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Title: The Story of the Great War, Volume I (of 8)
Introductions; Special Articles; Causes of War; Diplomatic and State Papers
Author: Various
Editor: Francis J. (Francis Joseph) Reynolds, Allen L. (Allen Leon)
Churchill, and Francis Trevelyan Miller
Release Date: March 5, 2009 [eBook #28257]
Language: English
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THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
History of the European War from Official Sources
Complete Historical Records of Events to Date,
Illustrated with Drawings, Maps, and Photographs
Prefaced by
What the War Means to America
Major General Leonard Wood, U.S.A.
Naval Lessons of the War
Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight, U.S.N.
The World's War
Frederick Palmer
Theatres of the War's Campaigns
Frank H. Simonds
The War Correspondent
Arthur Ruhl
Edited by
Francis J. Reynolds
Former Reference Librarian of Congress
Allen L. Churchill
Associate Editor, The New International Encyclopedia
Francis Trevelyan Miller
Editor in Chieft, Photographic History of the Civil War
P. F. Collier & Son Company
New York
[Illustration: _King George V of Britain and King Albert of Belgium
inspecting Belgian troops. The youth is the Prince of Wales, and
beside him is Major General Pertab Singh of the Indian army._]
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Introductions
Special Articles
Causes of War
Diplomatic and State Papers
[Illustration: Editor's logo.]
VOLUME I
P · F · Collier & Son · New York
Copyright 1916
By P. F. Collier & Son
CONTENTS
Page
WHAT THE WAR MEANS TO AMERICA.
_By Major General Leonard Wood, U. S. A._ 9
NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR.
_By Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight, U. S. N._ 17
THE WORLDS WAR.
_By Frederick Palmer_ 31
THE THEATRES OF THE WAR'S CAMPAIGNS.
_By F. H. Simonds_ 83
THE WAR CORRESPONDENT.
_By Arthur Ruhl_ 113
PART I.--INDIRECT CAUSES OF THE WAR--POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC
HISTORY OF EUROPE FROM 1866 TO 1914, WITH A CHAPTER ON THE
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN
CHAPTER
I. Germany 126
II. Austria-Hungary 142
III. Russia 148
IV. France 159
V. England 172
VI. Italy 188
VII. Belgium 197
VIII. Japan 200
IX. The Neutral States--Portugal and Spain 203
X. Sweden, Norway, Holland, Luxemburg 208
XI. Summary of Political History 212
PART II.--THE BALKANS
XII. The Balkan Peoples 215
XIII. Bulgaria 224
XIV. War with Serbia 230
XV. Work of Stambuloff 234
XVI. Attempts at Reform in Macedonia 238
XVII. Crisis in Turkey 244
XVIII. Formation of the Balkan League 248
XIX. First and Second Balkan Wars 252
PART III.--DIRECT CAUSES OF THE WAR
XX. Assassination of Franz Ferdinand--Austria's Ultimatum 258
XXI. Serbia's Reply 265
XXII. Diplomatic Exchanges 270
XXIII. Preparation for War 279
XXIV. Territorial and Geographical Comparisons 286
XXV. Assembling of the German Armies 292
XXVI. French Mobilization 297
XXVII. Britain--Russia--Austria 304
PART IV.--DIPLOMATIC PAPERS RELATING TO THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR,
COLLATED FROM THE OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS
List of Official Documents 313
List of Sovereigns and Diplomats 315
Important Dates Preceding the War 325
Warnings of Hostile Intentions 328
Report of M. Cambon in 1913 335
The Assassination of the Austrian Archduke 341
Attempts at Mediation 356
The Austro-hungarian Note to Serbia 362
Text of the Note 366
Controversy Over Time Limit 369
Chronological Arrangement of Dates 370
Serbia's Reply to the Austro-Hungarian Note 394
Beginning of Mobilization 401
Kaiser and Czar Exchange Telegrams 438
Henry of Prussia and George V 451
Sir Edward Grey Refuses Terms of Neutrality 455
Further Exchanges Between William and Nicholas 461
Russia Explains Her Efforts for Peace 482
German Declaration of Intentions Toward Belgium 487
Serbia's Position Explained 488
Von Bethmann-Hollweg Explains Germany's Position in
The Reichstag 498
Sir Edward Goschen's Interview with Von Jagow 502
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
King George and King Albert Inspecting Belgian Troops _Frontispiece_
Opposite Page
George V, King of Great Britain and Emperor of India 46
M. Raymond Poincaré, President of France 78
Nicholas II, Emperor of All the Russias 142
Wilhelm II, German Emperor and King of Prussia 206
Franz Josef I, Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary 270
Albert I, King of Belgium 318
King Peter of Serbia 382
Vittorio Emanuele III, King of Italy 446
LIST OF MAPS
Page
Conflicting Interests of the Great Powers in Europe, Africa
and Asia (_Colored Map_) _Front Insert_
Europe in Twelfth Century, Historical Map 137
Europe in 1648-1789, Historical Map 150
Europe in 1793-1815, Historical Map 193
Balkan States Before the First Balkan War 217
Balkans After the Second Balkan War 254
Austria, 1815-1914 264
Poland and Its Divisions from 1772-1914 277
Armies of the Contesting Nations 293
Navies of the Contesting Nations 298
German-French Frontier, Fortresses of 303
German Confederation of 1815 307
German-Belgian Frontier, Strategic Railroads on 311
[Illustration: The Conflicting Interests of the Great Powers in
Europe and Neighboring African and Asiatic Territories before the
Outbreak of the War.]
WHAT THE WAR MEANS TO AMERICA
By MAJOR GENERAL LEONARD WOOD, U. S. A.
"Go yourselves, every man of you, and stand in the ranks and
either a victory beyond all victories in its glory awaits you, or
falling you shall fall greatly, and worthy of your
past."--DEMOSTHENES TO THE ATHENIANS.
What lesson will America draw from the present Great War? Must she
see the heads of her own children at the foot of the guillotine to
realize that it will cut, or will she accept the evidence of the
thousands which have lain there before? Will she heed the lesson of
all time, that national unpreparedness means national downfall, or
will she profit from the experience and misfortunes of others and
take those needed measures of preparedness which prudence and wisdom
dictate. In a word, will she draw any valuable lessons from the
Great War? This is the question which is so often asked. As yet
there is no answer.
It is the question uppermost in the minds of all those who are
intelligently interested in our country's welfare and safety. It is
the question which vitally concerns all of us, as it concerns the
defense and possibly the very existence of our nation. The answer
must be "Preparedness." If we are to live, preparedness to oppose
the force of wrong with the strength of right. Will it be? That's
the question! Or will America drift on blind to the lessons of the
world tragedy, heedless of consequences, concerned with the
accumulation of wealth, satiated with a sense of moral worth which
the world does not so fully recognize, planning to capture the
commerce of the warring nations, and expecting at the same time to
retain their friendship and regard. Let us hope that, in the light
of what is, and as a preparation against what may be, the answer
will be characteristic of a great people, peaceful but prudent and
foreseeing; that it will be thorough, carefully thought-out
preparedness; preparedness against war. A preparedness which if it
is to be lasting and secure must be founded upon the moral
organization of our people; an organization which will create and
keep alive in the heart of every citizen a sense not only of
obligation for service to the nation in time of war or trouble, but
also of obligation to so prepare himself as to render this service
effective. An organization which will recognize that the basic
principle upon which a free democracy or representative government
rests, and must rest, if they are to survive the day of stress and
trouble, is, that with manhood suffrage goes manhood obligation for
service, not necessarily with arms in hand, but for service
somewhere in that great complex mass which constitutes the
organization of a nation's might and resources for defense;
organization which will make us think in terms of the nation and not
those of city, State, or personal interest; organization which will
result in all performing service for the nation with singleness of
purpose in a common cause--preparedness for defense: preparedness to
discharge our plain duty whatever it may be. Such service will make
for national solidarity, the doing away with petty distinctions of
class and creed, and fuse the various elements of this people into
one homogeneous mass of real Americans, and leave us a better and a
stronger people.
Once such a moral organization is accomplished, the remaining
organization will be simple. This will include an organization of
transportation, on land and sea, and of communications. An
organization of the nation's industrial resources so that the energy
of its great manufacturing plants may be promptly turned into making
what they can best make to supply the military needs of the nation.
By military needs we mean all the complex requirements of a nation
engaged in war, requirements which are, many of them, requirements
of peace as well as of war. It will also include a thorough
organization of the country's chemical resources and the development
thereof, so that we may be as little dependent as possible upon
materials from oversea. At present many important and essential
elements come from oversea nations and would not be available in
case of loss of sea control. We must devise substitutes or find
means of making these things. Chemistry is one of the great weapons
of modern war. There must also be organization which will provide a
regular army organized on sound lines, supplied with ample reserves
of men and material; an army adequate to the peace needs of the
nation, which means, among other things, the secure garrisoning of
our oversea possessions, including the Philippines and the Hawaiian
Islands. These latter are the key to the Pacific, and one of the
main defenses of the Pacific Coast and of the Panama Canal. Whoever
holds these islands will dominate the trade routes of the Pacific,
and in a large measure the Pacific itself.
The regular army should also be sufficient for the secure holding
and safeguarding of the Panama Canal, an instrument of war of the
greatest importance, so long as it is in our control, greatly
increasing the value of our navy, and an implement of commerce of
tremendous value, a possession so valuable and of such vital
importance to us that we cannot allow it to lie outside our secure
grasp.
It must also be adequate to provide garrisons in Porto Rico and
Alaska, and at the same time maintain in the continental United
States a force of coast artillery sufficient to furnish the
necessary manning details for our seacoast defenses, and a mobile
force complete in every detail and adequate in time of war to meet
the first shock of an invasion and sufficient in time of peace to
meet the various demands made upon it for home service, such as
troops for home emergencies or disorders, troops for the necessary
training of the National Militia, also sufficient officers and
noncommissioned officers for duty at schools, colleges, military
training camps and in various other capacities. It must be also
strong enough to provide a strong expeditionary force, such as we
sent to Cuba in 1898, without interfering with its regular duties.
The necessity of building and maintaining an adequate navy, well
balanced, thoroughly equipped and maintained at the highest standard
of efficiency and ready always for immediate service, with necessary
adjuncts afloat and ashore, is also one of the clear lessons of the
war; others are the establishment of ammunition plants at points
sufficiently remote from the seacoast, and so placed as to render
their capture and destruction improbable in case of sudden invasion;
the provision of an adequate reserve corps of 50,000 officers, a
number sufficient for one and one-half million of citizen soldiers;
officers well trained and ready for immediate service; the provision
of adequate supplies and reserve supplies of artillery, arms, and
ammunition of all types for these troops.
We must also build up a system under which officers and men for our
citizen soldiery can be trained with the minimum of interference
with their educational or industrial careers, under conditions which
will permit the accomplishment of their training during the period
of youth, and once this is accomplished will permit their return to
their normal occupations with the minimum of delay.
The lesson which we should draw from the Great War is that nothing
should be left to chance or to the promise of others, or to the
fair-weather relations of to-day; that we should be as well
prepared, and as well organized on land as Switzerland, a nation
without a trace of militarism, and yet so thoroughly prepared and so
thoroughly ready and able to defend herself that to-day her
territory is inviolate, although she is surrounded by warring
nations.
Belgium to-day is an illustration of what may be expected from lack
of adequate preparedness.
The great outstanding lesson of the war is that we must not trust to
righteousness and fair dealing alone; we must be prepared to play
our part, and while loving justice and dealing fairly with others,
we must be always ready to do our full duty, and to defend our
country with force if need be. If we do not, we shall always be
helpless and at the mercy of our enemies. We can be strong, yet
tolerant, just, yet prepared to defend ourselves against aggression.
Another lesson is that our military establishment on land and sea
should not be dependent upon a system of militia and volunteers.
These will not be found adequate under the conditions of modern
war, and above all we should appreciate the fact that our military
system must be founded upon _equality of service, rich and poor
alike_. We must while extending equality of privilege to all,
including the thousands who are coming to us every day, insist upon
equality of obligation by all. With the privileges of citizenship
must go the obligations and responsibilities not only in peace but
also in war.
We should take heed of the lessons of the past, and remember that
the volunteer system has always failed us in our wars. Such
experience as we have had in war in recent years has in no way
prepared us for a war with a first-class nation prepared for war. We
have never engaged in such a war unaided. This experience is one
which is still before us. We should look upon service for the nation
in the same way as we look upon the payment of taxes, or the
compliance with the thousand and one laws and regulations which
govern our everyday life.
Relatively few people would voluntarily pay taxes even though they
knew the money was to go to the best of purposes. They pay taxes
because the law requires it. The people as a whole cannot be
expected, nor can we with safety trust to their performing their
military duties effectively, unless some general system of equal
service for all who are physically fit, is prescribed, some system
which will insure preparation in advance of war, some system which
will _bear upon all alike_. The volunteer spirit is superb, but the
volunteer system is not a dependable system to which to trust the
life and security of the people, especially in these days when the
highest degree of organization marks all nations with whom we may
possibly have some day differences which will result in the use of
force. The militia, willing as it is, cannot be depended upon as a
reliable military asset. Its very method of control makes it an
undependable force, and at times unavailable. The men and officers
are not at fault; they have done all that could be expected under a
system which renders efficiency almost impossible of attainment. The
militia must be absolutely and completely transferred to Federal
control; it must cease to be a State and become a Federal force,
without any relationship whatever with the State.
The militia must have thoroughly trained reserves sufficient in
number to bring it promptly to war strength. The infantry of the
National Guard, as in the regular army, is maintained on a peace
footing at rather less than half its maximum strength.
For a number of years we have been confronted by conditions which
may involve the use of a considerable force of troops, a force
exceeding the regular army and perhaps even the regular army in
conjunction with the militia. This means that a thousand or more men
would have to be added to each regular and National Guard infantry
regiment to bring it to full strength. In the National Guard only a
small proportion of the men have had long service and thorough
training, and if brought to full strength through the injection of a
thousand practically untrained men it would mean these regiments
would go to the front with not over 30 per cent of well-trained men.
In other words, they would be military assemblages of well-meaning,
but undisciplined and untrained individuals, and unless we are to
repeat the experiences of '98 it will be necessary to hold them for
several months in camp and put them through a course of the most
intensive training. It is probable that if they are called it will
be under an emergency which will not permit such training, and we
shall see again the scenes of '98, untrained, willing boys,
imperfectly equipped under inexperienced officers, rushed to the
front, willing but a more or less useless sacrifice.
Another great lesson should be to heed no longer those false
prophets who have been proclaiming that the day of strife has
passed, and that everything is to be settled by arbitration;
prophets of the class who obstructed preparation in England, who
decried universal military training, and all but delivered her into
the hands of her enemies.
"Our culture must, therefore, not omit the arming of the man. Let
him hear in season that he is born into a state of war, and that
the commonwealth and his own well-being require that he should
not go dancing in the weeds of peace; but warned, self-collected,
and neither defying nor dreading the thunder; let him take both
reputation and life in his hands, and with perfect urbanity dare
the gibbet and the mob by the absolute truth of his speech and
rectitude of his behavior."--EMERSON.
NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR
By REAR ADMIRAL AUSTIN M. KNIGHT, U. S. N.
Although the greatest war in history is not yet at an end, and none
of us can even guess when the end will come, it is possible to draw
certain very important conclusions from the developments to date,
especially in so far as these developments are concerned with war
upon the sea. The great sea fight for which the world has looked
since its two greatest naval powers went to war against each other
has not taken place. It may never take place, although both sides
profess that they are eager for it. And until it does take place,
the final word will not be spoken as to the relations between guns
and armor, between battleships and battle cruisers, or between
either of these types of "capital" ships on the one hand, and the
destroyer and submarine on the other.
The submarine has proven its power, it is true, and against the
battleship; but always where the element of _surprise_ has entered
into its attack in quite a different fashion from that which is
inherent in its always mysterious and stealthy nature. The battle
cruiser has shown the value of speed and long-range guns combined,
but in a comparatively restricted field. The destroyer has played a
part in coast patrol and has doubtless accounted for a number of
submarines; but in its proper sphere of activity it has accomplished
nothing. And the wonderful achievements of the airship have been
practically confined to operations on land. We have waited vainly
and shall continue so to wait for the one supreme lesson which the
war has been expected to yield, unless it chance that on some day to
be forever memorable in the annals of the world there shall sweep
out upon the stormy waters of the North Sea two fleets complete in
every type of craft that human ingenuity has thus far contrived, to
engage in a struggle to the death--a struggle by which the issue of
the war may be decided in an hour, and in a fashion incomparably
more dramatic than anything which the warfare on land, with all its
horrors, has presented or by any possibility can present.
Pending this one great lesson, what is it that the war has taught?
First of all, it has taught once more the old, old lesson that has
been taught by practically every war in which sea power has been a
factor, that where this element is a factor, it is a factor of
decisive importance. The British navy may not win the war for
England, but it is every day more apparent that if the British navy
did not exist, or if it dominated the sea less decisively than it
does, the cause for which England stands would be a lost cause. And
the extraordinary feature of the situation is that the navy is
accomplishing its mission by merely existing. Thus far the "Grand
Fleet" has not struck a blow. From its position on the English coast
it looks across to the mouth of the Kiel Canal, and--waits! Its
patrols are always on guard, the coasts which it defends are never
threatened, and the commerce which trusts to its protection comes
and goes with practically no thought of danger. For several months
during the submarine campaign against commerce, something like
one-half of one per cent of the merchant vessels bound to and from
the ports of England were sunk. But no industry was crippled for a
moment, and neither the necessities nor the luxuries of life were
appreciably curtailed. Even at the height of the submarine
operations, great transports loaded with troops crossed the English
Channel freely, and out of a million and a half of soldiers so
transported not a single one was lost. It is safe to say that in any
three months since the war began the British navy has repaid the
cost of its maintenance for a century in pounds, shillings, and
pence; and in the sense of security which its existence and
efficiency have imparted to the English people, the return upon the
investment has been beyond all calculation.
The first and greatest lesson of the war, then, is this--that the
value of an effective navy, when the time comes for it to manifest
its effectiveness, is out of all proportion to the sums, vast though
these may be, that it has cost; that if it overmatches the opposing
navy decisively enough, the country behind it may rest secure and
serenely indifferent to the thought of invasion or even of attack,
so far as its sea frontier is concerned; and that the navy--still
assuming it to be of commanding strength--may accomplish its whole
mission of defense without ever being called upon to strike a blow.
It can hardly be necessary to point out the fact that this lesson
may be read in terms of "preparedness." The British navy was
prepared when the war began; the British army was not. The German
army was prepared; the German navy was not--in the sense of being
large enough for its mission. With these facts in mind, we have only
to look at the contrast between the progress of the war on land and
that on the sea to read the whole lesson of preparedness in a form
so concrete that it is hard to understand how any observer can fail
to grasp its full significance.
Among the minor lessons of the war, it will probably appear to most
laymen that the unforeseen effectiveness of the submarine is the
most significant. In a way this is true; but the significance of the
lesson may be dangerously exaggerated unless we recognize the part
contributed to the early successes of the submarine by the element
of surprise to which allusion has already been made. When the war
began, the submarine was an untried and an almost unknown weapon,
and the British navy was rather contemptuous of it, or at least
indifferent toward it. Its dramatic appearance in the North Sea at
early dawn of a misty September morning was as great a surprise to
the three British cruisers which it sank in rapid succession as the
story of the disaster was to the world at large. The fact that the
cruisers by their carelessness invited the fate which came to them
does not, of course, deprive the incident of significance. But after
all, the world has never doubted that a submarine could sink a ship
that practically insisted upon being sunk.
As a result of this experience, British men-of-war operating
thereafter in what they considered submarine territory, took
reasonable precautions; and in such waters no other important
successes have been scored against them. But neither to them nor,
probably, to anyone else except their adversaries, did it occur that
a submarine could make its way from the North Sea to the
Dardanelles. And so it came about that when one of them appeared
there, it found conditions again ideal for surprise, and taking
advantage of these conditions delivered its attack and scored a
success as striking as the earlier one in its own home waters.
The activities of submarines against merchant shipping we need not
discuss here. The only lesson they hold for us, from the point of
view of naval warfare, is the lesson that for them, as for all other
activities of the submarine, there is an answer. The answer was not
ready when the war began, but it was not long delayed. We are apt to
think of the submarine as if it always operated under water, and
completely under water. But when it is completely under water, it is
completely blind and as helpless as other blind things are. To see
objects at a distance, it must be on the surface, and to see them
even close at hand it must at least expose its periscope. Having
definitely located an object within easy range, it may wholly
submerge and deliver its torpedo without seeing the target. But the
chance of a hit under these conditions is remote. Normally the
submarine remains on the surface until it sights an enemy. Having
approached as close as seems practicable without danger of being
seen itself, it submerges, _except for the periscope_, and
approaches within range, directing its course and its aim, _by
sight_--not by some occult instinct such as is often attributed to
it. When within a zone where imminent danger threatens, it may
remain wholly submerged for a long period of time, but when so
submerged, it is not in any degree a threat to other craft.
In other words, the submarine is dangerous only when it can see. And
when it can see, it can be seen--not easily perhaps, but certainly
by an observer reasonably close at hand and on the lookout. It is
especially liable to detection from an airship. Moreover, the noise
of its propellers can be heard at a considerable distance, and a
very sensitive microphone has been developed as a submarine
detector. The waters about Great Britain are now patrolled by
hundreds of small, fast craft--destroyers, trawlers, motor
boats--always on the lookout for a periscope or other indication of
the proximity of a submarine. If one is actually seen, its capture
or destruction follows as a matter of course. If the presence of one
is indicated by the microphone or other evidence, such as oil
floating on the water, or bubbles rising to the surface, nets are
lowered and the water dragged for miles around. It is not known how
many submarines have been destroyed by these tactics, but the number
is unquestionably large. Thus the submarine is being robbed of much
of its mystery and much of its terror, and while it remains, and
will always remain, a danger, the lesson of the war is that it must
take its place beside other dangers with which modern war is filled,
as something to be respected and feared, but not as having rendered
the battleship and battle cruiser obsolete.
Another lesson of the war has resulted from the fact that
practically all of the important operations on the British side have
been conducted by battle cruisers, not by battleships. It is not to
be understood from this that the battleship has been discredited,
for such is not the case. The fleet to which reference has already
been made as holding the gates of the North Sea and "containing" the
German fleet behind the fortifications of Helgoland is made up
principally of battleships, and it is largely because they have been
engaged in this important duty that the few opportunities which the
war has offered for active service have fallen to the lot of battle
cruisers. But there are other reasons for this which spring from the
nature of the battle cruiser itself and inhere in the difference
between this type and the battleship. In size the types are
practically identical, and in power of armament the difference is
not great. But the battle cruiser sacrifices much of the armor by
which the battleship is weighted down, and purchases by this
sacrifice a great increase in speed. The typical battleship of
to-day has some 14 inches of armor on the side; the battle cruiser,
from 5 to 9 inches. The battleship has 22 knots speed, the battle
cruiser 32 knots. There has been much discussion as to the relative
merits of the two types, and conservative officers have been slow to
accept the battle cruiser. The war has shown the necessity for both
types, and no better illustration of their relative merits could be
wished than that which is afforded by the spectacle of the
battleships engaged in what is practically a blockade of the German
fleet, while the battle cruisers have swept the German raiders, the
_Scharnhorst_, _Gneisenau_, and their consorts, from the distant
seas which were the chosen field of their operations. Following the
destruction of Admiral Cradock's little squadron by the faster and
more heavily armed _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_, the British
admiralty dispatched a squadron of battle cruisers to run down the
German ships, and in the battle off the Falkland Islands the history
of Coronel was repeated with a change of sides, the fast and heavily
armed battle cruisers under Admiral Sturdee making short work of the
German ships, which they overmatched in speed and range as
decisively as the Germans had overmatched the ships of Admiral
Cradock's squadron at Coronel. In each case victory went to the
ships of high speed and long-range guns, and these two are the
determining characteristics of the battle cruiser. In the action of
January 25, 1915, in the North Sea, the same characteristics won
again. Battle cruisers were engaged on both sides, but the side
which had the advantage in speed and range won the fight.
Thus the battle cruiser had justified itself, and its justification
is one of the striking lessons of the war. We may believe that the
lesson will be emphasized if the time ever comes when this type
finds the opportunity to display its adaptability for work in
certain other fields for which it was originally designed--in
scouting operations, for example, and in flanking movements in
connection with a fleet engagement.
It does not appear that aeroplanes were used for scouting in any of
the operations in the open sea--either as preliminary to the battle
off Coronel and the Falklands, or in the search for raiders like the
_Emden_ and the _Karlsruhe_. They have been used, however, in the
waters about the British Islands, and with such marked success as to
leave no doubt that they would have been of great value in search
operations on a larger scale. They were used also for directing the
fire of ships on the fortifications at the Dardanelles, and the
results indicate that they have an important field of usefulness for
directing the fire of one ship or fleet against another. It is to be
expected that from this time forward, vessels fitted for carrying
and launching both air and water planes will accompany fleets, and
it is impossible to think of a scout to be designed after the
lessons of this war, which will not carry several of them. As the
scouts are the eyes of the fleet, so the aeroplanes will be the eyes
of the scouts, extending the scouting range by several hundred miles
and making secrecy of operations at sea almost as impossible as they
have already made it on land.
Allusion has already been made to the use of aeroplanes--flying not
more than a few hundred feet above the water--for locating
submarines; and it is not difficult to understand how effective a
waterplane would be for destroying a periscope, or even a submarine
itself--this last, perhaps, by dropping a bomb.
The lesson of the torpedo is connected with that of the submarine,
but has many features which are individual to itself. It is known
that within a very few years past the range and accuracy of the
torpedo have greatly increased, but there is little evidence
connecting these features with the performance of torpedoes in the
present war. So far as known, the submarines have done most of their
effective work at short ranges where hits were to be expected. And
no one will ever know how many shots have missed. The great
outstanding lesson thus far is the extraordinary destructiveness of
the torpedoes that have found their mark. It would never have been
believed two years ago that ships like the _Cressy_, _Aboukir_, and
_Hogue_ would turn turtle a few minutes after a single blow from a
torpedo. Still less would it have seemed possible to sink a
_Lusitania_ in fifteen minutes. A torpedo might, of course, produce
an extraordinary effect if it chanced to strike a boiler compartment
or a magazine. But it does not appear that this happened in any one
of the many disasters in question. It has been said that the German
torpedoes carry an exceptionally heavy explosive charge, the extra
weight having been gained by a sacrifice in speed and range. This
may in part explain their effectiveness, but when all allowance is
made for what we know or guess along this and similar lines, the
fact remains that the torpedo has shown itself a weapon of vastly
greater destructive power than the world has heretofore attributed
to it.
The story of the Dardanelles campaign has illustrated again the
futility of attacking land fortifications by battleships. Attacks of
this kind have never succeeded, and the temptation is strong to
accept the theory that in planning these operations the British
anticipated little or no resistance from those in command of the
forts. It was conceivable that the forts could be passed--as were
those at New Orleans and Mobile Bay by Farragut--but not that they
could be reduced by the gun fire of ships. Information is lacking as
to the damage actually done. It was probably greater than the
defenders have admitted; but it evidently fell far short of
silencing the forts. If the world needed a new demonstration of the
power of forts to stand out against ships, we may put this down as
one more lesson of the war.
An important revelation of the war is the smoothness and rapidity with
which large bodies of troops, with all their impedimenta--horses,
artillery, etc.--have been transported by water. This has, of course,
been possible only for Great Britain and her allies, and for them only
because they have held unchallenged the command of the sea. It is
thus, first of all, a confirmation of the lesson with which this paper
opened--the lesson that command of the sea is a factor of the very
first importance in any war in which it is a factor at all. It is
secondarily a lesson in the ease with which a nation which has command
of the sea can, in these days of large fast steamers, transport its
military forces in practically unlimited numbers to any distance that
may be desired. It is thus an answer to the protestations of those who
insist that the United States is secured against the danger of
invasion by the thousands of miles of water which separate its coasts
from those of possible enemies; for it demonstrates what has, from
the day of the first Atlantic crossing by a steamship, become more and
more notably a fact--that the oceans which separate frontiers for
certain purposes, connect them for other purposes and especially for
purposes of transit and transportation. The term "Ocean Highway" is no
mere figure of speech. The millions of troops that have passed by
water from England into France have made the passage with infinitely
less difficulty than has been connected with the further passage by
land to the fighting lines; and the hundreds of thousands from
England, France, India, and Australia, which have assembled in the
Near East could not have covered the distances that they have covered,
if they had moved by land, in ten times the number of days they have
occupied in moving by sea. The sea being clear of enemy ships, the
route from Liverpool to the Dardanelles has been a lane for an easy
and pleasant promenade. With the Atlantic and Pacific controlled by
the fleets of nations at war with us, their waters would invite,
rather than impede, the movement of an army to our shores. It would be
difficult to exaggerate the significance of this lesson for the United
States.
A rather grewsome lesson, but one which cannot be ignored, is that
in a naval battle, there are, at the end, neither "wounded",
"missing", nor "prisoners" to be reported. A ship defeated is, and
will be, in a great majority of cases, a ship sunk; and sinking, she
will sink with all on board. Some few exceptions there may be, but
the rule can hardly fail to be as thus stated. One of the first
things that a ship does in preparing for battle is to get rid of her
boats; and, as both her companions and her opponents are sure to do
the same, her crew can neither help themselves nor look for help
from friends or enemies. The _Good Hope_ and the _Monmouth_ went
down in the battle off Coronel leaving not a single survivor to tell
the story of their destruction. Following the battle off the
Falkland Islands, the British picked up a few survivors from the
German ships, but not enough to contradict the rule. In the running
engagement in the North Sea on January 25, 1915, the _Blücher_ went
down with 650 out of 900 of her crew. Scarcely a man was saved from
the _Cressy_, the _Aboukir_, or the _Hogue_. And so the story runs,
and so it must always run when modern ships fight in earnest.
One of the most striking features of the engagements up to the
present time is the range at which they have been fought. A few
years ago 10,000 yards was considered the extreme range at which
ships would open fire. The ranges used in the Russo-Japanese War
varied from 3,000 to 8,000 yards, and the battle off Tsushima was
decided at less than 6,000 yards. In the present war the ranges have
been nearly three times as great as these. In the battle off
Coronel, the _Good Hope_ was sunk at 12,000 yards, the _Monmouth_ at
a little less. In the battle off the Falkland Islands, both sides
opened fire at 17,000 yards, and the German ships were sunk at
approximately 16,000 yards. The running fight in the North Sea
opened at 18,000 yards, and the _Blücher_ was sunk at 15,000 yards.
This extraordinary increase in the fighting range corresponds in a
measure to an increase in accuracy of fire, but it corresponds also
to a new recognition of the enormous advantage which may result from
a fortunate hit early in the action. The theoretical advantage which
should result from this has been confirmed by practical experience,
and it may be regarded as certain that battle ranges hereafter will
conform more nearly to those off Coronel than to those of Tsushima.
To summarize: The great outstanding naval lesson of the war is this:
That a nation whose navy commands the sea can rest secure, so far as
its sea frontier is concerned, from the fear of invasion or of
serious attack; that, further, its command of the sea insures to its
commerce the freedom of the sea; and that, finally, this freedom
extends equally to its armed forces, to which the highways of the
sea are opened wide, affording a possibility of offense at distant
points which is denied to the forces of the enemy.
Perhaps the lesson second in importance is that, owing to the rapid
march of invention in these days of progress, it is to be expected
that every war which comes suddenly upon the world will come with
certain elements of surprise, some of them startling in their power
and effectiveness, some of them giving promise of much and
accomplishing comparatively little. However surprising and however
effective the best of these may be, they will fall short of
revolutionizing warfare, but they may profoundly modify it; and the
nation which has them ready for use in the beginning will gain an
initial advantage which may go far toward determining the issue of
the war.
Lessons of more limited significance have to do with the
effectiveness of the submarine and the unexpected radius of action
of which it has shown itself capable; the amazing destructive power
of the torpedo; the value of the battle cruiser, both for the
defense of a coast from raiding expeditions, and for operations in
distant seas where speed is needed to bring an enemy to action, and
heavy guns to insure his destruction; the difficulty of reducing
shore fortifications by fire from ships; the necessity of aeroplanes
for scouting at sea, and the modifications in naval strategy and
tactics which will result from their general adoption.
After many months of sparring between the British and German naval
forces in the North Sea, an important engagement took place on May
31, 1916, between the two main fleets. Exactly what forces were
engaged will probably not be known until the end of the war, and it
is certain that we must wait long for definitely reliable reports as
to the losses on the two sides. It is already clear, however, that
the encounter has added little to our knowledge of naval warfare.
British battle cruisers engaged German battleships at close range
and were badly punished. In this there was nothing new or
instructive. Nor has anything new or instructive developed from what
is thus far known of other phases of the battle. Indeed the one and
only striking feature of the battle appears to be the fact that
everything occurred practically as it might have been expected to
occur. Neither submarines nor destroyers, neither Zeppelins nor
aeroplanes provided any startling features. The only lesson thus far
apparent is the old one that while dash and audacity have their
place in warfare, they need the directing and steadying hand of
judgment and of skill.
THE WORLD'S WAR
By FREDERICK PALMER
INITIAL STRATEGY
In innumerable volumes future generations will learn the details of
this war: and the discussions among delving historians will never
end. For our time a simpler task is the service set for us. We
require a record of the essential facts of the struggle arranged
with a sense of historical perspective.
For forty years the great nations of Europe had had universal
service. Every able-bodied youth, unless his government chose to
excuse him, became a soldier. For forty years the diplomatists had
held the balance of power so delicately poised that the mighty armed
forces all kept to their own sides of their frontiers. It was in the
era of modern invention and man's mastery of material power that
these great armies were formed and trained for the war that was to
test their steel.
Where Napoleon marched a hundred thousand men along parallel roads,
the modern general sends his millions on railroad trains. The
problem for each nation when war came was to concentrate with a
greater rapidity than its adversary its enormous masses of men and
guns against the enemy; and success in this was not due as in former
days to speed of foot over good highways such as the Romans and
Napoleon built, but to organized railroad and automobile transport
or rather the prompt employment of all the industrial resources of
the nation for war alone.
Out of the conflicting reports day by day emerge to the observer as
he reviews the progress of the war, with the map before him, plans
of campaign as simple in their broad lines as in Cæsar's or
Alexander's day. Generals fighting with a million or two million men
under their command have held to the same principles as if they had
only ten or fifteen thousand.
All schools of successful warfare have believed in the offensive; in
quick decisive blows which take the enemy by surprise and find him
unready if possible. They hold that the army in rest must always be
beaten by the army which takes the initiative. This partly explains
the frequent small actions indicated by the reports of trenches
taken in assault along the western front, while the lines occupied
by the armies did not radically change. Such actions are the natural
expression by any spirited force of its sense of initiative. Unless
you sometimes take some of the enemy's trenches, he will be taking
yours. By striking him in one section you may prevent him from
striking you in another. Von Moltke and the other great German
generals were only following in the footsteps of Napoleon when they
taught that the offensive should be the first thought of every
soldier.
The offensive naturally seeks to flank its adversary. Lieutenant
General Winfield Scott once stated that if two lines of men, without
any officers, were placed in a field, one line would inevitably try
to get around the end of the other. The immensity of the forces, the
power and precision of modern armies in defense has lengthened the
battle fronts from a mile or a mile and a half in Napoleon's time to
hundreds of miles.
It is an old rule, that you cannot break through a battle front,
which means that you are thrusting in a wedge which will draw fire
on both sides. Pickett tried to break a battle front at Gettysburg.
A frontal attack which was no less pitiful in its results was that
of the Federals at Fredericksburg. Grant's hammering tactics against
Lee succeeded only by the flanking operations of superior numbers.
Strategically, the situation of the Central Powers was extremely
strong. Aside from the fact that their preparedness in numbers of
trained men, in arms and material, is too well known for mention
here, their excellent network of railways enabled them to make
rapid concentration. They had what is known as the interior line,
which gave Meade his advantage at Gettysburg. Whether the interior
line is three miles or a thousand miles long does not affect the
principle involved. Interior lines mean quick transportation of
reserves from point to point in concentration. It does not matter
whether their numbers are hundreds or hundreds of thousands; the
advantage is intrinsically the same. Joffre had probably fifteen
hundred thousand on the interior line of the Marne. Meade had
seventy thousand at Gettysburg.
In keeping with all great plans that of the Central Powers was
extremely simple. Austria was to look after Russia. She could
mobilize more rapidly than Russia, and her army was counted upon to
take the offensive into Russia and deliver a hard blow before the
Russian was ready to receive her. Indeed, the Austrian was to
attempt in the east what the German attempted in the west. The
German army was confident that in any event the slowness of Russian
mobilization would give it time for its daring venture in the west.
As the French, too, had excellent railroad systems, they also would
mobilize rapidly. The full strength of the German army, therefore,
was thrown against the French and the little Belgian army of eighty
thousand ill trained and equipped men in the first month of the war.
By using their interior lines, striking first in the west and then
in the east, the Germans were warranted on paper in counting on
successes that might have ended the war within the first four or
five months.
The frontier of France from Switzerland to Luxemburg, when manned by
the large numbers of the French army, became a battle front. There
was no room for a flanking operation. German ambition for a decisive
and prompt victory over the French army must have room for a turning
movement. The Germans made the invasion of Belgium a military
necessity for their purpose, which was the destruction of the French
army. They had built the great 17-inch mortars for smashing the
Belgian fortresses in order to open the gate for the flood which was
to sweep southward to Paris. These guns were less practicable for
field work or even for trench work, being best against cities and
stationary guns in forts.
Thus the German plan of campaign was fully developed the second day
of the war. It was no longer a secret to the general public, let
alone to the French staff, which recognized that it had to deal with
this effort of the German wing to come through Belgium. A French
movement into Alsace failed. The public reason given for this was
that it was a political demonstration in raising the Tricolor over
the "lost provinces" dear to the heart of every Frenchman.
Another--a military reason--which would seem a more obvious one to
the soldier, was a counteroffensive to draw off the force of the
German offensive at Liege and Namur, hoping thus, at least, while
Liege and Namur were holding the German right in position, to force
the German left to the bank of the Rhine. If you will look at the
map you will see that this strategy becomes transparently
intelligible.
Thus early in August the French were trying to turn the German left,
and the Germans were preparing to turn the French left. Had the
Belgians had anything like an adequate army, had it been skillfully
handled; had the fortress of Namur held ten days as many thought it
would, the German right might have been held long enough to prevent
the Germans forcing a battle on the Marne. By the third week of
August, however, the Germans had won their first point. They had
broken through Namur, so incapably defended. They had broken the
French left, put the British to flight, compelling the withdrawal of
the French from German Lorraine, and now the war in the west was
being waged entirely on French soil.
Technically and strategically the French had been outdone by
superior numbers and the incapable defense of Namur, but no decisive
battle had been fought. Indeed in a maneuver for positions, the
Germans had won. The test was to come on the Marne. Had France been
beaten there, she would have been beaten for good. Her army would
have been so badly shattered that the Germans would then have been
able to have thrown such preponderance of force, in conjunction with
the Austrians, against the Russians that Warsaw (and perhaps
Petrograd) must have fallen in the first year rather than in the
second of the campaign. It would not be going too far to call the
Marne the greatest battle in all history, both because of the
numbers engaged and the result. Barring a later successful German
offensive it decided the fate of France and very likely the fate of
the war. All the trench fighting that followed, after all, only
nailed down as it were the results of the Marne.
The general public taking its news from the daily press, thinks of
the Marne as having been waged mostly in the neighborhood of Paris.
It also wonders why the Germans did not go into Paris when they were
so near. Any entrance into Paris was of secondary and of superficial
consideration. The object of an army is to beat an enemy's army. Had
the German army beaten the French on the Marne, then it had plenty
of time for its entry into Paris. If it lost the battle, it could
not have held Paris.
The fate of Paris was no less decided in eastern France than on the
banks of the Marne. Far and away from a spectacular point of view,
the most interesting portion of that decisive conflict was among the
hills and valleys and woods of Lorraine, where over a front of
eighty miles the Bavarians and the French swayed back and forth in
fierce pitched battle. For the Bavarians were striking at the French
right flank toward the gap of Miracourt and the German Crown Prince
was striking in the Argonne at the same time that Von Kluck was
striking at the French left. The Bavarians and the crown prince
failed, while Von Kluck extended himself too far and was nearly
caught in the pincers by Manoury's new army striking on his flank.
But the vital, the human, the overwhelming factor was that the
French infantry after retreat, when they might have been in
confusion and poor heart, held with splendid stubbornness and
organization under the protection of the accurate fire from their
field batteries of 75's.
It is estimated that the Germans had actually on the front, or
within ready reach of the front in the battle of the Marne,
2,500,000 men, while the French had 1,500,000. As the population of
France is approximately forty-five million and that of Germany
seventy million, the ratio in armed men to population was
substantially the same for either combatant. For any decisive
offensive the Germans needed that percentage of superior numbers.
The fact that they failed carried its own significance.
Though they withdrew they were by no means decisively beaten. It
might be said--to give them the fullest benefit of the doubt--that
they undertook to buy something and the price was too high. To
insist, however, that they did not make their best effort is to
imply that the Germans were unwilling to pay the price for that
decisive victory which would win the war. They could not take the
risk of going too far or pressing too long and too hard; for that
might have meant, with the rapid mobilization of French reserves, a
defeat that would have thrown them clear out of France and lost the
war for them.
The Germans had profited by all the lessons of the Russo-Japanese
War, which taught the importance of trenches to modern armies, and
also the value of high-explosive shells, but their own expenditure
of shells had been far beyond their anticipation, and so far as we
can learn, at the Marne they faced a shortage. They lacked the
munitions to carry on the battle to a conclusion, even if they
possessed the men and the will.
Accepting the principle of the increased power of the defensive of
modern armies, they fell back to the defensive line of the Aisne,
and now the initiative must be with the French. There followed a
movement of precisely the kind characterizing many battles over a
smaller front and that was the extension of the line as reserves
were brought up by either side.
The French tried to flank the German left but the Germans extended
as rapidly as they, until the month of October found both armies
resting one flank on the sea and the other on Switzerland. Still
another reason for the German withdrawals from the Marne was the
loss of the battle of Lublin by the Austrians, due not to the
inferiority of the Austrian troops so much as to bad generalship.
The German staff was warranted by the defeat at Lublin in thinking
that they might have overestimated the Austrian army and
underestimated the Russian. In this case they might face the danger
of an invasion of Germany itself from Russia. Owing to the
heterogeneous character of the Austrian army with its many races and
the many pessimistic prophesies that have been made about the
loyalty of the Slav portions of Austria, which were fulfilled it is
said by the mutiny of some Slav regiments, it looked as if such
apprehensions had been well grounded.
In winning Lublin the Russians had done a distinct service to the
French in relieving pressure at the Marne and by their invasion of
East Prussia they undertook a service of a similar kind. The advance
of the Russian "steam roller" into Prussia so much heralded at the
time amounted to little more than an immense raid, as numbers go in
the greatest struggle of all history.
It won laurels for Von Hindenburg, a retired general, who became the
hero of the war in Germany, again illustrating that in this, as in
other wars, the fortune of circumstances and the character of your
enemy have much to do with the creation of martial glory. For it is
an open question if as a military feat Von Kluck's skillful
extrication of his army from the position beyond Paris is not as
worthy of praise as Von Hindenburg's clever victory of Tannenberg.
Though the German armies had not been able to gain a decisive
victory over the French, they had established themselves on French
soil. All the destructive effects of war must be borne by their
adversary while they could make use of the regions occupied to
supply and feed their troops. They had put the burden of direct
economic waste on the French and deprived them of economic supplies,
while the psychologic value of driving home to the enemy population
the ravages of war is considered important by military leaders.
Nor could the economic advantage be adequately measured by extent of
area occupied; for the one-twenty-sixth of the territory of France
which was held by the Germans represented far more than
one-twenty-sixth of French producing power for war purposes. A
nation's true material wealth in peace may be in its farms and
vineyards, but in war it is in the coal and steel and machine shops.
The "Black Country" of northern France of no interest to the
tourist, plays the same part to industrial France that the
Pittsburgh region plays to industrial America. Besides, with Lille
in German hands, France had lost the income from her export trade in
textiles.
As the Russians for lack of transport were not able to follow up
their success at Lublin, the succeeding weeks showed it to be far
from a decisive victory. The Austrian army soon recovered itself. In
comparison with Russia, both Austria and Germany were highly
organized industrial nations. They had not only been able to put
larger forces into the field at the outset than their adversaries,
but they had the resources in guns and rifles, and in the factories
for the manufacture of munitions, which enabled them to increase
their actual fighting forces faster than their adversaries, and to
supply them with larger quantities of munitions.
The German army was established in well-chosen positions in France,
which might be impregnable against even forces as superior as three
to one; the Austrian army was safely established in front of the
Russians. Both the French and the Russians were short of munitions,
and particularly of guns of heavier caliber, and of high-explosive
shells, which had become most essential in trench warfare.
Relatively, the Germans were depending upon their guns to hold the
Aisne line, while the Allies were depending upon the flesh and blood
of infantry. Germany was rushing every trained man she had to the
front and training a million volunteers. Now she could spare troops
moved by her efficient railroad system, taking advantage of the
interior line for Von Hindenburg to make a drive toward Warsaw,
where he repeated the same maneuver, in keeping with German practice
of the advance to the Marne. After his drive, he fell back from
Warsaw, and intrenched for the winter.
An unskilled garrison of Belgians held Antwerp, which was on the
flank of the German forces in Belgium. The fall of this fortress
meant the release of a considerable force of Germans, and allowed
their heavier concentration toward northwestern France. Having
failed to defeat the French at the Marne, which would have dropped
not only the ports of Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne, but also Havre,
like ripe plums into their basket, the Germans next sought to take
Calais, which is twenty-two miles from the coast of England. With
Calais went the possession of all Belgium, a strip of northern
France, and a foothold on the coast within twenty-two miles of
England, and with the free sweep of the Atlantic past the narrow
English Channel in front. Von Moltke, the chief of the German staff,
who was retired about this time, was said to have still favored the
greater conception of a decisive victory over the French army by an
attack on Verdun instead of on the Channel ports; and the kaiser's
own idea was said to have prevailed against his.
Now the allied armies in the west were to face a test second only to
that of the Marne. The British army, which had been in the
neighborhood of Soissons, had moved down to the left flank, hoping
to assist in a successful turning movement. Their little force was
being increased by every reserve that they could muster and arm.
From India they brought their native troops, long-service men
trained by British officers. These, at a time when every man of any
kind was needed, were thrown into the crucible of the coming
conflict, which reached its climax during the last days of October
in the chill rains and mists of Flanders, with rich fields of a flat
country turned into a glutinous mud.
Meanwhile, in a futile attempt, the British rushed small forces of
marines to the assistance of the Antwerp garrison. With Antwerp
theirs, the Germans were free to concentrate against the Channel
ports. Once more the offensive was entirely with them in the west.
They even brought into action some of the regiments of volunteers
who had been enlisted in August; and following the German system of
expending a fresh regiment in a single charge, these new levies were
sent in masses to the attack. The Belgians, including those who
escaped from Antwerp and from being driven into Holland, rested
their left on the sea. Some sixty thousand were all they could
muster out of a population of seven millions for the defense of the
sliver of country that still remained under their flag. A type of
man-of-war which was supposed to be antedated, the monitor, with its
low draft and powerful guns was brought into action by the British
in protecting the Belgians, who finally saved themselves by flooding
their front.
Next to the Belgians was a French army, and next to them the British
army, which shared with the French the brunt of the attack in that
sector around the old town of Ypres, which was to give its name to
the Ypres salient, the bloodiest region of this war, and of any war
in the history of Europe.
So far as one can learn, the losses of the British and the French
here were about 150,000, and of the Germans, about 250,000. Within
the succeeding year, probably another 200,000 men of both sides were
killed and wounded in the same locality. At the lowest estimate,
100,000 men have been killed outright in the Ypres salient, without
either side gaining any appreciable advantage. British regiments
held in the first battle of Ypres in some cases when they had a loss
of 80 per cent.
Both Germans and Allies fought in icy water up to their hips. Many
who survived succumbed to the cold. Lacking proper artillery
support, the British used to cheer when the Germans charged, as that
meant the end of shell fire, and they could come to close quarters
with the bayonet. Little by little, but grudgingly, they had to
yield against that persistent foe. The German staff was at its best
in its organized offensive, and the British at their best
"sticking," as they call it--and the prize was an arm of salt water,
to be all Ally or part German. When the Germans gave up the
struggle, they had the advantage of ground and the British stayed
where they were. Whether or not the Allies should have evacuated
Ypres and the deadly Ypres salient and withdrawn to better strategic
positions will ever be a subject of discussion; but the loss of the
city at the time would have had a moral effect on the situation of
the Allies, and the political consideration may have outweighed the
military.
Thus the campaign of the first summer and fall came to an end. The
Allies had failed in their hope of keeping the German within his
borders; and the German had failed to win any decisive victory
which could enforce peace on all or any one of the Allies.
The casualties, on account of the vast numbers engaged, had been
staggering. Germany held a small strip of Poland, and about the same
amount of territory in France that she was to hold a year later,
while Russia held a large section of Galicia. Where the armies had
operated, lay broad belts of ruins, destroyed at enormous cost by
shell fire. The moralist might well ask if the nations would have
entered the war if they could have foreseen the result of their
first four months' struggle.
SEA POWER
For any adequate understanding of the strategy of the war as a
whole, the trench line from Switzerland to Flanders must be extended
to the east of England across the North Sea to Iceland. This war has
again demonstrated the enormous value of sea power.
Glance at a map of the globe and you will see how small a portion of
it is occupied by the great nations of Europe, which for 2,000 years
have been the most vital and influential political, commercial, and
intellectual force in the world. The present nations are for the
most part only the modern expression of the vigorous races which
Cæsar found and conquered. They have been in continual competition
and in frequent wars.
The Russians have had only a little hold on the sea--in the Black
Sea and in the Baltic; the Germanic peoples have had the Baltic and
the North Sea; France faces the Mediterranean and the Atlantic; and
only twenty-two miles from France is the island of Britain and
Ireland, and other little islands, or what are known as the British
Isles, whose superficial area is less than that of France or
Germany.
Look again at the map, at the location of the British Isles and
Germany. Mark them in black, if you will, and those two little
points represent the two great antagonists in the war. Then turn the
globe around slowly, and you come to Canada, stretching from the
frontier of the United States to the Arctic, and across the Pacific
to Australia and Hongkong, the Straits Settlements and Ceylon,
India, and then in Africa, the most valuable of all its area--and
you have the dominions and the colonies of the British Empire!
Between Germany and the rest of the world is the British navy. Every
German ship which sails the trade routes of the earth must go past
the British threshold. Germany, with a rapidly increasing
population, with an imperial patriotism which discouraged emigration
to foreign countries, wished to extend her domain; she wanted room
in which German national ambition could expand.
Through all her history, Britain has had one eye on the continent
and one on the seas. Continental affairs concerned her only so far
as they meant the rise of any power which might threaten her
dominion of the seas. The silver-pewter streak of channel kept her
safe from invasion by any continental power, yet she could land
troops across the Channel and throw the weight of her forces in the
balance when her dominion was threatened. It is her boast that she
has always won the "last battle," which is sufficient. She had only
30,000 troops in the allied army under Wellington, which delivered
the finishing blow to Napoleon.
Twenty years ago, when the German navy was in its infancy, her
policy was one of splendid isolation. France then was the second
naval power, and Russia the third. The British naval program was
superior to any two continental powers. The increase in German
population and in trade and wealth brought with it an increase in
the German navy, until Germany, with her ally, Austria, became the
threatening continental factor to British security.
Now Britain formed a combination for defense with Russia and France.
Her military part was to send 120,000 troops across the Channel to
cooperate with the French army against the Germans. She was the only
one of the great nations, except the United States, that depended
upon a regular army, which was occupied mostly in policing her
empire. Aside from her regulars, her only military organization were
her Territorials, which were something on the same order as the
American National Guard.
The number of men which she could throw across the Channel was
therefore insignificant, compared to the great hordes of the
European armies. Her real part was command of the sea. She was
either to destroy the German navy or make it helpless in interfering
with allied trade on the seas. Her Government was Liberal, her
people as a whole skeptical of the possibility of a European war.
For centuries they had been bred to believe that her security was in
her fleet. She had long enjoyed her empire, she possessed immense
capital, and her inclination was toward complacency, while Germany's
was that of the eager newcomer to power.
The situation in Ireland on account of the passage of the Home Rule
Bill had become so strained that many people believed civil war to
be inevitable. The conviction of the German Ambassador in London, as
well as most German observers, was that Britain would not actually
enter the war, when the test came. Upon her decision, it is now
evident, depended the fate of Europe. With England out, the French
army could not have saved France. For then, Germany could have had
the freedom of the seas. Her navy would have sent the French into
harbor, closing not only every French, but every Russian port to the
entrance of supplies and munitions, which would have meant food
scarcity in France, and utter scarcity of munitions in Russia.
German troops could have landed in France to the rear of the French
army. The whole complexion of the war would have been changed. So
well laid were their plans, so sure were they of their numbers of
men and guns, which they could promptly concentrate, that there
seems little question of the ability of the Central Powers to have
crushed France in the first three months of the war, and then to
have won a decisive victory over Russia, bringing home from either
country great indemnities, and, with Germany, if she choose,
annexing northern France and Belgium.
Thus the Central Powers would have established themselves so
strongly as the dominant nations of Europe, that Germany with her
seventy millions of people could have directed her energy as the
next step in her career against the Mistress of the Seas.
Had Belgium not been invaded, it is questionable if the British
public would have favored joining in the war. But this aroused
public indignation to the breaking point in support of the war
members of the cabinet. Sir Edward Grey, the British Minister of
Foreign Affairs, had his way.
The British navy was as thoroughly prepared for an emergency as the
German army. It had no illusions as to the nature of its task or of
its responsibility to the nation. Britain had superior resources in
shipbuilding to Germany. She had a fleet superior in every class of
ship, and she had led the world in naval progress--both her
dreadnoughts and her battle cruisers being of a later type than her
rival's. Her desire, inevitably, was that the German fleet should
come out at once and give battle. Confident of the outcome, she
contemplated the removal of her rival from the seas at a single
blow.
German naval policy was as careful to avoid this test as British was
to invite it. The German navy was kept safely at anchor in Kiel,
protected by immense fortress guns, by elaborate mine fields, scores
of submarines and destroyers, and by numerous nets against the
approach of any British submarine. There was no way for any enemy to
reach it except by the air. The Germans would have located any
British attempt to attack their navy, as it might have meant the
loss of important British fighting units which would have given the
Germans more nearly equal chances of victory if they chose to
precipitate an engagement. Sir John Jellicoe, in command of the
fleet, however, refused to take any risks of losing his units. He
kept his fleet in harbor, ready at any moment to steam out into the
North Sea for action. Throughout the war to this writing, not one of
his great first-class battleships has fired a shot, with the
exception of the _Queen Elizabeth_, which took part in the
bombardment of the Dardanelles forts.
Superiority of gun power has been sufficient to keep England safe
from invasion, German merchant ships from sailing the seas, protect
the sea passage of millions of troops, and insure the occupation of
the German colonies by British expeditionary forces. Except as it
was raised over a submarine or commerce raider, the German flag was
swept from the sea within the first six months of the war.
There has been no naval battle at all commensurate with the strength
of the two fleets. Each time that a British and German ship have met
in action, the overwhelming importance of speed and of gun range
have been demonstrated. Speed and range enabled Von Spee to destroy
Cradock's squadron at Coronel off Chile, with almost no loss to
himself. Later at the Falkland Islands he suffered the same fate at
the hands of Sturdee, who, with his second-class battle cruisers,
had the speed and range of the German third-class.
Again, in the battle off Dogger Bank, the _Blücher_, the
second-class battle cruiser which had only 26 knots, was left behind
by her sisters, the German first-class battle cruisers, while she
was pounded into the sea by the _Lion_, the _Tiger_, and the
_Princess Mary_, which were driving ahead at 30 knots. The honors of
the war, so far as the offensive goes, therefore, have been with the
last battle cruiser.
German naval policy, no less wise for its own ends than for the
British, has depended upon the submarine, whose importance may be
easily exaggerated and easily underestimated. No submarine can
approach the major fighting ships of a great fleet when that fleet
is properly protected by torpedo-defense guns and fast destroyers
and light cruisers. The deciding test of a submarine's power in this
respect was the fruitless attempts of the best German submarines to
reach the _Lion_ with a deathblow, when crippled, after the battle
off Dogger Bank, she was being towed home at 5 knots an hour, under
the protection of the destroyers.
However, any isolated vessel, whether a merchantman or a man-of-war,
is at the mercy of a submarine, which hunts the seas for this kind
of target. It has only to lie in wait on the trade routes until its
prey appears, submerging in case of danger. Then a torpedo sent home
and a valuable piece of property goes to the bottom of the sea. What
resourceful brigandage is to traffic on the highways, the German
submarine became to British traffic on the seas. It is the sniper of
naval warfare, but cannot give battle. It must find its protection
under the sea, while all freight and all passengers, all the world's
business is done on the surface of the sea; and the great guns of
the dreadnoughts command the surface.
[Illustration: George V, King of Great Britain and Emperor of
India.]
When brigandage becomes highly organized, it means enormous expense
in increased police work, particularly if you cannot trail the
brigands to their hiding places and force them to capitulate. In
this case the brigands' hiding places are under the protection of
powerful fortress guns and mine fields in secure harbors.
The British navy, with over three thousand ships, including mine
sweepers and auxiliaries of all sorts under Sir John Jellicoe's
command, was forced to go to immense expense and pains in combating
the submarine campaign. Many submarines were taken; but the Germans
kept on building them. It was a war against an unseen and cunning
foe, which required ceaseless vigilance and painstaking effort. The
amount of material, as well as the amount of ships required in order
to combat the submarines and also to keep the patrol intact from the
British channel to Iceland, could it be enumerated, would stagger
the imagination. Meanwhile, England had to go on building new
dreadnoughts and cruisers and destroyers at top speed, with a view
to increasing her rate of naval superiority over the Germans. Once
the German fleet had come out and been beaten, then the British
would be secure in victory, and they could spare many guns for the
army and devote all their energy to the land campaign.
While the Germans had a "fleet in being," they had an important
counter for peace negotiations. They were as rightly advised in
sticking to their harbor, as the British in holding their command of
the sea without risking their units by trying to force an entrance
into harbors equipped with every known defense of modern warfare.
In all instances the British army must wait for material if navy
demands were unsatisfied. With the tide of fortune going against the
Russians and French on the Continent, the original agreement for
only 120,000 men became entirely perfunctory, in view of the tragic
necessity of more troops to be thrown against the Central Powers on
the Continent. With a large proportion of her regular officers
killed in the first two months of the war, Britain had to undertake
the preparation of a vast army without adequate drill masters or
leaders. She had to make wholly untrained civilians into soldiers
while the war was being waged. This took time, but less time than
for the manufacture of rifles and guns. She had everything necessary
for supplying her navy, but ridiculously inadequate plants for
supplying a force of soldiers so immense. Thus England had scores of
battalions of excellently drilled soldiers prepared to go to France
before there were any rifles for them to fight with, or before they
had the all-important artillery for their support in battle.
In the early months of the war probably she was not awake to the
necessity of the situation. Besides, her manufacturers, still
confident of an early victory over Germany, were more interested in
permanently gaining markets which the Germans would lose than in
making munitions. The war was not brought home to the Englishman as
it was to the German and the Frenchman, by having bloody lines of
trenches on his own soil. Every British soldier was fighting across
the seas in the defense of the soil of another nation. Naturally, in
many cases, he was slow to a realization that this also was his own
national defense. But by the volunteer system alone, England
enlisted over two million men before conscription was threatened.
In order to centralize authority under a single man, Lord Kitchener
was intrusted with the stupendous task of organizing the new army
and seeing that it was properly equipped. He had foreseen at the
start that the war would be long and that it would be nearly two
years before England could throw anything like an armed force
adequately representing her population into the struggle on the
Continent. He had to train his officers at the same time that he
trained his men and build guns and make rifles.
Meanwhile, the German army system was complete. Indeed, there was no
want of men with military experience in any one of the continental
countries to act as drill masters. England was attempting a feat
equaled only in our Civil War, where vast armies of untrained men
were raised. But in this case, the enemy was not composed also of
recruits, but of men trained under universal service by a staff
which had traditions of preparedness as a basis for the preparation
before the war, while the British staff and the British army had
been trained in the handling of small, mobile forces in policing
their empire. But as the months wore on, it was evident that the
military decision of the war might rest with this new army when the
other armies were exhausted, when at last it reached the front in
full force with adequate arms and equipment in the hope of repeating
history, thanks to the command of the sea which gave Britain time to
prepare--by winning the last battle.
Had Britain lost command of the sea early in the war, she would have
been utterly helpless. The Germans could readily have landed a force
that would have taken London in six weeks. Even this would have been
an unnecessary military action. For, with her food supply shut off
by German ships, Britain would have had to throw up her hands and
ask for terms.
The Dominion of Canada, Australasia and South Africa would have
found themselves in the position of isolated nations, dependent for
the time being upon their own resources for defense. Their loyalty
to the British Empire has not been the least wonderful of the many
wonderful results of this war. They have sent legions of volunteers
across the seas to France and Gallipoli to fight beside the British
and the French. As for Hongkong, the Straits Settlements, Ceylon,
India, and all the colonies of the empire, they would have been
Germany's for the occupation. Such is the meaning of sea power. But
the British navy being superior to the German, held Germany in
siege.
THE SECOND SUMMER'S CAMPAIGN
Germany must make the best possible use of her comprehensive
industrial organization and of her preparedness for war and throw
the greatest possible number of men into the fighting line at the
earliest possible moment. She was practically in a race against
time; and time was with the Allies. While they retained command of
the sea the United States and other neutral nations overseas, once
their plants for manufacture were completed, could pour out supplies
of munitions.
Germany's foreign trade was practically at a standstill. From the
port of Hamburg her argosies of manufactures no longer went forth to
the world in return for raw material. Her many ships, from the
enormous passenger steamers to the small tramps which had brought
her tribute with their carrying trade, were idle. She could
manufacture, then, only for home consumption and all her plants that
had been manufacturing for export began producing for her armies.
The energies of the one hundred and twenty-five millions of people,
men, women and children, in Germany and Austria-Hungary were wholly
occupied in making war. Their object must be to push the walls back
as far as they could, and so to punish Russia or France that one or
the other would yield a separate peace. The aim of British
statesmanship must be to hold the Allies together at any expense and
keep Germany from breaking the siege. If more nations could be
brought in against Germany, that would strengthen the siege lines
and lengthen the front the Central Powers were building.
Through the winter of 1914-15 the diplomats of the Allies and the
Central Powers in Rome fought for Italy's hand with all the skill
and resources of trained European diplomacy. Responding to the
sentiment for the recovery of Trentino and Trieste which she
considered ethnologically and geographically a part of her domain
she was to throw in her fortunes with the Allies against her old
enemy, Austria.
Serbia had her troops still on the boundary of the Danube and the
Save. Rumania, facing Austria with Russia on her flank, also much
courted, was even more coy than Italy. Bulgaria, with her excellent
army, was on the flank of Serbia and blocked the road to Turkey.
Little Greece was another state watching the conflict with the
selfish interest of a small spectator, trying to judge which side
would be the victor.
Russia of the steppes and the multitudes of men was short of
munitions; her plants were incapable of making sufficient supplies.
The Baltic was closed to her by the German navy, Archangel was
frozen in and the closing of the passage of the Dardanelles shut her
off from the Mediterranean. She was in touch with the sea only in
the Far East, with the Pacific Ocean and the Rocky Mountains between
her and the manufacturing regions of the United States. Her crop of
wheat, which she exchanged for manufactured goods in time of peace
was no less interned than the manufactured products of Germany. If
the Dardanelles were opened she could empty her granaries and
receive arms and munitions in return. Therefore, the first winter of
the war, while their main armies were intrenched in colder climes,
both sides turned their attention to the southeast. In November the
Turks had joined the Central Powers, thus flying in the face of the
historical Turkish policy, so cleverly applied by Abdul Hamid, in
playing one European power against another and profiting by their
international differences.
For many years German diplomacy, capital and enterprise had been
busy building up German influence in Asia Minor. Abdul Hamid had
been overthrown under the leadership of Enver Pasha and other
officers who had been trained in Germany according to German
military methods and who had absorbed the German ideas. Von der
Goltz, a German general, had reorganized the Turkish army. The
access of Turkey to the Central Powers formed the addition of
another thirty million people, which gave them one hundred and fifty
million on their side.
Through the assistance of the Turks, the Germans never for a moment
deserting their idea of keeping the initiative and forcing their
enemies to follow it, threatened an offensive against the Suez
Canal, which was abortive, but served the purpose of requiring
British preparation for its defense. Germany saw more than mere
military advantage in the Turkish adventure. She was reaching out
into the Mohammedan world which stretches across Persia and Asia
Minor, through little known and romantic regions, to India where, as
a part of her Indian Empire, England rules more Mohammedans than the
population of the German Empire. The unrest which was reported to
have been ripe in India for the last decade might thus be brought to
a head in a rebellion against British authority; as it might, too,
in Egypt, the Sultan of Turkey being the Padishah or head of the
Mohammedan faith.
At least Britain would be forced to maintain larger garrisons than
usual both in Egypt and India against any threat of insurrection.
Among all who have had to deal with the Oriental peoples, and
particularly those who know them as intimately as the British rulers
of India, the importance of power--and publicly demonstrated
power--is fully understood. To the average British Indian or
Egyptian subject, Britain has been an unconquerable country, the
mistress of the world.
Many reasons united in calling for some action on the part of the
British to offset that of the Germans. With Russia in retreat the
Balkan States, which had regarded her prowess as irresistible, were
losing their faith in the Allies. One successful blow would do more
to dispel their skepticism and to bring Italy in on the side of the
Allies than sheafs of diplomatic cablegrams and notes. During such a
crisis every message in the game of war diplomacy becomes only a
polite calling card that represents armed men.
The British decided to take the initiative though their new army had
as yet received hardly sufficient training to make them soldiers and
their supply of rifles, guns and munitions was insufficient. Indeed,
England was just beginning to awaken fully to the fact that the
forces of France and Russia alone were insufficient to cope on land
with the Central Powers, particularly now that the weight of Turkey
was thrown in the balance.
With her casualties three times the number of her original
expeditionary force, with more than the original number of her army
engaged in Flanders, she undertook an offensive against
Constantinople itself. Second-class men-of-war which were not
required with the grand fleet and a single first-class dreadnought
of the latest type, the _Queen Elizabeth_, in conjunction with a
French squadron, bombarded and reduced the ancient forts at the
entrance to the Dardanelles and then attacked those in the narrows.
British bluejackets even smoked their pipes and cracked jokes as
they sat on the crest of Achi Baba, which became an impregnable
Turkish position after the British Mediterranean force was landed.
Had the _Queen Elizabeth_ been able to fire an army corps ashore,
the corps could have marched on into Constantinople.
The success or failure of the Gallipoli expedition depended upon
surprise. Superficially it seems a colossal blunder. There are
inside facts about it which have never been disclosed. Greece, it is
supposed, agreed to send troops, but at the last moment changed her
mind. Undoubtedly the expedition was an important influence in
bringing Italy in. There was a fatal delay in its departure from
Alexandria. Too much time elapsed between the preparatory
bombardment and the landing. The Turks had been forewarned what to
expect. They had leisure for concentration and preparation. On a
narrow front of difficult shore where the landing was to be made,
they had stretched their barbed-wire entanglements into the sea
itself, while along the beach were carefully concealed machine guns
and back of them ample forces of men and artillery.
No effort in history was ever more gallant than that of the British
force, including the Australians, which threw itself ashore in the
face of simply insurmountable obstacles and fire, under the cover of
the guns of the men-of-war. As a surprise, the affair was a complete
failure. Its only chance of success being as a surprise, most
competent military leaders and experts agree that this was
sufficient reason, in a military sense, for an immediate withdrawal;
yet British stubbornness would not yield.
Indeed, the Gallipoli expedition was a political move, a violation
of the true military principle--that you should always go against
the main body of your enemy, which was at this time on the frontiers
of Russia and France. Of course the effort was not entirely without
its compensations; no expedition is, which holds any part of the
enemy's troops in place in front of your own. The pressure was
withdrawn from the Russians in the Caucasus and also further
adventures from the outskirts of Asia Minor toward India in stirring
up the Mohammedan population were for the time abated.
The attempt to reach the heart of Turkish power, the sultan's
capital itself, by opening these famous straits and sending British
ships to lay Constantinople under their guns, was a splendid
conception worthy the military imagination of the daring ages when
the British Empire was built and the days of the Spanish Main, but
the only criterion in the ghastly business of war remains success.
Yet the spring of 1915 opened with no rebellion in India except
sporadic outbreaks of the frontier tribes which are always
recurring, while Egypt itself remained peaceful. The Germans
inaugurated their second year's campaign by closing the Belgo-Dutch
frontier and by the administrative use of every possible means for
safeguarding their movements on the western front, which would
indicate that they were to undertake another effort for the Channel
ports. This was an obvious feint to conceal an effort elsewhere.
Instead of using troops to make it, they tried out for the first
time a form of warfare which was not new in the consideration of any
army, though it had not been used because it was considered inhuman.
With the wind blowing in the right direction, the Germans released
an immense cloud of chlorine gas. Its gravity held it close to the
ground as it swept down upon the British and French in the famous
Ypres salient. The effort was successful beyond their expectation,
more successful than they realized and had they had sufficient
reserves to press on, they might have broken the allied line at this
point.
The effect of the gas was that of a horrible form of asphyxiation;
the soldiers who did not succumb retreated in face of a weapon which
could not be countered by any in their possession. The casualties
were heavy, the sufferings of the wounded indescribable in their
torment. From the military point of view, which holds that war is
killing and that any method whatsoever is warrantable, the attack
was a success as it gained ground, and for the time being confused
the enemy. But it was a form of attack which could succeed only
once. After the soldiers were provided with proper respirators
containing a chemical antidote, they were in no danger of being
"gassed." Among those in the thick of the gas attack were the first
Canadian contingent, who bore themselves with unflinching fortitude,
not only that, but after the first surprise of the attack was over,
the survivors charged with rare heroism.
Strategy which formerly meant the swift movement of a few thousand
troops to one flank or another overnight, or in a two or three-hour
march, now means the concentration of hundreds of thousands by
railway trains upon a particular point and of many thousands of guns
and enormous quantities of material of every kind from shells to
that for building railroads to keep up with your advance.
But the general of to-day no less than the general of yesterday,
would always know where his enemy is most vulnerable, and strike him
at that point. In the spring of 1915, the line of least resistance
for the German army was obviously to the east where the loose
organization of the Russian army, lacking munitions, was stretched
over a front of over a thousand miles.
The French were better off in munitions, and their army and the
British had a front of four hundred and fifty miles of intact trench
line. It is estimated that in order to hold a battle front with
modern troops, about three thousand men to the mile are required.
This does not mean that there are three thousand actually on every
mile; but counting the thin line in the trenches, the thicker line
in the reserve trenches and the soldiers who are out of the trenches
resting and the battalions in reserve and the reserve supplies of
men in the depots who can promptly be brought into action.
For example, to hold a mile of the famous Ypres salient might
require double the number of men necessary to hold a mile where the
lay of the ground was in the favor of your troops. Owing to the use
of motor trucks and to railway trains, whenever there is an attack,
concentration of men at any point is very rapid. Holding to this
rule, the Germans maintained all through the summer of 1915,
1,500,000 men on their western front, and they had that number at
least to spare for their eastern front. Field Marshal von Hindenburg
said that by hammering he would get Warsaw, and he was to keep his
word with stolid German persistence. Napoleon, who had depended upon
the number of his guns, would have fully appreciated the
Austro-German plan of action against Russia.
The Russian army has been compared to cotton wool. The farther you
went into Russia, the more cotton wool there was. The Russian army
would yield, but there never seemed any end of it. Gaining a passive
victory over the Russian army has also been compared to brushing the
snow off the front doorstep. The more you brushed, the more snow
banked up. Russia could afford to lose territory equivalent to the
area of all France without having received a vital blow. Russia has
plenty of room in which to retreat, as Napoleon learned. She is
confident in the safety of her distances. When the enemy falls back
she follows on his heels.
At the end of the winter, 1914-15, she was still in the possession
of a large portion of Galicia. But the Germans were preparing a
battering ram which their generals thought irresistible. Their plan
now was to deliver so hard a blow at the Russian that he would be
forced to yield a separate peace. Von Mackensen formed his
unprecedented phalanx of soldiery and of artillery in Galicia and
destroying all the fortifications and covering the trenches with
torrents of shell fire he skillfully worked his legions forward,
first breaking the Przemysl line, which compelled a general retreat,
and then breaking the Lemberg line. Thus, having beaten back the
Russian left wing, the Austro-Germans turned their attention to the
Warsaw front and there repeated the same organized machine method of
warfare. There were no brilliant strokes of genius, but merely the
use of superior systems of railroads in making the concentration; of
trained engineers and workmen in advancing the railroad lines; of
systematic overwhelming attacks at critical points, directed by the
unsurpassed German staff organization.
With the fall of Warsaw the Russian army was inevitably badly
broken. They had lost multitudes of prisoners, and staggering
quantities of material. But still it remained an intact army. It was
not decisively beaten. The prisoners were taken by brigades,
regiments, and divisions--thousands of them in reserve, without a
rifle in their hands, as they waited their turn to pick up the rifle
of a dead man. For six months, March to August, the greatest of all
campaigns in numbers of troops and length of line continued in the
east, Von Mackensen and the Austrians striking in the south and Von
Hindenburg in the north. Its details will be read in the history
which follows. Characteristic of either adversary was his method.
The German with concentration of population, resources, artillery,
soldiery, and organization, and the Russian part, glamorous, slow,
yielding to the terrific blows, flowing back like an ebb tide, and
taking his time, never risking a decision, his army never surrounded
or cut in two.
While Von Hindenburg's guns were hammering the Russians in front,
German political influence was occupied in Petrograd in the rear,
where certain official circles were under German influence in the
hope of getting Russia to capitulate. The situation was the most
critical for the Allies since the Battle of the Marne. A most
influential court party was undoubtedly in favor of capitulation.
Russia was bleeding cruelly. She was suffering the psychological as
well as the material effects of defeat. In Paris and London the
possibility of having to go on with the war without the Russian's
assistance had become a serious consideration. In short, the fate of
Europe was then in the hands of diplomatic and court intrigue.
According to the accounts it was the mass of the Russian people
whose pressure undoubtedly defeated the aims of German diplomacy.
Uninformed of the real situation, conscious only of the enormous
cost of the war in blood and treasure, their spirit of race
patriotism was undaunted. They realized if Russians in high places
did not, that surrender by Russia then meant a defeat, which would
set the Russian power back for another fifty years. England could
make peace and be in possession of more territory than she had at
the beginning of the war. France could be certain of retaining what
she had before the war. But Russia had not only lost Poland, but the
Slav had bowed the knee to the Teuton.
At the same time there was widespread unrest among the Russian
people. They felt that they had deserved victory, but had been
denied it. It was not a question of the grand duke's skill in
conducting the retreat from Warsaw, or his indomitable will and
sturdy patriotism, but of satisfying popular sentiment. The
announcement that the czar himself was to take command unified and
heartened the Russian people, who felt that "The Little Father" was
the natural God-given head of the army.
There was discontent in Russia too, with the situation on the
western front. All the news that Russia had from France was of an
occasional hundred or five-hundred-yard trench won or lost, while
the Russian army had been swept from Galicia and been swept back
again and had gone through the fearful ordeal of the retreat of July
and August. Why shouldn't France and Britain do something to release
the pressure on the Russians? For not the least of the advantages
the Central Powers had had was single-headed direction. They
represented one united force, working out a consistent and simple
plan of campaign. But Russia, England, and France had to cooperate
in council.
With Russia so hard pressed and with the danger of her yielding to
the Germans so deeply impressed on London and Paris there was
nothing for the French staff to do but to respond by some sort of
action in loyalty to her allies as a matter of military necessity if
not of military wisdom. The attacks in Artois had fully demonstrated
the arduousness and cost of any such undertaking, particularly until
there was an unlimited supply of shells to draw on. A gain of two or
three miles' depth on a front meant no positive advance for either
side, but rather a waste of life. Indeed, any considerable attack on
that western trench line which did not actually break the line must
be considered a failure. And against their will, no doubt, the
French and British undertook another offensive on September 25,
1915.
On many sections of the western front the nature of the ground makes
an attack absolutely unfeasible. The place chosen by the French was
the Champagne region, in the neighborhood of the great army review
ground of Châlons. It is a rolling, sterile country, dotted with
sparse roads. There is a thin loam over a subsoil of chalk--excellent
for the defensive, but also permitting the rapid movement of artillery
troops in dry weather.
So far as can be learned the Germans had already given up their
offensive in Russia before the French began theirs. At least they
were well advised that the French offensive was under way, and they
needed to know it only a week beforehand, in order to transfer
reserves from their eastern front, which they brought to the number
of 300,000, concentrating them mostly in the Champagne region, where
they were to be needed. Coincident with the Champagne attack, the
British, who are for command purposes a part of the French army,
launched one in the region of Loos.
In northern France the country was extremely difficult, and as
unsuited for offense as the rest of the ground occupied by the
British. Aside from their object in assisting the Russians, the
French hoped to break the line. In this they failed. Over a
twelve-mile front they gained depths varying from one-half to three
miles; and altogether, with the British, they took some 25,000
prisoners and 160 guns. Both the numbers of prisoners and of guns
were small compared with the "bags" on the eastern front. But the
character of the fighting, the heavy volume of artillery fire and
extraordinary coordination of the first-class fighting units by the
most skilled armies in history, make this action memorable in
military annals in the same way as the German attack on Verdun in
the following February. The ground lost in no wise endangered the
German tenancy of their line.
Along the Italian front the summer had developed something of the
same kind of stalemate that had existed in France. Fighting in the
Alpine country so favored the defense that the Austrians did not
have more than three or four hundred thousand troops engaged in
holding the Italians in position. Therefore it had been easy for
anyone taking a superficial view to exaggerate the military value of
Italy's entry into the war. The Austrian troops had fought with
extreme tenacity, for naturally the Austrian staff had sent against
the Italians all those troops in Franz Josef's heterogeneous empire
who had any racial antagonism against the Italians, including those
who had been lukewarm in fighting against the Slav.
Unquestionably, honors at the end of the campaign in 1915 were with
Germany. She had held her line solidly in the west. She had stripped
the country of northern France and Belgium of all the machinery of
its factories which would be useful to her. She had been relieved of
any necessity of feeding the Belgian population, or of the menace
that would have come from the threat of a famine in either Belgium
or northern France by the American Food Commission which at first
had received supplies from America to carry on their work, and later
had depended almost altogether upon grants from the French and
English Governments and upon large voluntary contributions from
England. In the east she had gained territory almost equal in area
to that of Prussia itself. All Poland was hers. Her governor general
ruled Warsaw. Her situation as to food supplies was improved by the
occupation of immense productive areas. She had made war with all
her energy, and in want of able-bodied men to gather her own
harvests, she had used the hosts of prisoners which she had taken
from Russia. But, despite her victories, bravely and skillfully won,
she was still a nation in siege, with no communication with the
outside world, except through neutral countries.
In the second winter with uninterrupted energy she again turned
toward the southeast for another military adventure. Rumania still
held fast to her neutrality. In Bulgaria the Central Powers were to
succeed in gaining a fourth ally, which in sheer military advantage
was probably worth more than the accession of Italy to her enemies.
Though Russia had won her freedom for Bulgaria in '76, no sentiment
drew her to Russia's assistance when Russia was losing. No
statesmanship is more matter of fact than that of the Balkans.
Bulgaria had an old score to settle with Serbia, which had joined
Rumania and Greece against her in making the Second Balkan War,
after she had borne the brunt of the first against Turkey. Then,
besides, the military temptation offered the Bulgarian staff was
irresistible. Serbia had been through two wars before the heavy
drain of this one. A country of swineherds and miserable villages,
dependent for munitions upon England and the Allies--she was caught
in a wedge, with Bulgaria on the one side and the Austro-Hungarian
advance on the other. At the most the Central Powers had probably no
more than 300,000 troops--about the same number that the Bulgars
had. Against such a combination, Serbia, caught between the blades
of a pair of scissors, could make no successful resistance unless
assistance came from England and France, which the British and
French public demanded should be sent. There was no hope of
sufficient allied forces reaching Serbia in time to rescue her, but
the Allies, particularly the British, could not afford to see
Saloniki occupied by the Austro-Germans or by their friends, the
Bulgarians. Up to the Balkan War Saloniki was Turkish; then it
became Greek. This excellent port had long been the goal of Austrian
ambition, which sought an outlet to the Mediterranean, no less than
the traditional policy of Russia was aimed at the occupation of
Constantinople.
In the Crimean War France and England fought to thwart Russia's
designs on Turkey and now France and England were prepared to oppose
Austria's designs on Saloniki.
In order to defend Saloniki British and French troops must land on
the soil of Greece and march across the Greco-Serbian frontier,
which was no doubt one of the reasons that had kept the Allies from
sending forces before, in order to assist the Serbians on the Danube
and Save in closing "the ring of steel."
Venizelos, the Greek statesman, who had been the Greek Bismarck in
the extension of the Greek domain in the Balkan War, had taken sides
with the Allies; and he favored concessions by Greece as well as
Serbia to Bulgaria, in order to satisfy Bulgarian ambitions and keep
her from striking hands with the Central Powers, while the King of
Greece, with the Queen, a sister of the kaiser, had decidedly
pro-German leanings. The Greeks had a most difficult part, even for
Levantine diplomacy, to play. If they cast their fortunes with the
Allies and the Teutons won, then they could count upon the Central
Powers not only taking Saloniki away from them, but bringing
themselves practically under Germanic domination. If they openly
espoused the German side, then as the country depended upon the sea,
their ports would be blockaded, if not bombarded by the allied
fleets. In the event of an allied victory over the Central Powers
they were certain that Saloniki would not be annexed by the Allies,
bitter as they were against Greece because she was supposed to have
broken her pledged word to assist them in the Gallipoli expedition.
Following a policy of drift and protest, the Greeks consented to the
British and French landing troops at Saloniki and to their making it
a base of action.
Certain forces were sent into Serbia before the Serbian army had
been completely driven back, and whatever the public thought,
certainly with no expectation of gaining a victory over the
Bulgarians. This obvious movement was only for the purpose of
gaining time for fortifying a line around Saloniki and bringing
sufficient men and guns to defend it.
German diplomacy and staff work had not in all of the war gained a
more important technical advantage for less cost in time, money, and
troops, than it had in the fall of 1915 in the Balkans when they
made the Bulgars to serve as they had the Turks, to secure their
ends. At last the British withdrew from Gallipoli with such small
losses that the evacuation of this position on an exposed coast is
undoubtedly one of the most brilliant pieces of military maneuvering
of its kind in all history. No credit is ever given for retreats.
But this was a good deal more than a retreat. It was withdrawing
from a beach in face of a well-armed enemy. The story of it--as yet
unwritten--will some day bring a tribute to British military skill
from professional soldiers, if not from the lay public.
The Bulgarians decided not to invade Greece; the Greeks made no
attack. Those who looked forward to the war being settled in the
Balkans, and to Saloniki becoming another Port Arthur, had missed
their calculations. But every gun and every man that the Allies had
to maintain at Saloniki might be a gun and a man kept idle, when
they might be needed elsewhere.
The Germans having disposed of Serbia, had at the same time forced
the further dissipation of English and French troops. That they
could once more turn to the main theatre of the war and try to push
back the siege wall in another direction. Meantime, Turkey had been
doing their bidding in another quarter. The natural response of the
British to any threat to their Indian Empire was to take the
offensive, for this was one certain way to impress the Oriental
mind. Having annexed Egypt and Cyprus and occupied the German
colonies throughout the world, Britain now proceeded to the
extension of her Asiatic domain. The threat of Mohammedan
insurrection was met by an invasion of Mohammedan regions.
Her expedition toward Bagdad, had it not been in the midst of the
greatest war in all history, would perhaps have been the most
spectacular and interesting of all the small campaigns in remote
regions which have gradually extended British influence. It marched
through Mesopotamia and the Garden of Eden. The Turks under German
direction replied with an offensive which in turn put General
Townshend's army in siege, requiring that it should have relief.
The self-interest of each one of the parties to the war is evident,
with the exception of Turkey. Why she ever entered in on the side of
Germany, or on either side, is a puzzle. She was the one to lose in
any event. German success meant German domination. German failure
must mean that Russia would realize her ambition to take
Constantinople, and the British must further strengthen their empire
at her expense.
For many decades the British and Russian empires have glowered at
each other across the dividing belts of Thibet, Afghanistan, and
Persia. The fear of a Russian invasion of India haunted British
statesmen until the German power became so threatening that England
struck hands with France and Russia. Now while the British were
advancing northward, the Russians made a southerly move to her
assistance. The grand duke, who had been sent to the Caucasus in
February, 1916, took the offensive and captured the fortress of
Erzerum, an action which was bound to relieve pressure on the
British. Thus, the Turk who had been led to believe that he was to
regain Egypt and recover some of his lost territory, was simply
losing more. Indeed, after Saloniki, despite the talk to that
effect, the far-seeing Germans neither carried out their threatened
attempt to invade Egypt, nor, as many expected, were they drawn from
the main theatre of war by dispatching troops by rail to Turkey. In
dissipating the allied troops by their threats, they had taken care
not to dissipate their own.
Thus Germany would supply Turkey with officers, and all her
munitions, but she would not risk an army on the other side of
Bulgaria with a long line of communications threatened by the Allies
from Saloniki and Dedeagatch.
The approach of the spring of 1916 found them facing much the same
problem as in the spring of 1915. Despite the territory they had
gained, to ask for peace was to imply that their economic situation
was weaker and their casualties heavier than they were willing to
admit. Even if their economic situation was strong and the reserves
plentiful, any suggestion that they were ready for negotiations must
convince the Allies that they were reaching the end of their
resources. There could be no doubt of Russia's immense reserves of
men. It was only a question with her as to whether or not she could
make them into an efficient army properly equipped and supplied, and
whether or not she would be able to maintain her organization and
railway facilities and sufficient forces at the actual fighting
front to strike a successful blow against her enemies.
On the western front there had been an enormous accession of
munitions during the winter, while the British new army with two
million men yet to go under fire was gradually getting its rifles
and guns. Victory comes in war either when you are exhausted or when
you have taken from the enemy his capital or something of such vital
importance to him that he must yield in order to recover it. Neither
France nor Russia was by any means in that pass. Belgium had merely
become a dead land, a shop within a garden, cut off from all trade,
when it had been a nation of manufacturers and traders.
Germany, unless she were exhausted in men and supplies, could not
consider any peace which did not accord her the results of her
gains, while she was still in possession of much of the enemy's
territory, and she still maintained the power of the offensive. The
purpose of the Allies was to contain her, to strengthen "the ring of
steel." Her own purpose must be to strike some vital blow which
would win a separate peace either from Russia or France. The moment
she gave up her offensive and settled down to the defensive, which
was naturally against the policy of her staff and the vigorous
nature of her people, she was acknowledging that she had reached the
limit of her prowess. Then the Allies, with the sea at their
command, would bid her await their pleasure--unless she had so far
exhausted them that they considered a decided victory over her
hopeless, and they made a compromise.
Saloniki now being an incident of her military past, the next plan
of her staff was an effort on Verdun, the great fortress which
occupied a salient in the French siege line. Here, as elsewhere when
she attacked, she concentrated both her own and the Austrian heavy
artillery, and following the system of intense artillery
preparation, threw in her waves of infantry. This blow was struck at
the most inclement season of the year, in February snow and slush
and rain, as if to anticipate the allied attack which was generally
thought bound to come later in the spring when sufficient munitions
had been accumulated on the western front and the weather was
favorable.
By this time experts who had thought the war would be decided in the
Balkans had again realized that it never pays to desert the simple
military principle that the decision comes between the main bodies
of armies and not in remote regions from any clash of subsidiary
forces.
Paris or Petrograd in the hands of the Germans might mean such a
decision. Certainly, should the western front be broken by either
side, it would be the most telling blow of the war in both the moral
and the military sense. But after all, was the line of least
resistance for Germany the line of the western front? Would she
really strike her great blow of 1916--if she still had the power to
strike one--against the western rather than the eastern front?
Hitherto, attacks had succeeded against Russia.
It was in Russia that she had had her success. German officers had
always stated their confidence that with their superior gun fire and
tactics they could always force the Russians back. Could they press
back the French and the British?
When would the war end? seemed as unanswerable to the lay observer
in the spring of 1916 as in the spring of 1915. How long was the
fearful attrition to go on? Could either side ever strike a decisive
blow, or would the eventual result be a bloody stalemate, with
England still in command of the sea?
The significant generic lesson of the war is not in the power of
artillery, but the power of all material organization, when nations
set out to gain their ends by force: its military lesson was that
both sides had pretty well followed sound policy considering the
situation, despite armchair critics who knew nothing of inside
facts.
Europe was spending $100,000,000 or more a day in the business of
destruction--of life and of property. A broad belt of ruins spread
across France and Belgium for 450 miles; a broader one of 1,000
miles across Galicia and Russia. No nation engaged could be said to
be victorious except the Japanese. Japan had gained Kiao-chau;
strengthened her influence in China enormously, and was making
immense profits by working her arsenals and every plant at full
speed making munitions for Russia.
The United States at peace, preparing to make munitions as fast as
she could, and able to produce only 3,000 rifles a week for the
Allies on the 1st of December, 1915, and 5,000 a week March 1, 1916,
was enjoying an era of "boom" prosperity, thanks to the eager market
of nations whose own production was arrested while their workers
were at war. From the gloom of London and Paris, where men and women
had given up all luxuries, the transatlantic voyage brought you to
New York, which was the only gay capital in the world, enjoying all
the privileges of extravagance when money is plentiful.
WAR BY MACHINERY
This has been a war of machinery; but the old rule has been true
that development in any weapon of offense has been countered by
further development of means of defense. Nor is the theoretical
power of weapons ever equaled by their actual power when the test of
war comes. With self-preservation remaining the first law of nature,
man is in nothing so skillful as in avoiding the enemy's blows.
When one watches a 15-inch gun fired and hears its 2,000-pound shell
go screaming through the air, his concept of its destructive action
is exaggerated by imagination, and further confirmed if he sees that
shell burst inside a house, reducing its interior to wreckage. But
the shell may not hit the house; it may fall in an open field and
merely make a crater in the earth. Besides, someone must be in the
house when it is hit if there are to be any casualties; and it is
quite possible that a single person present might be dug out of the
debris unharmed. Vulnerable as man's flesh is, he remains a pretty
small object on the landscape. If he knows that his house is in
danger of being struck he then either goes into the cellar at the
first alarm, after having covered his floor with sandbags, or he may
take to a dugout in his yard.
When one has seen ten 15-inch shells strike a town of 25,000
inhabitants in a busy hour of the day and only half a dozen persons
killed and injured, he may learn a contempt for shell fire which,
however, is promptly turned into a tragic respect when one of the
same sort of shells strikes in a stone-paved courtyard where a
hundred soldiers are at their evening meal, and two-thirds of them
are killed and wounded.
The bursting of a shrapnel shell and its spray of low-velocity
bullets is also theoretically most destructive, but a roof of 6-inch
boards will furnish perfect protection from the bullets. Mother
Earth remains the best protection there is from fire. No rifle
bullet can penetrate through a 3-foot thickness of sandbags. A 6 or
8-inch high-explosive shell, which is the largest caliber
practicable for trench warfare, may burst near a double layer of
bags of stone rubble without hurting anyone in a cellar 30 feet
underneath. The rain of shrapnel bullets which mows the barbed wire
in front of a trench, as hail mows ripening grain, will not reach a
single man in the trench to the rear, if he keeps his head down.
At first thought it seems utterly inconsistent when bullets carry
effectively a mile and a half, and guns carry twenty miles, that
infantry should be fighting so close that they can throw bombs at each
other from distances of 15 and 20 yards. The very destructiveness of
modern weapons has contributed toward this result.
There has never been anything like so many guns used in battle, and
never have they been capable of such rapid fire. The field gun can
fire consistently eight or ten shots a minute, thanks to its modern
recoil cylinder and to the steadiness of aim, and literally
establish a "curtain of fire" with its torrent of bullets shot down
from the air and the cataracts of earth shot up by the bursting of
high-explosive shells in the ground, which no infantry can pass.
A machine gun behind a shield firing 500 shots a minute is
practically safe from rifle fire, and soldiers intrenched on either
side of it add to its volume their own more accurate fire from their
rifles. Infantry in the open, though they were not subjected to the
fearful concentration of artillery fire, could not survive through a
mile of machine-gun and rifle-swept space. Successful advances
against anything but very inferior numbers badly armed become
impossible in any frontal attack in the open. Thus all modern
infantry operations must have more or less a siege character, as the
only practicable means of approach is by digging your way forward.
The spade has become almost as important a weapon as the rifle.
Impatience with digging, which was characteristic of the early days
of the American Civil War, and which has been generally resented by
all armies in the past, has now become second nature to every
soldier, because its value is brought home to him by the most
telling kind of lesson in experience--death. He puts earth between
himself and the enemy's fire as instinctively as one holds up his
hand to ward off a blow.
In trench fighting all that is exposed of a man firing is his head
and shoulders, which accounts for the high percentage of dead to
wounded in this war. In other wars it has been as one to five; while
in this war, on the western front, it has varied from as one to two
and three. If the trenches are brought extremely close together then
either side is safe from the other's artillery fire, because there
is as much danger of hitting your own trench as the enemy's with
your shells. A distance of 20 or 30 yards meant that at any time
either side could start in throwing bombs or grenades by hand across
that one definitely neutral country--the zone of death between the
trenches. Beyond that range up to the average range, trench mortars
which "lobbed" a charge of high explosive from trench to trench
could be used. Thus the war of machinery became a war of explosives.
Anything that could be dropped into the trench and burst might kill
or wound some of the enemy, which meant debit on their side of the
ledger in a war of attrition and exhaustion. The higher the angle of
flight the more likely the charge actually to fall into the narrow
ditch in the earth, instead of breaking its force against the wall,
which accounts for the superiority of the howitzer with its high
angle of flight and shorter range to the gun with its lower
trajectory and longer range.
Thus there can be no limitation to the amount of artillery and the
quantities of explosives serviceable in this kind of warfare. No one
of the armies has ever had anything like enough shells. None ever
can. Five hundred guns of all ranges set back of one another from
3,000 to 20,000 yards' range to a mile could be placed, or 225,000
for the western front, and they could readily use five million
shells a day in this contest of munitions and manufacturing
resources.
All armies had to conserve their ammunition, and in parts of the
line, which were known as "quiet corners," for tactical reasons the
stalemate was almost peaceful, either side holding its fire unless
the other became restless. But between the trenches which had
remained in the same position for many months, no living thing was
visible day after day except a rabbit or a field mouse where the
ground birds made their nests, and there the piping of birds joined
with the song of the bullets. Except for occasional snipers' shots
at the sight of anything moving on the enemy's parapet, the day wore
monotonously on--when to expose the head for half a minute meant
death.
Naturally the trenches do not run straight. They bend in and out at
sharp angles in order to localize the explosions of shells; they are
so narrow in most places that two men can pass with difficulty. A
few soldiers are on guard, the rest may be lying about their dugouts
or probably engaged in building new traverses or in putting up new
layers of sandbags or deepening their dugouts. They become beavers
rather than warriors, day laborers with spade and shovel rather than
knights. There is no marching and countermarching; they have no use
for the skirmish drill or the maneuver ground. Sharpshooters with
clamped rifles watch for a target patiently as fishermen for a bite.
Back from the first line trench runs a winding communication trench,
a foot or more deeper than the average man's height and the turns in
its walls stop any bullets which otherwise might sweep its length in
enfilade. In the reserve trenches are other men in burrows who have
not even the excitement of sniping. They do nothing but wait and
dig, repairing damages wrought by occasional shells on dull days.
At any hour the enemy may suddenly decide to attack and they may
find their houses pounded down about their heads and perhaps half of
a company wiped out in a quarter of an hour. Then other
communication trenches lead back until finally you are in the open
country out of the range of bullets, but not outside the range of
shells. Here the munition caissons and the transport wagons come up
by night bringing the food for men and guns which is taken up to the
hungry mouths under the cover of darkness; and here, on an average
day, one will occasionally observe the passing of an ambulance with
its green roof and sides which melts it into the road and the
landscape--and processions of ambulances when there is battle. All
the detail of army existence is as precise as that of the best
organized industrial plant.
As you walk along you will spy at intervals a hidden battery,
perhaps in a house, perhaps in a hedge, perhaps in a group of trees,
perhaps beautifully roofed over with sod, so that it is invisible
from the air. You rarely look up without seeing an aeroplane flying
overhead. When there is action, you will see many. A faint pur comes
out of the heavens and two planes are seen circling as they exchange
bullets from their machine guns. Another plane is turning to the
right and left and ducking to avoid the thistle blows of smoke which
burst from the shrapnel shells fired by the antiaircraft guns.
Follow the course of the long procession of motor trucks which feed
the army and you arrive at one of the great supply depots which
every day send out the precise quota of supplies that are needed,
with every motor truck having its schedule and keeping that schedule
with the accuracy of a first-class passenger train. Follow the
ambulances back from station to station, where the wounded men are
examined to see if they are suffering from a hemorrhage and whether
they are able to stand the farther journey and do not need an
immediate operation, and you are brought to the immense base
hospitals in a closely guarded and well ordered camp where every
sanitary tradition known to modern life is absolutely enforced. One
of these hospitals had twelve thousand beds and in the offensive of
September 25, 1915, it discharged seven thousand patients in a day.
Soldiers are restricted to the neighborhood of their billets and
officers themselves must have passes if they travel outside the
region occupied by their battalions. Everyone is a policeman under
an intricate system guarding every detail of army secrets from any
spy and from those gallant aviators who risk antiaircraft gunfire in
the hope of bringing home some information to their side.
Never has the Intelligence Service of an army had so many secrets to
guard; never has it required such complicated measures of protection
against espionage. In Napoleonic times, it was enough to know that
your adversary was marching a hundred thousand men along parallel
roads. This your cavalry scouts might discover; or a spy who had
crossed the frontier in an unfrequented place might be watching the
enemy's army and counting his numbers as they passed. Now the
frontier is an intact line of trenches.
The spies of Richelieu's day have been surpassed in this, our
day--with their stories yet to be told. Many a man who spoke the
enemy's language well has put on the enemy's uniform, joined one of
his scouting parties between the trenches in the darkness, entered
the enemy's trenches, heard all the talk and slipped back to his own
lines safely. If apprehended, his fate was certain--death.
The most efficient spy, of course, is the one with military training
He knows the value of what he sees. Usually he is an officer of good
family who has been cashiered for gambling or debt and takes a
desperate chance out of patriotism and the hope of atonement.
Naturally, the easiest route for spies was through Holland and
Switzerland which became the gateway of passing spies and the
playground of espionage and counterespionage. Gradually the
restrictions tightened for all neutral travelers from capital to
capital, while none were permitted to go into the zones of the
armies, some twenty or thirty miles from the trenches.
The problem of the Intelligence Corps is much like that of putting
the parts of a picture puzzle together. A line from a newspaper in
one part of the world, a line from a newspaper in another taken in
connection with a photograph, an excerpt from a letter found on a
prisoner or a fact got from a prisoner by skillful catechism, might
develop a valuable contributory item. The amount of information
procured by either side about the other was only less amazing to the
outsider than how it was obtained. Again, events revealed amazing
ignorance. Most baffling and most secret of all branches is this,
whose work is both gaining and conserving information, and just as
professional, just as carefully prepared before the war as any
other.
A single instance illustrates how small a fact may be of value to
the enemy. A certain well known "military expert" went out to
British headquarters as a guest of a general. From a tower in the
square of a small town, he watched a certain action. When he wrote
his account of it, it was submitted to the general who was his
friend; and the general carelessly passed one little statement which
no Chief of Intelligence of any army would ever have passed and
probably no correspondent of experience would have had the temerity
to submit to the censor unless he wanted to be responsible for the
death of men who were his hosts and his friends. For the writer
stated that he saw the battle from this tower.
Now the London papers reach Holland at four o'clock in the afternoon
where they are seized promptly by the tentacles of the German
Intelligence Service, which did not need to undertake any "picture
puzzle work" on this occasion. It was plain as day that this tower
must be used as an artillery observation post by the enemy. From
there he could see the fall of shells from his batteries and know
whether they were "on" or not. Out of the blue sky the next morning,
came a German artillery concentration which brought the tower down
like a house of cards, and many British soldiers billeted in the
neighborhood were killed or wounded.
In order to deepen the shroud of mystery over his side which baffles
the enemy, many military men would undoubtedly make the press merely
the herald of official bulletins. The British Admiralty carried out
this system to the letter, as a navy may better than an army, in the
resistance of the German submarine campaign. Thus the "Untersee-boots"
came out from Kiel or Zeebrugge and disappeared in the mists of the
North Sea with no message of how they had been destroyed when they
never returned.
The Intelligence Service in common with army transport and the
sanitary service and every other expert branch has for its object
the conserving of the lives of your own soldiers and the taking of
those of the enemy, best expressed by an infantry attack on the
enemy's trenches, whether to gain a few hundred yards or a belt of
eight to ten miles as in the case of the French attack in Champagne
in September, 1915, and the German attack on Verdun in February,
1916. The first step is the concentration of batteries for
artillery preparation. Gradually, these guns all try out their range
with the aeroplanes spotting the fall of their shells. Then, at the
scheduled minute they loose their blasts upon the front line
trenches which are to be taken. In front of the trenches, of course,
are the elaborate barbed-wire entanglements. These are often twenty,
thirty or even forty feet deep. There may be more than one series of
entanglements and some may be screened in some fashion or other from
the effects of artillery fire. Aside from these, _trous de loup_,
pits with sharpened sticks to impale the invader, and all the other
devices of former times are used--in short, every obstacle from the
time of Moses to the modern machine gun. No invader can possibly
reach the enemy's trench to contest it with him until these
impedimenta are removed. Thousands of short-cut plans and inventions
have been offered for cleaning away the barbed wire before an
attack, but not one has succeeded because it requires that whoever
is to carry out the suggestion or remove the obstruction, must be
submitted to murderous grilling machine-gun and rifle fire. Shrapnel
shells with their sprays of bullets bursting at a height of a foot
above ground remain the approved method of cutting barbed wire. If
the barbed wire is not destroyed, the men in the charge are "hung
up" in it, as the saying is. Then if a machine gun is still in
position in the enemy's trench, they are riddled with bullets where
they lie. No form of death could be more pitiless or helpless for
the soldier than this. He becomes a target on a spit, as it were.
Granted that the barbed wire is swept away perfectly, no charge can
succeed if many machine guns or rifles from the trenches are playing
upon it. Then men simply rush into a spray of bullets. Therefore,
all the teeth must be drawn from the trench itself. This is done by
the concentration of high-explosive shells from guns of larger
caliber, mostly howitzers, which burst in the earth, tossing up
great fountains of dust, burying and smashing the machine guns and
driving all the operators into their dugouts, where they are
sometimes buried alive.
Back of the trench, the guns of smaller caliber which destroy the
barbed wire place a "curtain of fire," as it is called, which does
not permit the enemy to escape from a trench, or any reserves to
come to his assistance. This process is kept up for such a length of
time as is deemed sufficient. At a given moment, the invader
charges, often protected by a screen of smoke which is sent out from
his own trenches.
As the burrowers in the earth crawl from the parapets and take to
their legs, they know that their fate is almost altogether dependent
upon the preparation by the guns rather than any effort of their
own. Ahead of them is this wall of smoke and dust from the
explosions, in which they are lost to the observer. Keeping units
together and protecting them is as difficult as maneuvering ships in
a fog. The delicate problem of the gunner is to protect the invader
just as far forward as possible, without putting shells into his own
men. A few from defective fuses must fall short. This is expected
and is a part of the cost of a charge; but none with correct fuses
and dependable powder should. The gunners time their part to that of
the invader, by lifting their fire from the first to the second line
trench, as their own men are entering the first.
