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Title: The Yankee mining squadron
or, laying the North Sea mine barrage
Author: Reginald R. Belknap
Release date: December 1, 2024 [eBook #74827]
Language: English
Original publication: Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute
Credits: deaurider and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE YANKEE MINING SQUADRON ***
THE YANKEE MINING SQUADRON
[Illustration: THE NORTH SEA MINE BARRAGE.
Showing also Foul Ground East of Dogger Bank due to Irregular Minefields.
The 1st to 13th Minefields were American.]
THE YANKEE MINING
SQUADRON
OR
LAYING THE NORTH SEA
MINE BARRAGE
BY
CAPTAIN REGINALD R. BELKNAP, U.S.N.
_The Squadron Commander_
[Illustration]
ANNAPOLIS, MD.
THE UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE
1920
COPYRIGHT, 1919
COPYRIGHT, 1920
BY
J. W. CONROY
Trustee for U.S. Naval Institute
PREFACE
In writing of the “biggest ‘mine planting stunt’ in the world’s
history”—to quote a Christmas greeting from Rear Admiral Clinton-Baker,
head of the British minelaying force—I have endeavored to make an account
that would be readable enough for general interest, largely for the
reason that, compared to other operations, our undertaking received scant
mention at the time. Its very nature required preparation in quiet and
precluded discussion of its progress. Unnecessary technical detail has
therefore been suppressed, although much could be written that would be
welcomed by those versed in it.
The whole account is based on data obtained at first hand. The
description of assembling the squadron for a mining excursion fits the
third excursion rather than the first, but the difference is a minor one,
affecting only the numbers present—six ships on the first excursion, ten
on the third. All the rest is correct, in substance and details.
Besides influencing an early armistice, this great minelaying operation
marks an epoch in the use of submarine mines in warfare. It was an event
in military history, as well as a prominent operation, and the credit for
it belongs not alone to the officers and men who were actually present
but also to those of the old mine force, to whose services in developing,
in our navy, the art of handling and laying mines in large numbers, the
success of the great operation was so largely due.
Details of the mechanical development of the new mine itself have not
been gone into, for obvious reasons. Justice to that part could be
done only by those who were directly concerned in it, but I am glad of
the opportunity to express appreciation of the valuable service which
was rendered to our cause in the war by Commander S. P. Fullinwider,
U.S.N., in seizing upon and developing the long-sought means for such an
undertaking, and by Lieut. Commander T. S. Wilkinson, U.S.N., and the
officers and designing engineers in the Bureau of Ordnance and at the
Naval Torpedo Station, Newport, R.I., by their skill and ingenuity in
designing mechanical features, when normal experimenting was impossible.
As for the ships—the personal study which Captain J. D. Beuret (C.C.),
U.S.N., made of the mine elevator problem was the foundation of its
brilliant success, and the fact that, in the whole period of service,
few alterations or improvements in the minelayers were found desirable,
although suggestions were called for, is the best tribute to those who
planned and carried out their conversion.
Only very inadequate expression can be given here to my appreciation of
the services of my staff, in particular Captain H. V. Butler, U.S.N.,
whose excellent conduct of the flagship, supported by the indefatigable
care of his navigator, Lieut. Commander J. C. Cunningham, U.S.N., made
it possible to approach and navigate close to unmarked minefields in the
open sea. And I was fortunate to have one so thoroughly loyal and capable
as Commander B. L. Canaga, without whose unremitting attentiveness,
and tactful management of countless details under difficulties, our
performance would have been far less creditable.
Inseparable from our recollections will always be the excellent and
friendly official and personal relations with the destroyer escort,
especially when H.M.S. _Vampire_ led. Captain H. R. Godfrey, C.B.,
D.S.O., writes, “It was the determination of every officer and man in the
14th Flotilla, who had the honor of being entrusted with the screening of
the U.S. Minelaying Force, that no preventable attack by enemy submarine
or surface vessel should inflict damage on any ship of the Force.” It is
but speaking for all of us to say, that is what we felt, from the first
moment of that grey morning’s meeting on the day of arrival.
NEWPORT, 15 June, 1919.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
1. The Mine Force Ready 11
2. The Need and the Means 17
3. The Bases in Scotland 22
4. The Supply of Mines 25
5. General Supplies and Transportation 30
6. A Sample of Quality 33
7. Mine Assembling and Embarking 35
8. The First Minelaying Excursion 39
Squadron Organization and Ships’ Data 46
9. Athletics 49
10. The Squadron Complete 53
11. Tactics 57
12. Some Incidents 61
13. Signals 67
14. The Barrier Across 69
15. Finishing the Barrier 72
16. The Thirteenth Excursion 77
17. Results 82
18. General Living Conditions 86
19. Farewell to the Highlands 89
20. Scapa Flow 92
21. Home 94
22. The Mine Sweepers 96
23. The Mine Force, Old and New 98
24. After the War 108
Summary of Mines Laid 110
ILLUSTRATIONS
PAGE
The North Sea Mine Barrage Frontispiece
Mine Assembly and Storage Sheds 22
A Mine in Mid-Air, Being Hoisted in 25
Launching a Mine Through the Stern Port 26
The Sequence of Operations After a Mine is Launched 27
A Mine Carrier Steamer 30
Mines and Mine Anchors Awaiting Assembly 35
Loading Mines into Lighters 36
Squadron Flagship _San Francisco_ 37
The Mine Squadron at Sea 40
Arrangement of Mine Tracks, Elevators, and Turntables,
in _Roanoke_ Class of Minelayers 51
The Squadron in Minelaying Formation 59
Approaching and Laying the Fourth Mine Field 63
The Boston-New York Passenger Liner _Massachusetts_ 101
The 20-Knot Minelayer _Shawmut_ 102
Organization of the Mine Force 105
THE YANKEE MINING SQUADRON
CHAPTER ONE
THE MINE FORCE READY
The national anthem at morning colors woke me, and I arose and looked
out. What a glorious sight! Green slopes in all freshness, radiant with
broom and yellow gorse, the rocky shore mirrored in the Firth, which
stretched, smooth and cool, wide away to the east and south, and in
the distance snow-capped Ben Wyvis. Lying off the entrance to Munlochy
Bay, we had a view along its sloping shores into the interior of Black
Isle, of noted fertility. Farther out were Avoch, a whitewashed fishing
village, and the ancient town of Fortrose, with its ruined 12th century
cathedral. Across the Firth lay Culloden House, where Bonnie Prince
Charlie slept before the battle. Substantial, but softened in outline
by the morning haze, the Royal Burgh of Inverness covered the banks
and heights along the Ness River, gleaming in the bright sunshine. And
how peaceful everywhere! _Canandaigua_ and _Sonoma_ lay near by, the
_Canonicus_ farther out—but no movement, no signal, no beat of the
engines, no throbbing pumps. All seemed resting from those last four
days of our passage overseas, which had all but done away with sleep.
My responsibility for the safe conduct of the squadron had ended at 1
a.m., when it dispersed at the buoy, whence the routes to our bases at
Inverness and Invergordon diverged. The captains taking the ships to
their berths singly, Captain Butler was up until 5 o’clock, needing
daylight to take the _San Francisco_ all the way in. Turned in at last,
his servant and orderly at 8 o’clock were 45 minutes waking him.
The Senior British Naval officer, Captain H. F. J. Rowley, R.N., came
on board early, to give us welcome, and then we went to our own chief,
Rear Admiral Joseph Strauss, U.S.N., commander of the Mine Force, whose
headquarters were here at Inverness, U.S. Naval Base 18. After taking a
look over the base itself, Captain Murfin’s work and province, we stayed
to lunch at Kingsmills, a handsome place amid beautiful surroundings,
bordering on the golf links, with gardens, tennis court, croquet lawn,
and fishing brook, which Admiral Strauss, Captain Murfin, and some of the
headquarters staff had rented. It was a satisfaction to everyone to see
our chief so befittingly established, and this came out very effectively
later, at a picturesque and enjoyable garden party given there on the 4th
of July, an occasion which was being celebrated locally with unaffected
cordiality. Altogether, we could feel ourselves fortunate in the beauty
and attractiveness of our surroundings and also, as we soon found, in the
hospitality and kindliness of the people.
The American Mine Force had come to Scotland, arriving May 26, 1918, to
coöperate with the British in laying a great barrier of mines, from the
Orkney Islands across the North Sea to Norway. To provide for doing our
share, the small minelaying force which our navy possessed on entering
the war, consisting principally of the old cruisers _San Francisco_ and
_Baltimore_, had been augmented by eight converted merchantmen. Only six
weeks before, five of them had joined the _San Francisco_, the squadron
flagship, at Hampton Roads, Virginia, fresh from the shipyards.
The program for the newly organized squadron contemplated the ships being
in Scotland, ready for a minelaying operation, in 45 days from the time
they left the shipyards. The work of conversion having been extensive and
hardly finished, the new ships were very raw, having had but a few days
to shake down. Troubles with engines and steering gear, lost anchors,
fogs, and missing stores repeatedly interfered with training. Up to May
5, 1918, not a day had passed without a mishap or some forced alteration
of plan. Instead of progressing to the rehearsal of a minelaying
operation by the squadron, we had been unable even to keep all together
for a single whole day. Yet we were preparing for an operation in which,
with the ships steaming close together, all must go like clock-work, for
hours without interruption.
Another week of training before going across would, therefore, have been
amply justified, but the sense of urgency was too strong. Besides, our
mine bases in Scotland needed the 500 men we were to bring them. So,
after four hustling days and nights of final preparation, we had stolen
away from Newport, Rhode Island, just after midnight of Saturday, May 11,
1918.
Started at last! And, thanks to coöperation far and near, better prepared
than expected. There were a few quiet hours that Sunday morning—then fog
shut in thick until next day. This was trying, so early on the voyage,
but as we kept together all through it, the experience only gave more
confidence. Next, one ship’s steering gear broke down, and she just
escaped a fatal collision. The third morning, the same vessel broke down
altogether. Through lucky foresight, a powerful tug, _Sonoma_, was with
us, which towed the disabled ship 150 miles until next morning, when the
break was repaired.
The submarines that soon afterwards appeared on our coast were known to
be crossing the Atlantic now, so we had target practice next afternoon,
to be ready for them. Then I felt we could give a good account of any
surface attack. Torpedoes, fire, and collision were what we had to fear.
All the ships had mines on board and, since we steamed only 500 yards
apart, an explosion in one ship would have involved the others.
Crossing in our company was the big collier _Jason_, loaded with an
aviation station outfit for Killingholme, England, which afterwards
did good work. On the tenth day, heavy weather came on, and _Jason_
disappeared in a black squall, rolling heavily and steering far off the
course. She being a sister of the ill-fated _Cyclops_, and no trace of
her showing in four days, added considerably to the anxiety felt as we
entered the active submarine zone. Radio calls brought no response.
We had all but given her up, when, at early daylight, just before the
appointed rendezvous with the destroyers, she came lumbering up astern.
And so, notwithstanding the many vicissitudes in 3000 miles steaming, we
met the escort with our number complete and right on the dot, in time and
place.
Our arrival off Inverness the following midnight, May 25-26, 1918,
made the Mine Force complete as to constituent parts necessary for the
operation in hand. The _Baltimore_ and _Roanoke_ had preceded the others,
making us seven. Three more were still in shipyard hands, but there was
no need to wait for them before beginning the minelaying.
Between operations the squadron was divided for loading, half at
Inverness (Base 18), and half at Invergordon (Base 17), 30 miles away.
Being intended for the storage and assembly of mines—all that we used
came from America—these bases had scant means at first for assisting the
ships. Their needs could be supplied from the Royal Naval Dockyard and
two depots, under Rear Admiral E. R. Pears, R.N., and Captain Tancred at
Invergordon, and Captain Rowley at Inverness, who were always cordially
responsive to our requests.
The motto for all American naval forces abroad, however, was to be
self-supporting, and thanks to our provident first supply and to regular
replenishment by the mine carriers, we had to draw on the British stocks
for very little. After a month, the repair ship _Black Hawk_ arrived. She
took no part in minelaying, being always moored off Inverness, separate
from the Mine Squadron and flying Rear Admiral Strauss’ flag, but her
equipment of machine tools and repair material made the Mine Force
normally independent in regard to upkeep. Except for docking, we asked
very little of the British in the way of repairs.
Upon one occasion, the soluble salt washers for the principal safety
device of the mines nearly ran out, the local atmospheric conditions
having caused many more to be used than estimated. No washers of the
right size and kind were obtainable anywhere inside three weeks,
and thus a shortage of these atoms—the size of a peppermint “Life
Saver”—threatened to hold up the laying of 5000 mines. The _Black Hawk_
had a steam press, however, and could make a die—and by the time they
were needed, washers in plenty were ready—incidentally of better quality
than before.
While the ships were unloading the mines they had brought, for overhaul
on shore, and were coaling and otherwise preparing for minelaying, the
larger preliminaries were taken up at a conference of Rear Admiral
Strauss and myself with Admiral Sir David Beatty, Commander-in-Chief of
H.B.M. Grand Fleet. Vice Admiral Brock, his Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral
Clinton-Baker, the British Rear Admiral of Mines, Captain Lockhart-Leith,
the head of his Staff, and Captain R. A. Pound, of the Admiralty,
attended this conference, which was held on board the flagship _Queen
Elizabeth_, at Rosyth, Thursday, 30 May, 1918.
First came the subject of tactics, and I explained my plan, to lay
the mines with the squadron steaming in line abreast, ships 500 yards
apart, making a trace on the chart like a music score. Three vessels
(later five) would be laying mines simultaneously. When a ship had
emptied herself of mines, her neighbor, ready and waiting while steaming
alongside, would begin. At the end of the minefield, some temporary
small buoys would be planted, by which to pick the field up later, to
continue it. This plan was accepted without comment.
The area to be mined having been publicly notified two months before,
the enemy might have placed some mines there, on the random chance of
damaging our force. The only arrangement practicable to meet such a
contingency was for some of the destroyer escort to explore for mines
ahead of the minelaying formation as it proceeded. Only those ships would
be fully protected that might be following directly in the wake of the
searching destroyers, the main purpose being to discover the existence of
an enemy minefield in time for the squadron to maneuver aside.
A clear understanding was reached at the conference of the relation
of the mine squadron and its escort to the supporting force. The mine
squadron being lightly armed and of moderate speed, it would have been
at great disadvantage against even a numerically weaker force of light
cruisers, with their superior batteries and speed. Hence the need of
the support, which would consist of a battleship or battle cruiser
squadron, or both, and of light cruisers, according to the estimated
risk of attack at the time. If attack threatened, the mine squadron and
its destroyer escort would seek safety in the direction ordered by the
Support Commander; otherwise they would proceed on their mission and
return to base afterwards, according to the program for that occasion.
The destroyer escort would be of strength sufficient to ward off any
probable attack by submarines or by surface vessels that might elude the
supporting force and the regular patrols.
The location of the first minefield was decided upon; then further
details were settled with Vice Admiral Brock and Rear Admiral
Clinton-Baker, for the first mining excursion, which was to be done by
the American and British squadrons at the same time. Preparatory notice
was to be given by the Commander Mine Force to the Admiral of the Grand
Fleet at least four days before the time the mine squadron was expected
to be loaded and ready for an excursion. Upon a second, definite notice,
not less than 48 hours in advance, when it was certain that the squadron
would be ready, a combined operation order would be issued by the
Admiral, naming all the forces concerned and containing the instructions
and intelligence necessary for all.
After lunching on board with Admiral Beatty, Rear Admiral Strauss and
I took our leave. We had a look at Holyrood Palace and a walk through
Canongate Street that afternoon, returning to Inverness next day. Not
enough material had yet been accumulated to assemble mines to fill
all seven minelayers present, but 3400 would be ready in a few days,
sufficient to lay a field 47 miles long, consisting of one row of mines
at each of the three levels prescribed. A mine embarking schedule was
made out accordingly, to include _San Francisco_, _Baltimore_, _Roanoke_,
_Canandaigua_, _Canonicus_, and _Housatonic_, for a start on June 7.
CHAPTER TWO
THE NEED AND THE MEANS
A barrier of high explosive across the North Sea—10,000 tons of TNT, 150
shiploads of it, spread over an area 230 miles long by 25 miles wide and
reaching from near the surface to 240 feet below—70,000 anchored mines
each containing 300 pounds of explosive, sensitive to a touch, barring
the passage of German submarines between the Orkneys and Norway—this was
the final five months’ contribution of the American and British mining
forces towards bringing the war to a close.
To stop the enemy submarines near their bases, before they could scatter
on the trade routes, would obviously defeat their campaign more surely
than merely hunting them at large. That was the purpose of the Northern
Mine Barrage, which, with the barrage at Dover, made it not impossible
but extremely hazardous to enter or leave the North Sea. That many a
submarine came to grief in attempting these barriers is now a certainty,
and the establishment of the Northern Barrage, which many had thought
impossible, insured the early finish of the submarine campaign.
The resumption of ruthless submarine warfare became a serious threat
to the cause of the Allies, and at the time of our entry into the war
their situation was critical—how much more critical than the world was
allowed to know at the time, Admiral Sims has disclosed in his “The
Victory at Sea.” The relief brought about through the convoy system, in
which our destroyers, the navy’s first participants, had a large share,
was immediate and important. But the submarine menace was far from ended
and—according to the best information—would soon be greatly augmented,
while the increasing number of transports would offer the enemy more
opportunities, with the added horror of troopship sinkings in prospect.
Of further measures, the most effective would be such a blockade as would
keep the submarines in or from their bases. The British had already mined
a large area north and west from Heligoland, but this obstruction was
not insurmountable, for the Germans from nearby could always clear a
passage through when wanted. In any case, until the Skagerrack passage
were closed, the submarines might use that route without hindrance. Two
weighty reasons kept the Skagerrack open—unwillingness to violate neutral
waters, and the ease with which German forces could raid any barrier
near their bases. It may be recalled with what sudden damage a small
German cruiser detachment raided a convoy just outside the Skagerrack, in
October, 1917.
To be effective, therefore, any barrier must be beyond easy reach of
a raiding force and cover the Skagerrack, and must also be far enough
to the northward of the British bases not to hamper the battle fleet’s
engaging with the enemy. Hence, the anti-submarine barriers should be,
one near Dover Strait, the other across the North Sea, from Scotland to
Norway.
The closing of Dover Strait, undertaken by the British Navy alone, needs
no further mention here. Although the strong tidal currents there,
frequent rough seas, and hard, smooth bottom were unfavorable for
minefields, other means—such as a line of guard vessels moored not far
apart and equipped with powerful searchlights, together with numerous
active patrollers—were employed with a considerable degree of success.
The Northern Barrage would be too long a front, and much of it too far
from base, for effective patrol without a great number of vessels. A
wide, thickly sown minefield, however, would watch night and day in all
weathers without relief, and would be even more effective against passage
submerged than against passage on the surface, because of the less wear
and disturbance of the mines by wave action, deep down under water.
Currents were not strong in the northern location, but the bottom lay
as deep as 900 feet, whereas 300 feet had heretofore been the deepest
water ever mined. Merely to provide the mines meant a large undertaking,
besides involving an enormous quantity of the same high explosive which
was likewise in heavy demand for shells and bombs. Supposing the mines
ready, the planting of so many would be a long and dangerous operation,
employing all the Allies’ existing minelayers indefinitely. And neither
the British nor ourselves yet had a mine that was quite satisfactory for
the prospective requirements.
Our Naval Bureau of Ordnance, however, was intent on finding the
means for such a barrier, so that when, in May, 1917, among the many
contrivances offered for winning the war, Mr. Ralph E. Browne, an
electrical engineer of Salem, Massachusetts, presented his submarine
gun for consideration, Commander S. P. Fullinwider, U.S.N., in charge
of the Bureau’s mining affairs, saw that, although the invention was
not suitable for naval purposes in the form offered, a new electrical
device which it contained, if applied to the firing mechanism of a
submarine mine, would result in just what we were looking for—a mine at
once sensitive and far reaching. Mr. Browne collaborated with the Bureau
of Ordnance in developing the new mine-firing device. By July, 1917,
all doubt as to its practicability had been dispelled and the Bureau of
Ordnance was able to give assurance that, in urging the closing of the
German bases, our navy might offer the means.
Extravagant claims were common in the field of mining inventions, and
three years of war lessons in the perversity of mines made the British
naturally skeptical of this American find. An experienced officer in
mining was sent over to see, Lieutenant R. H. DeSalis, R.N., who had
received the D.S.O. for some minelaying on the Belgian coast. As the new
device was put through its paces before him, the chill thawed out and in
two hours he had become almost an enthusiast. Upon his report the British
Admiralty took up the plan with active interest.
Upon returning from London in mid-October, 1917, Admiral Mayo, of our
Atlantic Fleet, brought back the outline of a proposed minelaying
operation. The paper was quite informal—unsigned, undated, bearing in
pencil across the top, “Admiralty would be glad to learn whether Navy
Department concur in the plans as shewn.”
The field was to be 230 miles long—the distance from Washington to New
York—divided into three parts, the middle section, of 135 miles, called
Area A, allotted to us, because the reach of the new American mines was
greater than ordinary—three of them covering the same extent as eight
mines of other types. Thus numbers and effort were saved.
There would be three “systems,” each consisting of one or more rows of
mines just below the surface, dangerous to any craft, and other rows
at intermediate and extreme depths, so that, whether running on the
surface or at ordinary submergence or as deep as 240 feet, a submarine
had the odds against her. In the absence of patrol vessels to drive them
down, submarines would naturally run on the surface, and so the rows of
upper level mines were made more numerous than those at deeper levels.
