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Title: The British battle fleet, Vol. 2 (of 2)
Author: Fred T. Jane
Illustrator: William Lionel Wyllie
Release date: March 15, 2025 [eBook #75617]
Language: English
Original publication: London: The Library Press, limited, 1915
Credits: Peter Becker, Charlie Howard, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE BRITISH BATTLE FLEET, VOL. 2 (OF 2) ***
Transcriber’s Notes:
This is Volume II of a two-volume set. Volume I is available at Project
Gutenberg: https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/75616.
Italics are enclosed in _underscores_. Additional notes will be found
near the end of this ebook.
THE BRITISH BATTLE FLEET
[Illustration: DREADNOUGHTS ANCHORING--1912.]
THE
BRITISH BATTLE
FLEET
ITS INCEPTION AND GROWTH
THROUGHOUT THE CENTURIES
TO THE PRESENT DAY
BY
FRED T. JANE
AUTHOR OF “FIGHTING SHIPS,” “ALL THE WORLD’S AIRCRAFT,”
“HERESIES OF SEA POWER,” ETC., ETC.
WITH ILLUSTRATIONS IN COLOUR
FROM ORIGINAL WATER-COLOUR DRAWINGS BY
W. L. WYLLIE, R.A.
AND NUMEROUS PLANS AND PHOTOGRAPHS.
VOL. II.
London
The Library Press, Limited
26 Portugal St., W.C.
1915
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. THE BARNABY ERA 1
II. THE WHITE ERA 54
III. THE WATTS ERA 117
IV. THE DREADNOUGHT ERA (WATTS) 133
V. SUBMARINES 208
VI. NAVAL AVIATION 218
VII. AUXILIARY NAVIES 231
VIII. GENERAL MATTERS IN THE LAST HUNDRED YEARS 242
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
IN COLOUR
FROM PICTURES BY W. L. WYLLIE, R.A.
PAGE
DREADNOUGHTS ANCHORING--1912 _Frontispiece_
BOARDING A SLAVE DHOW 41
SECOND CLASS CRUISER OF THE NAVAL DEFENCE ACT ERA, NOW CONVERTED
INTO A MINELAYER 73
WHITE ERA BATTLESHIPS OF THE MAJESTIC CLASS 91
EARLY TYPE OF “27 KNOT” DESTROYERS 111
THE “DREADNOUGHT,” 1906 147
“INDEFATIGABLE” AND “INVINCIBLE,” 1911 171
EARLY “30 KNOT” DESTROYERS 189
SUBMARINES LEAVING PORTSMOUTH HARBOUR 209
BATTLE CRUISER “NEW ZEALAND” ON THE STOCKS 1912 235
SHIP PHOTOGRAPHS
“INFLEXIBLE” AS ORIGINALLY COMPLETED 1881 3
“BENBOW” SHIP OF THE ADMIRAL CLASS 29
SUBMARINE E2 213
BRITISH NAVY SEAPLANE 219
HOISTING A NAVAL SEAPLANE ON BOARD THE “HIBERNIA” 223
PORTRAITS
SIR N. BARNABY 45
SIR WILLIAM WHITE 55
SIR PHILIP WATTS 123
GENERAL CUNIBERTI 135
ADMIRAL FISHER 243
ADMIRAL SIR JOHN JELLICOE 249
PLANS, DIAGRAMS, ETC.
EARLY TURRET SHIPS OF THE BARNABY ERA 7
FOREIGN SHIPS PURCHASED FOR THE NAVY IN 1877–78 11
BARNABY BARBETTE SHIPS 17
SOME FAMOUS RAMS 21
CHARACTERISTIC BARNABY SHIPS 33
TURRET SHIPS OF THE BARNABY ERA 37
BATTLESHIPS OF THE WHITE ERA 79
SYSTEMS OF WATER-LINE PROTECTION 83
PRINCIPAL CRUISERS OF THE WHITE ERA 95
PRE-DREADNOUGHTS OF THE WATTS ERA 119
ALTERNATIVE DESIGNS FOR THE DREADNOUGHT 151
ORIGINAL DREADNOUGHT DESIGNS 157
EARLY EXAMPLES OF WING TURRETS 161
DREADNOUGHTS 167
CENTRE-LINE SHIPS OF VARIOUS DATES 177
DIAGRAM TO ILLUSTRATE WEAK POINT OF THE ÉCHELON SYSTEM 181
THE BRITISH BATTLE FLEET.
I.
THE BARNABY ERA.
The characteristic _motif_ of the Barnaby designs has been described
as a “maximum of offensive power and the minimum of defence.” This
is not altogether correct; though as a generalization it is no very
great exaggeration. In every Barnaby design proper, offence was the
first thing sought for, but defence as then understood was by no means
overlooked as to-day it appears to have been.
The bed rock “Reed idea” was to produce a ship which could attack and
destroy the enemy without much risk of being damaged in doing so. The
“Barnaby idea” was that “the best defensive is a strong offensive”; and
a strict subordination of defence to what might best serve the attack
on the same displacement.
The first big armoured ship to be laid down at all on Barnaby
principles, the _Inflexible_, was built under somewhat peculiar
circumstances. In the year 1871 a Committee was appointed. One of its
findings was as follows:--
“As powerful armament, thick armour, speed, and light draught
cannot be combined in one ship, although all are needed for the
defence of the country; there is no alternative but to give the
preponderance to each in its turn amongst different classes of
ships which shall mutually supplement one another.”[1]
Amongst the Committee’s suggestions had been the abolition of the
complete belt, and its concentration amidships. This recommendation
was mainly intended to refer to cruising ships rather than to ships
definitely intended for the line of battle; but the idea soon spread.
These suggestions had already been embodied in a modified form in the
_Shannon_, of which particulars will be found later on. The _Shannon_,
however, was frankly a “belted cruiser,” and no idea had then been
entertained of adapting a similar system for heavy armoured ships.
In the year 1874, however, it transpired that the Italians were
evolving an entirely new type of battleship, the _Duilio_ and
_Dandolo_, and adopting a central box system. By this means they were
able to protect the citadel with 22-inch armour and mount four 100-ton
guns in two turrets _en échelon_, so that all four could bear ahead and
astern as well as on either broadside. The seriousness of the situation
was increased by the fact that in most of the tactical ideas of the
day, end-on approach figured largely.[2]
Compared with these Italian designs, the most powerful British ironclad
of those days, the _Dreadnought_, with a belt of only 14-inch to
11-inch armour, and bearing but two of her four 38-ton guns end-on, cut
a sorry figure.
[Illustration:
_Photo_] [_Ellis_.
THE _INFLEXIBLE_, AS ORIGINALLY COMPLETED, 1881.]
It was deemed essential to build a “reply.” The largest gun actually
available at the time was, however, the 81-ton M.L.; so this was
adopted for the new ship. The _Inflexible_ being frankly an adoption
of Italian ideas, she can hardly be described as the design of any one
man; Sir N. Barnaby having been tied down to an extent with which
(from his subsequent writings) he did not, it would appear, altogether
agree. A smaller central citadel than that of the Italian ships was
adopted, but the thickness was carried to 24-inch, the thickest armour
ever introduced into an ironclad either before or since. The bulkheads
were 20-in. The freeboard of the central redoubt was 10ft. Round about
it, fore and aft, on an armoured raft-body were built a bow and stern,
with superstructures curtailed to the centre line sufficiently to allow
of unimpeded end-on fire from the big guns, which, like those of the
Italians, were placed in échelonned turrets.
With a view to satisfying the “masted turret-ship” ideal, an absurd
brig rig was fitted to the _Inflexible_. With this it was possible for
the ship to drift before the wind, haystack-fashion, but the rig was
so much of the “placebo” order that it was designed to be taken down
and thrown overboard in case of action! At a later date it was removed
altogether and a military rig substituted.
The _Inflexible_ was crammed with novelties. Like the _Devastation_
she was the “_Dreadnought_” of her time. Chief among her innovations
were the adoption of submerged torpedo tubes (of which she had two),
the mounting of Nordenfeldts as a definite anti-torpedo-boat armament,
and an ingenious anti-rolling arrangement, whereby water was admitted
amidships to counteract the roll. This was very partially successful;
but in 1910 the idea re-appeared in a slightly altered form and is now
used in certain big Atlantic liners.
An ingenious feature of the _Inflexible_ concerned the big guns. In the
_Devastation_ and _Dreadnought_ types these could be run in and loaded
inside the turret. With the much larger guns of the _Inflexible_
this was impossible, without a very considerable increase of the size
of the turrets. Outside loading without protection was recognised as
unsuitable and practically impossible. A special glacis was, therefore,
designed, which admitted of outside loading under cover, and at the
same time ensured that, in the event of premature discharge, the
projectile would emerge above the water-line and not below it.
This device is of special interest as the “last word” of those
muzzle-loading guns to which the British Navy adhered so long as it
possibly could. Had it been thought of earlier, the British Navy might
perhaps have adhered to muzzle-loaders even longer than it did. As
things were, the _Inflexible_ device came too late to stay the tide
which had already begun to set strongly in the breechloader direction.
Details of the _Inflexible_ were:--
Displacement--11,880 tons.
Length (between perpendiculars)--320ft.
Beam--75ft.
Maximum Draught--26⅓ft.
Armour--Belt amidships 24--16-inch, beyond that a protective deck
only; 22--14-inch bulkhead, all iron; and 17-inch compound armour
turrets.
Armaments--Four 81-ton guns (to which eight 4-inch breechloaders
were added later on). Two submerged tubes and two above-water
launching appliances for torpedoes.
Horse-power--8,010 (I.H.P.).
Speed--13.8 knots.
Coal--1,300 tons = nominal 10-knot radius of 5,200 miles.
Built at Portsmouth Dockyard. Engined by Elder. Completed 1881.
[Illustration:
DUILIO.
DREADNOUGHT.
INFLEXIBLE.
EARLY TURRET-SHIPS OF THE BARNABY ERA.]
On completion she was sent to the Mediterranean, with Captain Fisher
(afterwards Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Fisher) in command of her. He
was the chief gunnery officer of those days and the founder of the
torpedo school. At the time it was put on record that, asked by a Press
interviewer what he would do if the fortunes of war brought it about
that he had to encounter a similar “last word” in naval construction,
he replied that he would keep away from her till nightfall, and
then send in the, then, novel second-class torpedo-boats which the
_Inflexible_ carried, to settle the foe. Over which statement the
historian of fifty years hence may yet place Lord Fisher among the
prophets. To-day, some thirty years later, similar ideas obtain, but
have got no further. Fifty years hence----?
In 1882 the _Inflexible_ was the central figure at the bombardment of
Alexandria. The damage she did was infinitesimal compared to the ideas
which the public had formed of her. Far more actual mischief was done
by Lord Charles Beresford in a trivial gunboat, the _Condor_, which
steered into close range of the hostile guns and knocked them over. At
the time this was regarded as an act of spectacular heroism; but the
historian of the future is far more likely to discover in it (as in the
Fisher torpedo-boats) something closely akin to the reasoning behind
Nelson when he destroyed the French fleet at the Nile or charged into
them at Trafalgar. The commonplace expression, “sizing up the other
man,” and acting accordingly, is the secret. In peace time we are all
too apt to assess hostile weapons at their theoretical potentiality.
The victors in war are those who gauge correctly the handling ability
of the man behind the weapon and--act accordingly.
About the years 1877–78, towards the close of the Turco-Russian War, an
Anglo-Russian war seemed probable, and four foreign ships building in
England were purchased for the British Navy.
These were the Brazilian _Independencia_, an improved _Monarch_,
designed by Sir E. J. Reed, which went into the British service as
the _Neptune_. Save that she carried 38-ton guns instead of 25-ton,
she reproduced the _Monarch_ idea almost exactly. After certain
vicissitudes she entered the British service, and eventually was fitted
with a couple of military masts. The points of special interest about
her were that (1) owing to some error her funnels were put in sideways
instead of as designed; and (2) in service in any bad weather the sea
regularly washed out her wardroom; (3) she was the first ship of the
British Navy to carry a bath-room. As an effective warship she never
figured to any large extent.
The other three purchased ships had been destined for the Turkish Navy;
and all three turned out worse than the _Neptune_. The _Hamidieh_,
re-christened _Superb_, more or less duplicated the _Hercules_. She
took part in the bombardment of Alexandria a little later, and it
was there discovered that her guns could not train at all well in
comparison with contemporary British naval ships.
[Illustration:
SUPERB
NEPTUNE
BELLEISLE
FIRE ZONES OF THE BELLEISLE (4 GUNS)
FIRE ZONES OF THE DEVASTATION (4 GUNS)
FOREIGN SHIPS PURCHASED FOR THE NAVY IN 1877–78.]
Of the fighting value of the other two ships, _Pakyi-Shereef_ and
_Boordyi-Zaffir_, which became the _Belleisle_ and _Orion_, the least
said the better. They turned out to be nothing but improvements on a
type of “coast defender,” already obsolete, diminutives of the original
Reed broadside idea applied to a _Hotspur_ type hull. In place of
the single 25-ton gun of the _Hotspur_, they carried four similar
guns--the old 12-inch 25-ton M.L. These guns were carried in a central
raised battery, from which, as in the _Hotspur_, one gun could always
bear, and from which two bearing on an exact and unlikely broadside
might be looked for.
No useful service was ever performed by these ships. The _Belleisle_
ended her service as a target, the _Orion_ as a hulk. They proved
conclusively that the central battery idea was obsolete and so far
probably did good service. In the past Sir E. J. Reed had argued,
and for that matter proved, that for a given weight of armour and
armament eight guns, four on either broadside, could be mounted with
equal protection and economy of weight as against two pairs of guns in
turrets.[3] The _Belleisle_ gave the lie to this idea, however, when
it came to be applied to half the number of guns. The step from that
to the same thing with more guns was made easy, and the turret idea
assured, out of the _Belleisle_ type. To the _Belleisle_ and _Orion_
more than any other ships may be traced the first real appreciation of
“angles in between”--the demonstration that “right ahead” or “right
on the broadside” were ideal positions which no enemy would willingly
assume.
The _Devastation_ and her sisters had, of course, anticipated this
idea; but to the _Belleisle_, at most fighting angles only able to
bring a quarter of her battery into action, may be traced most modern
developments in gun disposition.
Contemporaneous with the special Barnaby ships, reference may be made
to the entirely nondescript _Téméraire_. She may be described as an
absolute hybrid--partly Reed, partly Barnaby, partly gun inventors of
the era, and partly nothing in particular.
Details of this ship are:--
Displacement--8,540 tons.
Length (between perpendiculars)--285ft.
Beam--62ft.
Draught--27¼ft.
Armament--Four 25-ton 11-inch M.L. (two in barbettes), four 18-ton
M.L.--two above water torpedo tubes.
Armour (iron)--Complete 11--8in. belt. Bulkheads 8--5in. Barbettes
10--8in. Battery 10--8in. Horse-power--7,520 = 14.5 knots.
Coal--620 tons = 2,680 miles at economical speed (nominal).
The _Téméraire_ was unique in the world’s navies in that two of her
25-ton guns were carried--one forward, one aft--on special Moncrieff
mountings, an adaption for naval purposes of the “disappearing gun,”
invented for forts of that era. The gun, loaded under cover, was raised
to fire by hydraulic mechanism, and then recoiled to the loading
position. The ship was otherwise essentially of the Reed box-battery
type; the other two 25-ton guns being in a central main-deck battery,
and capable of a good deal of ahead fire. The other big guns (18 tons)
were cut off from the 25-ton by an armoured bulkhead, and merely had
the ordinary broadside training.
Like the _Inflexible_, the _Téméraire_ had a heavy brig rig. Towards
the end of her active service career this was replaced by a military
rig; but all her active work was done as a brig. She was built at
Chatham Dockyard, engined by Humphrys, and completed for sea in 1877.
In 1882 she was at the bombardment of Alexandria, and there did more
execution than any other ship. Her subsequent career was uneventful,
and in her own way she was a “monstrosity” as much as the _Polyphemus_
was. She is generally understood to have been a “naval officers’ ideal”
ship, rather than the regular production of the Chief Constructor.
Whether this be true is, at least, doubtful. Certainly she may equally
well be regarded as the forlorn hope of those who looked to see the
general principles of the central battery system adapted to suit the
new ideas as to ironclads. French ideas[4] also had probably something
to do with her peculiar design.
The idea embodied in the _Inflexible_ was so pleasing to the
authorities of that period that she was duplicated in two smaller
vessels of the same type, the _Ajax_ and _Agamemnon_, though the
precise purpose for which these vessels were built is difficult to
fathom. They were in every way inferior to the _Inflexible_, and
mainly of interest as indicating the definite abandonment of the idea
of the masted battleship, and they were also the last ships to mount
muzzle-loading guns:--
Particulars of these ships were:--
Displacement--8,660 tons.
Length (between perpendiculars)--280ft.
Beam--66ft.
Draught (mean)--24ft.
Guns--Four 38-ton M.L., two 6-inch 81-cwt. B.L.
Horse-power--5,440.
Speed--13.25 knots.
These were followed by the _Colossus_ and _Edinburgh_, which were laid
down in 1879. In these ships the 12-inch breechloader was adopted,
and an attempt at what was then a very considerable speed was made.
An auxiliary armament made its first really definite appearance, five
6-inch guns being mounted on the superstructure.
Particulars of these ships were:--
Displacement--9,420 tons.
Length (between perpendiculars)--325ft.
Beam--68ft.
Draught (mean)--26ft. 3ins.
Guns--Four 45-ton B.L.R., five 6-inch, 89-cwt. do.
Horse-power--7,500.
Speed--15.50 knots.
At and about the same time considerable interest was being taken in
rams. This resulted in the laying down of the _Conqueror_, a species of
improved _Rupert_, and a type of ship destined to be enlarged upon in
the future.
Particulars of the _Conqueror_ were:--
Displacement--6,200 tons.
Length--270ft.
Beam--58ft.
Draught--24ft.
Armament--Two 45-ton B.L.R., four 6-inch 89-cwt. do., six 14-inch
torpedo tubes (above water).
Horse-power--(maximum) 6,000.
Speed--15.5 knots.
Coal--650 tons.
The _Conqueror_ was launched in September, 1881. Some three years later
a sister, the _Hero_, was laid down, and launched towards the end of
1885. She differed from the _Conqueror_ only in that all four of her
6-inch guns were mounted on the superstructure, whereas the _Conqueror_
carried two of them on the main deck inside the superstructure.
[Illustration:
TEMERAIRE
IMPERIEUSE
BRITISH SYSTEM IDEAL
FRENCH SYSTEM IDEAL
BARNABY BARBETTE SHIPS.]
Although developed from the _Rupert_, the _Conqueror_ differed a good
deal in appearance, on account of the whole of the after part of the
ship being one huge superstructure. In her, the superstructure, as a
very definite feature instead of a mere accessory, may be said to have
made its first appearance, to remain as a factor of growing importance
for many years.
Contemporaneously with these ships two entirely different types made
their appearance. One of these was the “torpedo ram” _Polyphemus_, an
absolutely unique vessel, the outcome (though not so designed) of the
influence of the torpedo. The ship was never duplicated, and never
performed much service, but it would be rash to assert that the future
may not see something like her re-appear. She was first projected as a
“ram” pure and simple, so long ago as 1873, and designed by Barnaby to
suit the specifications of certain naval officers as embodying their
ideals of the warship of the future. This is the generally accepted
theory, though Sir N. Barnaby[5] has made public a somewhat different
view of the matter, and according to him, Admiral Sir George Sartorius,
the naval officer principally concerned, lost his interest in the
_Polyphemus_ when it was decided to give her an armament of torpedo
tubes and some quick-firers against torpedo attack. So far as can be
gauged, the torpedo tubes were likewise a naval innovation with which
Sir N. Barnaby was also not much in sympathy. At any rate, he has put
on record the view[5] that:--
“The introduction of torpedoes made the ship far more costly than
she need have been, and it is possible that the type would have
been continued and improved had the simplicity of the ram been
adhered to.”
The _Polyphemus_ performed little useful service; her life on the Navy
List was short; and she is always spoken of as a “failure.” Officers
who served in her were, however, invariably enthusiastic about her, and
had war occurred during the time that she was in existence there is no
telling what she might have accomplished or how profoundly she might
have affected naval construction.
In essence the _Polyphemus_ was a semi-submerged craft, those parts of
her which were above water being merely a light superstructure for the
accommodation of her crew in peace time.
She was of 2,640 tons displacement, length 240ft. between
perpendiculars, beam 40ft., and a normal mean draught of 20ft. In form
she was cigar-shaped, plated with 3-inch armour on the upper part of
her curved sides. With 5,520 I.H.P. she had the then very high speed
of 17.8 knots. She carried 300 tons of coal, sufficient for a nominal
radius of 3,400 miles at economical speed.
Her principal feature, however, was the fitting of five submerged
tubes, one in the bow the others on the broadside. For repelling a
torpedo attack she carried six 6-pounders and a couple of machine guns.
[Illustration:
POLYPHEMUS.
ALARM.
KATAHDIN.
SOME FAMOUS RAMS.]
It is here of interest to relate that some years later the U.S. Navy
created a species of _Polyphemus_ imitation in the “ram” _Katahdin_. To
a certain extent they had anticipated her likewise in the _Alarm_, 720
tons, launched in 1873, which carried a 15-inch smooth-bore gun _under
water_ in her ram, and the _Intrepid_ (launched 1873), of 1,123 tons,
of which no details ever transpired, and it may be said that she was
“strangled at birth.” But the _Polyphemus’s_ ancestry is undoubtedly
American. The _Katahdin_ (first produced as the “ram” _Ammen_) was not
launched till 1893. She was of 2,050 tons and seventeen knots, and
having no torpedo tubes, being a “ram” pure and simple, exactly
reproduced the Sartorious-Barnaby idea. She soon disappeared from the
U.S. Navy List, and she never did anything. She doubled the armour of
the _Polyphemus_, whilst lacking her torpedo armament. Since then, the
idea has found expression in three small U.S. “semi-submerged” boats,
with the torpedo as their main armament; but these three boats never
got beyond the “designed” stage. No other nation ever exhibited the
least interest in the _Polyphemus_ idea.
Reference has already been made to the _Shannon_, which was the
first armoured cruiser of the British Navy. She was launched towards
the end of 1875 and completed two years later. In substance she
was a development of the idea which first found expression in the
_Inconstant_, heavy armament being preferred to the protection of
the guns. A narrow belt of armour with a maximum thickness of 9-ins.
protected three-quarters of the water-line. This belt commenced at the
stern and ended in a bulkhead some 70ft. from the bow. Forward of this
bulkhead was an under-water protective deck, and a certain amount of
armour was concentrated on the ram under water. The bulkhead, which
was from 9in. to 8in. thick, rose to the upper deck, and afforded
protection to a couple of 18-ton muzzle-loaders, capable of right-ahead
fire. The remainder of her armament consisted of seven 12½ton guns, and
was entirely unprotected.
Other details of the ship are as follows:--
Displacement--5,390 tons.
Length--260ft.
Beam--54ft.
Draught--23ft. 4in.
Horse-power--3,370.
Speed--12.35 knots.
Coal carried--580 tons = nominal economical radius of 2,260 miles.
The speed of the _Shannon_ was so low, even in those days, that it
is a little difficult to surmise for what purpose she was designed,
especially as this design was more or less contemporary with the
re-designing of the _Dreadnought_.[6] It found favour, however, since
she was almost immediately followed by two larger replicas, the
_Nelson_ and the _Northampton_, details of which were:--
Displacement--7,630 tons.
Length (between perpendiculars)--280ft.
Beam--60ft.
Draught (maximum)--26ft. 6in.
Armour--Belt amidships, 9in. to 6in., compound: bulkhead ditto.
Armour deck only, at ends.
Main Armament--Four 18-ton M.L.R., eight 12-ton M.L.R., two
above-water 14-inch torpedo tubes.
Horse-power--6,640.
Speed--14.41 knots.
Coal carried--1,150 tons = nominal radius of 3,850 miles.
These ships differed from the _Shannon_ in that the armour belt was
confined to a water-line strip amidships, while the after guns were
also protected by a bulkhead. The most curious, and to modern ideas,
eccentric feature of these ships, was that they were fitted with
triangular rams, which, “for the sake of safety,” could be removed in
peace time and merely put on for war purposes! As a matter of fact,
the ships always carried their rams without rendering themselves
dangerous to anybody. On the other hand, shortly after construction,
the _Northampton_ was run into by a small trading schooner, which cut
her down to the water’s edge. The ships, therefore, started with an
unfavourable reputation, which the _Northampton_ followed up by a total
inability to make even her moderate designed speed. The _Nelson_, on
the other hand, proved herself a comparatively good steamer, so much
so that at a later date she was to a certain extent modernised. Both
ships were originally heavily masted, the idea being to perform most
of their peace service when convenient under sail. The _Nelson_ sailed
moderately well, but the _Northampton_ very badly. It was possibly with
some view to remedying this that some years later, when it was decided
that the _Imperieuse_, originally built as a brig, should be given a
military rig, her lofty iron fore and mainmast were taken out of her
and substituted for the two equivalent masts in the _Northampton_. The
change, however, was not satisfactory, as thereafter she sailed if
anything worse than ever.
At and about this year protected cruisers made their first appearance
in the _Comus_ class. Of these altogether eleven were built, the best
known of these being the _Calliope_, which in the early nineties became
famous through steaming out of Samoa Roads in the teeth of a hurricane,
which utterly destroyed every foreign vessel anchored there at the
same time. The _Comus_ class consisted of the _Calliope_, _Calypso_,
_Canada_, _Carysfort_, _Champion_, _Cleopatra_, _Comus_, _Conquest_,
_Constance_, _Cordelia_, and _Curacoa_. They averaged 2,380 tons
displacement, though the first mentioned, which were the last to be
built, were slightly larger. The original armament consisted of two
6-ton muzzle-loaders and twelve 64-pounders. This was afterwards
varied by the substitution of breechloaders. The ships generally had
a speed of about thirteen knots, and were completed between the years
1877, for the earliest, and 1884 for the latest. They had a 1½-inch
protective deck for the engines amidships. These ships, which were
generally officially known as the “C” class cruiser, were undoubtedly
diminutives of the _Shannon_, or, at any rate, inspired by a similar
idea.
Besides growing downwards the idea also grew upwards, and resulted in
the building of six ships of the “Admiral” class, of which the first
was the _Collingwood_. These, which were the apotheosis of the Barnaby
idea, represented an absolute revolution in naval construction, so far
as big ships were concerned.
The “Admirals” were not all identical, as they formed four different
groups in the matter of displacement and three in armament. In all,
however, the integral idea was the same. Amidships was a narrow belt,
150ft. long by 7½ft. wide, which sufficed to protect engines, boilers,
and communication tubes of the barbettes. This belt varied in thickness
from 18ins. to 8ins, of compound armour. The ends of the belt were
closed up by 16-inch bulkheads. Forward and aft was merely a curved
protective deck; there was also a flat protective deck on top of the
armour belt. The ships were of low freeboard, forward and aft, but
had a large superstructure built up amidships. At either end of the
superstructure, with their bases unprotected by armour except for the
communication tubes already referred to, were many-sided barbettes
with plates set at an angle of about forty-five degrees. These
barbettes were about 11½ins. thick, and carried each a couple of the
heaviest guns then available. These were 12-inch breechloaders in the
_Collingwood_, and 13.5-inch in the other ships, except the _Benbow_,
which mounted one 16.5 inch 110-ton in each barbette instead. An
auxiliary armament was mounted inside the superstructure. The speed of
these ships was about seventeen knots, and was considerably in excess
of the average for the period.
=====================+====================+=====================+=====================+====================
Name. | _Collingwood._ | _Rodney_, | _Anson_, | _Benbow._
| | _Howe._ | _Camperdown._ |
---------------------+--------------------+---------------------+---------------------+--------------------
Displacement, tons | 9,500 | 10,300 | 10,600 | 10,600
| | | |
Length (_p.p._) ft.| 325 | 325 | 330 | 330
| | | |
Beam, ft. | 68 | 68 | 68½ | 68½
| | | |
Draught (_mean_) ft. | 26¾ | 27¼ | 26¾ | 27¼
| | | |
H.P. | 9,500 | 11,500 | 11,500 | 11,500
| | | |
Nominal Speed, | | | |
knots | 16.5 | 16.7 | 17.2 | 17.5
| | | |
Armament | 4--12in., 6--6in. | 4--13.5, 6--6in. | 4--13.5, 6--6 in. | 2--16.25, 10--6in.
| | | |
Built at | Pembroke Yard | _Rodney_, | _Anson_, | Thames, I.W.
| | Chatham Yd. | Pembroke Yd. |
| | _Howe_, Pembroke Yd.| _Camperdown_, |
| | Chatham Yd. | Por’th. |
| | | |
Engines by | Humphrys | _Rodney_, Humphrys | _Anson_, Humphrys | Maudslay
| | _Howe_, Humphrys | _Camperdown_, Maud’y|
| | | |
Armour belt | 18in.-8in. | 18in.-8in. | 18in.-8in. | 18in.-8in.
| | | |
barbettes | 14in.-12in. | 11½in.-10in. | 16in.-6in. | 12in.-4in.
| | | |
bulkheads | 16in.-6in. | 16in.-6in. | 14in.-12in. | 18in.-6in.*
| | | |
Armament | 4--12in., 6--6in., | 4--13.5, 6--6in., | 4--13.5, 6--6in., | 2--16.25, 10--6in.,
| and smaller, | and smaller, | and smaller, | and smaller,
| 2 sub. and 4 | as _Collingwood_ | as _Collingwood_ | as _Collingwood_
| above water tubes | | |
=====================+====================+=====================+=====================+====================
As compared with the _Colossus_ and _Edinburgh_ class of the same date
and era of design, the “Admirals” were somewhat inferior in armour
protection, but because of that secured a far better speed and a
greatly superior big gun command.
In all the “Admiral” class the armour weighed about 2,500 tons--say,
20 per cent. of the displacement. This proportion has never been very
greatly varied from either before or since, and the popular idea that
Barnaby designs sacrificed armour weight for other features is entirely
incorrect. The real Barnaby ideal is better described (the conditions
of his own time being kept in mind) as an attempt to put into practice
“everything or nothing,” so far as protection was concerned. To-day,
a compromise is in fashion, and Barnaby is very much out of date.
It may well be but a phase in the cycle of naval design. Properly
to appreciate the _Admiral_ class ideal, we have to translate it
into the ideal which obtains to-day. Thus put, the _Admirals_ would
be somewhat swifter than our existing battle-cruisers, their vitals
would be invulnerable and their armaments superior to that of any
potential enemy. They would not, in fact, very greatly differ from
Admiral Bacon’s conception (published some five years before the
present war) of the battleship of the future, in which he predicted the
disappearance of much of the side armour of to-day.
[Illustration:
_Photo_] [_Symonds & Co._
THE _BENBOW_--A SHIP OF THE “ADMIRAL” CLASS.]
The coming of the medium calibre quick-firer soon rendered the
“Admirals” obsolete and even ridiculous. The medium calibre quick-firer
profoundly modified design until the development of the big gun
enabled it to act well beyond the effective range of the medium gun,
and incidentally enabled it to fire nearly as fast as the elementary
quick-firers were built to do. Thus we have come back to something very
akin to the condition under which the Barnaby ships were designed.
These ships could not, perhaps, be described as an absolutely original
idea, save in so far as the British Navy was concerned, since the
Italian _Italia_ was launched in the same year that the _Collingwood_,
the first of the “Admirals” was laid down. The _Italia_, equally
abnormally fast (or faster) for the period, carried four 100-ton guns
échelonned in one large heavily armoured barbette amidships, but had
no water-line belt whatever, and relied entirely upon an armour-deck
to protect the motive power. In the “Admirals” the motive power was
thoroughly protected by the vertical belt amidships, while flotation
otherwise depended upon internal sub-divisions.
The “Admiral” class idea was re-developed into armoured cruisers in
a somewhat curious fashion. At that time the French Navy was second
in the world, and French ideas of construction commanded a great deal
of respect. French notions at that era ran largely to single gun
positions, four guns being separately disposed in four barbettes placed
one ahead, one astern, and one on either side. The particular point of
this arrangement was that while British designs accepted two or four
big guns bearing, the French system allowed for a definite mean of
three. More practically put, this may be translated into a conception
that an enemy would use every effort to avoid positions in which four
big guns could be brought to bear on him, and seek those in which he
was exposed to two only. A gun-arrangement which gave three big guns
bearing in _any_ position seemed therefore far more reasonable on paper.
It stands to the credit of Sir N. Barnaby (or else to the credit of the
Admiralty of the era) that he recognised the impossibility of any such
manœuvres in fleet actions, but at the same time he also realised how
heavily it might tell in cruiser duels. Out of which the _Imperieuse_
and _Warspite_ were born.
Details of these ships:--
Displacement--8,400 tons.
Length (between perpendiculars)--315ft.
Beam--62ft.
Draught (maximum)--27⅓ft.
Armament--Four 9.2 24-ton B.L., six 6-inch, 89cwt., six torpedo
tubes.
Horse-power--10,000=16.75 knots.
Coal--1,130 tons = nominal radius of ten knots of 7,000 miles.
Armour--Belt amidships of 10in. compound, with 9-inch bulkheads,
8-inch barbettes. No armour to lesser guns. 3-inch protective
deck fore and aft, and on top of belt.
[Illustration:
SHANNON.
NORTHAMPTON.
ADMIRAL class.
“C” class.
ORLANDO class.
CHARACTERISTIC BARNABY SHIPS.]
The _Imperieuse_ was built at Portsmouth Dockyard and engined by
Maudslay. The _Warspite_, built at Chatham, was engined by Penn.
Both were completed in 1886 at a total cost of about £630,000 each.
They were copper sheathed, and (like the _Inflexible_) originally
were to carry a heavy brig-rig. This was removed at an early stage,
and a single military mast between the funnels substituted. The
_Imperieuse’s_ masts were subsequently put in the _Northampton_
(which see). Both proved faster than anticipated; but the coming of
the quick-firer placed them in the semi-obsolete category almost as
soon as they were completed. The type was never repeated. Till recently
the _Imperieuse_ still existed as a depot ship for destroyers; the
_Warspite_ has long since gone to the scrap heap. Years after their
conception a modernised version of them was to some extent reproduced
in the _Black Prince_ class. In their own day, however, they appeared
and that was all.
The “battleship of the future” ideal of those days had to some extent
been foreshadowed in the _Benbow_, with her couple of 110-ton guns.
The monster gun was “the vogue” and no way of carrying it on existing
displacements allowed of more than two such pieces being mounted.
The idea of the moment became the mounting of guns capable of
delivering deadly blows, and (corollary therewith) protection to ensure
that that deadly blow could be delivered with relative impunity. Since
the secondary gun had now come in, auxiliary guns and a secondary
battery were a _sine quâ non_; but the ideal ship was to be one
incapable of vital injury from such weapons. On lines such as these the
_Victoria_ class was designed.
The call was for an improved _Benbow_. The armament was to be no less
and, if possible, more; while better protection was an essential
feature.
Details of the _Victoria_ type, of which only two were built, are as
follows:--
Displacement--10,470 tons (approximately that of the _Benbow_).
Length (between perpendiculars)--340ft.
Beam--70ft.
Draught (maximum)--27¼ft.
Armament--Two 110-ton guns (in a single turret), one 9.2 (aft),
twelve 6-inch; twenty-one anti-torpedo guns, and six torpedo
tubes (14-inch).
Armour (compound)--18-inch to 16-inch belt amidships, redoubt and
bulkheads, 18-inch turret, 2-inch in battery. Armour deck, and
heavily armoured conning tower.
Horse-power--14,000 = 16.75 knots.
Coal--1,200 tons = 7,000 miles at 10 knots.
The _Victoria_ was built at Elswick and engined by Humphrys; launched
in 1887 and completed for sea in 1889. The _Sanspareil_, engined by the
same firm, but built at Blackwall (Thames Ironworks) was launched a
year later, but completed about the same time.
The design of these ships closely approximated to the _Conqueror_,
of which they were merely enlarged editions with a heavily increased
battery.
[Illustration:
RUPERT.
CONQUEROR.
VICTORIA.
DREADNOUGHT.
TRAFALGAR.
TURRET SHIPS OF THE BARNABY ERA.]
The _Victoria_ on completion became the flagship in the Mediterranean
of Admiral Sir George Tryon. In the course of evolutions off the
coast of Syria on June 22nd, 1893, she was rammed and sunk by the
_Camperdown_. The disaster, which cost the lives of the Admiral and
321 officers and men, teaches no useful lesson, saving the danger of
transverse bulkheads. Water-tight doors were shut too late. The sea
entered. The ship gradually turned over, then suddenly “turned turtle”
and capsized.
The mystery of her loss has never been fully explained. Admiral Tryon
gave an order for the fleet, then in two lines, to turn inboard sixteen
points, while at six cables apart. This manœuvre, with turning
circles as they were, was bound to create a collision. This was
pointed out to Admiral Tryon, who, however, took no notice of the
representations. It has since been assumed that he went suddenly mad.
A more reasonable explanation is that he intended the ships to “jockey
with their screws” (a manœuvre which he never employed as a rule),
and forgot to mention the fact, though details of evidence in the
court-martial hardly bear this out.
The exact signal as made was:--
“Second division alter course in succession sixteen points to
starboard, preserving the order of the Fleet.”
“First division alter course in succession sixteen points to port,
preserving the order of the Fleet.”
This signal was capable of more than one interpretation. Along one of
them each ship in the two squadrons might easily have rammed the other
in succession, according to some interpretations. Using screws, both
divisions might have closed in very closely but quite safely. Acting
other than simultaneously they might anyway have effected the manœuvre
without disaster. At eight cables (a distance which was suggested to
the Admiral an hour before) it might have been done quite safely. There
have been other explanations also.
In the Fleet at the time everything was believed, except the “blunder”
theory which has gone down to history. To this day that is accepted
with reservation. But the rest is mystery.
The _Camperdown_, in turning, crashed into the _Victoria_, striking
her forward, curiously enough directly on a bulkhead, just as the
_Vanguard_ was struck when she was rammed.
It was not expected that the _Victoria_ would be sunk. Had the
water-tight doors been closed during the manœuvre, instead of at the
last moment, she would probably have remained afloat. As things were,
it was impossible to close many at the time the order was given, but
her low-freeboard also played a part. The sea invaded the door on the
starboard side of the superstructure and thence got everywhere on that
side of the ship. It was that which threw her over and capsized her,
but the chance circumstance of the blow on the lateral bulkhead should
not be forgotten. The _Victoria_ was struck just on one of the points
where all the odds were against her being struck.
The _Sanspareil_ had an uneventful career, and was eventually sold
out of the Service somewhat suddenly under the “scrap-heap” policy of
Admiral Fisher in 1904.
Following upon the _Imperieuse_ type, an entirely new class of armoured
cruisers, the _Orlandos_, were designed. Just as the _Victorias_ were
improved and enlarged _Conquerors_, so the _Orlandos_ were “improved
_Merseys_.” Particulars of these ships, of which seven were built
altogether, are as follows:--
Displacement--5,600 tons.
Length (between perpendiculars)--300ft.
Beam--56ft.
Draught (maximum)--22½ft. (actually more).
Armament--Two 9.2in. B.L.; ten 6in.; and six torpedo tubes.
Armour (compound)--Belt amidships 10in., with 16in. Bulkheads.
Protective deck at ends. All guns protected by shields only.
Horse-power--8,500 = 18 knots.
Coal (maximum)--900 tons = nominal radius of 8,000 miles.
[Illustration: BOARDING A SLAVE DHOW]
They were built as follows:--
===============+===========+=============
NAME. | BUILDER. | ENGINED BY
---------------+-----------+-------------
_Orlando_ | Palmer | Palmer
_Australia_ | Glasgow | Napier
_Aurora_ | Pembroke | Thompson
_Galatea_ | Glasgow | Napier
_Immortalité_ | Chatham | Earle
_Narcissus_ | Hull | Earle
_Undaunted_ | Palmer | Palmer
===============+===========+=============
They were laid down in 1885 and 1886. The _Orlando_ was completed in
1888, all the others in 1889. They were launched in 1886 and 1887, and
some of them, fitted with wooden guns (“Quakers”), served to swell the
Fleet at the great Jubilee Review of 1887. All made over their designed
speeds on trial, but they did their trials “light.” In service all
proved fairly useful, and the _Undaunted_, with Lord Charles Beresford
as her captain in the Mediterranean, “made history” to the extent
of first creating an Anglo-American _entente_, beginning with the
U.S.S. _Chicago_, captained then by the now universally known naval
author, Admiral Mahan. Beresford first achieved fame in the _Condor_
at Alexandra, in 1882; but it was in the _Undaunted_ that he first
“made history” by ending the previously existing hostility between the
British and U.S. Navies; and establishing the naval brotherhood of
those who speak the same language.
The _Orlandos_ were the last of the essentially Barnaby ships.
Barnaby was associated with the Navy thereafter; but the _Nile_ and
_Trafalgar_, though produced under his régime, were not “Barnaby
ships,” and differences of opinion with the Admiralty about them
eventuated in his resignation.
The tide of naval opinion was then setting back in the old
_Dreadnought_ direction. More complete protection was being demanded.
The quick-firer was just coming in and its potentialities seemed
enormous. The secondary battery had to be protected. Destruction of
communications on board began to take on a fresh and more serious
aspect. In a word, the Admiralty reverted to Reed ideas, and in
reverting exaggerated them. In such circumstances the general idea of
the _Trafalgars_ was born.
Sir N. Barnaby totally dissented from the Admiralty line of thought.
In his view the size of a ship could not legitimately be increased
unless her offensive powers increased in proportion; in the _Trafalgar_
idea both speed and armament were reduced as compared to the _Admiral_
class, and over a thousand odd tons added entirely to carry extra
defensive armour. Over which dispute he resigned his position.
Details of the _Nile_ and _Trafalgar_ as built are:--
Displacement--11,940 tons.
Length (between perpendiculars)--345ft.
Beam--73ft.
Draught (mean)--27½ft.
Armament--Four 13.5-inch, six 4.7 Q.F., also smaller guns, and four
14-inch torpedo tubes, of which two were submerged.
Armour (compound)--Belt, 230ft. long (_i.e._, 80ft. longer than
in the _Admirals_ and _Victorias_), 20--16in., with 16--14 inch
bulkheads, protective deck at ends and over main belt.
Over this a redoubt 141ft. long, 18in. thick. Above the redoubt a
battery, 4in. thick. Turrets, 18in.
Horse-power--12,000 = 17 knots.
Coal--(normal) 900 tons; (maximum) 1,200 tons = 6,500 miles at 10
knots.
[Illustration:
_Photo_] [_Russell & Sons._
SIR N. BARNABY.
A recent photograph.]
The _Nile_ was built at Pembroke and engined by Maudslay. She was laid
down in April, 1886, launched in March, 1888, and completed some two
years later. The _Trafalgar_ was laid down at Portsmouth in January,
1886, and launched in September, 1887. Her machinery was supplied by
Humphrys. The armour of these ships weighed no less than 4,230 tons,
_i.e._, some 35 per cent. of the displacement instead of the more usual
25 per cent. or so. The then first Lord of the Admiralty took the
occasion of the launch to remark that the days of such armoured ships
were over, and that probably these were the last ironclads that would
ever be built--the future would lie with fast deck-protected vessels!
