, and for some time served as the Shogun’s yacht.
Following this, the Fuji Yama, a full-rigged ship—a sailing frigate of
about 1010 tons and 24 guns—and the 523-ton barque-rigged sailing-ship
Ken-he were purchased.
To learn how to work this naval militia, Japan imported instructors
of various kinds from the Western world. In response to applications,
the present Admiral Tracy was sent out by the British Government, and
with him a small host of other Westerners. With their natural aptitude,
the Japanese rapidly acquired the rudiments of sea service, while on
shore the beginnings of a shipbuilding yard were made at Yokosuka.
The British naval uniform was adopted with some slight differences.
Officers were sent to Europe—chiefly to Holland—to study the principles
of naval warfare, and at once a desire to possess ironclads arose.
Out of this came the purchase of Japan’s first ironclad, the Adsuma.
The dimensions, etc., of the Adsuma were as follows:—
Displacement 1387 tons.
Material of hull Iron.
Length 157 ft.
Beam 30 ft.
Draught (maximum) 13¼ ft.
Armament One 9-in. 12½ M.L. Armstrong.
Four 6½-in. Parrot M.L. rifled.
Horse-power (nominal) 700.
Screws Two.
Speed 9 knots.
[Illustration: FUJI YAMA.]
The armour was 4½ to 4¾ ins. thick, and distributed on a complete
water-line belt and over both of the raised batteries. Though a very
famous vessel as the Stonewall Jackson, her war services under that
name were not extensive. She was built in France, and at the end
of 1864, when ready for sea, carried one large 13-in. 300-pounder
(smooth bore) in the bow, and the two 70-pounders (rifled) in the main
battery. No ship like her had ever been constructed before, and the
Confederates, to whom she then belonged, spread alarming reports as
to her power. Putting to sea, she reached Corunna in February, 1865,
and was there blockaded by the unarmoured Federal ships Niagara and
Sacramento. The former was a famous vessel in her way, of 5013 tons,
345 ft. long, 12-knot speed, and armed with twelve 11-in. smooth bores,
throwing a 135-lb. shell each. These guns were not able to fire shot
apparently, and the Sacramento was a weaker vessel. The Stonewall
Jackson challenged these two to a duel _à la_ Kearsarge and Alabama,
but Craven, the Federal commodore, declined—wisely enough, for he could
not have done anything against the ironclad with his few heavy pieces,
while the ironclad would certainly have disabled and then rammed
him.[3] Consequently, the Stonewall Jackson did not smell powder on
that occasion, and the war ended very soon afterwards.
[3] He was, however, court-martialled and punished for refusing to
fight.
In 1866 a mysterious Japanese deputation came to America. Its object
was long unknown, but the curiosity it excited was sufficient to
cause telegraphic reports of its movements, and surmises as to its
intentions, to appear in the London _Times_ every now and again.
Finally came the news that “the Japanese deputation have come to buy
ironclads”—a statement at first treated as a joke.
The Japanese do not, however, appear to have been large bidders for the
forty odd ironclads that America then had to dispose of. Few of these
“on sale” craft were fit for a sea voyage—they were merely hastily
constructed monitors intended more often than not for river service.
The Stonewall Jackson, however, being a sea-going ship, was purchased
for the Shogun, and re-named Adsuma.
A gunboat or two changed hands at this period, and altogether
the various Japanese governors collected between them a small,
heterogeneous fleet, the very existence of which was scarcely known
outside their own country. Indeed, twenty years later comparatively few
people knew, and still fewer cared, that Japan possessed a navy at all.
The Adsuma has long been removed from the effective list and relegated
to hulk duty. On account of her enormous ram, she was somewhat of a
curio to naval visitors for many years, and the most vivid memory
retained by some of our people of the harbour in which the Adsuma lay
was the fashion in which the Japanese sailors used her ram. They walked
down over it into the water when bathing.
Of the smaller vessels previously referred to the following may be
mentioned:—
No. 1 Tébo was a swan-bow, three-masted, schooner-rigged screw steamer
of 250 tons only. Two or three other ships like her existed.
[Illustration: [_By a Japanese artist._
THE ADSUMA (_ex_ STONEWALL JACKSON).]
The Unyo, built at Amsterdam, was little larger—295 tons only. She was
a brig-rigged and ram-bowed screw steamer, carrying three pivot guns
(Krupp’s), disposed in the centre line, as were the three big guns in
the French Baudin and Formidable till these ships were reconstructed.
The Unyo was wrecked many years ago.
The Moisshin, screw gunboat of 357 tons, is worthy of more attention,
as she was the first ship ever built in Japan since the days of
Adams. She was an enlarged edition of No. 1 Tébo, and exactly like
her in appearance. Between the funnel and foremast a single Long Tom
was carried. She was launched somewhere about the year 1865. Her
construction was not, of course, purely Japanese—she was a craft upon
which the Islanders practised and learnt construction with important
material.
The Setsu, 935 tons, 8 guns, a sailing frigate, and the Chio-bin, a
barque of 650 tons, originally used for trading purposes, also belong
to this early period.
So also does a ship with more history, the Asama, a composite
sailing-ship of 1445 tons and 14 guns. Her exact early history is
shrouded in some mystery, but just previous to her entry into the
Japanese fleet she was the property of a too-confiding pirate, who went
into a Japanese harbour to refit, and had his ship taken possession
of by the Japanese in consequence. The ship still exists as a gunnery
hulk, and carries, or did till recently, eight 7-in. breech-loaders and
four 4½-in. muzzle-loaders.
With these ships, built and building, Japan found herself engaged
in that civil war of which the Mikasa, Asama, and other ships of
to-day are the direct outcome. The officers had had some years of
Western training, chiefly in Holland and Denmark. The accompanying
illustration, from a Japanese photograph, indicates the uniform of the
period. There were in the Navy in those days two schools—the party of
progress and those opposed to change—by no means necessarily identical
with the same political parties. Indeed, of the two, the _Jo-i_ seem to
have chiefly availed themselves of the war-training to be secured from
the foreigners whose expulsion was one of their political tenets. This,
perhaps, was due in part or in great measure to the other factor in the
dispute—the question as to whether the Emperor or the Shogun and his
representatives should be ruler of the country. This became eventually
the sole question.
[Illustration]
[Illustration: THE MOISSHIN.]
[Illustration: [_By a Japanese artist._
THE EX-PIRATE SHIP ASAMA.]
In 1867 the Emperor Kōmei died, and was succeeded by his son, the
present Emperor, Mutsohito, then a boy. His advisers had by now
concluded that the anti-foreign agitation was a mistake, and thence
forward it was only carried on by a few isolated Daimios. The real
problem was one of ruling, and this culminated in 1867 by the Shogun
resigning his power, and becoming a species of minister.
The adherents of neither party were favourably disposed towards this
middle course; and ultimately civil war, in which the ex-Shogun’s party
were continually defeated, resulted.
The ironclad Adsuma was in the hands of the Imperialists, as also
were most of the other warships; but the ex-Shogun had owned seven
ships, mounting between them 83 guns, and these Yenomoto, his admiral
(one of the Dutch-trained officers) absolutely refused to surrender.
Chased by Nahamoto, the Imperial admiral, he took refuge in Hakodate,
where the remnants of the rebels had collected. A naval action
resulted disastrously for Yenomoto. In July, 1869, the rebels finally
surrendered, and Japan entered upon a new era, in which much of the
power hitherto wielded by the Daimios passed into the hands of the
Samaurai, whose descendants now supply the bulk of naval and military
officers, retaining all the courage of their fierce ancestors, and
more of their exclusiveness than is generally supposed. But further
particulars under this head will be found in a later chapter.[4]
[4] See Personal Characteristics.
IV THE IMPERIAL NAVY
With the sea fight off Hakodate the civil war ended. The feudal fleets
were abolished, and all ships were enrolled in an Imperial Navy—a
proceeding that, of course, increased its strength. Some reorganisation
of _personnel_ was also effected, bringing the Navy more into line with
the Western model.
Naval advisers came and went. They included, during the period
1865-1885, the present British admirals Tracy and Hopkins, the eminent
French naval architect M. Bertin, and finally Captain Ingles, R.N., of
whom more will be found in the Appendix.
The same year in which the Adsuma was launched the Riu Jo[5] was set
afloat at Aberdeen. She, too, was possibly originally destined to fly
the Confederate flag, but about this details are hard to procure.
Particulars are:—
Displacement 2530 tons.
Material Composite.
Length 213 ft.
Beam 41 ft.
Draught (extreme) 19 ft.
Armament One 6½-in. Krupp.
Six 70-pdrs.
[5] Pronounced “Dēēn-Jho,” but the exact sound cannot be rendered.
[Illustration: Fleet of Nahamoto, Adsuma leading.
[_By a Japanese artist._
BATTLE OF HAKODATE.]
The horse-power was 975 nominal, the speed 9 knots. She was
single-screwed, and carried 350 tons of coal. Like all the early
sea-going ironclads, she had a 4½-in. iron armour belt, and 4 inches
over the amidship battery. The heaviest gun was carried in the bow on
a pivot. The ship still exists as a hulk. She did not reach Japan till
the Civil War was over.
The he-sho, launched in England in 1867, is also retained as a gunnery
tender at the present day. She is a small gunboat of 320 tons, carrying
one 7-in. Armstrong M.L. and one 5½-in. Krupp B.L.
Some other early Japanese ships may now be referred to.
The Nisshin was built at Amsterdam, and ordered, probably, previously
to the Civil War.
Tonnage 1470.
Material of hull Wood.
Armament One 7-in. M.L.
Six smaller M.L.
Speed on trial 11 knots.
Single screw, swan-bow, barque-rigged corvette.
The Amagi of the same period was built in Japan. Particulars of her
are:—
Tonnage 526.
Material of hull Wood.
Armament One 6-in. 2½-ton Krupp.
Four 4¾-in. Krupp.
Horse-power (nominal) 720.
Speed 11 knots.
Screws One.
In appearance she more or less resembles the foregoing.
She was followed by the Seiki, also built in Japan, and famous in
her way, because she was the first Japanese ship to make a voyage to
England. Particulars:—
Tonnage 857.
Material of hull Wood.
Length 200 ft.
Beam 30 ft.
Draught 13 ft.
Armament One 6-in. 2½-ton Krupp.
Four 4¾-in. Krupp.
Horse-power 1270.
Speed 11 knots.
Save that her stern was sharper, she was, to look at, much like the
Amagi. She is now removed from the Japanese Navy list.
A sailing training brig of 153 tons, the Ishikawa, and a larger brig,
the Tateyama, of 543 tons, were built or acquired prior to 1877.
The Banjo was built by the Japanese on the same model as the Amagi.
Particulars are:—
Displacement 667 tons.
Material of hull Wood.
Length 154 ft.
Beam 25 ft.
Draught (mean) 12 ft.
Armament One 6-in. 2½-ton Krupp.
Two 4¾-in. Krupp.
I.H.P. 590.
Speed 10.5 knots.
Screws One.
Coal supply 107 tons.
She is swan-bow, barque-rigged, and has one funnel.
This ended this particular period of Japanese shipbuilding.
[Illustration:[_By a Japanese artist._ THE SEIKI.
(_The first Japanese warship to visit England._)]
In the year 1875, or thereabouts, the Japanese finally decided to
embark upon a war navy, and laid the foundations of that fleet which
some twenty years later was to vindicate its existence at Yalu and
Wei-hei-wei. In that year a then modern ironclad, up-to-date ironclad,
and two armoured cruisers, on what was then the best accepted model,
were ordered.
Of these the Fu-So,[6] designed by Sir E. J. Reed, and launched
at Samuda’s Yard, Poplar, England, in 1877, was then a powerful
second-class battleship. In design she resembles the French Rédoutable,
though of only half her size. Particulars are:—
Material of hull Iron.
Displacement 3718.
Length 220 ft.
Beam 48 ft.
Draught 18⅓ ft.
Original armament Four 9.4-in. Krupps in the main deck,
central-armoured battery.
Two 6.6-in. Krupps in unarmoured
barbettes above the armoured battery.
Horse-power 3500.
Nominal speed 13 knots.
Screws Two.
Coal 360 tons.
Nominal radius 3500 miles at 10 knots.
[6] Pronounced Fōō-Só.
The armour is distributed in a complete belt of iron from 9 to 4 ins.
in thickness. The battery armour is 8 ins., with 7-in. bulkheads
forming a redoubt. The engines, by Penn, are horizontal compound
trunk. She was then barque-rigged, with a single funnel. She carried
no torpedo tubes, but these were added later. Just previous to the
war with China the Japanese reconstructed and re-armed her, removing
the mainmast, and fitting military tops to the fore and mizzen; 6-in.
Q.F. were mounted in the barbettes in place of the old 6.6-in. Either
immediately before or directly after the war, two additional 6-in. Q.F.
(as shown in the photograph of her at sea) were mounted, one on the
forecastle and one on the poop behind shields; and subsequently four
further 6-in. Q.F. replaced the old guns in the battery, these having
been found well-nigh useless for modern warfare. This by no means
exhausts the history of the Fu-So, but her subsequent adventures will
be found on a later page.[7]
[7] See Chino-Japanese War.
[Illustration: Chin Yen. Chiyoda. [_Official photograph._
THE JAPANESE FLEET IN LINE ABREAST. NAVAL MANŒUVRES.]
Russia with the General Admiral would appear to have inspired the idea
of the Hi-Yei[8] and Kon-go. The former of these was launched early in
1878 at Milford Haven, the latter at Hull towards the end of 1877. The
ships are sisters. Details are:—
Material of hull Composite.
Displacement 2250 tons.
Length 231 ft.
Beam 40¾ ft.
Draught 17½ ft.
Armament Three 6.6-in. Krupp.
Six 6-in. 2½-ton Krupp.
Four Nordenfelts.
Two torpedo tubes.
Horse-power Hi-Yei, 2270.
Kon-go, 2035.
Screws One.
Speed (nominal) Hi-Yei, 13 knots.
Kon-go, 13.7 knots.
Engines (by Earle) Horizontal compound.
[8] Pronounced “Hēē-Yey.”
The armour is a mere iron strip on the water-line, varying from 4½ to 3
ins. in thickness.
In 1876 a new Imperial yacht, the Jin-Jei, was launched. She is
a paddler, with swan-bow, two funnels, and two high pole masts—a
pretty-looking vessel.
Displacement 1464 tons.
Material of hull Wood.
Length 249 ft.
Beam 32 ft.
Draught 14½ ft.
Armament Two 4¾-in. Krupp.
Horse-power 1430.
Speed 12 knots.
In 1879 began what later events constituted the supplementary Japanese
shipbuilding programme. In 1879 Elswick built for China those once
famous “alphabetical gunboats,” a series of “flat-irons” of the Rendel
type, to carry one gun. Like a good many other Chinese vessels, they
were destined to fly the Japanese flag at a later period of their
existence. Altogether there were eleven of these craft, named after
letters of the Greek alphabet, but re-named by the Chinese. They were
named Lung-shang (Alpha), he-wei (Beta), Fei-ting (Gamma), Tche-tien
(Delta), the first two of 340 tons, the other two of 420 tons, and
which the Chinese still own. The remainder are a little larger, four,
Cheng-tung (Epsilon), Chen-Sei (Zeta), Chen-nan (Eta), Chen-pei
(Theta), of 490 tons, and Chin-pen (Kappa), Hai-chang-ching (Lambda),
and Chen-chung (Iota) of 500 tons. Japan now owns all of this last
batch, except the Hai-chang-ching.
Gamma and Delta carry a 38-ton Armstrong M.L.; all the others are armed
with the 11-in. 25-ton gun. Horse-power varies from 235 in the smaller
craft to 472 in the larger. There are slight differences in dimensions,
but the largest only runs to 125 ft. long by 29 ft. broad. Two other
rather smaller gunboats once existed, but these the French sunk at
Foochow in the early eighties. The development of small guns has long
since rendered this type of gunboat useless; but, apart from that,
the bad care taken of them by the Chinese would have made them of no
service.
China in 1881 was making some considerable efforts towards being a
naval power, efforts that continued till 1889, when they suddenly
died out, or resolved themselves into the building of small craft by
Chinamen. A Chino-Japanese war was a possibility in 1881 as much as
in 1890. Neither side was, however, ready for the conflict, and in
the early eighties Japan’s energies were concentrated on training
_personnel_, China’s on acquiring _materiel_. In 1881 the latter had
launched for her the big ironclad Ting Yuen at Stettin, followed a
little later by the Chin Yuen, now in the Japanese service. From the
time China first had them, Japan coveted these ironclads; by the irony
of fate, she did not secure them (or rather the one that was left) till
far superior ships of her own were on the stocks.
The Tung Yuen sank at Wei-hai-wei during the war; the Chen Yuen, her
sister, was taken at the same time. Her details are:—
Displacement 7350 tons.
Material of hull Steel.
Length 308 ft.
Beam 59 ft.
Draught 23 ft.
Armament (originally) Four 12-in. 20 cals. Krupp.
Two 6-in. Krupp.
Eight machine guns.
One torpedo tube in the stern;
one on each beam forward of barbettes.
Horse-power 6200.
Screws Two.
Speed (on first trials) 14.5 knots.
Engines Two sets, three-cylinder horizontal
compound.
Coal 1000 tons.
The arrangement of the heavy armament is upon the system that in 1880
was held to be the system of the future—four big guns able to fire
end-on or on the broadside. The ideal warship of those days was to
fight in line abreast. The advantages of that disposition were seen,
while its disadvantages were ignored. It was not realised how easily
an enemy could get round upon either flank and mask the fire of nearly
all the units in this cumbersome formation, the advantages of which lie
only in going into action against an enemy right ahead.
When the Chin Yen was the Chinese Chen Yuen she carried thin shields
over her big guns. The 6-in. pieces were in the extreme bow and stern,
each in a 3-in. turret. The big gun shields were removed before the
war. The Japanese captured these with Port Arthur, and have since
replaced them. They have also mounted a 6-in. Q.F. in the bow turret,
substituted a 6-in. Q.F. behind a shield for the after turret, and
mounted two additional Q.F.’s upon sponsons specially built near the
mainmast. Two 6-pounder Q.F. and a number of 3- or 2½-pounders have
also been added on the upper deck. The photograph shows the ship as she
now is.
The armour of the Chin Yen is distributed as follows: Amidships for
150 ft. is a 14-in. compound belt. Under-water and at the end of it
this belt thins to 10 ins. Forward and aft of it is a protective deck
3 ins. thick. The ends of the belt are joined by flat bulkheads of 14
ins. Rising from this redoubt are the barbettes, 12 ins. compound.
The starboard one is forward, the port somewhat aft of it.[9] The big
gun hoods are quite thin, 4 ins. or less; between the big guns in the
conning-tower, 8 ins. in thickness.
[9] In the plans generally published of these ships this order is, in
error, reversed.
[Illustration: [_Official photo._
THE CHIN YEN AT EVOLUTIONS WITH THE JAPANESE FLEET. 1902.]
The ship, it will be seen, is of the British Ajax or Colossus type—very
much a “soft ender.” She is, however, given a good deal of protection
in the way of specially arranged watertight compartments, and there is
also a species of cofferdam.
In 1881 Elswick set afloat the Arturo Prat, a small cruiser originally
intended for Chili, but subsequently purchased by Japan and re-named
Tsukushi. China had two sisters built at the same time, the Tchao Yong
and Yang-wei, both of which were sunk at Yalu. Particulars of the
Tsukushi are as follows:—
Displacement 1350 tons.
Material of hull Steel.
Length 210 ft.
Beam 32 ft.
Draught (maximum) 16½ ft.
Armament Two 10-in. 32 cals. Elswick.
Four 4.7 in. Q.F.[10]
Four 1-pdr. Q.F.
Two torpedo tubes.
Horse-power 2887.
Screws Two.
Speed on trial 16.4 knots.
Sea speed (_circa_) 12 knots.
Coal 250 tons.
Engines (by Hawthorn Leslie) Horizontal compound.
[10] These replaced four non-quickfiring guns.
The ship has no armour deck, or protection of any sort.
In 1882 the construction of wooden ships was still proceeding in
Japan. In that year they launched at Yokosuka the Kaimon, of which the
measurements are:—
Displacement 1367 tons.
Material of hull Wood.
Length 211 ft.
Beam 32 ft.
Draught (mean) 16½ ft.
Armament Eight 4¾-in. Krupp.
Two 3-pdr. Q.F.
Horse-power 1125.
Trial speed 12 knots.
Screws One.
Coal 180 tons.
Complement 230.
The engines were constructed in Japan at the Yokosuka Dockyard, and are
of the horizontal compound type. This was the first ship put together
by them of which they constructed the engines also.
The following year they launched the Tenriu at Yokosuka. Details are:—
Displacement 1547 tons.
Material of hull. Wood.
Length 212 ft.
Beam 32½ ft.
Draught (mean) 16½ ft.
Armament Eight 4¾-in. Krupp.
Two Nordenfelts.
Horse-power 1165.
Trial speed 12 knots.
Screws One.
Coal 256 tons.
Complement 214.
[Illustration: Tsukushi. Naniwa. Itsukushima. [_Official photo._
JAPANESE CRUISER TSUKUSHI AT SEA.]
The ship is practically a sister to the Kaimon. The engines of both
were made at Yokosuka, and are of the same type. Both ships have swan
bows, one funnel, and are barque-rigged. The sterns are rather square.
In 1884 Elswick suddenly sprang the deck-protected cruiser on the
world. In that year was launched the famous Esmeralda. She was, like
the Arturo Prat, built for Chili, and as a Chilian cruiser bore a
share in the Chilian revolution. When the Chino-Japanese war broke out
Japan made overtures for this ship, and in 1895 purchased her through
the agency of Ecuador. The war was over before the cruiser could be
employed, but she was probably purchased against possible eventualities
with Russia, France, and Germany. Being now obsolete, she has not
proved a valuable acquisition, and the Japanese speak of her as a very
bad sea boat. Particulars of this once famous vessel are:—
Displacement 3000 tons.
Material of hull Steel.
Length 270 ft.
Beam 42 ft.
Draught (maximum) 19½ ft.
Armament (originally) Two 10-in. 32 cals.
Six 6-in. 32 cals.
Two 6-pdr. Q.F.
Five 1-pdr. Q.F.
Two Gardners.
Three torpedo tubes, one of them
in the bow.
The six 6-in. B.L. have been removed by the Japanese, and six 4.7-in.
Q.F. of 40 calibres substituted.
When new the Esmeralda was one of the swiftest ships afloat. Her I.H.P.
natural draught was 6500, with an 18.5-knot speed on her trials in
1885. She carries 400 tons of coal, with provision for 200 tons more.
Protection is afforded by a steel deck 1 in. thick on the slopes and
½ in. on the flat. Over the loading stations of the big guns a 1-in.
steel skin is carried.
[Illustration: ESMERALDA, NOW IDZUMI.]
News of the Esmeralda’s fame soon reached Japan, and two glorified
editions of her, the Naniwa and Takachiho, were promptly ordered.
Japanese home construction was not, however, affected, and three
composite vessels, Yamato, Katsuragi, and Mushashi, were put in hand,
and launched in 1885-86. Details of these are as follows:—
Displacement 1502 tons.
Material of hull Composite.
Length 207 ft.
Beam 36 ft.
Draught (mean) 15 ft.
Armament Two 6.6-in. Krupp.
Six 4¾-in. Krupp.
Four Nordenfelts.
Two torpedo tubes.
Horse-power 1600.
Trial speed 13.5 knots.
Complement 231.
As before, Yokosuka made the horizontal compound engines, and in the
Katsuragi twin screws were attempted for the first time. These ships
are now employed for training squadron duties. They have clipper bows,
and are, generally speaking, small editions of the British Raleigh.
They are all three barque-rigged. The Mushashi is distinguished by a
red band, the Katsuragi a yellow one.
The “warship Naniwa-kan,” as she used to be called in England, in
defiance to all explanations to the effect that the affix “kan”
simply meant “warship,” attained a good deal of celebrity while under
construction. The British Navy had then no ships like her, and the
Mersey class, then building, though more heavily gunned on about the
same displacement, were popularly considered very poor substitutes,
since their biggest guns were 8-in. pieces only, against the Naniwa’s
10-in. The big gun had at that time a very great hold on popular
imagination.
Details of the Naniwa, and her sister, the Takachiho, are as follows:—
Displacement 3700 tons.
Material of hull Steel.
Length 300 ft.
Beam 46 ft.
Draught 20 ft.
Armament Two 10-in. 32 cals. Krupp.
Six 6-in. B.L. Krupp.
Two 6-pdr. Q.F.
Fourteen smaller Q.F. and machine.
Four torpedo tubes.
(Elswick 6-in. Q.F. have lately been substituted for the old 6-in.
B.L.).
The big guns are generally described as Elswick pieces, but they are
not, although Elswick built the ships.
Engines (Hawthorn, Leslie & Co.) Horizontal compound.
Horse-power 7120.
Speed on trial 18.7 knots
Sea speed (_circa_) 15 knots.
Screws Two.
Coal (normal) 350 tons.
” (maximum) 800 tons.
Radius with full bunkers (_circa_) 5000 miles.
Complement 357.
Search-lights Four.
Protection is afforded by a steel deck 3 ins. on the slopes, 2 ins. on
the flat. The engine hatches have a 3-in. glacis. The conning-tower is
1½-in. steel, and the loading stations of the big guns have a similar
protection.
[Illustration: THE NANIWA (present rig).
(_This is the cruiser that sunk the Kow-shing._)
=Note.=—The sinking of the Kow-shing will be found described in the
chapter on the Chino-Japanese war. Special interest attaches to the
Naniwa on account of the fact that during this war she was commanded by
the present Admiral Togo.]
As originally rigged, the Naniwa and Takachiho carried a top on
each mast. After the war, in which they did not exhibit the best of
sea-keeping qualities, these tops were lowered, and light platforms
erected where they used to be, as in the illustration. The old rig,
which is tolerably familiar, will be noticed in the illustrations
dealing with the war. The Naniwa and Takachiho both took part in
the first engagement at Asan; the Naniwa subsequently made her
name familiar to the world over the Kow-shing affair. Both ships
participated at Yalu and Wei-hai-wei. The Naniwa was launched on March
18, 1885, at Elswick, the Takachiho on May 16th in the same year.
In appearance the two craft are almost absolutely identical; for
convenience, and to enable their own officers to distinguish them, the
Takachiho has a red band round her instead of the orthodox black one.
As a further guide, she carries a couple of signal yards on the main,
in place of the single yard carried there by the Naniwa.
[Illustration]
Meanwhile China continued to have ships built in England and Germany,
and in 1886 there was launched at Stettin a small cruiser, the
Tche-Yuen (Tsi-Yuen is a more familiar spelling), which was destined
to be taken over by the Japanese at Wei-hai-wei in 1895. Her details
are:—
Displacement 2300 tons.
Material of hull Steel.
Length 246 ft.
Beam 33 ft.
Draught (maximum) 18 ft.
Armament Two 8.2-in. Krupp, forward in an
armoured turret.
One 6-in. Krupp aft.
Four 4-pdr. Gruson Q.F.
Two Gatlings.
Four torpedo tubes.
Horse-power 2800.
Speed on trial 15 knots.
Screws Two.
Coal (normal) 230 tons.
Radius (_circa_)1000 miles.
Complement 180.
This ship represents an application of the Italian Lepanto idea to a
small cruiser. She is provided with a steel protective deck, 3 ins.
thick on the slopes; the hull is otherwise unprotected, but the fore
turret, containing the 8-in. guns, is heavily armoured with 10-in.
compound, thus rendering it proof against any of the 10-in. guns afloat
in the Japanese Fleet at the time she was built. Indeed, at Yalu there
were only three guns present in the Japanese Fleet against which the
Tche-Yuen’s turret armour was not proof. However, the possession of a
little impenetrable armour is of small service to a warship—the odds
being always against any one particular spot being hit. At Asan, in
which the Tche-Yuen suffered rather severely, none of the Japanese guns
against her were able to pierce this forward turret.
[Illustration: SAI YEN (_ex_ TCHE-YUEN).]
[Illustration]
In 1879 Japan had already had four torpedo boats built for her at
Yarrow’s. These craft displaced only 40 tons. In 1886, however,
Yarrow’s built the first-class twin-screw torpedo boat Kotaka. This
boat is remarkable as the first armoured torpedo boat ever constructed.
She has 1-in. steel plating all over her machinery compartment, and the
subdivision of the hull is, for a torpedo boat, singularly complete. In
her way the Kotaka was the forerunner of the destroyers, being larger
than the run of torpedo boats even now. Full details of her are:—
Displacement 190 tons.
Material of hull Steel.
Length 170 ft.
Beam 19½ ft.
Draught 5 feet.
Horse-power 1400.
Speed on trial 19 knots.
Screws Two.
Coal carried 50 tons.
Torpedo tubes Six.
Armament Four machine guns.
The torpedo tubes are thus disposed: two forward, firing right ahead,
a pair amidships, and another pair a little abaft of them. The Kotaka
made a name for herself in the war, and previously to that was a
successful craft. However, for some reason Japan had no more boats from
Yarrow, or, indeed, from England, for the next ten years, the next,
a batch of fourteen, being ordered from Creusot. These were launched
in 1889. The Kotaka, after being built, was sent out to Japan in
sections, and there put together again. The Creusot boats were sent out
in similar fashion, while a further seven were put together entirely at
Kobé, in Japan. All these boats were small ones of 56 tons, 114½ ft.
long, 10½ ft. beam, and 6 ft. draught. With 525 I.H.P., they made 20
knots on trial. They have two torpedo tubes, carry two 1-pounder Q.F.,
a complement of 16 men, and are single screw. One of them was lost
off the Pescadores in December, 1895, and a couple at Wei-hai-wei in
February of the same year.
Japan still continued the construction of other craft, having launched
the Maya[11] at Onohama in 1886, the Akagi[12] at the same yard in
1887, the Atago[13] at Yokosuka in 1887, and the Chiokai[14] at Tokio
in the same year. The Maya and Chiokai were, as before, composite, but
the other two are noteworthy as being constructed entirely of steel.
A large proportion of the material for them was imported, and the
building was rather a case of merely putting together.
[11] Pronounced Maï’yà.
[12] Ak-à-gēē.
[13] At-à-go.
[14] Tchio’ka’i.
The dimensions, etc., of all are identical, and are as follows:—
Displacement 622 tons.
Length 154¼ ft.
Beam 27 ft.
Draught (mean) 9¼ ft.
Horse-power 700.
Trial speed (_circa_) 12 knots.
Screws Two.
Coal supply 60 tons.
Complement 104.
[Illustration: [_Official photo._
JAPANESE FLEET AT SEA. FUSO LEADING.]
In appearance and armament they vary much. The Maya carries a couple of
6-in. Krupp’s, with two 3-pounder Q.F. and a couple of machine guns;
the Chiokai and Atago are armed with one 8-in. Krupp and one 4.7-in.
gun and two machine guns; the Akagi carries two special French guns of
about 4.7-in. calibre. These guns are the only ones of the kind in the
world, and singularly powerful pieces—Hebrieu guns. The objection to
them is that their lives are short. They proved too powerful for the
little Akagi, and shook her up badly on trial. They were afterwards
fired with reduced charges, except at Yalu, where they proved very
useful, owing to their power.
The Akagi has a raised forecastle, the other three have not. All used
to be schooner-rigged, but just before the war a fighting-top was
fitted to the Akagi’s foremast, and a crow’s-nest to her main. To
distinguish them, the Maya has a black band, the Chiokai a red one,
the Atago yellow. The Akagi’s band is black, but her forecastle and
fighting-top distinguish her. In addition, she has a rather elaborate
green scrollwork on the bow. She has also sponsons for her machine
guns. At Yalu this ship lost her mainmast, and the damage was left
unrepaired for a long time in deference to naval sentiment; it has,
however, been replaced lately.
Reference has already been made to the transfer of torpedo-boat
building from British to French firms. M. Bertin was at that time
naval adviser to the Japanese Government, consequently French design
for large ships secured a similar victory in the year 1887-8. With
such ships as she now had, Japan was beginning to be able to stand
alone, many English instructors were dispensed with; but she was yet
some distance from her present independence. French enterprise saw its
chance and took it; all the foreign-built ships of the new programme
came from France.
These were the Itsukushima, Matsushima, and Hashidate (this last put
together in Japan), the Unebi, Tschishima, and some smaller ships (laid
down in Japanese yards), Yayeyama, Oshima, and Takao.
The ships built in Japan during the Bertin _régime_, 1887 to 1890, are
distinctly French in design and appearance. The first to take the water
was the Takao, launched at Yokosuka in 1888. Particulars are:—
Displacement 1778 tons.
Material of hull Steel.
Length 229 ft.
Beam 34 ft.
Draught 14 ft.
Armament Four 6-in.
One 4.7-in. Q.F.
Two torpedo tubes.
Horse-power 2300.
Speed on trial 15 knots.
Sea speed (_circa_) 12 knots.
Screws Two.
Coal supply 300 tons.
Boilers Two cylindrical.
Engines (made at Yokosuka) Two sets horizontal compound.
Complement 220.
She is fitted with military and searchlight tops on both masts. The
four 6-in. guns are in sponsons in the waist, the 4.7-in. is carried
right aft. There is no protection of any sort to the machinery. She was
the first steel ship built in Japan.
[Illustration: TAKAO.]
About 1887 Japan definitely decided to draw all her Q.F. guns, 6-in. or
4.7-in., from Elswick, and all heavy guns from Canet. Krupp’s pieces
were discarded. This resolution was adhered to till 1902-03, so far as
Elswick was concerned, but Canet guns were given up some years ago.
Elswick guns were, in 1890, shipped to France for the Itsukushima and
her sister. At present (1904) new guns are on the Vickers model.
Following the Takao, Yokosuka launched the despatch vessel Yayeyama in
1899. She was designed by M. Bertin. Her dimensions, etc., are:—
Displacement 1605 tons.
Material of hull Steel.
Length 315 ft.
Beam 34½ ft.
Draught 15 ft.
Armament Three 4.7-in. Q.F.
Six machine guns.
Two torpedo tubes.
Horse-power (forced draught) 5630.
Speed on trial 20.7 knots.
Screws Two.
The engines were provided by Messrs. Hawthorn, Leslie & Co. of
England, and, instead of the horizontal compound previously fitted in
Japanese-built ships, are horizontal, direct-acting, triple expansion.
The boilers are of steel; there are six of these—cylindrical.
Over the engines and boilers a ½-in. steel deck is carried, affording,
in conjunction with the bunkers, some slight protection.
The Onohama Yard laid down a vessel in this year, the Oshima. She was
launched in 1890. Particulars:—
Displacement 640 tons.
Material of hull Steel.
Length 233 ft.
Beam 25½ ft.
Draught 15¾ ft.
Armament Four 4.7-in. Q.F.
Eight 3-pdr. Q.F.
Horse-power (forced draught) 1200.
Speed on trial 16 knots.
Screws One.
[Illustration: [_From a Japanese print._
THE UNEBI (NOW LOST).]
There is no protection to the machinery. The engines were built at
Yokosuka.
Meanwhile, shipbuilding abroad had been proceeding apace, but disaster
attended both the earlier vessels. The first, the Unebi, a cruiser of
3650 tons, with four 6-in. Q.F. as her principal armament, mysteriously
disappeared while on her way out to Japan[15] and still in the
contractors’ hands. Her loss was officially attributed to instability,
and seems to have inspired the Japanese authorities with a profound
distrust for French shipbuilding; at any rate, the Chiyoda, a vessel
generally resembling the lost Unebi, was given to Thomson Yard at
Clydebank for construction. She will be described in due course later
on.
[15] It was currently reported, and for a long time believed in Japan,
that the Unebi had been captured by the Chinese and taken into one of
their harbours. Another report was to the effect that the Chinese had
waylaid and destroyed her—a not impossible incident. A typhoon is,
however, a more likely cause. It may be remembered that our gunboat
Wasp mysteriously disappeared in Far Eastern waters, and nothing was
ever heard as to how she perished.
The second French-built ship, upon the same general plan as the
French Milan and Japanese Yayeyama, was the Tschishima, of 750 tons
displacement. In appearance she was nearly identical to the French
Milan. She met with disaster in the Inland Sea almost immediately after
the Japanese took her over (1892), and all her crew were drowned. The
Tatsuta was ordered from Elswick to replace her.
The Itsukushima, the first of the “Bertin cruisers,” so-called after
their designer, was launched at La Seyne in 1889. Captain Ingles,
R.N., naval adviser to the Japanese, had strongly persuaded them
against ironclads; they had been advised against the big gun also.
However, they were bent on mounting a gun able to pierce any armour
in the Chinese Navy or in foreign warships likely to come to the Far
East. By the irony of fate, these big guns contributed nothing to the
victory of the Yalu; however, the decision of the Japanese to have
them cannot be condemned, in view of the fact that naval construction
everywhere in ’88 was based upon the big gun. Having a full idea of
their requirements, the Japanese settled upon the Italian Lepanto as
embodying the most useful type of ship for them, and the Itsukushimas
were ordered on that principle.
[Illustration]
Particulars of the Itsukushima are as follows:—
Displacement 4278 tons.
Material of hull Steel.
Length 295 ft.
Beam 50½ ft.
Draught (maximum) 21¼ ft.
Armament One 12.8-in. Canet.
Eleven 4.7-in. Q.F. Elswick
of 32 cals.
Five 6-pdr. Q.F.
Eleven 3-pdr. Q.F.
Six machine guns.
Six torpedo tubes (bow,
stern, and four on the broadsides).
Horse-power (natural draught) 3400.
Trial speed (natural draught) 15.7 knots.
Horse-power (forced draught) 5400.
Trial speed (forced draught) 16.5 knots.
Screws Two.
Engines Triple expansion.
Boilers Six cylindrical.[16]
Furnaces 18.
Coal supply 400 tons.
Complement 360.
[16] Now Belleville.
