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Charles Bradlaugh
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Title: The True Story of my Parliamentary Struggle
Author: Charles Bradlaugh
Release Date: September 10, 2011 [EBook #37374]
Language: English
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THE TRUE STORY
OF
MY PARLIAMENTARY
STRUGGLE.
BY
CHARLES BRADLAUGH.
[Illustration]
LONDON:
FREETHOUGHT PUBLISHING COMPANY,
28, STONECUTTER STREET, E.C.
1882.
PRICE SIXPENCE
LONDON:
PRINTED BY ANNIE BESANT AND CHARLES BRADLAUGH,
28, STONECUTTER STREET, E.C.
So much misapprehension and misrepresentation prevails as to what has
really taken place in the House of Commons with reference to my
Parliamentary struggle, that I reprint the Report of the Second Select
Committee and the Evidence taken before such Committee, together with my
three speeches at the bar and the resolutions of the House: these
together giving the actual facts.
_Ordered_,--[Tuesday, 25th May 1880]:--THAT Mr. Bradlaugh, the Member for
Northampton, having claimed at the Table of this House to make an
Affirmation or Declaration instead of the Oath prescribed by Law,
founding his claim upon the terms of the Act 29 & 30 Vict. c. 19, and the
Evidence Amendment Acts of 1869 and 1870, and stating that he had been
permitted to affirm in Courts of Justice by virtue of the said Evidence
Amendment Acts: And it having been referred to a Select Committee to
consider and report their opinion whether persons entitled, under the
provisions of the Evidence Amendment Act, 1869, and the Evidence
Amendment Act, 1870, to make a solemn Declaration instead of an Oath in
Courts of Justice, may be admitted to make an Affirmation or Declaration
instead of an Oath in this House, in pursuance of the Acts 29 & 30 Vict.
c. 19, and 31 & 32 Vict. c. 72; And the said Committee having reported
that in their opinion such persons cannot be admitted to make an
Affirmation or Declaration, instead of an Oath in pursuance of the said
Acts:
And Mr. Bradlaugh having since come to the Table of the House for the
purpose of taking the Oath prescribed by the 29 & 30 Vict. c. 19, and the
31 & 32 Vict. c. 72, and objection having been made to his taking the
said Oath, it be referred to a Select Committee to inquire into and
consider the facts and circumstances under which Mr. Bradlaugh claims to
have the Oath prescribed by the 29 & 30 Vict. c. 19, and 31 & 32 Vict. c.
72, administered to him in this House, and also as to the Law applicable
to such claim under such circumstances, and as to the right and
jurisdiction of this House to refuse to allow the said form of the Oath
to be administered to him, and to report thereon to the House, together
with their opinion thereon.
_Ordered_,--[Friday, 28th May 1880]:--THAT the Committee do consist of
twenty-three Members.
Committee nominated of--
Mr. Whitbread.
Sir John Holker.
Mr. John Bright.
Lord Henry Lennox.
Mr. Massey.
Mr. Staveley Hill.
Sir Henry Jackson.
Mr. Attorney General.
Mr. Solicitor General.
Sir Gabriel Goldney.
Mr. Grantham.
Mr. Pemberton.
Mr. Watkin Williams.
Mr. Walpole.
Mr. Hopwood.
Mr. Beresford Hope.
Major Nolan.
Mr. Chaplin.
Mr. Serjeant Simon.
Mr. Secretary Childers.
Mr. Trevelyan.
Sir Richard Cross.
Mr. Gibson.
THAT the Committee have power to send for Persons, Papers, and Records.
THAT Five be the Quorum of the Committee.
REPORT.
THE SELECT COMMITTEE appointed to inquire into and consider the facts
and circumstances under which Mr. BRADLAUGH claims to have the OATH
prescribed by the 29 & 30 Vict., c. 19, and 31 and 32 Vict., c. 72,
administered to him in this House; and also as to the LAW
applicable to such claim under such circumstances; and as to the
right and jurisdiction of this House to refuse to allow the said
form of the OATH to be administered to him; and to Report thereon
to the House, together with their Opinion thereon:--HAVE agreed to
the following REPORT:--
In pursuance of the terms of the reference to your Committee, they have
inquired into and considered (1) the facts and circumstances under which
Mr. Bradlaugh claims to have the oath prescribed by the Parliamentary
Oaths Act, 1866, and the Promissory Oaths Act, 1868, administered to him
in the House, (2) the Law applicable to such claim under such
circumstances, and (3) the right and jurisdiction of the House to refuse
to allow the form of the said Oath to be administered to him.
In order to carry out such inquiry and consideration, your Committee
thought it right to examine Sir T. Erskine May as a witness before them.
Mr. Bradlaugh applied to be permitted to make a statement to your
Committee, and the application was granted. After such statement had been
made by Mr. Bradlaugh, he submitted himself for examination, and was
examined by any Members of your Committee who desired to put questions to
him. Under the circumstances appearing in the Evidence and in the
Appendix to this Report, your Committee admitted in evidence a letter
written by Mr. Bradlaugh to certain newspapers, dated 20th May, 1880. All
the evidence taken by your Committee appears in the Appendix to this
Report.
_Facts of the Case._
The facts and circumstances under which Mr. Bradlaugh claimed to take and
subscribe the Oath are as follow: On Monday, the 3rd of May, Mr.
Bradlaugh came to the Table of the House and claimed to be allowed to
affirm, as a person for the time being by law permitted to make a solemn
affirmation instead of taking an oath; and on being asked by the Clerk
upon what grounds he claimed to make an affirmation, he said that he did
so by virtue of the Evidence Amendment Acts, 1869 and 1870. Whereupon Mr.
Speaker informed Mr. Bradlaugh, "that if he desired to address the House
in explanation of his claim, he might be permitted to do so." In
accordance with Mr. Speaker's intimation, Mr. Bradlaugh stated shortly
that he relied on the Evidence Further Amendment Act, 1869, and the
Evidence Amendment Act, 1870, adding, "I have repeatedly, for nine years
past, made an affirmation in the highest courts of jurisdiction in this
realm; I am ready to make such a declaration or affirmation." Thereupon
Mr. Speaker acquainted the House that Mr. Bradlaugh having made such
claim, he did not consider himself justified in determining it; and
having grave doubts on the construction of the Acts above stated, he
desired to refer the matter to the judgment of the House. Thereupon a
Select Committee was appointed to consider and report their opinion
whether persons entitled, under the provisions of the Evidence Amendment
Acts, 1869 and 1870, to make a solemn declaration instead of an oath in
courts of justice, might be admitted to make an affirmation or
declaration instead of an oath, in pursuance of the Acts 29 & 30 Vict. c.
19, and 31 & 32 Vict. c. 72; and on the 20th of May the Committee
reported that, in their opinion, persons so entitled could not be
admitted to make such affirmation or declaration instead of an oath in
the House of Commons.
On the day after the receipt of this Report, Mr. Bradlaugh presented
himself at the table of the House to take and subscribe the Oath; and was
proceeding to do so, when Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, one of the Members
for Portsmouth, objected thereto, and Mr. Bradlaugh having been ordered
to withdraw, Sir H. D. Wolff moved, "That, in the opinion of the House,
Mr. Bradlaugh, the Member for Northampton, ought not to be allowed to
take the Oath which he then required to be administered to him, in
consequence of his having previously claimed to make an affirmation or
declaration instead of the Oath prescribed by law, founding his claim
upon the terms of the Act 29 & 30 Vict. c. 19, and the Evidence Amendment
Acts of 1869 and 1870; and on the ground that under the provisions of
those Acts the presiding judge at a trial has been satisfied that the
taking of an oath would have no binding effects on his conscience." This
Motion was superseded by an Amendment appointing your Committee.
_The Law Applicable to Mr. Bradlaugh's Claim._
Your Committee have been furnished by Sir T. Erskine May with a list of
precedents which illustrate the jurisdiction and proceedings of the House
in regard to the taking of Oaths. These precedents, and others which Mr.
Bradlaugh placed before your Committee as bearing on the case, will be
found in the Appendix to this Report. They may generally be divided into
three classes: first, cases of refusal to take the Oath; secondly, claims
to make an Affirmation, instead of taking the Oath; and, thirdly, claims
to omit a portion of the Oath of Abjuration. Among them there is no
precedent of any Member coming to the table to take and subscribe the
Oath, who has not been allowed to do so, nor of any Member coming to the
table and intimating expressly, or by necessary implication, that an oath
would not, as an oath, be binding on his conscience. The present case is,
therefore, one of first impression.
Now there is not only a _prima facie_ right, but it is the duty of every
Member who has been duly elected to take and subscribe the Oath, or to
affirm according to the Statute. No instance has been brought to the
attention of your Committee in which any inquiry has been made into the
moral, religious, or political opinion of the person who was desirous to
take any Promissory Oath, or of any objection being made to his taking
such Oath. It would be impossible to foresee the evils which might arise
if a contrary practice were sanctioned. But the question remains whether,
if a Member when about to take the Oath should voluntarily make
statements as to the binding effect of the Oath on his conscience, it is
not within the power of the House to take such statements into
consideration, and determine whether such member would, if he went
through the form of taking the Oath, be duly taking it within the
provisions of the Statute. In the present instance, when Mr. Bradlaugh
claimed under the Parliamentary Oaths Acts his right to affirm, and also
stated that he had on several occasions been permitted in a Court of
Justice to affirm, and had affirmed under the Evidence Amendment Acts,
1869 and 1870, he thereby in effect informed the House that on such
occasions a judge of such court had been satisfied that an oath would
have no binding effect upon his conscience. Your Committee did not think
it right to accept this implication as conclusive without permitting Mr.
Bradlaugh an opportunity of making a statement to, and giving evidence
before, them. Nothing that has come before your Committee has affected or
altered their views as to the effect of that which occurred when Mr.
Bradlaugh claimed to affirm, as above stated.
_As to the Right and Jurisdiction of the House._
As to the right and jurisdiction of the House to refuse to allow the form
of the Oath prescribed to be taken by duly elected Members to be taken by
them, your Committee are of opinion that there is and must be an inherent
power in the House to require that the law by which the proceedings of
the House and of its Members in reference to the taking of the
Parliamentary Oath is regulated, be duly observed. But this does not
imply that there is any power in the House to interrogate any Member
desirous to take the Oath of Allegiance upon any subject in connection
with his religious belief, or as to the extent the Oath will bind his
conscience; or that there is any power in the House to hear any evidence
in relation to such matters.
And your Committee are of opinion that by and in making the claim to
affirm, Mr. Bradlaugh voluntarily brought to the notice of the House that
on several occasions he had been permitted in a Court of Justice to
affirm, under the Evidence Amendment Acts, 1869 and 1870, in order to
enable him to do which a Judge of the Court must have been satisfied that
an Oath was not binding upon Mr. Bradlaugh's conscience; and, as he
stated he had acted upon such decisions by repeatedly making the
Affirmation in Courts of Justice; and, as above stated, nothing has
appeared before your Committee to cause them to think Mr. Bradlaugh
dissented from the correctness of such decisions, your Committee are of
opinion that, under the circumstances, the compliance by Mr. Bradlaugh
with the form used when an oath is taken would not be the taking of an
Oath within the true meaning of the Statutes 29 Vict. c. 19. and 31 & 32
Vict. c. 72; and, therefore, that the House can, and in the opinion of
your Committee ought, to prevent Mr. Bradlaugh going through this form.
But your Committee desire to point out to your Honorable House the
position in which Mr. Bradlaugh will be placed if he is not allowed
either to take the Oath or to affirm.
If the House of Commons prevent a duly elected Member from taking the
Oath or Affirming, there is no power of reviewing or reversing that
decision, however erroneous it may be in point of law.
But it appears to your Committee that if a Member should make and
subscribe the Affirmation in place of taking and subscribing the Oath, it
would be possible, by means of an action brought in the High Court of
Justice, to test his legal right to make such Affirmation.
The Committee appointed to inquire into the law relating to the right of
certain persons to affirm in effect recorded that Mr. Bradlaugh was not
entitled by law to make the Affirmation.
But, from the fact that this Report was carried by the vote of the
Chairman, thus showing a great division of opinion amongst the members of
that Committee, the state of the law upon the subject cannot be regarded
as satisfactorily determined. Under these circumstances it appears to
your Committee that Mr. Bradlaugh should have an opportunity of having
his statutory rights determined beyond doubt by being allowed to take the
only step by which the legality of his making an Affirmation can be
brought for decision before the High Court of Justice.
The House, by an exercise of its powers, can, doubtless, prevent Mr.
Bradlaugh from obtaining such judicial decision; but your Committee
deprecate that course.
Your Committee accordingly recommend that should Mr. Bradlaugh again seek
to make and subscribe the Affirmation he be not prevented from so doing.
_16 June, 1880._
LIST OF WITNESSES.
_Wednesday, 2nd June, 1880._
SIR THOMAS ERSKINE MAY, K.C.B.
MR. CHARLES BRADLAUGH, M.P.
_Monday, 7th June, 1880._
MR. CHARLES BRADLAUGH, M.P.
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.
_Wednesday, 2nd June, 1880._
MEMBERS PRESENT:
Mr. Attorney General.
Mr. John Bright.
Mr. Childers.
Sir Richard Cross.
Mr. Gibson.
Sir Gabriel Goldney.
Mr. Grantham.
Mr. Staveley Hill.
Sir John Holker.
Mr. Beresford Hope.
Mr. Hopwood.
Sir Henry Jackson.
Lord Henry Lennox.
Mr. Massey.
Major Nolan.
Mr. Pemberton.
Mr. Serjeant Simon.
Mr. Solicitor General.
Mr. Trevelyan.
Mr. Walpole.
Mr. Whitbread.
Mr. Watkin Williams.
The Right Honorable SPENCER HORATIO WALPOLE in the Chair.
Sir THOMAS ERSKINE MAY, K.C.B.; Examined.
1. CHAIRMAN: You are the Clerk of the House of Commons?--I am.
2. You, I believe, are perfectly acquainted with what took place when Mr.
Bradlaugh came to the table of the House, and proposed to make his
affirmation instead of taking the oath?--Yes, I was personally present on
that day.
3. Will you have the kindness to state to the Committee exactly what took
place on that occasion, in order that we may have the facts upon our
proceedings?--I will read what occurred, mainly from the Votes and
Proceedings of the House, in which an accurate and authentic record of
the proceedings of that day will be found. It appears that on Monday the
3rd of May, 1880, "Mr. Bradlaugh, returned as one of the Members for the
borough of Northampton, came to the table and delivered the following
statement in writing to the Clerk: 'To the Right Honorable the Speaker of
the House of Commons. I, the undersigned Charles Bradlaugh, beg
respectfully to claim to be allowed to affirm, as a person for the time
being by law permitted to make a solemn affirmation or declaration,
instead of taking an oath. (Signed) CHARLES BRADLAUGH.' And being asked
by the Clerk upon what grounds he claimed to make an affirmation, he
answered: By virtue of the Evidence Amendment Acts, 1869 and 1870.
Whereupon the Clerk reported to Mr. Speaker, that Mr. Bradlaugh, Member
for the borough of Northampton, claimed to make an affirmation or
declaration instead of taking the Oath prescribed by law, in virtue of
the provisions of the Evidence Amendment Acts, 1869 and 1870. Mr. Speaker
thereupon informed Mr. Bradlaugh that if he desired to address the House
in explanation of his claim he might be permitted to do so. Mr. Bradlaugh
addressed the House in accordance with Mr. Speaker's intimation, and then
he was directed to withdraw." The Committee will observe that there is no
entry in the Votes of the words used by Mr. Bradlaugh; it is not
customary on such occasions to make an entry of the observations made,
which are considered to be part of the debates of the House, which are
not recorded in the Votes and Proceedings; and there was no shorthand
writer authorised by the House to take notes, and therefore there could
have been no authentic record upon which one could rely.
4. Have you any reason to believe that something was said upon that
occasion by Mr. Bradlaugh other than what appeared upon the Votes?--Mr.
Bradlaugh's observations were very short. He repeated that he relied upon
the Evidence Further Amendment Act, 1869, and the Evidence Amendment Act,
1870, adding, "I have repeatedly, for nine years past, made an
affirmation in the highest courts of jurisdiction in this realm; I am
ready to make such a declaration or affirmation." Substantially those
were the words which he addressed to the Speaker.
5. What took place after that?--Whereupon Mr. Speaker addressed the House
as follows: "I have now formally to acquaint the House that Mr.
Bradlaugh, Member for the borough of Northampton, claims to make an
affirmation or declaration instead of the oath prescribed by law. He
founds this claim upon the terms of the 4th clause of the Act 29 and 30
Vict., c. 19, and the Evidence Amendment Acts, 1869 and 1870. I have not
considered myself justified in determining this claim myself, having
grave doubts on the construction of the Acts above stated, but desire to
refer the matter to the judgment of the House."
6. That is substantially all that took place upon that occasion?--I
presume the Committee will scarcely desire that I should proceed through
all the subsequent Votes of the House in regard to the appointment of the
Committees.
7. There is nothing beyond what you have stated which is material for the
Committee to consider?--No, nothing besides what happened on that day in
reference to this matter.
8. You are, of course, acquainted with the terms of the reference to this
Committee.--Yes.
9. What were the proceedings which took place after the Report of the
former Committee?--The Report of the Committee was ordered to lie upon
the table, and no further proceedings were taken upon it; it lies upon
the table at present.
10. Mr. GIBSON: On what day was it laid upon the table?--On the 20th of
May, the day on which the House assembled for business.
11. Mr. ATTORNEY GENERAL: I think some of the members of the Committee
would like to have some account of what took place in the interval
between the time when Mr. Bradlaugh claimed to make the affirmation, and
the time when he appeared at the table to take the Oath?--Mr. Bradlaugh
presented himself at the table to be sworn on the 21st of May, the day
after the receipt of the Report from the Committee; and if the Committee
would desire it, I can read from the Minutes what took place upon that
occasion. "Mr. Bradlaugh, returned as one of the Members for the borough
of Northampton, came to the table to take and subscribe the Oath, and the
Clerk was proceeding to administer the same to him, when Sir Henry
Drummond Wolff, Member for Portsmouth, rose to take objection thereto,
and submit a motion to the House; whereupon Mr. Speaker directed Mr.
Bradlaugh to withdraw." And then, as the Committee are aware, several
proceedings occurred, which extended over some days: the Committee will
scarcely desire them to be read.
12. CHAIRMAN: Those proceedings are really stated in the Order of
Reference to this Committee?--Yes.
13. Mr. GIBSON: At what date did this Parliament meet for the first
time?--On Thursday, the 29th of April.
14. And on what day did Mr. Bradlaugh claim to make the affirmation?--On
Monday, the 3rd of May.
15. The swearing of Members had been going on in the meantime, had it
not?--The swearing of Members began on Friday, the 30th of April.
16. You are acquainted with Mr. Bradlaugh's appearance; are you yourself
aware whether he had been in the House during the swearing of Members on
any of the intervening days?--He had been about the House,
unquestionably.
17. Mr. Serjeant SIMON: Mr. Bradlaugh was present, I believe, and voted
when the Speaker was elected?--Yes; none of the members had then been
sworn.
18. CHAIRMAN: Since this Committee has been appointed have you made a
search into the Journals of the House for any precedents which bear upon
the question before the Committee?--Yes, I directed the Clerk of the
Journals to make a search for every precedent which would tend to
illustrate the jurisdiction and proceedings of the House in regard to the
taking of oaths.
19. What is the result of the search?--The result of that search is the
paper which is upon the table to-day, and in the hands of all the Members
of the Committee.
20. I see that one of those is a precedent of a Member disabled for
having sat in the House without taking the Oath; then there is a
precedent of a Member being admitted to sit without taking the Oath of
Allegiance and Supremacy; then there are precedents of Members being
discharged for declining to take the Oath; then there is a precedent of a
Member, being a Quaker, refusing to take the Oath; then there is a
precedent of a Member expelled for absconding, and not taking the Oath;
then there is a precedent of a Member refusing to take the Oath of
Supremacy; then there is a precedent of a Member, being a Quaker,
claiming to make an affirmation; then there are precedents of Members
omitting the words in the Oath of Abjuration, "on the true faith of a
Christian;" and lastly, the precedent of a Member stating that he had a
conscientious objection to take the Oath. I should like to ask whether
there is any precedent amongst those of a member coming to the table and
stating that he was ready to take the Oath, and any objection being taken
to him in consequence of that statement?--No, there is no precedent to
that effect, unless it might be argued that the case of Mr. O'Connell, in
1829, was, to a certain extent, analogous. He claimed, as the Committee
are aware, to take the Oath recently provided by the Catholic Relief Act,
and which, he contended, was the oath that he was entitled to take; it
was a question of law whether that was the oath which he could take.
21. In that case he refused to take the old oath, and he offered to take
the new oath under the Catholic Relief Act?--That is so.
22. And the House refused, I believe, to allow him to take that
oath?--That was the case. I may state briefly that these precedents may
generally be divided into three classes: first, cases of refusal to take
the oath; secondly, claims to make an affirmation instead of taking the
oath; and thirdly, claims to omit a portion of the Oath of Abjuration.
With one or two exceptional cases, those three classes comprehend all the
cases which have been laid before the Committee.
23. Mr. BRADLAUGH (through the Committee): I should like to ask upon
that whether the case of Daniel O'Connell was not a case of absolute
refusal by the Member to take the oath required by law?--I think the best
way will be, perhaps, to read the precedent from this paper, and then any
inference can be drawn from it. It is at page 5. "Precedent of Member
refusing to take the Oath of Supremacy; Daniel O'Connell, Esq.,
professing the Roman Catholic religion, returned knight of the shire for
the county of Clare, being introduced in the usual manner, for the
purpose of taking his seat, produced at the table a certificate of his
having been sworn before two of the deputies appointed by the Lord
Stewart, whereupon the Clerk tendered to him the Oaths of Allegiance,
Supremacy, and Abjuration; upon which Mr. O'Connell stated that he was
ready to take the Oaths of Allegiance and Abjuration, but that he could
not take the Oath of Supremacy, and claimed the privilege of being
allowed to take the oath set forth in the Act passed in the present
Session of Parliament 'for the relief of His Majesty's Roman Catholic
subjects'; whereupon the Clerk having stated the matter to Mr. Speaker,
Mr. Speaker informed Mr. O'Connell that, according to his interpretation
of the law, it was incumbent upon Mr. O'Connell to take the Oaths of
Allegiance, Supremacy and Abjuration, and that the provisions of the new
act applied only to Members returned after the commencement of the said
Act, except in so far as regarded the repeal of the declaration against
transubstantiation; And that Mr. O'Connell must withdraw unless he were
prepared to take the Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy, and Abjuration.
Whereupon Mr. O'Connell withdrew. Motion, That Mr. O'Connell be called
back and heard at the table. Debate arising, a Member stated that he was
requested by Mr. O'Connell to desire that he might be heard. Debate
adjourned. Resolved, That Mr. O'Connell, the Member for Clare, be heard
at the bar, by himself, his counsel or agents, in respect of his claim to
sit and vote in Parliament without taking the Oath of Supremacy. Mr.
O'Connell was called in and heard accordingly: and being withdrawn;
Resolved, That it is the opinion of this House that Mr. O'Connell, having
been returned a Member of this House before the commencement of the Act
passed in this Session of Parliament 'for the relief of His Majesty's
Roman Catholic subjects,' is not entitled to sit or vote in this House
unless he first take the Oath of Supremacy. Ordered, That Mr. O'Connell
do attend the House this day, and that Mr. Speaker do then communicate to
him the said resolution, and ask him whether he will take the Oath of
Supremacy. And the House being informed that Mr. O'Connell attended at
the door, he was called to the Bar, and Mr. Speaker communicated to him
the resolution of the House of yesterday, and the order thereon, as
followeth." Then the resolution and the order are repeated. "And then Mr.
Speaker, pursuant to the said order, asked Mr. O'Connell whether he would
take the said Oath of Supremacy? Whereupon Mr. O'Connell requested to see
the said Oath, which being shown to him accordingly, Mr. O'Connell stated
that the said Oath contained one proposition which he knew to be false,
and another proposition which he believed to be untrue; and that he
therefore refused to take the said Oath of Supremacy. And then Mr.
O'Connell was directed to withdraw, and he withdrew accordingly;" and
then a new writ was ordered.
24. Mr. JOHN BRIGHT: Were those oaths separate oaths?--Yes, they were
three separate oaths.
25. And they require three separate acts in taking them?--Yes.
26. Mr. ATTORNEY GENERAL: I think the result is that the House first
determined that the Oath of Supremacy which ought to be taken by Mr.
O'Connell was the old oath, and not the oath under the Catholic Relief
Act?--Clearly.
27. And having determined that it was the old oath that required to be
taken, Mr. O'Connell refused to take it?--Certainly.
28. Mr. BRADLAUGH (through the Committee): Have you searched for any
precedent affecting the taking of the oath by a Member alleged to be
disqualified or ineligible; has your attention been called to the case of
John Horne Tooke, in Volume 35 of Parliamentary History, in the year
1801, commencing at page 956?--Not in respect of any question relating to
oaths: it is not amongst these precedents.
29. As a fact, was Mr. John Horne Tooke's capacity to sit in the House
challenged in this case?--Yes, as being in Holy Orders, but not in
relation to any question of taking the oath.
30. The next question that I have to ask is whether your attention has
been called to the case of the alleged ineligibility of Francis Bacon,
the King's Attorney General, in 1614, cited in the Commons Journal,
Volume I., pp. 459 and 460?--No, my attention has not been directed to
any questions of incapacity: it has been confined to questions arising
out of the taking of the oaths prescribed by law.
31. There is one other question that I should like to ask, and that is
whether your attention has been called to any case in which the House has
discussed and dealt with the election of a Member, before that Committee
was sworn?--With regard to the Jews, that would apply to Baron Rothschild
and to Alderman Salomons.
32. I do not mean a case of a Member refusing to be sworn, but a case in
which the House has dealt with the election before the Member had been
sworn; has your attention been called to that?--No.
33. There is one case, the case of John Wilkes; the cases of O'Donovan
Rossa and Mitchell were cases of legal disability; has your attention
been called to any case in which the House has dealt with the election of
a Member before he was sworn except for statutory disability?--Sir John
Leedes sat in the House without having taken the Oath, and therefore he
had clearly vacated his seat, and a new writ was issued.
34. I mean a case in which the Member has not been sworn, and in which
there has been a discussion upon his eligibility outside the precedents
which you have handed in; I refer to the case of John Wilkes, which is to
be found in 38 Commons Journals, p. 977, and Cavendish's Parliamentary
Debates, Volume I., extending over many hundred pages, commencing at 827.
May I ask Sir Erskine May whether the practice has not been that when a
Member appears to take the Oaths within the limited time, all other
business is immediately to cease and not to be resumed until he has sworn
and has subscribed the roll?--That was the old practice, but it has been
superseded by a recent Standing Order under the Parliamentary Oaths Act
of 1866, and the rule is now different; Members can be sworn until the
commencement of public business and afterwards; but no debate or business
may be interrupted for that purpose.
35. That is not quite the question that I wish to put; the question that
I wish to put is whether it is not now and has not always been the
practice of the House that within a limited time, whatever that time may
be, if a Member appears to take the oaths all other business is
immediately to cease and not to be resumed until he has been sworn and
has subscribed the Roll?--That was the old practice, when the oaths were
required to be taken before four o'clock, but it has since been altered.
This is the present Standing Order under which the oaths are
administered, and this order was made in pursuance of the Parliamentary
Oaths Act of 1866: "That Members may take and subscribe the Oath required
by law at any time during the sitting of the House before the Orders of
the Day and Notices of Motions have been entered upon, or after they have
been disposed of, but no debate or business shall be interrupted for that
purpose."
36. Then I again repeat my question, whether the practice has not been
that a Member so appearing under the Standing Order just read to take the
oath, all other business is immediately to cease and not to be resumed
until he has been sworn and has subscribed the Roll?--I have already
stated that such was the old practice, which has been distinctly and
specifically superseded by the last Standing Order, which is now in
force.
37. Is that the Standing Order which you have just read?--Yes, that is
the Standing Order now in force.
38. Of course it will be a matter for argument whether it has altered it
or not, but is there any other Order altering this practice except the
one which you have just read?--There is no other Standing Order, and that
Standing Order was made, as I have already stated, in pursuance of the
Parliamentary Oaths Act of 1866, which authorised the House to make
regulations with regard to the swearing of Members.
39. But except so far as it may have been altered by the Standing Order
which you have just read, was the practice that a Member appearing to
take the oath all other business was to cease, and not to be resumed
until he had sworn and subscribed the Roll?--Yes, certainly.
40. Mr. ATTORNEY GENERAL: The present Standing Order is dated the 30th
April, 1866, is it not?--It is.