The stroke of a mine is sudden and powerful, and while a vessel on the
surface may survive it, to a submerged submarine it is usually fatal.
All classes of vessels shy at a minefield, and that the Germans shared
this aversion was shown by captured papers, which made it clear that the
submarines dreaded nothing so much as mines.
The scheme was unprecedented, and that its great magnitude would involve
a mass of detail requiring very careful adjustment was evident on the
most cursory examination. Some who heard of it regarded it as impossible,
and foolish to attempt. As to the new mines, the very basis of the whole
project—since a complete unit would not exist for several months, the
statement of Rear Admiral Ralph Earle, Chief of the Naval Bureau of
Ordnance, that the mines would be forthcoming in season, had to be based
upon tests of the mine only by parts, with the assumption that all would
function properly when assembled. Action upon that assurance would at
once involve upward of forty million dollars, which made his stand a
bold one, inviting unmeasured odium, should the mine after all fail. To
await the mine’s final proving, however, would have been fatal to any
possibility of beginning the barrage before 1919.
The task of laying the barrier would be hazardous in itself, with
constant danger of interruption by the enemy. A single minefield in the
open sea, or widely separated ones, presented no extreme difficulties,
but to lay a series of them so close together as to leave no considerable
gaps between, made a problem for which no really practical solution was
yet visible.
For four days the project was under consideration by the Naval General
Board at Washington. Time pressed, the need was great, the new mine very
promising. The attitude of our officers was favorable. My own expressed
view, based on three years’ experience in mining, was that, though
much greater difficulties and magnitude would develop even than yet
foreseen, the scheme was nevertheless feasible, was within our minelaying
experience in principle, and, though it could hardly be more than half or
a quarter effective, it was well worth doing. The British Admiralty’s
approval and belief in the practicability of the scheme was implied in
the original paper, but an explicit confirmation was asked and obtained
by cable, on the basis of their three years’ war experience and knowledge
of North Sea conditions. And so the plan went to the Secretary of the
Navy bearing the General Board’s approval, as promising a sufficient
degree of success to warrant undertaking it.
CHAPTER THREE
THE BASES IN SCOTLAND
The British Minelaying Squadron was to operate from Grangemouth, near
Rosyth, on the Firth of Forth. As a mine assembling and operating
base for the American Squadron, the British naval authorities decided
on Inverness and Invergordon, in the Scottish Highlands, situated on
Inverness Firth and Cromarty Firth, respectively, which empty into Moray
Firth about eight miles apart. One base would have been enough and in
some respects more convenient, but the limited transportation means
across Scotland necessitated two. To require the slow mine carriers
to navigate the difficult passages around the north of Scotland would
prolong their exposure to submarines and cause more escort duty for
destroyers, so it was decided to discharge their cargoes on the west
side, at points which gave a short haul across Scotland—Fort William,
at the western terminus of the Caledonian Canal, and Kyle of Loch Alsh,
where one crosses to the Isle of Skye. The cargoes were transported by
canal motor-barge and by the Highland Railway.
[Illustration: MINE ASSEMBLY AND STORAGE SHEDS.
U.S. Naval Base 18, Inverness.]
In order to issue mines to the ships ready in all respects for planting,
the bases needed a large number of men for shop work, besides others
for transportation, police, clerical work, messmen, and sanitation. The
entire establishment on shore was under Captain O. G. Murfin, U.S.N.,
who had 20 American naval officers and 1000 enlisted men at each base,
3 officers and 60 men at each of the unloading points, Fort William
(actually at Corpach village) and Kyle. Headquarters was at Inverness,
because of its superior communications and more central location. Captain
Murfin had sailed November 13, for England, to supervise the preparation
of the bases. With him had gone Commander T. L. Johnson, then commanding
the small minelayer _Dubuque_, who was to inform himself fully on the
situation and return to Washington as soon as practicable with answers to
a long list of questions—everything we could then think of as useful to
know for intelligent coöperation in the preparations.
The large, substantial, stone buildings of two idle distilleries,
Dalmore, three miles out from Invergordon, and Glen Albyn, at Muirtown,
where the Caledonian Canal locks out to Inverness Firth—clean, dry, and
well ventilated—gave excellent living accommodations for the men. The
smaller buildings made suitable offices, but considerable additions were
made for messing, cooking, and washing arrangements. A Y.M.C.A. hut was
established in each base, and at Inverness the little Muirtown Hotel
was transformed into a small hospital. This, and similar provision at
Dalmore, all under Captain E. J. Grow (M.C.), were for mild or emergency
cases. The main dependence for hospital care was Strathpeffer—a “hydro”
cure in peace time—20 miles from either base. There a U.S. Naval Base
Hospital of 1000 beds had been established, under Captain E. S. Bogert,
Medical Corps, with the Leland Stanford unit.
The buildings for mine assembly and storage were erected on adjacent
vacant land, spur tracks being brought in from the main railway line,
thus making good communication between the two bases, as well as with
their receiving sources and shipping out points. Most of the machine
tools and other shop and office equipment, as well as furnishings for the
men’s use, came from the United States.
Some dredging was done in Inverness Firth to admit our minelayers into
Beauly Basin, near the canal entrance. The navigation marks for entering
the Firth were improved, because ordinarily vessels of our size seldom
came in there, and then only by day. In addition, the whole length of the
Caledonian Canal was lighted, for night navigation by the mine carrying
lighters.
Labor was scarce in the Highlands and the weather that winter was severe.
The work went slowly, delayed considerably beyond expectation. Captain
Murfin had many discouragements, and disappointments in deliveries from
the United States. In spite of the kindness of all about him, he must
often have felt very far away from home; but afterwards, the frank
admiration repeatedly expressed by all visitors to the bases must have
repaid his six long months of effort. In the end, the bases were ready in
time, and their capacity, and the rate of transportation as well, were
twice the original estimate, the two bases together being capable of
assembling 1000 mines a day ready for planting.
Sending over the base personnel began with small drafts in December, but
as accommodations for the full number were not ready soon enough, and
the demand to use all transportation for troops became pressing during
the Germans’ great drive in March, 1918, the base complements were not
more than about two-thirds full when the mine squadron sailed from the
United States coast in May. The greater part, 750, of the number then
lacking had therefore to be brought over by the squadron. Though this
retarded the proper organizing of the base personnel, it did not delay
the minelaying.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE SUPPLY OF MINES
In the same past six months other preparations, too, had been pushing
ahead, both at home and abroad. Providing the mines—the task of our
Naval Bureau of Ordnance—would alone make a story of great interest.
Considering how long it had taken to develop previous types of mines, to
have made a success of an invention that was new since our entering the
war was indeed remarkable, the more so from inability to test a single
mine complete before ordering 100,000.
[Illustration: A MINE IN MID-AIR, BEING HOISTED IN.
The Plummet is at the Lower Left Corner.]
Mines for the open sea in great numbers, moored “flying”—that is, by
ships steaming at considerable speed—need anchors with automatic depth
regulation. Such mechanism had undergone important changes during the
war, and the new American mines needed all the improvements, to make them
sure to plant at the intended level. They were to be much deeper than
ever attempted before, and also in deeper water.
[Illustration: LAUNCHING A MINE THROUGH THE STERN PORT.
There is a Nine-Foot Drop, from Rails to Water.]
Three British officers of considerable mine experience assisted here,
Lieut. Commander H. O. Mock, R.N.R., Lieutenant R. H. DeSalis, R.N.,
and Lieut. Commander Harold Isherwood, R.N.V.R. The last was an expert
designer, and had an important part in planning our new mine anchor,
which was similar to a late model British mine anchor.
A submarine mine of to-day consists of a mine case, shaped like a ball or
egg, about one yard in diameter, mounted on an anchor in the form of an
iron box about 30 inches square, connected by a wire rope mooring cable,
about ⅜ inch in diameter. The mine case contains the charge of high
explosive—300 pounds of TNT in our mines—and the firing mechanism. The
combination stands about 5 feet high and weighs 1400 pounds. Four small
car wheels on the anchor run on steel tracks, allowing the mines to be
easily moved along the decks to the launching point.
[Illustration: THE SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS AFTER A MINE IS LAUNCHED.]
When the mine dives overboard, the mine and anchor come to the surface
and float for a time, still held together, part of the mine case above
water. Outside the anchor is a 90-pound plummet, containing a reel of
⅛-inch diameter steel wire “plummet cord,” made the same length that the
mine is to be below the surface. Thus, if the mine is to be 160 feet
beneath the surface, the cord is made 160 feet long. The plummet drops
off when the mine goes overboard, unreels its cord, coming to the end
with a jerk that trips the slip hook which holds the mine and anchor
together. The pull on the cord also lifts the latch on the reel inside
the anchor, allowing the mooring wire to unwind. The nearly solid plummet
tends to sink faster than the more bulky anchor, thus keeping the cord
taut until the plummet strikes bottom. The cord then at once slackens,
releasing the latch, locking the reel, and preventing any more mooring
wire unwinding. The anchor, continuing to sink, pulls the mine under
until the anchor strikes bottom. The mine is thus finally moored always
at the desired depth beneath the surface, no matter how irregular the
ocean bed may be. The mine cases are buoyant enough to pull straight up
from their anchors ordinarily, but in a current they are swayed away from
the vertical, which dips them down somewhat deeper than intended. For
this reason, any locality where the currents are strong is unfavorable
for a minefield—one of the difficulties the British Navy had to contend
with in closing the Dover Strait.
The new mine having, by October, been carried past the experimental stage
as to its principal features, by the Naval Torpedo Station at Newport,
R.I., some important mechanical details of the mine yet remaining were
now worked out by the _Baltimore_, Captain A. W. Marshall, working
directly under the Bureau of Ordnance. By the time complete units were
ready, the _Baltimore_ had been sent abroad, so the proof testing
devolved upon the _San Francisco_, Captain H. V. Butler. This came in
March and April.
No throw of the dice was ever watched more intently than those first
proof tests. Upwards of forty million dollars had been staked on them and
were already half spent. Results on the first day made us feel easy, but
it was two days more—from various delays—before we succeeded in exploding
a full loaded mine. This had been planted in Chesapeake Bay, well marked
and guarded, in the very same deep hole where a whirlpool effect troubled
the German submarine _Deutschland_ on her first return trip. It was not
possible to place the mine far from the fairway, however, since the water
elsewhere was not deep enough for our purpose. Early the second morning,
the battleship _Arizona_ came along, heading too near it. The signal “You
are standing into a minefield!” sent her rudder hard over and engines
full speed astern. We could see the mud stirred up, from two miles away.
Since we could not get the mine up, what a relief it was when it was set
off at last by sweeping!
The final proving of the mine as a whole, which was completed in April,
off Cape Ann, did not take place until after several cargoes of mine
parts had been shipped abroad, but the mine’s success, from its first
trials, showed how careful and observant had been all those who were
concerned in its designing and testing.
The prospect in October was that the shipment of mines would begin in
January, but through delay in completing the detailed plans and from the
abnormal industrial conditions prevailing, these shipments did not attain
a regular flow until May, so that the ships and the mines were ready
together.
Secrecy, as well as timely delivery, caused the manufacturing to be
partitioned among 500 contractors and sub-contractors, some of them as
far west as the Mississippi. Certain mine parts from different makers
were put together by still others, and all parts flowed toward Norfolk,
Virginia, the trans-Atlantic shipping point. Planning this dividing up,
placing the contracts, and arranging for the inspection of all—taking
into account the transportation involved and the many different kinds of
firms—wire rope makers, automobile concerns, foundries, machine shops,
electricians, die-presses, and even candymakers—it was indeed a complex
web. What tireless industry and what endless patience under pressure went
into this work, only Commander Fullinwider and his assistants can fully
appreciate.
A large plant to charge the mines with explosive was built alongside
the Naval Magazine at St. Julien’s Creek, near the Norfolk Navy Yard.
This plant was of capacity larger than any other of the kind, ample for
handling 1000 mines a day. The high explosive was melted in steam kettles
to about the consistency of hasty pudding, and drawn off, 300 pounds of
TNT at a time, into the mine spheres. An automatic device shut the flow
off at the right weight, and a mechanical conveyer carried the mines
along slowly, to the pier end, by which time they would be cool enough to
load into the waiting ship. Hot work around those steam kettles through
the long summer! A quiet but important corner, handling 25,000,000
pounds of TNT, with constant risk from fire. Several of the sailors were
overcome by the kettles’ poisonous fumes, and one died. The duty was
monotonous and inconspicuous but was done with praiseworthy faithfulness.
CHAPTER FIVE
GENERAL SUPPLIES AND TRANSPORTATION
Under the extraordinary demand prevailing abroad for food and all kinds
of military material, it was only fitting that ordinary supplies for our
part of the Northern Barrage operation should come from America, British
sources to be used only for fuel and fresh provisions. Details are
needless here, except to mention their completeness—largely due to the
efforts of Captain G. C. Schafer of the Pay Corps. After starting things
fair at home, he sailed about mid-December for England, where the needs
of the bases could be best determined. With him went Assistant Paymaster
R. N. Smither, U.S.N.R.F., who later became his successor, and Lieutenant
Thomas Newhall, U.S.N.R.F., who had been enrolled for duty principally in
connection with transporting the mine carriers’ cargoes across Scotland.
His experience in railroading and his tactful energy made a valuable
asset. After their departure, purchases and deliveries were followed up
indefatigably by Assistant Paymaster A. B. Peacock, U.S.N.R.F., who was
quite successful in bringing pressure to bear effectively. One morning,
after a certain freight car had been missing for two weeks, he reported
that eight railroad presidents were now interested personally in the
search—and the car was then found.
[Illustration: A MINE CARRIER STEAMER.
Twenty-Four of These were Constantly Employed to Transport the Mine Parts
Over to Scotland for Assembly and Laying.]
For transportation beyond the seaboard, cargoes of mines must go in
special ships, which could carry also the general supplies for the
operation. The mine carriers should be small rather than large, to
minimize the effect on the progress of the operation in the event of
losing one. About 60,000 tons in constant employment being needed, 24 of
the so-called “Lake” steamers were selected, built on the Great Lakes
for coastwise service, of 2500 tons average capacity. They were armed
against submarines, manned by naval crews, and would sail in convoy,
two or three every eight days, beginning in February. Their fitting out
and management came under the Naval Overseas Transport Service, which
furnished them according to schedule. Slow speed, due to their small size
and cheap build, made them good prey for submarines, which sank one of
these carriers in April, the _Lake Moor_, with 41 of her crew—almost our
only loss of life in the whole operation. This was another part of the
whole operation that was obscure, though all-important, which would yet
have been very conspicuous had it not been so well done.
The great amount and the dangerous nature of these cargoes needed special
arrangements for embarking them, for which Southern Railway Pier No. 4.
at Pinner’s Point, opposite Norfolk, Virginia, was taken exclusively.
This pier being large enough to assemble several cargoes at once, the
entire cargoes could be loaded there, and that was the plan, until the
great disaster at Halifax aroused strong local opposition concerning the
place of loading the mines on board. It was too late then to relocate
the plant for charging the mines with TNT, and as the ground of local
opposition was undeniably well taken, a real problem was presented. To
take the loaded mines in lighters from the magazine 17 miles to the
Explosives Anchorage, as first proposed, would have been very slow—almost
impossible in bad weather—even had ample towage, lighterage, and labor
been available, besides involving an extra handling for every mine,
with attendant damage and risk. Thanks to the timely exertions of
Captain W. J. Maxwell, U.S.N., who was in general charge of the loading
and despatch of mines, a channel was dredged up to the magazine pier,
where the steamers could embark the mines directly, after loading the
unobjectionable part of their cargoes at Pier 4. Thus local interests
were quieted with the greatest measure of safety.
Several ingenious arrangements were devised for handling the mine
material quickly. Two mine anchors fastened together, 1600 pounds, could
be trundled about by one man, making a considerable labor saving on
loading 2000 in one cargo. The pier became also the sub-assembly point
for some mine parts, requiring a shop, as well as shipping organization.
All was done by naval enlisted men, under the supervision of Lieutenant
A. J. Love and Lieut. Commander R. E. Corcoran (P.C.). It was not long
before these steamers began to take supplies also for our Battle Squadron
with the Grand Fleet, 500 tons at a time.
CHAPTER SIX
A SAMPLE OF QUALITY
While details were shaping for proving the mine early in March, an urgent
request came from the British Admiralty for one or more minelayers to
help lay a field in the North Irish Channel. This passage was used by
slow convoys to the west coast, making port first at Lamlash in the
island of Arran, and submarine activity here needed to be checked. The
sinking of the _Tuscania_ had taken place in this vicinity.
At that time, only the _San Francisco_ and _Baltimore_ could be
considered for this duty, and as the former was flagship, the _Baltimore_
was sent. To “How soon can you go?” over long distance wire, Captain
Marshall answered “Right away,” guessing at the destination, and on March
4 he sailed from New York to join H.M.S. _Leviathan_ as escort for a fast
convoy out of Halifax.
By popular standards, the _Baltimore_ was a musty back number—years
older than many of her officers and crew—but she had been at Manila
Bay with Dewey and had otherwise distinguished herself in a long and
varied career. Though classed as a poor steamer, the ease with which,
time after time, she produced extra speed at a pinch was a standing
joke. Thanks to a good overhaul early in the war and to the ability and
contagious enthusiasm of her engineer, Lieutenant R. P. Molten, U.S.N.,
she now topped a 9-day transatlantic run at 13 knots, for the most part
in rough weather, with a three-hour spurt at 18.6 knots—2 knots faster
than was supposed to be safe for her engines—just to keep pace with the
_Leviathan_.
She arrived at Greenock, Scotland, March 17, ready for work, but was so
much earlier than expected that her first mines were not delivered until
April 13. Without any preparatory trials, though the mines were British,
of a type new to the _Baltimore_, she went out at once, beginning the
deep minefield between the island of Islay and the Irish coast, which was
to prevent submerged but not surface passage.
More mines in excess of her reported capacity having been sent to her,
10 had to be carried on the upper deck, and the last one of these mines,
in going down the elevator, was jambed, due to the roll of the ship,
and held suspended in the elevator shaft. William J. Powers, gunner’s
mate, 1st class, promptly of his own initiative, at imminent risk of the
1800-pound weight falling or one of the mine’s firing horns breaking,
removed the detonator and with it the great menace to the ship. Before
the _Baltimore’s_ next trip, her own mechanics extended the launching
deck tracks, to accommodate 180 instead of 170 mines, since the British
naval authorities wished her to plant the larger number each time. Four
times more she planted 180 mines, April 18, 21, 28 and May 2, planting
always at night, in an area infested with submarines.
Extra careful navigation was required, both to lay the mines just where
intended, as their anchor cables had been cut to fit (anchors not
automatic), and to approach close to the minefields previously laid,
yet avoid them. In one such operation, the gyro-compass went wrong at
a critical moment. The navigator, Lieut. Commander George W. Hewlett,
U.S.N., kept his head and held his peace, applying the corrections to the
magnetic compass with coolness and accuracy, as if maneuvering to avoid a
sand bank, instead of to clear a minefield by only 500 yards.
The _Baltimore_ laid this whole minefield unassisted, 899 mines in
all. She worked directly under Rear Admiral Clinton-Baker, R.N., who
wired his congratulations upon the successful completion of the first
three operations, and when, at the end of May, she was recalled to our
squadron, he wrote to Captain Marshall:
Once more I wish to thank you for all that you have done and
for the very willing help which you, your officers and ship’s
company have always given. It is much to be regretted that the
work which you commenced and so admirably carried out is not to
be completed, at any rate for the present, though doubtless you
will be doing equally useful work elsewhere in the near future.
Good luck to you and your ship.
This minefield accounted for two enemy submarines and there was little
further submarine activity in that vicinity, which should be credited
largely as an achievement of our squadron. And as a sample of quality
before the North Sea mining began, the _Baltimore’s_ work gave our
colleagues confidence that we could do our part—by far the largest
portion—in that great, open sea operation. As immortalized in our song:
“The _Baltimore_ was the first away.
She traveled a thousand miles a day,
To show the Allies the lively way
Of the Yankee Mining Squadron.”
CHAPTER SEVEN
MINE ASSEMBLING AND EMBARKING
Following the conference on board the _Queen Elizabeth_, our bases worked
full blast on the mines for the first operation. One group assembled and
tested the anchors, another the mines, a third the plummet, a fourth the
plummet and anchor together, and a fifth, the final assembly, of mine
and anchor complete—called a unit. A section of mine track of standard
gauge sufficed to test the anchor wheels and thus obviate trouble on
board from their binding or dropping between the ship’s tracks during
minelaying, possibly causing an interrupted string. It speaks well for
the manufacture, for the testing at the bases, and for the ship’s mine
track installations, that no such interruption ever occurred in the whole
series of operations.
[Illustration: MINES AND MINE ANCHORS AWAITING ASSEMBLY.
The Anchors were Shipped in Pairs, for Convenience in Handling.]
The adjustment of firing mechanism was done in a locked room, the secret
entrusted only to a few. It was delicate work, to be done patiently and
methodically, for its accuracy determined whether the mine would be
alive—or a dud. Fidelity in such adjustments is hard enough to maintain
when the repetitions are numbered only by tens. Where hundreds and
thousands are involved the tax on attention becomes severe.