[Illustration: TORPEDO GUNBOAT TSCHICHIMA—LOST BY CAPSIZING IN THE
INLAND SEA.]
For protection there is a steel deck 1½ ins. thick on the slopes. With
this is associated a cellulose belt and coal protection. The total
protection, so far as penetration is concerned, is not, however, more
than equivalent to what a 6-in. belt of old iron armour would afford,
and it would keep out nothing above a 4.7-in. shot, and that only at
long ranges. Over the engine hatches is a patch of thick steel armour.
The heavy gun barbette is a strip of 12-in. Creusot steel, with a 4-in.
steel shield over the breech of the gun. There is an armoured hoist
that affords some support, but, speaking generally, the gun is more or
less at the mercy of shell bursting underneath it.
The Hashidate was built from the same designs at Yokosuka, and is
practically identical with the Itsukushima, save that the battery guns
aft are in small unarmoured sponsons, and obtain thereby a slightly
greater angle of fire. She is further distinguished by a red band; the
Itsukushima, being the first of the class, has, of course, a black band.
Grave doubts were soon entertained as to the seaworthiness of these
two ships, and the Matsushima being a little more behindhand than the
others, her design was altered. She carries the big gun aft, which
makes her a better sea boat. The battery is shifted forward in the
main deck. In place of the single 4.7-in. that her companions carry in
the stern, the raised fok’s’le of the Matsushima contains two of these
pieces, firing through recessed port.
Her small quickfiring armament is also different, there being sixteen
3-pounders.
All three ships have a single tripod mast abaft the funnel, with a
couple of tops on it. Each now carries three signal yards.
The Itsukushima was launched on July 11, 1889, and commissioned in
Japan in 1891. The Matsushima, launched on January 22, 1890, went out
in 1892. The Hashidate was not launched till March 24, 1891, but early
in 1893 she was in commission.
It had been hoped that these ships would attain speeds of 17.5 knots;
none of them, however, ever reached it.
[Illustration: [_Official photo._ HASHIDATE.]
[Illustration: MATSUSHIMA.]
TORPEDO BOATS. 1891.
In 1891 Japan had built for her by Normand at Le Havre a 75-ton torpedo
boat, 118 ft. long, two tubes, and a trial speed of 23 knots. She is a
twin-screw boat.
Two other boats, 90-tonners, were also launched in Germany at Elbing.
Length, 128 ft.; trial speed, 23 knots; one screw; armament, three
tubes and three 1-pounder Q.F.
China in 1890 launched a home-built diminutive of the Itsukushima, the
Ping Yuen. The Japanese took her at Wei-hai-wei, but she has never
been of any use to them, and she now does duty as a gunnery hulk.
Particulars of this craft are:—
Displacement 2600 tons.
Material of hull Steel.
Length 200 ft.
Beam 40 ft.
Draught 19 ft.
Armament (originally) One 10.2-in. Krupp, 25 cals.
Two 6-in. Krupp.
Eight 3-pdr. Q.F.
One 1-pdr. Q.F. (in the top).
Four torpedo tubes.
The old 6-in. Krupp are now replaced by a couple of 45-calibre Elswick
6-in. Q.F. for drill purposes. The old 10-in. gun remains, and,
being always cocked up in the air at an extreme elevation, is the
most noticeable and characteristic feature of this ship, which every
Japanese regards as a standing joke. An enormous dragon adorns each
broadside. Japanese officers who come to Portsmouth always, by the way,
christen our Hero “the British Ping Yen.”
The Ping Yuen was begun as a 16-knot, 2850-ton ship, a copy in fine
of the Stettin-built King Yuen. In an early stage of construction,
however, her length was much reduced, _for economical reasons_.
She appears to have had much the same machinery as the King Yuen
originally. This, however, was tinkered in fitting, and some of her
boilers were stolen, or otherwise dispensed with! On trial she made
10.5 knots for a short period, but, after being taken care of by the
Chinese, soon sank below that modest speed. It is doubtful whether she
made as much as 6 knots at Yalu.
There is a 2-in. steel protective deck in places; amidships and under
water there is a small patch of 8-in. compound armour. The barbette is
a 5-in. strip of armour; the conning-tower has the same thickness. A
thin shield—removed during the war—covers the big gun.
On June 3, 1890, the third-class cruiser Chiyoda, built to replace the
lost Unebi, took the water at Clydebank. Particulars of her are as
follows:—
Displacement 2450 tons.
Material of hull Steel.
Length 308 ft.
Beam 43 ft.
Draught (maximum) 17 feet.
Armament Ten 4.7-in. Q.F. 40 cals.
Fourteen 3-pdr. Q.F.
Three Gatlings.
Three torpedo tubes (of which one
is fixed in the bow).
Horse-power 5600.
Trial speed 19 knots.
Engines Two sets, triple expansion.
Boilers Belleville.
Complement 350.
Coal supply 420 tons.
[Illustration: HEI YEN.]
[Illustration: CHIYODA. THE CHIYODA AT SEA WITH THE FLEET. 1903.]
She was the first ship in any navy to be fitted with water-tube
boilers, which were barely coming into existence in those days. Hers
are of the Belleville type.
[Illustration]
For protection she depends on a 4¼-in. chrome steel armour belt, 200
ft. long, amidships. Forward and aft of this is a protective deck
1½ ins. thick on the slopes. Throughout the entire water-line is a
cellulose belt, and she is divided into 84 watertight compartments. The
guns have no protection beyond the ordinary shields. They are, however,
very well disposed.
In 1898 she was practically re-boilered, the old tubes being replaced
by some specially large ones, in order to enable her to burn Japanese
coal, which sooted the ordinary tubes.
In 1890 the Akitsushima was laid down at Yokosuka. It was at first
supposed that she was a sister to the Matsushima. The Yoshino was
contracted for at Elswick towards the end of this year. Both were
launched in 1892, and commissioned just before the war with China.
The Akitsushima was the last ship to be built in Japan with imported
material. She is practically a small copy of the U.S.S. Baltimore.
Details of the two, for comparison, are as follows:—
AKITSUSHIMA. BALTIMORE.
Displacement 3150 tons. 4600 tons.
Material of hull Steel. Steel.
Length 302 ft. 328 ft.
Beam 43 ft. 48½ ft.
Draught 18½ ft. 23 ft.
Armament Four 6-in. Q.F. (D). Four 8-in. 25 cals. (C).
Six 4.7-in. Q.F. (E). Six 6-in. (D.)
Ten 3-pdr. Q.F. Eight small Q.F.
Four torpedo tubes. Five torpedo tubes.
Horse-power
(forced draught) 8400. 10,060.
Speed on trial 19 knots. 20.1 knots.
Engines Vertical triple Horizontal triple
expansion. expansion.
Boilers Cylindrical. Four double-ended
Scotch.
Screws Two. Two.
Coal (normal) 500. 400.
” (bunker capacity) 800. 900.
Armour deck on slopes 3-in. (_e_). 4-in. (_d_).
Other protection Cellulose belt and
cofferdam.
Complement 330. 395.
[Illustration: [_Photo by favour of Commander Kurri, I.J.N._
AKITSUSHIMA.]
[Illustration]
The Akitsushima mounts 6-in. guns in the foremost and aftermost
sponsons; four 4.7-in. are carried amidships, the fifth on the
forecastle, and the sixth astern. She has thus a broadside fire of
two 6-in. and four 4.7-in., against two 8-in. and three 6-in. in the
Baltimore. Assuming that ship’s guns to be now replaced by Q.F., the
Akitsushima would bring the equivalent of a 6-in. gun less.
The Yoshino, when new, was the swiftest cruiser in the world, and very
few ships are equal to her yet. Particulars of her are:—
Displacement 4150 tons.
Material of hull Steel.
Length 350 ft.
Beam 46 ft.
Draught (maximum) 19 ft.
Armament Four 6-in. Q.F.
Eight 4.7-in. Q.F.
Twenty-two 3-pdr. Q.F.
Five torpedo tubes (one of them
fixed in the bow).
Horse-power (forced draught) 15,000.
Trial speed 23.031 knots.
Engines (Humphrys, Tennant & Co.) Vertical triple expansion.
Boilers Cylindrical.
Screws Two.
Coal (maximum bunker capacity) 1000 tons.
Complement 360.
The normal coal supply, at 4150 tons displacement, is about 400 tons.
Bunkers are disposed amidships in the usual fashion above the armour
deck. Amidships this deck is 4½ ins. thick on the slopes (= _c_) and 2
ins. on the flat. Allowing for the additional resistance of the coal,
nothing under a 10-in., or modern 9.2 or 9.4-in., could penetrate
to the engine-room, and then only with solid shot. The watertight
compartments are exceptionally numerous. With natural draught the ship
has made 21.6 knots.
[Illustration]
The 6-in. guns are thus distributed: one on the forecastle, one on the
poop, the other two in the foremost sponsons. The other broadside guns
are 4.7-in. and 3-pounders. The bow and stern chasers have an arc of
fire of 270 degrees, the 6-in. guns in sponsons fire 3 degrees across
the bow and 60 degrees abaft it.
[Illustration: _Photo by Sir W. G. Armstrong, Mitchell & Co., Ltd.,
Elswick._
YOSHINO.]
The aftermost 4.7-in. fire 3 degrees across the stern and 60 degrees
before it. The broadside guns have an arc of about 120 degrees. Each
of the fighting-tops carries a couple of 3-pounder Q.F., four on each
bridge, two under the forecastle forward, two under the poop well aft,
the remaining six between the guns amidships.
Towards the end of 1893 a violent agitation against the Navy filled
the Japanese newspapers. The existing types of ships—particularly
the Chiyoda and Itsukushima class—were unfavourably criticised. The
_personnel_ was not free from these attacks; it was in some quarters
demonstrated useless and inefficient. In the midst of these attacks the
war with China loomed and broke out. After that war nothing further was
heard on the subject of the _personnel’s_ “defects.”
The primary result of the agitation was a new shipbuilding programme.
The only ships actually under construction at that time were the Suma,
building at Yokosuka, and laid down in March, 1893, and the Tatsuta,
ordered to replace the lost Tschishima, building at Elswick. The new
programme embodied “two first-class battleships of the most powerful
type,” a cruiser at Yokosuka of the Suma type, and a sloop Miyako, laid
down at Kuré in 1894. This programme was also a subject of attack in a
portion of the Japanese press.
Before, however, anything could be done, the battle of Asan and the
affair of the Kow-shing precipitated the war with China. Consequently,
on the outbreak of war, the Tatsuta, launched at Elswick on April 6,
1894, and hastily completed in August of the same year, was stopped as
contraband on her way out at Aden.
The Tatsuta is a torpedo gunboat. Particulars as follows:—
Displacement 875 tons.
Material of hull Steel.
Length 240 ft.
Beam 27½ ft.
Draught (mean) 9½ ft.
Armament Two 4.7-in. Q.F.
Four 3-pdr. Q.F.
Five torpedo tubes (one fixed in
bow, the others in pairs—
a pair on each quarter).
Horse-power (forced draught) 5500.
Trial speed 21 knots.
Engines (Hawthorn, Leslie & Co.) Vertical triple expansion.
Screws Two.
Coal supply (normal) 188 tons.
” ” (maximum capacity) 200 tons.
Complement 100 men.
[Illustration]
CHAPTER V THE WAR WITH CHINA
Japan was not long in finding uses for her navy.
The massacre of some shipwrecked Japanese in Formosa led to the
despatch of a punitive expedition, the expense of which was paid by
China, the suzerain, without any too much goodwill.
In 1875 Koreans gave trouble, by attacking a Japanese steamer that had
visited one of their ports for coal and provisions, and in the midst of
wild excitement a fleet was despatched, which, however, accomplished
its object without bloodshed. A commercial treaty was concluded, and
Japanese influences once more begun to gain ground in the Hermit
Kingdom.
Mention has already been made of the Satsuma clan, whose anti-foreign
sentiments had brought them into conflict with the British ten years
before. A large portion of this clan were still violently conservative,
and Saigo, the then head, having retired from Tokio, set up military
schools, which something like 20,000 young Samaurai entered. Owing
to his known reactionary ideas, Saigo was naturally viewed with some
suspicion, but it is questionable whether he was at first imbued with
anything but a strong imperialism. Amongst other things, he advocated
the seizure of Korea, which, at that time, could have been done without
much opposition, if any, from Russia, then busy over her war with
Turkey. The Russian danger crusade was not, however, taken seriously
by the people at large, and Saigo, in preaching war with Russia, was
regarded as a visionary, crying “wolf” where no wolf was to be found.
On the other hand, war with China was a foregone conclusion for a
long time before it occurred. Both China and Japan wanted Korea, and
while China claimed a suzerainty over Korea, Japan insisted that it
was an independent State. On account of this, strained relations were
continual.
In the spring of 1894 an insurrection broke out in Korea, and China,
to indicate her suzerainty, despatched troops to quell it. At the
same time she sent a Note to the Japanese Government, notifying her
intentions, using the term “tributary State” for Korea.
Japan replied by a Note, refusing to accept the “tributary State”
expression, and a little later announced her intention of sending
4000 troops to Korea—claiming this as her right under the Chemulpo
Convention—which specified that if China sent troops to Korea, Japan
might do the like.
China protested, and, after the exchange of many Notes, despatched ten
transports full of troops from Taku between July 21 and July 23. She
also sent to Asan in Korea the small cruiser Tche Yuen and the gunboat
Kuang-ki.
THE BATTLE OF ASAN (PHUNG-DO).
On July 25th the Chinese warships Tche Yuen (Tsi Yuen)[17] and
Kwang-Yi (Kuang King), coming from Asan in Korea, with awnings up, and
generally unprepared for action, encountered off the island of Phung-do
a portion of the Japanese flying squadron, consisting of the Naniwa
(Captain Togo),[18] Yoshino (Captain Kawara), and Akitsushima (Captain
Kamimura), the Yoshino flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Tsuboi.
[17] Now the Sai Yen.
[18] Admiral in command of the main fleet in February, 1904.
Many accounts of this action have been written. The one I give here
differs in many details from the narrative currently accepted; however,
it is based on the personal narratives to me of officers of the
Japanese ships engaged, and appears to me to afford by far the most
reasonable explanation as to how the fight came about.
The Tche Yuen was never a good steering ship, and her steering-gear,
which had been for some time in a state of neglect, broke down just
about the time the Japanese ships were sighted.
This caused her to alter her course, and she bore down upon the
Japanese, coming nearer and nearer. The idea went round that she
purposed torpedoing.
Every gun in the Japanese fleet was thereupon laid upon the Tche Yuen’s
conning-tower, red flags hoisted, and the Chinese ships ordered to keep
off. This the leading vessel, Tche Yuen (Captain Fong), was unable to
do, and she pressed so closely on the Naniwa that Captain Togo turned
and headed towards her.
The Tche Yuen hoisted a white flag, but still continued to approach.
Thereupon the Naniwa opened fire, the other ships following suit. The
Japanese version, that the Tche Yuen fired a torpedo first of all,
while under the white flag, generally credited, is, on the evidence of
Japanese officers, quite incorrect. No torpedo was fired; they expected
one—that is all.
The conning-tower of the Tche Yuen was hit five times at the first
discharge, the first lieutenant and a sub-lieutenant, who were inside,
being killed, though the captain, who stood beside them, was unhurt.
He vacated the tower, and gave orders to clear for action. In the
circumstances he made a very passable fight for it, despite the
subsequent Chinese allegations of cowardice. Caught unprepared, his
fighting did not amount to much; but that was a natural sequel to his
unpreparedness.
Long before the Chinese could reply, the Japanese, at 3000 yards,
had practically put the ship _hors de combat_. A large shell hit the
armour-deck, and glancing up, struck the fore-turret, disabling one of
the 8-in. guns. All men on deck were killed, wounded, or driven away,
and in a little while the fore-turret was again hit and the gun’s
crews killed. A shell burst in the funnel base, killing or wounding
men in the stokehold, and all the upper works were riddled.
At about this stage the Tche Yuen did what she should have done long
before, got the hand-steering wheel going, and, this done, she made
off for Wei-hai-wei, keeping up a mild fire on the Japanese ships from
her after 6-in. gun. This retreat was the only thing she could do; to
remain would have been madness.
The Japanese attempted no pursuit, despite Chinese stories to the
contrary. They believed that the Chinese battle-fleet was near by, and
were chary accordingly. The only hit obtained by the Tche Yuen was on
the Yoshino’s bridge, and this did little harm. On the other hand, the
Tche Yuen, though she lost three officers and thirteen men killed, and
twenty-five wounded, was not seriously damaged structurally, for within
a week she was repaired. She, however, looked a fearful wreck; and an
idea obtains that the Japanese thought that the sight of her would have
a strong moral effect on the Chinese, which to some extent it did. If
so, it was no unwise move; the ship, sound or damaged, could never be a
serious enemy to them.
While this was going on the Kuang-Yi, disregarding orders to retire,
attempted to charge and torpedo the enemy.[19] In this, of course, she
failed, and, being on fire, most of her crew killed or wounded, she
ran ashore. What was left of her crew—eighteen men all told—reached
the land. The Naniwa, which had engaged the gunboat, continued to
pound her, till a torpedo in the stern-tube blew up, and practically
destroyed her completely.
[19] See Appendix for Chinese version of this affair.
[Illustration: [_Official photo._
JAPANESE FLEET IN LINE ABREAST OFF CHEMULPO DURING THE WAR.]
This battle, save that it began the war, was a quite unimportant event,
and has never been regarded in the Japanese Navy for more than it is
worth. It is chiefly interesting on account of the pluck exhibited by
the Chinese captain of the Kuang-Yi, and for the fact that in it Togo
of the Naniwa first came to the front.
SINKING OF THE KOW-SHING
The Battle of Asan began at 7.5 a.m. on July 25, 1894. It was well over
when, at 8.30 a.m., the British-owned transport Kow-shing was sighted
in the distance, and at 9.15 a.m. the Naniwa fired two blank charges at
her and signalled to her to stop.
The Kow-shing was perfectly well known to the Japanese, Lieutenant
Kuroi, of the Intelligence Department, having informed his Government
on July 14th that she was chartered as a transport for Chinese troops.
She was commanded by Captain Galsworthy of the British mercantile
marine, and had on board, besides her officers and crew of 64 men, 1100
Chinese soldiers and the German Von Hannacken, who was in the Chinese
service.
The Naniwa ordered the Kow-shing to follow her, and to this capture
the captain assented, but the Chinese on board insisted on returning
to Taku instead. Four hours were spent in negotiations, at the end
of which time Captain Togo advised the Europeans in the Kow-shing to
leave. Before this was complied with the Chinese were in a state of
mutiny, and Togo, dreading the arrival of the Chinese battle-fleet,
gave the order to open fire on the transport. At 1.10 p.m. he fired a
torpedo, which missed, and a broadside that hit the Kow-shing in the
engine-room. Five minutes later she began to sink, and at 1.46 went
under.
Most of the European officers jumped overboard, and the majority were
rescued by the Naniwa’s boats. The Chinese on board the sinking ship
opened a heavy rifle-fire on everything and everybody. The story that
the Japanese fired on the men in the water does not appear to have
any foundation in fact. The statement that they did so rests on the
authority of the German Von Hannacken, who was hardly in a position
to observe the exact facts as he swam to safety. It is probable, and,
indeed, to be presumed, that the men on the Naniwa’s tops fired at the
Kow-shing, in order to keep down the fire which the Chinese soldiers
directed at the Japanese boats sent to pick up the European survivors.
About half the Chinese were picked up by a French gunboat or escaped
to the islands; no attempt to save any was made by the Japanese. For
this they have received stronger condemnation than they merit. To risk
being killed by one lot of the enemy in order to save another lot
is not a necessary act in war ethics. This was Captain Togo’s view,
situated as he was in a position of considerable danger, owing to the
supposed propinquity of the Chinese fleet. From panic, or the idea that
the Japanese would give no quarter, the Chinese had to all intents and
purposes gone mad _en masse_; and whatever theories armchair critics
may evolve, the amount of blame actually due to Captain Togo is of a
trifling nature. He had to choose between two evils, and chose the
least.
The legality of the attack on the Kow-shing was hotly contested; but
in the end it was established that Japan was inside her legal rights.
As to the ethics of the matter—well, the moralist who objects is apt to
fail to realise that the Kow-shing carried 1100 of the best soldiers
China could put in the field, and they had been destined to fight
the Naniwa’s countrymen. To allow them to proceed would have been a
splendid exhibition of legal-mindedness, but it would also have been a
criminally stupid act from the patriotic standpoint.
SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS
After this there was a lull. The Chinese battle-fleet, led by Admiral
Ting in the Ting Yuen, put to sea searching for the Japanese. Ting
was anxious to fight, and his _personnel_ was in a good state of
efficiency; his _materiel_ was otherwise. Still, at this early stage,
had he encountered the Japanese fleet, he was far more likely to have
destroyed it than he was later on.
He had, however, to reckon with Li Hung Chang and Loh Feng Lo. These
presently ordered him not to cruise east of Wei-hai-wei and the Yalu
river; and this order practically put the Chinese fleet out of the
operations. It has been stated many times that Li Hung Chang was bribed
by the Japanese to give this order, and it is possible that he was. It
is more probable, however, that for the Chinese to be defeated was a
part of his own peculiar policy.
For some time, therefore, nothing happened. The Japanese feinted at
Wei-hai-wei and Port Arthur, but for a good six weeks they spent most
of their time in sea work—drilling and preparing for battle. The
Chinese ships, on the other hand, lay inactive, steadily deteriorating
morally, as inactive ships must.
It was stated in Japan that British cruisers at this time acted as
Chinese scouts, giving information as to Japanese movements. It is
a difficult matter to authenticate or even to refer to. I have seen
Chinese official reports (translated ones) in which two cruisers
are specifically mentioned, but a Chinese official report is not
necessarily confirmation. There is no question whatever but that
the Chinese spread the rumour of British sympathy and benevolent
neutrality; it is fairly clear, too, that now and again they obtained
information as to Japanese whereabouts from British men-of-war. But
it is not proved that this was anything more than in the course of
ordinary conversation, and there is no reason whatever to believe that
the British Government had a hand in the matter.
VI THE BATTLE OF YALU (HAI YANG)
Japan, having been as good as presented with the command of the sea,
swiftly moved an army into Korea. This went on till, in September,
China began to realise that if she wished to hold that country she must
use the sea as transport. At Ping Yang her land forces had suffered
a severe defeat; reinforcements were urgently required. Ting was,
therefore, ordered to convey these to the Yalu River.
On Sunday, September 1st, at 1 a.m., Ting sailed from Talien Bay,
having with him the Ting Yuen (flag), Chen Yuen, Lai Yuen, King Yuen,
Ping Yuen, battleships;[20] and the cruisers Chin Yuen, Chih Yuen,
Tche Yuen, Tchao Yong, and Yank Wei; two gunboats, Kuang Kai and Kuang
Ping; four “flat-iron” Rendel gunboats; four torpedo boats; and five
transports, carrying a thousand men each.
[20] Except in the case of the first two, only by courtesy so called.
Reaching the mouth of the Yalu on the same evening, he sent the
transports, under convoy of the Ping Yuen, Kuang Ping, and torpedo
boats, up the Yalu River, anchoring twelve miles out with his main
fleet.
Early next morning the smoke of the Japanese, burning Takashima coal,
was observed on the horizon.
It has never been clearly demonstrated whether the meeting was
accidental or designed. The balance of evidence, to my mind, is in
favour of the theory that Admiral Ito calculated that the Chinese
would, after Ping Yang, send ships to the mouth of the Yalu, conveying
troops. That certainly was Admiral Ito’s theory.
The Chinese lay with banked fires. On seeing the Japanese smoke, they
got up anchor, and adopted the prearranged battle-formation—line
abreast _en échelon_, the centre strong, the wings weak. Line abreast
was the best formation for the Chinese fleet, which was best in bow
fire, but the weak ends of the wings were a serious error. In addition,
the Yang Wei and Tcho Yong were slow at getting up anchor.
The Japanese came along in line ahead, the flying squadron leading the
main astern of it.
The rival squadrons were as follows:—
Japan: 8 cruisers, 1 old battleship, 1 old “belted cruiser,” 1 gunboat,
and 1 armed liner.
China: 4 battleships, 3 cruisers, 3 gunboats, with (coming from the
Yalu) 1 battleship, 1 gunboat, and 2 torpedo boats.
The Japanese fleet fought by signals throughout; the Chinese fought
without signals, on a prearranged plan. In _materiel_, so far as ships
went, the fleets were about on a par in fighting value. Actually, the
Japanese were superior—in part from the possession of Q.F. guns, in
part because the Chinese were very badly supplied with shell. Had they
had a good supply of shell, there is little question but that, with
their preponderance of large calibre guns, they would have destroyed
the Japanese fleet, especially as Admiral Ito made a considerable error
at the outset.
[Illustration: ADMIRAL ITO.]
JAPANESE FLEET.
----------------+-----+--------+-----------------------------+------
Ship. |Tons.|Captain.| Armament. | Speed
| | | | in
| | | | 1894.
----------------+-----+--------+-----------------------------+------
Knots.
Flying squadron.
Yoshino[21] | 4150|Kawara | Four 6-in. Q.F., | 20
| | | eight 4.7-in. Q.F. |
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Takachiho | 3650|Nomura | Two 10-in. Krupp, six 6-in. | 15
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Naniwa | 3650|Togo | Ditto | 16
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Akitsushima | 3150|Kamimura|Four 6-in. Q.F., | 16
| | | six 4.7-in. Q.F. |
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Main fleet.
Matsushima[22]| 4277|{Omoto |One 12.6-in. Canet, | 14
| |{Dewa | twelve 4.7-in. Q.F. |
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Chiyoda | 2450|Uchida | Ten 4.7-in. Q.F. | ?
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Itsukushima | 4277|Yoko-o |One 12.6-in. Canet, | 14
| | | eleven 4.7-in. Q.F. |
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Hashidate | 4277|Hidaka | Ditto | 14
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Fuso | 3718|Arai |Four 9.4-in. Krupp, | 11
| | | two 6-in. Krupp |
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Hi Yei | 2200|Sakurai | Nine old 6-in. | 9
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Out of line.
Akagi | 615|Sakamoto| Two 4.7-in. Q.F. | 8
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Saikio-maru[23]| 2913|Kano | Two light guns and | 10
| | | some small Q.F. |
----------------+-----+--------+-----------------------------+------
[21] Rear-Admiral Tsuboi.
[22] Vice-Admiral Ito.
[23] Vice-Admiral Count Kabayama.
CHINESE FLEET.
(From starboard to port.)—
+-----------------+----+------------+--------------------------------+------+
| Ship. |Tons| Captain. | Armament. |Speed |
| | | | | in |
| | | | | 1894.|
+-----------------+----+------------+--------------------------------+------+
|Battle-line. | | | |Knots.|
| Yang Wei |1350| — |Two 10.2-in., four 4.7-in. Krupp| 6 |
| Tchao Yung |1350| — | Ditto | 6 |
| Ching Yuen |2300| — |Three 8.2-in., two 6-in. Elswick|14 |
| Lai Yuen |2850| — | Two 8.2-in., two 6-in. Krupp |10 |
| Chen Yuen |7430| Lin | Four 12-in., two 6-in. Krupp |12 |
| Ting Yuen[24] |7430|Lin-Poo-Chin| Ditto |12 |
| King Yuen |2850| — | Two 8.2-in., two 6-in. Krupp |10 |
| Chih Yuen |2300| Tang | Three 8.2-in., two 6-in. Krupp |15 |
| Kuang Chi |1290| — | Three 4.7-in. Krupp |10½ |
| Tsi Yuen |2355| Fong | Two 8.2-in., one 6-in. Krupp |12½ |
| | | | | |
|Inshore. | | — | | |
| Ping Yuen |2100| — | One 10.2-in., two 6-in. Krupp |6 or 7|
| Kwang Ping |1000| — | Three 4.7-in. Krupp |10 |
| One torpedo boat| 128| — | Three tubes |15 |
| ” ” ” | 69| — | Ditto |16 |
+-----------------+----+------------+--------------------------------+------+
[24] Admiral Ting.
[Illustration: YALU: THE BEGINNING OF THE BATTLE.]
The first shot, which fell short, was fired by the Ting Yuen at 12.30.
A moment later the battle was general.
The sea was smooth—almost glassy—the sky dull. There was, however, a
growing breeze, and this blew towards the Chinamen, so that the black
smoke from the Japanese cruisers acted as a helpful screen.
The Japanese came on, and passed right across the Chinese front,
turning in succession eight points to port, when they opened on the
Chinese at 3000 yards. This passing across the front was dangerous, and
the Chinese nearly succeeded in cutting the Japanese line. They lost
station in doing so, masking each other; and to this the Japanese fleet
owed much, and only their tail was endangered. The Fuso was badly hit.
The Hi Yei, in danger of being rammed, had to alter her course. She
passed between the Chinese battleships at short range, getting badly
hit as she cleared them. The Akagi was badly knocked about; the Saikio
alone passed on unhurt.
The Chinese had by now half won the battle, but they were in such a
muddle with their ships that the advantage was never followed up. At
this time the flying squadron, which had cut off the two old gunboats
to starboard of the Chinese line, was masked by the remaining four
vessels of the main fleet; and an inspection of the plan of the second
stage will show how near victory was for the Chinamen had their fleet
only been in hand. Overwhelming heavy gunfire was theirs.
They lost the opportunity, however, and the flying squadron, after a
short engagement with the Ping Yuen division, circled and came round on
the Chinese front, while the main squadron, also turning, assailed its
rear. The Ping Yuen devoted herself to a fruitless attempt at chasing
the main Japanese fleet, while the bulk of the Chinese wasted effort in
an attempt to complete the destruction of the little Akagi. In doing
this they came under fire of the flying squadron, which sank both the
King Yuen and Chih Yuen with its 10.2-in. guns.
Attempts by one of the torpedo boats to sink the Saikio-maru failed;
she also survived a fire from the Chinese battleships. The Lai Yuen was
by now ablaze; the Ching Yuen was no better off. Both battleships were
also on fire. The pendulum had swung round, and everything pointed to a
complete victory for Japan.
Matters were thus when, at 3.30, the Matsushima was put out of action.
The incidents enabled the battleships to recover, and they took,
without much serious harm, a hammering from the entire Japanese fleet
that remained.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF YALU: SECOND STAGE.]
This stage continued till nightfall, when the Chinese got into line and
steamed away, followed for a short distance only by the Japanese.
Both sides claimed the victory; as a matter of fact, it was a drawn
battle. When the length of time the battle took is considered, the
damages were relatively small. In detail, they were as follows:—
JAPANESE FLEET’S DAMAGES.
The Japanese flagship, Matsushima, went through the battle without
any particular harm for a considerable while, when one of the
Chinese ironclads fired a 12-in. common shell at her, which hit her,
making a big hole. It went in and wiped out practically the entire
battery, disabled two or three guns completely, and exploded some
spare ammunition. Altogether 100 men were killed or wounded by that
one shell, and she had to be hauled out of action. When that 12-in.
shell hit, the majority of the men were in working dresses, in cotton
things and so on, and a great many of them were men with beards, and
a Japanese officer who was on board the ship at the time tells me
that every single one of these men with cotton dresses was set on
fire, and all the men with beards and long hair also had their beards
and hair set on fire, and were rushing all over the ship, whereas
several officers, who happened to be in serge uniform near by, were
comparatively little hurt. The ship was set on fire to a certain
extent, but a few buckets of water very easily put the fire out.
This ship was also hit by a 10.2-in. shell a little earlier in the
action. It hit her torpedo-room, glanced up, and knocked up against the
barbette; but as the shell was loaded with cement its burst did not do
very much harm.
The second ship in the Japanese line was the Chiyoda. She was also hit
by a 12-in. shell, but that was another cement or coal-dust shell, so
did not burst. It went through just above the belt. Had it hit the belt
it ought to have sunk her; above, it simply made a large hole through
and went out again, and the ship was none the worse; there was not a
single man killed or wounded.
The Naniwa was hit by an 8.2-in. on the water-line, which went into
the coal bunkers, but it did no particular harm there. The shell was
afterwards picked up and pieced together, and a photograph taken of
such sections as were got. Twenty-seven pieces were recovered, and they
say there must have been a great many more. But that 8.2-in. shell
practically did no harm whatever to the ship. The coal bunkers acted
very efficiently.
In the Itsukushima there were shells in the torpedo-room, but none of
the torpedoes exploded—if there were any there with war-heads, which
is rather uncertain. There was also a shell in the engine-room, which,
curiously enough, did no harm.
The Hashidate had a 6-in. shell burst right up against the barbette of
a big gun, which was not hurt at all by it.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF YALU: THIRD STAGE.]
The Hi Yei, an oldish ship, was raked by a 12-in. common shell, and
also by some smaller shells, which set her on fire and practically blew
the ship to pieces.
The Sakio-maru was quite a small vessel. She was hit first of all
by a 12-in. common shell, which, in theory, ought to have blown her
to atoms. It disabled her steering-gear and wounded one man. She
altogether got eleven hits from pieces of 4.7-in. or over. Of these,
four were 12-in. shell, of which two burst inside; and the net result
of those eleven hits was to wound eleven men, to kill nobody, but to
make the ship leak a bit. The torpedoes fired at her missed, as has
already been stated. The reason was that the boat fired as she turned,
and the torpedo went under. Two others fired at longer ranges missed
badly. The torpedo boat was not hit. The Chinese version of the affair
runs to the effect that the Japanese on board the Saikio deserted their
guns in panic at the attack. This statement rests, of course, only on
the Chinese assertion.
The Akagi was hit by a 12-in. common shell, which struck the mainmast
and sent it overboard, and killed the captain. The peculiar thing
about it was that all the hits took her about that part; there was
not a single hit forward, but the bridge, which stands somewhere aft,
was continually swept, and the second in command was wounded almost
immediately after he went on the bridge. The third officer, Lieut.
Sato, then went up, and was hit by a fragment of shell that scraped
the top of his head off, and he went down below. A fourth man went up;
he got wounded, and the third man went up again and carried on. She was
able to steam and go home quite comfortably after the battle.
A gun shield, about two inches thick, was struck, and the shell that
hit it is supposed to have been a 6-in. common. It simply scooped out
the shield about an inch or so, and did no harm to the men inside, who
were just round the corner, and did no harm whatever to the gun.
One shell burst on the upper deck, wrecked everything, made a
tremendous mess, and riddled the deck all over, but the harm was
practically _nil_.
The old battleship Fuso was hit more than any other Japanese ship, but
every hit upon her has been kept confidential. Still, so far as can be
guessed, the Japanese opinion of the result of the fire on this ship
was that armour under the peculiar circumstances of the Yalu tended to
aggravate hits rather than the reverse, and it is certainly interesting
that this ship, with an armoured battery, completely armoured belt, and
fairly thick armour which could not be penetrated by any of the Chinese
6-in. shell, should have been one of the most damaged ship of any.
[Illustration: A JAPANESE PICTURE OF YALU.]
CHINESE FLEET’S DAMAGES.
The Chinese flagship was an ironclad of 7000 tons displacement, the
Ting Yuen. The first thing that hit her was a big ricochet which flew
up and knocked the mast, carried it over the side, and killed all the
men in the fighting-top. She was peppered all over by the Japanese, and
hit something like 300 times, the result of the 300 hits being 14 men
killed and 25 wounded. She was set on fire practically continuously all
through the action. As soon as one fire was put out she was set on fire
again in another place; but the Chinese managed to get these fires out
without any bother, and no harm was done to her that way.
The second principal Chinese ship was the Chen Yuen. She was hit 400
times. The photograph of her in dock is how she appeared shortly after
the battle. The funnel was peppered over everywhere. All the men in
the fighting-tops were killed. The fore 6-in. turret was hit; it is
only about an inch thick, and this shell went through and killed or
wounded the gun’s crew, but did not hurt the gun. The only gun that was
disabled at all in the battle was one of the 12-in., and it appears to
have been disabled by something very big—probably one of the Japanese
12.6-in. shell hit the barbette of the ship, and the concussion upset
the training gear of the guns in some way. Nothing could be done with
them for about ten minutes. After that they were got in working order
and fired again: This ship was also set on fire all over the place, but
was perfectly able to fight when the battle was over.
The Chen Yuen had on board her the famous Captain McGiffin, who wrote a
great deal about his adventures in the fight. He was an American, who
was usually described as commander of the ship and as having fought the
battle. He was photographed against the hits in a desperately wounded
condition, but afterwards it was surmised that he was not blind to
dramatic effect. His narratives can hardly be accepted as historical
evidence, save in a general way.
The next ship of interest at the battle of Yalu was the Elswick
cruiser, Chih Yuen. She is described in most accounts of the Yalu as
having very gallantly charged the entire Japanese fleet, attempting
to ram; a tremendous fire was poured into her till she went down, and
there was an end of her. According to Japanese officers, what really
happened was that at an early stage in the action her steering-gear got
disabled; she was simply wandering about unable to do anything. She was
simply a cloud of white smoke drifting along. The Takachiho, one of the
Japanese cruisers, had a 10-in. gun. She waited until the Chih Yuen was
within something like 400 yards, when they could not miss, then let
drive with this 10-in. They did not attempt to pick out any particular
part of the Chih Yuen; they simply fired “into the brown.” They hit her
somewhere rather high up near the funnel; there was a tremendous cloud
of white smoke, which became red, and when that cloud went the ship was
gone. There is no idea that any magazine was hit, or that there was any
ammunition on deck to account for it, and the favourite theory of the
Japanese officers is that this particular hit upset her stability in
some way and did the finishing touch, and thus caused her to capsize.
[Illustration: [_Sketch by a Japanese Officer._
SINKING OF THE KING YUEN (p. 139).]
Opposite is a sketch by a Japanese officer of the sinking of the King
Yuen, which was a small Chinese ironclad. There is a great deal of
mystery in all the histories as to how that ship really did go down.