Granted that the barbed wire is cleared and the men enter the
enemy's trench, they may find themselves struggling over heaps of
dust mixed with the rags of sandbags, splintered timbers and the
flesh and uniforms of their enemy--at first see not a single
adversary. They will be instantly due for heavy shell fire; and also
for heavy machine gun and rifle fire from the second line enemy
trench. They begin to dig at once in order to establish protection.
Out of this wreckage they have to reverse the enemy's trench, so
that it shall face toward him. This becomes a matter of desperate
effort and usually it is in the course of this that the severest
casualties are suffered. But should the artillery destruction of the
trench be imperfect, upon entering it they may still take the enemy
by surprise in his dugouts. In that case, bombs in hand, at the
doorways of these cellars they demand surrender. In case it is not
given, they throw the bombs into the dugout; for, to enter, means
that they will be shot down.
Or, upon entering the trench, they may meet the enemy's soldiers
running out of their dugouts for hand-to-hand battle. The traverses
are so narrow that the length of the rifle makes it a clumsy weapon,
and the adversaries in modern war, whose guns carry twenty miles,
engage hand to hand, using knives, bombs and even their fists. With
discarded rifles and bombs lying about a trench, it is difficult to
give quarter. For a prisoner who is down may pick up a rifle or a
bomb and turn on his captor. It is not human savagery so much as
conditions that has made the fighting so grim. Having established
themselves in a certain section or sections of the trench, naturally
the new occupants have the enemy on their right and left. That is,
on one side of one of the winding traverses will be a German, and
say on the other side a Frenchman. Neither sees the other's head,
for both are hidden behind these walls of earth. If one starts
around the corner, it means a bayonet or a bullet for him.
To gain ground in a trench requires a superior supply of bombs. Any
small package that will contain a high explosive would serve the
purpose. Early in the war, bombs were made out of jam tins and bottles
or any other receptacle which could be filled with an explosive and
set off by a fuse. Later on, different varieties of manufactured bombs
in great quantities appeared. There have been instances of five
thousand being used in a single day over two hundred yards of trench.
After throwing a bomb from the traverse, the offensive follows up the
explosion by rushing along the traverse and catching the defender with
a bayonet while he is _hors de combat_ from the effect of the
explosion. While this orgy--characteristic of cave dwellers battling
on a precipice in its ferocity--is proceeding, all is precision at the
rear. As the caissons bring up the supplies of ammunition, the
green-curtained motor ambulances speed on to the hospital with the
wounded and the military police direct the congested traffic and keep
watch for spies.
VITAL LESSONS
War is force, violence, killing. Whoever tries to disguise its character
is a poor soldier and a poorer citizen. If you would avoid it, and if
you would prepare for it, you must look at it as a fact, squarely in
the face. Never has war been so savage as it is in this most progressive
age in history. We had popular education, aseptic surgery, the wireless,
and antitoxin, but war came nevertheless, and in the wake of Hague
conferences and much preaching of internationalism. It came when the
nations were supposed on account of the press and the telegraph to have
been farther removed from parochialism than ever before, when more
people in every nation in Europe knew the language of their neighbors
than ever in history.
In the cave dweller's time, combatants used a stone hatchet which
was the best weapon that science could produce. To-day by land and
sea they have used all the powers of destruction known to modern
man; all the scientific brains of Europe have been at the disposal
of commanders. Yet no single revolutionary invention has appeared in
the course of the war. The idea of the gas was old. Man already had
learned to fly. Guns have been larger and shells more powerful, but
the principle is the same. Weapons have been further developed, but
the types have not changed.
All the essential lessons which the Germans applied they learned in
the Russo-Japanese War. The line of trenches throughout the winter
of 1904-05 before Mukden were much the same type as those along the
Aisne. There were trenches in the Civil War and in the Crimea, and
in the American Revolution and in many wars before that. So far as
one can learn, there has not been a single invention by a civilian
which would have been of any use to the British navy in fighting
submarines. All have been devised and applied by naval experts who
knew conditions. No profession is more expert than soldiering and
none is older, because it began when Cain killed Abel.
War being the ultimate resort of force, then the poet, the dreamer,
the scholar, the doctor and the organizer of the arts of peace may
succumb to the bully with the square jaw, the low brow and
flesh-tearing incisors, unless the civilized man uses his resources
and talents to make weapons which are stronger than the bully's
fist. This is precisely what civilization does in order to protect
itself.
The two forces which were really prepared for this war were the
British navy and the German army. The British navy has kept command
of the seas and the German army has planted its trenches on foreign
soil. For any nation which is separated from other nations by the
sea, the military lesson of this war is that the sea is the first
line of defense. You will escape bloody trenches at home if you
never allow an enemy to land. He cannot land until he has driven
your navy off the seas.
The other lesson is that a nation should know its method of defense
and have it as complete, practicable and ready as the German army
and British navies were. For three or four years, the Belgians saw
the Germans constructing railroad sidings at Aix and making their
preparations for the blow they struck. Yet the Belgians did not
modernize their forts, or adequately strengthen their army for
defense. If to the staffs of England and France war seemed
inevitable, their governments refused to be convinced.
Any nation which is considering preparedness for national defense
must have a national policy. It must know what it is going to defend
and how it is going to defend it. The British navy was built for the
specific problem of either defeating the German navy in battle or
keeping it fast in its lair. The German army was organized for the
purpose of the invasion of France and then of Russia; the French
army for defense from Germany.
Their efficiency was not the result of the expenditure of money, for
money will not buy defense. It requires training, organization, and
patriotism, and courage, which are not for sale in the market places
of mankind.
Until this war the opinion among English-speaking peoples was
universal that the volunteer system was the best method of
recruiting. This on the principle that the man who offers himself to
fight, fights better than the one who is called to arms by
government order. Thus England raised 3,000,000 men. But to a man
who has lived much with armies, it seems an immoral method; it means
hiring men to fight for you. One man's life is just as valuable to
him as another's. It is the final sacrifice which he makes for the
defense of his country or his home. He should make it himself and
not ask others to make it for him. Those who should be the first
into battle are the men of wealth, of position, the favored ones.
They owe their country more than the others, because their country
has done more for them.
[Illustration: M. Raymond Poincaré, President of France.]
The courage which every Continental army has exhibited has forever
destroyed the idea that universal service weakens the valor of an
army. Millionaire and peasant, nobleman and workman fighting side by
side in the ranks, and doing all the drudgery of the trenches in
common, develop a democracy which means that a man appreciates his
fellow man for his own sake.
The old idea that wars must be frequent in order to keep up a
nation's virility has also been disproved. Universal service both in
France and Germany through forty years of peace, had been an
important influence in the better physical development of the race,
which led to the fortitude, precision, and courage exhibited. At the
same time, a realization of the seriousness of war on the part of
all men, because they knew before this war began the punishing
effect of rifle or machine-gun and artillery fire, is a powerful
deterrent to making war in any spasm of emotion.
There is no more glory, there is no more sport to war. It has become
scientific, businesslike, and commonplace. Never has an unprepared
nation been so helpless against the prepared as to-day. The American
Revolution could never have been won by untrained levies to-day
against the British regulars if they possessed modern weapons. Our
forefathers had their fowling pieces, taken from the walls in the
days when the cannon fired a solid shot for a few hundred yards, and
there were few cannon; and so far as weapons were concerned, they
were almost on a level with their enemy, the enemy's only
superiority being that of their drill and organization. Now the
enemy would have guns and rifles which it takes many months to make,
even if you have the plants.
In an era of sanitation and bodily cleanliness and popular education,
it has been shown that far from men having lost their virility, they
fought far better than the so-called "strong" and primitive man, and
those soldiers of former ages who "drank hard six days a week and
fought like the devil on Sunday" and would look down upon this age as
effeminate. Physically, mentally, and morally, the soldiers who sprang
to arms in the beginning of this war were superior unquestionably to
any soldiers who have ever gone into any war in Europe. They had more
skill, more courage, more determination. Their pride was greater, and
that alone made them more gallant. Those who wanted to know what war
was like, to have the experience of their first baptism of fire, soon
had it in the swift processes of mobilization and attack. Then, in
their stubbornness, they settled down to the long, grim business of
seeing through a task that was begun. The trenches were the last
places where you would hear the advocacy of war as war. There the
sentiment was simply of duty that must go on until a decision was
reached.
Never has war been more savagely fought, possibly because the modern
mind reasons that war being force and violence and killing, this
principle should be applied to the limit. Yet never have the wounded
been so tenderly cared for, never has the hospital organization been
so complete. Never probably in the history of European warfare have
prisoners, once they were taken, been so well treated. In other wars
100,000 survivors or so returned home when the struggle was over.
Here millions will go. Every home will either have its dead hero or
its living veteran. These are the men who will rule Europe in the
future. Behind the lines, among the civilian population, the war has
acted as a scourge. It has submerged self into the whole. Fatty
degeneration of the heart of the body politic has been cut away to
the muscle.
THE THEATRES OF THE WAR'S CAMPAIGNS
By F. H. SIMONDS
MAIN MILITARY FEATURES
The purpose of this review is to summarize briefly the main military
phases of the first year and a half of the Great War. To do this it
is perhaps simplest to accept the unity supplied by the three major
campaigns of the Central Powers, that of Germany against France,
that of Austria and Germany against Russia, and that of Germany,
Austria, and Bulgaria against Serbia.
There is no intention of discussing here any ethical or political
considerations. Certain historical details are, however, of real
interest and value. Thus it is worth while to recall that the
present conflict differs little, if at all, from the earlier
coalition wars of Europe, in which one nation, numerically weaker,
has sought to impose its will upon a group of nations collectively
larger, richer, and potentially capable of employing greater numbers
of men. In a word, the present war is a pretty accurate repetition
of the wars of Louis XIV and Napoleon I, with Germany playing the
French rôle.
Now in such struggles it had always been true, and German writers,
notably Bernhardi, insisted it would be true of any future war, that
the single chance for a decisive victory for the smaller nation lay
in crushing the several foes before they were able to get their
collective strength in the field, while the superior preparedness,
training, general military efficiency of the smaller nation still
enabled it to put the superior numbers at the decisive point at the
crucial moment.
This whole conception is made perfectly clear by a glance at the
familiar and classic parallel of the Napoleonic wars. In 1805
Napoleon, facing a European coalition, which included Russia, Great
Britain, and Austria, and was bound to enlist Prussia ultimately,
quite as the present anti-German group enlisted Italy, had to solve
the same military problem.
Consider what he did. Breaking his camp at Boulogne, which he left
in September, 1805, he sent his Grand Army into southern Germany and
against Ulm. On October 20 he captured Mack's army at Ulm. On
December 2 he routed the Austrian and Russian armies at Austerlitz,
and on December 26 there was signed the Treaty of Pressburg, which
eliminated Austria from the war. Prussia now intervening, he
destroyed the Prussian armies at Jena and Auerstädt on October 14,
1806. In June, 1807, he completed his task by defeating the Russians
at Friedland. The Peace of Tilsit, which followed immediately,
removed Russia and Prussia from the fighting line, as Austria had
already been removed. Between the capitulation of Ulm and the
victory of Friedland there intervened nineteen months. More than
eighteen have now passed since the fall of Liege in the present war.
The Peace of Tilsit made Napoleon the master of Europe with only
Great Britain left in the field against him. The subsequent military
and political history which led to Napoleon's downfall has no
pertinence in the present discussion. What it is essential to
recognize is that the German high command in August, 1914,
approached a Napoleonic problem in the Napoleonic fashion.
In German quarters there had been before the war, and there has been
since, a debate as to the comparative advantage of making the first
campaign against France or against Russia. The fact that the attack
on France failed has doubtless contributed to strengthen the case of
those who held the view of the elder Moltke and advocated an eastern
offensive. But this is merely an academic discussion. What is of
interest to us now is to recognize that Germany did decide to attack
France, that she did direct against the republic the first and
necessarily the greatest blow she could deliver. It was not until
April, 1915, that she actually undertook an attack upon Russia, and
then the prospect of a decisive victory, on the Napoleonic order,
had practically disappeared.
THE ATTACK UPON FRANCE
Turning now to the first campaign, the attack upon France, it is to
be recognized at the outset that the German purpose was to dispose
of France in the military sense for the period of the war by a
campaign that should repeat the success of 1870. It was essential
that this victory should be achieved before France could profit by
Russian activity in the east and before Great Britain could render
material military assistance to her French ally. It was equally
essential that the blow should be so swift and heavy that it would
crush the French before they could equip and organize their great
reserves, for whom, thanks to legislative folly and pacifist
agitation, there was lacking equipment and arms.
For the accomplishment of this great task, Germany counted upon her
superior numbers, the greater speed of her mobilization, and the
excess of her population over France to give her a decisive
advantage. She counted also upon her advantage in heavy artillery
and machine guns, on her organization of motor transport, which was
to establish new records in invasion. Only in field artillery, in
the now famous "seventy-fives," could France claim any advantage.
In 1870 Sedan had come four weeks after the first German troops had
entered France. For the new campaign the Germans allowed six weeks.
For this time German high command reckoned that Russia could be
mobilized in the east, and that any incidental Russian success in
East Prussia or Silesia would be counterbalanced by the tremendous
victories to be won in northern France. Paris itself would be a
sufficient counterprize for Posen, Breslau, or Cracow.
The time limit, however, imposed certain other conditions. The
Franco-German frontier from Luxemburg to Switzerland had been
transformed into one long barrier, garnished with detached forts
and resting upon the first-class fortresses of Verdun, Toul, Epinal,
and Belfort. To pierce such a barrier was not impossible but to
break through in three weeks, with the whole French army before the
forts and the shortness of the front offering the Germans no
opportunity to take advantage of their superior numbers, was
recognized as next to impossible.
There was left the roads through Belgium and Luxemburg. To come this
way Germany had for more than a decade been constructing strategic
railways leading from the Rhine and Moselle valleys to the Belgian
frontier, double-track roads that served in a desolate country, but
were provided with all the necessary machinery for detraining
thousands of soldiers.
Belgium might not consent to suffer this invasion of her territory
but the Belgian army was negligible, and the German heavy artillery
was known to be adequate to dispose of the antiquated forts of Namur
and Liege with brief delay. Once the Germans had passed the Meuse
and deployed upon the Belgian plain, they could turn south and pass
the Franco-Belgian frontier, which was destitute of real defenses,
the few fortresses being obsolete, and thence the road ran down to
Paris clear and open.
Conceivably Great Britain might make the Belgian invasion a cause
for joining France. But, again, the British army was small, there
was the gravest doubt as to whether it would be sent to the
Continent at all, and even if it came, it would not redress the
balance between the French and German armies. Such being the case,
as German high command saw it, Belgium was summoned, and refusing,
was attacked, the German armies passing the Belgian frontier in the
direction of Liege on August 4, 1914, the day on which Germany
declared war upon France, and the forty-fourth anniversary of the
invasion of France in the Franco-Prussian War.
FROM THE MEUSE TO THE MARNE
To grasp the main circumstances of the opening campaign it is
simplest to think of the whole German invading forces as comprising
one army. The right of this army under Kluck and Bülow came west
through Belgium by Brussels and Namur, swinging south after the
Belgians were disposed of, and leaving a guard to curtain the
Belgian army which had retreated on Antwerp. The center moved
southwest through the Belgian Ardennes and Luxemburg, entering
France between Longwy and Givet on the Meuse. The left moved from
Metz and Strassburg, attempting to force the French barrier line
between Toul and Epinal. The center was commanded by the German
Crown Prince, Albert of Württemberg, and Hausen, the left by the
Crown Prince of Bavaria and Heeringen. Smaller forces operating in
Upper Alsace played little real part in the operations.
Taking up first the German right: It did not begin its real advance
until August 12, 1914. Liege had been captured on August 7, the last
fort fell on August 15. Meantime the Germans pushed a heavy screen
of cavalry forward, and there was steady skirmishing between Liege
and Brussels, which was magnified into battles and German defeats.
In point of fact, the Belgian army was rapidly pushed back, and once
the main German advance began, it fled to Antwerp.
Kluck took Brussels on August 18, 1914, and turned south, meeting
the first serious resistance at Mons. Bülow, moving across the Meuse
at Huy, took Namur on August 23, 1914, and his troops fought at
Charleroi, while those of Hausen forced a passage of the Meuse south
of Namur. The French were beaten at Charleroi, and the British while
the battle of Mons was still undecided, were forced to retreat,
because Bülow's success in taking Namur had imperiled the whole
allied left flank.
Because he delayed his retreat too long, Sir John French was
immediately threatened with destruction, Kluck having succeeded in
getting on his flank, while sending superior numbers against his
front. For a week there was grave danger that the Germans would be
able to destroy the British and intervene between the French left
and the city of Paris. At Cambrai on the 25th, British destruction
seemed imminent, but the British just managed to win clear, and
French troops coming up on their exposed flank by September 1, they
were safe.
The French center had essayed an offensive into the Ardennes at the
moment the battle of Charleroi was beginning. In this they did not
succeed, and the Fourth Army under Langle de Cary fell back in
perfect order from the Belgian-Luxemberg frontier across the Meuse
near Sedan, where they held their line until the general retreat
began. Henceforth the French armies from left to right were not
seriously threatened until the final struggle at the Marne.
But the right under De Castelnau had been obliged to retreat. It had
opened the campaign by a series of victories which had carried the
main force into German Lorraine as far as Saarburg on the railroad
from Metz to Strassburg. To the south Mülhausen had been taken,
lost, and recaptured. But in the third week of August the main army
encountered strong forces in the region of Morhange and fell back on
Nancy, the frontier town of Lunéville being momentarily occupied by
the Germans. At Nancy it stood. But its stand was one of the
important battles of the western war and a contributory cause to the
subsequent victory at the Marne. By this victory the eastern barrier
was held and the German effort to isolate Verdun and Toul blocked.
Some of the most terrible fighting of the war took place here, and
the Germans, fighting under the eye of the kaiser suffered colossal
losses.
In the last days of August Joffre had to make his great decision.
His right was holding before Nancy, and was soon to make a
successful advance, clearing most of eastern Lorraine. His center,
stretched across the Champagne country from the Argonne to the Oise,
had recovered from early reverses and won several considerable local
counteroffenses, notably at Guise. But his left was still shaky, his
reserves were not yet up and his reconcentration was incomplete.
Should he risk all now, or take his army back until his left rested
upon Paris? To do this latter would be to surrender more French
territory, but it would mean a further exhaustion of the Germans, a
further increase in his numbers. The morale of his troops was
unshaken. He had suffered defeats, but merely incidental defeats,
the real test had not yet come.
THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE
Joffre decided to continue his retreat, and took his army south of
the Marne, his left formed by the British resting upon the forts of
Paris, behind which he had massed a new army, his center stretching
between Paris and Verdun, his right along the barrier line from
Verdun to Switzerland. The German armies, already worn down by their
exertions and their losses, were now to be attacked by their foe,
whom they regarded as already vanquished.
The first phase of the Battle of the Marne was fought northeast of
Paris along the Ourcq, which gives its name to the local battle.
Kluck had marched past the French capital, going south along its
eastern front and leaving only small guards to cover his rear and
flank. He had before him the British and on his flank the new Paris
army, of the existence of which he was totally ignorant. In Joffre's
strategy this army was to strike east while the British struck
north, together they were to act like the two blades of a pair of
scissors. Between them Kluck was to be destroyed and his rout would
expose the flank and rear of all the German forces in France.
The French struck with great promptness, but the British failed to
move quickly enough. Kluck extricated himself from between the
blades with supreme generalship, brought his main force back against
the French, borrowing a corps from Bülow and presently the French
were driven back upon Paris. British slowness had wrecked the master
stroke of Joffre's strategy.
But in the center the situation was changing. Joffre had issued his
famous order to attack upon September 5. The Paris army under
Manoury had struck on the 6th, and the French offensive had steadily
communicated itself from west to east along the whole line, that is,
to the British army, then to the armies of Franchet d'Espérey, of
Foch, of De Langle de Cary, of Sarrail. In the French center about
September 9, General Foch, commanding still another new army, had
begun his attack. By a combination of operations, which remain the
most brilliant of the war, he flung a portion of the Germans before
him into the marshes of St. Gond and routed the remainder. In this
field the Germans now began a retreat which was almost a rout.
Meantime, further to the east, Sarrail, holding Verdun, had begun to
attack the crown prince, who was in difficulty.
Foch's success was decisive, Kluck and Bülow began their retreat,
leaving their own fights undecided. Hausen, who faced Foch, was
removed in disgrace, and his army now in bad shape, went back to
Châlons and then to the Rheims-Argonne district. The crown prince
with difficulty drew his forces out of the lower Argonne and north
of Verdun. The French victory in Lorraine had also become absolute,
and the Germans were back on the frontier.
But there was lacking to the French the numbers and the strength to
make their victory conclusive. They had been outnumbered at the
moment of victory, their twenty-two corps facing twenty-seven at the
Marne, 900,000 at most against 1,200,000. The fall of Maubeuge had
released fresh German troops, who came south, and, reenforcing
Kluck, enabled him to stand at the Aisne. The German front was
reconstituted, running from the Oise at Noyon to Metz and the
deadlock was about to begin, had in fact begun.
The remainder of the western campaign requires little comment. There
now followed that operation, well described as "the race to the
sea." The French coming east around the right flank of the Germans
north of Noyon attempted to reach their rear at St. Quentin and turn
them out of France. The Germans endeavored to extend their line
westward to the sea and thus secure their flank and, in addition,
take possession of the whole French coast from the mouth of the
Somme to Belgium.
Neither side succeeded. Instead a line was erected from the Oise due
north to the German Ocean at Nieuport, which became the new battle
front. Antwerp fallen, the Germans made a supreme effort to shorten
and straighten their line by attacking the French, British, and
Belgians, who held the extreme left of the allied forces between
Nieuport and La Bassée, along the Yser and about Ypres. This
struggle lasted for nearly a month, and was desperate in the
extreme. For the British it was a gigantic repetition of Waterloo,
and they were again asked to hold a position, not now for hours, but
for days, under heavy pressure, and in the face of odds such as
Napoleon did not possess in the earlier conflict. In the end the
line held, German approach to the Channel was blocked, and by
December 1 the western war had dropped to trench fighting which
still persists along the lines that had been substantially occupied
in November, 1914.
GERMAN FAILURE
Such briefly was the history of the first German venture, the effort
to dispose of France. So far as its main object was concerned it
failed absolutely. It failed because Joffre met the German thrust
with a parry which turned it aside. French military power was not
destroyed, it was not even shaken. France was not eliminated by a
crushing defeat as Austria had been eliminated at Austerlitz in a
similar conflict.
The victory had been won because Joffre had deliberately held his
forces in hand and avoided a decisive issue, until he had brought
the Germans to his own battle field. He had avoided a German net
which might have encircled a portion of his armies, as Bazaine had
been encircled at Metz; he had declined to consider political
conditions and fight as MacMahon had been compelled to fight at
Sedan. With inferior numbers, with smaller resources in heavy
artillery and transport, with a handicap of inferior subordinates,
who in Alsace and in the Ardennes, as well as at Charleroi, had by
their incompetence imperiled his first plans, he had won a campaign.
That the success was not conclusive cannot be charged to him, Sir
John French's failure along the Grand Morin, as other critics
assert, or Manoury's excess of zeal at the Ourcq, by enabling Kluck
to avoid Joffre's embrace, possibly saved the Germans from a general
disaster.
The Battle of the Marne denied Germany the continental supremacy
which Austerlitz prepared for Napoleon. It saved France, gave Great
Britain time to raise her volunteer armies, mobilize her industries.
To win it France had put in her last ounce of available strength,
and there was needed for her, too, time to reorganize her armies,
and prepare to conduct a long war. She was not able and she has not
yet been able to turn Germany out of that twenty-fifth of French
area, which Germany holds, and has held since October, 1914.
But in every sense this Battle of the Marne was one of the few
really decisive battles of all human history. It was a French
victory, organized by French genius and won by French soldiers. The
British contribution was slight, just as the British numbers were
insignificant. It was not due to Belgian resistance, as has been so
frequently asserted in the past, and the determining phase was the
wonderful fight of Foch at Champenoise, after the Paris army had
failed against Kluck.
AGAINST RUSSIA
The character of the German operations against Russia in the opening
days of the war was determined by the decision to attack France.
Necessarily all troops save that minimum which represented the
barest margin of safety were sent to the west and there was left to
a small force the duty of defending the East Prussian marshes.
Germany counted upon the slowness of Russian mobilization to give
her six weeks of immunity on her eastern frontier. She expected in
that time to dispose of France, and she believed that at the end of
it Russia would still be engaged in concentrating her masses. Both
calculations were wrong.
But the main reliance of Germany in the east was Austria, whose
whole force, save for one or two corps borrowed by Germany to defend
Alsace and four corps sent against Serbia, was available for the
invasion of Russian Poland. If Austria could organize a resistance
that would last for six weeks, Germany was prepared to do the rest.
This she expected of Austria, and again her calculations were wrong.
A glance at the map serves to explain the opening moves in the
eastern campaign. Russian Poland projects into Austro-German
territory, and is nearly encircled by German East Prussia and
Austrian Galicia. Russian mobilization had therefore to take place
not at the frontier, but behind the Vistula and the armies, once
concentrated, advanced from the Niemen, west of Kovno, from Warsaw,
from Brest-Litovsk on the Bug and from the Rowno-Dubno-Lutsk
fortresses west of Kiev. Thus the military as contrasted with the
political frontier of Russia was behind the Vistula, the Niemen and
the Bug.
The Austro-German plan contemplated a defensive fight on the north,
in East Prussia, and an offensive campaign from the south, aimed at
Lublin and Brest-Litovsk. The Russians on their side planned an
immediate invasion of East Prussia from Warsaw and Kovno and a far
more considerable offensive into Galicia from the Rumanian boundary
to Rowno. The objective of the northern operation was the conquest
of the whole of Prussia east of the Vistula, that of the southern
the capture of Lemberg and the conquest of all Galicia. Combined,
these two movements would abolish the Polish salient and give the
Russian right flank the protection of the Baltic, the left the cover
of the Carpathians. Only then could there be any safe advance by the
center through Poland upon Posen and Breslau and thence upon Berlin.
Russian mobilization was more rapid than Russia's allies could have
hoped for and it wholly confounded the Germans. While the Battle of
the Marne was still two weeks off Russian forces were sweeping west
from the Niemen and approaching Königsberg, a second army was
striking north from Warsaw. East Prussian populations were fleeing
before the invaders and a German disaster seemed imminent.
The genius of Hindenburg, who now appeared upon the eastern battle
ground, saved the situation. Gathering in all his available forces
and leaving the Russian army coming from the Niemen almost
unopposed, he caught the Warsaw army in the swamps about the
frontier in the last days of August and, thanks to his generalship
and heavy artillery, destroyed a Russian army. Tannenberg was a
great victory and it saved East Prussia. The Niemen army had to
retreat rapidly to escape destruction. At the time, it was asserted
that the Russian invasion had compelled the Germans to draw upon
their western front to meet the thrust and thus to weaken their
armies in advance of the decisive battle. This is not now believed
to be true, but there is no doubt that it drew reserves who might
otherwise have gone to the west or to the south.
Tannenberg was a victory which filled the world with its splendor,
but it merely disguised for the moment the far more considerable
Austrian disaster to the south. One Austrian army had crossed the
frontier and approached Lublin, another had advanced east from
Lemberg. Upon the Lemberg army the full weight of the Russian thrust
now fell and the army was promptly routed, driven through Lemberg
and west of the San or across the Carpathians. The force that had
approached Lublin was thus left in the air and succumbed to a series
of disasters, which culminated in the terrible defeat of Rawa-Ruska.
Meantime the Austrian troops, which had invaded Serbia were routed
in the Battle of the Jedar, which preceded the other Austrian
disasters and was, in fact, the first considerable triumph for the
Allies in the whole war.
AUSTRIAN PERIL
Austria was now in dire straits and her whole military structure
seemed on the point of crumbling. Russian armies flowed west through
Galicia and approached Tarnow, Przemysl was isolated, tens of
thousands of prisoners, innumerable guns and vast quantities of
stores fell to the victors. While the great German attack upon
France was failing, Russia seemed on the point of achieving against
Germany's ally what Germany had failed to achieve against France.
Germany was now compelled to intervene. At the moment when she was
organizing her final effort in the west and sending her best troops
to hack their way to Calais, she had to divert other troops to the
east. Hindenburg undertook a new offensive, this time from the
Silesian frontier, and pushed with great rapidity to the very
suburbs of Warsaw. He only failed by a narrow margin, Siberian
troops coming up just in time to save the Polish capital, and
Hindenburg, now outnumbered, conducted a swift and orderly retreat
to the frontier. But his intervention had disorganized the Russian
campaign in Galicia and Russian armies there had been compelled to
retreat and send reenforcements north.
Hindenburg's retreat was a signal for a fresh Russian advance, this
time the czar's forces reached the gates of Cracow and began to
crowd through the Carpathian passes and sweep down into the
Hungarian Plain. Przemysl was again invested, Russian troops for the
first time entering German territory west of the Vistula. It was
necessary for Germany to intervene again.
This time Hindenburg was more successful. He had retreated upon
Cracow and Breslau; gathering up his armies he transported them
rapidly to the north by strategic railways, brought them back into
Poland south of the Vistula, interposed between the Russians and
Warsaw and very nearly repeated at Lodz his great success of
Tannenberg. But this time the Russians after desperate fighting won
clear, and fell back to the lines in front of Warsaw, which they
were to hold for so many months. At the same time they retreated in
Galicia from before Cracow to Tarnow and stood behind the Dunajec
River. Austria was saved again, but having, in her extreme peril
recalled some of her corps from an army engaged in a new invasion of
Serbia, that army was routed and well-nigh destroyed.
GERMANY'S SECOND OFFENSIVE
From December to April the eastern campaign lacked decisive
circumstances. In the north Hindenburg won a new and splendid
victory at the Mazurian Lakes, expelling a Russian army which had
renewed the invasion of East Prussia. In the south the Russians
steadily pushed the Austrians back into the Carpathians, took
Przemysl with more than 125,000 prisoners, and as spring came seemed
on the point of crowning the Carpathians and descending into the
Hungarian Plain.
But the Germans were already organizing their second great
offensive. They were raising new armies, collecting fresh stores of
ammunition and preparing for a thrust against Russia as gigantic as
that against France, with the deliberate purpose of eliminating
Russia from the war. There was no longer any chance of a Napoleonic
success in Europe. But if Russia were eliminated, they could still
hope to win a peace that might leave them Belgium. Some portion of
their plans was spoiled almost as the spring campaign opened, by the
entrance of Italy on the Allies' side, but Italy came too late to
save Russia from the disasters that had begun.
The German plan of campaign was simple. Hindenburg was to strike east
and south from East Prussia at the Russian lines along the
Niemen-Bobr-Narew. Mackensen, having pushed the Russians out of
Galicia, was to strike north through Lublin and toward Brest-Litovsk.
A new army was to invade Courland and aim at Riga. It was the German
hope that the main Russian masses would be caught and enveloped by
Hindenburg and Mackensen, that Poland would be taken and all its
garrisons, and the bulk of the Russian military power be destroyed.
The first blow fell at Gorlice in Galicia in the last days of April.
Mackensen, furnished with the greatest train of artillery war had
ever seen, burst through the Russian lines along the Dunajec,
destroyed Dmitrieff's army, which faced him, almost captured the
Russian Carpathian forces and drove the Russians rapidly beyond the
San, retook first Przemysl and then Lemberg, thus clearing all but a
corner of Galicia.
The main German and Austrian armies were then sent north toward
Brest-Litovsk, while Hindenburg began his thrust by attacking
Ossowetz and the Niemen-Bobr-Narew barrier of forts. By this time
the world knew that Russian ammunition had failed and for many weeks
the possibility of a tremendous Russian disaster existed. Step by
step the Russians were pushed back. The fall of Warsaw was assured
in July and it was not until August that the escape of the Russian
garrison was certain. The same problem was raised about Kovno and
Brest-Litovsk, but again the Russians won clear. Late in August the
final net of the Germans about Vilna was drawn, but for the last
time the Russians eluded it.
And with the battle of Vilna the German eastern campaign practically
ends. In the north the Russians held Riga and the Dwina line, in the
center they were behind the great marshes of Pinsk, to the south
they were behind the Styr and Stripa, still holding Rowno, still
clinging to a corner of Galicia. They had lost hundreds of thousands
of prisoners and many guns. All of Russian Poland, most of Courland,
and much other territory had been surrendered. But they had kept
their armies intact and were once more in line.
In so far as the German campaign had been designed to free Austrian
soil and relieve the pressure upon Austrian and German fronts in the
east, it had been a shining success. It had served, too, to restore
German prestige in the Balkans. But it had come too late to keep
Italy out, and it had not eliminated Russia.
Unless the Germans were prepared to repeat the fatal Napoleonic
march upon Moscow, there was now nothing for them to do but abandon
their eastern campaign for the winter, to dig in and hold until the
spring permitted new operations. But this offered to the Russians a
period of recuperation and rest. In the spring they would have new
armies and fresh artillery. These circumstances were the measure of
the German failure in their second offensive. In their first they
had set out to dispose of France and had suffered defeat at the
Marne. In the second they had undertaken to put Russia out, and
after a long series of victories, Russia had escaped and was now
beyond their grasp.
From the military point of view the Russian failure was even more
serious than the French, because it came a year later, and at the
hour when the superior numbers and resources of the enemies of
Germany were already beginning to tell.
THE THIRD GERMAN OFFENSIVE
The two preceding German campaigns had been based on purely military
considerations. The first was a true Napoleonic conception designed
to grasp a Napoleonic opportunity. The second was partly imposed
upon Germany by Russian success and Austrian failure. There was no
longer a question of destroying the opponents in order, it was a
question of eliminating one and then finding a basis for peace with
the others. The third German campaign, that in the Balkans, was
political quite as much as it was military. It was designed to
provide Germany with some profit for her great sacrifices and her
great losses, but it was no longer a question of the conquest of any
considerable foe.
By the operations of British sea power, Germany had now practically
lost her colonial empire. It was certain that with peace she would
not again be permitted to make use of British colonies or ports, as
she had done before. Her overseas commerce with belligerents and
their colonies was bound to be ruined, even if peace came soon, for
the period of the war it was, of course, abolished.
The entrance of Turkey on the German side had opened for the Germans
a new field for industrial exploitation, if there could once be
opened a road from the Danube to Constantinople. This field would be
beyond the reach of sea power. Once Germany had taken actual command
at Constantinople, once the railroad from Hamburg to the Bosphorus
was open, it was possible to threaten Britain in Egypt, and perhaps
ultimately in India by the Bagdad and Mecca railways.
Such a threat, coupled with one more successful campaign, might
exercise a decisive influence upon the minds of the people of the
allied countries, and in opening a road to the Golden Horn, Germany
might find the path to peace. Already there was apparent willingness
in Berlin to evacuate Belgium and northern France, only from Russia
did Germany now insist upon tribute in the form of conquered
provinces. But until the road to Constantinople was open, until the
Serbian nuisance was abolished, peace could not be considered.
Turkey, too, was calling for aid. Early in the year the Anglo-French
fleets had tried to force the Dardanelles. Their failure had been
followed by a land attack at Gallipoli, which had so far failed, but
Turkish ammunition and artillery was inadequate for a sustained
fight, and there was needed German aid. To lose the Dardanelles was
to see Turkey conquered, Russia provided with munitions, and the
whole German dream of expansion to Asia Minor destroyed.
It was necessary, too, to provide the German people with a new
victory. They had been bitterly disappointed that the Russian
campaign had not brought peace, or, at the least, the elimination of
Russia. A new and relatively cheap success, the conquest of the
Balkans, would fire their imagination and again stimulate their
hopes for a victorious peace. In addition, Bulgaria now beckoned to
the Germans. Her army was at the disposition of the two kaisers, but
there was plain peril that if the coming were too long delayed, the
Allies might succeed in persuading Ferdinand to cast his lot with
the camp that now offered him Serbian Macedonia and Turkish Thrace,
and were suggesting the further _pourboire_ of Greek Kavala.
Accordingly Germany decided to go south, having gone west and east
without finding peace or decisive victory. She had available for
this operation troops no longer needed against Russia since the
campaign on this front had died out, and she had to command it, the
great Mackensen, whose fame now rivaled that of Hindenburg, whose
victories had regained Galicia. "Constantinople and Peace" became
the new German watchword, just as "Paris and Peace" and "Warsaw and
Peace" had been in preceding months.
And at the outset of this third campaign it is perhaps appropriate
to point out that Germany was now to achieve that complete military
success that had been denied to her in France and Russia, she was to
win a victory in the military sense which was beyond cavil, but she
was this time to lose the political profit she had hoped, because
she had mistaken the importance in the minds of her enemies of the
Balkan field and fatally overestimated the war weariness of the
peoples that opposed her. At the Golden Horn she was to find not
peace, but the necessity for new campaigns.
THE SERBIAN PHASE
On the military side the Serbian campaign was the simplest of
operations. For many months the Serbian forces had been posted south
of the Danube and the Save and east of the Drin, looking over their
frontiers into Hungary and Bosnia. Behind them from the Danube at
Belgrade to the Ægean at Saloniki ran the Orient railroad, by which
they were munitioned. At Nish halfway to the sea, the line drew near
to the Bulgarian frontier and sent a branch off, which passed
through Bulgaria and reached Constantinople.
The Saloniki railway was the life line of Serbia, it was also the
natural route for a retreat, if the Austro-German attack became too
heavy. But it was fatally exposed, should Bulgaria enter the war
against Serbia. In the Treaty of Bucharest, Greece and Rumania had
undertaken to join Serbia should she be attacked by Bulgaria, and
the mission of Greece was to cover the Saloniki railroad as far
north as it was necessary to join hands with the Serbians.
Now, while the Bulgarians were beginning to mobilize and the
Austro-German hosts were gathering to the north, Serbia appealed to
her former allies to keep their agreement. Both declined, and their
refusal was fatal. The Allies had relied upon Greek promises, and
had failed to collect any considerable force at Saloniki. They had
trusted Bulgaria and refused to let Serbia attack her neighbor
before Bulgarian mobilization was complete. Once Bulgaria had
mobilized the doom of Serbia was settled.
What happened was this: The Germans forced the passage of the Danube
north and east of Belgrade and came south along the broad Morava
River Valley, driving the Serbs before them. Thanks to the heavy
artillery of the invaders Serbian resistance was impotent. The
Austrians, meantime, crossed the Drin and came east from Bosnia.
Think of Serbia as a rectangle and you can visualize two sides of
the figure as closing in on the center, which was the heart of
Serbia.
At the appointed moment the Bulgarians struck west from a third side
of the rectangle, speedily crossed the Belgrade-Nish-Saloniki
railroad, and thus cut off the true line of Serbian retreat, that
upon Saloniki.
Very early in the campaign the Bulgars seized Uskub, thus
interposing a wedge between the small Anglo-French force at Saloniki
and the Serbs about Nish to the north of Uskub. Meantime a desperate
concentration was taking place at Saloniki, and an Anglo-French
force, commanded by Sarrail, was being pushed up the Saloniki
railroad toward Uskub to open a road to the Serbs to join their
allies. The operation suggested that successfully conducted in
Flanders in the opening months of the war, which enabled the Belgian
army to escape from Antwerp and join their allies in Flanders.
But this operation failed. The French came north to the outskirts of
Veles, twenty miles from Uskub, just too late to save the Serbians,
who now fled west to Monastir and south to Montenegro and Albania.
As a fighting force the Serbs were eliminated, the wrecks of their
armies barely escaping to the Adriatic and Ægean coasts at Durazzo
and Saloniki. Bulgarian troops forced the Katchanik gorges and took
Prisrend, and German and Austrian forces entered the ill-omened
Plain of Kossovo and overran the ancient Sanjak of Novibazar.
Before the storm that was now moving south, the French and British
retreated upon Saloniki, and presently began to construct about this
Greek city lines and defenses recalling those Wellington built at
Torres Vedras before Lisbon to restrain the flood of Napoleonic
invasion in the Iberian peninsula. The conquest of the Balkan
peninsula, save for Greece, was now as complete as Napoleon's own
success in Spain had been more than a century before.
In due course of time an Austrian army repeated the operations of
the Germans, this time succeeding in reducing the strongholds of
Montenegro, which had defied the Turk through long centuries. Mount
Lovetcen, the peak which looks down upon Cattaro and commands the
inner bay, was at last taken, Scutari followed, northern Albania was
overrun, Nicholas followed Peter into exile. All Macedonia was taken
and the Allies forced out of Serbia, which had become an entirely
conquered country. To complete the conquest of the Near East there
was needed nothing but a successful siege of Saloniki, but this
required preparation and the rebuilding of destroyed railroads, and
so the Allies found respite in this Ægean port for a brief time.
Such was Germany's third campaign. Her victory enabled her to send
munitions to Constantinople, and insured the failure of the allied
attack at the Dardanelles. Only a few weeks later the allied armies
evacuated the Gallipoli Peninsula; thus testifying to the decisive
character of the German operation. Still later Turkish reenforcements,
doubtless drawing upon German sources for munitions, defeated another
British expedition almost under the walls of Bagdad and drove it in
retreat down the Tigris, ultimately surrounding it at Kut-el-Amara, a
hundred miles to the south.
Again, there came immediately forecasts of another Turkish thrust at
Suez, under German direction, a first attack having failed in the
previous winter. Whether Germany actually obtained any considerable
stock of provisions or foodstuffs may be doubted by her succor, but
it is clear that her campaign had enabled her to make use of many
thousands of Turkish troops, who were waiting only for arms, it had
given her control of the Bulgarian army, a small but efficient
force, and it had provided an eventual means of attacking the
British Empire by land, once the advance upon Egypt could be
organized.
This last circumstance is worth noting, for the time had now arrived
when the Germans perceived that Great Britain had so far escaped
injury, was the single one of the larger powers who had drawn profit
without terrible loss from the war and was becoming the determining
force in the allied camp, because its resources were still
unexhausted and its armies only just coming into the field, while
German numbers were approaching a positive decline. If Germany could
reach Suez, conquer Egypt, using Turkish armies and German genius
and munitions, she would deal a heavy blow to the British Empire,
and she might compel the British to listen to proposals for peace,
which were now contemptuously thrust aside by London.
In sum, the Serbian campaign saved Turkey, disposed of Serbia,
enlisted Bulgaria, opened the road to the Near East and to
subsequent attacks upon Egypt and perhaps upon India, but it did not
bring peace, and it did not inflict any immediate injury upon any
one of Germany's larger foes, only Serbia and Montenegro actually
suffered serious loss, and the destruction of their armies was but a
detail in a world war.
ITALY
For the purposes of a summary it is unnecessary to review in detail
the Italian operations. They have no distinctive challenge to the
reader. Italian statesmanship imposed upon the Italian high command
a task which made immediate victory impossible, and assigned to
Italy the useful but inglorious rôle of occupying some 400,000
Austrian troops, and thus contributing to the strain imposed upon
the Central Powers and to the hastening of the moment when
exhaustion might be expected to set in.
Had Italy decided to enter the war at the moment when Russia was
destroying Austrian armies in Galicia in September and October of
1914 she would almost unquestionably have supplied the necessary
numbers to bring a speedy and decisive defeat for the Central
Powers. Again, had she selected the moment when Russian armies were
at the crests of the Carpathians, and Przemysl had just fallen, she
would have probably made the German offense against Russia
impossible, brought Rumania in with her, and produced the collapse
of Austria. Bulgaria would not have enlisted with the Central
Powers, Greece would almost certainly have attacked Turkey, and the
Balkan campaign would not have taken place.
But German diplomacy averted the second peril, and Italian alignment
with Austria and with Germany in the Triple Alliance made an attack
at the opening of the war unthinkable. When Italy did come in, the
German victory in Galicia had been won, Russia was in retreat, the
allied defeat before the Dardanelles forts and the Russian disasters
had produced a profound effect in Balkan capitals, and Austria was
able to find the troops to meet and check the Italian advance almost
at the frontier. Since that time the Italian operations have been
merely trench conflicts, and Italy has nowhere penetrated a score of
miles into Austrian territory, nor has she taken Trieste, Trent, or
even Gorizia.
If one desires a parallel for the Italian operations it is to be
found in the later phases of the Peninsula War against Napoleon.
This field was never of decisive importance, but it did require the
attention of several of Napoleon's best marshals, and drew off
thousands of French soldiers needed by the great emperor in the
campaigns in eastern Germany, where his fortunes were finally
decided. What Wellington did, the Italians under Cadorna have been
imitating in their own peninsula, and their service to their allies
has thus been very considerable.
Nor is it necessary for the purposes of so rapid a review of the
main phases of the war to dwell upon the allied failure in the west
between the end of the battles of Flanders in November, 1914, and
February, 1916. At the beginning of 1915 what were allied hopes and
purposes in the west? Unquestionably French and British public
believed that with the coming year the Grand Alliance would be able
to crush Germany. Unquestionably French and British high commands
planned to open the summer with a drive that would clear France and
Belgium. As for the Germans, having laid their plans to go to
Russia, they asked nothing of their western armies save that the
lines should be held.
The French began their spring drive in Artois and in Champagne. The
Artois fighting of May and June was exceedingly severe, incidental
gains were made, but the British were suddenly disclosed lacking in
all proper ammunition, lacking in numbers to support the French
offensive, and barely able to hold their own lines about Ypres,
after desperate fighting, made memorable by the first use by the
Germans of gas as a weapon of offense.
From June until September the western armies stood still, while
Britain organized her munition manufactures and continued to send
her new troops to the Continent. Kitchener's "million" was not
realized until the late fall, instead of the early spring. But
when, in the latter days of September, the British attacked about La
Bassée, and the French in Champagne, the muddling of British
officers cost the Allies a considerable triumph in Artois, and the
French victory in Champagne was purely local. Some 30,000 prisoners,
200 cannon, this was the fruit of an offensive which cost the
British 60,000 casualties, and the French hardly less than twice as
many.
German defense, therefore, fulfilled its mission in the west, German
armies were able to drive deep into Russia without having to detach
reenforcements to the west. Such offensives as the Allies ventured
were either complete failures or merely local successes, without
major value. Belgium and northern France were not liberated, and
there was, as yet, not even a promise of the crushing of Germany.
ALLIED POLICY
In the brief space that remains I desire to discuss the policy of
the nations which are fighting the Teutonic Alliance. The German
purpose at the outset of the war has been discussed. Franco-Russian
preparation had been made long before the war, and the general plan
of the high commands of the two allies worked out without any
material interruption. The same is true of the cooperation of the
British army. This simply followed out the plans agreed upon years
before.
It is not true, as has been frequently asserted, that France or her
allies were surprised by the German invasion of Belgium, this had
long been foreseen. It is not true, as was believed widely at the
time, that Joffre invited disaster by sending the mass of his troops
into Alsace-Lorraine, yielding to political and patriotic sentiment.
He did nothing of the sort. Such troops as were sent into these
provinces fulfilled their mission and contributed to drawing German
corps away from the north. The bulk of the French armies and the
British Expeditionary Corps were in line along the Belgium frontier
from Arlon to Mons when the Germans began their great drive.
The French were surprised in two respects. They had not foreseen the
rapidity with which the German heavy artillery would reduce the
forts in Belgium, the fall of Namur was the greatest catastrophe of
the first period of the campaign, and they had not dreamed that the
Germans would be able to mobilize so many troops in so short a
period. Joffre had planned to meet the Germans along the Meuse and
the Sambre, that is along the French frontier, but when the German
advance began, his troops on these fronts were outnumbered by at
least two to one, not because the mass of the French troops had been
sent to Alsace-Lorraine, but because the French had not foreseen the
capacity of the Germans to mobilize their reserves and had little
more than their first-line troops ready, while the Germans were
making use of Landwehr and even Landsturm formations in the first
shock.
Once this fact was clearly established, Joffre resolutely drew his
forces back until he was able to put more reserves in the field and
thus approximately restore the balance between the two armies. But
he was still heavily outnumbered at the decisive moment, winning his
great battle with inferior forces. His enemy had reckoned on the
traditional eagerness of the French to attack, and had expected to
obtain a decisive victory, through superior numbers, in the first
days of the war. The impression which the press reports gave in the
early days, that the French were driven from defeat to defeat and
almost succumbed to the German attack is far from accurate. In point
of fact, the French armies, after suffering marked but relatively
insignificant reverses at the outset, reverses due to the blunders
of the subordinate generals in part, and to the greatly superior
German numbers and artillery in the main, were drawn back in
obedience to a carefully conceived plan, were denied the opportunity
to fight, as they desired, until the exhaustion of German strength,
ammunition, and transport, and the increase in French numbers gave
the opportunity for a victory. The whole opening campaign was fought
on the French side with a very keen recollection of the mistakes of
1870, and the result justified the strategy.
But with the end of the Battle of the Marne both the Allied and the
German plans collapsed. Neither side had foreseen clearly the
possibility of a battle in which the French might win a decisive
victory, yet lack the numbers to enforce the decision absolutely.
But the Germans were able to meet the situation promptly and, by
preparing a position on the Aisne, to retain a considerable portion
of the ground they had occupied in their first rush. Thus in failing
to repeat their triumphs of the Franco-Prussian War and of the Seven
Weeks' War, they had escaped the disaster of Napoleon at Waterloo,
when he, too, had staked all on a single throw.
In the weeks and months that followed the German defeat at the
Marne, allied understanding of the actual nature of the war
developed only slowly. Until the coming of spring and the British
failure to get men or munitions, the French and the British public,
and probably their soldiers, believed that the Germans were shortly
to be turned out of France. But with the failure there was at last
established the real situation, the war had taken on the character
of our own Civil War, it had become a struggle in which the decision
would follow the exhaustion of one of the contending forces and the
incidental victories of either side could not contribute materially
to the ending of the war.
In the Civil War the North was exceedingly slow in learning this
lesson and it was not until General Grant at last assumed the
command of all the Northern armies that an intelligent policy was
adopted. This policy has been summarized as the policy of attrition
and it is now generally recognized as the policy on which the
enemies of the Central Powers rely for ultimate success. Grant's own
statement of this policy was as follows: "To hammer continuously
against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by
mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be left to him
nothing but submission." By this policy Grant won his war.
Now the allied policy, which it is necessary to recognize, to
understand the war as it is viewed by one of the two contending
forces, is this: The Allies are satisfied that the German numbers
have begun or are beginning to fail. They fix at around 8,000,000
the total man power of Germany at the outset, using all means of
computation including their own experience. They figure that at the
end of the first eighteen months Germany had lost permanently not
less than 3,500,000, possibly 4,000,000. They know that it requires
upwards of 3,000,000 men to hold Germany's present lines and about
1,000,000 to perform other necessary services.
Now no such wastage has to be faced by the Allies as a whole. France
is in the German situation, but Great Britain is still possessed of
large numbers of men and her losses are under 600,000, while her
population together with that of her colonies is above 60,000,000,
whites alone being considered, against Germany's 67,000,000.
Russia's man power is practically limited only by the ability to
equip and munition. Italy has, as yet, made little draft upon her
resources. Austria, on the other hand, has suffered more heavily,
proportionately figured, than Germany.
Within a time that can be approximately fixed, the Allies believe
that Germany will have either to shorten her lines or underman them.
If she undermans them she will face the peril that overtook Lee
about Richmond, when, as he said, his lines were stretched so thin,
they broke. If Germany shortens her lines, this will be a confession
of defeat and will deprive her of the conquered territories.
Meantime the entire strategy of the Allies is summed up in Grant's
grim words, and as Grant kept up his hammering on all the fronts of
the Confederacy so the Allies are keeping up their pressure.
But attrition of men is only half; there is the question of food and
of money. Command of the sea insures the food supply of the Allies
and their financial resources greatly surpass those of Germany.
Germany is suffering--we have Harden's word for this, because of
food shortage, she is suffering from economic paralysis resulting
from the blockade and she is suffering from the lack of certain
materials needed in war. She is compelled to find money for her
other and poorer allies. The enemies of Germany do not expect that
she will be starved out or that she will have to surrender for lack
of materials to make ammunition. But they do believe that shortage
of food, economic pressure, financial difficulties, will go hand in
hand with the failure of numbers.
In a word the Allies are fighting a war with many weapons of which
the army is only one and the British navy another, perhaps the most
effective. They are not fighting to win a campaign and they are not
basing their expectation of victory on the incidents in any one
field or in any single campaign. The Germans, on the contrary, as we
have seen, have undertaken three tremendous campaigns, the first to
win an absolute victory on the battle field, a victory which would
make the Germany of William II the successor of the France of
Napoleon I in Europe; the second to dispose of one of the great foes
and thereby win a limited but considerable success; the third to win
peace and an incidental opportunity to expand toward the east, the
only direction in which expansion cannot be checked by sea power.
The Allies still expect to crush Germany; by crushing Germany they
mean bringing her back to her frontiers of 1914, detaching
Alsace-Lorraine from her and possibly Prussian territory east of the
Vistula. They mean to destroy her fleet, demand indemnities for
Belgian and French sufferers, they mean to abolish what they regard
as the Prussian menace to peace. They are fighting Germany as Europe
fought Napoleon and with the same determination. On the German side
the struggle is also being waged in the Napoleonic fashion, Germany
is seeking to employ the Napoleonic method and has so far achieved
something of the early success of the great emperor.
But the simplest fashion in which to describe the later phases of
the conflict is to say that a war of action has become a war of
endurance, that Germany has sought and missed a decision on the
battle field and her foes are now seeking the decision through
economic forces quite as much as military and through casualty lists
rather than brilliant campaigns.
THE WAR CORRESPONDENT
By ARTHUR RUHL
When the American fleet was sent to Vera Cruz in the summer of 1914
and it looked for a time as if an army might go into Mexico, Major
General Funston explained the conditions under which correspondents
were to go to the front. There was to be no repetition of the
scandalous free-for-all of the Spanish War, when news prospectors of
all sorts and descriptions swarmed over to Cuba in almost as
haphazard fashion as Park Row reporters are rushed uptown to cover a
subway explosion or a four-alarm fire.
The number of men was to be limited and their privileges strictly
defined. Only the press associations and some twenty or thirty
newspapers were to send correspondents, and they must put up
substantial bonds for each man--one for his good behavior, the other
to serve as an expense fund against which would be charged his keep
as a civilian guest of the army. These conditions fulfilled, the men
were to accompany the expedition with the privileges, practically,
of officers or neutral attachés.
They would join an officers' mess or have a mess of their own with
similar service; they might provide their own horses which would be
cared for with the other horses of the unit to which they were
attached. They were to stay where they were put, so far as nearness
to the fighting was concerned, according to the judgment of the
commanding officer, and all their dispatches must first pass a
military censor.
These rules were read with some dismay by those not included in the
provisional list. To many who had hoped to see something of a war
they doubtless seemed severe, yet it is a fact that had they been
put into effect, the correspondents in Mexico would have seen much
more, comparatively speaking, than any group of correspondents has
seen in Europe. They would actually have accompanied the army,
sharing throughout the expedition the day-to-day life of the
fighting men, like the old-fashioned "horseback correspondent"--and
nobody in Europe has done that.
At the beginning of the war, England permitted no correspondents at
all at the front, and while a group was chosen, it was well into
1915 before they were even allowed to cross to France. Once they
reached their headquarters they saw a good deal. They lived at or
near the front instead of merely shooting up and back for a glimpse
of it. They met many officers more or less intimately, saw the life
behind and in the trenches; occasionally they were taken to
observation stations from which they saw the effect of artillery
fire, and even, perhaps, in the distance, charging infantry. Yet the
number who had even these privileges was so limited that it included
but one American.
Mr. Frederick Palmer was thus chosen to act as a sort of
correspondent at large for the American press. Mr. Ashmead Bartlett,
an English journalist, acted in a similar capacity for the English
press and, indeed, for the rest of the world, at the Dardanelles. He
saw a great deal, as much, perhaps, as any reporter has seen of any
campaign, but he was almost alone in his glory, and so far as the
distribution of such privileges is concerned, the English have been
more cautious than any of the belligerents.
The French military authorities were more open minded, yet, while a
few favored sons or the head of some press association whose
position in Paris was almost as secure as that of an accredited
diplomat, were quietly taken up to the trenches from the first,
several months had elapsed before a group of correspondents went to
the front. The desirability of publicity was better understood
later, many neutral correspondents visited the trenches, and a few
specially favored individuals spent some time at or near the front,
but, even here, permission was obtained as a result of individual
effort rather than as a part of a general scheme for handling, more
or less impersonally, all applicants in good standing.
In Germany, correspondents were rather freely taken to the various
fronts from the first. One reason for this, was, perhaps, that the
Germans, with their thorough organization of everything, including
censorship and secret service, may have known better just how far
they could go. They were not afraid of what might get through the
wall, because the wall was tight, and they knew just what could get
out and what couldn't. At any rate, many reporters, both native born
and foreign, were getting glimpses of the various fronts while the
English group were still eating their heads off in London. Once
there, however, they saw less, as a rule, than the English
correspondents finally did, for their trips were generally mere
visits--a sort of Cook's tour in war time.
A quotation from an article of mine in "Collier's" written after a
trip through Belgium and down to the first-line German trenches at
Givenchy will suggest the nature of these excursions:
"You go out a sort of zoo--our party included four or five
Americans, a Greek, an Italian (Italy had not yet gone into the
war), a diminutive Spaniard and a tall, preoccupied Swede--under the
direction of some hapless officer of the General Staff. For a week,
perhaps, you go hurtling through a closely articulated program,
almost as helpless as a package in a pneumatic tube--night
expresses, racing military motors, snapshots at this and that, down
a bewildering vista of long gray capes, heel clickings, stiff bows
from the waist, and punctilious military salutes. You are under fire
one minute, the next shooting through some captured palace or
barracks or museum of antiques. At noon the guard is turned out in
honor, at four you are watching distant shell fire from the Belgian
dunes; at eleven crawling under a down quilt in some French hotel
where the prices of food and wines are fixed by the local
commandant. Everything is done for you--more, of course, than one
would wish--the gifted young captain conductor speaks English one
minute, French or Italian the next, gets you up in the morning, to
bed at night, past countless sentries and thick-headed guards
demanding an _Ausweis_, contrives never to cease looking as if he
had stepped from the bandbox, and presently pops you into your
hotel in Berlin with the curious feeling of never having been away
at all."
There were a great many trips of this sort under the auspices of the
German General Staff, and every neutral correspondent who came to
Berlin with letters establishing his position as a serious workman
in good standing in his own country, could hope, after a reasonable
interval for getting acquainted, to obtain permission to go on one
of them. It was not an ideal way of working, to be sure, yet the
"front" was a big and rather accidental place, and one could
scarcely touch it anywhere without bringing back something to help
complete the civilian's puzzle picture of war.
One man would get a chance to spend a night in the trenches, with
the sky criss-crossed with searchlight shafts and illuminating
bombs; an automobile party might be caught on some East Prussian
road with the woods on either side crackling with rifle fire as the
skirmishers beat through the timber after the scattered enemy as
after so many squirrels. Our moment came one afternoon in the German
trenches at Givenchy, when, with the English trenches only a stone's
throw away, both sides began to amuse themselves by shooting
dynamite bombs.
Groups of native-born correspondents were likely to see rather more
than outsiders, and the more authoritative home writers were
attached not infrequently to an army corps or staff headquarters for
weeks at a time. The Berlin and Vienna bookshops are filled with
books and pamphlets written by such men, though, of course, little
of their correspondence has ever reached America. A man like Ludwig
Ganghofer, for instance, became so much of an institution that
papers even joked about him, and I remember a cartoon--in "Jugend,"
I think--picturing him puffing up a hill where a staff was waiting
and the commanding officer saying "Ganghofer's here. The attack may
now begin!"
In Germany, however, as in France, at least during the first year of
the war, each correspondent, particularly a foreigner, was merely a
privateer, making his own fight for a chance to work, and pulling
what wires he could. After his brief excursion he returned to
Berlin, a mere tourist, so to speak, and had to begin the old
tiresome round--his own embassy--the German Foreign Office--the War
Office--all over again. There was no organization in which he could
enroll, so to speak, he had no permanent standing. This
drawback--from the correspondent's point of view--was met in
Austria-Hungary by the Presse Quartier, an integral part of the army
like any other branch of the service, whose function it was to
handle the whole complicated business of war correspondence.
The Austro-Hungarians, prepared from the first for a large number of
civilian observers, including news and special writers,
photographers, illustrators and painters, and, to handle them
satisfactorily, organized this Presse Quartier, once admitted to
which--the fakers and fly-by-nights were supposed to be weeded out
by preliminary red tape--they were assumed to be serious workmen and
treated as the army's guests.
The Presse Quartier--the Germans later organized one on somewhat
different lines--was in two sections; an executive section with a
commandant responsible for the arrangement of trips to the various
fronts and the general business of censorship and publicity; and a
second, an entertainment section, so to speak, also with its
commandant, whose business it was to board, lodge, and otherwise
look after correspondents when they were not on trips to the front.
At the time I visited the Presse Quartier the executive section was
in the city of Teschen, across the border of Silesia; the
correspondents lived in the village of Nagybicse in Hungary, two or
three hours' railroad journey away. In this village--the most novel
part of the scheme--some thirty or forty correspondents were living,
writing their past adventures, setting forth on new ones, or merely
inviting their souls for the moment under a régime which combined
the functions of tourists' bureau, rest cure, and a sort of military
club.
For the time being they were part of the army--fed, lodged, and
transported at the army's expense, and unable to leave without
formal military permission. They were supposed to "enlist for the
whole war," so to speak, and most of the Austro-Hungarian and German
correspondents had so remained--some had even written books
there--but a good deal of freedom was allowed observers from neutral
countries and permission given to go when they felt they had seen
enough.
Isolated thus in the country--the only mail the military field post, the
only telegrams those that passed the military censor--correspondents
were as "safe" as in Siberia. They, on the other hand, had the
advantages of an established position, of living inexpensively in
pleasant surroundings where their relations with the censor and the
army were less those of policemen and of suspicious characters than of
host and guest. To be welcomed here, after the usual fretful dangling
and wire-pulling in war office anterooms and city hotels was
reassuring enough.
Correspondents were quartered in private houses, and as there was
one man to a family, generally, he was put in the villager's room of
honor, with a tall porcelain stove in the corner, a feather bed
under him and another on top. Each man had a soldier servant who
looked after his boots and luggage, kept him supplied with cigars
and cigarettes from the Quartier commissariat--for a paternal
government included even tobacco!--and whack his heels together
whenever spoken to and flung back an obedient "Ja wohl!" We
breakfasted separately, whenever we felt like it, lunched and
dined--officers and correspondents--together. There were soldier
waiters, and on every table big carafes of Hungarian white wine,
drunk generally instead of water. For beer one paid extra.
The commandant and his staff, including a doctor, and the
officer-guides not on excursions at the moment, sat at the head of
the long U-shaped table. Anyone who came in or went out after the
commandant was supposed to advance a bit into this "U," catch his
eye, bow and receive his returning nod. The silver click of spurs,
of course, accompanied this salute when an officer left the room,
and Austro-Hungarian and German correspondents generally snapped
their heels together in semi-military fashion. All our goings and
comings, indeed, were accompanied by a good deal of manner. People
who had seen each other at breakfast shook hands formally half an
hour later in the village square, and one bowed and was bowed to
and heard the sing-song "habe die Ehre!" a dozen times a day.
With amenities of this nature the Quartier guests passed their time
while waiting their turn to go to the front. There were always,
while I was there, one or more parties in the field, either on the
Italian or the Russian front, or both, while a few writers and
artists were well enough known to be permitted to go out alone. The
Hungarian, Mr. Molnar, for instance, whose play, "The Devil," was
seen in America a few years ago, was writing at that time a series
of letters under the general title, "Wanderings on the East Front,"
and apparently, within obvious military limitations, he did wander.
One day, another man came into lunch with the news that he was off
on the best trip he'd had yet--he was going back to Vienna for his
skis, to go down into the Tyrol and work along glaciers to the
battery positions. Another man, a Budapest painter, started off for
an indefinite stay with an army corps in Bessarabia. He was to be,
indeed, part of the army for the time being, and all his work
belonged to the army first.
Foreigners not intending to remain in Austria-Hungary could not
expect such privileges, naturally; but if they were admitted to the
Quartier at all they were sent on the ordinary group excursions like
the home correspondents themselves. Indeed, the wonder was--in view
of the comparative ease with which neutral correspondents drifted
about Europe; the naiveté to put it mildly, with which the wildest
romances had been printed in American newspapers--that we were
permitted to see as much as we did.
When a group started for the front it left Nagybicse in its own car,
which, except when the itinerary included some large city--Lemberg,
for instance--served as a little hotel until they came back again.
The car was a clean, second-class coach, of the usual European
compartment kind, two men to a compartment, and at night they bunked
on the long transverse seat comfortably enough. We took one long
trip of a thousand miles or so in this way, taking our own motor, on
a separate flat car, and even an orderly servant for each man.
Each of these groups was, of course, accompanied by an officer
guide--several were detailed at the Quartier for this special
duty--whose complex and nerve-racking task it was to answer all
questions, make all arrangements, report to each local commandant,
pass sentries, and comfortably waft his flock of civilians through
the maze of barriers which cover every foot, so to speak, of this
region near the front.
The things correspondents were permitted to see differed from those
seen on the other fronts less in kind than in quantity. More trips
were made, but there is and can be little place for a civilian on a
"front," any spot in which, over a strip several miles wide, from
the heavy artillery positions of one side to the heavy artillery of
the other, may be in absolute quiet one minute and the next the
center of fire.
There is no time to bother with civilians during an offensive, and,
if a retreat is likely, no commander wishes to have country
described which may presently be in the hands of the enemy. Hidden
batteries in action, reserves moving up, wounded coming back,
flyers, trenches quiet for the moment--this is about as close to
actual fighting as the outsider, under ordinary circumstances, can
expect to get on any front.
The difference in Austria-Hungary was that correspondents saw these
things, and the battle fields and captured cities, not as mere
outsiders, picked up from a hotel and presently to be dropped there
again, but as, in a sense, a part of the army itself. They had their
commandant to report to, their "camp" and "uniform"--the
gold-and-black Presse Quartier arm band--and they returned to
headquarters with the reasonable certainty that in another ten days
or so they would start out again.
Another advantage of the Quartier was the avoidance of the not
uncommon friction between the civilians of the Foreign Office and
the soldiers of the War Office. The Foreign Office runs things, so
to speak, in times of peace and it is to the Foreign Office that the
diplomatic representatives of foreign powers apply for favors for
their own fellow-citizens. But in war time the army runs things, and
the Foreign Office official who has charge of correspondents is
continually promising things or wishing to do things he is not sure
of being able to carry out. The result is often a rather unpleasant
sort of competitive wire-pulling between correspondents, some trying
the Foreign Office, some the War Office, some attacking both at the
same time--one would even hear it said now and then that the surest
way to get anything from the soldiers was to complain to them that
the Foreign Office civilians wouldn't do anything for you!
In Austria-Hungary the Presse Quartier acted as a bridge between the
two. It was the definite court to which all applicants were referred
and a good deal of aimless waiting about and wire-pulling eliminated
at once. And having cleared away the preliminary red-tape, the
correspondent had, in the Quartier commandant, an agent more likely
to push his interests than the civilian officials back in the
capital and more likely to be listened to by those at the front.
The war correspondent had been "killed off" so many times in
newspapers and magazines of late years that one might expect him to
be as dead as the dodo, and of course the old-fashioned "horseback"
correspondent--a sort of unofficial envoy extraordinary from the
reading public, who carried his own elaborate outfit and rode more
or less where he pleased--is extinct. A horse would have been about
as useful on most of the European fronts, under the conditions
prescribed, as a rowboat. What the correspondent needed, in the few
hours he was permitted to see anything, was a fast motor car, and
quite as much as the car itself the pass, without which it would
have been stopped at the first crossroads.
Wandering round the active front where any point in a strip of
several miles wide, however apparently peaceful, is under
observation and likely to be at any moment under fire, is not
practicable even were it permitted. Modern artillery, long range
rifles, aeroplanes and field telephones have put an end to such
strolling; while the elaborate system of communication in such
highly civilized neighborhoods as those in which the present war is
being fought, and the care with which every scrap of information
about the enemy is pieced together and coordinated, makes it
imperative that every possible source of such information shall be
controlled.
Nevertheless the Great War had no sooner started than the old guard
bobbed up serenely, and with them new ones--men and women writers,
adventurous novelists, privateers of all sorts. They have kept on
working and seeing more or less, and have performed necessary and
valuable service. They have described the life behind the front, the
life in towns, camps, prisons, hospitals and given the news--the
rough general outlines--of the swiftly changing drama. Very few have
seen any fighting, properly speaking, and although bits of their
work here and there deserve to become part of the permanent history
of the war, they themselves would be the last to suggest that they
have told the real story.
The real story is of two kinds. There is the narrative of the
events, the orderly, understanding arrangement and coordination of
the showers of facts and rumors that blow in from a hundred sources
to the great news centers far from the front. And there is the story
of personal experience, the sensations of the individual as he looks
into the face of war. The first tells what happened, the other how
it felt. For the one, the correspondent is too near, for the other
too far away.
The division of the enormous battle fronts into innumerable little
news-tight compartments, so to speak, understood in their entirety
only by the commanders in chief at the centers of the telegraph and
telephone network far behind the front, makes it impossible for a
correspondent to see very far beyond his own nose. Even were he
permitted to understand the general plan of his own army he could
scarcely know, while still at the front, the general plan of the
enemy. A well-informed observer working comfortably at his desk in
one of the capitals, with the news of the world at his disposal,
with experts on every subject within easy calling distance, and with
every sort of map and reference book, is much better able to write a
story of the war--such a story as this, for instance--than any
correspondent actually at the front, however fortunately situated.
There have been many such "correspondents at home" and reporters
returning from first-hand glimpses of this and that, have often for
the first time understood the significance of such details when they
were seen through the broad perspective and leisurely analysis of
such long-distance observers.
The nourishing flavor of such a little book as Fritz Kreisler's
"Four Weeks in the Trenches"--scarcely more than a magazine article,
with no sensational adventures and no attempt at rhetorical effect,
and of several little collections of published letters--reveals at
once the correspondent's other disability. People feel that this man
really was _there_--this is what one real man with a gun in his hand
did feel, and not what some civilian, sitting safely out of range,
imagines crowds of men might have felt. Its very incompleteness,
things left out because of sensibilities so stunned that events made
no mark as they whirled by, is often more impressive than the
conventional war correspondent's cocksureness and windy eloquence.
There are scores of men like this gifted violinist--playwriters,
painters, journalists, men trained to see things in various
ways--drawn in by universal service and now buried in the mass, but
destined some day to emerge to normal life.
From them the story of the individual, of the fighting itself, must
come long after the war is over. It will come piecemeal, from
diaries now stuck away in the soldiers' pockets, from memories that
will only begin to act when peace has given weary brains a chance to
work again, from men now tired and dirty and horror-stunned and
scarcely able to remember their own names.
PART I--INDIRECT CAUSES OF THE WAR
POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF EUROPE FROM 1866 TO 1914 WITH A
CHAPTER ON THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN
In order to understand properly the underlying causes which were
responsible for the outbreak of the Great European War of 1914, it
is necessary to be acquainted with the recent historical development
of the various nations involved. In considering the various phases
of this development it becomes evident that in modern times the
history of any _one_ country exerts a powerful influence upon the
history of all the other countries. The vast development of means of
communication between the various countries of the earth--railways,
steamships, telegraphs, telephones--resulted in an equally vast
increase of their commercial and social intercourse until one might
almost claim that there is not a single event of any importance
whatsoever happening in _one_ country which does not make its
influence felt throughout the entire world. It is not always easy or
even possible to determine the exact degree to which the various
nations of the world are affected by this mutual interdependency,
and frequently many years elapse before it becomes evident at all
that what one nation has done or neglected to do has an important
relation to the fate of another nation, even though the two nations
may have few points of contact and be separated by great distances.
To describe historical events as they happen day by day or even year
by year throughout the modern world is an almost hopeless task,
because a description of this nature would result in a confusion
which would be even worse than an entire lack of knowledge
concerning these matters. We will, therefore, consider separately
the historical development of each nation and thereby try to arrive
finally at a clear understanding of the historical causes of the
Great War of 1914.
Some of these causes, of course, may be claimed to go back to the
beginnings of the history of the various nations; but a majority of
them had their origin in comparatively recent times. It is also true
that the Napoleonic Wars resulted in certain international
alignments some of which, at least in part, held over until
comparatively recently. But it was only approximately at the
beginning of the second half of the nineteenth century that
international relations assumed the important position and the
fateful influence which they hold now. The short war of 1866 between
Prussia and Austria, fought primarily to determine the supremacy in
German affairs, may conveniently be considered for our purposes a
starting point of modern international history because it resulted
in changes so important that their final results had a powerful
influence over the fate of the entire civilized world. Inasmuch as
this war affected more directly Germany and Austria, we will first
consider these two countries.
CHAPTER I
GERMANY
In 1866 there was strictly speaking no Germany. That part of the
world which during the past forty-five years has been known as
Germany consisted of a large number of small states and
principalities, speaking the same language and having in a general
way the same customs and ideals. All attempts to find some basis for
their political unification, however, miscarried. Whenever Prussia,
which beyond doubt was the biggest and most powerful of all the
German-speaking states, attempted to take the lead it was opposed by
powerful Austria as well as by a varying number of smaller states.
The latter, much as they desired in certain ways to bring about a
united Germany in order to be better protected against their much
more powerful neighbors, Russia and France, feared these hardly
more than a Germany under the control of Prussia. It gradually
became clear that unification of Germany would never be realized as
long as Austria and Prussia were contending for leadership. How
utterly impossible it was for these two countries to achieve any
lasting success as long as they made a common cause of anything had
been proven only two years earlier, when both went to war with
Denmark about the succession to the throne of the duchies of
Schleswig-Holstein. For no sooner had they succeeded through their
combined efforts in defeating Denmark and thereby forced the
northern kingdom to relinquish its claims on Schleswig-Holstein than
they found it next to impossible to settle among themselves the
division of the newly acquired territory.
It was about at this time that the greatest statesman of modern
Germany, Bismarck, began to become all powerful. It was he who
recognized more clearly than anyone else the need of eliminating
Austria from German affairs, and then finding some cause which would
appeal strongly and equally to all the other German states. The
difficulties connected with the division of Schleswig-Holstein
offered to him an opportune cause for a quarrel with Austria, and
when he felt in 1866 that the Prussian army had been sufficiently
re-formed and built up to overpower not only Austria, but any of the
other German states which might possibly join with her, he went to
war. Prussia had succeeded in forming an alliance with the newly
united Italy on the basis of the latter's desire to regain the north
Italian territory which was then in the possession of Austria. On
the other hand the latter had drawn to its side the kingdoms of
Hanover and Saxony, as well as all the south German states. The war
was one of the shortest in the history of mankind, considering the
size of the countries involved and the odds at stake. In less than
two months, after only one important battle--at Sadowa--had been
fought on July 3, and lost by the Austrians, peace was concluded at
Prague. As a result of the arrangements made then, Austria was
eliminated from German affairs and withdrew all its claims for
Schleswig-Holstein, and Prussia was free to form a confederation of
the north German states with itself as a leader, while the south
German states were permitted to form a federation of their own.
Austria furthermore lost Venetia to Italy. Of the Austrian allies,
the south German states were let off easy with a money indemnity,
but Hanover, Nassau, and Hesse-Cassel lost their independence and
became part and parcel of the Prussian kingdom.
This addition to its territory made Prussia even more predominant in
Germany than it had been in the past and Bismarck immediately
proceeded to take the first step in the unification of Germany. This
took the form of the North German Confederation and so well did he
build at that time that the new government which he conceived then
has ever since remained the government of united Germany. In its way
it was unique. It was a mixture of monarchism and federation. Each
of the federated states retained a large amount of control over its
internal affairs, but yielded to Prussia control of its armies,
foreign relations, railways, and posts and telegraphs. The King of
Prussia became the president of this federation and as such its
chief executive. The legislative powers were intrusted to two
bodies, the Bundesrat and the Reichstag, the former representing the
various states, the latter their people. The members of the
Bundesrat were appointed by the rulers of the states which they
represented, whereas the members of the Reichstag were elected by
universal manhood suffrage.
This rise of Prussia's power and influence disturbed and displeased,
among all the European states, none more than France. It was only a
few years before Napoleon III saw himself forced, partly through
internal difficulties and partly through his failures in Mexico and
Italy, to challenge William I of Prussia. In this combat the
predominancy in German affairs was no longer at stake, as it had been
between Prussia and Austria; but so powerful had Prussia become that
France felt it necessary to defend the leadership in Central European
affairs which it then claimed. The revolution which had broken out in
1868 in Spain and resulted in the expulsion of Queen Isabella became
the indirect cause of the Franco-Prussian War. After various
unsuccessful attempts on the part of Spanish statesmen to find a king
for their country among the European princes they offered the crown of
Spain to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a relative of the
King of Prussia. Naturally the prospect of having a German prince rule
its western neighbor greatly excited France and led immediately to a
strong protest on its part. But not satisfied with this Napoleon
demanded from King William a promise that he should at no time permit
his cousin to accept the Spanish throne. These demands of the French
were promptly refused by the King of Prussia, and Bismarck and Von
Moltke saw to it that the message as delivered was brusque and
calculated to excite France to anger. Indeed, opinion was so deeply
stirred that Napoleon felt compelled to ask for a declaration of war.
On July 19, 1870, this step was taken.
Undoubtedly Napoleon was influenced in his decision by his
expectation that the south German states would either side openly
with him or else at least refuse to side with Prussia, basing this
hope on their fear that if Prussia should become all powerful in
Germany their own independence would be threatened. His
expectations, however, were not realized. As much through the
wonderful statesmanship of Bismarck, who knew when to give as well
as when to take, as through the awakening of an immensely strong
national feeling throughout the length and breadth of Germany, the
south Bavarian states, within a few days after France had declared
war, sided openly with Prussia. This combination proved too strong
for France, for it was superior not only in numbers and equipment,
but especially in leadership. The unified German armies won battle
after battle in quick succession and by September 2, Napoleon found
himself with a large army hopelessly surrounded in Sedan and was
forced to surrender. He was sent to Germany as a prisoner of war and
his downfall resulted in the end of the Second Napoleonic Empire and
the declaration of the Third French Republic.
The German armies immediately proceeded to the siege of Paris and on
January 8, 1871, the French capital had to capitulate. A few months
later, in May, France and Germany made peace, the former paying an
indemnity of $1,000,000,000 and ceding Alsace and a part of
Lorraine. In the meantime the unification of Germany had progressed
rapidly. Even before Paris had fallen, the German princes, headed by
the King of Bavaria, had offered to King William the presidency over
a new federation containing both the north and the south German
states. This federation was to be known as the German Empire and its
president as the German Emperor. On January 18, 1871, in the Hall of
Mirrors at Versailles King William accepted this offer, and was
proclaimed German Emperor.
It was quite natural that in the beginning the path of the newly
created German Empire should not be strewn exclusively with roses. At
the time of its formation, it is true, it had nothing to fear from
other nations. France which, in a way, may be considered at that time
as its only external enemy, had been beaten, and beaten in such a way
that it was clear that years would have to elapse before the new
republic would be in a position to undertake anything against Germany.
Indeed, a great many thoughtful people throughout the entire civilized
world were hoping that this period of recuperation through which
France was bound to pass would result in a gradual understanding
between Germany and France. The gulf which separated them immediately
after the Franco-Prussian War, to be sure, was wide; for the attitude
of the two peoples in regard to the taking over of Alsace-Lorraine was
widely different. The French felt that Germany had abused its power at
the moment of its victory to tear an integral part off the body
politic of the republic. They vowed that although the necessity of the
moment had forced them to submit they would never forget the "lost
provinces," and this spirit, this demand for restitution, was fostered
and nourished throughout the years to come. From time to time it
seemed as if the great masses of people in the two countries would
finally reach an understanding. But whenever the cry for restitution
seemed to have been stilled, politicians of one kind or another
succeeded in making it sound again. Germany on the other hand claimed
that Alsace-Lorraine had originally been a German province, had been
taken from Germany by force, and that the French had neither a legal
nor moral claim to the territory.
Internally the new chancellor of the German Empire had a great many
battles to fight in order to achieve the financial, social, and
military reforms which he deemed necessary for the safety and
upbuilding of the empire. It is not necessary for our purposes to go
into these struggles in detail. It suffices to note in passing that
they resulted in increases and in vast improvements of the German
army, and laid the foundation for the marvelous industrial and
commercial expansion of the German Empire.
The leading men of the German Empire fully appreciated the need of
their country of a long period of peace in order to work out the
many problems which the unification had brought about. In every
possible way the diplomats, politicians, and rulers of the various
German states did their best to make it clear to the other nations
that they had no desire for further conquests and were, to say the
least, as anxious as their neighbors to maintain peace. In 1872 the
three emperors of Russia, Austria, and Germany met together with
their ministers at Berlin, and although no treaty was concluded at
that time, the conferences which took place then and throughout the
following years had a powerful influence on the continuation of
European peace. About the same time Italy also attempted to show its
good will toward Germany by sending the crown prince of the new
kingdom on a visit to the German Emperor, and it seemed at that time
as if the fate of all of Europe and, indeed, of the entire civilized
world, was in the hands of the central European states--Germany,
Austria, Russia, and Italy. Both France and England seemed to be
isolated.
However, it was not long before clouds appeared on the firmament,
and they came, as they had come before, and as they were to come
again, from the East.
The first disturbance of the cordial relations, that apparently had
been established among Germany, Austria, and Russia, was caused in
1876 when the Near Eastern question became again an issue between
Austria and Russia. The latter's inquiries at Berlin as to the
German attitude in a possible war between the other two empires were
met with an evasive answer, except that it was made clear that
Germany would not permit Russia to deal with Austria beyond a
certain point. As a result of this stand Russia decided to settle
the Eastern question through a war with Turkey rather than with
Austria.
During the Russo-Turkish War, April, 1876, to February, 1877, the
causes and results of which will be considered in another place,
Germany maintained the strictest neutrality, so strict in fact that
at its conclusion Germany was chosen as mediator. To this part the
young empire adhered most carefully during the Congress of Berlin,
June to July, 1878, and, difficult though it was, showed the
strictest impartiality. At the same time it refused to gain any
profit from the readjustment which resulted. In spite of this,
however, it received little appreciation on the part of Russia,
which apparently had expected a more active display of gratitude on
the part of Germany for its own friendly neutrality during the
Franco-Prussian War. In a way this marks the beginning of a strong
anti-German feeling in Russia, which by 1879 had grown strong enough
to make a war between the two countries seem possible. Bismarck
immediately took the necessary steps to insure Germany against such
a possibility by concluding an alliance with Austria, October 7,
1879, at Gastein. In this he was bitterly opposed by William I,
whose personal feelings were leaning much more toward Russia than
Austria. However, a threat on the part of the chancellor to resign
brought this rapidly aging emperor to terms.
The Austro-German alliance was defensive only. It stipulated that in
case of an attack by Russia on either contracting party the other
was to assist with its entire forces. In case of an attack by any
other power only friendly neutrality was to be observed, except if
such a power was in any way supported by Russia, when the first
stipulation was to take force.
Three years later, in 1882, Bismarck strengthened Germany's
international position by overcoming Italy's enmity against Austria
to the extent of inducing the southern kingdom to join in this
defensive alliance, which from then on was known as the "Triple
Alliance," and which endured until Italy's declaration of war
against Austria in 1915. The chancellor had now succeeded in placing
the keystone in Germany's defensive bulwark. He had to fear no
longer the possibility of a joint attack by Russia and France. For
the powerful triple block of Central Powers would make any joining
of forces by these two countries impossible.
A result of this security was Germany's entrance among the colonial
powers of the world. The objects of this step were twofold: to open
up new fields for the rapidly expanding German trade, and to divert
German emigration in such a way that its steady stream would not
drain the Fatherland of too large a proportion of its surplus
population. From 1884 on Germany used every opportune moment to
acquire colonial possessions. Though for many years none of the
other powers seriously objected, it was quite natural that sooner or
later Germany would find itself in conflict with the other
colonizing powers, especially with the greatest of all--England.
In 1884, Alexander III, who had succeeded his murdered father in
1881 and who was much less pro-German than the latter, showed signs
of succumbing to France's strenuous advances looking toward an
alliance to enable the republic to gratify its desire for revenge.
But Bismarck's diplomatic genius not only prevented this, but even
brought about a secret neutrality treaty between the two empires,
which, however, was entirely separate from the Triple Alliance.
Gradually, thus, the chancellor accomplished all that he had set out
to do after the formation of the German Empire to place his country,
not only among the great powers of the world, but to gain for it
within certain limitations, a leading position. With his internal
policies he was hardly less successful, although he had many hard
battles to fight to gain his end. The year 1888 saw him in the
zenith of his power, and Wilhelmstrasse (where the German Foreign
Office was located) promised fair to take the place that Downing
Street had held. That year, however, brought a change of rulers to
Germany. In March William I died at the age of ninety-one, and was
succeeded by his son Frederick III, the son-in-law of Queen
Victoria of England. This in itself endangered Bismarck's position
and influence. For ever since 1879 Frederick had more or less openly
allied himself with the National-Liberal party, which strongly
opposed the chancellor's foreign policy. The new emperor, however,
had been stricken with a mortal disease, which in 1878 was diagnosed
as cancer of the throat, and which resulted in his death on June 15,
1888, less than four months after he had become emperor.
His son and successor, William II, was less than thirty years old, a
more or less unknown quantity, with little experience, but
possessing a very strongly individual temperament. The break between
him and Bismarck came soon, and resulted in the latter's resignation
on March 18, 1890. Germany could ill spare the master hand that had
guided so successfully its destinies since 1870, and at no time
since has Germany's international position been so strong or its
foreign policies as purposeful as under its first chancellor.
The second incumbent of this office was General von Caprivi,
1890-1894, whose accomplishments were chiefly of a military and
economic nature. Of the former the most important was the change to
the two years' term of army service, of the latter the conclusion of
commercial treaties with Austria-Hungary, Russia, Italy, and
Rumania. In the field of foreign relations his term of office
yielded the important result of a better understanding with England,
accompanied, however, by a lessening of friendly relations with
Russia. This period also brought to Germany the island of Helgoland
in exchange for certain readjustments of boundaries in Africa.
Bismarck's work in regard to cementing the German-Russian relations
was undone by the refusal of Germany to renew the secret neutrality
treaty which expired in 1890, and in 1891 Russia concluded an
alliance with France which from then on considerably reduced the
influence of the Triple Alliance. The menace of a France recovered
and supported by a strong ally again loomed up, and the
dissatisfaction of German public opinion, increased by the severe
criticism of the retired "iron chancellor," resulted finally in the
resignation of Von Caprivi.
His successor, Prince Chlodwig Hohenlohe-Schillingfürst, 1894-1900,
was an experienced diplomat, distantly related to the emperor, and
possessing much stronger convictions of his own. By this time
Germany's industrial development had made immense strides. From an
agricultural country it had changed to a nation deeply interested in
industry and commerce. Its merchants contended everywhere for the
world's trade. Articles of German manufacture made the term "made in
Germany" a by-word of quality and efficiency. Riches flowed into the
empire in a steady stream. Riches, however, were not the only result
of this development. The young empire began a fight for leadership
in manufacture and commerce, in science and the arts. To achieve
these ambitions, German agents and salesmen penetrated all
countries, new and old, and built up vast markets for German
products, at the same time using every means available to undermine
and destroy the economic influence of other nations. Nor was the
empire contented with material gain and new-found prestige; Germany
abandoned its former policy of concerning itself only with European
affairs, and became a sinister and unscrupulous opponent of other
great powers in the dangerous game of "world politics." We are not
concerned here, however, with this feature of Germany's advance,
which is fully treated elsewhere.
This period brought out more and more the strong individuality of
William II, who had early--earlier, perhaps, than anyone
else--recognized his country's new needs, and who put all of his
immense vitality into his efforts to fill them. Some results were:
the beginning of a very definite and extensive naval program, the
building and completion (1895) of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal between
the Baltic and the North Sea, active participation in the
development of Turkey in Europe and Asia, the acquisition of a
"sphere of influence" in China, and the lease of Kiao-chau in 1897,
the purchase of the Carolina Islands in 1899. All these activities
brought Germany more and more frequently in contact and often in
conflict with English interests. Its naval ambitions aroused the
suspicions of the old mistress of the sea, and relations which at no
time since the death of William I had been overcordial became more
strained.
In 1909, Prince Hohenlohe was succeeded by his Foreign Secretary,
Count, later Prince von Bülow. Though an experienced diplomat and a
man of great intelligence and culture, he found his road beset with
difficulties. Not only had he to face in international politics at
every step the dual alliance of France and Russia, which was
becoming rapidly more intimate, but English aversion against German
independence in matters of world politics, and English resentment
against German expansion grew day by day. The culmination of this
general dread of German ascendancy found expression in the formation
of the Anglo-French _entente cordiale_ of 1904 and the Anglo-Russian
arrangement of 1907, of which we shall hear more when considering
the histories of the three countries directly involved. Whether or
not the German claim that these agreements were concluded with the
ulterior motives of isolating and then crushing Germany and her
allies had foundations, is of little importance. For the fact
remains that they were considered in this light, not only by
Germany's diplomats, but by the nation at large, and ever after
Germany's foreign policy was based on this consideration.
Even before England had actually come to a definite understanding
with Russia, the first test was put to the new line-up of the
European powers. In 1905 trouble arose about the extension of French
influence in North Africa. Although a general European war seemed
more possible at that time than at any other time within recent
years, it was averted as a result of the so-called Algeciras
Conference. In this first inning Germany won together with Italy and
Austria against France, backed by Russia and England, and the result
was the declaration of Morocco's integrity.
[Illustration: Europe in Twelfth Century, Historical Map.]
During the next decade the foreign policy of Germany showed the same
chief characteristic that was noticeable in that of the other
countries--high tension. One is almost tempted to compare this
period of Europe's history to the hours immediately preceding a
violent electrical storm. The diplomatic atmosphere was surcharged
with electricity, and long before the storm really broke the growl
of distant thunder could be heard and occasional flashes of
lightning announced its approach. That, in spite of all signs, so
many people firmly believed that the storm would never break, is
easily explained with the innate optimism of mankind, and is on a
par with the spirit of unbelief in unpleasant things that makes
people go out unprepared for rain, as long as rain only threatens,
but does not actually fall.
In 1911, Morocco again almost became the stumblingblock. In that
year France annexed this north African country in spite of the
agreement that had been reached at Algeciras. Germany immediately
entered a strong protest, which, however, was later withdrawn in
consideration of certain commercial privileges in connection with
the development of the country, and the cession of territory in
central Africa. Once more war had been avoided.
This period also saw numerous upheavals in the Balkans. Throughout
these Germany made it clear that it would permit nothing in that
part of the world which would work out to the disadvantage of its
ally--Austria.
In spite of temporary reduction in the tension existing between
Germany on the one hand, and England, France, and Russia
respectively on the other, the differences between these countries
became more marked, diplomatic clashes more frequent, and their
mutual suspicion of each other more pronounced. England especially
resented the ambitious naval program of Germany, which seriously
threatened British supremacy on the sea and forced England to
tremendous expenditures to maintain its overwhelming naval strength.
France was menaced by Germany's increase in the peace strength of
its army, which was accomplished in 1913 by means of special
taxation known as the "Wehrbeitrag."
The German-French relations were influenced considerably, not only by
French colonial policy, but also by conditions in Alsace-Lorraine. We
have already heard of the French attitude in regard to these so-called
"lost provinces." Right after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, and
for a considerable period afterward, the desire for restitution and
the demand for the reconquest of the lost territory undoubtedly was as
sincere as it was widespread among the French nation. It is, however,
no less true that these sentiments decreased in fervor, and most
likely would have subsided entirely if they would have been permitted
to take their natural course. Instead of this, this question gradually
became a political issue of the first magnitude, and now one political
party and then another would use it for its own purposes. It was thus
that the French-German animosity was kept alive and nurtured. On the
German side the more or less uncompromising attitude toward all things
French as far as Alsace-Lorraine was officially claimed to be a matter
of political necessity. At any rate it gave continual opportunities to
French politicians to make capital out of the conditions as they
existed in Alsace-Lorraine. One of the most severe outbreaks of
anti-German and antimilitary feeling in that part of the German Empire
happened in December, 1913, in the small Alsatian garrison town of
Zabern, when some Alsatians of French antecedents and sympathizers
were wounded in a clash with German officers and soldiers. Unimportant
as this affair was, in a way, it resulted in a great deal of very
pointed and unfriendly comment in the French press, and undoubtedly
added fuel to the fire of Franco-German animosity which was burning
even then stronger than it had done for many years.
In 1908, near the end of Prince von Bülow's incumbency of the
chancellorship, his position became very difficult, because of the
general disapproval on the part of the nation of the German
emperor's custom to make long speeches concerning foreign affairs.
Some of these speeches caused a considerable amount of offense in
foreign capitals, and, while this matter, too, may be considered a
minor detail in Germany's relations with foreign powers, it had at
the same time some influence. Throughout this period the chancellor
was supported by a combination of the National-Liberal and
Conservative parties. But in 1909 the continuation of this
combination became impossible on account of the divergence of
opinion existing between these two parties in regard to the
Government's financial reforms. The National-Liberal as well as the
Social-Democrat and other radical members of the Finance Committee
withdrew, and the Conservatives formed a new combination with the
Center party. This new majority, however, made so many changes in
the original Government bill, and forced through measures which the
chancellor so thoroughly disapproved, that he handed his resignation
to the emperor. It was not accepted right away, but upon his
continued insistence, he finally was permitted to resign in July.
His successor was Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, up to then Minister of
the Interior of Prussia, a member of an old patrician house with
strong National-Liberal tendencies.
In 1910 the Far Eastern problem again became acute. Russia, Japan,
and England, of course, were most vitally interested in the future
of China. Both France and Germany, too, had important commercial
interests. For a time it looked as if these great powers would clash
about the Chinese question, which each wished to solve in such a
manner that the greatest possible advantage and gain would come to
itself and none or the least possible to the others. However, in
1910 the United States proposed that the Manchurian railway, just
then the principal issue, be financed by an international syndicate,
reasserting, thereby, its previous stand for an "open-door" policy
in China. Germany supported this attitude, and undoubtedly did not
make through this action any friendships among the other powers.
In May, 1911, the Reichstag, after long discussion, accepted a bill
giving a separate constitution to Alsace-Lorraine, making, thereby,
this territory more equal to the other parts of the German Empire.
This action, of course, was welcomed by the inhabitants of
Alsace-Lorraine, and was a long step toward reconciling them
sometime to the German overlordship. In the same degree in which it
accomplished this it caused displeasure in France, where, by this
time, every success in the Germanizing of the "lost provinces" was
viewed naturally with almost as much disapproval as the original
occupation.
It was in the same year, 1911, that the Morocco difficulties arose
again with France, as we have already seen, but in spite of the
appearance of a German gunboat at the port of Agadir and the
threatening attitude of Germany, matters were finally settled
amicably. The terms of the settlement, however, pleased neither the
German nor the French nation at large, and a considerable feeling of
enmity remained.
Late that year, 1911, a determined campaign was started by the
German Navy League in an effort to bring about an increase of
Germany's naval forces through the force of public opinion. This
activity, which met with considerable success, was viewed with alarm
and displeasure in England. These sentiments grew and spread to
France when in the spring of 1912 the newly elected Reichstag
adopted a bill carrying greatly increased expenditures for both army
and navy.
In the summer of 1912 the Balkan question, which is treated in
detail in a separate chapter, assumed threatening proportions.
Germany as well as the other great powers, however, at that time
managed to find a common basis and kept all from active
participation in the two Balkan wars, restricting their activities
to the exertion of their various influences for as just a settlement
as was possible under the circumstances when the time for settlement
had arrived in 1913. In spite of the inactivity of the powers there
can be no doubt that their respective attitudes at that time toward
the various Balkan States and their ambitions had an important
influence on the latter's attitude toward the various powers after
the war of 1914 had broken out.
In December, 1912, the Triple Alliance was renewed, although even
then the conflicting interests of Italy and Austria in the Balkans
had made such a step somewhat doubtful.
The early spring of 1913 brought with it the uncovering of a rather
extensive scandal in connection with the manufacture of guns and
other war materials. One of the Socialistic leaders in the Reichstag
charged some officials of the great munition firm of Krupp and of
other firms with bribery of War Department officials, and with the
creation of artificial war scares in other countries for the sake of
increasing munition orders. Although the German courts later
sustained this contention to a certain extent, and although it
resulted in a certain amount of antiwar sentiment, Germany continued
with its well-defined program of increased preparedness. That the
Government had behind it in its efforts the full support of public
opinion was proven in June of the same year, 1913, by the passage in
the Reichstag of another bill carrying considerable increases in the
peace strength of the army, and by the fact that the necessary
expenditures were met by special taxation, which, though severe in
its effects alike on poor and rich, was borne cheerfully by the
entire nation.
[Illustration: Nicholas II, Emperor of All the Russias.]
Although the Balkan question continued to be the source of
considerable anxiety and extensive diplomatic conferences, the
political horizon of Europe during the latter half of 1913 and the
first half of 1914 seemed comparatively cloudless to all but the
keenest observers. Like a flash of lightning out of a clear sky,
therefore, came the news that the heir to the throne of
Austria-Hungary, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and his wife, the
Duchess of Hohenberg, had been assassinated during a visit to
Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, June 28, 1914, and that the
Austrian Government had determined to hold Serbia responsible.
England, France, Russia, and Serbia tried, in vain, during the next
five weeks to check the outbreak of a general European war.
CHAPTER II
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
Amongst the great European nations the Austro-Hungarian Empire
occupies a unique position. In number of inhabitants it is inferior
only to Russia and Germany, whereas it occupies more territory than
any other European country, with the single exception of Russia. In
spite of this, however, Austria-Hungary possesses no foreign
colonies, and those of its inhabitants who, for one reason or
another, decided to leave the land of their birth, have, therefore,
for years emigrated to foreign countries, and have been lost, in
large numbers, to their native country. Of course, the desire for
expansion, which is one of the chief characteristics of the
historical development of the various nations during the twentieth
century, made itself felt in Austria-Hungary as well as everywhere
else. Not having any colonies and not having either the financial or
military means of acquiring any, the Dual Monarchy has for many
years been deeply interested in the Near East. There vast stretches
of undeveloped territory, much of which was immediately adjoining
its own territory, created a strong desire for possession, or at
least for a preponderating influence. This desire was intensified by
the peculiar racial conditions which existed in the Dual Monarchy.
Austria-Hungary in this respect also differed from all the other
European nations. In each one of the other countries of Europe there
was _one_ race that was more numerous and more influential than any
of the other races that might inhabit the same country. In
Austria-Hungary, however, there were living side by side a number of
widely different races. Germans, Bohemians, Poles, Hungarians,
Serbians, and others. Of most of these races additional numbers were
living in one or another of the adjoining countries, and this
condition brought about a continuous desire on the part of these
different nations to unite. For instance, the Poles living in
Austrian Galicia never gave up their hope of once more becoming
united with their fellow Poles in Prussian and in Russian Poland. In
the same way the Rumanians in the Austrian province of Bukowina cast
longing eyes toward Rumania and Russian Bessarabia; the Austrian
Serbs did the same in respect to Serbia and so on.
All attempts of the Government to change this condition appeared to
be futile, whether these attempts were of a friendly or of a hostile
and oppressive nature. Legislature of any kind, as long as it
affected racial questions, was not only unsuccessful in
accomplishing its ends, but often resulted in bitter parliamentary
discussions and hostilities. The resentment of the various racial
units of the Dual Monarchy against such legislation was only
deepened by the fact that for many years the actual power of
government lay in the hands of the Germanic part of the empire in
spite of the fact that the Germans, though in many ways the most
advanced, were the least numerous.
In view of all these conditions it is rather remarkable that the
Dual Monarchy should have held together as long as it did and,
indeed, its disruption was frequently prophesied and as frequently
expected. It is clear, therefore, why every attempt on the part of
the different Balkan nations to readjust their affairs deeply
interested and affected Austria-Hungary. For, even if the empire had
given up all thought of profiting itself by such a readjustment,
there was always the danger that it might lose both in territory and
population. Such a loss, however small, would have seriously
embarrassed the Dual Monarchy. For not only might it have resulted
in further losses of the same nature, but also from a financial
point of view the empire could not afford a diminution of any of its
resources. As national wealth goes, Austria-Hungary cannot be
considered rich by any means, being in this respect almost on an
equal basis with Italy, which has only two-thirds the number of
inhabitants and less than one-half the extent of the Dual Monarchy.
Considering the many difficult problems of political, financial and
economic nature which the possession of colonies created for the
various colonial powers of Europe, Austria might have considered
itself fortunate because of its entire lack of colonies. However,
the problem of Balkan readjustments, upon which we have touched just
now, took the place of colonial problems and brought to Austria as
many difficulties and entanglements as any colony has ever brought
to its possessor. It was along that line that Austria-Hungary was
brought into contact with the other nations of Europe. Of these
Russia was the one most vitally interested in the same questions as
Austria. For of almost every race that inhabited Austria additional
numbers were living in Russia and whatever one country did or
attempted to do in the Near East was looked upon with suspicion by
the other. Turkey, too, of course, was vitally interested and
affected by Austria's policy in the Near East and so was England
ever since its foreign policy had been committed to the principle of
keeping the Near Eastern _status quo_ undisturbed.
Outside of these possibilities of becoming involved with another
nation the Dual Monarchy had long-standing difficulties with Italy.
For, previous to the creation of the present kingdom of Italy,
Austria had possessed large parts of northern Italy, and the loss of
these fertile and rich territories was a severe blow to Austria.
The enmity between the two countries was still more enhanced when,
in 1866, Austria had to give up Venetia to Italy. This loss was an
indirect result of the Prusso-Austrian War of 1866, the details of
which we have already mentioned in the recital of the political
development of Germany. Previous to declaring war against Austria,
Prussia had formed an alliance with Italy and at the beginning of
hostilities between Prussia and Austria Italy, too, attacked
Austria. Although the Austrian troops defeated the Italians, Austria
was forced, when peace was concluded, to yield Venetia to Italy
retaining only a small part of its former possessions on the
Adriatic so as not to be cut off entirely from a maritime outlet.
This small remnant of its former Italian possessions, however,
proved to be a thorn in the body politic of the Dual Monarchy. The
inhabitants of this province were preponderately Italian in language
and Italian in feeling and ever since the formation of the kingdom
of Italy a strong propaganda was carried on with the object of
finally accomplishing the redemption of these provinces from
Austrian rule and their unification with Italy.
In spite of the difficulties between Austria on one side and Russia
and Italy respectively on the other it seemed, soon after the
Franco-Prussian war of 1870, as if all these difficulties would be
adjusted in an amicable way. In 1872 the three European Emperors of
Germany, Austria and Russia met and without actually concluding a
treaty arrived at a mutual understanding which promised well for the
future peace of Europe. Five years later in 1877 when Russia went to
war with Turkey the definite result of this mutual understanding was
a treaty concluded between Russia and Austria. As a result of this
treaty Austria agreed not to interfere between Turkey and Russia
whereas Russia promised to Austria Bosnia and Herzegovina, both of
which were at that time under the rule of Turkey. This latter
promise was kept in 1878, when the various Balkan questions that had
become acute through the Turko-Russian War were adjusted at the
Berlin Congress. It is true that at that time Austria was only
permitted to occupy these territories, but even this was a
considerable acquisition.
Four years later another step was taken toward the strengthening of
European peace. In that year the treaty which had been concluded in
1879 between Germany and Italy was extended to include Austria-Hungary
and this alliance of the three Central European Powers, known commonly
as the Triple Alliance, endured not only till the outbreak of the war
of 1914, but even for some time later. This alliance originally was
made only for five years, but at the expiration of this time it was
renewed in 1887 and again later.