Before loading the mines into the cars, for transfer to the lighters,
each mine was primed with a mealed TNT “booster” charge and the firing
detonator was put in place—all ready for the laying—and five safety
devices were seen in place and in order. These devices would prevent the
firing mechanism working until the mine had reached a certain minimum
depth under water and had been in the water about 20 minutes, and would
also prevent exploding in case of loss overboard during embarking. Such
devices usually function properly, and dependence is not placed on one
alone but on several together, any one of which will make the mine safe
to handle—by experienced men. At an early stage in the training in mines,
one learns to treat them with respect always—no liberties. Even the
safest explosives, the surest mechanism, have an occasional, inexplicable
aberration.
[Illustration: LOADING MINES INTO LIGHTERS.
At Base 18, on the Caledonian Canal, at Inverness.]
The ready mines are swung up into open freight cars, for hauling to the
water side, whence they go, 40 to 80 together, in lighters out to the
ships. After being landed on the tracks of the minelayer, one safety pin
is removed—leaving four—and the mine is then examined for any derangement
during the three handlings in transit from the store shed.
The north of Scotland was a barred area, yet it was reported possible for
information to get through to the enemy in 18 to 20 hours—time enough for
interference to hatch out. With so much activity at the bases, lighters
going to the ships loaded and returning empty, and a large destroyer
escort coming in on 5 June, the fact that an operation was in early
prospect was obvious. The _hour_ of departure at least could be kept
secret, and the start was fixed for midnight. The two detachments of the
mine squadron and the destroyer escort would assemble at 1 o’clock a.m.,
7 June, just outside the Sutors, the high rocky headlands at the mouth of
Cromarty Firth. On this first occasion the preparations continued until
one hour before the ships weighed anchor.
[Illustration: SQUADRON FLAGSHIP “SAN FRANCISCO.”
Receiving Mine Lighters Alongside in Inverness Firth.]
Rehearsal of this operation had been impossible except on paper, but
careful study of it had produced instructions that were comprehensive,
yet elastic enough for emergency. The order for the operation gave a
complete program, including a mining schedule showing the time when each
ship was to begin laying and how many mines to plant. This was gone
over with the captains, and then Captain H. R. Godfrey, R.N., and I had
a conference with Rear Admiral Strauss, on the general features of the
excursion. Captain Godfrey, commanding H.M.S. _Vampire_ and the 14th
Destroyer Flotilla, was our first escort leader.
Our operation was to be no “captains’ fight.” Teamwork was indispensable.
Every ship must keep in her station throughout and do her allotted stint
exactly on time. The instructions said, “Once begun, keep strictly to
schedule times, regardless of the _omission_ of signals or delay in
them.” Otherwise there would be gaps in the barrier, impossible to fill
without waste of time and space, and mines would be brought back that
should have been planted. Teamwork in the high degree wanted meant every
man alive to his interest in the general result and sensible to his
responsibility for his part in it. All would learn this in time, but it
must be driven home beforehand. It was of utmost importance that the
first operation should be an unquestionable success.
Accordingly, after making the preliminary inspection of each new ship,
I spoke to each ship’s company, partly to comment on their work so far,
but chiefly to enlist the best efforts of each individual. Rumor and
conjecture were the sources of all they had learned hitherto of the
work ahead of them. Now they were told something of its magnitude and
importance—that it had been regarded as doubtful of accomplishment, but
their squadron commander had promised success in their name, promised
the kind of success that comes only with the best teamwork throughout
the ship and by all ships in the squadron. Every man should realize that
now, in war, his utmost was called for, as never before in his life; that
however simple and unimportant his duty might seem, it was his to do,
and he was counted on not to be content that any other man’s work should
be better done, and that, in our work, prolonged through hours, the
attention must never slacken—the 600th mine must be as carefully tended
as the first. The men gave the closest attention—not an eye wavered,
hardly a muscle moved—giving back such confidence that, on board the
_Canonicus_, which I had found in fine condition, I could wind up with,
“And when the last mine is out, the only signal I expect to send to you
is ‘_Canonicus_ well done’!”
CHAPTER EIGHT
THE FIRST MINELAYING EXCURSION
The eve of our first departure was drizzling and misty. Attempts for some
advance sleep were of no avail—too much pressure had directly preceded.
When 11 o’clock came without sign of the two ships due from the inner
anchorage in Beauly Basin, we in the flagship wondered why. The tide was
falling, another half hour passed—would they never come? Signals and
radio failed to get through. Very soon, if not already, they would be
unable to pass through the new dredged channel. At last, near midnight,
they appeared. The pilots had been delayed through a misunderstanding on
shore, in itself slight—but it was a narrow escape from being 10 hours
late, which, on our first operation, would have made a bad impression,
without and within.
The start is made without signals, all dark and noiseless on board,
except for the rumbling chain as the ship gets underway. As the _San
Francisco_ heads out slowly, one after another the signal quartermaster
reports the other ships underway and following. We take two-thirds speed
now. The full number of lookouts are at their stations and warned to be
alert, and the men are now sent to the battery, making a little stir
for the moment, then quiet falls again. Fort George shows the signal
for an open gate, we increase to standard speed, and as the second ship
passes out through the submarine net, they all form single column astern
and close up—to 500 yards apart. The rocky shore looms high and black
on the left, not a single house light showing. On the off-shore side,
small patrol craft can be dimly seen, on watch against lurking danger.
Fifteen minutes more and we see long, low forms slinking against the dark
background of North Sutor. Those are the escort destroyers, going out to
form a screen. Close following them we make out larger, higher, moving
shadows—our detachment from the other base—one, two, three, four—_five_!
_All there!_ The detachments are so timed that they reach the junction
buoy at the same moment, and the whole squadron stands on, without pause,
together, 10 ships in two parallel columns, 500 yards apart. Ahead and
on either side are four destroyers, 12 in all. No signals, no lights, no
sound but quiet tones on the bridge and the swash of the water overside.
Three miles along, the water deepens to 60 feet. A screened flash from
the flagship to the opposite leader and the squadron, all together,
slackens speed, to get out paravanes—those underwater, outrigger-like
affairs which guard against anchored mines in one’s path. Only a few
minutes, then up each column comes the sign “yes,” passed by ships in
succession—another flash from the flagship, and we resume standard speed
again, keeping on, out Moray Firth, through the one-mile wide channel,
which is swept daily for mines.
[Illustration: THE MINE SQUADRON AT SEA.
Returning to Base After Laying the Ninth Minefield.]
Off Pentland Skerries, near John O’Groat’s House, we turn east, and
here as we pass, the supporting force files out of Scapa Flow—six
light cruisers, then a squadron of battle cruisers and another of four
battleships, each squadron screened by six destroyers. Very impressive
are these great ships, majestic in movement, as they sweep off to the
southward and eastward, disappearing in the morning haze, which magnifies
their towering bulk. We see them no more until next day but know they are
there, on guard against raiders.
The British Minelaying Squadron is out, too, four ships with a joint
capacity of 1300 mines, but we do not meet. Though protected by the
same heavy squadrons, we work independently, in different areas. They
are bound this time for the section near the Norway coast, Area C it is
called, while we are to begin at the southeastern corner of the middle
section, Area A, and work to the westward.
Straight over to Udsire we go, a small island off the Norway coast, the
nearest good landmark from which to take a departure for the minelaying
start point. We make Udsire Light near 11.30 p.m., close in to about 11
miles distance, turn north for a sufficient run to give a good fix, and
then head off-shore. Accurate determination of the minefield’s position
is necessary for use in laying another field close by subsequently, and
also for the safety of the vessels sweeping the mines up after the war.
There must be steady steaming and steering, with a minimum of changing
course—no hesitation, no trial moves, for neither the time at disposal
nor the submarine risk will permit.
All goes smoothly until the turn to head off-shore, when one destroyer
crosses too close under _San Francisco’s_ stern and cuts her “taut wire.”
This is fine piano wire, furnished in spools of 140 miles of wire, the
whole weighing one ton. A small weight would anchor the end to the
bottom, and then a mile of wire meant a mile over the ground without
question.
The wire is soon started again, and as the _Baltimore_ is running her
wire on the other flank, and the weather is clear enough for good
navigational bearings and star sights, no harm is done. We head for a
position seven miles in advance of the start point, so that the squadron
may turn together to the minelaying course and have still a half-hour in
which to settle down.
It is a busy night and early morning, keeping the ships in formation,
verifying the navigation, keeping a keen lookout in every direction for
submarines—we are now in their regular route—going over the mines for
final touches and making other preparations necessarily left to the last.
About 4 o’clock, Lieut. Commander Cunningham, the flagship’s navigator,
reports that we shall reach the start point at 5.27 a.m. Captain Butler
and I check his figures, and at 4.27 the signal is made that minelaying
will begin in one hour. The crews go to mining stations, to see all
clear and then stand by. In the flagship we watch for the reports of
readiness. Ship by ship they signal in the affirmative. They are ready,
every one.
Now the last turn has been made and the signal is flying to begin laying
in seven minutes. The ships are formed in a single line abreast, speeding
towards the start point—like race horses when the starter’s flag is up.
It is a stirring sight. How will it go, after all these months—for some
of us years—of preparation? Our work to-day will mean much to those in
Washington.
No ship is off the line by so much as a quarter length. Commander Canaga
stands with watch in hand—“two minutes, one minute, thirty seconds,
fifteen?” He looks up inquiringly. A nod—all right. “Five seconds—haul
down!” Up go the red flags on the first ships to plant, the sign that
their minelaying has begun, and word comes from the flagship’s launching
station at the stern, “First mine over.” All well so far.
The minelaying now runs entirely by the time table. Each ship gives her
successor five minutes warning and, as her last mine dives overboard,
shows the signal “Begin minelaying at once; I have suspended.” The
successor begins accordingly, showing her red flag. The staff officers on
board the _San Francisco_ watch for these signals, comparing the times
with what they should be, and counting also the seconds elapsed between
the launching of successive mines, from the ships whose sterns we can
see. A few seconds out now and then—otherwise all goes according to
schedule, just as planned before leaving the United States.
The hardest task is on board the _Housatonic_—a new ship, with a new
mining installation, of type untried in service, and a crew inexperienced
in minelaying—dropping 675 mines without intermission, 1 every 11½
seconds, during 2 hours and 10 minutes. Her mate is standing by, ready
for any interruption, but the _Housatonic_ completes the task without a
break—making a world record, a continuous line of mines, 28 miles long.
On a later occasion, the _Canonicus_ planted 860 mines in 3 hours 35
minutes, an unbroken line of 43 miles.
About 20 minutes after planting began, an explosion was felt and a
geyser seen astern. A few minutes later the same occurred again, and
other explosions followed, at varying intervals and distances, some just
visible on the horizon. Others which were nearer, as evidenced by the
sharpness of the shock, threw up no geyser, indicating that they were at
the middle or lowest depth.
In the proof tests held off Cape Ann in April, it had been observed
that a mine at the middle level, 160 feet submergence, made no surface
disturbance when detonated, until 8 seconds had elapsed, and then only as
much as the wash of a light swell over a submerged rock. At the deepest
level, 240 feet submergence, a detonation produced no more surface
upheaval than there is in a glass of well iced champagne. The ship being
about 800 yards away, the shock was heavy and sharp. The water surface
all over could be seen to tremble with the shock, but directly over the
mine itself, when, after 27 seconds, the gas came up, there was no more
surface disturbance than a pleasure canoe could have ridden with safety.
A slick on the water would follow, but this could not be distinguished
at much over a mile distance nor at all if there were a white cap sea
running.
Observers recorded the number, times, and approximate positions of all
explosions and, on board the _San Francisco_ and _Baltimore_, there were
listeners stationed at the submarine signal receivers, so as to get a
full count. All observers did not agree, as the indications from sounds
and shocks varied according to distance and depth. Some explosions gave
a prolonged reverberation, at times sounding to the unassisted ear like
two or three explosions in rapid succession, but in the submarine signal
receiver each explosion made a distinct sound, unmistakable.
The count by the _San Francisco_ and _Baltimore_, differing by only 2,
practically agreed on 100 explosions, or about 3 per cent of all mines
planted. Although a perfect record was desirable, the detonations showed
the minefield to be alive and sensitive, and their number was not large
for a new mine, not yet long enough in service to refine out the minor
defects.
Surprising enough on deck, where one could see, that first explosion must
have startled the men in the engine room, in the coal bunkers, and on
the lower mine decks. The blow rings sharper down there, where resulting
damage, in broken pipe joints or started boiler tubes, might be expected
first. Whether gun, torpedo, or mine, however, it is all one—the duties
go on just the same.
As the mines on the launching deck move slowly aft, those on lower decks
move forward, to the elevators and up. Working spaces are cramped,
passages narrow, bulkhead doors closed wherever possible. At the right
time, a door will be opened, the portable section of mine track
adjusted, the mines in that compartment hauled out, and the door closed
again water-tight, all as quickly as possible. Close, hot, foul with oily
steam and seasickness—it is sweating, disagreeable work below decks. But
complaint is nowhere in the ships. The feeling is well expressed by one
man, writing home:
When the first mine went over, I had a curious feeling of
exultation. The fear, the perils, the uncertainties that
surround our work, slipped from me like the foolish fancies of
a nightmare. There, at last, was a nail in the Kaiser’s coffin.
Come what might, I had justified my existence. Had the whole
German High Seas Fleet appeared in the offing, I am sure I
should have gone to my battle station with a shout of glee.
Prolonged activity, in preparing the squadron and bringing it out, makes
it trying now for me, to look on, hands folded—nothing to do while
everything goes well—yet constantly alert, for instant decision in case
of mishap. After nearly four hours, the schedule is finished. Some marker
buoys are dropped, for later use in beginning another minefield. The line
of ships then takes the narrower route formation, and we head back for
the base. Butler, Canaga, and I exchange quiet congratulations. Our work
together has been to good purpose.
The men clean up the decks, get a wash for themselves, and those off duty
drop asleep—anywhere—the deck is covered with them. On top of the duties
common to all men-of-war, to move the 400-ton masses of mines, in slow
but steady time, is very fatiguing, even with steam winches to help.
We are not finished yet. Expectation of a quiet afternoon doze, handy
to the bridge, is rudely dispelled by a smoke screen started by the
destroyers. Unaware it is only an exercise, all hands tumble up to battle
stations. Then one minelayer must stop, to tighten a nut working loose.
Two destroyers are left to guard her, all three overtaking us in a few
hours. Next a dirigible balloon heaves in sight, and then a widespread
smoke covers the horizon, developing into a convoy of 50 vessels.
Finally, in the midst of dinner, the siren of our next astern shrieks
“Submarine to port!”
While the minelayers, upon signal, swing together away from the danger
quarter, the _Vampire_ swoops by at 30 knots, to drop two depth charges
on the spot indicated. Captain Godfrey signals, “Whatever was there,
those charges will keep him down for a considerable time.” All quiet
again, we return to our cold provender, remarking that, as a name, mine
squadron is ill chosen. It should be “Crowded Hour Club.”
Reports had now come in from all the ships that there had been no
casualties. All were prepared to undertake another operation upon
receiving the mines, and without further incident we returned to our
former anchorages, arriving at 3.30 next morning. But ere that day
closed, so memorable in our lives, I signaled the squadron:
The operation to-day was an excellent performance by each ship
and by the squadron as a whole. The fact of some premature
explosions does not detract from the highly creditable mine
handling and steady steaming. Confidence in the personnel and
faith in the undertaking are well justified, and captains may
well be proud of their commands, as the squadron commander is
of the squadron.
SQUADRON ORGANIZATION AND SHIPS’ DATA
MINE SQUADRON ONE, U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET
(Designated in H.B.M. Grand Fleet, SECOND MINELAYING SQUADRON)
Captain Reginald R. Belknap, U.S.N., Squadron Commander
Flagship—U.S.S. _San Francisco_
Chief of staff [1]Captain H. V. Butler.
Aid and tactical officer Commander B. L. Canaga.
Squadron construction and mining officer [1]Comdr. L. F. Kimball.
Squadron engineer [1]Lt. Comdr. F. R. Berg.
Squadron engineer from 1 October, 1918 [1]Lieut. G. J. Blessing.
Flag lieutenant and secretary Lt. Comdr. E. S. R. Brandt.
Aid and secretary after 23 August, 1918 Ensign Roger F. Hooper, R.F.
Squadron radio officer, also signal
officer after 23 August, 1918 Lieut. R. C. Starkey.
Communication officer and aid Lt. (j. g.) R. L. White, R.F.
Squadron surgeon [1]Lt. Comdr. G. C. Rhoades
(M.C.).
Squadron surgeon from 1 October, 1918 [1]Lieut. H. P. Stevens
(M.C.), R.F.
Squadron supply officer [1]Lieut. C. R. Eagle (P.C.).
Squadron athletic officer [1]Lt. Comdr. G. W. Hewlett.
Assistant squadron construction officer [1]Lieut. G. R. Arey (C.C.).
_San Francisco_ (flagship)—Captain H. V. Butler, U.S.N.
Launched at Union Iron Works, San Francisco, October 26, 1889,
as a protected cruiser; commissioned as a mine ship August 21,
1911; length 324 feet, beam 49 feet, extreme draft 24 feet,
full load displacement 4583 tons; twin screw, 18 knots; four
5-inch 51-caliber guns, two 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, 170
mines; officers 22, crew 350; additional for flagship, officers
5, enlisted men 47; total on board 424.
_Baltimore_—Captain A. W. Marshall, U.S.N.
Launched at Cramp’s Shipyard, Philadelphia, October 26, 1888,
as a protected cruiser; commissioned as a mine ship March 8,
1915; length 335 feet, beam 48½ feet, extreme draft 24 feet,
5482 tons; twin screw, 18 knots; four 5-inch 51-caliber guns,
two 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, 180 mines; officers 21, crew
339; total 360.
_Roanoke_—Captain C. D. Stearns, U.S.N.
Launched August 30, 1911, named _El Dia_; commissioned as a
minelayer January 25, 1918, at Tietjen and Lang’s Shipyard,
Hoboken, N.J.
_Housatonic_—Captain J. W. Greenslade, U.S.N.
Launched November 14, 1899, named _El Rio_; commissioned
January 25, 1918, at Tietjen and Lang’s.
_Canandaigua_—Captain W. H. Reynolds, U.S.N.
Launched in May, 1901, named _El Siglo_; commissioned March 2,
1918, at the Morse Dry Dock and Repair Company, Brooklyn, N.Y.
_Canonicus_—Captain T. L. Johnson, U.S.N.
Launched November 14, 1899, named _El Cid_; commissioned March
2, 1918, at the Morse Yard.
All four preceding were built at the Newport News Ship and
Engine Building Company, Newport News, Va., as freight liners
for the Southern Pacific Steamship Company (Morgan Line).
Length 405 feet, beam 48 feet, draft 20 feet, displacement 7000
tons; single screw, 15 knots; one 5-inch 51-caliber gun aft,
two 3-inch anti-aircraft guns forward; 830 mines normally, 900
maximum, carried on three decks; officers 21, crew 400; total
421.
_Quinnebaug_—Commander D. Pratt Mannix, U.S.N.
Launched October 14, 1898, named _Jefferson_; commissioned
as minelayer March 23, 1918, at Robins’ Dry Dock and Repair
Company, Brooklyn, N.Y.
_Saranac_—Captain Sinclair Gannon, U.S.N.
Launched in 1899, named _Hamilton_; commissioned April 9, 1918,
at James Shewan & Sons, Inc., Brooklyn.
Both were built by John Roach & Sons, Chester, Pa., as
coastwise passenger and freight liners for the Old Dominion
Steamship Company; length 375 feet, beam 42 feet, draft 18½
feet, displacement 5150 tons; single screw, 16 knots; one
5-inch 51-caliber gun aft, two 3-inch anti-aircraft guns
forward; mines 612 normally, 642 maximum, carried on two decks;
officers 18, crew 392; total 410.
_Shawmut_—Captain W. T. Cluverius, U.S.N.
_Aroostook_—Captain J. Harvey Tomb, U.S.N.
Both vessels were launched in 1907 at Cramp’s Shipyard,
Philadelphia, named _Massachusetts_ and _Bunker Hill_
respectively; commissioned as minelayers at Navy Yard, Boston,
Mass., December 7, 1917; length 387 feet, beam 52 feet, draft
17½ feet, displacement 3800 tons; twin screw, oil fuel, 20
knots; one 5-inch 51-caliber and one 3-inch anti-aircraft gun
on the middle line aft, one 3-inch anti-aircraft gun forward;
320 mines normally, 352 maximum, all carried on one deck;
officers 20, crew 346; total 366.
_Totals of Squadron_:
Tonnage, 54,000 tons.
Mines, normal 5530, maximum 5834.
Officers 208, men 3839; total 4047.
In addition, four seagoing tugs belonged to the squadron, as
described in Chapter 22.
CHAPTER NINE
ATHLETICS
A shortage of some mine parts that had encountered difficulty in
manufacture now delayed the preparation for a second excursion, and the
respite came opportunely, for we had been driving hard for some time.
Though the minelayers were comfortable enough to live in when empty, it
was quite different with mines on board. Then only a few of the men could
swing their hammocks, the others having to lie on the decks. Crowding
the mess tables together, horns and sharp corners ever ready to tear the
clothes, mines were constantly at one’s elbow, and everywhere were mine
tracks, half-knee high, or turntables, to trip the unwary or bark his
shin. No smoking was allowed below decks, and the space above decks was
very limited for crews so numerous. The men made no complaint—such men
will not complain of discomfort which seems temporary and unavoidable,
when incident to an undertaking that interests them—but since the
discomfort could not be alleviated but, on the contrary, would increase
with the frequency of excursions and with inclement weather, sufficient
diversion was imperative to maintain the fine, cheerful spirit which had
characterized the work so far.