41. Mr. BRADLAUGH (through the Committee): Are you aware that the House
has refused to make any inquiry as to what is consistent, or what is not
consistent with the Oath of Allegiance taken by a Member?--I presume that
the reference must be to a case which arose in debate. That I do not
consider, in any way, in point in the present inquiry, but the question
was this: "In one case an attempt was made to obtain from a Member who
was about to bring forward a motion, a repudiation of statements made
elsewhere, which were alleged to be at variance with the oath he had
taken; but the Speaker stated that it was no part of his duty to
determine what was consistent with that oath, and that the terms of the
motion were not in violation of any rules of the House." That was a point
of Order, and had no reference whatever to the taking of the Oath.
42. Mr. ATTORNEY GENERAL: What was the motion?--It is in the 210th volume
of "Hansard's Debates," 3rd Series, page 252. It is at page 197 of my
book, in a note.
43. Mr. JOHN BRIGHT: In what year?--On the 19th March, 1872; there is
merely an incidental reference to it.
44. Mr. BRADLAUGH (through the Committee): Are you aware of any precedent
for the dealing by the House with the election of any Member not
disqualified by statute or common law, until after that Member had sat
and been sworn?--My attention has not been directed to any precedent
bearing upon that precise point, but I apprehend that the fact of whether
the Member had been sworn or not would not interfere with any
proceedings. For example, under an election petition, if a Member's seat
were contested, under the old system, the matter would have proceeded in
the usual way, without reference to the question of whether the Member
had taken the Oath or not.
45. But in such a case the Member would have been sworn, and would have
sat until the question was decided?--Not necessarily; under the terms of
the question I assume that he had not taken his seat.
46. Are there not very numerous cases in which with a petition against a
Member for alleged statutory disqualification that Member has been sworn
and has sat until the decision?--Unquestionably; there can be no doubt
about it; it frequently happens.
47. Then I ask whether there is any precedent whatever for the House
dealing with a Member's election or his right to sit, except in cases of
absolute statutory disqualification, until that Member has taken his seat
and the oaths?--So far as I understand the question, I should say that
whether the Member has been sworn, or not, the matter of his
disqualification, or of his right to sit would be open to the decision of
the House.
48. I am not arguing the point at the moment; I am only trying to get at
the fact. If you have not looked for it, of course I cannot have it; but
is there, so far as you know, any precedent of such a thing ever having
happened?--I know of none; but I have not searched for any such
precedent.
49. Mr. ATTORNEY GENERAL: It would not appear, would it?--I hardly know
how it would appear; unless one's attention were specifically drawn to
any case, there would be no means of discovering it.
50. Mr. BRADLAUGH (through the Committee): I will ask whether that
question was not raised in the case of Wilkes, and whether it was not in
the consideration of that case fully discussed, and whether the House did
not resolve that any such dealing with a member was subversive of the
rights of the whole body of electors of this kingdom?--I do not
understand how that case has any bearing upon the present question.
51. There are three cases: one of expulsion, two of election annulled,
and then ultimate reversal of the whole of that and expungment by the
House?--Yes, but that has no bearing upon the present case. Of course, I
am familiar with the case of Wilkes, but not in connection with any
matter arising out of the administration of oaths, which is the special
matter referred to this Committee.
52. Have you had your attention called to the Journal of the House of
Commons, Vol. I., page 460, in which Sir Francis Bacon, the King's
Attorney General, having sworn to his qualification, which was
challenged, the House said, "Their oath, their own consciences to look
into, not we to examine it?"--That case is not one of the precedents that
we have collected.
Mr. BRADLAUGH: They are entered extremely curiously, and one
can only take the decision. It begins on page 459, "Eligibility
of the Attorney General," and it does not show there that it is
Sir Francis Bacon: but I have learnt that by looking up the
other records; and there being then a statutory declaration
which lasted until a few years ago for all counsel, solicitors,
and practising men of the law, it was objected that the King's
Attorney General could not sit; it appears that he had to swear
to his qualification, and the question of his oath and of his
disqualification, being Attorney General, were put, and the
House said, "Their oath, their own consciences to look into,
not we to examine it," and they left him in the House,
resolving that no future Attorney General should sit in it.
CHAIRMAN: That was the case which was raised as to whether the
law officers of the Crown, who had for certain purposes seats
in the House of Lords, had seats in the House of Commons.
Mr. BRADLAUGH: Not quite that. There was an obsolete statute of
the 46th Edward III., which was only repealed eight or nine
years ago, but which does not seem to have been attended to, by
which all practising barristers and solicitors were
disqualified for sitting for counties.
53. Mr. BERESFORD HOPE: Wilkes's precedent being expunged, is it still
legible in the Journal, and could it be produced for historical
information?--Certainly.
54. Major NOLAN: With regard to the evidence about O'Connell, I think you
stated that an Act was passed to enable O'Connell and his co-religionists
to sit in Parliament?--Not to enable O'Connell to sit in Parliament, but
to enable Roman Catholics to sit in Parliament.
55. O'Connell was not allowed to take advantage of that Act until he was
re-elected?--No, because he had been elected prior to the passing of the
Act, and the Act was clearly prospective.
56. Was the wording of that particular statute the reason why he was not
allowed to take advantage of that Act?--Certainly; distinctly.
57. Would it be possible for the present or any future Parliament to
pass an Act which would enable a man who had been elected previous to the
passing of the Act to sit in the House?--It is not for me to say what Act
of Parliament might be agreed to by Parliament, but that is quite a
distinct case. In that case Mr. O'Connell had actually been elected when
the Catholic Relief Act was passed, and there was a clause in the Act
which made its operation prospective, and therefore distinctly, and, I
believe, intentionally, excluding Mr. O'Connell from the benefits of the
Act.
58. Then he was only prevented from taking advantage of that Act owing to
the particular wording of that particular clause, and not owing to
anything inherent in the House of Commons?--Yes; the decision was founded
upon a literal construction of the words of the recent statute.
59. Mr. WHITBREAD: The case of Mr. O'Connell was this: that he declined
to take the oath which was required of Members of Parliament elected at
the time that he was elected, and that he requested to be allowed to take
another form of oath; he was ordered to withdraw, and the House
considered his case; is there anything that you have found in the
Journals or in the Debates to indicate that if Mr. O'Connell had been
willing to take the oath required of him by the House, the House would
have objected to his so taking it?--Certainly not; they put it to him
whether he would take the Oath of Supremacy, and upon the face of the
Journal, it would seem that if he had taken that oath, he would have been
admitted.
60. Mr. BRADLAUGH (through the Committee): After John Archdale had
claimed to affirm, did not the House absolutely order him to attend in
his place for the purpose of being sworn, and tender the oaths to
him?--Mr. Archdale was ordered to attend, and the House being informed
that Mr. Archdale attended according to order, his letter to Mr. Speaker
was read. That letter is printed at full length among the precedents.
"And the several statutes qualifying persons to come into and sit and
vote in this House were read, viz., of the 30 Car. II., 1 Will. and
Mariæ, and 7 & 8 Will. and Mariæ. And then the said Mr. Archdale was
called in, and he came into the middle of the House, almost to the table;
and Mr. Speaker, by direction of the House, asked him whether he had
taken the oaths, or would take the oaths, appointed to qualify himself
to be a Member of this House; to which he answered, That in regard to a
principle of his religion he had not taken the oaths, nor could take
them; and then he withdrew, and a new writ was ordered."
61. Mr. Serjeant SIMON: With reference to what the Honorable Member for
Bedford has put to you just now, Mr. O'Connell refused to take the Oath
of Supremacy on the ground that it contained matter which he knew to be
untrue, and other matter which he believed to be untrue?--Yes, he so
stated.
62. Thereupon he withdrew; but is there any precedent among the Journals
to show that a Member stating beforehand that what was contained in the
oath was untrue, or a matter of unbelief to him, has been allowed to take
the oath under such circumstances?--No, this is the only precedent, so
far as I know, of that particular character. The others are cases of
absolute refusal to take the oath, or a desire to make an affirmation
instead of an oath, or to leave out certain words of the Oath.
63. But is there any precedent where, as in the case of Mr. O'Connell, a
Member coming to the table of the House, has made a statement such as Mr.
O'Connell made, that the oath contains matter which he knows to be
untrue, or believes to be untrue, and has been allowed to take the oath
afterwards?--There is no case to be found, so far as I know; certainly
there is none in any of these precedents.
64. Mr. Secretary CHILDERS: Is the precedent in Mr. O'Connell's case
this; that on the 15th May Mr. O'Connell said that he could not take the
Oath of Supremacy, and that, nevertheless, on the 19th, he was asked
whether he would take the Oath of Supremacy, although he had previously
informed the House that he was unable to take it?--Yes, because he had
been heard, in the interval, upon his claim to take the new oath, under
the recent Catholic Relief Act.
65. But was not that a precedent for a Member who had already stated that
he could not take a certain oath, nevertheless being afterwards asked by
the House whether he would take it?--It so appears on the face of the
precedents.
66. I will put that question again more clearly; is it not the case that,
as appears on page 5 of the Paper which you have placed before us, Mr.
O'Connell on the 15th May said, that he could not take the Oath of
Supremacy?--Yes.
67. And that, nevertheless, on the 19th of May it was ordered that Mr.
Speaker do communicate to him the Resolution passed on the same day, and
ask him whether he would take the Oath of Supremacy?--It was so.
68. Although the House was aware that Mr. O'Connell had said that he
could not take it?--Yes; but as I observed before, in the interval he had
been heard upon the question of his right to take the new oath; and that,
I think, accounts for the fact that the question was repeated to him as
to whether, after the decision of the House had been communicated, he
still persisted in refusing to take the Oath of Supremacy.
69. Mr. WATKIN WILLIAMS: Was not Mr. O'Connell's objection to taking the
Oath of Supremacy an objection to the truth of the matter sworn to?--Yes,
certainly; and it was an oath which no Roman Catholic could take.
70. It was the truth of the matter which he was asked to pledge his oath
to that he objected to, and he did not express any disbelief in the
binding character of the oath itself?--No. Every Roman Catholic objected
to take the Oath of Supremacy; in fact, the Oath of Supremacy was
expressly designed to exclude them from Parliament.
71. Mr. ATTORNEY GENERAL: And in consequence of the objection a new form
of oath was put in the Catholic Relief Bill?--Certainly, because the Oath
of Supremacy was intended to exclude Roman Catholics, and did exclude
them, and was known to exclude them.
72. Mr. WATKIN WILLIAMS: It was not his inability to take the oath, but
his inability to pledge himself to the truth of what he was asked to
swear to?--Certainly.
73. Mr. STAVELEY HILL: I gather from you that the House never asked
O'Connell to take the oath after his giving the grounds of
recusancy?--Yes, that is so.
74. Mr. Serjeant SIMON: It appears that the Speaker first asked him
whether he would take the Oath of Supremacy, and then he says, No, and
gives those reasons?--Yes.
75. Mr. PEMBERTON: In addition to Mr. O'Connell's having been heard after
he had at first declined to take the oath, was there not some further
discussion in the House in which other Members took part?--Certainly;
those Debates will all be found in Hansard.
76. Sir GABRIEL GOLDNEY: His refusal to take the oath in the first
instance was accompanied by a claim at the same time to take the new
oath?--Clearly.
77. It was a refusal to take the oath accompanied by a claim for a new
one; afterwards he was allowed to be heard upon that point, and then it
was that the House, having decided that he could not be admitted on the
new oath, he was asked if he chose to take the old oath, which he refused
to do?--That is a correct statement of the case.
78. Mr. HOPWOOD: With regard to the point of the Standing Orders as to
which Mr. Bradlaugh has asked, as I understand you, under the old
practice, as pointed out in Hatsell, and as we know it existed, the
occasion of a Member coming to be sworn caused all other business to
cease?--Yes.
79. And then as you say, a Standing Order was passed that particular
times more appropriate should be allotted for taking those oaths?--Yes.
80. But even though that may be so at the time of taking an oath, no
other business can go on?--Clearly not; it is the sole business that is
transacted at the moment.
81. No other business can be interposed, and nothing else can be
proceeded with but the oath of the Member?--Certainly not; it is the
business of the moment, and no other business can interpose.
82. Mr. GIBSON: You have been asked by several honorable Members about
O'Connell's case; in your opinion, is there the slightest analogy between
the facts and circumstances in O'Connell's case and those of the case now
before the Committee?--I see none myself, but I would rather leave such
questions for the determination of the Committee. I have stated the case
in print, and of course the points of difference are matters of argument.
83. So far as you know, is there any precedent for permitting a Member of
the House of Commons to take the Oath after he has stated in the House
expressly, or by necessary implication, that it will have no binding
effect upon his conscience?--There is no such case on record, so far as I
have had the means of ascertaining.
Mr. CHARLES BRADLAUGH, a Member of the House; Examined:
84. CHAIRMAN: You were in the room, I think, when Sir Thomas Erskine May
gave that part of his evidence as to a matter which was not on the Votes
and Proceedings?--Yes, but which took place upon the occasion of my first
coming to offer to affirm.
85. Is that accurately and fully stated?--It is accurately and fully
stated. I shall have to ask the indulgence of the Committee if in any of
the points which I press there seems to be any undueness in the pressing
of them, because, as far as I can see, this is the first occasion on
which such a matter has arisen. In the reference which the Committee have
to deal with, I claim to be sworn and take my seat by virtue of my due
return, a return untainted by illegality of any description, and in
pursuance of the Statute of the 5th of Richard II., which puts upon me
the duty of coming here to be sworn and do my duty under penalty of fine
and imprisonment. I do not know whether the Committee wish that I should
read the Statute. It is the second Statute of Richard II.; it is on page
228 of the revised Statutes, Vol. I.; it is a Statute of the year 1382. I
submit that although a Member may not sit and vote until he has taken the
oaths, he is entitled to all the other privileges of a Member, and is
otherwise regarded both by the House and the laws as qualified to serve,
until some other disqualification has been shown to exist; and I quote in
support of that Sir Thomas Erskine May's book, p. 202, that there is
nothing in what I did in asking to affirm which in any way disqualified
me from taking the Oath. The evidence that that is so is found in the
case of Archdale, on page 3 of the Precedents handed in by Sir Thomas
Erskine May, where, after John Archdale had claimed to affirm, he was
called into the House, and Mr. Speaker, by direction of the House, asked
him if he would take the oaths; that I have never at any time refused to
take the Oath of Allegiance provided by Statute to be taken by Members;
that all I did was, believing as I then did, that I had the right to
affirm, to claim to affirm, and I was then absolutely silent as to the
oath; that I did not refuse to take it, nor have I then or since
expressed any mental reservation, or stated that the appointed Oath of
Allegiance would not be binding upon me; that, on the contrary, I say,
and have said, that the essential part of the oath is in the fullest and
most complete degree binding upon my honor and conscience, and that the
repeating of words of asseveration does not in the slightest degree
weaken the binding effect of the Oath of Allegiance upon me. I may say,
that if it would be more convenient for any Member of the Committee to
ask me any question upon my statement as I go on, it will not interrupt
me at all.
86. I think the Committee would rather hear you through.--I submit that
according to law the House of Commons has neither the right nor the
jurisdiction to refuse to allow the said form of oath to be administered
to me, there being no legal disqualification on my part of which the
House can or ought to take notice, and there being on my part an express
demand to take the Oath, this demand being unaccompanied by, and free
from, any reservation or limitation. I submit that there is no case in
which the Oath of Allegiance has been refused to any Member respectfully
and unreservedly tendering himself to be sworn. I submit that any Member
properly presenting himself to be sworn, and not refusing to be sworn, is
entitled to be sworn, and to take his seat without interruption, and that
the discussion of any disqualification or ineligibility must in such
case, according to the practice and precedent of Parliament, take place
after the Member has taken his seat; and I quote in support of that John
Horne Tooke's case, which came before the House in 1801. It was alleged
that John Horne Tooke was ineligible because he was an ordained clergyman
of the Church of England. There he was allowed to take the oaths first,
and after he had taken the oaths Earl Temple rose and said (I am quoting
from page 956 of the Parliamentary History, Volume 35), that he observed
a gentleman who had just retired from the table after having taken the
Oaths whom he conceived to be incapable of having a seat in the House in
consequence of his having taken priest's orders, and been inducted into a
living. Earl Temple agreed he would wait to see if a petition were
presented against him, and if not he should move a resolution upon the
subject; and ultimately a resolution was moved that John Horne Tooke was
ineligible. The House allowed John Horne Tooke to sit, but declared
clergymen for the future to be ineligible for sitting. I rely upon that
as showing that the proper course to be pursued, supposing that any
Member should think that I am ineligible, is to wait until I have been
sworn and have taken my seat, and then to challenge it; and that this is
clear, because if it were not so it would be possible for the first 41
Members sworn or for a majority of that 41, that is, for 21 Members to
hinder the swearing of all Members coming later to the table without any
remedy on the part of the Members aggrieved; and I submit, with great
respect for the evidence of Sir Thomas Erskine May, that he has
misapprehended the force of the Standing Order that he read to you.
Hatsell's Precedents, Volume II., page 90, declares distinctly that when
a Member appears to take the oaths within a limited time, all other
business is immediately to cease, and not to be resumed until he has been
sworn and has subscribed the Roll; and with great submission to Sir
Thomas Erskine May, there is no word in the Standing Order which he
quoted as altering and changing that practice, which does so alter and
change it. All that the Standing Order does is to specify the time and
the manner in which the Members might come to the table to be sworn,
which had not been hitherto specified; but it does not in any way deal
with what was to happen when they did come to the table to be sworn. And
if the Committee would permit me respectfully to submit, it would be most
dangerous to the House if it were not so. The first batch of Members
called over by the Clerk of the House are sworn, and they may then, if
the contention raised upon the Standing Order quoted by Sir Thomas
Erskine May be correct, prevent every other Member being sworn, if there
be more than 40. They may fulfil all the duties of a House of Commons,
and do what they please, without any remedy, as the matter stands; every
election might be declared null and void, and every one sent back to
their constituencies one after another. I submit also that the case of
the Attorney General, Sir Francis Bacon, Volume I. of the Commons
Journal, page 459, is also a precedent in the same direction. I am
obliged to tell the Committee that I cannot quote it with the same
reliance that I can put upon Horne Tooke's case, for the notes seem to
have been taken, I will not say irregularly, but they do not seem to
convey the whole of what took place, and therefore I can only deal with
the result. Sir H. Hobart is quoted as being "the only attorney that hath
been in this House;" and then there arises a discussion, some of which
does not seem to me to be material, as to whether the then Attorney
General could sit or not, and I find in the returns that the Attorney
General at that date was Sir Francis Bacon, who, three days after this
discussion, elected to sit for the University of Cambridge, and although
I have not the legal evidence, because the returns are incomplete for
that year, as he elected to sit for the University of Cambridge, the
probability is that he had also been returned for a county. There was
then a Statute of the 46th Edward III., which has only recently been
repealed, which made a practising man of the law absolutely ineligible;
and it also appears that there was some oath of qualification, of which I
have not been able to find the words, which was then taken by a Member
coming to the table; and it appears here that the Oath was alleged in the
course of the discussion, and two things were said which I press upon the
attention of the Committee; one, that the precedents to disable a Member
ought to be shown on the side of those who seek to disable (it is not
written so lengthily as that; the words are, "The precedents to disable
him ought to be showed on the other side"), and the other is, "Their
oath, their own consciences to look unto, not we to examine it," which
meant, as I submit, that the House did not constitute itself into an
Inquisition to look behind a man coming to take the Oath, but that,
subject to his being dealt with by law if he had taken it improperly, or
subject to a legal disqualification being made clear to the House, they
assumed his oath to be properly taken. I submit that even Members
absolutely petitioned against and alleged to be disqualified or
ineligible by law, are always allowed to be sworn when they come to the
table to be sworn and to sit pending the decision of the petition. The
only cases which I have found of absolute legal disqualification in which
the Member's election was annulled before he had entered the House, are
the cases of Mitchell and O'Donovan Rossa (both of whom were away), and
the case of John Wilkes, who was physically incapacitated from taking the
oath from the act that he was in the custody of the law at the time, and
those who held him would not have permitted him to come to the table to
be sworn. Those are the only cases even with an allegation of an
absolute disqualification in the case of O'Donovan Rossa and Mitchell,
and of a disqualification alleged, but not admitted, and not legal, not
statutory, in the case of Wilkes, that I have been able to find; and in
Wilkes's case the House has solemnly decided that it did wrong there, and
I submit that it ought not to do it again. But here the return is not
questioned. It is not pretended that there has been a single circumstance
of illegality connected with the election, the sole point being, Am I
qualified to sit? If I am qualified to sit, I have the duty to take the
Oath, and the House has neither the right nor the jurisdiction to refuse
the Oath to me, nor to interrupt me in the taking of it. If my
qualification or eligibility to sit is to be discussed, the precedent for
the proper mode of discussing that qualification is in Horne Tooke's
case, and rightly so, because then I have the opportunity from my place
in the House of defending myself, and of correcting any misstatements
that may possibly be urged by Members who may be too anxious that I
should not sit, supposing in any other House of Commons it should happen,
and it then gives the Member attacked fair play. While I admit entirely
that the House has a full and most complete right to expel any sitting
Member, and this in its own discretion, and for any reasons in its wisdom
sufficient, I submit that it has never done this without first calling
upon the Member to be heard in his own defence, and that that cannot
possibly happen until the Member is sworn and is sitting. I submit that
while the House has the right to annul the election of a person
absolutely disqualified by law, it has never, except in one case, that of
John Wilkes, claimed the right to interfere, and in that case it
ultimately expunged from its proceedings the whole of its hostile
resolutions, as being subversive of the rights of the whole body of
electors of this kingdom. I quote on that the Commons Journal, Vol. 38,
3rd of May 1782. I do not think that I should be right in troubling the
Committee with the very strong arguments used time after time by Edmund
Burke, Thomas Pitt, and others; but I want to point out this, that in
addition to the charge on which John Wilkes was expelled from the House
(and I am not questioning his original expulsion), there were also
charges introduced against John Wilkes for his publications outside the
House. That will be found in 1st Cavendish, page 73 and page 129, and
they are charges far exceeding anything (if I may judge from the reports
which have even been put in) in relation to any supposed publications of
my own. None of those charges were ultimately considered by the House to
justify the interference of the House with the choice of the
constituency. To use the words of Mr. Thomas Pitt, on page 350 of
Cavendish, words endorsed by the House itself, "Nothing but a positive
law can enable you to circumscribe the electors in their choice of a
representative, however, indiscreet they may be in their choice." I
consider now on what grounds is it claimed that the House of Commons has
the right and jurisdiction, following the words of reference, to refuse
to allow me to take and subscribe the Oath? Is it for a disqualification
or ineligibility existing prior to my election and continuing down to the
time of my election--I mean a disqualification or ineligibility created
by Statute or existing at common law? No such disqualification is even
pretended. Is it for a disqualification or ineligibility of like legal
character arising since my election? No such disqualification is
pretended. Is it for conduct not amounting to absolute disqualification
legally, but conduct for which the House has in its discretion exercised
its rights and jurisdictions by expelling a Member? It must be this, or
it is nothing. If there is neither legal disqualification prior to my
election, nor legal disqualification subsequent to my election, then
there must be such conduct not amounting to absolute legal
disqualification as would, were I a sitting Member, justify the House in
using its discretion to expel a Member. But if that conduct be prior to
the election, then I submit that the constituency is the sole and
sovereign judge of the fitness of the candidate, such candidate not being
legally disqualified, and that where the chosen and duly returned
candidate is ready to perform his duties, this House has neither the
right nor the jurisdiction to revoke the decision of the constituency;
and that in the only case in which the House did so interfere it
afterwards solemnly recorded that its conduct was illegal, as being
subversive of the rights of the whole body of the electors of this
kingdom. If the complaint against me is for conduct arising since my
election, then I submit that even if such matters justify my expulsion as
a Member, the point could only be raised after I had been heard in my
place against the Resolution, and that the matter could not arise until I
have taken the Oath and become entitled to speak, sit, and vote.
Manifestly this must be so, as otherwise it would always be in the power
of a majority to exclude from coming to take his seat any Member to whom
they might have an objection; and although such a thing is, luckily, not
probable now, there have been times, even in the history of the House of
Commons, when a majority, even of election committees, as I read in the
Records of the House, have sought by mere prejudice to exclude Members.
It is, therefore, the more necessary that at any rate a Member should
have the right to be heard in his own defence. I submit that there is no
precedent whatever for preventing a Member from taking his seat and the
Oath, on the ground of conduct not amounting to absolute legal
disqualification. There is no such precedent to be found at all, and I
have searched very carefully indeed. I put the question to Sir Erskine
May lest anything should have escaped me, and I say absolutely there is
no precedent. Then I submit that it would not be consistent with the
dignity of the House to examine any statement made by any Member outside
the House, as to any of its procedure, and that in fact the House has
firmly refused to allow a Member to be challenged as to whether or not
some of his extra-Parliamentary utterances were inconsistent with his
Oath of Allegiance; and here I should like the Committee to come to a
decision, because it would alter and abridge my argument. If the
Committee thought (I will put a suppositious case) that, say there were
some document that they thought they had the right to take into
consideration here, then while I should object to that, I should like to
have the opportunity of addressing the Committee as to that. So far as
the evidence has gone, I have not heard of any, except the mere statement
in the House, only I judged from a question put by an honorable and
learned Member that something was passing in his mind (which, by the way,
did not seem to me to be the fact) justifying a question put to Sir
Thomas Erskine May as to whether the Oath could be administered to a man
who had done something either actually or by implication repudiating the
effect of that Oath. I have heard nothing in the evidence, so far as it
has gone, giving the slightest color or warranty for such a question. If
there are any facts to be dealt with by this Committee other than that,
then I should like to know the facts, and to argue upon them; but it
would be only wasting the time of the Committee to address argument to
any point which the Committee would not think it right to consider; and I
should be glad if, before going further into my statement, the Committee
thought it right to intimate to me their view upon that.
The Committee deliberated.
87. CHAIRMAN: I think the Committee would like to understand from you the
kind of objection that you are anticipating before you proceed with your
argument; as I understood you, you took this kind of objection: "I wish
to know whether the Committee are going into any proceedings external to
the proceedings which took place in the House, or will entertain the
consideration of those questions," and that if they did so you would wish
to be heard upon that point; I understood you also to say that beyond
that general question as to any proceedings which may have taken place as
part of the transaction in any other place than the House itself, you
wish to know whether the Committee would take such matter into their
consideration; am I right in supposing that to be the character of your
objection?--Not quite. Practically my question is this: Will this
Committee take any facts into consideration other than those of which I
have heard evidence given, and those which have been stated by myself in
the course of my argument? If so, I should like to know, because I
understood the permission of the Committee to be that I should address
them at the close of the case before their deliberations, and I should
submit with all respect that the Committee would not take one matter of
fact into their consideration to influence them in their deliberations
which I had not the opportunity of addressing them upon. If they have
finished, and if there are no facts except those which I have heard to be
dealt with, it enables me to turn out and eliminate a portion of the
argument which I have prepared.
The Committee deliberated.
88. CHAIRMAN: The Committee have considered the matter which you have
submitted to them, and they request me to inform you that members of the
Committee do propose, after your statement is concluded, to ask some
questions of you; but I have to inform you, at the same time, that you
will be invited, and are invited, to state any objections that you may
entertain to any such questions when put, and that you shall have a full
opportunity of addressing the Committee after they have heard your
answers to the questions so put?--That will enable me to eliminate a
portion of my argument. I wish to submit to the Committee one observation
on the precedent of Daniel O'Connell, and that is that, as a matter of
fact, the evidence of Sir Thomas Erskine May shows that he misapprehended
that precedent. It was a refusal by Daniel O'Connell to take the Oaths by
law required of a member at the date of his election. Between the date of
his election and the date of his refusal the law had changed, but it had
not changed (so the House interpreted the Statute, or so the Statute ran,
I do not know which) at the date of his election. So that I submit that
Daniel O'Connell's case is a case of a Member refusing to take the Oath
by law required; and I further submit that the Parliamentary Debates will
show that the words which appear as being used by Mr. O'Connell on the
19th of May, sufficiently expressed his reason for refusing to take the
Oath of Supremacy some days at least before the House asked him again to
take it. Then I have only two other matters which I should wish to submit
to the Committee. One is that I have, neither directly nor indirectly,
obtruded upon the House, since I have been a Member, any of my utterances
or publications upon any subject whatever; that there is no precedent,
except in the case of John Wilkes, for any reference on the part of any
opposing Member to such publications by any Member prior to the taking of
his seat; and that the ultimate decision of the House in John Wilkes's
case is directly against the introduction by any Member hostile to me of
any such matter as a reason for my not being allowed to take my seat.
Finally, I most respectfully submit that I have grave matter of complaint
that my privileges as a Member of the House of Commons have been
seriously infringed, and that the rights of the electors, my
constituents, have been ignored in the attacks made upon me without
previous notice to me; attacks to which I had no opportunity of making a
dignified reply; attacks which, if the newspaper reports be accurate,
were in many instances based upon absolute misapprehension or
misquotation of my publications, and in one instance at any rate, based
upon the most extreme misrepresentation of my conduct. I thank the
Committee for listening to me, and I regret if my want of knowledge of
the forms of the House has involved my saying anything in a manner in
which the Committee would prefer that I should not have said it.