As, for three years, no more armoured ships were laid down, he at least
enunciated a definite policy when these heavily armoured successors of
the _Admiral_ class were put afloat. They differed from the _Admirals_
in that turrets were reverted to instead of barbettes, and, as already
mentioned, they were really nothing but modernised versions of the old
low freeboard _Dreadnought_.
At a later date 6-inch Q.F. were substituted for the 4.7’s; but no
other schemes of modernising the ships ever came to a head.
_PROTECTED CRUISERS OF THE BARNABY ERA._
Four ships of the _Amphion_ Class--_Amphion_, _Arethusa_, _Leander_,
and _Phæton_, of which the first (_Arethusa_) was laid down in
1880--represented the first Barnaby idea of the protected cruiser. They
were of 4,300 tons displacement, and 16.5 knots nominal speed. They
carried ten 6-inch guns, and a 1½-inch deck amidships. According to the
ideas of those days they were heavily over-gunned. They always steamed
well; but it is doubtful whether Barnaby, left to himself, would ever
have produced them. Incidentally, they were always bad sea-boats.
In 1883, completed about the same time as the _Victoria_, the _Mersey_
class--_Mersey_, _Thames_, _Severn_, and _Forth_--of 4,050 tons
displacement, and carrying two 8-inch and ten 6-inch, were commenced:
practically early essays at the _Orlando_ class idea which followed.
The _Orlandos_, on only a thousand or so tons more displacement,
carried 9.2’s instead of 8-inch, had armour-belts as well as protective
decks, and were a good knot faster. Both the _Amphions_ and _Merseys_
may be described as representing strictly naval Admiralty ideas--the
_Orlando_, Barnaby ones. Each type was quickly rendered obsolete by the
coming of the quick-firer; but the Barnaby type of cruiser, for 20 per
cent. extra displacement, certainly offered better chances than any
rival proposition, if only we consider matters in the light of what
existed in those days and what promised best at that time.
So ends the Barnaby era. Barnaby’s constructional ideas were blown to
mincemeat by the advent of the quick-firer. Even to-day his ideas seem
somewhat obsolete. Yet a few years hence (if big ships survive) they
stand every chance of being reverted to, because to-day the big gun has
more or less come back to where it was in 1875–1885. Barnaby, though
he worked into its era, never realised the preponderance or possible
preponderance of the “secondary gun.” In his era it fired too slowly to
count for very much; in our own, range neutralises whatever it may have
accomplished in the rapidity of fire direction.
Likely enough, the reversion to Barnaby ideals, which is reasonably
probable for the immediate future, will be merely a phase; and casual
historians will ever put him down as the naval constructor who was
least able to anticipate the years ahead of his creations. But a
hundred years hence Barnaby may come into his own in a way little
suspected to-day. A hundred years hence, when all the most modern ideas
are ancient history, Barnaby may stand with Phineas Pett, and the Navy
which he created stand for something infinitely more than the scrap
heap to which a later age swiftly relegated it. Only the historian
of the distant future can estimate him at his real value. His own
generation never placed much faith in his ships; the generation that
followed generally regarded them with scorn. It was probably wrong, but
only the future can prove it to have been so.
_GUNS IN THE ERA._
The guns which especially belong to the Barnaby era were as follows:--
======+=======+========+==========+==========+=========+================
| | | | | | Penetration
| Weight| Length | Weight | Muzzle | Muzzle | 2000 yds.
Cal. | in | in |projectile| velocity | energy +-------+--------
ins. | tons. | cals. | lbs. | f.s. | ft. | iron. | comp.
------+-------+--------+----------+----------+---------+-------+--------
M.L. | | | | | | |
16 | 81 | 18 | 1684 | 1590 | 29,530 | 22 | 15
----- +-------+--------+----------+----------+---------+-------+--------
B.L. | | | | | | |
16.25 | 110 | 30 | 1800 | 2148 | 57,580 | 29 | 19
13.5 | 67 | 30 | 1250 | 2025 | 35,560 | 26 | 17
12 | 45 | 25 | 714 | 2000 | 18,060 | 19 | 12½
9.2 | 22 | 25 | 380 | 1809 | 8622 | 15 | 10
8 | 14 | 30 | 210 | 2200 | 7060 | 14 | 9
6 | 5 | 26 | 100 | 1960 | 2665 | 8 | 5
======+=======+========+==========+==========+=========+=======+========
In the early part of the period, guns of the Reed era, down to the
10-inch 18-ton M.L., were also made use of; but generally speaking,
the Barnaby designs coincide with early breechloading types. It is
interesting to note that the 81-ton gun figured in one ship only (the
_Inflexible_), and that after this the 38-ton 12.5 M.L. was reverted
to, to be replaced in later designs by the 45-ton 12-inch B.L.
The M.L. guns available for early Barnaby designs were considerably
superior to earlier examples of their type; as after the fiasco of
the _Glatton_ trials,[7] copper gas checks were introduced. These
were affixed to the base of the projectile and expanded on firing.
They led to a certain increased power and accuracy; but, even so,
only of a relative nature compared with the better results obtained
from breechloaders. The _Thunderer_ gun disaster, which after many
experiments was found to have been caused by doubly loading the gun,
added another argument to the anti-muzzle-loader cause.
The 12-inch, which was the first large B.L. to be introduced, compared
as follows with the 12-inch M.L.:--
==========+========+======+=======+==========+===========================
| | | | | Penetration of iron at
|Length |Weight|Muzzle |Weight of +---------------------------
Gun. |in cals.| tons.|energy |projectile|Muzzle.|1000 yds.|2000 yds.
| | | ft. | lbs. | in. | in. | in.
----------+--------+------+-------+----------+-------+---------+---------
12in. M.L.| 13½ | 35 | 9470 | 706 | 16 | 15 | 13
12in. B.L | 25 | 45 |18,060 | 1250 | 30½ | 28 | 26
==========+========+======+=======+==========+=======+=========+=========
The enormous difference in efficiency was of course traceable to other
causes than the adoption of the breechloader instead of the old M.L.;
but this was, equally naturally, overlooked; which, perhaps, was just
as well--otherwise the muzzle-loader might have persisted to quite
recent times. Though the _Thunderer_ disaster showed that a M.L. could
be loaded twice over by accident, this was an obviously unlikely thing
to occur again. The impression was made by the fact that the 12-inch
B.L. was far more powerful than the old 16-inch M.L. It was possibly
this which directly led to the “monster-gun craze” of the Barnaby
era, the way to which had already been shewn by the 16-inch M.L.
Incidentally it is interesting to note that the present monster gun era
is the third in which, after a period of adhesion to a 12-inch gun,
greatly increased calibres have suddenly and more or less generally
been resorted to.
_THE COMING OF THE TORPEDO._
Reference has been made in the past chapter to Sir E. J. Reed’s
recognition of the possibilities of the torpedo; and floating mines
were, of course, well known. It was not, however, till 1874 that either
mine or torpedo came to be regarded at all seriously.
The earliest Whitehead “fish torpedo” was produced in 1868; though it
was then little more than a curiosity. It was a crude weapon, although
it embodied, with two notable exceptions, most of the features that it
possesses to-day. Its motive power was compressed air; it carried an
explosive head with a sensitive pistol.
The secret was bought by the British Government at an early stage.
It was made strictly confidential; indeed, to the present day, the
internal mechanism of a torpedo is more or less sacred. Most other
nations purchased the secret also, and guarded it with like care!
It is but fair to add that this ridiculous situation was brought about
by the inventor, who particularly specified that the balance chamber
must not be revealed even to admirals commanding fleets, but only to
specially selected officers.
A main difficulty with the torpedo was how to discharge it. For some
while only two methods existed: the first, a mechanism of catapult
type which hurled the torpedo into the water; the other, by a crude
application of dropping gear, suitable, of course, for launches only.
In either case, especially the former, there was a strong element of
uncertainty as to the direction the torpedo would take; for one to
describe a circle and return to the firer was not unknown.[8]
The charge was inconsiderable, and range and speed were both very small.
An instrument called the Harvey torpedo was more or less
contemporaneous with the Whitehead. It was a very primitive idea,
consisting as it did merely in attempting to tow explosives across
the course of an enemy. It was too obviously cumbersome to cause
disquietude, and with the invention of torpedo tubes passed into
oblivion.
The advantages of the torpedo tube were quickly recognised; and though
the range was still little over a hundred yards or so--at any rate, so
far as any probability of hitting was concerned--the torpedo quickly
became a part of the armament of all important ships. So much was this
the case that the submerged tube was developed with sufficient celerity
to be adopted into the equipment of the _Inflexible_, of 1874 design.
None the less, however, the possible results of torpedo attack remained
uninvestigated till 1874, and even then only came to be inquired into
after the _Oberon_ experiments, which were primarily if not entirely
brought about by the advent of the observation mine as a practical
thing.
The mine’s arrival counted for little; the automobile torpedo being
at the moment much in the public eye, the point that the _Oberon_
experiments were primarily designed to test the effect of mines got
somewhat lost sight of. The essential fact is that by 1874 the fact of
other enemies to the ship than the gun was established. For a long time
it affected ship design no further than the gradual introduction of an
anti-torpedo-boat armament; but this was mainly due to Sir E. J. Reed
having in the _Bellerophon_ design endeavoured to anticipate torpedo
effect. In 1874, and onward therefrom for some time, the double bottom,
combined with water-tight bulkheads, was considered a suitable “reply”
to the “new arm,” and it was not for many years that torpedo nets were
in any degree appreciated.
In the later eighties some torpedo experiments were conducted against
the old ironclad _Resistance_, in which the Bullivant net defence
system proved altogether superior to the cumbersome old wooden booms
which were in use: but, despite this, nothing was done for many a year,
and the old pattern was adhered to.
_ESTIMATES IN THE ERA._
===============+=============+===========
Financial Year.| Amount. | Personnel.
---------------|-------------|-----------
1869 | 9,996,641 | 63,000
1870 | 9,370,530 | 61,000
1871 | 9,789,956 | 61,000
1872 | 9,532,149 | 61,000
1873 | 9,899,725 | 60,000
1874 | 10,440,105 | 60,000
1875 | 10,825,194 | 60,000
1876 | 11,288,872 | 60,000
1877 | 10,971,829 | 60,000
1878 | 12,129,901 | 60,000
1879 | 10,586,894 | 58,800
1880 | 10,566,935 | 58,800
1881 | 10,945,919 | 58,100
1882 | 10,483,901 | 57,500
1883 | 10,899,500 | 57,250
1884 | 11,185,770 | 56,950
1885 | 12,694,900 | 58,334
===============+=============+===========
II.
THE WHITE ERA.
The appointment of Sir William White as Chief Constructor more or less
synchronised with a considerable revolution in naval construction and
ideas. The institution of naval manœuvres drew great attention to the
sea-going quality of various types of ships. The manœuvres of 1887
mostly centred around the _Polyphemus_, and her charging a boom at
Berehaven. Little was here proved except that boom defences were easily
to be annihilated. In 1888, however, the manœuvres were of a much more
extensive nature, and a Committee was appointed to consider and report
upon them, especially with regard to the following points:--
“The feasibility or otherwise of maintaining an effective blockade
in war of an enemy’s squadron or fast cruisers in strongly
fortified ports, including the advantages and disadvantages of--
(a) Keeping the main body of the blockading Fleets off the ports
to be blockaded with an inshore squadron.
(b) Keeping the main body of the blockading Fleets at a base,
with a squadron of fast cruisers and scouts off the blockaded
ports, having means of rapid communication with the Fleet.
(c) In both cases the approximate relative number of battleships
and cruisers that should be employed by the blockading Fleet,
as compared with those of the blockaded Fleet.
“The value of torpedo-gunboats and first-class torpedo boats both
with the blockading and blockaded Fleets, and the most efficient
manner of utilising them.
“As to the arrangements made by B squadron for the attack of
commerce in the Channel, and by A squadron for its protection.
“As to the feasibility and expediency of cruisers making raids on
an enemy’s coasts and unprotected towns for the purpose of levying
contribution.
“As to the claims and counterclaims made by the Admirals in command
of both squadrons with regard to captures made during the operation.
“As to any defects of importance which were developed in any of the
vessels employed, and their cause.”
As Supplementary Instructions there were:--
(1) As to the behaviour and sea-going qualities of, or the
defects in, the new and most recently commissioned vessels,
as obtained from the reports of the Admirals in command of
the respective squadrons.
(2) The general conclusion to be drawn from the recent
operations.”
A summary of the findings[9] is as follows:--
“That to maintain an effective blockade of a Fleet in a strongly
fortified port a proportion of at least five to three would be
essential and possibly an even larger proportion, unless a good
anchorage could be found near the blockaded port which could
be used as a base, in which case a proportion of four to three
might suffice, supposing the blockading squadron to be very amply
supplied with look-out ships and colliers.”
Torpedo boats were condemned as being of little value to blockaders,
though useful to the blockaded. For blockade purposes the
torpedo-gunboats of the _Rattlesnake_ class were highly commended.
Attention was drawn to the large number of deck hands employed down
below on account of the insufficient engine-room complements, and
the excess of untrained stokers. The case of the _Warspite_ was
specifically mentioned. In order to break the blockade at sixteen
knots she sent thirty-six deck hands down below at a time when every
available deck hand would have been required above had the operations
been real war.
A special supplementary report was called for as to the sea-going
qualities of the ships. Considerable historical interest attaches to
this particular report, and the following extracts are especially
interesting:--
_Admiral_ class.
“So far as could be judged, these vessels are good sea-boats, and
their speed is not affected when steaming against a moderate wind
and sea; but we are of opinion that their low freeboard renders
them unsuitable as sea-going armour-clads for general service
with the Fleet, as their speed must be rapidly reduced when it is
necessary to force them against a head sea or swell.
“On the only occasion on which the _Collingwood_ experienced any
considerable beam swell she is reported to have rolled 20 degrees
each way; this does not make it appear as if the _Admiral_ class
will be very steady gun-platforms in bad weather.
“They are said to be ‘handy’ at 6 knots and over.
“In the _Benbow_ much difficulty was experienced in stowing the
bower anchors. This is the case in all low freeboard vessels,
more or less, but the evil appears to have been intensified in
this instance by defective fittings, and by the fact of her being
supplied with the old-fashioned iron-stocked anchors instead of
improved Martins.
“Serious complaints are made from these ships that the forecastles
leak badly, and that the mess-deck is made uninhabitable whenever
the sea breaks over the forecastle at all; it would seem that this
defect might be remedied.”
This opinion was not shared by Admiral Sir Arthur Hood, who commented
as follows:--
“I cannot concur in this opinion, my view being that the objects
of primary importance to be fulfilled in a first-class battleship
are: (1) That, on a given displacement, the combined powers of
offence and defence shall be as great as can be given; (2) that she
shall be handy and possess good speed in ordinary weather, combined
with sea-worthiness; (3) that she shall have large coal-carrying
capacity. I certainly do not consider that the _Admiral_ class,
which, on account of their comparatively low freeboard forward,
must have their speed reduced when steaming against a heavy
head sea or swell to a greater extent than is the case with the
long, high freeboard, older armour-clads, as the _Minotaur_,
_Northumberland_, _Black Prince_ are for this reason rendered
unsuitable as sea-going armour-clads for general service with a
Fleet. The power of being able to force a first-class battleship
at full speed against a head sea is not, in my opinion, a point
of the first importance, although in the case of a fast cruiser
it certainly is. Admiral Tryon draws an unfavourable comparison
between the speed of the new battleships and that of the long ships
of the old type, when steaming against a head sea. I admit at once
that vessels like the _Minotaur_ class would maintain their speed
and make better weather of it when being forced against a head
sea than would the _Admirals_; but this advantage, under these
exceptional conditions, cannot for a moment be compared with the
enormous increase in the power of offence and defence possessed by
the _Admirals_.”
[Illustration:
_Photo_] [_Russell & Sons._
SIR WILLIAM WHITE.]
The _Conqueror_ and _Hero_ were reported to roll a great deal. Being
short they felt a head sea quickly, and on account of their low
freeboard it was found impossible to drive them against a heavy sea at
anything approaching full speed. Incidentally these ships were known as
“half-boots.”
Here, again, Admiral Sir Arthur Hood dissented. In connection with
these points, Admiral Tryon submitted a report in which he emphasised,
as he had done with the _Admirals_, that however fast these short ships
might be in smooth water, their speeds fell off rapidly in a seaway.
The _Mersey_ class were described as being handy, steady gun platforms
and able to fight their guns longer than most ships.[10] The captain
of the _Severn_, however, reported a view that the 8-inch guns should
be removed and lighter pieces substituted. Admiral Baird agreed with
this. Sir Arthur Hood, in his comments, stated that he was “decidedly
opposed” to any reduction of armament, both in this case and that of
the other cruisers.
The _Arethusa_ type were reported to roll so heavily when the sea was
abeam or abaft that “accurate shooting would be impossible and machine
guns in the tops would be useless.”
The Committee concurred with Admiral Baird that the armament of these
should be reduced.
For the _Archer_ class it was unanimously suggested that lighter guns
should be fitted forward. Sir Arthur Hood agreed with this view, which,
however, was never carried into effect.
Particular interest attaches to the _Rattlesnake_[11] class of
torpedo-gunboats--these vessels being really prototypes of the
destroyers of the present day. They were reported as “safe, provided
they were handled with care.” Their handiness was unfavourably reported
on. It was strongly urged that the 4-inch gun mounted forward should be
removed. This, however, was never done.
With reference to any new vessels of this type, the Committee reported
as deserving immediate consideration:--
(1) Generally strengthen the hull in this type of vessel.
(2) Raise the freeboard forward.
_or_ (3) “Turtle-back” the forecastle.
In the gunboats that followed the freeboard forward was considerably
raised; but when destroyers came to be built several years later, it
is interesting to observe that the turtle-back forecastle was adopted,
and it was not till after over a hundred had been built that the high
forecastle, recommended so long before, appeared in the _River_ class.
The report concluded:--
“The proportion of untrained (2nd class) stokers which were drafted
to several of the ships appears to have been too large; in point of
physique they are reported as unequal to their work, and in many
instances the experience of these men in stokehold (or any other
work on board ship) was nil.
“As a means of affording opportunities for training newly-raised
stokers we recommend that at least one year should be served
by them as supernumerary in a sea-going ship before they are
considered fit to be draughted as part complement to any vessel;
we further are of opinion that a Committee should be appointed
to inquire into the sufficiency or otherwise of the complements
allowed in the steam department of each class of ship, the
proportion of 2nd class stokers which should be borne, and the
amount of training which they should be required to undergo before
they can usefully be borne as part complement in a fighting ship.”
An agitation as to the state of the Navy, which was commenced in the
year 1887, mainly by the initiative of the _Pall Mall Gazette_,[12]
finally resulted in the passing of the Naval Defence Act of 1889. This
provided for the construction of a total of seventy vessels, consisting
of ten armoured ships, nine first-class cruisers, twenty-nine
second-class cruisers, four third-class and eighteen torpedo gunboats,
to be built as quickly as possible at the estimated cost of £21,500,000.
The substantial part of the programme of 1886 had consisted of two big
turret ships, the _Nile_ and _Trafalgar_, and two armoured cruisers,
_Immortalité_ and _Aurora_ of the _Orlando_ class. In 1887 nothing
larger than second-class cruisers was laid down; and in 1888 the most
important vessels on the programme were only the protected cruisers,
_Blake_ and _Blenheim_. There was, therefore, ample material for panic.
Details of the _Blake_ class:--
Length (_p.p._)--375 ft.
Beam--65 ft.
Guns--Two 9.2 in., 22-ton B.L.R., ten 6-in. Q.F., eighteen 3-pdr.
H.P.--20,000.
Designed speed--22.0 kts.
Coal--1500 tons.
Builder of Ship--_Blake_, Chatham; _Blenheim_, Thames Ironworks.
Builder of machinery--_Blake_, Maudsley; _Blenheim_, Thames
Ironworks.
Launched--_Blake_, 1889; _Blenheim_, 1890.
Special features of these ships were a combination of the armament
of the _Orlando_ class with greatly increased speed secured by the
development of deck armour in place of the belts of the _Orlando_
class. In so far as a special type of ship may be said to be the
development of some predecessor, the _Blake_ and _Blenheim_ may be
described as enlarged _Merseys_. They were, however, unique on account
of their relatively great length and great increase of displacement
as compared with preceding vessels. In them the armoured casemate, a
leading characteristic of nearly all Sir William White’s ships, made
its first appearance. It was employed in the _Blake_ and _Blenheim_ for
four main deck guns, the upper deck guns being behind the usual shields.
The coming of the casemate, curiously enough, attracted little
attention, compared to its importance. It may be said to have rendered
possible the return to main deck guns in unarmoured ships. In the
_Orlando_ class, ten 6-inch guns were all bunched together on the upper
deck amidships. Since these ships were designed the 6-inch quickfirer
had made its first appearance, and the largest possible distribution of
armament was therefore desirable. The adoption of the two-deck system
of the _Blake_ and _Blenheim_ secured this much larger distribution,
rendering it impossible for a single shell to put more than one of the
five broadside 6-inch out of action, whereas in the _Orlando_ class at
least three guns were at the mercy of a single shell.
Another novelty of the type was the introduction of a special armoured
glacis around the engine hatches. This system had, of course, been used
before in the Italian monster ships _Italia_ and _Lepanto_, but it was
first introduced in the British Navy in the _Blakes_.[13]
The ships were very successful steamers, for all that neither made her
expected twenty-two knots on trial.
Trial results:--
_Blake_: Eight hours’ natural draught, mean I.H.P.--14,525 = 19.4
knots.
_Blenheim_: Eight hours’ natural draught, mean I.H.P.--14,925 =
20.4 knots.
_Blake_: Four hours’ force draught, mean I.H.P.--19,579 = 21.5
knots.
_Blenheim_: Four hours’ forced draught, mean I.H.P.--21,411 = 21.8
knots.
The principal item of the Naval Defence Act was eight first-class and
two second-class battleships. All these ships were designed by Sir
William White, and may be described as battleship editions of the
_Blake_ and _Blenheim_, so far as the disposition of their armament was
concerned. For the rest they may be described as attempts to combine
in one ship the best features of the Read and Barnaby ideals. In place
of the low freeboard of the _Admiral_ class, seven of the _Royal
Sovereigns_ were given high freeboard fore and aft, with the big guns
about twenty-three feet above water. The eighth ship, the _Hood_, was
modified to suit the ideals of Admiral Hood, and was to some extent an
improved _Trafalgar_, her big guns being in turrets some seventeen feet
above the water, in turrets instead of _en barbette_, with guns exposed
as in the rest of the class.
In them, among other special features, 18-inch torpedo tubes were first
introduced instead of 14-inch, and a stern torpedo tube appeared.
The original idea of end-on torpedo tubes was torpedo attack from the
bow in place of the ram. The _Polyphemus_ was the first ship in which
an end-on tube appeared (submerged). In cruisers of a later date the
bow tube was found to injure speed, and there was always the danger of
a ship over-running her own torpedo. On this account the bow-tube never
secured in the British Navy that vogue which it obtained, and still
has, in Germany.
The stern-tube appears to owe its origin to an idea that a defeated or
overpowered ship, running from an enemy, might save herself by it: dim
ideas of “runaway tactics” had also begun to appear.
Sir William White never claimed for himself that he had anticipated the
future in any way in his torpedo armament, even when defending himself
against criticisms, to the effect that he “gave too little for the
displacement.” Yet his torpedo innovations, besides discounting the
future, all helped to swell the total weight; as also did many internal
strengthenings of the kind which do not show on paper. Possibly he
did not realise his own greatness as the designer of a class of ship
which was so much better than any contemporary vessel, that even in
these days of “Super-Dreadnoughts” the _Royal Sovereigns_ are still
looked back upon with respect, and invariably regarded as marking the
beginning of an entirely new phase in ship construction.
In April, 1889, their designer read a paper about them at the
Institution of Naval Architects, in which the principal points which
he claimed were that much superior command of guns was given, and that
the auxiliary armament was nearly three times the weight of that of the
_Trafalgars_. The following points were also mentioned by him:--
“(_a_) ‘That (it was officially decided that) it was preferable to
have two separate strongly protected stations for the four heavy
guns, rather than to have a single citadel.’
“(_b_) ‘That on the whole the 4-inch armour amidships, from the
belt deck to the main deck, associated as it would be with the
internal coal bunkers, sub-divided into numerous compartments,
might be considered satisfactory; but that if armour weight became
available, it could be profitably utilised in thickening the 4-inch
steel above the middle portion of the belt.’
“I would draw particular attention to the first of these
conclusions, since it expresses a most important distinction
between the two systems of protection.
“With separate redoubts, placed far apart, the two stations
are isolated, and there is practically no risk of simultaneous
disablement by the explosion of shells, or perforation of
projectiles from the heaviest guns. Each redoubt offers a small
target to the fire of an enemy, and its weakest part--the thick
steel protective plating on the top--is of so small extent that the
chance of its being struck is extremely remote. Serious damage to
the unarmoured turret bases therefore involves the perforation of
the thick vertical armour on the redoubts.
“With a single citadel, extending the full breadth of a ship, the
case is widely different.
“Over a comparatively large area of the protective deck-plating in
the neighbourhood of each turret, perforation of the deck, or its
disruption by shell explosions at any point, involves very serious
risk of damage to the turret bases and the loading apparatus. In
fact, such damage may be effected and the heavy guns put out of
action while the thick vertical armour on the citadel is uninjured.
Moreover, as the turrets stand at the ends of a single citadel,
there is a possibility of their simultaneous disablement by the
explosion of heavy shell within the citadel.
“This last risk may be minimised (as in the _Nile_ and _Trafalgar_)
by constructing armoured ‘traverses’ within the citadel; but it
cannot be wholly overcome, so long as both turrets stand in one
armoured enclosure.
“It may be thought that the risk of damage to a 3-inch steel deck
situated 11 ft. above water is remote; but I think the facts are as
stated, when actions at sea are taken into account.
“For example, if a ship of 70 to 75 ft. beam is rolling only to 10
degrees from the vertical, which is by no means a heavy roll, she
presents a target having a vertical (projected) height of 13 to 14
ft. to an enemy’s fire, and even if she is a steady, slow-moving
ship, she will do this four or five times in each minute.
“Now, at this angle of inclination, assuming the flight of
projectiles to be practically horizontal, even the thickest
protective steel decks yet fitted in battleships are liable to
serious damage from the fire of guns of moderate calibre, and this
danger is increased by the employment of high explosives. Of
course, I do not mean to say that this damage is to follow from
fire intentionally aimed at the protective deck; but with a great
and sustained volume of fire, such as is possible with a powerful
auxiliary armament, and especially with quick-firing guns, it is
obvious that there is a very real danger of chance shots injuring
seriously the wide expanse of the protective deck at the top of a
long citadel.
“Again, it must be noted that the chances of damage to a deck
placed 10 or 11 ft. above water, and with large exposed surfaces
in the neighbourhood of the turrets when a ship is inclined or
rolling, are greater far than those of a deck 7 or 8 ft. lower,
and with 5-inch armour on the sides protecting the deck from the
direct impact of shells containing heavy bursters. It is for the
naval gunner to estimate these chances of injury; but, unless I am
greatly mistaken, their verdict will be that a far greater number
of shots are likely to strike at a height of 8 to 10 ft. above
water than at a height of 4 to 5 ft.
“These considerations, I submit, amply justify the selection of the
separate redoubt system, in association with the thin side armour
above the belt, and the lowering of the protective deck to the top
of the belt in the new designs.
“It may be urged that, if the redoubt system be adopted, it should
be associated with side armour and screen bulkheads of greater
thickness than 5-inch steel, and more strongly backed. This is
perfectly practicable, but necessarily costly, involving an
additional load of armour, and a corresponding increase in the size
of the ship.”
The designs were vigorously criticised by Sir Edward Reed, whose chief
objections centred on the fact that the lower-deck protection was thin
armour only. Sir William White combatted this idea, and proved very
conclusively that, according to the needs of the moment, his views
were correct. It is, however, worthy of record that at a later date
with the _Majestic_ class (see a few pages further on), he effected
modifications which brought his ships more into line with what Sir
Edward Reed had advocated. It should, however, be mentioned that
this was not done until improvements in armour construction rendered
possible things that were certainly impossible in the days of the
_Royal Sovereigns_.
In connection with the later career of the _Royal Sovereign_
class these items may be added. On completion they were found
to be singularly simple in all their internal arrangements, and
extraordinarily strong. When they went to the scrap-heap in 1911–12,
they were, constructionally, practically as good as when built. They
proved to be good sea boats, but at first rolled very badly, which
resulted in their getting an unenviable notoriety in this respect. This
was, however, completely cured by the fitting of bilge keels, after
which the ships were everything that could be desired in the way of
being steady gun platforms.
The ever increasing vogue of the quickfirer tended to render them
rather quickly obsolescent over things which to-day would count much
less than they did in the past. The defects of the _Sovereigns_, as
realised not very long after completion, were:--
(1) That the big guns’ crews were practically unprotected, and
easily to be annihilated by the newly-introduced high
explosive shells of the secondary armament of an enemy.
(2) Only four of the ten 6-inch were armour protected, which also
was considered a fatal drawback.
In the first case nothing was ever done; but in the second, about the
year 1900, casemates were fitted for the upper-deck guns of all ships
except the _Hood_,[14] which on survey was found unsuitable for such
reconstruction.
The only thing that remains to add is that although in the course of
years the ships lost the speeds for which they were designed, up to the
very end they proved capable of doing about thirteen knots indefinitely.
In addition to the _Sovereigns_ two “second-class battleships” were
built, the _Centurion_ and _Barfleur_, of which details are:--
Displacement--10,500 tons. Complement, 620.
Length--(Waterline) 360ft.
Beam--70ft.
Draught--(Maximum) 27ft.
Armament--Four 10-inch, ten 4.7-inch, eight 6-pounders, twelve
3-pounders, two Maxims, two 9-pounder boat guns. Torpedo tubes
(18-inch)--two submerged and one above water in the stern.
The _Barfleur_ was laid down at Chatham in November, 1890, launched in
August, 1892, and completed two years later. The _Centurion_, laid down
at Portsmouth in March, 1891, was launched a year later, but completed
before her sister.
The ships were armoured generally on the _Royal Sovereign_ plan,
with 12-inch belts which, however, were only 200ft. long, instead
of 250ft. The bulkheads were six inches only, and the upper belt
(nickel steel) an inch less than in the big ships. The barbettes were
reduced to nine inches only, but on the other hand were made circular
instead of pear-shaped, and 6-inch shields were provided for the big
guns--probably as the result of criticisms of the unprotected big guns
of the _Sovereigns_. With a few early exceptions as to the shape of the
base, and with certain variation in form, this kind of “turret” has
been adhered to ever since in the British Navy and copied into every
other.
Both ships were engined by the Greenock Foundry Company, and designed
for 13,000 H.P., with forced draught, giving a speed of 18.5 knots,
which speed both exceeded on trial. This high speed and their coal
endurance--they carried a maximum of 1,125 tons, sufficient for
a nominal 9750 mile radius--makes them something more than the
“second-class battleships” which they nominally were.
Compared to the _Sovereigns_ they were:--
=========================+====================+==================
_Minus Points_: | _Barfleurs._ | _Sovereigns._
| |
Displacement (tons) | 10,500 | 14,100
Principal guns | 4--10in., 10--4.7 | 4--13.5, 10--6in.
Armour belt | 12 inches. | 18 inches.
-------------------------+--------------------+------------------
_Plus Points_: | |
| |
Horse Power | 13,000 | 13,000
Speed | 18.5 | 17
Nominal endurance (kts.) | 9,750 | 7,900
=========================+====================+==================
From which the existence of an elementary conception of the
“battle-cruiser” of to-day seems fairly apparent. To-day the
battle-cruiser, instead of having guns of reduced calibre, carries a
reduced number, but the general principle of “moderate sacrifices for
increased speed” obtains.
The _Barfleur_ and _Centurion_ proved excellent steamers and good
sea-boats. Their defect was their weak armament, and in 1903 it was
decided to remedy this. In that year they were “reconstructed.” Their
4.7’s were taken out and 6-inch guns substituted, and the six on the
upper deck were put into casemates. As a species of make-weight the
foremast was taken out of both ships; but this made little difference.
The “improvements” were a total failure; the ships were immersed
far below what they had been designed for, and they never thereafter
realised much more than about sixteen knots. Within seven years they
were removed from the Navy List altogether, and such service as they
performed after modernising was entirely of a subsidiary order.
For the first-class cruisers of the Naval Defence Act reduced examples
of the _Blenheim_ were decided on. These vessels were the _Edgar_,
_Endymion_, _Grafton_, _Hawke_, _St. George_, _Gibraltar_, _Crescent_,
and _Royal Arthur_ (formerly designated as the _Centaur_). They were
launched between 1891 and 1892, averaging 7,350 tons (unsheathed)
and 7,700 tons (sheathed and coppered, in the case of the last four
mentioned). Except the two last, all had the _Blenheim_ armament of two
9.2 and ten 6-inch. The two latter had a couple of extra 6-inch on a
raised forecastle substituted for the forward 9.2.
No attempt was made to obtain the high speed of the _Blenheims_--19.5
knots being the utmost aimed at. Not only, however, did the _Edgar_
class exceed expectations on trial, but they proved most remarkably
good steamers in service. No engine-room defects of moment were ever
encountered in any of them, and twenty years after launch most were
still able to steam at little short of the designed speed. Like the
battleships, they were given 18-inch torpedoes in place of the 14-inch
of the _Blenheims_.
In the course of their service careers, the _St. George_ (or rather
her crew) earned distinction in the Benin Expedition. The _Crescent_
was served in by King George V, and the _Hawke_ achieved notoriety by
ramming the _Olympic_ in the Solent in 1911.
The lesser cruisers of the Naval Defence Act numbered altogether 28. Of
these twenty belonged to the _Apollo_ class of 3,400 tons (unsheathed)
and 3,600 tons (sheathed). They were _Apollo_, _Andromache_, _Latona_,
_Melampus_, _Naiad_, _Sappho_, _Scylla_, _Terpsichore_, _Thetis_,
_Tribune_ (unsheathed), and _Aeolus_, _Brilliant_, _Indefatigable_
(named _Melpomene_ in 1911), _Intrepid_, _Iphigenia_, _Pique_,
_Rainbow_, _Retribution_, _Sirius_, and _Spartan_ (sheathed).
In all, the armament was two 6-inch and six 4.7, with lesser guns, and,
above-water, 14-inch torpedo tubes. The speed was twenty knots in the
unsheathed, and a quarter of a knot less in the sheathed ones.
When built all proved able to steam very well, but after some years
service certain of them fell off very badly in speed. Others, however,
remained as fast as when they were built--the _Terpsichore_, in 1908,
averaging 20.1 knots, and the _Aeolus_, in 1909, nearly nineteen knots.
During their service, the _Melampus_ was commanded by King George as
Prince George, while the _Scylla_, under Captain Percy Scott, gave
birth to the “dotter,” and the “gunnery boom” which followed. In
1904 and onwards seven of them, scrapped from regular service--the
_Latona_, _Thetis_, _Apollo_, _Andromache_, Iphigenia, _Intrepid_, and
_Thetis_--were totally or partially disarmed and converted into mine
layers.
[Illustration: SECOND CLASS CRUISER OF THE NAVAL DEFENCE ACT ERA. NOW
CONVERTED INTO A MINE-LAYER]
The remaining eight cruisers of the Act--_Astræa_, _Bonaventure_,
_Cambrian_, _Charybdis_, _Flora_, _Forte_, _Fox_, and _Hermione_--were
increased in size up to 4,360 tons, and given a couple of extra
4.7, and 18-inch in place of 14-inch tubes. Instead of their 4.7’s
being mounted in the well amidships, they were placed on the upper
deck level, a much better position in a sea-way, but they never
proved themselves quite such good ships for their size as did the
earlier type. They served to illustrate the general rule that slight
improvements on a design are rarely satisfactory, and that while every
staple design has its defects, it is extremely difficult to remove
one drawback without creating another. Moreover, such improvements
invariably cause increased cost, and an essential with the small
cruiser is that she shall be cheap enough to be numerically strong.
Four _Astræas_ cost as much as five _Apollos_. They were rather more
seaworthy, but no faster--if as fast. The total broadsides obtained
were only _one_ 4.7 more and _two_ 6-inch _less_.[15] A considerably
greater possible bunker capacity was obtained; but the normal supply
(400 tons) was the same for both.
In the British Navy, in 1908–11, a precisely similar thing obtained.
It was probably inevitable. In the German Navy, between 1897 and 1907,
displacement for small cruisers rose from 2,645 to 4,350 tons, with
practically the same armament. But here the horse-power rose from about
8,500 or less to 20,000, and designed speeds in proportion, from a
twenty-one knots (not made) to a 25.5, which, on trial, turned out to
be 27,000 I.H.P. and over twenty-seven knots.
Here, however, there was a definite aim--increased speed, with only
trivial improvements in any other direction. With similar British
cruisers the defect has invariably been “general improvements” on what
the original design _might have been_ if plotted a year or two later
than it actually was. There is no question--or very little--but that
Germany in its ultra-conservative policy gauged the situation better
than any British Admiralty ever did till just before the war.
Minor cruisers _must_ be cheap to construct. Any improvement in them
_must_ have a definite intrinsic value. Lacking that, it is worth very
little. The _Astræas_, as cited, indicated how a supposed advantage may
even be a real deficit from another point of view.
The value of increased speed cannot be put into £ s. d., but armament
easily can be. Like reconstruction, minor “improvements” on a design
rarely pay. With the original conception the naval architect is given
certain data for which he arranges accordingly. Ordered to improve upon
it in any direction he can only add displacement and upset the balance
of everything.
The Naval Defence Act also included a certain number of third-class
cruisers--_Pallas_, _Pearl_, _Philomel_, and _Phœbe_--for the ordinary
service, and five similar ships for the Australian station, originally
named _Pandora_, _Pelorus_, _Persian_, _Phœnix_, and _Psyche_. These
were later altered to Australian names, _Katoomba_, _Mildura_,
_Wallaroo_, _Tauranga_, and _Ringarooma_. They were of 2,575 tons, with
2½ decks, armaments of eight 4.7-inch and four above-water 14-inch
tubes. The designed speed was 19 knots.
Thirteen torpedo gunboats, improved _Rattlesnakes_, were laid down
under the Act, corresponding to nine others of the normal Programme,
of which two were for Australia. The Naval Defence boats were _Alarm_,
_Antelope_, _Circe_, _Gleaner_, _Gossamer_, _Hebe_, _Renard_,
_Speedy_--all laid down in 1889, as also were the _Whiting_ (afterwards
_Boomerang_) and _Wizard_ (renamed _Karahatta_) for Australia. Those
laid down normally in the previous year were the _Salamander_,
_Seagull_, _Sheldrake_, _Skipjack_, _Spanker_, _Speedwell_, for the
British Navy. Two others, _Assaye_ and _Plassy_, were built for the
Indian Marine at and about this time. All carried a couple of 4.7-inch
guns, were of about 750–850 tons displacement, and were first known as
“catchers.” They were all intended to steam at 19 knots or over with
locomotive boilers; but in service none ever did. At a later date,
reboilered with water-tubes, many reached or exceeded the designed
speed, and the majority of them are still in service for auxiliary
purposes--many being specially fitted as mine sweepers, and the rest
used as tenders for various services.
They are of considerable interest on account of the fact that the
destroyers of 1909–12 were practically the same displacement and
general shape, with a not very dissimilar armament--two 4-inch instead
of two 4.7. The modern destroyers, however, were approximately ten
knots faster--an interesting commentary on engineering improvements in
the course of twenty years!
More interesting still, however, is the fact that Sir William White
should have evolved twenty years ago almost exactly what--except in the
matter of modern speed possibilities--is to-day the recognised ideal
for destroyers.
In the British Navy the torpedo gunboats never get beyond the “catcher”
stage--they never had the opportunity; but it is worthy of note
that the first two ships to be torpedoed under anything like modern
war conditions--the Chilian _Blanco Encalada_ and the Brazilian
_Aquidaban_--were both sunk by vessels of almost exactly the same type
as the “catchers,” and not by torpedo boats.
So far as the British Navy was concerned, the “catchers” tested in the
“secret manœuvres” of 1891 did uncommonly well. They hung about off the
torpedo bases, and though only about one to four, accounted for at
least 90 per cent. of the hostile torpedo boats. To this very success,
perhaps, was due the fact that in their own day they were not thought
of as an offensive arm against big ships--destruction of the torpedo
boat was then the principal aim in view. This they fulfilled. The South
American Republics discovered their “other uses,” and so really led the
way to the evolution of the destroyer of a later era.
Perhaps the only nation which really read the lesson involved was
Germany. So long ago as 1895 she had launched the 2,000-ton “small
cruiser” _Hela_; in 1898 the _Gazelle_ of 2,645 tons was set afloat.
For years Germany added to the _Gazelle_ class, at a time when all the
rest of the world had decreed that “third-class cruisers” were useless.
Not for many a year did the British Admiralty discover that Germany had
seen the matter of the _Lynch_ and the _Sampaio_[16] better than any
other Power.
Neither of these ships in attacking got hit. They got home without. But
they might have been hit. Germany evolved something that even if hit
badly would still float long enough to get off her torpedoes.
Till the Chilian “catchers” in 1891 proved their offensive abilities,
no one had ever considered that side of the question. To this day
Germany has never really received her meed of credit for perceiving
that a small third-class cruiser has potentialities with torpedoes
against a battleship at night.
[Illustration:
HOOD.
ROYAL SOVEREIGN.
BARFLEUR.
RENOWN.
MAJESTIC.
LONDON.
KING EDWARD.
BATTLESHIPS OF THE WHITE ERA.]
So late as the present day much comment about German small cruisers
being inadequately gunned, a clear indication that just as in the
past there was a difficulty in conceiving of the torpedo-gunboat for
other than her nominal use, so the possibilities of the small cruiser
in the role of destroyer were still apt to be generally overlooked.
In February, 1893, there was laid down the _Renown_, the only armoured
ship of the 1892–93 Estimates; an improved _Centurion_, with thinner
belt armour. Harvey armour--three inches of which had the resisting
value of four inches of compound or six inches of iron--was adopted in
this ship for the first time. Influences other than taking advantage of
the reduced weight required for a given protective value were, however,
at work, for in the _Renown_ sacrifices were made at the water-line in
order to secure better protection to the lower deck side.
Details of the _Renown_:--
Displacement--12,350 tons.
Length (between perpendiculars)--380ft.
Beam--72⅓ft.
Draught--(maximum) 27ft.
Armament--Four 10-inch, ten 6-inch 40 cal., twelve 12-pounders,
four submerged 18-inch tubes, and one above water-line in stern.
Armour--8--6in. belt, 200ft. long amidships, 6in. side above.
Bulkheads 10--6in., barbettes 10in., casemates, main deck ones
6in., upper deck ones, 4in.
Horse-power--12,000 = 18 knots.
Coal--(normal) 800 tons; (maximum) 1,760 tons = nominal 7,200 miles
at ten knots.