Of the causes and results of the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 we have
heard already in the consideration of Germany's history. Immediately
after its conclusion Austria-Hungary devoted its energies chiefly to
internal affairs and in 1867 succeeded in a reorganization of the
difficulties which had arisen with Hungary. The result was the
"Ausgleich" which established Hungary practically on an equal basis
with Austria, giving it a separate constitution, legislature and
cabinet. It is from this dual basis that the term "Dual Monarchy"
was derived and the arrangement made then fundamentally is in
existence to-day.
Throughout the ensuing years Austria-Hungary's position and
influence amongst the great European powers was of little direct
importance. In the first place the Dual Monarchy was occupied
continuously with the most vexing internal questions caused by the
incessant difficulties arising between its racially different
population. These were responsible for the fall of one ministry
after another, and frequently caused grave apprehension to all
Europe. For many years the disintegration of the empire was feared
and expected. But in spite of all difficulties it held together. In
the second place the country remained for many years chiefly
agricultural and even to-day, considering its extent, is only
moderately industrial. This made it unnecessary for Austria-Hungary
to concern itself directly with such questions as the colonization
of Africa or the division of China. Only occasionally it made its
influence felt indirectly by supporting the policies and claims of
its two allies, Germany and Italy.
In 1908, however, it took a step that immediately brought it into
the center of world politics. In that year the annexation of
Bosnia-Herzegovina was announced, although for many years previous
the Turkish suzerainty over these two provinces had been less than
nominal. As this was followed immediately by a declaration of
independence on the part of Bulgaria, the jealousy of Serbia was
aroused. But both the difficulties with this country and with Turkey
about the annexation were finally adjusted, mainly through the
strong support which Germany gave to its ally and in 1909 all of the
powers recognized the annexation.
Once more Austria-Hungary withdrew from the international concert
and devoted itself to its internal difficulties which seemed to
increase in frequency and violence as the years passed by. It was
not until the summer of 1912 that it again became active in
connection with foreign politics. Then, when the Balkan question had
become acute, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Count Berchtold,
suggested to the other powers that they combine for the purpose of
settling the Balkan disputes. The suggestion was accepted and
although it did not succeed in avoiding war between the different
Balkan States themselves, it, at least, localized this war and kept
the rest of Europe out of it.
Of course, Austrian diplomats were busily occupied throughout this
entire period in guarding their country's interests, and
Constantinople especially was the scene of many a diplomatic battle
between Austria-Hungary and the other powers. From time to time
relations with Russia became somewhat strained on account of the
conflicting interests of the two countries in the Balkans. But in
spite of this conditions were friendly enough to permit an
arrangement between these two powers in March, 1913, whereby they
agreed on the demobilization of their respective forces along the
Russo-Austrian border.
The murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the throne, and
his wife during a visit at Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, however,
changed immediately Austria-Hungary's attitude toward Serbia. Like
one man the country rose and demanded the punishment of the
murderers and of the nation which, it was claimed, had planned and
financed the murder, Serbia. Racial differences and dissensions of
long standing were forgotten and forgiven over night, as it were,
and a country, more solidified than at any other period in its
history, stood behind its Emperor Francis Joseph, a man who
throughout his life of more than eighty years--of which more than
three-fourths were spent on the throne--had suffered all the
disappointments and sorrows that can come to a man, but had never
lost the trust and love of his subjects.
CHAPTER III
RUSSIA
In the middle of the nineteenth century the Russian Empire, in spite
of its vast extent and resources, played a comparatively negligible
part in international politics. To a certain extent this was the
result of the Crimean War. But still more was it due to the internal
difficulties which were so many and so serious that they kept the
empire fully occupied for a considerable period.
This condition is easily understood if we remember that at that time
of all the great European nations Russia was the least developed,
the least advanced, and the least modernized. The many reforms
instituted at that time contributed their share in changing this
condition and resulted in bringing the Russian Empire rapidly to the
forefront of European nations. With the details of the reforms we
are not concerned, but as their actual accomplishment had an
important bearing on Russia's future activities in the field of
world politics it will be well to state that they consisted chiefly
of five great measures: the emancipation of the serfs; the
institution of the zemstvos or county councils; trial by jury;
regulation of the public press; and reorganization of the army. Some
of these reforms were instituted by the government only after public
opinion had made such a course inevitable, and of the history of
this entire period it may well be said that it was written in the
very lifeblood of the Russian people. Two forces continuously
combated each other; on one side were the large masses of the
people, on the other the ruling classes. The former it is true were
not always in solid union and, indeed, more frequently left the
burden of fighting their cause to a small group of intellectuals.
Their demands in many instances were unreasonable, but the ruling
classes were just as unreasonable in their attitude, and the result
was a period of terrorism during which assassination of officials
abounded and even the life of the emperor was threatened a number of
times.
During the war of 1866 between Prussia and Austria and in 1871
between France and Germany, Russia observed a friendly neutrality
toward Prussia. This attitude was the outcome of the long-standing
personal friendship between the Russian and Prussian dynasties, a
condition which at that period counted much more than in more modern
times. Although Russia kept out of any active participation in these
two struggles it used the Franco-Prussian War, when all the other
European powers were tied down by its possibilities, to declare, in
October, 1870, that it refused to be bound further by the provisions
of the treaty of Paris, made in 1856, establishing the neutrality of
the Black Sea. As a result of this a conference was called to London
the following year, 1871, which affirmed in the name of all powers
represented their determination to respect the sanctity of treaties,
but in spite of that rescinded the treaty of 1856 along the lines of
Russia's demands, and the neutrality of the Black Sea was abolished.
A few years later a separate arrangement between Russia and Turkey
made it possible for both of these powers to create and maintain
separate fleets in the Black Sea.
In 1872, as we have already heard, the three European emperors of
Russia, Austria, and Germany met at Berlin and possibly as a result
of that meeting a treaty was signed in 1873 between Germany and
Russia which, however, bearing as it did only the signatures of the
two emperors and of the heads of their respective general staffs,
had neither a real standing nor an important influence in the
affairs of either country.
[Illustration: Europe in 1648-1789, Historical Map.]
Two years later, in 1875, Russia once more acted in concert with
Austria and Germany when the Governments of these three empires
addressed a joint request to Turkey asking for the immediate
institution of reforms in the Balkan dependencies of the Turkish
Empire which were then the center of continuous upheavals and
threatened to disrupt European peace.
Before we continue the consideration of Russia's political history
it will be well to emphasize the chief characteristics of Russian
foreign policy. In western European politics Russia had no direct
interest. In the Near East, however, it was more directly interested
than any other European power with the possible exception of
Austria-Hungary; for not only were most of the European dependencies
of Turkey inhabited by Slavish people or else by races closely
related to them, but it was there also that Russia hoped to gain its
much-needed ice-free seaport. This strong interest of Russia in
Balkan affairs which will be brought out in greater detail in
another place, devoted exclusively to the Balkan question, naturally
brought it continuously in contact with Austria-Hungary. For the
latter's interest in these matters was as strong as was Russia's,
although it was, as we have seen, based on different grounds. This
condition then meant that there was nothing in the way of a strong
friendship or even a possible alliance between Germany and Russia
except Germany's friendship for and alliance with Austria-Hungary
which made it impossible for Germany to support Russia's policy in
the Balkans. As a secondary result of this obstacle to a
Russo-German alliance may be considered the gradual approachment
between France and Russia.
In one other part of the world Russia's interest was very strong and
that was in the Far East. Here it clashed with equally strong or
even stronger interests which England and Japan had and it took many
years before these three powers finally arrived at an understanding
concerning their several spheres of interest in the Far East.
Immediately following Russia's participation in asking reforms of
Turkey for its Balkan dependencies Pan-Slavism increased rapidly and
greatly in Russia. One of the most peculiar features of this
movement is the fact that the Russian Government suppressed with all
the power at its command and with all the severity within its
knowledge this movement as far as it affected internal affairs, but
supported it just as strongly as far as it affected the affairs of
other countries. The growth of Pan-Slavism finally resulted in
April, 1877, in Russia's declaration of war against Turkey.
In this war Russia was victorious, but only through the support
which it received from Rumania, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro. In
spite of repeated appeals on the part of Turkey to the other
European powers these did not step in until Turkey was almost
threatened with entire elimination. Then a conference of the
European powers was called at Berlin and resulted in July, 1878, in
the Treaty of Berlin which took the place of a treaty previously
arranged between Russia and Turkey in March, 1878, at San Stefano.
The Treaty of Berlin gave to Russia certain small parts of Turkey,
but successfully reduced the excessively strong influence over
Balkan affairs which Russia had attempted to gain for itself in the
Treaty of San Stefano.
In spite of the difficulties between Austria and Russia, of which we
have spoken, the two countries had arrived, previous to the outbreak
of the Russo-Turkish War, at an understanding according to which
Austria maintained a friendly neutrality toward Russia during the
war, in consideration of which Russia permitted Austria's occupation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The following years are again marked by internal difficulties
resulting in a reign of terrorism and in a period of reactionary
government which exceed almost anything in Russia's previous
history. It found its culmination in the successful assassination of
Czar Alexander II on March 13, 1881. He was succeeded by his son
Alexander III under whose rule the gulf between Russia and its
western neighbors, Germany and Austria, widened in the same
proportion as the friendship between Russia on one side and France
and England on the other increased. To a certain extent undoubtedly
this may be traced back to the new czar's personal relations with
the rulers of other nations; for the czarina was a sister of
Alexandria of Denmark, then Princess of Wales and later Queen of
England, and the daughter of that King of Denmark who in 1864 had
lost to Germany and Austria Schleswig-Holstein.
The beginning of Alexander III's reign was marked with the beginning
of a series of terrible persecutions of the Jewish inhabitants of
the Russian Empire which, though subsiding from time to time, have
continued throughout the years until the present time. With the
causes of these persecutions we are not concerned here, for they
were undoubtedly much more of an economic than of a political
nature. In one respect, however, the results had an important
bearing, at least for a time, on Russian politics. For during many
years both France and especially England found it difficult and
almost next to impossible to enter into a close alliance with a
country which apparently absolutely refused to acknowledge some of
the most fundamental principles of modern government in which they
themselves believed: religious and personal freedom.
With Alexander III came also a return to a more reactionary form of
government which in its turn brought about a revival of terrorism
and Nihilism with all its horrors and bloodshed. In spite of the
continuance of these conditions in Russian internal affairs Russia
participated actively in the general movement for expansion which
made itself felt in the latter decade of the nineteenth century. Its
interest in Near Eastern affairs became deeper and more active and
its advances in the Far East kept step. In the Near East, however,
Russia found determined opposition and the gradual development of
the independent states of Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece,
most of which were formed, at least partly, out of what was once the
Turkish Empire, made it clearer and clearer every day that Russia's
hope for gaining a maritime outlet through the conquest of
Constantinople would never be realized. Though never giving up
entirely this hope Russia's endeavors turned more and more toward
the Far East. One of the most important results of this new policy
was the beginning of the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway
in May, 1891.
The same year, 1891, saw the visit of a large French fleet at
Kronstadt, the harbor of Petrograd, which was welcomed effusively.
Two years later, in 1893, a Russian fleet repaid the compliment by
visiting Toulon and found an equally hospitable reception. Even
previous to this a large amount of French capital had been invested
in Russian Government Bonds and in Russian industrial undertakings
and the friendship between the two nations increased rapidly.
However, the death of Alexander III in November, 1894, somewhat
delayed the actual conclusion of the alliance and it was not until
1896 that an extensive and far-reaching treaty was signed at the
occasion of the visit of the new Czar, Nicholas II, to Paris. The
immense significance which this Franco-Russian treaty had in respect
to its effect on all of Europe was immediately recognized. If the
treaty succeeded in lasting for any length of time, it was
reasonably clear that it would be only a question of time before it
would result in an entirely new arrangement of European affairs.
The next five or six years were characterized by Russia's determined
advances in the Far East, a strengthening of the Franco-Russian
friendship and serious internal difficulties. The first of these
brought Russia more and more in conflict with England and Japan of
which we shall hear more immediately. The second resulted in a
growth of the estrangement between Russia and Germany. The third for
a time threatened the very existence of the Russian monarchy and it
seemed almost impossible that anything else than revolution and
anarchy could be the final outcome. These were averted only at the
last moment by the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War.
In April, 1902, a treaty had been signed between China and Russia.
According to it Russia agreed to observe the integrity of China and
to evacuate Manchuria which it had begun to occupy as early as 1897.
The evacuation was to be stretched over a year and a half and in the
beginning Russia lived up to the terms of the treaty. At the end of
the first six months, however, further evacuation stopped and when
China demanded explanations Russia repudiated the arrangement and
refused to proceed with the evacuation unless additional
concessions were made by China. Throughout 1903 negotiations took
place between Japan and Russia concerning this matter which,
however, were not very rich in results. On January 13, 1904, the
Japanese Government, therefore, sent what amounted practically to an
ultimatum in regard to Manchuria and Corea. This step was followed
immediately by warlike preparations on the part of both nations.
Three weeks later on February 6, 1904, diplomatic relations between
the two countries were broken off and the Russo-Japanese War was on.
The Japanese showed themselves superior to their European
adversaries in every respect, and, after inflicting severe defeats
on land and sea, peace was concluded on September 5, 1905, at
Portsmouth, U. S. A. The Japanese were very moderate in their terms,
waiving their demand for an indemnity, returning to Russia all
interned warships and not insisting on any restriction to Russian
power in the Far East.
In the meanwhile affairs at home had progressed rapidly toward
revolution. The defeat of the Russian army and fleet, the discovery
of immense peculations in connection with their equipment and an
increase of economic pressure, all combined to hasten the outbreak
which had been preparing for years. Strikes, riots, assassination of
officials and general bloodshed were the common order of the day. At
the very beginning of these outbreaks a manifest of the czar
promised some reforms. However, he made it clear that in a general
way the Government was resolved to retain its autocratic form. In a
way this manifest is a true picture of the cool attitude which the
Government took throughout these troublous times. Whenever the
Government was forced by especially violent outbreaks to fear the
worst, it would announce the introduction of some slight reforms.
This usually had the desired result of calming down, at least
temporarily, the excited masses, which condition would be followed
almost immediately either by a withdrawal of the reforms instituted
or by some reactionary laws offsetting their influence. In a general
way the revolution, however, improved somewhat internal conditions
in Russia. It led to the establishment of a representative form of
government by the creation of the Duma, although the limits within
which the people were allowed to participate in governmental affairs
were and are even now very narrow. In fact it was not an unusual
procedure for the Government to imprison members of the Duma and to
accuse them of treason whenever they promulgated or supported
measures of which the Government did not approve, and throughout the
following years up to the present time the struggle between a
frankly reactionary government and the people demanding more liberty
continued.
One of the centers of disturbances was Finland. This former province
of Sweden had been ceded to Russia by the Scandinavian Kingdom as
long ago as 1743, after having been practically conquered in 1714.
At that time certain rights of independency and autonomy were
granted to Finland. Throughout the next century and a half Russia
lived up to these promises in a fashion. But in 1899 the Finnish
Diet was deprived of its exclusive right of legislating for the
former grand duchy, and Russia started on a policy of Russification;
although the conqueror did not differ to any noticeable extent from
other nations who found themselves in similar positions--Prussia and
Austria in Poland, Germany in Alsace-Lorraine, England in some of
its colonies--Russia had to contend with greater opposition,
perhaps, than any of them. For the Finns were a people to whom
liberty was as dear as life or even dearer and no particle of it
would they give up except if an overwhelming power forced them to do
so. One Russian governor general after another became the victim of
assassination. This fact is of particular interest to us only
because it resulted in a deep-seated hatred of Russia and all things
Russian on the part of all Swedes, indeed, of all Scandinavians who,
though Finland had been separated from them for three or four
generations, still considered this unhappy country to be part and
parcel of Scandinavia. To a great extent this explains the
Scandinavian attitude toward Russia of which we shall hear more
presently.
Among the more prominent men of Russia who fell under assassins'
assaults were Von Plehve, Minister of the Interior, and Grand Duke
Sergius, an uncle of the czar, both typical reactionaries and men
whose death may well be claimed a gain for Russia rather than a
loss. In this period also belongs the killing of hundreds of
workingmen of Petrograd who, led by a Russian priest, Father Capon,
attempted to march to the Winter Palace of their "Little Father,"
the Czar, in order to present to him in person their petition for
relief from their many oppressions. Similar scenes were repeated in
Warsaw, in Lodz and in other Russian industrial centers during 1905.
Step by step the revolution of the people seemed to gain in spite of
all efforts of the Government. It even spread to the army and navy
and at Odessa the crew of a large battleship mutinied, seized the
boat and bombarded the city, killing more than a thousand of its
inhabitants. Strikes broke out in different parts of the country.
Troops murdered their officers and went over to the cause of the
people. Nevertheless the Government finally triumphed, partly by
diplomatically granting--temporarily only, of course--some of the
demands of the masses, but chiefly by force and unrelenting
severity. The latter policy brought about the fall of one of the
most able statesmen that Russia had ever produced, Count Witte, who
was then Prime Minister and to whose diplomacy and ability Russia
owed primarily its easy bargain with Japan after the latter
country's victory.
The next year, 1906, however, brought some relief to the sorely
oppressed people. The peasants were enabled to acquire the land
which heretofore they had tilled almost like slaves for the benefit
of the great landowners belonging to the aristocratic and patrician
classes. All were made equal before the law, oppressive taxes and
restrictions concerning the choice of residence on the part of
peasants were removed and certain electoral reforms were
promulgated. The latter, however, were of short duration, for in
1907, when things had quieted down a bit they were either recalled
or nullified by technical interpretations which thoroughly defeated
their original purposes.
During this entire period the persecution of Jews was kept up. In
spite of this, however, Russia took prompt steps to stop similar
persecutions of Armenians on the part of Turks, one of the few
undertakings of the Russian Government of that time which deserves
the approval of mankind.
In August of the same year, 1907, Russia also arrived at an
understanding with England concerning the respective spheres of
influence of these two countries in Asia, an important step toward
the completion of the "Triple Entente" of Russia, England, and
France.
The year 1908 was noticeable only for the enaction of further
reactionary measures. The next year, 1909, saw Russia's
participation in the successful effort of the European powers to
adjust pacifically the various questions that had arisen from
Bulgaria's proclamation as a kingdom and Austria-Hungary's
annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the same year, 1909, the
Russian advance for the possession of Persia began--without
opposition on the part of England by that time--and an understanding
was reached between the czar's and the Chinese Government concerning
the Manchurian railroad. This made it possible for Russia in the
following year, 1910, to reject the suggestion of the United States
Government to internationalize this railroad, in which attitude
Russia had the support of Japan, England and France.
During the Franco-German difficulties about Morocco in 1911 Russia
put itself squarely on the side of France and its announcement to
that effect, made officially to the German Government, was a decided
step forward toward French intimacy and German enmity. Having helped
out France in this manner, Russia promptly pushed its own cause in
Persia. With England and France indifferent to this unfortunate
country's fate, with Germany not sufficiently interested to risk a
break with any or all of the members of the "Triple Entente," and
with the United States much in the same position as Germany, Russia
had its own way and Persia had to submit to Russia's demands and to
its gradual enslavement under Russian rule.
In 1912 and 1913--before, during and after the two Balkan
Wars--Russia acted in concert with the other European powers and
refrained from active participation although its sympathies were
clearly enough with Serbia. So promising was the outlook then for a
lasting understanding between the nations of Europe that Russia and
Austria found it possible--as we have already heard--to agree, in
March, 1913, on a demobilization of their armies along their
respective borders.
A little more than a year, however, sufficed to bring about a change
in this friendly attitude of the two empires, a change fateful alike
to both and to all the world. For one day after Austria-Hungary's
declaration of war against Serbia on July 28, 1914, Russia began her
mobilization--a necessary measure with Austria at war for increased
power in the Balkans. By July 31, 1914, Russia's general
mobilization had taken place.
CHAPTER IV
FRANCE
The chief characteristic of the second empire established after
Napoleon III's coup d'état in 1852 was expansion. Napoleon III's
ambition in this direction was twofold. He desired to make the
French Empire not only the most advanced and strongest state in
Europe, but also to have it count as the strongest influence in
world politics. In regard to the first part of his ambitious plan,
both the emperor and his various governments were quite successful.
For during the twenty-odd years of the existence of the second
empire, the progress of France along industrial, commercial, and
agricultural lines was, perhaps, greater than in any other similar
period in its history. In regard to the second part, it also seemed
for a time as if Napoleon's ambitions were to be realized. It was
under his reign that the French nation's interest in colonies which
had gradually disappeared or had at least been submerged by
England's immense undertakings along that line was aroused again,
and a considerable part of the present very expansive colonial
possessions of France is one of the contributions of the second
empire. Furthermore in the early part of his rule he was fairly
successful, not only in expressing the desires of France in regard
to conditions and policies of other European countries, but also in
forcing their fulfillment. It is very doubtful if, had it not been
for Napoleon III's interest and assistance, a united Italy could
have been formed. The part which he played in the unification of
Italy has already been touched upon in the latter country's history,
and we have also heard how his support of Italian ambitions for
unity brought France into conflict with Austria-Hungary. It was,
therefore, quite natural that when the French Government was
approached in 1865 by Prussia in regard to the proposed
Prusso-Italian treaty he should be found a supporter, even if an
inactive and silent one, of this new arrangement. And it was equally
natural that during the short war of 1866 between Austria and
Prussia he kept aloof from any actual interference. It might even
have been possible that France indirectly would have been found at
that time on the side of Prussia, for there can be no doubt that
Napoleon III would have liked to assist at that time Italy against
Austria. But the Mexican War, which he had started in 1862 and which
had been going against France during 1865 and 1866, prevented any
active French interference in European affairs at that moment.
Satisfactory as it was to Napoleon III and France to see Austria
forced to relinquish its Italian provinces to Italy, it was almost
as unsatisfactory, or perhaps even more so, to notice at the same
time the immense and unexpectedly rapid increase of Prussian power
and influence. Immediately after the war of 1866 Napoleon III took a
number of steps with the object of counteracting Prussia's new power
or, if possible, of destroying it. As we have already seen during
the consideration of German history of that period, he met with a
fair degree of success. It looked very much, immediately after the
Prusso-Austrian War of 1866, as if Prussia could not count then or
for some time to come on the support of the south German states in
any enterprise in which Prussian influence would be predominant. The
attitude of these south German states toward Prussia at that time
was of such a nature that the French Government could hardly be
blamed in thinking that in a possible conflict between France and
Prussia they might be found on the side of France, or at least could
be counted upon not to be on the side of Prussia.
This conflict, it was clear, was to come soon. For under the able
leadership of the Prussian Prime Minister, Bismarck, Prussia was
gradually more and more increasing in power and influence and
intruding on the French leadership in European affairs. That it came
as early as 1870 was partly due to the French expectations of
support on the part of the south German states which we have just
mentioned, and partly to the general unrest which made itself felt
in France as a result of the lack of success of the recent foreign
policy of Napoleon III.
It is unnecessary to recite here the immediate causes as well as the
details of the result of this war, all of which have been considered
in the history of Germany of this period, and we shall, therefore,
content ourselves with the repetition of the fact that the south
German states disappointed French expectations by not only refusing
to support France, but by openly and actively supporting Prussia,
because the immediate cause of the Franco-Prussian War was
considered by them a matter of national importance affecting all
German-speaking people alike. The fall of Sedan, resulting in the
capture of Napoleon III himself, brought the downfall of the second
empire and the end of the monarchistic form of government in France.
The next few years are among the darkest in French history. In
February, 1871, M. Thiers had been made the executive head of
France, and it became his task to conclude the peace with Germany
which was ratified by the French Assembly on May 18, 1871. Previous
to that, on March 18, 1871, insurrection had broken out in Paris,
and a separate government had been set up by the people known as the
Commune. This revolution was put down only after the hardest kind of
fighting between the forces of the Commune and the Government
troops, and after more than $150,000,000 worth of property in Paris
had been destroyed.
On May 31, 1871, however, Thiers was finally elected president for a
term of three years. Considering the many and difficult problems
which the new Government had to solve, it is rather surprising that
it lasted as long as it did, even if its end came before the
appointed time. For in May, 1873, both the president and his
ministry resigned, and General MacMahon was elected president by the
Assembly. Early that fall (1873) the last parts of the German army
of occupation left France after the last installment of the war
indemnity had been paid, and in the latter part of the same year
President MacMahon's term was extended to a period of seven years.
The part which England had played during and immediately after the
German-French War was typical of England's cleverness in playing
foreign politics. Intimate as at that time were the Prusso-English
relations, and inactive as England remained during the war, it still
managed to impress the French nation with a strong feeling of
gratefulness for the apparently friendly attitude which England felt
toward France. In a way this is very remarkable, for after the fall
of the empire, England extended its hospitality to ex-Empress
Eugenie and her young son, and then, later, after Napoleon Ill's
release from German captivity, to the ex-emperor himself.
In 1876 France had sufficiently recovered from its apparently
complete breakdown of a few years ago to be able to dispose of the
largest revenue that had ever been at the disposal of any French
Government, and this fact is of interest to us chiefly because it is
one of the most definite and most significant proofs of the
remarkable inherent strength of the French country and people.
In spite of this quick recovery, France for the next few years
played an absolutely inactive and comparatively unimportant part in
European affairs. During the Russo-Turkish War of 1876, for
instance, the republic declared and maintained a strict neutrality.
Internally, the republic continued to have to contend with many
difficulties. Again and again strong opposition to the republican
form of government showed itself, expressed at one time by the
followers of the Bonapartist party, at another by those of the
Royalist party. However, all of these dissensions had no actual
result, and in spite of them the republic continued to progress and
to flourish to such an extent that, only seven years after one of
the most disastrous defeats that any European nation had ever
suffered, France was able, in 1878, to invite the rest of the world
to witness at Paris the most wonderful international exposition that
had ever been staged in the history of mankind. Early in the
following year President MacMahon resigned, having been practically
forced to this step by public sentiment which disapproved of and
feared his monarchistic leanings. M. Grévy was elected as his
successor. The early summer of this year (1879) brought death to the
only son of Napoleon III while he was fighting under the English
flag during the campaign against the Zulus in South Africa, and this
event practically ended all danger of a Napoleonic restoration,
because the representatives of the Napoleonic family left were
neither closely enough related to Napoleon III nor possessed the
necessary ability to accomplish a change of government.
The year 1880 brought the beginning of a strong anti-Catholic
movement in France. At first this movement was directed only against
the Jesuits, but it rapidly spread and in a way may be considered
the forerunner of the radical legislation along this line which was
passed in recent years. Throughout these years the life of the
different ministries was very short and in most instances measured
by months rather than by years. To go deeper into the causes for
this condition is not necessary; but one of its results undoubtedly
was that France continued to refrain from active participation in
European politics because it stands to reason that a continuous
change of the head of the Department of Foreign Affairs made it more
or less difficult, if not impossible, for France to establish a
definite foreign policy. However, in 1881 France began again to take
a more lively interest in its colonial affairs. It was in that year
that Tunis gave up its resistance to French occupation and from that
time on dates the preponderating influence which France has held
ever since in north Africa. For our purposes it is important only to
remember the fact of this preponderancy, although it may be
difficult to understand why this condition should exist, for
neither then nor during the years to come has France shown any
particular adaptability to colonial problems nor was it able to
register in its colonies successes such as England and Germany had
to show. The colonial expansion of France, however, continued. In
1882 new territory was acquired in Annam and, in 1884, Cambodia.
This aggrandizement of France at the cost of China finally resulted
in a declaration of war on the part of the latter country against
France in August, 1884, lasting until June, 1885, and resulting in
the confirmation of the French possessions in the Far East, not,
however, until the French troops had suffered severe reverses. In
1885 a protectorate was established over Madagascar.
The beginning and continuation of French expansion in other parts of
the world necessarily brought France into closer and more frequent
contact with other countries. French statesmen soon began to see the
necessity of making friends amongst the other nations if they hoped
to lead France back into the position amongst the great powers which
it had a right to occupy on account of its history as well as its
extent and ability. Throughout the first twenty years after the
Franco-Prussian War, France may be considered to have been on
friendly terms with practically all European nations with the
possible exception of Germany; but these friendships during that
period had not yet ripened into intimacy nor had they even resulted
in the establishment of definite alliances with any one of the
nations. The feeling against Germany, which was, of course, based on
the defeat which France had suffered at the hands of its eastern
neighbor, was not particularly pronounced during this period and,
unless French interests would finally have resulted in the
conclusion of alliances with countries which brought it into
commercial and political conflict with Germany, there seemed to be
no good reason in the late nineties why France and Germany could not
have found a common basis of understanding. In spite of this fact it
is true that French statesmen and especially French politicians had
never entirely given up the idea of revenging the defeat of 1870,
even though in a great many instances the desire for revenge was
secondary only, whereas the desire for the reconquest of lost
territory was the chief driving power. However, as we have said, in
1889 French relations with the world were pleasant enough to make it
possible for the republic to again extend an invitation to all
civilized nations to come to Paris for another exhibition which was
opened in May of that year, 1889. In the same year a bill was passed
making army service universal. In 1890 representatives of the
various nations again met at Paris at an international commercial
conference. In 1891 the first definite signs of an increasing
intimacy with some of the European countries showed themselves. In
March, 1891, England and France agreed to arbitrate the Newfoundland
fisheries question which had been a long standing cause of
difficulties and diplomatic dissensions between the two countries.
Some time later in July and August, 1891, a large French fleet paid
an official visit to Kronstadt, the port of Petrograd, and was
received there with the most remarkable expressions of friendship
and good will. This latter event was the beginning of the
Franco-Russian alliance. It was followed in October, 1893, by a
visit of a Russian fleet to Toulon, which was greeted with similar
enthusiasm.
In 1894 the so-called Dreyfus affair was responsible for a revival
of the anti-German feeling, because Dreyfus, who was then a captain
in the French army, had been accused and found guilty of selling
military secrets to a foreign power which was by everybody
considered to have been Germany. However, beyond intensifying the
anti-German sentiment nothing resulted, and in May, 1895, France
found it possible to join Germany and Russia in demanding from Japan
the return of the Liao-Tung peninsula to China.
The popular sentiment in France during the South African War was
strongly pro-Boer, although the official attitude was one of
neutrality. In September, 1896, France arrived at an understanding
with Italy concerning the former's desires for political supremacy
in Tunis. The next month brought a visit from the newly crowned Czar
Nicholas who was received in France with great hospitality. The
visit was reciprocated in August, 1897, by President Faure and
Europe made up its mind then that France and Russia had become
allied. In the next month England, too, as Italy had done before,
made arrangements to acknowledge French supremacy in Tunis.
In September, 1898, however, it looked for a short time as if
England and France were to go to war with each other on account of
further French advances in north Africa. In that month Major
Marchand with French troops occupied Fashoda, a town located on the
upper Nile in territory which England claimed to belong to its own
sphere of interest. Lord, then still Sir Herbert, Kitchener, who was
Governor General of the Sudan, demanded the withdrawal of the French
troops which demand was refused; but a few months afterward the
matter was amicably adjusted and the French withdrew from Fashoda.
At that time, however, the popular French feeling certainly was not
strongly pro-English; for when Major Marchand returned to France in
May, 1899, he was received with the most effusive enthusiasm.
In February, 1899, President Faure died very suddenly and M. Loubet
was elected as his successor. Throughout that year the Dreyfus
scandal continued to occupy public opinion in France to the
exclusion of almost everything else. A second trial was ordered,
but, although Captain Dreyfus was again condemned to ten years'
imprisonment, the president pardoned him and in the following year,
1900, the Senate passed a bill as a result of which further criminal
prosecutions on account of the Dreyfus affair became impossible.
Additional legislation regulating religious orders was passed in the
early part of 1901. In April of the same year, 1901, Toulon enjoyed
the visit of an Italian fleet which led to considerable discussion
among diplomats in regard to the apparently increasing friendship
between France and Italy. In August, 1901, the French Government
recalled its representative at Constantinople and handed his
passports to the Turkish ambassador at Paris because Turkey refused
to pay damages which had been adjudged due to some French companies.
Although in November, 1901, a French fleet occupied parts of the
island of Mitylene and war clouds once more seemed to be gathering,
the matter was finally settled amicably by the prompt payment of
the damages on the part of Turkey. In September, 1901, the czar
repeated his visit to France, where he witnessed both naval and
military maneuvers and was again received with expressions of the
most enthusiastic friendship.
Another change of ministry took place in 1902 when M.
Waldeck-Rousseau was succeeded by M. Combes. The new ministry caused
great excitement by closing by force all religious schools that were
not conforming by this time with the new Law of Associations.
Another difficulty which the cabinet had to face was caused by a
speech of the minister of marine during which he made remarks which
were considered offensive by England and Germany. The Government,
however, disavowed this speech and declared the expressions used to
be of a private and not of an official nature. The enforcement of
the Law of Associations continued to cause serious difficulties in
the next year, 1903. Throughout the country the clergy, which of
course resented the new regulations, took a more active interest in
politics than ever before and thereby caused many serious
dissensions between its members and the Government. A very strong
demand for absolute separation of church and state began to
crystallize which found its final result in May, 1904, in the
passage by the chamber of a bill prohibiting all instructions in
religious institutions by the end of a period of five years. The
attitude of the French Government toward the Catholic Church, of
course, was deeply disapproved by the pope, and when President
Loubet paid a visit to the King of Italy at Rome in May, 1904, and
thereby aroused the pope to an official protest, the French
Government promptly withdrew its representative at the Vatican.
May, 1903, brought to Paris King Edward of England on one of his
many visits to the French capital. This time, however, he appeared
there in his official capacity and was received with general
enthusiasm and expressions of the most sincere friendship on the
part of the French nation toward the English people. Throughout 1904
the difficulties between the French Government and the church
continued with increasing violence and in November of that year, a
bill finally was introduced separating absolutely church and state.
Relations between France and Germany became considerably strained
during 1905. France resented the advances which German diplomacy and
German commercial institutions had succeeded in making at
Constantinople and this resentment found its expression in a refusal
to finance any more Turkish loans. As an official explanation of
this attitude it was stated that the French Government objected to
supplying funds to the Turkish Government as long as the Turkish
Government continued to spend a large part of these funds for army
and munition purchases from German firms. More serious than this,
however, was Germany's official announcement that the empire would
insist firmly on an open-door policy in Morocco. But fortunately for
the peace of Europe this question at that time was settled by a
series of conferences which were concluded in the fall of 1905.
In July, 1905, the French Chamber of Deputies and in September of
the same year the French Senate finally adopted a bill for the
separation of state and church.
In January, 1906, France again severed diplomatic relations with
another power on account of commercial disputes, this time with
Venezuela.
In March, 1906, King Edward paid his first visit to the new
President, M. Fallières, who had been elected to succeed M. Loubet.
Other expressions of the growing intimacy between the English and
French nations were the visit of the lord mayor of London at Paris,
a visit of representatives of French universities at London, and a
special invitation extended to General French and other English
officers to view the fall maneuvers of the French army. Internally
the enforcement of the new Church and State Separation Law caused
many difficulties and widened the break between France and the pope.
A general strike of miners followed the worst mining disaster of the
age, which killed over 1,200 miners at Courrières. Captain Dreyfus
was finally completely vindicated. Two changes of ministry occurred.
M. Rouvier was succeeded as prime minister by M. Sarrien, whose
resignation, on account of ill health, brought M. Clemenceau to the
helm.
The separation of church and state continued to hold the center of
the stage in 1907. Monsignor Montagnini, auditor of the Papal
Nunciature, was expelled. The Catholic bishops, though, of course,
supporting the pope in his objection to the separation law, finally
reached a partial understanding with the Government in regard to the
continuation of public worship in Catholic churches. Labor troubles
and serious riots in the principal wine districts occurred
throughout May and June, but, though they were embarrassing the
Government, they did not result in any changes in its composition.
France exchanged notes with both Spain and England, establishing the
continuation of the _status quo_ in parts of the Mediterranean and
Atlantic as far as they affected lines of communication between the
contracting powers. A Franco-Japanese agreement of June, 1907, was
principally commercial in nature, although it expressed the
adherence of the two countries to an open-door policy in China. King
Edward and Queen Alexandria again visited Paris.
President Fallières, accompanied by M. Pichon, the Foreign Minister,
reciprocated with a visit to England in May, 1908, where he was most
cordially received. In July, 1908, the president also paid visits to
the kings of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, and to the czar.
Considerable bad feeling was created between France and Germany on
account of the action of the German consul at Casablanca in giving
shelter to some men of German origin who had deserted from the
Foreign Legion. The matter, however, was finally referred for
adjustment to the Hague Tribunal.
Both King Edward and the czar were visitors in France during 1909.
The French, Italian, and Spanish fleets passed in review before
President Fallières at Nice in March, 1909. A general strike, though
of short duration only, was indicative of the general feeling of
unrest which pervaded the country. The Clemenceau Ministry fell
under an assault from the ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Delcassé,
and was succeeded by one headed by M. Briand. In February, 1909, a
new agreement was signed between France and Germany, embodying the
general principles of French political preponderance and German
commercial equality in Morocco. This year 1910 again brought signs
of the general social unrest in the form of various strikes, the
most important of which was that of the employees of the Nord
Railway. This threatened to assume dangerous proportions, but was
suppressed by M. Briand's prompt action by issuing a mobilization
order to the strikers, and thereby, having turned them into
reservists, made them subject to military law.
M. Briand resigned in February, 1911, and was succeeded by M. Monis
and a Radical Cabinet, which, however, included M. Delcassé as
Minister of Marine. New wine riots taxed the ingenuity of the new
cabinet to its utmost before order was restored. In June, 1911, M.
Monis, who had been seriously injured in an aeroplane accident which
killed Minister of War Berteaux, resigned on account of ill health
and was followed by M. Caillaux, Minister of Finance in the Monis
Cabinet. In the late fall, 1911, the German-French difficulties
about Morocco were finally settled by another treaty reiterating the
general principles of the 1909 treaty, but arranging also for an
exchange of territory between France and Germany in the Congo, by
which Germany gained some 100,000 square miles to the east and south
of its Cameroons colony.
Although this adjustment was not considered as particularly
advantageous to Germany in that country itself, it aroused even more
criticism in France, and resulted, in January, 1912, in the downfall
of the Caillaux Cabinet. The president called upon M. Poincaré to
form a new cabinet. In the meantime an understanding concerning
Morocco had also been reached with Spain, and a treaty between the
two countries was signed. It is significant that during the
conferences held at Madrid between the Spanish Minister of Foreign
Affairs and the French Ambassador, the English Ambassador was
present at the invitation of both France and Spain. In March, 1912,
a French protectorate was established by treaty. Hardly had this
been accomplished when the natives revolted, and it was not until
the fall of 1912 that French troops succeeded in reestablishing
order. In August 1912, M. Poincaré visited Russia, and in September
Grand Duke Nicholas of Russia attended the French maneuvers, both
signs that the French-Russian friendship was losing nothing in
strength.
January, 1913, brought once more the presidential election, from
which, after two or three ballots, M. Poincaré emerged as M.
Fallières's successor. He asked M. Briand to form the cabinet and
appointed M. Delcassé Ambassador at Petrograd. The Briand Ministry
resigned as the result of difficulties over a matter of internal
policy in March, 1913, and was succeeded by one headed by M.
Barthou. The new president paid an official visit to the English
court in June, 1913, and to the Spanish court in October, 1913. In
August, 1913, a three years' service bill was passed to counteract
recent legislative measures in Germany, increasing the army's peace
strength. This bill at first encountered considerable opposition,
especially on the part of the Socialists.
Like all the other great European powers, France maintained a strict
neutrality during the two Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913, and, of
course, played an important part in the various unsuccessful
attempts of the powers to prevent their outbreak, as well as in the
conferences leading up to the final adjustment. In the latter the
French representatives worked in conjunction with those of the
republic's allies, England and Russia.
The year 1914 brought more than the usual number of ministerial
changes. First the Barthou Cabinet fell as a result of financial
legislation and of an attack on the part of M. Caillaux. M.
Doumerge, a political associate of the latter, formed a new one with
M. Caillaux in charge of the Finance Ministry. On March 16, 1914,
his wife killed M. Calmette, the editor of the Paris "Figaro," in
which he had attacked M. Caillaux most violently and consistently.
The Minister of Finance resigned on the evening of the murder, and
the rest of the cabinet followed on June 1, 1914. The new cabinet,
under M. Ribot, a moderate Republican, lasted one day and was
succeeded by another, headed by M. Viviani. In July, 1914, the
president paid a visit to Russia, from where he returned barely in
time to be greeted by Germany's declaration of war. At last the
moment had come when it would be seen what fruit the tree of the
Russian-English-French Entente was to bear.
CHAPTER V
ENGLAND
In two respects England, or, more correctly speaking, the United
Kingdom of England and Ireland, occupies a peculiar position among
the great European nations. In the first place, it differs from all
the other European countries in that it is an island. This fact, of
course, makes a great many of its political and economic problems
altogether different from those which the other countries have to
face. Its defenses, both military and naval, are naturally greatly
influenced by its geographical location, and so are the policies
which England has followed in connection with foreign politics.
Nature, having put vast oceans between it and the rest of the world,
gave thereby to England the strongest possible natural defenses. On
the other hand, this gift of Nature necessitated that the island's
government should at all times maintain a navy, strong and efficient
enough to defend it, not only from the attack of any one other
nation, but from the attack of any possible combination of
countries. Inhabited as it is by almost half a hundred million
people, crowded into a space of only 120,000 square miles, its
economic problems also are strongly influenced by its geographical
location. For it stands to reason that on comparatively so small a
space it is impossible to raise sufficient food for the inhabitants,
and it also stands to reason that many of the raw materials which in
modern times are required by civilized nations have to be secured
from outside sources. This is a second reason why an immensely
strong and efficient navy has been indispensable to England at all
times.
A second peculiarity of England is found in the fact that, although
England itself--by this we mean the United Kingdom of England,
Scotland, Ireland--is exceeded in extent by every one of the other
important European nations except Italy, it possesses more numerous,
more scattered, and more profitable colonies than any of the other
countries. Just as it was said of the old Spanish colonial empire at
the time of Charles V that the sun never set on it, this claim can
now be made for the English colonies. Large parts of every one of
the three continents--Africa, Asia, America--are ruled either
directly or indirectly by England, and the fourth continent,
Australia, it possesses entirely. This added only another reason to
England's need of a navy. For unless the home country's lines of
communication with its colonies in all parts of the world were kept
open at all times, the latter would have lost a great deal of their
value. In a way it may be claimed that English foreign politics was
predicated by these three fundamental conditions: to defend the home
country against all comers; to insure a plentiful supply of all raw
materials and products needed by the home country at all times; to
keep open communication with its colonies in every part of the world
against any interference, and to protect these colonial possessions
against all attacks.
Needless to say, the fact that England possessed colonies in all
parts of the world made it at once the greatest, richest, most
influential, and most jealous nation. For one of the chief national
characteristics of the English race is its tenacity, and it is loath
to let go of anything that has once come into its possession. This
characteristic frequently brought it into conflict with other
nations who wanted some of England's possessions. Furthermore, there
were many other instances where other nations were desirous of
acquiring territory or, at least, certain rights in other countries,
the acquisition of which found England's disapproval and opposition,
not because England possessed these lands or wished to possess them,
but because English interests apparently did not make it desirable
that the nation which was trying to gain these lands should succeed.
If we, however, consider that a great many of England's colonial
possessions were wrested at one time or another from other nations,
and that in some other cases their acquisition by conquest or treaty
ran counter against the interests of some other nations which,
however, were not strong or subtle enough to prevent England from
carrying out its plans, it becomes clear why England up to
comparatively recent times may be said to have possessed more and
more bitter enemies than any other nation.
In the consideration of the historical development of the various
European nations which we have set forth so far we have seen that,
whenever a nation possessed or acquired colonies, it was brought
immediately into contact, sometimes friendly and more frequently
unfriendly, with other nations, and this, of course, is not only
equally true of England, but even more so, because its colonial
interests were so much more extensive than any others. In one other
important direction England exerted an immense influence on the rest
of the world. From this vast colonial empire there had been flowing
for generations a steady stream of unequaled riches into the coffers
of England. And much of the surplus wealth accumulated in this way
was invested by Englishmen in other countries, and, even though
there were quite a number of countries on the government of which
England possessed no direct influence, still there were very few
nations who were not financially entirely, or at least partly,
dependent on England. The vastness of English interests may readily
be understood if we remember that out of the total inhabited surface
of the earth of about 50,000,000 square miles with 1,750,000,000
inhabitants, 13,500,000 square miles with 500,000,000 inhabitants
are under the rule of England.
Comparatively little of this empire was acquired by England during
the last half century, but the acquisitions which were made in that
period were at once greater and more desirable than similar
acquisitions by other nations. With very few exceptions England's
new territorial conquests during the last fifty years were made at
the expense of uncivilized and unorganized nations, and there was,
therefore, comparatively little direct cause for animosity. But, on
the other hand, a great many of the choice morsels which England
gathered in were desired by some other nation or nations, and
England's successes, therefore, gave plenty of indirect causes for
animosity, especially if it is borne in mind that English statesmen
were not only at all times striving very hard to secure for their
country the best of everything, but were also working equally hard
to prevent, if at all possible, other nations from getting anything.
In the period of European history, to which we are restricting our
attention, the first milestone of the long line of conflicts between
the different nations and countries has been the war between Prussia
and Austria on one hand and Denmark on the other for the possession
of Schleswig-Holstein. In this matter England, previous to the
outbreak of actual hostilities, expressed very strongly that anyone
who would attack Denmark would have to reckon with other than
Denmark; but when the English Foreign Secretary of that period, Lord
John Russell, found that he could not get the active support of
Napoleon III in opposing Prussia and Austria's aggressive steps,
Lord Palmerston's Cabinet, of which Lord Russell was a member, found
it necessary to maintain neutrality during the war, especially in
view of the fact that Queen Victoria was strongly opposed to any
active interference on the part of England. In spite of this
attitude of the queen a marriage was arranged in 1863 between the
Prince of Wales, later King Edward VII, and the daughter of King
Christian IX of Denmark, Princess Alexandria. Although it is true
that the personal relations of the ruling houses of the different
European countries did not any longer possess the same importance
that they formerly had, this new alliance undoubtedly had, even if
not immediately, an important influence on English foreign politics.
For not only was the Princess of Wales, later Queen of England,
unable to forget and forgive the territorial loss which her father
had suffered at the hands of Prussia, but this attitude was shared
by her sister, who was to become a few years later, as wife of
Alexander III of Russia, a powerful influence at the Russian court.
To a certain extent, of course, the influence of the Princess of
Wales did not make itself felt until she had become Queen of
England, and possibly not very strongly then, and it was also
somewhat counteracted by the fact that one of Queen Victoria's
daughters was married to the Crown Prince of Prussia, who later, as
Frederick III, became for a short time the German Emperor.
During the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 England maintained the
strictest neutrality and showed the same attitude during the few
years following, covering Napoleon III's attempts to stop the tide
of Prussian ascendancy. The English Government of that period was
headed by one of the most famous statesmen that England has ever
produced, Benjamin Disraeli. There can be no doubt that his attitude
toward affairs on the European continent was strongly influenced by
Queen Victoria's own attitude, who, it may be frankly acknowledged,
was strongly pro-German on account of her personal relations, which
not only included a German prince as son-in-law, but also a German
prince as husband. The official explanation which the prime minister
gave of England's policy of noninterference at that time was that
England had "outgrown the European continent because she was no
longer a mere European power. England is the metropolis of a great
maritime empire extending to the boundaries of the furthest oceans
... she is as ready, and as willing even, to interfere as in the old
days when the necessity of her position required it. There is no
power, indeed, which interferes more than England; she interferes in
Asia because she is really more of an Asiatic than of a European
power." This undoubtedly was not an explanation made for
convenience' sake, but expressed truly and sincerely the broad view
which the English Prime Minister took of England's mission, and
later events showed that he adhered to this new gospel of English
imperialism which was preached then for the first time. One result
of French jealousy of Prussian success was Napoleon III's effort to
gain some territorial compensations. In this connection he even went
so far as to propose secretly to Bismarck that Prussia should allow
France to invade and annex the kingdom of Belgium provided France
would recognize without opposition the new North German
Confederation. Bismarck refused, and, as a counterstroke, Napoleon
III protested against the continuation of Luxemburg's occupation by
German troops. A conference of the powers was finally called at
London in May, 1868, and a treaty was arranged according to which
the fortifications of the city of Luxemburg were dismantled and the
entire duchy received a joint guarantee of continuous neutrality.
In the meantime, in 1867, Parliament had passed a bill embodying the
confederation of the various British provinces in North America and
creating a form of self-government under which the Dominion of
Canada had existed and flourished since then. Other internal
measures of grave importance occupied the attention of the English
nation at that time. Certain ritualistic tendencies in the Anglican
Church aroused great excitement and apprehension. Disraeli's Prime
Ministership, which he had assumed in February, 1867, after Lord
Derby's resignation, came to an end in December, 1868, through a
victory of the Liberal party at the general election, and Gladstone
formed his first ministry. Difficulties in Ireland culminated in a
revival of Fenian activities and in the committing of numerous
outrages. With the fate of the reform and other measures of
Gladstone's government we are not concerned, for they were almost
exclusively of an internal nature. Of England's neutral attitude
during the Franco-Prussian War we have already heard; but it is
worth mentioning that previous to the outbreak of the war England
attempted, even if unsuccessfully, to mediate between France and
Prussia. In spite of the official neutrality observed by England
during this war, public sentiment was pro-French, and France
undoubtedly received considerable legitimate commercial assistance
from England. This claim is well borne out by the fact that a short
time after the war, as we have already learned during the
consideration of French history, the French Parliament passed a
resolution expressing the thanks of the French nation to England for
its expressions of friendship during the recent war. In Germany this
attitude of the English public was well known and caused a
considerable amount of ill feeling. It was at that time that
Bismarck published Napoleon III's suggestion of 1867 in regard to
the invasion and annexation of Belgium, and its publication at this
particular moment had two results: it made English intervention in
favor of France absolutely impossible and it caused the English
Government to demand from both belligerents--France and
Germany--their signatures to a treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of
Belgium and arranging that in case either France or Prussia would
violate this neutrality Great Britain would intervene in conjunction
with the other for the defense of Belgium. This treaty was also
extended to include Luxemburg. Another indirect result of the
Franco-Prussian War, Russia's declaration in October, 1870, that it
considered itself no longer bound to the terms of the treaty of
Paris, 1856, in regard to the neutrality of the Black Sea, aroused
vigorous English protests. For a time it seemed as if public opinion
would force England to go to war against Russia, but a conference of
the powers who had signed the 1856 treaty was finally called at
London in December, 1870, the results of which we have already
learned. In December, 1870, the difficulties between England and the
United States, which had held over until then from the Civil War,
were satisfactorily settled by international commissioners at
Geneva. A revolution of French-Canadians broke out in 1872, but was
quickly put down. Cape Colony added to its territory in 1871 by
annexing, over the protests of the Orange Free State, territory
known then as Griqualand West. In the same year the Gold Coast was
acquired on the West Coast of Africa through a treaty with Holland,
Great Britain relinquishing in exchange its claims to Dutch Indian
Sumatra. Russia's increased activity in Asia caused considerable
apprehension, which, however, was removed by an understanding
between Russia and Great Britain, concluded in 1872, according to
which Afghanistan was to be considered not within the sphere of
Russian interests in Asia.
In 1874 the ties of relationship which connected Queen Victoria's
family to that of the czar were strengthened by the marriage of her
son, the Duke of Edinburgh, to Grand Duchess Marie of Russia. In the
same year Czar Alexander II visited London. The Gladstone Ministry
was succeeded by one headed by Disraeli. In 1875 the Government
announced the purchase of the Suez Canal shares, then held by the
Khedive of Egypt. This practically gave England control of the
canal, as the khedive's holdings amounted to nine-twentieths of the
entire issue. A great many of the other shares were in the hands of
French investors. But the French Government accepted England's
purchase without opposition. This move not only secured to England
control of the shortest and safest route to India, but also brought
it into closer contact with Egypt, one of the great colonial prizes
of the world then still available.
Disraeli soon gave proof of the sincerity of his imperialistic
views. In 1876, at his suggestion and as a result of his diplomacy,
the queen was proclaimed Empress of India. In 1877 the Transvaal was
annexed by England. In the Russo-Turkish War, which broke out that
year, England maintained neutrality, but in 1878 a defensive treaty
was signed between Great Britain and Turkey which gave the island of
Cyprus to England. In 1879 the Zulu War broke out and kept English
forces engaged through the greater part of the year. The following
year, 1880, was marked chiefly by riots and bloodshed in Ireland,
the resignation of Disraeli, and the return to the premiership of
Gladstone, who in 1881 succeeded in passing the Irish Land Bill. The
Irish difficulties lasted throughout 1882, 1883, and 1884.
Throughout that year, 1884 and 1885, English troops fought
rebellious natives in Egypt after having announced to Turkey that it
felt that it was necessary for the protection of the Suez Canal that
British troops should assume the responsibility of restoring order
in Egypt.
The Gladstone Ministry was defeated in 1885 and succeeded by a
Conservative Cabinet under the Marquis of Salisbury. Following the
outbreak of a war in Burma in the fall of 1885, English troops
entered the capital, and in 1886 Burma's annexation was announced.
Internal dissensions brought about two changes of cabinets in 1886,
bringing in Gladstone again, but only for four months, when Lord
Salisbury returned to the premiership. Zululand was the next
addition to Great Britain's possession, its annexation being
announced in 1887. In the same year the fiftieth anniversary of
Queen Victoria's accession to the throne was celebrated with great
splendor at London, and became a means of strongly emphasizing
Disraeli's imperialistic idea. It brought together the most
noteworthy gathering of rulers of nations, and led undoubtedly to an
exchange of views which, at least for a short time, had a beneficial
influence on the world's peace. In 1889 the British South African
Company was chartered and the foundation was laid thereby for the
immense expansion of England in South Africa. In 1890 Germany and
England adjusted various difficulties in regard to their respective
spheres of influence in Africa by signing a treaty. This gave to
England a protectorate over Zanzibar, in exchange for which it ceded
the island of Helgoland to Germany. Though this adjustment was not
popular in either country, and especially not in Germany, it led to
a betterment of conditions between England and Germany, as it
removed at least one source of continual dissension by adjusting the
African question. The young German Emperor accompanied by the
Empress, paid a visit to his grandmother, Queen Victoria, in 1891,
and thereby emphasized the cordiality of relations existing between
the two Governments. In the summer of 1892 the Salisbury Ministry
resigned as the result of renewed difficulties in Ireland, and was
again succeeded by a Gladstone Cabinet.
In 1893 relations between France and England became temporarily
strained on account of English aggressiveness in Egypt, where France
had been considerably interested previous to England's purchase of
the Suez Canal. In 1894 the Gladstone Ministry resigned once more
and was succeeded by one headed by Lord Rosebery. Labor difficulties
were characteristic of that year, 1894, as well as the preceding
one, 1893. Another acquisition was made in 1894 by the establishment
of a protectorate over Uganda in East Africa. The appearance in 1895
of a British fleet in Nicaragua to enforce the payment of certain
indemnities held possibilities of a conflict with the United States
on account of the Monroe Doctrine, but the matter was quickly
settled and the fleet withdrawn. The Rosebery Cabinet was succeeded
by one headed by Lord Salisbury in July, 1895, in which month a
protectorate was established over British East Africa, and in
November Bechuanaland was annexed to Cape Colony. In December, 1895,
the memorable raid of Dr. Jamieson on the Transvaal miscarried. An
ultimatum presented to Venezuela caused strained relations between
the United States and England, which, however, were adjusted
amicably by the end of 1896. Throughout 1897 and 1898 English troops
were busily occupied with the pacification of newly acquired
territory in Africa, especially in Egypt and the Sudan. Toward the
end of 1898 the Fashoda incident, of which we have spoken at greater
length under the French history, brought England and France
dangerously near to war.
We have seen now how England, without stirring up a great deal of
dust, had been adding continually to her possessions, especially in
Africa. This, of course, aroused gradually the attention and, to a
certain extent, the jealousy of other countries. By 1899 it had
become necessary to adjust some of these difficulties, and England
succeeded in doing this by treaties with France and Egypt, as she
had done before with Germany. Her aggressive policy in South Africa,
however, met determined opposition at the hands of the Boers, who
had begun to fear for their own independence which, being of Dutch
extraction, they valued greater than life. Conferences between Lord
Milner on behalf of England and President Krueger of the Transvaal
came to naught. On October 9, 1899, the latter country presented an
ultimatum which England did not answer. Then the Boer War broke out.
For our purposes it is not necessary to consider its details. It
suffices to state that it lasted until April, 1902. For almost three
years the brave Boers fought against almost impossible odds. Again
and again they defeated the English, but finally they succumbed to
the British Empire's inexhaustible resources in men and money, and
on May 31, 1902, they were forced to accept England's terms for
surrender which cost them their independence. Indeed, as early as
September 1, 1900, the South African Republic was annexed, and on
October 25, Transvaal became an English colony. In its international
aspect the Boer War cost England temporarily the friendship of many
nations, who resented the ruthlessness with which they carried on
war, and ridiculed the lack of efficiency which was so noticeable
during the early stages of the war. Relations with Germany became
especially strained as a result of the strong pro-Boer sentiment
which was evident throughout the German Empire, and which found even
official expression in a much-discussed telegram of the German
Emperor to President Krueger.
Although the Boer War cost England much in lives, money, and
prestige, its gain far overshadowed its cost. By it Great Britain
won the richest gold-producing mines and the most wonderful diamond
mines in the world. It consolidated its South African possessions,
and, though hard pushed at times, she emerged from it richer and
more powerful than ever. Even if this war occupied public attention
almost to the exclusion of everything else, a few noteworthy events
happened during it. In 1900 the bill providing for the federation of
the Australian colonies under the name of the Commonwealth of
Australia was approved by the crown, and completed the consolidation
of another important part of the British Empire. In January, 1901,
Queen Victoria died, after a reign of sixty-four years, and was
succeeded by the Prince of Wales as Edward VII.
While the preparations for the coronation of Edward VII were in
progress the king suddenly was taken seriously ill and an operation
had to be made to save his life. His coronation finally took place
in Westminster Abbey in August, 1902. The rulers of all the
important countries of the world attended either personally or were
represented by important members of their families, and it may well
be said that no other event of modern times had brought together
such an assembly of the great of the earth. Once more England seemed
to have assumed a leading part in the affairs of the world, and the
nations of it apparently were not only willing but anxious to
acknowledge British power and greatness. Just previous to the
coronation, in July, 1902, Lord Salisbury had resigned the
premiership and had been succeeded by his nephew, A. J. Balfour.
Another feature of the coronation was the enthusiastic loyalty which
all the British colonies showed for the new king and the mother
country. This found even more definite expression in a series of
conferences which were held in November of the same year, 1902,
between the prime ministers of the different colonies and the
British Secretary of the Colonies. These resulted in resolutions
expressing a desire for a closer union of the various parts of the
empire and for an arrangement by which the trade with the colonies
should receive preferential treatment. In December, 1902, Great
Britain and Germany presented a joint ultimatum to Venezuela
concerning the payment of debts, and established a joint blockade
after having seized the Venezuelan fleet. The South American
republic appealed to the United States, at whose suggestion the
matter was referred to the Hague Tribunal of International
Arbitration.
The friendship between France and Great Britain manifested
indisputable signs of rapid growth in 1903 when President Loubet payed
a three days' visit to England in July, and was followed later that
month by a deputation of French deputies and senators. In 1903 it was
also that Joseph Chamberlain, then Secretary for the Colonies, began
his campaign against free trade and for a policy of a retaliatory
tariff and reciprocity with the colonies. Throughout 1902, 1903, and
1904 British troops were fighting in Somaliland, where a revolution
had broken out among the natives under the leadership of the "Mad
Mullah." In 1904 the Franco-English entente became still more cordial,
and in April of that year, 1904, an agreement was signed between the
two countries regulating their relations in Newfoundland, Morocco,
Egypt, West Africa, Siam, and Madagascar, and removing thereby a
prolific source of misunderstandings and irritation. A military
expedition was sent to Tibet, one of the few important parts of Asia
which had hitherto escaped from the attention of European powers.
After many difficulties and considerable fighting this force reached
the Tibetan capital, Lhassa, the ancient seat of the Dalai Lama, who
fled at the approach of the English. As a result a treaty was signed
between Tibet and England giving preferential treatment to English
trade and arranging that no other power should thereafter be permitted
to have any influence in Tibetan public affairs. In the meantime war
had broken out, in February, 1904, between Japan and Russia over the
latter's refusal to withdraw from China. In accordance with the
Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1902, Great Britain maintained neutrality
throughout this war, which, however, was of the benevolent kind
toward Japan. English public sympathy was strongly with the latter
country. In October, 1904, the continuation of England's neutrality
was seriously threatened. After the defeat of the Russian fleet in the
Far East, the Russian Baltic fleet was ordered to go to the support of
the Russian forces. During its progress through the North Sea some
shots were fired at an English fishing fleet, killing two men and
wounding others. War between Russia and England was averted only by
the prompt disavowal of this action on the part of Russia, and an
equally prompt compensation of the Englishmen affected after the
incident had been submitted to an international commission of
arbitration, which met in Paris. It was at this time that the new
_entente cordiale_ between France and England had its first test. For
there is no doubt that France exerted considerable pressure on its
Russian ally in order to hasten a prompt amicable settlement of the
matter.
In 1905 considerable opposition developed against the increase in
naval expenditures, occasioned chiefly by the necessity of keeping
step with the accelerated pace in naval armament which Germany began
to set at that time. In July, 1905, Lord Roberts made a speech in
the House of Lords in which he called the attention of the country
to the fact that the English army was unfit for war both in members
and equipment and training. In August, 1905, the Anglo-Japanese
alliance of 1902 was modified to conform to the new conditions that
had been created by the Russo-Japanese War. The terms of this new
arrangement have already been considered fully in that section of
this book which is devoted to Japan's history. In April, 1906, an
Anglo-Chinese conference modified the Anglo-Tibetan treaty allowing
China to maintain its suzerainty over Tibet, but giving full
protection to all English interests. This year, 1906, also saw the
beginning of the agitation for woman suffrage, which in the
following years assumed rapidly great proportions and violence.
Other matters of internal importance--educational, religious,
financial, and other legislation--made English internal politics
during this period more virulent than at any other period in recent
times, and gradually led up to the change from a Conservative to a
Liberal Government and to a series of very radical legislative
measures.
One of the chief causes of recent friction between Russia and Great
Britain was removed in March, 1907, by the signing of an agreement
between the two countries regulating their respective interests in
Persia. A colonial conference, which met in London in April, 1907,
gave new impetus to the imperialistic movement and to the closer
union between the United Kingdom and the colonies. In June of that
year, 1907, the great parliamentary struggle between the two Houses
of Parliament began with the passage by the House of Commons of a
bill reducing very materially the powers of the Upper House. As a
result of their agreement, Russia and Great Britain decided in
December on joint intervention in order to prevent a threatening
uprising in Persia. Slight friction between Japan and Great Britain,
which had been caused by strong popular demonstrations in Canada
against the increased Japanese immigration, was removed by Japan's
announcement of its intention to limit extensively this immigration.
In April, 1908, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman resigned the
premiership and was succeeded by Mr. Asquith and a Liberal Cabinet,
in which David Lloyd-George held the position of Chancellor of the
Exchequer, and soon began to push the most radical financial and
social measures which have ever been advanced in England. In May,
1908, Great Britain, together with France, Russia, and Italy,
withdrew her troops from the island of Crete, and in October joined
France and Russia in preventing the outbreak of war in the Balkans.
After the Franco-German agreement in regard to Morocco had been
signed in February, 1909, a conference was held between the German
Chancellor, Prince von Bülow, and Sir Charles Hardinge, with the
result that the German-English relations, which had been far from
cordial for a number of years, were adjusted. The refusal of the
House of Lords to pass Lloyd-George's budget, containing
revolutionary provisions for taxation, resulted in the dissolution
of Parliament by King Edward in February, 1910. The election of the
new Parliament clearly showed that the country was in favor of the
Liberal Government, which shortly after the opening of the new
Parliament showed its disapproval of the rejection of its budget by
the House of Lords by the introduction of a Parliament Reform Bill.
The budget was passed by the Upper House in April, 1910, but not
until after the Commons had passed a resolution limiting greatly the
veto power of the House of Lords. King Edward VII died on May 6,
1910, after a short illness and was succeeded by his son as George
V.
Just how much King Edward's personal influence was responsible for
the shaping of his country's foreign politics during his reign it is
hard to determine. Much has been written about this question, and
more undoubtedly will be said in the years to come. The fact
remains, however, that he had a strong dislike of his nephew, the
German Emperor, and an almost equally strong aversion of German
customs and ideals. On the other hand he had long been an admirer of
French culture and life, and he was a frequent visitor in the French
capital. The rapid growth of the Franco-British friendships
undoubtedly was helped along by him to his best ability. Naturally
he was influenced in this matter, not only by personal prejudices,
but chiefly by a conviction that his country's interests were
endangered by Germany's wonderful growth, and that they could be
preserved and improved more by strong alliances with other great
powers than by reaching an understanding with Germany herself.
The latter half of 1910 witnessed again violent parliamentary
dissensions in connection with the attempted reduction of the powers
of the House of Lords, resulting finally in another general election
in November, 1910, which gave to the Government a majority of 126.
That month also brought an announcement that English banks had
signed an agreement with German and French financial institutions to
join an American syndicate in advancing $50,000,000 to China, one of
the few instances of a joint financial undertaking by German and
British interests.
The greater part of 1911 was taken up with the settlement of the
difficulties between the Commons and the Lords, resulting finally in
the surrender of the latter and the adoption by them of the Commons'
bill depriving the Upper House of much of its former power. Hardly
had this troublesome question been adjusted when the question of Home
Rule for Ireland caused new difficulties of the severest nature. So
strong was the opposition of one part of Ireland to Home Rule, and so
strong the demand of the other part for it, that the dissensions
gradually reached the point where open revolution seemed to be
imminent. In July, 1911, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was renewed for a
period of ten years. During the Franco-German dispute about Morocco,
which threatened to disrupt the peace of Europe, Great Britain's
influence was thrown on the side of France, a fact which, of course,
resulted in increased bitterness against Great Britain on the part of
Germany. In November the king and queen left England on a trip to
India in order to be crowned as Emperor and Empress of India. In
common with other countries, England experienced in 1912 a great deal
of social unrest, which found expression in strikes as well as in
extremely radical legislation. The Irish question and the agitation
for woman suffrage continued to occupy public attention in 1912. In
August of that year, 1912, Great Britain joined with France and
Germany in accepting Austria-Hungary's invitation to confer on the
Balkan situation, which was rapidly assuming grave importance. In
conjunction with these powers, as well as Italy and Russia, it
maintained a strict neutrality during the Balkan Wars of 1912 and
1913, just as it had done during the Turko-Italian War of 1911 and
1912. At England's invitation the ambassadors of the powers met in
London in December, 1912, to discuss the Balkan question while the
representatives of the Balkan States and Turkey conferred concerning
peace.
Almost coincident with Germany's increased efforts to upbuild its
navy, a change had been made in the incumbency of the admiralty. One
of the younger and most active members of the Liberal party, Winston
Churchill, a member of the House of Marlborough, became First Lord. He
created a sensation by a speech made in the Commons in March, 1913,
suggesting that Germany and Great Britain should agree to stop naval
construction for a period of a year. Although this proposal received a
great deal of attention, it had no tangible result, and the race for
increased armament continued. Neither 1913 nor 1914 brought about any
diminution in the difficulties regarding the Irish question, in fact
rather the opposite, and the Government even went so far as to
prohibit the importation of arms into Ireland. Armed resistance
against Home Rule on the part of Ulster seemed to be unavoidable.
Agitation in England and Ireland over Home Rule had become so violent
that the murder of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne in June,
1914, did not arouse as much interest and attention in England as it
would have done otherwise. Revolution in Ireland was a matter that
England expected at that particular moment, rather than a general
European war. Not until the British fleet, assembled at Portsmouth for
maneuvers, left there on July 29, 1914, under sealed orders, was the
country aroused to the possibility of a world war, which had been
considered for so many years impossible by some and inevitable by
others, and which was now about to break out.
CHAPTER VI
ITALY
In the middle of the nineteenth century the position of Italy was
somewhat analogous to that of Germany. It consisted of a number of
separate states, and, in spite of the fact that all of these states
were inhabited by people speaking the same language and having the
same ideals and customs, they seemed to be unable to combine. One of
the results of this was the fact that the country adjoining on the
north, Austria, was meddling continually with Italian affairs and
attempting to gain a lasting influence over them. There were too
many racial differences, however, between the two countries to
permit an arrangement of this nature to continue for any length of
time without causing serious conflicts. Statesmen in the various
Italian states finally became convinced that it would be only a
question of time before some foreign nation would succeed in
dominating them unless they would be able to consolidate and show a
united front to any and all outsiders.
The difficulties in the way of Italian unification were manifold.
For our purposes, however, we are not interested in them or in the
means by which they were overcome beyond the fact that they finally
were overcome, and that as early as 1859 a large number of the
different Italian states had been united with the assistance of
Napoleon III under the rule of Victor Emmanuel II, originally King
of Sardinia and Piedmont. In that year, however, after Austria had
been driven out of Lombardy through the combined efforts of Italian
and French troops, Napoleon III suddenly arrived at an understanding
with Francis Joseph, and peace was concluded between France and
Austria. This left in the hands of the Austrians still an important
part of northern Italy known as the Quadrilateral. Rome, too, and a
considerable territory surrounding it, known as the Papal State, was
not included in the newly formed kingdom of Italy, the pope refusing
to give up his temporal powers and Napoleon III supporting him in
that refusal to the extent of maintaining French troops in Rome.
The Austro-Prussian War of 1866, as we have already shown, had
important results for Italy. For previous to its breaking out
Prussia had concluded a treaty with Italy, and when hostilities
began between Austria and Prussia, Italy immediately attacked her
old enemy. When peace was concluded between Prussia and Austria,
Prussia insisted, in order to reward her southern ally, that Austria
should relinquish practically all of her Italian possessions. Four
years later, in 1870, the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War
necessitated the withdrawal of the French troops from Rome, and
immediately after that event the forces of King Victor Emmanuel
appeared before Rome and occupied it to the great satisfaction of
the Romans, and in spite of all the protests of the pope. The latter
lost his temporal powers, although he was permitted to retain the
Vatican. This completed the unification of Italy.
The completion of the unification of Italy, of course, created many
difficult internal problems, chief of which was the adjustment
between the state and the church. The latter, as represented by the
pope, refused to become reconciled to the new conditions or to
acknowledge the legality of the so-called Laws of the Guarantees,
according to which he was given all the privileges of a sovereign,
the possession of the Vatican and Lateran palaces, and a
considerable annual income. None of these appeased the church, which
steadfastly refused to recognize the existence of the Italian state.
The difficulties created thereby can readily be understood if one
considers the immense influence that the Roman Catholic Church
possesses over the minds of its members, and if one further
remembers that practically all Italians are devout Catholics.
For many years after the unification of Italy and the destruction of
the church's temporal power, continuous and strong efforts were made
by the latter's adherents to restore to the pope that of which, as
they claimed, he had been deprived illegally. The only way in which
the Italian Government could subdue and overcome these efforts was
by legislation which would make these efforts not only futile but
also dangerous to the pope's friends, and these repressive practices
naturally resulted in a strong undercurrent of dissatisfaction.
These conditions, as well as a great many economic problems, very
difficult of solution, kept the new kingdom sufficiently occupied to
keep it out of international politics for a considerable period of
time. It was not long, however, before Italy was bound to be drawn
into the general scramble for colonial possessions. Italy's
interests in this direction were rather restricted, but within these
restrictions they were very intense. Its geographical situation made
it evident that any attempt on the part of any foreign power to gain
or increase its influence in northern Africa would be a matter of
grave concern to Italy. France had been deeply interested for many
years in north Africa, and when the French Republic showed signs of
strengthening and enlarging its interests, immediately after it had
somewhat recuperated from its defeat by Germany in 1871, it was
quite natural that Italy should look to Germany for an alliance to
counteract France's colonial policy. The seizure of Tunis by France
in 1881 undoubtedly was more responsible than any other single
factor for Italy's decision to ally itself as closely as possible
with Germany. Inasmuch as the latter country in the meanwhile had
arrived at a very close understanding with Austria-Hungary, there
were considerable difficulties in the way of an Italian-German
arrangement. For not only was it difficult for Italy to forget its
old struggles and quarrels with Austria, but the southern kingdom
felt very keenly on the subject of the retention on the part of
Austria of territory inhabited by Italians, even though this
territory was comparatively small in extent. This attitude of Italy
toward Austria may be called typical of one nation's attitude toward
another. It shows clearly the unreasonableness of national
sentiments. For even granting that Italy had a good cause for
resenting Austrian rule over Italian-speaking people, the necessity
of possessing this particular strip of country was much greater to
Austria than it was to Italy, giving, as it did, to Austria the only
seaport available, whereas Italy stood in no need whatsoever of
additional opportunities of this nature. However, Italy finally
reached the decision that, between the danger of having to face
alone the further extension of French power in north Africa or
burying the hatchet with Austria, the latter proposition was the
easier and more advantageous. As a result of this decision a treaty
was arranged finally between Germany, Austria, and Italy in 1883,
and this new alignment of three central European powers has since
been known as the Triple Alliance. We must not forget, however, that
in spite of this arrangement Italy never really has been a sincere
friend or well-wisher of Austria, and it is this fact which formed
the basis for the final disruption of the Triple Alliance and the
entrance of Italy in the war of 1914 on the side of the Triple
Entente.
The arrangement with Austria and Germany enabled Italy to enter upon
a colonial policy in Africa in the vicinity of the Red Sea. As has
been the case of all other colonial powers, this undertaking was
wrought with a great many difficulties. It forced Italy to fight
wars in distant countries, expensive in money as well as in human
life, and though, in spite of repeated defeats, Italy's colonial
enterprises have made considerable progress, the losses entailed up
to the present time outweigh to a considerable extent the gains.
In 1887 the Triple Alliance was renewed for the first time. In the
meantime Italy had continued to make considerable progress with its
colonial expansion. Another renewal of the Triple Alliance took
place in 1891. In 1893 Italy passed through a period of public
scandals in connection with the failure of some of the state banks,
involving one of its most prominent and able statesmen, Premier
Crispi. All these years the Italian Government found it more and
more difficult to raise the necessary revenues to sustain its
colonial policy and to provide for the increases in army and navy
which the possession of colonies naturally required. Rioting took
place in a great many parts of the kingdom, and had to be suppressed
by force. Socialism rapidly spread, and in October, 1894, the
Government finally found it necessary to suppress socialistic and
similar organizations. Earlier in that year, 1894, fighting took
place between the Italian forces and dervishes in Abyssinia, which
ended in success for the Italian arms. But in December of 1895 the
Italian army in Abyssinia suffered a severe defeat at the hands of
King Menelik. The same thing happened in March of 1896, and the
continued inability of the Italian army to make headway in Abyssinia
finally resulted in the overthrow of the Government and the
resignation of Premier Crispi, who was succeeded by Rudini. The loss
of Italian prestige had been so severe, however, that Italy was
forced in the fall of 1896 to conclude a treaty at Addis-Abeba with
Abyssinia, by which Italy relinquished all its claims to a
protectorate over the ancient African kingdom. The year 1898 was
marked again with a series of riots, caused by the high price of
grain, and resulting in clashes between the people and the military
forces with considerable loss on both sides.
Another result was the fall of the new cabinet, which was succeeded
by one formed by General Pelloux, which, however, lasted less than
one year.
In July, 1900, King Humbert was assassinated during a visit to Monza
by an Italian anarchist who had just returned from the United
States. The crown prince succeeded the murdered king as Victor
Emmanuel III. In 1901 a delegation of representative English Roman
Catholics, headed by the Duke of Norfolk, paid a visit to the pope,
and expressed the hope of the English Catholics for a restoration of
the pope's temporal powers, an action which caused considerable
offense in Italian Government circles.
[Illustration: Europe in 1793-1815, Historical Map.]
In 1902 the Triple Alliance was renewed, in spite of rumors to the
effect that Italy was contemplating a change in its international
politics. Previous to the announcement of this renewal, it had
become known that France and Italy had arrived at an understanding
in regard to their north African interests, as well as concerning
all questions affecting the Mediterranean. This in conjunction with
an announcement made by the French Foreign Minister, M. Delcassé, to
the effect that assurances had been given to France by the Italian
Government that no part of its treaty with Germany and Austria was
in any manner directed against France or contemplating an aggressive
attitude toward the republic, made it clear that the Franco-Italian
rapprochement was progressing rapidly. The same year also brought a
severance of diplomatic relations between Italy and Switzerland,
caused by a difference of opinion between the Swiss Government and
the Italian Ambassador at Bern. However, matters were adjusted
amicably later in the year. The improvement in Franco-Russian
relations apparently had a similar result in regard to Italy's
relations with Russia, for the King of Italy paid a visit to the
czar, during which--even if only semiofficially--international
politics were discussed. A little later, however, the king also
visited the German court.
These exchanges of visits with the rulers of other countries
continued in 1903. King Edward VII of England, as well as the German
Emperor, paid visits to Rome, both calling on the pope during their
stay. The King and Queen of Italy made an official visit at Paris
and London. The internal difficulties were somewhat less marked. In
July, 1902, Pope Leo XIII died, and was succeeded by Cardinal Sarto,
Archbishop of Venice, as Pius X.
Again, in 1904, the German Emperor visited at Naples. President
Loubet returned the king's and queen's visit to Paris in April,
1904, and thereby caused the break between France and the pope, on
account of the latter's protest against the official recognition on
the part of the head of a Catholic nation of the state which had
deprived the head of the Catholic religion of his dominions.
Throughout 1905 Italy was occupied with internal affairs, the most
important of which were the resignation on account of ill health of
Prime Minister Giolitti, the formation of a new cabinet under Signor
Fortis, and the purchase of the railways by the state. The Fortis
ministry lasted only until February, 1906, when it was succeeded by
one headed by Baron Sonnino, and in May by another under Signor
Giolitti. Although Italy had supported Germany at the Algeciras
conference, the support had not been all that had been expected, and
considerable resentment at Italy's lukewarm attitude was expressed
in the German newspapers. The Government disclaimed any change in
its attitude toward the Triple Alliance, announcing, however, at the
same time its intention to maintain good relations with France and
Great Britain. The latter were confirmed by a visit of King Edward
and Queen Alexandra in April, 1907.
Early in 1908 difficulties of a commercial nature between Turkey and
Italy led to the mobilization of the Italian fleet. Turkey, however,
thereupon acceded to all of Italy's demands. Foreign affairs were
overshadowed entirely throughout 1909 by the frightful destruction
wrought by a series of violent earthquakes which shook the Strait of
Messina on December 28, 1908, killing over 50,000 people. King
Edward, Emperor William, and Czar Nicholas again visited Italy at
different times in 1909.
On September 29, 1911, Italy declared war against Turkey, which
latter country had not answered satisfactorily an Italian ultimatum
concerning Tripoli. The war, which was principally fought in Africa,
lasted until October 18, 1912, when a treaty of peace was signed at
Lausanne, Switzerland, arranging for the immediate occupation of
Tripoli and Cyrenaica by Italy against an annual payment to Turkey.
Throughout the war the other European powers had maintained strict
neutrality. A few days before peace was concluded, October 8, 1912,
Montenegro had started that war against Turkey which was destined to
grow finally into the Balkan War. Italy, in common with the other
European powers, maintained strict neutrality throughout the two
Balkan wars, and participated in the conference of London which
settled the Balkan question, at least temporarily, in May, 1913.
Throughout that year (1913) Italian troops found considerable
difficulty in keeping order among the natives of Cyrenaica, and in
suppressing uprisings in various parts of this colony.
The outbreak of the war found Italy still a member of the Triple
Alliance; but the southern kingdom stoutly maintained that the terms
of the alliance did not call for its active participation. The latter,
at any rate, would have been an absolute impossibility, for public
opinion was too strong against Austria-Hungary to permit ever that
Italian troops should fight side by side with Austrians. In a general
way Italy found itself in a most unfortunate position. Moral
obligations undoubtedly strongly called, at least, for its neutrality
in any war in which both its allies were involved. Political
considerations equally strongly demanded that Italy should avoid
offending the French-English-Russian combination, which could have
ruined Italy in no time by an even superficial blockade. In regard to
Albania its position was equally difficult. Its own interests there
conflicted both with Austrian and Serbian ambitions. The result was
naturally--neutrality and diplomatic shilly-shallying.
One of the most ardent supporters of the Triple Alliance was the
Marquis di San Giuliano, who had been minister of foreign affairs
since 1905. His death in October, 1914, undoubtedly had a great
influence on Italy's further attitude. In October, 1914, Signor
Salandra's cabinet was reconstructed. At that time the prime
minister was still in more or less sympathy with the Giolitti party,
which were in favor of continuing the Triple Alliance, at least to
the extent of maintaining neutrality. The war party, however, gained
rapidly in strength, and finally brought about a reversal of the
country's foreign policy by denouncing the Triple Alliance of
almost half a century's standing. The next step, of course, was
Italy's declaration of war against Austria in May, 1915.
On May 10, 1915, the German and Austrian Consuls were removed from
their respective posts. Events progressed so rapidly that by May 20,
1915, the War Party under the ministership of Salandra was placed in
power.
CHAPTER VII
BELGIUM
The geographical location of Belgium is at once its blessing and its
curse. Its possession of a valuable seacoast, its proximity to the
rich and highly developed countries of Germany, France, and England
have made it, in spite of its comparatively very small extent, one
of the richest countries. Its ships have carried the goods of many
other nations, and its ports have been the gateway of an immense
international commerce. But these very nations which in time of
peace have been the source of much of Belgium's wealth, have brought
many wars upon this country. Again and again it has been Europe's
battle ground. Whenever France and Germany have gone to war against
each other it has always been a question which one would get at the
other first--through Belgium. And then through it lies the shortest
road to rich and proud Albion.
A change for the better seemed to have come for the little kingdom
as a result of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. At its outbreak both
of the belligerents reaffirmed the treaty of London of 1831 and
1839, by which they as well as Great Britain, Austria, and Russia
were bound to respect Belgium's neutrality and integrity, and to
Great Britain it is that Belgium was especially indebted for this
promise. For the island kingdom made it plain to both Russia and
France that it could not and would not stand by idly if Belgium were
invaded. After the end of the war had come, Russia, France, and
Great Britain signed a new agreement by which they arranged to
respect forever Belgium's neutrality, and if one of the signatories
should break the arrangement the other two were to combine for the
protection of Belgium. Although this pact has been kept officially
ever since, it seems in the light of recent discoveries in Belgian
archives as if Belgium itself had placed itself outside of it by
arriving at a secret understanding with both England and France that
both of these countries should be permitted certain privileges in
case of war with Germany. How much truth there is to these claims
history will undoubtedly discover and announce.
The fact remains that, secure in its guaranteed neutrality, Belgium
has prospered and grown. In spite of its smallness it has become one
of the great industrial and commercial countries in Europe. To a
great extent this was due to the remarkable gifts possessed by one
of its recent rulers, Leopold II, the uncle and predecessor of the
present king, Albert I. Leopold succeeded his father, Leopold I, in
1865. The latter had been on very friendly terms with Queen
Victoria, and, in a way, English friendship for Belgium dates from
that period, although Leopold II was not popular at the English
court. Leopold II was married to an Austrian archduchess. His sister
was the wife of the unfortunate Maximilian who, as Emperor of
Mexico, betrayed by Napoleon III in his hour of need, was stood up
against the walls of a Mexican town and shot by his rebellious
subjects. One of his daughters, Stefanie, married the unhappy Crown
Prince Rudolf of Austria-Hungary, who died mysteriously at a hunting
lodge long before his time. But Leopold II himself was of a
different mold than all his relations. He was a man of powerful
intellect, shrewd business sense, and remarkable foresight. Much
against his people's will he became first the promoter and then the
king of an immense and wonderfully valuable African empire, the
Congo Free State. This enterprise was not at all popular in Belgium.
But the king had a will of his own and saw it through, much to the
final advantage of his country. By a will made in 1889 he left the
Congo State to Belgium, which annexed it in 1908, and which has
found it not an unprofitable investment. The Congo question--its
finances, development, and administration--is the main feature of
internal politics of Belgium in modern times. Of course there were
other questions--electoral reform, financial legislation, military
expenditures--that offered plenty of causes for political
discussions and difficulties, but they were always more or less
overshadowed by the affairs of the African colony.
In foreign politics Belgium--on account of its neutrality--had no
cause to mix. It stood on the same footing with each of the other
nations: it expected from each and gave to each friendly
consideration. It might almost be called the irony of fate that the
country which kept, due to its special status, out of all
international disturbances of the last seventy-five years should be
drawn into the Great War deeper than almost any other country. It is
quite possible that had Leopold II still been at the helm in 1914,
his country's fate might have been different.
His successor was his younger brother's younger son, Albert I, a man
who, though lacking, of course, his uncle's greater experience,
seemed to have inherited some of his intellectual qualities. He
married a Bavarian princess, a sister of the late Crown Princess of
Bavaria, and a niece of the late Empress Elizabeth of Austria and
the ex-Queen Mother of Portugal.
Belgium's populace consists of two widely different parts--Flemings
and French. The former are closely related racially to the Dutch
inhabitants of Holland, with which country Belgium formerly was
united. The French portion of the populace is very much in sympathy
with French ideals and ideas, and has suppressed the Flemish half as
much as possible, a great deal of strife resulting. Racially and
socially Belgium felt itself closely allied to France, economically
its interests were much greater with Germany. If one can speak at
all of Belgium's foreign politics previous to the outbreak of the
war, one must say that they were influenced by sentiments rather
than anything else.
CHAPTER VIII
JAPAN
The awakening of modern Japan may be said to be coincident with
Commodore Perry's mission to the Far East in 1859. His was not only
the first of a long series of foreign embassies, but it resulted in
a treaty between Japan and the United States, and aroused the
curiosity of the Japanese sufficiently to send special ambassadors
of their own to the United States, and later to other countries.
This interest in western affairs at first found considerable
opposition at home on the part of the conservative element,
opposition which even resulted in civil war. The more liberal
attitude, however, carried the day. By 1879 Tokyo had been made the
capital and western laws had been introduced. At the same time that
Tokyo was made the capital the present form of imperial government
was adopted and the new emperor promised on his oath to give to his
people a constitution. This latter was proclaimed in 1889 and the
diet met for the first time in 1891.
Only three years later the Chino-Japanese War began. Its cause was
Chinese oppression of Korea. In one short year the ancient empire of
China was thoroughly beaten by its new rival for supremacy in the
Far East. As a result Japan received at the conclusion of peace in
1895 Formosa, a huge indemnity, and independence was granted to
Korea. This was a wonderful achievement for the young empire, and
the entire world's attention was centered on Japan. Some of the
European powers interested in China began to fear for their
interests and Germany, Russia, and France combined to restrain Japan
and moderate its terms to China. This aroused considerable ill
feeling in Japan against the three powers whose influences were said
to have deprived Japan of some of the fruits of its dearly bought
victory. Especially was this feeling directed against Russia whose
interests in China clashed directly with those of Japan. However, in
1898, these two countries concluded a treaty in which they both
acknowledged Korea's independence and promised to respect it.
As soon as commercial interests of the various foreign countries had
grown, Japan had to suffer the installment of consular courts of the
more important European nations. This soon was felt by the Japanese
as an intrusion on their sovereignty. In 1899 treaties which had
been arranged during the preceding years between Japan and these
countries abolishing the consular courts went into effect. Greater
and greater became Japan's influence in the Far East. The
superiority of its armies over the Chinese forces during the short
war of 1894-1895, the apparently wonderful adaptability of the
Japanese, their equally wonderfully rapid progress along commercial
and scientific lines soon made Japan a desirable ally.
As many times before in history Great Britain's statesmen showed
greater foresight than those of other countries. In 1902 they
arranged an alliance between their country and Japan which more than
offset the Franco-Russo-German bloc of 1895. It was signed at London
in August, 1905, by Lord Lansdowne and Count Hayastu and provided
for: (a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in
the regions of eastern Asia and of India; (b) The preservation of
the common interests of all powers in China by insuring the
independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle
of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations
in China; (c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the high
contracting parties in the regions of eastern Asia and of India, and
the defense of their special interests in the said regions. If the
rights and interests referred to above are in jeopardy, the two
governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly as
to the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced
rights or interests, and will act in common in case of unprovoked
attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, or the attack or
aggressive action, whenever arising, on the part of any other power
or powers.
This agreement was modified in 1911 to fit the changed conditions in
China and a new article was added which provided that "should
either high contracting party conclude a treaty of general
arbitration with a third power, it is agreed that nothing in this
agreement shall entail upon such contracting party an obligation to
go to war with the power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in
force." At the same time it was arranged that the alliance should
remain in force for ten years and "unless denounced twelve months
before the expiration of the said ten years, it will remain binding
until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the
high contracting parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the
date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually
engaged in war, the alliance shall, _ipso facto_, continue until
peace is concluded."
In the meantime, however, difficulties had arisen between Russia and
Japan, over the former country's refusal to evacuate certain parts
of Manchuria, occupied as a result of the Boxer uprising in the
suppression of which Japanese troops had participated successfully
with those of the other great nations. Japan sent an ultimatum to
Russia which did not receive prompt enough attention and war was
declared in 1904. For the second time the world's attention was
centered on Japan, and to the amazement of the western world the
eastern empire defeated the Russian Colossus most severely and
consistently both on land and on sea. The financial burden of the
war, however, was a severe strain on the limited resources of the
young world power and it was forced to accept mediation proffered by
the United States at a time when not all its objects had been
accomplished. Peace was concluded at Portsmouth in the United
States. Japan was very moderate in the consideration of the terms as
we have already seen during the review of the history of Russia.
In 1907 both France and Russia signed agreements with Japan in
regard to the independence and integrity of China and acknowledging
the "open door" policy in commercial matters for all nations alike.
In 1910 Korea was annexed, much against the desire of the natives
who made Japan's task a difficult one by means of many uprisings and
conspiracies. Internal affairs during the last ten years also have
given cause for anxiety. The two great wars in rapid succession have
put a heavy financial burden on the shoulders of the great masses
and socialistic tendencies have found a fertile soil in Japan. Labor
disturbances have sometimes assumed serious proportions and so have
demonstrations against other nations who had aroused the animosity
of the Japanese people by some acts. In general, however, the
progress of the country continues.
Japan's attitude in the Great European War was, of course,
influenced chiefly by its alliance with Great Britain. Its general
attitude toward Germany had always been a friendly one. For as
Germany has played the successful schoolmaster along military and
scientific lines for many nations, it has also done for Japan. The
efficiency of the Japanese army is due chiefly to what Japanese
officers have learned in German regiments and military schools.
CHAPTER IX
THE NEUTRAL STATES--PORTUGAL AND SPAIN
Now that we have reviewed the historical development of all the
belligerents, it becomes necessary to pay some attention to the few
European states which so far have not yet actually become involved.
For our purposes it will not be necessary to go into any great
detail concerning the political history of these noncombatant
nations. We are only interested in those features of their political
development which have some bearing on the reasons for their present
neutrality and on their attitude toward the various nations at war.
In our consideration of the neutral states there will not be
included either Greece or Rumania, because they will be covered
together with the other Balkan nations in a separate section of this
work.
Up to the beginning of 1916 there were two countries in southern
Europe which had managed to remain in a condition of neutrality,
Spain and Portugal. In the month of March the latter country,
however, precipitated a declaration of war on the part of the
Central European Powers and their allies by seizing the mercantile
steamers of these various countries which at the outbreak of the war
had sought refuge in Portuguese ports and had been interned there.
Before we determine why Portugal took this step which was sure to
provoke a declaration of war, it will be necessary to consider
shortly the history of this country in modern times. It is many
centuries since Portugal has lost its former importance as a
European nation which was based primarily on its extensive colonial
possessions. Its last really valuable and important colony, however,
Brazil, was not lost until the early part of the nineteenth century,
and even now Portugal possesses colonies in Asia and Africa which
are twenty times as large in extent as its European territory. Its
African possessions are adjoining chiefly British colonies and this
close proximity to parts of the British Empire has resulted at times
in some difficulties between the two countries, the most recent and
important of which occurred in 1890 and in 1894. In spite of these
slight disagreements, however, Portugal made an arrangement, quite
some time ago, according to which it was under certain conditions to
furnish limited subsidiary forces to England, in exchange for which
England promised to assume the friendly rôle of a protector in times
of need. It is undoubtedly this arrangement with England which
finally resulted in the aggressive action on the part of Portugal of
which we have just heard. Up to 1910 Portugal was a kingdom. In that
year, however, a revolution broke out chiefly on account of
oppressive financial measures which the Government had been in the
habit of passing and the reigning King, Manuel, was forced to flee
the country. Shortly afterward his former subjects exiled him and
decided for a republican form of government which in spite of
various slight monarchial revolutions has been maintained since. The
1910 revolution was preceded by two years by the murder of King
Manuel's father, Carlos I, and his older brother, Luis. After King
Manuel had been exiled, England assumed toward Portugal a part very
similar to that which England had assumed toward France after the
fall of the second empire. It offered a haven of refuge for the
exiled king and his relatives, but at the same time acknowledged the
establishment of the Portuguese Republic and showed in various ways
that it was in sympathy with the liberal movement in Portugal.
Immediately adjoining Portugal on the east is Spain, which is
separated from France on the north by the Pyrenees. Just as Portugal,
Spain had been in times past one of the great colonial powers of the
world, greater even than its neighbor. In fact, at one time in the
world's history Spain occupied very much the same position that
England occupies to-day. But this splendor belongs to the past and
gradually Spain has lost practically all of its colonies with the
single exception of the few comparatively small settlements and
islands in Western Africa which, however, still total 82,000 square
miles. Its last really important and valuable colonies in the West
Indies (Cuba, Porto Rico), and the Philippine Islands in the Far East
were lost as a result of the Spanish-American War of 1898. Some other
islands in the Pacific Ocean were sold in the year following, 1899, to
Germany. In more recent times, however, Spain has shown again more
aggressiveness in connection with the acquisition of colonial
possessions which chiefly centered in that part of north Africa which
is immediately opposite the south coast of Spain. Its activities in
that territory were not appreciated by the natives who at various
times with more or less success revolted against the foreign rule and
finally brought about the Moorish War of 1909, which was terminated by
Spain only after the Spanish troops had experienced a number of
defeats and after a considerable expenditure of money and life.
[Illustration: Wilhelm II, German Emperor and King of Prussia.]
During the second half of the nineteenth century Spain went through
a comparatively large number of revolutions, dynastic changes and
other internal difficulties. In 1886 Queen Isabella, a member of the
Bourbon family, was driven out of the country by a revolution of her
subjects. The latter, however, decided in favor of a continuation of
the monarchial form of government and thereupon set out to find
some European prince who would be willing to assume the burden of
the Spanish crown. We have already heard that this quest was one of
the principal direct causes of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870,
because Napoleon III attempted to force a promise from King William
of Prussia to the effect that the latter would not permit his
relative, the Prince of Hohenzollern, to accept the crown of Spain
which had been offered to him. In 1870, however, the Spanish people
succeeded in inducing Amadeus of Italy, a relative of the ruler of
the newly formed Italian kingdom, to become King of Spain. Only two
years later, in 1872, the so-called Carlist War broke out which had
its basis in the attempt of Don Carlos, also a member of the Bourbon
family, to secure the crown of Spain to which he claimed to have
prior rights to those of Queen Isabella's branch of the family. This
war, which really was a civil war, was accompanied by a great deal
of bloodshed and cruelty and finally brought about the abdication of
King Amadeus. For a short time after that Spain became a republic,
but in 1874 the people decided that their interests would be better
served by a monarchy and they made the son of Queen Isabella,
Alfonso XII, their King. The latter was married twice, first to
Princess Mercedes and after her death to Archduchess Marie Christine
of Austria. Of the former marriage the issue was one girl, Mercedes,
who at the death of Alfonso XII in 1885 became Queen of Spain with
her stepmother as regent. In 1886, however, a posthumous male heir
was born who immediately upon his birth became legally King of Spain
as Alfonso XIII. Of course Queen Christine's regency continued until
Alfonso XIII became of age. During her regency Queen Marie Christine
faced an arduous task in her attempt to maintain for her minor son
the throne of his father, but in spite of the many difficulties that
she had to face she succeeded. These difficulties were chiefly
internal and of an economic nature, although those in connection
with Spain's West Indian possessions were almost as vexing. For many
years of this period Spain was more or less in a state of anarchy,
and labor disturbances throughout the country took on a most violent
form. In recent years, however, conditions have improved
considerably and to-day the future of Spain is more promising than
it has been for many decades.
In foreign politics Spain did not play a very important part,
especially not since the loss of most of its colonies. It
participated in a number of the more important international
conferences held during the last thirty-five or forty years and,
generally speaking, managed to maintain friendly relations with most
of the other nations. During the long regency of Queen Marie
Christine her personal influence, of course, was bound to be felt to
a considerable extent and to that extent Spain may be said to have
been more inclined toward the Central European Powers and especially
toward Austria than toward any other countries. This is due to the
fact that the Queen Regent was a member of the Hapsburg family and
that one of her late husband's sisters is married to a prince of the
reigning house of Bavaria. On the other hand the Spanish people are,
of course, in customs and language, more closely related to the
French and Italian people and this racial relationship is found
expressed in a more or less strong sympathy for France. In 1906 King
Alfonso XIII married Princess Victoria of Battenberg, daughter of
one of the daughters of Queen Victoria of England and of a German
prince, but thoroughly English in her bringing up and sympathies.
This alliance of course brought Spain into closer contact with
England. Considering these various conditions it is clear that Spain
has about as many sentimental reasons for supporting the Allies as
it has for supporting the Central Powers, and this balanced its
sentiments so well that its neutrality has been really fair and
sincere. The entrance of Portugal into the war, however, may have an
important bearing on Spain's future attitude.
CHAPTER X
DENMARK, SWEDEN, NORWAY, HOLLAND, AND LUXEMBURG
The reasons for the neutrality which the three Scandinavian kingdoms
have maintained in the Great European War are chiefly economic and
geographical. Neither one alone nor all three combined are strong
enough in men or money to take sides with either the Allies or the
Central European Powers. Furthermore through their continued
neutrality they have been able to reap a rich harvest by means of an
immensely extended trade with practically all of the belligerents,
especially, however, with England, Germany, and Russia. These
conditions of course influence chiefly the official attitude of these
countries, but have less influence on popular opinion which is more or
less subject to sentimental influences. In that direction both Denmark
and Norway lean toward the Allies, while Sweden leans toward the
Central European Powers. Denmark has never forgotten or forgiven the
mutilation which it suffered at the hands of Prussia and Austria in
1864, and which resulted in the loss of Schleswig-Holstein, a
comparatively large slice of Denmark. This resentment toward Germany
has been intensified since then by the severe measures which from time
to time have been taken against the inhabitants of northern Schleswig,
who have adhered consistently to their Danish language and customs.
Its ruling family also is closely related to the rulers of England and
Russia.
The latter may also be said of the ruling family of Norway, but in
the case of Norway matters have been somewhat complicated by its
peculiar relation to Sweden. Up to 1905 these two countries were
known as the United Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway and were governed
on the basis of a very close union. In that year, however, the union
was dissolved after the Norwegians had shown for many years previous
their dislike of existing conditions. After the dissolution they
chose as their king a Prince of Denmark who is married to a sister
of King George of England; this as well as the very fact that Sweden
is leaning toward Germany is chiefly responsible for Norway's
sentimental preference for the cause of the Allies.
Sweden's tendency to support the Central European Powers is based
primarily on its fear of and hatred for Russia. The former sentiment
is due to Russia's well-known desire for a port which is ice-free
all year around and which it could, of course, acquire by the
conquest of Sweden. The latter sentiment, which has always been
strong in Sweden, has its origin in Russia's conquest of the former
Swedish province of Finland and in the oppressive and most cruel
treatment which Russia has given to the populace of this unfortunate
country which consistently have tried to adhere to their Swedish
habits and civilization. The fact that the present Queen of Sweden
is a German princess, closely related to the imperial family as well
as to some of the other German reigning families, and that this
Queen of Sweden is very popular in her adopted country, undoubtedly
also had some bearing on Sweden's attitude toward the various
countries at war.
Like Portugal and Spain, Holland of to-day is only a mere shadow of
its past glory. Most of its colonial possessions have passed out of
its hands. Those, however, that still remain are chiefly in the Far
East and are very valuable, especially Java. The possession of these
colonies by as small a country as Holland, of course, raised many
difficult problems of a financial and political nature. As a result,
Holland's participation in international politics was naturally very
restricted, and the general policy of the country was to maintain
the strictest neutrality and to keep up friendly relations with the
rest of the world. Its neutrality in the present war is based on the
same reasons. Furthermore, public sentiment is rather anti-English,
partly as a result of the resentment of English aggression during
the Napoleonic wars, which almost ended in the loss to Holland of
its colonies, and partly as a result of the intense sympathy felt
for the Boers, who are of Dutch descent, during the South African
War. At the same time they have no particularly strong liking for
Germany, suspecting it of having designs on their absolute
independence, which the Dutch guard most jealously.
The history of Holland during the last fifty years is, therefore,
concerned chiefly with internal affairs, and covers few events of
international importance. Its chief claim to international fame
rests on its selection by the other civilized nations as the center
of the international peace conferences and the seat of the
International Court of Arbitration. On May 18, 1899, the First Peace
Conference assembled at The Hague at the invitation of Czar Nicholas
II of Russia. In it there participated, besides twenty-one European
states, the United States, Mexico, China, Japan, Persia, and Siam.
During sessions lasting over ten weeks international questions of
the greatest importance, chiefly relating to the conduct of war,
were discussed. As a result the convention adopted certain
resolutions and declarations which modified warfare on land and sea,
and regulated it by means of certain rules which were to be observed
by all signatories. It also created a permanent court of
arbitration, consisting of eminent jurists from all the countries
represented, before which international disputes were to be brought
for pacific settlement. At the suggestion of the United States
(1904) the czar invited the countries to a second peace conference,
which met on June 15, 1907. Besides the former signatories, all the
South American States were represented. Its results were similar to
those of the first conference, and as the years passed by the
various countries concluded among each other a total of over 150
arbitration treaties.
In spite of being the center of the modern peace movement, Holland
found it necessary for its own protection to keep up with the
general increase in armament which was carried on in Europe. In 1913
the Coast Defense Bill provided for the fortification of Flushing
and for the expenditure of a comparatively large sum, and created
considerable discussion and some ill feeling, especially in England.
The Duchy of Luxemburg is ruled by the same dynasty that now occupies
the throne of Holland, the House of Orange-Nassau. Until 1866 it was a
member of the North German Federation, but in 1867 a conference of
the powers, held at London, declared it to be neutral territory, and
ordered the demolition of its fortifications. At that time the
succession in both Holland and Luxemburg descended in the direct male
line only. William III was King of Holland and Grand Duke of
Luxemburg. In 1879 the king's only brother and his oldest son, and in
1881 the king's second son died. This left that branch of the house
without male heirs. In 1879 William III had married a second time, and
had chosen Emma, Princess of Waldeck-Pyrmont, one of the smallest
German states. In 1880 a daughter, the present Queen Wilhelmina, was
born. As the king was aging rapidly and was not likely to have any
further issue, it became necessary to change the law of succession, in
order to prevent Holland's throne from coming into the hands of the
next male member of the House of Orange-Nassau, the Duke of Nassau,
who was practically a German prince, and, therefore, not acceptable to
Holland's people. In 1884 it was arranged that in case of lack of male
issue the succession in Holland should descend to direct female heirs.