89. That is all you wish to state at present?--That is all I wish to
state at present upon the evidence as taken by the Committee. If fresh
evidence should be taken, I should ask the permission of the Committee to
have the right of addressing them upon that.
90. The Committee will now proceed to examine you.--Before any question
is put to me, will you, Sir, tell me when is the proper time to object to
any question which I may think I have the right to object to?
91. When the question is put, before answering it?--
Mr. ATTORNEY GENERAL: You will understand that I am not in any
sense cross-examining you, but merely to clear up what took
place in the House.
I am entirely in the hands of the Committee.
92. We know from the Proceedings of the House that you did at the table
of the House make a claim, in the first instance, to make affirmation
instead of taking the oath?--Yes.
93. And we understand that you did so on the ground that you were a
person entitled to make affirmation within the terms of the Evidence
Amendment Acts of 1869 and 1870?--That was then my impression of the law,
and that was the claim which I made.
94. And I presume, of course, that at the time when you made that claim
you founded it upon the belief that you were entitled to make affirmation
in the House of Commons?--I made that claim solely upon my belief that
the law entitled me to make it.
95. Then as regards your power to give evidence under the Evidence
Amendment Acts in courts both civil and criminal, you of course put it
before the House of Commons, as a fact, that you were a person entitled
in those courts to make affirmation?--Yes.
96. And I presume that you were acquainted with the terms of those Acts,
the subject interesting you?--Quite.
97. Were you aware that if you yourself were called as a witness, it
would be necessary before you were allowed to make affirmation in a
court, either civil or criminal, under the Acts of 1869 and 1870, that
two things should be established; first, that you yourself objected to
take the oath, or that your right to take it was objected to by some one
else; and then, secondly, that the judge would be required to satisfy
himself that the taking of an oath by you would have no binding effect
upon your conscience?--No, that is not my interpretation of the Statute,
nor do I think it has always been (although I think it has sometimes
been) the interpretation of the judge or other presiding officer dealing
with it.
98. Would you kindly explain your own view as to the sense in which you
read the statute of 1869, which says that the judge must satisfy himself
that the oath is not binding upon the conscience of the person wishing to
affirm, the words being, "If any person called to give evidence in any
court of justice, whether in a civil or criminal proceeding, shall object
to take an oath, or shall be objected to as incompetent to take an oath,
such person shall, if the presiding judge is satisfied that an oath would
have no binding effect on his conscience, make the following promise and
declaration"?--My interpretation is that upon certain answers being given
by the witness, the judge is bound to take his affirmation, even
supposing that the judge himself should not be of opinion that the oath
is not binding upon him; and it has been decided so by the Court of
Queen's Bench. In the case of _ex parte_ Lennard _v._ Woolrych, a man
tendered his affirmation at the Westminster Police Court, and the
magistrate asked him (I am repeating from memory, but repeating perfectly
accurately the substance of what appears in the affidavits filed in the
Court of Queen's Bench), "Why do you object?" He said, "I am an Atheist."
The magistrate refused to allow him to give evidence upon affirmation,
and the court held that upon hearing that answer there was enough under
the Act, and that the magistrate was bound to take the man's evidence,
and issued a mandamus to compel him.
99. You will not suppose that I am arguing with you, but as I understand
that case the witness who tendered himself having said he was an Atheist,
the court held that the magistrate was bound to draw the inference from
that assertion that the oath was not binding, and therefore to let him
make the affirmation?--That is so. Whether the presiding officer did draw
the inference or not, the court held that he was bound to.
100. Then I do not think that there is much difference between us; but I
assume that when you come to the table of the House of Commons, and asked
leave to make affirmation instead of taking the Oath, you were a person,
as I understand it, who, if you had gone into a court of justice and made
the same request, would have been held by the presiding judge to be one
upon whom the oath would have no binding effect?--I did think so when I
applied to affirm. I do not think so since the Report of your Committee,
for your Committee has reported that the two oaths are entirely
different.
101. It is a question for you: do you draw any distinction between the
binding effect upon your conscience of the Assertory Oath, as it is
called, and the Promissory Oath?--Most certainly I do. The Testimony Oath
is not binding upon my conscience, because there is another form which
the law has provided which I may take, which is more consonant with my
feelings. The Promissory Oath is and will be binding upon my conscience
if I take it, because the law, as interpreted by your Committee, says
that it is the form which I am to take, and the Statute requires me to
take it.
102. Pray do not answer this question unless you like: am I to understand
you that the binding effect upon your conscience of the Oath depends upon
whether there is an alternative method of taking that which is to you
equivalent to the oath?--No, most certainly not. Any form that I went
through, any oath that I took, I should regard as binding upon my
conscience in the fullest degree. I would go through no form, I would
take no oath, unless I meant it to be so binding.
103. Pray object if you do not wish to answer this question: By virtue of
what do you regard that assertion which you make within the Oath as
binding?--I have not caught your question, if you will pardon me for
saying so.
104. By virtue of what portion of what is contained in the Oath do you
feel that your conscience is bound; is it by the mere fact that you
repeat the words therein contained, or is it by that which is contained
in the form of the Oath?--Those words, "I do swear that I will be
faithful and bear true allegiance to her Majesty Queen Victoria, her
heirs and successors, according to law," are to me, binding in the most
full and complete and thorough degree on my conscience.
105. If you read a promise out of any book or paper, and said, "I promise
so to do," is there more binding effect in those words that you have read
than in the mere ordinary assertion of a promise?--Yes, because this
reading is by law, and by the decision of your Committee intended to be
the form in which I pledge my allegiance as a Member.
106. Then if it were a form sanctioned by law, as in the case of an
affirmation, is there any more effect upon your mind if you take it in
the form of what we call an oath than if you took it simply by words of
affirmation or promise?--If the form sanctioned by law ran "I affirm," or
"I declare and affirm," or "I solemnly and sincerely declare and affirm
that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to her Majesty Queen
Victoria, her heirs and successors, according to law," that would be
equally binding upon my conscience.
107. Do you attach any express or particular meaning to the words "I
swear"?--The meaning that I attach to them is that they are a pledge upon
my conscience to the truth of the declaration which I am making.
108. But a pledge given, may I ask, to whom?--A pledge given to the
properly constituted authorities, whomsoever they may be, who are
entitled to receive it from me.
109. Do you attribute any more meaning to those words than a pledge to
human beings around you?--I attach no more meaning to those words than I
do to a pledge to human beings authorised by law to take such a pledge
from me under similar solemn circumstances.
110. But the solemn circumstances, I suppose, are the mere mundane
circumstances?--The statutory circumstances. I meant "solemn" simply in
the sense of being the statutory circumstances; I meant to distinguish
between that and mere conversation.
111. I think we understand from your answers that you do not attribute
any more weight to the use of the words "I swear," and to the words "So
help me God," than you would to an ordinary promise if it were given
under the same circumstances as those under which you gave that promise
in the House of Commons?--I conceive myself entitled by law to
distinguish, and I beg therefore to object to so much of the question as
deals with the words "So help me God," my objection being founded on the
case of Miller _v._ Salomons, in the 17th Jurist, and the case of the
Lancaster and Carlisle Railway Company _v._ Heaton in the 4th Jurist, new
series.
112. I presume by that answer you mean that "So help me, God" is no part
of the oath or promise, but merely the form in which it is taken?--That
is so; it is merely a form of asseveration.
113. Will you confine yourself, then, to the words "I swear"?--I will.
114. Do you attribute any greater weight or any meaning to the words "I
swear," and to the fact of kissing the book, beyond the words of ordinary
promise?--Not beyond the words of ordinary promise made under statutory
obligation.
115. Then what greater weight do you attach to a promise made under
statutory obligation than to an ordinary promise?--I would prefer not
making any promise that I did not intend to keep; but the law has
attached a weight to statutory promises, and a penalty and disgrace on
the breaking of them.
116. That is a consequence resulting from human action; you do not
attribute any other weight to such a promise beyond what results from
such penalties?--I object to that question.
117. I will now go to another point. How lately is it that you have
claimed a right to affirm in a court of law?--In a superior court or in
an inferior court?
118. In any court where you have taken an oath?--Recently in an inferior
court, within a few days.
119. How lately prior to your claim in the House of Commons?--Prior to my
claim in the House of Commons, about 12 months.
120. You had made a claim on several occasions, I suppose, prior to the
period which you have just mentioned?--Yes.
121. What steps, if any, were taken by the judge on such occasions to
arrive at the conclusion that the oath would have no binding effect:--On
the last occasion, by Mr. Justice Lindley, none. I presume he thought my
claim to affirm well founded, and he simply bowed his head, and the clerk
administered the affirmation after looking to him.
122. I suppose you made a claim to affirm?--When the clerk brought the
Testament to the witness-box I said, "I desire to affirm," and the clerk
looked at Mr. Justice Lindley, who just bowed his head (he happened to be
the presiding judge), and I did affirm.
123. Had you reason to think that Mr. Justice Lindley was acquainted with
any previous applications by you to affirm?--I should think it possible,
because the claim to affirm has been the subject of considerable
litigation by myself in the courts.
124. Upon any occasion upon which the judge did make inquiry, what was
the nature of the inquiry?--The present Lord Justice Brett, whom I
remember distinctly challenging me upon it when he was Mr. Justice Brett,
said: "Why do you claim, Mr. Bradlaugh?" and I perfectly remember my
answer, but I am just thinking whether I am not entitled to say this:
that happened seven years ago; I do not intend to imply that there is any
change or anything since, but I think I am entitled to say to this
Committee that it is hardly within the limits of their reference to
inquire into something that happened in a law court between myself and a
judge seven years ago.
125. I should not have asked the question, but you have stated in the
House of Commons yourself, in order to support your claim to make
affirmation, that you have frequently been permitted to affirm?--That is
so.
126. And I think you gave the last nine or ten years?--Yes, and Mr.
Justice Brett's question came within that time. I hope you will not
consider that I am putting the objection unfairly. What I want to put is
this: that the conversation which took place on the occasion of my having
affirmed (and I repeat that I have affirmed before different judges)
being more or less informal, ought not to be the subject of inquiry by
this Committee. The fact is of record. Those were all at _Nisi Prius_.
127. It was before a judge who would have to administer an oath?--Quite
so.
128. If you state that you really entertain an objection to the question,
I do not wish to press it myself personally?--I have no objection to
answering, except that I have purposely tried to keep out of this
discussion any question of my views; otherwise I am quite in the hands of
the Committee, and if the Committee are disposed to press the question I
will give the answer, having made my objection.
129. I do not wish to go into the views generally entertained by you,
except so far as expressed by you that the Testimony Oath had no binding
effect upon your conscience?--My answer applied to the Assertory or
Testimony Oath.
130. I am asking you what you stated when a Testimony Oath was being
administered to you; but if you desire not to answer the question, so far
as I, an individual member of the Committee, am concerned, I do not wish
to put it to you?--I take the objection.
131. Mr. GIBSON: Can you recall whether within any time since your right
to affirm was first recognised in courts of justice, you have taken the
Oath?--Never; that is to say, the oath as a witness.
132. Have you ever taken any oath since your right to affirm was first
admitted in courts of justice?--It only has been my right to affirm as a
witness that has been admitted in a court of justice; I have under cover
of that Act, but I think illegally, affirmed as foreman of a special
jury, but I have considerable doubt whether the Act covered my
affirmation as a juryman.
133. With that knowledge now present to your mind, is it the fact that
the oath which you seek to take at the table of the House is, if you are
permitted to take it, the first oath that you will have taken since you
were permitted to affirm in courts of justice?--It is the first occasion
upon which there has been any reason for my taking or not taking the Oath
of Allegiance since I have been permitted to affirm.
134. Or any other form of oath?--My memory is not quite clear upon that;
I am not sure. There was a case in which I took evidence as a
Commissioner from America, and I am not at all sure whether the
completion of that Commission was before or after the passing of the
Affirmation Act.
135. But since the passing of the Act?--I cannot quite pledge my mind as
to that; but except in that case in which I was a Commissioner for
taking some evidence in relation to an American process, in which I may
have done so, I certainly have not.
136. Then am I to understand that you seek now to take this oath with
exactly the same meaning in your mind as you would take the
affirmation?--Which affirmation?
137. The affirmation which you originally sought to take at the table of
the House, the Promissory Affirmation?--I seek to take the Oath of
Allegiance just as I should seek to take the Affirmation of Allegiance.
138. And do you attach in your mind no different meaning to the word
"swear" than you would to the word "affirm?"--The law does not.
139. Do you, in your own mind, attach any difference to the sanction?--I
object that the question put to me asks me to make a distinguishment
which the law does not make.
140. I do not wish to press anything to which you object; do you desire
to tell the Committee that, in your own mind, there is no distinction
drawn when you use the word "affirm" and when you use the word
"swear"?--To me, on the Statute they have the same meaning; that is, they
are a pledge that what I put after those words is binding upon me in the
most complete degree.
141. I suppose you are aware of all the ordinary definitions of an oath
contained in the law books?--I am afraid that would be saying more than I
have any right to say. I am fairly well read, but not sufficiently to say
that I know them all.
142. You know a great many of them, I suppose?--I have learnt a few.
143. You said to my honorable and learned friend, the Attorney General,
that you regarded the word "swear" as a pledge given to a properly
constituted authority, and that that was the meaning you attached to the
word "swear"; what do you mean by the "properly constituted authority"
that you referred to in that answer?--Whatever may be the authority
established by Statute for the purpose of taking such an oath.
144. A human authority?--All authorities established by Statute for the
taking of oaths are human authorities Any authority outside a Statute is
illegal, and any person administering such an oath is indictable.
145. You are aware of the meaning of the expression "sanction of an
oath"; what do you consider would be the sanction of the Oath if you took
it?--I am not sure that I apprehend the meaning that is in your mind when
you use the words "sanction of an oath."
146. I will read the definition which is contained in Mr. Baron Martin's
judgment in the case of Miller _v._ Salomon's, where it refers to the
case of Omichund _v._ Barker, as reported in the "Law Journal": "The
doctrine laid down by the Lord Chancellor (Hardwicke) (Omichund _v._
Barker), and all the other judges, was that the essence of an oath was an
appeal to a Supreme Being in whose existence the person taking the oath
believed, and whom he also believed to be a rewarder of truth and an
avenger of falsehood, and that the form of taking an oath was a mere
outward act, and not essential to the oath which might be administered to
all persons according to their own peculiar religious opinions, and in
such manner as most affected their consciences." You have listened to
that statement?--Yes; and I have also read the judgment of the Court of
Error in the following year, in which they say that the essential words
of the oath are those without the appeal, and that the words "So help me,
God" are words of asseveration, the manner of taking the oath; but the
words preceding them are, it appears to me, an essential part of the
oath; and in the case of the Lancaster and Carlisle Railway Company _v._
Heaton, it was held that the oath was completely taken without the
addition of that appeal.
147. I am not at all upon the words "So help me, God," which are the
words referred to in the last case to which you referred. I am now upon
what contains a promise that an oath is being taken when a man uses the
word "swear"; do you object to the definition which I have read?--I
object to that definition as overruled by the Court of Error in its final
decision in error, confirmed by a subsequent decision of Lord Campbell in
the Lancaster and Carlisle Railway Company _v._ Heaton, when it was held
that the appeal was not a part of the oath.
148. CHAIRMAN: In both those cases I think the judges in holding that
view had reference simply to the words "So help me, God"?--Simply to the
words "So help me, God."
149. I think we are a little misunderstanding each other?--I hope not; I
want to be candid with the Committee.
150. Mr. GIBSON: I am not at all on the words which that case went on of
"So help me, God," but I am on what must be the essential distinction
between an oath and an affirmation; what, I ask you now, do you conceive to
be the essential distinction between an oath and an affirmation?--Following
the judgment of the Court of Error, repeated in the other judgment which I
quoted, I regard the essential words of the oath as beginning with "I
swear," and ending with "according to law." I submit that it is no part of
my duty to draw any distinction, if distinction exists, between the value
of that and the value of an affirmation, because the Statute has declared
that they both have the same value.
151. Do you consider that the taking of an oath implies in the person
taking it the existence of a belief in God, and that he will reward and
punish us according to our deserts?--That depends upon the form of the
oath; and since the decision you quoted very many forms of oath have been
entirely changed by the Legislature.
152. Do you consider that if you use the word "swear," you appeal to a
God?--I consider that I take an oath which is binding upon my honor and
conscience.
153. Without any reference to God?--I consider that I take an oath which
is binding upon my honor and conscience.
154. And supposing that you break that oath, what what would be the
consequences which you consider would result to you?--I am not aware that
the Statute has provided that I shall declare my opinion upon those
consequences.
155. Am I to understand that you decline to answer?--I am objecting that
the question is one which would not be put in a court of law, and
therefore, much more, should not be put here.
156. In answer to the Attorney General, and in your statement also, you
used the words "essential part of the Oath," and the words of the Oath
are, "I do swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her
Majesty Queen Victoria, her heirs and successors, according to law;" do
you consider that all the words there present to your mind are equally
definite and clear meaning?--I consider that the whole of those words are
essential; I hold them to be essential, and I submit myself to the
construction which the Court has put upon them.
157. Is there any word in the Oath in the Statute which does not convey
to your mind any clear and definite meaning?--There is no word in that
which does not convey to me a clear and definite meaning.
158. And do you regard the words at the end of it, "So help me, God," as
conveying any definite meaning, or merely as a useless addendum to the
promise?--I object that this Committee will not ask me my opinion upon
those words, because they have been held by the highest court of law in
this realm, subject to appeal, to be no necessary part of the Oath.
159. Sir HENRY JACKSON: If your counsel were here I should put to him
this question, which do not answer if you object; I will treat you as if
you were your own counsel; I understand your view to be that the Act of
1866 or the Act of 1868, gives you two alternative methods of taking your
seat, the one of affirmation and the other of oath, and that it is open
to you to take whichever of the two you prefer; you prefer the
affirmation, but it having been decided not to be competent for you to
make the affirmation, you now propose to take the Oath?--That is exactly
my construction.
160. Now I will tell you my doubt, and perhaps you will be good enough to
tell me what you say upon it. It occurs to me that these two alternatives
are what lawyers call true alternatives; that is to say, that each
excludes the other, and that the Committee having decided (perhaps you
will say erroneously) that you cannot affirm, you have by your claim to
affirm excluded yourself from the alternative claim to take the Oath; are
not the two mutually exclusive?--No; the House of Commons decided that,
fortunately for me, and that saves me the trouble of thinking on it for
myself. When John Archdale applied to affirm, the House held that he
could not affirm, and they ordered him to take the Oath.
161. Was that under the Statute which regulates the present
procedure?--No, but it was under the claim of a man who thought that he
had alternative courses, and who refused to take the Oath.
162. That is the answer which you give to my doubt?--I am not sure
whether I have answered fully.
163. You do not condescend to any argument upon the Statute, but you
think that the one alternative is not exclusive of the other?--I thought
then, and subject to the Report of the Committee against me, which I
presume binds me, I should still think that I have the right to affirm,
and if there were any way in which I thought I could legally raise the
question, I should try to do so.
164. But on the hypothesis that the decision of the Committee was right,
have you anything except the Archdale precedent, from which you would
argue that these two Acts of Parliament do not create two mutually
exclusive alternatives?--I should simply reply that if that be so, and
you told me that I did not come within the one, I must come within the
other.
165. Mr. STAVELEY HILL: I wish to ask you one question with reference to
what took place before Lord Justice Brett (then Mr. Justice Brett), and,
of course, if you think proper, you will take the objection as you did to
what the Attorney General asked you: when Mr. Justice Brett admitted you
to affirm, what steps did he take with a view to satisfy himself that an
oath would not be binding upon your conscience?--He put to me the
question, "Why?" and I gave to him three words as an answer, and these
three words apparently satisfied him, and he directed the clerk to allow
me to affirm. He put no question to me as to whether the oath was binding
upon me or not.
166. Have you any objection to tell the Committee what those three words
were?--The question put by Mr. Justice Brett was, "Why?" I object to tell
the answer, because it would be an inquiry into a man's religious
opinions, and Sir George Grey, in introducing the Parliamentary Oaths Act
in 1866, under which I claim, said, "We will make no inquiry into any
man's religious opinions; let the constituencies be the judges of that."
167. But those three words, whatever they were, satisfied Mr. Justice
Brett that an oath would not be binding upon your conscience?--I cannot
say that, but they satisfied him sufficiently that he gave the clerk
directions to allow me to affirm.
168. When did that take place?--About eight years ago, speaking roughly;
it may be six or seven years, but I am not certain about the time.
169. Was it reported in the newspapers, and is it generally known?--I am
not sure; there have been cases reported.
170. Mr. PEMBERTON: I wish to ask whether, since you were returned as a
Member of this House, and since the Report of the last Committee, you
authorised the publication of a letter which appeared in the newspapers
of the 21st of May in reference to the proceedings which have taken place
on this matter?--I ask that the question may not be put to me, because I
say that the House has already decided that they will not put any inquiry
to a member as to what happens outside the House to determine what was
consistent with the Oath, or not.
171. Of course I do not press the question more than to remind you that
it had reference to proceedings which have taken place in this House, and
in a Committee of this House?--Many things I have read (I do not know
whether they are accurate or inaccurate), speeches made by Members
referring to proceedings in this House, and to that Committee in relation
to this matter. To put it roughly, I should submit that this Committee
should not examine me as to extra-Parliamentary utterances in reply to
extra-Parliamentary utterances. For example, one honorable Member, Sir
Henry Drummond Wolff, made a speech at Chichester----
172. Lord HENRY LENNOX: Not at Chichester?--The papers said so; they may
be very likely wrong, only it shows still more, I submit, the force of
the objection that extra-Parliamentary publications in reply to
extra-Parliamentary utterances should not be the subject of questions
before this Committee.
173. Mr. PEMBERTON: I will only again point out that it was not in reply
to an extra-Parliamentary utterance, but had reference to proceedings in
this House?--That assumes what would be passing in the mind of the writer
and what he had in view in assuming it, and I decline to discuss any
subject of that kind.
174. I am to take it that you decline to answer the question?--No, I
object to answer it. If the Committee think that I ought to answer it I
will answer it. I do not take a legal objection. You quite understand
that if the Committee think I ought to answer it, I will answer it at
once.
The Committee deliberated.
CHAIRMAN: The Committee have come unanimously to the conclusion
that the question put by the honorable Member for East Kent
ought to be answered; but, in arriving at that conclusion, I am
requested to inform you what I will now read: "That the
Committee think Mr. Bradlaugh should answer the question put to
him by Mr. Pemberton, on the ground that it refers to matters
written by him directly in relation to the question involved in
the order of reference to the Committee, and for the purpose of
expressing his views on such questions since the claim was made
by him to make the affirmation, and before the appointment of
the Committee."
175. Mr. PEMBERTON: I wish to ask whether, since you were returned as a
Member of this House, and since the Report of the last Committee, you
authorised the publication of a letter which appeared in the newspapers
of the 21st May, in reference to the proceedings which have taken place
on this matter, such letter being signed in your name?--I think one of
the members of the Committee has a copy, which I handed to him; I have
not seen the print; and as I sent to all the newspapers a lithographed
copy, I prefer, for greater accuracy, to ask him to return it to me. I
hold in my hand a copy which I have no doubt is the same.
176. CHAIRMAN: Do you object to that letter being put in?--The moment the
Committee decided that I ought to answer that question, I had no reserve
in saying that I left myself in the hands of the Committee on it. I shall
take the liberty of wishing to address a word or two to the Committee
presently upon it. (_The letter was handed in._)
177. Mr. WATKIN WILLIAMS: Do you propose to take the Oath in the form
given in the Statute of 1868, which I will read to you: "I., A. B., do
swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to her Majesty
Queen Victoria, her heirs and successors, according to law. So help me,
God?"--I do, that being the form in the Statute.
178. If you are permitted to take that oath, do you intend the Committee
to understand and believe that it will be binding upon your conscience as
an oath?--Yes.
179. In taking such oath, do you consider yourself as appealing to some
Supreme Being as a witness that you are speaking the truth?--I submit
that having said that I regard the oath as binding upon my conscience,
this Committee has neither the right nor the duty to further interrogate
my conscience.
180. Sir RICHARD CROSS: You know of course that in taking the oath in the
form prescribed by the Statute, and according to the custom of taking
oaths, you will have to kiss the Testament: do you attach the smallest
weight to the kissing of that book?--I attach the weight attached by the
law to the whole of the formula.
181. Do you attach the smallest weight to the kissing of the book; do you
think that the kissing of that book adds in the slightest degree to the
weight upon your conscience of the words which you have already spoken
without kissing the book?--The law has said that the whole of that is to
be complete; I have not the right, therefore, to form an opinion, or to
formulate an opinion as to how much of that I would leave out had I any
choice in the matter.
182. Then do you attach any further importance to the word "swear" in the
oath itself, and to the fact of the kissing of the book than if the word
"swear" were written "affirm," and no kissing of the book were
required?--I have already said that I attach to the complete affirmation
the most complete binding effect on my conscience. If I were allowed a
preference, I would and still prefer the affirmation. The law says that
the oath is the form, and I shall regard that form as in all its respects
binding upon my conscience.
183. Do you look upon the kissing of that particular book as adding any
more sanction than the kissing of any other book?--I decline to do that
which the law has not done; the law has not split up the formula into
parts, and expressed an opinion upon each part separately, and I deny the
right of the Committee to ask me to do that which the law has not done.
184. I will ask you one other question; do not answer it unless you
like?--I will not.
185. Do you think that the fact of the kissing of that book has any
relation to an appeal to a Supreme Being, that you will, before Him,
perform the oath which you have taken?--The law has not required me, in
any case, to express an opinion as to that by itself. As to the whole
Oath I have expressed an opinion.
186. As regards the kissing of that book, would you look upon that, so
far as your conscience is concerned, as an idle form?--The law has not
required me to look upon it by itself, and I dispute the right of the
Committee to divide the Oath into parts, and to take one part by itself
without the other. I have already answered that the whole of the Oath
when taken by me, and if taken by me, will be binding upon my conscience.
187. But still you consider that a certain part of that Oath, which the
Statute imposes upon you the necessity to take, is an idle, and empty,
and meaningless form?--I have never said so at any time.
188. But do you consider it so?--Most certainly I do not consider the
most considerable portion of it an idle and empty form.
189. Some portion of it, I said?--I consider no portion of the essential
Oath an idle and empty form.
190. That is to say, that you would take the Oath because the Statute
says you must do so in order to take your seat?--That is not so. I take
the Oath because the Statute says that I must do so, intending to be
bound in my honor and conscience by the oath I take. Every Member takes
the Oath because he must do so in order to take his seat, and he could
not take it without it.
191. But you do not think that the forms of the Oath, as settled by law,
adds anything to the binding of your conscience further than saying "I
solemnly affirm"?--Your question presumes a form of thought which I have
not enunciated.
192. Mr. JOHN BRIGHT: Do I understand you aright that you have never said
that the oath, as you propose to take it, is less binding upon your
conscience than it is supposed to be on the consciences of other men?--I
have never said so; and in 1868, when I stood for election, there being
then no form of affirmation possible for me, I had gravely considered the
question.
193. It is within your knowledge that some men, and not a few men, who do
not absolutely refuse to take an oath, still greatly prefer to make an
affirmation?--If it would not be impertinent to say it, many Members of
the House have told me so since this question has been pending.
194. CHAIRMAN: I think you said, when I informed you that the Committee
thought that the letter should be put in, that it was a subject upon
which you wished to make an observation?--I wish just to make the
slightest observation upon that, and upon one or two points that arose in
questions that have been put to me. If the Committee would allow me to
think for a moment I believe I can compress it within very slight limits.
195. Sir GABRIEL GOLDNEY: Your statement to Mr. Justice Brett, I
understood, you would think over?--No, that my answer did not apply to.
If the Committee think that I ought to answer that question in the same
way, the question as to the three words, or rather four words, that I
answered to Mr. Justice Brett, I am quite in the hands of the Committee,
and I should not decline to answer them.
196. Mr. STAVELEY HILL: The reason why I asked you what they were, and
where they were to be found if you did not answer the question, was on
purpose that one might look for them, because it must be a matter of
public notoriety what the words were?--I should think it very possible. I
have taken my objection, and if there is even a thought in the Committee
that I had better answer the question, I should not object to do so.