Built at Pembroke; engined by Maudslay; she was launched in May, 1895,
and completed for sea in April, 1897, having taken no less than 4¼
years to build. Cost, £746,247.
She proved one of the best steamers ever built for the Navy. On a
four-hour trial she made 18.75 knots, with 12,901 I.H.P. Her economical
speed proved to be fifteen knots. She always steamed well, and after
thirteen years’ service did 17.4 knots with ease.
The special feature of this ship was that in her instead of the
ordinary flat deck on top of the belt, a sloping deck behind the belt
was first introduced. This system--rigidly adhered to in the British
Navy ever since, and copied eventually into every other Navy--was
based upon the idea of reinforcing the deck-protected cruiser with
side armour. The principle involved was that at whatever angle the
belt might be hit and penetrated, the incoming projectile would then
meet a further obstruction at a 45° angle, calculated to present a
maximum of deflecting resistance. Professor Hovgaard and others have
since indicated that, weight for weight, three inches of inclined
deck armour, having to be spread more, represent as much or more
tons as six inches of vertical armour (the nominal equivalent), and
protective decks behind armour are to-day much thinner than of yore
and little better than “splinter decks.” The principle, however,
remains, as originated by Sir William White, and is, perhaps, the most
characteristic feature of his era: seeing how universally the idea was
copied.
The French were the last to adopt it. Instead, they used the flat deck
below the belt in addition to the one on top of it. This was made use
of so late as the _République_ and _Liberté_ class. While ideally
better for resisting projectiles which might penetrate the belt, it
was impossible of really practical application amidships on account of
the difficulty of keeping the engines entirely below it.
[Illustration:
PROTECTED CRUISER.
ROYAL SOVEREIGN.
RENOWN.
SUFFREN (FRENCH)
SYSTEMS OF WATER-LINE PROTECTION.]
The _Renown_ was the first ship to carry all her secondary guns in
casemates. She was fitted as a flagship, and first served on the
North American Station. When Admiral Fisher went from there to the
Mediterranean he took the _Renown_ with him as flagship, presumably
with the idea that speed was better than power in a flagship. The
_Renown’s_ fighting power was small even then, but she was well fitted
for the social side of flagship work--so nicely, indeed, that the
flash-plates of the big guns had been taken up so as not to interfere
with ladies’ shoes in dances!
After leaving the Mediterranean the _Renown_ was still further
converted into a “battleship yacht,” the six-inch guns being removed.
She was painted white, and used to convey the then Prince of Wales to
India. Thereafter she practically disappeared from the effective list
and eventually became a training ship for stokers.
The _Renown_ was followed by the ships of the Spencer programme,
nine battleships of the _Majestic_ class, which were spread over the
1893–94 Estimates, and those of the next year. The _Majestics_ were in
substance amplified _Renowns_, their special and particular feature
being that in place of the two amidships belt of varying thickness a
single belt of 16ft. wide of a uniform 9in. thickness was substituted.
In the _Majestics_, the 13.5, which had been for so long the standard
gun for first-class battleships, disappeared in favour of a new type
of 12-inch, a Mark VIII. of 35 calibres. The two types compare as
follows:--
=====+=======+=======+===========+=================================
| | | |Maximum Penetration against K.C.
Bore.|Length.|Weight.|Projectile.| (capped projectiles).
Inch.| Cals. | Tons. | lbs. | at 5000 yds. | at 3000 yds.
| | | | in. | in.
-----+-------+-------+-----------+-----------------+---------------
13.5 | 30 | 67 | 1250 | 9 | 12
| | | | |
12 | 35 | 46 | 850 | 11½ | 14½
=====+=======+=======+===========+=================+===============
The new gun was, therefore, superior in everything except weight of
projectile, and that was not considered much in those days. To-day, of
course, it has quite a special meaning.
In the _Majestics_, except in the first two, all-round loading
positions for the big guns were introduced in place of the cumbersome
old system whereby, after firing, the guns had to return to an end-on
position, tilt up, and at a fixed angle take their charges at what was
little but an adaption for breechloaders of the loading system evolved
twenty years before for the old _Inflexible_.
Details of these ships:--
Displacement--14,900 tons.
Length--(between perpendiculars) 390ft., (over-all) 413ft.
Beam--75ft.
Draught--(mean), 27½ ft., (maximum) about 30ft.
Armament--Four 12-inch 35 cal., twelve 6-inch 40 cal., sixteen
12-pounders, twelve 3-pounders. Torpedo tubes (18-inch), four
submerged and one above water in stern.
Armour (Harvey)--Belt, (220ft. by 16ft.) 9in. Bulkheads, 14in.
Barbettes, 14in. with 10in. turrets. Casemates, 6in.
Horse-power--12,000 = 17.5 knots.
Coal--(normal) 1,200 tons; (maximum) 2,200 tons = nominal radius of
7,600 miles at 10 knots and 4,000 at 15 knots.
The ships were built, etc., as follows:--
================+============+=============+==================
Name. | Laid down. | Builder. | Engined by
----------------+------------+-------------+------------------
_Magnificent_ | Dec. ’93 | Chatham | Penn
_Majestic_ | Feb. ’94 | Portsmouth | Vickers
_Hannibal_ | April, ’94 | Pembroke | Harland & Wolff
_Victorious_ | May, ’94 | Chatham | Hawthorn, Leslie
_Mars_ | June, ’94 | Laird | Laird
_Prince George_ | Sept. ’94 | Portsmouth | Humphrys
_Jupiter_ | Oct. ’94 | Clydebank | Clydebank
_Cæsar_ | March, ’95 | Portsmouth | Maudslay
_Illustrious_ | March, 95 | Chatham | Penn
================+============+=============+==================
Mostly they were completed inside two years, the only ones which took
appreciably longer being the _Hannibal_ and the _Illustrious_. In these
and the _Cæsar_ an innovation introduced in the others--the placing of
the chart house round the base of the foremast with the conning tower
well clear ahead--was done away with, and the old system of the bridge
over the conning tower reverted to. In the _Cæsar_ and _Illustrious_,
laid down later than the others, an improvement was effected by
the introduction of circular instead of pear-shaped barbettes. The
_Majestic_, _Magnificent_, and _Cæsar_ were built in dry dock instead
of on slips--the first instance of this since the days of early
coast-defence monitors.
The total cost was approximately a million per ship.
On trials most of them exceeded the designed speed, but all were light
on trials. They proved very handy ships, with circles of 450 yards at
fifteen knots. Coal consumption was always high.
Compared to the _Sovereigns_, the following figures are of interest:--
=============+============+=========+==========+=======+========
| | | Weight of| |
|Displacement|Weight of|Armament &| |Normal
Name. | (tons). | Armour |Ammunition| | Coal
| | (tons). | (tons). | H.P. |(tons).
-------------+------------+---------+----------+-------+--------
_Majestics_ | 14,900 | 4260 | 1500 |12,000 | 1200
_Sovereigns_ | 14,100 | 4600 | 1410 |13,000 | 900
=============+============+=========+==========+=======+========
The total dead weight carried in armament, armour, and coal thus works
out at practically the same figure, despite the rise of 800 tons in
displacement. On these grounds certain attacks were made upon the
ships, mainly by those who argued against the unarmoured ends. The
criticisms were, however, mainly of the captious order--the ships were
certainly the finest specimens of naval architecture of their day.
At a later date electric hoists were fitted to the 6-inch guns, and
400 tons of oil fuel were added to the fuel capacity (the maximum coal
capacity being reduced by 200 tons). The first ship to be so fitted was
the _Mars_. Another innovation was shifting the torpedo nets, first in
the _Mars_, then in all the others, from the upper deck to the main
deck level; the idea being to keep the nets clear of the 6-inch guns.
The _Majestic_ and _Magnificent_ served for a long time as flagships in
the Channel Fleet. Admiral Sir F. Stephenson and Sir A. K. Wilson flew
their flags in the _Majestic_, of which ship Prince Louis of Battenberg
was at one time captain.
It was during the early service of the _Majestics_ in the Channel Fleet
that “invisible” colours for warships first came into consideration,
all ships up to that date being painted with black hulls, white upper
works, and yellow masts and funnels. For these experiments the
_Magnificent_ was painted black all over, the _Majestic_ and _Hannibal_
were given grey and light green upper works respectively. The latter
was really the more “invisible” of the two, but both ships were left
with black hulls. Ultimately a grey, a little darker than that which
the Germans had long used, was adopted as the regulation, though for
some time it varied greatly between ship and ship, following the old
system under which a good deal of latitude in painting was allowed.[17]
To this era, 1894–95, belong two groups of protected cruisers, the
_Powerfuls_ and the _Talbots_. The latter, nine in all, were merely
enlarged (5,600 tons) editions of the later cruisers of the Naval
Defence Act, and call for no comment. The former group were the
_Powerful_ and _Terrible_, “replies” to the Russian _Rurik_ and
_Rossiya_. They displaced nearly as much as the battleships--14,200
tons--and ran to the then unheard of length of 500ft. between
perpendiculars. They carried no belt armour whatever, but were given
stout protective decks, no less than 6in. on the slopes amidships.
The two big guns (40 calibre, 9.2) were given 6in. Harvey barbettes,
the twelve other guns[18] (6-inch) being in 6-inch casemates. Sixteen
12-pounders were disposed about the upper works. Designed horse-power
25,000 = 22 knots. Total bunker capacity of 3,000 tons, equal to a
nominal 7,000 miles at fourteen knots. Both ships were laid down in
1894, the _Powerful_ by Vickers and the _Terrible_ at Clydebank. They
were launched in the following year.
In service the _Powerfuls_ proved capable of keeping up a speed of
twenty knots almost indefinitely. For the rest, they were unhandy ships
with large turning circles. At the time of the South African War, both
of them were at the Cape, and did service with landed naval brigades.
Of these, one from the _Powerful_, with some 4.7’s on special Percy
Scott gun-carriages, materially assisted in the defence of Ladysmith.
During the year 1911 the decision was come to that it was not worth
while preserving either ship, on account of the large crews required
and their comparatively small fighting value under modern conditions.
Two considerable novelties were embodied in these ships. The first of
these was the adoption of electrical gear for the big guns. The other
and more far-reaching was the adoption of Belleville boilers.
_THE BATTLE OF THE BOILERS._
Owing to favourable reports of their use in the French Navy, Belleville
boilers were in 1895 experimentally fitted to the _Sharpshooter_,
torpedo gunboat; but the decision to adopt them in large ships was
taken from French rather than any British experience. Trouble and
failure were freely predicted. With the result frequently attending
lugubrious predictions, very little trouble has ever been experienced
with any type and then only in the very early stage when the water-tube
boiler was an almost unknown curiosity to the engine-room staff.
The chief advantages claimed for Belleville boilers were the higher
working pressures, economy in maintenance and fuel consumption, saving
of weight, rapid steam raising, and great facility for repairs.
[Illustration: WHITE ERA BATTLESHIPS OF THE MAJESTIC CLASS]
The Belleville was the first water-tube boiler to come
into prominence; other types, however, soon appeared. In the
period 1895–98, torpedo gunboats were experimentally fitted as
follows:--_Sharpshooter_, Belleville; _Sheldrake_, Babcock; _Seagull_,
Niclausse; _Spanker_, Du Temple; _Salamander_, Mumford; _Speedy_,
Thornycroft--these three last being of the small tube type. Other
existing types were the Yarrow, White-Foster, Normand, Reed,
Blechynden, all these being of the small tube type also, and regarded
as suitable for small craft only.[19]
In the matter of big ships, so far as the British Navy was concerned,
“water-tube boiler” for some years meant Bellevilles only, whence it
came that in the insensate “Battle of the Boilers,” which presently
broke out, Bellevilles were the main object of attack in Parliament and
elsewhere. Actually, of course, the whole principle was in the melting
pot. All the elements opposed to change in any form rallied to the
attack, led on and influenced in some cases by those whose interests
were bound up with the old style cylindrical boilers. It was all over
again the old story of the fight for the retention of the paddle
against the screw propeller, with an equal disregard for facts.
Unfortunately the party of progress played somewhat into the hands of
the reactionaries. In fitting the Belleville type only, they had not
much alternative, other types being then in a less forward state. The
error made was that in the wholesale adoption of a new type of steam
generator, requiring twice the skill and intelligence necessary for
the old type, it was practically impossible to train quickly enough a
sufficiency of engineers and stokers. Hence troubles soon arose. An
even greater error was that the boilers were mostly built in England
to the French specifications, without, in many cases, sufficient
experienced supervision; and minor “improvements,” such as fusible
plugs and restricting regulations, were introduced by more or less
amateur Admiralty authorities--which also produced trouble.
For example, French practice had taught that adding lime to the feed
water was desirable; but in many British ships this rule was ignored.
Again, one Belleville essential was to throw on coal in very small
quantities at a time, in contradistinction to the old cylindrical
practice in which shovelling on enormous quantities of coal was the
recipe for increased speed. This feature was often disregarded.
The Belleville, ever a complicated and delicate mechanism, if its full
efficiency is to be secured, was a worse boiler for the experiments
than many of the simpler types of to-day would have been. But no
water-tube boiler of any type would have stood any chance of success
against the opposition. There were some terrible times in the boiler
rooms in those days. One or two ships whose chief engineers had been
specially trained in France secured marvellous results, usually by
ignoring Admiralty improvements and regulations.[20] But for one
success there were many early failures.
[Illustration:
EDGAR.
POWERFUL.
DIADEM.
CRESSY.
DRAKE.
COUNTY.
DEVONSHIRE.
PRINCIPAL CRUISERS OF THE WHITE ERA.]
The agitation triumphed to the extent of a Committee of Inquiry being
appointed. An interim report of this Committee made a scape-goat of the
Belleville, to the extent of recommending that no more should be
fitted. But the victory of the retrogrades ended there. A species of
compromise with public opinion inflamed against the water-tube system
was temporarily adopted, and absurd mixed installations of cylindrical
and water-tube boilers were fitted to some ships. Four large tube types
were selected as substitutes for Bellevilles, the Niclausse, Dürr (a
German variant of the Niclausse), the Babcock and Wilcox, and the
Yarrow large tube.
It may approximately be said that every water-tube boiler is a species
of compromise between facility for rapid repair on board ship and
complication, and the need of great care in using and working. It is
usual to put the Belleville at one end of this scale and the Yarrow
(large tube) at the other, this last boiler now requiring little, if
any, more care than the old type of cylindrical.
In the course of comparatively short experiments, both the Niclausse
and the Dürr were found to possess most of the alleged deficiencies of
the Belleville without its advantages; and it was decided to fit all
future types of large ships with the Babcock and Yarrow types only. The
absurd mixture of cylindrical and water-tube boilers was wisely done
away with. Curiously enough, the Belleville boiler, once the agitation
had ceased, also ceased to be troublesome. This was no doubt due to the
increased experience which had been gained in the interim.
Both the Babcock and Yarrow boilers have been immensely improved since
the days when they were first brought out. Something of the same sort
is, of course, true of all the standard types, and there is to-day
hardly any question as to which of them may be the best or worst. Each
type has some special advantage of its own, and in no case, probably,
is that advantage sufficiently pronounced to render any one type
absolutely the best. When adopted by the Admiralty the Belleville was
certainly the best water-tube boiler available. Had it been persisted
in and not “improved” by amateurs it would probably have done quite as
well as any type adopted to-day. The real issue was mainly not one of
type, but of principle. That principle was the water-tube boiler as
opposed to the old type cylindrical.
The Estimates for 1896–97 provided for five battleships which were
somewhat sarcastically alluded to as “improved” _Majestics_. These
ships were the _Canopus_ class, and they mark a species of early
striving after the ideal of the battle-cruisers of to-day. That is
to say, certain sacrifices were made in them with a view to securing
increased speed.
Particulars of these ships:--
Displacement--12,950 tons.
Length--(over all) 418ft.
Beam--74ft.
Draught--(maximum) 26½ft.
Armament--Four 12in., 35 cal., twelve 6in. 40 cal., ten
12-pounders, four submerged tubes (18in.)
Armour--Harvey-Nickel. Belt amidships 6in. with 2in. extension
to the bow and 1½in. skin aft on the water-line. Bulkheads and
barbettes 12in. Turrets 8in.
Horse-power--31,500 = 18.25 knots.
Coal--(normal) 1,000 tons; (maximum) 2,300 tons = nominal radius of
8,000 miles at 10 knots.
The adoption of Harvey-Nickel armour, which was of superior resisting
power to Harvey armour in the ratio of about 5 to 4, partly, but not
entirely accounted for the thinning of the armour of this class.
Theoretically, the 9in. armour belt of the _Majestic_ was equal to
18in. of iron, while the belt of the _Canopus_ class was equal to
about 15in. of iron. In place of the 4in. deck of the _Majestics_, the
_Canopus_ class had only a 2½in. deck. The thin bow (2in.) plating
was introduced as a sop to a public agitation against soft-ended
ships. Such a belt is, of course, perfectly useless against any heavy
projectile, or, for that matter, against 6in., except at very long
range indeed. Sir William White never made any secret of his cynical
disbelief in these bow belts. They were and always have been what
doctors call a “placebo.”
In the following year the sixth ship of this class was built--the
_Vengeance_. She differed from the others in the form of her turrets,
which were flat sided for the first time. In her also a mounting was
first introduced, whereby, in addition to being loaded in any position,
big guns could also be loaded at any elevation.
Some other details of the _Canopus_ class are:--
=============+=============+=================+============+==========
Name. | Built by | Engines by | Laid down. |Completed.
-------------+-------------+-----------------+------------+----------
_Canopus_ | Portsmouth | Greenock | Jan. ’97 | 1900
_Goliath_ | Chatham | Penn | Jan. ’97 | 1900
_Albion_ | Thames I.W. | Maudslay | Dec. ’96 | 1902
_Ocean_ | Devonport | Hawthorn Leslie | Feb. ’97 | 1900
_Glory_ | Laird | Laird | Dec. ’96 | 1901
_Vengeance_ | Vickers | Vickers | Aug. ’97 | 1901
=============+=============+=================+============+==========
The cruisers of the following year were eight cruisers of the much
discussed _Diadem_ class, small editions of the _Powerful_ (11,000
tons), and carrying a pair of 6-inch guns in place of the 9.2’s of the
_Powerfuls_. For the first four (the _Diadem_, _Andromeda_, _Europa_,
and _Niobe_) a speed of 20.5 knots only was provided, but in the late
four (the _Argonaut_, _Ariadne_, _Amphitrite_, and _Spartiate_) the
horse-power was increased to 18,000, in order to provide twenty-one
knots. At the present time (1912) these ships have for all practical
purposes already passed from the effective list, all the weak points of
the _Powerfuls_ being exaggerated in them.
In the Estimates for the years 1895 to 1898, provision was made also
for eleven small third-class cruisers of the “P” class of 2135 tons
and twenty knot speed. The armament consisted of eight 4-inch guns. On
trials most of them did well, but in a very short time their speeds
fell off, and at the present time, such of them as remain on the active
list are slower than the far older cruisers of the _Apollo_ class.
In the Estimates for 1897–98, in addition to the _Vengeance_, already
mentioned, three improved copies of the _Majestic_ were provided. These
ships were:--
===============+============+============+===========
Name. | Laid down. | Built at. | Engines by.
---------------+------------+----------- +-----------
_Formidable_ | March, ’98 | Portsmouth | Earle
_Irresistible_ | April, ’98 | Chatham | Maudslay
_Implacable_ | July, ’98 | Devonport | Laird
===============+============+============+===========
The only difference between them and the _Majestics_ lies in advantage
being taken of improvements in gunnery and armour to increase the
offensive and defensive items. The absurd 2-inch bow belt of the
_Canopus_ was repeated in them, but raised within 2½ft. of the main
deck. A 40-calibre 12-inch was mounted, also a 45-calibre 6-inch.
These were the first ships of the British Navy in which Krupp
cemented armour was used. This armour, generally known as “K.C.,” has
approximately a resisting power three times that of iron armour. That
is to say, the 9in. belts of the _Formidables_ were approximately 33
per cent. more effective than the similar belts of the _Majestics_.
These ships proved faster and more handy, easily exceeding their
designed eighteen knots. The superior handiness was brought about by a
superior form of hull--the deadwood aft being cut away for the first
time in them.
In this year’s Estimates armoured cruisers definitely re-appeared, six
ships of the _Cressy_ type being laid down.
Particulars of these:--
Displacement--12,000 tons.
Length--454ft.
Beam--69½ft.
Draught--(maximum) 28ft.
Armament--Two 9.2, 40 cal., twelve 6-inch, 45 cal., twelve
12-pounders, two 18in. submerged tubes.
Armour--6in. Krupp belt amidships, 250ft. long by 11½ft. wide, 2in.
continuation to the bow. Barbettes 6in. Casemates 5in.
Horse power--21,000 = 21 knots.
Coal--(normal) 800 tons; (maximum) 1,600 tons.
============+============+===========+============
Name. | Laid down. | Built at. | Engines by.
------------+------------+-----------+------------
_Sutlej_ | Aug. ’98 | Clydebank | Clydebank
_Cressy_ | Oct. ’98 | Fairfield | Fairfield
_Aboukir_ | Nov. ’98 | Fairfield | Fairfield
_Hogue_ | July, ’98 | Vickers | Vickers
_Bacchante_ | Dec. ’99 | Clydebank | Clydebank
_Euryalus_ | July, ’99 | Vickers | Vickers
============+============+===========+============
In substance these ships were armoured editions of the _Powerful_. They
steamed very well in their time, but have now fallen off considerably
and are no longer of any importance. Total weight of armour 2,100
tons. An innovation introduced in these ships was the fitting of
non-flammable wood, which at a later date was objected to on the
grounds that it deteriorated the gold lace of the uniforms stored in
drawers made of it. The _Cressy_ was completed in 1901; the others,
excepting the _Euryalus_, in 1902. This latter ship was greatly delayed
from various causes, and not completed until 1903.
The 1898–99 Estimates consisted of three battleships and four armoured
cruisers. The battleships were practically sisters to the _Formidable_,
but differed from her in that the main belt, instead of being a patch
amidships, has a total length of 300ft. from the bow. At the bow it is
2in., quickly increasing to 4in., 5in., 6in., and finally to 9in., and
this provided a measure of protection that the 2in. belts of preceding
ships could never afford. The flat-sided turrets, first introduced in
the _Vengeance_, were also fitted in these ships, the _Formidables_
having the old pattern turrets.
The advantages of flat-sided turrets lie in the fact that K.C. can
be used for them instead of the relatively softer non-cemented. K.C.
is not applicable to curved surfaces, for which reason barbettes,
casemates, and batteries with curved portholes in them and rounded
turrets cannot be constructed of it. Flat-sided turrets consist of
a number of flat plates placed to meet each other at predetermined
angles, thus forming one homogeneous whole.
These battleships were:--
============+============+===========+============
Name. | Laid down. | Built at. | Engines by.
------------+------------+-----------+------------
_London_ | Dec. ’98 | Portsmouth| Earle
_Bulwark_ | March, ’99 | Devonport | Hawthorn
_Venerable_ | Nov. ’99 | Chatham | Maudslay
============+============+===========+============
All were completed in 1902.
The cruisers of the same year, the _Drake_ class, were “improved”
_Cressies_, with increased displacement, power and speed. The increased
displacement allowed of four extra 6-inch guns being mounted, these
being placed in casemates on top of the amidships casemates.
Particulars of the _Drake_ class:--
Displacement--14,000 tons.
Length--(over all) 529½ft.
Beam--71ft.
Draught--(maximum) 28ft.
Armament--Two 9.2, 45 cal. (instead of 40 cal., as in the
_Cressies_), sixteen 6-inch, 45 cal., and fourteen 12-pounders,
two submerged tubes (18in.).
Armour--2,700 tons, as in _Cressy_, except that the casemates are
6in. thick.
Horse-power--30,000 = 23 knots. Boilers, 43 Belleville.
Coal--(normal) 1,250 tons; (maximum) 2,500.
These ships were altogether superior to the _Cressy_ class. On trial
they all easily made their contract speeds and subsequently greatly
exceeded them. It was discovered that increased speed was to be
obtained by additional weight aft, and this was so much brought to a
fine art that weights were adjusted accordingly, and in one of them,
seeking to make a speed record, the entire crew were once mustered aft
in order to vary the trim!
Building details are as follows:--
===============+============+==========+===========+==============
Name. | Laid down. |Completed.| Built at. | Engines by.
---------------+------------+----------+-----------+--------------
_Good Hope_ | Sept. ’99 | 1902 | Fairfield | Fairfield
_Drake_ | April, ’99 | 1902 | Pembroke | Humphrys & T.
_Leviathan_ | Nov. ’99 | 1903 | Clydebank | Clydebank
_King Alfred_ | Aug. ’99 | 1903 | Vickers | Vickers
===============+============+==========+===========+==============
For some years these were the fastest ships in the world. In 1905, in
a race by the Second Cruiser Squadron across the Atlantic, with ships
of nominally equal speed, the _Drake_ came in first. In December, 1906,
at four-fifths power for thirty hours, she averaged 22.5 knots. In
1907, the _King Alfred_ averaged 25.1 knots for one hour, and made an
eight hours’ mean of 24.8. They proved very economical steamers, being
able to do nineteen knots at an expenditure of eleven tons of coal an
hour, and though they are now getting old, as warships go, they have
never yet been beaten on the results achieved by horse-power per ton of
displacement.
The Estimates of 1898–99 included a supplementary programme of four
armoured ships which, like the _Canopus_ class, again foreshadowed the
battle cruisers of to-day. These were the famous _Duncan_ class, and
may be described as slightly smaller editions of the _London_, with
armour thickness sacrificed for superior speed. The belt amidships was
reduced from 9in. to 7in., but against this the belt at the extreme
bow was made an inch thicker, and 25ft. away from the ram became
5in. thick. The displacement sank by 1,000 tons, the horse-power was
increased by 3,000, and the speed by one knot.
The total weight of armour is about 3,500 against 4,300 tons in the
_Londons_. The _Duncans_ may be regarded as a species of recrudescence
of Barnaby ideas, plus a later notion that a well-extended partial
protection was better than a more concentrated protection of less
area. Generally speaking, they were improved duplicates of the
_Canopus_ class, in the same way that the _Formidable_ and the ships
that followed her were duplicates of the _Majestic_. Two ideas
were obviously at work. In other forms these two ideas have (with
variations) existed to the present day. Then it was purely a question
between ratios devoted to speed and protection. To-day (1912) matters
have been so far modified that increased displacements are given to
secure speed advantages, but protection remains proportionately as it
was. Reduced armament has always been accepted.
Construction details of the _Duncans_, of which two more figured in the
estimates for 1899–1900:--
============+============+==============+=============
Name. | Laid down. | Built at. | Engines by.
------------+------------+--------------+-------------
_Duncan_ | July, ’99 | Thames, I.W. | Thames, I.W.
_Russell_ | March, ’99 | Palmer | Palmer
_Cornwallis_| July, ’99 | Thames, I.W. | Thames, I.W.
_Exmouth_ | Aug. ’99 | Laird | Laird
_Albemarle_ | Jan. ’00 | Chatham | Thames, I.W.
_Montagu_ | Nov. ’99 | Devonport | Laird
============+============+==============+=============
The _Montagu_ was wrecked on Lundy Island in 1906.
Contemporaneous with the _Drakes_, and extending over four ships in
the Estimates of 1898–99 to two in the following and four in the year
later, ten armoured cruisers were provided for, which in essence were
little but an attempt to provide a normal second-class protected
cruiser of the _Talbot_ class, with armour protection. These ships--the
_County_ class--are of 9,800 tons displacement, and may also be
regarded as diminutives of the _Drake_ and _Cressy_ classes, with a
touch of the _Diadems_ thrown in. In place of the fore and aft 9.2’s
of the _Drake_ and _Cressy_, they were supplied with a couple of pairs
of 6-inch guns mounted in turrets fore and aft. The belt amidships
was reduced to 4in. (a thickness in K.C. which has no virtues over
armour of earlier type) with the usual extension of 2in. to the bow.
The twin turrets, in which, like those of the _Powerful_, electrical
control was once more introduced, have never given satisfaction, being
very cramped for working purposes, and probably no more efficient than
single gun turrets would have been, certainly less than the single gun
7--5in. turrets, originally proposed as an alternative, would have been.
Had the ships been regarded frankly as modern variants of the
second-class protected cruisers, they probably would have been esteemed
more than they were. Unfortunately they have always been regarded as
“armoured ships” and discounted on account of their obvious inferiority
to the _Drakes_. In the matter of steaming all of them have invariably
done well (except in the case of the _Essex_, over which a mistake in
design was made). The anticipated twenty-three knots was made quite
easily, once certain early propeller difficulties were overcome. The
Boiler Commission, already referred to, affected these ships, in so far
that, instead of the hitherto inevitable Bellevilles, the _Berwick_ and
_Suffolk_ were given Niclausse boilers and the _Cornwall_ Babcocks. The
total weight of armour is 1,800 tons.
Details of the construction of this class are:--
==============+===========+==============+==============
Name. | Laid down.| Built at. | Engines by.
--------------+-----------+------------- +--------------
_Essex_ | Jan. ’00 | Pembroke | Clydebank
_Kent_ | Feb. ’00 | Portsmouth | Hawthorn
_Bedford_ | Feb. ’00 | Fairfield | Fairfield
_Monmouth_ | Aug. ’99 | L. & Glasgow | L. & Glasgow
_Lancaster_ | Mar. ’01 | Elswick | Hawthorn L.
_Berwick_ | April, ’01| Beardmore | Humphrys
_Donegal_ | Feb. ’01 | Fairfield | Fairfield
_Cornwall_ | Mar. ’01 | Pembroke | Hawthorn
_Cumberland_ | Feb. ’01 | L. & Glasgow | L. & Glasgow
_Suffolk_ | Mar. ’02 | Portsmouth | Humphrys & T.
==============+===========+==============+==============
All were completed during 1903 and 1904.
For the year 1900–01 only two battleships were provided: the _Queen_,
built at Devonport and engined by Harland and Wolff, and the _Prince
of Wales_, built at Chatham and engined by the Greenock Foundry Co.
These were laid down in 1901 and completed in 1904. They were copies of
the _Londons_ in every detail, saving that, instead of being enclosed,
their upper deck batteries were left open as in the _Duncans_. The
_Queen_ was given Babcock boilers instead of Bellevilles.
The 1901–02 Estimates provided three battleships and six armoured
cruisers of the _County_ class. These were the last ships designed
by Sir William White. The battleships, of which eight were built
altogether--three for 1901–02, two for the next year--were of a
different type from any which had preceded them, and to some extent may
be said to mark the birth of the _Dreadnought_ era. That is to say, in
them the old idea of the two calibres, 12in. and 6in., died out, and
heavier auxiliary guns began to appear.
Particulars of these ships, _the King Edward VII_ class, are as
follows:--
Displacement--16,350 tons.
Length--(over all) 453¾ft.
Beam--78ft.
Draught--(maximum) 26¾ft.
Armament--Four 12-inch, 40 cal., four 9.2, 45 cal., ten 6-inch,
45 cal., twelve 12-pounders, fourteen 3-pounders, five 18-inch
submerged tubes (of which one is in the stern).
Armour--As in the _London_ (but a 6in. battery instead of
casemates).
Horse-power--18,000 = 18.9 knots.
Coal--(normal) 950 tons; (maximum) 2,150 tons, also 400 tons of
oil, except in the _New Zealand_.
==============================+===========+============+==============
Name. | Laid down.| Built at. | Engines by.
------------------------------+-----------+------------+--------------
_Commonwealth_ | June, ’01 | Fairfield | Fairfield
_King Edward_ | Mar. ’02 | Devonport | Harland & W.
_Dominion_ | May, ’02 | Vickers | Vickers
_Hindustan_ | Oct. ’02 | Clydebank | Clydebank
_New Zealand_ (now _Zelandia_)| Feb. ’03 | Portsmouth | Humphrys & T.
_Africa_ | Jan. ’04 | Chatham | Clydebank
_Britannia_ | Feb. ’04 | Portsmouth | Humphrys & T.
_Hibernia_ | Jan. ’04 | Devonport | Harland & W.
==============================+===========+============+==============
Except the last three, all were completed in 1905. The others were
completed very shortly afterwards.
The boilers fitted to these ships varied considerably. The _King
Edward_, _Hindustan_, and _Britannia_ were given a mixed installation
of Babcocks and cylindricals; the _New Zealand_ Niclausse boilers;
the other ships Babcock only. In the _Britannia_, super-heaters were
also fitted to six of her boilers. The point differentiating these
ships from their predecessors was the mounting of four 9.2 guns in
single turrets at the angles of the superstructure. Equally novel was
the placing of 6-inch guns in a battery behind the armour on the main
deck.[21] Fighting tops, a feature of all previous ships, disappeared,
and in place of them fire-control platforms were substituted.
When produced, these ships were considered as something like the “last
word”; but in service later on it was very soon found that the two
calibres of big guns rendered fire-control extremely difficult, and
they have been a somewhat costly lesson in that respect. They cost
about £1,500,000 each, and were found to be all that could be desired
tactically, their turning circles with engines being only about 340yds.
at fifteen knots. All of them did not make their speeds on trials, and
some have never quite come up to expectations in that respect, but
they have all proved remarkably reliable steamers.
Six armoured cruisers provided for in the 1901–02 Estimates were the
_Devonshires_. These were originally intended to have been enlarged
_Counties_, carrying a single 7.5 fore and aft, in place of the twin
6-inch turrets of the prototype ships. The design was, however,
modified to the extent of substituting a single 7.5 for each of the
forward pairs of 6-inch casemates.
Details of these ships are:--
Displacement--10,850 tons.
Length (between perpendiculars)--450ft.
Beam--68½ft.
Draught--(maximum) 25½ft.
Armament--Four 7.5, six 6-inch, 45 cal.; two 12-pounders,
twenty-two 3-pounders, two 18in. torpedo tubes submerged.
Armour Belt--(length 325ft. from the bow, width 10½ft.), 6in.
amidships, thinning to 2in. right forward. Barbettes 6in. Turrets
5in. Casemates 6in.
Horse-power--21,000==22.5 knots.
Coal--(normal) 800; (maximum) 1,800 tons.
Other details are:--
================+============+==================+==============
Name. | Laid down. | Built at. | Engined by.
----------------+------------+------------------+--------------
_Devonshire_ | Mar. ’02 | Chatham | Thames I.W.
_Antrim_ | Aug. ’02 | Clydebank | Clydebank
_Argyll_ | Sept. ’02 | Greenock Foundry | Greenock F.C.
_Carnarvon_ | Oct. ’02 | Beardmore | Beardmore
_Hampshire_ | Sept. ’02 | Elswick | Elswick
_Roxburgh_ | June, ’02 | L. & Glasgow | L. & Glasgow
================+============+==================+==============
Like the _King Edwards_, various boilers were given to them. All
of them have one-fifth cylindrical boilers. The _Devonshire_ and
_Carnarvon_ were otherwise given Niclausse; _Antrim_ and _Hampshire_,
Yarrow; _Argyll_, Babcock; and _Roxburgh_, Dürr. The designed speed was
exceeded by all on trials, but none have proved successful steamers
ever since. They were completed between 1904 and 1905.
These were the last ships to be designed by Sir William White. He
resigned his position from ill-health; but, like his predecessors, left
under a cloud--at any rate, with his services not really appreciated.
He had created a magnificent fleet; but its very magnificence made many
of his designs look poor on paper against any foreign construction of
less displacement, but--_on paper_--of equal or superior qualities. It
is the fate of the naval architect in peace-time to be judged on paper
with small regard to issues such as nautical qualities, constructional
strength, and a score of other details which are not to be expressed
by any statistical formulæ, but yet make all the difference between
efficiency and the absence of it.
[Illustration: EARLY TYPE OF “27 KNOT” DESTROYERS.]
Sir William White’s period of office was marked by an almost
complete naval revolution. It began with the quick-firer and the
disappearance of the low freeboard battleships. It ended with the
coming of submarines, fire-control, and wireless. In between, it
included the coming of the destroyer, the re-birth of the armoured
cruiser; the arrival of the water-tube boiler, new forms of hull,
unprecedented advances in both guns and armour--in fact, almost every
conceivable change. Through these troubled waters with a steady hand
and cool brain Sir William White guided the destiny of the Fleet and
the millions of pounds expended in shipbuilding. Already his era
is “the pre-_Dreadnought_” one, and to present-day ideas the term
“pre-_Dreadnought_” is already very nearly akin to “pre-historic.”
His creations preserved the peace, for which very reason they failed
to secure glory. Already some have gone to the scrap-heap, and others
are well on their way thither to join the Reed and Barnaby ships in
that oblivion to which modern _Dreadnoughts_ will just as surely go in
their season. More might be said: but _cui bono?_ Such public epitaph
as Sir William White received when he retired was of the “about time,
too!” order. The creator of the finest fleet that the world has ever
seen left office with less honour and no more public interest than did
half-a-dozen mediocre admirals who had chanced to fly their flags in
some of his creations. It is not given for the stage manager to stand
in the lime-light reserved for the principal actors. But the historian
of a hundred years hence, placing great Englishmen in perspective, will
assuredly place Sir William White far ahead of many who loom greater in
the public eye to-day.
_GUNS IN THE ERA._
The guns which especially belong to the White era are as follows:--
===============+========+============+=========+============================
Designation. | Weight.| Projectile.| Velocity| Maximum Penetration with
| Tons. | lbs. | f.s. | capped shot against K.C. at
| | | +------------+---------------
| | | | 5000 yds. | 3000 yds.
---------------+--------+------------+---------+------------+---------------
13.5, 30 cal. | 67 | 1250 | 2016 | 9 | 12
| | | | |
12in., 35 cal. | 46 | 850 | 2367 | 11½ | 14½
12in., 40 cal. | 50 | 850 | 2750 | 16 | 20
| | | | |
10in., 32 cal. | 29 | 500 | 2040 | 5½ | 7½
| | | | |
9.2, 30 cal. | 24 | 380 | 2065 | 4 | 6
9.2, 40 cal. | 25 | 380 | 2347 | 6¾ | 9¼
9.2, 45 cal. | 27 | 380 | 2640 | 8¾ | 11¼
| | | | |
7.5, 45 cal. | 14 | 200 | 2600 | 5¾ | 7½
| | | | |
6in., 40 cal. | 7½ | 100 | 2200 | -- | --
| | | | |
6in., 45 cal. | 7 | 100 | 2535 | -- | 4½
===============+========+============+=========+============+===============
_PURCHASED SHIPS._
In the year 1902 two ships, the _Constitucion_ and _Libertad_, were
laid down at Elswick and Vickers-Maxims’ respectively for the Chilian
Government. They were designed by Sir Edward Reed, and compare
interestingly with the _King Edwards_ in being much longer and
narrower. It will be remembered that in the past Reed ideals had always
centred round a “short handy ship.” They had also always embodied the
maximum of protection, while these ships carried medium armour only.
His ships had, further, always been characterised by extremely strong
construction, while these verged on the flimsy, the scantlings being
far lighter than in British naval practice.
Out of all which it has been held that they represented the Reed ideal
of armoured cruisers interlaced with whatever limitations the Chilian
authorities may have specified.
Particulars of these ships, which in 1903 were purchased for the
British Navy and renamed _Swiftsure_ (ex _Constitucion_) and _Triumph_
(ex _Libertad_):--
Displacement--11,800. Complement, 700.
Length--(over all) 470ft.
Beam--71ft.
Draught--(Maximum) 24ft. 8in.
Armament--Four 10-inch, 45 cal.; fourteen 7.5-inch, 50 cal.;
fourteen 14-pounders, four 6-pounders, four Maxims; two 18-inch
submerged tubes.
Armour--Practically complete belt 8ft. wide, 7-inch thick
amidships, reduced to 3-inch at ends. 10-inch bulkheads at ends
of thick portion of belt. Redoubt above (250ft. long), 7-inch on
sides 6-inch bulkheads to it. Deck 1½-inch on slopes amidships,
3-inch on slopes at ends. Barbettes 10-inch, with 8 to 6-inch
turrets. Battery and upper deck casemates, 7-inch.
Horse-power--14,000 = 20 knots. Yarrow boilers.
Coal--(normal) 800 tons; (maximum) 2,000 tons.
These ships compare interestingly with the _King Edwards_ and
_Devonshires_, between which they struck a mean, as follows:--
===============+=================+===============+===============
| _King Edward._ | _Swiftsure._ | _Devonshire._
---------------+-----------------+---------------+---------------
Displacement | 16,350 | 11,800 |10,850
Principal Guns | 4--12in. | 4--10in. | 4--7.5.
| 4--9.2 | 14--7.5 | 6--6in.
| 16--6in. | |
| 5--18in. tubes | 2--18in. tubes| 2--18in. tubes
---------------+-----------------+---------------+---------------
Armour belt | 9--2in. | 7--3in. | 6--2in.
Speed | 18.9 knots | 20 knots | 22.25 knots
Coal (Normal) | 950 | 800 | 800
Coal (Maximum) | 2,150--400 (oil)| 2,000 | 1,800
===============+=================+===============+===============
Other items of interest are that the armament of the _Swiftsures_
(10-inch and 7.5’s) had somewhere about that time been laid down by
Admiral Fisher as the ideal armament of the future, on the principle
that the best possible was “the smallest effective big gun, and the
largest possible secondary gun.”
In service these ships never proved brilliantly successful. They rarely
managed to make their speeds successfully, and there was a great deal
of vibration with them. They were shored up internally in places with a
view to strengthening them. On the other hand, it should be mentioned
that some of these alleged defects have been put down to conservatism
in nautical ideas, and that the shoring up was not really required.
Their great drawback was that so far as the British Navy was concerned
they were neither one thing nor the other, being too light in heavy
guns to be satisfactory with the battleships, and too slow to act with
the cruisers. Had there been six or so of them they would, possibly
enough, have formed an ideal squadron. Being two ships only, they of
necessity became round pegs in square holes.
_NAVAL ESTIMATES IN THE ERA._
===========+=============+============+=====================================
Financial | | | Ships.
Year. | Amount. | Personnel. +--------------+-----------+----------
| | | | Armoured | Protected
| | | Battleships. | Cruisers. | Cruisers.
-----------+-------------+------------+--------------+-----------+----------
1887–88 | 12,476,800 | 62,500 | -- | -- | 3
1888–89[22]| 13,082,800 | 62,500 | -- | -- | 2
1889–90 | 13,685,400 | 62,400 | -- | -- | --
1890–91 | 13,786,600 | 65,400 | 8 | -- | 42
1891–92 | 14,557,856 | 68,800 | 2 | -- | --
1892–93 | 14,240,200 | 67,700 | 1 | -- | --
1893–94 | 14,340,000 | 70,500 | 6 | -- | 2
1894–95 | 17,365,900 | 83,000 | 3 | -- | 9
1895–96 | 18,701,000 | 88,850 | -- | -- | 8
1896–97 | 21,823,000 | 93,750 | 6 | -- | 3
1897–98 | 21,838,000 | 100,050 | 7 | 6 | --
1898–99 | 23,780,000 | 106,390 | 3 | 4 | --
1899–00 | 26,594,000 | 110,640 | 2 | 2 | 1
1900–01 | 28,791,900 | 114,880 | 2 | 6 | 1
1901–02 | 30,875,500 | 118,625 | 3 | 6 | --
1902–03 | 31,255,500 | 122,500 | 2 | 2 | --
===========+=============+============+==============+===========+==========
In the following year 1903–04 three ships (the last of the _King
Edwards_) were provided for. The total number of battleships designed
for the British Navy by Sir William White was therefore 48. There were
in addition 26 armoured cruisers--making a total of 74 armoured ships,
and about as many protected cruisers, including some for Colonial
service.
