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Title: The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, Vol. II. (of 12)
Author: Edmund Burke
Release Date: February 28, 2005 [EBook #15198]
[Date last updated: May 5, 2006]
Language: English
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THE WORKS
OF
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
EDMUND BURKE
IN TWELVE VOLUMES
VOLUME THE SECOND
[Illustration: Burke Coat of Arms.]
LONDON
JOHN C. NIMMO
14, KING WILLIAM STREET, STRAND, W.C.
MDCCCLXXXVII
CONTENTS OF VOL. II.
SPEECH ON AMERICAN TAXATION, April 19, 1774 1
SPEECHES ON ARRIVAL AT BRISTOL AND AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE POLL,
October 13 and November 3, 1774 81
SPEECH ON MOVING RESOLUTIONS FOR CONCILIATION WITH AMERICA,
March 22, 1775 99
LETTER TO THE SHERIFFS OF BRISTOL, ON THE AFFAIRS OF AMERICA,
April 3, 1777 187
TWO LETTERS TO GENTLEMEN OF BRISTOL, ON THE BILLS DEPENDING IN
PARLIAMENT RELATIVE TO THE TRADE OF IRELAND, April 23 and
May 2, 1778 247
SPEECH ON PRESENTING TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS A PLAN FOR THE BETTER
SECURITY OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF PARLIAMENT, AND THE ECONOMICAL
REFORMATION OF THE CIVIL AND OTHER ESTABLISHMENTS,
February 11, 1780 265
SPEECH AT BRISTOL PREVIOUS TO THE ELECTION, September 6, 1780 365
SPEECH AT BRISTOL ON DECLINING THE POLL, September 9, 1780 425
SPEECH ON MR. FOX'S EAST INDIA BILL, December 1, 1783 431
A REPRESENTATION TO HIS MAJESTY, MOVED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS,
June 14, 1784 537
SPEECH
ON
AMERICAN TAXATION.
APRIL 19, 1774.
PREFACE.
The following speech has been much the subject of conversation, and the
desire of having it printed was last summer very general. The means of
gratifying the public curiosity were obligingly furnished from the notes
of some gentlemen, members of the last Parliament.
This piece has been for some months ready for the press. But a delicacy,
possibly over-scrupulous, has delayed the publication to this time. The
friends of administration have been used to attribute a great deal of
the opposition to their measures in America to the writings published in
England. The editor of this speech kept it back, until all the measures
of government have had their full operation, and can be no longer
affected, if ever they could have been affected, by any publication.
Most readers will recollect the uncommon pains taken at the beginning of
the last session of the last Parliament, and indeed during the whole
course of it, to asperse the characters and decry the measures of those
who were supposed to be friends to America, in order to weaken the
effect of their opposition to the acts of rigor then preparing against
the colonies. The speech contains a full refutation of the charges
against that party with which Mr. Burke has all along acted. In doing
this, he has taken a review of the effects of all the schemes which
have been successively adopted in the government of the plantations. The
subject is interesting; the matters of information various and
important; and the publication at this time, the editor hopes, will not
be thought unseasonable.
SPEECH.
During the last session of the last Parliament, on the 19th of
April, 1774, Mr. Rose Fuller, member for Rye, made the following
motion:--
"That an act made in the seventh year of the reign of his present
Majesty, intituled, 'An act for granting certain duties in the
British colonies and plantations in America; for allowing a
drawback of the duties of customs upon the exportation from this
kingdom of coffee and cocoa-nuts, of the produce of the said
colonies or plantations; for discontinuing the drawbacks payable on
china earthenware exported to America; and for more effectually
preventing the clandestine running of goods in the said colonies
and plantations, might be read."
And the same being read accordingly, he moved,--
"That this House will, upon this day sevennight, resolve itself
into a committee of the whole House, to take into consideration the
duty of three-pence per pound weight upon tea, payable in all his
Majesty's dominions in America, imposed by the said act; and also
the appropriation of the said duty."
On this latter motion a warm and interesting debate arose, in which
Mr. Burke spoke as follows.
Sir,--I agree with the honorable gentleman[1] who spoke last, that this
subject is not new in this House. Very disagreeably to this House, very
unfortunately to this nation, and to the peace and prosperity of this
whole empire, no topic has been more familiar to us. For nine long
years, session after session, we have been lashed round and round this
miserable circle of occasional arguments and temporary expedients. I am
sure our heads must turn and our stomachs nauseate with them. We have
had them in every shape; we have looked at them in every point of view.
Invention is exhausted; reason is fatigued; experience has given
judgment; but obstinacy is not yet conquered.
The honorable gentleman has made one endeavor more to diversify the form
of this disgusting argument. He has thrown out a speech composed almost
entirely of challenges. Challenges are serious things; and as he is a
man of prudence as well as resolution, I dare say he has very well
weighed those challenges before he delivered them. I had long the
happiness to sit at the same side of the House, and to agree with the
honorable gentleman on all the American questions. My sentiments, I am
sure, are well known to him; and I thought I had been perfectly
acquainted with his. Though I find myself mistaken, he will still permit
me to use the privilege of an old friendship; he will permit me to apply
myself to the House under the sanction of his authority, and, on the
various grounds he has measured out, to submit to you the poor opinions
which I have formed upon a matter of importance enough to demand the
fullest consideration I could bestow upon it.
He has stated to the House two grounds of deliberation: one narrow and
simple, and merely confined to the question on your paper; the other
more large and more complicated,--comprehending the whole series of the
Parliamentary proceedings with regard to America, their causes, and
their consequences. With regard to the latter ground, he states it as
useless, and thinks it may be even dangerous, to enter into so extensive
a field of inquiry. Yet, to my surprise, he had hardly laid down this
restrictive proposition, to which his authority would have given so much
weight, when directly, and with the same authority, he condemns it, and
declares it absolutely necessary to enter into the most ample historical
detail. His zeal has thrown him a little out of his usual accuracy. In
this perplexity, what shall we do, Sir, who are willing to submit to the
law he gives us? He has reprobated in one part of his speech the rule he
had laid down for debate in the other, and, after narrowing the ground
for all those who are to speak after him, he takes an excursion,
himself, as unbounded as the subject and the extent of his great
abilities.
Sir, when I cannot obey all his laws, I will do the best I can. I will
endeavor to obey such of them as have the sanction of his example, and
to stick to that rule which, though not consistent with the other, is
the most rational. He was certainly in the right, when he took the
matter largely. I cannot prevail on myself to agree with him in his
censure of his own conduct. It is not, he will give me leave to say,
either useless or dangerous. He asserts, that retrospect is not wise;
and the proper, the only proper subject of inquiry, is "not how we got
into this difficulty, but how we are to get out of it." In other words,
we are, according to him, to consult our invention, and to reject our
experience. The mode of deliberation he recommends is diametrically
opposite to every rule of reason and every principle of good sense
established amongst mankind. For that sense and that reason I have
always understood absolutely to prescribe, whenever we are involved in
difficulties from the measures we have pursued, that we should take a
strict review of those measures, in order to correct our errors, if they
should be corrigible,--or at least to avoid a dull uniformity in
mischief, and the unpitied calamity of being repeatedly caught in the
same snare.
Sir, I will freely follow the honorable gentleman in his historical
discussion, without the least management for men or measures, further
than as they shall seem to me to deserve it. But before I go into that
large consideration, because I would omit nothing that can give the
House satisfaction, I wish to tread the narrow ground to which alone the
honorable gentleman, in one part of his speech, has so strictly confined
us.
He desires to know, whether, if we were to repeal this tax, agreeably to
the proposition of the honorable gentleman who made the motion, the
Americans would not take post on this concession, in order to make a new
attack on the next body of taxes; and whether they would not call for a
repeal of the duty on wine as loudly as they do now for the repeal of
the duty on tea. Sir, I can give no security on this subject. But I will
do all that I can, and all that can be fairly demanded. To the
_experience_ which the honorable gentleman reprobates in one instant and
reverts to in the next, to that experience, without the least wavering
or hesitation on my part, I steadily appeal: and would to God there was
no other arbiter to decide on the vote with which the House is to
conclude this day!
When Parliament repealed the Stamp Act in the year 1766, I affirm,
first, that the Americans did _not_ in consequence of this measure call
upon you to give up the former Parliamentary revenue which subsisted in
that country, or even any one of the articles which compose it. I affirm
also, that, when, departing from the maxims of that repeal, you revived
the scheme of taxation, and thereby filled the minds of the colonists
with new jealousy and all sorts of apprehensions, then it was that they
quarrelled with the old taxes as well as the new; then it was, and not
till then, that they questioned all the parts of your legislative power,
and by the battery of such questions have shaken the solid structure of
this empire to its deepest foundations.
Of those two propositions I shall, before I have done, give such
convincing, such damning proof, that, however the contrary may be
whispered in circles or bawled in newspapers, they never more will dare
to raise their voices in this House. I speak with great confidence. I
have reason for it. The ministers are with me. _They_ at least are
convinced that the repeal of the Stamp Act had not, and that no repeal
can have, the consequences which the honorable gentleman who defends
their measures is so much alarmed at. To their conduct I refer him for a
conclusive answer to his objection. I carry my proof irresistibly into
the very body of both Ministry and Parliament: not on any general
reasoning growing out of collateral matter, but on the conduct of the
honorable gentleman's ministerial friends on the new revenue itself.
The act of 1767, which grants this tea-duty, sets forth in its preamble,
that it was expedient to raise a revenue in America for the support of
the civil government there, as well as for purposes still more
extensive. To this support the act assigns six branches of duties. About
two years after this act passed, the ministry, I mean the present
ministry, thought it expedient to repeal five of the duties, and to
leave (for reasons best known to themselves) only the sixth standing.
Suppose any person, at the time of that repeal, had thus addressed the
minister:[2] "Condemning, as you do, the repeal of the Stamp Act, why do
you venture to repeal the duties upon glass, paper, and painters'
colors? Let your pretence for the repeal be what it will, are you not
thoroughly convinced that your concessions will produce, not
satisfaction, but insolence in the Americans, and that the giving up
these taxes will necessitate the giving up of all the rest?" This
objection was as palpable then as it is now; and it was as good for
preserving the five duties as for retaining the sixth. Besides, the
minister will recollect that the repeal of the Stamp Act had but just
preceded his repeal; and the ill policy of that measure, (had it been so
impolitic as it has been represented,) and the mischiefs it produced,
were quite recent. Upon the principles, therefore, of the honorable
gentleman, upon the principles of the minister himself, the minister has
nothing at all to answer. He stands condemned by himself, and by all his
associates old and new, as a destroyer, in the first trust of finance,
of the revenues,--and in the first rank of honor, as a betrayer of the
dignity of his country.
Most men, especially great men, do not always know their well-wishers. I
come to rescue that noble lord out of the hands of those he calls his
friends, and even out of his own. I will do him the justice he is denied
at home. He has not been this wicked or imprudent man. He knew that a
repeal had no tendency to produce the mischiefs which give so much alarm
to his honorable friend. His work was not bad in its principle, but
imperfect in its execution; and the motion on your paper presses him
only to complete a proper plan, which, by some unfortunate and
unaccountable error, he had left unfinished.
I hope, Sir, the honorable gentleman who spoke last is thoroughly
satisfied, and satisfied out of the proceedings of ministry on their own
favorite act, that his fears from a repeal are groundless. If he is not,
I leave him, and the noble lord who sits by him, to settle the matter as
well as they can together; for, if the repeal of American taxes destroys
all our government in America,--he is the man!--and he is the worst of
all the repealers, because he is the last.
But I hear it rung continually in my ears, now and formerly,--"The
preamble! what will become of the preamble, if you repeal this tax?"--I
am sorry to be compelled so often to expose the calamities and disgraces
of Parliament. The preamble of this law, standing as it now stands, has
the lie direct given to it by the provisionary part of the act: if that
can be called provisionary which makes no provision. I should be afraid
to express myself in this manner, especially in the face of such a
formidable array of ability as is now drawn up before me, composed of
the ancient household troops of that side of the House and the new
recruits from this, if the matter were not clear and indisputable.
Nothing but truth could give me this firmness; but plain truth and
clear evidence can be beat down by no ability. The clerk will be so good
as to turn to the act, and to read this favorite preamble.
"Whereas it is _expedient_ that a revenue should be raised in your
Majesty's dominions in America, for making a more _certain_ and
_adequate_ provision for defraying the charge of the _administration of
justice and support of civil government_ in such provinces where it
shall be found necessary, and towards _further defraying_ the expenses
of _defending, protecting, and securing the said dominions_."
You have heard this pompous performance. Now where is the revenue which
is to do all these mighty things? Five sixths
repealed,--abandoned,--sunk,--gone,--lost forever. Does the poor
solitary tea-duty support the purposes of this preamble? Is not the
supply there stated as effectually abandoned as if the tea-duty had
perished in the general wreck? Here, Mr. Speaker, is a precious
mockery:--a preamble without an act,--taxes granted in order to be
repealed,--and the reasons of the grant still carefully kept up! This is
raising a revenue in America! This is preserving dignity in England! If
you repeal this tax, in compliance with the motion, I readily admit that
you lose this fair preamble. Estimate your loss in it. The object of the
act is gone already; and all you suffer is the purging the statute-book
of the opprobrium of an empty, absurd, and false recital.
It has been said again and again, that the five taxes were repealed on
commercial principles. It is so said in the paper in my hand:[3] a paper
which I constantly carry about; which I have often used, and shall
often use again. What is got by this paltry pretence of commercial
principles I know not; for, if your government in America is destroyed
by the _repeal of taxes_, it is of no consequence upon what ideas the
repeal is grounded. Repeal this tax, too, upon commercial principles, if
you please. These principles will serve as well now as they did
formerly. But you know that either your objection to a repeal from these
supposed consequences has no validity, or that this pretence never could
remove it. This commercial motive never was believed by any man, either
in America, which this letter is meant to soothe, or in England, which
it is meant to deceive. It was impossible it should: because every man,
in the least acquainted with the detail of commerce, must know that
several of the articles on which the tax was repealed were fitter
objects of duties than almost any other articles that could possibly be
chosen,--without comparison more so than the tea that was left taxed, as
infinitely less liable to be eluded by contraband. The tax upon red and
white lead was of this nature. You have in this kingdom an advantage in
lead that amounts to a monopoly. When you find yourself in this
situation of advantage, you sometimes venture to tax even your own
export. You did so soon after the last war, when, upon this principle,
you ventured to impose a duty on coals. In all the articles of American
contraband trade, who ever heard of the smuggling of red lead and white
lead? You might, therefore, well enough, without danger of contraband,
and without injury to commerce, (if this were the whole consideration,)
have taxed these commodities. The same may be said of glass. Besides,
some of the things taxed were so trivial, that the loss of the objects
themselves, and their utter annihilation out of American commerce, would
have been comparatively as nothing. But is the article of tea such an
object in the trade of England, as not to be felt, or felt but slightly,
like white lead, and red lead, and painters' colors? Tea is an object of
far other importance. Tea is perhaps the most important object, taking
it with its necessary connections, of any in the mighty circle of our
commerce. If commercial principles had been the true motives to the
repeal, or had they been at all attended to, tea would have been the
last article we should have left taxed for a subject of controversy.
Sir, it is not a pleasant consideration, but nothing in the world can
read so awful and so instructive a lesson as the conduct of ministry in
this business, upon the mischief of not having large and liberal ideas
in the management of great affairs. Never have the servants of the state
looked at the whole of your complicated interests in one connected view.
They have taken things by bits and scraps, some at one time and one
pretence, and some at another, just as they pressed, without any sort of
regard to their relations or dependencies. They never had any kind of
system, right or wrong; but only invented occasionally some miserable
tale for the day, in order meanly to sneak out of difficulties into
which they had proudly strutted. And they were put to all these shifts
and devices, full of meanness and full of mischief, in order to pilfer
piecemeal a repeal of an act which they had not the generous courage,
when they found and felt their error, honorably and fairly to disclaim.
By such management, by the irresistible operation of feeble councils,
so paltry a sum as three-pence in the eyes of a financier, so
insignificant an article as tea in the eyes of a philosopher, have
shaken the pillars of a commercial empire that circled the whole globe.
Do you forget that in the very last year you stood on the precipice of
general bankruptcy? Your danger was indeed great. You were distressed in
the affairs of the East India Company; and you well know what sort of
things are involved in the comprehensive energy of that significant
appellation. I am not called upon to enlarge to you on that danger,
which you thought proper yourselves to aggravate, and to display to the
world with all the parade of indiscreet declamation. The monopoly of the
most lucrative trades and the possession of imperial revenues had
brought you to the verge of beggary and ruin. Such was your
representation; such, in some measure, was your case. The vent of ten
millions of pounds of this commodity, now locked up by the operation of
an injudicious tax, and rotting in the warehouses of the Company, would
have prevented all this distress, and all that series of desperate
measures which you thought yourselves obliged to take in consequence of
it. America would have furnished that vent, which no other part of the
world can furnish but America, where tea is next to a necessary of life,
and where the demand grows upon the supply. I hope our dear-bought East
India Committees have done us at least so much good, as to let us know,
that, without a more extensive sale of that article, our East India
revenues and acquisitions can have no certain connection with this
country. It is through the American trade of tea that your East India
conquests are to be prevented from crushing you with their burden. They
are ponderous indeed; and they must have that great country to lean
upon, or they tumble upon your head. It is the same folly that has lost
you at once the benefit of the West and of the East. This folly has
thrown open folding-doors to contraband, and will be the means of giving
the profits of the trade of your colonies to every nation but
yourselves. Never did a people suffer so much for the empty words of a
preamble. It must be given up. For on what principle does it stand? This
famous revenue stands, at this hour, on all the debate, as a description
of revenue not as yet known in all the comprehensive (but too
comprehensive!) vocabulary of finance,--_a preambulary tax_. It is,
indeed, a tax of sophistry, a tax of pedantry, a tax of disputation, a
tax of war and rebellion, a tax for anything but benefit to the imposers
or satisfaction to the subject.
Well! but whatever it is, gentlemen will force the colonists to take the
teas. You will force them? Has seven years' struggle been yet able to
force them? Oh, but it seems "we are in the right. The tax is
trifling,--in effect it is rather an exoneration than an imposition;
three fourths of the duty formerly payable on teas exported to America
is taken off,--the place of collection is only shifted; instead of the
retention of a shilling from the drawback here, it is three-pence custom
paid in America." All this, Sir, is very true. But this is the very
folly and mischief of the act. Incredible as it may seem, you know that
you have deliberately thrown away a large duty, which you held secure
and quiet in your hands, for the vain hope of getting one three fourths
less, through every hazard, through certain litigation, and possibly
through war.
The manner of proceeding in the duties on paper and glass, imposed by
the same act, was exactly in the same spirit. There are heavy excises on
those articles, when used in England. On export, these excises are drawn
back. But instead of withholding the drawback, which might have been
done, with ease, without charge, without possibility of smuggling, and
instead of applying the money (money already in your hands) according to
your pleasure, you began your operations in finance by flinging away
your revenue; you allowed the whole drawback on export, and then you
charged the duty, (which you had before discharged,) payable in the
colonies, where it was certain the collection would devour it to the
bone,--if any revenue were ever suffered to be collected at all. One
spirit pervades and animates the whole mass.
Could anything be a subject of more just alarm to America than to see
you go out of the plain highroad of finance, and give up your most
certain revenues and your clearest interest, merely for the sake of
insulting your colonies? No man ever doubted that the commodity of tea
could bear an imposition of three-pence. But no commodity will bear
three-pence, or will bear a penny, when the general feelings of men are
irritated, and two millions of people are resolved not to pay. The
feelings of the colonies were formerly the feelings of Great Britain.
Theirs were formerly the feelings of Mr. Hampden, when called upon for
the payment of twenty shillings. Would twenty shillings have ruined Mr.
Hampden's fortune? No! but the payment of half twenty shillings, on the
principle it was demanded, would have made him a slave. It is the weight
of that preamble, of which you are so fond, and not the weight of the
duty, that the Americans are unable and unwilling to bear.
It is, then, Sir, upon the _principle_ of this measure, and nothing
else, that we are at issue. It is a principle of political expediency.
Your act of 1767 asserts that it is expedient to raise a revenue in
America; your act of 1769, which takes away that revenue, contradicts
the act of 1767, and, by something much stronger than words, asserts
that it is not expedient. It is a reflection upon your wisdom to persist
in a solemn Parliamentary declaration of the expediency of any object,
for which, at the same time, you make no sort of provision. And pray,
Sir, let not this circumstance escape you,--it is very material,--that
the preamble of this act which we wish to repeal is not _declaratory of
a right_, as some gentlemen seem to argue it: it is only a recital of
the _expediency_ of a certain exercise of a right supposed already to
have been asserted; an exercise you are now contending for by ways and
means which you confess, though they were obeyed, to be utterly
insufficient for their purpose. You are therefore at this moment in the
awkward situation of fighting for a phantom,--a quiddity,--a thing that
wants, not only a substance, but even a name,--for a thing which is
neither abstract right nor profitable enjoyment.
They tell you, Sir, that your dignity is tied to it. I know not how it
happens, but this dignify of yours is a terrible incumbrance to you; for
it has of late been ever at war with your interest, your equity, and
every idea of your policy. Show the thing you contend for to be reason,
show it to be common sense, show it to be the means of attaining some
useful end, and then I am content to allow it what dignity you please.
But what dignity is derived from the perseverance in absurdity is more
than ever I could discern. The honorable gentleman has said
well,--indeed, in most of his _general_ observations I agree with
him,--he says, that this subject does not stand as it did formerly. Oh,
certainly not! Every hour you continue on this ill-chosen ground, your
difficulties thicken on you; and therefore my conclusion is, remove from
a bad position as quickly as you can. The disgrace, and the necessity of
yielding, both of them, grow upon you every hour of your delay.
But will you repeal the act, says the honorable gentleman, at this
instant, when America is in open resistance to your authority, and that
you have just revived your system of taxation? He thinks he has driven
us into a corner. But thus pent up, I am content to meet him; because I
enter the lists supported by my old authority, his new friends, the
ministers themselves. The honorable gentleman remembers that about five
years ago as great disturbances as the present prevailed in America on
account of the new taxes. The ministers represented these disturbances
as treasonable; and this House thought proper, on that representation,
to make a famous address for a revival and for a new application of a
statute of Henry the Eighth. We besought the king, in that
well-considered address, to inquire into treasons, and to bring the
supposed traitors from America to Great Britain for trial. His Majesty
was pleased graciously to promise a compliance with our request. All the
attempts from this side of the House to resist these violences, and to
bring about a repeal, were treated with the utmost scorn. An
apprehension of the very consequences now stated by the honorable
gentleman was then given as a reason for shutting the door against all
hope of such an alteration. And so strong was the spirit for supporting
the new taxes, that the session concluded with the following remarkable
declaration. After stating the vigorous measures which had been pursued,
the speech from the throne proceeds:--
"You have assured me of your _firm_ support in the _prosecution_ of
them. Nothing, in my opinion, could be more likely to enable the
well-disposed among my subjects in that part of the world effectually to
discourage and defeat the designs of the factious and seditious than the
hearty concurrence of every branch of the legislature in the resolution
of _maintaining the execution of the laws in every_ part of my
dominions."
After this no man dreamt that a repeal under this ministry could
possibly take place. The honorable gentleman knows as well as I, that
the idea was utterly exploded by those who sway the House. This speech
was made on the ninth day of May, 1769. Five days after this speech,
that is, on the thirteenth of the same month, the public circular
letter, a part of which I am going to read to you, was written by Lord
Hillsborough, Secretary of State for the Colonies. After reciting the
substance of the king's speech, he goes on thus:--
"I can take upon me to assure you, notwithstanding insinuations to the
contrary from men with _factious and seditious views_, that his
Majesty's _present administration have at no time entertained a design
to propose to Parliament to lay any further taxes upon America, for the
purpose of_ RAISING A REVENUE; and that it is at present their intention
to propose, the next session of Parliament, to take off the duties upon
glass, paper, and colors, upon consideration of such duties _having been
laid contrary to the true principles of commerce_.
"These have _always_ been, and _still are_, the sentiments of _his
Majesty's present servants_, and by which their conduct _in respect to
America has been governed._ And _his Majesty_ relies upon your prudence
and fidelity for such an explanation of _his_ measures as may tend to
remove the prejudices which have been excited by the misrepresentations
of those who are enemies to the peace and prosperity of Great Britain
and her colonies, and to reëstablish that mutual _confidence and
affection_ upon which the glory and safety of the British empire
depend."
Here, Sir, is a canonical boot of ministerial scripture: the general
epistle to the Americans. What does the gentleman say to it? Here a
repeal is promised,--promised without condition,--and while your
authority was actually resisted. I pass by the public promise of a peer
relative to the repeal of taxes by this House. I pass by the use of the
king's name in a matter of supply, that sacred and reserved right of the
Commons. I conceal the ridiculous figure of Parliament hurling its
thunders at the gigantic rebellion of America, and then, five days
after, prostrate at the feet of those assemblies we affected to
despise,--begging them, by the intervention of our ministerial sureties,
to receive our submission, and heartily promising amendment. These might
have been serious matters formerly; but we are grown wiser than our
fathers. Passing, therefore, from the Constitutional consideration to
the mere policy, does not this letter imply that the idea of taxing
America for the purpose of revenue is an abominable project, when the
ministry suppose none but _factious_ men, and with seditious views,
could charge them with it? does not this letter adopt and sanctify the
American distinction of _taxing for a revenue_? does it not formally
reject all future taxation on that principle? does it not state the
ministerial rejection of such principle of taxation, not as the
occasional, but the constant opinion of the king's servants? does it not
say, (I care not how consistently,) but does it not say, that their
conduct with regard to America has been _always_ governed by this
policy? It goes a great deal further. These excellent and trusty
servants of the king, justly fearful lest they themselves should have
lost all credit with the world, bring out the image of their gracious
sovereign from the inmost and most sacred shrine, and they pawn him as a
security for their promises:--"_His Majesty_ relies on your prudence and
fidelity for such an explanation of _his_ measures." These sentiments of
the minister and these measures of his Majesty can only relate to the
principle and practice of taxing for a revenue; and accordingly Lord
Botetourt, stating it as such, did, with great propriety, and in the
exact spirit of his instructions, endeavor to remove the fears of the
Virginian assembly lest the sentiments which it seems (unknown to the
world) had _always_ been those of the ministers, and by which _their_
conduct _in respect to America had been governed_, should by some
possible revolution, favorable to wicked American taxers, be hereafter
counteracted. He addresses them in this manner:--
"It may possibly be objected, that, as his Majesty's present
administration are _not immortal_, their successors may be inclined to
attempt to undo what the present ministers shall have attempted to
perform; and to that objection I can give but this answer: that it is my
firm opinion, that the plan I have stated to you will certainly take
place, and that it will never be departed from; and so determined am I
forever to abide by it, that I will be content to be declared infamous,
if I do not, to the last hour of my life, at all times, in all places,
and upon all occasions, exert every power with which I either am or ever
shall be legally invested, in order to obtain and _maintain_ for the
continent of America that _satisfaction_ which I have been authorized to
promise this day by the _confidential_ servants of our gracious
sovereign, who to my certain knowledge rates his honor so high _that he
would rather part with his crown than preserve it by deceit_."[4]
A glorious and true character! which (since we suffer his ministers with
impunity to answer for his ideas of taxation) we ought to make it our
business to enable his Majesty to preserve in all its lustre. Let him
have character, since ours is no more! Let some part of government be
kept in respect!
This epistle was not the letter of Lord Hillsborough solely, though he
held the official pen. It was the letter of the noble lord upon the
floor,[5] and of all the king's then ministers, who (with, I think, the
exception of two only) are his ministers at this hour. The very first
news that a British Parliament heard of what it was to do with the
duties which it had given and granted to the king was by the publication
of the votes of American assemblies. It was in America that your
resolutions were pre-declared. It was from thence that we knew to a
certainty how much exactly, and not a scruple more nor less, we were to
repeal. We were unworthy to be let into the secret of our own conduct.
The assemblies had _confidential_ communications from his Majesty's
_confidential_ servants. We were nothing but instruments. Do you, after
this, wonder that you have no weight and no respect in the colonies?
After this are you surprised that Parliament is every day and everywhere
losing (I feel it with sorrow, I utter it with reluctance) that
reverential affection which so endearing a name of authority ought ever
to carry with it? that you are obeyed solely from respect to the
bayonet? and that this House, the ground and pillar of freedom, is
itself held up only by the treacherous underpinning and clumsy
buttresses of arbitrary power?
If this dignity, which is to stand in the place of just policy and
common sense, had been consulted, there was a time for preserving it,
and for reconciling it with any concession. If in the session of 1768,
that session of idle terror and empty menaces, you had, as you were
often pressed to do, repealed these taxes, then your strong operations
would have come justified and enforced, in case your concessions had
been returned by outrages. But, preposterously, you began with violence;
and before terrors could have any effect, either good or bad, your
ministers immediately begged pardon, and promised that repeal to the
obstinate Americans which they had refused in an easy, good-natured,
complying British Parliament. The assemblies, which had been publicly
and avowedly dissolved for _their_ contumacy, are called together to
receive _your_ submission. Your ministerial directors blustered like
tragic tyrants here; and then went mumping with a sore leg in America,
canting, and whining, and complaining of faction, which represented them
as friends to a revenue from the colonies. I hope nobody in this House
will hereafter have the impudence to defend American taxes in the name
of ministry. The moment they do, with this letter of attorney in my
hand, I will tell them, in the authorized terms, they are wretches "with
factious and seditious views," "enemies to the peace and prosperity of
the mother country and the colonies," and subverters "of the mutual
affection and confidence on which the glory and safety of the British
empire depend."
After this letter, the question is no more on propriety or dignity. They
are gone already. The faith of your sovereign is pledged for the
political principle. The general declaration in the letter goes to the
whole of it. You must therefore either abandon the scheme of taxing, or
you must send the ministers tarred and feathered to America, who dared
to hold out the royal faith for a renunciation of all taxes for revenue.
Them you must punish, or this faith you must preserve. The preservation
of this faith is of more consequence than the duties on _red lead_, or
_white lead_, or on broken _glass_, or _atlas-ordinary_, or _demy-fine_,
or _blue-royal_, or _bastard_, or _fools cap_, which you have given up,
or the three-pence on tea which you retained. The letter went stamped
with the public authority of this kingdom. The instructions for the
colony government go under no other sanction; and America cannot
believe, and will not obey you, if you do not preserve this channel of
communication sacred. You are now punishing the colonies for acting on
distinctions held out by that very ministry which is here shining in
riches, in favor, and in power, and urging the punishment of the very
offence to which they had themselves been the tempters.
Sir, if reasons respecting simply your own commerce, which is your own
convenience, were the sole grounds of the repeal of the five duties, why
does Lord Hillsborough, in disclaiming in the name of the king and
ministry their ever having had an intent to tax for revenue, mention it
as the means "of reëstablishing the confidence and affection of the
colonies?" Is it a way of soothing _others_, to assure them that you
will take good care of _yourself_? The medium, the only medium, for
regaining their affection and confidence is that you will take off
something oppressive to their minds. Sir, the letter strongly enforces
that idea: for though the repeal of the taxes is promised on commercial
principles, yet the means of counteracting the "insinuations of men with
factious and seditious views" is by a disclaimer of the intention of
taxing for revenue, as a constant, invariable sentiment and rule of
conduct in the government of America.
I remember that the noble lord on the floor, not in a former debate to
be sure, (it would be disorderly to refer to it, I suppose I read it
somewhere,) but the noble lord was pleased to say, that he did not
conceive how it could enter into the head of man to impose such taxes as
those of 1767: I mean those taxes which he voted for imposing, and voted
for repealing,--as being taxes, contrary to all the principles of
commerce, laid on _British manufactures_.
I dare say the noble lord is perfectly well read, because the duty of
his particular office requires he should be so, in all our revenue laws,
and in the policy which is to be collected out of them. Now, Sir, when
he had read this act of American revenue, and a little recovered from
his astonishment, I suppose he made one step retrograde (it is but one)
and looked at the act which stands just before in the statute-book. The
American revenue act is the forty-fifth chapter; the other to which I
refer is the forty-fourth of the same session. These two acts are both
to the same purpose: both revenue acts; both taxing out of the kingdom;
and both taxing British manufactures exported. As the forty-fifth is an
act for raising a revenue in America, the forty-fourth is an act for
raising a revenue in the Isle of Man. The two acts perfectly agree in
all respects, except one. In the act for taxing the Isle of Man the
noble lord will find, not, as in the American act, four or fire
articles, but almost the _whole body_ of British manufactures, taxed
from two and a half to fifteen per cent, and some articles, such as that
of spirits, a great deal higher. You did not think it uncommercial to
tax the whole mass of your manufactures, and, let me add, your
agriculture too; for, I now recollect, British corn is there also taxed
up to ten per cent, and this too in the very head-quarters, the very
citadel of smuggling, the Isle of Man. Now will the noble lord
condescend to tell me why he repealed the taxes on your manufactures
sent out to America, and not the taxes on the manufactures exported to
the Isle of Man? The principle was exactly the same, the objects charged
infinitely more extensive, the duties without comparison higher. Why?
Why, notwithstanding all his childish pretexts, because the taxes were
quietly submitted to in the Isle of Man, and because they raised a flame
in America. Your reasons were political, not commercial. The repeal was
made, as Lord Hillsborough's letter well expresses it, to regain "the
confidence and affection of the colonies, on which the glory and safety
of the British empire depend." A wise and just motive, surely, if ever
there was such. But the mischief and dishonor is, that you have not done
what you had given the colonies just cause to expect, when your
ministers disclaimed the idea of taxes for a revenue. There is nothing
simple, nothing manly, nothing ingenuous, open, decisive, or steady, in
the proceeding, with regard either to the continuance or the repeal of
the taxes. The whole has an air of littleness and fraud. The article of
tea is slurred over in the circular letter, as it were by accident:
nothing is said of a resolution either to keep that tax or to give it
up. There is no fair dealing in any part of the transaction.
If you mean to follow your true motive and your public faith, give up
your tax on tea for raising a revenue, the principle of which has, in
effect, been disclaimed in your name, and which produces you no
advantage,--no, not a penny. Or, if you choose to go on with a poor
pretence instead of a solid reason, and will still adhere to your cant
of commerce, you have ten thousand times more strong commercial reasons
for giving up this duty on tea than for abandoning the five others that
you have already renounced.
The American consumption of teas is annually, I believe, worth 300,000_l._
at the least farthing. If you urge the American violence as a
justification of your perseverance in enforcing this tax, you know that
you can never answer this plain question,--Why did you repeal the others
given in the same act, whilst the very same violence subsisted?--But you
did not find the violence cease upon that concession.--No! because the
concession was far short of satisfying the principle which Lord
Hillsborough had abjured, or even the pretence on which the repeal of
the other taxes was announced; and because, by enabling the East India
Company to open a shop for defeating the American resolution not to pay
that specific tax, you manifestly showed a hankering after the principle
of the act which you formerly had renounced. Whatever road you take
leads to a compliance with this motion. It opens to you at the end of
every visto. Your commerce, your policy, your promises, your reasons,
your pretences, your consistency, your inconsistency,--all jointly
oblige you to this repeal.
But still it sticks in our throats, if we go so far, the Americans will
go farther.--We do not know that. We ought, from experience, rather to
presume the contrary. Do we not know for certain, that the Americans are
going on as fast as possible, whilst we refuse to gratify them? Can they
do more, or can they do worse, if we yield this point? I think this
concession will rather fix a turnpike to prevent their further
progress. It is impossible to answer for bodies of men. But I am sure
the natural effect of fidelity, clemency, kindness in governors is
peace, good-will, order, and esteem, on the part of the governed. I
would certainly, at least, give these fair principles a fair trial;
which, since the making of this act to this hour, they never have had.
Sir, the honorable gentleman having spoken what he thought necessary
upon the narrow part of the subject, I have given him, I hope, a
satisfactory answer. He next presses me, by a variety of direct
challenges and oblique reflections, to say something on the historical
part. I shall therefore, Sir, open myself fully on that important and
delicate subject: not for the sake of telling you a long story, (which,
I know, Mr. Speaker, you are not particularly fond of,) but for the sake
of the weighty instruction that, I flatter myself, will necessarily
result from it. It shall not be longer, if I can help it, than so
serious a matter requires.
Permit me then, Sir, to lead your attention very far back,--back to the
Act of Navigation, the cornerstone of the policy of this country with
regard to its colonies. Sir, that policy was, from the beginning, purely
commercial; and the commercial system was wholly restrictive. It was the
system of a monopoly. No trade was let loose from that constraint, but
merely to enable the colonists to dispose of what, in the course of your
trade, you could not take,--or to enable them to dispose of such
articles as we forced upon them, and for which, without some degree of
liberty, they could not pay. Hence all your specific and detailed
enumerations; hence the innumerable checks and counterchecks; hence that
infinite variety of paper chains by which you bind together this
complicated system of the colonies. This principle of commercial
monopoly runs through no less than twenty-nine acts of Parliament, from
the year 1660 to the unfortunate period of 1764.
In all those acts the system of commerce is established as that from
whence alone you proposed to make the colonies contribute (I mean
directly and by the operation of your superintending legislative power)
to the strength of the empire. I venture to say, that, during that whole
period, a Parliamentary revenue from thence was never once in
contemplation. Accordingly, in all the number of laws passed with regard
to the plantations, the words which distinguish revenue laws
specifically as such were, I think, premeditately avoided. I do not say,
Sir, that a form of words alters the nature of the law, or abridges the
power of the lawgiver. It certainly does not. How ever, titles and
formal preambles are not always idle words; and the lawyers frequently
argue from them. I state these facts to show, not what was your right,
but what has been your settled policy. Our revenue laws have usually a
_title_, purporting their being _grants_; and the words "_give and
grant_" usually precede the enacting parts. Although duties were imposed
on America in acts of King Charles the Second, and in acts of King
William, no one title of giving "an aid to his Majesty," or any other of
the usual titles to revenue acts, was to be found in any of them till
1764; nor were the words "give and grant" in any preamble until the
sixth of George the Second. However, the title of this act of George the
Second, notwithstanding the words of donation, considers it merely as a
regulation of trade; "An act for the better securing of the trade of his
Majesty's sugar colonies in America." This act was made on a compromise
of all, and at the express desire of a part, of the colonies themselves.
It was therefore in some measure with their consent; and having a title
directly purporting only a _commercial regulation_, and being in truth
nothing more, the words were passed by, at a time when no jealousy was
entertained, and things were little scrutinized. Even Governor Bernard,
in his second printed letter, dated in 1763, gives it as his opinion,
that "it was an act of _prohibition_, not of revenue." This is certainly
true, that no act avowedly for the purpose of revenue, and with the
ordinary title and recital taken together, is found in the statute-book
until the year I have mentioned: that is, the year 1764. All before this
period stood on commercial regulation and restraint. The scheme of a
colony revenue by British authority appeared, therefore, to the
Americans in the light of a great innovation. The words of Governor
Bernard's ninth letter, written in November, 1765, state this idea very
strongly. "It must," says he, "have been supposed _such an innovation as
a Parliamentary taxation_ would cause a great _alarm_, and meet with
much _opposition_ in most parts of America; it was _quite new_ to the
people, and had no _visible bounds_ set to it." After stating the
weakness of government there, he says, "Was this a time to introduce _so
great a novelty_ as a Parliamentary inland taxation in America?"
Whatever the right might have been, this mode of using it was absolutely
new in policy and practice.
Sir, they who are friends to the schemes of American revenue say, that
the commercial restraint is full as hard a law for America to live
under. I think so, too. I think it, if uncompensated, to be a condition
of as rigorous servitude as men can be subject to. But America bore it
from the fundamental Act of Navigation until 1764. Why? Because men do
bear the inevitable constitution of their original nature with all its
infirmities. The Act of Navigation attended the colonies from their
infancy, grow with their growth, and strengthened with their strength
They were confirmed in obedience to it even more by usage than by law.
They scarcely had remembered a time when they were not subject to such
restraint. Besides, they were indemnified for it by a pecuniary
compensation. Their monopolist happened to be one of the richest men in
the world. By his immense capital (primarily employed, not for their
benefit, but his own) they were enabled to proceed with their fisheries,
their agriculture, their shipbuilding, (and their trade, too, within the
limits,) in such a manner as got far the start of the slow, languid
operations of unassisted Nature. This capital was a hot-bed to them.
Nothing in the history of mankind is like their progress. For my part, I
never cast an eye on their flourishing commerce, and their cultivated
and commodious life, but they seem to me rather ancient nations grown to
perfection through a long series of fortunate events, and a train of
successful industry, accumulating wealth in many centuries, than the
colonies of yesterday,--than a set of miserable outcasts a few years
ago, not so much sent as thrown out on the bleak and barren shore of a
desolate wilderness three thousand miles from all civilized intercourse.
All this was done by England whilst England pursued trade and forgot
revenue. You not only acquired commerce, but you actually created the
very objects of trade in America; and by that creation you raised the
trade of this kingdom at least fourfold. America had the compensation of
your capital, which made her bear her servitude. She had another
compensation, which you are now going to take away from her. She had,
except the commercial restraint, every characteristic mark of a free
people in all her internal concerns. She had the image of the British
Constitution. She had the substance. She was taxed by her own
representatives. She chose most of her own magistrates. She paid them
all. She had in effect the sole disposal of her own internal government.
This whole state of commercial servitude and civil liberty, taken
together, is certainly not perfect freedom; but comparing it with the
ordinary circumstances of human nature, it was an happy and a liberal
condition.
I know, Sir, that great and not unsuccessful pains have been taken to
inflame our minds by an outcry, in this House, and out of it, that in
America the Act of Navigation neither is or never was obeyed. But if you
take the colonies through, I affirm that its authority never was
disputed,--that it was nowhere disputed for any length of time,--and, on
the whole, that it was well observed. Wherever the act pressed hard,
many individuals, indeed, evaded it. This is nothing. These scattered
individuals never denied the law, and never obeyed it. Just as it
happens, whenever the laws of trade, whenever the laws of revenue, press
hard upon the people in England: in that case all your shores are full
of contraband. Your right to give a monopoly to the East India Company,
your right to lay immense duties on French brandy, are not disputed in
England. You do not make this charge on any man. But you know that
there is not a creek from Pentland Frith to the Isle of Wight in which
they do not smuggle immense quantities of teas, East India goods, and
brandies. I take it for granted that the authority of Governor Bernard
in this point is indisputable. Speaking of these laws, as they regarded
that part of America now in so unhappy a condition, he says, "I believe
they are nowhere better supported than in this province: I do not
pretend that it is entirely free from a breach of these laws, but that
such a breach, if discovered, is justly punished." What more can you say
of the obedience to any laws in any country? An obedience to these laws
formed the acknowledgment, instituted by yourselves, for your
superiority, and was the payment you originally imposed for your
protection.
Whether you were right or wrong in establishing the colonies on the
principles of commercial monopoly, rather than on that of revenue, is at
this day a problem of mere speculation. You cannot have both by the same
authority. To join together the restraints of an universal internal and
external monopoly with an universal internal and external taxation is an
unnatural union,--perfect, uncompensated slavery. You have long since
decided for yourself and them; and you and they have prospered
exceedingly under that decision.
This nation, Sir, never thought of departing from that choice until the
period immediately on the close of the last war. Then a scheme of
government, new in many things, seemed to have been adopted. I saw, or
thought I saw, several symptoms of a great change, whilst I sat in your
gallery, a good while before I had the honor of a seat in this House.
At that period the necessity was established of keeping up no less than
twenty new regiments, with twenty colonels capable of seats in this
House. This scheme was adopted with very general applause from all
sides, at the very time that, by your conquests in America, your danger
from foreign attempts in that part of the world was much lessened, or
indeed rather quite over. When this huge increase of military
establishment was resolved on, a revenue was to be found to support so
great a burden. Country gentlemen, the great patrons of economy, and the
great resisters of a standing armed force, would not have entered with
much alacrity into the vote for so large and so expensive an army, if
they had been very sure that they were to continue to pay for it. But
hopes of another kind were held out to them; and in particular, I well
remember that Mr. Townshend, in a brilliant harangue on this subject,
did dazzle them by playing before their eyes the image of a revenue to
be raised in America.
Here began to dawn the first glimmerings of this new colony system. It
appeared more distinctly afterwards, when it was devolved upon a person
to whom, on other accounts, this country owes very great obligations. I
do believe that he had a very serious desire to benefit the public. But
with no small study of the detail, he did not seem to have his view, at
least equally, carried to the total circuit of our affairs. He generally
considered his objects in lights that were rather too detached. Whether
the business of an American revenue was imposed upon him
altogether,--whether it was entirely the result of his own speculation,
or, what is more probable, that his own ideas rather coincided with the
instructions he had received,--certain it is, that, with the best
intentions in the world, he first brought this fatal scheme into form,
and established it by Act of Parliament.
No man can believe, that, at this time of day, I mean to lean on the
venerable memory of a great man, whose loss we deplore in common. Our
little party differences have been long ago composed; and I have acted
more with him, and certainly with more pleasure with him, than ever I
acted against him. Undoubtedly Mr. Grenville was a first-rate figure in
this country. With a masculine understanding, and a stout and resolute
heart, he had an application undissipated and unwearied. He took public
business, not as a duty which he was to fulfil, but as a pleasure he was
to enjoy; and he seemed to have no delight out of this House, except in
such things as some way related to the business that was to be done
within it. If he was ambitious, I will say this for him, his ambition
was of a noble and generous strain. It was to raise himself, not by the
low, pimping politics of a court, but to win his way to power through
the laborious gradations of public service, and to secure himself a
well-earned rank in Parliament by a thorough knowledge of its
constitution and a perfect practice in all its business.
Sir, if such a man fell into errors, it must be from defects not
intrinsical; they must be rather sought in the particular habits of his
life, which, though they do not alter the groundwork of character, yet
tinge it with their own hue. He was bred in a profession. He was bred to
the law, which is, in my opinion, one of the first and noblest of human
sciences,--a science which does more to quicken and invigorate the
understanding than all the other kinds of learning put together; but it
is not apt, except in persons very happily born, to open and to
liberalize the mind exactly in the same proportion. Passing from that
study, he did not go very largely into the world, but plunged into
business,--I mean into the business of office, and the limited and fixed
methods and forms established there. Much knowledge is to be had,
undoubtedly, in that line; and there is no knowledge which is not
valuable. But it may be truly said, that men too much conversant in
office are rarely minds of remarkable enlargement. Their habits of
office are apt to give them a turn to think the substance of business
not to be much more important than the forms in which it is conducted.
These forms are adapted to ordinary occasions; and therefore persons who
are nurtured in office do admirably well as long as things go on in
their common order; but when the high-roads are broken up, and the
waters out, when a new and troubled scene is opened, and the file
affords no precedent, then it is that a greater knowledge of mankind,
and a far more extensive comprehension of things is requisite, than ever
office gave, or than office can ever give. Mr. Grenville thought better
of the wisdom and power of human legislation than in truth it deserves.
He conceived, and many conceived along with him, that the flourishing
trade of this country was greatly owing to law and institution, and not
quite so much to liberty; for but too many are apt to believe regulation
to be commerce, and taxes to be revenue. Among regulations, that which
stood first in reputation was his idol: I mean the Act of Navigation. He
has often professed it to be so. The policy of that act is, I readily
admit, in many respects well understood. But I do say, that, if the act
be suffered to run the full length of its principle, and is not changed
and modified according to the change of times and the fluctuation of
circumstances, it must do great mischief, and frequently even defeat its
own purpose.
After the war, and in the last years of it, the trade of America had
increased far beyond the speculations of the most sanguine imaginations.
It swelled out on every side. It filled all its proper channels to the
brim. It overflowed with a rich redundance, and breaking its banks on
the right and on the left, it spread out upon some places where it was
indeed improper, upon others where it was only irregular. It is the
nature of all greatness not to be exact; and great trade will always be
attended with considerable abuses. The contraband will always keep pace
in some measure with the fair trade. It should stand as a fundamental
maxim, that no vulgar precaution ought to be employed in the cure of
evils which are closely connected with the cause of our prosperity.
Perhaps this great person turned his eyes somewhat less than was just
towards the incredible increase of the fair trade, and looked with
something of too exquisite a jealousy towards the contraband. He
certainly felt a singular degree of anxiety on the subject, and even
began to act from that passion earlier than is commonly imagined. For
whilst he was First Lord of the Admiralty, though not strictly called
upon in his official line, he presented a very strong memorial to the
Lords of the Treasury, (my Lord Bute was then at the head of the board,)
heavily complaining of the growth of the illicit commerce in America.
Some mischief happened even at that time from this over-earnest zeal.
Much greater happened afterwards, when it operated with greater power in
the highest department of the finances. The bonds of the Act of
Navigation were straitened so much that America was on the point of
having no trade, either contraband or legitimate. They found, under the
construction and execution then used, the act no longer tying, but
actually strangling them. All this coming with new enumerations of
commodities, with regulations which in a manner put a stop to the mutual
coasting intercourse of the colonies, with the appointment of courts of
admiralty under various improper circumstances, with a sudden extinction
of the paper currencies, with a compulsory provision for the quartering
of soldiers,--the people of America thought themselves proceeded against
as delinquents, or, at best, as people under suspicion of delinquency,
and in such a manner as they imagined their recent services in the war
did not at all merit. Any of these innumerable regulations, perhaps,
would not have alarmed alone; some might be thought reasonable; the
multitude struck them with terror.
But the grand manoeuvre in that business of new regulating the colonies
was the fifteenth act of the fourth of George the Third, which, besides
containing several of the matters to which I have just alluded, opened a
new principle. And here properly began the second period of the policy
of this country with regard to the colonies, by which the scheme of a
regular plantation Parliamentary revenue was adopted in theory and
settled in practice: a revenue not substituted in the place of, but
superadded to, a monopoly; which monopoly was enforced at the same time
with additional strictness, and the execution put into military hands.
This act, Sir, had for the first time the title of "granting duties in
the colonies and plantations of America," and for the first time it was
asserted in the preamble "that it was _just_ and _necessary_ that a
revenue should be raised there"; then came the technical words of
"giving and granting." And thus a complete American revenue act was made
in all the forms, and with a full avowal of the right, equity, policy,
and even necessity, of taxing the colonies, without any formal consent
of theirs. There are contained also in the preamble to that act these
very remarkable words,--the Commons, &c., "being desirous to make _some_
provision in the _present_ session of Parliament _towards_ raising the
said revenue." By these words it appeared to the colonies that this act
was but a beginning of sorrows,--that every session was to produce
something of the same kind,--that we were to go on, from day to day, in
charging them with such taxes as we pleased, for such a military force
as we should think proper. Had this plan been pursued, it was evident
that the provincial assemblies, in which the Americans felt all their
portion of importance, and beheld their sole image of freedom, were
_ipso facto_ annihilated. This ill prospect before them seemed to be
boundless in extent and endless in duration. Sir, they were not
mistaken. The ministry valued themselves when this act passed, and when
they gave notice of the Stamp Act, that both of the duties came very
short of their ideas of American taxation. Great was the applause of
this measure here. In England we cried out for new taxes on America,
whilst they cried out that they were nearly crushed with those which
the war and their own grants had brought upon them.
Sir, it has been said in the debate, that, when the first American
revenue act (the act in 1764, imposing the port-duties) passed, the
Americans did not object to the principle. It is true they touched it
but very tenderly. It was not a direct attack. They were, it is true, as
yet novices,--as yet unaccustomed to direct attacks upon any of the
rights of Parliament. The duties were port-duties, like those they had
been accustomed to bear,--with this difference, that the title was not
the same, the preamble not the same, and the spirit altogether unlike.
But of what service is this observation to the cause of those that make
it? It is a full refutation of the pretence for their present cruelty to
America; for it shows, out of their own mouths, that our colonies were
backward to enter into the present vexatious and ruinous controversy.
There is also another circulation abroad, (spread with a malignant
intention, which I cannot attribute to those who say the same thing in
this House,) that Mr. Grenville gave the colony agents an option for
their assemblies to tax themselves, which they had refused. I find that
much stress is laid on this, as a fact. However, it happens neither to
be true nor possible. I will observe, first, that Mr. Grenville never
thought fit to make this apology for himself in the innumerable debates
that were had upon the subject. He might have proposed to the colony
agents, that they should agree in some mode of taxation as the ground of
an act of Parliament. But he never could have proposed that they should
tax themselves on requisition, which is, the assertion of the day.
Indeed, Mr. Grenville well knew that the colony agents could have no
general powers to consent to it; and they had no time to consult their
assemblies for particular powers, before he passed his first revenue
act. If you compare dates, you will find it impossible. Burdened as the
agents knew the colonies were at that time, they could not give the
least hope of such grants. His own favorite governor was of opinion that
the Americans were not then taxable objects.
"Nor was the time less favorable to the _equity_ of such a taxation. I
don't mean to dispute the reasonableness of America contributing to the
charges of Great Britain, _when she is able_; nor, I believe, would the
Americans themselves have disputed it at a _proper time and season_. But
it should be considered, that the American governments themselves have,
in the prosecution of the late war, contracted very large debts, which
it will take some years to pay off, and in the mean time occasion very
_burdensome taxes for that purpose_ only. For instance, this government,
which is as much beforehand as any, raises every year 37,500_l._
sterling for sinking their debt, and must continue it for four years
longer at least before it will be clear."
These are the words of Governor Bernard's letter to a member of the old
ministry, and which he has since printed.
Mr. Grenville could not have made this proposition to the agents for
another reason. He was of opinion, which he has declared in this House
an hundred times, that the colonies could not legally grant any revenue
to the crown, and that infinite mischiefs would be the consequence of
such a power. When Mr. Grenville had passed the first revenue act, and
in the same session had made this House come to a resolution for laying
a stamp-duty on America, between that time and the passing the Stamp Act
into a law he told a considerable and most respectable merchant, a
member of this House, whom I am truly sorry I do not now see in his
place, when he represented against this proceeding, that, if the
stamp-duty was disliked, he was willing to exchange it for any other
equally productive,--but that, if he objected to the Americans being
taxed by Parliament, he might save himself the trouble of the
discussion, as he was determined on the measure. This is the fact, and,
if you please, I will mention a very unquestionable authority for it.
Thus, Sir, I have disposed of this falsehood. But falsehood has a
perennial spring. It is said that no conjecture could be made of the
dislike of the colonies to the principle. This is as untrue as the
other. After the resolution of the House, and before the passing of the
Stamp Act, the colonies of Massachusetts Bay and New York did send
remonstrances objecting to this mode of Parliamentary taxation. What was
the consequence? They were suppressed, they were put under the table,
notwithstanding an order of Council to the contrary, by the ministry
which composed the very Council that had made the order; and thus the
House proceeded to its business of taxing without the least regular
knowledge of the objections which were made to it. But to give that
House its due, it was not over-desirous to receive information or to
hear remonstrance. On the 15th of February, 1765, whilst the Stamp Act
was under deliberation, they refused with scorn even so much as to
receive four petitions presented from so respectable colonies as
Connecticut, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Carolina, besides one from the
traders of Jamaica. As to the colonies, they had no alternative left to
them but to disobey, or to pay the taxes imposed by that Parliament,
which was not suffered, or did not suffer itself, even to hear them
remonstrate upon the subject.
This was the state of the colonies before his Majesty thought fit to
change his ministers. It stands upon no authority of mine. It is proved
by uncontrovertible records. The honorable gentleman has desired some of
us to lay our hands upon our hearts and answer to his queries upon the
historical part of this consideration, and by his manner (as well as my
eyes could discern it) he seemed to address himself to me.
Sir, I will answer him as clearly as I am able, and with great openness:
I have nothing to conceal. In the year sixty-five, being in a very
private station, far enough from any line of business, and not having
the honor of a seat in this House, it was my fortune, unknowing and
unknown to the then ministry, by the intervention of a common friend, to
become connected with a very noble person, and at the head of the
Treasury Department. It was, indeed, in a situation of little rank and
no consequence, suitable to the mediocrity of my talents and
pretensions,--but a situation near enough to enable me to see, as well
as others, what was going on; and I did see in that noble person such
sound principles, such an enlargement of mind, such clear and sagacious
sense, and such unshaken fortitude, as have bound me, as well as others
much better than me, by an inviolable attachment to him from that time
forward. Sir, Lord Rockingham very early in that summer received a
strong representation from many weighty English merchants and
manufacturers, from governors of provinces and commanders of men-of-war,
against almost the whole of the American commercial regulations,--and
particularly with regard to the total ruin which was threatened to the
Spanish trade. I believe, Sir, the noble lord soon saw his way in this
business. But he did not rashly determine against acts which it might be
supposed were the result of much deliberation. However, Sir, he scarcely
began to open the ground, when the whole veteran body of office took the
alarm. A violent outcry of all (except those who knew and felt the
mischief) was raised against any alteration. On one hand, his attempt
was a direct violation of treaties and public law; on the other, the Act
of Navigation and all the corps of trade-laws were drawn up in array
against it.
The first step the noble lord took was, to have the opinion of his
excellent, learned, and ever-lamented friend, the late Mr. Yorke, then
Attorney-General, on the point of law. When he knew that formally and
officially which in substance he had known before, he immediately
dispatched orders to redress the grievance. But I will say it for the
then minister, he is of that constitution of mind, that I know he would
have issued, on the same critical occasion, the very same orders, if the
acts of trade had been, as they were not, directly against him, and
would have cheerfully submitted to the equity of Parliament for his
indemnity.
On the conclusion of this business of the Spanish trade, the news of the
troubles on account of the Stamp Act arrived in England. It was not
until the end of October that these accounts were received. No sooner
had the sound of that mighty tempest reached us in England, than the
whole of the then opposition, instead of feeling humbled by the unhappy
issue of their measures, seemed to be infinitely elated, and cried out,
that the ministry, from envy to the glory of their predecessors, were
prepared to repeal the Stamp Act. Near nine years after, the honorable
gentleman takes quite opposite ground, and now challenges me to put my
hand to my heart and say whether the ministry had resolved on the repeal
till a considerable time after the meeting of Parliament. Though I do
not very well know what the honorable gentleman wishes to infer from the
admission or from the denial of this fact on which he so earnestly
adjures me, I do put my hand on my heart and assure him that they did
_not_ come to a resolution directly to repeal. They weighed this matter
as its difficulty and importance required. They considered maturely
among themselves. They consulted with all who could give advice or
information. It was not determined until a little before the meeting of
Parliament; but it was determined, and the main lines of their own plan
marked out, before that meeting. Two questions arose. (I hope I am not
going into a narrative troublesome to the House.)
[A cry of "Go on, go on!"]
The first of the two considerations was, whether the repeal should be
total, or whether only partial,--taking out everything burdensome and
productive, and reserving only an empty acknowledgment, such as a stamp
on cards or dice. The other question was, on what principle the act
should be repealed. On this head also two principles were started. One,
that the legislative rights of this country with regard to America were
not entire, but had certain restrictions and limitations. The other
principle was, that taxes of this kind were contrary to the fundamental
principles of commerce on which the colonies were founded, and contrary
to every idea of political equity,--by which equity we are bound as much
as possible to extend the spirit and benefit of the British Constitution
to every part of the British dominions. The option, both of the measure
and of the principle of repeal, was made before the session; and I
wonder how any one can read the king's speech at the opening of that
session, without seeing in that speech both the repeal and the
Declaratory Act very sufficiently crayoned out. Those who cannot see
this can see nothing.
Surely the honorable gentleman will not think that a great deal less
time than was then employed ought to have been spent in deliberation,
when he considers that the news of the troubles did not arrive till
towards the end of October. The Parliament sat to fill the vacancies on
the 14th day of December, and on business the 14th of the following
January.
Sir, a partial repeal, or, as the _bon-ton_ of the court then was, a
_modification_, would have satisfied a timid, unsystematic,
procrastinating ministry, as such a measure has since done such a
ministry. A modification is the constant resource of weak, undeciding
minds. To repeal by a denial of our right to tax in the preamble (and
this, too, did not want advisers) would have cut, in the heroic style,
the Gordian knot with a sword. Either measure would have cost no more
than a day's debate. But when the total repeal was adopted, and adopted
on principles of policy, of equity, and of commerce, this plan made it
necessary to enter into many and difficult measures. It became necessary
to open a very largo field of evidence commensurate to these extensive
views. But then this labor did knights' service. It opened the eyes of
several to the true state of the American affairs; it enlarged their
ideas; it removed prejudices; and it conciliated the opinions and
affections of men. The noble lord who then took the lead in
administration, my honorable friend[6] under me, and a right honorable
gentleman[7] (if he will not reject his share, and it was a large one,
of this business) exerted the most laudable industry in bringing before
you the fullest, most impartial, and least garbled body of evidence that
ever was produced to this House. I think the inquiry lasted in the
committee for six weeks; and at its conclusion, this House, by an
independent, noble, spirited, and unexpected majority, by a majority
that will redeem all the acts ever done by majorities in Parliament, in
the teeth of all the old mercenary Swiss of state, in despite of all the
speculators and augurs of political events, in defiance of the whole
embattled legion of veteran pensioners and practised instruments of a
court, gave a total repeal to the Stamp Act, and (if it had been so
permitted) a lasting peace to this whole empire.
I state, Sir, these particulars, because this act of spirit and
fortitude has lately been, in the circulation of the season, and in some
hazarded declamations in this House, attributed to timidity. If, Sir,
the conduct of ministry, in proposing the repeal, had arisen from
timidity with regard to themselves, it would have been greatly to be
condemned. Interested timidity disgraces as much in the cabinet as
personal timidity does in the field. But timidity with regard to the
well-being of our country is heroic virtue. The noble lord who then
conducted affairs, and his worthy colleagues, whilst they trembled at
the prospect of such distresses as you have since brought upon
yourselves, were not afraid steadily to look in the face that glaring
and dazzling influence at which the eyes of eagles have blenched. He
looked in the face one of the ablest, and, let me say, not the most
scrupulous oppositions, that perhaps ever was in this House; and
withstood it, unaided by even one of the usual supports of
administration. He did this, when he repealed the Stamp Act. He looked
in the face a person he had long respected and regarded, and whose aid
was then particularly wanting: I mean Lord Chatham. He did this when he
passed the Declaratory Act.
It is now given out, for the usual purposes, by the usual emissaries,
that Lord Rockingham did not consent to the repeal of this act until he
was bullied into it by Lord Chatham; and the reporters have gone so far
as publicly to assert, in an hundred companies, that the honorable
gentleman under the gallery,[8] who proposed the repeal in the American
committee, had another set of resolutions in his pocket, directly the
reverse of those he moved. These artifices of a desperate cause are at
this time spread abroad, with incredible care, in every part of the
town, from the highest to the lowest companies; as if the industry of
the circulation were to make amends for the absurdity of the report.
Sir, whether the noble lord is of a complexion to be bullied by Lord
Chatham, or by any man, I must submit to those who know him. I confess,
when I look back to that time, I consider him as placed in one of the
most trying situations in which, perhaps, any man ever stood. In the
House of Peers there were very few of the ministry, out of the noble
lord's own particular connection, (except Lord Egmont, who acted, as
far as I could discern, an honorable and manly part,) that did not look
to some other future arrangement, which warped his politics. There were
in both Houses new and menacing appearances, that might very naturally
drive any other than a most resolute minister from his measure or from
his station. The household troops openly revolted. The allies of
ministry (those, I mean, who supported some of their measures, but
refused responsibility for any) endeavored to undermine their credit,
and to take ground that must be fatal to the success of the very cause
which they would be thought to countenance. The question of the repeal
was brought on by ministry in the committee of this House in the very
instant when it was known that more than one court negotiation was
carrying on with the heads of the opposition. Everything, upon every
side, was full of traps and mines. Earth below shook; heaven above
menaced; all the elements of ministerial safety were dissolved. It was
in the midst of this chaos of plots and counterplots, it was in the
midst of this complicated warfare against public opposition and private
treachery, that the firmness of that noble person was put to the proof.
He never stirred from his ground: no, not an inch. He remained fixed and
determined, in principle, in measure, and in conduct. He practised no
managements. He secured no retreat. He sought no apology.
I will likewise do justice--I ought to do it--to the honorable gentleman
who led us in this House.[9] Far from the duplicity wickedly charged on
him, he acted his part with alacrity and resolution. We all felt
inspired by the example he gave us, down even to myself, the weakest in
that phalanx. I declare for one, I knew well enough (it could not be
concealed from anybody) the true state of things; but, in my life, I
never came with so much spirits into this House. It was a time for a
_man_ to act in. We had powerful enemies; but we had faithful and
determined friends, and a glorious cause. We had a great battle to
fight; but we had the means of fighting: not as now, when our arms are
tied behind us. We did fight that day, and conquer.
I remember, Sir, with a melancholy pleasure, the situation of the
honorable gentleman[10] who made the motion for the repeal: in that
crisis, when the whole trading interest of this empire, crammed into
your lobbies, with a trembling and anxious expectation, waited, almost
to a winter's return of light, their fate from your resolutions. When at
length you had determined in their favor, and your doors thrown open
showed them the figure of their deliverer in the well-earned triumph of
his important victory, from the whole of that grave multitude there
arose an involuntary burst of gratitude and transport. They jumped upon
him like children on a long absent father. They clung about him as
captives about their redeemer. All England, all America, joined in his
applause. Nor did he seem insensible to the best of all earthly rewards,
the love and admiration of his fellow-citizens. _Hope elevated and joy
brightened his crest_. I stood near him; and his face, to use the
expression of the Scripture of the first martyr, "his face was as if it
had been the face of an angel." I do not know how others feel; but if I
had stood in that situation, I never would have exchanged it for all
that kings in their profusion could bestow. I did hope that that day's
danger and honor would have been a bond to hold us all together forever.
But, alas! that, with other pleasing visions, is long since vanished.
Sir, this act of supreme magnanimity has been represented as if it had
been a measure of an administration that, having no scheme of their own,
took a middle line, pilfered a bit from one side and a bit from the
other. Sir, they took _no_ middle lines. They differed fundamentally
from the schemes of both parties; but they preserved the objects of
both. They preserved the authority of Great Britain; they preserved the
equity of Great Britain. They made the Declaratory Act; they repealed
the Stamp Act. They did both _fully_: because the Declaratory Act was
_without qualification_; and the repeal of the Stamp Act _total_. This
they did in the situation I have described.
Now, Sir, what will the adversary say to both these acts? If the
principle of the Declaratory Act was not good, the principle we are
contending for this day is monstrous. If the principle of the repeal was
not good, why are we not at war for a real, substantial, effective
revenue? If both were bad, why has this ministry incurred all the
inconveniences of both and of all schemes? why have they enacted,
repealed, enforced, yielded, and now attempt to enforce again?
Sir, I think I may as well now as at any other time speak to a certain
matter of fact not wholly unrelated to the question under your
consideration. We, who would persuade you to revert to the ancient
policy of this kingdom, labor under the effect of this short current
phrase, which the court leaders have given out to all their corps, in
order to take away the credit of those who would prevent you from that
frantic war you are going to wage upon your colonies. Their cant is
this: "All the disturbances in America have been created by the repeal
of the Stamp Act." I suppress for a moment my indignation at the
falsehood, baseness, and absurdity of this most audacious assertion.
Instead of remarking on the motives and character of those who have
issued it for circulation, I will clearly lay before you the state of
America, antecedently to that repeal, after the repeal, and since the
renewal of the schemes of American taxation.
It is said, that the disturbances, if there were any before the repeal,
were slight, and without difficulty or inconvenience might have been
suppressed. For an answer to this assertion I will send you to the great
author and patron of the Stamp Act, who, certainly meaning well to the
authority of this country, and fully apprised of the state of that,
made, before a repeal was so much as agitated in this House, the motion
which is on your journals, and which, to save the clerk the trouble of
turning to it, I will now read to you. It was for an amendment to the
address of the 17th of December, 1765.
"To express our just resentment and indignation at the _outrageous
tumults and insurrections_ which have been excited and carried on in
North America, and at the resistance given, by _open_ and _rebellious_
force, to the execution of the laws in that part of his Majesty's
dominions; to assure his Majesty, that his faithful Commons, animated
with the warmest duty and attachment to his royal person and
government, ... will firmly and effectually support his Majesty in all
such measures as shall be necessary for preserving and securing the
legal dependence of the colonies upon this their mother country," &c.,
&c.
Here was certainly a disturbance preceding the repeal,--such a
disturbance as Mr. Grenville thought necessary to qualify by the name of
an _insurrection_, and the epithet of a _rebellious_ force: terms much
stronger than any by which those who then supported his motion have ever
since thought proper to distinguish the subsequent disturbances in
America. They were disturbances which seemed to him and his friends to
justify as strong a promise of support as hath been usual to give in the
beginning of a war with the most powerful and declared enemies. When the
accounts of the American governors came before the House, they appeared
stronger even than the warmth of public imagination had painted them: so
much stronger, that the papers on your table bear me out in saying that
all the late disturbances, which have been at one time the minister's
motives for the repeal of five out of six of the new court taxes, and
are now his pretences for refusing to repeal that sixth, did not
amount--why do I compare them?--no, not to a tenth part of the tumults
and violence which prevailed long before the repeal of that act.
Ministry cannot refuse the authority of the commander-in-chief, General
Gage, who, in his letter of the 4th of November, from New York, thus
represents the state of things:--
"It is difficult to say, from the _highest to the lowest_, who has not
been _accessory_ to this _insurrection_, either by writing, or _mutual
agreements_ to oppose the act, by what they are pleased to term all
legal opposition to it. Nothing effectual has been proposed, either to
prevent or quell the tumult. _The rest of the provinces are in the same
situation_, as to a positive refusal to take the stamps, and threatening
those who shall take them _to plunder and murder them_; and this affair
stands _in all the provinces_, that, unless the act from its own nature
enforce itself, nothing but a _very_ considerable military force can do
it."
It is remarkable, Sir, that the persons who formerly trumpeted forth the
most loudly the violent resolutions of assemblies, the universal
insurrections, the seizing and burning the stamped papers, the forcing
stamp officers to resign their commissions under the gallows, the
rifling and pulling down of the houses of magistrates, and the expulsion
from their country of all who dared to write or speak a single word in
defence of the powers of Parliament,--these very trumpeters are now the
men that represent the whole as a mere trifle, and choose to date all
the disturbances from the repeal of the Stamp Act, which put an end to
them. Hear your officers abroad, and let them refute this shameless
falsehood, who, in all their correspondence, state the disturbances as
owing to their true causes, the discontent of the people from the taxes.
You have this evidence in your own archives; and it will give you
complete satisfaction, if you are not so far lost to all Parliamentary
ideas of information as rather to credit the lie of the day than the
records of your own House.
Sir, this vermin of court reporters, when they are forced into day upon
one point, are sure to burrow in another: but they shall have no refuge;
I will make them bolt out of all their holes. Conscious that they must
be baffled, when they attribute a precedent disturbance to a subsequent
measure, they take other ground, almost as absurd, but very common in
modern practice, and very wicked; which is, to attribute the ill effect
of ill-judged conduct to the arguments which had been used to dissuade
us from it. They say, that the opposition made in Parliament to the
Stamp Act, at the time of its passing, encouraged the Americans to their
resistance. This has even formally appeared in print in a regular volume
from an advocate of that faction,--a Dr. Tucker. This Dr. Tucker is
already a dean, and his earnest labors in this vineyard will, I suppose,
raise him to a bishopric. But this assertion, too, just like the rest,
is false. In all the papers which have loaded your table, in all the
vast crowd of verbal witnesses that appeared at your bar, witnesses
which were indiscriminately produced from both sides of the House, not
the least hint of such a cause of disturbance has ever appeared. As to
the fact of a strenuous opposition to the Stamp Act, I sat as a stranger
in your gallery when the act was under consideration. Far from anything
inflammatory, I never heard a more languid debate in this House. No more
than two or three gentlemen, as I remember, spoke against the act, and
that with great reserve and remarkable temper. There was but one
division in the whole progress of the bill; and the minority did not
reach to more than 39 or 40. In the House of Lords I do not recollect
that there was any debate or division at all. I am sure there was no
protest. In fact, the affair passed with so very, very little noise,
that in town they scarcely knew the nature of what you were doing. The
opposition to the bill in England never could have done this mischief,
because there scarcely ever was less of opposition to a bill of
consequence.
Sir, the agents and distributors of falsehoods have, with their usual
industry, circulated another lie, of the same nature with the former. It
is this: that the disturbances arose from the account which had been
received in America of the change in the ministry. No longer awed, it
seems, with the spirit of the former rulers, they thought themselves a
match for what our calumniators choose to qualify by the name of so
feeble a ministry as succeeded. Feeble in one sense these men certainly
may be called: for, with all their efforts, and they have made many,
they have not been able to resist the distempered vigor and insane
alacrity with which you are rushing to your ruin. But it does so happen,
that the falsity of this circulation is (like the rest) demonstrated by
indisputable dates and records.
So little was the change known in America, that the letters of your
governors, giving an account of these disturbances long after they had
arrived at their highest pitch, were all directed to the _old ministry_,
and particularly to the _Earl of Halifax_, the Secretary of State
corresponding with the colonies, without once in the smallest degree
intimating the slightest suspicion of any ministerial revolution
whatsoever. The ministry was not changed in England until the 10th day
of July, 1765. On the 14th of the preceding June, Governor Fauquier,
from Virginia, writes thus,--and writes thus to the Earl of
Halifax:--"Government is set at _defiance_, not having strength enough
in her hands to enforce obedience to the laws of the community.--The
private distress, which every man feels, increases the _general
dissatisfaction_ at the duties laid by the _Stamp Act_, which breaks out
and shows itself upon every trifling occasion." The general
dissatisfaction had produced some time before, that is, on the 29th of
May, several strong public resolves against the Stamp Act; and those
resolves are assigned by Governor Bernard as the cause of the
_insurrections_ in Massachusetts Bay, in his letter of the 15th of
August, still addressed to the Earl of Halifax; and he continued to
address such accounts to that minister quite to the 7th of September of
the same year. Similar accounts, and of as late a date, were sent from
other governors, and all directed to Lord Halifax. Not one of these
letters indicates the slightest idea of a change, either known or even
apprehended.
Thus are blown away the insect race of courtly falsehoods! Thus perish
the miserable inventions of the wretched runners for a wretched cause,
which they have fly-blown into every weak and rotten part of the
country, in vain hopes, that, when their maggots had taken wing, their
importunate buzzing might sound something like the public voice!
Sir, I have troubled you sufficiently with the state of America before
the repeal. Now I turn to the honorable gentleman who so stoutly
challenges us to tell whether, after the repeal, the provinces were
quiet. This is coming home to the point. Here I meet him directly, and
answer most readily, _They were quiet_. And I, in my turn, challenge him
to prove when, and where, and by whom, and in what numbers, and with
what violence, the other laws of trade, as gentlemen assert, were
violated in consequence of your concession, or that even your other
revenue laws were attacked. But I quit the vantage-ground on which I
stand, and where I might leave the burden of the proof upon him: I walk
down upon the open plain, and undertake to show that they were not only
quiet, but showed many unequivocal marks of acknowledgment and
gratitude. And to give him every advantage, I select the obnoxious
colony of Massachusetts Bay, which at this time (but without hearing
her) is so heavily a culprit before Parliament: I will select their
proceedings even under circumstances of no small irritation. For, a
little imprudently, I must say, Governor Bernard mixed in the
administration of the lenitive of the repeal no small acrimony arising
from matters of a separate nature. Yet see, Sir, the effect of that
lenitive, though mixed with these bitter ingredients,--and how this
rugged people can express themselves on a measure of concession.
"If it is not now in our power," (say they, in their address to Governor
Bernard,) "in so full a manner as will be expected, to show our
respectful gratitude to the mother country, or to make a dutiful,
affectionate return to the indulgence of the King and Parliament, it
shall be no fault of ours; for this we intend, and hope shall be able
fully to effect."
Would to God that this temper had been cultivated, managed, and set in
action! Other effects than those which we have since felt would have
resulted from it. On the requisition for compensation to those who had
suffered from the violence of the populace, in the same address they
say,--"The recommendation enjoined by Mr. Secretary Conway's letter, and
in consequence thereof made to us, we shall embrace the first convenient
opportunity to consider and act upon." They did consider; they did act
upon it. They obeyed the requisition. I know the mode has been chicaned
upon; but it was substantially obeyed, and much better obeyed than I
fear the Parliamentary requisition of this session will be, though
enforced by all your rigor and backed with all your power. In a word,
the damages of popular fury were compensated by legislative gravity.
Almost every other part of America in various ways demonstrated their
gratitude. I am bold to say, that so sudden a calm recovered after so
violent a storm is without parallel in history. To say that no other
disturbance should happen from any other cause is folly. But as far as
appearances went, by the judicious sacrifice of one law you procured an
acquiescence in all that remained. After this experience, nobody shall
persuade me, when an whole people are concerned, that acts of lenity are
not means of conciliation.
I hope the honorable gentleman has received a fair and full answer to
his question.
I have done with the third period of your policy,--that of your repeal,
and the return of your ancient system, and your ancient tranquillity and
concord. Sir, this period was not as long as it was happy. Another scene
was opened, and other actors appeared on the stage. The state, in the
condition I have described it, was delivered into the hands of Lord
Chatham, a great and celebrated name,--a name that keeps the name of
this country respectable in every other on the globe. It may be truly
called
Clarum et venerabile nomen
Gentibus, et multum nostræ quod proderat urbi.
Sir, the venerable age of this great man, his merited rank, his superior
eloquence, his splendid qualities, his eminent services, the vast space
he fills in the eye of mankind, and, more than all the rest, his fall
from power, which, like death, canonizes and sanctifies a great
character, will not suffer me to censure any part of his conduct. I am
afraid to flatter him; I am sure I am not disposed to blame him. Let
those who have betrayed him by their adulation insult him with their
malevolence. But what I do not presume to censure I may have leave to
lament. For a wise man, he seemed to me at that time to be governed too
much by general maxims. I speak with the freedom of history, and I hope
without offence. One or two of these maxims, flowing from an opinion not
the most indulgent to our unhappy species, and surely a little too
general, led him into measures that were greatly mischievous to himself,
and for that reason, among others, perhaps fatal to his
country,--measures, the effects of which, I am afraid, are forever
incurable. He made an administration so checkered and speckled, he put
together a piece of joinery so crossly indented and whimsically
dovetailed, a cabinet so variously inlaid, such a piece of diversified
mosaic, such a tessellated pavement without cement,--here a bit of black
stone and there a bit of white, patriots and courtiers, king's friends
and republicans, Whigs and Tories, treacherous friends and open
enemies,--that it was, indeed, a very curious show, but utterly unsafe
to touch and unsure to stand on. The colleagues whom he had assorted at
the same boards stared at each other, and were obliged to ask,--"Sir,
your name?"--"Sir, you have the advantage of me."--"Mr. Such-a-one."--"I
beg a thousand pardons."--I venture to say, it did so happen that
persons had a single office divided between them, who had never spoke
to each other in their lives, until they found themselves, they knew not
how, pigging together, heads and points, in the same truckle-bed.[11]
Sir, in consequence of this arrangement, having put so much the larger
part of his enemies and opposers into power, the confusion was such that
his own principles could not possibly have any effect or influence in
the conduct of affairs. If over he fell into a fit of the gout, or if
any other cause withdrew him from public cares, principles directly the
contrary were sure to predominate. When he had executed his plan, he had
not an inch of ground to stand upon. When he had accomplished his scheme
of administration, he was no longer a minister.
When his face was hid but for a moment, his whole system was on a wide
sea without chart or compass. The gentlemen, his particular friends,
who, with the names of various departments of ministry, were admitted to
seem as if they acted a part under him, with a modesty that becomes all
men, and with a confidence in him which was justified even in its
extravagance by his superior abilities, had never in any instance
presumed upon any opinion of their own. Deprived of his guiding
influence, they were whirled about, the sport of every gust, and easily
driven into any port; and as those who joined with them in manning the
vessel were the most directly opposite to his opinions, measures, and
character, and far the most artful and most powerful of the set, they
easily prevailed, so as to seize upon the vacant, unoccupied, and
derelict minds of his friends, and instantly they turned the vessel
wholly out of the course of his policy. As if it were to insult as well
as to betray him, even long before the close of the first session of his
administration, when everything was publicly transacted, and with great
parade, in his name, they made an act declaring it highly just and
expedient to raise a revenue in America. For even then, Sir, even before
this splendid orb was entirely set, and while the western horizon was in
a blaze with his descending glory, on the opposite quarter of the
heavens arose another luminary, and for his hour became lord of the
ascendant.
This light, too, is passed and set forever. You understand, to be sure,
that I speak of Charles Townshend, officially the reproducer of this
fatal scheme, whom I cannot even now remember without some degree of
sensibility. In truth, Sir, he was the delight and ornament of this
House, and the charm of every private society which he honored with his
presence. Perhaps there never arose in this country, nor in any country,
a man of a more pointed and finished wit, and (where his passions were
not concerned) of a more refined, exquisite, and penetrating judgment.
If he had not so great a stock as some have had, who flourished
formerly, of knowledge long treasured up, he knew, better by far than
any man I ever was acquainted with, how to bring together within a short
time all that was necessary to establish, to illustrate, and to decorate
that side of the question he supported. He stated his matter skilfully
and powerfully. He particularly excelled in a most luminous explanation
and display of his subject. His style of argument was neither trite and
vulgar, nor subtle and abstruse. He hit the House just between wind and
water. And not being troubled with too anxious a zeal for any matter in
question, he was never more tedious or more earnest than the
preconceived opinions and present temper of his hearers required, to
whom he was always in perfect unison. He conformed exactly to the temper
of the House; and he seemed to guide, because he was always sure to
follow it.
I beg pardon, Sir, if, when I speak of this and of other great men, I
appear to digress in saying something of their characters. In this
eventful history of the revolutions of America, the characters of such
men are of much importance. Great men are the guideposts and landmarks
in the state. The credit of such men at court or in the nation is the
sole cause of all the public measures. It would be an invidious thing
(most foreign, I trust, to what you think my disposition) to remark the
errors into which the authority of great names has brought the nation,
without doing justice at the same time to the great qualities whence
that authority arose. The subject is instructive to those who wish to
form themselves on whatever of excellence has gone before them. There
are many young members in the House (such of late has been the rapid
succession of public men) who never saw that prodigy, Charles Townshend,
nor of course know what a ferment he was able to excite in everything by
the violent ebullition of his mixed virtues and failings. For failings
he had undoubtedly,--many of us remember them; we are this day
considering the effect of them. But he had no failings which were not
owing to a noble cause,--to an ardent, generous, perhaps an immoderate
passion for fame: a passion which is the instinct of all great souls. He
worshipped that goddess, wheresoever she appeared; but he paid his
particular devotions to her in her favorite habitation, in her chosen
temple, the House of Commons. Besides the characters of the individuals
that compose our body, it is impossible, Mr. Speaker, not to observe
that this House has a collective character of its own. That character,
too, however imperfect, is not unamiable. Like all great public
collections of men, you possess a marked love of virtue and an
abhorrence of vice. But among vices there is none which the House abhors
in the same degree with _obstinacy_. Obstinacy, Sir, is certainly a
great vice; and in the changeful state of political affairs it is
frequently the cause of great mischief. It happens, however, very
unfortunately, that almost the whole line of the great and masculine
virtues, constancy, gravity, magnanimity, fortitude, fidelity, and
firmness, are closely allied to this disagreeable quality, of which you
have so just an abhorrence; and, in their excess, all these virtues very
easily fall into it. He who paid such a punctilious attention to all
your feelings certainly took care not to shock them by that vice which
is the most disgustful to you.
That fear of displeasing those who ought most to be pleased betrayed him
sometimes into the other extreme. He had voted, and, in the year 1765,
had been an advocate for the Stamp Act. Things and the disposition of
men's minds were changed. In short, the Stamp Act began to be no
favorite in this House. He therefore attended at the private meeting in
which the resolutions moved by a right honorable gentleman were settled:
resolutions leading to the repeal. The next day he voted for that
repeal; and he would have spoken for it, too, if an illness (not, as was
then given out, a political, but, to my knowledge, a very real illness)
had not prevented it.
The very next session, as the fashion of this world passeth away, the
repeal began to be in as bad an odor in this House as the Stamp Act had
been in the session before. To conform to the temper which began to
prevail, and to prevail mostly amongst those most in power, he declared,
very early in the winter, that a revenue must be had out of America.
Instantly he was tied down to his engagements by some, who had no
objection to such experiments, when made at the cost of persons for whom
they had no particular regard. The whole body of courtiers drove him
onward. They always talked as if the king stood in a sort of humiliated
state, until something of the kind should be done.
Here this extraordinary man, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, found
himself in great straits. To please universally was the object of his
life; but to tax and to please, no more than to love and to be wise, is
not given to men. However, he attempted it. To render the tax palatable
to the partisans of American revenue, he made a preamble stating the
necessity of such a revenue. To close with the American distinction,
this revenue was _external_ or port-duty; but again, to soften it to the
other party, it was a duty of _supply_. To gratify the _colonists_, it
was laid on British manufactures; to satisfy the _merchants of Britain_,
the duty was trivial, and (except that on tea, which touched only the
devoted East India Company) on none of the grand objects of commerce. To
counterwork the American contraband, the duty on tea was reduced from a
shilling to three-pence; but to secure the favor of those who would tax
America, the scene of collection was changed, and, with the rest, it
was levied in the colonies. What need I say more? This fine-spun scheme
had the usual fate of all exquisite policy. But the original plan of the
duties, and the mode of executing that plan, both arose singly and
solely from a love of our applause. He was truly the child of the House.
He never thought, did, or said anything, but with a view to you. He
every day adapted himself to your disposition, and adjusted himself
before it as at a looking-glass.
He had observed (indeed, it could not escape him) that several persons,
infinitely his inferiors in all respects, had formerly rendered
themselves considerable in this House by one method alone. They were a
race of men (I hope in God the species is extinct) who, when they rose
in their place, no man living could divine, from any known adherence to
parties, to opinions, or to principles, from any order or system in
their politics, or from any sequel or connection in their ideas, what
part they were going to take in any debate. It is astonishing how much
this uncertainty, especially at critical times, called the attention of
all parties on such men. All eyes were fixed on them, all ears open to
hear them; each party gaped, and looked alternately for their vote,
almost to the end of their speeches. While the House hung in this
uncertainty, now the _hear-hims_ rose from this side, now they
rebellowed from the other; and that party to whom they fell at length
from their tremulous and dancing balance always received them in a
tempest of applause. The fortune of such men was a temptation too great
to be resisted by one to whom a single whiff of incense withheld gave
much greater pain than he received delight in the clouds of it which
daily rose about him from the prodigal superstition of innumerable
admirers. He was a candidate for contradictory honors; and his great aim
was, to make those agree in admiration of him who never agreed in
anything else.
Hence arose this unfortunate act, the subject of this day's debate: from
a disposition which, after making an American revenue to please one,
repealed it to please others, and again revived it in hopes of pleasing
a third, and of catching something in the ideas of all.
This revenue act of 1767 formed the fourth period of American policy.
How we have fared since then: what woful variety of schemes have been
adopted; what enforcing, and what repealing; what bullying, and what
submitting; what doing, and undoing; what straining, and what relaxing;
what assemblies dissolved for not obeying, and called again without
obedience; what troops sent out to quell resistance, and, on meeting
that resistance, recalled; what shiftings, and changes, and jumblings of
all kinds of men at home, which left no possibility of order,
consistency, vigor, or even so much as a decent unity of color, in
anyone public measure--It is a tedious, irksome task. My duty may call
me to open it out some other time; on a former occasion[12] I tried your
temper on a part of it; for the present I shall forbear.
After all these changes and agitations, your immediate situation upon
the question on your paper is at length brought to this. You have an act
of Parliament stating that "it is _expedient_ to raise a revenue in
America." By a partial repeal you annihilated the greatest part of that
revenue which this preamble declares to be so expedient. You have
substituted no other in the place of it. A Secretary of State has
disclaimed, in the king's name, all thoughts of such a substitution in
future. The principle of this disclaimer goes to what has been left, as
well as what has been repealed. The tax which lingers after its
companions (under a preamble declaring an American revenue expedient,
and for the sole purpose of supporting the theory of that preamble)
militates with the assurance authentically conveyed to the colonies, and
is an exhaustless source of jealousy and animosity. On this state, which
I take to be a fair one,--not being able to discern any grounds of
honor, advantage, peace, or power, for adhering, either to the act or to
the preamble, I shall vote for the question which leads to the repeal of
both.
If you do not fall in with this motion, then secure something to fight
for, consistent in theory and valuable in practice. If you must employ
your strength, employ it to uphold you in some honorable right or some
profitable wrong. If you are apprehensive that the concession
recommended to you, though proper, should be a means of drawing on you
further, but unreasonable claims,--why, then employ your force in
supporting that reasonable concession against those unreasonable
demands. You will employ it with more grace, with better effect, and
with great probable concurrence of all the quiet and rational people in
the provinces, who are now united with and hurried away by the
violent,--having, indeed, different dispositions, but a common interest.
If you apprehend that on a concession you shall be pushed by
metaphysical process to the extreme lines, and argued out of your whole
authority, my advice is this: when you have recovered your old, your
strong, your tenable position, then face about,--stop short,--do nothing
more,--reason not at all,--oppose the ancient policy and practice of the
empire as a rampart against the speculations of innovators on both sides
of the question,--and you will stand on great, manly, and sure ground.
On this solid basis fix your machines, and they will draw worlds towards
you.
Tour ministers, in their own and his Majesty's name, have already
adopted the American distinction of internal and external duties. It is
a distinction, whatever merit it may have, that was originally moved by
the Americans themselves; and I think they will acquiesce in it, if they
are not pushed with too much logic and too little sense, in all the
consequences: that is, if external taxation be understood, as they and
you understand it, when you please, to be not a distinction of
geography, but of policy; that it is a power for regulating trade, and
not for supporting establishments. The distinction, which is as nothing
with regard to right, is of most weighty consideration in practice.
Recover your old ground, and your old tranquillity; try it; I am
persuaded the Americans will compromise with you. When confidence is
once restored, the odious and suspicious _summum jus_ will perish of
course. The spirit of practicability, of moderation, and mutual
convenience will never call in geometrical exactness as the arbitrator
of an amicable settlement. Consult and follow your experience. Let not
the long story with which I have exercised your patience prove fruitless
to your interests.