The Japanese account of it is that “she was on fire, and apparently the
fire could not be put out; she began to roll very much indeed—first
very heavily over one way and then very heavily over the other way; she
continued rolling like that, and one time she rolled and did not come
back.”
She had a sister ship, the Lai Yuen. This ship was set on fire at an
early stage of the action, and the Chinese apparently did not trouble
to put the fire out. The consequence was it got a large hold and burnt
every scrap of woodwork in the ship. But the extraordinary thing is
that her people managed to go on fighting. Of her deck nothing was left
but twisted beams. The ship was nearly white-hot, and a number of men
got roasted to death in her; but she was still in fighting condition
when the battle ended. Probably only Chinamen could have fought in such
conditions.
The Ching Yuen was set on fire, but not badly hit in any way.
There were two other Chinese ships lost, the Tchao Yung and the
Yang Wei. These were set on fire at a very early stage, and most of
the accounts that we hear of the danger of fire in action are based
upon these two particular ships. It appears that their captains were
economical men, who liked to make a little money; so when the ships
were painted they did not scrape off the old paint, and as the ships
were about twelve years old the paint got very thick. Moreover, as they
found kerosine cheaper than linseed oil, they mixed the paint always
with kerosine. The ships, therefore, were of a somewhat inflammable
nature. When they got hit, the men trying to put the fire out got hit
also, and the ships were then simply left to blaze away. That is the
true cause of most of the fire scares that happened just after Yalu.
The Chinese shell were very defective indeed. They had very few shell
with any charges; nearly all they had to fire with were solid shot or
cement shell, the very worst possible thing for firing at cruisers
with; and this fact that they had no good shell must, perhaps, account
for the survival of the Japanese fleet. For although just after Yalu
the Japanese said that their shooting was 15 per cent. and the Chinese
10 per cent., they have since stated that the Chinese hits were
something like 25 per cent. and their own about 12 per cent., and they
say that in the early stages of the battle the Chinese never missed a
single shot with their big guns—they hit every ship that they fired
at; and they describe them as being some of the best gunners in the
world—that these No. 1 Chinese gunners were born shots; but gradually,
as the battle went on, the Japanese 3-pounders and machine guns playing
on the Chinese ships took off the heads of those men, and they were
replaced by other men who were not such good shots, and this went on
until, towards the end of the battle, practically no hitting at all was
done by the Chinese. But in the early part of the fight their shooting
was very good indeed.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF YALU: FOURTH STAGE.]
The Japanese in their fleet had three enormous guns, each of 66 tons,
which would penetrate something like double the thickness of any
armour opposed to them. Only one of those guns seems to have been in
a condition to fire. In the excitement of the battle the Japanese got
something wrong with the gear, and had to manipulate them by hand;
and the consequence was that two of those guns fired about once each,
and the third once an hour. It is unfortunate that these guns did not
secure at least one fair and square hit—the data of it would have been
extremely valuable.
After the battle of Yalu the Chinese ships were patched up. The Tche
Yuen, which had already taken part in the battle of Asan, took part in
Yalu, but was then knocked about and ran away. Although she had been
so badly hit in the battle of Asan, when she was doing the strategical
movement at the rear, she only took eight days to patch up, and she was
then able to go out to sea again. After Yalu she was very quickly got
ready once more.
The first conclusion one is forced to is that penetration does not
seem to have done anything in this battle. Where a gun was matched
against some very inferior armour, it went through and smashed it up,
but wherever the armour that it ought to penetrate was anything like
equal to the gun, the result was failure.
The second point is the astonishing amount of hitting that all these
ships seem to have been able to stand. There are many cases of quite
little ships that in theory one single shell would finish, but it has
taken five or six shells to disable them at all, and in a week or two
they have been fit to go out fighting again. The Saikio-maru, and the
way she was hammered and still managed to go on fighting and remain in
a fairly good condition, is a particular case in point. Although the
upper works may be knocked about and splintered, and so on, it does not
seem much good splintering the upper works and making a mess of the
ship unless there is a gun near it, and somebody to be disabled. Now,
this conclusion is dead against the “moral effect” theory. It is almost
a gospel that if the upper works are shelled enough the crew somewhere
else will get demoralised. I do not believe it; they will not in a
modern war be aware of it. I think this point should be laid to heart
and thought over by those who have 6-in. guns to attack ships with. To
do harm, they must fire those guns with all the intelligence they can
bring to bear.
On the other hand, it is well to remember, as in the case of the King
Yuen and Chih Yuen, that hits in the upper works caused the loss of
these ships by affecting stability, so far as can be gathered in the
absence of the hulls now at the bottom of the Yellow Sea.
[Illustration: [_Official photo._
ON BOARD THE TING YUEN AFTER THE SURRENDER AT WEI-HAI-WEI.]
A third point is, that the danger from fire in action is grossly
exaggerated. As to the Japanese, they one and all say that they had
no trouble with fire at Yalu. They have not entirely done away with
woodwork in their ships. Following the fashion set by the Germans,
they have done away with a fair amount, but their ships are by no
means without wood, like German ships and others which have not been
in action—though even Germans are now reverting to a certain amount
of wood. The Japanese say that they had buckets of water standing
round; the men ran to the buckets of water, and the fire was under.
The Chinese had exactly the same system, and they had no trouble till
about the end of the action, when they got demoralised, and then
the fire began to get headway. Hose pipes seem to have always been
untrustworthy, too liable to be holed by splinters. Wet sand proved
excellent. It may be noted that hits on the sea near the ships deluged
all the exposed parts of ships at Yalu with water. The loss of life was
returned as follows:—
Japanese—90 killed, 204 wounded.
Chinese—36 killed, 88 wounded, 700 drowned (approximate).
Details (official) of the losses are:—
JAPANESE.
+-------------+--------------+--------------+
| | Killed. | Wounded. |
| +---------+----+---------+----+
| |Officers.|Men.|Officers.|Men.|
+-------------+---------+----+---------+----+
|Matsushima | 2 | 33 | 5 | 71 |
|Chiyoda | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|Itsukushima | 0 | 13 | 1 | 17 |
|Hashidate | 2 | 1 | 0 | 9 |
|Hi-yei | 3 | 16 | 3 | 34 |
|Fusoo | 0 | 2 | 2 | 10 |
|Yoshino | 0 | 1 | 2 | 9 |
|Takachiho | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
|Akitsusu | 1 | 4 | 0 | 10 |
|Naniwa | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
|Akagi | 2 | 9 | 2 | 15 |
|Saikio | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 |
| +---------+----+---------+----+
| Total | 10 | 80 | 16 |188 |
+-------------+---------+----+---------+----+
Total killed and wounded, 294. Wounded who died subsequently were:
Matsushima, 1 officer and 21 men;
Itsukushima, 1 man;
Hi-yei, 4 men;
Fusoo, 1 officer and 2 men;
Yoshino, 1 officer; and
Saikio, 1 man.
CHINESE.
+----------+-------+--------+--------+------+
| |Killed.|Wounded.|Drowned.|Total.|
+----------+-------+--------+--------+------+
|Ting Yuen | 14 | 25 | | 39 |
|Lai Yuen | 10 | 20 | | 30 |
|Chen Yuen | 7 | 15 | | 22 |
|Ching Yuen| 2 | 14 | | 16 |
|Tche Yuen | 3 | 0 | | 3 |
|Ping Yuen | 0 | 12 | | 12 |
|Kuang Chi | 0 | 2 | | 2 |
|Chih Yuen | ? | ? | 200 | 200 |
|King Yuen | ? | ? | 200 | 200 |
|Tchao Yong| ? | ? | | ? |
|Yang Wei | ? | ? | | ? |
+----------+-------+--------+--------+------+
During the battle both the Tche Yuen and Kuang Chi ran away. The first
reached Port Arthur, and her captain was beheaded; the other ran ashore
at Talienwan, and remained there till she was found on the 23rd by the
Naniwa and Akitsushima, which destroyed her. The Yang Wei was finished
by a spar torpedo on the 18th.
The remaining Chinese ships reached Port Arthur without adventure, and
“victory” was celebrated by the draping of all guns, save those of the
Tche Yuen, in red. They refitted very slowly.[25]
[25] Some of the dead were not removed for a fortnight.
The Japanese, on the other hand, kept the sea, repairing ships—except
the Matsushima—in secluded bays. The least damaged cruisers watched
Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei.
On October 20th the Chinese were all repaired, and went to Wei-hai-wei,
whence Admiral Ting meanwhile cruised aimlessly; but no action took
place, and on November 7th he returned to Wei-hai-wei. Here the Chen
Yuen ran ashore while entering harbour, and did not get off for three
weeks. She was not repaired till the middle of January, a great hole in
her bottom having to be mended. This was done with cement.
Meanwhile the Japanese, ignoring Ting, concentrated efforts on Port
Arthur, the Lao Tung Peninsula being invaded while the Japanese fleet
lay blockading the enemy in Wei-hai-wei. On the 20th he returned to
Port Arthur, leaving a few cruisers to watch Ting, and the rest of the
fleet took part in the fighting there.
The fleet was in four divisions:—
I.
Matsushima. Itsukushima.
Hashidate. Chiyoda
II.
Fuso. Hi-Yei.
Takao. Yayeyama.
III.
Yoshino. Naniwa.
Akitsushima. Takachiho.
IV.
Two divisions of 5 torpedo boats each,
and some gunboats inshore.
[This fleet moved parallel with the army on shore, and occasionally
shelled the Chinese.]
On the 21st the fleet steamed past the harbour entrance, about seven
miles out. They then detached the Chiyoda, which went to Pigeon Bay,
and shelled Port Arthur at extreme range till 4 p.m.
At that time the Chinese fired at the fleet without result, till a
heavy squall came on, in the midst of which the torpedo boats rushed
the harbour. Excellently manœuvred, they got in untouched, and shelled
the disorganised Chinese in the town. Outside, the Japanese soldiers
were carrying fort after fort, the defence being poor, as the Chinese
grew panic-stricken.
“THE MASSACRE AT PORT ARTHUR.”
Then followed the Port Arthur massacre, horrible stories of which
flooded the world for the next few days. It has been strenuously
denied that any massacre took place, but this is not correct. Few, if
any, civilians were killed; there were next to none in the place, the
supposed dead civilians being Chinese soldiers, who had discarded the
overcoats, which were the only uniform they had, in order to continue
the fight on guerilla lines. But very little quarter was given.
A Japanese disavowal and explanation will be found below:—
To the Editor of the _Japan Mail_.
SIR,—In September last, for the purpose of studying the
practical application of International Law, I joined the fleet,
and embarked in a man-of-war of the Imperial Japanese
Navy. I am now staying in Port Arthur, after witnessing
several battles. Being a subscriber to your paper, I saw in
the issue of the 21st January some singular statements by Mr.
Creelman, to which you refer. It being impossible for an
eye-witness like me to pass over such a matter in silence, I
enclose an explanation of this affair, in the hope that you will
kindly have it translated at your office, and published through
the columns of your valuable paper. What I write is an
accurate and faithful description of the things that actually
happened, and I vouch for their truth in the sight of Heaven.
Convinced that the contents of my letter are of value to the
public at large, I venture to trouble you, especially since my
facts may furnish material to strengthen the position you take
in the matter. Harassed by official business of various kinds,
I cannot find leisure to write at greater length, and must
crave your kind indulgence.
I am, sir, your obedient servant,
TAKAHASHI SAKUYE,
_Hogakushi_,
Professor at the Naval University, and Ex-legal Adviser to
the Commander-in-Chief of the Regular Imperial Fleet.
ENCLOSURE.
On the occasion of the battle of Port Arthur I was on board
the Itsukushima, and accurately observed the fight as
carried on both on shore and at sea. I saw how the Imperial
troops fought, and how the squadron co-operated with the
army off the coast of Port Arthur, and I watched the
movements of the enemy with the utmost vigilance. Similarly,
I carefully looked out for any incident that might furnish
material for the study of my special subject, and I do
not therefore hesitate to say that I am among those best
informed as to what actually took place on that occasion.
Equally, I do not hesitate to declare that I saw nothing
blameworthy about the assault on Port Arthur.
I have seen to-day in a copy of the _Japan Mail_ that
reached me, that Mr. Creelman, the war correspondent of
the _New York World_, wrote to that paper to the following
effect: “Torpedo boats were going through the waves, sinking
junks loaded with men, women, and children endeavouring
to escape. Ten junks, laden with terror-stricken people,
were thus sunk, and the water was filled with drowning
inhabitants.” While regretting, for the sake of Mr.
Creelman, whose honour as a gentleman may be impaired by
such absurd fabrications, I fear that the public might be
led astray by what he has written, and therefore I feel
constrained to refute the false statements made by him.
In the first place, the assertions of Mr. Creelman are
entirely imaginary; for his allegation that he saw from the
shore, on the day of the assault upon Port Arthur, that is,
on November 21, 1894, Japanese men-of-war and torpedo boats
in motion, cannot be founded on actual fact. It is true
that on the 21st men-of-war and torpedo boats were off the
coast of Port Arthur, but for two days, from the evening of
the 21st, they were away from the coast, owing to stress
of weather. Now, Port Arthur was not entirely taken on the
21st. Severe struggles were still in progress on that day.
Hence it was practically impossible at such a juncture to
see the warships and torpedo boats in motion off the coast
of Port Arthur, and the fictitiousness of any statement to
the contrary will be admitted by any one actually at the
scene of the battle. On that same day certain staff officers
of the Army, desiring to communicate some intelligence
to the fleet, could only effect their object by braving
extraordinary dangers and hardships, and by passing through
the lines of the enemy. How, then, could Mr. Creelman have
seen the movements of the fleet and the torpedo flotilla
except in pure imagination!
Secondly, while the fleet and flotilla were lying off the
coast of Port Arthur and in the vicinity, from 5 a.m. to 6
p.m. on the 21st, not a single Chinese junk was captured.
Only two junks escaped that day, at a little past 5 p.m.
But the commander of the fleet had specially ordered that
any small vessel of the kind should be let alone, attention
being paid to the larger only. No other junk escaped. It is
true that there were five or six junks on the shore, close
by the foot of Lao-Tie-Shan, but they were all beached.
Thus the statement that junks, loaded with men, women, and
children, were sunk is not only absolutely groundless, but
the very allegation that such a number of junks attempted to
escape is a fabrication.
Thirdly, it is a fact that at a little past 4 p.m. two
steamers emerged from Port Arthur. It was subsequently
known by the confession of Chinese prisoners that a number
of Chinese officers were on these vessels. It is also a
fact that torpedo boats pursued these steamers. It would
have been a neglect of duty on the part of the fleet to
disregard the escape of such vessels. When the torpedo boats
gave chase to the steamers, they signalled, “Heave-to, or
take the consequence.” The steamers not obeying, two blank
cartridges were fired after them, but they still kept on
their course. Moreover, they returned the fire of their
pursuers, and the latter therefore began to chase them with
more vigour. Thereat one of the steamers turned back into
the harbour, and the other changing its course, ran ashore,
and all the persons on board fled. Was not this procedure on
the part of the Japanese officers perfectly proper, and in
strict accordance with the canons of western nations?
The foregoing explanations are sufficient to prove the
falsehood of Mr. Creelman’s statements. I regret that he
should be so lost to the sense of honour as to fabricate
such injurious stories. In order that the public may not be
deceived, I beg you to give publicity to these facts.
Your obedient servant,
TAKAHASHI SAKUYE,
_Hogakushi_.
Port Arthur,
_February 11, 1895_.
This disposes of the most gruesome fictions about the massacre, but it
does not deal with what took place on shore.
The true story, as I had it from a Japanese army officer who was there,
is as follows:—
The battle was over, and the Japanese were marching into the town, a
few Chinese retreating before them. Isolated fighting continued; but
the place was, to all intents and purposes, captured.
As the victorious Japanese pressed forward, a young officer suddenly
came across the remains of his brother, who had been captured, wounded,
a day or two before. The body showed that death had been inflicted with
atrocious Chinese tortures.
Maddened at this dreadful sight, the young officer practically ran
amok. Crying “No quarter,” he began to kill. His men, understanding
the cause, started on the same career of vengeance; and it spread like
wildfire through the army, that the town was full of the corpses of
tortured Japanese prisoners, and two or three regiments got out of
hand. For some time “Vengeance” was the battle-cry, and terrible things
happened that night.
Before we blame the Japanese, we should remember that our own hands are
not quite clean in this matter; human nature has its limitations, and
there are many men still living who can recall what they did when, in
the Indian Mutiny, they found rebels red-handed among the tortured and
outraged bodies of British ladies and children. Armchair ethics may
condemn; but the armchair critics sit at home doing the condemnation.
It is less easy to be philosophical in the hour of battle. The
philosopher must have been through it, and abstained from slaughter,
for his strictures to be worth anything. Personally, I think few things
come more under the head of “excusable” than the Port Arthur massacre,
so long as human nature remains human.
Port Arthur was converted into a Japanese base, and for a few weeks
events languished, while preparations were made for the attack on
Wei-hai-wei.
VII WEI-HAI-WEI
On January 18, 1895, the Japanese fleet bombarded Teng-ckow-foo, facing
Port Arthur on the Chinese mainland. It is about eight miles west of
Wei-hai-wei.
On the 19th the bombardment was continued; on the 20th the army was
landed to the east of Wei-hai-wei.
Wei-hai-wei was moderately fortified, chiefly with 8-in. Krupp guns.
There were a few larger ones, and a sprinkling of modern pieces.
Mostly, however, the guns were old. On Leu-Kun tau[26] were some more
forts, a gunnery school, and a coaling station. The Chinese fleet lay
behind this island, the Japanese watching both entrances, which were
protected by booms.
[26] _Tau_ means island.
On the 30th the Japanese fleet and army opened fire on the defences.
In this affair the Chao-pei-tsui defences were silenced by the Naniwa,
Akitsushima, and Katsuragi, the division being under command of Captain
(now Admiral) Togo. The magazine was exploded, and the forts taken
possession of by the Japanese soldiers. Before retreating, however, the
Chinese destroyed all save a few old guns.
[Illustration: MAP OF WEI-HAI-WEI.]
The rest of the fleet bombarded Leu-Kun tau without much result
on either side. The Chinese warships took part in the defence. A
photograph of this battle, taken from a captured fort, is given.
The net result, however, of the operations of the 30th to 31st was that
the Japanese took practically everything except the island. On the
night of the 31st, Admiral Ito decided on a torpedo-boat attack. Both
entrances had some boom defence, with gaps here and there. The Japanese
attempted to attack by the east with sixteen boats.
Division I. six boats.
” II. six ”
” III. four ”
The Japanese soldiers in the forts took them for Chinese, so they
retired.
A heavy gale came on next day, and the whole Japanese fleet ran
to shelter at Teng-chow, returning on February 2nd, when another
ineffectual bombardment at 2500 metres took place. An equally
ineffective torpedo attack was tried in the night. It failed, as the
Chinese sighted the boats, and they wisely did not try to force their
way in.
Next day, and the next again, the bombardment was violently renewed,
but on both sides it led to nothing save expenditure of ammunition.
Landings on Leu-Kun tau led to nothing, and the only incident of real
moment was the rushing out of twelve Chinese torpedo boats on the 4th.
Several were sunk as they came out; the rest ran ashore, and were
captured or destroyed. So far as can be gathered, Ting had found his
boats a nuisance, and was in terror of the Japanese boats being allowed
in in mistake for Chinese ones. He also appears to have imagined that a
daylight attack might produce something in his favour; but the balance
of evidence seems to point to the fact that the boats were a nuisance
to him.
Whatever was intended, the Chinese boats made no attack on the Japanese
cruisers; escape was their only objective. Only two succeeded in
getting away.
On the night of the 4th the third torpedo attack was made. The boats
went in in three divisions of four each, though only the second and
third divisions went in—the first being employed to create a diversion
at the western entrance.
The eastern boats crept in slowly, in a cold so intense that an officer
and two men were frozen to death. Two boats (8 and 21), their steersmen
frost-bitten, grounded as they tried to enter.
By four o’clock a boat had got quite near the Chinese, and fired two
torpedoes without result; a second boat was no luckier with three.
Not till then did the Chinese open fire, and this boat ran ashore
immediately afterwards.
[Illustration: CELEBRATING SURRENDER OF THE CHINESE FLEET, AT THE NAVAL
CLUB, TOKIO.]
Two more boats collided in the confusion, another had her boilers
burst, yet another was badly hit. Only one boat came out unscathed. As
mentioned further on in “Personal Characteristics,” the real truth of
the attack has never been known, and never will be, save vaguely.[27]
[27] See this chapter for the reason why.
Its result, however, is well known, the battleship Ting Yuen was hit in
the stern and sank in the mud, where she lay with her upper works above
water and guns still firing.
Throughout the 5th the bombardment continued unabated, and though no
harm was done, the ceaseless worry told heavily on the Chinese.
On the night of the 5th a fourth attack was made by the first division.
It met with little resistance, torpedoed the Lai Yuen and a despatch
vessel, the Wei Yuen, and also hit the Ching Yuen in the bow without
sinking her. The boats met with no defence worth mentioning; the
Chinese look-outs, worn out with the ceaseless bombardments, were
mostly asleep.
On the 6th a landing was effected on Leu-Kun tau, and on the 7th the
usual bombardment continued. The Matsushima, Naniwa, and Yoshino were
hit, but the Chinese lost a magazine, blown up.
On the 9th the Ching Yuen sank, her end being accelerated by a
water-line hit from a shore gun. The Itsukushima was hit on the
water-line this day by a shell from the 12-in. guns of the Chen Yuen,
but the shell failed to burst. On the 10th and 11th the bombardment
still continued. Only one fort now remained to the Chinese, but their
ships still afloat were comparatively little hurt. The moral effect of
the continuous firing finally broke them down, and on the 12th, in the
midst of the firing, a gunboat flying a white flag came out.
The Japanese ceased fire, and the gunboat came to the Matsushima. Two
officers from the Chinese fleet came on board, and delivered a letter
from Admiral Ting to Admiral Ito, suggesting terms of surrender. It
is worthy of note that, so one of the Malsushima’s officers told me,
these two Chinamen, on being taken to the wardroom to await Admiral
Ito’s reply, promptly and instantly fell asleep, and were only awakened
later with the greatest difficulty. They were absolutely worn out. It
is stated, also, that the whole of the beleaguered crews did the same
thing directly firing ceased; want of sleep was, indeed, the immediate
cause of Admiral Ting’s surrender, though, of course, his position was
absolutely hopeless.
Ting surrendered on condition that the lives of his men were spared,
but he and his principal officers committed suicide. The whole of
the defenders were executed by the Chinese at the first available
opportunity.
Japanese naval losses during this affair were officially given as:—
2 officers and 27 men killed.
4 ” ” 32 ” wounded.
On shore the army lost much more heavily, as during the fighting the
entire force occupying one captured fort were destroyed by the Chen
Yuen, which steamed up close to them and opened fire.
[Illustration: [_Official photo._
JAPANESE FLEET BOMBARDING WEI-HAI-WEI DURING THE WAR.]
Chinese losses were never stated, but they are believed to have been
much less than was expected. The entire crews of the Lai Yuen and Wei
Yuen were lost, and most of those in the Ching Yuen.
Wei-hai-wei was won chiefly through sheer human inability to stand
the strain of the everlasting bombardment and torpedo menace. Guns
accomplished practically nothing directly towards it, and even the
torpedo _per se_ was not decisive. The principal factor was Admiral
Ito’s persistent and unremitting attack.
With Wei-hai-wei the war was practically over. The only remaining
incident of note was an attack on Formosa, in which, if all accounts
are true, the Japanese did not shine very greatly, or else there are
problems in war which in peace cannot be conceived. It is stated that
the Japanese began to bombard at 8 a.m. The Chinese had loaded all
guns; they left a few men to fire them, and then retired. Reply ceased
about 8.30, but the Japanese did not, it is said, discover it till
about 2 p.m. An explanation, of course, is that they did not trust the
silence of the forts—which is reasonable enough. That they did not
notice it is the accusation of their critics.
VIII AFTER THE WAR WITH CHINA
Save for a few torpedo boats lost, the war left the Japanese fleet
unimpaired; the ships damaged at Yalu were in trim again when peace was
declared. On the other hand, beyond the Chin Yen, Japan gained little
in the ships she took. The Tche Yuen is of very small fighting value,
the Ping Yuen of none, and none of the gunboats are of any utility. Of
the captured torpedo boats, one was superior to any Japanese boat; the
rest, from long neglect, were in a bad way.
Towards the end of the war the Esmeralda (now Idzumi), already
described, passed from the Chilian to the Japanese Navy, and at its
close the Tatsuta, detained _en route_, proceeded on her way.
Just before war broke out—in May, 1894—the Akaski, a sister to the
Suma, had been laid down at Yokosuka; the two battleships Fuji and
Yashima, of an improved Royal Sovereign type, were progressing in
England, the former at the Thames Ironworks, the latter at Elswick.
[Illustration: SUMA.]
The Suma was launched at Yokosuka on March 9, 1895. Unlike the
Akitsushima and other ships which had preceded her, she is of entirely
Japanese design and workmanship, and nothing more Western than an odd
“stand-by man” or two assisted in her construction. Practically, she is
the first Japanese-built ship. Particulars of her are:—
Displacement 2700 tons.
Material of hull Steel.
Length 305 ft.
Beam 41 ft.
Draught 16⅓ ft.
Armament Two 6-in. Q.F. 45 cals.
Six 4.7-in. Q.F. 45 cals.
Twelve 3-pdr. Q.F.
Four Nordenfelts.
Two torpedo tubes.
Horse-power (forced) 8500.
Boilers Cylindrical.
Number of boilers Eight.
Screws Two.
Type of engines Vertical triple expansion.
Where made Yokosuka.
Trial speed (forced draught) 20 knots.
Coal (normal) 200 tons.
” (maximum capacity) 600 tons.
Nominal radius at that 11,000 miles.
Protection is afforded by a steel deck 2 ins. on the slopes and 1 in.
on the flat.
The Akashi, launched two years later, is a sister, without
fighting-tops and more built-up amidships.
The Yashima was launched at Elswick on February 28, 1896; the Fuji at
the Thames Ironworks on March 31st in the same year. Mr. G. C. Mackrow,
of the Thames Ironworks, was the designer.
The following are particulars:—
Displacement 12450 tons.
Material Steel.
Length between perpendiculars 374 ft.
” over all 400 ft.
Beam 73½ ft.
Draught 30 ft.
Armament Four 12-in. 40 cals.
Ten 6-in. Q.F. 40 cals.
Twenty 3-pdr. Q.F.
Four 2½ pdr. Q.F.
One torpedo tube in bow.
Four broadside tubes (submerged).
Horse-power (natural draught)
on trials (10,000) Fuji, 10200.
Yashima, 9750.
Speed (natural draught) Fuji, 16.8 knots.
Yashima, 17.7 knots.
Horse-power (forced draught)
(14,000) Fuji, 14,100.
Yashima, 14,075.
Speed (forced draught) (contract
18 knots) Fuji, 18.5 knots.
Yashima, 19.2 knots.
Boilers Cylindrical
(with Humphrys’ ferrules).
Engines (by Humphrys and
Tennant) Triple expansion.
Screws Two.
Weight of armour 3000 tons.
Material of armour Harvey steel.
Normal coal 700 tons.
Bunker capacity 1100 tons.
Complement 600.
[Illustration: PLAN OF FUJI AND YASHIMA.]
These ships are, as has been before noted, improved Royal Sovereigns.
As designed, they would have differed from these ships only in that,
being some 1500 tons smaller, they are able to carry less weight
in the way of coal, etc. Their big guns, 12 in. against 13.5 in.,
are lighter, but against this must be put the fact that they carry
heavy shields to them. Further, the introduction of Harvey steel
in the place of compound armour greatly increased the value of
their armour without adding to its weight. Regarded in the light
of present-day developments, they are defective in protection to
the secondary armament nearly as much as the Royal Sovereigns were
before reconstruction. A comparison of the two ships, Fuji and Royal
Sovereign, is of interest.
ROYAL
FUJI. SOVEREIGN.
Guns 4 A (12-in.). 4 A (13.5-in.).
10 D (6-in. Q.F.). 10 D (6-in. Q.F.).
Steel armour deck on slopes 2½ ins. 3 ins.
Belt (water-line) 18-16 ins. 18-8 ins.
Length of belt 226 ft. 250 ft.
Lower deck 4 ins. 4 ins.
Barbettes 14 ins. 17 ins.
Barbette guns Inclined thick No protection.
shields.
Bulkheads 14 ins. 16 ins.
Casemates (main deck),
thickness in front 6 ins. 6 ins.
Casemate backs 2 ins. 2 ins.
Coal carried normally 700. 900.
Capacity 1100. 1450.
The difference in armour value, caused by the introduction of Harvey
process in time to allow of its adoption on the Fuji, is very marked.
Since then, of course, Harvey has given place to Harvey nickel, and
this in its turn to Krupp process armour, of which 9 ins. would nearly
equal 17 ins. of Royal Sovereign armour. But their fine 12-in. guns, as
powerful still as any afloat, keep the Fuji class still in the ranks of
good fighting ships.
[Illustration: FUJI.]
[Illustration: PLAN OF SHIKISHIMA.]
In appearance the two ships are almost identical, the only difference
being in the arrangement of the ventilators.
Between them, however, an important difference exists; the Yashima has
her dead wood cut away aft, while the Fugi has not. Consequently, the
Yashima is much the handier vessel, but, in part from the fact that
she was the first ship to have the dead wood aft cut away, in part
from inherent weaknesses thereby engendered, the Fuji is regarded as
the better ship of the two. The Yashima, being docked without proper
precautions suitable to the case, exhibited some dropping aft, in
consequence of the effect of the unsupported weight. This led to such
sterns being countermanded for subsequent Japanese battleships, though
in cruisers it is always applied. The turning circle of the Yoshima, it
may be mentioned, is extremely small.
Finally, it may be noted that these two ships were the first to be
fitted with the Elswick submerged torpedo tube. They have the earliest
pattern, and it will not deliver torpedoes very successfully when the
ship is at high speed.
THE “AFTER-THE-WAR PROGRAMME.”
After the war Japan decided to have a really first-class modern fleet
of four battleships, six cruisers, and a proportionate number of
smaller craft.
[Illustration: [_Photo, Symonds_.
HATSUSE.]
The four big battleships are practically sisters, though differing in
appearance and detail. The main differences are as follows:—
FUNNELS.
Shikishima 3
Hatsuse 3
Asahi 2
Mikasa 2
Little differences in rig have been purposely introduced; thus the
Hatsuse is shorter-masted than the Shikishima, and the Asahi and Mikasa
have their funnels differently placed, those of the latter being more
amidships.
Also, instead of casemates, the Mikasa has her 6-in. battery protected
by a continuous armoured wall. Essentially, however, the ships are
sisters.
They were produced as follows:—
Shikishima, by Thames Ironworks, launched 1898.
Asahi, ” Clydebank, ” 1899.
Hatsuse, ” Elswick, ” 1899.
Mikasa, ” Vickers-Maxim, ” 1900.
Although she differs considerably from the Shikishima in appearance,
the Asahi is practically a sister ship, the sole points of difference
being (1) funnels; (2) distribution of the 2½-pounders; (3) absence
of a bow torpedo boat; and (4) mounting of the big guns. There are,
of course, certain minor structural differences—such, for instance,
as the fact that the Asahi has a slightly larger wardroom, and that
this wardroom is a trifle further aft—but, generally speaking, for
fighting purposes they are identical, save for the points of difference
noted above. There are unseen differences of detail also, such as the
thickness of the armour deck, but none of these affect the fighting
value. There is a difference, too, in the coal carried, but coal
capacity does not show to the eye.
The details of the Asahi, with those of the Shikishima and the British
Formidable, are as follows:—
------------------------+-------------+-------------+--------------+
| Asahi. | Shikishima.| Formidable. |
------------------------+-------------+-------------+--------------+
Displacement | 15,200 | 14,850 | 15,000 |
Material of hull | steel | steel | steel |
Length | 400 ft. | 400 ft. | 400 ft. |
Beam | 75⅙ ft. | 75½ ft. | 75 ft. |
Draught | 27½ ft. | 27¼ ft. | 26¾ ft. |
Guns--12-in. Four 12-in. Mark IX. for all |
6-in. | 14 | 14 | 12 |
3-in. | 20 | 20 | 16 |
------------------------+-------------+-------------+--------------+
| Six 3-pdrs. | Six 3-pdrs. |Twelve 3-pdrs.|
Smaller | Six 2½-pdrs.| Six 2½-pdrs.| Eight Maxims |
| Eight Maxims| Eight Maxims| |
------------------------+-------------+-------------+--------------+
Torpedo tubes, submerged| 4 | 4 | 4 |
” above water | 0 | 1 | 0 |
Armour belt | 9 ins. | 9 ins. | 9 ins. |
” at ends | 4½ ins. | 4½ ins. | 3 ins. |
” deck | 4 ins. | 5 ins. | 3 ins. |
Lower deck | 6 ins. | 6 ins. | 9 ins. |
Casemates | 6 ins. | 6 ins. | 6 ins. |
Barbettes | 14 ins. | 14 ins.| 12 ins. |
Bulkheads | 14 ins. | 14 ins.| 12 ins. |
Armour material | Harvey nickel, all three |
I.H.P., forced | 15,000 | 14,500 | 15,000 |
Boilers | Belleville, all three |
Speed (contract) | 18 | 18.5 | 18 |
Coal (normal) | (?) 1,400 | 700 | 900 |
Screws | Two in all three |
------------------------+------------------------------------------+
[Illustration: PLAN OF MIKASA.]
There is some doubt about the Asahi’s coal, 1400 tons may be the
maximum and 700 the normal. Japanese ships do not need to carry much
coal, being designed to operate in waters where friendly coal stations
are numerous. True, ships thus kept short are likely to be out of
action because they are coaling, about once a week; but, on the other
hand, as they get two extra 6-in. quickfirers and four 12-pounders
for this sacrifice, they are rather envied by our naval officers.
After all, the primary duty of a battleship is to hit the enemy hard,
and an extra 6-in. in the broadside is no mean advantage. There are
other incidental advantages too—a single 6-in. shell would put all the
eight 12-pounders out of action on the upper deck of the Formidable,
while, thanks to the casemates acting as screens, the Asahi could only
lose four of her 3-in. by a single shell. In the placing of her 3-in.
guns she is altogether better off than the Formidable, the sole point
in which the British ship is superior being the four guns carried
on the main deck forward. The Formidable can fight all these on the
broadsides; it is doubtful if the Asahi could, because of the blast
from the big guns firing above them. But _per contra_ she has her other
3-in. quickfirers much better placed; they are more distributed.
The positions of these are: four on the main deck forward; four on
the main deck aft; four on the upper deck amidships; two on top of
the forward upper deck casemates; two beside the fore conning-tower;
and four beside the after conning-tower—a total of twenty. Those of
the Shikishima are placed in exactly the same fashion. Those of the
Formidable are: four on main deck forward (extreme bow); four on main
deck aft; and eight on upper deck amidships; a total of sixteen. Three
units instead of six; or, to put it another way, work for only three
shells instead of six shells.
The Asahi is an improvement on the Shikishima in the matter of the
2½-pounders—a very small detail. In the Shikishima these are grouped
on top of the amidship upper-deck casemates; in the Asahi only two are
over these casemates, the other four being distributed, a couple on
each bridge. Two theories are at work here, and it will need a war to
say which is the better. In the Shikishima it is easy to concentrate
three 2½-pounders on a single torpedo boat or portion of a big enemy,
while, as a price for this, they are at the mercy of a single shell.
Those of the Asahi are not thus at the mercy of one shell, but it will
be far less easy to concentrate them.
The next point of difference between the Shikishima and the Asahi is
that the former carries a bow above-water torpedo tube, with 6-in.
Harvey nickel protection to it. This tube, similarly protected, is in
the Fuji, Yashima, Asama, Tokiwa, and Yakumo. After some experiments
and practice the Japanese authorities decided that this tube was of no
use practically, and decreed its abolition. That of the Shikishima had,
however, already been built in, so this ship has it. In the Asahi the
design was modified, and the bow tube dropped out. It is absent also in
the Hatsuse, a sister, and in the Iwate and Idzumo.
Under certain circumstances such a tube might be of great use in
action—for instance, approaching an enemy who presented his broadside
while the ship possessing the tube wished to make a feint to close. But
to use it it would be necessary to slow down or reverse engines—both
things that might be awkward to do in an action. Still, the real
objection does not lie there, so much as in the trouble with sea that
a bow tube causes. Bow guns, even high up, are always liable to get
“washed out,” a bow torpedo tube is still more likely to be so. In
addition to this, it raises an unnecessary large bow wave.
In comparison with the Formidable, the Asahi and Shikishima have—beside
the 6-in. and 3-in. guns—other points of distinct difference. They
have (1) complete instead of partial belts; (2) 6-in. instead of 9-in.
armour protecting the lower deck; (3) much higher barbettes; and (4)
quite differently shaped hoods to the big guns.
Of these differences the armour one is of no immediate moment at
present. The Asahi, in the matter of armour, is practically a Majestic
with 3-in. stripped off the lower deck amidships and disposed on the
ends plus some extra armour paid for in the weight of coal carried.
Now, the 6-in. lower deck armour of the Asahi is proof against any
6-in. projectile at any range, and though a steel-pointed 9.2-in.
common shell has been through 6-in. Harvey nickel at Whale Island,
this is probably an isolated proving-ground case, and nothing but an
armour-piercing shell of large calibre is ever likely to get through
such armour in actual warfare. Also it is at least doubtful whether
such a shell would do more harm than a solid shot, and against a 12-in.
solid shot 9-in. armour is no more protection than 6-in. In either
case the shot will go through and dance about inside, and it is this
“dancing about” that makes shot dangerous, and all armour save the very
best a snare and a delusion so far as solid projectiles are concerned.