Let the report on squadron athletics, written at the end of September by
Ensign Walter P. Hanson, U.S.N.R.F., editor of our _Athletic Bulletin_,
tell what was done, in true sporting page style:
The situation was new, practically unparalleled, and called for
immediate action. With the exception of the _San Francisco_ and
_Baltimore_, none of the ships had the traditional atmosphere
of a man-of-war, so essential to the building up of _esprit
de corps_. It was a new squadron, manned largely by new men,
performing a new operation in strange waters. Something was
needed to weld this war-sprouted organization into a solid,
indissoluble unit, to build up ship spirit and a high squadron
spirit, recalling old traditions and laying the foundation for
new ones, to fire the men’s enthusiasm to a pitch that would
insure the success of the gigantic operation in hand and spell
defeat for the German submarine forces.
There were other just as important reasons why an athletic
organization was necessary. Minelaying in contested waters is
not the easiest nor the least dangerous of duties. To eat,
sleep and work in close proximity to tons of the deadliest
explosive known, and then to cruise day and night in submarine
infested waters with this same explosive for cargo—knowing that
one well-aimed torpedo, a well-placed mine, or a few enemy
shells, would wipe out an entire ship’s company, and possibly
the whole squadron—is not exactly the sort of recreation a
worn-out business man would seek as a cure for “nerves.” And
blue-jackets, despite a common fallacy in America, are no more
than human. Numerous mining excursions, with no intervening
periods of recreation, were bound to tell on the men.
Relaxation and amusement they would get in one form or another.
Where were they to turn for it? To the theaters and amusement
centers of two Scotch, war-stricken villages? They were almost
a myth and couldn’t hold a man-sized blue-jacket’s attention
for half an hour a week. What then—the Y.M.C.A.? Yes, to some
extent, but even those faithful workers couldn’t solve the
problem. Active amusement the men wanted, excitement, thrills,
anything to take their minds off their work for a few hours
several times a week when they went ashore.
Obviously there was but one answer to the question and that was
the healthful recreation of organized, competitive athletics.
Athletics of all sorts and forms, teams organized on each
ship, and an officially recognized and governed organization
to direct the activities of the entire squadron. Spirited
competition and clean sportsmanship was to be the keynote of
the movement, with one directing head, under the supervision of
the Squadron Commander.
The official “season” was formally opened on July 4, at both
bases, with eight teams competing. The initial success was most
gratifying. The spirit shown by the townspeople gave the day
all the ear-marks of a regular league opening in the states.
The games were closely contested and the players, cheered on by
the rooting of hundreds of loyal “fans,” displayed an excellent
brand of ball. Business houses had declared a holiday in honor
of our Independence Day and apparently the natives decided to
attend the festivities in a body, for at Inverness more than
three thousand of them were present, eagerly attempting to
learn the intricacies of the game.
From then on, the success of athletics in the squadron was
assured. When the ships were in port and the weather permitted,
not a day passed without one or more games played. Each team
was loyally supported by its own ship’s company, even the
officers forgetting their dignity long enough to root long
and loudly. In these demonstrations the men were moderate,
considerate of the neighbors, realizing that local custom did
not favor such noise, though indulged now with perfect good
humor, since we appeared to need it.
Athletic activities were not confined to baseball. Boat-racing,
track, tug-of-war teams, boxing and wrestling, were all taken
up and encouraged. On July 4, the entire morning was given
over to boat racing. Excellent time was made over the mile
course and good seamanlike qualities were displayed. The
afternoon track events developed into a spirited contest, in
which the marks made would have done justice to any first-class
American university. Again on Labor Day a similar athletic meet
was arranged and once more the same measure of success was
attained, thousands of townspeople in attendance.
Boxing and wrestling were taken up by the individual ships and,
generally speaking, one evening each week was given over to
“happy hours,” for bouts in the ring and on the mat. Ambitious
youngsters would send forth bristling challenges, which were
immediately snapped up by rivals in other ships and the
resulting encounter was the equivalent—seldom bloodless—of a
naval engagement in building up _esprit de corps_.
Excellent golf courses and tennis courts lay convenient to both
bases, and many a day the Squadron Commander returned from the
Nigg links with 18 officers crowding the barge. The squadron
surgeon, Dr. Rhoades, secured many recruits for the ancient and
honorable game, with the result that upward of 50 officers out
of 200 entered the tournament played in September.
From the start the good effect on the men was noticeable. A
consistently winning baseball team made that ship’s company
the envy of all others, and fostered a spirit that could not
confine itself to athletics alone but was injected into drills,
mining excursions and all forms of ship’s work. Indeed, it
would not be overshooting the mark to state that the success of
the operation as a whole was due in large part to the spirit
of enthusiasm aroused among the men by organized competitive
athletics.
The men and officers were benefited from a mental and moral,
as well as physical, standpoint. They had something really
interesting to go to see on shore and to talk about on
returning aboard. Their minds were taken absolutely away from
war while the games were in progress, their nerves relaxed
and the tension removed. Their activities were directed into
healthful channels, whereas, thrown upon their own resources,
they might have sought amusement in some harmful form.
Not only did athletics benefit the men, it also played its part
from an international aspect, especially baseball. Essentially
an American sport, it typifies everything American—rapid
thinking, quickness of action, and purely American
individualism, coupled with the keenest alertness in teamwork.
These traits the British admire in the “Yanks.” At any of
our baseball games, hundreds of British soldiers and sailors
could always be seen, wearing broad grins of appreciation and
admiration of the cleverness of their comrades in arms. So much
were they taken up with the sport that on some British ships
they began to organize baseball teams, with the hope in the
near future to compete with their American cousins. And the
small boys in the towns were quick to take up playing ball with
a stick and an old string ball. All this helped in creating a
spirit of coöperation and good feeling between the British and
the Americans, so important to both present and future common
aims.
[Illustration: ARRANGEMENT OF MINE TRACKS, ELEVATORS, AND TURNTABLES, IN
“ROANOKE” CLASS OF MINELAYERS.]
CHAPTER TEN
THE SQUADRON COMPLETE
After a conference with the commanding officers with the various
incidents of the first excursion fresh in mind, revised instructions
applying equally to every excursion were drawn up, to be supplemented by
the particulars for each successive occasion issued at the appropriate
time. The term excursion met with ready adoption, for its cheerful
suggestion of a return—weary no doubt, but content.
A navigation memorandum of the intended courses, speeds, and principal
incidents, for the information of the escort leader and each ship,
accompanied the excursion order. An excellent understanding, as well as
good feeling, grew up between the squadron and its escort. The escort
commander would often dine on board the _San Francisco_ and discuss the
coming excursion and the two bodies soon came to move as one, changing
course, night or day, or changing formation, frequently with only a
whistle blast—a whole excursion sometimes without any tactical signal at
all between the two bodies, except for some unforeseen change of course
or speed.
Preparations had begun at once for the second excursion to continue the
first minefield, but change had become necessary, and a line across Area
C was ordered—not, however, until _Roanoke_ had been loaded with 830
mines of an adjustment not suited to the changed plan, and these remained
on board 33 days, the crew living around, but keeping up cleanliness
and order the same as usual. So long a period fully loaded had not been
contemplated, but it showed one more thing these vessels could do when
well manned and commanded.
As before, assembly was at night 30 June, and Udsire the point of final
departure. The supporting force was the 6th Battle Squadron of five
American battleships under Rear Admiral Hugh Rodman, U.S.N. Needless to
say, every one came on deck to see our handsome battle squadron, as it
filed out past Pentland Skerries and formed line, disappearing to the
southeastward. Twice during the afternoon submarine periscopes were seen
by the battleships and their destroyer screen, which opened fire and
dropped depth bombs, but without known effect.
Considerable current was found near the Norwegian coast, but visibility
was good until we passed to the northward of Udsire; then it became
increasingly hazy. The run of the flagship, guiding, was accurately
determined notwithstanding, by other marks to the northward before they
too became indistinct. At 4.26 a.m., minelaying began—great care taken
not to lay any mines inside Norwegian waters, yet to begin just outside
them. Despite the unexpected strong current at the critical moment, the
first mines were dropped within 250 yards of the intended spot, just
outside the three-mile limit.
Overcast sky prevented obtaining good observations to check the run
during the minelaying, and as there was no check on latitude and the
current was variable, the course was changed slightly for the last third
of the run, to be sure of clearing our first field, towards which we were
heading. This accounts for the bend in that line on the chart. We were
crossing the 150-fathom deep water which skirts the Norway coast, three
large ships, _Canonicus_, _Canandaigua_, and _Housatonic_, led by _San
Francisco_, laying 2200 mines in two rows on a line 46 miles long. In
spite of repeated breaking of the distance-measuring taut wire, the speed
over ground was estimated closely enough to end the line within one-half
mile of the point intended, which was correct within 1 per cent.
There were again no casualties and all the mines were planted. Two ships
planted 710 each in continuous strings, fully establishing the success of
the mining installations. There was no longer any doubt of the ability of
one of these ships to plant her entire load of 860 mines without break.
All vessels returned to base ready for further duty.
The explosions of defective mines on this excursion amounted to between 4
and 5 per cent, and reports received from British trawlers watching the
first minefield indicated that enough more had gone off in that field
since the first day, to bring the total there up to between 5 and 6 per
cent. Despite all remedy, these explosions increased in number up to
the 5th excursion. Then the cause was found to be due not to unskilful,
negligent, or otherwise faulty procedure in either the ships or the
bases, but to lie partly in supersensitiveness in the mines’ adjustment,
partly in imperfection in manufacture—inevitable in such large numbers
made under prevailing industrial conditions, especially of a new design.
On June 29, just before departure on the second excursion, the minelayers
_Shawmut_, Captain W. T. Cluverius, _Aroostook_, Commander J. H. Tomb,
and _Saranac_, Commander Sinclair Gannon, and the repair ship _Black
Hawk_, Captain R. C. Bulmer, had arrived from the United States.
Uncompleted work had not delayed them like the others, but the trial runs
of the _Shawmut_ and _Aroostook_ showed their fuel consumption to be much
larger than had been estimated—no data having been available when their
conversion was planned—making their fuel capacity insufficient for the
passage over. Indefinite delay, until a tanker could accompany them, was
averted by the captains hunting up enough oil hose to fuel the ships at
sea. Their departure on June 16 took place during the German submarines’
activity on the New England coast—not a favorable condition for ships
just out of a navy yard. Twice during the crossing, the _Black Hawk_
took the _Shawmut_ and _Aroostook_ in tow, to give them fuel oil. Though
a new operation to all hands—likewise new ships, new crews, half a gale
of wind, and oil hose twice as heavy as proper—it was done well, without
mishap, and all four arrived at our bases ready for service.
The third excursion could therefore be made by the full squadron of
ten. It was to continue the first minefield, and as some of our mark
buoys were known to have broken adrift—we had passed two on the second
excursion—the flagship’s navigator, Lieut. Commander Cunningham, was sent
out in the squadron tugs _Patuxent_ and _Patapsco_, to verify what might
remain of the buoyfield. Finding half the buoys in place, he planted
two new ones as a precaution. Then he passed along both our minefields,
listening for further explosions, but heard none. The necessary
improvement in the buoy moorings was now made, so effectively that they
could be counted on thereafter. Each ship carried four buoys on her
quarters, ready to drop on the instant. One stroke of an axe, or pull on
a slip would release a buoy and its 1000-lb. sinker together, the mooring
wire cable being so looped up around the buoy as to pay out clear. Thus
the ship had no need to reduce speed nor any fear of getting her screw
foul of the buoy.
Embarking mines for the third excursion had already begun when a message
came that no mines were to be placed west of zero longitude for the
present, a restriction that shortened the intended line by 30 miles,
quite upsetting the embarking arrangements then in progress.
Meantime, the original plan had, in London, undergone considerable
modification as to the constitution of the barrage. Originally of three
systems, each comprising three lines of mines—upper, middle, and lower
levels—the necessity which had developed for wider spacing between
mines, to avoid structural damage to neighboring mines when one was
detonated—300 feet instead of 150, as originally planned—made it seem
desirable to increase the number of lines of mines, so as to maintain
the same density of the mine barrage as a whole. The revision aimed to
increase the risk to surface passage considerably. No effective patrol
being maintained along the barrage, submarines would naturally prefer the
surface. The revised plan, in brief, made 10 upper level rows instead of
3, and 4 middle and 4 lower level, instead of 3 each, or a total of 18
rows instead of 9.
Rather than shorten our line and again employ only part of the squadron,
the Commander of the Mine Force took up the revised scheme at once,
ordering 5400 mines prepared, for a field of 5 parallel lines 54 miles
long. All 10 ships were loaded nearly to full capacity, _Housatonic_
taking 840 mines. Departure was taken at 2 p.m., Sunday 14 July, hauling
down, as we got underway, the dress bunting which had been hoisted in
honor of the French Bastille Day.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
TACTICS
Ten ships laden with high explosive, navigating in mine-swept channels,
in submarine thoroughfares, and near minefields beyond sight of fixed
marks—compactness of the minefield demanding that the layers steam as
near together as safe—necessity for keeping together in fog, darkness, or
submarine attack—these were the conditions governing our tactics.
Thus, the mining excursions were not merely arduous in preparation
and execution. Precision and quickness of action while at sea were
imperative, from start to finish. To foster these, a steady tension
was kept up throughout the squadron, a tension which likewise helped
the individual ships to maintain a careful habit among the men,
without making them jumpy or fearful. To sustain attention and prevent
over-confidence growing with familiarity, unremitting pains were
exercised to note and correct any irregularity or apparent slackness—not
to find fault but to keep things taut everywhere. Only in this way could
compliance with all details be insured—so very important in our work.
From assembly at the buoy until the return to it after the excursion,
the _San Francisco_, leading the squadron, would maintain a steady
pace, sometimes increasing to make up for adverse current, but rarely
slackening speed for anything. The squadron’s position was frequently
compared with the time schedule, and no effort was spared to carry
through the excursion with precision. There was time enough, we had speed
enough, but none too much of either, and the whole body felt a constant
urge towards a direct and clean-cut movement out to the field, over it,
and back to the base.
Stretched in two mile-long columns while in mine-searched waters, which
were comparatively narrow, the formation would widen and shorten upon
reaching the 50-fathom line, so as to diminish the depth of the target
offered to a submarine. Approaching the mine start point, the vessels
would take the relative positions which they would occupy when the
mining was begun—not too soon, because such a formation was unwieldy,
and if maneuvering into position involved much turning, the formation
would become disordered. The 10 vessels were of 5 different types, with
different handling qualities and having very small speed reserve with
which to regain lost position. On the other hand, the change had to be
made early enough for all vessels to get settled in station, at standard
speed, before the minelaying began.
As the planting progressed, we had to make use of large, lighted,
navigation buoys, planted in the open sea, obviously for our use.
The British had warned us, from their own experience, of the enemy’s
habit of moving all such buoys whenever seen, or planting mines near
them—sometimes doing both. Working far away from the nearest landmark, we
would pass close to these buoys in order to determine the position of the
mine start point accurately. Against enemy mines which might be around
the buoys, our paravanes were counted upon for protection, but here came
in a complication. While paravanes would protect against ordinary mines,
they actually increased the risk from any of our own mines which they
might touch. To keep the paravanes out until after clearing the buoy,
then take them in before approaching one of our fields, would have been
simple enough, but for the necessity of maintaining steady speed and
course from the buoy to the mining start point, which precluded slowing
down to take the paravanes in. Since the risk could be measured from our
own mines but not from the enemy’s, the paravanes were always kept in use.
Pressure of time and division of the ships between two bases while in
port limited the tactical training of the squadron to what could be done
while crossing the Atlantic and while going to and from the minefields.
The special equipment to facilitate accurate station keeping which is
usually found in men-of-war was lacking in these ex-merchant vessels.
They had comparatively small rudders, and the nice regulation of steam to
the engines, necessary for steady steaming in company, was very difficult
with their deficient means for that purpose. Moreover, on the first
excursion by the complete squadron of 10 vessels, 4 of them took part for
the first time. The excellent performance of the squadron as a whole was
all the more remarkable.
Passing through the mark buoys, which the sloop H.M.S. _Laburnum_ pointed
out, the squadron, formed in three lines abreast, stood on beyond,
to allow distance in which to steady down on the reverse course, then
turned ships 90 degrees right together, by divisions in succession. This
evolution formed the squadron in a single column which steered about
SSW, until within two miles of the previous minefield. Two of the 10
vessels were on the right flank, so that a second, simultaneous turn,
ships right, brought the squadron into the planting formation, consisting
of a line of 8 ships abreast, stretching a mile and three-quarters, the
remaining two in an advance line, 500 yards ahead, with three miles still
to go, allowing 15 minutes time in which to settle down, before the order
to begin planting. The execution of the operation was seamanlike to a
degree, and the alignment, distance keeping, and handling of the vessels,
in approaching and on the planting line, were excellent throughout.
[Illustration: THE SQUADRON IN MINELAYING FORMATION.
Two Ships of British Minelaying Squadron in the Left Background.]
It would have widened the field unnecessarily to dispose all 10 ships
abreast. The advanced ships would ease back into the main line as soon
as two of the 8 ships directly astern had finished their minelaying and
speeded ahead, leaving vacancies. Ample time was allowed to do this
slowly, before their time came to plant, so as to avoid the extra demand
on their engines which might be caused by dropping back too fast. The
ships were neither new nor decrepit, but there was no excuse for taking
unnecessary chances of spoiling a good performance by the squadron as a
whole. Steady steaming and steering were important for safety—as well as
for regularity of the mine-spacing. God help a ship whose engine broke
down or rudder jammed during the minelaying! With a strong head wind, she
would drift into the minefield, before even a destroyer could tow her
clear. It was partly for such an emergency that the sweepers originally
included with our force were wanted—powerful, handy, seagoing tugs, able
to assist in any circumstances. The tugs that we had were not fast enough
to keep up with the squadron. Fortunately, engine or steering disablement
never occurred during planting, but two did occur just afterward, and
once, in Fair Island Channel, on the way to plant, a ship had to stop for
a disabled feed pump. It was 11 o’clock at night, pitch dark, with the
tide turning strong towards the 9th minefield, and in the submarines’
thoroughfare. As I slowed the squadron and waited for report of the
probable length of delay, I felt what a reliance a good tender would have
been!
The support force on the third excursion, the 4th Battle Squadron, came
close enough to observe the minelaying, steaming along parallel, four
miles distant, for an hour. Its commander, in H.M.S. _Hercules_, was
Vice Admiral Sir Montague E. Browning, who, with the French Rear Admiral
Grasset, had come from Bermuda in the earliest days of our entering the
war, to attend the first conference on our naval participation, and as
their flagships, H.M.S. _Leviathan_ and the _Jeanne d’Arc_, stood in to
Hampton Roads, the _San Francisco_ had been the vessel to salute their
flags. Now, in the same ship, it was a pleasure to lead a large, new mine
squadron, performing so creditably before such an observer, the more
so as Admiral Browning had sent a special message of welcome upon our
arrival from America.
After this excursion was over and all the reports were in from the
several ships, showing that all mines had been planted, with no mishaps
of any kind, and that the vessels were ready to undertake another
excursion, the following signal was sent:
The squadron commander extends sincere congratulations upon the
completion of to-day’s mining operation by the whole squadron.
It was a handsome performance that would have done credit to
a squadron of long experience. The squadron commander, the
captains, the officers, and every man may rightly feel deep
pride in having earned a success worthy of our navy’s best
traditions. 7.45 p.m., 15 July, 1918.
CHAPTER TWELVE
SOME INCIDENTS
By consensus of opinion, the limit of safe approach to a minefield in
the open sea was five miles. Where appreciable current exists, a heavy
sea may cause mines to step along, or “migrate”—there is no telling
how far—and the danger from mines adrift is naturally greater near a
minefield than elsewhere. Mines are designed to become safe on breaking
adrift and many of them are, but far from all. Submergence in salt water
may derange the mechanism for that safety purpose. There was very little
current across Area A, however, and the fine tactical qualities shown
by the squadron lent confidence that it could be safely conducted much
nearer to our minefields than five miles. Since the barrage plan had been
revised, this closer approach had become necessary, if we were to get
the whole barrage in between the southernmost line, already laid, and
the northern limit, which had been publicly proclaimed. There was some
aversion to proclaiming a new limit and we had no mind to say it was
necessary. So, instead of lapping the ends of adjacent minefields, the
practice was adopted of “butting” the new field close to the end of its
neighbor, thus continuing the same line with only a small gap between
adjacent ends.
Our first news of damage inflicted on the enemy came in mid-July, soon
after the second excursion, though the barrier was then hardly more than
begun. The information was authentic but not very circumstantial—the
standing policy was against that. Four submarines were mentioned. One of
them lost nearly all her fuel and called by wireless for help, so loudly
that it was overheard and a British force was sent out to capture or
destroy her—but too late. Another German submarine had come to her aid,
and the two got safely back. Further details are lacking.
The third excursion, together with the British minefields in Area C,
completed the equivalent of one system, extending from the Norway coast
as far west as 0 degrees longitude. The prohibition against laying any
mines farther westward than that was still in force—although the enemy
submarines had changed their route so as to pass clear to the westward
of the partial barrier. So our fourth excursion began a second “system,”
parallel to and five miles distant from the first.