III.
THE WATTS ERA.
Sir William White was succeeded by Mr., afterwards Sir Philip Watts,
who came to the Admiralty from Elswick, where he had been Chief
Constructor. He came with the reputation of “putting in plenty of
guns,” and his appointment was favourably received, both inside the
Navy and outside.
The armoured cruisers _Duke of Edinburgh_ and _Black Prince_ were the
first ships for which he was personally responsible.
Details of these:--
Displacement--13,550 tons.
Length (between perpendiculars)--480ft.
Beam--73½ft.
Draught--(maximum) 27½ft.
Armament--Six 9.2, 45 cal., ten 6-inch, 50 cal.; twenty-two
3-pounders. Torpedo tubes:--Three submerged (18in.).
Horse-power--23,500 = 22.3 knots.
Coal--(normal) 1,000 tons; (maximum) 2,000; also 400 tons of oil.
The former ship was laid down at Pembroke and engined by Hawthorn; the
latter was built and engined by the Thames Iron Works. In the matter
of armament and its arrangement the ships were to some extent cruiser
versions of the _King Edward_; but equally, in the adoption of a number
of single gun-houses for big guns, and the jump from two to a larger
number of big guns, the influence of the Chilian _O’Higgins_, built
at Elswick, may be noticed. The big guns were placed one forward and
one aft, two on either beam and two on either quarter. The 6-inch
were placed in an armoured battery below. As originally designed,
right ahead fire was given to the forward battery guns, but this was
dispensed with at a later date. The ships were never good sea boats,
and the 6-inch guns were soon found to be well-nigh useless in any sea.
The armour was disposed in generous fashion--a complete belt reaching
up to the main deck, 4in. forward, 6in. for some 260ft. amidships, and
3in. aft of that. A 6in. battery (K.N.C.) with bulkheads surmounts the
belt-7in. barbettes with 6in. K.C. flat-sided gunhouses.
Both were given a mixed installation of Babcock and cylindrical
boilers. A novelty was the standardisation of all their machinery, a
very valuable innovation, which has been followed ever since. Parts of
any one ship’s machinery can be used for any other of her class, thus
facilitating rapid repairs and requiring a considerably reduced stock
of spares.
On trials the _Duke of Edinburgh_ did on her eight hours’ full power
trial I.H.P. 23,685 = 22.84 knots, the _Black Prince_ 23,939 = 23.6
knots. In service, however, the former has generally proved the better
steamer. Another innovation in these ships was the re-appearance of
the stern torpedo tube, first introduced in the _Centurions_. As
re-introduced it was built submerged, a feature long desired, but which
had previously presented innumerable difficulties in design.
[Illustration:
SWIFTSURE.
WATTS ERA.
LORD NELSON.
BLACK PRINCE.
WARRIOR.
MINOTAUR.
PRE-DREADNOUGHTS OF THE WATTS ERA.]
For the Estimates of the following year (1903–04) four more ships of
the same type were provided--
===========+============+===========+=============
Name. | Laid down. | Builders. | Engines by.
-----------+------------+-----------+-------------
_Achilles_ | Feb. ’04 | Elswick | Hawthorn
_Cochrane_ | Mar. ’04 | Fairfield | Fairfield
_Warrior_ | Jan. ’04 | Vickers | Vickers
_Natal_ | Nov. ’03 | Pembroke | Wallsend Co.
===========+============+===========+=============
In these the defect of the low 6-in. battery of the _Black Princes_ was
anticipated, and instead of ten 6-inch guns, four 7.5 were mounted in
gun-houses on the upper deck amidships. Yarrow and cylindrical boilers
mixed were installed. Otherwise no change was made. On trial the
_Achilles_ reached a maximum of 23.27, the other three ships all made
their contracts or over.
These four, generally known as the _Warriors_, proved to be the finest
cruisers as sea-boats ever built for the British Navy. They have always
proved most remarkably steady gun platforms. Shooting from them is
invariably good--they have always been near the top of the list in
gunnery returns. For a single ship in a single commission good shooting
is attributable to causes other than the ship; but with four ships and
different crews at different times the effect of the design is obvious.
Apparently the extra weight on their upper decks is responsible; for
their dimensions are identical with those of the unsatisfactory _Black
Princes_.
In all these ships, as in the _Devonshires_ which preceded them, raking
masts and stumpy funnels were introduced. The latter proved most
inconvenient for navigating purposes, and in 1911 all the _Warriors_
had their funnels considerably heightened.
In these four latter the “dove-cot” platform fire-controls first
appeared; they were fitted also to the three latest ships of the _King
Edward_ class.
The main defect of all six is the trivial anti-torpedo armament. The
3-pounders are perfectly useless against destroyers. Incidentally it
may be noticed that the class signalled the scientific placing of such
guns for control purposes. In the _Warriors_ some guns were mounted on
turret tops also, this being with a view to their survival after an
action. It was contended that an actual hit was extremely improbable on
any anti-t.b. guns, but that shells bursting underneath might easily
disable them. Hence the search for an armoured base. This idea seems to
have originated in the German Navy, though the Germans never adopted
the turret-top position.
The Estimates (1904–05) provided for two battleships and three armoured
cruisers. The latter of these, the _Minotaur_ class, were “improved
_Warriors_”; but, as a matter of fact, except for a larger armament,
they proved somewhat inferior to their immediate predecessors:--
Details are:
Displacement--14,600 tons (as against 13,550).
Length (between perpendiculars)--490ft., (over all) 525ft.
Beam--74½ft. (but a foot more in _Shannon_).
Draught--(maximum) 28ft. (but a foot less in _Shannon_).
Armament--Four 9.2, 50 cal., ten 7.5, fourteen 12-pounders, five
18in. tubes (submerged).
Horse-power--27,000 = 23 knots.
Coal--(normal) 1,000 tons (950 only in _Shannon_); (maximum) 2,000,
also 400 tons oil.
[Illustration: SIR PHILIP WATTS.]
The 9.2 were placed in double turrets fore and aft. For those of the
_Minotaur_ electric manœuvring was substituted for the usual hydraulic.
The 7.5’s are disposed in ten single gun houses on the upper deck,
_Warrior_ fashion. The armour belt is of the same maximum thickness,
but only 3in. for 50ft. from the bow. Thereafter it thickens gradually
for the next 75ft. then reaches its maximum. Vertical armour above
the main deck was given up in order to allow for the increased weight
of armament and its protection--a total of 2,073 tons. The _Minotaur_
has Babcock, the other two Yarrow large-tube boilers. No cylindricals
were fitted; the opponents of the water-tube system having lost their
influence by 1905, when the ships were laid down.
None of these ships came up to expectations on trial, though they
developed considerably more than the contract horse-power. The
_Minotaur_ just made her speed, the _Defence_ just failed to reach it,
the _Shannon_ failed by half-a-knot. This last ship had been varied
from the others with an idea that a new form of hull, would produce
better speed--an unfortunate surmise. Shortly after completion all had
15ft. added to their funnels. The increased draught added to their
power somewhat, but did not materially better their speeds.
Further details of these three ships are:--
============+============+===========+==================
Name. | Laid down. | Built at. | Engined by.
------------+------------+-----------+------------------
_Minotaur_ | Jan. ’05 | Devonport | Harland & Wolff
_Defence_ | Feb. ’05 | Pembroke | Scott S. & E. Co.
_Shannon_ | Jan. ’05 | Chatham | Humphrys
============+============+===========+==================
All were completed in 1908. Average cost, £1,400,000 per ship. In them
solid bulkheads first appear, their engine-rooms having no water-tight
doors.
The battleships of the same programme (1904–05) were the _Lord Nelson_
and _Agamemnon_.
Details are:--
Displacement--16,500 tons.
Length (between perpendiculars)--410 ft., (over all) 445ft.
Beam--79½ft.
Draught--(mean) 27ft.
Armament--Four 12-inch, 45 cal., ten 9.2, 50 cal. fifteen
12-pounders, sixteen 3-pounders, five submerged tubes (18in.).
Horse-power--16,750 = 18.5 knots.
Coal--(normal) 900 tons; (maximum) 2,000 tons; also 400 tons oil.
The _Lord Nelson_ was built and engined by Palmer, the _Agamemnon_
by Beardmore and engined by Hawthorn. The former was given Babcock,
the latter Yarrow boilers. Both on trial easily exceeded the contract
speed, and proved abnormally handy ships. They cost £1,500,000 or only
a little more than the _Minotaurs_.
The _Nelsons_ are often counted as “Dreadnoughts”; but their only
claim to the position is they do not happen to carry any 6-inch guns.
Actually they are nothing but improved _King Edwards_, bearing to those
ships very much the same relation as the _Warriors_ to the _Black
Princes_. Their comparatively slow speeds and their mixed armaments
entirely differentiate them from the swifter “all-big-gun” ship which
followed, and, for that matter, caught them up.[23]
The _Nelsons_ were never really successful ships outside the points
alluded to above. Eight of their ten 9.2’s were placed in twin
turrets, and in many circumstances two 9.2 so mounted proved very
little superior in efficiency to a similar single gun in an isolated
gun-house.[24]
In the matter of protection the _Nelsons_ far exceeded the _King
Edwards_. In place of a 9in. belt amidships they were given a 12in.
one, while the 8in. and 6in. strakes above of the earlier ships
became a uniform 8in. The bow belt forward was also augmented to 6in.
on the water-line, surmounted by 4in., instead of a belt uniformly
increasing from 2in. to 6in. further aft. But none of this made them
“Dreadnoughts,” and the absence of “Dreadnought” features relegated
them to the second line very soon after they were completed.
In these ships the tripod mast, the idea of which dates back to the
_Captain_ era, re-appeared. The _Nelsons_ were given as mainmasts the
first of those modern tripods which have characterised nearly every
British capital ship since built till the _Lion_ was altered.
The idea of the tripod mast is to avoid the many shrouds of an ordinary
mast; and so give greater training to the guns. Whether the idea be
of use is another matter. Generally speaking ideas abandoned by our
forefathers have failed to live long if resuscitated.
In the 1902–03 and 1903–04 Estimates provision was made for four
vessels each year of a new type, known as “Scouts.” These were the
_Adventure_ and _Attentive_ (Elswick), _Forward_ and _Foresight_
(Fairfield), _Pathfinder_ and _Patrol_ (Laird), _Sentinel_ and
_Skirmisher_ (Vickers-Maxim). One was awarded each year to each of the
firms mentioned, but all were actually laid down between June, 1903,
and January, 1904. The first four to be given out to contract were
originally named _Eddystone_, _Nore_, _Fastnet_, and _Inchkeith_.
These vessels came to be built owing to an appreciation of the fact
that destroyers had altogether lost their original rôle and had become
torpedo-boats, pure and simple. The “Scouts,” though from three to four
times the size, were the old “catchers” re-introduced.
They compared with these as follows:--
=========+===============+==========+====================
| Average | Average |
| Displacement. | Designed | Armament.
| | Speed. |
---------+---------------+----------+--------------------
“Scouts” | 2850 | 25 | 12 to 14--12pdr.,
| | | 2--14in. tubes[25]
Halcyons | 1070 | 18.5 | 2--4.7, 4--6pdr.,
| | | 5--18in. tubes
=========+===============+==========+====================
A 1½ deck on slopes amidships was provided for the “Scouts,” which
incidentally were designed for ten 12-pounders only. By the year
1912 it became abundantly clear that, like their predecessors the
“catchers,” they were doomed to pass quickly into the “little use”
category on account of their weak armaments and small sea-keeping
capacity.
_TORPEDO CRAFT._
It has already been mentioned that Sir William White’s period of
office saw the coming of the destroyer. The origin of this craft is
to be found in a public agitation, which arose out of the tremendous
attention paid to torpedo boats by the French, who were then our most
likely enemy, and who had an overwhelming superiority in torpedo craft.
Some years before a type of craft, the torpedo gunboats already
referred to, which were first known as “torpedo boat catchers” and
subsequently as “catchers” had been introduced. It soon, however,
became very clear that they were little likely to achieve this end, and
the doctrine that “the torpedo boat is the answer to the torpedo boat”
was being steadily preached. At that time (1892) the then insignificant
navy of Germany was in possession of eight very large torpedo boats,
which were known as “division boats.” Austria also had one or two fast
craft, capable of dealing with torpedo boats. Upon these existing lines
a new type of craft was developed for the British Navy. The first two
to be built were the _Havock_ and _Hornet_, which were launched in
1893. In substance they were very large torpedo boats of about 250
tons displacement, designed by Messrs. Yarrow. Their speed of 27 knots
was well in excess of that of any existing torpedo boat, and it was
confidently expected that they would easily run down and destroy any
such. In addition to what was then the very considerable armament of
one 12-pounder and three 6-pounders, they were also fitted with torpedo
tubes.[26] The original idea of this was that when hostile torpedo
boats had been annihilated by them, the destroyers could be used as
torpedo boats in case of need.
In 1894 the _Havock_ and _Hornet_ were used in manœuvres and tested by
being made to lie by for twenty-four hours in the Bay of Biscay. They
underwent the test very well, and to this is probably attributed the
realisation of the fact that in them a more or less really effective
sea-going torpedo boat had been evolved. A large number of duplicates
were ordered; at first of 27 knots. Later this was increased to 30, and
in a few boats to a little more.
The whole of these boats were nothing but enlarged editions of existing
torpedo boats, and some of them proved rather weak for the service
demanded of them. In the year 1902 and onwards, therefore, a type of
better sea-going qualities was demanded, and the River class, which
totalled about 35 boats, began to be built. A feature of the River
class was that they were a blend of the early torpedo gunboats of the
Rattlesnake type, with the later and heavier torpedo gunboats. There
was a reduction of speed to 25½ knots, with a view to securing better
sea-going qualities. On account of their slow speed the River class are
verging on the obsolete to-day, but the high forecastle first embodied
in them has never been departed from, and the very latest types of
destroyers are nothing but swifter and larger editions of them.
It is interesting to note that here again to some extent the Germans
led the way. German destroyers had the North Sea to consider, whereas
all early British destroyers were built with a view to being used only
in the Channel. Consequently and naturally enough the Germans were the
first to perceive the necessity for a high forecastle.
The submarine also appeared in the pre-Dreadnought era, but the boats
of that time were of such a primitive type that they need hardly be
specially mentioned. They will be found alluded to in a later chapter.
_END OF THE PRE-DREADNOUGHT ERA._
So ended the pre-Dreadnought era. It was characterised by a
multiplicity of types which had included:--
First class battleships.
Second class battleships.
Fast intermediate battleships.
First rate armoured cruisers.
Second rate armoured cruisers.
First class protected cruisers.
Second class protected cruisers.
Third class protected cruisers.
Scouts.
Torpedo gunboats.
Sloops.
Gunboats.
Destroyers.
Torpedo boats.
Submarines.
Although the whole of these types were not all building or provided
for at any one and the same time, yet towards the end of the period
there was a general feeling that too many types of ships were in use.
Reductions in this direction were announced, at first indicating that
in future programmes provision would be made only for:--
“Armoured ships.”
Destroyers.
Submarines.
Contemporaneously with this came Admiral Fisher’s famous “scrap-heap
policy,” whereby some eighty vessels of one kind and another were
struck off the effective list, and either sold or relegated to
subsidiary service.
The ships removed included all battleships and armoured cruisers of
earlier date than the _Trafalgar_, several ships of the _Apollo_ class,
all earlier protected cruisers, some of the “P” class, and the bulk of
the small fry in the way of sloops and gunboats.
This action aroused a certain amount of criticism on the grounds that
the clearance was excessive. As some of the ships were subsequently
restored to the active list, something is undoubtedly to be said for
that point of view; especially as no steps were taken to replace the
scrapped cruisers. On the other hand, most of the ships removed were
of trivial fighting value; though here again the zeal of the reformer
somewhat overlooked the fact that the police duties rendered by the
small fry had been valuable.
In connection with this policy some of the outlying naval bases were
done away with, and there commenced a “reorganisation” of the Fleet
which has continued intermittently from that day to this! Certain other
considerable changes affecting the _personnel_ will be found dealt with
in a later chapter.
IV.
THE DREADNOUGHT ERA--(WATTS).
A new era in battleship design, not only for the British Navy, but
for the navies of the entire world, was opened with the advent of the
_Dreadnought_. As has been seen, it was in a way led up to by previous
designs, notably the _Lord Nelson_ class. The essential point of
difference, however, lies in the fact that whereas the _Lord Nelson_
carries heavy guns of two calibres, in the _Dreadnought_ the main
armament is confined to one calibre only. The advantages of this on
paper are not particularly great, but for practical purposes, such
as fire control and so forth, the superiority to be obtained by a
uniformity of big gun armament is tremendous.
As the historical portion of this book indicates, the “Dreadnought
idea” has been a fairly regular feature of British Naval Policy, but
in this particular case the inception would seem to have been due to
accident and circumstance rather than to any settled policy.
Immature and abortive attempts to realise something of the “Dreadnought
ideal” had taken place in the past. The earliest ship claimed to
represent the Dreadnought ideal was the U.S. _Roanoake_, built at
the time of the Civil War. This was a high freeboard ship, fitted
with three turrets in the centre line. A few years later something
of the same sort found expression in the four-turreted British
_Royal Sovereign_ and _Prince Albert_, though these were merely coast
defence ships. Still later in the _Tchesma_ class, Russian, and in the
_Brandenburg_ class of the German Navy, six big guns were installed
as the primary armament. Both these two ideas were laughed out of
existence; and it became a settled fashion to carry four big guns, two
forward and two aft.
[Illustration: GENERAL CUNIBERTI.]
Matters were at this stage when the late “Colonel” Cuniberti,
Constructor to the Italian Navy, conceived the idea of a ship carrying
a considerable number of big guns, and embodying in herself the
power of two or three normal battleships. This design was considered
altogether too ambitious for the Italian Navy; but permission was
given him to publish the general idea, subject to official revision.
It first saw the light in “_Fighting Ships_,” in 1903, and is now so
historically interesting that I here reproduce the article in full, the
original being long since out of print:--
“Admiral Sir John Hopkins, late Controller of the British Navy, in his
admirable article, ‘Intermediates for the British Fleet,’ published in
the last edition (1902) of this Annual, asks what results it would be
possible to obtain in the British Navy by extending the ideas of the
two Italian Ministers of Marine, Admiral Morin and Admiral Bettolo,
which were translated into fact in the _Vittorio Emanuele III_ (12,625
tons), so as to arrive at the much greater tonnage of recent British
battleships, in the same manner as the ideas that found concrete form
in the projected vessels of the _Amalfi_ class were amplified and
realised in the Italian battleships alluded to and regarding which,
even now, so many doubts are expressed as to such realisation being
practicable.
“To proceed from 8,000 to 12,000, and from 12,000 to 17,000 tons of
displacement, constitutes not only a problem of naval architecture, but
also involves high considerations of quite another nature, such as the
special functions of the Fleet, so as to harmonise with the political
objects of any given maritime Power, the geographical position of that
Power, the state of its finances, etc., etc. So that not only does the
answer to such a question entail a certain amount of difficulty from
the constructive point of view, but before the answer can be seriously
considered it is absolutely necessary to determine exactly what end
this ideal British battleship is to serve; for it is not to be imagined
that we are going merely to enlarge the _Vittorio Emanuele_ until we
arrive at a displacement equal to that of the _King Edward VII._ For
example, putting an extra 4,000 tons on board will produce a vessel
that will perhaps be a little steadier in heavy weather than the
original ship.
* * * * *
“In Britain are to be found naval experts of the highest possible
order, and they will have their own ideas as to what type of vessels
best fulfil the needs and ideals of the British Fleet, so that it
would almost appear a presumption on my part to offer suggestions for
any Navy other than the Italian. But in deference to the courteous
interrogation of Admiral Hopkins I may be permitted to point out that
from the purely human point of view there are two leading methods by
which one can strike to the ground one’s opponent, either by gradually
developing the attack and disposing of him little by little, or, on
the other hand, killing him at one blow without causing him prolonged
suffering. In like manner there are two distinct modes of sending an
enemy’s ship to the bottom.
“Let us take, for example, a human combat. The first--the most commonly
used, and the most practical in the majority of cases--has as its basis
the progressive dismemberment of the enemy.
“Two mortal foes place themselves on guard at a distance; they begin
with exceptional strokes, with feints, with opportune advances and
retreats, never coming to close quarters for a deadly blow until the
capabilities of the enemy, both offensive and defensive, are well
tested, and until some fortunate stroke, even although not actually
deadly, has considerably weakened the foe, has rendered his defence
less able, and has somewhat demoralised him. Covered with blood,
stunned, mutilated, and hardly capable of remaining on his feet, then
comes the moment when his adversary closes in upon him and delivers
the final and mortal blow. And we may almost imagine we hear the
beaten one, with thick and choking voice, repeat the terrible words of
Francesco Ferruccio at the battle of Gavinana: ‘Maramaldo, thou but
killest a man already dead!’
“Similarly, two opposing ships, with but slight differences in their
powers, will commence their combat at a great distance, utilising their
evolutionary abilities and their speed in prudent manœuvres, seeking
to gain as much advantage as possible from their offensive powers,
and attempting to place every obstacle in the way of the antagonist
utilising powers in either direction. The discharge of projectiles will
commence in earnest, greatly assisted by the rapid loading of which
the guns of medium and small calibre are now capable. What results
can reasonably be expected from the discharge of the smaller guns at
such great distances is hard to say; nor can the slender expectation
of, let us say, chancing to hit the captain of the opposing ship in
the eye with a lucky shot, at all justify such a waste of ammunition.
Gradually nearing one another, the ships manœuvring less freely, hits
will become more dangerous; the boats that were not set adrift before
the action began will be alight and burning fiercely; the cowls of the
wind trunks, the funnels, and the masts will be in fragments.
“The crew, wounded and reduced in numbers, will have lost their calm,
and consequently the firing will have become wilder; finally, one of
the two antagonists will get in a lucky shot that will disable the
other. She will speedily become unmanageable, and her enemy will as
speedily close into within the thousand metres which will permit of a
torpedo being launched with every chance of success, or the battle may
be concluded by a final rush and the point of the ram.
“As the wounded hull sinks slowly beneath the waves, the flag which had
put such heart into the crew, and the sight of which had spurred them
to fight to the last, may well seem as it disappears to repeat to the
enemy these sad words, ‘Thou but slayest one already dead.’
“Four ships in place of two, eight in place of four, will repeat in a
perhaps more complex action the same phases of attack, and the same
foolish waste of ammunition, which in these days causes the greatest
preoccupation of those who, having to design warships, must decide on
the quantity of ammunition and projectiles provided for each different
calibre of the armament.
* * * * *
“There is, however, another method of fighting and sending your enemy
to the bottom; but it is one that is capable of adoption only by a
Navy at the same time most potent and very rich.
“Let us imagine a vessel whose armour is so well distributed and so
impervious as to be able to resist all the attacks of an enemy’s
artillery with the exception of the projectiles of the 12-inch guns.
Such a ship could approach her enemy without firing a shot, without
wasting a single round of ammunition, absolutely regardless of all the
scratchings that her antagonist might inflict on the exterior of her
armour plates.
“And as to-day the belts of fighting ships are generally of such
thickness that, when we leave the results of the proving ground and
come to the conditions of actual combat, we find that it would be more
than difficult to penetrate them with 6-inch guns, we see at once that
it would be useless to equip our contemplated ship with such artillery.
“Further, if this ideal vessel which we have imagined to be so potently
armoured is also very swift, and of a speed greater than that of a
possible antagonist, she could not only prevent this latter from
getting away, but also avail herself of her superiority in this respect
for choosing the most convenient position for striking the belt of the
enemy in the most advantageous manner.
“For this swift vessel a numerous and uniform armament of 8-inch guns,
such as was contemplated for the _Amalfi_ class,[27] would appear to be
sufficient, if we had only to consider the penetration at right angles
of modern belts, especially if capped projectiles are adopted.
“If, however, the hit is an oblique one, and the distance is
considerable, it appears necessary that we should adopt the calibre of
12-inch if we want to be absolutely certain of sinking the adversary,
striking him _only_ on the belt. But the loading of such guns is as yet
very slow, although it has been greatly improved of late. Besides, the
number of hits that one can get in on to the belt itself is small. From
this it appears that in our ideal and intensely powerful ship we must
increase the number of pieces of 12-inch so as to be able to get in at
least one fatal shot on the enemy’s belt at the water-line before she
has a chance of getting a similar fortunate stroke at us from one of
the four large pieces now usually carried as the main armament.
“We thus have outlined for us the main features of our absolutely
supreme vessel--with medium calibres abolished--so effectually
protected as to be able to disregard entirely all the subsidiary
armament of an enemy, and armed only with twelve pieces of 12-inch.
Such a ship could fight in the second method we have delineated,
without throwing away a single shot, without wasting ammunition. Secure
in her exuberant protection with her twelve guns ready, she would
swiftly descend on her adversary and pour in a terrible converging fire
at the belt.
“Having disposed of her first antagonist, she would at once proceed
to attack another, and almost untouched, to despatch yet another, not
throwing away a single round of her ammunition, but utilising all
for sure and deadly shots. A large and abundant supply of 12-inch
projectiles and ammunition can be provided, in addition to the belt and
guns contemplated, out of the 4,500 tons of increase of displacement
that will be disposable in the enlargement of the _Vittorio Emanuele
III_ to become the national British type of vessel in place of the
_King Edward VII_.
“It will be necessary to defend our ‘_Invincible_’ with a thick
complete belt of twelve inches, and a battery also protected with the
12-inch armour (for the redoubt must be thus defended as well as the
water-line, so as to eliminate the perils of the first system of attack
sketched out, of progressive damages being adopted against her); and at
the same time she must be armed with twelve pieces of 12-inch, arranged
as in the _Amalfi_ class or in the _Vittorio Emanuele III_, so as to
be able herself to attack in the second method that has been outlined,
that is to say, the system of the stronger, of the better defended, and
most certainly that of the richer. But when a certain number of such
colossi of 17,000 tons--six, for example--had been constructed, it is
more than probable that the adversary would do his utmost to prevent
their getting near him, and, fearful of the fatal result of so unequal
a combat, would seek to betake himself elsewhere immediately on the
appearance of the famous _Invincible_ division.
“In that case the command of the seas, or a deluded belief that they
have such command, will remain with these _Invincible_ ships, even
although they may be of slow speed; but to stop at this point would
be too little and unworthy of the Navy of the richest and most potent
Power in the world.
“For this squadron or division, however ‘invincible,’ will not be
really and truly _supreme_ if it cannot also catch hold of the enemy’s
tail. The bull in the vast ring of the amphitheatre deludes himself
with the idea that because he is more powerful than the agile toreador
he therefore has absolute command of the scene of the combat; but he
is too slow in following up his adversaries and these almost always
succeed in eluding his terrible horns.
“We must, therefore, come to the conclusion that the type of vessel
will not be absolutely _supreme_ and worthy of such a nation unless
we furnish it with such speed that it can overtake any of the enemy’s
battleships and oblige them to fight. It is, then, possible to give to
a vessel of 17,000 tons displacement--
Protective armour of 12ins.
Twelve guns of 12-inch calibre.
An abundant supply of ammunition, and
A very high speed, superior to that of all and existing battleships
afloat.
“It has been said and written--indeed, repeatedly written--that the
_Vittorio Emanuele III_ was a practical impossibility. But before long
she will be actually in the water, and facts already show how vain were
the suppositions and criticisms of such croakers.[28]
“But it has also been asserted that in the case of this vessel
surpassing the contemplated speed of 21½ knots on trial and attaining
that hoped for of 22 knots, such would only prove that that particular
tonnage of displacement especially lends itself to obtaining a form
of hull with which we can realise a very high speed, and more so than
with larger ships. This, however, is not quite exact. The law which
governs the speed and displacement, other things being equal, is well
known to all naval constructors, who have by heart the rule that
whilst the displacement increases as the cube of the dimensions, the
resistance, on the other hand, at a given speed does not increase in
the same proportion as the displacement. The pith of the kernel lies
in utilising the most opportune dimensions, or, rather, let us say, in
adopting the special form of hull most adapted to those dimensions,
more than in the actual amount of the displacement itself.
“The amount of the displacement, however, is intimately bound up with
the question of the defensive and offensive powers that it is wished to
give to a ship; so that once the particular objectives of the Italian
Navy had been laid down, and thereby the defensive and offensive power
sought for decided on, the question resolved itself into harmonising
them with a form of hull of the greatest possible efficiency, and this
worked out at 12,600 tons. Nor does it appear that the problem could
have been satisfactorily solved with a vessel of less displacement,
as in that case it would have been impossible to realise the required
power, while with a greater displacement the ship would have been
incapable of obtaining the desired speed.
“In the same manner the defensive and offensive power of the projected
ships of the _Amalfi_ class was harmonised with a form of hull of such
high efficiency that it would have been possible to obtain a speed of
23 knots and probably more; but the statement that the problem could
not have been solved with a displacement of much less or much greater
tonnage than that projected, is not to be taken as insisting that the
solution must be interpreted in a too absolute manner, asserting that
the speed of 23 knots could not be efficiently obtained save with a
displacement of from 8,000 to 9,000 tons, for this would be inexact.
“If now the question be put--Is it possible for some naval architect
to design a special form of hull having a displacement of 17,000 tons,
and with which we can realise a very high speed--twenty-four knots, for
example?
“‘Without doubt,’ will answer all practical naval constructors.
“If we go further, and ask--Is it possible for him at the same time to
arm such a vessel with twelve pieces of 12-inch?
“‘Without doubt,’ will answer but a certain number of such experienced
men.
“But if we go still further, and demand, finally--Is it also possible
for him to protect such a ship with 12-inch armour?
“‘Without doubt,’ will answer only one here and there who may have
already made researches in that direction.
“And as the solving of such a problem necessitates many and many a
calculation, and no amount of discussion or argument on the matter
could in any way be conclusive unless based on definite plans and
figures, these lines might well conclude here.
“But, in deference to the courteous inquiry of Admiral Hopkins, this
brief article must not be allowed to close in a manner so indefinite.
“I would, therefore, say frankly at once that the designs for such a
vessel have already been worked out, and that its construction seems
quite feasible and attainable. Following up the progressive scale of
displacement from 8,000 to 12,000 tons, and then on to 17,000 tons,
a new _King Edward VII_ has been designed, 521½ft. (159 metres) in
length, with a beam of eighty-two feet (twenty-five metres), and mean
draught of 27ft. (8.5 metres); with the water-line protected with
12-inch plates, and the battery similarly armoured; having two turrets
at the ends, each armed with a pair of 12-inch guns, and two central
side turrets high up (similar to the two with 8-inch guns in the
_Vittorio Emanuele III_), also each armed with two pieces of 12-inch,
and four turrets at the four angles of the upper part of the battery,
having each one 12-inch gun.
“This vessel has no ports whatever in her armour; she carries no
secondary armament at all, but only the usual pieces of small calibre
for defence against torpedo attack.
“The speed to be realised, as proved by the tank trials, is twenty-four
knots.”
The idea was at first received with derision and scepticism, which
lasted until, in the Russian-Japanese War, it was announced that the
Japanese had laid down two battleships, the _Aki_ and _Satsuma_, which
“were to be more or less on the lines of the ship projected by Colonel
Cuniberti.” Contemporaneous with this the United States authorised the
building of the _South Carolina_ and _Michigan_, which carry eight
12-inch guns, so disposed as to be available on either broadside.
Both these ideas were public property before the British _Dreadnought_
was laid down. She was, however, built with such rapidity that she was
completed long before any other vessel of the type.
[Illustration: THE “DREADNOUGHT”--1906.]
In the design for a new type of British capital ship, a great many
ideas were considered and rejected. Eventually, however, it was decided
to equip the _Dreadnought_ with five turrets so disposed that eight
guns were available on either broadside and six guns available ahead
or astern. The designed speed of the ship was twenty-one knots.
Together with this type of ship, another type, somewhat more resembling
the Cuniberti ideal, was laid down. Three ships of this class, the
_Invincible_ class, were designed for a speed of twenty-five knots, and
given big guns so disposed that eight guns were available on either
broadside and six big guns ahead or astern.
The _Dreadnought_ was officially laid down in December, 1905, and
completed ten months later. Actually, however, materials for her were
collected months beforehand, and the rate at which she was built,[29]
like the secrecy with which her building was surrounded, consisted in
great measure of a theatrical display, very impressive to the general
public at the time, but to-day generally regarded as “unfortunate”
on account of the foreign attention thus attracted. But, while the
previous chapter is clear proof of the futility of any real secrecy
about the “Dreadnought idea,” so far as the British Navy was concerned,
it likewise serves to refute a charge which has been made to the effect
that the “secrecy policy” induced foreign nations to build Dreadnoughts
also. The most that can be said is that had the _Dreadnought_ been
built without so much attention being attracted to her, foreign nations
might have been less in a hurry to copy her. But it is absolutely clear
that the all-big-gun ship era had arrived, just as in the past the
ironclad era came, or, in earlier days still, the gun and steam eras
did. The actual place of the _Dreadnought_ in history is that she marks
a wise and rapid recognition of new conditions.
Details of the _Dreadnought_ are as follows:--
Displacement--17,900 tons.
Length--526ft. (over all).
Beam--82ft.
Draught--Maximum, 29ft. (normal).
Armament--Ten 12-inch, 45 cal.; twenty-seven 12 pounders; five
submerged tubes (18 inch).
Armour Belt--11-in. to 6-in. forward; and 4-in. aft. On turrets
11-inch (K.C.)
Machinery--Parsons Turbine; four screws.
Horse-power--23,000 = 21 knots.
Boilers--Babcock.
Coal--(normal) 900 tons; (maximum) 2,000 tons; oil fuel also.
Built at Portsmouth; Engined by Vickers.
The _Dreadnought_ was unique in every particular. The exact disposition
of her big gun armament was only arrived at after a long and careful
consultation, and the consideration of a number of alternatives. It
admits of eight big guns bearing in nearly every position, and allows
a minimum fire of six in any case. It is understood that, in addition
to the plan actually adopted, in the earliest plan of all (which was
merely an adaption of the _Lord Nelson_ class), consideration was
given to a scheme of five turrets, all in the centre line, and also to
an arrangement whereby the two amidship turrets would be placed _en
échelon_.
One of the particular arguments in favour of the plan ultimately
adopted was that next to four, eight big guns form the best workable
unit for fire control purposes. It was also considered that eight guns
would probably be the maximum that could safely be fired together
continuously, with full charges in battle conditions.
[Illustration: ALTERNATIVE DESIGNS FOR THE DREADNOUGHT.]
In these days when all big gun armaments are the rule, there is a
tendency to overlook the fact that the _Dreadnought’s_ main armament
was double that of previous ships, with only a comparatively small
increase of displacement, and that no intermediate experience existed
as to what might be expected.
With a view to standing the shock of discharge, the _Dreadnought_ was
built with very heavy scantlings and generally given an immensely
strong hull. The armouring followed orthodox lines, except that a
certain amount was applied internally under-water as a protection
against torpedoes. In addition she was given solid bulkheads,[30]
though this was no novelty except with the British Navy, as they had
been introduced some years before in the battleship _Tsarevitch_ and
the armoured cruiser _Bayan_, built for the Russians at La Seyne.
Another novelty in the _Dreadnought_ was the adoption of a high
forecastle, she being the first British battleship in which this
appears. Another innovation was the placing of the officers’ quarters
forward and putting the men aft, a system which, however, has since
been abandoned in the most recent vessels.
The greatest novelty of the _Dreadnought_, however, was the adoption of
turbine machinery, and the form of her hull, with a 30ft. overhang aft,
in order to adapt the ship to the new means of propulsion. The fitting
of turbines to the new _Dreadnought_ was perhaps an even greater
novelty than her armament, she being the first warship, other than
small cruisers, to be so equipped.
The introduction of turbines was regarded with a good deal of
apprehension in certain quarters, especially when it became known that
the three other big ships belonging to the same programme were also to
be turbine propelled. The type selected for all was the Parsons with
four shafts. The wing shafts of the _Dreadnought_ have each one high
pressure ahead and one high pressure astern turbine. The amidship ones
are fitted with three turbines each--one low pressure one ahead, and
one low pressure astern, and one turbine for going astern. Each turbine
has 39,600 blades.
On her first trials the _Dreadnought_ exceeded her designed speed for
short spurts by three-quarters of a knot, but on the eight hours’
run barely succeeded in making a mean of twenty-one knots. Shortly
afterwards she fell a little below this, but at a later date picked
up again, and on more than one occasion since she has easily made
twenty-two knots or over. Such early difficulties as occurred were due
to the fact that her engine-room complement were at first necessarily
unfamiliar with working so large an installation. The total cost of the
_Dreadnought_, which belongs to the 1905–06 programme, was £1,797,497,
and save that her draught somewhat exceeded anticipations, the ship was
a success in every way, proving a remarkably steady gun-platform.
The Committee which sat on the _Dreadnought_ design was by no means
entirely unanimous as to what sacrifice should be made for speed.
The _Dreadnought_ herself, despite a considerable increase of speed
as compared with the battleships that preceded her, did not obtain
that speed by the sacrifice of any battleship qualities, but almost
entirely on account of the substitution of turbines for reciprocating
engines. To that extent, therefore, though nearly as fast as the
armoured cruisers of a few years before, she may be said to have
developed entirely along normal lines, rather than on those laid down
by Cuniberti.
The table on the next page and diagrams indicate how the original
Cuniberti idea compares with the first results obtained. It will be
noticed that, except in the case of the _Invincible_ type, and there
only at a sacrifice of armour and armament, was, however, anything
like the Cuniberti speed attempted. It should be stated that in the
Cuniberti ship the peculiar “girder construction” of his _Vittorio
Emanuele_ was obviously contemplated. This construction, which admits
of far lighter scantlings than usually employed, has not been attempted
in any other Navies, and a corresponding extra dead-weight results.
Coming to details, there is uncertainty as to the exact original design
of the _Satsuma_; but a uniform armament of big guns was certainly the
first to be projected. It is not clear whether it was abandoned from a
preference for a numerically larger but mixed battery; or with a view
to utilising such guns as were most likely to be available for early
delivery. Japan was then at war, and there was the natural anticipation
that the ships might be wanted before the war was over. It should, on
the other hand, be borne in mind that the _Kashima_ and _Katori_, of
16,400 tons, carrying four 12-inch, four 10-inch, twelve 6-inch, and
twelve 14-pounders, with 9-inch belts and 18.5 knot speeds were at that
time held up in England on account of the war. Hence it has with some
considerable show of reason been argued that the _Satsuma_ and _Aki_
are nothing but normal developments of the _Kashima_ design, bearing
just the same relation to it as the British _Lord Nelsons_ bear to the
_King Edwards_. It was also practically admitted by the Japanese at a
later date that for diplomatic reasons, in accounts of the contemporary
armoured cruisers of the _Tsukuba_ class, the armaments[31] were
exaggerated.
ORIGINAL DREADNOUGHT DESIGNS.
============================+===============+==================================+=======+========+============
| Normal | | | Des’d. |
| Displacement. | Armament. | Belt. | Speed. | Laid
| Tons. | | in. | Knots. | Down.
----------------------------+---------------+----------------------------------+-------+--------+------------
_Cuniberti_ (as built) | 17,000 | 12--12in., 18--12 pdr. | 12 | 24 | _pro._ 1903
_Satsuma_ Design | 19,250 | 12 _or_ 10--12in., 12--4.7 | 9 | 20 | ----
----------------------------+---------------+----------------------------------+-------+--------+------------
_Satsuma_ | 19,250 | 4--12in., 12--10in., 12--6 | 9 | 20 | 1905
_S. Carolina, pro._ | 16–17,000 | 8--12in., (_or_ 4--12in., | 10 | 18–20 | ----
| | 8--10in.), 30--14 pdr. | | |
_S. Carolina_ | 16,000 | 8--12in., 22--14 pdr. | 12 | 18½ | 1906
_Dreadnought_, 1st Design | ? | 10--12in. | .. | .. | ----
_Dreadnought_ (as built) | 17,900 | 10--12in., 27--12 pdr. | 11 | 21 | 1905
_Invincible_ | 17,250 | 8--12in., 16--4in. | 7 | 25 | 1906
_Nassau_ (as “S”) | ? | 8--11in., 12--6in., 10--24 pdr. | ? | 19½ | 1906
_Nassau_ | 18,500 | 12--11in., 12--6in., 10--24 pdr. | 9¾ | 19½ | 1907
============================+===============+==================================+=======+========+============
_Note._--The _Nassau_ was delayed a year owing to alterations in design.
Be all these things as they may, however, Japan is obviously entitled
to some considerable share in originating the “Dreadnought movement.”
The claims of the United States Navy rest on a stronger basis. The
_South Carolina_ type, all big guns in the centre line, all bearing
on either broadside, was a distinct advance and novelty. The actual
chronological date of laying down goes for nothing; the ships were
designed and authorised long before they were commenced. No secrecy
whatever was observed about them, and a strong body of opinion will
always credit the United States with being the first Navy that
definitely adopted the “all-big-gun idea.” It is interesting to note
(see table) that at one stage a mixed 12-inch and 10-inch armament was
regarded as a possible alternative.
[Illustration:
CUIBERI.
SATSUMA.
S CAROLINA. FIRST DESIGN
S CAROLINA.
FIRST BRITISH DREADNOUGHT DESIGN
DREADNOUGHT.
INVINCIBLE.
NASSAU FIRST DESIGN
NASSAU AS BUILT
ORIGINAL DREADNOUGHT DESIGNS.]
It has been claimed, either by those responsible for the _Dreadnought_
herself, or by others professing to speak for them, that the
_Dreadnought_ was evolved entirely independently of Cuniberti’s ideal.
It is practically impossible to say definitely how far there can be any
truth in this. In all Admiralties, ships are, as a rule, designed as
“projects” long before they see the light (some never see it at all,
as witness the sea-going masted turret-ship of his design referred to
by Sir Edward Reed in some remarks quoted on an earlier page!). The
first British all-big-gun ship design (see diagram) is a lineal enough
descendant of the _King Edward_ and _Lord Nelson_, just as Cuniberti’s
is a descendant of the _Vittorio Emanuele_.
The Cuniberti design appears, however, to have been submitted as early
as 1901. In any case, to Cuniberti belongs the first clear exposition
of the idea, while the ridicule with which it was at first received
indicates the general novelty.
Germany is also a claimant to having evolved Dreadnoughts with the
“_S_” type, intended to have been laid down in 1906, to follow the
_Deutschlands_. These ships can hardly have been designed much later
than 1904. When first heard of they were reported to carry four big gun
turrets, of which two were placed on either side amidships. Six big
guns was the first reputed armament, later each turret was to carry two
guns.