However, medium armour is imperatively needed to keep off shells,
for it is good-bye to any ship inside of which a big common shell is
comfortably planted. The Admiral class, for instance, would do no more
fighting once a big common shell got them amidships.
[Illustration: [_Photo, West._ MIKASA.]
As for the complete belt, the Formidable, of course, has something
on the bow, and this may be considered proof against 6-in. shell in
action, save at short range. It is, at any rate, proof against the
deadly little shell from 12-pounders and the like. As for any 6-in.
shot—well, very few 6-in. shot are carried in any ship, and holes made
by them are easily plugged.
The real gain of the Asahi is the extra gun-power, but since it is held
essential that British ships shall have a large coal supply, it is
useless to decry the Formidable over the two missing 6-in. guns. The
defect of the Formidable, and one that might have been remedied, is the
position of the 12-pounders. These could and should have been either
more distributed, or else placed right up above everything and clear of
everything, much as the French place their 4-in. quickfirers. Such a
gun is extremely unlikely to be actually hit, whereas if it is crowded
about with bulwarks, boats, and so on, a shell coming anywhere near is
bound to burst with devastating effect.
In appearance it is difficult to tell the Asahi from our Canopus class,
save for colour. A critical eye could detect the much higher barbettes
of the Japanese vessel and their different shape, but that is about
all, for the extra casemate would hardly be visible at any appreciable
distance. Like the Canopus class, the Asahi has the huge after funnel,
and the resemblance is increased by the tautness of her masts. The sign
manual of a British man-of-war is the rake forward of the top masts, in
the smartest Channel Fleet ships this is most noticeable; but the Asahi
also is taut.
The Asahi has a slight sheer forward, like all our new ships, in
consequence of which, though both pairs of guns are at the same height
above the water, the after barbette looks a good deal higher than the
fore one. The shields are peculiar. The plan gives a general idea of
their appearance—sloping fronts but straight sides. The British pattern
slopes all round, and is generally more squat—and of the two is more
favourably regarded afloat. If by any off chance a big shot hit the
side of the Asahi shield it would get through, from the inclined sides
of the British pattern it would rebound at any range. However, a shot
is very unlikely to hit the sides of the shield, and probably the mere
shock of a big projectile would effectually displace everything and put
the turret out of action. Wherever a big projectile hits it must do
some harm, whether it gets through or not, and the old American idea of
battering in preference to penetration is not so unsound as many folk
are now disposed to regard it. Especially must this be so with certain
foreign-built ships; the least little thing wrong and the colossal blow
will find it out.
The guns and mountings of the Asahi are from Elswick. They embody some
slight improvements upon those of the Shikishima, but are on exactly
the same general principle. The 12-in. can easily do a round a minute,
and should be able to do a round every two minutes in action. The rate
of the 12.5-in. Canet gun at Yalu was one round per sixty minutes, but
there were special circumstances involved. Still, there is no doubt
that big guns have made enormous strides towards quick-fire in the last
year or two, and two of the Asahi or Formidable 12-in. are equal to
three of those in the Majestic probably.
The Asahi is fitted with the Barr and Stroud transmitters, each
casemate having an indicator—in English and Japanese—to give the range
automatically from the conning-tower. The official British view is
against these transmitters, on the grounds that action will derange
them; but there is no getting away from the fact that, even so, till
deranged they will be exceedingly useful. Our methods of passing the
range are cumbersome, and, in addition, by the time it is passed it has
probably altered. Moreover, gunnery is not so much a matter of good
shooting as knowing the range; the wrong range given accounts for most
misses—at any rate, in the British Navy.
All the hoists in the Asahi are electrical, with auxiliary hand-power
in case of need.
All the ships have twenty-five Belleville boilers each, fitted with
economisers.
Full-speed trial results were:—
Shikishima 6 hours 16,370 = 18.78 knots.
Asahi 6 ” 16,360 = 18.3 ”
Hatsuse 6 ” 16,117 = 19.11 ” (maximum).
Mikasa 6 ” 16,400 = 18.6 ”
[Illustration: [_Photo, Elswick._ IDZUMO.]
ARMOURED CRUISERS
The armoured cruisers are of two classes. The first comprises the
British (Elswick) built Asama, Tokiwa, Idzumo, Iwate; the second the
Stettin-built Yakumo, and the St. Nazaire-built Azuma.
These last were the original Japanese design; Elswick put the extra
guns at its own discretion, and rearranged the positions as the plans
indicate.
Particulars are:—
ASAMA TYPE. AZUMA TYPE.
Displacement 9750. 9436.
Length 408 ft. 446 ft.
Beam 67 ft. 59 ft.
Draught (mean) 24¼ ft. 24½ ft.
Guns Four 8-in. Four 8-in.
Fourteen 6-in. Twelve 6-in.
Twelve 3-in. Twelve 3-in.
Seven 2½-pdrs. Twelve 1-pdrs., etc.
Torpedo tubes (submerged) Four. Four.
” ” (above water) One.[28] One.
[28] Not in Iwate and Idzumo.
All six have four of the 6-in. guns unprotected, the other 6-in. and
the 8-in. guns are in casemates and turrets (for the 8-in.).
All have 7-in. belts reduced to 3½ ins. forward, with 5-in. armour on
the lower deck side. Their decks reinforce the belts.
[Illustration: PLAN OF THE ASAMA.]
[Illustration: [_Photo, Steinitz._ YAKUMO.]
The Iwate, Idzumo, Azuma, and Yakumo have Belleville boilers, the other
two cylindrical. The type ship had very high horse-power; in the later
vessels this was reduced, and the saving effected spent in substituting
Krupp process armour for Harvey nickel on the sides.
Trial (full-speed) results were:—
Designed Indicated Trial
speed. horse-power. result.
Asama 22 knots 19,000 = 22 knots.
Tokiwa ” (?) = 22.7 ”
Idzumo 20.75 knots 15,739 = 22.04 ”
Iwate ” (?) = 21.8 ”
Yakumo 20 knots 15,500 = 20.7 ”
Azuma 21 knots 18,000 = 21 ”
The first two have a pair of funnels only.
The ships are very good ones, equal in many ways to second-class
battleships, but not calculated to stand battleship fire, I fancy.
The Kasuga and Nisshin were launched for Argentina in 1902 and 1903
respectively, by Messrs. Ansalds, of Genoa, Italy. They were purchased
by Japan immediately before the war with Russia.
Details are—
Displacement 7700 tons.
Length 357 ft.
Beam 61½ ft.
Draught (mean) 23 ft.
Guns (in Kasuga) One 10-in. 45 cals.
Two 8-in. 45 cals.
” (in Nisshin) Four 8-in. 45 cals.
The secondary armament
is in both Fourteen 6-in. 45 cals.
Ten 12-pdrs.
2 Maxims.
Two field-guns.
Torpedo tubes Four (above water).
Designed horse-power 13,500.
Speed 20 knots.
Coal (normal) 650 tons.
” (maximum) 1100 tons.
Boilers Cylindrical.
[Illustration: AZUMA.]
[Illustration: [_Photo by favour of C. de Grave Sells, Esq._
NISSHIN.]
These ships belong to the well-known Garibaldi class. The belt is 6-in.
Terni armour reduced to 4½ ins. at the ends, and reinforced by a deck
1½ in. on the slopes.
Above the main belt is a 6-in. redoubt, with 4¾ in. ends, above again a
6-in. battery containing ten 6-in. guns.
The primary guns are protected by 5½-in. armour.
The remaining 6-in. guns are carried without protection on the upper
deck. Six 12-pounders are carried between them, the remainder under the
poop and forecastle.
The torpedo tubes are in special casements.
The ships originally had a single military mast, but just before
completion the fighting-tops were removed.
They are the heaviest-armed armoured cruisers of their size in the
world. Compared to the Russian Bayan, of about the same displacement,
this superiority is manifest.
NISSHIN. KASUGA. BAYAN.
Four 8-in. One 10-in. Two 8-in.
Fourteen 6-in. Two 8-in. Eight 6-in.
Ten 12-pdrs. Fourteen 6-in. Twenty 12-pdrs.
Ten 12-pdrs.
[Illustration: NISSHIN AND KASUGA.
(_Nisshin has two 8-in. in forward turret where Kasuga has a single
10-in. The fighting-tops were removed on completion._)]
[Illustration: [_Photo by favour of C. de Grave Sells, Esq._
KASUGA.]
The Bayan is the product of La Seyne. She is somewhat faster, better
protected by 2 ins. on the water-line, but less protected on the guns,
and with only half as many. She would take more punishment than the
Nisshin and Kasuga; but, given equal crews and tactics, the heavy fire
of the Nisshin type would seem to convey an immense advantage.
PROTECTED CRUISERS
The three ships Takasago, Kasagi, and Chitose, are slightly improved
editions of the Yoshino already described. The first was built at
Elswick, the other two in America.
There are slight differences in dimensions, otherwise the description
of the Yoshino stands for them. The armament is not quite the same as
in the Yoshino, as these three later vessels carry two 8-in. guns in
heavy turrets, ten 4.7’s on the broadsides, and 12-pounders instead of
6-pounders.
They are very fast, but the heavy gun turret forward does not improve
their behaviour at sea. _Per contra_, the 8-in. guns give them the
power to deal a knock-out blow to other cruisers of their size; so
their value depends on whether scouting or fighting is the more
important _métier_ for a second-class cruiser. The Yoshino type is
intended to be both, and the Yoshino herself in a great measure is; the
others are too heavily armed to be ideal scouts.
The Niitaka and Tsushima were launched in 1902. A sister, the Otawa,
was laid down in 1903. They are improved Sumas, and entirely of
Japanese design and construction.
[Illustration: KASAGI.]
[Illustration: TAKASAGO.]
Particulars are:—
Displacement 3420 tons.
Length 334½ ft.
Beam 44 ft.
Draught 16½ ft.
Guns Six 6-in.
Ten 12-pdrs.
Four 2½-pdrs.
Machinery Two sets triple expansion.
Screws Two.
Designed I.H.P. 9500.
Speed 20 knots.
Coal (maximum capacity) 600 tons.
A 2½-in. steel deck protects the vitals.
The ships embody no novelty, except in the selection of armament. The
Suma’s 4.7’s disappear, and 6-in. and 12-pounders take their place.
[Illustration: PLAN OF NIITAKA.]
TORPEDO GUNBOATS
The Miyako was launched in 1897.
Details are:—
Displacement 1800 tons.
Length 304 ft.
Beam 35 ft.
Draught (mean) 13 ft.
Armament Two 4.7-in.
Eight 3-pdrs.
Indicated horse-power 6130.
Speed 20 knots.
Coal 400 tons.
Boilers Cylindrical.
Complement 220.
The Chihaya was launched in 1901.
Details are:—
Displacement 850 tons.
Length 314¾ ft.
Beam 36 ft.
Draught 13 ft.
Armament Two 4.7-in.
Four 12-pdrs.
Three torpedo tubes.
Indicated horse-power 6000.
Speed 21 knots.
Coal 250 tons.
Boilers Cylindrical.
There is no armour protection.
[Illustration: MIYAKO.]
[Illustration: CHIHAYA.]
DESTROYERS
Japan has selected two types of destroyers, the Yarrow and the
Thornycroft. The Thornycroft boats are practically replicas of similar
boats in the British Navy, and the Yarrow boats do not greatly differ,
except that they have the usual Yarrow stern.
Details will be found in the Appendix.
The feature of most interest concerns the disposition of the guns—the
12-pounder being carried aft instead of forward. This is a preferable
system to the usual one of the 12-pounder forward, as the bow is thus
less weighted down.
Mention may also be made of the fact that a railway is fitted on deck
for the conveyance of torpedoes. This is convenient, but the raised
rails are apt to get in the way of the crew a good deal.
In the war with Russia the Japanese destroyers appear to have stood the
strains to which they have been subjected remarkably well, and no cases
of “broken backs” and similar catastrophies which had been foretold
seem to have occurred.
TORPEDO BOATS
Till recently, the fastest Japanese torpedo boat was one captured
from the Chinese at Wei-hai-wei. Some very fast boats were built
in the period 1898-1901, the types being Normand and Yarrow (Viper
type), mostly the former. Details will be found in the Appendix. Some
recent boats reached 29 knots on trial, and they are practically small
destroyers.
The early Japanese torpedo boats were of the “second-class” variety,
usually of the Normand or some similar French type, and the boats which
sealed the fate of the Chinese Fleet at Wei-hai-wei were mostly of this
pattern.
[Illustration: THE FIRST TORPEDO BOAT BUILT IN JAPAN.
(Nos. 5-19 are of this type.)]
SUBMARINES
Japan had no submarines when the war with Russia broke out, but orders
for an experimental Holland type boat are said to have been placed.
IX THE NEW PROGRAMME
The new programme began, in 1904, with the ordering of two 16,400-ton
battleships at Elswick and Barrow respectively. They have been named
Kashima and Katori.
The following description of the Elswick battleship appeared in the
_Engineer_:—
Her length on the water-line is 455 ft.; her breadth, 78 ft. 2 ins.;
her draught, 26 ft. 7½ ins.; and her displacement, in tons, 16,400;
and she will carry for her armament four 12-in. guns, twin mounted in
barbettes; four 10-in. guns, mounted singly in barbettes; twelve 6-in.
guns in the citadel; twelve 12-pounder guns; six Maxim guns; three
3-pounder guns; and five torpedo tubes. The plan shows the disposition
of the above-named armament, the arrangement of which has been most
carefully considered, so that there is no interference with one another
in the firing of the different guns, which, however, are all capable of
being trained through large arcs. The 12-in. guns are 26 ft., and the
10-in. 22 ft., above the water-line. The 6-in. guns in the battery are
from 13 ft. to 14 ft. above the water-line.
The general disposition of the armour protection is that adopted in
the latest and most powerful battleships, the armour amidships being
carried from below the water-line right up to the upper deck. Above
the level of the upper deck additional protection has been adopted, a
4-in. screen being worked to a height of 7 ft. 6 ins. above the upper
deck, and extending between the 10-in. gun positions. The main armour
belt, which extends the whole length of the vessel, has a thickness of
9 ins. for more than half its length, tapering to rather less at the
extremities. The depth of this belt is from 5 ft. below water to 2 ft.
6 ins. above water. Immediately above this is a belt of 6-in. armour,
extending in length from the after 12-in. barbette right forward to
the stem. Above this again is the 6-in. citadel armour carried to the
height of the upper deck, and enclosing the two 12-in. barbettes. In
this citadel are placed ten of the 6-in. guns, divided from one another
by screens of 80-lb. armour plating, and firing through ports similar
to those adopted in casemates. This citadel arrangement, which is one
of the most important features of this and other recent battleships,
is really a revival or development of the old box battery arrangement
adopted in some of our battleships built in the seventies, such as
the Shannon and Alexandra. This arrangement fell into disuse when
the great improvement made in ordnance—which for a time kept so far
ahead of the improvements in armour—made it necessary to increase the
thickness of the armour to make it efficient, and therefore it was only
possible to cover a comparatively small area of the vessel’s side.
However, the recent improvements in armour have been such that again
comparatively thin armour is efficient in keeping out projectiles,
which has once more made it possible to protect a greater area of side.
In more recent years the same system with protective divisions between
the guns in the battery was adopted in the Nile and Trafalgar, but as
the 4-in. armour protecting the battery of each of these vessels was
not of a quality to keep out even the smaller armour-piercing shell,
the system was not repeated until the latest and most improved armour
was adopted in such vessels as our King Edward VII. class, and in the
much-talked-of Swiftsure and Triumph. The remaining two 6-in. guns fire
through similar ports in the 4-in. screen armour on the upper deck
amidships. The barbette armour of the 12-in. guns is 9 ins. thick on
the upper portions where exposed, and 5 ins. thick where protection is
afforded by the citadel armour. The barbette armour of the 10-in. guns
has a thickness of 6 ins., the conning-tower armour is 9 ins. thick,
and the observer tower 5 ins. thick. In addition to these two armoured
positions for commanding officers, three officers’ shelters are to be
built of 3-in. armour, one above the conning-tower and one on each
side. Besides the armour described above, a steel protective deck runs
throughout the entire length of the vessel, the whole of the machinery,
magazines, etc., being kept below. This protective deck has a thickness
of 2 ins. on the flat portions amidships, and 3 ins. on the sloping
sides, which are carried down to meet the bottom of the main armour
belt. At the ends where the armour protection is reduced, this deck
has a thickness of 2½ ins. all over. Thick protective plating is also
worked on the top of the screen armour at the boat deck level.
[Illustration]
Special attention has been paid to the arrangement and disposition
of the magazines, so that the ammunition can be got to all the guns
with the greatest speed and minimum of trouble. There are independent
magazines for each pair of 12-in. guns, and for each 10-in. gun, and an
ammunition passage is provided running right round the machinery spaces
below the protective deck for the supply of ammunition to the various
6-in. and smaller quickfiring guns. The torpedo tubes are situated
in watertight chambers—two tubes forward and two aft firing on the
broadsides, and one tube firing right astern, also under water. Special
means are provided for rapidly clearing water from these submerged
torpedo-rooms in case of emergency.
The general particulars of the main propelling machinery and boilers
are as follows: There are twenty Niclausse boilers disposed in three
separate boiler-rooms. These boilers will have a working pressure of
230 lbs., and a grate surface of 1300 sq. ft., and a heating surface
of 43,000 sq. ft. The twin engines will have four cylinders each, of
36 ins., 56 ins., 63 ins., and 63 ins., with a stroke of 48 ins., and
the horse-power will be sufficient to give a speed of at least 18½
knots. The coal bunkers are so arranged as to reinforce the protection
given by the armour and protective deck to the engines and boilers,
whilst their disposition is such as to require very little trimming to
get the coal to the furnaces. The bulk of the coal can also be got to
the stokeholds without opening any of the doors in the main watertight
bulkheads—a point of very great importance when the vessel is in
action. In addition to the coal bunkers below the protective deck,
reserve bunkers are arranged on the slopes of the protective deck up
to the height of the main deck over the length of the machinery spaces
amidships, the total capacity being approximately 2000 tons, which is
sufficient to give the vessel a very large radius of action.
A very complete outfit is being provided for the vessel, including the
following boats: Two 56-ft. vedette torpedo boats of high speed, one
36-ft. steam pinnace, one 40-ft. launch, one 32-ft. pinnace, three
30-ft. cutters, two 30-ft. gigs. For lifting these boats two powerful
electrically worked derricks are provided—one on each side of the
vessel.
There is also a powerful electrical equipment, both for providing
energy for the numerous machines on board, and also for lighting.
The latter will include provision for six searchlights and some 1250
incandescent lamps.
The equipment of anchors and cables includes three stockless bower
anchors of 120 cwt. each, and other smaller anchors. There are also
three main cables of 150 fathoms each of 2⅝ ins. stud chain.
The vessel being of such an immense weight—over 17,000 tons with her
full equipment of coal, stores, etc.—special arrangements have been
provided for docking her with safety, and, in addition to shoring
ribbands for giving special support to the armour in dock, two docking
keels are provided on the flat portions of the bottom under the bilges
amidships. These keels will rest on separate lines of blocks in the
dock, as well as the usual blocks along the middle line of the vessel.
Bilge keels are also provided to reduce rolling in a seaway.
The watertight subdivision of the vessel is of a most thorough
description; the inner bottom extends over the whole length of the
vessel, and is minutely subdivided, and above this the number of
transverse and longitudinal watertight bulkheads is too numerous to
mention.
An elaborate system of pumping and draining has been worked out, and
in addition to the main pumps in the engine-rooms, which can be used
in case of emergency for dealing with a large inrush of water, are two
9-in. pumps, two 5½-in., and one 4½-in., besides pumps for fresh and
salt water services.
In a vessel of this description the ventilation arrangements are not
the least important of the many items which have to be thought out,
and every precaution has been taken for efficiently ventilating spaces
both above and below the protective deck. In addition to the natural
ventilation, artificial means have to be largely adopted, even in
the upper portions of the vessel where she is entirely enclosed in
with armour and protective plating, and here, as well as below the
protective deck, numerous electrical fans, with air trunks, branches,
pipes, etc., are being provided for.
Two complete sets of steering engines, independent of one another
and in separate watertight compartments, are fitted, with steering
positions both forward and aft. Hand gear is also provided, and
appliances for changing as quickly as possible from hand to steam
gear, and _vice versâ_. Tiller indicators are fitted in all the
steering and conning-tower positions. Helm signals are provided for
the purpose of communicating the position of the helm to other vessels
in the neighbourhood. Voice-pipes, telegraphs, and telephones are
fitted throughout the vessel to communicate between all the important
positions. The vessel is also to be supplied with a wireless telegraphy
installation. Torpedo net defence is to be fitted around the greater
part of the vessel, which, in view of recent experience, appears to be
not an unnecessary precaution.
With the exception of the main propelling machinery and boilers, which
are being supplied by Messrs. Humphrys, Tennant and Co., the whole of
the ship, with armour, armament, fittings, etc., will be supplied by
Sir W. G. Armstrong, Whitworth and Co., Limited.
The 12-in. guns will weigh approximately 59 tons each. The length is 46
ft. 9½ ins. (46.7 calibres). The weight of the projectile is 850 lbs.
The charge will be cordite, probably of the modified type. The exact
weight of the charge is not yet fixed, and neither can the velocity be
given, but these guns will be the most powerful 12-in. guns which have
yet been constructed. No armour which any ship can carry can hope to
cope with their penetrating powers at 3000 yards. The breech-screw is
arranged for a parallel motion, which obviates the necessity of having
a steep cone at the seating of the obturating pad. It is yet early to
speak of the rapidity of fire to be obtained with these guns, but it
is anticipated that, in conjunction with the mounting described, the
hitherto obtained rate of approximately two rounds per minute from each
gun will be exceeded.
The 10-in. guns will weigh approximately 34 tons each. The length is
39 ft. (46.76 calibres). The weight of the projectile is 500 lbs. The
charge will be cordite, probably of the modified type. As in the 12-in.
guns, the exact weight of the charge has yet to be fixed, but here
again this will be the most powerful gun of its calibre in existence.
As a gauge of the power of these guns, it may be noticed that their
penetrating power is equal to the penetrating power at 3000 yards
of any of the 12-in. guns at present afloat in any navy. The breech
mechanism will be somewhat similar in design to that of the 12-in., and
will embody all the essential advantages of that design. The rapidity
of fire of these guns on the Elswick mounting it is anticipated will
at least be at the rate of three rounds per minute with a well-drilled
gun’s crew.
The 6-in. guns will weigh approximately 8½ tons. The length is 23 ft. 6
ins. approximately (47 calibres). The weight of the projectile is 100
lbs. The charge will be probably M.D. cordite; but here again this is
not definitely fixed, but these guns will be the most powerful guns
of their description made, having a penetrating power at 3000 yards
equal to, if not exceeding, any 6-in. guns hitherto built. The breech
mechanism will be of the Elswick modified coned type, actuated by the
single motion of the lever, and, as in the other gun, the necessity for
the steep-coned obturator is obviated. The exact type of the smaller
guns is not yet settled, but they will also follow the general advances
in power and efficiency noted in the case of the heavier armaments.
12-IN. GUN MOUNTINGS.
The 12-in. guns are mounted forward and aft on the midship line, as
shown in the sketch on the ship. Owing to the powerful nature of the
guns, these mountings are necessarily stronger than any hitherto
manufactured in this or any other country. The design is arranged
with a view to occupying the least possible space in the ship, and,
at the same time, to give ample room for working the machinery. The
general features of the design are the turn-table proper containing
the mountings for the gun, the working chamber underneath into
which the ammunition is received from the magazine and shell-rooms
in preparation for sending up into the secondary or loading hoist,
the trunk connecting the working chamber with the magazines and
shell-rooms, and the hoist connecting the working chamber and the gun.
This latter hoist is so arranged that a gun can be loaded at any angle
of elevation or training. The charge for each gun, consisting of the
projectile and the cordite charge, the latter in two halves, is brought
up at one time in a loading cage, which is automatically stopped in its
proper position in line with the breech opening of the gun. It is then
rammed home by means of a chain rammer actuated by a hydraulic motor.
The breech-block of the gun is opened or closed by a hydraulic motor,
thus enabling this operation to be performed with great rapidity. In
the working chamber, by an ingenious arrangement, the projectile and
the two halves of the cordite charge are simultaneously transferred
from the cage which works in the trunk connecting the shell-rooms and
magazines with the working chamber, to the cage working in the hoist
connecting the working chamber with the gun position. The ammunition
trunk is of a new design, which enables the ammunition cage always to
come to the same position in the magazines and shell-rooms; but when
it is brought up to the top of the trunk the cage is in its proper
position with respect to the ammunition loading hoist, although the
turret may be revolving at a quick rate; or, in other words, the
ammunition trunk does not revolve at the bottom, but revolves with the
turn-table at the top. The guns are protected by 10-in. hard armour in
the front, and 8-in. at the sides and back. The feature of the turret
is that it is quite balanced, thus enabling it to be readily trained by
hand, although the ship may have a heel at the time.
There are three systems for performing the operation of training,
primarily by hydraulic power, and should this fail through any of the
piping being shot away, electric training gear can be quickly put into
operation; and finally, should this be disabled, the turret can be
trained by hand. Similarly the operation of elevating and depressing
the gun can be performed by working primarily by hydraulic power, and
then either by electric or hand. The operations of loading can also be
performed by hand should the hydraulic system be disabled. To safeguard
against accident by freezing in the intense cold which is found in
the China seas during the winter months, heating apparatus is fitted
throughout the turret installation. The gun mountings are so arranged
as to give the gun 18 deg. elevation and 3 deg. depression, a greater
range of elevation than has hitherto been provided for mountings of
this description. The training angle is arranged for 270 deg., that is
to say, from right ahead or right astern to 45 deg. before or abaft the
beam. The turret can be trained at the rate of one complete revolution
(viz. 360 deg.) per minute. In the shell-room, suitable overhead
hydraulic lifting and traversing arrangements are made for lifting the
shell out of the bays and placing them in the cage, but this operation
can also be done by hand should necessity require it.
The sighting of the guns is provided for by a central sighting station
and two side sighting stations, one on the left and the other on
the right. By an ingenious arrangement the captain of the turret is
enabled by working one lever to train or elevate the gun or to perform
both these motions at the same time. Voice-pipes and other apparatus
are fitted to enable the officer in charge of the turret to communicate
his orders to the magazines and shell-rooms. A complete system of
electric circuits enables the guns to be fired from any one of the
eight positions either simultaneously or independently. Percussion
firing arrangements are also provided.
10-IN. GUN MOUNTINGS.
Each 10-in. gun is placed in an armoured revolving gun-house, or
turret. The ammunition is sent up in a lifting cage from the magazine
and shell-room direct to the gun platform, each cage containing a
projectile and cordite charge in two parts. On reaching the gun
platform the projectile is quickly transferred to a hinged loading
tray fixed on the gun-cradle by means of an intermediate resting
tray, the cordite being transferred by hand to the loading tray. By
this arrangement three projectiles are always in waiting for loading,
ensuring rapidity of fire. The projectile and charges can then be
rammed into the gun by a telescopic hydraulic rammer. This rammer is
arranged to follow the gun in elevation or depression, so that it
always remains in line with the gun axis, enabling the operation of
loading to take place at any angle within the usual fighting limits.
The training of the gun-house is performed as in the case of the
12-in., primarily by hydraulic power; then by electric, and finally,
if necessity occasions it, by hand, and, like the larger mounting, it
is balanced so that the operation of training by hand can be readily
performed although the ship may have a heel. The breech-block of
the gun is arranged to be operated either by hydraulic power or by
hand. The gun can be elevated by hydraulic power as in the 12-in.
The operations of training and elevating are performed by the single
motion of a lever. These guns also have the large range in elevation of
18 deg., with 3 deg. depression. The sighting of the gun is provided
for by two positions, placed on the right and the left of the gun
respectively. A complete set of electric firing circuits is fitted to
enable the gun to be fired from either of these positions. Percussion
firing gear is also provided. The guns are protected in front by 9 ins.
of hard armour, and on the sides and back 6 ins. The training angle is
from right ahead to 30 deg. before or abaft the beam, or a total angle
of 120 deg.
6-IN. GUN MOUNTINGS.
The 6-in. guns are mounted on the well-known central pivot principle.
This principle was first introduced by Sir W. G. Armstrong, Whitworth
and Co., and has since been adopted for mounting guns of medium
calibre by all the Governments and armament constructors in the world.
Briefly, to describe this system, it may be said that the gun is
mounted in a cradle in which it recoils, the recoil being absorbed by
an oil buffer attached to it forming a part of the cradle, the piston
of which is attached to the gun. The cradle is mounted by means of
trunnions on a Y piece, which revolves on hard steel balls placed on
a fixed pedestal. This pedestal is bolted to the ship’s structure,
the elevating arrangements are attached to the cradle, thus enabling
the elevating gun number to work the gear even during the firing of
the gun without injury to himself. Telescopic sights are fitted in a
convenient position. Electric circuits are fitted to enable the guns to
be fired by the simple operation of pressing the trigger of a pistol.
Arrangements for percussion firing are also provided. A circular shield
is attached to the revolving Y piece, so as to keep the port opening in
the ship’s side blocked up at any angle of training. This port opening
allows for the guns to be trained through a range of 120 deg., viz. 60
deg. before the beam and 60 deg. abaft.
12-POUNDER GUN MOUNTINGS.
The 12-pounder mountings are similar in principle to the 6-in. above
described, but, of course, arranged to suit the smaller size of the
gun. They are protected by revolving shields attached to the Y pieces
by elastic stays.
TORPEDO TUBES.
The vessel carries four 18-in. torpedo tubes on the Armstrong-Whitworth
principle, which has been fitted to all the Japanese warships built
either in this country or abroad since the date of the Fuji and the
Yashima, which were the two first ships to have this apparatus. The
vessel will also be fitted with a torpedo tube for firing 18-in.
torpedoes in the line of keel astern. This also will be a special
design by the builders.
The ammunition supply to the 12-in. and 10-in. guns has been described
under the heading of mountings for these guns. The ammunition supply
for the 6-in. and 12-pounder guns is arranged for by supplying to each
6-in. gun an electrically driven ammunition hoist of the improved
Elswick design. These hoists will bring up the projectile and the
cordite charge, and maintain a continuous supply. The operation of
the hoist is extremely simple, and necessitates the minimum personal
attendance. The seaman working the hoist has only to start it in motion
and then keep it supplied with the necessary ammunition, which is
automatically discharged in a position best situated for the working
of the gun. The hoists for supplying the 12-pounder guns are of
similar design; eight of them will be placed in suitable positions for
supplying the 12-pounder guns.
X THE JAPANESE DOCKYARDS
YOKOSUKA.
Yokosuka is the oldest Imperial dockyard in Japan, and was a going
concern in the sixties. It is at present expanding considerably as a
building yard. There are large engine shops for machinery construction.
There are three dry docks opening into the outer basin, their
dimensions being—
No. 1 (stone).
Feet.
Length 392
Width 82
Depth 22½
No. 2 (stone).
Length 502⅓
Width 94½
Depth 28⅓
No. 3 (stone).
Length 308
Width 45¼
Depth 17¼
No. 2 is able to take any ship in the Japanese Navy; but the others are
not available for any of the large battleships or armoured cruisers.
There are two slips. On these, amongst others, the following ships have
been built: Hashidate, Akitsushima, Suma, Akashi, Takao, and Yaeyama.
The dockyard lies at the foot of a picturesquely wooded hill, in the
Bay of Tokio, and is well defended by sea forts. To the landward the
defence is, however, poor, and Yokosuka could be taken by an army that
could secure a foothold on the southern coast, supposing it able to
defeat the defenders.
[Illustration]
TOKIO.
At Tokio, roughly twenty-five miles from Yokosuka, there is a small
dry dock belonging to the Japanese Government. It is, however, only
suitable for gunboats and destroyers.
Dimensions—
Feet.
Length 300
Width 52
High-water depth at springs 14⅔
There is also a private dock here, belonging to the Tokio Shipbuilding
Company.
Dimensions—
Feet.
Length 220
Width 42
High-water depth 14
The water front of Tokio is very shallow.
KURÉ.
Kuré, in the province of Aki, is the coming dockyard of Japan. Situated
on the Inland Sea, it is almost impossible of access by an enemy,
while it is far nearer any possible base of operations than Yokosuka.
Two large dry docks have been built here, but the larger is not yet
complete.
Dimensions—
No. 1.
Feet.
Length 464
Width 69
High-water depth 29
This dock is able to take the Asama class, but not the battleships.
No. 2 (building).
Feet.
Length 525
Width 125
High-water depth on sill 33½
This dock is building for the new 16,400-ton battleships, and its
dimensions indicate that still larger vessels are expected in the
future. It will be the largest dry dock in the world.
SASSEBO.
Sassebo, in Hizen, near Nagasaki, is not of much account as a dockyard.
It has neither dry docks nor slips, and is essentially a place for
minor repairs. For these it is very fully equipped.
It was found most useful in the Chino-Japanese War, and its utility
continued in the war with Russia.
The dockyard lies well inside a deep, sheltered bay. The navigation
around it would be very difficult to a hostile fleet, as many shoals
exist.
[Illustration]
[Illustration: NAVAL CLUB, SASSEBO.]
MAITZURU.
Maitzuru, in the province of Tango, lies at the end of an inlet which
has a uniform depth of seven fathoms at low water. The position is not
very unlike that of Kiel, in Germany.
A dockyard is building here, but its resources are _nil_ as yet.
[Illustration]
XI NAVAL HARBOURS
NAGASAKI
Nagasaki is not a dockyard town, though it is generally supposed to be
outside Japan, on account of its being a naval harbour.
It is the oldest port in Japan, its history dating from the Dutch
trading days. It contains two docks, as follows:—
1. TATEGAMI.
Feet.
Length on blocks 510
Extreme length 530
Breadth 99
Depth (maximum) 27½
2. MUKAIJIMA.
Length on blocks 360
Extreme length 371
Breadth 53
Depth (maximum) 24½
There is also a patent slip, of which the rails are 750 ft. long, the
breadth 30 ft., and the lifting power in tons 1200.
It has already been mentioned that Nagasaki was an old Dutch station;
but the present Tategami yard was established about the time of the
Crimean War, by the Tokugawa Government, with the assistance of Dutch
engineers. After the civil war it was taken over by the Imperial
Government, who in 1884 sold it to the Mitsu Bishi Company, to which it
now belongs.
This company built the present granite dry docks. In 1889 they had
begun to build ships—a tug of 206 tons gross being their first effort.
Since then quite large vessels have been constructed, not always with
success; but, as an invariable rule, the failures on one have led
to successes on another, and the yard is now a very going concern,
employing about 4000 men.
The harbour and docks are extensively used by men-of-war.
As yet, judged by European standards, no really excellent work has been
turned out at Nagasaki. The main trouble has been with riveting; but
this is being steadily overcome, and it is purely a question of time
before ocean greyhounds will be turned out at this yard.
The work is not entirely Japanese; “stand-by” Westerners still exist.
These are kept in the background, in case their services are needed.
So far as I can gather, they are not requisitioned unless a difficulty
occurs, which is another way of saying that they are less and less
in demand. The majority of these stand-by men have Japanese wives,
and have adopted Japan as their country; as often as not they are
naturalised Japanese subjects.
TAKESHIKI.
Takeshiki, on the island of Tsushima, is the advanced coaling station
of Japan. There are two approaches, on the west and on the south-east,
but only the first is possible to big ships. In the centre of the
western entrance is a large shoal, three and a half fathoms below
low-water mark, leaving very deep channels close inshore on either
side. As the whole entrance is only some two thousand yards wide,
flanked by high hills, it will be seen that it is impregnable. Inside
is a large and very deep harbour, where the whole Japanese Fleet could
lie.
[Illustration]
The coaling station of Takeshiki lies six miles from the entrance
by water, and five as the crow flies. It is, however, only some
three thousand five hundred yards from a fourteen-fathom bay on the
south-east, and so susceptible to a long-range bombardment from this
quarter. It is to be bombarded also from several other east-coast
inlets.
The port is very strongly fortified with Canet 9.4’s on disappearing
mountings.
OMINATO.
Ominato, on the north coast of the principal island, is a torpedo-boat
base. The town lies in a huge bay (Rikuoko Bay) that runs out of the
Tsuguru Straits, on the opposite shores of which Hakodate stands.
The country is very mountainous, the highest peak being 3264 feet high,
and the lower ones seldom less than a thousand feet.
In the war the Russians once passed through the Tsuguru Straits, but it
was a risky proceeding.
KOBÉ.
Kobé, on the Gulf of Osaka, on the Inland Sea, is a fine roadstead,
with western and southern entrances twenty miles apart, the island
between them being nearly two thousand feet high in places.
There is a yard here, where all the Japanese-built torpedo craft are
constructed.
KURÉ.
At Kuré, no great distance away, the Japanese armour-plate plant is
being laid down; but at the time of writing things are still in an
elementary stage, and it will be some years yet before Japan is able to
armour plate her own battleships. Probably, as Russia did, Japan will
begin by building her own battleships and importing the armour plates.
[Illustration: KOBÉ HARBOUR.]
XII THE MERCANTILE MARINE
The Japanese mercantile marine is of a steadily increasing character.
Quite a few years ago it had no existence, and though in past centuries
Japan had a very considerable merchant fleet, few people are aware of
it, and fewer still realise that the present fleet of merchant ships,
instead of being a wonderful new development, is merely a return to
what previously existed. In this matter Japan is rather reasserting
herself than striking out a new line.
The principal trade ports are—
Yokohama. Nagasaki.
Kobé. Hakodate.
Osaka. Ni-igata.
There are twenty other ports which have some export trade.
The principal imports are: cotton and seed, sugar, rice, wines, food,
etc., wool, manufactured cotton, drugs, dyes and paints, petroleum,
manure, iron and steel manufactures, arms and machinery.