For my part, I should choose (if I could have my wish) that the
proposition of the honorable gentleman[13] for the repeal could go to
America without the attendance of the penal bills. Alone I could almost
answer for its success. I cannot be certain of its reception in the bad
company it may keep. In such heterogeneous assortments, the most
innocent person will lose the effect of his innocency. Though you should
send out this angel of peace, yet you are sending out a destroying angel
too; and what would be the effect of the conflict of these two adverse
spirits, or which would predominate in the end, is what I dare not say:
whether the lenient measures would cause American passion to subside, or
the severe would increase its fury,--all this is in the hand of
Providence. Yet now, even now, I should confide in the prevailing virtue
and efficacious operation of lenity, though working in darkness and in
chaos, in the midst of all this unnatural and turbid combination: I
should hope it might produce order and beauty in the end.
Let us, Sir, embrace some system or other before we end this session. Do
you mean to tax America, and to draw a productive revenue from thence?
If you do, speak out: name, fix, ascertain this revenue; settle its
quantity; define its objects; provide for its collection; and then
fight, when you have something to fight for. If you murder, rob; if you
kill, take possession; and do not appear in the character of madmen as
well as assassins, violent, vindictive, bloody, and tyrannical, without
an object. But may better counsels guide you!
Again, and again, revert to your old principles,--seek peace and ensue
it,--leave America, if she has taxable matter in her, to tax herself. I
am not here going into the distinctions of rights, nor attempting to
mark their boundaries. I do not enter into these metaphysical
distinctions; I hate the very sound of them. Leave the Americans as they
anciently stood, and these distinctions, born of our unhappy contest,
will die along with it. They and we, and their and our ancestors, have
been happy under that system. Let the memory of all actions in
contradiction to that good old mode, on both sides, be extinguished
forever. Be content to bind America by laws of trade: you have always
done it. Let this be your reason for binding their trade. Do not burden
them by taxes: you were not used to do so from the beginning. Let this
be your reason for not taxing. These are the arguments of states and
kingdoms. Leave the rest to the schools; for there only they may be
discussed with safety. But if, intemperately, unwisely, fatally, you
sophisticate and poison the very source of government, by urging subtle
deductions, and consequences odious to those you govern, from the
unlimited and illimitable nature of supreme sovereignty, you will teach
them by these means to call that sovereignty itself in question. When
you drive him hard, the boar will surely turn upon the hunters. If that
sovereignty and their freedom cannot be reconciled, which will they
take? They will cast your sovereignty in your face. Nobody will be
argued into slavery. Sir, let the gentlemen on the other side call forth
all their ability; let the best of them get up and tell me what one
character of liberty the Americans have, and what one brand of slavery
they are free from, if they are bound in their property and industry by
all the restraints you can imagine on commerce, and at the same time are
made pack-horses of every tax you choose to impose, without the least
share in granting them. When they bear the burdens of unlimited
monopoly, will you bring them to bear the burdens of unlimited revenue
too? The Englishman in America will feel that this is slavery: that it
is _legal_ slavery will be no compensation either to his feelings or his
understanding.
A noble lord,[14] who spoke some time ago, is full of the fire of
ingenuous youth; and when he has modelled the ideas of a lively
imagination by further experience, he will be an ornament to his country
in either House. He has said that the Americans are our children, and
how can they revolt against their parent? He says, that, if they are not
free in their present state, England is not free; because Manchester,
and other considerable places, are not represented. So, then, because
some towns in England are not represented, America is to have no
representative at all. They are "our children"; but when children ask
for bread, we are not to give a stone. Is it because the natural
resistance of things, and the various mutations of time, hinders our
government, or any scheme of government, from being any more than a sort
of approximation to the right, is it therefore that the colonies are to
recede from it infinitely? When this child of ours wishes to assimilate
to its parent, and to reflect with a true filial resemblance the
beauteous countenance of British liberty, are we to turn to them the
shameful parts of our constitution? are we to give them our weakness for
their strength, our opprobrium for their glory, and the slough of
slavery, which we are not able to work off, to serve them for their
freedom?
If this be the case, ask yourselves this question: Will they be content
in such a state of slavery? If not, look to the consequences. Reflect
how you are to govern a people who think they ought to be free, and
think they are not. Your scheme yields no revenue; it yields nothing but
discontent, disorder, disobedience: and such is the state of America,
that, after wading up to your eyes in blood, you could only end just
where you begun,--that is, to tax where no revenue is to be found, to
---- My voice fails me: my inclination, indeed, carries me no further;
all is confusion beyond it.
Well, Sir, I have recovered a little, and before I sit down I must say
something to another point with which gentlemen urge us. What is to
become of the Declaratory Act, asserting the entireness of British
legislative authority, if we abandon the practice of taxation?
For my part, I look upon the rights stated in that act exactly in the
manner in which I viewed them on its very first proposition, and which I
have often taken the liberty, with great humility, to lay before you. I
look, I say, on the imperial rights of Great Britain, and the privileges
which the colonists ought to enjoy under these rights, to be just the
most reconcilable things in the world. The Parliament of Great Britain
sits at the head of her extensive empire in two capacities. One as the
local legislature of this island, providing for all things at home,
immediately, and by no other instrument than the executive power. The
other, and I think her nobler capacity, is what I call her _imperial
character_; in which, as from the throne of heaven, she superintends all
the several inferior legislatures, and guides and controls them all
without annihilating any. As all these provincial legislatures are only
coördinate to each other, they ought all to be subordinate to her; else
they can neither preserve mutual peace, nor hope for mutual justice, nor
effectually afford mutual assistance. It is necessary to coerce the
negligent, to restrain the violent, and to aid the weak and deficient,
by the overruling plenitude of her power. She is never to intrude into
the place of the others, whilst they are equal to the common ends of
their institution. But in order to enable Parliament to answer all these
ends of provident and beneficent superintendence, her powers must be
boundless. The gentlemen who think the powers of Parliament limited may
please themselves to talk of requisitions. But suppose the requisitions
are not obeyed? What! shall there be no reserved power in the empire, to
supply a deficiency which may weaken, divide, and dissipate the whole?
We are engaged in war,--the Secretary of State calls upon the colonies
to contribute,--some would do it, I think most would cheerfully furnish
whatever is demanded,--one or two, suppose, hang back, and, easing
themselves, let the stress of the draft lie on the others,--surely it is
proper that some authority might legally say, "Tax yourselves for the
common Supply, or Parliament will do it for you." This backwardness was,
as I am told, actually the case of Pennsylvania for some short time
towards the beginning of the last war, owing to some internal
dissensions in that colony. But whether the fact were so or otherwise,
the case is equally to be provided for by a competent sovereign power.
But then this ought to be no ordinary power, nor ever used in the first
instance. This is what I meant, when I have said, at various times,
that I consider the power of taxing in Parliament as an instrument of
empire, and not as a means of supply.
Such, Sir, is my idea of the Constitution of the British Empire, as
distinguished from the Constitution of Britain; and on these grounds I
think subordination and liberty may be sufficiently reconciled through
the whole,--whether to serve a refining speculatist or a factious
demagogue I know not, but enough surely for the ease and happiness of
man.
Sir, whilst we hold this happy course, we drew more from the colonies
than all the impotent violence of despotism ever could extort from them.
We did this abundantly in the last war; it has never been once denied;
and what reason have we to imagine that the colonies would not have
proceeded in supplying government as liberally, if you had not stepped
in and hindered them from contributing, by interrupting the channel in
which their liberality flowed with so strong a course,--by attempting to
take, instead of being satisfied to receive? Sir William Temple says,
that Holland has loaded itself with ten times the impositions which it
revolted from Spain rather than submit to. He says true. Tyranny is a
poor provider. It knows neither how to accumulate nor how to extract.
I charge, therefore, to this new and unfortunate system the loss not
only of peace, of union, and of commerce, but even of revenue, which its
friends are contending for. It is morally certain that we have lost at
least a million of free grants since the peace. I think we have lost a
great deal more; and that those who look for a revenue from the
provinces never could have pursued, even in that light, a course more
directly repugnant to their purposes.
Now, Sir, I trust I have shown, first on that narrow ground which the
honorable gentleman measured, that you are like to lose nothing by
complying with the motion, except what you have lost already. I have
shown afterwards, that in time of peace you flourished in commerce, and,
when war required it, had sufficient aid from the colonies, while you
pursued your ancient policy; that you threw everything into confusion,
when you made the Stamp Act; and that you restored everything to peace
and order, when you repealed it. I have shown that the revival of the
system of taxation has produced the very worst effects; and that the
partial repeal has produced, not partial good, but universal evil. Let
these considerations, founded on facts, not one of which can be denied,
bring us back to our reason by the road of our experience.
I cannot, as I have said, answer for mixed measures: but surely this
mixture of lenity would give the whole a better chance of success. When
you once regain confidence, the way will be clear before you. Then you
may enforce the Act of Navigation, when it ought to be enforced. You
will yourselves open it, where it ought still further to be opened.
Proceed in what you do, whatever you do, from policy, and not from
rancor. Let us act like men, let us act like statesmen. Let us hold some
sort of consistent conduct. It is agreed that a revenue is not to be had
in America. If we lose the profit, let us get rid of the odium.
On this business of America, I confess I am serious, even to sadness. I
have had but one opinion concerning it, since I sat, and before I sat in
Parliament. The noble lord[15] will, as usual, probably, attribute the
part taken by me and my friends in this business to a desire of getting
his places. Let him enjoy this happy and original idea. If I deprived
him of it, I should take away most of his wit, and all his argument. But
I had rather bear the brunt of all his wit, and indeed blows much
heavier, than stand answerable to God for embracing a system that tends
to the destruction of some of the very best and fairest of His works.
But I know the map of England as well as the noble lord, or as any other
person; and I know that the way I take is not the road to preferment. My
excellent and honorable friend under me on the floor[16] has trod that
road with great toil for upwards of twenty years together. He is not yet
arrived at the noble lord's destination. However, the tracks of my
worthy friend are those I have ever wished to follow; because I know
they lead to honor. Long may we tread the same road together, whoever
may accompany us, or whoever may laugh at us on our journey! I honestly
and solemnly declare, I have in all seasons adhered to the system of
1766 for no other reason than, that I think it laid deep in your truest
interests,--and that, by limiting the exercise, it fixes on the firmest
foundations a real, consistent, well-grounded authority in Parliament.
Until you come back to that system, there will be no peace for England.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Charles Wolfran Cornwall, Esq., lately appointed one of the Lords of
the Treasury.
[2] Lord North, then Chancellor of the Exchequer.
[3] Lord Hillsborough's Circular Letter to the Governors of the
Colonies, concerning the repeal of some of the duties laid in the Act of
1767.
[4] A material point is omitted by Mr. Burke in this speech, viz. _the
manner in which the continent received this royal assurance_. The
assembly of Virginia, in their address in answer to Lord Botetourt's
speech, express themselves thus:--"We will not suffer our present hopes,
arising from the pleasing prospect your Lordship hath so kindly opened
and displayed to us, to be lashed by the bitter reflection that any
_future_ administration will entertain a wish to depart from that _plan_
which affords the surest and most permanent foundation of public
tranquillity and happiness. No, my Lord, we are sure _our most gracious
sovereign_, under whatever changes may happen in his confidential
servants, will remain immutable in the ways of truth and justice, and
that he is _incapable of deceiving his faithful subjects_; and we esteem
your Lordship's information not only as warranted, but even sanctified
_by the royal word_."
[5] Lord North.
[6] Mr. Dowdeswell.
[7] General Conway.
[8] General Conway.
[9] General Conway.
[10] General Conway.
[11] Supposed to allude to the Right Honorable Lord North, and George
Cooke, Esq., who were made joint paymasters in the summer of 1766, on
the removal of the Rockingham administration.
[12] Resolutions in May, 1770.
[13] Mr. Fuller.
[14] Lord Carmarthen.
[15] Lord North.
[16] Mr. Dowdeswell
SPEECHES
AT
HIS ARRIVAL AT BRISTOL,
AND AT THE
CONCLUSION OF THE POLL.
1774 EDITOR'S ADVERTISEMENT.
We believe there is no need of an apology to the public for offering to
them any genuine speeches of Mr. Burke: the two contained in this
publication undoubtedly are so. The general approbation they met with
(as we hear) from all parties at Bristol persuades us that a good
edition of them will not be unacceptable in London; which we own to be
the inducement, and we hope is a justification, of our offering it.
We do not presume to descant on the merit of these speeches; but as it
is no less new than honorable to find a popular candidate, at a popular
election, daring to avow his dissent to certain points that have been
considered as very popular objects, and maintaining himself on the manly
confidence of his own opinion, so we must say that it does great credit
to the people of England, as it proves to the world, that, to insure
their confidence, it is not necessary to flatter them, or to affect a
subserviency to their passions or their prejudices.
It may be necessary to promise, that at the opening of the poll the
candidates were Lord Clare, Mr. Brickdale, the two last members, and Mr.
Cruger, a considerable merchant at Bristol. On the second day of the
poll, Lord Clare declined; and a considerable body of gentlemen, who had
wished that the city of Bristol should, at this critical season, be
represented by some gentleman of tried abilities and known commercial
knowledge, immediately put Mr. Burke in nomination. Some of them set off
express for London to apprise that gentleman of this event; but he was
gone to Malton, in Yorkshire. The spirit and active zeal of these
gentlemen followed him to Malton. They arrived there just after Mr.
Burke's election for that place, and invited him to Bristol.
Mr. Burke, as he tells us in his first speech, acquainted his
constituents with the honorable offer that was made him, and, with their
consent, he immediately set off for Bristol, on the Tuesday, at six in
the evening; he arrived at Bristol at half past two in the afternoon, on
Thursday, the 13th of October, being the sixth day of the poll.
He drove directly to the mayor's house, who not being at home, he
proceeded to the Guildhall, where he ascended the hustings, and having
saluted the electors, the sheriffs, and the two candidates, he reposed
himself for a few minutes, and then addressed the electors in a speech
which was received with great and universal applause and approbation.
SPEECH
AT
HIS ARRIVAL AT BRISTOL.
Gentlemen,--I am come hither to solicit in person that favor which my
friends have hitherto endeavored to procure for me, by the most
obliging, and to me the most honorable exertions.
I have so high an opinion of the great trust which you have to confer on
this occasion, and, by long experience, so just a diffidence in my
abilities to fill it in a manner adequate even to my own ideas, that I
should never have ventured of myself to intrude into that awful
situation. But since I am called upon by the desire of several
respectable fellow subjects, as I have done at other times, I give up my
fears to their wishes. Whatever my other deficiencies may be, I do not
know what it is to be wanting to my friends.
I am not fond of attempting to raise public expectations by great
promises. At this time, there is much cause to consider, and very little
to presume. We seem to be approaching to a great crisis in our affairs,
which calls for the whole wisdom of the wisest among us, without being
able to assure ourselves that any wisdom can preserve us from many and
great inconveniences. You know I speak of our unhappy contest with
America. I confess, it is a matter on which I look down as from a
precipice. It is difficult in itself, and it is rendered more intricate
by a great variety of plans of conduct. I do not mean to enter into
them. I will not suspect a want of good intention in framing them. But
however pure the intentions of their authors may have been, we all know
that the event has been unfortunate. The means of recovering our affairs
are not obvious. So many great questions of commerce, of finance, of
constitution, and of policy are involved in this American deliberation,
that I dare engage for nothing, but that I shall give it, without any
predilection to former opinions, or any sinister bias whatsoever, the
most honest and impartial consideration of which I am capable. The
public has a full right to it; and this great city, a main pillar in the
commercial interest of Great Britain, must totter on its base by the
slightest mistake with regard to our American measures.
Thus much, however, I think it not amiss to lay before you,--that I am
not, I hope, apt to take up or lay down my opinions lightly. I have
held, and ever shall maintain, to the best of my power, unimpaired and
undiminished, the just, wise, and necessary constitutional superiority
of Great Britain. This is necessary for America as well as for us. I
never mean to depart from it. Whatever may be lost by it, I avow it. The
forfeiture even of your favor, if by such a declaration I could forfeit
it, though the first object of my ambition, never will make me disguise
my sentiments on this subject.
But--I have ever had a clear opinion, and have ever held a constant
correspondent conduct, that this superiority is consistent with all the
liberties a sober and spirited American ought to desire. I never mean to
put any colonist, or any human creature, in a situation not becoming a
free man. To reconcile British superiority with American liberty shall
be my great object, as far as my little faculties extend. I am far from
thinking that both, even yet, may not be preserved.
When I first devoted myself to the public service, I considered how I
should render myself fit for it; and this I did by endeavoring to
discover what it was that gave this country the rank it holds in the
world. I found that our prosperity and dignity arose principally, if not
solely, from two sources: our Constitution, and commerce. Both these I
have spared no study to understand, and no endeavor to support.
The distinguishing part of our Constitution is its liberty. To preserve
that liberty inviolate seems the particular duty and proper trust of a
member of the House of Commons. But the liberty, the only liberty, I
mean is a liberty connected with order: that not only exists along with
order and virtue, but which cannot exist at all without them. It inheres
in good and steady government, as in its substance and vital principle.
The other source of our power is commerce, of which you are so large a
part, and which cannot exist, no more than your liberty, without a
connection with many virtues. It has ever been a very particular and a
very favorite object of my study, in its principles, and in its details.
I think many here are acquainted with the truth of what I say. This I
know,--that I have ever had my house open, and my poor services ready,
for traders and manufacturers of every denomination. My favorite
ambition is, to have those services acknowledged. I now appear before
you to make trial, whether my earnest endeavors have been so wholly
oppressed by the weakness of my abilities as to be rendered
insignificant in the eyes of a great trading city; or whether you choose
to give a weight to humble abilities, for the sake of the honest
exertions with which they are accompanied. This is my trial to-day. My
industry is not on trial. Of my industry I am sure, as far as my
constitution of mind and body admitted.
When I was invited by many respectable merchants, freeholders, and
freemen of this city to offer them my services, I had just received the
honor of an election at another place, at a very great distance from
this. I immediately opened the matter to those of my worthy constituents
who were with me, and they unanimously advised me not to decline it.
They told me that they had elected me with a view to the public service;
and as great questions relative to our commerce and colonies were
imminent that in such matters I might derive authority and support from
the representation of this great commercial city: they desired me,
therefore, to set off without delay, very well persuaded that I never
could forget my obligations to them or to my friends, for the choice
they had made of me. From that time to this instant I have not slept;
and if I should have the honor of being freely chosen by you, I hope I
shall be as far from slumbering or sleeping, when your service requires
me to be awake, as I have been in coming to offer myself a candidate for
your favor.
SPEECH
TO THE
ELECTORS OF BRISTOL,
ON HIS BEING DECLARED BY THE SHERIFFS DULY ELECTED ONE OF THE
REPRESENTATIVES IN PARLIAMENT FOR THAT CITY,
ON THURSDAY, THE 3D OF NOVEMBER, 1774.
Gentlemen,--I cannot avoid sympathizing strongly with the feelings of
the gentleman who has received the same honor that you have conferred on
me. If he, who was bred and passed his whole life amongst you,--if he,
who, through the easy gradations of acquaintance, friendship, and
esteem, has obtained the honor which seems of itself, naturally and
almost insensibly, to meet with those who, by the even tenor of pleasing
manners and social virtues, slide into the love and confidence of their
fellow-citizens,--if he cannot speak but with great emotion on this
subject, surrounded as he is on all sides with his old friends,--you
will have the goodness to excuse me, if my real, unaffected
embarrassment prevents me from expressing my gratitude to you as I
ought.
I was brought hither under the disadvantage of being unknown, even by
sight, to any of you. No previous canvass was made for me. I was put in
nomination after the poll was opened. I did not appear until it was far
advanced. If, under all these accumulated disadvantages, your good
opinion has carried me to this happy point of success, you will pardon
me, if I can only say to you collectively, as I said to you
individually, simply and plainly, I thank you,--I am obliged to you,--I
am not insensible of your kindness.
This is all that I am able to say for the inestimable favor you have
conferred upon me. But I cannot be satisfied without saying a little
more in defence of the right you have to confer such a favor. The person
that appeared here as counsel for the candidate who so long and so
earnestly solicited your votes thinks proper to deny that a very great
part of you have any votes to give. He fixes a standard period of time
in his own imagination, (not what the law defines, but merely what the
convenience of his client suggests,) by which he would cut off at one
stroke all those freedoms which are the dearest privileges of your
corporation,--which the Common Law authorizes,--which your magistrates
are compelled to grant,--which come duly authenticated into this
court,--and are saved in the clearest words, and with the most religious
care and tenderness, in that very act of Parliament which was made to
regulate the elections by freemen, and to prevent all possible abuses in
making them.
I do not intend to argue the matter here. My learned counsel has
supported your cause with his usual ability; the worthy sheriffs have
acted with their usual equity; and I have no doubt that the same equity
which dictates the return will guide the final determination. I had the
honor, in conjunction with many far wiser men, to contribute a very
small assistance, but, however, some assistance, to the forming the
judicature which is to try such questions. It would be unnatural in me
to doubt the justice of that court, in the trial of my own cause, to
which I have been so active to give jurisdiction over every other.
I assure the worthy freemen, and this corporation, that, if the
gentleman perseveres in the intentions which his present warmth dictates
to him, I will attend their cause with diligence, and I hope with
effect. For, if I know anything of myself, it is not my own interest in
it, but my full conviction, that induces me to tell you, _I think there
is not a shadow of doubt in the case_.
I do not imagine that you find me rash in declaring myself, or very
forward in troubling you. From the beginning to the end of the election,
I have kept silence in all matters of discussion. I have never asked a
question of a voter on the other side, or supported a doubtful vote on
my own. I respected the abilities of my managers; I relied on the candor
of the court. I think the worthy sheriffs will bear me witness that I
have never once made an attempt to impose upon their reason, to surprise
their justice, or to ruffle their temper. I stood on the hustings
(except when I gave my thanks to those who favored me with their votes)
less like a candidate than an unconcerned spectator of a public
proceeding. But here the face of things is altered. Here is an attempt
for a general _massacre_ of suffrages,--an attempt, by a promiscuous
carnage of _friends_ and _foes_, to exterminate above two thousand
votes, including _seven hundred polled for the gentleman himself who now
complains_, and who would destroy the friends whom he has obtained, only
because he cannot obtain as many of them as he wishes.
How he will be permitted, in another place, to stultify and disable
himself, and to plead against his own acts, is another question. The law
will decide it. I shall only speak of it as it concerns the propriety of
public conduct in this city. I do not pretend to lay down rules of
decorum for other gentlemen. They are best judges of the mode of
proceeding that will recommend them to the favor of their
fellow-citizens. But I confess I should look rather awkward, if I had
been _the very first to produce the new copies of freedom_,--if I had
persisted in producing them to the last,--if I had ransacked, with the
most unremitting industry and the most penetrating research, the
remotest corners of the kingdom to discover them,--if I were then, all
at once, to turn short, and declare that I had been sporting all this
while with the right of election, and that I had been drawing out a
poll, upon no sort of rational grounds, which disturbed the peace of my
fellow-citizens for a month together;--I really, for my part, should
appear awkward under such circumstances.
It would be still more awkward in me, if I were gravely to look the
sheriffs in the face, and to tell them they were not to determine my
cause on my own principles, nor to make the return upon those votes upon
which I had rested my election. Such would be my appearance to the court
and magistrates.
But how should I appear to the _voters_ themselves? If I had gone round
to the citizens entitled to freedom, and squeezed them by the
hand,--"Sir, I humbly beg your vote,--I shall be eternally
thankful,--may I hope for the honor of your support?--Well!--come,--we
shall see you at the Council-House."--If I were then to deliver them to
my managers, pack them into tallies, vote them off in court, and when I
heard from the bar,--"Such a one only! and such a one forever!--he's my
man!"--"Thank you, good Sir,--Hah! my worthy friend! thank you
kindly,--that's an honest fellow,--how is your good family?"--Whilst
these words were hardly out of my mouth, if I should have wheeled round
at once, and told them,--"Get you gone, you pack of worthless fellows!
you have no votes,--you are usurpers! you are intruders on the rights of
real freemen! I will have nothing to do with you! you ought never to
have been produced at this election, and the sheriffs ought not to have
admitted you to poll!"--
Gentlemen, I should make a strange figure, if my conduct had been of
this sort. I am not so old an acquaintance of yours as the worthy
gentleman. Indeed, I could not have ventured on such kind of freedoms
with you. But I am bound, and I will endeavor, to have justice done to
the rights of freemen,--even though I should at the same time be obliged
to vindicate the former[17] part of my antagonist's conduct against his
own present inclinations.
I owe myself, in all things, to _all_ the freemen of this city. My
particular friends have a demand on mo that I should not deceive their
expectations. Never was cause or man supported with more constancy, more
activity, more spirit. I have been supported with a zeal, indeed, and
heartiness in my friends, which (if their object had been at all
proportioned to their endeavors) could never be sufficiently commended.
They supported me upon the most liberal principles. They wished that the
members for Bristol should be chosen for the city, and for their country
at large, and not for themselves.
So far they are not disappointed. If I possess nothing else, I am sure I
possess the temper that is fit for your service. I know nothing of
Bristol, but by the favors I have received, and the virtues I have seen
exerted in it.
I shall ever retain, what I now feel, the most perfect and grateful
attachment to my friends,--and I have no enmities, no resentments. I
never can consider fidelity to engagements and constancy in friendships
but with the highest approbation, even when those noble qualities are
employed against my own pretensions. The gentleman who is not so
fortunate as I have been in this contest enjoys, in this respect, a
consolation full of honor both to himself and to his friends. They have
certainly left nothing undone for his service.
As for the trifling petulance which the rage of party stirs up in little
minds, though it should show itself even in this court, it has not made
the slightest impression on me. The highest flight of such clamorous
birds is winged in an inferior region of the air. We hear them, and we
look upon them, just as you, Gentlemen, when you enjoy the serene air on
your lofty rocks, look down upon the gulls that skim the mud of your
river, when it is exhausted of its tide.
I am sorry I cannot conclude without saying a word on a topic touched
upon by my worthy colleague. I wish that topic had been passed by at a
time when I have so little leisure to discuss it. But since he has
thought proper to throw it out, I owe you a clear explanation of my poor
sentiments on that subject.
He tells you that "the topic of instructions has occasioned much
altercation and uneasiness in this city"; and he expresses himself (if I
understand him rightly) in favor of the coercive authority of such
instructions.
Certainly, Gentlemen, it ought to be the happiness and glory of a
representative to live in the strictest union, the closest
correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with his
constituents. Their wishes ought to have great weight with him; their
opinions high respect; their business unremitted attention. It is his
duty to sacrifice his repose, his _pleasure_, _his satisfactions_, _to
theirs_,--and above all, ever, and in all cases, to prefer their
interest to his own.
But his unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened
conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set
of men living. These he does not derive from your pleasure,--no, nor
from the law and the Constitution. They are a trust from Providence, for
the abuse of which he is deeply answerable. Your representative owes
you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of
serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.
My worthy colleague says, his will ought to be subservient to yours. If
that be all, the thing is innocent. If government were a matter of will
upon any side, yours, without question, ought to be superior. But
government and legislation are matters of reason and judgment, and not
of inclination; and what sort of reason is that in which the
determination precedes the discussion, in which one set of men
deliberate and another decide, and where those who form the conclusion
are perhaps three hundred miles distant from those who hear the
arguments?
To deliver an opinion is the right of all men; that of constituents is a
weighty and respectable opinion, which a representative ought always to
rejoice to hear, and which he ought always most seriously to consider.
But _authoritative_ instructions, _mandates_ issued, which the member is
bound blindly and implicitly to obey, to vote, and to argue for, though
contrary to the clearest conviction of his judgment and
conscience,--these are things utterly unknown to the laws of this land,
and which arise from a fundamental mistake of the whole order and tenor
of our Constitution.
Parliament is not a _congress_ of ambassadors from different and hostile
interests, which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate,
against other agents and advocates; but Parliament is a _deliberative_
assembly of _one_ nation, with _one_ interest, that of the whole--where
not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the
general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole. You choose
a member, indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not member of
Bristol, but he is a member of _Parliament_. If the local constituent
should have an interest or should form an hasty opinion evidently
opposite to the real good of the rest of the community, the member for
that place ought to be as far as any other from any endeavor to give it
effect. I beg pardon for saying so much on this subject; I have been
unwillingly drawn into it; but I shall ever use a respectful frankness
of communication with you. Your faithful friend, your devoted servant, I
shall be to the end of my life: a flatterer you do not wish for. On this
point of instructions, however, I think it scarcely possible we ever can
have any sort of difference. Perhaps I may give you too much, rather
than too little trouble.
From the first hour I was encouraged to court your favor, to this happy
day of obtaining it, I have never promised you anything but humble and
persevering endeavors to do my duty. The weight of that duty, I confess,
makes me tremble; and whoever well considers what it is, of all things
in the world, will fly from what has the least likeness to a positive
and precipitate engagement. To be a good member of Parliament is, let me
tell you, no easy task,--especially at this time, when there is so
strong a disposition to run into the perilous extremes of servile
compliance or wild popularity. To unite circumspection with vigor is
absolutely necessary, but it is extremely difficult. We are now members
for a rich commercial _city_; this city, however, is but a part of a
rich commercial _nation_, the interests of which are various, multiform,
and intricate. We are members for that great nation, which, however, is
itself but part of a great _empire_, extended by our virtue and our
fortune to the farthest limits of the East and of the West. All these
wide-spread interests must be considered,--must be compared,--must be
reconciled, if possible. We are members for a _free_ country; and surely
we all know that the machine of a free constitution is no simple thing,
but as intricate and as delicate as it is valuable. We are members in a
great and ancient _monarchy_; and we must preserve religiously the true,
legal rights of the sovereign, which form the keystone that binds
together the noble and well-constructed arch of our empire and our
Constitution. A constitution made up of balanced powers must ever be a
critical thing. As such I mean to touch that part of it which comes
within my reach. I know my inability, and I wish for support from every
quarter. In particular I shall aim at the friendship, and shall
cultivate the best correspondence, of the worthy colleague you have
given me.
I trouble you no farther than once more to thank you all: you,
Gentlemen, for your favors; the candidates, for their temperate and
polite behavior; and the sheriffs, for a conduct which may give a model
for all who are in public stations.
FOOTNOTES:
[17] Mr. Brickdale opened his poll, it seems, with a tally of those very
kind of freemen, and voted many hundreds of them.
SPEECH
ON
MOVING HIS RESOLUTIONS FOR CONCILIATION WITH THE COLONIES.
MARCH 22, 1775.
I hope, Sir, that, notwithstanding the austerity of the Chair, your
good-nature will incline you to some degree of indulgence towards human
frailty. You will not think it unnatural, that those who have an object
depending, which strongly engages their hopes and fears, should be
somewhat inclined to superstition. As I came into the House, full of
anxiety about the event of my motion, I found, to my infinite surprise,
that the grand penal bill by which we had passed sentence on the trade
and sustenance of America is to be returned to us from the other
House.[18] I do confess, I could not help looking on this event as a
fortunate omen. I look upon it as a sort of Providential favor, by which
we are put once more in possession of our deliberative capacity, upon a
business so very questionable in its nature, so very uncertain in its
issue. By the return of this bill, which seemed to have taken its flight
forever, we are at this very instant nearly as free to choose a plan for
our American government as we were on the first day of the session. If,
Sir, we incline to the side of conciliation, we are not at all
embarrassed (unless we please to make ourselves so) by any incongruous
mixture of coercion and restraint. We are therefore called upon, as it
were by a superior warning voice, again to attend to America,--to attend
to the whole of it together,--and to review the subject with an unusual
degree of care and calmness.
Surely it is an awful subject,--or there is none so on this side of the
grave. When I first had the honor of a seat in this House, the affairs
of that continent pressed themselves upon us as the most important and
most delicate object of Parliamentary attention. My little share in this
great deliberation oppressed me. I found myself a partaker in a very
high trust; and having no sort of reason to rely on the strength of my
natural abilities for the proper execution of that trust, I was obliged
to take more than common pains to instruct myself in everything which
relates to our colonies. I was not less under the necessity of forming
some fixed ideas concerning the general policy of the British empire.
Something of this sort seemed to be indispensable, in order, amidst so
vast a fluctuation of passions and opinions, to concentre my thoughts,
to ballast my conduct, to preserve me from being blown about by every
wind of fashionable doctrine. I really did not think it safe or manly to
have fresh principles to seek upon every fresh mail which should arrive
from America.
At that period I had the fortune to find myself in perfect concurrence
with a large majority in this House. Bowing under that high authority,
and penetrated with the sharpness and strength of that early
impression, I have continued ever since, without the least deviation,
in my original sentiments. Whether this be owing to an obstinate
perseverance in error, or to a religious adherence to what appears to me
truth and reason, it is in your equity to judge.
Sir, Parliament, having an enlarged view of objects, made, during this
interval, more frequent changes in their sentiments and their conduct
than could be justified in a particular person upon the contracted scale
of private information. But though I do not hazard anything approaching
to a censure on the motives of former Parliaments to all those
alterations, one fact is undoubted,--that under them the state of
America has been kept in continual agitation. Everything administered as
remedy to the public complaint, if it did not produce, was at least
followed by, an heightening of the distemper, until, by a variety of
experiments, that important country has been brought into her present
situation,--a situation which I will not miscall, which I dare not name,
which I scarcely know how to comprehend in the terms of any description.
In this posture, Sir, things stood at the beginning of the session.
About that time, a worthy member,[19] of great Parliamentary experience,
who in the year 1766 filled the chair of the American Committee with
much ability, took me aside, and, lamenting the present aspect of our
politics, told me, things were come to such a pass that our former
methods of proceeding in the House would be no longer tolerated,--that
the public tribunal (never too indulgent to a long and unsuccessful
opposition) would now scrutinize our conduct with unusual
severity,--that the very vicissitudes and shiftings of ministerial
measures, instead of convicting their authors of inconstancy and want of
system, would be taken as an occasion of charging us with a
predetermined discontent which nothing could satisfy, whilst we accused
every measure of vigor as cruel and every proposal of lenity as weak and
irresolute. The public, he said, would not have patience to see us play
the game out with our adversaries; we must produce our hand: it would be
expected that those who for many years had been active in such affairs
should show that they had formed some clear and decided idea of the
principles of colony government, and were capable of drawing out
something like a platform of the ground which might be laid for future
and permanent tranquillity.
I felt the truth of what my honorable friend represented; but I felt my
situation, too. His application might have been made with far greater
propriety to many other gentlemen. No man was, indeed, ever better
disposed, or worse qualified, for such an undertaking, than myself.
Though I gave so far into his opinion, that I immediately threw my
thoughts into a sort of Parliamentary form, I was by no means equally
ready to produce them. It generally argues some degree of natural
impotence of mind, or some want of knowledge of the world, to hazard
plans of government, except from a seat of authority. Propositions are
made, not only ineffectually, but somewhat disreputably, when the minds
of men are not properly disposed for their reception; and for my part, I
am not ambitious of ridicule, not absolutely a candidate for disgrace.
Besides, Sir, to speak the plain truth, I have in general no very
exalted opinion of the virtue of paper government, nor of any polities
in which the plan is to be wholly separated from the execution. But when
I saw that anger and violence prevailed every day more and more, and
that things were hastening towards an incurable alienation of our
colonies, I confess my caution gave way. I felt this as one of those few
moments in which decorum yields to an higher duty. Public calamity is a
mighty leveller; and there are occasions when any, even the slightest,
chance of doing good must be laid hold on, even by the most
inconsiderable person.
To restore order and repose to an empire so great and so distracted as
ours is, merely in the attempt, an undertaking that would ennoble the
flights of the highest genius, and obtain pardon for the efforts of the
meanest understanding. Struggling a good while with these thoughts, by
degrees I felt myself more firm. I derived, at length, some confidence
from what in other circumstances usually produces timidity. I grew less
anxious, even from the idea of my own insignificance. For, judging of
what you are by what you ought to be, I persuaded myself that you would
not reject a reasonable proposition because it had nothing but its
reason to recommend it. On the other hand, being totally destitute of
all shadow of influence, natural or adventitious, I was very sure, that,
if my proposition were futile or dangerous, if it were weakly conceived
or improperly timed, there was nothing exterior to it of power to awe,
dazzle, or delude you. You will see it just as it is, and you will treat
it just as it deserves.
The proposition is peace. Not peace through the medium of war; not peace
to be hunted through the labyrinth of intricate and endless
negotiations; not peace to arise out of universal discord, fomented from
principle, in all parts of the empire; not peace to depend on the
juridical determination of perplexing questions, or the precise marking
the shadowy boundaries of a complex government. It is simple peace,
sought in its natural course and in its ordinary haunts. It is peace
sought in the spirit of peace, and laid in principles purely pacific. I
propose, by removing the ground of the difference, and by restoring the
_former unsuspecting confidence of the colonies in the mother country_,
to give permanent satisfaction to your people,--and (far from a scheme
of ruling by discord) to reconcile them to each other in the same act
and by the bond of the very same interest which reconciles them to
British government.
My idea is nothing more. Refined policy ever has been the parent of
confusion,--and ever will be so, as long as the world endures. Plain
good intention, which is as easily discovered at the first view as fraud
is surely detected at last, is, let me say, of no mean force in the
government of mankind. Genuine simplicity of heart is an healing and
cementing principle. My plan, therefore, being formed upon the most
simple grounds imaginable, may disappoint some people, when they hear
it. It has nothing to recommend it to the pruriency of curious ears.
There is nothing at all new and captivating in it. It has nothing of the
splendor of the project which has been lately laid upon your table by
the noble lord in the blue riband.[20] It does not propose to fill your
lobby with squabbling colony agents, who will require the interposition
of your mace at every instant to keep the peace amongst them. It does
not institute a magnificent auction of finance, where captivated
provinces come to general ransom by bidding against each other, until
you knock down the hammer, and determine a proportion of payments beyond
all the powers of algebra to equalize and settle.
The plan which I shall presume to suggest derives, however, one great
advantage from the proposition and registry of that noble lord's
project. The idea of conciliation is admissible. First, the House, in
accepting the resolution moved by the noble lord, has admitted,
notwithstanding the menacing front of our address, notwithstanding our
heavy bill of pains and penalties, that we do not think ourselves
precluded from all ideas of free grace and bounty.
The House has gone farther: it has declared conciliation admissible
_previous_ to any submission on the part of America. It has even shot a
good deal beyond that mark, and has admitted that the complaints of our
former mode of exerting the right of taxation were not wholly unfounded.
That right thus exerted is allowed to have had something reprehensible
in it,--something unwise, or something grievous; since, in the midst of
our heat and resentment, we, of ourselves, have proposed a capital
alteration, and, in order to get rid of what seemed so very
exceptionable, have instituted a mode that is altogether new,--one that
is, indeed, wholly alien from all the ancient methods and forms of
Parliament.
The _principle_ of this proceeding is large enough for my purpose. The
means proposed by the noble lord for carrying his ideas into execution,
I think, indeed, are very indifferently suited to the end; and this I
shall endeavor to show you before I sit down. But, for the present, I
take my ground on the admitted principle. I mean to give peace. Peace
implies reconciliation; and where there has been a material dispute,
reconciliation does in a manner always imply concession on the one part
or on the other. In this state of things I make no difficulty in
affirming that the proposal ought to originate from us. Great and
acknowledged force is not impaired, either in effect or in opinion, by
an unwillingness to exert itself. The superior power may offer peace
with honor and with safety. Such an offer from such a power will be
attributed to magnanimity. But the concessions of the weak are the
concessions of fear. When such a one is disarmed, he is wholly at the
mercy of his superior; and he loses forever that time and those chances
which, as they happen to all men, are the strength and resources of all
inferior power.
The capital leading questions on which you must this day decide are
these two: First, whether you ought to concede; and secondly, what your
concession ought to be. On the first of these questions we have gained
(as I have just taken the liberty of observing to you) some ground. But
I am sensible that a good deal more is still to be done. Indeed, Sir, to
enable us to determine both on the one and the other of these great
questions with a firm and precise judgment, I think it may be necessary
to consider distinctly the true nature and the peculiar circumstances of
the object which we have before us: because, after all our struggle,
whether we will or not, we must govern America according to that nature
and to those circumstances, and not according to our own imaginations,
not according to abstract ideas of right, by no means according to mere
general theories of government, the resort to which appears to me, in
our present situation, no better than arrant trifling. I shall therefore
endeavor, with your leave, to lay before you some of the most material
of these circumstances in as full and as clear a manner as I am able to
state them.
The first thing that we have to consider with regard to the nature of
the object is the number of people in the colonies. I have taken for
some years a good deal of pains on that point. I can by no calculation
justify myself in placing the number below two millions of inhabitants
of our own European blood and color,--besides at least 500,000 others,
who form no inconsiderable part of the strength and opulence of the
whole. This, Sir, is, I believe, about the true number. There is no
occasion to exaggerate, where plain truth is of so much weight and
importance. But whether I put the present numbers too high or too low is
a matter of little moment. Such is the strength with which population
shoots in that part of the world, that, state the numbers as high as we
will, whilst the dispute continues, the exaggeration ends. Whilst we are
discussing any given magnitude, they are grown to it. Whilst we spend
our time in deliberating on the mode of governing two millions, we shall
find we have millions more to manage. Your children do not grow faster
from infancy to manhood than they spread from families to communities,
and from villages to nations.
I put this consideration of the present and the growing numbers in the
front of our deliberation, because, Sir, this consideration will make it
evident to a blunter discernment than yours, that no partial, narrow,
contracted, pinched, occasional system will be at all suitable to such
an object. It will show you that it is not to be considered as one of
those _minima_ which are out of the eye and consideration of the
law,--not a paltry excrescence of the state,--not a mean dependant, who
may be neglected with little damage and provoked with little danger. It
will prove that some degree of care and caution is required in the
handling such an object; it will show that you ought not, in reason, to
trifle with so large a mass of the interests and feelings of the human
race. You could at no time do so without guilt; and be assured you will
not be able to do it long with impunity.
But the population of this country, the great and growing population,
though a very important consideration, will lose much of its weight, if
not combined with other circumstances. The commerce of your colonies is
out of all proportion beyond the numbers of the people. This ground of
their commerce, indeed, has been trod some days ago, and with great
ability, by a distinguished person,[21] at your bar. This gentleman,
after thirty-five years,--it is so long since he first appeared at the
same place to plead for the commerce of Great Britain,--has come again
before you to plead the same cause, without any other effect of time
than that to the fire of imagination and extent of erudition, which even
then marked him as one of the first literary characters of his age, he
has added a consummate knowledge in the commercial interest of his
country, formed by a long course of enlightened and discriminating
experience.
Sir, I should be inexcusable in coming after such a person with any
detail, if a great part of the members who now fill the House had not
the misfortune to be absent when he appeared at your bar. Besides, Sir,
I propose to take the matter at periods of time somewhat different from
his. There is, if I mistake not, a point of view from whence, if you
will look at this subject, it is impossible that it should not make an
impression upon you.
I have in my hand two accounts: one a comparative state of the export
trade of England to its colonies, as it stood in the year 1704, and as
it stood in the year 1772; the other a state of the export trade of this
country to its colonies alone, as it stood in 1772, compared with the
whole trade of England to all parts of the world (the colonies included)
in the year 1704. They are from good vouchers: the latter period from
the accounts on your table; the earlier from an original manuscript of
Davenant, who first established the Inspector-General's office, which
has been ever since his time so abundant a source of Parliamentary
information.
The export trade to the colonies consists of three great branches: the
African, which, terminating almost wholly in the colonies, must be put
to the account of their commerce; the West Indian; and the North
American. All these are so interwoven, that the attempt to separate them
would tear to pieces the contexture of the whole, and, if not entirely
destroy, would very much depreciate, the value of all the parts. I
therefore consider these three denominations to be, what in effect they
are, one trade.
The trade to the colonies, taken on the export side, at the beginning of
this century, that is, in the year 1704, stood thus:--
Exports to North America and the West
Indies £ 483,265
To Africa 86,665
---------
£ 569,930
In the year 1772, which I take as a middle year between the highest and
lowest of those lately laid on your table, the account was as follows:--
To North America and the West Indies £ 4,791,734
To Africa 866,398
To which if you add the export trade
from Scotland, which had in 1704 no
existence 364,000
----------
£6,024,171
From five hundred and odd thousand, it has grown to six millions. It has
increased no less than twelve-fold. This is the state of the colony
trade, as compared with itself at these two periods, within this
century;--and this is matter for meditation. But this is not all.
Examine my second account. See how the export trade to the colonies
alone in 1772 stood in the other point of view, that is, as compared to
the whole trade of England in 1704.
The whole export trade of England, including
that to the colonies, in 1704 £6,509,000
Export to the colonies alone, in 1772 6,024,000
---------
Difference £485,000
The trade with America alone is now within less than 500,000_l._ of
being equal to what this great commercial nation, England, carried on at
the beginning of this century with the whole world! If I had taken the
largest year of those on your table, it would rather have exceeded. But,
it will be said, is not this American trade an unnatural protuberance,
that has drawn the juices from the rest of the body? The reverse. It is
the very food that has nourished every other part into its present
magnitude. Our general trade has been greatly augmented, and augmented
more or less in almost every part to which it ever extended, but with
this material difference: that of the six millions which in the
beginning of the century constituted the whole mass of our export
commerce the colony trade was but one twelfth part; it is now (as a part
of sixteen millions) considerably more than a third of the whole. This
is the relative proportion of the importance of the colonies at these
two periods: and all reasoning concerning our mode of treating them must
have this proportion as its basis, or it is a reasoning weak, rotten,
and sophistical.
Mr. Speaker, I cannot prevail on myself to hurry over this great
consideration. It is good for us to be here. We stand where we have an
immense view of what is, and what is past. Clouds indeed, and darkness,
rest upon the future. Let us, however, before we descend from this noble
eminence, reflect that this growth of our national prosperity has
happened within the short period of the life of man. It has happened
within sixty-eight years. There are those alive whose memory might touch
the two extremities. For instance, my Lord Bathurst might remember all
the stages of the progress. He was in 1704 of an age at least to be made
to comprehend such things. He was then old enough _acta parentum jam
legere, et quæ sit poterit cognoscere virtus_. Suppose, Sir, that the
angel of this auspicious youth, foreseeing the many virtues which made
him one of the most amiable, as he is one of the most fortunate men of
his age, had opened to him in vision, that, when, in the fourth
generation, the third prince of the House of Brunswick had sat twelve
years on the throne of that nation which (by the happy issue of moderate
and healing councils) was to be made Great Britain, he should see his
son, Lord Chancellor of England, turn back the current of hereditary
dignity to its fountain, and raise him to an higher rank of peerage,
whilst he enriched the family with a new one,--if, amidst these bright
and happy scenes of domestic honor and prosperity, that angel should
have drawn up the curtain, and unfolded the rising glories of his
country, and whilst he was gazing with admiration on the then commercial
grandeur of England, the genius should point out to him a little speck,
scarce visible in the mass of the national interest, a small seminal
principle rather than a formed body, and should tell him,--"Young man,
there is America,--which at this day serves for little more than to
amuse you with stories of savage men and uncouth manners, yet shall,
before you taste of death, show itself equal to the whole of that
commerce which now attracts the envy of the world. Whatever England has
been growing to by a progressive increase of improvement, brought in by
varieties of people, by succession of civilizing conquests and
civilizing settlements in a series of seventeen hundred years, you shall
see as much added to her by America in the course of a single life!" If
this state of his country had been foretold to him, would it not require
all the sanguine credulity of youth, and all the fervid glow of
enthusiasm, to make him believe it? Fortunate man, he has lived to see
it! Fortunate indeed, if he lives to see nothing that shall vary the
prospect, and cloud the setting of his day!
Excuse me, Sir, if, turning from such thoughts, I resume this
comparative view once more. You have seen it on a large scale; look at
it on a small one. I will point out to your attention a particular
instance of it in the single province of Pennsylvania. In the year 1704,
that province called for 11,459_l._ in value of your commodities,
native and foreign. This was the whole. What did it demand in 1772! Why,
nearly fifty times as much; for in that year the export to Pennsylvania
was 507,909_l._, nearly equal to the export to all the colonies
together in the first period.
I choose, Sir, to enter into these minute and particular details;
because generalities, which in all other cases are apt to heighten and
raise the subject, have here a tendency to sink it. When we speak of the
commerce with our colonies, fiction lags after truth, invention is
unfruitful, and imagination cold and barren.
So far, Sir, as to the importance of the object in the view of its
commerce, as concerned in the exports from England. If I were to detail
the imports, I could show how many enjoyments they procure which deceive
the burden of life, how many materials which invigorate the springs of
national industry and extend and animate every part of our foreign and
domestic commerce. This would be a curious subject indeed,--but I must
prescribe bounds to myself in a matter so vast and various.
I pass, therefore, to the colonies in another point of view,--their
agriculture. This they have prosecuted with such a spirit, that, besides
feeding plentifully their own growing multitude, their annual export of
grain, comprehending rice, has some years ago exceeded a million in
value. Of their last harvest, I am persuaded, they will export much
more. At the beginning of the century some of these colonies imported
corn from the mother country. For some time past the Old World has been
fed from the New. The scarcity which you have felt would have been a
desolating famine, if this child of your old age, with a true filial
piety, with a Roman charity, had not put the full breast of its youthful
exuberance to the mouth of its exhausted parent.
As to the wealth which the colonies have drawn from the sea by their
fisheries, you had all that matter fully opened at your bar. You surely
thought those acquisitions of value, for they seemed even to excite your
envy; and yet the spirit by which that enterprising employment has been
exercised ought rather, in my opinion, to have raised your esteem and
admiration. And pray, Sir, what in the world is equal to it? Pass by
the other parts, and look at the manner in which the people of New
England have of late carried on the whale-fishery. Whilst we follow them
among the tumbling mountains of ice, and behold them penetrating into
the deepest frozen recesses of Hudson's Bay and Davis's Straits, whilst
we are looking for them beneath the arctic circle, we hear that they
have pierced into the opposite region of polar cold, that they are at
the antipodes, and engaged under the frozen serpent of the South.
Falkland Island, which seemed too remote and romantic an object for the
grasp of national ambition, is but a stage and resting-place in the
progress of their victorious industry. Nor is the equinoctial heat more
discouraging to them than the accumulated winter of both the poles. We
know, that, whilst some of them draw the line and strike the harpoon on
the coast of Africa, others run the longitude, and pursue their gigantic
game along the coast of Brazil. No sea but what is vexed by their
fisheries. No climate that is not witness to their toils. Neither the
perseverance of Holland, nor the activity of France, nor the dexterous
and firm sagacity of English enterprise, ever carried this most perilous
mode of hardy industry to the extent to which it has been pushed by this
recent people,--a people who are still, as it were, but in the gristle,
and not yet hardened into the bone of manhood. When I contemplate these
things,--when I know that the colonies in general owe little or nothing
to any care of ours, and that they are not squeezed into this happy form
by the constraints of watchful and suspicious government, but that,
through a wise and salutary neglect, a generous nature has been
suffered to take her own way to perfection,--when I reflect upon these
effects, when I see how profitable they have been to us, I feel all the
pride of power sink, and all presumption in the wisdom of human
contrivances melt and die away within me,--my rigor relents,--I pardon
something to the spirit of liberty.
I am sensible, Sir, that all which I have asserted in my detail is
admitted in the gross, but that quite a different conclusion is drawn
from it. America, gentlemen say, is a noble object,--it is an object
well worth fighting for. Certainly it is, if fighting a people be the
best way of gaining them. Gentlemen in this respect will be led to their
choice of means by their complexions and their habits. Those who
understand the military art will of course have some predilection for
it. Those who wield the thunder of the state may have more confidence in
the efficacy of arms. But I confess, possibly for want of this
knowledge, my opinion is much more in favor of prudent management than
of force,--considering force not as an odious, but a feeble instrument,
for preserving a people so numerous, so active, so growing, so spirited
as this, in a profitable and subordinate connection with us.
First, Sir, permit me to observe, that the use of force alone is but
_temporary_. It may subdue for a moment; but it does not remove the
necessity of subduing again: and a nation is not governed which is
perpetually to be conquered.
My next objection is its _uncertainty_. Terror is not always the effect
of force, and an armament is not a victory. If you do not succeed, you
are without resource: for, conciliation failing, force remains; but,
force failing, no further hope of reconciliation is left. Power and
authority are sometimes bought by kindness; but they can never be begged
as alms by an impoverished and defeated violence.
A further objection to force is, that you _impair the object_ by your
very endeavors to preserve it. The thing you fought for is not the thing
which you recover, but depreciated, sunk, wasted, and consumed in the
contest. Nothing less will content me than _whole America_. I do not
choose to consume its strength along with our own; because in all parts
it is the British strength that I consume. I do not choose to be caught
by a foreign enemy at the end of this exhausting conflict, and still
less in the midst of it. I may escape, but I can make no insurance
against such an event. Let me add, that I do not choose wholly to break
the American spirit; because it is the spirit that has made the country.
Lastly, we have no sort of _experience_ in favor of force as an
instrument in the rule of our colonies. Their growth and their utility
has been owing to methods altogether different. Our ancient indulgence
has been said to be pursued to a fault. It may be so; but we know, if
feeling is evidence, that our fault was more tolerable than our attempt
to mend it, and our sin far more salutary than our penitence.
These, Sir, are my reasons for not entertaining that high opinion of
untried force by which many gentlemen, for whose sentiments in other
particulars I have great respect, seem to be so greatly captivated. But
there is still behind a third consideration concerning this object,
which serves to determine my opinion on the sort of policy which ought
to be pursued in the management of America, even more than its
population and its commerce: I mean its _temper and character_.
In this character of the Americans a love of freedom is the
predominating feature which marks and distinguishes the whole: and as an
ardent is always a jealous affection, your colonies become suspicious,
restive, and untractable, whenever they see the least attempt to wrest
from them by force, or shuffle from them by chicane, what they think the
only advantage worth living for. This fierce spirit of liberty is
stronger in the English colonies, probably, than in any other people of
the earth, and this from a great variety of powerful causes; which, to
understand the true temper of their minds, and the direction which this
spirit takes, it will not be amiss to lay open somewhat more largely.
First, the people of the colonies are descendants of Englishmen.
England, Sir, is a nation which still, I hope, respects, and formerly
adored, her freedom. The colonists emigrated from you when this part of
your character was most predominant; and they took this bias and
direction the moment they parted from your hands. They are therefore not
only devoted to liberty, but to liberty according to English ideas and
on English principles. Abstract liberty, like other mere abstractions,
is not to be found. Liberty inheres in some sensible object; and every
nation has formed to itself some favorite point, which by way of
eminence becomes the criterion of their happiness. It happened, you
know, Sir, that the great contests for freedom in this country were from
the earliest times chiefly upon the question of taxing. Most of the
contests in the ancient commonwealths turned primarily on the right of
election of magistrates, or on the balance among the several orders of
the state. The question of money was not with them so immediate. But in
England it was otherwise. On this point of taxes the ablest pens and
most eloquent tongues have been exercised, the greatest spirits have
acted and suffered. In order to give the fullest satisfaction concerning
the importance of this point, it was not only necessary for those who in
argument defended the excellence of the English Constitution to insist
on this privilege of granting money as a dry point of fact, and to prove
that the right had been acknowledged in ancient parchments and blind
usages to reside in a certain body called an House of Commons: they went
much further: they attempted to prove, and they succeeded, that in
theory it ought to be so, from the particular nature of a House of
Commons, as an immediate representative of the people, whether the old
records had delivered this oracle or not. They took infinite pains to
inculcate, as a fundamental principle, that in all monarchies the people
must in effect themselves, mediately or immediately, possess the power
of granting their own money, or no shadow of liberty could subsist. The
colonies draw from you, as with their life-blood, these ideas and
principles. Their love of liberty, as with you, fixed and attached on
this specific point of taxing. Liberty might be safe or might be
endangered in twenty other particulars without their being much pleased
or alarmed. Here they felt its pulse; and as they found that beat, they
thought themselves sick or sound. I do not say whether they were right
or wrong in applying your general arguments to their own case. It is not
easy, indeed, to make a monopoly of theorems and corollaries. The fact
is, that they did thus apply those general arguments; and your mode of
governing them, whether through lenity or indolence, through wisdom or
mistake, confirmed them in the imagination, that they, as well as you,
had an interest in these common principles.
They were further confirmed in this pleasing error by the form of their
provincial legislative assemblies. Their governments are popular in an
high degree: some are merely popular; in all, the popular representative
is the most weighty; and this share of the people in their ordinary
government never fails to inspire them with lofty sentiments, and with a
strong aversion from whatever tends to deprive them of their chief
importance.
If anything were wanting to this necessary operation of the form of
government, religion would have given it a complete effect. Religion,
always a principle of energy, in this new people is no way worn out or
impaired; and their mode of professing it is also one main cause of this
free spirit. The people are Protestants, and of that kind which is the
most adverse to all implicit submission of mind and opinion. This is a
persuasion not only favorable to liberty, but built upon it. I do not
think, Sir, that the reason of this averseness in the dissenting
churches from all that looks like absolute government is so much to be
sought in their religious tenets as in their history. Every one knows
that the Roman Catholic religion is at least coeval with most of the
governments where it prevails, that it has generally gone hand in hand
with them, and received great favor and every kind of support from
authority. The Church of England, too, was formed from her cradle under
the nursing care of regular government. But the dissenting interests
have sprung up in direct opposition to all the ordinary powers of the
world, and could justify that opposition only on a strong claim to
natural liberty. Their very existence depended on the powerful and
unremitted assertion of that claim. All Protestantism, even the most
cold and passive, is a sort of dissent. But the religion most prevalent
in our northern colonies is a refinement on the principle of resistance:
it is the dissidence of dissent, and the protestantism of the Protestant
religion. This religion, under a variety of denominations agreeing in
nothing but in the communion of the spirit of liberty, is predominant in
most of the northern provinces, where the Church of England,
notwithstanding its legal rights, is in reality no more than a sort of
private sect, not composing, most probably, the tenth of the people. The
colonists left England when this spirit was high, and in the emigrants
was the highest of all; and even that stream of foreigners which has
been constantly flowing into these colonies has, for the greatest part,
been composed of dissenters from the establishments of their several
countries, and have brought with them a temper and character far from
alien to that of the people with whom they mixed.
Sir, I can perceive, by their manner, that some gentlemen object to the
latitude of this description, because in the southern colonies the
Church of England forms a large body, and has a regular establishment.
It is certainly true. There is, however, a circumstance attending these
colonies, which, in my opinion, fully counterbalances this difference,
and makes the spirit of liberty still more high and haughty than in
those to the northward. It is, that in Virginia and the Carolinas they
have a vast multitude of slaves. Where this is the case in any part of
the world, those who are free are by far the most proud and jealous of
their freedom. Freedom is to them not only an enjoyment, but a kind of
rank and privilege. Not seeing there, that freedom, as in countries
where it is a common blessing, and as broad and general as the air, may
be united with much abject toil, with great misery, with all the
exterior of servitude, liberty looks, amongst them, like something that
is more noble and liberal. I do not mean, Sir, to commend the superior
morality of this sentiment, which has at least as much pride as virtue
in it; but I cannot alter the nature of man. The fact is so; and these
people of the southern colonies are much more strongly, and with an
higher and more stubborn spirit, attached to liberty, than those to the
northward. Such were all the ancient commonwealths; such were our Gothic
ancestors; such in our days were the Poles; and such will be all masters
of slaves, who are not slaves themselves. In such a people, the
haughtiness of domination combines with the spirit of freedom, fortifies
it, and renders it invincible.
Permit me, Sir, to add another circumstance in our colonies, which
contributes no mean part towards the growth and effect of this
untractable spirit: I mean their education. In no country, perhaps, in
the world is the law so general a study. The profession itself is
numerous and powerful, and in most provinces it takes the lead. The
greater number of the deputies sent to the Congress were lawyers. But
all who read, and most do read, endeavor to obtain some smattering in
that science. I have been told by an eminent bookseller, that in no
branch of his business, after tracts of popular devotion, were so many
books as those on the law exported to the plantations. The colonists
have now fallen into the way of printing them for their own use. I hear
that they have sold nearly as many of Blackstone's "Commentaries" in
America as in England. General Gage marks out this disposition very
particularly in a letter on your table. He states, that all the people
in his government are lawyers, or smatterers in law,--and that in Boston
they have been enabled, by successful chicane, wholly to evade many
parts of one of your capital penal constitutions. The smartness of
debate will say, that this knowledge ought to teach them more clearly
the rights of legislature, their obligations to obedience, and the
penalties of rebellion. All this is mighty well. But my honorable and
learned friend[22] on the floor, who condescends to mark what I say for
animadversion, will disdain that ground. He has heard, as well as I,
that, when great honors and great emoluments do not win over this
knowledge to the service of the state, it is a formidable adversary to
government. If the spirit be not tamed and broken by these happy
methods, it is stubborn and litigious. _Abeunt studia in mores_. This
study renders men acute, inquisitive, dexterous, prompt in attack, ready
in defence, full of resources. In other countries, the people, more
simple, and of a less mercurial cast, judge of an ill principle in
government only by an actual grievance; here they anticipate the evil,
and judge of the pressure of the grievance by the badness of the
principle. They augur misgovernment at a distance, and snuff the
approach of tyranny in every tainted breeze.
The last cause of this disobedient spirit in the colonies is hardly less
powerful than the rest, as it is not merely moral, but laid deep in the
natural constitution of things. Three thousand miles of ocean lie
between you and them. No contrivance can prevent the effect of this
distance in weakening government. Seas roll, and months pass, between
the order and the execution; and the want of a speedy explanation of a
single point is enough to defeat an whole system. You have, indeed,
winged ministers of vengeance, who carry your bolts in their pounces to
the remotest verge of the sea: but there a power steps in, that limits
the arrogance of raging passions and furious elements, and says, "So far
shalt thou go, and no farther." Who are you, that should fret and rage,
and bite the chains of Nature? Nothing worse happens to you than does to
all nations who have extensive empire; and it happens in all the forms
into which empire can be thrown. In large bodies, the circulation of
power must be less vigorous at the extremities. Nature has said it. The
Turk cannot govern Egypt, and Arabia, and Kurdistan, as he governs
Thrace; nor has he the same dominion in Crimea and Algiers which he has
at Brusa and Smyrna. Despotism itself is obliged to truck and huckster.
The Sultan gets such obedience as he can. He governs with a loose rein,
that he may govern at all; and the whole of the force and vigor of his
authority in his centre is derived from a prudent relaxation in all his
borders. Spain, in her provinces, is perhaps not so well obeyed as you
are in yours. She complies, too; she submits; she watches times. This is
the immutable condition, the eternal law, of extensive and detached
empire.
Then, Sir, from these six capital sources, of descent, of form of
government, of religion in the northern provinces, of manners in the
southern, of education, of the remoteness of situation from the first
mover of government,--from all these causes a fierce spirit of liberty
has grown up. It has grown with the growth of the people in your
colonies, and increased with the increase of their wealth: a spirit,
that, unhappily meeting with an exercise of power in England, which,
however lawful, is not reconcilable to any ideas of liberty, much less
with theirs, has kindled this flame that is ready to consume us.
I do not mean to commend either the spirit in this excess, or the moral
causes which produce it. Perhaps a more smooth and accommodating spirit
of freedom in them would be more acceptable to us. Perhaps ideas of
liberty might be desired more reconcilable with an arbitrary and
boundless authority. Perhaps we might wish the colonists to be persuaded
that their liberty is more secure when held in trust for them by us (as
their guardians during a perpetual minority) than with any part of it in
their own hands. But the question is not, whether their spirit deserves
praise or blame,--what, in the name of God, shall we do with it? You
have before you the object, such as it is,--with all its glories, with
all its imperfections on its head. You see the magnitude, the
importance, the temper, the habits, the disorders. By all these
considerations we are strongly urged to determine something concerning
it. We are called upon to fix some rule and line for our future conduct,
which may give a little stability to our politics, and prevent the
return of such unhappy deliberations as the present. Every such return
will bring the matter before us in a still more untractable form. For
what astonishing and incredible things have we not seen already! What
monsters have not been generated from this unnatural contention! Whilst
every principle of authority and resistance has been pushed, upon both
sides, as far as it would go, there is nothing so solid and certain,
either in reasoning or in practice, that has not been shaken. Until very
lately, all authority in America seemed to be nothing but an emanation
from yours. Even the popular part of the colony constitution derived all
its activity, and its first vital movement, from the pleasure of the
crown. We thought, Sir, that the utmost which the discontented colonists
could do was to disturb authority; we never dreamt they could of
themselves supply it, knowing in general what an operose business it is
to establish a government absolutely new. But having, for our purposes
in this contention, resolved that none but an obedient assembly should
sit, the humors of the people there, finding all passage through the
legal channel stopped, with great violence broke out another way. Some
provinces have tried their experiment, as we have tried ours; and theirs
has succeeded. They have formed a government sufficient for its
purposes, without the bustle of a revolution, or the troublesome
formality of an election. Evident necessity and tacit consent have done
the business in an instant. So well they have done it, that Lord Dunmore
(the account is among the fragments on your table) tells you that the
new institution is infinitely better obeyed than the ancient government
ever was in its most fortunate periods. Obedience is what makes
government, and not the names by which it is called: not the name of
Governor, as formerly, or Committee, as at present. This new government
has originated directly from the people, and was not transmitted
through any of the ordinary artificial media of a positive constitution.
It was not a manufacture ready formed, and transmitted to them in that
condition from England. The evil arising from hence is this: that the
colonists having once found the possibility of enjoying the advantages
of order in the midst of a struggle for liberty, such struggles will not
henceforward seem so terrible to the settled and sober part of mankind
as they had appeared before the trial.
Pursuing the same plan of punishing by the denial of the exercise of
government to still greater lengths, we wholly abrogated the ancient
government of Massachusetts. We were confident that the first feeling,
if not the very prospect of anarchy, would instantly enforce a complete
submission. The experiment was tried. A new, strange, unexpected face of
things appeared. Anarchy is found tolerable. A vast province has now
subsisted, and subsisted in a considerable degree of health and vigor,
for near a twelvemonth, without governor, without public council,
without judges, without executive magistrates. How long it will continue
in this state, or what may arise out of this unheard-of situation, how
can the wisest of us conjecture? Our late experience has taught us that
many of those fundamental principles formerly believed infallible are
either not of the importance they were imagined to be, or that we have
not at all adverted to some other far more important and far more
powerful principles which entirely overrule those we had considered as
omnipotent. I am much against any further experiments which tend to put
to the proof any more of these allowed opinions which contribute so much
to the public tranquillity. In effect, we suffer as much at home by
this loosening of all ties, and this concussion of all established
opinions, as we do abroad. For, in order to prove that the Americans
have no right to their liberties, we are every day endeavoring to
subvert the maxims which preserve the whole spirit of our own. To prove
that the Americans ought not to be free, we are obliged to depreciate
the value of freedom itself; and we never seem to gain a paltry
advantage over them in debate, without attacking some of those
principles, or deriding some of those feelings, for which our ancestors
have shed their blood.
But, Sir, in wishing to put an end to pernicious experiments, I do not
mean to preclude the fullest inquiry. Far from it. Far from deciding on
a sudden or partial view, I would patiently go round and round the
subject, and survey it minutely in every possible aspect. Sir, if I were
capable of engaging you to an equal attention, I would state, that, as
far as I am capable of discerning, there are but three ways of
proceeding relative to this stubborn spirit which prevails in your
colonies and disturbs your government. These are,--to change that
spirit, as inconvenient, by removing the causes,--to prosecute it, as
criminal,--or to comply with it, as necessary. I would not be guilty of
an imperfect enumeration; I can think of but these three. Another has,
indeed, been started,--that of giving up the colonies; but it met so
slight a reception that I do not think myself obliged to dwell a great
while upon it. It is nothing but a little sally of anger, like the
frowardness of peevish children, who, when they cannot get all they
would have, are resolved to take nothing.
The first of these plans--to change the spirit, as inconvenient, by
removing the causes--I think is the most like a systematic proceeding.
It is radical in its principle; but it is attended with great
difficulties: some of them little short, as I conceive, of
impossibilities. This will appear by examining into the plans which have
been proposed.
As the growing population of the colonies is evidently one cause of
their resistance, it was last session mentioned in both Houses, by men
of weight, and received not without applause, that, in order to check
this evil, it would be proper for the crown to make no further grants of
land. But to this scheme there are two objections. The first, that there
is already so much unsettled land in private hands as to afford room for
an immense future population, although the crown not only withheld its
grants, but annihilated its soil. If this be the case, then the only
effect of this avarice of desolation, this hoarding of a royal
wilderness, would be to raise the value of the possessions in the hands
of the great private monopolists, without any adequate check to the
growing and alarming mischief of population.
But if you stopped your grants, what would be the consequence? The
people would occupy without grants. They have already so occupied in
many places. You cannot station garrisons in every part of these
deserts. If you drive the people from one place, they will carry on
their annual tillage, and remove with their flocks and herds to another.
Many of the people in the back settlements are already little attached
to particular situations. Already they have topped the Appalachian
mountains. From thence they behold before them an immense plain, one
vast, rich, level meadow: a square of five hundred miles. Over this
they would wander without a possibility of restraint; they would change
their manners with the habits of their life; would soon forget a
government by which they were disowned; would become hordes of English
Tartars, and, pouring down upon your unfortified frontiers a fierce and
irresistible cavalry, become masters of your governors and your
counsellors, your collectors and comptrollers, and of all the slaves
that adhered to them. Such would, and, in no long time, must be, the
effect of attempting to forbid as a crime, and to suppress as an evil,
the command and blessing of Providence, "Increase and multiply." Such
would be the happy result of an endeavor to keep as a lair of wild
beasts that earth which God by an express charter has given to the
children of men. Far different, and surely much wiser, has been our
policy hitherto. Hitherto we have invited our people, by every kind of
bounty, to fixed establishments. We have invited the husbandman to look
to authority for his title. We have taught him piously to believe in the
mysterious virtue of wax and parchment. We have thrown each tract of
land, as it was peopled, into districts, that the ruling power should
never be wholly out of sight. We have settled all we could; and we have
carefully attended every settlement with government.
Adhering, Sir, as I do, to this policy, as well as for the reasons I
have just given, I think this new project of hedging in population to be
neither prudent nor practicable.
To impoverish the colonies in general, and in particular to arrest the
noble course of their marine enterprises, would be a more easy task. I
freely confess it. We have shown a disposition to a system of this
kind,--a disposition even to continue the restraint after the
offence,--looking on ourselves as rivals to our colonies, and persuaded
that of course we must gain all that they shall lose. Much mischief we
may certainly do. The power inadequate to all other things is often more
than sufficient for this. I do not look on the direct and immediate
power of the colonies to resist our violence as very formidable. In
this, however, I may be mistaken. But when I consider that we have
colonies for no purpose but to be serviceable to us, it seems to my poor
understanding a little preposterous to make them unserviceable, in order
to keep them obedient. It is, in truth, nothing more than the old, and,
as I thought, exploded problem of tyranny, which proposes to beggar its
subjects into submission. But remember, when you have completed your
system of impoverishment, that Nature still proceeds in her ordinary
course; that discontent will increase with misery; and that there are
critical moments in the fortune of all states, when they who are too
weak to contribute to your prosperity may be strong enough to complete
your ruin. _Spoliatis arma supersunt_.
The temper and character which prevail in our colonies are, I am afraid,
unalterable by any human art. We cannot, I fear, falsify the pedigree of
this fierce people, and persuade them that they are not sprung from a
nation in whose veins the blood of freedom circulates. The language in
which they would hear you tell them this tale would detect the
imposition; your speech would betray you. An Englishman is the unfittest
person on earth to argue another Englishman into slavery.
I think it is nearly as little in our power to change their republican
religion as their free descent, or to substitute the Roman Catholic as a
penalty, or the Church of England as an improvement. The mode of
inquisition and dragooning is going out of fashion in the Old World, and
I should not confide much to their efficacy in the New. The education of
the Americans is also on the same unalterable bottom with their
religion. You cannot persuade them to burn their books of curious
science, to banish their lawyers from their courts of law, or to quench
the lights of their assemblies by refusing to choose those persons who
are best read in their privileges. It would be no less impracticable to
think of wholly annihilating the popular assemblies in which these
lawyers sit. The army, by which we must govern in their place, would be
far more chargeable to us, not quite so effectual, and perhaps, in the
end, full as difficult to be kept in obedience.
With regard to the high aristocratic spirit of Virginia and the southern
colonies, it has been proposed, I know, to reduce it by declaring a
general enfranchisement of their slaves. This project has had its
advocates and panegyrists; yet I never could argue myself into any
opinion of it. Slaves are often much attached to their masters. A
general wild offer of liberty would not always be accepted. History
furnishes few instances of it. It is sometimes as hard to persuade
slaves to be free as it is to compel freemen to be slaves; and in this
auspicious scheme we should have both these pleasing tasks on our hands
at once. But when we talk of enfranchisement, do we not perceive that
the American master may enfranchise, too, and arm servile hands in
defence of freedom?--a measure to which other people have had recourse
more than once, and not without success, in a desperate situation of
their affairs.
Slaves as these unfortunate black people are, and dull as all men are
from slavery, must they not a little suspect the offer of freedom from
that very nation which has sold them to their present masters,--from
that nation, one of whose causes of quarrel with those masters is their
refusal to deal any more in that inhuman traffic? An offer of freedom
from England would come rather oddly, shipped to them in an African
vessel, which is refused an entry into the ports of Virginia or
Carolina, with a cargo of three hundred Angola negroes. It would be
curious to see the Guinea captain attempting at the same instant to
publish his proclamation of liberty and to advertise his sale of slaves.
But let us suppose all these moral difficulties got over. The ocean
remains. You cannot pump this dry; and as long as it continues in its
present bed, so long all the causes which weaken authority by distance
will continue.
"Ye Gods! annihilate but space and time,
And make two lovers happy,"
was a pious and passionate prayer,--but just as reasonable as many of
the serious wishes of very grave and solemn politicians.
If, then, Sir, it seems almost desperate to think of any alterative
course for changing the moral causes (and not quite easy to remove the
natural) which produce prejudices irreconcilable to the late exercise of
our authority, but that the spirit infallibly will continue, and,
continuing, will produce such effects as now embarrass us,--the second
mode under consideration is, to prosecute that spirit in its overt acts,
as _criminal_.
At this proposition I must pause a moment. The thing seems a great deal
too big for my ideas of jurisprudence. It should seem, to my way of
conceiving such matters, that there is a very wide difference, in reason
and policy, between the mode of proceeding on the irregular conduct of
scattered individuals, or even of bands of men, who disturb order within
the state, and the civil dissensions which may, from time to time, on
great questions, agitate the several communities which compose a great
empire. It looks to me to be narrow and pedantic to apply the ordinary
ideas of criminal justice to this great public contest. I do not know
the method of drawing up an indictment against an whole people. I cannot
insult and ridicule the feelings of millions of my fellow-creatures as
Sir Edward Coke insulted one excellent individual (Sir Walter Raleigh)
at the bar. I am not ripe to pass sentence on the gravest public bodies,
intrusted with magistracies of great authority and dignity, and charged
with the safety of their fellow-citizens, upon the very same title that
I am. I really think that for wise men this is not judicious, for sober
men not decent, for minds tinctured with humanity not mild and merciful.
Perhaps, Sir, I am mistaken in my idea of an empire, as distinguished
from a single state or kingdom. But my idea of it is this: that an
empire is the aggregate of many states under one common head, whether
this head be a monarch or a presiding republic. It does, in such
constitutions, frequently happen (and nothing but the dismal, cold, dead
uniformity of servitude can prevent its happening) that the subordinate
parts have many local privileges and immunities. Between these
privileges and the supreme common authority the line may be extremely
nice. Of course disputes, often, too, very bitter disputes, and much ill
blood, will arise. But though every privilege is an exemption (in the
case) from the ordinary exercise of the supreme authority, it is no
denial of it. The claim of a privilege seems rather, _ex vi termini_, to
imply a superior power: for to talk of the privileges of a state or of a
person who has no superior is hardly any better than speaking nonsense.
Now in such unfortunate quarrels among the component parts of a great
political union of communities, I can scarcely conceive anything more
completely imprudent than for the head of the empire to insist, that if
any privilege is pleaded against his will or his acts, that his whole
authority is denied,--instantly to proclaim rebellion, to beat to arms,
and to put the offending provinces under the ban. Will not this, Sir,
very soon teach the provinces to make no distinctions on their part?
Will it not teach them that the government against which a claim of
liberty is tantamount to high treason is a government to which
submission is equivalent to slavery? It may not always be quite
convenient to impress dependent communities with such an idea.
We are, indeed, in all disputes with the colonies, by the necessity of
things, the judge. It is true, Sir. But I confess that the character of
judge in my own cause is a thing that frightens me. Instead of filling
me with pride, I am exceedingly humbled by it. I cannot proceed with a
stern, assured judicial confidence, until I find myself in something
more like a judicial character. I must have these hesitations as long as
I am compelled to recollect, that, in my little reading upon such
contests as these, the sense of mankind has at least as often decided
against the superior as the subordinate power. Sir, let me add, too,
that the opinion of my having some abstract right in my favor would not
put me much at my ease in passing sentence, unless I could be sure that
there were no rights which, in their exercise under certain
circumstances, were not the most odious of all wrongs and the most
vexatious of all injustice. Sir, these considerations have great weight
with me, when I find things so circumstanced that I see the same party
at once a civil litigant against me in a point of right and a culprit
before me, while I sit as criminal judge on acts of his whose moral
quality is to be decided upon the merits of that very litigation. Men
are every now and then put, by the complexity of human affairs, into
strange situations; but justice is the same, let the judge be in what
situation he will.
There is, Sir, also a circumstance which convinces me that this mode of
criminal proceeding is not (at least in the present stage of our
contest) altogether expedient,--which is nothing less than the conduct
of those very persons who have seemed to adopt that mode, by lately
declaring a rebellion in Massachusetts Bay, as they had formerly
addressed to have traitors brought hither, under an act of Henry the
Eighth, for trial. For, though rebellion is declared, it is not
proceeded against as such; nor have any steps been taken towards the
apprehension or conviction of any individual offender, either on our
late or our former address; but modes of public coercion have been
adopted, and such as have much more resemblance to a sort of qualified
hostility towards an independent power than the punishment of rebellious
subjects. All this seems rather inconsistent; but it shows how
difficult it is to apply these juridical ideas to our present case.
In this situation, let us seriously and coolly ponder. What is it we
have got by all our menaces, which have been many and ferocious? What
advantage have we derived from the penal laws we have passed, and which,
for the time, have been severe and numerous? What advances have we made
towards our object, by the sending of a force, which, by land and sea,
is no contemptible strength? Has the disorder abated? Nothing
less.--When I see things in this situation, after such confident hopes,
bold promises, and active exertions, I cannot, for my life, avoid a
suspicion that the plan itself is not correctly right.
If, then, the removal of the causes of this spirit of American liberty
be, for the greater part, or rather entirely, impracticable,--if the
ideas of criminal process be inapplicable, or, if applicable, are in the
highest degree inexpedient, what way yet remains? No way is open, but
the third and last,--to comply with the American spirit as necessary,
or, if you please, to submit, to it as a necessary evil.
If we adopt this mode, if we mean to conciliate and concede, let us see
of what nature the concession ought to be. To ascertain the nature of
our concession, we must look at their complaint. The colonies complain
that they have not the characteristic mark and seal of British freedom.
They complain that they are taxed in a Parliament in which they are not
represented. If you mean to satisfy them at all, you must satisfy them
with regard to this complaint. If you mean to please any people, you
must give them the boon which they ask,--not what you may think better
for them, but of a kind totally different. Such an act may be a wise
regulation, but it is no concession; whereas our present theme is the
mode of giving satisfaction.
Sir, I think you must perceive that I am resolved this day to have
nothing at all to do with the question of the right of taxation. Some
gentlemen startle,--but it is true: I put it totally out of the
question. It is less than nothing in my consideration. I do not indeed
wonder, nor will you, Sir, that gentlemen of profound learning are fond
of displaying it on this profound subject. But my consideration is
narrow, confined, and wholly limited to the policy of the question. I do
not examine whether the giving away a man's money be a power excepted
and reserved out of the general trust of government, and how far all
mankind, in all forms of polity, are entitled to an exercise of that
right by the charter of Nature,--or whether, on the contrary, a right of
taxation is necessarily involved in the general principle of
legislation, and inseparable from the ordinary supreme power. These are
deep questions, where great names militate against each other, where
reason is perplexed, and an appeal to authorities only thickens the
confusion: for high and reverend authorities lift up their heads on both
sides, and there is no sure footing in the middle. This point is the
_great Serbonian bog, betwixt Damiata and Mount Casius old, where armies
whole have sunk_. I do not intend to be overwhelmed in that bog, though
in such respectable company. The question with me is, not whether you
have a right to render your people miserable, but whether it is not your
interest to make them happy. It is not what a lawyer tells me I _may_
do, but what humanity, reason, and justice tell me I ought to do. Is a
politic act the worse for being a generous one? Is no concession proper,
but that which is made from your want of right to keep what you grant?
Or does it lessen the grace or dignity of relaxing in the exercise of an
odious claim, because you have your evidence-room full of titles, and
your magazines stuffed with arms to enforce them? What signify all those
titles and all those arms? Of what avail are they, when the reason of
the thing tells me that the assertion of my title is the loss of my
suit, and that I could do nothing but wound myself by the use of my own
weapons?
Such is steadfastly my opinion of the absolute necessity of keeping up
the concord of this empire by a unity of spirit, though in a diversity
of operations, that, if I were sure the colonists had, at their leaving
this country, sealed a regular compact of servitude, that they had
solemnly abjured all the rights of citizens, that they had made a vow to
renounce all ideas of liberty for them and their posterity to all
generations, yet I should hold myself obliged to conform to the temper I
found universally prevalent in my own day, and to govern two million of
men, impatient of servitude, on the principles of freedom. I am not
determining a point of law; I am restoring tranquillity: and the general
character and situation of a people must determine what sort of
government is fitted for them. That point nothing else can or ought to
determine.
My idea, therefore, without considering whether we yield as matter of
right or grant as matter of favor, is, _to admit the people of our
colonies into an interest in the Constitution_, and, by recording that
admission in the journals of Parliament, to give them as strong an
assurance as the nature of the thing will admit that we mean forever to
adhere to that solemn declaration of systematic indulgence.
Some years ago, the repeal of a revenue act, upon its understood
principle, might have served to show that we intended an unconditional
abatement of the exercise of a taxing power. Such a measure was then
sufficient to remove all suspicion and to give perfect content. But
unfortunate events since that time may make something further
necessary,--and not more necessary for the satisfaction of the colonies
than for the dignity and consistency of our own future proceedings.
I have taken a very incorrect measure of the disposition of the House,
if this proposal in itself would be received with dislike. I think, Sir,
we have few American financiers. But our misfortune is, we are too
acute, we are too exquisite in our conjectures of the future, for men
oppressed with such great and present evils. The more moderate among the
opposers of Parliamentary concession freely confess that they hope no
good from taxation; but they apprehend the colonists have further views,
and if this point were conceded, they would instantly attack the trade
laws. These gentlemen are convinced that this was the intention from the
beginning, and the quarrel of the Americans with taxation was no more
than a cloak and cover to this design. Such has been the language even
of a gentleman[23] of real moderation, and of a natural temper well
adjusted to fair and equal government. I am, however, Sir, not a little
surprised at this kind of discourse, whenever I hear it; and I am the
more surprised on account of the arguments which I constantly find in
company with it, and which are often urged from the same mouths and on
the same day.
For instance, when we allege that it is against reason to tax a people
under so many restraints in trade as the Americans, the noble lord[24]
in the blue riband shall tell you that the restraints on trade are
futile and useless, of no advantage to us, and of no burden to those on
whom they are imposed,--that the trade to America is not secured by the
Acts of Navigation, but by the natural and irresistible advantage of a
commercial preference.
Such is the merit of the trade laws in this posture of the debate. But
when strong internal circumstances are urged against the taxes,--when
the scheme is dissected,--when experience and the nature of things are
brought to prove, and do prove, the utter impossibility of obtaining an
effective revenue from the colonies,--when these things are pressed, or
rather press themselves, so as to drive the advocates of colony taxes to
a clear admission of the futility of the scheme,--then, Sir, the
sleeping trade laws revive from their trance, and this useless taxation
is to be kept sacred, not for its own sake, but as a counter-guard and
security of the laws of trade.
Then, Sir, you keep up revenue laws which are mischievous in order to
preserve trade laws that are useless. Such is the wisdom of our plan in
both its members. They are separately given up as of no value; and yet
one is always to be defended for the sake of the other. But I cannot
agree with the noble lord, nor with the pamphlet from whence he seems to
have borrowed these ideas concerning the inutility of the trade laws.
For, without idolizing them, I am sure they are still, in many ways, of
great use to us; and in former times they have been of the greatest.
They do confine, and they do greatly narrow, the market for the
Americans. But my perfect conviction of this does not help me in the
least to discern how the revenue laws form any security whatsoever to
the commercial regulations,--or that these commercial regulations are
the true ground of the quarrel,--or that the giving way, in any one
instance, of authority is to lose all that may remain unconceded.
One fact is clear and indisputable: the public and avowed origin of this
quarrel was on taxation. This quarrel has, indeed, brought on new
disputes on new questions, but certainly the least bitter, and the
fewest of all, on the trade laws. To judge which of the two be the real,
radical cause of quarrel, we have to see whether the commercial dispute
did, in order of time, precede the dispute on taxation. There is not a
shadow of evidence for it. Next, to enable us to judge whether at this
moment a dislike to the trade laws be the real cause of quarrel, it is
absolutely necessary to put the taxes out of the question by a repeal.
See how the Americans act in this position, and then you will be able to
discern correctly what is the true object of the controversy, or whether
any controversy at all will remain. Unless you consent to remove this
cause of difference, it is impossible, with decency, to assert that the
dispute is not upon what it is avowed to be. And I would, Sir, recommend
to your serious consideration, whether it be prudent to form a rule for
punishing people, not on their own acts, but on your conjectures. Surely
it is preposterous, at the very best. It is not justifying your anger
by their misconduct, but it is converting your ill-will into their
delinquency.
But the colonies will go further.--Alas! alas! when will this
speculating against fact and reason end? What will quiet these panic
fears which we entertain of the hostile effect of a conciliatory
conduct? Is it true that no case can exist in which it is proper for the
sovereign to accede to the desires of his discontented subjects? Is
there anything peculiar in this case, to make a rule for itself? Is all
authority of course lost, when it is not pushed to the extreme? Is it a
certain maxim, that, the fewer causes of dissatisfaction are left by
government, the more the subject will be inclined to resist and rebel?
All these objections being in fact no more than suspicions, conjectures,
divinations, formed in defiance of fact and experience, they did not,
Sir, discourage me from entertaining the idea of a conciliatory
concession, founded on the principles which I have just stated.
In forming a plan for this purpose, I endeavored to put myself in that
frame of mind which was the most natural and the most reasonable, and
which was certainly the most probable means of securing me from all
error. I set out with a perfect distrust of my own abilities, a total
renunciation of every speculation of my own, and with a profound
reverence for the wisdom of our ancestors, who have left us the
inheritance of so happy a Constitution and so flourishing an empire,
and, what is a thousand times more valuable, the treasury of the maxims
and principles which formed the one and obtained the other.
During the reigns of the kings of Spain of the Austrian family,
whenever they were at a loss in the Spanish councils, it was common for
their statesmen to say that they ought to consult the genius of Philip
the Second. The genius of Philip the Second might mislead them; and the
issue of their affairs showed that they had not chosen the most perfect
standard. But, Sir, I am sure that I shall not be misled, when, in a
case of constitutional difficulty, I consult the genius of the English
Constitution. Consulting at that oracle, (it was with all due humility
and piety,) I found four capital examples in a similar case before me:
those of Ireland, Wales, Chester, and Durham.
Ireland, before the English conquest, though never governed by a
despotic power, had no Parliament. How far the English Parliament itself
was at that time modelled according to the present form is disputed
among antiquarians. But we have all the reason in the world to be
assured, that a form of Parliament, such as England then enjoyed, she
instantly communicated to Ireland; and we are equally sure that almost
every successive improvement in constitutional liberty, as fast as it
was made here, was transmitted thither. The feudal baronage, and the
feudal knighthood, the roots of our primitive Constitution, were early
transplanted into that soil, and grew and flourished there. Magna
Charta, if it did not give us originally the House of Commons, gave us
at least an House of Commons of weight and consequence. But your
ancestors did not churlishly sit down alone to the feast of Magna
Charta. Ireland was made immediately a partaker. This benefit of English
laws and liberties, I confess, was not at first extended to _all_
Ireland. Mark the consequence. English authority and English liberty had
exactly the same boundaries. Your standard could never be advanced an
inch before your privileges. Sir John Davies shows beyond a doubt, that
the refusal of a general communication of these rights was the true
cause why Ireland was five hundred years in subduing; and after the vain
projects of a military government, attempted in the reign of Queen
Elizabeth, it was soon discovered that nothing could make that country
English, in civility and allegiance, but your laws and your forms of
legislature. It was not English arms, but the English Constitution, that
conquered Ireland. From that time, Ireland has ever had a general
Parliament, as she had before a partial Parliament. You changed the
people, you altered the religion, but you never touched the form or the
vital substance of free government in that kingdom. You deposed kings;
you restored them; you altered the succession to theirs, as well as to
your own crown; but you never altered their Constitution, the principle
of which was respected by usurpation, restored with the restoration of
monarchy, and established, I trust, forever by the glorious Revolution.
This has made Ireland the great and flourishing kingdom that it is, and,
from a disgrace and a burden intolerable to this nation, has rendered
her a principal part of our strength and ornament. This country cannot
be said to have ever formally taxed her. The irregular things done in
the confusion of mighty troubles, and on the hinge of great revolutions,
even if all were done that is said to have been done, form no example.