The absurd secrecy with which subsequent German designs have been
shrouded was not then in evidence; and all the indications are that the
_Nassau_, as originally contemplated, was to have been a four-turret
ship--the two extra 11-inch being Germany’s equivalent for the four
12-inch, four 9.2, of our _King Edwards_. This would perhaps accord
Germany a priority in actually adopting the principle of an increased
number of heavy guns.
All of which suffices to indicate that the adoption of more than four
big guns had little or nothing to do with the somewhat theatrical
building of the original _Dreadnought_.
On the other hand (with the possible and doubtful exception of the
_South Carolinas_[32]) it appears clear that the _Dreadnought_ was
the first ship in which the all-big-gun principle was adopted as a
technical asset in gun-laying over and above guns _qua_ guns. After
four, eight was the “tactical unit” of guns, promising results
altogether out of proportion to anything that six, or for that matter,
ten (in proportion) could achieve.
[Illustration:
1879. French AMIRAL DUPERRÉ.
1886. French HOCHE.
1886. Austria K.E.RUDOLPH.
1886. Russian TCHESMA.
1889. German SIEGFRIED.
EARLY EXAMPLES OF WING TURRETS.]
It may not be too much to say that what Cuniberti “saw as through a
glass darkly,” the _Dreadnought_ translated into fact, and that she was
the first battleship avowedly so designed.
“Fire control” was a new thing in 1905. No navy, save the British,
had considered it to any appreciable degree. The _King Edwards_ had
taught that control of two calibres from one position was a practical
impossibility. Mixed calibres were damned accordingly, and there was no
outlet but the _Dreadnought_.
But for Cuniberti she might, and possibly would, have remained a
theoretical desirability for several more years. The measure of his
genius may be the demonstration that such an ideal ship could be built.
It is to be argued that he did nothing more than put into practicable
shape what already existed as a hypothesis. Even so, however, to him
belongs the honour of indicating that the step from theory to practice
was possible; and on that account alone he deserves to go down to
posterity as the actual creator of Dreadnoughts.
In the other three ships of the 1905–06 programme, however, a high
speed was accepted as the governing factor. The ships as built were
designated “armoured cruisers,” and in so far as the Japanese were
known to be building armoured cruisers carrying battleship guns,
that designation was legitimate. For that matter, there also existed
a paper by Professor Hovgaard, of the Massachusetts School of Naval
Architecture, in which it was tentatively laid down that the ideal
armoured cruiser of the future would be a battleship in armament and
armour, increased in size, to obtain greater speed.
The three companion ships to the _Dreadnought_--the _Invincible_,
_Inflexible_, and _Indomitable_--adhered no more closely to the
Hovgaard ideal than to the Cuniberti one. In principle they varied from
the _Dreadnought_ design only in that they sacrificed a certain amount
of armour in order to obtain a greater speed. By the adoption of the
échelon system, the same broadside-fire was secured for them (on paper,
at any rate) as for the _Dreadnought_, though with a turret less.
In practice it has been found that there are very few positions in
which they can bring more than six big guns to bear, but this must be
considered as an error of construction rather than of principle. They
have turned out to be wonderful steamers, but considerably inferior
sea-boats to the _Dreadnought_, and in the British Navy are generally
likely in the future to become regarded as obsolete long before the
former. For all that, they probably approximate more nearly to the
warship of the future than the _Dreadnought_.
Admiral Bacon, in his views as to the warship of the future, generally
inclined to the idea of very large and very swift ships, relying on
armament, speed, and super-scientific internal sub-division rather than
on armour protection. These ships would act more or less independently,
each, as it were, representing a divided squadron group of to-day.
It is interesting to note that Italy, which in the seventies evolved in
the _Duilio_ and _Dandolo_ the “Dreadnought” of that period, eventually
developed a very similar idea in the _Italia_ and _Lepanto_, which had
no side armour whatever. In later designs a thin belt was reverted to,
and finally the old cycle was resumed.
This result was brought about by the quickfirer, which appeared as a
rival to the hitherto predominant monster gun. To-day the torpedo is
becoming paramount and a danger to a fleet in close order at almost any
range--hence the Bacon ideal. It remains to be seen whether the future
will produce any analogy to the cycle of the quickfirer of the eighties.
Details of the _Invincible_ type are:--
Displacement--17,250 tons.
Length (over all)--562ft. (_p.p._, 530ft.).
Beam--78½ft.
Draught--29ft.
Armament--Eight 12-inch, XI, 45 calibre, sixteen 4-inch (model
1907); three submerged tubes.
Armour Belt--7-inch, reduced to 4-inch at the ends.
Machinery--Parsons Turbine.
Horse-power--41,000 = 25 knots.
Boilers--(_Invincible_ and _Inflexible_) Yarrow, (_Indomitable_)
Babcock.
Coal--(normal) 1,000 tons; (maximum) 3,000 tons; oil fuel also.
Builders--(_Invincible_) Elswick, (_Inflexible_) Clydebank,
(_Indomitable_) Fairfield.
Engined--(_Invincible_) Humphrys, (_Inflexible_) Clydebank,
(_Indomitable_) Fairfield.
As originally designed, the anti-torpedo guns of these ships would
have been the same as the _Dreadnought’s_, but, having been completed
nearly two years later and a new pattern 4-inch quickfirer having been
invented in the interim, they were fitted with these guns. The trial
results were as follows:--_Invincible_, 26.6 knots; _Inflexible_, 26.5
knots; and _Indomitable_, 26.1 knots; the designed horse power being
considerably exceeded in every case. After they were commissioned and
had shaken down, these trial speeds were considerably exceeded, and at
one time and another they all did well over 28 knots; the _Indomitable_
having made a record of 28.7.
The fuel consumption of these ships is naturally enormous. The
_Indomitable_, in crossing the Atlantic at full speed, burned about
500 tons of coal a day, as well as about 120 tons of oil. As steamers
they are to be considered remarkably successful. The average cost of
construction was about £1,752,000, which works out at a little under
£102 per ton.
Towards the close of the year 1911 the official designation of
“armoured cruiser” for them and similar ships was abandoned, and the
term “battle cruiser” substituted. No further secret was made of the
fairly obvious fact that they were designed as “fast battleships,”
intended to engage and hold a retreating enemy till such time as the
main squadron could come up.
Curiously enough, for some while, though every nation started building
_Dreadnoughts_, Germany alone proceeded to build _Invincibles_ also.
In 1911 Japan ordered a ship of fast battleship type; but, generally
speaking, foreign nations have abstained from embodying this portion of
the Cuniberti ideal in their designs.
[Illustration:
DREADNOUGHT.
INDOMITABLE.
NEPTUNE.
INDEFATIGABLE.
DREADNOUGHTS.]
The programme for the years 1906–07 had been originally intended
to include the building of four armoured ships, presumably one
_Dreadnought_ and three _Invincibles_; but the Liberal party, which
had just come into power, modified this to three battleships of an
improved _Dreadnought_ type. This action led to a popular agitation
which ultimately eventuated in the provision of no less than eight
armoured ships in the estimates of three years later.
The three ships which followed, the _Dreadnought_, the _Bellerophon_,
_Téméraire_, and _Superb_, are some seven hundred tons heavier, but
otherwise differ only in minor details. For the one heavy tripod of
the _Dreadnought_, two were substituted, and the 4-inch anti-torpedo
gun was also mounted. In the next year the _St. Vincent_ class, a
group of similar type, but increased by 650 tons, were provided. The
anti-torpedo armament is carried to 20 guns in the _St. Vincent_ class,
which are 10ft. longer than their predecessors, and carry fifty-calibre
big guns in place of the forty-five calibre pieces of the earlier
ships. The constructive particulars of these ships are as follows:--
==============+============+====================+===========+===========+========
Name. | Built at. | Machinery by. | Laid down.| Completed.| Trials.
--------------+------------+--------------------+-----------+-----------+--------
_Bellerophon_ | Portsmouth | Fairfield | Dec., ’06 | Feb., ’07 | 21.9
_Téméraire_ | Devonport | Hawthorn, Leslie | Jan., ’07 | May, ’09 |
_Superb_ | Elswick | Wallsend Co. | Feb., ’07 | June, ’09 |
--------------+------------+--------------------+-----------+-----------+--------
_St. Vincent_ | Portsmouth | Scott Eng. & S. Co.| Dec., ’07 | Jan., ’10 | 21.9
_Collingwood_ | Devonport | Hawthorn, L. | Feb., ’08 | Jan., ’10 | 22
_Vanguard_ | Vickers | Vickers | April, ’08| Feb., ’10 | 22.1
==============+============+====================+===========+===========+========
In the Estimates for 1908–09, the armoured ships provided were reduced
to two, the _Neptune_ and the _Indefatigable_. Provision in the United
States, Argentine, and Brazilian Navies for ships bearing ten big guns
on the broadside and the prospect of ships with equal broadsides being
constructed elsewhere is presumably the reason why in the _Neptune_
the original _Dreadnought_ design was varied, and a new arrangement
of turrets introduced. The _Neptune_, which is of 20,200 tons, is
a species of compromise between the _Dreadnought_ and _Invincible_
designs, the amidship guns being _en échelon_, and so mounted that
they give a very full arc of fire on either broadside. The increased
space occupied by this arrangement necessitated a certain cramping aft,
for which reason the forward of the two after turrets was superposed to
train over the aftermost, American fashion.
Particulars of the _Neptune_ are as follows:--
Displacement--20,200 tons.
Length (over all)--546ft.
Beam--85ft.
Draught--29ft.
Guns--Ten 12-inch, fifty calibre, twenty 4-inch.
Armour--Belt 12-in. amidships, 6-in. forward, 4-in. aft. Lower
deckside, 9¾-in. Turrets, 12--8-in.
Machinery--Parsons Turbine.
Horse-power--25,000 = 21 knots.
Boilers--Yarrow.
Coal--(normal) 900 tons; (maximum) 2,700 tons; oil fuel also.
Built at Portsmouth Dockyard.
Engined by Harland and Wolff.
On trial she developed at three-quarter power I.H.P. 18,575, with a
speed of nineteen knots, and at full power 27,721, with 21.78 knots.
Her best maximum spurt speed was 22.7--that is to say, about one and
three-quarter knots over contract.
In the _Neptune_ the original _Dreadnought_ practice of mounting the
anti-torpedo armament on top of the turrets was entirely abandoned, and
these guns were placed inside or on top of the superstructure in three
main groups.
The number of torpedo tubes was reduced to three, the reason for this
being partly to save space and also to take advantage of improved
methods for securing rapidity of fire. In the _Neptune_ the possibility
of aero craft first received consideration, the upper deck being built
sufficiently thick to be proof against bombs dropped from aloft.
[Illustration: “INDEFATIGABLE” AND “INVINCIBLE” 1911.]
The _Neptune_ was one of the cheapest ships ever built for the British
Navy, her cost working out at a little under £87 per ton.
The other ship of the same programme was the _Indefatigable_, an
improved _Invincible_. She represents an increase of nearly 2,000 tons
over the type ship, with an increase in length of 18ft. and a foot more
beam. Save for the addition of four more anti-torpedo guns the armament
remains the same, but an extra inch is added to the belt. The principal
improvement achieved in her is that the two amidship turrets are much
less crowded up than in the type ship, thus securing a considerably
better range of fire.
Although the horse power is proportionately less than that of the
_Invincibles_, the better lines of the ship have made her even more
speedy. She easily exceeded her designed speed on trial, and has
reached as high as 29.13 knots.
The cost of construction was £1,547,426, which works out at about
£82 10s. per ton, as against the average £120 per ton that the
_Invincibles_ cost to build. She was the cheapest ship ever built for
the British Navy,[33] to her date.
Details of the _Indefatigable_ are:--
Displacement--19,200 tons.
Length--578ft.
Beam--79½ft.
Draught--27¾ft.
Guns--Eight 12-inch, fifty calibre, twenty 4-inch.
Armour Belt--8-in. amidships, diminished to 4-in. at the ends.
Machinery--Parsons Turbine.
Horse-power--43,000 = 25 knots.
Boilers--Babcock.
Coal--(normal) 1,000 tons; (maximum) 2,500 tons; oil fuel also.
Built at Devonport Dockyard.
Engined by J. Brown & Co., of Clydebank.
Two other battle-cruisers almost identical to the _Indefatigable_,
the _Australia_ at Clydebank, for the Australian Navy, and the _New
Zealand_ at Fairfield, a gift from New Zealand to the British Navy,
were launched in 1911.
The programme for 1908–09, consisting as it did of only two armoured
ships, and the fact that the corresponding German programme was
increased by one capital ship, bringing the total to four, brought the
naval agitation to a head. Meetings demanding eight “Dreadnoughts” were
held all over the country, with the result that the British programme
for 1909–10 rose to four armoured ships with four other “conditional”
ships. The ships of the former programme were the _Colossus_,
_Hercules_, _Orion_, and _Lion_, and the first two of these were laid
down some months before the usual date, the _Colossus_ being commenced
in July instead of at the end of the year.
The “conditional” ships were all eventually laid down in April of the
following year. They were the _Monarch_, _Conqueror_, _Thunderer_, and
_Princess Royal_.
Under this programme there were no less than three distinct types of
ships. The first two, the _Colossus_ and _Hercules_, are practically
sisters of the _Neptune_, but of 400 tons greater displacement. They
differ in appearance in having but one tripod mast instead of two.
This, like the _Dreadnought’s_, is placed abaft the foremost funnel.
The _Colossus_ was built and engined by the Scott Shipbuilding and
Engineering Co., commenced in July, 1909, and completed two years
later. The _Hercules_, built by Palmer’s, followed a month later in
both cases. The first is fitted with Babcock, and the second with
Yarrow boilers. A point of minor interest about these two ships is that
whereas the anti-torpedo armament of the _Neptune_ is in three groups,
that of the _Colossus_ and _Hercules_ is in two groups only, the
mounting of small guns between the échelon turrets being done away with.
The other two types of the 1909–10 Estimates are the ships generally
known as “super-Dreadnoughts.”
_SUPER-DREADNOUGHTS._
The most obvious feature of the so-called “super-Dreadnoughts” is
the introduction of the 13.5-inch gun, particulars of which will be
found at the end of this chapter. This gun was experimented with
with a certain amount of secrecy, and was for a long time officially
designated as the 12-inch “A,” although practically everybody knew
that it was really a 13.5. It was only rendered possible by recent
improvements in gun-mountings and gun-construction. It is not very
appreciably heavier than the latest type of 12-inch, as mounted in the
_Colossus_, and its adoption was not so much a matter of obtaining
an increased range and penetration, as of securing the tremendously
increased smashing power of the heavier projectile.
Somewhat less obvious to the general public, but really of a great deal
more far-reaching importance, is the “Americanising” of British naval
design exhibited in all the “super-Dreadnoughts.” Though differing in
detail, the arrangement of the armament in all the “super-Dreadnoughts”
followed the American centre-line system, an interesting indication
of the progress of the United States Navy from the days, not so very
long ago, when American warship design was more or less a _pour faire
rire_! It is none the less interesting from the fact that in the
earliest designs, in all ships carrying more than two turrets, the
centre line was the only arrangement ever built or even considered.
Yet when an increased number of turrets came into being, the American
Navy was the only one which followed the original practice. In all
other Navies ideas of the period 1870–1880, when strong end-on fire was
considered an all-important essential, influenced design. America alone
appreciated the prophecy long ago made by Admiral Colomb to the effect
that whatever else might temporarily obtain, broadside to broadside
would always be reverted to for battle, on the grounds that thus, and
thus only, could the maximum number of guns be utilised.
It is proper here to remark that though the Americans adopted the
centre line from the outset for practical reasons, this disposition
became more or less a necessity when 13.5’s came in, owing to the
infinitely greater strain on the structure. This has been occasionally
used as an argument against American influence having made itself felt,
but the balance of evidence shows that even had the 13.5-inch not
appeared, the centre line system would have figured in the Navy. The
original centre-line idea disappeared because the échelon system looked
so superior. The échelon system of the 1875–85 era, however, died
out in its turn on account of certain practical disadvantages. It was
resurrected when these had been forgotten in the lapse of years; but
the disadvantages entailed in firing across a deck soon made themselves
felt again once the system was reverted to.
[Illustration:
U.S. ROANOKE.
British. ROYAL SOVEREIGN.
Russian. ADMIRAL LAZAREFF.
French. AMIRAL BAUDIN.
German. BRANDENBURG.
U.S. S. CAROLINA.
CENTRE-LINE SHIPS OF VARIOUS DATES.]
One of the earliest advocates, if not the first of modern advocates, of
the centre-line in England was Admiral Hopkins. Discussing the original
Cuniberti ideal, Admiral Hopkins pointed out that although for an
absolute right-ahead or astern fire wing-turrets gave an advantage, a
very slight yaw entirely altered the proportion, and that circumstance
in which the enemy was dead right-ahead necessitating such a yaw were
likely to occur very rarely indeed in war. He leaned, therefore, to the
opinion that a fewer number of guns all in the centre line would be
equally as efficacious, practically, as a larger number disposed partly
in wing turrets.
The échelon system, of course, renders practically no assistance
here, the arc of the guns firing across the deck being necessarily
restricted, even with the best échelon arrangement. While, therefore,
the échelon system is good for absolute end-on, or for more or less
absolute broadside firing, any intermediate and more probable position
renders it less efficient than a centre-line arrangement.
Another defect of the échelon system is that with it, except exactly
end-on, one side of the ship is necessarily more efficient than the
other, and that this is reversed according to whether the enemy is
ahead or astern, twenty-five per cent. of the big-gun armament being
affected thereby in a four turreted ship.
Though attention never seems to have been drawn to the matter, it is
a fact worthy of some attention that the _Von der Tann_, which is to
be regarded as Germany’s “answer” to the _Invincibles_, has (like all
German[34] ships on the same system) her échelonned turrets exactly in
reverse order to British ones. All British ships have the port turret
foremost; all German ones the starboard. The net result of this is that
(as the diagram indicates) there are two worst and two best positions
for either design. An _Invincible_ getting and keeping a _Von der
Tann_ upon her starboard bow or port quarter would have a twenty-five
per cent. superiority over her, while, supposing the German type to
maintain a position on her starboard quarter or port bow she would be
to the same extent over-matched, and to a certain extent “in chancery.”
With the centre line system, the imposition of fighting one side
rather than the other is not imposed, and overhauling or being
overhauled causes no disadvantage. Nothing is lost, save in the almost
hypothetical case of two ships engaging exactly end-on--a condition
which in no case would endure for more than a very short space of time,
to say nothing of the fact that practically all gunnery errors being
of “elevation” and not of “direction,” a ship adopting the end-on
position offers the equivalent of a vertical target of some 60ft. to
70ft. instead of the equivalent of 30ft. or so that she would present
broadside on.
The centre-line system may, therefore, be expected to endure against
all other dispositions pending the appearance of some fresh
condition of affairs which would cause the old end-on idea to be
reverted to.[35]
[Illustration: DIAGRAM TO ILLUSTRATE WEAK POINT OF THE ÉCHELON SYSTEM.]
The _Orion_ was the only one of her class which belonged to the
normal Estimates, 1909–10, the other three--_Conqueror_, _Thunderer_,
_Monarch_--being “contingent ships.” Details of the class are as
follows:--
Displacement--23,500 tons.
Length--(between perpendiculars) 554½ft; (over all) 584ft.
Beam--88½ft.
Draught--(mean) 27¾ft.
Armament--Ten 13.5-inch, forty-five calibre; sixteen 4-inch; three
21-inch torpedo tubes.
Armour Belt--12--4-inch. Turrets, 12-inch.
Machinery--Parsons turbine.
Horse-power--27,000 = 21 knots.
Boilers--Babcock.
Coal--(nominal) 900 tons; (maximum) 2,700 tons; oil, 1,000 tons.
============+=============+=============
Name. | Built at. | Engines by.
------------+-------------+-------------
_Orion_ | Portsmouth | Wallsend Co.
_Conqueror_ | Beardmore | Beardmore
_Thunderer_ | Thames I.W. | Thames I.W.
_Monarch_ | Elswick | Hawthorn
============+=============+=============
The _Orion_ was laid down in November, 1909, the others in April, 1910.
The _Orion_ was the first of these ships to be commissioned, and her
gunnery trials were watched with great interest. Few details of them
transpired, save that part of the secondary battery was injured by
blast. After commissioning, the _Orion_ was sent for a voyage across
the Bay of Biscay, and attracted much attention by rolling very
heavily, this being attributed to the fact that her bilge keels were
not large enough--not to any general structural defect.
An interesting feature of the _Orion_ type is that in it provision
first appears for the protection of boats in action.
Belonging to the same programme (1909–10), the first belonging to the
normal Estimates and the second to the “contingent,” are the battle
cruisers _Lion_ and _Princess Royal_. A great deal of secrecy was
observed about these ships, but their main details are approximately as
follows:--
Displacement--25,000 tons. Full load, 26,350 tons.
Length--(water-line), 675ft.; (over all) 690ft.
Beam--86½ft.
Draught--(maximum) 30ft.
Armament--Eight 13.5 inch 45 calibre, twenty 4-inch, three 21-inch
torpedo tubes.
Armour--Belt, 9--4-inch.
Machinery--Parsons Turbine.
Horse-power--(as designed) = 28 knots.
Boilers--Yarrow.
Coal--(normal) 1,000 tons; (maximum) 3,500 tons; oil also.
_Lion_--Built at Devonport; engined by Vickers.
_Princess Royal_--Built at Vickers; engined by Vickers.
The _Lion_ was laid down in November, 1909, and launched in the
following year. The _Princess Royal_ was laid down in April, 1910, and
launched a year later. Both were arranged to be completed during 1912.
The _Lion_ was somewhat delayed owing to slight repairs being required
to her turbines. In addition, the authorities very wisely did not
“hurry” her--hurrying ships to fit an exact official date having done
more mischief than anything else in the past.
The _Lion_ did her trials early in 1912, and reached a maximum of
31.7 knots by patent log, with a mean of 29 knots at full power and
24.5 or so at three-quarter power. For her trials the _Lion_ burned
coal only, and this at the seemingly enormous rate of 950 tons a day,
which worked out at approximately about a ton and a quarter per mile.
This consumption, heavy though it seems, really pans out at about the
usual “ton a mile,” as the ship developed horse-power far in excess
of the contract. At the same time it necessarily draws attention to
the enormous increase in coal stores required for supplying modern
warships. It is unfortunately by no means clear that the question of
the very great increase in coal required for modern warships has been
thoroughly realised by the authorities. The amount provided may be said
to be what ships needed in the pre-Dreadnought era. It is now an open
secret that at the time of the “war scare” with Germany in 1911, the
British Home Fleet was unable to proceed to sea owing to a shortage
of coal supply, many ships being a thousand tons short and no proper
arrangements for rapid remedy existing. This state of affairs, at
one time alleged to be merely a newspaper _canard_, is not likely to
occur again; but it is an indication of how difficult it is adequately
to realise the problem of coal supply to ships of ever-increasing
horse-power.
During the _Lion’s_ trials it was found that the heat from the fore
funnel was so great that the fire-control station (then carried on
a tripod mast placed immediately over the forward funnel) was so
intense as to render that position practically impossible. On the
navigating bridge also, instruments were badly affected by the heat.
The ship was consequently further delayed in order to effect essential
modifications. These included the abolition of the tripod mast,
shifting the fore funnel back a long way, and enormously increasing the
height of all funnels.
The principal item of the Estimates of 1910–11 was five armoured ships.
Of these, four, the _King George V_ class, are slightly improved
replicas of the _Orion_, while the remaining vessel, the _Queen Mary_,
is a battle-cruiser of the _Lion_ type.
Ships of the _George V_ class are as follows:--
================+===============+==============
Name. | Built at. | Machinery by.
----------------+---------------+--------------
_King George V_ | Portsmouth Y. | Hawthorn
_Centurion_ | Devonport Y. | Hawthorn
_Ajax Scotts_ | Scotts | Scotts
_Audacious_ | Cammell-Laird | Cammell-Laird
================+===============+==============
The over-all length is increased to 596ft., and the horse-power to
31,000. All were laid down during 1911, with a view to launching during
1912 and completion in 1913. The displacement of these ships is 23,000
tons odd.
The _Queen Mary_, laid down at Palmers’ early in 1911, and engined by
Clydebank, is virtually a sister to the _Lion_, differing from her
merely in a slight variation of the lines, and some increase in length.
Save for these items, and a small difference in the arrangement of the
anti-torpedo armament, the ship belongs to the same class and type.
The 1911–12 Estimates provided for five further large armoured ships,
which represent an increase in dimensions over their predecessors. Of
these the first four are battleships varying from their predecessors
in the inevitable increase in size to allow of somewhat superior
protection and an improved secondary battery--twelve 6-inch being
substituted for the sixteen 4-inch of the _King George_ class.
The selection of the 6-inch gun as the anti-torpedo craft weapon was
due partly to the way in which Germany had persisted in her rigid
adherence to that calibre for her minor armament, and partly to the
rapidly increasing size of destroyers. It was held as questionable,
even by the most ardent believers in the ability of the big ship
to defend herself against destroyer attack, whether the 4-inch was
sufficient to disable large destroyers. Hence the adoption of the
6-inch--the largest gun that can be man-handled.
The nominal displacement of these battleships, the _Iron Duke_ class,
rises to 25,000 tons as against 23,000 of the previous class. The
length is increased to 620ft. and the beam to 89½ (instead of 89ft.).
Owing to improved lines, the horse-power is reduced to 30,000 without
any very material loss of speed. In all these super-Dreadnoughts, as
in the Dreadnoughts themselves, 21 knots has always been the selected
speed, though in units there have been slight variations.
Ships of the _Iron Duke_ class are as follows:--
====================+===============+==============
Name. | Built at. | Machinery by.
--------------------+---------------+--------------
_Iron Duke_ | Portsmouth Y. | Cammell-Laird
_Benbow Beardmore_ | Beardmore | Beardmore
_Emperor of India_ | Vickers | Vickers
_Marlborough_ | Devonport Y. | Hawthorn
====================+===============+==============
The _Emperor of India_ was originally named _Delhi_. The first two were
given Babcock, and the second two Yarrow boilers. All were completed
in 1914, but only the _Iron Duke_ was available for service on the eve
of the outbreak of the war with Germany and Austria. The other three
were, however, rapidly completed and put into commission.
The fifth ship of the 1911–12 Estimates was the battle cruiser _Tiger_,
nominally belonging to the _Lion_ group, but actually differing very
considerably in various important details.
She was laid down at Clydebank in June, 1912, a great deal of official
reticence being maintained concerning her. She was not complete on
the outbreak of war; but as she was available for service not long
afterwards she is included in this survey.
The marked and most characteristic difference between her and the
_Lions_ is that the third turret instead of being cramped amidships
as in the _Lion_ design, is moved further aft, thus giving a greatly
improved arc of fire. Twelve 6-inch were substituted for the sixteen
4-inch of the _Lions_ for reasons already given.
The _Tiger_ is approximately 720ft. long, with a nominal horse-power of
75,000. Babcock type boilers are fitted. Her nominal speed is 27 knots,
but this has more than once been very considerably exceeded.
For 1912–13 the Estimates provided for four capital ships, the usual
twenty destroyers, and a new type of warship designated as “lightly
armoured cruisers.”
This programme is of abounding interest, not only on account of the
fact that--so far as the larger types of ships are concerned--it
probably embodies the last new construction available for the British
Fleet in the war (unless the war endure beyond all anticipations) but
also because of its more or less revolutionary nature.
[Illustration: EARLY “30 KNOT” DESTROYERS.]
The big ships of the programme were as follows:--
==================+=================+==============
Name. | Built at. | Machinery by.
------------------+-----------------+--------------
_Queen Elizabeth_ | Portsmouth Yard | Wallsend
_Warspite_ | Devonport Yard | Hawthorn
_Valiant_ | Clydebank | Fairfield
_Barham_ | Fairfield | Fairfield
_Malaya_ | Elswick | Wallsend
==================+=================+==============
The fifth ship in this list, the _Malaya_, is an extra vessel paid for
and presented to the British Navy by the Federated Malay States.
In general appearance these ships of the _Queen Elizabeth_ class do not
greatly differ from their predecessors; but there all resemblance ends.
In every other way they embody a “new idea”--an attempt so to blend
the battleship proper with the battle-cruiser so as to secure the best
points of both.
Roughly, the battleship proper sacrifices speed for extra gun power
and protection; while the battle-cruiser sacrifices these two latter
for speed. The speed of the _Queen Elizabeths_ was fixed at 25
knots--something rather less than that of battle-cruisers, but still
sufficiently high to take them out of the ordinary battleship category
as hitherto understood. Certainly they differ from the normal quite
as much as the original _Dreadnought_ differed from her immediate
predecessors.
It was only possible to secure this high speed, plus other qualities,
by the bold adoption of oil fuel only--in itself of the nature of a
gigantic experiment, which, however, results have more than justified.
The designed horse-power to secure 25 knots is 58,000.
If, however, the motive power embodied novelty, still more so did the
armament. For the ten 13.5’s of preceding ships, eight 15-inch guns
were substituted. So far as power is concerned the 13.5 is ample for
all contingencies, but the 15-inch embodies a marked superiority in
range and the additional accuracy which a heavier projectile naturally
affords. Furthermore--a very important point--the “life” of the 15-inch
gun is much longer, owing to there being no necessity to utilise the
full power of which it is capable.
The general arrangement of turrets is that of all the
super-Dreadnoughts, with the middle turret (always the most restricted
in arc of fire) omitted.
Nothing has ever been officially stated as to the armour protection;
but it is known to be equal or superior to that of any preceding
battleships.
When war broke out, the first two of these ships were nearing
completion--the first being completed about the end of 1914 and the
second at the end of March, 1915.
The 1913–14 Estimates provided for five more or less normal battleships
designed for coal fuel,[36] the usual 21 knots speed, but 15-inch
instead of 13.5-inch guns.
==================+===============+==============
Name. | Built at. | Machinery by.
------------------+---------------+--------------
_Royal Sovereign_ | Portsmouth Y. | (not stated)
_Royal Oak_ | Devonport Y. | (not stated)
_Resolution_ | Palmer | Palmer
_Ramillies_ | Beardmore | Beardmore
_Revenge_ | Vickers | Vickers
==================+===============+==============
Beyond that they are of 25,750 tons, and were designed for 31,000
horse-power, no details of these ships have been furnished. Two were
estimated to be completed by the end of 1915--the others in 1916.
The rest of the programme consisted of eight more lightly armoured
cruisers, a reduced number of destroyers and an increased number of
submarines.
In the 1914–15 Estimates three more battleships of the _Royal
Sovereign_ class--to be named _Renown_, _Repulse_, and
_Resistance_--were provided for, also a sixth ship of the _Queen
Elizabeth class_, which was provisionally named _Agincourt_. The
participation of any of these in the war is very improbable.
The other vessels of the programme were four lightly armoured cruisers,
twelve destroyers and an unstated number of submarines.
When war broke out three battleships building in British Yards--two for
Turkey and one for Chili--were taken over by the British Admiralty.
Details of these are as follows:--
==========================+===============+==============================
Name. | Displacement. | Armament.
--------------------------+---------------+------------------------------
_Agincourt_ | |
(ex-_Sultan Osman I_) | 27,500 | 14--12in., 20--6in.; 3 tubes.
| |
_Erin_ | |
(ex-_Sultan Rechad V_) | 23,000 | 10--13.5, 16--6in.; 3 tubes.
| |
_Canada_ | |
(ex-_Almirante Latorre_)| 28,000 | 10--14in., 16--6in.; 4 tubes.
==========================+===============+==============================
There were also taken over three Brazilian armoured gunboats--renamed
_Humber_, _Severn_, and _Mersey_--of 1,200 tons each, carrying two
6-inch guns forward and two 4.7-inch howitzers aft. The speed is about
11½ knots, and early use was made of these vessels on the Belgian coast
shortly after the outbreak of war.
In addition to the above, two large Chilian destroyers building at
Cowes were taken over and renamed _Broke_ and _Faulknor_.
A variety of other vessels were likewise incorporated into the British
Fleet, liners (to act as auxiliary cruisers), trawlers (to act as
mine sweepers), plus various hospital ships, transports, and so on and
so forth. Roughly, from 25 to 33 per cent. of the British Mercantile
Marine came to be used in some way or other by the Admiralty--to say
nothing of innumerable private yachts and motor boats.
The destroyers of the period have not materially differed from their
predecessors of the Dreadnought era, save for the adoption of two, and
subsequently three, 4-inch guns in the armament, instead of one.
Submarines and aerial craft are dealt with in a separate chapter.
* * * * *
At and about the year 1912, the “super-Dreadnought” may be said to have
reached its apotheosis.
For what it is worth, however, it may here be put on record that
junior opinion in the Navy was then becoming opposed not only to
“super-Dreadnoughts” but to Dreadnoughts in any shape or form. Hardly
any naval officer under the rank of Commander, and an ever-increasing
percentage over that rank, was to be found who was not more or less
convinced that the days of the Dreadnoughts and “super-Dreadnoughts”
might be nearly numbered, and that we were possibly on the verge of
some as yet indeterminate revolution in naval construction as great as
any that the “fifties” saw.
As yet no very clear argument can be produced. Only vaguely it is put
forward that with torpedo range what it is, the big ship’s chance
against torpedo craft is practically relegated to not being found, and
“not being found” depends mainly upon the “super-Dreadnought” being
screened with very numerous smaller craft.
When Lord Charles Beresford put it on record that a hundred
anti-torpedo attack guns would be useless in a battleship, he spoke for
all progressive naval ideas. A destroyer may be hit and hit vitally,
but it is hard to imagine a hit which will stop her drifting within
easy range of her quarry before going down. If hostile destroyers get
in, the only real chance of big ships is to sweep their decks with
the modern variant of “case shot” and so kill the crews, a difficult
proposition at the best owing to the small amount of time available.
The proposition is rendered tenfold harder by the certainty that
attack, if it comes, will not come from one quarter only, but from
several. Consequently to preserve the Dreadnoughts, an ever increasing
number of auxiliaries is demanded. Of these no Navy can be said to have
a sufficiency. Hence it is argued that a destroyer attack is bound to
succeed sooner or later, while even did a sufficiency of small craft
exist, the big ship has to be so nursed and protected that her sphere
of usefulness is enormously reduced. Submarines also are a deadly
danger.
On the other hand it is argued that, given sufficient bulk to the big
ship, torpedoes are likely to be relatively harmless to her; it is also
asked how can the small craft protect their own big ships and also
search out and attack the enemy’s mastodons?
There, till the war proves something definite one way or the other,
the matter must be left. The big ship has been doomed so often, and
so often adapted itself to changed conditions, that it may well do so
again, despite the seemingly heavy odds against it.
_PROTECTED CRUISERS OF THE DREADNOUGHT ERA._
The original conception of the Dreadnought era was “nothing between
the most powerful armoured ships and torpedo craft,” though so far as
second class cruisers were concerned the last of these had been laid
down in 1901.
The persistence with which Germany continued yearly to build
small protected cruisers eventually, however, began to cause some
perturbation; and in the 1908–09 Estimates five protected cruisers
of the _Bristol_ class were provided for. These were the _Bristol_
(Clydebank), _Glasgow_ (Fairfield), _Gloucester_ (Beardmore),
_Liverpool_ (Vickers), _Newcastle_ (Elswick). The designed displacement
was 4,820 tons, length 453 feet over all, beam 47 feet, and mean
draught 15¼ feet. Armament two 6-inch, ten 4-inch, and two submerged
tubes. A speed of 25 knots was expected from 22,000 horse-power. On
trials all exceeded 26 knots. All were fitted with Yarrow boilers, also
turbines of the Parsons type, except in the _Bristol_, in which Curtiss
type turbines were installed.
For 1909–10 four more similar ships were provided--the _Weymouth_
class. Displacement rose to 5,250 tons, and a uniform armament of eight
6-inch was substituted for the mixed armament of the _Bristol_ class.
These four “Town” cruisers were the _Weymouth_ (Elswick), _Yarmouth_
(London and Glasgow Co.), _Dartmouth_ (Vickers), and _Falmouth_
(Beardmore). All were given Yarrow boilers and Parsons turbines except
the _Weymouth_, which was supplied with Curtiss turbines.
The Estimates of 1910–11 contained three cruisers, the _Chatham_,
_Dublin_, and _Southampton_, of the same type, but with a displacement
increased by 200 tons. Three more, the _Birmingham_, _Nottingham_, and
_Lowestoft_, figured in the Estimates of 1911–12.
In 1907 the practice was instituted of building a Scout or two a year,
those constructed to date being the _Boadicea_, _Bellona_, _Blanche_,
_Blonde_, _Active_, _Amphion_, and _Fearless_, all of which are
unarmoured, and so more or less compelled to fight modern destroyers on
equal terms. Of these the _Amphion_ was lost early in the war by a mine.
Of the original type were three Australian cruisers, _Sydney_,
_Melbourne_ and _Brisbane_, of which two were built in this country and
the third built, or put together, in Australia. In all these ships the
slight increase in displacement was due to the introduction of a thin
armour belt amidships--a “reply” to a similar innovation in the German
Navy.
The 1912–13 Estimates saw no more of the “Town” class cruisers being
provided for, but, as already stated, they heralded the appearance of
eight vessels of a new type, officially described as “lightly armoured
cruisers.”
They were at one and the same time an entirely new type, and also
a reversion to the original _Bristol_ with modifications born of
experience.
In essence, these ships of the _Arethusa_ class--_Arethusa_, _Aurora_,
_Galatea_, _Inconstant_, _Royalist_, _Penelope_, _Phaeton_ and
_Undaunted_, compared with the prototype as follows:--
====================+========================+======================
| _Arethusa._ | _Bristol._
--------------------+------------------------+----------------------
Displacement (tons) | 3520 | 4800
Armament | 2--6in. | 2--6in.
| 6--4in. | 10--4in.
| 4 above water t. tubes | 2 submerged t. tubes
Side protection | 2½″ | _nil._
H.P. | 30,000 | 22,000
Speed (est.) kts. | 30 | 25
====================+========================+======================
Fuel supply has never been given out officially, but it may be stated
that, roughly, by making use of oil fuel in the _Arethusa_, a radius
equal to that of the _Bristols_ was secured with a considerable saving
in weight.
Incidentally, this is one of the most interesting examples of how
the progress of invention makes possible to-day the impossibility
of yesterday. When the _Bristols_ were designed they were the “best
possible” of 1908. Four years later oil fuel had opened out an entirely
novel vista.
In the 1913–14 Estimates another eight of similar cruisers were
provided for, with, however, 250 tons odd added to the displacement
and an extra 6-inch gun forward allowed for; though this, however,
was altered afterwards, as this batch of cruisers, the _Calliope_,
_Caroline_, _Carysfort_, _Champion_, _Cleopatra_, _Comus_, _Conquest_,
_Cordelia_, do not carry any 6-inch guns forward like the _Arethusa_,
but mount a couple, one abaft the other aft--a wise arrangement, as a
heavy weight forward does not make for sea-worthiness.
The _Arethusas_ and the “C” class, therefore, compare as follows:--
==============+==========+============+===================
| Forward. | Amidships. | Aft.
--------------+----------+------------+-------------------
_Arethusas_ | One 6in. | Four 4in. | One 6in., two 4in.
“_C_” _class_ | Two 4in. | Six 4in. | Two 6in.
==============+==========+============+===================
which indicates a couple of 4-inch guns gained for the extra 250 tons.
In the 1914–15 Estimates four similar vessels were provided for, but no
details whatever have been published concerning them.
_DESTROYERS IN THE DREADNOUGHT ERA._
The Dreadnought era, while simplifying types of big ships, was the
early institution of two distinct types of destroyers, plus an
experimental vessel which was not duplicated. The original staple
idea of Dreadnought era destroyers was to build very fast ocean-going
destroyers for fleet work, and smaller craft, “coastals,” for
local duties. A considerable flourish of trumpets accompanied the
announcement of this decision, which, however, was in no way really
novel. It merely reproduced in destroyers the long exploded idea of
sea-going and coast-defence ironclads.
Of these boats the first instalment amounted to a total of eighteen;
the most important being the experimental boat _Swift_, which was given
a displacement of 1,825 tons, and so might just as well have been
designated a fast small cruiser. The horse-power provided was no less
than 30,000, the speed 36 knots, though on trials she once reached
nearly 39 knots. Armament four 4-inch, two 18-inch tubes. Cost about
£280,500.
It is interesting to note that in 1885 a precisely similar idea found
vent in a _Swift_ (afterwards renamed t.b. 81) of 125 tons against the
40 to 65 tons that was then normal for torpedo boats. It was nine years
before anything else of the same size was built.
The first standard destroyers of the era were the “Oceans” (often known
as “Tribals”). These averaged 880 tons, 33 knot speed with oil fuel
only. Between 1906 and 1910 altogether a dozen were built. The armament
given to the five first was five 12-pounder, and two 18-inch tubes;
in later boats two 4-inch, 25-pounder were substituted for the five
12-pounders.
The “coastal destroyers,” which have since lost that name, and are now
known as first-class torpedo-boats, were built in groups of twelve for
three years; the first batch averaging 225 tons, and later boats about
260 tons. In all the armament is two 12-pounder and three 18-inch
torpedo tubes; speed 26 knots. Parsons turbines in all, and oil fuel
instead of coal.
In 1908–09 there came a revulsion of official feeling against both
types, and an attempt to evolve a species of intermediate was made.
It was held that the Oceans were exceedingly costly; also somewhat
fragile. The new boats, the _Beagle_ class, averaged 900 tons instead
of the thousand tons that the latest Oceans were getting to. Armament
was reduced to one 4-inch, 25-pounder, and three 12-pounders, with the
usual two 18-inch torpedo tubes. Speed was cut down to 27 knots. Oil
fuel was done away with, and coal reverted to.
The 1909–10 programme provided for 20 destroyers of the _Acorn_ class.
These are slightly smaller than the _Beagles_, armed with two 4-inch
and two 12-pounders, but with oil again instead of coal only.
On account of considerable agitation in Parliament as to the small
number of modern British destroyers, the construction of all this class
was accelerated by a few months, and with a single exception they were
completed in June, 1911.
Up till this time considerable latitude had been given to contractors
for destroyers. In the 1910–11 programme the _Acheron_ class, an
Admiralty design, was given out for fourteen of the boats, which,
except that they had two funnels instead of three, closely corresponded
with the destroyers of the preceding year. In the other six boats the
firms of Thornycroft, Yarrow, and Parsons were given some considerable
freedom of design with two boats each, and an increased speed was
obtained with all.
For 1911–12 boats a similar principle was followed, and there was also
still further acceleration. These latest boats are somewhat faster
than heretofore, and an interesting innovation in the case of one of
them--the Thornycroft type--is the appearance of the Diesel engine for
partial propulsion instead of steam. As a matter of fact, this idea
did not eventually materialise, owing to various circumstances of the
side issue nature. More or less contemporaneously with this the Yarrow
firm in the _Archer_ and _Attack_, their special destroyers, evolved a
system of super-heated steam, which led to a very considerable increase
in speed, as compared with older methods. A conflict between steam
and “gas engines” for destroyers was, therefore, in 1912, a probable
feature of the early future, a conflict still in the “to-morrow” stage;
but it may be unwise to place too much reliance on the fact that a
similar conflict with motor cars ended in the practical extinction
of steam, for all that the probabilities point in that direction.