197. CHAIRMAN: What are the observations which you wish to offer in
consequence of your examination?--As the House will now have before it
the statement, I ask the Committee in examining it to take it complete,
not to separate one or two words in it and to take those without the
countervailing words, and to remember that in this letter I declare that
the oath, if I take it, would bind me, and I now repeat that in the most
distinct and formal manner; that the Oath of Allegiance, viz.: "I do
swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to her Majesty
Queen Victoria, her heirs and successors, according to law," will, when I
take it, be most fully, completely, and unreservedly binding upon my
honor and conscience; and I crave leave to refer to the unanimous
judgment of the full Court of the Exchequer Chamber, in the case of
Miller _v._ Salomons, 17th Jurist, page 463, and to the case of the
Lancaster and Carlisle Railway Company _v._ Heaton, 4th Jurist, new
series, page 708, for the distinguishment between the words of
asseveration and the essential words of an oath. But I also desire to
add, and I do this most solemnly and unreservedly, that the taking and
subscribing, or repeating of those words of asseveration, will in no
degree weaken the binding effect of the oath on my conscience. I should
like, finally, simply to submit to the Committee, and especially to the
honorable and learned gentleman on the left of the Chairman, that there
has not been from the beginning to the end of this matter, any
declaration, either distinct or implied, that the Oath if taken by me
would be less binding upon me than upon him; and I do submit to this
Committee that this House has never sought to inquire or to distinguish
in any fashion as to the religious views of its Members, except so far as
any of them have found themselves obliged by their conscience to refuse
to comply with some form that the House has put before them. On the
contrary, in the Lords' protest on the discussion of the Promissory Oaths
Municipal Bill, Lord Holland and other Lords put it in the most distinct
fashion that no sort of inquisition and no sort of inquiry ought to be
tolerated involving any examination of a man's theological views. Lord
Holland added, in words better than I can command: "That there is no
tribunal which he knows competent to make that examination, and that the
purely secular and political duties called upon to be performed were not
such as to entitle that examination to be made." I thank the Committee
for having listened to me, and I submit myself to their decision.
198. CHAIRMAN: You mentioned some precedents which you thought might
usefully be added to the list of precedents which we have already had:
could you conveniently add those cases?--Yes, I will do so.
_Monday, 7th June 1880._
MEMBERS PRESENT:
Mr. Attorney General.
Mr. John Bright.
Mr. Secretary Childers.
Mr. Chaplin.
Sir Richard Cross.
Mr. Gibson.
Mr. Grantham.
Mr. Staveley Hill.
Sir John Holker.
Mr. Beresford Hope.
Mr. Hopwood.
Lord Henry Lennox.
Sir Henry Jackson.
Mr. Massey.
Major Nolan.
Mr. Pemberton.
Mr. Serjeant Simon.
Mr. Solicitor General.
Mr. Trevelyan.
Mr. Walpole.
The Right Honorable SPENCER HORATIO WALPOLE, in the Chair.
Mr. CHARLES BRADLAUGH, a member of the House; further Examined.
199. CHAIRMAN: There was some reference, I think, made to you by Mr.
Whitbread, with regard to which you desire to make some
observations?--There was a point urged by Mr. Whitbread upon the first
Committee. I do not know whether I should be in order in referring to it.
I thought it had been sufficiently covered by what I had said, until I
reflected upon it, and then I thought it had not. I wish to submit to
this Committee that it ought not to consider that I claimed to affirm
because I regarded the oath as not binding upon my conscience, under the
spirit of the Evidence Further Amendment Act, 1869, for that Statute
runs: "If any one shall object to take an oath, or be objected to as
incompetent to take an oath;" and that it is quite possible (perhaps
wrongly, and undoubtedly wrongly, as the Committee have so decided) that
I might claim to affirm, objecting to take the oath, and that the
Committee have not on the evidence here either the right or the duty to
assume anything more as against me in dealing with it now. That is all I
wish to put before the Committee.
APPENDIX.
Appendix No. 1.
PRECEDENTS RELATIVE TO PARLIAMENTARY OATHS.
PRECEDENT of a MEMBER disabled for having sat in the House without
taking the Oath.
Sir JOHN LEEDES hath been in the House and not taken the Oath.
Sir John Leedes not to come into the House till further Order.
Sir E. COKE: That by the law Sir J. Leedes is disabled to serve this
Parliament, and therefore ought to be discharged, and a new Writ.
Mr. PAWLETT, accordant.
Sir J. STRANGWAYS: Can pretend no ignorance, for a Member of the House
last Parliament.
Mr. CREW, for Sir J. Leedes: No question but he is incapable. 2. He is to
be punished.
_Resolved_, Sir J. Leedes incapable of being a Member of this House, as
if never returned.
Mr. HACKWYLL: To have him removed; a Writ for a new choice; and to punish
him, by sending him to the Tower.
Sir G. MOORE: To have no question made, but where it is questioned.
Mr. SECRETARY: The fault great, especially because of last Parliament. To
order, he shall be discharged now, and to serve no more this Parliament.
Sir J. Leedes, brought to the Bar, confesseth he was of the House last
meeting in Parliament; and that he hath sit this Parliament in the House,
and hath not taken his Oath.
Mr. T. FANSHAW: That he must be punished as one that hath come into the
House, not being chosen.
Sir E. SANDES: To pay the Serjeant his fees, and no further punishment;
because, but negligence, no presumption, and is willing to take the Oath.
Mr. CHIDLEY: To have an order to disable him for this Parliament.
A Warrant for a new Writ in his room.
PRECEDENT of a MEMBER Admitted to sit without taking the OATHS of
ALLEGIANCE and SUPREMACY.
_Ordered_, That WILLIAM AYRES, Esquire, being legally elected and
returned a Member of this House, his election being returned and remitted
of Record, shall be admitted to sit in this House, without taking the
Oaths of Supremacy and Allegiance.
_Ordered_, That an Ordinance be brought in by Mr. Lisle, to-morrow
morning, for repealing that clause in the Act of * * That no person be
admitted to sit as a Member of this House, before he hath taken the Oath
of Allegiance and Supremacy.
_Ordered_, That all and every the Sheriffs of the respective counties in
England and Wales do henceforth execute their several places and offices
of Sheriffs of their several and respective counties, according to the
duty of their said office, without taking the Oaths of Allegiance and
Supremacy.
PRECEDENT of a MEMBER Discharged for declining to take the OATHS.
The House being informed, that Sir HENRY MOUNSON attended, according to
the Order on Saturday last;
_Resolved_, That he be called in, and tendered the Oaths and Declaration
directed to be taken, made, repeated, and subscribed by the Members of
the House.
He was called in accordingly; and came up to the table: And Mr. Speaker
acquainted him, That the House had taken notice that he had been about
the town a considerable time; but yet did not attend the service of the
House: And that he had directions to tender him the Oaths and the
Declarations.
Whereupon, Sir Henry Mounson said: That he was sorry that for some
reasons he could not comply to qualify himself to sit in the House: But
that those reasons would no way incline him to disturb the Government;
and that he submitted himself to the House.
And then withdrew.
_Resolved_, That Sir Henry Mounson be discharged from being a Member of
the House.
New Writ Ordered.
PRECEDENT of a MEMBER Discharged for declining to take the OATHS.
The House being informed, That the Lord FANSHAW attended at the door,
according to the order of Saturday last.
_Resolved_, That he be called in, and tendered the Oaths and Declaration,
directed to be taken, made, repeated, and subscribed by the Members of
the House.
He was called in accordingly; and came up to the table: And Mr. Speaker
acquainted him, That the House had taken notice that he had been about
the town a considerable time; but yet did not attend the Service of the
House; and that he had direction to tender him the Oaths and Declaration.
Whereupon the Lord Fanshaw said, that it was true, he had been about town
a great while indeed; but had been in the country, if his health would
have permitted him; but that he had been in a strict course of physick,
and was in the same condition still of physick and diet; but, however,
that since he was absent there was an Act of Parliament passed for taking
the Oaths; and he was not qualified to sit in the House, in regard he was
not satisfied to take the Oaths; and therefore he could not appear.
And then withdrew.
_Resolved_, That the Lord Fanshaw be discharged from being a Member of
the House.
And there being a Petition in, touching the Election, the granting a new
Writ was respited.
PRECEDENT of a MEMBER Committed to the TOWER for declining to take the
OATHS.
The House being acquainted, that Mr. CHOLMLY attended according to their
order of Tuesday last;
He was called in, and came up to the table: And Mr Speaker, by the
direction of the House, acquainted him to this effect, viz., That the
House had taken notice of his being absent from their service a
considerable time, and that now he was come he was to tender him, and
accordingly did tender him, the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy
appointed to be taken by the Members of the House, according to an Act of
this present Parliament.
To which Mr. Cholmly replied, That as to his absence, both when he was in
the country and since he came to town, he had been infirm and lame, and
had been under the doctor's hands, and could not as yet recover himself.
And that he had endeavored to qualify himself to be a sitting Member of
the House, by taking the Oaths, as the House expects, but that he could
not as yet do it: And therefore humbly submitted himself to the House;
and that he did it not out of any wilful humor.
Upon which he was commanded to withdraw.
And being withdrawn accordingly;
_Resolved_, That Francis Cholmly, Esquire, a Member of this House, for
his contempt in refusing to take the Oaths, * *, be committed Prisoner to
the Tower of London.
_Ordered_, That the Serjeant-at-Arms attending this House do take into
his custody the said Mr. Cholmly, and convey him to the Tower: And that
Mr. Speaker do issue his Warrant for that purpose.
PRECEDENT of a MEMBER, being a QUAKER, refusing to take the OATH.
House called over,
And the name of John Archdale, Esquire, a burgess for the borough of
Chipping Wicomb, in the county of Bucks, being called over a second time:
Mr. Speaker acquainted the House that Mr. Archdale had been with him this
morning, and delivered him a letter sealed, which Mr. Speaker presented
to the House.
And the same was opened and read, and is as followeth, viz.:--
"London, the 3rd of the 11th month, called January 1698-9.
"Sir.
"Upon the call of the House it will appear that I am duly
chosen and returned to serve in Parliament for the borough of
Chipping Wycomb, in the county of Bucks; and, therefore, I
request of thee to acquaint the honorable House of Commons the
reason I have not as yet appeared, which is, that the burgesses
being voluntarily inclined to elect me, I did not oppose their
inclinations, believing that my declarations of fidelity, etc.,
might, in this case, as in others, where the law requires an
oath, be accepted, I am, therefore, ready to execute my trust
if the House think fit to admit of me thereupon; which I do
humbly submit to their wisdom and justice; and shall acquiesce
with what they will be pleased to determine therein: This being
all at present, I remain,
"Thy real and obliged friend,
"JOHN ARCHDALE."
Day appointed for considering the contents of the said letter.
Mr. Archdale ordered to attend.
The House being informed, that Mr. Archdale attended according to order;
His letter to Mr. Speaker was again read;
And the several statutes qualifying persons to come into and sit and vote
in this House were read, viz., of the 30 Car. II., 1 Will. and Mariæ, and
7 and 8 Will. and Mariæ.
And then the said Mr. Archdale was called in,
And he came into the middle of the House, almost to the table;
And Mr. Speaker, by direction of the House, asked him whether he had
taken the Oaths or would take the Oaths, appointed to qualify himself to
be a member of this House; To which he answered, That in regard to a
principle of his religion he had not taken the Oaths, nor could take
them.
And then he withdrew.
A new Writ ordered.
PRECEDENT of a MEMBER expelled for absconding, and not taking the
OATHS.
The House was called over according to order.
And the names of such as made default to appear were taken down.
_Ordered_, That the names of such as made default be now called over.
And they were called over accordingly.
And several of them appeared, and others were excused upon account of
their being ill, some in the country, some in town; and others upon
account of their being in the country upon extraordinary occasions; and
some as being upon the road.
Upon calling over the names of * * LEWIS PRICE, Esquire, * * they were
not excused.
Several Members sent for.
_Ordered_, That Lewis Price, Esquire, be sent for, in custody of the
Serjeant-at-Arms attending this House.
The Serjeant-at-Arms being called upon to give the House an account of
what he had done in relation to Lewis Pryse, Esquire, who was, the 8th of
August last, ordered to be sent for in custody, for not attending the
Service of the House; he acquainted the House, That the messenger he sent
to bring up Mr. Pryse, had been at his house at Gargathen, but that he
was not there; nor could the messenger have any intelligence where he
was.
_Ordered_, That Lewis Pryse, Esquire, do surrender himself into the
custody of the Serjeant-at-Arms attending this House, by this day month
at the farthest, upon pain of occurring the farther displeasure of this
House, and of being proceeded against with the utmost severity.
The order of the 2nd of February last being read requiring Lewis Pryse,
Esquire, to surrender himself into the custody of the Serjeant-at-Arms
attending this House by that day month at farthest;
The Serjeant was called upon to know whether he had heard from the said
Mr. Pryse, and he acquainted the House, That he had not heard from him.
Mr. Speaker acquainted the House, that he had received a letter from the
said Mr. Pryse, and he delivered the same to the Clerk to be read; and
the same was read accordingly, and is as follows, viz.:
"Sir,
"'Tis with pleasure that I embrace every opportunity of
returning you my acknowledgments for the good offices you have
done me, as often as the case of my unavoidable absence has
come under debate in the House. The repeated experience I have
had of your friendship in this point, encourages me to hope for
the continuance of them, which I shall not offer to desire
longer than the reasonableness of my case shall appear to
deserve them.
"I beg leave once more to represent it to you; and through your
assistance to the honorable House; whose displeasure as it is a
very sensible affliction to me, I should be glad by any means
in my power to remove. That as it is impracticable for me to
attend by the time appointed, because of a very severe fit of
the gout which I am now afflicted with, and thereby give
satisfaction to the House in the method they have insisted on;
I hope they will accept of such as is in my power, and give me
a favorable hearing when I represent to them, that I was chose
knight of the shire of Cardigan when I was at 100 miles distant
from it, and had been absent thence for ten months before the
time of my election; which I was so far from seeking, that I
never asked a vote for it, and was chose even against my
inclinations.
"I know not how far a man is obliged to stand to the choice a
county makes of him. Sure I am that I have reason to complain
of a force that has administered the occasion of my disobliging
the honorable House, by an absence caused by infirmities, under
which I labored at the time of my choice, and which have
continued upon me ever since with the greatest severity, and
with little or no intermission.
"In these circumstances I would fain hope that the honorable
House will rather blame the country's choice than him who has
been unwillingly forced into a post, and lies under the
misfortune (for I flatter myself 'twill not be thought a crime)
of not being able to attend the business of it; and will
therefore lay aside their displeasure, and remit the sentence
ordered against me.
"And I am the rather encouraged to hope this, because Mr.
Prynne, in his comment on the fourth book of Sir Edward Coke's
Institutes, shows, from various records, that incurable
distempers have been constantly allowed by the House for a just
excuse of non-attendance; and upon debates in such cases, no
other punishment has been inflicted than excusing the service
of the Member, and ordering a new writ for electing a person
duly qualified, and capable of attending the business of the
House. This being the course of Parliamentary proceedings in
such cases as mine, which I have now truly represented to you,
and can produce hundreds of witnesses to confirm, I hope that
the unhappy incapacity I am under of attending the service of
the House, will be thought to deserve no severer treatment than
has been usual in the like cases; and that my ready submission
to the honorable House's pleasure in this point, will be a
means to restore me to their favorable opinion, and engage you
to promote the request of
"Your most obliged and obedient humble servant,
"LE PRYSE.
"Aberllefenny, 18th February, 1715.
"I know not how far the House in their last order about me,
might be influenced by any report of the messenger who came
down to my house; but to prevent misrepresentation I think it
proper to assure you, that within three days after a very
dangerous fit of the gout suffered me to come downstairs, I
came from thence hither to my father-in-law's, eighteen miles
in my way to London. But the motion of even so small a journey
brought another fit upon me immediately, with which I have been
laid up here ever since, and not having been yet so much as
able to return to my own house."
Then the journal of the * day of May, 1689, in the case of Mr.
Cholmondley was read.
(House interrupted--Conference.)
The House resumed the consideration of the matter relating to Mr. Pryse.
_Resolved_, That Lewis Pryse, Esquire, a Member of this House, having
been sent for in custody of the Serjeant-at-Arms attending this House,
the 8th day of August last, for not attending the service of this House,
and having never qualified himself as a Member of this House, by taking
the oaths at the table, be forthwith brought up in custody.
The Messenger gives the House an account of what he had done pursuant to
the order of the House.
_Resolved_, That Lewis Pryse, Esquire, a Member of this House, having
been sent for in custody of the Serjeant-at-Arms attending this House,
the 8th day of August last, for not attending the service of this House,
and having never qualified himself as a Member of this House by taking
the Oaths at the table; and having been on the 2nd of February last
summoned to surrender himself into custody of the Serjeant-at-Arms, upon
pain of being proceeded against with the utmost severity, and he having
absconded, and peremptorily refused to surrender himself into custody,
be, for the same contempt, expelled this House.
PRECEDENT of a MEMBER refusing to take the OATH of SUPREMACY.
DANIEL O'CONNELL, Esq., professing the Roman Catholic religion, returned
Knight of the Shire for the County of Clare, being introduced in the
usual manner, for the purpose of taking his seat, produced at the table a
certificate of his having been sworn before two of the deputies appointed
by the Lord Steward, whereupon the clerk tendered to him the Oaths of
Allegiance, Supremacy, and Abjuration; upon which Mr. O'Connell stated,
that he was ready to take the Oaths of Allegiance and Abjuration, but
that he could not take the Oath of Supremacy, and claimed the privilege
of being allowed to take the Oath set forth in the Act passed in the
present Session of Parliament "for the Relief of his Majesty's Roman
Catholic Subjects;" whereupon the Clerk having stated the matter to Mr.
Speaker, Mr. Speaker informed Mr. O'Connell that, according to his
interpretation of the law, it was incumbent on Mr. O'Connell to take the
Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy, and Abjuration, and that the provisions
of the new Act applied only to Members returned after the commencement of
the said Act, except in so far as regarded the repeal of the Declaration
against transubstantiation; and that Mr. O'Connell must withdraw unless
he were prepared to take the Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy, and
Abjuration.
Whereupon Mr. O'Connell withdrew.
Motion, That Mr. O'Connell be called back and heard at the table. Debate
arising.
A Member stated that he was requested by Mr. O'Connell to desire that he
might be heard.
Debate adjourned.
_Resolved_, That Mr. O'Connell, the Member for Clare, be heard at the
Bar, by himself, his counsel or agents, in respect of his claim to sit
and vote in Parliament without taking the Oath of Supremacy.
Mr. O'Connell was called in, and heard accordingly: And being withdrawn;
_Resolved_, That it is the opinion of this House, that Mr. O'Connell
having been returned a Member of this House before the commencement of
the Act passed in this Session of Parliament "for the Relief of his
Majesty's Roman Catholic Subjects," is not entitled to sit or vote in
this House unless he first take the Oath of Supremacy.
_Ordered_, That Mr. O'Connell do attend the House this day, and that Mr.
Speaker do then communicate to him the said resolution, and ask him
whether he will take the Oath of Supremacy.
And the House being informed that Mr. O'Connell attended at the door, he
was called to the Bar, and Mr. Speaker communicated to him the resolution
of the House of yesterday, and the order thereupon, as followeth:--
_Resolved_, That it is the opinion of this House, that Mr. O'Connell
having been returned a Member of this House before the commencement of
the Act passed in this Session of Parliament, "for the Relief of his
Majesty's Roman Catholic Subjects," is not entitled to sit or vote in
this House unless he first take the Oath of Supremacy.
_Ordered_, That Mr. O'Connell do attend the House this day, and that Mr.
Speaker do then communicate to him the said resolution, and ask him
whether he will take the Oath of Supremacy.
And then Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the said order, asked Mr. O'Connell
whether he would take the said Oath of Supremacy? Whereupon Mr. O'Connell
requested to see the said Oath, which being shown to him accordingly, Mr.
O'Connell stated that the said Oath contained one proposition which he
knew to be false, and another proposition which he believed to be
untrue; and that he therefore refused to take the said Oath of Supremacy.
And then Mr. O'Connell was directed to withdraw; and he withdrew
accordingly.
_Ordered_, That Mr. Speaker do issue his warrant to the Clerk of the
Crown in Ireland to make out (subject to the provisions of an Act passed
in this Session of Parliament, intituled, "An Act to amend certain Acts
of the Parliament of Ireland relative to the election of Members to serve
in Parliament, and to regulate the qualification of persons to vote at
the election of Knights of the Shire of Ireland") a new writ for the
electing of a Knight of the Shire to serve in this present Parliament for
the County of Clare, in the room of Daniel O'Connell, Esq., who, having
been returned a Member of this House before the commencement of an Act
passed in this Session of Parliament "for the Relief of his Majesty's
Roman Catholic Subjects," has refused to qualify himself to sit and vote
as a Member of this House, by taking the Oath of Supremacy.
PRECEDENT of a MEMBER being a QUAKER, claiming to make an AFFIRMATION.
Several Members attended at the table to take the Oaths; and Joseph
Pease, Esquire, returned for the Southern Division of the County of
Durham, having stated that, being one of the people called Quakers, he
claimed the privilege of making an Affirmation, instead of taking the
Oaths; whereupon he was desired by Mr. Speaker to retire until the sense
of the House could be taken upon his claim; and he retired accordingly.
_Ordered_, That a Select Committee be appointed to search the Journals of
the House, and to report to the House such precedents, and such Acts or
parts of Acts of Parliament as relate to the right of the people called
Quakers to take their seats in Parliament, and to the privilege conferred
upon them to make their solemn Affirmation in Courts of Justice, and
other places where by law an Oath is allowed, authorised, or required to
be taken.
Report:--
_Resolved_, That it appears to this House, that Joseph Pease is entitled
to take his seat upon making his solemn Affirmation and Declaration to
the effect of the Oaths directed to be taken at the table of this House.
* * * * *
The Counsel and Agents in the case of the Coleraine Election, being
returned to the bar, the Clerk appointed to attend the said Committee
delivered into the House a reduced List; and the same was called over,
and is as follows:--
* * * * *
And the Members of the Committee being as usual, come to the Table to be
sworn, and Joseph Pease, Esquire, a Quaker, being one of the said
Members, Mr. Speaker submitted to the House whether Mr. Pease was capable
of serving on the said Election Committee without having been sworn.
* * * * *
And the House being unanimously of opinion, That Mr. Pease was capable of
serving on the said Committee;
The rest of the Committee were sworn, and Mr. Pease made his solemn
Affirmation, as follows:
* * * * *
PRECEDENT of a MEMBER omitting the words in the OATH of ABJURATION "On
the true Faith of a Christian."
The Baron LIONEL NATHAN DE ROTHSCHILD, returned as one of the members for
the City of London, came to the table to be sworn; and being asked by the
Clerk what Oath he wished to take, the Protestant or the Roman Catholic
Oath, he replied, "I desire to be sworn upon the Old Testament."
Whereupon the Clerk having stated the matter to Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker
directed Baron Rothschild to withdraw.
[Debate on Question relative to the matter adjourned.]
_Ordered_, That Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild, one of the Members for
the City of London, having demanded to be sworn on the Old Testament, be
called to the table, and that Mr. Speaker do ask him why he has demanded
to be sworn in that form.
Whereupon Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild, having come to the Table,
was asked by Mr. Speaker--
"Baron de Rothschild, you have demanded to be sworn on the Old
Testament, and I am directed by the House to ask you why you have
demanded to be sworn in that form?"
To which Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild replied:
"Because that is the form of swearing that I declare to be most binding
on my conscience."
And then Mr. Speaker directed him to withdraw.
_Ordered_, That Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild, one of the Members for
the City of London, having presented himself at the table of the House,
and having previously to taking the Oaths, requested to be sworn on the
Old Testament (being the form which he has declared at the table to be
most binding on his conscience), the Clerk be directed to swear him on
the Old Testament accordingly.
The Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild, having come to the table, Mr.
Speaker acquainted him that the House had made the following Order:
"That Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild, one of the Members for the City
of London, having presented himself at the table of the House, and having
previously to taking the Oaths, requested to be sworn on the Old
Testament (being the form which he has declared at the table to be most
binding on his conscience), the Clerk be directed to swear him on the Old
Testament accordingly."
Whereupon the Clerk handed to him the Old Testament, and tendered him the
Oaths; and he accordingly took the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy,
repeating the same after the Clerk; the Clerk then proceeded to
administer the Oath of Abjuration, which the Baron de Rothschild repeated
after the Clerk so far as the words "upon the true faith of a Christian,"
but upon the Clerk reading those words, the Baron de Rothschild said, "I
omit those words as not binding on my conscience;" he then concluded with
the words "So help me, God" (the Clerk not having read those words to
him), and kissed the said Testament:--Whereupon he was directed to
withdraw.
Question for a new writ negatived.
_Resolved_, That the Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild is not entitled to
vote in this House, or to sit in this House during any debate, until he
shall take the Oath of Abjuration in the form appointed by law.
_Resolved_, That this House will, at the earliest opportunity in the next
Session of Parliament, take into its serious consideration the form of
the Oath of Abjuration, with a view to relieve her Majesty's subjects
professing the Jewish religion.
[The House refuses to hear Petitioners by Counsel in favour of a
resolution admitting Baron Lionel de Rothschild.]
[_See_ case of David Salomons, Esq., July, 1851, _infra._]
Bill to provide for the relief of her Majesty's subjects professing the
Jewish Religion. Brought from the Lords, 13th July. Royal assent, 23rd
July, 1858.
[Oaths Bill Passed: By the Lords with Amendments; Lords' Amendments
disagreed to; Lords insist, and assign reasons.]
_Resolved_, That this House does not consider it necessary to examine the
reasons offered by the Lords for insisting upon the exclusion of Jews
from Parliament, as by a Bill of the present Session, intituled, "An Act
to provide for the relief of her Majesty's subjects professing the Jewish
Religion," their Lordships have provided means for the admission of
persons professing the Jewish Religion to seats in the Legislature.
_Resolved_, That this House doth not insist upon its disagreement with
the Lords in their Amendments to the said Bill.
Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild, returned as one of the Members for the
City of London, came to the table to be sworn; and stated that, being a
person professing the Jewish religion, he entertained a conscientious
objection to take the Oath which, by an Act passed in the present
Session, has been substituted for the Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy, and
Abjuration, in the form therein required. Whereupon the Clerk reported
the matter to Mr. Speaker, who desired Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild
to withdraw, and he withdrew accordingly.
_Resolved_, That it appears to this House that Baron Lionel Nathan de
Rothschild, a person professing the Jewish religion, being otherwise
entitled to sit and vote in this House, is prevented from so sitting and
voting by his conscientious objection to take the oath which, by an Act
passed in the present Session of Parliament, has been substituted for the
Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy, and Abjuration, in the form therein
required.
_Resolved_, That any person professing the Jewish religion may
henceforth, in taking the oath prescribed in an Act of the present
Session of Parliament to entitle him to sit and vote in this House, omit
the words "and I make this declaration upon the true faith of a
Christian."
Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild having again come to the table, desired
to be sworn on the Old Testament, as being binding on his conscience.
Whereupon the Clerk reported the matter to Mr. Speaker, who then desired
the Clerk to swear him upon the Old Testament.
Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild was sworn accordingly, and subscribed
the Oath at the table.
[_See_ case of Baron Mayer Amschel de Rothschild, 15th Feb., 1859,
_infra._]
Parliament dissolved, 23rd April, 1859; met, 31st May, 1859.
Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild, Member for the City of London, came to
the table to be sworn, and stated that being a person professing the
Jewish religion, he had a conscientious objection to take the oath in the
form required by the Act 22 Vict. c. 48. The Clerk having reported the
circumstance to Mr. Speaker, Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild was
directed to withdraw, and he withdrew accordingly.
_Resolved_, That it appears to this House that Baron Lionel Nathan de
Rothschild, a person professing the Jewish religion, being otherwise
entitled to sit and vote in this House, is prevented from so sitting and
voting by his conscientious objection to take the oath, which by an Act
passed in the 22nd year of her Majesty has been substituted for the Oaths
of Allegiance, Supremacy, and Abjuration in the form therein required.
_Resolved_, That any person professing the Jewish religion may henceforth
in taking the oath prescribed in an Act passed in the twenty-second year
of her Majesty to entitle him to sit and vote in this House, omit the
words "and I make this declaration upon the true faith of a Christian."
Whereupon Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild, Alderman David Salomons, and
Baron Mayer Amschel de Rothschild, being Members professing the Jewish
religion, having come to the table, were sworn upon the Old Testament,
and took the oath, omitting the words "and I make this declaration upon
the true faith of a Christian," and subscribed the same.
PRECEDENT of a MEMBER omitting the words in the OATH OF ABJURATION, "on
the true faith of a Christian."
DAVID SALOMONS, Esq., returned as one of the Members for the borough of
Greenwich, came to the table to be sworn; and being tendered the New
Testament by the Clerk, stated that he desired to be sworn on the Old
Testament: Whereupon the Clerk reported the matter to Mr. Speaker, and
Mr. Speaker asked him why he desired to be sworn on the Old Testament; he
answered, because he considered it binding on his conscience; Mr. Speaker
then desired the Clerk to swear him upon the Old Testament; the Clerk
handed to him the Old Testament, and tendered him the oaths; and he took
the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy, repeating the same after the
Clerk. The Clerk then proceeded to administer the Oath of Abjuration,
which Mr. Salomons read as far as the words "upon the true faith of a
Christian," which he omitted, concluding with the words "So help me,
God". And the Clerk having reported to Mr. Speaker that Mr. Salomons had
omitted to repeat the words "upon the true faith of a Christian," Mr.