If they have any effect in argument, they make an exception to prove the
rule. None of your own liberties could stand a moment, if the casual
deviations from them, at such times, were suffered to be used as proofs
of their nullity. By the lucrative amount of such casual breaches in
the Constitution, judge what the stated and fixed rule of supply has
been in that kingdom. Your Irish pensioners would starve, if they had no
other fund to live on than taxes granted by English authority. Turn your
eyes to those popular grants from whence all your great supplies are
come, and learn to respect that only source of public wealth in the
British empire.
My next example is Wales. This country was said to be reduced by Henry
the Third. It was said more truly to be so by Edward the First. But
though then conquered, it was not looked upon as any part of the realm
of England. Its old Constitution, whatever that might have been, was
destroyed; and no good one was substituted in its place. The care of
that tract was put into the hands of Lords Marchers: a form of
government of a very singular kind; a strange, heterogeneous monster,
something between hostility and government: perhaps it has a sort of
resemblance, according to the modes of those times, to that of
commander-in-chief at present, to whom all civil power is granted as
secondary. The manners of the Welsh nation followed the genius of the
government: the people were ferocious, restive, savage, and
uncultivated; sometimes composed, never pacified. Wales, within itself,
was in perpetual disorder; and it kept the frontier of England in
perpetual alarm. Benefits from it to the state there were none. Wales
was only known to England by incursion and invasion.
Sir, during that state of things, Parliament was not idle. They
attempted to subdue the fierce spirit of the Welsh by all sorts of
rigorous laws. They prohibited by statute the sending all sorts of arms
into Wales, as you prohibit by proclamation (with something more of
doubt on the legality) the sending arms to America. They disarmed the
Welsh by statute, as you attempted (but still with more question on the
legality) to disarm New England by an instruction. They made an act to
drag offenders from Wales into England for trial, as you have done (but
with more hardship) with regard to America. By another act, where one of
the parties was an Englishman, they ordained that his trial should be
always by English. They made acts to restrain trade, as you do; and they
prevented the Welsh from the use of fairs and markets, as you do the
Americans from fisheries and foreign ports. In short, when the
statute-book was not quite so much swelled as it is now, you find no
less than fifteen acts of penal regulation on the subject of Wales.
Here we rub our hands,--A fine body of precedents for the authority of
Parliament and the use of it!--I admit it fully; and pray add likewise
to these precedents, that all the while Wales rid this kingdom like an
_incubus_; that it was an unprofitable and oppressive burden; and that
an Englishman travelling in that country could not go six yards from the
highroad without being murdered.
The march of the human mind is slow. Sir, it was not until after two
hundred years discovered, that, by an eternal law, Providence had
decreed vexation to violence, and poverty to rapine. Your ancestors did,
however, at length open their eyes to the ill husbandry of injustice.
They found that the tyranny of a free people could of all tyrannies the
least be endured, and that laws made against an whole nation were not
the most effectual methods for securing its obedience. Accordingly, in
the twenty-seventh year of Henry the Eighth the course was entirely
altered. With a preamble stating the entire and perfect rights of the
crown of England, it gave to the Welsh all the rights and privileges of
English subjects. A political order was established; the military power
gave way to the civil; the marches were turned into counties. But that a
nation should have a right to English liberties, and yet no share at all
in the fundamental security of these liberties,--the grant of their own
property,--seemed a thing so incongruous, that eight years after, that
is, in the thirty-fifth of that reign, a complete and not
ill-proportioned representation by counties and boroughs was bestowed
upon Wales by act of Parliament. From that moment, as by a charm, the
tumults subsided; obedience was restored; peace, order, and civilization
followed in the train of liberty. When the day-star of the English
Constitution had arisen in their hearts, all was harmony within and
without:--
Simul alba nautis
Stella refulsit,
Defluit saxis agitatus humor,
Concidunt venti, fugiuntque nubes,
Et minax (quod sic voluere) ponto
Unda recumbit.
The very same year the County Palatine of Chester received the same
relief from its oppressions, and the same remedy to its disorders.
Before this time Chester was little less distempered than Wales. The
inhabitants, without rights themselves, were the fittest to destroy the
rights of others; and from thence Richard the Second drew the standing
army of archers with which for a time he oppressed England. The people
of Chester applied to Parliament in a petition penned as I shall read to
you.
"To the king our sovereign lord, in most humble wise shown unto your
most excellent Majesty, the inhabitants of your Grace's County Palatine
of Chester: That where the said County Palatine of Chester is and hath
been alway hitherto exempt, excluded, and separated out and from your
high court of Parliament, to have any knights and burgesses within the
said court; by reason whereof the said inhabitants have hitherto
sustained manifold disherisons, losses, and damages, as well in their
lands, goods, and bodies, as in the good, civil, and politic governance
and maintenance of the common wealth of their said country: And
forasmuch as the said inhabitants have always hitherto been bound by the
acts and statutes made and ordained by your said Highness, and your most
noble progenitors, by authority of the said court, as far forth as other
counties, cities, and boroughs have been, that have had their knights
and burgesses within your said court of Parliament, and yet have had
neither knight no burgess there for the said County Palatine; the said
inhabitants, for lack thereof, have been oftentimes touched and grieved
with acts and statutes made within the said court, as well derogatory
unto the most ancient jurisdictions, liberties, and privileges of your
said County Palatine, as prejudicial unto the common wealth, quietness,
rest, and peace of your Grace's most bounden subjects inhabiting within
the same."
What did Parliament with this audacious address?--Reject it as a libel?
Treat it as an affront to government? Spurn it as a derogation from the
rights of legislature? Did they toss it over the table? Did they burn
it by the hands of the common hangman?--They took the petition of
grievance, all rugged as it was, without softening or temperament,
unpurged of the original bitterness and indignation of complaint; they
made it the very preamble to their act of redress, and consecrated its
principle to all ages in the sanctuary of legislation.
Here is my third example. It was attended with the success of the two
former. Chester, civilized as well as Wales, has demonstrated that
freedom, and not servitude, is the cure of anarchy; as religion, and not
atheism, is the true remedy for superstition. Sir, this pattern of
Chester was followed in the reign of Charles the Second with regard to
the County Palatine of Durham, which is my fourth example. This county
had long lain out of the pale of free legislation. So scrupulously was
the example of Chester followed, that the style of the preamble is
nearly the came with that of the Chester act; and, without affecting the
abstract extent of the authority of Parliament, it recognizes the equity
of not suffering any considerable district, in which the British
subjects may act as a body, to be taxed without their own voice in the
grant.
Now if the doctrines of policy contained in these preambles, and the
force of these examples in the acts of Parliament, avail anything, what
can be said against applying them with regard to America? Are not the
people of America as much Englishmen as the Welsh? The preamble of the
act of Henry the Eighth says, the Welsh speak a language no way
resembling that of his Majesty's English subjects. Are the Americana not
as numerous? If we may trust the learned and accurate Judge Barrington's
account of North Wales, and take that as a standard to measure the
rest, there is no comparison. The people cannot amount to above 200,000:
not a tenth part of the number in the colonies. Is America in rebellion?
Wales was hardly ever free from it. Have you attempted to govern America
by penal statutes? You made fifteen for Wales. But your legislative
authority is perfect with regard to America: was it less perfect in
Wales, Chester, and Durham? But America is virtually represented. What!
does the electric force of virtual representation more easily pass over
the Atlantic than pervade Wales, which lies in your neighborhood? or
than Chester and Durham, surrounded by abundance of representation that
is actual and palpable? But, Sir, your ancestors thought this sort of
virtual representation, however ample, to be totally insufficient for
the freedom of the inhabitants of territories that are so near, and
comparatively so inconsiderable. How, then, can I think it sufficient
for those which are infinitely greater, and infinitely more remote?
You will now, Sir, perhaps imagine that I am on the point of proposing
to you a scheme for a representation of the colonies in Parliament.
Perhaps I might be inclined to entertain some such thought; but a great
flood stops me in my course. _Opposuit Natura._ I cannot remove the
eternal barriers of the creation. The thing, in that mode, I do not know
to be possible. As I meddle with no theory, I do not absolutely assert
the impracticability of such a representation; but I do not see my way
to it; and those who have been more confident have not been more
successful. However, the arm of public benevolence is not shortened; and
there are often several means to the same end. What Nature has
disjoined in one way wisdom may unite in another. When we cannot give
the benefit as we would wish, let us not refuse it altogether. If we
cannot give the principal, let us find a substitute. But how? where?
what substitute?
Fortunately, I am not obliged, for the ways and means of this
substitute, to tax my own unproductive invention. I am not even obliged
to go to the rich treasury of the fertile framers of imaginary
commonwealths: not to the Republic of Plato, not to the Utopia of More,
not to the Oceana of Harrington. It is before me,--it is at my feet,--
"And the rude swain
Treads daily on it with his clouted shoon."
I only wish you to recognize, for the theory, the ancient constitutional
policy of this kingdom with regard to representation, as that policy has
been declared in acts of Parliament,--and as to the practice, to return
to that mode which an uniform experience has marked out to you as best,
and in which you walked with security, advantage, and honor, until the
year 1763.
My resolutions, therefore, mean to establish the equity and justice of a
taxation of America by _grant_, and not by _imposition_; to mark the
_legal competency_ of the colony assemblies for the support of their
government in peace, and for public aids in time of war; to acknowledge
that this legal competency has had a _dutiful and beneficial exercise_,
and that experience has shown _the benefit of their grants_, and _the
futility of Parliamentary taxation, as a method of supply_.
These solid truths compose six fundamental propositions. There are three
more resolutions corollary to these. If you admit the first set, you can
hardly reject the others. But if you admit the first, I shall be far
from solicitous whether you accept or refuse the last. I think these six
massive pillars will be of strength sufficient to support the temple of
British concord. I have no more doubt than I entertain of my existence,
that, if you admitted these, you would command an immediate peace, and,
with but tolerable future management, a lasting obedience in America. I
am not arrogant in this confident assurance. The propositions are all
mere matters of fact; and if they are such facts as draw irresistible
conclusions even in the stating, this is the power of truth, and not any
management of mine.
Sir, I shall open the whole plan to you together, with such observations
on the motions as may tend to illustrate them, where they may want
explanation.
The first is a resolution,--"That the colonies and plantations of Great
Britain in North America, consisting of fourteen separate governments,
and containing two millions and upwards of free inhabitants, have not
had the liberty and privilege of electing and sending any knights and
burgesses, or others, to represent them in the high court of
Parliament."
This is a plain matter of fact, necessary to be laid down, and
(excepting the description) it is laid down in the language of the
Constitution; it is taken nearly _verbatim_ from acts of Parliament.
The second is like unto the first,--"That the said colonies and
plantations have been made liable to, and bounden by, several subsidies,
payments, rates, and taxes, given and granted by Parliament, though the
said colonies and plantations have not their knights and burgesses in
the said high court of Parliament, of their own election, to represent
the condition of their country; by lack whereof they have been
oftentimes touched and grieved by subsidies, given, granted, and
assented to, in the said court, in a manner prejudicial to the common
wealth, quietness, rest, and peace of the subjects inhabiting within the
same."
Is this description too hot or too cold, too strong or too weak? Does it
arrogate too much to the supreme legislature? Does it lean too much to
the claims of the people? If it runs into any of these errors, the fault
is not mine. It is the language of your own ancient acts of Parliament.
Non meus hic sermo, sed quæ præcepit Ofellus
Rusticus, abnormis sapiens.
It is the genuine produce of the ancient, rustic, manly, home-bred sense
of this country. I did not dare to rub off a particle of the venerable
rust that rather adorns and preserves than destroys the metal. It would
be a profanation to touch with a tool the stones which construct the
sacred altar of peace. I would not violate with modern polish the
ingenuous and noble roughness of these truly constitutional materials.
Above all things, I was resolved not to be guilty of tampering,--the
odious vice of restless and unstable minds. I put my foot in the tracks
of our forefathers, where I can neither wander nor stumble. Determining
to fix articles of peace, I was resolved not to be wise beyond what was
written; I was resolved to use nothing else than the form of sound
words, to let others abound in their own sense, and carefully to abstain
from all expressions of my own. What the law has said, I say. In all
things else I am silent. I have no organ but for her words. This, if it
be not ingenious, I am sure is safe.
There are, indeed, words expressive of grievance in this second
resolution, which those who are resolved always to be in the right will
deny to contain matter of fact, as applied to the present case; although
Parliament thought them true with regard to the Counties of Chester and
Durham. They will deny that the Americans were ever "touched and
grieved" with the taxes. If they consider nothing in taxes but their
weight as pecuniary impositions, there might be some pretence for this
denial. But men may be sorely touched and deeply grieved in their
privileges, as well as in their purses. Men may lose little in property
by the act which takes away all their freedom. When a man is robbed of a
trifle on the highway, it is not the twopence lost that constitutes the
capital outrage. This is not confined to privileges. Even ancient
indulgences withdrawn, without offence on the part of those who enjoyed
such favors, operate as grievances. But were the Americans, then, not
touched and grieved by the taxes, in some measure, merely as taxes? If
so, why were they almost all either wholly repealed or exceedingly
reduced? Were they not touched and grieved even by the regulating duties
of the sixth of George the Second? Else why were the duties first
reduced to one third in 1764, and afterwards to a third of that third in
the year 1766? Were they not touched and grieved by the Stamp Act? I
shall say they were, until that tax is revived. Were they not touched
and grieved by the duties of 1767, which were likewise repealed, and
which Lord Hillsborough tells you (for the ministry) were laid contrary
to the true principle of commerce? Is not the assurance given by that
noble person to the colonies of a resolution to lay no more taxes on
them an admission that taxes would touch and grieve them? Is not the
resolution of the noble lord in the blue riband, now standing on your
journals, the strongest of all proofs that Parliamentary subsidies
really touched and grieved them? Else why all these changes,
modifications, repeals, assurances, and resolutions?
The next proposition is,--"That, from the distance of the said colonies,
and from other circumstances, no method hath hitherto been devised for
procuring a representation in Parliament for the said colonies."
This is an assertion of a fact. I go no further on the paper; though, in
my private judgment, an useful representation is impossible; I am sure
it is not desired by them, nor ought it, perhaps, by us: but I abstain
from opinions.
The fourth resolution is,--"That each of the said colonies hath within
itself a body, chosen, in part or in the whole, by the freemen,
freeholders, or other free inhabitants thereof, commonly called the
General Assembly, or General Court, with powers legally to raise, levy,
and assess, according to the several usages of such colonies, duties and
taxes towards defraying all sorts of public services."
This competence in the colony assemblies is certain. It is proved by the
whole tenor of their acts of supply in all the assemblies, in which the
constant style of granting is, "An aid to his Majesty"; and acts
granting to the crown have regularly, for near a century, passed the
public offices without dispute. Those who have been pleased
paradoxically to deny this right, holding that none but the British
Parliament can grant to the crown, are wished to look to what is done,
not only in the colonies, but in Ireland, in one uniform, unbroken
tenor, every session. Sir, I am surprised that this doctrine should come
from Rome of the law servants of the crown. I say, that, if the crown
could be responsible, his Majesty,--but certainly the ministers, and
even these law officers themselves, through whose hands the acts pass
biennially in Ireland, or annually in the colonies, are in an habitual
course of committing impeachable offences. What habitual offenders have
been all Presidents of the Council, all Secretaries of State, all First
Lords of Trade, all Attorneys and all Solicitors General! However, they
are safe, as no one impeaches them; and there is no ground of charge
against them, except in their own unfounded theories.
The fifth resolution is also a resolution of fact,--"That the said
general assemblies, general courts, or other bodies legally qualified as
aforesaid, have at sundry times freely granted several large subsidies
and public aids for his Majesty's service, according to their abilities,
when required thereto by letter from one of his Majesty's principal
Secretaries of State; and that their right to grant the same, and their
cheerfulness and sufficiency in the said grants, have been at sundry
times acknowledged by Parliament."
To say nothing of their great expenses in the Indian wars, and not to
take their exertion in foreign ones, so high as the supplies in the year
1695, not to go back to their public contributions in the year 1710, I
shall begin to travel only where the journals give me light,--resolving
to deal in nothing but fact authenticated by Parliamentary record, and
to build myself wholly on that solid basis.
On the 4th of April, 1748,[25] a committee of this House came to the
following resolution:--
"_Resolved_, That it is the opinion of this committee, _that it is just
and reasonable_, that the several provinces and colonies of
Massachusetts Bay, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Rhode Island be
reimbursed the expenses they have been at in taking and securing to the
crown of Great Britain the island of Caps Breton and its dependencies."
These expenses were immense for such colonies. They were above
200,000_l._ sterling: money first raised and advanced on their public
credit.
On the 28th of January, 1756,[26] a message from the king came to us, to
this effect:--"His Majesty, being sensible of the zeal and vigor with
which his faithful subjects of certain colonies in North America have
exerted themselves in defence of his Majesty's just rights and
possessions, recommends it to this House to take the same into their
consideration, and to enable his Majesty to give them such assistance as
may be _proper reward and encouragement_."
On the 3d of February, 1756,[27] the House came to a suitable
resolution, expressed in words nearly the same as those of the message;
but with the further addition, that the money then voted was as an
_encouragement_ to the colonies to exert themselves with vigor. It will
not be necessary to go through all the testimonies which your own
records have given to the truth of my resolutions. I will only refer you
to the places in the journals:--
Vol. XXVII--16th and 19th May, 1757.
Vol. XXVIII.--June 1st, 1758,--April 26th and 30th, 1759,--March
26th and 31st, and April 28th, 1760,--Jan. 9th and 20th, 1761.
Vol. XXIX.--Jan. 22d and 26th, 1762,--March 14th and 17th, 1763.
Sir, here is the repeated acknowledgment of Parliament, that the
colonies not only gave, but gave to satiety. This nation has formally
acknowledged two things: first, that the colonies had gone beyond their
abilities, Parliament having thought it necessary to reimburse them;
secondly, that they had acted legally and laudably in their grants of
money, and their maintenance of troops, since the compensation is
expressly given as reward and encouragement. Reward is not bestowed for
acts that are unlawful; and encouragement is not held out to things that
deserve reprehension. My resolution, therefore, does nothing more than
collect into one proposition what is scattered through your journals. I
give you nothing but your own; and you cannot refuse in the gross what
you have so often acknowledged in detail. The admission of this, which
will be so honorable to them and to you, will, indeed, be mortal to all
the miserable stories by which the passions of the misguided people have
been engaged in an unhappy system. The people heard, indeed, from the
beginning of these disputes, one thing continually dinned in their ears:
that reason and justice demanded, that the Americans, who paid no taxes,
should be compelled to contribute. How did that fact, of their paying
nothing, stand, when the taxing system began? When Mr. Grenville began
to form his system of American revenue, he stated in this House that the
colonies were then in debt two million six hundred thousand pounds
sterling money, and was of opinion they would discharge that debt in
four years. On this state, those untaxed people were actually subject to
the payment of taxes to the amount of six hundred and fifty thousand a
year. In fact, however, Mr. Grenville was mistaken. The funds given for
sinking the debt did not prove quite so ample as both the colonies and
he expected. The calculation was too sanguine: the reduction was not
completed till some years after, and at different times in different
colonies. However, the taxes after the war continued too great to bear
any addition, with prudence or propriety; and when the burdens imposed
in consequence of former requisitions were discharged, our tone became
too high to resort again to requisition. No colony, since that time,
ever has had any requisition whatsoever made to it.
We see the sense of the crown, and the sense of Parliament, on the
productive nature of a _revenue by grant_. Now search the same journals
for the produce of the _revenue by imposition_. Where is it?--let us
know the volume and the page. What is the gross, what is the net
produce? To what service is it applied? How have you appropriated its
surplus?--What! can none of the many skilful index-makers that we are
now employing find any trace of it?--Well, let them and that rest
together.--But are the journals, which say nothing of the revenue, as
silent on the discontent?--Oh, no! a child may find it. It is the
melancholy burden and blot of every page.
I think, then, I am, from those journals, justified in the sixth and
last resolution, which is,--"That it hath been found by experience, that
the manner of granting the said supplies and aids by the said general
assemblies hath been more agreeable to the inhabitants of the said
colonies, and more beneficial and conducive to the public service, than
the mode of giving and granting aids and subsidies in Parliament, to be
raised and paid in the said colonies."
This makes the whole of the fundamental part of the plan. The conclusion
is irresistible. You cannot say that you were driven by any necessity to
an exercise of the utmost rights of legislature. You cannot assert that
you took on yourselves the task of imposing colony taxes, from the want
of another legal body that is competent to the purpose of supplying the
exigencies of the state without wounding the prejudices of the people.
Neither is it true, that the body so qualified, and having that
competence, had neglected the duty.
The question now, on all this accumulated matter, is,--Whether you will
choose to abide by a profitable experience or a mischievous theory?
whether you choose to build on imagination or fact? whether you prefer
enjoyment or hope? satisfaction in your subjects, or discontent?
If these propositions are accepted, everything which has been made to
enforce a contrary system must, I take it for granted, fall along with
it. On that ground, I have drawn the following resolution, which, when
it comes to be moved, will naturally be divided in a proper
manner:--"That it may be proper to repeal an act, made in the seventh
year of the reign of his present Majesty, intituled, 'An act for
granting certain duties in the British colonies and plantations in
America; for allowing a drawback of the duties of customs, upon the
exportation from this kingdom, of coffee and cocoa-nuts, of the produce
of the said colonies or plantations; for discontinuing the drawbacks
payable on China earthen ware exported to America; and for more
effectually preventing the clandestine running of goods in the said
colonies and plantations.'--And also, that it may be proper to repeal an
act, made in the fourteenth year of the reign of his present Majesty,
intituled, 'An act to discontinue, in such manner and for such time as
are therein mentioned, the landing and discharging, lading or shipping,
of goods, wares, and merchandise, at the town and within the harbor of
Boston, in the province of Massachusetts Bay, in North America.'--And
also, that it may be proper to repeal an act, made in the fourteenth
year of the reign of his present Majesty, intituled, 'An act for the
impartial administration of justice, in the cases of persons questioned
for any acts done by them, in the execution of the law, or for the
suppression of riots and tumults, in the province of the Massachusetts
Bay, in New England.'--And also, that it may be proper to repeal an act,
made in the fourteenth year of the reign of his present Majesty,
intituled,' An act for the better regulating the government of the
province of the Massachusetts Bay, in New England.'--And also, that it
may be proper to explain and amend an act, made in the thirty-fifth year
of the reign of King Henry the Eighth, intituled, 'An act for the trial
of treasons committed out of the king's dominions.'"
I wish, Sir, to repeal the Boston Port Bill, because (independently of
the dangerous precedent of suspending the rights of the subject during
the king's pleasure) it was passed, as I apprehend, with less
regularity, and on more partial principles, than it ought. The
corporation of Boston was not heard before it was condemned. Other
towns, full as guilty as she was, have not had their ports blocked up.
Even the Restraining Bill of the present session does not go to the
length of the Boston Port Act. The same ideas of prudence, which induced
you not to extend equal punishment to equal guilt, even when you were
punishing, induce me, who mean not to chastise, but to reconcile, to be
satisfied with the punishment already partially inflicted.
Ideas of prudence and accommodation to circumstances prevent you from
taking away the charters of Connecticut and Rhode Island, as you have
taken away that of Massachusetts Colony, though the crown has far less
power in the two former provinces than it enjoyed in the latter, and
though the abuses have bean full as great and as flagrant in the
exempted as in the punished. The same reasons of prudence and
accommodation have weight with me in restoring the charter of
Massachusetts Bay. Besides, Sir, the act which changes the charter of
Massachusetts is in many particulars so exceptionable, that, if I did
not wish absolutely to repeal, I would by all means desire to alter it;
as several of its provisions tend to the subversion of all public and
private justice. Such, among others, is the power in the governor to
change the sheriff at his pleasure, and to make a new returning officer
for every special cause. It is shameful to behold such a regulation
standing among English laws.
The act for bringing persons accused of committing murder under the
orders of government to England for trial is but temporary. That act has
calculated the probable duration of our quarrel with the colonies, and
is accommodated to that supposed duration. I would hasten the happy
moment of reconciliation, and therefore must, on my principle, get rid
of that most justly obnoxious act.
The act of Henry the Eighth for the trial of treasons I do not mean to
take away, but to confine it to its proper bounds and original
intention: to make it expressly for trial of treasons (and the greatest
treasons may be committed) in places where the jurisdiction of the crown
does not extend.
Having guarded the privileges of local legislature, I would next secure
to the colonies a fair and unbiased judicature; for which purpose, Sir,
I propose the following resolution:--"That, from the time when the
general assembly, or general court, of any colony or plantation in North
America shall have appointed, by act of assembly duly confirmed, a
settled salary to the offices of the chief justice and other judges of
the superior courts, it may be proper that the said chief justice and
other judges of the superior courts of such colony shall hold his and
their office and offices during their good behavior, and shall not be
removed therefrom, but when the said removal shall be adjudged by his
Majesty in council, upon a hearing on complaint from the general
assembly, or on a complaint from the governor, or the council, or the
house of representatives, severally, of the colony in which the said
chief justice and other judges have exercised the said offices."
The next resolution relates to the courts of admiralty. It is
this:--"That it may be proper to regulate the courts of admiralty or
vice-admiralty, authorized by the 15th chapter of the 4th George the
Third, in such a manner as to make the same more commodious to those who
sue or are sued in the said courts, and to provide for the more decent
maintenance of the judges of the same."
These courts I do not wish to take away: they are in themselves proper
establishments. This court is one of the capital securities of the Act
of Navigation. The extent of its jurisdiction, indeed, has been
increased; but this is altogether as proper, and is, indeed, on many
accounts, more eligible, where new powers were wanted, than a court
absolutely new. But courts incommodiously situated, in effect, deny
justice; and a court partaking in the fruits of its own condemnation is
a robber. The Congress complain, and complain justly, of this
grievance.[28]
These are the three consequential propositions. I have thought of two or
three more; but they come rather too near detail, and to the province of
executive government, which I wish Parliament always to superintend,
never to assume. If the first six are granted, congruity will carry the
latter three. If not, the things that remain unrepealed will be, I hope,
rather unseemly incumbrances on the building than very materially
detrimental to its strength and stability.
Here, Sir, I should close, but that I plainly perceive some objections
remain, which I ought, if possible, to remove. The first will be, that,
in resorting to the doctrine of our ancestors, as contained in the
preamble to the Chester act, I prove too much: that the grievance from a
want of representation, stated in that preamble, goes to the whole of
legislation as well as to taxation; and that the colonies, grounding
themselves upon that doctrine, will apply it to all parts of legislative
authority.
To this objection, with all possible deference and humility, and wishing
as little as any man living to impair the smallest particle of our
supreme authority, I answer, that _the words are the words of
Parliament, and not mine_; and that all false and inconclusive
inferences drawn from them are not mine; for I heartily disclaim any
such inference. I have chosen the words of an act of Parliament, which
Mr. Grenville, surely a tolerably zealous and very judicious advocate
for the sovereignty of Parliament, formerly moved to have read at your
table in confirmation of his tenets. It is true that Lord Chatham
considered these preambles as declaring strongly in favor of his
opinions. He was a no less powerful advocate for the privileges of the
Americans. Ought I not from hence to presume that these preambles are as
favorable as possible to both, when properly understood: favorable both
to the rights of Parliament, and to the privilege of the dependencies of
this crown? But, Sir, the object of grievance in my resolution I have
not taken from the Chester, but from the Durham act, which confines the
hardship of want of representation to the case of subsidies, and which
therefore falls in exactly with the case of the colonies. But whether
the unrepresented counties were _de jure_ or _de facto_ bound the
preambles do not accurately distinguish; nor, indeed, was it necessary:
for, whether _de jure_ or _de facto_, the legislature thought the
exercise of the power of taxing, as of right, or as of fact without
right, equally a grievance, and equally oppressive.
I do not know that the colonies have, in any general way, or in any cool
hour, gone much beyond the demand of immunity in relation to taxes. It
is not fair to judge of the temper or dispositions of any man or any set
of men, when they are composed and at rest, from their conduct or their
expressions in a state of disturbance and irritation. It is, besides, a
very great mistake to imagine that mankind follow up practically any
speculative principle, either of government or of freedom, as far as it
will go in argument and logical illation. We Englishmen stop very short
of the principles upon which we support any given part of our
Constitution, or even the whole of it together. I could easily, if I had
not already tired you, give you very striking and convincing instances
of it. This is nothing but what is natural and proper. All government,
indeed every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue and every prudent
act, is founded on compromise and barter. We balance inconveniences; we
give and take; we remit some rights, that we may enjoy others; and we
choose rather to be happy citizens than subtle disputants. As we must
give away some natural liberty, to enjoy civil advantages, so we must
sacrifice some civil liberties, for the advantages to be derived from
the communion and fellowship of a great empire. But, in all fair
dealings, the thing bought must bear some proportion to the purchase
paid. None will barter away the immediate jewel of his soul. Though a
great house is apt to make slaves haughty, yet it is purchasing a part
of the artificial importance of a great empire too dear, to pay for it
all essential rights, and all the intrinsic dignity of human nature.
None of us who would not risk his life rather than fall under a
government purely arbitrary. But although there are some amongst us who
think our Constitution wants many improvements to make it a complete
system of liberty, perhaps none who are of that opinion would think it
right to aim at such improvement by disturbing his country and risking
everything that is dear to him. In every arduous enterprise, we consider
what we are to lose, as well as what we are to gain; and the more and
better stake of liberty every people possess, the less they will hazard
in a vain attempt to make it more. These are _the cords of man_. Man
acts from adequate motives relative to his interest, and not on
metaphysical speculations. Aristotle, the great master of reasoning,
cautions us, and with great weight and propriety, against this species
of delusive geometrical accuracy in moral arguments, as the most
fallacious of all sophistry.
The Americans will have no interest contrary to the grandeur and glory
of England, when they are not oppressed by the weight of it; and they
will rather be inclined to respect the acts of a superintending
legislature, when they see them the acts of that power which is itself
the security, not the rival, of their secondary importance. In this
assurance my mind most perfectly acquiesces, and I confess I feel not
the least alarm from the discontents which are to arise from putting
people at their ease; nor do I apprehend the destruction of this empire
from giving, by an act of free grace and indulgence, to two millions of
my fellow-citizens some share of those rights upon which I have always
been taught to value myself.
It is said, indeed, that this power of granting, vested in American
assemblies, would dissolve the unity of the empire,--which was preserved
entire, although Wales, and Chester, and Durham were added to it. Truly,
Mr. Speaker, I do not know what this unity means; nor has it ever been
heard of, that I know, in the constitutional policy of this country. The
very idea of subordination of parts excludes this notion of simple and
undivided unity. England is the head; but she is not the head and the
members too. Ireland has ever had from the beginning a separate, but not
an independent legislature, which, far from distracting, promoted the
union of the whole. Everything was sweetly and harmoniously disposed
through both islands for the conservation of English dominion and the
communication of English liberties. I do not see that the same
principles might not be carried into twenty islands, and with the same
good effect. This is my model with regard to America, as far as the
internal circumstances of the two countries are the same. I know no
other unity of this empire than I can draw from its example during these
periods, when it seemed to my poor understanding more united than it is
now, or than it is likely to be by the present methods.
But since I speak of these methods, I recollect, Mr. Speaker, almost too
late, that I promised, before I finished, to say something of the
proposition of the noble lord[29] on the floor, which has been so lately
received, and stands on your journals. I must be deeply concerned,
whenever it is my misfortune to continue a difference with the majority
of this House. But as the reasons for that difference are my apology for
thus troubling you, suffer me to state them in a very few words. I shall
compress them into as small a body as I possibly can, having already
debated that matter at large, when the question was before the
committee.
First, then, I cannot admit that proposition of a ransom by
auction,--because it is a mere project. It is a thing new, unheard of,
supported by no experience, justified by no analogy, without example of
our ancestors, or root in the Constitution. It is neither regular
Parliamentary taxation nor colony grant. _Experimentum in corpore vili_
is a good rule, which will ever make me adverse to any trial of
experiments on what is certainly the most valuable of all subjects, the
peace of this empire.
Secondly, it is an experiment which must be fatal in the end to our
Constitution. For what is it but a scheme for taxing the colonies in the
antechamber of the noble lord and his successors? To settle the quotas
and proportions in this House is clearly impossible. You, Sir, may
flatter yourself you shall sit a state auctioneer, with your hammer in
your hand, and knock down to each colony as it bids. But to settle (on
the plan laid down by the noble lord) the true proportional payment for
four or five and twenty governments, according to the absolute and the
relative wealth of each, and according to the British proportion of
wealth and burden, is a wild and chimerical notion. This new taxation
must therefore come in by the back-door of the Constitution. Each quota
must be brought to this House ready formed. You can neither add nor
alter. You must register it. You can do nothing further. For on what
grounds can you deliberate either before or after the proposition? You
cannot hear the counsel for all these provinces, quarrelling each on its
own quantity of payment, and its proportion to others. If you should
attempt it, the Committee of Provincial Ways and Means, or by whatever
other name it will delight to be called, must swallow up all the time of
Parliament.
Thirdly, it does not give satisfaction to the complaint of the colonies.
They complain that they are taxed without their consent. You answer,
that you will fix the sum at which they shall be taxed. That is, you
give them the very grievance for the remedy. You tell them, indeed,
that you will leave the mode to themselves. I really beg pardon; it
gives me pain to mention it; but you must be sensible that you will not
perform this part of the compact. For suppose the colonies were to lay
the duties which furnished their contingent upon the importation of your
manufactures; you know you would never suffer such a tax to be laid. You
know, too, that you would not suffer many other modes of taxation. So
that, when you come to explain yourself, it will be found that you will
neither leave to themselves the quantum nor the mode, nor indeed
anything. The whole is delusion, from one end to the other.
Fourthly, this method of ransom by auction, unless it be _universally_
accepted, will plunge you into great and inextricable difficulties. In
what year of our Lord are the proportions of payments to be settled? To
say nothing of the impossibility that colony agents should have general
powers of taxing the colonies at their discretion, consider, I implore
you, that the communication by special messages and orders between these
agents and their constituents on each variation of the case, when the
parties come to contend together, and to dispute on their relative
proportions, will be a matter of delay, perplexity, and confusion, that
never can have an end.
If all the colonies do not appear at the outcry, what is the condition
of those assemblies who offer, by themselves or their agents, to tax
themselves up to your ideas of their proportion? The refractory
colonies, who refuse all composition, will remain taxed only to your old
impositions, which, however grievous in principle, are trifling as to
production. The obedient colonies in this scheme are heavily taxed; the
refractory remain unburdened. What will you do? Will you lay new and
heavier taxes by Parliament on the disobedient? Pray consider in what
way you can do it. You are perfectly convinced, that, in the way of
taxing, you can do nothing but at the ports. Now suppose it is Virginia
that refuses to appear at your auction, while Maryland and North
Carolina bid handsomely for their ransom, and are taxed to your quota,
how will you put these colonies on a par? Will you tax the tobacco of
Virginia? If you do, you give its death-wound to your English revenue at
home, and to one of the very greatest articles of your own foreign
trade. If you tax the import of that rebellious colony, what do you tax
but your own manufactures, or the goods of some other obedient and
already well-taxed colony? Who has said one word on this labyrinth of
detail, which bewilders you more and more as you enter into it? Who has
presented, who can present, you with a clew to lead you out of it? I
think, Sir, it is impossible that you should not recollect that the
colony bounds are so implicated in one another (you know it by your
other experiments in the bill for prohibiting the New England fishery)
that you can lay no possible restraints on almost any of them which may
not be presently eluded, if you do not confound the innocent with the
guilty, and burden those whom upon every principle you ought to
exonerate. He must be grossly ignorant of America, who thinks, that,
without falling into this confusion of all rules of equity and policy,
you can restrain any single colony, especially Virginia and Maryland,
the central, and most important of them all.
Let it also be considered, that either in the present confusion you
settle a permanent contingent, which will and must be trifling, and
then you have no effectual revenue,--or you change the quota at every
exigency, and then on every new repartition you will have a new quarrel.
Reflect besides, that, when you have fixed a quota for every colony, you
have not provided for prompt and punctual payment. Suppose one, two,
five, ten years' arrears. You cannot issue a Treasury extent against the
failing colony. You must make new Boston port bills, new restraining
laws, new acts for dragging men to England for trial. You must send out
new fleets, new armies. All is to begin again. From this day forward the
empire is never to know an hour's tranquillity. An intestine fire will
be kept alive in the bowels of the colonies, which one time or other
must consume this whole empire. I allow, indeed, that the Empire of
Germany raises her revenue and her troops by quotas and contingents; but
the revenue of the Empire and the army of the Empire is the worst
revenue and the worst army in the world.
Instead of a standing revenue, you will therefore have a perpetual
quarrel. Indeed, the noble lord who proposed this project of a ransom by
auction seemed himself to be of that opinion. His project was rather
designed for breaking the union of the colonies than for establishing a
revenue. He confessed he apprehended that his proposal would not be to
_their taste_. I say, this scheme of disunion seems to be at the bottom
of the project; for I will not suspect that the noble lord meant nothing
but merely to delude the nation by an airy phantom which he never
intended to realize. But whatever his views may be, as I propose the
peace and union of the colonies as the very foundation of my plan, it
cannot accord with one whose foundation is perpetual discord.
Compare the two. This I offer to give you is plain and simple: the other
full of perplexed and intricate mazes. This is mild: that harsh. This is
found by experience effectual for its purposes: the other is a new
project. This is universal: the other calculated for certain colonies
only. This is immediate in its conciliatory operation: the other remote,
contingent, full of hazard. Mine is what becomes the dignity of a ruling
people: gratuitous, unconditional, and not held out as matter of bargain
and sale. I have done my duty in proposing it to you. I have, indeed,
tired you by a long discourse; but this is the misfortune of those to
whose influence nothing will be conceded, and who must win every inch of
their ground by argument. You have heard me with goodness. May you
decide with wisdom! For my part, I feel my mind greatly disburdened by
what I have done to-day. I have been the less fearful of trying your
patience, because on this subject I mean to spare it altogether in
future. I have this comfort,--that, in every stage of the American
affairs, I have steadily opposed the measures that have produced the
confusion, and may bring on the destruction, of this empire. I now go so
far as to risk a proposal of my own. If I cannot give peace to my
country, I give it to my conscience.
But what (says the financier) is peace to us without money? Your plan
gives us no revenue.--No! But it does: for it secures to the subject the
power of REFUSAL,--the first of all revenues. Experience is a cheat, and
fact a liar, if this power in the subject, of proportioning his grant,
or of not granting at all, has not been found the richest mine of
revenue ever discovered by the skill or by the fortune of man. It does
not, indeed, vote you £152,750: 11: 2-3/4ths, nor any other paltry
limited sum; but it gives the strong-box itself, the fund, the bank,
from whence only revenues can arise amongst a people sensible of
freedom: _Posita luditur arca_. Cannot you in England, cannot you at
this time of day, cannot you, an House of Commons, trust to the
principle which has raised so mighty a revenue, and accumulated a debt
of near 140 millions in this country? Is this principle to be true in
England and false everywhere else? Is it not true in Ireland? Has it not
hitherto been true in the colonies? Why should you presume, that, in any
country, a body duly constituted for any function will neglect to
perform its duty, and abdicate its trust? Such a presumption would go
against all government in all modes. But, in truth, this dread of penury
of supply from a free assembly has no foundation in Nature. For first,
observe, that, besides the desire which all men have naturally of
supporting the honor of their own government, that sense of dignity, and
that security to property, which ever attends freedom, has a tendency to
increase the stock of the free community. Most may be taken where most
is accumulated. And what is the soil or climate where experience has not
uniformly proved that the voluntary flow of heaped-up plenty, bursting
from the weight of its own rich luxuriance, has ever run with a more
copious stream of revenue than could be squeezed from the dry husks of
oppressed indigence by the straining of all the politic machinery in the
world?
Next, we know that parties must ever exist in a free country. We know,
too, that the emulations of such parties, their contradictions, their
reciprocal necessities, their hopes, and their fears, must send them all
in their turns to him that holds the balance of the state. The parties
are the gamesters; but government keeps the table, and is sure to be the
winner in the end. When this game is played, I really think it is more
to be feared that the people will be exhausted than that government will
not be supplied. Whereas whatever is got by acts of absolute power ill
obeyed because odious, or by contracts ill kept because constrained,
will be narrow, feeble, uncertain, and precarious.
"Ease would retract
Vows made in pain, as violent and void."
I, for one, protest against compounding our demands: I declare against
compounding, for a poor limited sum, the immense, ever-growing, eternal
debt which is due to generous government from protected freedom. And so
may I speed in the great object I propose to you, as I think it would
not only be an act of injustice, but would be the worst economy in the
world, to compel the colonies to a sum certain, either in the way of
ransom, or in the way of compulsory compact.
But to clear up my ideas on this subject,--a revenue from America
transmitted hither. Do not delude yourselves: you can never receive
it,--no, not a shilling. We have experience that from remote countries
it is not to be expected. If, when you attempted to extract revenue from
Bengal, you were obliged to return in loan what you had taken in
imposition, what can you expect from North America? For, certainly, if
ever there was a country qualified to produce wealth, it is India; or an
institution fit for the transmission, it is the East India Company.
America has none of these aptitudes. If America gives you taxable
objects on which you lay your duties here, and gives you at the same
time a surplus by a foreign sale of her commodities to pay the duties on
these objects which you tax at home, she has performed her part to the
British revenue. But with regard to her own internal establishments, she
may, I doubt not she will, contribute in moderation. I say in
moderation; for she ought not to be permitted to exhaust herself. She
ought to be reserved to a war; the weight of which, with the enemies
that we are most likely to have, must be considerable in her quarter of
the globe. There she may serve you, and serve you essentially.
For that service, for all service, whether of revenue, trade, or empire,
my trust is in her interest in the British Constitution. My hold of the
colonies is in the close affection which grows from common names, from
kindred blood, from similar privileges, and equal protection. These are
ties which, though light as air, are as strong as links of iron. Let the
colonies always keep the idea of their civil rights associated with your
government,--they will cling and grapple to you, and no force under
heaven will be of power to tear them from their allegiance. But let it
be once understood that your government may be one thing and their
privileges another, that these two things may exist without any mutual
relation,--the cement is gone, the cohesion is loosened, and everything
hastens to decay and dissolution. As long as you have the wisdom to keep
the sovereign authority of this country as the sanctuary of liberty, the
sacred temple consecrated to our common faith, wherever the chosen race
and sons of England worship freedom, they will turn their faces towards
you. The more they multiply, the more friends you will have; the more
ardently they love liberty, the more perfect will be their obedience.
Slavery they can have anywhere. It is a weed that grows in every soil.
They may have it from Spain, they may have it from Prussia. But, until
you become lost to all feeling of your true interest and your natural
dignity, freedom they can have from none but you. This is the commodity
of price, of which you have the monopoly. This is the true Act of
Navigation, which binds to you the commerce of the colonies, and through
them secures to you the wealth of the world. Deny them this
participation of freedom, and you break that sole bond which originally
made, and must still preserve, the unity of the empire. Do not entertain
so weak an imagination as that your registers and your bonds, your
affidavits and your sufferances, your cockets and your clearances, are
what form the great securities of your commerce. Do not dream that your
letters of office, and your instructions, and your suspending clauses
are the things that hold together the great contexture of this
mysterious whole. These things do not make your government. Dead
instruments, passive tools as they are, it is the spirit of the English
communion that gives all their life and efficacy to them. It is the
spirit of the English Constitution, which, infused through the mighty
mass, pervades, feeds, unites, invigorates, vivifies every part of the
empire, even down to the minutest member.
Is it not the same virtue which does everything for us here in England?
Do you imagine, then, that it is the Land-Tax Act which raises your
revenue? that it is the annual vote in the Committee of Supply which
gives you your army? or that it is the Mutiny Bill which inspires it
with bravery and discipline? No! surely, no! It is the love of the
people; it is their attachment to their government, from the sense of
the deep stake they have in such a glorious institution, which gives you
your army and your navy, and infuses into both that liberal obedience
without which your army would be a base rabble and your navy nothing but
rotten timber.
All this, I know well enough, will sound wild and chimerical to the
profane herd of those vulgar and mechanical politicians who have no
place among us: a sort of people who think that nothing exists but what
is gross and material,--and who, therefore, far from being qualified to
be directors of the great movement of empire, are not fit to turn a
wheel in the machine. But to men truly initiated and rightly taught,
these ruling and master principles, which in the opinion of such men as
I have mentioned have no substantial existence, are in truth everything,
and all in all. Magnanimity in politics is not seldom the truest wisdom;
and a great empire and little minds go ill together. If we are conscious
of our situation, and glow with zeal to fill our place as becomes our
station and ourselves, we ought to auspicate all our public proceedings
on America with the old warning of the Church, _Sursum corda!_ We ought
to elevate our minds to the greatness of that trust to which the order
of Providence has called us. By adverting to the dignity of this high
calling our ancestors have turned a savage wilderness into a glorious
empire, and have made the most extensive and the only honorable
conquests, not by destroying, but by promoting the wealth, the number,
the happiness of the human race. Let us get an American revenue as we
have got an American empire. English privileges have made it all that it
is; English privileges alone will make it all it can be.
In full confidence of this unalterable truth, I now (_quod felix
faustumque sit!_) lay the first stone of the Temple of Peace; and I move
you,--
"That the colonies and plantations of Great Britain in North America,
consisting of fourteen separate governments, and containing two millions
and upwards of free inhabitants, have not had the liberty and privilege
of electing and sending any knights and burgesses, or others, to
represent them in the high court of Parliament."
Upon this resolution the previous question was put and carried: for the
previous question, 270; against it, 78.
* * * * *
As the propositions were opened separately in the body of the speech,
the reader perhaps may wish to see the whole of them together, in the
form in which they were moved for.
"MOVED,
"That the colonies and plantations of Great Britain in North America,
consisting of fourteen separate governments, and containing two millions
and upwards of free inhabitants, have not had the liberty and privilege
of electing and sending any knights and burgesses, or others, to
represent them in the high court of Parliament."
"That the said colonies and plantations have been made liable to, and
bounden by, several subsidies, payments, rates, and taxes, given and
granted by Parliament, though the said colonies and plantations have not
their knights and burgesses in the said high court of Parliament, of
their own election, to represent the condition of their country; _by
lack whereof they have been oftentimes touched and grieved by subsidies,
given, granted, and amended to, in the said, court, in a manner
prejudicial to the common wealth, quietness, rest, and peace of the
subjects inhabiting within the same_."
"That, from the distance of the said colonies, and from other
circumstances, no method hath hitherto been devised for procuring a
representation in Parliament for the said colonies."
"That each of the said colonies hath within itself a body, chosen, in
part or in the whole, by the freemen, freeholders, or other free
inhabitants thereof, commonly called the General Assembly, or General
Court, with powers legally to raise, levy, and assess, according to the
several usages of such colonies, duties and taxes towards defraying all
sorts of public services."[30]
"That the said general assemblies, general courts, or other bodies
legally qualified as aforesaid, have at sundry times freely granted
several large subsidies and public aids for his Majesty's service,
according to their abilities, when required thereto by letter from one
of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State; and that their right to
grant the same, and their cheerfulness and sufficiency in the said
grants, have been at sundry times acknowledged by Parliament."
"That it hath been found by experience, that the manner of granting the
said supplies and aids by the said general assemblies hath been more
agreeable to the inhabitants of the said colonies, and more beneficial
and conducive to the public service, than the mode of giving and
granting aids and subsidies in Parliament, to be raised and paid in the
said colonies."
"That it may be proper to repeal an act, made in the seventh year of the
reign of his present Majesty, intituled, 'An act for granting certain
duties in the British colonies and plantations in America; for allowing
a drawback of the duties of customs, upon the exportation from this
kingdom, of coffee and cocoa-nuts, of the produce of the said colonies
or plantations; for discontinuing the drawbacks payable on China earthen
ware exported to America; and for more effectually preventing the
clandestine running of goods in the said colonies and plantations.'"
"That it may be proper to repeal an act, made in the fourteenth year of
the reign of his present Majesty, intituled, 'An act to discontinue, in
such manner and for such time as are therein mentioned, the landing and
discharging, lading or chipping, of goods, wares, and merchandise, at
the town and within the harbor of Boston, in the province of
Massachusetts Bay, in North America.'"
"That it may be proper to repeal an act, made in the fourteenth year of
the reign of his present Majesty, intituled, 'An act for the impartial
administration of justice, in the cases of persons questioned for any
acts done by them, in the execution of the law, or for the suppression
of riots and tumults, in the province of the Massachusetts Bay, in New
England.'"
"That it may be proper to repeal an act, made in the fourteenth year of
the reign of his present Majesty, intituled, 'An act for the better
regulating the government of the province of the Massachusetts Bay, in
New England.'"
"That it may be proper to explain and amend an act, made in the
thirty-fifth year of the reign of King Henry the Eighth, intituled, 'An
act for the trial of treasons committed out of the king's dominions.'"
"That, from the time when the general assembly, or general court, of any
colony or plantation in North America, shall have appointed, by act of
assembly duly confirmed, a settled salary to the offices of the chief
justice and other judges of the superior courts, it may be proper that
the said chief justice and other judges of the superior courts of such
colony shall hold his and their office and offices during their good
behavior, and shall not be removed therefrom, but when the said removal
shall be adjudged by his Majesty in council, upon a hearing on complaint
from the general assembly, or on a complaint from the governor, or the
council, or the house of representatives, severally, of the colony in
which the said chief justice and other judges have exercised the said
offices."
"That it may be proper to regulate the courts of admiralty or
vice-admiralty, authorized by the 15th chapter of the 4th George the
Third, in such a manner as to make the same more commodious to those who
sue or are sued in the said courts; _and to provide for the mere decent
maintenance of the judges of the same_."
FOOTNOTES:
[18] The act to restrain the trade and commerce of the provinces of
Massachusetts Bay and New Hampshire, and colonies of Connecticut and
Rhode Island and Providence Plantation, in North America, to Great
Britain, Ireland, and the British Islands in the West Indies; and to
prohibit such provinces and colonies from carrying on any fishery on the
banks of Newfoundland, and other places therein mentioned, under certain
conditions and limitations.
[19] Mr. Rose Fuller.
[20] "That when the governor, council, and assembly, or general court,
of any of his Majesty's provinces or colonies in America shall _propose_
to make provision, _according to the condition, circumstances_, and
_situation_ of such province or colony, for contributing their
_proportion_ to the _common defence_, (such _proportion_ to be raised
under the authority of the general court or general assembly of such
province or colony, and disposable by Parliament,) and shall _engage_ to
make provision, also for the support of the civil government and the
administration, of justice in such province or colony, it will be
proper, _if such proposal shall be approved by his Majesty and the two
Houses of Parliament_, and for so long as such provision shall be made
accordingly, to forbear, in _respect of such province or colony_, to
levy any duty, tax, or assessment, or to impose any farther duty, tax,
or assessment, except only such duties as it may be expedient to
continue to levy or to impose for the regulation of commerce: the net
produce of the duties last mentioned to be carried to the account of
such province or colony respectively."--Resolution moved by Lord North
in the Committee, and agreed to by the House, 27th February, 1775.
[21] Mr. Glover.
[22] The Attorney-General.
[23] Mr. Rice.
[24] Lord North.
[25] Journals of the House, Vol. XXV.
[26] Journals of the House, Vol. XXVII.
[27] Ibid.
[28] The Solicitor-General informed Mr. B., when the resolutions were
separately moved, that the grievance of the judges partaking of the
profits of the seizure had been redressed by office; accordingly the
resolution was amended.
[29] Lord North.
[30] The first four motions and the last had the previous question put
on them. The others were negatived.
The words in Italics were, by an amendment that was carried, left out of
the motion; which will appear in the journals, though it is not the
practice to insert such amendments in the votes.
A
LETTER
TO
JOHN FARR AND JOHN HARRIS, ESQRS.,
SHERIFFS OF THE CITY OF BRISTOL,
ON THE
AFFAIRS OF AMERICA.
1777.
Gentlemen,--I have the honor of sending you the two last acts which have
been passed with regard to the troubles in America. These acts are
similar to all the rest which have been made on the same subject. They
operate by the same principle, and they are derived from the very same
policy. I think they complete the number of this sort of statutes to
nine. It affords no matter for very pleasing reflection to observe that
our subjects diminish as our laws increase.
If I have the misfortune of differing with some of my fellow-citizens on
this great and arduous subject, it is no small consolation to me that I
do not differ from you. With you I am perfectly united. We are heartily
agreed in our detestation of a civil war. We have ever expressed the
most unqualified disapprobation of all the steps which have led to it,
and of all those which tend to prolong it. And I have no doubt that we
feel exactly the same emotions of grief and shame on all its miserable
consequences, whether they appear, on the one side or the other, in the
shape of victories or defeats, of captures made from the English on the
continent or from the English in these islands, of legislative
regulations which subvert the liberties of our brethren or which
undermine our own.
Of the first of these statutes (that for the letter of marque) I shall
say little. Exceptionable as it may be, and as I think it is in some
particulars, it seems the natural, perhaps necessary, result of the
measures we have taken and the situation we are in. The other (for a
partial suspension of the _Habeas Corpus_) appears to me of a much
deeper malignity. During its progress through the House of Commons, it
has been amended, so as to express, more distinctly than at first it
did, the avowed sentiments of those who framed it; and the main ground
of my exception to it is, because it does express, and does carry into
execution, purposes which appear to me so contradictory to all the
principles, not only of the constitutional policy of Great Britain, but
even of that species of hostile justice which no asperity of war wholly
extinguishes in the minds of a civilized people.
It seems to have in view two capital objects: the first, to enable
administration to confine, as long as it shall think proper, those whom
that act is pleased to qualify by the name of _pirates_. Those so
qualified I understand to be the commanders and mariners of such
privateers and ships of war belonging to the colonies as in the course
of this unhappy contest may fall into the hands of the crown. They are
therefore to be detained in prison, under the criminal description of
piracy, to a future trial and ignominious punishment, whenever
circumstances shall make it convenient to execute vengeance on them,
under the color of that odious and infamous offence.
To this first purpose of the law I have no small dislike, because the
act does not (as all laws and all equitable transactions ought to do)
fairly describe its object. The persons who make a naval war upon us, in
consequence of the present troubles, may be rebels; but to call and
treat them as pirates is confounding not only the natural distinction of
things, but the order of crimes,--which, whether by putting them from a
higher part of the scale to the lower or from the lower to the higher,
is never done without dangerously disordering the whole frame of
jurisprudence. Though piracy may be, in the eye of the law, a _less_
offence than treason, yet, as both are, in effect, punished with the
same death, the same forfeiture, and the same corruption of blood, I
never would take from any fellow-creature whatever any sort of advantage
which he may derive to his safety from the pity of mankind, or to his
reputation from their general feelings, by degrading his offence, when I
cannot soften his punishment. The general sense of mankind tells me that
those offences which may possibly arise from mistaken virtue are not in
the class of infamous actions. Lord Coke, the oracle of the English law,
conforms to that general sense, where he says that "those things which
are of the highest criminality may be of the least disgrace." The act
prepares a sort of masked proceeding, not honorable to the justice of
the kingdom, and by no means necessary for its safety. I cannot enter
into it. If Lord Balmerino, in the last rebellion, had driven off the
cattle of twenty clans, I should have thought it would have been a
scandalous and low juggle, utterly unworthy of the manliness of an
English judicature, to have tried him for felony as a stealer of cows.
Besides, I must honestly tell you that I could not vote for, or
countenance in any way, a statute which stigmatizes with the crime of
piracy these men whom an act of Parliament had previously put out of the
protection of the law. When the legislature of this kingdom had ordered
all their ships and goods, for the mere new-created offence of
exercising trade, to be divided as a spoil among the seamen, of the
navy,--to consider the necessary reprisal of an unhappy, proscribed,
interdicted people, as the crime of piracy, would have appeared, in any
other legislature than ours, a strain of the most insulting and most
unnatural cruelty and injustice. I assure you I never remember to have
heard of anything like it in any time or country.
The second professed purpose of the act is to detain in England for
trial those who shall commit high treason in America.
That you may be enabled to enter into the true spirit of the present
law, it is necessary, Gentlemen, to apprise you that there is an act,
made so long ago as in the reign of Henry the Eighth, before the
existence or thought of any English colonies in America, for the trial
in this kingdom of treasons committed out of the realm. In the year 1769
Parliament thought proper to acquaint the crown with their construction
of that act in a formal address, wherein they entreated his Majesty to
cause persons charged with high treason in America to be brought into
this kingdom for trial. By this act of Henry the Eighth, _so construed
and so applied_, almost all that is substantial and beneficial in a
trial by jury is taken away from the subject in the colonies. This is,
however, saying too little; for to try a man under that act is, in
effect, to condemn him unheard. A person is brought hither in the
dungeon of a ship's hold; thence he is vomited into a dungeon on land,
loaded with irons, unfurnished with money, unsupported by friends, three
thousand miles from all means of calling upon or confronting evidence,
where no one local circumstance that tends to detect perjury can
possibly be judged of;--such a person may be executed according to form,
but he can never be tried according to justice.
I therefore could never reconcile myself to the bill I send you, which
is expressly provided to remove all inconveniences from the
establishment of a mode of trial which has ever appeared to me most
unjust and most unconstitutional. Far from removing the difficulties
which impede the execution of so mischievous a project, I would heap new
difficulties upon it, if it were in my power. All the ancient, honest,
juridical principles and institutions of England are so many clogs to
check and retard the headlong course of violence and oppression. They
were invented for this one good purpose, that what was not just should
not be convenient. Convinced of this, I would leave things as I found
them. The old, cool-headed, general law is as good as any deviation
dictated by present heat.
I could see no fair, justifiable expedience pleaded to favor this new
suspension of the liberty of the subject. If the English in the colonies
can support the independency to which they have been unfortunately
driven, I suppose nobody has such a fanatical zeal for the criminal
justice of Henry the Eighth that he will contend for executions which
must be retaliated tenfold on his own friends, or who has conceived so
strange an idea of English dignity as to think the defeats in America
compensated by the triumphs at Tyburn. If, on the contrary, the colonies
are reduced to the obedience of the crown, there must be, under that
authority, tribunals in the country itself fully competent to administer
justice on all offenders. But if there are not, and that we must
suppose a thing so humiliating to our government as that all this vast
continent should unanimously concur in thinking that no ill fortune can
convert resistance to the royal authority into a criminal act, we may
call the effect of our victory peace, or obedience, or what we will, but
the war is not ended; the hostile mind continues in full vigor, and it
continues under a worse form. If your peace be nothing more than a
sullen pause from arms, if their quiet be nothing but the meditation of
revenge, where smitten pride smarting from its wounds festers into new
rancor, neither the act of Henry the Eighth nor its handmaid of this
reign will answer any wise end of policy or justice. For, if the bloody
fields which they saw and felt are not sufficient to subdue the reason
of America, (to use the expressive phrase of a great lord in office,) it
is not the judicial slaughter which is made in another hemisphere
against their universal sense of justice that will ever reconcile them
to the British government.
I take it for granted, Gentlemen, that we sympathize in a proper horror
of all punishment further than as it serves for an example. To whom,
then does the example of an execution in England for this American
rebellion apply? Remember, you are told every day, that the present is a
contest between the two countries, and that we in England are at war for
_our own_ dignity against our rebellious children. Is this true? If it
be, it is surely among such rebellious children that examples for
disobedience should be made, to be in any degree instructive: for who
ever thought of teaching parents their duty by an example from the
punishment of an undutiful son? As well might the execution of a
fugitive negro in the plantations be considered as a lesson to teach
masters humanity to their slaves. Such executions may, indeed, satiate
our revenge; they may harden our hearts, and puff us up with pride and
arrogance. Alas! this is not instruction.
If anything can be drawn from such examples by a parity of the case, it
is to show how deep their crime and how heavy their punishment will be,
who shall at any time dare to resist a distant power actually disposing
of their property without their voice or consent to the disposition, and
overturning their franchises without charge or hearing. God forbid that
England should ever read this lesson written in the blood of _any_ of
her offspring!
War is at present carried on between the king's natural and foreign
troops, on one side, and the English in America, on the other, upon the
usual footing of other wars; and accordingly an exchange of prisoners
has been regularly made from the beginning. If, notwithstanding this
hitherto equal procedure, upon some prospect of ending the war with
success (which, however, may be delusive) administration prepares to act
against those as _traitors_ who remain in their hands at the end of the
troubles, in my opinion we shall exhibit to the world as indecent a
piece of injustice as ever civil fury has produced. If the prisoners who
have been exchanged have not by that exchange been _virtually pardoned_,
the cartel (whether avowed or understood) is a cruel fraud; for you have
received the life of a man, and you ought to return a life for it, or
there is no parity or fairness in the transaction.
If, on the other hand, we admit that they who are actually exchanged
are pardoned, but contend that you may justly reserve for vengeance
those who remain unexchanged, then this unpleasant and unhandsome
consequence will follow: that you judge of the delinquency of men merely
by the time of their guilt, and not by the heinousness of it; and you
make fortune and accidents, and not the moral qualities of human action,
the rule of your justice.
These strange incongruities must ever perplex those who confound the
unhappiness of civil dissension with the crime of treason. Whenever a
rebellion really and truly exists, which is as easily known in fact as
it is difficult to define in words, government has not entered into such
military conventions, but has ever declined all intermediate treaty
which should put rebels in possession of the law of nations with regard
to war. Commanders would receive no benefits at their hands, because
they could make no return for them. Who has ever heard of capitulation,
and parole of honor, and exchange of prisoners in the late rebellions in
this kingdom? The answer to all demands of that sort was, "We can engage
for nothing; you are at the king's pleasure." We ought to remember,
that, if our present enemies be in reality and truth rebels, the king's
generals have no right to release them upon any conditions whatsoever;
and they are themselves answerable to the law, and as much in want of a
pardon, for doing so, as the rebels whom they release.
Lawyers, I know, cannot make the distinction for which I contend;
because they have their strict rule to go by. But legislators ought to
do what lawyers cannot; for they have no other rules to bind them but
the great principles of reason and equity and the general sense of
mankind. These they are bound to obey and follow, and rather to enlarge
and enlighten law by the liberality of legislative reason than to fetter
and bind their higher capacity by the narrow constructions of
subordinate, artificial justice. If we had adverted to this, we never
could consider the convulsions of a great empire, not disturbed by a
little disseminated faction, but divided by whole communities and
provinces, and entire legal representatives of a people, as fit matter
of discussion under a commission of Oyer and Terminer. It is as opposite
to reason and prudence as it is to humanity and justice.
This act, proceeding on these principles, that is, preparing to end the
present troubles by a trial of one sort of hostility under the name of
piracy, and of another by the name of treason, and executing the act of
Henry the Eighth according to a new and unconstitutional interpretation,
I have thought evil and dangerous, even though the instruments of
effecting such purposes had been merely of a neutral quality.
But it really appears to me that the means which this act employs are at
least as exceptionable as the end. Permit me to open myself a little
upon this subject; because it is of importance to me, when I am obliged
to submit to the power without acquiescing in the reason of an act of
legislature, that I should justify my dissent by such arguments as may
be supposed to have weight with a sober man.
The main operative regulation of the act is to suspend the Common Law
and the statute _Habeas Corpus_ (the sole securities either for liberty
or justice) with regard to all those who have been out of the realm, or
on the high seas, within a given time. The rest of the people, as I
understand, are to continue as they stood before.
I confess, Gentlemen, that this appears to me as bad in the principle,
and far worse in its consequence, than an universal suspension of the
_Habeas Corpus_ Act; and the limiting qualification, instead of taking
out the sting, does in my humble opinion sharpen and envenom it to a
greater degree. Liberty, if I understand it at all, is a _general_
principle, and the clear right of all the subjects within the realm, or
of none. Partial freedom seems to me a most invidious mode of slavery.
But, unfortunately, it is the kind of slavery the most easily admitted
in times of civil discord: for parties are but too apt to forget their
own future safety in their desire of sacrificing their enemies. People
without much difficulty admit the entrance of that injustice of which
they are not to be the immediate victims. In times of high proceeding it
is never the faction of the predominant power that is in danger: for no
tyranny chastises its own instruments. It is the obnoxious and the
suspected who want the protection of law; and there is nothing to bridle
the partial violence of state factions but this,--"that, whenever an act
is made for a cessation of law and justice, the whole people should be
universally subjected to the same suspension of their franchises." The
alarm of such a proceeding would then be universal. It would operate as
a sort of _call of the nation_. It would become every man's immediate
and instant concern to be made very sensible of _the absolute necessity_
of this total eclipse of liberty. They would more carefully advert to
every renewal, and more powerfully resist it. These great determined
measures are not commonly so dangerous to freedom. They are marked with
too strong lines to slide into use. No plea, nor pretence, of
_inconvenience or evil example_ (which must in their nature be daily
and ordinary incidents) can be admitted as a reason for such mighty
operations. But the true danger is when liberty is nibbled away, for
expedients, and by parts. The _Habeas Corpus_ Act supposes, contrary to
the genius of most other laws, that the lawful magistrate may see
particular men with a malignant eye, and it provides for that identical
case. But when men, in particular descriptions, marked out by the
magistrate himself, are delivered over by Parliament to this possible
malignity, it is not the _Habeas Corpus_ that is occasionally suspended,
but its spirit that is mistaken, and its principle that is subverted.
Indeed, nothing is security to any individual but the common interest of
all.
This act, therefore, has this distinguished evil in it, that it is the
first _partial_ suspension of the _Habeas Corpus_ that has been made.
The precedent, which is always of very great importance, is now
established. For the first time a distinction is made among the people
within this realm. Before this act, every man putting his foot on
English ground, every stranger owing only a local and temporary
allegiance, even negro slaves who had been sold in the colonies and
under an act of Parliament, became as free as every other man who
breathed the same air with them. Now a line is drawn, which may be
advanced further and further at pleasure, on the same argument of mere
expedience on which it was first described. There is no equality among
us; we are not fellow-citizens, if the mariner who lands on the quay
does not rest on as firm legal ground as the merchant who sits in his
counting-house. Other laws may injure the community; this dissolves it.
As things now stand, every man in the West Indies, every one inhabitant
of three unoffending provinces on the continent, every person coming
from the East Indies, every gentleman who has travelled for his health
or education, every mariner who has navigated the seas, is, for no other
offence, under a temporary proscription. Let any of these facts (now
become presumptions of guilt) be proved against him, and the bare
suspicion of the crown puts him out of the law. It is even by no means
clear to me whether the negative proof does not lie upon the person
apprehended on suspicion, to the subversion of all justice.
I have not debated against this bill in its progress through the House;
because it would have been vain to oppose, and impossible to correct it.
It is some time since I have been clearly convinced, that, in the
present state of things, all opposition to any measures proposed by
ministers, where the name of America appears, is vain and frivolous. You
may be sure that I do not speak of my opposition, which in all
circumstances must be so, but that of men of the greatest wisdom and
authority in the nation. Everything proposed against America is supposed
of course to be in favor of Great Britain. Good and ill success are
equally admitted as reasons for persevering in the present methods.
Several very prudent and very well-intentioned persons were of opinion,
that, during the prevalence of such dispositions, all struggle rather
inflamed than lessened the distemper of the public counsels. Finding
such resistance to be considered as factious by most within doors and by
very many without, I cannot conscientiously support what is against my
opinion, nor prudently contend with what I know is irresistible.
Preserving my principles unshaken, I reserve my activity for rational
endeavors; and I hope that my past conduct has given sufficient
evidence, that, if I am a single day from my place, it is not owing to
indolence or love of dissipation. The slightest hope of doing good is
sufficient to recall me to what I quitted with regret In declining for
some time my usual strict attendance, I do not in the least condemn the
spirit of those gentlemen who, with a just confidence in their
abilities, (in which I claim a sort of share from my love and admiration
of them,) were of opinion that their exertions in this desperate case
might be of some service. They thought that by contracting the sphere of
its application they might lessen the malignity of an evil principle.
Perhaps they were in the right. But when my opinion was so very clearly
to the contrary, for the reasons I have just stated, I am sure _my_
attendance would have been ridiculous.
I must add, in further explanation of _my_ conduct, that, far from
softening the features of such a principle, and thereby removing any
part of the popular odium or natural terrors attending it, I should be
sorry that anything framed in contradiction to the spirit of our
Constitution did not instantly produce, in fact, the grossest of the
evils with which it was pregnant in its nature. It is by lying dormant a
long time, or being at first very rarely exercised, that arbitrary power
steals upon a people. On the next unconstitutional act, all the
fashionable world will be ready to say, "Your prophecies are ridiculous,
your fears are vain, you see how little of the mischiefs which you
formerly foreboded are come to pass." Thus, by degrees, that artful
softening of all arbitrary power, the alleged infrequency or narrow
extent of its operation, will be received as a sort of aphorism,--and
Mr. Hume will not be singular in telling us, that the felicity of
mankind is no more disturbed by it than by earthquakes or thunder, or
the other more unusual accidents of Nature.
The act of which I speak is among the fruits of the American war,--a war
in my humble opinion productive of many mischiefs, of a kind which
distinguish it from all others. Not only our policy is deranged, and our
empire distracted, but our laws and our legislative spirit appear to
have been totally perverted by it. We have made war on our colonies, not
by arms only, but by laws. As hostility and law are not very concordant
ideas, every step we have taken in this business has been made by
trampling on some maxim of justice or some capital principle of wise
government. What precedents were established, and what principles
overturned, (I will not say of English privilege, but of general
justice,) in the Boston Port, the Massachusetts Charter, the Military
Bill, and all that long array of hostile acts of Parliament by which the
war with America has been begun and supported! Had the principles of any
of these acts been first exerted on English ground, they would probably
have expired as soon as they touched it. But by being removed from our
persons, they have rooted in our laws, and the latest posterity will
taste the fruits of them.
Nor is it the worst effect of this unnatural contention, that our _laws_
are corrupted. Whilst _manners_ remain entire, they will correct the
vices of law, and soften it at length to their own temper. But we have
to lament that in most of the late proceedings we see very few traces of
that generosity, humanity, and dignity of mind, which formerly
characterized this nation. War suspends the rules of moral obligation,
and what is long suspended is in danger of being totally abrogated.
Civil wars strike deepest of all into the manners of the people. They
vitiate their politics; they corrupt their morals; they pervert even the
natural taste and relish of equity and justice. By teaching us to
consider our fellow-citizens in an hostile light, the whole body of our
nation becomes gradually less dear to us. The very names of affection
and kindred, which were the bond of charity whilst we agreed, become new
incentives to hatred and rage when the communion of our country is
dissolved. We may flatter ourselves that we shall not fall into this
misfortune. But we have no charter of exemption, that I know of, from
the ordinary frailties of our nature.
What but that blindness of heart which arises from the frenzy of civil
contention could have made any persons conceive the present situation of
the British affairs as an object of triumph to themselves or of
congratulation to their sovereign? Nothing surely could be more
lamentable to those who remember the flourishing days of this kingdom
than to see the insane joy of several unhappy people, amidst the sad
spectacle which our affairs and conduct exhibit to the scorn of Europe.
We behold (and it seems some people rejoice in beholding) our native
land, which used to sit the envied arbiter of all her neighbors, reduced
to a servile dependence on their mercy,--acquiescing in assurances of
friendship which she does not trust,--complaining of hostilities which
she dares not resent,--deficient to her allies, lofty to her subjects,
and submissive to her enemies,--whilst the liberal government of this
free nation is supported by the hireling sword of German boors and
vassals, and three millions of the subjects of Great Britain are seeking
for protection to English privileges in the arms of France!
These circumstances appear to me more like shocking prodigies than
natural changes in human affairs. Men of firmer minds may see them
without staggering or astonishment. Some may think them matters of
congratulation and complimentary addresses; but I trust your candor will
be so indulgent to my weakness as not to have the worse opinion of me
for my declining to participate in this joy, and my rejecting all share
whatsoever in such a triumph. I am too old, too stiff in my inveterate
partialities, to be ready at all the fashionable evolutions of opinion.
I scarcely know how to adapt my mind to the feelings with which the
Court Gazettes mean to impress the people. It is not instantly that I
can be brought to rejoice, when I hear of the slaughter and captivity of
long lists of those names which have been familiar to my ears from my
infancy, and to rejoice that they have fallen under the sword of
strangers, whose barbarous appellations I scarcely know how to
pronounce. The glory acquired at the White Plains by Colonel Rahl has no
charms for me, and I fairly acknowledge that I have not yet learned to
delight in finding Fort Kniphausen in the heart of the British
dominions.
It might be some consolation for the loss of our old regards, if our
reason were enlightened in proportion as our honest prejudices are
removed. Wanting feelings for the honor of our country, we might then in
cold blood be brought to think a little of our interests as individual
citizens and our private conscience as moral agents.
Indeed, our affairs are in a bad condition. I do assure those gentlemen
who have prayed for war, and obtained the blessing they have sought,
that they are at this instant in very great straits. The abused wealth
of this country continues a little longer to feed its distemper. As yet
they, and their German allies of twenty hireling states, have contended
only with the unprepared strength of our own infant colonies. But
America is not subdued. Not one unattacked village which was originally
adverse throughout that vast continent has yet submitted from love or
terror. You have the ground you encamp on, and you have no more. The
cantonments of your troops and your dominions are exactly of the same
extent. You spread devastation, but you do not enlarge the sphere of
authority.
The events of this war are of so much greater magnitude than those who
either wished or feared it ever looked for, that this alone ought to
fill every considerate mind with anxiety and diffidence. Wise men often
tremble at the very things which fill the thoughtless with security. For
many reasons I do not choose to expose to public view all the
particulars of the state in which you stood with regard to foreign
powers during the whole course of the last year. Whether you are yet
wholly out of danger from them is more than I know, or than your rulers
can divine. But even if I were certain of my safety, I could not easily
forgive those who had brought me into the most dreadful perils, because
by accidents, unforeseen by them or me, I have escaped.
Believe me, Gentlemen, the way still before you is intricate, dark, and
full of perplexed and treacherous mazes. Those who think they have the
clew may lead us out of this labyrinth. We may trust them as amply as we
think proper; but as they have most certainly a call for all the reason
which their stock can furnish, why should we think it proper to disturb
its operation by inflaming their passions? I may be unable to lend an
helping hand to those who direct the state; but I should be ashamed to
make myself one of a noisy multitude to halloo and hearten them into
doubtful and dangerous courses. A conscientious man would be cautious
how he dealt in blood. He would feel some apprehension at being called
to a tremendous account for engaging in so deep a play without any sort
of knowledge of the game. It is no excuse for presumptuous ignorance,
that it is directed by insolent passion. The poorest being that crawls
on earth, contending to save itself from injustice and oppression, is an
object respectable in the eyes of God and man. But I cannot conceive any
existence under heaven (which in the depths of its wisdom tolerates all
sorts of things) that is more truly odious and disgusting than an
impotent, helpless creature, without civil wisdom or military skill,
without a consciousness of any other qualification for power but his
servility to it, bloated with pride and arrogance, calling for battles
which he is not to fight, contending for a violent dominion which he can
never exercise, and satisfied to be himself mean and miserable, in order
to render others contemptible and wretched.
If you and I find our talents not of the great and ruling kind, our
conduct, at least, is conformable to our faculties. No man's life pays
the forfeit of our rashness. No desolate widow weeps tears of blood
over our ignorance. Scrupulous and sober in a well-grounded distrust of
ourselves, we would keep in the port of peace and security; and perhaps
in recommending to others something of the same diffidence, we should
show ourselves more charitable to their welfare than injurious to their
abilities.
There are many circumstances in the zeal shown for civil war which seem
to discover but little of real magnanimity. The addressers offer their
own persons, and they are satisfied with hiring Germans. They promise
their private fortunes, and they mortgage their country. They have all
the merit of volunteers, without risk of person or charge of
contribution; and when the unfeeling arm of a foreign soldiery pours out
their kindred blood like water, they exult and triumph as if they
themselves had performed some notable exploit. I am really ashamed of
the fashionable language which has been held for some time past, which,
to say the best of it, is full of levity. You know that I allude to the
general cry against the cowardice of the Americans, as if we despised
them for not making the king's soldiery purchase the advantage they have
obtained at a dearer rate. It is not, Gentlemen, it is not to respect
the dispensations of Providence, nor to provide any decent retreat in
the mutability of human affairs. It leaves no medium between insolent
victory and infamous defeat. It tends to alienate our minds further and
further from our natural regards, and to make an eternal rent and schism
in the British nation. Those who do not wish for such a separation would
not dissolve that cement of reciprocal esteem and regard which can alone
bind together the parts of this great fabric. It ought to be our wish,
as it is our duty, not only to forbear this style of outrage ourselves,
but to make every one as sensible as we can of the impropriety and
unworthiness of the tempers which give rise to it, and which designing
men are laboring with such malignant industry to diffuse amongst us. It
is our business to counteract them, if possible,--if possible, to awake
our natural regards, and to revive the old partiality to the English
name. Without something of this kind I do not see how it is ever
practicable really to reconcile with those whose affection, after all,
must be the surest hold of our government, and which is a thousand times
more worth to us than the mercenary zeal of all the circles of Germany.
I can well conceive a country completely overrun, and miserably wasted,
without approaching in the least to settlement. In my apprehension, as
long as English government is attempted to be supported over Englishmen
by the sword alone, things will thus continue. I anticipate in my mind
the moment of the final triumph of foreign military force. When that
hour arrives, (for it may arrive,) then it is that all this mass of
weakness and violence will appear in its full light. If we should be
expelled from America, the delusion of the partisans of military
government might still continue. They might still feed their
imaginations with the possible good consequences which might have
attended success. Nobody could prove the contrary by facts. But in case
the sword should do all that the sword can do, the success of their arms
and the defeat of their policy will be one and the same thing. You will
never see any revenue from America. Some increase of the means of
corruption, without ease of the public burdens, is the very best that
can happen. Is it for this that we are at war,--and in such a war?
As to the difficulties of laying once more the foundations of that
government which, for the sake of conquering what was our own, has been
voluntarily and wantonly pulled down by a court faction here, I tremble
to look at them. Has any of these gentlemen who are so eager to govern
all mankind shown himself possessed of the first qualification towards
government, some knowledge of the object, and of the difficulties which
occur in the task they have undertaken?
I assure you, that, on the most prosperous issue of your arms, you will
not be where you stood when you called in war to supply the defects of
your political establishment. Nor would any disorder or disobedience to
government which could arise from the most abject concession on our part
ever equal those which will be felt after the most triumphant violence.
You have got all the intermediate evils of war into the bargain.
I think I know America,--if I do not, my ignorance is incurable, for I
have spared no pains to understand it,--and I do most solemnly assure
those of my constituents who put any sort of confidence in my industry
and integrity, that everything that has been done there has arisen from
a total misconception of the object: that our means of originally
holding America, that our means of reconciling with it after quarrel, of
recovering it after separation, of keeping it after victory, did depend,
and must depend, in their several stages and periods, upon a total
renunciation of that unconditional submission which has taken such
possession of the minds of violent men. The whole of those maxims upon
which we have made and continued this war must be abandoned. Nothing,
indeed, (for I would not deceive you,) can place us in our former
situation. That hope must be laid aside. But there is a difference
between bad and the worst of all. Terms relative to the cause of the war
ought to be offered by the authority of Parliament. An arrangement at
home promising some security for them ought to be made. By doing this,
without the least impairing of our strength, we add to the credit of our
moderation, which, in itself, is always strength more or less.
I know many have been taught to think that moderation in a case like
this is a sort of treason,--and that all arguments for it are
sufficiently answered by railing at rebels and rebellion, and by
charging all the present or future miseries which we may suffer on the
resistance of our brethren. But I would wish them, in this grave matter,
and if peace is not wholly removed from their hearts, to consider
seriously, first, that to criminate and recriminate never yet was the
road to reconciliation, in any difference amongst men. In the next
place, it would be right to reflect that the American English (whom they
may abuse, if they think it honorable to revile the absent) can, as
things now stand, neither be provoked at our railing or bettered by our
instruction. All communication is cut off between us. But this we know
with certainty, that, though we cannot reclaim them, we may reform
ourselves. If measures of peace are necessary, they must begin
somewhere; and a conciliatory temper must precede and prepare every plan
of reconciliation. Nor do I conceive that we suffer anything by thus
regulating our own minds. We are not disarmed by being disencumbered of
our passions. Declaiming on rebellion never added a bayonet or a charge
of powder to your military force; but I am afraid that it has been the
means of taking up many muskets against you.
This outrageous language, which has been encouraged and kept alive by
every art, has already done incredible mischief. For a long time, even
amidst the desolations of war, and the insults of hostile laws daily
accumulated on one another, the American leaders seem to have had the
greatest difficulty in bringing up their people to a declaration of
total independence. But the Court Gazette accomplished what the abettors
of independence had attempted in vain. When that disingenuous
compilation and strange medley of railing and flattery was adduced as a
proof of the united sentiments of the people of Great Britain, there was
a great change throughout all America. The tide of popular affection,
which had still set towards the parent country, began immediately to
turn, and to flow with great rapidity in a contrary course. Par from
concealing these wild declarations of enmity, the author of the
celebrated pamphlet which prepared the minds of the people for
independence insists largely on the multitude and the spirit of these
addresses; and he draws an argument from them, which, if the fact were
as he supposes, must be irresistible. For I never knew a writer on the
theory of government so partial to authority as not to allow that the
hostile mind of the rulers to their people did fully justify a change of
government; nor can any reason whatever be given why one people should
voluntarily yield any degree of preëminence to another but on a
supposition of great affection and benevolence towards them.
Unfortunately, your rulers, trusting to other things, took no notice of
this great principle of connection. From the beginning of this affair,
they have done all they could to alienate your minds from your own
kindred; and if they could excite hatred enough in one of the parties
towards the other, they seemed to be of opinion that they had gone half
the way towards reconciling the quarrel.
I know it is said, that your kindness is only alienated on account of
their resistance, and therefore, if the colonies surrender at
discretion, all sort of regard, and even much indulgence, is meant
towards them in future. But can those who are partisans for continuing a
war to enforce such a surrender be responsible (after all that has
passed) for such a future use of a power that is bound by no compacts
and restrained by no terror? Will they tell us what they call
indulgences? Do they not at this instant call the present war and all
its horrors a lenient and merciful proceeding?
No conqueror that I ever heard of has _professed_ to make a cruel,
harsh, and insolent use of his conquest. No! The man of the most
declared pride scarcely dares to trust his own heart with this dreadful
secret of ambition. But it will appear in its time; and no man who
professes to reduce another to the insolent mercy of a foreign arm ever
had any sort of good-will towards him. The profession of kindness, with
that sword in his hand, and that demand of surrender, is one of the most
provoking acts of his hostility. I shall be told that all this is
lenient as against rebellious adversaries. But are the leaders of their
faction more lenient to those who submit? Lord Howe and General Howe
have powers, under an act of Parliament, to restore to the king's peace
and to free trade any men or district which shall submit. Is this done?
We have been over and over informed by the authorized gazette, that the
city of New York and the countries of Staten and Long Island have
submitted voluntarily and cheerfully, and that many are very full of
zeal to the cause of administration. Were they instantly restored to
trade? Are they yet restored to it? Is not the benignity of two
commissioners, naturally most humane and generous men, some way fettered
by instructions, equally against their dispositions and the spirit of
Parliamentary faith, when Mr. Tryon, vaunting of the fidelity of the
city in which he is governor, is obliged to apply to ministry for leave
to protect the King's loyal subjects, and to grant to them, not the
disputed rights and privileges of freedom, but the common rights of men,
by the name of _graces_? Why do not the commissioners restore them on
the spot? Were they not named as commissioners for that express purpose?
But we see well enough to what the whole leads. The trade of America is
to be dealt out in _private indulgences and grants,_--that is, in jobs
to recompense the incendiaries of war. They will be informed of the
proper time in which to send out their merchandise. From a national, the
American trade is to be turned into a personal monopoly, and one set of
merchants are to be rewarded for the pretended zeal of which another set
are the dupes; and thus, between craft and credulity, the voice of
reason is stifled, and all the misconduct, all the calamities of the war
are covered and continued.
If I had not lived long enough to be little surprised at anything, I
should have been in some degree astonished at the continued rage of
several gentlemen, who, not satisfied with carrying fire and sword into
America, are animated nearly with the same fury against those neighbors
of theirs whose only crime it is, that they have charitably and humanely
wished them to entertain more reasonable sentiments, and not always to
sacrifice their interest to their passion. All this rage against
unresisting dissent convinces me, that, at bottom, they are far from
satisfied they are in the right. For what is it they would have? A war?
They certainly have at this moment the blessing of something that is
very like one; and if the war they enjoy at present be not sufficiently
hot and extensive, they may shortly have it as warm and as spreading as
their hearts can desire. Is it the force of the kingdom they call for?
They have it already; and if they choose to fight their battles in their
own person, nobody prevents their setting sail to America in the next
transports. Do they think that the service is stinted for want of
liberal supplies? Indeed they complain without reason. The table of the
House of Commons will glut them, let their appetite for expense be never
so keen. And I assure them further, that those who think with them in
the House of Commons are full as easy in the control as they are liberal
in the vote of these expenses. If this be not supply or confidence
sufficient, let them open their own private purse-strings, and give,
from what is left to them, as largely and with as little care as they
think proper.
Tolerated in their passions, let them learn not to persecute the
moderation of their fellow-citizens. If all the world joined them in a
full cry against rebellion, and were as hotly inflamed against the whole
theory and enjoyment of freedom as those who are the most factious for
servitude, it could not, in my opinion, answer any one end whatsoever in
this contest. The leaders of this war could not hire (to gratify their
friends) one German more than they do, or inspire him with less feeling
for the persons or less value for the privileges of their revolted
brethren. If we all adopted their sentiments to a man, their allies, the
savage Indians, could not be more ferocious than they are: they could
not murder one more helpless woman or child, or with more exquisite
refinements of cruelty torment to death one more of their English flesh
and blood, than they do already. The public money is given to purchase
this alliance;--and they have their bargain.
They are continually boasting of unanimity, or calling for it. But
before this unanimity can be matter either of wish or congratulation, we
ought to be pretty sure that we are engaged in a rational pursuit.
Frenzy does not become a slighter distemper on account of the number of
those who may be infected with it. Delusion and weakness produce not one
mischief the less because they are universal. I declare that I cannot
discern the least advantage which could accrue to us, if we were able to
persuade our colonies that they had not a single friend in Great
Britain. On the contrary, if the affections and opinions of mankind be
not exploded as principles of connection, I conceive it would be happy
for us, if they were taught to believe that there was even a formed
American party in England, to whom they could always look for support.
Happy would it be for us, if, in all tempers, they might turn their eyes
to the parent state, so that their very turbulence and sedition should
find vent in no other place than this! I believe there is not a man
(except those who prefer the interest of some paltry faction to the very
being of their country) who would not wish that the Americans should
from time to time carry many points, and even some of them not quite
reasonable, by the aid of any denomination of men here, rather than they
should be driven to seek for protection against the fury of foreign
mercenaries and the waste of savages in the arms of France.
When any community is subordinately connected with another, the great
danger of the connection is the extreme pride and self-complacency of
the superior, which in all matters of controversy will probably decide
in its own favor. It is a powerful corrective to such a very rational
cause of fear, if the inferior body can be made to believe that the
party inclination or political views of several in the principal state
will induce them in some degree to counteract this blind and tyrannical
partiality. There is no danger that any one acquiring consideration or
power in the presiding state should carry this leaning to the inferior
too far. The fault of human nature is not of that sort. Power, in
whatever hands, is rarely guilty of too strict limitations on itself.
But one great advantage to the support of authority attends such an
amicable and protecting connection: that those who have conferred favors
obtain influence, and from the foresight of future events can persuade
men who have received obligations sometimes to return them. Thus, by the
mediation of those healing principles, (call them good or evil,)
troublesome discussions are brought to some sort of adjustment, and
every hot controversy is not a civil war.
But, if the colonies (to bring the general matter home to us) could see
that in Great Britain the mass of the people is melted into its
government, and that every dispute with the ministry must of necessity
be always a quarrel with the nation, they can stand no longer in the
equal and friendly relation of fellow-citizens to the subjects of this
kingdom. Humble as this relation may appear to some, when it is once
broken, a strong tie is dissolved. Other sort of connections will be
sought. For there are very few in the world who will not prefer an
useful ally to an insolent master.
Such discord has been the effect of the unanimity into which so many
have of late been seduced or bullied, or into the appearance of which
they have sunk through mere despair. They have been told that their
dissent from violent measures is an encouragement to rebellion. Men of
great presumption and little knowledge will hold a language which is
contradicted by the whole course of history. _General_ rebellions and
revolts of an whole people never were _encouraged_, now or at any time.
They are always _provoked_. But if this unheard-of doctrine of the
encouragement of rebellion were true, if it were true that an assurance
of the friendship of numbers in this country towards the colonies could
become an encouragement to them to break off all connection with it,
what is the inference? Does anybody seriously maintain, that, charged
with my share of the public councils, I am obliged not to resist
projects which I think mischievous, lest men who suffer should be
encouraged to resist? The very tendency of such projects to produce
rebellion is one of the chief reasons against them. Shall that reason
not be given? Is it, then, a rule, that no man in this nation shall open
his mouth in favor of the colonies, shall defend their rights, or
complain of their sufferings,--or when war finally breaks out, no man
shall express his desires of peace? Has this been the law of our past,
or is it to be the terms of our future connection? Even looking no
further than ourselves, can it be true loyalty to any government, or
true patriotism towards any country, to degrade their solemn councils
into servile drawing-rooms, to flatter their pride and passions rather
than to enlighten their reason, and to prevent them from being cautioned
against violence lest others should be encouraged to resistance? By such
acquiescence great kings and mighty nations have been undone; and if any
are at this day in a perilous situation from rejecting truth and
listening to flattery, it would rather become them to reform the errors
under which they suffer than to reproach those who forewarned them of
their danger.
But the rebels looked for assistance from this country.--They did so, in
the beginning of this controversy, most certainly; and they sought it by
earnest supplications to government, which dignity rejected, and by a
suspension of commerce, which the wealth of this nation enabled you to
despise. When they found that neither prayers nor menaces had any sort
of weight, but that a firm resolution was taken to reduce them to
unconditional obedience by a military force, they came to the last
extremity. Despairing of us, they trusted in themselves. Not strong
enough themselves, they sought succor in France. In proportion as all
encouragement here lessened, their distance from this country increased.
The encouragement is over; the alienation is complete.