The principal exports are: manufactured silk, copper, food, rice,
drugs, and colours, matches, mats for floors, coal.
The principal import trade is from: Great Britain, the United States,
British India, Hong Kong, Korea, China, Germany, Russian Asia, France,
and Belgium.
The principal export trade is with: United States (72,000,000 yen),
China and Hong Kong (about 40,000,000 yen each), France (about
27,000,000 yen), Korea (11,000,000 yen odd), Great Britain (11,000,000
yen), and British India (9,000,000 yen).
The following (from the _Statesman’s Year Book_) are the shipping
statistics of the Japanese ports (without Formosa), exclusive of
coasting trade, each vessel being counted at every Japanese port it
entered:—
+--------------------------+----------------+----------------+
| | Entered. | Cleared. |
| +-----+----------+-----+----------+
| | No. | Tonnage. | No. | Tonnage. |
+--------------------------+-----+----------+-----+----------+
|Japanese steamships |3,042| 3,861,659|3,064| 3,883,782|
| ” sailing ships and| | | | |
| junks |1,344| 67,139|1,408| 68,902|
|Foreign steamships |2,998| 7,018,077|2,990| 7,016,357|
| ” sailing ships | 105| 104,505| 102| 95,910|
| +-----+----------+-----+----------+
| Total |7,489|11,051,380|7,564|11,064,951|
+--------------------------+-----+----------+-----+----------+
Of the total foreign ships entered, 1644 of 4,080,583 tons were
British; 385 of 1,192,153 tons German; 284 of 455,243 tons Russian; 188
of 240,906 tons Norwegian; 175 of 404,724 tons American; 154 of 303,690
tons French. Of the total shipping in 1901, 1094 vessels of 2,050,201
tons entered Nagasaki; 770 of 2,001,233 tons Yokohama; 1446 of
2,998,955 tons Kobé; 207 of 85,952 tons Shimonoseki; 1683 of 2,870,640
tons Moji.
In 1901 the merchant navy of Japan (without Formosa) consisted of 1321
steamers of European type, of 543,258 tons; 3850 sailing vessels of
European type, of 320,572 tons; and 911 native craft above 200 “koku,”
of 415,260 “koku.”
In 1901 the total ships for foreign trade entered to the ports of
Formosa were 2017 of 184,192 tons, of which 140 of 125,222 tons were
steamers, 1877 of 58,970 tons were sailing vessels.
The total ships cleared the ports of Formosa were 1946 of 174,814 tons,
of which 139 of 118,912 tons were steamers, 1807 of 55,902 were sailing
vessels.
The principal steamship line is the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, the ships of
which are usually white with black funnels, and a white house-flag
carrying two red horizontal lines in the centre. It has a dozen good
steamers and many smaller ones. None are very swift, and so there are
none of any account as “armed liners,” supposing such craft even to be
of value. On the other hand, all are very useful as transports. Both
in the Chino-Japanese war and in the war with Russia they proved very
valuable.
XIII THE JAPANESE ADMIRALTY
The Japanese Admiralty is modelled closely on the British one.
The supreme command is vested in the Emperor.
The Minister of Marine—the present holder of this office (1904) is
Admiral Yamamoto Gombey—is a member of the Cabinet, and superintends
administration. He is selected from the admirals on the active list,
and responsible under the Emperor for everything.
The coast is divided into four naval districts:—
Yokosuka. Sassebo.
Kuré. Maitzuru.
A fifth district, that of Muroran, is in process of formation.
Each district has its headquarters at the arsenal from which it takes
its name, and barracks, etc., are at each of these places.
The men belonging to any district wear the name of that on their cap
ribbons, not the name of the ship in which they serve.
[Illustration: ADMIRAL GOMBEY.]
INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT
The Japanese Naval Intelligence Department is, in my opinion, the
best in the world. In the popular view this is the characteristic
of the Russian one; but the Russian Intelligence Department hardly
lives up to its reputation. For the collection of immaterial facts
it is unrivalled, but the little it really gleaned of Japanese war
preparation was amply evidenced in February, 1904.
The Japanese, on the other hand, manage to find out nearly everything.
They have to a marked degree men eminently qualified for the task.
Where other nations employ agents, Japanese naval officers have always
been found ready to serve in the most menial capacities. Both at Port
Arthur and Vladivostok officers served as coolies, or as “native
servants,” being Japanese, Chinese, or Koreans, as it suited their
book. Whether any one man secured really valuable information is
doubtful; the benefits were secured rather by the patient sifting of
everything at Tokio.
It is said that the Japanese torpedo craft reached the Russian
battleships on February 8th by using Russian signals that they had
stolen the secret of. Far more probable is it that they had learned
them by long and patient observation.
FINANCE
The expenditure upon the Japanese Navy for the years preceding the war
with Russia was—
Yen.
1900-1 17,513,354
1901-2 20,161,010
1902-3 28,425,630
In 1903 the new programme was authorised, to spread over a series of
years.
The Chinese war indemnity paid for most of the ships of the
after-the-war programme. The war with China cost £3,595,400 for the
Navy, while the Army part totalled to £16,455,200.
Japan is not a wealthy country, and, but for the probability of war
with Russia, it is quite possible that the new naval programme would
never have been authorised—at any rate, on so extended a scale as now.
XIV ENTRY AND TRAINING OF OFFICERS
EXECUTIVE.
Theoretically, the Imperial Japanese Navy is a democratic institution;
actually, it is no more so than the British Army. All classes are
eligible for commissions, but, owing to the low rate of pay, only those
with some private means care much to become officers. Eighty-five per
cent. or so belong to the old fighting class, the Samaurai.
The regulations as to the entry of cadets are as follows:—
They must be between the ages of 16 and 19. On the day appointed they
must present themselves for a physical examination, and about 33 per
cent. fail to satisfy the medical board in this respect. The remainder
are then entered for a competitive examination in the following
subjects:—
Japanese literature.
Chinese literature.
English grammar.
” dictation.
English conversation.
” translation (English to Japanese and
Japanese to English).
Arithmetic.
Algebra.
Plain trigonometry.
Elementary geometry.
History (of the world).
Geography.
Elementary physics.
Very elementary chemistry.
Freehand drawing.
Competition is severe; for each vacancy there are about five
competitors; consequently, of those that originally enter only about 15
per cent. become _ko-hoshi_ (naval cadets).
The successful competitors are sent to the Naval College at Yetajima,
near Kuré (pronounced Kōūrā), where they remain three years, at the
entire expense of the Government nominally, but generally costing
something to their relatives.
Here they go through a very extensive course, which, in addition to a
number of subjects not specified here, includes:—
Seamanship,
Gunnery,
Torpedo,
Navigation,
Field drill,
Physics,
Chemistry,
Mechanical engineering (elementary),
English,
and all the other subjects of the original competitive examination in
advanced stages.
There is a feeling in Japan that this curriculum is rather too liberal
for the time allowed.
Some gunboats are attached to the college, and in these classes of the
cadets go out for a day or two’s practical instruction now and again;
speaking generally, however, the three years are shore-service.
After the three years at college a cadet becomes a _sho-i ko-hoshé_
(midshipman), and is sent to sea for one year in a training ship
(masted), drawing a trifling pay.
At the expiration of this period, when between the ages of twenty to
twenty-three, the midshipmen enter for a technical pass-examination for
_sho-i_ (second-class sub-lieutenant). If he fails (as a proportion do)
he is put back six months. He then has a second try. If he fails in
this attempt his services are dispensed with for good and all.
Passed midshipmen become sub-lieutenants, not by virtue of the
examination only, but in order of seniority obtained in the
examination, and as vacancies occur.
As sub-lieutenants they leave examinations behind them, but they have
to write essays on naval subjects. According to how the _sho-i_ does in
these, he passes up through into the higher class of sub-lieutenants.
The best take about one year to become a _tchu-i_ (first-class
sub-lieutenant), the worst take much longer.
After two years’ service as first-class sub-lieutenant a _tchu-i_ is
eligible for promotion to _taï-i_ (lieutenant).
Promotion is entirely by selection in this and all senior ranks.
The very youngest age at which an officer can become a _taï-i_ is
twenty-three. Twenty-four to twenty-five is nearer the average. A
non-promoted _tchu-i_ is compulsorily retired at the age of forty-two;
but there are none so old as that.
After eight years’ service a _taï-i_ is eligible for promotion (by
selection entirely) to lieutenant-commander. Thirty-one is the youngest
age for this. Lieutenant-commander is a distinct rank, intermediate
between lieutenant and commander. Its holder is entitled to the
courtesy rank of “captain,” and officially so addressed. In command
of a small ship he is a _scho-sa_; serving in a big ship he is a
_hojutsho_ (gunnery lieutenant), _suirisho_ (torpedo lieutenant) or a
_kokisho_ (navigator).
A lieutenant-commander is selected for _tchu-sa_ (commander) without
any definite service time.
Thence, still entirely by selection he can pass on upwards through
the usual higher grades of captain, rear-admiral, and vice-admiral
(_kan-cho_, _scho-sho_, and _tucho_). The average age at which an
officer becomes a _scho-cho_ (rear-admiral) is forty-five. The retiring
age is sixty-five, but comparatively few live so long.
To be selected for _taï-sho_ (admiral), a _tucho_ must have been in
command of a fleet two years, and, further, have been so in actual war.
A higher nominal rank still exists of admiral of the fleet—destined for
a full admiral who has had meritorious war service in that rank; but
there are none at present.
ENGINEERS.
An officer enters for a _kika-no_ (engineer) by competitive examination
identical with that for those of military rank already described.
Those who pass are sent to Yokosuka, where they spend four years
training in the technique of their profession. After that they join
ships, having equivalent rank with, but after, the military branch,
according to the table on a later page.
Engineers in the Japanese Navy have power to punish their own men,
being executive in their own department. They are not, however, granted
military titles.
DOCTORS.
A doctor (_quini_) is now a civilian who has a fancy for the
sea-service. Like engineers, doctors have equivalent rank with, but
after, the corresponding military branch, and are eligible for pensions
after twenty years’ service.
PAYMASTERS.
A paymaster (_shukei_) is also a civilian, entered as doctors are, and
serving under the same conditions.
CONSTRUCTORS.
The constructor (_losin-sokun_) enters by competitive examination
much as executive and engineers do. After passing he is attached to a
dockyard, and then sent abroad, usually to England, to learn more than
he can acquire in Japanese dockyards, where only small ships are built
as yet. A constructor has equivalent rank with the executive, just like
the other non-military branches. All these branches at times use for
themselves a military title; thus, _taï-i-kikano_ (lieutenant-engineer)
or _taï-i-losin-sokun_ (lieutenant-constructor); but the military
branch being, naturally enough, jealous of their titles, the prefix is
non-official, and never applied to civil branches by the executive. Of
the civil branches, constructors most often get the military title,
and in the dockyards are always addressed by the employés as _taï-i_,
_houk-cho_, or _kan-cho_, without the word constructor at all. In the
British Navy, of course, constructors are almost as entirely civil a
profession as Admiralty clerks, and are absolutely unknown to naval
officers afloat; but in the Japanese Navy the tie is closer, and every
officer knows them.
JAPANESE NAVAL TITLES WITH ENGLISH EQUIVALENTS
=Note.=— _a_ is pronounced as _a_ in f_a_ther.
_ai_ “ _i_ in _i_dle.
_i_ “ _e_ in f_ee_t,
_u_ “ _ou_, or as _ue_ in cl_ue_.
_ei_ or _e_ “ _a_ in f_a_te.
Example: _taï-i_ is pronounced “_ti-ēē_.”
To follow French pronunciation is a tolerably safe guide.
The system under which the Japanese name their deck officers is
extremely simple. They are divided into three groups—big, medium, and
little. For each of the three grades in these groups there are three
similar prefixes—_taï_-, _tchū_-,[29] and _shŏ_-. The affix is the same
for all grades in each group, -_shō_ for the big, -_sá_ for the medium,
and -_i_ for the lowest.
[29] Might also be transliterated “su,” “s” having the pronunciation of
“tch” here.
Thus they get:—
PREFIX. AFFIX.
1. _taï_- } Big. Medium. Little.
2. _tchū_- } -_shŏ_ -_sá_ -_i_
3. _shŏ_- }
The various ranks, with the corresponding English equivalents, are as
follows, working upwards:—
Sho-i (Ko-hoshei) = midshipman.
Sho-i = 2nd class sub-lieutenant.
Tchu-i = 1st class sub-lieutenant.
Taï-i = lieutenant.
Sho-sá = lieutenant-commander.
Tchu-sá = commander.
Taï-sá = captain.
Sho-sho = rear-admiral.
Tchu-sho = vice-admiral.
Taï-sho = admiral.
In addition, there are the following branches of lieutenant-commanders:—
Ho-jūt-sho = gunnery lieutenant,
Sui-ri-sho = torpedo lieutenant,
Ko-ki-sho = navigating lieutenant,
which means principal officer connected with guns, torpedo, or
navigation, as the case may be.
As for the other branches:—
Kika-no = engineer.
Gui-ni = doctor.
Shukei = paymaster.
Zosin = constructor.
The affix _kwan_ (pronounced “kuàrn”) denotes junior rank,
and is equivalent to our “assistant.” _Tdi-kikansh_ is also
“assistant-engineer,” while the chief of any ship is _kikan-sho_.
The ordinary warrant officer is known as a _juin’shi-kwan_ (“jivēntsh
kuàrn”).
XV ENTRY OF MEN
BLUEJACKETS
By the law of Japan, every male of the age of twenty has to draw lots
for the conscription, unless he is already serving. As a matter of
fact, however, there are comparatively few conscript sailors in the
Imperial Navy, as young Japanese volunteer for service in large numbers.
All candidates undergo a physical examination; and also a literary
examination in elementary writing, reading, and arithmetic.
Volunteers are accepted between the ages of seventeen and twenty-one
years, and sign on for six years’ service.
Conscripts are compelled to serve four years.
Both classes may volunteer to continue serving up to the following
ages, when they are pensioned off:—
Seamen 40 years.
Petty officers 45 ”
Warrant officers 50 ”
Chief warrant officers 55 ”
Warrant and chief warrant officers in the Japanese Navy never undertake
watch-keeping as in the British Navy. In no cases do they mess with the
commissioned officers, as in our destroyers, torpedo boats, and torpedo
gunboats, but, even in destroyers, have always their own mess.
They are not eligible for promotion to commissioned rank.
XVI PAY
Pay in the Japanese Navy is, save in one important particular (mess
allowance), very much on all-fours as to system with pay in the Russian
Navy. There is, in all ranks, the same distinction between shore pay
and sea pay, only, unlike the Russian, the Jap is not confined inside
his harbours by Nature for two-thirds of the year.
Like Russian pay, too, it varies according to the station and varying
living expenses. The distinctly Japanese element—and a very democratic
one to boot—is that mess allowance is the same for all ranks: an
ordinary seaman, a lieutenant, and a vice-admiral all draw exactly the
same sum for messing, and that the modest one of 4_s_. 7_d_. and a
fraction per week—a pound a month. The idea of the Japanese Government
appears to be admirable enough in theory; it has certainly the merit of
simplicity.
It must be borne in mind that the cost of living in Japan is about
one-third the cost of living in the same style in England, about half
the cost of living in Russia, and one-fifth the cost in the United
States.
Details of pay for the various ranks are as follows:—
OFFICERS.
Naval cadets and engineer students, while at college, are allowed £5
(50 yen) a month to cover all expenses.
Midshipmen, during their year at sea, receive £3 a month.
Sub-lieutenants get from £3 5_s_. to £4 a month, plus a sea allowance
of £1 a month and the £1 mess allowance. Altogether they draw about
£70 a year, the equivalent of £200 a year in England; while, if
serving abroad, their sea allowance is nearly trebled. It is said to
be practically impossible for sub-lieutenants to live on their pay. A
first-class sub-lieutenant draws £5 a month as ordinary pay.
_Lieutenants and Equivalent Ranks._
Lieutenants draw £8 a month, plus a sea allowance of from £1 to £8
per month, according to the station. Exclusive of mess allowance, a
Japanese lieutenant in England gets a little under £200 a year—more or
less the same as a British naval lieutenant.
Flag, gunnery, and torpedo lieutenants draw some additional pay for
these duties. Unlike British specialists, all specialist lieutenants
are watch-keepers in the Japanese service.
_Lieutenant-Commanders._
A lieutenant-commander is paid £10 a month, while his sea allowance
varies from £2 to £12, according to the service on which he is engaged.
Destroyers are lieutenant-commanders commands, and those who are
captains of destroyers draw more accordingly than those serving in big
ships as senior lieutenants.
_Commanders._
Commanders are paid £15 a month. Sea pay ranges from £2 10_s_.
to £10—the maximum in a big ship; but if captain of a gunboat, a
commander’s sea pay may rise to £15.
_Captains._
The pay of a captain is £22 a month. Sea pay runs from £3 to £16. He
may also draw additions for entertaining expenses.
_Rear-Admirals._
Rear-Admirals draw £29 a month, and the extra sea pay may run to £23,
plus entertaining allowances.
_Vice-Admirals._
Vice-admirals draw £35 per month ordinary and £30 extra sea pay. In
Japan this is equivalent to over £2000 a year in comparison with life
on the English scale.
_Admirals._
The pay of admirals is fixed at £52 per month and £30 sea allowance.
In addition to these sources of pay, all officers on the active list in
the senior ranks are eligible for extra pay—a species of good-service
pensions. Meritorious conduct and medals are qualifications.
Engineers, doctors, and paymasters draw identical pay with the
corresponding naval ranks, and extra pay for special duties.
Constructors are on the same footing.
The equivalents in the different branches are:—
-----------------+------------------+---------------------+
Military. | Engineer. | Doctor. |
-----------------+------------------+---------------------+
Cadet. | Cadet | |
Midshipman | Assist.-Engineer | Assist.-Surgeon |
| (junior) | (junior) |
Sub-lieutenant | Assist.-Engineer | Assist.-Surgeon |
| (senior) | (senior) |
Lieutenant | Engineer | Surgeon |
Lieut.-Commander | | |
Commander | Staff-Engineer | Staff-Surgeon Staff |
Captain | Fleet-Engineer | Fleet-Surgeon Fleet |
{| Inspector of | Deputy Inspector |
{| Machinery | of Hospitals |
Rear-Admiral {| Chief Inspector | Inspector of |
Vice-Admiral {| of Machinery | Hospitals and |
{| | Fleets |
{| Inspector of | Inspector-General |
{| Machinery | |
{| General | |
Admiral | | |
| | |
-----------------+------------------+---------------------+
--------------------+---------------------+
Paymaster. | Constructor. |
--------------------+---------------------+
Clerk | |
Assist.-Paymaster | |
(junior) | |
Assist.-Paymaster | Assist.-Constructor |
(senior) | |
Paymaster | Constructor |
| |
Staff-Paymaster | |
Fleet-Paymaster | Chief-Constructor |
Paymaster-in-Chief | Inspector |
| |
Paymaster-General | |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
--------------------+---------------------+
MEN.
Ordinary seamen get 7_s_. a month. In addition, they have a varying
sea allowance. The pay of seamen ranges up to 30_s_. a month, plus sea
allowance. Altogether the average Japanese sailor, while in England,
gets about 3_s_. a day.
_Petty Officers._
The normal pay of petty officers, according to class and length of
service, runs from 17_s_. to £2 a month, with allowances extra.
_Warrant Officers._
Warrant officers draw from £3 to £5 a month, with numerous allowances.
Allowances to the men include clothing, or money for clothing, etc.
Altogether the Japanese sailor is very well paid. In our naval ports he
is looked on as something of a Crœsus. He spends his money freely, as
all sailors do, and his purchases run to practically everything, from
top-hats to trinkets, and heavy technical books to musical instruments.
Many of them talk English, and still more are able to read it, and
these are prone to buy books. It is quite a common thing for them to
tender five-pound notes in payment; but further particulars of this
sort will be found under the head of Personal Characteristics.
RETIREMENTS, PENSIONS, ETC.
As already stated, the retiring age (nominally) of a sub-lieutenant is
42. Other officers are retired _pro rata_ up to 65 years of age for
vice-admirals.
Officers of good conduct are promoted on retirement as a rule. Pensions
vary from a minimum of £20 to £76 per annum upward in each case. In the
admirals’ ranks, the minimum ranges from £105 to £150 per annum. There
is no exact maximum.
Intentionally or otherwise, there is one excellent thing that obtains
in the Japanese Navy. By the system of selection of captains to be
admirals the “duffer officer” has little chance of blocking the way
of better men. He, however, as a rule is ready to recognise his own
shortcomings, and it is not at all uncommon for such officers to
exhibit their patriotism by retiring to make room for those who are
likely to do better than they. It is only in the Japanese Navy that
this happens: and it is in very marked contrast to certain other
navies.
[Illustration: JAPANESE FLAGS.]
XVII FLAGS
Till comparatively quite recent times the Japanese naval ensign was the
same as the present jack and mercantile flag. The first battleships
flew this white flag with the red ball, and the now well-known Japanese
naval ensign only dates from the Itsukushima. It is very rarely
correctly represented. The accompanying illustration shows it as it
actually is; usually the sun is put in the centre instead of in its
proper place.
Admirals’ flags are remarkable in that they follow the Russian system
of marking by bands at the edges, instead of the almost universal balls
or stars which other nations employ.
The other flags illustrated do not call for comment to any extent, as
they follow existing custom in all navies.
The device on the Imperial Standard is the national chrysanthemum. It
is the personal flag of the Emperor. This badge, by the way, is found
upon the device on the caps of all officers.
XVIII UNIFORMS, ETC.
(1) OFFICERS
Japanese officers’ full-dress uniform is very like full-dress English.
The difference lies in the sword, which is a dirk, and the cap, which
is rather Russian in shape, and has a gold band round it.
The reefer jacket does not exist. In place of it they wear a dark blue
military undress tunic, buttoning at the neck with stand-up collar, and
black braid down the front. There are no gold insignia of rank; these
are of black braid, with a loop for the military branch, just like
the gold ones. Engineers, paymasters, and doctors have their stripes
in black; but, being without the mauve, white, or red distinguishing
badge between the stripes with their undress, it is impossible to
distinguish. Cocked hats and frockcoats are identical with ours. Owing
to the extra number of ranks, the stripes vary slightly from ours. They
are:—
Sub-lieutenant or equivalent 1
1st class sub-lieutenant or equivalent 1½
Lieutenant 2
Senior lieutenant 2½
Lieutenant-commander 3
Commander 3½
Captain 4
These are the usual gold stripes.
Admirals have stripes just like ours. No special illustrations of these
various stripes are given, as the photographs of officers of different
ranks throughout the book show them clearly.
There is no dress uniform in the Japanese Navy, but the national kimino
is often worn at dinner.
Constructors wear a uniform identical with that of paymasters in
undress.
Warrant officers wear a uniform closely akin to that of commissioned
officers. Ordinary warrant officers have no stripes. Chief warrant
officers wear a half stripe.
(2) MEN.
The uniform of Japanese seamen is identical with that of British
seamen, save that the cap is a little flatter and nearer the French
shape. The cap ribbon is just like ours—the name of the depôt instead
of ship is on it in Chinese characters.
XIX PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
OFFICERS.
Japanese naval officers, like as they are to European ones in many
characteristics, are yet of a more distinct class by themselves than
any other body of men in the world. The likeness to European officers
is superficial, a first impression; the real Japanese officer is not to
be known or understood at a casual glance; he needs knowing.
Whether the Western brain can ever get to truly comprehend the Oriental
is a favourite question, usually answered in the negative. But, true as
the negative may be in a general way, it is only true to that extent.
Sea service marks all its votaries as a class apart; and additionally
apart as the Japanese may be by race, they are not more so than
Russians or Frenchmen. It is just as easy or just as impossible to
“bottom” a Japanese as a Russian. Still, Japanese officers as a class
are, as before stated, a unique class.
Their primary and principal characteristic is that they are utterly
different to the Japanese that we read about in books. Art books
tell us of Japanese art instinct, of their feeling for decorative
art, and so forth. Japanese artists may possess, or have possessed,
this feeling, but it is conspicuous for its absence in Japanese naval
officers, who are as “Philistine” as British officers—if possible, more
so. The decorative art that their nation is supposed to live for they
cordially despise. I have never heard one admire a picture for its
colour, but light and shade (that decorative art knows not) appeals
to many. Effects, action, motion, sentiment they will understand, but
abstract art, never. They are truly and healthily “Philistines.”
So much for art, which I have touched on because it is said to be,
over here, the keynote of Japanese character. Illustrated as a good
deal of this work is with Japanese drawings and photographs, selected
for the book by Japanese officers, this matter deserves mention apart
from the question of artistic influence on national life. We may
note, therefore, that “art-instinct” was the first thing flung behind
him by the Japanese when he “advanced.” If the so-called taking to
civilisation of the Japanese means anything, it means having abandoned
art for something more utilitarian and more forceful.
Some slight recapitulation is now necessary. When Japan, as the
saying goes, “adopted Western civilisation,” she did little but adopt
Western methods of war and business, and, in the strictly ethical
sense, discarded a good deal of civilisation rather than adopted it;
she abandoned all those forms of civilisation that have a decadent
tendency. Her advance was not the birth of a new empire with a new
civilisation, but the awakening of an old nation that for centuries had
been sleeping, steeped in ultra-civilisation. In this fact lies her
strength and her weakness.
A forgotten history was studied, and with that study slumbering
ambitions were revived. The man of action, relegated to the background
by ultra-civilisations,[30] again began to loom upon the stage.
Disputes with foreigners called him on to it; Japan awoke determined
to be again a nation. “Let us have intercourse with foreigners, learn
their drill and tactics, and ... we shall be able to go abroad and give
lands in foreign countries to those who have distinguished themselves
in battle,”—this sentiment every Japanese officer has imbibed with his
mother’s milk. The introduction of Western social institutions, such as
newspapers, railways, telegraphs, the new criminal code, the abolition
of torture as a punishment, all these things are side issues. They have
contributed to build commercial Japan; but they have had small part in
making her Navy; the Navy, indeed, would perhaps have been stronger
without them. The mechanical arts and _the food_[31] of the West, not
its social institutions, have made the new Japan an empire.
[30] The drift of ultra-civilisation is towards peace and the arts. The
man of action must embody something of the savage, and the seeker after
universal peace draws his chief recruits from the ranks of those who
supply those luxuries of life that civilisation makes into necessaries.
[31] See p. 310, where the food question is fully gone into.
Now, having decided to adopt Western methods, the Japanese sought
Western instructors. The British being the premier navy, they sought
naval instruction from us, and were chiefly supplied with officers of
what even then was the “old school.” In one of Major Drury’s books
of naval stories[32] there is a British admiral who always read his
Bible in his shirt-sleeves, because the sight of his uniform made it
difficult for him to realise the existence of a Higher Power! Absurd,
no doubt; but this seemingly far-fetched yarn exactly represents the
“old-school” sentiment, and the sentiment upon which every Japanese
officer has been dry-nursed. Even to-day a British admiral is encircled
with a halo of pomp, formula, and etiquette equal to that of any Court;
in the old days the reverence was greater still. The young Japanese
officers’ first lessons in “sea-power” were in reverence to its chief
practitioners. With their reverential loyalty to their Emperor, they
proved apt pupils. As the seat of power the quarter-deck is revered in
the British service; lesson number two taught this to the Japanese,
and included the bridge and a few other places. Practical work they
were taught on our model; the theoretical they more or less taught
themselves. Japanese naval strategy and tactics are much less the
result of European tuition than we suppose. What they learnt from the
West was after the Nelson model.
[32] “The Tadpole of an Archangel,” by Major Drury, R.M.L.I.
To understand a Japanese naval officer at all, we must fully realise
that he has been brought up with the things mentioned above as his
religion—indeed, it is the only religion he knows. Whether a professed
atheist, or a Christian, or a Buddhist, the only semblance of reality
in his creed is this religion of “Sea-Power,” and the worship of its
visible embodiment. Such god as he has is the navy to which he belongs.
We are more or less given to understand nowadays that Japan has
adopted Christianity. A Japanese told me that, to a certain extent,
they have. “Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar’s,” struck
him as an excellent text for the common people—Cæsar being translated
Emperor of Japan. He preferred Christianity too, he said, “because it
was more modern and general.” Had the leading Powers been Mahomedan,
I have no doubt that official Japan would revere Mecca. It was, I
think, this same officer who told me that some friends of his who had
become Christians were anxious that he should do the same. He agreed,
therefore, to go and be baptised on a certain date _if it were fine_.
The day was wet, so he did not go. Some other friends were anxious that
he should embrace Buddhism. “As their temple was much nearer, I went
there,” he said; “so I am a Buddhist. But, of course, I do not believe
in any religion really.”
A Christian Jap, on the other hand, once asked me whether Santa Klaus
was one of our gods—the combination of monotheism and pantheism of the
Doctrine of the Trinity being altogether outside their philosophy.
Actually the Japanese are members of that “Agnostic Creed” which
some of our greater materialists have preached, plagiarising both
Christianity and Buddhism. “Do unto others as you would that they
should do unto you.” And in a great measure they live up to it. Where
they seem not to, the difference between ideals of the Orient and the
West explains the omission. Our particular type of hypocrite is not
known in Japan. But, as I have said before, the only “Power” that they
recognise and worship is their fleet. To grasp the true inwardness of
this is not over and above easy to our mental processes, but it is the
keynote.
One might imagine that a far-seeing administrative brain had evolved
this most utilitarian religion, but I have never detected evidences
of purpose. The seed was planted by our “old-school” naval officers;
it fell on fruitful soil, and grew of its own accord into a weapon of
almost indescribable potency. It is not on the lines of fanaticism
exactly—the case of the Mahomedan is not altogether analogous. Rather,
it is on all fours with Calvinism.
“If people don’t like being killed, why do they fight?” a Japanese
officer remarked when discussing war. Individually and physically, a
Japanese officer is not at all brave, if we define “bravery” in our
sense of the word, but he will fight harder and die harder than any
Westerner. To him a wound taken in action is on a par with a toothache
or more serious ailment in ordinary everyday life; death in battle he
views as we view ordinary death in our beds. The risk of death in
action is an idea that moves him about as much as an actuary’s table
affects us. Unlike the Mahomedan warrior, death in battle entails no
Paradise with beautiful Houris as a reward; nor does _dulce et decorum
est pro patria mori_ seem to weigh much. Death is an incident, nothing
more. “If people do not like being killed, why do they fight?” is the
beginning and end of their ideas on the subject.
In every navy there are men who work at their profession and men who do
not. The Japanese Navy is no exception to the rule, but the proportion
of those who are casual is very small.
“Working at their profession” has, however, a very liberal meaning in
the Japanese Navy. It means the absolute ignoring of everything else. I
once inquired of a Japanese naval officer over here what the Japanese
military attaché was called. “I cannot tell you,” was the answer,
“_because I work at my profession_.”
And, judging by his expression, my friend was proud of this little bit
of evidence that he wasted no time on extraneous matters. This, too,
was in England. His ship was then in an elementary stage at Elswick; he
was at Portsmouth on leave.
The “working at his profession” in this particular case, of an officer
with his ship a mere skeleton on the building slip, consisted in
spending the day poring over naval books. I generally found him deep in
Mahan, with halma-pieces on sheets of paper to work out the tactics.
Speaking generally, a Japanese naval officer’s (in England) idea of a
holiday appears to be to come to Portsmouth, spend the day going over
the dockyard, with a visit to my house to play naval war-game into
the small hours as a kind of subsequent dissipation and relaxation!
Whatever naval Kriegspiel may or may not be, it takes a Japanese to
regard it as a dissipation.
In person, Japanese officers are very short, but the generality of
them are far more “physically fit” than popular opinion imagines. The
narrow-chested, sloping-shoulder variety is the exception, not the
rule. Many are very well proportioned indeed. Height averages about
five feet, or an inch or two over. In type of feature there is an
immense variety; though black hair, high cheek-bones, and narrow eyes
are common to all, general resemblance ends there. Colour varies much.
Some have the same pale, yellow complexion that one often meets with
in Russians; others have the more olive Italian tint. The former type
have the _nez retroussé_, usually small; the latter have a more or less
hooked nose. Features vary much according to the province or island
from which the owner hails.[33] Occasionally one encounters a swarthy
officer, hailing from the Northern islands, while here and there one
meets a face almost typically European.
[33] Those who come from the South are usually nicknamed “Russians.”
In character they are all more or less after one model. Taking them in
the lump, they are the merriest lot I ever came across. No one enjoys
the “At Homes” which Japanese officers invariably give before their
ships leave England more than the givers of them; they make the best
of hosts for that reason. These “At Homes” are a distinctive Japanese
feature; no other foreign visitors in our harbours ever give them. The
usual foreigner arrives, official calls are made, one or two of us
may perhaps be entertained on board, and there the matter ends. With
a Japanese ship, on the other hand, that is about where it begins. As
an old waterman on Portsmouth Hard observed, “One Japanee is worth a
dozen bloomin’ Rooshians and Eyetalians. Give me a Japper here once
a month and I’ll make my bloomin’ fortune,” the fact being that the
civil population, who never dare venture near a Russian, crowd on board
a Japanese ship in season and out, sure that, even if they are not
wanted, their invasion will be forgiven. I suppose the Japanese derive
some pleasure from watching the enjoyment of these self-invited guests,
though their good nature must be a trifle strained at times.
When the Shikishima was docked at Portsmouth, I happened to call,
with an officer of ours in uniform. In company with several of the
Shikishima’s officers, we were doing the round of the upper deck, when
a tripper of the regulation type suddenly confronted us, and addressed
my companion.
“One moment, sir!” he cried. “I want to see over the ship.”
My companion indicated the Japanese officers, telling the man to apply
to them.
[Illustration: THE SHIKISHIMA ENTERING PORTSMOUTH DOCKYARD.]
“Bother the foreigners!” returned the man. “I was told that if I went
on board the officials would show me round. Can’t you send one of ’em?
You can tell ’em I ain’t a spy. I don’t mind showing ’em my card—at
least, no; I find I haven’t any about me. But here’s my return ticket
from London; they can see that if they want to. I assure you I’m not a
spy, or connected with the Press in any way.”
As all the Japanese understood and spoke English perfectly, this was
not the happiest of introductions. However, one of them volunteered to
show the tripper round, for which the tripper tendered thanks to _our_
officer. He then called out to a party of his friends on the jetty that
he had “managed to make one of the silly foreigners understand,” after
which he devoted himself to patronising his guide. He meant no harm,
doubtless, but it was a good deal of a tax on Japanese politeness,
and had he been kicked off the ship he would have only had himself to
thank for it. There are, unhappily, a good many of these tripper-folk
who, given an inch in the way of being allowed on board at all, grab a
good many ells in the way of taking advantage of it. Nor is it only the
tripper-folk who take undue advantage of Japanese hospitality. At the
“At Homes” I have seen women, who certainly ought to know better, armed
with scissors, with which they cut down any decoration that takes their
fancy. The sight of the decorations does not make the Tenth Commandment
easy to observe. At the close of the “At Home,” the paper flowers are
always all given away to the guests. But this sort of thing would
never happen on board an English ship in a Japanese harbour.
For an “At Home” the Japanese officers put all the men to work making
paper flowers. Chrysanthemums and cherry blossoms are the favourites,
but convolvuli and iris are also made, as well as a few others. All
are singularly beautiful and realistic reproductions—very different
things to the ordinary artificial flower of commerce. With these
flowers the greater part of the ship is profusely decorated, numbers
of lanterns are hung about, and here and there a “Welcome” is stuck
up. In addition, each ship hits on some device of its own; thus the
Kasagi went in for a host of Japanese and British naval ensigns, while
the Shikishima turned diving-dresses into decorative uses. Generally,
as in the illustration of the Kasagi’s “At Home,” some sports make a
programme, fencing, single stick, conjuring tricks, and so on, with
some Japanese songs in between the turns. The Shikishima, however,
before she left England, capped all these things by rigging up a
stage, scenery, platform, and all, upon the quarter-deck, and here
old Japanese plays, with the proper costumes and everything, were
performed, while the entire upper deck was transformed into a paper
flower-garden. I have attempted in the illustration to give some idea
of the fairyland thus created, but it needs colour to give anything
like the real effect.
[Illustration: “AT HOME” ON BOARD THE KASAGI.]
I have dwelt thus upon Japanese “At Homes,” because the way in which
the officers put themselves out to enjoy these, and make their guests
do the same, is an index to one of their leading characteristics. It
is a curious thing that no descriptions or illustrations of these gala
days of the Japanese war-god ever find their way into print. The whole
thing is essentially Japanese, and shows that Western drill and weapons
have not killed Oriental charm.
Beyond relegating art to its proper and inferior position, I do not
think that Western influence has altered Japanese character to any
great extent. A Japanese naval officer of some note, in relating
to me his experiences during the war against China, referred to a
combined naval and military operation in which he was engaged. Cholera
killed them off like rats. “It was one of the funniest sights I have
ever seen,” he said, “to see the soldiers all doubled up and rolling
about by the side of the road as we marched.” This frame of mind is
distinctly Oriental; it is also distinctly useful for a fighting-man.
A British bluejacket might have contrived to see the humour of the
situation also,[34] but no other Westerner is so blest—for it is a
case of blest; the toughest warrior is the one that wins. Japan is not
going to collapse in a war while this sort of sentiment can obtain.
Modern warfare is becoming more and more a matter of acting on the
_morale_ of the _personnel_; it is on nerves rather than on bodies that
shell-fire is intended to have its most powerful effect, and it will
take a good deal of it, and a very deadly deal, to affect those who
can see the humorous side of what is primarily a very terrible thing.
Probably the root of the “war-instinct” lies somewhere hereabouts, and
we should think many times ere we endeavour to “humanise” such ideas
out of our own Mark Tapleys.