When, therefore, William III died in 1890 his minor daughter became
queen under the regency of Queen Emma. Luxemburg, however, descended
to the Duke of Nassau, who, upon his death was succeeded by his son,
and upon the latter's death by his granddaughter, the present Grand
Duchess Marie Adelaide. Queen Wilhelmina, the idol of her people,
assumed the reins of government upon reaching her majority in 1898
after her mother's skillful regency of eight years. In 1901 she
married a German prince, Henry, Duke of Mecklenburg. This marriage was
blessed with one daughter, Princess Juliana, who is heir apparent to
the throne of Holland. Otherwise, though, it did not prove very happy,
and, therefore, did certainly not increase Dutch friendship for
Germany.
CHAPTER XI
SUMMARY OF POLITICAL HISTORY
From the preceding narration of the political histories of Europe's
nations during the last half century there stand out very clearly
two facts. All the bigger countries and even one or two of the
smaller ones displayed a strong desire for expansion and the
gratification of this desire resulted in a crude form of
international cooperation between various groups of nations, crude
because each separate nation at all times was guided primarily by
its own interests and demanded cooperation on the part of some other
nation or nations much more readily than it was willing to grant
cooperation to its ally or allies.
The motive of this desire for expansion, it is true, was in all cases
chiefly an economic need. But the very fact that the various efforts at
expansion, at least in their early stages, found almost always popular
approval, shows that there usually was a secondary motive, a desire for
aggrandizement. For it is very rare, indeed, that public opinion
possesses sufficient foresight to either appreciate or be guided by
economic necessities, while undertakings which can be made to appeal to
the sentiments of jealousy, of nationalism, and of rivalry, readily find
public support. The second of these--nationalism--especially was
reawakened and in many an instance grew into chauvinism, endangering
frequently the peace of the world. This, in a way, was very remarkable;
for hand in hand with the increase of nationalism went an increase of
internationalism to a degree that never before had been achieved in the
history of the world. Indeed, for a considerable period it looked as if
the world nations were rapidly approaching that happy state when war
would be unnecessary because a peaceful method of adjusting
international difficulties had been found and had been universally
adopted. Whether the Great War of 1914 has destroyed all that was
accomplished in the years preceding to make peace lasting, or whether it
was only one of the obstacles in the path of this revolutionary
undertaking, remains to be seen.
The international cooperation of which we have just spoken was, of
course, nothing new. For treaties have been signed and alliances
have been concluded between nations ever since they have been
developed far enough to be capable of definite, deliberate political
efforts. But never before have treaties and alliances been so
plentiful or gone so far, and only rarely have they resulted in such
a definite alignment of the European nations into two groups. The
inception of this policy the world owes to the great modern German
statesman, Bismarck. It was through his efforts that the Triple
Alliance was created soon after the Franco-Prussian War and after
the foundation of the new German Empire which chose as its
companions Austria-Hungary and Italy. That Bismarck built well then
is clearly shown by the wonderful progress that Germany especially
has been able to make since the Triple Alliance was founded and
insured European peace for a long period of years. But that either
he did not build well enough for all exigencies or else that his
successors were not as capable as he, is shown equally clearly by
the fact that at the most crucial moment in Germany's modern history
one member of the Triple Alliance, Italy, deserted. The second group
of European nations, in a way, was the logical result of the first,
for the latter, as it were, left high and dry on the sea of
international cooperation the three powerful countries of England,
France, and Russia. At the time of the formation of the Triple
Alliance France, of course, was disabled through its defeat by
Germany to such an extent that alliances were, at least temporarily,
out of the question. Its wonderfully quick recovery soon changed
that, however, and resulted in very definite efforts on the part of
French statesmen to form a defensive alliance which would insure
France from any aggressiveness on the part of the Triple Alliance.
This finally brought about the Franco-Russian Alliance. That Russia
was available then was due to the fact that Germany's old intimacy
with its eastern neighbor had received a serious setback when it
chose Austria as its ally. For, though Austria and Russia had once
been friends and for a short time even allies, conditions had
changed and in modern times the interests of the two countries had
become so conflicting that an alliance was entirely out of the
question.
After France and Russia had gotten together it was not long before
England found it necessary to choose between these two international
groups. That in spite of its close racial relation to the Germanic
countries it preferred the Gallo-Slavic combination, was due to a
number of reasons. In the first place it was found easier to adjust
whatever conflicts there were between England on the one side and
France and Russia on the other than those in existence between
England and Germany. In the second place English modern culture was
clearly more interested in and more influenced by French than by
German achievements. And last, but not least, an alliance between
Germany and England became impossible, because in such an alliance
neither country would have gracefully yielded the leadership to the
other, whereas in an Anglo-Franco-Russian concert all England had to
do was to signify its willingness to join and the leadership was
England's without question or contest. It was England, then, which
gave up its international isolation later than any of the others.
But it did not lose thereby; for just as its Franco-Russian alliance
assured to it cooperation against the Triple Alliance, if such
cooperation was needed, it secured to itself protection for its
immense Far Eastern interests by an alliance with the new world
power of the Far East, Japan.
The outbreak of the war of 1914, then, saw these two great groups of
nations: The Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy,
and the Quadruple Entente of England, France, Russia and Japan. To
foretell the result of the gigantic struggle in international
relations is obviously impossible. Its end may bring a revival of
internationalism on a greater scale than ever before, it may result
in a new and severe separatism, it may cause a rearrangement of the
present alliances or it may simply mean a return to the _status quo_
of August, 1914.
PART II--THE BALKANS
CHAPTER XII
THE BALKAN PEOPLES
While it is of course impossible to assign the causes of the Great
War to any one circumstance, there can be no doubt that at least one
of the chief causes may be found in that snarl of diplomatic
intrigues, whose setting has been the Balkans peninsula. There is
not a close student of European history and politics who has not
predicted the "Great European War." Indeed, it required no special
powers of prophecy to foresee that this constantly smoldering, and
sometimes blazing corner of Europe, would one day burst into a
sweeping conflagration. The chief cause of this constant turmoil and
conflict in the Balkans lay in its geographical relation to the
expansion plan of Austria and Germany and all the other European
states, the Balkans being the gate and roadway to the Orient. The
first essential to an understanding of the situation is a general
knowledge of the races and nations that inhabit this portion of the
European Continent.
As the reader of ancient history knows, it was within this territory
that the Macedon of Philip and Alexander was situated, their capital
being not far from the present city of Saloniki. Then came the great
eastern Roman Empire, which later developed into the Byzantine
Empire, whose inhabitants were the degenerated descendants of the
ancient Greeks. Western Rome was constantly threatened by the
northern barbarian tribes, so the Greek emperors of Byzantium were
in perpetual conflict with barbarian hordes that pressed down on
them from the north, more than once driving them within the walls of
their capital, the present Constantinople.
These northern barbarians were wild Slavic tribes which had come out
of the steppes of Russia and swept down the Balkan peninsula,
penetrating as far as Mt. Olympus itself. After them came a tribe of
Asiatic origin, the Volgars, so called because they had for a period
inhabited the banks of the Volga, and they first conquered and then
mixed with the Slavs who lived in that section which is now
Bulgaria.
And finally came the Moslem Turks, who first conquered Asia Minor
from the degenerated Greeks, then took Constantinople from them in
1453. After that the Turks swept up the entire Balkan peninsula,
conquering all except that little mountainous corner up against the
Adriatic, which is now Montenegro, and subjugating all the peoples,
Greeks and Slavs alike. Nor did the Turkish conquest stop here; it
swept onward, up into Europe, and was not definitely checked until
it had advanced as far as Vienna itself. Then the tide turned, and
little by little the Turks were driven back, until now they are on
the very verge of being forced across the Bosphorus. And as the
Turkish flood ebbed, the Balkan peoples gradually emerged, one after
another springing up into independent nationalities.
Now the two great forces that had been driving back the Turks during
the centuries were the Austrians and the Russians. And though these
two great Christian powers fought against the same enemy, there
gradually arose between them a bitter jealousy. Each was determined
that the Turk should be driven out of Europe, but each realized that
their two paths after the retreating Turk must soon converge in the
Balkan peninsula. Neither cared anything for the Christian peoples
who had been and were being oppressed by the Turks; that they were
freed from this oppression was merely incidental, though it was the
pretext for much of the warfare during this long period. But each of
these two great powers coveted the Balkan peninsula. To Austria
Saloniki would be an excellent seaport opening out on the
Mediterranean, for the Adriatic was dominated by Italy. Russia, on
her part, had her eyes on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, which
would offer her an opening into the Mediterranean, to which she had
no access at all. Added to that, the people of the Balkans were
Slavs, blood kindred of the Russians, and could speedily be made
into loyal subjects of the czar. Such was the situation which
gradually evolved; which became more and more acute as the Turks
retreated into the Balkan peninsula proper, across the Danube. And
the first of the two grim powers to lead the pursuit down into the
peninsula was Russia in 1877, when she hurled her armies over the
Danube to "liberate" the Bulgars. From then on the Balkan problem
demanded the most serious attention of European diplomats.
[Illustration: Balkan States Before the First Balkan War.]
But the Balkan peoples that emerged, as the Turkish flood receded,
were very different from those that had been engulfed four centuries
previously. The Greeks had accepted the conquest, they bent rather
than broke. Therefore the Turks had granted them special privileges.
Their church and its clergy were spared and even given full
spiritual authority over the other Christian peoples. But the Slavs
fought stubbornly, not giving way until all their leaders were
slain, and what culture they possessed was thoroughly wiped out. The
Bulgars suffered especially, because they dwelt in the less
mountainous regions of the peninsula. The Serbians could,
occasionally, take refuge in the mountains of Montenegro, where
their traditions and national spirit smoldered through the darker
periods.
Just how many there were of these various peoples in the Balkans
when Russia invaded the peninsula nearly forty years ago can only be
left to surmise. In no country in the world has the question of
population caused so much bitter dispute as in the Balkans. Because
of racial and national jealousies, census figures have been
deliberately padded and falsified by church and state alike. This is
especially true of that part of the peninsula (Thrace and Macedonia)
which was still under Turkish rule when the First Balkan War broke
out in 1912. Only in what were then Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria
proper were genuine census enumerations made.
Bulgaria claims to have had a population in 1910 of about 4,337,000,
this being increased by half a million after the two wars. Serbia
reported 2,900,000 in 1910, the new territory increasing this by
more than 1,500,000. In Greece the population was 2,730,000 before
the wars and then became 4,400,000. Little Montenegro contributed
another 800,000 Serbs. In Albania the population has been estimated
roughly at 800,000. Add all these figures together, and the result
is the total population of the Balkan peninsula proper, less that
which covers what was still Turkish territory when the present war
broke out.
It is in the proportionate numbers of the various races and
nationalities, however, that the greatest confusion and uncertainty
exists. Nowhere in the world is there such an intermingling of
various and differing peoples. Here official figures are especially
misleading, and should be considered only within the boundaries of
Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece as they were before the Balkan wars.
For the peninsula as a whole the testimony or the reports of
impartial foreigners who have traveled through the country is likely
to be far more trustworthy.
The consensus of opinion would indicate that along the seacoast the
Greeks predominate, and that they are also numerous in the large
towns and cities. In the interior they are not found much north of
Saloniki, and even in that city the majority of the population is
Jewish. As traders, as the business elements in the cities, however,
they are found even up in Varna and Bourgas in Bulgaria.
In the interior there can be no doubt that the Slavs are in the vast
majority over all the other peoples. The names of the smallest
villages, as indicated on Austrian maps, the most trustworthy that
have been made, are obviously Slavic. Down through Thrace, almost to
Constantinople, over to a few miles outside Saloniki, sweeping over
almost into the mountains of Albania, up to Montenegro, the people
are Slavic.
The Slavs, again, are subdivided into two families: Serbs and
Bulgars. And here it is more difficult to distinguish the dividing
line, for although there is a marked difference between the
characteristics of the two peoples, both physical and temperamental,
so nearly alike are their languages that speech forms no sure guide
to distinguishing, especially in Macedonia, where dialects vary with
a day's travel. The trend of popular feeling seems the only guide.
The main population west of the Struma and nearly up to Saloniki are
Serb, descendants of the Serbs, who were the inhabitants of the old
Serb Kingdom and Empire in that region. In Thrace and east of the
Struma the people are Bulgars.
Next to the Slavs in importance come the Turks, but these are nowhere
found in a solid mass; they are scattered all over the peninsula, and
even up into Bosnia and Herzegovina in Austria. Nowhere are they more
numerous than in northern Bulgaria, along the banks of the Danube, and
in the seaport cities on the Black Sea--Varna and Bourgas. The
Bulgarian census figures give their number as about half a million in
Bulgaria proper--about a seventh of the total population. Bulgaria,
though she suffered most from the oppression and fanatical outbursts
of the Turks in the old days, has always been the most tolerant.
Because of this there was comparatively little emigration of the
Turkish population after freedom gave the Christian majority control.
Serbia reports only about 14,000 in her territory, but this is
probably an underestimate. Down in Macedonia and southern Thrace the
Turkish element is naturally very strong, increasing in mass toward
Constantinople.
Of the minor race divisions the Albanians deserve first mention, not
only because of their number, but because of their being more
concentrated within a certain territory, which gives them some
political significance. Though they have certain fine primitive
qualities, they are not much higher in the scale of intelligence and
civilization than were our North American Indians in the early days
of our history. It is supposed that they are the direct descendants
of the ancient Illyrians; if this be so, they have certainly not
developed at all in the past two thousand years. The majority have
long since accepted the Mohammedan faith of the Turks, but they
differ markedly from the Turks in that they are rough in their
manners, less fanatical in matters of religion, though violently
prejudiced against all their Christian neighbors. Steady work of any
kind is their horror. As a fighting force they can give much
trouble, but they are not yet sufficiently developed to form a
nation.
Next to the Albanians come the Jews. These differ very much from the
Jews known to us in our American cities. They are the direct
descendants of the Jews who were driven out of Spain by Torquemada
during the Spanish Inquisition, and found refuge under the
protection of the sultan. They still speak a curious old obsolete
Spanish that can be understood by a Mexican or a Spaniard quite
easily. The special privileges and the life of comparative ease
which they enjoyed under Ottoman rule seems to have weakened them,
for among them are not found the men of marked ability in the fields
of art, science, and philosophy that may be found among the German
or the Russian Jews. In Bulgaria, where the Government has given
them equal rights with its Christian citizens, they number about
40,000, nearly all of them being engaged in small commercial
pursuits. Farther south they increase in number. In Saloniki, now a
Greek city, they form a huge majority of the total population--about
100,000 out of a mixed population of 175,000.
The Wallachs or Vlachs are another considerable portion of the
Balkan population, especially in the mountain regions. They are
generally considered as Rumanians, and have enjoyed the special
protection of the Rumanian diplomatic agents in Turkey, but they
differ somewhat from the Rumanians in Rumania proper. A gentle,
peaceful people, most of them are engaged in pastoral pursuits,
tending their flocks up in the mountains in the summer and coming
down into the lowlands in the winter. In some places they have
settled down to a civic life, as in Bersa, a town not far out of
Saloniki along the Monastir railroad, where the majority of the
population is Wallachian. It is said that their dialect is the
nearest approach to a survival of the ancient Latin of any spoken
tongue, from which it is deduced that they are the descendants of
the Roman colonists that were sent by Rome into this country when it
was under her rule.
Another scattered element are the Gypsies; they are especially
numerous in Bulgaria and Serbia. These people are the lowest in
their standard of living and culture of all the Balkan races. All of
them speak Turkish, but their natural tongue differs from any other
Balkan dialect. Among themselves they are known as "Copts," which
would rather indicate a comparatively recent Egyptian origin.
However, as they are absolutely of no significance, either
politically or in any other sense, they need not be considered
further.
Rumania, though not properly a Balkan State, has played some part in
Balkan politics. The Danube forms not only a political, but a
natural boundary, between Bulgaria and Rumania. Along either of
their respective banks the population is solidly Bulgarian or
Rumanian; there has been comparatively little mixing. Though Rumania
boasts of a distinct cultured class, and her larger cities,
especially Bucharest, present all the physical appearances of a
higher order of civilization, on account of the longer period of
independence enjoyed from the Turk, it is doubtful if the Rumanian
people as a whole possess the hardy qualities of the Serbians and
Bulgars. At any rate the level of education among the peasantry is
much lower. In race the Rumanians are of Latin blood with some
admixture of Slavic. As has been stated elsewhere, they extend as a
people up into Transylvania and Bukowina in Austria, and into the
Russian province of Bessarabia.
As will now be seen, the Slavs, including both Bulgars and Serbs,
form the predominating element in the Balkans. Yet, in spite of the
similarity between their speech, they differ strongly in
temperament, as has already been stated. Possibly it is because of
the mixture of Asiatic blood in the Bulgars. The Bulgar, slow,
heavy, inclined to be morose and suspicious of all strangers, does
not give so pleasant a first impression. The Serb is light-hearted,
inclined to be frivolous, and is much more adaptable. Give the
Bulgar a patch of ground and he will immediately plant vegetables;
the Serb will devote at least some of it to flowers. Then will come
the Greek trader and make a fatter profit out of the product of
their toil than either of them.
But what is of especial political significance, in considering these
various Balkan peoples, is the mutual distrust and hatred that
exists between them, sown and sedulously fostered by outside powers.
For had they been able to weld themselves into one people, one
nation, they would have been able to withstand the aggressive
intentions of both Austria and Russia, presented a solid front to
both those powers, and able to maintain the independence and peace
in the Balkans, and, very possibly, no great war at present.
The Turk is universally hated, but he is not despised. Except when
his fanaticism is aroused there is no better neighbor than the Turk,
he is courteous, tolerant in his quieter moments, and very much
inclined to be a good fellow in the disposal of his money. Moreover,
he is a hard fighter, and that quality always excites respect. Nor
is he at all underhand--he never makes a good spy.
The Greek, and more especially the Greek who lives on Turkish soil,
has not possessed these qualities. He has accepted and bent to the
Turk, and in his rôle of a willing slave, he has played a very
questionable part toward the other Christian peoples. However, there
is a political reason for his unpopularity.
On account of his acceptance of Turkish rule the Greek was allowed
special privileges. The Turks acknowledged the Greek Church as the
representative of all the Christian peoples under their rule. This
gave the patriarch of the Greek Church not only a spiritual but a
temporal authority over the Bulgars and the Serbs, as well as over
his own people, a power which was backed by Turkish troops.
Putting aside those frantic outbursts of barbarity against the
Christian inhabitants of his country, of which the Turk has
frequently been guilty, yet never has he been so oppressive as the
Greek patriarch. Given power over the Slav population, the patriarch
used it to its limit. Not only did he tax them oppressively to
support a church with which they had no sympathy, but he used all
efforts to stamp out every little spark of national feeling that had
survived the centuries of Turkish rule. He forced Greek teachers on
their children, and finally he made it a crime for any Slav to be
heard speaking his own tongue. It was the aim to make all Turkish
Christians into Greeks, and to attain this end no means was too
severe. Later, some years before the liberation of Bulgaria, the
sultan gave the Bulgars the right to establish a church of their
own. And then, when he could no longer employ Turkish troops to
force adherence to his church, the patriarch did not hesitate to
organize secret bands of terrorists to take their place. And this
policy was followed up until just before the First Balkan War, then
resumed with renewed ferocity afterward in the territory acquired
after the Second Balkan War.
Between the Serbs and the Bulgars the hatred may be very intense at
this present moment on account of the Second Balkan War and because
King Ferdinand, helped by Austria and Germany, has at last
accomplished his long-prepared ambition to crush Serbia. When Bulgar
meets Serb they naturally fraternize. The prejudice between them is
really artificial. It has been partly created and wholly fanned into
flame by the governing cliques for political reasons. In fact, it
may be said that all these hatreds would gradually die out were it
not for the artificial irritation that has been kept up by the
governing cliques of the respective states. The fact that they could
all combine against the Turks in the First Balkan War seems evidence
enough that union is not impossible, if only the various kings and
their supporters would suppress their personal ambitions and greed
and consider the welfare of their respective people as of the first
importance.
CHAPTER XIII
BULGARIA
The present war is the logical sequel of the successive scenes of
the drama enacted in the Balkan theatre. And though original causes
may be found still farther back in history, by beginning with the
liberation of Bulgaria, the whole story may be fairly well unfolded.
All students of Balkan history are fairly well agreed on the point
that the Treaty of Berlin is responsible for most of the troubles
that have come since.
At that time in 1877 Turkey still controlled all of the Balkan
Peninsula except Greece, including Bosnia, Herzegovina, and
Rumania. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, however, were only
nominally part of Turkey, since they were allowed to have their own
ruling princes and enjoyed almost complete independence. The Bulgars
were still governed by Turkish pashas, and were in no way allowed to
participate in their own government.
For many years there had been revolutionary activities among them,
whose aim was to prepare and stir up the peasants to active revolt
against the rule of the Turks. It was part of Russia's policy to
encourage these conspirators, for a strong revolutionary uprising
might always be the opportunity for intervention and ultimate
annexation.
In the spring of 1876 a slight uprising took place under the
leadership of some schoolmasters, some of whom had been educated in
Russia and had there imbibed the Panslavist idea: the ultimate union
of all Slavs under the autocracy of the czar.
At first the uprising attracted little attention; it had occurred
down in southern Rumania, not far from Philippopolis. Nor did its
suppression at first attract notice, until MacGhan, the American
correspondent of an English newspaper, went down to the scene of the
troubles and began sending in reports to his paper, and as the
European public read these descriptions in the British newspaper,
their indignation rose and presently swept all over Europe in a
storm of fury against the Turks.
These were what afterward became known as the Bulgarian atrocities.
The villagers of Batak had been preparing for some days to join the
insurrection when a force of bashi-bazouks, Turkish irregulars,
under the command of Achmet Agha and Mohammed Agha arrived at the
place. On the two Turkish leaders giving their word of honor that no
harm should come to them, the villagers surrendered. No sooner had
they laid down their arms than a general massacre of the whole
population began; not only the men, but women and children were
tortured, outraged, and hacked to pieces. When a British commission
appeared on the scene two months later to investigate, the little
village church was still piled up to the windows with the corpses of
those that had fled there for sanctuary. Skulls with gray hairs
still attached to them, tresses which had once adorned the heads of
young girls, and the rotting limbs of small children were mingled in
one gruesome heap. It is said that the Ottoman High Commissioner,
who was sent by the Turkish Government with the British commission
to investigate, on beholding this sight, turned to one of the
perpetrators who was present and asked him how much Russia had paid
him for a deed which, as he phrased it, would be "the beginning of
the end of the Ottoman Empire." The Turkish Government evidently did
not share this pessimistic view, for it decorated the two Turks who
had led the bashi-bazouks in the massacre.
It presently developed that Batak was not an isolated example. Mr.
Baring of the British commission estimated that the total number of
Bulgars slaughtered in that district during the month of May must
have been 12,000. In Batak 5,000 out of a population of 7,000 had
been killed.
Never was Europe more aroused. Mr. Gladstone's famous pamphlet,
denouncing the Turkish administration in its European provinces,
went through edition after edition. Lord Derby, on behalf of the
British Government, telegraphed that "any renewal of the outrages
would be more fatal to the Turkish Government than the loss of a
battle." Bulgaria, which had been forgotten for centuries, became a
household word. All over the world swept a fierce popular demand
that the Turk be immediately driven out of Europe.
Here was Russia's opportunity. In the face of this world-wide
popular sentiment the policy of the European powers, especially of
Austria, that Russia should not be allowed to acquire more Turkish
territory, could not very well be enforced. The Austrian diplomat
who would object to Russia hurrying to the aid of the outraged
Bulgars, her own blood kindred, would have been mobbed in his own
country. The hearts of people were so moved that they forgot the
dark intrigues of diplomats.
So in the following spring Russia declared war against Turkey, and
Rumania taking this opportunity to declare her complete
independence, sent an army into the field to aid the Russians. The
Bulgars, unorganized and untrained as they were, also gave what aid
they could, especially in the storming of Shipka Pass, through
which the invaders burst out into the plains of Thrace and advanced
triumphantly on to the gates of Constantinople. Then the Turks cried
for terms, and the famous Treaty of San Stefano, drawn up in the
small town by that name just outside the Turkish capital, was the
result.
By this treaty there would have been created the "Greater Bulgaria,"
of which the Bulgarians have been dreaming of and fighting for ever
since. The Bulgaria of the San Stefano Treaty would have cut the
European territories of the sultan in two, and thus effectively
dismembered the Ottoman Empire. In addition to a coast line on the
Black Sea extending a little farther north, and considerably farther
south than Bulgaria now possesses, she would have had a frontage on
the Ægean Sea. Practically all of Macedonia, over to the lakes of
Ochrida and Prespa, and down to near Saloniki, would have been
included; the Vardar and the Struma would have been Bulgarian
streams from their sources to their mouths.
But by this time the great popular indignation against the Turks had
spent itself and the diplomatic machinery of the powers began
revolving again. England, who had protested against the Bulgarian
atrocities strongest, was the first to veto the plan that was to
give all the Bulgarians their independence of Turkey. To Lord
Beaconsfield, Disraeli, himself one of a race which has suffered
oppression for centuries, and then prime minister of Great Britain,
belongs the honor of being the first diplomat to set in motion that
intervention by the powers which was to give the Bulgars of
Macedonia back into the hands of the Turks.
There was a conference of the powers in Berlin, and there it was
decided that the Treaty of San Stefano must be revised. The reason
was that it was feared that Bulgaria would become merely a Russian
province; that through Bulgaria Russia would all but have her hands
on the Bosphorus, the aim of all her ambitions. So the Treaty of San
Stefano was torn up and the Treaty of Berlin was substituted in its
place.
By this new document, which was in force practically up until the
First Balkan War, Bulgaria was created an "autonomous and tributary
principality under the suzerainty of his Imperial Majesty the
Sultan"; its limits were defined to be the Balkans on the south,
eastern Rumelia being thus excluded from it; the Danube on the
north, the Black Sea from just south of Mangalia to near Cape Emineh
on the east, and Serbia on the west from the point where the Timok
River joins the Danube to the point at which the two principalities
and Macedonia should meet. Thus were not only the Bulgars of eastern
Rumelia and Macedonia separated from their kinsmen in the new
principality, but the district of Pirot was handed over to Serbia,
who had participated in both wars of 1876 and of 1877-78. Austria's
share in the spoils was Bosnia and Herzegovina, though ostensibly
these two provinces were only to be under her temporary
administration. The Berlin Treaty also provided for certain reforms
of the Turkish Government in the Macedonian provinces, but as these
were never carried out, and were never expected to be carried out by
either the Turkish or European statesmen concerned, these
provisions, known as "Article XXIII of the Treaty of Berlin," need
not be described. This article was a mere sop thrown to whatever
might be left of that public opinion which had thundered through
Europe a year previously. Macedonia was handed back body and soul to
Turkey, to be done with as she pleased. Herein was the cause of all
the trouble that was to follow; one of the chief causes of the
present Great War.
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that Russia's motives had
been entirely or even largely altruistic. The powers had expressed
the fear that a greater Bulgaria would gradually become part of the
Russian Empire. There can be no doubt that Russia thought so too.
All her later actions point to that fact. The only mistake, and this
was shared by all who participated in the Treaty of Berlin alike,
was the assumption that Bulgaria herself would allow this to be
done. It only developed later what a stiff-necked people the Bulgars
could be.
Bulgaria, as Prince Bismarck expressed it, had been put into the
saddle. Her next task was to learn to ride. Under the rule of the
Turks there had been no opportunity to acquire political or
administrative experience; all the public offices had been filled by
Turks or Greeks. All the natural leaders of the people having been
killed off by Turks and Greeks alike for centuries, the Bulgars that
emerged into independence in 1878 were essentially a nation of
peasants. There were very few of them who could read or write; there
were no printed Bulgarian books. Small wonder if all Europe and
Russia thought that these people would not be able to govern
themselves.
Until the Government of the new little nation could be organized and
a ruler chosen, a Russian prince was left in the country, with a
Russian army to support him to maintain order. And he acted indeed
as though he were governing a Russian province. He gave the
Bulgarians a taste of what real Russian authority might be like, and
they did not like it. This was Russia's first mistake in her
capacity as guide through the first difficulties of self-government.
Eventually, however, a General Assembly was called, a constitution
drafted and the first ruler was selected. The choice fell on Prince
Alexander of Battenberg, a nephew of the Russian Czar Alexander II.
At the time of his election he was only twenty-two years of age, and
lived as a simple military officer in the barracks of Potsdam in
Germany. It is said that he asked the advice of Bismarck, when his
election first became known to him, as to whether he should accept,
and that Bismarck replied, "at least, a reign in Bulgaria will
always be a pleasant reminiscence." Bismarck was one of those who
had drafted the Treaty of Berlin and had no faith in the stability
of any possible government the Bulgars could organize for
themselves. On July 9, 1879, Prince Alexander took the oath to the
constitution at Tirnovo. A week later the Russian army of occupation
evacuated the country.
But if the Russian soldiers had left the country there were still
plenty of Russians left in Bulgaria. The president of the council,
the minister of war, the chief of police, the governor of Sofia, the
capital, and 300 superior officers in the Bulgarian army that was
presently organized, were all Russians. The Russian agent, M.
Hitrovo, cleverly worked on the national dread of Austria, and
tried to play the part of a British political resident at the court
of an Indian prince.
This continued until 1883, when suddenly Prince Alexander dismissed
all his Russian advisers, and Bulgarians were established in their
places. Naturally, Russia was enraged. By this time Alexander's
uncle, the Czar of Russia, had died, and Czar Alexander III, his
cousin, was now ruler of Russia.
One night not long after the dismissal of the Russian advisers two
Russian generals, Skobeleff and Kaulbars, arrived at the palace and
demanded an audience of the prince. The sentry refused them
admittance, and when they attempted to force their way past him the
soldier drew his side arm and threatened to strike them down. The
guard was called; a carriage which stood at the palace gates and
from which the two Russian generals had alighted was searched, and
evidence was discovered that the prince was to have been kidnapped
to the Danube, thence over into Russia. Proclamations announcing
Alexander's expulsion from Bulgaria, and the formation of a
provisional government under the two leading conspirators, proved
conclusively the complicity of Russia. Thanks to the support that he
received from the Bulgarian officers about him, Alexander was saved
and the plot was exposed to Russia's humiliation. Also, it showed
the Bulgars to what measures Russia would resort to force her will
upon them.
CHAPTER XIV
WAR WITH SERBIA
Meanwhile down in Eastern Rumelia the bitter disappointment caused
by the separation of the two Bulgarias by the Treaty of Berlin had
increased. On the morning of September 18, 1885, as Gavril Pasha,
the Turkish governor, was quietly sipping his coffee in his home in
Philippopolis a group of Bulgarian officers rushed in and took him
prisoner. The pasha yielded to superior force; without the shedding
of a drop of blood the revolutionists took possession. Union with
Bulgaria was proclaimed. Prince Alexander, fearing the international
complications that might follow, hesitated, but his Bulgarian
advisers insisted, so on September 20 he issued a proclamation
announcing himself as "Prince of North and South Bulgaria."
Naturally, in the commotion among the diplomats which followed, it
might be supposed that those who had drafted the Treaty of Berlin
would insist on its being observed, and that Russia would welcome
the Greater Bulgaria she had planned at San Stefano. But just the
contrary happened. England, now under the guidance of Gladstone,
threatened a naval demonstration before the Dardanelles if Turkey
interfered. Russia, on her part, was furious; she pressed Turkey to
march an army up into south Bulgaria. Turkey, however, had no desire
to be interviewed by the British ships.
Thus Russia and England had changed places in their attitude toward
Bulgaria. Both had realized that they had made a mistake seven years
previously; that Bulgaria herself would have a word to say as to
whether she was to become a Russian province. Having failed to
persuade Turkey to take military steps to bring Eastern Rumelia back
under her rule, Russia now turned to Serbia. Greece and Serbia were
also furious that Bulgaria should suddenly acquire territory without
their having a share in it, thus making her the biggest nation of
the Balkans. So Serbia and Russia intrigued together. The result was
that, like the proverbial bolt out of a clear sky, Serbia hurled a
declaration of war at Bulgaria and began marching her army across
the frontier toward Sofia.
The Bulgarian army was in Eastern Rumelia at the time, expecting
trouble from the Turks. When the news came that the Serbians were
attacking them from the rear, they began rushing up north. They
packed themselves into the box cars on the railroad like dried fish,
and they clung to the tops like insects. Meanwhile the people of
Belgrade toasted their sovereign, King Milan, as "King of Serbia and
Macedonia."
Three days later the Serbian army was well on the road over the
frontier toward the Bulgarian capital. Suddenly, at Slivnitza, a
small town just over the frontier, the Bulgars burst down on them.
At their head rushed a brigade of 3,000 Macedonian "brigands,"
natives of that territory that the Treaty of Berlin had cut off from
Bulgaria. With the Bulgarian army was also a corps of 6,000
Mohammedan volunteers who rushed into the battle with as much
enthusiasm as their Christian fellows. At that moment Bulgaria
reaped the benefits of the tolerance she had shown the Mohammedan
population during the seven years of her independence. They were now
good Bulgarian citizens.
The war with Serbia lasted just three days. At the end of that time
the Serbians were flying, a panic-stricken mob, back across the
frontier toward Belgrade, the Bulgars at their heels. At their head,
in the midst of the flying bullets, rode Prince Alexander. The war
was won in spite of the fact that all the Russian officers, acting
on secret instruction from home, had resigned on the day before the
battle.
The Bulgarian army had already advanced to and occupied Pirot, and
was preparing to continue on to Belgrade, when Count Khevenhüller,
the Austrian Minister to Serbia, arrived at Bulgarian headquarters
and informed Prince Alexander that if the Bulgarians continued their
advance the Serbians would be joined by Austrian troops. The prince
yielded to superior force, and in March, 1886, a treaty of peace was
signed at Bucharest. Serbia did not cede a single yard of territory,
nor did she pay one cent of indemnity. Not only Russia, but Austria,
was beginning to fear Bulgaria; neither wanted a really formidable
power in the Balkans. But at any rate the union with Eastern Rumelia
was accomplished and remained a fact.
Again Russian intrigue had failed; again Bulgaria had not only shown
her capacity for managing her own affairs, but she had also shown
that her soldiers could fight. All Europe was surprised. It was not
supposed that the army of this little nation, whose people only
eight years ago had been all slaves, could meet trained troops in
action.
Russia now made immediately another mistake in attributing her
humiliation to Prince Alexander, the good-natured boy who was
supposed to rule Bulgaria. She was now determined to be revenged on
him. Nor did the Russian agents wait long before taking action.
Peace had hardly been declared between Bulgaria and Serbia when they
began laying their plans.
A rumor having been spread that the Serbians were going to resume
their attack, all the troops were taken out of Sofia and sent away
toward the frontier. Then a regiment, on which the conspirators, the
Russian agents and some Bulgarian officers whom they had bribed,
felt they could count, was smuggled into the capital. At two o'clock
in the morning on August 21, 1886, the Bulgarian officers in the pay
of the conspirators rushed into the palace, forced the prince at the
point of a revolver to sign his own abdication, then kidnapped him
in a carriage, taking him off to the Danube, where he was put on
board of a boat under heavy guard and taken to Russia.
Meanwhile the conspirators, among whom was the metropolitan of the
Bulgarian Church, Clement, issued a proclamation establishing
themselves as the provisional government, and assuring the people
that it would have the hearty support of the "Little White Father"
in St. Petersburg.
This proclamation had hardly been launched when Stambuloff, the
Speaker of the National Assembly, issued another proclamation, in
his official capacity, in which he declared the metropolitan,
Clement, and the other known conspirators outlaws, and appealed to
the Bulgarian people to defend the independence of their Government.
And the people did rise to his support, all over the country, so
decidedly and with so much enthusiasm that the members of the
provisional government fled. Thereupon Stambuloff and two other
officials of the National Assembly assumed control of the Government
until the prince could be found. Telegrams were sent all over
Europe, and finally the Russian authorities were obliged to set the
prince free, whereupon he reappeared in Lemberg, whence he returned
to Bulgaria.
But the experience had apparently thoroughly frightened the prince.
On landing at Rustchuk on the Danube, he sent a telegram to the
czar, saying: "Russia gave me my crown; I am ready to return it to
her sovereign." So on September 7, in spite of the protests of
Stambuloff and the other members of the Government, he abdicated in
earnest and next day he left Bulgaria forever.
CHAPTER XV
WORK OF STAMBULOFF
A delegation was then sent wandering around Europe for another
sovereign, and after much difficulty the final choice fell on Prince
Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, whose mother, Princess Clementine,
was the granddaughter of King Louis Philippe, his father being an
Austrian nobleman of large means. On August 14, 1887, he took the
oath and was installed on the throne which he still occupies, though
now as king. He immediately did what made him ever afterward
bitterly hated by the Russian Government, namely, requested
Stambuloff, he who had uncovered Russia's latest intrigue and
conspiracy, to become prime minister, a post which he occupied for
the next seven years, constantly fighting Russian influence.
Stephen Stambuloff, the son of an innkeeper, born in 1854, and one
of the early revolutionary agitators among his own people, has often
been referred to as the "Bismarck of the Balkans." He was,
undoubtedly, the biggest statesman that the Balkans has yet
produced, unless time shall decide that Venizelos is another such as
he.
In the hands of Stambuloff Prince Ferdinand was nothing but a
puppet, and so he continued for some years, until he became
acquainted with the language, customs, and mental qualities of his
people. Then the two fell out. But to the end Stambuloff was the
real ruler, and under his guidance Bulgaria made that progress, both
in military organization and in education, which was the surprise of
the world when the First Balkan War broke out. It now dawned on
Russia that it was Bulgaria herself that was opposed to her
intrigues and not the princes who happened to occupy her throne. And
the leader of the Bulgarians was undoubtedly Stambuloff, a peasant
himself and the son of a peasant. His downfall must be brought
about.
From the very beginning of his reign Ferdinand had not been
recognized by the Russian Government. As he began to feel himself
more secure in his throne he began to work for this recognition, as
well as for the favor of all the reigning monarchs of Europe. With
this end in view he began intriguing, and as an intriguer, Ferdinand
is the cleverest of all the Balkan monarchs. Thus it was that he
finally dismissed Stambuloff from office on May 31, 1894, an act
which he found all the easier because Stambuloff had made many
enemies among his own people by his brusque, almost brutal, ways.
But in spite of the wave of unpopularity that happened to be
sweeping over him at the time, there could be no doubt that a man of
Stambuloff's abilities would again rise to power. Only one thing
could prevent that. And that one thing was brought to pass by his
enemies. In the evening of July 15, 1895, as he was driving home
from his club, three men sprang up on his carriage and literally
hacked him to pieces. Thus ended the comparatively short career of
the man who had most to do with defeating Russian intrigues in
Bulgaria. His murderers, though identified, were never arrested or
punished, and found safe refuge in Russia.
But for all that his enemies gained by his death, Stambuloff might
as well have continued to live. One of the strongest political
parties in Bulgaria is still named after him, and bases its appeal
on his policies. And ever after every Bulgarian who knows the short
history of his country has hated the Russian Government, though this
sentiment does not include the Russian people. In fact, nowhere in
all Europe have Russian political exiles found more secure refuge
than in Bulgaria, where they are received with hearty welcome, and
the abler ones of them offered Government employment. As an
instance: the national university in Sofia was founded by a Russian
scholar upon the invitation of the Bulgarian Government. Had this
same Russian scholar dared to cross over the Russian frontier he
would have been arrested immediately, and, if not hung, have been
sent into exile to Siberia. Again and again Russia has demanded that
certain notable refugees living in Bulgaria be delivered up to her,
but always Bulgaria has refused. The Bulgars love the Russian
people; they hate the Russian autocracy.
Meanwhile important events were developing down in Macedonia. The
people throughout this region, with the exception of the few Greeks
along the sea shores, had been bitterly disappointed by the Treaty
of Berlin, which delivered them back into the hands of the Turks. It
soon became obvious that even the reforms promised by the XXIII
Article of that document were to remain meaningless; the Turkish
Government did not even pretend to put them into effect.
During this period many young Macedonian peasant boys crossed the
frontier over into free Bulgaria, where the excellent schools being
established offered them opportunity to obtain an education that had
never before been available to Bulgars. These young fellows returned
to Macedonia unobtrusively and quietly by exerting their influence
on the peasants. At first they merely instructed them in reading and
writing; then they inaugurated evening gatherings where things of
the outside world were discussed. Two of the most prominent of these
young educators were Damyan Grueff and Gotze Deltcheff, now
worshipped by the common peasants as the martyr heroes of their
movement for freedom.
It was Grueff and Deltcheff who first gave these early efforts a
definite turn. They began organizing the villagers into societies
whose object was distinctly revolutionary. But during all their
careers neither of these two men advocated union with Bulgaria.
Later on, as will be shown, they became bitterly opposed to that
idea, as did all of their followers and disciples. They wanted to
create a program for their organization which should be acceptable
to all the people of Macedonia; Greeks, Serbs, Vlachs and even
Mohammedans, as well as Bulgars. So they preached the idea of
"Macedonia for the Macedonians;" Macedonia to be either an entirely
separate nation by itself, or an autonomous state, under Turkish
suzerainty.
Their organization had a more immediate purpose, however. And that
was to establish some sort of order in the midst of Turkish
anarchy. The trouble with the Turkish rule was not that it ruled too
much, but that it ruled too little. Brigands, both Mohammedan and
Christian, ranged the mountain regions, preying on the poor
peasants. Turkish troops made no special efforts to check them.
Turkish courts were so corrupt that justice was a joke. Though there
was a tendency on the part of the courts to favor their own people,
all other things being equal, still that was not the chief grievance
of the Macedonian peasants. The trouble was that the courts could
always be bought and a case always went against the poor man,
whether he was Christian or Mohammedan. And finally, in some
sections of Macedonia, especially down around Monastir, toward the
Greek frontier, the Greek Church was still enjoying the same
authority over Bulgar communities that it had once enjoyed up in
Bulgaria. To add to this trouble, the Greek patriarch was again
attempting to push his propaganda all over the country, employing
armed bands to terrorize the villagers into declaring themselves
Greeks. This, of course, was a campaign carried on in conjunction
with the Greek Government, which wished to Hellenize Macedonia
against the day when Turkey should be driven out, so that it could
lay claim to the country on the strength of "blood kindred."
Over and over again the Bulgar communities sent delegations to the
Turkish padisha complaining of these evils, but no measures were
ever taken to remedy them. The brigands continued unmolested, the
courts remained corrupt and as for curtailing the power of the Greek
Church, that was distinctly against the policy of the sultan. With
the Bulgars in overwhelming majority, he considered it wise to
confer his privileges on the fewer Greeks, thus to rouse a mutual
hatred between the two peoples, so they should not join together and
make common cause against him.
CHAPTER XVI
ATTEMPTS AT REFORM IN MACEDONIA
The first object of the organization which Grueff and Deltcheff set
about forming was to remedy this evil. In each village they
established a local committee, composed of the more intelligent
villagers, whose function it should be to take the place of the
Turkish courts. The members of these secret tribunals were elected
democratically by the villagers themselves. Later on they elected
local delegates to provincial committees, which acted as courts of
higher appeal, to which a defendant on trial might appeal should he
feel that local sentiment was prejudiced against him. Later on, when
these committees spread all over the country, yearly congresses were
held, the first of which drew up a constitution for what was nothing
less than a secret provisional government for the underground
republic of Macedonia. Such was the beginning and the first purposes
of the famous Macedonian Committee, so called because authority was
always vested in the hands of committees, rather than with
individuals, so strong was the democratic sentiment of the people.
The next thing was to get rid of the brigands. To accomplish that
the provincial committees organized and maintained armed bands,
which patrolled the mountains of the territory assigned to them.
Numbering all the way from ten men to fifty each, these bands
protected the villages from the bandits and even hunted them down.
And, naturally, when the terrorist bands of the Greek Church became
active, they were confronted by the armed bands of the committee.
It is notable that when the existence of the Macedonian Committee
and its small local armed forces first became known to the outside
world, it was not the Turkish Government which showed most
animosity. In fact, for a long time the Turks rather treated the
committee much as they had treated the brigands; that is, let them
alone, so long as they did not cross their path, and the committee
did not set out to molest the Turks.
It was the Greek Church, and the Greek and Serbian Governments that
became most excited. Both the Greeks and the Serbians had been
making every effort to arouse a "spirit of nationalism" of their own
brand among the Macedonians. The committee was distinctly going to
counteract their influence and efforts by arousing a spirit of
nationality among the Macedonians which was neither Serbian nor
Bulgarian nor Greek. And when the Bulgarian Government understood
this thoroughly it showed itself equally unfriendly. For Prince
Ferdinand and his clique dreamed of the Greater Bulgaria which they
should rule. They wanted no autonomous Macedonia; even less did they
want an independent Macedonia.
It was along in the later nineties that the Macedonian Committee
began assuming such proportions as to attract the attention of the
Balkan Governments. They began preparations for counteracting its
influence, even for its destruction. So they organized armed bands,
commanded by army officers "on furlough," or, in some cases, by the
very brigand chiefs whom the committee had driven out. These bands
were sent across the frontier to "arouse the national spirit" among
the peasants.
From the very first the Bulgarian bands fought the forces of the
committee as did the Greeks. Neither ever penetrated very far into
the country from their respective frontiers, for the peasants were
opposed to them and would not feed them, though they had plenty of
money and did succeed in bribing some. They did, however, do a great
deal of damage among the villages near the frontiers and, instead of
arousing any national spirit, only planted a deep hatred in the
hearts of the Macedonians for their respective governments. But of
the three forces, Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian, the Bulgars and
Greeks were by far the most ferocious. The Serbs were inclined to
fight fair, attacking only the committee's bands and such villages
as sheltered them. The Greeks and Bulgars knew no such restrictions.
They burned whole villages, massacred whole communities, including
women and children, and frequently outraged women. And wherever they
left their bloody marks behind, there they also left the official
seal of their master, rudely drawn on rocks or charred timbers--a
bishop's miter and cross.
Between the committee's armed forces and the propagandist bands sent
over by Prince Ferdinand's Government there were open hostilities.
The peasants complained to the committee that some of Ferdinand's
band leaders, those who had formerly been brigands, were beginning
to resort to their old practices, though now they described their
robberies as "contributions to the cause of the revolution." The
Macedonians fought Bulgars as bitterly and fiercely as they fought
Greeks and Serbs. For months a bloody war was waged in the mountain
forests of northern Macedonia. The committee's forces had the
support of the population. The invaders had the advantage of a
bigger supply of arms and ammunition, and that finally told. Little
by little the bands of the committee were driven back. And just at
that juncture an authority of the organization, the Executive
Committee, was betrayed by a Greek spy. These leaders, who had
charge of the organization's funds, were arrested and imprisoned.
Without funds the bands in the field were cut off from further
supplies of arms and ammunition, which had been supplied in large
part by illicit Greek and Turkish traders.
Only two leaders, and less than a hundred armed men, were left in
northern Macedonia to resist the further advance of the Bulgarian
propagandists.
In 1901 a Macedonian leader, whose headquarters were in Thrace and
in the country east of the Struma, of the name of Yani Sandanski,
who later became prominent in connection with the Young Turk
movement, kidnapped the American missionary, Miss Ellen Stone, and
held her for a ransom of $60,000. His desperate venture succeeded.
The ransom was paid, arms and ammunition were bought in large
quantities, and his committee was able to meet the Bulgarian
propagandists with stronger forces than ever in the country east of
the Struma. The committee had men in plenty.
The Miss Stone episode, however, had given the Macedonian situation
a great deal of publicity in the Bulgarian press, and the Bulgarian
public began protesting. Thousands of students in Bulgaria were
Macedonians; others were government officials. Thousands also were
prospering merchants. Popular demonstrations against Ferdinand's
policy were reported all over the country, and finally he was
compelled to withdraw his armed forces from Macedonia. Thus was his
first intrigue in that direction defeated.
It should be obvious by this time that the Macedonian Committee was
the key to the whole Balkan problem, in so far as it was an internal
problem at least. All the little states surrounding Macedonia wanted
to grab her, and Macedonia did not want to be grabbed by any of
them. In their selfish greed the governing cliques of all the little
states absolutely disregarded the will of the people of Macedonia.
In their efforts they were only reviving the old hatreds and
creating new ones. Little wonder that the Turks sat back and
refrained from interfering too actively. Meanwhile the people of
Europe, seeing that the Balkan Christians fought more among
themselves than they fought the Turks, believed they were only
barbarians, little dreaming that the fight was not so much between
Turk and Christian, as between Democracy and Imperialism; the
democracy of the Macedonians against the imperialistic ambitions of
the selfish little states around them. This point should be realized
and emphasized, for this fight culminated in the next big act of the
Balkan drama; the rise of Young Turkey.
If the little Balkan States were opposed to the Macedonian
Committee, for the very same reason Russia and Austria were opposed,
though to these two powers it was not so vital a matter. For the
present they, with the rest of Europe were maintaining the _status
quo_. For a number of years Russia had been busy in another quarter
in the Far East, and had not much thought to give to the Balkans.
Then came her defeat at the hands of the Japanese in 1905 and her
hopes of emerging on the open sea in that direction were effectually
doomed. Austria, too, was willing to defer the realization of her
ambitions, so long as Russia made no move. Yet both realized that
they must do battle for their interests in the Balkans.
In 1903 the Macedonian Committee, rendered desperate by the pressure
of the Greek, Bulgar, and Serbian propagandists, as well as by the
Turks, who were beginning to take more active measures against the
"comitlara," or "committee people," as they called the revolutionists,
precipitated an uprising in the Monastir district, under the
leadership of Damyan Grueff, Deltcheff having been killed by soldiers
some time previous. The object was not so much a successful revolution
as to create a crisis in the Balkan problem; to disturb the _status
quo_ of the European statesmen. For, as Grueff expressed it, "horror
with an end is better than horror without an end."
The uprising was suppressed with the customary Turkish severity,
though not with such atrocities as had occurred in Bulgaria
twenty-eight years previously. Nor did the burning of hundreds of
villages ruffle the European statesmen. A conference of the powers
was indeed called and an attempt made to institute such reforms as
had been contemplated by the XXIII Article of the Berlin Treaty,
which included foreign police officers, in command of the Turkish
police in Macedonia. Each of the powers did indeed send some
officers down there, but they had little more influence than so many
tourists. After the uprising the same old situation continued. The
Greek Church was now making desperate attempts to overrun Macedonia
with its terrorist bands and Ferdinand started another intrigue on
behalf of Bulgarian propaganda which came near proving more fatal to
the committee than any of the Greek attacks.
Ferdinand, through a young Macedonian who had been an officer in his
army and was now an active member of the committee, Boris Sarafoff,
began a propaganda of bribery within the organization itself. By
this means he hoped to work up a majority within the committee in
favor of annexation with Bulgaria.
At this juncture Yani Sandanski reappeared on the scene. Grueff had
recently been killed in a skirmish with soldiers. Sandanski sent one
of his men down into Sofia, where Sarafoff was conferring with
Ferdinand at the time, and had him shot down in the streets of the
capital. At the same time he sent an open message to Ferdinand,
warning the prince that if he continued his interference in
Macedonia's internal affairs, he would share the fate of Sarafoff.
That ended Ferdinand's second intrigue in Macedonia. Sandanski, who
was now the recognized leader of the Macedonian organization, was of
course outlawed in Bulgaria. But the time was presently to come when
Ferdinand would seek his friendship most humbly.
It must not be supposed that the Macedo-Slovenes, though they formed
an overpowering majority in the membership of the committee, were
the only ones who were discontented with the rule of Abdul Hamid.
The Vlachs of Macedonia stood solidly beside the Macedo-Slovenes. In
the beginning some Greeks, too, had joined, but as the Greek Church
excommunicated all who enrolled under the banner of the committee,
and, moreover, as excommunication meant certain assassination, those
few Greeks who really felt sympathy for the cause of a free
Macedonia found it expedient to remain quiet.
The Mohammedans, however, though they did belong to the ruling race
and had more reason to hold aloof than the Greeks, were by no means
solidly against the committee. Whole communities of them, too,
joined, or at least offered shelter and comfort to the armed bands
of the committee. The Albanians especially were sympathetic, and
great numbers of them were active in the work.
But the discontent of the Turks with the Government was more fully
represented in a movement of separate origin. Young Turkish men had
been going abroad to study in foreign universities for a generation
past and had begun imbibing advanced ideas. They returned and began
spreading those ideas among their followers at home. Finally they
too organized, and this was the beginning of the Young Turk party.
The Young Turks had aims that differed very little from those of the
committee. They wanted a constitutional Turkey, under which all the
subjects of the sultan should be allowed to enjoy equal rights,
regardless of creed or race. Many of them were, in fact, in favor of
a republic. It was not long before their leaders came in contact
with the leaders of the committee. And for some years they worked
quietly together. The Young Turks, it should be remembered, were
especially active in the army.
CHAPTER XVII
CRISIS IN TURKEY
Then, suddenly, in 1908, occurred what was probably the most
alarming event that had yet happened, from the point of view of
Austria and Russia. The sultan had decided to begin taking more
severe measures with the Young Turks, with the result that he
precipitated a crisis. Enver Bey and Niazi Bey, two of the Young
Turk leaders, openly revolted in Monastir and took to the near-by
mountains, calling on all Turkish subjects to support them. The
revolt spread rapidly. The Young Turks captured the city of Monastir
and then the garrison at Saloniki handed that city over to them. The
sultan, seeing that the whole army was against him, suddenly decided
to temporize and finally agreed to proclaim a constitution for
Turkey.
In November of 1908 elections were held for the new Parliament and
all the various nationalities were given an opportunity to send in
their deputies.
But Abdul Hamid was not going to accept the new régime without
another effort to regain his old control. The following winter,
after the Parliament had met, he gathered together his old
supporters and, having made sure that he could count on the loyalty
of the garrison in Constantinople, suddenly abolished all that he
had proclaimed and declared the old régime restored.
Then Mahmud Shevket Pasha, the military leader of the Young Turks,
established himself in Macedonia and called on all the people to
support him.
The events which followed will ever rank as among the most dramatic
and picturesque of recent Turkish history. First of all the fighting
bands of the committee, which had already laid down their arms,
reorganized again and came down from the mountains to join Shevket's
army. At their head marched Yani Sandanski, the leader of the
committee and the hated enemy of Prince Ferdinand. The comitajis,
however, were not the only ones to respond. When Shevket finally
began to march on the capital, he had in his army whole brigades of
Greeks, Jews, Vlachs as well as Turks and Bulgars.
When this army finally appeared outside the gates of Constantinople,
the sultan and his soldiers realized that all was lost, but it was
now too late to temporize again. A large force was sent in to disarm
the garrison and to drag Abdul Hamid off his throne. And at the very
head of that force, together with a hundred of his best men, marched
Yani Sandanski, the abductor of Miss Stone, the slayer of Prince
Ferdinand's chief conspirator in Macedonia, Boris Sarafoff, the
brigand chief who represented the people of Macedonia, but had been
outlawed in every Balkan State. What could be more symbolical of the
partnership between the Macedonia Committee and Young Turkey than
that Yani Sandanski should be one of those who were to drag Abdul
Hamid off his throne and send him a prisoner to Saloniki?
At that moment, and for some months after, it looked indeed as
though this union of previously antagonistic elements in European
Turkey would effectually balk all the intrigues, not only of the
little Balkan States, but of Austria and Russia as well. Nothing
could have been more disappointing to the tribe of diplomats than
this unexpected turn of events.
Undoubtedly most of the Young Turk leaders were sincere and really
wished to establish a new Ottoman Empire based on a broad
citizenship of all its peoples and the elimination of religious and
racial differences from politics. Many of them were out-and-out
Socialists, as was Yani Sandanski himself, who saw far-off visions
of a great European, if not a world, confederation which should
banish war entirely from the earth.
But unfortunately Young Turkey had a bigger task on its hands than
it could swing. The Mohammedans of Macedonia and Thrace had been won
over to its progressive ideas. But the people of Islam on the other
side of the Bosphorus had yet to be heard from. And when they did
make their voices heard, it was not in favor of recognizing the
giaours as their political equals.
Perhaps, even, if left to itself, Turkey, under the guidance of the
new and younger elements, might eventually have emerged triumphant
against the dark forces of fanaticism and reaction. But it was not
to have that opportunity. The solidarity of all the Turkish
subjects, especially in European Turkey, would be nothing less than
a calamity to all the Balkan States. There would be no "oppressed"
brothers to rescue, consequently no pretext for that territorial
expansion which they had all counted on to take place some day in
the future. There could be no Greater Hellas, a Byzantine Empire
reestablished, with Constantinople as its capital; there could be no
Greater Bulgaria, with Czar Ferdinand as its ruler. Russia, too,
when her opportunity came to take Constantinople, would come, not as
a liberator of the Macedonian Slavs, but as an invading enemy. And
Austria would find her pathway to Saloniki blocked by a stronger
Turkey than she had counted upon. All these powers were against the
success of Young Turkey. But they did not stand shoulder to shoulder
against it. Between the Balkan States and the two big powers was
another division of interest quite as deep. It was the rivalry of
the wolves and the bears.
The Young Turks' revolution may definitely be considered the first
jar to the _status quo_, as established by the Treaty of Berlin, to
be followed in quick succession by other similar shocks, which were
presently to culminate in its complete upset and the present war.
Turkey herself had broken the compact to remain quiescent, to stand
pat. With the exception of the union of Eastern Rumelia with
Bulgaria, there had been no changes during those twenty-nine years.
The next event in the chain happened almost immediately. Hardly had
the revolution in Turkey occurred when Austria, who had, by the
terms of the Berlin Treaty, been simply administrating the two
provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, annexed them without any
ceremony. In actual fact this was merely making theory conform to
the practical situation, but it put the Young Turks in an awkward
predicament. The old régime under Abdul Hamid would not have been
able to do more than accept, and that was what the Young Turks were
compelled to do, handicapped as they were by the confusion attending
their own affairs at home. But it roused the anger of the
conservative Turks, and they somehow attributed it to the new
régime.
And at almost the same moment, as though to increase the irritation,
Prince Ferdinand kicked over another theory--that his principality
was under the suzerainty of the sultan--and declared himself king,
or as he called himself, czar of the independent kingdom of the
Bulgars and of all Bulgars elsewhere. Practically it meant nothing
more than that he was making faces at the new régime in Turkey, but
it served the purpose of irritating the masses of Islam.
But if the act of Austria in annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina
irritated the Turks, it almost maddened the Serbians, who had no
cards to play in this little game of diplomacy just at that moment.
Serbia, like all her neighbors, had her dreams of empire; she
aspired not only to the possession of Macedonia, but to the
provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well, because of Serb
population. Their annexation by Austria meant to Serbia that there
could now be no rearrangement. And it meant, too, that Austria was
still determined to work her way south, down to Saloniki, when time
and opportunity were ripe. It was, in fact, as much of a threat to
Serbia as to the Turks.
Meanwhile the Young Turks continued with their attempt to establish
democracy in Constantinople. During the winter of 1908-9 the first
Parliament met. And naturally, the deputies representing the
backward and fanatical Mussulmans of Asia were in the majority, so
that in the very beginning it became obvious that democracy itself
was going to defeat its own ends. The reactionary elements, being in
a majority in the empire as a whole, it was only natural that their
representatives in the Parliament should be in a majority.
In the spring of 1910 there was a violent uprising of the more
fanatical Albanian tribes, who resisted the efforts of the new
Government to disarm the whole of the population, which was
undertaken as a first step toward establishing that law and order
which had never yet been known in the empire and which the committee
had organized to establish, within the limits of its own
communities, at least. The schools, too, were taken out of the hands
of the priests of the respective peoples and put under the control
of a Ministry of Education, and this roused bitter resentment on the
part of the Greeks, who, unlike the Serbs and Bulgars, are under the
complete domination of their church.
Under the influence of the reactionary elements that had gained
majority control through the Parliament, the old repressive measures
began gradually to be reestablished. To Sandanski and his colleagues
it soon became evident that their fond hopes of a truly democratic
Turkish Empire was not to be realized. It was not under a
constitutional Turkey that the Macedonians would be accorded civic
justice; that could only be accomplished through a Macedonia
enjoying home rule, whether as an independent state or under the
mere suzerainty of the sultan. This was the state of mind toward
which the Macedonians were tending when the next serious event began
developing.
CHAPTER XVIII
FORMATION OF THE BALKAN LEAGUE
Even to a school child it must have been obvious all along that the
solution of the whole Balkan trouble, from an internal point of
view, at least, lay in a union of all the peoples and the
establishment of one great nation, or federation of nations. Such a
power, capable of putting two million soldiers into the field, would
not only be able to push the Turk out of Europe, but it would be
such an obstacle to the aggressive ambitions of Russia and Austria
that either would think twice before attempting to overcome it by
force.
This solution had been suggested at various times by various Balkan
statesmen during the past twenty years, statesmen with broader
visions than most of their colleagues. Stambuloff had been one of
them. But such a union, or confederation, while it might prove of
great benefit to the general population, would mean a complete end
to the ambitions indulged in by the various Balkan monarchs and
their cliques. Each hoped to build a great empire which should
include all the rest as inferior possessions. Thus their selfish
ambitions stood in the way of the only feasible plan for a true
remedy for the political ills of the people.
But the new régime in Turkey seemed likely to put an end to their
imperial ambitions anyhow. The Young Turks were spending huge
amounts of money in equipping their army with modern guns and the
admission of Christians into the army was increasing its size too.
Within a few years Turkey would be in such a state of preparedness,
from a military point of view, as to make the task of driving her
out of Europe forever impossible. For each state had been building
up its army for years past with this ultimate end in view.
The time had come to act. It was now or never. The Balkan States
must bury their mutual jealousies, temporarily at least, and form a
temporary alliance with the object of defeating the Turks before it
should be too late. For the time being the spoils could be divided
equally. Later on each might find an opportunity to force
rearrangements. Such an alliance might temporarily suspend, but it
would not end, the individual ambitions of each governing clique.
The idea may not have presented itself so cynically to the man who
first conceived it, but that was the spirit in which it was later on
acceded to by the Governments of the states concerned.
It seems now to be generally conceded that it was the Prime Minister
of Greece, Eleutheorios Venizelos, to whom the credit belongs for
having initiated this new move. Of all the Balkan statesmen, not
omitting the monarchs, Venizelos stands out prominently not only as
the most able, but as being by far the most liberal and as possessed
of the broadest vision. Toleration has been the keynote to all his
utterances and actions. He seems to have been the one man of them
all who, without ceasing to be a Greek, has been able to rise above
the atmosphere of petty jealousy, greed, and hatred that pervades
the politics of the Balkan States, especially in their mutual
relations.
Though Italian by blood extraction, descendant of the old Dukes of
Athens, Venizelos is a Cretan by birth. Beginning his public career
in his native island as a "brigand" insurgent against Turkish power,
he finally became the leader of his people, being Prime Minister of
the Cretan Government in 1909.
In that year, shortly after the revolution of the Young Turks, there
had also been a revolution in Greece, though not of so progressive a
character. The "Military League," composed of the army officers, had
been organized and began to institute certain reforms that should
end the corruption and inefficiency that had been characteristic of
Greek politics. The members of the league being military men, were
also modest enough to realize their unfitness to undertake the task
unaided, so they called upon Venizelos to take charge, he being then
the cleanest Greek in politics. This task he assumed, as prime
minister, with such ability and effectiveness that he at once became
the most popular man in Greece. Among other things he undertook a
complete reorganization of the army under the supervision of foreign
officers.
In April of 1911 Venizelos, through a British journalist, sent an
unofficial note to the Bulgarian Government suggesting an alliance
against Turkey. Five months later negotiations were also commenced
with Serbia, where a Serbo-Bulgarian alliance was suggested. But for
a while nothing definite was done, until suddenly the bigger powers
began showing signs of action. Italy, the ally of Austria, declared
war on Turkey in September, 1911, with the avowed purpose of
possessing herself of Tripoli.
This hurried the Balkan States. In March, 1912, Serbia and Bulgaria
signed a treaty of alliance. In April Greece and Bulgaria signed a
similar treaty, and a fortnight later Serbia and Greece signed
another document which made the Balkan League complete, Montenegro
acting in agreement with Serbia.
According to the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement, should the Turks be
defeated, Bulgaria was to take the whole of the territory south and
east of the Rhodope Mountains and the Struma River, while Serbia was
to take that north of the Shar Mountains, including Old Serbia and
Kossovo. The rest, comprising all of Macedonia, was to be
established as an independent state. Should this, for any reason, be
impossible, a line was to be drawn from the point at which the
Bulgarian, Serbian, and Turkish frontiers met, a little northwest of
Kustendil, to Struga at the north end of Lake Ochrida, leaving
Kratovo, Veles, Monastir, and Ochrida to Bulgaria, all purely Slav
districts, while the Czar of Russia was to act as arbitrator with
regard to the rest of the region, including Kumanovo, Uskub,
Krushevo, and Dibra. To this was added a clause by which Bulgaria
agreed to send 200,000 men to the support of Serbia should Austria
threaten her.
The agreement with Greece did not definitely provide for her share,
but it was understood she should have Epirus in southern Albania,
Crete, what islands in the Ægean her naval forces might capture, and
a slice of the Ægean seacoast where the population was mostly Greek.
Montenegro was to have what she could take from the Turkish forces
in her vicinity. Albania was not mentioned, but it was understood
that Serbia was to obtain her outlet on the Adriatic.
The clause in the agreement between Serbia and Bulgaria, providing
for an independent Macedonia, is especially significant. It was
inserted for the special consideration of Sandanski and the other
Macedonian committee leaders.
Shortly after the committee had made common cause with the Young
Turks, an attempt had been made to assassinate Sandanski in
Saloniki. And although it did not succeed, the attempt did not serve
to warm the hearts of the Macedonians toward King Ferdinand. None
but he could have had any interest in Sandanski's death at that
time.
But by the summer of 1912 the Macedonians were pretty well
disillusioned regarding a constitutional Turkey. Many of the old
leaders had taken to the hills again, determined to take up the old
fight where they had left off. Even that fight seemed more hopeless
than ever, for the Turkish army was now being speedily reorganized
and rendered more effective, which meant that the pursuit of the
guerrilla bands would be more deadly than it had ever been under the
old régime.
How the knowledge of the clause providing for an independent
Macedonia was conveyed to them is not recorded, but that Sandanski
and his colleagues were approached by the Bulgarian agents cannot be
doubted. Certain it is that just before hostilities broke out the
blood feud between Ferdinand and Sandanski had been put aside, and
Sandanski, the slayer of Sarafoff, the outlawed bandit, walked
through the streets of Sofia unmolested. And when the war did
actually break out, Sandanski was leading some thousands of his
Macedonian comitajis against the Turks in the Razlog district, which
he conquered and turned over to the Bulgarian authorities when they
came there to establish a civil government.
The league, having been established, was now anxious to begin
operations as soon as possible, for the reason that beginning
hostilities against Turkey while she was still at war with Italy
would put the latter in the position of being their ally. But that
was just a position in which Italy, as an ally of Austria, did not
wish to find herself. So when it became evident that the Balkan
league had been formed and meant to take action, Italy and Turkey
both hastened to arrange terms of peace, the former to save herself
from an awkward situation, the latter so that she might give her
full attention to the new danger.
CHAPTER XIX
FIRST AND SECOND BALKAN WARS
The war finally broke out on September 30, 1912, precipitated by
Montenegro before the other members of the league were quite ready.
The wonderful victories of the Serbian and Bulgarian armies were the
surprise and wonder of the world at the time. The Bulgarians were
victorious at Lule Burges, and the Serbians at Kumanovo. The Greeks
advanced as far as Saloniki, while their fleet bottled up the ships
of the Turks in the Dardanelles. Finally the Bulgarians swept the
Turks in Thrace into Constantinople and were battering down the
gates of the capital itself. The Serbians marched an army over the
mountains to Durazzo on the Adriatic, and the Montenegrins took
Scutari. And by the following spring Turkey was suing for peace,
which was finally brought about by the Treaty of London on May 30,
1913.
But the very success of the Balkan allies opened up new dangers of
deep gravity. And now Austria, who had not quite dared to attack
Serbia during the hostilities, saw an opportunity whereby she might
defeat the league by opening up the dangers engendered by their very
success. Had it not been for her intrigues there would have been no
Second Balkan War. But she hated Serbia and was already determined
on her destruction.
Largely because of the determined stand taken by Austria in the
London conference, Albania was made an independent principality,
Serbia was denied her longed-for outlet on the Adriatic, Greece was
deprived of Epirus, and Montenegro had to give up Scutari, the
taking of which cost her so much blood.
Now it had also happened that the operations of the various armies
of the Balkan allies had been in territories different from what had
at first been anticipated. The Turks had put up their main fight
down in Thrace, leaving the greater area of Macedonia comparatively
undefended. Thus the Bulgarians, while doing the heaviest fighting,
had been concentrated in a small territory, hammering away at the
main forces of the Turks, while the Serbian and Greek armies had
been able to overrun much larger territories with comparative ease.
Thus Bulgaria, though she had done most of the fighting and had lost
the heaviest, occupied only a broad pathway from her own southern
frontier, down through Thrace to Constantinople, while Serbia
occupied most of Macedonia, and Greece was in possession of
Saloniki.
Greece and Serbia, and especially Serbia, having been cheated of
most of the territory they had counted on annexing by the Treaty of
London, now demanded a revision of the treaties by which they had
gone into the war. Moreover, the Treaty of London confirmed them in
the possession of the territory they now occupied.
The bitterest feelings were at once rekindled. Both sides had
grievances. Serbia maintained that at the conference in London
Bulgaria had failed to back up her claim for Albania. Therefore she
was entitled to compensation in Macedonia. Bulgaria asserted that
Macedonia was inhabited by Bulgars who did not wish to become
Serbian subjects.
[Illustration: Balkans After the Second Balkan War.]
At this juncture Austria again appeared on the scene and whispered
in Bulgaria's ear that she should take what she wanted by force of
arms; was not her army equal to the armies of Greece and Serbia
combined? Meanwhile she, Austria, would see that there was no
intervention from the outside. This was one motive that drove
Bulgaria into the Second Balkan War.
For the past generation Macedonian boys had been coming up into
Bulgaria. Many had gone back to Macedonia, but the majority had
remained and settled in Bulgaria. Hundreds of them had entered the
army and many of them had acquired high rank. Others, again, had
entered the Government service, and dozens had been sent to the
National Assembly by Bulgarian constituencies. And several, among
them Ghenadieff, had become ministers in the cabinet.
To a still greater extent Macedonians have poured into Serbia.
During the past hundred years, ever since the pashalic of Belgrade
became free from the Turks, thousands of Macedonians have come up
into Serbia for education and a life. They entered the army,
Parliament, and every department of state, in large numbers, they
became educationalists and swelled the ranks of commerce. Among the
members of the Serb Cabinet during this war born in Macedonia are:
the Prime Minister Nikola Pashich, from Tetovo; Dr. Lazar Patchou,
Minister of Finance, from Monastir; Nicola Stefanovich, Cabinet
Minister at the war's outbreak, from Navrovo; Kosta Stoyanovich,
former Minister of Commerce, from Monastir; General Dimitriye
Tzintzar-Markovich, from Ochrida; General Lazar Lazarevich, from
Moskopolye, Monastir; former Prime Minister Milan Christich, the
Serb Minister Plenipotentiary in Rome; Michael Ristich; former Prime
Minister Dr. Vladam Georgevich; Svetolick Popovich, from Uskub;
Under-Secretary of State for Public Works, Petar Popovich, from
Prilep; Head of Public Works, Professor Lazarevich, from Ghevgheli;
Professor Alexich, from Kumanovo; General Lazar Petrovich, from
Bashino Selo; Veles, and many others. The names of the distinguished
and prominent Macedonians in army, state, and education services,
and those in trade and other useful occupations in Serbia fill a
considerable space in the Post Office Directory.
The ambition of the Coburg King Ferdinand, since his coming to
Bulgaria, has steadily aimed at the conquest and annexation of
neighboring countries with the view of forming for himself an
extended state. In this idea Bulgaria has been developed by him on
lines _de facto_ tending toward creating rather a feudal domain than
a free, modern constitutional state. He encouraged a large number of
political parties which could be easily played one against another,
duplicating somewhat the Hapsburg principle as applied in the
Austrian system of counterbalancing the various nationalities; the
educational system was not developed to the extent nor along lines
to produce a truly free and powerful people evidenced by the large
number of young men and women students finding it necessary to go
for higher education to the American Roberts College at
Constantinople.
Ferdinand, always supported by Austria, with whom he has always been
in secret alliance, has devoted large sums to anti-Serb and
anti-Greek propaganda in Bulgaria, Macedonia, and throughout the
world, preparing for the day when his designs of conquest could be
carried into effect.
As the First Balkan War drew to a finish, when King Ferdinand's grip
had hardly closed on the golden prize of that war, Adrianople, which
the Serbs helped their Bulgar brothers to conquer, and whose Turkish
commander and his staff, as fate decreed, were actually captured by
the Serbs and handed over by them to the Bulgarians, Ferdinand
turned his army westward to attack the Serbs, leaving Adrianople and
Thracia, rich territory which the Bulgars had just reconquered at
such cost of blood and which was confirmed to Bulgaria by the Treaty
of London, to fall back unprotected into the hands of the Turks.
On the night of June 29, 1913, without any declaration of war, the
Bulgarian army suddenly attacked the Serbians and Greeks all along
the line, over 250 miles in length. Apparently General Savoff, the
Bulgarian commander, had taken the initiative upon himself, for all
that night and the next day the Government in Sofia kept sending
telegrams ordering the operations to cease.
All through July the fighting continued, and the battles were far
more bloody than those that had been fought with the Turks in the
first war. In the south the Bulgarians were decidedly beaten, but
this was because they had counted on holding the Greeks back with
only 70,000 men.
The main fighting was on the Bregalnitza River, between the Serbians
and the Bulgarians. Here the Bulgarians also suffered a reverse. And
the Serbians were suffering losses that they could less afford than
the Bulgarians. Whether the Bulgarians might eventually have won
out, as their lines were contracted and the Greeks were drawn away
from their base at Saloniki, was a military question that was not to
be decided. For at this juncture Rumania took unexpected action. She
suddenly on July 10 began an invasion of Bulgaria from the north,
and by the end of the month her cavalry screens were within twenty
miles of the Bulgarian capital. The Turks, too, had recrossed the
frontier and were once more in possession of Adrianople, which the
small Bulgarian garrison surrendered without resistance. Literally
the armies of all her neighbors were invading Bulgaria. Further
resistance was useless. On July 31, after just one month of
fighting, an armistice was signed, and representatives from all the
belligerents met in Bucharest to negotiate terms of peace. On August
10 the Treaty of Bucharest was finally signed.
As a result of the Second Balkan War Bulgaria was left in a much
worse position than she was in after the first war. First of all she
had to give a slice of her Danubian territory to Rumania, as her
price for entering the war. Then she had to return part of Thrace,
including Adrianople, to the Turks. Serbia retained southeastern
Macedonia, and Greece kept Saloniki and its hinterland for fifty
miles inward, including Kavala, the natural economic outlet for
Bulgaria on the Ægean.
PART III--DIRECT CAUSES OF THE WAR
CHAPTER XX
ASSASSINATION OF FRANZ FERDINAND--AUSTRIA'S ULTIMATUM
It was the boast of the greater European powers, during the Balkan
Wars of 1912 and 1913, and after, that the "conflagration in the
Balkans had been localized"--i.e., that none of the western nations
would be involved in the complications growing out of the trouble in
the Balkans. The conflagration in the mountainous peninsula had been
"localized," it was true; but the smouldering fire that remained
after the Balkan Wars was to flare forth, during the summer of 1914,
to spread over Europe from the Shetland Islands to Crete in one
grand flame, and to drop sparks on the remaining four continents.
That smouldering fire was the doctrine known as Greater Serbianism,
sometimes wrongly spoken of as Pan-Serbianism.
As during the nineteenth century one after another the Balkan States
gained independence from Turkish sovereignty and the germ of what is
called Nationalism was born in them, each looked about to see in
what direction its boundaries might be extended. The appetite of
Nationalism, with these small states as with the greater countries,
demanded that under the flag of a given nation must be gathered all
the peoples of that nation; if some of them dwell in foreign lands
those lands must be conquered; if foreigners live within the borders
of the country those foreigners must be "ironed out"--the crushing
machinery of despotic government must be brought into use to force
them to adopt the language, literature, traditions, and religion of
the nation which considered them alien. And the appetite of
Nationalism demanded one thing more--that the political boundaries
of a nation conform with the "natural boundaries" as they seemed to
be delimited by mountains, rivers, and coasts.
The kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro had shown symptoms of
Nationalism long before the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913; when they
emerged from those wars with their territories almost doubled the
idea took even greater hold on them. As Turkish sovereignty and
influence became less feared, Austrian dominance replaced them.
Austria did nothing to allay this fear; she stood as a Teutonic
bulwark between a growing Slavic menace (in Serbia and Montenegro)
on the south and the already formidable Slavic menace (Russia) on
the east. In her provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were
transformed from protectorates to integral parts of the Austrian
Empire in 1908, there dwelt thousands of peasants who were of
Serbian nationality; in more concise terms they were of the same
racial stock as the Serbians. After Serbian prestige rose as a
result of the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 these Serbian subjects of
Austria desired more than ever to be a part of the Slav kingdom;
this desire was shared by the leading factions in Serbia itself; the
doctrine of "Greater Serbia" demanded that the aims of the desire be
materialized. Besides, the "natural boundaries" of Serbia seemed to
take in the greater part, if not all, of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for
they stretched along the eastern shores of the Adriatic and shut
Serbia and Montenegro off from that sea.
Propaganda began to spread throughout Serbia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina, reminding the Serbs in all three places that they must
work to bring themselves under one government, and that government
their own; they were urged to keep up their efforts to standardize
their religion, their speech, their traditions; they were called
upon, by this same propaganda, to substitute Austria for Turkey as
the object of national Serbian hate.
But Austria, too, had the disease of Nationalism, and she had been
engaged since 1908 in "ironing out" the Serbs within her borders.
Thus great friction was engendered, and when, on June 28, 1914, the
Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the crown prince and his morganatic wife
visited the Bosnian city of Sarajevo, they and the officials of the
city and province knew that the lives of the pair were in danger
from Serbian intrigue.
The archduke had gone to Bosnia on his first visit to take charge of
military maneuvers there, and before he left the Austrian capital
the Serbian minister had expressed doubt as to the wisdom of the
visit, telling the court that the Serbian population in Bosnia might
make unfavorable demonstrations. The fears of the Serbian minister
proved to be well founded; Sarajevo displayed many Serbian flags on
the day of his arrival. The archduke's party, in automobiles,
proceeded to the Town Hall after leaving the railway station,
passing through crowded streets. The city officials were gathered at
the Town Hall to give him an official welcome. A bomb, hurled from a
roof, fell into the archduke's car; he caught it and threw it to the
pavement, where it exploded, doing no damage to either him or his
wife, but injuring two adjutants in the car following. One
Gabrinovics, a Serbian from Trebinje, was arrested as the assailant.
The archduke proceeded to the Town Hall, and after berating the city
officials listened to the speeches of welcome. As he and his wife
were departing a Serbian student, named Prinzip, who was later
arrested, rushed out from the crowd and fired point-blank at the
couple with a revolver. Both were hit a number of times and died
some hours later from their wounds.
Great excitement immediately prevailed in Sofia and Vienna, and in
Berlin and St. Petersburg to a lesser degree. What retribution would
Austria demand? The Austrian press openly avowed that the plot on
the archduke's life had been hatched in official circles in Serbia,
and the Austrian Government made no attempt to suppress these
statements. One hour after the tragedy had taken place it had
assumed an official and international complexion.
A punitive war against Serbia was immediately urged in Vienna. On
June 29, 1914, anti-Serbian riots broke out in Bosnia, Sarajevo was
put under martial law, and the bodies of the assassinated couple
began the mournful journey to Vienna. On July 2, 1914, Prinzip
confessed that he had apprised the Pan-Serbian Union of his attempt
to kill the archduke, and on the same day the first intimation came
that the matter was considered a serious one in Germany--the kaiser
became "diplomatically ill." Then, for twenty days there was an
outward calm in the capitals of Europe, but behind the scenes the
diplomats were at work; the great question was how far Russia would
go in defending her Slavic sister state against the impending
demands of Austria.
These demands were made public in a note which Austria sent to
Serbia on July 23, 1914. Serbia was given till 6 p. m., July 25,
1914, to comply with the ultimatum, which read as follows:
"On March 31, 1909, the Royal Serbian Minister in Vienna, on the
instructions of the Serbian Government, made the following
statements to the Imperial and Royal Government:
"'Serbia recognizes that the _fait accompli_ regarding Bosnia has
not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the
decisions that the powers will take in conformity with Article XXV
of the Treaty of Berlin. At the same time that Serbia submits to the
advice of the powers she undertakes to renounce the attitude of
protest and opposition which she has adopted since October last. She
undertakes on the other hand to modify the direction of her policy
with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good
neighborly terms with the latter.'
"The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events
on June 28 last, have shown the existence in Serbia of subversive
movement with the object of detaching a part of Austria-Hungary from
the monarchy. The movement which had its birth under the eyes of the
Serbian Government, has had consequences on both sides of the
Serbian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of
outrages and murders.
"Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the
declaration of March 31, 1909, the Royal Serbian Government has done
nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal
machinations of various societies and associations, and has
tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the press, apologies
for the perpetrators of outrage and the participation of officers
and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an
unwholesome propaganda in public instruction. In short, it has
permitted all the manifestations which have incited the Serbian
population to hatred of the monarchy and contempt of its
institutions.
"This culpable tolerance of the Royal Serbian Government had not
ceased at the moment when the events of June 28 last proved its
fatal consequences to the whole world.
"It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal
perpetrators of the outrage of June 28 that the Sarajevo
assassinations were hatched in Belgrade, that the arms and
explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to
them by Serbian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna
Obrava, and, finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals
and their arms was organized and effected by the chiefs of the
Serbian Frontier Service.
"The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investigation do not
permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the
attitude of expectant forbearance which it has maintained for years
in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade and thence
propagated in the territories of the monarchy. These results, on the
contrary, impose on it the duty of putting an end to intrigues which
form a perpetual menace to the tranquility of the monarchy.
"To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government sees itself
compelled to demand from the Serbian Government a formal assurance
that it condemns this dangerous propaganda against the monarchy and
the territories belonging to it, and that the Royal Serbian
Government shall no longer permit these machinations and this
criminal and perverse propaganda.
"In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal
Serbian Government shall publish on the front page of its official
journal for July 26 the following declaration:
"'The Royal Government of Serbia condemns the propaganda directed
against Austria-Hungary, i. e., the ensemble of tendencies of which
the final aim is to detach from Austro-Hungarian monarchy
territories belonging to it, and it sincerely deplores the fatal
consequences of these criminal proceedings.
"'The Royal Government regrets that Serbian officers and
functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and
thus compromised the good, neighborly relations to which the Royal
Government was solemnly pledged by its declaration of March 31,
1909. The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all
idea of interfering or attempt to interfere with the destinies of
the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, considers
it its duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the
whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward it will proceed
with the utmost rigor against persons who may be guilty of such
machinations, which it will use all its efforts to anticipate and
suppress.'
"The Royal Serbian Government further undertakes:
"1. To suppress any publications which incite to hatred and contempt
of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and the general tendency of which
is directed against its territorial integrity.
"2. To dissolve immediately the society styled Narodna Obrava, to
confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same
manner against other societies and their branches which are addicted
to propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The Royal
Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the
societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another
name and form.
"3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia,
not only as regards the teaching body, but also as regards the
methods of instruction, everything that serves or might serve to
foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary.
"4. To remove from the military service and from the Administration
in general all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda
against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, whose names and deeds the
Austro-Hungarian Government reserves to itself the right of
communicating to the Royal Government.
"5. To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the
Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the subversive
movement directed against the territorial integrity of the
monarchy.
"6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot
of June 28 who are on Serbian territory. Delegates of the
Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation
relating thereto.
"7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch
and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Serbian state
employee, who have been compromised by the results of the
magisterial inquiry at Sarajevo.
"8. To prevent by effective measures the cooperation of the Serbian
authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the
frontier, and to dismiss and punish severely officials of the
frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica guilty of having assisted
the perpetrators of the Sarajevo crime by facilitating the passage
of the frontier for them.
"9. To furnish the Austro-Hungarian Government with explanations
regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Serbian officials, both
in Serbia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position,
did not hesitate after the crime of June 28 to express themselves in
interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government,
and finally;
"10. To notify the Austro-Hungarian Government without delay of the
execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.
"The Austro-Hungarian Government expects the reply of the Serbian
Government at the latest by six o'clock on Saturday evening, July
26, 1914."
[Illustration: Austria, 1815-1914.]
CHAPTER XXI
SERBIA'S REPLY
Because this note was so specific in its demands it is best to give
in full the Serbian reply to it, which was issued within the period
set by the Austro-Hungarian note. The Serbian answer in full was as
follows:
"The Royal Serbian Government has received the communication of the
Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government, and it is persuaded
that its reply will remove all misunderstanding tending to threaten
or to prejudice the friendly and neighborly relations between the
Austro-Hungarian monarchy and the kingdom of Serbia.
"The Royal Government is aware that the protests made both at the
tribune of the National Skupshtina (the Serbian legislative body)
and in the declarations and the acts of responsible representatives
of the state--protests which were cut short by the declaration of
the Serbian Government made on March 18--have not been renewed
toward the great neighboring monarchy on any occasion and that since
this time, both on the part of the Royal Governments which have
followed on one another, and on the part of their organs, no attempt
has been made with the purpose of changing the political and
judicial state of things in this respect.
"The Imperial and Royal Government has made no representations save
concerning a scholastic book regarding which the Imperial and Royal
Government has received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Serbia
has repeatedly given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during
the Balkan crises, and it is thanks to Serbia and the sacrifice she
made exclusively in the interest of the peace of Europe that this
peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held
responsible for manifestations of a private nature, such as newspaper
articles and the peaceful work of societies--manifestations which
occur in almost all countries as a matter of course, and which, as a
general rule, escape official control--all the less in that the Royal
Government when solving a whole series of questions which came up
between Serbia and Austria-Hungary has displayed a great readiness to
treat prevenance, and in this way succeeded in settling the greater
number to the advantage of the progress of the two neighboring
countries.
"It is for this reason that the Royal Government has been painfully
surprised by the statements according to which persons of the
Kingdom of Serbia are said to have taken part in the preparation of
the outrage committed at Sarajevo. It expected that it would be
invited to collaborate in the investigation of everything bearing on
this crime, and it was ready to prove by its actions its entire
correctness to take steps against all persons with regard to whom
communications had been made to it, thus acquiescing in the desire
of the Imperial and Royal Government.
"The Royal Government is disposed to hand over to the courts any
Serbian subject, without regard to his situation and rank, for whose
complicity in the crime of Sarajevo it shall have been furnished
with proofs, and especially it engages itself to have published on
the front page of the official journal of July 13-26 the following
announcement:
"'The Royal Serbian Government condemns all propaganda directed
against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all tendencies as a whole
of which the ultimate object is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian
monarchy territories which form part of it, and it sincerely
deplores the fatal consequences of these criminal actions. The Royal
Government regrets that Serbian officers and officials should,
according to the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government,
have participated in the above-mentioned propaganda, thereby
compromising the good neighborly relations to which the Royal
Government solemnly pledged itself by its declaration of March 31,
1909. The Government, which disapproves and repudiates any idea or
attempt to interfere in the destinies of the inhabitants of any part
of Austria-Hungary whatsoever, considers it its duty to utter a
formal warning to the officers, the officials, and the whole
population of the kingdom that henceforth it will proceed with the
utmost rigor against persons who render themselves guilty of such
actions, which it will use all its force to prevent and repress.'
"This announcement shall be brought to the cognizance of the Royal
army by an order of the day issued in the name of his Majesty the
King by H. R. H. the Crown Prince Alexander, and shall be published
in the next official bulletin of the army.
"1. The Royal Government engages itself, furthermore, to lay before
the next meeting of the Skupshtina an amendment to the press law,
punishing in the severest manner incitements to hate and contempt of
the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and also all publications of which
the general tendency is directed against the territorial integrity
of the monarchy. It undertakes at the forthcoming revision of the
constitution to introduce an amendment whereby the above
publications may be confiscated, which is at present forbidden by
the terms of Article XXII of the constitution.
"2. The Government does not possess any proof, nor does the note of
the Imperial and Royal Government furnish such, that the Society
Narodna Obrana and other similar societies have up to the present
committed any criminal acts of this kind through the instrumentality
of one of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will
accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government and will
dissolve the Narodna Obrana Society and any other society which
shall agitate against Austria-Hungary.
"3. The Royal Serbian Government engages itself to eliminate without
delay for public instruction in Serbia everything which aids or
might aid in fomenting the propaganda against Austria-Hungary when
the Imperial and Royal Government furnishes facts and proofs of this
propaganda.
"4. The Royal Government also agrees to remove from the military
service (all persons) whom the judicial inquiry proves to have been
guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of
the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and it expects the Imperial and Royal
Government to communicate at an ulterior date the names and the
deeds of these officers and officials for the purposes of the
proceedings which will have to be taken.
"5. The Royal Government must confess that it is not quite clear as
to the sense and object of the demands of the Imperial and Royal
Government that Serbia should undertake to accept on her territory
the collaboration of delegates of the Imperial and Royal Government,
but it declares that it will admit whatever collaboration which may
be in accord with the principles of international law and criminal
procedure, as well as with good neighborly relations.
"6. The Royal Government, as goes without saying, considers it to be
its duty to open an inquiry against all those who are, or shall
eventually prove to have been, involved in the plot of June 28, and
who are in Serbian territory. As to the participation at this
investigation of agents of the Austro-Hungarian authorities
delegated for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the
Royal Government cannot accept this demand, for it would be a
violation of the constitution and of the law of criminal procedure.
Nevertheless, in concrete cases it might be found possible to
communicate the results of the investigation in question to the
Austro-Hungarian representatives.
"7. On the very evening that the note was handed in the Royal
Government arrested Major Voija Tankositch. As for Milan
Ciganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and
who until June 15 was employed as a beginner in the administration
of the railways, it has not yet been possible to (arrest) him. In
view of the ultimate inquiry the Imperial and Royal Government is
requested to have the goodness to communicate in the usual form as
soon as possible the presumptions of guilt, as well as the eventual
proofs of guilt, against these persons which have been collected up
to the present in the investigations at Sarajevo.
"8. The Serbian Government will strengthen and extend the measures
taken to prevent the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across
the frontier. It goes without saying that it will immediately order
an investigation and will severely punish the frontier officials
along the line Schabatz-Losnitza who have been lacking in their
duties and who allowed the authors of the crime of Sarajevo to pass.
"9. The Royal Government will willingly give explanations regarding
the remarks made in interviews by its officials, both in Serbia and
abroad, after the attempt, and which, according to the statement of
the Imperial and Royal Government, were hostile toward the monarchy,
as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government has (forwarded) it the
passages in question of these remarks and as soon as it has shown
that the remarks made were really made by the officials regarding
whom the Royal Government itself will see about collecting proofs.
[Illustration: Franz Josef I, Emperor of Austria and King of
Hungary.]
"10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal
Government of the execution of the measures comprised in the
preceding points, in so far as that has not already been done by the
present note, as soon as such measure has been ordered and executed.
"In the event of the Imperial and Royal Government considering that
it is to the common interest not to precipitate the solution of this
question, it is ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding,
either by referring this question to the decision of The Hague
International Tribunal or to the great powers which took part in the
drawing up of the declaration made by the Serbian Government on
March 18-31, 1909."
CHAPTER XXII
DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES
This reply from Serbia was not deemed satisfactory by Austria-Hungary
and relations with Serbia were immediately broken off. On the
following day, July 26, 1914, "diplomatic conversations," the object
of which was to smooth over the differences between Austria-Hungary
and Serbia, took place in Berlin, St. Petersburg and Vienna between
representatives of the three nations whose capitals these were.
Austria-Hungary sent to the various governments the following
"circular note" on July 27, 1914:
"The object of the Serbian note is to create the false impression
that the Serbian Government is prepared in great measure to comply
with our demands.
"As a matter of fact, however, Serbia's note is filled with the
spirit of dishonesty, which clearly lets it be seen that the Serbian
Government is not seriously determined to put an end to the culpable
tolerance it hitherto has extended to intrigues against the
Austro-Hungarian monarchy.
"The Serbian note contains such far-reaching reservations and
limitations not only regarding the general principles of our Action,
but also in regard to the individual claims we have put forward,
that the concessions actually made by Serbia become insignificant.
"In particular, our demand for the participation of the
Austro-Hungarian authorities in investigations to detect accomplices
in the conspiracy on Serbian territory has been rejected, while our
request that measures be taken against that section of the Serbian
press hostile to Austria-Hungary has been declined, and our wish
that the Serbian Government take the necessary measures to prevent
the dissolved Austrophobe associations continuing their activity
under another name and under another form has not even been
considered.
"Since the claims in the Austro-Hungarian note of July 23, regard
being had to the attitude hitherto adopted by Serbia, represent the
minimum of what is necessary for the establishment of permanent
peace with the southeastern monarchy, the Serbian answer must be
regarded as unsatisfactory.
"That the Serbian Government itself is conscious that its note is
not acceptable to us is proved by the circumstances that it proposes
at the end of the note to submit the dispute to arbitration--an
invitation which is thrown into its proper light by the fact that
three hours before handing in the note, a few minutes before the
expiration of the time limit, the mobilization of the Serbian army
took place."
The Great powers were not willing to go to war without first trying
mediation between the two kingdoms in southeastern Europe, and even
Russia, which was known to be a potential ally of Serbia, showed a
disposition to use diplomacy before force. When the demands made by
Austria-Hungary in her note of July 25, 1914, became known in the
Russian capital, the following note was immediately telegraphed to
Vienna:
"The communication [the circular note quoted above] made by
Austria-Hungary to the powers the day after the presentation of the
ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the powers which is quite
insufficient to enable them to take any steps which might help to
smooth away the difficulties that have arisen.
"In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and
fatal to all the powers, which may result from the course of action
followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be
above all essential that the period allowed for the Serbian reply
should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness
to inform the powers of the results of the inquiry upon which the
Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally
allow them sufficient time to study them.
"In this case, if the powers were convinced that certain of the
Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to
offer advice to the Serbian Government.
"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render
nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to
the powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of
international relations."
A copy of this note was at the same time sent to London with the
addenda: "M. Sazonoff (Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs) hopes
that his Britannic Majesty's Government will share the point of view
set forth above, and he trusts that Sir E. Grey will see his way to
furnish similar instructions to the British Ambassador at Vienna."
But on the same day, July 25, 1914, the Government at Vienna
informed the powers that the note to Serbia was not an ultimatum; it
was merely a démarche, and in it Austria had threatened to start
military preparations, not operations. The requested delay,
therefore, was not granted. That day was eventful in London, too,
for the Foreign Office was notified by the German Ambassador that
though Germany had not been apprised beforehand of the contents of
Austria's note to Serbia, the German nation would nevertheless stand
by its ally. "The German Ambassador read to me," said Sir Edward
Grey in a telegram to the British Ambassador at Vienna, "a telegram
from the German Foreign Office saying that his Government had not
known beforehand, and had had no more than other powers to do with
the stiff terms of the Austrian note to Serbia, but that once she
had launched the note, Austria could not draw back." Prince
Lichnowsky (German Ambassador at London) said, however, that "if
what I contemplated was mediation between Austria and Russia,
Austria might be able with dignity to accept it." He expressed
himself as personally favorable to this suggestion.
"I concurred in his observation, and said that I felt I had no title
to intervene between Austria and Serbia, but as soon as the question
became one as between Austria and Russia, the peace of Europe was
affected, in which we must all take a hand.
"I impressed upon the ambassador that, in the event of Russian and
Austrian mobilization, the participation of Germany would be
essential to any diplomatic peace. Alone we could do nothing. The
German Government agreed with my suggestion, to tell the French
Government that I thought it the right thing to act upon it."
On July 26, 1914, the Russian Ambassador at Berlin informed the
German Government that he was instructed to state that any
annexation by Austria-Hungary of Serbian territory would not be
looked upon by Russia with indifference. The German Emperor, who had
been away from Berlin, returned hastily to the capital. As the
crisis approached the British Government once more attempted to have
the matters in dispute settled by mediation. The following telegram
was dispatched from Downing Street to the British Ambassadors at
Paris and Rome: "London, Foreign Office, July 26, 1914. Would
Minister of Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct ambassador here
to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and
myself to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose of
discovering an issue which would prevent complications? You should
ask the Minister of Foreign Affairs whether he would do this. If so,
when bringing the above suggestions to the notice of the Governments
to which they are accredited, representatives of Belgrade, Vienna,
and St. Petersburg, could be authorized to request that all active
military operations should be suspended pending results of the
conference."
But this move had come too late. The British Ambassador to Berlin
reported by telegraph to his Government on July 27, 1914, that the
Imperial German Government considered that the proposed conference
amounted practically to a court of arbitration and could not be
called except at the behest of Austria-Hungary and Russia. The
German Government therefore turned down the British proposal. But
Germany was not for provoking a war; the German Ambassador at London
informed the British Foreign Office that his Government was willing
to accept in principle the mediation of the powers between Austria
and Russia.
The question of whether the alliances between the various nations
would hold under a strain now became pointed. The Russian Government
informed the British Government on July 27, 1914, that the
impression prevailed in Berlin and Vienna that England would stand
aloof under any circumstances, differences between Russia and
Austria notwithstanding. But on the same day Sir Edward Grey,
British Minister for Foreign Affairs, dispelled these impressions in
a telegram to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg. "The
impression ought to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the
First Fleet," it read in part, "which is concentrated, as it
happens, at Portland, not to disperse for maneuver leave." On July
28, 1914, the British Government was informed that France and Russia
were agreeable to having a conference called in London; the Italian
Government had already reported that it agreed to this plan, but the
refusal of Germany, mentioned above, rendered these communications
useless.
On July 28, 1914, the British Government was informed by telegram
from its Ambassador at Vienna that "Austria-Hungary cannot delay
warlike proceedings against Serbia, and would have to decline any
suggestions of negotiations on basis of Serbian reply.
"Prestige of Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now
prevent conflict." This telegram, be it noted, made use of the term
"military proceedings" instead of "military preparations" and
therefore had the effect of changing Austria-Hungary's note to
Serbia into an ultimatum. Russia, on July 28, 1914, began to
mobilize troops near Odessa, Moscow, Kieff and Kazan, and on the
following day this fact was communicated officially to the
Government at Berlin.
As Austria-Hungary and Russia were about to come to grips Germany
made it plain that she would stand by her ally, Austria-Hungary. In
times of peace there may have been doubt throughout Europe as to the
strength of the bonds of the Triple Entente, but the German
Government was not disposed to rely on these doubts when the
critical moment came. The British Ambassador at Berlin was asked to
visit the German Chancellor and as a result of this visit the former
sent the following telegram to the British Foreign Office:
"Berlin, July 29, 1914. I was asked to call upon the chancellor
to-night. His excellency had just returned from Potsdam.
"He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European
conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to
Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued
efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following
strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far
as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British
policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to
be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not
the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great
Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British
Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial
acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious
in any war that might ensue.
"I questioned his excellency about the French colonies, and he said
that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As
regards Holland, however, his excellency said that, so long as
Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the
Netherlands, Germany was ready to give his Majesty's Government an
assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of
France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in
Belgium, but when the war was over Belgian integrity would be
respected if she had not sided against Germany.
"His excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been
chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to
bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these
assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so
much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between
England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment
too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality
in the conflict which the present crisis might possibly produce
would enable him to look forward to a realization of his desire.
"In reply to his excellency's inquiry how I thought his request
would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at
this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course
of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain
full liberty."
Here for the first time the matter of Belgian neutrality entered
into the diplomatic discussions; the danger of a Pan-European
conflict was apparent, for the diplomats from then on were less
concerned with the Austro-Hungarian dispute with Serbia than with
the possibilities that a war in western Europe might entail. On the
same day, July 29, 1914, the German Ambassador at London was
officially informed that if the European crisis involved nothing
more than disputes between Russia and Austria on the one hand, and
the military operations of Austria in Serbia on the other, England
would keep out of the trouble, but if Germany went to war with
Russia, or if France went to war, England could not stand quietly
aside. News had come that day that Austria had declared war on
Serbia the day before. The declaration read as follows:
"The Royal Government of Serbia, not having replied in a satisfactory
manner to the note remitted to it by the Austro-Hungarian Minister in
Belgrade on July 23, 1914, the Imperial and Royal Government finds
itself compelled to proceed to safeguard its rights and interests and
to have recourse for this purpose to force of arms.
"Austria-Hungary considers itself, therefore, from this moment in a
state of war with Serbia."
[Illustration: Poland and Its Divisions from 1772-1914.]
At the same time the Government at Vienna issued this note to the
foreign ambassadors there with the request that they forward it to
their respective governments:
"In order to bring to an end the subversive intrigues originating
from Belgrade and aimed at the territorial integrity of the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Imperial and Royal Government has
delivered to the Royal Serbian Government a note in which a series
of demands were formulated, for the acceptance of which a delay of
forty-eight hours has been granted to the Royal Government. The
Royal Serbian Government not having answered this note in a
satisfactory manner, the Imperial and Royal Government are
themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and
interest, and with this object, to have recourse to force of arms.
"Austria-Hungary, who has just addressed to Serbia a formal
declaration, in conformity with Article I of the convention of
October 18, 1907, relative to the opening of hostilities, considers
itself in a state of war with Serbia.
"In bringing the above notice to the powers, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs has the honor to declare that Austria-Hungary will act
during the hostilities in conformity with the terms of the
Conventions of the Hague of October 18, 1907, as also with those of
the Declaration of London of February 28, 1909, provided an
analogous procedure is adopted by Serbia."
The great question as to what Russia would do was answered by a note
issued at St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914, which stated that Russia
wished, above all, to maintain peace. But the moments during which
words alone would be availing were fast passing. Austria-Hungary was
mobilizing her armies, and not all of the mobilization was on her
southern frontier; some corps were gathered at points from which a
blow from Russia might be warded off, or offensive move against
Russia made.
On July 30, 1914, the German Government sent a short note to St.
Petersburg, in which three questions were asked. These were: the
reason for the Russian mobilization, which Berlin knew to be in
progress; whether it was directed against Austria; and on what terms
Russia might be induced to demobilize.
The Czar, on July 31, 1914, sent a note to the German Emperor in
which he said in part: "... It is technically impossible to
discontinue our military operations, which have been rendered
necessary by Austrian mobilization. We are far from wishing for war,
and so long as negotiations with Austria regarding Serbia continue,
my troops will not undertake any provocative actions." This was an
admission that Russian general mobilization was in progress.
CHAPTER XXIII
PREPARATION FOR WAR
As a matter of fact, during the last days of July, 1914, all the
Governments in Europe had their military departments busy on the
problem of preparing for the first blows in war; these included not
only the six leading powers, but also the Scandinavian countries,
Spain, Portugal, all the Balkan kingdoms, and Belgium and Holland.
The diplomatic exchanges that were meanwhile taking place were known
to all experienced statesmen to be hardly more than masks.
On August 1, 1914, the kaiser declared Germany to be "in a state of
war." This did not carry with it a declaration of war against any
power, but had the effect of putting the entire German Empire under
martial law, everything being in readiness to cope with an enemy. On
the same day the kaiser made an important speech in which he said,
"A fateful hour has fallen for Germany. Envious peoples everywhere
are compelling us to our just defense. The sword has been forced
into our hands.