In order to produce this favorite unanimity in delusion, and to prevent
all possibility of a return to our ancient happy concord, arguments for
our continuance in this course are drawn from the wretched situation
itself into which we have been betrayed. It is said, that, being at war
with the colonies, whatever our sentiments might have been before, all
ties between us are now dissolved, and all the policy we have left is to
strengthen the hands of government to reduce them. On the principle of
this argument, the more mischiefs we suffer from any administration, the
more our trust in it is to be confirmed. Let them but once get us into a
war, and then their power is safe, and an act of oblivion passed for all
their misconduct.
But is it really true that government is always to be strengthened with
the instruments of war, but never furnished with the means of peace? In
former times, ministers, I allow, have been sometimes driven by the
popular voice to assert by arms the national honor against foreign
powers. But the wisdom of the nation has been far more clear, when those
ministers have been compelled to consult its interests by treaty. We all
know that the sense of the nation obliged the court of Charles the
Second to abandon the _Dutch war_: a war, next to the present, the most
impolitic which we ever carried on. The good people of England
considered Holland as a sort of dependency on this kingdom; they dreaded
to drive it to the protection or subject it to the power of France by
their own inconsiderate hostility. They paid but little respect to the
court jargon of that day; nor were they inflamed by the pretended
rivalship of the Dutch in trade,--by the massacre at Amboyna, acted on
the stage to provoke the public vengeance,--nor by declamations against
the ingratitude of the United Provinces for the benefits England had
conferred upon them in their infant state. They were not moved from
their evident interest by all these arts; nor was it enough to tell
them, they were at war, that they must go through with it, and that the
cause of the dispute was lost in the consequences. The people of England
were then, as they are now, called upon to make government strong. They
thought it a great deal better to make it wise and honest.
When I was amongst my constituents at the last summer assizes, I
remember that men of all descriptions did then express a very strong
desire for peace, and no slight hopes of attaining it from the
commission sent out by my Lord Howe. And it is not a little remarkable,
that, in proportion as every person showed a zeal for the court
measures, he was then earnest in circulating an opinion of the extent of
the supposed powers of that commission. When I told them that Lord Howe
had no powers to treat, or to promise satisfaction on any point
whatsoever of the controversy, I was hardly credited,--so strong and
general was the desire of terminating this war by the method of
accommodation. As far as I could discover, this was the temper then
prevalent through the kingdom. The king's forces, it must be observed,
had at that time been obliged to evacuate Boston. The superiority of the
former campaign rested wholly with the colonists. If such powers of
treaty were to be wished whilst success was very doubtful, how came they
to be less so, since his Majesty's arms have been crowned with many
considerable advantages? Have these successes induced us to alter our
mind, as thinking the season of victory not the time for treating with
honor or advantage? Whatever changes have happened in the national
character, it can scarcely be our wish that terms of accommodation never
should be proposed to our enemy, except when they must be attributed
solely to our fears. It has happened, let me say unfortunately, that we
read of his Majesty's commission for making peace, and his troops
evacuating his last town in the Thirteen Colonies, at the same hour and
in the same gazette. It was still more unfortunate that no commission
went to America to settle the troubles there, until several months after
an act had been passed to put the colonies out of the protection of this
government, and to divide their trading property, without a possibility
of restitution, as spoil among the seamen of the navy. The most abject
submission on the part of the colonies could not redeem them. There was
no man on that whole continent, or within three thousand miles of it,
qualified by law to follow allegiance with protection or submission with
pardon. A proceeding of this kind has no example in history.
Independency, and independency with an enmity, (which, putting ourselves
out of the question, would be called natural and much provoked,) was the
inevitable consequence. How this came to pass the nation may be one day
in an humor to inquire.
All the attempts made this session to give fuller powers of peace to the
commanders in America were stifled by the fatal confidence of victory
and the wild hopes of unconditional submission. There was a moment
favorable to the king's arms, when, if any powers of concession had
existed on the other side of the Atlantic, even after all our errors,
peace in all probability might have been restored. But calamity is
unhappily the usual season of reflection; and the pride of men will not
often suffer reason to have any scope, until it can be no longer of
service.
I have always wished, that as the dispute had its apparent origin from
things done in Parliament, and as the acts passed there had provoked the
war, that the foundations of peace should be laid in Parliament also. I
have been astonished to find that those whose zeal for the dignity of
our body was so hot as to light up the flames of civil war should even
publicly declare that these delicate points ought to be wholly left to
the crown. Poorly as I may be thought affected to the authority of
Parliament, I shall never admit that our constitutional rights can ever
become a matter of ministerial negotiation.
I am charged with being an American. If warm affection towards those
over whom I claim any share of authority be a crime, I am guilty of this
charge. But I do assure you, (and they who know me publicly and
privately will bear witness to me,) that, if ever one man lived more
zealous than another for the supremacy of Parliament and the rights of
this imperial crown, it was myself. Many others, indeed, might be more
knowing in the extent of the foundation of these rights. I do not
pretend to be an antiquary, a lawyer, or qualified for the chair of
professor in metaphysics. I never ventured to put your solid interests
upon speculative grounds. My having constantly declined to do so has
been attributed to my incapacity for such disquisitions; and I am
inclined to believe it is partly the cause. I never shall be ashamed to
confess, that, where I am ignorant, I am diffident. I am, indeed, not
very solicitous to clear myself of this imputed incapacity; because men
even less conversant than I am in this kind of subtleties, and placed
in stations to which I ought not to aspire, have, by the mere force of
civil discretion, often conducted the affairs of great nations with
distinguished felicity and glory.
When I first came into a public trust, I found your Parliament in
possession of an unlimited legislative power over the colonies. I could
not open the statute-book without seeing the actual exercise of it, more
or less, in all cases whatsoever. This possession passed with me for a
title. It does so in all human affairs. No man examines into the defects
of his title to his paternal estate or to his established government.
Indeed, common sense taught me that a legislative authority not actually
limited by the express terms of its foundation, or by its own subsequent
acts, cannot have its powers parcelled out by argumentative
distinctions, so as to enable us to say that here they can and there
they cannot bind. Nobody was so obliging as to produce to me any record
of such distinctions, by compact or otherwise, either at the successive
formation of the several colonies or during the existence of any of
them. If any gentlemen were able to see how one power could be given up
(merely on abstract reasoning) without giving up the rest, I can only
say that they saw further than I could. Nor did I ever presume to
condemn any one for being clear-sighted when I was blind. I praise their
penetration and learning, and hope that their practice has been
correspondent to their theory.
I had, indeed, very earnest wishes to keep the whole body of this
authority perfect and entire as I found it,--and to keep it so, not for
our advantage solely, but principally for the sake of those on whose
account all just authority exists: I mean the people to be governed.
For I thought I saw that many cases might well happen in which the
exercise of every power comprehended in the broadest idea of legislature
might become, in its time and circumstances, not a little expedient for
the peace and union of the colonies amongst themselves, as well as for
their perfect harmony with Great Britain. Thinking so, (perhaps
erroneously, but being honestly of that opinion,) I was at the same time
very sure that the authority of which I was so jealous could not, under
the actual circumstances of our plantations, be at all preserved in any
of its members, but by the greatest reserve in its application,
particularly in those delicate points in which the feelings of mankind
are the most irritable. They who thought otherwise have found a few more
difficulties in their work than (I hope) they were thoroughly aware of,
when they undertook the present business. I must beg leave to observe,
that it is not only the invidious branch of taxation that will be
resisted, but that no other given part of legislative rights can be
exercised, without regard to the general opinion of those who are to be
governed. That general opinion is the vehicle and organ of legislative
omnipotence. Without this, it may be a theory to entertain the mind, but
it is nothing in the direction of affairs. The completeness of the
legislative authority of Parliament _over this kingdom_ is not
questioned; and yet many things indubitably included in the abstract
idea of that power, and which carry no absolute injustice in themselves,
yet being contrary to the opinions and feelings of the people, can as
little be exercised as if Parliament in that case had been possessed of
no right at all. I see no abstract reason, which can be given, why the
same power which made and repealed the High Commission Court and the
Star-Chamber might not revive them again; and these courts, warned by
their former fate, might possibly exercise their powers with some degree
of justice. But the madness would be as unquestionable as the competence
of that Parliament which should attempt such things. If anything can be
supposed out of the power of human legislature, it is religion; I admit,
however, that the established religion of this country has been three or
four times altered by act of Parliament, and therefore that a statute
binds even in that case. But we may very safely affirm, that,
notwithstanding this apparent omnipotence, it would be now found as
impossible for King and Parliament to alter the established religion of
this country as it was to King James alone, when he attempted to make
such an alteration without a Parliament. In effect, to follow, not to
force, the public inclination,--to give a direction, a form, a technical
dress, and a specific sanction, to the general sense of the community,
is the true end of legislature.
It is so with regard to the exercise of all the powers which our
Constitution knows in any of its parts, and indeed to the substantial
existence of any of the parts themselves. The king's negative to bills
is one of the most indisputed of the royal prerogatives; and it extends
to all cases whatsoever. I am far from certain, that if several laws,
which I know, had fallen under the stroke of that sceptre, that the
public would have had a very heavy loss. But it is not the _propriety_
of the exercise which is in question. The exercise itself is wisely
forborne. Its repose may be the preservation of its existence; and its
existence may be the means of saying the Constitution itself, on an
occasion worthy of bringing it forth.
As the disputants whose accurate and logical reasonings have brought us
into our present condition think it absurd that powers or members of any
constitution should exist, rarely, if ever, to be exercised, I hope I
shall be excused in mentioning another instance that is material. We
know that the Convocation of the Clergy had formerly been called, and
sat with nearly as much regularity to business as Parliament itself. It
is now called for form only. It sits for the purpose of making some
polite ecclesiastical compliments to the king, and, when that grace is
said, retires and is heard of no more. It is, however, _a part of the
Constitution_, and may be called out into act and energy, whenever there
is occasion, and whenever those who conjure up that spirit will choose
to abide the consequences. It is wise to permit its legal existence: it
is much wiser to continue it a legal existence only. So truly has
prudence (constituted as the god of this lower world) the entire
dominion over every exercise of power committed into its hands! And yet
I have lived to see prudence and conformity to circumstances wholly set
at nought in our late controversies, and treated as if they were the
most contemptible and irrational of all things. I have heard it an
hundred times very gravely alleged, that, in order to keep power in
wind, it was necessary, by preference, to exert it in those very points
in which it was most likely to be resisted and the least likely to be
productive of any advantage.
These were the considerations, Gentlemen, which led me early to think,
that, in the comprehensive dominion which the Divine Providence had put
into our hands, instead of troubling our understandings with
speculations concerning the unity of empire and the identity or
distinction of legislative powers, and inflaming our passions with the
heat and pride of controversy, it was our duty, in all soberness, to
conform our government to the character and circumstances of the several
people who composed this mighty and strangely diversified mass. I never
was wild enough to conceive that one method would serve for the whole,
that the natives of Hindostan and those of Virginia could be ordered in
the same manner, or that the Cutchery court and the grand jury of Salem
could be regulated on a similar plan. I was persuaded that government
was a practical thing, made for the happiness of mankind, and not to
furnish out a spectacle of uniformity to gratify the schemes of
visionary politicians. Our business was to rule, not to wrangle; and it
would have been a poor compensation that we had triumphed in a dispute,
whilst we lost an empire.
If there be one fact in the world perfectly clear, it is this,--"that
the disposition of the people of America is wholly averse to any other
than a free government"; and this is indication enough to any honest
statesman how he ought to adapt whatever power he finds in his hands to
their case. If any ask me what a free government is, I answer, that, for
any practical purpose, it is what the people think so,--and that they,
and not I, are the natural, lawful, and competent judges of this matter.
If they practically allow me a greater degree of authority over them
than is consistent with any correct ideas of perfect freedom, I ought to
thank them for so great a trust, and not to endeavor to prove from
thence that they have reasoned amiss, and that, having gone so far, by
analogy they must hereafter have no enjoyment but by my pleasure.
If we had seen this done by any others, we should have concluded them
far gone in madness. It is melancholy, as well as ridiculous, to observe
the kind of reasoning with which the public has been amused, in order to
divert our minds from the common sense of our American policy. There are
people who have split and anatomized the doctrine of free government, as
if it were an abstract question concerning metaphysical liberty and
necessity, and not a matter of moral prudence and natural feeling. They
have disputed whether liberty be a positive or a negative idea; whether
it does not consist in being governed by laws, without considering what
are the laws, or who are the makers; whether man has any rights by
Nature; and whether all the property he enjoys be not the alms of his
government, and his life itself their favor and indulgence. Others,
corrupting religion as these have perverted philosophy, contend that
Christians are redeemed into captivity, and the blood of the Saviour of
mankind has been shed to make them the slaves of a few proud and
insolent sinners. These shocking extremes provoking to extremes of
another kind, speculations are let loose as destructive to all authority
as the former are to all freedom; and every government is called tyranny
and usurpation which is not formed on their fancies. In this manner the
stirrers-up of this contention, not satisfied with distracting our
dependencies and filling them with blood and slaughter, are corrupting
our understandings: they are endeavoring to tear up, along with
practical liberty, all the foundations of human society, all equity and
justice, religion and order.
Civil freedom, Gentlemen, is not, as many have endeavored to persuade
you, a thing that lies hid in the depth of abstruse science. It is a
blessing and a benefit, not an abstract speculation; and all the just
reasoning that can be upon it is of so coarse a texture as perfectly to
suit the ordinary capacities of those who are to enjoy, and of those who
are to defend it. Far from any resemblance to those propositions in
geometry and metaphysics which admit no medium, but must be true or
false in all their latitude, social and civil freedom, like all other
things in common life, are variously mixed and modified, enjoyed in very
different degrees, and shaped into an infinite diversity of forms,
according to the temper and circumstances of every community. The
_extreme_ of liberty (which is its abstract perfection, but its real
fault) obtains nowhere, nor ought to obtain anywhere; because extremes,
as we all know, in every point which relates either to our duties or
satisfactions in life, are destructive both to virtue and enjoyment.
Liberty, too, must be limited in order to be possessed. The degree of
restraint it is impossible in any case to settle precisely. But it ought
to be the constant aim of every wise public counsel to find out by
cautious experiments, and rational, cool endeavors, with how little, not
how much, of this restraint the community can subsist: for liberty is a
good to be improved, and not an evil to be lessened. It is not only a
private blessing of the first order, but the vital spring and energy of
the state itself, which has just so much life and vigor as there is
liberty in it. But whether liberty be advantageous or not, (for I know
it is a fashion to decry the very principle,) none will dispute that
peace is a blessing; and peace must, in the course of human affairs, be
frequently bought by some indulgence and toleration at least to liberty:
for, as the Sabbath (though of divine institution) was made for man, not
man for the Sabbath, government, which can claim no higher origin or
authority, in its exercise at least, ought to conform to the exigencies
of the time, and the temper and character of the people with whom it is
concerned, and not always to attempt violently to bend the people to
their theories of subjection. The bulk of mankind, on their part, are
not excessively curious concerning any theories whilst they are really
happy; and one sure symptom of an ill-conducted state is the propensity
of the people to resort to them.
But when subjects, by a long course of such ill conduct, are once
thoroughly inflamed, and the state itself violently distempered, the
people must have some satisfaction to their feelings more solid than a
sophistical speculation on law and government. Such was our situation:
and such a satisfaction was necessary to prevent recourse to arms; it
was necessary towards laying them down; it will be necessary to prevent
the taking them up again and again. Of what nature this satisfaction
ought to be I wish it had been the disposition of Parliament seriously
to consider. It was certainly a deliberation that called for the
exertion of all their wisdom.
I am, and ever have been, deeply sensible of the difficulty of
reconciling the strong presiding power, that is so useful towards the
conservation of a vast, disconnected, infinitely diversified empire,
with that liberty and safety of the provinces which they must enjoy,
(in opinion and practice at least,) or they will not be provinces at
all. I know, and have long felt, the difficulty of reconciling the
unwieldy haughtiness of a great ruling nation, habituated to command,
pampered by enormous wealth, and confident from a long course of
prosperity and victory, to the high spirit of free dependencies,
animated with the first glow and activity of juvenile heat, and assuming
to themselves, as their birthright, some part of that very pride which
oppresses them. They who perceive no difficulty in reconciling these
tempers (which, however, to make peace, must some way or other be
reconciled) are much above my capacity, or much below the magnitude of
the business. Of one thing I am perfectly clear: that it is not by
deciding the suit, but by compromising the difference, that peace can be
restored or kept. They who would put an end to such quarrels by
declaring roundly in favor of the whole demands of either party have
mistaken, in my humble opinion, the office of a mediator.
The war is now of full two years' standing: the controversy of many
more. In different periods of the dispute, different methods of
reconciliation were to be pursued. I mean to trouble you with a short
state of things at the most important of these periods, in order to give
you a more distinct idea of our policy with regard to this most delicate
of all objects. The colonies were from the beginning subject to the
legislature of Great Britain on principles which they never examined;
and we permitted to them many local privileges, without asking how they
agreed with that legislative authority. Modes of administration were
formed in an insensible and very unsystematic manner. But they gradually
adapted themselves to the varying condition of things. What was first a
single kingdom stretched into an empire; and an imperial
superintendence, of some kind or other, became necessary. Parliament,
from a mere representative of the people, and a guardian of popular
privileges for its own immediate constituents, grew into a mighty
sovereign. Instead of being a control on the crown on its own behalf, it
communicated a sort of strength to the royal authority, which was wanted
for the conservation of a new object, but which could not be safely
trusted to the crown alone. On the other hand, the colonies, advancing
by equal steps, and governed by the same necessity, had formed within
themselves, either by royal instruction or royal charter, assemblies so
exceedingly resembling a parliament, in all their forms, functions, and
powers, that it was impossible they should not imbibe some opinion of a
similar authority.
At the first designation of these assemblies, they were probably not
intended for anything more (nor perhaps did they think themselves much
higher) than the municipal corporations within this island, to which
some at present love to compare them. But nothing in progression can
rest on its original plan. We may as well think of rocking a grown man
in the cradle of an infant. Therefore, as the colonies prospered and
increased to a numerous and mighty people, spreading over a very great
tract of the globe, it was natural that they should attribute to
assemblies so respectable in their formal constitution some part of the
dignity of the great nations which they represented. No longer tied to
by-laws, these assemblies made acts of all sorts and in all cases
whatsoever. They levied money, not for parochial purposes, but upon
regular grants to the crown, following all the rules and principles of a
parliament, to which they approached every day more and more nearly.
Those who think themselves wiser than Providence and stronger than the
course of Nature may complain of all this variation, on the one side or
the other, as their several humors and prejudices may lead them. But
things could not be otherwise; and English colonies must be had on these
terms, or not had at all. In the mean time neither party felt any
inconvenience from this double legislature, to which they had been
formed by imperceptible habits, and old custom, the great support of all
the governments in the world. Though these two legislatures were
sometimes found perhaps performing the very same functions, they did not
very grossly or systematically clash. In all likelihood this arose from
mere neglect, possibly from the natural operation of things, which, left
to themselves, generally fall into their proper order. But whatever was
the cause, it is certain that a regular revenue, by the authority of
Parliament, for the support of civil and military establishments, seems
not to have been thought of until the colonies were too proud to submit,
too strong to be forced, too enlightened not to see all the consequences
which must arise from such a system.
If ever this scheme of taxation was to be pushed against the
inclinations of the people, it was evident that discussions must arise,
which would let loose all the elements that composed this double
constitution, would show how much each of their members had departed
from its original principles, and would discover contradictions in each
legislature, as well to its own first principles as to its relation to
the other, very difficult, if not absolutely impossible, to be
reconciled.
Therefore, at the first fatal opening of this contest, the wisest course
seemed to be to put an end as soon as possible to the immediate causes
of the dispute, and to quiet a discussion, not easily settled upon clear
principles, and arising from claims which pride would permit neither
party to abandon, by resorting as nearly as possible to the old,
successful course. A mere repeal of the obnoxious tax, with a
declaration of the legislative authority of this kingdom, was then fully
sufficient to procure peace to _both sides_. Man is a creature of habit,
and, the first breach being of very short continuance, the colonies fell
back exactly into their ancient state. The Congress has used an
expression with regard to this pacification which appears to me truly
significant. After the repeal of the Stamp Act, "the colonies fell,"
says this assembly, "into their ancient state of _unsuspecting
confidence in the mother country_." This unsuspecting confidence is the
true centre of gravity amongst mankind, about which all the parts are at
rest. It is this _unsuspecting confidence_ that removes all
difficulties, and reconciles all the contradictions which occur in the
complexity of all ancient puzzled political establishments. Happy are
the rulers which have the secret of preserving it!
The whole empire has reason to remember with eternal gratitude the
wisdom and temper of that man and his excellent associates, who, to
recover this confidence, formed a plan of pacification in 1766. That
plan, being built upon the nature of man, and the circumstances and
habits of the two countries, and not on any visionary speculations,
perfectly answered its end, as long as it was thought proper to adhere
to it. Without giving a rude shock to the dignity (well or ill
understood) of this Parliament, they gave perfect content to our
dependencies. Had it not been for the mediatorial spirit and talents of
that great man between such clashing pretensions and passions, we should
then have rushed headlong (I know what I say) into the calamities of
that civil war in which, by departing from his system, we are at length
involved; and we should have been precipitated into that war at a time
when circumstances both at home and abroad were far, very far, more
unfavorable unto us than they were at the breaking out of the present
troubles.
I had the happiness of giving my first votes in Parliament for that
pacification. I was one of those almost unanimous members who, in the
necessary concessions of Parliament, would as much as possible have
preserved its authority and respected its honor. I could not at once
tear from my heart prejudices which were dear to me, and which bore a
resemblance to virtue. I had then, and I have still, my partialities.
What Parliament gave up I wished to be given as of grace and favor and
affection, and not as a restitution of stolen goods. High dignity
relented as it was soothed; and a benignity from old acknowledged
greatness had its full effect on our dependencies. Our unlimited
declaration of legislative authority produced not a single murmur. If
this undefined power has become odious since that time, and full of
horror to the colonies, it is because the _unsuspicious confidence_ is
lost, and the parental affection, in the bosom of whose boundless
authority they reposed their privileges, is become estranged and
hostile.
It will be asked, if such was then my opinion of the mode of
pacification, how I came to be the very person who moved, not only for a
repeal of all the late coercive statutes, but for mutilating, by a
positive law, the entireness of the legislative power of Parliament, and
cutting off from it the whole right of taxation. I answer, Because a
different state of things requires a different conduct. When the dispute
had gone to these last extremities, (which no man labored more to
prevent than I did,) the concessions which had satisfied in the
beginning could satisfy no longer; because the violation of tacit faith
required explicit security. The same cause which has introduced all
formal compacts and covenants among men made it necessary: I mean,
habits of soreness, jealousy, and distrust. I parted with it as with a
limb, but as a limb to save the body: and I would have parted with more,
if more had been necessary; anything rather than a fruitless, hopeless,
unnatural civil war. This mode of yielding would, it is said, give way
to independency without a war. I am persuaded, from the nature of
things, and from every information, that it would have had a directly
contrary effect. But if it had this effect, I confess that I should
prefer independency without war to independency with it; and I have so
much trust in the inclinations and prejudices of mankind, and so little
in anything else, that I should expect ten times more benefit to this
kingdom from the affection of America, though under a separate
establishment, than from her perfect submission to the crown and
Parliament, accompanied with her terror, disgust, and abhorrence. Bodies
tied together by so unnatural a bond of union as mutual hatred are only
connected to their ruin.
One hundred and ten respectable members of Parliament voted for that
concession. Many not present when the motion was made were of the
sentiments of those who voted. I knew it would then have made peace. I
am not without hopes that it would do so at present, if it were adopted.
No benefit, no revenue, could be lost by it; something might possibly be
gained by its consequences. For be fully assured, that, of all the
phantoms that ever deluded the fond hopes of a credulous world, a
Parliamentary revenue in the colonies is the most perfectly chimerical.
Your breaking them to any subjection, far from relieving your burdens,
(the pretext for this war,) will never pay that military force which
will be kept up to the destruction of their liberties and yours. I risk
nothing in this prophecy.
* * * * *
Gentlemen, you have my opinions on the present state of public affairs.
Mean as they may be in themselves, your partiality has made them of some
importance. Without troubling myself to inquire whether I am under a
formal obligation to it, I have a pleasure in accounting for my conduct
to my constituents. I feel warmly on this subject, and I express myself
as I feel. If I presume to blame any public proceeding, I cannot be
supposed to be personal. Would to God I could be suspected of it! My
fault might be greater, but the public calamity would be less extensive.
If my conduct has not been able to make any impression on the warm part
of that ancient and powerful party with whose support I was not honored
at my election, on my side, my respect, regard, and duty to them is not
at all lessened. I owe the gentlemen who compose it my most humble
service in everything. I hope that whenever any of them were pleased to
command me, that they found me perfectly equal in my obedience. But
flattery and friendship are very different things; and to mislead is not
to serve them. I cannot purchase the favor of any man by concealing from
him what I think his ruin.
By the favor of my fellow-citizens, I am the representative of an
honest, well-ordered, virtuous city,--of a people who preserve more of
the original English simplicity and purity of manners than perhaps any
other. You possess among you several men and magistrates of large and
cultivated understandings, fit for any employment in any sphere. I do,
to the best of my power, act so as to make myself worthy of so honorable
a choice. If I were ready, on any call of my own vanity or interest, or
to answer any election purpose, to forsake principles (whatever they
are) which I had formed at a mature age, on full reflection, and which
had been confirmed by long experience, I should forfeit the only thing
which makes you pardon so many errors and imperfections in me.
Not that I think it fit for any one to rely too much on his own
understanding, or to be filled with a presumption not becoming a
Christian man in his own personal stability and rectitude. I hope I am
far from that vain confidence which almost always fails in trial. I know
my weakness in all respects, as much at least as any enemy I have; and I
attempt to take security against it. The only method which has ever been
found effectual to preserve any man against the corruption of nature and
example is an habit of life and communication of councils with the most
virtuous and public-spirited men of the age you live in. Such a society
cannot be kept without advantage, or deserted without shame. For this
rule of conduct I may be called in reproach a _party man_; but I am
little affected with such aspersions. In the way which they call party I
worship the Constitution of your fathers; and I shall never blush for my
political company. All reverence to honor, all idea of what it is, will
be lost out of the world, before it can be imputed as a fault to any
man, that he has been closely connected with those incomparable persons,
living and dead, with whom for eleven years I have constantly thought
and acted. If I have wandered out of the paths of rectitude into those
of interested faction, it was in company with the Saviles, the
Dowdeswells, the Wentworths, the Bentincks; with the Lenoxes, the
Manchesters, the Keppels, the Saunderses; with the temperate, permanent,
hereditary virtue of the whole house of Cavendish: names, among which,
some have extended your fame and empire in arms, and all have fought the
battle of your liberties in fields not less glorious. These, and many
more like these, grafting public principles on private honor, have
redeemed the present age, and would have adorned the most splendid
period in your history. Where could any man, conscious of his own
inability to act alone, and willing to act as he ought to do, have
arranged himself better? If any one thinks this kind of society to be
taken up as the best method of gratifying low personal pride or
ambitious interest, he is mistaken, and knows nothing of the world.
Preferring this connection, I do not mean to detract in the slightest
degree from others. There are some of those whom I admire at something
of a greater distance, with whom I have had the happiness also
perfectly to agree, in almost all the particulars in which I have
differed with some successive administrations; and they are such as it
never can be reputable to any government to reckon among its enemies.
I hope there are none of you corrupted with the doctrine taught by
wicked men for the worst purposes, and received by the malignant
credulity of envy and ignorance, which is, that the men who act upon the
public stage are all alike, all equally corrupt, all influenced by no
other views than the sordid lure of salary and pension. The thing I know
by experience to be false. Never expecting to find perfection in men,
and not looking for divine attributes in created beings, in my commerce
with my contemporaries I have found much human virtue. I have seen not a
little public spirit, a real subordination of interest to duty, and a
decent and regulated sensibility to honest fame and reputation. The age
unquestionably produces (whether in a greater or less number than former
times I know not) daring profligates and insidious hypocrites. What
then? Am I not to avail myself of whatever good is to be found in the
world, because of the mixture of evil that will always be in it? The
smallness of the quantity in currency only heightens the value. They who
raise suspicions on the good on account of the behavior of ill men are
of the party of the latter. The common cant is no justification for
taking this party. I have been deceived, say they, by _Titius_ and
_Mævius_; I have been the dupe of this pretender or of that mountebank;
and I can trust appearances no longer. But my credulity and want of
discernment cannot, as I conceive, amount to a fair presumption against
any man's integrity. A conscientious person would rather doubt his own
judgment than condemn his species. He would say, "I have observed
without attention, or judged upon erroneous maxims; I trusted to
profession, when I ought to have attended to conduct." Such a man will
grow wise, not malignant, by his acquaintance with the world. But he
that accuses all mankind of corruption ought to remember that he is sure
to convict only one. In truth, I should much rather admit those whom at
any time I have disrelished the most to be patterns of perfection than
seek a consolation to my own unworthiness in a general communion of
depravity with all about me.
That this ill-natured doctrine should be preached by the missionaries of
a court I do not wonder. It answers their purpose. But that it should be
heard among those who pretend to be strong assertors of liberty is not
only surprising, but hardly natural. This moral levelling is a _servile
principle_. It leads to practical passive obedience far better than all
the doctrines which the pliant accommodation of theology to power has
ever produced. It cuts up by the roots, not only all idea of forcible
resistance, but even of civil opposition. It disposes men to an abject
submission, not by opinion, which may be shaken by argument or altered
by passion, but by the strong ties of public and private interest. For,
if all men who act in a public situation are equally selfish, corrupt,
and venal, what reason can be given for desiring any sort of change,
which, besides the evils which must attend all changes, can be
productive of no possible advantage? The active men in the state are
true samples of the mass. If they are universally depraved, the
commonwealth itself is not sound. We may amuse ourselves with talking as
much as we please of the virtue of middle or humble life; that is, we
may place our confidence in the virtue of those who have never been
tried. But if the persons who are continually emerging out of that
sphere be no better than those whom birth has placed above it, what
hopes are there in the remainder of the body which is to furnish the
perpetual succession of the state? All who have ever written on
government are unanimous, that among a people generally corrupt liberty
cannot long exist. And, indeed, how is it possible, when those who are
to make the laws, to guard, to enforce, or to obey them, are, by a tacit
confederacy of manners, indisposed to the spirit of all generous and
noble institutions?
I am aware that the age is not what we all wish. But I am sure that the
only means of checking its precipitate degeneracy is heartily to concur
with whatever is the best in our time, and to have some more correct
standard of judging what that best is than the transient and uncertain
favor of a court. If once we are able to find, and can prevail on
ourselves to strengthen an union of such men, whatever accidentally
becomes indisposed to ill-exercised power, even by the ordinary
operation of human passions, must join with that society, and cannot
long be joined without in some degree assimilating to it. Virtue will
catch as well as vice by contact; and the public stock of honest, manly
principle will daily accumulate. We are not too nicely to scrutinize
motives as long as action is irreproachable. It is enough (and for a
worthy man perhaps too much) to deal out its infamy to convicted guilt
and declared apostasy.
This, Gentlemen, has been from the beginning the rule of my conduct; and
I mean to continue it, as long as such a body as I have described can
by any possibility be kept together; for I should think it the most
dreadful of all offences, not only towards the present generation, but
to all the future, if I were to do anything which could make the
minutest breach in this great conservatory of free principles. Those who
perhaps have the same intentions, but are separated by some little
political animosities, will, I hope, discern at last how little
conducive it is to any rational purpose to lower its reputation. For my
part, Gentlemen, from much experience, from no little thinking, and from
comparing a great variety of things, I am thoroughly persuaded that the
last hopes of preserving the spirit of the English Constitution, or of
reuniting the dissipated members of the English race upon a common plan
of tranquillity and liberty, does entirely depend on their firm and
lasting union, and above all on their keeping themselves from that
despair which is so very apt to fall on those whom a violence of
character and a mixture of ambitious views do not support through a
long, painful, and unsuccessful struggle.
There never, Gentlemen, was a period in which the steadfastness of some
men has been put to so sore a trial. It is not very difficult for
well-formed minds to abandon their interest; but the separation of fame
and virtue is an harsh divorce. Liberty is in danger of being made
unpopular to Englishmen. Contending for an imaginary power, we begin to
acquire the spirit of domination, and to lose the relish of honest
equality. The principles of our forefathers become suspected to us,
because we see them animating the present opposition of our children.
The faults which grow out of the luxuriance of freedom appear much more
shocking to us than the base vices which are generated from the rankness
of servitude. Accordingly, the least resistance to power appears more
inexcusable in our eyes than the greatest abuses of authority. All dread
of a standing military force is looked upon as a superstitious panic.
All shame of calling in foreigners and savages in a civil contest is
worn off. We grow indifferent to the consequences inevitable to
ourselves from the plan of ruling half the empire by a mercenary sword.
We are taught to believe that a desire of domineering over our
countrymen is love to our country, that those who hate civil war abet
rebellion, and that the amiable and conciliatory virtues of lenity,
moderation, and tenderness to the privileges of those who depend on this
kingdom are a sort of treason to the state.
It is impossible that we should remain long in a situation which breeds
such notions and dispositions without some great alteration in the
national character. Those ingenuous and feeling minds who are so
fortified against all other things, and so unarmed to whatever
approaches in the shape of disgrace, finding these principles, which
they considered as sure means of honor, to be grown into disrepute, will
retire disheartened and disgusted. Those of a more robust make, the
bold, able, ambitious men, who pay some of their court to power through
the people, and substitute the voice of transient opinion in the place
of true glory, will give into the general mode; and those superior
understandings which ought to correct vulgar prejudice will confirm and
aggravate its errors. Many things have been long operating towards a
gradual change in our principles; but this American war has done more in
a very few years than all the other causes could have effected in a
century. It is therefore not on its own separate account, but because of
its attendant circumstances, that I consider its continuance, or its
ending in any way but that of an honorable and liberal accommodation, as
the greatest evils which can befall us. For that reason I have troubled
you with this long letter. For that reason I entreat you, again and
again, neither to be persuaded, shamed, or frighted out of the
principles that have hitherto led so many of you to abhor the war, its
cause, and its consequences. Let us not be amongst the first who
renounce the maxims of our forefathers.
I have the honor to be,
Gentlemen,
Your most obedient and faithful humble servant,
EDMUND BURKE.
BEACONSFIELD, April 3, 1777.
P.S. You may communicate this letter in any manner you think proper to
my constituents.
TWO LETTERS
TO
GENTLEMEN IN THE CITY OF BRISTOL.
ON THE
BILLS DEPENDING IN PARLIAMENT RELATIVE TO THE TRADE OF IRELAND.
1778.
LETTERS.
TO SAMUEL SPAN, ESQ., MASTER OF THE SOCIETY OF MERCHANTS ADVENTURERS OF
BRISTOL.
Sir,--I am honored with your letter of the 13th, in answer to mine,
which accompanied the resolutions of the House relative to the trade of
Ireland.
You will be so good as to present my best respects to the Society, and
to assure them that it was altogether unnecessary to remind me of the
interest of the constituents. I have never regarded anything else since
I had a seat in Parliament. Having frequently and maturely considered
that interest, and stated it to myself in almost every point of view, I
am persuaded, that, under the present circumstances, I cannot more
effectually pursue it than by giving all the support in my power to the
propositions which I lately transmitted to the Hall.
The fault I find in the scheme is, that it falls extremely short of that
liberality in the commercial system which I trust will one day be
adopted. If I had not considered the present resolutions merely as
preparatory to better things, and as a means of showing, experimentally,
that justice to others is not always folly to ourselves, I should have
contented myself with receiving them in a cold and silent acquiescence.
Separately considered, they are matters of no very great importance. But
they aim, however imperfectly, at a right principle. I submit to the
restraint to appease prejudice; I accept the enlargement, so far as it
goes, as the result of reason and of sound policy.
We cannot be insensible of the calamities which have been brought upon
this nation by an obstinate adherence to narrow and restrictive plans of
government. I confess, I cannot prevail on myself to take them up
precisely at a time when the most decisive experience has taught the
rest of the world to lay them down. The propositions in question did not
originate from me, or from my particular friends. But when things are so
right in themselves, I hold it my duty not to inquire from what hands
they come. I opposed the American measures upon the very same principle
on which I support those that relate to Ireland. I was convinced that
the evils which have arisen from the adoption of the former would be
infinitely aggravated by the rejection of the latter.
Perhaps gentlemen are not yet fully aware of the situation of their
country, and what its exigencies absolutely require. I find that we are
still disposed to talk at our ease, and as if all things were to be
regulated by our good pleasure. I should consider it as a fatal symptom,
if, in our present distressed and adverse circumstances, we should
persist in the errors which are natural only to prosperity. One cannot,
indeed, sufficiently lament the continuance of that spirit of delusion,
by which, for a long time past, we have thought fit to measure our
necessities by our inclinations. Moderation, prudence, and equity are
far more suitable to our condition than loftiness, and confidence, and
rigor. We are threatened by enemies of no small magnitude, whom, if we
think fit, we may despise, as we have despised others; but they are
enemies who can only cease to be truly formidable by our entertaining a
due respect for their power. Our danger will not be lessened by our
shutting our eyes to it; nor will our force abroad be increased by
rendering ourselves feeble and divided at home.
There is a dreadful schism in the British nation. Since we are not able
to reunite the empire, it is our business to give all possible vigor and
soundness to those parts of it which are still content to be governed by
our councils. Sir, it is proper to inform you that our measures _must be
healing_. Such a degree of strength must be communicated to all the
members of the state as may enable them to defend themselves, and to
coöperate in the defence of the whole. Their temper, too, must be
managed, and their good affections cultivated. They may then be disposed
to bear the load with cheerfulness, as a contribution towards what may
be called with truth and propriety, and not by an empty form of words,
_a common cause_. Too little dependence cannot be had, at this time of
day, on names and prejudices. The eyes of mankind are opened, and
communities must be held together by an evident and solid interest. God
forbid that our conduct should demonstrate to the world that Great
Britain can in no instance whatsoever be brought to a sense of rational
and equitable policy but by coercion and force of arms!
I wish you to recollect with what powers of concession, relatively to
commerce, as well as to legislation, his Majesty's commissioners to the
United Colonies have sailed from England within this week. Whether these
powers are sufficient for their purposes it is not now my business to
examine. But we all know that our resolutions in favor of Ireland are
trifling and insignificant, when compared with the concessions to the
Americans. At such a juncture, I would implore every man, who retains
the least spark of regard to the yet remaining honor and security of
this country, not to compel others to an imitation of their conduct, or
by passion and violence to force them to seek in the territories of the
separation that freedom and those advantages which they are not to look
for whilst they remain under the wings of their ancient government.
After all, what are the matters we dispute with so much warmth? Do we in
these resolutions _bestow_ anything upon Ireland? Not a shilling. We
only consent to _leave_ to them, in two or three instances, the use of
the natural faculties which God has given to them, and to all mankind.
Is Ireland united to the crown of Great Britain for no other purpose
than that we should counteract the bounty of Providence in her favor?
and in proportion as that bounty has been liberal, that we are to regard
it as an evil, which is to be met with in every sort of corrective? To
say that Ireland interferes with us, and therefore must be checked, is,
in my opinion, a very mistaken, and a very dangerous principle. I must
beg leave to repeat, what I took the liberty of suggesting to you in my
last letter, that Ireland is a country in the same climate and of the
same natural qualities and productions with this, and has consequently
no other means of growing wealthy in herself, or, in other words, of
being useful to us, but by doing the very same things which we do for
the same purposes. I hope that in Great Britain we shall always pursue,
without exception, _every_ means of prosperity, and, of course, that
Ireland _will_ interfere with us in something or other: for either, in
order to _limit_ her, we _must restrain_ ourselves, or we must fall into
that shocking conclusion, that we are to keep our yet remaining
dependency under a general and indiscriminate restraint for the mere
purpose of oppression. Indeed, Sir, England and Ireland may flourish
together. The world is large enough for us both. Let it be our care not
to make ourselves too little for it.
I know it is said, that the people of Ireland do not pay the same taxes,
and therefore ought not in equity to enjoy the same benefits with this.
I had hopes that the unhappy phantom of a compulsory _equal taxation_
had haunted us long enough. I do assure you, that, until it is entirely
banished from our imaginations, (where alone it has, or can have, any
existence,) we shall never cease to do ourselves the most substantial
injuries. To that argument of equal taxation I can only say, that
Ireland pays as many taxes as those who are the best judges of her
powers are of opinion she can bear. To bear more, she must have more
ability; and, in the order of Nature, the advantage must _precede_ the
charge. This disposition of things being the law of God, neither you nor
I _can_ alter it. So that, if you will have more help from Ireland, you
must _previously_ supply her with more means. I believe it will be
found, that, if men are suffered freely to cultivate their natural
advantages, a virtual equality of contribution will come in its own
time, and will flow by an easy descent through its own proper and
natural channels. An attempt to disturb that course, and to force
Nature, will only bring on universal discontent, distress, and
confusion.
You tell me, Sir, that you prefer an union with Ireland to the little
regulations which are proposed in Parliament. This union is a great
question of state, to which, when it comes properly before me in my
Parliamentary capacity, I shall give an honest and unprejudiced
consideration. However, it is a settled rule with me, to make the most
of my _actual situation_, and not to refuse to do a proper thing because
there is something else more proper which I am not able to do. This
union is a business of difficulty, and, on the principles of your
letter, a business impracticable. Until it can be matured into a
feasible and desirable scheme, I wish to have as close an union of
interest and affection with Ireland as I can have; and that, I am sure,
is a far better thing than any nominal union of government.
France, and indeed most extensive empires, which by various designs and
fortunes have grown into one great mass, contain many provinces that are
very different from each other in privileges and modes of government;
and they raise their supplies in different ways, in different
proportions, and under different authorities: yet none of them are for
this reason curtailed of their natural rights; but they carry on trade
and manufactures with perfect equality. In some way or other the true
balance is found; and all of them are properly poised and harmonized.
How much have you lost by the participation of Scotland in all your
commerce? The external trade of England has more than doubled since that
period; and I believe your internal (which is the most advantageous) has
been augmented at least fourfold. Such virtue there is in liberality of
sentiment, that you have grown richer even by the partnership of
poverty.
If you think that this participation was a loss, commercially
considered, but that it has been compensated by the share which Scotland
has taken in defraying the public charge, I believe you have not very
carefully looked at the public accounts. Ireland, Sir, pays a great deal
more than Scotland, and is perhaps as much and as effectually united to
England as Scotland is. But if Scotland, instead of paying little, had
paid nothing at all, we should be gainers, not losers, by acquiring the
hearty coöperation of an active, intelligent people towards the increase
of the common stock, instead of our being employed in watching and
counteracting them, and their being employed in watching and
counteracting us, with the peevish and churlish jealousy of rivals and
enemies on both sides.
I am sure, Sir, that the commercial experience of the merchants of
Bristol will soon disabuse them of the prejudice, that they can trade no
longer, if countries more lightly taxed are permitted to deal in the
same commodities at the same markets. You know, that, in fact, you trade
very largely where you are met by the goods of all nations. You even pay
high duties on the import of your goods, and afterwards undersell
nations less taxed, at their own markets, and where goods of the same
kind are not charged at all. If it were otherwise, you could trade very
little. You know that the price of all sorts of manufacture is not a
great deal enhanced (except to the domestic consumer) by any taxes paid
in this country. This I might very easily prove.
The same consideration will relieve you from the apprehension you
express with relation to sugars, and the difference of the duties paid
here and in Ireland. Those duties affect the interior consumer only,
and for obvious reasons, relative to the interest of revenue itself,
they must be proportioned to his ability of payment; but in all cases in
which sugar can be an _object of commerce_, and therefore (in this view)
of rivalship, you are sensible that you are at least on a par with
Ireland. As to your apprehensions concerning the more advantageous
situation of Ireland for some branches of commerce, (for it is so but
for some,) I trust you will not find them more serious. Milford Haven,
which is at your door, may serve to show you that the mere advantage of
ports, is not the thing which shifts the seat of commerce from one part
of the world to the other. If I thought you inclined to take up this
matter on local considerations, I should state to you, that I do not
know any part of the kingdom so well situated for an advantageous
commerce with Ireland as Bristol, and that none would be so likely to
profit of its prosperity as our city. But your profit and theirs must
concur. Beggary and bankruptcy are not the circumstances which invite to
an intercourse with that or with any country; and I believe it will be
found invariably true, that the superfluities of a rich nation furnish a
better object of trade than the necessities of a poor one. It is the
interest of the commercial world that wealth should be found everywhere.
The true ground of fear, in my opinion, is this: that Ireland, from the
vicious system of its internal polity, will be a long time before it can
derive any benefit from the liberty now granted, or from any thing else.
But, as I do not vote advantages in hopes that they may not be enjoyed,
I will not lay any stress upon this consideration. I rather wish that
the Parliament of Ireland may, in its own wisdom, remove these
impediments, and put their country in a condition to avail itself of its
natural advantages. If they do not, the fault is with them, and not with
us.
I have written this long letter in order to give all possible
satisfaction to my constituents with regard to the part I have taken in
this affair. It gave me inexpressible concern to find that my conduct
had been a cause of uneasiness to any of them. Next to my honor and
conscience, I have nothing so near and dear to me as their approbation.
However, I had much rather run the risk of displeasing than of injuring
them,--if I am driven to make such an option. You obligingly lament that
you are not to have me for your advocate; but if I had been capable of
acting as an advocate in opposition to a plan so perfectly consonant to
my known principles, and to the opinions I had publicly declared on an
hundred occasions, I should only disgrace myself, without supporting,
with the smallest degree of credit or effect, the cause you wished me to
undertake. I should have lost the only thing which can make such
abilities as mine of any use to the world now or hereafter: I mean that
authority which is derived from an opinion that a member speaks the
language of truth and sincerity, and that he is not ready to take up or
lay down a great political system for the convenience of the hour, that
he is in Parliament to support his opinion of the public good, and does
not form his opinion in order to get into Parliament, or to continue in
it. It is in a great measure for your sake that I wish to preserve this
character. Without it, I am sure, I should be ill able to discharge, by
any service, the smallest part of that debt of gratitude and affection
which I owe you for the great and honorable trust you have reposed in
me.
I am, with the highest regard and esteem, Sir,
Your most obedient and humble servant,
E.B.
BEACONSFIELD, 23rd April, 1778.
* * * * *
COPY OF A LETTER TO MESSRS. ******* ****** AND CO., BRISTOL.
Gentlemen,--
It gives me the most sensible concern to find that my vote on the
resolutions relative to the trade of Ireland has not been fortunate
enough to meet with your approbation. I have explained at large the
grounds of my conduct on that occasion in my letters to the Merchants'
Hall; but my very sincere regard and esteem for you will not permit me
to let the matter pass without an explanation which is particular to
yourselves, and which I hope will prove satisfactory to you.
You tell me that the conduct of your late member is not much wondered
at; but you seem to be at a loss to account for mine; and you lament
that I have taken so decided a part _against_ my constituents.
This is rather an heavy imputation. Does it, then, really appear to you
that the propositions to which you refer are, on the face of them, so
manifestly wrong, and so certainly injurious to the trade and
manufactures of Great Britain, and particularly to yours, that no man
could think of proposing or supporting them, except from resentment to
you, or from some other oblique motive? If you suppose your late
member, or if you suppose me, to act upon other reasons than we choose
to avow, to what do you attribute the conduct of the _other_ members,
who in the beginning almost unanimously adopted those resolutions? To
what do you attribute the strong part taken by the ministers, and, along
with the ministers, by several of their most declared opponents? This
does not indicate a ministerial job, a party design, or a provincial or
local purpose. It is, therefore, not so absolutely clear that the
measure is wrong, or likely to be injurious to the true interests of any
place or any person.
The reason, Gentlemen, for taking this step, at this time, is but too
obvious and too urgent. I cannot imagine that you forget the great war
which has been carried on with so little success (and, as I thought,
with so little policy) in America, or that you are not aware of the
other great wars which are impending. Ireland has been called upon to
repel the attacks of enemies of no small power, brought upon her by
councils in which she has had no share. The very purpose and declared
object of that original war, which has brought other wars and other
enemies on Ireland, was not very flattering to her dignity, her
interest, or to the very principle of her liberty. Yet she submitted
patiently to the evils she suffered from an attempt to subdue to _your_
obedience countries whose very commerce was not open to her. America was
to be conquered in order that Ireland should _not_ trade thither; whilst
the miserable trade which she is permitted to carry on to other places
has been torn to pieces in the struggle. In this situation, are we
neither to suffer her to have any real interest in our quarrel, or to
be flattered with the hope of any future means of bearing the burdens
which she is to incur in defending herself against enemies which we have
brought upon her?
I cannot set my face against such arguments. Is it quite fair to suppose
that I have no other motive for yielding to them but a desire of acting
_against_ my constituents? It is for _you_, and for _your_ interest, as
a dear, cherished, and respected part of a valuable whole, that I have
taken my share in this question. You do not, you cannot, suffer by it.
If honesty be true policy with regard to the transient interest of
individuals, it is much more certainly so with regard to the permanent
interests of communities. I know that it is but too natural for us to
see our own _certain_ ruin in the _possible_ prosperity of other people.
It is hard to persuade us that everything which is _got_ by another is
not _taken_ from ourselves. But it is fit that We should get the better
of these suggestions, which come from what is not the best and soundest
part of our nature, and that we should form to ourselves a way of
thinking, more rational, more just, and more religious. Trade is not a
limited thing: as if the objects of mutual demand and consumption could
not stretch beyond the bounds of our jealousies. God has given the earth
to the children of men, and He has undoubtedly, in giving it to them,
given them what is abundantly sufficient for all their exigencies: not a
scanty, but a most liberal, provision for them all. The Author of our
nature has written it strongly in that nature, and has promulgated the
same law in His written word, that man shall eat his bread by his labor;
and I am persuaded that no man, and no combination of men, for their own
ideas of their particular profit, can, without great impiety, undertake
to say that he _shall not_ do so,--that they have no sort of right
either to prevent the labor or to withhold the bread. Ireland having
received no _compensation_, directly or indirectly, for any restraints
on their trade, ought not, in justice or common honesty, to be made
subject to such restraints. I do not mean to impeach the right of the
Parliament of Great Britain to make laws for the trade of Ireland: I
only speak of what laws it is right for Parliament to make.
It is nothing to an oppressed people, to say that in part they are
protected at our charge. The military force which shall be kept up in
order to cramp the natural faculties of a people, and to prevent their
arrival to their utmost prosperity, is the instrument of their
servitude, not the means of their protection. To protect men is to
forward, and not to restrain, their improvement. Else, what is it more
than to avow to them, and to the world, that you guard them from others
only to make them a prey to yourself? This fundamental nature of
protection does not belong to free, but to all governments, and is as
valid in Turkey as in Great Britain. No government ought to own that it
exists for the purpose of checking the prosperity of its people, or that
there is such a principle involved in its policy.
Under the impression of these sentiments, (and not as wanting every
attention to my constituents which affection and gratitude could
inspire,) I voted for these bills which give you so much trouble. I
voted for them, not as doing complete justice to Ireland, but as being
something less unjust than the general prohibition which has hitherto
prevailed. I hear some discourse as if, in one or two paltry duties on
materials, Ireland had a preference, and that those who set themselves
against this act of scanty justice assert that they are only contending
for an _equality_. What equality? Do they forget that the whole woollen
manufacture of Ireland, the most extensive and profitable of any, and
the natural staple of that kingdom, has been in a manner so destroyed by
restrictive laws of ours, and (at our persuasion, and on our promises)
by restrictive laws of _their own_, that in a few years, it is probable,
they will not be able to wear a coat of their own fabric? Is this
equality? Do gentlemen forget that the understood faith upon which they
were persuaded to such an unnatural act has not been kept,--but a
linen-manufacture has been set up, and highly encouraged, against them?
Is this equality? Do they forget the state of the trade of Ireland in
beer, so great an article of consumption, and which now stands in so
mischievous a position with regard to their revenue, their manufacture,
and their agriculture? Do they find any equality in all this? Yet, if
the least step is taken towards doing them common justice in the
slightest articles for the most limited markets, a cry is raised, as if
we were going to be ruined by partiality to Ireland.
Gentlemen, I know that the deficiency in these arguments is made up (not
by you, but by others) by the usual resource on such occasions, the
confidence in military force and superior power. But that ground of
confidence, which at no time was perfectly just, or the avowal of it
tolerably decent, is at this time very unseasonable. Late experience has
shown that it cannot be altogether relied upon; and many, if not all, of
our present difficulties have arisen from putting our trust in what may
very possibly fail, and, if it should fail, leaves those who are hurt by
such a reliance without pity. Whereas honesty and justice, reason and
equity, go a very great way in securing prosperity to those who use
them, and, in case of failure, secure the best retreat and the most
honorable consolations.
It is very unfortunate that we should consider those as rivals, whom we
ought to regard as fellow-laborers in a common cause. Ireland has never
made a single step in its progress towards prosperity, by which you have
not had a share, and perhaps the greatest share, in the benefit. That
progress has been chiefly owing to her own natural advantages, and her
own efforts, which, after a long time, and by slow degrees, have
prevailed in some measure over the mischievous systems which have been
adopted. Far enough she is still from having arrived even at an ordinary
state of perfection; and if our jealousies were to be converted into
politics as systematically as some would have them, the trade of Ireland
would vanish out of the system of commerce. But, believe me, if Ireland
is beneficial to you, it is so not from the parts in which it is
restrained, but from those in which it is left free, though not left
unrivalled. The greater its freedom, the greater must be your advantage.
If you should lose in one way, you will gain in twenty.
Whilst I remain under this unalterable and powerful conviction, you will
not wonder at the _decided_ part I take. It is my custom so to do, when
I see my way clearly before me, and when I know that I am not misled by
any passion or any personal interest, which in this case I am very sure
I am not. I find that disagreeable things are circulated among my
constituents; and I wish my sentiments, which form my justification,
may be equally general with the circulation against me. I have the honor
to be, with the greatest regard and esteem, Gentlemen,
Your most obedient and humble servant,
E.B.
Westminster, May 2, 1778.
I send the bills.
SPEECH
ON PRESENTING TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
(ON THE 11TH FEBRUARY, 1780)
A PLAN
FOR
THE BETTER SECURITY OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF PARLIAMENT, AND THE
ECONOMICAL REFORMATION OF THE CIVIL AND OTHER ESTABLISHMENTS
Mr. Speaker,--I rise, in acquittal of my engagement to the House, in
obedience to the strong and just requisition of my constituents, and, I
am persuaded, in conformity to the unanimous wishes of the whole nation,
to submit to the wisdom of Parliament "A Plan of Reform in the
Constitution of Several Parts of the Public Economy."
I have endeavored that this plan should include, in its execution, a
considerable reduction of improper expense; that it should effect a
conversion of unprofitable titles into a productive estate; that it
should lead to, and indeed almost compel, a provident administration of
such sums of public money as must remain under discretionary trusts;
that it should render the incurring debts on the civil establishment
(which must ultimately affect national strength and national credit) so
very difficult as to become next to impracticable.
But what, I confess, was uppermost with me, what I bent the whole force
of my mind to, was the reduction of that corrupt influence which is
itself the perennial spring of all prodigality and of all
disorder,--which loads us more than millions of debt,--which takes away
vigor from our arms, wisdom from our councils, and every shadow of
authority and credit from the most venerable parts of our Constitution.
Sir, I assure you very solemnly, and with a very clear conscience, that
nothing in the world has led me to such an undertaking but my zeal for
the honor of this House, and the settled, habitual, systematic affection
I bear to the cause and to the principles of government.
I enter perfectly into the nature and consequences of my attempt, and I
advance to it with a tremor that shakes me to the inmost fibre of my
frame. I feel that I engage in a business, in itself most ungracious,
totally wide of the course of prudent conduct, and, I really think, the
most completely adverse that can be imagined to the natural turn and
temper of my own mind. I know that all parsimony is of a quality
approaching to unkindness, and that (on some person or other) every
reform must operate as a sort of punishment. Indeed, the whole class of
the severe and restrictive virtues are at a market almost too high for
humanity. What is worse, there are very few of those virtues which are
not capable of being imitated, and even outdone in many of their most
striking effects, by the worst of vices. Malignity and envy will carve
much more deeply, and finish much more sharply, in the work of
retrenchment, than frugality and providence. I do not, therefore, wonder
that gentlemen have kept away from such a task, as well from good-nature
as from prudence. Private feeling might, indeed, be overborne by
legislative reason; and a man of a long-sighted and a strong-nerved
humanity might bring himself not so much to consider from whom he takes
a superfluous enjoyment as for whom in the end he may preserve the
absolute necessaries of life.
But it is much more easy to reconcile this measure in humanity than to
bring it to any agreement with prudence. I do not mean that little,
selfish, pitiful, bastard thing which sometimes goes by the name of a
family in which it is not legitimate and to which it is a disgrace;--I
mean even that public and enlarged prudence, which, apprehensive of
being disabled from rendering acceptable services to the world,
withholds itself from those that are invidious. Gentlemen who are, with
me, verging towards the decline of life, and are apt to form their ideas
of kings from kings of former times, might dread the anger of a reigning
prince;--they who are more provident of the future, or by being young
are more interested in it, might tremble at the resentment of the
successor; they might see a long, dull, dreary, unvaried visto of
despair and exclusion, for half a century, before them. This is no
pleasant prospect at the outset of a political journey.
Besides this, Sir, the private enemies to be made in all attempts of
this kind are innumerable; and their enmity will be the more bitter, and
the more dangerous too, because a sense of dignity will oblige them to
conceal the cause of their resentment. Very few men of great families
and extensive connections but will feel the smart of a cutting reform,
in some close relation, some bosom friend, some pleasant acquaintance,
some dear, protected dependant. Emolument is taken from some; patronage
from others; objects of pursuit from all. Men forced into an involuntary
independence will abhor the authors of a blessing which in their eyes
has so very near a resemblance to a curse. When officers are removed,
and the offices remain, you may set the gratitude of some against the
anger of others, you may oppose the friends you oblige against the
enemies you provoke. But services of the present sort create no
attachments. The individual good felt in a public benefit is
comparatively so small, comes round through such an involved labyrinth
of intricate and tedious revolutions, whilst a present personal
detriment is so heavy, where it falls, and so instant in its operation,
that the cold commendation of a public advantage never was and never
will be a match for the quick sensibility of a private loss; and you may
depend upon it, Sir, that, when many people have an interest in railing,
sooner or later, they will bring a considerable degree of unpopularity
upon any measure. So that, for the present at least, the reformation
will operate against the reformers; and revenge (as against them at the
least) will produce all the effects of corruption.
This, Sir, is almost always the case, where the plan has complete
success. But how stands the matter in the mere attempt? Nothing, you
know, is more common than for men to wish, and call loudly too, for a
reformation, who, when it arrives, do by no means like the severity of
its aspect. Reformation is one of those pieces which must be put at some
distance in order to please. Its greatest favorers love it better in the
abstract than in the substance. When any old prejudice of their own, or
any interest that they value, is touched, they become scrupulous, they
become captious; and every man has his separate exception. Some pluck
out the black hairs, some the gray; one point must be given up to one,
another point must be yielded to another; nothing is suffered to prevail
upon its own principle; the whole is so frittered down and disjointed,
that scarcely a trace of the original scheme remains. Thus, between the
resistance of power, and the unsystematical process of popularity, the
undertaker and the undertaking are both exposed, and the poor reformer
is hissed off the stags both by friends and foes.
Observe, Sir, that the apology for my undertaking (an apology which,
though long, is no longer than necessary) is not grounded on my want of
the fullest sense of the difficult and invidious nature of the task I
undertake. I risk odium, if I succeed, and contempt, if I fail. My
excuse must rest in mine and your conviction of the absolute, urgent
_necessity_ there is that something of the kind should be done. If there
is any sacrifice to be made, either of estimation or of fortune, the
smallest is the best. Commanders-in-chief are not to be put upon the
forlorn hope. But, indeed, it is necessary that the attempt should be
made. It is necessary from our own political circumstances; it is
necessary from the operations of the enemy; it is necessary from the
demands of the people, whose desires, when they do not militate with the
stable and eternal rules of justice and reason, (rules which are above
us and above them,) ought to be as a law to a House of Commons.
As to our circumstances, I do not mean to aggravate the difficulties of
them by the strength of any coloring whatsoever. On the contrary, I
observe, and observe with pleasure, that our affairs rather wear a more
promising aspect than they did on the opening of this session. We have
had some leading successes. But those who rate them at the highest
(higher a great deal, indeed, than I dare to do) are of opinion, that,
upon the ground of such advantages, we cannot at this time hope to make
any treaty of peace which would not be ruinous and completely
disgraceful. In such an anxious state of things, if dawnings of success
serve to animate our diligence, they are good; if they tend to increase
our presumption, they are worse than defeats. The state of our affairs
shall, then, be as promising as any one may choose to conceive it: it
is, however, but promising. We must recollect, that, with but half of
our natural strength, we are at war against confederated powers who have
singly threatened us with ruin; we must recollect, that, whilst we are
left naked on one side, our other flank is uncovered by any alliance;
that, whilst we are weighing and balancing our successes against our
losses, we are accumulating debt to the amount of at least fourteen
millions in the year. That loss is certain.
I have no wish to deny that our successes are as brilliant as any one
chooses to make them; our resources, too, may, for me, be as
unfathomable as they are represented. Indeed, they are just whatever the
people possess and will submit to pay. Taxing is an easy business. Any
projector can contrive new impositions; any bungler can add to the old.
But is it altogether wise to have no other bounds to your impositions
than the patience of those who are to bear them?
All I claim upon the subject of your resources is this: that they are
not likely to be increased by wasting them. I think I shall be permitted
to assume that a system of frugality will not lessen your riches,
whatever they may be. I believe it will not be hotly disputed, that
those resources which lie heavy on the subject ought not to be objects
of preference,--that they ought not to be the _very first choice_, to an
honest representative of the people.
This is all, Sir, that I shall say upon our circumstances and our
resources: I mean to say a little more on the operations of the enemy,
because this matter seems to me very natural in our present
deliberation. When I look to the other side of the water, I cannot help
recollecting what Pyrrhus said, on reconnoitring the Roman camp:--"These
barbarians have nothing barbarous in their discipline." When I look, as
I have pretty carefully looked, into the proceedings of the French king,
I am sorry to say it, I see nothing of the character and genius of
arbitrary finance, none of the bold frauds of bankrupt power, none of
the wild struggles and plunges of despotism in distress,--no lopping off
from the capital of debt, no suspension of interest, no robbery under
the name of loan, no raising the value, no debasing the substance of the
coin. I see neither Louis the Fourteenth nor Louis the Fifteenth. On the
contrary, I behold, with astonishment, rising before me, by the very
hands of arbitrary power, and in the very midst of war and confusion, a
regular, methodical system of public credit; I behold a fabric laid on
the natural and solid foundations of trust and confidence among men, and
rising, by fair gradations, order over order, according to the just
rules of symmetry and art. What a reverse of things! Principle, method,
regularity, economy, frugality, justice to individuals, and care of the
people are the resources with which France makes war upon Great Britain.
God avert the omen! But if we should see any genius in war and politics
arise in France to second what is done in the bureau!--I turn my eyes
from the consequences.
The noble lord in the blue ribbon, last year, treated all this with
contempt. He never could conceive it possible that the French minister
of finance could go through that year with a loan of but seventeen
hundred thousand pounds, and that he should be able to fund that loan
without any tax. The second year, however, opens the very same scene. A
small loan, a loan of no more than two millions five hundred thousand
pounds, is to carry our enemies through the service of this year also.
No tax is raised to fund that debt; no tax is raised for the current
services. I am credibly informed that there is no anticipation
whatsoever. Compensations[31] are correctly made. Old debts continue to
be sunk as in the time of profound peace. Even payments which their
treasury had been authorized to suspend during the time of war are not
suspended.
A general reform, executed through every _department of the revenue_,
creates an annual income of more than half a million, whilst it
facilitates and simplifies all the functions of administration. The
king's _household_--at the remotest avenues to which all reformation has
been hitherto stopped, that household which has been the stronghold of
prodigality, the virgin fortress which was never before attacked--has
been not only not defended, but it has, even in the forms, been
surrendered by the king to the economy of his minister. No capitulation;
no reserve. Economy has entered in triumph into the public splendor of
the monarch, into his private amusements, into the appointments of his
nearest and highest relations. Economy and public spirit have made a
beneficent and an honest spoil: they have plundered from extravagance
and luxury, for the use of substantial service, a revenue of near four
hundred thousand pounds. The reform of the finances, joined to this
reform of the court, gives to the public nine hundred thousand pounds a
year, and upwards.
The minister who does these things is a great man; but the king who
desires that they should be done is a far greater. We must do justice to
our enemies: these are the acts of a patriot king. I am not in dread of
the vast armies of France; I am not in dread of the gallant spirit of
its brave and numerous nobility; I am not alarmed even at the great navy
which has been so miraculously created. All these things Louis the
Fourteenth had before. With all these things, the French monarchy has
more than once fallen prostrate at the feet of the public faith of Great
Britain. It was the want of public credit which disabled France from
recovering after her defeats, or recovering even from her victories and
triumphs. It was a prodigal court, it was an ill-ordered revenue, that
sapped the foundations of all her greatness. Credit cannot exist under
the arm of necessity. Necessity strikes at credit, I allow, with a
heavier and quicker blow under an arbitrary monarchy than under a
limited and balanced government; but still necessity and credit are
natural enemies, and cannot be long reconciled in any situation. From
necessity and corruption, a free state may lose the spirit of that
complex constitution which is the foundation of confidence. On the other
hand, I am far from being sure that a monarchy, when once it is properly
regulated, may not for a long time furnish a foundation for credit upon
the solidity of its maxims, though it affords no ground of trust in its
institutions. I am afraid I see in England, and in France, something
like a beginning of both these things. I wish I may be found in a
mistake.
This very short and very imperfect state of what is now going on in
France (the last circumstances of which I received in about eight days
after the registry of the edict[32]) I do not, Sir, lay before you for
any invidious purpose. It is in order to excite in us the spirit of a
noble emulation. Let the nations make war upon each other, (since we
must make war,) not with a low and vulgar malignity, but by a
competition of virtues. This is the only way by which both parties can
gain by war. The French have imitated us: let us, through them, imitate
ourselves,--ourselves in our better and happier days. If public
frugality, under whatever men, or in whatever mode of government, is
national strength, it is a strength which our enemies are in possession
of before us.
Sir, I am well aware that the state and the result of the French economy
which I have laid before you are even now lightly treated by some who
ought never to speak but from information. Pains have not been spared to
represent them as impositions on the public. Let me tell you, Sir, that
the creation of a navy, and a two years' war without taxing, are a very
singular species of imposture. But be it so. For what end does Necker
carry on this delusion? Is it to lower the estimation of the crown he
serves, and to render his own administration contemptible? No! No! He is
conscious that the sense of mankind is so clear and decided in favor of
economy, and of the weight and value of its resources, that he turns
himself to every species of fraud and artifice to obtain the mere
reputation of it. Men do not affect a conduct that tends to their
discredit. Let us, then, get the better of Monsieur Necker in his own
way; let us do in reality what he does only in pretence; let us turn his
French tinsel into English gold. Is, then, the mere opinion and
appearance of frugality and good management of such use to France, and
is the substance to be so mischievous to England? Is the very
constitution of Nature so altered by a sea of twenty miles, that economy
should give power on the Continent, and that profusion should give it
here? For God's sake, let not this be the only fashion of France which
we refuse to copy!
To the last kind of necessity, the desires of the people, I have but a
very few words to say. The ministers seem to contest this point, and
affect to doubt whether the people do really desire a plan of economy in
the civil government. Sir, this is too ridiculous. It is impossible that
they should not desire it. It is impossible that a prodigality which
draws its resources from their indigence should be pleasing to them.
Little factions of pensioners, and their dependants, may talk another
language. But the voice of Nature is against them, and it will be heard.
The people of England will not, they cannot, take it kindly, that
representatives should refuse to their constituents what an absolute
sovereign voluntarily offers to his subjects. The expression of the
petitions is, that, "_before any new burdens are laid upon this country,
effectual measures be taken by this House to inquire into and correct
the gross abuses in the expenditure of public money_."
This has been treated by the noble lord in the blue ribbon as a wild,
factious language. It happens, however, that the people, in their
address to us, use, almost word for word, the same terms as the king of
France uses in addressing himself to his people; and it differs only as
it falls short of the French king's idea of what is due to his subjects.
"To convince," says he, "our faithful subjects of _the desire we
entertain not to recur to new impositions_, until we have first
exhausted all the resources which order and economy can possibly
supply," &c., &c.
These desires of the people of England, which come far short of the
voluntary concessions of the king of France, are moderate indeed. They
only contend that we should interweave some economy with the taxes with
which we have chosen to begin the war. They request, not that you should
rely upon economy exclusively, but that you should give it rank and
precedence, in the order of the ways and means of this single session.
But if it were possible that the desires of our constituents, desires
which are at once so natural and so very much tempered and subdued,
should have no weight with an House of Commons which has its eye
elsewhere, I would turn my eyes to the very quarter to which theirs are
directed. I would reason this matter with the House on the mere policy
of the question; and I would undertake to prove that an early
dereliction of abuse is the direct interest of government,--of
government taken abstractedly from its duties, and considered merely as
a system intending its own conservation.
If there is any one eminent criterion which above all the rest
distinguishes a wise government from an administration weak and
improvident, it is this: "well to know the best time and manner of
yielding what it is impossible to keep." There have been, Sir, and
there are, many who choose to chicane with their situation rather than
be instructed by it. Those gentlemen argue against every desire of
reformation upon the principles of a criminal prosecution. It is enough
for them to justify their adherence to a pernicious system, that it is
not of their contrivance,--that it is an inheritance of absurdity,
derived to them from their ancestors,--that they can make out a long and
unbroken pedigree of mismanagers that have gone before them. They are
proud of the antiquity of their house; and they defend their errors as
if they were defending their inheritance, afraid of derogating from
their nobility, and carefully avoiding a sort of blot in their
scutcheon, which they think would degrade them forever.
It was thus that the unfortunate Charles the First defended himself on
the practice of the Stuart who went before him, and of all the Tudors.
His partisans might have gone to the Plantagenets. They might have found
bad examples enough, both abroad and at home, that could have shown an
ancient and illustrious descent. But there is a time when men will not
suffer bad things because their ancestors have suffered worse. There is
a time when the hoary head of inveterate abuse will neither draw
reverence nor obtain protection. If the noble lord in the blue ribbon
pleads, "_Not guilty_," to the charges brought against the present
system of public economy, it is not possible to give a fair verdict by
which he will not stand acquitted. But pleading is not our present
business. His plea or his traverse may be allowed as an answer to a
charge, when a charge is made. But if he puts himself in the way to
obstruct reformation, then the faults of his office instantly become
his own. Instead of a public officer in an abusive department, whose
province is an object to be regulated, he becomes a criminal who is to
be punished. I do most seriously put it to administration to consider
the wisdom of a timely reform. Early reformations are amicable
arrangements with a friend in power; late reformations are terms imposed
upon a conquered enemy: early reformations are made in cool blood; late
reformations are made under a state of inflammation. In that state of
things the people behold in government nothing that is respectable. They
see the abuse, and they will see nothing else. They fall into the temper
of a furious populace provoked at the disorder of a house of ill-fame;
they never attempt to correct or regulate; they go to work by the
shortest way: they abate the nuisance, they pull down the house.
This is my opinion with regard to the true interest of government. But
as it is the interest of government that reformation should be early, it
is the interest of the people that it should be temperate. It is their
interest, because a temperate reform is permanent, and because it has a
principle of growth. Whenever we improve, it is right to leave room for
a further improvement. It is right to consider, to look about us, to
examine the effect of what we have done. Then we can proceed with
confidence, because we can proceed with intelligence. Whereas in hot
reformations, in what men more zealous than considerate call _making
clear work_, the whole is generally so crude, so harsh, so indigested,
mixed with so much imprudence and so much injustice, so contrary to the
whole course of human nature and human institutions, that the very
people who are most eager for it are among the first to grow disgusted
at what they have done. Then some part of the abdicated grievance is
recalled from its exile in order to become a corrective of the
correction. Then the abuse assumes all the credit and popularity of a
reform. The very idea of purity and disinterestedness in politics falls
into disrepute, and is considered as a vision of hot and inexperienced
men; and thus disorders become incurable, not by the virulence of their
own quality, but by the unapt and violent nature of the remedies. A
great part, therefore, of my idea of reform is meant to operate
gradually: some benefits will come at a nearer, some at a more remote
period. We must no more make haste to be rich by parsimony than by
intemperate acquisition.
In my opinion, it is our duty, when we have the desires of the people
before us, to pursue them, not in the spirit of literal obedience, which
may militate with their very principle,--much less to treat them with a
peevish and contentious litigation, as if we were adverse parties in a
suit. It would, Sir, be most dishonorable for a faithful representative
of the Commons to take advantage of any inartificial expression of the
people's wishes, in order to frustrate their attainment of what they
have an undoubted right to expect. We are under infinite obligations to
our constituents, who have raised us to so distinguished a trust, and
have imparted such a degree of sanctity to common characters. We ought
to walk before them with purity, plainness, and integrity of
heart,--with filial love, and not with slavish fear, which is always a
low and tricking thing. For my own part, in what I have meditated upon
that subject, I cannot, indeed, take upon me to say I have the honor _to
follow_ the sense of the people. The truth is, _I met it on the way_,
while I was pursuing their interest according to my own ideas. I am
happy beyond expression to find that my intentions have so far coincided
with theirs, that I have not had, cause to be in the least scrupulous to
sign their petition, conceiving it to express my own opinions, as nearly
as general terms can express the object of particular arrangements.
I am therefore satisfied to act as a fair mediator between government
and the people, endeavoring to form a plan which should have both an
early and a temperate operation. I mean, that it should be substantial,
that it should be systematic, that it should rather strike at the first
cause of prodigality and corrupt influence than attempt to follow them
in all their effects.
It was to fulfil the first of these objects (the proposal of something
substantial) that I found myself obliged, at the outset, to reject a
plan proposed by an honorable and attentive member of Parliament,[33]
with very good intentions on his part, about a year or two ago. Sir, the
plan I speak of was the tax of twenty-five per cent moved upon places
and pensions during the continuance of the American war. Nothing, Sir,
could have met my ideas more than such a tax, if it was considered as a
practical satire on that war, and as a penalty upon those who led us
into it; but in any other view it appeared to me very liable to
objections. I considered the scheme as neither substantial, nor
permanent, nor systematical, nor likely to be a corrective of evil
influence. I have always thought employments a very proper subject of
regulation, but a very ill-chosen subject for a tax. An equal tax upon
property is reasonable; because the object is of the same quality
throughout. The species is the same; it differs only in its quantity.
But a tax upon salaries is totally of a different nature; there can be
no equality, and consequently no justice, in taxing them by the hundred
in the gross.
We have, Sir, on our establishment several offices which perform real
service: we have also places that provide large rewards for no service
at all. We have stations which are made for the public decorum, made for
preserving the grace and majesty of a great people: we have likewise
expensive formalities, which tend rather to the disgrace than the
ornament of the state and the court. This, Sir, is the real condition of
our establishments. To fall with the same severity on objects so
perfectly dissimilar is the very reverse of a reformation,--I mean a
reformation framed, as all serious things ought to be, in number,
weight, and measure.--Suppose, for instance, that two men receive a
salary of 800_l._ a year each. In the office of one there is nothing at
all to be done; in the other, the occupier is oppressed by its duties.
Strike off twenty-five per cent from these two offices, you take from
one man 200_l._ which in justice he ought to have, and you give in
effect to the other 600_l._ which he ought not to receive. The public
robs the former, and the latter robs the public; and this mode of mutual
robbery is the only way in which the office and the public can make up
their accounts.
But the balance, in settling the account of this double injustice, is
much against the state. The result is short. You purchase a saving of
two hundred pounds by a profusion of six. Besides, Sir, whilst you leave
a supply of unsecured money behind, wholly at the discretion of
ministers, they make up the tax to such places as they wish to favor, or
in such new places as they may choose to create. Thus the civil list
becomes oppressed with debt; and the public is obliged to repay, and to
repay with an heavy interest, what it has taken by an injudicious tax.
Such has been the effect of the taxes hitherto laid on pensions and
employments, and it is no encouragement to recur again to the same
expedient.
In effect, such a scheme is not calculated to produce, but to prevent
reformation. It holds out a shadow of present gain to a greedy and
necessitous public, to divert their attention from those abuses which in
reality are the great causes of their wants. It is a composition to stay
inquiry; it is a fine paid by mismanagement for the renewal of its
lease; what is worse, it is a fine paid by industry and merit for an
indemnity to the idle and the worthless. But I shall say no more upon
this topic, because (whatever may be given out to the contrary) I know
that the noble lord in the blue ribbon perfectly agrees with me in these
sentiments.
After all that I have said on this subject, I am so sensible that it is
our duty to try everything which may contribute to the relief of the
nation, that I do not attempt wholly to reprobate the idea even of a
tax. Whenever, Sir, the incumbrance of useless office (which lies no
less a dead weight upon the service of the state than upon its revenues)
shall be removed,--when the remaining offices shall be classed according
to the just proportion of their rewards and services, so as to admit the
application of an equal rule to their taxation,--when the discretionary
power over the civil list cash shall be so regulated that a minister
shall no longer have the means of repaying with a private what is taken
by a public hand,--if, after all these preliminary regulations, it
should be thought that a tax on places is an object worthy of the public
attention, I shall be very ready to lend my hand to a reduction of their
emoluments.
Having thus, Sir, not so much absolutely rejected as postponed the plan
of a taxation of office, my next business was to find something which
might be really substantial and effectual. I am quite clear, that, if we
do not go to the very origin and first ruling cause of grievances, we do
nothing. What does it signify to turn abuses out of one door, if we are
to let them in at another? What does it signify to promote economy upon
a measure, and to suffer it to be subverted in the principle? Our
ministers are far from being wholly to blame for the present ill order
which prevails. Whilst institutions directly repugnant to good
management are suffered to remain, no effectual or lasting reform _can_
be introduced.
I therefore thought it necessary, as soon as I conceived thoughts of
submitting to you some plan of reform, to take a comprehensive view of
the state of this country,--to make a sort of survey of its
jurisdictions, its estates, and its establishments. Something in every
one of them seemed to me to stand in the way of all economy in their
administration, and prevented every possibility of methodizing the
system. But being, as I ought to be, doubtful of myself, I was resolved
not to proceed in an _arbitrary_ manner in any particular which tended
to change the settled state of things, or in any degree to affect the
fortune or situation, the interest or the importance, of any individual.
By an arbitrary proceeding I mean one conducted by the private
opinions, tastes, or feelings of the man who attempts to regulate. These
private measures are not standards of the exchequer, nor balances of the
sanctuary. General principles cannot be debauched or corrupted by
interest or caprice; and by those principles I was resolved to work.
Sir, before I proceed further, I will lay these principles fairly before
you, that afterwards you may be in a condition to judge whether every
object of regulation, as I propose it, comes fairly under its rule. This
will exceedingly shorten all discussion between us, if we are perfectly
in earnest in establishing a system of good management. I therefore lay
down to myself seven fundamental rules: they might, indeed, be reduced
to two or three simple maxims; but they would be too general, and their
application to the several heads of the business before us would not be
so distinct and visible. I conceive, then,
_First_, That all jurisdictions which furnish more matter of
expense, more temptation to oppression, or more means and
instruments of corrupt influence, than advantage to justice or
political administration, ought to be abolished.
_Secondly_, That all public estates which are more subservient to
the purposes of vexing, overawing, and influencing those who hold
under them, and to the expense of perception and management, than
of benefit to the revenue, ought, upon every principle both of
revenue and of freedom, to be disposed of.
_Thirdly_, That all offices which bring more charge than
proportional advantage to the state, that all offices which may be
engrafted on others, uniting and simplifying their duties, ought,
in the first case, to be taken away, and, in the second, to be
consolidated.
_Fourthly_, That all such offices ought to be abolished as obstruct
the prospect of the general superintendent of finance, which
destroy his superintendency, which disable him from foreseeing and
providing for charges as they may occur, from preventing expense in
its origin, checking it in its progress, or securing its
application to its proper purposes. A minister, under whom expenses
can be made without his knowledge, can never say what it is that he
can spend, or what it is that he can save.
_Fifthly_, That it is proper to establish an invariable order in
all payments, which will prevent partiality, which will give
preference to services, not according to the importunity of the
demandant, but the rank and order of their utility or their
justice.
_Sixthly_, That it is right to reduce every establishment and every
part of an establishment (as nearly as possible) to certainty, the
life of all order and good management.
_Seventhly_, That all subordinate treasuries, as the nurseries of
mismanagement, and as naturally drawing to themselves as much money
as they can, keeping it as long as they can, and accounting for it
as late as they can, ought to be dissolved. They have a tendency to
perplex and distract the public accounts, and to excite a suspicion
of government even beyond the extent of their abuse.
Under the authority and with the guidance of those principles I
proceed,--wishing that nothing in any establishment may be changed,
where I am not able to make a strong, direct, and solid application of
those principles, or of some one of them. An economical constitution is
a necessary basis for an economical administration.
First, with regard to the sovereign jurisdictions, I must observe, Sir,
that whoever takes a view of this kingdom in a cursory manner will
imagine that he beholds a solid, compacted, uniform system of monarchy,
in which all inferior jurisdictions are but as rays diverging from one
centre. But on examining it more nearly, you find much eccentricity and
confusion. It is not a _monarchy_ in strictness. But, as in the Saxon
times this country was an heptarchy, it is now a strange sort of
_pentarchy_. It is divided into five several distinct principalities,
besides the supreme. There is, indeed, this difference from the Saxon
times,--that, as in the itinerant exhibitions of the stage, for want of
a complete company, they are obliged to throw a variety of parts on
their chief performer, so our sovereign condescends himself to act not
only the principal, but all the subordinate parts in the play. He
condescends to dissipate the royal character, and to trifle with those
light, subordinate, lacquered sceptres in those hands that sustain the
ball representing the world, or which wield the trident that commands
the ocean. Cross a brook, and you lose the King of England; but you have
some comfort in coming again under his Majesty, though "shorn of his
beams," and no more than Prince of Wales. Go to the north, and you find
him dwindled to a Duke of Lancaster; turn to the west of that north, and
he pops upon you in the humble character of Earl of Chester. Travel a
few miles on, the Earl of Chester disappears, and the king surprises
you again as Count Palatine of Lancaster. If you travel beyond Mount
Edgecombe, you find him ones more in his incognito, and he is Duke of
Cornwall. So that, quite fatigued and satiated with this dull variety,
you are infinitely refreshed when you return to the sphere of his proper
splendor, and behold your amiable sovereign in his true, simple,
undisguised, native character of Majesty.
In every one of these five principalities, duchies, palatinates, there
is a regular establishment of considerable expense and most domineering
influence. As his Majesty submits to appear in this state of
subordination to himself, his loyal peers and faithful commons attend
his royal transformations, and are not so nice as to refuse to nibble at
those crumbs of emoluments which console their petty metamorphoses. Thus
every one of those principalities has the apparatus of a kingdom for the
jurisdiction over a few private estates, and the formality and charge of
the Exchequer of Great Britain for collecting the rents of a country
squire. Cornwall is the best of them; but when you compare the charge
with the receipt, you will find that it furnishes no exception to the
general rule. The Duchy and County Palatine of Lancaster do not yield,
as I have reason to believe, on an average of twenty years, four
thousand pounds a year clear to the crown. As to Wales, and the County
Palatine of Chester, I have my doubts whether their productive exchequer
yields any returns at all. Yet one may say, that this revenue is more
faithfully applied to its purposes than any of the rest; as it exists
for the sole purpose of multiplying offices and extending influence.
An attempt was lately made to improve this branch of local influence,
and to transfer it to the fund of general corruption. I have on the seat
behind me the constitution of Mr. John Probert, a knight-errant dubbed
by the noble lord in the blue ribbon, and sent to search for revenues
and adventures upon the mountains of Wales. The commission is
remarkable, and the event not less so. The commission sets forth, that,
"upon a report of the _deputy-auditor_" (for there is a deputy-auditor)
"of the Principality of Wales, it appeared that his Majesty's land
revenues in the said principality _are greatly diminished_";--and "that
upon a _report_ of the _surveyor-general_ of his Majesty's land
revenues, upon a _memorial_ of the auditor of his Majesty's revenues,
_within the said principality_, that his mines and forests have produced
very _little profit either to the public revenue or to
individuals_";--and therefore they appoint Mr. Probert, with a pension
of three hundred pounds a year from the said principality, to try
whether he can make anything more of that very _little_ which is stated
to be so _greatly_ diminished. "_A beggarly account of empty boxes_."
And yet, Sir, you will remark, that this diminution from littleness
(which serves only to prove the infinite divisibility of matter) was not
for want of the tender and officious care (as we see) of surveyors
general and surveyors particular, of auditors and deputy-auditors,--not
for want of memorials, and remonstrances, and reports, and commissions,
and constitutions, and inquisitions, and pensions.
Probert, thus armed, and accoutred,--and paid,--proceeded on his
adventure; but he was no sooner arrived on the confines of Wales than
all Wales was in arms to meet him. That nation is brave and full of
spirit. Since the invasion of King Edward, and the massacre of the
bards, there never was such a tumult and alarm and uproar through the
region of Prestatyn. Snowdon shook to its base; Cader-Idris was loosened
from its foundations. The fury of litigious war blew her horn on the
mountains. The rocks poured down their goatherds, and the deep caverns
vomited out their miners. Everything above ground and everything under
ground was in arms.
In short, Sir, to alight from my Welsh Pegasus, and to come to level
ground, the _Preux Chevalier_ Probert went to look for revenue, like his
masters upon other occasions, and, like his masters, he found rebellion.
But we were grown cautious by experience. A civil war of paper might end
in a more serious war; for now remonstrance met remonstrance, and
memorial was opposed to memorial. The wise Britons thought it more
reasonable that the poor, wasted, decrepit revenue of the principality
should die a natural than a violent death. In truth, Sir, the attempt
was no less an affront upon the understanding of that respectable people
than it was an attack on their property. They chose rather that their
ancient, moss-grown castles should moulder into decay, under the silent
touches of time, and the slow formality of an oblivious and drowsy
exchequer, than that they should be battered down all at once by the
lively efforts of a pensioned engineer. As it is the fortune of the
noble lord to whom the auspices of this campaign belonged frequently to
provoke resistance, so it is his rule and nature to yield to that
resistance _in all cases whatsoever_. He was true to himself on this
occasion. He submitted with spirit to the spirited remonstrances of the
Welsh. Mr. Probert gave up his adventure, and keeps his pension; and so
ends "the famous history of the revenue adventures of the bold Baron
North and the good Knight Probert upon the mountains of Venodotia."
In such a state is the exchequer of Wales at present, that, upon the
report of the Treasury itself, its _little_ revenue is _greatly_
diminished; and we see, by the whole of this strange transaction, that
an attempt to improve it produces resistance, the resistance produces
submission, and the whole ends in pension.[34]
It is nearly the same with the revenues of the Duchy of Lancaster. To do
nothing with them is extinction; to improve them is oppression. Indeed,
the whole of the estates which support these minor principalities is
made up, not of revenues, and rents, and profitable fines, but of
claims, of pretensions, of vexations, of litigations. They are
exchequers of unfrequent receipt and constant charge: a system of
finances not fit for an economist who would be rich, not fit for a
prince who would govern his subjects with equity and justice.
It is not only between prince and subject that these mock jurisdictions
and mimic revenues produce great mischief. They excite among the people
a spirit of informing and delating, a spirit of supplanting and
undermining one another: so that many, in such circumstances, conceive
it advantageous to them rather to continue subject to vexation
themselves than to give up the means and chance of vexing others. It is
exceedingly common for men to contract their love to their country into
an attachment to its petty subdivisions; and they sometimes even cling
to their provincial abuses, as if they were franchises and local
privileges. Accordingly, in places where there is much of this kind of
estate, persons will be always found who would rather trust to their
talents in recommending themselves to power for the renewal of their
interests, than to incumber their purses, though never so lightly, in
order to transmit independence to their posterity. It is a great
mistake, that the desire of securing property is universal among
mankind. Gaming is a principle inherent in human nature. It belongs to
us all. I would therefore break those tables; I would furnish no evil
occupation for that spirit. I would make every man look everywhere,
except to the intrigue of a court, for the improvement of his
circumstances or the security of his fortune. I have in my eye a very
strong case in the Duchy of Lancaster (which lately occupied Westminster
Hall and the House of Lords) as my voucher for many of these
reflections.[35]
For what plausible reason are these principalities suffered to exist?
When a government is rendered complex, (which in itself is no desirable
thing,) it ought to be for some political end which cannot be answered
otherwise. Subdivisions in government are only admissible in favor of
the dignity of inferior princes and high nobility, or for the support of
an aristocratic confederacy under some head, or for the conservation of
the franchises of the people in some privileged province. For the two
former of these ends, such are the subdivisions in favor of the
electoral and other princes in the Empire; for the latter of these
purposes are the jurisdictions of the Imperial cities and the Hanse
towns. For the latter of these ends are also the countries of the States
(_Pays d'États_) and certain cities and orders in France. These are all
regulations with an object, and some of them with a very good object.
But how are the principles of any of these subdivisions applicable in
the case before us?
Do they answer any purpose to the king? The Principality of Wales was
given by patent to Edward the Black Prince on the ground on which it has
since stood. Lord Coke sagaciously observes upon it, "That in the
charter of creating the Black Prince Edward Prince of Wales there is a
_great mystery_: for _less_ than an estate of inheritance so _great_ a
prince _could_ not have, and an _absolute estate of inheritance_ in so
_great_ a principality as Wales (this principality being _so dear_ to
him) he _should_ not have; and therefore it was made _sibi et heredibus
suis regibus Angliæ_, that by his decease, or attaining to the crown, it
might be extinguished in the crown."