Speaker desired Mr. Salomons to withdraw. He thereupon retired from the
table and sat down upon one of the lower benches, upon which Mr. Speaker
informed him that, not having taken the Oath of Abjuration in the form
prescribed by the Act of Parliament, and in the form in which the House
had upon a former occasion expressed its opinion that it ought to be
taken, he could not be allowed to remain in the House, but must withdraw.
And he withdrew accordingly.
Motion for new writ withdrawn.
The House resumed the further proceedings.
Mr. Alderman Salomons entered the House, and took his seat within the
Bar: Whereupon Mr. Speaker said that he saw that a Member had taken his
seat without having taken the Oaths required by law; and that he must
therefore desire that the honorable Member do withdraw.
Mr. Alderman Salomons continued in the seat within the Bar.
_Ordered_ (after Debate), That Mr. Alderman Salomons do now withdraw.
Whereupon Mr. Speaker stated that the honorable Member for Greenwich had
heard the decision of the House, and hoped that the honorable Member was
prepared to obey it.
Mr. Alderman Salomons continuing to sit in his seat, Mr. Speaker directed
the Serjeant-at-Arms to remove him below the Bar.
Whereupon Mr. Serjeant-at-Arms having placed his hand on Mr. Alderman
Salomons, he was conducted below the Bar.
[The House refuses to hear Petitioners by Counsel at the Bar of the House
in defence of their right to elect their own Representative.]
_Resolved_ (after Debate), That David Salomons, Esq., is not entitled to
vote in this House, or to sit in this House, during any debate, until he
shall take the Oath of Abjuration in the form appointed by law.
PRECEDENT of a MEMBER stating that he had a conscientious objection to
take the OATH.
Baron MAYER AMSCHEL DE ROTHSCHILD, returned for the town and port of
Hythe, came to the table to be sworn, and stated that, being a person
professing the Jewish religion, he entertained a conscientious objection
to take the oath, which by an Act passed in the last Session has been
substituted for the Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy, and Abjuration, in
the form therein required. Whereupon the Clerk reported the matter to Mr.
Speaker, who desired Baron Mayer Amschel de Rothschild to withdraw; and
he withdrew accordingly.
_Resolved_, That it appears to this House that Baron Mayer Amschel de
Rothschild, a person professing the Jewish religion, being otherwise
entitled to sit and vote in this House, is prevented from so sitting and
voting by his conscientious objection to take the oath, which by an Act
passed in the last Session of Parliament has been substituted for the
Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy, and Abjuration in the form therein
required.
_Resolved_, That any person professing the Jewish religion may
henceforth, in taking the oath prescribed in an Act of the last Session
of Parliament to entitle him to sit and vote in this House, omit the
words "and I make this declaration upon the true faith of a Christian."
Baron Mayer Amschel de Rothschild, being again come to the table, desired
to be sworn on the Old Testament as binding on his conscience.
Whereupon the Clerk reported the matter to Mr. Speaker, who then desired
the Clerk to swear him upon the Old Testament.
Baron Mayer Amschel de Rothschild was sworn accordingly, and subscribed
the oath at the table.
Appendix No. 2.
PAPER handed in by Mr. Bradlaugh, 2nd June, 1880.
PRECEDENTS RELATING TO PARLIAMENTARY OATHS.
CASE of Attorney General Sir FRANCIS BACON, Commons Journals, Vol. 1,
page 459, 11th April, 1614, continued from page 456, 8th April.
ELIGIBILITY of the Attorney General to sit in Parliament. By 46 Edward
III., 1372, no practising barrister could be Knight of the Shire.
Page 459.--"The precedents to disable him ought to be showed on the other
side."
Page 460.--"Their Oath their own consciences to look unto, not we to
examine it."
At that date each Member had to make Oath that he was duly qualified.
1. Question whether he shall for this Parliament remain of the House or
not:--_Resolved_, He shall.
2. Question.--Whether any Attorney General shall after this Parliament
serve as a Member of this House:--_Resolved_, No.
CASE of JOHN WILKES, Esquire, Commons Journal, 38, page 977, 3rd May,
1782.
THE House was moved, that the entry in the Journal of the House, of the
17th day of February, 1769, of the Resolution, "That John Wilkes,
Esquire, having been in this Session of Parliament expelled this House,
was and is incapable of being elected a Member to serve in this present
Parliament," might be read, and the same being read accordingly;
A motion was made, and the question being put, That the said resolution
be expunged from the Journals of this House, as being subversive of the
rights of the whole body of electors of this Kingdom.
The House divided.
The Yeas went forth.
Tellers for the Yeas, Sir Philip Jennings Clarke and Mr. Byng, 115.
Tellers for the Noes, Mr. John St. John and Sir William Augustus
Cunynghame, 47,
So it was resolved in the affirmative.
And the same was expunged by the Clerk at the table, accordingly.
_Ordered_, That all Declarations, Orders, and Resolutions of this House,
respecting the election of John Wilkes, Esquire, for the county of
Middlesex, as a void election, the true and legal election of Henry Lawes
Luttrell, Esquire, into Parliament for the said county, and the
incapacity of John Wilkes, Esquire, to be elected a Member to serve in
the said Parliament, be expunged from the Journals of this House as being
subversive of the rights of the whole body of electors of this Kingdom.
By Cavendish's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. I., page 73, 24th November,
1768, it appears that _inter alia_ were used to justify the original and
subsequently expunged Resolutions--first, "the copy of the record of the
proceedings, on an information in the Court of King's Bench, against John
Wilkes, Esquire, for blasphemy"--page 123; "three obscene and impious
libels"; "an impious libel with intent to blaspheme the Almighty God."
CASE of Mr. JOHN HORNE TOOKE, Parliamentary History, Vol. 35, page 956,
16th February, 1801.
Mr. John Horne Tooke took the Oaths and his seat for Old Sarum. He was
introduced by Sir Francis Burdett and Mr. Wilson. This being done, Earl
Temple rose and said, he had observed a gentleman who had just retired
from the table, after having taken the Oaths, whom he conceived to be
incapable of a seat in that House, in consequence of his having taken
priest's orders and been inducted into a living. He would wait the
allotted time of fourteen days to see whether there was any petition
presented against his return; if not he should then move that the return
for Old Sarum be taken into consideration.
Page 1323, 10th March, 1801.--Earl Temple moved that Mr. Boucher, Deputy
Registrar of Salisbury, be called in to prove that Mr. Horne Tooke, being
a priest in orders, was not eligible to a seat in that House. After
debate, in which Mr. John Horne Tooke spoke--Amendment and
Division--Motion agreed to (page 1342),--Select Committee appointed (page
1343). Two reports given, pages 1343 to 1349, were made, giving all the
cases of "any of the clergy" returned to Parliament.
4th May, 1801.--Earl Temple moved (pages 1349 to 1374), "That Mr. Speaker
do issue his warrant to the clerk of the Crown in Great Britain, to make
out a new writ for the election of a burgess to serve in this present
Parliament for the Borough of Old Sarum, in the county of Wilts, in the
room of the Rev. John Horne Tooke, who being at the time of his election
in priest's orders, was and is incapable of sitting in this House." A
debate took place in which Mr. John Horne Tooke spoke (pp. 1350 to 1402),
division, and the motion negatived.
Jurist, Vol. 17, Page 463.--Exchequer Chamber; Error from the Court of
Exchequer: Coram, Lord Campbell, Chief Justice, and Coleridge, Cresswell,
Wightman, Williams, and Crompton, J.
One judgment by Lord Chief Justice Campbell for the whole Court.
Lord Campbell (page 464).--The words "so help me, God," are words of
asseveration, and of the manner of taking the oath; but the words
preceding them are, it appears to me, an essential part of the oath.
Fisher's Digest, Vol. 3, page 6179.--By a private Act, no person
appointed to act as tithe valuer shall be capable of acting until he
shall have taken and subscribed an oath in the words following: "I, A.
B., do swear that I will faithfully, etc., execute, etc.; so help me,
God." Held, that the oath had nevertheless been properly administered
according to the Statute, for the words omitted were no part of the oath,
but only an indication of the manner of administering it. Lancaster and
Carlisle Railway Company _v._ Heaton, 8 El. & Bl., 952; 4 Jur., N. S.,
707; 27 L. J., Q. B., 195.
Appendix No. 3.
PAPER handed in by Mr. BRADLAUGH, 2nd June, 1880.
STATEMENT on the OATH QUESTION by Mr. BRADLAUGH.
20, Circus Road, St. John's Wood, London, N.W., 20th May, 1880.
WHEN elected as one of the Burgesses to represent Northampton in the
House of Commons, I believed that I had the legal right to make
affirmation of allegiance in lieu of taking the oath, as provided by
section 4 of the Parliamentary Oaths Act, 1866. While I considered that I
had this legal right, it was then clearly my moral duty to make the
affirmation. The oath, although to me including words of idle and
meaningless character, was, and is, regarded by a large number of my
fellow countrymen as an appeal to Deity to take cognizance of their
swearing. It would have been an act of hypocrisy to voluntarily take this
form if any other had been open to me, or to take it without protest, as
though it meant in my mouth any such appeal. I, therefore, quietly and
privately notified the Clerk of the House of my desire to affirm. His
view of the law and practice differing from my own, and no similar case
having theretofore arisen, it became necessary that I should tender
myself to affirm in a more formal manner, and this I did at a season
deemed convenient by those in charge of the business of the House. In
tendering my affirmation, I was careful when called on by the Speaker to
state my objection, to do nothing more than put in the fewest possible
words my contention that the Parliamentary Oaths Act, 1866, gave the
right to affirm in Parliament to every person for the time being by law
permitted to make an affirmation in lieu of taking an oath, and that I
was such a person, and therefore claimed to affirm. The Speaker neither
refusing, nor accepting my affirmation, referred the matter to the House,
which appointed a Select Committee to report whether persons entitled to
affirm under the Evidence Amendment Acts, 1869 and 1870, were, under
Section 4 of the Parliamentary Oaths Act, 1866, also entitled to affirm
as Members of Parliament. This Committee, by the casting-vote of its
Chairman, has decided that I am not entitled to affirm. Two courses are
open to me, one of appeal to the House against the decision of the
Committee; the other, of present compliance with the ceremony, while
doing my best to prevent the further maintenance of a form which many
other Members of the House think as objectionable as I do, but which
habit, and the fear of exciting prejudice, has induced them to submit to.
To appeal to the House against the decision of the Committee would be
ungracious, and would certainly involve great delay of public business. I
was present at the deliberations of the Committee, and while naturally I
cannot be expected to bow submissively to the statements and arguments of
my opponents, I am bound to say that they were calmly and fairly urged. I
think them unreasonable; but the fact that they included a legal argument
from an earnest Liberal deprives them even of a purely party character.
If I appealed to the House against the Committee, I, of course, might
rely on the fact that the Attorney General, the Solicitor General, Sir
Henry Jackson, Q.C., Watkin Williams, Q.C., and Mr. Serjeant Simon are
reported in the _Times_ to have interpreted the law as I do; and I might
add that the Right Honorable John Bright and Mr. Whitbread are in the
same journal arrayed in favor of allowing me to affirm. But even then the
decision of the House may endorse that of the Committee, and should it be
in my favor it could only, judging from what has already taken place, be
after a bitter party debate, in which the Government specially and the
Liberals generally would be sought to be burdened with my
anti-theological views, and with promoting my return to Parliament. As a
matter of fact, the Liberals of England have never in any way promoted my
return to Parliament. The much-attacked action of Mr. Adam had relation
only to the second seat, and in no way related to the one for which I was
fighting. In 1868, the only action of Mr. Gladstone and of Mr. Bright was
to write letters in favor of my competitors; and since 1868 I do not
believe that either of these gentlemen has directly or indirectly
interfered in any way in connection with my Parliamentary candidature.
The majority of the electors of Northampton had determined to return me
before the recent union in that borough, and while pleased to aid their
fellow Liberals in winning the two seats, my constituents would have at
any rate returned me had no union taken place. My duty to my constituents
is to fulfil the mandate they have given me, and if to do this I have to
submit to a form less solemn to me than the affirmation I would have
reverently made, so much the worse for those who force me to repeat words
which I have scores of times declared are to me sounds conveying no clear
and definite meaning. I am sorry for the earnest believers who see words
sacred to them used as a meaningless addendum to a promise, but I cannot
permit their less sincere co-religionists to use an idle form in order to
prevent me from doing my duty to those who have chosen me to speak for
them in Parliament. I shall, taking the oath, regard myself as bound, not
by the letter of its words, but by the spirit which the affirmation would
have conveyed had I been permitted to use it. So soon as I am able, I
shall take such steps as may be consistent with Parliamentary business to
put an end to the present doubtful and unfortunate state of the law and
practice on oaths and affirmations. Only four cases have arisen of
refusal to take the oath except, of course, those cases purely political
in their character; two of those cases are those of the Quakers John
Archdale and Joseph Pease. The religion of these men forbade them to
swear at all, and they nobly refused. The sect to which they belonged was
outlawed, insulted and imprisoned; they were firm, and one of that sect
sat on the very committee, a member of her Majesty's Privy Council, and a
member of the actual Cabinet. I thank him gratefully that, valuing right
so highly, he cast his vote so nobly for one for whom I am afraid he has
but scant sympathy. No such religious scruple prevents me from taking the
oath as prevented John Archdale and Joseph Pease. In the case of Baron
Rothschild and Alderman Salomons the words "upon the true faith of a
Christian" were the obstacle. To-day the oath contains no such words. The
Committee report that I may not affirm, and protesting against a decision
which seems to me alike against the letter of the law and the spirit of
modern legislation, I comply with the forms of the House.
CHARLES BRADLAUGH.
MR. BRADLAUGH'S SPEECHES.
MR. BRADLAUGH'S First Speech at the Bar of the House of Commons,
delivered June 23rd, 1880.
SIR,--I have to ask the indulgence of every member of this House while,
in a position unexampled in the history of this House, I try to give one
or two reasons why the resolution which you have read to me should not be
enforced. If it were not unbecoming I should appeal to the traditions of
the House against the House itself, and I should point out that in none
of its records, so far as my poor reading goes, is there any case in
which this House has judged one of its members in his absence, and taken
away from that member the constitutional right he has (hear, hear). There
have been members against whom absolute legal disqualification has been
urged. No such legal disqualification is ventured to be urged by any
member of this House against myself. But even those members have been
heard in their places; those members have been listened to before the
decision was taken against them; and I ask that this House to myself
shall not be less just than it has always been to every one of its
members (hear, hear). Do you tell me I am unfit to sit amongst you?
(hear, hear, and Order, order.) The more reason, then, that this House
should show the generosity which judges show to a criminal, and allow
every word he has to say to be heard. But I stand here, Sir, as no
criminal. I stand here as the chosen of a constituency of this country,
with my duty to that constituency to do. I stand here, Sir--if it will
not be considered impertinent to put it so--with the most profound
respect for this House, of which I yet hope and mean to form a part, and
on whose traditions I should not wish to cast one shadow of reproach. I
stand here returned duly; no petition against my return; no impeachment
of that return. I stand here returned duly, ready to fulfil every form
that this House requires, ready to fulfil every form that the law permits
this House to require, ready to do every duty that the law makes
incumbent upon me. I will not in this presence argue whether this House
has or has not the right to set its decision against the law, because I
should imagine that even the rashest of those who spoke against me would
hardly be prepared to put in the mouth of one whom they consider too
advanced in politics an arguments so dangerous as that might become. I
speak within the limits of the law, asking for no favor from this House
for myself or for my constituents, but asking the merest justice which
has always been accorded to a member of the House (hear, hear, and
Order.) I have to ask indulgence lest the memory of some hard words which
have been spoken in my absence should seem to give to what I say a tone
of defiance, which it is far from my wish should be there at all; and I
am the more eased because although there were words spoken which I had
always been taught English gentlemen never said in the absence of an
antagonist without notice to him, yet there were also generous and brave
words said for one who is at present, I am afraid, a source of trouble
and discomfort and hindrance to business. I measure the generous words
against the others, and I will only make one appeal through you, Sir,
which is, that if the reports be correct that the introduction of other
names came with mine in the heat of passion and the warmth of debate, the
gentleman who used those words, if such there were, will remember that he
was wanting in chivalry, because, while I can answer for myself, and am
able to answer for myself, nothing justified the introduction of any
other name beside my own to make a prejudice against me (cheers and cries
of Question and Order.) I fear lest the strength of this House,
judicially exercised as I understand it to be--with infrequency of
judicial exercise--that the strength of this House makes it forget our
relative positions. At present I am pleading at its bar for justice. By
right it is there I should plead. [The hon. member pointed to the seats.]
It is that right I claim in the name of those who sent me here. No legal
disqualification before my election, or it might have been made the
ground of petition. No legal disqualification since my election--not even
pretended. It is said: "You might have taken the oath as other members
did." I could not help when I read that, Sir, trying to put myself in the
place of each member who said it. I imagined a member of some form of
faith who found in the oath words which seemed to him to clash with his
faith, but still words which he thought he might utter, but which he
would prefer not to utter if there were any other form which the law
provided him, and I asked myself whether each of those members would not
then have taken the form which was most consonant with his honor and his
conscience. If I have not misread, some hon. members seem to think that I
have neither honor nor conscience. Is there not some proof to the
contrary in the fact that I did not go through the form, believing that
there was another right open to me? (hear, hear, and Order.) Is that not
some proof that I have honor and conscience? Of the gentlemen who are now
about to measure themselves against the rights of the constituencies of
England I ask what justification had they for that measurement? They have
said that I thrust my opinions on the House. I hold here, Sir, the
evidence of Sir Thomas Erskine May, and I can find no word of any opinion
of mine thrust upon the House at all. I have read--it may be that the
reports misrepresent--that the cry of "Atheist" has been raised from that
side. [The hon. member pointed to the Opposition side.] No word of all
mine before the committee put in any terms those theological or
anti-theological opinions in evidence before the House. I am no more
ashamed of my own opinions, which I did not choose, opinions into which I
have grown, than any member of this House is ashamed of his; and much as
I value the right to sit here, and much as I believe that the justice of
this House will accord it to me before the struggle is finished, I would
rather relinquish it for ever than it should be thought that by any
shadow of hypocrisy I had tried to gain a feigned entrance here by
pretending to be what I am not (cheers, and cries of Order.) On the
report of the committee as it stands, on the evidence before the House,
what is the objection to either my affirming or taking the oath? It is
said I have no legal right to affirm. I will suppose that to be so. It is
the first time that the House has made itself a court of law from which
there may be no appeal, and deprived a citizen of his constitutional
right of appeal to a court of law to make out what the statute means in
dealing with him. There is no case in which this House has overridden
everything, and put one of its members where he had no chance of battling
for his right at all. Take the oath. It is possible that some of the
lawyers, who have disagreed among themselves even upon that (the
Opposition) side of the House, may be right, and that I may be wrong in
the construction I have put upon the oath, but no such objection can
come. There is no precedent--there is, I submit respectfully, no
right--in this House to stand between me and the oath which the law
provides for me to take, which the statute, under penalty even upon
members of this House themselves if they put me out from my just return,
gives me the right to take. What kind of a conflict is provoked here if
this resolution be enforced? Not a grave conflict in a court of law,
where the judges exclude passion, where they only deal with facts and
evidence. I do not mean that these gentlemen do not deal with facts; but,
if I am any judge of my own life's story, there have been many things
which I can hardly reckon in the category of facts put against myself. I
don't mean that they are not right, for hon. members may know more of
myself than I do myself; but, judging myself as I know myself, some of
the members who have attacked me so glibly during the last few days must
have been extraordinarily misinformed, or must have exceedingly
misapprehended the matters they alleged. It has been said that I have
paraded and flaunted some obnoxious opinions. I appeal to your justice,
sir, and to that of the members of this House, to say whether my manner
has not been as respectful as that of man could be--whether in each case
I have not withdrawn when you told me. If I now come here with even the
appearance of self-assertion, it is because I would not be a recreant
and a coward to the constituency that sent me to represent them; and I
mean to be as members have been in the best history of this assembly. I
ask the House, in dealing with my rights, to remember how they are
acting. It is perfectly true that by a majority they may decide against
me now. What are you to do then? Are you going to declare the seat
vacant? First, I tell you that you have not the right. The moment I am
there--[the hon. member pointed inside the House]--I admit the right of
the House, of its own good will and pleasure, to expel me. As yet I am
not under your jurisdiction. As yet I am under the protection of the law.
A return sent me to this House, and I ask you, sir, as the guardian of
the liberties of this House, to give effect to that return. The law says
you should, and that this House should. And naturally so; because, if it
were not so, any time a majority of members might exclude anyone they
pleased. What has been alleged against me? Politics? Are views on
politics urged as a reason why a member should not sit here? Pamphlets
have been read--I won't say with accuracy, because I will not libel any
of the hon. members who read them; but, surely, if they are grounds for
disqualification they are grounds for indictment to be proved against me
in a proper fashion. There is no case in all the records of this House in
which you have ransacked what a man has written and said in his past life
and then challenged him with it here. My theology? It would be
impertinent in me, after the utterances of men so widely disagreeing from
me that have been made on the side of religious liberty during the past
two nights--it would be impertinent in me to add one word save this. It
is said that you may deal with me because I am isolated. I could not help
hearing the ring of that word in the lobby as I sat outside last night.
But is that a reason, that, because I stand alone the House are to do
against me what they would not do if I had 100,000 men at my back? (cries
of Oh). That is a bad argument which provokes a reply inconsistent with
the dignity of this House and which I should be sorry to give. I have not
yet used--I hope no passion may tempt me to be using--any words that
would seem to savor of even a desire to enter into conflict with this
House. I have always taught, preached, and believed the supremacy of
Parliament, and it is not because for a moment the judgment of one
Chamber of Parliament should be hostile to me that I am going to deny the
ideas I have always held; but I submit that one Chamber of
Parliament--even its grandest Chamber, as I have always held this to
be--had no right to override the law. The law gives me the right to sign
that roll, to take and subscribe the oath, and to take my seat there
[pointing to the benches]. I admit that the moment I am in the House,
without any reason but your own good will, you can send me away. That is
your right. You have full control over your members, but you cannot send
me away until I have been heard in my place, not a suppliant as I am now,
but with the rightful audience that each member has always had. There is
one phase of my appeal which I am loth indeed to make. I presume you will
declare the seat vacant. What do you send me back to Northampton to say?
I said before, and I trust I may say again, that this assembly was one in
which any man might well be proud to sit--prouder I that I have not some
of your traditions and am not of your families, but am of the people, the
people that sent me here to speak for them. Do you mean that I am to go
back to Northampton as to a court, to appeal against you? that I am to
ask the constituency to array themselves against this House? I hope not.
If it is to be, it must be. If this House arrays itself against an
isolated man--its huge power against one citizen--if it must be, then the
battle must be too. But it is not with the constituency of Northampton
alone--hon. members need not mistake--that you will come into conflict if
this appeal is to go forward, if the House of Commons is to override the
statute law to get rid of even the vilest of members. Had you alleged
against me even more than against one man whose name was mentioned in
this House last night, I should still have held that the House cannot
supersede the rights of the people. But not as much is alleged against me
as was alleged against that man, in whose case the House itself said that
its conduct had been subversive of the rights of the people. I beg you,
for your own sakes, don't put yourselves in that position. I have no
desire to wrestle with you for justice. I admit that I have used hard
words in my short life, giving men the right in return to say hard things
of me; but is it not better that I should have the right to say them to
your faces? If they are within the law, let the law deal with me fairly
and properly; but if they are without the law, not unfairly, as I submit
you are doing now. You have the power to send me back, but in appealing
to Northampton I must appeal to a tribunal higher than yours--not to
courts of law, for I hope the days of conflict between the assembly which
makes the law and the tribunals which administer it are passed. It must
be a bad day for England and for Great Britain, if we are to be brought
again to the time when the judges and those who make the law for the
judges are in rash strife as to what they mean. But there is a court to
which I shall appeal--the court of public opinion, which will have to
express itself. You say it is against me. Possibly; but if it be so, is
it against me rightly or wrongly? I am ready to admit, if you please, for
the sake of argument, that every opinion I hold is wrong and deserves
punishment. Let the law punish it. If you say the law cannot, then you
admit that you have no right, and I appeal to public opinion against the
iniquity of a decision which overrides the law and denies me justice. I
beg your pardon, Sir, and that of the House too, if in this warmth there
seems to lack respect for its dignity; and as I shall have, if your
decision be against me, to come to that table when your decision is
given, I beg you, before the step is taken in which we may both lose our
dignity--mine is not much, but yours is that of the Commons of England--I
beg you, before the gauntlet is fatally thrown--I beg you, not in any
sort of menace, not in any sort of boast, but as one man against six
hundred, to give me that justice which on the other side of this hall the
judges would give me were I pleading there before them (loud cheers and
cries of Order, amid which Mr. Bradlaugh again bowed and retired).
MR. BRADLAUGH'S Second Speech at the Bar of the House of Commons,
delivered April 28th, 1881.
Mr. SPEAKER,--I have again to ask the indulgence of the House while I
submit to it a few words in favor of my claim to do that which the law
requires me to do. Perhaps the House will pardon me if I supply an
omission, I feel unintentionally made, on the part of the hon. member
for Chatham in some words which have just fallen from him. I understood
him to say that he would use a formal statement made by me to the
Committee against what the Chancellor of the Duchy had said I had said. I
am sure the hon. and learned member for Chatham, who has evidently read
the proceedings of the Committee with care, would, if he had thought it
fair, have stated to the House that the statement only came from me after
an objection made by me--a positive objection on the ground that it
related to matters outside this House, and that the House in the course
of its history had never inquired into such matters; but I can hardly
understand what the member for Chatham meant when he said that he
contrasted what I did say with what the Chancellor of the Duchy said I
said, for it is not a matter of memory, it is on the proceedings of this
House, that being examined formally before the Committee, I stated: "That
the essential part of the oath is in the fullest and most complete degree
binding upon my honor and conscience, and that the repeating of the words
of asseveration does not in the slightest degree weaken the binding of
the allegiance on me." I say now I would not go through any form--much as
I value the right to sit in this House, much as I desire and believe that
this House will accord me that right--that I did not mean to be binding
upon me without mental reservation, without equivocation. I would go
through no form unless it were fully and completely and thoroughly
binding upon me as to what it expressed or promised. Mine has been no
easy position for the last twelve months. I have been elected by the free
votes of a free constituency. My return is untainted. There is no charge
of bribery (cheers), no charge of corruption, nor of inducing men to come
drunken to the polling booth. I come here with a pure untainted
return--not won by accident. For thirteen long years have I fought for
this right--through five contested elections, including this. It is now
proposed to prevent me from fulfilling the duty my constituents have
placed upon me. You have force--on my side is the law. The hon. and
learned member for Plymouth spoke the truth when he said he did not ask
the House to treat the matter as a question of law, but the
constituencies ask me to treat it as a question of law. I, for them, ask
you to treat it as a question of law. I could understand the feeling
that seems to have been manifested were I some great and powerful
personage. I could understand it had I a huge influence behind me. I am
only one of the people, and you propose to teach them that on a mere
technical question you will put a barrier in the way of my doing my duty
which you have never put in the way of anyone else. The question is, has
my return on the 9th of April, 1881, anything whatever to impeach it?
There is no legal disqualification involved. If there were it could be
raised by petition. The hon. member for Plymouth says the dignity of this
House is in question. Do you mean that I can injure the dignity of this
House? This House which has stood unrivalled for centuries? This House
supreme among the assemblies of the world? This House, which represents
the traditions of liberty? I should not have so libelled you. How is the
dignity of this House to be hurt? If what happened before the 9th of
April is less than a legal disqualification, it is a matter for the
judgment of the constituency and not for you. The constituency has judged
me; it has elected me. I stand here with no legal disqualification upon
me. The right of the constituency to return me is an unimpeachable right.
I know some gentlemen make light of constituencies; yet without the
constituencies you are nothing. It is from them you derive your whole and
sole authority. The hon. and learned member for Plymouth treats lightly
the legal question. It is dangerous to make light of the law--dangerous
because if you are only going to rely on your strength of force to
override the law, you give a bad lesson to men whose morality you impeach
as to what should be their duty if emergence ever came (hear, hear).
Always outside the House I have advocated strenuous obedience to the law,
and it is under that law that I claim my right. It is said by the right
hon. baronet who interposes between me and my duty that this House has
passed some resolution. First, I submit that that resolution does not
affect the return of the 9th April. The conditions are entirely
different, there is nothing since the date of that return. I submit next
that if it did affect it the resolution was illegal from the beginning.
In the words of George Grenville, spoken in this House in 1769, I say if
your resolution goes in the teeth of the law--if against the
statute--your resolution is null and void. No word have I uttered
outside these walls which has been lacking in respect to the House. I
believe the House will do me justice, and I ask it to look at what it is
I claim. I claim to do that which the law says I must. Frankly, I would
rather have affirmed. When I came to the table of the House I deemed that
I had a legal right to do it. The courts have decided against me, and I
am bound by their decision. I have the legal right to do what I propose
to do. No resolution of yours can take away that legal right. You may act
illegally and hinder me, and unfortunately I have no appeal against you.