The superior convenience of the Diesel engine whether for destroyers
or larger ships is obvious, but there are undoubtedly still certain
practical difficulties which cannot be ignored.
In 1912 the destroyer may be said to have reached its apotheosis. Later
boats are considerably larger, more powerfully armed, and occasionally
a trifle faster, but, taken all in all, they do not indicate any
definite advance on the “general idea” of a destroyer.
Novelty, such as it exists, is confined to the introduction of flotilla
leaders. The idea is not new, since the Germans hit on it for torpedo
boats long before destroyers as we understand them were evolved. There
is also the still older idea of our original _Swift_.
The integral notion is in each case the same. The idea is to provide
the commander of the flotilla with a boat swifter and more powerful
than those of his normal command, and thus to enable him to reinforce
as requisite any particular portion of his squadron. Thus viewed,
the idea is, of course, as old as naval warfare itself, or, for that
matter, any warfare whatever; and it is strange that the principle of
the superior power of the chief should ever have been allowed to lapse.
It is, however, curious to note that at the outbreak of the present war
the British was the only Navy in which the idea was in actual practice.
Not till the war is over shall we learn whether the seeming advantage
is or is not of real value. All the indications, however, are that it
should be an immense asset if properly handled.
_GUNS OF THE WATTS ERA._
The principal guns of the Watts era are as follows:--
=======+========+========+==========+=========================
Calibre| Length | Weight |Weight of | Maximum penetration
in. | in | tons. |projectile| A.P. capped against K.C.
| cals. | | lbs. +------------+------------
| | | |at 5000 yds.| 3000 yds.
-------+--------+--------+----------+------------+------------
| | | | in. | in.
13.5 | 45 | 80 | 1250 | 22 | 26
12 | 50 | 58 | 850 | 19 | 24
12 | 45 | 50 | 850 | 17½ | 22
9.2 | 50 | 30 | 380 | 10 | 13
9.2 | 45 | 27 | 380 | 8¾ | 11¼
=======+========+========+==========+============+============
It may be noted that the 12-inch, 45 cal. (as mounted in the original
_Dreadnought_) is quite capable of penetrating anything in existence
at most ranges, and the 12-inch, 50 cal. anything likely to exist. The
main advantage of the 13.5 is the superior weight of the projectile and
the better capacity of its shell.
Modern progress in gunnery is remarkably demonstrated by a comparison
between the 13.5 of the Barnaby era and the same calibre of the Watts
era.
========+========+========+==========+======================+================
Calibre | Length | Weight |Projectile| Maximum penetration | Corresponding
in. | in | tons. | lbs. | A.P. capped against | value in K.C.
| cals. | | | K.C. at | of belt of ship
| | | +-----------+----------+ carrying
| | | | 5000 yds. | 3000 yds.|
--------+--------+--------+----------+-----------+----------+----------------
13.5 | 30 | 80 | 1250 | 9 | 12 | 9
13.5 | 45 | 67 | 1250 | 22 | 26 | 12
========+========+========+==========+===========+==========+================
From which it will be seen that armour has in no way kept pace with the
gun, except in so far as that in the conditions which obtained with the
old 13.5 a range of 3,000 yards was considered an outside limit, 12,000
yards is now held in the same or even less estimation.
Along such lines progress has been practically nullified during the
last twenty years. But the limit of vision has now been reached, and
increased gun-power cannot, practically speaking, any longer be met by
range. Whence the argument of many that, failing the production of some
armour altogether superior to anything now existing, the armoured ship
is closely approaching the status of the armoured soldier of the Middle
Ages. A precisely similar remark, however, was first made in 1887,[37]
and proved an incorrect prophecy. To-day, therefore, those best able to
judge are extremely careful about prophecying.
Meanwhile, the outbreak of war synchronised with the fact that both the
British and German Navies had under construction ships carrying 15-inch
guns; thus indicating a trend of opinion towards ships capable of
delivering heavier and heavier projectiles.
_TORPEDO PROGRESS._
The principal feature of the last few years has been the steadily
increasing efficiency of torpedoes, mainly by the adoption of improved
engines. For many years 2,000 yards had been the maximum torpedo range.
About 1904 an 18-inch Whitehead with 4,000 yards range and a maximum
speed of 33 knots came into service. This was presently improved upon
by torpedoes of 7,000 yards range. The exact range of the latest type
Hardcastle torpedo--so called after its inventor, Engineer Commander
Hardcastle--is a matter of uncertainty, but it is supposed to be
capable of about 7,000 yards at 45 knots, and up to 11,000 at 30 knots.
As a torpedo would take about 5½ minutes to travel this distance, it is
obviously unlikely to be able to anticipate the position of a single
enemy sufficiently to ensure hitting her, except by pure chance. On the
other hand, if a fleet be fired at, hits with a torpedo are almost as
likely as hits from a gun, and it seems impossible that the old idea of
ships fighting in line can possibly survive, and Admiral Bacon’s theory
that for the squadron of the past there will have to be substituted
the isolated monster ship of the future seems the only reasonable one,
despite all the protests against “mastodons.”
With the improvement of torpedoes, especial attention has been
devoted to under-water protection against them. One form of this, the
solid bulkheads of the original _Dreadnought_, was, after a time,
partially abandoned owing to its extreme inconvenience. Another form
of protection adopted in all Dreadnoughts is a certain amount of
internal armour, an idea first evolved in France for the battleship
_Henri IV_, which was laid down in July, 1897. Experiments with a view
to testing the efficiency of this device were not very promising. An
improvement on the system was effected by M. Lagane, of La Seyne, in
the Russian _Tsarevitch_ in 1899. This ship was actually torpedoed
in the Russo-Japanese War, but unfortunately she was not hit on the
specially-protected portion, so no experience was gained of the war
utility of the system. While at the outbreak of war it was believed by
some that the modern system is proof against half a dozen torpedoes,
others were extremely sceptical as to whether any real immunity is
afforded. The most that could ever be prophesied was that the next
naval war would see the torpedo accomplish either a great deal more or
a great deal less than is generally assumed. A paradoxical position;
but so things are! No one can predict with any more certainty, even now
that war is on us. We do not know what may happen. Some of us adhere to
the idea that the torpedo is going to be omnipotent: that the gun is
going to be relegated to the second place. The future is likely enough
to discount the destroyer idea. But, from the submarine the torpedo
is likely to do many unexpected things. If the Germans realise the
torpedo, startling things are toward.[38]
The period just preceding the war saw a curious state of affairs in
connection with net defence against torpedoes. Practically ever since
nets were invented the use of them had been confined to the British,
Russian and Japanese Navies--most other navies making no use of net
defence. Curiously enough the adoption of nets by Germany and Austria
coincided with their abandonment in the British Navy--the British
theory being that net cutters had become so efficient that any kind of
net would immediately be cut through. Incidentally it may be observed
that with nets down a ship can only proceed at a very slow speed.
_NAVAL ESTIMATES OF THE WATTS ERA._
==========+============+===========+===============================================
Financial | Amount. | Personnel.| Ships provided.
Year. | | +-----------+-----------------------------------
| | |Battleships|Battle-cruisers|Armoured |Prot.
| | | | |cruisers.|cruisers.
----------+------------+-----------+-----------+---------------+---------+---------
1902–03 | 31,003,977 | 122,500 | 2 | | 2 |
1903–04 | 35,709,477 | 127,100 | 3 | | 4 |
1904–05 | 36,859,681 | 131,100 | 2 | | 3 |
1905–06 | 33,389,500 | 129,000 | 1 | 3 | |
1906–07 | 31,472,087 | 129,000 | 3 | | |
1907–08 | 31,419,500 | 128,000 | 3 | | |
1908–09 | 32,319,500 | 128,000 | 1 | 1 | | 5
1909–10 | 35,142,700 | 138,000 | 6 | 2 | | 3
1910–11 | 40,603,700 | 131,000 | 4 | 1 | | 3
1911–12 | 44,392,500 | 134,000 | 4 | 1 | | 3
1912–13 | 44,085,400 | 136,000 | 3 | 1 | |
==========+============+===========+===========+===============+=========+=========
Later in 1912 the sum of £1,000,000 was handed to the Navy out of the
Budget surplus. This sum, the “supplementary estimate,” was allotted in
order to set off a corresponding German increase.
The decrease of 1905–1908 is probably directly responsible for the
increase 1910–1912; owing to the fact that the British decrease was
met by a corresponding rise in German expenditure. It was the fashion
before the war to deplore the sums spent on naval armaments, while
little or nothing was said about the military estimates.
For 1912–13 the Naval Estimates were £45,075,400.
For 1912–14 they increased to £48,809,300, and for 1914–15 they stood
at £51,550,000.
On the face of things, this ever-increasing naval outlay looked likely
to lead to ultimate financial ruin. This, however, is really a somewhat
superficial view, and mostly nothing but a modern equivalent to that
“Insular Spirit” which has been referred to in previous pages.
Compared to the national interests at stake, the increase regarded as
an insurance is more apparent than real. It is, if anything, a smaller
percentage on national existence; also over a period of a hundred years
it is far less than the corresponding increase in the Civil Service
Vote, which lacks any claims to be considered an “insurance.” The
entire amount spent in shipbuilding is expended in the country, and
about 70 per cent. of it goes in direct payment to “Labour”: which is
probably a larger percentage than would be achieved were the same sum
spent in any other way whatever.
The “ruinous competition in naval armaments” so prated on by certain
publicists was really little better than an idle phrase so far as the
British nation is concerned; and there was never any real reason to
regard future increases with apprehension.
Now that the nation is at war this fact is being recognised. We must
continue to recognise it. In trenches over the water we may attack. But
on the British Navy depends our defence of home interests.
V.
SUBMARINES.
The submarine as anything of the nature of a practical arm made its
first appearance as a “submarine torpedo boat,” useful merely for
harbour defence. As such it was eagerly embraced by the French Navy,
and had a considerable vogue therein, besides being a commonplace in
the United States long before the British Admiralty accepted it as
serious in a way.
As a matter of fact, till the invention of the periscope enabled it
to see where it was going when submerged, the submarine was little if
anything but a paper menace. The periscope altered all this.
The first submarines for the British Navy figured in the 1901–2
Estimates. Five copies of the American _Holland_ were laid down at
Barrow, the first being launched in October, 1901. These boats were of
120 tons submerged displacement, and used merely as instructional or
experimental craft almost as soon as completed.
[Illustration: SUBMARINES LEAVING PORTSMOUTH HARBOUR.]
They were followed immediately by the “A” class, totalling thirteen
boats in all. Displacement submerged, 207 tons. Those numbered from
five to thirteen were given sixteen cylinder surface motors of 550
horse-power in place of the 450 horse-power twelve cylinder ones of
the earlier boats. In 1904 A1 was lost with all hands under tragic
circumstances off Spithead, being run down by a merchant steamer. This
disaster led to the installation of double periscopes in later types.
A3 was lost off Spithead in 1912, being run down by the _Hazard_, very
near where A1 was lost.
The B class which followed numbered eleven boats, of which B1 was
originally known as A14. The remaining B class belong to the 1904–05
Estimates. The submerged displacement in these rises to 313 tons, and
the surface speed to thirteen knots, instead of eleven and a half,
though, owing to improved lines, the horse-power was little increased.
New boats, completed in 1906 and later, though generally identical
with the B class, were known as the C class, and totalled thirty-eight
altogether. One, C11, was lost at sea from a collision.
In 1907 the earliest boat of a new type (D Class) was put in
hand. Displacing 600 tons submerged, she practically doubled her
predecessors. Her surface speed rose to sixteen knots with 1,200
horse-power. Three instead of two torpedo tubes were fitted, also
wireless telegraphy was experimentally adopted in her. She herself
was never any great success, but the rest of the type were far more
successful.
By the end of 1911 eight boats of the D class had been launched. It was
originally intended to build a total of nineteen of this class, but
meanwhile an improved boat of the E type was evolved. The E class are
177ft. long, with a submerged displacement of 800 tons or thereabouts,
and four 21-inch tubes. They are fitted with wireless. Their special
feature, however, is the fitting of guns, as a regular and integral
part of the design.
The first submarine to mount a gun was D4, in which a special
12-pounder was experimentally mounted, so that it could be housed when
the boat was submerged; for later boats two guns were decided on.
The E class were followed by an F class--and a variety of other boats,
most of which have been completed since the war began and concerning
which it is obviously undesirable to say anything whatever.
Guns for submarines were expected to appear sooner than they actually
did. At an early stage it was foreseen that, once radii developed,
submarines were likely enough to find themselves in contact with
hostile submarines and to need something to attack them with. The
original idea of the submarine as “the weapon of the weaker Power” soon
went the same way as did a similar idea about torpedo boats at their
first inception.
In torpedo-boats it was at once self-evident that, whatever the value
of the torpedo boat, the stronger Power was able to build far more than
the weaker, and to annihilate accordingly.
For a time the submarine seemed to defy this law. It was fatuously
hoped that “submarines cannot injure hostile submarines”; and that the
“torpedo boat is the answer to the torpedo boat” would not have as
sequel “the submarine is the answer to the submarine.”
[Illustration:
_Photo_] [_Stephen Crabb. Southsea._
SUBMARINE E 2.]
It may well be in the womb of the future that submarines to-morrow,
or perhaps to-day, may be what the ironclad was yesterday or the day
before. The submarine battleship may appear and render obsolete the
“Dreadnought” of to-day! But nothing can alter the cardinal fact that,
given equal efficiency, the Power with most such craft must win,
and that, given an inferior efficiency, defeat may be looked for as
the natural corollary on lines entirely unconnected with whether
the “capital ship” is of a type that floats only or one that can be
submerged at will.
Tactics may alter, the means may alter, and the most obvious
instruments of naval strategy may do the same. But nothing whatever
can affect the bedrock truth that, given equal efficiency, “numbers
only can annihilate.” Given the “equal efficiency” nothing else really
matters!
If the creators of weapons keep themselves to date, if those who supply
them see to it that the supply is sufficient, if those who work the
weapons are efficient, the part of those in chief control resolves
itself into little save achieving victory with the minimum of loss. The
day may yet arrive when someone discovers that a good deal of what has
been written about the genius of various famous admirals of the past is
verbiage rather than fact, that they were a part of one great whole,
rather than the sole controlling organisation--at any rate, once battle
was engaged.
In the future, if the submarine “Dreadnought” becomes an actuality,
this is probably likely to be so to a greater extent than anything
which obtained in the past. So far as we can to-day conceive of such
future fights, much of the battle, at any rate, will entail more or
less blind work under the surface, individual enemies engaging one
another, the leader compelled to rely more and more upon the efficiency
of his individual units and less and less upon his own tactical
combinations.
Of course things may turn out otherwise. Inventions yet undreamed of
may come to the fore, and the nether waters present no greater obstacle
to regular operations than the surface does to-day. Plunging may offer
no salvation to a beaten enemy. We can only make idle speculations now.
Yet, however things may shape, success or failure, victory or defeat
must assuredly depend in a great measure on the makers of the
weapons and the efficiency of those who work them--the tools, on the
reliability of which every admiral must trust for victory.
When this war started there were roughly thirty German submarines to
something like seventy British. At the moment of writing (June, 1915)
at least twenty of those German submarines have gone below. How and why
cannot be published: but they have gone under in one way or another.
Means of defeating submarines are being developed.
Where big ships are concerned the principle means in use are high speed
and a zig-zag course, the combination making it difficult for the
relatively slow submarine to arrive at the correct striking point.
In this connection it has to be remembered that the vision of a
submarine is limited; and so that though the range of modern torpedoes
is something like five miles, the actual effective range of a
submarine’s torpedoes is nearer a mile or less.
So much is this the case that German submarines are fitted with a
torpedo which has a range of only a thousand yards or thereabouts, the
reduced range being compensated for by a greatly increased charge. This
charge, 420 lbs. of very high explosive instead of the usual charge
of 300 lbs. or less, accounts for the devastating effects of German
torpedoes fired from submarines.
It is merely a phase in submarine warfare. At present a submarine
dare not fire too near its victim lest it be involved in the common
destruction. That, however, is likely enough to be guarded against
in future construction, and the prospects of the early future is
one of more importance for submarines rather than less. They are
bound to become larger and larger, their radius increasing with the
size. Coincidently with this we may expect to see the birth of small
submarines designed to attack big ones: some new variant of the
swordfish and the whale.
VI.
NAVAL AVIATION.
The aeroplane idea is so old that we find it in Greek mythology, and it
is consequently of unknown antiquity. Hundreds of years before Christ
there were hoary old legends of Dædalus and Icarus, who made wings for
themselves and flew. Icarus flew too high, the sun melted his wings,
with the result that there happened to him what happens about once a
week to aviators to-day, he fell and died. Contemporary with these
legends, are legends of floating rocks which spurted out fire--stories
which sounded inestimably silly till steamships came along. We may
imagine prophets able to look ahead[39] and to invest their day with
visions of the future. Equally we can discard prophets and imagine a
civilisation long since dead which knew all about flying and steamers,
and survives in legends only.
[Illustration:
_Photo_] [“_Topical._”
BRITISH NAVY SEAPLANE.]
The latter alternative is really the more reasonable of the two. While
imagination can do a very great deal and exaggerate to any extent,
it must have a base to work on. It is easier to believe in some long
gone and extinct civilisation which destroyed itself in the air, than
to believe that pure imagination accounts for the flying stories
of long ago. Africa is full of traces of vast cities older than any
history, telling of past civilisations of which nothing is or ever will
be known. Also there is practically no known age in which anything but
the motive power stood between aeroplane theories and their realisation.
In support of the theory that men flew before to-day there is the
following:--Somewhere about the year 1100, that is to say, back in the
reign of King Stephen, a French historian relates the appearance of “as
it were, a ship, in the air over London.” It anchored, and the citizens
of London got hold of the anchor. The airship sent a man down to free
it, and the citizens of London caught him and drowned him in the river.
The rest of the aviators then cut the rope and sailed away.
This incident is mentioned so baldly and casually and so much mixed up
with ordinary petty chat of the era (chat which proves to have been
quite true), that it takes far more faith to accept it as “pure lies”
than to accept it as fact more or less.
These legends cannot be disregarded lightly. They one and all give
priority to the aeroplane--the “heavier than air” vehicle. Once in a
way the “lighter than air” idea got a casual look in; but it was not
till the end of the eighteenth century that it got into the regions of
practical politics with the French Montgolfiers. But there were people
who invented elementary aeroplanes long before Montgolfier.
From the end of the eighteenth century until to-day the Montgolfier
idea of “lighter than air” has got little further. The shape has
altered; instead of hot air, hydrogen gas is now employed; and by
means of motors the balloon no longer drifts before the wind. But
progress is terribly slow. That it is so, is a very important thing to
recognise, as slow development is by no means a reason for ignoring an
invention. Sometimes it is quite the opposite.
It will probably be a good many years before it is definitely settled
whether the “heavier than air” or “lighter than air” principle is the
better for Naval purposes, though there are not wanting enthusiasts who
decry the “lighter than air” machines altogether.
This is probably a grave mistake, brought about by the fact that
practical balloons existed long before practical aeroplanes, and
dirigibles made flights before ever aeroplanes rose off the earth. Yet
the dirigible is in a far more elementary stage than the aeroplane
is. Not only is the aeroplane a much older idea in the theoretical
direction, but, being very much smaller, it on that account has very
possibly developed more quickly.
The world has been building ships for thousands of years, yet it has
only recently developed _Tigers_ and _Olympics_, and both are still
developing and likely to do so for some time to come. Row-boats,
however, arrived at perfection a good thousand years ago. That is
to say, there has been no alteration or improvement in them at all
commensurate with the alterations that have taken place in big ships
during the same period.
[Illustration:
_Photo_] [_Sport & General._
HOISTING A NAVAL SEAPLANE ON BOARD THE _HIBERNIA_.]
Something of the same sort is quite possible with aeroplanes. It is
already comparatively easy to forecast their eventual form without much
danger of being proved a false prophet later on. We may safely say
that they will become capable of much higher speeds than at present;
also (which is perhaps more important) _slower_ speeds; and that all
existing troubles with stability will eventually be overcome. But
experiments made with birds indicate that the run which an aeroplane
has to take before it can rise occurs in much the same proportion with
birds; and so there are few, if any, practical men who now expect to
see future aeroplanes capable of rising vertically from the ground, or
hovering in the air except under such conditions as any bird can hover
without inconvenience.
The possibilities of the dirigible, on the other hand, no man can
foresee. The gasbag that can be brought to the ground by a single
bullet hole in it, is a very different thing from the possibility of
airships of the future, which may be a mile or two long, divided into
innumerable compartments, filled with non-explosive gas such as is sure
to be discovered sooner or later. Two miles seems an extraordinary
length to-day, but a ship ten miles long would only be something like
the ratio of the early dirigible to the future ones compared to the
ratio Dreadnoughts bear to the first ships built by men.
On the water, bulk is limited by the depth and size of harbours, but
in the vast regions of the air there are practically no limitations
whatever, and there is virtually nothing to limit size, save the
building of land docks on open plains into which airships could descend
for purposes of repair and so forth. Consequently those who hastily
assume from a few accidents that the “lighter than air” craft has no
future are probably making a mistake; at any rate, so far as naval work
is concerned. Certain definite uses are apparent even now to those who
think and ignore commercial rivalries.
It has been wisely laid down that aeroplanes for naval purposes must
be capable of rising from and descending on the water. The Curtiss
was the first successful hydro-aeroplane, but since then floats have
been fitted to various other types with equal success. It is doubtful
whether naval aeroplanes will ever be carried on shipboard like boats,
although this is by no means impossible. It will, however, be more
convenient for a variety of reasons to use them like submarines with
their own special depot ships.
The main naval use of aeroplanes at the outbreak of war was for
scouting purposes. How near they would be able to approach a hostile
fleet was a question not likely to be solved until the day of battle.
The question of their being hit is secondary to the question of their
being upset, owing to tremendous concussions of heavy gun fire. The
idea of aeroplanes dropping bombs down the funnels of warships can be
dismissed as the entirely fanciful dreams of people who know nothing
whatever about aeroplanes or the mathematical problems involved.
Judging by recent events, dropping bombs anywhere upon a moving ship is
nearly or entirely impossible, except at ranges where the aviator would
at once be brought down by rifle fire.
A far more likely and useful service would be the destruction of enemy
aeroplanes. For this purpose a special gun, firing a species of chain
shot, has already been suggested, and the naval aeroplane of the future
was always certain to carry a gun of some kind. The off-chance of doing
a certain amount of damage to a hostile ship by dropping a bomb upon
it, is nothing compared to the importance of destroying the enemy’s
aeroplanes. This last seems likely to be all-important as time goes on.
The duties of naval airships will be of a different nature. Already a
point kept in view in their design is ability to “keep the air” for a
considerable period, and with what are in these days “large airships”
of the Zeppelin type (to which the ill-fated Naval Airship No. 1
_Mayfly_ belonged) there seems no reason why an airship should not be
kept in the air for three or four days already.
The fuel problem is not very difficult, because a great deal can
already be done without the use of the engines, or with only partial
use of them. It is also more than probable that with a view to
further economy some kind of sails, combined with sea-anchors, will
be evolved, whereby the ship might become able to sail in the air
nearly as well as the old three-deckers, or, at any rate, as well as
the masted ironclads, sailed in the water. The difficulty of “keeping
the air” is the inevitable leakage of gas, but as leakage nowadays is
infinitesimally less than it once was, the assumption is that as the
years go on it will eventually be reduced to almost a minus quantity.
Gales will be met by “bulk” and efficient anchors, on the principle
that the gale which swamps a fishing-boat or blows over a haystack has
no effect on a Dreadnought or a cathedral.
Ability to keep the air will enable all Fleets to be accompanied by
airships, which would detect mines and perhaps submarines, and with
their ability to adapt their speeds at will, the presumption is that
they would be able to destroy submarines by bombs.
A further and very important duty would be the detection of torpedo
attacks at night. Experiments carried out in Austria some few years
ago with a captive balloon proved conclusively that except in cases
of thick fog any vessels in motion are easily detected at a distance
of ten or twelve miles. It is not merely the tell-tale flames in the
funnels which betray attacking vessels; their wakes are always clearly
visible, and as a general rule the vessels themselves, no matter how
dark the night.
Bomb-dropping from an airship must be a more serious matter than from
aeroplanes, as so much more in the way of explosives could be carried.
The chance of being hit, however, would probably be so much greater
that it was (when war broke out) unlikely that any airships would be
risked for such purposes. Nor is it very probable that naval airships
will for some time to come attack each other, if they can possibly
avoid it, the reason being that for a good many years they will be
comparatively few in number, and the attack would have, in most cases,
to be delivered in the presence of a fleet, which would make the
attack, to say the least of it, very hazardous.
Eventually, of course, aerial Dreadnoughts fighting each other are
probable enough; but “the Trafalgar of the air” is unlikely to be
witnessed within the lifetime of most or any of us now living. Nor is
it likely that aerial Dreadnoughts will replace Dreadnoughts of the
water, although as years go on they may cause profound modifications in
design in order to allow of mounting guns for vertical fire.
We are in the presence of the introduction of a “new arm.” But between
what a “new arm” can actually accomplish, and what enthusiastic
inventors say it will do, there is always an enormous gap. Inventors,
when they come to prophesying, are usually one of two things--asses, or
prodigious asses! France--once the second Naval Power in Europe--became
of little or no account because it took the submarine at the
enthusiastic inventor’s face value, and neglected the present and
immediate future.
The present stage of aerial progress in the British Navy is briefly to
be summarised as follows:--
1. A big Zeppelin type naval airship was built in 1909–1911. It proved
a total failure.
2. In 1911 four naval officers were appointed to learn aeroplane work.
Subsequently a few others were appointed. Others, again, qualified
privately. In 1912, the Royal Flying Corps was established--both naval
and military aviators becoming “wings” of the same body--an excellent
principle, but one necessarily experimental so far as practical work
was concerned.
3. In practice it proved a failure; so the Naval Air Service was formed
into a branch by itself. Four small army airships were handed over
to it--craft too small to be of any value except for instructional
purposes.
At the outbreak of war there were two effective dirigibles--one of
French type of Astra-Torres design, the other a Parseval purchased in
Germany. Neither of these ships is in any way comparable to the German
Zeppelins in dimensions or endurance. A number of other dirigibles
of varying sizes were on order, but it is inadvisable to publish any
particulars on this subject. The designs for these were foreign, but
the construction was British.
In the matter of aeroplanes a number of special naval stations were
established and supplied with seaplanes and landplanes of various
types, while strenuous efforts were made towards the training of a
large number of efficient pilots. The building of an aeroplane is a
matter of only a few weeks, whereas the training of a really efficient
pilot is a matter of a year or thereabouts.
VII
AUXILIARY NAVIES.
No account of the British battle fleet would be complete without
reference to the various auxiliary navies. Though none of them
possesses any very serious fighting value, yet all possess
potentialities for the future which can with difficulty be computed.
The auxiliary navies may be divided into two main sections--(1) those
which are direct branches of the British Navy, and (2) those which
belong to the semi-independent colonies.
Of the former, the principal is the Royal Indian Marine, which
consists of a number of armed troopships. Of these the chief are the
_Northbrook_, launched at Clydebank in 1907, 5,820 tons, 16 knot speed,
and an armament of six 4-inch and six 3-pounders. The _Dufferin_, which
was launched in 1904, is of 7,457 tons, has a speed of 19 knots, and an
armament of eight 4-inch and eight 3-pounders. The _Hardinge_, launched
1900, is of 6,520 tons, 18 knots speed, and carries six 4.7-inch guns
as well as six 3-pounders and 4 Maxims.
There are three older troopships, the _Minto_ (1893), the _Elphinstone_
(1887), and the _Dalhousie_ (1886). These are supplemented by ten small
steamers and nine small mining vessels.
The germ of this fleet was created in the early seventies when the
breastwork monitors _Abyssinia_ and _Magdala_ were sent out for the
defence of Indian harbours. These were small predecessors of the
_Devastation_, very similar to the home coast-defence monitors of the
_Cyclops_ class, and carried four 18-ton muzzle-loading guns.
About the year 1888 some new torpedo boats (Nos. 100–106) were lent for
the Indian Marine service. These, with their names and numbers, were
as follows:--_Baluch_ (100), _Ghurka_ (101), _Kahren_ (102), _Pathan_
(103), _Maharatta_ (104), _Sikh_ (105), and _Rajput_ (106). The two
earliest numbers were built by Thornycroft, and were of 92 tons; the
others were built by White, of Cowes, and were of 95 tons displacement.
In the years 1890–91 two torpedo gunboats, _Plassy_ and _Assaye_, of
the _Sharpshooter_ class, were launched at Elswick for the Indian
Marine, in which they remained until withdrawn in the early years of
the present century.
On a similar footing to the Royal Indian Marine are the flotillas,
mostly consisting of river gunboats, maintained in North and South
Nigeria and in Central Africa, and the gunboats on the Nile under the
Egyptian Government.
The Colonial Navies are on a different standing. First place in their
formation belongs to Australia. The monitor _Cerberus_, practically a
sister of the _Abyssinia_ and _Magdala_ already mentioned, was launched
at Jarrow in 1868 for Victoria. This vessel (which still exists as a
drill ship) is of 3,480 tons, armed with four 18-ton muzzle-loaders,
and protected with an 8-inch belt.
In 1884 Australia’s local defence was re-inforced with four gunboats as
follows:--The _Protector_, of 920 tons, carrying one 8-inch and five
6-inch guns, for South Australia. She, as well as the others, was built
at Elswick. For Western Australia a similar vessel of 530 tons, named
the _Victoria_, was built, armed with one 18-ton muzzle-loader. The
_Gayundah_ and _Paluma_, also of the same type, carrying one old 8-inch
and one 6-inch, were built for Queensland. Their displacement is 360
tons each.
From that time onward the Australian Navy occasionally sent a few
officers and men for training in the British Navy.
Towards the end of the eighties interest began to be taken in
Australian naval defence, and five cruisers and two torpedo gunboats
were ordered for local Australian service while borne on the Royal
Navy List. Of these vessels the five cruisers were the _Katoomba_ (ex
_Pandora_), _Mildura_ (ex _Pelorus_), _Ringarooma_ (ex _Psyche_),
_Tauranga_ (ex _Phœnix_), and the _Wallaroo_ (ex _Persian_), all 2,575
vessels of the old _Pallas_ class, of which at the time of writing
the _Philomel_ still exists. These ships had a designed speed of 16.5
knots, a protective deck, and an armament of eight 4.7-inch and some
smaller guns.
The torpedo gunboat _Boomerang_ (ex _Whiting_) and _Karrakatta_ (ex
_Wizard_) belonged to the _Sharpshooter_ class, and were lent under the
same conditions as the cruisers.
In the course of time all of them wore out and were eventually recalled.
Coincident with this the Australians commenced to have a revived
interest in Imperial defence, and in the year 1905–6 Australia and New
Zealand contributed £240,000 to Imperial naval defence, and a project
was put forward for the building of eight destroyers and four torpedo
gunboats for Colonial Defence purposes.
A few years later this project took a more definite shape, and
about the year 1910 the battle-cruiser _Australia_, a sister of the
_Indefatigable_, was ordered. As part of the same programme, three
protected cruisers of the _Dartmouth_ type, the _Melbourne_, _Sydney_,
and _Brisbane_, were also ordered. Previously to this, three destroyers
of the _Paramatta_ type had been commenced, and in 1911 three more were
ordered, thus forming a nucleus of a serious Australian Navy.[40]
New Zealand’s interest in the Imperial Navy may be said to have
commenced about the year 1900. It eventuated in paying for the
battleship _New Zealand_[41] of the _King Edward_ class, which was
laid down in September, 1903. An old gunboat of the _Magpie_ class
was purchased, re-christened the _Amokoura_, and used for training
purposes, while to replace some old torpedo boats, which had been sent
to New Zealand about the same time as similar boats went to Australia,
three destroyers of the _Paramatta_ type were ordered. Finally, an
offer from the New Zealand Premier to supplement the Dreadnought
efficiency of the British Navy culminated in the battle-cruiser _New
Zealand_, which was offered to be provided about the same time or a
little before Australia offered a similar vessel.[42]
[Illustration: BATTLE CRUISER “NEW ZEALAND” ON THE STOCKS--1912.]
The Dominion of Canada has always maintained a certain number of
small vessels for Customs duties or fishery protection, also for
service on the Great Lakes. In 1909 the question of a Canadian Navy
became insistent, and two old British cruisers--the _Niobe_ of the
_Diadem_ class and the _Rainbow_ of the _Apollo_ class--were purchased
as training ships for the Canadian Navy. A project was also brought
forward for the creation of Canadian dockyards and building therein
four second-class cruisers of the _Dartmouth_ class and six destroyers,
though up to the time of writing none of these ships have materialised,
and the Canadian Navy is still very much a project in the air.
Newfoundland has a naval reserve, trained over many years in the
drill-ship, which is ex H.M.S. _Calypso_.
The whole subject of Colonial Navies is somewhat involved, owing to
the question as to how far they should be under the orders of and part
of the British Navy, liable to be used when and where required for
Imperial needs, and how far they should be regarded as merely for local
defence. It has been argued from one point of view that Colonial Navies
acting on their own responsibility might create undesirable Imperial
complications--as for instance, Australia with Japan, or Canada with
the United States. On the other hand it is argued that it would not
be possible to arouse Colonial enthusiasm for a Colonial fleet which
was not always on the spot, despite any strategical grounds that might
exist for its being elsewhere. New Zealand, in May, 1912, negatived
this by presenting her battle-cruiser to the Imperial Navy for use
where most needed, but generally speaking Colonials think first of
local defence.
These two divergent points of view, which are certainly extremely
delicate, may be said to be still _subjudice_, but in the year 1911
the following agreement, which is of the nature of a very judicious
compromise, was drawn up:--
1. The naval services and forces of the Dominions of Canada and
Australia will be exclusively under the control of their respective
Governments.
2. The training and discipline of the naval forces of the Dominions
will be generally uniform with the training and discipline of the fleet
of the United Kingdom, and by arrangement, officers and men of the said
forces will be interchangeable with those under the control of the
British Admiralty.
3. The ships of each Dominion naval force will hoist at the stern the
white ensign as the symbol of the authority of the Crown, and at the
jack-staff the distinctive flag of the Dominion.
4. The Canadian and Australian Governments will have their own
naval stations as agreed upon and from time to time. The limits of
the stations are described in Schedule A (Canada) and Schedule B
(Australia).
5. In the event of the Canadian or Australian Government desiring
to send ships to a part of the British Empire outside of their own
respective stations, they will notify the British Admiralty.
6. In the event of the Canadian or Australian Government desiring to
send ships to a foreign port, they will obtain the concurrence of
the Imperial Government, in order that the necessary arrangements
with the Foreign Office may be made, as in the case of ships of the
British Fleet, in such time and manner as is usual between the British
Admiralty and the Foreign Office.
7. While ships of the Dominions are at a foreign port a report of
their proceedings will be forwarded by the officer in command to
the Commander-in-Chief on the station or to the British Admiralty.
The officer in command of a Dominion ship so long as he remains in
the foreign port will obey any instructions he may receive from the
Government of the United Kingdom as to the conduct of any international
matters that may arise, the Dominion Government being informed.
8. The commanding officer of a Dominion ship having to put into a
foreign port without previous arrangement on account of stress of
weather, damage, or any unforeseen emergency, will report his arrival
and reason for calling to the Commander-in-Chief of the station or to
the Admiralty, and will obey, so long as he remains in the foreign
port, any instructions he may receive from the Government of the
United Kingdom as to his relations with the authorities, the Dominion
Government being informed.
9. When a ship of the British Admiralty meets a ship of the Dominions,
the senior officer will have the right to command in matters of
ceremony or international intercourse, or where united action is agreed
upon, but will have no power to direct the movements of ships of the
other service unless the ships are ordered to co-operate by mutual
arrangement.
10. In foreign ports the senior officer will take command, but not so
as to interfere with the orders that the junior may have received from
his Government.
11. When a court-martial has to be ordered by a Dominion and a
sufficient number of officers are not available in the Dominion
service at the time, the British Admiralty, if requested, will make
the necessary arrangements to enable a court to be formed. Provision
will be made by order of his Majesty in Council and by the Dominion
Governments respectively to define the conditions under which officers
of the different services are to sit on joint courts-martial.
12. The British Admiralty undertakes to lend to the Dominions during
the period of development of their services, under conditions to be
agreed upon, such flag officers and other officers and men as may be
needed. In their selection preference will be given to officers and
men coming from, or connected with, the Dominions, but they should all
be volunteers for the service.
13. The service of officers of the British Fleet in the Dominion naval
forces or of officers of those forces in the British Fleet will count
in all respects for promotion, pay, retirement, etc., as service in
their respective forces.
14. In order to determine all questions of seniority that may arise,
the names of all officers will be shown in the Navy List, and their
seniority determined by the date of their commissions, whichever is the
earlier, in the British, Canadian, or Australian services.
15. It is desirable in the interests of efficiency and co-operation
that arrangements should be made from time to time between the British
Admiralty and the Dominion for the ships of the Dominions to take part
in fleet exercises or for any other joint training considered necessary
under the Senior Naval Officer. While so employed the ships will be
under the command of that officer, who would not, however, interfere
in the internal economy of ships of another service further than is
absolutely necessary.
16. In time of war, when the naval service of a Dominion or any part
thereof has been put at the disposal of the Imperial Government by
the Dominion authorities, the ships will form an integral part of
the British Fleet, and will remain under the control of the British
Admiralty during the continuance of the war.
17. The Dominions having applied to their naval forces the King’s
Regulations and Admiralty Instructions and the Naval Discipline Act,
the British Admiralty and Dominion Governments will communicate to each
other any changes which they propose to make in these Regulations or
that Act.
The Schedules A and B defined the stations of Canadian and Australian
ships respectively. These stations cover the territorial and contiguous
waters in each case. The agreement generally seems framed in an
exceedingly able and statesmanlike spirit, designed so far as may be
to avoid any possible friction or misunderstanding in the future, and
in preparation for the day when the Imperial British Fleet shall be
something very much more than a dream or just a fancy.
This chapter merely records the birth of something the end of which
none can foretell. It may be the first hint of a great world-wide
English-speaking confederation: it may be the swan song of the British
Empire. But it is probably one or the other in full measure.
VIII.
GENERAL MATTERS IN THE LAST HUNDRED YEARS.
Since the Great French Wars the British Navy has altered out of all
recognition in its _materiel_; but changes in the _personnel_ are often
considerably less than appears on the surface.
To take matters in the same order as they are taken in Chapter VIII,
Vol. I., uniform has, of course, long established itself. It has done
so with a formality which, in the view of many, has “established the
régime of the tailor rather than the sailor.” Within the last few years
a slight change for the better has occurred; but of the greater part
of the period so far as concerns purposes for which uniform was first
introduced--the sailor and tailor exchanged places. Much has been
written about admirals and captains whose ideas of naval efficiency
were limited by “spit and polish,”[43] but “spit and polish” at its
worst was never so bad as that tailoring idea which was the ultimate
result of George II admiring the costume of the Duchess of Bedford.[44]
[Illustration:
_Photo_] [_Stuart, Southampton._
ADMIRAL FISHER.]
The mischief is popularly supposed to lie with naval officers.
Actually its roots lie with officials, who have piled regulation upon
regulation, and the Vanity of Vanities is to be found so far back
as the days of the great St. Vincent and his recorded orders about
officers shoe-laces. Lesser lights than he, being in authority,
blindly imitated. And so the uniform fetish grew and prospered.
This is not to be taken wholly as a condemnation--for all that a system
which made one of the most important duties of a lieutenant to be the
carrying round of a tape measure with a view to ascertaining whether
every man was “uniform” within a fraction of an inch may seem more
suggestive of comic opera than of naval efficiency. Within reasonable
limits, conformity has many virtues; and a man slovenly in observing
uniform regulations is likely enough to be slovenly in things of
greater moment. Like most bad things in the Navy, the principle was
ideal: only the carrying of it too far was at fault. There is not the
remotest reason to believe that a Navy not in uniform would be as
efficient as one in uniform--all the probabilities are that it would
be less so. The man who invented the saying that “a pigmy in uniform
is more impressive than a giant in plain clothes” was making no idle
statement, but stating a general verity. The trouble is solely in the
difficulty that has ever been experienced in striking a common-sense
mean--a difficulty created by the first mediocrity who tried to stand
in St. Vincent’s shoes, and who lacked the brains to realise that
what St. Vincent had started with a definite Service object in view,
he--the unknown mediocrity--had merely lost in the _means_. An example
once created had to be followed. The hardships of conformity--of which
overmuch is heard nowadays--are actually trivial, on account of the
custom. The mischief lies not in the conforming, but in the waste of
time of those who are made responsible for that conformity.
In essence, modern uniform is simple enough: that the various ranks
should be noted by special insignia is obviously desirable. For
combatant officers, the distinguishing sleeve-marks are:--
[Illustration: Admiral Vice-Admiral Rear-Admiral Commodore Captain
Commander Lieutenant-Commander Lieutenant Sub-Lieutenant]
Engineer officers wear the same insignia with purple between the
stripes. Non-combatant officers are without the curl to the stripes,
and wear colours to distinguish them as follows:--Doctors, red;
Paymasters, white; Naval Instructors, blue.
The system for the supply of the _personnel_ is to-day altogether
different from what it was a hundred years ago. Till comparatively
recently future deck officers were taken very young, passed into the
Service as Naval Cadets, and thence promoted up to Midshipmen, etc.,
while Engineers and officers of the other civilian branches joined
later in life.
More or less contemporaneously with the Dreadnought era this was
altered by the “New Scheme of Entry,” also known as the “Selbourne
Scheme,” after the then first Lord of the Admiralty, but really the
creation of Admiral Fisher, the Sea Lord who was the moving spirit at
the Admiralty at that time.
Few schemes have been more virulently criticised--few, in some cases,
more unfairly. Like nearly all Admiral Fisher’s innovations, the scheme
was better on paper than in fact. Like all his other schemes it was
carried through at far too great a pace for the ultra-conservative
moods of the British Navy, which has ever resented anything but the
most gradual of changes. On the other hand, it is too often forgotten
by critics that a great agitation on the part of naval engineer
officers, backed by very considerable shore-influences, was then in
existence. Something had to be done, and done quickly. Of Admiral
Fisher it may ever be said that he acted where others merely argued.
Under the New Scheme, the deck-officer, the engineer, and the
marine-officer were all to enter as cadets at a very tender age,
undergo a common training, and be specialised for any Branch at option
or at Admiralty discretion later on.
Whatever may be said against the New Scheme, it was magnificent on
paper. Engineer officers had first come into the Navy as mechanics to
work an auxiliary motive-power in which no “seamen” had much faith.
From that humble beginning the status of their Branch grew and grew,
till both motive-power and the existence of nearly everything on
ship-board depended on the engineers. At the same time the official
status of the Branch remained practically in the same stage as it
did when the first few “greasers” were entered. The deck-officer was
(nominally, at any rate) drawn from the aristocracy; the engineer
officer from the democracy in a great measure. In so far as this
obtained, “social war” was added to the real issue. It was obvious that
this state of affairs was detrimental to naval efficiency. Something
had to be done.