[34] The following I can vouch for, as I heard it myself:—A certain
warrant man in one of our destroyers came off leave one morning a
little late, and thus explained himself to his skipper: “I was waiting
for the train all right, sir, when some silly fool walking across the
line got run over by a train coming the other way. It took both his
legs off, and there was he and the legs lying on the line. _I stood
there laughing so that I clean forgot my train._” This is not exactly
typical, but we have a good many such Mark Tapleys in the R.N.
The Japanese also retains his old native dignity; European uniform has
not abated one jot of that dignity which we have all read about as
having been beneath the Kimino. Mostly, though not invariably, they are
the descendants of the old fighting men, the Samaurai.[35] In the midst
of the new order all the best of the old traditions live, just as, in a
few cases in our new social order, pauper members of old families scorn
the wealthy mushroom aristocracy around them. Whatever he may do, in
whatever position he may be placed, the Japanese officer never forgets
his dignity, and, further, is always a _gentleman_. I believe this is
the first impression that he creates; it is also the last.
[35] These Samaurai, or officer class—there were three classes in
Japan: (1) the nobles, descendants of rulers of provinces; (2) the
officer class; (3) the common people—for generation after generation
lived very uncertain lives; they were liable to be killed at any moment
once they left their homes. In addition, they were used to killing,
having the right to do so at pleasure. If they unsheathed their swords,
they could not replace them until they had killed some one. Possessing
this power, it is little wonder that a strong sense of dignity was
acquired with it.
On the whole, though their politeness generally hides it completely,
the Japanese are a very “touchy” and sensitive people. Quite
unwittingly one is apt to tread on tender corns, without in the least
realising it, until one gets to know them a good deal more than
casually. They are sensitive about any infraction of the extended laws
of etiquette, which they themselves observe most punctilliously. There
are numbers of little things to be learnt and observed by one who would
come to be on friendly terms with them, and I doubt if any Westerner
can acquire all. Still, if he offends through ignorance he will never
learn his fault from his hosts.
They carry this sensitiveness a considerable distance, and into a
variety of things. For instance, to see themselves represented in
print in broken English and queer pronunciation annoys them intensely.
An Englishman, seeing his rendering of a foreign language guyed,
would laugh at it; but not so the Japanese. I remember well the
indignation of a Japanese at reading in a Portsmouth local paper that
his countrymen had talked about their vessel as a fine “_sipp_.” He
did not like it at all. Incidentally, I may mention that “sipp” was
phonetically inaccurate; the majority say the word “ship” just as we
do, while the rest would merely give the “i” the same phonetic value
that it has in French, Italian, or Russian. On their part, I have known
Japanese deliberately pronounce many of their own ship-names wrongly,
so as not to offend English ears by emphasising an English error.
It is a legend in our navy that the first English word learnt by a
Japanese is always _Damn!_ but I have only once heard a Japanese use
it. His own language is singularly defective in swear words. Japanese
learn English very rapidly, and soon grow to speak it remarkably well.
After a year, or less, in England they acquire not merely a mastery
of the English, but also a far more difficult thing for a foreigner—a
mastery of our _slang_. Ability to pick this up argues a singularly
quick brain, as dictionaries are of no avail here. It is characteristic
of them, too, to set about it with a serious thoroughness, essentially
Japanese. Recently a sub-lieutenant, not long from the Far East, who
had learnt school English out there, took to studying a novel of mine,
“The Port Guard Ship,” a book that deals solely with social naval
life, and so is loaded to the muzzle with current naval slang and
phraseology. Every time I met this sub. he used to haul a notebook
from his pocket, and reel off a list of slang and, possibly, now and
again, profanities culled from its pages, the exact import of each of
which I had to explain! In consequence that sub. is now able to join in
any conversation without difficulty, or without the talk having to be
suited for him. The Frenchman’s dilemmas over such expressions as “Look
out!” do not bother him at all. In fine, he knows “English as she is
spoke,” by virtue of adopting a method.
Curiously enough, Japanese never learn to write English so well as they
speak it—thus reversing the condition of all other foreigners. Their
caligraphy is fine and bold always, but the phraseology as invariably
formal. Possibly it is due to the etiquette of letter-writing in their
own country that their letters here almost always begin with a “Thank
you for your kind letter,” and continue formal all through.
Mentally, the Japanese is adaptive, not originative. If one is
explaining anything to a Japanese, he will have seized on the idea and
absorbed it while a European is still struggling with the externals
of it. Japanese invention has extended to a small quickfirer and a
water-tube boiler, but in both cases the invention is merely a change
of some existing mechanism. Even so, neither is of great moment; their
abilities do not lie in that direction at all. If an entirely new
system of naval tactics is ever evolved, it will not be by a Japanese;
like their British _confrères_, they shine better at practical work
than in the regions of theory.
They are not, however, devoid of views. Every Japanese gives time to
thinking of the future, and were any lieutenant suddenly made into an
admiral, I fancy that he would acquit himself quite as well as if he
had reached his rank by orthodox gradations. He is apt to fail now and
again at his present task from this trait, which is in many ways his
chief defect, and one that may lead to trouble in war. It is sometimes
dangerous to reason before proceeding to obey. A Japanese tends to do
this. It is details that they think about. For instance, I once got a
Japanese officer to give me his views on the conduct of a naval war.
They are worth quoting _in extenso_, because naval opinions invariably
run more or less in grooves.
His primary detail was strategical, and referred to the Press. “I
shall have no correspondents with my fleet when I am an admiral in
war,” said he. “If they insist on coming, directly we get out to sea
I shall set them all adrift in a boat. If they do their duty to their
papers they are a hindrance to me; if they do not they are no good at
all.”
Detail number two referred to his fleet. “I shall hoist the signal, ’No
ship is to surrender; if beaten, it must sink.‘ If any ship hoists the
white flag, the rest of my ships will open fire on it till it sinks.”
I shall watch this officer’s career with interest if ever he commands a
war fleet in the future, for he will go far; every detail was similarly
thought out. I fancy every Japanese who stands any prospect of being an
admiral in the future does the same, though the matter is not one upon
which they talk at all readily to a stranger.
It is also, however, their weakest point, this fondness for thinking
of the future. Too often they think of it unduly, and to the detriment
of the present. Not invariably, of course, still there is, I fancy, a
fair sprinkling of lieutenants who devote as much or more thought to an
admiral’s duty twenty years hence than to lieutenant work of to-day.
It is not, primarily, a bad thing so much as a good thing overdone;
but that is a Japanese naval characteristic all through. They are
always in more danger of overdoing a good thing than anything else.
Curiously enough, this tendency to think for the admiral does not lead
to any great evil in the way of an undue corresponding tendency to be
critical.
On the other hand, a Japanese naval officer never underrates his own
abilities. Every junior officer feels in his inmost soul that he is
fully as capable and as fully able to do anything as his senior. None
of them suffer from false modesty. On the whole, this, within due
bounds, is by no means a defect; self-confidence is a fine thing for
begetting ability; but, as before stated, they are prone to overdo many
good things. Some of them, doubtless, overdo the confidence in their
own abilities.
They are, in a way, a discontented lot of men as a whole, despite
all their fatalism, their enthusiasm, and their joviality. Every
civilian officer fumes over to himself that he is not an executive;
every lieutenant curses the time that must pass before he is a
lieutenant-commander, and so on all through. Wherever they are in the
professions, they want to be better and higher. Sometimes this is a
defect, sometimes not. When it is a defect, it is again a case of the
good thing overdone.
With all this, however, they are not ambitious in the exact way that
we define the word. A friend of mine was appointed skipper of a
destroyer, to take her out to Japan. He had worried everything and
everybody for the post. Now, he could have gone back to Japan as a
passenger in a steamer, drawing more pay, and without the risks and
heavy responsibilities of being a destroyer captain; but, having got
his wished-for ship, there the matter ended. There was no “another
rung in the ladder” about it; it was simply “a good opportunity to get
experience.”
He got it. He left the Thames in a blizzard. Down Channel he had a
gale, a head sea, and a thermometer well below freezing-point. Not
having been to sea for some time, he was seasick continually, and
the weather gave him neuralgia and bronchitis in addition. Having a
crew new to the ship, he had to spend nearly the whole trip from the
Thames to Portsmouth on deck, and when he snatched a brief watch below
a defective cowl gave him shower-baths in his bunk. Yet, when he put
into Portsmouth Harbour to coal, I found him sitting in the wardroom,
expatiating to his officers on his good luck in having thus early been
favoured with some bad weather experience.
“Duty,” in the sense in which one finds it in the British or Russian
navies, is not much of a motive-power to Japanese officers. The
religion of war, the interest of their profession, the longing to put
theories to a fuller practical test—here lie the springs of their
motive-power. To quote one of them, they “like being killed.” I believe
they do.
Personal glory is, again, discouraged rather than otherwise; a
solidarity of glory is rather aimed at. In the torpedo attacks at
Wei-hai-wei some boats “got in,” some failed. No Japanese officer who
participated will tell you his share. I once asked one of these, whom I
met, about the famous action. “Oh yes,” said he, “I was there. It was a
very cold night.”
Subsequently I learnt from another officer that this particular one had
commanded the boat that sank the Ting Yuen. “But,” added my informant,
“he would not tell you, and you should not ask. All did well; some were
lucky, some not; since all did well, they agreed not to speak of it
after and say who did this or did that, _for all were equally worthy of
praise_.”
Ethically our socialists theorise on this sort of thing, but only the
Japanese have actually practised it. Such are Japanese naval officers.
To sum up, they have little ambition, little thirst for personal glory,
but a good deal of thirst for the thunder of battle. The only religion
that they wot of is the worship of their fleet; their only heaven,
that fleet in action. They cannot originate, but they are peerless at
practising the things that they have learnt. And there is only one
possible way of beating a Japanese fleet—by sinking it.
In many of these things the trail of Samaurai may be visible. The
Samaurai were trained to kill and to be killed; it was the thing they
lived for. Take the case of the old Japanese duelling laws, which
ceased to exist quite recently comparatively. No French _affaire_ about
these duels. To a Japanese serious European duels are as comic as
French duels are to us. With the Japs the vanquished had to die, only
death or a mortal wound stopped the duel, and the victor had then to
commit suicide.
_Hari-kari_, though now illegal, is not yet entirely dead. It is not
very many years ago that a Japanese sub-lieutenant disembowelled
himself because of the disgrace of some affront that he felt had
been put on him; in the war with China there were one or two cases.
_Hari-kari_ is not a nice thing to describe, and has been described in
detail often enough before to-day. It has altered somewhat from the
orthodox manner. The torpedo-gunner who, after his frozen-in torpedo
failed to leave the tube at Wei-hai-wei, committed _hari-kari_, slit
his stomach across with a knife, and then fired a pistol at his
throat—according to the captain of his boat, who told me about it. This
was not quite after the orthodox manner, but it was a singular painful
means of death for a man to choose of his own accord. The ancestors
of Japanese officers, near and remote, lived for centuries under the
_hari-kari régime_. In other ways human life was cheap, and torture
was common. Their descendants reap the results in an age when war has
become so much a matter of “moral effect.” And this is one great reason
why a Japanese fleet will have to be sunk _en masse_ for it to be
defeated.
I will close this chapter with one anecdote, a trifle shocking to our
convictions possibly, but so eminently characteristic that I must give
it. One Japanese I know was studying naval history, noting the most
effective dying words of great commanders (the distant future in his
mind’s eye very probably). “They are pretty, some of them,” he said,
“but I do not think them very useful. Now, if I get killed, I think I
shall say, ‘I die a good Christian, and shall soon be an angel with
very pretty wings.’”
I can quite imagine him saying it, and his comrades finding the jest
useful.
XX PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
MEN.
I sometimes wonder who it was first coined that well-known phrase,
“little Japanese sailors.” As phrases go it is very “catchy,” but in
the matter of accuracy it is very general only. Save for Russians and
Italians, some of the biggest sailors going are Japanese. Beside their
own officers they look giants, while actually they average nearly an
inch higher than British bluejackets, and in breadth fully equal them.
One and all, they are fine men physically, able to hold their own
in size with almost any other nation’s bluejackets, except Russians
and Italians. They are almost invariably stout and well set up, and
they are always smiling; they take to their profession much as their
officers do.
As previously stated, they are recruited chiefly from the northern
islands, and chiefly from the lowest classes. These make the bravest
sailors, and they have been educated from early youth upward into a
disregard for death. Till quite recently, most Japanese villages had
feuds with neighbouring hamlets, and these resulted in a good many
broken heads and a fair amount of blood-letting, all of which the
Government, if it did not actually encourage, at least viewed with
a very lenient eye on account of its practical utility in rearing
fighters.
Japanese officers have, on the whole, a preference for sailors
of little education. Their view is that such are less hampered
by appreciating danger. Apparently some of the better class
sailors—artificers and others drawn from a rather better class
socially, acquire with their education an inconvenient ability to
realise some of the frightful dangers of modern naval warfare. Either
from experience or instinct, these more educated men are not looked on
with favour. “The less a man knows the better sailor he will make,” is
the saying.
A rabid anti-Japanese of my acquaintance, who has spent his life
in the Far East, allows the Japanese only one virtue—general and
complete bravery. “No Japanese,” said he, “is ever afraid.” It is
not easy to reconcile this statement with the Japanese estimate of
educated sailors given above; but I am not in a position to deliver
a verdict of any value on the question. The officers’ contempt of
danger, alluded to some pages back, has little bearing on the point.
The fact that “cowardice” exists as an offence in the Japanese naval
code of punishments may, perhaps, throw a little light upon the
matter; but, even so, we need an exact definition of what the word
“cowardice” means to a Japanese. It does not mean cowardice as we
should understand it. I incline to fancy that it means the absence of
an utter disregard for life; and that what the Japanese call a coward
we describe as a waverer—which is by no means the same thing. It is
not impossible that their more liberal definition of cowardice would
include a man who got unduly excited in action. After Yalu, several men
were punished for that.
The general intelligence of Japanese bluejackets is high, they
have the national aptitude for “picking things up” with marvellous
rapidity—wherein they form a marked contrast to the Russian sailors,
who learn very slowly. They—some of them—also forget rapidly; a
national defect in Japan.
In many ways they are replicas of their officers. Like their officers,
their ideas of dissipation centre round learning something. Parties
of fifty or so “do” London and our chief industrial centres when they
are in England. On these occasions, and, indeed, always in foreign
ports, their behaviour leaves nothing to be desired. At Portsmouth,
where public houses are thick as can be, and where leave is given
very freely, a hundred or so will roam the town all day in groups,
fraternising and being made much of by the populace, but any disorder
or trouble with the police in consequence is almost unknown.
On shipboard drinking is said to be on the increase; but it is rarely a
cause of trouble, though a drunken Japanese is a nasty customer. Most
are temperate.
Stealing is practically unknown. Natural causes operate here. If by
any chance a Japanese sailor steals, he is a marked man. His shipmates
refuse to have any dealings with him whatever, he is an absolute
outcast; and his crime is passed on against him by his comrades
should he be sent to another ship. This perpetual ostracism is a most
effectual safeguard.
Till recently Japanese sailors were not over and above obedient. A
marked change has since sprung up, and they are now, as a rule, very
amenable and willing, as well as able. They still, however, need some
tact in management; and attempts to knife officers are not unknown.
Cleanliness is a national characteristic. Japanese sailors, like all
of the lower class in Japan, bathe more frequently even than the upper
classes—twice each day every Japanese sailor has a bath. If from war,
or any other cause, they are prevented from bathing for a couple of
weeks or so, the lower class Japanese suffer a great deal from skin
diseases. Hence they are ill-adapted for lengthy torpedo boat service.
In general neatness their average is high; on whatever work they are
engaged—except, of course, coaling ship—they are usually spick and span.
Despite his good qualities, however, the average Japanese bluejacket
is not on a par with his officers in value. He lacks stolidity; and,
take him all and all, he is inferior to a Chinese sailor. The Chinaman
is braver, or, rather, what the Japanese call braver. According to the
Japanese, Ah Sin is the finest material for bluejackets in the world,
and they are not alone in this opinion.
To return to the Japanese bluejacket. Like his officers, he has little,
if any, religion—though, nominally, a certain proportion may be
Buddhists or Shinto. They have, however, a species of semi-religious
code over some minor matters—for instance, no Japanese sailor will
accept a tip for small services, such as showing visitors round a ship,
or because he is coxswain of a boat in which you have taken passage.
According to their ethics, it is a _crime_ to accept special payment
for anything done in the way of duty, and if a man by any chance did
accept anything, his shipmates would render his life unbearable by
their contemptuous ridicule of him. So, though they will as readily and
gladly take any amount of trouble for a stranger, to try and give them
a tip annoys them. I once kept a Japanese boat’s crew, which had been
sent for me, waiting a long time, on a bitterly cold day, through some
misunderstanding as to time. It was a long row to the ship, against
a strong tide, in which they were soon wet through. Arrived at the
ship, my first attempt to tip the coxswain was greeted by a shake of
the head. Thinking he had misunderstood my intention, I repeated the
attempt. He at once called out, “No. Go away!” in a most indignant
tone, and his whole expression was that of a man on whom I had put a
deadly insult.
Japanese sailors are very quick in everything. In the Far East brawls
between them and Russian sailors, before the war, were very frequent,
and though the Russians are physically much the superior, yet, from
their quickness, the Japanese were more frequently the victors.
When Japanese sailors are in England, some of our missionary societies
keep an eye on them—taking them about, and generally trying to help
them. One old lady is particularly kindly remembered by the crews of
those destroyers that fitted out at the West India Docks. She gave the
crew of one of them a good many texts of the usual ornamental sort
when they left. They hung all these up, giving the post of honour to
one that said, “The wicked shall be destroyed.” They regarded this
as a very kindly compliment and good wish to their destroyer! I do
not think that the texts stand any chance of fulfilling a missionary
_rôle_—however, there they hung, in the fok’s’le, and over the
officers’ bunks in the wardroom also, in the hopes that “the old lady,
who had been so good to the men,” would derive some _quid pro quo_ in
the way of satisfaction at the sight.
XXI MESSING
In the Japanese Navy, as in ours, there are many messes—admirals being
by themselves, captains by themselves, and below them the wardroom,
gun-room, warrant officers, and petty officers’ messes.
The officers have three meals a day—
Breakfast at 7.0 to 7.30 a.m.
Lunch at 12 noon.
Dinner at 7.0 p.m.
The food is alternately English and Japanese—thus, one day there are
two meals European and one Japanese; the day following two Japanese and
one European. Preference is probably towards our food, but sentiment
retains the national diet. At the Japanese meals chopsticks are used.
The staple of these meals is rice.
In the way of liquids, our whisky-and-soda has now as great a vogue
as anything; but in all ships the national _saki_ still abounds. This
is a light wine made from rice—a sort of cross between hock and thin
cider—disagreeable at first to most European palates, but for which
one soon cultivates a liking. It is apt to play unexpected tricks on
the stranger who imbibes it too freely. In the winter time _saki_ is
drunk warm.
Japanese tea is always “on tap.” It bears no resemblance to tea as we
know it, being a strong green tea made with water just off the boil.
Neither milk nor sugar is taken with it—sweets are, however, eaten
beforehand.
So far from these national drinks being in abeyance, if a visitor in a
Japanese warship elects to take one or the other in place of whisky or
champagne, it is taken as a compliment by his hosts.
Japanese sailors are fed entirely, or nearly so, on European food.
It was found that they could not work so well on Japanese diet, and
they prefer European. They cook it, however, in more or less Japanese
fashion, and always eat it with chopsticks.
[Illustration: 24-CM. (9.4-IN.) 36-CALIBRE SCHNEIDER-CANET ON
DISAPPEARING MOUNTING FOR THE JAPANESE COAST SERVICE. FIRING POSITION.]
XXII ARMAMENT AND EQUIPMENT
1. GUNS.
The early Japanese warships were equipped with Krupp guns, the Naniwa
and Takachiho being so fitted. At a later date Canet guns were
introduced, but only for the heavy pieces, and the Matsushima class
carried a big 12.6 Canet and Elswick guns for the smaller pieces.
Subsequently, with the Fuji and Yashima, Elswick guns alone were
employed, and a factory for the construction of guns on the Elswick
model was established in Japan. The pieces selected were the 12-in.
40-calibre, the 8-in. 40-calibre, the 40-calibre 6-in., and the
45-calibre 4.7-in. Up to and including the Mikasa, all ships were
mounted with these guns.
In 1902-3 the Vickers 50-calibre 6-in. was experimented with and
adopted.
[Illustration: 12-IN. GUNS OF THE MIKASA.]
[Illustration: 24-CM. (9.4-IN.) CANET GUN OF 36 CALIBRES ON
DISAPPEARING MOUNTING, AS SUPPLIED FOR JAPANESE COAST FORTS. LOADING
AND TRAINING POSITION.]
The guns at present mounted in the Japanese fleet, excluding a few old
pieces about to be replaced or already removed, are as follows:—
----------+-----------+-----+----------+----------+------+---------+
Nominal | | | | | | |
calibre. | — |Long.| Initial | Initial |Shell.| Weight |
| | |velocity. | energy. | | of gun. |
----------+-----------+-----+----------+----------+------+---------+
in. cm. | |cals.|foot secs.|foot tons.| lbs. | tons. |
12.6 32 |Canet[36] | 40 | 2306 | 35220 | 990 | 66 |
12 30.5|Elswick[37]| 40 | 2423 | 34600 | 850 | 49 |
| | | | | | |
12 30.5|Krupp[38] | 20 | 1755 | 14750 | 725 | 35.4 |
| | | | | | |
10.2 26 |Krupp[39] | 25 | 1640 | 8400 | 450 | .. |
8.2 21 |Krupp | 30 | 1935 | 6167 | .. | 13 |
| | {| 2242 | 7319 | 210 |} |
8 20.3|Elswick | 40 {| 2068 | 7413 | 250 |} 15½ |
| | | | | | |
6 15 |Vickers | 50 | 3000 | 6240 | 100 | 8 |
6 15 |Elswick | 40 | 2500 | 4334 | 100 | 6½ |
6 15 |Elswick | 40 | 2220 | 3417 | 100 | 6 |
6 15 | .. | 35 | 1958 | 2554 | 100 | 5 |
| | | | | |
4.7 12 |Elswick | 40 | 2150 | 1442 | 45 | 2 |
4.7 12 |Elswick[40]| 32 | 1938 | 900 | 36 | 1⅔ |
| | | | | | |
3 7.5|Elswick | 40 | 2200 | 420 | 12 | 2 |
| | | | | | |
----------+-----------+-----+----------+----------+------+---------+
[36] Matsushima class.
[37] In Fuji to Mikasa.
[38] Chin Yen.
[39] Hei Yen, Naniwa, Takachiho.
[40] Matsushima class.
All guns of 40-calibres and over—that is to say, all the modern
pieces—fire a smokeless nitro-cellulose powder of Japanese invention,
and the maximum service velocities of all, save the 50-calibre Vickers,
are now up to the nominal initial velocity.
A.P. shot, A.P. shell, and common shell are fired by all guns, and, in
addition, those of 8 ins. or less calibre fire a special Japanese high
explosive of the lyddite type.
In smaller pieces, a 2½-pounder exists, which is to a certain extent a
Japanese invention; but it differs from models existing elsewhere only
in a few minor details of a semi-automatic nature. From what I have
seen of it, the piece would be better without these innovations.
[Illustration]
[Illustration: VICKERS 50-CALIBRE 6-IN. JAPANESE GUN.]
[Illustration: THE VICKERS 6-IN. AND 7.5-IN. OF 50 CALIBRES.
(_The former is adopted, the latter under consideration._)]
The maximum penetrations of the larger pieces through Krupp cemented
armour at 3000 yards are as follows:—
Capped. Uncapped.
Schneider-Canet 12.6-in. 16 13
Elswick 12-in. 15½ 12½
Elswick 8-in. 7½ 6
Vickers 6-in. 6½ 5
Elswick 6-in. 4 4
For coast defence, Schneider-Canet guns are mostly employed, many 9.4’s
on disappearing mounting having been supplied for forts.
2. GUNNERY ACCESSORIES.
The Barr and Stroud range-finder is used in all Japanese ships, and
acted excellently at the bombardments of Port Arthur in February, 1904.
The Barr and Stroud transmitters are also fitted to all first-class
warships. By means of these the range, projectile, and so forth is
telegraphed from the conning-tower to a dial in each turret and
casement. Without some such device a range-finder is of no particular
service, as by the time the range is passed down it will have altered.
The Grenfell system of transmission is also understood to be under
experiment. This differs in details from the Barr and Stroud, but in
general principle is much the same thing.
The theoretical objection to the Barr and Stroud is that the electric
leads may be cut by a hostile shot. They might be, but as the wires
are carried in duplicate under the armour deck the chances of failure
are about one in a million! Throughout the war with Russia all these
instruments have worked perfectly, and proved particularly serviceable
in the bombardments of Port Arthur.
[Illustration: CANET 27-CM. (10.6-IN.) JAPANESE COAST GUN OF 36
CALIBRES.]
3. TORPEDOES.
The Japanese service has three torpedoes:—
14-in. Whitehead, for torpedo boats and small cruisers.
18-in. ” for destroyers and large ships.
24-in. ” for defence of channels.
This last torpedo has an effective range of over 3000 yards. It is not,
however, carried on shipboard.
The Whiteheads are identical with those in the British service. So,
too, are the above-water tubes. The submerged ones are of Elswick
pattern—Mark I., which was not satisfactory at high speeds in the Fuji,
Yashima, and Shikishima; Mark II., which delivers fairly well at all
speeds in the later ships. All ships that carry submerged tubes—that
is, all first-class battleships or cruisers—have four fitted: two
forward on the broadside and two bearing 45° abaft the beam, just abaft
the after barbette.
Above-water tubes are condemned, and several of those in existence were
under orders of removal when the Russian war broke out.
Above-water bow tubes were condemned on account of the seas that they
took in. As such as exist in armoured vessels are protected by 6-in.
armour, they did not improve seaworthiness, the weight in the extreme
bow being inconvenient.
[Illustration: PLAN OF CIRCUITS OF THE ELSWICK TUBE.]
[Illustration: CANET 15-CM. (6-IN.) JAPANESE COAST GUN.]
4. ARMOUR.
An armour-plate factory has been established at Kobé, but it is not yet
in a position to turn out much except gun shields.
A characteristic of the Japanese has been their readiness to adopt new
processes.
Thus the Fuji and Yashima were designed for compound armour, but the
Harvey process coming in while the ships were building, it was at once
adopted in preference to compound. So, too, in later ships the improved
Harvey, “Harvey-Nickel,” was at once used, and in the Iwate and Idzumo
belts were shortened a little and speed reduced, so that the Krupp
process might be employed for the water-line plates.
In the Mikasa great expense was undertaken solely in order to apply
Krupp cemented to curved surfaces instead of the non-cemented and less
tough Krupp plates usually so employed. There is some doubt whether
this experiment was successful; if Krupp cemented plates are “fiddled
with” their special virtue departs. It is also stated, however, that
the Mikasa’s plates were made on a special process somewhat analogous
to the Krupp, but differing from it in certain details, and less liable
to injury in bending.
5. ENGINES AND BOILERS.
The engines of Japanese warships are, save in the case of a few small
vessels, of British manufacture, and the same as those of British ships.
In boilers, the Belleville type was adopted with the Shikishima, and
several older vessels have been re-boilered with it. Almost the first
warship to be fitted with this type was the Chiyoda.
With some remarkable exceptions, Japanese naval engineers have not
succeeded very conspicuously in securing the very economical coal
results which have been obtained with Bellevilles in the British Fleet.
A remarkable instance to the contrary was the Idzumo; the Mikasa also
did well. The Asahi, when first commissioned, did badly, but, when the
art of coal spreading on scientific lines was mastered, suddenly became
very economical.
No trouble of any sort has been experienced, and the Japanese have
shown themselves singularly adapted to the management of water-tube
boilers.
[Illustration: THE LATEST PATTERN ELSWICK SUBMERGED TUBE.]
When the Yaeyama was re-boilered, Niclausse generators were fitted to
her, but with indifferent success. Consequently, in order to continue
experiments on the lines of the British Navy, this type was fitted to
the Niitaka and Tsushima, and ordered for one of the new battleships.
Apparently the experiment is to be continued to other types, following
the example of the British Navy, though the majority of the engineers
are averse to such a procedure, both on account of the success obtained
with the Belleville and because of the extreme difficulty involved when
many types exist, and many of the men sent to a ship are used to some
other type of boiler than the one that they are called on to work.
[Illustration: BELLEVILLE BOILER WITH ECONOMISERS.]
A water-tube boiler of Japanese design exists—a species of cross
between the Belleville and Yarrow, with a little Niclausse thrown in.
It does not appear to promise well, and though designed to possess the
virtues of each type, seems more likely to embody their weaker points
than their strong ones. Such, at least, appears to be the general
verdict.
There is also another water-tube boiler of Japanese origin, something
like the Thornycroft, which is in the hands of the Temperley
Transported Company; but I have not heard of any practical tests of it
as yet, its invention being quite recent.
In any case, neither is likely to oust existing types, as most of the
valuable points in a boiler are already patented all over the world.
The inventors of new types are, therefore, hampered much like inventors
of new systems of wireless telegraphy are—some one has been before
them. In addition, a water-tube boiler requires some years of practical
service before it can be classed as out of the experimental stage. The
great advantage possessed by the Belleville, which “in theory” is one
of the worst of boilers, lies in the numerous features introduced by
years of practical experience. In rough-sea work theory and practice
rarely go together; the thing that is ideal on paper is apt at sea to
fail unexpectedly. The water-tube boilers fitted in Japanese ships are
as follows:—
BELLEVILLE. NILAUSSE.
Chiyoda (old type). Niitaka.
Itsukushima. Yaeyama.
Matsushima (old type). Tsushima.
Shikishima (old type). Kashima.
Asahi. Katori.
Hatsuse.
Mikasa.
Yakumo.
Azuma.
Iwate.
Idzumo.
Takasago.
[Illustration: NICLAUSSE BOILER.]
The Japanese boiler under experiment is the Miyabara, the invention of
the Engineer-in-Chief of the Japanese Navy. It is to be fitted to the
Otawa, and probably some other ships. It is also in the Hashidate. The
inventor recently produced a paper showing its all-round advantages
over every other type of water-tube boiler; but this, of course, may
be taken _cum grano salis_. However, there is little doubt but that,
should it be in any way successful, natural national vanity will lead
to its general adoption in preference to European types, just as the
2½-pounder gun has been.
XXIII OTHER NAVIES AS SEEN BY THE JAPANESE
The following expressions of opinion are not necessarily entirely
representative, but they certainly coincide with the views of a great
many of the more travelled officers, and as such will have, no doubt,
some considerable interest.
BRITISH.
“British officers are too fond of golf and other games—they do not
study enough. They are very stiff at first, but nice when you know
them. They are always very clean, spick and span, and well shaved. On
board a British warship it is always very impressive—it is the most
impressive navy in the world. And it is more ready than many people
think.”
FRENCH.
“The French is a funny navy, and it is hard to say what is good and
what is bad in it, for the thing that looks good may be bad, and the
thing that looks bad, good. They have some very clever engineers.”
GERMAN.
“The German officers all seem ‘strong.’ To many they seem always
overbearing. They hope to be the greatest navy in the world; and plenty
of them think that they already are.”
RUSSIAN.[41]
“The Russians are brave—very brave. But not many are good, and they
are savages. They can be very polite when it suits them; when not—ah!
Russian sailors are miserable people who lie in the snow, who have
very little money, which they spend in buying cheap fish. They are
very dirty. That is all we know of Russian sailors, who are quite like
strange people to us. But we have no fear as to the result of a war
with the Polar Bear.”
[41] Expressed before the Russo-Japanese War.
UNITED STATES, AMERICA.
“The Americans have a wonderful navy with wonderful ships. Everything
American is more wonderful than anything else in the world, so that we
do not know what to believe.”
THEMSELVES.
Of themselves Japanese officers speak little. But it is not difficult
to infer from their talk that they do not in any way feel dissatisfied
with themselves. Ship for ship, they are firmly convinced that they
are the finest navy in the world; and it cannot be said that up to the
moment of writing (June, 1904) they have done anything to cause them
to retract this opinion. No body of men could have displayed better
qualities than they have from all accounts. It may be added that, in my
opinion, every Japanese is also of conviction that Japan is going to be
the greatest naval power in the world in the future. With that feeling
they entered on the present war. It is a very useful feeling to have.
XXIV THE WAR WITH RUSSIA
The war with Russia was the direct outcome of the action of that Power
in ousting Japan from Port Arthur. There is little question but that
the real object of the Chino-Japanese War was Japan’s determination to
be the paramount power in the Far East. The action of Russia, France,
and Germany in neutralising all that victory gave her completely
checkmated Japan, and from that day onward she made little secret of
her preparations for a war, the prize of which would be the control
of China, and the foundation of a Far Eastern Empire whose ultimate
proportions none can foresee.
The political situation between Japan and Russia needs no comment
in a purely naval record of events: Japan made ready with a steady
determination, where Russia ignored the obvious.
Not till a month or two before the war did Russia recognise that it was
inevitable; she then sought refuge in diplomatic delays, which Japan
severed by the sudden rupture of negotiations at a moment favourable
to herself. Much has been written of Japan’s “treachery” and Russia’s
“duplicity,” but neither accusation is just.
[Illustration: VARIAG.]
Following are the Japanese versions of the various incidents of the
war, as officially reported:—
They were prefaced by the Chemulpo incident, in which the Asama,
Naniwa, Takachiho, Suma, Chiyoda, and Niitaka annihilated the Russian
cruiser Variag and the gunboat Korietz.
As a naval incident, this action has little interest or significance,
the Russian ships being abnormally overmatched; indeed, there is
nothing in the affair worthy of comment save the admirable strategy
displayed by the Japanese in thus ensuring absolute victory without
taking any risks. A very high appreciation of the real meaning of
sea-power is evidenced here.
The rest of the naval war concentrated around Port Arthur. The Japanese
task was in no way an easy one, for Russia made no errors after the
first stupendous one by which she lost her two best battleships.
[Illustration: [_Reproduced by kind permission of the “Graphic.”_
ADMIRAL TOGO.]
FIRST ATTACK ON PORT ARTHUR
Admiral Togo’s official report of the attack on Port Arthur is dated
February 10, 1904, at sea, and is as follows:—
After the combined fleet left Sasebo on the 6th,
everything went off as planned.
At midnight, on the 8th, the advance squadron attacked
the enemy’s advance squadron, the latter being mostly
outside the bay.
The Poltava, Askold, and two others were apparently
struck by torpedoes.
At noon, on the 9th, the fleet advanced to the offing
of Port Arthur Bay, and attacked the enemy for forty
minutes, I believe doing considerable damage.
I believe the enemy were greatly demoralised. They
stopped fighting at one o’clock, and appeared to
retreat to the harbour.
The Japanese fleet suffered but very slight damage, and
its fighting strength has not decreased.
Our casualties were four killed and fifty-four wounded.
The imperial princes on board suffered no harm.
The conduct of the officers was cool, and not unlike
their conduct at manœuvres.
This morning, owing to the heavy south wind, detailed
reports from the vessels have not been received, so I
merely report the above facts.
TOGO.
The ships actually torpedoed were the Tsarevitch, Retvizan, and
Pallada, none of which were sunk.
The Japanese fleet consisted of all the modern vessels.
The relative small loss inflicted upon the Russians is explained as
follows:—
(1) Several of the Japanese boats followed some
scouting Russian boats in error.
(2) The torpedo is an uncertain weapon at the best.
The Japanese boats got in by imitating Russian signals.
In the battle of the 9th very little harm was done on either side. The
Novik and several other Russian ships were struck, but the damages were
in no case serious. On the Japanese side the Fuji and Iwate received
some hits, but these, though extensive, were not of a really serious
nature.
SECOND ATTACK
The official report is as follows:—
On the 13th a division of torpedo-boat destroyers
started for Port Arthur during a heavy snowstorm. The
boats lost sight of each other and became separated.
Only the Hayatori and Asagiri reached Port Arthur. The
Asagiri sighted the entrance to the harbour at three
o’clock on the morning of the 14th, and was received
with a heavy fire by the batteries and scouting torpedo
boats. She entered the harbour and discharged a torpedo
at a warship from whose funnel smoke was ascending. The
Asagiri then emerged safely, returning the fire of the
enemy’s torpedo-boats.
The same morning, at five o’clock, the Hayatori
approached Port Arthur and discerned two Russian ships,
which opened fire on her. The destroyer discharged a
torpedo, which was seen to explode. The Hayatori also
escaped scathless.
It is impossible to state the definite material
results, owing to the darkness, but the moral effect
was certainly considerable.
TOGO.
It has not yet been definitely ascertained whether any Russian ship was
sunk; if so, it was only a minor vessel. This attack may be written off
as a wasted effort.
ATTACK ON VLADIVOSTOK
The next incident of note was the attack on Vladivostok, which, again,
was barren of results, as the Russians did not attempt to reply.
The official report of the attack on Vladivostok, from Admiral
Kamimura, commanding the second squadron, is as follows:—
As prearranged, the squadron reached the eastern
entrance of Vladivostok on the morning of March 6,
after passing through the frozen sea. The enemy’s ships
were not seen in the outside harbour, and the Japanese
vessels approached the batteries on the north-east
coast from a point beyond the range of the batteries of
the Balzan Promontory and the Bosphorous Strait.
After bombarding the inner harbour for forty minutes
from ten minutes to two, the Japanese squadron
retired. It is believed that the bombardment effected
considerable damage. Soldiers were seen on land, but
the Russian batteries did not reply to the Japanese
fire.
Black smoke was observed in the eastern entrance about
five in the afternoon, and was thought to be from the
enemy’s ships, but the smoke gradually disappeared. On
the morning of the 7th inst. the Japanese squadron
reconnoitred America Bay and Strelok Bay, but nothing
unusual was seen. The warships again approached the
eastern entrance of Vladivostok at noon, but the
enemy’s ships were not visible, and the batteries did
not fire.