"Unfortunately" perhaps I should not say. Perhaps it is better that the
Chamber which makes the law should never be in conflict with the courts
which administer the laws that the Chamber makes. I think the word
"unfortunately" was not the word I ought to have used in this argument.
But the force that you invoke against the law to-day may to-morrow be
used against you, and the use will be justified by your example. It is a
fact that I have no remedy if you rely on your force. I can only be
driven into a contest, wearying even to a strong man well supported,
ruinous and killing to one man standing by himself--a contest in which if
I succeed it will be injurious to you as well as to me. Injurious to me
because I can only win by lessening your repute which I desire to
maintain. The only court I have the power of appealing to is the court of
public opinion, which I have no doubt in the end will do me justice. The
hon. member for Plymouth said I had the manliness on a former occasion to
make an avowal of opinions to this House. I did nothing of the kind. I
have never, directly or indirectly, said one word about my opinions, and
this House has no right to inquire what opinions I may hold outside its
walls, the only right is that which the statute gives you; my opinions
there is no right to inquire into. I shelter myself under the laws of my
country. This is a political assembly, met to decide on the policy of the
nation, and not on the religious opinions of the citizens (cheers). While
I had the honor of occupying a seat in the House when questions were
raised which touched upon religious matters, I abstained from uttering
one word. I did not desire to say one word which might hurt the feelings
of even the most tender (hear). But it is said, why not have taken the
oath quietly? I did not take it then because I thought I had the right to
do something else, and I have paid the penalty. I have been plunged in
litigation fostered by men who had not the courage to put themselves
forward (loud cheers below the gangway). I, a penniless man, should have
been ruined if it had not been that the men in workshop, pit, and factory
had enabled me to fight this battle (interruption). I am sorry that hon.
members cannot have patience with one pleading as I plead here. It is no
light stake, even if you put it on the lowest personal grounds, to risk
the ambition of a life on such an issue. It is a right ambition to desire
to take part in the councils of the nation, if you bring no store of
wisdom with you, and can only learn from the great intellects that we
have (hear, hear). What will you inquire into? The right hon. baronet
would inquire into my opinions. Will you inquire into my conduct, or is
it only my opinions you will try here? The hon. member for Plymouth
frankly puts it opinions. If opinions, why not conduct? Why not examine
into members' conduct when they come to the table, and see if there be no
members in whose way you can put a barrier? (Hear, hear.) Are members,
whose conduct may be obnoxious, to vote my exclusion because to them my
opinions are obnoxious? As to any obnoxious views supposed to be held by
me, there is no duty imposed upon me to say a word. The right hon.
baronet has said there has been no word of recantation. You have no right
to ask me for any recantation. Since the 9th April you have no right to
ask me for anything. If you have a legal disqualification, petition, lay
it before the Judges. When you ask me to make a statement, you are
guilty of impertinence to me, of treason to the traditions of this House,
and of impeachment of the liberties of the people. My difficulty is that
those who have made the most bitter attacks upon me only made them when I
was not here to deal with them. One hon. and gallant member recently told
his constituents that this would be made a party question, but that the
Conservative members had not the courage to speak out against me. I
should have thought, from reading "Hansard," not that they wanted
courage, but that they had cultivated a reticence that was more just. I
wish to say a word or two on the attempt which has been made to put on
the Government of the day complicity in my views. The Liberal party has
never aided me in any way to this House. (Oh, from the Opposition.)
Never. I have fought by myself. I have fought by my own hand. I have been
hindered in every way that it was possible to hinder me, and it is only
by the help of the people, by the pence of toilers in mine and factory,
that I am here to-day, after these five struggles right through thirteen
years. I have won my way with them, for I have won their hearts, and now
I come to you. Will you send me back from here? Then how? You have the
right, but it is the right of force, and not of law. When I am once
seated on these benches, then I am under your jurisdiction. At present I
am under the protection of the writ from those who sent me here. I do not
want to quote what has happened before, but if there be one lesson which
the House has recorded more solemnly than another, it is that there
should be no interference with the judgment of a constituency in sending
a man to this House against whom there is no statutory disqualification.
Let me appeal to the generosity of the House as well as to its strength.
It has traditions of liberty on both sides. I do not complain that
members on that (the Conservative) side try to keep me out. They act
according to their lights, and think my poor services may be injurious to
them. (Cries of No.) Then why not let me in? (Cheers.) It must be either
a political or a religious question. I must apologise to the House for
trespassing upon its patience. I apologise because I know how generous in
its listening it has been from the time of my first speech in it till
now. But I ask you now, do not plunge with me into a struggle I would
shun. The law gives me no remedy if the House decides against me. Do not
mock at the constituencies. If you place yourselves above the law, you
leave me no course save lawless agitation instead of reasonable pleading.
It is easy to begin such a strife, but none knows how it would end. I
have no court, no tribunal to appeal to; you have the strength of your
votes at the moment. You think I am an obnoxious man, and that I have no
one on my side. If that be so, then the more reason that this House,
grand in the strength of its centuries of liberty, should have now that
generosity in dealing with one who to-morrow may be forced into a
struggle for public opinion against it (cheers).
MR. BRADLAUGH'S Third Speech at the Bar of the House of Commons,
delivered February 7th, 1882.
SIR,--In addressing the House for the third time from this position, I
feel the exceeding difficulty of dealing fairly with myself without
dealing unfairly with the House. If I were to follow the hon. member who
has just sat down into his errors of law, of history, and of memory, into
his reckless misconceptions as to what are the views I hold and write
about, I should only be giving pain to numbers of members here, and
departing from that mandate with which my constituents have trusted me.
It is--I say it with all respect--not true that I done anything more with
reference to the succession than maintain the right of Parliament,
meaning by Parliament both Houses, to control it; and any member who
pretends that I done anything else, either does it, not having read what
I have written, or heard what I have said, or having forgotten entirely
what I have written or said, and being extremely careless in representing
my views to the House. I regret that the hon. member should have imported
into the discussion some fact supposed to have occurred in a police-court
since I stood here before. I can only give the House my positive
assurance that the hon. member is perfectly inaccurate in his
representation of what took place. It is exceedingly painful to bandy
words in this way. The hon. member was good enough to say he did not
hear--he could not well have heard, for the magistrate did not refuse my
affirmation at all. I happened to have been before Sir J. Ingham before,
and he knew me, and knew the particular form of affirmation, and when the
clerk read it to me no discussion took place on the subject. I hope the
House will forgive me for contradicting such a small thing, but small
things are sometimes much used. They have been used to work my ruin since
I stood here before, and I regret that the shame of reticence did not at
least keep it from this House, that the hon. member thought it his duty,
by a common informer, to attempt to drive me into the Bankruptcy Court,
and outside this House has boasted that the question would be solved in
that way. It may be a brave boast, it may be consonant with piety from the
hon. member's point of view, but I believe that every other gentleman's
sense of piety would revolt against the notion of driving a single man
into bankruptcy, and then canvassing for subscriptions--(hear, hear)--for
the "bold and vigorous, and patriotic and noble conduct," as the
advertisement said, which consisted in hurrying in a cab to find the
common informer to issue a writ against me. I dismiss that, however. I ask
the House to pardon me for having wasted its time on this poor thing. I do
not hope, I dare not think, that any word I may say here will win one
vote; and I would have let this go silently against me, were it not that I
owe a duty to the constituency that has twice entrusted me with its
suffrages, a duty to every constituency right through the land in time to
come--(hear, hear)--whose representative may be challenged as
Northampton's has been. (Hear, hear, and No.) Some gentlemen say "No," but
where is the challenge to stop? (Hear.) It is not simply theology, it is
politics too (hear, hear). It is not simply theology that is brought
before the House, but the wild imaginings of some member who, with the
nightmare of panic upon him, and a wild imagining of the French Revolution
clothed in terrors of which I know nothing, comes here to tell you of
mighty Russia successful, and of the unfortunate United States with its
Presidents assassinated because of religious and political opinions. Panic
of that kind is not evidence as to my opinions. If this House intends to
try me for my opinions, let it do it reasonably, and at least have the
evidence before it. I would show you how unfair it is to trust to memory
of words. The hon. member was good enough to tell the House that I had
declared to a Committee of the House that certain words were meaningless.
I hold in my hand the report of the Committee and the minutes of evidence,
and no such words exist in any declaration of mine. (Hear, hear. Mr.
Newdegate shook his head.) The hon. member does not believe me. I cannot
make more than facts. I cannot make the comprehension which should
distinguish when prejudice has determined that nothing shall be right that
is put. The only way in which it can be pretended that anything of the
kind in reference to the oath can be brought in is by taking my letter of
the 20th of May, written outside the House, which does not contain a
specific declaration the hon. member has put into it, which letter I
protested ought not to be brought before the Committee at all, which I
never volunteered to the Committee--(Opposition laughter)--which I
objected to the Committee having before them. (Oh, and laughter from the
Opposition.) The gentlemen who laugh, laugh because the laugh is the only
answer that could be given. No reason can be given in reply, no facts can
be quoted; and I ask hon. members who laugh to remember that I am pleading
as though a quasi-criminal at this bar, and that I have a right to an
audience from them, and I appeal to the House at least to give me a silent
hearing. Judges do that. If you are unfit to be judges, then do not judge
(hear, hear). It shows, at least, the difficulty of dealing with a
question like this, when those who are to judge have come to a judgment
already, not upon any facts, but upon what they think ought to be the
facts. I ask the House to deal legally and fairly with me. Legally you are
bound to deal; fairly, as an assembly of English gentlemen, you ought to
deal with me, even if you have differences with me, even if you think my
opinions so obnoxious, even if you think that the politics with which you
identify me in your minds are dangerous to you (oh, oh). If I am not
dangerous, why not let me speak there? (pointing to the seat he occupied
last Session.) If there is no danger, why strain the law? If there is no
danger, why disobey the law? It is put by the hon. gentleman who spoke
last that there are certain words of the oath which the courts of law have
declared essential, The courts of law have declared the exact opposite. So
far as a decision has been given, the very report of the Committee shows
that the highest court of judicature in this realm has decided the words
are not essential to the oath at all. I ask the House to deal with me with
some semblance and show of legality and fairness, and first I say that
they ought not to go behind my election of the 9th of April, 1881, and
that the House ought to reject the resolution moved by the right hon.
gentleman, because it deals with matters which antedate my election, and
because the House has nothing to do with me before the 9th of April, 1881.
That is the return of which the Clerk at the table has the certificate.
That is my only authority for being here. If I did aught before that
rendered me unworthy to sit here, why did the House let me sit here from
the 2nd of July to the 29th of March? If what I did entitles the House not
to receive me, why has not the House had the courage of its opinions and
vacated the seat? Either the seat is mine in law, and in law I claim it
from you, or I am unworthy to hold it, and then why not vacate the seat
and let the constituency express its opinion again? But my return is
unimpeached, it is unimpeachable, and there has been no petition against
me. The hon. member who went into back alleys for common informers could
not find a petitioner to present a petition against it. If I speak with
temper--(Opposition laughter)--the House, I trust, will pardon me. I
have read within the last few days words spoken, not by members of no
consequence, but by members occupying high position in this House, which
make me wonder if this is the House of Commons to which I aspired so
much. I have read that one right hon. member, the member for
Whitehaven--(laughter from the Ministerial side)--was prompted to say to
his constituents that I was kicked down stairs last Session, and that he
hoped I should be again. If it were true that I was kicked downstairs I
would ask members of the House of Commons on whom the shame, on whom the
disgrace, on whom the stigma? I dare not apply this, but history will
when I have mouldered, and you too, and our passions are quite gone. But
it is not quite true that I was kicked downstairs, and it is a dangerous
thing to say that I was, for it means that hon. members who should rely
on law rely on force. It is a dangerous provocation to conflict to throw
to the people. If I had been as wicked in my thought as some members are
reported to have been in their speech, this quarrel, not of my
provoking, would assume a future to make us all ashamed. I beg this
House to believe, and I trust, Sir, that you at least will believe me,
that I have tried as much as man might to keep the dignity of this
House. I submitted last Session, and the Session before, to have had
things said against me without one word of reply, because having had
your good counsel, I felt it might provoke discussion upon matters which
this House would willingly not have speech upon, and that I had far
better rest under some slight stigma than occupy the House with my
personality. I appeal to the recollection of every member of the House
whether from the moment of my entering into it I did not utterly
disregard everything that took place prior to my coming into it, and
direct myself to the business for which my constituents sent me here.
The most extraordinary statements are made as to my views, statements as
inaccurate as those which have fallen, no doubt unconsciously, from the
hon. member who has last addressed the House. One noble lord in a great
London gathering convoked against me, a gathering which was not as
successful as some that have taken place in my favor, denounced me as a
Socialist. I do not happen to be one. I happen to think that Socialists
are the most unwise and illogical people you can happen to meet. But the
noble lord knew that I ought to be something (laughter). I am a red rag
to a wild Conservative bull, and it must rush at me and call me
Socialist. I ask this House to be more fair and just. If I am to be
tried, at least let me be tried for the opinions I hold and the views I
express. Why, there are members who have soiled their tongues with words
about social relations and marriage for which I have no proper reply in
this House, as unfortunately the forms of the House do not permit me to
use the only fitting answer, and perhaps it is as well. But I ask the
House, Do not let this be the kind of weapon with which a return is met.
Deal with me as the law directs, and in no other way. It is said "You
have brought this upon yourself" (hear, hear). One baronet who has
spoken of me with a kindness more than I deserve, in the very borough
which I represent said I had brought it upon myself, because when I
originally came to the House I flaunted and most ostentatiously put my
opinion upon the House (hear, hear). Well, not one word of that is true.
Not a shadow of it is true. I hold in my hand the sworn evidence of Sir
Erskine May. I do not ask gentlemen to take my word, for it is clear
they will not, but that of their own officer. And when the right hon.
baronet said I claimed under the statute, and drew an inference from it,
he knows that my claim contained no such words until the clerk at the
table of the House challenged me as to the law under which I claimed. I
do not quarrel with him, but I submit that the Clerk of the House had no
right to put that question to me. I submit that the House had nothing
whatever to do with it--that it certainly is no ostentatious flaunting
by me. I submit, that at any rate, that it is prior to the 9th of April,
1881, and the House had no right to revive it against me. I ask the
House to try and deal with me with some show of fairness. They will
find when I was before the Committee, instead of obtruding my opinions,
I said I had never directly or indirectly obtruded upon the House any of
my utterances or publications upon any subject whatever, and when
pressed by one of the members sitting on that (the Opposition) side of
the House as to certain opinions I was supposed to hold, by asking me
particular words I was supposed to have used in a judicial proceeding, I
said that if the Committee wished I would answer, but that I objected to
answer, because I had carefully refrained from saying any word which
would bring my opinions before the House. I ask, therefore, the House
whether it is not monstrously unfair to say that I have obtruded any
opinions here when I have expressly, carefully, and thoroughly kept them
from the House? But it is said by the right hon. baronet that it would
be a profanation to allow me to take the oath, and that the House would
be no party to such a profanation (Opposition cheers). Does the House
mean that it is a party to each oath taken? (hear.) There was a time
when most clearly it was not so a party. There was a time when the oath
was not even taken in the presence of members at all. But does the House
mean it is a party now? Was it a party the Session before last? Was it a
party when Mr. Hall walked up to that table, cheered by members on the
other side who knew his seat was won by deliberate bribery? (loud
Opposition cries of Order.) Bribery sought to be concealed by the most
corrupt perjury. Did the House join in it? (renewed cries of Order.) If
the House did not join in it, why did you cheer so that the words of the
oath were drowned? But was the House a party when John Stuart Mill sat
in this House? (hear, no.) A member who is, I think, now within the
walls of the House--the hon. member for Greenwich--in addressing his
constituents, said that Mr. Bradlaugh's opinions were hardly more
objectionable than those of some other members of the House. If the hon.
member knew that, then he was a party to the profanation of the oath:
but perhaps they were on his own side, and he did not feel the
profanation so acutely (hear, hear, and laughter). But it is said, "Our
real objection is that you have declared that the oath is not binding
upon you" (hear, hear, from Mr. Alderman Fowler). That is exactly the
opposite of what I did declare. The hon. member whose voice I hear now,
I unfortunately heard on the 3rd of August; and heard so that I shall
never forget it. (Mr. Bradlaugh here looked towards Alderman Fowler and
paused.) The hon. member admits that is the point--that I have declared
the oath is not binding upon my conscience; but, unfortunately, all the
print goes the other way. I am asked by the Committee who sat as to
whether the oath is binding, and on page 15 I reply: "Any form that I
went through, any oath that I took, I shall regard as binding upon my
conscience in the fullest degree, and I would go through no form and
take no oath unless I meant it to be so binding." Again, I am asked as
to the word "swear." I say: "I consider when I take an oath it is
binding upon my honor and upon my conscience"; and with reference to the
words of asseveration to which the hon. member for North Warwickshire
referred, he would at least have been more generous towards myself, if
generosity be possible with him, if he had said: "I desire to add--and I
do this most solemnly and unreservedly--that the taking, and
subscribing, and repeating these words of asseveration will in no degree
weaken the binding effect of the oath upon my conscience." I say here,
Sir, before you, with all the solemnity man can command, that I know the
words of the oath the statute requires me to take, that I am ready to
take that oath according to law, and that I will not take an oath
without intending it to be binding upon me, and that if I do take the
oath it will be binding upon my honor and conscience. (Conservative
cries of "Oh! oh!") Members of the House who are ignorant of what is
honor and conscience----(Loud cries of "Order," "Oh, oh," and
"Withdraw," from the Opposition.) If members will allow me to finish my
sentence----(Cries of "Withdraw.") Members of this House who are
ignorant of what is----(Renewed cries from the Opposition of
"Withdraw.") These (Mr. Bradlaugh pointing to the Opposition benches)
are my judges. Members of this House who are ignorant of what is the
honor and conscience of the man who stands before them--("Oh," and
laughter from the Opposition)--have a right to shout "Withdraw;" but
they must beware lest a greater voice outside--("Oh, oh," and laughter
from the Opposition)--at the ballot-box, where it has a right to express
it, may not only say "withdraw," but make withdraw all those who
infringe the constitutional rights of the nation, as they seek to
infringe them now. If I knew any kind of word which might convince
members whom I desire to convince that I would take no pledge that I did
not mean to be binding, I would use that form of words. But I have found
myself so harshly judged, so unfairly dealt with, that one feels a
difficulty in understanding whether any form of words, however often
repeated, would convey any kind of conviction to some minds. I presume
that this House will repeat its vote of April 26th. What then? Will it
have the courage of its opinions, and vacate my seat? (Hear, hear.) If
it does not, this House leaves me in an unfair position before the law.
I am bound to come to this table, and will come to this table, as long
as the mandate of my constituents sends me here, unless the House
vacates the seat. If my seat be vacated, it is my duty to bow to the
House, and appeal to my constituents again; and then the verdict rests
with them. But to take away part of the right, and deal with it in this
fashion, leaving me with the full legal responsibility and no kind of
legal authority, I submit is not generous. Well, will this House repeat
its vote of 9th May? Will it substitute force for law? At present the
law is on my side (No, no, and hear, hear). If not, let me sit and sue
me (hear, hear). If not, try by petition. If not, bring an action. But
shouting "No" won't decide the law, even with the united wisdom of the
members of this House who shout it. I know that no man is a good
advocate for a great principle unless he himself be worthy of the
principle he advocates, and I have felt acutely the judgment properly
passed upon me by many members of this House, who, knowing their
superiority to me, say how unworthy I am that this question should be
fought in my person. I admit I am unworthy, but it is not my fault that
I have this fight to make. I remind you of the words of one of the
greatest statesmen who sat in this House more than a hundred years ago,
that whenever an infringement of the constitutional right was attempted,
it was always attempted in the person of some obnoxious man (hear,
hear). I ask the House for a moment to carry its mind to the 3rd of
August last. I do that because either I do not understand what took
place then, or my memory has failed me, as the memory of other hon.
members sometimes does, or things happened without my consciousness. I
thought I had stood aside until Parliament had dealt with the pressing
business of the nation. I thought that had been recognised by this
House. I thought I only came saying at the very door of the House that I
was ready to obey its lawful orders, and I thought I was then seized by
force while saying it. My memory may not serve me well on that, but I
think it does. There were plenty of witnesses to the scene. I saw one
hon. member climb on to a pedestal to see how fourteen men could
struggle with one. It was hardly generous, hardly brave, hardly worthy
of the great House of Commons, that those sending out to the whole world
lessons of freedom, liberty, and law, should so infringe and so stamp
them under foot. I had no remedy in any court, or I would have taken it.
With all respect to you, Sir, and the officers of this House, if there
had been any possibility of trying at law against the mighty privilege
of this House, I would have appealed to that possibility. Let me now,
before I finish, ask the ear of the House for one moment. It is said it
is the oath and not the man; but others, more frank, say it is the man
and not the oath. Is it the oath and not the man? I am ready to stand
aside, say for four or five weeks, without coming to that table, if the
House within that time, or within such time as its great needs might
demand, would discuss whether an Affirmation Bill should pass or not. I
want to obey the law, and I tell you how I might meet the House still
further, if the House will pardon me for seeming to advise it. Hon.
members have said that would be a Bradlaugh Relief Bill (hear, hear).
Bradlaugh is more proud than you are (hear, hear). Let the Bill pass
without applying to elections that have taken place previously, and I
will undertake not to claim my seat, and when the Bill has passed I will
apply for the Chiltern Hundreds (cheers.) I have no fear. If I am not
fit for my constituents, they shall dismiss me, but you never shall. The
grave alone shall make me yield (hear, hear, and "Oh").
_A CARDINAL'S BROKEN OATH._
A Letter
TO HIS EMINENCE HENRY EDWARD, CARDINAL-ARCHBISHOP
OF WESTMINSTER.
BY
CHARLES BRADLAUGH.
[EIGHTH THOUSAND.]
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LONDON:
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1882.
PRICE ONE PENNY.
LONDON:
PRINTED BY ANNIE BESANT AND CHARLES BRADLAUGH.
63, FLEET STREET, E.C.
TO HIS EMINENCE
HENRY EDWARD,
CARDINAL-ARCHBISHOP OF WESTMINSTER.
Three times your Eminence has--through the pages of the _Nineteenth
Century_--personally and publicly interfered and used the weight of your
ecclesiastical position against me in the Parliamentary struggle in which
I am engaged, although you are neither voter in the borough for which I
am returned to sit, nor even co-citizen in the state to which I belong.
Your personal position is that of a law-breaker, one who has deserted his
sworn allegiance and thus forfeited his citizenship, one who is tolerated
by English forbearance, but is liable to indictment for misdemeanor as
"member of a society of the Church of Rome." More than once, when the
question of my admission to the House of Commons has been under
discussion in that House, have I seen you busy in the lobby closely
attended by the devout and sober Philip Callan, or some other equally
appropriate Parliamentary henchman. Misrepresenting what had taken place
in the House of Commons when I took my seat on affirmation in July, 1880,
your Eminence wrote in the _Nineteenth Century_ for August, 1880, that
which you were pleased to entitule "An Englishman's Protest" against my
being allowed to sit in the Commons' House, to which the vote of a free
constituency had duly returned me. In that protest you blundered alike in
your law and in your history. You gave the Tudor Parliamentary oath
Saxon and Norman antiquity. You spoke of John Horne Tooke as having had
the door of the House shut against him by a by-vote, no such by-vote
having been carried, and the statute which disabled clergymen in the
future not affecting John Horne Tooke's seat in that Parliament. You
declared that in the French Revolution the French voted out the Supreme
Being; there is no record of any such vote. In March, 1882, when the
House had expelled me for my disobedience of its orders in complying with
the law, and taking my seat, you again used the _Nineteenth Century_.
This time for a second protest, intended to prevent my re-election. You,
in both your articles, reminded the bigots that I might be indicted for
blasphemy. Your advice has since been followed. Persecution is a
"two-edged sword," and I return the warning you offer to Lord Sherbrooke.
When I was in Paris some time since, and was challenged to express an
opinion as to the enforcement of the law against the religious orders in
France, I, not to the pleasure of many of my friends, spoke out very
freely that in matters of religion I would use the law against none; but
your persecuting spirit may provoke intemperate men even farther than you
dream. In this country, by the 10th George IV., cap. 7, secs. 28 and 29,
31, 32 and 34, you are criminally indictable, Cardinal-Archbishop of
Westminster. You only reside here without police challenge by the
merciful forbearance of the community. And yet you parade in political
contest your illegal position as "a member of a religious order of the
Church of Rome," and have the audacity to invoke outlawry and legal
penalty against me. Last month, in solemn state, you, in defiance of the
law, in a personal and official visit to the borough of Northampton
itself, sought to weaken the confidence of my constituents; and you were
not ashamed, in order to injure me, to pretend friendship with men who
have for years constantly and repeatedly used the strongest and foulest
abuse of your present Church. An amiable but ignorant Conservative mayor,
chief magistrate of the borough, but innocent of statutes, was misled
into parading his official robe and office while you openly broke the law
in his presence. In the current number of the _Nineteenth Century_ you
fire your last shot, and are coarse in Latin as well as in the vulgar
tongue. Perhaps the frequenting Philip Callan has spoiled your manners.
It else seems impossible that one who was once a cultured scholar and a
refined gentleman could confuse with legitimate argument the abuse of his
opponents as "cattle." But who are you, Henry Edward Manning, that you
should throw stones at me, and should so parade your desire to protect
the House of Commons from contamination? At least, first take out of it
the drunkard and the dissolute of your own Church. You know them well
enough. Is it the oath alone which stirs you? Your tenderness on swearing
comes very late in life. When you took orders as a deacon of the English
Church, in presence of your bishop, you swore "so help me, God," that you
did from your "heart abhor, detest and abjure," and, with your hand on
the "holy gospels," you declared "that no foreign prince, person,
prelate, state, or potentate hath, or ought to have, any jurisdiction,
power, superiority, pre-eminence, or authority, ecclesiastical or
spiritual, within this realm." You may now well write of men "whom no
oath can bind." The oath you took you have broken; and yet it was because
you had, in the very church itself, taken this oath, that you for many
years held more than one profitable preferment in the Established Church
of England. You indulge in inuendoes against my character in order to do
me mischief, and viciously insinuate as though my life had in it
justification for good men's abhorrence. In this you are very cowardly as
well as very false. Then, to move the timid, you suggest "the fear of
eternal punishment," as associated with a broken oath. Have you any such
fear? or have you been personally conveniently absolved from the
"eternal" consequences of your perjury? Have you since sworn another oath
before another bishop of another church, or made some solemn vow to Rome,
in lieu of, and in contradiction to, the one you so took in presence of
your bishop, when, "in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost," that
bishop of the church by law established in this country accepted your
oath, and gave you authority as a deacon in the Church you have since
forsaken. I do not blame you so much that you are forsworn: there are, as
you truly say, "some men whom no oath can bind;" and it has often been
the habit of the cardinals of your Church to take an oath and break it
when profit came with breach; but your remembrance of your own perjury
might at least keep you reticent in very shame. Instead of this, you
thrust yourself impudently into a purely political contest, and shout as
if the oath were to you the most sacred institution possible. You say
"there are happily some men who believe in God and fear him." Do you do
either? You, who declared, "So help me, God" that no foreign "prelate ...
ought to have any jurisdiction or authority ecclesiastical or spiritual
within this realm." And you--who in spite of your declaration on oath
have courted and won, intrigued for and obtained, the archbishop's
authority and the cardinal's hat from the Pope of Rome--you rebuke Lord
Sherbrooke for using the words "sin and shame" in connexion with
oath-taking; do you hold now that there was no sin and no shame in your
broken oath? None either in the rash taking or the wilful breaking? Have
you no personal shame that you have broken your oath? Or do the pride and
pomp of your ecclesiastical position outbribe your conscience? You talk
of the people understanding the words "so help me, God." How do you
understand them of your broken oath? Do they mean to you: "May God desert
and forsake me as I deserted and forsook the Queen's supremacy, to which
I so solemnly swore allegiance"? You speak of men being kept to their
allegiance by the oath "which binds them to their sovereign." You say
such men may be tempted by ambition or covetousness unless they are bound
by "the higher and more sacred responsibility" involved in the
"recognition of the lawgiver in the oath." Was the Rector of Lavington
and Graffham covetous of an archbishopric that he broke his oath? Was the
Archdeacon of Chichester ambitious of the Cardinal's hat that he became
so readily forsworn? Lord Archbishop of Westminster, had you, when you
were apostate, remained a poor and simple priest in poverty and
self-denial, although your oath would have still been broken, yet you
might have taunted others more profited by their perjuries. But you, who
have derived profit, pride, and pomp from your false swearing--you, who
sign yourself "Henry Edward, Cardinal-Archbishop" by favor of the very
authority you abjured in the name of God--it is in the highest degree
indecent and indecorous for you to parade yourself as a defender of the
sanctity of the oath. As a prince-prelate of the Church of Rome you have
no right to meddle with the question of the English Parliamentary oath.