"I hope that if my efforts at the last hour do not succeed in
inducing our opponents to see eye to eye with us and in maintaining
peace, we shall, with God's help, so wield the sword that we shall
restore it to its sheath again with honor." On the same day,
however--namely August 1, 1914, at five o'clock in the evening he
signed an order mobilizing the German army, and Russia and Germany
went to war two hours later. A demand made upon the French
Government by the German Government, asking the intentions of France
in case Russia went to war with Germany, received an unsatisfactory
reply on August 2, 1914, and France on the same day mobilized its
army, though it declared war on no power. On August 3, 1914, German
troops entered French territory, for Germany did not wish to be
delayed in a campaign in the west by waiting for diplomatic
exchanges to take place; war between Germany and France began at the
moment the foreign soldiers crossed into France.
It was, in theory at least, over the matter of Belgian neutrality
that England and Germany went to war. As soon the British Government
saw that hopes for peace were no longer possible Sir Edward Grey
sent to its ambassadors in Germany and France the following
telegram; "London, July 31, 1914; I still trust situation is not
irretrievable, but in view of prospect of mobilization in Germany it
becomes essential to his Majesty's Government, in view of existing
treaties, to ask whether French [and German] Government is prepared
to engage to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as no other
power violates it. A similar request is being addressed to the
German [and French] Government. It is important to have an early
answer."
To this telegram the French Government, on August 1, 1914, answered
that it stood ready to respect Belgian neutrality provided no other
power threatened or violated it. Germany hesitated to give a
definite reply immediately for fear of disclosing the plans of
campaign she had against France.
On August 3, 1914, German troops moved into Luxemburg, en route for
France, and it was then known that a German invasion of Belgium
would be inevitable. But before taking this step Germany tendered
certain proposals to the Belgian Government, assuring it that if
peaceful passage were given to German troops Belgium would be given
a subsidy. But the Belgian Government turned down these proposals
and the king sent this telegram to the British monarch: "Remembering
the numerous proofs of your majesty's friendship and that of your
predecessor, of the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the
proof of the friendship which she has just given us again, I make a
supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's
Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."
Italy and England were now the only two important powers in Europe
which were not embroiled in war, but the moment was rapidly
approaching when the former could no longer keep out of it, if for
no other reason than to see that the balance of power in Europe was
not upset. On August 4, 1914, Sir Edward Grey said in the British
House of Commons, "The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and
the northern coasts of France are defenseless. If a foreign fleet
engaged in war against France should come down and battle against
those defenseless coasts, we could not stand aside. We felt strongly
that France was entitled to know at once whether, in the event of
attack on her unprotected coasts, she could rely on our support. I
gave the engagement to the French Ambassador last night that if the
German fleet goes into the English Channel or into the North Sea to
attack French shipping, or the French coast, the British fleet will
give all the protection in its power. That answer is subject to the
approval of Parliament. It is not a declaration of war. I understand
that the German Government would be prepared, if we would pledge
ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack
the northern coasts of France. That is far too narrow an
engagement." Germany had thrown down the gauntlet in showing she
intended to invade Belgium; Great Britain here threw down the
gauntlet. It could be but a question of hours before Germany and
England went to war.
Meanwhile, because war was already on between Germany and France,
the latter did not go to the trouble of issuing a declaration of
war. And on August 4, 1914, the Italian Government announced that
"The Italian Cabinet has decided that while some of the European
powers are at war Italy is at peace with all the belligerents.
Consequently the citizens and subjects of the Kingdom of Italy are
obliged to observe the duty of neutrality." This declaration of
neutrality severed the bonds that held Italy to the Triple Alliance.
On the same afternoon, August 4, 1914, the Russian Ambassador at
Berlin was handed his passports and departed; this official
statement was given to the German press: "In consequence of a
Russian attack on German territory Germany is in a state of war with
Russia.
"The French reply to Germany's note has been received in the
meantime, and is of an unsatisfactory character. In addition France
has ordered the mobilization of her army so that the outbreak of war
between Germany and France must be awaited at any moment." The
outbreak of war between France and Germany was indeed near at hand,
for, as we have already seen, Germany declared war on France August
3, 1914, and on that very day served an ultimatum on neutral Belgium
and occupied Luxemburg preparatory to an immediate invasion of
Belgium. In view of the evident long and careful preparations for
just such a sudden stroke, by which to crush France and take Paris
before the French armies could offer adequate resistance, the clumsy
attempts of the Germans on August 2, 1914, to represent the French
as the aggressors seem ridiculous, though typical of German attempts
to influence opinion at home and abroad. The German Government
declared that French airmen had flown over Nuremburg, that French
officers in German uniforms had crossed the German frontier from
Holland, that the French were already in Alsace. These stories
deceived no one.
What the neutral nations saw and understood was that the autocratic
governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary had plunged the world
into a war of incalculable magnitude, almost without warning and
with comparatively trivial pretexts. There had been only a brief
mockery of diplomatic interchanges, for the most part by telegraph
and telephone.
On August 4, 1914, the last chance for averting war between England
and Germany went by. On that date the British Foreign Office had
telegraphed to its Envoy at Brussels: "You should inform Belgian
Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce
them to depart from neutrality, his Majesty's Government expect that
they will resist by any means in their power, and that his Majesty's
Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that
his Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia
and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at
once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by
Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence
and integrity in future years."
Germany, through its Intelligence Department, was aware that this
note had been sent, but the invasion of Belgium began, nevertheless.
Then came an ultimatum from England. As soon as the British Foreign
Office had learned that German troops had crossed the border and
that the fortifications at Liege had been summoned to surrender to
the German army, this telegram was sent to the British Ambassador at
Berlin:
"London Foreign Office, August 4, 1914. We hear that Germany has
addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that
German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary, by
force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.
"We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at
Gemmenich.
"In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany
declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France
gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin
and Paris, we must repeat that request and ask that a satisfactory
reply to it and to my telegram of this morning [which said that
England was bound to protest against violation of Belgian
neutrality] be received here by twelve o'clock to-night. If not, you
are instructed to ask for your passports and to say that his
Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to
uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to
which Germany is as much a part as ourselves."
Midnight of August 4, 1914, came and the German Government had not
yet made a reply to this note; fifteen minutes of grace were
allowed, and then the British Government formally declared war.
The next move of a world power, toward belligerency, came in the Far
East. In 1911 Japan and England had entered an offensive and
defensive alliance, which bound each to come to the other's aid
should that other become involved in war with more than one nation.
Japan readily agreed to live up to its part, and on August 16, 1914,
sent an ultimatum to Germany which read:
"Tokyo, August 16, 1914. We consider it highly important and
necessary in the present situation to take measures to remove the
causes of all disturbances of the peace in the Far East, and to
safeguard the general interests as contemplated by the agreement of
alliance between Japan and Great Britain.
"In order to secure a firm and enduring peace in eastern Asia, the
establishment of which is the aid of the said agreement, the
Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believes it to be its duty to
give the advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the
following two propositions:
"First. To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters
German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at
once those which cannot be so withdrawn.
"Second. To deliver on a date not later than September 15 to the
Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation,
the entire leased territory of Kiao-chau, with a view to the
eventual restoration of the same to China.
"The Imperial Japanese Government announces at the same time that in
the event of its not receiving by noon on August 23, 1914, an answer
from the Imperial German Government, signifying its unconditional
acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese
Government, Japan will be compelled to take such action as she may
deem necessary to meet the situation."
The time limit set for the German reply came and passed with no
official communication with Berlin. Consequently the Japanese
Government declared war in the following proclamation:
"Issued at Tokyo, August 23, 1914, at 6 p. m.
"We, by the Grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on the throne
occupied by the same dynasty from time immemorial, do hereby make
the following proclamation to all our loyal and brave subjects:
"We hereby declare war against Germany, and we command our army and
navy to carry on hostilities against that empire with all strength,
and we also command our competent authorities to make every effort,
in pursuance of their respective duties, to attain the national aim
by all means within the limits of the law of nations.
"Since the outbreak of the present war in Europe, the calamitous
effect of which we view with grave concern, we on our part have
entertained hopes of preserving the peace of the Far East by the
maintenance of strict neutrality, but the action of Germany has at
length compelled Great Britain, our ally, to open hostilities
against that country, and Germany is at Kiao-chau, its leased
territory in China, busy with warlike preparations, while its armed
vessels cruising the seas of eastern Asia are threatening our
commerce and that of our ally. Peace of the Far East is thus in
jeopardy.
"Accordingly, our Government and that of his Britannic Majesty,
after full and frank communication with each other, agreed to take
such measures as may be necessary for the protection of the general
interests contemplated in the Agreement of Alliance, and we on our
part, being desirous to attain that object by peaceful means,
commanded our Government to offer with sincerity an advice to the
Imperial German Government. But on the last day appointed for the
purpose, however, our Government failed to receive an answer
accepting their advice. It is with profound regret that we, in spite
of our ardent devotion to the cause of peace, are thus compelled to
declare war, especially at this early period of our reign, and while
we are still in mourning for our lamented mother.
"It is our earnest wish that by the loyalty and valor of our
faithful subjects peace may soon be restored and the glory of the
empire be enhanced."
Germany made no reply to the Japanese declaration. On August 19,
1914, the emperor had sent word to the garrison at Kiao-chau that it
was to defend itself against all attacks made by the Japanese, and
when the commander there heard of the Japanese declaration he issued
a statement in which he invited the Japanese, if they wanted the
place, to come and fight for it.
CHAPTER XXIV
TERRITORIAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL COMPARISONS
The fundamental factor in war is territory. Whether war be viewed
from the point of its relation to the racial characteristics of the
nations who are opposed, or to national rivalries, or to imperial
ambitions, the solid fact remains that war is of peoples who live
upon a certain land domain, who possess frontiers that may be
attacked and must be defended, and whose patriotism coheres with
geographical boundaries. The riches of a country depend upon
territory and the density of population. Consequently the proportion
of men able to bear arms depends upon territory, and the power of
self-maintenance under times of stress--such as a blockade--is again
a territorial question.
The Germanic nations, known as the Central Powers, which were allied
at the opening of the war were the German Empire and the
Austro-Hungarian Empire. The area of the German Empire (exclusive of
colonial possessions) in 1914 was 208,825.2 square miles. The area
of the Austrian Empire was 115,831.9, and of the kingdom of Hungary
was 125,641.2. In addition to these, the area of Bosnia and
Herzegovina was 19,767.9, making the total area of the territories
of the Central Powers the sum of 470,093.2 square miles.
The nations known as the "Allies" in popular speech, consisted, at
the opening of the war, of the British Empire, the French Republic,
and the Russian Empire. Using the same basis of comparison, the area
of the British Isles was 121,633 square miles; the area of the
Republic of France was 207,129 square miles; and the area of
European Russia, including Finland and Poland, and excluding
territory within the Arctic circle, was approximately 2,500,000
square miles. Serbia had an area of 34,000 square miles. Belgium,
although in no way responsible for the outbreak of the war--no
matter from what point of view it may be considered--became the
nation to suffer most at first and in the very earliest days of the
war was on the side of the Allies. Her area, exclusive of oversea
possessions, was 11,373 square miles. This makes a total of
2,874,135 square miles for the Allies, a preponderance of territory
which seems extraordinarily disproportionate until it is realized
that the British Isles, France, Belgium, and Serbia together were
far smaller than the combined territories of the Central Powers, and
that only a small proportion of European Russia was liable to become
a part of the actual field of conflict.
Passing on to larger figures, that is to say to the total area of
all the possessions of the nations involved, it will be seen that
the preponderance on the part of the Allies is even greater. Thus
the German Empire, inclusive of colonial possessions in Africa, in
Asia, and in the Pacific, contained 1,236,600 square miles. The
Austro-Hungarian Empire, as previously stated, was 261,239 square
miles, there being no oversea colonies. This makes a total of
1,497,839 square miles as the total territory of the Central Powers.
Balanced against this come the enormous figures of the three great
allied empires. The area of the British Empire was approximately
13,158,712 square miles, the Republic of France and her colonies
4,983,086 square miles, and the Russian Empire 8,394,018 square
miles. The three empires combined thus made a total of 26,535,816
square miles, or but very little less than one-half of the total
land area of the earth. These figures are compiled from the latest
sources before the opening of the war, but it is to be remembered
that some of the figures are approximate. For example the French
possessions in Africa, of enormous extent, have not been surveyed,
and there are vast stretches of Arctic Siberia and Arctic Canada
which are but half explored. The small territories of Belgium and
Serbia may be added to the total of the three great allied empires,
and thus practically one-half of the earth on this globe was opposed
to the million and a half square miles of the Central Powers.
Owing to Bulgaria's position in the Balkan Peninsula, and also owing
to aggrievement following the results of former Balkan wars,
Bulgaria joined the Central Powers later in the war. Turkey, also,
fearing the loss of Constantinople to the Russians as a result of
the coalition of the Allies, threw her forces on the side of
Germany. The area of Bulgaria was only 43,000 square miles, but the
Ottoman or Turkish Empire was territorially very large, containing
1,420,448 square miles, or almost as much as Germany, Austria, and
Bulgaria combined. In round numbers, and for easy remembrance, it
may be said that the territory of the Central Powers engaged in the
war was about three million square miles.
For a long time Italy maintained neutrality, but the onrush of
conditions forced her into the war, also on the side of the Allies.
The territory of European Italy was 110,623 square miles, and
inclusive of her African possessions the territory under the Italian
flag was 706,623 square miles.
The territory of the Japanese Empire, also, needs to be taken into
consideration, for the reason that Japan, while not entering the
European theater of war, declared herself on the side of the Allies
by the capture of Kiao-chau, a district leased from China by
Germany, and the very next month declared to be a German
protectorate. The territorial extent of the Japanese Empire was
254,266 square miles, inclusive of Korea. These are the principal
factors to be taken into consideration in the mere question of the
territorial extent of the opposing forces.
The geographical position of the belligerent countries, with their
corresponding advantages and disadvantages, is the next factor to be
considered. The geographical position of the Central Powers is best
expressed by the fact that they are central. They have all the
advantages of being in a united whole. When, later in the war,
Serbia was conquered, Bulgaria joined the Central Powers and Turkey
was swung into line, the same condition held true. Germany and her
allies were a homogeneous unit, geographically considered. From the
point of view of land defense very little of Germany's frontiers
bordered upon enemy territory. The small section that confronted
France on the west and the larger section facing Russia on the east
were her only open points of attack. Her sea front except for the
small section near the mouth of the Rhine, was on the Baltic, and
secure from naval attack except by the Russian fleet, and Russia has
never been a naval power. Her Mediterranean outlet, near Trieste and
Fiume, menaced by the Mediterranean fleets of the allied powers, was
comparatively safe, for the Austrian fleet was an efficient fighting
unit, especially so for defense.
As opposed to this was the openness of England, France, and Russia
to naval attack. England has but a small proportion of land to
seacoast, and France is open to the sea on three sides. Russia,
fronting the Baltic, possessed an infinitely inferior fleet, to
which the Allies could send no reenforcement as long as the
Skagerrak and Cattegat Straits were the only way into the Baltic;
moreover, by the Kiel Canal, connecting the North Sea and the
Baltic, the remodeling of which was completed in a few months before
the declarations of war, a German naval fleet would possess an
enormous advantage over an allied fleet, endeavoring to force
entrance into the Baltic. In addition to this, while the Central
Powers could work together on both fronts with great ease, thanks to
the excellent system of German railways, Great Britain and France
had no means of direct communication with their great ally in the
east of Europe. Thus, in a measure, the Central Powers were not
attacking the Allies at any one time, though it might truly be said
that they were being attacked by the Allies. In the event of any
lack of synchronization between the plans of Russia and those of the
western allies, German and Austrian troops could be massed first on
one side of the field of operations and then on the other. Such
action was impossible to the Allies. At the time of the great German
advance on Paris, Russia could give no aid. At the time of the
German advance on Riga, Britain and France could give no aid. Both
German advances were checked and the invaders driven back, not by
the armies of the Allies, but by two non-interlocking parts of the
armies of the Allies. At the same time, the susceptibility to attack
on both sides prevented the Central Powers from deflecting all their
men to either front, and thus by the mere existence of passive
menace, prevented the Central Powers from using their geographic
advantage to the full.
Their disadvantage, in the military sense of the recognition of
geographical conditions, was that the Central Powers had constantly
to bear in mind the necessity of fighting upon two fronts. Russian
activity, while important to Britain and France, was a matter with
which their policy had nothing to do; the coordination of movements
on the west front was a matter entirely outside the scope of the
operations of the Russian commanders. The German military staff, on
the other hand, had the task of constantly coordinating two separate
campaigns, to determine where the greatest number of men should be,
to avoid weakening the one side or the other at the wrong moment.
The advantages, again considered geographically, greatly outweigh
the disadvantages. The first of these was the homogeneity of the
Central Powers. A general could attend a war council in Berlin in
the evening, and one in Vienna the next morning. The influence of
Germany was an understood thing, moreover, and in Vienna there was a
readiness to accept and carry out the policies of the German
military staff. There was also a geographical homogeneity, due to
modern facility of communication. Not only in mobilization, but in
the entire conduct of the war, the geographic nearness of points in
Germany and Austria was brought about by an excellent east and west
railway system. The disadvantage of fighting on two fronts was
partly compensated by the fact that within three days enormous
masses of men could be moved from Galicia to the Rhine, or from the
Belgian frontier to the wastes of East Prussia. In all Europe there
is no stretch of land so well suited by nature for this task of
fighting upon two fronts as the area of the combined Austrian and
German Empires. This is emphasized by the topography of the Baltic
Plain, the Rhine and Danube valleys. One might say, in a measure,
that this stretch of territory has not wasted any of its natural
mountain defenses by flinging them athwart the territory. Thus the
Vosges defend against France, the Alps against Italy, the
Transylvanian Alps against Rumania--in the event of that nation
entering the war with Russia--the Carpathians behind Galicia against
Russia's southern attacks, and the marshy country east of East
Prussia against Russian northern attack. Yet it is to be added that
these very advantages of defense were also disadvantages of attack.
The march through Belgium would not have been necessitated if, for
example, the portion of Central Powers territory that confronted
France had been of the same character as that which confronted
Russia. The mountainous character of that frontier was a determining
factor in the invasion of Belgium. The invasion of Belgium was a
determining factor in the relation which Germany sustained in the
war to the allied powers, and especially to the neutral nations. The
relation of the neutral nations, in modern warfare, which requires
such immense supplies, is a factor of great importance for success
in the field. Therefore, to close the syllogism, the mountainous
character of the Vosges country was the primary factor in
determining the relation of all other countries to the Central
Powers, a factor constantly arising at every point in the Great War.
On such geographical factors does the strategy of huge campaigns
depend. One more example may be given. In the battles of the Marne
it became evident that France's strongest defense was the Argonne
Forest, in the battle of the Aisne it became clear that the
geological formation of a river bank made the German position almost
impregnable.
The topographical position of the allied powers is the next factor
to be considered. Germany's geographical resources have been touched
upon, and to them may be added the fact that, if invaded, she had,
at the Rhine, a marvelous line to fall back upon. The first factor
to be considered in France is its openness to attack. Thanks to the
Vosges and the Argonne, a line of great strength could be
established (it was so established and was so held in the teeth of
determined attack) from Belfort to Verdun. But north of Verdun the
earth-making forces have not been kind to France, in a military
sense. From Verdun to the North Sea is, geographically speaking,
open country. This is not the place to discuss the availability of
forts in open country, it is sufficient to point out that there is
no geographical defense. Between the German border and Paris there
is no topographical barrier to an invading army. The Germans found
this out in the Franco-Prussian War, and it had not been forgotten.
CHAPTER XXV
ASSEMBLING OF THE GERMAN ARMIES
"The German mobilization was the greatest movement of people that
the world has ever seen. Nearly four million people had to be
transported from every part of the empire to her borders. The manner
in which the population is distributed made the task extremely
difficult. Berlin, Rhenish Westphalia, Upper Silesia, and Saxony,
especially had to send their contingents in every direction, since
the eastern provinces are more thinly settled and had to have a
stronger guard for the borders immediately. The result was a
hurrying to and fro of thousands and hundreds of thousands of
soldiers, besides a flood of civilians who had to reach their homes
as soon as possible. Countries where the population is more
regularly distributed have an easier task than Germany, with its
predominating urban population.
"The difficulties of the gigantic undertaking were also increased by
the necessity for transporting war materials of every sort. In the
west are chiefly industrial undertakings, in the east mainly
agricultural. Horse raising is mostly confined to the provinces on
the North Sea and the Baltic, but chiefly to East Prussia, and this
province, the farthest away from France, had to send its best horses
to the western border, as did also Schleswig-Holstein and Hanover.
Coal for our warships had to go in the other direction. From the
Rhenish mines it went to the North Sea, from Upper Silesia to the
Baltic. Ammunition and heavy projectiles were transported from the
central part of the empire to its borders. And everywhere these
operations had to be carried on with haste....
"And how was it carried on? No one could have wondered if there had
been hundreds of unforeseen incidents, if military trains had
arrived at their stations with great delays, if there had resulted
in many places a wild hugger-mugger from the tremendous problems on
hand. But there was not a trace of this. ... All moved with the
regularity of clockwork. Regiments that had been ordered to
mobilize in the forenoon left in the evening for the field, fully
equipped....
[Illustration: Armies of the Contesting Nations.]
"A thing that raised the national enthusiasm still higher was the
appearance of the troops in brand-new uniforms, complete from head
to feet. The first sight of these new uniforms of modest, field
gray, faultlessly made, evoked everywhere the question: Where did
they come from? On the first day of mobilization dozens of cloth
manufacturers appeared at the War Ministry with offers of new
material. 'We don't want any' was the astonishing reply. Equal
amazement was caused by the faultless boots and shoes of the new
troops, especially in view of the recent famous 'boot speech' of the
French Senator Humbert.
"Small arms, cannon, and ammunition are so plentiful, that they have
merely to be unpacked. In view of all this, it is no wonder that the
regiments marching in were everywhere greeted with jubilation, and
that those marching out took leave of their garrisons with joyful
songs. No one thinks of death and destruction, every one of happy
victory and joyful reunion. German discipline, once so slandered,
now celebrates its triumph.
"There was still another matter in which the troops gave their
countrymen cause for rejoicing. Not one drunken man was seen during
these earnest days on the city streets. The General Staff had,
moreover, wisely ordered that during the mobilization, when every
one had money in his pockets, alcoholic drinks were not to be sold
at the railroad stations....
"The army is increased to many times its ordinary strength by the
mobilization. It draws from everywhere millions of soldiers,
workmen, horses, wagons, and other materials. The entire railway
service is at its disposal.... Not only is our great army mobilized,
but the whole folk is mobilized, and the distribution of labor, the
food question, and the care of the sick and wounded are all being
provided for. The whole German folk has become a gigantic war camp,
all are mobilized to protect kaiser, folk, and fatherland, as the
closing report of the Reichstag put it."
From this German statement of German mobilization by a German
committee of men of the utmost standing in the empire certain
things stand out very clearly. Of this the first one is that, with a
peace strength of less than a million, on the very first flush of
mobilization, every possible contingency for the mobilization of
four million men was at hand. German mobilization, therefore, was
not the devising of plans to carry out a project, but it was rather
the putting into action of a vast interacting series of preparation
that had long been made and carefully conceived for an attack upon
the powers to the westward. From every point of view, looking at the
mobilization at the opening of the war, Germany's was the most rapid
and the most complete, and, as the "Truth about Germany" states, it
was perhaps the most marvelous piece of military mobilization that
the world has ever seen.
As mobilization finally results in army corps, and is designed to
fit into a frame, the component parts of an army corps may be set
forth to show the way in which all the various units have to be
drawn together to their places on a battle front. A complete army
corps of the German scheme consists of 56,000 combatants and 12,000
men in the supply train. Of this, 63.81 per cent are infantry, 11.56
per cent cavalry, 10.99 field artillery, 4.21 per cent light
artillery, 4.21 engineer corps, etc., hospital corps 1.04, and
miscellaneous 2.02 per cent. There are 4 brigades with 24
battalions, there are 24 batteries of field artillery with 144 guns,
there are 8 squadrons of cavalry, 4 howitzer batteries with 16 heavy
howitzers, a machine-gun section, a battalion of rifles, a battalion
of engineers, a telegraph section, a bridge train, 6 provision
columns, 7 wagon-park columns, a stretcher-bearer column, a horse
depot, a field bakery, 12 field hospitals, and 8 ammunition columns.
One has but to think of the various places from which these men and
stores must come, of the thousands of horses and hundreds of wagons;
of the millions of rounds of ammunition, speeding from different
points over different railroads, and when disembarked by roads, by
lanes, even by small bypaths to the appointed place on the battle
front, to realize what a marvelous feat is mobilization of a modern
army at the time of an outbreak of war.
An insight into the manner in which this can be carried out, and
incidentally, an insight into the preparedness of Germany for the
war, is seen in an analysis of the extraordinary and otherwise
inexplicable network of railways recently erected by Germany to tap
the frontiers of Belgium and Luxemburg.
"In the southwest corner of Prussia," says Walter Littlefield,
writing on this subject, "is a rectangular piece of territory, the
western and eastern sides of which are formed respectively by the
Belgian and Luxemburg frontiers and the River Rhine.... Five years
ago, this little corner of Prussia had about 15.10 miles of railway
to every hundred square miles of territory. At the opening of the
war this had increased to 28.30. In five years, without any apparent
industrial and commercial demand for it, this traction has been
increased to nearly twice its length. Villages of less than 1,300
inhabitants have been linked up with double-track lines. For
example, Pelm is 2-3/4 miles from Gerolstein, a town principally of
comic-opera fame, and yet over this short distance, between the two
villages, there are laid down six parallel lines of rail, besides
numerous additional sidings.... Few of these lines, it is to be
noted, cross the frontier. Three of them, as late as last May (this
was written in the fall of 1914), led to blind terminals within a
day's march of it--the double line from Cologne via Stolberg to
Weiwertz, the double line from Cologne via Junkerath and Weiwertz to
St. With and the double line from Remagen via Hillesheim and Pelm to
Pronsfeld."
"Another point that is noticeable," says another observer, quoted in
the same article, "is that provision exists everywhere at these new
junctions and extensions for avoiding an upline crossing a down line
on the level, the upline is carried over the down line by a bridge,
involving long embankments on both sides (so new that as yet nothing
has had time to grow on them) at great expense, but enormously
simplifying traffic problems, when it comes to a question of full
troop trains pushing through at the rate of one every quarter of an
hour, and the empty cars returning eastward at the same rate.
"The detraining stations are of sufficient length to accommodate the
longest troop train (ten cars) easily, and they generally have at
least four sidings apart from the through up and down lines.
Moreover, at almost every station there are two lines of sidings
long enough for troop trains, so that they can be used to some
extent as detraining stations, and so that a couple of troop trains
can be held up at any time while traffic continues uninterrupted."
Such facts of railway preparedness explain, in a great measure, the
means whereby Germany was able to launch upon the Belgian,
Luxemburg, and French frontiers such a vast array of fully equipped
troops almost at the moment of the outbreak of the war. It must be
left to the reader to determine whether there is any connection
between this activity of railroad building in a district
industrially inactive on a frontier that was always held inviolate;
and the violation of that territory by means of these very
railroads. Facts remain facts, however, and the absolutely admitted
facts declare that German mobilization was directed, not at the
French frontier, but at the frontier of Luxemburg and Belgium,
especially at the great Belgian plain, commanded and dominated by
the great fortress of Liege. In the story of that siege will be
shown its topographic position. As bearing upon the subject of
mobilization, however, it is to be remembered that at this point,
Belgium, and not at France, was directed the main first mobilization
of the German army.
CHAPTER XXVI
FRENCH MOBILIZATION
French mobilization was smooth, but slow. France's great
disadvantage, making her mobilization slow, was that her regiments
were not territorially recruited, whereas the German army was
entirely based on territorial recruitment. Where it would take a
French regiment to receive its reserve men and be completed on war
footing in about four days, the German regiment could be completed
on war footing within four to five days. France in recognition of
this weakness had on her eastern borders special troops stationed
called "troops de couverture." Moreover, as has been pointed out,
all the French railways center in Paris, and the nearness of the
capital to the frontier is a gain as well as a source of danger.
Therefore, from the railways running to the frontier from Paris, and
from the strong garrison at the great Verdun to Belfort chain of
forts, France was able to bring into effect at once enough men to
present a strong face to the foe.
[Illustration: Navies of the Contesting Nations.]
Here Germany's reason for invading Belgium appeared. French
mobilization assumed the integrity of Belgium and Luxemburg. Her
mobilization was directed to the German frontier. Had Germany been
able to go through Belgium without an hour's delay the situation
would have been serious for France, for she mobilized on the wrong
front. Germany had correctly assumed that France would expect her to
abide by the treaties, and consequently by disavowing these
obligations had outguessed her Gallic neighbor. The speedy
mobilization of Belgium, and the heroic defense of that little land
by its gallant citizens, did much to alter the possible destinies of
the war, not because there was at any time any expectation that
Belgium would be able entirely to resist the passage of the armies
of the kaiser, but because the delay which her defense caused gave
the French troops time to mobilize in the direction whither the blow
was designed.
The first movement against Germany was when M. Eyschen, a member of
the cabinet of the Duchy of Luxemburg, drove in his motor car across
the great Adolf Bridge, which had been seized by Germany and
confronted the leading officer of the German advance guard with a
copy of the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of the state. The
reigning Grand Duchess Marie Adelaide blocked the way with her motor
car, she was ordered to return at once, and when General Vandyck,
commandant of Luxemburg, arrived, he was confronted with a revolver.
At the end of July, when there was evidence that the storm which had
been brewing ever since Austria sent an ultimatum to Serbia on July
23, 1914, thirteen classes of Belgian recruits were called to the
colors; but even so, at its full war strength on August 1, 1914,
the entire army numbered only 160,000 men. Owing to the small size
of the Belgian army and the small territory of that country, and
also owing to the fact that it is one of the most thoroughly
equipped countries of the world so far as railroads are concerned,
Belgian mobilization presented few difficulties for the
concentration of the few available troops.
But Belgium was in the midst of reorganization of its national
defenses and its army, and so was _de facto_ unprepared to use to
the utmost the advantages of great fortresses of Liege, Namur, and
Antwerp, which could have been made almost impregnable if the
necessary field army and artillery material had existed. The
fortresses of Liege and Namur demanded a garrison of about 250,000
men and artillery, and there were only about 30,000 men disponible.
If the organization of the national defense of Belgium had been
completed, the Belgian army would have been probably of a strength
of over 600,000 men, well trained, instead of the poorly trained
army of about 160,000 combatants equipped only for parade, and the
story of that part of the Great War would have been another.
The German cavalry entered Belgium and pushed on ahead, and a few
stray shots were fired, but the first Belgian town of Limburg, on
the road to Liege, was occupied without attack. At Verviers a weak
Belgian force was driven out by the strong advance guard of the
German cavalry. This was the "peaceful invasion of Belgian
territory" spoken of in the earliest telegrams sent to the kaiser
from the advancing army. Then the German troops suddenly found
themselves confronted by the destruction of the Trois Ponts tunnels,
and by the wrecked bridges across the Meuse. The attack upon Vise,
which had been figured by the Germans to be a matter of form, and
not requiring a body of troops of any size, was stopped by blown-up
bridges, and a detachment of German engineers, undertaking to build
a new pontoon bridge, was shot to pieces. Belgium, having thus
thrown down the gauntlet, concentrated its troops, a little over
100,000, on a line back of the forts of Liege and Namur. King Albert
himself was at the front, and not only directed, but also led the
defense.
This gallant action on the part of Belgium formed a screen behind
which the French troops could mobilize in full order and with a
clear knowledge of the intention of the enemy. Already the skies
were filled with scouting aircraft and wireless messages buzzed
incessantly from the overhead scouts of the movements of the hostile
troops rushing from Berlin, from Cologne, from every point of the
German Empire to the three frontiers of Luxemburg, Belgium, and
France. And, all the while, the band of devoted heroes at Liege held
to their ideal of independence, and Belgium grew to be a bigger
thing in the eyes of the world, as her territory grew hourly smaller
by the encroachment of the German invaders.
French mobilization, in spite of the prompt action in sending the
first half million to the front, became disorganized under the
discovery of the plans of Germany. It will be remembered that the
French railroad systems all center in Paris. Therefore, in order to
divert the troops to what was seen to be the point of attack,
brigades had to be brought back from the Verdun-Belfort district and
transshipped to the north. This, in a word, was the answer to the
question why France did not rush to the aid of Belgium and hurl her
forces at the Germans at the gates of Liege. For that mobilization
they were not ready. The neutrality of Belgium had been considered
as a true military barrier.
A glance at the railroad map of France shows how thoroughly (and
unwisely) France had trusted to this treaty, the treaty that became
famous when it was declared by Germany to be merely a "scrap of
paper," for while there are good transport facilities to the
Franco-German frontier, there were few to the Franco-Belgian
frontier. The motor busses practically saved the day, and nearly all
the French troops went to the northern front by this means of
transport. Still more difficult was the question of munitions. The
German railways brought troops at forty miles an hour, the French
lines carried munitions at forty miles per day. For her German
frontier she was ready. For this new contingency she was unprepared.
For this unpreparedness France paid dearly. Some of her richest
provinces were invaded and held all through the early part of the
war by Germany, almost solely because her transportation of troops
to the crucial point was not effective. The mere presence of the
Germans over so large a section of French territory was due solely
to the rapidity of the German mobilization, which was the result of
long years of preparation. Even behind the Belgian screen France did
not move rapidly enough to save herself, only barely rapidly enough
to save Paris. The plan of General Joffre, which entailed a gradual
retreat to let the Germans expand far from their base, while the
French concentrated between the border and Paris, was a move
determined, not by any special theory of war, nor yet by special
configuration of the country, but by the slowness of mobilization.
The initial success of Germany was a victory of thorough
preparedness, the initial defeats of the French army were the
results of military preparedness hampered by politics.
As the campaign developed, the mobilization of the Germans on the
west front was seen to have a double purpose. The armies of Von
Kluck were to hold Belgium and the north of France, while the armies
of the crown prince were to march through Luxemburg and batter down
the Verdun-Belfort line. It has been shown how the rapid
mobilization and gallant defense of Liege by the Belgians delayed
the former. Without aircraft it was more than possible that, behind
the screen of the forests of Luxemburg, France might not have known
what forces were being concentrated on that frontier, and might have
weakened the line to rush troops against Von Kluck. But the French
aviators, who are the best in the world, were able to fly over the
territory of Germany and Luxemburg where troops were mobilizing, and
the information they sent down was sufficiently alarming to keep
France from weakening the Franco-German fortress-defended line too
seriously. This, again, handicapped France from being able to go to
the support of Belgium. The dramatic plan of the crown prince's
hammering march to Paris failed absolutely and completely by the
successful defense of Verdun.
[Illustration: German-French Frontier, Fortresses of.]
CHAPTER XXVII
BRITAIN--RUSSIA--AUSTRIA
The initial mobilization of Great Britain was a matter as well
managed as that of Germany. For precision there was nothing to
choose as between them. Yet, comparing the German and British
mobilizations, one thing stands out clearly, viz., that Germany was
ready and Britain unready, while, on the other hand, Germany had to
move 4,000,000 men and England only 100,000. To offset this, Britain
had to mobilize stores and supplies, not only for her own 100,000
expeditionary force, but for a large part of the armies of France
and for all the armies of Belgium. Even the very motor busses that
carried French troops from Paris to the Belgian frontier were
largely English, two cargoes of 100 vehicles each being rushed
across the English Channel on the same day.
The food question for the Belgian army and for the French armies on
the Belgian frontier was acute at the opening of the war, France was
ready and prepared to handle any eventuality in the way of supplies
that might be needed on the Belfort-Verdun line, but she was not
prepared for the conditions in the rear of the Belgian frontier.
Britain came to the support of France and Belgium without a day's
delay. She rushed food and munitions to the front, and on one
occasion Kitchener fed two French army corps, or 80,000 troops, for
eleven days without the slightest hitch. A moment's thought will
show that this means not only the ability to send food, but also to
organize the entire mechanism of the preparing and handling of that
food.
This was made possible largely by what was known in Britain as the
motor-lorry system, unlike that of any other army, introduced in
1911. Horse transport was relegated solely to the work of
distributing, the conveyance of supplies to the areas occupied being
performed wholly by motor transport. As the daily run of a motor
lorry may be put at 100 miles, it follows that an army could advance
fifty miles from its railhead and still be easily served with food
and ammunition. Thus, for the first time in the history of war, the
British army had devised a system whereby fresh meat and bread could
be supplied daily to a distant army. If, as the Germans declared,
the British soldier thought more of his food than fight, this desire
at least had the effect of keeping the supply system to the topmost
notch. The same principle was used for ammunition columns, in no
case any of the men from the front being detailed in the work of
looking after munitions or supplies. Thus, while British
mobilization of men consisted mainly of the expeditionary force of
100,000, the British mobilization of auxiliary columns for aiding
the supply system of the Belgian and French army was of a size large
enough to look after several corps. By this means, recruits could be
constantly forwarded to the field of war, secure in the knowledge
that no matter how rapidly men were rushed to the front, the
question of supplies was already considered and the requisites were
in place awaiting the use of the new troops.
England's mobilization, especially when it is remembered that after
the first 150,000 it was all volunteers, was a marvelous thing. How
many men were sent no one could tell but Kitchener, and if ever a
man was born with a gift for telling nothing, that man is Kitchener.
How steadily recruits poured over no one knew. Officially, only
enough men were sent to fill up the losses in the 150,000, but
before the end of the year England's trained forces were immense.
The details of the mobilization of that first 100,000 men (the first
group of the expeditionary force) were marvelous. The railroads
running to the southeast were put into Government hands, trains were
scheduled at twelve minutes' distance apart, to run day and night,
every troop train was on schedule, and every one was unloaded and
out of the depot in time for the next train to pull in, every
transport was at the dock waiting, with another ready to take her
place, and the expeditionary force was in Boulogne in less than
forty-eight hours after the first mobilization order had been sent
out. It is not to be forgotten that Britain commandeered every ship
she needed from her huge mercantile marine, and thus had transports
not only for troops but also for supplies.
For a moment one may glance at a side issue, but an important one in
the mobilization, namely the mobilization of horses. The French
bought horses by the thousand in Texas. Yet English farriers
inspected them, paid for them, put them in charge of their own men
on their own ships, landed them in England or Bordeaux, fed them
into prime condition at England's own expense, and then delivered
them to the French battle line ready for service. In the first week
of the war the total output of the English rifle factories was
10,000 rifles a week (a rifle will shoot well for only 4,000
rounds), by the seventh week of the war there were eleven factories
with a weekly output of 40,000 rifles each, and more being built on
every hand. In addition to this, between August and December, 1914,
English money mobilized--it is the word--rifle orders in the United
States to the extent of $650,000,000. It is a matter of knowledge
that many of the Russian munition orders were either financed or
indorsed by British capital. In a word, while England's military
mobilization of her regular troops was rapid and efficient, and
while her recruiting of volunteers was the greatest support of the
principles of a volunteer army that could ever be imagined, the
chief importance and the chief wonder of Britain's mobilization was
her mobilization of commerce and of trade. She made it possible for
French soldiers to be used at their full power, and France's
perennial weakness--supply organization--was supplemented by that
very thing which is the British army's chief boast.
It is time, now, to turn to the eastern theatre of war, and there
the diplomatic questions underlying mobilization become excessively
intertwined. All European powers watch each other like falcons above
their prey, in the constant endeavor to discern the slightest sign
of unusual military activity. The tornado of conflicting reports at
the end of July, 1914, as to which power had begun mobilizing first,
as to whether army maneuvers were a cloak for mobilization, as to
whether activity in arsenals was not a threat or as to the
manipulation of finances, were all due to a single thing--the
knowledge that a week's advantage in mobilization might mean a huge
advantage, an advantage in position so great that thousands of
lives might be lost because of the two days' delay. It has been
shown how the conquest of France's richest northern provinces by
Germany was due to the difference in speed of mobilization. There
was a great deal of misunderstanding on the part of the American
public about this very importance of mobilization. "Supposing Russia
did mobilize first, or Austria," people said, "what about it? No one
has declared war." Mobilization is like two western desperadoes
watching each other. They do not wait until the other man has drawn
his gun and has them covered, but trouble begins at the slightest
move toward the hip pocket. Any move toward mobilization is a move
toward a nation's hip pocket.
[Illustration: German Confederation of 1815.]
Germany did not dare to let Russia mobilize. Had a large Russian
army been concentrated in Poland, had Russia been allowed to
intrench herself on the Austrian frontier, had she had the
opportunity at the beginning of the war to seize the fortress of
Thorn and to secure control of the Vistula River, there would have
been little to stop the armies of the czar from marching into
Berlin. General mobilization by one power, therefore, absolutely
compels countermobilization by another power, and unless diplomatic
agreements are speedily made and the mobilization checked, it is a
prelude to war.
The diplomatic interpretations of the discussion over mobilization
have been dealt with elsewhere, but it may be summarily said here
that Austria was the first of the great powers to begin mobilization
in the first part of July, in order to frighten Serbia into
submission in the controversy that arose from the assassination of
the Austrian Crown Prince at Sarajevo (in Bosnia, Austria) on June
28, 1914. Serbia mobilized, and it was generally believed that this
action was due to Serbia's knowledge that Russia was secretly
mobilizing. By about July 10, 1914, Germany believed herself
satisfied that Russia was actually mobilizing, and she also began
secretly to do so. France became suspicious of German military
activity, and by the end of the third week and the beginning of the
fourth week in July a general, but unadmitted, military preparation
was in progress. Actual and admitted mobilization is more or less
arbitrarily placed as of August 1, 1914, which date is now
generally regarded as the opening of the Great War.
In any consideration of Russian mobilization it will be remembered
that Russia had three armies, not one, to mobilize, i. e., the
armies of European Russia, of the Asiatic Russia, and of the
Caucasus. It is also to be remembered that, unlike the German system
in which every man has a definite place in a particular corps, the
Russian system holds its reserves as reserves solely, and organizes
them after they have been gathered together. Slow mobilization is
therefore an evil not to be avoided. For this reason one must expect
to find Russian mobilization occurring, not on the frontier, but at
a point sufficiently far therefrom to be safe from hostile attack
during the period of disorganization.
The line Bialystok-Brest-Litovsk was the main field selected,
because of its central location between the Austro-German frontiers,
and more particularly because it was well covered from attack by the
intrenched fortress and camp of Warsaw. The troops and reserves from
Little Russia, especially from the Kiev district, were readily
available on lines converging to the Austrian city of Lemberg in
Galicia, and, it was estimated, could take the front in ten days.
From this district five army corps are raised. From the Odessa
district to the south two more army corps could be counted upon, and
these could reach the scene of operations in twelve or thirteen
days. In actual speed of mobilization the Austrian army was ready
first, but the Russian army protected and covered the slow
mobilization and concentration of its forces by a dense curtain of
cavalry masses, for which task the rapidly mobilized Cossack cavalry
was especially well fitted. These cavalry engagements--for the
Russians were met by the Hungarian cavalry--effectually screened the
actual gathering of the armies, and led Austria into the error of
supposing Russia to be quite unready. But, although Austria had been
the first to begin actual mobilization, her strategic railways on
the frontier were so poor that it was not until August 10, 1914,
that she was ready to advance, and even then that single line of
railroad running from the Bug to the Vistula was deficient in
rolling stock. Austrian military organization was excellent,
Hungarian railroad organization was utterly inadequate to cope with
the sudden requirements of modern warfare.
The Austrian army advanced on Russia in force, expecting the success
of the German armies to the east. From the plans as they developed,
and particularly from railroad orders given to the lines crossing
Germany, it was expected that before Russia could be mobilized
sufficiently to do more than give a temporary check to the Austrian
army, several German army corps could be released from the western
front and sent to the Russian border to take the burden of Russian
invasion away from Austria. But the resistance of Belgium against
Von Kluck's armies, the resistance of France against the armies of
the crown prince, and the resistance of England to all naval action,
prevented any release of the German armies, and the mobilization
orders for the transference of German troops from the western
theatre to the eastern theatre of war during the first few weeks of
the struggle proved to be unavailing, for the men could not be
spared. Slowly but heavily the mobilization of Russian forces
continued. Lacking strategic railroads, lacking the motor-lorry
system of England, the heavy-footed but untiring Russian infantry
marched the scores and hundreds of miles from their homes to the
front. The Russian dirigibles and aeroplanes were more than a match
for the Austrian aircraft, and kept them back from flying over the
country to determine the number of forces opposing. Then the action
of the Russian "steam roller" began, and with more men marching in
every day, unwearied despite their long travel, the steam roller
gathered force. But, in one regard, Russia had miscalculated. She
had never contemplated the terrific wastage of ammunition that is
required for modern artillery duels, gun conflicts that are
necessary before troops can advance, and in the first few weeks of
the war her ammunition was all shot away. Without ammunition the
steam roller could not continue, and the advance of the Russians
upon Austrian territory was first halted and then driven back. Here,
again, then, was a campaign successfully begun because of a better
mobilization of men than was expected, and lost because of a lack of
mobilization of supplies.
A great deal has been said of the slowness of Russian mobilization,
and much of it is undoubtedly true. But little has been said about
the steadiness of Russian mobilization. The Russian officer, almost
always a noble, and belonging to what is probably the most polished
and most cultured class in Europe, an aristocrat to his finger tips,
possesses the power of commanding men, and understands his Slav
soldiers. He knows that no army in the world can begin to compare
with the Russian for enduring hardship, and that no troops in the
world can sustain so large a proportion of loss and still advance.
Forced marches that would kill English troops can be handled by a
Russian army without great fatigue. The principal note in the
gathering of the czar's armies was that day by day, week by week,
from every corner of the empire, men went to the front. It was not
the sudden concentration of Germany, it was not the eager formation
of France, it was not the heroic sturdiness of Belgium, it was not
the accustomedness to active service of the British regulars, it was
a gradual transition of an idealistic people from contemplation into
action.
[Illustration: German-Belgian Frontier, Strategic Railroads on.]
To the Russian, more than to any other of the peoples engaged in the
war, mobilization spells advance, advance in a thousand ways.
Germany, France, and England were practically unchanged in
temperament and viewpoint by the mere processes of mobilization, but
old Russia became new Russia almost within a month. War is the
greatest unifier of racial dissension in the world, and when the
first three months of war were over, the German Empire, the British
Empire, the Republic of France and her colonies, and above all, the
Russian Empire, were welded by the grim forces of necessity into
homogeneous units. Moreover, mobilization and the conditions of war
bring into high relief the powers and the characters of the several
nations, and as the story of the war is told, its developments
portray the changing appreciations of the national combatants for
each other, and of the neutral nations for all.
PART IV--DIPLOMATIC PAPERS RELATING TO THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR,
COLLATED FROM THE OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS
Realizing the importance of presenting its case to the neutral
world, each of the warring nations published its diplomatic
correspondence leading up to the outbreak of the war, at a period
during hostilities when the publication seemed best calculated to
serve the end in view.
THE OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS
British White Papers, July 20 to September 1, 1914.
Belgian Gray Book, April 7, 1914, to September 30, 1914.
German White Book, July 23 to August 4, 1914.
French Yellow Book, March 17, 1913, to September 4, 1914.
Russian Orange Book, July 23 to August 6, 1914.
Serbian Blue Book, June 29 to August 4, 1914.
Austro-Hungarian Red Book, June 29 to August 24, 1914.
Official publications in the press by Great Britain, Russia,
Germany, and Italy, July 30 to December 6, 1914.
Various speeches by officers of the Governments.
It is from these official documents, cast into one form by
rearranging all letters, telegrams, proclamations, speeches, etc.,
in their chronological order, that the following history of the
diplomatic controversy is compiled.
It will be observed that, from the necessity of the case, the books
of the six principal allies against the Teutonic Powers are
threefold in number the books of those powers; and that, from choice
of their promulgators the books of the Teutonic Powers are also
disproportionately less in total volume, owing to the almost entire
absence in them of communications between Austria-Hungary and
Germany; while the correspondence between their adversaries is
presented by these with a fulness which gives the neutral reader the
impression that nothing of importance has been withheld--indeed,
that the Allies (to use for convenience the popular designation of
the anti-Teutonic powers) have laid all their cards face upward on
the table. The intelligent reader will not have to be cautioned that
this is a psychological, rather than logical, inference.
If any prevalent arguments on either side fail to be upheld by the
evidence here given, it will be because this evidence does not
appear in the official documents; the editors feel that their
functions do not warrant their inclusion of pleas or testimony
formed outside of the records mentioned above. The time will not
come until long after the close of the war when the conflicting
claims in the vast amount of propagandial literature issued by both
parties can be judicially weighed by impartial historians, and
presented at the bar of public opinion. In the meantime, however, we
can bring before this court the case as officially presented by the
contesting parties, a "perfect enumeration" of all the available.
The editor acts merely in a reporting capacity. He does not
discriminate between "Trojan and Tyrian," unless it be called
discrimination to refuse by allotment of lesser space to inflict on
the party neglecting fully to present its case a penalty beyond that
which necessarily results, in adverse effect, on the mind of the
reader from this omission.
In brief, the controversy is presented as a case in law. The
evidence is given in the correspondence between ministers of state
and the pleadings are presented in the words of responsible
statesmen, who apply this evidence to the issues in question.
Since the validity of the evidence is based not only on its inherent
motive but on the character and authority of those communicating it,
and the force of the pleadings is even more dependent upon the
character and authority of the advocates, it is necessary at the
outset to state the offices held by the chief representatives of the
parties to the controversy, and to present something of their past
records, especially in the case of the more responsible statesmen.
This will also serve to make graphic the story of the great trial
before the bar of the world; it will visualize it as a contest, man
to man, in which the distance between the combatants is eliminated,
and they seem to be in each other's presence, testifying and arguing
in behalf of their respective causes, as in a case at law. And, when
it is borne in mind that these persons are representative of the
dignity of great and sovereign peoples, the exponents and
conservators of their national and individual rights and
aspirations, their ideas and ideals of civilization, the contest
will gain rather than lose in impressiveness by the concrete form in
which it is presented. The sovereigns and statesmen of the
anti-Teutonic allies are listed first; of the Teutonic allies next,
and a few statesmen of neutral countries who were involved in the
controversy last.
LIST OF SOVEREIGNS AND DIPLOMATS
GREAT BRITAIN
George V, King of Great Britain and Ireland, Emperor of India, and
Sovereign of the entire British Empire.
Haldane, Richard Burdon (Viscount), Lord High Chancellor. Born 1856,
studied German at Göttingen, member Parliament for Haddingtonshire
1885-1911; Secretary of State for War 1905-12; Lord High Chancellor
1912. As Secretary of State for War, Haldane, introduced into his
department several innovations, the knowledge of which he had
acquired during his residence at Göttingen and in his frequent
visits to the Continent. He has been in public life since entering
Parliament in 1885, and, despite his later removal from the office
which he held at the outbreak of the war, is still recognized as one
of Great Britain's most brilliant men. Previous to the war, he was
looked on as an especially warm friend of Germany, and frequently
went to Berlin in the interests of British amity with that country.
Grey, Sir Edward: Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Born April
25, 1862, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1892-95; Secretary
State for Foreign Affairs December, 1905.
Of the conduct of the British Foreign Office since 1906 Gilbert
Murray in his "Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey" ("Clarendon
Press," Oxford, 1915) says:
"In general, Grey is often supposed to represent the principle of
continuity in foreign policy, but this is not quite exact. In
certain very large issues the Liberal Government of 1906 and onward
agreed entirely with the conservative policy of Lord Salisbury
(Prime Minister), and Lord Lansdowne (Foreign Secretary), and
therefore followed their action. On other issues it differed. For
instance, it stopped indentured Chinese labor in the Transvaal, and
it granted immediate self-government to South Africa. But in Europe
the policy has been mostly continuous. The principles are
conveniently stated in the House of Commons debate of foreign policy
on November 27, 1911:
"'1. In my opinion the wise policy for this country is to expand as
little as possible.' 'I say without any hesitation that we do not
desire accessions of territory, and in saying that I am not speaking
for one small section of the House. I believe I am speaking for the
nation at large.' The first sentence comes from Sir Edward Grey, the
second from Mr. Bonar Law (leader of the opposition).
"This is made a little clearer in a latter sentence of Sir Edward
Grey's speech. 'If there are to be changes of territory brought
about by good will and negotiation between other powers, then we are
not an ambitious competing party.... And if it is wise policy not to
go in for great schemes of expansion ourselves, then I think it
would be morally and diplomatically wrong to indulge in a
dog-in-the-manger policy in regard to others.' In particular, he
explains, if Germany wishes, 'by friendly arrangement with other
powers,' to extend her territories, we do not wish to stand in her
way, or to claim 'compensations.'"
Nicholson, Sir Arthur: Permanent Under-Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs.
Bertie, Sir Francis: Ambassador to France. Born August 17, 1844;
private secretary to Hon. R. Bourke (Under-Secretary State), 1874-80;
attached to Embassy, Berlin, 1878; Assistant Under-Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs, 1894; Ambassador to Rome, 1903; Paris, 1905.
Buchanan, Sir George: Ambassador to Russia. Born Copenhagen November
25, 1854; entered Diplomatic Service 1875; Third Secretary, Rome,
1878; Second Secretary, Tokyo, 1879; Second Secretary, Vienna, 1882;
Berne, 1889; British Agent to Venezuela Arbitration Tribunal, 1898;
Secretary Embassy, Rome, 1900; Berlin, 1901-3; Minister
Plenipotentiary, Sofia, 1903-8; Hague, 1908-10; St. Petersburg,
1910.
Goschen, Sir Edward: Ambassador to Germany. Born July 18, 1847;
entered Diplomatic Service, 1869; Attaché, Madrid, 1870; Buenos
Aires, 1873; Second Secretary, Rio de Janeiro, 1877; Constantinople,
1881; Secretary Legation, Peking, 1885; Copenhagen, 1888; Lisbon,
1890; Secretary Embassy, Washington, 1893; St. Petersburg, 1894;
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Belgrade,
1898-1900; Copenhagen, 1900-5; Ambassador, Vienna, 1905-8; Berlin,
1908.
Rumbold, Sir Horace: Counsellor German Embassy and Chargé
d'Affaires. Born February 5, 1869; Attaché, Hague, 1888; Chargé
d'Affaires, Munich, 1908; served at Cairo, Teheran, and Athens;
Counsellor Embassy, Tokyo, 1909; learned in Arabic, Persian, and
Japanese.
De Bunsen, Sir Maurice: Ambassador in Austria. Born January 8, 1852;
entered Diplomatic Service, 1877; Secretary Legation, Tokyo, 1891;
Secretary Embassy, Constantinople, 1897-1902; Paris, 1902-5; Envoy
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Lisbon, 1905;
Ambassador, Madrid, 1906-13; Vienna, 1913.
Beaumont, Henry Dawson: Chargé d'Affaires, Turkey. Born February 4,
1867; entered Diplomatic Service, 1892; served in Copenhagen,
Madrid, Rio de Janeiro, St. Petersburg, and Montenegro; Chargé
d'Affaires, Turkey, 1914.
Villiers, Sir Francis: Minister to Belgium. Born August 13, 1852;
entered Foreign Office, 1870; Assistant Under-Secretary State
Foreign Affairs, 1896-1905; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary, Portugal, 1905-11; Belgium, 1911.
Des Graz, Charles Louis: Minister to Serbia. Born March 2, 1860;
entered Diplomatic Service, 1884; Constantinople, Teheran, Athens;
Counsellor Embassy, Rome, 1905; Chargé d'Affaires, Cettinje, 1906;
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Peru and Ecuador,
1908-13; Minister, Serbia, 1913.
Crackanthorpe, Dayrell Eardley Montague: First Secretary of Legation
to Serbia. Born September 9, 1871; entered Diplomatic Service, 1896;
Madrid, Washington, Brussels, Bucharest, Vienna, Belgrade, 1913.
Rodd, Sir Rennell: Ambassador to Italy. Born November 9, 1858;
entered Diplomatic Service, 1883; Berlin, Athens, Rome, Paris;
Secretary Embassy, Rome, 1901-4; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary, Sweden, 1904-8; Ambassador, Italy, 1908.
[Illustration: Albert I, King of Belgium.]
FRANCE
Poincaré, Raymond: President of the Republic.
Viviani, René: President of the Council, a Minister of Foreign
Affairs, and Premier of the Cabinet. Had been Minister of
Instruction in the Cabinet of Gaston Doumergue, which resigned June
2, 1914; Poincaré asked him at that time to form a cabinet, but
Ambassador Paléologue intimated from St. Petersburg that the Czar
feared a Viviani ministry would modify the three years' military
service law, and therefore another was sought for this position.
After the failure of the Ribot Cabinet on June 12, 1914, he was
again called upon, and, no objections being made, he formed the
ministry acting at the outbreak of the war. After the beginning of
the hostilities he retained the position of President of the Council
without portfolio.
Jonnart, Charles Celestin: Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born
December 27, 1857; Governor General Algiers and Minister of the
Interior.
Pichon, Stephen: Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born August 10, 1857
Diplomatic Service in Hayti, San Domingo, Rio de Janeiro, and at
Peking during the Boxer Rebellion.
Bienvenu-Martin, Jean Baptiste: Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Born July 22, 1847; Minister Instruction, 1905; in public life since
1878.
Doumergue, Gaston: Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born 1863; Minister
Colonies, 1902-5; Commerce, 1906-7; Premier, resigning, June 2,
1914.
Delcassé, Théophile: Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born March 1, 1852;
started life as journalist; Counsellor General; Under-Secretary
Colonies, 1893; Colonial Minister, 1894-5; Foreign Minister,
1898-1905; Minister Marine, 1905-13; Mediator between Spain and the
United States, 1899; Ambassador, St. Petersburg, 1913; Minister
Foreign Affairs, 1913. Is one of the strong men of France; in 1904 was
the French negotiator of the Anglo-French Convention (the "Entene")
concerning Egypt and Morocco; was sacrificed to assuage German feeling
at the time of the Algeciras conference; called the "Deadly Enemy of
Germany."
Berthelot: Political Director.
Cambon, Paul; Ambassador to Great Britain. Born January 20, 1843;
Ambassador Madrid, Constantinople, and at London, 1898.
Fleuriau, M. De: Chargé d'Affaires, London.
De Manneville: Chargé d'Affaires, Germany. Born February 27, 1865;
entered Diplomatic Service at Berlin, 1893; later at London; a
Minister of the First Class in 1904.
Paléologue, Maurice: Ambassador to Russia. Born January 13, 1859;
served in Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service at Rome, Berlin,
Peking, Korea, and in Bulgaria.
Cambon, Jules: Ambassador to Germany. Born April 5, 1845; entered
Diplomatic Service, 1874; Ambassador, Washington, 1897; Madrid,
1902; Berlin, 1907.
Allizé: Minister at Munich, Germany.
Ronssin, P.: Consul General at Frankfort, Germany.
Dumaine, Chilhaud: Ambassador to Austria-Hungary.
d'Apchier-le-Maugin: Consul General at Budapest.
Bompard, Maurice: Ambassador to Turkey. Born May 17, 1854; Minister,
First Class, 1898; Ambassador to Russia, 1902.
Klokowski, Antony: Minister to Belgium. Born September 23, 1855;
served at Yokohoma, Calcutta, and Bangkok.
Boppé, Jules: Minister to Serbia. Born June 26, 1862; entered
Diplomatic Service, 1890; served at Constantinople and St.
Petersburg.
Barrère, Camille: Ambassador to Italy.
Bapst, Constant: Minister to Holland.
Mollard, Armard: Minister to Luxemburg.
Chevalley: Minister to Norway.
Thiébaut, Eugene: Minister to Sweden.
Farges: Consul General at Basle, Switzerland.
RUSSIA
Nicholas II: Emperor (Czar).
Sazonof: Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Suchomlinof, Vladimir Alexandrovitch: Minister for war. In 1890 at
the age of forty-eight Suchomlinof was made a major general, and in
1904 became commander of Russia's most important military
zone--Kiev. In 1909 he was appointed to the post which he has since
relinquished, and the amazing rapidity with which Russia mobilized
her army in August, 1914, can be accredited to the methods which he
instituted. As a writer he is known as "Shpioa" (Spur), and is the
biographer of Peter the Great, Frederick the Great, and Murat.
Benckendorff, Count A.: Ambassador to Great Britain. Born in Berlin,
August 1, 1849; entered Diplomatic Service, 1869; served at Rome,
Vienna; Minister Copenhagen, 1897-1903; Ambassador London, 1903.
Isvolsky, Alexander P.: Ambassador to France; was Russian negotiator
of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 regarding Persia,
Afghanistan, and Tibet.
Swastopoulo: Chargé d'Affaires, France.
Swereiev, S. N.: Ambassador to Germany.
Broniersky, A.: Chargé d'Affaires, Germany.
Schebeko, N.: Ambassador to Austria-Hungary.
Koudacheff, Prince Nicholas: Chargé d'Affaires, Austria-Hungary.
Salviatti, A.: Consul General at Fiume.
Kazansky: Acting Consul General at Prague.
Strandtman: Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia.
BELGIUM
Albert: King of the Belgians.
Davignon, M. J.: Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Elst, van der, Baron: Secretary General.
Renkin, J.: Colonial Minister.
Lalaing H. de, Count: Minister to Great Britain. Entered Foreign
Office, 1879; served Vienna, Bucharest, Berlin, Hague, London;
Minister, Brazil, 1893; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary, Bucharest, 1898; Berne, 1899; London, 1903.
Guillaume, Baron: Minister to France.
Beyens, Baron: Minister to Germany.
De Dudzeele, Errembault, Count: Minister to Austria-Hungary.
De Welle, Michotte, Baron: Minister to Serbia.
Grenier, A., Baron: Minister to Spain.
Fallon, Baron: Minister to Holland.
SERBIA
Peter Karageorgevitch: King.
Pashitch, Nikola P.: Prime Minister. In 1878, at the age of
thirty-two, M. Pashitch entered the Serbian Parliament, and in three
years he became leader of the "Old Radicals." Always a champion of
liberty, he joined the Zayenchar Mutiny of 1883, and, of twenty-two,
he alone escaped execution by flight. Upon his return he was
appointed Mayor of Belgrade and in 1893 Minister to Russia, where he
made a lasting impression. In 1899 he was again accused of hatching
a conspiracy, but Russia served him well and intervention saved
him. To him, in no slight degree, does Serbia owe Russia's
friendship, and to his efforts has been attributed the Balkan
Alliance.
Patchou, Dr. Laza: Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs.
Boschkovitch: Minister to Great Britain.
Vesnitch, M. R.: Minister to France.
Spalaikovitch, Dr. M.: Minister to Russia.
Yovanovitch, Dr. M.: Chargé d'Affaires in Germany.
Yovanovitch, Yov. M.: Minister to Austria-Hungary.
Georgevitch, M.: Chargé d'Affaires in Turkey.
Michailovitch, Ljub: Minister to Italy.
ITALY
Victor Emmanuel (Vittorio Emanuele) III.: King.
San Giuliano, Antonio di, Marquis: Minister Foreign Affairs. Born
Catania, December 10, 1852; Mayor Catania, 1879; member Chamber
Deputies, 1882-1904; Senate, 1904; Under-Secretary for Industry and
Commerce, 1892-3; Minister Posts and Telegraph, 1899-1900; Minister
Foreign Affairs, 1905-6; Ambassador, London, 1906-10; Minister
Foreign Affairs, 1910. His opposition to war with Austria
precipitated his downfall. Said to be the repository of more
European secrets than any European statesman since Bismarck.
D'Avarna, Duke: Ambassador to Austria-Hungary.
Salandra: Premier. Appointed November 5, 1914.
Sonnino, Baron Sidney: Minister Foreign Affairs. Born March 11,
1847; entered Diplomatic Service, 1867; Parliament, 1880; Minister
Finance, 1893-4; Treasury, 1894-96; Interior, 1906 and 1909-10;
Foreign Affairs, November 5, 1914.
JAPAN
Yoshihito: Emperor.
Shigenobu Okuma, Count: Prime Minister.
Takaaki Kato, Baron: Minister Foreign Affairs.
GERMANY
William (Wilhelm) II.: Kaiser of Germany, King of Prussia.
Bethmann-Hollweg, Dr. Theobald von: Imperial Chancellor. Born
November 29, 1856, at Hohenfinow, Brandenburg; entered Civil
Service, 1879; Prussian Minister Interior, 1905; Imperial Secretary
of State and Vice President of Prussian Council, 1907; Imperial
Chancellor, 1909; member of Reichstag since 1890. His actions before
the present war seemed to indicate an earnest desire for the peace
of Europe; he appeared to oppose the military party and align
himself with the moderates. His manner is frank to the point of
bluffness.
Jagow, Gottlieb von: Secretary of State. Born June 26, 1863; entered
Diplomatic Service, 1895, at Rome; Minister to Rome, 1907;
Ambassador, 1908; Minister Foreign Affairs, 1913; credited with
postponing the inevitable conflict between Italy and Austria while
at Rome.
Zimmerman, von: Under-Secretary of State. Appointed 1911; previously
Vice Consul Shanghai; Consul at Tientsin and in Diplomatic Corps.
Lichnowsky, Prince Karl Maximilian: Ambassador to Great Britain.
Born 1860; Attaché, London, 1885; Counsellor Embassy, Vienna;
Foreign Office, Berlin; Ambassador to London, 1912. Member Roman
Catholic party. Did all he could to prevent rupture between Great
Britain and Germany. Was very popular in England.
Schoen, Baron Wilhelm von: Ambassador to France. Born June 3, 1851;
entered Diplomatic Service, 1877; Madrid, Hague, Athens, Berne,
Paris, Copenhagen, St. Petersburg; Ambassador, Paris, 1910.
Pourtalès, Count Frederic: Ambassador to Russia. Born October 24,
1853; appointed St. Petersburg, 1908.
Tschirschky, Heinrich von: Ambassador to Austria-Hungary. Born
August 15, 1858; entered Diplomatic Service, 1873; Constantinople,
Vienna, St. Petersburg; Ambassador to Vienna, 1907.
Below Saleske, Konrad von: Minister to Belgium. Born April 18, 1866;
Secretary Legation, Athens; Ambassador, Constantinople, 1907.
Storck, von: Secretary Legation in Serbia.
Flotow, Hans von: Ambassador to Italy. Born September 10, 1862;
entered Diplomatic Service, 1893; Second Secretary Legation,
Washington, Hague, Paris.
Buch, von: Minister to Luxemburg.
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
Francis Joseph (Franz Josef): Emperor.
Berchtold, Count Leopold: Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Born April 18, 1863; saw Diplomatic Service in Paris. London;
Ambassador to St. Petersburg, 1906; appointed Secretary of State,
1914; emulated his predecessor, Count d'Herenthal, the annexor of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, in strong foreign policy.
Macchio, Dr. K., Baron: Under-Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs.
Forgach, Count: Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Diplomatic Service in Belgrade and Dresden.
Tisza, Count Stephen: President of the Ministry of Hungary. Born
April 22, 1861; served as President Ministry, 1903-06.
Mensdorff, A.: Ambassador to Great Britain. Born September 5, 1861;
Diplomatic Service in Paris, London, St. Petersburg; Secretary
Ambassador, London, 1896-1904; Minister Plenipotentiary, 1903-04;
Ambassador, 1904.
Szécsen, Count Nicolaus: Ambassador to France.
Szápáry, Count Josef: Ambassador to Russia.
Czernin, Count Jaromir: Chargé d'Affaires, Russia.
Szögyény, Count Ladislaus: Ambassador to Germany.
Zehlitschka: Consul General in Turkey.
Clary, S., Count: Minister to Belgium.
Giesl von Gieslingen, Baron: Minister to Serbia.
Hoflehner: Consular Agent at Nish, Serbia.
TURKEY
Mohammed V: Sultan.
Said Halim Pasha, Prince: Grand Vizier.
Tewfik Pasha: Ambassador to Great Britain.
NEUTRAL NATIONS
Loudon: Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Eyschen, Dr.: Minister of State and President of the Government of
Luxemburg.
Gerard, James Watson: American Ambassador to Germany.
Penfield, Frederic Courtland: American Ambassador to
Austria-Hungary.
Whitlock, Brand: American Minister to Belgium.
* * * * *
It will be convenient for the reader, before entering into the
diplomatic history of the war, to have before him the dates of the
war marking diplomatic crises.
IMPORTANT DATES PRECEDING THE WAR
June 28, 1914. Assassination of Austrian hereditary Archduke Franz
Ferdinand at Sarajevo, Bosnia.
July 23, 1914. Austria-Hungary hands note to Serbia.
July 24, 1914. Russia proposes extension of time limit in note;
decides on mobilization in South Bosnia; and seeks unconditional
support of Great Britain in conflict with Austria-Hungary. Great
Britain proposes four-power intervention.
July 25, 1914. Austria-Hungary sends memorandum to powers containing
_dossier_ of evidence discovered at Sarajevo trial, and declares
dispute lies wholly between her and Serbia. Serbia replies to note,
having previously ordered mobilization. Austro-Hungarian Legation
leaves Belgrade. Germany refuses to enter mediation between
Austria-Hungary and Serbia, wishing to "localize" the conflict, and
proposes mediation of powers between Russia and Austria-Hungary.
Russia mobilizes fourteen army corps on Austro-Hungarian frontier.
Great Britain asks Austria-Hungary to extend time limit and suspend
hostilities pending four-power conference.
July 26, 1914. Russia proposes direct conversations to
Austria-Hungary. France and Italy accept four-power conference in
London.
July 27, 1914. William II returns from Norway cruise to Potsdam.
Austria-Hungary informs Russia she will respect Serbian integrity
and independence. Russia agrees to four-power conference if direct
negotiations with Austria-Hungary fail.
July 28, 1914. Austria-Hungary breaks off direct negotiations with
Russia; refuses four-power mediation; declares war on Serbia, and
mobilizes eight army corps. Russia begins partial mobilization.
Great Britain asks Germany her plan of mediation between Russia and
Austria-Hungary.
July 29, 1914. Germany attempts to secure neutrality of Great
Britain in case of Austro-Hungarian and Russian war. Great Britain
warns Germany that if France is involved in war she will support
her.
July 30, 1914. Austria-Hungary, advised by Germany, agrees to resume
negotiations with Russia, but not on basis of Serbian reply. Germany
asks Russia's explanation of her mobilization. Russia agrees to stop
mobilization if Austria-Hungary respects Serbian sovereignty. After
negotiations with Austria-Hungary, Russia orders general
mobilization of army and navy. France reminds Great Britain of her
naval agreement. Great Britain refuses Germany's proposal that she
remain neutral if French territory in Europe is respected, and
proposes that Germany occupy Belgrade and force mediation by the
powers.
July 31, 1914. Austria-Hungary accepts Anglo-German proposal for
four-power mediation on basis of temporary prosecution of military
measures against Serbia. Russia agrees to take no military action
pending negotiations. Germany refuses to press Austria-Hungary so
long as Russia mobilizes; sends ultimatum to Russia and France, and
refuses to answer about respecting neutrality of Belgium. France
agrees to respect this neutrality.
August 1, 1914. Austria orders general mobilization, but continues
discussion with Russia, and gives way on only point remaining at
issue. Germany orders general mobilization and declares war on
Russia. France orders general mobilization. Great Britain refuses
Germany's request to secure French neutrality in Russo-German war,
and to remain neutral herself if Germany respect Belgian neutrality.
Belgium declares she will uphold neutrality. Italy decides to remain
neutral.
August 2, 1914. Great Britain agrees to give naval aid to France in
event of German attack. Germany sends ultimatum to Belgium about
passage of troops. German troops enter Luxemburg.
August 3, 1914. Germany declares war on France and bids for British
neutrality by offering not to attack northern French coast nor use
Belgium and Dutch ports as bases. Great Britain refuses offer.
Belgium refuses Germany's ultimatum.
August 4, 1914. Germany sends second ultimatum to Belgium,
threatening force, and offers Great Britain not to annex Belgian
territory. Great Britain demands that Germany respect Belgian
neutrality, and in default of reply declares war on Germany.
August 5, 1914. Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia.
August 6, 1914. Montenegro declares war on Austria-Hungary.
August 9, 1914. Serbia declares war on Germany.
August 10, 1914. France declares war on Austria-Hungary.
August 12, 1914. Great Britain declares war on Austria-Hungary.
August 12, 1914. Montenegro declares war on Germany.
August 23, 1914. Japan declares war on Germany.
August 27, 1914. Austria-Hungary declares war on Japan.
August 28, 1914. Austria-Hungary declares war on Belgium.
November 3, 1914. Russia declares war on Turkey.
November 5, 1914. France and Great Britain declare war on Turkey.
May 23, 1915. Italy declares war on Austria-Hungary.
June 3, 1915. San Marino declares war on Austria-Hungary.
August 20, 1915. Italy declares war on Turkey.
October 14, 1915. Bulgaria declares war on Serbia.
October 15, 1915. Great Britain declares war on Bulgaria.
October 19, 1915. Russia and Italy declare war on Bulgaria.
WARNINGS OF HOSTILE INTENTIONS
The first evidence presented before the court of nations was that of
France, in regard to the hostile intentions of Germany. To this
Germany has made no official answer in the form of documentary
evidence, and any inference as to the hostile intentions of France
against Germany, if there were any, must be inferred by the reader
without any help from cross-examination by the official advocates of
Germany. The value of the French evidence must be judged by later
events. Have they, or have they not, corroborated the anticipations
of France, held for a year before the war, as to an attack upon her
by Germany?
On March 17, 1913, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin,
wrote to M. Jonnart, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris,
transmitting reports by French military and naval attachés in Berlin
to their respective French departments on German military affairs,
and called his attention to the importance of the documents. Delay,
he said, in the publication of the reports was due to lack of funds
wherewith to provide for these military measures. The rich classes
objected to a forced levy in times of peace, and the Federal states
to the Imperial Government adopting direct taxation which had
heretofore been reserved to them.
"However this may be, in increasing the strength of the German
army the empire desires to leave nothing to chance in the event
of a possible crisis.
"The German changes have produced a result unexpected by that
country, viz., the proposal of the Government of the [French]
Republic to reestablish the three years' service, and the manly
determination with which this proposal has been welcomed in
France. The surprise occasioned by these proposals of insisting
on the absolute necessity of an increase of German military
strength; the German proposals are represented as a reply to our
own. The reverse is the case, since the immense military effort
which France is undertaking is but the consequence of German
initiative.
"The Imperial Government is constantly rousing patriotic
sentiment. Every day the emperor delights to revive memories of
1813. Yesterday evening a military tattoo went through the
streets of Berlin, speeches were delivered in which the present
situation was compared to that of a hundred years ago.... It was
of course to be expected that national patriotism would be worked
up just when fresh sacrifices are being required, but to compare
the present time to 1813 is to misuse an historical analogy. If,
to-day, there is anything corresponding to the movement which a
hundred years ago roused Germans to fight the man of genius who
aspired to universal dominion, it is in France that such a
counterpart would have to be sought, since the French nation
seeks but to protect itself against the domination of force.
"Nevertheless, it is true that the state of public opinion in
both countries makes the situation grave."
The first inclosure in M. Cambon's letter was the report of
Lieutenant Colonel Serret. He speaks of a "virulent" article in the
"Kölnische Zeitung" ("Cologne Gazette") on the menace of France,
which, though immediately disavowed by the Government, cannot be
disregarded, since its sentiments have been approved by other
prominent newspapers, and it appears to express a "real feeling"
among the people, a "latent anger." It throws light on the present
German armaments.
"For some time now it has been quite a common thing to meet
people who declare that the military plans of France are
extraordinary and unjustified. In a drawing room a member of the
Reichstag who is not a fanatic, speaking of the three years'
service in France, went so far as to say: 'It is a provocation;
we will not allow it.' More moderate persons, military and civil,
glibly voice the opinion that France with her 40,000,000
inhabitants has no right to compete in this way with Germany.
"To sum up, people are angry, and this anger is not caused by the
shrieking of certain French papers, to which sober-minded people
pay little attention. It is a case of vexation. People are angry
at realizing that in spite of the enormous effort made last year,
continued and even increased this year, it will probably not be
possible this time to outrun France completely.
"To outdistance us, since we neither will nor can be allied with
her, is Germany's real aim....
"At the moment when German military strength is on the point of
acquiring that final superiority which, should the occasion
arise, would force us to submit to humiliation or destruction,
France suddenly refuses to abdicate, and shows, as Renan said:
'her eternal power of renaissance and resurrection.' The disgust
of Germany can well be understood.
"Of course the Government points to the general situation in
Europe and speaks of the 'Slav Peril.' As far as I can see,
however, public opinion really seems indifferent to this
'Peril,' and yet it has accepted with a good grace, if not with
welcome, the enormous burdens of these two successive laws....
"To sum up, if public opinion does not actually point at France,
as does the 'Kölnische Zeitung,' we are in fact, and shall long
remain the nation aimed at. Germany considers that for our
40,000,000 of inhabitants our place in the sun is really too
large.
"Germans wish for peace--so they keep on proclaiming, and the
emperor more than anyone--but they do not understand peace as
involving either mutual concessions or a balance of armaments.
They want to be feared and they are at present engaged in making
the necessary sacrifices. If on some occasion their national
vanity is wounded, the confidence which the country will feel in
the enormous superiority of its army will be favorable to an
explosion of national anger, in the face of which the moderation
of the Imperial Government will perhaps be powerless.
"It must be emphasized again that the Government is doing
everything to increase patriotic sentiment by celebrating with
éclat all the various anniversaries of 1813.
"The trend of public opinion would result in giving a war a more
or less national character. By whatever pretext Germany should
justify the European conflagration, nothing can prevent the first
decisive blows being struck at France."
The second inclosure in M. Cambon's letter is the report of M. de
Faramond, Naval Attaché. He says that there will be no increase in
the German fleet this year, and that the whole military effort will
be directed against France.
By October 1, 1914, the imperial army will be increased from 720,000
to 860,000 men, and proposed legislation will place the army corps
near the French frontier most nearly on a war footing, in order on
the very day of the outbreak of hostilities to attack us suddenly
with forces very much stronger than our own. It is absolutely
imperative for the Imperial Government to obtain success at the very
outset of the operations....
"William II cannot allow a retreat to enter into his
calculations, although the German soldier is no longer to-day
what he was forty years ago, a plain religious man, ready to die
at the order of his king. When it is remembered that at the last
elections 4,000,000 votes were cast by the Socialists and that
the franchise is only obtained in Germany at the age of
twenty-five, it may be presumed that the active army, composed of
young men from twenty to twenty-five, must contain in its ranks a
considerable proportion of Socialists.
"It would indeed be foolish to think that the German Socialists
will throw down their rifles on the day when France and Germany
come to blows; but it will be very important that the Imperial
Government should persuade them that on the one hand we are the
aggressors, and on the other that they can have entire confidence
in the direction of the campaign and its final result....
"And it is because a German defeat at the outset would have such
an incalculable effect on the empire that we find in all the
plans worked out by the general staff proposals for a crushing
offensive movement against France.
"In reality the Imperial Government wishes to be in a position to
meet all possible eventualities. It is from the direction of
France that the danger seems to them greatest....
"In this connection I think it is interesting to quote a
conversation which a member of our embassy had the other evening
with the old Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck, as it may serve to
reflect the opinions which dominate court circles.
"Referring to the new German military proposals Prince
Donnersmarck spoke as follows:
"'French people are quite wrong in thinking that we harbor evil
designs and want war. But we cannot forget that in 1870 popular
opinion forced the French Government to make a foolish attack on
us before they were ready. Who can assure us that public opinion,
which in France is so easily inflamed, will not force the
Government to declare war? It is against this danger that we wish
to protect ourselves.'"
The prince, a veteran of the French war, expressed the opinion that
Germany would again conquer France in event of another war.
"Frenchmen, who have a great facility for work, are not as
punctual as Germans in the fulfillment of their duty. In the
coming war that nation will be victorious whose servants from the
top of the ladder to the bottom will do their duty with absolute
exactitude, however important or small it may be. And Prince
Donnersmarck added: 'An exactitude which played so great a rôle
forty years ago in moving an army of 500,000 men will have a far
greater importance in the next war, when it will be a question of
moving masses far more numerous.'
"In this way the old prince gave expression to the confidence
shared by all Germans in the superiority of their military
organization."
The attaché then discusses German finances.
He mentions particularly the large loans raised by the empire and
Prussia: 500,000,000 marks on January 29, 1912, and 350,000,000
marks on March 7, 1913. Quite an important part of these loans
must have been applied to military expenses.
"The military law of 1913 will require quite exceptional
financial measures.
"According to the indications given by the semiofficial press,
the 'nonrecurring' expenditure will amount to a milliard marks,
while the 'permanent' annual expenditure resulting from the
increase of effectives will exceed 200,000,000 marks.
"It seems certain that the 'nonrecurring' expenditure will be
covered by a war contribution levied on capital. Small fortunes
would be exempted and those above 20,000 marks would be subject
to a progressive tax. Presented in this guise the war tax would
not be objected to by the Socialists, who will be able, in
accordance with their usual tactics, to reject the principle of
the military law and at the same time to pass the votes which
assure its being carried into effect."
The attaché then discusses a subject already mentioned--the
persuasion of the rich and bourgeois classes by the Government to
submit to the increased taxation by "noisy celebrations of the
centenary of the War of Independence" in order to convince them of
the necessity of sacrifice, and to remind them that France is
to-day, as 100 years ago, their hereditary enemy.
"If it is established that the German Government are doing their
utmost to secure that the payment of this enormous tax should be
made in full, and not by way of installment, and if, as some of
the newspapers say, the whole payment is to be complete before
July 1, 1914, these facts have a formidable significance for us,
for nothing can explain such haste on the part of the military
authorities to obtain war treasure in cash to the amount of a
milliard."
On April 2, 1913, M. Etienne, French Minister of War, wrote to M.
Jonnart, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, enclosing a German
official secret report concerning strengthening of the army. This
report is interesting in that it mentions knowledge that, as a
result of her entente with France and Russia, Great Britain was
prepared to send an expeditionary force of 100,000 to the Continent,
and confesses that Germany refrained from declaring war on France at
the time of the Agadir incident because of "the progress made by the
French army, the moral recovery of the nation, and the technical
advance in the realm of aviation and of machine guns."
"Public opinion is being prepared for a new increase in the
active army, which would ensure Germany an honorable peace and
the possibility of properly ensuring her influence in the affairs
of the world. The new army law and the supplementary law which
should follow will enable her almost completely to attain this
end....
"Neither ridiculous shriekings for revenge by French chauvinists,
nor the Englishmen's gnashing of teeth, nor the wild gestures of
the Slavs will turn us from our aim of protecting and extending
_Deutschtum_ (German influence) all the world over.
"The French may arm as much as they wish, they cannot in one day
increase their population. The employment of an army of black men
in the theatre of European operations will remain for a long
time a dream, and in any case be devoid of beauty.
"Our new army law is only an extension of the military education
of the German nation. Our ancestors of 1813 made greater
sacrifices. It is our sacred duty to sharpen the sword that has
been put into our hands and to hold it ready for defense as well
as for offense. _We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of
our people that our armaments are an answer to the armaments and
policy of the French._ We must accustom them to think that an
offensive war on our part is a necessity, in order to combat the
provocations of our adversaries. We must act with prudence so as
not to arouse suspicion, and to avoid the crises which might
injure our economic existence. We must so manage matters that
under the heavy weight of powerful armaments, considerable
sacrifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak
(_Losschlagen_) should be considered as a relief, because after
it would come decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870. We
must prepare for war from the financial point of view; there is
much to be done in this direction. We must not arouse the
distrust of our financiers, but there are many things which
cannot be concealed.
"We must not be anxious about the fate of our colonies. The final
result in Europe will settle their position. On the other hand we
must stir up trouble in the north of Africa and in Russia. It is
a means of keeping the forces of the enemy engaged. It is,
therefore, absolutely necessary that we should open up relations,
by means of well-chosen agents, with influential people in Egypt,
Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, in order to prepare the measures
which would be necessary in the case of a European war. Of course
in case of war we should openly recognize these secret allies;
and on the conclusion of peace we should secure to them the
advantages which they had gained. These aims are capable of
realization. The first attempt which was made some years ago
opened up for us the desired relations. Unfortunately these
relations were not sufficiently consolidated. Whether we like it
or not it will be necessary to resort to preparations of this
kind, in order to bring a campaign rapidly to a conclusion.
"Risings provoked in time of war by political agents need to be
carefully prepared and by material means. They must break out
simultaneously with the destruction of the means of
communication; they must have a controlling head to be found
among the influential leaders, religious or political. The
Egyptian School is particularly suited to this purpose; more and
more it serves as a bond between the intellectuals of the
Mohammedan world.
"However this may be, we must be strong in order to annihilate at
one powerful swoop our enemies in the east and west. But in the
next European war it will also be necessary that the small states
should be forced to follow us or be subdued. In certain
conditions their armies and their fortified places can be rapidly
conquered or neutralized; this would probably be the case with
Belgium and Holland, so as to prevent our enemy in the west from
gaining territory which they could use as a base of operations
against our flank. In the north we have nothing to fear from
Denmark or Scandinavia, especially as in any event we shall
provide for the concentration of a strong northern army, capable
of replying to any menace from this direction. In the most
unfavorable case, Denmark might be forced by Great Britain to
abandon her neutrality; but by this time the decision would
already have been reached both on land and on sea. Our northern
army, the strength of which could be largely increased by Dutch
formations, would oppose a very active defense to any offensive
measures from this quarter.
"In the south, Switzerland forms an extremely solid bulwark, and
we can rely on her energetically defending her neutrality against
France, and thus protecting our flank.
"As was stated above, the situation with regard to the small
states on our northwestern frontier cannot be viewed in quite the
same light. This will be a vital question for us, and our aim
must be to take the offensive with a large superiority from the
first days. For this purpose it will be necessary to concentrate
a large army, followed up by strong Landwehr formations, which
will induce the small states to follow us or at least to remain
inactive in the theatre of operations, and which would crush them
in the event of armed resistance. If we could induce these states
to organize their system of fortification in such a manner as to
constitute an effective protection for our flank we could abandon
the proposed invasion. But for this, army reorganization,
particularly in Belgium, would be necessary in order that it
might really guarantee an effective resistance. If, on the
contrary, their defensive organization was established against
us, thus giving definite advantages to our adversary in the West,
we could in no circumstances offer Belgium a guaranty for the
security of her neutrality. Accordingly, a vast field is open to
our diplomacy to work in this country on the lines of our
interests.
"The arrangements made with this end in view allow us to hope
that it will be possible to take the offensive immediately after
the complete concentration of the army of the Lower Rhine. An
ultimatum with a short-time limit, to be followed immediately by
invasion, would allow a sufficient justification for our action
in international law.
"Such are the duties which devolve on our army and which demand a
striking force of considerable numbers. If the enemy attacks us,
or if we wish to overcome him, we will act as our brothers did a
hundred years ago; the eagle thus provoked will soar in his
flight, will seize the enemy in his steel claws and render him
harmless. We will then remember that the provinces of the ancient
German Empire, the County of Burgundy and a large part of
Lorraine, are still in the hands of the French; that thousands of
brother Germans in the Baltic provinces are groaning under the
Slav yoke. It is a national question that Germany's former
possessions should be restored to her."
REPORT OF M. CAMBON IN 1913
On May 6, 1913, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, wrote
to M. Stephen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, giving
an account of an interview with the German Secretary of State, Herr
von Jagow, concerning the conference of ambassadors in London on May
5th, and the results there obtained. It was agreed by Cambon and Von
Jagow that the immediate crisis was over. Cambon submitted proofs of
the anxiety of the German Government over the crisis.
"1. Von Jagow had questioned a colleague of Cambon about Russia's
situation in the Far East, whether there was cause for Russia to
fear difficulties in that quarter which would cause her to retain
troops there. The ambassador answered him that he knew of
absolutely no trouble in the Far East, and that Russia had her
hands free for Europe.
"2. The mobilization of the German army is not restricted to the
recall of reservists to their barracks. There is in Germany a
preliminary measure which we have not got, and which consists in
warning officers and men of the reserve to hold themselves ready
for the call, in order that they may make the necessary
arrangements. It is a general call to 'attention' and it requires
an incredible spirit of submission, discipline, and secrecy such
as exists in this country, to make a step of this kind possible.
If such a warning were given in France, a thrill would run
through the whole country, and it would be in the papers the next
day....
"The intention of the General Staff is to act by surprise. 'We
must put on one side,' said General von Moltke, 'all commonplaces
as to the responsibility of the aggressor. When war has become
necessary it is essential to carry it on in such a way as to
place all the chances in one's own favor. Success alone justifies
war. Germany cannot and ought not to leave Russia time to
mobilize, for she would then be obliged to maintain on her
eastern frontier so large an army that she would be placed in a
position of equality, if not of inferiority, to that of France.
Accordingly,' added the general, 'we must anticipate our
principal adversary as soon as there are nine chances to one of
going to war, and begin it without delay in order ruthlessly to
crush all resistance.'
"This represents exactly the attitude of military circles and it
corresponds to that of political circles; the latter, however, do
not consider Russia, in contradistinction to us, as a necessary
enemy....
"From these events the following conclusions may be drawn ...
these people are not afraid of war, they fully accept its
possibility and they have consequently taken the necessary steps.
_They wish to be always ready._
"As I said, this demands qualities of secrecy, discipline and of
persistence; enthusiasm alone is not sufficient. This lesson may
form a useful subject of meditation when the Government of the
[French] Republic ask Parliament for the means of strengthening
the defenses of the country."
On July 30, 1913, M. Pichon, French Minister for Foreign Affairs,
made an official report on the state of German public opinion, as
derived from French diplomatic and consular agents. It said that:
"1. The treaty of November 4, 1912, is considered a
disappointment for Germany.
"2. France--a new France--undreamed of prior to the summer of
1911, is considered ... to want war.
"Members of all the parties in the Reichstag, from the
Conservatives to the Socialists [and of all classes of the
people] are unanimous on these two points, with very slight
differences corresponding to their position in society or their
political party. Here is a synthesis of all these opinions:
"The treaty of November 4 is a diplomatic defeat, a proof of the
incapacity of German diplomacy and the carelessness of the
Government (so often denounced), a proof that the future of the
empire is not safe without a new Bismarck; it is a national
humiliation, a lowering in the eyes of Europe, a blow to German
prestige, all the more serious because up to 1911 the military
supremacy of Germany was unchallenged, and French anarchy and the
powerlessness of the Republic were a sort of German dogma....
"And the attitude of France, her calmness, her reborn spiritual
unity, her resolution to make good her rights right up to the
end, the fact that she has the audacity not to be afraid of war,
these things are the most persistent and the gravest cause of
anxiety and bad temper on the part of German public opinion....
"German public opinion is divided into two currents on the
question of the possibility and proximity of war.
"There are in the country forces making for peace, but they are
unorganized and have no popular leaders. They consider that war
would be a social misfortune for Germany, and that caste pride,
Prussian domination, and the manufacturers of guns and armor
plate would get the greatest benefit, but above all that war
would profit Great Britain.
"The forces consist of the following elements:
"The bulk of the workmen, artisans, and peasants, who are peace
loving by instinct.
"Those members of the nobility detached from military interests
and engaged in business, such as the _grands seigneurs_ of
Silesia and a few other personages very influential at court who
are sufficiently enlightened to realize the disastrous political
and social consequences of war, even if successful.
"Numerous manufacturers, merchants and financiers in a moderate
way of business, to whom war, even if successful, would mean
bankruptcy, because their enterprises depend on credit, and are
chiefly supported by foreign capital.
"Poles, inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, and
Schleswig-Holstein--conquered, but not assimilated and suddenly
hostile to Prussian policy. There are about 7,000,000 of these
annexed Germans.
"Finally, the governments and the governing classes in the large
southern states--Saxony, Bavaria, Württemburg, and the Grand
Duchy of Baden--are divided by these two opinions: an
unsuccessful war would compromise the Federation from which they
have derived great economic advantages; a successful war would
profit only Prussia and Prussianization, against which they have
difficulty in defending their political independence and
administrative autonomy.
"These classes of people either consciously or instinctively
prefer peace to war; but they are only a sort of makeweight in
political matters, with limited influence on public opinion, or
they are silent social forces, passive, and defenseless against
the infection of a wave of warlike feeling.
"An example will make this idea clear: The 110 Socialist members
of the Reichstag are in favor of peace. They would be unable to
prevent war, for war does not depend upon a vote of the
Reichstag, and in the presence of such an eventuality the greater
part of their number would join the rest of the country in a
chorus of angry excitement and enthusiasm.
"Finally it must be observed that these supporters of peace
believe in war in the mass because they do not see any other
solution for the present situation. In certain contracts,
especially in publishers' contracts, a clause has been introduced
cancelling the contract in the case of war. They hope, however,
that the will of the emperor on the one side, France's
difficulties in Morocco on the other, will be for some time a
guaranty of peace. Be that as it may, their pessimism gives free
play to those who favor war....
"On the other hand there is a war party with leaders and
followers, a press either convinced or subsidized for the purpose
of creating public opinion; it has means both varied and
formidable for the intimidation of the Government. It goes to
work in the country with clear ideas, burning aspirations, and a
determination that is at once thrilling and fixed.
"Those in favor of war are divided into several categories; each
of these derives from its social caste, its class, its
intellectual and moral education, its interests, its hates,
special arguments which create a general attitude of mind and
increase the strength and rapidity of the stream of warlike
desire.
"Some want war because in the present circumstances they think it
is _inevitable_. And, as far as Germany is concerned, the sooner
the better.
"Others regard war as necessary for economic reasons based on
overpopulation, overproduction, the need for markets and outlets;
or for social reasons, i. e., to provide the outside interests
that alone can prevent or retard the rise to power of the
democratic and socialist masses.
"Others, uneasy for the safety of the empire, and believing that
time is on the side of France, think that events should be
brought to an immediate head. It is not unusual to meet, in the
course of conversation or in the pages of patriotic pamphlets,
the vague but deeply rooted conviction that a free Germany and a
regenerated France are two historical facts mutually
incompatible.
"Others are bellicose from 'Bismarckism,' as it may be termed.
They feel themselves humiliated at having to enter into
discussions with France, at being obliged to talk in terms of
law and right in negotiations and conferences where they have not
always found it easy to get right on their side, even when they
have a preponderating force. From their still recent past they
derive a sense of pride ever fed by personal memories of former
exploits, by oral traditions, and by books, and irritated by the
events of recent years. Angry disappointment is the unifying
force of the _Wehrvereine_ [defense leagues] and other
associations of Young Germany.
"Others again want war from a mystic hatred of revolutionary
France; others, finally, from a feeling of rancor. These last the
people who heap up pretexts for war.
"Coming to actual facts, these feelings take concrete form as
follows: The country squires, represented in the Reichstag by the
Conservative party, want at all costs to escape the death duties,
which are bound to come if peace continues. In the last sitting
of the session which has just closed the Reichstag agreed to
these duties in principle. It is a serious attack on the
interests and privileges of the landed gentry. On the other hand,
this aristocracy is military in character, and it is instructive
to compare the Army List with the Year Book of the nobility. War
alone can prolong its prestige and support its family interest.
During the discussions on the Army Bill a Conservative speaker
put forward the need for promotion among officers as an argument
in its favor. Finally this social class, which forms a hierarchy
with the King of Prussia as its supreme head, realizes with dread
the democratization of Germany and the increasing power of the
Socialist party, and considers its own days numbered. Not only
does a formidable movement hostile to agrarian protection
threaten its material interests, but in addition the number of
its political representatives decreases with each legislative
period. In the Reichstag of 1878, out of 397 members, 162
belonged to the aristocracy; in 1898, 83; in 1912, 57. Out of
this number 27 alone belong to the Right, 14 to the Center, 7 to
the Left, and 1 sits among the Socialists.
"The higher bourgeoisie, represented by the National Liberal
party, the party of the contented spirits, have not the same
reasons as the squires for wanting war. With a few exceptions,
however, they are bellicose. They have their reasons, social in
character.
"The higher bourgeoisie is no less troubled than the aristocracy
at the democratization of Germany. In 1871 they had 125 members
in the Reichstag; in 1874, 55; in 1887, 99; in 1912, 45. They do
not forget that in the years succeeding the war they played the
leading rôle in Parliament, helping Bismarck in his schemes
against the country squires. Uneasily balanced to-day between
Conservative instincts and Liberal ideas they look to war to
settle problems which their parliamentary representatives are
painfully incapable of solving. In addition, doctrinaire
manufacturers declare that the difficulties between themselves
and their workmen originate in France, the home of revolutionary
ideas of freedom--without France industrial unrest would be
unknown.
"Lastly, there are the manufacturers of guns and armor plate, big
merchants who demand bigger markets, bankers who are speculating
on the coming of the golden age and the next war indemnity--all
these regard war as good business.
"Among the 'Bismarckians' must be reckoned officials of all
kinds, represented fairly closely in the Reichstag by the Free
Conservatives or Imperial party. This is the party of the
'pensioned,' whose impetuous sentiments are poured out in the
'Post.' They find disciples and political sympathizers in the
various groups of young men whose minds have been trained and
formed in the public schools and universities.
"The universities, if we except a few distinguished spirits,
develop a warlike philosophy. Economists demonstrate by
statistics Germany's need for a colonial and commercial empire
commensurate with the industrial output of the empire. There are
sociological fanatics who go even further. The armed peace, so
they say, is a crushing burden on the nations; it checks
improvement in the lot of the masses and assists the growth of
Socialism. France, by clinging obstinately to her desire for
revenge, opposes disarmament. Once for all she must be reduced
for a century to a state of impotence; that is the best and
speediest way of solving the social problem.
"Historians, philosophers, political pamphleteers, and other
apologists of German _Kultur_ wish to impose upon the world a way
of thinking and feeling specifically German. They wish to wrest
from France that intellectual supremacy which, according to the
clearest thinkers, is still her possession. From this source is
derived the phraseology of the Pan-Germans and the ideas and
adherents of the _Kriegsvereine_ [war leagues], _Wehrvereine_,
and other similar associations too well known to need particular
description. It is enough to note that the dissatisfaction caused
by the treaty of November 4 has considerably swelled the
membership of colonial societies.
"We come finally to those whose support of the war policy is
inspired by rancor and resentment. These are the most dangerous.
They are recruited chiefly among diplomatists. German
diplomatists are now in very bad odor in public opinion. The most
bitter are those who since 1905 have been engaged in the
negotiations between France and Germany; they are heaping
together and reckoning up their grievances against us, and one
day they will present their accounts in the war press....
"During the discussion on the Army Bill one of these warlike
diplomatists exclaimed: 'Germany will not be able to have any
serious conversation with France until she has every sound man
under arms.'
"In what terms will this conversation be couched? The opinion is
fairly widely spread, even in Pan-German circles, that Germany
will not declare war in view of the system of defensive alliances
and the tendencies of the emperor. But when the moment comes she
will have to try in every possible way to force France to attack
her. Offense will be given if necessary. That is the Prussian
tradition.
"Must war, then, be considered as inevitable?
"It is hardly likely that Germany will take the risk if France
can make it clear to the world that the _Entente Cordiale_ and
the Russian alliance are not mere diplomatic fictions but
realities which exist and will make themselves felt. The British
fleet inspires a wholesome terror. It is well known, however,
that victory on sea will leave everything in suspense. On land
alone can a decisive issue be obtained.
"As for Russia, even though she carries greater weight in
political and military circles than was the case three or four
years ago, it is not believed that her cooperation will be
sufficiently rapid and energetic to be effective.
"People's minds are thus getting used to consider the next war as
a duel between France and Germany."
On November 22, 1913, M. Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin,
reported to M. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, an
account of a recent conversation between the Kaiser and the King of
the Belgians in the presence of General von Moltke, Chief of the
General German Staff, which gravely impressed King Albert. It showed
that German enmity against France was increasing, and that the
Kaiser had ceased to be the friend of peace. The Kaiser had come to
believe that war with France was inevitable; and, when it did come,
that German success was certain. General von Moltke strengthened his
sovereign in these opinions:
"This time the matter must be settled, and your majesty can have
no conception of the irresistible enthusiasm with which the whole
German people will be carried away when that day comes.
"The king of the Belgians protested that it was a travesty of the
intentions of the French Government to interpret them in that
sense, and to let oneself be misled as to the sentiments of the
French nation by the ebullitions of a few irresponsible spirits
or the intrigues of unscrupulous agitators.
"The emperor and his chief of the General Staff nevertheless
persisted in their point of view.
"During the course of this conversation the emperor seemed
overstrained and irritable. As William II advances in years,
family traditions, the reactionary tendencies of the court, and
especially the impatience of the soldiers, obtain a greater
empire over his mind. Perhaps he feels some slight jealousy of
the popularity acquired by his son, who flatters the passions of
the Pan-Germans and who does not regard the position occupied by
the empire in the world as commensurate with its power. Perhaps
the reply of France to the last increase of the Germany army, the
object of which was to establish the incontestable supremacy of
Germany is, to a certain extent, responsible for his bitterness,
for, whatever may be said, it is realized that Germany cannot go
much further.
"One may well ponder over the significance of this conversation.
The emperor and his chief of the General Staff may have wished to
impress the king of the Belgians and induce him not to make any
opposition in the event of a conflict between us....
"The Emperor William is less master of his impatience than is
usually supposed. I have known him more than once to allow his
real thoughts escape him....
"If I may be allowed to draw a conclusion I would submit that it
would be well to take account of this new factor, namely, that
the emperor is becoming used to an order of ideas which were
formerly repugnant to him, and that, to borrow from him a phrase
which he likes to use, 'we must keep our powder dry.'"
[See also letter of M. Allizé, French Minister at Munich, of July
10, 1914, in pages following.]
The next evidence presented before the court of the world is that by
Serbia and her witnesses, the nations thus far, to all appearances,
interested solely in maintaining the peace of Europe, as to Serbia's
non-responsibility for the assassination of the hereditary Archduke
of Austria at Sarajevo, Bosnia, on June 28, 1914, and as to her
sincere desire to do all she could, short of impairing her
sovereignty and suffering national humiliation; and that by
Austria-Hungary and the same witnesses that were brought forward by
Serbia as to Serbia's complicity in the assassination, and to
Austria-Hungary's right to fix this, and to exact guaranties that
Serbia should not in the future prosecute her evil designs against
Austria-Hungary.
THE ASSASSINATION OF THE AUSTRIAN ARCHDUKE
On June 28, 1914, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, reported
to M. René Viviani, President of the Council and Minister for
Foreign Affairs at Paris, the assassination that day of the
hereditary Archduke of Austria and his wife at Sarajevo, Bosnia.
On June 29, 1914, Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna,
telegraphed to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for
Foreign Affairs at Belgrade, that the Vienna press asserted that
magisterial inquiry had already shown that the Sarajevo outrage was
prepared at Belgrade; that the whole conspiracy in its wider issues
was organized there among youths inspired with the great Serbian
idea; and that the Belgrade press was exciting public opinion by
articles about the intolerable conditions in Bosnia, papers
containing which were being smuggled in large quantities into
Bosnia.
On the same day, June 29, 1914, Ritter von Storck, Secretary of the
German Legation at Belgrade, the Austro-Hungarian Minister, Baron
Giesl von Gieslingen being absent from his post on leave, reported
to Count Berchtold, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in
Vienna, the following facts:
"Yesterday the anniversary of the battle of the Amselfeld was
celebrated with greater ceremony than usual, and there were
celebrations in honor of the Serbian patriot, Milos Obilic, who
in 1389 with two companions treacherously stabbed the victorious
Murad.
"Among all Serbians, Obilic is regarded as the national hero. In
place of the Turks, however, we are now looked on as the
hereditary enemy, thanks to the propaganda which has been
nourished under the aegis of the royal Government and the
agitation which for many years has been carried on in the press.
"A repetition of the drama on the field of Kossovo seems,
therefore, to have hovered before the minds of the three young
criminals of Sarajevo, Princip, Cabrinovic, and the third person
still unknown, who also threw a bomb. They also shot down an
innocent woman and may, therefore, think that they have surpassed
their model.
"For many years hatred against the [Dual] Monarchy has been sown
in Serbia. The crop has sprung up and the harvest is murder.
"The news arrived at about five o'clock; the Serbian Government
at about ten o'clock caused the Obilic festivities to be
officially stopped. They continued, however, unofficially for a
considerable time after it was dark. The accounts of
eye-witnesses say that people fell into one another's arms in
delight, and remarks were heard such as: 'It serves them right;
we have been expecting this for a long time,' or 'This is revenge
for the annexation [of Bosnia].'"