Leaving the bases during the night of 28 July, and taking final departure
from Buoy No. 2, which marked the north end of the division between
Areas A and C, we ran south, clearing the ends of three British deep
minefields by three miles—quite safe to do if they were all in their
intended places. Then, by an “isodromic” maneuver—not easy and little
favored, on account of the precision that is requisite, but necessary on
this occasion—our three columns, with _San Francisco_ making a fourth on
the left, formed a single line to the right, of eight ships, with two
more in an advanced line, all steering about WSW. Being on the outside
of the turn, the old _San Francisco_ had to spring from 12 to 16½ knots
within a few minutes, to gain her station on the southern flank in time,
but no parade ground evolution could have been done more smoothly, and
the quickness with which all ships steadied into accurate distance and
bearing showed that, in future, the steadying interval could be safely
reduced. Originally a half hour, it was cut down to 75 seconds.
Commander Moir, a new escort leader, in H.M.S. _Valhalla_, smiled
slightly as he read over the mining order for the first time and I asked
whether it were about this isodromic movement. He replied, No; he was
wondering how they could execute one of the intermediate changes which
the order prescribed to be made en route, to sort the ships out from the
assembling order to the arrangement which they would be in preparatory to
swinging into minelaying formation. It did look mixed at first glance,
there was no denying, but I said, “Watch them do it, the Rules of the
Road will govern”—and when the time came, I felt quite willing for any
one to be a witness.
[Illustration: APPROACHING AND LAYING THE FOURTH MINE FIELD.
Excursion 4: Formations Before, During, and After Planting.]
At the end of a minefield, the wing and the center ships simultaneously
would drop mark buoys, 250 yards from the last mines, and again one mile
farther on, making in all six buoys in two lines. When we came back after
10 days or so, to continue that field, a destroyer would go well ahead,
to sight and stand by the outermost buoy, and the flagship would lead for
it, but not steer towards the minefield side of it until the inner line
of buoys had been sighted—those which were only 250 yards from the mines.
The outer buoys were regarded with suspicion until some of the inner ones
were seen to be in place. It was then deemed safe to lead between the two
lines of buoys, for as long as there were any between the ships and the
minefield, ships would be at least 250 yards clear. Passing in column
midway between the lines of buoys to make the start, and allowing for the
simultaneous turn into line abreast, the squadron could begin mining by
the time the outer buoys were passed, thus leaving a gap of but little
more than a mile between the mines in the old field and those in its
continuation.
An early care while fitting out had been to organize and train a good
lookout service. This duty is a severe tax on the men, and when, time
after time, they see nothing suspicious, they tend to relax. Fearing
this, as we had yet seen no submarines, barring an alarm on the first
excursion, a special warning to lookouts was issued, which, fortunately
was well supported on our next trip. A beautiful, peaceful evening off
the Orkneys was rudely interrupted by messages from three different
sources within the space of a minute, reporting a submarine estimated to
be a half-hour ahead of us, outbound, making for Fair Island Channel.
Taking no chances on its having innocent intentions towards us, Captain
Godfrey turned his flank destroyers outward and bang! bang! went four
depth charges, and four more on the other side—just to let the sub know
he might except a hearty reception. The _Aroostook’s_ siren then shrieked
for “torpedo to starboard!” the ship charging ahead across another’s
bows, and the _Housatonic’s_ steering chain took that occasion to break.
Serenity was gone, for a time at least, but being in a swept channel,
there was small choice for maneuvering. All we could do was to shorten
up our formation before dark shut in and trust to our escort and a good
lookout.
In the event of a submarine appearing, our rôle was to make off, leaving
the attack to the destroyers and being careful not to harm them by
our own fire. The escort was prepared to engage its own kind, as well
as submarines, and even to make a sacrifice attack on light cruisers,
to assist our escape under cover of a smoke screen, but our moderate
speed—15 knots at best when keeping together—and the small number and
caliber of our guns, made us rather helpless against an enemy cruiser’s
long-range, 6-inch gunfire and high speed.
Upon returning from an Allied conference in Malta on mining the
Mediterranean, Rear Admiral Strauss came out with the squadron, on the
seventh excursion, 26 August, hoisting his flag in the _San Francisco_.
This was the first time our program was interfered with by fog, which
shut in thick soon after assembly. Incidentally, our tug _Patuxent_,
going out ahead with her sister _Patapsco_ to observe, found herself in
the midst of a large convoy from Norway that night and had a collision,
which fortunately was not serious to either vessel.
After four hours’ delay by fog, we made our departure buoy and steered
for the end of the 5th minefield, 13 miles distant. Fog shut in again
when we were half way, but fortunately lifted just before we should have
had to turn back, and minelaying began, although the weather was still
far from settled. Twice during the schedule, dense fog enveloped us, but
the planting went on without interruption. It was rather ghostly to hear
and feel the explosions of the defective mines, yet see nothing—not even
the neighboring ship. Several times Admiral Strauss expressed admiration
for the steady alignment of the formation, and upon leaving the _San
Francisco_ when we had returned to port, he signalled, “The Commander
Mine Force congratulates Mine Squadron One on the seamanlike manner in
which the seventh excursion was accomplished by all ships.”
On this occasion, for the first and only time, one ship had to drop out
from an excursion, the _Saranac_ having a smash inside the cylinder of
her main circulating pump shortly after the squadron had assembled.
Temporary repairs being impossible soon enough, she returned to base.
The absence of her 580 mines left the 7th minefield incomplete, and to
make good the defect a special excursion was ordered for the _Shawmut_,
Captain Cluverius, and _Aroostook_, Captain Tomb, the two fast minelayers.
Met off Cromarty buoy at 6 a.m., 31 August, by Commander Lowry in H.M.S.
_Wrestler_, with three other destroyers, the detachment proceeded,
first at 15 then at 17 knots, by the usual route to the end buoys of
the seventh field, then close along the northern side of the field. The
_Baltimore_ had been on that flank, and after planting all her mines had
dropped a buoy and again, at about 9-mile intervals, two other buoys,
while steaming 500 yards abeam of the nearest planting vessel. A fresh
breeze was now blowing, making the buoys none too easy to pick up. Fog
had prevailed while the _Baltimore_ was dropping the buoys, making
uncertainty as to their position and also as to whether they were there
at all. Accordingly, the detachment first ran parallel to the minefield,
from 1000 to 2000 yards outside the line of buoys, so as to sight them
all; then it turned back and began planting, _Shawmut_ first. The mines
were laid in one line averaging 600 yards outside the line of buoys, or
about 1100 yards from the nearest line of mines, thus completing the
original field neatly without wasting space. The mining installations
of these fast ships worked as well at 17 knots as they had at 12, and
altogether the excursion gave the two a good try out. They were back
in their berths 26 hours after leaving them, in ample time to embark
their mines for the squadron’s next excursion, and with a record to
their credit for laying 580 mines on the closest parallel to a deep-sea
minefield that had ever been run.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
SIGNALS
Signals had come well to the front in the course of the first excursions,
not only for tactics but also for assembling data quickly, so that a
fairly comprehensive report of the excursion might go to headquarters by
the first boat to shore after arrival. Spelling out messages by Morse or
semaphore proved too slow and inaccurate for reports from nine ships in
one afternoon, often in hazy weather, so a collection of phrases, and
questions to be answered by reference number, was established, to be
signaled by hoists of flags.
As we had expected to use the British signal system, a special training
class was formed at Newport in January, while the minelayers were fitting
out. In consequence, from first falling in with British destroyers, the
_San Francisco_ communicated easily, and British flags could be used on
the first excursion. But neither the British system nor our own was found
to suit our needs, and to combine British flags with American meanings
made a risk of misinterpretation at a critical time. So the American
flags were restored to use and the British ones discontinued, except
a few retained by each ship for calls and other routine uses, while
the flagship kept a full set, for communicating with the escort by the
British code. A new system, embodying several of the British features,
was devised, mainly by Lieut. Commander E. S. R. Brandt, then flag
lieutenant, and was put into effect on the second excursion. The main
feature was that the meaning of tactical signals—those which required
immediate action, affecting the ships’ movements—was self-evident to
anyone who knew the names of the flags.
Flags and associations already familiar having been utilized, the
signalmen quickly learned. Separation among three anchorages prevented
signal practice by the squadron as a whole in port, but drills several
times daily at each anchorage and on the way out to the mining ground
enabled the new code to be used on the full squadron’s first trip. Great
interest was evident among the signal forces of all ships. Signals were
habitually hoisted only just long enough, as determined by experience,
for the average vessel to repeat the hoist. Competition became keen
not to be the cause of delay, and very soon the signaling attained
an accuracy, rapidity, and style comparing favorably with the best
performance of any type of vessel. Once or twice the _Quinnebaug_—whose
mast was not high—beat the flagship in getting her own signal up to the
yardarm. Less than a minute by day, and often only 30 seconds, would
suffice between giving an order for a tactical signal and beginning its
execution by the squadron—without a glance at a key book or card at
either end. Most efficient telephone service would hardly equal that.
The _Vampire_ soon picked up our new system, so that signals to her
could frequently be dispensed with. Upon one of ours going up, the
corresponding British signal on _Vampire_ would be seen in a few moments.
Accuracy of transmission and of record being very important where so
much was done by signal, these were stimulated by daily comparison of
the signal records of all ships. A “discrepancy” sheet was compiled, to
show the errors and omissions of each ship for the previous day, and
directly after each excursion, the signal officers would meet, to compare
the signal records of the trip. A further check was kept by a staff
officer being constantly on watch on board the _San Francisco_ when at
sea, taking notes upon incidents and errors in signals, station-keeping,
and the behavior of ships. The Recording Angel could not have been
more observant. I would edit the rough record at the end of a watch,
references to the pertinent instructions were entered, and a smooth
“Discrepancy Report” was sent to all ships at the end of the excursion,
as a reminder of their sins.
Had the signal officers been regulars and but one system of signals
been in use from the beginning, the high standard maintained would have
been commendable. The attainment of such a standard by inexperienced
personnel, adopting a new system on very short notice, was highly
creditable to all concerned. Especially should there be mention of Chief
Quartermaster William H. Kerins, of the _San Francisco_, and the other
chiefs, whose training and management of their signalmen and whose own
skill and fidelity made our quick and accurate communication possible.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
THE BARRIER ACROSS
The barrage began to show results early in July, after our second
excursion, although not yet half across. The enemy submarines changed
their route then, so as to go through Fair Island Channel, south instead
of north of the Shetlands. Thus they would pass west of the partial
barrage, through the 60-mile wide passage still open. The fact of Area A
having been proclaimed gave ample warning, and even the enemy could not
complain of being ambushed, if he sustained damage there. Advertising a
minefield two months in advance was certainly fair play. But now came the
mining of Area B, which would carry the barrier clear across the last
45 miles of the 230-mile stretch. This was not published, but the enemy
might have assumed that it would be done sooner or later.
A joint excursion by the two squadrons was arranged, Rear Admiral Strauss
commanding the whole, flying his flag on board _San Francisco_ again. The
squadrons joined off the middle Orkneys the morning of 7 September, and
began the minelaying a few miles to the northward, starting from a buoy
placed by H.M.S. _Laburnum_ and removed by her after we had passed. As
we were directly in the submarines’ thoroughfare, special patrols were
provided, surface and air, in Fair Island Channel and also well to the
southward of us. The American squadron planted six upper level lines, the
British squadron planted one similar line, after the completion of which
it separated to the southward, returning to its base at Grangemouth,
Firth of Forth. On the way, one of them had a collision in the fog with a
destroyer of its escort, which later sank in consequence.
Our squadron turned north at the end of our minefield, ran taut wire to
Buoy No. 5, thence paralleled the minefield at five miles distance for
observation of defective mine explosions, steering west to the Orkneys
and returning to the base on the reverse of the outbound courses. Fog
came on soon after mining was finished, continuing intermittently until
we made port. For this reason, _San Francisco_ did not cut her taut wire
at Buoy 5 but kept it running until the squadron slowed to take in
paravanes, near Cromarty—122 miles of wire run out, without a break.
The succeeding excursion was similar, with Rear Admiral L. Clinton-Baker,
R.N., in H.M.S. _Princess Margaret_, in command of the whole force, Rear
Admiral Strauss again on board _San Francisco_. On the way out, it was
not permitted to pass between the Orkneys and the western end of the
minefield planted just previously, but instead, the squadrons were routed
NW’ly, through Stronsay and Westray Firths, in the Orkneys, thence E’ly
through Fair Island Channel, and down to within five miles north of the
other minefield.
While standing through Stronsay Firth in a long, single column, the
British squadron, which was in the lead, opened fire on its starboard
quarter, its escorting destroyers gathering to drop bombs about a certain
spot. Upon signal from the _Princess Margaret_, the starboard wing
destroyers of our escort speeded ahead to join the attack, but the port
wing destroyers remained on station, although the leading squadron’s
destroyers had left theirs. In a few moments, a submarine broached about
1500 yards, two points on _San Francisco’s_ starboard bow, heading
across to port, through the column, between the two squadrons. Some
destroyers followed and continued bombing. Smoke screens were laid by
our escort (_Vampire_, Captain Godfrey, and 11 others of 14th Flotilla)
and by our own ships, which thus had a good test for their smoke
outfits. _Roanoke_ chanced to have a steering engine disablement just at
this moment, causing her to sheer out and shift to hand gear, and the
_Housatonic_ also had some steering trouble, but there was no mishap,
and the submarine also for the time escaped. By good luck, an official
photographer happened to be on board _San Francisco_, and he got some
pictures of genuine activity.
A delay at the morning rendezvous, the long distance round about, and
adverse current combined to make a late mining start. While the mining
was in progress, the bodies of two German sailors were passed, and a
heavy explosion was observed in the eighth minefield, five miles distant,
in a position that plotted in the same place a submarine would be which
had been reported shortly before.
Darkness shut in about an hour before planting was completed but it
caused no suspension nor interference. At the end of the field, buoys
were dropped as usual, and all ships together turned left, without
signal but on orders given before dark, to the course north, then formed
in two columns for the run home. The British and American squadrons had
now separated and they passed back through Westray Firth in succession
after daylight next morning. Off Pentland Skerries a suspicious craft
ahead caused another submarine alarm, and the escort again enveloped the
squadron in a smoke screen, but the alarm proved false.
This time, the 10 American vessels had planted six lines, two at each of
the usual levels, 46 miles long, 5520 mines in all, the maximum of any
excursion; the 4 British vessels planted one line at deep level, 1300
mines, 32 miles long, making altogether 6820 mines on the excursion, the
largest single minefield ever planted—done in 3 hours and 50 minutes.
Upon returning to the bases, Admiral Strauss signaled “The Commander Mine
Force congratulates the squadron on this biggest and most successful
excursion.”
CHAPTER FIFTEEN
FINISHING THE BARRIER
The conference at Malta at which Rear Admiral Strauss was the American
representative recommended extensive mine barrages in the Mediterranean,
in locations where the depths of water were much greater than any yet
mined, involving winter operations for us. As a first step, Captain
Murfin was sent down to Bizerta, near Tunis, to establish a base there,
like his two in Scotland—though under much less favorable conditions.
Considerable experimenting at home was likewise involved, to develop a
suitable extra-deep mine and its moorings. Experienced personnel being
needed for this, orders came placing the _Baltimore_ at disposition of
our Naval Bureau of Ordnance for the purpose. Accordingly, on the tenth
excursion, 26 September, she parted company off Scapa Flow, sailing
thence two days later for home. In the nine other ships, 97 per cent
of the mine capacity remained, but as an experienced vessel of regular
man-of-war type, the _Baltimore’s_ value in the squadron had far exceeded
her proportionate capacity.
The minelaying squadrons were now doubling and trebling the barrage,
which had been carried clear across the North Sea on the eighth
excursion, 7 September. Hitherto we had been favored by good weather, but
the season of frequent storms was approaching and already the lengthening
hours of darkness made a considerable difference.
Our one loss of life at sea occurred just as the _Baltimore_ left us. The
_Saranac’s_ port paravane was running badly and, in clearing it, George
C. Anderson, chief boatswain’s mate, stepped out on the davit—a sudden
jerk! and he was gone. Although search was made, he was never seen again.
He had been an energetic yet safe leader, never allowing another man to
go overside without a bowline around him, but of himself had been less
careful.
An almost unbroken record of ten excursions carried through without
breakdown or delay made such a performance now seem a matter of course.
The artificer personnel of all ships made a fine showing in upkeep and
in steady steaming at sea, notwithstanding that overhaul time was very
limited. On returning to port, the squadron would prepare immediately
for another excursion and would then wait from day to day for the
escort, under notice too short for the extensive overhaul desirable.
As the operation progressed, making more wear and tear, the intervals
between excursions became shorter and bad weather frequently necessitated
keeping steam ready, in case the anchors dragged, as often they did, all
which reduced the repair time. Unfinished details of conversion, hard
usage in former hands, absence of spare feed pumps and similar secondary
dependencies, and a large amount of auxiliary machinery for the vessels’
size,—all these were work-making factors. Yet, except for wear, the
general condition of all machinery steadily improved.
A large amount of self-repair was done, the _Roanoke_ being almost wholly
self-sustaining, resorting very little even to our own repair ship
_Black Hawk_. The _San Francisco’s_ carpenter gang built an excellent
emergency cabin under the bridge in about 10 days. Then the _Shawmut_ and
_Aroostook_ by themselves increased their oil fuel capacity by 50 per
cent, which later enabled them to make the run homeward unassisted and
unescorted.
Procedure in conducting the squadron aimed at steadiness in steaming
and steering. No unnecessary chances were taken, but neither was the
treatment tender. The ships always worked near their speed limit, with
only the reserve needed for tactical reasons. Their good performance
was due to careful, intelligent foresight, and the rarity of even minor
disablements is proof of noteworthy ability and fidelity on the part of
the engine and fireroom personnel. No ship was ever late, no minelaying
operation ever interrupted, only one hot bearing occurred, only once did
a ship’s engine have to stop—for but a few minutes—in 8400 miles steaming.
As for steady station-keeping, some ships, notably _Canandaigua_, were
always there—hour after hour, night and day—and the others were seldom
out. Approaching and during the minelaying, they were very accurate.
As one visiting officer from the fleet said, “You’ve got it on the
battleships,” and it was officially reported by Admiral Mayo that
The minelayers, though of diverse types, maneuvered well
together and kept station very well indeed; they appeared to be
under excellent control, both individually and as units, at all
times. The laying operation which was witnessed was carried out
according to plan without hitch of any kind, thus indicating
the efficacy of the preparation, including planning, and the
thorough understanding of the work by all concerned.
Much official interest was taken in our operation and brief visits to the
bases and the ships were made during the summer by Vice Admiral Sims,
Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, the British First Sea Lord, Vice Admiral
Ommaney of the Admiralty, Rear Admiral Clinton-Baker, R.N., the House
of Representatives’ Naval Committee, and Assistant Secretary Franklin
D. Roosevelt. Several of our naval officers went out on excursions, and
Lieut. Commander DeSalis, R.N., always a welcome, enthusiastic supporter,
went on several of them. They all admired the orderly, complete, and
ample arrangements of the mine assembling bases and were especially
complimentary about the new minelayers.
Officers and men felt intense pride in their ships, and spared no effort
to keep them in regular man-of-war condition. The ten made a handsome
squadron, and in capacity for carrying mines, in equipment for handling
and planting them continuously, and general arrangement and quality, the
new American minelayers were admittedly superior to any others.
Their capacity and performance was the subject of much favorable comment
and careful study by the British Admiralty. Besides large mine capacity,
their mine elevators were a striking feature. The very first thing
considered in the plans had been how to get the lower deck mines up to
the launching deck, so that a ship’s entire load might be planted in
one unbroken string. The Otis Elevator Company’s representatives had
been called in at the outset and, after several alternatives had been
examined, their standard platform type was decided upon, each elevator
lifting two mines every 20 seconds. Six elevators in the four largest
ships, four in two others, were in use 9 months in all kinds of weather
at sea. Only one of the 32 elevators ever failed, and that one just once!
The British minelayers had had trouble from the mine tracks opening and
closing with the working of the ship in a seaway. In ours, the tracks
were secured to steel crossties mounted on wooden bolsters, the strength
and stiffness of the tie, with the elasticity of the bolster, keeping
the rails true to gauge, notwithstanding they were lighter rails than
the British used. Special interest was taken also in the simple, light
switches used in our ships’ mine tracks. Some of the Admiralty officials
were hard to convince that these switches actually worked, even when
operated before their eyes.
While the ships were embarking mines and coaling for the twelfth
excursion, Admiral H. T. Mayo, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet,
accompanied by Captain O. P. Jackson, his Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral
Strauss, and Captain N. C. Twining, Chief of Staff to Vice Admiral Sims,
made an informal ship inspection, after which Rear Admiral Strauss
published the following:
8 October, 1918.
Admiral Mayo, commander-in-chief, left the headquarters of the
mine force yesterday evening for the south.
He expressed himself as highly pleased with the zeal, loyal
coöperation and efficiency of the mine force both ashore and
afloat and congratulated us on the work we have accomplished.
The commander of the mine force is unable to give any data as
to the number of enemy submarines that have been destroyed as a
result of our efforts, but it is practically certain that the
toll is considerable.
The commander-in-chief emphasized the part that the mine force
is taking against the enemy as a distinct military offensive,
thoroughly known and appreciated at home.
Admiral Mayo found things in their normal condition, with no preparation
made for him, as some ships were coaling, others embarking mines. He was
evidently pleased with all that he saw, and he remarked how fortunate it
was that we had been training in that kind of work, in the old, small
mine force, for two years past.
Bad weather during some part of an excursion became now the rule. Coming
through a narrow passage in Westray Firth one morning, strong tide
against a strong wind made an ugly cross sea, knocking us down to eight
knots. One destroyer broached to, and for a few moments lay between our
columns, wallowing heavily, as if the next roll would surely take her
under.