For the sake of this foolish _mystery_, of what a great prince _could_
not have _less_ and _should_ not have _so much_, of a principality which
was too _dear_ to be given and too _great_ to be kept,--and for no other
cause that ever I could find,--this form and shadow of a principality,
without any substance, has been maintained. That you may judge in this
instance (and it serves for the rest) of the difference between a great
and a little economy, you will please to recollect, Sir, that Wales may
be about the tenth part of England in size and population, and certainly
not a hundredth part in opulence. Twelve judges perform the whole of
the business, both of the stationary and the itinerant justice of this
kingdom; but for Wales there are eight judges. There is in Wales an
exchequer, as well as in all the duchies, according to the very best and
most authentic absurdity of form. There are in all of them a hundred
more difficult trifles and laborious fooleries, which serve no other
purpose than to keep alive corrupt hope and servile dependence.
These principalities are so far from contributing to the ease of the
king, to his wealth, or his dignity, that they render both his supreme
and his subordinate authority perfectly ridiculous. It was but the other
day, that that pert, factious fellow, the Duke of Lancaster, presumed to
fly in the face of his liege lord, our gracious sovereign, and,
_associating_ with a parcel of lawyers as factious as himself, to the
destruction of _all law and order_, and _in committees leading directly
to rebellion_, presumed to go to law with the king. The object is
neither your business nor mine. Which of the parties got the better I
really forget. I think it was (as it ought to be) the king. The material
point is, that the suit cost about fifteen thousand pounds. But as the
Duke of Lancaster is but a sort of _Duke Humphrey_, and not worth a
groat, our sovereign was obliged to pay the costs of both. Indeed, this
art of converting a great monarch into a little prince, this royal
masquerading, is a very dangerous and expensive amusement, and one of
the king's _menus plaisirs_, which ought to be reformed. This duchy,
which is not worth four thousand pounds a year at best to _revenue_, is
worth forty or fifty thousand to _influence_.
The Duchy of Lancaster and the County Palatine of Lancaster answered, I
admit, some purpose in their original creation. They tended to make a
subject imitate a prince. When Henry the Fourth from that stair ascended
the throne, high-minded as he was, he was not willing to kick away the
ladder. To prevent that principality from being extinguished in the
crown, he severed it by act of Parliament. He had a motive, such as it
was: he thought his title to the crown unsound, and his possession
insecure. He therefore managed a retreat in his duchy, which Lord Coke
calls (I do not know why) "_par multis regnis_." He flattered himself
that it was practicable to make a projecting point half way down, to
break his fall from the precipice of royalty; as if it were possible for
one who had lost a kingdom to keep anything else. However, it is evident
that he thought so. When Henry the Fifth united, by act of Parliament,
the estates of his mother to the duchy, he had the same predilection
with his father to the root of his family honors, and the same policy in
enlarging the sphere of a possible retreat from the slippery royalty of
the two great crowns he held. All this was changed by Edward the Fourth.
He had no such family partialities, and his policy was the reverse of
that of Henry the Fourth and Henry the Fifth. He accordingly again
united the Duchy of Lancaster to the crown. But when Henry the Seventh,
who chose to consider himself as of the House of Lancaster, came to the
throne, he brought with him the old pretensions and the old politics of
that house. A new act of Parliament, a second time, dissevered the Duchy
of Lancaster from the crown; and in that line tilings continued until
the subversion of the monarchy, when principalities and powers fell
along with the throne. The Duchy of Lancaster must have been
extinguished, if Cromwell, who began to form ideas of aggrandizing his
house and raising the several branches of it, had not caused the duchy
to be again separated from the commonwealth, by an act of the Parliament
of those times.
What partiality, what objects of the politics of the House of Lancaster,
or of Cromwell, has his present Majesty, or his Majesty's family? What
power have they within any of these principalities, which they have not
within their kingdom? In what manner is the dignity of the nobility
concerned in these principalities? What rights have the subject there,
which they have not at least equally in every other part of the nation?
These distinctions exist for no good end to the king, to the nobility,
or to the people. They ought not to exist at all. If the crown (contrary
to its nature, but most conformably to the whole tenor of the advice
that has been lately given) should so far forget its dignity as to
contend that these jurisdictions and revenues are estates of private
property, I am rather for acting as if that groundless claim were of
some weight than for giving up that essential part of the reform. I
would value the clear income, and give a clear annuity to the crown,
taken on the medium produce for twenty years.
If the crown has any favorite name or title, if the subject has any
matter of local accommodation within any of these jurisdictions, it is
meant to preserve them,--and to improve them, if any improvement can be
suggested. As to the crown reversions or titles upon the property of the
people there, it is proposed to convert them from a snare to their
independence into a relief from their burdens. I propose, therefore, to
unite all the five principalities to the crown, and to its ordinary
jurisdiction,--to abolish all those offices that produce an useless and
chargeable separation from the body of the people,--to compensate those
who do not hold their offices (if any such there are) at the pleasure of
the crown,--to extinguish vexatious titles by an act of short
limitation,--to sell those unprofitable estates which support useless
jurisdictions,--and to turn the tenant-right into a fee, on such
moderate terms as will be better for the state than its present right,
and which it is impossible for any rational tenant to refuse.
As to the duchies, their judicial economy may be provided for without
charge. They have only to fall of course into the common county
administration. A commission more or less, made or omitted, settles the
matter fully. As to Wales, it has been proposed to add a judge to the
several courts of Westminster Hall; and it has been considered as an
improvement in itself. For my part, I cannot pretend to speak upon it
with clearness or with decision; but certainly this arrangement would be
more than sufficient for Wales. My original thought was, to suppress
five of the eight judges; and to leave the chief-justice of Chester,
with the two senior judges; and, to facilitate the business, to throw
the twelve counties into six districts, holding the sessions alternately
in the counties of which each district shall be composed. But on this I
shall be more clear, when I come to the particular bill.
Sir, the House will now see, whether, in praying for judgment against
the minor principalities, I do not act in conformity to the laws that I
had laid to myself: of getting rid of every jurisdiction more
subservient to oppression and expense than to any end of justice or
honest policy; of abolishing offices more expensive than useful; of
combining duties improperly separated; of changing revenues more
vexatious than productive into ready money; of suppressing offices which
stand in the way of economy; and of cutting off lurking subordinate
treasuries. Dispute the rules, controvert the application, or give your
hands to this salutary measure.
Most of the same rules will be found applicable to my second
object,--_the landed estate of the crown_. A landed estate is certainly
the very worst which the crown can possess. All minute and dispersed
possessions, possessions that are often of indeterminate value, and
which require a continued personal attendance, are of a nature more
proper for private management than public administration. They are
fitter for the care of a frugal land-steward than of an office in the
state. Whatever they may possibly have been in other times or in other
countries, they are not of magnitude enough with us to occupy a public
department, nor to provide for a public object. They are already given
up to Parliament, and the gift is not of great value. Common prudence
dictates, even in the management of private affairs, that all dispersed
and chargeable estates should be sacrificed to the relief of estates
more compact and better circumstanced.
If it be objected, that these lands at present would sell at a low
market, this is answered by showing that money is at a high price. The
one balances the other. Lands sell at the current rate; and nothing can
sell for more. But be the price what it may, a great object is always
answered, whenever any property is transferred from hands that are not
fit for that property to those that are. The buyer and seller must
mutually profit by such a bargain; and, what rarely happens in matters
of revenue, the relief of the subject will go hand in hand with the
profit of the Exchequer.
As to the _forest lands_, in which the crown has (where they are not
granted or prescriptively held) the _dominion_ of the _soil_, and the
_vert_ and _venison_, that is to say, the timber and the game, and in
which the people have a variety of rights, in common of herbage, and
other commons, according to the usage of the several forests,--I propose
to have those rights of the crown valued as manorial rights are valued
on an inclosure, and a defined portion of land to be given for them,
which land is to be sold for the public benefit.
As to the timber, I propose a survey of the whole. What is useless for
the naval purposes of the kingdom I would condemn and dispose of for the
security of what may be useful, and to inclose such other parts as may
be most fit to furnish a perpetual supply,--wholly extinguishing, for a
very obvious reason, all right of _venison_ in those parts.
The forest _rights_ which extend over the lands and possessions of
others, being of no profit to the crown, and a grievance, as far as it
goes, to the subject,--these I propose to extinguish without charge to
the proprietors. The several commons are to be allotted and compensated
for, upon ideas which I shall hereafter explain. They are nearly the
same with the principles upon which you have acted in private
inclosures. I shall never quit precedents, where I find them applicable.
For those regulations and compensations, and for every other part of the
detail, you will be so indulgent as to give me credit for the present.
The revenue to be obtained from the sale of the forest lands and rights
will not be so considerable, I believe, as many people have imagined;
and I conceive it would be unwise to screw it up to the utmost, or even
to suffer bidders to enhance, according to their eagerness, the purchase
of objects wherein the expense of that purchase may weaken the capital
to be employed in their cultivation. This, I am well aware, might give
room for partiality in the disposal. In my opinion it would be the
lesser evil of the two. But I really conceive that a rule of fair
preference might be established, which would take away all sort of
unjust and corrupt partiality. The principal revenue which I propose to
draw from these uncultivated wastes is to spring from the improvement
and population of the kingdom,--which never can happen without producing
an improvement more advantageous to the revenues of the crown than the
rents of the best landed estate which it can hold. I believe, Sir, it
will hardly be necessary for me to add, that in this sale I naturally
except all the houses, gardens, and parks belonging to the crown, and
such one forest as shall be chosen by his Majesty as best accommodated
to his pleasures.
By means of this part of the reform will fall the expensive office of
_surveyor-general,_ with all the influence that attends it. By this will
fall _two chief-justices in Eyre_, with all their train of dependants.
You need be under no apprehension, Sir, that your office is to be
touched in its emoluments. They are yours by law; and they are but a
moderate part of the compensation which is given to you for the ability
with which you execute an office of quite another sort of importance:
it is far from overpaying your diligence, or more than sufficient for
sustaining the high rank you stand in as the first gentleman of England.
As to the duties of your chief-justiceship, they are very different from
those for which you have received the office. Your dignity is too high
for a jurisdiction over wild beasts, and your learning and talents too
valuable to be wasted as chief-justice of a desert. I cannot reconcile
it to myself, that you, Sir, should be stuck up as a useless piece of
antiquity.
I have now disposed of the unprofitable landed estates of the crown, and
thrown them into the mass of private property; by which they will come,
through the course of circulation, and through the political secretions
of the state, into our better understood and better ordered revenues.
I come next to the great supreme body of the civil government itself. I
approach it with that awe and reverence with which a young physician
approaches to the cure of the disorders of his parent. Disorders, Sir,
and infirmities, there are,--such disorders, that all attempts towards
method, prudence, and frugality will be perfectly vain, whilst a system
of confusion remains, which is not only alien, but adverse to all
economy; a system which is not only prodigal in its very essence, but
causes everything else which belongs to it to be prodigally conducted.
It is impossible, Sir, for any person to be an economist, where no order
in payments is established; it is impossible for a man to be an
economist, who is not able to take a comparative view of his means and
of his expenses for the year which lies before him; it is impossible for
a man to be an economist, under whom various officers in their several
departments may spend--even just what they please,--and often with an
emulation of expense, as contributing to the importance, if not profit
of their several departments. Thus much is certain: that neither the
present nor any other First Lord of the Treasury has been ever able to
take a survey, or to make even a tolerable guess, of the expenses of
government for any one year, so as to enable him with the least degree
of certainty, or even probability, to bring his affairs within compass.
Whatever scheme may be formed upon them must be made on a calculation of
chances. As things are circumstanced, the First Lord of the Treasury
cannot make an estimate. I am sure I serve the king, and I am sure I
assist administration, by putting economy at least in their power. We
must _class services_; we must (as far as their nature admits)
_appropriate_ funds; or everything, however reformed, will fall again
into the old confusion.
Coming upon this ground of the civil list, the first thing in dignity
and charge that attracts our notice is the _royal household_. This
establishment, in my opinion, is exceedingly abusive in its
constitution. It is formed upon manners and customs that have long since
expired. In the first place, it is formed, in many respects, upon
_feudal principles_. In the feudal times, it was not uncommon, even
among subjects, for the lowest offices to be held by considerable
persons,--persons as unfit by their incapacity as improper from their
rank to occupy such employments. They were held by patent, sometimes for
life, and sometimes by inheritance. If my memory does not deceive me, a
person of no slight consideration held the office of patent hereditary
cook to an Earl of Warwick: the Earl of Warwick's soups, I fear, were
not the better for the dignity of his kitchen. I think it was an Earl of
Gloucester who officiated as steward of the household to the Archbishops
of Canterbury. Instances of the same kind may in some degree be found in
the Northumberland house-book, and other family records. There was some
reason in ancient necessities for these ancient customs. Protection was
wanted; and the domestic tie, though not the highest, was the closest.
The king's household has not only several strong traces of this
_feudality_, but it is formed also upon the principles of a _body
corporate_: it has its own magistrates, courts, and by-laws. This might
be necessary in the ancient times, in order to have a government within
itself, capable of regulating the vast and often unruly multitude which
composed and attended it. This was the origin of the ancient court
called the _Green Cloth_,--composed of the marshal, treasurer, and other
great officers of the household, with certain clerks. The rich subjects
of the kingdom, who had formerly the same establishments, (only on a
reduced scale,) have since altered their economy, and turned the course
of their expense from the maintenance of vast establishments within
their walls to the employment of a great variety of independent trades
abroad. Their influence is lessened; but a mode of accommodation and a
style of splendor suited to the manners of the times has been increased.
Royalty itself has insensibly followed, and the royal household has been
carried away by the resistless tide of manners, but with this very
material difference: private men have got rid of the establishments
along with the reasons of them; whereas the royal household has lost all
that was stately and venerable in the antique manners, without
retrenching anything of the cumbrous charge of a Gothic establishment.
It is shrunk into the polished littleness of modern elegance and
personal accommodation; it has evaporated from the gross concrete into
an essence and rectified spirit of expense, where you have tuns of
ancient pomp in a vial of modern luxury.
But when the reason of old establishments is gone, it is absurd to
preserve nothing but the burden of them. This is superstitiously to
embalm a carcass not worth an ounce of the gums that are used to
preserve it. It is to burn precious oils in the tomb; it is to offer
meat and drink to the dead: not so much an honor to the deceased as a
disgrace to the survivors. Our palaces are vast inhospitable halls.
There the bleak winds, there "Boreas, and Eurus, and Caurus, and
Argestes loud," howling through the vacant lobbies, and clattering the
doors of deserted guardrooms, appall the imagination, and conjure up the
grim spectres of departed tyrants,--the Saxon, the Norman, and the
Dane,--the stern Edwards and fierce Henrys,--who stalk from desolation
to desolation, through the dreary vacuity and melancholy succession of
chill and comfortless chambers. When this tumult subsides, a dead and
still more frightful silence would reign in this desert, if every now
and then the tacking of hammers did not announce that those constant
attendants upon all courts in all ages, jobs, were still alive,--for
whose sake alone it is that any trace of ancient grandeur is suffered to
remain. These palaces are a true emblem of some governments: the
inhabitants are decayed, but the governors and magistrates still
flourish. They put me in mind of Old Sarum, where the representatives,
more in number than the constituents, only serve to inform us that this
was once a place of trade, and sounding with "the busy hum of men,"
though now you can only trace the streets by the color of the corn, and
its sole manufacture is in members of Parliament.
These old establishments were formed also on a third principle, still
more adverse to the living economy of the age. They were formed, Sir, on
the principle of _purveyance_ and _receipt in kind_. In former days,
when the household was vast, and the supply scanty and precarious, the
royal purveyors, sallying forth from under the Gothic portcullis to
purchase provision with power and prerogative instead of money, brought
home the plunder of an hundred markets, and all that could be seized
from a flying and hiding country, and deposited their spoil in an
hundred caverns, with each its keeper. There, every commodity, received
in its rawest condition, went through all the process which fitted it
for use. This inconvenient receipt produced an economy suited only to
itself. It multiplied offices beyond all measure,--buttery, pantry, and
all that rabble of places, which, though profitable to the holders, and
expensive to the state, are almost too mean to mention.
All this might be, and I believe was, necessary at first; for it is
remarkable, that _purveyance_, after its regulation had been the subject
of a long line of statutes, (not fewer, I think, than twenty-six,) was
wholly taken away by the 12th of Charles the Second; yet in the next
year of the same reign it was found necessary to revive it by a special
act of Parliament, for the sake of the king's journeys. This, Sir, is
curious, and what would hardly he expected in so reduced a court as
that of Charles the Second and in so improved a country as England might
then be thought. But so it was. In our time, one well-filled and
well-covered stage-coach requires more accommodation than a royal
progress, and every district, at an hour's warning, can supply an army.
I do not say, Sir, that all these establishments, whose principle is
gone, have been systematically kept up for influence solely: neglect had
its share. But this I am sure of: that a consideration of influence has
hindered any one from attempting to pull them down. For the purposes of
influence, and for those purposes only, are retained half at least of
the household establishments. No revenue, no, not a royal revenue, can
exist under the accumulated charge of ancient establishment, modern
luxury, and Parliamentary political corruption.
If, therefore, we aim at regulating this household, the question will
be, whether we ought to economize by _detail_ or by _principle_. The
example we have had of the success of an attempt to economize by detail,
and under establishments adverse to the attempt, may tend to decide this
question.
At the beginning of his Majesty's reign, Lord Talbot came to the
administration of a great department in the household. I believe no man
ever entered into his Majesty's service, or into the service of any
prince, with a more clear integrity, or with more zeal and affection for
the interest of his master, and, I must add, with abilities for a still
higher service. Economy was then announced as a maxim of the reign. This
noble lord, therefore, made several attempts towards a reform. In the
year 1777, when the king's civil list debts came last to be paid, he
explained very fully the success of his undertaking. He told the House
of Lords that he had attempted to reduce the charges of the king's
tables and his kitchen. The thing, Sir, was not below him. He knew that
there is nothing interesting in the concerns of men whom we love and
honor, that is beneath our attention. "Love," says one of our old poets,
"esteems no office mean,"--and with still more spirit, "Entire affection
scorneth nicer hands." Frugality, Sir, is founded on the principle, that
all riches have limits. A royal household, grown enormous, even in the
meanest departments, may weaken and perhaps destroy all energy in the
highest offices of the state. The gorging a royal kitchen may stint and
famish the negotiations of a kingdom. Therefore the object was worthy of
his, was worthy of any man's attention.
In consequence of this noble lord's resolution, (as he told the other
House,) he reduced several tables, and put the persons entitled to them
upon board wages, much to their own satisfaction. But, unluckily,
subsequent duties requiring constant attendance, it was not possible to
prevent their being fed where they were employed: and thus this first
step towards economy doubled the expense.
There was another disaster far more doleful than this. I shall state it,
as the cause of that misfortune lies at the bottom of almost all our
prodigality. Lord Talbot attempted to reform the kitchen; but such, as
he well observed, is the consequence of having duty done by one person
whilst another enjoys the emoluments, that he found himself frustrated
in all his designs. On that rock his whole adventure split, his whole
scheme of economy was dashed to pieces. His department became more
expensive than ever; the civil list debt accumulated. Why? It was truly
from a cause which, though perfectly adequate to the effect, one would
not have instantly guessed. It was because _the turnspit in the king's
kitchen was a member of Parliament_![36] The king's domestic servants
were all undone, his tradesmen remained unpaid and became
bankrupt,--_because the turnspit of the king's kitchen was a member of
Parliament_. His Majesty's slumbers were interrupted, his pillow was
stuffed with thorns, and his peace of mind entirely broken,--_because
the king's turnspit was a member of Parliament_. The judges were unpaid,
the justice of the kingdom bent and gave way, the foreign ministers
remained inactive and unprovided, the system of Europe was dissolved,
the chain of our alliances was broken, all the wheels of government at
home and abroad were stopped,--_because the king's turnspit was a member
of Parliament_.
Such, Sir, was the situation of affairs, and such the cause of that
situation, when his Majesty came a second time to Parliament to desire
the payment of those debts which the employment of its members in
various offices, visible and invisible, had occasioned. I believe that a
like fate will attend every attempt at economy by detail, under similar,
circumstances, and in every department. A complex, operose office of
account and control is, in itself, and even if members of Parliament had
nothing to do with it, the most prodigal of all things. The most
audacious robberies or the most subtle frauds would never venture upon
such a waste as an over-careful detailed guard against them will
infallibly produce. In our establishments, we frequently see an office
of account of an hundred pounds a year expense, and another office of an
equal expense to control that office, and the whole upon a matter that
is not worth twenty shillings.
To avoid, therefore, this minute care, which produces the consequences
of the most extensive neglect, and to oblige members of Parliament to
attend to public cares, and not to the servile offices of domestic
management, I propose, Sir, to _economize by principle_: that is, I
propose to put affairs into that train which experience points out as
the most effectual, from the nature of things, and from the constitution
of the human mind. In all dealings, where it is possible, the principles
of radical economy prescribe three things: first, undertaking by the
great; secondly, engaging with persons of skill in the subject-matter;
thirdly, engaging with those who shall have an immediate and direct
interest in the proper execution of the business.
To avoid frittering and crumbling down the attention by a blind,
unsystematic observance of every trifle, it has ever been found the best
way to do all things which are great in the total amount and minute in
the component parts by a _general contrast_. The principles of trade
have so pervaded every species of dealing, from the highest to the
lowest objects, all transactions are got so much into system, that we
may, at a moment's warning, and to a farthing value, be informed at what
rate any service may be supplied. No dealing is exempt from the
possibility of fraud. But by a contract on a matter certain you have
this advantage: you are sure to know the utmost _extent_ of the fraud to
which you are subject. By a contract with a person in _his own trade_
you are sure you shall not suffer by _want of skill._ By a _short_
contract you are sure of making it the _interest_ of the contractor to
exert that skill for the satisfaction of his employers.
I mean to derogate nothing from the diligence or integrity of the
present, or of any former board of Green Cloth. But what skill can
members of Parliament obtain in that low kind of province? What pleasure
can they have in the execution of that kind of duty? And if they should
neglect it, how does it affect their interest, when we know that it is
their vote in Parliament, and not their diligence in cookery or
catering, that recommends them to their office, or keeps them in it?
I therefore propose that the king's tables (to whatever number of
tables, or covers to each, he shall think proper to command) should be
classed by the steward of the household, and should be contracted for,
according to their rank, by the head or cover; that the estimate and
circumstance of the contract should be carried to the Treasury to be
approved; and that its faithful and satisfactory performance should be
reported there previous to any payment; that there, and there only,
should the payment be made. I propose that men should be contracted with
only in their proper trade; and that no member of Parliament should be
capable of such contract. By this plan, almost all the infinite offices
under the lord steward may be spared,--to the extreme simplification,
and to the far better execution, of every one of his functions. The king
of Prussia is so served. He is a great and eminent (though, indeed, a
very rare) instance of the possibility of uniting, in a mind of vigor
and compass, an attention to minute objects with the largest views and
the most complicated plans. His tables are served by contract, and by
the head. Let me say, that no prince can be ashamed to imitate the king
of Prussia, and particularly to learn in his school, when the problem
is, "The best manner of reconciling the state of a court with the
support of war." Other courts, I understand, have followed his with
effect, and to their satisfaction.
The same clew of principle leads us through the labyrinth of the other
departments. What, Sir, is there in the office of _the great wardrobe_
(which has the care of the king's furniture) that may not be executed by
the lord chamberlain himself? He has an honorable appointment; he has
time sufficient to attend to the duty; and he has the vice-chamberlain
to assist him. Why should not he deal also by contract for all things
belonging to this office, and carry his estimates first, and his report
of the execution in its proper time, for payment, directly to the Board
of Treasury itself? By a simple operation, (containing in it a treble
control,) the expenses of a department which for naked walls, or walls
hung with cobwebs, has in a few years cost the crown 150,000_l._, may
at length hope for regulation. But, Sir, the office and its business are
at variance. As it stands, it serves, not to furnish the palace with its
hangings, but the Parliament with its dependent members.
To what end, Sir, does the office of _removing wardrobe_ serve at all?
Why should a _jewel office_ exist for the sole purpose of taxing the
king's gifts of plate? Its object falls naturally within the
chamberlain's province, and ought to be under his care and inspection
without any fee. Why should an office of the _robes_ exist, when that
of _groom, of the stole_ is a sinecure, and that this is a proper object
of his department?
All these incumbrances, which are themselves nuisances, produce other
incumbrances and other nuisances. For the payment of these useless
establishments there are no less than _three useless treasurers_: two to
hold a purse, and one to play with a stick. The treasurer of the
household is a mere name. The cofferer and the treasurer of the chamber
receive and pay great sums, which it is not at all necessary _they_
should either receive or pay. All the proper officers, servants, and
tradesmen may be enrolled in their several departments, and paid in
proper classes and times with great simplicity and order, at the
Exchequer, and by direction from the Treasury.
The _Board of Works_, which in the seven years preceding 1777 has cost
towards 400,000_l._,[37] and (if I recollect rightly) has not cost less
in proportion from the beginning of the reign, is under the very same
description of all the other ill-contrived establishments, and calls for
the very same reform. We are to seek for the visible signs of all this
expense. For all this expense, we do not see a building of the size and
importance of a pigeon-house. Buckingham House was reprised by a bargain
with the public for one hundred thousand pounds; and the small house at
Windsor has been, if I mistake not, undertaken since that account was
brought before us. The good works of that Board of Works are as
carefully concealed as other good works ought to be: they are perfectly
invisible. But though it is the perfection of charity to be concealed,
it is, Sir, the property and glory of magnificence to appear and stand
forward to the eye.
That board, which ought to be a concern of builders and such like, and
of none else, is turned into a junto of members of Parliament. That
office, too, has a treasury and a paymaster of its own; and lest the
arduous affairs of that important exchequer should be too fatiguing,
that paymaster has a deputy to partake his profits and relieve his
cares. I do not believe, that, either now or in former times, the chief
managers of that board have made any profit of its abuse. It is,
however, no good reason that an abusive establishment should subsist,
because it is of as little private as of public advantage. But this
establishment has the grand radical fault, the original sin, that
pervades and perverts all our establishments: the apparatus is not
fitted to the object, nor the workmen to the work. Expenses are incurred
on the private opinion of an inferior establishment, without consulting
the principal, who can alone determine the proportion which it ought to
bear to the other establishments of the state, in the order of their
relative importance.
I propose, therefore, along with the rest, to pull down this whole
ill-contrived scaffolding, which obstructs, rather than forwards, our
public works; to take away its treasury; to put the whole into the hands
of a real builder, who shall not be a member of Parliament; and to
oblige him, by a previous estimate and final payment, to appear twice at
the Treasury before the public can be loaded. The king's gardens are to
come under a similar regulation.
The _Mint_, though not a department of the household, has the same
vices. It is a great expense to the nation, chiefly for the sake of
members of Parliament. It has its officers of parade and dignity. It has
its treasury, too. It is a sort of corporate body, and formerly was a
body of great importance,--as much so, on the then scale of things, and
the then order of business, as the Bank is at this day. It was the great
centre of money transactions and remittances for our own and for other
nations, until King Charles the First, among other arbitrary projects
dictated by despotic necessity, made it withhold the money that lay
there for remittance. That blow (and happily, too) the Mint never
recovered. Now it is no bank, no remittance-shop. The Mint, Sir, is a
_manufacture_, and it is nothing else; and it ought to be undertaken
upon the principles of a manufacture,--that is, for the best and
cheapest execution, by a contract upon proper securities and under
proper regulations.
The _artillery_ is a far greater object; it is a military concern; but
having an affinity and kindred in its defects with the establishments I
am now speaking of, I think it best to speak of it along with them. It
is, I conceive, an establishment not well suited to its martial, though
exceedingly well calculated for its Parliamentary purposes. Here there
is a treasury, as in all the other inferior departments of government.
Here the military is subordinate to the civil, and the naval confounded
with the land service. The object, indeed, is much the same in both.
But, when the detail is examined, it will be found that they had better
be separated. For a reform of this office, I propose to restore things
to what (all considerations taken together) is their natural order: to
restore them to their just proportion, and to their just distribution.
I propose, in this military concern, to render the civil subordinate to
the military; and this will annihilate the greatest part of the expense,
and all the influence belonging to the office. I propose to send the
military branch to the army, and the naval to the Admiralty; and I
intend to perfect and accomplish the whole detail (where it becomes too
minute and complicated for legislature, and requires exact, official,
military, and mechanical knowledge) by a commission of competent
officers in both departments. I propose to execute by contract what by
contract can be executed, and to bring, as much as possible, all
estimates to be previously approved and finally to be paid by the
Treasury.
Thus, by following the course of Nature, and not the purposes of
politics, or the accumulated patchwork of occasional accommodation, this
vast, expensive department may be methodized, its service proportioned
to its necessities, and its payments subjected to the inspection of the
superior minister of finance, who is to judge of it on the result of the
total collective exigencies of the state. This last is a reigning
principle through my whole plan; and it is a principle which I hope may
hereafter be applied to other plans.
By these regulations taken together, besides the three subordinate
treasuries in the lesser principalities, five other subordinate
treasuries are suppressed. There is taken away the whole _establishment
of detail_ in the household: the _treasurer_; the _comptroller_ (for a
comptroller is hardly necessary where there is no treasurer); the
_cofferer of the household_; the _treasurer of the chamber_; the _master
of the household_; the whole _board of green cloth_;--and a vast number
of subordinate offices in the department of the _steward of the
household_,--the whole establishment of the _great wardrobe_,--the
_removing wardrobe_,--the _jewel office_,--the _robes_,--the _Board of
Works_,--almost the whole charge of the _civil branch_ of the _Board of
Ordnance_, are taken away. All these arrangements together will be found
to relieve the nation from a vast weight of influence, without
distressing, but rather by forwarding every public service. When
something of this kind is done, then the public may begin to breathe.
Under other governments, a question of expense is only a question of
economy, and it is nothing more: with us, in every question of expense
there is always a mixture of constitutional considerations.
It is, Sir, because I wish to keep this business of subordinate
treasuries as much as I can together, that I brought the _ordnance
office_ before you, though it is properly a military department. For the
same reason I will now trouble you with my thoughts and propositions
upon two of the greatest _under-treasuries_: I mean the office of
_paymaster of the land forces_, or _treasurer of the army_, and that of
the _treasurer of the navy_. The former of these has long been a great
object of public suspicion and uneasiness. Envy, too, has had its share
in the obloquy which is cast upon this office. But I am sure that it has
no share at all in the reflections I shall make upon it, or in the
reformations that I shall propose. I do not grudge to the honorable
gentleman who at present holds the office any of the effects of his
talents, his merit, or his fortune. He is respectable in all these
particulars. I follow the constitution of the office without persecuting
its holder. It is necessary in all matters of public complaint, where
men frequently feel right and argue wrong, to separate prejudice from
reason, and to be very sure, in attempting the redress of a grievance,
that we hit upon its real seat and its true nature. Where there is an
abuse in office, the first thing that occurs in heat is to censure the
officer. Our natural disposition leads all our inquiries rather to
persons than to things. But this prejudice is to be corrected by maturer
thinking.
Sir, the profits of the _pay office_ (as an office) are not too great,
in my opinion, for its duties, and for the rank of the person who has
generally held it. He has been generally a person of the highest
rank,--that is to say, a person of eminence and consideration in this
House. The great and the invidious profits of the pay office are from
the _bank_ that is held in it. According to the present course of the
office, and according to the present mode of accounting there, this bank
must necessarily exist somewhere. Money is a productive thing; and when
the usual time of its demand can be tolerably calculated, it may with
prudence be safely laid out to the profit of the holder. It is on this
calculation that the business of banking proceeds. But no profit can be
derived from the use of money which does not make it the interest of the
holder to delay his account. The process of the Exchequer colludes with
this interest. Is this collusion from its want of rigor and strictness
and great regularity of form? The reverse is true. They have in the
Exchequer brought rigor and formalism to their ultimate perfection. The
process against accountants is so rigorous, and in a manner so unjust,
that correctives must from time to time be applied to it. These
correctives being discretionary, upon the case, and generally remitted
by the Barons to the Lords of the Treasury, as the test judges of the
reasons for respite, hearings are had, delays are produced, and thus the
extreme of rigor in office (as usual in all human affairs) leads to the
extreme of laxity. What with the interested delay of the officer, the
ill-conceived exactness of the court, the applications for dispensations
from that exactness, the revival of rigorous process after the
expiration of the time, and the new rigors producing new applications
and new enlargements of time, such delays happen in the public accounts
that they can scarcely ever be closed.
Besides, Sir, they have a rule in the Exchequer, which, I believe, they
have founded upon a very ancient statute, that of the 51st of Henry the
Third, by which it is provided, that, "when a sheriff or bailiff hath
begun his account, none other shall be received to account, until he
that was first appointed hath clearly accounted, and that the sum has
been received."[38] Whether this clause of that statute be the ground of
that absurd practice I am not quite able to ascertain. But it has very
generally prevailed, though I am told that of late they have began to
relax from it. In consequence of forms adverse to substantial account,
we have a long succession of paymasters and their representatives who
have never been admitted to account, although perfectly ready to do so.
As the extent of our wars has scattered the accountants under the
paymaster into every part of the globe, the grand and sure paymaster,
Death, in all his shapes, calls these accountants to another reckoning.
Death, indeed, domineers over everything but the forms of the Exchequer.
Over these he has no power. They are impassive and immortal. The audit
of the Exchequer, more severe than the audit to which the accountants
are gone, demands proofs which in the nature of things are difficult,
sometimes impossible, to be had. In this respect, too, rigor, as usual,
defeats itself. Then the Exchequer never gives a particular receipt, or
clears a man of his account as far as it goes. A final acquittance (or a
_quietus_, as they term it) is scarcely ever to be obtained. Terrors and
ghosts of unlaid accountants haunt the houses of their children from
generation to generation. Families, in the course of succession, fall
into minorities; the inheritance comes into the hands of females; and
very perplexed affairs are often delivered over into the hands of
negligent guardians and faithless stewards. So that the demand remains,
when the advantage of the money is gone,--if ever any advantage at all
has been made of it. This is a cause of infinite distress to families,
and becomes a source of influence to an extent that can scarcely be
imagined, but by those who have taken some pains to trace it. The
mildness of government, in the employment of useless and dangerous
powers, furnishes no reason for their continuance.
As things stand, can you in justice (except perhaps in that over-perfect
kind of justice which has obtained by its merits the title of the
opposite vice[39]) insist that any man should, by the course of his
office, keep a _bank_ from whence he is to derive no advantage? that a
man should be subject to demands below and be in a manner refused an
acquittance above, that he should transmit an original sin and
inheritance of vexation to his posterity, without a power of
compensating himself in some way or other for so perilous a situation?
We know, that, if the paymaster should deny himself the advantages of
his bank, the public, as things stand, is not the richer for it by a
single shilling. This I thought it necessary to say as to the offensive
magnitude of the profits of this office, that we may proceed in
reformation on the principles of reason, and not on the feelings of
envy.
The treasurer of the navy is, _mutatis mutandis_, in the same
circumstances. Indeed, all accountants are. Instead of the present mode,
which is troublesome to the officer and unprofitable to the public, I
propose to substitute something more effectual than rigor, which is the
worst exactor in the world. I mean to remove the very temptations to
delay; to facilitate the account; and to transfer this bank, now of
private emolument, to the public. The crown will suffer no wrong at
least from the pay offices; and its terrors will no longer reign over
the families of those who hold or have held them. I propose that these
offices should be no longer _banks_ or _treasuries_, but mere _offices
of administration_. I propose, first, that the present paymaster and the
treasurer of the navy should carry into the Exchequer the whole body of
the vouchers for what they have paid over to deputy-paymasters, to
regimental agents, or to any of those to whom they have and ought to
have paid money. I propose that those vouchers shall be admitted as
actual payments in their accounts, and that the persons to whom the
money has been paid shall then stand charged in the Exchequer in their
place. After this process, they shall be debited or charged for nothing
but the money-balance that remains in their hands.
I am conscious, Sir, that, if this balance (which they could not expect
to be so suddenly demanded by any usual process of the Exchequer) should
now be exacted all at once, not only their ruin, but a ruin of others to
an extent which I do not like to think of, but which I can well
conceive, and which you may well conceive, might be the consequence. I
told you, Sir, when I promised before the holidays to bring in this
plan, that I never would suffer any man or description of men to suffer
from errors that naturally have grown out of the abusive constitution of
those offices which I propose to regulate. If I cannot reform with
equity, I will not reform at all.
For the regulation of past accounts, I shall therefore propose such a
mode, as men, temperate and prudent, make use of in the management of
their private affairs, when their accounts are various, perplexed, and
of long standing. I would therefore, after their example, divide the
public debts into three sorts,--good, bad, and doubtful. In looking over
the public accounts, I should never dream of the blind mode of the
Exchequer, which regards things in the abstract, and knows no difference
in the quality of its debts or the circumstances of its debtors. By this
means it fatigues itself, it vexes others, it often crushes the poor, it
lets escape the rich, or, in a fit of mercy or carelessness, declines
all means of recovering its just demands. Content with the eternity of
its claims, it enjoys its Epicurean divinity with Epicurean languor. But
it is proper that all sorts of accounts should be closed some time or
other,--by payment, by composition, or by oblivion. _Expedit reipublicæ
ut sit finis litium_. Constantly taking along with me, that an extreme
rigor is sure to arm everything against it, and at length to relax into
a supine neglect, I propose, Sir, that even the best, soundest, and the
most recent dents should be put into instalments, for the mutual benefit
of the accountant and the public.
In proportion, however, as I am tender of the past, I would be provident
of the future. All money that was formerly imprested to the two great
_pay offices_ I would have imprested in future to the _Bank of England_.
These offices should in future receive no more than cash sufficient for
small payments. Their other payments ought to be made by drafts on the
Bank, expressing the service. A check account from both offices, of
drafts and receipts, should be annually made up in the
Exchequer,--charging the Bank in account with the cash balance, but not
demanding the payment until there is an order from the Treasury, in
consequence of a vote of Parliament.
As I did not, Sir, deny to the paymaster the natural profits of the bank
that was in his hands, so neither would I to the Bank of England. A
share of that profit might be derived to the public in various ways. My
favorite mode is this: that, in compensation for the use of this money,
the bank may take upon themselves, first, _the charge of the Mint_, to
which they are already, by their charter, obliged to bring in a great
deal of bullion annually to be coined. In the next place, I mean that
they should take upon themselves the charge of _remittances to our
troops abroad_. This is a species of dealing from which, by the same
charter, they are not debarred. One and a quarter per cent will be saved
instantly thereby to the public on very large sums of money. This will
be at once a matter of economy and a considerable reduction of
influence, by taking away a private contract of an expensive nature. If
the Bank, which is a great corporation, and of course receives the least
profits from the money in their custody, should of itself refuse or be
persuaded to refuse this offer upon those terms, I can speak with some
confidence that one at least, if not both parts of the condition would
be received, and gratefully received, by several bankers of eminence.
There is no banker who will not be at least as good security as any
paymaster of the forces, or any treasurer of the navy, that have ever
been bankers to the public: as rich at least as my Lord Chatham, or my
Lord Holland, or either of the honorable gentlemen who now hold the
offices, were at the time that they entered into them; or as ever the
whole establishment of the Mint has been at any period.
These, Sir, are the outlines of the plan I mean to follow, in
suppressing these two large subordinate treasuries. I now come to
another subordinate treasury,--I mean that of the _paymaster of the
pensions_; for which purpose I reënter the limits of the civil
establishment: I departed from those limits in pursuit of a principle;
and, following the same game in its doubles, I am brought into those
limits again. That treasury and that office I mean to take away, and to
transfer the payment of every name, mode, and denomination of pensions
to the Exchequer. The present course of diversifying the same object can
answer no good purpose, whatever its use may be to purposes of another
kind. There are also other lists of pensions; and I mean that they
should all be hereafter paid at one and the same place. The whole of
the new consolidated list I mean to reduce to 60,000_l._ a year, which
sum I intend it shall never exceed. I think that sum will fully answer
as a reward to all real merit and a provision for all real public
charity that is ever like to be placed upon the list. If any merit of an
extraordinary nature should emerge before that reduction is completed, I
have left it open for an address of either House of Parliament to
provide for the case. To all other demands it must be answered, with
regret, but with firmness, "The public is poor."
I do not propose, as I told you before Christmas, to take away any
pension. I know that the public seem to call for a reduction of such of
them as shall appear unmerited. As a censorial act, and punishment of an
abuse, it might answer some purpose. But this can make no part of _my_
plan. I mean to proceed by bill; and I cannot stop for such an inquiry.
I know some gentlemen may blame me. It is with great submission to
better judgments that I recommend it to consideration, that a critical
retrospective examination of the pension list, upon the principle of
merit, can never serve for my basis. It cannot answer, according to my
plan, any effectual purpose of economy, or of future, permanent
reformation. The process in any way will be entangled and difficult, and
it will be infinitely slow: there is a danger, that, if we turn our line
of march, now directed towards the grand object, into this more
laborious than useful detail of operations, we shall never arrive at our
end.
The king, Sir, has been by the Constitution appointed sole judge of the
merit for which a pension is to be given. We have a right, undoubtedly,
to canvass this, as we have to canvass every act of government. But
there is a material difference between an office to be reformed and a
pension taken away for demerit. In the former case, no charge is implied
against the holder; in the latter, his character is slurred, as well as
his lawful emolument affected. The former process is against the thing;
the second, against the person. The pensioner certainly, if he pleases,
has a right to stand on his own defence, to plead his possession, and to
bottom his title in the competency of the crown to give him what he
holds. Possessed and on the defensive as he is, he will not be obliged
to prove his special merit, in order to justify the act of legal
discretion, now turned into his property, according to his tenure. The
very act, he will contend, is a legal presumption, and an implication of
his merit. If this be so, from the natural force of all legal
presumption, he would put us to the difficult proof that he has no merit
at all. But other questions would arise in the course of such an
inquiry,--that is, questions of the merit when weighed against the
proportion of the reward; then the difficulty will be much greater.
The difficulty will not, Sir, I am afraid, be much less, if we pass to
the person really guilty in the question of an unmerited pension: the
minister himself. I admit, that, when called to account for the
execution of a trust, he might fairly be obliged to prove the
affirmative, and to state the merit for which the pension is given,
though on the pensioner himself such a process would be hard. If in this
examination we proceed methodically, and so as to avoid all suspicion of
partiality and prejudice, we must take the pensions in order of time,
or merely alphabetically. The very first pension to which we come, in
either of these ways, may appear the most grossly unmerited of any. But
the minister may very possibly show that he knows nothing of the putting
on this pension; that it was prior in time to his administration; that
the minister who laid it on is dead: and then we are thrown back upon
the pensioner himself, and plunged into all our former difficulties.
Abuses, and gross ones, I doubt not, would appear, and to the correction
of which I would readily give my hand: but when I consider that pensions
have not generally been affected by the revolutions of ministry; as I
know not where such inquiries would stop; and as an absence of merit is
a negative and loose thing;--one might be led to derange the order of
families founded on the probable continuance of their kind of income; I
might hurt children; I might injure creditors;--I really think it the
more prudent course not to follow the letter of the petitions. If we fix
this mode of inquiry as a basis, we shall, I fear, end as Parliament has
often ended under similar circumstances. There will be great delay, much
confusion, much inequality in our proceedings. But what presses me most
of all is this: that, though we should strike off all the unmerited
pensions, while the power of the crown remains unlimited, the very same
undeserving persons might afterwards return to the very same list; or,
if they did not, other persons, meriting as little as they do, might be
put upon it to an undefinable amount. This, I think, is the pinch of the
grievance.
For these reasons, Sir, I am obliged to waive this mode of proceeding as
any part of my plan. In a plan of reformation, it would be one of my
maxims, that, when I know of an establishment which may be subservient
to useful purposes, and which at the same time, from its discretionary
nature, is liable to a very great perversion from those purposes, _I
would limit the quantity of the power that might be so abused_. For I am
sure that in all such cases the rewards of merit will have very narrow
bounds, and that partial or corrupt favor will be infinite. This
principle is not arbitrary, but the limitation of the specific quantity
must be so in some measure. I therefore state 60,000_l._, leaving it
open to the House to enlarge or contract the sum as they shall see, on
examination, that the discretion I use is scanty or liberal. The whole
amount of the pensions of all denominations which have been laid before
us amount, for a period of seven years, to considerably more than
100,000_l._ a year. To what the other lists amount I know not. That
will be seen hereafter. But from those that do appear, a saving will
accrue to the public, at one time or other, of 40,000_l._ a year; and
we had better, in my opinion, to let it fall in naturally than to tear
it crude and unripe from the stalk.[40]
There is a great deal of uneasiness among the people upon an article
which I must class under the head of pensions: I mean the _great patent
offices in the Exchequer_. They are in reality and substance no other
than pensions, and in no other light shall I consider them. They are
sinecures; they are always executed by deputy; the duty of the principal
is as nothing. They differ, however, from the pensions on the list in
some particulars. They are held for life. I think, with the public, that
the profits of those places are grown enormous; the magnitude of those
profits, and the nature of them, both call for reformation. The nature
of their profits, which grow out of the public distress, is itself
invidious and grievous. But I fear that reform cannot be immediate. I
find myself under a restriction. These places, and others of the same
kind, which are held for life, have been considered as property. They
have been given as a provision for children; they have been the subject
of family settlements; they have been the security of creditors. What
the law respects shall be sacred to me. If the barriers of law should be
broken down, upon ideas of convenience, even of public convenience, we
shall have no longer anything certain among us. If the discretion of
power is once let loose upon property, we can be at no loss to determine
whose power and what discretion it is that will prevail at last. It
would be wise to attend upon the order of things, and not to attempt to
outrun the slow, but smooth and even course of Nature. There are
occasions, I admit, of public necessity, so vast, so clear, so evident,
that they supersede all laws. Law, being only made for the benefit of
the community, cannot in any one of its parts resist a demand which may
comprehend the total of the public interest. To be sure, no law can set
itself up against the cause and reason of all law; but such a case very
rarely happens, and this most certainly is not such a case. The mere
time of the reform is by no means worth the sacrifice of a principle of
law. Individuals pass like shadows; but the commonwealth is fixed and
stable. The difference, therefore, of to-day and to-morrow, which to
private people is immense, to the state is nothing. At any rate, it is
better, if possible, to reconcile our economy with our laws than to set
them at variance,--a quarrel which in the end must be destructive to
both.
My idea, therefore, is, to reduce those offices to fixed salaries, as
the present lives and reversions shall successively fall. I mean, that
the office of the great auditor (the auditor of the receipt) shall be
reduced to 3000_l._ a year; and the auditors of the imprest, and the
rest of the principal officers, to fixed appointments of 1,500_l._ a
year each. It will not be difficult to calculate the value of this fall
of lives to the public, when we shall have obtained a just account of
the present income of those places; and we shall obtain that account
with great facility, if the present possessors are not alarmed with any
apprehension of danger to their freehold office.
I know, too, that it will be demanded of me, how it comes, that, since I
admit these offices to be no better than pensions, I chose, after the
principle of law had been satisfied, to retain them at all. To this,
Sir, I answer, that, conceiving it to be a fundamental part of the
Constitution of this country, and of the reason of state in every
country, that there must be means of rewarding public service, those
means will be incomplete, and indeed wholly insufficient for that
purpose, if there should be no further reward for that service than the
daily wages it receives during the pleasure of the crown.
Whoever seriously considers the excellent argument of Lord Somers, in
the Bankers' Case, will see he bottoms himself upon the very same maxim
which I do; and one of his principal grounds of doctrine for the
alienability of the domain in England,[41] contrary to the maxim of the
law in France, he lays in the constitutional policy of furnishing a
permanent reward to public service, of making that reward the origin of
families, and the foundation of wealth as well as of honors. It is,
indeed, the only genuine, unadulterated origin of nobility. It is a
great principle in government, a principle at the very foundation of the
whole structure. The other judges who held the same doctrine went beyond
Lord Somers with regard to the remedy which they thought was given by
law against the crown upon the grant of pensions. Indeed, no man knows,
when he cuts off the incitements to a virtuous ambition, and the just
rewards of public service, what infinite mischief he may do his country
through all generations. Such saving to the public may prove the worst
mode of robbing it. The crown, which has in its hands the trust of the
daily pay for national service, ought to have in its hands also the
means for the repose of public labor and the fixed settlement of
acknowledged merit. There is a time when the weather-beaten, vessels of
the state ought to come into harbor. They must at length have a retreat
from the malice of rivals, from the perfidy of political friends, and
the inconstancy of the people. Many of the persons who in all times have
filled the great offices of state have been younger brothers, who had
originally little, if any fortune. These offices do not furnish the
means of amassing wealth. There ought to be some power in the crown of
granting pensions out of the reach of its own caprices. An entail of
dependence is a bad reward of merit.
I would therefore leave to the crown the possibility of conferring some
favors, which, whilst they are received as a reward, do not operate as
corruption. When men receive obligations from the crown, through the
pious hands of fathers, or of connections as venerable as the paternal,
the dependences which arise from thence are the obligations of
gratitude, and not the fetters of servility. Such ties originate in
virtue, and they promote it. They continue men in those habitudes of
friendship, those political connections, and those political principles,
in which they began life. They are antidotes against a corrupt levity,
instead of causes of it. What an unseemly spectacle would it afford,
what a disgrace would it be to the commonwealth that suffered such
things, to see the hopeful son of a meritorious minister begging his
bread at the door of that Treasury from whence his father dispensed the
economy of an empire, and promoted the happiness and glory of his
country! Why should he be obliged to prostrate his honor and to submit
his principles at the levee of some proud favorite, shouldered and
thrust aside by every impudent pretender on the very spot where a few
days before he saw himself adored,--obliged to cringe to the author of
the calamities of his house, and to kiss the hands that are red with his
father's blood?--No, Sir, these things are unfit,--they are intolerable.
Sir, I shall be asked, why I do not choose to destroy those offices
which are pensions, and appoint pensions under the direct title in their
stead. I allow that in some cases it leads to abuse, to have things
appointed for one purpose and applied to another. I have no great
objection to such a change; but I do not think it quite prudent for me
to propose it. If I should take away the present establishment, the
burden of proof rests upon me, that so many pensions, and no more, and
to such an amount each, and no more, are necessary for the public
service. This is what I can never prove; for it is a thing incapable of
definition. I do not like to take away an object that I think answers my
purpose, in hopes of getting it back again in a better shape. People
will bear an old establishment, when its excess is corrected, who will
revolt at a new one. I do not think these office-pensions to be more in
number than sufficient: but on that point the House will exercise its
discretion. As to abuse, I am convinced that very few trusts in the
ordinary course of administration have admitted less abuse than this.
Efficient ministers have been their own paymasters, it is true; but
their very partiality has operated as a kind of justice, and still it
was service that was paid. When we look over this Exchequer list, we
find it filled with the descendants of the Walpoles, of the Pelhams, of
the Townshends,--names to whom this country owes its liberties, and to
whom his Majesty owes his crown. It was in one of these lines that the
immense and envied employment he now holds came to a certain duke,[42]
who is now probably sitting quietly at a very good dinner directly under
us, and acting _high life below stairs_, whilst we, his masters, are
filling our mouths with unsubstantial sounds, and talking of hungry
economy over his head. But he is the elder branch of an ancient and
decayed house, joined to and repaired by the reward of services done by
another. I respect the original title, and the first purchase of merited
wealth and honor through all its descents, through all its transfers,
and all its assignments. May such fountains never be dried up! May they
ever flow with their original purity, and refresh and fructify the
commonwealth for ages!
Sir, I think myself bound to give you my reasons as clearly and as fully
for stopping in the course of reformation as for proceeding in it. My
limits are the rules of law, the rules of policy, and the service of the
state. This is the reason why I am not able to intermeddle with another
article, which seems to be a specific object in several of the
petitions: I mean the reduction of exorbitant emoluments to efficient
offices. If I knew of any real efficient office which did possess
exorbitant emoluments, I should be extremely desirous of reducing them.
Others may know of them: I do not. I am not possessed of an exact common
measure between real service and its reward. I am very sure that states
do sometimes receive services which is hardly in their power to reward
according to their worth. If I were to give my judgment with regard to
this country, I do not think the great efficient offices of the state to
be overpaid. The service of the public is a thing which cannot be put to
auction and struck down to those who will agree to execute it the
cheapest. When the proportion between reward and service is our object,
we must always consider of what nature the service is, and what sort of
men they are that must perform it. What is just payment for one kind of
labor, and full encouragement for one kind of talents, is fraud and
discouragement to others. Many of the great offices have much duty to
do, and much expense of representation to maintain. A Secretary of
State, for instance, must not appear sordid in the eyes of the ministers
of other nations; neither ought our ministers abroad to appear
contemptible in the courts where they reside. In all offices of duty,
there is almost necessarily a great neglect of all domestic affairs. A
person in high office can rarely take a view of his family-house. If he
sees that the state takes no detriment, the state must see that his
affairs should take as little.
I will even go so far as to affirm, that, if men were willing to serve
in such situations without salary, they ought not to be permitted to do
it. Ordinary service must be secured by the motives to ordinary
integrity. I do not hesitate to say that that state which lays its
foundation in rare and heroic virtues will be sure to have its
superstructure in the basest profligacy and corruption. An honorable and
fair profit is the best security against avarice and rapacity; as in all
things else, a lawful and regulated enjoyment is the best security
against debauchery and excess. For as wealth is power, so all power will
infallibly draw wealth to itself by some means or other; and when men
are left no way of ascertaining their profits but by their means of
obtaining them, those means will be increased to infinity. This is true
in all the parts of administration, as well as in the whole. If any
individual were to decline his appointments, it might give an unfair
advantage to ostentatious ambition over unpretending service; it might
breed invidious comparisons; it might tend to destroy whatever little
unity and agreement may be found among ministers. And, after all, when
an ambitious man had run down his competitors by a fallacious show of
disinterestedness, and fixed himself in power by that means, what
security is there that he would not change his course, and claim as an
indemnity ten times more than he has given up?
This rule, like every other, may admit its exceptions. When a great man
has some one great object in view to be achieved in a given time, it may
be absolutely necessary for him to walk out of all the common roads,
and, if his fortune permits it, to hold himself out as a splendid
example. I am told that something of this kind is now doing in a country
near us. But this is for a short race, the training for a heat or two,
and not the proper preparation for the regular stages of a methodical
journey. I am speaking of establishments, and not of men.
It may be expected, Sir, that, when I am giving my reasons why I limit
myself in the reduction of employments, or of their profits, I should
say something of those which seem of eminent inutility in the state: I
mean the number of officers who, by their places, are attendant on the
person of the king. Considering the commonwealth merely as such, and
considering those officers only as relative to the direct purposes of
the state, I admit that they are of no use at all. But there are many
things in the constitution of establishments, which appear of little
value on the first view, which in a secondary and oblique manner produce
very material advantages. It was on full consideration that I determined
not to lessen any of the offices of honor about the crown, in their
number or their emoluments. These emoluments, except in one or two
cases, do not much more than answer the charge of attendance. Men of
condition naturally love to be about a court; and women of condition
love it much more. But there is in all regular attendance so much of
constraint, that, if it wore a mere charge, without any compensation,
you would soon have the court deserted by all the nobility of the
kingdom.
Sir, the most serious mischiefs would follow from such a desertion.
Kings are naturally lovers of low company. They are so elevated above
all the rest of mankind that they must look upon all their subjects as
on a level. They are rather apt to hate than to love their nobility, on
account of the occasional resistance to their will which will be made by
their virtue, their petulance, or their pride. It must, indeed, be
admitted that many of the nobility are as perfectly willing to act the
part of flatterers, tale-bearers, parasites, pimps, and buffoons, as any
of the lowest and vilest of mankind can possibly be. But they are not
properly qualified for this object of their ambition. The want of a
regular education, and early habits, and some lurking remains of their
dignity, will never permit them to become a match for an Italian eunuch,
a mountebank, a fiddler, a player, or any regular practitioner of that
tribe. The Roman emperors, almost from the beginning, threw themselves
into such hands; and the mischief increased every day till the decline
and final ruin of the empire. It is therefore of very great importance
(provided the thing is not overdone) to contrive such an establishment
as must, almost whether a prince will or not, bring into daily and
hourly offices about his person a great number of his first nobility;
and it is rather an useful prejudice that gives them a pride in such a
servitude. Though they are not much the better for a court, a court
will be much the better for them. I have therefore not attempted to
reform any of the offices of honor about the king's person.
There are, indeed, two offices in his stables which are sinecures: by
the change of manners, and indeed by the nature of the thing, they must
be so: I mean the several keepers of buck-hounds, stag-hounds,
foxhounds, and harriers. They answer no purpose of utility or of
splendor. These I propose to abolish. It is not proper that great
noblemen should be keepers of dogs, though they were the king's dogs.
In every part of the scheme, I have endeavored that no primary, and that
even no secondary, service of the state should suffer by its frugality.
I mean to touch no offices but such as I am perfectly sure are either of
no use at all, or not of any use in the least assignable proportion to
the burden with which they load the revenues of the kingdom, and to the
influence with which they oppress the freedom of Parliamentary
deliberation; for which reason there are but two offices, which are
properly state offices, that I have a desire to reform.
The first of them is the new office of _Third Secretary of State_, which
is commonly called _Secretary of State for the Colonies_.
_We_ know that all the correspondence of the colonies had been, until
within a few years, carried on by the Southern Secretary of State, and
that this department has not been shunned upon account of the weight of
its duties, but, on the contrary, much sought on account of its
patronage. Indeed, he must be poorly acquainted with the history of
office who does not know how very lightly the American functions have
always leaned on the shoulders of the ministerial _Atlas_ who has
upheld that side of the sphere. Undoubtedly, great temper and judgment
was requisite in the management of the colony politics; but the official
detail was a trifle. Since the new appointment, a train of unfortunate
accidents has brought before us almost the whole correspondence of this
favorite secretary's office since the first day of its establishment. I
will say nothing of its auspicious foundation, of the quality of its
correspondence, or of the effects that have ensued from it. I speak
merely of its _quantity_, which we know would have been little or no
addition to the trouble of whatever office had its hands the fullest.
But what has been the real condition of the old office of Secretary of
State? Have their velvet bags and their red boxes been so full that
nothing more could possibly be crammed into them?
A correspondence of a curious nature has been lately published.[43] In
that correspondence, Sir, we find the opinion of a noble person who is
thought to be the grand manufacturer of administrations, and therefore
the best judge of the quality of his work. He was of opinion that there
was but one man of diligence and industry in the whole administration:
it was the late Earl of Suffolk. The noble lord lamented very justly,
that this statesman, of so much mental vigor, was almost wholly disabled
from the exertion of it by his bodily infirmities. Lord Suffolk, dead to
the state long before he was dead to Nature, at last paid his tribute to
the common treasury to which we must all be taxed. But so little want
was found even of his intentional industry, that the office, vacant in
reality to its duties long before, continued vacant even in nomination
and appointment for a year after his death. The whole of the laborious
and arduous correspondence of this empire rested solely upon the
activity and energy of Lord Weymouth.
It is therefore demonstrable, since one diligent man was fully equal to
the duties of the two offices, that two diligent men will be equal to
the duty of three. The business of the new office, which I shall propose
to you to suppress, is by no means too much to be returned to either of
the secretaries which remain. If this dust in the balance should be
thought too heavy, it may be divided between them both,--North America
(whether free or reduced) to the Northern Secretary, the West Indies to
the Southern. It is not necessary that I should say more upon the
inutility of this office. It is burning daylight. But before I have
done, I shall just remark that the history of this office is too recent
to suffer us to forget that it was made for the mere convenience of the
arrangements of political intrigue, and not for the service of the
state,--that it was made in order to give a color to an exorbitant
increase of the civil list, and in the same act to bring a new accession
to the loaded compost-heap of corrupt influence.
There is, Sir, another office which was not long since closely connected
with this of the American Secretary, but has been lately separated from
it for the very same purpose for which it had been conjoined: I mean the
sole purpose of all the separations and all the conjunctions that have
been lately made,--a job. I speak, Sir, of the _Board of Trade and
Plantations_. This board is a sort of temperate bed of influence, a sort
of gently ripening hothouse, where eight members of Parliament receive
salaries of a thousand a year for a certain given time, in order to
mature, at a proper season, a claim to two thousand, granted for doing
less, and on the credit of having toiled so long in that inferior,
laborious department.
I have known that board, off and on, for a great number of years. Both
of its pretended objects have been much the objects of my study, if I
have a right to call any pursuits of mine by so respectable a name. I
can assure the House, (and I hope they will not think that I risk my
little credit lightly,) that, without meaning to convey the least
reflection upon any one of its members, past or present, it is a board
which, if not mischievous, is of no use at all.
You will be convinced, Sir, that I am not mistaken, if you reflect how
generally it is true, that commerce, the principal object of that
office, flourishes most when it is left to itself. Interest, the great
guide of commerce, is not a blind one. It is very well able to find its
own way; and its necessities are its best laws. But if it were possible,
in the nature of things, that the young should direct the old, and the
inexperienced instruct the knowing,--if a board in the state was the
best tutor for the counting-house,--if the desk ought to read lectures
to the anvil, and the pen to usurp the place of the shuttle,--yet in any
matter of regulation we know that board must act with as little
authority as skill. The prerogative of the crown is utterly inadequate
to the object; because all regulations are, in their nature, restrictive
of some liberty. In the reign, indeed, of Charles the First, the
Council, or Committees of Council, were never a moment unoccupied with
affairs of trade. But even where they had no ill intention, (which was
sometimes the case,) trade and manufacture suffered infinitely from
their injudicious tampering. But since that period, whenever regulation
is wanting, (for I do not deny that sometimes it may be wanting,)
Parliament constantly sits; and Parliament alone is competent to such
regulation. We want no instruction from boards of trade, or from any
other board; and God forbid we should give the least attention to their
reports! Parliamentary inquiry is the only mode of obtaining
Parliamentary information. There is more real knowledge to be obtained
by attending the detail of business in the committees above stairs than
ever did come, or ever will come, from any board in this kingdom, or
from all of them together. An assiduous member of Parliament will not be
the worse instructed there for not being paid a thousand a year for
learning his lesson. And now that I speak of the committees above
stairs, I must say, that, having till lately attended them a good deal,
I have observed that no description of members give so little
attendance, either to communicate or to obtain instruction upon matters
of commerce, as the honorable members of the grave Board of Trade. I
really do not recollect that I have ever seen one of them in that sort
of business. Possibly some members may have better memories, and may
call to mind some job that may have accidentally brought one or other of
them, at one time or other, to attend a matter of commerce.
This board, Sir, has had both its original formation and its
regeneration in a job. In a job it was conceived, and in a job its
mother brought it forth. It made one among those showy and specious
impositions which one of the experiment-making administrations of
Charles the Second held out to delude the people, and to be substituted
in the place of the real service which they might expect from a
Parliament annually sitting. It was intended, also, to corrupt that
body, whenever it should be permitted to sit. It was projected in the
year 1668, and it continued in a tottering and rickety childhood for
about three or four years: for it died in the year 1673, a babe of as
little hopes as ever swelled the bills of mortality in the article of
convulsed or overlaid children who have hardly stepped over the
threshold of life.
It was buried with little ceremony, and never more thought of until the
reign of King William, when, in the strange vicissitude of neglect and
vigor, of good and ill success that attended his wars, in the year 1695,
the trade was distressed beyond all example of former sufferings by the
piracies of the French cruisers. This suffering incensed, and, as it
should seem, very justly incensed, the House of Commons. In this
ferment, they struck, not only at the administration, but at the very
constitution of the executive government. They attempted to form in
Parliament a board for the protection of trade, which, as they planned
it, was to draw to itself a great part, if not the whole, of the
functions and powers both of the Admiralty and of the Treasury; and
thus, by a Parliamentary delegation of office and officers, they
threatened absolutely to separate these departments from the whole
system of the executive government, and of course to vest the most
leading and essential of its attributes in this board. As the executive
government was in a manner convicted of a dereliction of its functions,
it was with infinite difficulty that this blow was warded off in that
session. There was a threat to renew the same attempt in the next. To
prevent the effect of this manoeuvre, the court opposed another
manoeuvre to it, and, in the year 1696, called into life this Board of
Trade, which had slept since 1673.
This, in a few words, is the history of the regeneration of the Board of
Trade. It has perfectly answered its purposes. It was intended to quiet
the minds of the people, and to compose the ferment that was then
strongly working in Parliament. The courtiers were too happy to be able
to substitute a board which they knew would be useless in the place of
one that they feared would be dangerous. Thus the Board of Trade was
reproduced in a job; and perhaps it is the only instance of a public
body which has never degenerated, but to this hour preserves all the
health and vigor of its primitive institution.
This Board of Trade and Plantations has not been of any use to the
colonies, as colonies: so little of use, that the flourishing
settlements of New England, of Virginia, and of Maryland, and all our
wealthy colonies in the West Indies, were of a date prior to the first
board of Charles the Second. Pennsylvania and Carolina were settled
during its dark quarter, in the interval between the extinction of the
first and the formation of the second board. Two colonies alone owe
their origin to that board. Georgia, which, till lately, has made a very
slow progress,--and never did make any progress at all, until it had
wholly got rid of all the regulations which the Board of Trade had
moulded into its original constitution. That colony has cost the nation
very great sums of money; whereas the colonies which have had the
fortune of not being godfathered by the Board of Trade never cost the
nation a shilling, except what has been so properly spent in losing
them. But the colony of Georgia, weak as it was, carried with it to the
last hour, and carries, even in its present dead, pallid visage, the
perfect resemblance of its parents. It always had, and it now has, an
_establishment_, paid by the public of England, for the sake of the
influence of the crown: that colony having never been able or willing to
take upon itself the expense of its proper government or its own
appropriated jobs.
The province of Nova Scotia was the youngest and the favorite child of
the Board. Good God! what sums the nursing of that ill-thriven,
hard-visaged, and ill-favored brat has cost to this wittol nation! Sir,
this colony has stood us in a sum of not less than seven hundred
thousand pounds. To this day it has made no repayment,--it does not even
support those offices of expense which are miscalled its government; the
whole of that job still lies upon the patient, callous shoulders of the
people of England.
Sir, I am going to state a fact to you that will serve to set in full
sunshine the real value of formality and official superintendence. There
was in the province of Nova Scotia one little neglected corner, the
country of the _neutral French_; which, having the good-fortune to
escape the fostering care of both France and England, and to have been
shut out from the protection and regulation of councils of commerce and
of boards of trade, did, in silence, without notice, and without
assistance, increase to a considerable degree. But it seems our nation
had more skill and ability in destroying than in settling a colony. In
the last war, we did, in my opinion, most inhumanly, and upon pretences
that in the eye of an honest man are not worth a farthing, root out this
poor, innocent, deserving people, whom our utter inability to govern, or
to reconcile, gave us no sort of right to extirpate. Whatever the
merits of that extirpation might have been, it was on the footsteps of a
neglected people, it was on the fund of unconstrained poverty, it was on
the acquisitions of unregulated industry, that anything which deserves
the name of a colony in that province has been formed. It has been
formed by overflowings from the exuberant population of New England, and
by emigration from other parts of Nova Scotia of fugitives from the
protection of the Board of Trade.
But if all of these things were not more than sufficient to prove to you
the inutility of that expensive establishment, I would desire you to
recollect, Sir, that those who may be very ready to defend it are very
cautious how they employ it,--cautious how they employ it even in
appearance and pretence. They are afraid they should lose the benefit of
its influence in Parliament, if they deemed to keep it up for any other
purpose. If ever there were commercial points of great weight, and most
closely connected with our dependencies, they are those which have been
agitated and decided in Parliament since I came into it. Which of the
innumerable regulations since made had their origin or their improvement
in the Board of Trade? Did any of the several East India bills which
have been successively produced since 1767 originate there? Did any one
dream of referring them, or any part of them, thither? Was anybody so
ridiculous as even to think of it? If ever there was an occasion on
which the Board was fit to be consulted, it was with regard to the acts
that were preludes to the American war, or attendant on its
commencement. Those acts were full of commercial regulations, such as
they were: the Intercourse Bill; the Prohibitory Bill; the Fishery
Bill. If the Board was not concerned in such things, in what particular
was it thought fit that it should be concerned? In the course of all
these bills through the House, I observed the members of that board to
be remarkably cautious of intermeddling. They understood decorum better;
they know that matters of trade and plantations are no business of
theirs.
There were two very recent occasions, which, if the idea of any use for
the Board had not been extinguished by prescription, appeared loudly to
call for their interference.
When commissioners were sent to pay his Majesty's and our dutiful
respects to the Congress of the United States, a part of their powers
under the commission were, it seems, of a commercial nature. They were
authorized, in the most ample and undefined manner, to form a commercial
treaty with America on the spot. This was no trivial object. As the
formation of such a treaty would necessarily have been no less than the
breaking up of our whole commercial system, and the giving it an entire
new form, one would imagine that the Board of Trade would have sat day
and night to model propositions, which, on our side, might serve as a
basis to that treaty. No such thing. Their learned leisure was not in
the least interrupted, though one of the members of the Board was a
commissioner, and might, in mere compliment to his office, have been
supposed to make a show of deliberation on the subject. But he knew that
his colleagues would have thought he laughed in their faces, had he
attempted to bring anything the most distantly relating to commerce or
colonies before _them_. A noble person, engaged in the same commission,
and sent to learn his commercial rudiments in New York, (then under the
operation of an act for the universal prohibition of trade,) was soon
after put at the head of that board. This contempt from the present
ministers of all the pretended functions of that board, and their manner
of breathing into its very soul, of inspiring it with its animating and
presiding principle, puts an end to all dispute concerning their opinion
of the clay it was made of. But I will give them heaped measure.
It was but the other day, that the noble lord in the blue ribbon carried
up to the House of Peers two acts, altering, I think much for the
better, but altering in a great degree, our whole commercial system:
those acts, I mean, for giving a free trade to Ireland in woollens, and
in all things else, with independent nations, and giving them an equal
trade to our own colonies. Here, too, the novelty of this great, but
arduous and critical improvement of system, would make you conceive that
the anxious solicitude of the noble lord in the blue ribbon would have
wholly destroyed the plan of summer recreation of that board, by
references to examine, compare, and digest matters for Parliament. You
would imagine that Irish commissioners of customs, and English
commissioners of customs, and commissioners of excise, that merchants
and manufacturers of every denomination, had daily crowded their outer
rooms. _Nil horum_. The perpetual virtual adjournment, and the unbroken
sitting vacation of that board, was no more disturbed by the Irish than
by the plantation commerce, or any other commerce. The same matter made
a large part of the business which occupied the House for two sessions
before; and as our ministers were not then mellowed by the mild,
emollient, and engaging blandishments of our dear sister into all the
tenderness of unqualified surrender, the bounds and limits of a
restrained benefit naturally required much detailed management and
positive regulation. But neither the qualified propositions which were
received, nor those other qualified propositions which were rejected by
ministers, were the least concern of theirs, or were they ever thought
of in the business.
It is therefore, Sir, on the opinion of Parliament, on the opinion of
the ministers, and even on their own opinion of their inutility, that I
shall propose to you to _suppress the Board of Trade and Plantations_,
and to recommit all its business to the Council, from whence it was very
improvidently taken; and which business (whatever it might be) was much
better done, and without any expense; and, indeed, where in effect it
may all come at last. Almost all that deserves the name of business
there is the reference of the plantation acts to the opinion of
gentlemen of the law. But all this may be done, as the Irish business of
the same nature has always been done, by the Council, and with a
reference to the Attorney and Solicitor General.
There are some regulations in the household, relative to the officers of
the yeomen of the guards, and the officers and band of gentlemen
pensioners, which I shall likewise submit to your consideration, for the
purpose of regulating establishments which at present are much abused.
I have now finished all that for the present I shall trouble you with on
the _plan of reduction_. I mean next to propose to you the _plan of
arrangement_, by which I mean to appropriate and fix the civil list
money to its several services according to their nature: for I am
thoroughly sensible, that, if a discretion wholly arbitrary can be
exercised over the civil list revenue, although the most effectual
methods may be taken to prevent the inferior departments from exceeding
their bounds, the plan of reformation will still be left very imperfect.
It will not, in my opinion, be safe to permit an entirely arbitrary
discretion even in the First Lord of the Treasury himself; it will not
be safe to leave with him a power of diverting the public money from its
proper objects, of paying it in an irregular course, or of inverting
perhaps the order of time, dictated by the proportion of value, which
ought to regulate his application of payment to service.
I am sensible, too, that the very operation of a plan of economy which
tends to exonerate the civil list of expensive establishments may in
some sort defeat the capital end we have in view,--the independence of
Parliament; and that, in removing the public and ostensible means of
influence, we may increase the fund of private corruption. I have
thought of some methods to prevent an abuse of surplus cash under
discretionary application,--I mean the heads of _secret service, special
service, various payments_, and the like,--which I hope will answer, and
which in due time I shall lay before you. Where I am unable to limit the
quantity of the sums to be applied, by reason of the uncertain quantity
of the service, I endeavor to confine it to its _line_, to secure an
indefinite application to the definite service to which it belongs,--not
to stop the progress of expense in its line, but to confine it to that
line in which it professes to move.
But that part of my plan, Sir, upon which I principally rest, that on
which I rely for the purpose of binding up and securing the whole, is to
establish a fixed and invariable order in all its payments, which it
shall not be permitted to the First Lord of the Treasury, upon any
pretence whatsoever, to depart from. I therefore divide the civil list
payments into _nine_ classes, putting each class forward according to
the importance or justice of the demand, and to the inability of the
persons entitled to enforce their pretensions: that is, to put those
first who have the most efficient offices, or claim the justest debts,
and at the same time, from the character of that description of men,
from the retiredness or the remoteness of their situation, or from their
want of weight and power to enforce their pretensions, or from their
being entirely subject to the power of a minister, without any
reciprocal power of awing, ought to be the most considered, and are the
most likely to be neglected,--all these I place in the highest classes;
I place in the lowest those whose functions are of the least importance,
but whose persons or rank are often of the greatest power and influence.
In the first class I place the _judges_, as of the first importance. It
is the public justice that holds the community together; the ease,
therefore, and independence of the judges ought to supersede all other
considerations, and they ought to be the very last to feel the
necessities of the state, or to be obliged either to court or bully a
minister for their right; they ought to be as _weak solicitors on their
own demands_ as strenuous assertors of the rights and liberties of
others. The judges are, or ought to be, of a _reserved_ and retired
character, and wholly unconnected with the political world.
In the second class I place the foreign ministers. The judges are the
links of our connections with one another; the foreign ministers are the
links of our connection with other nations. They are not upon the spot
to demand payment, and are therefore the most likely to be, as in fact
they have sometimes been, entirely neglected, to the great disgrace and
perhaps the great detriment of the nation.
In the third class I would bring all the tradesmen who supply the crown
by contract or otherwise.
In the fourth class I place all the domestic servants of the king, and
all persons in efficient offices whose salaries do not exceed two
hundred pounds a year.
In the fifth, upon account of honor, which ought to give place to
nothing but charity and rigid justice, I would place the pensions and
allowances of his Majesty's royal family, comprehending of course the
queen, together with the stated allowance of the privy purse.
In the sixth class I place those efficient offices of duty whose
salaries may exceed the sum of two hundred pounds a year.
In the seventh class, that mixed mass, the whole pension list.
In the eighth, the offices of honor about the king.
In the ninth, and the last of all, the salaries and pensions of the
First Lord of the Treasury himself, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and
the other Commissioners of the Treasury.
If, by any possible mismanagement of that part of the revenue which is
left at discretion, or by any other mode of prodigality, cash should be
deficient for the payment of the lowest classes, I propose that the
amount of those salaries where the deficiency may happen to fall shall
not be carried as debt to the account of the succeeding year, but that
it shall be entirely lapsed, sunk, and lost; so that government will be
enabled to start in the race of every new year wholly unloaded, fresh in
wind and in vigor. Hereafter no civil list debt can ever come upon the
public. And those who do not consider this as saving, because it is not
a certain sum, do not ground their calculations of the future on their
experience of the past.
I know of no mode of preserving the effectual execution of any duty, but
to make it the direct interest of the executive officer that it shall be
faithfully performed. Assuming, then, that the present vast allowance to
the civil list is perfectly adequate to all its purposes, if there
should be any failure, it must be from the mismanagement or neglect of
the First Commissioner of the Treasury; since, upon the proposed plan,
there can be no expense of any consequence which he is not himself
previously to authorize and finally to control. It is therefore just, as
well as politic, that the loss should attach upon the delinquency.
If the failure from the delinquency should be very considerable, it will
fall on the class directly above the First Lord of the Treasury, as well
as upon himself and his board. It will fall, as it ought to fall, upon
offices of no primary importance in the state; but then it will fall
upon persons whom it will be a matter of no slight importance for a
minister to provoke: it will fall upon persons of the first rank and
consequence in the kingdom,--upon those who are nearest to the king, and
frequently have a more interior credit with him than the minister
himself. It will fall upon masters of the horse, upon lord
chamberlains, upon lord stewards, upon grooms of the stole, and lords of
the bedchamber. The household troops form an army, who will be ready to
mutiny for want of pay, and whose mutiny will be _really_ dreadful to a
commander-in-chief. A rebellion of the thirteen lords of the bedchamber
would be far more terrible to a minister, and would probably affect his
power more to the quick, than a revolt of thirteen colonies. What an
uproar such an event would create at court! What _petitions_, and
_committees_, and _associations_, would it not produce! Bless me! what a
clattering of white sticks and yellow sticks would be about his head!
what a storm of gold keys would fly about the ears of the minister! what
a shower of Georges, and thistles, and medals, and collars of S.S. would
assail him at his first entrance into the antechamber, after an
insolvent Christmas quarter!--a tumult which could not be appeased by
all the harmony of the new year's ode. Rebellion it is certain there
would be; and rebellion may not now, indeed, be so critical an event to
those who engage in it, since its price is so correctly ascertained at
just a thousand pound.
Sir, this classing, in my opinion, is a serious and solid security for
the performance of a minister's duty. Lord Coke says, that the staff was
put into the Treasurer's hand to enable him to support himself when
there was no money in the Exchequer, and to beat away importunate
solicitors. The method which I propose would hinder him from the
necessity of such a broken staff to lean on, or such a miserable weapon
for repulsing the demands of worthless suitors, who, the noble lord in
the blue ribbon knows, will bear many hard blows on the head, and many
other indignities, before they are driven from the Treasury. In this
plan, he is furnished with an answer to all their importunity,--an
answer far more conclusive than if he had knocked them down with his
staff:--"Sir, (or my Lord,) you are calling for my own salary,--Sir, you
are calling for the appointments of my colleagues who sit about me in
office,--Sir, you are going to excite a mutiny at court against me,--you
are going to estrange his Majesty's confidence from me, through the
chamberlain, or the master of the horse, or the groom of the stole."
As things now stand, every man, in proportion to his consequence at
court, tends to add to the expenses of the civil list, by all manner of
jobs, if not for himself, yet for his dependants. When the new plan is
established, those who are now suitors for jobs will become the most
strenuous opposers of them. They will have a common interest with the
minister in public economy. Every class, as it stands low, will become
security for the payment of the preceding class; and thus the persons
whose insignificant services defraud those that are useful would then
become interested in their payment. Then the powerful, instead of
oppressing, would be obliged to support the weak; and idleness would
become concerned in the reward of industry. The whole fabric of the
civil economy would become compact and connected in all its parts; it
would be formed into a well-organized body, where every member
contributes to the support of the whole, and where even the lazy stomach
secures the vigor of the active arm.
This plan, I really flatter myself, is laid, not in official formality,
nor in airy speculation, but in real life, and in human nature, in what
"comes home" (as Bacon says) "to the business and bosoms of men." You
have now, Sir, before you, the whole of my scheme, as far as I have
digested it into a form that might be in any respect worthy of your
consideration. I intend to lay it before you in five bills.[44] The plan
consists, indeed, of many parts; but they stand upon a few plain
principles. It is a plan which takes nothing from the civil list without
discharging it of a burden equal to the sum carried to the public
service. It weakens no one function necessary to government; but, on the
contrary, by appropriating supply to service, it gives it greater vigor.
It provides the means of order and foresight to a minister of finance,
which may always keep all the objects of his office, and their state,
condition, and relations, distinctly before him. It brings forward
accounts without hurrying and distressing the accountants: whilst it
provides for public convenience, it regards private rights. It
extinguishes secret corruption almost to the possibility of its
existence. It destroys direct and visible influence equal to the offices
of at least fifty members of Parliament. Lastly, it prevents the
provision for his Majesty's children from being diverted to the
political purposes of his minister.
These are the points on which I rely for the merit of the plan. I pursue
economy in a secondary view, and only as it is connected with these
great objects. I am persuaded, that even for supply this scheme will be
far from unfruitful, if it be executed to the extent I propose it. I
think it will give to the public, at its periods, two or three hundred
thousand pounds a year; if not, it will give them a system of economy,
which is itself a great revenue. It gives me no little pride and
satisfaction to find that the principles of my proceedings are in many
respects the very same with those which are now pursued in the plans of
the French minister of finance. I am sure that I lay before you a scheme
easy and practicable in all its parts. I know it is common at once to
applaud and to reject all attempts of this nature. I know it is common
for men to say, that such and such things are perfectly right, very
desirable,--but that, unfortunately, they are not practicable. Oh, no,
Sir! no! Those things-which are not practicable are not desirable. There
is nothing in the world really beneficial that does not lie within the
reach of an informed understanding and a well-directed pursuit. There is
nothing that God has judged good for us that He has not given us the
means to accomplish, both in the natural and the moral world. If we cry,
like children, for the moon, like children we must cry on.
We must follow the nature of our affairs, and conform ourselves to our
situation. If we do, our objects are plain and compassable. Why should
we resolve to do nothing, because what I propose to you may not be the
exact demand of the petition, when we are far from resolved to comply
even with what evidently is so? Does this sort of chicanery become us?
The people are the masters. They have only to express their wants at
large and in gross. We are the expert artists, we are the skilful
workmen, to shape their desires into perfect form, and to fit the
utensil to the use. They are the sufferers, they tell the symptoms of
the complaint; but we know the exact seat of the disease, and how to
apply the remedy according to the rules of art. How shocking would it be
to see us pervert our skill into a sinister and servile dexterity, for
the purpose of evading our duty, and defrauding our employers, who are
our natural lords, of the object of their just expectations! I think the
whole not only practicable, but practicable in a very short time. If we
are in earnest about it, and if we exert that industry and those talents
in forwarding the work, which, I am afraid, may be exerted in impeding
it, I engage that the whole may be put in complete execution within a
year. For my own part, I have very little to recommend me for this or
for any task, but a kind of earnest and anxious perseverance of mind,
which, with all its good and all its evil effects, is moulded into my
constitution. I faithfully engage to the House, if they choose to
appoint me to any part in the execution of this work, (which, when they
have made it theirs by the improvements of their wisdom, will be worthy
of the able assistance they may give me,) that by night and by day, in
town or in country, at the desk or in the forest, I will, without regard
to convenience, ease, or pleasure, devote myself to their service, not
expecting or admitting any reward whatsoever. I owe to this country my
labor, which is my all; and I owe to it ten times more industry, if ten
times more I could exert. After all, I shall be an unprofitable servant.
At the same time, if I am able, and if I shall be permitted, I will lend
an humble helping hand to any other good work which is going on. I have
not, Sir, the frantic presumption to suppose that this plan contains in
it the whole of what the public has a right to expect in the great work
of reformation they call for. Indeed, it falls infinitely short of it.
It falls short even of my own ideas. I have some thoughts, not yet fully
ripened, relative to a reform in the customs and excise, as well as in
some other branches of financial administration. There are other things,
too, which form essential parts in a great plan for the purpose of
restoring the independence of Parliament. The contractors' bill of last
year it is fit to revive; and I rejoice that it is in better hands than
mine. The bill for suspending the votes of custom-house officers,
brought into Parliament several years ago by one of our worthiest and
wisest members,[45]--would to God we could along with the plan revive
the person who designed it! but a man of very real integrity, honor, and
ability will be found to take his place, and to carry his idea into full
execution. You all see how necessary it is to review our military
expenses for some years past, and, if possible, to bind up and close
that bleeding artery of profusion; but that business also, I have reason
to hope, will be undertaken by abilities that are fully adequate to it.
Something must be devised (if possible) to check the ruinous expense of
elections.
Sir, all or most of these things must be done. Every one must take his
part. If we should be able, by dexterity, or power, or intrigue, to
disappoint the expectations of our constituents, what will it avail us?
We shall never be strong or artful enough to parry, or to put by, the
irresistible demands of our situation. That situation calls upon us, and
upon our constituents too, with a voice which _will_ be heard. I am sure
no man is more zealously attached than I am to the privileges of this
House, particularly in regard to the exclusive management of money. The
Lords have no right to the disposition, in any sense, of the public
purse; but they have gone further in self-denial[46] than our utmost
jealousy could have required. A power of examining accounts, to censure,
correct, and punish, we never, that I know of, have thought of denying
to the House of Lords. It is something more than a century since we
voted that body useless: they have now voted themselves so. The whole
hope of reformation is at length cast upon _us_; and let us not deceive
the nation, which does us the honor to hope everything from our virtue.
If _all_ the nation are not equally forward to press this duty upon us,
yet be assured that they all equally expect we should perform it. The
respectful silence of those who wait upon your pleasure ought to be as
powerful with you as the call of those who require your service as their
right. Some, without doors, affect to feel hurt for your dignity,
because they suppose that menaces are held out to you. Justify their
good opinion by showing that no menaces are necessary to stimulate you
to your duty. But, Sir, whilst we may sympathize with them in one point
who sympathize with us in another, we ought to attend no less to those
who approach us like men, and who, in the guise of petitioners, speak to
us in the tone of a concealed authority. It is not wise to force them to
speak out more plainly what they plainly mean.--But the petitioners are
violent. Be it so. Those who are least anxious about your conduct are
not those that love you most. Moderate affection and satiated enjoyment
are cold and respectful; but an ardent and injured passion is tempered
up with wrath, and grief, and shame, and conscious worth, and the
maddening sense of violated right. A jealous love lights his torch from
the firebrands of the furies. They who call upon you to belong _wholly_
to the people are those who wish you to return to your _proper_
home,--to the sphere of your duty, to the post of your honor, to the
mansion-house of all genuine, serene, and solid satisfaction. We have
furnished to the people of England (indeed we have) some real cause of
jealousy. Let us leave that sort of company which, if it does not
destroy our innocence, pollutes our honor; let us free ourselves at once
from everything that can increase their suspicions and inflame their
just resentment; let us cast away from us, with a generous scorn, all
the love-tokens and symbols that we have been vain and light enough to
accept,--all the bracelets, and snuff-boxes, and miniature pictures, and
hair devices, and all the other adulterous trinkets that are the pledges
of our alienation and the monuments of our shame. Let us return to our
legitimate home, and all jars and all quarrels will be lost in embraces.
Let the commons in Parliament assembled be one and the same thing with
the commons at large. The distinctions that are made to separate us are
unnatural and wicked contrivances. Let us identify, let us incorporate
ourselves with the people. Let us cut all the cables and snap the chains
which tie us to an unfaithful shore, and enter the friendly harbor that
shoots far out into the main its moles and jetties to receive us. "War
with the world, and peace with our constituents." Be this our motto, and
our principle. Then, indeed, we shall be truly great. Respecting
ourselves, we shall be respected by the world. At present all is
troubled, and cloudy, and distracted, and full of anger and turbulence,
both abroad and at home; but the air may be cleared by this storm, and
light and fertility may follow it. Let us give a faithful pledge to the
people, that we honor, indeed, the crown, but that we _belong_ to them;
that we are their auxiliaries, and not their task-masters,--the
fellow-laborers in the same vineyard, not lording over their rights, but
helpers of their joy; that to tax them is a grievance to ourselves, but
to cut off from our enjoyments to forward theirs is the highest
gratification we are capable of receiving. I feel, with comfort, that we
are all warmed with these sentiments, and while we are thus warm, I wish
we may go directly and with a cheerful heart to this salutary work.
Sir, I move for leave to bring in a bill, "For the better regulation of
his Majesty's civil establishments, and of certain public offices; for
the limitation of pensions, and the suppression of sundry useless,
expensive, and inconvenient places, and for applying the moneys saved
thereby to the public service."[47]
* * * * *
Lord North stated, that there was a difference between this bill for
regulating the establishments and some of the others, as they affected
the ancient patrimony of the crown, and therefore wished them to be
postponed till the king's consent could be obtained. This distinction
was strongly controverted; but when it was insisted on as a point of
decorum _only_, it was agreed to postpone them to another day.
Accordingly, on the Monday following, viz. Feb. 14, leave was given, on
the motion of Mr. Burke, without opposition, to bring in--
1st, "A bill for the sale of the forest and other crown lands, rents,
and hereditaments, with certain exceptions, _and for applying the
produce thereof to the public service_; and for securing, ascertaining,
and satisfying _tenant rights_, and common and other rights."
2nd, "A bill for the more perfectly uniting to the crown the
Principality of Wales and the County Palatine of Chester, and for the
more commodious administration of justice within the same; as also for
abolishing certain offices now appertaining thereto, _for quieting
dormant claims, ascertaining and securing tenant rights_, and for the
sale of all forest lands, and other lands, tenements, and hereditaments,
held by his Majesty in right of the said Principality, or County
Palatine of Chester, _and for applying the produce thereof to the public
service_."
3rd, "A bill for uniting to the crown the Duchy and County Palatine of
Lancaster, for the suppression of unnecessary offices now belonging
thereto, for the _ascertainment and security of tenant and other
rights_, and for the sale of all rents, lands, tenements, and
hereditaments, and forests, within the said Duchy and County Palatine,
or either of them, _and for applying the produce thereof to the public
service_."
And it was ordered that Mr. Burke, Mr. Fox, Lord John Cavendish, Sir
George Savile, Colonel Barré, Mr. Thomas Townshend, Mr. Byng, Mr.
Dunning, Sir Joseph Mawbey, Mr. Recorder of London, Sir Robert Clayton,
Mr. Frederick Montagu, the Earl of Upper Ossory, Sir William Guise, and
Mr. Gilbert do prepare and bring in the same.
At the same time, Mr. Burke moved for leave to bring in--
4th, "A bill for uniting the Duchy of Cornwall to the crown; for the
suppression of certain unnecessary offices now belonging thereto; for
the _ascertainment and security of tenant and other rights_; and for
the sale of certain rents, lands, and tenements, within or belonging to
the said Duchy; _and for applying the produce thereof to the public
service_."