On the following day (June 30, 1914), M. Yovanovitch, Serbian
Minister at Vienna, warned M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade,
by telegraph, that the tendency in Vienna was becoming more and more
apparent to represent, in the eyes of Europe, the assassination as
the act of a conspiracy engineered in Serbia.
The idea was to use this as a political weapon against Serbia. Great
attention should therefore be paid to the tone of the Serbian
press.
On the same day (June 30, 1914), Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargé
d'Affaires in Berlin, in two telegrams informed M. Pashitch that the
Berlin press was misleading German public opinion on the outrage;
that German hostility toward Serbia was growing, being fostered by
false reports from Vienna and Budapest, which were diligently spread
in spite of contradictions by some newspapers and news agencies.
On the same day (June 30, 1914), M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at
Vienna, reported to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, a
conversation he had held, in the absence of Count Berchtold,
Austro-Hungarian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with Baron
Macchia, Under-Secretary of the Foreign Department. In this the
Serbian Minister adopted the following line of argument:
"The Royal Serbian Government condemn most energetically the
Sarajevo outrage and on their part will certainly most loyally do
everything to prove that they will not tolerate within their
territory the fostering of any agitation or illegal proceedings
calculated to disturb our already delicate relations with
Austria-Hungary. I am of opinion that the Government are prepared
also to submit to trial any persons implicated in the plot in the
event of its being proved that there are any in Serbia. The Royal
Serbian Government, notwithstanding all the obstacles hitherto
placed in their way by Austro-Hungarian diplomacy (creation of an
independent Albania, opposition to Serbian access to the
Adriatic, demand for revision of the Treaty of Bucharest, the
September ultimatum, etc.) remained loyal in their desire to
establish a sound basis for our good neighborly relations. You
know that in this direction something has been done and achieved.
Serbia intends to continue to work for this object, convinced
that it is practicable and ought to be continued. The Sarajevo
outrage ought not to and cannot stultify this work."
M. Yovanovitch said that he had communicated the substance of this
conversation to the French and Russian Ambassadors.
On the same day (June 30, 1914), the Serbian Prime Minister received
from M. Georgevitch, Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople,
the information that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador there had told
him that, in recent conversations, Count Berchtold, the
Austro-Hungarian Prime Minister and Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
had expressed himself as satisfied with the attitude of the Serbian
Government, and desired friendly relations with it.
On the same day (June 30, 1914), Herr von Storck, Secretary of the
German Legation at Belgrade, telegraphed to Count Berchtold that he
had asked Herr Gruic, General Secretary of the Serbian Foreign
Office, what measures the Royal Serbian police had taken, or
proposed to take, to follow up clues to the crime which notoriously
were partly to be found in Serbia, and that the reply was that the
matter had not yet engaged the attention of the police.
On July 1, 1914, M. Pashitch, Serbian Prime Minister was informed by
telegraph from the Serbian Minister in London, M. S. Boschkovitch,
that, basing their conclusion on Austrian reports, the English press
attributed the Sarajevo outrages to Serbian revolutionaries. He was
informed by telegraph on the same day, by M. Yovanovitch, Serbian
Minister at Vienna, of popular hostile demonstrations in front of
the Serbian Legation, which were quelled by the police. A Serbian
flag was said to have been burned.
"Hatred against Serbians and Serbia is being spread among the
people, especially by the lower Catholic circles, the Vienna
press, and military circles. Please do what is possible to
prevent demonstrations taking place in Serbia, and to induce the
Belgrade press to be as moderate as possible in tone.... It is
expected that decision as to the attitude to be adopted toward
Serbia and the Serbians will be taken after the funeral [of the
archduke]."
Thereupon, on the same day (July 1, 1914), M. Pashitch warned all
the Serbian legations at foreign courts of the evident purpose of
the Austrian and Hungarian press to take political advantage of the
act of a "young and ill-balanced fanatic." All ranks of Serbian
society, official and unofficial, he said, condemned the act,
recognizing that it would be most prejudicial not only to good
relations with Austria-Hungary, but to their coreligionists in that
country.
"At a moment when Serbia is doing everything in her power to
improve her relations with the neighboring monarchy it is absurd
to think that Serbia could have directly or indirectly inspired
acts of this kind. On the contrary, it was of the greatest
interest to Serbia to prevent the perpetration of this outrage.
Unfortunately this did not lie within Serbia's power, as both
assassins are Austrian subjects. Hitherto Serbia has been careful
to suppress anarchic elements, and after recent events she will
redouble her vigilance, and in the event of such elements
existing within her borders will take the severest measures
against them. Moreover, Serbia will do everything in her power
and use all the means at her disposal in order to restrain the
feelings of ill-balanced people within her frontiers. But Serbia
can on no account permit the Vienna and Hungarian press to
mislead European public opinion and lay the heavy responsibility
for a crime committed by an Austrian subject at the door of the
whole Serbian nation and on Serbia, who can suffer only harm from
such acts....
"Please ... use all available channels in order to put an end as
soon as possible to the anti-Serbian campaign in the European
press."
On the same day (July 1, 1914), Herr Jehlitschka, Austrian Consul
General to Turkey, wrote from Uskub, in European Turkey, to Count
Berchtold, Minister of Foreign Affairs at Vienna, of the actions at
Prestina on the 525th anniversary of the battle of the Amselfeld
(1389), for the first time officially celebrated as the "Festival of
the Liberation" of the Serbian nation, and carefully prepared to
make it an especially solemn and magnificent demonstration of
Serbian nationality.
"The propaganda connected with this at the same time extended to
Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia, but especially to Hungary; those
who took part in it received free passes on the Serbian state
railways; food and lodging at low prices, maintenance by public
bodies, etc., were promised....
"The various speeches ... dealt ... with the well-known theme of
the union of all Serbia and the 'liberation of our brethren in
bondage' beyond the Danube and the Save, even as far as Bosnia
and Dalmatia.
"When, during the course of the evening, the news of the horrible
crime of which Sarajevo had been the scene was circulated, the
feeling which animated the fanatical crowd was, to judge by the
numerous expressions of applause reported to me by authorities in
whom I have absolute confidence, one that I can only characterize
as inhuman.
"In view of this attitude of the population, which was also
displayed at Uskub, all attempts of the Serbian press to divest
Serbia of the moral responsibility for a deed which was received
by a representative gathering with such unvarnished satisfaction
collapse miserably."
On July 2, 1914, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, reported
to M. Viviani, Prime Minister in Paris, the resentment against
Serbia in Austrian military circles and by those persons opposed to
Serbia's maintenance of the position she had acquired in the
Balkans. If the Serbian Government refused as intolerable to its
dignity the demand of Austria-Hungary that the Serbian Government
investigate into the origin of the archduke's assassination, he
feared that this would furnish Austria-Hungary a ground for resort
to military measures.
On the same day (July 2, 1914), Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Serbian Minister
at Paris, telegraphed to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade,
that the French Government advised Serbia to remain calm, in
official circles as well as in public opinion.
On July 3, 1914, M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, sent
two reports to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, the first
containing an account of a mob which gathered before the Serbian
Legation on July 2, on account of his having hoisted the national
flag at half-mast as a sign of mourning; the bodies of the victims
of the Sarajevo tragedy having been brought that day to the Austrian
capital. The police dispersed the mob. The papers of July 3, under
the heading of "Provocation by the Serbian Minister," falsely
described the incident. The minister mentioned by name leading
instigators of attacks in the Austrian and German press on Serbia as
haranguing the crowd. In the second letter he reported a
conversation he had had with Baron Macchio, Austro-Hungarian
Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in which the Baron severely
censured the Belgrade press for its antimonarchical propaganda, and,
implicitly, the Serbian Government for not controlling the press.
The Serbian Minister had replied that the press was free, and that
there was no means of curbing it except by going to law; and, in
rejoinder, he censured the Austro-Hungarian Government, which could
control the press of its empire, for permitting it shamefully to
attack Serbia by accusing the whole nation of being an accomplice in
the Sarajevo crime. Baron Macchio had replied: "We accuse only those
who encourage the Great Serbian scheme, and work for the realization
of its object." Yovanovitch had rejoined that, till the
assassination, Bosnia Serbs had been uniformly called "Bosniaks,"
yet the assassin was now described as "a Serb," and no mention was
made that he was a Bosnian and an Austrian subject. This was
evidently to cast odium upon Serbia.
On July 4, 1914, Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Serbian Minister at Paris,
reported to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, a recent
conversation with M. Viviani, the new French Minister for Foreign
Affairs, on the Sarajevo incident.
"I described to him briefly the causes which had led to the
outrage and which were to be found, in the first place, in the
irksome system of Government in force in the annexed provinces,
and especially in the attitude of the officials, as well as in
the whole policy of the monarchy toward anything orthodox. He
understood the situation, but at the same time expressed the hope
that we should preserve an attitude of calm and dignity in order
to avoid giving cause for fresh accusations in Vienna.
"After the first moment of excitement public opinion here has
quieted down to such an extent that the minister-president
himself considered it advisable in the Palais de Bourbon to
soften the expressions used in the statement which he had made
earlier on the subject in the Senate."
On the same day (July 4, 1914), Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Serbian
Minister at Petrograd,[1] telegraphed to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister
at Belgrade, that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, M.
Sazonof, had expressed his opinion that the outrages upon the Serbs
in Bosnia would increase the sympathy of Europe for Serbia; that the
accusations made in Vienna would not obtain credence and that
therefore Serbia should remain calm.
[Footnote 1: Although the name St. Petersburg was not changed
officially to Petrograd until after the outbreak of the war, the
latter name is used uniformly in the Serbian Blue Book and
Russian Orange Book.]
On the same day (July 4, 1914), Count Szécsen, Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador at Paris, telegraphed to Count Berchtold, Minister for
Foreign Affairs at Vienna, that, in officially thanking M. Poincaré
for his sympathy over the Sarajevo tragedy, the President had
excused the hostile demonstrations against Serbia by citing those
against all Italians in France after the assassination of President
Carnot.
"I drew his attention to the fact that that crime had no
connection with any anti-French agitation in Italy, while in the
present case it must be admitted that for years past there has
been an agitation in Serbia against the [Dual] Monarchy fomented
by every means, legitimate and illegitimate.
"In conclusion, M. Poincaré expressed his conviction that the
Serbian Government would meet us with the greatest willingness in
the judicial investigation and the prosecution of the
accomplices. No state could divest itself of this duty."
On the same day (July 4, 1914), M. de Manneville, French Chargé
d'Affaires at Berlin, reported to M. Viviani, President of the
Council in Paris, a conversation with Herr von Zimmermann, German
Under-Secretary of State, in which von Zimmermann had expressed the
hope that Serbia would satisfy Austria's demands with regard to the
investigation and prosecution of the accomplices in the crime of
Sarajevo. Otherwise she would be condemned by the whole civilized
world.
"The German Government do not then appear to share the anxiety
which is shown by a part of the German press as to possible
tension in the relations between the Governments of Vienna and
Belgrade, or at least they do not wish to seem to do so."
Two days later (July 6, 1914), M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at
St. Petersburg, reported to M. Viviani, Prime Minister at Paris, a
recent interview which M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, had had with Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Chargé
d'Affaires at the request of the latter. The Count intimated that
the Austro-Hungarian Government would perhaps be compelled to search
for the instigators of the crime of Sarajevo on Serbian soil. M.
Sazonof interjected:
"No country has had to suffer more than Russia from crimes
prepared on foreign territory. Have we ever claimed to employ in
any country whatsoever the procedure with which your papers
threaten Serbia? Do not embark on such a course."
On the same day (July 6, 1914), M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian
Minister at Vienna, telegraphed to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at
Belgrade, that the excitement in military and government circles
against Serbia was growing, owing to the tone of the press, which
was diligently exploited by the Austro-Hungarian Legation at
Belgrade. On the same date he informed the Prime Minister in detail
of the press agitation against Serbia. By headlines the people were
led to infer, on the date of the crime of Sarajevo, that the two
perpetrators were Serbs from Serbia proper. In later reports there
was a marked tendency to connect the crime with Serbia. Belgrade was
indicated as the place of its origin by the visit to that capital of
the assassins, and by the bombs originating there, which facts had
been elucidated at the trial of the assassins in Sarajevo. The
Hungarian press claimed that there was evidence to show:
"1. That the perpetrators while in Belgrade associated with the
_comitadji_ [revolutionist] Mihaylo Ciganovitch; and (2) that the
organizer and instigator of the outrage was Major
Pribitchevitch....
"Further ... the latest announcement which the Hungarian
_Korrespondenzbureau_ made to the newspapers stated:
"'The inquiries made up to the present prove conclusively that
this outrage is the work of a conspiracy. Besides the two
perpetrators, a large number of persons have been arrested,
mostly young men, who are also, like the perpetrators, proved to
have been employed by the Belgrade Narodna Odbrana in order to
commit the outrage, and who were supplied in Belgrade with bombs
and revolvers.' [This item was later recalled.]
"At the same time the Vienna _Korrespondenzbureau_ published the
following official statement:
"'We learn from authoritative quarters that the inquiries
relating to the outrage are being kept absolutely secret. All the
details, therefore, which have appeared in the public press
should be accepted with reserve.'
"Nevertheless the Budapest newspapers continued to publish
alleged reports on the inquiry. In the last 'report' of the
Budapest newspaper 'A Nap,' which was reprinted in yesterday's
Vienna papers, the tendency to lay the responsibility for the
outrage on the Narodna Odbrana is still further emphasized.
According to this report the accused Gabrinovitch had stated that
General Yankovitch is the chief instigator of the outrage."
On the same day Herr Hoflehner, Austro-Hungarian Consular Agent at
Nish, Serbia, wrote to Count Berchtold, Minister of Foreign Affairs
at Vienna, of the satisfaction and even joy expressed, especially in
the leading circles, over the crime at Sarajevo.
On the next day (July 7, 1914), M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian
Minister at Vienna, wrote to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at
Belgrade, that, though Emperor Francis Joseph had appealed to the
Prime Ministers of Austria (Count Berchtold) and of Hungary (Count
Tisza), and to the Minister of Finance (Herr Bilinski) for calmness,
it was impossible to tell what attitude toward Serbia the Government
would take.
"For them one thing is obvious; whether it is proved or not that
the outrage has been inspired and prepared at Belgrade, they must
sooner or later solve the question of the so-called Great Serbian
agitation within the Hapsburg Monarchy. In what manner they will
do this and what means they will employ to that end has not as
yet been decided; this is being discussed especially in high
Catholic and military circles. The ultimate decision will be
taken only after it has been definitely ascertained what the
inquiry at Sarajevo has brought to light....
"Austria-Hungary has to choose one of the following courses:
either to regard the Sarajevo outrage as a national misfortune
and a crime which ought to be dealt with in accordance with the
evidence obtained, in which case Serbia's cooperation ... will be
requested in order to prevent the perpetrators escaping the
extreme penalty; or, to treat the Sarajevo outrage as a
Pan-Serbian, South-Slav, and Pan-Slav conspiracy with every
manifestation of the hatred, hitherto repressed, against Slavdom.
There are many indications that influential circles are being
urged to adopt the latter course: it is, therefore, advisable to
be ready for defense. Should the former and wiser course be
adopted, we should do all we can to meet Austrian wishes in this
respect."
On July 9, 1914, M. Pashitch telegraphed to all the foreign Serbian
Legations that the Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince Alexander was
receiving daily threatening letters from Austro-Hungarians, and that
they should make use of this information with other foreign
ministers and journalists.
On July 10, 1914, M. Allizé, French Minister In Munich, wrote to M.
Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, that the Bavarians
were asking the object of the new German armaments.
"Recognizing that no one threatens Germany, they consider that
German diplomacy had already at its disposal forces sufficiently
large and alliances sufficiently powerful to protect German
interests with success."
Nevertheless, public opinion will support the Imperial Government in
any enterprise in which they might energetically embark, even at the
risk of conflict.
"The state of war to which all the events in the East have
accustomed people's minds for the last two years appears no
longer like some distant catastrophe, but as a solution of the
political and economic difficulties which will continue to
increase."
On July 11, 1914, M. d'Apchier-le-Maugin, French Consul General at
Budapest, reported to M. Vivian, Prime Minister at Paris, that Count
Tisza, Hungarian Prime Minister, had refused to make to the
Hungarian Chamber any disclosures on the Sarajevo incident until the
judicial inquiry was closed. The chamber approved.
"He did not give any indication whether the project of a
_démarche_ [proceeding] at Belgrade, with which all the papers of
both hemispheres are full, would be followed up."
The virulence of the Hungarian press has diminished, and the papers
are unanimous in advising against this step, which might be
dangerous.
"The semiofficial press especially would desire that for the word
'_démarche_,' with its appearance of a threat, there should be
substituted the expression '_pourparlers_' [conversations],
which appears to them more friendly.
"The general public, however, fears war. It is said that every
day cannon and ammunition were being sent in large quantities
toward the frontier.... The Government, whether it is sincerely
desirous of peace, or whether it is _preparing a coup_, is now
doing all that it can to allay these anxieties.... Their optimism
to order is, in fact, without an echo; the nervousness of the
Bourse, a barometer which cannot be neglected, is a sure proof of
this; without exception, stocks have fallen to an unaccountably
low level."
On July 14, 1914, Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at
Berlin, telegraphed to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, that
Herr von Jagow, German Secretary of State, had told him that
Austria-Hungary, as a great power, could not tolerate the
provocative attitude of the Serbian press.
On the same day M. Yov. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna,
wrote M. Pashitch that the Literary Bureau of the Austro-Hungarian
Foreign Office, which supplied the press with material and set its
tone, was exciting opinion against Serbia. Official German circles
in Vienna were especially ill disposed toward Serbia. The "Neue
Freie Presse," under instructions from the Vienna Press Bureau,
summarized the feeling:
"We have to settle matters with Serbia by war; it is evident that
peaceable means are of no avail. And if it must come to war
sooner or later, then it is better to see the matter through now.
"The Bourse is very depressed. There has not been such a fall in
prices In Vienna for a long time."
On the same day, July 14, 1914, M. Pashitch sent two letters to all
the foreign Serbian Legations.
In the first letter he gave specific illustrations of misinformation
by the Austro-Hungarian press such as that Austro-Hungarian subjects
were maltreated in Belgrade, and were now panic-stricken, and that
there had been a demonstration against the Austrian Minister at the
funeral of Dr. Hartwig, the Russian Minister. There was no
foundation whatever for these statements.
In the second letter he notified the Legations that the
Austro-Hungarian news bureaus, the channel of Serbian news to the
world, misrepresented, through garbling extracts, the tone of the
Belgrade press, and that all Serbian papers were forbidden entry
into Austria-Hungary.
"With us the press is absolutely free. Newspapers can be
confiscated only for _lèse-majesté_ or for revolutionary
propaganda; in all other cases confiscation is illegal. There is
no censorship of newspapers."
Accordingly the Serbian foreign ministers were instructed to give
out information that the Serbian Government lacked the power to
control the newspapers, and further to spread knowledge of the fact
that it was Austro-Hungarian papers which originated all the
controversies, while the Serbian ones only replied. There was no
desire in Serbia to provoke Austria-Hungary.
On July 15, 1914, M. Yov. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna,
reported to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, that the
Ministers of the Dual Monarchy had been consulting about the
Sarajevo incident, and that it appeared nothing was decided. Count
Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, had
gone to Ischl, where Emperor Francis Joseph was recovering from the
shock of the assassination, to report to him. Count Tisza, the
Hungarian Prime Minister, had replied evasively to interpellations
made in the Hungarian Parliament by the Opposition. Owing to the
absence on leave from his post of the War Minister and his chief of
staff, the Bourse had recovered.
"One thing is certain: Austria-Hungary will take diplomatic steps
at Belgrade as soon as the magisterial inquiry at Sarajevo is
completed and the matter submitted to the court."
In a second letter of the same date M. Yovanovitch reported to M.
Pashitch that it was thought that the inquiry had not produced
sufficient evidence to justify officially accusing Serbia more than
for tolerating in her borders certain revolutionary elements.
Austro-Hungarian methods were criticized in diplomatic circles and
the Serbian attitude was commended as in accord with the dignity of
a nation.
"In spite of the fact that it appears that the German Foreign
Office does not approve of the anti-Serbian policy of Vienna, the
German Embassy here is at this very moment encouraging such a
policy."
In a third letter of the same date M. Yovanovitch informed the Prime
Minister that it appeared that Austria-Hungary would not invite the
Serbian Government to assist her in discovering and punishing the
culprits of the Sarajevo crime, but would make it a case against
Serbia and the Serbians, or even against the Jugo-Slavs (on her own
border), looking in this for the approval of Europe, which would
prepare the way for the sharp reactionary measures she contemplated
to take internally to suppress the great Serbian propaganda and the
Jugo-Slav idea. The Government must take some action for the sake of
its prestige at home as well as abroad....
The accusation against Serbia will extend from April, 1909, to the
present. Austria-Hungary will claim to the powers that the facts
developed therein give her the right to take diplomatic steps at
Belgrade, and demand that Serbia in future act as a loyal neighbor.
Austria-Hungary will ask Serbia to accept unconditionally her
demands.
On the same day, July 15, 1914, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at
Vienna, reported to M. Viviani, Prime Minister at Paris, that
certain press organs in Vienna, specifically the "Militärische
Rundschau," represented France and Russia as incapable of holding
their own in European affairs, and that Austria-Hungary, with the
support of Germany, could therefore subject Serbia to any treatment
she pleased. The "Rundschau" argued that now was the most propitious
time for the war in which Austria-Hungary would have to engage in
two or three years at the latest.
"At this moment the initiative rests with us: Russia is not
ready, moral factors and right are on our side, as well as might.
Since we shall have to accept the contest some day, let us
provoke it at once. Our prestige, our position as a great power,
our honor, are in question; and yet more, for it would seem that
our very existence is concerned....
"Surpassing itself, the 'Neue Freie Presse' of to-day reproaches
Count Tisza for the moderation of his second speech, in which he
said: 'Our relations with Serbia require, however, to be made
clear.' These words rouse its indignation. For it tranquillity
and security can result only from a _war to the knife_ against
Pan-Serbism, and it is in the name of humanity that it demands
the extermination of the cursed Serbian race."
On July 16, 1914, Dr. Yovanovitch, Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at
Berlin, telegraphed to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade,
that Secretary of State Von Jagow had informed him that reports of
the German Minister at Belgrade pointed to the existence of a great
Serbian propaganda, which should be energetically suppressed by the
Serbian Government in the interest of good relations with
Austria-Hungary.
On July 17 M. Boschkovitch, Serbian Minister at London, telegraphed
to M. Pashitch that the Austrian Embassy there was endeavoring to
favor the idea that Austria must give a good lesson to Serbia.
Despite peaceable official statements by Austria-Hungary the way was
preparing for diplomatic pressure upon Serbia which might develop
into an armed attack.
On the same day, July 17, M. Ljub Michailovitch, Serbian Minister at
Rome, telegraphed to M. Pashitch that the Marquis di San Giuliano,
Prime Minister of Italy, had stated to the Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador:
"Any step undertaken by Austria against Serbia which failed to
take into account international considerations would meet with
the disapproval of public opinion in Italy, and that the Italian
Government desire to see the complete independence of Serbia
maintained."
On July 19, 1914, M. Pashitch telegraphed a long notice to the
foreign Serbian legations, telling of the accusation of the Austrian
press from the time of the Sarajevo outrage that the crime was the
direct result of the great Serbian idea, propagated by various
associations such as the Narodna Odbrana, which were tolerated by
the Serbian Government. The notice detailed the attitude of the
Serbian Government toward the Serbian press, presented in the
preceding correspondence. In regard to its attitude toward
Austria-Hungary it said:
"The Serbian Government at once expressed their readiness to hand
over to justice any of their subjects who might be proved to have
played a part in the Sarajevo outrage. The Serbian Government
further stated that they had prepared a more drastic law against
the misuse of explosives. The draft of a new law in that sense
had already been laid before the State Council, but could not be
submitted to the Skupshtina [Serbian Parliament], as the latter
was not sitting at the time. Finally, the Serbian Government
stated that they were ready, as heretofore, to observe all those
good neighborly obligations to which Serbia was bound by her
position as a European state.
"From the date of the perpetration of the outrage until to-day
not once did the Austro-Hungarian Government apply to the Serbian
Government for their assistance in the matter. They did not
demand that any of the accomplices should be subjected to an
inquiry, or that they should be handed over to trial. In one
instance only did the Austrian Government ask for information;
this was as to the whereabouts of certain students who had been
expelled from the Pakratz Teachers' Seminary and had crossed over
to Serbia to continue their studies. All available information on
this point was supplied."
The notice related the anti-Serbian propaganda conducted by the
Austro-Hungarian press, the interpellations in the Hungarian
Parliament, etc., and the probable intention of the Austro-Hungarian
Government to demand a categorical reply from Serbia, which, if not
satisfactory, would be followed by war.
That Austria-Hungary was picking a quarrel had been evidenced by her
use of an exploded rumor of a contemplated attack on the Austrian
Legation in Belgrade to prove how excited public opinion was in
Serbia, and to what lengths she was ready to go.
"There is reason for apprehension that some step is being
prepared against us [in the evident intention] that the inquiry
which is being made is not to be limited to the perpetrators and
their possible accomplices in the crime, but is most probably to
be extended to Serbia and the Great Serbian idea....
"On the other hand the Serbian Government have given their
particular attention to the improvement and strengthening of
their relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which had
lately become strained as a result of the Balkan wars and of the
questions which arose therefrom. With that object in view the
Serbian Government proceeded to settle the question of the
Oriental Railway, the new railway connections, and the transit
through Serbia of Austro-Hungarian goods for Constantinople,
Sofia, Saloniki, and Athens.
"The Serbian Government consider that their vital interests
require that peace and tranquillity in the Balkans should be
firmly and lastingly established. And for this very reason they
fear lest the excited state of public opinion in Austria-Hungary
may induce the Austro-Hungarian Government to make a _démarche_
which may humiliate the dignity of Serbia as a state, and to put
forward demands which could not be accepted.
"I have the honor, therefore, to request you to impress upon the
Government to which you are accredited our desire to maintain
friendly relations with Austria-Hungary, and to suppress every
attempt directed against the peace and public safety of the
neighboring monarchy. We will likewise meet the wishes of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire in the event of our being requested to
subject to trial in our independent courts any accomplices in the
outrage who are in Serbia--should such, of course, exist.
"But we can never comply with demands which may be directed
against the dignity of Serbia, and which would be inacceptable to
any country which respects and maintains its independence.
"Actuated by the desire that good neighborly relations may be
firmly established and maintained, we beg the friendly
Governments to take note of these declarations and to act in a
conciliatory sense should occasion or necessity arise."
ATTEMPTS AT MEDIATION
With Serbia's case now fully before the courts of Europe, there
began a movement among the powers desiring to keep the peace of the
continent for mediation between the disputants. This was begun by
Germany and Great Britain.
On July 20, 1914, Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, wrote to Sir Horace Rumbold, British Chargé
d'Affaires at Berlin, recounting a conversation with the German
Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky. The prince said that Austria was
certainly going to take some step in the Serbian matter; that the
situation was uncomfortable, and that it would be desirable if
Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Russia. Sir Edward
Grey presumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything
until they had first disclosed to the public their case against
Serbia, founded upon what they had discovered at the trial of the
Sarajevo assassins. This would make it easier for other powers, such
as Russia, to counsel moderation in Belgrade. The more reasonable
the demands of Austria, the easier it would be to smooth things
over.
"I hated the idea of a war between any of the great powers, and
that any of them should be dragged into a war by Serbia would be
detestable.
"The ambassador agreed whole-heartedly in this sentiment."
On the same day, July 20, 1914, M. Yov. Yovanovitch, Serbian
Minister at Vienna, reported to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at
Belgrade, that the word had been passed round in Vienna to maintain
absolute secrecy about what was being done in the Serbian matter.
There was no room for the optimism reported to exist in Belgrade. It
was highly probable Austria-Hungary was preparing for war against
Serbia.
"The general conviction that prevails here is that it would be
nothing short of suicide for Austria-Hungary once more to fail to
take advantage of the opportunity to act against Serbia. It is
believed that the two opportunities previously missed--the
annexation of Bosnia and the Balkan War--have been extremely
injurious to Austria-Hungary. In addition, the conviction is
steadily growing that Serbia, after her two wars, is completely
exhausted, and that a war against Serbia would, in fact, merely
mean a military expedition to be concluded by a speedy
occupation. It is also believed that such a war could be brought
to an end before Europe could intervene.
"The seriousness of Austrian intentions is further emphasized by
the military preparations which are being made, especially in the
vicinity of the Serbian frontier."
On the same day, July 20, 1914, a French consular report was made
from Vienna to the Government at Paris, which referred to the
diplomatic situation.
"Much will be demanded of Serbia; she will be required to
dissolve several propagandist societies, she will be summoned to
repress nationalism, to guard the frontier in cooperation with
Austrian officials, to keep strict control over anti-Austrian
tendencies in the schools; and it is a very difficult matter for
a government to consent to become in this way a policeman for a
foreign government. They foresee the subterfuges by which Serbia
will doubtless wish to avoid giving a clear and direct reply;
that is why a short interval will perhaps be fixed for her to
declare whether she accepts or not. The tenor of the note and its
imperious tone almost certainly insure that Belgrade will refuse.
Then military operations will begin.
"There is here, and equally in Berlin, a party which accepts the
idea of a conflict of widespread dimensions; in other words, a
conflagration. The leading idea is probably that it would be
necessary to start before Russia has completed the great
improvements of her army and railways, and before France has
brought her military organization to perfection. But on this
point there is no unanimity in high circles; Count Berchtold and
the diplomatists desire at the most localized operations against
Serbia. But everything must be regarded as possible."
The report commented on the departure from usage by the
Austro-Hungarian press in prominently reporting the remarks of the
most obscure Serbian newspapers,
"which, just on account of their obscurity, employ language
freer, bolder, more aggressive, and often insulting. This work of
the official agency has obviously for its aim the excitement of
public feeling and the creation of opinion favorable to war. The
fact is significant."
On July 21 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, reported to
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris,
that M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister to Germany, had declared to
the German Government that Serbia was willing to entertain Austria's
requirements arising out of the Sarajevo outrage, provided that she
asked only for
"judicial cooperation in the punishment and prevention of
political crimes, but that he was charged to warn the German
Government that it would be dangerous to attempt, through that
investigation, to lower the prestige of Serbia.
"M. Browniewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, mentioned
this subject to Herr von Jagow, German Secretary of State. Von
Jagow said that he supposed the German Government now had full
knowledge of the note prepared by Austria, and were therefore
willing to give the assurance that the Austro-Serbian
difficulties would be localized. The Secretary of State protested
that he was in complete ignorance of the contents of that note,
and expressed himself in the same way to me. I could not help
showing my astonishment at a statement which agreed so little
with what circumstances lead one to expect.
"I have also been assured that from now on the preliminary
notices for mobilization, the object of which is to place Germany
in a kind of 'attention' attitude in times of tension, have been
sent out here to those classes which would receive them in
similar circumstances. That is a measure to which the Germans,
constituted as they are, can have recourse without indiscretion
and without exciting the people. It is not a sensational measure,
and is not necessarily followed by full mobilization, as we have
already seen, but it is none the less significant."
On the same day, July 21, 1914, M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister
for Foreign Affairs at Paris, notified the French Legations at
London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Rome that the Berlin Bourse was
extremely weak on the 20th, probably on account of anxiety over the
Serbian question, and that M. Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin,
had grave reason that Germany would support Austria-Hungary in her
contemplated _démarche_ at Belgrade without seeking to play the part
of mediator.
On the same day, July 21, 1914, Baron Giesl von Gieslingen,
Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, wrote a long letter to Count
Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Vienna, reviewing the
situation. Most of his statements have been given in more moderate
language in the preceding correspondence. He describes how the
relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary have been "poisoned" by
Serbian national aspirations, due to the great Serbian propaganda
(carried on in Austria-Hungary as well as in Serbia), and to Serbian
success in the Balkan wars. This chauvinism has increased to a
paroxysm, bordering on insanity. The policy is to separate from
Austria-Hungary the southern Slav provinces, and so abolish the Dual
Monarchy as a great power. Bosnia and Herzegovina are expected to
revolt, and the Slav regiments in the Austro-Hungarian army to
mutiny. Out of the ruins will be builded the great Serbian Empire,
and that in the immediate future.
Serbian newspapers without fear of reprimand discuss the decrepitude
of the Dual Monarchy and insult her officials, and even "the exalted
person of our ruler." The press is the educator of the Serbian
people; it promoted the great Serbian propaganda, from which sprang
the crime of Sarajevo. Political parties and governmental policy are
wholly subservient to it. Its accusations that the sudden death of
the Russian Minister, Dr. Hartwig, was due to poison are on the
verge of insanity--the London "Times" called them ravings. The
people, in gratitude for the past, and in anxiety for the future,
outbid one another in servility to Russia. They despise
Austria-Hungary as powerless, for internal and external reasons. The
serious words of our statesmen are regarded as "bluff."
"This picture leads up to the conclusion that a reckoning with
Serbia, a war for the position of the [Dual] Monarchy as a great
power, even for its existence as such, cannot be permanently
avoided.
"If we delay in clearing up our relations with Serbia we shall
share the responsibility for the difficulties and the unfavorable
situation in any future war which must, however, sooner or later
be carried through....
"Should we therefore ... put forward far-reaching requirements
joined to effective control--for this alone could clear the
Augean stable of great Serbian intrigues--then all possible
consequences must be considered, and from the beginning there
must be a strong and firm determination to carry through the
matter to the end.
"Half measures, the presentation of demands, followed by long
discussions and ending only in an unsound compromise, would be
the hardest blow which could be directed against
Austria-Hungary's reputation in Serbia and her position in
Europe."
On July 22, 1914, Sir Horace Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at
Berlin, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of Foreign Affairs
at London, that he had had an interview with the German Secretary of
State, Herr von Jagow, who insisted that the question at issue
between Serbia and Austria-Hungary was for these alone to settle,
without interference from outside, and said that it was inadvisable
for the German Government to approach the Austro-Hungarian
Government on the matter. The German Secretary had frequently
emphasized to the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, M.
Yovanovitch, that Austro-Serbian relations should be put on a proper
footing. He thought that Austria had acted toward Serbia with great
forbearance.
On the same day, July 22, 1914, M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister
for Foreign Affairs at Paris, notified the foreign French legations
of the information in M. Cambon's report of the 21st, and said that
the Marquis di San Giuliano, Prime Minister at Rome, was interceding
with Austria-Hungary that nothing impracticable be demanded of
Serbia; thus, that the dissolution of the Narodna Odbrana be
required, and not a judicial inquiry into the causes of the crime of
Sarajevo. Evidently the Cabinet at Vienna, under pressure of the
press and military party, is trying to intimidate Serbia by extreme
demands, expecting German support in this policy.
"I have asked the French Ambassador at Vienna [M. Dumaine] to use
all his influence with Count Berchtold [the Austrian Minister for
Foreign Affairs] and to represent to him in a friendly
conversation how much Europe would appreciate moderation on the
part of the Austrian Government, and what consequences would be
likely to be entailed by violent pressure on Serbia."
On the same day, July 22, 1914, M. Dumaine reported to M.
Bienvenu-Martin that Count Berchtold was still at Ischl evidently
waiting for the decision of Kaiser Francis Joseph on the Serbian
question.
"The intention of proceeding against Serbia with the greatest
severity ... of 'treating her like another Poland,' is attributed
to the Government. Eight army corps are said to be ready to start
on the campaign, but M. Tisza [Hungarian Prime Minister], who is
very disturbed about the excitement in Croatia, is said to have
intervened actively in order to exercise a moderating influence.
"In any case it is believed that the _démarche_ will be made at
Belgrade this week. The requirements of the Austro-Hungarian
Government with regard to the punishment of the outrage, and to
guarantees of control and police supervision, seem to be
acceptable to the dignity of the Serbians; M. Yovanovitch
[Serbian Minister at Vienna] believes they will be accepted. M.
Pashitch [Serbian Prime Minister] wishes for a peaceful solution,
but says that he is ready for a full resistance. He has
confidence in the strength of the Serbian army, besides, he
counts on the union of all the Slavs in the [Dual] Monarchy to
paralyze the effort directed against his country.
"Unless people are absolutely blinded, it must be recognized here
that a violent blow has every chance of being fatal both to the
Austro-Hungarian army and to the cohesion of the nationalities
governed by the emperor, which has already been so much
compromised.
"Herr von Tschirschky, the German Ambassador, is showing himself
a supporter of violent measures, while at the same time he is
willing to let it be understood that the Imperial Chancellery
would not be in entire agreement with him on this point. The
Russian Ambassador [M. Schebeko], who left yesterday for the
country in consequence of reassuring explanations made to him at
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, has confided to me that his
Government will not raise any objection to steps directed toward
the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the societies
which are notoriously revolutionary, but could not accept
requirements which would humiliate Serbian national feeling."
On the same day, July 22, 1914, M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at
London, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin that Sir Edward Grey, British
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, had told him that Prince Lichnowsky,
had stated that a _démarche_ of Austria-Hungary against Serbia was
expected at Berlin, and that the German Government was endeavoring
to hold back the Austro-Hungarians, but thus far had been
unsuccessful. Sir Edward Grey had answered that he would like to
believe that Austria-Hungary, before intervening at Belgrade, were
assured that the Serbian Government had been cognizant of the
conspiracy resulting in the crime of Sarajevo, and had not done all
in their power to prevent the crime.
"For if it could not be proved that the Serbian Government were
responsible and implicated to a certain degree, the intervention
of Austria-Hungary would not be justified and would arouse
against them the opinion of Europe."
The Italian Ambassador and Serbian Minister, M. Boschkovitch, share
Sir Edward Grey's apprehensions. M. Boschkovitch fears that demands
will be made on the Serbian Government which their dignity and
public opinion may not allow them to accept without protest.
"Notwithstanding the sacrifices which Serbia has made for her
recent victories she can still put 400,000 men in the field, and
public opinion, which knows this, is not inclined to put up with
any humiliation.
"Sir Edward Grey, in an interview with the Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador [Count Mensdorff], asked him to recommend his
Government not to depart from the prudence and moderation
necessary for avoiding new complications, not to demand from
Serbia any measures to which she could not reasonably submit, and
not to allow themselves to be carried away too far."
THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NOTE TO SERBIA
The expected blow now fell on Serbia. On the same day, July 22,
1914, Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, sent out to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors in Berlin,
Rome, Paris, London, St. Petersburg, and Constantinople, the
contents of the note which was to be presented on the morrow to the
Serbian Government.
A justification of the demands in it were given. All of the
complaints here made against Serbia have already been given, except
the charge that
"individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia
had come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist
propaganda against Austria-Hungary.
"The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government, in the face
of the provocative attitude of Serbia, was inspired by the
territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
and the hope that the Serbian Government would end in spite of
everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its
true value. By observing a benevolent attitude toward the
political interests of Serbia, the Imperial and Royal Government
hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an
analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular,
Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the
political ideas of Serbia, when, after the events of 1912, the
Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and
ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandizement of
Serbia possible."
This benevolence, however, was repaid by the Serbian Government
tolerating the propaganda which ended in the crime of Sarajevo.
"In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal
Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at
Belgrade with a view to inducing the Serbian Government to stop
the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and
integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.
"The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in taking
this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the
sentiments of all civilized nations, who cannot permit regicide
to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in
political strife and the peace of Europe to be continually
disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade."
The ambassadors were instructed each to submit a copy of the note to
the Government to which he was accredited, together with a _dossier_
"elucidating the Serbian intrigues and the connection between
these intrigues and the murder of the 28th of June."
On the following day, Thursday, July 23, 1914, Count Berchtold
telegraphed to Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at
London, that, as Great Britain of all the powers might be most
easily led to form an impartial judgment on the action taken, in
presenting the copy of the note, he should point out that Serbia
might have rendered less acute the serious steps she must expect
from Austria-Hungary by spontaneously investigating the conspiracy
tending to the crime of Sarajevo, and that on the contrary she had
endeavored to wipe out all its traces, for example, in the case of
the Serbian civil servant Ciganovic, who was compromised by the
independent testimony of both of the assassins, and who was in
Belgrade on the day of the crime, yet whom the director of the
Serbian press declared to be completely unknown in that city.
"The short time limit attached to our demand must be attributed
to our long experience of the dilatory arts of Serbia.
"The requirements which we demand that Serbia should fulfill, and
which indeed contain nothing which is not a matter of course in
the intercourse between states which are to live in peace and
friendship, cannot be made the subject of negotiations and
compromise; and, having regard to our economic interests, we
cannot take the risk of a method of political action by which it
would be open to Serbia at pleasure to prolong the crisis which
has arisen."
Later in the day Count Mensdorff had an interview with Sir Edward
Grey, British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the substance of which
Sir Edward communicated on the same date to Sir Maurice de Bunsen,
British Ambassador at Vienna.
Count Mensdorff intimated the general nature of the note. Sir Edward
regretted the time limit set as akin to an ultimatum, and so likely
to inflame opinion in Russia, and render difficult securing a
satisfactory reply from Serbia. If it later developed that
proceedings were unduly protracted, a time limit could then be set.
By that time Russian opinion would be less excited, and, if the case
appeared strong against Serbia, the Russian Government would be in
a position to influence Serbia to reply satisfactorily to the
demands of the note. A time limit was generally a thing used only as
a last resort, when all other means had failed.
Count Mensdorff instanced the bad faith of Serbia in not fulfilling
her promise of 1909 to live on neighborly terms with Austria-Hungary,
and said that, on the contrary, she had conducted an agitation to
disintegrate that country, which made it absolute for Austria to
protect herself. On this Sir Edward did not comment. He said that the
French Ambassador, M. Cambon, and the Russian, Count Benckendorff, and
others were agreed that those who had influence at St. Petersburg
should exert it on behalf of patience and moderation.
"I had replied that the amount of influence that could be used in
this sense would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian
demands and how strong the justification that Austria might have
discovered for making her demands. The possible consequences of
the present situation were terrible. If as many as four great
powers of Europe--let us say, Austria, France, Russia, and
Germany--were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must
involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money, and such an
interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or
followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry.
In these days, in great industrial states, this would mean a
state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who
were victors in the war, many things might be completely swept
away.
"Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the possible
consequences of the present situation, but he said that all would
depend upon Russia.
"I made the remark that, in a time of difficulties such as this,
it was just as true to say that it required two to keep the peace
as it was to say ordinarily that it took two to make a quarrel. I
hoped very much that, if there were difficulties, Austria and
Russia would be able in the first instance to discuss them
directly with each other.
"Count Mensdorff said that he hoped this would be possible, but
he was under the impression that the attitude in Petrograd had
not been very favorable recently."
On the same day, July 23, 1914, before the copy of the note had been
presented to him, M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign
Affairs at Paris, notified the French Ambassadors at London, Berlin,
St. Petersburg, and Rome, that it was reported by M. Dumaine, French
Ambassador at Vienna, that the intention of Austria-Hungary was to
proceed with the greatest severity against Serbia, while keeping
eight army corps ready to start operations.
Nevertheless Baron Macchio, Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary for
Foreign Affairs, had assured M. Dumaine that the tone and demands of
the note were such as to allow us to count on a peaceful result.
"In view of the customary procedure of the Imperial Chancellery,
I do not know what confidence ought to be placed in these
assurances....
"The Serbian Minister [M. Vesnitch] holds that as M. Pashitch
[Serbian Prime Minister] wishes to come to an understanding, he
will accept those demands which relate to the punishment of the
outrage and to the guaranties for control and police supervision,
but that he will resist everything which might affect the
sovereignty and dignity of his country.
"In diplomatic circles at Vienna the German Ambassador [Von
Tschirschky] is in favor of violent measures, while at the same
time he confesses that the Imperial Chancellery is perhaps not
entirely in agreement with him on this point; the Russian
Ambassador [Schebeko], trusting to assurances which have been
given him, has left Vienna, and before his departure confided to
M. Dumaine that his Government will not raise any objection to
the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the
revolutionary associations, but that they could not accept
requirements which were humiliating to the national sentiment of
Serbia."
On the same day, July 23, 1914, M. Allizé, French Minister at
Munich, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin that the Bavarian press were
optimistic over a peaceful solution of the Serbian question, but
that official circles were pessimistic.
The note was presented at 6 p. m., Thursday, July 23, 1914, by the
Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, Baron Giesl von Gieslingen,
to the Serbian Minister of Finance, M. Laza Patchou, in the absence
of M. Pashitch, the Prime Minister, who was away electioneering. The
time limit for acceptance of its demands was forty-eight hours.
Giesl added verbally that, if the demands were not accepted within
that period, the Austro-Hungarian Legation would leave Belgrade on
the morrow, Friday, at 10 a. m. This information was telegraphed
that evening to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Petrograd, M.
Sazonof, by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Belgrade, M.
Strandtman. Through him M. Patchou solicited the help of Russia,
declaring that no Serbian Government could accept the demands of
Austria-Hungary. M. Patchou at the same time telegraphed to the
foreign Serbian Legations the news of the delivery of the note, and
informed them that he was in a position to state that no Serbian
Government could accept its demands in their entirety.
TEXT OF THE NOTE
The following are the contents of the note:
"On March 31, 1909, the Royal Serbian Minister to the court of
Vienna made the following statement, by order of his Government:
"'Serbia declares that she is not affected in her rights by the
situation established in Bosnia, and that she will therefore
adapt herself to the decisions which the powers are going to
arrive at in reference to Article XXV of the Berlin Treaty. By
following the councils of the powers, Serbia binds herself to
cease the attitude of protest and resistance which she has
assumed since last October, relative to the annexation, and she
binds herself further to change the direction of her present
policies toward Austria-Hungary, and in the future to live with
the latter in friendly and neighborly relations.'"
Here follow the charges with which the reader is already familiar:
That there is in Serbia a movement to separate certain territories
from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, which, developed under the eyes
of the Government of Serbia, has found expression beyond that
kingdom in a series of acts of terrorism and assassination.
The Serbian Government has done nothing to suppress the movement,
its violent propaganda in public education and the press, or the
participation in its intrigues by public officials.
"It becomes plain from the evidence and confessions of the
criminal authors of the outrage of June 28 that the murder at
Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade, that the murderers received
the arms and bombs with which they were equipped from Serbian
officers and officials who belonged to the Narodna Odbrana, and
that, lastly, the transportation of the criminals and their arms
to Bosnia was arranged and carried out by leading Serbian
frontier officials.
"These results impose upon the Imperial and Royal Government the
duty to terminate intrigues which constitute a permanent menace
for the peace of the monarchy.
"In order to obtain this purpose, the Imperial and Royal
Government is forced to demand official assurance from the
Serbian Government that it condemns the propaganda directed
against Austria-Hungary, i. e., the entirety of the machinations
whose aim it is to separate parts from the monarchy which belong
to it, and that Serbia binds herself to suppress with all means
this criminal and terrorizing propaganda.
"In order to give to these obligations a solemn character, the
Royal Serbian Government will publish on the first page of its
official organ of July 26, 1914, the following declaration:
"'The Royal Serbian Government condemns the propaganda directed
against Austria-Hungary, i.e., the entirety of those machinations
whose aim it is to separate from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
territories belonging thereto, and she regrets sincerely the
ghastly consequences of these criminal actions.
"'The Royal Serbian Government regrets that Serbian officers and
officials have participated in the propaganda, cited above, and
have thus threatened the friendly and neighborly relations which
the Royal Government was solemnly bound to cultivate by its
declaration of March 31, 1909.
"'The Royal Government, which disapproves and rejects every
thought or every attempt at influencing the destinations of the
inhabitants of any part of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty
to call most emphatically to the attention of its officers and
officials, and of the entire population of the kingdom, that it
will henceforward proceed with the utmost severity against any
persons guilty of similar actions, to prevent and suppress which
it will make every effort.'
"This explanation is to be brought simultaneously to the
cognizance of the royal army through an order of his majesty the
king, and it is to be published in the official organ of the
army.
"The Royal Serbian Government binds itself, in addition, as
follows:
"'1. To suppress any publication which fosters hatred of, and
contempt for, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and whose general
tendency is directed against the latter's territorial integrity.
"'2. To proceed at once with the dissolution of the society
Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate their entire means of propaganda,
and to proceed in the same manner against the other societies and
associations in Serbia which occupy themselves with the
propaganda against Austria-Hungary. The Royal Government will
take the necessary measures, so that the dissolved societies may
not continue their activities under another name or in another
form.
"'Without delay to eliminate from the public instruction in
Serbia, so far as the corps of instructors as well as the means
of instruction are concerned, that which serves, or may serve, to
foster the propaganda against Austria-Hungary.
"'4. To remove from military service and the administration in
general all officers and officials who are guilty of propaganda
against Austria-Hungary, and whose names, with a communication of
the material which the Imperial and Royal Government possesses
against them, the Imperial and Royal Government reserves the
right to communicate to the Royal Government.
"'5. To consent that in Serbia officials of the Imperial and
Royal Government cooperate in the suppression of a movement
directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy.
"'6. To commence a judicial investigation against the
participants of the conspiracy of June 28, who are on Serbian
territory. Officials, delegated by the Imperial and Royal
Government, will participate in the examinations.
"'7. To proceed at once with all severity to arrest Major Voja
Tankosic and a certain Milan Ciganowic, Serbian state officials,
who have been compromised through the result of the
investigation.
"'8. To prevent through effective measures the participation of
the Serbian authorities in the smuggling of arms and explosives
across the frontier, and to dismiss those officials of Shabatz
and Loznica who assisted the originators of the crime of Sarajevo
in crossing the frontier.
"'9. To give to the Imperial and Royal Government explanations in
regard to the unjustifiable remarks of high Serbian functionaries
in Serbia and abroad who have not hesitated, in spite of their
official position, to express themselves in interviews in a
hostile manner against Austria-Hungary after the outrage of June
28.
"'10. The Imperial and Royal Government expects a reply from the
Royal Government, at the latest by Saturday, 25th inst., at 6 p.
m. A memoir concerning the results of the investigations at
Sarajevo, so far as they concern points 7 and 8, is inclosed with
this note.'"
INCLOSURE
"The investigation carried on against Gabrilo Princip and
accomplices in the court of Sarajevo, on account of the
assassination on June 28, has so far yielded the following
results:
"'1. The plan to murder Archduke Franz Ferdinand during his stay
in Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade by Gabrilo Princip,
Nedeljko, Gabrinowic, and a certain Milan Ciganowic and Trifko
Grabez, with the aid of Major Voja Tankosic.
"'2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols which were used by
the criminals were obtained by Milan Ciganowic and Major
Tankosic, and presented to Princip Gabrinowic in Belgrade.
"'3. The bombs are hand grenades, manufactured at the arsenal of
the Serbian army in Kragujevac.
"'4. To insure the success of the assassination, Milan Ciganowic
instructed Princip Gabrinowic in the use of the grenades and gave
instructions in shooting with Browning pistols to Princip Grabez
in a forest near the target practice field of Topshider (outside
Belgrade).
"'5. In order to enable the crossing of the frontier of Bosnia
and Herzegovina by Princip Gabrinowic and Grabez, and the
smuggling of their arms, a secret system of transportation was
organized by Ciganowic. The entry of the criminals with their
arms into Bosnia and Herzegovina was effected by the frontier
captains of Shabatz (Rade Popowic) and of Loznica, as well as by
the custom-house official Rudivoy Grbic of Loznica with the aid
of several other persons.'"
On the same day that the note was presented to Serbia, July 23,
1914, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Chancellor, wrote a
circular letter to the German Ambassadors at Paris, London, and St.
Petersburg, embodying and enforcing the Austro-Hungarian arguments
justifying the note. These the ambassadors were instructed to
present to the Foreign Offices of the countries to which they were
accredited. The chancellor commended the self-restraint of
Austria-Hungary in thus far avoiding war with Serbia. Now, however,
he feared that Serbia would not comply with the just demands of the
country she had injured, but would adopt "a provocative attitude
toward Austria-Hungary."
"Nothing would remain for the Austro-Hungarian Government, unless
it renounced definitely its position as a great power, but to
press its demands with the Serbian Government, and, if need be,
enforce the same by appeal to military measures, in regard to
which the choice of means must be left with it."
The ambassadors were charged to give special emphasis to the view
"that in this question there is concerned an affair which should
be settled solely between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, the
limitation to which it must be the earnest endeavor of the powers
to insure. We anxiously desire the localization of the conflict
because every intercession of another power on account of the
various treaty alliances would precipitate inconceivable
consequences."
The ambassadors were instructed by the chancellor to send him
telegraphic reports of their interviews.
CONTROVERSY OVER THE TIME LIMIT
The diplomatic correspondence of the two following days is occupied
chiefly with the attempt of Serbia and the powers not party to the
dispute to have the time limit of the Austro-Hungarian note
extended. In order to save repetition the correspondence hereafter
will be given under the heads of the dates when letters, telegrams,
etc., were sent, and the subheads of the countries in whose official
reports they are found.
CHRONOLOGICAL ARRANGEMENT OF DATES
FRIDAY, JULY 24, 1914
_Serbia._ M. Strandtman, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade,
telegraphed to M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs at
Petrograd, that Pashitch, Prime Minister of Serbia, had returned to
the capital, and would give an answer to Austria within the
prescribed time, showing the points which are acceptable or
unacceptable.
"To-day an appeal will be addressed to the powers to defend the
independence of Serbia. Then, added Pashitch, if war is
inevitable, we will make war."
_Great Britain._ Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at
Belgrade, telegraphed Sir Edward Grey that M. Pashitch had told him
that the Austrian demands were considered unacceptable by the
Serbian Government, and that it trusted to Great Britain to induce
Austria to moderate them. M. Pashitch was dejected and anxious.
_Russia._ The Crown Prince Alexander, Prince Regent of Serbia,
telegraphed to Czar Nicholas II of Russia that the Serbian
Government had been willing from the first to open an inquiry in
Serbia as to complicity of Serbian subjects in the crime of
Sarajevo.
"The demands contained in the Austro-Hungarian note are, however,
unnecessarily humiliating for Serbia, and incompatible with her
dignity as an independent state....
"We are prepared to accept those of the Austro-Hungarian
conditions which are compatible with the position of an
independent state, as well as those to which your majesty may
advise us to agree, and all those persons whose complicity in the
crime may be proved will be severely punished by us. Certain of
the demands could not be carried out without changes in our
legislation, which would need time.... We may be attacked at the
expiration of the time limit by the Austro-Hungarian army which
is concentrating upon our frontier. We are unable to defend
ourselves, and we beg your majesty to come to our aid as soon as
possible. The much-appreciated good will which your majesty has
so often shown toward us inspires us with the firm belief that
once again our appeal to your noble Slav heart will not pass
unheeded...."
_Russia._ M. Broniewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin,
telegraphed to M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs at St.
Petersburg, that the Berlin press in the main warmly welcomed the
uncompromising attitude of Austria-Hungary.
"The semiofficial 'Lokal-Anzeiger' is particularly violent; it
describes as fruitless any possible appeals that Serbia may make
to St. Petersburg, Paris, Athens, or Bucharest, and concludes by
saying that the German people will breathe freely when they learn
that the situation in the Balkan Peninsula is to be cleared up at
last."
_Serbia._ Dr. Spalaikovitch, Serbian Minister at St. Petersburg,
telegraphed to M. Pashitch a report of a chance interview with Count
Pourtalès, the German Ambassador. The Count had said that peace with
Austria-Hungary depended on Serbia alone, since the matter lay
entirely between the two disputants.
"In reply I told Count Pourtalès that he was under a
misapprehension, and that he would see before long that this was
not a question merely between Serbia and Austria, but a European
question."
_Austria-Hungary._ Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at
London, telegraphed to Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs
at Vienna, that he had handed a copy of the note to Serbia to Sir
Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
"At the fifth heading he asked what it meant; to introduce
officials of our Government in Serbia would be equivalent to the
end of Serbian political independence. I answered that
cooperation of, e.g., police officials, in no way affected the
sovereignty of the state.
"He regretted the time limit, as in this way we should be
deprived of the possibility of quieting the first outbreak of
excitement and bringing pressure to bear upon Belgrade to give us
a satisfactory answer. It was always possible to send an
ultimatum if answer was not satisfactory.
"I developed our point of view at length. (Necessity of defense
against continued revolutionary undertakings which threaten the
territory of the [Dual] Monarchy, protection of our most vital
interests, complete failure of the conciliatory attitude which we
had hitherto often shown to Serbia, who had had more than three
weeks to set on foot of her own accord investigations as to
accomplices in outrage, etc.)
"The Secretary of State repeated his objections to the short time
limit, but recognized that what was said as to complicity in the
crime of Sarajevo, as well as many of our other requirements, was
justified.
"He would be quite ready to look on the affair as one which only
concerned Austria-Hungary and Serbia. He is, however, very
'apprehensive' that several great powers might be involved in a
war. Speaking of Russia, Germany, and France, he observed that
the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance might be more or less to
the same effect as those of the Triple Alliance.
"I fully explained to him our point of view, and repeated with
emphasis that in this case we must stand firm so as to gain for
ourselves some sort of guaranties, as hitherto Serbian promises
have never been kept. I understood that in the first place he
considered the question only as it influences the position of
Europe. He must, however, in order to be fair to our point of
view, put himself in our situation.
"He would not go into any more detailed discussion on this
subject, said he must have time to study the note more carefully.
He was to see the German and the French Ambassadors, as he must
first of all exchange ideas with the powers who are allies of
Austria-Hungary and Russia respectively, but have themselves no
direct interest in Serbia."
Count Szécsen, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Paris, telegraphed to
Count Berchtold that, on his presentation of the copy of the note to
Serbia to M. Bienvenu-Martin, French Acting Secretary for Foreign
Affairs, point five in the note had seemed to make a special
impression on the secretary, since he had asked that it be reread.
"I took the opportunity to impress on him that the question was
one which must be brought to an issue directly between Serbia and
us, but that it was in the general interests of Europe that the
trouble which for years past had been kept up by Serbian
intrigues against us should at last make way for a clear
situation.
"All friends of peace and order, and I placed France in the first
rank of these, should therefore give serious advice to Serbia to
change completely her attitude and to satisfy our just demands.
"The minister said that it was the duty of Serbia to proceed
energetically against any accomplices of the murderers of
Sarajevo, a duty which she could not escape. While laying special
stress on the sympathy of France for Austria-Hungary, and on the
good relations which existed between our two countries, he
expressed the hope that the controversy would be brought to an
end peacefully in a manner corresponding to our wishes.
"The minister avoided every attempt to palliate or to defend in
any way the attitude of Serbia."
In a second telegram Count Szécsen reported that Baron von Schoen,
German Ambassador at Paris, had officially informed M. Bienvenu-Martin,
French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, that, in the view of the
Berlin Cabinet, the Serbian controversy concerned only the two parties
to it, and, in case that third states should wish to intervene, Germany
would be on the side of her ally. M. Bienvenu-Martin replied that his
Government agreed that the controversy concerned Belgrade and Vienna
alone, and he hoped for a peaceful solution.
Count Szápáry, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg,
telegraphed to Count Berchtold that, on presenting the copy of the
note to Serbia to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
the minister had questioned the fact of the outrages complained of
arising in Serbia, and declared that the note was a pretext for war
on Serbia.
"I said to him that no one among us was attacking the integrity
of Serbia or the dynasty. M. Sazonof expressed himself most
vigorously against the dissolution of the Narodna Odbrana, which
Serbia would never undertake. The participation of imperial and
royal officials in the suppression of the revolutionary movements
elicited further protest on the part of the minister. Serbia then
will no longer be master in her own house. 'You will always be
wanting to intervene again, and what a life you will lead
Europe!' I answered that if Serbia shows good will it will be a
quieter life than hitherto.
"The commentary added to the communication of the note was
listened to by the minister with fair composure; at the passage
that our feelings were shared by those of all civilized nations,
he observed that this was a mistake. With all the emphasis I
could command, I pointed out how regrettable it would be if we
could not come to an understanding with Russia on this question,
in which everything which is most sacred to us was at stake, and,
whatever the minister might say, everything which is sacred in
Russia. The minister attempted to minimize the monarchical side
of the question.
"With regard to the _dossier_ which was put at the disposal of
the Governments, M. Sazonof wanted to know why we had given
ourselves this trouble, as we had already delivered the
ultimatum. This was the best proof that we did not really desire
an impartial examination of the matter. I said to him that the
results which had been attained by our own investigations were
quite sufficient for our procedure in this matter, which had to
do with Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that we were only ready
to give the powers further information if it interested them, as
we had nothing to keep secret.
"M. Sazonof said that now that the ultimatum had been issued he
was not in the least curious. He represented the matter as if we
only wanted to make war with Serbia whatever happened. I answered
that we were the most peace-loving power in the world, but what
we wanted was security for our territory from foreign
revolutionary intrigues, and the protection of our dynasty from
bombs....
"In spite of his relative calm, the attitude of the minister was
throughout unaccommodating and hostile."
The Russian "Official Gazette" announced that the Government were
closely and anxiously following the Serbian controversy, to which
Russia could not remain indifferent.
Count Szápáry telegraphed to Count Berchtold that, after a council
of ministers which had lasted five hours, M. Sazonof had received
the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalés.
M. Sazonof took the position that the Serbian question was a
European affair, the settlement of 1909 having been made under the
auspices of all the powers. He pointed out
"that Austria-Hungary had offered a _dossier_ for investigation
when an ultimatum had already been presented. Russia would
require an international investigation of the _dossier_, which
had been put at her disposal. My German colleague at once brought
to M. Sazonof's notice that Austria-Hungary would not accept
interference in her difference with Serbia, and that Germany also
on her side could not accept a suggestion which would be contrary
to the dignity of her ally as a great power.
"In the further course of the conversation the minister explained
that that which Russia could not accept with indifference was the
eventual intention of Austria-Hungary 'to devour Serbia.' Count
Pourtalès answered that he did not accept any such intention on
the part of Austria-Hungary, as this would be contrary to the
most special interest of the monarchy. The only object of
Austria-Hungary was 'to inflict on Serbia justly deserved
chastisement.' M. Sazonof on this expressed his doubts whether
Austria-Hungary would allow herself to be contented with this
even if explanations on this point had been made.
"The interview concluded with an appeal by M. Sazonof that
Germany should work with Russia for the maintenance of peace. The
German Ambassador assured the Russian Minister that Germany
certainly had no wish to bring about a war, but that she
naturally fully represented the interests of her ally."
Count Pourtalès telegraphed his Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg
that M. Sazonof was very much agitated.
Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador at London, to explain to Sir Edward Grey, British
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that the action taken toward Serbia
was not a formal ultimatum but "merely a _démarche_ with a time
limit," which, if not acceded to, would be followed only by
Austria's breaking off diplomatic relations and beginning military
preparations.
"If Serbia were to give way only under the pressure of our
military preparations, we should indeed have to demand that she
should make good the expenses which we had incurred; as is well
known, we have already had twice (1908 and 1912) to mobilize
because of Serbia."
Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Szápáry, Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador at St. Petersburg, a report of his interview with Prince
Koudacheff, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna. The prince had
stated that St. Petersburg was apprehensive that the _démarche_
might take the form of humiliating Serbia, and this would have an
echo in Russia.
"I explained ... the danger, not only to the integrity of the
[Dual] Monarchy, but also to the balance of power and the peace
of Europe, which would be involved in giving further scope to the
great Serbian propaganda, and how all the dynasties, and not
least the Russian, would apparently be threatened if the idea
took root that a movement which made use of murder as a national
weapon could be continued with impunity.
"I pointed out that we did not aim at any increase of territory,
but only at the maintenance of what we possess, a point of view
which could not fail to be understood by the Russian Government."
_Russia._ M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
telegraphed to Prince Koudacheff, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at
Vienna, to ask Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for
Foreign Affairs, that the time limit in the note to Serbia be
extended, as it left to the powers insufficient time for
conciliation.
"Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the
powers of the results of the inquiry upon which the Imperial and
Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow
them sufficient time to study them.
"In this case, if the powers were convinced that certain of the
Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position
to offer advice to the Serbian Government.
"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render
nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to
the powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of
international relations."
M. Sazonof communicated this message to London, Rome, Paris, and
Belgrade, with the request that in the three former cases similar
instructions be given to their Ambassadors at Vienna.
_Great Britain._ Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign
Affairs, telegraphed to Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at
Vienna, that he had said to Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador at London, that it was a matter for great regret that a
time limit, and such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at
this stage of the proceedings.
"The murder of the archduke and some of the circumstances
respecting Serbia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with
Austria, as was but natural, but at the same time I had never
before seen one state address to another independent state a
document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be
hardly consistent with the maintenance of Serbia's independent
sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that
Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint
officials who would have authority within the frontiers of
Serbia.
"I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should
concern myself with the matter simply and solely from the point
of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between
Austria and Serbia were not the concern of his majesty's
Government, and such comments as I had made above were not made
in order to discuss those merits.
"I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an
exchange of views with other powers, and that I must await their
views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of
the situation."
Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg,
telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that M. Sazonof, the Russian Minister
for Foreign Affairs, had sought an interview with him, as the
Austrian step clearly meant war. At the interview M. Sazonof had
said Austria's demands were provocative and immoral, some being
impossible of acceptance. She would never have taken such action
unless Germany had first been consulted. He hoped Great Britain
would proclaim her solidarity with Russia and France. France would
fulfill the treaty obligations with Russia, besides supporting
Russia in diplomatic negotiations. Sir George said, that personally
he did not expect any declaration of this kind from Great Britain.
Direct British interests were nil in Serbia, British public opinion
would not permit Great Britain to enter war on her behalf. M.
Sazonof replied that the general European question was involved, and
Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems
now at issue.
Evidently Sazonof wants Great Britain to join in warning Austria
that her intervention in Serbia will not be tolerated. But suppose
Austria nevertheless wars in Serbia, will Russia forthwith declare
war on Austria?
A council of ministers is being held this afternoon on mobilization.
At a meeting to-morrow, where the czar will preside, a decision will
be come to.
Sir George said the important thing to do was to influence Austria
to extend the time limit. M. Paléologue, the French Ambassador, was
either set on war or was bluffing, and whichever it was, our only
chance for peace was to adopt a firm and united attitude. There was
no time to carry out Sir George's suggestion. The British Ambassador
then said that his Government might perhaps warn Austria that war
would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France
and Germany, and so make it hard for Great Britain to keep out of
the conflict. M. Sazonof answered that Great Britain would sooner or
later be dragged into war; war would be rendered more likely by
Great Britain if she did not make common cause with Russia and
France. President Poincaré and M. Viviani, President of the Council,
being in Russia, it appears as if Austria had taken advantage of
their absence from France to present their ultimatum to Serbia. Even
though we do not join them it seems that France and Russia are
determined to make a strong stand.
Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed to
Sir Edward Grey that he was assured by M. Schebeko, Russian
Ambassador at Vienna, that Russia would not be indifferent to the
humiliation of Serbia. Prince Koudacheff, the Russian Chargé
d'Affaires, had told Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Minister
for Foreign Affairs, that the note to Serbia was unusual and
peremptory, and drawn up in a form rendering its acceptance
impossible. The count replied that the Austro-Hungarian Minister
would leave Belgrade at the time set if Serbia did not yield. The
Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence was at stake. The step
taken by the Government was approved by the country. He did not
think objections would be raised by the powers.
Sir Edward Grey informed Sir Francis Bertie, British Ambassador at
Paris of a conversation with M. Cambon, the French Ambassador at
London, over an intended interview that afternoon of Sir Edward with
Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador.
"I would say to the ambassador that, of course, if the
presentation of this ultimatum to Serbia did not lead to trouble
between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about
it; but, if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum, which
it seemed to me that any power interested in Serbia would take. I
should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the
ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence. I would say that
I thought the only chance of any mediating or moderating
influence being exercised was that Germany, France, Italy, and
ourselves, who had not direct interests in Serbia, should act
together for the sake of peace, simultaneously in Vienna and St.
Petersburg.
"M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the
four powers, he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to
join in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in
St. Petersburg till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken
some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march
into Serbia, for the Serbians could not possibly accept the
Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion
to take action as soon as Austria attacked Serbia, and therefore,
once the Austrians had attacked Serbia, it would be too late for
any mediation.
"I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St.
Petersburg until after it was clear that there must be trouble
between Austria and Russia. I had thought that if Austria did
move into Serbia, and Russia then mobilized, it would be possible
for the four powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, and
Russia also to stop hers, pending mediation. But it would be
essential for any chance of success for such a step that Germany
should participate in it.
"M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had once
moved against Serbia. The important thing was to gain time by
mediation in Vienna. The best chance of this being accepted would
be that Germany should propose it to the other powers.
"I said that by this he meant a mediation between Austria and
Serbia.
"He replied that it was so."
Sir Edward Grey telegraphed the results of the interview with Prince
Lichnowsky to Sir Horace Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at
Berlin. Sir Edward's statements were those he had decided upon in
his interview with M. Cambon. The prince replied that Austria might
be expected to move unless Serbia accepted her demands _in toto_. He
suggested that Serbia ought in no case to give a negative reply. A
partial acceptance if sent at once might afford an excuse to Russia
against immediate action. Sir Edward asked Sir Horace to submit his
views to the German Secretary of State, Herr von Jagow.
Sir Edward Grey telegraphed Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé
d'Affaires at Belgrade, to advise the Serbian Government, if it were
proved that any Serbian officials, however subordinate, were
accomplices in the murder of the archduke, to give Austria the
fullest satisfaction in the way of expressing concern with regret.
For the rest they must reply as they consider best in Serbian
interests. The only chance for Serbia is to reply favorably to as
many points in the note as the time limit allows.
"Serbian Minister here has begged that his majesty's Government
will express their views, but I cannot undertake responsibility
of saying more than I have said above, and I do not like to say
even that without knowing what is being said at Belgrade by
French and Russian Governments. You should therefore consult your
French and Russian colleagues as to repeating what my views are,
as expressed above, to Serbian Government.
"I have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria should not
precipitate military action."
_France._ M. Viviani, French Prime Minister, who had not yet seen
the note to Serbia, wrote from Reval, Russia, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, to send on to M.
Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, the following information and
instructions:
In M. Viviani's conversation with M. Sazonof, Russian Minister of
Foreign Affairs, it was agreed to prevent Austrian intervention in
the internal affairs of Serbia of a kind which Serbia might consider
as an attack on her sovereignty and independence. This view should
be communicated to Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Minister
for Foreign Affairs, and moderation counseled him, cooperation in
this should be secured from the Russian and British Ambassadors in
Vienna. The British Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, had informed M.
Sazonof that his Government might join in a _démarche_ (proceeding)
for removing any danger to general peace, and telegraphed his
Government to that effect. M. Sazonof has instructed Count
Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, to secure such
cooperation. M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, should be
instructed to back him up. M. Bienvenu-Martin sent to M. Viviani,
returning from Russia on _La France_, and to the French Ambassadors
at London, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Rome, and the French
Minister at Belgrade, the contents of the Austrian note to Serbia,
and an account of the circumstances of the delivery of the copy to
the French Government by Count Szécsen, the Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador. M. Berthelot, French Political Director, in obedience to
M. Bienvenu-Martin's instructions, had confined himself to stating
to the ambassador that painful feeling would be aroused in French
public opinion by the categorical nature of the note, and its short
time limit, and its presentation to Serbia at a time when the
President and Prime Minister of France were at sea, and could not
exert, in cooperation with statesmen of other powers not directly
interested, that soothing influence on Serbia and Austria which was
so desirable in the interest of general peace.
In a letter to these ambassadors and minister, and to the French
Minister at Stockholm (M. Thiébaut), M. Bienvenu-Martin said that M.
Berthelot, French Political Director, had advised M. Vesnitch,
Serbian Minister at Paris, that Serbia should play for delay by
asking that she be allowed time to verify the evidence, presumably
one sided, adduced by Austria in support of her note to Serbia, and,
above all, that Serbia should declare herself ready to submit to the
arbitration of Europe.
Italy had not been consulted by Austria in regard to the note, nor
even informed of it. M. Bienvenu-Martin informed these same
representatives at foreign courts (with exception of the Ambassador
at Vienna), that M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna had
reported that the chief fear of the Austro-Hungarian military party
was that Serbia would accede to the demands of Austria-Hungary; and
that M. Yov. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna thought his
Government would give way on all points save the order to the army
dictated to King Peter, dismissal of officers suspected by Austria,
and interference by foreign officials in Serbia. M. Yovanovitch
hoped that a discussion on these points might be started which would
lead to arbitration by the powers.
The feeling in Germany was warlike. The tone of the press there was
intimidating, particularly toward Russia. Italy was exercising
moderating influence at Vienna.
M. Bienvenu-Martin notified the French representatives at the above
courts and at Vienna of the contents of the circular note of the
German Government delivered him that day by Baron von Schoen, the
German Ambassador. Said the Acting Foreign Secretary:
"I called the German Ambassador's attention to the fact that
while it might appear legitimate to demand the punishment of all
those who were implicated in the crime of Sarajevo, on the other
hand it seemed difficult to require measures which could not be
accepted, having regard to the dignity and sovereignty of Serbia;
the Serbian Government, even if it was willing to submit to them,
would risk being carried away by a revolution.
"I also pointed out to Herr von Schoen that his note only took
into account two hypotheses: that of a pure and simple refusal or
that of a provocative attitude on the part of Serbia. The third
hypothesis (which would leave the door open for an arrangement)
should also be taken into consideration; that of Serbia's
acceptance and of her agreeing at once to give full satisfaction
for the punishment of the accomplices and full guaranties for the
suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda so far as they were
compatible with her sovereignty and dignity.
"I added that if within these limits the satisfaction desired by
Austria could be admitted, the means of obtaining it could be
examined; if Serbia gave obvious proof of good will it could not
be thought that Austria would refuse to take part in the
conversation.
"Perhaps they should not make it too difficult for third powers,
who could not either morally or sentimentally cease to take
interest in Serbia, to take an attitude which was in accord with
the wishes of Germany to localize the dispute.
"Herr von Schoen recognized the justice of these considerations
and vaguely stated that hope was always possible. When I asked
him if we should give to the Austrian note the character of a
simple _mise en demeure_, which permitted a discussion, or an
ultimatum, he answered that personally he had no views."
M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, reported to M.
Bienvenu-Martin, that official German opinion supported Austria in
not abating her demands on Serbia. There was pessimism in diplomatic
circles. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires, M. Broniewsky, had bitterly
noted the presentation of the note to Serbia during the absence from
France of the French President and Prime Minister. He thought that
William II, in his desire to support the monarchic principle, was
becoming less inclined to show a conciliatory attitude.
In a second letter M. Cambon reported an interview he had just had
with Herr von Jagow, German Secretary of State. The secretary
supported the Austrian note to Serbia. It was that country's
domestic affair, and he hoped that the dispute would be localized.
[Illustration: King Peter of Serbia.]
"I asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been entirely
ignorant of Austria's requirements before they were communicated
to Belgrade, and as he told me that that was so, I showed him my
surprise at seeing him thus undertake to support claims of whose
limit and scope he was ignorant.
"Herr von Jagow interrupted me, and said: 'It is only because we
are having a personal conversation that I allow you to say that
to me.'
"'Certainly,' I replied, 'but if Peter I humiliates himself,
domestic trouble will probably break out in Serbia; that will
open the door to fresh possibilities, and do you know where you
will be led by Vienna?' I added that the language of the German
newspapers was not the language of persons who were indifferent
to, and unacquainted with, the question, but betokened an active
support. Finally I remarked that the shortness of the time limit
given to Serbia for submission would make an unpleasant
impression in Europe.
"Herr von Jagow answered that he quite expected a little
excitement (_un peu d'émotion_) on the part of Serbia's friends,
but that he was counting on their giving her wise advice.
"'I have no doubt,' I then said to him, 'that Russia would
endeavor to persuade the Cabinet of Belgrade to make acceptable
concessions; but why not ask from one what is being asked from
the other, and if reliance is being placed on advice being given
at Belgrade, is it not also legitimate to rely on advice being
given at Vienna from another quarter?'
"The Secretary of State went so far as to say that that depended
on circumstances; but immediately checked himself; he repeated
that the difficulty must be localized. He asked me if I really
thought the situation serious. 'Certainly,' I answered, 'because
if what is happening is the result of due reflection, I do not
understand why all means of retreat have been cut off.'
"All the evidence shows that Germany is ready to support
Austria's attitude with unusual energy. The weakness which her
Austro-Hungarian ally has shown for some years past has weakened
the confidence that was placed in her here. She was found heavy
to drag along. Mischievous legal proceedings, such as the Agram
and the Friedjung affairs, brought odium on her police and
covered them with ridicule. All that was asked of the police was
that they should be strong; the conviction is that they were
violent.
"An article which appeared in the 'Lokal Anzeiger' this evening
shows also that at the German Chancellery there exists a state of
mind to which we in Paris are naturally not inclined to pay
sufficient attention, I mean the feeling that monarchies must
stand together. I am convinced that great weight must be attached
to this point of view in order to appreciate the attitude of the
Emperor William, whose impressionable nature must have been
affected by the assassination of a prince whose guest he had been
a few days previously.
"It is not less striking to notice the pains with which Herr von
Jagow, and all the officials placed under his orders, pretend to
everyone that they were ignorant of the scope of the note sent by
Austria to Serbia."
M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reported to M.
Bienvenu-Martin as follows:
"The intentions of the Emperor of Russia and his ministers could
not be more pacific, a fact of which the President of the
[French] Republic and the president of the council have been
able to satisfy themselves directly; but the ultimatum which the
Austro-Hungarian Government has just delivered to the Cabinet at
Belgrade introduces a new and disquieting element into the
situation.
"Public opinion in Russia would not allow Austria to offer
violence to Serbia. The shortness of the time limit fixed by the
ultimatum renders still more difficult the moderating influence
that the powers of the Triple Entente might exercise at Vienna.
"On the other hand, M. Sazonof [Russian Prime Minister] assumes
that Germany will desire to support her ally and I am afraid that
this impression is correct. Nothing but the assurance of the
solidarity of the Triple Entente can prevent the German powers
from emphasizing their provocative attitude."
M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, reported to M.
Bienvenu-Martin an interview with Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary
for Foreign Affairs. Cambon and Grey were agreed that everything
must be done to avert the crisis, and that the British Cabinet
should take the initiative in offering mediation by the four powers
not directly interested, Great Britain, France, Russia and Germany.
If Germany assented, time would be gained, and this was the
essential point.
"Sir Edward Grey told me that he would discuss with Prince
Lichnowsky the proposal. I mentioned the matter to my Russian
colleague [Count Benckendorff] who is afraid of a surprise from
Germany, and who imagines that Austria would not have dispatched
her ultimatum without previous agreement with Berlin.
"Count Benckendorff told me that Prince Lichnowsky, when he
returned from leave about a month ago, had intimated that he held
pessimistic views regarding the relations between St. Petersburg
and Berlin. He had observed the uneasiness caused in this latter
capital by the rumors of a naval entente between Russia and Great
Britain, by the czar's visit to Bucharest, and by the
strengthening of the Russian army. Count Benckendorff had
concluded from this that a war with Russia would be looked upon
without disfavor in Germany.
"The Under-Secretary of State [Sir Arthur Nicholson] has been
struck, as all of us have been, by the anxious looks of Prince
Lichnowsky since his return from Berlin, and he considers that if
Germany had wished to do so she could have stopped the dispatch
of the ultimatum.
"The situation, therefore, is as grave as it can be, and we see
no way of arresting the course of events.
"However, Count Benckendorff thinks it right to attempt the
démarche upon which I have agreed with Sir Edward Grey."
In a second letter M. Cambon reported receipt of the details of the
Austrian ultimatum.
"In consultation with my Russian colleague, who thinks it
extremely difficult for his Government not to support Serbia, we
have been asking ourselves what intervention could avert the
conflict.
"Sir Edward Grey having summoned me for this afternoon, I propose
to suggest that he should ask for the semiofficial intervention
of the German Government at Vienna to prevent a sudden attack."
M. Bienvenu-Martin informed the French Ambassadors at St.
Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna and Rome, and the Ministers at Stockholm
and Belgrade of M. Cambon's report, and his (Bienvenu-Martin's)
willingness to cooperate in the proposed conciliatory action at
Vienna.
_Belgium._ M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
notified the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna, and
St. Petersburg
"that the Government had under consideration an address to the
powers who guarantee Belgian independence and neutrality assuring
them of Belgium's determination to fulfill the international
obligations imposed upon her by treaty in the event of a war
breaking out on her frontiers.
"The Government have come to the conclusion that such a
communication would be premature at present, but that events
might move rapidly and not leave sufficient time to forward
suitable instructions at the desired moment to the Belgian
representatives abroad.
"In these circumstances I have proposed to the King [Albert] and
to my colleagues in the Cabinet, who have concurred, to give you
now exact instructions as to the steps to be taken by you if the
prospect of a Franco-German war became more threatening.
"I inclose herewith a note, signed but not dated, which you
should read to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and of which you
should give him a copy, if circumstances render such a
communication necessary.
"I shall inform you by telegram when you are to act on these
instructions.
"This telegram will be dispatched when the order is given for the
mobilization of the Belgian army if, contrary to our earnest hope
and to the apparent prospect of a peaceful settlement, our
information leads us to take this extreme measure of precaution."
The note inclosed said that Belgium had "most scrupulously" observed
the obligations of neutrality imposed on her by the treaties of
April 19, 1839, and would "strive unflinchingly" to fulfill them
whatever the new circumstances might be.
"The friendly feelings of the powers toward her have been so
often reaffirmed that Belgium confidently expects that her
territory will remain free from any attack, should hostilities
break out upon her frontiers.
"All necessary steps to insure respect of Belgian neutrality have
nevertheless been taken by the Government. The Belgian army has
been mobilized and is taking up such strategic positions as have
been chosen to secure the defense of the country and the respect
of its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse have
been put in a state of defense....
"These measures are intended solely to enable Belgium to fulfill
her international obligations; and it is obvious that they
neither have been nor can have been undertaken with any intention
of taking part in an armed struggle between the powers or from
any feeling of distrust of any of those powers."
On the following day this notification was also sent to the Belgian
Ministers at Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg.
SATURDAY, JULY 25, 1914
_Austria-Hungary._ Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for
Foreign Affairs, telegraphed from Lembach to his Under-Secretary,
Baron von Macchio, that Russia through Prince Koudacheff, its Chargé
d'Affaires at Vienna, was pressing for an extension of the time
limit in the note to Serbia, and that he should tell the prince this
would not be granted, but that, even after the severance of
diplomatic relations, Serbia could have peace by complying
unconditionally with Austria-Hungary's demands--in which case,
however, she must pay the cost of Austro-Hungarian military
measures.
Later, Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Szápáry,
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that Prince
Koudacheff had based his request on the powers being taken by
surprise in the demands on Serbia, and therefore that Russia should
have time to consider the evidence in the case as presented in
Austria-Hungary's _dossier_. These grounds, said Count Berchtold,
rested on a mistaken hypothesis.
"Our note to the powers was in no way intended to invite them to
make known their own views on the subject, but merely bore the
character of a statement for information, the communication of
which we regarded as a duty laid on us by international
courtesy.... We regarded our action as concerning us and Serbia
alone."
Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade,
telegraphed Count Berchtold that the Serbian Cabinet on the evening
of the 24th and morning of the 25th had been preparing its reply to
the note, and would deliver it before the time limit expired;
preparations were being made by the Serbian Government and army for
removal into the interior; foreign legations expected to have to
follow; the Russian Legation was already packing up; the
Austro-Hungarian Legation were ready to leave Belgrade by the 6.30
p. m. train.
Count Berchtold notified Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg, on the
same day, that, in case of Russia reconsidering her position, and
refusing to be swept away by the bellicose elements, he, with the
support of his German colleague, Count Pourtalès, a close
understanding with whom was presumed, should impress upon M.
Sazonof, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that
Austria-Hungary, in event of war with Russia, would not stand alone.
"That we had striven up till now, so far as in us lay, to
preserve the peace which we considered to be the most precious
possession of nations, was shown by the course of events during
the last forty years, and by the historical fact that our
gracious emperor has won for himself the glorious title of
'Protector of the Peace.'
"We should, therefore, most sincerely deplore the disturbance of
the European peace, because we also were of the opinion that the
strengthening of the Balkan States in a position of political and
national independence would prove to the advantage of our
relations with Russia, and would also remove all possibility of
antagonism between us and Russia; also because we have always
been ready, in the shaping of our own policy, to take into
consideration the dominant political interests of Russia.
"Any further toleration of Serbian intrigues would undermine our
existence as a state and our position as a great power, thus also
threatening the balance of power in Europe. We are, however,
convinced that it is to Russia's own interests, as her peaceful
leaders will clearly see, that the existing European balance of
power which is of such importance for the peace of the world,
should be maintained. Our action against Serbia, whatever form it
takes, is conservative from first to last, and its object is the
necessary preservation of our position in Europe."
In a supplementary telegram Count Berchtold instructed Count Szápáry
to explain that point five in the note to Serbia was interpolated
merely out of practical considerations, and not to infringe on the
sovereignty of Serbia.
"By 'collaboration' in point five, we are thinking of the
establishment of a private 'Bureau de Sûreté' at Belgrade, which
would operate in the same way as the analogous Russian
establishments in Paris and in cooperation with the Serbian
police and administration."
Other ambassadors were similarly instructed.
_Russia._ M. Broniewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin,
telegraphed to M. Sazonof reporting that he and the British
Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, had urged the German Secretary of
State, Herr von Jagow, to advise Vienna to extend the time limit in
the ultimatum to Serbia. Von Jagow had telegraphed the request to
Vienna, but, owing to the absence of Count Berchtold from the
capital, feared that it would have no result.
"Moreover, he has doubts as to the wisdom of Austria yielding at
the last moment, and he is inclined to think that such a step on
her part might increase the assurance of Serbia. I replied that a
great power such as Austria could give way without impairing her
prestige, and I adduced every other similar argument, but failed,
nevertheless, to obtain any more definite promise. Even when I
gave him to understand that action must be taken at Vienna if the
possibility of terrible consequences was to be avoided, the
Minister for Foreign Affairs answered each time in the negative."
M. Sevastipoulo, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, telegraphed M.
Sazonof that, at his instance, the French representative at Vienna
had been instructed to request extension of the time limit in the
note to Serbia.
Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, telegraphed that
the British representative at Vienna had been instructed to do the
same, and also to discuss the prevention of hostilities should the
request be refused.
M. Sazonof replied by telegraph that in event of hostilities, Russia
counted on Great Britain siding at once and definitely with France
and Russia in order to maintain the European balance of power for
which Great Britain had constantly intervened in the past and which
would certainly be compromised by the triumph of Austria.
Count Pourtalès, German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, handed a note
_verbale_ to M. Sazonof, denying the press report that the action of
Austria-Hungary was instigated by the German Government, and
declaring that this government "had no knowledge of the text" of the
note to Serbia before it was presented, and had "exercised no
influence upon its contents."
"Germany, as the ally of Austria, naturally supports the claims
made by the Vienna Cabinet against Serbia, which she considers
justified.
"Above all Germany wishes, as she has already declared from the
very beginning of the Austro-Serbian dispute, that this conflict
should be localized."
The same statement was made to the French Government by Baron von
Schoen, the German Ambassador, and to the British Government by
Count Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador. The count asked Sir
Edward Grey, British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, that the British
Government bring conciliatory pressure on Austria.
"Grey replied that this was quite impossible. He added that, as
long as complications existed between Austria and Serbia alone,
British interests were only indirectly affected; but he had to
look ahead to the fact that Austrian mobilization would lead to
Russian mobilization, and that from that moment a situation would
exist in which the interests of all the powers would be involved.
In that event Great Britain reserved to herself full liberty of
action."
_Great Britain._ Sir Francis Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris,
telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that M. Bienvenu-Martin, French
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, hoped that Serbia's reply to
Austra-Hungary's demands would be sufficiently conciliatory to
obviate extreme measures, but said that there would be revolution in
Serbia if she were to accept the demands in their entirety.
Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg,
telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for
Foreign Affairs, said that the explanations of the Austrian
Ambassador, Count Szápáry, did not quite correspond with information
received from German quarters, which information came too late to
affect negotiations at Vienna.
"The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Serbia was quite
ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be
guilty, but that no independent State could be expected to accept
the political demands which had been put forward. The Minister
for Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversation which he had
with the Serbian Minister [Dr. Spalaikovitch] yesterday, that, in
the event of the Austrians attacking Serbia, the Serbian
Government would abandon Belgrade, and withdraw their forces into
the interior, while they would at the same time appeal to the
powers to help them. His excellency was in favor of their making
this appeal. He would like to see the question placed on an
international footing, as the obligations taken by Serbia in
1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were
given not to Austria, but to the powers.
"If Serbia should appeal to the powers, Russia would be quite
ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of
England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his
opinion, that Serbia might propose to submit the question to
arbitration.
"On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not
precipitate war by mobilizing until you had had time to use your
influence in favor of peace, his excellency assured me that
Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no action
until it was forced upon her. Austria's action was in reality
directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present
_status quo_ in the Balkans, and establishing her own hegemony
there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her
attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with
France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now,
rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged
into war.
"I said that England could play the rôle of mediator at Berlin
and Vienna to better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of
moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an
ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once.
His excellency said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that
she could count upon our neutrality.
"I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilized, Germany
would not be content with mere mobilization, or give Russia time
to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His
excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush
Serbia and become the predominant power in the Balkans, and, if
she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the
risks of war."
Sir Horace Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed
to Sir Edward Grey that Herr von Jagow, German Secretary of State,
had instructed the German Ambassador at Vienna, Herr von Tschirscky,
to present to Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Grey's suggestion of an extension of the time limit for
Serbia's reply, but that, owing to Berchtold's absence from the
capital, the extension would probably not be granted. Von Jagow did
not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but admitted
that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that
Serbia "could not swallow" certain of Austria-Hungary's demands.
"I asked whether it was not to be feared that, in taking military
action against Serbia, Austria would dangerously excite public
opinion in Russia. He said he thought not. He remained of opinion
that crisis could be localized. I said that telegrams from Russia
in this morning's papers did not look very reassuring, but he
maintained his optimistic view with regard to Russia. He said
that he had given the Russian Government to understand that the
last thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all
in his power to prevent such a calamity. If the relations between
Austria and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall
in with your suggestion as to the four powers working in favor of
moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg.
"Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note
left much to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated
very earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all
about the contents of that note, he had in fact had no such
knowledge."
Sir Rennell Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, telegraphed to Sir
Edward Grey that the Italian Secretary General was of opinion that
Austria will only be restrained by Serbia's unconditional surrender,
and that there was reliable information she intended to seize the
Saloniki Railway.
Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed Sir
Edward Grey that the language of the Vienna press left the
impression that the surrender of Serbia was neither expected nor
desired, and that Minister for Foreign Affairs Berchtold would go to
Ischl to communicate Serbia's reply as soon as it was presented.
Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade,
telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey a forecast of the Serbian reply, and
said that the Serbian Government considered it would be fully
satisfactory unless Austria-Hungary was determined on war at any
cost. In a supplementary telegram he said that in view of his French
and Russian colleagues not having received instructions from their
governments and of the proposed conciliatory terms of the Serbian
reply, he had not offered advice to the Serbian Government. It was
highly probable the Russian Government had urged the utmost
moderation on Serbia.
Sir Edward Grey telegraphed Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador
at St. Petersburg, that he could not promise to Russia more than he
had done.
"I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to
sanction our going to war over a Serbian quarrel. If, however,
war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us
into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it.
"The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian
_démarche_ makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time
both Russia and Austria will have mobilized against each other.
In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for
the other four powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian
Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the
four powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg to try and
arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly
that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no
doubt gladly cooperate.
"No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by
either Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial and
included the allies or friends of both. The cooperation of
Germany would, therefore, be essential."
Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir Horace Rumbold, British Chargé
d'Affaires at Berlin, to the same effect, and also that Prince
Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London, was personally favorable to
the suggestion of mediation between Austria and Russia, which he
thought Austria might be able with dignity to accept.
"I impressed upon the ambassador that, in the event of Russian
and Austrian mobilization, the participation of Germany would be
essential to any diplomatic action for peace. Alone we could do
nothing. The French Government were traveling at the moment, and
I had had no time to consult them, and could not therefore be
sure of their views, but I was prepared, if the German Government
agreed with my suggestion, to tell the French Government that I
thought it the right thing to act upon it."
Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British
Ambassador at Vienna, the text of the Russian telegram sent to the
Russian Ambassador at Vienna asking the Austro-Hungarian Government
for extension of the time limit for the Serbian reply, and
protesting that a refusal would be "against international ethics."
Grey asked Bunsen to support the Russian position.
"I trust that if the Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too
late to prolong the time limit, they will at any rate give time
in the sense and for the reasons desired by Russia before taking
any irretrievable steps."
Sir Edward Grey telegraphed Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé
d'Affaires at Belgrade, an account of an interview of M.
Boschkovitch, Serbian Minister at London, with Sir Arthur Nicholson,
British Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
"He mentioned that both the assassins of the archduke were
Austrian subjects--Bosniaks; that one of them had been in Serbia,
and that the Serbian authorities, considering him suspect and
dangerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying to the
Austrian authorities found that the latter protected him, and
said that he was an innocent and harmless individual."
_France._--M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, reported to
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, an
interview with Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin.
"The Belgian Minister appears very anxious.... He is of opinion
that Austria and Germany have desired to take advantage of the
fact that, owing to a combination of circumstances at the present
moment, Russia and England appear to them to be threatened by
domestic troubles, while in France the state of the army is under
discussion. Moreover, he does not believe in the pretended
ignorance of the Government of Berlin on the subject of Austria's
_démarche_.
"He thinks that, if the form of it has not been submitted to the
Cabinet at Berlin, the moment of its dispatch has been cleverly
chosen in consultation with that Cabinet, in order to surprise
the Triple Entente at a moment of disorganization.
"He has seen the Italian Ambassador, who has just interrupted his
holiday in order to return. It looks as if Italy would be
surprised, to put it no higher, at having been kept out of the
whole affair by her two Allies."
M. Bienvenu-Martin notified the French Legations at London, Berlin,
St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Stockholm of a visit made him by Baron
von Schoen, the German Ambassador, to protest against an article in
the _Écho de Paris_ calling his _démarche_ of yesterday a "German
threat." M. Berthelot, French Political Director, assured him that
no private information had been given out by the Foreign office of
the _démarche_, and that the article merely showed that the
proceeding was known elsewhere than at the Quai d'Orsay. The German
Ambassador did not take up the allusion.
M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reported to M.
Bienvenu-Martin that M. Sazonof, Russian Secretary for Foreign
Affairs, had been unfavorably impressed by the evasive replies and
recriminations of Count de Pourtalès, the German Ambassador, over
the note to Serbia.
"The ministers will hold a council to-morrow with the czar
presiding. M. Sazonof preserves complete moderation. 'We must
avoid,' he said to me, 'everything which might precipitate the
crisis. I am of opinion that, even if the Austro-Hungarian
Government come to blows with Serbia, we ought not to break off
negotiations.'"
M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, reported to M.
Bienvenu-Martin the interview with Herr von Jagow, German Secretary
of State, by Sir Horace Rumbold.
"The British Chargé d'Affaires inquired of Herr von Jagow, as I
had done yesterday, if Germany had had no knowledge of the
Austrian note before it was dispatched, and he received so clear
a reply in the negative that he was not able to carry the matter
further; but he could not refrain from expressing his surprise at
the blank cheque given by Germany to Austria.
"Herr von Jagow having replied to him that the matter was a
domestic one for Austria, he remarked that it had become
essentially an international one."
Later in the day M. Cambon reported the interview between Herr von
Jagow and M. Broniewski, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.
"M. Broniewski, like myself, has heard the rumor that Austria,
while declaring that she did not desire an annexation of
territory, would occupy parts of Serbia until she had received
complete satisfaction. 'One knows,' he said to me, 'what this
word "satisfaction" means.' M. Broniewski's impressions of
Germany's ultimate intentions are very pessimistic."
M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, reported to M.
Bienvenu-Martin that Prince Koudacheff, Russian Chargé d'Affaires,
had sent his Government's request of an extension of the time limit
for the Serbian reply to Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian
Minister for Foreign Affairs, in two telegrams, one addressed to him
on his journey, and the other to Ischl, his destination. The prince
does not expect any result. Baron Macchio, General Secretary of the
Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, had received "with icy coldness"
the prince's expostulation that the submission by Austria-Hungary of
grievances against Serbia without permitting time for their
examination was not consonant with international courtesy. The baron
replied that one's interests sometimes exempted one from being
courteous.
"The Austrian Government is determined to inflict humiliation on
Serbia: it will accept no intervention from any power until the
blow has been delivered and received full in the face by Serbia."
M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, reported to M.
Bienvenu-Martin that the request by the Russian Government for
Italy's cooperation in securing from Austria-Hungary an extension of
the time limit for the Serbian reply, came too late for action
thereon, owing to the absence from Rome of the Prime Minister, the
Marquis di San Giuliano.
M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, notified M.
Bienvenu-Martin that report had come from Vienna of rupture between
Austria-Hungary and Serbia.
"Large crowds consisting of several hundred persons are
collecting here before the newspaper offices and a demonstration
of numbers of young people has just passed through the
Pariser-platz shouting cries of 'Hurrah' for Germany, and singing
patriotic songs. The demonstrators are visiting the _Siegessaül_
[column of victory], the Austrian and then the Italian Embassy.
It is a significant outburst of chauvinism....
"In financial circles measures are already being taken to meet
every eventuality, for no means of averting the crisis is seen,
in view of the determined support which Germany is giving to
Austria.
"I, for my part, see in Great Britain the only power which might
be listened to at Berlin.
"Whatever happens, Paris, St. Petersburg, and London will not
succeed in maintaining peace with dignity unless they show a firm
and absolutely united front."
At the hour of expiration of the ultimatum to Serbia, M. Dumaine,
French Ambassador at Vienna, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin that
Prince Koudacheff, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, had presented
alone his request for an extension of the time limit, it seeming to
the representatives of the other powers useless to support him when
there was no time to do so.
"At the last moment we are assured that the Austrian Minister has
just left Belgrade hurriedly; he must have thought the Serbian
Government's acceptance of the conditions imposed by his
Government inadequate."
SERBIA'S REPLY TO THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NOTE
A few minutes before 6 p. m., July 25, 1914, the Serbian Government
made its reply to the Austrian note.
This declared that no attempts had been made, or declarations
uttered, by responsible representatives of Serbia, tending to
subvert Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina, since March
31, 1909, when protests against the annexation of these countries
made in the Skupshtina (Serbian Parliament) were cut short by
declarations of the Serbian Government. It drew attention to the
fact that Austria-Hungary had since then made no complaint in this
connection save in regard to a school book, concerning which it had
received an entirely satisfactory explanation.
"Serbia has several times given proofs of her pacific and
moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to
Serbia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive
interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved.
The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for
manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the
press and the peaceable work of societies--manifestations which
take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of
events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control.
The Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the
fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions
which arose between Serbia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of
a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the
majority of these questions to the advantage of the two
neighboring countries.
"For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and
surprised at the statements, according to which members of the
Kingdom of Serbia are supposed to have participated in the
preparations for the crime committed at Sarajevo; the Royal
Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an
investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were
ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their
attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom
representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with
the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are
prepared to hand over for trial any Serbian subject, without
regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime
of Sarajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they
undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the
'Journal officiel,' on the date of July 26, the following
declaration":
[Here follows the declaration required by Austria-Hungary, with
alterations intended to lessen the humiliation, which changes will
be noted in a following criticism by the Austro-Hungarian Foreign
Office.]
"This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal
army in an order of the day, in the name of his majesty the king,
by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be
published in the next official army bulletin.
"The Royal Government further undertake:
"1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the
Skupshtina a provision into the press law providing for the most
severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any
publication the general tendency of which is directed against
the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government
engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause
an amendment to be introduced into Article XXII of the
Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be
confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the
categorical terms of Article XXII of the Constitution.
"2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the
Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the
'Narodna Odbrana' and other similar societies have committed up
to the present any criminal act of this nature through the
proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal
Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal
Government, and will dissolve the 'Narodna Odbrana" Society and
every other society which may be directing its efforts against
Austria-Hungary.
"3. The Royal Serbian Government undertake to remove without
delay from their public educational establishments in Serbia all
that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against
Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government
furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.
"4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military
service all such persons as the judicial inquiry may have proved
to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the
territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the
Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later
date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for
the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against
them.
"5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly
grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial
and Royal Government that Serbia shall undertake to accept the
collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government
upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such
collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law,
with criminal procedure, and with good neighborly relations.
"6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it
their duty to open an inquiry against all such persons as are, or
eventually may be, implicated in the plot of June 28, and who
happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the
participation in this inquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or
authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal
Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an
arrangement, as it would be a violation of the constitution and
of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases
communications as to the results of the investigations in
question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.
"7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the
delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voislav Tankossitch.
As regards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a subject of the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to June 28 was employed (on
probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been
possible to arrest him.
"The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as
to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the
presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of
guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the inquiry
at Sarajevo for the purposes of the later inquiry.
"8. The Serbian Government will reinforce and extend the measures
which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms
and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that
they will immediately order an inquiry and will severely punish
the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitza line who have
failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of
Sarajevo to pass.
"9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the
remarks made by their officials whether in Serbia or abroad, in
interviews after the crime which according to the statement of
the Imperial and Royal Government were hostile toward the [Dual]
Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have
communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks,
and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually
made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will
itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs.
"10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal
Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the
above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the
present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and
carried out.
"If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this
reply, the Serbian Government, considering that it is not to the
common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are
ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by
referring this question to the decision of the International
Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in
the drawing up of the declaration made by the Serbian Government
on March 31, 1909."
The Austro-Hungarian Minister to Belgrade, Baron Giesl von
Gieslingen, to whom the reply was delivered, on comparing it with
his instructions, declared it unsatisfactory, and informed M.
Pashitch, the Serbian Prime Minister that he and his legation would
leave Belgrade that evening, turning over his Government's interests
in Serbia to the German Legation. Rupture in diplomatic relations
between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, he said, was a _fait accompli_.
These events M. Pashitch reported on the same day to all the Serbian
Legations abroad, and further announced:
"The Royal Serbian Government have summoned the Skupshtina to
meet on July 27 at Nish, whither all the ministries with their
staffs are proceeding this evening. The crown prince has issued,
in the name of the king, an order for the mobilization of the
army, while to-morrow or the day after a proclamation will be
made in which it will be announced that civilians who are not
liable to military service should remain peaceably at home, while
soldiers should proceed to their appointed posts and defend the
country to the best of their ability, in the event of Serbia
being attacked."
The Austrian Minister left Belgrade at 6.30 p. m. for Vienna. On the
same day the Serbian Minister at Vienna, M. Yov. Yovanovitch,
received his passports. On the same day the Serbian reply was
presented at Vienna, where it received the following commentaries by
the Foreign Office:
"The Royal Serbian Government limits itself to establishing that
since the declaration of March 31, 1909, there has been no
attempt on the part of the Serbian Government to alter the
position of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
"With this she deliberately shifts the foundation of our note, as
we have not insisted that she and her officials have undertaken
anything official in this direction. Our gravamen is that in
spite of the obligation assumed in the cited note, she has
omitted to suppress the movement directed against the territorial
integrity of the monarchy.
"Her obligation consisted in changing her attitude and the entire
direction of her policies, and in entering into friendly and
neighborly relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and not
to interfere with the possession of Bosnia.
"The assertion of the Royal Serbian Government that the
expressions of the press and the activity of Serbian associations
possess a private character and thus escape governmental control,
stands in full contrast with the institutions of modern states
and even the most liberal of press and society laws, which nearly
everywhere subject the press and the societies to a certain
control of the state. This is also provided for by the Serbian
institutions. The rebuke against the Serbian Government consists
in the fact that it has totally omitted to supervise its press
and its societies, in so far as it knew their direction to be
hostile to the [Dual] Monarchy.