Your Church has been the foe of liberty through the world, and I am
honored by your personal assailment. But you presume too much on the
indifference of the age when, in this free England, you so recklessly
exhibit as weapons in an election contest the outward signs of the
authority the Vatican claims, but shall never again exercise, in Britain.
CHARLES BRADLAUGH.
NORTHAMPTON
AND THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS.
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN
CHARLES BRADLAUGH, M.P.,
AND THE RIGHT HON.
SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE, M.P.
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NORTHAMPTON
AND THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS.
20, Circus Road, St. John's Wood, London, N.W.,
_March 1st, 1884_.
To the Right Hon. SIR STAFFORD H. NORTHCOTE, M.P., G.C.B.
SIR,--If, on either of the occasions when recently moving against me in
the House of Commons, you had accorded or claimed for me opportunity of
speech in self-defence, I might have been spared the need for this
letter.
Apparently your view is that a member unfortunate enough to have the
majority of the House against him need not have even the semblance of
fairness shown him--that you, being strong, need not be troubled with
scruples, and that the mere fact that the member is, like yourself, the
chosen member of a constituency does not entitle him to the smallest
courtesy or consideration.
You have taught me, Sir, many lessons during the past four years. Some of
these I trust to remember and profit by in the future. You have taught me
that a temporary majority of the House may, year after year, exclude any
member of Parliament from his seat, although he has strictly obeyed every
Standing Order--and this without vacating that seat--that it may so
exclude the member although he has been a decent and orderly member of
the House, attending regularly for months to all its duties, and one
against whom no charge or pretence of Parliamentary misconduct was made
whilst he so served in it.
You have taught me, Sir, that the leader of a great party may sit silent,
and acquiesce in it by his support, while the law-abiding electors of a
great constituency are called "mob," "dregs," and "scum"--that such a
leader may permit his followers to openly accuse two of the highest
judges of our country of having judicially decided unfairly from corrupt
party motives--that he may even, without dishonor, keep silence whilst it
is suggested that the whole judicial bench is so corrupt that it will be
ready to decide unjustly at the bidding of a government--and that the
first law officer of the Crown is ready to be fraudulently collusive with
myself. Did you believe these things, Sir, when they were stated and
loudly cheered by those who sit around you on your side of the House? If
yes, I am glad that your experience of humanity has been less fortunate
than my own. I have regarded our judges as at least striving to be just
and independent. You seem to think it nothing that the highest judges
should, in your presence, be charged with judging unjustly from
favoritism for the government of the day.
You have encouraged and practised deliberate violation of the law, and,
to cover this law-breaking, you have connived at, and been party to, the
basest insinuations against those whose duty it is to judicially
pronounce on matters of legal dispute. You have, without rebuke,
permitted your followers to declare that if the High Court of Judicature
declared the law to be in my favor, that then they and you still intended
to defy and disobey the law.
The first resolution you moved against me, on the 11th February, was
worse than futile, for it forbade me to do that which I had already done,
and which you well knew that I had so done, in order to compel the
submission to the judgment of a competent tribunal of the legality of my
act.
The ridiculous form of your resolution arose because you--having
bargained with me in writing through Mr. Winn that I should come to the
table immediately after questions, and not before--intended to interpose
ere I could reach the table. This would have been a dishonest trick had
you succeeded; it became contemptibly ridiculous when you failed; but it
is a lesson to me that I must be careful, indeed, when English gentlemen
of name and family make treaties with me.
Your second resolution, on February 11th, was a spiteful, paltry, and
cowardly insult to myself and to my constituents, for it was pressed by
you despite that my colleague offered for me the express undertaking that
you pretended you wished to secure, and was still pressed by you though
Mr. Burt offered for me that I would at once personally give such
undertaking. These two resolutions, utterly illegal and dangerous to
Parliamentary repute, you have renewed on Thursday, the 21st, although
you had heard read by Mr. Speaker an undertaking from me to the House
that I would not attempt to take my seat until the judicial interpreters
of the law had given formal judgment. And they are very cowardly and
inexcusable resolutions, spiteful in excess of any ever passed in
previous years. They exclude me, not only from the House, but from the
reading-room, library, tea-room, dining-rooms, and exterior lobbies,
though there is not the faintest suggestion that I have used my right to
go to those places to enable me to disturb the House. If I had not taken
the precaution to anticipate your malice, I should actually have been
hindered by force from going to the proper officer to obtain the
certificate of my return. Yours is a mean and spiteful act, Sir, unworthy
an English gentleman. And I admit that you have inconvenienced me, for
you have deprived me of access to the library of the House, and you may
thus put me to some expense and annoyance in the procurement of law books
and Parliamentary records in the litigation in which I am involved in
defending the rights of my constituents.
It is too much that, in 1884, a duly-elected and properly-qualified
burgess of Parliament should be shut outside by such votes.
To repeat to you words signed, in September, 1656, by your own ancestor,
Sir John Northcote, M.P. for the County of Devon: "we who have been duly
chosen to be members of the Parliament, have an undoubted right to meet,
sit, and vote in Parliament," and "no part of the representative body are
trusted to consent to anything in the nation's behalf if the whole have
not their free liberty of debating and voting in the matters propounded."
To continue the language of your sturdy ancestor, you have "now declared
that the people's choice cannot give a man a right to sit in Parliament,
but the right must be derived from _your_ gracious will and pleasure."
You reply that you have the force on your side; but Sir John Northcote
declared that: "The violent exclusion of any of the people's deputies
from doing their duties and executing their trust freely in Parliament
doth change the state of the people from freedom into a mere slavery;"
and if you tell me that the majority of the present members of the House
are with you in what you do, I recall Sir John Northcote's protest:
"That all such chosen members for Parliament as shall take upon them to
approve of the forcible exclusion of other chosen members, or shall sit,
vote, and act by the name of the Parliament of England while, to their
knowledge, any of the chosen members are so by force shut out, we say
such ought to be reputed betrayers of the liberties of England."
You cannot now pretend with any hope that sane men will believe you, that
you desire "to prevent the profanation of the oath." In 1880 you
prevented the second reading of the Affirmation Bill, introduced by my
colleague, Mr. Labouchere, under the pretext that such a measure ought to
be introduced by the Government. In 1881, after you yourself had said the
matter should be dealt with by legislation, you prevented the Government
from introducing it. In 1882 your friends blocked the Affirmation measure
again proposed by my colleague, and in 1883 you exerted every influence
to defeat, and successfully defeated, the Affirmation Bill brought
forward by the Government.
If you had really believed the oath profaned by me, you would have been
one of the first to aid in removing the possible profanation by
substituting the right of affirmation. In Ulster you took credit for
keeping an Atheist out of Parliament, but it was not my Atheism you kept
out, for I actually sat with you day by day, speaking, voting, and
serving, from the beginning of July, 1880, until the end of March, 1881.
And, during the whole of that time, my care was to be at least as good
and loyal a member of that House as any sitting within its walls. I do
not plead my conduct there, whilst using all my right, as anything on my
behalf, for I at most could do no more than my duty; but at least I have
the right to say that it was never suggested that I was other than a good
working member of the House, strict in my attendance at and during every
one of its sittings. It cannot be pretended that I used my right of
speech to force upon the House one word which did not relate to the
business then being dealt with, or that in any fashion I obtruded upon
what should be a purely political assembly any views of mine on matters
of religion.
You have permitted in public my conduct to be misstated in your presence,
and utterances in Parliament to be attributed to me which are none of
mine, and you have done this because you hoped that, by exciting
religious and social prejudice against me, you might weaken the
Government, and crawl back into office. To injure the Liberal party, you
have allowed words which you pretend are sacred to be used as party
cries, and you have made hundreds of thousands examine into and declare
in favor of my opinions and expressions on religious questions who but
for you might perhaps have never even known my name. You have allied
yourself at Westminster with men whom you denounced in Ireland as
"traitors and disloyal," in order that, with their help, you might insult
an English constituency; and you have succeeded in bringing Parliamentary
Government into contempt by parading the House of Commons as the chief
law-breaking assembly in the world. In four years against me you have
done your worst to destroy me; with your own purse you have helped the
various projects to ruin me; and you have so failed that clergymen and
Nonconformist ministers have been driven to support me from very
indignation against the injury you have done to the cause of religion.
Your Conservative associations have flooded the country with leaflets
containing garbled and misleading extracts from my speeches and writings,
and have thus excited the curiosity of many whom I could have never
reached. These, procuring my works, and finding that my words have been
distorted and taken out of context, give a favor to me that I should
perhaps have never otherwise won.
Few believe that you are moved by religious motives. Mr. Newdegate is
regarded as sincere, though his sanity is doubted; but when men recollect
the past and even present lives of many of those around you, whose
tongues so loudly declare their piety, they come, not unnaturally, to the
conclusion that he is the worst infidel who trails the banner of his
church in the mire of political warfare, and permits the votes of the
drunken, the dissolute, the dishonest, and the disloyal to be canvassed
by his whips so that they may be counted on the side which he parades as
that of the pure and the holy.
On the 7th February, 1882, I told you and your majority: "If I am not fit
for my constituents, they shall dismiss me, but you never shall." I have
gone since voluntarily to my constituents--to those from whom you
presented a petition with 10,400 mock signatures upon it. The answer has
come at the ballot-box. My constituents bid me resist you, and I will.
They trust me to defeat you, and I will. The law is on my side, and you
fear its pronouncement. You kept me from the possibility of obtaining a
decision as long as you could, but on the 11th February I broke through
your barriers. Then you fruitlessly tried to erase all trace of my
voting, and when you found that I beat you on this by adding a new vote
as you rubbed out the vote before, then, in malicious spite, you shut me
out of the tea-room, dining-room, cloak-room, and library. For shame, Sir
Stafford Northcote! This was worthy of "O'Donnell," but not of the leader
of a great party. You wear knightly orders. You should be above a knave's
spitefulness.
My turn is coming. You have won sympathy for me throughout the land; you
have made Northampton men stand by me closer than ever; you are now
awaking the country to stand by Northampton. Mr. Justice Stephen says
that the appeal is to the constituencies, and I appeal. In the name of
justice, by the hope of liberty, in memory of English struggles for
freedom, I appeal, and I hear the answer growing as you shall hear it,
too, on the day when, from my place in the House, I move: "That all the
resolutions respecting Charles Bradlaugh, member for Northampton,
hindering him from obeying the law, and punishing him for having obeyed
the law, be expunged from the Journals of this House as being subversive
of the rights of the whole body of electors of this kingdom."
CHARLES BRADLAUGH.
* * * * *
30, St. James' Place, S.W.
_March 4th, 1884._
SIR,--There are some points in the letter you have addressed to me which
I am unwilling to pass over in silence lest I should be taken to admit
your assertions.
In the first place, it is necessary that I should point out to you that
the action of the House of Commons with respect to yourself has not been
arbitrary or capricious, but has been founded on principles deliberately
adopted by a large majority of its members of various political opinions,
to which principles they have steadily adhered, and which they have
always been prepared to justify.
In the second place it should be clearly understood that in all the steps
which we have taken with respect to yourself, including some which we
took with the greatest reluctance, we were acting on the defensive, in
consequence of your repeated attempts to override or to evade the
repeated decisions of the House of Commons.
The brief history of your case is this. You were duly elected member for
Northampton at the General Election of 1880. On presenting yourself to
take your seat you tendered an affirmation instead of an oath, and
supported your claim to affirm by reference to the fact that you had been
permitted to do so in a court of law under the Evidence Amendment Acts of
1869 and 1870. That claim at once, and necessarily, brought under the
notice of the House that you must either yourself have objected in a
court of law to take an oath, or must have been objected to as
incompetent to do so, and that the presiding judge must have been
satisfied that the taking of an oath would have no binding effect upon
your conscience.
That being so, a Committee was appointed by the House to consider whether
the Evidence Amendment Acts were applicable to the case of a member of
the House of Commons desiring to take his seat and to comply with the
necessary conditions.
It was held by the Committee that they were not so applicable, and this
finding of the Committee was subsequently confirmed by the judgment of
the Court of Appeal.
Upon being refused permission to affirm, you immediately came to the
table of the House and offered to take the oath. This proceeding was
objected to, and the majority of the House (still, as theretofore,
composed of members of different shades of politics) refused to allow you
to go through the form of taking an oath, which, by the hypothesis on
which your original claim to affirm was founded, as well as by the
evidence afforded by a letter of your own, they held you to be
incompetent really to take, and which they considered it would be a
profanation to allow you to pretend to take.
That was the ground taken by the House on the 23rd June, 1880, and it is
the ground which it has maintained ever since.
You have, since the adoption of that resolution, made various attempts to
force the House to admit you to a seat, while still maintaining its
objection; and those attempts have, on more than one occasion, led to
scenes of a very indecent and disorderly character. In its anxiety to
prevent the recurrence of such scenes, the House has felt itself obliged
to adopt measures of rigid exclusion, which it would gladly have avoided.
I do not think it necessary to enter into the details of these scenes.
I am, however, obliged to take notice of your allegation that my action
on the 11th February involved a breach of an arrangement previously made
through Mr. Winn.
The arrangement which I authorised Mr. Winn to make in my name, and which
he did make in a letter to Mr. Labouchere, was as follows:
"If Mr. Bradlaugh will write you a letter to the effect that he
will not go up to the table to take the oath, nor make any
other move with regard to his seat until Monday, February
11th, and will do so on that day, say immediately after
questions, I am quite sure that Sir Stafford will neither move
anything himself respecting Mr. Bradlaugh's seat, nor employ
anyone else to do so, _previous to that day_."
The meaning of this is perfectly obvious, and it was in strict conformity
with it that I myself abstained, and urged my friends to abstain, from
taking any step whatever in relation to Mr. Bradlaugh until the day
named. When, upon that day, you came forward in defiance of the Speaker's
repeated calls to order, and began to go through the form of taking the
oath, I had no option but to support the Chair, and to support also the
repeatedly pronounced resolutions of the House in former sessions.
I do not take notice of other passages in your letter reflecting on the
course of the majority, and more particularly of myself.
But I will add, in conclusion, what your letter does not show, that your
exclusion from the precincts of the House is terminable at any moment
when you may be willing to undertake not to disturb the proceedings of
the House. The inconveniences of which you complain are inconveniences
which you might, if you chose, put an end to to-morrow.
I have the honor to remain,
Your obedient servant,
STAFFORD H. NORTHCOTE.
C. BRADLAUGH, Esq., M.P.
* * * * *
23, Circus Road, St. John's Wood, London, N.W.,
_March 7th, 1884_.
To the Right Hon. SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE, Bart, M.P.
SIR,--In reply to your favor of the 4th instant, in which you say that
the House held me to be incompetent to take the oath, will you permit me
to answer: 1. That the question of competence or incompetence to take the
oath is one of law, fit only for the decision of a judicial tribunal, to
which tribunal I have always desired and endeavored to refer such
question. 2. That if the "principle deliberately adopted" by a large
majority of the members of the House of Commons had been that they
desired to prevent "a profanation of the oath," then they ought, during
the sessions of 1882--1883, to have gladly facilitated the passage of the
Affirmation Bill, which would have prevented the necessity for the
fulfilling by me of that which you describe as profanation, but which I
contend is the duty imposed on me by law.
In your very temperate historic narrative, you omit the fact that when
the House passed its resolution of the 23rd June, 1880, it had before it
my declaration, made three weeks earlier, in answer to question 102 of
the second Select Committee:
"Any form that I went through, any oath that I took, I should
regard as binding upon my conscience in the fullest degree. I
would go through no form, I would take no oath, unless I meant
it to be so binding."
And as you refer to my letter of the 20th May, printed in the report of
that committee, it is also fair to recall my answer thereon on the same
day to question 197:
"I ask the Committee in examining it to take it complete, not
to separate one or two words in it and to take those without
the countervailing words, and to remember that in this letter I
declare that the oath, if I take it, would bind me, and I now
repeat that in the most distinct and formal manner; that the
Oath of Allegiance, viz.: 'I do swear that I will be faithful
and bear true allegiance to her Majesty Queen Victoria, her
heirs and successors, according to law,' will, when I take it,
be most fully, completely, and unreservedly binding upon my
honor and conscience; and I crave leave to refer to the
unanimous judgment of the full Court of the Exchequer Chamber,
in the case of Miller _v._ Salomons, 17th Jurist, page 463, and
to the case of the Lancaster and Carlisle Railway Company _v._
Heaton, 4th Jurist, new series, page 708, for the
distinguishment between the words of asseveration and the
essential words of an oath. But I also desire to add, and I do
this most solemnly and unreservedly, that the taking and
subscribing, or repeating of those words of asseveration, will
in no degree weaken the binding effect of the oath on my
conscience."
In your reference to my attempts to take the seat to which I am by law
entitled, you have omitted to state that on the 27th April, 1881, you
personally advised me to wait for legislation, and that when I did so
wait, your friends of the majority and yourself prevented such
legislation.
In recalling the arrangement made by Mr. Winn on your behalf, you have
omitted his most explicit and latest letter:
"Nostell Priory, Wakefield,
"January 28th, 1884.
"DEAR MR. LABOUCHERE,--On the distinct understanding and
agreement that Mr. Bradlaugh does not come to the table to take
the oath, or adopt any other course with reference to his seat
in the House of Commons, until immediately after questions on
Monday, the 11th of February next, and that he will on that day
and time come to the table, as he has intimated his intention
of doing, I am prepared to say that Sir Stafford Northcote will
not previous to Monday the 11th make any motion hostile to Mr.
Bradlaugh, nor support any motion coming from any of our
independent friends on the subject.
"I am, yours very truly,
"ROW. WINN.
"H. Labouchere, Esq., M.P."
My charge against you is that, despite this agreement, you had gone down
to the House with a resolution prepared beforehand, and by its wording
showing that it was intended to be moved before I should be able to get
near the table to which you had made me specifically agree then to come.
You conclude by saying that I can put an end to any personal
inconvenience by undertaking not to disturb the proceedings of the House.
I gave such an undertaking last year in express words; it is printed in
the journals of the House, and you did not accept it. Immediately before
you moved your resolution of 21st February, you heard Mr. Speaker read my
undertaking to do nothing until a legal decision was obtained. This you
refused, and I have no reason to suppose that any second offer from me
would be accepted. If what you really desire is that, if the law decides
in my favor, I shall none the less join in your insult to my constituents
by refusing to try to serve in the Parliament to which they have lawfully
returned me, I can only say that I will never give such an undertaking.
I have the honor to be, Sir,
Your most obedient Servant,
C. BRADLAUGH.
THE LATEST
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE:
A REGISTER OF EVENTS
_Which have occurred since April 2nd, 1880._
BY
W. MAWER.
"No, not an oath....
Swear priests, and cowards, and men cautelous,
Old feeble carrions and such suffering souls
That welcome wrongs; unto bad causes swear
Such creatures as men doubt; but do not stain
The even virtue of our enterprise,
Nor the insuppressive metal of our spirits,
To think that or our cause or our performance
Did need an oath."--_Julius Cæsar_, Act II., Scene 1.
[Illustration]
LONDON:
FREETHOUGHT PUBLISHING COMPANY
63, FLEET STREET, E.C.
1883.
PRICE TWOPENCE.
LONDON:
PRINTED BY ANNIE BESANT AND CHARLES BRADLAUGH,
63, FLEET STREET E.C.
THE LATEST
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE.
1880.
April 2nd.--After twelve years' fight and three repulses, Mr. Charles
Bradlaugh is elected member of Parliament for Northampton. The polling
was as follows:--
Labouchere (L.) 4,158
Bradlaugh (R.) 3,827
Phipps (C.) 3,152
Merewether (C.) 2,826
The _Weekly Dispatch_ said: Mr. Bradlaugh's achievement of the position
he has been aiming at so long and so zealously is a notable sign of the
times. Whatever his critics may think of him, he will enter Parliament as
the representative of a vastly larger constituency than the whole
electorate or the whole population of Northampton.
The _Birmingham Daily Mail_: Mr. Bradlaugh holds extreme views on some
subjects, but he will none the less be a useful man in Parliament, his
unflinching courage in the exposure of abuses being unquestionable.
The _Standard_: Mr. Bradlaugh, now that he has got to the House of
Commons, is not likely to efface himself in speechless obscurity.
The _Southampton Times_: The most signal and portentous triumph is that
which has been achieved by Mr. Bradlaugh. His election shows what the
unity of the Liberal party must have been.
The _Christian World_: His contributions to the discussions of the House
may not be without value.
During the election Mr. Samuel Morley telegraphed to Mr. Labouchere as
follows: I strongly urge necessity of united effort in all sections of
Liberal party, and the sinking of minor and personal questions, with many
of which I deeply sympathise, in order to prevent the return, in so
pronounced a constituency as Northampton, of even one Conservative.
April 15th.--Mr. S. Morley, speaking at Bristol said, respecting his
telegram to Northampton: He made no reference to candidates, nor did the
friend who wrote the telegram go into detail, but he advised union. Those
who had known him all his life would believe that he viewed with the
intensest repugnance the supposed opinions, both social and religious, of
one of the candidates. Afterwards, writing to the _Record_, Mr. Morley
said he deeply regretted his telegram.
The _Weekly Dispatch_, commenting on Mr. Morley's conduct, said: Let the
bigots who have taken him to task for his temporary aberration from the
path of pharisaism make what they can of his pitiful excuse. Other people
can only regret that a man so useful in many ways, both as a politician
and a philanthropist, should show himself so narrow-minded.
The _Edinburgh Evening News_: In their disappointment, the defeated party
have eagerly caught at the election of Mr. Bradlaugh as supplying the
most pungent taunt that can be thrown at their victorious opponents.
The _Sheffield Telegraph_: Bradlaugh is an M.P. ... the bellowing
blasphemer of Northampton.
Mr. Bradlaugh announces that he considers he is legally entitled to avail
himself of the Freethinkers' affirmation, and that there is some reason
to hope that other members will join him in that course.
April 17th.--_Sheffield Independent's_ "London Correspondent" says:
Tenets which constitute the religious faith of Mr. Bradlaugh are
understood to constitute an insuperable difficulty in the way of his
being sworn a member of "the faithful Commons."
April 29th.--Parliament opens.
May 3rd.--At the table of the House Mr. Bradlaugh handed in a written
paper to the Clerk of the House; on this were written the words: "To the
Right Honorable the Speaker of the House of Commons. I, the undersigned
Charles Bradlaugh, beg respectfully to claim to be allowed to affirm, as
a person for the time being by law permitted to make a solemn affirmation
or declaration, instead of taking an oath. Charles Bradlaugh." Asked if
he desired to state anything to the House, Mr. Bradlaugh said: I have to
submit that the Parliamentary Oaths Act, 1866, gives the right to affirm
to every person for the time being permitted by law to make affirmation.
I am such a person; and under the Evidence Amendment Act, 1869, and the
Evidence Amendment Act, 1870, I have repeatedly, for nine years past,
affirmed in the highest courts of jurisdiction in this realm. I am ready
to make the declaration or affirmation of allegiance.
At the request of the Speaker Mr. Bradlaugh then withdrew, in order that
the House might consider the claim, and Lord F. Cavendish, urging that
it would be manifestly inconvenient that when any hon. member had applied
to take his seat in the House, any unnecessary delay should intervene,
moved the appointment of a committee of inquiry which should lay before
the House the material on which the House itself should found its
decision. Sir Stafford Northcote seconded. Several other members spoke,
and Mr. Beresford Hope said that the grievance of one man was very little
compared with a great principle; at present the House of Commons was only
a half-hatched chicken. The committee was then agreed to.
May 11th.--Appointment of committee carried by 171 votes against 74,
after a two hours' debate.
May 20th.--The committee report: "that in the opinion of the committee,
persons entitled under the provisions of 'the Evidence Amendment Act,
1869,' and 'the Evidence Amendment Act, 1870,' to make a solemn
declaration instead of an oath in courts of justice, can not be admitted
to make an affirmation or declaration instead of an oath in the House of
Commons, in persuance of the Acts 29 and 30 Vict., c. 19, and 31 and 32
Vict., c. 72."
The draft report, proposed by the Attorney-General, was to the effect
that "persons so admitted," etc., _may be_ admitted, etc. This was lost
by the casting vote of the chairman (Mr. Walpole), the other members of
the committee voting as follows. Ayes: Mr. Whitbread, Mr. John Bright,
Mr. Massey, Mr. Sergeant Simon, Sir Henry Jackson, Mr. Attorney General,
Mr. Solicitor-General, Mr. Watkin Williams. Noes: Sir John Holker, Lord
Henry Lennox, Mr. Staveley Hill, Mr. Grantham, Mr. Pemberton, Mr.
Hopwood, Mr. Beresford Hope, Mr. Henry Chaplin.
Mr. Bradlaugh makes a public statement of his position with regard to the
oath. He considered he had a legal right to choose between the
alternatives of making an affirmation or taking the oath, and he felt it
clearly his moral duty, in that case, to make an affirmation. The oath
included words which, to him, were meaningless, and it would have been an
act of hypocrisy to voluntarily take this form if any other had been open
to him. He should, taking the oath, regard himself as bound not by the
letter of its words, but by the spirit which the affirmation would have
conveyed, had he been allowed to make it, and as soon as he might be able
he should take steps to put an end to the present doubtful and
unfortunate state of the law and practice on oaths and affirmations.
May 21st.--Amid a tumult of cries from the Conservative benches Mr.
Bradlaugh goes to the table for the purpose of being sworn. Sir H. D.
Wolff objecting, the Speaker requested Mr. Bradlaugh to withdraw. He (the
Speaker) was bound to say he knew of no instance in which a member who
had offered to take the oath in the usual form was not allowed by the
House to do so. Sir H. D. Wolff then moved that Mr. Bradlaugh should not
be allowed to take the oath, alleging against Mr. Bradlaugh his repute as
an Atheist, and his authorship of "The Impeachment of the House of
Brunswick." Mr. Alderman Fowler seconded the motion, stating that he held
in his hand a petition praying the House not to alter the law and the
custom of the realm for the purpose of admitting an Atheist to
Parliament. Mr. Gladstone, in the course of replying, said: "it was not
in consequence of any regulation enforced by the authority of this
House--of a single branch of the legislature, however complete that
authority may be over the members of this House, that the hon. member for
Northampton presents himself to take the oath at the table. He presents
himself in pursuance of a statutory obligation to take the oath in order
that he may fulfil the duty with which, as we are given to understand, in
a regular and formal manner, his constituents have entrusted him. That
statutory obligation implied a statutory right." He moved that it be
referred to a select committee to consider and report for the information
of the House whether the House has any right to prevent a duly-elected
member, who is willing to take the oath, from doing so. A long debate
ensued, characterised by the fierceness with which Mr. Bradlaugh's
admission to Parliament was opposed. Mr. John Bright, however, asked if
the House were entitled thus to obstruct what he called the right of a
member to take his seat on account of his religious belief, because it
happened that his belief or no belief had been openly professed, what
reason was there that any member of the House should not be questioned as
to his beliefs, and if the answer were not satisfactory that the House
should not be at liberty to object to his taking his seat? After two or
three adjournments of the debate the Premier's amendment was virtually
withdrawn, and a motion by the Attorney-General was carried to the effect
that a committee should be appointed to report whether it was competent
to the House to prevent Mr. Bradlaugh, by resolution, from taking the
oath.
May 28th.--Committee nominated--twenty-three members.
Mr. Labouchere gives notice to ask leave to bring in a Bill to amend the
law of Parliamentary Oaths, to provide that any member may, if he desire,
make a solemn affirmation in lieu of taking the oath.
June 2nd.--Mr. Bradlaugh gives evidence before Select Committee, in the
course of which he said: "I have never at any time refused to take the
oath of allegiance provided by statute to be taken by members; all I did
was, believing as I then did that I had the right to affirm, to claim to
affirm, and I was then absolutely silent as to the oath; that I did not
refuse to take it, nor have I then or since expressed any mental
reservation, or stated that the appointed oath of allegiance would not be
binding upon me; that, on the contrary, I say, and have said, that the
essential part of the oath is in the fullest and most complete degree
binding upon my honor and conscience, and that the repeating of words of
asseveration does not in the slightest degree weaken the binding effect
of the oath of allegiance upon me." [It had been persistently represented
that Mr. Bradlaugh had refused to take the oath.] "Any form that I went
through, any oath that I took, I should regard as binding upon my
conscience in the fullest degree."
June 16th.--The committee report that the compliance by Mr. Bradlaugh
with the form used when an oath is taken would not be the taking of the
oath within the true meaning of the statutes; that if a member make and
subscribe the affirmation in place of taking the oath it is possible by
means of an action in the High Court of Justice, to test his legal right
to do so; and that the committee recommend that should Mr. Bradlaugh
again seek to make and subscribe the affirmation he be not prevented from
so doing. (Majority in favor of his being allowed to affirm--four.)