Admiral Fisher cut the Gordian knot in his own fashion. In substance
his Scheme provided that future engineer officers were to be drawn from
the same class as deck-officers--to gild the pill, marine officers were
flung into the same melting pot. He might have done better: but far
more conceivably harm might have been perpetrated.
As an argument behind him, he had Drake and Elizabethan conditions,
the history of the days when every man was made to “sail his ship and
fight it too.” The U.S. Navy had already plunged on a somewhat similar
experiment. When the Russo-Japanese War came, the Japanese, in the
middle of a life-and-death fight, suddenly granted executive rank to
their engineer officers--_i.e._, that right to control and punish their
own men which British marine officers have always had.
The Scheme met its first rock in the Marines. For three hundred years
or thereabouts the “Sea Regiment” has been afloat as a thing apart.
The “leather-necks”--as the sailors call them--have built up their own
traditions. They have ever remained a force apart from both Army and
Navy, belonging to both and yet to neither. The record of the Marines
is such that when, recently, it was proposed that they should have a
regimental colour with their battles emblazoned on it, the idea had to
be abandoned because there was not room on the flag for their services!
Any attempt to interfere with the continuity of such a corps was
fore-doomed to failure from the first. The Marines resisted being
turned into sailors just as they would have resisted being turned
into soldiers. They stood out uncompromisingly for being “the Sea
Regiment.” The expected happened. By 1911 this part of the New Scheme
was practically shelved, and the most unique body of men in the world
was left to carry out its own traditions.
[Illustration:
_Photo_] [_Russell & Sons, Southsea._
ADMIRAL SIR JOHN JELLICOE.]
In the matter of future engineers, snags were struck likewise, but
here a more or less unreasoning conservatism on the part of parents
played its full part. The average parent objected to his son becoming
an engineer specialist over old-time reasons. A further and weightier
objection was, and continues to be, raised by engineering experts,
who argue that engineering is a life profession, not to be picked up
efficiently by casual specialization.
The matter is still under discussion, and its verification or otherwise
rests with the future. As to the first point, a serious effort to
overcome it was made early in 1912 by the promulgation of an order that
New Scheme officers, specialised for engineering, would be eligible for
the command of submarines equally with deck-officers.
The importance of this particular point is great; for by the end
of 1911 it was generally believed that the motor warship would at
some more or less early date in the future replace the steam-driven
one; and so the “sail-his-ship-and-fight-it-too” theory found a new
interpretation.
As regards the rank and file of the Navy, the difference of a hundred
years has been so great and so commented on that to-day we perhaps tend
to make it, seem far greater than it really is. It is to be doubted
whether the “prime seaman” has altered to anything like the extent
imagined. We are all too prone to forget that in the days of the Great
French Wars _all_ the crews were not jail-birds, pressed-men, and
riff-raff. The leaven of the mass were the “prime seamen,” who, in
their own way, were as well trained for the naval service as are the
bluejackets of to-day.
Since then the “prime seamen” have had many vicissitudes. So long ago
as the time of the Crimean War men of ten years’ continuous service
were in existence, but whatever the “paper” value of this force may
have been, the extracts given in Chapter VIII, Vol. I, make it
abundantly clear that the “prime seaman” was in practice very scarce.
It is long since then that the long service system was built up.
Under this every bluejacket was a “prime seaman” either in _posse_
or in _esse_. He was entered for a period of ten years, with option
to re-engage for a further ten years at slightly increased pay and a
pension on retirement. At a later and comparatively recent stage this
total of twenty years got increased to twenty-two years. The prospects
were improved to the extent that the best men of the Lower Deck upon
reaching Warrant Rank were able, towards the close of their careers, to
reach the rank of lieutenant on the Active List. In a word, the idea of
a Navy consisting entirely of “prime seamen” was more or less actually
reached.
This system had, however, one drawback. It was, relatively speaking,
very expensive. When the Fisher revolution took place Economy was very
much the motto of the day. It was pointed out that outside the Royal
Naval Reserve, consisting of merchant seamen, no effective reserve
existed. It was further pointed out that on board a modern battleship
there were many duties which could just as well be performed by
partially trained or even untrained men as by skilled men.
Out of these two points (according to some critics), by using the first
as a cloak for the economy of the second, a certain retrograde movement
was established in the institution of the Short Service System. Under
this the old time “landsman” was revived under another name. Under
the Short Service System a man could enter the Navy for five years,
receiving ordinary pay for ordinary duties, but without prospects of
promotion or pension, except in so far as he might afterwards be
utilised for reserve purposes.
How far this scheme made for efficiency is a moot point, but it
certainly led to economy. As certainly it was bitterly resented by
the men of the Navy. The views of the officers on the subject of
“ticklers”--as Short Service men were termed afloat--were less decided.
Some considered the scheme an abomination; others thought it very
satisfactory.
With so conservative an institution as the British Navy, it is yet too
early to give a definite decision one way or the other on the subject.
But it is worth noting that no one seems to have remarked on the fact
that it was a tentative return, under modern and peace conditions, to
what obtained in the days of the Great French Wars, and then at least
satisfactorily answered requirements.
No one really knew, and no one could do more than surmise, what would
be required for manning the Fleet in the next great war in which the
British Navy was engaged. It was generally assumed that in the present
century the re-institution of the press-gang would be quite impossible
owing to public opinion.
Public opinion, however, is a variable quantity, and with a Navy in
desperate plight for men there is no saying definitely what might or
might not happen, either publicly or _sub rosa_. It was generally
agreed on all hands that, large as the trained _personnel_ of the
British Navy is, it might prove totally inadequate in a big naval
war. In such case extra men would have to be found--sentiment or no
sentiment. The Short Service System, despite all its drawbacks, has so
far proved a loophole to avoid the horrors of the press-gang of the
old days; and much which on the face of it was at the time obviously
unsatisfactory may in the future prove to have been foresight of an
unexpectedly high order.
It only remains to add that nothing of this sort has ever been advanced
in extenuation by advocates of Short Service, who have confined
themselves entirely to the obvious point of economy and the more or
less debatable point of an efficient reserve.
To-day, of course, the crews do not find their ships a prison; but it
is a moot question whether they are relatively much better off than
in Nelson’s day. A great deal of leaven is given--far more, indeed,
than is represented by philanthropic agitators--but it is mainly of
the nature of “short leave.” This--in these days of travel--means very
little relatively, since it rarely allows of a trip home. For good or
ill, the bluejacket of to-day is a “home-bird”; consequently, what
a hundred years ago would have represented “ample liberty,” to-day
appears much on all fours with the old time confinement to the ship.
Modern facilities for travel have swallowed up most of the difference!
This is among the matters not understood by the Powers That Be. The
perspective has changed; and Service Conditions have not yet been fully
accommodated to the alteration.
Food remains a source of naval grievance to-day almost as much as in
the days of the Great Mutiny. That it does so is mostly an inherited
tradition of the past; for both quality and quantity are now excellent.
An impression prevails, however, that were messing provided by the
Admiralty on non-profit lines instead of by contract, “extras” would
either be cheaper, or that what are now “canteen profits” on them would
be more available than they are at present. There is little reason
to believe that this is so. Like the purser of a hundred years ago,
the modern contractor probably does not make a tenth of the profit
that he is legendarily supposed to make, nor is there any clear proof
that things could be materially bettered, except in details which have
little or nothing to do with the main point.
When all is said and done, the bluejacket of the Twentieth Century
has always been fed as well or better than his brother in civilian
life, and his growls upon the subject of messing do not demand any
very serious attention. Just as the Great Mutiny of 1797 brought about
an attention to details of uniform, regulations and things of that
sort which have ever since endured, so it perpetuated a corresponding
impression that an official eye must ever be directed to keeping
messing more or less up to the mark. And that eye has never slumbered.
In Chapter VIII, Vol. I, a page is devoted to surgery in the Great War
Era. Here, as in some other matters, progress may be more real than
imaginary. Now, as then, the Navy offers little in the way of lucrative
inducements to a good surgeon. In one sense it offers less than it did;
for, though exceptions can be found, the general naval conception of
the doctor is still the old-fashioned notion of someone to cure the
sick man rather than the more modern idea of preventing the man from
becoming sick.
The problem, it must, however, be admitted, is a difficult one in many
ways. In peace conditions the medical staff is rather too large than
too small; for all that, for modern war conditions it is probably
hopelessly inadequate.
It is more or less accepted that in modern battle the wounded must lie
where they fall. Theoretically, at any rate, this is mitigated by
certain instructions in First Aid, and the furnishing of hypodermic
syringes to one member of each gun’s crew for use on the badly wounded.
The days when lint was forbidden as a useless extravagance, and
sponges were restricted for the sake of economy, have indeed gone,
just as surely as has the old-time surgeon who, unable to afford his
own instruments, had to borrow from the carpenter an ordinary saw to
amputate a limb! But--relatively to shore-practice of equal date--the
naval medical service is not much less hampered than it was a hundred
odd years ago; and a really big naval action is likely enough to see as
much superfluous agony (relatively speaking) as in the old days!
The true position of the surgeon in a warship is not recognised; the
official duties of a doctor are officially purely “curative,” very
rarely “preventive.” Some or most of this is due to the prevalence
of old-fashioned obsolete ideas in high quarters; but some also
is to be laid at the door of the “Churches,” and their fancy for
differentiating between diseases. The matter is not one that admits of
further discussion here; but the enforcement upon naval surgeons (who
have to deal with large bodies of men crowded into spaces necessarily
favourable for contagion) of conditions which, rightly or wrongly, are
deemed to be for the public’s ultimate welfare on shore, are a terrible
menace to naval efficiency. Things are indeed bettering in this
respect, but still somewhat slowly.
After the Great Mutiny of 1797 the pay of the men was approximately
trebled. Although “extras” have since been added, the normal pay
has remained to all intents and purposes stationary, while if
qualifications be taken into account it has actually decreased, since
the “ordinary” of to-day is called on to do just about what the “able
seamen” of a hundred odd years had to do.
The respective rates[45] are:--
================+============+=============
| 1797 | 1914
| per week. | per week
| | (minimum).
----------------+------------+-------------
Ordinary seamen | 6/6 | 8/9
Able seamen | 8/4 | 11/8
================+============+=============
Since the cost of living has certainly gone up at least twenty per
cent. in the interim, and since the normal increase is undoubtedly
under that, a _prima facie_ case is certainly made out for those who
contend that the British sailor is, if anything, worse paid than he was
a hundred years ago.
The board and lodging which he obtains of course adds to the actual
total; but the fact remains that the board and lodging labourer of
to-day, who takes no risks of his life, is now as much ahead of the
sailor as he was behind him in 1797. And “uniform” means a heavy extra
expense for clothing.
In 1912 the men of the Navy definitely asked for a twenty per cent.
increase of pay. It amounted to nothing but an adjustment of 1797
conditions to modern ones. They did not obtain it--unasked for
off-chances of “Democracy on the Quarter Deck” were given instead.
Later on a 3d. a day concession was made to able seamen after the
completion of six years’ more service.
There at the moment the question remains. It has to a certain extent
been obscured by question of naval punishments; about which a good deal
of nonsense has been written by people who in some cases should know
better.
Naval punishments are severe; but discipline necessitates punishments,
and these have been regularly toned down to the spirit of the age.
The real and genuine grievances of to-day are almost identical with
the genuine grievances of which the “prime seamen” complained in
1797:--pay, leave, and the treatment of men who happen to come into the
hands of the ship’s medical staff through no fault of their own.
In 1912 a Commission was enquiring into punishments, and further
reductions in them to suit modern ideas resulted; but it is by no means
certain that any advantage in efficiency will be acquired therefrom.
Naval Discipline--no matter how harsh--is a tricky thing to tamper
with. The highest possible ideal of Discipline was reached by the
Japanese, who, previous to the war with Russia, ran their Navy on “the
honour of the flag” lines; and presumably had some similar system in
the Army. In what is certainly the most patriotic land of our era
this succeeded in peace time. Yet in the attacks on Port Arthur, when
a great assault was made, when the time came to cease bombarding the
hostile position, the guns were turned on the possible line of retreat,
ensuring that for a man to retire was more dangerous to him than to
go forward. In the case of the Japanese it was perhaps an unnecessary
precaution, but it was borrowed from old-time precautionary usage in
Europe.
Every system of discipline is based on the fact that either sooner or
later there will be some man who will be frightened enough to turn
tail, and lead others to follow his example, unless there is something
still worse to stop him. On this foundation stone the most seemingly
trivial items of discipline are based.
No normal man, _when it comes to the point_, cares to risk his life
or limbs. Here and there an individual of the “don’t care” order is
to be found; but generally speaking he is an anomaly. In the ordinary
way the safest assumption is that he will think more of his skin
than anything else--and on this theory all systems of discipline are
founded. All rely on the ultimate fact that “it is worse to go back
than to go forward.” The curse of the present age is the semi-educated
humanitarian who criticises the _means_ (often crude enough) without
taking the _end_ into proper account. At the other extreme are those
who, though familiar with the story of the Russian sentry regularly
placed to protect a favourite flower which had died two hundred years
before, understand that there is a _reason_ for everything, but fail to
realise fully that conditions change.
Many works have been written on the tactical and strategical
superiority of those who have led British Fleets to victory; but in
the great majority of cases there is little to show that the majority
of our admirals were really more clever than many of their opponents.
He would be a bold man who set out to prove in black and white that
Collingwood had more brain than Villeneuve, or would have done better
than that unlucky admiral had they changed places with each other. Nor
would he have much more luck in attempting to prove that at any era in
history British sailors were really braver than French ones.
In one critical period of English history Drake appeared--and the most
lasting sign of “how he did it” was “spit and polish”! In another
dark time came St. Vincent--and his sign manual was “tailoring” and
“routine.” In yet another critical hour came Nelson who supplied
enthusiasm by his care for the health of his men. But it was Nelson who
went out of his way to congratulate St. Vincent on hanging mutineers
out of hand on a Sunday instead of keeping them till the Monday! These
three great men knew what they relied upon.
The real secret of British naval success has surely lain in the
possession of naval architects able to create the kind of ship best
calculated to stand hammering, and hard-hearted folk in authority who
created a discipline which, however unreasonable some of it may now
seem, has ever ensured victory.
Superior British courage then, as now, was a pleasing topic for the
music hall or its equivalent; but the real driving power of the British
battle fleet in the past was “discipline.” Those who to-day would amend
or alter even the most seemingly ridiculous anomalies of discipline
will do well to ponder and walk warily, lest they upset greater things
than they wot of--lest they damage the keystone embodied in the crude
words of that unknown stoker who said: “It’s just this--do your blanky
job.”
WARSHIP NICKNAMES
PAST AND PRESENT.
_Achilles_ A-chilles, _also_ The Chilly
_Aeolus_ Oily
_Anson_ Handsome
_Agamemnon_ Aggie, _also_ Mother Weston
_Alexandra_ Alex
_Ajax_ Queen of Hearts
_Andromache_ Andrew Mark
_Apollo_ Pollie
_Ariadne_ Harry Agony, _also_ Hairy Annie
_Bacchante_ Boozer, _also_ Black Shanty
_Belleisle_ Belle-isle
_Bellerophon_ Bellyfull
_Black Prince_ British Public
_Brilliant_ Hair Wash
_Caesar_ Gripes
_Calliope_ Cally-ope
_Cambrian_ Taffy
_Camperdown_ Scamperdown
_Circe_ Sirse
_Collingwood_ Collywobbles
_Colossus_ Costly
_Conqueror_ Corncurer
_Cornwallis_ Colliwobbles
_Cumberland_ Cumbersome
_Curacoa_ Cocoa
_Curlew_ Curly
_Cyclops_ Sickly
_Daphne_ Duffer
_Devastation_ Devy
_Diana_ Die Anyhow
_Dido_ Diddler
_Donegal_ Don’t Again
_Duke of Wellington_ The Dook
_Dreadnought_ Fearnought
_Endymion_ Andy Man
_Fantome_ Ghost
_Galatea_ Gal to Tea
_Gibraltar_ Gib
_Glory_ Ruddigore
_Gorgon_ Guzzler
_Grasshopper_ Grass Bug
_Hannibal_ Annie Bell
_Hawke_ Awkward
_Hecate_ Tom Cat
_Hercules_ Her-cules
_Hermione_ Hermy-one
_Highflyer_ Aeroplane
_Hindustan_ Dusty One
_Hogue_ Road Hog
_Howe_ Anyhow
_Illustrious_ Lusty
_Immortalité_ Immortal Light, _also_ Immorality
_Imperieuse_ Impy
_Indefatigable_ Antipon
_Iphigenia_ Silly Jane
_Isis_ Icy
_Jupiter_ Jupes
_King Alfred_ Alfie
_King Edward_ Neddie, _also_ King Ned
_Lancaster_ Lanky
_Leda_ Bleeder
_Lion_ Liar, _also_ Lie On
_Magnificent_ Maggie
_Melpomene_ Melpo-mean
_Montagu_ Montie
_Narcissus_ Nasty Sister
_Niger_ Nigger
_Nile_ Jew
_Northampton_ Northo’, _also_ Bradlaugh
_Northumberland_ Northo’
_Onyx_ Only One
_Pandora_ Paddler
_Penelope_ Penny Lope
_Perseus_ Percy
_Philomel_ Filly
_Polyphemus_ Polly
_Prince George_ P.G.
_Psyche_ Sue, _or_ Sukey, _also_ Sickly
_Queen Elizabeth_ Black Bess, _also_ Bessie, _also_ Lizzie
_Ramillies_ Mutton Chop
_Rattlesnake_ Ratto
_Repulse_ Beecham
_Resolution_ Reso
_Royal Sovereign_ Royal Quid
_Salamander_ Sally and her Ma
_Sanspareil_ San Pan
_Scylla_ Silly
_Seagull_ Gull
_Sheldrake_ Shell Out
_St. Vincent_ Saint
_Sutlej_ Suble J.
_Tartar_ Emetic
_Téméraire_ Temmy
_Terrible_ Orrible
_Undaunted_ Dauntless
_Yarmouth_ Lunatic
_Warspite_ War Spider
_Note._--From time to time Nicknames vary, as occasionally they are
bestowed by other ships. This list is not quite complete on that
account.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Most of the criticism past and present of the Barnaby era is
rendered worthless by an ignoring of this report.
[2] This is instanced by the increasing ahead fire given to the
broadside ironclads.
[3] _Our Ironclad Ships._
[4] In this connection see _Imperieuse_ and _Warspite_ later on.
[5] _Naval Developments of the Century_, by Sir N. Barnaby, pp. 163–164.
[6] Re-designed to give extra protection.
[7] _See_ Reed Era.
[8] In the Chili-Peruvian War--as late as 1879–81--a torpedo fired from
the _Huascar_ did this.
[9] The full report is to be found in Part IV of _Brassey’s Naval
Annual_, 1888–9.
[10] It is worthy of note that these ships were abnormally
“over-gunned” according to the ideas which were then in official
favour, and which, later on, came more into favour still. The same
applies to the _Arethusa_ class.
[11] It is interesting to note that the Laird firm, who built the
_Rattlesnake_, which was easily the fastest of her class, made her
engines considerably heavier than Admiralty specifications. For this
they were fined £1,000, which sum, however, was remitted after the
brilliant success of the ship in the manœuvres above referred to.
[12] Mr. W. T. Stead, who edited the _Pall Matt Gazette_ at that time,
intimated some twenty years later that Lord Fisher was behind him in
commencing the agitation. Lord Charles Beresford, then in political
life, brought the Bill forward.
[13] In 1899 the _Blake_ was re-boilered. The ships remained upon the
effective list till 1906, when they were converted into sea-going depot
ships for destroyers, most of their guns being removed. They now carry
each 670 tons of coal of their own, and 470 tons stowed in one cwt.
bags for use by destroyers.
[14] This ship very greatly exceeded her nominal displacement of 14,200
tons. She was actually 15,400 tons. The essentially White ships were,
on the other hand, of about their nominal displacement. Of the _Hood_
it may further be added that she was greatly inferior to the others as
a sea-boat--a serious set-off against her superior big gun protection.
[15] 4 _Astræas_ = 8--6in., 16--4.7. 5 _Apollos_ = 10--6in., 15--4.7
[16] The _Lynch_ and _Condell_ (launched 1890) sank the Chilian _Blanco
Encalada_ in 1891; the _G. Sampaio_ (1893) the Brazilian _Aquidaban_ in
1894.
[17] In 1894 the _Thunderer_ had her upper works painted in black and
white chequers, like the old three-deckers of the Nelson era. Ships
with the top of their upper works yellow were also not uncommon.
[18] About 1902–3 four additional casemates for 6-inch guns were added
on top of the four amidship casemates.
[19] The large tube Yarrow, now so general, did not appear till at a
later date.
[20] Comparatively recently a ship--best left unnamed--made wonderful
speed. With a new Engineer Commander she suddenly lost 25 per cent. of
her horse-power. The newcomer was rather inexperienced in the type, and
closely followed Admiralty regulations. Presently the ship recovered
her power--he had given up following the book! It is only fair to
say that the restrictive regulations of the Admiralty were mostly
forced upon them by people ashore, who probably had not even a nodding
acquaintance with the engine-room of a warship, or warship requirements.
[21] This idea was borrowed from the Continent. Germany had long
adopted batteries, and nearly every other nation had followed suit.
[22] Also under Naval Defence Act an additional sum of £10,000,000,
spread over seven years.
[23] The _Nelsons_ were delayed in completion, as the 12-inch guns made
for them were appropriated for the _Dreadnought_, in order to ensure
rapid completion of that ship.
[24] To some extent this is probably true of slower firing of larger
guns. The only warships with single 12-inch--the Italian _Victor
Emanuele_ class--have generally achieved almost as many hits at target
practice as the _Brine_, with two pairs of 12-inch. Improved mountings
have since appeared, but certain advantages still seem inevitable to
the single gun. Its disadvantage lies, of course, in much extra weight,
and to-day in the space question also.
[25] Armament recently altered to 9--4 inch.
[26] They had a bow tube besides broadside tubes. This bow tube was
soon done away with and a couple of 6-pounders substituted.
[27] The vessels of the _Amalfi_ class designed by Col. Cuniberti in
1899 were of 8,000 tons displacement; they were to have been armed with
twelve 203-m/m (8-inch), twelve 76-m/m (12-pounders), and twelve 47-m/m
(3-pounders). The armour belt was 152-m/m (6-inches) thick, as also was
the armour of the battery and of the turrets. The engines were to be
19,000 H.P., and the speed with 15,000 H.P. was to be 22 knots.
[28] The _Vittorio Emanuele_ proved a most successful ship, answering
all expectations of her. One of her chief novelties was the employment
of a special girder construction, and the scientific reduction of
all superfluous weights upon a scale never before attempted. Though
apparently lightly built the ship was found to be abnormally strong.
[29] The false impression that a British battleship could be built in
about a third of the time that German ships take to construct had far
more to do with subsequent shipbuilding reductions than any deliberate
ignoring of naval needs, such as those responsible were accused of.
[30] They first appeared, as already recorded, in British cruisers
of the _Minotaur_ class. Their safety record is to be found in the
survival of the _Pallada_ at Port Arthur; their inconvenience in the
fact that in the _Neptune_ they were abandoned.
[31] These were announced as intended to carry four 12-inch and eight
10-inch, besides smaller guns. The 10-inch proved later on to be
mythical.
[32] American scientific gunnery rather post-dates the _South Carolina_
design.
[33] It should be remembered that alterations were made in the
_Invincible_ class in the course of construction, and this probably
helped to swell the cost.
[34] In the Chinese ships _Ting Yuen_ and _Chen Yuen_, built in Germany
in 1882 with big guns _en échelon_, the former had the port big guns
foremost, the latter the starboard ones--presumably an appreciation
of and an attempt to overcome the inherent defect of the échelon
system--the two ships being intended to fight in company, and so have
one of the two always in the best fighting position were the enemy
anywhere on the beam or quarter.
[35] The torpedo, for example, may possibly bring about something
of the sort by a state of speed and accuracy which leads to heavy
or anticipated heavy long-range losses from it in fleet actions. To
offer only one-fifth or so of the target would then be a serious
consideration.
[36] This is rumoured to have been abandoned for oil fuel.
[37] Something of the same kind was also observed about 1870 or
earlier, when a Whitworth gun punched through a 6-inch iron plate!
[38] Since these words were written the _Lusitania_ has been torpedoed.
I see no reason whatever to alter the original thesis.
[39] Dean Swift in “Gulliver’s Travels” described almost exactly the
moons of Mars long before their existence was ever suspected.
[40] Of these, the third in either case was built or put together in
Australia.
[41] Now renamed _Zelandia_.
[42] In May, 1912, the _New Zealand_ was definitely handed over to the
British Navy. The _Australia_ still remains a Commonwealth ship.
[43] See Vol. I., Chap. III. No less a man than Sir Francis Drake
appears to have invented “spit and polish.”
[44] See Vol. I., page 194.
[45] The minimum is given in each case.
Index.
Aboukir, Battle of, 152, v. i
Abuses, Naval, 65, v. i
Acquitaine, 11, v. i
Admiral Bacon’s Theory, 204, v. ii
Admiral Hopkins--Earliest Advocate of Centre-Line in England, 179, v.
ii
Aerial Bombs First Provided Against, 173, v. ii
Aerial Dreadnoughts, 171, v. ii
Aerial Experiments in Austria, 228, v. ii
Aerial Guns, 226, v. ii
Aeroplanes for Naval Purposes, 226, v. ii
Agreement with the Colonies, Naval, 237, v. ii
Aircraft, Possibilities of, 95, v. i
Aircraft, Potentialities in, 228, v. i
Alexander, 162, v. i
Alexandria, 163, v. i
Alfred the Great, 1, 14, v. i
Alfred, King, 60, 73, v. i
Algiers, 59, v. i
All-Big-Gun Ship Arguments, 143, v. ii
Alterations to “Lion,” 185, v. ii
Alternative “Dreadnought” Ideal, 165, v. ii
Alva, Duke of, 48, v. i
American Colonies Revolution, 124, v. i
American Frigates, 189, v. i
Americanising of British Naval Designs, 176, v. ii
American Monitors and Conning Towers, 272, v. i
American Monitors, limitations of, 292, v. i
American Navy, 189, v. i
American War, 189, v. i
Amiens, Peace of, 163, v. i
Anson, Commodore, 109, v. i
“Answer” British, to frégates blindées, 249, v. i
Antigua, 172, v. i
Antwerp, 183, v. i
Appreciation of Barnaby, 49, v. ii
Arch Duke Charles, 98, v. i
Archers, English, 27, v. i
Armada, Defeat of, 57, v. i
Armada, Delayed, 48, v. i
Armada, Force of, 49, v. i
Armada, Indifferent Gunnery of, 50, v. i
Armada, Real History of, 57, v. i
Armament, Ratio of Size, 95, v. i
Armed Neutrality, The, 161, v. i
Armour, 204, v. ii
Armoured Cruisers Re-appear, 101, v. ii
Armour Experiments at Woolwich, 219, v. i
Armoured Forecastles, 284, v. i
Armoured Scouts, 197, v. ii
Armstrong and Percussion Shell, 227, v. i
“Army of Invasion,” 170, v. i
Articles of War, 11, v. i
Artificial Ventilation, 225, v. i
Armstrong, Guns of, 241, v. i
Artillery, Superior, 229, v. i
Assize of Arms, The, 10, v. i
Athelston, 7, v. i
Australia, Navy of, 233, v. ii
Auxiliary Navies, 231, v. ii
Battle of Trafalgar, 177, v. i
Belle Island Captured, 122, v. i
Berwick Captured by French (1795), 138, v. i
Blockade, Scientific, First Instituted, 120, v. i
Blockade Work, 165, v. i
Bomb Dropping, 226, 228, v. ii
Bombs from Airships, 228, v. ii
Bomb Vessels Introduced, 87, v. i
Bonaparte (see Napoleon), 230, v. i
Bordelais Captured, 158, v. i
Boscawen, 120, v. i
Boswell, Invention of, 107, v. i
Bounty, 200, v. i
Bounty, Given by Henry VII, 36, v. i
Bounty to Seamen, 234, v. i
Bourbon, Isle of, Captured, 185, v. i
Box-Battery Ironclads, 318, v. i
Brading, Battle of, 5, v. i
Breaking the Line, First Attempt at, 128, v. i
Breaking the Line by Rodney, 129, v. i
Breastwork Monitors, 292, 307, 308, v. i
Breech Blocks, Elementary, 320, v. i
Breechloaders, Armstrongs, 320, v. i
Brest, 157, v. i
Brest, Cornwallis off, 172, v. i
Bridport, 139, v. i
Brig Sloop of 18 Guns, 178, v. i
British Battle Fleet, 257, v. i
British Defects in the Crimean War, 234, v. i
British Empire, an English-Speaking Confederation, 241, v. ii
British Flag, 75, v. i
British and French Ideals, 249, v. i
British v. French Ships Discussed in Parliament, 37, v. i
British Guns, 232, v. i
British Merchant Ships Trade with Russia During War, 186, v. i
British Methods of Warfare, 41, v. i
British Navy, Birth of, 34, v. i
British Squadron, Defeat of, 186, v. i
British Tactics, 231, v. i
Broadside Ironclads, 257, v. i
Broke, Captain, 189, v. i
Brown, Samuel, Invents a Propeller (1825), 216, v. i
Bruat, 234, v. i
Brueys, 152, v. i
Bruix, 154, v. i
Buckingham, Duke of, 65, v. i
Bullivant Torpedo Defence, 53, v. ii
Burchett, 92, v. i
Burgoyne, Alan H., 59, v. i
Burgoyne, Captain, 288, v. i
Bushnell, David, and his Submarine, 124, v. i
Busk, Hans, 237, v. i
Busses, 11, v. i
Byng, 99, v. i
Byng, Shot, 116, v. i
Cadiz, 171, v. i
Cadiz, Collingwood off, 175, v. i
Calais, 27, 30, 33, v. i
Colder, 172, v. i
Calcutta, Recapture of (1757), 119, v. i
Calypso, 237, v. ii
Campaign of Trafalgar (Corbett), 170, v. i
Camperdown, Battle of, 150, v. i
Canada Acquired by England, 123, v. i
Canadian Dockyards, 237, v. ii
Canadian Navy, 237, v. ii
Cannon, Early, 38, v. i
Cannon, First use of, 29, v. i
Canute, 8, v. i
Cape St. Vincent, Battle of (1759), 121, v. i
“Capital Ship” Adjusts Itself, 218, v. ii
Capital Ship, Galley Replaced by Galleon, 27, v. i
Cape La Hogue, Battle of, 90, v. i
Capraja, “Queen Charlotte” blown up off (1880), 160, v. i
“Captain,” Nelson in, 142, v. i
Carronades, 129, v. i
Carronades, Part of Armament, 201, v. i
Cartagena, Vernon Fails at, 109, v. i
Catapults, 15, 30, 38, v. i
Catherine the Great, 154, v. i
Cayenne Captured, 184, v. i
Cellular Construction, 267, v. i
Central Africa, 232, v. ii
Central Battery Ironclads, 292, v. i
Centre-line, System, 179, v. ii
Cerberus, 232, v. ii
Cette, 103, v. i
Chads, Captain and Gunnery Experiments, 220, v. i
Chads, Captain, 223, v. i
Chagres Bombarded, 109, v. i
Channel Policed, 10, v. i
Channel Protected by Merchants, 33, v. i
Chappel, Captain, 215, v. i
Charles I, 65, v. i
Charles II, 81, v. i
Charles, Prince, 73, v. i
Charring, 107, v. i
Charter of Ethelred, 8, v. i
Chartres, Duke of, 126, v. i
Chateau, Renault, 96, v. i
Chatham, Earl of, 183, v. i
Christian VII, 180, v. i
Cinque Ports, 22, 29, 35, v. i
Cinque Ports Established, 10, v. i
Civil War, 75, v. i
Claxton, Captain, 215, v. i
Clive, 119, v. i
Clothing, 65, v. i
Clydebank, 188, v. ii
Coal, Larger Store of, Affects
Construction, 263, v. i
Coal Stores, 185, v. ii
“Coastals,” 199, v. ii
“Coastal Destroyers,” 199, v. ii
Coast Defence Ironclads, 199, v. ii
Coat of Mail Idea, 249, v. i
Cockpit, Horrors of, 204, v. i
Cochrane, Lord, and Fire Ships, 183, v. i
Cochrane Opposes Vote of Thanks to Lord Gambier, 183, v. i
Code of Naval Discipline, 12, v. i
Colonials and Local Defence, 237, v. ii
Colour Experiments, 89, v. ii
Command of the Sea (First Appearance of), 75, v. i
Commerce Defence, 75, v. i
Commission, Report of (1806), 187, v. i
Compass, 12, v. i
Coles, Captain Cowper, 272, v. i
Coles, Captain, 280, v. i
Coles, 275, v. i
Coles, Captain, 284, v. i
Collingwood Incompetent, 202, v. i
Collingwood, Resignation of, 148, v. i
Colomb, Admiral, Quoted, 53, v. i
Communication Tube, First for
Conning Tower, 318, v. i
Conflict Between Steam and Gas Engines, 201, v. ii
Congreve Rocket, 236, v. i
Conning Towers in American Monitors, 272, v. i
Constantinople Bombarded, 179, v. i
Continuous Service, 251, v. ii
Contractors, Unscrupulous, 65, v. i
Contemporary Art, 195, v. i
Contraband of War, 161, v. i
Contract-Built Ships First Advocated, 280, v. i
Controller of the Navy and Constructor, Disputes Between, 258, v. i
Converted Ironclads, 257, 258, v. i
Convoys, 92, v. i
Cook, Captain, 115, v. i
Copper Bottoms, 123, v. i
Copper Bottoms, Rapid Deterioration of, 129, v. i
Copenhagen, 161, v. i
Cornwall, Captain, 108, v. i
Cornwallis off Brest, 172, v. i
Cornwallis, 139, v. i
Corsairs, 91, 102, v. i
Cost per Gun for Sailing Man-of-War, 238, v. i
Cost per Gun for Steamers, 238, v. i
Cotton, Sir Charles, 184, v. i
Crimean War, British Defects in, 237, v. i
Crimean War, the British Navy in: Little Better than a Paper Force,
228, v. i
Cromwell, 73, v. i
Cronstadt, 226, v. i
Cross Raiding, 75, v. i
Cruisers of the Super-Dreadnought Era, 188, v. ii
Crusaders, 10, v. i
“Conditional” Ships, 174, v. ii
Cost of Oak, 132, v. i
Cost per Gun for Early Ironclads, 238, v. i
Cumberland, Inventor of Stoving, 107, v. i
Cuniberti, 179, v. ii
Cuniberti’s Conception of All Big-Gun ships, 139, v. ii
Curtis, Captain of the Fleet, 136, v. i
Curtiss Aeroplane, 226, v. ii
Curtiss Turbines, 196, v. ii
Cutting Out Expeditions Instituted, 41, v. i
Daedalus, 221, v. ii
“Dandy” Captains, 195, v. i
“Dandy” Sailors, 195, v. i
Danes, 1, v. i
Danish Fleet Surrendered, 162, v. i
Danish Ships Hired, 5, v. i
Darien, 108, v. i
Dawkins, Captain, 299, v. i
Dean, Sir Anthony, 94, v. i
Dean, Sir John, 94, v. i
Decline of the Navy, 43, v. i
De Conflans, 121, v. i
Defects of the échelon System, 179, v. ii
Defects of the “Royal Sovereigns,” 69, v. ii
De la Clue, 120, v. i
Delegates of Mutineers, 147, v. i