But some objections being made by the Surveyor-General of the Duchy
concerning the rights of the Prince of Wales, now in his minority, and
Lord North remaining perfectly silent, Mr. Burke, at length, though he
strongly contended against the principle of the objection, consented to
withdraw this last motion _for the present_, to be renewed upon an early
occasion.
FOOTNOTES:
[31] This term comprehends various retributions made to persons whose
offices are taken away, or who in any other way suffer by the new
arrangements that are made.
[32] Edict registered 29th January, 1780.
[33] Thomas Gilbert, Esq., member for Lichfield.
[34] Here Lord North shook his head, and told those who sat near him
that Mr. Probert's pension was to depend on his success. It may be so.
Mr. Probert's pension was, however, no essential part of the question;
nor did Mr. B. care whether he still possessed it or not. His point was,
to show the ridicule of attempting an improvement of the Welsh revenue
under its present establishment.
[35] Case of Richard Lee, Esq., appellant, against George Venables Lord
Vernon, respondent, in the year 1775.
[36] Vide Lord Talbot's speech in Almon's Parliamentary Register. Vol
VII. p. 79, of the Proceedings of the Lords.
[37] More exactly, 378,616_l._ 10 _s._ 1-3/4 _d._
[38] Et quaunt viscount ou baillif eit comence de acompter, nul autre ne
seit resceu de aconter tanque le primer qe soit assis eit peraccompte,
et qe la somme soit resceu.--Stat. 5. Ann Dom. 1266.
[39] Summum jus summa injuria.
[40] It was supposed by the Lord Advocate, in a subsequent debate, that
Mr. Burke, because he objected to an inquiry into the pension list for
the purpose of economy and relief of the public, would have it withheld
from the judgment of Parliament for all purposes whatsoever. This
learned gentleman certainly misunderstood him. His plan shows that he
wished the whole list to be easily accessible; and he knows that the
public eye is of itself a great guard against abuse.
[41] Before the statute of Queen Anne, which limited the alienation of
land.
[42] Duke of Newcastle, whose dining-room is under the House of Commons.
[43] Letters between Dr. Addington and Sir James Wright.
[44] Titles of the bills read.
[45] W. Dowdeswell, Esq., Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1765.
[46] Rejection of Lord Shelburne's motion in the House of Lords.
[47] The motion was seconded by Mr. Fox.
SPEECH
AT THE
GUILDHALL IN BRISTOL, PREVIOUS TO THE LATE ELECTION IN THAT CITY,
UPON
CERTAIN POINTS RELATIVE TO HIS PARLIAMENTARY CONDUCT.
1780.
Mr. Mayor, and Gentlemen,--I am extremely pleased at the appearance of
this large and respectable meeting. The steps I may be obliged to take
will want the sanction of a considerable authority; and in explaining
anything which may appear doubtful in my public conduct, I must
naturally desire a very full audience.
I have been backward to begin my canvass. The dissolution of the
Parliament was uncertain; and it did not become me, by an unseasonable
importunity, to appear diffident of the effect of my six years'
endeavors to please you. I had served the city of Bristol honorably, and
the city of Bristol had no reason to think that the means of honorable
service to the public were become indifferent to me.
I found, on my arrival here, that three gentlemen had been long in eager
pursuit of an object which but two of us can obtain. I found that they
had all met with encouragement. A contested election in such a city as
this is no light thing. I paused on the brink of the precipice. These
three gentlemen, by various merits, and on various titles, I made no
doubt were worthy of your favor. I shall never attempt to raise myself
by depreciating the merits of my competitors. In the complexity and
confusion of these cross pursuits, I wished to take the authentic public
sense of my friends upon a business of so much delicacy. I wished to
take your opinion along with me, that, if I should give up the contest
at the very beginning, my surrender of my post may not seem the effect
of inconstancy, or timidity, or anger, or disgust, or indolence, or any
other temper unbecoming a man who has engaged in the public service. If,
on the contrary, I should undertake the election, and fail of success, I
was full as anxious that it should be manifest to the whole world that
the peace of the city had not been broken by my rashness, presumption,
or fond conceit of my own merit.
I am not come, by a false and counterfeit show of deference to your
judgment, to seduce it in my favor. I ask it seriously and unaffectedly.
If you wish that I should retire, I shall not consider that advice as a
censure upon my conduct, or an alteration in your sentiments, but as a
rational submission to the circumstances of affairs. If, on the
contrary, you should think it proper for me to proceed on my canvass, if
you will risk the trouble on your part, I will risk it on mine. My
pretensions are such as you cannot be ashamed of, whether they succeed
or fail.
If you call upon me, I shall solicit the favor of the city upon manly
ground. I come before you with the plain confidence of an honest servant
in the equity of a candid and discerning master. I come to claim your
approbation, not to amuse you with vain apologies, or with professions
still more vain and senseless. I have lived too long to be served by
apologies, or to stand in need of them. The part I have acted has been
in open day; and to hold out to a conduct which stands in that clear and
steady light for all its good and all its evil, to hold out to that
conduct the paltry winking tapers of excuses and promises,--I never
will do it. They may obscure it with their smoke, but they never can
illumine sunshine by such a flame as theirs.
I am sensible that no endeavors have been left untried to injure me in
your opinion. But the use of character is to be a shield against
calumny. I could wish, undoubtedly, (if idle wishes were not the most
idle of all things,) to make every part of my conduct agreeable to every
one of my constituents; but in so great a city, and so greatly divided
as this, it is weak to expect it.
In such a discordancy of sentiments it is better to look to the nature
of things than to the humors of men. The very attempt towards pleasing
everybody discovers a temper always flashy, and often false and
insincere. Therefore, as I have proceeded straight onward in my conduct,
so I will proceed in my account of those parts of it which have been
most excepted to. But I must first beg leave just to hint to you that we
may suffer very great detriment by being open to every talker. It is not
to be imagined how much of service is lost from spirits full of activity
and full of energy, who are pressing, who are rushing forward, to great
and capital objects, when you oblige them to be continually looking
back. Whilst they are defending one service, they defraud you of an
hundred. Applaud us when we run, console us when we fall, cheer us when
we recover; but let us pass on,--for God's sake, let us pass on!
Do you think, Gentlemen, that every public act in the six years since I
stood in this place before you, that all the arduous things which have
been done in this eventful period which has crowded into a few years'
space the revolutions of an age, can be opened to you on their fair
grounds in half an hour's conversation?
But it is no reason, because there is a bad mode of inquiry, that there
should be no examination at all. Most certainly it is our duty to
examine; it is our interest, too: but it must be with discretion, with
an attention to all the circumstances and to all the motives; like sound
judges, and not like cavilling pettifoggers and quibbling pleaders,
prying into flaws and hunting for exceptions. Look, Gentlemen, to the
_whole tenor_ of your member's conduct. Try whether his ambition or his
avarice have justled him out of the straight line of duty,--or whether
that grand foe of the offices of active life, that master vice in men of
business, a degenerate and inglorious sloth, has made him flag and
languish in his course. This is the object of our inquiry. If our
member's conduct can bear this touch, mark it for sterling. He may have
fallen into errors, he must have faults; but our error is greater, and
our fault is radically ruinous to ourselves, if we do not bear, if we do
not even applaud, the whole compound and mixed mass of such a character.
Not to act thus is folly; I had almost said it is impiety. He censures
God who quarrels with the imperfections of man.
Gentlemen, we must not be peevish with those who serve the people; for
none will serve us, whilst there is a court to serve, but those who are
of a nice and jealous honor. They who think everything, in comparison of
that honor, to be dust and ashes, will not bear to have it soiled and
impaired by those for whose sake they make a thousand sacrifices to
preserve it immaculate and whole. We shall either drive such men from
the public stage, or we shall send them to the court for protection,
where, if they must sacrifice their reputation, they will at least
secure their interest. Depend upon it, that the lovers of freedom will
be free. None will violate their conscience to please us, in order
afterwards to discharge that conscience, which they have violated, by
doing us faithful and affectionate service. If we degrade and deprave
their minds by servility, it will be absurd to expect that they who are
creeping and abject towards us will ever be bold and incorruptible
assertors of our freedom against the most seducing and the most
formidable of all powers. No! human nature is not so formed: nor shall
we improve the faculties or better the morals of public men by our
possession of the most infallible receipt in the world for making cheats
and hypocrites.
Let me say, with plainness, I who am no longer in a public character,
that, if, by a fair, by an indulgent, by a gentlemanly behavior to our
representatives, we do not give confidence to their minds and a liberal
scope to their understandings, if we do not permit our members to act
upon a _very_ enlarged view of things, we shall at length infallibly
degrade our national representation into a confused and scuffling bustle
of local agency. When the popular member is narrowed in his ideas and
rendered timid in his proceedings, the service of the crown will be the
sole nursery of statesmen. Among the frolics of the court, it may at
length take that of attending to its business. Then the monopoly of
mental power will be added to the power of all other kinds it possesses.
On the side of the people there will be nothing but impotence: for
ignorance is impotence; narrowness of mind is impotence; timidity is
itself impotence, and makes all other qualities that go along with it
impotent and useless.
At present it is the plan of the court to make its servants
insignificant. If the people should fall into the same humor, and should
choose their servants on the same principles of mere obsequiousness and
flexibility and total vacancy or indifference of opinion in all public
matters, then no part of the state will be sound, and it will be in vain
to think of saving it.
I thought it very expedient at this time to give you this candid
counsel; and with this counsel I would willingly close, if the matters
which at various times have been objected to me in this city concerned
only myself and my own election. These charges, I think, are four in
number: my neglect of a due attention to my constituents, the not paying
more frequent visits here; my conduct on the affairs of the first Irish
Trade Acts; my opinion and mode of proceeding on Lord Beauchamp's
Debtors' Bills; and my votes on the late affairs of the Roman Catholics.
All of these (except perhaps the first) relate to matters of very
considerable public concern; and it is not lest you should censure me
improperly, but lest you should form improper opinions on matters of
some moment to you, that I trouble you at all upon the subject. My
conduct is of small importance.
With regard to the first charge, my friends have spoken to ms of it in
the style of amicable expostulation,--not so much blaming the thing as
lamenting the effects. Others, less partial to me, were less kind in
assigning the motives. I admit, there is a decorum and propriety in a
member of Parliament's paying a respectful court to his constituents. If
I were conscious to myself that pleasure, or dissipation, or low,
unworthy occupations had detained me from personal attendance on you, I
would readily admit my fault, and quietly submit to the penalty. But,
Gentlemen, I live at an hundred miles' distance from Bristol; and at the
end of a session I come to my own house, fatigued in body and in mind,
to a little repose, and to a very little attention to my family and my
private concerns. A visit to Bristol is always a sort of canvass, else
it will do more harm than good. To pass from the toils of a session to
the toils of a canvass is the furthest thing in the world from repose. I
could hardly serve you _as I have done_, and court you too. Most of you
have heard that I do not very remarkably spare myself in _public_
business; and in the _private_ business of my constituents I have done
very near as much as those who have nothing else to do. My canvass of
you was not on the 'change, nor in the county meetings, nor in the clubs
of this city: it was in the House of Commons; it was at the
Custom-House; it was at the Council; it was at the Treasury; it was at
the Admiralty. I canvassed you through your affairs, and not your
persons. I was not only your representative as a body; I was the agent,
the solicitor of individuals; I ran about wherever your affairs could
call me; and in acting for you, I often appeared rather as a ship-broker
than as a member of Parliament. There was nothing too laborious or too
low for me to undertake. The meanness of the business was raised by the
dignity of the object. If some lesser matters have slipped through my
fingers, it was because I filled my hands too full, and, in my eagerness
to serve you, took in more than any hands could grasp. Several gentlemen
stand round me who are my willing witnesses; and there are others who,
if they were here, would be still better, because they would be
unwilling witnesses to the same truth. It was in the middle of a summer
residence in London, and in the middle of a negotiation at the Admiralty
for your trade, that I was called to Bristol; and this late visit, at
this late day, has been possibly in prejudice to your affairs.
Since I have touched upon this matter, let me say, Gentlemen, that, if I
had a disposition or a right to complain, I have some cause of complaint
on my side. With a petition of this city in my hand, passed through the
corporation without a dissenting voice, a petition in unison with almost
the whole voice of the kingdom, (with whose formal thanks I was covered
over,) whilst I labored on no less than five bills for a public reform,
and fought, against the opposition of great abilities and of the
greatest power, every clause and every word of the largest of those
bills, almost to the very last day of a very long session,--all this
time a canvass in Bristol was as calmly carried on as if I were dead. I
was considered as a man wholly out of the question. Whilst I watched and
fasted and sweated in the House of Commons, by the most easy and
ordinary arts of election, by dinners and visits, by "How do you dos,"
and "My worthy friends," I was to be quietly moved out of my seat,--and
promises were made, and engagements entered into, without any exception
or reserve, as if my laborious zeal in my duty had been a regular
abdication of my trust.
To open my whole heart to you on this subject, I do confess, however,
that there were other times, besides the two years in which I did visit
you, when I was not wholly without leisure for repeating that mark of
my respect. But I could not bring my mind to see you. You remember that
in the beginning of this American war (that era of calamity, disgrace,
and downfall, an era which no feeling mind will ever mention without a
tear for England) you were greatly divided,--and a very strong body, if
not the strongest, opposed itself to the madness which every art and
every power were employed to render popular, in order that the errors of
the rulers might be lost in the general blindness of the nation. This
opposition continued until after our great, but most unfortunate victory
at Long Island. Then all the mounds and banks of our constancy were
borne down, at once, and the frenzy of the American war broke in upon us
like a deluge. This victory, which seemed to put an immediate end to all
difficulties, perfected us in that spirit of domination which our
unparalleled prosperity had but too long nurtured. We had been so very
powerful, and so very prosperous, that even the humblest of us were
degraded into the vices and follies of kings. We lost all measure
between means and ends; and our headlong desires became our politics and
our morals. All men who wished for peace, or retained any sentiments of
moderation, were overborne or silenced; and this city was led by every
artifice (and probably with the more management because I was one of
your members) to distinguish itself by its zeal for that fatal cause. In
this temper of yours and of my mind, I should sooner have fled to the
extremities of the earth than hate shown myself here. I, who saw in
every American victory (for you have had a long series of these
misfortunes) the germ and seed of the naval power of France and Spain,
which all our heat and warmth against America was only hatching into
life,--I should not have been a welcome visitant, with the brow and the
language of such feelings. When afterwards the other face of your
calamity was turned upon you, and showed itself in defeat and distress,
I shunned you full as much. I felt sorely this variety in our
wretchedness; and I did not wish to have the least appearance of
insulting you with that show of superiority, which, though it may not be
assumed, is generally suspected, in a time of calamity, from those whose
previous warnings have been despised. I could not bear to show you a
representative whose face did not reflect that of his constituents,--a
face that could not joy in your joys, and sorrow in your sorrows. But
time at length has made us all of one opinion, and we have all opened
our eyes on the true nature of the American war,--to the true nature of
all its successes and all its failures.
In that public storm, too, I had my private feelings. I had seen blown
down and prostrate on the ground several of those houses to whom I was
chiefly indebted for the honor this city has done me. I confess, that,
whilst the wounds of those I loved were yet green, I could not bear to
show myself in pride and triumph in that place into which their
partiality had brought me, and to appear at feasts and rejoicings in the
midst of the grief and calamity of my warm friends, my zealous
supporters, my generous benefactors. This is a true, unvarnished,
undisguised state of the affair. You will judge of it.
This is the only one of the charges in which I am personally concerned.
As to the other matters objected against me, which in their turn I shall
mention to you, remember once more I do not mean to extenuate or excuse.
Why should I, when the things charged are among those upon which I
found all my reputation? What would be left to me, if I myself was the
man who softened and blended and diluted and weakened all the
distinguishing colors of my life, so as to leave nothing distinct and
determinate in my whole conduct?
It has been said, and it is the second charge, that in the questions of
the Irish trade I did not consult the interest of my constituents,--or,
to speak out strongly, that I rather acted as a native of Ireland than
as an English member of Parliament.
I certainly have very warm good wishes for the place of my birth. But
the sphere of my duties is my true country. It was as a man attached to
your interests, and zealous for the conservation of your power and
dignity, that I acted on that occasion, and on all occasions. You were
involved in the American war. A new world of policy was opened, to which
it was necessary we should conform, whether we would or not; and my only
thought was how to conform to our situation in such a manner as to unite
to this kingdom, in prosperity and in affection, whatever remained of
the empire. I was true to my old, standing, invariable principle, that
all things which came from Great Britain should issue as a gift of her
bounty and beneficence, rather than as claims recovered against a
struggling litigant,--or at least, that, if your beneficence obtained no
credit in your concessions, yet that they should appear the salutary
provisions of your wisdom and foresight, not as things wrung from you
with your blood by the cruel gripe of a rigid necessity. The first
concessions, by being (much against my will) mangled and stripped of the
parts which were necessary to make out their just correspondence and
connection in trade, were of no use. The next year a feeble attempt was
made to bring the thing into better shape. This attempt, (countenanced
by the minister,) on the very first appearance of some popular
uneasiness, was, after a considerable progress through the House, thrown
out by _him_.
What was the consequence? The whole kingdom of Ireland was instantly in
a flame. Threatened by foreigners, and, as they thought, insulted by
England, they resolved at once to resist the power of France and to cast
off yours. As for us, we were able neither to protect nor to restrain
them. Forty thousand men were raised and disciplined without commission
from the crown. Two illegal armies were seen with banners displayed at
the same time and in the same country. No executive magistrate, no
judicature, in Ireland, would acknowledge the legality of the army which
bore the king's commission; and no law, or appearance of law, authorized
the army commissioned by itself. In this unexampled state of things,
which the least error, the least trespass on the right or left, would
have hurried down the precipice into an abyss of blood and confusion,
the people of Ireland demand a freedom of trade with arms in their
hands. They interdict all commerce between the two nations. They deny
all new supply in the House of Commons, although in time of war. They
stint the trust of the old revenue, given for two years to all the
king's predecessors, to six months. The British Parliament, in a former
session, frightened into a limited concession by the menaces of Ireland,
frightened out of it by the menaces of England, was now frightened back
again, and made an universal surrender of all that had been thought the
peculiar, reserved, uncommunicable rights of England: the exclusive
commerce of America, of Africa, of the West Indies,--all the
enumerations of the Acts of Navigation,--all the manufactures,--iron,
glass, even the last pledge of jealousy and pride, the interest hid in
the secret of our hearts, the inveterate prejudice moulded into the
constitution of our frame, even the sacred fleece itself, all went
together. No reserve, no exception; no debate, no discussion. A sudden
light broke in upon us all. It broke in, not through well-contrived and
well-disposed windows, but through flaws and breaches,--through the
yawning chasms of our ruin. We were taught wisdom by humiliation. No
town in England presumed to have a prejudice, or dared to mutter a
petition. What was worse, the whole Parliament of England, which
retained authority for nothing but surrenders, was despoiled of every
shadow of its superintendence. It was, without any qualification, denied
in theory, as it had been trampled upon in practice. This scene of shame
and disgrace has, in a manner, whilst I am speaking, ended by the
perpetual establishment of a military power in the dominions of this
crown, without consent of the British legislature,[48] contrary to the
policy of the Constitution, contrary to the Declaration of Right; and by
this your liberties are swept away along with your supreme
authority,--and both, linked together from the beginning, have, I am
afraid, both together perished forever.
What! Gentlemen, was I not to foresee, or foreseeing, was I not to
endeavor to save you from all these multiplied mischiefs and disgraces?
Would the little, silly, canvass prattle of obeying instructions, and
having no opinions but yours, and such idle, senseless tales, which
amuse the vacant ears of unthinking men, have saved you from "the
pelting of that pitiless storm," to which the loose improvidence, the
cowardly rashness, of those who dare not look danger in the face so as
to provide against it in time, and therefore throw themselves headlong
into the midst of it, have exposed this degraded nation, beat down and
prostrate on the earth, unsheltered, unarmed, unresisting? Was I an
Irishman on that day that I boldly withstood our pride? or on the day
that I hung down my head, and wept in shame and silence over the
humiliation of Great Britain? I became unpopular in England for the one,
and in Ireland for the other. What then? What obligation lay on me to be
popular? I was bound to serve both kingdoms. To be pleased with my
service was their affair, not mine.
I was an Irishman in the Irish business, just as much as I was an
American, when, on the same principles, I wished you to concede to
America at a time when she prayed concession at our feet. Just as much
was I an American, when I wished Parliament to offer terms in victory,
and not to wait the well-chosen hour of defeat, for making good by
weakness and by supplication a claim of prerogative, preëminence, and
authority.
Instead of requiring it from me, as a point of duty, to kindle with your
passions, had you all been as cool as I was, you would have been saved
disgraces and distresses that are unutterable. Do you remember our
commission? We sent out a solemn embassy across the Atlantic Ocean, to
lay the crown, the peerage, the commons of Great Britain at the feet of
the American Congress. That our disgrace might want no sort of
brightening and burnishing, observe who they were that composed this
famous embassy. My Lord Carlisle is among the first ranks of our
nobility. He is the identical man who, but two years before, had been
put forward, at the opening of a session, in the House of Lords, as the
mover of an haughty and rigorous address against America. He was put in
the front of the embassy of submission. Mr. Eden was taken from the
office of Lord Suffolk, to whom he was then Under-Secretary of
State,--from the office of that Lord Suffolk who but a few weeks before,
in his place in Parliament, did not deign to inquire where a congress of
vagrants was to be found. This Lord Suffolk sent Mr. Eden to find these
vagrants, without knowing where his king's generals were to be found who
were joined in the same commission of supplicating those whom they were
sent to subdue. They enter the capital of America only to abandon it;
and these assertors and representatives of the dignity of England, at
the tail of a flying army, let fly their Parthian shafts of memorials
and remonstrances at random behind them. Their promises and their
offers, their flatteries and their menaces, were all despised; and we
were saved the disgrace of their formal reception only because the
Congress scorned to receive them; whilst the State-house of independent
Philadelphia opened her doors to the public entry of the ambassador of
France. From war and blood we went to submission, and from submission
plunged back again to war and blood, to desolate and be desolated,
without measure, hope, or end. I am a Royalist: I blushed for this
degradation of the crown. I am a Whig: I blushed for the dishonor of
Parliament. I am a true Englishman: I felt to the quick for the
disgrace of England. I am a man: I felt for the melancholy reverse of
human affairs in the fall of the first power in the world.
To read what was approaching in Ireland, in the black and bloody
characters of the American war, was a painful, but it was a necessary
part of my public duty. For, Gentlemen, it is not your fond desires or
mine that can alter the nature of things; by contending against which,
what have we got, or shall ever get, but defeat and shame? I did not
obey your instructions. No. I conformed to the instructions of truth and
Nature, and maintained your interest, against your opinions, with a
constancy that became me. A representative worthy of you ought to be a
person of stability. I am to look, indeed, to your opinions,--but to
such opinions as you and I _must_ have five years hence. I was not to
look to the flash of the day. I knew that you chose me, in my place,
along with others, to be a pillar of the state, and not a weathercock on
the top of the edifice, exalted for my levity and versatility, and of no
use but to indicate the shiftings of every fashionable gale. Would to
God the value of my sentiments on Ireland and on America had been at
this day a subject of doubt and discussion! No matter what my sufferings
had been, so that this kingdom had kept the authority I wished it to
maintain, by a grave foresight, and by an equitable temperance in the
use of its power.
The next article of charge on my public conduct, and that which I find
rather the most prevalent of all, is Lord Beauchamp's bill: I mean his
bill of last session, for reforming the law-process concerning
imprisonment. It is said, to aggravate the offence, that I treated the
petition of this city with contempt even in presenting it to the House,
and expressed myself in terms of marked disrespect. Had this latter part
of the charge been true, no merits on the side of the question which I
took could possibly excuse me. But I am incapable of treating this city
with disrespect. Very fortunately, at this minute, (if my bad eyesight
does not deceive me,) the worthy gentleman[49] deputed on this business
stands directly before me. To him I appeal, whether I did not, though it
militated with my oldest and my most recent public opinions, deliver the
petition with a strong and more than usual recommendation to the
consideration of the House, on account of the character and consequence
of those who signed it. I believe the worthy gentleman will tell you,
that, the very day I received it, I applied to the Solicitor, now the
Attorney General, to give it an immediate consideration; and he most
obligingly and instantly consented to employ a great deal of his very
valuable time to write an explanation of the bill. I attended the
committee with all possible care and diligence, in order that every
objection of yours might meet with a solution, or produce an alteration.
I entreated your learned recorder (always ready in business in which you
take a concern) to attend. But what will you say to those who blame me
for supporting Lord Beauchamp's bill, as a disrespectful treatment of
your petition, when you hear, that, out of respect to you, I myself was
the cause of the loss of that very bill? For the noble lord who brought
it in, and who, I must say, has much merit for this and some other
measures, at my request consented to put it off for a week, which the
Speaker's illness lengthened to a fortnight; and then the frantic
tumult about Popery drove that and every rational business from the
House. So that, if I chose to make a defence of myself, on the little
principles of a culprit, pleading in his exculpation, I might not only
secure my acquittal, but make merit with the opposers of the bill. But I
shall do no such thing. The truth is, that I did occasion the loss of
the bill, and by a delay caused by my respect to you. But such an event
was never in my contemplation. And I am so far from taking credit for
the defeat of that measure, that I cannot sufficiently lament my
misfortune, if but one man, who ought to be at large, has passed a year
in prison by my means. I am a debtor to the debtors. I confess judgment.
I owe what, if ever it be in my power, I shall most certainly
pay,--ample atonement and usurious amends to liberty and humanity for my
unhappy lapse. For, Gentlemen, Lord Beauchamp's bill was a law of
justice and policy, as far as it went: I say, as far as it went; for its
fault was its being in the remedial part miserably defective.
There are two capital faults in our law with relation to civil debts.
One is, that every man is presumed solvent: a presumption, in
innumerable cases, directly against truth. Therefore the debtor is
ordered, on a supposition of ability and fraud, to be coerced his
liberty until he makes payment. By this means, in all cases of civil
insolvency, without a pardon from his creditor, he is to be imprisoned
for life; and thus a miserable mistaken invention of artificial science
operates to change a civil into a criminal judgment, and to scourge
misfortune or indiscretion with a punishment which the law does not
inflict on the greatest crimes.
The next fault is, that the inflicting of that punishment is not on the
opinion of an equal and public judge, but is referred to the arbitrary
discretion of a private, nay, interested, and irritated, individual. He,
who formally is, and substantially ought to be, the judge, is in reality
no more than ministerial, a mere executive instrument of a private man,
who is at once judge and party. Every idea of judicial order is
subverted by this procedure. If the insolvency be no crime, why is it
punished with arbitrary imprisonment? If it be a crime, why is it
delivered into private hands to pardon without discretion, or to punish
without mercy and without measure?
To these faults, gross and cruel faults in our law, the excellent
principle of Lord Beauchamp's bill applied some sort of remedy. I know
that credit must be preserved: but equity must be preserved, too; and it
is impossible that anything should be necessary to commerce which is
inconsistent with justice. The principle of credit was not weakened by
that bill. God forbid! The enforcement of that credit was only put into
the same public judicial hands on which we depend for our lives and all
that makes life dear to us. But, indeed, this business was taken up too
warmly, both here and elsewhere. The bill was extremely mistaken. It was
supposed to enact what it never enacted; and complaints were made of
clauses in it, as novelties, which existed before the noble lord that
brought in the bill was born. There was a fallacy that ran through the
whole of the objections. The gentlemen who opposed the bill always
argued as if the option lay between that bill and the ancient law. But
this is a grand mistake. For, practically, the option is between not
that bill and the old law, but between that bill and those occasional
laws called acts of grace. For the operation of the old law is so
savage, and so inconvenient to society, that for a long time past, once
in every Parliament, and lately twice, the legislature has been obliged
to make a general arbitrary jail-delivery, and at once to set open, by
its sovereign authority, all the prisons in England.
Gentlemen, I never relished acts of grace, nor ever submitted to them
but from despair of better. They are a dishonorable invention, by which,
not from humanity, not from policy, but merely because we have not room
enough to hold these victims of the absurdity of our laws, we turn loose
upon the public three or four thousand naked wretches, corrupted by the
habits, debased by the ignominy of a prison. If the creditor had a right
to those carcasses as a natural security for his property, I am sure we
have no right to deprive him of that security. But if the few pounds of
flesh were not necessary to his security, we had not a right to detain
the unfortunate debtor, without any benefit at all to the person who
confined him. Take it as you will, we commit injustice. Now Lord
Beauchamp's bill intended to do deliberately, and with great caution and
circumspection, upon each several case, and with all attention to the
just claimant, what acts of grace do in a much greater measure, and with
very little care, caution, or deliberation.
I suspect that here, too, if we contrive to oppose this bill, we shall
be found in a struggle against the nature of things. For, as we grow
enlightened, the public will not bear, for any length of time, to pay
for the maintenance of whole armies of prisoners, nor, at their own
expense, submit to keep jails as a sort of garrisons, merely to fortify
the absurd principle of making men judges in their own cause. For credit
has little or no concern in this cruelty. I speak in a commercial
assembly. You know that credit is given because capital _must_ be
employed; that men calculate the chances of insolvency; and they either
withhold the credit, or make the debtor pay the risk in the price. The
counting-house has no alliance with the jail. Holland understands trade
as well as we, and she has done much more than this obnoxious bill
intended to do. There was not, when Mr. Howard visited Holland, more
than one prisoner for debt in the great city of Rotterdam. Although Lord
Beauchamp's act (which was previous to this bill, and intended to feel
the way for it) has already preserved liberty to thousands, and though
it is not three years since the last act of grace passed, yet, by Mr.
Howard's last account, there were near three thousand again in jail. I
cannot name this gentleman without remarking that his labors and
writings have done much to open the eyes and hearts of mankind. He has
visited all Europe,--not to survey the sumptuousness of palaces or the
stateliness of temples, not to make accurate measurements of the remains
of ancient grandeur nor to form a scale of the curiosity of modern art,
not to collect medals or collate manuscripts,--but to dive into the
depths of dungeons, to plunge into the infection of hospitals, to survey
the mansions of sorrow and pain, to take the gauge and dimensions of
misery, depression, and contempt, to remember the forgotten, to attend
to the neglected, to visit the forsaken, and to compare and collate the
distresses of all men in all countries. His plan is original; and it is
as full of genius as it is of humanity. It was a voyage of discovery, a
circumnavigation of charity. Already the benefit of his labor is felt
more or less in every country; I hope he will anticipate his final
reward by seeing all its effects fully realized in his own. He will
receive, not by retail, but in gross, the reward of those who visit the
prisoner; and he has so forestalled and monopolized this branch of
charity, that there will be, I trust, little room to merit by such acts
of benevolence hereafter.
Nothing now remains to trouble you with but the fourth charge against
me,--the business of the Roman Catholics. It is a business closely
connected with the rest. They are all on one and the same principle. My
little scheme of conduct, such as it is, is all arranged. I could do
nothing but what I have done on this subject, without confounding the
whole train of my ideas and disturbing the whole order of my life.
Gentlemen, I ought to apologize to you for seeming to think anything at
all necessary to be said upon this matter. The calumny is fitter to be
scrawled with the midnight chalk of incendiaries, with "No Popery," on
walls and doors of devoted houses, than to be mentioned in any civilized
company. I had heard that the spirit of discontent on that subject was
very prevalent here. With pleasure I find that I have been grossly
misinformed. If it exists at all in this city, the laws have crushed its
exertions, and our morals have shamed its appearance in daylight. I have
pursued this spirit wherever I could trace it; but it still fled from
me. It was a ghost which all had heard of, but none had seen. None would
acknowledge that he thought the public proceeding with regard to our
Catholic dissenters to be blamable; but several were sorry it had made
an ill impression upon others, and that my interest was hurt by my share
in the business. I find with satisfaction and pride, that not above four
or five in this city (and I dare say these misled by some gross
misrepresentation) have signed that symbol of delusion and bond of
sedition, that libel on the national religion and English character, the
Protestant Association. It is, therefore, Gentlemen, not by way of cure,
but of prevention, and lest the arts of wicked men may prevail over the
integrity of any one amongst us, that I think it necessary to open to
you the merits of this transaction pretty much at large; and I beg your
patience upon it: for, although the reasonings that have been used to
depreciate the act are of little force, and though the authority of the
men concerned in this ill design is not very imposing, yet the
audaciousness of these conspirators against the national honor, and the
extensive wickedness of their attempts, have raised persons of little
importance to a degree of evil eminence, and imparted a sort of sinister
dignity to proceedings that had their origin in only the meanest and
blindest malice.
In explaining to you the proceedings of Parliament which have been
complained of, I will state to you,--first, the thing that was
done,--next, the persons who did it,--and lastly, the grounds and
reasons upon which the legislature proceeded in this deliberate act of
public justice and public prudence.
Gentlemen, the condition of our nature is such that we buy our blessings
at a price. The Reformation, one of the greatest periods of human
improvement, was a time of trouble and confusion. The vast structure of
superstition and tyranny which had been for ages in rearing, and which
was combined with the interest of the great and of the many, which was
moulded into the laws, the manners, and civil institutions of nations,
and blended with the frame and policy of states, could not be brought to
the ground without a fearful struggle; nor could it fall without a
violent concussion of itself and all about it. When this great
revolution was attempted in a more regular mode by government, it was
opposed by plots and seditions of the people; when by popular efforts,
it was repressed as rebellion by the hand of power; and bloody
executions (often bloodily returned) marked the whole of its progress
through all its stages. The affairs of religion, which are no longer
heard of in the tumult of our present contentions, made a principal
ingredient in the wars and politics of that time: the enthusiasm of
religion threw a gloom over the politics; and political interests
poisoned and perverted the spirit of religion upon all sides. The
Protestant religion, in that violent struggle, infected, as the Popish
had been before, by worldly interests and worldly passions, became a
persecutor in its turn, sometimes of the new sects, which carried their
own principles further than it was convenient to the original reformers,
and always of the body from whom they parted: and this persecuting
spirit arose, not only from the bitterness of retaliation, but from the
merciless policy of fear.
It was long before the spirit of true piety and true wisdom, involved in
the principles of the Reformation, could be depurated from the dregs and
feculence of the contention with which it was carried through. However,
until this be done, the Reformation is not complete: and those who think
themselves good Protestants, from their animosity to others, are in
that respect no Protestants at all. It was at first thought necessary,
perhaps, to oppose to Popery another Popery, to get the better of it.
Whatever was the cause, laws were made in many countries, and in this
kingdom in particular, against Papists, which are as bloody as any of
those which had been enacted by the Popish princes and states: and where
those laws were not bloody, in my opinion, they were worse; as they were
slow, cruel outrages on our nature, and kept men alive only to insult in
their persons every one of the rights and feelings of humanity. I pass
those statutes, because I would spare your pious ears the repetition of
such shocking things; and I come to that particular law the repeal of
which has produced so many unnatural and unexpected consequences.
A statute was fabricated in the year 1699, by which the saying mass (a
church service in the Latin tongue, not exactly the same as our liturgy,
but very near it, and containing no offence whatsoever against the laws,
or against good morals) was forged into a crime, punishable with
perpetual imprisonment. The teaching school, an useful and virtuous
occupation, even the teaching in a private family, was in every Catholic
subjected to the same unproportioned punishment. Your industry, and the
bread of your children, was taxed for a pecuniary reward to stimulate
avarice to do what Nature refused, to inform and prosecute on this law.
Every Roman Catholic was, under the same act, to forfeit his estate to
his nearest Protestant relation, until, through a profession of what he
did not believe, he redeemed by his hypocrisy what the law had
transferred to the kinsman as the recompense of his profligacy. When
thus turned out of doors from his paternal estate, he was disabled from
acquiring any other by any industry, donation, or charity; but was
rendered a foreigner in his native land, only because he retained the
religion, along with the property, handed down to him from those who had
been the old inhabitants of that land before him.
Does any one who hears me approve this scheme of things, or think there
is common justice, common sense, or common honesty in any part of it? If
any does, let him say it, and I am ready to discuss the point with
temper and candor. But instead of approving, I perceive a virtuous
indignation beginning to rise in your minds on the mere cold stating of
the statute.
But what will you feel, when you know from history how this statute
passed, and what were the motives, and what the mode of making it? A
party in this nation, enemies to the system of the Revolution, were in
opposition to the government of King William. They knew that our
glorious deliverer was an enemy to all persecution. They knew that he
came to free us from slavery and Popery, out of a country where a third
of the people are contented Catholics under a Protestant government. He
came with a part of his army composed of those very Catholics, to
overset the power of a Popish prince. Such is the effect of a tolerating
spirit; and so much is liberty served in every way, and by all persons,
by a manly adherence to its own principles. Whilst freedom is true to
itself, everything becomes subject to it, and its very adversaries are
an instrument in its hands.
The party I speak of (like some amongst us who would disparage the best
friends of their country) resolved to make the king either violate his
principles of toleration or incur the odium of protecting Papists. They
therefore brought in this bill, and made it purposely wicked and absurd
that it might be rejected. The then court party, discovering their game,
turned the tables on them, and returned their bill to them stuffed with
still greater absurdities, that its loss might lie upon its original
authors. They, finding their own ball thrown back to them, kicked it
back again to their adversaries. And thus this act, loaded with the
double injustice of two parties, neither of whom intended to pass what
they hoped the other would be persuaded to reject, went through the
legislature, contrary to the real wish of all parts of it, and of all
the parties that composed it. In this manner these insolent and
profligate factions, as if they were playing with balls and counters,
made a sport of the fortunes and the liberties of their
fellow-creatures. Other acts of persecution have been acts of malice.
This was a subversion of justice from wantonness and petulance. Look
into the history of Bishop Burnet. He is a witness without exception.
The effects of the act have been as mischievous as its origin was
ludicrous and shameful. From that time, every person of that communion,
lay and ecclesiastic, has been obliged to fly from the face of day. The
clergy, concealed in garrets of private houses, or obliged to take a
shelter (hardly safe to themselves, but infinitely dangerous to their
country) under the privileges of foreign ministers, officiated as their
servants and under their protection. The whole body of the Catholics,
condemned to beggary and to ignorance in their native land, have been
obliged to learn the principles of letters, at the hazard of all their
other principles, from the charity of your enemies. They have been taxed
to their ruin at the pleasure of necessitous and profligate relations,
and according to the measure of their necessity and profligacy. Examples
of this are many and affecting. Some of them are known by a friend who
stands near me in this hall. It is but six or seven years since a
clergyman, of the name of Malony, a man of morals, neither guilty nor
accused of anything noxious to the state, was condemned to perpetual
imprisonment for exercising the functions of his religion; and after
lying in jail two or three years, was relieved by the mercy of
government from perpetual imprisonment, on condition of perpetual
banishment. A brother of the Earl of Shrewsbury, a Talbot, a name
respectable in this country whilst its glory is any part of its concern,
was hauled to the bar of the Old Bailey, among common felons, and only
escaped the same doom, either by some error in the process, or that the
wretch who brought him there could not correctly describe his person,--I
now forget which. In short, the persecution would never have relented
for a moment, if the judges, superseding (though with an ambiguous
example) the strict rule of their artificial duty by the higher
obligation of their conscience, did not constantly throw every
difficulty in the way of such informers. But so ineffectual is the power
of legal evasion against legal iniquity, that it was but the other day
that a lady of condition, beyond the middle of life, was on the point of
being stripped of her whole fortune by a near relation to whom she had
been a friend and benefactor; and she must have been totally ruined,
without a power of redress or mitigation from the courts of law, had
not the legislature itself rushed in, and by a special act of Parliament
rescued her from the injustice of its own statutes. One of the acts
authorizing such things was that which we in part repealed, knowing what
our duty was, and doing that duty as men of honor and virtue, as good
Protestants, and as good citizens. Let him stand forth that disapproves
what we have done!
Gentlemen, bad laws are the worst sort of tyranny. In such a country as
this they are of all bad things the worst,--worse by far than anywhere
else; and they derive a particular malignity even from the wisdom and
soundness of the rest of our institutions. For very obvious reasons you
cannot trust the crown with a dispensing power over any of your laws.
However, a government, be it as bad as it may, will, in the exercise of
a discretionary power, discriminate times and persons, and will not
ordinarily pursue any man, when its own safety is not concerned. A
mercenary informer knows no distinction. Under such a system, the
obnoxious people are slaves not only to the government, but they live at
the mercy of every individual; they are at once the slaves of the whole
community and of every part of it; and the worst and most unmerciful men
are those on whose goodness they most depend.
In this situation, men not only shrink from the frowns of a stern
magistrate, but they are obliged to fly from their very species. The
seeds of destruction are sown in civil intercourse, in social habitudes.
The blood of wholesome kindred is infected. Their tables and beds are
surrounded with snares. All the means given by Providence to make life
safe and comfortable are perverted into instruments of terror and
torment. This species of universal subserviency, that makes the very
servant who waits behind your chair the arbiter of your life and
fortune, has such a tendency to degrade and abase mankind, and to
deprive them of that assured and liberal state of mind which alone can
make us what we ought to be, that I vow to God I would sooner bring
myself to put a man to immediate death for opinions I disliked, and so
to get rid of the man and his opinions at once, than to fret him with a
feverish being, tainted with the jail-distemper of a contagious
servitude, to keep him above ground an animated mass of putrefaction,
corrupted himself, and corrupting all about him.
The act repealed was of this direct tendency; and it was made in the
manner which I have related to you. I will now tell you by whom the bill
of repeal was brought into Parliament. I find it has been industriously
given out in this city (from kindness to me, unquestionably) that I was
the mover or the seconder. The fact is, I did not once open my lips on
the subject during the whole progress of the bill. I do not say this as
disclaiming my share in that measure. Very far from it. I inform you of
this fact, lest I should seem to arrogate to myself the merits which
belong to others. To have been the man chosen out to redeem our
fellow-citizens from slavery, to purify our laws from absurdity and
injustice, and to cleanse our religion from the blot and stain of
persecution, would be an honor and happiness to which my wishes would
undoubtedly aspire, but to which nothing but my wishes could possibly
have entitled me. That great work was in hands in every respect far
better qualified than mine. The mover of the bill was Sir George
Savile.
When an act of great and signal humanity was to be done, and done with
all the weight and authority that belonged to it, the world could cast
its eyes upon none but him. I hope that few things which have a tendency
to bless or to adorn life have wholly escaped my observation in my
passage through it. I have sought the acquaintance of that gentleman,
and have seen him in all situations. He is a true genius; with an
understanding vigorous, and acute, and refined, and distinguishing even
to excess; and illuminated with a most unbounded, peculiar, and original
cast of imagination. With these he possesses many external and
instrumental advantages; and he makes use of them all. His fortune is
among the largest,--a fortune which, wholly unincumbered as it is with
one single charge from luxury, vanity, or excess, sinks under the
benevolence of its dispenser. This private benevolence, expanding itself
into patriotism, renders his whole being the estate of the public, in
which he has not reserved a _peculium_ for himself of profit, diversion,
or relaxation. During the session the first in and the last out of the
House of Commons, he passes from the senate to the camp; and seldom
seeing the seat of his ancestors, he is always in Parliament to serve
his country or in the field to defend it. But in all well-wrought
compositions some particulars stand out more eminently than the rest;
and the things which will carry his name to posterity are his two bills:
I mean that for a limitation of the claims of the crown upon landed
estates, and this for the relief of the Roman Catholics. By the former
he has emancipated property; by the latter he has quieted conscience;
and by both he has taught that grand lesson to government and
subject,--no longer to regard each other as adverse parties.
Such was the mover of the act that is complained of by men who are not
quite so good as he is,--an act most assuredly not brought in by him
from any partiality to that sect which is the object of it. For among
his faults I really cannot help reckoning a greater degree of prejudice
against that people than becomes so wise a man. I know that he inclines
to a sort of disgust, mixed with a considerable degree of asperity, to
the system; and he has few, or rather no habits with any of its
professors. What he has done was on quite other motives. The motives
were these, which he declared in his excellent speech on his motion for
the bill: namely, his extreme zeal to the Protestant religion, which he
thought utterly disgraced by the act of 1699; and his rooted hatred to
all kind of oppression, under any color, or upon any pretence
whatsoever.
The seconder was worthy of the mover and the motion. I was not the
seconder; it was Mr. Dunning, recorder of this city. I shall say the
less of him because his near relation to you makes you more particularly
acquainted with his merits. But I should appear little acquainted with
them, or little sensible of them, if I could utter his name on this
occasion without expressing my esteem for his character. I am not afraid
of offending a most learned body, and most jealous of its reputation for
that learning, when I say he is the first of his profession. It is a
point settled by those who settle everything else; and I must add (what
I am enabled to say from my own long and close observation) that there
is not a man, of any profession, or in any situation, of a more erect
and independent spirit, of a more proud honor, a more manly mind, a more
firm and determined integrity. Assure yourselves, that the names of two
such men will bear a great load of prejudice in the other scale before
they can be entirely outweighed.
With this mover and this seconder agreed the _whole_ House of Commons,
the _whole_ House of Lords, the _whole_ Bench of Bishops, the king, the
ministry, the opposition, all the distinguished clergy of the
Establishment, all the eminent lights (for they were consulted) of the
dissenting churches. This according voice of national wisdom ought to be
listened to with reverence. To say that all these descriptions of
Englishmen unanimously concurred in a scheme for introducing the
Catholic religion, or that none of them understood the nature and
effects of what they were doing so well as a few obscure clubs of people
whose names you never heard of, is shamelessly absurd. Surely it is
paying a miserable compliment to the religion we profess, to suggest
that everything eminent in the kingdom is indifferent or even adverse to
that religion, and that its security is wholly abandoned to the zeal of
those who have nothing but their zeal to distinguish them. In weighing
this unanimous concurrence of whatever the nation has to boast of, I
hope you will recollect that all these concurring parties do by no means
love one another enough to agree in any point which was not both
evidently and importantly right.
To prove this, to prove that the measure was both clearly and materially
proper, I will next lay before you (as I promised) the political grounds
and reasons for the repeal of that penal statute, and the motives to its
repeal at that particular time.
Gentlemen, America--When the English nation seemed to be dangerously,
if not irrecoverably divided,--when one, and that the most growing
branch, was torn from the parent stock, and ingrafted on the power of
France, a great terror fell upon this kingdom. On a sudden we awakened
from our dreams of conquest, and saw ourselves threatened with an
immediate invasion, which we were at that time very ill prepared to
resist. You remember the cloud that gloomed over us all. In that hour of
our dismay, from the bottom of the hiding-places into which the
indiscriminate rigor of our statutes had driven them, came out the body
of the Roman Catholics. They appeared before the steps of a tottering
throne, with one of the most sober, measured, steady, and dutiful
addresses that was ever presented to the crown. It was no holiday
ceremony, no anniversary compliment of parade and show. It was signed by
almost every gentleman of that persuasion, of note or property, in
England. At such a crisis, nothing but a decided resolution to stand or
fall with their country could have dictated such an address, the direct
tendency of which was to cut off all retreat, and to render them
peculiarly obnoxious to an invader of their own communion. The address
showed what I long languished to see, that all the subjects of England
had cast off all foreign views and connections, and that every man
looked for his relief from every grievance at the hands only of his own
natural government.
It was necessary, on our part, that the natural government should show
itself worthy of that name. It was necessary, at the crisis I speak of,
that the supreme power of the state should meet the conciliatory
dispositions of the subject. To delay protection would be to reject
allegiance. And why should it be rejected, or even coldly and
suspiciously received? If any independent Catholic state should choose
to take part with this kingdom in a war with France and Spain, that
bigot (if such a bigot could be found) would be heard with little
respect, who could dream of objecting his religion to an ally whom the
nation would not only receive with its freest thanks, but purchase with
the last remains of its exhausted treasure. To such an ally we should
not dare to whisper a single syllable of those base and invidious topics
upon which some unhappy men would persuade the state to reject the duty
and allegiance of its own members. Is it, then, because foreigners are
in a condition to set our malice at defiance, that with _them_ we are
willing to contract engagements of friendship, and to keep them with
fidelity and honor, but that, because we conceive some descriptions of
our countrymen are not powerful enough to punish our malignity, we will
not permit them to support our common interest? Is it on that ground
that our anger is to be kindled by their offered kindness? Is it on that
ground that they are to be subjected to penalties, because they are
willing by actual merit to purge themselves from imputed crimes? Lest by
an adherence to the cause of their country they should acquire a title
to fair and equitable treatment, are we resolved to furnish them with
causes of eternal enmity, and rather supply them with just and founded
motives to disaffection than not to have that disaffection in existence
to justify an oppression which, not from policy, but disposition, we
have predetermined to exercise?
What shadow of reason could be assigned, why, at a time when the most
Protestant part of this Protestant empire found it for its advantage to
unite with the two principal Popish states, to unite itself in the
closest bonds with France and Spain, for our destruction, that we should
refuse to unite with our own Catholic countrymen for our own
preservation? Ought we, like madmen, to tear off the plasters that the
lenient hand of prudence had spread over the wounds and gashes which in
our delirium of ambition we had given to our own body? No person ever
reprobated the American war more than I did, and do, and ever shall. But
I never will consent that we should lay additional, voluntary penalties
on ourselves, for a fault which carries but too much of its own
punishment in its own nature. For one, I was delighted with the proposal
of internal peace. I accepted the blessing with thankfulness and
transport. I was truly happy to find _one_ good effect of our civil
distractions: that they had put an end to all religious strife and
heart-burning in our own bowels. What must be the sentiments of a man
who would wish to perpetuate domestic hostility when the causes of
dispute are at an end, and who, crying out for peace with one part of
the nation on the most humiliating terms, should deny it to those who
offer friendship without any terms at all?
But if I was unable to reconcile such a denial to the contracted
principles of local duty, what answer could I give to the broad claims
of general humanity? I confess to you freely, that the sufferings and
distresses of the people of America in this cruel war have at times
affected me more deeply than I can express. I felt every gazette of
triumph as a blow upon my heart, which has an hundred times sunk and
fainted within me at all the mischiefs brought upon those who bear the
whole brunt of war in the heart of their country. Yet the Americans are
utter strangers to me; a nation among whom I am not sure that I have a
single acquaintance. Was I to suffer my mind to be so unaccountably
warped, was I to keep such iniquitous weights and measures of temper and
of reason, as to sympathize with those who are in open rebellion against
an authority which I respect, at war with a country which by every title
ought to be, and is, most dear to me,--and yet to have no feeling at all
for the hardships and indignities suffered by men who by their very
vicinity are bound up in a nearer relation to us, who contribute their
share, and more than their share, to the common prosperity, who perform
the common offices of social life, and who obey the laws, to the full as
well as I do? Gentlemen, the danger to the state being out of the
question, (of which, let me tell you, statesmen themselves are apt to
have but too exquisite a sense,) I could assign no one reason of
justice, policy, or feeling, for not concurring most cordially, as most
cordially I did concur, in softening some part of that shameful
servitude under which several of my worthy fellow-citizens were
groaning.
Important effects followed this act of wisdom. They appeared at home and
abroad, to the great benefit of this kingdom, and, let me hope, to the
advantage of mankind at large. It betokened union among ourselves. It
showed soundness, even on the part of the persecuted, which generally is
the weak side of every community. But its most essential operation was
not in England. The act was immediately, though very imperfectly, copied
in Ireland; and this imperfect transcript of an imperfect act, this
first faint sketch of toleration, which did little more than disclose a
principle and mark out a disposition, completed in a most wonderful
manner the reunion to the state of all the Catholics of that country. It
made us what we ought always to have been, one family, one body, one
heart and soul, against the family combination and all other
combinations of our enemies. We have, indeed, obligations to that
people, who received such small benefits with so much gratitude, and for
which gratitude and attachment to us I am afraid they have suffered not
a little in other places.
I dare say you have all hoard of the privileges indulged to the Irish
Catholics residing in Spain. You have likewise heard with what
circumstances of severity they have been lately expelled from the
seaports of that kingdom, driven into the inland cities, and there
detained as a sort of prisoners of state. I have good reason to believe
that it was the zeal to our government and our cause (somewhat
indiscreetly expressed in one of the addresses of the Catholics of
Ireland) which has thus drawn down on their heads the indignation of the
court of Madrid, to the inexpressible loss of several individuals, and,
in future, perhaps to the great detriment of the whole of their body.
Now that our people should be persecuted in Spain for their attachment
to this country, and persecuted in this country for their supposed
enmity to us, is such a jarring reconciliation of contradictory
distresses, is a thing at once so dreadful and ridiculous, that no
malice short of diabolical would wish to continue any human creatures in
such a situation. But honest men will not forget either their merit or
their sufferings. There are men (and many, I trust, there are) who, out
of love to their country and their kind, would torture their invention
to find excuses for the mistakes of their brethren, and who, to stifle
dissension, would construe even doubtful appearances with the utmost
favor: such men will never persuade themselves to be ingenious and
refined in discovering disaffection and treason in the manifest,
palpable signs of suffering loyalty. Persecution is so unnatural to
them, that they gladly snatch the very first opportunity of laying aside
all the tricks and devices of penal politics, and of returning home,
after all their irksome and vexatious wanderings, to our natural family
mansion, to the grand social principle that unites all men, in all
descriptions, under the shadow of an equal and impartial justice.
Men of another sort, I mean the bigoted enemies to liberty, may,
perhaps, in their politics, make no account of the good or ill affection
of the Catholics of England, who are but an handful of people, (enough
to torment, but not enough to fear,) perhaps not so many, of both sexes
and of all ages, as fifty thousand. But, Gentlemen, it is possible you
may not know that the people of that persuasion in Ireland amount at
least to sixteen or seventeen hundred thousand souls. I do not at all
exaggerate the number. A _nation_ to be persecuted! Whilst we were
masters of the sea, embodied with America, and in alliance with half the
powers of the Continent, we might, perhaps, in that remote corner of
Europe, afford to tyrannize with impunity. But there is a revolution in
our affairs, which makes it prudent to be just. In our late awkward
contest with Ireland about trade, had religion been thrown in, to
ferment and embitter the mass of discontents, the consequences might
have been truly dreadful. But, very happily, that cause of quarrel was
previously quieted by the wisdom of the acts I am commending.
Even in England, where I admit the danger from the discontent of that
persuasion to be less than in Ireland, yet even here, had we listened to
the counsels of fanaticism and folly, we might have wounded ourselves
very deeply, and wounded ourselves in a very tender part. You are
apprised that the Catholics of England consist mostly of our best
manufacturers. Had the legislature chosen, instead of returning their
declarations of duty with correspondent good-will, to drive them to
despair, there is a country at their very door to which they would be
invited,--a country in all respects as good as ours, and with the finest
cities in the world ready built to receive them. And thus the bigotry of
a free country, and in an enlightened age, would have repeopled the
cities of Flanders, which, in the darkness of two hundred years ago, had
been desolated by the superstition of a cruel tyrant. Oar manufactures
were the growth of the persecutions in the Low Countries. What a
spectacle would it be to Europe, to see us at this time of day balancing
the account of tyranny with those very countries, and by our
persecutions driving back trade and manufacture, as a sort of vagabonds,
to their original settlement! But I trust we shall be saved this last of
disgraces.
So far as to the effect of the act on the interests of this nation. With
regard to the interests of mankind at large, I am sure the benefit was
very considerable. Long before this act, indeed, the spirit of
toleration began to gain ground in Europe. In Holland the third part of
the people are Catholics; they live at ease, and are a sound part of the
state. In many parts of Germany, Protestants and Papists partake the
same cities, the same councils, and even the same churches. The
unbounded liberality of the king of Prussia's conduct on this occasion
is known to all the world; and it is of a piece with the other grand
maxims of his reign. The magnanimity of the Imperial court, breaking
through the narrow principles of its predecessors, has indulged its
Protestant subjects, not only with property, with worship, with liberal
education, but with honors and trusts, both civil and military. A worthy
Protestant gentleman of this country now fills, and fills with credit,
an high office in the Austrian Netherlands. Even the Lutheran obstinacy
of Sweden has thawed at length, and opened a toleration to all
religions. I know, myself, that in France the Protestants begin to be at
rest. The army, which in that country is everything, is open to them;
and some of the military rewards and decorations which the laws deny are
supplied by others, to make the service acceptable and honorable. The
first minister of finance in that country is a Protestant. Two years'
war without a tax is among the first fruits of their liberality.
Tarnished as the glory of this nation is, and far as it has waded into
the shades of an eclipse, some beams of its former illumination still
play upon its surface; and what is done in England is still looked to,
as argument, and as example. It is certainly true, that no law of this
country ever met with such universal applause abroad, or was so likely
to produce the perfection of that tolerating spirit which, as I
observed, has been long gaining ground in Europe: for abroad it was
universally thought that we had done what I am sorry to say we had not;
they thought we had granted a full toleration. That opinion was,
however, so far from hurting the Protestant cause, that I declare, with
the most serious solemnity, my firm belief that no one thing done for
these fifty years past was so likely to prove deeply beneficial to our
religion at large as Sir George Savile's act. In its effects it was "an
act for tolerating and protecting Protestantism throughout Europe"; and
I hope that those who were taking steps for the quiet and settlement of
our Protestant brethren in other countries will, even yet, rather
consider the steady equity of the greater and better part of the people
of Great Britain than the vanity and violence of a few.
I perceive, Gentlemen, by the manner of all about me, that you look with
horror on the wicked clamor which has been raised on this subject, and
that, instead of an apology for what was done, you rather demand from me
an account, why the execution of the scheme of toleration was not made
more answerable to the large and liberal grounds on which it was taken
up. The question is natural and proper; and I remember that a great and
learned magistrate,[50] distinguished for his strong and systematic
understanding, and who at that time was a member of the House of
Commons, made the same objection to the proceeding. The statutes, as
they now stand, are, without doubt, perfectly absurd. But I beg leave to
explain the cause of this gross imperfection in the tolerating plan, as
well and as shortly as I am able. It was universally thought that the
session ought not to pass over without doing _something_ in this
business. To revise the whole body of the penal statutes was conceived
to be an object too big for the time. The penal statute, therefore,
which was chosen for repeal (chosen to show our disposition to
conciliate, not to perfect a toleration) was this act of ludicrous
cruelty of which I have just given you the history. It is an act which,
though not by a great deal so fierce and bloody as some of the rest, was
infinitely more ready in the execution. It was the act which gave the
greatest encouragement to those pests of society, mercenary informers
and interested disturbers of household peace; and it was observed with
truth, that the prosecutions, either carried to conviction or
compounded, for many years, had been all commenced upon that act. It was
said, that, whilst we were deliberating on a more perfect scheme, the
spirit of the age would never come up to the execution of the statutes
which remained, especially as more steps, and a coöperation of more
minds and powers, were required towards a mischievous use of them, than
for the execution of the act to be repealed: that it was better to
unravel this texture from below than from above, beginning with the
latest, which, in general practice, is the severest evil. It was
alleged, that this slow proceeding would be attended with the advantage
of a progressive experience,--and that the people would grow reconciled
to toleration, when they should find, by the effects, that justice was
not so irreconcilable an enemy to convenience as they had imagined.
These, Gentlemen, were the reasons why we left this good work in the
rude, unfinished state in which good works are commonly left, through
the tame circumspection with which a timid prudence so frequently
enervates beneficence. In doing good, we are generally cold, and
languid, and sluggish, and of all things afraid of being too much in the
right. But the works of malice and injustice are quite in another style.
They are finished with a bold, masterly hand, touched as they are with
the spirit of those vehement passions that call forth all our energies,
whenever we oppress and persecute.
Thus this matter was left for the time, with a full determination in
Parliament not to suffer other and worse statutes to remain for the
purpose of counteracting the benefits proposed by the repeal of one
penal law: for nobody then dreamed of defending what was done as a
benefit, on the ground of its being no benefit at all. We were not then
ripe for so mean a subterfuge.
I do not wish to go over the horrid scene that was afterwards acted.
Would to God it could be expunged forever from the annals of this
country! But since it must subsist for our shame, let it subsist for our
instruction. In the year 1780 there were found in this nation men
deluded enough, (for I give the whole to their delusion,) on pretences
of zeal and piety, without any sort of provocation whatsoever, real or
pretended, to make a desperate attempt, which would have consumed all
the glory and power of this country in the flames of London, and buried
all law, order, and religion under the ruins of the metropolis of the
Protestant world. Whether all this mischief done, or in the direct train
of doing, was in their original scheme, I cannot say; I hope it was not:
but this would have been the unavoidable consequence of their
proceedings, had not the flames they had lighted up in their fury been
extinguished in their blood.
All the time that this horrid scene was acting, or avenging, as well as
for some time before, and ever since, the wicked instigators of this
unhappy multitude, guilty, with every aggravation, of all their crimes,
and screened in a cowardly darkness from their punishment, continued,
without interruption, pity, or remorse, to blow up the blind rage of the
populace with a continued blast of pestilential libels, which infected
and poisoned the very air we breathed in.
The main drift of all the libels and all the riots was, to force
Parliament (to persuade us was hopeless) into an act of national perfidy
which has no example. For, Gentlemen, it is proper you should all know
what infamy we escaped by refusing that repeal, for a refusal of which,
it seems, I, among others, stand somewhere or other accused. When we
took away, on the motives which I had the honor of stating to you, a few
of the innumerable penalties upon an oppressed and injured people, the
relief was not absolute, but given on a stipulation and compact between
them and us: for we bound down the Roman Catholics with the most solemn
oaths to bear true allegiance to this government, to abjure all sort of
temporal power in any other, and to renounce, under the same solemn
obligations, the doctrines of systematic perfidy with which they stood
(I conceive very unjustly) charged. Now our modest petitioners came up
to us, most humbly praying nothing more than that we should break our
faith, without any one cause whatsoever of forfeiture assigned; and when
the subjects of this kingdom had, on their part, fully performed their
engagement, we should refuse, on our part, the benefit we had stipulated
on the performance of those very conditions that were prescribed by our
own authority, and taken on the sanction of our public faith: that is to
say, when we had inveigled them with fair promises within our door, we
were to shut it on them, and, adding mockery to outrage, to tell
them,--"Now we have got you fast: your consciences are bound to a power
resolved on your destruction. We have made you swear that your religion
obliges you to keep your faith: fools as you are! we will now let you
see that our religion enjoins us to keep no faith with you." They who
would advisedly call upon us to do such things must certainly have
thought us not only a convention of treacherous tyrants, but a gang of
the lowest and dirtiest wretches that ever disgraced humanity. Had we
done this, we should have indeed proved that there were _some_ in the
world whom no faith could bind; and we should have _convicted_ ourselves
of that odious principle of which Papists stood _accused_ by those very
savages who wished us, on that accusation, to deliver them over to their
fury.
In this audacious tumult, when our very name and character as gentlemen
was to be cancelled forever, along with the faith and honor of the
nation, I, who had exerted myself very little on the quiet passing of
the bill, thought it necessary then to come forward. I was not alone;
but though some distinguished members on all sides, and particularly on
ours, added much to their high reputation by the part they took on that
day, (a part which will be remembered as long as honor, spirit, and
eloquence have estimation in the world,) I may and will value myself so
far, that, yielding in abilities to many, I yielded in zeal to none.
With warmth and with vigor, and animated with a just and natural
indignation, I called forth every faculty that I possessed, and I
directed it in every way in which I could possibly employ it. I labored
night and day. I labored in Parliament; I labored out of Parliament.
If, therefore, the resolution of the House of Commons, refusing to
commit this act of unmatched turpitude, be a crime, I am guilty among
the foremost. But, indeed, whatever the faults of that House may have
been, no one member was found hardy enough to propose so infamous a
thing; and on full debate we passed the resolution against the petitions
with as much unanimity as we had formerly passed the law of which these
petitions demanded the repeal.
There was a circumstance (justice will not suffer me to pass it over)
which, if anything could enforce the reasons I have given, would fully
justify the act of relief, and render a repeal, or anything like a
repeal, unnatural, impossible. It was the behavior of the persecuted
Roman Catholics under the acts of violence and brutal insolence which
they suffered. I suppose there are not in London less than four or five
thousand of that persuasion from my country, who do a great deal of the
most laborious works in the metropolis; and they chiefly inhabit those
quarters which were the principal theatre of the fury of the bigoted
multitude. They are known to be men of strong arms and quick feelings,
and more remarkable for a determined resolution than clear ideas or much
foresight. But, though provoked by everything that can stir the blood of
men, their houses and chapels in flames, and with the most atrocious
profanations of everything which they hold sacred before their eyes, not
a hand was moved to retaliate, or even to defend. Had a conflict once
begun, the rage of their persecutors would have redoubled. Thus fury
increasing by the reverberation of outrages, house being fired for
house, and church for chapel, I am convinced that no power under heaven
could have prevented a general conflagration, and at this day London
would have been a tale. But I am well informed, and the thing speaks it,
that their clergy exerted their whole influence to keep their people in
such a state of forbearance and quiet, as, when I look back, fills me
with astonishment,--but not with astonishment only. Their merits on that
occasion ought not to be forgotten; nor will they, when Englishmen come
to recollect themselves. I am sure it were far more proper to have
called them forth, and given them the thanks of both Houses of
Parliament, than to have suffered those worthy clergymen and excellent
citizens to be hunted into holes and corners, whilst we are making
low-minded inquisitions into the number of their people; as if a
tolerating principle was never to prevail, unless we were very sure that
only a few could possibly take advantage of it. But, indeed, we are not
yet well recovered of our fright. Our reason, I trust, will return with
our security, and this unfortunate temper will pass over like a cloud.
Gentlemen, I have now laid before you a few of the reasons for taking
away the penalties of the act of 1699, and for refusing to establish
them on the riotous requisition of 1780. Because I would not suffer
anything which may be for your satisfaction to escape, permit me just to
touch on the objections urged against our act and our resolves, and
intended as a justification of the violence offered to both Houses.
"Parliament," they assert, "was too hasty, and they ought, in so
essential and alarming a change, to have proceeded with a far greater
degree of deliberation." The direct contrary. Parliament was too slow.
They took fourscore years to deliberate on the repeal of an act which
ought not to have survived a second session. When at length, after a
procrastination of near a century, the business was taken up, it
proceeded in the most public manner, by the ordinary stages, and as
slowly as a law so evidently right as to be resisted by none would
naturally advance. Had it been read three times in one day, we should
have shown only a becoming readiness to recognize, by protection, the
undoubted dutiful behavior of those whom we had but too long punished
for offences of presumption or conjecture. But for what end was that
bill to linger beyond the usual period of an unopposed measure? Was it
to be delayed until a rabble in Edinburgh should dictate to the Church
of England what measure of persecution was fitting for her safety? Was
it to be adjourned until a fanatical force could be collected in London,
sufficient to frighten us out of all our ideas of policy and justice?
Were we to wait for the profound lectures on the reason of state,
ecclesiastical and political, which the Protestant Association have
since condescended to read to us? Or were we, seven hundred peers and
commoners, the only persons ignorant of the ribald invectives which
occupy the place of argument in those remonstrances, which every man of
common observation had heard a thousand times over, and a thousand times
over had despised? All men had before heard what they dare to say, and
all men at this day know what they dare to do; and I trust all honest
men are equally influenced by the one and by the other.
But they tell us, that those our fellow-citizens whose chains we have a
little relaxed are enemies to liberty and our free Constitution.--Not
enemies, I presume, to their _own_ liberty. And as to the Constitution,
until we give them some share in it, I do not know on what pretence we
can examine into their opinions about a business in which they have no
interest or concern. But, after all, are we equally sure that they are
adverse to our Constitution as that our statutes are hostile and
destructive to them? For my part, I have reason to believe their
opinions and inclinations in that respect are various, exactly like
those of other men; and if they lean more to the crown than I and than
many of you think _we_ ought, we must remember that he who aims at
another's life is not to be surprised, if he flies into any sanctuary
that will receive him. The tenderness of the executive power is the
natural asylum of those upon whom the laws have declared war; and to
complain that men are inclined to favor the means of their own safety is
so absurd, that one forgets the injustice in the ridicule.
I must fairly tell you, that so far as my principles are concerned,
(principles that I hope will only depart with my last breath,) that I
have no idea of a liberty unconnected with honesty and justice. Nor do I
believe that any good constitutions of government, or of freedom, can
find it necessary for their security to doom any part of the people to a
permanent slavery. Such a constitution of freedom, if such can be, is in
effect no more than another name for the tyranny of the strongest
faction; and factions in republics have been, and are, full as capable
as monarchs of the most cruel oppression and injustice. It is but too
true, that the love, and even the very idea, of genuine liberty is
extremely rare. It is but too true that there are many whose whole
scheme of freedom is made up of pride, perverseness, and insolence. They
feel themselves in a state of thraldom, they imagine that their souls
are cooped and cabined in, unless they have some man or some body of men
dependent on their mercy. This desire of having some one below them
descends to those who are the very lowest of all; and a Protestant
cobbler, debased by his poverty, but exalted by his share of the ruling
church, feels a pride in knowing it is by his generosity alone that the
peer whose footman's instep he measures is able to keep his chaplain
from a jail. This disposition is the true source of the passion which
many men in very humble life have taken to the American war. _Our_
subjects in America; _our_ colonies; _our_ dependants. This lust of
party power is the liberty they hunger and thirst for; and this Siren
song of ambition has charmed ears that one would have thought were never
organized to that sort of music.
This way of _proscribing the citizens by denominations and general
descriptions_, dignified by the name of reason of state, and security
for constitutions and commonwealths, is nothing better at bottom than
the miserable invention of an ungenerous ambition which would fain hold
the sacred trust of power, without any of the virtues or any of the
energies that give a title to it,--a receipt of policy, made up of a
detestable compound of malice, cowardice, and sloth. They would govern
men against their will; but in that government they would be discharged
from the exercise of vigilance, providence, and fortitude; and
therefore, that they may sleep on their watch, they consent to take some
one division of the society into partnership of the tyranny over the
rest. But let government, in what form it may be, comprehend the whole
in its justice, and restrain the suspicious by its vigilance,--let it
keep watch and ward,--let it discover by its sagacity, and punish by its
firmness, all delinquency against its power, whenever delinquency exists
in the overt acts,--and then it will be as safe as ever God and Nature
intended it should be. Crimes are the acts of individuals, and not of
denominations: and therefore arbitrarily to class men under general
descriptions, in order to proscribe and punish them in the lump for a
presumed delinquency, of which perhaps but a part, perhaps none at all,
are guilty, is indeed a compendious method, and saves a world of trouble
about proof; but such a method, instead of being law, is an act of
unnatural rebellion against the legal dominion of reason and justice;
and this vice, in any constitution that entertains it, at one time or
other will certainly bring on its ruin.
We are told that this is not a religious persecution; and its abettors
are loud in disclaiming all severities on account of conscience. Very
fine indeed! Then, let it be so: they are not persecutors; they are only
tyrants. With all my heart. I am perfectly indifferent concerning the
pretexts upon which we torment one another,--or whether it be for the
constitution of the Church of England, or for the constitution of the
State of England, that people choose to make their fellow-creatures
wretched. When we were sent into a place of authority, you that sent us
had yourselves but one commission to give. You could give us none to
wrong or oppress, or even to suffer any kind of oppression or wrong, on
any grounds whatsoever: not on political, as in the affairs of America;
not on commercial, as in those of Ireland; not in civil, as in the laws
for debt; not in religious, as in the statutes against Protestant or
Catholic dissenters. The diversified, but connected, fabric of
universal justice is well cramped and bolted together in all its parts;
and depend upon it, I never have employed, and I never shall employ, any
engine of power which may come into my hands to wrench it asunder. All
shall stand, if I can help it, and all shall stand connected. After all,
to complete this work, much remains to be done: much in the East, much
in the West. But, great as the work is, if our will be ready, our powers
are not deficient.
Since you have suffered me to trouble you so much on this subject,
permit me, Gentlemen, to detain you a little longer. I am, indeed, most
solicitous to give you perfect satisfaction. I find there are some of a
better and softer nature than the persons with whom I have supposed
myself in debate, who neither think ill of the act of relief, nor by any
means desire the repeal,--yet who, not accusing, but lamenting, what was
done, on account of the consequences, have frequently expressed their
wish that the late act had never been made. Some of this description,
and persons of worth, I have met with in this city. They conceive that
the prejudices, whatever they might be, of a large part of the people,
ought not to have been shocked,--that their opinions ought to have been
previously taken, and much attended to,--and that thereby the late
horrid scenes might have been prevented.
I confess, my notions are widely different; and I never was less sorry
for any action of my life. I like the bill the better on account of the
events of all kinds that followed it. It relieved the real sufferers; it
strengthened the state; and, by the disorders that ensued, we had clear
evidence that there lurked a temper somewhere which ought not to be
fostered by the laws. No ill consequences whatever could be attributed
to the act itself. We knew beforehand, or we were poorly instructed,
that toleration is odious to the intolerant, freedom to oppressors,
property to robbers, and all kinds and degrees of prosperity to the
envious. We knew that all these kinds of men would gladly gratify their
evil dispositions under the sanction of law and religion, if they could:
if they could not, yet, to make way to their objects, they would do
their utmost to subvert all religion and all law. This we certainly
knew. But, knowing this, is there any reason, because thieves break in
and steal, and thus bring detriment to you, and draw ruin on themselves,
that I am to be sorry that you are in possession of shops, and of
warehouses, and of wholesome laws to protect them? Are you to build no
houses, because desperate men may pull them down upon their own heads?
Or, if a malignant wretch will cut his own throat, because he sees you
give alms to the necessitous and deserving, shall his destruction be
attributed to your charity, and not to his own deplorable madness? If we
repent of our good actions, what, I pray you, is left for our faults and
follies? It is not the beneficence of the laws, it is the unnatural
temper which beneficence can fret and sour, that is to be lamented. It
is this temper which, by all rational means, ought to be sweetened and
corrected. If froward men should refuse this cure, can they vitiate
anything but themselves? Does evil so react upon good, as not only to
retard its motion, but to change its nature? If it can so operate, then
good men will always be in the power of the bad,--and virtue, by a
dreadful reverse of order, must lie under perpetual subjection and
bondage to vice.
As to the opinion of the people, which some think, in such cases, is to
be implicitly obeyed,--near two years' tranquillity, which follows the
act, and its instant imitation in Ireland, proved abundantly that the
late horrible spirit was in a great measure the effect of insidious art,
and perverse industry, and gross misrepresentation. But suppose that the
dislike had been much more deliberate and much more general than I am
persuaded it was,--when we know that the opinions of even the greatest
multitudes are the standard of rectitude, I shall think myself obliged
to make those opinions the masters of my conscience. But if it may be
doubted whether Omnipotence itself is competent to alter the essential
constitution of right and wrong, sure I am that such _things_ as they
and I are possessed of no such power. No man carries further than I do
the policy of making government pleasing to the people. But the widest
range of this politic complaisance is confined within the limits of
justice. I would not only consult the interest of the people, but I
would cheerfully gratify their humors. We are all a sort of children
that must be soothed and managed. I think I am not austere or formal in
my nature. I would bear, I would even play my part in, any innocent
buffooneries, to divert them. But I never will act the tyrant for their
amusement. If they will mix malice in their sports, I shall never
consent to throw them any living, sentient creature whatsoever, no, not
so much as a kitling, to torment.
"But if I profess all this impolitic stubbornness, I may chance never to
be elected into Parliament."--It is certainly not pleasing to be put out
of the public service. But I wish to be a member of Parliament to have
my share of doing good and resisting evil. It would therefore be absurd
to renounce my objects in order to obtain my seat. I deceive myself,
indeed, most grossly, if I had not much rather pass the remainder of my
life hidden in the recesses of the deepest obscurity, feeding my mind
even with the visions and imaginations of such things, than to be placed
on the most splendid throne of the universe, tantalized with a denial of
the practice of all which can make the greatest situation any other than
the greatest curse. Gentlemen, I have had my day. I can never
sufficiently express my gratitude to you for having set me in a place
wherein I could lend the slightest help to great and laudable designs.
If I have had my share in any measure giving quiet to private property
and private conscience,--if by my vote I have aided in securing to
families the best possession, peace,--if I have joined in reconciling
kings to their subjects, and subjects to their prince,--if I have
assisted to loosen the foreign holdings of the citizen, and taught him
to look for his protection to the laws of his country, and for his
comfort to the good-will of his countrymen,--if I have thus taken my
part with the best of men in the best of their actions, I can shut the
book: I might wish to read a page or two more, but this is enough for my
measure. I have not lived in vain.
And now, Gentlemen, on this serious day, when I come, as it were, to
make up my account with you, let me take to myself some degree of honest
pride on the nature of the charges that are against me. I do not here
stand before you accused of venality, or of neglect of duty. It is not
said, that, in the long period of my service, I have, in a single
instance, sacrificed the slightest of your interests to my ambition or
to my fortune. It is not alleged, that, to gratify any anger or revenge
of my own, or of my party, I have had a share in wronging or oppressing
any description of men, or any one man in any description. No! the
charges against me are all of one kind: that I have pushed the
principles of general justice and benevolence too far,--further than a
cautious policy would warrant, and further than the opinions of many
would go along with me. In every accident which may happen through life,
in pain, in sorrow, in depression, and distress, I will call to mind
this accusation, and be comforted.
Gentlemen, I submit the whole to your judgment. Mr. Mayor, I thank you
for the trouble you have taken on this occasion: in your state of health
it is particularly obliging. If this company should think it advisable
for me to withdraw, I shall respectfully retire; if you think otherwise,
I shall go directly to the Council-House and to the 'Change, and without
a moment's delay begin my canvass.
* * * * *
BRISTOL, September 6, 1780.
At a great and respectable meeting of the friends of EDMUND BURKE, Esq.,
held at the Guildhall this day, the Right Worshipful the Mayor in the
chair:--Resolved, That Mr. Burke, as a representative for this city, has
done all possible honor to himself as a senator and a man, and that we
do heartily and honestly approve of his conduct, as the result of an
enlightened loyalty to his sovereign, a warm and zealous love to his
country through its widely extended empire, a jealous and watchful care
of the liberties of his fellow-subjects, an enlarged and liberal
understanding of our commercial interest, a humane attention to the
circumstances of even the lowest ranks of the community, and a truly
wise, politic, and tolerant spirit, in supporting the national church,
with a reasonable indulgence to all who dissent from it; and we wish to
express the most marked abhorrence of the base arts which have been
employed, without regard to truth and reason, to misrepresent his
eminent services to his country.
Resolved, That this resolution be copied out, and signed by the
chairman, and be by him presented to Mr. Burke, as the fullest
expression of the respectful and grateful sense we entertain of his
merits and services, public and private, to the citizens of Bristol, as
a man and a representative.
Resolved, That the thanks of this meeting be given to the Right
Worshipful the Mayor, who so ably and worthily presided in this meeting.
Resolved, That it is the earnest request of this meeting to Mr. Burke,
that he should again offer himself a candidate to represent this city in
Parliament; assuring him of that full and strenuous support which is due
to the merits of so excellent a representative.
* * * * *
This business being over, Mr. Burke went to the Exchange, and offered
himself as a candidate in the usual manner. He was accompanied to the
Council-House, and from thence to the Exchange, by a large body of most
respectable gentlemen, amongst whom were the following members of the
corporation, viz.: Mr. Mayor, Mr. Alderman Smith, Mr. Alderman Deane,
Mr. Alderman Gordon, William Weare, Samuel Munckley, John Merlott, John
Crofts, Levy Ames, John Fisher Weare, Benjamin Loscombe, Philip
Protheroe, Samuel Span, Joseph Smith, Richard Bright and John Noble,
Esquires.
FOOTNOTES:
[48] Irish Perpetual Mutiny Act.
[49] Mr. Williams.
[50] The Chancellor.
SPEECH AT BRISTOL,
ON
DECLINING THE POLL
1780.
BRISTOL, Saturday, 9th Sept, 1780.
This morning the sheriff and candidates assembled as usual at the
Council-House, and from thence proceeded to Guildhall. Proclamation
being made for the electors to appear and give their votes, Mr.
BURKE stood forward on the hustings, surrounded by a great number
of the corporation and other principal citizens, and addressed
himself to the whole assembly as follows.
Gentlemen,--I decline the election. It has ever been my rule through
life to observe a proportion between my efforts and my objects. I have
never been remarkable for a bold, active, and sanguine pursuit of
advantages that are personal to myself.
I have not canvassed the whole of this city in form, but I have taken
such a view of it as satisfies my own mind that your choice will not
ultimately fall upon me. Your city, Gentlemen, is in a state of
miserable distraction, and I am resolved to withdraw whatever share my
pretensions may have had in its unhappy divisions. I have not been in
haste; I have tried all prudent means; I have waited for the effect of
all contingencies. If I were fond of a contest, by the partiality of my
numerous friends (whom you know to be among the most weighty and
respectable people of the city) I have the means of a sharp one in my
hands. But I thought it far better, with my strength unspent, and my
reputation unimpaired, to do, early and from foresight, that which I
might be obliged to do from necessity at last.
I am not in the least surprised nor in the least angry at this view of
things. I have read the book of life for a long time, and I have read
other books a little. Nothing has happened to me, but what has happened
to men much better than me, and in times and in nations full as good as
the age and country that we live in. To say that I am no way concerned
would be neither decent nor true. The representation of _Bristol_ was an
object on many accounts dear to me; and I certainly should very far
prefer it to any other in the kingdom. My habits are made to it; and it
is in general more unpleasant to be rejected after long trial than not
to be chosen at all.
But, Gentlemen, I will see nothing except your former kindness, and I
will give way to no other sentiments than those of gratitude. From the
bottom of my heart I thank you for what you have done for me. You have
given me a long term, which is now expired. I have performed the
conditions, and enjoyed all the profits to the full; and I now surrender
your estate into your hands, without being in a single tile or a single
stone impaired or wasted by my use. I have served the public for fifteen
years. I have served you in particular for six. What is past is well
stored; it is safe, and out of the power of fortune. What is to come is
in wiser hands than ours; and He in whose hands it is best knows whether
it is best for you and me that I should be in Parliament, or even in the
world.
Gentlemen, the melancholy event of yesterday reads to us an awful
lesson against being too much troubled about any of the objects of
ordinary ambition. The worthy gentleman[51] who has been snatched from
us at the moment of the election, and in the middle of the contest,
whilst his desires were as warm and his hopes as eager as ours, has
feelingly told us what shadows we are and what shadows we pursue.
It has been usual for a candidate who declines to take his leave by a
letter to the sheriffs: but I received your trust in the face of day,
and in the face of day I accept your dismission. I am not--I am not at
all ashamed to look upon you; nor can my presence discompose the order
of business here. I humbly and respectfully take my leave of the
sheriffs, the candidates, and the electors, wishing heartily that the
choice may be for the best, at a time which calls, if ever time did
call, for service that is not nominal. It is no plaything you are about.
I tremble, when I consider the trust I have presumed to ask. I confided,
perhaps, too much in my intentions. They were really fair and upright;
and I am bold to say that I ask no ill thing for you, when, on parting
from this place, I pray, that, whomever you choose to succeed me, he may
resemble me exactly in all things, except in my abilities to serve, and
my fortune to please you.
FOOTNOTES:
[51] Mr. Coombe.
SPEECH
(DECEMBER 1, 1783)
UPON
THE QUESTION FOR THE SPEAKER'S LEAVING THE CHAIR IN ORDER FOR THE HOUSE
TO RESOLVE ITSELF INTO A COMMITTEE
ON
MR. FOX'S EAST INDIA BILL.
Mr. Speaker,--I thank you for pointing to me. I really wished much to
engage your attention in an early stage of the debate. I have been long
very deeply, though perhaps ineffectually, engaged in the preliminary
inquiries, which have continued without intermission for some years.
Though I have felt, with some degree of sensibility, the natural and
inevitable impressions of the several matters of fact, as they have been
successively disclosed, I have not at any time attempted to trouble you
on the merits of the subject, and very little on any of the points which
incidentally arose in the course of our proceedings. But I should be
sorry to be found totally silent upon this day. Our inquiries are now
come to their final issue. It is now to be determined whether the three
years of laborious Parliamentary research, whether the twenty years of
patient Indian suffering, are to produce a substantial reform in our
Eastern administration; or whether our knowledge of the grievances has
abated our zeal for the correction of them, and our very inquiry into
the evil was only a pretext to elude the remedy which is demanded from
us by humanity, by justice, and by every principle of true policy.
Depend upon it, this business cannot be indifferent to our fame. It will
turn out a matter of great disgrace or great glory to the whole British
nation. We are on a conspicuous stage, and the world marks our demeanor.
I am therefore a little concerned to perceive the spirit and temper in
which the debate has been all along pursued upon one side of the House.
The declamation of the gentlemen who oppose the bill has been abundant
and vehement; but they have been reserved and even silent about the
fitness or unfitness of the plan to attain the direct object it has in
view. By some gentlemen it is taken up (by way of exercise, I presume)
as a point of law, on a question of private property and corporate
franchise; by others it is regarded as the petty intrigue of a faction
at court, and argued merely as it tends to set this man a little higher
or that a little lower in situation and power. All the void has been
filled up with invectives against coalition, with allusions to the loss
of America, with the activity and inactivity of ministers. The total
silence of these gentlemen concerning the interest and well-being of the
people of India, and concerning the interest which this nation has in
the commerce and revenues of that country, is a strong indication of the
value which they set upon these objects.
It has been a little painful to me to observe the intrusion into this
important debate of such company as _quo warranto_, and _mandamus_, and
_certiorari_: as if we were on a trial about mayors and aldermen and
capital burgesses, or engaged in a suit concerning the borough of
Penryn, or Saltash, or St. Ives, or St. Mawes. Gentlemen have argued
with as much heat and passion as if the first things in the world were
at stake; and their topics are such as belong only to matter of the
lowest and meanest litigation. It is not right, it is not worthy of us,
in this manner to depreciate the value, to degrade the majesty, of this
grave deliberation of policy and empire.
For my part, I have thought myself bound, when a matter of this
extraordinary weight came before me, not to consider (as some gentlemen
are so fond of doing) whether the bill originated from a Secretary of
State for the Home Department or from a Secretary for the Foreign, from
a minister of influence or a minister of the people, from Jacob or from
Esau.[52] I asked myself, and I asked myself nothing else, what part it
was fit for a member of Parliament, who has supplied a mediocrity of
talents by the extreme of diligence, and who has thought himself obliged
by the research of years to wind himself into the inmost recesses and
labyrinths of the Indian detail,--what part, I say, it became such a
member of Parliament to take, when a minister of state, in conformity to
a recommendation from the throne, has brought before us a system for the
better government of the territory and commerce of the East. In this
light, and in this only, I will trouble you with my sentiments.
It is not only agreed, but demanded, by the right honorable
gentleman,[53] and by those who act with him, that a _whole_ system
ought to be produced; that it ought not to be an _half-measure_; that it
ought to be no _palliative_, but a legislative provision, vigorous,
substantial, and effective.--I believe that no man who understands the
subject can doubt for a moment that those must be the conditions of
anything deserving the name of a reform in the Indian government; that
anything short of them would not only be delusive, but, in this matter,
which admits no medium, noxious in the extreme.
To all the conditions proposed by his adversaries the mover of the bill
perfectly agrees; and on his performance of them he rests his cause. On
the other hand, not the least objection has been taken with regard to
the efficiency, the vigor, or the completeness of the scheme. I am
therefore warranted to assume, as a thing admitted, that the bills
accomplish what both sides of the House demand as essential. The end is
completely answered, so for as the direct and immediate object is
concerned.
But though there are no direct, yet there are various collateral
objections made: objections from the effects which this plan of reform
for Indian administration may have on the privileges of great public
bodies in England; from its probable influence on the constitutional
rights, or on the freedom and integrity, of the several branches of the
legislature.
Before I answer these objections, I must beg leave to observe, that, if
we are not able to contrive some method of governing India _well_, which
will not of necessity become the means of governing Great Britain _ill_,
a ground is laid for their eternal separation, but none for sacrificing
the people of that country to our Constitution. I am, however, far from
being persuaded that any such incompatibility of interest does at all
exist. On the contrary, I am certain that every means effectual to
preserve India from oppression is a guard to preserve the British
Constitution from its worst corruption. To show this, I will consider
the objections, which, I think, are four.
1st, That the bill is an attack on the chartered rights of men.
2ndly, That it increases the influence of the crown.
3rdly, That it does _not_ increase, but diminishes, the influence of the
crown, in order to promote the interests of certain ministers and their
party.
4thly, That it deeply affects the national credit.
As to the first of these objections, I must observe that the phrase of
"the chartered rights _of men_" is full of affectation, and very unusual
in the discussion of privileges conferred by charters of the present
description. But it is not difficult to discover what end that ambiguous
mode of expression, so often reiterated, is meant to answer.
The rights of _men_--that is to say, the natural rights of mankind--are
indeed sacred things; and if any public measure is proved mischievously
to affect them, the objection ought to be fatal to that measure, even if
no charter at all could be set up against it. If these natural rights
are further affirmed and declared by express covenants, if they are
clearly defined and secured against chicane, against power and
authority, by written instruments and positive engagements, they are in
a still better condition: they partake not only of the sanctity of the
object so secured, but of that solemn public faith itself which secures
an object of such importance. Indeed, this formal recognition, by the
sovereign power, of an original right in the subject, can never be
subverted, but by rooting up the holding radical principles of
government, and even of society itself. The charters which we call by
distinction _great_ are public instruments of this nature: I mean the
charters of King John and King Henry the Third. The things secured by
these instruments may, without any deceitful ambiguity, be very fitly
called _the chartered rights of men_.
These charters have made the very name of a charter dear to the heart of
every Englishman. But, Sir, there may be, and there are, charters, not
only different in nature, but formed on principles _the very reverse_ of
those of the Great Charter. Of this kind is the charter of the East
India Company. _Magna Charta_ is a charter to restrain power and to
destroy monopoly. The East India charter is a charter to establish
monopoly and to create power. Political power and commercial monopoly
are _not_ the rights of men; and the rights to them derived from
charters it is fallacious and sophistical to call "the chartered rights
of men." These chartered rights (to speak of such charters and of their
effects in terms of the greatest possible moderation) do at least
suspend the natural rights of mankind at large, and in their very frame
and constitution are liable to fall into a direct violation of them.