Shortly afterwards, one arm of the _Quinnebaug’s_ rudder quadrant broke,
and the other arm bent almost to the point of fracture. Had it too gone,
she could not have escaped wreck on the rocky channel side. Fortunately
she was able to gain partial shelter; in two hours she made repairs and,
taking after the rest at top speed, she arrived at Invergordon only
45 minutes behind them. As a coastwise merchant liner, she was often
behind time, but in naval hands she developed speed to spare, frequently
maintaining on natural draft 10 per cent more than her former best speed
under forced draft.
Passing mines adrift was a frequent occurrence. Occasionally we would
have to turn out for them. If of the moored type originally, broken away
from their anchors, they should be safe when drifting. But of course
safety devices, like all others, not infrequently fail to function,
especially after immersion in sea water. We let the mines alone, but
occasionally an escort destroyer would fire a few rounds, to sink them.
A German floating mine, upon one occasion, was sighted nearly ahead by
the _Quinnebaug_, at a moment when her port paravane, running foul,
had been hauled in, to clear it. Thrown overboard bodily, the paravane
fell on its back, and fortunately righting itself, came in contact with
the floating mine, which apparently had a mooring line attached to it,
and towed it along with the ship for probably 30 seconds—when the mine
detached itself and floated astern. While this was going on on deck, a
fire broke out below, in the midst of the mines on the stowage deck.
The ship’s cooks, who were in the galley at work, with the greatest
promptness seized hand fire extinguishers, climbed over between the mines
and extinguished the flames. The _Quinnebaug_ started planting within two
minutes after this danger was averted.
How such a fire would have spread in one of these ships, so full of
woodwork, was shown on board the sister ship, _Saranac_, after our
return, in January, 1919, at Hampton Roads. The very night after
discharging her mines a fire broke out, spreading with such rapidity that
the sleeping officers had to escape in their night clothes, losing all
their effects, and the men in the engine room were barely able to attend
the pumps without suffocation.
The longest single minefield on record was the twelfth, laid on 13
October,—first an 8½ mile stretch 5 lines wide, then 65 miles 3 lines
wide, 73½ miles in all. It was begun at 7.33 a.m. and finished at 2.52,
over 7 hours. In the latter part, we ran closer than usual to the
adjacent field, to keep inside the proclaimed barrage limits. That night,
steaming at easy speed so as not to make the entrance to Westray Firth
before daylight, radio orders were received from the Commander-in-Chief,
Grand Fleet, about 11 o’clock, to proceed with despatch into Westray
Firth. Other messages were intercepted, indicating that enemy vessels
were out, and as we passed Pentland Skerries next forenoon an unusually
large number of British destroyers and sweepers and an observation
balloon were searching that vicinity for mines and submarines. Quiet was
returning, after a night of greater activity than for a long time.
CHAPTER SIXTEEN
THE THIRTEENTH EXCURSION
The thirteenth minefield was to be partly in Area A, extending from its
southeast corner across Area C towards Udsire Island, ending at a point
three miles short of a minefield which the Norwegians had planted around
Udsire. All mines were of the upper level, and, as the depth varied from
70 to 150 fathoms, three kinds of anchors were used, which necessitated
special care as to the order in which mines were stowed in the ships.
The purpose of this field was to close the gap between the British and
American minefields in Area C, and the American minefields in Area A, and
also to increase the surface obstruction across Area C by two more lines
of upper level mines.
No duty could surpass this series of mining excursions for interest
sustained to the end. The few events and noteworthy features so far
mentioned may perhaps seem to conflict with this statement, but the
smoothness of operation constantly striven for tended to eliminate
interior incidents, and no mere description can ever impart an adequate
impression of our experiences. Keen anticipation, attention ever alert,
and a sense of adventure were fresh on each occasion. There was sameness
enough in the occupations while in port—coaling, cleaning, embarking
mines, and liberty in small towns, but life underway meant something
doing all the time which every one felt worth while. Until back at the
buoy again, inward bound, it was all activity, the hours often crowded,
the whole period sleepless for those in command, never dull for any one.
Only as the anchors went down and the tension relaxed could one realize
how fast we were living. To quote a _Saranac_ poet—
“They gave us a job we had to do,
A little bit risky—yes—that’s true;
A good deal like work, both night and day
But a darn good game for a man to play.”
From the earliest discussion of the Northern Barrage project, one of
its probable developments was, by general acceptance, to draw out the
German fleet, and that ever present possibility gave an added spice to
the work. Someone characterized our operations as “An important military
offensive with a front seat at the second battle of Jutland,” and at the
time of the thirteenth excursion it seemed as if the mine squadron might
indeed be the bait. Due to the prospect of the German fleet coming out,
the squadron was ready a full week before Admiral Beatty could spare a
destroyer escort for us.
The _San Francisco_ and six other planters made this excursion, the
_Roanoke_ and _Canandaigua_ being omitted. They had been docking at
Newcastle-on-Tyne when the mine embarking was done, and although they
returned in time to have joined without altering the loading of the other
ships, other considerations, external to our Force, determined that they
should not go. With _Vampire_, Captain Godfrey, as escort leader for the
tenth time, departure was made from Cromarty buoy at 1.30 p.m., Thursday,
24 October. An earlier departure had been first ordered, but a message
from the Grand Fleet held us back a few hours.
A storm warning was out as we sailed, and that night the storm overtook
us, continuing with varying intensity all the next day and night. Friday
forenoon, H.M.S. _Primrose_ pointed out and verified Buoy No. 3, and a
lull in the storm gave hope that the mining might be carried out that
day; but the wind freshened again before the starting point was reached.
The ships rolled deeply with their heavy loads, from 27 to 32 degrees
each way, but suffered no damage, and the mine installations stood the
severe test very well. Through Friday night the squadron cruised back and
forth 15 miles either side of the buoy, as far as adjacent minefields
would permit. We could not afford to go far away from the buoy, as the
time within which we must complete the task was limited and was now
scant. After the first turn about, the destroyers disappeared in the
darkness, and it was a relief to feel that at least they were clear
of possible collision. We needed no screen in such weather and could
dispense with them for the night. In the morning they were back again,
the weather moderated, _Vampire_ pointed out the buoy, and we could
proceed.
Mining began at 1.27 p.m. and continued according to schedule until
two hours after sunset. The sea and swell had died out so quickly that
conditions were very good for mining. All went smoothly; 3760 mines were
planted, the last 37 miles being over water up to 150 fathoms deep. As
the first four vessels completed their strings, they were ordered to
cross ahead of the remaining planting vessels and take station on the
southern wing, off _San Francisco’s_ starboard quarter, where they would
be clear of the British minefield which lay just to the north of us.
Three destroyers with high-speed minesweeps out preceded the line of
planting vessels until an hour after dark, 5.30 p.m. They then joined
the other destroyers to starboard and southward of us. In darkness, and
in silence except for the mine detonations astern from time to time, the
_San Francisco_, _Canonicus_, and _Housatonic_, in line abreast, stood
on a half-hour longer, to the end of the mining track, with no vessels
to sweep or to screen ahead as we drew near the coast. The coastal
mountains of Norway and a searchlight playing on the clouds were sighted
at considerable distance, but not distinctly enough at any time to make
an identified bearing. Udsire Island was dimly sighted in the direction
expected, but it was too dark to obtain a definite fix, as its light was
not burning. On our left was a field of British mines, eight miles away
by the chart, but of uncertain distance in fact, since storms and the
coastal current might have moved some of the mines in the ten weeks since
they were planted, or broken some adrift. The ships kept on to within
three miles, by the chart, of the Norwegian minefield ahead—presumably
in place and the mines presumably safe if broken adrift. One lacks,
however, the same confidence in other people’s mines and minefields as in
one’s own, and more than the usual relief was felt when our schedule was
finished.
Then, promptly, all ships and destroyers turned right 90 degrees, again
turning right, five minutes later, 70 degrees more, to course W. by S.
The squadron then formed in two columns and, when seven miles clear of
the minefield, ran parallel to it on the reverse of the mining course,
for observation. A curious effect was experienced here, the first
occasion where we were heading generally toward a freshly laid field,
instead of directly away. The vessel’s movement through the water towards
the mines enhanced the sharpness of shock from the exploding defective
ones—to such an extent that both officers and men came on the bridge in
real concern, reporting that we must have struck something.
It was noteworthy during this thirteenth excursion that the management
of the ships, always good before, continued so, in spite of the heavy
weather. About 9.00 p.m. following a hard squall which came in the midst
of a turn, causing the ships to get considerably out of station, three
successive 90-degree turns were made and the squadron was then formed,
upon signal, in a new order, for more convenience during the rest of
the night. All was done in good time, yet without any vessels coming
uncomfortably near in the course of it. Next day, the last two hours of
mining were after sunset, but no lights were shown nor tactical signal
made. All maneuvers at the finish were made at prescribed clock times, in
obedience to signals sent before dark.
The supporting force sighted us about 1.55 p.m. Friday, 12 miles off,
then stood to the westward. About 9.30 a.m. Saturday a light cruiser
of the support communicated and at 2.00 p.m. the whole support was
sighted again, to the southward, consisting of the second battle cruiser
squadron, the fifth battle squadron, and the seventh light cruiser
squadron. Vice Admiral Pakenham, in H.M.S. _Lion_, commanding the Battle
Cruiser Force, was in command of the whole. This excursion took our
squadron farther afield than it had been since June. After the third
excursion, all our planting had been done behind a barrier of our own
making or else close to British waters, but on this occasion we were on
the exposed side of the whole barrage.
Late Sunday night, 27 October, the squadron returned to port, and by
the following Wednesday, 30 October, all nine ships were again loaded,
and there they waited, for 12 days of vile weather, ready for another
excursion. The one planned would have completed the fourth system,
extending northeasterly from the end of the twelfth minefield. But no
more mining was necessary, and upon the signing of the armistice, the
mines on the launching decks were disembarked from the ships, to give
more space for the crews. Preparations were then taken up for returning
to the United States.
Of six months in European waters to the date of the armistice, on 33
days the squadron or some of its ships were underway, steaming in the
North Sea more than 8400 miles. So far as readiness of the squadron
was concerned, the excursions could have been made with greater
rapidity—never was an excursion delayed on account of a ship’s not being
prepared. During the five months of minelaying activity, the intervals
between excursions averaged 10 days. The time actually consumed in
embarking mines, coaling, and routine overhaul came to less than four
days, so that four excursions a month could have been made, but for the
delays incident to manufacture and to considerations external to our
Force.
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN
RESULTS
Altogether there were 13 regular excursions and two special ones by the
American squadron, and 11 by the British squadron. In all, 70,117 mines
were planted, of which 56,571, or four-fifths, were American. In its
230 miles length, the barrage varied in width from 15 to 35 miles, so
that a submarine could not attempt a crossing without being in danger
for from one to three hours, or twice as long, if running submerged. The
obstruction extended to a depth of 240 feet, except over the eastern
section of 50 miles length, where the deepest mines were submerged 125
feet.
In small fields, of a few score or hundreds of mines, laid piecemeal by
fixed marks, the mines in adjacent lines are usually “staggered,” so as
to halve and block the opposite intervals, but in an open-sea minefield
of immense area, far beyond sight of any marks and laid at 12 knots speed
or faster, no such nicety is possible or necessary. The great Northern
Barrage opposed from 6 to 10 lines of mines to a submarine on the surface
and three to four lines more at whatever depth the submarine might
think he could safely pass. Absolute impassability never was attained
nor expected. At the thickest part a submarine had one chance in ten of
getting through. The explosion of defective mines had left some thin
spots—but who could tell where? Such a minefield is not so much like a
Chinese wall as it is like a stretch of rough, treacherous country, whose
crossing would always be a desperate venture.
Submarines are known to have crossed the barrier, but they all feared it,
and as early as 8 July, 1918, some experienced its deadly effect. From
the very circumstances of the barrier’s great extent and the absence of
observers, the full toll, in damage as well as destruction, may never
be known. The official statistics of lost German submarines, compiled
March 1, 1919, credit the Northern Barrage with the destruction of four
submarines certainly, two more probably, and possibly still two more.
An equal number were severely damaged, though not destroyed, and it is
considered probable by the British Admiralty that the loss of five other
submarines, the cause of which cannot be definitely proven, is accounted
for by the Northern Barrage. Thus by reliable records, the toll was
17. Indications during the sweeping up of the barrage tend to confirm
this. Besides these, to the squadron’s credit, should be added the two
submarines reported lost in the North Irish Channel, in the field which
consisted of British mines laid by our _Baltimore_.
The summary of Activities of U.S. Naval Forces in European Waters, issued
by Admiral Sims, says further:
There is no doubt that this barrage had a considerable moral
effect on the German naval crews, for it is known that several
submarines hesitated some time before crossing. Also, reports
from German sources are that the barrage caused no small amount
of panic in some of the submarine flotillas.
It is also probable that the barrage played a part in
preventing raids on Allied commerce by fast enemy cruisers.
In thus deterring a sally by enemy cruisers, the barrage aided the
mission of the American Battleship Division Six, under Rear Admiral T.
S. Rodgers, U.S.N., flagship _Utah_, which was sent over to guard the
convoys and was based on Berehaven, Ireland.
One officially reported statement of a German submarine captain said that
three submarines, including his own, had been damaged by the barrage but
all had reached port. The injury in his case prevented his diving. Other
accounts, in the press and from individuals, give some indication of the
moral effect produced by this great minefield, reaching to the German
Army and also among civilians.
It would be interesting to know what proportion of the submarines that
passed the line of the barrier were harmed by it, but the effect upon the
enemy went far beyond such tangible injuries. Every successive case of
being damaged yet escaping destruction would increase the moral effect,
and magnify the number of losses that would be attributed to the barrage,
as other submarines failed to return. Official summaries rate depth
charges first, mines next, in importance among the five most effective
measures against submarines.
A mark of royal approval was indirectly conferred upon the Mine Force
undertaking after only one excursion, in the bestowal upon Rear Admiral
Strauss of the honor Knight Commander of St. Michael and St. George,
and our operations received mention later by the First Sea Lord of the
British Admiralty in his reply to the congratulatory message of Admiral
Sims upon the conclusion of the armistice:
We recognize with a feeling of gratitude the debt we owe to the
United States Navy for its wholehearted support during the past
18 months, not only in the submarine campaign and extensive
minelaying programme, but also in sending the Atlantic squadron
to reinforce the Grand Fleet ...
During the four months intervening, the press made occasional brief
reference to the effectiveness of the North Sea barrier but, compared to
other operations, ours received scant mention. A veil of general silence
was deemed necessary for our doings, and the policy of concealing the
destruction of submarines stood in the way of even telling our men the
few authentic reports we did receive of damage to the enemy from our own
work.
One account, widely copied in the British and home press, described the
barrier, which we had begun and were still at work upon, as already a
fact and a British accomplishment! And when, in October, the story was
released in America, the accounts which reached us dwelt mainly upon the
parts of the work done on shore. As the Secretary of the Navy put it, the
minelaying was done with “no glamour nor romance nor appreciation.”
It was not in the character of our officers and men, however, to feel
discontent. Thoroughly interested in their work and convinced of its
importance, they were satisfied to have it progressing well, and to wait
for their part to receive its due.
Admiral Sims expressed his recognition shortly before we sailed from
Portland, England, for home. All the commanding officers, many other
officers, and 25 men from each minelayer were assembled on board the _San
Francisco_, and when the admiral came on board, his flag was broken at
the main truck. After brief mention of the large numbers and the many
activities of our naval forces in European waters, he said that the Mine
Force—
had done a stunt the like of which had not been done in the
world before. After we came into the war we designed a mine,
built it, equipped the minelayers, sent them over to this side
and planted more mines in less space of time than any nation in
the world ever thought of doing before. As to the efficiency of
the mine barrier, that is something that has not concerned you
so particularly as those who designed it; but fitting out the
vessels, learning to handle the mines, planting them, and going
through the strenuous work has been really one of the finest
accomplishments of the navy on this side.... as a nautical
feat, a piece of seamanship, it has been perfectly successful.
Another thing particularly gratifying is that the conduct of
the men of the Mine Force at their bases and at sea has been
exemplary. I think one thing that has impressed itself on this
side more than any other is the conduct of our men. They were
inclined to regard us, when we first came over here, as men
out of the wilds of America. I think they rather wanted to
strengthen their police force when we came around. They found
out it was not necessary. Not only have you created a good
impression by your conduct as far as seamanship is concerned,
but you have created a splendid impression socially. We hear it
on all sides....
I wish you a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year; and when you
get back there you can tell them all about it. You need not
feel that you have to tell them you did the whole thing. Just
tell them a straight story and you may be more than satisfied
with that....
The Secretary of the Navy’s annual report characterizes the Northern
Barrage as “the outstanding anti-submarine offensive project of the
year,” and elsewhere he wrote of it as “a truly wonderful work,” the
story of it “one of the thrilling contributions of what the navy men did
in the war.”
Admiral Benson, Chief of Naval Operations, our highest professional
authority, considered the achievement of the Mine Force
one of the most successful efforts of the whole war by any of
the forces engaged. Not only has the North Sea barrage had a
deterring effect necessarily on the enemy, but it has convinced
the European nations that there is no task which the United
States once undertakes to perform that they cannot and will not
successfully carry through. I believe that the moral effect
alone of the North Sea barrage, not only on the enemy, but on
our friends, to say nothing of the excellent training to our
own personnel, will be worth more to the country than all the
money and time spent upon it.
Actual serious damage to submarines, in amount comparing well with that
done by patrol and escort vessels in thrice the period of time, panic
among submarine flotillas, probable deterrence of cruiser raids, and
considerable moral effect at home and abroad—these results were well
worth while. And is it not more than probable that the barrage weighed
heavily towards the German collapse? Imperfect though it was—expected to
be so in its first consideration—still, there it stood, a deadly menace
already, which could and would become more and more effective, the more
the submarine campaign was persisted in. That campaign could not hope to
survive it.
CHAPTER EIGHTEEN
GENERAL LIVING CONDITIONS
No account of the mining excursions would be complete without some
description of the conditions in which the ships’ companies worked.
The accommodations on board were sufficient for their officers and,
when clear of mines and the weather such as to permit hatches and air
ports to be open, the crew’s quarters were roomy and comfortable. Upon
embarking mines, however, the crew spaces in all ships except _Shawmut_
and _Aroostook_ became very cramped, and as the season advanced, mines
were on board during a greater part of the time, while rainy weather
became more frequent, thus making more discomfort on board with less
diversion on shore. The simplest movement below decks was interfered with
by the mines; moreover, their presence forbade moving pictures on board,
restricted smoking, and limited the “happy hours” and similar forms of
diversion, so common in our navy and so particularly desirable in our
circumstances.
After the third excursion it became the rule to embark the mines as
soon as possible after returning to base. For the one night following a
planting, the ships’ decks would be clear for hammocks, and all the watch
below might then swing on their billets. Occasionally there would be one
more night before the mines would be in the way again, but generally
most of the ships would begin to take coal or mines on the day following
their return to port. Thus the period of rest allowed, after the physical
exertion and the tension of a mining excursion, was brief.
Ventilation was always poor at sea, especially in the _Roanoke_ and
_Quinnebaug_ classes. The intended ventilation systems had not been
completed, no ship having more than 60 per cent of the designed supply
of air and some less than 40 per cent. On the lower mine decks, with
steam on the elevator pumps and mine winches, and considerable numbers
of men in the track crews, the air became very close, foul, and hot. As
the weather grew bad, causing seasickness below, the condition of the
lower decks and the air may be imagined, making an extensive cleaning and
airing out imperative immediately on reaching port.
All the ships crews numbered considerably more than originally intended,
because extra men were found to be needed and still others were taken, in
training for the general naval supply. Notwithstanding the crowding and
other unfavorable conditions, partial inspections in the course of the
summer and thorough inspections at the close showed that in upkeep and
cleanliness—as well as in mining, steaming, signaling, tactical handling,
boating, messing, and discipline—the state of affairs in all departments
was highly creditable to any type of ship.
The crowded conditions on board, the lack of deck space, and the tense
and arduous character of the men’s normal work, made diversion on
shore more than ordinarily necessary. Thanks to the energy and tact of
Commander Canaga and the squadron athletic officer, Lieut. Commander
Hewlett, and to the coöperation of the ships’ athletic officers, interest
in athletics was well sustained, a series of well-played baseball games
giving entertainment to the townspeople as well as the men, and doing
much to promote friendly relations, as described in an earlier chapter.
And thanks are due in large measure to the local residents for their
hospitality extended to both officers and men. The opening of the
Northern Meetings’ building, well equipped, by the American Y.M.C.A., and
a large reception by Captain and Mrs. Rowley at Inverness, and a similar
initiative by Rear Admiral and Mrs. Pears at Invergordon, gave such
things a good start, which carried on throughout our stay.
Inverness being headquarters for the relief of prisoners of war in
Germany belonging to the Cameron Highlanders, and Invergordon for
the Seaforth Highlanders, our people attended the fairs and sports
in considerable numbers, bringing in new life and spirit, as well as
swelling the receipts. The bands from our two bases and from the _San
Francisco_ were in constant demand through all the neighboring country,
and exhibition games of baseball made another drawing feature. After the
Black Isle fête, at the ancient little town of Fortrose, the manager
wrote that the _San Francisco’s_ band had brought in £27 from the sale of
programs alone, and the whole intake was more than double the previous
year’s.