"The assertion [that the Serbian Government was ready to proceed
against all persons in regard to whom it would receive
information] is incorrect. The Serbian Government was accurately
informed about the suspicion resting upon quite definite
personalities and not only in the position, but also obliged by
its own laws to institute investigations spontaneously. The
Serbian Government has done nothing in this direction."
The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office objected to the alterations made
by Serbia in the declaration published in the official organ. This,
in the Serbian reply, began:
"The Royal Serbian Government condemns every propaganda which
should be directed against Austria-Hungary.
"The Austrian demand reads: 'The Royal Serbian Government
condemns the propaganda against Austria-Hungary....' The
alteration of the declaration as demanded by us, which has been
made by the Royal Serbian Government, is meant to imply that a
propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary does not exist, and
that it is not aware of such. This formula is insincere, and the
Serbian Government reserves itself the subterfuge for later
occasions that it had not disavowed by this declaration the
existing propaganda, nor recognized the same as hostile to the
[Dual] Monarchy, whence it could deduce further that it is not
obliged to suppress in the future a propaganda similar to the
present one."
Objection was similarly made to the alteration in the Serbian
apology for acts of Serbian officers. This apology began:
"The Royal Government regrets that according to a communication
of the Imperial and Royal Government certain Serbian officers and
functionaries have participated in the propaganda.
"The formula as demanded by Austria reads: The Royal Government
regrets that Serbian officers and functionaries ... have
participated.... Also with this formula and the further addition
'according to the declaration of the Imperial and Royal
Government,' the Serbian Government pursues the object, already
indicated above, to preserve a free hand for the future.
"Austria had demanded:
"1. To suppress every publication which incites to hatred and
contempt for the [Dual] Monarchy, and whose tendency is directed
against the territorial integrity of the monarchy.
"We wanted to bring about the obligation for Serbia to take care
that such attacks of the press would cease in the future.
"Instead Serbia offers to pass certain laws which are meant as
means toward this end, viz:
"(_a_) A law according to which the expressions of the press
hostile to the [Dual] Monarchy can be individually punished, a
matter which is immaterial to us, all the more so, as the
individual prosecution of press intrigues is very rarely possible
and as, with a lax enforcement of such laws, the few cases of
this nature would not be punished. The proposition, therefore,
does not meet our demand in any way, and it offers not the least
guaranty for the desired success.
"(_b_) An amendment to article 22 of the constitution, which
would permit confiscation, a proposal which does not satisfy us,
as the existence of such a law in Serbia is of no use to us. For
we want the _obligation_ of the Government to _enforce_ it and
that has not been promised us.
"These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory and
evasive as we are not told within what time these laws will be
passed, and as in the event of the not passing of these laws by
the Skupshtina everything would remain as it is, except in the
event of a possible resignation of the Government.
"2. The propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated
societies hostile to the [Dual] Monarchy fills the entire public
life of Serbia; it is therefore an entirely inacceptable reserve
if the Serbian Government asserts that it knows nothing about it.
Aside from this, our demand is not completely fulfilled, as we
have asked besides:
"To confiscate the means of propaganda of these societies to
prevent the reformation of the dissolved societies under another
name and in another form.
"In these two directions the Belgrade Cabinet is perfectly
silent, so that through this semiconcession there is offered us
no guaranty for putting an end to the agitation of the
associations hostile to the monarchy, especially the Narodna
Odbrana.
"3. The Serbian Government first demands proofs for a propaganda
hostile to the monarchy in the public instruction of Serbia while
it must know that the textbooks introduced in the Serbian schools
contain objectionable matter in this direction and that a large
portion of the teachers are in the camp of the Narodna Odbrana
and affiliated societies.
"Furthermore the Serbian Government has not fulfilled a part of
our demands, as we have requested, as it omitted in its text the
addition desired by us: 'as far as the body of instructors is
concerned, as well as the means of instruction'--a sentence which
shows clearly where the propaganda hostile to the monarchy is to
be found in the Serbian schools.
"4. By promising the dismissal from the military and civil
services of those officers and officials who are found guilty by
judicial procedure, the Serbian Government limits its assent to
those cases, in which these persons have been charged with a
crime according to the statutory code. As, however, we demand the
removal of such officers and officials as indulge in a propaganda
hostile to the monarchy, which is generally not punishable in
Serbia, our demands have not been fulfilled in this point."
5. The Serbian reply declared that Serbia was willing to permit that
cooperation of officials of the [Dual] Monarchy on Serbian territory
which does not run counter to international law and criminal law.
"The international law, as well as the criminal law, has nothing
to do with this question; it is purely a matter of the nature of
state police which is to be solved by way of a special agreement.
The reserved attitude of Serbia is therefore incomprehensible and
on account of its vague general form it would lead to
unbridgeable difficulties.
"6. The Austrian demand was clear and unmistakable:
"1. To institute a criminal procedure against the participants in
the outrage.
"2. Participation by Imperial and Royal Government officials in
the examinations ('recherche' in contrast with 'enquête
judiciaire').
"3. It did not occur to us to let Imperial and Royal Government
officials participate in the Serbian court procedure; they were
to cooperate only in the police researches which had to furnish
and fix the material for the investigation.
"If the Serbian Government misunderstands us here, this is done
deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference between
'enquête judiciaire' and simple police researches. As it desired
to escape from every control of the investigation which would
yield, if correctly carried out, highly undesirable results for
it, and as it possesses no means to refuse in a plausible manner
the cooperation of our officials (precedents for such police
intervention exist in great numbers) it tries to justify its
refusal by showing up our demands as impossible.
"(In reference to arrest of conspirators).
"7. This reply is disingenuous. According to our investigation,
Ciganowic, by order of the police prefect in Belgrade, left three
days after the outrage for Ribari, after it had become known that
Ciganowic had participated in the outrage. In the first place, it
is therefore incorrect that Ciganowic left the Serbian service on
June 28. In the second place, we add that the prefect of police
at Belgrade, who had himself caused the departure of this
Ciganowic and who knew his whereabout, declared in an interview
that a man by the name of Milan Ciganowic did not exist in
Belgrade.
"9. (In reference to expressions made against Austria-Hungary by
Serbian officials in interviews.)
"The Royal Serbian Government must be aware of the interviews in
question. If it demands of the Imperial and Royal Government that
it should furnish all kinds of detail about the said interviews
and if it reserves for itself the right of a formal
investigation, it shows that it is not its intention seriously to
fulfill the demand.
"10. (In reference to referring the dispute to arbitration of the
powers.)
"The Serbian Note, therefore, is entirely a play for time."
BEGINNING OF MOBILIZATION
The diplomatic issue now became that over mobilization by Russia:
whether it was a threat of war against Austria-Hungary alone, or
against Germany as well.
On the day of Serbia's reply to the Austro-Hungarian note, July 25,
1914, General von Chelius, German honorary aide to the Czar, sent a
telegram to Kaiser William II through the German Foreign Office,
which stated:
"The maneuvers of the troops in the Krasnoe camp were suddenly
interrupted and the regiments returned to their garrisons at
once. The maneuvers have been cancelled. The military pupils were
raised to-day to the rank of officers instead of next fall. At
headquarters there obtains great excitement over the procedure of
Austria. I have the impression that complete preparations for
mobilization against Austria are being made."
On the same day Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London,
telegraphed M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs:
"Grey has told the German Ambassador [Prince Lichnowsky] that in
his opinion Austrian mobilization must lead to Russian
mobilization, that grave danger of a general war will thereupon
arise, and that he sees only one means of reaching a peaceful
settlement, namely, that, in view of the Austrian and Russian
mobilizations, Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain should
abstain from immediate mobilization, and should at once offer
their good offices. Grey told me that the first essential of this
plan was the consent of Germany and her promise not to mobilize.
He has therefore, as a first step, made an inquiry on this point
at Berlin."
On the same day the German Chancellor, Dr. Bethmann-Hollweg,
telegraphed to Prince Lichnowsky:
"The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between an
Austro-Serbian and an Austro-Russian conflict is perfectly
correct. We do not wish to interpose in the former any more than
England, and as heretofore we take the position that this
question must be localized by virtue of all powers refraining
from intervention. It is therefore our hope that Russia will
refrain from any action in view of her responsibility and the
seriousness of the situation. We are prepared, in the event of an
Austro-Russian controversy, quite apart from our known duties as
Allies, to intercede between Russia and Austria jointly with the
other powers."
SUNDAY, JULY 26, 1914
_Austria-Hungary._ The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St.
Petersburg, Count Szápáry, telegraphed to Count Berchtold, Secretary
for Foreign Affairs in Vienna, that Count Pourtalès the German
Ambassador, upon hearing reports of measures for Russian
mobilization, had called the attention of M. Sazonof, the Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the fact that nowadays mobilization
was a highly dangerous form of diplomatic pressure.
"For, in that event, the purely military consideration of the
question by the general staffs would find expression, and if that
button were once touched in Germany, the situation would get out
of control.
"M. Sazonof assured the German Ambassador on his word of honor
that the reports on the subject were incorrect; that up to that
time not a single horse and not a single reservist had been
called up, and that all the measures that were being taken were
merely measures of preparation in the military districts of Kiev,
Odessa, and perhaps Kazan and Moscow."
M. Suchomlinoff, Russian Minister for War, had immediately after
this, summoned Major von Eggeling, German Military Attaché and
confirmed M. Sazonof's assurance in detail. As reported by the
major, he said:
"For the present merely preparatory measures would be taken, not
a horse would be taken, not a reservist called up. If Austria
crossed the Serbian frontier, the military districts of Kiev,
Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan, which face Austria, would be
mobilized. In no circumstances will mobilization take place on
the German front, Warsaw, Vilna, and St. Petersburg. Peace with
Germany is earnestly desired.... I gave the Minister for War to
understand that his friendly intentions would be appreciated by
us, but that we should also consider mobilization against Austria
to be in itself extremely threatening."
_Russia._ M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed the
Ambassador at Rome to persuade the Italian Government to act in the
interests of peace by bringing influence to bear on her ally,
Austria-Hungary, and by opposing the view that the dispute with
Serbia could be localized. Russia cannot possibly avoid coming to
the help of Serbia. M. Kasansky, Acting Consul at Prague,
telegraphed that Austro-Hungarian mobilization had been ordered. M.
Sazonof reported to M. Schebeko, Ambassador at Vienna, an interview
just held with Count Szápáry, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador.
"After discussing the ten demands addressed to Serbia, I drew his
attention to the fact that, quite apart from the clumsy form in
which they were presented, some of them were quite impracticable,
even if the Serbian Government agreed to accept them. Thus, for
example, points one and two could not be carried out without
recasting the Serbian press law and associations law, and to that
it might be difficult to obtain the consent of the Skupshtina. As
for enforcing points four and five, this might lead to most
dangerous consequences, and even to the risk of acts of terrorism
directed against the Royal Family and against Pashitch, which
clearly could not be the intention of Austria. With regard to the
other points it seemed to me that, with certain changes of
detail, it would not be difficult to find a basis of mutual
agreement, if the accusations contained in them were confirmed by
sufficient proof.
"In the interest of the maintenance of peace, which, according to
the statements of Szápáry, is as much desired by Austria as by
all the powers, it was necessary to end the tension of the
present moment as soon as possible. With this object in view it
seemed to me most desirable that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador
should be authorized to enter into a private exchange of views in
order to redraft certain articles of the Austrian note of July 23
in consultation with me. This method of procedure would perhaps
enable us to find a formula which would prove acceptable to
Serbia, while giving satisfaction to Austria in respect of the
chief of her demands. Please convey the substance of this
telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in a judicious and
friendly manner."
Communicated to Russian Ambassadors in Germany, France, Great
Britain, and Italy. The Ambassador at Berlin was requested to
communicate the contents of the telegram to Secretary of State von
Jagow, and express to him the hope that he would advise Vienna to
meet Russia's proposal in a friendly spirit.
M. Sevastopoulo, Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, telegraphed M. Sazonof
that, when M. Berthelot, French Political Director, informed Count
Szécen, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, of the Serbian reply to the
ultimatum, the count did not conceal his surprise that it was not
accepted.
In a supplementary telegram he said M. Berthelot was convinced that
Germany's aim, in her negotiations at Paris, was to intimidate
France to mediate with Russia.
M. Broniewsky, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, reported noisy
demonstrations there by a crowd largely composed of Austrians on
news of Austrian mobilization, and anti-Russian shouting by the
crowd before the Russian Embassy. No precautions were taken by the
police.
_Germany._ Major von Eggeling telegraphed to the German Chancellor,
Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, that it was certain mobilization had been
ordered for Kiev and Odessa; it was doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow,
and improbable elsewhere in Russia.
The Chancellor telegraphed to Baron von Schoen, German Ambassador at
Paris, after Austria-Hungary's official declaration to Russia, that
she had no intention to annex the territory of Serbia or to impair
her sovereignty, the responsibility for a European war rested on
Russia.
"We depend upon France, with which we are at one in the desire
for the preservation of the peace of Europe, that it will
exercise its influence at St. Petersburg in favor of peace."
This telegram, without the final sentence, the Chancellor sent also
to Count Pourtalès, German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and to
Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London, adding in the latter
case that a call was expected for the several classes of Russian
reserves, which would be equivalent to mobilization, and, in this
case, Germany would be forced to mobilize, much against her wish.
"We ask [Great Britain] to act on this understanding at St.
Petersburg with all possible emphasis."
Count Pourtalès was directed to make the following declaration to
the Russian Government:
"Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to
countermeasures which must consist in mobilizing the army.
"But mobilization means war.
"As we know the obligations of France toward Russia, this
mobilization would be directed against both Russia and France. We
cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain such a European war.
Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the existence of the Serbian
Kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can afford to assume
an attitude of waiting. We can all the more support the desire of
Russia to protect the integrity of Serbia as Austria-Hungary does
not intend to question the latter. It will be easy in the further
development of the affair to find a basis for an understanding."
_Great Britain._ Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at
Vienna, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign
Affairs at London, that it was the belief of the German Ambassador,
Herr von Tschirscky, that Russia would keep quiet during the
chastisement of Serbia. Everything, said Von Tschirscky, depended on
the personality of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who
could resist easily the pressure of a few newspapers; pan-Slav
agitation in Russia was over; intervention in behalf of Serbia would
open up Swedish, Polish, Ruthenian, Rumanian, and Persian questions;
France, too, was not in a condition for war. Von Tschirscky doubted
that Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over Serbia,
would assert it by action; Germany knew what she was about in
backing up Austria-Hungary; the Serbian concessions were all a sham,
as proved by the Government previously ordering mobilization and
preparing to retire from Belgrade.
Sir Horace Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, telegraphed
Sir Edward Grey that Kaiser William was returning suddenly that
night (from a sea trip to Norway) on his own initiative, and that
the Foreign Office regretted it, owing to the speculation and
excitement which it would cause. Herr von Zimmermann, German
Under-Secretary of State, had inferred from Russia's statement that
she would intervene in case of annexation of Serbian territory; that
she would not do so if no territory were taken.
In a supplementary telegram Sir Horace informed Sir Edward that Von
Zimmermann considered that the communication by Germany to
Austria-Hungary of his (Grey's) hope for a favorable view of the
Serbian reply implied that the German Government associated itself
to a certain extent with Grey's hope. It did not, however, go beyond
this.
Sir Rennell Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, telegraphed Sir Edward
Grey that Austria-Hungary had informed the Italian Government that
the Austro-Hungarian Minister to Belgrade had been recalled, but
that this did not imply a declaration of war.
Sir Edward telegraphed to Sir Rennell Rodd, Sir Francis Bertie,
Ambassador at Paris, and Sir Horace Rumbold, Chargé d'Affaires at
Berlin, to ask if the ministers of foreign affairs at their courts
would instruct their ambassadors at London to meet with him in
conference "to discover an issue which would prevent complications,"
and to suggest that the ministers should instruct their
representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg to request a
suspension of military operations pending results of the conference.
Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed to
Sir Edward Grey that the Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko, just
returned from leave of absence, thinks Austria-Hungary determined on
war, and that it will be impossible for Russia to remain
indifferent. He and the French Ambassador, M. Dumaine, doubt whether
the principle of Grey's suggestion that Russia, being an interested
party, is entitled to have a say in a purely Austro-Serbian dispute,
would be accepted by either Austria-Hungary or Germany.
_France._ M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,
notified M. Viviani, Prime Minister on board _La France_, and the
French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, and
Rome, of the events at Belgrade on Saturday, July 25, ending with
the order for mobilization given by the Serbian Government, which
had retired to Kragoujewatz, whither it was followed by the French
and Russian Ministers. At Vienna people "soothe themselves with the
illusion that Russia 'will not hold firm.'"
"It must not be forgotten that Italy is bound by the engagements
of the Triple Alliance only if she has been consulted beforehand.
"From St. Petersburg we learn that M. Sazonof [Minister for
Foreign Affairs] has advised Serbia to ask for British mediation.
At the Council of Ministers on the 25th, which was held in
presence of the emperor, the mobilization of thirteen army corps
intended eventually to operate against Austria was considered;
this mobilization, however, would only be made effective if
Austria were to bring armed pressure to bear upon Serbia, and not
till after notice had been given by the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, upon whom falls the duty of fixing the day, liberty
being left to him to go on with negotiations even if Belgrade
should be occupied. Russian opinion makes clear that it is both
politically and morally impossible for Russia to allow Serbia to
be crushed.
"In London the German _démarche_ was made on the 25th, in the
same terms as those used by Baron von Schoen at Paris. Sir Edward
Grey has replied to Prince Lichnowsky that if the war were to
break out no power in Europe could take up a detached attitude.
He did not express himself more definitely and used very reserved
language to the Serbian Minister [M. Boschkovitch]. The
communication made on the evening of the 25th by the Austrian
Ambassador makes Sir Edward Grey more optimistic; since the
diplomatic rupture does not necessarily involve immediate
military operations, the Secretary of State is still willing to
hope that the powers will have time to intervene.
"At Berlin the language used by the Secretary of State [Von
Jagow] to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires [Broniewsky] is
unsatisfactory and dilatory; when the latter asked him to
associate himself with a _démarche_ at Vienna for an extension of
the time limit, he replied that he had already taken action in
this sense but that it was too late; to the request for an
extension of the time limit before active measures were taken, he
replied that this had to do with a domestic matter, and not with
a war but with local operations. Herr von Jagow pretends not to
believe that the Austrian action could lead to general
consequences.
"A real explosion of chauvinism has taken place at Berlin. The
German Emperor returns direct to Kiel. M. Jules Cambon thinks
that, at the first military steps taken by Russia, Germany would
immediately reply, and probably would not wait for a pretext
before attacking us.
"At Vienna, the French Ambassador [Dumaine] has not had time to
join in the _démarche_ of his Russian colleague [Schebeko] for
obtaining an extension of the time limit fixed for Serbia; he
does not regret it, this _démarche_ having been categorically
rejected, and England not having had time to give instructions to
her representative about it.
"A note from the British Embassy has been delivered to me: it
gives an account of the conversation between the British
Ambassador at St. Petersburg [Buchanan] and M. Sazonof and M.
Paléologue. Sir Edward Grey thinks that the four powers who are
not directly interested ought to press both on Russia and Austria
that their armies should not cross the frontier, and that they
should give time to England, France, Germany, and Italy to bring
their mediation into play. If Germany accepts, the British
Government has reason to think that Italy also would be glad to
be associated in the joint action of England and France; the
adherence of Germany is essential, for neither Austria nor Russia
would tolerate any intervention except that of impartial friends
or Allies."
M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, informed M. Bienvenu-Martin
that a telegram from Vienna stated that diplomatic rupture between
Austria and Serbia had taken place, and Austria was proceeding to
military measures. Marquis di San Giuliano, the Prime Minister,
would return in two days to Rome. The president of the council had
given Barrère the impression that Italy would be neutral in case of
war, maintaining "an attitude of observation." M. Salandra
[afterward Prime Minister] had said that:
"'We shall make the greatest efforts to prevent peace being
broken; our situation is somewhat analogous to that of England.
Perhaps we could do something in a pacific sense together with
the English.' M. Salandra stated definitely to me that the
Austrian note had been communicated to Rome at the last moment."
M. Barrère, in a second telegram, said that the greater part of
Italian public opinion was hostile to Austria "in this serious
business."
M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed that
M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs, had advised Serbia to ask
for British mediation. M. Bienvenu-Martin thereupon telegraphed M.
de Fleuriau, Chargé d'Affaires, London, that France desired British
mediation. M. Paléologue reported at greater length M. Sazonof's
determination to secure a peaceful solution to the Serbian question.
"'Up to the last moment,' he declared to me, 'I shall show myself
ready to negotiate.'
"It is in this spirit that he has just sent for Count Szápáry to
come to a 'frank and loyal explanation.' M. Sazonof commented in
his presence on the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, article by
article, making clear the insulting character of the principal
clauses. 'The intention which inspired this document,' he said,
'is legitimate if you pursued no aim other than the protection of
your territory against the intrigues of Serbian anarchists; but
the procedure to which you have had recourse is not defensible.'
He concluded: 'Take back your ultimatum, modify its form, and I
will guarantee you the result.'
"The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador showed himself moved by this
language; however, while awaiting instructions, he reserves the
opinion of his Government. Without being discouraged M. Sazonof
has decided to propose this evening to Count Berchtold the
opening of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg
on the changes to be introduced into the ultimatum.
"This friendly and semiofficial interposition of Russia between
Austria and Serbia has the advantage of being expeditious. I
therefore believe it to be preferable to any other procedure and
likely to succeed."
M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, reported to M.
Bienvenu-Martin that M. Schebeko, Russian Ambassador, had returned
in haste from Russia, whither he had gone on the assurance of Count
Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the
demands on Serbia would be acceptable. Other Austrian officials had
taken the same attitude, which is quite usual in Austro-Hungarian
diplomacy, and this procedure has greatly increased the irritation
of the Russian Government.
M. Schebeko, seizing advantage of the delay of mobilization, will
make a proposal calculated to test the value of the pacific
declarations of Germany. This is for a conference of the British,
French, Italian, and German Ambassadors, to refuse concurrence in
which the German Ambassador, M. Tschirsky, will almost certainly
have to plead the principle of "localizing the conflict."
"My impression is that the Austro-Hungarian Government, although
surprised and perhaps regretting the vigor with which they have
been inspired, will believe themselves obliged to commence
military action."
M. Bienvenu-Martin reported to M. Viviani on _La France_ and to the
ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome the
rupture of diplomatic relations with Serbia made by Austria-Hungary.
"According to a telegram from M. Jules Cambon [at Berlin], the
British Ambassador [Sir Edward Goschen] thinks that there is a
slight yielding; when he observed to Herr von Jagow that Sir
Edward Grey did not ask him to intervene between Austria and
Serbia, but, as this question ceased to be localized, to
intervene with England, France, and Italy at Vienna and St.
Petersburg, the Secretary of State declared that he would do his
best to maintain peace."
M. Bienvenu-Martin also reported that Italy, not having been
consulted about the note to Serbia, felt herself relieved from all
responsibility in the grave step taken by her ally. He also told of
his answer to the German Ambassador, Baron von Schoen, who sought
France's influence to keep Russia from war, that Germany ought, on
her side, to influence Austria-Hungary to avoid military operations
leading to the occupation of Serbia, and the consequent intervention
of Russia.
"The ambassador having observed to me that this could not be
reconciled with the position taken up by Germany 'that the
question concerned only Austria and Serbia,' I told him that
mediation at Vienna and St. Petersburg would be the act of the
four other powers less interested in the question.
"Herr von Schoen then intrenched himself behind his lack of
instructions in this respect, and I told him that in these
conditions I did not feel myself in a position to take any action
at St. Petersburg alone."
After his visit to M. Bienvenu-Martin at 5 p. m. Baron von Schoen
went to see M. Berthelot, the Political Director, to have an account
of the interview officially published in the press. The article he
proposed indicated the most amicable cooperation between France and
Germany in the furtherance of European peace.
"The Political Director replied at once, 'Then, in your opinion,
every thing is settled, and you bring us the assurance that
Austria accepts the Serbian note or will enter into conversations
with the powers on this matter?' The ambassador having ...
vigorously denied the suggestion, it was explained to him that if
there was no modification in Germany's negative attitude, the
terms of the suggested 'note to the press' were exaggerated, and
of a nature to give a false security to French opinion by
creating illusion on the real situation, the dangers of which
were only too evident.
"To the assurances lavished by the German Ambassador as to the
optimistic impressions which he had formed, the Acting Political
Director replied by asking if he might speak to him in a manner
quite personal and private, as man to man, quite freely and
without regard to their respective functions. Baron von Schoen
asked him to do so.
"M. Berthelot then said that to any simple mind Germany's
attitude was inexplicable if it did not aim at war; a purely
objective analysis of the facts and the psychology of the
Austro-German relations led logically to this conclusion. In the
face of the repeated statement that Germany was ignorant of the
contents of the Austrian note, it was no longer permissible to
raise any doubt on that point; but was it probable that Germany
would have arrayed herself on the side of Austria in such an
adventure with her eyes closed? Did the psychology of all the
past relations of Vienna and Berlin allow one to admit that
Austria could have taken up a position without any possible
retreat, before having weighed with her ally all the consequences
of her uncompromising attitude? How surprising appeared the
refusal by Germany to exercise mediating influence at Vienna now
that she knew the extraordinary text of the Austrian note! What
responsibility was the German Government assuming and what
suspicions would rest upon them if they persisted in interposing
between Austria and the powers, after what might be called the
absolute submission of Serbia, and when the slightest advice
given by them to Vienna would put an end to the nightmare which
weighed on Europe!
"The breaking off of diplomatic relations by Austria, her threats
of war, and the mobilization which she was undertaking make
peculiarly urgent pacific action on the part of Germany, for from
the day when Austrian troops crossed the Serbian frontier, one
would be faced by an act which without doubt would oblige the St.
Petersburg Cabinet to intervene, and would risk the unloosing of
a war which Germany declares that she wishes to avoid.
"Herr von Schoen, who listened smiling, once more affirmed that
Germany had been ignorant of the text of the Austrian note, and
had approved it only after its delivery; she thought, however,
that Serbia had need of a lesson severe enough for her not to be
able to forget it, and that Austria owed it to herself to put an
end to a situation which was dangerous and intolerable for a
great power. He declared besides that he did not know the text of
the Serbian reply, and showed his personal surprise that it had
not satisfied Austria, if indeed it was such as the papers, which
are often ill informed, represented it to be.
"He insisted again on Germany's peaceful intentions and gave his
impressions as to the effect that might arise from good advice
given, for instance, at Vienna, by England in a friendly tone.
According to him Austria was not uncompromising; what she rejects
is the idea of a formal mediation, the 'spectre' of a conference:
a peaceful word coming from St. Petersburg, good words said in a
conciliatory tone by the powers of the Triple Entente, would have
a chance of being well received. He added, finally, that he did
not say that Germany on her side would not give some advice at
Vienna.
"In these conditions the Political Director announced that he
would ask the minister if it appeared to him opportune to
communicate to the press a short note in a moderate tone."
M. Chevalley, French Minister at Christiania, telegraphed to M.
Bienvenu-Martin that the whole German fleet in Norway was returning
to Germany. M. d'Annoville, French Chargé d'Affaires at Luxemburg,
telegraphed that the last four classes of [German] reservists set at
liberty had been forbidden to leave their places of residence, and
were ordered to hold themselves at the disposition of the
_Kommandutur_ at any moment.
MONDAY, JULY 27, 1914
_Austria-Hungary._ On the following day Count Szápáry,
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed Count
Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Vienna, of a conversation
he had just had with M. Sazonof.
Mistaken impressions, he told the Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, were abroad in Russia as to Austria-Hungary's intentions.
"We were credited with wishing to push forward into Balkan
territory, and to begin a march to Salonica or even to
Constantinople. Others, again, went so far as to describe our
action merely as the starting point of a preventive war against
Russia. I said that all this was erroneous, and that parts of it
were absolutely unreasonable. The goal of our action was
self-preservation and self-defense against hostile propaganda by
word, in writing, and in action, which threatened our integrity.
It would occur to no one in Austria-Hungary to threaten Russian
interests, or indeed to pick a quarrel with Russia. And yet we
were absolutely determined to reach the goal which we had set
before us, and the path which we had chosen seemed to us the most
suitable. As, however, the action under discussion was action in
self-defense, I could not conceal from him that we could not
allow ourselves to be diverted from it by any consequences, of
whatever kind they might be.
"M. Sazonof agreed with me. Our goal, as I had described it to
him, was an entirely legitimate one, but he considered that the
path which we were pursuing with a view to attaining it was not
the surest. He said that the note which we had delivered was not
happy in its form. He had since been studying it, and if I had
time, he would like to look it through once more with me. I
remarked that I was at his service, but was not authorized either
to discuss the text of the note with him or to interpret it. Of
course, however, his remarks were of interest. The minister then
took all the points of the note in order, and on this occasion
found seven of the ten points admissible without very great
difficulty; only the two points dealing with the collaboration of
the Imperial and Royal officials in Serbia and the point dealing
with the removal of officers and civil servants to be designated
by us, seemed to him to be unacceptable in their present form.
With regard, to the first two points, I was in a position to give
an authentic interpretation in the sense of your excellency's
telegram of the 25th instant; with regard to the third, I
expressed the opinion that it was a necessary demand. Moreover,
matters had already been set in motion. The Serbians had
mobilized on the previous day, and I did not know what had
happened since then."
Count Berchtold instructed Count Szápáry by telegraph to declare to
M. Sazonof that, so long as the war between Austria-Hungary and
Serbia remained localized, the [Dual] Monarchy did not aim in any
way at territorial acquisitions of any sort.
Count Szögyény, Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphed to Count Berchtold
that M. Sazonof had explained to Count Pourtalès, the German
Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that he could not guarantee that
Russia had not begun mobilization, and confessed that certain
necessary military measures were being taken.
"Major von Eggeling, German Military Attaché at St. Petersburg,
reports that the Russian Minister for War, M. Suchomlinof, has
given him his word of honor that not a man or a horse has been
mobilized; however, naturally, certain military precautions have
been taken; precautions which, as the German military attaché
adds ... 'are to be sure pretty far-reaching.'"
Count Berchtold informed the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors at Berlin,
Rome, London, Paris, and St. Petersburg of the annotations of his
Government to the Serbian reply.
_Germany._ The Austro-Hungarian Consulate at Kovno, Russia,
telegraphed to the German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, that
Kovno had been declared to be in a state of war.
The German Minister at Berne, Switzerland, telegraphed to the
Chancellor that the French Fourteenth Corps had discontinued
maneuvers.
Count Pourtalès, German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed to
the Chancellor at Berlin:
"The Secretary of War [Suchomlinof] has given me his word of
honor that no order to mobilize has as yet been issued. Though
general preparations are being made, no reserves were called and
no horses mustered. If Austria crossed the Serbian frontier, such
military districts as are directed toward Austria, viz Kiev,
Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, are to be mobilized. Under no
circumstances those on the German frontier, Warsaw, Vilni, St.
Petersburg. Peace with Germany was desired very much. Upon my
inquiry into the object of mobilization against Austria he
shrugged his shoulders and referred to the diplomats. I told the
secretary that we appreciated the friendly intentions, but
considered mobilization even against Austria as very menacing."
The Chancellor telegraphed Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at
London:
"We know as yet nothing of a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey's to
hold a quadruple conference in London. It is impossible for us to
place our ally in his dispute with Serbia before a European
tribunal. Our mediation must be limited to the danger of an
Austro-Russian conflict."
This was supplemented by a telegram:
"We have at once started the mediation proposal in Vienna in the
sense as desired by Sir Edward Grey. We have communicated besides
to Count Berchtold the desire of M. Sazonof for a direct parley
with Vienna."
_Russia._ Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London,
telegraphed to M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs at St.
Petersburg, to know if his views on direct discussions with the
Vienna Cabinet harmonized with Grey's scheme for mediation by the
four powers, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany.
"Having heard from the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that
you would be prepared to accept such a combination, Grey decided
to turn it into an official proposal, which he communicated
yesterday to Berlin, Paris, and Rome."
M. Sazonof replied by telegraph that the British Ambassador at St.
Petersburg, Sir George Buchanan, had asked him if the Russian
Government thought it desirable for Great Britain to take the
initiative in convoking a conference in London of the four powers.
"I replied that I have begun conversations with the
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions which, I hope, may
be favorable. I have not, however, received as yet any reply to
the proposal made by me for revising the note between the two
Cabinets.
"If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet were to prove
impossible, I am ready to accept the British proposal, or any
other proposal of a kind that would bring about a favorable
solution of the conflict.
"I wish, however, to put an end from this day forth to a
misunderstanding which might arise from the answer given by the
French Minister of Justice to the German Ambassador, regarding
counsels of moderation to be given to the Imperial [Russian]
Cabinet."
This telegram Benckendorff communicated to Grey on the following
day.
M. Sazonof telegraphed to the Russian Ambassadors at Paris, London,
Berlin, Vienna, and Rome that the Serbian reply exceeded
expectations in its moderation and desire to afford the fullest
satisfaction.
"We do not see what further demands could be made by Austria,
unless the Vienna Cabinet is seeking for a pretext for war with
Serbia."
M. Isvolsky, Russian Ambassador at Paris, telegraphed to M. Sazonof
that the German Ambassador, Baron von Schoen, had confirmed his
declaration of yesterday in writing, i.e.:
"1. That Austria has declared to Russia that she seeks no
territorial acquisitions and that she harbors no designs against
the integrity of Serbia. Her sole object is to secure her own
peace and quiet.
"2. That consequently it rests with Russia to avoid war.
"3. That Germany and France, entirely at one in their ardent
desire to preserve peace, should exercise their moderating
influence upon Russia.
"Baron von Schoen laid special emphasis on the expression of
solidarity of Germany and France. The Minister of Justice is
convinced that these steps on the part of Germany are taken with
the evident object of alienating Russia and France, of inducing
the French Government to make representations at St. Petersburg,
and of thus compromising our ally in our eyes; and finally, in
the event of war, of throwing the responsibility not on Germany,
who is ostensibly making every effort to maintain peace, but on
Russia and France."
In a supplementary telegram M. Isvolsky stated that the telegram
from Belgrade to Paris, giving the Serbian reply to the Austrian
note was delayed twenty hours, and that the telegram from the French
Foreign Office containing instructions to support Russia's
representations, which had been sent at the special urgent rate at
11 a. m., July 25, 1914, only reached its destination at 6 p. m.
"There is no doubt that this telegram was intentionally delayed
by the Austrian telegraph office."
M. Isvolsky telegraphed to M. Sazonof:
"The Austrian Ambassador [Count Szécsen] has informed the Acting
Minister for Foreign Affairs [M. Bienvenu-Martin] that to-morrow,
Tuesday, Austria will proceed to take 'energetic action' with the
object of forcing Serbia to give the necessary guaranties. The
minister having asked what form such action would take, the
ambassador replied that he had no exact information on the
subject, but it might mean either the crossing of the Serbian
frontier, or an ultimatum, or even a declaration of war."
M. Broniewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed M.
Sazonof:
"I begged the Minister for Foreign Affairs [Von Jagow] to support
your proposal in Vienna that Szápáry [Austro-Hungarian Ambassador
at St. Petersburg] should be authorized to draw up, by means of a
private exchange of views with you, a wording of the
Austro-Hungarian demands which would be acceptable to both
parties. Jagow answered that he was aware of this proposal and
that he agreed with Pourtalès [German Ambassador at St.
Petersburg] that, as Szápáry had begun this conversation, he
might as well go on with it. He will telegraph in this sense to
the German Ambassador at Vienna. I begged him to press Vienna
with greater insistence to adopt this conciliatory line; Jagow
answered that he could not advise Austria to give way."
In a second telegram M. Broniewsky gave an account of an interview
just held between Von Jagow and the French Ambassador, M. Jules
Cambon:
"Cambon endeavored to induce Von Jagow to accept the British
proposal for action in favor of peace to be taken simultaneously
at St. Petersburg and at Vienna by Great Britain, Germany, Italy,
and France. Cambon suggested that these powers should give their
advice to Vienna in the following terms: 'To abstain from all
action which might aggravate the existing situation.' By adopting
this vague formula, all mention of the necessity of refraining
from invading Serbia might be avoided. Jagow refused point blank
to accept this suggestion in spite of the entreaties of the
ambassador, who emphasized, as a good feature of the suggestion,
the mixed grouping of the powers, thanks to which the opposition
between the Alliance and the Entente--a matter of which Jagow
himself had often complained--was avoided."
Nicholas II telegraphed his reply to the appeal for Russian aid made
by Prince Alexander of Serbia on July 25, 1914. It assured the
prince of the Czar's cordial sympathy with the Serbian people.
"The existing situation is engaging my most serious attention,
and my government are using their utmost endeavor to smooth away
the present difficulties. I have no doubt that your highness and
the Royal Serbian Government wish to render that task easy by
neglecting no step which might lead to a settlement, and thus
both prevent the horrors of a new war and safeguard the dignity
of Serbia.
"So long as the slightest hope exists of avoiding bloodshed, all
our efforts must be directed to that end; but if in spite of our
earnest wish we are not successful, your highness may rest
assured that Russia will in no case disinterest herself in the
fate of Serbia."
M. Schebeko, Russian Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed to M. Sazonof
of a conversation he had had in the absence of Count Berchtold,
Minister for Foreign Affairs, with Baron Macchio, the Under-Secretary.
"I drew his attention to the unfavorable impression produced in
Russia by the presentation of demands by Austria to Serbia, which
it was quite impossible for any independent state, however small,
to accept. I added that this method of procedure might lead to
the most undesirable complications, and that it had aroused
profound surprise and general condemnation in Russia. We can only
suppose that Austria, influenced by the assurances given by the
German representative at Vienna, who has egged her on throughout
this crisis, has counted on the probable localization of the
dispute with Serbia, and on the possibility of inflicting with
impunity a serious blow upon that country. The declaration by the
Russian Government that Russia could not possibly remain
indifferent in the face of such conduct has caused a great
sensation here."
Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, telegraphed to M.
Sazonof:
"Grey has just informed the German Ambassador, who came to
question him as to the possibility of taking action at St.
Petersburg, that such action ought rather to be taken at Vienna,
and that the Berlin Cabinet were the best qualified to do so.
Grey also pointed out that the Serbian reply to the Austrian note
had exceeded anything that could have been expected in moderation
and in its spirit of conciliation. Grey added that he had
therefore come to the conclusion that Russia must have advised
Belgrade to return a moderate reply, and that he thought the
Serbian reply could form the basis of a peaceful and acceptable
solution of the question.
"In these circumstances, continued Grey, if Austria were to begin
hostilities in spite of that reply, she would prove her intention
of crushing Serbia. Looked at in this light, the question might
give rise to a situation which might lead to a war in which all
the powers would be involved.
"Grey finally declared that the British Government were sincerely
anxious to act with the German Government as long as the
preservation of peace was in question; but, in the contrary
event, Great Britain reserved to herself full liberty of action."
_Great Britain._ Sir Maurice de Bunsen, Ambassador at Vienna,
telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs at
London, that he had consulted with his colleagues about the
mediation of the four powers, and the impression was that the note
to Serbia was intentionally drawn to make war inevitable, and, until
Serbia had been punished, no proposals for mediation would be
listened to.
"This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with
Serbia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a
great disappointment.
"I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send
me, to express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the
hope of his majesty's Government that it may yet be possible to
avoid war, and to ask his excellency whether he cannot suggest a
way out even now."
Sir Francis Bertie, Ambassador at Paris, telegraphed to Grey that
France had accepted his proposal for the four-power mediation, and
sent the necessary instructions to her representatives at Belgrade,
Vienna, and St. Petersburg.
"Instructions have been sent to the French Ambassador at Berlin
to concert with his British colleague as to the advisability of
their speaking jointly to the German Government. Until it is
known that the Germans have spoken at Vienna with some success,
it would, in the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be
dangerous for the French, Russian, and British Ambassadors to do
so."
Sir Edward Goschen, Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphed to Grey:
"Secretary of State [Von Jagow] says that conference you suggest
would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not,
in his opinion, be called together except at the request of
Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your
suggestion, desirous though he was to cooperate for the
maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had
nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of
the four nations not directly interested should discuss and
suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained,
however, that such a conference as you proposed was not
practicable. He added that news he had just received from St.
Petersburg showed that there was an intention on the part of M.
de Sazonof [Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs] to exchange
views with Count Berchtold [Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign
Affairs]. He thought that this method of procedure might lead to
a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing
anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between
the Austrian and Russian Governments.
"In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said
that as yet Austria was only partially mobilizing, but that if
Russia mobilized against Germany latter would have to follow
suit. I asked him what he meant by 'mobilizing against Germany.'
He said that if Russia only mobilized in south, Germany would not
mobilize, but if she mobilized in north, Germany would have to do
so too, and Russian system of mobilization was so complicated
that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilization.
Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken
by surprise.
"Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburg
had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general
situation."
Sir George Buchanan, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed Grey
an account of the interview between M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for
Foreign Affairs, and Count Szápáry, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador,
in which Sazonof had pointed out that Austria's demands entailed
entire revision of existing Serbian laws, and were moreover
incompatible with Serbia's dignity as an independent state; and that
it would be useless for Russia, being an object of suspicion in
Austria, to offer her good offices.
"In order, however, to put an end to the present tension, he
thought that England and Italy might be willing to collaborate
with Austria."
Sir George told M. Sazonof that Grey could do nothing more than he
had promised on the 24th inst., and that the Russian Minister was
mistaken if he believed that peace would be promoted by Great
Britain telling Germany it would have to deal with her as well as
with Russia and France if it supported Austria by force of arms.
"Their attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and
we could only induce Germany to use her influence at Vienna to
avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was
anxious to preserve peace. His excellency must not, if our
efforts were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a
conflict. I trusted that the Russian Government would defer
mobilization ukase for as long as possible, and that troops would
not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued.
"The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that, until the issue
of the imperial ukase, no effective steps toward mobilization
could be taken, and the Austro-Hungarian Government would profit
by delay in order to complete her military preparations if it
were deferred too long."
In a supplementary telegram Buchanan reported that M. Sazonof had
proposed
"that the modifications to be introduced into Austrian demands
should be the subject of direct conversation between Vienna and
St. Petersburg."
Grey telegraphed to Sir Eward Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin,
that Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador at London, had
informed him that Germany accepted in principle the four-power
mediation, reserving its right as ally to help Austria if attacked.
"He has also been instructed to request me to use influence in
St. Petersburg to localize the war and to keep up the peace of
Europe.
"I have replied that the Serbian reply went further than could
have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary
of State [Von Jagow] has himself said that there were some things
in the Austrian note that Serbia could hardly be expected to
accept. I assumed that Serbian reply could not have gone as far
as it did unless Russia had exercised conciliatory influence at
Belgrade, and it was really at Vienna that moderating influence
was now required. If Austria put the Serbian reply aside as being
worth nothing and marched into Serbia, it meant that she was
determined to crush Serbia at all costs, being reckless of the
consequences that might be involved. Serbian reply should at
least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. I said
German Government should urge this at Vienna.
"I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity of
the situation if the war could not be localized, and observed
that if Germany assisted Austria against Russia it would be
because, without any reference to the merits of the dispute,
Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed. Just so other
issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between
Austria and Serbia, and would bring other powers in, and the war
would be the biggest ever known; but as long as Germany would
work to keep the peace I would keep closely in touch. I repeated
that after the Serbian reply it was at Vienna that some
moderation must be urged."
Grey telegraphed Buchanan at St. Petersburg, referring him to the
above, and informing him that the Russian Ambassador at London,
Count Benckendorff had told him [Grey] that the impression prevailed
in German and Austrian circles that Great Britain would stand aside
in event of war. This the Ambassador deplored for its adverse effect
on peace.
Grey informed Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna,
of his interview just held with Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador at London.
"Mensdorff said that the Austrian Government, very reluctantly
and against their wish, were compelled to take more severe
measures to enforce a fundamental change of the attitude of
enmity pursued up to now by Serbia.... We would understand that
the Austrian Government must consider that the moment had arrived
to obtain, by means of the strongest pressure, guaranties for the
definite suppression of the Serbian aspirations and for the
security of peace and order on the southeastern frontier of
Austria.
"As the peaceable means to this effect were exhausted, the
Austrian Government must at last appeal to force. Their action,
which had no sort of aggressive tendency, could not be
represented otherwise than as self-defense. Also they thought
that they would serve a European interest if they prevented
Serbia from being henceforth an element of general unrest such as
she had been for the last ten years. The high sense of justice of
the British nation and of British statesmen could not blame the
Austrian Government if the latter defended by the sword what was
theirs, and cleared up their position with a country whose
hostile policy had forced upon them for years measures so costly
as to have gravely injured Austrian national prosperity. Finally,
the Austrian Government, confiding in their amicable relations
with us, felt that they could count on our sympathy in a fight
that was forced on them, and on our assistance in localizing the
fight, if necessary.
"Count Mensdorff added on his own account that, as long as Serbia
was confronted with Turkey, Austria never took very severe
measures because of her adherence to the policy of the free
development of the Balkan States. Now that Serbia had doubled her
territory and population without any Austrian interference, the
repression of Serbian subversive aims was a matter of
self-defense and self-preservation on Austria's part. He
reiterated that Austria had no intention of taking Serbian
territory or aggressive designs against Serbian territory.
"I said that I could not understand the construction put by the
Austrian Government upon the Serbian reply, and I told Count
Mensdorff the substance of the conversation that I had had with
the German Ambassador this morning about that reply.
"Count Mensdorff admitted that, on paper, the Serbian reply might
seem to be satisfactory; but the Serbians had refused the one
thing--the cooperation of Austrian officials and police--which
would be a real guaranty that in practice the Serbians would not
carry on their subversive campaign against Austria.
"I said that it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government
believed that, even after the Serbian reply, they could make war
upon Serbia anyhow, without risk of bringing Russia into the
dispute. If they could make war on Serbia and at the same time
satisfy Russia, well and good; but, if not, the consequences
would be incalculable. I pointed out to him that I quoted this
phrase from an expression of the views of the German Government.
I feared that it would be expected in St. Petersburg that the
Serbian reply would diminish the tension, and now, when Russia
found that there was increased tension, the situation would
become increasingly serious. Already the effect on Europe was one
of anxiety. I pointed out [as an instance of this] that our fleet
was to have dispersed to-day, but we had felt unable to let it
disperse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this
moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our
fleet; but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration,
it was impossible for us to disperse our forces at this moment.
It seemed to me that the Serbian reply already involved the
greatest humiliation to Serbia that I had ever seen a country
undergo, and it was disappointing to me that the reply was
treated by the Austrian Government as if it were as
unsatisfactory as a blank negative."
Grey informed Sir Rennell Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, that the
Italian Ambassador at London had stated to Sir Arthur Nicholson,
Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that Italy agreed to the
four-power conference, and that the Marquis di San Giuliano, Italian
Minister for Foreign Affairs, would recommend to Germany the
suggestion that Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Serbia should suspend
military operations pending result of the conference, and would
inquire what procedure Germany proposed to be followed at Vienna.
Sir Francis Bertie, Ambassador at Paris, sent Grey a memorandum of
M. Bienvenu-Martin's, French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, as
to steps to be taken to prevent hostilities between Austria-Hungary
and Serbia.
M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, has been requested to
act in concert with the British Ambassador there in Grey's plan. M.
Paul Cambon, Ambassador at London, has been appointed France's
representative in the four-power conference. France is ready to
instruct her representatives at St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Belgrade
to induce these governments to abstain from hostilities pending the
results of the conference.
But M. Bienvenu-Martin considers success of the conference depends
on the action Berlin is willing to take at Vienna beforehand.
Sir George Buchanan, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed to
Grey an account of an interview just had with M. Sazonof, Minister
for Foreign Affairs. Sazonof was conciliatory and optimistic.
"Sazonof said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the powers
accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you
would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of
its taking place."
_France._ M. Farges, Consul General at Basle, Switzerland, reported
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris,
that German officers on leave in this district had been ordered to
return to Germany, and that owners of motor cars in Baden had been
ordered to be ready to place them at the disposal of the Government,
and secrecy enjoined as to the order under penalty of fine. People
at Basle are uneasy, and banking facilities restricted.
M. de Fleuriau, Chargé d'Affaires at London, reported to M.
Bienvenu-Martin that the German and Austrian Ambassadors there were
letting it appear that they were sure Great Britain would preserve
neutrality in case of war. Sir Arthur Nicholson, Under-Secretary for
Foreign Affairs, had, however, assured Prince Lichnowsky, the German
Ambassador, that Great Britain was free to intervene if she judged
it expedient. To make this understood in Germany, nevertheless, that
Government should be made to know for certain that they will find
Great Britain by the side of France and Russia.
M. Paléologue, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed that M.
Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs, was using conciliatory
language to the ambassadors, and was restraining the press,
particularly in recommending great moderation toward Germany.
M. Bompard, Ambassador at Constantinople, telegraphed from Therapia
that the Turks were delighted at the misfortunes of Serbia, and
thought that Russia will not intervene in her favor under
circumstances which would extend the war beyond Serbia and Austria.
"The unanimous feeling in Ottoman political circles is that
Austria, with the support of Germany, will attain her objects,
and that she will make Serbia follow Bulgaria and enter into the
orbit of the Triple Alliance."
M. de Fleuriau, Chargé d'Affaires at London, reported the interview
between Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Prince
Lichnowsky, German Ambassador.
"The attitude of Great Britain is confirmed by the postponement
of the demobilization of the fleet. The First Lord of the
Admiralty [Winston Churchill] took this measure quietly on Friday
on his own initiative; to-night Sir Edward Grey and his
colleagues decided to make it public. This result is due to the
conciliatory attitude of Serbia and Russia."
M. de Fleuriau, Chargé d'Affaires at London, reported news from St.
Petersburg of the willingness of Russia to stand aside if Serbia
appealed to the powers. Accordingly Sir Edward Grey will proceed
with his plan of a conference, on the understanding that, pending
its results, Russia, Austria, and Serbia abstain from active
military operations. To this the German Ambassador, Prince
Lichnowsky is favorably disposed. Later M. de Fleuriau reported that
the Serbian Minister at London, M. Boschkovitch, had not yet
received instructions to ask for British mediation. Possibly
telegrams to that effect had been stopped on the way.
M. Bienvenu-Martin having received Sir Edward Grey's proposal for
the four-power conference, authorized M. de Fleuriau to represent
France in it. He repeated his conviction of failure of the
conference unless Germany's influence were first exercised
pacifically at Vienna.
"I have also noted, during Baron von Schoen's observations, that
the Austro-Hungarian Government was particularly susceptible when
the words 'mediation,' 'intervention,' 'conference' were used,
and was more willing to admit 'friendly advice' and
'conversations.'"
De Fleuriau reported that Italy had accepted intervention by the
powers to prevent military operations. Germany had not yet replied
to Italy's request for information as to procedure to be followed
with regard to Austria-Hungary.
M. Barrère, Ambassador at Rome, reported his interview with the
Marquis di San Giuliano, in which that Minister for Foreign Affairs
had repudiated his reported approval of the action of Austria-Hungary.
"He is convinced that Austria will not withdraw any of her
claims, and will maintain them, even at the risk of bringing
about a general conflagration; he doubts whether Germany is
disposed to lend herself to any pressure on her ally. He asserts,
however, that Germany at this moment attaches great importance to
her relations with London, and he believes that if any power can
determine Berlin in favor of peaceful action, it is England.
"As for Italy she will continue to make every effort in favor of
peace. It is with this end in view that he had adhered without
hesitation to Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a meeting in London
of the ambassadors of those powers which are not directly
interested in the Austro-Serbian dispute."
M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador at Berlin, reported the interview of Sir
Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador, with the German Secretary of
State, and said that Herr von Jagow's language confirmed that of
Baron von Schoen at Paris.
M. Bienvenu-Martin then notified the French Ambassadors at London,
St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome, of his interview with
Count Szécsen, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, and the memorandum
he had submitted criticizing the Serbian reply to the Austrian note.
_Belgium._ Baron Beyens, Minister at Berlin, reported to M.
Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Brussels, the diplomatic
situation at the German capital. Germany had not replied to the
British proposal. "The decision rests with the emperor."
TUESDAY, JULY 28, 1914
_Serbia._ Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, this day telegraphed to M. Pashitch, Serbian Prime
Minister, that Serbia's reply to the Austrian note being
unsatisfactory, the Austro-Hungarian Government
"was compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and
interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of
arms. Austria-Hungary consequently considers herself henceforward
in a state of war with Serbia."
M. Pashitch telegraphed this news from Nish to all the Serbian
Legations abroad.
Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Serbian Minister at Petrograd, gave the
information officially to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.
"I have the honor to inform your excellency of this regrettable
act, which a great power had the courage to commit against a
small Slav country which only recently emerged from a long series
of heroic but exhausting battles, and I beg leave on this
occasion of deep gravity for my country to express the hope that
this act, which disturbs the peace of Europe and revolts her
conscience, will be condemned by the whole civilized world and
severely punished by Russia, the protector of Serbia.
"I beg your excellency to be so kind as to lay this petition from
the whole Serbian nation before the throne of his majesty."
_Austria-Hungary._ An official communication was given to the press
at Vienna summarizing the Government's criticism of the Serbian
reply to the Austro-Hungarian note.
"Inasmuch as the Austro-Hungarian demands constitute the minimum
regarded as necessary for the reestablishment of a permanent
peace in the southeast of the [Dual] Monarchy, the Serbian reply
is considered to be insufficient.
"That the Serbian Government is aware of this appears from the
fact that they contemplate the settlement of the dispute by
arbitration, and also from the fact that on the day on which
their reply was due, and before it was in fact submitted, they
gave orders for mobilization."
Count Szögyény, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphed
to Count Berchtold that Germany had declined to take part in the
four power-conference
"on the ground that it is impossible for Germany to bring her
ally before a European court in her settlement with Serbia."
Baron von Müller telegraphed to Count Berchtold from Tokyo, Japan,
that the semiofficial Japan "Times" concludes a leading article on
the Serbian question with the statement that Japan is on the best of
terms with the three great powers concerned, Austria-Hungary,
Germany, and Russia, while it is in no way interested in Serbia. He
infers that, in case of war, Japan would, as a matter of course,
maintain strict neutrality.
Count Berchtold telegraphed Count Szögyény at Berlin the report made
by Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London, of his
interview on the 27th with Sir Edward Grey.
"I believe that I need not specially point out to your excellency
that Grey's proposal for a conference, in so far as it relates to
our conflict with Serbia, appears, in view of the state of war
which has arisen, to have been outstripped by events."
Count Berchtold telegraphed Count Mensdorff in London to explain to
Sir Edward Grey in detail the _dossier_ of charges against Serbia
accompanying the Austrian note, and
"make clear to him that the offer of Serbia to meet points in our
note was only an apparent one, intended to deceive Europe without
giving any guaranty for the future.
"As the Serbian Government knew that only an unconditional
acceptance of our demands could satisfy us, the Serbian tactics
can easily be seen through: Serbia accepted a number of our
demands, with all sorts of reservations, in order to impress
public opinion in Europe, trusting that she would not be required
to fulfill her promises. In conversing with Sir Edward Grey, your
excellency should lay special emphasis on the circumstance that
the general mobilization of the Serbian army was ordered for the
afternoon of July 25 at three o'clock, while the answer to our
note was delivered just before the expiration of the time
fixed--that is to say, a few minutes before six o'clock. Up to
then we had made no military preparations, but by the Serbian
mobilization we were compelled to do so."
Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Szápáry, Ambassador at St.
Petersburg, an account of an interview with the Russian Ambassador at
Vienna. Count Berchtold had informed M. Schebeko of Austria-Hungary's
inability to concur in Russia's proposal to take the Serbian reply to
the Austrian note as a starting point for an understanding between the
disputants.
"No one in our country could understand, nor could anyone approve
negotiations with reference to the wording used in the answer
which we had designated as unsatisfactory. This was all the more
impossible because, as the ambassador knew, there was a deep
feeling of general excitement which had already mastered public
opinion. Moreover, on our side war had to-day been declared
against Serbia.
"In reply to the explanations of the ambassador, which culminated
in asserting that we should not in any way suppress the admitted
hostile opinion in Serbia by a warlike action, but that, on the
contrary, we should only increase it, I gave him some insight
into our present relations toward Serbia which made it necessary,
quite against our will, and without any selfish secondary object,
for us to show our restless neighbor, with the necessary
emphasis, our firm intention not to permit any longer a movement
which was allowed to exist by the Government, and which was
directed against the existence of the [Dual] Monarchy. The
attitude of Serbia after the receipt of our note had further not
been calculated to make a peaceful solution possible, because
Serbia, even before she transmitted to us her unsatisfactory
reply, had ordered a general mobilization, and in so doing had
already committed a hostile act against us. In spite of this,
however, we had waited for three days. Yesterday hostilities were
opened against us on the Hungarian frontier on the part of
Serbia. By this act we were deprived of the possibility of
maintaining any longer the patience which we had shown toward
Serbia. The establishment of a fundamental but peaceful
amelioration of our relations toward Serbia had now been made
impossible, and we were compelled to meet the Serbian provocation
in the only form which in the given circumstances was consistent
with the dignity of the monarchy."
Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Mensdorff in London of his
interview with Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador in Vienna.
Bunsen had explained Sir Edward Grey's position.
Count Berchtold telegraphed Count Szögyény at Berlin to communicate
to the German Chancellor or Secretary of State the following
information:
"According to mutually consistent reports, received from St.
Petersburg, Kiev, Warsaw, Moscow, and Odessa, Russia is making
extensive military preparations. M. Sazonof has indeed given an
assurance on his word of honor, as has also the Russian Minister
of War, that mobilization has not up to now been ordered; the
latter has, however, told the German Military Attaché that the
military districts which border on Austria-Hungary--Kiev, Odessa,
Moscow, and Kazan--will be mobilized should our troops cross the
Serbian frontier.
"Under these circumstances I would urgently ask the Cabinet at
Berlin to take into immediate consideration the question whether
the attention of Russia should not be drawn, in a friendly
manner, to the fact that the mobilization of the above districts
amounts to a threat against Austria-Hungary, and that, therefore,
should these measures be carried out, they would be answered by
the most extensive military countermeasures, not only by the
[Dual] Monarchy but by our ally, the German Empire.
"In order to make it more easy for Russia to withdraw, it appears
to us appropriate that such a step should, in the first place, be
taken by Germany alone; nevertheless we are ready to take this
step in conjunction with Germany.
"Unambiguous language appears to me at the present moment to be
the most effective method of making Russia fully conscious of all
that is involved in a threatening attitude."
_Russia._ Consul General at Fiume telegraphed to M. Sazonof,
Minister for Foreign Affairs at St. Petersburg, that a state of
siege had been proclaimed in Slavonia, in Croatia, and at Fiume, and
reservists of all classes called out.
M. Broniewsky, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed M. Sazonof
that the local papers had not published _in extenso_ the Serbian
reply, evidently being well aware of the calming effect it would
have on German readers.
M. Schebeko, Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed that the
Austro-Hungarian order for general mobilization had been signed.
M. Sazonof telegraphed the ambassadors at London, Paris, Berlin,
Vienna, and Rome:
"In face of the hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia,
it is necessary that Great Britain should take instant mediatory
action, and that the military measures undertaken by Austria
against Serbia should be immediately suspended. Otherwise
mediation will only serve as an excuse to make the question drag
on, and will meanwhile make it possible for Austria to crush
Serbia completely and to acquire a dominant position in the
Balkans."
_Germany._ The Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, confidentially
reported to the Government of Germany that the evidence presented by
Austria-Hungary was conclusive of the complicity in the crime of
Sarajevo of members of the Serbian Government and army, and the
existence of organized Serb propaganda against the Dual Monarchy.
Austria-Hungary therefore was justified in her action as well as
demands against Serbia.
The Chancellor telegraphed to Count Pourtalès, Ambassador at St.
Petersburg:
"We continue in our endeavor to induce Vienna to elucidate in St.
Petersburg the object and scope of the Austrian action in Serbia
in a manner both convincing and satisfactory to Russia. The
declaration of war which has meanwhile ensued alters nothing in
this matter."
Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Vienna, telegraphed
to the German Chancellor that the British mediation proposal, "owing
to the opening of hostilities by Serbia," was "belated." William II
at 10. 45 p. m., sent the following message to Nicholas II:
"I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which
is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against Serbia. The
unscrupulous agitation which has been going on for years in
Serbia has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz
Ferdinand has become a victim. The spirit which made the Serbians
murder their own king and his consort still dominates that
country. Doubtless you will agree with me that both of us, you as
well as I, and all other sovereigns, have a common interest to
insist that all those who are responsible for this horrible
murder shall suffer their deserved punishment.
"On the other hand, I by no means overlook the difficulty
encountered by you and your Government to stem the tide of public
opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which has joined us
both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use my entire
influence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a frank and
satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope confidently that
you will support me in my efforts to overcome all difficulties
which may yet arise.
"Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin."
_Great Britain._ Sir Maurice de Bunsen, Ambassador at Vienna, sent
to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs at London, the
text of the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war against Serbia. This
was followed by the statements:
"Austria-Hungary, who has just addressed to Serbia a formal
declaration, in conformity with Article I of the convention of
October 18, 1907, relative to the opening of hostilities,
considers herself henceforward in a state of war with Serbia.
"In bringing the above to notice of his Britannic Majesty's
embassy, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honor to
declare that Austria-Hungary will act during the hostilities in
conformity with the terms of the conventions of the The Hague of
October 18, 1907, as also with those of the Declaration of London
of February 28, 1909, provided an analogous procedure is adopted
by Serbia."
The French Embassy informed Sir Edward Grey that France accepted his
four-power mediation proposal, and had appointed M. Paul Cambon her
representative in the conference.
Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, communicated to
Grey a telegram from M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, which stated that his interviews with the German
Ambassador, Count Pourtalès, confirmed his impression that Germany
would support Austria-Hungary's uncompromising attitude.
"The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this
crisis developing, appear to be exerting no influence on their
ally....
"This attitude of the German Government is most alarming.
"It seems to me that Great Britain is in a better position than
any other power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce the
German Government to take the necessary action. There is no doubt
that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin."
Sir Francis Bertie, Ambassador at Paris, telegraphed Grey that M.
Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Secretary for Foreign Affairs, realized the
position of Great Britain.
"He quite appreciates the impossibility for his [British]
majesty's Government to declare themselves 'solidaires' with
Russia on a question between Austria and Serbia, which in its
present condition is not one affecting England. He also sees
that you cannot take up an attitude at Berlin and Vienna more
Serbian than that attributed in German and Austrian sources to
the Russian Government.
"The German Ambassador [Baron von Schoen] has stated that Austria
would respect the integrity of Serbia, but when asked whether her
independence also would be respected, he gave no assurance."
Sir Edward Goschen, Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphed that, after
conference with his French and Italian colleagues, he had found that
the German Secretary of State von Jagow had, while refusing to take
part in the proposed conference, said to all of them that he desired
to work with their Governments for the maintenance of general peace.
"We therefore deduced that if he is sincere in this wish he can
be objecting only to the form of your proposal. Perhaps he
himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he would find
it possible to work with us."
Maurice de Bunsen, Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed that Count
Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared Austria-Hungary
could not delay military proceedings against Serbia, and so declined
the mediation proposed.
"Prestige of [Dual] Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now
prevent conflict."
The Ambassador supplemented this in a longer telegram, giving
details of his interview with Count Berchtold.
Sir Rennell Rodd, Ambassador at Rome, telegraphed an account of an
interview the Marquis di San Giuliano, Prime Minister, had just had
with the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires.
If explanations were given of mode in which Austrian agents would
intervene under Articles V and VI of the note to Serbia, Serbia
might still accept the whole note. This explanation could be
imparted, without loss of dignity to Austria, through the powers,
who might then advise Serbia to accept the note without conditions.
The Marquis pointed out a passage in the Austrian note which had
been misinterpreted by Serbia, and so might be used as a basis for
settlement, namely, that regarding cooperation of Austrian agents in
Serbia; this was to be only in investigation, not in judicial or
administrative measures.
Mr. Crackanthorpe, Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia, telegraphed from
Nish that he was urging greatest moderation on the Serbian
Government pending mediatory efforts by the powers.
"Two Serbian steamers fired on and damaged, and two Serbian
merchant vessels have been captured by a Hungarian monitor at
Orsova."
This was supplemented by a telegram that war had been declared by
Austria.
Grey telegraphed to Sir Edward Goschen, Ambassador at Berlin,
explaining the nature of his proposed four-power conference. No
suggestion would be put forward that has not previously been
ascertained to be acceptable to Austria and Russia. A direct
exchange of views between these countries is preferable to all other
methods. This the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Sazonof,
is reported to have offered. If Austria accepts, the situation will
become less critical. Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at
London, reports that his Government has counseled moderation at
Vienna. This is very satisfactory.
A supplementary telegram read:
"German Government, having accepted principle of mediation
between Austria and Russia by the four powers, if necessary, I am
ready to propose that the German Secretary of State should
suggest the lines on which this principle should be applied. I
will, however, keep the idea in reserve until we see how the
conversations between Austria and Russia progress."
Grey telegraphed to Sir George Buchanan, Ambassador at St.
Petersburg, his satisfaction over prospect of direct exchange of
views between Russia and Austria, and readiness to facilitate this
if he knew what Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
proposes that the ministers at Belgrade do.
"Could he not first mention in an exchange of views with Austria
his willingness to cooperate in some such scheme? It might then
take more concrete shape."
Sir Edward Goschen, Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphed report to Grey
on the 28th inst. of an interview with the German Chancellor, Dr.
von Bethmann-Hollweg. The Chancellor was most anxious for Germany
and Great Britain to work together for European peace, as they had
successfully done in last preceding crisis. He could not accept the
four-power proposal, since the conference would look like an
"Areopagus" of two groups of two powers, each sitting in judgment
on two other powers, but this refusal should not militate against
his strong desire for effective cooperation. He was doing his best
at Vienna and St. Petersburg to get both powers into friendly direct
discussion, but if, as reported, Russia had mobilized fourteen army
corps in the south, this would put it out of his power to continue
preaching moderation at Vienna. Austria, who was only partially
mobilizing, would have to take similar measures; so, if war results,
Russia will be responsible.
Goschen remarked that surely part of the responsibility rested on
Austria for refusing to accept the almost wholly compliant reply of
Serbia, or to admit it as a basis for discussion. The Chancellor
repeated his views about the Serbian question being wholly Austria's
affair, with which Russia had nothing to do.
"Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most
unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make
war. I think that that opinion is shared by many people here."
Ambassador Buchanan telegraphed from St. Petersburg report of
interview with M. Sazonof, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
who thanked Grey for his language to Prince Lichnowsky, the German
Ambassador. Sazonof was pessimistic. Buchanan asked him if he would
be satisfied with Austria's assurances to respect Serbia's integrity
and independence. He replied: Not if she attacked Serbia; that he
would order mobilization on the day that Austria crossed the Serbian
frontier.
"I told the German Ambassador [Count Pourtalès], who appealed to
me to give moderating counsels to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, that from the beginning I had not ceased to do so, and
that the German Ambassador at Vienna should now in his turn use
his restraining influence. I made it clear to his excellency
that, Russia being thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not
be averted if Serbia were attacked by Austria."
Ambassador de Bunsen at Vienna telegraphed news of Austria's
declaration of war against Serbia, and her declination of Russia's
suggestion of direct discussion with her. Russian Ambassador
Schebeko said that the London conference now offered the only
prospect of European peace, and he was sure Russia would agree to
it.
"So long as opposing armies have not actually come in contact,
all hope need not be abandoned."
_France._ M. Viviani, French Prime Minister, on board _La France_,
telegraphed to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign
Affairs at Paris, approving his course. Russia was not responsible
for present situation, and Germany could not with grace refuse to
counsel Austria, provoker of the crisis. He approved Grey's
proposition of a four-power conference.
"The action of the four less interested powers cannot ... be
exerted only at Vienna and St. Petersburg. In proposing to exert
it also at Belgrade, which means, in fact, between Vienna and
Belgrade, Sir E. Grey grasps the logic of the situation; and, in
not excluding St. Petersburg, he offers, on the other hand, to
Germany a method of withdrawing with perfect dignity from the
_démarche_ by which the German Government have caused it to be
known at Paris and at London that the affair was looked upon by
them as purely Austro-Serbian and without any general character."
M. Bienvenu-Martin replied to M. Viviani that Germany had taken no
sincere action to hold back Austria, and was opposing Grey's plan of
mediation, thus dooming it to failure. Austria will take energetic
measures to-morrow, the 29th, to compel Serbia to give them the
satisfaction demanded, and has begun to mobilize.
M. Paul Cambon, Ambassador at London, reported interviews of Sir
Edward Grey, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, with Count Mensdorff,
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, and Prince Lichnowsky, German
Ambassador. The first continued to maintain that the Serbian reply
was unacceptable. The second talked like Baron von Schoen at Paris;
he desired Great Britain to use moderating influence at St.
Petersburg. Grey replied that this would be embarrassing, as Russia
had been moderate from the beginning, especially in her pacific
advice to Serbia. It was at Vienna that action was necessary, and
there Germany's help was indispensable. News had come from St.
Petersburg of the first direct conversations between Russia and
Austria, that of Prime Minister Sazonof and Ambassador Szápáry.
Secretary Grey and Under-Secretary Nicholson were doubtful of its
success, since M. Sazonof had not yet secured assent to a revision
of the Serbian note by the two cabinets.
"In any case, at a moment when the least delay might have serious
consequences, it would be very desirable that these direct
negotiations should be carried on in such a way as not to hamper
Sir E. Grey's action, and not to furnish Austria with a pretext
for slipping out of the friendly intervention of the four powers.
"The British Ambassador at Berlin having made a determined effort
to obtain Herr von Jagow's adherence to Sir E. Grey's suggestion,
the German Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that it was best
to await the result of the conversation which had been begun
between St. Petersburg and Vienna. Sir E. Grey has, in
consequence, directed Sir E. Goschen to suspend his _démarche_
for the moment. In addition, the news that Austria has just
officially declared war against Serbia opens a new phase of the
question."
M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador at Berlin, reported an interview of Herr
von Jagow with M. Broniewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires, in which
the German Secretary of State was hopeful that Austria-Hungary's
willingness to converse with Russia after the expiration of the
ultimatum to Serbia might discover an issue from present
difficulties. M. Cambon adds that perhaps Austria is seeking time to
make her preparations.
Von Jagow told Cambon that he could not accept the kind of
conference proposed by Grey, and that success depended on mediation
taking another form.
"I laid stress upon the danger of delay, which might bring on
war, and asked him if he wished for war. He protested, and added
that direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg were
in progress, and that from now on he expected a favorable
result."
Von Jagow had made the same suggestion to the British and Italian
Ambassadors.
"My colleagues and I thought that this was only a question of
form, and the British Ambassador is going to suggest to his
Government that they should change the wording of their proposal,
which might take the character of a diplomatic _démarche_ at
Vienna and St. Petersburg.
"In consequence of the repugnance shown by Herr von Jagow to any
démarche at Vienna, Sir Edward Grey could put him in a dilemma by
asking him to state himself precisely how diplomatic action by
the powers to avoid war could be brought about.
"We ought to associate ourselves with every effort in favor of
peace compatible with our engagements toward our ally; but to
place the responsibility in the proper quarter, we must take care
to ask Germany to state precisely what she wishes."
M. Paléologue, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reported that M.
Sazonof, Russian Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had said "Austria is
unwilling to converse."
M. Dumaine, Ambassador to Vienna, reported the declaration of Count
Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to British
Ambassador Bunsen that discussion of the Serbian reply was useless,
war having been declared. M. Schebeko, Russian Ambassador, said that
his position from the beginning had been that the question was not
of localizing the war, but preventing it. The declaration of war
made _pourparlers_ by the four powers extremely difficult. The
German formula, "Mediation between Austria and Russia," is
unsuitable, since it assumes a dispute between the two empires which
does not exist.
WEDNESDAY, JULY 29, 1914
_Austria-Hungary._ On the following day, July 29, 1914, Count
Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Vienna, telegraphed the
Ambassadors at St. Petersburg, London, Paris, and Rome, copies of a
memorandum which he had handed Herr von Tschirscky that day in
answer to the _démarche_ made by the German Ambassador, namely that
the Austro-Hungarian Government should accept the Serbian reply
either as satisfactory or as a basis for discussion. The memorandum
declared that, contrary to the assumption of Sir Edward Grey,
British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, at whose instance the
proceeding was taken, the parts of the Serbian reply which were not
accepted by Austria-Hungary are the most vital in it, since they
contain the guarantees for Serbia's observance of the demands made
on her. So, too, it is an assumption that the action taken against
Serbia was directed against Russia and her influence in the Balkans.
Austria-Hungary does not charge Russia with instigating the Serbian
propaganda against the Dual Monarchy. Our feelings toward her are
entirely friendly.
Austria-Hungary cannot adopt the desired attitude toward the Serbian
reply since this has already been outstripped by events. Our
declaration of war was made after vainly waiting three days for
Serbia to abandon her point of view.
"If the British Cabinet is prepared to use its influence on the
Russian Government with a view to the maintenance of peace
between the great powers, and with a view to the localization of
the war which has been forced upon us by many years of Serbian
intrigues, the Imperial and Royal Government could only welcome
this."
Ambassador Szécsen telegraphed from Paris that France was
unmistakably making military preparations.
"The German Ambassador, Baron von Schoen is commissioned to
discuss these preparations with M. Viviani [French Prime
Minister] to-day, and to point out that in these circumstances
Germany may be compelled to take similar measures which
necessarily could not be kept secret, and which could not fail to
cause great public excitement when they became known. In this way
the two countries, although they are only striving for peace,
will be compelled to at least a partial mobilization, which would
be dangerous.
"Further, in accordance with these instructions, Baron Schoen
will declare that Germany has a lively desire that the conflict
between us and Serbia should remain localized, and that in this
Germany relies on the support of France."
Ambassador Szögyény telegraphed from Berlin that as early as the
26th inst. the German Government had warned Russia that mobilization
by her would cause German mobilization.
"Another telegram has to-day been sent to St. Petersburg, stating
that owing to the further progress of the Russian measures of
mobilization Germany might be brought to mobilize."
Ambassador Szápáry telegraphed from St. Petersburg that M. Sazonof,
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, was greatly excited over the
alleged disinclination of Austria-Hungary to continue exchange of
ideas with Russia, and over her mobilization, which is supposed to
be more extensive than necessary, and therefore directed against
Russia.
I visited the minister to explain matters. I agreed that you (Count
Berchtold) had declined to discuss the wording of the Serbian reply,
but made it clear that we had no intention, if the conflict remained
localized, to annex Serbian territory or touch her sovereignty, and
would always be ready to keep in touch with St. Petersburg on
Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests.
M. Sazonof accepted the assurance in regard to territory, but on the
point of sovereignty said he must continue to believe that our
coercion of Serbia would result in her becoming our vassal, and that
this would upset equilibrium in the Balkans, and so involve Russian
interests. Russia recognized our legitimate interest there, but its
assertion must be acceptable to Serbia.
"I expressed the view that this was not a Russian but a Serbian
interest, whereupon M. Sazonof claimed that Russian interests
were in this case Serbian interests, so that I was obliged to
make an end of the vicious circle by going on to a new topic.
"I mentioned that I had heard that there was a feeling of anxiety
in Russia, because we had mobilized eight corps for action
against Serbia. M. Sazonof assured me that it was not he (who
knew nothing about this) but the Chief of the General Staff who
had expressed this anxiety. I endeavored to convince the minister
that any unprejudiced person could easily be persuaded that our
southern corps could not constitute a menace for Russia.
"I indicated to the minister that it would be well if his
Imperial Master were informed of the true situation, as it was
urgently necessary, if it was desired to maintain peace, that a
speedy end should be put to the military competition which now
threatened to ensue on account of false news.
"The minister further informed me that a ukase would be signed
to-day, which would give orders for a mobilization in a somewhat
extended form. He was able, however, to assure me in the most
official way that these troops were not intended to attack us.
They would only stand to arms in case Russian interests in the
Balkans should be in danger. An explanatory note would make it
clear that this was a measure of precaution, since we, who in any
case have the advantage of quicker mobilization, have now also
already so great a start. In earnest words I drew M. Sazonof's
attention to the impression which such a measure would make in
our country. I went on to express doubt whether the explanatory
note would be calculated to soften the impression, whereupon the
minister again gave expression to assurances regarding the
harmlessness (!) of this measure."
Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Szögyény at Berlin that the
Russian military districts of Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan were
being mobilized. The ambassador should notify the German Government
of this, and emphasize that if Russian mobilization were not stopped
without delay, Austria-Hungary would follow with general
mobilization. The representatives of Germany and Austria-Hungary at
St. Petersburg, and, if necessary, at Paris, will declare the same
to the Government there. We will not be diverted from our course
against Serbia.
_Germany._ Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg telegraphed to Ambassador
von Schoen at Paris to protest against the military measures France
was reported to be taking, and say that, in answer, Germany would
have to proclaim "a threatening state of war."
"While this would not mean a call for the reserves or
mobilization, yet the tension would be aggravated. We continue to
hope for the preservation of peace."
Count Pourtalès, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, had an interview with
M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs, which he reported as
follows:
"The secretary tried to persuade me that I should urge my
Government to participate in a quadruple conference to find means
to induce Austria-Hungary to give up those demands which touch
upon the sovereignty of Serbia. I could merely promise to report
the conversation and took the position that, after Russia had
decided upon the baneful step of mobilization, every exchange of
ideas appeared now extremely difficult, if not impossible.
Besides, Russia now was demanding from us in regard to
Austria-Hungary the same which Austria-Hungary was being blamed
for with regard to Serbia, _i.e._, an infraction of sovereignty.
Austria-Hungary having promised to consider the Russian interests
by disclaiming any territorial aspiration--a great concession on
the part of a state engaged in war--should therefore be permitted
to attend to its affairs with Serbia alone. There would be time
at the peace conference to return to the matter of forbearance
toward the sovereignty of Serbia.
"I added very solemnly that at this moment the entire
Austro-Serbian affair was eclipsed by the danger of a general
European conflagration, and I endeavored to present to the
secretary the magnitude of this danger.
"It was impossible to dissuade Sazonof from the idea that Serbia
could not now be deserted by Russia."
THE KAISER AND CZAR EXCHANGE TELEGRAMS
William II received the following telegram from Nicholas II:
"I am glad that you are back in Germany. In this serious moment I
ask you earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been
declared against a weak country and in Russia the indignation
which I fully share is tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall
be unable to resist the pressure exercised upon me and that I
shall be forced to take measures which will lead to war. To
prevent a calamity as a European war would be, I urge you in the
name of our old friendship to do all in your power to restrain
your ally from going too far."
The Kaiser replied at 6.30 p. m.:
"I have received your telegram and I share your desire for the
conservation of peace. However, I cannot--as I told you in my
first telegram--consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an
'ignominious war.' Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the
promises of Serbia as long as they are merely on paper are
entirely unreliable.
"According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to be
considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the
promises of Serbia are effectively translated into deeds. In this
opinion I am strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian
Cabinet that Austria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the
expense of Serbia. I am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly
possible for Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Serbian
war without drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever
seen. I believe that a direct understanding is possible and
desirable between your Government and Vienna, an understanding
which--as I have already telegraphed you--my Government endeavors
to aid with all possible effort. Naturally military measures by
Russia, which might be construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary,
would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to avoid and
would undermine my position as mediator which--upon your appeal
to my friendship and aid--I willingly accepted."
The Czar answered:
"Thanks for your telegram, which is conciliatory and friendly,
whereas the official message presented to-day by your ambassador
to my minister was conveyed in a very different tone. I beg you
to explain this divergency. It would be right to give over the
Austro-Serbian problem to the Hague Tribunal. I trust in your
wisdom and friendship."
_Russia._ M. Broniewsky, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed to
M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs, that Herr von Jagow,
German Secretary of State, had told him no news had been received
from Vienna as to acceptance of private discussions at St.
Petersburg--that it was very difficult for him to produce any effect
at Vienna, especially openly.
"He even added, in speaking to Cambon, that were pressure brought
to bear too obviously, Austria would hasten to face Germany with
a _fait accompli_."
Von Jagow had heard from St. Petersburg that you were more
inclined than previously to find a compromise acceptable to all
parties. I replied that this had been your position from the
outset, provided the compromise were acceptable not only to
Austria, but equally to Russia. He then said that Russian
mobilization on the frontier, of which he had heard, would render
an understanding with Austria difficult as she was making no
preparations on the Russian frontier. I replied that I had
information in my possession that Austria was mobilizing there,
and that our mobilization was in reply to it. But our measures, I
assured him, were not directed against Germany.
Alexander, Crown Prince of Serbia, telegraphed to Nicholas II his
gratitude for the sympathy extended to Serbia by the Czar on the
28th inst.
"It fills our hearts with the belief that the future of Serbia is
secure now that it is the object of your majesty's gracious
solicitude. These painful moments cannot but strengthen the bonds
of deep attachment which bind Serbia to Holy Slav Russia."
M. Sazonof telegraphed Ambassador Isvolsky at Paris that Germany had
decided to mobilize if Russia did not cease her military
preparations.
"As we cannot comply with the wishes of Germany, we have no
alternative but to hasten on our own military preparations and to
assume that war is probably inevitable. Please inform the French
Government of this, and add that we are sincerely grateful to
them for the declaration which the French Ambassador made to me
on their behalf, that we could count fully upon the assistance of
our ally, France. In the existing circumstances that declaration
is especially valuable to us.
"[Communicated to the Russian Ambassadors in Great Britain,
Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Germany.]"
_Great Britain._ Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London,
reported to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that
Russia would mobilize at Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan. This
information had been officially sent by Russia to Berlin on the 28th
inst., with assurances that there was no aggressive intention
against Germany. The Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko, was still
retained at Vienna. Direct communication between Austria and Russia
was, however, at an end, owing to Austria's declaration of war on
Serbia. Mediation by London Cabinet to end Austria's military
operations was therefore most urgent. If these continued Austria
would crush Serbia while the conference was continuing.
Sir Edward Goschen, Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphed to Grey a
report of his interview with Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg.
He informed me that Austria-Hungary refused to act on your
suggestion to make the Serbian reply the basis of discussion. Von
Jagow had written to Vienna that, though Serbia had shown a certain
desire to meet the demands made on her, nevertheless he appreciated
Austria's requirement of guaranties which were absent in the Serbian
reply:
"The Chancellor then went on to say that the hostilities which
were about to be undertaken against Serbia had presumably the
exclusive object of securing such guaranties, seeing that the
Austrian Government already assured the Russian Government that
they had no territorial designs.
"He advised the Austro-Hungarian Government, should this view be
correct, to speak openly in this sense. The holding of such
language would, he hoped, eliminate all possible
misunderstandings.
"As yet, he told me, he had not received a reply from Vienna.
"From the fact that he had gone so far in the matter of giving
advice at Vienna, his excellency hoped that you would realize
that he was sincerely doing all in his power to prevent danger of
European complications."
Goschen reported an interview with the German Secretary of State.
Von Jagow was much depressed.
"He reminded me that he had told me the other day that he had to
be very careful in giving advice to Austria, as any idea that
they were being pressed would be likely to cause them to
precipitate matters and present a _fait accompli_. This had, in
fact, now happened, and he was not sure that his communication of
your suggestion that Serbia's reply offered a basis for
discussion had not hastened declaration of war. He was much
troubled by reports of mobilization in Russia, and of certain
military measures, which he did not specify, being taken in
France. He subsequently spoke of these measures to my French
colleague [M. Jules Cambon] who informed him that French
Government had done nothing more than the German Government had
done, namely, recalled officers on leave. His excellency denied
German Government had done this, but as a matter of fact it is
true. My French colleague said to under-Secretary of State [Herr
von Zimmermann] that, when Austria had entered Serbia, and so
satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be
favorable for four disinterested powers to discuss situation and
come forward with suggestions for preventing graver
complications. Under-Secretary of State seemed to think idea
worthy of consideration, as he replied that would be a different
matter from conference proposed by you."
Grey replied to Goschen, stating his appreciation of the Dr. von
Bethmann-Hollweg's language, and assuring the Chancellor that Great
Britain would strain every effort for peace.
"If he can induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from
going so far as to come into collision with her, we shall all
join in deep gratitude to his excellency for having saved the
peace of Europe."
Ambassador Buchanan at St. Petersburg telegraphed to Grey that
partial mobilization had been ordered. This said M. Sazonof,
Minister for Foreign Affairs, was against Austria-Hungary alone.
Direct conversation with St. Petersburg having been refused by
Vienna, he would urge Germany that a return be made to your proposal
of a four-power conference.
Ambassador Bunsen reported from Vienna that there was no step to be
taken at present to stop war with Serbia, to which the Austro-Hungarian
Government was fully committed by the declaration of war, and Kaiser
Francis Joseph's appeal to his people, published this morning. In the
opinion of Duke d'Avarans, the Italian Ambassador, Russia might be
quieted by Austria-Hungary making a binding engagement not to destroy
Serbian independence nor seize Serbian territory, but this she would
refuse to do.
Sir Rennell Rodd, Ambassador at Rome, telegraphed that the Marquis
di San Giuliano would urge in Berlin an exchange of views by the
powers in London, and suggest that the German Secretary of State
propose a formula acceptable to his Government.
"The Secretary for Foreign Affairs remarked that it was difficult
to make Germany believe that Russia was in earnest. As Germany,
however, was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if
she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France
he thought it would have a great effect."
Grey replied to Rodd that the London conference was now
impracticable owing to the attitude of Austria-Hungary, and that
Italy must now speak at Berlin and Vienna.
Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Goschen at Berlin that the German
Chancellor, Von Bethmann-Hollweg, said he was endeavoring to make
Austria satisfactorily explain at St. Petersburg the scope of her
proceedings in Serbia, but information comes from Vienna that
Austria declines to discuss the Serbian issue. Germany opposes the
four-power conference. I asked her to present her plan to prevent
war between Russia and Austria, France and Italy joined with my
request.
"Let mediation come into operation by any method that Germany
thinks possible if only Germany will 'press the button' in the
interests of peace."
Goschen telegraphed back to Grey that he had had an interview with
Bethmann-Hollweg who had just returned from Potsdam. The Chancellor
feared Germany's being drawn into war by Russia attacking her ally.
"He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British
neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to
judge the main principle which governed British policy, that
Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed
in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object
at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain
were certain, every assurance would be given to the British
Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial
acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove
victorious in any war that might ensue.
"I questioned his excellency about the French colonies, and he
said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that
respect. As regards Holland, however, his excellency said that,
so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and
neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give his
majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It
depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might
be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over,
Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against
Germany.
"His excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been
Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware,
to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that
these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which
he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement
between England and Germany, though it was of course at the
present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of
British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might
possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realization
of his desire.
"In reply to his excellency's inquiry how I thought his request
would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that
at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any
course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire
to retain full liberty."
Grey informed Ambassador Bertie at Paris of a conversation he had
had with M. Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador.
I told Cambon that I would inform the German Ambassador Prince
Lichnowsky, to-day that he must not suppose by my friendly tone that
we should stand aside in event of a general war following failure of
efforts to maintain peace. However, I warned Cambon that the case of
Serbia was not like that of Morocco, in which we had made a special
agreement with France, but one in which we did not feel called to
take a hand.
"M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly.
He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a
struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel
called to intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany
and France become involved, so that the question became one of
the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was
necessary for us to do. He seemed quite prepared for this
announcement, and made no criticism upon it.
"He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a
demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany
attacked Russia. This assurance France, of course, could not
give; she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked."
Grey telegraphed Ambassador Goschen at Berlin of his conversation
with Prince Lichnowsky, in which he had pointed out
"that the Russian Government, while desirous of mediation,
regarded it as a condition that the military operations against
Serbia should be suspended, as otherwise a mediation would only
drag on matters, and give Austria time to crush Serbia. It was,
of course, too late for all military operations against Serbia to
be suspended. In a short time, I supposed, the Austrian forces
would be in Belgrade, and in occupation of some Serbian
territory. But even then it might be possible to bring some
mediation into existence, if Austria, while saying that she must
hold the occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction
from Serbia, stated that she would not advance further, pending
an effort of the powers to mediate between her and Russia."
In a following message Grey related to Goschen a second conversation
with Prince Lichnowsky, in which he told the German Ambassador that,
in event of a general war, the issues might be so great that it
would involve all European interests, and he should not think that
Great Britain would stand aside.
"He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I
meant that we should, under certain circumstances, intervene?
"I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything
that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying
that, if things became worse, we should intervene. There would be
no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or
even if France was not involved. But we knew very well, that if
the issue did become such that we thought British interests
required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the
decision would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of
other powers had to be....
"The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said;
indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already
given in Berlin as his view of the situation."
In still another message Grey informed Goschen that he had said to
the German Ambassador, in reference to the suggestion of San
Giuliano, the Italian Prime Minister of mediation between Russia and
Austria, that it would not be mediation to urge Russia to stand
aside and give Austria a free hand to go any length she pleased.
Grey informed Ambassador Bunsen at Vienna that Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador Mensdorff, had offered to submit him a long memorandum
justifying the action of his government toward Serbia. Grey refused
to discuss the Serbian question now that the peace of Europe was
imperilled. The greater question settled, the powers might be free
to obtain satisfaction for Austria in the lesser.
"In reply to some further remarks of mine, as to the effect that
the Austrian action might have upon the Russian position in the
Balkans, he said that, before the Balkan war, Serbia had always
been regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence."
Bunsen reported to Grey that the news of Russian mobilization was
not generally known in Vienna.
_France._ M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,
notified the Ambassadors at St. Petersburg, London, Berlin, Rome,
Vienna, and Constantinople, and the Minister to Serbia, that the
Austro-German attitude was becoming clearer.
"Austria, uneasy concerning the Slav propaganda, has seized the
opportunity of the crime of Sarajevo in order to punish the
Serbian intrigues, and to obtain in this quarter guaranties
which, according as events are allowed to develop or not, will
either affect only the Serbian Government and army, or become
territorial questions. Germany intervenes between her ally and
the other powers and declares that the question is a local one,
namely, punishment of a political crime committed in the past,
and sure guaranties for the future that the anti-Austrian
intrigues will be put an end to. The German Government thinks
that Russia should be content with the official and formal
assurances given by Austria that she does not seek territorial
aggrandizement and that she will respect the integrity of Serbia;
in these circumstances the danger of war can come only from
Russia, if she seeks to intervene in a question which is well
defined. In these circumstances any action for the maintenance of
peace must take place at St. Petersburg alone.
"The attitude at Berlin, as at Vienna, is still dilatory. In the
former capital, while protesting that the Germans desire to
safeguard general peace by common action between the four powers,
the idea of a conference is rejected without any other expedient
being suggested, and while they refuse to take any positive
action at Vienna. In the Austrian capital they would like to keep
St. Petersburg in play with the illusion of an _entente_ which
might result from direct conversations, while they are taking
action against Serbia.
"In these circumstances it seems essential that the St.
Petersburg Cabinet, whose desire to unravel this crisis
peacefully is manifest, should immediately give their adherence
to the British proposal. This proposal must be strongly supported
at Berlin in order to decide [Secretary of State] Von Jagow to
take real action at Vienna capable of stopping Austria and
preventing her from supplementing her diplomatic advantage by
military successes. The Austro-Hungarian Government would,
indeed, not be slow to take advantage of it in order to impose on
Serbia, under the elastic expression of 'guaranties' conditions
which, in spite of all assurances that no territorial
aggrandizement was being sought, would in effect modify the
status of eastern Europe, and would run the risk of gravely
compromising the general peace either at once or in the near
future."
[Illustration: Vittorio Emanuele III, King of Italy.]
Ambassador Paléologue telegraphed from St. Petersburg that Russia
would acquiesce in any measures proposed by France and Great Britain
to maintain peace. Minister Klobukowski reported from Brussels that
the Belgian Government regarded Germany's attitude as enigmatical,
and justifying every apprehension.
"It seems improbable that the Austro-Hungarian Government would
have taken an initiative which would lead, according to a
preconceived plan, to a declaration of war, without previous
arrangement with the Emperor William.
"The German Government stand 'with rounded arms' ready to take
peaceful or warlike action as circumstances may require; a sudden
intervention against us would not surprise anybody here.
"The Belgian Government are taking steps which harmonize with the
statement made to me yesterday by M. Davignon that everything
will be put in readiness for the defence of the neutrality of the
country."
Ambassador Dumaine reported from Vienna:
"The French Consul at Prague confirms the mobilization of the
Eighth Army corps, and that of the Landwehr division of this army
corps. The cavalry divisions in Galicia are also mobilizing;
regiments and cavalry divisions from Vienna and Budapest have
already been transported to the Russian frontier. Reservists are
now being called together in this district.
"There is a rumor that the Austro-Hungarian Government, in order
to be in a position to meet any danger, and perhaps in order to
impress St. Petersburg, intend to decide on a general
mobilization of their forces on July 30, or August 1. The
Austrian Emperor will return from Ischl to Vienna to-morrow."
Ambassador Paléologue reported from Berlin that Austria-Hungary
refused direct conversation offered by Russia.
"Austria is hurrying on her military preparations against Russia,
and is pressing forward the mobilization which has begun on the
Galician frontier. As a result the order to mobilize will be
dispatched to-night to thirteen army corps, which are destined
to operate eventually against Austria."
Ambassador Jules Cambon reported from Berlin his interview with the
German Secretary of State. Von Jagow was awaiting reply from Vienna
to his request to hold direct conversation with Russia. He
considered that the Serbian reply afforded a basis for negotiation.
"I said that it was just on that account that I considered the
rupture by Austria, after she had received such a document,
inexplicable.
"The Secretary of State then remarked that with eastern nations
one could never obtain sufficient guaranties, and that Austria
wished to be able to supervise the carrying out of promises made
to her, a supervision which Serbia refused. This, in the eyes of
the Secretary of State, is the cardinal point. I answered Herr
von Jagow that Serbia, as she wished to remain independent, was
bound to reject the control of a single power, but that an
International Commission would not have the same character. The
Balkan States have more than one, for instance the Financial
Commission at Athens. One could imagine among other combinations,
a Provisional International Commission, charged with the duty of
controlling the police inquiry demanded by Austria; it was clear,
by this instance, that the reply of Serbia opened the door to
conversations and did not justify a rupture.
"I then asked the Secretary of State if, leaving aside direct
conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg to which Sir E.
Grey had given his adherence, he did not think that common action
could be exercised by the four powers by means of their
ambassadors. He answered in the affirmative, adding that at this
moment the London Cabinet were confining themselves to exercising
their influence in support of direct conversations."
He gave a summary of the interview between Bethmann-Hollweg and
British Ambassador Goschen.
"The attitude of the German Chancellor is very probably the
result of the last interview of Sir E. Grey with Ambassador
Lichnowsky. Up to quite the last days they flattered themselves
here that England would remain out of the question, and the
impression produced on the German Government and on the
financiers and business men by her attitude is profound."
Ambassador Dumaine reported from Vienna that he and his British,
Russian, and Italian colleagues agreed that war is now certain
between Austria and Serbia since all attempts to avoid it have
failed. The Italian Ambassador, Duke d'Avarna, said
"it is very probable that the imminence of a general insurrection
among the Southern Slav inhabitants precipitated the resolutions
of the [Dual] Monarchy. He still clings to the hope that, after a
first success of the Austro-Hungarian arms, but not before this,
mediation might be able to limit the conflict."
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs, informed
the ambassadors at London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Rome, Vienna, and
Constantinople, and the minister to Serbia, of a semiofficial
communication made by the German Ambassador.
Germany, said Baron von Schoen, was continuing its efforts to induce
Austria-Hungary to hold direct conversations with Russia, being in
no way impeded by her ally's declaration of war on Serbia. Germany
did not know Austria's intentions.
A second message was sent to these French representatives abroad
reporting an interview of M. Bienvenu-Martin and the Russian
Ambassador at Paris.
M. Isvolsky communicated the telegram from Sazonof, Russian Minister
for Foreign Affairs to Berlin, notifying Germany of Russian
mobilization in the southern provinces, and the telegrams from
Sazonof to London asking Great Britain to use her influence as
quickly as possible with Austria to secure cessation of military
operations, and stating that he believed Germany was favoring her
ally's uncompromising attitude.
Ambassador Barrère at Rome reported that the Italian Minister for
Foreign Affairs had been officially informed of the above telegrams.
M. Viviani, who had now reached Paris and resumed his office of
Minister for Foreign Affairs, instructed Ambassador Paul Cambon at
London to request Sir Edward Grey to renew at Berlin his proposal of
four-power mediation, the principle of which had been accepted by
both Germany and Russia.
"I would ask you also to point out to the British Secretary of
State how important it would be for him to obtain from the
Italian Government the most whole-hearted continuance of their
support in cooperating in the action of the four powers in favor
of peace."
M. Paul Cambon reported that Grey had invited Germany to propose her
own formula for peace as acceptable to Great Britain, France, and
Italy.
"The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said to me that
Germany's reply to this communication and to that of Russia
concerning the mobilization of four army corps on the Austrian
frontier would allow us to realize the intentions of the German
Government.
"Sir E. Grey did not disguise the fact that he found the
situation very grave and that he had little hope of a peaceful
solution."
Ambassador Paléologue telegraphed from St. Petersburg of the
notification by the German Ambassador that Russia must stop
mobilization or Germany would mobilize.
"The tone in which Count Pourtalès delivered this communication
has decided the Russian Government this very night to order the
mobilization of the thirteen army corps which are to operate
against Austria."
_Belgium._ M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, notified the
ministers at Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, St. Petersburg, Rome,
The Hague, and Luxemburg that the Belgian Government had decided to
place the army upon a strengthened peace footing.
"This step should in no way be confused with mobilization.
"Owing to the small extent of her territory, all Belgium
consists, in some degree, of a frontier zone. Her army on the
ordinary peace footing consists of only one class of armed
militia; on the strengthened peace footing, owing to the recall
of three classes, her army divisions and her cavalry division
comprise effective units of the same strength as those of the
corps permanently maintained in the frontier zones of the
neighboring powers."
THURSDAY, JULY 30, 1914
_Austria-Hungary._ On the following day Count Berchtold, Minister
for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg
his answer to the ambassador's telegram of July 29:
"I am of course still ready to explain to M. Sazonof [Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs] the various points contained in our
note addressed to Serbia which, however, has already been
outstripped by recent events. I should also attach special
importance, in accordance with the suggestion made to me through
M. Schebeko [Russian Ambassador at Vienna], also, to discussing
on this occasion in a confidential and friendly manner the
questions which affect directly our relations toward Russia. From
this it might be hoped that it would be possible to remove the
ambiguities which have arisen and to secure the development in a
friendly manner of our relations toward our neighbors, which is
so desirable an object."
This was followed by another telegram. Count Berchtold said that he
had explained to Russian Ambassador Schebeko what seemed his flat
refusal to discuss matters directly with Russia, which had so hurt
the feelings of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
"This must rest on a misunderstanding, as M. Schebeko and myself
had discussed the practical questions two days before, a fact
which the ambassador confirmed with the observation that he had
fully informed M. Sazonof of this conversation.
"M. Schebeko then explained why our action against Serbia was
regarded with such anxiety at St. Petersburg. He said that we
were a great power which was proceeding against the small Serbian
state, and it was not known at St. Petersburg what our intentions
in the matter were; whether we desired to encroach on its
sovereignty, whether we desired completely to overthrow it, or
even to crush it to the ground. Russia could not be indifferent
toward the future fate of Serbia, which was linked to Russia by
historical and other bonds. At St. Petersburg they had taken the
trouble to use all their influence at Belgrade to induce them to
accept all our conditions, though this was indeed at a time when
the conditions afterward imposed by us could not yet be known.
But even with reference to these demands they would do everything
they could in order to accomplish at any rate all that was
possible.
"I reminded the ambassador that we had repeatedly emphasized the
fact that we did not desire to follow any policy of conquest in
Serbia, also that we would not infringe her sovereignty, but we
only desired to establish a condition of affairs which would
offer us a guarantee against being disturbed by Serbia. To this I
added a somewhat lengthy discussion of our intolerable relations
with Serbia. I also gave M. Schebeko clearly to understand to how
large an extent Russian diplomacy was responsible for these
circumstances, even though this result might be contrary to the
wishes of the responsible authorities.
"I referred to the Russian mobilization which had then come to my
knowledge. Since this was limited to the military districts of
Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan it had an appearance of hostility
against the [Dual] Monarchy. I did not know what the grounds for
this might be, as there was no dispute between us and Russia.
Austria-Hungary had mobilized exclusively against Serbia; against
Russia not a single man; and this would be observed from the
single fact that the first, tenth, and eleventh corps had not
been mobilized. In view, however, of the fact that Russia was
openly mobilizing against us, we should have to extend our
mobilization too, and in this case I desired to mention expressly
that this measure did not, of course, imply any attitude of
hostility toward Russia."
_Germany._ Military Attaché Eggeling at St. Petersburg telegraphed
to William II that Prince Troubetzki had said to him yesterday:
"Thank God that a telegram from your emperor has come!"
"He has just told me the telegram has made a deep impression upon
the czar but as the mobilization against Austria had already been
ordered and Sazonof [Minister for Foreign Affairs] had convinced
his majesty that it was no longer possible to retreat, his
majesty was sorry he could not change it any more. I then told
him that the guilt for the measureless consequences lay at the
door of premature mobilization against Austria-Hungary which
after all was involved merely in a local war with Serbia, for
Germany's answer was clear and the responsibility rested upon
Russia which ignored Austria-Hungary's assurance that it had no
intentions of territorial gain in Serbia. Austria-Hungary
mobilized against Serbia and not against Russia and there was no
ground for an immediate action on the part of Russia. I further
added that in Germany one could not understand any more Russia's
phrase that 'she could not desert her brethren in Serbia' after
the horrible crime of Sarajevo. I told him finally he need not
wonder if Germany's army were to be mobilized."
At 1 a. m. the German Kaiser telegraphed to Nicholas II:
"My ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of your
Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a
mobilization. I have told you the same in my last telegram.
Austria-Hungary has mobilized only against Serbia, and only a
part of her army. If Russia, as seems to be the case, according
to your advice and that of your Government, mobilizes against
Austria-Hungary, the part of the mediator with which you have
intrusted me in such friendly manner and which I have accepted
upon your express desire, is threatened if not made impossible.
The entire weight of decision now rests upon your shoulders, you
have to bear the responsibility for war or peace."
HENRY OF PRUSSIA AND GEORGE V
The Czar at once replied:
"I thank you from my heart for your quick reply. I am sending
to-night Tatisheff (Russian honorary aide to the Kaiser) with
instructions. The military measures now taking form were decided
upon five days ago, and for the reason of defense against the
preparations of Austria. I hope with all my heart that these
measures will not influence in any manner your position as
mediator, which I appraise very highly. We need your strong
pressure upon Austria so that an understanding can be arrived at
with us."
Prince Henry of Prussia, brother of the Kaiser, telegraphed to the
King of Great Britain from Berlin:
"I arrived here yesterday and have communicated what you were so
good as to say to me at Buckingham Palace last Sunday to William,
who was very thankful to receive your message.
"William, who is very anxious, is doing his utmost to comply with
the request of Nicholas to work for the maintenance of peace. He
is in continual telegraphic communication with Nicholas, who has
to-day confirmed the news that he has ordered military measures
which amount to mobilization, and that these measures were taken
five days ago.
"We have also received information that France is making military
preparations while we have not taken measures of any kind, but
may be obliged to do so at any moment if our neighbors continue
their preparations. This would then mean a European war.
"If you seriously and earnestly desire to prevent this terrible
misfortune, may I propose to you to use your influence on France
and also on Russia that they should remain neutral. In my view
this would be of the greatest use. I consider that this is a
certain and, perhaps, the only possible way of maintaining the
peace of Europe. I might add that Germany and England should now
more than ever give each other mutual support in order to prevent
a terrible disaster, which otherwise appears inevitable.
"Believe me that William is inspired by the greatest sincerity in
his efforts for the maintenance of peace. But the military
preparations of his two neighbors may end in compelling him to
follow their example for the safety of his own country, which
otherwise would remain defenseless."