The squadron then turned towards Possiet Bay, but
seeing nothing of the enemy, retired.
The next operations were more exciting, being officially reported as
follows:—
An attack on Port Arthur took place on March 10th, as
previously planned.
Our destroyers were formed into two separate flotillas.
Both of them reached the outside of the harbour at
midnight on the 9th and reconnoitred, but no enemy
was seen. At dawn the second flotilla laid special
mechanical mines in many places, and succeeded in the
task, notwithstanding the intermittent fires from the
enemy’s forts.
At half-past four a.m. the first flotilla encountered
six Russian destroyers at the south of Liaotishan,
and a hot action took place for twenty minutes. In
its course three of our destroyers—Asashio, Kasumi,
and Akatsuki—fought very closely against the enemy’s
destroyers, almost touching each other, and delivered a
hot fire.
The enemy’s destroyers were severely injured, either
being damaged in engines or suffering from the outbreak
of fire, and fled away in great confusion. Our ships also
sustained some damage. Casualties on our side are seven
petty officers killed and nine men wounded.
The Akatsuki’s auxiliary steampipe was destroyed,
but all the destroyers of the first flotilla have no
difficulty for further fighting or navigation.
The second flotilla, when it was leaving the outside
of the harbour at 7 a.m., found two Russian destroyers
just coming back into the harbour, and attacked them,
intercepting their return course. One of the two
escaped, but the other—namely, the Steregutchy—was
destroyed and captured by our destroyer Sazanami, which
tried to tow it back. However, the leakage was great
and the sea very rough, and the towing-rope was broken.
Therefore, after the prisoners, four in all, were taken
up, the captured ship was left, and she sank at ten
minutes past ten a.m.
The damage in the second flotilla is insignificant.
Casualties: Two men killed and one officer and three
men wounded.
Although the Novik and Bayan came out from the harbour
towards the second flotilla, they soon retired into the
harbour upon seeing that our cruisers were approaching.
As to the movements of our main squadron and the
cruiser squadron, they arrived off Port Arthur at eight
a.m. The cruiser squadron at once proceeded towards the
front of the mouth of the harbour and supported our
destroyer flotilla, as above stated.
The main squadron also approached Liaotishan, from ten
a.m. until twenty minutes to two p.m., and made an
indirect bombardment against the harbour. The enemy’s
forts intermittently returned the fire, but no damage
was inflicted upon our ships. A detached squadron of
cruisers went to Dalny, and destroyed the enemy’s
buildings on the San Shan Islands.
The Takasago and Chihaya scouted the western coast of
the entrance of Port Arthur, but no enemy was seen.
A Russian destroyer, which had been sunk in Pigeon Bay
in the last battle, is found to be the Vnushitelni, of
which now the upper parts of the masts and funnels are
seen on the surface. All our ships discontinued the
battle at two p.m., and retired.
Subsequently an attempt was made to block Port Arthur harbour with
sunken ships. It was also hoped to destroy the Retvizan by exploding
ships near her, but the attack was completely foiled by the defence.
There was a second bottling expedition of March 27th, which again
failed. It led to the death of a valuable officer, Commander Hirose.
The official report ran as follows:—
The united squadron again left for Port Arthur on
Saturday.
On Sunday morning at half-past three it commenced
blockading the harbour entrance. The four steamers to
be sunk, escorted by a flotilla of destroyers, advanced
to the entrance, facing the enemy’s searchlights.
At about two miles from the entrance they were
discovered by the enemy, and exposed to fire from the
fortress on either shore, and also from the enemy’s
ships on guard.
Braving these dangers, the four steamers ran into the
waterway at the mouth of the harbour. The Chiyo-maru
anchored at about half a chain from the shore, to the
west of Golden Hill, and blew up. The Fukui-maru,
passing to the left of Chiyo-maru, advanced a short
distance, and was about to anchor, when she was struck
by a torpedo from the enemy’s destroyers, and sank. The
Yahiko-maru went to the left of the Fukui-maru, and
blew up herself.
The Yoneyama-maru reached the harbour entrance, and
colliding against the stern of an enemy’s destroyer,
managed to reach the middle passage by passing between
the Chiyo-maru and Fukui-maru. Just at that moment
an enemy’s torpedo struck and sunk her. The momentum
brought her forward to the left shore, and with her
bows towards the left side sank sideways.
To have accomplished the work so far under such great
disadvantages and dangers must be considered a success
and command admiration. It is regrettable, however,
that, owing to some space being still left between the
Yahiko-maru and Yoneyama-maru, a complete blocking has
not been effected.
Those who were engaged in this work are those who had
been engaged in the same work before. It was by their
special request that only the petty officers and crews
were supplanted by new men.
The casualties were as follows:—Commander Hirose and
three petty officers killed; Lieut. Shimada mortally
wounded; Lieut. Masuki, Engineer Kura, and six petty
officers and men slightly wounded. All the rest of the
crews were safely picked up by our destroyers.
Commander Hirose and Boatswain Sugino, who were killed,
displayed admirable courage. Sugino was just going
down to light the magazine on the Fukui-maru, when the
ship was struck by the enemy’s torpedo, killing him.
Commander Hirose, after causing his men to take to the
boats, and not finding Sugino, searched through the
ship three times. Finding his ship gradually going
down, he was compelled to leave her and enter the boat.
As the boat was rowing away under the enemy’s fire, a
shell struck him on the head, and the greater part of
his body was blown away, the only remaining part of
this brave officer’s body being a piece of flesh in the
boat.
Commander Hirose was always a model officer, and he
leaves a meritorious example and memory which will be
everlasting.
For the protection of the steamers and the rescue of
their crews, all our flotilla of destroyers did their
utmost, in the face of the enemy’s severe cannonade.
Above all, the destroyers Kotaka and Tsubame penetrated
to within a mile of the harbour entrance, where they
encountered and engaged an enemy’s destroyer, to which
they did considerable damage. The Russian destroyer
seemed to have had her boiler hit, and sent up a volume
of steam, and retreated.
As the officers and men were leaving the harbour after
their work was done, they observed one of the enemy’s
ships below Golden Hill. She seemed completely disabled.
In spite of the enemy’s very hot fire, to which our
flotilla was exposed until dawn, no damage whatever was
sustained.
The crews on board the Chiyo-maru and Yahi-maru were
taken on board the destroyer Tsubame. The crew of the
Yoneyama-maru escaped in three boats, and were rescued
by the destroyers Misasagi and Karigane. The crew of
the Fukui-maru was taken on board the Kasumi.
The following torpedo boats and destroyers took part in
the engagement:—
Destroyers.—Shirakumo, Kasumi, Asashio, Akatsuki,
Akebono, Oboro, Inazumi, Ikadzuchi, Usugumo, Sazanami,
and Shimonome.
Torpedo boats.—Karigane, Kotaka, Misasagi, Tsubame,
Managure, and Hato.
TOGO.
The concluding operation of the first stage of the war was reported as
follows by Admiral Togo:—
On the 11th our combined fleet commenced, as previously
planned, the eighth attack upon Port Arthur. The fourth
and the fifth destroyer flotillas, the fourteenth
torpedo flotilla, and the Koryo-maru reached the mouth
of Port Arthur at midnight of the 12th, and effected the
laying of mines at several points outside the port,
defying the enemy’s searchlight.
The second destroyer flotilla discovered, at dawn of
the 13th, one Russian destroyer trying to enter the
harbour, and, after ten minutes’ attack, sank her.
Another Russian destroyer was discovered coming from
the direction of Liau-tie-shan. We attacked her, but
she managed to flee into the harbour.
There were no casualties on our side, except two seamen
in the Ikazuchi slightly wounded. There was no time
to rescue the enemy’s drowning crew, as the Bayan
approached.
The third fleet reached outside of Port Arthur at
8 a.m., when the Bayan came out and opened fire.
Immediately the Novik, Askold, Diana, Petropavlovsk,
Pobieda, and Poltava came out and made offensive attack
upon us.
Our third fleet, tardily answering and gradually
retiring, enticed the enemy fifteen miles south-east of
the port, when our first fleet, being informed through
wireless telegraphy from the third fleet, suddenly
appeared before the enemy and attacked them.
While the enemy was trying to regain the port, a
battleship of the Petropavlovsk type struck mines laid
by us in the previous evening, and sank at 10.32 a.m.
Another ship was observed to have lost freedom of
movement, but the confusion of enemy’s ships prevented
us from identifying her. They finally managed to regain
the port.
Our third fleet suffered no damage.
The enemy’s damage was, besides the above-mentioned,
probably slight also.
Our first fleet did not reach firing distance. Our
fleets retired at 1 p.m., prepared for another attack
On the 14th our fleet resailed towards Port Arthur. The
second, the fourth, and the fifth destroyer flotillas
and the ninth torpedo flotilla joined at 3 a.m., and
the third fleet at 7 a.m. No enemy’s ship was seen
outside the port.
Our first fleet arrived there at 9 a.m., and,
discovering three mines laid by the enemy, destroyed
them all.
The Kasuga and the Nisshin were despatched to the west
of Liau-tie-shan. They made an indirect bombardment for
two hours, this being their first action. The new forts
at Liau-tie-shan were finally silenced.
Our forces retired at 1.30 p.m.
TOGO.
The Russian ship destroyed was Admiral Makaroff’s flagship, the
Petropavlovsk; the second ship injured was the battleship Pobieda. In
the action in which she engaged the third squadron, the Bayan also was
damaged, and the effective Russian fleet for the moment reduced to the
Peresviet, Sevastopol, Askold, Diana, Novik, and some five destroyers.
Another attempt to block the harbour followed, no less than ten ships
being employed. In Japan this attempt was accepted as completely
successful; but there are few grounds for believing that it was more
than temporarily so.
Too little is yet known of the real facts of the war for many
conclusions of value to be drawn; indeed, only one thing is as yet
fully clear, and that is the importance of battleships. Russia’s
failure lay here. Lacking a battleship superiority, she was unable to
support her cruisers, and these consequently unable to support the
destroyers. As a result, despite the extraordinary activity of the
Russian cruiser Bayan, the naval war followed the exact course that any
one cognizant of naval affairs could have predicted on February 10,
1904. Only the battleship can confer command of the sea.
Later events to the end of May included the loss of the battleship
Hatsuse, by contact with a Russian mine, and the sinking of the cruiser
Yoshino, after collision with the Kasuga in a fog.
APPENDICES
THE SINKING OF THE KOW-SHING
OFFICIAL REPORT OF CAPTAIN TOGO OF THE NANIWA
“At 9.15 a.m., coming close to the Kow-shing, I signalled J. W. (to
stop immediately) and twice fired blank shot. The next signal was L.
P. (to anchor), which she obeyed. I was at that time very anxious to
catch the flying Chinese warship, and I turned a little while in that
direction. At that time the Kow-shing signalled D. N. W. R. (may I
proceed), which I answered by the signal J. W.
“At 10.40, I sent Lieutenant Hitomi and others as prize officers to
her. On seeing all the papers and other things, they found that she
was carrying contraband persons. So I ordered her to follow me, which
her captain consented to do. When I hoisted the signal L. R. (slip
or weigh anchor immediately), she asked me by signal to send a boat
for communication. I thought that the captain wished to tell me that
he was prevented by the Chinese soldiers from obeying my order. So I
ordered Lieutenant Hitomi to go again to her, giving him instructions
to bring the Europeans on board the Naniwa, if the Chinese generals
were resisting the carrying out of my order. When the lieutenant came
alongside, the captain came to the gangway and said that the Chinese
generals asked to be allowed to return to Taku, as they did not know
that war had broken out. The lieutenant informed me that, when he
went there, the Chinese soldiers were in a condition of the greatest
confusion and excitement, so that the captain intentionally came down
to the gangway and would not let him go on deck. Four hours had been
consumed in these fruitless negotiations, and there was no longer room
for hesitation, so I signalled M. L. (quit the ship immediately). To
this the captain again answered by the signal demanding a boat. At that
time I thought it would be rather foolish to send our officers, as the
Chinese were in such an excited state. Accordingly I signalled H. J.
(boat cannot come). It seemed to me that she was awaiting the arrival
of the Chinese fleet; moreover, it was very dangerous to hesitate any
longer, so I again hoisted the signal M. L., and at the same time a red
flag on the foremast. At 1.10 p.m. I ordered one torpedo and shells to
be discharged. The latter hit the engine-room.
“At 1.15 the Kow-shing began to sink from her stern.
“At 1.37 I sent two cutters to rescue the captain, the officers and the
rest.
“At 1.46 she sank.
“The spot where she sank is two miles south of the island of
Sho-pai-oul.”
CAPTAIN GALSWORTHY’S REPORT.
The British steamer Kow-shing, owned by the Indo-China Co., left
Shang-hai on July 17th, bound to Taku, under charter to carry Chinese
troops from that port to Asan, on the coast of Korea. Arriving at Taku
on the 20th, arrangements were made to ship the troops, and on the 23rd
1100 came on board, including two generals, a number of other officers
of various ranks, and a German ex-army officer named Hanneken, who came
as an ordinary passenger. At 9.50 p.m. on the 23rd the ship proceeded
on her voyage to Asan. All went well until the morning of the 25th,
when off Shopeiul Island, we passed a man-of-war flying the Japanese
naval ensign, with a white flag above it. This vessel proved to be the
Chinese warship Tei-yuen. Shortly afterwards we sighted three Japanese
men-of-war, the Naniwa, Yoshino, and another (probably the Akitsushiu).
The Naniwa at once steamed towards us, flying a signal ordering us to
stop. She also fired two blank charges, and signalled us to anchor,
which we did at once. The Naniwa then steamed away, apparently to
communicate with the other ships. I at once enquired by signal if I
might proceed, to which the Naniwa replied, “Heave-to or take the
consequences.” A boat then came from the Naniwa and an officer came on
board. He was received at the gangway, and he asked to see the ship’s
papers. They were shown him, and his attention particularly called to
the fact that she was a British ship. Numerous other questions were
asked and answered, the most important one being, “Would the Kow-shing
follow the Naniwa?” Being utterly helpless against a man-of-war, I
replied that there would be no alternative but to do so, under protest,
if ordered. The officer then left the ship, and proceeded to the
Naniwa. Shortly after, being still at anchor, I was ordered by signal
to cut, slip, or weigh immediately. The Chinese generals learning
the meaning of the signals, and finding preparations were being made
to follow the Naniwa, objected most emphatically. They were told how
useless it would be to resist, as one shot would sink them in a short
time. The generals then said they would rather die than obey Japanese
orders, and, as they had 1100 men against about 400 on the Naniwa, they
would fight sooner than surrender. They were told that if they decided
to fight, the foreign officers would leave the ship. The generals then
gave orders to the troops on deck to kill us if we obeyed the orders
of the Japanese or attempted to leave the ship. With gestures they
threatened to cut off our heads, to stab or shoot us; and a lot of men
were selected to watch us and carry out the order. A signal was then
made requesting the Naniwa to send a boat, in order to communicate
the state of affairs. A boat was at once sent, but a crowd of armed
Chinese took possession of the gangway, until I prevailed on the
generals to send them away. Eventually the officers came alongside, and
a message for the commander of the Naniwa was sent, stating that the
Chinese refused to allow the Kow-shing to be taken, and insisting upon
returning to Taku. It was again pointed out that she was a British
ship, and that she had left port before war had been declared. The boat
then returned to the Naniwa, and on her arrival a signal was hoisted
ordering the Europeans to leave the ship at once. A reply was given
that they were not allowed to leave the ship, and asking for a boat to
be sent. Notice was sent to the engineers to be handy on deck in case
the Japanese fired. The Naniwa shortly afterwards replied that a boat
could not be sent. The Naniwa then hoisted a red flag at the fore,
which was apparently a signal for discharging a torpedo, as one was
fired at the Kow-shing, but missed her. A broadside of five guns was
then fired. At the time I was on the bridge, my officers having left
it, and seeing that the soldiers set to watch me had left their station
at the foot of the ladder, I rushed to the wheelhouse, and, after
obtaining a lifebelt (the last one remaining), I jumped over the ship’s
side. In doing so I heard a terrific explosion, and upon returning to
the surface of the sea I found the atmosphere was thick with smoke and
fine coal-powder. I at once struck out for the shore, distant about
1¼ miles. There were many Chinese in the water, but I only saw one
European, Mr. von Hanneken. As the air cleared, a bullet struck the
water close to my ear, and was followed by a shower of bullets. Knowing
that shot from the Naniwa could not strike near me, owing to being
sheltered by the hull of the Kow-shing, I turned on my back, and saw
the Chinese soldiers firing at me from the deck and the ’tween deck
ports. As far as possible I protected the back of my head with the
lifebelt, and swam as low in the water as I could. Shortly after the
Kow-shing went down, stern first. After being in the water some time,
I was picked up by the Naniwa’s cutter, in a very exhausted condition.
The same boat had already rescued one of the quartermasters, who had
been wounded in the neck by a rifle bullet. On arriving at the Naniwa
we found that the chief officer was the only other person saved by
the Japanese, leaving five Europeans connected with the ship, and the
passenger, missing. We anchored off Shopeiul about 9 a.m. The firing
commenced about 1 p.m., and we were taken aboard the Naniwa about 2.30
p.m. During the evening the Naniwa steamed away, arriving the next
morning at the rendezvous of the Japanese Fleet in Korea. We were then
transferred to the Yayeyama, together with a Danish electrician, named
Muhlenstedt, and about sixty Chinese, who were taken prisoners from the
Chinese steamer Tso-kiang, the same clay. The Yayeyama then proceeded
to Sasebo, arriving on the morning of the 28th. From Sasebo I and Mr.
Tamplin, the chief officer, came here in a small tender at noon on
Sunday last, having in the mean time been interviewed by Mr. Suyematsu
Kencho, President of the Imperial Board of Legislature, who came down
from Tokyo for that purpose. The quartermaster remained behind owing
to his wound not having properly healed up, whilst Mr. Muhlenstedt
is being further detained. During our detention we received every
care and attention necessary for our comfort. After arriving here we
proceeded to H.M.’s Consulate, and made an affidavit of the entire
circumstances. The Naniwa, I may mention, had been damaged on the port
quarter from a shot fired from the Tche-yuen in the morning. I can
positively say I did not see the Japanese fire on the Chinese in the
water. The Chinese killed many of their own people.
LOSS OF THE KOW-SHING
Finding and Order of a Naval Court, held at H.B.M. Consulate, Nagasaki,
on August 7, 1894.
The S.S. Kow-shing was an iron vessel, schooner rigged, of 1355 tons
registered tonnage, official number 87000, built at Barrow-in-Furness,
and belonging to the port of London. It appears from evidence given
before this court that she sailed from Taku on or about the 23rd day of
July, 1894, bound for Gasan, in Korea, with no cargo but 1100 Chinese
troops on board, that everything went well until the morning of the
25th July, when about 9 a.m. the Naniwa-kan, a Japanese man-of-war,
signalled to her to stop and to anchor, with the island of Sho-pei-oul
bearing about N. by E., distant 1¼ miles. That after communicating
with the Kow-shing twice by boat, and ordering the officers to quit
the vessel, which they were prevented doing by the Chinese troops, the
Naniwa-kan, about 1 p.m., discharged a torpedo at the Kow-shing, and
this not striking her the Naniwa-kan fired a broadside of five heavy
guns at her and continued firing both heavy and machine guns from
deck and tops until she sank, about an hour later. That when firing
commenced a number of the crew and Chinese troops jumped overboard,
amongst them the master, Thomas Ryder Galsworthy, the first mate, Lewis
Henry Tamplin, and a quartermaster, Lucas Evangelista (a Manilla man),
who are the only members of the crew at present known to be saved.
The court, having regard to the circumstances above stated, find as
follows:—
1. That the ship was sufficiently seaworthy and
found well in all necessary respects.
2. That the conduct of the officers and crew before
and up to the time of the sinking of the vessel was
satisfactory and free from blame.
3. That the cause of the sinking was due to her
having been repeatedly struck by heavy cannon shots
from the Naniwa-kan, a Japanese man-of-war.
4. That no efforts on the part of the master or crew
would have availed to avert the catastrophe.
5. That the court attaches no blame whatever to
the master, Thomas Ryder Galsworthy, or any of the
officers or crew.
6. The expenses of the Court are merely approved.
Dated at Nagasaki, the 7th day of August, 1894.
JOHN J. QUIN,
H.B.M. Consul, president.
THE ARMISTICE
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan having in view of the untoward event
which temporarily interrupted the depending negotiations for peace
commanded his plenipotentiaries to consent to a temporary armistice,
The undersigned Count Ito Hirobumi, Junii, grand cross of the imperial
order of Paullownia, minister president of state, and Viscount Mutsu
Munemitsu, Junii, first class of the imperial order of the Sacred
Treasure, minister of state for foreign affairs, the plenipotentiaries
of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan; and Li Hung-Chang, plenipotentiary
of His Majesty the Emperor of China, senior tutor to the Heir Apparent,
senior grand secretary of state, minister superintendent of trade for
the northern ports of China, viceroy of the province of Chihli and earl
of the first rank, have concluded the following treaty of armistice:—
Art. 1. The Imperial governments of Japan and China agree to enforce
an armistice between their respective military and naval forces in the
provinces of Fêng-tien, Chihli and Shan-tung subject to the provisions
contained in the following articles:—
Art. 2. The forces affected by this armistice shall have the right
to maintain the positions respectively occupied by them at the time
hostilities are actually suspended, but they shall not under any
circumstances during the existence of this armistice advance beyond
such positions.
Art. 3. The two governments engage during the existence of this
treaty not to extend, perfect or advance their attacking works or to
reinforce or in anywise to strengthen either for offensive or defensive
operations their confronting military line. But this engagement shall
not prevent either government from making any new distribution or
arrangement of troops not intended to augment or strengthen the armies
now actually in the field and engaged in active military operations.
Art. 4. The movement of troops and the transportation of military
supplies and all other contraband of war by sea shall be subject to
the ordinary rules of war and shall consequently be liable to hostile
capture.
Art. 5. This armistice shall be enforced by the imperial governments
of Japan and China for the period of 21 days from the date of the
signature of this treaty.
In those localities occupied by the troops of the two governments to
which there is no telegraphic communication the quickest possible means
shall be employed in issuing the orders for the armistice, and the
respective commanders of the two countries shall upon the receipt of
such orders announce the fact to each other and take steps to enforce
the armistice.
Art. 6. This armistice shall terminate, without notice on either side,
at mid-day on the 20th day of the 4th month of the 28th year of Meiji
corresponding to the 26th day of the 3rd month of the 21st year of
Kwang-Hsu. If in the mean time the depending negotiations for peace are
broken off, this armistice shall in that case terminate at the same
time such negotiations cease.
In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries of Japan and China have
hereunto set their hands and affixed their seals.
Done at Shimonosiki, Japan, this 30th day of the 3rd month of the 28th
year of Meiji corresponding to the 5th day of the 3rd month of the 21st
year of Kwang-Hsu.
COUNT ITO HIROBUMI (L. S.),
_Junii; grand cross of the imperial order
of Paullownia; minister president of
state; plenipotentiary of His Majesty the
Emperor of Japan_.
VISCOUNT MUTSU MUNEMITSU (L. S.),
_Junii; first class of the imperial order
of the Sacred Treasure; minister of state
for foreign affairs; plenipotentiary of
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan_.
LI HUNG-CHANG (L. S.),
_plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor
of China; senior tutor to the Heir_
_Apparent; senior grand secretary of state;
minister superintendent of trade for the
northern ports of China; viceroy of the
province of Chihli and earl of the first rank_.
THE TREATY OF PEACE
(_Official translation._)
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and His Majesty the Emperor of China,
desiring to restore the blessings of peace to their countries and
subjects and to remove all cause for future complications, have named
as their plenipotentiaries for the purpose of concluding a treaty of
peace, that is to say:
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Count Ito Hirobumi, Junii, grand
cross of the imperial order of the Paullownia, minister president of
state, and Viscount Mutsu Munemitsu, Junii, first class of the imperial
order of the Sacred Treasure, minister of state for foreign affairs;
and His Majesty the Emperor of China, Li Hung-chang, senior tutor
to the heir apparent, senior grand secretary of state, minister
superintendent of trade for the northern ports of China, viceroy of
the province of Chihli and earl of the first rank, and Li Ching-Fong,
ex-minister of the diplomatic service, of the second official rank;
who, after having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be
in good and proper form, have agreed to the following articles:
Art. 1. China recognises definitively the full and complete
independence and autonomy of Korea, and in consequence the payment of
tribute and the performance of ceremonies and formalities by Korea to
China in derogation of such independence and autonomy shall wholly
cease for the future.
Art. 2. China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and sovereignty the
following territories together with all fortifications, arsenals and
public property therein:
(_a_) The southern portion of the province of Fêng-Tien within the
following boundaries:
The line of demarcation begins at the mouth of the River Yalu and
ascends that stream to the mouth of the River Anping; from thence
the line runs to Funghwang; from thence to Haiching, from thence to
Yingkow, forming a line which describes the southern portion of the
territory. The places above named are included in the ceded territory.
When the line reaches the River Liao at Yingkow it follows the course
of that stream to its mouth, where it terminates. The mid-channel of
the River Liao shall be taken as the line of demarcation.
The cession also includes all islands appertaining or belonging to the
province of Fêng-Tien situated in the eastern portion of the bay of
Liaotung and in the northern part of the Yellow Sea.
(_b_) The Island of Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or
belonging to the said Island of Formosa.
(_c_) The Pescadores Group, that is to say, all islands lying between
the 119th and 120th degrees of longitude east of Greenwich and the 23rd
and 24th degrees of north latitude.
Art. 3. The alignments of the frontiers described in the preceding
article shall be subject to verification and demarcation on the
spot, by a joint commission of delimitation consisting of two or
more Japanese and two or more Chinese delegates to be appointed
immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of this act. In
case the boundaries laid down in this act are found to be defective
at any point, either on account of topography or in consideration of
good administration, it shall also be the duty of the delimitation
commission to rectify the same.
The delimitation commission will enter upon its duties as soon as
possible, and will bring its labours to a conclusion within the period
of one year after appointment.
The alignments laid down in this act shall, however, be maintained
until the rectifications of the delimitation commission, if any are
made, shall have received the approval of the governments of Japan and
China.
Art. 4. China agrees to pay to Japan as a war indemnity the sum of
200,000,000 Kuping Taels. The said sum to be paid in eight instalments.
The first instalment of 50,000,000 taels to be paid within six months,
and the second instalment of 50,000,000 taels to be paid within twelve
months, after the exchange of the ratifications of this act. The
remaining sum to be paid in six equal annual instalments, as follows:
The first of such equal annual instalments to be paid within two
years; the second within three years; the third within four years; the
fourth within five years; the fifth within six years, and the sixth
within seven years, after the exchange of the ratification of this
act. Interest at the rate of 5 per centum per annum shall begin to run
on all unpaid portions of the said indemnity from the date the first
instalment falls due.
China shall, however, have the right to pay by anticipation at any
time any or all of the said instalments. In case the whole amount of
the indemnity is paid within three years after the exchange of the
ratification of the present act, all interest shall be waived and
the interest for two years and a half or for any less period if then
already paid shall be included as a part of the principal amount of the
indemnity.
Art. 5. The inhabitants of the territories ceded to Japan, who wish
to take up their residence outside the ceded districts, shall be at
liberty to sell their real property and retire. For this purpose a
period of two years from the date of the exchange of the ratifications
of the present act shall be granted. At the expiration of that period
those of the inhabitants who shall not have left such territories
shall, at the option of Japan, be deemed to be Japanese subjects.
Each of the two governments shall, immediately upon the exchange of
the ratifications of the present act, send one or more commissioners
to Formosa to effect a final transfer of that province; and within the
space of two months after the exchange of the ratifications of this act
such transfer shall be completed.
Art. 6. All treaties between Japan and China having come to an end in
consequence of the war, China engages, immediately upon the exchange
of the ratifications of this act, to appoint plenipotentiaries to
conclude, with the Japanese plenipotentiaries, a treaty of commerce and
navigation and a convention to regulate frontier intercourse and trade.
The treaties, conventions and regulations now subsisting between China
and European powers shall serve as a basis for the said treaty and
convention between Japan and China. From the date of the exchange of
the ratifications of this act until the said treaty and convention are
brought into actual operation, the Japanese government; its officials;
commerce; navigation; frontier intercourse and trade; industries; ships
and subjects, shall, in every respect, be accorded by China the most
favoured nation treatment.
China makes in addition the following concession, to take effect six
months after the date of the present act:
1st.—The following cities, towns and ports, in addition to those
already opened, shall be opened to the trade, residence, industries and
manufactures of Japanese subjects, under the same conditions and with
the same privileges and facilities as exist at the present in cities,
towns, and ports of China:
1.—Shashih in the Province of Hupeh.
2.—Chungking in the Province of Szechüan.
3.—Soochow in the Province of Kianghsu.
4.—Hangchow in the Province of Chekiang.
The Japanese government shall have the right to station consuls at any
or all of the above-named places.
2nd.—Steam navigation for vessels under the Japanese flag for the
conveyance of passengers and cargo shall be extended to the following
places:
1.—On the Upper Yangtsze River, from Ichang
to Chungking.
2.—On the Woosung River and the Canal, from
Shang-hai to Soochow and Hangchow.
The rules and regulations which now govern the navigation of the inland
waters of China by foreign vessels shall, so far as applicable, be
enforced in respect of the above-named routes, until new rules and
regulations are conjointly agreed to.
3rd.—Japanese subjects purchasing goods or produce in the interior of
China shall have the right temporarily to rent or hire warehouses for
the storage of the articles so purchased or transported, without the
payment of any taxes or exactions whatever.
4th.—Japanese subjects shall be free to engage in all kinds of
manufacturing industries in all the open cities, towns and ports of
China, and shall be at liberty to import into China all kinds of
machinery, paying only the stipulated import duties thereon.
All articles manufactured by Japanese subjects in
China, shall, in respect of inland transit and internal
taxes, duties, charges and exactions of all kinds, and
also in respect of warehousing and storing facilities
in the interior of China, stand upon the same footing
and enjoy the same privileges and exemptions as
merchandise imported by Japanese subjects into China.
In the event of additional rules and regulations
being necessary in connection with these concessions,
they shall be embodied in the treaty of commerce and
navigation provided for by this article.
Art. 7. Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding article, the
evacuation of China by the armies of Japan shall be completely effected
within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the
present act.
Art. 8. As a guarantee of the faithful performance of the stipulations
of this act, China consents to the temporary occupation of the military
forces of Japan of Wei-hai-wei in the Province of Shan-tung.
Upon the payment of the first two instalments of the war indemnity,
herein stipulated, this place shall be evacuated by the Japanese
forces, provided the Chinese government consents to pledge, under
suitable and sufficient arrangements, the customs revenue of China as
security for the payment of the principal and interest of the remaining
instalments of the said indemnity. In the event no such arrangements
are concluded, such evacuation shall only take place upon the payment
of the final instalment of the said indemnity.
It is, however, expressly understood that no such evacuation shall take
place until after the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty of
commerce and navigation.
Art. 9. Immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of this act
all prisoners of war then held shall be restored, and China undertakes
not to ill-treat or punish prisoners of war so restored to her by
Japan. China also engages to at once release all Japanese subjects
accused of being military spies or charged with any other military
offences. China further engages not to punish in any manner, nor to
allow to be punished, those Chinese subjects who have in any manner
been compromised in their relations with the Japanese army during the
war.
Art. 10. All offensive military operations shall cease upon the
exchange of the ratifications of this act.
Art. 11. The present act shall be ratified by Their Majesties the
Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of China, and ratifications shall be
exchanged at Chefoo, on the 8th day of the 5th month of the 28th year
of Meiji, corresponding to 14th day of the 4th month of the 21st year
of Kuang-Hsü (May 8th, 1895).
In witness whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the
same and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.
Done at Shimonoseki, in duplicate, this 17th day of the 4th month of
the 28th year of Meiji, corresponding to the 23rd day of the 3rd month
of 21st year of Kuang-Hsü.
COUNT ITO HIROBUMI [L.L.],
_Junii; grand cross of the imperial order of the
Paullownia; minister president of state; plenipotentiary
of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan._
VISCOUNT MUTSU MUNEMITSU [L.L.],
_Junii; first class of the imperial order of the Sacred
Treasure; minister of state for foreign affairs;
plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan._
LI HUNG-CHANG [L.L.],
_plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of China,
senior tutor to the heir apparent; senior grand
secretary of state; minister superintendent of trade for
the northern ports of China; viceroy of the province
of Chihli and earl of the first rank._
LI CHING-FONG,
_plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of China,
ex-minister of the diplomatic service of the
second official rank._
CORRESPONDENCE IN CONNECTION WITH THE WEI-HAI-WEI SURRENDER.
“HONOURED SIR,
“An unfortunate turn of events has made us enemies:
but as the warfare of to-day does not imply animosity
between each and all individuals, we hope our former
friendship is still warm enough to assure Your
Excellency that these lines, which we address to you
with your kind permission, are dictated by a motive
higher than that of a mere challenge to surrender. This
motive is that of submitting to the calm consideration
of a friend a reason for an action which seems to
be truly conducive to the good of his country and
of himself, although stress of circumstances might
temporarily conceal this from him. To whatever cause
the successive failures of Chinese arms on both sea
and land may be attributed, we think Your Excellency’s
sound judgement will not fail in assigning them
to their true cause, which must be apparent to
any unprejudiced observer. In China the literary
class is still the governing section, and literary
accomplishment is the chief if not the sole way to rank
and power now as it was a thousand years ago. We do
not venture to deny that this system is excellent in
well be permanent and sufficient if China were to
stand alone in the world. But national isolation is no
longer a possibility. Your Excellency must know what a
hard experience the Japanese empire had thirty years
ago, and how narrowly she escaped the awful calamity
which threatened. To throw away the old principle and
to adopt the new, as the sole condition of preserving
the integrity of your empire, is as necessary with
your government now as it was with ours. The necessity
must be attended to, or fall is inevitable sooner or
later. That the crisis is being brought about by the
Japanese arms is mere chance. It might have been caused
by other political difficulties, which are equally
destructive. Now at such a juncture is it the part
of a truly patriotic man, upon whom the necessity of
action devolves, to allow himself to be simply dragged
along by force of circumstances? Compared with the
re-establishment on a sound working basis of the oldest
empire in the world, with its glorious history and its
extensive territories, what is the surrender of a fleet
or the loss of a whole army? If Your Excellency be
truly patriotic and loyal to the cause of your country,
we beg you to listen to the words of sympathetic hearts
filled with the sense of honour representative of the
fighting men of Japan; words which ask you to come and
stay in Japan until the time arrives when your services
shall be required for the good cause. Not to speak of
the numerous instances of final success after temporary
humiliation in your own history of the ancient dynasties,
let me call your attention to the case of the French
Marshal Macmahon, who allowed himself to be detained
in the enemy’s land till it was expedient that he
should return and aid in reforming the government,
which instead of dishonouring him raised him to the
presidency: or to the case of Osman Pasha whom the
unfortunate event of Plevna did not prevent from
subsequently filling the post of minister of war and
rendering important services in reforming the army. As
to the way in which Your Excellency may be received
in Japan, let us assure you of the magnanimity of
our sovereign. His Majesty not only pardoned his own
subjects who fought against the imperial side, but
even raised them to important positions according
to their personal merits, as in the case of Admiral
Enomoto, Privy Councillor Otori, and others. Surely he
would be more magnanimous to one who is not his own
subject, and whose glorious career is so well known to
the world. The great problem with Your Excellency now
is whether to submit to the great calamity which must
be the inevitable consequence of further adherence
to the old principle, or to survive it for the sake
of future reform. We know it is the custom of your
officials to meet any communication from an opponent
with a pride designed to show consciousness of strength
or to conceal weakness, but we hope Your Excellency
will understand that the present communication is not
made without due consideration of the vast interests
at stake, but that it is the outcome of the truest
sincerity and of feelings which should lead to the
realisation of those interests, and we hope you will
kindly consider it in that light.
“Should the present communication meet with your
approval, the carrying out of its import will, with
Your Excellency’s permission, be arranged through
further communications, and we have the honour to be,
etc., etc.
“_Signed_: COUNT ŌYAMA,
“_Signed_: ADMIRAL ITO.
“_20th January, 1895._”
THE PROPOSAL TO SURRENDER
“I, Ting, commander-in-chief of the Pei-yang squadron,
acknowledge having previously received a letter from
Vice-Admiral Ito, commander of the port of Sasebo. This
letter I have not answered until to-day, owing to the
hostilities going on between our fleets. It had been
my intention to continue fighting until every one of
my men-of-war was sunk and the last sailor killed;
but I have reconsidered the matter and now request a
truce, hoping thereby to save many lives. I earnestly
beseech you to refrain from doing further hurt to the
Chinese and Westerners serving in the army and navy of
China, as well as to the townspeople of Wei-hai-wei;
in return for which I offer to surrender to the empire
of Japan all my men-of-war, the forts on Liu-kung-tau
and all material of war in and about Wei-hai-wei. If
Vice-Admiral Ito will accede to these terms, I desire
to have the commander-in-chief of the British warships
in the offing as a guarantor of the contract. Requesting
an answer to this by to-morrow, I have the honour to
remain, etc.
_Signed_: ADMIRAL TING.
18th day, 1st month, 21st year of Kwangshu
(12th Feb. 1895).”
“I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your
esteemed favour, and to accept the proposal therein
contained. Accordingly I shall take over all the
men-of-war, the forts and all warlike material from
your hands. As to the time when the surrender is to
take place, I will consult you again on receiving
your reply to this. My idea is, after taking over
everything, to escort you and the others referred to in
your letter on board one of our warships to some safe
place where your convenience may be suited. If I may
be permitted to speak quite frankly, I advise you for
your own and your country’s sake to remain in Japan
until the war is over. Should you decide to come to my
country you may rest assured that you will be treated
with distinguished consideration. But if you desire to
return to your native land I shall of course put no
obstacle in your path. As for any British guarantee, I
think it quite unnecessary, and trust in your honour as
an officer and a gallant man. Requesting your reply to
this by 10 a.m. to-morrow, I have the honour to remain,
etc.