For the Cameron Highlanders’ sports, the Countess of Elgin organized a
toy-making competition, offering souvenir prizes. Our men entered into
the idea with more interest than expected, producing many articles of
real value, none that did not bring a good price, and helping materially
to make the toy stall a great success. Before sailing for home, the men
afloat and ashore combined in presenting a fund exceeding $500 to equip a
new school playground for the Inverness boys and girls.
When the summer had passed and darkness came on early, dances became
frequent, the Scottish lassies quickly learning the American steps. The
erstwhile quiet little Queensgate hotel did a rushing business, its ball
room being taken, by sailors or officers, six nights in the week. And the
men of Base 18, together with amateur talent of Inverness, staged a show,
of which Admiral Sims, who saw it in London, said:
I saw your show, the second part of it, in London the other
day. It had anything of its kind I have seen skinned to death.
There isn’t another one that holds a candle to it. It is
particularly gratifying that the show included a number of
the young girls of Inverness. The show was clean and refined
and splendid in every way. It was a pleasure to go behind the
curtain and thank them and to kiss that wee bit of a girl who
used to do the dance.
These diversions kept the men in good spirits and up to the mark in their
work. They were the more useful because of our comparative isolation and
concealment. The best was made of whatever came, with unabated zeal,
steady improvement, and cheerfulness always. Despite the high prices of
clothing and the excessive wear and tear on uniforms from the mines, the
crews kept themselves, as well as their ships, in creditable appearance.
Their discipline was excellent, their behavior on shore on all occasions
repeatedly evoking favorable comment, both official and private, and
their fine spirit showed also in a handsome subscription to the Liberty
Loans, the squadron taking of the fourth loan five dollars for each mine
in their fields. As a visiting naval officer reported:
The whole Mine Force is short on criticism and complaints, but
long on work and results, and the navy should be intensely
proud of them.
CHAPTER NINETEEN
FAREWELL TO THE HIGHLANDS
The squadron’s task was not finished with the signing of the armistice,
for some of the unused mines had to be carried back. Two weeks passed
before orders came for home—all kinds of rumors were rife meanwhile, and
the wait was the more trying because of the influenza quarantine against
amusement resorts. This had its benefit, in that the Mine Force escaped
the epidemic almost entirely, but with the season too far advanced and
rainy for athletics and the Y.M.C.A. closed, the quarantine bore hard on
the men afloat.
So long as the mines were on board, no relaxation of discipline could
be permitted, and in order to keep the men well occupied, infantry and
rifle practice were added to the ship drills, and formal inspections of
ships were begun. The prospect of these inspections always keys things
up. All ships did well, but the last one inspected, _Roanoke_, Captain
Stearns, surpassed all expectation, being a model—judged by the highest
standard—of efficient organization, training, and administration,
pervaded by a uniformly high and loyal spirit.
One great test was to rig for getting the mines out in case of
fire—though a forlorn hope at best, since 15 minutes (the time in which
the mines would explode when exposed to fire) would scarcely suffice to
begin discharging. The promise of Commander Beck, _Roanoke’s_ executive
officer, to be ready in 10 minutes was received by his colleagues with
derision. When the test came, he stood quietly by, letting his men work
without coaching. A flicker of patient resignation came over his face
as he saw that some zealot had disabled one of the winches to be used
by putting oil on the friction-clutch, because “it looked like bright
work.” But in spite of the consequent delay, all was ready in only
_six_ minutes. “I thought I was some little executive myself,” said one
colleague, “but I’ve got nothing more to say.”
Fortunately the quarantine was raised in time for full enjoyment of our
last week in the Highlands. Our friends omitted nothing in hospitality
and goodwill. Entertaining on board had been an extreme rarity during
the minelaying, but now it could be permitted, and the squadron had
the honor of a visit from The Mackintosh of Mackintosh, chief of
Clan Chattan, colonel of the Cameron Highlanders, lord lieutenant of
Invernesshire, who had been most hospitable to us. All the captains were
assembled on board the _San Francisco_ to receive him and afterwards to
lunch with him. He inspected the crew and ship with Captain Butler, his
first visit to an American man-of-war since 1870 in Gibraltar, on board
the old _Kearsarge_. Chancing to ask a man’s name, the reply “Scott,
sir,” made everything after that go smoothly.
On our national Thanksgiving Day, Rear Admiral Clinton-Baker sent
a message to Rear Admiral Strauss, which, with the latter’s reply,
expressed cordial satisfaction in working together and in the mutual
regard and respect sprung up, which would help to bring the two great
navies into still closer union. A theater party and reception at
Invergordon and a formal dinner and ball at Inverness were given that day
by British naval officers. The ball was held in the “Northern Meeting”
rooms, the annual assembly place of all the Highland nobility and gentry.
This was the first dance there since the war began, and it was a most
enjoyable affair, picturesque with dress kilts and lively with the
Highland fling. Next day the enlisted men were given a ball in the same
place, which usually held 700, but on this occasion 1400. Next morning my
orderly, Rose, could not wait for me to appear but woke me up to hear,
“Commodore, the British treated us _fine_!”
On Saturday, the American officers gave a return ball, which was as well
attended as we could desire, and so, at midnight, festivities ended.
Our sailing being set for Sunday midnight, there could be no gatherings
at the actual departure, but just before noon Captain Rowley came out to
the _San Francisco_ with Mrs. Rowley and a small party, to say goodbye,
and at Invergordon Rear Admiral Pears went on board the _Roanoke_, to
use her radio telephone for his parting message to me. From late that
afternoon until midnight the flagship’s signal bridge had no respite,
farewell messages and replies continuing until we were clear of the
harbor. All were the same tenor—appreciation of the work accomplished,
“pleasant and friendly memory, goodbye and God speed.” The recollections
taken away of beautiful country and kindly people could only make us wish
to revisit them.
Among the last signals exchanged with the shore were:
To: Commander Mine Squadron One:
The Commander Mine Force wishes to thank the officers and the
men of the Mine Squadron for their efficient work and loyal
coöperation and wishes them a happy return to the United States.
To: Commander Mine Force:
The Squadron Commander in behalf of the captains, officers, and
men of Mine Squadron One returns sincere acknowledgment for
the Commander Mine Force. Signal of thanks and good wishes.
The Squadron is deeply gratified to receive his approbation
for its part in his unprecedented undertaking so successfully
accomplished.
CHAPTER TWENTY
SCAPA FLOW
The Mine Force was not represented at the surrender of the German fleet,
but on our way to Portland, where leave was to be given before sailing
for home, we passed through Scapa Flow to see the surrendered ships.
As our long, single column approached the British squadrons lying at
anchor, on guard, a signal invited us to steer between their lines, and
as we wound in between the battleships and battle cruisers, their crews
were assembled on deck—very striking in solidity of mass and evenness of
rank and file. They cheered each passing minelayer, our crews running
from side to side to make response, the bands playing the national airs,
and signals being exchanged.
To: Admiral First Battle Squadron.
From: Commander Mine Squadron One.
Captain Belknap presents his compliments and regrets that
his movement orders do not permit paying his respects in
person to Admiral Madden. The U.S. Mine Squadron sends
congratulations upon the great success that has brought about
this unprecedented spectacle. 0919.
From: Admiral Madden.
To: Captain Belknap.
Thank you for your 0919. I wish the Mining Squadron speedy
return home and have much regret in parting with such a
splendid force.
Then silence was ordered, as we neared the Germans’ anchorage. First
came the destroyers, to the left, moored in pairs with a few British
destroyers at their head, and then, on the west side of Cava Island, the
large ships came into view. Many signs of their downfallen state were
evident, and the sight was to me the more impressive from having seen
that fleet in its ascendancy. Now, in some ships scarcely a man was to
be seen, on others the rails were crowded, officers and men mingling
together, to gaze on their untouched bait.
In quiet procession we had nearly passed them all, when the British
trawlers on the opposite side, holding the net across Hoy Sound—had been
holding it in fair weather and foul, for three long years—seeing our flag
and knowing what our work had been, broke out in long and loud blasts
of their whistles—having crews too small for an audible cheer. The _San
Francisco_ responded with the usual three whistle blasts, which the ships
following repeated in succession, but one of them blew her siren instead,
and that started them all again. For a few moments there was a fearful
din, and how this must have struck the British ships, on the other side
of Cava, was indicated by the next signals exchanged soon afterwards:
From: Captain Belknap.
To: Admiral Madden.
Many thanks for your kind message. The Mine Squadron has much
enjoyed its duty with the Grand Fleet and is much honored by
the association.
From: Admiral Madden.
To: Captain Belknap.
Reply.—Thank you. For your hilarious Mining Squadron, a speedy
trip home and have much regret in parting with such a brave
bunch.
Clearing the island, we passed H.M.S. _Lion_, flagship of Vice Admiral
Pakenham, who had commanded the support on our last excursion. The _Lion_
was steaming back and forth across the way out, like a sentry on his
beat, a ready check on any German ship that might attempt escape.
Replying to my greeting, the _Lion_ flashed from Vice Admiral Pakenham:
I greatly regret that only a farewell signal is possible. You
take with you not only my personal regards, but the gratitude
and admiration of the Battle Cruiser Force and united wishes
for a happy return to your country.
As the squadron passed out of the harbor, the garrisons at the entrance
turned out and cheered and one of the seaplanes that had patrolled for
submarines while the squadron was planting on some of its excursions
sailed over and around the _San Francisco_, each time nearer, until he
swooped by with a roar and a wave of the hand, so near that his wing tip
passed not 20 feet from the bridge.
Three months afterwards came a letter from Vice Admiral Sir William C.
Pakenham:
I trust old friends on your side have enjoyed return to their
own country, but we miss them much over here. When your Force
steamed through Scapa, I thought Providence as well as skill
must have been on your side to enable you to pass through a
period of such dangerous service, and yet to take all home.
CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE
HOME
Until departure from Scotland, the squadron had been almost free from
the influenza epidemic prevailing elsewhere so seriously, but during
the ten-day stay at Portland some cases appeared among men returning
from leave. Among 427 persons on board the _San Francisco_, there were
113 cases before the disease was finally checked. Enough officers and
leading men escaped, however, to warrant sailing for home with only one
day’s delay, but leaving 40 men in Portland hospital. A few mild cases
developed on board the other ships, fortunately with no serious outcome.
On Saturday, 14 December, the _Shawmut_ and _Aroostook_ sailed for the
Azores, en route for Bermuda and Hampton Roads, their limited fuel
radius making these stops necessary. The rest of the squadron followed
on Tuesday, 17 December, taking the direct route. The rule of no
homeward-bound pennants for less than two years’ absence being relaxed
on account of exceptional conditions, all ships on leaving Portland flew
long streamers—one so long and large from the _Roanoke_, a steam winch
was needed to hoist it.
Immediately encountering bad weather, for three days less than half
the desired progress was made, and the _San Francisco_ had a serious
breakdown of her steering gear. Several men were injured while steering
by hand, which had to be discontinued, because the sea drove so heavily
on the rudder. The ship was then steered by the screws alone for four
days until temporary repairs could be made. Upon the weather clearing, it
was decided to divide the squadron, allowing _Roanoke_, _Canandaigua_,
_Housatonic_, and _Quinnebaug_ to continue the direct run, which their
remaining coal and daily consumption warranted doing, while the _San
Francisco_, _Canonicus_, and _Saranac_, with shorter fuel supply and
larger consumption, proceeded by the Azores.
Like other forces coming home, we wished to come into New York, for a
touch of the limelight after being so long in obscurity, and because the
location was central for letting the men go home. With mines on board,
we could not expect a welcome anywhere, and at New York bare permission
was doubtful—especially so soon after the Perth Amboy explosions. With no
prospect of being _invited_ there, we sailed with destination announced
as New York as the one possible chance of getting there, but orders soon
came to steer for Hampton Roads instead.
Near mid-passage on Christmas night, after dinner, a British collier
collided with the _Roanoke_, opening a good-sized hole in her port side
forward. Supports of the bridge being knocked away, its end sloped down,
making it seem at first that the ship was rapidly settling. Steam from
a broken pipe came forth in volumes, to which the red glow of the port
sidelight lent the appearance of smoke and flames. Collision and fire,
with 500 mines on board, far at sea in cold, misty weather, would have
been indeed serious. It needed just that to round out our experiences,
but fortune was with us, and the situation was promptly brought under
control.
The _Quinnebaug_ saw the collier safe into Halifax, and then overtook
the other three, all four minelayers arriving at Hampton Roads without
further incident on 30 December. The _Shawmut_ and _Aroostook_ had
already come in on the 27th. The rest, pursued by bad weather 10 days out
of 16, both Christmas and New Year spent at sea, and feeling our way into
port through fog, the _San Francisco_ and the two with her arrived early
January 3, 1919, making the squadron once more complete, except for the
_Baltimore_, still absent on experimenting duty.
In due course, the last mine was safely discharged from our ships, making
a clear record of over 60,000 mines handled without mishap. And yet we
were not to disperse without one more experience—a serious fire. The very
night after the _Saranac_ had landed her mines, a fire broke out in the
wardroom, spreading so rapidly that, until outside help came, it seemed
impossible to prevent her being completely gutted. Only great exertions
saved her and the incident showed that our strict guard against fire had
been no idle precaution.
CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO
THE MINE SWEEPERS
With the removal of the mines in peace, the sweepers came into
prominence, which gives occasion to mention an inconspicuous part of
the Mine Force work, too easily overlooked. There were four large
seagoing tugs in the mine squadron, _Patuxent_, Lieutenant J. B. Hupp;
_Patapsco_, Lieutenant W. E. Benson; _Sonoma_, Lieutenant J. S. Thayer;
and _Ontario_, Lieutenant E. J. Delavy. These, as fleet tenders had
towed targets, carried passengers, mail, stores, and the like. All this
continued after they were assigned to the original Mine Force, yet,
by a more systematic apportionment of their former duties, time was
gained for training in mining and sweeping, enough to arouse a keen
interest and foster the Mine Force spirit. In the fleet’s tactical and
strategical exercises the tugs took part, and upon our entering the war,
the anti-submarine net tasks and the experimenting that were assigned to
the Mine Force were possible of accomplishment only by the use of these
tugs, together with our mine carrier vessel, the _Lebanon_, Lieutenant
H. N. Huxford. In seaworthiness, power, and equipment, these vessels had
what was needed, but their chief value lay in the resourcefulness and
energy of their personnel. Lieutenant E. S. R. Brandt, U.S.N., was their
division leader, commanding the _Sonoma_, during their first 18 months in
the Mine Force.
Night and day, they were always ready, and it seemed as if their power
and seaworthiness would take them anywhere. Well equipped for salvaging,
they played an important part in saving the U.S.S. _Olympia_ and
afterwards the _Texas_, when they grounded, in 1917. Often they had long
hours of hard duty, but could always be counted on. Service in them gave
excellent experience for both officers and men, and many were the capable
petty officers turned out. The question “Can you do it?” was never asked,
nor “Are you ready?” It was necessary only to say go and do, and whether
foggy or clear, the tug that was sent would nose her way through somehow.
These tugs were not properly equipped for mine sweeping, lacking the
special type of winch needed for that purpose, but their 18 months’
experience with improvised arrangements yielded information of great
value for the new design of a combined seagoing tug and mine-sweeper
type, of the _Bird_ Class, contracted for during the summer of 1917.
By the original plan for the Northern Mine Barrage, the first 12 to
be completed of these new sweeping vessels were assigned to the mine
squadron, and continued efforts were made to expedite their completion,
but without success so far as concerned their joining the mine squadron.
Meantime, in the experiments and tests of the mine, in training the new
personnel, and in every kind of transportation and other assistance to
the new minelayers during the month preparatory to sailing, the four
original tugs were invaluable. The new sweepers not being ready, the
original four were fitted out to take part in the work abroad. When the
mine squadron left Hampton Roads late in April, 1918, the _Patuxent_ and
_Patapsco_ were temporarily detached, to proceed by way of Bermuda, the
Azores, and Brest, escorting a convoy of submarine chasers across. Rear
Admiral Wilson, U.S.N., commended them for being the first to deliver
such a convoy intact. They finally arrived at Inverness 24 June, 1918,
where they were used to inspect and observe minefields, to communicate
between the detachments of minelayers at the two bases, and to train men.
The larger pair, _Sonoma_ and _Ontario_, were retained with the
minelayers until their final sailing for abroad. The _Sonoma_, Lieutenant
J. S. Trayer, accompanied the squadron on its trip across, making a
notable passage for a vessel of her size. Always ready for any duty, up
to station, and able to steam at maximum speed at the end of a 3000-mile
run, she earned commendation for her captain and her engineer officer,
Lieutenant L. W. Knight, U.S.N.
With the _Ontario_, which accompanied a convoy of submarine chasers
across, the _Sonoma_, after a brief stay in Scotland, went to Queenstown,
where the need for that type was greater than with the Mine Force. In
this assignment their rescue of submarine victims was a continuation
in greater degree of similar pre-war assistance, in home and Cuban
ports, off Hatteras and Cape Maysi, rendered to vessels in distress from
collision, breakdown, and fire at sea.
CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE
THE MINE FORCE, OLD AND NEW
Details of preparation have been only briefly touched upon in the
preceding chapters, though actually their influence on the success of
the operation deserves more prominence. It will not be supposed that the
new squadron just grew, or that in the active operations everything just
broke fair. On the contrary, success was earned by logical, consistent
preparation, extending back over years and by sound organization and
execution when the plan was launched. Hard work, development of doctrine,
and prospective study, between 1914 and 1917, bore fruit, and, for the
navy’s credit, the foresight which produced it deserves record along with
the achievement itself.
While suitable and adequate material would ever be the first essential
in such an operation, the all-important question lay in the personnel
afloat. The excellent qualities of the new mine would be of no avail
without proper laying of the barrage. Fortunately we already had a
minelaying force, small but capable, so that we did not look abroad for
instruction.
Prior to 1914, minelaying from a ship underway had received little
attention in our navy, but when some early events of the great European
war showed what a part mines were likely to play in the future, mining
affairs were made the principal duty of Captain G. R. Marvell in the
Navy Department, the conversion of two more minelayers was pushed to
completion, and mine training was taken up in earnest in the fleet.
The hitherto solitary mine ship _San Francisco_ was taken out of the
heterogeneous group known as the Auxiliary Division of our fleet, to
become the flagship of a separate organization for mining and mine
sweeping, which was established on July 10, 1915, while Admiral F. F.
Fletcher had the Atlantic fleet.
In the development of this new branch, which was under my command
until September, 1917, one truth came out forcibly, that the sustained
attention requisite throughout mining operations could only be insured
by keeping everything up in man-of-war style. Laying and recovering
mines was messy work, and in a ship of a type long obsolete, classed as
auxiliary, and using a weapon of stealth barely tolerated, to maintain
such a standard was not easy. As Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord of the
British Admiralty, said in a speech in New York, “Before the war,
minelaying was considered unpleasant work for a naval man, an occupation
like that of rat-catching, and not attractive.”
Whatever aversion may have been felt quickly vanished in the growing
interest that had been aroused. Besides its own specialty, the new
branch joined the fleet’s tactical, gunnery, and strategic exercises,
these last leading to new activities and to study of the possibilities
of mines and of the logical functions of the Mine Force. Both Admiral
Fletcher and his successor, Admiral H. T. Mayo, did all in their power to
establish the new element firmly as a regular part of the mobile fleet.
Their interest and encouragement had immediate effect in confirming the
personnel’s sense of value, which had been engendered by the variety of
their employment, the stimulating results of their efforts, and belief in
the power of their weapon.
Experimenting with submarine nets was also taken up, and in our first
six months of war, the Mine Force was employed chiefly in planting three
nets in Chesapeake Bay, and one each in Long Island Sound and at Newport
entrance. Success with the Long Island net, over five miles long, was
only achieved after a hard struggle with a five-knot current, which time
after time swept the net away or, crushing its buoys, pulled it under and
entwined it with tons of kelp.
Such in outline was the scope of Mine Force activities during the 28
months prior to preparing for the North Sea expedition. We had not
yet laid any minefields during the war, but as if in practice for the
very operation to come, the Force, early in December, 1916, had laid
a minefield off the Jersey Coast, below Sandy Hook—200 loaded mines,
in three parallel lines laid simultaneously, and all taken up by next
day—the press not notified. Various arrangements in connection with
the handling and transportation of mines had been planned and actually
practiced. For result—when the Northern Barrage project came under
consideration, the question of practicability of the operation could be
answered yes with confidence, and the subsequent working out of mining
installations, organization, and training was guided by reliable data—all
from our own experience.
Many-sided experience had produced a well-knit organization of units that
were resourceful, self-reliant, and mutually helpful, well trained on
sound lines in minelaying, singly and together. Long hours and work in
all weathers were a matter of course. Quiet self-confidence was the mark
of the Force spirit. And thus, although the original Mine Force was much
too small for the great task ahead, its value as a nucleus and leaven
for the greatly enlarged mine squadron to be formed could hardly be
overstated.
Since the autumn of 1916, the principal Mine Force officers had been
myself, as Force Commander, Commander H. V. Butler, commanding the
flagship _San Francisco_ and senior aid, Commander A. W. Marshall, U.S.S.
_Baltimore_, and Commander T. L. Johnson, U.S.S. _Dubuque_. All these
were to take part in the North Sea operation and were concerned in its
preparation—myself in charge, Butler training the new crews, Marshall
experimenting with the new mine, which Butler concluded, and Johnson
helping to select the new ships, then going abroad for information.
Their experience and their ships were invaluable both in preparation and
afterwards. On the principle that, let material be old or new, discipline
may be the best, the style of these seasoned men-of-war, aiming to match
the highest naval standard, was always a strong influence in the squadron.