It is a charter of this latter description (that is to say, a charter of
power and monopoly) which is affected by the bill before you. The bill,
Sir, does without question affect it: it does affect it essentially and
substantially. But, having stated to you of what description the
chartered rights are which this bill touches, I feel no difficulty at
all in acknowledging the existence of those chartered rights in their
fullest extent. They belong to the Company in the surest manner, and
they are secured to that body by every sort of public sanction. They are
stamped by the faith of the king; they are stamped by the faith of
Parliament: they have been bought for money, for money honestly and
fairly paid; they have been bought for valuable consideration, over and
over again.
I therefore freely admit to the East India Company their claim to
exclude their fellow-subjects from the commerce of half the globe. I
admit their claim to administer an annual territorial revenue of seven
millions sterling, to command an army of sixty thousand men, and to
dispose (under the control of a sovereign, imperial discretion, and with
the due observance of the natural and local law) of the lives and
fortunes of thirty millions of their fellow-creatures. All this they
possess by charter, and by Acts of Parliament, (in my opinion,) without
a shadow of controversy.
Those who carry the rights and claims of the Company the furthest do not
contend for more than this; and all this I freely grant. But, granting
all this, they must grant to me, in my turn, that all political power
which is set over men, and that all privilege claimed or exercised in
exclusion of them, being wholly artificial, and for so much a derogation
from the natural equality of mankind at large, ought to be some way or
other exercised ultimately for their benefit.
If this is true with regard to every species of political dominion and
every description of commercial privilege, none of which can be
original, self-derived rights, or grants for the mere private benefit of
the holders, then such rights, or privileges, or whatever else you
choose to call them, are all in the strictest sense _a trust_: and it is
of the very essence of every trust to be rendered _accountable_,--and
even totally to _cease_, when it substantially varies from the purposes
for which alone it could have a lawful existence.
This I conceive, Sir, to be true of trusts of power vested in the
highest hands, and of such, as seem to hold of no human creature. But
about the application of this principle to subordinate _derivative_
trusts I do not see how a controversy can be maintained. To whom, then,
would I make the East India Company accountable? Why, to Parliament, to
be sure,--to Parliament, from whom their trust was derived,--to
Parliament, which alone is capable of comprehending the magnitude of its
object, and its abuse, and alone capable of an effectual legislative
remedy. The very charter, which is held out to exclude Parliament from
correcting malversation with regard to the high trust vested in the
Company, is the very thing which at once gives a title and imposes a
duty on us to interfere with effect, wherever power and authority
originating from ourselves are perverted from their purposes, and become
instruments of wrong and violence.
If Parliament, Sir, had nothing to do with this charter, we might have
some sort of Epicurean excuse to stand aloof, indifferent spectators of
what passes in the Company's name in India and in London. But if we are
the very cause of the evil, we are in a special manner engaged to the
redress; and for us passively to bear with oppressions committed under
the sanction of our own authority is in truth and reason for this House
to be an active accomplice in the abuse.
That the power, notoriously grossly abused, has been bought from us is
very certain. But this circumstance, which is urged against the bill,
becomes an additional motive for our interference, lest we should be
thought to have sold the blood of millions of men for the base
consideration of money. We sold, I admit, all that we had to sell,--that
is, our authority, not our control. We had not a right to make a market
of our duties.
I ground myself, therefore, on this principle:--that, if the abuse is
proved, the contract is broken, and we reënter into all our rights, that
is, into the exercise of all our duties. Our own authority is, indeed,
as much a trust originally as the Company's authority is a trust
derivatively; and it is the use we make of the resumed power that must
justify or condemn us in the resumption of it. When we have perfected
the plan laid before us by the right honorable mover, the world will
then see what it is we destroy, and what it is we create. By that test
we stand or fall; and by that test I trust that it will be found, in the
issue, that we are going to supersede a charter abused to the full
extent of all the powers which it could abuse, and exercised in the
plenitude of despotism, tyranny, and corruption,--and that in one and
the same plan we provide a real chartered security for _the rights of
men_, cruelly violated under that charter.
This bill, and those connected with it, are intended to form the _Magna
Charta_ of Hindostan. Whatever the Treaty of Westphalia is to the
liberty of the princes and free cities of the Empire, and to the three
religions there professed,--whatever the Great Charter, the Statute of
Tallage, the Petition of Right, and the Declaration of Right are to
Great Britain, these bills are to the people of India. Of this benefit I
am certain their condition is capable: and when I know that they are
capable of more, my vote shall most assuredly be for our giving to the
full extent of their capacity of receiving; and no charter of dominion
shall stand as a bar in my way to their charter of safety and
protection.
The strong admission I have made of the Company's rights (I am conscious
of it) binds me to do a great deal. I do not presume to condemn those
who argue _a priori_ against the propriety of leaving such extensive
political powers in the hands of a company of merchants. I know much is,
and much more may be, said against such a system. But, with my
particular ideas and sentiments, I cannot go that way to work. I feel an
insuperable reluctance in giving my hand to destroy any established
institution of government, upon a theory, however plausible it may be.
My experience in life teaches me nothing clear upon the subject. I have
known merchants with the sentiments and the abilities of great
statesmen, and I have seen persons in the rank of statesmen with the
conceptions and character of peddlers. Indeed, my observation has
furnished me with nothing that is to be found in any habits of life or
education, which tends wholly to disqualify men for the functions of
government, but that by which the power of exercising those functions is
very frequently obtained: I mean a spirit and habits of low cabal and
intrigue; which I have never, in one instance, seen united with a
capacity for sound and manly policy.
To justify us in taking the administration of their affairs out of the
hands of the East India Company, on my principles, I must see several
conditions. 1st, The object affected by the abuse should be great and
important. 2nd, The abuse affecting this great object ought to be a
great abuse. 3d, It ought to be habitual, and not accidental. 4th, It
ought to be utterly incurable in the body as it now stands constituted.
All this ought to be made as visible to me as the light of the sun,
before I should strike off an atom of their charter. A right honorable
gentleman[54] has said, and said, I think, but once, and that very
slightly, (whatever his original demand for a plan might seem to
require,) that "there are abuses in the Company's government." If that
were all, the scheme of the mover of this bill, the scheme of his
learned friend, and his own scheme of reformation, (if he has any,) are
all equally needless. There are, and must be, abuses in all governments.
It amounts to no more than a nugatory proposition. But before I consider
of what nature these abuses are, of which the gentleman speaks so very
lightly, permit me to recall to your recollection the map of the country
which this abused chartered right affects. This I shall do, that you may
judge whether in that map I can discover anything like the first of my
conditions: that is, whether the object affected by the abuse of the
East India Company's power be of importance sufficient to justify the
measure and means of reform applied to it in this bill.
With very few, and those inconsiderable intervals, the British dominion,
either in the Company's name, or in the names of princes absolutely
dependent upon the Company, extends from the mountains that separate
India from Tartary to Cape Comorin, that is, one-and-twenty degrees of
latitude!
In the northern parts it is a solid mass of land, about eight hundred
miles in length, and four or five hundred broad. As you go southward, it
becomes narrower for a space. It afterwards dilates; but, narrower or
broader, you possess the whole eastern and northeastern coast of that
vast country, quite from the borders of Pegu.--Bengal, Bahar, and
Orissa, with Benares, (now unfortunately in our immediate possession,)
measure 161,978 square English miles: a territory considerably larger
than the whole kingdom of France. Oude, with its dependent provinces, is
53,286 square miles: not a great deal less than England. The Carnatic,
with Tanjore and the Circars, is 65,948 square miles: very considerably
larger than England. And the whole of the Company's dominions,
comprehending Bombay and Salsette, amounts to 281,412 square miles:
which forms a territory larger than any European dominion, Russia and
Turkey excepted. Through all that vast extent of country there is not a
man who eats a mouthful of rice but by permission of the East India
Company.
So far with regard to the extent. The population of this great empire is
not easy to be calculated. When the countries of which it is composed
came into our possession, they were all eminently peopled, and eminently
productive,--though at that time considerably declined from their
ancient prosperity. But since they are come into our hands!----!
However, if we make the period of our estimate immediately before the
utter desolation of the Carnatic, and if we allow for the havoc which
our government had even then made in these regions, we cannot, in my
opinion, rate the population at much less than thirty millions of souls:
more than four times the number of persons in the island of Great
Britain.
My next inquiry to that of the number is the quality and description of
the inhabitants. This multitude of men does not consist of an abject and
barbarous populace; much less of gangs of savages, like the Guaranies
and Chiquitos, who wander on the waste borders of the River of Amazons
or the Plate; but a people for ages civilized and
cultivated,--cultivated by all the arts of polished life, whilst we
were yet in the woods. There have been (and still the skeletons remain)
princes once of great dignity, authority, and opulence. There are to be
found the chiefs of tribes and nations. There is to be found an ancient
and venerable priesthood, the depository of their laws, learning, and
history, the guides of the people whilst living and their consolation in
death; a nobility of great antiquity and renown; a multitude of cities,
not exceeded in population and trade by those of the first class in
Europe; merchants and bankers, individual houses of whom have once vied
in capital with the Bank of England, whose credit had often supported a
tottering state, and preserved their governments in the midst of war and
desolation; millions of ingenious manufacturers and mechanics; millions
of the most diligent, and not the least intelligent, tillers of the
earth. Here are to be found almost all the religions professed by
men,--the Braminical, the Mussulman, the Eastern and the Western
Christian.
If I were to take the whole aggregate of our possessions there, I should
compare it, as the nearest parallel I can find, with the Empire of
Germany. Our immediate possessions I should compare with the Austrian
dominions: and they would not suffer in the comparison. The Nabob of
Oude might stand for the King of Prussia; the Nabob of Arcot I would
compare, as superior in territory, and equal in revenue, to the Elector
of Saxony. Cheit Sing, the Rajah of Benares, might well rank with the
Prince of Hesse, at least; and the Rajah of Tanjore (though hardly equal
in extent of dominion, superior in revenue) to the Elector of Bavaria.
The polygars and the Northern zemindars, and other great chiefs, might
well class with the rest of the princes, dukes, counts, marquises, and
bishops in the Empire; all of whom I mention to honor, and surely
without disparagement to any or all of those most respectable princes
and grandees.
All this vast mass, composed of so many orders and classes of men, is
again infinitely diversified by manners, by religion, by hereditary
employment, through all their possible combinations. This renders the
handling of India a matter in an high degree critical and delicate. But,
oh, it has been handled rudely indeed! Even some of the reformers seem
to have forgot that they had anything to do but to regulate the tenants
of a manor, or the shopkeepers of the next county town.
It is an empire of this extent, of this complicated nature, of this
dignity and importance, that I have compared to Germany and the German
government,--not for an exact resemblance, but as a sort of a middle
term, by which India might be approximated to our understandings, and,
if possible, to our feelings, in order to awaken something of sympathy
for the unfortunate natives, of which I am afraid we are not perfectly
susceptible, whilst we look at this very remote object through a false
and cloudy medium.
My second condition necessary to justify me in touching the charter is,
whether the Company's abuse of their trust with regard to this great
object be an abuse of great atrocity. I shall beg your permission to
consider their conduct in two lights: first the political, and then the
commercial. Their political conduct (for distinctness) I divide again
into two heads: the external, in which I mean to comprehend their
conduct in their federal capacity, as it relates to powers and states
independent, or that not long since were such; the other
internal,--namely, their conduct to the countries, either immediately
subject to the Company, or to those who, under the apparent government
of native sovereigns, are in a state much lower and much more miserable
than common subjection.
The attention, Sir, which I wish to preserve to method will not be
considered as unnecessary or affected. Nothing else can help me to
selection out of the infinite mass of materials which have passed under
my eye, or can keep my mind steady to the great leading points I have in
view.
With regard, therefore, to the abuse of the external federal trust, I
engage myself to you to make good these three positions. First, I say,
that from Mount Imaus, (or whatever else you call that large range of
mountains that walls the northern frontier of India,) where it touches
us in the latitude of twenty-nine, to Cape Comorin, in the latitude of
eight, that there is not a _single_ prince, state, or potentate, great
or small, in India, with whom they have come into contact, whom they
have not sold: I say _sold_, though sometimes they have not been able to
deliver according to their bargain. Secondly, I say, that there is not a
_single treaty_ they have ever made which they have not broken. Thirdly,
I say, that there is not a single prince or state, who ever put any
trust in the Company, who is not utterly ruined; and that none are in
any degree secure or flourishing, but in the exact proportion to their
settled distrust and irreconcilable enmity to this nation.
These assertions are universal: I say, in the full sense, _universal_.
They regard the external and political trust only; but I shall produce
others fully equivalent in the internal. For the present, I shall
content myself with explaining my meaning; and if I am called on for
proof, whilst these bills are depending, (which I believe I shall not,)
I will put my finger on the appendixes to the Reports, or on papers of
record in the House or the Committees, which I have distinctly present
to my memory, and which I think I can lay before you at half an hour's
warning.
The first potentate sold by the Company for money was the Great
Mogul,--the descendant of Tamerlane. This high personage, as high as
human veneration can look at, is by every account amiable in his
manners, respectable for his piety, according to his mode, and
accomplished in all the Oriental literature. All this, and the title
derived under his _charter_ to all that we hold in India, could not save
him from the general _sale_. Money is coined in his name; in his name
justice is administered; he is prayed for in every temple through the
countries we possess;--but he was sold.
It is impossible, Mr. Speaker, not to pause here for a moment, to
reflect on the inconstancy of human greatness, and the stupendous
revolutions that have happened in our age of wonders. Could it be
believed, when I entered into existence, or when you, a younger man,
were born, that on this day, in this House, we should be employed in
discussing the conduct of those British subjects who had disposed of the
power and person of the Grand Mogul? This is no idle speculation. Awful
lessons are taught by it, and by other events, of which it is not yet
too late to profit.
This is hardly a digression: but I return to the sale of the Mogul. Two
districts, Corah and Allahabad, out of his immense grants, were reserved
as a royal demesne to the donor of a kingdom, and the rightful sovereign
of so many nations.--After withholding the tribute of 260,000_l._ a
year, which the Company was, by the _charter_ they had received from
this prince, under the most solemn obligation to pay, these districts
were sold to his chief minister, Sujah ul Dowlah; and what may appear to
some the worst part of the transaction, these two districts were sold
for scarcely two years' purchase. The descendant of Tamerlane now stands
in need almost of the common necessaries of life; and in this situation
we do not even allow him, as bounty, the smallest portion of what we owe
him in justice.
The next sale was that of the whole nation of the Rohillas, which the
grand salesman, without a pretence of quarrel, and contrary to his own
declared sense of duty and rectitude, sold to the same Sujah ul Dowlah.
He sold the people to utter _extirpation_, for the sum of four hundred
thousand pounds. Faithfully was the bargain performed on our side. Hafiz
Rhamet, the most eminent of their chiefs, one of the bravest men of his
time, and as famous throughout the East for the elegance of his
literature and the spirit of his poetical compositions (by which he
supported the name of Hafiz) as for his courage, was invaded with an
army of an hundred thousand men, and an English brigade. This man, at
the head of inferior forces, was slain valiantly fighting for his
country. His head was cut off, and delivered for money to a barbarian.
His wife and children, persons of that rank, were seen begging an
handful of rice through the English camp. The whole nation, with
inconsiderable exceptions, was slaughtered or banished. The country was
laid waste with fire and sword; and that land, distinguished above most
others by the cheerful face of paternal government and protected labor,
the chosen seat of cultivation and plenty, is now almost throughout a
dreary desert, covered with rushes, and briers, and jungles full of wild
beasts.
The British officer who commanded in the delivery of the people thus
sold felt some compunction at his employment. He represented these
enormous excesses to the President of Bengal, for which he received a
severe reprimand from the civil governor; and I much doubt whether the
breach caused by the conflict between the compassion of the military and
the firmness of the civil governor be closed at this hour.
In Bengal, Surajah Dowlah was sold to Mir Jaffier; Mir Jaffier was sold
to Mir Cossim; and Mir Cossim was sold to Mir Jaffier again. The
succession to Mir Jaffier was sold to his eldest son;--another son of
Mir Jaffier, Mobarech ul Dowlah, was sold to his step-mother. The
Mahratta Empire was sold to Ragobah; and Ragobah was sold and delivered
to the Peishwa of the Mahrattas. Both Ragobah and the Peishwa of the
Mahrattas were offered to sale to the Rajah of Berar. Scindia, the chief
of Malwa, was offered to sale to the same Rajah; and the Subah of the
Deccan was sold to the great trader, Mahomet Ali, Nabob of Arcot. To the
same Nabob of Arcot they sold Hyder Ali and the kingdom of Mysore. To
Mahomet Ali they twice sold the kingdom of Tanjore. To the same Mahomet
Ali they sold at least twelve sovereign princes, called the Polygars.
But to keep things even, the territory of Tinnevelly, belonging to their
nabob, they would have sold to the Dutch; and to conclude the account of
sales, their great customer, the Nabob of Arcot himself, and his lawful
succession, has been sold to his second son, Amir ul Omrah, whose
character, views, and conduct are in the accounts upon your table. It
remains with you whether they shall finally perfect this last bargain.
All these bargains and sales were regularly attended with the waste and
havoc of the country,--always by the buyer, and sometimes by the object
of the sale. This was explained to you by the honorable mover, when he
stated the mode of paying debts due from the country powers to the
Company. An honorable gentleman, who is not now in his place, objected
to his jumping near two thousand miles for an example. But the southern
example is perfectly applicable to the northern claim, as the northern
is to the southern; for, throughout the whole space of these two
thousand miles, take your stand where you will, the proceeding is
perfectly uniform, and what is done in one part will apply exactly to
the other.
My second assertion is, that the Company never has made a treaty which
they have not broken. This position is so connected with that of the
sales of provinces and kingdoms, with the negotiation of universal
distraction in every part of India, that a very minute detail may well
be spared on this point. It has not yet been contended, by any enemy to
the reform, that they have observed any public agreement. When I hear
that they have done so in any one instance, (which hitherto, I confess,
I never heard alleged,) I shall speak to the particular treaty. The
Governor General has even amused himself and the Court of Directors in
a very singular letter to that board, in which he admits he has not been
very delicate with regard to public faith; and he goes so far as to
state a regular estimate of the sums which the Company would have lost,
or never acquired, if the rigid ideas of public faith entertained by his
colleagues had been observed. The learned gentleman[55] over against me
has, indeed, saved me much trouble. On a former occasion, he obtained no
small credit for the clear and forcible manner in which he stated, what
we have not forgot, and I hope he has not forgot, that universal,
systematic breach of treaties which had made the British faith
proverbial in the East.
It only remains, Sir, for me just to recapitulate some heads.--The
treaty with the Mogul, by which we stipulated to pay him 260,000_l._
annually, was broken. This treaty they have broken, and not paid him a
shilling. They broke their treaty with him, in which they stipulated to
pay 400,000_l._ a year to the Subah of Bengal. They agreed with the
Mogul, for services admitted to have been performed, to pay Nudjif Cawn
a pension. They broke this article with the rest, and stopped also this
small pension. They broke their treaties with the Nizam, and with Hyder
Ali. As to the Mahrattas, they had so many cross treaties with the
states-general of that nation, and with each of the chiefs, that it was
notorious that no one of these agreements could be kept without grossly
violating the rest. It was observed, that, if the terms of these several
treaties had been kept, two British armies would at one and the same
time have met in the field to cut each other's throats. The wars which
desolate India originated from a most atrocious violation of public
faith on our part. In the midst of profound peace, the Company's troops
invaded the Mahratta territories, and surprised the island and fortress
of Salsette. The Mahrattas nevertheless yielded to a treaty of peace by
which solid advantages were procured to the Company. But this treaty,
like every other treaty, was soon violated by the Company. Again the
Company invaded the Mahratta dominions. The disaster that ensued gave
occasion to a new treaty. The whole army of the Company was obliged in
effect to surrender to this injured, betrayed, and insulted people.
Justly irritated, however, as they were, the terms which they prescribed
were reasonable and moderate, and their treatment of their captive
invaders of the most distinguished humanity. But the humanity of the
Mahrattas was of no power whatsoever to prevail on the Company to attend
to the observance of the terms dictated by their moderation. The war was
renewed with greater vigor than ever; and such was their insatiable lust
of plunder, that they never would have given ear to any terms of peace,
if Hyder Ali had not broke through the Ghauts, and, rushing like a
torrent into the Carnatic, swept away everything in his career. This was
in consequence of that confederacy which by a sort of miracle united the
most discordant powers for our destruction, as a nation in which no
other could put any trust, and who were the declared enemies of the
human species.
It is very remarkable that the late controversy between the several
presidencies, and between them and the Court of Directors, with relation
to these wars and treaties, has not been, which of the parties might be
defended for his share in them, but on which of the parties the guilt
of all this load of perfidy should be fixed. But I am content to admit
all these proceedings to be perfectly regular, to be full of honor and
good faith; and wish to fix your attention solely to that single
transaction which the advocates of this system select for so
transcendent a merit as to cancel the guilt of all the rest of their
proceedings: I mean the late treaties with the Mahrattas.
I make no observation on the total cession of territory, by which they
surrendered all they had obtained by their unhappy successes in war, and
almost all they had obtained under the treaty of Poorunder. The
restitution was proper, if it had been voluntary and seasonable. I
attach on the spirit of the treaty, the dispositions it showed, the
provisions it made for a general peace, and the faith kept with allies
and confederates,--in order that the House may form a judgment, from
this chosen piece, of the use which has been made (and is likely to be
made, if things continue in the same hands) of the trust of the federal
powers of this country.
It was the wish of almost every Englishman that the Mahratta peace might
lead to a general one; because the Mahratta war was only a part of a
general confederacy formed against us, on account of the universal
abhorrence of our conduct which prevailed in every state, and almost in
every house in India. Mr. Hastings was obliged to pretend some sort of
acquiescence in this general and rational desire. He therefore
consented, in order to satisfy the point of honor of the Mahrattas, that
an article should be inserted to admit Hyder Ali to accede to the
pacification. But observe, Sir, the spirit of this man,--which, if it
were not made manifest by a thousand things, and particularly by his
proceedings with regard to Lord Macartney, would be sufficiently
manifest by this. What sort of article, think you, does he require this
essential head of a solemn treaty of general pacification to be? In his
instruction to Mr. Anderson, he desires him to admit "a _vague_ article"
in favor of Hyder. Evasion and fraud were the declared basis of the
treaty. These _vague_ articles, intended for a more vague performance,
are the things which have damned our reputation in India.
Hardly was this vague article inserted, than, without waiting for any
act on the part of Hyder, Mr. Hastings enters into a negotiation with
the Mahratta chief, Scindia, for a partition of the territories of the
prince who was one of the objects to be secured by the treaty. He was to
be parcelled out in three parts: one to Scindia; one to the Peishwa of
the Mahrattas; and the third to the East India Company, or to (the old
dealer and chapman) Mahomet Ali.
During the formation of this project, Hyder dies; and before his son
could take any one step, either to conform to the tenor of the article
or to contravene it, the treaty of partition is renewed on the old
footing, and an instruction is sent to Mr. Anderson to conclude it in
form.
A circumstance intervened, during the pendency of this negotiation, to
set off the good faith of the Company with an additional brilliancy, and
to make it sparkle and glow with a variety of splendid faces. General
Matthews had reduced that most valuable part of Hyder's dominions called
the country of Biddanore. When the news reached Mr. Hastings, he
instructed Mr. Anderson to contend for an alteration in the treaty of
partition, and to take the Biddanore country out of the common stock
which was to be divided, and to keep it for the Company.
The first ground for this variation was its being a separate conquest
made before the treaty had actually taken place. Here was a new proof
given of the fairness, equity, and moderation of the Company. But the
second of Mr. Hastings's reasons for retaining the Biddanore as a
separate portion, and his conduct on that second ground, is still more
remarkable. He asserted that that country could not be put into the
partition stock, because General Matthews had received it on the terms
of some convention which might be incompatible with the partition
proposed. This was a reason in itself both honorable and solid; and it
showed a regard to faith somewhere, and with some persons. But in order
to demonstrate his utter contempt of the plighted faith which was
alleged on one part as a reason for departing from it on another, and to
prove his impetuous desire for sowing a new war even in the prepared
soil of a general pacification, he directs Mr. Anderson, if he should
find strong difficulties impeding the partition on the score of the
subtraction of Biddanore, wholly to abandon that claim, and to conclude
the treaty on the original terms. General Matthews's convention was just
brought forward sufficiently to demonstrate to the Mahrattas the
slippery hold which they had on their new confederate; on the other
hand, that convention being instantly abandoned, the people of India
were taught that no terms on which they can surrender to the Company are
to be regarded, when farther conquests are in view.
Next, Sir, let me bring before you the pious care that was taken of our
allies under that treaty which is the subject of the Company's
applauses. These allies were Ragonaut Row, for whom we had engaged to
find a throne; the Guickwar, (one of the Guzerat princes,) who was to be
emancipated from the Mahratta authority, and to grow great by several
accessions of dominion; and, lastly, the Rana of Gohud, with whom we had
entered into a treaty of partition for eleven sixteenths of our joint
conquests. Some of these inestimable securities called _vague_ articles
were inserted in favor of them all.
As to the first, the unhappy abdicated Peishwa, and pretender to the
Mahratta throne, Ragonaut Row, was delivered up to his people, with an
article for safety, and some provision. This man, knowing how little
vague the hatred of his countrymen was towards him, and well apprised of
what black crimes he stood accused, (among which our invasion of his
country would not appear the least,) took a mortal alarm at the security
we had provided for him. He was thunderstruck at the article in his
favor, by which he was surrendered to his enemies. He never had the
least notice of the treaty; and it was apprehended that he would fly to
the protection of Hyder Ali, or some other, disposed or able to protect
him. He was therefore not left without comfort; for Mr. Anderson did him
the favor to send a special messenger, desiring him to be of good cheer
and to fear nothing. And his old enemy, Scindia, at our request, sent
him a message equally well calculated to quiet his apprehensions.
By the same treaty the Guickwar was to come again, with no better
security, under the dominion of the Mahratta state. As to the Rana of
Gohud, a long negotiation depended for giving him up. At first this was
refused by Mr. Hastings with great indignation; at another stage it was
admitted as proper, because he had shown himself a most perfidious
person. But at length a method of reconciling these extremes was found
out, by contriving one of the usual articles in his favor. What I
believe will appear beyond all belief, Mr. Anderson exchanged the final
ratifications of that treaty by which the Rana was nominally secured in
his possessions, in the camp of the Mahratta chief, Scindia, whilst he
was (really, and not nominally) battering the castle of Gwalior, which
we had given, agreeably to treaty, to this deluded ally. Scindia had
already reduced the town, and was at the very time, by various
detachments, reducing, one after another, the fortresses of our
protected ally, as well as in the act of chastising all the rajahs who
had assisted Colonel Camac in his invasion. I have seen in a letter from
Calcutta, that the Rana of Gohud's agent would have represented these
hostilities (which went hand in hand with the protecting treaty) to Mr.
Hastings, but he was not admitted to his presence.
In this manner the Company has acted with their allies in the Mahratta
war. But they did not rest here. The Mahrattas were fearful lest the
persons delivered to them by that treaty should attempt to escape into
the British territories, and thus might elude the punishment intended
for them, and, by reclaiming the treaty, might stir up new disturbances.
To prevent this, they desired an article to be inserted in the
supplemental treaty, to which they had the ready consent of Mr.
Hastings, and the rest of the Company's representatives in Bengal. It
was this: "That the English and Mahratta governments mutually agree not
to afford refuge to any _chiefs, merchants, or other persons_, flying
for protection to the territories of the other." This was readily
assented to, and assented to without any exception whatever in favor of
our surrendered allies. On their part a reciprocity was stipulated which
was not unnatural for a government like the Company's to ask,--a
government conscious that many subjects had been, and would in future
be, driven to fly from its jurisdiction.
To complete the system of pacific intention and public faith which
predominate in those treaties, Mr. Hastings fairly resolved to put all
peace, except on the terms of absolute conquest, wholly out of his own
power. For, by an article in this second treaty with Scindia, he binds
the Company not to make any peace with Tippoo Sahib without the consent
of the Peishwa of the Mahrattas, and binds Scindia to him by a
reciprocal engagement. The treaty between France and England obliges us
mutually to withdraw our forces, if our allies in India do not accede to
the peace within four months; Mr. Hastings's treaty obliges us to
continue the war as long as the Peishwa thinks fit. We are now in that
happy situation, that the breach of the treaty with France, or the
violation of that with the Mahrattas, is inevitable; and we have only to
take our choice.
My third assertion, relative to the abuse made of the right of war and
peace, is, that there are none who have ever confided in us who have not
been utterly ruined. The examples I have given of Ragonaut Row, of
Guickwar, of the Rana of Gohud, are recent. There is proof more than
enough in the condition of the Mogul,--in the slavery and indigence of
the Nabob of Oude,--the exile of the Rajah of Benares,--the beggary of
the Nabob of Bengal,--the undone and captive condition of the Rajah and
kingdom of Tanjore,--the destruction of the Polygars,--and, lastly, in
the destruction of the Nabob of Arcot himself, who, when his dominions
were invaded, was found entirely destitute of troops, provisions,
stores, and (as he asserts) of money, being a million in debt to the
Company, and four millions to others: the many millions which he had
extorted from so many extirpated princes and their desolated countries
having (as he has frequently hinted) been expended for the ground-rent
of his mansion-house in an alley in the suburbs of Madras. Compare the
condition of all these princes with the power and authority of all the
Mahratta states, with the independence and dignity of the Subah of the
Deccan, and the mighty strength, the resources, and the manly struggle
of Hyder Ali,--and then the House will discover the effects, on every
power in India, of an easy confidence or of a rooted distrust in the
faith of the Company.
These are some of my reasons, grounded on the abuse of the external
political trust of that body, for thinking myself not only justified,
but bound, to declare against those chartered rights which produce so
many wrongs. I should deem myself the wickedest of men, if any vote of
mine could contribute to the continuance of so great an evil.
Now, Sir, according to the plan I proposed, I shall take notice of the
Company's internal government, as it is exercised first on the dependent
provinces, and then as it affects those under the direct and immediate
authority of that body. And here, Sir, before I enter into the spirit of
their interior government, permit me to observe to you upon a few of the
many lines of difference which are to be found between the vices of the
Company's government and those of the conquerors who preceded us in
India, that we may be enabled a little the better to see our way in an
attempt to the necessary reformation.
The several irruptions of Arabs, Tartars, and Persians into India were,
for the greater part, ferocious, bloody, and wasteful in the extreme:
our entrance into the dominion of that country was, as generally, with
small comparative effusion of blood,--being introduced by various frauds
and delusions, and by taking advantage of the incurable, blind, and
senseless animosity which the several country powers bear towards each
other, rather than by open force. But the difference in favor of the
first conquerors is this. The Asiatic conquerors very soon abated of
their ferocity, because they made the conquered country their own. They
rose or fell with the rise or fall of the territory they lived in.
Fathers there deposited the hopes of their posterity; and children there
beheld the monuments of their fathers. Here their lot was finally cast;
and it is the natural wish of all that their lot should not be cast in a
bad land. Poverty, sterility, and desolation are not a recreating
prospect to the eye of man; and there are very few who can bear to grow
old among the curses of a whole people. If their passion or their
avarice drove the Tartar lords to acts of rapacity or tyranny, there was
time enough, even in the short life of man, to bring round the ill
effects of an abuse of power upon the power itself. If hoards were made
by violence and tyranny, they were still domestic hoards; and domestic
profusion, or the rapine of a more powerful and prodigal hand, restored
them to the people. With many disorders, and with few political checks
upon power, Nature had still fair play; the sources of acquisition were
not dried up; and therefore the trade, the manufactures, and the
commerce of the country flourished. Even avarice and usury itself
operated both for the preservation and the employment of national
wealth. The husbandman and manufacturer paid heavy interest, but then
they augmented the fund from whence they were again to borrow. Their
resources were dearly bought, but they were sure; and the general stock
of the community grew by the general effort.
But under the English government all this order is reversed. The Tartar
invasion was mischievous; but it is our protection that destroys India.
It was their enmity; but it is our friendship. Our conquest there, after
twenty years, is as crude as it was the first day. The natives scarcely
know what it is to see the gray head of an Englishman. Young men (boys
almost) govern there, without society and without sympathy with the
natives. They have no more social habits with the people than if they
still resided in England,--nor, indeed, any species of intercourse, but
that which is necessary to making a sudden fortune, with a view to a
remote settlement. Animated with all the avarice of age and all the
impetuosity of youth, they roll in one after another, wave after wave;
and there is nothing before the eyes of the natives but an endless,
hopeless prospect of new flights of birds of prey and passage, with
appetites continually renewing for a food that is continually wasting.
Every rupee of profit made by an Englishman is lost forever to India.
With us are no retributory superstitions, by which a foundation of
charity compensates, through ages, to the poor, for the rapine and
injustice of a day. With us no pride erects stately monuments which
repair the mischiefs which pride had produced, and which adorn a country
out of its own spoils. England has erected no churches, no
hospitals,[56] no palaces, no schools; England has built no bridges,
made no high-roads, cut no navigations, dug out no reservoirs. Every
other conqueror of every other description has left some monument,
either of state or beneficence, behind him. Were we to be driven out of
India this day, nothing would remain to tell that it had been possessed,
during the inglorious period of our dominion, by anything better than
the orang-outang or the tiger.
There is nothing in the boys we send to India worse than in the boys
whom we are whipping at school, or that we see trailing a pike or
bending over a desk at home. But as English youth in India drink the
intoxicating draught of authority and dominion before their heads are
able to bear it, and as they are full grown in fortune long before they
are ripe in principle, neither Nature nor reason have any opportunity to
exert themselves for remedy of the excesses of their premature power.
The consequences of their conduct, which in good minds (and many of
theirs are probably such) might produce penitence or amendment, are
unable to pursue the rapidity of their flight. Their prey is lodged in
England; and the cries of India are given to seas and winds, to be blown
about, in every breaking up of the monsoon, over a remote and unhearing
ocean. In India all the vices operate by which sudden fortune is
acquired: in England are often displayed, by the same persons, the
virtues which dispense hereditary wealth. Arrived in England, the
destroyers of the nobility and gentry of a whole kingdom will find the
best company in this nation at a board of elegance and hospitality. Here
the manufacturer and husbandman will bless the just and punctual hand
that in India has torn the cloth from the loom, or wrested the scanty
portion of rice and salt from the peasant of Bengal, or wrung from him
the very opium in which he forgot his oppressions and his oppressor.
They marry into your families; they enter into your senate; they ease
your estates by loans; they raise their value by demand; they cherish
and protect your relations which lie heavy on your patronage; and there
is scarcely an house in the kingdom that does not feel some concern and
interest that makes all reform of our Eastern government appear
officious and disgusting, and, on the whole, a most discouraging
attempt. In such an attempt you hurt those who are able to return
kindness or to resent injury. If you succeed, you save those who cannot
so much as give you thanks. All these things show the difficulty of the
work we have on hand: but they show its necessity, too. Our Indian
government is in its best state a grievance. It is necessary that the
correctives should be uncommonly vigorous, and the work of men sanguine,
warm, and even impassioned in the cause. But it is an arduous thing to
plead against abuses of a power which originates from your own country,
and affects those whom we are used to consider as strangers.
I shall certainly endeavor to modulate myself to this temper; though I
am sensible that a cold style of describing actions, which appear to me
in a very affecting light, is equally contrary to the justice due to
the people and to all genuine human feelings about them. I ask pardon of
truth and Nature for this compliance. But I shall be very sparing of
epithets either to persons or things. It has been said, (and, with
regard to one of them, with truth,) that Tacitus and Machiavel, by their
cold way of relating enormous crimes, have in some sort appeared not to
disapprove them; that they seem a sort of professors of the art of
tyranny; and that they corrupt the minds of their readers by not
expressing the detestation and horror that naturally belong to horrible
and detestable proceedings. But we are in general, Sir, so little
acquainted with Indian details, the instruments of oppression under
which the people suffer are so hard to be understood, and even the very
names of the sufferers are so uncouth and strange to our ears, that it
is very difficult for our sympathy to fix upon these objects. I am sure
that some of us have come down stairs from the committee-room with
impressions on our minds which to us were the inevitable results of our
discoveries, yet, if we should venture to express ourselves in the
proper language of our sentiments to other gentlemen not at all prepared
to enter into the cause of them, nothing could appear more harsh and
dissonant, more violent and unaccountable, than our language and
behavior. All these circumstances are not, I confess, very favorable to
the idea of our attempting to govern India at all. But there we are;
there we are placed by the Sovereign Disposer; and we must do the best
we can in our situation. The situation of man is the preceptor of his
duty.
Upon the plan which I laid down, and to which I beg leave to return, I
was considering the conduct of the Company to those nations which are
indirectly subject to their authority. The most considerable of the
dependent princes is the Nabob of Oude. My right honorable friend,[57]
to whom we owe the remedial bills on your table, has already pointed out
to you, in one of the reports, the condition of that prince, and as it
stood in the time he alluded to. I shall only add a few circumstances
that may tend to awaken some sense of the manner in which the condition
of the people is affected by that of the prince, and involved in
it,--and to show you, that, when we talk of the sufferings of princes,
we do not lament the oppression of individuals,--and that in these cases
the high and the low suffer together.
In the year 1779, the Nabob of Oude represented, through the British
resident at his court, that the number of Company's troops stationed in
his dominions was a main cause of his distress,--and that all those
which he was not bound by treaty to maintain should be withdrawn, as
they had greatly diminished his revenue and impoverished his country. I
will read you, if you please, a few extracts from these representations.
He states, "that the country and cultivation are abandoned, and this
year in particular, from the excessive drought of the season, deductions
of many lacs having been allowed to the farmers, who are still left
unsatisfied"; and then he proceeds with a long detail of his own
distress, and that of his family and all his dependants; and adds, "that
the new-raised brigade is not only quite useless to my government, but
is, moreover, the cause of much loss both in revenues and customs. The
detached body of troops under European officers bring nothing _but
confusion to the affairs of my government, and are entirely their own
masters_." Mr. Middleton, Mr. Hastings's confidential resident, vouches
for the truth of this representation in its fullest extent. "I am
concerned to confess that there is too good ground for this plea. _The
misfortune hat been general throughout the whole of the vizier's_ [the
Nabob of Oude] _dominions_, obvious to everybody; and so _fatal_ have
been its consequences, that no person of either credit or character
would enter into engagements with government for farming the country."
He then proceeds to give strong instances of the general calamity, and
its effects.
It was now to be seen what steps the Governor-General and Council took
for the relief of this distressed country, long laboring under the
vexations of men, and now stricken by the hand of God. The case of a
general famine is known to relax the severity even of the most rigorous
government.--Mr. Hastings does not deny or show the least doubt of the
fact. The representation is humble, and almost abject. On this
representation from a great prince of the distress of his subjects, Mr.
Hastings falls into a violent passion,--such as (it seems) would be
unjustifiable in any one who speaks of any part of _his_ conduct. He
declares "that the _demands_, the _tone_ in which they were asserted,
and the _season_ in which they were made, are all equally alarming, and
appear to him to require an adequate degree of firmness in this board in
_opposition_ to them." He proceeds to deal out very unreserved language
on the person and character of the Nabob and his ministers. He declares,
that, in a division between him and the Nabob, "_the strongest must
decide_." With regard to the urgent and instant necessity from the
failure of the crops, he says, "that _perhaps_ expedients _may be found_
for affording a _gradual_ relief from the burden of which he so heavily
complains, and it shall be my endeavor to seek them out": and lest he
should be suspected of too much haste to alleviate sufferings and to
remove violence, he says, "that these must be _gradually_ applied, and
their complete _effect_ may be _distant_; and this, I conceive, _is all_
he can claim of right."
This complete effect of his lenity is distant indeed. Rejecting this
demand, (as he calls the Nabob's abject supplication,) he attributes it,
as he usually does all things of the kind, to the division in their
government, and says, "This is a powerful motive with _me_ (however
inclined I might be, _upon any other occasion_, to yield to some _part_
of his demand) to give them an _absolute and unconditional refusal_ upon
the present,--and even _to bring to punishment, if my influence can
produce that effect, those incendiaries who have endeavored to make
themselves the instruments of division between us_."
Here, Sir, is much heat and passion,--but no more consideration of the
distress of the country, from a failure of the means of subsistence, and
(if possible) the worse evil of an useless and licentious soldiery, than
if they were the most contemptible of all trifles. A letter is written,
in consequence, in such a style of lofty despotism as I believe has
hitherto been unexampled and unheard of in the records of the East. The
troops were continued. The _gradual_ relief, whose effect was to be so
_distant_, has _never_ been substantially and beneficially applied,--and
the country is ruined.
Mr. Hastings, two years after, when it was too late, saw the absolute
necessity of a removal of the intolerable grievance of this licentious
soldiery, which, under pretence of defending it, held the country under
military execution. A new treaty and arrangement, according to the
pleasure of Mr. Hastings, took place; and this new treaty was broken in
the old manner, in every essential article. The soldiery were again
sent, and again set loose. The effect of all his manoeuvres, from which
it seems he was sanguine enough to entertain hopes, upon the state of
the country, he himself informs us,--"The event has proved the _reverse_
of these hopes, and _accumulation of distress, debasement, and
dissatisfaction_ to the Nabob, and _disappointment and disgrace to
me_.--Every measure [which he had himself proposed] has been _so
conducted_ as to give him cause of displeasure. There are no officers
established by which his affairs could be regularly conducted: mean,
incapable, and indigent men have been appointed. A number of the
districts without authority, and without the means of personal
protection; some of them have been murdered by the zemindars, and those
zemindars, instead of punishment, have been permitted to retain their
zemindaries, with independent authority; _all_ the other zemindars
suffered to rise up in rebellion, and to insult the authority of the
sircar, without any attempt made to suppress them; and the Company's
debt, instead of being discharged by the assignments and extraordinary
sources of money provided for that _purpose, is likely to exceed even
the amount at which it stood at the time in which the arrangement with
his Excellency was concluded_." The House will smile at the resource on
which the Directors take credit as such a certainty in their curious
account.
This is Mr. Hastings's own narrative of the effects of his own
settlement. This is the state of the country which we have been told is
in perfect peace and order; and, what is curious, he informs us, that
_every part of this was foretold to him in the order and manner in which
it happened_, at the very time he made his arrangement of men and
measures.
The invariable course of the Company's policy is this: either they set
up some prince too odious to maintain himself without the necessity of
their assistance, or they soon render him odious by making him the
instrument of their government. In that case troops are bountifully sent
to him to maintain his authority. That he should have no want of
assistance, a civil gentleman, called a Resident, is kept at his court,
who, under pretence of providing duly for the pay of these troops, gets
assignments on the revenue into his hands. Under his provident
management, debts soon accumulate; new assignments are made for these
debts; until, step by step, the whole revenue, and with it the whole
power of the country, is delivered into his hands. The military do not
behold without a virtuous emulation the moderate gains of the civil
department. They feel that in a country driven to habitual rebellion by
the civil government the military is necessary; and they will not permit
their services to go unrewarded. Tracts of country are delivered over to
their discretion. Then it is found proper to convert their commanding
officers into farmers of revenue. Thus, between the well-paid civil and
well-rewarded military establishment, the situation of the natives may
be easily conjectured. The authority of the regular and lawful
government is everywhere and in every point extinguished. Disorders and
violences arise; they are repressed by other disorders and other
violences. Wherever the collectors of the revenue and the farming
colonels and majors move, ruin is about them, rebellion before and
behind them. The people in crowds fly out of the country; and the
frontier is guarded by lines of troops, not to exclude an enemy, but to
prevent the escape of the inhabitants.
By these means, in the course of not more than four or five years, this
once opulent and flourishing country, which, by the accounts given in
the Bengal consultations, yielded more than three crore of sicca rupees,
that is, above three millions sterling, annually, is reduced, as far as
I can discover, in a matter purposely involved in the utmost perplexity,
to less than one million three hundred thousand pounds, and that exacted
by every mode of rigor that can be devised. To complete the business,
most of the wretched remnants of this revenue are mortgaged, and
delivered into the hands of the usurers at Benares (for there alone are
to be found some lingering remains of the ancient wealth of these
regions) at an interest of near _thirty per cent per annum_.
The revenues in this manner failing, they seized upon the estates of
every person of eminence in the country, and, under the name of
_resumption_, confiscated their property. I wish, Sir, to be understood
universally and literally, when I assert that there is not left one man
of property and substance for his rank in the whole of these provinces,
in provinces which are nearly the extent of England and Wales taken
together: not one landholder, not one banker, not one merchant, not one
even of those who usually perish last, the _ultimum moriens_ in a ruined
state, not one farmer of revenue.
One country for a while remained, which stood as an island in the midst
of the grand waste of the Company's dominion. My right honorable friend,
in his admirable speech on moving the bill, just touched the situation,
the offences, and the punishment of a native prince, called Fizulla
Khân. This man, by policy and force, had protected himself from the
general extirpation of the Rohilla chiefs. He was secured (if that were
any security) by a treaty. It was stated to you, as it was stated by the
enemies of that unfortunate man, "that the whole of his country _is_
what the whole country of the Rohillas _was_, cultivated like a garden,
without one neglected spot in it." Another accuser says,--"Fyzoolah
Khan, though a bad soldier, [that is the true source of his misfortune,]
has approved himself a good aumil,--having, it is supposed, in the
course of a few years, at least _doubled_ the population and revenue of
his country." In another part of the correspondence he is charged with
making his country an asylum for the oppressed peasants who fly from the
territories of Oude. The improvement of his revenue, arising from this
single crime, (which Mr. Hastings considers as tantamount to treason,)
is stated at an hundred and fifty thousand pounds a year.
Dr. Swift somewhere says, that he who could make two blades of grass
grow where but one grew before was a greater benefactor to the human
race than all the politicians that ever existed. This prince, who would
have been deified by antiquity, who would have been ranked with Osiris,
and Bacchus, and Ceres, and the divinities most propitious to men, was,
for those very merits, by name attacked by the Company's government, as
a cheat, a robber, a traitor. In the same breath in which he was
accused as a rebel, he was ordered at once to furnish five thousand
horse. On delay, or (according to the technical phrase, when any
remonstrance is made to them) "_on evasion_," he was declared a violator
of treaties, and everything he had was to be taken from him. Not one
word, however, of horse in this treaty.
The territory of this Fizulla Khân, Mr. Speaker, is less than the County
of Norfolk. It is an inland country, full seven hundred miles from any
seaport, and not distinguished for any one considerable branch of
manufacture whatsoever. From this territory several very considerable
sums had at several times been paid to the British resident. The demand
of cavalry, without a shadow or decent pretext of right, amounted to
three hundred thousand a year more, at the lowest computation; and it is
stated, by the last person sent to negotiate, as a demand of little use,
if it could be complied with,--but that the compliance was impossible,
as it amounted to more than his territories could supply, if there had
been no other demand upon him. Three hundred thousand pounds a year from
an inland country not so large as Norfolk!
The thing most extraordinary was to hear the culprit defend himself from
the imputation of his virtues, as if they had been the blackest
offences. He extenuated the superior cultivation of his country. He
denied its population. He endeavored to prove that he had often sent
back the poor peasant that sought shelter with him.--I can make no
observation on this.
After a variety of extortions and vexations, too fatiguing to you, too
disgusting to me, to go through with, they found "that they ought to be
in a better state to warrant forcible means"; they therefore contented
themselves with a gross sum of one hundred and fifty thousand pounds for
their present demand. They offered him, indeed, an indemnity from their
exactions in future for three hundred thousand pounds more. But he
refused to buy their securities,--pleading (probably with truth) his
poverty; but if the plea were not founded, in my opinion very wisely:
not choosing to deal any more in that dangerous commodity of the
Company's faith; and thinking it better to oppose distress and unarmed
obstinacy to uncolored exaction than to subject himself to be considered
as a cheat, if he should make a treaty in the least beneficial to
himself.
Thus they executed an exemplary punishment on Fizulla Khân for the
culture of his country. But, conscious that the prevention of evils is
the great object of all good regulation, they deprived him of the means
of increasing that criminal cultivation in future, by exhausting his
coffers; and that the population of his country should no more be a
standing reproach and libel on the Company's government, they bound him
by a positive engagement not to afford any shelter whatsoever to the
farmers and laborers who should seek refuge in his territories from the
exactions of the British residents in Oude. When they had done all this
effectually, they gave him a full and complete acquittance from all
charges of rebellion, or of any intention to rebel, or of his having
originally had any interest in, or any means of, rebellion.
These intended rebellions are one of the Company's standing resources.
When money has been thought to be heaped up anywhere, its owners are
universally accused of rebellion, until they are acquitted of their
money and their treasons at once. The money once taken, all accusation,
trial, and punishment ends. It is so settled a resource, that I rather
wonder how it comes to be omitted in the Directors' account; but I take
it for granted this omission will be supplied in their next edition.
The Company stretched this resource to the full extent, when they
accused two old women, in the remotest corner of India, (who could have
no possible view or motive to raise disturbances,) of being engaged in
rebellion, with an intent to drive out the English nation, in whose
protection, purchased by money and secured by treaty, rested the sole
hope of their existence. But the Company wanted money, and the old women
_must_ be guilty of a plot. They were accused of rebellion, and they
were convicted of wealth. Twice had great sums been extorted from them,
and as often had the British faith guarantied the remainder. A body of
British troops, with one of the military farmers-general at their head,
was sent to seize upon the castle in which these helpless women resided.
Their chief eunuchs, who were their agents, their guardians, protectors,
persons of high rank according to the Eastern manners, and of great
trust, were thrown into dungeons, to make them discover their hidden
treasures; and there they lie at present. The lands assigned for the
maintenance of the women were seized and confiscated. Their jewels and
effects were taken, and set up to a pretended auction in an obscure
place, and bought at such a price as the gentlemen thought proper to
give. No account has ever been transmitted of the articles or produce of
this sale. What money was obtained is unknown, or what terms were
stipulated for the maintenance of these despoiled and forlorn
creatures: for by some particulars it appears as if an engagement of the
kind was made.
Let me here remark, once for all, that though the act of 1773 requires
that an account of all proceedings should be diligently transmitted,
that this, like all the other injunctions of the law, is totally
despised, and that half at least of the most important papers are
intentionally withheld.
I wish you, Sir, to advert particularly, in this transaction, to the
quality and the numbers of the persons spoiled, and the instrument by
whom that spoil was made. These ancient matrons, called the Begums, or
Princesses, were of the first birth and quality in India: the one
mother, the other wife, of the late Nabob of Oude, Sujah Dowlah, a
prince possessed of extensive and flourishing dominions, and the second
man in the Mogul Empire. This prince (suspicious, and not unjustly
suspicious, of his son and successor) at his death committed his
treasures and his family to the British faith. That family and household
consisted of _two thousand women_, to which were added two other
seraglios of near kindred, and said to be extremely numerous, and (as I
am well informed) of about fourscore of the Nabob's children, with all
the eunuchs, the ancient servants, and a multitude of the dependants of
his splendid court. These were all to be provided, for present
maintenance and future establishment, from the lands assigned as dower,
and from the treasures which he left to these matrons, in trust for the
whole family.
So far as to the objects of the spoil. The _instrument_ chosen by Mr.
Hastings to despoil the relict of Sujah Dowlah was _her own son_, the
reigning Nabob of Oude. It was the pious hand of a son that was selected
to tear from his mother and grandmother the provision of their age, the
maintenance of his brethren, and of all the ancient household of his
father. [_Here a laugh, from some young members_.] The laugh is
_seasonable_, and the occasion decent and proper.
By the last advices, something of the sum extorted remained unpaid. The
women, in despair, refuse to deliver more, unless their lands are
restored, and their ministers released from prison; but Mr. Hastings and
his council, steady to their point, and consistent to the last in their
conduct, write to the resident to stimulate the son to accomplish the
filial acts he had brought so near to their perfection. "We desire," say
they in their letter to the resident, (written so late as March last,)
"that you will inform us if any, and what means, have been taken for
recovering the balance due from the Begum [Princess] at Fyzabad; and
that, if necessary, you _recommend_ it to the vizier to enforce _the
most effectual means_ for that purpose."
What their effectual means of enforcing demands on women of high rank
and condition are I shall show you, Sir, in a few minutes, when I
represent to you another of these plots and rebellions, which _always_
in India, though so _rarely_ anywhere else, are the offspring of an easy
condition and hoarded riches.
Benares is the capital city of the Indian religion. It is regarded as
holy by a particular and distinguished sanctity; and the Gentoos in
general think themselves as much obliged to visit it once in their lives
as the Mahometans to perform their pilgrimage to Mecca. By this means
that city grew great in commerce and opulence; and so effectually was it
secured by the pious veneration of that people, that in all wars and in
all violences of power there was so sure an asylum both for poverty and
wealth, (as it were under a divine protection,) that the wisest laws and
best assured free constitution could not better provide for the relief
of the one or the safety of the other; and this tranquillity influenced
to the greatest degree the prosperity of all the country, and the
territory of which it was the capital. The interest of money there was
not more than half the usual rate in which it stood in all other places.
The reports have fully informed you of the means and of the terms in
which this city and the territory called Ghazipoor, of which it was the
head, came under the sovereignty of the East India Company.
If ever there was a subordinate dominion pleasantly circumstanced to the
superior power, it was this. A large rent or tribute, to the amount of
two hundred and sixty thousand pounds a year, was paid in monthly
instalments with the punctuality of a dividend at the Bank. If ever
there was a prince who could not have an interest in disturbances, it
was its sovereign, the Rajah Cheit Sing. He was in possession of the
capital of his religion, and a willing revenue was paid by the devout
people who resorted to him from all parts. His sovereignty and his
independence, except his tribute, was secured by every tie. His
territory was not much less than half of Ireland, and displayed in all
parts a degree of cultivation, ease, and plenty, under his frugal and
paternal management, which left him nothing to desire, either for honor
or satisfaction.
This was the light in which this country appeared to almost every eye.
But Mr. Hastings beheld it askance. Mr. Hastings tells us that it was
_reported_ of this Cheit Sing, that his father left him a million
sterling, and that he made annual accessions to the hoard. Nothing could
be so obnoxious to indigent power. So much wealth could not be innocent.
The House is fully acquainted with the unfounded and unjust requisitions
which were made upon this prince. The question has been most ably and
conclusively cleared up in one of the reports of the select committee,
and in an answer of the Court of Directors to an extraordinary
publication against them by their servant, Mr. Hastings. But I mean to
pass by these exactions as if they were perfectly just and regular; and
having admitted them, I take what I shall now trouble you with only as
it serves to show the spirit of the Company's government, the mode in
which it is carried on, and the maxims on which it proceeds.
Mr. Hastings, from whom I take the doctrine, endeavors to prove that
Cheit Sing was no sovereign prince, but a mere zemindar, or common
subject, holding land by rent. If this be granted to him, it is next to
be seen under what terms he is of opinion such a landholder, that is a
British subject, holds his life and property under the Company's
government. It is proper to understand well the doctrines of the person
whose administration has lately received such distinguished approbation
from the Company. His doctrine is,--"That the Company, or the _person
delegated by it_, holds _an absolute_ authority over such
zemindars;--that he [such a subject] owes _an implicit_ and _unreserved_
obedience to its authority, at the _forfeiture_ even of his _life_ and
_property_, at the DISCRETION of those who held _or fully represented_
the sovereign authority;--and that _these_ rights are _fully_ delegated
_to him_, Mr. Hastings."
Such is a British governor's idea of the condition of a great zemindar
holding under a British authority; and this kind of authority he
supposes fully delegated to _him_,--though no such delegation appears in
any commission, instruction, or act of Parliament. At his _discretion_
he may demand of the substance of any zemindar, over and above his rent
or tribute, even, what he pleases, with a sovereign authority; and if he
does not yield an _implicit, unreserved_ obedience to all his commands,
he forfeits his lands, his life, and his property, at Mr. Hastings's
_discretion_. But, extravagant, and even frantic, as these positions
appear, they are less so than what I shall now read to you; for he
asserts, that, if any one should urge an exemption from more than a
stated payment, or should consider the deeds which passed between him
and the Board "as bearing _the quality and force_ of a treaty between
equal states," he says, "that such an opinion is itself criminal to the
state of which he is a subject; and that he was himself amenable to its
justice, if he gave _countenance_ to such a _belief_." Here is a new
species of crime invented, that of countenancing a belief,--but a belief
of what? A belief of that which the Court of Directors, Hastings's
masters, and a committee of this House, have decided as this prince's
indisputable right.
But supposing the Rajah of Benares to be a mere subject, and that
subject a criminal of the highest form; let us see what course was taken
by an upright English magistrate. Did he cite this culprit before his
tribunal? Did he make a charge? Did he produce witnesses? These are not
forms; they are parts of substantial and eternal justice. No, not a word
of all this. Mr. Hastings concludes him, _in his own mind_, to be
guilty: he makes this conclusion on reports, on hearsays, on
appearances, on rumors, on conjectures, on presumptions; and even these
never once hinted to the party, nor publicly to any human being, till
the whole business was done.
But the Governor tells you his motive for this extraordinary proceeding,
so contrary to every mode of justice towards either a prince or a
subject, fairly and without disguise; and he puts into your hands the
key of his whole conduct:--"I will suppose, for a moment, that I have
acted with unwarrantable rigor towards Cheit Sing, and even with
injustice.--Let my MOTIVE be consulted. I left Calcutta, impressed with
a belief that _extraordinary means_ were necessary, and those exerted
with a _steady hand_, to preserve the Company's _interests from sinking
under the accumulated weight which oppressed them_. I saw a _political
necessity_ for curbing the _overgrown_ power of a great member of their
dominion, and _for making it contribute to the relief of their pressing
exigencies_." This is plain speaking; after this, it is no wonder that
the Rajah's wealth and his offence, the necessities of the judge and the
opulence of the delinquent, are never separated, through the whole of
Mr. Hastings's apology. "The justice and _policy_ of exacting _a large
pecuniary mulct_." The resolution "_to draw from his guilt the means of
relief to the Company's distresses."_ His determination "to make him
_pay largely_ for his pardon, or to execute a severe vengeance for past
delinquency." That "as his _wealth was great_, and the _Company's
exigencies_ pressing, he thought it a measure of justice and policy to
exact from him a large pecuniary mulct _for their relief_."--"The sum"
(says Mr. Wheler, bearing evidence, at his desire, to his intentions)
"to which the Governor declared his resolution to extend his fine was
forty or fifty lacs, _that is, four or five hundred thousand pounds_;
and that, if he refused, he was to be removed from his zemindary
entirely; or by taking possession of his forts, to obtain, _out of the
treasure deposited in them_, the above sum for the Company."
Crimes so convenient, crimes so politic, crimes so necessary, crimes so
alleviating of distress, can never be wanting to those who use no
process, and who produce no proofs.
But there is another serious part (what is not so?) in this affair. Let
us suppose that the power for which Mr. Hastings contends, a power which
no sovereign ever did or ever can vest in any of his subjects, namely,
his own sovereign authority, to be conveyed by the act of Parliament to
any man or body of men whatsoever; it certainly was never given to Mr.
Hastings. The powers given by the act of 1773 were formal and official;
they were given, not to the Governor-General, but to the major vote of
the board, as a board, on discussion amongst themselves, in their public
character and capacity; and their acts in that character and capacity
were to be ascertained by records and minutes of council. The despotic
acts exercised by Mr. Hastings were done merely in his _private_
character; and, if they had been moderate and just, would still be the
acts of an usurped authority, and without any one of the legal modes of
proceeding which could give him competence for the most trivial exertion
of power. There was no proposition or deliberation whatsoever in
council, no minute on record, by circulation or otherwise, to authorize
his proceedings; no delegation of power to impose a fine, or to take
any step to deprive the Rajah of Benares of his government, his
property, or his liberty. The minutes of consultation assign to his
journey a totally different object, duty, and destination. Mr. Wheler,
at his desire, tells us long after, that he had a confidential
conversation with him on various subjects, of which this was the
principal, in which Mr. Hastings notified to him his secret intentions;
"and that he _bespoke_ his support of the measures which he intended to
pursue towards him (the Rajah)." This confidential discourse, and
_bespeaking_ of support, could give him no power, in opposition to an
express act of Parliament, and the whole tenor of the orders of the
Court of Directors.
In what manner the powers thus usurped were employed is known to the
whole world. All the House knows that the design on the Rajah proved as
unfruitful as it was violent. The unhappy prince was expelled, and his
more unhappy country was enslaved and ruined; but not a rupee was
acquired. Instead of treasure to recruit the Company's finances, wasted
by their wanton wars and corrupt jobs, they were plunged into a new war,
which shook their power in India to its foundation, and, to use the
Governor's own happy simile, might have dissolved it like a magic
structure, if the talisman had been broken.
But the success is no part of my consideration, who should think just
the same of this business, if the spoil of one rajah had been fully
acquired, and faithfully applied to the destruction of twenty other
rajahs. Not only the arrest of the Rajah in his palace was unnecessary
and unwarrantable, and calculated to stir up any manly blood which
remained in his subjects, but the despotic style and the extreme
insolence of language and demeanor, used to a person of great condition
among the politest people in the world, was intolerable. Nothing
aggravates tyranny so much as contumely. _Quicquid superbia in
contumeliis_ was charged by a great man of antiquity, as a principal
head of offence against the Governor-General of that day. The unhappy
people were still more insulted. A relation, but an _enemy_ to the
family, a notorious robber and villain, called Ussaun Sing, kept as a
hawk in a mew, to fly upon this nation, was set up to govern there,
instead of a prince honored and beloved. But when the business of insult
was accomplished, the revenue was too serious a concern to be intrusted
to such hands. Another was set up in his place, as guardian to an
infant.
But here, Sir, mark the effect of all these _extraordinary_ means, of
all this policy and justice. The revenues, which had been hitherto paid
with such astonishing punctuality, fell into arrear. The new prince
guardian was deposed without ceremony,--and with as little, cast into
prison. The government of that once happy country has been in the utmost
confusion ever since such good order was taken about it. But, to
complete the contumely offered to this undone people, and to make them
feel their servitude in all its degradation and all its bitterness, the
government of their sacred city, the government of that Benares which
had been so respected by Persian and Tartar conquerors, though of the
Mussulman persuasion, that, even in the plenitude of their pride, power,
and bigotry, no magistrate of that sect entered the place, was now
delivered over by English hands to a Mahometan; and an Ali Ibrahim Khân
was introduced, under the Company's authority, with power of life and
death, into the sanctuary of the Gentoo religion. After this, the taking
off a slight payment, cheerfully made by pilgrims to a chief of their
own rites, was represented as a mighty benefit.
It remains only to show, through the conduct in this business, the
spirit of the Company's government, and the respect they pay towards
other prejudices, not less regarded in the East than those of religion:
I mean the reverence paid to the female sex in general, and particularly
to women of high rank and condition. During the general confusion of the
country of Ghazipoor, Panna, the mother of Cheit Sing, was lodged with
her train in a castle called Bidgé Gur, in which were likewise deposited
a large portion of the treasures of her son, or more probably her own.
To whomsoever they belonged was indifferent: for, though no charge of
rebellion was made on this woman, (which was rather singular, as it
would have cost nothing,) they were resolved to secure her with her
fortune. The castle was besieged by Major Popham.
There was no great reason to apprehend that soldiers ill paid, that
soldiers who thought they had been defrauded of their plunder on former
services of the same kind, would not have been sufficiently attentive to
the spoil they were expressly come for; but the gallantry and generosity
of the profession was justly suspected, as being likely to set bounds to
military rapaciousness. The Company's first civil magistrate discovered
the greatest uneasiness lest the women should have anything preserved to
them. Terms tending to put some restraint on military violence were
granted. He writes a letter to Mr. Popham, referring to some letter
written before to the same effect, which I do not remember to have seen;
but it shows his anxiety on this subject. Hear himself:--"I think
_every_ demand she has made on you, except that of safety and respect to
her person, is unreasonable. If the reports brought to me are true, your
rejecting her offers, or _any negotiation,_ would soon obtain you the
fort upon your own terms. I apprehend she will attempt to _defraud the
captors of a considerable part of their booty, by being suffered to
retire without examination_. But this is your concern, not mine. I
should _be very sorry_ that your officers and soldiers lost _any_ part
of the reward to which they are so well entitled; but you must be the
best judge of the _promised_ indulgence to the Ranny: what you have
engaged for I will certainly ratify; but as to suffering the Ranny to
hold the purgunna of Hurlich, or any other zemindary, without being
subject to the authority of the zemindar, _or any lands whatsoever_, or
indeed making _any_ condition with her for a _provision_, I will _never
consent_."
Here your Governor stimulates a rapacious and licentious soldiery to the
personal search of women, lest these unhappy creatures should avail
themselves of the protection of their sex to secure any supply for their
necessities; and he positively orders that no stipulation should be made
for any provision for them. The widow and mother of a prince, well
informed of her miserable situation, and the cause of it, a woman of
this rank became a suppliant to the domestic servant of Mr. Hastings,
(they are his own words that I read,) "imploring his intercession that
she may be relieved _from the hardships and dangers of her present
situation_, and offering to surrender the fort, and the _treasure and
valuable effects_ contained in it, provided she can be assured _of
safety and protection to her person and honor_, and to that of her
family and attendants." He is so good as to consent to this, "provided
she surrenders everything of value, with the reserve _only_ of such
articles as _you_ shall think _necessary_ to her condition, or as you
_yourself_ shall be disposed to indulge her with.--But should she refuse
to execute the promise she has made, or delay it beyond the term of
twenty-four hours, it is _my positive_ injunction that you immediately
put a stop to any further intercourse or negotiation with her, and on no
pretext renew it. If she disappoints or _trifles_ with me, after I have
subjected _my duan_ to the disgrace of returning ineffectually, and of
course myself to discredit, I shall consider it as a _wanton_ affront
and indignity _which I can never forgive_; nor will I grant her _any_
conditions whatever, but leave her exposed _to those_ dangers which she
has chosen to risk, rather than trust to the clemency and generosity of
our government. I think she cannot be ignorant of these consequences,
and will not venture to incur them; and it is for this reason I place a
dependence on her offers, and have consented to send my duan to her."
The dreadful secret hinted at by the merciful Governor in the latter
part of the letter is well understood in India, where those who suffer
corporeal indignities generally expiate the offences of others with
their own blood. However, in spite of all these, the temper of the
military did, some way or other, operate. They came to terms which have
never been transmitted. It appears that a fifteenth per cent of the
plunder was reserved to the captives, of which the unhappy mother of
the Prince of Benares was to have a share. This ancient matron, born to
better things [_A laugh from certain young gentlemen]_--I see no cause
for this mirth. A good author of antiquity reckons among the calamities
of his time "_nobilissimarum fæminarum exilia et fugas_." I say, Sir,
this ancient lady was compelled to quit her house, with three hundred
helpless women and a multitude of children in her train. But the lower
sort in the camp, it seems, could not be restrained. They did not forget
the good lessons of the Governor-General. They were unwilling "to be
defrauded of a considerable part of their booty by suffering them to
pass without examination."--They examined them, Sir, with a vengeance;
and the sacred protection of that awful character, Mr. Hastings's
_maître d'hôtel,_ could not secure them from insult and plunder. Here is
Popham's narrative of the affair:--
"The Ranny came out of the fort, with her family and dependants, the
tenth, at night, owing to which such attention was not paid to her as I
wished; and I am exceedingly sorry to inform you that _the
licentiousness of our followers was beyond the bounds of control; for,
notwithstanding all I could do, her people were plundered on the road of
most of the things which they brought out of the fort, by which means
one of the articles of surrender has been much infringed_. The distress
I have felt upon this occasion cannot be expressed, and can only be
allayed by a firm performance of the other articles of the treaty, which
I shall make it my business to enforce.--The suspicions which the
officers had of treachery, and the delay made to our getting possession,
had enraged them, as well as the troops, so much, that the treaty was at
first regarded as void; but this determination was soon succeeded by
pity and compassion for the unfortunate besieged."--After this comes, in
his due order, Mr. Hastings; who is full of sorrow and indignation, &c.,
&c., &c., according to the best and most authentic precedents
established upon such occasions.
The women being thus disposed of, that is, completely despoiled, and
pathetically lamented, Mr. Hastings at length recollected the great
object of his enterprise, which, during his zeal lest the officers and
soldiers should lose any part of their reward, he seems to have
forgot,--that is to say, "to draw from the Rajah's guilt the means of
relief to the Company's distresses." This was to be the stronghold of
his defence. This compassion to the Company, he knew by experience,
would sanctify a great deal of rigor towards the natives. But the
military had distresses of their own, which they considered first.
Neither Mr. Hastings's authority, nor his supplications, could prevail
on them to assign a shilling to the claim he made on the part of the
Company. They divided the booty amongst themselves. Driven from his
claim, he was reduced to petition for the spoil as a loan. But the
soldiers were too wise to venture as a loan what the borrower claimed as
a right. In defiance of all authority, they shared among themselves
about two hundred thousand pounds sterling, besides what had been taken
from the women.
In all this there is nothing wonderful. We may rest assured, that, when
the maxims of any government establish among its resources extraordinary
means, and those exerted with a strong hand, that strong hand will
provide those extraordinary means for _itself_. Whether the soldiers had
reason or not, (perhaps much might be said for them,) certain it is,
the military discipline of India was ruined from that moment; and the
same rage for plunder, the same contempt of subordination, which blasted
all the hopes of extraordinary means from your strong hand at Benares,
have very lately lost you an army in Mysore. This is visible enough from
the accounts in the last gazette.
There is no doubt but that the country and city of Benares, now brought
into the same order, will very soon exhibit, if it does not already
display, the same appearance with those countries and cities which are
under better subjection. A great master, Mr. Hastings, has himself been
at the pains of drawing a picture of one of these countries: I mean the
province and city of Furruckabad. There is no reason to question his
knowledge of the facts; and his authority (on this point at least) is
above all exception, as well for the state of the country as for the
cause. In his minute of consultation, Mr. Hastings describes forcibly
the consequences which arise from the degradation into which we have
sunk the native government. "The total want (says he) of all order,
regularity, or authority, in his (the Nabob of Furruckabad's)
government, and to which, among other obvious causes, it may no doubt be
owing that the country of Furruckabad is become _almost an entire waste,
without cultivation or inhabitants_,--that the capital, which but a very
short time ago was distinguished as one of the most populous and opulent
commercial cities in Hindostan, at present exhibits nothing but _scenes
of the most wretched poverty, desolation, and misery_,--and that the
_Nabob himself_, though in the possession of a tract of country which,
with only common care, is notoriously capable of yielding an annual
revenue of between thirty and forty lacs, (three or four hundred
thousand pounds,) with _no military establishment_ to maintain, scarcely
commands _the means of a bare subsistence_."
This is a true and unexaggerated picture, not only of Furruckabad, but
of at least three fourths of the country which we possess, or rather lay
waste, in India. Now, Sir, the House will be desirous to know for what
purpose this picture was drawn. It was for a purpose, I will not say
laudable, but necessary: that of taking the unfortunate prince and his
country out of the hands of a sequestrator sent thither by the Nabob of
Oude, the mortal enemy of the prince thus ruined, and to protect him by
means of a British resident, who might carry his complaints to the
superior resident at Oude, or transmit them to Calcutta. But mark how
the reformer persisted in his reformation. The effect of the measure was
better than was probably expected. The prince began to be at ease; the
country began to recover; and the revenue began to be collected. These
were alarming circumstances. Mr. Hastings not only recalled the
resident, but he entered into a formal stipulation with the Nabob of
Oude never to send an English subject again to Furruckabad; and thus the
country, described as you have heard by Mr. Hastings, is given up
forever to the very persons to whom he had attributed its ruin,--that
is, to the sezawals or sequestrators of the Nabob of Oude.
Such was the issue of the first attempt to relieve the distresses of the
dependent provinces. I shall close what I have to say on the condition
of the northern dependencies with the effect of the last of these
attempts. You will recollect, Sir, the account I have not long ago
stated to you, as given by Mr. Hastings, of the ruined condition of the
destroyer of others, the Nabob of Oude, and of the recall, in
consequence, of Hannay, Middleton, and Johnson. When the first little
sudden gust of passion against these gentlemen was spent, the sentiments
of old friendship began to revive. Some healing conferences were held
between them and the superior government. Mr. Hannay was permitted to
return to Oude; but death prevented the further advantages intended for
him, and the future benefits proposed for the country by the provident
cars of the Council-General.
One of these gentlemen was accused of the grossest peculations; two of
them by Mr. Hastings himself, of what he considered as very gross
offences. The Court of Directors were informed, by the Governor-General
and Council, that a severe inquiry would be instituted against the two
survivors; and they requested that court to suspend its judgment, and to
wait the event of their proceedings. A mock inquiry has been instituted,
by which the parties could not be said to be either acquitted or
condemned. By means of the bland and conciliatory dispositions of the
charter-governors, and proper private explanations, the public inquiry
has in effect died away; the supposed peculators and destroyers of Oude
repose in all security in the bosoms of their accusers; whilst others
succeed to them to be instructed by their example.
It is only to complete the view I proposed of the conduct of the Company
with regard to the dependent provinces, that I shall say _any_ thing at
all of the Carnatic, which is the scene, if possible, of greater
disorder than the northern provinces. Perhaps it were better to say of
this centre and metropolis of abuse, whence all the rest in India and in
England diverge, from whence they are fed and methodized, what was said
of Carthage,--"_De Carthagine satius est silere quam parum dicere_."
This country, in all its denominations, is about 46,000 square miles.
It may be affirmed universally, that not one person of substance or
property, landed, commercial, or moneyed, excepting two or three
bankers, who are necessary deposits and distributors of the general
spoil, is left in all that region. In that country, the moisture, the
bounty of Heaven, is given but at a certain season. Before the era of
our influence, the industry of man carefully husbanded that gift of God.
The Gentoos preserved, with a provident and religious care, the precious
deposit of the periodical rain in reservoirs, many of them works of
royal grandeur; and from these, as occasion demanded, they fructified
the whole country. To maintain these reservoirs, and to keep up an
annual advance to the cultivators for seed and cattle, formed a
principal object of the piety and policy of the priests and rulers of
the Gentoo religion.
This object required a command of money; and there was no pollam, or
castle, which in the happy days of the Carnatic was without some hoard
of treasure, by which the governors were enabled to combat with the
irregularity of the seasons, and to resist or to buy off the invasion of
an enemy. In all the cities were multitudes of merchants and bankers,
for all occasions of moneyed assistance; and on the other hand, the
native princes were in condition to obtain credit from them. The
manufacturer was paid by the return of commodities, or by imported
money, and not, as at present, in the taxes that had been originally
exacted from his industry. In aid of casual distress, the country was
full of choultries, which were inns and hospitals, where the traveller
and the poor were relieved. All ranks of people had their place in the
public concern, and their share in the common stock and common
prosperity. But _the chartered rights of men_, and the right which it
was thought proper to set up in the Nabob of Arcot, introduced a new
system. It was their policy to consider hoards of money as crimes,--to
regard moderate rents as frauds on the sovereign,--and to view, in the
lesser princes, any claim of exemption from more than settled tribute as
an act of rebellion. Accordingly, all the castles were, one after the
other, plundered and destroyed; the native princes were expelled; the
hospitals fell to ruin; the reservoirs of water went to decay; the
merchants, bankers, and manufacturers disappeared; and sterility,
indigence, and depopulation overspread the face of these once
flourishing provinces.
The Company was very early sensible of these mischiefs, and of their
true cause. They gave precise orders, "that the native princes, called
polygars, should _not be extirpated_." "The rebellion" (so they choose
to call it) "of the polygars may, they fear, _with, too much justice_,
be attributed to the maladministration of the Nabob's collectors." "They
observe with concern, that their troops have been put to _disagreeable_
services." They might have used a stronger expression without
impropriety. But they make amends in another place. Speaking of the
polygars, the Directors say that "it was repugnant to humanity to
_force_ them to such dreadful extremities _as they underwent";_ that
some examples of severity _might_ be necessary, "when they fell into
the Nabob's hands," _and not by the destruction of the country_; "that
_they fear_ his government is _none of the mildest_, and that there is
_great oppression_ in collecting his revenues." They state, that the
wars in which he has involved the Carnatic had been a cause of its
distresses; "that those distresses have been certainly great, but those
by _the Nabob's oppressions_ they believe _to be greater than all_."
Pray, Sir, attend to the reason for their opinion that the government of
this their instrument is more calamitous to the country than the ravages
of war:--Because, say they, his oppressions are "_without intermission_;
the others are temporary;--by all which _oppressions_ we believe the
Nabob has great wealth in store." From this store neither he nor they
could derive any advantage whatsoever, upon the invasion of Hyder Ali,
in the hour of their greatest calamity and dismay.
It is now proper to compare these declarations with the Company's
conduct. The principal reason which they assigned against the
_extirpation_ of the polygars was, that the _weavers_ were protected in
their fortresses. They might have added, that the Company itself, which
stung them to death, had been warmed in the bosom of these unfortunate
princes: for, on the taking of Madras by the French, it was in their
hospitable pollams that most of the inhabitants found refuge and
protection. But notwithstanding all these orders, reasons, and
declarations, they at length gave an indirect sanction, and permitted
the use of a very direct and irresistible force, to measures which they
had over and over again declared to be false policy, cruel, inhuman, and
oppressive. Having, however, forgot all attention to the princes and the
people, they remembered that they had some sort of interest in the
trade of the country; and it is matter of curiosity to observe the
protection which they afforded to this their natural object.
Full of anxious cares on this head, they direct, "that, in reducing the
polygars, they [their servants] were to be _cautious_ not to deprive the
_weavers and manufacturers_ of the protection they often met with in the
strongholds of the polygar countries"; and they write to their
instrument, the Nabob of Arcot, concerning these poor people in a most
pathetic strain. "We _entreat_ your Excellency," (say they,) "in
particular, to make the manufacturers the object of your _tenderest
care;_ particularly when you _root out_ the polygars, you do not deprive
the _weavers of the protection they enjoyed under them_." When they root
out the protectors in favor of the oppressor, they show themselves
religiously cautious of the rights of the protected. When they extirpate
the shepherd and the shepherd's dog, they piously recommend the helpless
flock to the mercy, and even to the _tenderest care,_ of the wolf. This
is the uniform strain of their policy,--strictly forbidding, and at the
same time strenuously encouraging and enforcing, every measure that can
ruin and desolate the country committed to their charge. After giving
the Company's idea of the government of this their instrument, it may
appear singular, but it is perfectly consistent with their system, that,
besides wasting for him, at two different times, the most exquisite spot
upon the earth, Tanjore, and all the adjacent countries, they have even
voluntarily put their own territory, that is, a large and fine country
adjacent to Madras, called their jaghire, wholly out of their
protection,--and have continued to farm their subjects, and their
duties towards these subjects, to that very Nabob whom they themselves
constantly represent as an habitual oppressor and a relentless tyrant.
This they have done without any pretence of ignorance of the objects of
oppression for which this prince has thought fit to become their renter;
for he has again and again told them that it is for the sole purpose of
exercising authority he holds the jaghire lands; and he affirms (and I
believe with truth) that he pays more for that territory than the
revenues yield. This deficiency he must make up from his other
territories; and thus, in order to furnish the means of oppressing one
part of the Carnatic, he is led to oppress all the rest.
The House perceives that the livery of the Company's government is
uniform. I have described the condition of the countries indirectly, but
most substantially, under the Company's authority. And now I ask,
whether, with this map of misgovernment before me, I can suppose myself
bound by my vote to continue, upon any principles of pretended public
faith, the management of these countries in those hands. If I kept such
a faith (which in reality is no better than a _fides latronum_) with
what is called the Company, I must break the faith, the covenant, the
solemn, original, indispensable oath, in which I am bound, by the
eternal frame and constitution of things, to the whole human race.
As I have dwelt so long on these who are indirectly under the Company's
administration, I will endeavor to be a little shorter upon the
countries immediately under this charter-government. These are the
Bengal provinces. The condition of these provinces is pretty fully
detailed in the Sixth and Ninth Reports, and in their Appendixes. I
will select only such principles and instances as are broad and general.
To your own thoughts I shall leave it to furnish the detail of
oppressions involved in them. I shall state to you, as shortly as I am
able, the conduct of the Company:--1st, towards the landed
interests;--next, the commercial interests;--3rdly, the native
government;--and lastly, to their own government.
Bengal, and the provinces that are united to it, are larger than the
kingdom of France, and once contained, as France does contain, a great
and independent landed interest, composed of princes, of great lords, of
a numerous nobility and gentry, of freeholders, of lower tenants, of
religious communities, and public foundations. So early as 1769, the
Company's servants perceived the decay into which these provinces had
fallen under English administration, and they made a strong
representation upon this decay, and what they apprehended to be the
causes of it. Soon after this representation, Mr. Hastings became
President of Bengal. Instead of administering a remedy to this
melancholy disorder, upon the heels of a dreadful famine, in the year
1772, the succor which the new President and the Council lent to this
afflicted nation was--shall I be believed in relating it?--the landed
interest of a whole kingdom, of a kingdom to be compared to France, was
set up to public auction! They set up (Mr. Hastings set up) the whole
nobility, gentry, and freeholders to the highest bidder. No preference
was given to the ancient proprietors. They must bid against every
usurer, every temporary adventurer, every jobber and schemer, every
servant of every European,--or they were obliged to content themselves,
in lieu of their extensive domains, with their house, and such a
pension as the state auctioneers thought fit to assign. In this general
calamity, several of the first nobility thought (and in all appearance
justly) that they had better submit to the necessity of this pension,
than continue, under the name of zemindars, the objects and instruments
of a system by which they ruined their tenants and were ruined
themselves. Another reform has since come upon the back of the first;
and a pension having been assigned to these unhappy persons, in lieu of
their hereditary lands, a new scheme of economy has taken place, and
deprived them of that pension.
The menial servants of Englishmen, persons (to use the emphatical phrase
of a ruined and patient Eastern chief) "_whose fathers they would not
have set with the dogs of their flock_" entered into their patrimonial
lands. Mr. Hastings's banian was, after this auction, found possessed of
territories yielding a rent of one hundred and forty thousand pounds a
year.
Such an universal proscription, upon any pretence, has few examples.
Such a proscription, without even a pretence of delinquency, has none.
It stands by itself. It stands as a monument to astonish the
imagination, to confound the reason of mankind. I confess to you, when I
first came to know this business in its true nature and extent, my
surprise did a little suspend my indignation. I was in a manner
stupefied by the desperate boldness of a few obscure young men, who,
having obtained, by ways which they could not comprehend, a power of
which they saw neither the purposes nor the limits, tossed about,
subverted, and tore to pieces, as if it were in the gambols of a boyish
unluckiness and malice, the most established rights, and the most
ancient and most revered institutions, of ages and nations. Sir, I will
not now trouble you with any detail with regard to what they have since
done with these same lands and landholders, only to inform you that
nothing has been suffered to settle for two seasons together upon any
basis, and that the levity and inconstancy of these mock legislators
were not the least afflicting parts of the oppressions suffered under
their usurpation; nor will anything give stability to the property of
the natives, but an administration in England at once protecting and
stable. The country sustains, almost every year, the miseries of a
revolution. At present, all is uncertainty, misery, and confusion. There
is to be found through these vast regions no longer one landed man who
is a resource for voluntary aid or an object for particular rapine. Some
of them were not long since great princes; they possessed treasures,
they levied armies. There was a zemindar in Bengal, (I forget his name,)
that, on the threat of an invasion, supplied the subah of these
provinces with the loan of a million sterling. The family at this day
wants credit for a breakfast at the bazaar.
I shall now say a word or two on the Company's care of the commercial
interest of those kingdoms. As it appears in the Reports that persons in
the highest stations in Bengal have adopted, as a fixed plan of policy,
the destruction of all intermediate dealers between the Company and the
manufacturer, native merchants have disappeared of course. The spoil of
the revenues is the sole capital which purchases the produce and
manufactures, and through three or four foreign companies transmits the
official gains of individuals to Europe. No other commerce has an
existence in Bengal. The transport of its plunder is the only traffic of
the country. I wish to refer you to the Appendix to the Ninth Report for
a full account of the manner in which the Company have protected the
commercial interests of their dominions in the East.
As to the native government and the administration of justice, it
subsisted in a poor, tottering manner for some years. In the year 1781 a
total revolution took place in that establishment. In one of the usual
freaks of legislation of the Council of Bengal, the whole criminal
jurisdiction of these courts, called the Phoujdary Judicature, exercised
till then by the principal Mussulmen, was in one day, without notice,
without consultation with the magistrates or the people there, and
without communication with the Directors or Ministers here, totally
subverted. A new institution took place, by which this jurisdiction was
divided between certain English servants of the Company and the Gentoo
zemindars of the country, the latter of whom never petitioned for it,
nor, for aught that appears, ever desired this boon. But its natural use
was made of it: it was made a pretence for new extortions of money.
The natives had, however, one consolation in the ruin of their
judicature: they soon saw that it fared no better with the English
government itself. That, too, after destroying every other, came to its
period. This revolution may well be rated for a most daring act, even
among the extraordinary things that have been doing in Bengal since our
unhappy acquisition of the means of so much mischief.
An establishment of English government for civil justice, and for the
collection of revenue, was planned and executed by the President and
Council of Bengal, subject to the pleasure of the Directors, in the year
1772. According to this plan, the country was divided into six
districts, or provinces. In each of these was established a provincial
council, which administered the revenue; and of that council, one
member, by monthly rotation, presided in the courts of civil resort,
with an appeal to the council of the province, and thence to Calcutta.
In this system (whether in other respects good or evil) there were some
capital advantages. There was, in the very number of persons in each
provincial council, authority, communication, mutual check, and control.
They were obliged, on their minutes of consultation, to enter their
reasons and dissents; so that a man of diligence, of research, and
tolerable sagacity, sitting in London, might, from these materials, be
enabled to form some judgment of the spirit of what was going on on the
furthest banks of the Ganges and Burrampooter.
The Court of Directors so far ratified this establishment, (which was
consonant enough to their general plan of government,) that they gave
precise orders that no alteration should be made in it without their
consent. So far from being apprised of any design against this
constitution, they had reason to conceive that on trial it had been more
and more approved by their Council-General, at least by the
Governor-General, who had planned it. At the time of the revolution, the
Council-General was nominally in two persons, virtually in one. At that
time measures of an arduous and critical nature ought to have been
forborne, even if, to the fullest council, this specific measure had
not been prohibited by the superior authority. It was in this very
situation that one man had the hardiness to conceive and the temerity to
execute a total revolution in the form and the persons composing the
government of a great kingdom. Without any previous step, at one stroke,
the whole constitution, of Bengal, civil and criminal, was swept away.
The counsellors were recalled from their provinces; upwards of fifty of
the principal officers of government were turned out of employ, and
rendered dependent on Mr. Hastings for their immediate subsistence, and
for all hope of future provision. The chief of each council, and one
European collector of revenue, was left in each province.
But here, Sir, you may imagine a new government, of some permanent
description, was established in the place of that which had been thus
suddenly overturned. No such thing. Lest these chiefs, without councils,
should be conceived to form the ground-plan of some future government,
it was publicly declared that their continuance was only temporary and
permissive. The whole subordinate British administration of revenue was
then vested in a committee in Calcutta, all creatures of the
Governor-General; and the provincial management, under the permissive
chief, was delivered over to native officers.
But that the revolution and the purposes of the revolution might be
complete, to this committee were delegated, not only the functions of
all the inferior, but, what will surprise the House, those of the
supreme administration of revenue also. Hitherto the Governor-General
and Council had, in their revenue department, administered the finances
of those kingdoms. By the new scheme they are delegated to this
committee, who are only to report their proceedings for approbation.
The key to the whole transaction is given in one of the instructions to
the committee,--"that it is not necessary that they should enter
dissents." By this means the ancient plan of the Company's
administration was destroyed; but the plan of concealment was perfected.
To that moment the accounts of the revenues were tolerably clear,--or at
least means were furnished for inquiries, by which they might be
rendered satisfactory. In the obscure and silent gulf of this committee
everything is now buried. The thickest shades of night surround all
their transactions. No effectual means of detecting fraud,
mismanagement, or misrepresentation exist. The Directors, who have dared
to talk with such confidence on their revenues, know nothing about them.
What used to fill volumes is now comprised under a few dry heads on a
sheet of paper. The natives, a people habitually made to concealment,
are the chief managers of the revenue throughout the provinces. I mean
by natives such wretches as your rulers select out of them as most
fitted for their purposes. As a proper keystone to bind the arch, a
native, one Gunga Govind Sing, a man turned out of his employment by Sir
John Clavering for malversation in office, is made the corresponding
secretary, and, indeed, the great moving principle of their new board.
As the whole revenue and civil administration was thus subverted, and a
clandestine government substituted in the place of it, the judicial
institution underwent a like revolution. In 1772 there had been six
courts, formed out of the six provincial councils. Eighteen new ones
are appointed in their place, with each a judge, taken from the _junior_
servants of the Company. To maintain these eighteen courts, a tax is
levied on the sums in litigation, of two and one half per cent on the
great, and of five per cent on the less. This money is all drawn from
the provinces to Calcutta. The chief justice (the same who stays in
defiance of a vote of this House, and of his Majesty's recall) is
appointed at once the treasurer and disposer of these taxes, levied
without any sort of authority from the Company, from the Crown, or from
Parliament.
In effect, Sir, every legal, regular authority, in matters of revenue,
of political administration, of criminal law, of civil law, in many of
the most essential parts of military discipline, is laid level with the
ground; and an oppressive, irregular, capricious, unsteady, rapacious,
and peculating despotism, with a direct disavowal of obedience to any
authority at home, and without any fixed maxim, principle, or rule of
proceeding to guide them in India, is at present the state of your
charter-government over great kingdoms.
As the Company has made this use of their trust, I should ill discharge
mine, if I refused to give my most cheerful vote for the redress of
these abuses, by putting the affairs of so large and valuable a part of
the interests of this nation and of mankind into some steady hands,
possessing the confidence and assured of the support of this House,
until they can be restored to regularity, order, and consistency.
I have touched the heads of some of the grievances of the people and the
abuses of government. But I hope and trust you will give me credit, when
I faithfully assure you that I have not mentioned one fourth part of
what has come to my knowledge in your committee; and further, I have
full reason to believe that not one fourth part of the abuses are come
to my knowledge, by that or by any other means. Pray consider what I
have said only as an index to direct you in your inquiries.