_Signed_: ADMIRAL ITO.
_12th February, 1895._”
“I am delighted to learn that you are in the enjoyment
of good health. I thank you heartily for your kind
reply, and the assurance that the lives of those under
me will be spared. You have kindly forwarded me certain
gifts, but while I thank you I cannot accept them, our
two nations being at war. You write that you desire me
to surrender everything into your hands to-morrow. This
gives too short a period in which to make the necessary
preparations, and I fear that the troops will not be
able to evacuate the place by the time specified. I
therefore pray you to wait until the 22nd day of the
1st month (Chinese calendar), February 16th. You need
not fear that I shall go back from my word.
_Signed_: ADMIRAL TING.
_18th day, 1st month (12th February)._”
“HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY’S SHIP MATSUSHIMA,
_February 13th, 1895_.
“To the officers representing the Chinese fleet at
Wei-hai-wei.
“I hereby acknowledge the receipt of the letter of
Admiral Ting dated the 18th of January of the Chinese
year. The report of the death of Admiral Ting last
night, communicated verbally by the messenger who
brought over the said letter, I received with great
personal regret.
“As to postponing taking over the vessels, forts and
other materials of war until the 22nd of January of
the Chinese year, I am ready to comply with it under
a certain condition. This condition is that some
responsible Chinese officer should come over to this
our flagship Matsushima before 6 o’clock p.m. this day,
the 13th of February according to the Japanese year,
and we will then make certain arrangements, which have
to be definitely fixed, regarding the taking over of the
said vessels, forts and other materials of war, as well
as the escorting of the Chinese and foreign officers
and men out of Wei-hai-wei. In my last letter to the
lamented Admiral Ting I stated that as to the hour
and other minor conditions I should be glad to make
arrangements with him on the morrow; so as he is now
dead, these minor conditions have to be arranged with
some one who can deal with us in his stead.
“It is my express wish that the said officer who is to
come to this our flagship for the above purpose be a
Chinese, not a foreign officer, and be it understood
that I am willing to receive him with honour.
J. K. ITO,
_Vice-Admiral_,
_Commander-in-Chief_.”
THE CONVENTION OF SURRENDER
Towards 7 p.m. of 13th February Tao-tai Niu Chang-Ping, accompanied by
Captain Ching, came under a white flag to the Matsushima. He introduced
himself as the representative of the naval and military forces at
Wei-hai-wei. Admiral Ito then proposed to him several conditions
relating to the vessels, forts and materials of war, the escorting of
the Chinese and foreign officers and men out of Wei-hai-wei, and so
forth. After a consultation of several hours Tao-tai Niu and Captain
Ching left the ship, arranging to come back before 2 p.m. on the 14th.
At 2 p.m. on the 14th, Tao-tai Niu, the Chinese plenipotentiary, came
again under a white flag, accompanied by Captain Ching, and after
further consultation the following terms were agreed upon between the
two parties as conditions of capitulation, and the English version of
them, which was to serve as the original text, was signed by Admiral
Ito and Tao-tai Niu.
Art. I. That a list of the names, functions, and ranks of all the
naval and military officers, both Chinese and foreign, required to
be transported in safety, should be produced. For foreigners, their
nationalities should also be mentioned. As to soldiers, clerks, etc.,
only their numbers are to be given.
Art. II. That all the naval and military officers, both Chinese and
foreign, should pledge themselves by a formal declaration in writing
that they will not re-engage themselves in the present war between
Japan and China.
Art. III. That all the weapons, powder, and projectiles for use of
land forces on the Island of Liu-kung-tau should be collected in fixed
places, and these places made known to us. The soldiers of the said
land forces shall be landed at Chiu-tau, and from thence they are to
be conducted by Japanese guards to the outposts of the Japanese army
now occupying the localities around Wei-hai-wei. The landing is to
begin from 5 o’clock p.m. on the 14th of February, 1895 (20th January,
Chinese calendar), and end before noon on the 15th February, 1895 (21st
January of the Chinese calendar).
Art. IV. That Tao-tai Niu, representing the Chinese naval and military
forces at Wei-hai-wei as plenipotentiary, should appoint a suitable
number of committees, for the delivery of the vessels and forts. These
committees are required to send in before noon, February 15th, 1895, a
list of the vessels and forts in their charge with the number and kinds
of the guns, rifles, and other weapons now contained in these vessels
or forts.
Art. V. That the Chinese naval and military officers and men, native
and foreign, should be allowed to leave Wei-hai-wei after noon on the
16th of February, 1895 (22nd of January of the Chinese calendar),
in the steamship Kwang-Chi, sailing out of the harbour under the
condition stipulated in Art. X.
Art. VI. That the Chinese naval and military officers, both native and
foreign, should be allowed to take with them their personal movable
property only, with the exception of arms, which are to be delivered up
even if they be private property. Whenever deemed necessary the things
they take away shall be submitted to inspection.
Art. VII. That the permanent residents, _i.e._ the original inhabitants
of the Island of Liu-kung-tau, should be persuaded to continue their
abode on the island.
Art. VIII. That the landing of the requisite number of the Japanese
officers and men, on the Island of Liu-kung-tau, in order to take
possession of the forts and materials of war on the island, should
commence from 9 o’clock a.m. on the 16th of February, 1895 (22nd of
January by Chinese calendar), but that Admiral Ito reserves to himself
the right of sending a certain number of the Japanese men-of-war into
the harbour, whenever the necessity occurs at any time after the
signing of the present stipulations.
The naval officers, both native and foreign, on board the Chinese
vessels may remain therein until 9 o’clock a.m. on the 16th February,
1895 (22nd January of Chinese calendar). Those marines, seamen, etc.,
on board the same vessels who wish to be escorted out of Wei-hai-wei by
land should be landed in the same place and escorted in the same way
as the soldiers of the land forces, the landing to begin from noon on
the 15th of February (21st January of Chinese calendar), that is to say
after the landing of the soldiers of the land forces is finished.
Art. IX. That women, children, aged persons and other non-combatants
who wish to leave the Island of Liu-kung-tau should be allowed to sail
out of either the eastern or western mouth of the harbour in Chinese
junks any time after the morning of the 15th of February, 1895 (21st
January of the Chinese calendar). These vessels are, however, to be
examined by the Japanese naval officers and men in the torpedo boats
or the other boats posted at the mouth of the harbour, the examination
extending to both persons and baggage.
Art. X. That the coffins of the lamented Admiral Ting and the officers
next to him should be allowed to be carried out of the harbour after
noon on the 16th of February, 1895 (22nd of January of the Chinese
calendar), and before noon on the 23rd of February, 1895 (29th January
of the Chinese calendar), in the steamer Kwang-chi, which Admiral Ito
refrains from taking possession of and lays at the disposal of Tao-tai
Niu as representing the Chinese navy and army at Wei-hai-wei, solely
out of respect to the memory of Admiral Ting, who did his duty towards
his country.
The said steamer Kwang-chi is to be inspected by the Japanese naval
officers on the morning of the 15th February, 1895 (21st January of
Chinese calendar), to see that she is not equipped as a war vessel.
Art. XI. That it be always understood that after the present
stipulations have been made the Chinese naval and military forces at
Wei-hai-wei are to give up all hostile operations against the Japanese
naval and military forces, and that the moment such operations are made
the present stipulations shall lose effect at once and the Japanese
naval and military forces shall resume hostilities.
_Signed_: ADMIRAL ITO.
_Signed_: NIU CHANG-PING.
16th February, 28th year of Meiji.
22nd of 1st month, 21st year of Kwangshu.
JAPANESE FLEET IN FEBRUARY, 1904.
(Ships in italics were not ready for sea when the war began.)
(‡‡) = Approximate unit of battle value.
BATTLESHIPS.
-----+----+-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+-------+-----------+-------+
| | | |Displace-|Armour| Principal |Torpedo| Indicated |Nominal|
(‡‡) |Rate| Name. |Launched| ment. | belt.| armament. | tubes.|horsepower.| speed.|
-----+----+-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+-------+-----------+-------+
| | | | Tons. | Ins. | | | | Knots.|
80 | 2 |Yashima | 1896 | 12,517 | 18 |Four 12-in., | 5 | 13,687 | 18 |
| | | | | |ten 6-in., | | | |
| | | | | |sixteen 12-pdrs.| | | |
-----+----+-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+-------+-----------+-------+
80 | 2 |Fuji | 1896 | 12,649 | 18 | Ditto | 5 | 13,687 | 18 |
-----+----+-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+-------+-----------+-------+
100 | 1 |Shikishima | 1898 | 15,088 | 9 |Four 12-in., | 5 | 14,700 | 18 |
| | | | | |fourteen 6-in., | | | |
| | | | | |twenty 12-pdrs. | | | |
-----+----+-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+-------+-----------+-------+
100 | 1 |Asahi | 1899 | 15,443 | 9 | Ditto | 4 | 15,207 | 18 |
100 | 1 |Mikasa | 1900 | 15,362 | 9 | Ditto | 4 | 15,207 | 18 |
100 | 1 |Hatsuse | 1899 | 15,240 | 9 | Ditto | 4 | 14,700 | 18 |
-----+----+-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+-------+-----------+-------+
125 | A1 |_Kashima_ |Building| 16,400 | 9 |Four 12-in., | 4 | (?) | (?) |
125 | A1 |_Katori_ | ” | 16,400 | 9 |four 10-in., | 4 | (?) | (?) |
| | | | | |fourteen 6-in., | | | |
| | | | | |twenty 12-pdrs. | | | |
-----+----+-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+-------+-----------+-------+
35 | 4 |Chin-Yen | 1882 | 7,335 | 14 |Four 12-in., | 3 | 6,000 | 15 |
| | | | | |four 6-in. | | | |
-----+----+-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+-------+-----------+-------+
ARMOURED CRUISERS.
-----+----+-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+-------+-----------+-------+
| |Tokiwa | 1898 | 9,855 | 7 |Four 8-in., | 5 | 18,248 | 22 |
| | | | | |fourteen 6-in., | | | |
| | | | | |twelve 12-pdrs. | | | |
| +-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+--------+----------+-------+
| |Asama | 1898 | 9,855 | 7 | Ditto | 5 | 18,248 | 22 |
| |Idzumo | 1899 | 9,906 | 7 | Ditto | 4 | 14,700 | 21 |
| |Iwate | -- | 9,906 | 7 | Ditto | 4 | 14,700 | 21 |
| +-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+--------+----------+-------+
| |Yakumo | 1899 | 9,800 | 7 |Four 8-in., | 5 | 15,500 | 20 |
| | | | | |twelve 6-in., | | | |
| | | | | |twelve 3-in. | | | |
60 | 3 +-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+--------+----------+-------+
| |Azuma | 1899 | 9,456 | 7 | Ditto | 5 | 16,600 | 20 |
| +-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+--------+----------+-------+
| |Nisshin | 1903 | 8,000 | 6 |Four 8-in., | 4 | 13,500 | 20 |
| | | | | |fourteen 6-in., | | | |
| | | | | | ten 12-pdrs. | | | |
| +-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+--------+----------+-------+
| |Kasuga | 1903 | 8,000 | 6 |One 10-in., | 4 | 13,500 | 20 |
| | | | | |two 8-in., | | | |
| | | | | |fourteen 6-in., | | | |
| | | | | |ten 12-pdrs. | | | |
-----+----+-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+--------+----------+-------+
PROTECTED CRUISERS.
-----+----+-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+-------+-----------+-------+
15 | 6 |Akitsushima| 1892 | 3,172 | — |Four 6-in., | 4 | 8,516 | 19 |
| | | | | |six 4.7-in. | | | |
-----+----+-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+--------+----------+-------+
20 | 6 |Hashidate | 1891 | 4,278 | — |One 12.5-in., | 4 | 5,400 | 16 |
| | | | | |eleven 4.7-in. | | | |
-----+----+-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+--------+----------+-------+
20 | 6 |Itsukushima| 1889 | 4,278 | — | Ditto | 4 | 5,400 | 16 |
-----+----+-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+--------+----------+-------+
20 | 6 |Matsushima | 1890 | 4,278 | — |One 12.5-in., | 4 | 5,400 | 16 |
| | | | | |twelve 4.7-in. | | | |
-----+----+-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+--------+----------+-------+
10 | 7 |Naniwa | 1885 | 3,709 | — |Two 10.2-in., | 4 | 7,604 | 18 |
| | | | | |six 6-in. | | | |
-----+----+-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+--------+----------+-------+
10 | 7 |Takachiho | 1885 | 3,709 | — | Ditto | 4 | 7,604 | 18 |
-----+----+-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+--------+----------+-------+
20 | 6 |Yoshino | 1892 | 4,225 | — |Four 6-in., | 5 | 15,967 | 23 |
| | | | | |eight 4.7-in. | | | |
-----+----+-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+--------+----------+-------+
20 | 6 |Chitose | 1898 | 4,836 | — |Two 8-in., | 5 | 15,714 | 23 |
| | | | | |ten 4.7-in., | | | |
| | | | | |twelve 3-in. | | | |
-----+----+-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+--------+----------+-------+
20 | 6 |Kasagi | 1898 | 4,978 | — | Ditto | 5 | 17,235 | 23 |
-----+----+-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+--------+----------+-------+
10 | 7 |Idzumi | 1883 | 2,967 | — |Two 10-in., | — | 5,576 | 17 |
| | | | | |six 4.7-in. | | | |
-----+----+-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+--------+----------+-------+
15 | 6 |Suma | 1895 | 2,700 | — |Two 6-in., | 2 | 8,500 | 20 |
| | | | | |six 4.7-in. | | | |
-----+----+-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+--------+----------+-------+
15 | 6 |Akashi | 1897 | 2,800 | — | Ditto | 2 | 8,000 | 20 |
-----+----+-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+--------+----------+-------+
10 | 7 |Chiyoda | 1890 | 2,439 | 4½ |Ten 4.7-in., | 3 | 5,678 | 19 |
| | | | | |fourteen 3-pdrs.| | | |
-----+----+-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+--------+----------+-------+
10 | 7 |Niitaka | 1902 | 3,400 | — |Six 6-in., | 0 | 9,000 | 20 |
| | | | | |eight 3-in. | | | |
-----+----+-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+--------+----------+-------+
10 | 7 |Tsushima | 1902 | 3,400 | — | Ditto | 0 | 9,000 | 20 |
10 | 7 |_Otawa_ |Building| 3,400 | — | Ditto | 0 | 9,000 | 20 |
-----+----+-----------+--------+---------+------+----------------+--------+----------+-------+
DESTROYERS.[42]
Thornycroft Type.
+-------------------------+-------------+------------+------+-------+
| Name. |Displacement.| Indicated |Speed.| Built.|
| | |horse-power.| | |
+-------------------------+-------------+------------+------+-------+
| | Tons. | |Knots.| |
+-------------------------+-------------+------------+------+-------+
|Kagero | | | | |
|Murákumo | | | | |
|Ousagoumo | 275 | 5400 | 30 |1898-99|
|Shinonome | | | | |
|Shiranöi | | | | |
|Yuguri | | | | |
+-------------------------+-------------+------------+------+-------+
|Asashio | | | | |
|Shirakuma | 385 | 6000 | 31 | 1901 |
|Asagiri (J[43]) | | | | |
|Harusame (J) | | | | |
+-------------------------+-------------+------------+------+-------+
| YARROW TYPE. |
+-------------------------+-------------+------------+------+-------+
|Akebono | | | | |
|Ikadsuchi | | | | |
|Inanzuma | 306 | 6000 | 31 |1898-99|
|Oboro | | | | |
|Sazanami | | | | |
|Niji[44] (rebuilt) (J) | | | | 1903 |
+-------------------------+-------------+------------+------+-------+
|Akatsuki | | | | |
|Kasumi | 385 | 6000 | 31 | 1901 |
|Hayatori (J) | | | | |
|Murasame (J) | | | | |
| | | | | |
+-------------------------+-------------+------------+------+-------+
| TORPEDO BOATS. |
| First Class.[45] |
| 1 Yarrow boat (Kotaka) | 190 | 1400 | 19 | 1886 |
| 5 ” boats | 135 | 2000 | 27 | 1898 |
| 1 Krupp boat | 128 | 1015 | 19 | 1895 |
| 4 Normand boats | 150 | | 29 | 1899 |
| 1 Schichau boat | 130 | | (?) | 1900 |
|10 Kobé and Normand boats| 110 | | 27 | 1900 |
|15 Kobé and Yarrow boats | 150 | | 29 | 1900 |
| | | | | |
| Second Class. |
| 3 Schichau boats | 85 | | 23 | 1891 |
| 2 Normand ” | 80 | | 23 | 1891 |
|20 various boats | 56 | | 20 | |
|10 new boats | | | 23 | 1901 |
+-------------------------+-------------+------------+------+-------+
[42] All have two tubes (18-in.), one 12-pdr. aft, and five 3-pdrs.
[43] J = built in Japan.
[44] The original Niji was wrecked in 1901.
[45] Except the Kotaka and the Krupp boat, which have six tubes
(14-in.), all carry three tubes (14-in.).
MISCELLANEOUS SHIPS.
+--------+---------+-------------+------+-------------+---------+------+
| Name. |Launched.|Displacement.|Armour| Armament. |Indicated|Speed.|
| | | |belt. | | horse- | |
| | | | | | power. | |
+--------+---------+-------------+------+-------------+---------+------+
| | | Tons. | Ins. | | |Knots.|
|Chihaya | 1901 | 850 | |Two 4.7-in., | 6000 | 21 |
| | | | |four 12-pdrs.| | |
+--------+---------+-------------+------+-------------+---------+------+
|Tatsuta | 1894 | 875 | |Two 4.7-in. | 5500 | 21 |
|Miyako | 1897 | 1800 | | Ditto | 6130 | 20 |
|Yaeyama | 1889 | 1600 | |Three 4.7-in.| 5500 | 20 |
+--------+---------+-------------+------+-------------+---------+------+
|Takao | 1888 | 1800 | |Four 6-in., | 2400 | 15 |
| | | | |one 4.7-in., | | |
| | | | |one 12-pdr. | | |
+--------+---------+-------------+------+-------------+---------+------+
|Akagi | 1887 | 614 | |Four 4.7-in. | 700 | 12 |
|Oshima | 1890 | 640 | | Ditto | 1200 | 16 |
+--------+---------+-------------+------+-------------+---------+------+
|Atago | 1887 | 640 | |One 8.2-in., | 700 | 12 |
| | | | |one 4.7-in. | | |
+--------+---------+-------------+------+-------------+---------+------+
|Maya | 1887 | 640 | | Ditto | 700 | 12 |
|Chiokai | 1888 | 640 | |Two 6-in. | 700 | 12 |
+--------+---------+-------------+------+-------------+---------+------+
|Tsushima| 1881 | 1380 | |Two 10-in., | 2880 | 16.4 |
| | | | |four 4.7-in. | | |
+--------+---------+-------------+------+-------------+---------+------+
|Musashi | 1885 | 1480 | |Two 6-in., | 1600 | 13.5 |
| | | | |four 4.7-in. | | |
+--------+---------+-------------+------+-------------+---------+------+
|Yamato | 1886 | 1480 | | Ditto | 1600 | 13.5 |
+--------+---------+-------------+------+-------------+---------+------+
|Amagi | | 1030 | | | | |
|Kaimon | | 1360 | | Old guns | | |
|Tenriu | | 1550 | | | | |
+--------+---------+-------------+------+-------------+---------+------+
|Fuso | 1877 | 3717 | 9 |Eight 6-in. | 3500 | 13 |
+--------+---------+-------------+------+-------------+---------+------+
|Hei Yen | 1890 | 2000 | 8 |One 10-in., | 2400 | 11 |
| | | | |two 6-in. | | |
+--------+---------+-------------+------+-------------+---------+------+
|Six ex-Chinese gunboats |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------+
JAPANESE SHIP-NAMES
The names of a few Japanese ships are singularly beautiful and poetical
in their meanings; the majority, however, have little significance. As
the meanings of Japanese ship-names are not given in Captain Prince
Louis of Battenberg's interesting “Men-of-War Names,” a glossary of
them is here inserted for reference and information.
All names with the prefix _Chin_ (Chinese _Chen_) are Chinese. The
names of captured Chinese ships have always been retained by the
Japanese, but they have been translated into their own language, _i.e._
as though, when in the past we took the _Téméraire_, we had taken to
calling her _The Rash_.
I am indebted to my friends Commander Takarabé and Lieutenant Yamamoto,
both of the Imperial Japanese Navy, for the meanings of these
ship-names.
Adsuma = a mountain with a poetical history.
Asama = a sacred volcanic island in Japan. The present is the second
ship of the name. The first was a pirate frigate that put into a
Japanese port to refit and was seized.
Akagi = a mountain in Japan. Akashi = a beautiful seaside place near
Kobé. Akebono = dawn. Akitsushima = an old name for Japan (poetical).
Asahi = “the (rising) morning sun.” Amagi = name of a mountain in
Japan.
Atago = name of a mountain in Japan.
Chitose = “long life.”
Chiyoda = the name of Shogun's castle and Emperor's palace. The
present Chiyoda is the second of the name. (See p. 402.)
Chin Yen = “striking from a long way off.” The name is Chinese.
This ship was formerly the Chinese Chen Yuen.
Chin Nan = striking south.
Chin To = striking east.
Chin Sei = striking west.
Chin Hoku = striking north.
Chin Chaiu = striking midway.
Chin Pen = striking everywhere near.
Fuso = “Japan.”
Fuji = name of the celebrated Japanese mountain, Fuji-Yama.
This is the second ship of the name.
Hashidate = name of a Japanese port.
Hatsuse = a place in Japan celebrated for its maple woods.
Hi-yei = a famous battle mountain in Japan.
Hei Yen = “pacifying a long way off.” This is a captured Chinese
ship, Ping Yuen.
he-Sho = name of a scare bird.
Inadzuma = “lightning.”
Idzumi = a country of Japan.
Ikadzuche = “thunder.”
Itsukushima = a Japanese island.
Idzumo = a province of Japan.
Iwate = name of a place in Japan.
Kaimon = “sea gate.”
Kasagi = a mountain in Japan.
Katsuragi = a mountain in Japan.
Kagero = “the shimmering mist that rises from the earth on a hot
day.”
Kotaka = “a hawk.”
Kasauga = a mountain in Japan.
Kon-go = a famous battle mountain in Japan.
Mikasa = a mountain.
Maya = a Japanese mountain.
Matsushima = a Japanese island.
Musashi = the province in which Toku is situated.
Miyako = a place in Japan.
Murákumo = “a cloud cluster.”
Niji = “rainbow.”
Naniwa = a palace of the Emperor's.
Nisshin = “daily progressing.”
Oshima = “a large island.”
Ousougumo = “thin clouds.”
Obero = “Dim.”
Rio-jo = “powerful as a dragon.” This is a Chinese word.
Shinonome = “daybreak cloud.”
Sai Yen = “helping from a long way off.”
Sazanami = “the pretty, small waves raised by a zephyr.”
Shikishima = an old poetical name for Japan.
Saikio-maru = the merchant steamer Saikio.
Shiranöi = “will-o'-the-wisp.”
Suma = a place in Japan close to Akashi.
So-Ko = Chinese.
Takao = a Japanese town.
Tateyama = name of a Japanese mountain.
Takachiho = name of a sacred place in Japan.
Takasago = “Darby and Joan.” It is the name of a town associated
in poetry with a couple of that nature.
Tatsuta = name of a Japanese mountain.
Tenriu = a river in Japan.
Tsukuba = a mountain in Japan.
Tokiwa = “evergreen.”
Tsukushi = a Japanese town.
Yashima = “Japan.”
Yaxyama = an island mountain.
Yamato = a Japanese province. Also an old name for Japan
(poetical).
Yoshino = a mountain in Japan famous for its beautiful
cherry-blossom; hence “cherry-blossom.”
SHIPS THAT HAVE BEEN LOST BY SHIPWRECK
Taiebo No. 1 (small gunboat). Wrecked about 1870.
Unebi (cruiser). Mysteriously lost, with all hands,
at sea about 1890. Believed in Japan to have been
destroyed by the Chinese.
Tschishima (torpedo cruiser). Foundered on her trial
trip in the Inland Sea, 1891. Most of her crew were
drowned.
Kohei, ex-Kwang Ping (gunboat). Formerly Chinese.
Wrecked off the Pescadores, 1895.
Fuso (ironclad). This ship broke from her cable, and
drifted across the ram of the Matsushima during a
gale in 1897. She sank, but was subsequently raised
and repaired.
Katsuragi (wooden corvette). Wrecked in the later nineties.
WAR LOSSES
Miyako (gunboat). Blown up at Dalny, 1904.
Yoshino (cruiser). Sunk by collision with Kasuga, 1904.
Hatsuse (battleship). Blown up off Port Arthur, 1904.
HISTORICAL SHIP-NAMES
Asama. No. 1, a pirate ship (sailing) captured by the
Japanese (p. 195). No. 2, the present armoured
cruiser of 9700 tons, launched 1898.
Chiyoda. No. 1, launched in the sixties; a small
vessel; now known as Chiyoda-nata. No. 2, launched
1890, of 2450 tons; to replace the Unebi.
Fuji. No. 1, a sailing-ship; always known as Fuji-Yama.
No. 2, the present 12,300-ton battleship, launched
1896; always called Fuji only.
Kasuga. No. 1, a paddler of 1270 tons, formerly known
as the Kiang Tse; launched in England, 1863; depôt
ship at Tsushima. No. 2, purchased from Argentina
just before the war with Russia; 8000 tons.
Nisshin. No. 1, a wooden ship, launched in 1869, and
now used as a training-ship for boys at Sassebo.
No. 2, purchased from Argentina just before the war
with Russia; 8000 tons.
A JAPANESE NAVAL “AT HOME”
“Captain Kawashibara and officers of H.I.J.M.S. Kasagi at home, Monday,
March 15th.”
The Kasagi herself is an American-built ship.
The peculiarity of this ship lies in the tremendous amount of
electricity there is on board her. The ammunition hoists are electric,
the lights and bells, of course, are, the engine-room indicators
are, and, finally, electric fans are all over the ship. So, too, are
telephones.
On the afternoon in question the fair ones of Portsmouth were initiated
into all these mysteries, and probably regarded the electric fans as
some new and horrible war device. I heard a remark to that effect,
anyhow!
Not all the visitors, however, were so inclined to regard everything as
a war machine. On Sunday a good many visitors of both sexes found their
way to the Kasagi, and peeped into the wardroom, where the officers
were wrestling with naval Kriegspiel.
“Race game,” said one lady; “how babyish these foreigners are!”
“I don't know, my dear,” replied her companion, apologetically.
“Perhaps they gamble on it for high stakes.”
“Oh,” was the response, “of course that makes a difference!”
For the “At Home” the Kasagi was _en fête_, draped in flags, and
generally looking her smartest. Even the engine-room was on show,
though I only noticed one visitor venture there—a lady in a light
fawn-coloured rig-out, not the best thing to penetrate the mysteries of
an engine-room in. Perhaps, however, she contented herself with peeping
in.
The main feature of the “At Home” was an entertainment given by the
bluejackets. There was quite a long variety programme, with fencing
between each “turn.” As these encounters are accompanied by wild
yells every now and again on the part of the combatants, they are
particularly interesting.
There was a conjuring entertainment, which mightily amused the crew,
but perhaps puzzled the visitors somewhat as to what it was all about.
The best thing of all was a song by a Japanese sailor—a monotonous
chant that grew gradually louder, accompanied by various movements with
a sword, suggesting that something exciting was about to happen. Then
came in English, “That's all; you know!” It was well done, and its flat
finale very amusing.
There were dances of various sorts, sack races, egg races, and a few
other sports with which we are familiar, interesting here because the
performers were Japanese, and also because of their intense zest and
evident pleasure. Some English songs by Japanese sailors were one of
the interesting bits, too.
Finally, on leaving, each lady guest was presented with a paper
chrysanthemum. They had previously been asking the Japanese officers
how they managed to get them to bloom in the summer season! The
imitations and colouring were perfect. The material for construction:
odd bits of paper and—Japanese bluejackets.
INDEX
A
Adams, William, 9
Admiralty, the Japanese, 252
Adsuma, the, 22
Ainus, the, 1
Akagi, the, 68, 119
Akaski, the, 168
Akatsuki, the, 349
Akitsushima, the, 91, 104, 119, 150
Amagi, the, 39
America, treaty with, 15
Armament and equipment—guns, 313
Armistice with China, 368
Armour, 329
Arturo Prat, the, 53
Asagiri, the, 347
Asaki, the, 181
Asama, the, 195, 342
Asan, battle of, 63, 99, 104, 110
Asashio, the, 349
Askold, the, 345, 355
Atago, the, 68
“At Homes,” Japanese, 290, 403
Azuma, the, 195
B
Baltimore, the, 92
Banjo, the, 40
Barr and Stroud, transmitters, 191, 322
” ” range-finders, 322
Bayan, the, 203, 350
Belleville boilers, 333
Bertin, M., 36, 72, 74
Boilers, 330
Bravery, Japanese, 283
C
Canet guns, 73, 312, 315, 327
Canopus class, 190
Characteristics, personal, 278
Chemulpo Convention, the, 102
” battle of, 342
Chen Yuen, the, 115, 163
Chen-chung, the, 48
Chen-Sei, the, 48
Chen-nan, the, 48
Chen-pei, the, 48
Chen-pen, the, 48
Cheng-tung, the, 48
Chihaya, the, 213, 351
Chinese gunboats, 48
Chinese invasion, 6
Chinese war, 99, 101, 368, 372
Chin Yuen, the, 49, 115, 163, 168
Chio Kai, the, 68
Chitose, the, 208
Chiyoda-nata, the, 21
Chiyoda, the, 77, 86, 119, 150, 342
Christians, massacre of, 9
Cleanliness, Japanese, 306
College, naval, 258
Creelman, Mrs., 151
Creusot boats, 68
Cruisers, armoured, 195
” protected, 208
D
Destroyers, 215
Diana, the, 355
Dockyards, 237
Dutch establish themselves, 10
E
Elswick battleship, 218
” guns, 73
Engines, 330
Esmeralda, the, 57, 168
Export trade, 249
F
Feudal system, 11
Fei-ting, the, 48
Finance, 256
Fire, danger in action by, 147
Flags, Japanese, 275
Fong, Captain, 105
Formidable, the, 182
Formosa, attack on, 167
France, ships built in, 72, 77
Fu-So, the, 43, 119, 150
Fuji, the, 168, 346,
Fuji-Yama, the, 21
G
Galsworthy Captain, 110, 361, 366
Garibaldi class, 203
Grenfell transmission system, 322
Gunboats, torpedo, 213
Gunnery accessories, 322
Guns, 313
” Canet, 73, 312, 315, 327
” Vickers-Maxim, 314, 318
” Elswick, 73
” Hebrien, 71
H
Hakodate, port of, 249
” battle of, 35
Harbours, naval, 242
Hashidate, the, 72, 81, 119, 150
Hatsuse, the, 181
Hayatori, the, 347
Hebrien guns, 71
Hei-chang-ching, the, 48
Hi-Yei, the, 44, 119, 150
Hirose, Commander, 351
Holland, treaty with, 15
Hopkins, Admiral, 36
he-sho, the, 39
he-wei, the, 48
I
Idzumi, the, 58, 168
Idzumo, the, 195
Import trade, 250
Ingles, Captain, R.N., 36, 77
Intelligence Department, 255
Ishikawa, the, 40
Ito, Admiral, 116, 119, 159, 163
Itsukushima, the, 72, 77, 119, 150, 156, 163
Iwate, the, 195, 346
J
Japanese-built ship, the first, 171
Jimmu, Emperor, 2
Jingo, Empress, 2
Jin-Jei, the, 47
K
Kabayama, Vice-Admiral Count, 119
Kaimon, the, 54
Kamimura, Admiral, 348
Karigane, the, 354
Kasagi, the, 208, 403
Kashima, the, 218
Kasuga, the, 21, 199, 356
Kasumi, the, 349
Katori, the, 218
Katsuragi, the, 58, 156
Kawashibara, Captain, 403
Keitai Tenno, Emperor, 5
Kiang-tse, the, 21
King Yuen, the, 86, 115
Kobé harbour, 246
Kobé, port of, 249
Kōmei, Emperor, 30
Korea, invasion of, 8
Korietz, the, 342
Kotaka, the, 67, 353
Kou-go, the, 44
Kow-shing, sinking of, 63, 99, 110, 359, 366
Kuang Kai, 115
Kuang Ping, 115
Kuper, Admiral, 16
Kuré dockyard, 237
Kuroi, Lieut., 110
Kwang-yi, the, 104
L
Lai Yuen, the, 115, 163
Lao Tung Peninsula, invasion of, 149
Lepanto, type, 64, 78
Li Hung Chang, 113
Loh Feng Lo, 113
Lung-Shan, the, 48
M
Maitzuru dockyard, 241
Makaroff, Admiral, 356
Malacca, the, 21
Masuki, Lieut., 353
Matsushima, the, 72, 119, 150, 163
Maya, the, 68
Mercantile marine, 249
Men, training and entry, 265
Messing, 309
Mikasa, the, 181
Misasagi, the, 354
Miyako, the, 99, 213
Moisshin, the, 29
Mukaijima dock, 242
Mushashi, the, 58
Mutsohito, Emperor, 35
N
Nagasaki harbour, 242
” port of, 249
Nahamoto, Admiral, 35
Naniwa, the, 58, 104, 110, 119, 150, 156, 163, 342, 361
Naval college, 258
” districts, 252
” flags, 275
” harbours, 242
” titles, 263
Navy, first inception, 43
Navies—British, 337
” French, 337
” German, 338
” Russian, 338
” United States, America, 338
” Japanese, 338
Niagara, the, 25
Niclausse boiler, 335
Ni-igata, port of, 249
Niitaka, the, 208, 342
Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 251
Nisshin, the, 39, 199, 356
Novik, the, 346, 350, 355
No. 1 Tébo, the, 26
O
Officers, training and entry of, 251
Ominato harbour, 248
Osaka, port of, 249
Oshima, the, 72, 74
P
Pabieda, the, 355
Pallada, the, 346
Pay, 267
Pensions, 272
Peresviet, the, 356
Personal characteristics—officers, 278
” ” men, 303
Petropavlovsk, the, 356
Ping Yuen, the, 85, 115, 168
Politeness, Japanese, 294
Poltava, the, 345, 355
Portuguese, first appearance of, 7
Port Arthur, first attack on, 345
” ” second attack on, 347
” ” massacre at, 151
Programme, “After the War,” 178
” the new, 218
R
Retirement, age of, 272
Retvizan, the, 346, 351
Riaden, the, 21
Richardson, murder of Mr., 16
Royal Sovereign, the, 174
Rio-Jo, the, 36
Russia, treaty with, 15
” war with, 340
S
Sacramento, the, 25
Saigo, the Samaurai chief, 101
Saikio-maru, the, 119
Samaurii caste, 5, 294
Sassebo dockyard, 238
Sazanami, the, 350
Seiki, the, 40
Setsu, the, 29
Shikishima, the, 181, 286
Shimada, Lieut., 352
Shimonoseki, bombardment of, 17
Ship-names, 398
” historical, 402
Ships lost by shipwreck, 401
Steamship lines, 251
Steregutchy, the, 350
Stonewall Jackson, the, 22
Submarines, 217
Suma, the, 99, 168, 342
T
Takachiho, the, 58, 119, 150, 342
Takahashi Sakuye, Professor, 152
Takao, the, 72, 150
Takasago, the, 208, 351
Tategami dock, 242
Takeshiki harbour, 244
Tateyama, the, 40
Tatsuta, the, 77, 99, 168
Tchao Yong, the, 53, 115, 139
Tche-tien, the, 48
Tche Yuen, the, 63, 104, 115, 168
Tenriu, the, 54
Ting, Admiral, 113, 115, 119, 149, 164, 385, 387, 392
Ting Yuen, the, 49, 113, 115, 163
Titles, naval, 263
Togo, Admiral, 104, 111, 156, 345
Tokio dockyard, 236
Tokiwa, the, 195
Torpedo-boats, 85, 216
Torpedo gunboats, 213
Torpedo tube, Elswick, 326, 331
Torpedoes, 325
Tracy, Admiral, 22, 36
Trade, export, 249
” import, 259
Training—officers, 251
” men, 265
Tsarevitch, the, 346
Tschishima, the, 77
Tsubame, the, 353
Tsuboi, Rear-Admiral, 104, 119
Tsukuba, the, 21
Tsukushi, the, 53
Tsushima, the, 208
U
Unebi, the, 77
Uniform, officers', 276
” men's, 277
Uniforms in the period about 1865, 30
Unyo, the, 26
V
Variag, the, 341, 342
Vickers-Maxim guns, 314, 318
Vladivostok, attack on, 348
Vnushitelni, the, 351
Von Hanneken, 110, 361
W
War with Russia, 340
” ” China, 99, 101, 368, 372
Warships, list of, 394
Wasp, the, 77
Wei-hai-wei, correspondence _re_ surrender, 381
” proposal to surrender, 385
” convention of surrender, 389
” blockade of, 149, 156
Wei Yuen, the, 163
Y
Yakumo, the, 196
Yalu, battle of—Japanese losses, 148
” ” Chinese losses, 148
” ”, 113
Yamato, the, 58
Yang-wei, the, 53, 139
Yank Wei, the, 115
Yashima, the, 168
Yayeyama, the, 72, 150, 364
Yenomoto, Admiral, 35
Yetajima, Naval College, 258
Yokohama, port of, 249
Yokosuka dockyard, 234
Yoshimo, the, 92, 104, 119, 150, 163
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