George V replied:
"I am very glad to hear of William's efforts to act with Nicholas
for the maintenance of peace. I earnestly desire that such a
misfortune as a European war--the evil of which could not be
remedied--may be prevented. My Government is doing the utmost
possible in order to induce Russia and France to postpone further
military preparations, provided that Austria declares herself
satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the neighboring
Serbian territory as a pledge for a satisfactory settlement of
her demands, while at the same time the other countries suspend
their preparations for war. I rely on William applying his great
influence in order to induce Austria to accept this proposal. In
this way he will prove that Germany and England are working
together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe.
Please assure William that I am doing all I can, and will
continue to do all that lies in my power, to maintain the peace
of Europe."
_Russia._ M. Strandtman, Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia, telegraphed
from Nish to M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs at St.
Petersburg, that Prince Regent Alexander had yesterday published a
manifesto, signed by all the Serbian Ministers, on Austria's
declaration of war against Serbia.
M. Sazonof telegraphed to the ambassadors at Berlin, Vienna, Paris,
London, and Rome:
"The German Ambassador [Count Pourtalès], who has just left me,
has asked whether Russia would not be satisfied with the promise
which Austria might give--that she would not violate the
integrity of the Kingdom of Serbia--and whether we could not
indicate upon what conditions we would agree to suspend our
military preparations. I dictated to him the following
declaration to be forwarded to Berlin for immediate action:
"'If Austria, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian question has
assumed the character of a question of European interest,
declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points
which violate the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia engages to
stop her military preparations.'
"Please inform me at once by telegraph what attitude the German
Government will adopt in face of this fresh proof of our desire
to do the utmost possible for a peaceful settlement of the
question, for we cannot allow such discussions to continue solely
in order that Germany and Austria may gain time for their
military preparations."
Ambassador Swerbeiev telegraphed from Berlin that the order for the
mobilization of the German army and navy had just been issued. He
followed this with a telegram stating that Secretary of State von
Jagow had just telephoned him that the news was false:
"the news sheets had been printed in advance so as to be ready
for all eventualities, and they were put on sale in the
afternoon, but they have now been confiscated."
Ambassador Swerbeiev telegraphed from Berlin to M. Sazonof that he
had presented the minister's telegram of July 29 to Secretary of
State von Jagow, who "declared that he considered it impossible for
Austria to accept our proposal."
_Great Britain._ Ambassador Bunsen telegraphed from Vienna to Sir
Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs:
"Russian Ambassador [Schebeko] hopes that Russian mobilization
will be regarded by Austria as what it is, viz., a clear
intimation that Russia must be consulted regarding the fate of
Serbia, but he does not know how the Austrian Government are
taking it. He says that Russia must have an assurance that Serbia
will not be crushed, but she would understand that
Austria-Hungary is compelled to exact from Serbia measures which
will secure her Slav provinces from the continuance of hostile
propaganda from Serbian territory.
"The French Ambassador [Dumaine] hears from Berlin that the
German Ambassador at Vienna [Tschirsky] is instructed to speak
seriously to the Austro-Hungarian Government against acting in a
manner calculated to provoke a European war.
"Unfortunately the German Ambassador is himself so identified
with extreme anti-Russian and anti-Serbian feeling prevalent in
Vienna that he is unlikely to plead the cause of peace with
entire sincerity.
"Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information
that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian
ultimatum to Serbia before it was dispatched, and telegraphed it
to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself
that he indorses every line of it."
Ambassador Buchanan telegraphed from St. Petersburg to Grey of an
interview with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
"M. Sazonof said that German Ambassador [Count Pourtalès] had
told him yesterday afternoon that German Government were willing
to guarantee that Serbian integrity would be respected by
Austria. To this he had replied that this might be so, but
nevertheless Serbia would become an Austrian vassal, just as, in
similar circumstances Bokhara had become a Russian vassal. There
would be a revolution in Russia if she were to tolerate such a
state of affairs.
"M. Sazonof told us that absolute proof was in possession of
Russian Government that Germany was making military and naval
preparations against Russia--more particularly in the direction
of the Gulf of Finland.
"German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for
Foreign Affairs at 2 a. m., when former completely broke down on
seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof to make
some suggestion which he could telegraph to German Government as
a last hope. M. Sazonof accordingly drew up and handed to German
Ambassador a formula.
"'If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Serbia has
assumed character of question of European interest, declares
herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which
violate principle of sovereignty of Serbia, Russia engages to
stop all military preparations.'
"Preparations for general mobilization will be proceeded with if
this proposal is rejected by Austria, and inevitable result will
be a European war. Excitement here has reached such a pitch that,
if Austria refuses to make a concession, Russia cannot hold back,
and now that she knows that Germany is arming, she can hardly
postpone, for strategical reasons, converting partial into
general mobilization."
Ambassador Goschen telegraphed from Berlin to Grey:
"Secretary of State [Von Jagow] informs me that immediately on
receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's [German Ambassador in London]
telegram recording his last conversation with you he asked
Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to
accept mediation on basis of occupation by Austrian troops of
Belgrade or some other point and issue their conditions from
here. He has up till now received no reply, but he fears Russian
mobilization against Austria will have increased difficulties, as
Austria-Hungary, who has as yet only mobilized against Serbia,
will probably find it necessary also against Russia. Secretary of
State says if you can succeed in getting Russia to agree to above
basis for an arrangement and in persuading her in the meantime to
take no steps which might be regarded as an act of aggression
against Austria he still sees some chance that European peace may
be preserved.
"He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position
in view of Russian mobilization and military measures which he
hears are being taken in France. Beyond recall of officers on
leave--a measure which had been officially taken after, and not
before, visit of French Ambassador [Jules Cambon]
yesterday--Imperial Government had done nothing special in way of
military preparations. Something, however, would have soon to be
done, for it might be too late, and when they mobilized they
would have to mobilize on three sides. He regretted this, as he
knew France did not desire war, but it would be a military
necessity.
"His excellency added that telegram received from Prince
Lichnowsky last night contains matter which he had heard with
regret, but not exactly with surprise, and at all events he
thoroughly appreciated frankness and loyalty with which you had
spoken.
"He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very
late last night; had it been received earlier chancellor would,
of course, not have spoken to me in the way he had done."
Ambassador Bertie telegraphed from Paris to Grey the report of
Germany's request to Russia to be informed on what conditions Russia
would consent to demobilization.
"The answer given is that she agrees to do so on condition that
Austria-Hungary gives an assurance that she will respect the
sovereignty of Serbia and submit certain of the demands of the
Austrian note, which Serbia has not accepted, to an international
discussion."
SIR EDWARD GREY REFUSES TERMS OF NEUTRALITY
Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Goschen at Berlin in answer to his
telegram of July 29:
"His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the
Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to
neutrality on such terms.
"What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French
colonies are taken and France is beaten, so long as Germany does
not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.
"From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable,
for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from
her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a great
power, and become subordinate to German policy.
"Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to
make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a
disgrace from which the good name of this country would never
recover.
"The chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever
obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of
Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.
"Having said so much it is unnecessary to examine whether the
prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England
and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate
us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to
act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such
unfavorable and regrettable development of the present crisis as
the chancellor contemplates.
"You should speak to the chancellor in the above sense, and add
most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations
between England and Germany is that they should continue to work
together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeeded in this
object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I
believe, be _ipso facto_ improved and strengthened. For that
object his majesty's Government will work in that way with all
sincerity and good will.
"And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved,
and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to
promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by
which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy
would be pursued against her or her Allies by France, Russia, and
ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked
for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and,
Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly
improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the
subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so
much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for
generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and
reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite
rapprochement between the powers than has been possible
hitherto."
Grey telegraphed Ambassador Buchanan at St. Petersburg:
"German Ambassador [Prince Lichnowsky] informs me that German
Government would endeavor to influence Austria, after taking
Belgrade and Serbian territory in region of frontier, to promise
not to advance further, while powers endeavored to arrange that
Serbia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria.
Territory occupied would of course be evacuated when Austria was
satisfied. I suggested this yesterday as a possible relief to the
situation, and, if it can be obtained, I would earnestly hope
that it might be agreed to suspend further military preparations
on all sides.
"Russian Ambassador [Count Benckendorff] has told me of condition
laid down by M. Sazonof [Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs],
as quoted in your telegram of July 30, and fears it cannot be
modified; but if Austrian advance were stopped after occupation
of Belgrade, I think Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs'
formula might be changed to read that the powers would examine
how Serbia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Serbian
sovereign rights or independence.
"If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighboring Serbian
territory declares herself ready, in the interest of European
peace, to cease her advance and to discuss how a complete
settlement can be arrived at, I hope that Russia would also
consent to discussion and suspension of further military
preparations, provided that other powers did the same.
"It is a slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one I
can suggest if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can come to
no agreement at Berlin. You should inform Minister for Foreign
Affairs"
Grey wrote Ambassador Bertie at Paris enclosing a copy of a letter
he had written to Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, on
November 22, 1912, and of the agreement of which M. Cambon had just
reminded him. The letter was as follows:
"From time to time in recent years the French and British naval
and military experts have consulted together. It has always been
understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom
of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not
to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that
consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded
as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a
contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The
disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets
respectively at the present moment is not based upon an
engagement to cooperate in war.
"You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had
grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, it
might become essential to know whether it could in that event
depend upon the armed assistance of the other.
"I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an
unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened
the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other
whether both Governments should act together to prevent
aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they
would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved
action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken
into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what
effect should be given to them."
Ambassador Goschen telegraphed from Berlin to Sir Edward Grey:
"The Chancellor [Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg] told me last night
that he was 'pressing the button' as hard as he could, and that
he was not sure whether he had not gone so far in urging
moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather
than otherwise."
_France._ M. Viviani, Prime Minister, informed the Ambassadors at
St. Petersburg and London that Germany had notified Russia of her
decision to mobilize unless Russia ceased her military preparations.
"M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, declares that
in these circumstances Russia can only expedite her arming and
consider war as imminent; that she counts on the help of France
as an ally; and that she considers it desirable that England
should join Russia and France without loss of time.
"France is resolved to fulfill all the obligations of her
alliance.
"She will not neglect, however, any effort toward a solution of
the conflict in the interests of universal peace. The
conversation entered into between the powers which are less
directly interested still allows of the hope that peace may be
preserved; I therefore think it would be well that, in taking any
precautionary measures of defense, which Russia thinks must go
on, she should not immediately take any step which may offer to
Germany a pretext for a total or partial mobilization of her
forces.
"Yesterday, in the late afternoon, the German Ambassador [Baron
von Schoen] spoke to me of the military measures which the
Government of the republic were taking, adding that France was
able to act in this way, but that in Germany preparations could
not be secret and that French opinion should not be alarmed if
Germany decided on them.
"I answered that the French Government had not taken any step
which could give their neighbors any cause for disquietude, and
that their wish to lend themselves to any negotiations for the
purpose of maintaining peace could not be doubted."
Ambassador Paléologue reported from St. Petersburg that, in
deference to the desire of M. Viviani, no pretext be offered Germany
for general mobilization, the Russian General Staff had suspended
all measures of military precaution.
"Yesterday the chief of the staff sent for the Military Attaché
of the German Embassy and gave him his word of honor that the
mobilization ordered this morning was exclusively directed
against Austria.
"Nevertheless, from an interview which he had this afternoon with
Count Pourtalès [German Ambassador], M. Sazonof was forced to the
conclusion that Germany does not wish to pronounce at Vienna the
decisive word which would safeguard peace. The Emperor Nicholas
has received the same impression from an exchange of telegrams
which he has just had personally with the Emperor William.
"Moreover, the Russian General Staff and Admiralty have received
disquieting information concerning the preparations of the German
army and navy.
"In giving me this information Mr. Sazonof added that the Russian
Government are continuing none the less their efforts toward
conciliation. He repeated to me: 'I shall continue to negotiate
until the last moment.'"
Ambassador Jules Cambon reported from Berlin of the official recall
of the press announcement of German mobilization, but added that his
apprehension of the plans of Germany was not diminished thereby.
"It seems certain that the Extraordinary Council held yesterday
evening at Potsdam with the military authorities under the
presidency of the emperor decided on mobilization, and this
explains the preparation of the special edition of the 'Lokal
Anzeiger,' but that from various causes (the declaration of Great
Britain that she reserved her entire liberty of action, the
exchange of telegrams between the czar and William II) the
serious measures which had been decided upon were suspended.
"One of the ambassadors with whom I have very close relations saw
Herr von Zimmermann at two o'clock. According to the
Under-Secretary of State, the military authorities are very
anxious that mobilization should be ordered, because every delay
makes Germany lose some of her advantages. Nevertheless, up to
the present time the haste of the General Staff, which sees war
in mobilization, had been successfully prevented. In any case
mobilization may be decided upon at any moment. I do not know who
has issued in the 'Lokal Anzeiger,' a paper which is usually
semiofficial, premature news calculated to cause excitement in
France.
"Further, I have the strongest reasons to believe that all the
measures for mobilization which can be taken before the
publication of the general order have already been taken here,
and that they are anxious here to make us publish our
mobilization first in order to attribute the responsibility to
us."
M. Viviani instructed Ambassador Paul Cambon at London to inform Sir
Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, of the following
facts of French and German military preparations, to show that, "if
France is resolved, it is not she who is taking aggressive steps."
"Although Germany has made her covering dispositions a few
hundred meters from the frontier, along the whole front from
Luxemburg to the Vosges, and has transported her covering troops
to their war positions, we have kept our troops ten kilometers
from the frontier and forbidden them to approach nearer.
"By leaving a strip of territory undefended against sudden
aggression of the enemy, the Government of the republic hopes to
prove that France does not bear, any more than Russia, the
responsibility for the attack.
"In order to be convinced of this, it is sufficient to compare
the steps taken on the two sides of our frontier; in France
soldiers who were on leave were not recalled until we were
certain that Germany had done so five days before.
"In Germany, not only have the garrison troops of Metz been
pushed up to the frontier, but they have been reenforced by units
transported by train from garrisons of the interior such as
Trèves or Cologne; nothing like this has been done in France.
"The arming of the frontier defenses (clearing of trees, placing
of armament, construction of batteries, and strengthening of wire
entanglements) was begun in Germany on Saturday, the 25th; with
us it is going to be begun, for France can no longer refrain from
taking similar measures.
"The railway stations were occupied by the military in Germany on
Saturday, the 25th; in France on Tuesday, the 28th.
"Finally, in Germany the reservists by tens of thousands have
been recalled by individual summons, those living abroad (the
classes of 1903 to 1911) have been recalled, the officers of
reserve have been summoned; in the interior the roads are closed,
motor cars only circulate with permits. It is the last stage
before mobilization. None of these measures has been taken in
France.
"The German army has its outposts on our frontier; on two
occasions yesterday German patrols penetrated our territory. The
whole Sixteenth Army Corps from Metz, reenforced by part of the
Eighth from Trèves and Cologne, occupies the frontier from Metz
to Luxemburg; the Fifteenth Army Corps from Strassburg is massed
on the frontier.
"Under penalty of being shot, the inhabitants of the annexed
parts of Alsace-Lorraine are forbidden to cross the frontier."
FRIDAY, JULY 31, 1914
_Austria-Hungary._ On the following day Count Berchtold, Minister
for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed the ambassador at Berlin, Count
Szögyény, an account of the discussion on the 30th inst. between Sir
Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and the German
Ambassador in London, Prince Lichnowsky.
The ambassador was instructed to thank Secretary of State von Jagow
for communications made to Austria-Hungary
"and to declare to him that in spite of the change in the
situation which has since arisen through the mobilization of
Russia, we are quite prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir
Edward Grey to negotiate between us and Serbia.
"The conditions of our acceptance are, nevertheless, that our
military action against Serbia should continue to take its
course, and that the British Cabinet should move the Russian
Government to bring to a standstill the Russian mobilization
which is directed against us, in which case, of course, we will
also at once cancel the defensive military countermeasures in
Galicia, which are occasioned by the Russian attitude."
Ambassador Szápáry telegraphed from St. Petersburg:
"The order for the general mobilization of the entire [Russian]
army and fleet was issued early to-day."
Count Berchtold notified the Austro-Hungarian representatives
abroad:
"As mobilization has been ordered by the Russian Government on
our frontier, we find ourselves obliged to take military measures
in Galicia.
"These measures are purely of a defensive character and arise
exclusively under the pressure of the Russian measures, which we
regret exceedingly, as we ourselves have no aggressive intentions
of any kind against Russia, and desire the continuation of the
former neighborly relations.
"_Pourparlers_ between the Cabinets at Vienna and St. Petersburg
appropriate to the situation are meanwhile being continued, and
from these we hope that things will quiet down all around."
Ambassador Szécsen telegraphed from Paris that the German Ambassador
had officially declared to France
"that if the general mobilization ordered by the Russian
Government is not stopped within twelve hours, Germany also will
mobilize. At the same time Baron Schoen has asked whether France
will remain neutral in the event of a war between Germany and
Russia. An answer to this is requested within eighteen hours. The
time limit expires to-morrow (Saturday) at one o'clock in the
afternoon."
Ambassador Szápáry telegraphed from St. Petersburg that he had
resumed conversations with M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, but that the "points of view on the two sides had not
materially approximated to each other."
"Meanwhile, however, it has appeared from the conversations
between the German Ambassador [Count Pourtalès] and M. Sazonof
that Russia will not accept as satisfactory the formal
declaration that Austria-Hungary will neither diminish the
territory of the Serbian Kingdom nor infringe on Serbian
sovereignty, nor injure Russian interests in the Balkans or
elsewhere; since then, moreover, a general mobilization has been
ordered on the part of Russia."
FURTHER EXCHANGES BETWEEN WILLIAM AND NICHOLAS
_Germany._ The Czar sent the following telegram to William II:
"I thank you cordially for your mediation, which permits the hope
that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically
impossible to discontinue our military preparations, which have
been made necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It is far from
us to want war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and
Serbia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action.
I give you my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in
the grace of God, and I hope for the success of your mediation in
Vienna for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe."
This telegram of the Czar crossed with the following sent by the
Kaiser, at 2 p. m.:
"Upon your appeal to my friendship and your request for my aid, I
have engaged in mediation between your Government and the
Government of Austria-Hungary. While this action was taking place
your troops were being mobilized against my ally,
Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I have already communicated to you,
my mediation has become almost illusory. In spite of this I have
continued it, and now I receive reliable news that serious
preparations for war are going on on my eastern frontier. The
responsibility for the security of my country forces me to
measures of defense. I have gone to the extreme limit of the
possible in my efforts for the preservation of the peace of the
world. It is not I who bear the responsibility for the misfortune
which now threatens the entire civilized world. It rests in your
hand to avert it. No one threatens the honor and peace of Russia
which might well have awaited the success of my mediation. The
friendship for you and your country, bequeathed to me by my
grandfather on his deathbed, has always been sacred to me, and I
have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in serious
affliction, especially during its last war. The peace of Europe
can still be preserved by you if Russia decides to discontinue
those military preparations which menace Germany and
Austria-Hungary."
_Germany._ Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg telegraphed to Ambassador
Von Flotow at Rome:
"We have continued to negotiate between Russia and
Austria-Hungary through a direct exchange of telegrams between
his Majesty the Kaiser and his Majesty the Czar, as well as in
conjunction with Sir Edward Grey. Through the mobilization of
Russia all our efforts have been greatly handicapped, if they
have not become impossible. In spite of pacifying assurances
Russia is taking such far-reaching measures against us that the
situation is becoming continually menacing."
The Chancellor telegraphed to Ambassador Pourtalès at St.
Petersburg:
"In spite of negotiations still pending, and although we have up
to this hour made no preparations for mobilization, Russia has
mobilized her _entire_ army and navy, hence also against us. On
account of these Russian measures we have been forced, for the
safety of the country, to proclaim the threatening state of war,
which does not yet imply mobilization. Mobilization, however, is
bound to follow if Russia does not stop every measure of war
against us and against Austria-Hungary within twelve hours, and
notifies us definitely to this effect. Please to communicate this
at once to M. Sazonof and wire hour of communication."
The German White Book states that Count Pourtalès delivered the note
at midnight of this day (July 31).
"The reply of the Russian Government has _never_ reached us.
"_Two hours after the expiration of the time limit_ the czar
telegraphed the kaiser as follows:
"I have received your telegram. I comprehend that you are forced
to mobilize, but I should like to have from you the same guaranty
which I have given to you, viz., that these measures do not mean
war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of
our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our
hearts. With the aid of God it must be possible to our
long-tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect
with full confidence your urgent reply."
The Chancellor telegraphed to Ambassador Schoen at Paris:
"Russia has ordered mobilization of her entire army and fleet,
therefore also against us in spite of our still pending
mediation. We have, therefore, declared the threatening state of
war which is bound to be followed by mobilization unless Russia
stops within twelve hours all measures of war against us and
Austria. Mobilization inevitably implies war. Please ask French
Government whether it intends to remain neutral in a Russo-German
war. Reply must be made in eighteen hours. Wire at once hour of
inquiry. Utmost speed necessary."
William II telegraphed to George V of Great Britain:
"Many thanks for your friendly communication. Your proposals
coincide with my ideas and with the communication which I have
this evening received from Vienna, and which I have passed on to
London. I have just heard from the chancellor that intelligence
has just reached him that Nicholas this evening has ordered the
mobilization of his entire army and fleet. He has not even
awaited the result of the mediation in which I am engaged, and he
has left me completely without information. I am traveling to
Berlin to assure the safety of my eastern frontier, where strong
Russian forces have already taken up their position."
_Russia._ M. Schebeko, Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed to M.
Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs at St. Petersburg:
"In spite of the general mobilization, my exchange of views with
Count Berchtold and his colleagues continues. They all dwell upon
the absence on Austria's part of any hostile intentions
whatsoever against Russia, and of any designs of conquest at the
expense of Serbia, but they are all equally insistent that
Austria is bound to carry through the action which she has begun
and to give Serbia a serious lesson, which would constitute a
sure guaranty for the future."
_Great Britain._ Ambassador Goschen telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey,
Secretary for Foreign Affairs:
"The [German] Chancellor [Bethmann-Hollweg] informs me that his
efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have been
seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilization against
Austria. He has done everything possible to attain his object at
Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at
the Ballplatz. He could not, however, leave his country
defenseless while time was being utilized by other powers; and
if, as he learns the case, military measures are now being taken
by Russia against Germany also, it would be impossible for him to
remain quiet. He wished to tell me that it was quite possible
that in a very short time, to-day perhaps, the German Government
would take some very serious step; he was, in fact, just on the
point of going to have an audience with the emperor.
"His excellency added that the news of the active preparations on
the Russo-German frontier had reached him just when the czar had
appealed to the emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to
mediate at Vienna, and when the emperor was actually conforming
to that request."
Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Buchanan at St. Petersburg that a
conversation had taken place between Austria and Russia at Vienna,
and that one at St. Petersburg had been authorized by the Austrian
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Berchtold, in which Austria
would explain the ultimatum to Serbia and discuss any questions
directly affecting Austro-Russian relations.
"I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military
preparations, I did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend
them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her
troops into Serbia."
Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Goschen at Berlin his hope for a
satisfactory result from the Austro-Russian conversations.
"The stumblingblock hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of
Serbian assurances, and Russian mistrust of Austrian intentions
with regard to the independence and integrity of Serbia. It has
occurred to me that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a
solution being found by Vienna and St. Petersburg, Germany might
sound Vienna, and I would undertake to sound St. Petersburg,
whether it would be possible for the four disinterested powers to
offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she
obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Serbia, provided
that they did not impair Serbian sovereignty and the integrity of
Serbian territory. As your excellency is aware, Austria has
already declared her willingness to respect them. Russia might be
informed by the four powers that they would undertake to prevent
Austrian demands going the length of impairing Serbian
sovereignty and integrity. All powers would of course suspend
further military operations or preparations.
"You may sound the Secretary of State [Von Jagow] about this
proposal.
"I said to German Ambassador [Prince Lichnowsky] this morning
that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward
which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to
preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be
unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St.
Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia
and France would not accept it his majesty's Government would
have nothing more to do with the consequences; but, otherwise, I
told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should
be drawn in.
"You can add this when sounding Chancellor [Bethmann-Hollweg] or
Secretary of State as to proposal above."
Goschen telegraphed Grey that the whole Russian army and fleet were
mobilizing, and that _Kriegsgefahr_ (imminence of war) will be
proclaimed at once by Germany, as it can be only against her that
Russian general mobilization is directed. German mobilization would
follow almost immediately.
Ambassador Buchanan telegraphed from St. Petersburg that Russian
general mobilization had been ordered because of news from Vienna
"that Austria is determined not to yield to intervention of
powers, and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as
against Serbia.
"Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active
military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a
start."
Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Bertie at Paris:
"I still trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in view
of mobilization in Germany it becomes essential to his majesty's
Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French
Government are prepared to engage to respect neutrality of
Belgium so long as no other power violates it."
The same telegram, with change of words, "French Government" to
"German Government," was sent to Ambassador Goschen at Berlin. Grey
asked Sir Francis Villiers, Ambassador at Brussels, to inform M.
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, of these telegrams,
and to say:
"I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost
of their power their neutrality, which I desire and expect other
powers to uphold and observe."
Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Bertie at Paris:
"Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet
gone, British treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is
quite different from what it was during the Morocco question.
That crisis involved a dispute directly involving France, whereas
in this case France is being drawn into a dispute which is not
hers.
"I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a
decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our
neutrality.
"We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war. I
have so told the French Ambassador, who has urged his majesty's
Government to reconsider this decision.
"I have told him that we should not be justified in giving any
pledge at the present moment, but that we will certainly consider
the situation again directly there is a new development."
Bertie telegraphed to Grey that German Ambassador von Schoen had
just informed M. Viviani, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, that
Germany had addressed an ultimatum to Russia to demobilize, saying
that, if it were not complied with within twenty-four hours,
Germany would order complete mobilization on Russian and French
frontiers. Viviani wishes to know what, in these circumstances, will
be Great Britain's attitude.
"German Ambassador is going to call at the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs to-morrow at 1 p. m. in order to receive the French
Government's answer as to their attitude."
Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Bertie at Paris that French
Ambassador Jules Cambon at Berlin had reported to M. Paul Cambon,
French Ambassador at London, that uncertainty of Great Britain's
intervention was encouraging Germany in her warlike attitude, and
that a definite declaration by Great Britain on the side of Russia
and France would decide the German attitude in favor of peace.
Ambassador Buchanan telegraphed from St. Petersburg the following
proposition (sent also to France), made by M. Sazonof, Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs:
"If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on
Serbian territory; if, recognizing that the dispute between
Austria and Serbia has assumed a character of European interest,
she will allow the great powers to look into the matter and
determine whether Serbia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian
Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign state of
her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting
attitude."
M. Sazonof adduced the latest telegram of Nicholas II to William II
as proof of sincerity of Russia's attitude. He proposed that the
conference of the powers be held in London. He was grateful to Great
Britain; if peace were secured, it would be due largely to her
efforts; Russia would never forget her firm attitude.
Ambassador Goschen telegraphed from Berlin that he had spent an hour
with Secretary of State von Jagow, urging him to accept Grey's
proposal to make another effort to prevent the terrible catastrophe
of a European war.
"He appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but
said it was impossible for the Imperial Government to consider
any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to
their communication of to-day [the ultimatum].
"I asked his excellency why they had made their demand even more
difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilize in
south as well. He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia
from saying all her mobilization was directed only against
Austria.
"His excellency said that if the answer from Russia was
satisfactory he thought personally that your proposal merited
favorable consideration, and in any case he would lay it before
the emperor and chancellor.
"He again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the
request of the Emperor of Russia, and the German Foreign Office
had even up till last night been urging Austria to show
willingness to continue discussions--and telegraphic and the
telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising
nature--but Russia's mobilization had spoilt everything."
Ambassador Bertie telegraphed from Paris that he had presented to M.
Viviani, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Grey's inquiry concerning
France respecting Belgian neutrality.
"He is urgently anxious as to what the attitude of England will
be in the circumstances [which may arise from Germany's ultimatum
to Russia.]"
The German Embassy is packing up.
In a supplementary telegram Bertie informed Grey:
"French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of
Belgium, and it would be only in the event of some other power
violating that neutrality that France might find herself under
the necessity, in order to assure defense of her own security, to
act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times.
President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the
Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously
renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs
to-day."
_France._ Raymond Poincaré, President of France, informed George V
that Germany was pushing forward military preparations, especially
on the French frontier, while France had till now confined herself
to indispensable precautionary measures.
"We are, in spite of the moderation of the Government of the
Republic and the calm of public opinion, on the eve of the most
terrible events.
"From all the information which reaches us it would seem that war
would be inevitable if Germany were convinced that the British
Government would not intervene in a conflict in which France
might be engaged; if on the other hand, Germany were convinced
that the _entente cordiale_ would be affirmed, in case of need,
even to the extent of taking the field side by side, there would
be the greatest chance that peace would remain unbroken.
"It is true that our military and naval arrangements leave
complete liberty to your majesty's Government, and that, in the
letters exchanged in 1912 between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul
Cambon, Great Britain and France entered into nothing more than a
mutual agreement to consult one another in the event of European
tension, and to examine in concert whether common action were
advisable.
"But the character of close friendship which public feeling has
given in both countries to the _entente_ between Great Britain
and France, the confidence with which our two governments have
never ceased to work for the maintenance of peace, and the signs
of sympathy which your majesty has ever shown to France, justify
me in informing you quite frankly of the impressions of all
France.
"It is, I consider, on the language and the action of the British
Government that henceforward the last chances of a peaceful
settlement depend.
"We, ourselves, from the initial stages of the crisis, have
enjoined upon our ally [Russia] an attitude of moderation from
which they have not swerved. In concert with your majesty's
Government, and in conformity with Sir E. Grey's latest
suggestions, we will continue to act on the same lines.
"But if all efforts at conciliation emanate from one side, and if
Germany and Austria can speculate on the abstention of Great
Britain, Austria's demands will remain inflexible, and an
agreement between her and Russia will become impossible. I am
profoundly convinced that at the present moment, the more Great
Britain, France and Russia can give a deep impression that they
are united in their diplomatic action, the more possible will it
be to count upon the preservation of peace.
"I beg that your majesty will excuse a step which is inspired
only by the hope of seeing the European balance of power
definitely reaffirmed."
Ambassador Paul Cambon telegraphed from London of Grey's reply to
Germany on attitude of Great Britain in event of European war.
"The Cabinet Council took place this morning. After having
examined the situation, the Cabinet thought that for the moment
the British Government were unable to guarantee to us their
intervention; that they intended to take steps to obtain from
Germany and France an understanding to respect Belgian
neutrality; but that before considering intervention it was
necessary to wait for the situation to develop.
"I asked Sir E. Grey if, before intervening, the British
Government would await the invasion of French territory. I
insisted on the fact that the measures already taken on our
frontier by Germany showed an intention to attack in the near
future, and that, if a renewal of the mistake of Europe in 1870
was to be avoided, Great Britain should consider at once the
circumstances in which she would give France the help on which
she relied.
"Sir E. Grey replied that the opinion of the Cabinet on the
situation had been formed only at the moment; that the situation
might be modified; and that in that case a meeting of the Cabinet
would be called at once in order to consider it.
"I am informed that the Cabinet will meet again to-morrow, and
that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will be certain
to renew the discussion.
"The letter which the President of the Republic has addressed to
the King of England should be given to the king this evening.
This step will, I am sure, be taken into serious consideration by
the British Cabinet."
M. Viviani notified the Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg,
Berlin, Vienna, and Rome, of France's agreement to the proposal of
Great Britain to Austria-Hungary not to proceed further against
Serbia after occupying Belgrade, and to await mediation by the
powers.
"Sir E. Grey made this suggestion in the hope that military
preparations would be suspended on all sides."
Russia had already agreed to stop military preparations if Austria
eliminated from her ultimatum to Serbia all points which endanger
Serbian sovereignty.
"Sir E. Grey thinks that, if Austria stops her advance after the
occupation of Belgrade, the Russian Government could agree to
change their formula in the following way:
"That the powers would examine how Serbia should give complete
satisfaction to Austria without endangering the sovereignty or
independence of the kingdom. In case Austria should declare
herself ready, in the interests of Europe, to stop her advance
and to discuss how an arrangement might be arrived at, Russia
could also consent to the discussion and suspend her military
preparations, provided that the other powers acted in the same
way."
M. Viviani telegraphed to the Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg,
Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and Constantinople that negotiations had begun
again between Austria and Russia, the latter having accepted the
formula advised by Great Britain.
"Nevertheless ... Germany ... has not ceased to encourage the
uncompromising attitude of Vienna; the German military
preparations continue; the immediate opposition of Germany to the
Russian formula was declared at Berlin inacceptable for Austria
before that power had even been consulted; in conclusion, all the
impressions derived from Berlin bring conviction that Germany has
sought to humiliate Russia, to disintegrate the Triple Entente,
and if these results can not be obtained, to make war."
Ambassador Dumaine telegraphed from Vienna:
"General mobilization for all men from nineteen to forty-two
years of age was declared by the Austro-Hungarian Government this
morning at one o'clock.
"My Russian colleague [M. Schebeko] still thinks that this step
is not entirely in contradiction to the declaration made
yesterday by Count Berchtold [Austro-Hungarian Minister for
Foreign Affairs]."
Ambassador Jules Cambon telegraphed from Berlin that Secretary of
State von Jagow had informed him that, in the face of total
mobilization by Russia, Germany had declared _Kriegsgefahrzustand_
(imminence of war). German Ambassador Schoen had been instructed to
ask France what attitude she intended to adopt.
M. Viviani informed Ambassador Paléologue at St. Petersburg of the
Schoen interview and the ultimatum he had delivered, to be replied
to on the morrow (Saturday) at 1 p. m.
"I shall confine myself to telling him that France will have
regard to her interests. The Government of the Republic need not
indeed give any account of her intentions except to her ally.
"I ask you to inform M. Sazonof [Minister for Foreign Affairs] of
this immediately. As I have already told you, I have no doubt
that the Imperial Government, in the highest interests of peace,
will do everything on their part to avoid anything that might
render inevitable or precipitate the crisis."
Minister Klobukowski telegraphed from Brussels that _L'Agence Havas_
having announced the proclamation of "imminence of war" in Germany,
he had assured M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, that
France would respect Belgian neutrality.
"The Russian and British Ministers appeared much pleased that in
the circumstances I gave this assurance, which further, as the
British Minister told me, was in accordance with the declaration
of Sir E. Grey."
_Belgium._ M. Davignon reported the above interview to the Belgian
Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London, giving the exact words of
the French Minister:
"No incursion of French troops into Belgium will take place, even
if considerable forces are massed upon the frontiers of your
country. France does not wish to incur the responsibility, so far
as Belgium is concerned, of taking the first hostile act.
"I thanked M. Klobukowski, and I felt bound to observe that we
had always had the greatest confidence in the loyal observance by
both our neighboring states of their engagements toward us. We
have also every reason to believe that the attitude of the German
Government will be the same as that of the Government of the
French Republic."
M. Davignon telegraphed to all the Belgian Legations abroad:
"The Minister of War informs me that [Belgian] mobilization has
been ordered, and that Saturday, August 1, will be the first
day."
He telegraphed to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, London, and
Paris, that the British Minster had reported Sir Edward Grey's
inquiry to France and Germany if they would respect Belgian
neutrality, and now formally states that he presumes--
"that Belgium will do her utmost to maintain her neutrality, and
that she desires and expects that the other powers will respect
and maintain it.
"I thanked Sir Francis Villiers for this communication, which the
Belgian Government particularly appreciate, and I added that
Great Britain and the other nations guaranteeing our independence
could rest assured that we would neglect no effort to maintain
our neutrality, and that we were convinced that the other powers,
in view of the excellent relations of friendship and confidence
which had always existed between us, would respect and maintain
that neutrality.
"I stated that our military forces, which had been considerably
developed in consequence of our recent reorganization, were
sufficient to enable us to defend ourselves energetically in the
event of the violation of our territory.
"In the course of the ensuing conversation, Sir Francis seemed to
me somewhat surprised at the speed with which we had decided to
mobilize our army. I pointed out to him that the Netherlands had
come to a similar decision before we had done so, and that,
moreover, the recent date of our new military system, and the
temporary nature of the measures upon which we then had to
decide, made it necessary for us to take immediate and thorough
precautions. Our neighbors and guarantors should see in this
decision our strong desire to uphold our neutrality ourselves.
"Sir Francis seemed to be satisfied with my reply, and stated
that his Government were awaiting this reply before continuing
negotiations with France and Germany, the result of which would
be communicated to me."
He telegraphed to the same ministers that the German Minister, Herr
von Below Saleske, had been informed of Belgium's military measures,
and that it was explained to him
"a consequence of our desire to fulfill our international
obligations, and that they in no wise implied an attitude of
distrust toward our neighbors."
The German Minister was reminded of instructions his Chancellor,
Bethmann-Hollweg, had given to his predecessor, Herr von Flotow.
"In the course of the controversy which arose in 1911 as a
consequence of the Dutch scheme for the fortification of
Flushing, certain newspapers had maintained that in the case of a
Franco-German war Belgian neutrality would be violated by
Germany.
"The [Belgian] Department of Foreign Affairs had suggested that a
declaration in the German Parliament during a debate on foreign
affairs would serve to calm public opinion, and to dispel the
mistrust which was so regrettable from the point of view of the
relations between the two countries.
"Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg replied that he had fully appreciated
the feelings which had inspired our representations. He declared
that Germany had no intention of violating Belgian neutrality,
but he considered that in making a public declaration Germany
would weaken her military position in regard to France, who,
secured on the northern side, would concentrate all her energies
on the east.
"Since then, in 1913, Herr von Jagow [German Secretary of State]
had made reassuring declarations to the Budget Commission of the
Reichstag respecting the maintenance of Belgian neutrality.
"Herr von Below replied that he knew of the conversation with
Herr von Flotow, and that he was certain that the sentiments
expressed at that time had not changed."
SATURDAY, AUGUST 1, 1914
_Austria._ On the following day Count Szápáry, Ambassador at St.
Petersburg, telegraphed to Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, an interview with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
"I first warned M. Sazonof," said the count, "that in interpreting
my instructions to him I must leave out of account the new condition
of affairs in Vienna created by the general Russian mobilization. I
then said that it was a mistake that Austria had declined further
negotiations with Russia.
"Your excellency was not only quite prepared to deal with Russia
on the broadest basis possible, but was also especially inclined
to subject the text of our note to a discussion so far as its
interpretation was concerned.
"I could only hope that the course of events had not already
taken us too far; in any case, I regarded it as my duty in the
present moment of extreme anxiety to prove once again the good
will of the Imperial and Royal Government. M. Sazonof replied
that he took note with satisfaction of this proof of good will,
but he desired to draw my attention to the fact that negotiations
at St. Petersburg for obvious reasons appeared to promise less
prospect of success than negotiations on the neutral _terrain_ of
London. I replied that your excellency, started from the point of
view that direct contact should be maintained at St. Petersburg,
so that I was not in a position to commit myself with regard to
his suggestion as to London, but I would communicate on the
subject with your excellency."
_Germany._ The German White Book states:
"As the time limit given to Russia had expired without the
receipt of a reply to our inquiry, the kaiser ordered the
mobilization of the entire German army and navy on August 1, at 5
p. m.
"The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg [Count Pourtalès] was
instructed that, in the event of the Russian Government not
giving a satisfactory reply within the stipulated time he should
declare that we considered ourselves in a state of war after the
refusal of our demands. [He so declared at 5 p. m.] However,
before a confirmation of the execution of this order had been
received, that is to say, already in the afternoon of August 1,
Russian troops crossed our frontier and marched into German
territory.
"Thus Russia began the war against us.
"The French Prime Minister [M. Viviani] gave an equivocal and
unsatisfactory reply on August 1 at 1 p. m., which gave no clear
idea of the position of France, as he limited himself to the
explanation that France would do that which her interests
demanded. A few hours later, at 5 p. m., the mobilization of the
entire French army and navy was ordered.
"On the morning of the next day France opened hostilities."
Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg telegraphed to Ambassador Lichnowsky
at London:
"Germany is ready to agree to the English proposal in the event
of England guaranteeing with all her forces the unconditional
neutrality of France in the conflict between Germany and Russia.
Owing to the Russian challenge German mobilization occurred
to-day before the English proposals were received. In consequence
our advance to the French frontier cannot now be altered. We
guarantee, however, that the French frontier will not be crossed
by our troops until Monday, August 3, at 7 p. m., in case
England's assent is received by that time."
Lichnowsky answered that Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for
Foreign Affairs, had asked him
"whether I thought I could declare that in the event of France
remaining neutral in a German-Russian war we would not attack the
French. I told him that I believed that I could assume
responsibility for this."
At 5.30 p. m. the ambassador telegraphed that Grey had just read to
him the following unanimous declaration of the British Cabinet:
"The reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality
of Belgium is a matter of very great regret, because the
neutrality of Belgium does affect feeling in this country. If
Germany could see her way to give the same positive reply as that
which has been given by France, it would materially contribute to
relieve anxiety and tension here, while, on the other hand, if
there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one
combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely
difficult to restrain public feeling in this country.
"On my question whether, on condition that we would maintain the
neutrality of Belgium, he could give me a definite declaration
with regard to the neutrality of Great Britain, the minister
answered that that was impossible, but that this question would
play a great part in public opinion in this country. If we
violated Belgian neutrality in a war with France there would
certainly be a change in public opinion which would make it
difficult for the Cabinet here to maintain friendly neutrality.
For the time there was not the slightest intention to proceed in
a hostile manner against us. It would be their desire to avoid
this if there was any possibility of doing so. It was, however,
difficult to draw a line up to which we could go without
intervention on this side. He turned again and again to Belgian
neutrality, and was of opinion that this question would also play
a great part.
"He had also thought whether it was not possible that we and
France should, in case of a Russian war, stand armed opposite to
one another without attacking. I asked him if he would be in a
position to arrange that France would assent to an agreement of
this kind. As we wanted neither to destroy France nor to annex
portions of French territory, I could think that we would give
our assent to an arrangement of this kind which would secure for
us the neutrality of Great Britain. The minister said he would
make inquiries; he also recognized the difficulties of holding
back the military on both sides."
At 8.30 p. m. the ambassador telegraphed:
"My communication of this morning is canceled by my communication
of this evening. As there is no positive English proposal before
us, any further step in the sense of the message I sent is
superfluous."
At 7.10 p. m. Ambassador Pourtalès presented at St. Petersburg a
note repeating the ultimatum of July 31, and closing:
"Russia having refused to comply with [not having considered it
necessary to answer*] this demand, and having shown by this
refusal [this attitude*] that her action was directed against
Germany, I have the honor, on the instructions of my Government,
to inform your excellency as follows:
"His majesty the emperor, my august sovereign, in the name of the
German Empire, accepts the challenge, and considers himself at
war with Russia.
"* The words in brackets occur in the original. It must be
supposed that two variations had been prepared in advance, and
that, by mistake, they were both inserted in the Note."
_Russia._ A secret telegram was sent to Russian representatives
abroad announcing Germany's ultimatum delivered at midnight, and
stating the German Ambassador's reply to the inquiry if it meant
war: "No, but we are very near it."
Ambassador Benckendorff telegraphed from London that Sir Edward
Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, hoped that no great power would
open hostilities before the formula for a peaceful settlement of the
disputes, accepted by Russia and offered to Germany, had been
considered. Later he telegraphed that France had agreed to respect
the neutrality of Belgium, but that Germany had stated she could
give no definite answer to the question.
Ambassador Isvolsky telegraphed from Paris:
"The Austrian Ambassador [Count Szécsen] yesterday visited
Viviani [Minister for Foreign Affairs] and declared to him that
Austria, far from harboring any designs against the integrity of
Serbia, was in fact ready to discuss the grounds of her
grievances against Serbia with the other powers. The French
Government are much exercised at Germany's extraordinary
military activity on the French frontier, for they are convinced
that, under the guise of _Kriegszustand_, mobilization is in
reality being carried out."
Later he telegraphed that, hearing from St. Petersburg of the German
order of general mobilization, President Poincaré had signed the
order for French mobilization.
"The German Ambassador [Baron von Schoen] has just visited
Viviani [Minister for Foreign Affairs] but told him nothing
fresh, alleging the impossibility of deciphering the telegrams he
has received. Viviani informed him of the signature of the order
for mobilization issued in reply to that of Germany, and
expressed to him his amazement that Germany should have taken
such a step at a moment when a friendly exchange of views was
still in progress between Russia, Austria, and the powers. He
added that mobilization did not necessarily entail war, and that
the German Ambassador might stay in Paris as the Russian
Ambassador had remained in Vienna and the Austrian Ambassador in
St. Petersburg."
_Great Britain._ George V sent the following telegram to William II:
"Many thanks for your telegram of last night. I have sent an
urgent telegram to Nicholas, in which I have assured him of my
readiness to do everything in my power to further the resumption
of the negotiations between the powers concerned."
Upon receipt of the telegram from the German Kaiser of August 1,
King George replied that there must be a misunderstanding in regard
to the suggestion of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, made to the
German Ambassador, respecting avoidance of conflict between Germany
and France, while the possibility remained of an agreement being
arrived at between Austria and Russia.
"Sir Edward Grey will see Prince Lichnowsky early to-morrow
morning in order to ascertain whether there is any
misunderstanding on his side."
King George replied to the letter of President Poincaré of July 31,
assuring him of cooperation of their two Governments in the interest
of peace.
"I admire the restraint which you and your Government are
exercising in not adopting an attitude which could in any wise be
interpreted as a provocative one."
Grey sent a personal message from King George to Nicholas II in
which he appealed to the czar to remove the misunderstanding that
had evidently produced the deadlock between Russia and Germany, and
offered his assistance in reopening the conversations between Russia
and Austria.
The Czar replied to King George that attempts at peace had been that
afternoon rendered futile by Germany's declaration of war, which was
wholly unexpected by him, since he had given William II "most
categorical assurances that my troops would not move so long as
mediation negotiations continued."
"In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that I have
done all in my power to avert war. Now that it has been forced on
me, I trust your country will not fail to support France and
Russia. God bless and protect you."
Ambassador Bertie, telegraphing from Paris, reported an interview
that morning between the French Political Director and German
Ambassador Schoen.
"M. Berthelot pointed out that general mobilization in Russia had
not been ordered until after Austria had decreed a general
mobilization, and that the Russian Government were ready to
demobilize if all powers did likewise. It seemed strange to the
French Government that in view of this and of the fact that
Russia and Austria were ready to converse, the German Government
should have at that moment presented an ultimatum at St.
Petersburg requiring immediate demobilization by Russia. There
were no differences at issue between France and Germany, but the
German Ambassador had made a menacing communication to the French
Government and had requested an answer the next day, intimating
that he would have to break off relations and leave Paris if the
reply were not satisfactory. The French Government considered
that this was an extraordinary proceeding.
"The German Ambassador, who is to see the Minister for Foreign
Affairs again this evening, said nothing about demanding his
passports, but he stated that he had packed up."
Ambassador Bunsen telegraphed from Vienna that a general
mobilization of the Austro-Hungarian army and fleet had been
ordered. Minister Villiers telegraphed from Brussels:
"Belgium expects and desires that other powers will observe and
uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the
utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign
Affairs [Davignon] said that they believed that they were in a
position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations
between Belgium and her neighbors were excellent, and there was
no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well,
nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies."
Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Goschen at Berlin that the Hamburg
authorities had detained British merchant ships on unknown grounds,
and instructed him to request the German Government to order their
release.
"The effect on public opinion here will be deplorable unless this
is done. His majesty's Government, on their side, are most
anxious to avoid any incident of an aggressive nature, and the
German Government will, I hope, be equally careful not to take
any step which would make the situation between us impossible."
Later Grey telegraphed Goschen that he still believed it possible to
secure peace if a little respite could be gained before any great
power began war. Russia and Austria had at last agreed to accept a
basis of mediation which is not open to objections raised to the
original Russian formula.
"Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia
are ready to converse, and I hope the German Government may be
able to make use of the Russian communications referred to, in
order to avoid tension. His majesty's Government are carefully
abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters."
In following telegrams Grey sent Goschen the Russian formula as
amended by himself, and the acceptance of the same by Russia.
Ambassador Bertie telegraphed from Paris information received from
President Poincaré of German mobilization, etc., and Russia's desire
to continue pacific conversations with Germany.
"The French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific,
sincerely desire the preservation of peace and do not quite
despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war."
Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Buchanan at St. Petersburg that
reliable news had come from Vienna that the Austro-Hungarian
Government,
"though the situation has been changed by the mobilization of
Russia, would, in full appreciation of the efforts of England for
the preservation of peace, be ready to consider favorably my
proposal for mediation between Austria and Serbia. The effect of
this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military
action against Serbia would continue for the present, and that
the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop
the mobilization of troops directed against Austria, in which
case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military
countermeasures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria
by Russian mobilization.
"You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs [M. Sazonof] and
say that if, in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation
by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilization, it appears
still to be possible to preserve peace. Presumably the matter
should be discussed with German Government also by Russian
Government."
Ambassador Bertie telegraphed from Paris that orders for general
mobilization had been given at 3.30 p. m., in answer to the German
_Kriegsgefahrzustand_ (imminence of war), which, by calling out
troops up to war strength, is tantamount to mobilization.
"The Minister of War is anxious that it should be explained that
this act of mobilization is one for purely defensive purposes."
Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Bunsen at Vienna an account of
interviews with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, in which Count
Mensdorff gave him assurances that Austria would not impair the
territorial integrity or sovereignty of Serbia, and said that,
contrary to report, Austria was willing to continue conversations
with Russia.
Ambassador Buchanan telegraphed Grey of an interview that morning
with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which M. Sazonof
recounted his conversation with Count Szápáry, the Austrian
Ambassador, the evening before, in which he proposed the London
conference.
Ambassador Bunsen telegraphed Grey from Vienna that the Russian
Ambassador, Schebeko, thought that, as mobilization is too expensive
to be continued long, Germany will attack Russia at once. Tension
now is greater between Russia and Germany than between Russia and
Austria. Russia would be satisfied, says Schebeko, with Austria's
acceptance of the new formula.
"He is going again to-day to point out to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs [Count Berchtold] that most terrific consequences
must ensue from refusal to make this slight concession. This time
Russia would fight to the last extremity. I agree with his
excellency that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from
the first, and that his strong personal bias probably colored his
action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German
Government also desired war from the first.
"It is the intention of the French Ambassador [Dumaine] to speak
earnestly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day on the
extreme danger of the situation, and to ask whether proposals to
serve as a basis of mediation from any quarter are being
considered. There is great anxiety to know what England will do.
I fear that nothing can alter the determination of
Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on their present course,
if they have made up their mind with the approval of Germany."
Ambassador Goschen telegraphed from Berlin:
"Orders have just been issued for the general mobilization of the
navy and army, the first day of mobilization to be August 2."
Later he telegraphed that Secretary of State von Jagow had expressed
annoyance at detention of British ships at Hamburg, and promised to
order their immediate release.
_France._ M. Viviani, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, informed the
ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome of
the two _démarches_ made on the previous evening at Paris and St.
Petersburg--"the one rather vague, the other precise and
conciliatory."
"Unfortunately these [latter] arrangements which allowed one to
hope for a peaceful solution appear, in fact, to have been
rendered useless by the attitude of Germany [in presenting her
ultimatum to Russia].
"The attitude of Germany proves that she wishes for war. And she
wishes for it against France. [Here he recounted the interview
with the German Ambassador Schoen at the French Foreign Office.]
"This attitude of breaking off diplomatic relations without any
direct dispute, and although he has not received any definitely
negative answer, is characteristic of the determination of
Germany to make war against France. The want of sincerity in her
peaceful protestations is shown by the rupture which she is
forcing upon Europe at a time when Austria had at last agreed
with Russia to begin negotiations."
M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador at Berlin, reported Austria's
willingness to continue conversations with Russia.
"The ultimatum to Russia can only do away with the last chances
of peace which these conversations still seemed to leave. The
question may be asked whether in such circumstances the
acceptance by Austria was serious, and had not the object of
throwing the responsibility of the conflict on to Russia."
He told of the interviews of the British Ambassador with Secretary
of State von Jagow, in which Mr. Goschen vainly pleaded that Germany
use her influence with Austria in the cause of peace.
"Germany's ultimatum coming at the very moment when an agreement
seemed about to be established between Vienna and St. Petersburg,
is characteristic of her warlike policy."
It looks as if she desired war on her own account.
M. Viviani, Minister for Foreign Affairs, notified the ambassadors
at London and Berlin and the Minister of Brussels of his pledge to
respect Belgian neutrality as given to Great Britain.
Ambassador Barrère reported from Rome an interview of the German
Ambassador with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which Herr von
Flotow had asked the intentions of Italy in the present crisis.
"The Marquis di San Giuliano answered that as the war undertaken
by Austria was aggressive and did not fall within the purely
defensive character of the Triple Alliance, particularly in view
of the consequences which might result from it according to the
declaration of the German Ambassador, Italy could not take part
in the war."
M. Viviani reported to the ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg,
Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, and Constantinople the visit to him at
11 a. m. of German Ambassador Schoen.
"After having recalled all the efforts made by France toward an
honorable settlement of the Austro-Serbian conflict and the
difficulty between Austria and Russia which has resulted from it,
I put him in possession of the facts as to the _pourparlers_
which have been carried on since yesterday [in reference to
Austro-Russian dispute].
"I drew attention to the attitude of Germany who, abandoning all
_pourparlers_, presented an ultimatum to Russia at the very
moment when this power had just accepted the British formula
(which implies the cessation of military preparations by all the
countries which have mobilized) and regarded as imminent a
diplomatic rupture with France.
"Baron von Schoen answered that he did not know the developments
which had taken place in this matter for the last twenty-four
hours, that there was perhaps in them a 'glimmer of hope' for
some arrangement, that he had not received any fresh
communication from his Government, and that he was going to get
information. He gave renewed protestations of his sincere desire
to unite his efforts to those of France for arriving at a
solution of the conflict. I laid stress on the serious
responsibility which the Imperial Government would assume if, in
circumstances such as these, they took an initiative which was
not justified and of a kind which would irremediably compromise
peace.
"Baron von Schoen did not allude to his immediate departure and
did not make any fresh request for an answer to his question
concerning the attitude of France in case of an Austro-Russian
conflict. He confined himself to saying of his own accord that
the attitude of France was not doubtful.
"It would not do to exaggerate the possibilities which may result
from my conversation with the German Ambassador for, on their
side, the Imperial Government continue the most dangerous
preparations on our frontier. However, we must not neglect the
possibilities, and we should not cease to work toward an
agreement. On her side France is taking all military measures
required for protection against too great an advance in German
military preparations. She considers that her attempts at
solution will only have a chance of success so far as it is felt
that she will be ready and resolute if the conflict is forced on
her."
Ambassador Paul Cambon reported from London the situation between
Great Britain and Germany, especially in regard to British
neutrality and Germany's attitude toward Belgian neutrality.
"Sir Edward Grey will ask the Cabinet to authorize him to state
on Monday in the House of Commons that the British Government
will not permit a violation of Belgian neutrality.
"In the second place, the British fleet is mobilized, and Sir
Edward Grey will propose to his colleagues that he should state
that it will oppose the passage of the Straits of Dover by the
German fleet, or, if the German fleet should pass through, will
oppose any demonstration on the French coasts. These two
questions will be dealt with at the meeting on Monday. I drew the
attention of the Secretary of State to the point that, if during
this intervening period any incident took place, it was necessary
not to allow a surprise, and that it would be desirable to think
of intervening in time."
Minister Mollard presented the request from Dr. Eyschen, Minister of
State of Luxemburg, for an assurance that France would respect the
neutrality of the Grand Duchy. A similar request has been made to
Germany.
M. Viviani returned the same assurance that he had given in the case
of Belgium.
_Belgium._ M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed to
the Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg
to carry out the instructions [in case of war between France and
Germany becoming imminent] of July 24; and to the Ministers at Rome,
The Hague, and Luxemburg to carry out instructions [the same] of
July 25.
SUNDAY, AUGUST 2, 1914
_Austria-Hungary._ On the following day, Ambassador Szögyény
telegraphed from Berlin that no answer had been received from Russia
to Germany's demand that she demobilize; that Russian troops had
crossed the German frontier at Schwidden (southeast of Bialla); and
that Germany therefore regarded herself at war with Russia and had
that morning given Ambassador Swerbeiev his passports.
_Germany._ Ambassador Lichnowsky telegraphed from London to
Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg that Sir Edward Grey, British
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had given up as impracticable his
suggestions as to the possibility of creating lasting British
neutrality, which were made without previous inquiry of France and
without knowledge of mobilization.
RUSSIA EXPLAINS HER EFFORTS FOR PEACE
_Russia._ M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs, published an
announcement respecting recent events in correction of a "garbled
version" appearing in the foreign press. This recited the
circumstances of the Austrian note of July 23 to Serbia and Serbia's
reply of the 25th.
"Russia considered that the humiliation of Serbia, involved in
these demands, and equally the evident intention of
Austria-Hungary to secure her own hegemony in the Balkans, which
underlay her conditions, were inadmissible. The Russian
Government, therefore, pointed out to Austria-Hungary in the most
friendly manner that it would be desirable to re-examine the
points contained in the Austro-Hungarian note. The
Austro-Hungarian Government did not see their way to agree to a
discussion of the note. The moderating influence of the four
powers at Vienna was equally unsuccessful....
"The Austro-Hungarian Government proceeded to mobilize and
declared war officially against Serbia, and the following day
Belgrade was bombarded. The manifesto which accompanied the
declaration of war openly accuses Serbia of having prepared and
carried out the crime of Sarajevo. Such an accusation of a crime
at common law, launched against a whole people and a whole State,
aroused, by its evident inanity, widespread sympathy for Serbia
throughout all classes of European society.
"In consequence of this behavior of the Austro-Hungarian
Government, in spite of Russia's declaration that she could not
remain indifferent to the fate of Serbia, the Russian Government
considered it necessary to order mobilization in the military
districts of Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan. This decision was
rendered necessary by the fact that since the date when the
Austro-Hungarian note was communicated to the Serbian Government,
and since the first steps taken by Russia, five days had elapsed,
and yet the Vienna Cabinet had not taken one step to meet Russia
halfway in her efforts towards peace. Indeed, quite the contrary;
for the mobilization of half of the Austro-Hungarian army had
been ordered.
"The German Government were kept informed of the steps taken by
Russia. At the same time it was explained to them that these
steps were only the result of the Austrian preparations, and that
they were not in any way aimed at Germany. Simultaneously, the
Russian Government declared that Russia was ready to continue
discussions with a view to a peaceful settlement of the dispute,
either in the form of direct negotiations with Vienna or, as
suggested by Great Britain, in the form of a conference of the
four great powers not directly interested, that is to say, Great
Britain, France, Germany, and Italy.
"This attempt on the part of Russia was, however, equally
unsuccessful. Austria-Hungary declined a further exchange of
views with Russia, and the Vienna Cabinet was unwilling to join
the proposed conference of the powers.
"Nevertheless Russia did not abandon her efforts for peace. When
questioned by the German Ambassador as to the conditions on which
we would still agree to suspend our preparations, the Minister
for Foreign Affairs declared that these conditions were Austria's
recognition that the Austro-Serbian question had assumed a
European character, and a declaration by her that she agreed not
to insist upon such of her demands as were incompatible with the
sovereign rights of Serbia.
"Germany considered this Russian proposal unacceptable to
Austria-Hungary. At that very moment news of the proclamation of
general mobilization by Austria-Hungary reached St. Petersburg.
"All this time hostilities were continuing on Serbian territory,
and Belgrade was bombarded afresh.
"The failure of our proposals for peace compelled us to extend
the scope of our precautionary military measures.
"The Berlin Cabinet questioned us on this, and we replied that
Russia was compelled to begin preparations so as to be ready for
every emergency.
"But while taking this precautionary step, Russia did not on that
account abandon her strenuous efforts to find some solution of
the situation, and she announced that she was ready to accept any
proposed settlement of the problem that might be put forward,
provided it complied with the conditions laid down by her.
"In spite of this conciliatory communication, the German
Government on July 31 demanded of the Russian Government that
they should suspend their military measures by midday on August
1, and threatened, should they fail to comply, to proceed to
general mobilization.
"On the following day, August 1, the German Ambassador, on behalf
of his Government, forwarded a declaration of war to the Minister
for Foreign Affairs."
M. Sazonof telegraphed to the Russian representatives abroad
"that Germany is now doing her utmost to foist upon us the
responsibility for the rupture. We were forced to mobilize by the
immense responsibility which would have fallen upon our shoulders
if we had not taken all possible precautionary measures at a time
when Austria, while confining herself to discussions of a
dilatory nature, was bombarding Belgrade and was undertaking
general mobilization.
"The Emperor of Russia had promised the German Emperor that he
would take no aggressive action as long as the discussions with
Austria continued. With such a guarantee, and after so many
proofs of Russia's desire for peace, Germany neither could, nor
had the right to, doubt our declaration that we would joyfully
accept any peaceful settlement compatible with the dignity and
independence of Serbia. Any other solution, besides being
entirely incompatible with our own dignity, would assuredly have
upset the European balance of power by securing the hegemony of
Germany. The European--nay, the world-wide--character of this
dispute is infinitely more important than the pretext from which
it springs. By her decision to declare war upon us, at a moment
when negotiations were in progress between the powers, Germany
has assumed a heavy responsibility."
_Great Britain._ Ambassador Goschen sent from Berlin two telegrams
to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, one stating that
Secretary of State von Jagow had just informed him that, owing to
certain Russian troops having crossed the frontier, Germany and
Russia were in a state of war, and the other that the reason for the
detention of British ships on the day preceding was laying of mines
and taking other precautions.
Ambassador Villiers telegraphed from Brussels that a German force
had entered Luxemburg. This was confirmed by a telegram from the
Minister of State for Luxemburg, who gave details, and added:
"These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary
to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty
of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to
address an energetic protest against this aggression to the
representatives of his majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg.
An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin. [Paris was also
informed.]"
Grey telegraphed Ambassador Bertie at Paris:
"After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon [French
Ambassador in London] the following memorandum:
"I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the German fleet
comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake
hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British
fleet will give all the protection in its power.
"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of his
majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and
must not be taken as binding his majesty's Government to take any
action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet
takes place.
"I pointed out that we had very large questions and most
difficult issues to consider, and that our Government felt that
they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany
necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany
to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose
fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know
how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely
undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this
assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless
the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did not give a
security to France that would enable her to settle the
disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet.
"M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him
the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord
Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the
violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much
more important matter; we were considering what statement we
should make in Parliament to-morrow--in effect, whether we should
declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a _casus belli_. I
told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this
point."
_France._ Ambassador Paléologue telegraphed from St. Petersburg that
the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalés was leaving the Russian
capital that day, and that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Count
Szápáry had not yet received instructions from Vienna as to the
declaration of war.
M. Viviani, Minister for Foreign Affairs, notified the Ambassadors
at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, and
Constantinople:
"This morning, French territory was violated by German troops at
Ciry and near Longwy. They are marching on the fort which bears
the latter name. Elsewhere the Custom House at Delle has twice
been fired upon. Finally, German troops have also violated this
morning the neutral territory of Luxemburg.
"You will at once use this information to lay stress on the fact
that the German Government is committing itself to acts of war
against France without provocation on our part, or any previous
declaration of war, whilst we have scrupulously respected the
zone of ten kilometers which we have maintained, even since the
mobilization, between our troops and the frontier."
Ambassador Paul Cambon reported from London Sir Edward Grey's
declaration of the British Cabinet as to protection of France by the
British fleet.
"Afterwards in speaking to me of the neutrality of Belgium and
that of Luxemburg, the Secretary of State reminded me that the
Convention of 1867, referring to the Grand Duchy, differed from
the Treaty referring to Belgium, in that Great Britain was bound
to require the observance of this latter Convention without the
assistance of the other guaranteeing powers, while with regard to
Luxemburg all the guaranteeing powers were to act in concert.
"The protection of Belgian neutrality is here considered so
important that Great Britain will regard its violation by Germany
as a _casus belli_. It is a specially British interest and there
is no doubt that the British Government, faithful to the
traditions of their policy, will insist upon it, even if the
business world in which German influence is making tenacious
efforts, exercises pressure to prevent the Government committing
itself against Germany."
M. Viviani replied to M. Paul Cambon that the promise of the British
Cabinet was "a first assistance which is most valuable to us."
"The help which Great Britain intends to give to France for the
protection of the French coasts or the French merchant marine,
will be used in such a way that our navy will also, in case of a
Franco-German conflict, be supported by the British fleet in the
Atlantic as well as in the North Sea and Channel. I would note
that British ports could not serve as places for revictualling
for the German fleet."
M. Viviani telegraphed to Ambassador Jules Cambon at Berlin to
protest to the German Government against the violation of the French
frontier by German armed forces, as "unjustified by anything in the
present situation."
"The Government of the Republic can only leave to the Imperial
Government the entire responsibility for these acts."
M. Marcellin Pellet, Minister at the Hague, telegraphed to M.
Viviani that the German Minister had called on M. Loudon, Dutch
Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain the necessity for the
German violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg.
_Belgium._ M. Davignon, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed
to the ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St.
Petersburg, that he had warned the German Minister at Brussels, Herr
von Below Saleske, that the French Minister, M. Klobukowski, would
publish the formal declaration made by the German Minister on August
1, respecting Belgian neutrality.
"When I next met Herr von Below he thanked me for this attention,
and added that up to the present he had not been instructed to
make us an official communication, but that we knew his personal
opinion as to the feelings of security, which we had the right to
entertain toward our eastern neighbors. I at once replied that
all that we knew of their intentions, as indicated in numerous
previous conversations, did not allow us to doubt their perfect
correctness toward Belgium. I added, however, that we should
attach the greatest importance to the possession of a formal
declaration, which the Belgian nation would hear of with joy and
gratitude."
Later, the German Minister presented the following "very
confidential" note to Belgium.
GERMAN DECLARATION OF INTENTIONS TOWARD BELGIUM
"Reliable information has been received by the German Government
to the effect that French forces intend to march on the line of
the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as
to the intention of France to march through Belgian territory
against Germany.
"The German Government cannot but fear that Belgium, in spite of
the utmost good will, will be unable, without assistance, to
repel so considerable a French invasion with sufficient prospect
of success to afford an adequate guaranty against danger to
Germany. It is essential for the self-defense of Germany that she
should anticipate any such hostile attack. The German Government
would, however, feel the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an
act of hostility against herself the fact that the measures of
Germany's opponents force Germany, for her own protection, to
enter Belgian territory.
"In order to exclude any possibility of misunderstanding, the
German Government make the following declaration:
"1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium. In
the event of Belgium being prepared in the coming war to maintain
an attitude of friendly neutrality toward Germany, the German
Government bind themselves, at the conclusion of peace, to
guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian Kingdom
in full.
"2. Germany undertakes, under the above-mentioned condition, to
evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of peace.
"3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared,
in cooperation with the Belgian authorities, to purchase all
necessaries for her troops against a cash payment, and to pay an
indemnity for any damage that may have been caused by German
troops.
"4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and in particular
should she throw difficulties in the way of their march by a
resistance of the fortresses on the Meuse, or by destroying
railways, roads, tunnels, or other similar works, Germany will,
to her regret, be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.
"In this event Germany can undertake no obligations toward
Belgium, but the eventual adjustment of the relations between the
two States must be left to the decision of arms.
"The German Government, however, entertain the distinct hope that
this eventuality will not occur, and that the Belgian Government
will know how to take the necessary measures to prevent the
occurrence of incidents such as those mentioned. In this case the
friendly ties which bind the two neighboring States will grow
stronger and more enduring."
MONDAY, AUGUST 3, 1914
_Serbia._ On the following day M. Yov. Yovanovitch, former Minister
to Vienna, and now at Nish, the temporary capital of Serbia, made a
long report to M. N. Pashitch, the Prime Minister, of events at
Vienna from the days following the crime of Sarajevo to his
departure from the Austrian capital. The points in this are:
SERBIA'S POSITION EXPLAINED
1. Constant police surveillance of the Serbian legation and menacing
attitude of the public.
2. Sudden change early in July of Austro-Hungarian attitude to the
Sarajevo incident. Press begins to represent it as a manifestation
of Serbian intrigue which Austria must settle, and alone, with
Serbia--eventually by war.
3. Assistance given by German Embassy to this press agitation.
4. Austrian financiers declare that "a settlement with Serbia" is
the only way out of the general financial and economic crisis
prevailing in Austria-Hungary since annexation of Bosnia. Gold
secretly and gradually withdrawn from circulation.
5. Austrian Minister of War, Krobatin, and Chief of Staff,
Hetzendorf, break leave of absence to return to Vienna, the latter
having had a conversation at Carlsbad with German Chief of Staff,
Count Moltke.
6. Reserves retained after stipulated period for maneuvers had
expired and their numbers augmented.
7. Noncommittal answers of Count Tisza, Hungarian Prime Minister, to
interpolations concerning Serbia in Hungarian Diet.
8. Refusal at Foreign Office in Vienna to discuss Sarajevo incident
with foreign representatives, or if subject was mentioned,
assurances that nothing would be done against Serbia to give
uneasiness to the powers, in particular Russia. Foreign ambassadors,
thus assured, quit Vienna on long leaves of absence for watering
places. All this indicates that Austria-Hungary was contemplating
sudden action, which, when a _fait accompli_, would likely be
accepted by the powers in order to avoid a general war.
9. German Ambassador, Herr von Tschirschky, the only foreign
representative informed of note to Serbia. He knew its minutest
details, and there is reason to believe he helped draft it.
10. When note was published, French, British, and Russian
representatives at Vienna asked me if it were not better to accept
the demands and avoid war for the present.
"I said that the note, which amounted in fact to a declaration of
war upon Serbia, was worded in such a way that, even if Serbia
should accept all the conditions without reserve, Austria-Hungary
would still find an excuse for her army to march into Serbia at
any time. It was in the belief that the conflict would be limited
to Serbia and Austria-Hungary that Austria-Hungary had drafted
such a note.
"The Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko [then absent from Vienna,]
previously to the presentation of the note, had stated on several
occasions to his colleagues and the Austro-Hungarian Government
that Russia could not remain indifferent to any step taken by
Austria-Hungary, which might have as an object the humiliation of
Serbia. Hence the apprehension felt by the French and British
Ambassadors and the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, who at once
foresaw the possibility of war between Russia and
Austria-Hungary."
11. Expressed intention of Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian
Minister of Foreign Affairs, to chastise Serbia by arms without
consent of European concert. Belief expressed by German Ambassador
that Russia would permit this, owing to troubles in Asia, and
assurances given by him that Germany would stand by her ally in the
matter.
"These statements of Herr von Tschirschky have induced many to
hold the opinion that Germany desired to provoke a European war,
on the ground that it was better to have war with Russia before
the latter had completed her military reorganization, _i.e._,
before the spring of 1917. This point of view had formerly been
freely discussed and even written about in Vienna. 'The longer
the matter is postponed, the smaller will become the chances of
success of the Triple Alliance.' On the other hand, rumors from
the most authoritative diplomatic sources in Berlin reached me in
Vienna, to the effect that the Wilhelmstrasse [German Foreign
Office] did not approve of Austria's policy on this question,
and that Herr von Tschirschky has exceeded the instructions given
to him."
_Great Britain._ Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
made a statement in the House of Commons as to the diplomatic
situation, particularly of Great Britain. The chief points in it
were:
1. The peace of Europe cannot be preserved, despite Great Britain's
earnest and consistent efforts to that end.
2. Great Britain's good faith in this matter is proved by her
actions in the Balkan crisis, where it was generally admitted she
worked for peace.
3. Parliament is free to decide on attitude of Great Britain.
Here the secretary referred to the Moroccan crisis of 1906, and said
that then he had taken the same attitude with respect to France.
"That position was accepted by the French Government, but they
said to me at the time, and I think very reasonably, 'If you
think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might,
should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the
armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not
be able to give that support, even if you wish it, when the time
comes, unless some conversations have already taken place between
naval and military experts.' There was force in that. I agreed to
it, and authorized those conversations to take place, but on the
distinct understanding that nothing which passed between military
or naval experts should bind either Government or restrict in any
way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they
would give that support when the time arose.
"As I have told the House, upon that occasion a general election
was in prospect; I had to take the responsibility of doing that
without the Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer had to
be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime
Minister; I consulted Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of
State for War; and the present Prime Minister [Henry Asquith] who
was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. They authorized that
[answer], on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of
the Government free whenever the crisis arose."
Here the secretary read his reply to the French Ambassador, dated
November 22, 1912, which was to the effect stated. It instanced the
disposition of the French and British fleets at the time as "not
based upon an engagement to cooperate in war," and went on to say
"that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an
unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened
the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other
whether both governments should act together to prevent
aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so what measures they
would be prepared to take in common."
The secretary said that the present crisis involved Great Britain's
obligations to France in a less formal fashion.
"While we were pledged to give nothing but diplomatic support to
France in the Morocco affairs, we were pledged to do so by a
definite public agreement [the Treaty of April 8, 1904]. But no
Government and no country has less desire to be involved in war
over a dispute with Austria and Serbia than the Government and
the country of France. France is involved in it because of her
obligation of honor under a definite alliance with Russia. It is
only fair to the House to say that that obligation cannot apply
in the same way to us. We are not parties to the Franco-Russian
alliance. We do not even know its terms.
"I now come to what we think the situation requires of us. We
have had a long-standing friendship with France. But how far that
friendship entails obligation, let every man look into his own
heart, and his own feelings, and construe for himself.
"The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is
in the Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated
there because of the feeling of confidence and friendship which
has existed between the two countries. My own feeling is that if
a foreign fleet, engaged in a war which France had not sought,
and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the
English Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts
of France, we could not stand aside, and see this going on
practically within sight of our eyes, with our arms folded,
looking on dispassionately, doing nothing.
"Let us assume that out of the situation come consequences
unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden moment that, in
defense of vital British interests, we should go to war; and let
us assume--which is quite possible--that Italy, who is now
neutral, should depart from her attitude, what then will be the
position in the Mediterranean where our trade routes are vital to
our interests? We have not kept a fleet in the Mediterranean
which is equal to dealing alone with a combination of other
fleets in the Mediterranean. We would have exposed this country
from our negative attitude at the present moment to the most
appalling risk. We feel strongly that France was entitled to
know--and to know at once--whether or not in the event of attack
upon her unprotected northern and western coasts she could depend
upon British support. In these compelling circumstances,
yesterday afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador the assurance
that if the German fleet undertakes hostile operations against
the French coast or shipping the British fleet will give all the
protection in its power, subject to the ratification of
Parliament.
"I understand that the German Government would be prepared, if we
would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet
would not attack the northern coast of France. It is far too
narrow an engagement for us. And, Sir, there is the more serious
consideration--becoming more serious every hour--of the
neutrality of Belgium."
Here the secretary discussed the treaties of 1839 and of 1870
between the powers and Belgium respecting preservation of her
neutrality, and cited in particular the real and written recognition
by Prince Bismarck of the sacredness of this neutrality, and the
speech in Parliament by William E. Gladstone on Great Britain's
obligation to maintain it.
He then reported the promise he had just secured from France to
respect Belgian neutrality, the evasive answer that had been given
by Germany in regard to the same, and Belgium's promise to maintain
her neutrality.
He then recited Germany's ultimatum to Belgium, and Belgium's appeal
to King George.
"Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What
can diplomatic intervention do now? We have great and vital
interests in the independence--and integrity is the least
part--of Belgium. The smaller States in that region of Europe ask
but one thing, to be left alone and independent. If in this war
which is before Europe the neutrality of one of those countries
is violated, and no action be taken [by the powers] to resent it,
at the end of the war, whatever the integrity may be, the
independence will be gone. Mr. Gladstone said:
"We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is
wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the
guaranty. It is found in the answer to the question whether,
under the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it
is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness
the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages
of history, and thus become participators in the sin.
"If Belgium's independence goes, the independence of Holland will
follow. I ask the House from the point of view of British
interests to consider what may be at stake. If France is beaten
in a struggle of life and death, loses her position as a great
power, becomes subordinate to the will and power of one greater
than herself--consequences which I do not anticipate, because I
am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the
energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often,
and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then
Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Gladstone's words
come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common
interest against the unmeasured aggrandizement of any power?
"It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband
our strength, and that, whatever happened in the course of this
war, at the end of it to intervene with effect to put things
right, and to adjust them to our own point of view. If, in a
crisis like this, we run away from those obligations of honor and
interest as regards the Belgian treaty, I doubt whether,
whatever material force we might have at the end, it would be of
very much value in face of the respect that we should have lost.
And do not believe, whether a great power stands outside this war
or not, it is going to be in a position at the end of it to exert
its superior strength. For us, with a powerful fleet, which we
believe able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and
to protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall
suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand
aside.
"We are going to suffer terribly in this war, whether we are in
it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not
because the trade routes are closed, but because there is no
trade at the other end. I do not believe for a moment that at the
end of this war, even if we stood aside, we should be in a
material position, to use our force decisively to undo what had
happened in the course of the war, to prevent the whole of the
west of Europe opposite to us falling under the domination of a
single power, and I am quite sure that our moral position would
be such as to have lost us all respect.
"Mobilization of the fleet has taken place; mobilization of the
army is taking place; but we have as yet taken no engagement with
regard to sending an expeditionary armed force out of the
country, because I feel that--in the case of a European
conflagration such as this, unprecedented, with our enormous
responsibilities in India and other parts of the Empire, or in
countries in British occupation, with all the unknown factors--we
must take the question very carefully into consideration, until
we know how we stand.
"What other policy is there before the House? There is but one
way in which the Government could make certain at the present
moment of keeping outside this war, and that would be that it
should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional
neutrality. We cannot do that. We should sacrifice our good name
and reputation before the world, and should not escape the most
serious and grave economic consequences.
"As far as the forces of the crown are concerned, we are ready. I
believe the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty
[Winston Churchill] have no doubt whatever that the readiness and
the efficiency of those forces were never at a higher mark than
they are to-day, and never was there a time when confidence was
more justified in the power of the navy to protect our commerce
and to protect our shores.
"The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Government in
deciding what to advise the House of Commons to do. We have made
clear to the House, I trust, that we are prepared to face that
situation. We worked for peace up to the last moment, and beyond
the last moment. We believe we shall have the support of the
House at large in proceeding to whatever the consequences may be
and whatever measures may be forced upon us. The country has not
had time to realize the issue. It perhaps is still thinking of
the quarrel between Austria and Serbia, and not the complications
of this matter which have grown out of the quarrel between
Austria and Serbia. Russia and Germany we know are at war. We do
not yet know officially that Austria, the ally whom Germany is to
support, is yet at war with Russia. We know that a good deal has
been happening on the French frontier.
"I believe, when the country realizes what is at stake, what the
real issues are, the magnitude of the impending dangers in the
west of Europe, we shall be supported throughout, not only by the
House of Commons, but by the determination, the resolution, the
courage, and the endurance of the whole country."
_France._ Minister Klobukowski telegraphed from Brussels the answer
the Belgian Government had given on the evening of August 2 to the
German ultimatum:
"The information as to the French movements appeared to them to
be inaccurate in view of the formal assurances which had been
given by France, and were still quite recent; that Belgium, which
since the establishment of her kingdom, has taken every care to
assure the protection of her dignity and of her interests, and
has devoted all her efforts to peaceful development of progress,
strongly protests against any violation of her territory from
whatever quarter it may come: and that, supposing the violation
takes place, she will know how to defend with energy her
neutrality, which has been guaranteed by the powers, and notably
by the King of Prussia."
M. Klobukowski added in a supplementary telegram:
"To the assurance which I gave him that if Belgium appealed to
the guarantee of the powers against the violation of her
neutrality by Germany, France would at once respond to her
appeal, the Minister for Foreign Affairs [M. Davignon] answered:
"It is with great sincerity that we thank the Government of the
Republic for the support which it would eventually be able to
offer us, but under present conditions we do not appeal to the
guarantee of the powers. At a later date the Government of the
king will weigh the measures which it may be necessary to take."
Ambassador Paul Cambon telegraphed from London:
"Sir Edward Grey has authorized me to inform you that he was
making explanations to the Commons as to the present attitude of
the British Government, and that the chief of these declarations
would be as follows:
"'In case the German fleet came into the Channel or entered the
North Sea in order to go round the British Isles with the object
of attacking the French coasts or the French navy and of
harassing French merchant shipping, the British fleet would
intervene in order to give to French shipping its complete
protection, in such a way that from that moment Great Britain and
Germany would be in a state of war.'
"Sir Edward Grey explained to me that the mention of an operation
by way of the North Sea implied protection against a
demonstration in the Atlantic Ocean.
"The declaration concerning the intervention of the British fleet
must be considered as binding the British Government. Sir Edward
Grey has assured me of this and has added that the French
Government were thereby authorized to inform the Chambers of
this."
M. Paul Cambon supplemented this by a telegram stating:
"Just as Sir Edward Grey was starting this morning for the
meeting of the Cabinet, my German colleague [Prince Lichnowsky]
came to press him to say that the neutrality of Great Britain did
not depend upon respecting Belgian neutrality. Sir Edward Grey
refused all conversation on this matter.
"The German Ambassador has sent to the press a _communiqué_
saying that if Great Britain remained neutral Germany would give
up all naval operations and would not make use of the Belgian
coast as a _point d'appui_. My answer is that respecting the
coast is not respecting the neutrality of the territory, and that
the German ultimatum is already a violation of this neutrality."
Later M. Paul Cambon telegraphed:
"Sir Edward Grey has made the statement regarding the
intervention of the British fleet. He has explained, in
considering the situation, what he proposed to do with regard to
Belgian neutrality; and the reading of a letter from King Albert
asking for the support of Great Britain has deeply stirred the
House.
"The House will this evening vote the credit which is asked for;
from this moment its support is secured to the policy of the
Government, and it follows public opinion which is declaring
itself more and more in our favor."
M. Viviani warned M. Paul Cambon that the German Ambassador Schoen
was reported to have said at the Foreign Office that yesterday
eighty French officers in Prussian uniform had attempted to cross
the German frontier in twelve motor cars at Walbeck.
"Be good enough urgently to contradict this news which is pure
invention, and to draw the attention of the [British] Foreign
Office to the German campaign of false news which is beginning."
German Ambassador von Schoen had a farewell audience at the Foreign
Office at 6.45 p. m., at which he handed M. Viviani a letter stating
that French military aviators had committed "flagrantly hostile
acts" on German territory, one throwing bombs on the railway near
Karlsruhe and Nuremberg, and had openly violated the neutrality of
Belgium by flying over Belgian territory.
"I am instructed, and I have the honor to inform your excellency,
that in the presence of these acts of aggression the German
Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in
consequence of the acts of this latter power.
"At the same time I have the honor to bring to the knowledge of
your excellency that the German authorities will detain French
mercantile vessels in German ports, but they will release them
if, within forty-eight hours, they are assured of complete
reciprocity."
M. Viviani formally challenged as inaccurate the allegations of the
ambassador.
M. Viviani instructed Ambassador Jules Cambon at Berlin to ask for
his passports.
"I request you at the same time to protest in writing against the
violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg by German troops, of
which notice has been given by the Prime Minister of Luxemburg;
against the ultimatum addressed to the Belgian Government by the
German Minister at Brussels to force upon them the violation of
Belgian neutrality and to require of that country that she should
facilitate military operations against France on Belgian
territory; finally against the false allegation of an alleged
projected invasion of these two countries by French armies, by
which he has attempted to justify the state of war which he
declares henceforth exists between Germany and France."
M. Allizé, Minister at Munich, was also instructed to ask for his
passports.
M. Viviani reported to the French representatives abroad that German
troops had violated Belgian territory at Gemmerich.
_Belgium._ Baron von der Elst, Secretary General, reported an
interview at 1.30 p. m. with Herr von Below Saleske, German
Minister.
"The minister officially informed the Belgian Government that
French dirigibles had thrown bombs, and that a French cavalry
patrol had crossed the frontier in violation of international
law, seeing that war had not been declared.
"The secretary general asked Herr von Below where these incidents
had happened, and was told that it was in Germany. Baron van der
Elst then observed that in that case he could not understand the
object of this communication. Herr von Below stated that these
acts, which were contrary to international law, were calculated
to lead to the supposition that other acts, contrary to
international law, would be committed by France."
M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, communicated to Herr von
Below Saleske Belgium's reply to the German note.
"This note has made a deep and painful impression upon the
Belgian Government.
"The intentions attributed to France by Germany are in
contradiction to the formal declarations made to us on August 1,
in the name of the French Government.
"Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality
should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfill her
international obligations and the Belgian army would offer the
most vigorous resistance to the invader.
"The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870 vouch
for the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guaranty
of the powers, and notably of the Government of his majesty the
King of Prussia.
"Belgium has always been faithful to her international
obligations, she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal
impartiality, and she has left nothing undone to maintain and
enforce respect for her neutrality.
"The attack upon her independence with which the German
Government threaten her constitutes a flagrant violation of
international law. No strategic interest justifies such a
violation of law.
"The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals
submitted to them, would sacrifice the honor of the nation and
betray their duty toward Europe.
"Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for more than
eighty years in the civilization of the world, they refuse to
believe that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at
the price of the violation of her neutrality.
"If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Government are firmly
resolved to repel, by all the means in their power, every attack
upon their rights."
M. Davignon reported this action to the Ministers at St. Petersburg,
Berlin, London, Paris, Vienna, and The Hague. To the same
representatives, except the Minister at The Hague, he reported a
statement made to him by the French Minister at Brussels:
"Although I have received no instructions to make a declaration
from my Government, I feel justified, in view of their well-known
intentions, in saying that if the Belgian Government were to
appeal to the French Government as one of the powers guaranteeing
their neutrality, the French Government would at once respond to
Belgium's appeal; if such an appeal were not made it is probable,
that--unless of course exceptional measures were rendered
necessary in self-defence--the French Government would not
intervene until Belgium had taken some effective measure of
resistance.
"I thanked M. Klobukowski for the support which the French
Government had been good enough to offer us in case of need, and
I informed him that the Belgian Government were making no appeal
at present to the guaranty of the powers, and that they would
decide later what ought to be done."
Count Lalaing, Minister at London, telegraphed to M. Davignon that
Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had informed him
"that if our neutrality is violated it means war with Germany."
TUESDAY, AUGUST 4, 1914
_Serbia._ On the following day, August 4, 1914, M. Pashitch, Prime
Minister, recalled the legation and consulate from Germany.
_Austria-Hungary._ Ambassador Mensdorff telegraphed from Berlin that
Great Britain had sent to Germany its ultimatum concerning Belgium,
and expected an answer to-night at twelve o'clock.
"Sir E. Grey said to me that at present there was no reason why
he should make any communication to the Imperial and Royal
Government, and there was no cause why a conflict should arise
between us, so long as we were not in a condition of war with
France. In any case, he hoped that we would not begin hostilities
without the formality of a previous declaration of war. He does
not intend to recall Sir M. de Bunsen.
"Should we be at war with France, it would indeed be difficult
for Great Britain, as the ally of France, to cooperate with her
in the Atlantic, and not in the Mediterranean."
VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG EXPLAINS GERMANY'S POSITION IN THE REICHSTAG
_Germany._ Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg spoke before the
Reichstag (Imperial Parliament). The points of his address were as
follows:
1. Germany has kept the peace and protected the peace of Europe for
forty-four years, yet, under the pretense that she was desirous of
war,
"enmity has been awakened against us in the East and the West and
chains have been fashioned for us. The wind then sown has brought
forth the whirlwind which has now broken loose. We wished to
continue our work of peace, and, like a silent vow, the feeling
that animated everyone from the emperor down to the youngest
soldier was this: Only in defence of a just cause shall our sword
fly from its scabbard.
"The day has now come when we must draw it, against our wish, and
in spite of our sincere endeavors. Russia has set fire to the
building. We are at war with Russia and France--a war that has
been forced upon us."
2. Germany has endeavored to localize the conflict between
Austria-Hungary and Serbia. All other European Governments
(particularly Great Britain) save one took the same attitude.
Russia alone asserted that she had to be heard in a settlement of
the matter.
"Thus the danger of a European crisis raised its threatening
head."
3. Russia began to mobilize. On this, Germany declared that Russian
military measures against Austria-Hungary would find her on the side
of her ally, and that she would take countermeasures, coming near to
actual war.
"Russia assured us in the most solemn manner of her desire for
peace, and declared that she was making no military preparations
against us.
"In the meantime, Great Britain, warmly supported by us, tried to
mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg."
4. Kaiser William II telegraphed to Nicholas II asking for the
Czar's assistance in smoothing over difficulties between Russia and
Austria-Hungary. Before receipt of this telegram the Czar asked the
Kaiser to induce Austria-Hungary to aid him in inducing Vienna to
moderate her demands on Serbia. The Kaiser accepted the rôle of
mediator.
5. Germany influenced Austria-Hungary to resume the broken
conversations with Russia.
"But before the final decision was taken at Vienna, the news
arrived that Russia had mobilized her entire forces and that her
mobilization was therefore directed against us also. The Russian
Government, who knew from our repeated statements what
mobilization on our frontiers meant, did not notify us of this
mobilization, nor did they even offer any explanation. It was not
until the afternoon of July 31 that the emperor received a
telegram from the czar in which he guaranteed that his army would
not assume a provocative attitude toward us. But mobilization on
our frontiers had been in full swing since the night of July
30-31, and France, though indeed not actually mobilizing, was
admittedly making military preparations.
"What was our position? For the sake of the peace of Europe we
had, up till then, deliberately refrained from calling up a
single reservist. Were we now to wait further in patience until
the nations on either side of us chose the moment for their
attack? It would have been a crime to expose Germany to such
peril. Therefore, on July 31, we called upon Russia to demobilize
as the only measure which could still preserve the peace of
Europe, and informed her that in case our demand met with a
refusal, we should have to consider that a state of war existed.
"No answer was given, and we mobilized our forces on August 1, at
5 p. m."
6. France evaded our direct question as to whether she would remain
neutral in a Russo-German war.
"In spite of this, the kaiser ordered that the French frontier
was to be unconditionally respected. This order, with one single
exception[2], was strictly obeyed. France, who mobilized at the
same time as we did, assured us that she would respect a zone of
10 kilometers on the frontier. What really happened? Aviators
dropped bombs, and cavalry patrols and French infantry
detachments appeared on the territory of the empire! Though war
had not been declared, France thus broke the peace and actually
attacked us."
[Footnote 2: Against express orders, a patrol of the Fourteenth
Army Corps, apparently led by an officer, crossed the frontier
on August 2. They seem to have been shot down, only one man
having returned.]
After this recital the Chancellor entered upon his oration proper.
"Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity (_Notwehr_), and
necessity (_Not_) knows no law. Our troops have occupied
Luxemburg and perhaps have already entered Belgian territory.
"Gentlemen, that is a breach of international law. It is true
that the French Government declared at Brussels that France would
respect Belgian neutrality as long as her adversary respected it.
We knew, however, that France stood ready for an invasion. France
could wait, we could not. A French attack on our flank on the
lower Rhine might have been disastrous. Thus we were forced to
ignore the rightful protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and
Belgium. The wrong--I speak openly--the wrong we thereby commit
we will try to make good as soon as our military aims have been
attained.
"He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for his highest
possession can only consider how he is to hack his way through
(_durchhauen_).
"Gentlemen, we stand shoulder to shoulder with Austria-Hungary.
"As for Great Britain's attitude, the statements made by Sir
Edward Grey in the House of Commons yesterday show the standpoint
assumed by the British Government. We have informed the British
Government that, as long as Great Britain remains neutral, our
fleet will not attack the northern coast of France, and that we
will not violate the territorial integrity and independence of
Belgium. These assurances I now repeat before the world, and I
may add that, as long as Great Britain remains neutral, we would
also be willing, upon reciprocity being assured, to take no
warlike measures against French commercial shipping.
"Gentlemen, so much for the facts. I repeat the words of the
emperor: 'With a clear conscience we enter the lists.' We are
fighting for the fruits of our works of peace, for the
inheritance of a great past and for our future. The fifty years
are not yet past during which Count Moltke said we should have to
remain armed to defend the inheritance that we won in 1870. Now
the great hour of trial has struck for our people. But with clear
confidence we go forward to meet it. Our army is in the field,
our navy is ready for battle--behind them stands the entire
German nation--the entire German nation united to the last man.
"Gentlemen, you know your duty and all that it means. The
proposed laws need no further explanation. I ask you to pass them
quickly."
Secretary of State von Jagow telegraphed Ambassador Lichnowsky at
London:
"Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the
British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating
most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed
conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever,
annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne
out by the fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland
strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could
not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same
time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please
impress upon Sir E. Grey that the German army could not be
exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned
according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had
consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a
question of life or death to prevent French advance."
_Great Britain._ Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
telegraphed Ambassador Goschen at Berlin to protest to the German
Government against its violation of the treaty safeguarding Belgian
neutrality, and to request an immediate assurance that the demand
made upon Belgium would not be proceeded with.
Ambassador Villiers telegraphed from Brussels that the German
Minister, Von Below Saleske, had addressed a note to M. Davignon,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
"stating that as Belgian Government have declined the
well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the Imperial
Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled
to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures
considered indispensable in view of the French menaces."
Sir Edward Grey telegraphed back that Great Britain expected the
Belgian Government to resist by any means in their power Germany's
invasion of their neutrality, and that the British Government were
prepared to join Russia and France in common action to resist the
German action and to guarantee to maintain Belgian independence and
integrity in future years.
Grey protested, through Ambassador Goschen, to the German Government
against the continued detention of British merchant ships at Hamburg
and other German ports, as in direct contravention of international
law and of the assurances given by Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg.
Villiers telegraphed from Brussels:
"German troops have entered Belgian territory, and Liege has been
summoned to surrender by small party of Germans who, however,
were repulsed."
Grey, on the basis of this information, telegraphed Ambassador
Goschen to ask the German Government that a satisfactory answer to
his morning telegram be received in London by twelve o'clock at
night.
"If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say
that his majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in
their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the
observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as
ourselves."
As reported to Sir Edward Grey on August 8, after his return to
London, Sir Edward Goschen, Ambassador at Berlin, had an interview
with Herr von Jagow on this same day, August 4.
SIR EDWARD GOSCHEN'S INTERVIEW WITH VON JAGOW
"In accordance with your instructions of the 4th inst., I called
upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and inquired, in the
name of his majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government
would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow
at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be
'No,' as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the
frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already
violated. He again went into the reasons why the Imperial
Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they
had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as
to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavor
to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a
matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the
more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the
paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got
through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of
time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the
Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier.
Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of
Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to
Herr von Jagow that this _fait accompli_ of the violation of the
Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the
situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was
not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences,
which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the
reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw
back.
"During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the
same date and, in compliance with the instructions therein
contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and
informed the Secretary of State that, unless the Imperial
Government could give the assurance by twelve o'clock that night
that they would proceed no further with their violation of the
Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to
demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that his
majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power
to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a
treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.
"Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no
other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day,
namely, that the safety of the empire rendered it absolutely
necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through
Belgium. I asked him whether, in view of the terrible
consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible
even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered.
He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or
more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I
should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at
about seven o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr
von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his
entire policy and that of the chancellor, which had been to make
friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to
get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in
Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment,
but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in
view of our engagements, his majesty's Government could not
possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.
"I then said that I should like to go and see the chancellor, as
it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity
of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the chancellor very
agitated. His excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted
for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by his
majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a
word--'neutrality,' a word which in war time had so often been
disregarded--just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to
make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to
be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been
rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to
which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to
office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done
was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he
was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great
Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might
happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said
that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to
understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life
and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the
latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it
was, so to speak, a matter of 'life and death' for the honor of
Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do
her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That
solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could
anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future?
The chancellor said: 'But at what price will that compact have
been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?' I hinted
to his excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences
could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn
engagements, but his excellency was so excited, so evidently
overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to
hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by
further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great
Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost
up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with
us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria
and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw
the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations
between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had
been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to
maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and
had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to
our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which
unfortunately entailed our separation from our late
fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted
this more than I.
"After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy
and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This
telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little
before 9 p. m. It was apparently never dispatched."[3]
[Footnote 3: This telegram never reached the British Foreign
Office.]
Mr. Goschen's report went on to relate the attack that evening on
the British Embassy by a mob excited by the report in a flying sheet
of the "Berliner Tageblatt" that Great Britain had declared war on
Germany. The German Government repudiated the report and did all it
could, by the personal apology of the secretary of state and by
police protection, to make amends for what Herr von Jagow termed
"the indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin."
"On the following morning, August 5, the emperor sent one of his
majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following message:
"'The emperor has charged me to express to your excellency his
regret for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the
same time that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of
the feelings of his people respecting the action of Great Britain
in joining with other nations against her old Allies of Waterloo.
His majesty also begs that you will tell the king that he has
been proud of the titles of British field marshal and British
admiral, but that in consequence of what has occurred he must now
at once divest himself of those titles.'
"I would add that the above message lost none of its acerbity by
the manner of its delivery."
At 11 a. m., August 5, Ambassador Goschen received his passports. He
returned to London on the following day without molestation from the
crowd, although this could not be said of the departure of the
French and Russian Ambassadors. He closed his report with a
compliment to the American Ambassador, Mr. Gerard, for assistance
rendered by him in these trying times.
_France._ A message from President Poincaré was read at a
extraordinary session of Parliament, the members of which remained
standing during the reading. This announced the "violent and
premeditated" attack on France by Germany in "insolent defiance of
the law of nations" being delivered before any declaration of war,
and asking for passports by the German Ambassador at Paris. The
president recounted the pacific course of Frenchmen in "burying at
the bottom of their heart the desire for legitimate reparation, of
the wrong done their country by Germany in 1871, and in using their
rejuvenated strength in the interest of progress and for the good of
humanity." In particular he spoke of the efforts France had made for
peace since Austria's ultimatum to Serbia. He solemnly declared
"that France had made up to the last moment supreme efforts to
avert the war now about to break out, the crushing responsibility
for which the German Empire will have to bear before history.
(_Unanimous and repeated applause._)
"On the very morrow of the day when we and our allies were
publicly expressing our hope of seeing negotiations which had
been begun under the auspices of the London Cabinet carried to a
peaceful conclusion Germany suddenly declared war upon Russia;
she has invaded the territory of Luxemburg; she has outrageously
insulted the noble Belgian nation (_loud applause_), our neighbor
and our friend, and attempted treacherously to fall upon us while
we were in the midst of diplomatic conversation. (_Fresh and
repeated applause._)
"But France was watching. As alert as she was peaceful, she was
prepared; and our enemies will meet on their path our valiant
covering troops, who are at their post and will provide the
screen behind which the mobilization of our national forces will
be methodically completed....
"In the war which is beginning France will have right on her
side, the eternal power of which cannot with impunity be
disregarded by nations any more than by individuals. (_Loud
applause._)
"She will be heroically defended by all her sons; nothing will
break their sacred union before the enemy; to-day they are joined
together as brothers in a common indignation against the
aggressor, and in a common patriotic faith. (_Loud and prolonged
applause and cries of 'Vive la France.'_)
"She is faithfully helped by Russia, her ally (_loud applause_);
she is supported by the loyal friendship of Great Britain. (_Loud
applause._)
"And already from every part of the civilized world sympathy and
good wishes are coming to her. For to-day once again she stands
before the universe for liberty, justice, and reason (_loud and
repeated applause_) 'Haut les coeurs et vive la France!'[4]
(_Prolonged applause._)"
[Footnote 4: Lift up your hearts, and long live France!]
M. Viviani, the Prime Minister, spoke before the Chamber of
Deputies. He recounted those actions of Germany in relation to the
Austro-Serbian crisis on which the light of subsequent events cast a
sinister interpretation. He gave the fabricated complaints against
France for violating German territory presented by Ambassador von
Schoen plainly to offset the true charges made by France of German
violation of French territory, and declared:
"At no time has any French aviator penetrated into Belgium, nor
has any French aviator committed either in Bavaria or any other
part of Germany any hostile act. The opinion of Europe has
already done justice to these wretched inventions. (_Loud
applause._)
"Against these attacks, which violate all the laws of justice and
all the principles of public law, we have now taken all the
necessary steps; they are being carried out strictly, regularly,
and with calmness.
"The mobilization of the Russian army also continues with
remarkable vigor and unrestrained enthusiasm. (_Prolonged
applause, all the deputies rising from their seats._) The Belgian
army, mobilized with 250,000 men, prepares with a splendid
passion and magnificent ardor to defend the neutrality and
independence of their country. (_Renewed applause._)
"The entire British fleet is mobilized and orders have been given
to mobilize the land forces. (_Loud cheers, all the deputies
rising to their feet._)"
_Belgium._ Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, reported to
M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Brussels, that Holland
intended to institute war buoying on the Scheldt (Dutch river
leading to Antwerp in Belgium). The river would be closed at night
only, and navigation by day would be under Dutch pilots. Belgian
lightships must be withdrawn from Dutch territory to facilitate
maintenance of its neutrality.
M. Davignon presented passports to German Minister von Below
Saleske. The minister intrusted the custody of the German Legation
to the American Minister, Brand Whitlock. The Belgian Minister,
Baron Beyens, at Berlin, asked for his passports. Before leaving he
telegraphed a report of the German Chancellor's speech to the
Reichstag on the "infamous" violation of Belgian neutrality.
"It is noteworthy that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg recognizes
without the slightest disguise, that Germany is violating
international law by her invasion of Belgian territory, and that
she is committing a wrong against us."
Count de Lalaing, Minister at London, telegraphed that Sir Edward
Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had informed the British
Ministers in Norway, Holland, and Belgium
"that Great Britain expects that these three kingdoms will resist
German pressure and observe neutrality. Should they resist they
will have the support of Great Britain, who is ready in that
event, should the three above-mentioned Governments desire it, to
join France and Russia in offering an alliance to the said
Governments for the purpose of resisting the use of force by
Germany against them, and a guaranty to maintain the future
independence and integrity of the three kingdoms. I observed to
him that Belgium was neutral in perpetuity. The Minister for
Foreign Affairs answered: This is in case her neutrality is
violated."
M. Davignon reported to the ministers at Paris, London, and St.
Petersburg all the important diplomatic happenings respecting
Belgium from July 31 to the appeal to the powers to guarantee
Belgian neutrality, which was under present deliberation.
M. Davignon appealed to Great Britain, France, and Russia to
cooperate as guarantors of her territory and independence, and to
employ concerted action to resist by force German violation of the
same, and at the same time
"to guarantee the future maintenance of the independence and
integrity of Belgium.
"Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will undertake
the defense of her fortified places."
King Albert made an address to the Belgian Parliament which closed
as follows:
"The army is equal to its task. The Government and myself have
full confidence. The Government understands its responsibilities
and will maintain them till the end to safeguard the supreme good
of the country. If the stranger violates our territory he will
find all Belgians gathered round their sovereign, who will never
betray his constitutional oath.
"I have faith in our destinies. A country which defends itself
imposes respect on all and does not perish. God will be with us."
War was now on between Russia, France, Great Britain and Belgium on
the one side, and Germany, soon and certainly to be joined by
Austria-Hungary, on the other. While the diplomatic controversy
continued, it was over minor subjects, such as what understanding, if
any, had existed before the war between Great Britain and Belgium with
reference to the former landing an expeditionary force on the soil of
the latter in event of hostilities with Germany. By August 5, 1914,
all the main evidence which the belligerent powers chose to present
was before the court of the world's opinion. It has here been given in
as full a form as the exigency of space has permitted, and in that
impartial manner which a strict observance of editorial ethics
insures. The editor has refrained from cross-references indicating a
conflict of evidence, since this could not be made without exercising
a judicial function into which biased opinion might creep. It will be
easy for the reader to make these comparisons for himself, because of
the listing of the correspondence by countries and dates. A careful
study of the data here given should afford everyone an answer to the
solemn inquiry, the greatest ever put before the civilized world: Who
was responsible for the war?
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