June 21st.--Mr. Labouchere moved in the House of Commons that Mr.
Bradlaugh be admitted to make an affirmation instead of taking the oath,
seconded by Mr. M'Laren. Sir H. Giffard moved a resolution seeking to
debar Mr. Bradlaugh from both oath and affirmation. Alderman Fowler
seconded, a man who did not believe in a God was not likely to be a man
of high moral character. The majority of the people were opposed to an
Atheist being admitted to Parliament. Many other members spoke. General
Burnaby said the making of the affirmation by Mr. Bradlaugh would pollute
the oath. Mr. Palmer said Mr. Bradlaugh had a legal right with which the
House had no power to interfere. The Attorney-General said he had come to
the conclusion that Mr. Bradlaugh could not take the oath, chiefly on the
consideration that he was a person entitled to affirm. Mr. John Bright
said it was certainly open to any member to propose to take either oath
or affirmation; probably if Mr. Bradlaugh had had any suspicion that the
affirmation would have been refused him, he would have taken the oath as
other members take it--very much, he was afraid, as a matter of form.
Debate adjourned.
June 22nd.--Mr. Gladstone said that the House, by agreeing to the
amendment, would probably be entering on the commencement of a long,
embarrassing, and a difficult controversy, not perhaps so much within as
beyond the limits of the House, perhaps with the result of ultimate
defeat of the House. The more he looked at the case the stronger appeared
the arguments which went to prove that in the essence of the law and the
constitution the House had no jurisdiction. In interfering between a
member and what he considered his statutory duty, the House might find
itself in conflict with either the courts of law or the constituency of
Northampton. No doubt an action could not be brought against the House,
but he was not so clear that an action could not be brought against the
servants of the House. He was still less willing to face a conflict with
the constituency. The House had commonly been successful in its
controversies with the Crown or House of Lords, but very different was
the issue of its one lamentable conflict with a constituency.--Sir Henry
Tyler, with execrable taste, dragged in the name of a lady with whom Mr.
Bradlaugh is associated in business. At last, by a majority of 45--the
numbers voting being 275 and 230--another triumph against liberty was
scored.
The _Christian World_ regretted that some Nonconformists helped to swell
the Tory majority.
The _Jewish World_ held it as a reproach to Judaism, that members of
their community should have gone over to the party which once strove to
detain them in bondage.
In 1851, Mr. Newdegate protested against the idea "that they should have
sitting in the House, an individual who regarded our redeemer as an
impostor," and yet Baron de Worms voted with Mr. Newdegate for the
exclusion of a man with whose tenets he disagreed.
The _Whitehall Review_ headed an article "God _v._ Bradlaugh," and said
the majority had "protected God from insult."
June 23rd.--Mr. Bradlaugh again claimed at the table of the House of
Commons to take the oath, and the Speaker having informed him of the
resolution passed the previous evening, requested his withdrawal. Mr.
Bradlaugh thereupon asked to be heard, and after some debate the demand
was complied with.
Mr. Bradlaugh spoke from the bar of the House, asking no favor, but
claiming his right, and warning hon. members against a conflict with
public opinion.
Mr. Labouchere moved, and Mr. Macdonald seconded, the rescindment of the
resolution of the 22nd, which was lost on division.
Mr. Bradlaugh was then recalled and requested to withdraw from the House.
Standing by the table, he said: "I respectfully refuse to obey the order
of the House, because the order is against the law." The raging of the
bigots and Tories recommenced. Mr. Gladstone declined to help them out of
the pit into which they had leapt: "Those who were responsible for the
decision might carry it out as they chose." After a sharp discussion Mr.
Bradlaugh was, on the motion of Sir Stafford Northcote, "committed to the
Clock Tower." In the division the numbers were 274 for and 7 against, the
Radicals having left the House.
June 24th.--On the motion of Sir Stafford Northcote, Mr. Bradlaugh is
released from custody, "not upon apology, or reparation, or promise not
to repeat his offence, but with the full knowledge and clear
recollection of his announcement that the offence would be repeated
_toties quoties_ till his object was effected."
June 25th.--Mr. Labouchere gives notice of motion to rescind the
resolution of the 22nd, and Government agreed to give an early day for
the discussion of the same.
June 28th.--Baron de Ferrieres announced his intention to move that the
seat for Northampton be declared vacant, and that a Bill be brought in
providing for the substitution of an affirmation for the oath at the
option of members. Mr. Wyndham (Conservative) asked Mr. Gladstone whether
the Government would bring in a Bill to remove all doubts as to the legal
right of members to make a solemn affirmation. Mr. Gladstone said the
Government did not propose to do so, and gave notice for Thursday (1st
July) to move as a standing order that members-elect be allowed, subject
to any liability by statute, to affirm at their choice. Mr. Labouchere
then said he would not proceed with his motion. On another motion,
however, by the same member, leave was given to bring in a Bill for the
amendment of the Parliamentary Oaths and Affirmations, which was read a
first time.
July 1st.--After a futile attempt made by Mr. Gorst to show that Mr.
Gladstone's resolution was a disorderly one, the Premier, in moving it
said, in the course of an extremely fair speech, that the allegation of
members that Mr. Bradlaugh had thrust his opinions upon the House was
untrue. His (Mr. Bradlaugh's) reference to the Acts under which he
claimed to affirm had only been named in answer to a question from the
clerk of the House. Sir Erskine May, in his evidence before the recent
committee, stated that Mr. Bradlaugh simply claimed to affirm.
Sir Stafford Northcote admitted that when Mr. Bradlaugh was called upon
to affirm he was not disrespectful, but firm. He opposed the resolution
as humiliating to the House. Several members protested against any course
for facilitating the admission of Mr. Bradlaugh. General Burnaby stated
that in order to obtain "authoritative" opinions on the matter he had
obtained letters or telegrams from the Moravian body, the Bishop of
London, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Ossory, the Bishop of Ratho, the
Archbishop of Dublin, the Bishop of Galway, and the Bishop of Argyle and
the Isles, and the Secretary of the Pope of Rome, all of whom expressed
themselves in the strongest terms against the admission of an Atheist
into Parliament. Mr. Spurgeon, who was unfortunately from home, had
expressed his opinion strongly adverse to it, and the Chief Rabbi--(loud
laughter)--although refusing to interfere with political questions, felt
very deeply on the subject. (Laughter, and cries of "the Sultan," and
"Shah.")
When the House divided the numbers were 303 for, and 249 against.
July 2nd.--Mr. Bradlaugh takes the affirmation of allegiance, and his
seat.
* * * * *
During the struggle several hundreds of indignation meetings were held in
London and the provinces, and petitions, letters, telegrams, etc., in
immense numbers, poured in upon the Government and the House, in favor of
Mr. Bradlaugh's rights.
* * * * *
July 2nd.--Mr. Bradlaugh gives his first vote, and was thereupon served
with a writ to recover against him a penalty of £500 for having voted and
sat without having made and subscribed the oath, the plaintiff being one
Henry Lewis Clarke, who, as subsequently appeared, was merely the tool of
the actual common informer, Charles Newdigate Newdegate, M.P. This writ
was ready so quickly that, if not issued actually before Mr. Bradlaugh
had taken his seat, it must have been prepared beforehand.
July 8th.--Mr. Norwood asks the first Lord of the Treasury whether,
considering the Government declined to introduce a bill to amend the
Oaths Act, it would instruct the law officers of the Crown to defend the
junior member for Northampton against the suit of the common informer.
Mr. Callan asked whether the Government would remit the penalty. Mr.
Gladstone said no application had been received for remission of the
penalties, and that his reply to Mr. Norwood must be in the negative.
July 14th.--Read first time in the House of Commons, a bill "to
incapacitate from sitting in Parliament any person who has by deliberate
public speaking, or by published writing, systematically avowed his
disbelief in the existence of a supreme being." It was prepared and
introduced by Sir Eardley Wilmot, Mr. Alderman Fowler and Mr. Hicks.
Owing to an informality the Bill could not come on for second reading.
The Rev. Canon Abney, of Derby, speaks of Mr. Bradlaugh as "the apostle
of filth, impurity, and blasphemy."
July 16th.--Parliament indemnifies Lord Byron against an action, he
having sat and voted without being sworn.
July 20th.--Sir Eardley Wilmot gives notice of moving that it is
repugnant to the constitution for an Atheist to become a member of "this
Honorable House." He afterwards postponed his motion.
At a meeting of the Dumfries Town Council, a member said: "If the law
courts should decide that it was legal for an Atheist to sit in the House
of Commons, he should feel it is duty to give notice of petition to
Parliament to have the law altered; he would not allow Mr. Bradlaugh to
go into a hundred acre field beside cattle, let alone the House of
Commons."
The Rev. Chas. Voysey writes, that he feels disgraced by the people of
Northampton electing Mr. Bradlaugh, and declares that "most of the
speeches in the Bradlaugh case in favor of his exclusion, strike me as
singularly good, wholesome and creditable." He repeats the myth of Mr.
Bradlaugh forcing his objections to the oath upon the House.
July 21st.--Sir John Hay, M.P., speaking about Mr. Bradlaugh at New
Galloway, made a most infamous, cowardly, and uncalled for attack on Mrs.
Besant. The _Scotsman_ refused to print the remarks, as "the language was
so coarse that it could hardly have dropped from a Yahoo."
Aug. 1st.--The _Nineteenth Century_ prints "An Englishman's Protest,"
written by Cardinal Manning, personally directed against Mr. Bradlaugh.
Aug. 24th.--Mr. Bradlaugh gives notice that early next session he will
call attention to perpetual pensions.
Sept. 7th.--Parliament prorogued. Hansard credits Mr. Bradlaugh with
about twenty speeches during the Session. (Mr. Newdegate told the
Licensed Victuallers that Mr. Bradlaugh "had made one speech, and proved
himself a second or third-rate speaker.")
1881.
Jan. 6th.--Parliament reopens. Mr. Bradlaugh renews his notice as to
perpetual pensions. Great interest in the question throughout the
kingdom.
Jan. 24th.--Mr. Bradlaugh makes a speech in the House of Commons against
Coercion in Ireland.
Jan. 31st.--Mr. Newdegate, speaking in the House, described Northampton
as an "oasis in the Midland Counties."
Feb. 4th.--Mr. Bradlaugh makes a speech against the second reading of the
Coercion Bill, and concluded by moving that it be read that day six
months.
Feb. 15th.--Date of motion for inquiry into perpetual pensions fixed for
March 15th. (When the day arrived Mr. Bradlaugh, on an appeal from Mr.
Gladstone, allowed the motion to be postponed, in order to allow supply
to be taken. 848 petitions had been presented to the House, with 251,332
signatures in favor of the motion.)
Feb. 17th.--Mr. Dawson, M.P. for Carlow, said that Irish members were
much indebted to Mr. Bradlaugh for what he had done on the Coercion Bill.
Feb. 25th.--Mr. Bradlaugh made final speech against third reading of the
Coercion Bill.
March 7th.--The case of Clarke _v._ Bradlaugh heard by Mr. Justice
Mathew.
March 10th.--Mr. Bradlaugh brought before the House the case of the
imprisoned Maoris.
March 11th.--Judgment in the case given, which was for the plaintiff,
that he was entitled to recover the penalty, subject to appeal. Mr.
Bradlaugh gave notice of appeal.
Mr. Gorst gave notice to move that Mr. Speaker issue his warrant for new
writ for the borough of Nottingham [!].
March 14th.--Upon Mr. Bradlaugh rising to present petitions against
perpetual pensions, signed by over 7,000 persons, Mr. Gorst rose to
order, on the ground that the seat for Northampton was vacant. After
discussion the Speaker called upon Mr. Bradlaugh to proceed with the
presentation of his petitions.
March 15th.--At request of Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Bradlaugh postponed his
motion for enquiry into perpetual pensions.
March 23rd.--Mr. Bradlaugh moved the Court of Appeal to expedite the
hearing of his appeal, and also to expedite the trial of the issues in
fact. The Court gave the appeal priority over other cases.
March 28th.--Mr. Bradlaugh made his last speech in the House against
flogging in the Army.
March 30th.--Appeal heard.
March 31st.--Judgment given against the defendant. Plaintiff not yet
entitled to execution, but seat vacated, Mr. Bradlaugh undertaking not to
appeal so far as the affirmation was concerned.
Mr. Bradlaugh again seeks the suffrages of the electors of Northampton.
April 6th.--The Tories serve notice on the Mayor not to accept Mr.
Bradlaugh's nomination, which the Mayor disregarded. Mr. Edward Corbett
nominated by Tories.
April 9th.--Mr. Bradlaugh re-elected by 3,437 votes to Corbett 3,305.
April 26th.--Mr. Bradlaugh, accompanied by Mr. Labouchere and Mr. Burt,
came to the table of the House, and, "the book" having been handed to
him, was about to take the oath when Sir Stafford Northcote interposing,
he was requested to withdraw, in order that the House might consider the
new conditions under which the oath was proposed to be taken. Mr.
Bradlaugh withdrew to the bar of the House, and Sir Stafford Northcote
moved that he be not allowed to go through the form of taking the oath.
Mr. Davey moved and Mr. Labouchere seconded an amendment to the effect
that where a person who had been duly elected presented himself at the
table to take the oath he ought not to be prevented from doing so by
anything extraneous to the transaction. Other members spoke, and Mr.
Bright regretted "the almost violent temper with which some hon.
gentlemen came to the consideration of the question."
Mr. Bradlaugh, speaking at the bar, claimed that his return was
untainted, that it had not been brought about by the Liberal party, but
by the help of the people, by the pence of toilers in mine and factory.
He begged the House not to plunge into a struggle with him, which he
would shun. Strife was easy to begin, but none knew where it would end.
There was no legal disqualification upon him, and they had no right to
impose a disqualification which was less than legal.
Mr. Gladstone made a lengthy and fine speech in favor of Mr. Bradlaugh,
the text of which was Mr. Bradlaugh's own words given above as to
imposition of a new disqualification; on a division, however, the bigots
again had it.
Mr. Bradlaugh again stepped to the table, and demanded the administration
of the oath, refusing to obey the Speaker's order to withdraw. Sir
Stafford Northcote asked the Prime Minister whether he proposed to offer
the House any counsel. Mr. Gladstone said he should leave it to the
majority to carry out the effects of their vote. Eventually the Speaker
called upon the Sergeant-at-Arms to remove Mr. Bradlaugh, who during the
debate had been standing at the table. Mr. Bradlaugh withdrawing with the
Sergeant three times to the bar, as often returned to the table. After
further passages at arms between Mr. Gladstone and Sir Stafford
Northcote, the House adjourned.
April 27th.--Mr. Bradlaugh again found at the table of the House claiming
to be allowed to take the oath. At the bidding of the Speaker the
Sergeant-at-Arms again caused Mr. Bradlaugh to withdraw to the bar, where
he remained during the discussion which followed.
Mr. Labouchere asked the Prime Minister whether he would give him
reasonable facilities to introduce his Affirmation Bill, if so Mr.
Bradlaugh would not interfere with the resolution passed last night.
Mr. Gladstone said the giving facility for that purpose, meant the
postponement of very serious and very urgent business, and he had no
assurance as to the disposition of the House. He could not see his way to
consent if it was to be an opposed Bill. After further discussion,
however, Mr. Gladstone said it might be possible to test the feeling of
the House by one or more morning sittings.
April 29th.--Mr. Gladstone announces the intention of the Government of
bringing in a bill amending the Parliamentary Oaths Act.
May 2nd.--The Attorney-General moved that the House resolve itself into
committee with a view of his asking leave to introduce the Bill. Debate
on motion adjourned to the 5th with the view of fixing the time on the
6th, when the discussion should be resumed.
Mr. MacIver gave notice to ask the Prime Minister whether he was prepared
to reconsider his decision of last session, and will introduce "a short
measure" for the partial disfranchisement of Northampton. (The question
was never put.)
May 6th.--Further obstruction of the Bigots.
May 10th.--After 1.15 a.m. the Government proposed a morning sitting for
that day (Tuesday), to discuss the introduction of their Bill. Further
obstruction, wrath, and bitterness, and the Government abandoned the
intention to hold a morning sitting.
At the afternoon sitting a resolution was arrived at, which authorised
the Sergeant-at-Arms to prevent Mr. Bradlaugh from entering the House.
Lord Selborne (Lord Chancellor) in reply to a letter relative to Mr.
Bradlaugh and the oath, says equal justice is due to Christian and
infidel; he saw no possibility of refusing to afford by legislation to
all who scruple to take the oath, the same option in Parliament as they
have in courts of law, to make an affirmation.
May 25th.--Mr. Newdegate formally blocked the Bill, of which Mr.
Labouchere gave notice, for indemnifying Mr. Bradlaugh against penalties
for having sat and voted on affirmation.
June 19th and 20th.--The common informer's action tried at _Nisi prius_
before Mr. Justice Grove. Verdict against Mr. Bradlaugh for penalty and
costs.--_Rule nisi_ for new trial afterwards, granted by Justices Grove
and Lindley; this rule was made absolute by Justices Denman and Hawkins,
but was set aside by Lords Justices Brett, Cotton and Holker.
* * * * *
Mr. Bradlaugh appeals to the country. The country answers.
* * * * *
Aug. 3rd.--Mr. Bradlaugh, acting on his right to enter the House of
Commons, is seized at the door of the House by fourteen men, police and
ushers (Inspector Denning said ten), and roughly hustled out into Palace
Yard, Mr. Bradlaugh protesting against such treatment as illegal. "In the
passage leading out to the yard Mr. Bradlaugh's coat was torn down on the
right side; his waistcoat was also pulled open, and otherwise his toilet
was much disarranged. The members flocked down the stairs on the heels of
the struggling party, but no pause was made until Mr. Bradlaugh was
placed outside the precincts and in Palace Yard."--_Times._ Alderman
Fowler was heard to call, "Kick him out." This he afterwards denied, but
there is evidence that he did so. (Mr. Bradlaugh suffered the rupture of
the small muscles of both his arms, and erysipelas ensued).
Many thousands of people went up to the House with petitions, urging the
House to do justice to Northampton and Mr. Bradlaugh.
In the House Mr. Labouchere moved a resolution condemning, as an
interference with the privilege of members, the action of the authorities
in expelling Mr. Bradlaugh from the lobby. This was rejected by 191
votes against 7, and a motion of Sir Henry Holland, declaring the
approval of the House of the course taken by the Speaker, was agreed to
without controversy.
At a crowded meeting at the Hall of Science the same evening Mr.
Bradlaugh stated that he had told Inspector Denning in Palace Yard that
he could come back with force enough to gain admittance, but that he had
no right to risk the lives and liberties of his supporters.
Aug. 4th.--The _Times_ declares, in an article favorable on the whole to
Mr. Bradlaugh's claims, that the House of Commons was yesterday the real
sufferer in dignity, authority, and repute. It says: "the question
contains within itself the baleful germ of a grave constitutional contest
between the House of Commons and any constituency in the land;" and "such
a conflict can but have one conclusion, as all history shows."
The _Daily News_, in a similar article, concludes thus: "Sooner or later
it will be generally acknowledged that Mr. Bradlaugh's exclusion was one
of the most high-handed acts of which any legislative body has ever been
guilty."
The following unique paragraph from _The Rock_ is worth preserving in its
original form: "The question now is whether the Christian people of this
realm will quietly allow clamorous groups of infidels, Radicals, and
seditionists, by organised clamor, bluster, and menace, to overawe the
legislature, and by exhibitions of violence--not at all unlikely, if
permitted to develop into outrage and riot--to cause an organic and vital
change to be made in our Constitution and laws, in order that
brazen-faced Atheism might display itself within the walls of the British
Parliament."
Mr. E. D. Girdlestone writes: "If the present Cabinet does not secure
your admission to the House in some way or other, I can only wish they
may soon be turned out of office. I don't know what more I can do than
say, 'Go on! and go in!'"
Aug. 5th.--Mr. Bradlaugh's application at Westminster Police Court for
summons against Inspector, for having assaulted him at the House of
Commons on the 3rd inst., refused.
Mr. Bradlaugh confined to the House with severe erysipelas in both arms,
resulting from the injuries inflicted. Attended by Drs. Ramskill and
Palfrey. The latter, on August 12th, ordered his immediate removal from
town, to prevent yet more dangerous complications.
Aug. 13th.--Mr. Bradlaugh went to Worthing to recruit his health. Outside
the station there, weary and exhausted, both arms in a sling, he was
rudely stared at by a clergyman, who, having satisfied himself as to Mr.
Bradlaugh's identity, walked away saying loudly: "There's Bradlaugh; I
hope they'll make it warm for him yet."
The _Northern Star_ (a Tory paper) suggested that Mr. Bradlaugh was
malingering--"simply carrying on the showman business."
Aug. 24th.--Sir Henry Tyler, in the House of Commons, attempts to
discredit the South Kensington department for allowing science and art
classes at the Hall of Science. Mr. Mundella gives those classes great
credit.
Aug. 27th.--Parliament prorogued.
Further appeal to England.
1882.
Jan. 9th.--The Earl of Derby, in a speech at the Liverpool Reform Club,
says: "For my part I utterly disbelieve in the value of political
oaths.... I should hope that if Mr. Bradlaugh again offers to take the
oath, as he did last year, there will be no further attempt to prevent
him."
Feb. 7th.--Reopening of Parliament. Mr. Bradlaugh again attended at the
table to take the oath, and Sir Erskine May, the clerk of the House, was
about to administer the same when Sir Stafford Northcote, interposing,
moved that Mr. Bradlaugh be not allowed to go through the form. Sir W.
Harcourt, in moving the previous question, said the Government held the
view that the House had no right to interpose between a duly-elected
member and the oath.
Mr. Bradlaugh, addressing the House from the bar for the third time,
begged the House to deal with him with some semblance and show of
legality and fairness. He concluded: "I want to obey the law, and I tell
you how I might meet the House still further, if the House will pardon me
for seeming to advise it. Hon. members had said that an Affirmation Bill
would be a Bradlaugh Relief Bill. Bradlaugh is more proud than you are.
Let the Bill pass without applying to elections that have taken place
previously, and I will undertake not to claim my seat, and when the Bill
has passed I will apply for the Chiltern Hundreds. I have no fear. If I
am not fit for my constituents they shall dismiss me, but you never
shall. The grave alone shall make me yield."
When a division was taken there were for the previous question 228,
against 286. Mr. Samuel Morley voted with the majority against the
Government. Sir Stafford Northcote's motion was then agreed to without a
division.
Feb. 8th.--Mr. Labouchere, in committee of the whole House, proposed for
leave to bring in a Bill to amend the law of Parliamentary Oaths and
Affirmations. The Bill was afterwards formally blocked by Mr. Molloy.
Feb. 17th.--Mr. Labouchere asked the Attorney-General whether the
resolution of Feb. 7th had not vacated the seat. Sir Henry James answered
that it had not.
Feb. 18th.--Mr. Gladstone writes Mr. Bradlaugh that the Government have
no measure to propose with respect to his seat.
Feb. 21st.--Mr. Bradlaugh of himself takes and subscribes the oath, and
takes his seat.
Feb. 22nd.--Mr Bradlaugh expelled the House of Commons.
Mar. 2nd--Re-elected for Northampton. For Bradlaugh, 3,796; for Corbett,
3,688.
Mar. 6th.--On the motion of Sir Stafford Northcote, the House reaffirms
its motion of the 7th Feb., Mr. Gladstone supporting an amendment moved
by Mr. Marjoribanks, by which the House would have declared the
desirability of legislation, for the purpose of giving members an option
between oath and affirmation.
Mar. 7th.--Lord Redesdale introduces in the House of Lords a Bill,
requiring every peer and every member of the House of Commons before
taking the oath or making the affirmation, to declare and affirm his
belief in Almighty God. The Bill, introduced "from a sense of what was
due to Almighty God," was afterwards withdrawn "in deference to Lord
Salisbury."
To this date, 317 petitions with 62,168 signatures had been presented
against Mr. Bradlaugh being allowed to take his seat; while in favor of
the same 1,051, with 250,833 signatures, had been presented.
Mr. Labouchere's Affirmation Bill blocked by Earl Percy.
1883
Jan. 11th.--Mr. Justice Field gave judgment that the privileges of the
House of Commons prevented Mr. Bradlaugh from obtaining any redress for
the assault upon him on August 3rd, 1881.
Feb. 15th.--Great demonstration in Trafalgar Square; from eighty to one
hundred thousand people present. (_Evening Standard_ says 30,000; _Daily
News_, 50,000 an hour before the meeting.) Mr. Adams, chairman; Rev. W.
Sharman, Jos. Arch, and Mr. Bradlaugh, speakers.
Opening of Parliament. (Mr. Gladstone at Cannes.) Government give notice
for to-morrow for leave to introduce bill to amend the Oaths Act, 1866.
Sir R. Cross gives notice of opposition on second reading of same. Mr.
Bradlaugh consents, with the approval of his constituents, expressed on
the 13th inst., to await the fate of the measure.
Feb. 16th.--Sharp succession of frantic speeches in the House of Commons
by Mr. Newdegate, Alderman Fowler, Mr. Warton, Mr. Henry Chaplin, Mr.
Onslow, Mr. Grantham, Mr. Beresford Hope, Lord H. Lennox, Lord C.
Hamilton, Mr. A. Balfour, Mr. Ashmead Bartlett, and Mr. A. O'Connor.
Divisions: from two to three to one for Government. The Marquis of
Hartington consents to adjourn the motion for Bill until Monday at
twelve.
Feb. 18th.--The _Observer_ says that when Conservatives ask Liberals
whether they really mean to alter the law for the purpose of admitting
Mr. Bradlaugh, it is fair for Liberals in turn to ask Conservatives
whether they really mean to maintain an admitted abuse and injustice for
the mere purpose of excluding Mr. Bradlaugh.
Feb. 19th.--First reading of Bill carried on division by 184 votes to 53;
second reading formally fixed for that night week.
Feb. 20th.--_Daily News_ says Bill will be carried by large majorities,
and will be regarded by the House and the country as the appropriate
settlement of an unfortunate controversy.
The _Times_ says the leaders of the opposition will not succeed in
finally preventing the Bill from becoming law. Its real concern is that
Mr. Bradlaugh has been substantially in the right; that he has been
unjustly excluded from taking the seat which belongs to him.
The _Morning Advertiser_ thinks the Government may yet find it difficult
to persuade the House to adopt the Bill.
The _Morning Post_ justifies the irregular opposition to the first
reading of the Bill, and thinks notice of the measure should have been
given in the Queen's Speech. No measure had created more excitement or
raised more indignation in the country, which desired to see it rejected
by a decisive majority.
March 5th.--Appeal case Bradlaugh _v._ Clarke part heard before the House
of Lords.
March 6th.--Case concluded; judgment deferred.
March 9th.--Action for maintenance--Bradlaugh _v._ Newdegate--tried
before Lord Coleridge and a special jury. Henry Lewis Clarke, the common
informer, swore that he had not the means to pay the costs, and would not
have brought the action if he had not been indemnified by Mr. Newdegate.
Case adjourned for argument of legal points.
March 17th.--Maintenance action argued; four counsel appearing for Mr.
Newdegate. Lord Coleridge reserved judgment.
March 20th.--The Solicitors to the Treasury compelled Mr. Bradlaugh to
pay the costs of the House of Commons in the action against the deputy
Sergeant-at-Arms.
TRANSCRIBERS' NOTES
Page 58, 59: Variable spelling of Chipping Wicomb/Wycomb as in the
original
Page 62: . added after "brought up in custody"
Page 70: " added after 'concluding with the words "So help me, God'
Page 75: " removed after '27 L. J., Q. B., 195.'
Page 83: aseembly corrected to assembly after "may say again, that this"
Page 88: Extra the removed from "lay it before the the Judges"
Page 96: " added after 'the man who stands before them--('
Page 100 (A Cardinal's Broken Oath Page 2): . added after E.C
Page 104 (A Cardinal's Broken Oath Page 6): inuendoes as in the original
Page 111 (Northampton and the House of Commons Page 5): , corrected to .
after "personally give such undertaking"
Page 113 (Northampton and the House of Commons Page 7): . added after
"sitting within its walls"
Page 121 (Northampton and the House of Commons Page 15): " corrected to
' after "heirs and successors, according to law,"
Page 127 (Diary of the Northampton Struggle Page 5): . added after
'"persons so admitted," etc'
Page 133 (Diary of the Northampton Struggle Page 11): v. italicised for
consistency after "The case of Clarke"
Page 140 (Diary of the Northampton Struggle Page 18): v. italicised for
consistency after "Appeal case Bradlaugh" and after "Action for
maintenance--Bradlaugh"
General: Variable spelling of Serjeant-at-Arms/Sergeant-at-Arms as in
the original
General: There are several words, which would normally have been spelt
with a "u" in British English, which have been spelt without in the
original text e.g. humor, endeavored, savor. These spellings have been
preserved.
General: Variable spelling of Lewis Price/Pryse as in the original
End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The True Story of my Parliamentary
Struggle, by Charles Bradlaugh
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