“Democracy on the Quarter Deck,” 257, v. ii
De Pontis, 102, v. i
De Witt, 79, v. i
Deptford Yard, 107, v. i
De Ruyter, 85, v. i
D’Estaing, 126, v. i
D’Estrees, 85, v. i
Descharges, Inventor of Portholes, 38, v. i
Destroyer Attack Bound to Succeed, 195, v. ii
Destroyers in the Dreadnought Era, 199, v. ii
De Tourville, 90, v. i
Devastation idea evolved, 232, v. ii
Devonport Yard, 191, v. ii
Dibden (ref.), 34, v. i
Diesel Engine, 201, v. ii
Dirigibles, 222, v. ii
Discipline, 20, v. i; 258, v. ii
Discipline, Jervis Idea of, 141, v. i
Discipline, Lack of, in time of Charles I, 66, v. i
Disputes Between the Controller of the Navy and Constructor, 258, v. i
Doctors, Naval, 256, v. ii
Dominion of Canada, 234, v. ii
D’Orvilliers, 125, v. i
Double Bottoms, 267, v. i
Dover, 219, v. i
Downs, Battle in (1639), 76, v. i
Drake, Character of, 48, v. i
Drake, Sir Francis, 47, v. i
Drake, Methods of, 48, v. i; 259, v. ii
Dreadnought (analogy), 69, v. i
Dreadnought, first idea of, 164, v. ii
Dromons, 33, v. i
Dropping Bombs, 226, v. ii
Dry Dock, First, 35, v. i
Dubourdieu, 186, v. i
Du Casse, 97, v. i
Ducas, 234, v. i
Duchess of Bedford and Uniform, 194, v. i
Ducking, 12, v. i
Duckworth, Sir John, 179, v. i
Duguay-Trouin, 92, 177, v. i
Dumanoir, 177, v. i
Duncan, 147, v. i
Dundonald, Earl of (Cochrane), 216, v. i
Dutch Fleet Captured by Anglo-Russian Force, 159, v. i
Dutch War, First, 75, v. i
Dutch War, Second, 81, v. i
Dutch War, Third, 83, v. i
Eagle attacked by Submarine, 124, v. i
Earliest Advocate of the centre-line in England, Admiral Hopkins,
179, v. ii
Early Aerial Ideas, 218, v. ii
Early Wire Guns, 247, v. i
Economists Limit Lint and Sponges, 207, v. i
Economists on Shore, 201, v. i
Economy, 36, 114, v. i
Economy in Construction, 97, v. i
Edgar, 7, v. i
Edmund, 7, v. i
Edward I, 22, v. i
Edward II, 23, v. i
Edward III, 23, v. i
Edward IV, 33, v. i
Edward the Confessor, 8, v. i
Effects of Shell Fire, 219, v. i
Egyptian Government, 232, v. ii
Electro, 219, v. i
Elementary Quickfirers, 243, v. i
Elizabeth, 73, v. i
Elizabeth, First Acts of, 44, v. i
Elizabethan Fleet, 73, v. i
Elphinstone, Captain in Russian Navy, 154, v. i
Elswick, 227, v. i; 232, v. ii
End-on Fire, 176, v. ii
End-on Idea, 179, v. ii
End of the White Era, 116, v. ii
Engineer Agitation, 247, v. ii
Engines of “Glatton” built in Royal Dockyard, 311, v. i
England, Austria, and Sweden at war, 180, v. i
“Equal Efficiency,” 215, v. ii
Ericsson, 272, v. i
Ericsson Patents Propeller (1836), 216, v. i
Espagnols-sur-Mer, Les, 29, v. i
Ethelred’s Navy, 8, v. i
Excellence of the “Warrior” Class, 121, v. ii
Experiments, Gunnery, 219, v. i
Experiments to Improve Sailing Ships, 211, v. i
“Explosion” Vessels, 182, v. i
Eustace the Monk, 21, v. i
Feeding of Men During Great War, 200, v. i
Ferrol, 96, 172, v. i
Fight--Shannon (British) v. Chesapeake (U.S.), 189, v. i
Finisterre, 172, v. i
Finisterre, Rodney off, 127, v. i
Fire, Raking, 211, v. i
Fire Ships, 54, 84, 182, v. i
Fire Ships, Decline of, 131, v. i
Fireworks, Use of, 69, v. i
First English Over-Sea Voyage, 11, v. i
First of June, Battle of, 135, v. i
First Ship of Royal Navy, 35, v. i
Fisher, Admiral Lord, 247, v. ii
Flag, Neutral, 161, v. i
Fleet Decoyed Away, 172, v. i
Fleet Saved by a Military Officer, 103, v. i
Fleet of Richard I, 10, v. i
Floating Batteries, First Use of, 130, v. i
Florida Acquired by England, 123, v. i
Flotilla, 163, v. i
Flotilla Invasion, 166, v. i
Flushing Blockaded, 183, v. i
Food, 65, v. i; 254, v. ii
Forecastle, Armoured, 284, v. i
Forecastles on Turret Ships, 284, v. i
Fort, S. Phillip, 116, v. i
Frames, Trussed, Introduced, 210, v. i
France, Why Beaten in Great War, 233, v. i
France, War with, 37, 113, v. i
Frégates Blindées, 247, 250, v. i
French Fleet in Crimean War, 230, v. i
French and British Ideals, 253, v. i
French Warships, Superb Qualities of, 92, v. i
French Fleet Superior to British, 193, v. i
French Floating Batteries, 225, v. i
French Revolution, 132, v. i
Freya, Danish Frigate, Captured, 159, v. i
Frisians, 5, v. i
“Fulton” Driven by steam Paddle, 193, v. i
Future Fights, 215, v. ii
“Galatea” Fitted with Paddles, 213, v. i
Galleon as Dreadnought of the 14th Century, 27, v. i
Galley, Replaced as Capital Ship, 27, v. i
Gambier, Admiral, 179, v. i
Gambier, Lack of Energy of, 182, v. i
Gambier, Lord, Acquitted, 183, v. i
Gambier, Lord, Vote of Thanks to Opposed by Cochrane, 183, v. i
Gambling, Punishment for, 12, v. i
Ganteaume, 163, v. i
Ganteaume, Admiral Escapes from Rochefort, 181, v. i
Garay, Inventor of Steamship, (1543), 214, v. i
Genereux Captured by Nelson, 160, v. i
Genius of Famous Admirals, 216, v. ii
Genoa, Hotham’s Battle of, 138, v. i
Gentlemen Adventurers, 45, v. i
George I, 104, v. i
George II, 107, v. i
George II and Institution of Uniform, 194, v. i
German Seamen, 233, v. i
Germans Agitate for British Naval Efficiency, 231, v. i
Germany, 233, v. i
Germany (analogy), 65, v. i
Germany, Guns from, 43, v. i
Gibraltar, 130, 172, v. i
Gibraltar, Nelson at, 172, v. i
Glasgow, “Black Prince,” Built at, 250, v. i
Globe Circumnavigated by Drake, 45, v. i
Godwin, 9, v. i
Good Hope, Cape Dutch Squadron Captured at, 141, v. i
Graham, Sir James, 236, v. i
Grasse, De, 129, v. i
Greek Fire, 15, 243, v. i
Guadaloup Captured, 137, 185, v. i
Guarda-Costas, 108, v. i
Guerre de Course, 102, v. i
Guichen, 128, v. i
Guillaume Tell Captured, 161, v. i
Gunners, Training of, 241, v. i
Gunnery, Enemy’s Inefficiency of, 176, v. i
Gunnery Errors, 179, v. ii
Gunnery Experiments, 231, v. ii
Guns Against Aircraft, 226, v. ii
Guns, British, 232, v. i
Guns in the Reed Era, 319, v. i
Guns in Submarine, 212, v. ii
Guns of the Watts Era, 202, v. ii
Guns, Pivot, 272, v. i
Guns, Rapid Fire, Development of, 227, v. i
Guns, Turkish Monster, 179, v. i
Hales, Dr., Ventilation System of, 115, v. i
Hamelin, 234, v. i
Hampden, John, 73, v. i
Hanniken, 28, v. i
Hardcastle Torpedo, 204, v. ii
Hardy, Sir Charles, 127, v. i
Harvey-Nickel Armour Introduced, 99, v. ii
Hawkins, 46, v. i
Hawthorn, 188, v. ii
“Heavier than Air,” 221, v. ii
Heavy Rolling of the “Orion,” 183, v. ii
Henry II, 10, v. i
Henry III, 20, v. i
Henry IV, 30, v. i
Henry V, 33, v. i
Henry VII, 34, v. i
Henry VIII, 37, v. i
“Hermione,” Mutiny in, 145, v. i
Hickley, Captain, 299, v. i
Hire of Danish Ships, 8, v. i
Hired Ships, 28, 33, 36, v. i
Holy Land, 11, v. i
Hood, 130, 137, v. i
Hopkins, Admiral, Ideas of, 134, v. ii
Horsey, Admiral de, 322, v. i
Hoste, Captain William, 186, v. i
Hotham, 138, v. i
Howard, Sir Edward, 41, v. i
Howe, 134, v. i
Hubert de Burgh, 20, v. i
Hurrying Ships, 185, v. ii
Hyeres, Battle of, 138, v. i
Icarus, 218, v. ii
Imperial British Fleet, 241, v. ii
Imperial Needs, 237, v. ii
Impressment, 234, v. i
Increased Gun-Power, 203, v. ii
Increased Smashing Power of Projectiles, 175, v. ii
Indecisiveness in British Operations, 137, v. i
Indies, Spanish Wealth from, 47, v. i
Inexperienced Officers, 233, v. i
“Inflexible” at the Nore Mutiny, 147, v. i
Inman, Dr., 187, v. i
Inscription, Maritime, 233, v. i
Instructors, Spanish, in English Navy, 42, v. i
“Insular Spirit,” 5, 73, 82, v. i
Insurance, 206, v. ii
Internal Armour, 206, v. ii
Introduction of Steam, 214, v. i
Introduction of 13.5-inch Gun, 175, v. ii
Invasion, 30, 163, v. i
Invasion, Nelson’s Schemes Against, 161, v. i
Invasion of England, 47, 119, v. i
Invasion Projected by French, 91, v. i
Ironclads, Converted, 257, 263, v. i
Ironclads, The First British, 249, v. i
Ironclad Ships, 229, v. i
Iron for Shipbuilding Instead of Oak, 219, v. i
Iron-plated Ships, 237, v. i
Iron Ships Condemned (1850), 223, v. i
Iron Steamer Existed in 1821, 219, v. i
Island Empires, 6, v. i
Jacobite Element in the Fleet, 88, v. i
Jacobite Rising, 105, v. i
James I, 59, v. i
James II, 86, v. i
James Watt, 236, v. i
Jarrow, 232, v. i
Java, Isle of, Captured, 187, v. i
Jean Bart, 92, v. i
Jervis, Sir John, 141, v. i
Jews, 209, v. i
John, King, 16, 30, 60, v. i
Juan, Fernandez, 110, v. i
Julius Cæsar, 1, v. i
Junction of the Fleets, 98, v. i
“Kamptulicon,” 219, v. i
Keel-Hauling, 12, v. i
“Keeping the Air,” 227, v. ii
Keith, 154, 163, v. i
Keppel, 125, v. i
Killala Bay, French Expedition to, 151, v. i
Kinburn Bombarded, 225, 248, v. i
Kipling (ref.), 34, v. i
Kronstadt, 162, v. i
Kronstadt, Anglo-Danish Demonstration at, 107, v. i
Krupp Fire, Shell, 244, v. i
La Gallisonnier, 116, v. i
“Labour” and the Navy, 207, v. ii
Lagane, 204, v. ii
Laird, Messrs., of Birkenhead, 284, 288, v. i
Laird, 321, v. i; 186, v. ii
Lalande de Joinville, 234, v. i
Lancaster Guns, 227, v. i
“Lancaster,” The, at Camperdown, 150, v. i
“Landsmen,” 252, v. ii
La Rochelle, 30, v. i
La Rochelle, Expedition to, in time of Charles I, 66, v. i
“Last Word,” 258, v. i
Latouche-Treville, 169, v. i
Laughton, Professor, Quoted, 50, v. i
Laughton’s, Professor, Summary, 176, v. i
Laws of Oberon, 17, v. i
Leake, Sir John, 101, v. i
Leave, 254, v. ii
Legends of Floating Rocks, 218, v. ii
Leissegues, Vice-Admiral, 177, v. i
Louisbourg Invested (1758), 119, v. i
“Lighter than Air,” 221, v. ii
Linois, 163, v. i
Liquid Fire, Norton’s, 243, v. i
Lisbon, 102, v. i
Lissa, Battle of, 186, 300, v. i
Little Englanders, 73, v. i
Lloyd, 237, v. i
Loading, Greater Rapidity in, 231, v. i
London, Citizens of, Fit out Fleet Against Spain, 48, v. i
London, Dutch Guns heard in, 83, v. i
Longridge, C. E., 244, v. i
Lord Charles Beresford, 195, v. ii
Lord of the Sea, 22, v. i
Lorient, French Squadron, break-out of, 188, v. i
Lorient, Partial Battle of (1795), 139, v. i
Loss of the “Victoria,” 39, v. ii
Louis Napoleon, 230, v. i
Lower Deck, The, 97, v. i
Lowestoft, 207, v. ii
Machine of Meerlers, 90, v. i
Macintosh, 226, v. i
Maderia Captured, 180, v. i
Maintenance Allowance Increased, 182, v. i
Malaga, Battle of, 101, v. i
Mallett, 244, v. i
Malta, Russian Designs on, 159, v. i
Malta Captured, 160, v. i
Malta Starved into Surrender, 160, v. i
Marines, Objection to New Scheme, of the, 251, v. ii
Marryat, Captain, 12, 212, v. i
Martinique, 137, v. i
Masefield, John, Quoted, 204, v. i
Mastless Ships, 292, v. i
Masts, Tripod, 287, v. i
Mauritius Attacked, 185, v. i
Medal, Tempus, Charles I, 74, v. i
Medine Sidonia, 53, v. i
Mediterranean, 59, v. i
Mediterranean, English Fleet First Stationed, 91, v. i
Meerlers, Machine Ships of, 90, v. i
Meerlers “Smoak-boat,” 90, v. i
Memoirs of Torrington, 100, v. i
Men Wanting, 237, v. i
Men, Lack of Training of, 236, v. i
Messing, 254, v. ii
Messing in Tudor Times, 43, v. i
Methods of Drake, 45, v. i
Military Officer Saves Fleet, 103, v. i
Military Warfare, 7, v. i
Milne, Admiral, 288, v. i
Mines Appear, 226, v. i
Mines, Russian, 226, v. i
Minorca, Battle of, 119, v. i
Moderate Dimensions, 135, v. i
Modern Protective Decks Introduced, 85, v. ii
Modern Variant of “Case Shot,” 195, v. ii
Monk, 76, v. i
Monitor and Merrimac, Fight between, 275, v. i
Montgolfier, 221, v. ii
Motor-Destroyers, 201, v. ii
Mounting of Small Guns Between the échelon Turrets done away with,
175, v. ii
Murder, Punishment for, 12, v. i
Mutiny at Spithead, 145, 200, v. i
Mutiny, The Great, 255, v. ii
Muzzle Loaders, 320, v. i
Nachimoff, Admiral (Russian), 223, v. i
Napier, Admiral Sir Charles, K.C.B., 234, 235, v. i
Napoleon, at Toulon, 133, v. i
Napoleon, Deportation of, to Elba, 193, v. i
Napoleon, Deportation of, to St. Helena, 193, v. i
Napoleon, Emperor, 164, v. i
Napoleon, First Consul, 159, v. i
Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia, 188, v. i
Napoleon and Nelson, 169, v. i
Napoleon, Re-appearance of, 193, v. i
Napoleon, Renovates his Navy, 181, v. i
Napoleon and “Sea Power,” 163, v. i
National Interests, 206, v. ii
Naval Abuses, 65, v. i
Naval Aeroplanes, 225, v. ii
Naval Agreement with the Colonies, 237, v. ii
Naval Aviation, 222, v. ii
Naval Defence Act, 63, v. ii
Naval Defence Act Cruisers, 71, v. ii
Naval Commission, 81, v. i
Naval Regulations of John, 16, v. i
Naval Pay in Great War, 209, v. i
Naval Scare of 1887–89, 61, v. ii
Naval Punishments, 20, v. i
Naval War, The Next, 265, v. ii
Navarino, Battle of, 213, v. i
Navy of Canute, 8, v. i
Navy, Non-Existence of, in Early Times, 19, v. i
Nelson, 12, 97, 162, v. i; 260, v. ii
Nelson (analogy), 42, v. i
Nelson at Gibraltar, 172, v. i
Nelson at Toulon, 133, v. i
Nelson in the “Agamemnon,” 138, v. i
Nelson in the Mediterranean, 157, v. i
Nelson (ref.), 34, v. i
Nelson at Cadiz, 149, v. i
Nelson, First Appearance of (1780), 128, v. i
Nelson, Costume of Men, in Era of, 196, v. i
Nelson Defeated at Santa Cruz, 150, v. i
Nelson, Drawing Away of, 171, v. i
Nelson Institutes Theatricals, 200, v. i
Nelson, Last Order of, 177, v. i
Nelson’s Limitations, 169, v. i
Nelson Mortally Wounded, 176, v. i
Nelson and Mutineers, 151, v. i
Nelson’s Schemes of Invasion, 162, v. i
Neutral Flag, Property Under, 161, v. i
Neutrality, Armed, 161, v. i
New Forest, Oak Plantations, 132, v. i
New Scheme, The, 247, v. ii
Newfoundland Naval Reserve, 237, v. ii
New Zealand and the British Fleet, 234, 237, v. ii
New Zealand’s Interest in the Imperial Navy, 234, v. ii
Nore, Mutiny at, 146, v. i
Norman Invasion, 9, v. i
Normans, 21, v. i
Norris, Sir John, 105, v. i
Norton’s Liquid Fire, 243, v. i
North Foreland, Battle of, 82, v. i
Nova Scotia, 103, v. i
Nile, Battle of (analogy), 42, v. i
North and South Nigeria, 232, v. ii
“Numbers Only Can Annihilate,” 215, v. ii
Oak Plantations, 132, v. i
Oberon, Laws of, 17, v. i
Ocean-going Destroyers, 199, v. ii
Odessa Bombarded, 224, v. i
Odin, 216, v. i
Officering the Fleet, 115, v. i
Officers, Inexperience of, 233, v. i
Officers’ Wine for Wounded, 207, v. i
Ogle, 109, v. i
Oil Fuel, 200, v. ii
Original Conception of the Dreadnought Era, 196, v. ii
Ormonde, Duke of, 96, v. i
Ornamental Work Reduced, 97, v. i
Ostend Attacked, 82, v. i
Ostend Captured (1706), 103, v. i
Paddle Experiments, 212, v. i
Paddles, “Galatea” Fitted with, 213, v. i
Paddle Recognised as a Source of Danger (1825), 216, v. i
Paddle Wheels Exposed, 216, v. i
Paint on Warships, 69, v. i
Paixham, General, 223, v. i
Palmer’s, 175, v. ii
Parma, Duke of, 49, v. i
Parker, Sir Hyde, 161, v. i
Parliament Discusses French v. British Ships, 137, v. i
Parliamentarians, 74, v. i
Parson’s Turbine, 183, 196, 200, v. ii
Paul, Russia, 159, v. i
Pay (1653), 65, v. i
Pay, Modern, 257, v. ii
Payta Captured by Captain Anson, 111, v. i
Peace of Amiens, 86, v. i
Pembroke, Earl of, 29, v. i
“Penelope” Fitted with Engines, 216, v. i
Penelope Frigate attacks Guillaume Tell, 160, v. i
Pennington, Sir John, 73, v. i
Pensions for Wounds, Time of John, 17, v. i
Pepys, 79, v. i
Period of Broadside Ironclads Ends, 263, v. i
Personality, 97, v. i
Peterborough, Earl of, 103, v. i
Peter the Great, 95, v. i
Phineas Petts, 59, 69, 80, v. i
Phœnicians, 1, v. i
Pierola, 322, v. i
Pigot, Captain of “Hermione,” 151, v. i
Pigtail, Origin of, 197, v. i
Pinnaces, 41, v. i
Piracy, 43, 44, v. i
Piracy, English Acts of, 22, v. i
Pirates, 30, v. i
Pitt and Sea Power, 141, v. i
Pivot Guns, 272, v. i
Pizarro, 110, v. i
Plymouth Hoe, Drake on, 50, v. i
Plymouth, Mutiny at, 146, v. i
Plymouth Sacked, 23, v. i
Policing the Channel, 10, v. i
Politics and Admirals, 130, v. i
Pomone, French Frigate, Captured (1794), 135, v. i
Portholes, 49, v. i
Portsmouth, Review at (1512), 37, v. i
Portsmouth Sacked, 29, v. i
Portsmouth Yard, 191, v. ii
Possibility of Airships in the Future, 226, v. ii
Possibility of Dreadnoughts Considered, 145, v. ii
Present Stage of Aerial Progress, 229, v. ii
Press Gang, 199, 200, v. i
Presumed End of Ironclads, 47, v. ii
Prime Seamen, 115, 196, v. i; 251, v. ii
Prince Charles, 74, v. i
Prince of Hesse, 99, v. i
Private Ships, 36, v. i
Privateering, 43, 91, 111, v. i
Privateers Attack Henry IV, 30, v. i
Privateers, French, Activity of, 189, v. i
Private Yards, 132, v. i
Progress Nullified During the Last Twenty Years, 203, v. ii
Progressive Naval Ideas, 196, v. ii
Promotion on the Lower Deck, 252, v. ii
Protection of Boats in Action, 184, v. ii
Providence and the Armada, 53, v. i
Provisioning of Ships Under John, 17, v. i
Punishments, 12, v. i
Punishments (Modern), 259, v. ii
Pursers, 146, v. i
Pym, Captain, 185, v. i
Quebec, Abortive Attack on, 104, v. i
Queen Anne, 95, v. i
Queensland, 233, v. ii
Quiberon, 121, v. i
Quick Firers, Elementary, 243, v. i
Quick Lime, Use of, 21, v. i
Raking Fire, 211, v. i
Raleigh, Sir Walter, 60, 65, v. i
Ram Tactics, 300, v. i
Ramming, 17, v. i
Rapidity in Loading, 231, v. i
Rates in English Navy, Time of Queen Anne, 95, v. i
Rating, New, of Ships Introduced (1817), 211, v. i
“Re-construction Never Pay,” 312, v. i
Reed, Sir E. J., 257, 266, v. i
Reed, Sir E. J., Anticipates Torpedoes, 268, v. i
Reed Broadside Ships, 283, v. i
Reed Ideals in the White Era, 115, v. ii
Reed, Sir E. J., Turret Ships, 292, v. i
Regular Stores Instituted, 132, v. i
Repairs, Cost of, 132, v. i
Reserve Ships, Speedy Equipment of, 132, v. i
Restoration, The, 81, v. i
Retirement of Sir W. White, 113, v. ii
Richard I, 10, v. i
Richard II, 10, 30, v. i
Richard III, 33, 60, v. i
Right Ahead Fire, 258, v. i
Rigging, Firing at, 129, v. i
Right of Search, 159, 161, v. i
Robinson, Commander, on Causes of Mutiny, 146, v. i
Robinson, Commander, R.N., Quoted, 194, v. i
Rocket, Congreve, 236, v. i
Rodjestvensky (analogy), 53, v. i
Rodney, 127, 129, v. i
Rogerswick, Harbour of, 180, v. i
Rogues in Authority, 201, v. i
Rolling of the “Orion,” 183, v. ii
Romans in Britain, 1, v. i
Rooke, Sir George, 96, v. i
Routine, 260, v. ii
Row Boats, 222, v. ii
Royal Indian Marine, 233, v. ii
Royal Naval College Established, Portsmouth, 187, v. i
Royal Navy, Birth of, 35, v. i
Royal Ships, 35, v. i
Royal Yachts, 33, v. i
“Ruinous Competition in Naval Armaments,” 206, v. ii
Russel, 90, 91, v. i
Russell, John Scott, 237, 249, v. i
Russia, War with (1720), 106, v. i
Russian Mines, 226, v. i
Russian Navy Established by England, 95, v. i
Russo-Japanese War, 205, v. ii
Ryswick, Peace of, 92, v. i
Samaurez, 163, v. i
Samaurez in the Baltic, 180, v. i
San Domingo, Battle of, 178, v. i
Sandwich, Earl of, 84, v. i
Saints, Battle of the, 129, v. i
San Juan Nicaragua, Nelson at, 128, v. i
Santa Croix, Capture of, 180, v. i
Santa Cruz, Marquis of, 49, v. i
Santissima Trinidad (130), 145, v. i
Saxon Fleet, 8, v. i
Saxons, 1, v. i
Scantlings, 135, v. i
Scarcity of Oak, 132, v. i
“Scouts” Appear, 127, v. ii
“Scrapping,” 311, v. i
Scheldt, 183, v. i
School of Naval Architecture, 187, v. i
Scotts, 186, v. ii
Scott Shipbuilding and Engineering Company, 175, v. ii
Sea-Fights with the Danes, 2, v. i
Seamen, Bounty to, 234, v. i
Seamen, Foreign, 235, v. i
Seamen, German, 233, v. i
Sea-Going Masted Turret Ship, 276, v. i
Sea-Going Qualities of Barnaby Ships, 59, v. ii
Seamen, Improved, 44, v. i
Sea Kings, Elizabethan, 47, v. i
Seamanship, 114, v. i
Sea Power and Napoleon, 163, 169, v. i
Sea Regiment, The, 251, v. ii
Search, Right of, 159, 161, v. i
Sebastopol Attacked, 224, v. i
Sebastopol, Siege of, 224, v. i
Semenoff, Captain (quoted), 243, v. i
“Semi-Dreadnoughts,” 127, v. ii
Senegal Captured, 184, v. i
Senyavin in the Mediterranean, 181, v. i
Senyavin, Ships of, Restored, 186, v. i
Serpents, 15, v. i
Seymour, Sir Hamilton, 235, v. i
Shah and Huascar Action, 322, v. i
Shell Guns, Adopted, 220, v. i
Shell, Percussion, 227, v. i
Shell, Thermite, 244, v. i
Sheerness, Dutch at, 83, v. i
Ships, Engaging exactly End-on, 179, v. ii
Ships, Iron-plated, 237, v. i
Ships, Ironclad, 239, v. i
Ships of King Alfred, 5, v. i
_SHIPS MENTIONED BY NAME._
Aboukir, 101, v. ii
Abyssinia, 231, v. ii
Acheron class, 200, v. ii
Achilles, 257, 258, v. i
Acorn class, 200, v. ii
Active, 197, v. ii
Admiral class, 47, v. ii
Adventure, 127, v. ii
Aeolus, 72, v. ii
Africa, 108, v. ii
Agamemnon, 133, 138, v. i
Agincourt, 279, v. i
Ajax, 186, v. ii
Aki, 146, v. ii
Alarm, 76, v. ii
Albemarle, 105, v. ii
Albion, 99, v. ii
Alexandra, 277, 318, v. i
Amphitrite, 99, v. ii
Amethyst, 322, v. i
Antrim, 109, v. ii
Amokoura, 234, v. ii
Amphion, 47, 197, v. ii
Andromache, 72, v. ii
Andromeda, 99, v. ii
Anna Pink (1740), 111, v. i
Antelope, 76, v. ii
Apollo class, 72, v. ii
Aquidaban, 77, v. ii
Archer, 201, v. ii
Argonaut, 99, v. ii
Arethusa, 197, v. ii
Ariadne, 99, v. ii
Argyll, 109, v. ii
Assaye, 232, 76, v. ii
Astraeas, 76, v. ii
Atalanta, 187, v. i
Attack, 200, v. ii
Attentive, 127, v. ii
Audacious, 277, 295, v. i
Audacious (1794), 134, 295, v. i; 186, v. ii
Aurora, 197, v. ii
Australia, 174, v. ii
Bacchante, 101, v. ii
Badere Zaffer (Turkish), 232, v. i
Bahama (Spanish), 177, v. i
Baluch, 232, v. ii
Barfluer, 69, 70, v. ii
Beagle class, 200, v. ii
Bellerophon, 266, 279, v. i; 169, v. ii
Belleisle, 232, v. i
Bellona, 197, v. ii
Berwick, 106, v. ii
Birmingham, 197, v. ii
Black Prince, 250, v. i; 35, v. ii
Blake, 61, 63, v. ii
Blanco Encalada (Chilian), 77, v. ii
Blanche, 197, v. ii
Blenheim, 61, 63, v. ii
Blonde, 321, v. i; 197, v. ii
Boadicea, 197, v. ii
Bonaventure, 72, v. ii
Boomerang, 76, 233, v. ii
Brilliant, 72, v. ii
Britannia (1688), 87, v. i
Britannia, 108, v. ii
Brisbane, 197, v. ii
Bulwark, 102, v. ii
Cæsar, 87, v. ii
Caledonia, 181, 263, v. i
Calypso, 237, v. ii
Cambrian, 72, v. ii
Camperdown, 39, v. ii
Canopus, ex-Franklin (French prize), 150, v. i
Canopus, 99, 100, v. ii
Carnarvon, 109, v. ii
Captain, 283, v. i
Captain, Loss of, 291, v. i
Centurion (1740), 112, v. i
Centurion (1891), 81, v. ii
Cerebus (Australian), 292, v. i
Charybdis, 72, v. ii
Chatham, 196, v. ii
Chen Yuen (Chinese), 180, v. ii
Chicago (U.S.), 43, v. ii
Circe, 76, v. ii
Cog, Thomas, The, 28, v. i
Commonwealth, 108, v. ii
Conqueror, 59, 174, v. ii
Cornwall, 106, v. ii
Cornwallis, 105, v. ii
County class, 105, v. ii
Crescent, 71, v. ii
Cressy, 101, v. ii
Cumberland, 106, v. ii
Cyclops, 308, v. i; 242, v. ii
Dalhousie, 231, v. ii
Dartmouth, 234, 237, v. ii
Dauntless, 219, v. i
Defence, 257, v. i
Devastation (1870), 248, 312, v. i
Devonshires, 109, v. ii
Diadem, 99, v. ii
Diana, 212, v. i
Dominion, 108, v. ii
Donegal, 106, v. ii
Drake, 105, 106, v. ii
Dreadnought (old), 292, 317, v. i
Dreadnought (1908), 164, v. ii
Dublin, 196, v. ii
Dufferin, 231, v. ii
Duncans, 105, v. ii
Edgar, 71, v. ii
Elphinstone, 231, v. ii
Endymion, 71, v. ii
Entrepennant (French), 187, v. i
Erebus, 225, v. i
Essex, 106, v. ii
Etna, 225, v. i
Europa, 99, v. ii
Euryalus, 101, v. ii
Exmouth, 105, v. ii
Fearless, 197, v. ii
Flora, 72, v. ii
Formidable, 100, 102, v. ii
Foresight, 129, v. ii
Forth, 48, v. ii
Forward, 129, v. ii
Foudroyant, 140, 160, v. i
Franklin (French prize), 150, v. i
Fulton, 190, v. i
Galatea, 197, v. ii
Gayundah, 233, v. ii
Gazelle, 78, v. ii
Gibraltar, 71, v. ii
Glasgow, 196, v. ii
Glatton (1795), 140, v. i
Glatton, 308, v. i
Gleaner, 76, v. ii
Glory, 99, v. ii
Gloucester (1740), 112, v. i
Gloucester, 204, v. ii
Goliath, 99, v. ii
Good Hope, 103, v. ii
Gorgon, 308, v. i
Gossamer, 76, v. ii
Grace de Dieu, The, 38, v. i
Grafton, 71, v. ii
Great Harry, 35, 37, v. i
Ghurka, 237, v. ii
Hampshire, 109, v. ii
Hannibal, 87, v. ii
Hardinge, 231, v. ii
Havock, 129, v. ii
Hawke, 71, v. ii
Hebe, 76, v. ii
Hecate, 308, v. i
Hector, 257, v. i
Hela (German), 78, v. ii
Henri IV (French), 204, v. ii
Hercules, 279, 283, 288, 295, v. i; 175, v. ii
Hermione, 72, v. ii
Hero, 59, v. ii
Hibernia, 108, v. ii
Hindustan, 108, v. ii
Holland, 218, v. i
Hood, 68, v. ii
Hornet, 129, v. ii
Hotspur (British), 321, v. i
Huascar (Peruvian), 322, v. i
Hydra, 308, v. i
Immortalitie, 43, v. ii
Inflexible, 52, v. ii
Intrepid, 72, v. ii
Imperieuse, 43, v. ii
Iphigenia, 72, v. ii
Iron Duke, 187, v. ii
Illustrious, 87, v. ii
Implacable, 100, v. ii
Inconstant, 321, v. i
Indefatigable, 72, 100, v. ii
Independencia, 280, v. i
Invincible, 295, 319, v. i; 183, v. ii
Iphigenia, 185, v. i
Irresistible, 100, v. ii
Italia (Italian), 63, v. ii
Jupiter, 87, v. ii
Kahren, 232, v. ii
Karrahatta, 76, 233, v. ii
Katoomba, 76, 233, v. ii
Kent, 106, v. ii
King Alfred, 103, v. ii
King Edward VII class, 107, 108, 114, 233, v. ii
King George V, 186, v. ii
Lady Nancy (Gun raft), 272, v. i
La Forte (French), 231, v. i
La Gloire (French), 254, v. i
Lancaster, 106, v. ii
Latona, 72, v. ii
Lave La, 248, v. i
Lavinia, 232, v. i
Leander, 47, v. ii
Lepanto (Italian), 63, v. ii
Leviathan, 103, v. ii
L’Hercule (French), 231, v. i
Liberté class (French), 82, v. ii
Lion, The (1800), 160, v. i
Lively, frégate, 141, v. i
Liverpool, 196, v. ii
London, 231, v. i; 104, 107, v. ii
Lord Clyde, 263, v. i
Lord Nelson, 133, v. ii
Lord Warden (British), 288, v. i
Lorne, 212, v. i
Lynch, 78, v. ii
Magdala class, 232, v. ii
Magnificent, 87, 88, v. ii
Maharatta, 232, v. ii
Majestic, 236, v. i; 85, 86, v. ii
Marengo (French), 231, v. i
Marlborough, 187, v. ii
Mars, 231, v. i; 87, v. ii
Melampus, 72, v. ii
Melbourne, 234, v. ii
Melpomene, 72, v. ii
Merrimac, 190, v. i
Mersey, 48, v. ii
Meteor, 225, v. i
Mildura, 76, 233, v. ii
Minotaur, 258, 272, v. i
Monarch, 280, 283, 284, v. i; 175, v. ii
Monarch, 183, v. ii
Montagu, 105, v. ii
Naiad, 72, v. ii
Narcissus, 43, v. ii
Neptune (1797), 151, v. i
Newcastle, 196, v. ii
New Zealand, 107, 108, v. ii
Nile, 44, v. ii
Niobe, 99, 234, v. ii
Northbrook, 231, v. ii
Northumberland, 257, 258, v. i; 59, v. ii
Nottingham, 197, v. ii
Oberon, 53, v. ii
Ocean, 263, v. i; 99, v. ii
Olympic, 71, v. ii
Orion, 183, v. ii
Orlando, 48, 63, v. ii
Pallas class, 76, 233, v. ii
Paluma, 233, v. ii
Pandora, 76, v. ii
Pathan, 232, v. ii
Pathfinder, 127, v. ii
Pearl (1740), 112, v. i; 76, v. ii
Pelican, The, 45, v. i
Pelorus, 72, v. ii
Penelope, 279, v. i
Persian, 76, v. ii
Phaeton, 197, v. ii
Phœbe, 76, v. ii
Philomel, 76, 233, v. ii
Pique, 72, v. ii
Plassy, 76, 232, v. ii
Polyphemus, 64, v. ii
Powerful, 89, v. ii
Prince Albert, 275, v. i; 134, v. ii
Prince Consort, 261, 263, v. i
Prince George, 87, v. ii
Prince of Wales, 107, v. ii
Prince Regent, 236, v. i
Prince Royal, The, 59, v. i; 174, v. ii
Princessa (Spanish), 114, v. i
Protector, 232, v. ii
Psyche, 76, v. ii
Queen, 107, v. ii
Queen Charlotte, 161, v. i
Queen Mary, 186, v. ii
Rainbow, 72, 234, v. ii
Rajput, 232, v. ii
Raleigh, 321, v. i
Ram, The, 300, v. i
Rattler, 219, v. i
Rattlesnake class, 76, v. ii
Re d’Italia, 300, v. i
Regent, 35, v. i
Renard, 76, v. ii
Renown, 79, 81, v. ii
Republique (French), 82, v. ii
Repulse, 263, v. i
Resistance, 255, 257, v. i
Retribution, 72, v. ii
Revolutionaire (French), (1794), 134, 158, v. i
Ringarooma, 76, 233, v. ii
“River” class destroyers, 131, v. ii
Rossiya (Russian), 89, v. ii
Royal Alfred, 263, v. i
Royal Arthur, 71, v. ii
Royal George, The, 114, v. i
Royal James, The, 84, v. i
Royal Oak, 263, v. i
Royal Sovereign, 275, 284, v. i; 198, v. ii
Royal Sovereign (1657), 69, v. i
Royal Sovereign (1795), 139, v. i
Royal Sovereigns, (old), 81, v. i
Roxburgh, 109, v. ii
Rupert reconstructed, 311, v. i
Rurik (Russian), 89, v. ii
Russell, 105, v. ii
Salamander, 93, 76, v. ii
Sampaio, 78, v. ii
San Ildefonso (Spanish), 177, v. i
Sappho, 72, v. ii
Satsuma (Japanese), 146, v. ii
Scorpion, 287, v. i
Scylla, 72, v. ii
Sea Gull, 76, 93, v. ii
Sea-horse, 232, v. i
Sentinel, 129, v. ii
Severn, 112, v. i; 48, v. ii
Shah, 321, v. i
Sharpshooter class, 90, 93, 232, v. ii
Sheldrake, 76, 93, v. ii
Sikh, 232, v. ii
Sirius, 185, v. i
Skipjack, 76, v. ii
Skirmisher, 127, v. ii
Southampton, 196, v. ii
Sovereign, The, 37, v. i
Spanker, floating battery, 188, v. i
Spanker, 76, 93, v. ii
Spartan, 72, v. ii
Spartiate, 99, v. ii
Speedwell, 76, v. ii
Speedy, 76, 93, v. ii
St. George, 71, v. ii
Suffolk, 106, v. ii
Sultan, 304, 313, 318, v. i
Sutlej, 101, v. ii
Swift, 200, v. ii
Swiftsure, 177, 295, v. i
Sybil, 231, v. i
Sydney, 197, v. ii
Talbot, 89, v. ii
Tauranga, 76, 233, v. ii
Terpsichore, 72, v. ii
Terrible, 89, v. ii
Terror, 225, v. i
Thames, 48, v. ii
Thetis, 72, v. ii
Thunder, 225, v. i
Thunderer, 50, 175, v. ii
Thunderbolt, 225, v. i; 50, v. ii
Tiger, 188, v. ii
Ting Yuen (Chinese), 180, v. ii
Tonnant (French), 248, v. i
“Town” class cruisers, 197, v. ii
Trafalgar, 43, 64, v. ii
Transports, 22, v. i
“Tribals,” 199, v. ii
Tribune, 72, v. ii
Triumph, 58, 295, v. i
Trusty, 225, v. i
Tryal (1740), 111, v. i
Tsarevitch (Russian), 204, v. ii
Undaunted, 197, v. ii
Valiant, 257, v. i
Vanguard, 268, 295, v. i; 169, v. ii
Venerable, 102, v. ii
Vengeance, 99, v. ii
Vernon, 254, v. i
Victoria, 48, v. ii
Victoria (Colonial), 233, v. ii
Victorious, 189, v. i; 87, v. ii
Victory, 231, v. i
Viper, 276, v. i
Vixen, 276, v. i
Von der Tann (German), 180, v. ii
Wager (1740), 111, v. i
Wallaroo, 76, 233, 256, v. ii
Wampanoag (U.S.), 320, v. i; 233, v. ii
Warrior, 254, 257, 267, v. i
Warspite, 195, v. ii
Waterwitch, 276, v. i
Weymouth class, 196, v. ii
Whiting, 76, v. ii
Wizard, 76, v. ii
Wsewolod (Russian), 232, v. i
Yarmouth, 196, v. ii
Zealous, 263, v. i
Zelandia, 108, 234, v. ii
Ship Money, 7, 69, v. i
Ships, Short, handy, 264, v. i
Shipwrights’ Company Established, 59, v. i
Short Service System, 253, v. ii
Shovell, Sir Cloudesley, 98, v. i
Sidon, 216, v. i
Simoon, 223, v. i
Sinope, Battle of, 224, v. i
Syracuse, Neutrality of, Disregarded by Nelson, 152, v. i
Sir Charles Napier, 213, v. i
“Sirius” and “Magicienne” Aground, 185, v. i
Sir W. White’s Views on the “Sovereigns,” 65, v. ii
“Slop Chest,” 195, v. i
Sluys, 24, v. i
Small Cruisers and First Cost, 75, v. ii
Small German Protected Cruisers, 197, v. ii
Smith, Sir Sidney, 180, v. i
“Smoak-Boat” of Meerlers, 90, v. i
Sole Bay, Battle of, 85, v. i
Solid Bulkhead, 204, v. ii
Suffren, 129, v. i
Southampton Sacked, 23, v. i
South Australia, 232, v. ii
Southsea Beach, 175, v. i
Sovereignty of the British Seas, 10, 16, v. i
Sovereignty of the Seas upheld by Cromwell, 75, v. i
Spain, First War with, 28, v. i
Spain, Operations against, 45, v. i
Spanish Instructors in English Navy, 43, v. i
Spanish Wars (Succession), 95, v. i
Spanish Treasure Ship Captured by Captain Anson, 111, v. i
Spanish Treasure Ships, 158, v. i
Specialisation in Elizabethan Times, 46, v. i
Speed in the “Drake” class, 103, v. ii
“Spit and Polish,” 242, v. ii
Spithead Mutiny, 146, 202, v. i
Spragge, 85, v. i
St. Andre, Jean Bon, 134, v. i
St. Bride’s Day Massacre, 8, v. i
St. Lucia Captured (1794), 137, v. i
St. Malo, 90, 119, v. i
St. Thomas Captured, 180, v. i
St. Vincent, 145, v. i
St. Vincent, Cape, Battle of, 145, v. i
Steam Ships Anticipated, 212, v. i
Steam Tugs added to Navy, 213, v. i
Steam Vessel, The First, 215, v. i
Steam Vessels, Auxiliary, 219, v. i
Steam Warships, 215, v. i
Steering Gear Unprotected, 257, v. i
Sterns made Circular, 211, v. i
Stewart Kings and the Navy, 87, v. i
Stones from Aloft, 27, v. i
Stores regularly Instituted, 132, v. i
Stour, Battle of, 2, v. i
Stoving, 107, v. i
Strachan, Rear Admiral Sir E., 177, 183, v. i
Sub-divisions, 271, v. i
Submarine, Americans refuse to officially sanction, 190, v. i
Submarine Battleship may appear, 215, v. ii
Submarine, First, 59, v. i
Submarine, First appearance of, 190, v. i
Submarine, First use of, in War, 125, v. i
Submarine, The, 228, v. i; 208, v. ii
Submarines, a Danger to Big Ships, 194, v. ii
Submarines and Harbour Defence, 208, v. ii
Succession, War of the Spanish, 95, v. i
Super-Dreadnoughts, 175, v. ii
Super-heated Steam, 201, v. ii
Superior Artillery, 231, v. i
Supply of Oak, 132, v. i
Surgeons, 207, v. i; 257, v. ii
Sveaborg, 235, v. i
Swain, King of Denmark, 8, v. i
Sweden becomes French Ally, 186, v. i
Sweden, War with (1715), 105, v. i
Sweden, Peace with, Declared (1812), 188, v. i
Swedish Fleet, 162, v. i
Sweeps superseded by Paddles, 213, v. i
Tactics, 60, v. i
Tactics at Trafalgar, 176, v. i
Tactics, Early, 28, v. i
Tactics, English, 230, v. i
Tactics, First appearance of, 21, v. i
Tagus Blockaded, 181, v. i
“Tailoring,” 260, v. ii
Tarpaulin Seamen, 115, v. i
Tegethoff at Lissa (analogy), 100, v. i
Tercera, Battle of, 48, v. i
Teignmouth Attacked, 89, v. i
Texel, 84, v. i
Thames Iron Works, Blackwall, 250, v. i
Thames, Project to Block, 84, v. i
The Australian Navy, 237, v. ii
The “Battle of the Boilers,” 93, v. ii
The Cape, 176, v. i
The Coming of the Torpedo, 51, v. ii
The “Dreadnought” Commenced, 149, v. ii
The Duties of Naval Airships, 227, v. ii
The Earliest Naval Manœuvres, 54, v. ii
The “Échelon” System Resurrected, 179, v. ii
The First British Ironclads, 249, v. i
Theft, Punishment for, 12, v. i
The Future of Submarines, 215, v. ii
“The Offensive,” 321, v. i
The Origin of “Dreadnoughts,” 137, v. ii
The Periscope, 208, v. ii
“The Torpedo Boat, the Answer to the Torpedo Boat,” 212, v. ii
“The Trafalgar of the Air,” 228, v. ii
Thermite Shell, 244, v. i
“Theseus,” Nelson’s Ship at Santa Croix, 150, v. i
“Thieving Pursers,” 201, v. i
Thompson, Messrs, of Clydebank, 304, v. i
Thornycroft, 201, v. ii
Three Days’ Battle, 76, v. i
Three-Masters, 11, v. i
Thurot, 121, v. i
Ticklers, 253, v. ii
Tiddy, Mr. David, 299, v. i
Tilset, Peace of, 180, v. i
Timber, Boiling, 107, v. i
Timber, Supply of, 132, v. i
Tiptoft, Sir Robert, 22, v. i
Torpedo (analogy), 41, v. i
Torpedo Boat, 120, v. i; 199, v. ii
Torpedoes anticipated by Reed, 268, v. i
Torpedo, First use of, from Big Ship in Action, 322, v. i
Torpedo Gun-Boats, 77, v. ii
Torpedo, The, 228, v. i
Torpedoes, 322, v. i
Torpedo Progress, 203, v. ii
Torrington, 88, v. i
Toulon, 163, 171, v. i
Toulon Abandoned, 133, v. i
Toulon, Attack on Defeated (1707), 103, v. i
Toulon, Royalists at, 133, v. i
Toulouse, Comte de, 98, v. i
Trafalgar, Battle of, 232, v. i
Trafalgar, First Battle deliberately fought under White Ensign, 210,
v. i
Trafalgar, Losses to the Allied Fleets at, 177, v. i
Trafalgar Made a Certainty, 166, v. i
Trafalgar, Tactics at, 175, v. i
Training, Lack of, 233, v. i
Training of Gunners, 241, v. i
Treadwell, Professor Daniel, 244, v. i
Treasure Ships Captured (Spanish), 158, v. i
“Trident,” First Iron Warship, 219, v. i
Trinidad, 214, v. i
Tripod Masts, 287, v. i; 175, 186, v. ii
Troubridge, 152, v. i
Trousers, Ample, 196, v. i
Tsushima, 244, v. i
Tudor Navy, 35, v. i
Tumble Home Sides, 41, v. i
Turbines Introduced for Big Ships, 155, v. ii
Turning Circles, 272, v. i
Turkish Monster Guns, 179, v. i
Turret Craze, 275, v. i
Turret on Rollers, 275, v. i
Turret Ships, Idea of, 275, v. i
Turret Ship, Sea-Going Masted, 276, v. i
Turret Ship Controversy, 292, v. i
Turret Ships, Panic About, 292, v. i
Twelve-Inch “A,” 175, v. ii
Two-Power Standard, 96, 131, v. i
Under-Water Protection, 204, v. ii
Uniform, Anson’s Use of, 113, v. i
Uniform, 25, v. ii
Uniform Badge of Pressed Men and Jail Birds, 195, v. i
Uniform, Description of First, 194, v. i
Uniform, First Use of, for Officers, 194, v. i
Union Flag Altered, 209, v. i
Union Jack, 209, v. i
United Provinces, 63, v. i
Unprotected Steering Gear, 257, v. i
Unscrupulous Contractors, 65, v. i
Ushant, 125, v. i
U.S. Monitors, 285, v. i
Vaisseaux Blindées, 248, v. i
Van Drebel, 59, v. i
“Vanguard,” The, Nelson in, 152, v. i
Van Tromp, 76, 84, v. i
Venetian Frigates Captured, 187, v. i
“Vengeur” Sunk (1795), 136, v. i
Ventilation, 115, v. i
Ventilation, Artificial, 225, v. i
Vernon, Admiral, 108, 109, v. i
Versailles, Treaty of, 130, v. i
Vickers, Lts., 192, v. ii
Villaret-Joyeuse, 134, 139, v. i
Villeneuve, 233, v. i
Villeneuve Appointed, 169, v. i
Villeneuve Gets Out of Toulon, 171, v. i
Villeneuve Returns to Toulon, 172, v. i
Victualling, 146, v. i
Walpole, 107, v. i
War, Contraband of, 161, v. i
“War Scare” with Germany in 1911, 185, v. ii
Wars of the Roses, 33, v. i
Warwick, Earl of, 33, v. i; 198, v. ii
Warry (Early Idea of Quick Firer), 242, v. i
Walcheren Expedition, 183, v. i
Watts, Isaac, Sir, 254, 258, v. i
Waterloo, Battle of, 193, v. i
Weather Gauge, 21, v. i
Western Australia, 232, v. ii
West Indies, 171, 177, v. i
Whitehead, 204, v. ii
White, of Cowes, 232, v. ii
Whitworth, Works of, 239, v. i
Who First Adopted Cuniberti Ideas?, 159, v. ii
Why France was Beaten, 233, v. i
Willaumez, Leaves Brest, 182, v. i
Willaumez, Rear Admiral, 177, v. i
Willaumez Blockaded in Basque Roads, 182, v. i
Will Dreadnoughts Die Out?, 195, v. ii
William of Orange, 88, v. i
William the Conqueror, 10, v. i
Wire Guns, Early, 247, v. i
Wolfe, 122, v. i
Wood-Copper Sheathing Re-introduced, 295, v. i
Woolwich, 183, v. i
World Circumnavigated by Drake, 45, v. i
Yarmouth Ships, 22, v. i
Yarrow Boilers, 97, 196, v. ii
York, New, 237, v. i
Zarate, Don Francisco de, 46, v. i
Zeppelin Type (Dirigible), 227, v. ii
THE END.
NETHERWOOD, DALTON & CO., RASHCLIFFE, HUDDERSFIELD.
Transcriber’s Notes
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