In October, 1917, with the original order to go ahead, which was
accompanied by a word of strong approval, from the President down, the
development of plans and coordination of all preparations became my
principal duty in the Office of Naval Operations. Command of a minelayer
and two years at the head of mining affairs in the Atlantic fleet had
given me experience that was directly pertinent.
The intention being to lay the barrage as soon as possible, and counting
five days as the least time between minelaying operations—coaling,
embarking mines, out, laying, and back—the expected manufacturing output
of 1000 mines a day demanded a minelaying squadron with capacity of 5000
mines at one time. Towards this, our _San Francisco_ and _Baltimore_
carried together only 350 mines. The eight new vessels would add 5350,
thus providing a good margin, either for the loss of a ship or for
speeding up.
No time was to be lost. The demand for ships, shipyard work, and ship
equipment for other purposes was increasing every day. Within 10 days
the Eastern Steamship Corporation’s fast passenger liners _Massachusetts_
and _Bunker Hill_, running daily between New York and Boston, were
purchased outright, becoming the _Shawmut_ and _Aroostook_. Within a
month the Southern Pacific freight steamers _El Rio_, _El Dia_, _El
Cid_, and _El Siglo_ were taken over, becoming _Roanoke_, _Housatonic_,
_Canonicus_, and _Canandaigua_, respectively. Carrying 860 mines each
they soon became known as the Big Four. The Old Dominion steamers
_Hamilton_ and _Jefferson_, familiar to passengers between New York and
Norfolk, followed by December 6, 1917.
[Illustration: THE BOSTON-NEW YORK PASSENGER LINER “MASSACHUSETTS.”
Before conversion into a minelayer.]
The task of making four freight ships habitable for crews of 400 men, at
the same time carrying twice as many mines as any other vessel of their
size, is not done by a wave of the hand, and as for the four passenger
steamers taken, they were gutted like fish—saloons and cabins ripped
out—before their conversion could begin. Although plans had to be based
upon what could be done within a reasonable time, with material and labor
scarce, all features had to conform to the requirements of the mining
installations. These were almost entirely new on the scale contemplated,
either in our own or any other service. There was little data available
of similar installations, except some British mining memoranda and a
few belated blueprints. Lieutenant DeSalis, R.N., kindly placed his
experience at our disposal, which was a help, but attempts abroad had not
made a success of mine elevators—which would form a cardinal feature of
our installation—nor had others gone in for mine-carrying capacity to
the extent we contemplated—which was the maximum number consistent with
not squeezing the crew intolerably. Hence, little of their information
proved applicable to our case. Experience in our own minelayers, however,
_San Francisco_, _Baltimore_, and _Dubuque_, during the past three years,
enabled many details to be decided with a confidence that subsequent
results confirmed.
[Illustration: THE 20-KNOT MINELAYER “SHAWMUT.”
Formerly the coastwise passenger liner _Massachusetts_.]
That winter of 1917-18 will be long remembered! Material was scarce,
transportation congested, labor unsettled, fuel short, weather severe,
haste and high prices everywhere. Much delay came from lack of interest
among workmen. The campaign of addresses by good speakers explaining the
need for the ships and the men’s own interest in doing their best, did
not begin until sometime in February, and then only in a small way. There
was insufficient supervision, the contractors were converting vessels
to a type for which no model existed, and plans were not forthcoming
as fast as wanted, often not in the logical order. Besides delays and
losses of material in transportation, one trade in which labor was
shortest—shipfitter—was the one on whose work much of the other had to
wait.
By constant urging and anticipating probable delays, the work as a whole
was kept always progressing, even if at times slowly. The captains to
be, and their principal officers, came to the ships soon after their
taking over, and by January 25, 1918, two of the largest ships,
_Roanoke_ and _Housatonic_, were enough advanced to be commissioned.
Living conditions were extremely rough amid the dirt and disorder, made
worse by the slush and mud in the unpaved shipyards; but the presence
of officers and men on board exerted constant forward pressure, while
they were becoming acquainted with their ships. In the conversion of
the _Shawmut_ and _Aroostook_ at Boston Navy Yard, the ships’ companies
worked in industrial gangs alongside the civilian employees, with such
actual accomplishment and setting such an example, as to advance the date
of completion materially. At the same time, their training progressed so
well that, on June 16, 1918, only one week after completion, they started
across.
Every 10 days or so during the five months shipyard work, I would go
from Washington for a conference with the captains and the navy yard
officers at New York and Boston, to keep in touch with the actual
progress and the matters that appeared to need special attention. These
conferences eliminated infinite writing and enabled closer touch to be
kept with all preparations, additional effort to be more appropriately
applied, than were possible by regular procedure alone, especially amid
the swollen volume of correspondence in general. They developed, too, a
good understanding among the officers, which made for future harmony and
gained time towards the squadron’s readiness.
Before the new ships were delivered, a special camp at Newport had been
provided for training their crews under Mine Force officers. The _San
Francisco_ and _Baltimore_ gave some practical instruction on board,
and the camp was supplemented elsewhere, so that few, if any, wholly
untrained men went to any ship. Three gun crews were trained in the
battleships for each minelayer, and the engineer personnel were kept
under training at Philadelphia until wanted. For the officers, similar
measures were taken to put them in touch with the methods and experience
of the Mine Force, as far as this could be done with ships most of the
time at shipyards, fitting out.
Unlike the old Mine Force, the new was to consist of organizations on
shore as well as afloat, and for this an officer of flag rank was wanted.
Rear Admiral Joseph Strauss, U.S.N., was selected as the new Commander of
the Mine Force.
Long identified with ordnance matters and of distinguished experience
at the Naval Ordnance Proving Ground and Smokeless Powder Factory,
he was Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance for some years before going to
command the U.S. Battleship _Nevada_, which he quitted to take command
of the mine operation. On February 15, 1918, he came to temporary duty
in the Office of Naval Operations, where he familiarized himself with
all information bearing on the operation and its preparation, and after
a tour of inspection to the ships and acquainting himself with the mine
situation, he sailed for England with his aid, Lieutenant Noel Davis.
U.S.N. On March 29, 1918, he assumed command of the Mine Force, with
headquarters at U.S. Naval Base 18, Inverness, Scotland. Thereupon the
original Mine Force, consisting only of ships, became Mine Squadron One,
and it became my part to complete its preparations in the United States
and command the active force afloat.
The new Mine Squadron One was organized on Wednesday, April 10, 1918, at
Hampton Roads, Virginia, on board the squadron flagship _San Francisco_.
I relieved Captain H. V. Butler, U.S.N., who had been in command of the
Mine Force in the interval. He remained as captain of the flagship and
was also my chief-of-staff—the same association that we had in the old
Mine Force. Commander Bruce L. Canaga, U.S.N., who had been my invaluable
assistant in Washington since the preparations began in November, came as
my senior aid.
To us who had struggled through the long winter’s difficulties, it
was a memorable event when the first new minelayer, the _Roanoke_,
Captain Stearns, joined the flag, on Friday, 12th April, 1918. She was
followed closely by the _Housatonic_, Commander Greenslade, and by
the _Canandaigua_, Commander Reynolds, next day. All was arranged for
their loading with mines, and they began at once. By a week later the
_Quinnebaug_, Commander Mannix, and _Canonicus_, Commander Johnson, had
joined, completing the number ready for service at that time.
Almost immediately the _Roanoke_ was sent across ahead of the others,
an inspection only 16 days after leaving the shipyard showing that her
excellent condition warranted it. She was to help the _Baltimore_,
already there, to finish laying the minefield in the North Irish Channel,
described in a previous chapter, but though she arrived in good season
and ready, through a change of plan the _Roanoke_ was not employed there,
proceeding instead to Invergordon.
[Illustration: ORGANIZATION OF THE MINE FORCE.
Transcriber’s Note: The below is a transcription of the text printed
in an org chart. The hierarchy is indicated by the level of indentation.
For best results, view the HTML version, which contains the chart as an
illustration.
Commander Mine Force Rear Admiral Joseph Strauss, U.S.N. Headquarters
Base 18 Inverness.
Mine Squadron One Captain R.R. Belknap, U.S.N. Squadron Commander
Minelayers
U.S.S. San Francisco Flagship Captain H. V. Butler
U.S.S. Aroostook Captain J. H. Tomb
U.S.S. Baltimore Captain A. W. Marshall
U.S.S. Canandaigua Captain W. H. Reynolds
U.S.S. Canonicus Captain T. L. Johnson
U.S.S. Housatonic Captain J. W. Greenslade
U.S.S. Quinnebaug Commander D. P. Mannix
U.S.S. Roanoke Captain C. D. Stearns
U.S.S. Saranac Captain S. Gannon
U.S.S. Shawmut Captain W. T. Cluverius
Mine Sweepers
Ontario † Lieutenant E. Delavy
Patuxent Lieutenant J. B. Hupp
Patapsco Lieutenant W. E. Benson
Sonoma ‡ Lieutenant J. S. Trayer
Staff
Chief of Staff Captain H. V. Butler *
Aid & Tactical Officer Commander B. L. Canaga
Squadron Const. Officer Commander L. F. Kimball *
Squadron Eng. Officer Lieut. Comm’dr F. R. Berg *
Same, Later Lieutenant G. J. Blessing *
Aide, Flag Secretary Lieut. Comm’dr E. S. R. Brandt
Same, Later Ensign R. F. Hooper R.F.
Squadron Radio Officer Lieutenant R. C. Starkey.
Aid & Communication Officer Lieutenant (J.G.) R. L. White, R.F.
Squadron Surgeon Commander (M.C.) G. C. Rhodes *
Same, Later Lieutenant (M.C.) H. P. Stevens R.F.
Squadron Supply Officer Lieutenant (P.C.) C. R. Eagle *
Squadron Athletic Off. Lieut. Comm’dr G. W. Hewlett *
Asst. Sqd. Const. Off. Lieutenant (C.C.) G. R. Arey *
U.S.S. Blackhawk Force Flagship & Repair Ship Captain R. C. Bulmer
Chief of Staff Captain R. R. Belknap *
Senior Aid Captain O. G. Murfin *
Aid, Flag Secretary Lieutenant N. Davis
Force Radio Officer Lieutenant W. K. Harrill
Force Commun. Officer Ensign D. A. Nichols, R.F.
Force Medical Officer Captain (M.C.) E. J. Grow
Force Supply Officer Captain (P.C.) G. C. Schafer
Same, Later Lieut. (P.C.) R. N. Smither, R.F.
Commander of Bases 17 & 18 Captain O. G. Murfin. Headquarters Base 18
Inverness, Scotland
Base 17 Invergordon, Scotland. Executive Officer in Charge Commander
E. A. Wolleson
General Management
Officers’ Messes
Print Shop
Communication
Signals
Telephone
Mail
Telegraph
Military Administration
Guard
Details
Quarters
Messing
Plant
Power Plant
Upkeep
Repair Force
Carpenters
Machinists
Operation
Assembly & Test of Anchors
Assembly & Test of Mines
Assembly & Test of Plummet
Assembly of Plummet & Anchor
Final Assembly
Heating Plant
Machine Shop
Tool Room
Medical Department
Dispensary
Sanitation
Sick Bay
Supply
Pay & Clothing
Commissary
Laundry
Canteen
General Mess
Chief Petty Officers
Gen. Store K Dept
Transportation
Land
Water
Disembarking Port Kyle of Loch Alsh. F. W. Ferguson, R.F.
Base 18 Inverness, Scotland. Executive Officer in Charge Lieut.
Comm’dr L. M. Stewart
Organization Like Base 17
Disembarking Port Corpach. A. W. Patten, R.F.
Transportation of Mine Layers’ Cargoes. Lieutenant T. Newhall, R.F.
* Additional to Principal Duty
† On Detached Duty after 11-May-1918
‡ Same, after 15-July-1918]
The other four, with the _San Francisco_, continued the training program.
An engine accident in the _Housatonic_, needing 10 days at Norfolk Navy
Yard to repair it, delayed us a week, which was profitable for tying
up the many loose ends left by the shipyards. Our second great event
came on Sunday, 28 April, 1918, when the new squadron got underway
together for the first time to exercise tactics and signals while en
route from the Chesapeake for Provincetown. The day began and ended
with steering gear troubles, and was followed by 40 hours of fog, which
deprived us of valuable time that had been counted on. Tuesday, at 5
p.m., the _San Francisco_ and _Housatonic_ arrived at Provincetown. The
_Canandaigua_ was already maneuvering on the measured mile course while
her diver was searching for a lost anchor. _Canonicus_ was anchored
inside. _Quinnebaug_ reported herself anchored in the fog off Nantucket
Lightship, repairing an engine break.
Next day, the morning fog lifted enough for all to begin standardizing
over the measured course, afterwards proceeding to Gloucester Harbor,
Massachusetts, where the final mine proving and the first practice
minelaying by the new ships would be done. Strenuous days these,
especially for captains! _Housatonic_ asked permission to lag behind
awhile, arriving at Gloucester very late. “Sorry to drag you over at this
unchristian hour, Greenslade, but I wanted to see you about to-morrow’s
work.” “Oh! never mind, sir. This is the _life_!”
_Quinnebaug_ joined next afternoon, but she still needed some engine
repairs which required navy yard assistance, and was accordingly ordered
at once to Boston. More than unwelcome there with mines on board, the
work and her departure were heartily speeded.
After scarcely any let-up since the ships had left the shipyards four
weeks previously, a Sunday, May 5, 1918, was devoted to a well-earned
rest. And now had to be decided whether to continue training longer or
not. Outside of the ships singly, little had been done. They had not even
been all together since the first evening at sea. Yet the mine bases were
in such need of the 500 men that we were to bring them that, although
only a meager part of the training had been carried out, it was decided
to push on. There would be tactics and gunnery exercise en route, and
possibly other training that had been omitted might be made up then too.
And so the original period of time, estimated as necessary to prepare,
was adhered to, namely: in 45 days after leaving the shipyards to be at
the North Sea base, with coal and mines on board, ready for a minelaying
operation. Despite the numerous delays and mishaps, our arrival in
Scotland, May 26, 1918, was on the fortieth day from the fifth ship
leaving the yard, and all ships were ready for duty.
CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR
AFTER THE WAR
The war over, the reorganized United States fleet was to include only the
_San Francisco_, _Baltimore_, _Shawmut_, and _Aroostook_ as minelayers.
The Big Four ships were to bring troops home, and the _Quinnebaug_ and
_Saranac_ to go back to their owners, the Old Dominion Steamship Company.
The _San Francisco_ needing repairs, the squadron flag was transferred
temporarily to the _Baltimore_. This took place 17 January, 1919, at
Newport, Rhode Island, whence we had sailed on our mission eight months
before.
Never before in all my experience had I been in an organization where
harmony, mutual confidence, good will, and loyalty prevailed so
completely as in this Mine Squadron. The high spirit of the officers and
men showed in the condition of their ships, their work, their discipline,
and their individual personal bearing. To command such a body was an
honor that could not be laid down in silence, and so, before the two
pioneer minelayers parted, I spoke to their assembled officers and men as
follows:
I am speaking to you to-day as representing the Squadron. It
is very appropriate that, on this occasion of temporarily
transferring the flag, I should get together the officers
and crews of the two old war horses, _San Francisco_ and
_Baltimore_, that have made our success possible. The work in
the Northern Mine Barrage did not begin only a year ago. It
began for a squadron of mining ships when the _Baltimore_ and
the _Dubuque_ joined the _San Francisco_, in the middle of
1915. These old ships set an example that made the rest aspire
to follow, to live up to the high standard and steady pace
necessary to accomplish what we have done.
To-day marks the end of the “Yankee Mining Squadron,” that did
four-fifths of the Northern Mine Barrage. I do not need to tell
you how highly mentioned our work has been. When the reports
have been published, no doubt it will be highly thought of in
this country and by all who read about it in the future. This
success is due, not to any one of us, not to any few of us, it
is due to all of us. I am very proud to have commanded such a
force. It is a deep gratification to have such a success come
as a result of the efforts we have made through four years.
Naturally, I shall never forget, but I wish to let you know
that you should never forget it.
The Squadron is now reorganizing. Some of you may go to other
duty, some may go out into civil life, where you will work
during the conditions of peace which you helped to bring about.
And now let me remind you of the principles on which we won
success in our part in this war and on which we always did our
work. Remember this! that the everyday things are the easiest
to forget, and it is because we have carefully kept before us
the importance of doing the everyday things right that we have
earned success. We have not been afraid of work, we have never
shied at any job. Every man has felt his part as important to
do properly as any other man’s part, and as long as the work
was to be done he has kept up his attention. That has been the
main principle—not to slack down—that a job is not finished
until it is done, and it is not done until it is done right. We
have not sought the easiest way but the right way, and we have
generally found that the right way was the easiest way in the
long run. And further, that a job, to be rightly done, must be
as good at the end and in the middle as in the beginning. We
have not slackened. The 860th mine of the _Canonicus_, of the
longest string ever laid, was as good as the first or the 300th
or any other mine.
I congratulate you all on the work you have done. It will
be a very satisfactory and proud memory for you and for all
those connected with it. But I congratulate you most on the
preparation that it gives you to do still more, to be better
men, to be better citizens. Nothing more valuable could come
from our work than that.
You can fancy what my associations are with these two ships.
I made my first cruise as a commissioned officer in the
_Baltimore_; and the past four years in her and the _San
Francisco_ have been the most interesting I ever had. I am
very sorry to leave you of the _San Francisco_ even for a
short time, but I could not leave under happier conditions. To
leave at a time of a success like this happens only once in a
lifetime. Good luck to all of you.
Long before the barrage was finished we were studying how to sweep
it up, and soon after the signing of the armistice, experiment began
towards safeguarding the sweeping vessels. Before leaving for home the
squadron transferred over 400 men to the bases for the sweeping duty,
and subsequently a number of new sweepers were sent over from the United
States, in groups commanded by officers formerly of the mine squadron.
The British authorities took steps immediately to mark out the barrage
area, with light-vessels and gas buoys, and actual sweeping began as
early as December, 1918. It will take months to complete, but well inside
a year from its laying the Northern Barrage will have become a thing of
the past.
It served its purpose, and more besides. Through the part played in
former wars, submarine mines grew in recognition, though slowly, as
important means of defense. In this war they came into extensive
employment in offense, the largest as well as most striking offensive use
being the Northern Barrage, which, in popular phrase, put mines on the
map.
SUMMARY OF MINES LAID
--------------------+----+----+----+----+----+---+----+-------+
Excursions | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 5a| 6 | 7 |
--------------------+----+----+----+----+----+---+----+-------+
1. Canonicus | 763| 710| 798| 810| 170| | 640| 810 |
2. Housatonic | 769| 800| 840| 830| 320| | | 810 |
3. Canandaigua | 775| 710| 760| 779| 170| | 640| 810 |
4. Roanoke | 745| | 830| 810| 146| | 640| 820 |
5. Quinnebaug | | | 600| 600| | | 610| 590 |
6. Saranac | | | 597| 580| | | | |
7. Aroostook | | | 320| 320| 290| | 330| 310 |
8. Shawmut | | | 300| 320| 150| | | 320 |
9. San Francisco | 153| [2]| 170| 170| 170|166| 160| 170[5]|
(Squadron Flagship)| | | | | | | | |
10. Baltimore | 180| | 180| 180| 180| | 180| 180 |
+----+----+----+----+----+---+----+-------+
|3385|2220|5395|5399|1596|166|3200|4820 |
--------------------+----+----+----+----+----+---+----+-------+
--------------------+------+-------+-------+----+----+----+----+-------
Excursions | 7a | 8[3] | 9[4] | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | Total
--------------------+------+-------+-------+----+----+----+----+-------
1. Canonicus | | 820 | 830 | 860| 860| 820| 890|9781
2. Housatonic | | 820 | 830 | 860| 840| 820| 800|9399
3. Canandaigua | | 820 | 830 | 840| 840| 855| |8829
4. Roanoke | | 820 | 840 | 840| 860| 855| |8206
5. Quinnebaug | | 600 | 600 | 610| 610| 615| 610|6045
6. Saranac | | 560 | 600 | 610| 610| 615| 610|4782
7. Aroostook |290 | | 320 | 330| 330| | 340|3180
8. Shawmut |290[6]| 270 | 320 | 330| 330| | 340|2970
9. San Francisco | | 170[5]| 170[5]| 170| 170| 170| 170|2179
(Squadron Flagship)| | | | | | | |
10. Baltimore | | | 180 | | | | |1260[7]
+------+-------+-------+----+----+----+----+-------
|580 |4880 |5520 |5450|5450|4750|3760|
--------------------+------+-------+-------+----+----+----+----+-------
Supplied by Base 17 28,930
Supplied by Base 18 27,641
------
Total 56,571
Total U.S. Mines in Northern Barrage 56,571
Total laid by U.S. Squadron in the war 57,470
British mines in Northern Barrage 13,546
Grand Total in Northern Barrage 70,117
Total distance steamed, from the assembly buoy and back 8,383.5 miles
Total hours underway, from the assembly buoy and back 739 hours
FOOTNOTES
[1] Additional to ship duties.
[2] Present but not planting.
[3] Excursion by U.S. and British Minelaying Squadrons joined, Rear
Admiral Strauss. U.S.N., in command.
[4] Same, Rear Admiral Clinton-Baker, R.N., in command.
[5] Flying the flag of the Commander of the Mine Force for the excursion.
[6] Flying the Squadron Commander’s broad pennant for the excursion.
[7] Plus 899 British mines laid in North Irish Channel.
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