If this, then, Sir, has been the use made of the trust of political
powers, internal and external, given by you in the charter, the next
thing to be seen is the conduct of the Company with regard to the
commercial trust. And here I will make a fair offer:--If it can be
proved that they have acted wisely, prudently, and frugally, as
merchants, I shall pass by the whole mass of their enormities as
statesmen. That they have not done this their present condition is proof
sufficient. Their distresses are said to be owing to their wars. This is
not wholly true. But if it were, is not that readiness to engage in
wars, which distinguishes them, and for which the Committee of Secrecy
has so branded their politics, founded on the falsest principles of
mercantile speculation?
The principle of buying cheap and selling dear is the first, the great
foundation of mercantile dealing. Have they ever attended to this
principle? Nay, for years have they not actually authorized in their
servants a total indifference as to the prices they were to pay?
A great deal of strictness in driving bargains for whatever we contract
is another of the principles of mercantile policy. Try the Company by
that test. Look at the contracts that are made for them. Is the Company
so much as a good commissary to their own armies? I engage to select for
you, out of the innumerable mass of their dealings, all conducted very
nearly alike, one contract only the excessive profits on which during a
short term would pay the whole of their year's dividend. I shall
undertake to show that upon two others the inordinate profits given,
with the losses incurred in order to secure those profits, would pay a
year's dividend more.
It is a third property of trading-men to see that their clerks do not
divert the dealings of the master to their own benefit. It was the other
day only, when their Governor and Council taxed the Company's investment
with a sum of fifty thousand pounds, as an inducement to persuade only
seven members of their Board of Trade to give their _honor_ that they
would abstain from such profits upon that investment, as they must have
violated their _oaths_, if they had made at all.
It is a fourth quality of a merchant to be exact in his accounts. What
will be thought, when you have fully before you the mode of accounting
made use of in the Treasury of Bengal? I hope you will have it soon.
With regard to one of their agencies, when it came to the material part,
the prime cost of the goods on which a commission of fifteen per cent
was allowed, to the astonishment of the factory to whom the commodities
were sent, the Accountant-General reports that he did not think himself
authorized to call for _vouchers_ relative to this and other
particulars,--because the agent was upon his _honor_ with regard to
them. A new principle of account upon honor seems to be regularly
established in their dealings and their treasury, which in reality
amounts to an entire annihilation of the principle of all accounts.
It is a fifth property of a merchant, who does not meditate a
fraudulent bankruptcy, to calculate his probable profits upon the money
he takes up to vest in business. Did the Company, when they bought goods
on bonds bearing eight per cent interest, at ten and even twenty per
cent discount, even ask themselves a question concerning the possibility
of advantage from dealing on these terms?
The last quality of a merchant I shall advert to is the taking care to
be properly prepared, in cash or goods in the ordinary course of sale,
for the bills which are drawn on them. Now I ask, whether they have ever
calculated the clear produce of any given sales, to make them tally with
the four million of bills which are come and coming upon them, so as at
the proper periods to enable the one to liquidate the other. No, they
have not. They are now obliged to borrow money of their own servants to
purchase their investment. The servants stipulate five per cent on the
capital they advance, if their bills should not be paid at the time when
they become due; and the value of the rupee on which they charge this
interest is taken at two shillings and a penny. Has the Company ever
troubled themselves to inquire whether their sales can bear the payment
of that interest, and at that rate of exchange? Have they once
considered the dilemma in which they are placed,--the ruin of their
credit in the East Indies, if they refuse the bills,--the ruin of their
credit and existence in England, if they accept them?
Indeed, no trace of equitable government is found in their politics, not
one trace of commercial principle in their mercantile dealing: and hence
is the deepest and maturest wisdom of Parliament demanded, and the best
resources of this kingdom must be strained, to restore them,--that is,
to restore the countries destroyed by the misconduct of the Company, and
to restore the Company itself, ruined by the consequences of their plans
for destroying what they were bound to preserve.
I required, if you remember, at my outset, a proof that these abuses
were habitual. But surely this is not necessary for me to consider as a
separate head; because I trust I have made it evident beyond a doubt, in
considering the abuses themselves, that they are regular, permanent, and
systematical.
I am now come to my last condition, without which, for one, I will never
readily lend my hand to the destruction of any established government,
which is,--that, in its present state, the government of the East India
Company is absolutely incorrigible.
Of this great truth I think there can be little doubt, after all that
has appeared in this House. It is so very clear, that I must consider
the leaving any power in their hands, and the determined resolution to
continue and countenance every mode and every degree of peculation,
oppression, and tyranny, to be one and the same thing. I look upon that
body incorrigible, from the fullest consideration both of their uniform
conduct and their present real and virtual constitution.
If they had not constantly been apprised of all the enormities committed
in India under their authority, if this state of things had been as much
a discovery to them as it was to many of us, we might flatter ourselves
that the detection of the abuses would lead to their reformation. I will
go further. If the Court of Directors had not uniformly condemned every
act which this House or any of its committees had condemned, if the
language in which they expressed their disapprobation against enormities
and their authors had not been much more vehement and indignant than any
ever used in this House, I should entertain some hopes. If they had not,
on the other hand, as uniformly commended all their servants who had
done their duty and obeyed their orders as they had heavily censured
those who rebelled, I might say, These people have been in an error, and
when they are sensible of it they will mend. But when I reflect on the
uniformity of their support to the objects of their uniform censure, and
the state of insignificance and disgrace to which all of those have been
reduced whom they approved, and that even utter ruin and premature death
have been among the fruits of their favor, I must be convinced, that in
this case, as in all others, hypocrisy is the only vice that never can
be cured.
Attend, I pray you, to the situation and prosperity of Benfield,
Hastings, and others of that sort. The last of these has been treated by
the Company with an asperity of reprehension that has no parallel. They
lament "that the power of disposing of their property for perpetuity
should fall into such hands." Yet for fourteen years, with little
interruption, he has governed all their affairs, of every description,
with an absolute sway. He has had himself the means of heaping up
immense wealth; and during that whole period, the fortunes of hundreds
have depended on his smiles and frowns. He himself tells you he is
incumbered with two hundred and fifty young gentlemen, some of them of
the best families in England, all of whom aim at returning with vast
fortunes to Europe in the prime of life. He has, then, two hundred and
fifty of your children as his hostages for your good behavior; and
loaded for years, as he has been, with the execrations of the natives,
with the censures of the Court of Directors, and struck and blasted with
resolutions of this House, he still maintains the most despotic power
ever known in India. He domineers with an overbearing sway in the
assemblies of his pretended masters; and it is thought in a degree rash
to venture to name his offences in this House, even as grounds of a
legislative remedy.
On the other hand, consider the fate of those who have met with the
applauses of the Directors. Colonel Monson, one of the best of men, had
his days shortened by the applauses, destitute of the support, of the
Company. General Clavering, whose panegyric was made in every dispatch
from England, whose hearse was bedewed with the tears and hung round
with the eulogies of the Court of Directors, burst an honest and
indignant heart at the treachery of those who ruined him by their
praises. Uncommon patience and temper supported Mr. Francis a while
longer under the baneful influence of the commendation of the Court of
Directors. His health, however, gave way at length; and in utter
despair, he returned to Europe. At his return, the doors of the India
House were shut to this man who had been the object of their constant
admiration. He has, indeed, escaped with life; but he has forfeited all
expectation of credit, consequence, party, and following. He may well
say, "_Me nemo ministro fur erit, atque ideo nulli comes exeo_." This
man, whose deep reach of thought, whose large legislative conceptions,
and whose grand plans of policy make the most shining part of our
Reports, from whence we have all learned our lessons, if we have learned
any good ones,--this man, from whose materials those gentlemen who have
least acknowledged it have yet spoken as from a brief,--this man, driven
from his employment, discountenanced by the Directors, has had no other
reward, and no other distinction, but that inward "sunshine of the soul"
which a good conscience can always bestow upon itself. He has not yet
had so much as a good word, but from a person too insignificant to make
any other return for the means with which he has been furnished for
performing his share of a duty which is equally urgent on us all.
Add to this, that, from the highest in place to the lowest, every
British subject, who, in obedience to the Company's orders, has been
active in the discovery of peculations, has been ruined. They have been
driven from India. When they made their appeal at home, they were not
heard; when they attempted to return, they were stopped. No artifice of
fraud, no violence of power, has been omitted to destroy them in
character as well as in fortune.
Worse, far worse, has been the fate of the poor creatures, the natives
of India, whom the hypocrisy of the Company has betrayed into complaint
of oppression and discovery of peculation. The first women in Bengal,
the Ranny of Rajeshahi, the Ranny of Burdwan, the Ranny of Ambooah, by
their weak and thoughtless trust in the Company's honor and protection,
are utterly ruined: the first of these women, a person of princely rank,
and once of correspondent fortune, who paid above two hundred thousand a
year quit-rent to the state, is, according to very credible information,
so completely beggared as to stand in need of the relief of alms.
Mahomed Reza Khân, the second Mussulman in Bengal, for having been
distinguished by the ill-omened honor of the countenance and protection
of the Court of Directors, was, without the pretence of any inquiry
whatsoever into his conduct, stripped of all his employments, and
reduced to the lowest condition. His ancient rival for power, the Rajah
Nundcomar, was, by an insult on everything which India holds respectable
and sacred, hanged in the face of all his nation by the judges you sent
to protect that people: hanged for a pretended crime, upon an _ex post
facto_ British act of Parliament, in the midst of his evidence against
Mr. Hastings. The accuser they saw hanged. The culprit, without
acquittal or inquiry, triumphs on the ground of that murder: a murder,
not of Nundcomar only, but of all living testimony, and even of evidence
yet unborn. From that time not a complaint has been heard from the
natives against their governors. All the grievances of India have found
a complete remedy.
Men will not look to acts of Parliament, to regulations, to
declarations, to votes, and resolutions. No, they are not such fools.
They will ask, What is the road to power, credit, wealth, and honors?
They will ask, What conduct ends in neglect, disgrace, poverty, exile,
prison, and gibbet? These will teach them the course which they are to
follow. It is your distribution of these that will give the character
and tone to your government. All the rest is miserable grimace.
When I accuse the Court of Directors of this habitual treachery in the
use of reward and punishment, I do not mean to include all the
individuals in that court. There have been, Sir, very frequently men of
the greatest integrity and virtue amongst them; and the contrariety in
the declarations and conduct of that court has arisen, I take it, from
this,--that the honest Directors have, by the force of matter of fact on
the records, carried the reprobation of the evil measures of the
servants in India. This could not be prevented, whilst these records
stared them in the face; nor were the delinquents, either here or there,
very solicitous about their reputation, as long as they were able to
secure their power. The agreement of their partisans to censure them
blunted for a while the edge of a severe proceeding. It obtained for
them a character of impartiality, which enabled them to recommend with
some sort of grace, what will always carry a plausible appearance, those
treacherous expedients called moderate measures. Whilst these were under
discussion, new matter of complaint came over, which seemed to antiquate
the first. The same circle was here trod round once more; and thus
through years they proceeded in a compromise of censure for punishment,
until, by shame and despair, one after another, almost every man who
preferred his duty to the Company to the interest of their servants has
been driven from that court.
This, Sir, has been their conduct: and it has been the result of the
alteration which was insensibly made in their constitution. The change
was made insensibly; but it is now strong and adult, and as public and
declared as it is fixed beyond all power of reformation: so that there
is none who hears me that is not as certain as I am, that the Company,
in the sense in which it was formerly understood, has no existence.
The question is not, what injury you may do to the proprietors of India
stock; for there are no such men to be injured. If the active, ruling
part of the Company, who form the General Court, who fill the offices
and direct the measures, (the rest tell for nothing,) were persons who
held their stock as a means of their subsistence, who in the part they
took were only concerned in the government of India for the rise or fall
of their dividend, it would be indeed a defective plan of policy. The
interest of the people who are governed by them would not be their
primary object,--perhaps a very small part of their consideration at
all. But then they might well be depended on, and perhaps more than
persons in other respects preferable, for preventing the peculations of
their servants to their own prejudice. Such a body would not easily have
left their trade as a spoil to the avarice of those who received their
wages. But now things are totally reversed. The stock is of no value,
whether it be the qualification of a Director or Proprietor; and it is
impossible that it should. A Director's qualification may be worth about
two thousand five hundred pounds,--and the interest, at eight per cent,
is about one hundred and sixty pounds a year. Of what value is that,
whether it rise to ten, or fall to six, or to nothing; to him whose son,
before he is in Bengal two months, and before he descends the stops of
the Council-Chamber, sells the grant of a single contract for forty
thousand pounds? Accordingly, the stock is bought up in qualifications.
The vote is not to protect the stock, but the stock is bought to acquire
the vote; and the end of the vote is to cover and support, against
justice, some man of power who has made an obnoxious fortune in India,
or to maintain in power those who are actually employing it in the
acquisition of such a fortune,--and to avail themselves, in return, of
his patronage, that he may shower the spoils of the East, "barbaric
pearl and gold," on them, their families, and dependants. So that all
the relations of the Company are not only changed, but inverted. The
servants in India are not appointed by the Directors, but the Directors
are chosen by them. The trade is carried on with their capitals. To them
the revenues of the country are mortgaged. The seat of the supreme power
is in Calcutta. The house in Leadenhall Street is nothing more than a
'change for their agents, factors, and deputies to meet in, to take care
of their affairs and support their interests,--and this so avowedly,
that we see the known agents of the delinquent servants marshalling and
disciplining their forces, and the prime spokesmen in all their
assemblies.
Everything has followed in this order, and according to the natural
train of events. I will close what I have to say on the incorrigible
condition of the Company, by stating to you a few facts that will leave
no doubt of the obstinacy of that corporation, and of their strength
too, in resisting the reformation of their servants. By these facts you
will be enabled to discover the sole grounds upon which they are
tenacious of their charter.
It is now more than two years, that upon account of the gross abuses and
ruinous situation of the Company's affairs, (which occasioned the cry of
the whole world long before it was taken up here,) that we instituted
two committees to inquire into the mismanagements by which the Company's
affairs had been brought to the brink of ruin. These inquiries had been
pursued with unremitting diligence, and a great body of facts was
collected and printed for general information. In the result of those
inquiries, although the committees consisted of very different
descriptions, they were unanimous. They joined in censuring the conduct
of the Indian administration, and enforcing the responsibility upon two
men, whom this House, in consequence of these reports, declared it to be
the duty of the Directors to remove from their stations, and recall to
Great Britain,--"_because they had acted in a manner repugnant to the
honor and policy of this nation, and thereby brought great calamities on
India and enormous expenses on the East India Company_."
Here was no attempt on the charter. Here was no question of their
privileges. To vindicate their own honor, to support their own
interests, to enforce obedience to their own orders,--these were the
sole object of the monitory resolution of this House. But as soon as the
General Court could assemble, they assembled to demonstrate who they
really were. Regardless of the proceedings of this House, they ordered
the Directors not to carry into effect any resolution they might come to
for the removal of Mr. Hastings and Mr. Hornby. The Directors, still
retaining some shadow of respect to this House, instituted an inquiry
themselves, which continued from June to October, and, after an
attentive perusal and full consideration of papers, resolved to take
steps for removing the persons who had been the objects of our
resolution, but not without a violent struggle against evidence. Seven
Directors went so far as to enter a protest against the vote of their
court. Upon this the General Court takes the alarm: it reassembles; it
orders the Directors to rescind their resolution, that is, not to recall
Mr. Hastings and Mr. Hornby, and to despise the resolution of the House
of Commons. Without so much as the pretence of looking into a single
paper, without the formality of instituting any committee of inquiry,
they superseded all the labors of their own Directors and of this House.
It will naturally occur to ask, how it was possible that they should not
attempt some sort of examination into facts, as a color for their
resistance to a public authority proceeding so very deliberately, and
exerted, apparently at least, in favor of their own. The answer, and the
only answer which can be given, is, that they were afraid that their
true relation should be mistaken. They were afraid that their patrons
and masters in India should attribute their support of them to an
opinion of their cause, and not to an attachment to their power. They
were afraid it should be suspected that they did not mean blindly to
support them in the use they made of that power. They determined to show
that they at least were set against reformation: that they were firmly
resolved to bring the territories, the trade, and the stock of the
Company to ruin, rather than be wanting in fidelity to their nominal
servants and real masters, in the ways they took to their private
fortunes.
Even since the beginning of this session, the same act of audacity was
repeated, with the same circumstances of contempt of all the decorum of
inquiry on their part, and of all the proceedings of this House. They
again made it a request to their favorite, and your culprit, to keep his
post,--and thanked and applauded him, without calling for a paper which
could afford light into the merit or demerit of the transaction, and
without giving themselves a moment's time to consider, or even to
understand, the articles of the Mahratta peace. The fact is, that for a
long time there was a struggle, a faint one indeed, between the Company
and their servants. But it is a struggle no longer. For some time the
superiority has been decided. The interests abroad are become the
settled preponderating weight both in the Court of Proprietors and the
Court of Directors. Even the attempt you have made to inquire into their
practices and to reform abuses has raised and piqued them to a far more
regular and steady support. The Company has made a common cause and
identified themselves with the destroyers of India. They have taken on
themselves all that mass of enormity; they are supporting what you have
reprobated; those you condemn they applaud, those you order home to
answer for their conduct they request to stay, and thereby encourage to
proceed in their practices. Thus the servants of the East India Company
triumph, and the representatives of the people of Great Britain are
defeated.
I therefore conclude, what you all conclude, that this body, being
totally perverted from the purposes of its institution, is utterly
incorrigible; and because they are incorrigible, both in conduct and
constitution, power ought to be taken out of their hands,--just on the
same principles on which have been made all the just changes and
revolutions of government that have taken place since the beginning of
the world.
I will now say a few words to the general principle of the plan which is
set up against that of my right honorable friend. It is to recommit the
government of India to the Court of Directors. Those who would commit
the reformation of India to the destroyers of it are the enemies to
that reformation. They would make a distinction between Directors and
Proprietors, which, in the present state of things, does not, cannot
exist. But a right honorable gentleman says, he would keep the present
government of India in the Court of Directors, and would, to curb them,
provide salutary regulations. Wonderful! That is, he would appoint the
old offenders to correct the old offences; and he would render the
vicious and the foolish wise and virtuous by salutary regulations. He
would appoint the wolf as guardian of the sheep; but he has invented a
curious muzzle, by which this protecting wolf shall not be able to open
his jaws above an inch or two at the utmost. Thus his work is finished.
But I tell the right honorable gentleman, that controlled depravity is
not innocence, and that it is not the labor of delinquency in chains
that will correct abuses. Will these gentlemen of the direction
animadvert on the partners of their own guilt? Never did a serious plan
of amending of any old tyrannical establishment propose the authors and
abettors of the abuses as the reformers of them. If the undone people of
India see their old oppressors in confirmed power, even by the
reformation, they will expect nothing but what they will certainly
feel,--continuance, or rather an aggravation, of all their former
sufferings. They look to the seat of power, and to the persons who fill
it; and they despise those gentlemen's regulations as much as the
gentlemen do who talk of them.
But there is a cure for everything. Take away, say they, the Court of
Proprietors, and the Court of Directors will do their duty. Yes,--as
they have done it hitherto. That the evils in India have solely arisen
from the Court of Proprietors is grossly false. In many of them the
Directors were heartily concurring; in most of them they were
encouraging, and sometimes commanding; in all they were conniving.
But who are to choose this well-regulated and reforming Court of
Directors?--Why, the very Proprietors who are excluded from all
management, for the abuse of their power. They will choose, undoubtedly,
out of themselves, men like themselves; and those who are most forward
in resisting your authority, those who are most engaged in faction or
interest with the delinquents abroad, will be the objects of their
selection. But gentlemen say, that, when this choice is made, the
Proprietors are not to interfere in the measures of the Directors,
whilst those Directors are busy in the control of their common patrons
and masters in India. No, indeed, I believe they will not desire to
interfere. They will choose those whom they know may be trusted, safely
trusted, to act in strict conformity to their common principles,
manners, measures, interests, and connections. They will want neither
monitor nor control. It is not easy to choose men to act in conformity
to a public interest against their private; but a sure dependence may be
had on those who are chosen to forward their private interest at the
expense of the public. But if the Directors should slip, and deviate
into rectitude, the punishment is in the hands of the General Court, and
it will surely be remembered to them at their next election.
If the government of India wants no reformation, but gentlemen are
amusing themselves with a theory, conceiving a more democratic or
aristocratic mode of government for these dependencies, or if they are
in a dispute only about patronage, the dispute is with me of so little
concern that I should not take the pains to utter an affirmative or
negative to any proposition in it. If it be only for a theoretical
amusement that they are to propose a bill, the thing is at best
frivolous and unnecessary. But if the Company's government is not only
full of abuse, but is one of the most corrupt and destructive tyrannies
that probably ever existed in the world, (as I am sure it is,) what a
cruel mockery would it be in me, and in those who think like me, to
propose this kind of remedy for this kind of evil!
I now come to the third objection,--that this bill will increase the
influence of the crown. An honorable gentleman has demanded of me,
whether I was in earnest when I proposed to this House a plan for the
reduction of that influence. Indeed, Sir, I was much, very much, in
earnest my heart was deeply concerned in it; and I hope the public has
not lost the effect of it. How far my judgment was right, for what
concerned personal favor and consequence to myself, I shall not presume
to determine; nor is its effect upon _me_, of any moment. But as to this
bill, whether it increases the influence of the crown, or not, is a
question I should be ashamed to ask. If I am not able to correct a
system of oppression and tyranny, that goes to the utter ruin of thirty
millions of my fellow-creatures and fellow-subjects, but by some
increase to the influence of the crown, I am ready here to declare that
I, who have been active to reduce it, shall be at least as active and
strenuous to restore it again. I am no lover of names; I contend for the
substance of good and protecting government, let it come from what
quarter it will.
But I am not obliged to have recourse to this expedient. Much, very
much, the contrary. I am sure that the influence of the crown will by no
means aid a reformation of this kind, which can neither be originated
nor supported but by the uncorrupt public virtue of the representatives
of the people of England. Let it once get into the ordinary course of
administration, and to me all hopes of reformation are gone. I am far
from knowing or believing that this bill will increase the influence of
the crown. We all know that the crown has ever had some influence in the
Court of Directors, and that it has been extremely increased by the acts
of 1773 and 1780. The gentlemen who, as part of their reformation,
propose "a more active control on the part of the crown," which is to
put the Directors under a Secretary of State specially named for that
purpose, must know that their project will increase it further. But that
old influence has had, and the new will have, incurable inconveniences,
which cannot happen under the Parliamentary establishment proposed in
this bill. An honorable gentleman,[58] not now in his place, but who is
well acquainted with the India Company, and by no means a friend to this
bill, has told you that a ministerial influence has always been
predominant in that body,--and that to make the Directors pliant to
their purposes, ministers generally caused persons meanly qualified to
be chosen Directors. According to his idea, to secure subserviency, they
submitted the Company's affairs to the direction of incapacity. This was
to ruin the Company in order to govern it. This was certainly influence
in the very worst form in which it could appear. At best it was
clandestine and irresponsible. Whether this was done so much upon system
as that gentleman supposes, I greatly doubt. But such in effect the
operation of government on that court unquestionably was; and such,
under a similar constitution, it will be forever. Ministers must be
wholly removed from the management of the affairs of India, or they will
have an influence in its patronage. The thing is inevitable. Their
scheme of a new Secretary of State, "with a more vigorous control," is
not much better than a repetition of the measure which we know by
experience will not do. Since the year 1773 and the year 1780, the
Company has been under the control of the Secretary of State's office,
and we had then three Secretaries of State. If more than this is done,
then they annihilate the direction which they pretend to support; and
they augment the influence of the crown, of whose growth they affect so
great an horror. But in truth this scheme of reconciling a direction
really and truly deliberative with an office really and substantially
controlling is a sort of machinery that can be kept in order but a very
short time. Either the Directors will dwindle into clerks, or the
Secretary of State, as hitherto has been the course, will leave
everything to them, often through design, often through neglect. If both
should affect activity, collision, procrastination, delay, and, in the
end, utter confusion, must ensue.
But, Sir, there is one kind of influence far greater than that of the
nomination to office. This gentlemen in opposition have totally
overlooked, although it now exists in its full vigor; and it will do so,
upon their scheme, in at least as much force as it does now. That
influence this bill cuts up by the roots. I mean the _influence of
protection_. I shall explain myself.--The office given to a young man
going to India is of trifling consequence. But he that goes out an
insignificant boy in a few years returns a great nabob. Mr. Hastings
says he has two hundred and fifty of that kind of raw materials, who
expect to be speedily manufactured into the merchantable quality I
mention. One of these gentlemen, suppose, returns hither laden with
odium and with riches. When he comes to England, he comes as to a
prison, or as to a sanctuary; and either is ready for him, according to
his demeanor. What is the influence in the grant of any place in India,
to that which is acquired by the protection or compromise with such
guilt, and with the command of such riches, under the dominion of the
hopes and fears which power is able to hold out to every man in that
condition? That man's whole fortune, half a million perhaps, becomes an
instrument of influence, without a shilling of charge to the civil list:
and the influx of fortunes which stand in need of this protection is
continual. It works both ways: it influences the delinquent, and it may
corrupt the minister. Compare the influence acquired by appointing, for
instance, even a Governor-General, and that obtained by protecting him.
I shall push this no further. But I wish gentlemen to roll it a little
in their own minds.
The bill before you cuts off this source of influence. Its design and
main scope is, to regulate the administration of India upon the
principles of a court of judicature,--and to exclude, as far as human
prudence can exclude, all possibility of a corrupt partiality, in
appointing to office, or supporting in office, or covering from inquiry
and punishment, any person who has abused or shall abuse his authority.
At the board, as appointed and regulated by this bill, reward and
punishment cannot be shifted and reversed by a whisper. That commission
becomes fatal to cabal, to intrigue, and to secret representation, those
instruments of the ruin of India. He that cuts off the means of
premature fortune, and the power of protecting it when acquired, strikes
a deadly blow at the great fund, the bank, the capital stock of Indian
influence, which cannot be vested anywhere, or in any hands, without
most dangerous consequences to the public.
The third and contradictory objection is, that this bill does not
increase the influence of the crown; on the contrary, that the just
power of the crown will be lessened, and transferred to the use of a
party, by giving the patronage of India to a commission nominated by
Parliament and independent of the crown. The contradiction is glaring,
and it has been too well exposed to make it necessary for me to insist
upon it. But passing the contradiction, and taking it without any
relation, of all objections that is the most extraordinary. Do not
gentlemen know that the crown has not at present the grant of a single
office under the Company, civil or military, at home or abroad? So far
as the crown is concerned, it is certainly rather a gainer; for the
vacant offices in the new commission are to be filled up by the king.
It is argued, as a part of the bill derogatory to the prerogatives of
the crown, that the commissioners named in the bill are to continue for
a short term of years, too short in my opinion,--and because, during
that time, they are not at the mercy of every predominant faction of the
court. Does not this objection lie against the present Directors,--none
of whom are named by the crown, and a proportion of whom hold for this
very term of four years? Did it not lie against the Governor-General and
Council named in the act of 1773,--who were invested by name, as the
present commissioners are to be appointed in the body of the act of
Parliament, who were to hold their places for a term of years, and were
not removable at the discretion of the crown? Did it not lie against the
reappointment, in the year 1780, upon the very same terms? Yet at none
of these times, whatever other objections the scheme might be liable to,
was it supposed to be a derogation to the just prerogative of the crown,
that a commission created by act of Parliament should have its members
named by the authority which called it into existence. This is not the
disposal by Parliament of any office derived from the authority of the
crown, or now disposable by that authority. It is so far from being
anything new, violent, or alarming, that I do not recollect, in any
Parliamentary commission, down to the commissioners of the land-tax,
that it has ever been otherwise.
The objection of the tenure for four years is an objection to all places
that are not held during pleasure; but in that objection I pronounce the
gentlemen, from my knowledge of their complexion and of their
principles, to be perfectly in earnest. The party (say these gentlemen)
of the minister who proposes this scheme will be rendered powerful by
it; for he will name his party friends to the commission. This objection
against party is a party objection; and in this, too, these gentlemen
are perfectly serious. They see, that, if, by any intrigue, they should
succeed to office, they will lose the _clandestine_ patronage, the true
instrument of clandestine influence, enjoyed in the name of subservient
Directors, and of wealthy, trembling Indian delinquents. But as often as
they are beaten off this ground, they return to it again. The minister
will name his friends, and persons of his own party. Whom should he
name? Should he name his adversaries? Should he name those whom he
cannot trust? Should he name those to execute his plans who are the
declared enemies to the principles of his reform? His character is here
at stake. If he proposes for his own ends (but he never will propose)
such names as, from their want of rank, fortune, character, ability, or
knowledge, are likely to betray or to fall short of their trust, he is
in an independent House of Commons,--in an House of Commons which has,
by its own virtue, destroyed the instruments of Parliamentary
subservience. This House of Commons would not endure the sound of such
names. He would perish by the means which he is supposed to pursue for
the security of his power. The first pledge he must give of his
sincerity in this great reform will be in the confidence which ought to
be reposed in those names.
For my part, Sir, in this business I put all indirect considerations
wholly out of my mind. My sole question, on each clause of the bill,
amounts to this:--Is the measure proposed required by the necessities of
India? I cannot consent totally to lose sight of the real wants of the
people who are the objects of it, and to hunt after every matter of
party squabble that may be started on the several provisions. On the
question of the duration of the commission I am clear and decided. Can
I, can any one who has taken the smallest trouble to be informed
concerning the affairs of India, amuse himself with so strange an
imagination as that the habitual despotism and oppression, that the
monopolies, the peculations, the universal destruction of all the legal
authority of this kingdom, which have been for twenty years maturing to
their present enormity, combined with the distance of the scene, the
boldness and artifice of delinquents, their combination, their excessive
wealth, and the faction they have made in England, can be fully
corrected in a shorter term than four years? None has hazarded such an
assertion; none who has a regard for his reputation will hazard it.
Sir, the gentlemen, whoever they are, who shall be appointed to this
commission, have an undertaking of magnitude on their hands, and their
stability must not only be, but it must be thought, real; and who is it
will believe that anything short of an establishment made, supported,
and fixed in its duration, with all the authority of Parliament, can be
thought secure of a reasonable stability? The plan of my honorable
friend is the reverse of that of reforming by the authors of the abuse.
The best we could expect from them is, that they should not continue
their ancient, pernicious activity. To those we could think of nothing
but applying _control_; as we are sure that even a regard to their
reputation (if any such thing exists in them) would oblige them to
cover, to conceal, to suppress, and consequently to prevent all cure of
the grievances of India. For what can be discovered which is not to
their disgrace? Every attempt to correct an abuse would be a satire on
their former administration. Every man they should pretend to call to
an account would be found their instrument, or their accomplice. They
can never see a beneficial regulation, but with a view to defeat it. The
shorter the tenure of such persons, the better would be the chance of
some amendment.
But the system of the bill is different. It calls in persons in no wise
concerned with any act censured by Parliament,--persons generated with,
and for, the reform, of which they are themselves the most essential
part. To these the chief regulations in the bill are helps, not fetters:
they are authorities to support, not regulations to restrain them. From
these we look for much more than innocence. From these we expect zeal,
firmness, and unremitted activity. Their duty, their character, binds
them to proceedings of vigor; and they ought to have a tenure in their
office which precludes all fear, whilst they are acting up to the
purposes of their trust,--a tenure without which none will undertake
plans that require a series and system of acts. When they know that they
cannot be whispered out of their duty, that their public conduct cannot
be censured without a public discussion, that the schemes which they
have begun will not be committed to those who will have an interest and
credit in defeating and disgracing them, then we may entertain hopes.
The tenure is for four years, or during their good behavior. That good
behavior is as long as they are true to the principles of the bill; and
the judgment is in either House of Parliament. This is the tenure of
your judges; and the valuable principle of the bill is to make a
judicial administration for India. It is to give confidence in the
execution of a duty which requires as much perseverance and fortitude
as can fall to the lot of any that is born of woman.
As to the gain by party from the right honorable gentleman's bill, let
it be shown that this supposed party advantage is pernicious to its
object, and the objection is of weight; but until this is done, (and
this has not been attempted,) I shall consider the sole objection from
its tendency to promote the interest of a party as altogether
contemptible. The kingdom is divided into parties, and it ever has been
so divided, and it ever will be so divided; and if no system for
relieving the subjects of this kingdom from oppression, and snatching
its affairs from ruin, can be adopted, until it is demonstrated that no
party can derive an advantage from it, no good can ever be done in this
country. If party is to derive an advantage from the reform of India,
(which is more than I know or believe,) it ought to be that party which
alone in this kingdom has its reputation, nay, its very being, pledged
to the protection and preservation of that part of the empire. Great
fear is expressed that the commissioners named in this bill will show
some regard to a minister out of place. To men made like the objectors
this must appear criminal. Let it, however, be remembered by others,
that, if the commissioners should be his friends, they cannot be his
slaves. But dependants are not in a condition to adhere to friends, nor
to principles, nor to any uniform line of conduct. They may begin
censors, and be obliged to end accomplices. They may be even put under
the direction of those whom they were appointed to punish.
The fourth and last objection is, that the bill will hurt public credit.
I do not know whether this requires an answer. But if it does, look to
your foundations. The sinking fund is the pillar of credit in this
country; and let it not be forgot, that the distresses, owing to the
mismanagement, of the East India Company, have already taken a million
from that fund by the non-payment of duties. The bills drawn upon the
Company, which are about four millions, cannot be accepted without the
consent of the Treasury. The Treasury, acting under a Parliamentary
trust and authority, pledges the public for these millions. If they
pledge the public, the public must have a security in its hands for the
management of this interest, or the national credit is gone. For
otherwise it is not only the East India Company, which is a great
interest, that is undone, but, clinging to the security of all your
funds, it drags down the rest, and the whole fabric perishes in one
ruin. If this bill does not provide a direction of integrity and of
ability competent to that trust, the objection is fatal; if it does,
public credit must depend on the support of the bill.
It has been said, If you violate this charter, what security has the
charter of the Bank, in which public credit is so deeply concerned, and
even the charter of London, in which the rights of so many subjects are
involved? I answer, In the like case they have no security at all,--no,
no security at all. If the Bank should, by every species of
mismanagement, fall into a state similar to that of the East India
Company,--if it should be oppressed with demands it could not answer,
engagements which it could not perform, and with bills for which it
could not procure payment,--no charter should protect the mismanagement
from correction, and such public grievances from redress. If the city
of London had the means and will of destroying an empire, and of cruelly
oppressing and tyrannizing over millions of men as good as themselves,
the charter of the city of London should prove no sanction to such
tyranny and such oppression. Charters are kept, when their purposes are
maintained: they are violated, when the privilege is supported against
its end and its object.
Now, Sir, I have finished all I proposed to say, as my reasons for
giving my vote to this bill. If I am wrong, it is not for want of pains
to know what is right. This pledge, at least, of my rectitude I have
given to my country.
And now, having done my duty to the bill, let me say a word to the
author. I should leave him to his own noble sentiments, if the unworthy
and illiberal language with which he has been treated, beyond all
example of Parliamentary liberty, did not make a few words
necessary,--not so much in justice to him as to my own feelings. I must
say, then, that it will be a distinction honorable to the age, that the
rescue of the greatest number of the human race that ever were so
grievously oppressed from the greatest tyranny that was ever exercised
has fallen to the lot of abilities and dispositions equal to the
task,--that it has fallen to one who has the enlargement to comprehend,
the spirit to undertake, and the eloquence to support so great a measure
of hazardous benevolence. His spirit is not owing to his ignorance of
the state of men and things: he well knows what snares are spread about
his path, from personal animosity, from court intrigues, and possibly
from popular delusion. But he has put to hazard his ease, his security,
his interest, his power, even his darling popularity, for the benefit
of a people whom he has never seen. This is the road that all heroes
have trod before him. He is traduced and abused for his supposed
motives. He will remember that obloquy is a necessary ingredient in the
composition of all true glory: he will remember that it was not only in
the Roman customs, but it is in the nature and constitution of things,
that calumny and abuse are essential parts of triumph. These thoughts
will support a mind which only exists for honor under the burden of
temporary reproach. He is doing, indeed, a great good,--such as rarely
falls to the lot, and almost as rarely coincides with the desires, of
any man. Let him use his time. Let him give the whole length of the
reins to his benevolence. He is now on a great eminence, where the eyes
of mankind are turned to him. He may live long, he may do much; but here
is the summit: he never can exceed what he does this day.
He has faults; but they are faults that, though they may in a small
degree tarnish the lustre and sometimes impede the march of his
abilities, have nothing in them to extinguish the fire of great virtues.
In those faults there is no mixture of deceit, of hypocrisy, of pride,
of ferocity, of complexional despotism, or want of feeling for the
distresses of mankind. His are faults which might exist in a descendant
of Henry the Fourth of France, as they did exist in that father of his
country. Henry the Fourth wished that he might live to see a fowl in the
pot of every peasant in his kingdom. That sentiment of homely
benevolence was worth all the splendid sayings that are recorded of
kings. But he wished perhaps for more than could be obtained, and the
goodness of the man exceeded the power of the king. But this gentleman,
a subject, may this day say this at least with truth,--that he secures
the rice in his pot to every man in India. A poet of antiquity thought
it one of the first distinctions to a prince whom he meant to celebrate,
that through a long succession of generations he had been the progenitor
of an able and virtuous citizen who by force of the arts of peace had
corrected governments of oppression and suppressed wars of rapine.
Indole proh quanta juvenis, quantumque daturus
Ausoniæ populis ventura in sæcula civem!
Ille super Gangem, super exauditus et Indos,
Implebit terras voce, et furialia bella
Fulmine compescet linguæ.--
This was what was said of the predecessor of the only person to whose
eloquence it does not wrong that of the mover of this bill to be
compared. But the Ganges and the Indus are the patrimony of the fame of
my honorable friend, and not of Cicero. I confess I anticipate with joy
the reward of those whose whole consequence, power, and authority exist
only for the benefit of mankind; and I carry my mind to all the people,
and all the names and descriptions, that, relieved by this bill, will
bless the labors of this Parliament, and the confidence which the best
House of Commons has given to him who the best deserves it. The little
cavils of party will not be heard where freedom and happiness will be
felt. There is not a tongue, a nation, or religion in India, which will
not bless the presiding care and manly beneficence of this House, and of
him who proposes to you this great work. Your names will never be
separated before the throne of the Divine Goodness, in whatever
language, or with whatever rites, pardon is asked for sin, and reward
for those who imitate the Godhead in His universal bounty to His
creatures. These honors you deserve, and they will surely be paid, when
all the jargon of influence and party and patronage are swept into
oblivion.
I have spoken what I think, and what I feel, of the mover of this bill.
An honorable friend of mine, speaking of his merits, was charged with
having made a studied panegyric. I don't know what his was. Mine, I am
sure, is a studied panegyric,--the fruit of much meditation, the result
of the observation of near twenty years. For my own part, I am happy
that I have lived to see this day; I feel myself overpaid for the labors
of eighteen years, when, at this late period, I am able to take my
share, by one humble vote, in destroying a tyranny that exists to the
disgrace of this nation and the destruction of so large a part of the
human species.
FOOTNOTES:
[52] An allusion made by Mr. Powis.
[53] Mr. Pitt.
[54] Mr. Pitt.
[55] Mr. Dundas, Lord Advocate of Scotland.
[56] The paltry foundation at Calcutta is scarcely worth naming as an
exception.
[57] Mr. Fox.
[58] Governor Johnstone.
A
REPRESENTATION TO HIS MAJESTY,
MOVED IN
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
BY THE RIGHT HON. EDMUND BURKE, AND SECONDED BY WILLIAM WINDHAM, ESQ.,
ON MONDAY, JUNE 14, 1784,
AND NEGATIVED.
WITH A PREFACE AND NOTES.
PREFACE.
The representation now given to the public relates to some of the most
essential privileges of the House of Commons. It would appear of little
importance, if it were to be judged by its reception in the place where
it was proposed. There it was rejected without debate. The subject
matter may, perhaps, hereafter appear to merit a more serious
consideration. Thinking men will scarcely regard the _penal_ dissolution
of a Parliament as a very trifling concern. Such a dissolution must
operate forcibly as an example; and it much imports the people of this
kingdom to consider what lesson that example is to teach.
The late House of Commons was not accused of an interested compliance to
the will of a court. The charge against them was of a different nature.
They were charged with being actuated by an extravagant spirit of
independency. This species of offence is so closely connected with
merit, this vice bears so near a resemblance to virtue, that the flight
of a House of Commons above the exact temperate medium of independence
ought to be correctly ascertained, lest we give encouragement to
dispositions of a less generous nature, and less safe for the people; we
ought to call for very solid and convincing proofs of the existence, and
of the magnitude, too, of the evils which are charged to an independent
spirit, before we give sanction to any measure, that, by checking a
spirit so easily damped, and so hard to be excited, may affect the
liberty of a part of our Constitution, which, if not free, is worse than
useless.
The Editor does not deny that by possibility such an abuse may exist:
but, _primâ fronte_, there is no reason to presume it. The House of
Commons is not, by its complexion, peculiarly subject to the distempers
of an independent habit. Very little compulsion is necessary, on the
part of the people, to render it abundantly complaisant to ministers and
favorites of all descriptions. It required a great length of time, very
considerable industry and perseverance, no vulgar policy, the union of
many men and many tempers, and the concurrence of events which do not
happen every day, to build up an independent House of Commons. Its
demolition was accomplished in a moment; and it was the work of ordinary
hands. But to construct is a matter of skill; to demolish, force and
fury are sufficient.
The late House of Commons has been punished for its independence. That
example is made. Have we an example on record of a House of Commons
punished for its servility? The rewards of a senate so disposed are
manifest to the world. Several gentlemen are very desirous of altering
the constitution of the House of Commons; but they must alter the frame
and constitution of human nature itself, before they can so fashion it,
by any mode of election, that its conduct will not be influenced by
reward and punishment, by fame and by disgrace. If these examples take
root in the minds of men, what members hereafter will be bold enough
not to be corrupt, especially as the king's highway of obsequiousness is
so very broad and easy? To make a passive member of Parliament, no
dignity of mind, no principles of honor, no resolution, no ability, no
industry, no learning, no experience, are in the least degree necessary.
To defend a post of importance against a powerful enemy requires an
Eliot; a drunken invalid is qualified to hoist a white flag, or to
deliver up the keys of the fortress on his knees.
The gentlemen chosen into this Parliament, for the purpose of this
surrender, were bred to better things, and are no doubt qualified for
other service. But for this strenuous exertion of inactivity, for the
vigorous task of submission and passive obedience, all their learning
and ability are rather a matter of personal ornament to themselves than
of the least use in the performance of their duty.
The present surrender, therefore, of rights and privileges without
examination, and the resolution to support any minister given by the
secret advisers of the crown, determines not only on all the power and
authority of the House, but it settles the character and description of
the men who are to compose it, and perpetuates that character as long as
it may be thought expedient to keep up a phantom of popular
representation.
It is for the chance of some amendment before this new settlement takes
a permanent form, and while the matter is yet soft and ductile, that the
Editor has republished this piece, and added some notes and explanations
to it. His intentions, he hopes, will excuse him to the original mover,
and to the world. He acts from a strong sense of the incurable ill
effects of holding out the conduct of the late House of Commons as an
example to be shunned by future representatives of the people.
MOTION
RELATIVE TO
THE SPEECH FROM THE THRONE.
LUNÆ, 14° DIE JUNII, 1784.
A motion was made, That a representation be presented to his Majesty,
most humbly to offer to his royal consideration, that the address of
this House, upon his Majesty's speech from the throne, was dictated
solely by our conviction of his Majesty's own most gracious intentions
towards his people, which, as we feel with gratitude, so we are ever
ready to acknowledge with cheerfulness and satisfaction.
Impressed with these sentiments, we were willing to separate from our
general expressions of duty, respect, and veneration to his Majesty's
royal person and his princely virtues all discussion whatever with
relation to several of the matters suggested and several of the
expressions employed in that speech.
That it was not fit or becoming that any decided opinion should be
formed by his faithful Commons on that speech, without a degree of
deliberation adequate to the importance of the object. Having afforded
ourselves due time for that deliberation, we do now most humbly beg
leave to represent to his Majesty, that, in the speech from the throne,
his ministers have thought proper to use a language of a very alarming
import, unauthorized by the practice of good times, and irreconcilable
to the principles of this government.
Humbly to express to his Majesty, that it is the privilege and duty of
this House to guard the Constitution from all infringement on the part
of ministers, and, whenever the occasion requires it, to warn them
against any abuse of the authorities committed to them; but it is very
lately,[59] that, in a manner not more unseemly than irregular and
preposterous, ministers have thought proper, by admonition from the
throne, implying distrust and reproach, to convey the expectations of
the people to us, their sole representatives,[60] and have presumed to
caution us, the natural guardians of the Constitution, against any
infringement of it on our parts.
This dangerous innovation we, his faithful Commons, think it our duty to
mark; and as these admonitions from the throne, by their frequent
repetition, seem intended to lead gradually to the establishment of an
usage, we hold ourselves bound thus solemnly to protest against them.
This House will be, as it ever ought to be, anxiously attentive to the
inclinations and interests of its constituents; nor do we desire to
straiten any of the avenues to the throne, or to either House of
Parliament. But the ancient order in which the rights of the people have
been exercised is not a restriction of these rights. It is a method
providently framed in favor of those privileges which it preserves and
enforces, by keeping in that course which has been found the most
effectual for answering their ends. His Majesty may receive the opinions
and wishes of individuals under their signatures, and of bodies
corporate under their seals, as expressing their own particular sense;
and he may grant such redress as the legal powers of the crown enable
the crown to afford. This, and the other House of Parliament, may also
receive the wishes of such corporations and individuals by petition. The
collective sense of his people his Majesty is to receive from his
Commons in Parliament assembled. It would destroy the whole spirit of
the Constitution, if his Commons were to receive that sense from the
ministers of the crown, or to admit them to be a proper or a regular
channel for conveying it.
That the ministers in the said speech declare, "His Majesty has a just
and confident reliance that we (his faithful Commons) are animated with
the same sentiments of loyalty, and the same attachment to our excellent
Constitution which he had the happiness to see so fully manifested in
every part of the kingdom."
To represent, that his faithful Commons have never foiled in loyalty to
his Majesty. It is new to them to be reminded of it. It is unnecessary
and invidious to press it upon them by any example. This recommendation
of loyalty, after his Majesty has sat for so many years, with the full
support of all descriptions of his subjects, on the throne of this
kingdom, at a time of profound peace, and without any pretence of the
existence or apprehension of war or conspiracy, becomes in itself a
source of no small jealousy to his faithful Commons; as many
circumstances lead us to apprehend that therein the ministers have
reference to some other measures and principles of loyalty, and to some
other ideas of the Constitution, than the laws require, or the practice
of Parliament will admit.
No regular communication of the proofs of loyalty and attachment to the
Constitution, alluded to in the speech from the throne, have been laid
before this House, in order to enable us to judge of the nature,
tendency, or occasion of them, or in what particular acts they were
displayed; but if we are to suppose the manifestations of loyalty (which
are held out to us as an example for imitation) consist in certain
addresses delivered to his Majesty, promising support to his Majesty in
the exercise of his prerogative, and thanking his Majesty for removing
certain of his ministers, on account of the votes they have given upon
bills depending in Parliament,--if this be the example of loyalty
alluded to in the speech from the throne, then we must beg leave to
express our serious concern for the impression which has been made on
any of our fellow-subjects by misrepresentations which have seduced them
into a seeming approbation of proceedings subversive of their own
freedom. We conceive that the opinions delivered in these papers were
not well considered; nor were the parties duly informed of the nature of
the matters on which they were called to determine, nor of those
proceedings of Parliament which they were led to censure.
We shall act more advisedly.--The loyalty we shall manifest will not be
the same with theirs; but, we trust, it will be equally sincere, and
more enlightened. It is no slight authority which shall persuade us (by
receiving as proofs of loyalty the mistaken principles lightly taken up
in these addresses) obliquely to criminate, with the heavy and
ungrounded charge of disloyalty and disaffection, an uncorrupt,
independent, and reforming Parliament.[61] Above all, we shall take care
that none of the rights and privileges, always claimed, and since the
accession of his Majesty's illustrious family constantly exercised by
this House, (and which we hold and exercise in trust for the Commons of
Great Britain, and for their benefit,) shall be constructively
surrendered, or even weakened and impaired, under ambiguous phrases and
implications of censure on the late Parliamentary proceedings. If these
claims are not well founded, they ought to be honestly abandoned; if
they are just, they ought to be steadily and resolutely maintained.
Of his Majesty's own gracious disposition towards the true principles of
our free Constitution his faithful Commons never did or could entertain
a doubt; but we humbly beg leave to express to his Majesty our
uneasiness concerning other new and unusual expressions of his
ministers, declaratory of a resolution "to support in their _just
balance_ the rights and privileges of every branch of the legislature."
It were desirable that all hazardous theories concerning a balance of
rights and privileges (a mode of expression wholly foreign to
Parliamentary usage) might have been forborne. His Majesty's faithful
Commons are well instructed in their own rights and privileges, which
they are determined to maintain on the footing upon which they were
handed down from their ancestors; they are not unacquainted with the
rights and privileges of the House of Peers; and they know and respect
the lawful prerogatives of the crown: but they do not think it safe to
admit anything concerning the existence of a balance of those rights,
privileges, and prerogatives; nor are they able to discern to what
objects ministers would apply their fiction of a balance, nor what they
would consider as a just one. These unauthorized doctrines have a
tendency to stir improper discussions, and to lead to mischievous
innovations in the Constitution.[62]
That his faithful Commons most humbly recommend, instead of the
inconsiderate speculations of unexperienced men, that, on all occasions,
resort should be had to the happy practice of Parliament, and to those
solid maxims of government which have prevailed since the accession of
his Majesty's illustrious family, as furnishing the only safe principles
on which the crown and Parliament can proceed.
We think it the more necessary to be cautious on this head, as, in the
last Parliament, the present ministers had thought proper to
countenance, if not to suggest, an attack upon the most clear and
undoubted rights and privileges of this House.[63]
Fearing, from these extraordinary admonitions, and from the new
doctrines, which seem to have dictated several unusual expressions, that
his Majesty has been abused by false representations of the late
proceedings in Parliament, we think it our duty respectfully to inform
his Majesty, that no attempt whatever has been made against his lawful
prerogatives, or against the rights and privileges of the Peers, by the
late House of Commons, in any of their addresses, votes, or resolutions;
neither do we know of any proceeding by bill, in which it was proposed
to abridge the extent of his royal prerogative: but, if such provision
had existed in any bill, we protest, and we declare, against all
speeches, acts, or addresses, from any persons whatsoever, which have a
tendency to consider such bills, or the persons concerned in them, as
just objects of any kind of censure and punishment from the throne.
Necessary reformations may hereafter require, as they have frequently
done in former times, limitations and abridgments, and in some cases an
entire extinction, of some branch of prerogative. If bills should be
improper in the form in which they appear in the House where they
originate, they are liable, by the wisdom of this Constitution, to be
corrected, and even to be totally set aside, elsewhere. This is the
known, the legal, and the safe remedy; but whatever, by the
manifestation of the royal displeasure, tends to intimidate individual
members from proposing, or this House from receiving, debating, and
passing bills, tends to prevent even the beginning of every reformation
in the state, and utterly destroys the deliberative capacity of
Parliament. We therefore claim, demand, and insist upon it, as our
undoubted right, that no persons shall be deemed proper objects of
animadversion by the crown, in any mode whatever, for the votes which
they give or the propositions which they make in Parliament.
We humbly conceive, that besides its share of the legislative power, and
its right of impeachment, that, by the law and usage of Parliament, this
House has other powers and capacities, which it is bound to maintain.
This House is assured that our humble advice on the exercise of
prerogative will be heard with the same attention with which it has ever
been regarded, and that it will be followed by the same effects which it
has ever produced, during the happy and glorious reigns of his Majesty's
royal progenitors,--not doubting but that, in all those points, we shall
be considered as a council of wisdom and weight to advise, and not
merely as an accuser of competence to criminate.[64] This House claims
both capacities; and we trust that we shall be left to our free
discretion which of them we shall employ as best calculated for his
Majesty's and the national service. Whenever we shall see it expedient
to offer our advice concerning his Majesty's servants, who are those of
the public, we confidently hope that the personal favor of any minister,
or any set of ministers, will not be more dear to his Majesty than the
credit and character of a House of Commons. It is an experiment full of
peril to put the representative wisdom and justice of his Majesty's
people in the wrong; it is a crooked and desperate design, leading to
mischief, the extent of which no human wisdom can foresee, to attempt
to form a prerogative party in the nation, to be resorted to as occasion
shall require, in derogation, from the authority of the Commons of Great
Britain in Parliament assembled; it is a contrivance full of danger, for
ministers to set up the representative and constituent bodies of the
Commons of this kingdom as two separate and distinct powers, formed to
counterpoise each other, leaving the preference in the hands of secret
advisers of the crown. In such a situation of things, these advisers,
taking advantage of the differences which may accidentally arise or may
purposely be fomented between them, will have it in their choice to
resort to the one or the other, as may best suit the purposes of their
sinister ambition. By exciting an emulation and contest between the
representative and the constituent bodies, as parties contending for
credit and influence at the throne, sacrifices will be made by both; and
the whole can end in nothing else than the destruction of the dearest
rights and liberties of the nation. If there must be another mode of
conveying the collective sense of the people to the throne than that by
the House of Commons, it ought to be fixed and defined, and its
authority ought to be settled: it ought not to exist in so precarious
and dependent a state as that ministers should have it in their power,
at their own mere pleasure, to acknowledge it with respect or to reject
it with scorn.
It is the undoubted prerogative of the crown to dissolve Parliament; but
we beg leave to lay before his Majesty, that it is, of all the trusts
vested in his Majesty, the most critical and delicate, and that in which
this House has the most reason to require, not only the good faith, but
the favor of the crown. His Commons are not always upon a par with his
ministers in an application to popular judgment; it is not in the power
of the members of this House to go to their election at the moment the
most favorable for them. It is in the power of the crown to choose a
time for their dissolution whilst great and arduous matters of state and
legislation are depending, which may be easily misunderstood, and which
cannot be fully explained before that misunderstanding may prove fatal
to the honor that belongs and to the consideration that is due to
members of Parliament.
With his Majesty is the gift of all the rewards, the honors,
distinctions, favors, and graces of the state; with his Majesty is the
mitigation of all the rigors of the law: and we rejoice to see the crown
possessed of trusts calculated to obtain good-will, and charged with
duties which are popular and pleasing. Our trusts are of a different
kind. Our duties are harsh and invidious in their nature; and justice
and safety is all we can expect in the exercise of them. We are to offer
salutary, which is not always pleasing counsel: we are to inquire and to
accuse; and the objects of our inquiry and charge will be for the most
part persons of wealth, power, and extensive connections: we are to make
rigid laws for the preservation of revenue, which of necessity more or
less confine some action or restrain some function which before was
free: what is the most critical and invidious of all, the whole body of
the public impositions originate from us, and the hand of the House of
Commons is seen and felt in every burden that presses on the people.
Whilst ultimately we are serving them, and in the first instance whilst
we are serving his Majesty, it will be hard indeed, if we should see a
House of Commons the victim of its zeal and fidelity, sacrificed by his
ministers to those very popular discontents which shall be excited by
our dutiful endeavors for the security and greatness of his throne. No
other consequence can result from such an example, but that, in future,
the House of Commons, consulting its safety at the expense of its
duties, and suffering the whole energy of the state to be relaxed, will
shrink from every service which, however necessary, is of a great and
arduous nature,--or that, willing to provide for the public necessities,
and at the same time to secure the means of performing that task, they
will exchange independence for protection, and will court a subservient
existence through the favor of those ministers of state or those secret
advisers who ought themselves to stand in awe of the Commons of this
realm.
A House of Commons respected by his ministers is essential to his
Majesty's service: it is fit that they should yield to Parliament, and
not that Parliament should be new-modelled until it is fitted to their
purposes. If our authority is only to be held up when we coincide in
opinion with his Majesty's advisers, but is to be set at nought the
moment it differs from them, the House of Commons will sink into a mere
appendage of administration, and will lose that independent character
which, inseparably connecting the honor and reputation with the acts of
this House, enables us to afford a real, effective, and substantial
support to his government. It is the deference shown to our opinion,
when we dissent from the servants of the crown, which alone can give
authority to the proceedings of this House, when it concurs with their
measures.
That authority once lost, the credit of his Majesty's crown will be
impaired in the eyes of all nations. Foreign powers, who may yet wish to
revive a friendly intercourse with this nation, will look in vain for
that hold which gave a connection with Great Britain the preference to
an affiance with any other state. A House of Commons of which ministers
were known to stand in awe, where everything was necessarily discussed
on principles fit to be openly and publicly avowed, and which could not
be retracted or varied without danger, furnished a ground of confidence
in the public faith which the engagement of no state dependent on the
fluctuation of personal favor and private advice can ever pretend to. If
faith with the House of Commons, the grand security for the national
faith itself, can be broken with impunity, a wound is given to the
political importance of Great Britain which will not easily be healed.
That there was a great variance between the late House of Commons and
certain persons, whom his Majesty has been advised to make and continue
as ministers, in defiance of the advice of that House, is notorious to
the world. That House did not confide in those ministers; and they
withheld their confidence from them for reasons for which posterity will
honor and respect the names of those who composed that House of Commons,
distinguished for its independence. They could not confide in persons
who have shown a disposition to dark and dangerous intrigues. By these
intrigues they have weakened, if not destroyed, the clear assurance
which his Majesty's people, and which all nations, ought to have of what
are and what are not the real acts of his government.
If it should be seen that his ministers may continue in their offices
without any signification to them of his Majesty's displeasure at any of
their measures, whilst persons considerable for their rank, and known to
have had access to his Majesty's sacred person, can with impunity abuse
that advantage, and employ his Majesty's name to disavow and counteract
the proceedings of his official servants, nothing but distrust, discord,
debility, contempt of all authority, and general confusion, can prevail
in his government.
This we lay before his Majesty, with humility and concern, as the
inevitable effect of a spirit of intrigue in his executive government:
an evil which we have but too much reason to be persuaded exists and
increases. During the course of the last session it broke out in a
manner the most alarming. This evil was infinitely aggravated by the
unauthorized, but not disavowed, use which has been made of his
Majesty's name, for the purpose of the most unconstitutional, corrupt,
and dishonorable influence on the minds of the members of Parliament
that ever was practised in this kingdom. No attention even to exterior
decorum, in the practice of corruption and intimidation employed on
peers, was observed: several peers were obliged under menaces to retract
their declarations and to recall their proxies.
The Commons have the deepest interest in the purity and integrity of the
Peerage. The Peers dispose of all the property in the kingdom, in the
last resort; and they dispose of it on their honor, and not on their
oaths, as all the members of every other tribunal in the kingdom must
do,--though in them the proceeding is not conclusive. We have,
therefore, a right to demand that no application shall be made to peers
of such a nature as may give room to call in question, much less to
attaint, our sole security for all that we possess. This corrupt
proceeding appeared to the House of Commons, who are the natural
guardians of the purity of Parliament, and of the purity of every branch
of judicature, a most reprehensible and dangerous practice, tending to
shake the very foundation of the authority of the House of Peers; and
they branded it as such by their resolution.
The House had not sufficient evidence to enable them legally to punish
this practice, but they had enough to caution them against all
confidence in the authors and abettors of it. They performed their duty
in humbly advising his Majesty against the employment of such ministers;
but his Majesty was advised to keep those ministers, and to dissolve
that Parliament. The House, aware of the importance and urgency of its
duty with regard to the British interests in India, which were and are
in the utmost disorder, and in the utmost peril, most humbly requested
his Majesty not to dissolve the Parliament during the course of their
very critical proceedings on that subject. His Majesty's gracious
condescension to that request was conveyed in the royal faith, pledged
to a House of Parliament, and solemnly delivered from the throne. It was
but a very few days after a committee had been, with the consent and
concurrence of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, appointed for an inquiry
into certain accounts delivered to the House by the Court of Directors,
and then actually engaged in that inquiry, that the ministers,
regardless of the assurance given from the crown to a House of Commons,
did dissolve that Parliament. We most humbly submit to his Majesty's
consideration the consequences of this their breach of public faith.
Whilst the members of the House of Commons, under that security, were
engaged in his Majesty's and the national business, endeavors were
industriously used to calumniate those whom it was found impracticable
to corrupt. The reputation of the members, and the reputation of the
House itself, was undermined in every part of the kingdom.
In the speech from the throne relative to India, we are cautioned by the
ministers "not to lose sight of the effect any measure may have on the
Constitution of our country." We are apprehensive that a calumnious
report, spread abroad, of an attack upon his Majesty's prerogative by
the late House of Commons, may have made an impression on his royal
mind, and have given occasion to this unusual admonition to the present.
This attack is charged to have been made in the late Parliament by a
bill which passed the House of Commons, in the late session of that
Parliament, for the regulation of the affairs, for the preservation of
the commerce, and for the amendment of the government of this nation, in
the East Indies.
That his Majesty and his people may have an opportunity of entering into
the ground of this injurious charge, we beg leave humbly to acquaint his
Majesty, that, far from having made any infringement whatsoever on any
part of his royal prerogative, that bill did, for a limited time, give
to his Majesty certain powers never before possessed by the crown; and
for this his present ministers (who, rather than fall short in the
number of their calumnies, employ some that are contradictory) have
slandered this House, as aiming at the extension of an unconstitutional
influence in his Majesty's crown. This pretended attempt to increase the
influence of the crown they were weak enough to endeavor to persuade his
Majesty's people was amongst the causes which excited his Majesty's
resentment against his late ministers.
Further, to remove the impressions of this calumny concerning an attempt
in the House of Commons against his prerogative, it is proper to inform
his Majesty, that the territorial possessions in the East Indies never
have been declared by any public judgment, act, or instrument, or any
resolution of Parliament whatsoever, to be the subject matter of his
Majesty's prerogative; nor have they ever been understood as belonging
to his ordinary administration, or to be annexed or united to his crown;
but that they are acquisitions of a new and peculiar description,[65]
unknown to the ancient executive constitution of this country.
From time to time, therefore, Parliament provided for their government
according to its discretion, and to its opinion of what was required by
the public necessities. We do not know that his Majesty was entitled,
by prerogative, to exercise any act of authority whatsoever in the
Company's affairs, or that, in effect, such authority has ever been
exercised. His Majesty's patronage was not taken away by that bill;
because it is notorious that his Majesty never originally had the
appointment of a single officer, civil or military, in the Company's
establishment in India: nor has the least degree of patronage ever been
acquired to the crown in any other manner or measure than as the power
was thought expedient to be granted by act of Parliament,--that is, by
the very same authority by which the offices were disposed of and
regulated in the bill which his Majesty's servants have falsely and
injuriously represented as infringing upon the prerogative of the crown.
Before the year 1773 the whole administration of India, and the whole
patronage to office there, was in the hands of the East India Company.
The East India Company is not a branch of his Majesty's prerogative
administration, nor does that body exercise any species of authority
under it, nor indeed from any British title that does not derive all its
legal validity from acts of Parliament.
When a claim was asserted to the India territorial possessions in the
occupation of the Company, these possessions were not claimed as parcel
of his Majesty's patrimonial estate, or as a fruit of the ancient
inheritance of his crown: they were claimed for the public. And when
agreements were made with the East India Company concerning any
composition for the holding, or any participation of the profits, of
those territories, the agreement was made with the public; and the
preambles of the several acts have uniformly so stated it. These
agreements were not made (even nominally) with his Majesty, but with
Parliament: and the bills making and establishing such agreements always
originated in this House; which appropriated the money to await the
disposition of Parliament, without the ceremony of previous consent from
the crown even so much as suggested by any of his ministers: which
previous consent is an observance of decorum, not indeed of strict
right, but generally paid, when a new appropriation takes place in any
part of his Majesty's prerogative revenues.
In pursuance of a right thus uniformly recognized and uniformly acted
on, when Parliament undertook the reformation of the East India Company
in 1773, a commission was appointed, as the commission in the late bill
was appointed; and it was made to continue for a term of years, as the
commission in the late bill was to continue; all the commissioners were
named in Parliament, as in the late bill they were named. As they
received, so they held their offices, wholly independent of the crown;
they held them for a fixed term; they were not removable by an address
of either House or even of both Houses of Parliament, a precaution
observed in the late bill relative to the commissioners proposed
therein; nor were they bound by the strict rules of proceeding which
regulated and restrained the late commissioners against all possible
abuse of a power which could not fail of being diligently and zealously
watched by the ministers of the crown, and the proprietors of the stock,
as well as by Parliament. Their proceedings were, in that bill, directed
to be of such a nature as easily to subject them to the strictest
revision of both, in case of any malversation.
In the year 1780, an act of Parliament again made provision for the
government of those territories for another four years, without any sort
of reference to prerogative; nor was the least objection taken at the
second, more than at the first of those periods, as if an infringement
had been made upon the rights of the crown: yet his Majesty's ministers
have thought fit to represent the late commission as an entire
innovation on the Constitution, and the setting up a new order and
estate in the nation, tending to the subversion of the monarchy itself.
If the government of the East Indies, other than by his Majesty's
prerogative, be in effect a fourth order in the commonwealth, this order
has long existed; because the East India Company has for many years
enjoyed it in the fullest extent, and does at this day enjoy the whole
administration of those provinces, and the patronage to offices
throughout that great empire, except as it is controlled by act of
Parliament.
It was the ill condition and ill administration of the Company's affairs
which induced this House (merely as a temporary establishment) to vest
the same powers which the Company did before possess, (and no other,)
for a limited time, and under very strict directions, in proper hands,
until they could be restored, or farther provision made concerning them.
It was therefore no creation whatever of a new power, but the removal of
an old power, long since created, and then existing, from the management
of those persons who had manifestly and dangerously abused their trust.
This House, which well knows the Parliamentary origin of all the
Company's powers and privileges, and is not ignorant or negligent of the
authority which may vest those powers and privileges in others, if
justice and the public safety so require, is conscious to itself that it
no more creates a new order in the state, by making occasional trustees
for the direction of the Company, than it originally did in giving a
much more permanent trust to the Directors or to the General Court of
that body. The monopoly of the East India Company was a derogation from
the general freedom of trade belonging to his Majesty's people. The
powers of government, and of peace and war, are parts of prerogative of
the highest order. Of our competence to restrain the rights of all his
subjects by act of Parliament, and to vest those high and eminent
prerogatives even in a particular company of merchants, there has been
no question. We beg leave most humbly to claim as our right, and as a
right which this House has always used, to frame such bills for the
regulation of that commerce, and of the territories held by the East
India Company, and everything relating to them, as to our discretion
shall seem fit; and we assert and maintain that therein we follow, and
do not innovate on, the Constitution.
That his Majesty's ministers, misled by their ambition, have
endeavored, if possible, to form a faction in the country against the
popular part of the Constitution; and have therefore thought proper to
add to their slanderous accusation against a House of Parliament,
relative to his Majesty's prerogative, another of a different nature,
calculated for the purpose of raising fears and jealousies among the
corporate bodies of the kingdom, and of persuading uninformed persons
belonging to those corporations to look to and to make addresses to
them, as protectors of their rights, under their several charters, from
the designs which they, without any ground, charged the then House of
Commons to have formed against _charters in general_. For this purpose
they have not scrupled to assert that the exertion of his Majesty's
prerogative in the late precipitate change in his administration, and
the dissolution of the late Parliament, were measures adopted in order
to rescue the people and their rights out of the hands of the House of
Commons, their representatives.
We trust that his Majesty's subjects are not yet so far deluded as to
believe that the charters, or that any other of their local or general
privileges, can have a solid security in any place but where that
security has always been looked for, and always found,--in the House of
Commons. Miserable and precarious indeed would be the state of their
franchises, if they were to find no defence but from that quarter from
whence they have always been attacked![66] But the late House of
Commons, in passing that bill, made no attack upon any powers or
privileges, except such as a House of Commons has frequently attacked,
and will attack, (and they trust, in the end, with their wonted
success,)--that is, upon those which are corruptly and oppressively
administered; and this House do faithfully assure his Majesty, that we
will correct, and, if necessary for the purpose, as far as in us lies,
will wholly destroy, every species of power and authority exercised by
British subjects to the oppression, wrong, and detriment of the people,
and to the impoverishment and desolation of the countries subject to it.
The propagators of the calumnies against that House of Parliament have
been indefatigable in exaggerating the supposed injury done to the East
India Company by the suspension of the authorities which they have in
every instance abused,--as if power had been wrested by wrong and
violence from just and prudent hands; but they have, with equal care,
concealed the weighty grounds and reasons on which that House had
adopted the most moderate of all possible expedients for rescuing the
natives of India from oppression, and for saving the interests of the
real and honest proprietors of their stock, as well as that great
national, commercial concern, from imminent ruin.
The ministers aforesaid have also caused it to be reported that the
House of Commons have confiscated the property of the East India
Company. It is the reverse of truth. The whole management was a trust
for the proprietors, under their own inspection, (and it was so provided
for in the bill,) and under the inspection of Parliament. That bill, so
far from confiscating the Company's property, was the only one which,
for several years past, did not, in some shape or other, affect their
property, or restrain them in the disposition of it.
It is proper that his Majesty and all his people should be informed that
the House of Commons have proceeded, with regard to the East India
Company, with a degree of care, circumspection, and deliberation, which
has not been equalled in the history of Parliamentary proceedings. For
sixteen years the state and condition of that body has never been wholly
out of their view. In the year 1767 the House took those objects into
consideration, in a committee of the whole House. The business was
pursued in the following year. In the year 1772 two committees were
appointed for the same purpose, which examined into their affairs with
much diligence, and made very ample reports. In the year 1773 the
proceedings were carried to an act of Parliament, which proved
ineffectual to its purpose. The oppressions and abuses in India have
since rather increased than diminished, on account of the greatness of
the temptations, and convenience of the opportunities, which got the
better of the legislative provisions calculated against ill practices
then in their beginnings; insomuch that, in 1781, two committees were
again instituted, who have made seventeen reports. It was upon the most
minute, exact, and laborious collection and discussion of facts, that
the late House of Commons proceeded in the reform which they attempted
in the administration of India, but which has been frustrated by ways
and means the most dishonorable to his Majesty's government, and the
most pernicious to the Constitution of this kingdom. His Majesty was so
sensible of the disorders in the Company's administration, that the
consideration of that subject was no less than six times recommended to
this House in speeches from the throne.
The result of the Parliamentary inquiries has been, that the East India
Company was found totally corrupted, and totally perverted from the
purposes of its institution, whether political or commercial; that the
powers of war and peace given by the charter had been abused, by
kindling hostilities in every quarter for the purposes of rapine; that
almost all the treaties of peace they have made have only given cause to
so many breaches of public faith; that countries once the most
flourishing are reduced to a state of indigence, decay, and
depopulation, to the diminution of our strength, and to the infinite
dishonor of our national character; that the laws of this kingdom are
notoriously, and almost in every instance, despised; that the servants
of the Company, by the purchase of qualifications to vote in the General
Court, and, at length, by getting the Company itself deeply in their
debt, have obtained the entire and absolute mastery in the body by which
they ought to have been ruled and coerced. Thus their malversations in
office are supported, instead of being checked by the Company. The whole
of the affairs of that body are reduced to a most perilous situation;
and many millions of innocent and deserving men, who are under the
protection of this nation, and who ought to be protected by it, are
oppressed by a most despotic and rapacious tyranny. The Company and
their servants, having strengthened themselves by this confederacy, set
at defiance the authority and admonitions of this House employed to
reform them; and when this House had selected certain principal
delinquents, whom they declared it the duty of the Company to recall,
the Company held out its legal privileges against all reformation,
positively refused to recall them, and supported those who had fallen
under the just censure of this House with new and stronger marks of
countenance and approbation.
The late House, discovering the reversed situation of the Company, by
which the nominal servants are really the masters, and the offenders are
become their own judges, thought fit to examine into the state of their
commerce; and they have also discovered that their commercial affairs
are in the greatest disorder; that their debts have accumulated beyond
any present or obvious future means of payment, at least under the
actual administration of their affairs; that this condition of the East
India Company has begun to affect the sinking fund itself, on which the
public credit of the kingdom rests,--a million and upwards being due to
the customs, which that House of Commons whose intentions towards the
Company have been so grossly misrepresented were indulgent enough to
respite. And thus, instead of confiscating their property, the Company
received without interest (which in such a case had been before charged)
the use of a very large sum of the public money. The revenues are under
the peculiar care of this House, not only as the revenues originate from
us, but as, on every failure if the funds set apart for the support of
the national credit, or to provide for the national strength and safety,
the task of supplying every deficiency falls upon his Majesty's faithful
Commons, this House must, in effect, tax the people. The House,
therefore, at every moment, incurs the hazard of becoming obnoxious to
its constituents.
The enemies of the late House of Commons resolved, if possible, to bring
on that event. They therefore endeavored to misrepresent the provident
means adopted by the House of Commons for keeping off this invidious
necessity, as an attack on the rights of the East India Company: for
they well knew, that, on the one hand, if, for want of proper regulation
and relief, the Company should become insolvent, or even stop payment,
the national credit and commerce would sustain a heavy blow; and that
calamity would be justly imputed to Parliament, which, after such long
inquiries, and such frequent admonitions from his Majesty, had neglected
so essential and so urgent an article of their duty: on the other hand,
they knew, that, wholly corrupted as the Company is, nothing effectual
could be done to preserve that interest from ruin, without taking for a
time the national objects of their trust out of their hands; and then a
cry would be industriously raised against the House of Commons, as
depriving British subjects of their legal privileges. The restraint,
being plain and simple, must be easily understood by those who would be
brought with great difficulty to comprehend the intricate detail of
matters of fact which rendered this suspension of the administration of
India absolutely necessary on motives of justice, of policy, of public
honor, and public safety.
The House of Commons had not been able to devise a method by which the
redress of grievances could be effected through the authors of those
grievances; nor could they imagine how corruptions could be purified by
the corrupters and the corrupted; nor do we now conceive how any
reformation can proceed from the known abettors and supporters of the
persons who have been guilty of the misdemeanors which Parliament has
reprobated, and who for their own ill purposes have given countenance to
a false and delusive state of the Company's affairs, fabricated to
mislead Parliament and to impose upon the nation.[67]
Your Commons feel, with a just resentment, the inadequate estimate which
your ministers have formed of the importance of this great concern.
They call on us to act upon the principles of those who have not
inquired into the subject, and to condemn those who with the most
laudable diligence have examined and scrutinized every part of it. The
deliberations of Parliament have been broken; the season of the year is
unfavorable; many of us are new members, who must be wholly unacquainted
with the subject, which lies remote from the ordinary course of general
information.
We are cautioned against an infringement of the Constitution; and it is
impossible to know what the secret advisers of the crown, who have
driven out the late ministers for their conduct in Parliament, and have
dissolved the late Parliament for a pretended attack upon prerogative,
will consider as such an infringement. We are not furnished with a rule,
the observance of which can make us safe from the resentment of the
crown, even by an implicit obedience to the dictates of the ministers
who have advised that speech; we know not how soon those ministers may
be disavowed, and how soon the members of this House, for our very
agreement with them, may be considered as objects of his Majesty's
displeasure. Until by his Majesty's goodness and wisdom the late example
is completely done away, we are not free.
We are well aware, in providing for the affairs of the East, with what
an adult strength of abuse, and of wealth and influence growing out of
that abuse, his Majesty's Commons had, in the last Parliament, and still
have, to struggle. We are sensible that the influence of that wealth, in
a much larger degree and measure than at any former period, may have
penetrated into the very quarter from whence alone any real reformation
can be expected.[68]
If, therefore, in the arduous affairs recommended to us, our proceedings
should be ill adapted, feeble, and ineffectual,--if no delinquency
should be prevented, and no delinquent should be called to account,--if
every person should be caressed, promoted, and raised in power, in
proportion to the enormity of his offences,--if no relief should be
given to any of the natives unjustly dispossessed of their rights,
jurisdictions, and properties,--if no cruel and unjust exactions should
be forborne,--if the source of no peculation or oppressive gain should
be cut off,--if, by the omission of the opportunities that were in our
hands, our Indian empire should fall into ruin irretrievable, and in its
fall crush the credit and overwhelm the revenues of this country,--we
stand acquitted to our honor and to our conscience, who have reluctantly
seen the weightiest interests of our country, at times the most critical
to its dignity and safety, rendered the sport of the inconsiderate and
unmeasured ambition of individuals, and by that means the wisdom of his
Majesty's government degraded in the public estimation, and the policy
and character of this renowned nation rendered contemptible in the eyes
of all Europe.
* * * * *
It passed in the negative.
FOOTNOTES:
[59] See King's Speech, Dec. 5, 1782, and May 19, 1784.
[60] "I shall never submit to the doctrines I have heard this day from
the woolsack, that the other House [House of Commons] are the only
representatives and guardians of the people's rights. I boldly maintain
the contrary. I say this House [House of Lords] _is equally the
representatives of the people_."--Lord Shelburne's Speech, April 8,
1778. _Vide_ Parliamentary Register, Vol. X. p. 892.
[61] In that Parliament the House of Commons by two several resolutions
put an end to the American war. Immediately on the change of ministry
which ensued, in order to secure their own independence, and to prevent
the accumulation of new burdens on the people by the growth of a civil
list debt, they passed the Establishment Bill. By that bill thirty-six
offices tenable by members of Parliament were suppressed, and an order
of payment was framed by which the growth of any fresh debt was rendered
impracticable. The debt on the civil list from the beginning of the
present reign had amounted to one million three hundred thousand pounds
and upwards. Another act was passed for regulating the office of the
Paymaster-General and the offices subordinate to it. A million of public
money had sometimes been in the hands of the paymasters: this act
prevented the possibility of any money whatsoever being accumulated in
that office in future. The offices of the Exchequer, whose emoluments in
time of war were excessive, and grew in exact proportion to the public
burdens, were regulated,--some of them suppressed, and the rest reduced
to fixed salaries. To secure the freedom of election against the crown,
a bill was passed to disqualify all officers concerned in the collection
of the revenue in any of its branches from voting in elections: a most
important act, not only with regard to its primary object, the freedom
of election, but as materially forwarding the due collection of revenue.
For the same end, (the preserving the freedom of election,) the House
rescinded the famous judgment relative to the Middlesex election, and
expunged it from the journals. On the principle of reformation of their
own House, connected with a principle of public economy, an act passed
for rendering contractors with government incapable of a seat in
Parliament. The India Bill (unfortunately lost in the House of Lords)
pursued the same idea to its completion, and disabled all servants of
the East India Company from a seat in that House for a certain time, and
until their conduct was examined into and cleared. The remedy of
infinite corruptions and of infinite disorders and oppressions, as well
as the security of the most important objects of public economy,
perished with that bill and that Parliament. That Parliament also
instituted a committee to inquire into the collection of the revenue in
all its branches, which prosecuted its duty with great vigor, and
suggested several material improvements.
[62] If these speculations are let loose, the House of Lords may quarrel
with their share of the legislature, as being limited with regard to the
origination of grants to the crown and the origination of money bills.
The advisers of the crown may think proper to bring its negative into
ordinary use,--and even to dispute, whether a mere negative, compared
with the deliberative power exercised in the other Houses, be such a
share in the legislature as to produce a due balance in favor of that
branch, and thus justify the previous interference of the crown in the
manner lately used. The following will serve to show how much foundation
there is for great caution concerning these novel speculations. Lord
Shelburne, in his celebrated speech, April 8th, 1778, expresses himself
as follows. (_Vide_ Parliamentary Register, Vol. X.)
"The noble and learned lord on the woolsack, in the debate which opened
the business of this day, asserted that your Lordships were incompetent
to make any alteration in a money bill or a bill of supply, I should be
glad to see the matter fairly and fully discussed, and the subject
brought forward and argued upon precedent, as well as all its collateral
relations. I should be pleased to see the question fairly committed,
were it for no other reason but to hear the sleek, smooth contractors
from the other House come to this bar and declare, that they, and they
only, _could frame a money bill_, and they, and they _only_, could
dispose of the _property of the peers of Great Britain_. Perhaps some
arguments more plausible than those I heard this day from the woolsack,
to show that the Commons have an uncontrollable, unqualified right to
bind your Lordships' property, may be urged by them. At present, I beg
leave to differ from the noble and learned lord; for, until the claim,
after a solemn discussion of this House, is openly and directly
relinquished, I shall continue to be of opinion that your Lordships have
a right to after, _amend_, or reject a money bill."
The Duke of Richmond also, in his letter to the volunteers of Ireland,
speaks of several of the powers exercised by the House of Commons in the
light of usurpations; and his Grace is of opinion, that, when the people
are restored to what he conceives to be their rights, in electing the
House of Commons, the other branches of the legislature ought to be
restored to theirs.--_Vide_ Remembrancer, Vol. XVI.
[63] By an act of Parliament, the Directors of the East India Company
are restrained from acceptance of bills drawn, from India, beyond a
certain amount, without the consent of the Commissioners of the
Treasury. The late House of Commons, finding bills to an immense amount
drawn upon that body by their servants abroad, and knowing their
circumstances to be exceedingly doubtful, came to a resolution
providently, cautioning the Lords of the Treasury against the acceptance
of these bills, until the House should otherwise direct. The Court Lords
then took occasion to declare against the resolution as illegal, by the
Commons undertaking to direct in the execution of a trust created by act
of Parliament. The House, justly alarmed at this resolution, which went
to the destruction of the whole of its superintending capacity, and
particularly in matters relative to its own province of money, directed
a committee to search the journals, and they found a regular series of
precedents, commencing from the remotest of those records, and carried
on to that day, by which it appeared that the House interfered, by an
authoritative advice and admonition, upon every act of executive
government without exception, and in many much stronger cases than that
which the Lords thought proper to quarrel with.
[64] "I observe, at the same time, that there is _no charge or
complaint_ suggested against my present ministers."--The King's Answer,
25th February, 1784, to the Address of the House of Common. _Vide_
Resolutions of the House of Commons, printed for Debrett, p. 31.
[65] The territorial possessions in the East Indies were acquired to the
Company, in virtue of grants from the Great Mogul, in the nature of
offices and jurisdictions, to be held under _him_, and dependent upon
_his_ crown, with the express condition of being obedient to orders from
_his_ court, and of paying an annual tribute to _his_ treasury. It is
true that no obedience is yielded to these orders, and for some time
past there has been no payment made of this tribute. But it is under a
grant so conditioned that they still hold. To subject the King of Great
Britain as tributary to a foreign power by the acts of his subjects; to
suppose the grant valid, and yet the condition void; to suppose it good
for the king, and insufficient for the Company; to suppose it an
interest divisible between the parties: these are some few of the many
legal difficulties to be surmounted, before the Common Law of England
can acknowledge the East India Company's Asiatic affairs to be a subject
matter of _prerogative_, so as to bring it within the verge of English
jurisprudence. It is a very anomalous species of power and property
which is held by the East India Company. Our English prerogative law
does not furnish principles, much less precedents, by which it can be
defined or adjusted. Nothing but the eminent dominion of Parliament over
every British subject, in every concern, and in every circumstance in
which he is placed, can adjust this new, intricate matter. Parliament
may act wisely or unwisely, justly or unjustly; but Parliament alone is
competent to it.
[66] The attempt upon charters and the privileges of the corporate
bodies of the kingdom in the reigns of Charles the Second and James the
Second was made by the _crown_. It was carried on by the ordinary course
of law, in courts instituted for the security of the property and
franchises of the people. This attempt made by the _crown_ was attended
with complete success. The corporate rights of the city of London, and
of all the companies it contains, were by solemn judgment of law
declared forfeited, and all their franchises, privileges, properties,
and estates were of course seized into the hands of the _crown_. The
injury was from the crown: the redress was by Parliament. A bill was
brought into the _House of Commons_, by which the judgment against the
city of London, and against the companies, was reversed: and this bill
passed the House of Lords without any complaint of trespass on their
jurisdiction, although the bill was for a reversal of a judgment in law.
By this act, which is in the second of William and Mary, chap. 8, the
question of forfeiture of that charter is forever taken out of the power
of any court of law: no cognizance can be taken of it except in
Parliament.
Although the act above mentioned has declared the judgment against the
corporation of London to be _illegal_ yet Blackstone makes no scruple of
asserting, that, "perhaps, in strictness of law, the proceedings in most
of them [the Quo Warranto causes] were sufficiently regular," leaving it
in doubt, whether this regularity did not apply to the corporation of
London, as well as to any of the rest; and he seems to blame the
proceeding (as most blamable it was) not so much on account of
illegality as for the crown's having employed a legal proceeding for
political purposes. He calls it "an exertion of _an act of law_ for the
purposes of the state."
The same security which was given to the city of London, would have been
extended to all the corporations, if the House of Commons could have
prevailed. But the bill for that purpose passed but by a majority of one
in the Lords; and it was entirely lost by a prorogation, which is the
act of the crown. Small, indeed, was the security which the corporation
of London enjoyed before the act of William and Mary, and which all the
other corporations, secured by no statute, enjoy at this hour, if strict
law was employed against them. The use of strict law has always been
rendered very delicate by the same means by which the almost unmeasured
legal powers residing (and in many instances dangerously residing) in
the crown are kept within due bounds: I mean, that strong superintending
power in the House of Commons which inconsiderate people have been
prevailed on to condemn as trenching on prerogative. Strict law is by no
means such a friend to the rights of the subject as they have been
taught to believe. They who have been most conversant in this kind of
learning will be most sensible of the danger of submitting corporate
rights of high political importance to these subordinate tribunals. The
general heads of law on that subject are vulgar and trivial. On them
there is not much question. But it is far from easy to determine what
special acts, or what special neglect of action, shall subject
corporations to a forfeiture. There is so much laxity in this doctrine,
that great room is left for favor or prejudice, which might give to the
crown an entire dominion over those corporations. On the other hand, it
is undoubtedly true that every subordinate corporate right ought to be
subject to control, to superior direction, and even to forfeiture upon
just cause. In this reason and law agree. In every judgment given on a
corporate right of great political importance, the policy and prudence
make no small part of the question. To these considerations a court of
law is not competent; and, indeed, an attempt at the least intermixture
of such ideas with the matter of law could have no other effect than
wholly to corrupt the judicial character of the court in which such a
cause should come to be tried. It is besides to be remarked, that, if,
in virtue of a legal process, a forfeiture should be adjudged, the court
of law has no power to modify or mitigate. The whole franchise is
annihilated, and the corporate property goes into the hands of the
crown. They who hold the new doctrines concerning the power of the House
of Commons ought well to consider in such a case by what means the
corporate rights could be revived, or the property could be recovered
out of the hands of the crown. But Parliament can do what the courts
neither can do nor ought to attempt. Parliament is competent to give due
weight to all political considerations. It may modify, it may mitigate,
and it may render perfectly secure, all that it does not think fit to
take away. It is not likely that Parliament will ever draw to itself the
cognizance of questions concerning ordinary corporations, farther than
to protect them, in case attempts are made to induce a forfeiture of
their franchises.
The case of the East India Company is different even from that of the
greatest of these corporations. No monopoly of trade, beyond their own
limits, is vested in the corporate body of any town or city in the
kingdom. Even within these limits the monopoly is not general. The
Company has the monopoly of the trade of half the world. The first
corporation of the kingdom has for the object of its jurisdiction only a
few matters of subordinate police. The East India Company governs an
empire, through all its concerns and all its departments, from the
lowest office of economy to the highest councils of state,--an empire to
which Great Britain is in comparison but a respectable province. To
leave these concerns without superior cognizance would be madness; to
leave them to be judged in the courts below, on the principles of a
confined jurisprudence, would be folly. It is well, if the whole
legislative power is competent to the correction of abuses which are
commensurate to the immensity of the object they affect. The idea of an
absolute power has, indeed, its terrors; but that objection lies to
every Parliamentary proceeding; and as no other can regulate the abuses
of such a charter, it is fittest that sovereign authority should be
exercised, where it is most likely to be attended with the most
effectual correctives. These correctives are furnished by the nature and
course of Parliamentary proceedings, and by the infinitely diversified
characters who compose the two Houses. In effect and virtually, they
form a vast number, variety, and succession of judges and jurors. The
fulness, the freedom, and publicity of discussion leaves it easy to
distinguish what are acts of power, and what the determinations of
equity and reason. There prejudice corrects prejudice, and the different
asperities of party zeal mitigate and neutralize each other. So far from
violence being the general characteristic of the proceedings of
Parliament, whatever the beginnings of any Parliamentary process may be,
its general fault in the end is, that it is found incomplete and
ineffectual.
[67] The purpose of the misrepresentation being now completely answered,
there is no doubt but the committee in this Parliament, appointed by the
ministers themselves, will justify the grounds upon which the last
Parliament proceeded, and will lay open to the world the dreadful state
of the Company's affairs, and the grossness of their own calumnies upon
this head. By delay the new assembly is come into the disgraceful
situation of allowing a dividend of eight per cent by act of Parliament,
without the least matter before them to justify the granting of any
dividend at all.
[68] This will be evident to those who consider the number and
description of Directors and servants of the East India Company chosen
into the present Parliament. The light in which the present ministers
hold the labors of the House of Commons in searching into the disorders
in the Indian administration, and all its endeavors for the reformation
of the government there, without any distinction of times, or of the
persons concerned, will appear from the following extract from a speech
of the present Lord Chancellor. After making a high-flown panegyric on
those whom the House of Commons had condemned by their resolutions, he
said:--"Let us not be misled by reports from committees of _another_
House, to which, I again repeat, _I pay as much attention as I would do
to the history of Robinson Crusoe,_ Let the conduct of the East India
Company be fairly and fully inquired into. Let it be acquitted or
condemned by evidence brought to the bar of the House. Without entering
very deeply into the subject, let me reply in a few words to an
observation which fell from a noble and learned lord, that the Company's
finances are distressed, and that they owe at this moment a million
sterling to the nation. When such a charge is brought, will Parliament
in its justice forget that the Company is restricted from employing
_that credit which its great and flourishing situation_ gives to it?"
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